i£x ICtbrta SEYMOUR DURST ~t ' ~Fort tiUmw ^4mAerda™ cjr Jt Mtrnhatans IVhen you leave, please "leave this book Because it has been said "Ever'thing comes t' him who waits Except a loaned book." OLD YORK LIBRARY - OLD YORK FOUNDATION Avery Architectural and Fine Arts Library Gift of Seymour B. Durst Old York Library Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2013 http://archive.org/details/alexanderhamiltoOOoliv_0 ALEXANDER HAMILTON ; And in regions far, Such heroes bring ye forth As those from whom we came ; And plant our name Uuder that star Not known unto our North.' Tcthe, Virginian Voyage. —Drayton. ALEXANDER HAMILTON An Essay on American Union BY FREDERICK SCOTT OLIVER I NEW EDITION fVITH FRONTISPIECE AND A MAP G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS NEW YORK 1021 0^5 l«^ TO THE MEMORY OF CHARLES WELLINGTON FURSE WHOSE FRIENDSHIP ENCOURAGED ME TO UNDERTAKE THIS WORK. PREFACE I wish to acknowledge the debt I owe to various friends fl"ho have done me the honour to read the proofs of this ossay. I have not ceased to marvel at their kindness and their patience. Their advice has helped me at many points, and, although their frankness has occasionally been some- what disconcerting, it has been mingled with encourage- ment. As a result I have completed a task which less biased critics may well consider to have been presump- tuously undertaken. In particular I have to thank Miss Mary Stubbert for her valuable assistance ; but at the same time it is necessary to make it clear that she is not to be held responsible for the opinions I have ventured to express on men and events. I am well aware that in several instances she is in dis- agreement with my conclusions. I wish also to thank Mr. William Wallace, who has read and corrected all the proofs for the press, and has compiled the chronological table which will be found on pages 490-4. The references need a few words of explanation. The Works of Alexander Hamilton, in twelve volumes, edited by Senator H. C. Lodge (2nd Federal Edition, 1904), and The History of the Republic of the United States of America, as traced in the Writings of Alexander Hamilton and of his Co- temporaries, in s«ven volumes, by his son John C. viii ALEXANDER HAMILTON Hamilton (1857), are mentioned in the footnotes for the sake of brevity as Works and History respectively. The Life which is quoted is The Life of Alexander Hamilton, in one volume, also by his son (1834). There are several modern lives and studies of Alexander Hamilton — by Mr. John T. Morse, jr., in two volumes (1882); by Senator H. C. Lodge (1886, 'American Statesmen' series); by Dr. W. G. Sumner (1890, ' Makers of America' series); Hamilton and his Contemporaries, by Mr. C. J. Riethmiiller (1864); Alex- ander Hamilton: a Historical Study (1877), and The Life and Epoch of Alexander Hamilton (1879), by Mr. G. Shea. A comprehensive bibliography of the period will be found in the Cambridge Modern History, vol. vii. pp. 780-810. The History by John C. Hamilton is open to all the objections that may be alleged against a life written by a son. It is the work of a vehement partisan. Nothing that Alexander Hamilton did is wrong, and all the deeds of his opponents are as black as ink. But, notwithstanding, it is a book of great value. Of the subject as a man it does not afford a single glimpse ; but it abounds in evidence with regard to his career. It is full of quotations from the letters of friends and enemies, and the abstracts of debates are illuminating. Dr. Sumner's volume, on the other hand, has a considerable interest because it is written from the point of view of the American free-trader, and although the author generously acknowledges the great qualities of Hamilton, he boldly challenges his economic conclusions. Mr. Rieth- milller's book was written during the War of Secession. It is full of sympathy, but arrives at a strange conclusion. Hamilton, in his opinion, would have acquiesced in the dis- memberment of the Union. PREFACE ix it must be frankly admitted that no adequate life of Hamilton has yet been written. His achievements have been chronicled, praised and condemned; but in the case of such a character it is impossible to rest content with an account of his public deeds. Hamilton awaits a true inter- preter, and it is hardly necessary to say that the present volume does not aim at supplying the deficiency. The only vivid account of 'the man' with which I am acquainted is to be found in the historical romance by Mrs. Atherton, entitled The Conqueror. If the writer of a dusty, historical essay may speak without impertinence of the merits of such a work, I should venture to express my admiration for the insight of the authoress. Her pre- sentment of Hamilton, in my humble judgment, is not merely a masterly work of art, but a most serious and truthful portrait. Mrs. Atherton has led us to expect that one day she will give us an authentic life of her hero. I could have wished that she had accomplished her task before I had engaged on mine. At any rate I venture to express the hope, which many others must entertain, that her promise will not remain for long unfulfilled. F. S. O. (Jhkckemdon Court, Oxfordshire, 22nd January 1906. CONTENTS INTRODUCTION, PAGE 3 BOOK I THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES (A.D. 1757-1783) CHAP. I. Boyhood, II. The Quarrel with Great Britain, III. Early Writings, IV. The Beginning of the War, v. The Course of the War, VI. The End of the War, . vii. The Military Secretary, BOOK II THE UNION OF THE STATES (A.D. 1780-1788) I. Political Writings during the War, . H. Congress and the Conduct of the War, ill. Centrifugal Force and its Consequences, IV. Disorder and Anarchy, v. The Power of a Vision, VI. The Convention of Philadelphia, Vii. The Federalist, 11 19 27 33 44 56 68 83 96 111 123 138 147 165 Ill ALEXANDER HAMILTON BOOK III THE FEDERALISTS (A.D. 1789-1791) I. President Washington, II. The Threefold Policy, IIL Hamilton's Difficulties, IV. Secretary of the Treasury, v. The Public Credit, VI. Commerce and the Union, VII. The Stewardship of the Estate, BOOK IV THE DEMOCRATS (A.D. 1791-1794) L Thomas Jefferson, II. The Origin and Growth of Parties, ill. Charges of Corruption, IV. Foreign Dangers, V. The French Revolution and the Declaration of Neutrality, . VI. The Treaty with Great Britain, VII. The Foundations of Foreign Policy, BOOK V THE POLITICIANS (A.D. 1795 1804) I. The End of an Epoch, II. James Monroe, in. John Adams, . iv. The Victory of Jefferson, v. Aaron Burr, . VI. Duel and Death, VII. The Failure of the Democrats, CONTENTS 1111 BOOK VI CONCLUSION CHAP. PAQB i. Some General Remarks, 44! n. Whig or Tory t 448 it i. Union and its Difficulties, 454 iv. Nationality and Empire, 461 v. Commerce under Two Aspects, 466 VI. Sovereignty, . 473 vii. The Duties of Empire, 479 Appendix I., . 489 Appendix II. : Chronological Table, 490 Index, 495 INTRODUCTION But be the worke-men what they may be, let us speake of the Worke; that is; the true greatnesse of kingdoms and estates . rmd the meanes thereof. — Bacon. ALEXANDER HAMILTON INTRODUCTION Englishmen for the most part are not learned in American history. Possibly at the bottom of their neglect lies an opinion that the study would prove more profitable than entertaining, richer in useful lessons and estimable characters than in stirring events and figures of a romantic interest. It is necessary to admit that the whole narrative haa fallen under the suspicion of being somewhat akin to a moral tale, in which persons of Radical and Tory proclivities play the parts respectively of Sandford and Merton, in order that, in the end, democracy and business methods may be glorified in the eyes of men. The wars of Independence and Secession are the only events with which, as a rule, an Englishman pretends to an acquaintance, and when he has stated it as his opinion that the former was a wise resistance to an intolerable oppres- sion, and the latter a humane and heroic enterprise to put an end to slavery, he has usually come to the end of his conversation. It is not the purpose of this essay to ques- tion either of these judgments, but to consider a struggle entirely different in its character, which had its origin in the war with Britain and its sequel in the war between North and South. When peace was signed in 1783 the States had indeed secured their independence, but union seemed even more remote and difficult of attainment than nine years earlier 4 ALEXANDER HAMILTON when the war began. The United States are to-day so firm a political fact that it is not unusual to overlook the critical and dangerous period during which they were disunited. We are apt to imagine that the war was waged against an enemy as compact as ourselves, not against thirteen jealous allies whose only serviceable bonds of union were an aspira- tion towards independence and a common enemy. Another view of the matter has been put forward upon high authority. We have been told that, in the passionate heat of victory, a unanimous and patriotic impulse, working in half-molten metal, wrought and fashioned a noble con- stitution. This statement is dramatic, but untrue. No travesty of the facts could indeed be more complete. The metal was stone-cold, full of cracks and flaws and fissures, when the Convention of Philadelphia, six years later, welded it together. After more than four months of angry debate, the Union was in the end confirmed, but only by a narrow majority, and amid indignant protests. Upon its first announcement, it had many more enemies than friends throughout the continent. For every state claimed a separate sovereignty, and was reluctant to part with any shred of its authority. Only after a long and difficult assault were they persuaded that there would be a greater benefit in the surrender. When the Constitution was at last acknowledged there remained a still more arduous undertaking; for it was necessary to set Government to work, to defend it against the open and covert attacks of the party of disintegration, and to devise a policy which should have sufficient strength and dignity, and hold upon the hearts of men to support the fabric of the Union. In dramatic quality the history of the war is inferior to the course of events after the war had ended. The whole situation becomes more tense. The clash of personal INTRODUCTION 5 forces is fiercer, the action swifter ; motives, principles and tendencies are easier to comprehend. War is always a confusion, filled with irrelevant and distracting excitement. The hero, indeed, is visible, but his subordinates are a part of the spectacle, not actors in a drama. Private character is smothered by discipline or overwhelmed in a single patriotic purpose. On the signing of peace men begin to regain their humanity. Their tongues are loosened. Ideas and counter ideas spring up as soon as the frost-bound repression is relaxed. The interest shifts from the opposition of masses to the visions and beliefs, the rivalries and hatreds, of indi- vidual men. In the Revolution, Alexander Hamilton played no promi- nent part. He was a boy at college when discontent drew to a head, and at the date of the skirmish of Lexington was only eighteen years of age. In the War of Independence his share was subordinate, though it was brilliant and effective. But when the war had ended, he became the master spirit of America. In the great rebellion Washington was the master spirit. In the great struggle to prevent the breaking of the Union, Lincoln was the master spirit. In his fitness for the par- ticular crisis Hamilton was the equal of these men, and it would be hard to find higher praise. In character he was their equal ; in force of will ; in efficiency ; in practical wisdom ; in courage and in virtue. But in a certain sense his greatness surpasses theirs, for it is more universal and touches the interest of the whole world in a wider circle. He was great in action which is for the moment, and in thought which is for all time; and he was great, not merely as a minister of state, but as a man of letters. In constancy it is customary to compare him with the younger Pitt, who was his contemporary. In political foresight and penetration it 6 ALEXANDER HAMILTON is no extravagance to place him by the side of Burke. He shares with Fox his astounding genius for friendship. The end of the eighteenth century was a fertile period. Great men abounded in it. Talleyrand had known them all, and had contended with most of them. He was himself one of the greatest; certainly one of the coolest observers. He cherished few illusions, and it has never been said of him, even by his bitterest enemy, that he suffered his judgment to be duped by his affections. In statecraft he had a wide horizon, and his experience enabled him to make just comparisons. He mentions Hamilton with the greatest of his contem- poraries, even with Napoleon, and mentions him with them in order to place him above them. Hamilton's portrait hung in his study till he died, and on it was an inscription in his own hand, ' that he had loved Hamilton and that Hamilton had loved him.' To subjects of King Edward the history of the Union of the States should be of profound interest at the present time. Under many aspects the problems in America at the end of the eighteenth century and in the British Empire at the beginning of the twentieth bear a startling likeness to each other. In the memoirs of the chief actors we find a frequent echo of our own phrases. The attitudes of men, according to their various temperaments, are the same. There are the same enthusiasms and the same suspicions ; the same vehement desires, indignant against all the race of sceptics ; the same pleas of insuperable obstacles and the imprudence of a rash initiative. A slightly formal and old-fashioned speech enhances rather than conceals the likeness, as the portrait of an ancestor in prim cap or flowing periwig startles the beholder by its resemblance to some familiar youthful face. This romantic influence is not without its danger, and is INTRODUCTION 7 apt to work in our minds with an excessive vivacit} 7 , luring us too readily to the conclusion that history is about to repeat itself. It is well to remember that when the gods arrange the pieces upon their broad chessboard in situations which surprise us by their similarity to the order of some previous game, it is commonly with the whimsical intention of solving the problem in an altogether different manner. Viewed with less excitement, the things themselves lose not a little of their likeness, and important differences appear. We are therefore well advised if we are wary and do not assume too much. To say, at the present crisis, that the study of American history may prove useful and suggestive, is so obvious a reflection that it can only be excused by the almost uni- versal omission to undertake the labour; but to conclude that the Union of the States is a precedent governing our own case would be idle talk. For it is the business of the British people to-day, as it has been for four centuries past, not to follow precedents, but to make them. If it were possible to find among the lives of the nations any parallel to the British Empire, it might be different; but no parallel exists in any records for so diverse and marvellous a growth. One of the chief merits of the Americans when they framed their constitution was their earnest determination to consider the facts of their own case before all else, and their firm refusal to be led blindfold either by history or logic ; and these, perhaps, are the only rules which can be recommended absolutely for every quandary, the only examples which it is safe to follow to the letter. Our eternal warning should be the Chinese tailor who copies a coat even to its patches. When we begin to grope and rummage for precedents, our decadence cannot be long delayed. The situation must be viewed by each race and generation boldly through its own eyes, not timorously S ALEXANDER HAMILTON with a forefinger in the guide-book of history. For though we turn over pages never so industriously to discover how foreigners or our own kinsmen have acted in circumstances somewhat alike, we shall never arrive at any ready-made solution of our difficulty. Nor, on the other hand, is it the highest wisdom to entertain an undue reverence for our own institutions, for though these are an elastic garment, there may come a time when they will no longer serve. It is a vain hope that by cheerfully ignoring danger we shall avoid it. It is rash to assume that a constitution must always grow, and that it can never be made; or that, by spiriting and conjuring over the respectable antiquity of the Privy Council, we shall be able to convert the loose confederation of our Empire into a firm union. BOOK I THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES AJD. 1757-1783 Character it of a stellar and undiminishablt greatness. What others effect by talents or by eloquence, this man accomplishes by some mag- netism. ' Half his strength he put not forth.' His victories are by demonstration of superiority, and not by crossing of bayonets. He conquers, because his arrival alters the face of affairs. ■ Iole ! how did you know that Hercules was a God 1 ' ' Because, 1 answered Iole, 'I was content the moment my eyes fell on him. When I beheld 1 Theseus, I desired that I might see him offer battle, or at least guide 1 his horses in the chariot race ; but Hercules did not wait for a contest ; 1 he conquered whether he stood, or walked, or sat, or whatever thing he 1 did.' Man ordinarily a pendant to events, only half attached, and that awkwardly, to the world he lives in, in these examples appears to share the life of things, and to be an expression of the same laws which control the tides and the sun, numbers and quantities. — Emerson, BOOK I THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES CHAPTER I Boyhood The childhood of Alexander Hamilton ended when he A.D. 1757 was eleven years of age. For four years he was a store- keeper's clerk at St. Croix, in the Leeward Islands; for three he was a college student at New York; for six he was a soldier in the War of Independence. After these experiences, at the age of twenty-five, he was admitted to the bar. His professional career covered a period of twenty- two years ; but during five of these he was Secretary of the Treasury in General Washington's cabinet, and withdrew entirely from practice during the term of his office. He was killed in a duel at the age of forty-seven, when his fame as a lawyer stood at its highest. These are the main divisions of his life; but the bare catalogue gives an incomplete idea of his activity. While he was a student he wrote and spoke so as to produce a considerable influence upon the whole State of New York. While he was a soldier he was also an organiser, a diplo- matist and a writer of despatches that have a world-wide celebrity. From the time he left the army and joined the bar until he became head of the most arduous department of government, his energies were more deeply engaged in promoting the Union of the States than in the practice of 12 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1757 the law. From the date of his retirement from the cabinet until his death he was at the same time leader of the bar and the acknowledged chief of a powerful political party. He was a boy for eleven years only. Perhaps it would be truer to say of him that he was a boy throughout the whole of his marvellous career. For youth was the distinguishing note of his career. His triumph was the triumph of youth: his failure the failure of youth. His personal charm and exuberant con- fidence did not follow the normal course, mellowing in middle life into a genial tolerance, a quieter wisdom, a less vehement but more masterful efficiency. The change was in a contrary direction. He beheld mankind hobbling and hurrying after impossible compromises, striving timidly to keep the peace among their ideas by smiling with an equal favour upon the most irreconcilable and deadly enemies. It is true that under this disappointment his courage never flagged. His efforts were as heroic at the end as at the beginning. But his heart was filled with a fierce impatience and an anger which broke away at times from his control. Like a boy who has dreamed a dream, but cannot prevail with men to accept it in all its glorious symmetry, he came to despair of the consequences to a world containing so much obstruction and so many fools. It is a rare occurrence under popular government for a young statesman to hold the predominant power, for the policy of a nation to be moulded by the thoughts of a fresh and eager mind, and executed by the vigour of a spirit not yet tamed to an immoderate reverence for obstacles. For where the people hold the ultimate control, a patient dexterity, with which no man was ever born, has in the long game of politics an undue advantage. Youth, with a wise instinct, abstains as a rule from conspicuous activity in serious matters until it has acquired the craft which is the THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 13 necessary complement of its force, and when it bursts at A.D. 1757 last upon the admiration of its fellow-citizens, has entered into the shadowless and dusty realm of middle age. This unfortunate exclusion of youth is to be lamented, for age is too considerate of rubbish. Like a housewife in her lumber-room, it shrinks from the wise sacrifice of useless possessions, pleading ever that at some future day they may recover a portion of their former value. The destructiveness and extravagance of youth are in many cases the best economy and the wisest defence of a nation. The perfect government would maintain the balance of youth and age, of confidence and experience, no less carefully than the balance of poor and rich, of force and breeding, of honesty and honour. The embargo on youth impoverishes the quality of statesmanship ; but how to remedy the evil is a problem which still seeks an answer. All that is most excellent in popular government, the wide interest in public affairs, the sense of duty, the pursuit of a worthy ambition, tend to swell the ranks of old age; while each fresh com- plexity of the conditions and growth of the great machine entrenches the veterans more firmly in their advantage. Hamilton was not merely a good soldier, a great lawyer, a statesman of rare and exceptional splendour, but also a figure of deep romantic interest. Such an endowment is uncommon, especially in Anglo-Saxon communities, where a wise absorption in a single activity is approved by public opinion, and any variety of talents is viewed askance. But the explanation of his character is not to be found in the dramatic temperament. Had he been a better actor he must assuredly have been a more successful politician. He was as heedless of all matters of style and deportment as of his popularity, or even of his life. Ever intent on objects, he followed them in and out through the crowd of rapidly changing events, caring infinitely less for the opinion people H ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1757 formed upon his personal merits than for the ultimate success of his pursuit. Few men, filling so large a space in history, have been less concerned with their own particular appearance or fame in the pageant of affairs. He became a soldier upon a generous impulse, a lawyer for a living, a statesman because it was the strongest passion of his nature to promote union, order and progress. The circumstances of his birth and of his death, his private adventures and the publicity that political malice has caused them to assume, cannot by any ingenuity be traced to a disposition for the picturesque. To pretend that he had no joy in battle, no exultation in victory, would be absurd, for his nature was frank and vehement. He was never detached and seldom reticent. To endure human folly in patient and hopeful expectation of the inevitable reaction was contrary to his character. He had no hatred of limelight nor horror of applause, but both with him were secondary matters. Throughout his whole life the paramount motive was to get things done, not to make himself a great fame by doing things. So unusual an ambition has caused him to be suspected of an inordinate subtlety. To the common politician whose main sincerity is his determination to ride into popular notice on the back of a grievance or a fit of hysterics, such an attitude is wholly incredible. He cannot fathom the depths of a spirit that loves union, and order, and progress for their own sakes, and seeks power, not as an end in itself, but as a means to the accomplishment of a vision. And yet, to the candid reader of Hamilton's life and writings, nothing is clearer at every turn than that he came to enact his high and notable part in public affairs chiefly because it seemed to be the only way open to him of getting the work done which he considered essential for the salvation of his adopted country. THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 15 Alexander Hamilton was born a British subject in the A.D. 175V island of Nevis, in the Leeward Group, on the 11th of January 1757. On both sides he was of gentle descent. 1 His father was one James Hamilton, a younger son of Hamilton of Grange, in Lanarkshire ; his mother, Rachel 2 Faucette, the daughter of a Huguenot emigrant. Rachel Faucette had been previously married to a Dane, but finding her life insupportable had left him. 3 Gossip asserts that, divorce having proved to be impracticable, she took the law into her own hands and accepted James Hamilton as her second husband, but without the blessing of the Church. While we cannot accept Alexander Hamilton's illegitimacy 4 to be a matter of certainty, there can be no doubt that it was believed in by his contemporaries, and was made the subject of sneering references in the correspondence of his political enemies. 6 His father was a merchant; an amiable man, but feckless and unfortunate, so that almost from infancy the boy owed his support to relatives of his mother. In the small and leisured society of a sugar island the circumstances of a family can hardly have been a close secret from its neighbours. Even if no stain attached to Hamilton's birth, his poverty and dependence were obvious to all men. He was a boy of strange precocity and a remarkable intelligence, sensitive, affectionate and deeply attached to his mother — a brilliant and beautiful woman who died while he was still a child. In temper he was fiery and passionate, but delicate in frame and puny of stature. With such a constitution of mind and body, and in such circumstances of poverty and dependence, it needed something greater than an ordinary hero to emerge unhurt. The most remarkable fact about his boyhood is the 1 Appendix I. 3 The Christian name is given by Mrs. Atherton, • History, i. pp. 40-43. 4 Lodge's HamMon, Appendix, pp. 285-297- • Sumner's Hamilton^ p. 1. 16 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1769 early development of his character. Before he was sixteen * he had served an apprenticeship to practical affairs in the warehouse, or store, of Nicholas Cruger, a substantial merchant of St. Croix, by whom he was sent to other islands on important business, and left in complete control of the staff, correspondence and undertaking, during the prolonged absence of his master in the Northern colonies. There is a letter 1 of this period to the firm's agent in New York in reference to the cargo and return cargo of the sloop Thunderbolt, which shows more than a mere facility in business forms and phrases. What most impresses us in the document is the careful foresight and arrange- ments of which it forms the record. It is the letter of one who feels his responsibilities, but is not overburdened by their weight. Another letter of an even earlier date has a wider celebrity, but in spite of its precocity of language is of less value as illuminating his character. It is addressed to his school- fellow Stevens. 2 "To confess my weakness, Ned, my ' ambition is prevalent, so that I contemn the grovelling ' condition of a clerk or the like, to which my fortune, etc., 1 condemns me, and would willingly risk my life, though 1 not my character, to exalt my station. I am confident, • Ned, that my youth excludes me from any hopes of ' immediate preferment ; nor do I desire it ; but I mean 1 to preface the way for futurity. I 'm no philosopher, you 1 see, and may justly be said to build castles in the air ; my 1 folly makes me ashamed, and I beg you '11 conceal it ; yet, 1 Neddy, we have seen such schemes successful when the ' projector is constant. I shall conclude saying, I wish there 1 was a war." Here indeed is the accustomed language of the infant prodigy. Both words and sentiments are striking, but they i Work» t ix. pp. 38-39. * Ibid. ix. pp. 37-38, THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 17 are the convention of youthful genius. They reflect a glin A.D. 1769 of the dramatic from the great light of subsequent events ; 12 but are really less remarkable than the quiet, executive letter on freight and accounts, staves, hogsheads, mules, and the armament which is desirable in view of the ' Guarda Costas which are said to swarm upon the coast.' We may believe him to have been sincere in his contempt for ' the grovelling condition of a clerk,' but he soon had reason to bless the results of his service. For a boy loving bocks and conscious of an extraordinary facility in the use of language, there is a constant danger that his intelligence may be brought under the domination of words. At the most impressionable period of his life Hamilton learned the hard lesson that the finest phrases, though they may tem- porarily sway the dispositions of men, will never alter a single fact of their existence ; that the most fluent explana- tion will never wipe out the ill results of a bad bargain, a want of foresight or a misplaced confidence. Through- out the whole of his writings we are conscious of this quality — that he was ever striving to express in language which admitted of no misunderstanding, ideas which he had already brought to the test of things. It is a rare quality in any man, but more than usually rare in lawyers and politicians, never to allow words a part in completing the fabric of an imperfect thought. The experience gained in Nicholas Cruger's store was of great value in itself; but the habit which it imposed upon his mind of going always to the facts was immeasurably beyond all other benefits. With so much knowledge of his temperament and circumstances it is natural to picture an austere youth : courageous certainly, but somewhat bitter and sardonic, narrow in his sympathies, chary of his confidence. But early responsibility failed to give him even a grave face. B 18 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1772 The imaginary portrait is wholly at fault. The real picture shows a boy of a gay and affectionate disposition, bubbling over with hope, naively exulting in the consciousness of his powers, winning friends wherever he goes and keeping them without an effort or a calculation, merely by the charm and sincerity of his spirit. His 'grovelling' clerkship ended and he became a student, as the result of a hurricane. 1 Shortly after midsummer 1772 the Leeward Islands were devastated by a tempest of remarkable violence. Hamilton wrote a description which was published anonymously in the adjacent island of St. Kitts. The principal personages were impressed by its vigorous merits, and the authorship was soon discovered. It was felt that a boy of so great talent deserved to have a chance given him in the world. His proud relatives were not hard to persuade. Their kindness supplied the funds necessary for a college education, and, armed with intro- ductions from his friend Dr. Knox, a Presbyterian minister he set out for New York a few weeks later. The vessel caught fire on the voyage, but the flames being got under she landed her passengers in safety at Boston Harbour sometime in the month of October. Hamilton appears to have directed his course of studies without the aid of any guardian. His first step was to «nter himself at a grammar school where he remaiued for a year. He then presented himself to the head of Princeton College and underwent a private examination. We may presume it was entirely satisfactory, seeing that he thereupon proposed to the principal, and the principal gravely recommended to the trustees, that he should not be fettered by the usual regulations as to years, but should be allowed to pass through the curriculum as rapidly as his progress justified. 2 The trustees not being amenable he 1 £(/>, PP- 6 *nd 7. * Ibid. p. 9. THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 19 entered at King's College (Columbia), which was ready to A.D. 1777 take him upon his own terms. Here he remained for two 18 years, working with an extraordinary swiftness and in- dustry, but finding time notwithstanding for college debates, political pamphlets, the writing of verses and for general society. He appears also to have given much of his time and thought to religion, and, by the testimony of his friend Robert Troup, was an earnest believer in the doctrines of Christianity. The plan of his education was therefore a curious inver- sion. After a training in affairs he submitted himself to an academic course, and the unusual order of events had at least this advantage, that he knew with greater clearness than most students what he wished to learn, and why he wished to learn it. CHAPTER II The Quarrel with Great Britain In the autumn of 1773, within a few months of Hamilton's enrolment as a student at King's College, Boston Harbour was black with tea. He visited friends in that town in the following spring, and returned to New York a convert to the policy of resistance. 1 The true importance of Hamilton is not in the events which led to the great rebellion, but in those which flowed from it. It would therefore be out of place to enter upon an elaborate discussion of the causes of the war; but in attempting even the briefest summary of the situation, we are met at once by the difficulty which arises when popular opinion has accepted and embalmed an explanation which ii not in accordance with the facts. ■ Lyft, p. 25. 20 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1773 ' The Revolution/ it has been said, ' was merely an episode ^ T ' 16 in British history, but it is the American epic.' The early chroniclers of the Republic abounded in pious panegyric. They chanted paeans, and pointed morals, and delivered philippics against tyranny and oppression without check or contradiction; for in England the minds of men were turned away from a distasteful subject to matters of more immediate and absorbing interest. A war which has failed is a dreary topic, and in the events which crowded upon Europe at the end of the eighteenth century, achievements of a contrasting glory were not far to seek. In these propitious circumstances, the crude theory that right lay wholly upon one side, and wrong upon the other, was boldly put forward. So careless were our ancestors in the matter, that the growth of this heroic legend hns had a free course until, in popular discussions upon both sides of the Atlantic, it is now usually assumed to be outside the region of criticism. The world is required to believe that in 1776 the majority of Americans were good men, and the majority of Britons bad ones; that the former were liberal and intelligent, the latter dull and furious ; that the leaders in the one case were disinterested patriots, in the other the corrupt sycophants of a tyrannical madman, and that, in Washington's vigorous words, all loyalists and Tories were merely ■ abominable pests of society.' This opinion in time came to be accepted, like a quack medicine, mainly because it was well advertised. The plain man was captivated by the simplicity of a statement which his intelligence could grasp almost without an effort. Fluent moralists among us, writing with no more serious motive than to celebrate the triumph of their own party principles, found the explanation admirably suited to their purpose, and gave their solemn blessing and approval to the myth which our kinsmen had invented, as Romans before them had devised the legend of THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 21 Romulus, Remus and the she-wolf to adorn the illustrious a.d. 1773 foundation of the city. T " The balance of legal right was almost as plainly in favour of the British contentions as the balance of common- sense was against them. The Supreme Courts of Appeal in this country and the States, sitting in banc for a new trial of the issues involved, would probably be forced to decide, as a matter of law, that upon most of the essential points our ancestors were technically in the right. On the other hand, a jury of men of the world would almost as certainly conclude that imprudence rarely steered a more perilous course or followed it in a spirit less likely to escape ship- wreck. It is difficult to believe that legal right really mattered a great deal to any one. The fundamental, para- mount, determining cause of the war with Britain was the need of getting free from restraint, and this need was realised rather by a kind of instinct than by any reasoning. It drew its main force much more from a vague fear of what might happen in the future than from any material damage or political injury that had actually occurred. As things then stood, the simplest and most obvious way of dealing with the difficulty seemed to the one side to be coercion, to the other side revolt. On the one hand there was a new country, vigorous and remote, possessing enormous resources of which it was at least dimly conscious, eager, hopeful and impatient in pursuit of its destiny; on the other an old, dignified, slow-moving, sceptical people, lack- ing certainly in sympathy, but lacking most of all in knowledge of any circumstances but its own. By the constitution, imperial sovereignty was in the hands of the second, and the real danger of the situation lay in the mixture of sense of duty, selfish interest and ignorance which the British cabinet brought into its attempt to rule over an imnetuous subject at such a distance in time and 22 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1773 miles. But, granting bo much, we may dismiss without • 16 ceremony all the bogeys with corked eyebrows which the patriotism of early American historians has constructed. The evil was hindrance, not tyranny; vexatious, but not ill-meant, delays ; a tendency to strangle colonial ambitions and to impede action by processes and references, cere- monies and forms, by disparaging criticisms and buckets of elder-brotherly cold water. But a settled policy, even serious isolated acts, of tyranny, as tyranny has generally been understood, never did happen and never could have happened. It is impossible to conduct successfully the infinitely less complex affairs of an ordinary business from a centre separated by great distances from its branches, unless the manager be given so free a hand that he becomes in fact the predominant partner within his own sphere. The British king and people failed to realise this essential limitation of their sovereignty. It was no wonder, for no country in the world had ever realised it before them. The essence of the difficulty was never clearly stated by either side, so little was it grasped by reason, so much was it a matter of mere instinct. Americans felt that a free hand was a necessity, and that under existing circumstances they would never obtain it. It seemed to them that they were not understood, which was true, and that they could never hope to be understood, which was probable ; for it was impossible at that date to foresee ocean greyhounds and Marconi installations, and a system of news — truthful, rapid and cheap — which at the present time seems not beyond reasonable hope. When it is a question of preserving or accomplishing a political union, it is time, not distance, that is the great obstacle. The swift interchange of thought and the simultaneous impulses which spring therefrom are even greater forces for binding nations together than are safety and speed of travel to and fro. THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 23 The two nations, therefore, came in the end to a A.D. 1773 desperate struggle, the one side for its independence, the 16 other for its dignity, and being for the most part of the Anglo-Saxon stock, they brought up their batteries and engaged in a solemn and interminable argument on the principles of constitutional law. Beyond sharpening the wits of the disputants and improving the education of their readers, this long-range duel of claims and counter-claims served no important purpose and has needlessly obscured the issue for future generations. In great events it is always well to look for the idea, and the idea in this case was neither legal right nor private rights, was not even freedom, but only independence. The American loyalists or Tories suffered greater evils and showed a finer judgment than either Parliament or Congress ; but as loyalty, like treachery, bears a certain relation to the issue of any struggle, the virtues of these men have rarely received a fit acknowledgment. They failed in their endeavour. The great Washington denounced them in the harsh terms which have been already quoted. The epic required that they should be painted black. Consequently they have been set down for the most part as sordid schemers, and for the rest as unreasoning fanatics moved by a spirit of impossible loyalty. But the motive of the Ameri- cans who stood out against their fellow-colonists was neither a private advantage nor a sentimental attachment. Their aim was the security of an inheritance, and they judged any attempt to sever or divide it to be the greatest of all political crimes. The Empire had been built up with painful effort, and, in their opinion, a people that was worthy of it would have endured, in order to maintain it, much greater sufferings than had ever been inflicted by British statesmen. Oppres- sion and injustice were evils which time would surely abate. The Tories had a settled belief in their countrymen on both 24 ALEXANDER HAMILTON a.d. 1773 sides of the ocean, and foresaw what is obviously the truth, Mt ' 16 that when the temper of the disputants should have cooled, the wrongs and grievances would gradually disappear. They were people of the old school, who considered patience to be the finaj test of national greatness. They had a sound instinct of statesmanship, a memory of the slow movement and ultimate triumph of England under the Tudors ; and they were content, as their ancestors had been content, who lived, and fought, and grumbled under the two Henrys and Elizabeth, to endure obstruction and delay, regarding these things even with a measure of gratitude as a precaution imposed by Providence in order that the mortar might have time to set. They abhorred the idea of a jerry-built nation. The desire of their hearts was a British North America ; the chief of their fears was a foreign conquest, settlement, or intrusion. Foreign interference, as their terrors painted it, has been successfully withstood, but it must be remembered that within a few years of the foundation of the new republic the attempt was made and reached the height of a serious danger. The great majority of the citizens were ready to welcome it. The leaders of the popular party even invited it, and it was prevented only by the efforts of Washington, Hamilton and a few others who were covered with oppro- brium as their reward. But if in one form the disaster of foreign influence has been avoided, almost by a miracle, it is worth considering whether in another the fears of the loyalists have not been to some extent realised. A cosmo- politan America, though they did not foresee the possibility, would certainly have been distasteful to their principles. They did not desire a huge immigration of strange people, and would hardly have accepted the mere predominance of the English tongue throughout the union as a proof that their aim of a British North America had been realised. THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 25 The central idea of these Tories was the preservation at A.D. 1773 all costs of an existing union, and their failure to achieve it was due no less to the raw impatience of their fellow- colonists, than to the blundering management of the British Cabinet, which always pushed things to extremes at the wrong moment. Between these headstrong opponents tnere was no possibility of accommodation. Every act of either party, after disagreement first arose, appeared to the other in lurid colours. The Canadian War had left a legacy of ill-feeling and distrust. The British considered, with some reason, that the colonials had often shirked their fair share of danger and hardship ; that their governments had been niggardly, cheese-paring and ungenerous in the matter of supplies ; that they had created difficulties and sought a profit at a time of national crisis. They argued further that the taking of Quebec and the total expulsion of the French from the north and west of the continent were of much greater benefit and moment to Americans than to Englishmen. The colonies had been preserved from the imminent danger of a French envelopment, their borders had been placed in a position of comparative security from the instigated raids of ferocious savages, mainly by British arms and treasure. As a consequence, the indignant Briton viewed the American as a creature of the blackest ingratitude, canting about his rights, like a fraudulent bankrupt, in order to escape the payment of his just debts. The colonial opinion of the mother country was equally unflattering, and probably equally just The colonists despised the home Government for its lack of foresight, knowledge of conditions and estimate of difficulties. The British officer, who is apt upon occasions to be wanting in tact, had not brought any exceptional qualities of efficiency er resource to reduce the balance of his social imperfec- tions. In consequence, the colonial picture of his patronising 26. ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1773 kinsman represented him as a swaggering bully, bloated " Et * 16 with a fatuous and misplaced self-confidence, who misunder- stood everything and everybody, and by reason of his natural endowment of stupidity, was destined in the nature of things to continue to misunderstand until the end of time. The old country was wounded in its feelings, the new country in its pride, and both doubtless with much reason ; but if all the evil that each thought of the other had been true, it was still entirely unimportant. There are moments in the happiest history of the best husbands and the most perfect wives when the estimate is equally black; but circumstances being favourable, charity, laughter and a true sense of proportion enter in to set the matter right. But in this unfortunate union the circumstances were unfavourable, and time only widened the cleavage. The difficulty was that Britain would not consent to a partner- ship, which was the only solution, but insisted upon a dependency. The American colonists therefore hardened their hearts and would accept nothing short of indepen- dence. Raw feelings alone will never make a great revolution. They are but light and trivial breezes. Blowing with the current they would hardly have raised a ripple, but blowing against it they covered the surface with a thousand white and angry waves, which overwhelmed all the light craft of conciliation and drowned every peacemaker, lay and official. Lord Rockingham, with Burke to find him brains, was as helpless as Lord North. Every act, word and proposal of every negotiation was suspect by the other side. Little things not worth a second thought, the small blunders of obscure officials, old wives' grievances, and the absurd and unintended wrongs done by pompous men, elevated them- selves into national questions, and became the food and THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 27 nourishment of disputants upon constitutional and iesral A.D. 1773 right. **■ 16 We may dismiss the theory of malign intriguers who perverted the judgment and poisoned the affections of the American people. The misrepresentations of Samuel Adams, the craftiness of Franklin, the heroics of Henry, and the phrases of Jefferson, were no more the cause of the rebellion than the obstinacy of George the Third, the pedantry of Grenville, the flippancy of Townshend, the indecency of Wedderburn, or the easy, good-natured facing-bo th-ways of Lord North. We have been inclined to dwell too much upon the defects of individual men and to attribute too great a power to minor influences, which, although they exasperated the combatants, could never have caused the combat and in many instances were merely the external phenomena of a great struggle. CHAPTER III Early Writings By his own account Hamilton started as a loyalist, and was converted to the popular side by his visit to Boston. 1 His sympathies were always aristocratic, and he was born with a reverence for tradition ; but his strongest instinct was for the orderly achievement of a practical end. He was ever quick to make up his mind, and having come to a decision, to take all the steps needful for attaining the objects of his policy. In the month of July (1774) following his matriculation, a great meeting was held ' in the fields ' with the purpose of influencing the vote of New York in the election of 1 Lift, p. 25. 28 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1774 delegates to the first Continental Congress. It was a 17 popular convocation, and had the advantage of a political martyr as its president. 1 The speeches were hearty enough, but, as might have been expected, ignored the most essential points of the argument. Hamilton, instigated thereto by his friends, mounted upon the platform, and supplied the deficiencies. He was a young-looking boy of seventeen, and began with hesitation; but being desperately in earnest, and having a natural gift of expression, he held his audience, gaining confidence as he proceeded. " His mind 1 warmed with the theme, his energies were recovered ; ' and, after a discussion clear, cogent, and novel, of the 1 great principles involved in the controversy, he depicted * in glowing colours the long-continued and long-endured ' oppressions of the mother country ; he insisted on the ' duty of resistance, pointed to the means and certainty of * success, and described the waves of rebellion sparkling 1 with fire, and washing back on the shores of England the 1 wrecks of her power, her wealth, and her glory." * This incident has a great celebrity, and we can well believe it alL But here again we are face to face with the infant prodigy, the same who wrote in his twelfth year to Ned Stevens that ■ his ambition was prevalent.' Our astonishment is less that he should have made such a gifted speech, than that having made it he was ever heard of again. Of a different character altogether from this incident are his pamphlets, which were printed in quick succession between the end of the same year and the midsummer following. Before Christmas he had undertaken the defence of the first Continental Congress against the attack of Dr. Seabury, a clergyman (afterwards a bishop) who wrote under the signature of a ■ West Chester farmer.' Hamilton's 1 Captain Alexander M'Dougal, imprisoned 1770 for seditious libel. • Life, pp. 22-23. THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 29 Full Vindication 1 provoked a reply, and in February there A. P. 1775 came a rejoinder, The Farmer Refuted. 2 He continued to M ^ 18 write upon similar themes in Holt's Journal, and in June he published another pamphlet under the title of Remarks upon the Quebec Bill. 3 These works, although enjoying a considerable fame (they were generally attributed to the experienced pen of Mr. Jay), 4 are not of great importance either as history or literature. But they speak a different language from the infant prodigy, and bear a nearer family resemblance to the letter that dealt with staves and hogsheads and Guarda Costas. There is, of course, a considerable number of words expended upon the texts of slavery and tyranny. The future bishop is well bethumped. The premises are not reasoned but accepted, as we should expect in the case of a boy of eighteen ; but nevertheless, rhetorical exaggeration and turgid general- ities play but a small part. In the first pamphlet the most telling argument is a sober and practical analysis directed to disprove the assertion that Britain had but little, the colonies everything, to lose by such a stoppage of trade as was advocated by Congress. It concludes with a vigorous epistle to the farmers of the New York colony, somewhat in the manner of the Drapier Letters; as simple and direct, almost as hearty in its intolerance, but a few degrees more just in its foundation. In the second pamphlet Hamilton pursued his victim with an ardour whetted on applause. It abounds in bad law, bad history and bad philosophy, but is more than redeemed by an exuberance of common-sense. The cen- tral argument admits the allegiance due by the American colonists to a common sovereign, but repudiates the authority of the British Parliament. A democracy attempting to rule 1 Works, i. p. 4. a Ibid. i. p. 66. » Ibid. i. p. 181. * Life, p. 37. SO ALEXANDER HAMILTON A-D. 1775 over another democracy he holds to be a worse tyrant than Mt ' 18 any autocrat. 1 He deals with the pretensions of the home Government in the first place on the theory of the British constitution, and having established their absurdity by this examination, he next overwhelms them by an appeal to the Natural Rights of Man. Satisfied with his victory in this empty game of battledore and shuttlecock, he proceeds to a technical argument drawn from the charters of the colonies, and concludes triumphantly by denying the rights of Britain to tax her colonists or to legislate for them. He justifies, however, upon the ground of an implied concession, her claim to regulate their trade for the advantage of the empire, and even for her own particular advantage as a return for the protection afforded by her navy. The alternative to a slavish submission is civil war, and accordingly to sustain the confidence of his country- men in such a struggle he describes in a hopeful spirit the boundless resources of the colonies, their indepen- dence of external commerce, their fitness for the peculiar warfare that is likely to be pursued, and paints in the gloomiest colours the difficulties and embarrassments against which their oppressors will be forced to contend. No hope remains in patience and loyalty, in petitions and remon- strances, but only in arms. The discipline of Britain will in the end prove powerless against the patriotism of America, and a favourable neutrality, if not an active interference, on the part of France and Holland, will sustain them in their struggle for freedom. "I earnestly lament 1 the unnatural quarrel between the parent state and the ' colonies, and most ardently wish for a speedy reconciliation • — a perpetual and mutually beneficial union " ; and he protests that he is ' a warm advocate for limited monarchy, and an unfeigned well wisher to the present Royal Family.' ■ » Works, i. p. 81. ' Ibid. i. p. 17$. THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 31 This pamphlet was published early in February. In the a.d. 1775 third week of April the British troops were routed as they T ' withdrew from Lexington, and before the middle of May the strong posts of Ticonderoga and Crown Point had fallen into the hands of rebel raiders under Allen and Benedict Arnold. In June the American militia was defeated at Bunker Hill after a gallant resistance, and George Washington was appointed by the Second Congress to the office of commander-in-chief. Henceforth for many years to come the written word was to exercise less influence than the loaded musket. The Remarks on the Quebec Bill, a short and acrimonious document, whose chief object appears to have been to excite religious prejudice against the British Government for their toleration, or, as Hamilton preferred to allege, their establishment of Roman Catholicism in Canada, marks the ending of his youthful fertility. It was published in the same month th*t saw the battle of Bunker Hill. The pamphlets ceased, and by degrees the speeches ceased also. Hamilton joined a volunteer corps called the Hearts of Oak, drilled early in the morning, and wore a uniform of green, with brown leather facings, and the appropriate motto, Freedom or Death. He turned from constitutional law to the study of strategy and tactics, and had the honour, with his comrades in arms, to draw the first fire of his Britannic Majesty in the colony of New York while engaged in re- moving the guns from the harbour battery. The chronicler, searching for evidence to support his favourite idea of the infant prodigy, has recorded that when H.M.S. Asia, lying at anchor, let off a broadside at her godsons of the Hearts of Oak, " Hamilton, who was aiding in the removal of the 1 cannon, exhibited the greatest unconcern, although one of ' his companions was killed by his ride." 1 We may believe 1 Lift, p. 48. 32 ALEXANDER HAMILTON AD. 1775 it or not as we choose, but such events are at any rate vin- i ® r - 18 favourable to the composition of pamphlets. We hear of him again on three occasions during these months, playing a part which is noteworthy and highly characteristic. For all his love of freedom, his hatred of lawlessness was the stronger passion. Both indeed had their origin in his detestation of injustice and oppression. His fame stood high with the revolutionary party, whose enthusiasm had christened him 'the oracle'; 1 but he did not hesitate to risk his popularity by withstanding the violence of the mob against private individuals suspected of Tory proclivities. There is an element of comedy in the student of King's delivering a lengthy harangue from the College steps in order to give his principal the opportunity of escape to a British ship of war; while, from an upper window, this worthy gentleman, mistaking the object of the address, besought the people who had come to tar and feather him not to listen to his defender because he was ' crazy.' With less success he attempted to prevent the destruction of Rivington's press. 2 It is not without importance that upon the appearance of the first pamphlet Hamilton was approached by the loyalist party with flattering offers of employment if he would transfer his services to the other side. Such proposals must have been attractive not only on account of his youth and poverty, but for the further reason that so many of his sympathies were bound up with the ideas of monarchy and a settled constitution. His prompt rejection of the offer is all the more remarkable, when we remember that it has been the ignorant habit of Democrat historians to write of him as if he had been a pure adventurer, and that even in recent times apologies for his career and appreciations of his character, with equal ignorance and less excuse, have 1 Life, p. 37. a Ibid. pp. 48, 49. THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 33 tacitly assumed the justice of the charge. Only in the most A.D. 1775 romantic sense can Hamilton be termed an adventurer : Mr ' 18 only because he was a young man from a strange land seeking adventures ; never because he sold his sword. A character less mercenary, and less concerned in any personal advancement, save as a means of rendering better service to the state, has never played a part upon the public stage. To the Dugald Dalgettys of history he bore no resemblance save in his courage ; and if we are in search of an analogy we shall find it rather among the knights of the Round Table than among the soldiers of fortune. We cannot deplore the interruption of his pamphleteering ; but, on the contrary, and in spite of the merits of his work in this direction, must judge it to have been most fortunate. Such extraordinary facility, such dangerous precocity, needed the sternest antidotes. In the moulding of Hamil- ton's great character, the counting-house of Nicholas Cruger and the campaigns of Washington were the severest and the best influences, for both called upon him in harsh tones to be certain that his words corresponded with some fact, and were not merely words. The questioning of such experiences will take no denial ; and the man who, possessing high gifts of thought and eloquence, finds himself forced by circum- stances to endure their relentless catechism, may hope to enjoy his reward by escaping for ever from the bondage of phrases. CHAPTER IV The Beginning of the War The War of Independence covered a period little short of nine years, if we reckon it to have begun at the skirmish of 34 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A. D. 1775 Lexington 1 and to have ended when General Washington 18 bade farewell to his officers at Fraunces' Tavern. 2 During the whole of this time there was a military organisation and an army in being. The issue indeed was decided at Yorktown * more than two years earlier. After that event Britain gave up the hope of regaining her colonies and undertook no further enterprises. The maxim which insists upon strategy as a deciding factor in a long and dreary struggle never found a more conspicuous illustration. With bad strategy victories brought no profit, while with good, defeats were matters of but little moment. Strategy may be defined as a wise alliance with circumstances which, in case of success, will follow up the pursuit, and in case of failure will screen the retreat. The strong sense of Washington was incapable of distraction from this consideration either under adversity, of which he had a wide experience, or in good fortune, which occasionally rewarded his devotion. It has been assumed that in the case of the colonists strategy was an easy matter ; that it was obvious, and from the beginning had determined the course of their efforts and the ultimate issue of the war. The Americans had a base of operations in every village, an army in the whole population. Before a British advance the waves parted, as the Red Sea before the army of Pharaoh, only to engulf and overwhelm them. Our own countrymen, on the other hand, had but one base — the sea. Yet when we con- sider the matter, the contest was not so unequal as our apologists have alleged. A population of some two and a half millions sprinkled upon a coastline of twelve hundred miles as the crow flies, or, if we count the great bays and indentations and the extent of navigable rivers, more than twice as much again, must in the end fall a victim to any 1 19th April 1775. 2 4th December 1783. « 19th October 1781, THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 35 great power holding command of the sea. Nothing appears A.D. 1775 more certain than that, had our ancestors maintained their iET- 18 maritime supremacy, the rebellion must have perished of sheer exhaustion. At the critical moment, when the resources of Congress were at their last extremity, naval superiority upon the coasts of North America passed into other hands. What it is also easy to forget is that Britain, as happens from time to time, was at war with the world. France and Spain and Holland were at open war with her. The Baltic States — Russia, Denmark and Sweden — had allied themselves in an armed neutrality. At all points through- out our dispersed empire we were outnumbered and on the defensive. "The Marquis de Lafayette," Washington wrote in July 1780, "will be pleased to communicate 1 the following: general ideas to Count de Rochambeau and 1 the Chevalier de Ternay as the sentiments of the under- ■ written : — In any operation, and under all circumstances, a ' decisive naval superiority is to be considered as a funda- ' mental principle, and the basis upon which ever} 7 hope of 'success must ultimately depend." 1 On land the great captain had done his utmost. Circumstances of hill and river, swamp and forest, farm and desert, had been bound in alliance to his victorious arms ; but for the supreme victory there was need of a general strategy in which the blue ocean played a part. Failing that confederate, the only choice for his wearied veterans and a devastated people was submis- sion to the British Parliament, or some great trek into the prairies of the West. It is not the least of the glories of an imperishable fame that one who was so hot and eager a soldier should have grasped thus coolly and considerately the essential, unalterable condition of final success. * Sparks'* Washington. ~ii. p. 509 36 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1775 At the beginning of the war (1775) the King's army iET * 18 under General Gage held Boston, in Massachusetts. The distinguishing note of this period was a fear on the part of the British to strike hard while conditions were still favour- able to their arms. This fear arose from an ill-grounded hope that the mere display of military strength in a defensive attitude might be sufficient to- overawe and suppress the rebellion without recourse to sterner measures which would, it was thought, add to the difficulties already existing the further obstacle of bitter memories. The centre of disaffection was in the northern states of New England, and the object of King George's Government was to overawe the rebels by pressure on the heart. General Washington received from Congress his commission as commander-in-chief shortly before midsummer. In July he settled down to the siege of Boston. His army, though full of spirit, lacked both organisation and discipline. When he had to some extent remedied these defects, it was discovered that there was no gunpowder. His opponent, on the other hand, commanded a body of troops, as well- trained and courageous as Europe could produce. He was superior in numbers ard well supplied with ammunition. He was not a brilliant man, but had he merely consulted the drill-book and moved his pieces in a mechanical fashion, he must have destroyed the beleaguering army of militiamen. Dulness in a general officer is in itself a serious obstacle ; but when one of that quality is bound by the careless pedantry of instructions, his unfortunate army becomes mere food for bullets. The idea of reconciliation was in the air. The tone of despatches from one of the most incompetent ministers for war that ever sat in a British cabinet filled the slow mind of Gage with a fear of winning a bloody but decisive battle. From the beginning it was an ill-conducted war. Mediocrity appointed mediocrity; THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 37 lectured it to be dilatory; dwelt with a kind of drunken A.D. 17:;. wisdom upon the advantage of building golden bridges; JEr - ]S paralysed it with a fear to strike ; failed to send it reinforce- ments ; from time to time forgot even that it existed ; and only under the cold douche of disaster roused itself to deal out solemn blame. So during the whole of that summer, autumn and winter General Gage sat in Boston, growing more and more uncomfortable, doing nothing, and allowing Washington to drill his men, find gunpowder, and hem him in. As the days began to shorten, an American expedition under Montgomery departed up the Hudson by the lakes George and Champlain to invade Canada. Early in November St. John surrendered to him after a siege of fifty days, and before the middle of the month Montreal was also taken. In September a second column under Arnold set out through the woods of Maine, and after incredible hardships arrived before the Heights of Abraham. Carleton, with a thousand men, held Quebec for the King. Contrary to colonial expectations, the country did not rise at their coming in any enthusiasm for freedom. Possibly there was some lurking suspicion that King Stork would prove a worse tyrant than King Log. Hamilton's eloquent pamphlet against the establishment of Papacy and the applause which greeted it may well have disturbed Canadian minds. The invaders received but scant help. Their two columns joined forces before Quebec, but on the last day of the year Carleton drove back the assault. Mont- gomery, a gallant and noble figure, was killed in the attempt; and Arnold, no less brave, was forced to retreat with great loss and hardship, having gained nothing by the attempt. Meanwhile, Washington was engaged in a great struggle 38 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1775 to make his army effective. Patriotism was prevalent, but ' 18 by no means universal. Corruption, stock-jobbing, and an eagerness to make a profit out of army supplies were matters which stirred his indignation even in the early days of the contest. Congress was inclined to argue, and to make long speeches, and to invoke general prin- ciples of considerable grandeur but no practical utility. It was invested with high duties but meagre powers. All affairs, military and diplomatic, were in its hands ; but as funds, without which duties have little chance of getting themselves performed, depended entirely upon the voluntary contributions of the various States, Congress lacked the right to enforce its will, and had to rely upon moral influence for its supplies. In spite of the danger that menaced them, the states, from memory of British oppression, were deeply con- cerned with a pedantic idea of liberty, and never abandoned an unreasonable suspicion of a strong central govern- ment. Their jealous refusal to delegate power or to part with any of their individual rights, even to a congress elected by their own citizens, was the cause of more disasters to their arms and more embarrassment to their leaders than all the assaults of the enemy. Their prejudice against a regular army was ineradicable. They sought to preserve the superiority of the civil power over the military by a system of short enlistments that regarded four months as the proper term of service, and a year as justifiable only in circumstances of extreme emergency. To make the task of the commander-in-chief quite beyond the wit of man, Congress, in its anxiety to conform to this general idea of political liberty, decreed that a want of discipline should not be punished without the consent of the state to which the delinquent had the honour to belong. THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 39 The Second Year of the war (1776), despite the failure of A.D. 1776 the Canadian invasion, opened gloomily for the British. Their Ml! - 19 stolid occupation of Boston had entirely failed to win over colonial opinion, or to daunt the rebellious spirit of the New England states. Sir William Howe had succeeded General Gage. Easy, indolent and good-humoured, he was entirely lacking in the quality of swift decision. Like his elder brother, the distinguished admiral, he was a friend of Benjamin Franklin's. He had much sympathy with the colonial grievance, and was appointed partly on his merits as a soldier, partly with a vague idea of conciliation. It is always dangerous to attempt a combination of these func- tions while victory hangs in the balance. Early in March Washington, having organised and in- creased his army, occupied Dorchester Heights and com- manded the British position. A fortnight later Sir William, finding his lines untenable, embarked the troops and sailed to Halifax, where, until June, he waited for reinforcements which had been promised but never came. Washington, foreseeing that the next move of the British must be against New York, marched southwards, arriving in that city towards the middle of April. The British general, holding the absolute command of the sea, determined, as had been foreseen, to occupy New York and to make it the base of operations for his main army. Between Boston and New York, as strategical positions, no hesitation was possible ; for the latter city, commanding the mouth of the navigable waterway of the Hudson, was immensely superior. Moreover, it was to a large extent a friendly city, full of rich and respectable Tories. But although from a purely military point of view the exchange was profitable, the loss of Boston was in the political aspect a damaging blow to British prestige. It filled the raw colonial troops with confidence in themselves 40 ALEXANDER HAMILTON i.D. 1776 and in their leader, and relaxed that pressure upon the 19 heart of the rebellion which had been rightly judged of high importance by the King's Government. For the moment Britain was at peace with the rest of the world, and providing she could have kept the flames under and conserved her authority among the colonists, there was no immediate menace of foreign attack. Holding an absolute command of the sea, it seems as if her right strategy would have been to strain every nerve for the provision of enough troops to seize and hold the great towns along the coast — Boston in the north, Charleston in the south, New York commanding the mouth of the Hudson, Philadelphia the estuary of the Delaware ; from these stroug positions upon a common base, the sea, to have pressed and strangled the revolution by a grinding occupation, to have discouraged its forces by frequent expeditions, and to have worn down resist- ance by sheer exhaustion of funds. When we remember how nearly the revolt came to failure from lack of money on more than one occasion, and even when in a military view affairs wore a fortunate appearance for the colonists, we can hardly resist the conclusion that had the war been directed at its beginning in the grand manner of Pitt instead of by the diffidence of Lord North, if the advantage of sea-power and of the long purse had been fully realised and used with intelligence and without mercy, neither the genius of Washington nor the devotion of his troops could have secured independence for the allied states. But no nerves were strained. Energy and intelligence did not exist. Sir William Howe, disappointed of reinforce- ments and paralysed by dilatory instructions, sailed towards midsummer for New York and established himself at Sandy Hook and Staten Island. On the 4th of July an eloquent document, drafted by one Thomas Jefferson of Virginia — a ready penman but a shrinking antagonist — was issued to THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 41 the world. The Declaration of Independence was a useful a.d. 17 -e assertion, for t it had a dramatic quality which stirred men's iET * 19 hearts. A few days later Admiral Lord Howe arrived with an addition to the fleet and reinforcements for the army, bring- ing powers to offer pardon and amnesty, which unfortunately the evacuation of Boston and the enthusiasm excited by the famous Declaration had shorn of all hopes of success. The failure of an expedition against Charleston brought the forces who had been engaged in it back from the south. Sir William Howe accordingly found himself in command of some twenty-five thousand men with a fleet in support excellent in itself and admirably officered. Against him were thirty thousand American levies. Washington held New York. A part of his army, five thousand strong, was in August entrenched at Brooklyn, in Long Island, separated from the city by a sea channel a mile in width. On the 27th the British general attacked and inflicted a severe defeat upon his opponents, who lost two thousand men. But, fearing great bloodshed and a crowning victory, he failed to storm the trenches. His delay allowed, or tempted, Washington to bring up more troops, making his effective total nine thousand combatants. It was a mistaken policy, which with a swifter antagonist must have resulted in ruin. But Sir William, though a sound man, was leisurely, and by the time he had matured his plans, the prompt action of the American general had rendered them fruitless. The obvious measure was to make use of the fleet and cut the nine thousand off from the mainland. While Sir William was considering this excellent method Washington realised his danger. A fog fell oppor- tunely, as in some Homeric contest, and under the protec- tion of the gods the colonial troops withdrew in good order, and unmolested, across the dividing arm of the sea. It was *2 ALEXANDER HAMILTON *.D. 1776 a masterly performance, and atoned for the bad judgment which had incurred the risk. Washington realised that New York could no longer be held. On military grounds he desired to burn it, but political considerations rendered this course impracticable. About the middle of September Admiral Howe forced his way up the Hudson, threatening to cut off the American army who found themselves obliged to evacuate the city and to retreat up the east bank of the river. But General Howe was dilatory and made no effective pursuit. A month went by, during which the colonial army dwindled to twelve thousand men. In the middle of October the fleet forced its way still further, past forts and obstructions, causing Washington to retreat to White Plains, where he took up a strong position. Sir William, without undue haste, attacked him towards the end of the month and drove him, but in good order, out of his entrenchments. Again there was delay, and after- wards a spell of unpropitious weather which induced the British commander to withdraw. A few days later he successfully attacked the American forts on both sides of the river, capturing two thousand men and a large store of munitions. Under this heavy blow Washington withdrew to the west bank of the river, and, during November, with a rapidly shrinking army, was pursued by Cornwallis south- wards across New Jersey; but always without disorder or defeat. In the early days of December he arrived at Princeton with barely three thousand ragged men, and the British troops at his heels. Finding his position impossible, he crossed the Delaware river, destroying behind him all the boats for many miles along its course. The population wavered, and many of them came in seeking the royal pardon. Congress was helpless, though still loquacious. Considering Philadelphia, where they sat, to be in serious danger of capture, they departed to Baltimore. Their fears, however, THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 43 were groundless, for to a commander like Sir William A.D. 1776 Howe the difficulties of transport through an unfriendly ^ T " 19 country, m the depth of winter, presented too great an obstacle. It was the fate of the British general to nourish himself upon text-book probabilities and the phrases of war. He appears to have concluded, upon the best possible grounds, that the American army had dissolved. Accordingly, with- drawing a great portion of his troops to comfortable winter quarters in New York, he left a long, straggling line of posts parallel to the Delaware. Washington may have harboured illusions contrary to the teaching of the Pundits, but he had the great gift of turning them into realities. With small thanks to Congress he brought his ragged and bootless army up to the strength of six thousand men, and planned an elaborate attack at different points upon the extended British line. But he reckoned without his generals, and to a certain extent without natural obstacles. Gates, Ewing, Griffin, Putnam, Cadwalader, some for good reasons and others for bad, all failed him, and he went with his lonely column across the Delaware on a bitter night. With less than twenty-five hundred men he marched, after the arduous crossing, nine miles through darkness, with a sleet-storm driving in his face. As he approached the village of Trenton, held by Hessians, word reached him that the arms of his right flank were wet. He sent them word 'to use the bayonet, for the town must be taken.' At Christmas daybreak he stormed, took two thousand prisoners, and re- turned whence he came. The alarm reached New York, and Cornwallis, the ever- vigorous, sallied out to inflict punishment. Leaving three regiments at Princeton he pushed on against the enemy, who had again crossed to the east bank of the river. 44 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1776 But Washington, evading the rush, slipped past him, and " Et# 19 cut to pieces the three regiments left behind at Princeton. Upon this unlooked-for event Sir William judged it wiser to leave the line of the Delaware and concentrate his main army for the winter in New York. The colonists, dispirited by the autumn reverses, were now filled with new courage, and the task of withdrawing the British posts was none too easy. It was a gallant campaign, and from the political stand- point something even greater. In the severest weather, with starved and ill-clad troops, absurdly inferior in num- bers, and depressed by the memory of many months of defeat, Washington twice within a few days succeeded by the force of his great will in concentrating his small column in superior strength and destroying his enemy unawares. The mobility of footsore men in wintry weather is a contingency that text-books dealing with average conditions are justified in ignoring. But as Britons we must concede that there is a contrast not wholly in our favour between Sir William Howe, comfortably eating his Christmas dinner by a warm fire in New York city, and this calm American, undeluded and undismayed, deaf equally to false hopes and to despair, who, realising that the thing most necessary to his country at the moment was victory, lifted his weary militia through the snow and won it. CHAPTER V The Course of the War In January (1777), at the beginning of the Third Year of the war, Washington took his troops into winter quarters at Morris town, keeping close watch upon New York, where THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 45 all the British regiments lay huddled together, after their A.D. 1777 evacuation of New Jersey. " Et * 20 By March his five thousand men had again dwindled to three thousand under the hardships of famine and an ill- equipped camp. Congress did little to support his arms beyond passing resolutions that victories ought to occur. It intermeddled, making unfit military appointments, and giving commissions to foreigners flown with European tactics and personal complacency. 1 Boots and stockings, food and great- coats, even muskets and gunpowder, were sadly wanting. In May, having collected seven thousand men with much difficulty, and mainly by his personal exertions, Washington broke up his cantonments. Sir William Howe's plan of campaign was re-formed partly upon his own experience and partly by help of the valuable suggestions which packet boats brought him from the War Office. His main army was to take Philadelphia for its objective, and he formed the intention of marching upon that city through New Jersey. From Canada an expedition under General Burgoyne (a gifted and fashionable soldier with a reputation for wit, who had passed over the head of Carleton, in spite of the merit which attached to that officer's defence of Quebec) was to force its way south by Lake Champlam and the Hudson river. A junction was to be made with Sir Henry Clinton, who, according to the arrangement, was to sally out from New York. The objective of this combination was the isolation of the disaffected New England states. This part of the plan was arranged between Burgoyne and Lord George Ger- maine, the Secretary of State for War, and was not even communicated to the British commander-in-chief until he was committed to his southern movement. Two figures in this war occupy a unique position : Washington, because it has never been possible to praise 1 Hamilton to Duer, History, i. p. 431. 46. ALEXANDER HAMILTON A. D. 1777 him beyond his merits; Germaine, for the reason that ^t- 20 no blame has ever done justice to his incompetency. A nation can only expect humiliation when, regardless of its interest and its honour, it entrusts its War Office to a soldier of battered reputation, incapable of transact- ing the simplest business with industry and despatch. If a layman may presume to offer an opinion upon such high matters, it would be that the Canadian expedition was singularly futile in its design, and was based upon a mis- apprehension of books rather than upon any understanding of the facts. For Burgoyne's column was, as the saying is, ' in the air.' It was obliged to carry its supplies, and could never have hoped to hold any lines of communication. When it had passed on its way, except for a certain devasta- tion, it might as well never have been there. It is only dream-strategy which attempts to cut off a province by drawing a line which is immediately rubbed out behind the pencil. The Hudson river was a different matter. There was a possibility of holding that waterway, and thereby making a division that it would have been difficult for the colonists to obliterate. But to such an end, concentration of the whole British army was necessary. For this purpose Bur- goyne was wanted at New York, not at Ticonderoga ; and Sir William Howe, having regard to the smallness of his total force, had no business to be thinking of Philadelphia. But the strategy was arranged from home. That in itself was an evil of the first magnitude; but having been so arranged, it was essential that it should have been firmly imposed upon the generals who were to carry out the campaign. This was omitted, although Germaine appears at one time to have realised the necessity of clear orders and afterwards to have forgotten. A letter directing the British commander-in-chief to operate upon the Hudson so as to THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 47 support Burgoyne was actually written; but the Secre- ad. 177T tary for War refused to sign it because no copy had been JE,T - 2° taken, and being committed to a holiday in Kent, he would not wait until this omission had been rectified. The letter was never sent, and Sir William Howe, who, with many merits, lacked a swift intelligence, was left to guess at the meaning of a plan made by other people. In the third week of July, General Howe, judging it impracticable to march south upon Philadelphia with Washington hovering upon his right flank, put his troops into transports and rounded Cape May into the estuary of the Delaware. But finding himself confronted with forts and other difficulties, he put about and sailed away to the south, round the Capes of Delaware, up the long Chesapeake Bay to the Head of Elk, where he finally disembarked. His expedition had occupied more than a month, and it was now near the end of August. As the result of much seafaring the indefatigable traveller was nearly as far from Philadelphia as when he started, and the army of Washington was hovering on his left flank instead of on his right. He was separated from his base at New York by a hundred and forty miles or thereabouts of hostile country (measuring as the crow flies); or, if it were a question of returning as he came, by some four hundred and fifty miles of sea. Washington on the easy interior lines had moved his army south to Germantown with the idea of defending Philadelphia. On the 11th of September the British army in superior numbers defeated Washington at the Forks of the Brandy- wine and opened the way north to Philadelphia, which they occupied towards the end of the month, after fighting another, but smaller, engagement, in which they were also victorious. Sir William then divided his army. One portion held 48 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A D. 1777 Germantown, while the other attempted to reduce the Sa ' 20 American forts which surrounded the mouth of the Dela- ware. Washington, undismayed by his ill-luck, brought up his army, now diminished to eight thousand men, to the attack of Germantown. It is probable that with seasoned troops and favourable weather he would have been successful. Fortune favoured him to begin with, but a mist fell (not opportunely, as at Brooklyn) which confused and misled his officers. A panic ensued, and he suffered a severe defeat. What is remarkable about the performance is the tenacity it displays. With a raw army he had suffered two defeats and lost the city which it had been his object to cover; but a little more than a fortnight later he had inspired sufficient spirit in his men to attack his victorious enemy in its lines. Beaten once more, he withdrew un- dismayed to prepare for further operations. Partly, no doubt, it was the personal qualities of the man, but partly also the wise alliance with circumstances which the British had disdained, but which Washington had priced at its true value. In spite of victories Sir William Howe was ever unable to pursue. Burgoyne had moved from Canada shortly after mid- summer with three thousand regular troops and five hundred Indians, and had recaptured Ticonderoga with stores and guns during the first week of July. But Clinton at New York had found himself too weak to venture within striking distance to support the expedi- tion, which was slowly struggling south through swamps and forests with a heavy train of artillery, baggage, and supplies ; harassed by a multitude of invisible foes in camp end upon the march. In the middle of October all Washington's anxieties for the safety of the New England states were brought to an end by the surrender of Burgoyne with between three and THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 49 four thousand men to a force five times his number at a.d. 1:77 Saratoga, thirty miles to the north of Albany, and about a 20 hundred and eighty from New York. The full consequences of the surrender at Saratoga can hardly have been clear at once even to the sagacious mind of the American commander-in-chief. It was one of those small battles which are remarkable in history for having changed the whole face of a situation. It secured the northern states from any serious attack; raised the con- fidence of the American army, Government, and citizens ; depressed in equal proportion the spirits of their enemy; dislocated his plan of campaign, and endangered the posi- tion of his main army at Philadelphia by releasing large reinforcements. These were the obvious results, but also the least important. Up to this *>ime Britain had not only held com- mand of the sea, but had enjoyed complete immunity. She could carry her troops to and fro along the coasts wheru and when she liked. A few frigates were sufficient pro- tection against American privateers. The immediate effect of Saratoga was to menace this invaluable security. The ultimate efiect was to destroy her naval superiority in those waters, and by this means to bring the war to a disastrous ending. An alliance with a great sea power was, from the point of view of the states, the most important object of diplomacy, and Saratoga is a memorable battle chiefly because it was the direct cause of such an alliance. The neutrality of France had no tinge of benevolence for Britain. The ministers of Louis xvi. were watchful and jealous. The loss of Canada and the triumphant adminis- tration of Pitt were memories which still rankled. Under a thin veil of private adventure France had sought from the beginning to furnish the rebellious colonists with the sinews of war. She Vad regarded with a favourable eye the enlist- D 60 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1777 ment of her subjects as volunteers. But the prestige of her T " ancient rival was as yet unshaken. France was willing to comfort the enemies of the King of England, but her policy stopped short of open war. For this step more was requisite than the Bourbon alliance. The revolutionary states must first give some signal proof of their superiority. In the surrender of Saratoga she found a justification for bolder measures. Britain thenceforth was no longer engaged in a purely domestic warfare with her rebellious children, but had to defend herself also against two great European powers — France and Spain. Towards the end of November, Sir William Howe had taken the forts upon the Delaware, and his supporting fleet had safe access to the estuary. In the beginning of De- cember he made preparations for a forward movement against the American army, but nothing came of it, and Washington retired unmolested into winter quarters at Valley Forge. If the results of a campaign could be measured by the comfort of the adversaries when it has ended, or even if it bore any fixed relation to the number of victories won in the field, the British general would have had good reason for complacency. But the hard order of facts ignores these minor considerations. It was probably clear even to Sir William Howe, amiable, courteous, liberal, but a frank hater of all arduous affairs, that the starved and shiver- ing regiments in the hills fifteen miles away were the real victors, although he lay pleasantly at Philadelphia with his fleet anchored in the Delaware under silenced forts. A.D. 1778 At the beginning of May (1778), in the Fourth Year of the war, the French alliance became known and was eagerly welcomed in America. A fortnight earlier, Admiral d'Estaing had set sail with twelve ships of the line, his total force both THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 51 in numbers and weight of armament being greatly superior A.D. 1778 to the fleet serving under Lord Howe. But his voyage was 21 performed with all the deliberation that had marked British enterprises on land. He had no luck with the elements, nor much skill. It took him twelve weeks to arrive. Meanwhile it had been arranged that the Howes, upon their own request, were to be relieved. They heartily dis- liked the job, and they disliked even more the ministry under which they had the honour to serve. Sir William was superseded by Sir Henry Clinton before the middle of May. The stout old admiral should shortly have followed his brother home, but as he was on the point of handing over his command, news reached him of d'Estaing and his superior fleet. In such circumstances he let his resignation wait over. Also in the month of May (though for all the effect that came of it 'tis hardly worth mentioning) commissioners arrived, appointed under the Conciliatory Bills — Lord Carlisle, Eden, and Johnstone — to offer concessions and accommodations. But as the Americans, bound by the terms of their alliance with France, demanded the recognition of their indepen- dence, or the withdrawal of King George's troops as a preliminary to all negotiations, nothing but some delay was the result — delay hurtful to Britain, having regard to d'Estaing, who was approaching with his superior fleet. A few days before midsummer, Clinton evacuated Philadelphia, and started to march northward, through New Jersey, to his base at New York — none too early, for d'Estaing was already much overdue. Lord Howe, in his cool, workmanlike manner, unperturbed by the British Govern- ment's neglect to reinforce him, or even to send him word of the sailing of the French admiral (such oversights he appears to have taken with resignation, as he did gales, shoals, and tides, and the other natural hazards and condi- tions of his service), got on board his transports all the 52 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1778 stores and supplies and sailed for New York, arriving there Mi. 21 w ithout misadventure. Clinton was less fortunate. He had been compelled to return north with his army by land, for the reason that his ships afforded barely sufficient accommodation for the large numbers of loyalist refugees whom it was considered unsafe to leave to the tender mercies of Congress. His force num- bered ten thousand. Against him were thirteen thousand colonials, who hung upon his left flank and threatened to envelop his rear. On June 28 Washington sent orders to General Lee, who commanded the advanced division, to attack the British at Monmouth Court-house. But Lee was a thoroughly in- competent soldier, and evidence has come to light in recent years which raises the suspicion that he was also a traitor. 1 He hesitated, expressed grave doubts and found delay wiser than action. Cornwallis, realising the danger, pushed forward his baggage, and came to the aid of the rearguard. Being met by no attack, he proceeded with his usual prompt valour to deliver one. Lee thereupon ordered a general retreat. It was a day of excessive heat, when the astonished Washington, riding forward at the head of his main army, encountered a string of fugitives. They were ignorant of any reason for their flight except that it was by order. With the aid of his staff, the rout was checked and the battle re-formed. Cornwallis was driven back, the lost ground recovered, and the exhausted troops bivouacked on the field. The British had lost a rearguard action, but the Americans had lost the opportunity of a crowning victory. By the following morning Cornwallis had withdrawn, and Clinton's army was safe, if not from effective pursuit, at least from annihilation. A grateful tradition has so recklessly transformed the 1 Fiake's American Revolution, i. pp. 300-306. THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 53 character of Washington that he has become a kind of A.D. 1778 mechanical monster stuffed with incredible copy-book T * 21 headings, strangely unlike the altogether human and passionate hero that he was in fact. At Monmouth Court- house on that blazing, winking, dusty afternoon, the com- mander-in-chief received the report of his subordinate. A blast of pale anger, a terrific eloquence of unprintable scorn, and General Lee vanished from all part and promi- nence in the war. After a feeble recovery of the spirits, a few months of inglorious notoriety, some bursts of impu- dence and muttering discontent, he faded utterly out of the knowledge of men. Sir Henry Clinton's retreat had cost him fifteen hundred men by the time he reached the southern shore opposite Staten Island. Here he put his army on board Lord Howe's transports, which having disembarked their passengers in safety had now returned across the bay to his assistanca By the end of the first week in July he was safe in New York, but only in the nick of time. The British admiral, unlike his adversary, had been fortunate as well as skilful. Having secured the army, he prepared to encounter d'Estaing, who commanded a fleet of double his numbers and more than double his armament. The episode of which this gallant and good- tempered gentleman was the hero is one of the few in the history of the American War to which the British nation can look back with unmingled satisfaction. He disposed his small fleet in so masterly a fashion across the entrance to New York harbour that d'Estaing judged him, after a careful reconnaissance, to be unassailable, and towards the end of July moved to Rhode Island, a hundred and fifty miles to the north, where a colonial force under General Sullivan was endeavouring to drive the British out of Newport. 1 1 Mahau, Types of Naval Ojficen, pp. 276-284. 54 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A..D. 1778 But on the 9th of August, to the bewilderment of the iEx * 21 allies, the British fleet appeared off the entrance to Narra- gansett Bay. Lord Howe had received reinforcements, which brought his strength in numbers up to about two- thirds of the French. The adverse balance, in his opinion, might be redressed by seamanship, and in this he rightly believed himself to hold an easy superiority. The British had lost command of the sea, and so long as he should lie at anchor in New York harbour, the allies had gained that inestimable advantage. The best he could hope for with so inferior a force was to produce a deadlock in which neither party held a clear predominance. His unforeseen arrival and daring menace drew the French admiral in pursuit. After two days during which Lord Howe skilfully manoeuvred in the open sea, a gale sprang up which separated the two fleets and inflicted so great damage upon d'Estaing that he considered it impera- tive to retire to Boston, fifty miles further north, to refit. Upon this General Sullivan was obliged to withdraw, which he did in high dudgeon, relieving his wounded feelings in indiscreet and bitter criticism of his faint-hearted ally. Colonial opinion echoed these hot opinions, so that it needed all the cool tactfulness of Washington to prevent the prophecy of Chatham coming true, and the ' unnatural alliance which had been welcomed with such fervid en- thusiasm from falling hopelessly to pieces. D'Estaing sailed for the West Indies early in November, and his departure gave back the command of the sea to Lord Howe's successor. Under favour of this condition the British pressed an attack in the southern states, cap- turing and holding the town and harbour of Savannah. The Fifth Year of the war (1779) lacked the excitement of great events. The want of French co-operation until the THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 55 late autumn produced a deadlock. In the chief seat of a. P. 1770 the war, the state of New York, Washington did not feel iET - ~ 2 himself strong enough to attack the British lines, while Clinton was too weak to push his army into the open and risk a pitched battle in a hostile country. For the first time since the beginning of the war, winter had passed without famine or excessive privation among the colonial troops. But Congress had less credit for this result than the increased authority of the commander-in- chief and the disastrous experience of previous years, which even the state governments who held the purse-strings were driven to respect. Congress was in fact as bankrupt as ever of executive powers, and still more bankrupt in the matter of capable men. For the need of officers had drawn many away, while foreign missions had found more congenial employment for others. The finances of the country were in a most melancholy state of exhaustion ; while profit-making and corruption took a heavy toll upon the meagre funds. ' Speculation and peculation.' in Washington's phrase, were deadlier enemies than the fleets and armies of King George. In such circumstances a campaign of passive resistance, upon which Washington had determined, placed a severe strain upon the spirits of his dwindling army. In the spring the British operations were confined to a series of raids which have raised the usual cloud of charges and countercharges of barbarity which are incidental to the nature of such a plan of campaign. Where the devastation of homesteads is the deliberate policy of a commander, the argument of expediency will not wipe out bitter memories, whether the general be British or American— Clinton in New Jersey or Sherman in Georgia. In June the British showed an inclination to extend their posts along the Hudson. Forts were captured 56 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A. P. 1779 and recaptured, occupied and demolished, but no events w " happened which gave a decided advantage to either side. Washington turned a deaf ear to all heroic advice, and steadily pursued his weary strategy of squeezing Clinton back into his lines as often as he showed a disposition to move out of them. Re turned an equally deaf ear to the cries of Congress for a more ferocious retaliation in the matter of the raids. He knew his own business and the nature of war. Considering he was but a plain country gentleman and a soldier, he also understood with marvellous insight those orators and journalists, drunk with the rumours of outrage and atrocity, ignorant of warfare and by temperament averse from it. He rated the value of their counsel at a price that was unflattering, and the opinion of the army supported him in his clemency. As was but natural, there were strong murmurs against the French. For ten months the alliance had lain dormant. The sea-power of Britain was as absolute as it had been in the early years of the war. On the 1st of September, however, d'Estaing reappeared off Savannah, which was still in British hands. In co-operation with the Ameri- can besiegers he delivered an attack which was repulsed. During October he sailed away with the greater part of his ships for France, so that even the menace of a superior hostile fleet in the West Indies was withdrawn, and Britain resumed her command of the sea. CHAPTER VI The End of the War In the early days of the Sixth Year of the war (1780) the outlook of the American States seemed as hopeless as in the THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 57 black autumn of 76. Men suffered less, or at any rate felt a.d. 1780 their sufferings with a duller ache, but no excitement would JEr - 2S have been so dangerous as the weariness that was hanging on their shoulders. It seemed to them as if, in spite of all their valour and devotion, in spite of the capacity of their leader and the success of his strategy, in spite even of their superior numbers, more earnest spirit, and the advantage of a well- known and friendly country, they were after all about to be crushed by the sheer weight of an enemy who, possessing boundless resources, would neither budge nor yield. Their treasury was as dry as a summer sandbank, and foreign loans were hard to come by. Congress was sometimes hysterical, often absurd, and always impotent. It passed resolutions, gave much advice to the commander-in-chief, and sat for ever whistling for a wind. The state governments were filled with jealousy, spleen and suspicions, by no means groundless, one of another. They were incapable equally of effective co-opera- tion and of delegation of their petty sovereignties to the hands of a federal power. The Army, under ill treatment and neglect, was dwindling, and had even become mutinous. The people had comforted their sad hearts with a splendid alliance, but the nuptials were barely concluded when, like the citizen's fashionable wife, the partner proved gadding and unprofitable. The British enemy remained in stolid occupation of the chief commercial city ; and in this com- manding position, which enabled them always to menace injury, and often to inflict it, they remained unassailable so long as they held command of the sea. In the early weeks of the year the royalist army in the south, reinforced by sympathisers among the American citizens, and led by Sir Henry Clinton himself, was vigorously pushing on the siege of Charleston with good prospects of success. The feeling of discouragement was not only excusable as a 58 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1780 weakness of human nature, but was grounded in the very iET - 23 facts of the situation. Had the British government been willing to risk some bold stroke of magnanimity, had it acted with more astuteness and greater energy, or had there arisen some statesman of the mettle of the elder Pitt, suddenly awakening the slumbering spirit of patriotism among the people, we feel that, even at the eleventh hour, our ances- tors might still have turned the tables on their adver- saries and prevented the disruption of the empire. The faults of King George the Third have been conceded with a liberal hand, and are written large in every schoolbook of history. It is but due, however, to his memory to recognise that, although the beginnings of the quarrel may have been owing in great measure to his defects of judgment and of temper, he stood alone among his ministers, and all but alone among his subjects, in the possession of that spirit and pride of duty that made the strength of Washington and his ragged army. In April Lafayette returned from France bringing news of a French fleet and army to sail without delay. Washing- ton thereupon turned his mind to plans for a joint attack upon New York, and to the alternative scheme for a com- bination against the enemy in the south. But on May 12 Charleston, hitherto deemed impregnable, was stormed and captured by Clinton, an achievement which deserves high praise for its skill and daring. His losses were but two hundred and fifty men, and with this small sacrifice he secured the town and harbour, and took six thousand prisoners and four hundred guns. Having secured his conquest, he left Cornwallis in command in the south, which now lay open to invasion, and returned to New York. Washington held grimly to the Hudson river, and awaited the coming of the French forces. Towards the middle of July an army of five thousand THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 59 men under Rochambeau, and a small fleet with seven ships A.D. 1780 of the line under de Ternay, arrived once more off Rhode Island, bringing intelligence of a larger fleet that was to follow. Their arrival was welcome ; but the orders of the French Government that no important enterprises were to be undertaken until the promised reinforcements should appear produced much heartburning. Weeks went by, and then word came that the second fleet lay in Brest Harbour blocked by a British admiral. Under this disappointment the heads even of good soldiers and citizens began to swim, and the mouths of men were full of contradictory reasons for resting from the struggle. Some drew attention to the empty treasury ; others to the fact that the French had now come; others, again, demonstrated convincingly that the British were worn out, and as good as beaten already. August saw the army on the verge of dissolution. But Washington, as ever, was calm, industrious and determined ; writing with suppressed passion to Congress ; inspiriting his troops ; reasoning with men by letter and speech, and succeeding somehow in keeping things together. September was a black month for the Americans. Corn- wallis in the south with two thousand men utterly de- feated their army, over three thousand strong, at Camden, under Gates, the conqueror of Burgoyne. Washington returning from a meeting with Rochambeau learned of the treachery and flight of General Arnold commanding at West Point. Meanwhile the army watching New York starved and became more mutinous. Admiral Rodney with a portion of his fleet visited the city, but un- fortunately he did not see his duty in the same light as it had appeared to Lord Howe. The French were left undisturbed at Newport, and he sailed back to the West Indies, 60 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1781 When the Seventh Year of the war (1781) opened, Greene, iET - 24 the best of Washington's generals, took command against Cornwallis in the south. He had succeeded Gates, whose vanity and incompetence were at length manifest even to Congress despite his flattery and intrigues. A column under Arnold, now in the British service, ravaged Virginia. Washington's hands were full of disciplinary matters. There was a mutiny of the Pennsylvania regiments, due to the misery of their conditions, and when that was settled, another broke out among their comrades of New Jersey. Some hanging was necessary, from which the commander- in-chief did not shrink. Greene, opposed to the main army under Cornwallis, made a successful retreat, drawing the British two hundred miles from their base, but leaving both the Carolinas at their mercy. On March 15, Greene with four thousand five hundred men judged himself to be in sufficient strength to turn and risk a battle with his redoubtable antagonist, who had less than half his numbers. But he was heavily defeated at Guilford Court-house ; though, like many of the British victories, this one also was barren of good results for the conquerors. Cornwallis found himself obliged to retreat to Wilmington, and the Americans re-entered South Carolina. Again at Hobkirk Hill on April 25 Greene was beaten by a small force of nine hundred men under Lord Rawdon, but being too weak to pursue, the British troops were forced to retire on Charleston. At the end of March de Grasse sailed from Brest with an overwhelming fleet of twenty-six ships of the line and a large convoy, arriving at Martinique in the last days of April. 1 Cornwallis at Wilmington debated whether he should rejoin Rawdon at Charleston or push on to Arnold in the 1 Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power in History, chap. x. THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 61 north. At the end of April he determined on the latter a.d. 1781 course, and the fate of the war was decided. JEt ' 24 On May 20 Cornwallis met Arnold at Petersburg, when their united armies amounted to five thousand men. Taking command, he sent Arnold back to New York. Clinton when he heard of this movement condemned it, and with good reason. The position of an army resting on the Chesapeake depended for its safety on command of the sea, and this upon his information was unlikely to be retained for many weeks longer. Washington, having full knowledge of the intentions of de Grasse, discussed with Rochambeau the alternatives — a combined attack upon Clinton's army in New York, or upon that of Cornwallis in the south. Having decided upon the latter course, the allies determined to alarm Clinton by the feint of an attack, which succeeded so well that he applied to Cornwallis for reinforcements. Towards the middle of August a frigate brought word that de Grasse might shortly be expected in the Chesapeake. Washington wrote immediately in reply that he would join him with as many troops as could be spared from the investment of the main army of the British. In Virginia, Lafayette with light troops had for some time been watching and harassing Cornwallis, who had gradually withdrawn to the coast, and was established with his prin- cipal force at Yorktown, on the south shore of the estuary of the York river. On the 21st of August Washington began to move his army southwards. On the 23rd and 24th he crossed from the east to the west bank of the Hudson river. On the 27th de Barras, the French admiral at Newport, sailed with his fleet of eight ships of the line, and eighteen transports carrying troops and a siege-train, to join de Grasse in the south. 62 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1781 Rodney in the West Indies, at the news of the French ^ T * 24 departure from these waters, had detached Hood with four- teen ships to follow them. 1 Making a quicker passage, the British arrived in Chesapeake Bay three days before the enemy, and finding no trace of him sailed on to New York. Admiral Graves at that station had five ships of the line, and was Hood's senior officer. He took command of the united fleet, and having word of de Barras's departure from Newport, weighed anchor on the 31st in the hopes of delivering a crushing blow. But the French had good luck in their sluggishness, and Graves went past without sighting them. When he arrived in Chesapeake Bay he found only the fleet of de Grasse, which outnumbered him by five ships of the line. He engaged gallantly, but without discretion, and allowed de Grasse to manoeuvre him gradually out of the bay, declining action for five consecutive days. Mean- while de Barras arrived with his contingent, and Graves, hopelessly outnumbered, withdrew to New York. It was a good scheme on the part of the British, and miscarried partly through ill-fortune, but mainly through a lack of wits. September opened hopefully for the allies. On the 2nd Washington, having taken every ingenious precaution to conceal his departure, reached Philadelphia with his army. About the same time Clinton appears to have first realised that he was seriously bent on a southern movement. In the south Greene engaged Colonel Stewart at Eutaw Springs, and fought an indecisive battle, but the result was to force the British commander to fall back upon Charleston, thereby cutting off Cornwallis's retreat towards the south. On the 22nd French transports carried Washington's army down the Chesapeake and up the James river to Williamsburg. On the 28 th he marched on York town. The meshes were 1 Mahan, The Injlru.net ofS'a Power in History, chap. x. THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 63 being drawn very tight round the best soldier who had A. D. 1781 fought in America for King George. T * 4 The French fleet held the river mouth against escape or succour. To the south, the estuary of the James, four hundred miles of hostile country, and the army of Greene, cut off all hope of a retreat on Charleston. To the north the York river, over a mile broad, separated Cornwallis from his outpost at Gloucester. To transport his little army, number- ing somewhat more than seven thousand men, in open boats across such an obstacle, exposed during the process to attack from the fleet at anchor in the bay, having transported it in safety, to traverse Maryland and Pennsylvania and New Jersey to New York, four hundred miles away, with an elated enemy on his heels and lining every wood and river bank upon the march, was an opportunity so slender that only desperation could have thought of clutching at it. Across the peninsula to the west, cutting him off entirely from the mainland, lay the army of Washington, eighteen thousand strong — eleven thousand Americans and seven thousand Frenchmen — with a heavy and well-appointed siege-train. The allies were full of fresh hope and ardour, and their great leader was calmly confident of a crowning victory at last. Discouragement and disease among the British and their Hessian mercenaries increased the odds against Cornwallis. So matters stood on the 1st of October 1781. On the 5th the Americans opened their trenches. On the 14th two commanding redoubts were captured — the first by a light corps led by Colonel Alexander Hamilton with great judgment and gallantry, the second more deliberately by the French. The game was hopeless from the beginning, and now it was all but played out Still the intrepid defender remained obdurate to all talk of a surrender. If he could not avert the inevitable, he could 64 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1781 at all events add another example of courage and resource /Et. 24 to t ke great tradition of the British arms. His ammuni- tion was giving out, and many of his soldiers were sick. He made a night attack, spiked guns, destroyed some earth- works, but to no purpose. Then he formed an audacious scheme of escape to the north. One contingent crossed successfully to the northern shore ; but even the elements were against him. A gale sprang up in which no open boat, weighted to the gunwale with men and stores, could ever hope to live. So upon the 19th of October, there being no other course available, he surrendered. In a war which was the grave of most men's reputations who had in it any prominent part, military or civil, Cornwallis almost alone added to his fame. For not only was he a soldier of stainless courage, but he had a bold and steady judgment, and in his actions a promptness that was lacking in all the others. Yorktown was the end of the war. Charleston and Savannah were evacuated in the succeeding year, and only New York remained in possession of the King's troops. Washington was not less admirable in success than under defeat. He had no thought of taking his ease until not only victory, but the fruits of victory, had been secured. The general conviction that the war was over seemed to him to be fraught with dangerous possibilities. Negotiation must follow, supposing both parties to be inclined to peace. Having regard to the alliance with France and Spain, who as yet had tasted little of the sweets of conquest, had settled but few of their old accounts, and had enjoyed revenge only, as it were, vicariously, in the profit THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 65 taken by a third party at the expense of their ancient foe, A.D. 1781 it was probable that such negotiations would extend over a ^ r " 24 long period. Washington was still too weak to turn Clinton out of New York without French aid, and the French had other more urgent uses for their ships and men. But it was a clear necessity that Clinton should be kept fast under lock and key, otherwise, when it came to a treaty, the British Government might have some solid advantage to throw into the scales. At all costs the colonial army must be kept in being, an effective force, capable not only of defence but of aggression. In this attempt it was necessary to reckon with Congress and the state governments, and the temper of the civil population and the army itself, who were, one and all, weary of the war, and only too much inclined to a complacent admiration of their past valour. At no period of his career had the commander-in-chief to encounter difficulties that were harder to contend with, and his credit stands as high in these irksome labours as it did at Princeton, Valley Forge, or York town. In March, in the Eighth Year of the war (1782), the A.D. 1782 British House of Commons voted for the discontinuance of iEr ' 25 hostilities, and Lord George Germaine resigned. There is a touch of irony in the event ; for his retention of office would now no longer have been of any conspicuous injury to his country. In May Washington was imploring the states for men, and for money to pay the troops and to provide them with supplies. 1 The question of arrears and pensions was very urgent. In October we find him writing to the Secretary 1 Spitrka'a Washington, viii. pp 284-88. I 66 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1782 of War on these matters, pressing immediate consideration Mt25 of the just claims of his soldiers, "after having spent the ' flower of their days, and many of them their patrimonies, 1 in establishing the freedom and independence of their 1 country." * But in Congress, and not only in Congress, but also in the people, there was an exaggerated standard of political morality founded upon stock phrases regarding the sub- ordination of the military to the civil power. In times of war this excessive virtue had yielded with a sigh to the importunate violence of events, but with the return of peace it sought to stifle the memory of its lapse under a prudish, circumspect, precise and jealous behaviour. The army was at last told in plain words that it placed too high an estimate both upon its importance and its claims. It was exhorted to practise the virtue of patience. By and by, when the civil power should decide in its wisdom that the time was ripe, something would probably be done. As a matter of grace, relief would then be doled out, of such a kind as prudent citizens, without losing sight of first principles, could allow to thoughtless fellows who had risked nothing but their fortunes and their reputations for the common good. Addressed in terms of so cool a gratitude, the army began to murmur mutinously, and to consider whether after all it was not master of the situation. There was talk of a dictator, 2 which threw Washington into a rage and Hamilton into a fit of laughter. In the following year things became graver. There was open sedition, of which the heroic Gates was the secret instigator. 8 The army, urged in anonymous broadsheets to use force for securing its well-earned provision of half-pay, gave an attentive ear. Gates in former years, with the aid 1 Sparks's Washington, viii. p. 354, a History, ii. p. Ill, 3 Ibid, it pp. 393-94. THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 07 of Congress, had endeavoured to supplant Washington in A. D. 1782 the chief command. He now turned upon his former ally, * 6 and made it the object of his mean intrigues to destroy the affection of the army for its great loader by forcing him to act as the protector of Congress. There was only one man in America capable of quelling the mutinous spirit, and he, by the irony of fate, was in full sympathy with the grievance. His enemies counted safely that to Washington disorder and civil war would appear even greater evils than the suffering of his soldiers. They judged rightly that he would not hesitate in his course of action. A meeting of the discontented assembled upon an appointed day, and Gates was called on to preside. Washington attended with a set speech in writing in his pocket. " He, who had never been greeted but with affec- ' tion, was received with cold and calm respect. It appeared 1 as though sedition had felt it necessary to commence her ' secret work by engendering suspicions against the Father ' of his country. He arose : he felt the estrangement — 1 he paused, and he doubted of the issue. As he uncovered ' his venerated head, and was about to address them from 1 a written paper in his hand, his eye grew dim, and he ' uttered this pathetic unpremeditated remark : ' Fellow 1 soldiers, you perceive I have not only grown grey, but ' blind in your service.' " * He then proceeded to read his speech, which was an indignant condemnation of the con- spiracy ; but the phrase of his opening had been enough. "Awed by the majesty of his virtue, and touched with 1 his interest in their sufferings, every soldier's eye was ' filled with a generous tear ; they reproved themselves 4 for having doubted him who had never deceived them : 1 they forgot their wrongs, in the love of their country ' and of their chief." 2 1 History, ii. p. 391. * H>id. p. 393. 68 ALEXANDER HAMILTON a.d. 1783 . By the autumn of 1782 the allies of the states were in a 26 more accommodating humour for discussing terms of peace. In April, Rodney in the West Indies had broken the line of de Grasse. In September, Elliot at Gibraltar, after a three years' siege, had burned de Crillon's famous batteries to the water's edge. The preliminary articles of peace were signed on January the 20th, 1783, and the welcome news reached Washington in March. In November the British army left New York, and before Christmas Day the American commander-in-chief had bidden his officers good-bye and laid down his commission in Congress. CHAPTER VII The Military Secretary A.D. 1776 In March 76, a few days before Washington drove Sir iET * 19 William Howe out of Boston, Hamilton was appointed to the captaincy of the company of artillery which had been raised by New York state. In January of the same year he had celebrated hia nineteenth birthday. Murmurs on the score of his youth were quieted by testimonials from the military instructors, and at the earliest opportunity by his conduct in the field. It is notable that he laboured at the science of his profession during the twelve months that intervened between his enrolment in the Hearts of Oak and the battle of Brooklyn, with the same zeal which he had previously given to philosophy and the classics. In drills and gun-practice he was equally industrious, and valued the smart appearance of his company to the extent of giving the larger portion of his allowance from the West Indies to their external embellishment. 1 1 Life, p. 52, THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 69 In the famous passage from Brooklyn he brought up A.D. 1776 the rear, comported himself in such a manner as to win - * 19 considerable credit, and lost his baggage and a gun. He attracted the favourable notice of Greene, the best general who served under Washington, and afterwards, during the retreat from New York, of the commander-in-chief him- self, who was impressed by his earthworks at Harlem, and engaged him in conversation. 1 At White Plains he again won admiration for the coolness and courage with which he used his battery to check the British attack. 2 In October, after the fall of the posts on the Hudson river, he volun- teered to retake Fort Washington, but the offer did not commend itself at headquarters. 8 In the late autumn, when the American army was falling back through New Jersey, dwindling in numbers and hope, he again earned high praise by the bold and sagacious handling of his battery for the protection of the rearguard in its crossing of the Raritan. 4 By the end of the year he had won as great a fame for his soldierly qualities as a few months earlier for his pamphlets and speeches. A contemporary record is quoted by his biographer : — " I noticed a youth, a mere stripling, 1 small, slender, almost delicate in frame, marching beside 1 a piece of artillery with a cocked hat pulled down over 1 his eyes, apparently lost in thought, with his hand resting ' on the cannon, and every now and then patting it as ' he mused, as if it were a favourite horse or a pet play- ' thing." 5 On the 1st of March 1777 he was appointed aide-de-camp a.d. 1777 to General Washington with the rank of lieutenant- colonel, iET> 20 and entered into close relations with that great man which lasted for the whole period of their joint lives. It is fair to assume that he owed this appointment as much 1 Life, p. 56. > Ibid. p. 56. « Ibid. p. 56. * Ibid. p. 57. B History, L pp. 137-8. 70 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1777 to his reputation with the pen as to the handling Xn ' 20 of his battery. The combination of qualities made him invaluable. Washington was overwhelmed with corre- spondence, and although he wrote well, it was with ex- treme difficulty and slowness, and innumerable corrections even in such details as grammar and spelling. A large proportion of his letters were political and diplomatic, rather than military in the strictest sense. A boy who was not only a ready and powerful writer, but who possessed in addition the instinct of a statesman and the spirit of a soldier, was an inestimable discovery. From the first he acted as secretary, sharing the duties of the post with one who became at once his devoted friend, ' the old secretary,' General Harrison. The aftection of this colleague invented the nickname which has stuck — 'the little lion.' " From the first, also, he was employed to write important documents, and sent upon errands that required character and discretion. It is beyond question that the messages to Congress, and the correspondence with British generals, which impressed Europe with the dignity and power of the American leader, were mainly the work of Hamilton's mind. The official correspondence of Washington during this period had a wide audience and a great celebrity, and while we must acknowledge the credit due to his secretary in the vigour, the logical arrangement, the lucidity and the stateli- ness of these documents, we are no less bound to beware of the absurd explanation which has depicted the commander- in-chief as a kind of puppet. It is a favourite device of a certain class of commentators upon great men to attribute their excellences always to some one else, and Hamilton has not altogether escaped this indiscreet tribute, either during his life or subsequently. But certainly he never sought it, 1 Life, p. 64. THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 71 nor gave the least colour to the legend. Washington was a.d. 1777 not the readiest of writers, but he held his opinions in T ' a vice; and we may safely assume that if his vivacious secretary had happened upon any occasion to set forth his own views and not those of his chief, the despatch containing them would have been rewritten before it was signed. It is not unfair, however, nor is it any derogation from the splendid character of the commander-in-chief, to say that Hamilton began by writing to his instructions, and ended by divining, interpreting and anticipating his thoughts. 1 In counsel no less than in action, the greatest of Washington's qualities was his instinct for the true relation of things. Reasoning and argument were only a degree less irksome to him than composition and penman- ship. It has been said of him by one who had acted as his secretary, that when some important document had to be acknowledged, he left his bewildered amanuensis to find not only the words, but even the answer itself. But to live on close terms with Washington was to be dominated by his opinions to such an extent that it would have been difficult to run counter to them. Of one of Hamilton's services we have very ample records. At the end of October, after the news had come of Burgoyne's surrender, he was despatched to General Gates for reinforcements. He was in his twenty-first year, and had been acting as military secretary for a period of only eight months. Gates was a vain, envious and foolish creature, but he was also a victorious general. He had reaped where others had sown, and was enjoying an immense fame and popularity in consequence. His success at Saratoga was contrasted by shallow and impatient people with the defeat at Brandywine and the fall of Philadelphia. There was a strong Gates party, composed of his own henchmen and the ill-wishers of the 1 Pickering to Coleman, History, ii., preface, p. vii. 72 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1777 commander-in-chief. Gates, in the first flush of conquest, had even permitted himself certain deliberate slights and discourtesies. Altogether it was a difficult embassy for a boy to accomplish with credit, and it may be taken as proof of the confidence which Washington reposed in Hamilton that he went armed with a letter, to use if there were need of it, clothing him with absolute power and leaving everything to his discretion. Gates, as might have been expected, demurred to parting with two out of his three brigades, and pretended danger from Sir Henry Clinton in New York as his justification. He would give one of the three, which Hamilton, mindful of the diplomacies, was about to accept with a wry face, when he discovered that it was less than half the strength of either of the others, and liable to still further diminution at an early date through the expiry of the term of enlistment. There- upon Hamilton had no option but to act upon his powers. His letter to Gates is a masterpiece of courtesy in the im- perative mood. The victorious general, surprised in sharp practice, gave up more than he need otherwise have done, and added a second brigade. With General Putnam, whom he met by the way, Hamil- ton dealt more cavalierly. Putnam was a better man than Gates, braver and more honest, but he had what in Scotland is called 'a bee in his bonnet.' With him high matters were a complete confusion, and the little things usually took precedence of the big. Like many brave veterans who are dimly conscious of their own lack of perspicacity, he was of a most touchy disposition. Orders given without any authority by a very youthful staff officer, command- ing him forthwith to detach troops to the south when he had been planning a baresark descent upon Clinton in New York, were a great deal more than he could stand with equanimity. THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 73 Hamilton returned a few days later, after his encounter A.D. 1778 with General Gates, to find that his august commands to ^ T# General Putnam had not been carried into execution. His indignation was only equalled by his determination to be obeyed. He was shivering with fever, but such was the force of his youthful spirit that from his sick-bed orders went forth to Putnam's puzzled subordinates to march south immediately, and neither the unwillingness of one, nor the ingenious pretext of another that his men were undergoing 1 an operation for the itch,' was able to stand against such persuasions. In the following year we find for the first time murmurs against the undue influence exercised by Hamilton upon the mind of Washington. The charge was maintained till the end of his days, and in later years became one of the chief cries of the Democratic party. The power which Hamilton exercised over the minds of his fellows and over events is undeniable; but throughout his life he was ever suspected of an even greater personal influence than he possessed. The superior brilliance of his personality dis- torted the true proportions of every word and action. If something noteworthy was done, men were certain that he had pulled the strings ; if something remarkable was said, that he had prompted. All admiration and odium were concentrated upon him, and it was con- ceived to be impossible for any colleague to retain his independence of will or judgment in such dangerous company. Hamilton's correspondence during the period of the war ia full of interest, and bears evidence to a clear and soldierly view of the situation. But what has been preserved is only a fragment, and where we should most desire his commentary there is usually a gap. In the early months of the year he was engaged at Valley Forge with a com- 74 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A. D. 1779 inittee of Congress, drafting and redrafting their reports A. 22 U p 0n ^ e organisation and subsistence of the army. He kept up a regular but unofficial correspondence in his own name, but on his general's behalf, with the friendly party in Congress. At the battle of Monmouth he appeared once more as a soldier, protesting energetically against the tactics of Lee and rallying the retreating regiments. Afterwards he was sent to interview Admiral d'Estaing. In the following winter (79), while the army lay watching the British, a plan for kidnapping Sir Henry Clinton was hatched by some audacious spirits. "The British general ' was then occupying a house near the Battery, in New York, 1 situate a few yards from the Hudson river. Intelligence, 1 through spies, had been obtained of the approaches to his ' bedchamber. Light whale-boats, with muffled oars, were 1 to be placed under the command of Colonel Humphreys, 1 of Connecticut ; and the party, in full preparation, were ' waiting anxiously the approach of night for the execution ' of their purpose. . . . Colonel Hamilton, in the interval, * became informed of the intended enterprise. He observed ' to General Washington ' that there could be little doubt 1 of its success ; but, sir, 1 said he, ' have you examined the 1 consequences of it ? ' The general inquired, ' In what 1 respect ? ' ' Why,' replied Hamilton, ' it has occurred to 1 me that we shall rather lose than gain by removing Sir 1 Henry Clinton from the command of the British army, ' because we perfectly understand his character; and, by 1 taking him off, we only make way for some other, perhaps * an abler officer, whose character and disposition we have 1 to learn.' The general acknowledged the force of the 'objection, and abandoned the project." 1 . . . There is an almost preternatural sagacity in such reasoning. The 1 Lift, pp. 218, 219. THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 75 scene appeals to the imagination so strongly that we A.D. 1780 pray it may indeed have happened : — the solemn general, iET ' 23 with the weight of American freedom on his broad shoulders, standing six feet two in his shoes and frown- ing over his big, thick nose which turned to so bright a scarlet in cold weather that intelligent strangers visiting in the camp suspected the sobriety of his habits ; the little secretary, stretching to his full height of some five feet six, delicate and dark-eyed, propounding with an awful and relentless gravity the logical defects of this exuberant plan — it 13 a situation filled with the spirit of eternal humour. For beyond doubt either of the two men would have given his ears to go, had his duty allowed it, in the light whale-boat with muffled oars to steal Sir Henry Clinton from his bed-chamber in that dark night of February. In December 1780 Hamilton was married to Miss Betsy Schuyler, a girl of great charm and a quick and humorous intelligence. Her father was that General Schuyler who had held the important command of the northern army until a few weeks before Saratoga, when Gates, by intrigues with Congress, contrived to supplant him and to reap the credit of his patient strategy. Despite his ill-treatment Schuyler continued to serve against Burgoyne as a volun- teer until the British surrender, when he showed the most considerate hospitality to his defeated enemies. He was a man of a noble and magnanimous nature, greatly trusted by Washington, and possessing much political influence, especially in his native state of New York, by reason of his character, his old family traditions of public spirit, and his wide possessions. To what extent this alliance added to Hamilton's resources is uncertain, for he was of a fierce independence with respect to money matters; but the marriage, which had the hearty approval of his wife's 76 ALEXANDER HAMILTON a.D. 1780 family, assured his position as an American citizen. It ^ Et ' 23 was, in other respects also, a fortunate and happy union to the end. For in spite of certain scandals that were brought to light in later days through the industry of political malice, the confidence and affection exist- ing between the two was never shaken. The private shortcomings of Hamilton cannot be denied. He has himself admitted them gravely and with dignity, making neither reservation nor excuse; but as regards his loyalty there has never at any time existed even the shadow of a doubt. The circumstances of Hamilton's resignation of his staff appointment have been made the subject of much fine writing. It is clear that even so early as the spring of 1780 he had grown somewhat impatient of his office, and had sought without success an independent command in the south, at a time when the fortunes of the colonists were by no means brilliant, and there had been much hard fighting and many serious defeats. It must be remembered that he valued himself more highly as a soldier than in any other capacity. He believed, whether rightly or wrongly can never be decided, that war was his true profession, and that if the chance were given he could prove himself to be a great commander. His post on the staff was a strict and literal secretaryship, more civil indeed than military. It was indeed ' the grovelling condition of a clerk,' which his youthful genius had contemned with such vivacity. The very excellence *of his work made promotion nearly impossible ; for Washington could find many capable men to lead columns, but what other to write letters to Congress ? The cause of the severance was simple enough, but, as the incident was dramatic, it has resulted that Hamilton has sometimes been accused of ingratitude to his bene- THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 77 factor. This rupture, or quarrel, assuredly did not A.D. 1780 produce the effect that such occurrences beget in the JErr ' ^ relations of common men ; for within a week or two of the event we find Washington inviting his ex-secretary to be present at a private conference with Rochambeau, and signing himself ' yours sincerely and affectionately.' * Indeed, there is not the slightest evidence of any slacken- ing in their mutual confidence either then or afterwards. The truth of the matter appears to lie in this — that a great man will not continue contentedly to be secretary to any one, not even to another great man many years his senior, at a time full of arduous enterprises and stirring events. It is a trying relationship, and must soon become intolerable to a vigorous and independent mind. Hamilton longed for a command in the field, and the work which in despondent moments he may have regarded as that of a conduit pipe became more and more distasteful to him. In the end he seized at an opportunity that let him escape into freedom. The evidence against him is his own letter. He had the defects of his qualities. Not to write upon any subject which interested him was an impossibility ; and he had the further Johnsonian failing that he made his minnows speak like whales. There is often a touch of the ' my-ambition- is- prevalent ' in his early letters, and when he wrote to his admiring father-in-law, General Schuyler, to explain why he had ceased to be a member of General Washington's 'family,' his statement is more than usually pompous. The commander-in-chief had met him on the stairs and desired his immediate attendance. The Marquis de Lafayette had button-holed him as he was hastening to obey. Washington had exploded, as the best man will, n,t having been kept waiting; imagined it was t,en minutes 1 Life, p. 373. 78 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1781 when in fact it was but two. The little secretary was 2 ® T ' 24 icily respectful under the tempest, but adamantine that the incident must end his service. As to the alleged delay — 'I am not conscious of it, sir; but since you have thought it, we part.' * Nor would any condescension move him one hairsbreadth. The good Washington went further than any but a great man would have gone to soothe the ruffled feelings ; but it was unavailing, not because feathers were ruffled, but because the bird longed for freedom. Doubtless each in his heart understood the other, and in spite of some display of temper loved him only the more. Hamilton resigned his position on the staff in February 1781, and obtained command of a light corps late in the follow- ing summer. In October, when Cornwallis was surrounded at Yorktown, he found the chance that he had longed for. It was indeed too late in the day to dream of becoming a great general ; but the opportunity of proving himself a daring and capable officer was still open, and Hamilton seized it, or it might almost be said, snatched it out of the hands of another who had been appointed over his head. His assault upon the first redoubt at Yorktown did not determine the issue of the war ; did not even determine the surrender of Cornwallis. It was only one of those brilliant and particular actions of which military history has thousands on its record, and will continue, we may safely believe, to inscribe thousands more so long as there are wars in the world and brave men. But although from the general view of the campaign it may almost be ignored, it was an effective deed, and showed the highest qualities of swiftness, judgment, leadership and courage. It was valuable to Hamilton him- self because it confirmed his confidence, and to his descen- dants as one of those personal heirlooms that will never be 1 Work*, ix. pp. 232-37. THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES 79 forgotten even in a greater fame. The praise of Washington A.D. 1781 was never lightly earned. "Few cases," he wrote of the taking of the first redoubt, " have exhibited greater proofs 1 of intrepidity, coolness and firmness than were shown on ' this occasion." * 1 Life, p. 383. BOOK II THE UNION OF THE STATES A.D. 1780-1788, Mt. 23-31 The greatness of an estate in bulk and territory doth fall under measure ; and the greatness of finances and revenue doth fall under computation. The population may appear by musters ; and the number and greatness of cities and towns by cards and maps. But yet there is not anything amongst civil affairs more subject to error, than the right valuation and true judgment concerning the power and forces of an estate. The Kingdom of Heaven is compared, not to any kernel or nut, but to a grain of mustard seed ; which is one of the least grains, but hath in it a property and spirit hastily to get up and spread. So there are states great in territory, and yet not apt to enlarge or command; and some that have but a small dimension of stem> and yet apt to be the foundations of great monarchies. — Bacon. BOOK II THE UNION OF THE STATES CHAPTER I Political Writings during the War The second period of Hamilton's career began in the sixth a.d. 1780 year of the war. As military secretary he had seen his commander-in-chief hampered and distressed, the army starved and disheartened. He discovered the cause in the impotence, faction and financial discredit of a Congress which affected to represent thirteen jealous and discordant states temporarily and imperfectly united by a common danger. Being what he was, a confidential staff-officer, he viewed the matter in the first instance from that standpoint. He was impressed by the bad effects of misgovernment upon military affairs. He realised that the federal assembly lacked the power, the intelligence and the will to support its generals with vigour and consistency. He was confronted with that order of difficulties which arises when a debating-club is dressed up in the lion's skin of authority; when a deliberative assembly, upon a dubious warrant, endeavours to perform the high executive functions of government. The routine of his office brought him into daily touch with a bustling and eloquent sham. A military secretary, whose concern is with an army and its supplies, may be forgiven for unfavourable opinions of a government that can neither recruit nor pro- vide. To discharge its proper share of the burdens of such 84 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1778 a time it needed to be of good credit, and to this end it 21 was essential that it should be honest, resourceful and businesslike. In Hamilton's opinion it was lacking in all these qualities. In the autumn following the battle of Monmouth (1778) he found time to undertake the flagellation of a certain legislator of Maryland, who had made a corner in flour. This gentleman was a member not merely of Congress, but of the very committee charged with provisioning the army and the French fleet. By Hamilton's account he would appear to have been a worthy pioneer of the most modern commercial developments. He played with his committee, postponing its decision, while his emissaries bought up all the available flour. Prices were thereupon doubled, and the speculation wore a smiling face, when by some means his sins were discovered. Over the signature Publius, 1 which a few years later was to become immortal in a nobler controversy, Hamilton is forcible enough, but not in his happiest vein. The correspondence is a pompous exercise in the manner of Junius, interesting less for its intrinsic merits than for the simple fact which it records. Little, indeed, is left of the offender and his corner in flour ; but we feel that such sentences as " notwithstanding 1 our youth as a nation we begin to emulate the most veteran 1 and accomplished states in the art of corruption," 2 are a trifle too grandiose for the occasion that called them forth. Early in 1780 Robert Morris undertook the desperate finances of the Federal Government. He was a rich man and an able administrator, but he had to make bricks with- out straw. The great plan and the astute, particular re- source were equally within the field of his practical energy. He ruined his own fortune for the state, and a grateful country allowed him in later years to gain experience in a > Works, i. p. 199. ■ Ibid. i. p. 202. THE UNION OF THE STATES 85 debtor's prison. Money was harder to raise at this time A.D. 1780 than ever before. Supplies were more deficient, and the iET - ^ army was mutinous. Hamilton, who held Morris in great and deserved respect, took the opportunity of his appoint- ment to present him with an anonymous memorandum on the financial situation. It is amazing to find a soldier of three-and-twenty, with his hands full of a laborious official correspondence, with no experience of business beyond what he had gained as a boy in a merchant's office, plunging into a detailed and forcible argument for the establishment of a national bank. 1 " The present plan," he announces with modesty, " is the product 1 of some reading on the subjects of commerce and finance, 1 and of occasional rejections on our particular situation ; 1 but a want of leisure has prevented its being examined in ' so many lights and digested so materially as its importance 1 requires." 2 There is indeed proof of considerable reading in this lengthy analysis, though how he can have found the time for it remains a mystery. But there is also something a great deal more valuable. It is an argument from experi- ence. It was but a small section of human affairs that formed the basis of his theories — Cruger's ledgers and the starvation of the federal army — but he viewed these scraps of reality in a light of such intense understanding that they were sufficient for the purpose in hand. There is eloquence in the letter, for it is a quality always present in his writings, even upon the driest themes, but the fabric is substantial and practical. The bank is realised down to its quills and ink-pots as vividly as in its grandest international operations. Mr. Law, he argues, was right in his main idea. 3 For Law had grasped the necessity of interesting the moneyed classes to co-operate with Government, and his policy was a failure only because Law was himself dishonest. 1 Works, iii. p. 319. f Ibid. iii. p. 341. » Ibid. iii. p. 332. 86 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1781 In the following year Hamilton returned to his argument in ,a second letter to Morris, 1 this time under his own name. A national bank still appeared to him to be the only way out of the difficulty which had arisen owing to the lack of funds. He accordingly provided an elaborate plan, with articles of constitution. Britain, he argued, had failed to subdue the states by force of arms ; she was within an ace of winning by their financial exhaustion. He urged the advantages of a national debt, a blessing if not ex- cessive, and ' a powerful cement of our union.' The idea of an alliance with the moneyed classes, of taking hostages from them, was enforced once more. It remained to the end a fundamental article of his financial creed. Later on, in his own famous administration, he was able to realise it. Morris in answer was polite and appreciative. He in- formed his correspondent that a bank was about to be started, following the lines of Hamilton's project, but upon a more modest scale. That a soldier should have sought to intervene in these weary matters with so much zest and vehemence may well have excited wonder in the mind of the statesman. The modern reader marvels to find a military secretary discoursing in his leisure moments on national resources and foreign loans, on imposts and taxes and the balance of trade, propounding a plan for a national bank, elaborating it with an exuberant energy, a comprehen- siveness of vision, a directness and ease and force of expres- sion which disclosed the blessed quality of youth in every line and turn. There are occasions in Hamilton's career when we are puzzled whether to laugh or to cry out with admiration at the boyish confidence undaunted by the grimmest difficulties. There is a heroic quality even in his longest letters on taxation. Their passionate sincerity, their joyful audacity, bridge the gulf of years and create an 1 Works, iii. p. UZ THE UNION OF THE STATES 87 intimacy such as wo have felt with our heroes of romance — A.D. 1780 with Quentin Durward and with d'Artagnan ; a confusion of wonder with personal affection. For a true understanding of Hamilton's part in American history it is necessary to realise that he was loved by his contemporaries in this spirit. A more famous letter was written between the dates of the two that have been mentioned. In August 1780 there was a general despondency, not wholly financial. French aid had arrived at Newport, but the second fleet which was looked to for complete supremacy lay in Brest Harbour blocked by the tyrant of the seas. Americans, with an easy lethargy, affected nevertheless to believe that Britain was finally exhausted. A few days later Gates was routed by Cornwallis at Camden. 1 The fundamental defect/ wrote Hamilton to Duane, ' is a want of power in Congress.' * Three causes contributed to this misfortune: in the people a jealous excess of the spirit nf liberty; in Congress a diffidence of their own authority and a want of sufficient means at their disposal. The clear duty of Congress was to usurp powers in order to preserve the Republic ; but its courage stopped short of this solution. The confederation, as it stood, was fit neither for war nor peace. Men, mindful of the pretensions of a British Parliament, were jealous of sovereignty; but the real danger of the states lay in too little sovereignty and not in too much. The defects of the situation were plain to any one who was not blinded by phrases or misled by distrust. As funds were the basis of all civil authority, the central government must have the power to tax, which under the existing arrangement was denied to it. A deliberative body was unfit to rule, for a powerful 1 Works, i. p. 213. 88 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1780 executive must be few and not numerous ; active, not merely loquacious. Congress, from a kind of vanity, was averse from delegation to individuals. The small powers it possessed were whittled down to an absurdity by delegation to boards ; and boards, as John Stuart Mill pointed out in later days, are screens. The fluctuating constitution of the army, the imperfection and inequality of its supplies, were consequences to be ex- pected from such conditions. " It is now a mob, rather 1 than an army ; without clothing, without pay, without 1 provision, without morals, without discipline. We begin ' to hate the country for its neglect of us. The country 1 begin to hate us for our oppressions of them. Congress * have long been jealous of us. We have now lost all con- 1 fidence in them, and give the worst construction to all 1 they do. Held together by the slenderest ties, we are 1 ripening for a dissolution." l The remedies were hard to achieve, though easy to name. Congress must have greater powers, either by taking its courage in both hands and seizing them upon the plea of necessity, or by a convention of the states empowered to conclude a real confederation. Personal responsibility was an essential, and the only safety was to be found in the appointment of great officers of state, ministers for foreign affairs, for war, marine, finance, and trade. Recruits must be enlisted for the period of the war, or at the least for three years. Congress itself must have the duty of supply, and the means for exercising it. Officers who sacrificed their prospects for patriotism deserved consideration. The least they had a right to was half-pay for life. But the question of funds lay at the bottom of everything. A foreign loan, a federal revenue, a tax in kind, and a national bank were Hamilton's prescriptions ; and, as he added shrewdly, » Works, i. p. 221. THE UNION OF THE STATES 89 they need not want for the first of these, since they could AD. 1780 coerce France with a threat of peace. 3 This letter to Duane is an important landmark. It shows that even at this early date Hamilton had fully and firmly grasped the essentials of the situation. In his cogent and unambiguous fashion he led his various arguments up to the final conclusion that the supreme need of the moment was the need of a nation. The artificial nature of the states, with their unreasonable sentiments, eternal jealousies and disastrous pretensions to separate sovereignty, was no doubt easier to understand and harder to excuse when viewed by one who was an American only by adoption, and had become a citizen of one of these rival communities almost by an accident. His foreign birth was therefore an advantage, since it enabled him to consider the problems and forces of the time in a spirit of detachment, without the heat of local prejudice and in their true proportions. Hamilton, it will be remembered, resigned his appointment A.D. 1781 as military secretary in February 1781, and it was not until August that he obtained a command and marched south against Cornwallis in York town. During these seven months of leisure he had time to meditate more deeply upon the political situation. The fruits were The Continentalist, 1 a series of six papers, of which four were written during this interval, and the remaining two in the spring and summer of the following year. It is an odd but magnificent way of spending a short leave, after five years of uninterrupted labour and hardship. For the great Washington was an exacting taskmaster, and his campaigns were not conducted with much regard for a generous diet, warm feet, or soft lying- in these letters, which contain the kernel of Hamilton's theory of statesmanship, he goes further back into causes 1 Workt, i. p. 243. ^t. 24 90 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1781 in search of a cure for the national disorders. There is no contradiction of his former ideas, but only a greater completeness. At the beginning of the war there was a lack of men experienced in government. The majority of this class adhered to the other side, and the influence of the small number who were available ' was too commonly borne down by the prevailing torrent of ignorance and prejudice.' 'An extreme jealousy of power is the attendant on all popular revolutions.' It was not marvellous, therefore, that both the people and the states were jealous of the authority of Congress; or that Congress, being subject to the epidemic timidity, was jealous of the army. With courageous iteration Hamilton returned to his old argument. The capital defect was a want of power in Congress. Unsupported by the confidence of its constituents, it had none to bestow upon its servants. There was a want of agreement as to the proper remedies ; but every man admitted that the confederation was unequal either to a 'vigorous prosecution of the war, or to the preservation of the union in peace.' The great danger of a popular government is ever its jealousy of power. " In a government framed for durable liberty, not 4 less regard must be paid to giving the magistrate a proper 1 degree of authority to make and execute the laws with * rigour, than to guard against encroachments upon the 1 rights of the community ; as too much power leads to 1 despotism, too little leads to anarchy, and both eventually * to the ruin of the people." * In the case of a single state the commonest danger is that the sovereign, whether a monarch or a republican council, will make himseif too powerful for his subjects; but in federal governments which have to deal with the affairs of a group of states the peril is of an opposite character. 1 Works, i. p. 246. THE UNION OF THE STATES 91 In such a case it usually happens that the members are A.D. 1781 an overmatch for the common head, and that the central 24 power is lacking in authority sufficient to secure the obedi- ence of the several parts of the confederacy. States sub- scribing to a league or union may have, or seem to have, at certain times an advantage in things contrary to the good of the whole, or a disadvantage in things conducive to the common weal. And under this aspect states are like private men who, when they have the power of disregarding the laws of their country, frequently find a sufficient reason for doing jo in their own interest. But the danger that, upon a cool estimate, the members may discover a real or imaginary gain in disobedience to the titular sovereign, is not the end of the evil. Prejudice, vanity and passion have also to be taken into account. The ambitions of persons holding office in the several states foster ideas hostile to the con- federacy, in order to preserve their own consequence ; while the people tend also in the same direction, being more devoted in their attachment and obedience to their own particular government, which acts upon them directly, than towards the central power which can only touch them in- directly, and possesses no officers clothed in a calm assur- ance to enforce its laws. When the war came to an end all danger from foreign aggression would temporarily disappear. Relieved from this menace, centrifugal tendencies would then run riot. Societies whose true aim and only security against attack lay in a close political union "must either be firmly united under 1 one government, or there will infallibly exist emulations and 1 quarrels ; this is in human nature." 1 Even when Hamilton wrote, in the midst of war and of danger too serious for trifling, some of the states had evaded or refused compliance with the demands of Congress on points of the greatest 1 Work*, i. p. 254. 92 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1781 moment. Peace would bring the danger of disunion much ** 24 more near. After the final defeat of British policy it ought to be the aim of American statesmanship to prevent and frustrate for all time European interference with the development of the states, and even with the destinies of the whole Northern Continent. It was only to be expected that the great powers would endeavour to obtain a foothold, and might therefore upon occasions have an interest in fostering in- ternal contentions, jealousies and schisms; in instigating competitions with regard to boundaries, rivalry in commerce and disputes wheresoever a plausible pretext could be dis- covered. Groups and minor confederacies would then begin to combine, and Europe would be allowed to come into American affairs as an ally of one or other of them. From such an opportunity it was of vital importance that she should be rigorously excluded. To a man viewing the thirteen states in a broad vision, as one nation, such a con- clusion was too obvious for any argument. To a man regard- ing the matter from the meaner standpoint of the interest of an individual state, the conclusion was no less clear if he would but project his mind a few years into the future. "Our whole system," he continues, "is in disorder; our 4 currency depreciated, till in many places it will hardly 1 obtain a circulation at all ; public credit at its lowest ebb ; 1 our army deficient in numbers, and unprovided with every- 1 thing." l And while government was thus unable to pay, clothe, or feed the troops, things were happening in the Southern States which should have caused Americans to blush. Cornwallis had won victory after victory, and was making steady progress, in spite of the fact that the whole British forces in the states were little more than fourteen thousand men. And yet the population of those states was 1 Works, I p. 265. THE UNION OF THE STATES 93 greater than at the beginning of the war — more than two A.D. 1781 millions and a quarter of white citizens. The quantity of JF>r ' 24 specie had also increased. The country abounded in the necessaries of life and in warlike materials. There was no lack even of foreign commodities, and commerce in spite of everything was growing. A powerful ally co operated by sea and land, and paid the whole cost of supporting her five thousand troops on American soiL In these circumstances but one of two things could afford an explanation of the disastrous situation — a general dis- affection on the part of the people, or mismanagement on the part of their rulers. The former alternative could not be entertained, for the reason that it was contrary to notori- ous facts. The prime necessity therefore was to strike at the root of the whole evil by a reform of government and by augmenting the powers of the confederation. The great defect of the constitution under another aspect, was that it had no property; no revenue, nor the means of obtaining it. Funds are the foundation of every- thing. 'Power without revenue, in political society, is a name.' At this point the series of letters was interrupted by Washington's sudden campaign in the south against Corn- wallis. After the fall of Yorktown in the autumn, Hamilton retired into civil life, and in the following April and July the argument was concluded in a different strain. From the necessities of government he passed to the possibilities of development ; from a criticism of the theory to a discussion of the practice of government. " The vesting Congress with the power of regulating trade ' ought to have been a principal object of the confederation 1 for a variety of reasons. It is as necessary for the purposes ' of commerce as of revenue. There are some who maintain ' that trade will regulate itself, and is not to be benefited by 94 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1782 ■ the encouragement or restraints of government Such ' persons will imagine that there is no need of a common 1 directing power. This is one of those wild, speculative ■ paradoxes vrhich have grown into credit among us, contrary 1 to the uniform practice and sense of the most enlightened 1 nations." 1 There are laws which a government must observe in regulating commerce. Individuals may have objects in trade which it is the duty of a government to defeat. There may be prospects of national wealth which, since the capital of private persons is limited, only government help can inaugurate. The state will aim at a balance of the whole, favouring neither the cultivators of the land, nor the merchants, nor the manufacturers, nor the artisans and labourers. Under this aspect an excessive tariff would be as unstatesmanlike as no tariff at all. That trade can be trusted to regulate itself to the greatest advantage of the community is the prime paradox. All experience is against it, and proves that the influence of government is salutary if only government be wise and honest. The government of Elizabeth fostered the trade of England. Colbert laid the foundations of prosperous trade in France. In the opinion of some, who grant these premises, the separate states and not the federal power were the proper regulators of commerce ; " but as they are parts of a whole, with a common interest in ' trade, as in other things, there ought to be a common direc- 1 tion in that as in all other matters." 2 With regard to any plan devised by human ingenuity, it will always be possible to argue that it is for the advantage of one unit, or of one state, rather than of another ; but " unless we can overcome ' this narrow disposition and learn to estimate measures by ■ their general tendencies, we shall never be a great or a ' happy people, if we remain a people at all." 8 But supposing that the central power is prevented from ■ Works, i. p. 267. 2 Ibid. I p. 271. 8 Ibid. i. p. 277. THE UNION OF THE STATES 96 undertaking, or should be unwilling to undertake, the A.D. nsa control of trade, what will happen? There will be a lack M ' 1 ' 25 of revenue. There will be a risk of independence. The union will become precarious. The want of a wholesome concort and provident superintendence to advance the general prosperity will lead to a depression of the landed interest and of labour for the immediate advantage of the trading classes. Finally, the trading interest itself will fall a victim to bad policy. It is of the essence of states- manship that burthens should be distributed and benefits shared. No class should be oppressed, for the interests of all are interwoven. " Oppress trade, lands sink in value ; 1 make it flourish, their value rises. Encumber husbandry, 1 trade declines ; encourage agriculture, commerce revives." ! "There is something," he concludes, " noble and magnificent ' in the perspective of a great Federal Republic, closely linked 1 in the pursuit of a common interest, tranquil and prosperous ' at home, respectable abroad ; but there is something pro- 1 portionably diminutive and contemptible in the prospect 1 of a number of petty states, with the appearance cnly of 1 union, jarring, jealous, and perverse, without any determined ' direction, fluctuating and unhappy at home, weak and in- ' significant by their dissensions in the eyes of other nations. 1 . . . Happy America if those to whom thou hast intrusted ' the guardianship of thy infancy know how to provide 1 for thy future repose, but miserable and undone if their ' negligence or ignorance permits the spirit of discord to * erect her banner on the ruins of thy tranquillity." 2 1 Work*, i. p. 281. * /bid. i. pp. 286. 287 dtf ALEXANDER HAMILTON CHAPTER II Congress and the Conduct of the War A.D. The legend which was born out of the soaring fancy iET 19-26 °^ ^ Q ear ty chroniclers covers a much wider field than the mere origins of the rebellion. The influence of the epic can be traced no less plainly in the popular beliefs regarding the course of the war, than in the current estimates of the virtues of individuals and of the value of institutions. The image of the American Revolution which fills the mind of the average Englishman is smooth, definite and highly coloured, but it is a poor likeness of the event. In this picture the thirteen colonies are presented as one people, firmly bound together from the beginning by a confidence in one another, and a common sentiment of freedom far stronger than the forms and articles of any constitution. 1 The League of Friendship,' as it was named by hopeful enthusiasts, is conceived to have had no parallel save in the Golden Age. The prevailing pattern of man during this virtuous epoch is imagined to have been George Washington. Congress, no less than the army, was cast in that heroic mould. The nation itself rises before a picturesque imagina- tion like some vast audience in the Albert Hall, tier upon tier, a multitude of individuals, but a single type. Everywhere there appoars the same austere patriotism and awful gravity, the same fortitude and the same simplicity. If any man were bold enough to suggest that comparison is possible between the British Parliament and the American Congress of that time, or that among the members of these two august assem- blies there was anything approaching an equality of virtue, wisdom, or courage, popular opinion, nourished upon the 1776-1783 Mr*. 19-26 THE UNION OF THE STATES 97 my lii, would put aside the paradox without a smile, as a A.D. jest bordering too closely on profanity. The Englishman, who never shows to best advantage in the apologetic mood, has accepted everything which the American epic required for its completeness. He has bowed in humility before the frequent scorn of its moral judgments, has received without demur its shallow and eloquent generalisations, and, clothed in a white sheet, has joined, with a taper in his hand, in the discovery of scape- goats and the making of heroes. It is no part of our purpose to enter upon a defence of British policy; but if we are to entertain a true regard for the fame of Washington and Hamilton, the difficulties against which they had to contend must be firmly grasped. If these be covered over industriously with rose-leaves, we may arrive at a very flattering estimate of the virtues of the American colonists ; but in that case we shall be forced to undervalue the greatness of these two leaders, who both during and after the war had, according to the common history of mankind, their hardest difficulties to overcome from within and not from without. Instead of this picture of a perfect patriotism, it is wiser to accept the plain facts. The American Revolution, after the war began, owed but little to Congress, much certainly to the patriotic spirit of the people, but most of all to a few great men. The countrymen of Washington, engaged in a prolonged and painful struggle, where fortune varied and hearts grew sick with deferred hope, showed the same high qualities and the same ignoble faults that might have been looked for in men of that race. Throughout the whole period of the war, and for more than seven years afterwards (dating from the surrender at Yorktown), the states were not a nation, but merely a loose and jealous confederacy. It is indeed matter for amaze- 98 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. ment, not that the war should have run such a lon£ and T76-1783 Mt. 19-26 53 painful course, but that under such conditions it was ever conducted to a successful conclusion. We must admire the binding force of the desire for independence by which the ill-founded structure was kept together, and marvel at the ineptitude of British diplomacy that could drive no wedges of disunion into a fabric riddled with such dangerous gaps. Until the outbreak of war none of the thirteen colonies had been, or had even claimed to be, a sovereign state. Sovereignty, for what it was worth, resided in King George, who exercised it upon the advice of his cabinet and through the agency of the different governors. Each state was in- dependent of its neighbours. None was in a position of superiority to another. There was no machinery of law or custom for joint action through any central power. Franklin, indeed, had dreamed of federation in years gone by. The representative Congress which assembled to concert measures with regard to the prosecution of the war with France had arrived at a plan of union largely under his influence. The royal governors were favourable to the proposal ; but it was rejected without hesitation by the home Government, which feared to call into existence so powerful a subject, and by the colonial legislatures, whose jealousy of one another seemed to be ineradicable. 1 With the assumption of independence sovereignty therefore went a-begging. No federal power existed, only a Congress of the States, assembled in a great emer- gency to take counsel together and to speak, if possible, with one voice. In political virtue, courage and sagacity, this first Congress was a body of a remarkable distinction ; but it was not a government, and it lacked both the authority and any precedent for creating one. The prevalent opinion was that sovereignty, having departed 1 History, iii. p. 245 THE UNION OF THE STATES 99 out of King George the Third and the British Parliament, A.D. had entered into the individual legislatures of the thirteen 1 1 76 " 1 J 83 . ^ T - 19-26 states. A minority, it is true, held that by some mystical process sovereignty had passed into the hands of Congress ; but all serious attempts on the part of that assembly to exercise sovereign powers over the various states incurred at once the odium of the selfsame tyranny against which the revolution was directed. Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and the rest, were determined that they would no longer be subjects. Their aim in taking up arms was independence, and they were no more willing to part with this precious possession to their own Congress than to King George. At a later date, when it was proposed to create a revenue for support of the army out of a duty upon imports, a patriotic opposition demanded a plain answer to the question as to how this measure differed in principle from the Stamp Act which had set two continents by the ears. In spite, however, of this extreme jealousy, the severe pressure of circumstances brought it about that from the beginning many of the customary duties and functions of a sovereign were performed by Congress. There being, in fact, no alternative, it took upon itself to create an army, to build a fleet, to issue paper money, to raise loans, make alliances and assert the independence of the United States. But as Congress acted always upon sufferance, it lacked the confidence which is given by real authority, and as a natural result its procedure was feeble, irresolute and ineffectual. Shortly after the famous declaration of July 1776, ' articles of confederation and perpetual union ' were submitted for consideration, but until March 1781 they remained without ratification. The delay was a matter of but little moment, seeing that this stately and sonorous document merely defined in more precise terms the impotence of govern- ment. 100 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. Put in the shortest form, the evil lay in the want of 76-1783 JErr. 19-26 power. ■ Influence/ in the words of Washington, ' is not government.' Congress had no subjects. It was merely the council of an alliance. It could requisition supplies, and money and men; but if a state chose to fill its ears with wax and pay no heed, the central authority was without any remedy but patience. Over the individual citizens of the states it had no jurisdiction whatsoever. With the various legislatures its relations were those of a diplomatist. When it sought to create an army it needed to ask leave, and to accomplish its end was forced to submit to terms not only ignominious but contrary to reason. When a state saw fit to furnish a regiment, it claimed and exercised the right to appoint its officers. Military organisation under such conditions was clearly impossible. Efficiency would have been beyond hope had the commander-in-chief lacked the courage and persona] force necessary for exceeding his functions. Congress issued paper money, and its value sank after a few months to two cents in the dollar. It made alliances which could and would have been disowned by any state had it discerned a private advantage in the disavowal. When Congress finally came to make peace, the terms which it had agreed to were ignored and repudiated. In the harlequinade of human affairs no pantaloon ever exercised less discipline and authority. , The consequences of this want of power were certain. Men of capacity who desired to serve their country sought other opportunities, in the state legislatures, in diplomacy, or in the army. The ranks of Congress were recruited by medio- crities, most of them loquacious and many of them corrupt. It had the mysterious confidence of Chinese mandarins in the efficacy of ordinances and proclamations. It ordered victories and decreed an army of eighty thousand men ; but, THE UNION OF THE STATES 101 notwithstanding, Washington had to make shift with ten A.D. thousand that he and not Congress had the labour and 1 J, 76 ~1 V 7 ? 3 & Mr. 19-26 credit of collecting. It meddled with appointments and promotions, and to every foreign "adventurer that came, ' without even the shadow of credentials, gave the rank of ' field officers." 1 It fumed over the question of supplies, leaving the army to perish of cold and hunger while it debated interminably and bungled its diplomacy with the states who were the real paymasters. Occasionally it had ideas. Officers, Samuel Adams argued, ought to be elected annually, so as to preserve the commonwealth from military despotism 2 — a view of the matter which, had it prevailed, might have ended the war at a much earlier date. His kinsman, John Adams, Chairman of the Board of War, discoursed on strategy and promulgated maxims. ■ My toast is a short and violent war ' ; for he was utterly ' sick of Fabian systems.' George the Third, if he had happened to hear of these sayings, must have wished well to the Adams family. These rhetorical activities were their own reward. They found no shoes, blankets or victuals for the men who camped at Valley Forge and huddled round the fires at night, afraid to sleep lest they should never wake. Mad- dened by the ingratitude and ingenious persecution of con- gressmen, Arnold became a traitor ; 3 and Greene, who had a nature beyond treachery, was driven to resignation 4 by their consequential malice. In this buzz and hubbub of inferior minds Washington alone was able to endure, wearing down their folly and conceit by his resolute gravity. This Congress, to which the great and constant general was obliged to defer and appeal, was clothed with a mock dignity and that fickle and uncertain power which rests entirely upon moral influence. It was meddlesome and 1 Hamilton to Duer, History, i. p. 431. 2 Cf. also History, i. p. 420. ' History, ii. pp. 50-52. * Ibid. ii. pp. 39-42, 102 ALEXANDER HAMILTON a.d. inefficient; was much addicted to fault-finding, to the giving M 19 26 °^ ^ 00 ^ s ^ a( ivice, and to intrigue against its own officers. It stinted supplies and delayed action. While it endeavoured with certain ill results to assert its own vain and foolish authority in the conduct of military affairs, it showed a corresponding backwardness and timidity in grappling with the national credit and curbing the recalcitrancy of the states. Enjoying the exercise of its minor functions with a peculiar zest, it shrank from placing them in jeopardy by any bold attempt to develop its implied powers on the plea of a national emergency. To consolidate its position and assume or usurp the high executive rights of govern- ment was an ambition wholly beyond its mean horizon; but in the torment and obstruction of its servants it was an adept, jealous of its privileges and observant of the letter of its commission. It is interesting, no doubt, to speculate upon the events which might have happened had the British Cabinet acted with more vigour, or had Washington been governed by less fortitude ; but it is, perhaps, still more interesting to consider what might have happened had Hamilton been a member of Congress instead of a soldier. When we consider his daring and masterful spirit, and remember how at a later date, with less assistance from the pressure of events, and in the teeth of interests which in the meanwhile had become more widely vested, of prejudices which had hardened into hatred, of traditions of independence which had grown from saplings into timber, he still succeeded in prevailing upon his fellow-countrymen to accept a real union, it is hard to believe that in the case we have imagined the signature of peace would have found the whole work of federation still waiting to be done. It appears more likely that he would have taken the metal at a red heat in 1777, than that he would have waited for eleven years longer until THE UNION OF THE STATES 103 it had grown cool. That his attempt would have succeeded A.D. is not beyond possibility, and had it succeeded it is con- J^ ig ^ ceivable that the constitution so created would have been a more powerful charter and more in accordance with his own political convictions than that which was subsequently approved at Philadelphia. The famous Conway Cabal (1777-1778) aimed at getting rid of Washington and replacing him by Gates ' the hero of Saratoga,' afterwards the hero of Camden, on which occa- sion he fled a hundred and eighty miles without looking back. 1 Because all Americans at the present time enter- tain an affectionate reverence for the memory of their first great leader, we are apt to assume that there must have been an even livelier passion of loyalty in the breasts of their ancestors who were his contemporaries. The reality was somewhat different. It is well to remember that for a time the opinion of a majority of Congress was in favour of driving Washington to resignation. In November 1777 that body was in the pride of its youth. If it was powerless to supply Washington with reinforce- ments, it was equal to the task of complaint against his failures and condemnation of his ' Fabian tactics ' ; if it showed no alacrity in checking frauds in the commissariat, it could still point a moral and deduce conclusions from the victory of Saratoga and the defeats of Brandywine and Germantown. It was inclined to a simple-minded worship of success, without analysis or consideration of circumstances. In the early spring thieves fell out, and the Conway Cabal came to an inglorious end. It had reckoned hopefully upon Washington's resignation, and had the commander-in-chief been merely the good man and high- spirited gentleman he was, and not something still greater over and above, the plan would have had the best chances 1 Hamilton to Duane, History, ii. p. 124. 164 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. of success. But, fortunately for his country, he looked upon l -y >6 ~i9 26 ^ s own P os i^ on m a spirit of extraordinary detachment. He regarded domestic intrigue, discontent and calumny as natural incidents in the war ; as things to be reckoned with, like floods, frosts and snowfalls, impersonally and without malice. As he had never sought power and honour, but merely accepted them when duty left no escape, he had no motive for resigna- tion ; for his duty was unchanged either by ingratitude or abuse. Under this attack his strength was weighted with another burden in that winter of suffering in the hills at Valley Forge, but he would have thought himself no less disgraced in laying down his commission before the clamours of Congress than in laying down his arms to a summons from Sir William Howe. To have a clear understanding, not merely of the cam- paigns of Washington, but of what followed after, when peace was signed, it is necessary that the character of the govern- ment, the nature and extent of its authority, should be firmly grasped. The war languished and dragged wearily along from the want of power in Congress and from the lack of virtue in congressmen. In reality the second was merely a consequence of the first ; for a position of promi- nence and publicity without powers commensurate to the office has no attractions for effective citizens who take statecraft seriously and are content to endure speech only as a means to action. But tq the consequential classes, prominence, publicity and speech have ever appeared ends admirable in themselves. Such men are easily content with those shreds of power which consist in the giving of advice, in the finding of fault, and in setting their servants by the ears. We must therefore admire the constancy of the patriotic minority who held to Congress through good and evil report, bearing with the din of clap-trap for the chance of being able now and again to serve their THE UNION OF THE STATES 105 country by the defeat of an intrigue or the destruction of A.D. a folly. Men like Kobert Morris have a right to share in ^"^gjj the fame of Washington. In a sense they have a double title to the gratitude of their countrymen, seeing that they not only withstood the mischief but endured the debate. Putting aside all consideration of persons, putting aside also such aspects of the conduct of government as the ingenious bad faith which marked its action after the Saratoga capitulation, looking at the matter in the driest light, there can be no shadow of a doubt that the feeble constitution of Congress, with its attendant evils in the character of its members, was the cause of the long . continuance of the war. Had Washington been supported with men and supplies, it is neither incredible nor even unlikely that the messengers bringing news of the surrender of Burgoyne, in October 1777, might have met halfway upon their journey riders from the south with word of the surrender of Howe at Philadelphia. The number of Washington's troops was at no time in proportion to the manhood of the country, nor were his supplies of food, clothing and pay ever commensurate with its wealth. Neither in men nor money was there a true measure taken of the spirit of its citizens. These difficulties dogged AVashington to the end. In every year after 1775 there was a possibility of ending the war by a crowning victory had he commanded an army worthy in numbers and equip- ment of the resources of the United States. It has been calculated by a thoughtful American his- torian, 1 that in the war between North and South, ninety years later, the federal troops towards the end of the struggle were in the proportion of one in every five of the men capable of bearing arms ; more than a million 1 Tht Critical Period of American History, by John Fiske, pp. 101-3. 106 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. soldiers were in the field for the defence of the union 1 I 76 ~ 1 J«? In the War of Independence the numbers never reached ^Et- 19-26 . r ' so high a ratio even if the militia, who appeared and disappeared very much at their own pleasure, is included in the sum. Accordingly it has been maintained by certain writers, that in the war against Britain there was a weaker spirit of patriotism than in the War of Secession. In both cases there was a man of immense character acting disinterestedly to attain success. Lincoln and Washington may be held to cancel one another in the equation. The real difference is that in the one case there was govern- ment, and in the other there was not. For if Congress could not bring into the field in such a cause men who were willing to serve, and if it could not provide for its soldiers, whom the country was well able to support, it was clearly an institution too contemptible to be described as a government. Allowing to natural conditions and the inertness of Britain their full force, the success of the colonists in the fight for independence was due to no political institutions, but only to the binding force of a common aim and the unmatched qualities of one great man. At the end of the war government was still to seek. The binding force of a common aim was then for the time being relaxed, for it had split into a thousand centrifugal forces of local jealousy and minor interests. But at least the one great man remained as before, and by good fortune another great man emerged in the nick of time to his assistance. Neither Washington nor Hamilton was under any illusion with regard to the immediate consequences of peace. They foresaw dangers ahead of them more grave in character than those which had already been surmounted. They knew that the future of their country hung upon a firm union, and that a firm union was impossible without a strong THE UNION OF THE STATES 107 government. The existing government was a make-believe. A.D. It had been maintained in an appearance of authority only 1 2 I 76 ~ 1 Q 7 ^ 3 by the determination of the people, and by an excessive con- sideration, a conscious and patriotic hypocrisy, on the part of their leaders. It had no inward strength, but like a sinking patient depended upon stimulants and doses for the preservation of its feeble vitality. As Hamilton had foretold, the ending of the war let loose at once all the forces of disunion. Men ringing their joy-bells as King George's fleet of transports shook out their white sails in New York harbour forgot that independence, being won, had still to be secured ; or, if they did not actually forget, indulged themselves in an easy confidence, longing for a brief respite from all high endeavour. To Hamilton such indiffer- ence seemed as dangerous as the lethargy of the traveller who sinks exhausted in a snowdrift. He believed that all effective co-operation had ceased when Washington dis- banded his army in the autumn of 1783; that the union was then dissolved as a reality, and preserved in Congress only as a tradition. The states were thirteen independent sovereigns, whose jealousies left open the doors of the house to foreign intrigue. Unless the people could be brought to realise the gravity of their predicament, the natural consequence of the War of Independence would be another civil war. During the spring of the year 1783 much correspondence had passed between Hamilton and the commander-in-chief upon this matter. Their minds were clear both as to the malady and the means to a cure. " Unless Congress have 1 powers competent to all general purposes," Washington wrote, u the distresses we have encountered, the expense we 4 have incurred, and the blood we have spilt, will avail us ' nothing." * ■ It now only remains," Hamilton replied, " to 1 Spark s'a Washington, viii. p. 391. 108 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1783 ' make solid establishments within, to perpetuate our Union, ' to prevent our being a ball in the hands of European * powers, bandied against each other at their pleasure : in fine, ■ to make our independence truly a blessing. This, it is 1 to be lamented, will be an arduous work ; for to borrow a ' figure from mechanics, the centrifugal is much stronger 1 than the centripetal force in these states — the seeds of 1 disunion much more numerous than those of union. I 1 will add that your Excellency's exertions are as essential 1 to accomplish this end as they have been to establish * independence." l Washington's circular letter to the governors of the states at the close of the war breathed the same prayer for "four ' things which I humbly conceive are essential to the well- 1 being, I may even venture to say, to the existence of the 1 United States as an independent power : — First, an indis- ' soluble union of the states under one federal head ; second, 1 a sacred regard to public justice; third, the adoption of a 1 proper peace establishment ; and fourth, the prevalence of ' that pacific and friendly disposition among the people of the 1 United States which will induce them to forget their local * prejudices and policies ; to make those mutual concessions 1 which are requisite to the general prosperity; and, in some * instances, to sacrifice their individual advantages to the 1 interest of the community." * In his farewell address to his soldiers he entreated them to go forth as missionaries among their fellow-citizens, preaching the gospel of union and a strong government. 8 It is not beyond the truth to say that Hamilton alone fully understood the heart of Washington upon this issue ; that he alone fully realised the grandeur of the policy of union. For between the aims of these two men and the 1 Works, ix. p. 327. * Sparks's Washington, viii. pp. 442-3. 1 Ibid. viii. p. 495. THE UNION OF THE STATES 109 aims of the rest of the national party there was something A.D. 1783 more than a difference of degree. The majority supported 26 the constitutional movement out of fear, these two from hope. Washington's fame is still, in some respects, far below his true deserts. We are apt to imagine him a man of cold courage and unimaginative wisdom. He was, in truth, under certain aspects neither cold nor unimagina- tive. His vision of the future was glowing and exuberant. The fancy of the veteran who had borne the brunt and discouragement of a wasting war was as fresh and san- guine as that of a boy who has never known a check. Alive no less to the value of the inheritance than to the dangers which threatened it, his chief concern was not a temporary triumph, but an ultimate security. Like Hamil- ton, he fixed his eyes upon a future far beyond his own span of life, and the welding of the thirteen states was to make the foundations of an Empire. From the declaration of peace there is a change in the relations of the two men. Their correspondence is still grave and formal; sometimes affectionate, never familiar. On the part of the elder there is an extraordinary generosity, a loyalty which never fails; on that of the younger a respectful consideration which has no tinge of the histrionic. In a sense, the leadership passes into the hands of Hamilton. It is his thought which ever presses forward, binding and constructing and preparing the way. He is the interpreter of the federal idea, and his main support is Washington's instinct which approves, Washing- ton's character which upholds him at every crisis of the struggle. Without diminishing his dignity or self-respect, without any abdication or surrender of his personal con- victions, Washington places the whole force of his great influence at the disposal of Hamilton, recognising in him a genius for statecraft, and without a grudge or afterthought 110 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1783 for his own glory. Such alliances are rare, but out of their T# conjunction great events are apt to be begotten. Hamilton was justified in all his predictions. The centri- fugal forces, escaping from their cave, made such a tempest of disorder as may well have taken even the prophet himself by surprise. Washington, in his wise optimism, held un- moved to the belief that * everything would come right at last/ and compared the riot and extravagance of the states after the peace to that of ' a young heir come a little prematurely to a large inheritance,' ! who by and by, under the pressure of circumstances, will return to his natural good sense, and successfully rebuild his dilapidated fortune. As things went from bad to worse he grew graver, but never despondent. What perhaps weighed upon him most heavily was not so much any doubt of the result, as the peril of his most cherished desire. He wished to live the rest of his days as a country gentleman, mending and enjoying his estate. He loved his wide plantations, green forests and majestic river. The struggle with Nature for an antagonist delighted his great heart by its arduous intensity, its compatibility with silence, its freedom from the restlessness of camps and cities and the affairs of men. But gradually it became clear that no union could ever be attained without him; and when it was at length attained, that no man but he could properly start it on its course ; and afterwards, that no man but he could continue it with safety. So in the end there remained barely three years for a reward to one who cared less than most men for the prizes of ambition, and loved to watch the seasons in his country home more than to lead victorious armies or to be a ruler over a great nation. 1 Spaiks's Washington, ix. p. 11. THE UNION OF THE STATES 111 1782-1783 Mr. 25-26 CHAPTER III Centrifugal Force and its Consequences The first trouble was the army, as has already been stated A.D. in a previous chapter. 1 Unpaid and unpensioned, it spoke openly of rebellion. Washington was urged to make himself king, not only by men who had claims and grievances, but by others who, while they loved order, considered this remedy to be the only means of obtaining an honest acknowledgment and liquidation of the various liabilities which had been contracted during the war. 2 Soldiers in peace-time are at a disadvantage. They are rarely masters of effective speech. Their words lack the cunning of restraint. Their sincerity and their conscious- ness of injustice render them impatient of parties. Occa- sionally they are useful to the politician, but he discards the alliance immediately it becomes a question of recompense. Moreover, their misfortunes tend to bring them upon the rates. Their grievance being that the country has dealt with them ungenerously, the taxpayers of whom the country is composed are placed in what they would themselves de- scribe as ' a delicate position ' — the delicacy consisting in the fact that they cannot indulge their emotions without putting their hands deeper into their pockets. Consequently, in a democracy, though the wrongs of an army frequently call forth much sentiment, they rarely obtain substantial redress .* A pension-list for political purposes is the utmost that a reasonable mind will entertain. Congressmen were very slow to respond. They continued 1 Book I. Chap. vi. pp. 65-67. ■ Fiske's Critical Period, pp. 106-8. 1 Cf. action of Massachusetts, Hi.Hori/, ii. pp. 494-5. 112 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. to draw their own salaries with a most punctual fidelity ; l ! 82 ^ 17 ?? but the claims of the army were a controversial matter Mt, 25-26 J which they professed to have scruples against settling offhand. It would be easier, they alleged with some truth, and more dignified, to discuss the question at leisure when the army was disbanded. 1 When mutinous murmurs reached their ears they looked askance at Washington, and made speeches upon the text, ' No Cromwells.' In plain words, they had no power, and what was even more, they had no goodwill. The debating caste was jealous of the warrior caste ; feared it, and affected, not altogether insincerely, to regard the calling of arms with a kind of moral reprobation. Soldiers were under certain conditions a painful necessity, but, like a panther used for hunting, should be clapped in chains as speedily as possible after the quarry had been killed. Hamilton, writing to Washington from Philadelphia in the spring of 1783, describes the attitude of his fellow-congressmen without flattery : " But ' while I urge the army to moderation, I advise your 1 Excellency to take the direction of their discontents, and ' endeavour to confine them within the bounds of duty. I 1 cannot, as an honest man, conceal from you that I am ' afraid their distrusts have too much foundation. Repub- 1 lican jealousy has in it a principle of hostility to an army, 1 whatever be their merits, whatever be their claims to 1 the gratitude of the community. It acknowledges their 1 services with unwillingness, and rewards them with reluct- 1 ance. I see this temper, though smothered with great care, 1 involuntarily breaking out upon too many occasions. I often 1 feel a mortification, which it would be impolitic to express, ' that sets my passions at variance with my reason. Too 1 many, I perceive, if they could do it with safety or colour, 1 would be glad to elude the just pretensions of the army." 2 1 History, ii. p. 496. 2 Works, ix. p. 330, THE UNION OF THE STATES 113 The dangers of a military rebellion were avoided in the AD - manner which has been already described. For success the ^ T 25 . 2 6 movement needed a Cromwell; and there was only one Cromwell possible, who not only declined to serve, but by adroit and courageous management defeated the hopes of the revolutionary party. Hot as was Washington's indigna- tion, much as he loved the army, his patriotism was too wide and well balanced to let loose the havoc of civil war, even though short of this remedy there was no hope of an adequate provision. It was said with truth that the defeated Government of King George dealt with the exiled and fugitive loyalists with a far greater liberality than the United States bestowed upon their victorious but im- poverished army. After the taking of Yorktown, Hamilton returned to Albany, and remained the guest of his father-in-law until the spring. General Schuyler offered pecuniary assistance, and there was some talk of a public appointment, but both were refused. Hamilton's determination was fixed to go to the bar. He resigned his commission in the army on the ground that he had obtained his command in the autumn only with great difficulty and after repeated applications. He was unwilling, now that the issue admitted of no uncertainty, to 'obtrude' his claims upon the commander-in-chief. At the same time he gave up his rights in the matters of half-pay and com- pensation. In the May following (1782) he accepted for the period of a few months the office of receiver of the continental taxes for New York state, but resigned it in winter, when he was chosen to be a member of Congress. In 1782, after a few months of study, Hamilton was admitted to the bar. The age of twenty-five, which was his age at that date, is to-day the usual time of life for young men to enter upon this arduous profession. There is an odd contrast, however, between the typical student of n 114 ALEXANDER HAMILTON AD - Lincoln's Inn or the Temple, and this strange, smiling, «£h\ 25-26 D °yi sn figure, with the fine lace ruffles, who had already- played the part and borne the responsibilities of a man in the affairs of a great war, who had dealt with statesmen in high matters of politics, and conducted with tact and firm- ness the diplomacy between the commanders of America and France. When we read of his sudden success as an advocate, we are inclined to look for the reason in the smallness of the arena and the dearth of great practitioners. To a certain extent both explanations are correct. The population of New York state in 1782 numbered only about a hundred and seventy thousand persons, New York city some thirty thousand. The former leaders of the bar, for the most part loyalists or Tories, had been swept entirely out of the field. But granting that the arena was small, it was not so with the issues which the conclusion of peace had brought up for consideration. Few courts of justice have ever been called upon to settle principles of higher moment to tbe state. Hamilton followed the Ciceronian tradition, mixing and inter- weaving law with politics. Through his advocacy in private causes he sought to affect, and to a large degree succeeded in affecting, public opinion outside the court-house. The treaty of peace with Britain, like other docu- ments of the kind, contained provisions of give and take. After signature by the commissioners in Paris, it was rati- fied with due consideration by the Continental Congress. The advantages which it secured were not merely of a sentimental nature, but material. It was justly regarded by enlightened citizens of the States as a triumph of diplomacy. The credit of Britain in the bargain was more of the heart than of the head. She was willing to concede substantial and important benefits in order to secure the THE UNION OF THE STATES 115 lives and property of those colonists who had clung to the A.D. 1783 old tradition and had sustained her arms. Looking at the matter in a cool light, she blundered into sacrifices that were altogether needless even with this aim in view. Her discredit was a lack of knowledge, of foresight and of interest. The game was played, and she had lost. North America, in the eyes of her statesmen, was a strip of eastern seaboard ; the great lakes were but dimly understood ; the continent beyond the Mississippi was ignored. She gave much more than she needed to have given, both in east and west, to attain her honourable end ; and what was more immediately distressing, she received little or no value in return for her liberal concessions. " The uti possidetis, each party to hold what it possesses," Hamilton writes in the first letter from Phocion, "is the ' point from which nations set out in framing a treaty of ' peace. If one side gives up a part of its acquisitions, the 1 other side renders an equivalent in some other way. What f is the equivalent given to Great Britain for all the important • concessions she has made ? She has surrendered the capital 1 of this state (New York) and its large dependencies. She 1 is to surrender our immensely valuable posts on the ' frontier, and to yield to us a vast tract of western territory, 1 with one-half of the lakes, by which we shall command ■ almost the whole fur trade. She renounces to us her claim ' to the navigation of the Mississippi, and admits us to share 1 in the fisheries even on better terms than we formerly 1 enjoyed it. As she was in possession, by right of war, of •' all these objects, whatever may have been our original • pretensions to them, they are, by the laws of nations, to 1 be considered as so much given up on her part. And what ' do we give in return ? We stipulate — that there shall be 1 no future injury to her adherents among us. How insigni- 1 ficant the equivalent in comparison with the acquisition ! 116 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A. D. 1783 ' A man of sense would be ashamed to compare them; a jpi Oft ' man of honesty, not intoxicated with passion, would blush * to lisp a question of the obligation to observe the stipulation 1 on our part." x In return for these advantages Congress had most solemnly undertaken three things, and the people, wearied by the sufferings of an eight years' war, would have gladly purchased the blessings of peace at a much higher price. The first of these conditions was that no obstacle or im- pediment should be put in the way of the recovery of debts due to British subjects from the citizens of the Republic ; the second, that in the future no fresh prosecu- tions or confiscations should be directed against loyalists; the third, that Congress should sincerely recommend to the legislatures of the various states a repeal of the existing acts of confiscation which affected the property of these unfor- tunate persons. On the last no stress need be laid. Franklin was candid as to the difficulties, and in all likelihood it was little more than a pious hope. But the first and the second were unambiguous, and by every man, honest or dishonest, were understood in the same sense when peace was joyfully accepted. The forms of political knavery are beyond enumeration, but they fall into classes with certain conspicuous features, according to the development of the community. There is the knavery of the pure savage, which differs from that of the feudal baron ; and there are knaveries peculiar to a bureaucracy, to a despot, and to a people without previous experience in international relations. The knavery of the American states was of the last-named order. They took the benefits of peace which the efforts of Congress had secured to them ; they accepted the advantages of the treaty which their representatives had signed ; they watched 1 Works, iv. p. 239. THE UNION OF THE STATES 117 and waited until the troops of King George were embarked A.D. 1783 in transports for England, and then proceeded to deny, in a M variety of tones, all power in the central government to bind them in the matter of the quid pro quo. It was not a great thing which Congress had undertaken to do, or one which could be of any material advantage to their late enemy. All their promise amounted to was that they would abstain from the degradation of a petty and personal revenge, and this promise they proceeded to break in every particular. As Hamilton wisely and nobly urged, the breach was not only a despicable perfidy but an impolitic act, since loyalists might become good citizens, and the states needed nothing more urgently than population. But no sooner was danger at a distance, embarked on transports, than the states assumed an attitude of defiance. New York in particular proceeded to persecute the Tories by novel expedients and with re- doubled energy. The thirteen legislatures vied with one another in the ingenuity of measures for defeating recovery of debts due to British creditors. They derided the recom- mendation to repeal oppressive acts and to restore con- fiscated property, and proceeded without regard either for honour or consequences to pass new acts of wider oppression and to order confiscations on a grander scale. It was the same spirit which had violated the terms of the Saratoga capitulation : the same which in later days preached the gospel of repudiation with its hand upon its heart. The United States at this date were not independent of European assistance, but on the contrary stood urgently in need of it. They required capital and credit, and, beyond everything, treaties of commerce; but until 1789, when the constitution was in being, they called their wants to deaf ears. European bankers and ministers of state, mindful of these events, evaded — sometimes with less of courtesy and circum- locution than was agreeable — all proposals for co-operation. 118 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1783 Even their politest messages were unflattering. They coni 26 p] a i ne( j f the duality of a government that was one and indivisible when it desired to purchase a favour or an accommodation, but turned into thirteen recusants when it became a question of paying the reckoning. They declined to be captivated or tempted by the illusion of a Congress that dissolved and faded under the pressure of an obligation into a welter of truculent and con- ceited legislatures, who pleaded their municipal statutes against the law of nations, and denied the right of the central power to do more than secure prepayment from simpletons. Against this flagrant and ruinous chicanery the nobler spirits of the Revolution revolted, protested and fought, but for a considerable period of years in vain. They had no regard for popularity, and incurred much hatred. Among its opponents Hamilton was foremost in writings and action. Clinton, Governor of New York, became at this time his enemy, and remained so to the end. Among people who had no word upon their lips so frequently as freedom, Clinton acted the part of a predatory despot by playing ingeniously upon the greed and passions of his constituents. It is impossible to withhold a certain degree of admiration for this narrow, irascible, obstinate, masterful precursor of Tammany, who* maintained his domination against a coalition of all the virtues and all the talents over a prolonged term. In shrewdness, and not from cynicism, he called his policy Democracy. Phrases never clouded his illiterate and direct intelligence; but he was far from despis- ing their utility in dealing with the electorate. Having given his policy a name, not with the object of describing it, but merely to please the public taste, he fixed it like a ring in a bull's nose, and led the passive creature whithersoever it pleased him. THE UNION OF THE STATES 119 Clinton loved his governorship with a passion that was A.D. 1783 entirely royal, and he hated Congress because it possessed ^ jT ' 26 a semblance of superior power. When it was possible to do so he thwarted that august impotency and treated it to humiliation and contempt. He hated and feared the idea of union, and fought against it tooth and nail; for union, beyond any doubt, meant the curtailment of his power and importance. He hated the loyalists and Tories because they had once been his enemies. It is probable that after a fashion he loved his own state of New York, was jealous of her glory, desired to see her independent, rich and powerful, as sometimes a man has a pride in his wife though he ill-uses her. Such a character holding the governorship of the chief commercial state of the Union was the natural leader of the revolt against treaty obligations, and in his action it is likely that his hatred of Congress was at least an equal motive with his hatred of loyalists. His first move was a comprehensive measure for disfranchising every one who had stayed of his own free will in places occupied by British troops or under their nominal control ; but the pro- posal was too crude a usurpation for the stomachs of his more timid supporters. Then he attempted to impose an oath as a condition of enfranchisement — an oath not of loyalty in the present and for the future, which would have been legitimate, but of immaculate patriotism in the past. 1 He promoted an edict of perpetual exile against all Tories who had left the state. He carried an act enabling citizens whose property had been occupied or entered upon by others under British authority, during the military occupation, to bring suits for damages against such persons as tres- passers. This measure struck at the roots of the settlement, and such was the intention of the Clintonian party. It 1 History, hi. p. 29. 120 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1783 also opened the doors to every kind of extortion working Mt ' 26 through prejudice against justice. Hamilton contended boldly that the act was illegal, being contrary to the treaty of peace which Congress was within its legitimate powers in concluding. Clinton, with much adroitness, arranged for a test case in which a poor widow sought damages from a wealthy merchant. 1 Popular sympathy was on the side of Clinton's law, and the circum- stances of this particular cause lent themselves to a senti- mental treatment. The state courts were swayed by both considerations, and would gladly have found a way to enforce the Trespass Act and right the widow. But Hamilton left them no way. He fought the case upon the great principles of national obligation which lay at the root of the matter, and wrung a verdict for his client from the reluctant judges. By this victory he smashed the Trespass Act; but the whole policy of repudiation was abhorrent to him, and he attacked it at large in the first of his letters from Phocion. One Ledyard, over the signature of Mentor, attempted a reply which drew from Hamilton a second letter upon the same theme. These two pamphlets are among the noblest and most persuasive of his writings. In personal invective he was not a great master. He lacked the delicacy of wit and melody of phrase which ajone can render anger and contempt agreeable to a passionless and disinterested posterity; but when he writes, as in these, with deep sincerity, with candour and good temper, he is disarming and resistless. His simple object was to persuade all honest men that for them the Clintonian policy of oppres- sion was impossible ; and honest men, reading the pamphlets, put aside their prejudices and became slowly convinced. We find some measure of his success in the rage of 1 History, iii. pp. 11-22- THE UNION OF THE STATES 121 the governor's Taction. Never, even later when he spoke A.D. 1783 disrespectfully of the French Revolution, was he hated with JEft - 26 so great a frenzy. A club frequented by Ledyard decided to challenge Hamilton, each member in turn, until some one at length should have the good fortune to put an end to him. But Ledyard, who had, at least, the virtue of being able to take blows in return for those he gave, entering the club and hearing of this strange proposal, broke out in loud indignation : " This, gentlemen, can never be ! 1 What? You write what you please, and because you 1 cannot refute what he writes in reply you form a com- ' bination to take his life." x And so, reluctantly, the scheme was abandoned by its devoted authors. It was Hamilton's most fatal weakness as a politician, and one of his chief virtues as a statesman, that he was indifferent to popularity. The same passion for order and justice, which had driven him as a boy to defend his enemies against the vio- lence of an excited mob, armed him now against the threats and abuse of Clinton's henchmen. He called himself a Whig, following the practice of the revolutionary leaders, and his definition of the name might almost have converted Lord Thurlow himself. "The spirit of Whiggism is generous, 1 humane, beneficent, and just. These men (the Clintonians) ' inculcate revenge, cruelty, persecution and perfidy. The ' spirit of Whiggism cherishes legal liberty, holds the rights 1 of every individual sacred, condemns or punishes no man 1 without regular trial and conviction of some crime declared 1 by antecedent laws ; reprobates equally the punishment of ' the citizen by arbitrary acts of legislation, as by the lawless 1 combmations of unauthorised individuals, while those men ' are advocates for expelling a large number of their fellow- 1 citizens unheard, untried; or, if they cannot effect this, are ' for disfranchising them, in the face of the constitution, 1 History, in. p. 45. 122 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1783 ■ without the judgment of their peers and contrary to the ^• 26 ' law of the land." * Hamilton's career and merits as a lawyer have been dis- cussed at length by men who were themselves great jurists. In the present essay, which is concerned with his political services, any elaborate survey would be out of place. His practice grew rapidly. Abilities that could win a verdict against the oppressed widow and the popular governor could not be safely overlooked by litigants, no matter what political views they might entertain. He was no mere advocate to dazzle twelve plain men in a box. With courts he was more successful than with juries ; and the higher the court, the greater was his influence upon it. We are apt, having rarely witnessed the phenomenon, to ignore the chief advantage of his circumstances. In the vigour of his youth and at the very summit of hope, he brought to the study of the divine precepts of law a char- acter already trained and tested by the realities of life, formed by success, experienced in the facts and disorders with which law has to deal. Before he began the study of the remedies, he had a wide knowledge of the conditions of human society. Although still a boy in years and spirits, the memory of playing fields and debating clubs was faint and far off; for he had already contended and measured himself against characters who have left their mark on history. It is characteristic of his quality that during the year in which he studied for the bar he wrote a text-book on law for the use of students. With a succeeding generation of students Hamilton's text-book remained in use, 2 not from any sentimental reason, for the party which he had led was extinguished and his own fame. lay under a cloud of unpopularity, but solely on its merits. > Worki, iv. p. 231. a History, ii. p. 282. THE UNION OF THE STATES 123 He practised at the bar for seven years before Washington A.D. 178: summoned him to his cabinet, and for ten after he had T ' resigned his office — altogether barely seventeen years. During the whole of this period he was occupied as much with public affairs as with his profession. Yet from what remains to us in the meagre reports, and in his own notes, abstracts and memoranda, from the testimony of his con- temporaries and the criticism of men who followed after, there exists no doubt that he must be numbered among the great lawyers, one of the smallest societies of mortal excellence. With him, as with them (for it is the badge of their company), law was not so much a slow and arduous acquisition as a sudden discovery; not so much a painful effort of learning as the intuition of an eternal harmony : a reality, quick and human, buxom and jolly, and not a formula pinched and embalmed, stiff, banded and dusty like a royal mummy of Egypt. Reversing the rule of all academies, and following the invariable practice of greatness, he learned from the top do wn wards, not from the base upwards ; and if he escaped drudgery, which we are too often inclined to place upon a separate pedestal and worship for its own sake, it was not at the sacrifice of thoroughness ; for principles were a part of his being, and he found his details as he needed them, like a man seeking needles with a lodestone. CHAPTER IV Disorder and Anarchy The violations of the terms of peace which took place in New York were conspicuous, not so much by reason of their exceptional flagrancy, as from the commercial importance 124 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. of that state, from the large number of Tories included in Mt~26?q * te P P u ^ at i° n » an( * f rom tne notable part taken by Hamilton in opposing a policy which in his eyes was one not merely of breach of faith, but of disintegration. Up till this time the great difficulty had been to arrive at anything approaching unanimity among the states; but there was at once a perfect unanimity in refusing to repeal the acts of confiscation. There was also a practical unanimity in engaging in fresh persecutions of the loyalists, not merely by the enactment of oppressive civil laws, but even by deny- ing them the protection afforded by a just enforcement of the criminal laws. In many districts these unfortunate persons were robbed, tortured, and even put to death with impunity, and over a hundred thousand were driven into exile in Canada, Florida and the Bahamas. Finally, there was unanimity among all the most important states in taking measures to defeat the recovery of private debts in cases where the creditors were Englishmen. 1 It was the same in Massachusetts and in South Carolina, in Pennsyl- vania, Maryland and Virginia, as well as in New York. The recovery of private debts was indeed one of the stipulations of the treaty of peace, but in dealing with any nation which had evolved a public opinion capable of sus- taining the most rudimentary code of personal honour it would have been superfluous, a thing which would have gone without saying. It is remarkable, however, that in this period of pristine virtue public opinion was at once so childish and so rotten, that we are at a loss whether to marvel most at its recklessness of credit or at its unvarnished dishonesty. Public opinion was entirely favourable to the idea of private theft, and the interest of rogues was con- sidered with a tender compassion by the grave and respect- able citizens who composed the legislatures of the various 1 Fiakfj'fli Critical Period of American History, pp. 129 130. 1783-1787 Ms. 26-30 THE UNION OF THE STATES 125 states. Measures were passed amid popular rejoicing to a.D. obstruct the recovery of debts due to British merchants, and to enable the fortunate Americans to revel unmolested in the pleasant flavour of stolen fruit. Such lack of morals in the people being added to the lack of power in Congress, it is not wonderful that the federal government gradually faded into a dim shadow. Even the instinct of self-importance was insufficient to keep it alive. Having become wholly a farce, it sank into indifference. The legislatures of the thirteen states treated it with frank contumety; acted in open defiance of its authority ; ignored its counsels ; refused its requests ; and went their various ways in contempt. Delaware and Georgia, with stern economy, considered it to be a waste of the public money to furnish delegates During the six years preceding 1789 the average attendance was about twenty-five, out of a total of ninety-one. Frequently the meetings were adjourned, which harmed no man, for want of a quorum. " Our prospects," wrote Hamilton to Jay, "are not flattering. Every day proves the inefficiency of 1 the present confederation ; yet the common danger being 1 removed, we are receding instead of advancing in a dis ' position to amend its defects. The road to popularity in 1 each state is to inspire jealousies of the power of Congress, ' though nothing can be more apparent than that they have 1 no power ; and that for the want of it the resources of the 1 country during the war could not be drawn out, and we at ' this moment experience all the mischiefs of a bankrupt and * ruined credit. It is to be hoped that when prejudice and 1 folly have run themselves out of breath, we may return to ' reason and correct our errors." 1 Hamilton took his seat in Congress during November 1782, and remained for eight months a member of that body. 1 Works, ix. pp. 381 , 382. 126 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. The debates were not open to the public, and the only l J?^~}]V n authentic records which remain are the Journals of the ALT. zb-30 House. Details are therefore entirely lacking; but it is certain that he took a great part, if not the most prominent part, ir> its proceedings. 1 From the formal entries, from his own letters and from contemporary notices, he stands out clearly as the courageous advocate of union speaking to deaf ears. His disposition was the reverse of reticent. He never stored up ideas awaiting the dramatic occasion that would receive them with applause. If his mind was full of any matter, he announced it regardless of the forces or the lethargy that were arrayed against him. All the chief measures of his subsequent administration were brought under discussion at this period without consideration for the hopelessness of success. His ideas in the matters of foreign policy, defence, national credit and commercial affairs were all mooted in this uncongenial atmosphere. 2 But in the end even he succumbed to its intolerable influence. The absence of any pressing external danger removed all chance of an effective effort proceeding from within. The time had gone by when a bold demand by Congress for sufficient powers to govern with might have had some hope of success; and although in a sanguine moment Hamilton had drafted a series of resolutions in favour of union, he met with so little encouragement that he did not in the end submit them to the judgment of the lack-lustre assembly. 3 Meanwhile the policy of breach of faith was producing its natural crop of inconveniences. Clintonian methods were not the unmixed advantage which his adherents had supposed when they engaged upon them in a spirit of light- hearted cunning. It was true that Britain was in no mood to embark upon a fresh war for the punishment of broken 1 History, ii. pp. 335-7. a Ibid. ii. pp. 568-9. s Ibid. ii. pp. 571-8. THE UNION OF THE STATES 12? promises. She had surrendered the chief hostage when A.D. 1783-17 IRr. 26-30 she evacuated her strategical position at New York ; but she declined to hand over the eight important frontier posts which she held upon the American side of the line between Lake Michigan and Lake Champlain. 1 These forts were much in themselves, and as a symbol of dominion to the Indian tribes. They were much also as a matter of pride; while their retention carried with it the whole of the valuable fur trade, which consequently, until 1795, when they were at last surrendered, brought its considerable profits to British merchants. Among British statesmen unfriendly to the American confederation there was at this time an opinion, not alto- gether ill-founded, that the slender bonds of union might be broken by a war of tariffs and navigation acts. 2 Britain still remained the chief customer of the states, as well as their chief market for those needs which they were unable to produce within their own borders. It was there- fore thought by many people that if the pressure of commercial restrictions were rigidly applied, individual members of the confederacy might, sooner or later, be tempted to enter into separate fiscal agreements with the British Government out of consideration for their own pecuniary interests. By this means it was hoped that a considerable number might be gradually and gently de- tached from the Union, and in the end led back to their old allegiance. During the parliamentary session of 1783, after the pre- liminaries of peace had been signed, but before the evacua- tion of New York had taken place, Pitt, in a different spirit, introduced a bill, the object of which was to secure unconditional free trade between the mother country and the states. For this he has been warmly praised by the 1 History, iii. pp. 113-14. » Ibid. iii. p. 109. 128 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. majority of modern writers, while the House of Commons, A 26 30 wn ^ cn refused to entertain his proposals, has been un- sparingly condemned as narrow-minded, short-sighted and churlish. In so far as its action was due to temper, the result was doubtless lamentable, since it has tended to obscure the cool motives of policy which were the real mainspring. It is not clear, however, that temper had much to do with the matter. Historians have perhaps tended to assume too readily that a nation which had been worsted in a long, costly, and somewhat ignominious war, would be in a mood highly unfavourable for considering measures which, while they might conceivably have conferred substantial benefits upon themselves, would have had the undoubted effect of conferring benefits, relatively much greater, upon their late antagonists. To a generation which has grown accustomed to regard all state regulation of international commerce as nothing better than a way of cutting off one's nose to spite one's face, it has seemed natural to conclude that the decision of the British legislature must have been dictated by no more respectable motive than ill-feeling. But this assump- tion rests more upon its inherent probability, according to modern ideas, than upon any contemporary evidence of repute. Pitt's view, certainly the view of the later writers who have praised his foresight and breadth of mind, was not only that the purposed arrangement would have been commercially beneficial to Britain by enriching an eager and important customer, but further, that it would have excited a strong sentiment of gratitude in the citizens of the new Republic, and would have swiftly consigned to oblivion all the bitter memories of the war. 1 It has been assumed as an axiom that this admirable result must have 1 History, iii. p. 57. THE UNION OF THE STATES 129 ensued; but at the best it was no more than a vague A.D. 1783-17 J&r. 26-30 possibility, and upon the whole it seems more likely that ] nothing of the kind would ever have occurred. For, in point of fact, it was in the states and not in England that revenge was elevated into a national object. The wholesale repudiation of the terms of peace would never have found its necessary support in public opinion had it rested merely upon the interest of private debtors. To pretend that the policy of Clinton was the result of the British regulations concerning trade and shipping is only possible to a profligate imagination, or to a memory un- retentive of dates. The nature of these regulations was unknown, their effect had not begun to make itself felt, when the carnival began like some process of spontaneous combustion. Nor even had those things been known and felt would they have afforded a plausible pretext. For there was nothing invidious in the action of Britain. The policy she chose to pursue was entirely in accordance with the practice of all nations at that epoch. Commercial warfare was their normal condition. France, the ally of the states, was no less stiff in her enactments, and the hostility of Britain excited louder complaints only because Britain was of incomparably greater importance to the prosperity of the states than any of her rivals. Had Pitt's measure been passed it would have meant a complete reversal of a policy which had been pursued with success since the days of Elizabeth. The refusal of Par- liament to approve of so great a revolution implied no particular animosity to America, but merely an aversion from the sudden jettison of an approved tradition. It is credible, and even likely, that a system of unconditional free trade might have resulted in the enrichment of many British manufacturers and merchants, and in an increase of the volume of trade between the two countries ; but it 130 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. would have been none the less a startling violation of a 52fiJ2j! principle which had obtained for many generations. This principle laid it down firmly that the proper object of national policy was to bind together the mother country and her colonies in an empire which should be as nearly as possible self-sufficing and independent ot the rest of the world. According to this view, it was a mistake to cherish our rivals, and strengthen their sinews, even for the sake of a pecuniary advantage to ourselves. In this case, moreover, there were particular reasons which weighed with the majority both in the Cabinet and in Parliament against any relaxation of the traditional policy of Britain. Then, as now, this country was the chief maritime power, and then, as now, she was determined at all costs to maintain her supremacy. The conditions of this supremacy were sailors and ships, and for these she looked to the prosperity of her mercantile marine and of her building-yards. Gratuitously to invite America to take a share in the carrying-trade seemed little short of madness. The right policy was to exclude her from it to the utmost extent that was possible, seeing that of all others she was the rival who had the greatest natural advantages to support her competition. Materials were so plentiful and ready to hand that in those days ships could be built in New England for less than two- thirds of the price that was required in Europe. 1 The, development of American resources and an encouragement of her shipping must, therefore, have meant within a few years the closing of British yards. These considerations lent an overwhelming force to the opposition directed against the free trade proposals, and it may even be that on second thoughts Pitt himself was converted by their logic. Certainly he never again submitted his Utopian scheme. British trade to and 1 Flake's Critical Period of American History, p. 137. THE UNION OF THE STATES 131 from British colonies was accordingly confined as rigidly A.D. as before to British bottoms. ^ 26 ' 3 q The result entailed much hardship and widespread fuin in the states. In the old colonial days, American shipping had depended almost entirely upon the trade with Britain and her West Indian possessions. Under the new settlement, however, the latter were immediately closed to her vessels. The distress thus caused was genuine ; but the complaints which it called forth were to a large extent unreasonable ; for in fact the states, having voluntarily broken away from the Empire, could hardly claim with any justice to pursue the same profitable intercourse which would have remained open to them had they chosen to remain within it. British policy, however, did not stop short at this point, but sought a further advantage which the unfortunate pre- dicament of the states enabled it to seize without much difficulty. A bold attempt was made to confine all trade between Britain and America to our own shipping, and so long as dissension continued among the thirteen states the attempt succeeded, since no measures of reprisal, no unani- mous and general counter-strokes, were possible. Duties upon imports coming from England, and dues upon English ships, could only become an effective weapon if they were universally levied at all the ports along the coast, and this was out of the question until the Union was something more than a mere name. Congress, urged to it by the chief commercial states, asked for powers, but asked always in vain. Each state was jealous of its neighbours. The southern states, who depended upon the export of their raw material, were distrustful of the northern states who owned the ships, and not without reason suspected a design to exclude the English carrying- trade from American harbours only in order that Yankees and New Yorkers might be enriched by exacting more burdensome freights for do- 132 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. livering the produce of the plantations to European 1 ™*~™1 consumers. 1 jEt. 26-30 Things accordingly became even worse than during the war. The carrying- trade then existed, though its risks were high ; but now it was wholly extinguished by the competition of their former enemy in American ports. Shipbuilding, though no nation had more natural advantages of materials and situation, was likewise extinguished ; for, with the loss of the carrying-trade, there was no market at home, and abroad the hostile duties made sales impossible. The free access to the fisheries which had been secured under the treaty was in practice but a small boon, since the profitable foreign market in the British West Indian possessions was closed to the sale of the salted produce. 2 And in spite of all the grievance and ill-feeling, a large demand arose for British goods. For these specie had to be paid down on the nail in all cases where wares or materials were not taken in exchange, since no British merchant would now give one pennyworth of credit, out of respect to the measures of the various states for the obstruction of the payment of British debts. Even when payment was taken in kind the rate of the exchange was ruinous to the American producer, for many of his commodities fell under the ban of the British tariff, and had to be reckoned, not at their market value, but at their market value less the amount of the import duties Uiey would have to bear when landed in London or Bristol. It has been computed that in 1784 £1,700,000 of our manufactures were imported, and but £700,000 of native produce taken in exchange. 3 The balance was paid in hard cash. Specie flowed out of the country, so that, in addition to the ruin of the merchants, shipowners, shipbuilders and fishermen, there was added a 1 History, iii. p. 110. 2 Ibid. iii. p 108. * Cambridge Modern History, vii. p. 312, THE UNION OF THE STATES 133 currency question that ultimately led to civil war upon a A.D. considerable scale. ^^J*! Mt. 26-30 Financial trouble had dogged the steps of Congress throughout the war. As the struggle dragged on, this problem increased in difficulty; but so long as hostilities continued, the difficulty was by some means overcome. It had been to the interest of France and Holland, and of the other enemies of Britain, to keep the war alive. They could not afford to let it perish of exhaustion. And a further reason was found in the argument that when the severe drain of war expenditure had ceased, prompt payments of interest and a speedy return of the principal would certainly be made. Creditors had therefore been sanguine and in- dulgent. But in fact all their calculations were upset, for with the declaration of peace precisely the reverse of all their forecasts came to pass. The chief stimulus to contributions from the various states was gone, for the common danger no longer existed. Far from being in a position to deal handsomely with its creditors, Congress could barely support the small charges of the nominal government. The interest on foreign loans was still unpaid, and repayment of the capital became a remote and visionary possibility. European financiers were disinclined, therefore, to throw good money after bad. Not only were American applications refused ; they were derided. In the end even the resourcefulness of Robert Morris could do nothing. He had in all likelihood achieved more than any other man could have hoped to achieve. 1 His dis- interestedness no less than his competency was singular in that company, for, like Washington, he contributed his private fortune to the common stock. But the limit of his powers had been reached, and, hopeless of any speedy change in the constitution, he felt the position to be impossible. The 1 Hamilton to Washington, History , ii. p. 603. 134 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. true remedy was discussed by Congress with ungrudging Mr~2G.ll P ronxit y> bufc n ©ver seriously attempted, and with a fine sense of irony it appointed a committee to succeed to his functions when he tendered his resignation. Commercial treaties were no easier to obtain than loans, so that this means of reviving and fostering commerce was also closed. No country would conclude a bargain with Congress, for the reason that the thirteen states could be relied upon to repudiate all parts of the arrangement which conferred an advantage upon the other contracting party. 1 Even the little commerce overseas which was retained lacked all security, and was endangered by the want of power to protect it. American ships were seized, and American citizens sold in slavery by Barbary pirates, while their countrymen at home were engaged in arguing the question of State Rights, and laying traps for the con- fusion of the central government. American diplomacy and American subjects were open to insults and injuries from the meanest antagonists. The voice of the Union had no authority among nations, any more than its bonds had credit or its promises were believed. It was indeed a somewhat humiliating pass to have come to, within a few years after having overcome the richest, proudest and most powerful people in Europe. Power, prosperity and consideration, which all men affected to desire, were only to be had on terms which the states could not bring themselves to pay. The dignified entreaties of Washington, the unanswerable reasoning of Hamilton, failed to move their light minds. The number of the plagues was still incomplete. The citizens hardened their hearts ; preferring, like Pharaoh, to endure the murrain, the locusts, and the darkness, rather than abandon their mean jealousies, their rivalries at once sordid and malicious; 1 History, iii. pp. 87, 90, 91. THE UNION OF THE STATES 135 rather than part with, or delegate, a single shred of local A.D. 26-3( 1 >7qo 1 70*7 sovereignty to clothe the shivering and naked form of Mt the federal government. Finally in their madness they fell one upon another; each at the beginning looking merely for advantage to itself in injury to its neighbours, but as time went on seeking injury to its neighbours even as an end desirable in itself. The thirteen states proceeded to indulge themselves in the costly luxury of an internecine tariff war. The states with seaports preyed upon their land-locked brethren, and provoked a boycott in return. Pennsylvania attacked Delaware. Connecticut was oppressed by Rhode Island and New York. New Jersey, lying between New York on the one hand, and Pennsylvania on the other, was com- pared to 'a cask tapped at both ends'; North Carolina, between South Carolina and Virginia, to ■ a patient bleeding at both stumps.' It was a dangerous game, ruinous in itself, and, behind the custom-house officers, men were beginning to furbish up the locks of their muskets. Wherever there is a boundary there are apt to be disputes, and the political conditions being what they were, it was not likely that this copious source of ill-feeling would run dry. The barbarities of the Pennsylvanians under Patter- son, in the valley of Wyoming, outdid even the legends of British atrocities, and left a rankling memory in Connecti- cut. At one time war between Vermont, New Hampshire, and New York seemed all but inevitable. Then there came the greatest of all the plagues in the not unusual disguise of a panacea. The general commercial ruin and financial collapse had all but extinguished credit. The drain of specie had all but extinguished the currency. Credit without currency might in theory work great mar- vels; but the lack of both is necessarily fatal. Barter became a common expedient. Tobacco, whisky, and salt 136 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. pork served in different states as the clumsy medium of 83-1787 /Ex. 26-30 exchange. Every industry groaned under the calamity. But help was at hand. Towards 1786 the genius of democracy discovered a remedy. The sound political in- stinct of the people, which it was the fashion of the Clintonian school to uphold as equally fitted for a general judgment after the event, and for the nicest pro- blems of expert knowledge, rose to the occasion and demanded paper money. Printing-presses in Georgia and the Carolinas, in Pennsylvania, New York and Rhode Island, obediently creaked out affluence in response to the resolutions of their various legislatures. All the states, save only Connecticut and Delaware, were more or less disturbed by the agitation which passed like a sudden wave over the whole Union. 1 In the matter of knots the prudent statesman will dis- criminate. All are not of the Gordian character, and, as a rule, it is safer to unravel than to shear them through. The panacea met with a fate unworthy of the high hopes of its inventors. The paper currency showed an immediate tendency to drop to two cents, or thereabouts, in the dollar. Mutton chops could sometimes be obtained for four dollars apiece, and a good, wearable hat for forty ; but more usually a prudent shopkeeper preferred to lose his customer than handle such precarious stuff. Clearly something was wrong, and the people taking thought discovered that it was the shopkeepers who needed coercion. Laws accordingly were passed with this object, and when they were defied, the matter came before the courts. The judges, sitting amid the noisy demonstration of popular anger, decided nevertheless that the laws were invalid, and absolved the defendants. 2 Up to this point 1 Fiake'a Critical Period of American History, pp. 168-186. 3 Ibid. p. 176. THE UNION OF THE STATES 137 there had been, if not unanimity, at any rate a huge A.D. majority supporting the panacea; but now there was a ^e^'-q division. One party grumbled, but owned itself defeated ; the other, with a stern logic, discovered that to complete the system the judges must be done away with or intimidated. In Rhode Island they were accordingly dismissed, and else- where there was dangerous rioting. In Massachusetts there was civil war. Battles had been fought at Spring- field and at Petersham, and upwards of eight thousand men were bearing arms, before Shays's rebellion was finally reduced. Congress rising to the emergency called out for troops ; but, by a stratagem more prudent possibly than dignified, pre- tended that they were for use against the Indian tribes. 1 Paper money was the worst of all the plagues; and yet the people still hardened their hearts. ' The League of Friendship,' as it was affectionately named, had reached a sad dissolution. A union resting upon sentiment, a govern- ment depending upon the goodwill of its members, are only the make-believes of amiable enthusiasts or the cheats and counterfeits of quacks and sophists. The only security for union must be found in the strength of the central govern- ment, and such strength can only be given by the forms and machinery of a constitution. In America during these years men thought otherwise, and the words of Washington and Hamilton therefore fell unheeded. It was believed that a federal power could be preserved by occasional outbursts of high emotion. It was forgotten that a government depend- ing upon emotion for its authority is more likely in the end to be destroyed by that incalculable force than to be saved by it. 1 History, iii. p. .1*78. 138 ALEXANDER HAMILTON CHAPTER V The Power of a Vision A.D. In the early spring of 1785 a modest but memorable !^ 85 ^ 7 2fl meefcm & to °k place at Washington's country seat of Mount Vernon, between representatives from the states of Maryland and Virginia. The occasion was a conference in regard to waterways between the eastern settlements and the western unpeopled land lying in the valley of the Ohio and to the north-west. The greater portion of these vast territories had been ceded to the Federal Government by the various states who claimed them under their charters, or by virtue of a nominal occupation. To the south North Carolina stretched out in a wide strip to the banks of the Mississippi. Her western population being something more than nominal, had refused to be included in the cession, and after an unsuccessful effort to form themselves into a separate state under the name of Frankland, 1 had been compelled to return to their old allegiance. The development of the western country was one of the great dreams of Washington's life. He foresaw the import- ance of these possessions at a time when few men were willing to give them much thought. They were the fruits of the great policy of the elder Pitt, in which, as a youthful soldier, Washington had borne a distinguished part. What the Treaty of Paris in 1763 had secured to Britain, another Treaty of Paris in 1783 had divided between Britain and the victorious colonists. This rich inheritance it was his fixed determination to weld into the confederacy. By speech and correspondence he had pressed the matter upon his fellow-citizens even before peace had actually been signed; 1 History ; iii. p. 121. 1786-1786 Mt. 28-2Q THE UNION OF THE STATES 189 and throughout the whole of the turbulent period which a.d. ensued he continued to urge the need for development, and for the firm attachment of this estate to the rest of the Union. When these means proved inadequate, being a practical man, he founded a joint-stock company to open up communications. Even the peculiar advantages of this territory appeared to Washington to contain some not inconsiderable dangers. The splendid waterways of the Mississippi and its tributary streams were not an unmixed advantage, seeing that the mouth and the lower reaches were in the hands of Spain, who also extended a shadowy claim to the whole western bank and to the unknown region beyond. The easiest course for the new settlers was to drift their produce down the broad current to New Orleans, and the dread of Washington was lest this tendency might induce 'a habit of trade' with a foreign power ; an intimacy and a mutual interest which in the end might lead to a detachment from the Union. Consequently, at a time when the chief matter of political anxiety with regard to the western lands was the menace by Spain against the free navigation of the Mississippi, he was more concerned to develop the natural trade routes from east to west by clearing the waterways of the James, the Potomac, and the Ohio, and by the construction of a system of supplementary canals. It was for the adjustment of certain differences, and to procure the co-operation of the two states, whose sympathies had already been enlisted in this enterprise, that the meet- ing took place at Mount Vernon in March 1785. As the delegates had come together in a businesslike and peaceful spirit, other matters of mutual interest were brought tactfully under discussion — the advantages of a uniform currency and system of duties; the need for a general cohesion and mutual support among the confederated states. Under the spell of 140 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1786 a great character prejudice was for the moment forgotten, ^ Et * 29 and invitations were issued to Pennsylvania and Delaware to join in the discussion. But good feeling expanded even further — once started on the course of reason it was easy to urge it forward — and it was ultimately decided to pro- pose to all the thirteen states that in the autumn of the following year (1786) they should meet at Annapolis to discuss the whole commercial situation. Before this date arrived the paper panacea had been pricked, and Shays's rebellion was in full blast. In addition, the disputes with Spain about the free navigation of the Mississippi had come to a head. Threats of the confiscation of American ships presuming to enter the lower waters had been followed up by action. The southern states were in a flame of indignation. Their northern neighbours were apathetic. The problems of the Mississippi did not touch their interests at any vital point. On the contrary, they desired nothing so much as a good understanding with Spain, for they had hopes that in this quarter their court- ship might not be despised, and that a commercial treaty might at last be signed. All this pother about free naviga- tion for the sake of a few backwoodsmen seemed to them to indicate a lack of the sense of proportion. Jay at the Foreign Office took this view of the matter, and, as a com- promise, advised Congress to consent to close the river to free navigation for a period of twenty-five years. 1 The southern states were in no mood for such concessions, and threatened that if Jay's proposal were accepted they would secede and return to the British allegiance. The New England states, with an equal vivacity, threatened secession unless the recommendation were confirmed. The crisis was averted only by an indefinite postponement; New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island siding with the South. 1 HUtoty, iii. pp. 101, 104-5. THE UNION OF THE STATES 141 The convention of Annapolis, though it met in stirring A.D. 1786 times, was but a thin congregation. Only five of the states T " appointed commissioners who attended ; four appointed commissioners who did not attend, and the remaining four did not appoint commissioners at all. The last class in- cluded Maryland, which had joined in issuing the invitation; but what was more than all the rest, New York was repre- sented by Hamilton, and Hamilton ruled the convention. It is something of a shock to the finer feelings that this assemblage, the beginning of the movement which cul- minated in the constitution, should have been convoked for the consideration of purely material things; for the discussion of inland navigation, of customs duties and the currency. The folly of distracted effort was gradually mailing itself apparent. The advantages of combination were beginning to be dimly surmised. The farce of fiscal independence was played out. Even the stiff-necked citizens of New York had come to entertain doubts whether their private interests as a trading state would not be better served in the long run by the pursuit of the prosperity of the whole, than by a narrow policy of individual gain at the moment. It is notable that the immediate cause of the constitutional compact is to be sought, not in the higher spheres of political necessity, but in the practical needs of business men. Trade necessities, and these alone, were the occasion of their meeting and the purpose of their deliberations. By these ' sordid bonds ' a loose confederation was in due time to be lashed together into such a union as the world had never seen. In the short session at Annapolis it became evident to the delegates, under the searching analysis of Hamilton, that the only remedy for the evils affecting trade must be looked for in broad constitutional changes which their limited commissions crave them no authoritv to discuss. 14«2 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1786 Under the influence of his vigorous spirit the convention 9 had a remarkable result ; for out of its unanimous con- clusion that it could do nothing great things came to pass. Hamilton drafted an address which, after much modifica- tion, was adopted. It was his policy and habit to overshoot the mark ; to compel the weaker brethren to consider plans that were too heroic for their natural timidity, confident that the diminished fabric would still be of an ampler pro- portion than if it had arisen from mean foundations. This document set out precisely the object of the convention — " To take into consideration the trade and commerce of the 1 United States; to consider how far a uniform system in ' their commercial intercourse and regulations might be 1 necessary to their common interest and permanent har- 1 mony ; and to report to • the several states such an Act 1 relative to this great object as, when unanimously ratified 1 by them, would enable the United States in Congress 1 assembled effectually to provide for the same." ' New Jersey, he pointed out, had given a more liberal commission to her delegates, empowering them to discuss not only these, but 'other important matters.' A complete agreement among the thirteen states, which was the chief object of the meeting, was precluded by the mean attendance. "Your 1 commissioners," therefore, " did not conceive it advis- 1 able to proceed to the business of their mission " ; but they place upon the record " their earnest and unanimous ■ wish that speedy measures may be taken to effect a ' general meeting of the states in a future convention for the 1 same, and such other purposes as the situation of public * affairs may be found to require." 2 They submit "that 1 the idea of extending the powers of their deputies to other 1 subjects than those of commerce . . . was an improvement ' on the original plan, and will deserve to be incorporated 1 Work*, i. pp. 335-6, 2 Ibid. i. p. 337. THE UNION OF THE STATES 143 ' into that of a future convention. They are the more A.D. 1786 1 naturally led to this conclusion as, in the course of their ^ T ' 29 ' reflections on the subject, they have been induced to think 1 that the power of regulating trade is of such comprehensive ' extent, and will enter so far into the general system of the ' Federal Government, that to give it efficacy, and to obviate ' questions and doubts concerning its precise nature and 1 limits, may require a correspondent adjustment of other ' parts of the federal system." x The address concluded by recommending that " the states by which they have been ' respectively delegated would concur themselves, and use 1 their endeavours to procure the concurrence of the other ' states in the appointment of commissioners to meet at 1 Philadelphia on the second Monday in May next, to take 1 into consideration the situation of the United States, to ' devise such further provisions as shall appear to them ■ necessary to render the constitution of the Federal Govern- 1 ment adequate to the exigencies of the Union." 2 Congress was fatuously indignant at such a usurpation ; 8 indulged in hair-splitting arguments upon legal rights and the lack of authority in any body save themselves to summon a representative council. But things had come into too bad a pass for the groans of Congress to produce much impression upon the minds of men. Amidst riots, rebellions and threats of secession, on the very brink of a war with Spain, people were in no mood to pay much heed to the loquacity of angry impotence. Congress, deprived of all hope of a sufficient revenue by the con- tumacious wrangling of New Jersey and New York, 4 had merely a Hobson's choice — they might consent to the con- vention or they might forbid it, but whatsoever course they adopted the convention would nevertheless take place. 1 Works, i. p. 337. a Ibid. i. p. 339. 9 History, iii. p. 236. * Ibid. pp. 175-8, 1*4 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1786 Considerations of dignity seemed to point on the whole to acquiescence ; but while the matter was still under debate Virginia chose General Washington as one of her delegates to the proposed meeting at Philadelphia. The tide was running in over the flats of the firth, and a Congress with any care for its popularity, had to gallop before it ventre a terre. The convention of Annapolis was the turning-point. The reaction which had ensued when the war was ended, and independence for the time being assured, had spent its main effort. The removal of a common danger had let loose at once, as Hamilton had prophesied, all the forces of disintegration. States had clamoured about their particular sovereignties. Individuals, in a needless panic lest union should mean some abatement in the pre-eminence of mediocrity, flung all their influence into the centrifugal movement. Mean spirits, hating the heroic and incredulous of magnanimity, stirred up suspicion against those for whose services gratitude was the only recompense possible or welcome. Washington aimed at the title of king; Hamilton at the reversion of the monarchy. No figment was too gross for belief. Providence, which is on the side of the big battalions, appears to be also on the side of the great idea. Visions that were at once noble in their proportions and consistent within themselves have played a notable part in the history of mankind ; but there is this difficulty, arising out of the conditions of the particular time, that a vision is wholly without force to move a generation which is unprepared to apprehend its meaning. The virtue of the seer who produces a practical effect upon the fortunes of any nation is not that he sees some image of surpassing splendour which no one else has seen, but rather that he sees clearly something THE UNION OF THE STATES 145 which a large number of his felloe-men have already seen A.D. 1786 dimly. His merit is that he removes a few of the wrappings which conceal the pattern of life, and discloses a design which though half suspected had lain till that time hidden. The result is a vivid presentment, some startling re-arrange- ment of familiar things, which contains the promise of relief from an intolerable suffering, or adds a sudden value to life by giving a nobler purpose to human endeavour. Michael Angelo has said that he already saw in the unhewn block a statue which to duller eyes remained invisible until his chisel had removed the flakes of marble which concealed it. The fabric of a vision which worketh great marvels is the experience of common men. Nothing is novel or surprising in the material, but only in the plan. When once an idea of this order has taken possession of the spirit of a nation, it will not be overcome by criticism. The forensic method, argument and rhetoric undirected by a master thought, can never hope to hold it back. For an idea can only be fought by an idea. It is not sufficient that it should be crushed by disproof; it must be expelled by some more powerful vision which usurps its place. The inherent truth or falseness of such a vision does not seem to afford any measure of the effect it may produce upon human institutions. What is shown in an alluring picture may be incapable of achievement. Facts may be distorted in the crystal until they become mere phantoms. The motive and the goal of a great convulsion may be nothing better than mirage. Two things only appear to be essential to its potency — some exceptioual gift of present- ment in the seer, and an eager predisposition on the part of men. The same strange expectancy, which greets the Mahdi or Messiah, met Rousseau more than halfway, overwhelming him in gratitude. His gospel immediately entered into a place in men's hearts that was empty. He saw beautiful K 146 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1786 things ; he saw them clearly and believed them to be true , T ' 29 and although to a large extent his vision was pure fantasy, its triumph was almost as swift and facile as his dream. There are some rare occasions scattered about in history where, as if by a common impulse, humanity has paused at its work, and, leaning upon its spade, has looked round bewildered by a sudden hopefulness ; aware dimly that something fortunate has happened, that a new man has appeared in the world, and that he is a friend. Of all men who have sought to benefit their fellows by a change in the old order, Hamilton and Rousseau are probably the most opposite in character and aims. Hamilton was a man in a world of men, and the affairs of the world he lived in were to him an open book. The counters of his fancy were not shadows, but real people, real motives, and real things. His labour in accomplishment was severe, and, by comparison, slow ; for a vision that is free and careless has an advantage over one that is burdened and hampered by the whole fabric of society. Rousseau, lying under a tree beside the road to Vincennes on a hot summer's afternoon, 'in an unspeakable agitation,' and Hamilton, meditating from day to day, as he struggled cheerfully and laboriously with the correspondence of General Washington, had little in common except the divine gift of revelation. Each beheld an immeasurable and splendid prospect, and what he saw he believed with an intensity and an unwavering faith that no logic could shake. To each his vision seemed to be the firmest truth that life contained. Neither the knowledge of new facts nor the experience of changing conditions ever raised a doubt or provoked a conflict in their minds, but like well-disciplined reserves swung swiftly into line, as if such reinforcement in the general movement had been from the first foreseen and preordained. IHE UNION OF THE STATES 147 CHAPTER VI The Convention of PJciladelphia The Convention of Philadelphia was summoned for the 14th A.D. 17s: of Alay 1787. In spite of the distracted condition of public Mr - 30 affairs, the arrival of the delegates was marked by no in- decent haste. It was not until the 25th that a quorum of seven states was assembled. All were ultimately repre- sented, with the exception of Rhode Island, which held aloof in ridiculous isolation. Of sixty-five delegates who were appointed, ten never attended. The final draft of the constitution was signed on the 17th of September by only thirty-nine delegates, and out of the total number only forty- two were then in attendance. The sessions were held in private, and General Washing- ton presided. No reports were issued of the debates, which, from the notes and correspondence of Madison, Yates and others who were present, appear to have been conducted with great vivacity, and to have been influenced, not merely by strong convictions, but by violent prejudice. Neverthe- less, by virtue of the secrecy of the proceedings, speeches were addressed mainly to the point, and but little to the gallery. It is impossible to overestimate the advantages of privacy in such an undertaking. When at last the constitution emerged it was a complete thing; to be judged by the nation, for whose salvation it was intended to provide, as an organism, and not as a series of inde- pendent propositions. The use and the misuse of popular judgment have been subjects of much dispute among wise men from the be- ginnings of society. Popular judgment is a sound but rough instinct, impatient of diplomacy, unfit for adjust- 148 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1787 ment, and incapable of compromise. These are the func* ^ T * 30 tions of individual men, meeting inside closed doors, and if their work is to be of the best, it must be left undis- tracted by a running commentary of criticism and applause, by incitements to combat and appeals for consideration. The elimination of the partisan is of the highest importance, for the need in such a case is of negotiators, and champions of all varieties are a curse. The wider the audience, the harder for good feeling to be maintained and for good sense to conquer. Even in those days of slower publicity, the Convention of Philadelphia would hardly have succeeded in accomplishing its work had it been beaten upon day after day by a well-informed public opinion and a patriotic press. The first labour of the Convention was to settle the foundation upon which the Union should be built up. Was it to be, as in the past, a confederation or league of states, or was it to be a fusion of men into a nation ? Its second labour was to draft a constitution that should rightly give effect to the principle which had been agreed upon. In both stages the part played by Hamilton was powerful rather than conspicuous. ' He had not great tact/ it has been said of him, ' but he set his foot contemptuously to work the treadles of slower minds.' 1 The criticism is not entirely just, for contemptuous calculation is a quality that belongs to calmer natures. Moreover, in great matters he had something which is closely akin to tact ; a knowledge of the dangers arising from his own eager and impetuous temper; a power of self-restraint where the argument was more safely left to a more conciliatory spokesman. His intervention, when he deemed the occasion favourable, was on the heroic scale; but even in the earlier debates he was an infrequent speaker, not only as compared with 1 Schouler, History of the United States under the Constitution, i. p. 25. THE UNION OF THE STATES 149 Madison and Randolph, but also with others of the second A.D. 1787 rank. **■ 30 The importance of Hamilton's influence upon events at this period is missed if we attempt to measure it either by his speeches upon great occasions or by his writings. His pamphlets had borne fruit, his orations resounded in the ears of men; but his most effective weapon was the private conference. The Convention did not meet until near mid- summer, but early in the spring the federal Congress came together in New York, and many of its members were already nominated delegates to the assembly that was to consider the constitution at Philadelphia. Hamilton spared no pains to prepare the ground. He was not one of those statesmen who make their rare, stately appearances in a dramatic arrangement of lights and slow music. His great- ness was as confident and humane as that of Rabelais himself. It did not fear the familiar encounter, or the good-natured match of wits across the bare mahogany. He loved society, and rejoiced to meet his enemy in any gate. His house was open to all men without distinction of politics. His hospi- tality was splendid in its simplicity and kindliness. Men were put off their guard by his wit and gaiety. They were dis- armed by his enthusiasm. His eloquence took them prisoners. The power of his intellect was hardly suspected under the ambush of his extraordinary charm. It is even claimed for him that Madison 1 was his convert ; and judging that eminent man by his past record and his subsequent career, it is difficult to account for the steadfast course of his endeavours during the Convention upon any other hypo- thesis than that some more powerful nature had for the time being cast a generous spell over his timid and grudging disposition. When the basis was at length a settled matter, Hamilton 1 Hiatory, iii. pp. 239, 303, 323. 150 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1787 ceased from all public speaking, and even upon two occa- Mt ' 30 sions returned to New York to attend to professional matters. 1 It has been alleged by his enemies that he was mortified by the rejection of his own plan, and by his apologists that, as his vote was nullified by the opposition of his two colleagues from New York, his close attendance would have been to no purpose. The real reason was that by this time the power of his ideas was secure enough in the minds of his party for it to be left without his presence to work out the details of the constitution. Four days after a quorum of states had assembled, the Virginia Plan was introduced by Randolph. Its main prin- ciple implied a revolution. Government, to be effective, must act directly on its subjects as individual men. To this end it must be fully clothed in powers, not merely by the unambiguous phrases of a constitution, but also by the opinion of a united people. It was not sufficient that its authority should be defined beyond a doubt; but further, that the men who obeyed its laws and supplied its revenues should feel their submission was rendered, not to some remote tyranny or committee of oppressive rivals, but to a government that was indeed their own. The essential condition of popular affection and awe could be secured by one means alone. The loyal support which had hitherto been lacking would only be possible if the government rested upon election by the people, and if, between the value attaching to the votes of all citizens throughout the Union, there was a rough equality. Election by the separate states must cease ; for clearly there could be no approach to equality if a community of 70,000 free inhabitants had the same power in the Union as one containing 700,000. Population, therefore, whether tempered or not by the contribution of revenue, was the basis of the Virginia proposals. 1 History, iii. pp. 317, 322, 329. THE UNION OF THE STATES 151 The machinery of the constitution was to consist of an A.D. 1787 upper and a lower house, elected by the people. The executive iET> 30 government was placed in the hands of a single man, to be chosen by this legislature. This governor or president was to hold office for a short term, was to be removable only by impeachment and conviction, and was not to be re-eligible. The judges of the supreme court were likewise to be chosen by the legislature, which had powers to create such inferior federal courts as might be required. The ideal of the Virginia Plan and of the national party was a union of the people and not a league of states. The ideal of the opposite party was precisely the reverse. They cared nothing for the equality of the citizens, everything for the equality of the states. On June 15, after prolonged debate on Randolph's resolutions, the New Jersey Plan was submitted to the Convention by Patterson. His proposals were put forward avowedly for the protection of the smaller states against their more powerful neighbours. His chief concern was the pride and dignity of thirteen separate nations, which required that no distinctions should be created between the power and status of the contracting parties. The logic of this policy was anti-democratic, since the unit which it considered was not a man ; nor even a particular race or breed of men; but a mere boundary, always artificial, and in many cases an accident. The Convention as a whole was certainly conspicuous by its lack of any enthusiasm for democracy ; but the delegates who supported the doctrine of State Rights carried distrust of the people to an extreme which is remarkable not only in the light of modern de- velopments, but of what happened only a few years later. The Democratic party was then compounded by the genius of Jefferson out of a sheer contradiction ; for the ideas most diametrically opposed in principle were those of State Rights and the Rights of Man. 152 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1787 The New Jersey proposals were respectful to Congress. 30 They aimed at strengthening in some particulars, but in principle maintaining, the existing arrangements. Their object was a binding alliance between sovereign states. They were utterly opposed to the idea of a nation. They contemplated a single house of delegates, voting by states. The executive was to consist of a council chosen by this legislature, but removable by the hostile vote of a majority of the state governments. The supreme court was to be appointed in a similar manner; but there was no power to constitute any inferior tribunals. A plan like this could never be accepted, for it provided no cure for the evils that had brought the Convention together. Its fatal defect was the same lack of power which had made the original Congress impotent during the war and contemptible after peace had been declared. For it was impossible to preserve the sovereignties of the various states without denying to Congress any direct power upon in- dividual men. If the central government was restricted to an indirect authority which could only operate through the state legislatures, it could only coerce at second-hand. In any case of recalcitrancy the procedure would be cum- brous and unworkable. The federal council would find itself obliged in such a case to direct the local government to compel the individual; and if the local government, for any reason, or upon any pretext, should refuse, the remedy would be the coercion of a state, which is not a constabu- lary business, but civil war. On the other hand, it was urged with great eloquence that a reformed Congress, acting through articles of confedera- tion, now most solemnly confirmed, revised, corrected and enlarged, would have upon its side a very powerful senti- ment, and would exercise a prodigious influence. But Wash- ington, who in his quiet mind always saw the big objects THE UNION OF THE STATES 153 clearly, had already settled that argument for ever. 'Inftvr A.D. 1787 ence is not government.' Sentiment is no adequate bond for a nation. On the 18th of June, three days after the introduction of the New Jersey plan, Hamilton submitted his own proposals to the Convention. This famous statement occupied five hours in delivery, and by all accounts was an achievement far overtopping all other speeches made at the Convention in force of reasoning, in courage and in eloquence. Unfortu- nately we have to estimate its quality at second-hand, for no adequate report remains to us. His own notes are methodical, but a mere skeleton or list of points to guide the speaker in the order of discussion. 1 The argument is nowhere opened out, and of the style and force which counted for so much in the effect upon those who listened, no trace remains under his own hand. The reports or notes that were taken by Madison 2 and Yates 3 are not only condensed but im- perfect. They do not cover more than a small portion of the ground. The longer of them would occupy barely a column and a half of the Times, while a verbatim report of the speech itself would probably have filled about twenty columns. Hamilton was an ample speaker; certainly not verbose, but exhaustive of the facts and copious in illustra- tion. His style does not lend itself easily to abridgment. "He was obliged to declare himself unfriendly to both ' plans. He was particularly opposed to that from New 1 Jersey, being fully convinced that no amendment of the 1 confederation leaving the states in possession of their 1 sovereignty could possibly answer the purpose." i People had questioned the powers of the Convention to propose anything beyond a mere amendment of the existing system ; but " we owed it to our country to do, in this emergency, 1 Works, i. pp. 370-378. 2 Ibid. pp. 381-393. » Ibid. pp. 393-403. 4 Madison's Report, Work*, i. p. 381. 154 ALEXANDER HAMILTON a.d. 1787 ' whatever we should deem essential to its happiness. The iET> *° ' states send us here to provide for the exigencies of the ' union. To rely on and propose any plan not adequate to ' these exigencies, merely because it was not clearly within 1 our powers, would be to sacrifice the means to the ' end." ' Having swept aside this plea of obstruction, he proceeded to examine and condemn the existing situation in terms and upon principles with which we are already familiar after a study of his previous writings. The esprit de corps of the various states had proved hostile to any superior government, and this principle was ineradicable, seeing that it was founded on human nature. The love of power in mediocrities, the ambitions of demagogues, and the local attachment of the people to their particular legisla- tures, set up a plain and obvious opposition which nothing could remove save a power in the central government to operate directly upon its subjects. If the weapons of coercion of the people were left in the hands of the states by their titular master, mastery would pass with the weapons, though the title might remain as an empty form. For coercion of a sovereign state was impossible by a mere abstraction calling itself the central government. The practical means were wholly wanting — armies and supplies. And even if these could be brought into existence, the remedy "amounts to war between the parties. Foreign 1 powers will not be idle spectators. They will interpose ; ■ the confusion will increase, and a dissolution of the union 1 will ensue." 2 A powerful influence, also, not necessarily amounting to actual corruption, was on the side of the states against the central power — the gift of places, the dispensation of honours and emoluments. These forces made a continuance of the existing system an impossibility, and the New Jersey Plan, which aimed at conserving and 1 Madison's Report, Works, i. p. 382. * Ibid. i. p. 384. THE UNION OF THE STATES 155 perpetuating the present institutions, should therefore be A.D. 1787 utterly discarded. ' The complete extinction of the states would have simplified the problem and would have been productive of a great economy ; but such a measure, however desirable in itself, was out of the question. Hamilton did not propose a revolution on so grand a scale, realising that the sentiments of the people made it altogether impracticable. Subordinate authorities and jurisdictions would still be necessary under the strongest government, and the state legislatures might well be used for this purpose. He despaired " that a republican government could be 1 established over so great an extent. ... In my private 1 opinion, I have no scruple in declaring, supported as I am ' by so many of the wise and good, that the British Govern- ' ment is the best in the world ; and that I doubt much ' whether anything short of it will do in America." l He quoted the opinion of Necker that " it is the only Govern- 1 ment in the world which unites public strength with 1 individual security." To Hamilton the term 'republic' stood for something different from the meaning attaching to the word to-day. His pattern of a republic was an assemblage in the market- place — the direct and turbulent practice of Athens and Rome. In 1787 it was this idea which arose most readily to the minds of men. The credit of republican institutions in the modern sense had yet to be established; and it is necessary to bear in mind that even at the present day the respectability of this form of government rests mainly, if not entirely, upon the success and stability of the American constitution. When Hamilton announced his distrust of a republic and his preference for a limited monarchy, he was using language as it was understood by his audience. He 1 Madison'R Report, Works, i. pp. 388, 38G. 156 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1787 could not foresee the history of the next hundred years ; but A/c - 30 had he foreseen it he would have claimed with perfect justice that the success of the United States was based upon that monarchical element which he had spent such great efforts in establishing. Throughout the whole discussion the terms are used by both sides with a certain degree of ambiguity — sometimes as epithets of abuse, at others as quiet words of science. Hamilton himself speaks of a monarchy upon occasions as if it were synonymous with a despotism, a republic as an equivalent for a democracy of the market- place; while upon others the adjective monarchical is an epithet of praise, implying merely a salutary strength in the executive, and the word republic is innocently employed as the title of the proposed union. It is also worthy of attention that his idea of the British constitution which was held up for admiration is oddly un- like the system under which we find ourselves at the begin- ning of the twentieth century. It was not even a correct picture of the facts as they stood in 1787. What he had in his mind was the British constitution as George the Third had tried hard to make it. 1 The king's policy working to increase the strength of the executive power had, as a minor accident of his policy, provoked the War of Independence. With the disastrous result of that struggle his attempt had failed. To a large extent his failure was due, as Hamilton saw, to a lack of central authority and to the obstacles that were created by an opposition not yet reduced to its proper functions in the state — an opposition whose sympathy and encouragement from the beginning to the end of the war had strengthened the hands of the rebellious colonists against the British king. His Majesty's opposition had been of great service to the rebellious colonists, but the danger of adopting such an institution was sufficiently obvious. The 1 Sir Henry Maine, Popular Government, pp. 212-13. THE UNION OF THE STATES 16? aim of the American statesman was to create a system which A.D. 1787 should be free from the defects which George the Third 30 had laboured vainly to remove. It is necessary to under- stand, not merely that Hamilton and many of the wisest men engaged in the Convention of Philadelphia, including the great Washington himself, held these views with a deep sincerity, but, further, that their object was attacked by the bulk of the opposite party not because of its conflict with the principles of a democracy, but because of its antagonism to the theory of State Rights. Hamilton's ideal was, in fact, an elective monarchy, and his guiding political principle a balance of authority. " Give 1 all power to the many, and they will oppress the few. Give ' all power to the few, and they will oppress the many. Both, ' therefore, ought to have the power, that each may defend ! itself against the other. To the want of this check we owe ' our paper-money, instalment laws, etc. To the proper ad- justment of it the British owe the excellence of their con- ' stitution. Their House of Lords is a most noble institution. ' Having nothing to hope for by a change, and a sufficient ' interest, by means of their property, in being faithful to the 1 national interest, they form a permanent barrier against ' every pernicious innovation, whether attempted on the part ' of the Crown or of the Commons. No temporary senate will ' have firmness enough to answer that purpose. ... As to 1 the executive, it seemed that no good one could be estab- ' lished on republican principles. Was not this giving up the ' merits of the question, for can there be a good government * without a good executive ? " 1 " Having made these observations, I will read to the com- 1 mittee a sketch of a plan which I should prefer to either of ' those under consideration. I am aware that it goes beyond 1 the ideas of most members. But will such a plan be 1 Madison's Report, Works, i, pp. 389, 390. 158 ALEXANDER HAMILTON 4. D. 1787 'adopted out of doors? In return I would ask, will the Mr ' * ' people adopt the other plan ? At present they will adopt 1 neither. But I see the union dissolving, or already dis- c solved. I see evils operating in the states which must soon 1 cure the people of their fondness for democracies. I see 1 that a great progress has been already made, and is still ; going on, in the public mind. I think, therefore, that the ' people will in time be unshackled from their prejudices ; 1 and whenever that happens, they will themselves not be ' satisfied at stopping where the plan of Mr. Randolph would ■ place them, but be ready to go as far at least as he pro- 1 poses. I do not mean to offer the paper I have sketched ' as a proposition to the committee. It is meant only to 1 give a more correct view of my ideas, and to suggest the 1 amendments which I would propose to the plan of Mr. * Randolph, in the proper steps of its future discussion." 1 Hamilton's plan may be summarised in a few words. The legislature was to consist of two chambers — an Assembly elected by the people for three years, and a Senate elected by electors chosen for that purpose by the people. The Senate was to hold office for life or good behaviour. The supreme executive power was to be placed in the hands of a Governor, elected in the same manner and upon the same terms as the Senate, who should have the right to negative all laws passed by the legislature, and who should hold the office of commander-in-chief of all the forces of the Re- public. With the advice and approbation of the Senate he should be empowered to make treaties and to appoint all the officers of the state, and the appointment of the cabinet was to be in his hands without control. The Senate should have the sole power of declaring war. The judges of the supreme court were likewise to hold their offices for life or good behaviour, and power was to be given to the legislature 1 Madison's Report, Works, i. pp. 392, 393. THE UNION OF THE STATES 159 to create inferior federal courts in every state. The gover- A D. 1787 nor, the senators and all officers of the Republic were to be ^ /T - * liable to impeachment before the supreme court. Laws passed by the state legislatures, contrary to the constitu- tion or laws of the United States, were to be void, and for greater security the governors of each state, who were to be appointed by the central government, should have a negative upon all local legislation. No state was to main- tain any warlike force on land or sea. It is abundantly clear from Hamilton's own words that he entertained no hope of carrying his plan ; but equally it is beyond a doubt that he sincerely held it to be better than either of the others. To the New Jersey principles he was utterly opposed. He accepted the main proposition of the Virginia scheme, but desired to extend it further in the direction of strength and permanency. His own proposals were brought forward in no unfriendly spirit, but as a reinforcement to the movement led by Madison and Ran* dolph, with whom he was on terms of confidence and alliance. His deliberate purpose, as at Annapolis, was to overshoot the mark; to set up an ideal which should to some extent compel the minds of men, even in their rejec- tion of it ; to terrify the champions of a loose confederation with the formidable aspect of an alternative which was vastly more disconcerting. At a somewhat later date he drafted a complete constitution upon the basis of his own proposals, and handed it to Madison for his guidance in the subsequent discussion. 1 It is worth while to compare it 1 Works, i. pp. 347-369. The point whether Hamilton read his final scheme to the Convention, or read only a skeleton of it, is not without doubt. Madison's report of the proceedings is the main authority. He out- lived all the members of the Convention, and when he published his report, was beyond contradiction. J. C. Hamilton accuses him of suppressing certain things, and garbling others, in order to justify the outrageous attacks made by himself and his friends upon Hamilton during the first administration, when their main charge was his alleged disloyalty to the 160 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1787 with the actual constitution of the United States, for there iET. 30 are £ ew more conspicuous examples in history of the maxim that when people are struggling towards a decision the man who will take the pains to think out and elaborate his own plan in a clear consistency is apt to reap a reward entirely beyond his hopes, in the domination of his drilled ideas over the undisciplined aspirations of his enemies. The struggle was long and bitter between the Virginia and the New Jersey Plans. At times it seemed beyond possibility to avoid a deadlock which would have broken up the Con- vention. In the end there was a compromise. The legisla- ture was to consist of two chambers, of which the Assembly was to be chosen by the people upon a basis of population, the Senate by the states upon the principle of equality among themselves. In the former, therefore, the national principle was to prevail, and in the latter the federal. The voting in both branches of the legislature was to be by the representatives and senators in their individual capacities, and not according to the method of the old Congress. The effect of the compromise was to concede certain powers to the central government; not, as Hamilton would have wished, to give all powers, except such as were expressly reserved to the state legislatures. Disappointed in this, his whole influence was exerted to make the intention of union clear, while keeping the conferred authority vague, indefinite, un- trammelled and unlimited. He foresaw that administration could afterwards proceed to discover powers that were im- plied, though not precisely designated. Although the frontal attack had failed, there was still a way round. Republic. The matter is not of great importance except to persons who are interested in the psychology of Madison, for no one believes those oharges to-day, and it is hard to imagine that any one but the blindest partisans believed them at the time. Young Hamilton also maintains that Madison had no right to take notes at all, far less to publish them, as such actions were contrary to the spirit and the letter of the arrangement for complete secrecy. Cf. History, iii. pp. 284-6, 301-2, 338. THE UNION OF THE STATES 161 It was alleged against Hamilton at the time, and after- A.D. 1787 wards during his administration of the Treasury, incessantly * 30 and with excessive bitterness, that he desired to establish royalty, and that at heart he was an aristocrat. There is no colour for the first charge, and there is no doubt of the second. Hamilton made no secret of his belief in the advantages of an aristocratic power in the commonwealth, or of his reasons for that belief. Apart altogether from the need of stability and of deliberate judgment, he was deeply conscious of the importance of honour in the history of nations ; and he was wise enough to grasp the truth that the honour of nations ought to be of a composite character, deriving its virtue out of the separate and peculiar virtues of every order. The people at large are ever eager to act upon a sudden emotion of justice, resentment, or pity ; ready to accept the plausible coherence of an ex 'parte statement. They are impatient of evidence, and wholly averse from the consideration of what may be urged upon the other side. The merchant classes, basing themselves upon contract, and conscientiously examining into the extent and nature of their rights under a bond, judging everything by that supreme test, assert confidently that there is no place for sentiment in business, and are full of a fine contempt for mere tradition. The lawyers bring everything to trial by arguments and precedents, interpreting the bond, advocating or questioning it with one eye on the immediate issue, the other upon some general principle of society. The people see national justice as good fellowship. The merchants see it as common-sense. The lawyers see it as law. There is some- thing beyond all this; not hostile to it, but different. It has received a variety of names, but none of them entirely suitable. The honour of a gentleman is perhaps nearest the mark ; the honour of a man whose position is secure, whose authority is acknowledged, who is neither concerned nor I 162 ALEXANDER HAMILTON a. d. 1787 interested in any struggle for pre-eminence. His own per- sonal dignity is the spring of his judgments, which are instinctive rather than reasoned. His opinions, like those of the people, are grounded on the feelings, but they are deeper and more constant. They may be contrasted with the sudden violence of popular sentiment as the current which flows underneath the waves. In addition, there is a touch of something conventional and fantastic. The parchment of the bond is less honoured than the spirit of it ; and while he is jealous, almost unreasonably and to extremes, of certain punctilios, there is often present to his mind a generous sympathy towards the motives of his opponent, and a lofty consideration for his feelings. As an element in a republic the honour of a gentleman is of at least as much importance as the precedents of the lawyer, the honesty of the merchant, or the enthusiasm of the people. But while in a swelling and triumphant democracy the three last named are always certain of a great influence, it is not the same with the first, which requires the support of some strong convention if it is to render effective service to the state. Hamilton was deeply concerned to make this element a force under the new constitution. His idea of a senate which, like the judges, should hold office for life or good conduct, was founded in this sentiment. Though not hereditary, and although resting upon popular choice, it was to be frankly, and in the best sense, aristocratic. The class from which he desired to exact political service was not likely, in his opinion, to be willing every few years to submit themselves to the calumny and fluster of contested elections ; to canvass for votes and to court popularity. It is possible that his race and temperament had much to do with his view of this matter, but it is probable that his main reason lay in his experience gained in the conduct of the THE UNION OF THE STATES 163 war, and in the founding of the constitution. We are con- A.D. 1787 scious of a strong current working throughout the war and iEx- 30 in the early years of the Republic always on the side of constancy and strong government — of the sustained and instinctive effort of a class, capable of cohesion and inured to responsibility. Behind Franklin, Madison, Jay, Jefferson, Gouverneur Morris, Randolph, Wilson and the other notable spokesmen and writers, was a powerful order that cared little for notoriety, but without whose silent and devoted leadership the dominion of King George the Third might never have been overthrown nor the Union of the States achieved. From this aristocracy of squires and planters Washington himself was sprung; and though circum- stances forced him to the utterance of words, he was a true type both in his natural silence and in his calm efficiency. Hamilton failed. The Constitution of Philadelphia has proved itself to be of immense strength, but the principle of aristocracy has no part or credit in it. In the light of history we are forced to admit that Hamilton's lamentations appear exaggerated ; that his prophecies of disaster have not come true; that the swing of democracy has so far been able to keep the balance of the state unaided. But ad- mitting so much, and even granting to American public virtue most of the excellence which its patriotic pane- gyrists have so lavishly claimed for it, it is still permissible to speculate whether it might not have stood even higher than it does in the opinion of the world had it possessed, in addition to its other components, that element which Hamilton struggled so hard and vainly to include. His eagerness to secure an element of aristocracy in the constitution of the United States was due much less to a love of aristocrats, or to any tenderness for their privileges, than to a conviction that it would prove a good bargain for 164 ALEXANDER HAMILTON a.d. 1787 tHe nation. His aim was economic. Popular government /Et * *° may secure at a cheap price the services of a large number of men in easy circumstances, of superior education, and with family traditions of loyal service to the state. If it is not willing to pay the price, it must rub along as best it may with the professional politician. The new Republic chose the latter alternative, while Britain, by a most fortunate obstinacy, adhered to the former. It is easy to deride the House of Lords, the vanity of titles and the custom of primogeniture. The philosopher, regarding only the value of a man across a dinner-table or in popular debate, easily justifies his derision. But there is a practical as well as an academic side to the matter, leading us to inquire further, if Britain has not gained much by her illogical disregard of the principles of natural selec- tion, and if the Republic has not lost much by a too reverent observance of the Rights of Man ? As a matter of logic the democratic argument is con- clusive ; as a matter of history it is nonsense. The principle of aristocracy in a popular government is a very practical device for making use of the upper classes. We use ours while the Americans waste theirs. Titles and primogeniture may be absurd, but the fact remains that the wealthiei classes in Britain recognise a public duty attaching to their position, while in the United States they do not. The tradition of the great English families, and of those whose ambition it is to become great, is service of the state in peace and war. The tradition of the great families in the Republic is as yet, in the nature of things, less denned ; but, so far as it may be judged by a foreigner, it seems for the most part unconcerned with the duties of government, and is tending more and more towards the acquisition of com- mercial influence upon a scale such as the world has never before seen. The public spirit of its wealthy citizens is THE UNION OF THE STATES 165 measured by huge donatives rather than by loyal service. A.D. 1787 They appear to entertain a cockney confidence that every iET - 30 obligation can be discharged by the signing of a cheque. The conspicuous virtue in the one case is honour; in the other, enterprise and industry ; but if in a purely practical spirit we endeavour to compute the advantage to the state, everything is on the side of Britain, from the government of a parish to the councils of the nation. CHAPTER VII The Federalist The constitution had been framed at Philadelphia with AI) an admirable patience ; but there still remained the labour 1787-1788 i-i • mi -, r • ^T. 30-31 of persuading the nation to accept it. Ihe draft m due course was reported to Congress, and by Congress the decision was referred to separate conventions in the thirteen states. As soon as nine had ratified the constitution, it was to be at once adopted by those states themselves and put in force. The delegates dispersed from Philadelphia in September 1787, and the ninth state confirmed the Union in June 1788. Between these two events lay a period which is remarkable, not merely for the success of its achievement, but also for the fact that it threw up as a by-product one of the great books of the world. The labouring constancy of Washington and Hamilton, aided in their work by the plagues arising from misrule, had ended the first period of the struggle for union at the Convention of Annapolis. They had then succeeded in awakening a powerful section of the people to the need for a national policy. They had inspired a hesitating world with confidence in its own instincts; had guided 165 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. events and managed interests till the meaning of each *Z 87 ~ 17 ®® event and the security of every interest were made to point in one direction, and to produce and sustain the idea of an inexorable destiny barring every road save that alone which led to the desired goal. The work of the second period was done when the draft of the constitution was signed by the delegates at Phila- delphia. Their business had been to construct a system strong enough to fulfil the needs of the present, wide enough to admit those of the future. The third period was occupied in convincing the people of the various states that the reality which had been attained in the heat of debate and by the practice of concession, corresponded with their various and conflicting ideals ; that a document in matter-of-fact phrases, definite, precise, cold and formal was indeed a true translation into a practical shape of the vague but fervent spirit of their hearts. They had to be persuaded on the morning after marriage, that Leah was a bride no less desirable than Rachel. It was during this period, and while the state conventions wore being held for the purpose of ratifying the constitution, that the Federalist l was written. It has been said, and probably with truth, that in every state there was, at the beginning of the agitation, a majority against the new constitution. To the friends of union its weakness was a disappointment. To the defenders of State Rights its usurpations appeared an outrage. But the alter- 1 The word itself is a concession. Up till the compromise between the Virginia and the New Jersey plans the opposition was between the Nationalists (the party of Hamilton and Madison) and the Federalists (the party of State Rights). Satisfied with material victory, the former took the name of their opponents, but before twelve months had passed they became nearly as odious under the new title as they had been under the old one. The upholders of State Rights thereupon took the names at first of JRepublicans, afterwards of Democrats. It is under the latter title that they are referred to throughout this eseay. THE UNION OF THE STATES 167 native was nothing less than anarchy and dissolution, and A.D. 1787-17 ^Et. 30-31 against so menacing a combination there was everywhere an l even larger preponderance, if the real issue could but be clearly stated. The object of the opposition was to confuse the actual choice. Its leaders were active and unscrupulous, strong in a ready-made party organisation of state legis- latures. The work remaining to be done was therefore harder than any that had yet been accomplished. " Among the most formidable of the obstacles which the 1 new constitution will have to encounter," Hamilton wrote in the first number of the Federalist, " may readily be dis- ' tinsruished the obvious interest of a certain class of men o 1 in every state, to resist all changes which may hazard a ' diminution of the power, emolument, and consequence of ' the offices they hold under the state establishments ; and 1 the perverted ambition of another class of men, who will 1 either hope to aggrandise themselves by the confusions of 1 their country, or will flatter themselves with fairer prospects 1 of elevation from the sub-division of the empire into several 1 partial confederacies, than from its union under one govern- 1 ment." To convert these two classes was impossible ; but 'the honest errors of minds, led astray by preconceived 4 jealousies and fears,' 1 Hamilton considered it to be within the limits of human endeavours to remove. The attempt was made in the Federalist, one of the most remarkable of political documents. The idea of the work was Hamilton's. Something more, indeed, than merely the idea — the spirit of the whole enter- prise was his. It was his energy that carried the thing through, as it was his wisdom that had planned it; and without detracting from the deserved renown of his two contributors, the lion's share of the credit must rest with the creator. Out of eighty-five short essays, which appeared 1 Works, xi. p. 4. 16ft ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. at intervals of a few days during the autumn and winter of S 7 30 7 3i 1787 - 1788 > more tnan fift y were written by Hamilton him- self. 1 Of the rest, the greater number were by Madison ; a few by Jay. The crowning merit of these papers, which were produced under great pressure — often while the printer's boy was waiting in the office 2 — is that they suc- ceeded in accomplishing what they set out to accomplish. They were the greatest force that worked on men's minds to make them consent to the adoption of the constitution. It is difficult to bear in mind, as we read the vigorous pages of the Federalist, distinguished by their hopefulness no less than by their conviction, that Hamilton was by no means satisfied with the constitution. But his mind was of a practical cast. His military experiences had intensified his natural horror of schism and lukewarm co-operation; and in big things, at all events, magnanimity was a stronger force than any personal consideration. From the moment when he attached his signature to the Philadelphia draft he became its champion. He accepted it as a whole and with- out reserves. If in precise terms it did not achieve all he had hoped, he saw, nevertheless, that it contained huge possibilities. Courage and patience might still contrive to supply many of the omissions. As it realised many of his dearest aims, he received it in a spirit of wide compromise and wise opportunism, thrusting his preferences upon one side, and looking only to the gravest fact — that the chance of union was never likely to recur save as the outcome of a bloody war. The most striking difference between Hamilton and the constitution-makers of France a few years later is the absence of all illusions regarding the magic of a mere document. A constitution was to him but a skeleton ; and had it been put 1 History, iii. p. 371, says sixty five. ■ Ibid. p. 370. THE UNION OF THE STATES 169 together by the wisest men, in the coolest hour, there would A. P. 1787-1788 &t. 30-3)1 still have been no virtue in it until it was inspired with life. Its strength lay not in the written words, but in the tradi- tion that was still to seek. The first administration would have greater powers in moulding the destinies of the nation than the whole Convention of Philadelphia voting unani- mously. For the title-deeds of all political authority are elastic. Courage will stretch them, and the process will appear inevitable; but with a timid possessor they will shrink into a feeble formula. In the one case the intention will ever override the words ; in the other even the words themselves, like teeth in old gums, will be useless for the lack of their natural support. The Federalist is pure advocacy, but it is the greatest and rarest advocacy, for it appears to the reader to be a reasoned judgment. Confident in their cause, the authors never shrink from a fair statement of opposite opinions ; so that, to the modern, its wisdom and justice are apt to obscure the amazing skill of the counsel who conducted the case. Hamilton had two aims — the adoption of the constitution, and its security. He sought to establish the first by an exhaustive explanation of the practical conveniences and advantages of the Philadelphia plan, by a full exposition of its merits, and by showing in contrast the existing paralysis, unsettlement and danger. But for the security of the new institutions it was necessary to prove also that they were founded upon broad and eternal principles, harmonious with the ideals of his countrymen. A self-respecting nation, as it stands at the cross-roads, will deliberate, demanding to be satisfied under both heads : requiring to be shown clearly that its convenience will be well and promptly served ; asking, further, for full assurance that the remedy for present ills is not contrary to nature, or 1787-1788 <£t. 3031 170 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. likely to induce at a future time some morbid disaster. It occasionally happens that a political party is able to snatch a hurried decision on the first ground alone, on some temporary personal advantage, truly or falsely alleged; but a verdict given in this fashion lacks stability. Having no foundation in the real nature of things, it is easily shaken. No sanctity adheres to it. When men, despite the promises made to them, experience disappointment, they will pull it down without reverence, for it draws no aid from a noble tradition. A democracy at its best is not content with a proof of self-interest, even though it extends to its grandchildren. Mere practical considerations may be clearly shown to possess a certain permanency, but are not, by that reason alone, enough to make a strong tradition upon which men will act as it were by instinct, to which they will defer as to the precepts of a revealed religion. Public opinion is at once a man of affairs, dry, grudging, sceptical of all sciences save arithmetic, and an idealist who will reject the most fortunate balance of material profit, if the attainment of it is in conflict with the national honour. There is a need for some spiritual element ; for some ideal, informing policy. The politician, ignoring these things, involves us in endless debate ; but the statesman, fully aware, is unsatisfied with a favourable vote which, given inconsiderately, does not set the seal upon the upholding principle. It was not enough for Hamilton that the constitution should be accepted, unless men firmly believed it with their minds and cherished it in their hearts. The United States have been fortunate in the possession of a great and constant tradition, compounded of an intense belief in their institutions, in their destiny and in them- selves. It has carried them safely through much rough weather, and it is not idle curiosity that puts the question how, being so young a nation, they came to gain it ? The THE UNION OF THE STATES 171 Pangloss opinion does not hesitate: that as their institu- A.D. tions were good, their destiny favourable, and they them- ^ 87 gQ «? selves were born valiant and virtuous, it was impossible that belief could be withheld, the conditions being so obvious. But the inquiry is still unanswered, for their institutions are not conspicuously better than those of other nations that have come and gone, except precisely in this, that they are more steadfastly believed in. Their destiny likewise could have worked no wonders until men had faith in it, which in 1787 was far from being the case. Few men even surmised it, and still fewer then held to it firmly — not even Madison, anxious and defensive, but only Washington, Hamilton and Franklin, who found no great number of visionaries to understand their meaning. Without this tradition the emigrants who flocked into the states during the nineteenth century, overwhelming and out- numbering the descendants of the old colonists who fought against George the Third, would never have been compacted into a great people. In these exiles and outcasts there resided no superior virtue, but rather the reverse. It was not merely the pure spirit of adventure, but suffering, weakness, despair, discontent, turbulence and crime that swept them together out of the dusty corners of Europe, and shook them out, Celts and Saxons and Latins and Slavs, in the seaports of the states. It is impossible to conceive of any immigration more lacking in unity and cohesion, or con- taining elements more dangerous to human society. Had the same men landed instead in the disunited states of the southern or central continent, they would have swollen the forces of disorder. But if they came on shore at Boston, Philadelphia, or New York, they were met at once by a tradition so universally held and so despotic that disagree- ment and resistance appeared equally absurd. This tradition has the defects of its qualities: extrava- 172 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. -gances, excesses, and upon occasions a preposterous assurance \i 87 " 17 ^ which strangers may fairly deride. But men of our nation can laugh with good humour because, being governed by a like tradition of their own which leads them at times into similar absurdities, they can also admire without envy. Questioned as to the origin of our faith, we find it hard, when taken unawares, to make any suitable reply. We know vaguely that we have scrambled to it somehow ; slowly, over a long period, through a series of events which, viewed carelessly, look almost like accidents. We are inclined to believe that its foundations must have been deliberately laid by a few great men working in reasonably good material. We have a backward vision of Alfreds and Henrys and Edwards, far off, 'like misty warders dimly seen.' But in our sober moments we do not claim that the tradition which governs us so despotically can be fully explained and accounted for by our splendid opportunities, by our noble laws, or even by the virtue of the mass of our citizens. These things are rather the results of the tradition than the causes which have produced it. In periods of extreme complacency we have perhaps inclined to overlook the most remarkable excellence of the British race, which is its fertility in leaders ; and leadership is the true cause of the tradition no less in the history of a nation than in the annals of a regiment. Under this aspect America is an admirable example and a useful reminder. The great interest which attaches to her experiment is that during the whole of its develop- ment it has been under a close and rigid observation ; for the time is short, and records have been kept. If we choose to look we can see the founders of the tradition at work like bees in a glass hive, careful, industrious and ungrudging. From Washington to Lincoln there is no obscurity any- where. And great as was the practical achievement of 1787-1788 iEr. 30-31 THE UNION OF THE STATES 173 the Federalist in procuring the adoption of the Union, its A.D. glory is even greater in having established it among those firm things which a nation with loving reverence has deter- mined to place beyond all question. For the rest of the world who are not the subjects of the Union the Federalist has the value of a great book, and this not merely for the style in which it is written, or even for the wisdom it contains. Style is a wonderful pickle that is able to preserve mediocrity of thought under favourable conditions for many centuries. Ingenious and consistent thought will frequently preserve itself even in the teeth of obviously uncomplying facts. The greatness of the Federalist, though it is lacking neither in style nor con- sistency of thought, is something different, something altogether unique. Men speak of it in the same breath with L' Esprit des Lois and R Principe) and it has at least this in common with those works, that it deals with the problems of government, not merely on the surface with a tidy ingenuity, but fundamentally. Like them, it has had an immense influence both upon thinkers and upon men of action. But the contrasts are also valuable. Montesquieu was a curious analyst, a man of wit and eloquence; but he was almost at the opposite pole from the visionaries. He expounds a situation, explains it, comments upon it, and sums it up with the charming attribute of French writers, that his conclusions seem inevitable even on the occasions when we know his premises to be inaccurate. But he is always outside the actual controversy ; keenly interested, but entirely detached ; calm and impartial in his demeanour, even if in his heart he cherished certain preferences. He is considering other people's affairs all the while; never concerned in vindicating anything for which he is personally responsible. The conspicuous quality is his fertility in suggestion; the book is oftener on the knee than in the 174 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. hand, and the reader far away on the wings of his own 235 «-**: Machiavelli, on the other hand, is always the man of action — the would-be man of action — or at least the counsellor of men of action. In a sense he is an idealist, and would have built up a state; but he lacks the true spirit of the revolutionary, for he never contemplates, nor ever appears to desire, any change in the rules of the game. He is of opinion that he could play it better and more intelligently than his contemporaries ; and it is not derogat- ing from his genius to say of him that he writes somewhat in the manner of Cavendish on Whist. Assuming the con- ditions which exist — the nature of man and of things — to be unchangeable, he proceeds in a calm, unmoral way, like a lecturer on frogs, to show how a valiant and sagacious ruler can best turn events to his own advantage and the security of his dynasty. If we can conceive of Montesquieu and Machiavelli set upon the same problem, the construction of an ideal state, the former would have sought for the wisest balance, the latter for the strongest prince. The morals which Montesquieu draws out of his analysis, the maxims which Machiavelli prepares from his experience, are entirely different from the method of the Federalist, which advocated a plan; explained and justified it; pre- vailed upon a nation of practical men to make a trial of it. This plan has now been at work for upwards of a hundred years, and its strength appears to-day to be greater than it was at the beginning. A book which has helped to produce a phenomenon of this order would possess an interest for mankind, even if it were not, as the Federalist is, a classic at once in style and thought. The science of political philosophy in recent times has drawn in its horns, setting an example of modesty which its economic sister shows some disposition to imitate. Its 1787-1788 Mr. 30-31 THE UNION OF THE STATES 175 pretensions are to-day less confident than in the England A.D. of the seventeenth century, or the France of the eighteenth. Since Edmund Burke it has wisely chosen to waive its early ambition of absolute power, accepting a position of influential dignity rather than of executive authority. In its present mood it is ready to agree with the Law of England that a superior virtue resides in judgments de- livered upon particular issues, and that obiter dicta, however entertaining, are not sound rules to go by. The author writing on themes of government, as it were at large, with- out direct responsibility for the result, and chiefly for the edification of the intelligent classes and the general im- provement of the world, can still enjoy an ample reward for his fancy and his industry. But the statesman whose effort is to explain, to justify and to recommend a particular policy, is on a different plane. If his plan in the end succeeds and becomes notable, the words in which he urged its adoption command a deeper attention. He challenges a verdict not merely upon his principles, but in their result ; so that if his work has stood, the statement of his belief on which it was based has a superior authority with succeeding generations. The opponents of Union had no artillery of sufficient weight to reply to the Federalist and to withstand its tremendous attack. They trusted vainly to the machine; relying upon intrigue in the state legislatures, upon light calumny and incredible misstatement. Confronted with a real issue which for the moment has touched men's hearts, even the strong management of a modern party has found itself discomfited. An organisation is an excellent thing in itself, but at such times it cannot fight ideas with bogeys. People refused to believe that Washington wished to be a king. They refused to believe that a state would deprive 176 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. its subjects of freedom and install a tyranny were it to part Ifa aSi ^k a P orfc i° n °f i ts sovereignty to the central government. They were told, in the hallowed phrases which have done duty since the days of Cleon the demagogue, that the Convention of Philadelphia aimed at making the poor poorer, and the rich richer ; at the domination of the few and the slavery of the many ; x but men remained unconvinced even by this familiar eloquence. It was urged upon the maritime states that to part with a shred of their fiscal independence was to make over a portion of their natural wealth for the benefit of their neighbours; 2 but even their faith in this plausible appeal began to crumble before a wider vision and a nobler aim. Finally they were assured that the plan was fantastic and unworkable; that it was but the wild experiment of ' visionary young men.' Every pamphlet and every platform of the opposition echoed with this tremen- dous charge, and young men who see visions may, if we consider the result, take comfort throughout the ages. On the 17th of June 1788 the Convention of New York state met at Poughkeepsie to consider the draft constitu- tion. This event stands in somewhat the same relation to Hamilton's political career as the taking of the first redoubt at Yorktown to his military service. It was a brilliant episode, a gallant action upon which popular imagination has fastened, attracted by the spectacle of enemies meeting one another in the gate. ' Two-thirds of the Convention,' Hamilton wrote, ' and four-sevenths of the people are against us.' 3 Governor Clinton was his opponent, not himself an orator, but a character of impressive size. Even in private conferences he was hardly articulate, but he knew clearly the direction in which he had reasons for not travelling. 1 History, iii. p. 449, also pp. 452-4. 2 Cf. Clinton's policy in New York, History, iii. p. 174, 8 Works, ix. pp. 432-3, THE UNION OF THE STATES 177 He controlled a majority of forty-six against a minority of A. P. 1788 nineteen. 1 But there comes a time in most struggles that J&T ' 31 are prolonged when it is not enough to direct the battle, when the leader who is willing to risk a personal encounter prevails over his opponent who seeks to control the move- ment from a windmill. Clinton was strong, narrow, un- scrupulous and very stubborn, but he had in him nothing of the stuff of a paladin. His military career had been inglorious, and in debate he pushed others forward to do the fighting, lashing them into combat with a surly condemnation. Since our narrative of the events at Poughkeepsie is mainly drawn from the notes and journals of the opponents of union, we may believe that the accounts of Hamilton's prowess are not exaggerated. Ho fought every point, and was at first beaten upon every point. His eloquence could make no impression upon the mechanical majority. He drew tears from his audience, both sides alike ; spoke for hours at a time, and all men hung upon his words. But still, at the vote, forty-six hands went up against nineteen. The system on which the discussion was conducted is very puzzling. The constitution was rejected by a clear majority, and next day Hamilton returned undaunted to advocate it once more. Again it was rejected, and again he refused to accept the decision as final, arguing for delay, hoping that the news of ratification by other states would gradually wear down the obduracy of his opponents. A friend finding him one day alone, " took the liberty to ■ say to him, that they would inquire of me in New York 1 what was the prospect in relation to the adoption of the 1 Constitution ; and asked him what I should say to fhem. 1 His manner immediately changed, and he answered : ' God * only knows. Several votes have been taken, by which if. 1 History, iii. p. 483. M 178 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1788 ' appears that there are two to one against us.' Supposing Mr. 31 c h e na( j concluded his answer, I was about to retire, when he ' added, in a most emphatic manner : ' Tell them that the 1 Convention shall never rise until the Constitution is 'adopted.'" 1 Minorities are to be measured by spirit as well as numbers, and the buoyancy of the nineteen who followed Hamilton was disconcerting. Suddenly there came a collapse. Melancthon Smith, the able leader in debate of the Clintonian party, announced his willingness to ratify ' upon conditions.' Hamilton refused to entertain the idea of a compromise, and wisely took the admission as a signal for a more vehement assault. The ob- jections that were made to a complete acceptance "vanished 1 before him. He remained an hour and twenty minutes on ' the floor. After which Mr. Smith, with great candour, got 'up; and after some explanations, confessed that Mr. 1 Hamilton by his reasoning had removed the objections he 1 had made." 2 In spite of this defection, Clinton refused to budge, and for a time it appeared as if his silent legion would stand by him in sufficient numbers to ensure his victory. But day by day the news of ratification by other states came to strengthen the weaker party. All eyes were turned upon Virginia, where the influence of Washington was pitted against the open opposition of Monroe and the puzzling advice of Jefferson, who wrote from Paris that he was in favour both of acceptance and rejection. But when at last, over the dusty summer roads, Hamilton's triumphant gallopers brought word of the adherence of the great southern state, the battle was decided against the strong. On the 25th July the minority of twenty-seven was changed into a majority of three. While we may accept without hesitation Hamilton's 1 History, Hi. pp. 522-23. 2 Ibid. iii. p. 524. THE UNION OF THE STATES 179 estimate that four-sevenths of the population of New York a.d. 1788 state were opposed to the Union, we must also believe the • 31 contemporary accounts, which assure us that on his return to the city it seemed as if a unanimous people had come out to celebrate his victory. It was not only the Convention of Poughkeepsie which had been conquered by his masterful and persuasive influence. The minds also of the men who wel- comed him with hymns and banners 1 had been subdued and fascinated by the dramatic spectacle of a ' visionary young man ' struggling against the discipline of overwhelming odds, day after day for six weary weeks, and in the end ■overcoming all opposition, by the prowess of a great char- acter strung to its highest pitch by the inspiration of a great idea. 1 History, iii. p. 628. BOOK III THE FEDERALISTS A.D. 1789-1791 The feudal system may 'hate worn out, but its main principle, that the tenure of property should be the fulfilment of duty, is the essence of good government. The divine right of kings may have been a plea for feeble tyrants, but the divine right of government is the keystone of human progress, and without it governments sink into police, and a nation is degraded into a mob. — Disraeli. BOOK III TEE FEDERALISTS CHAPTER I President Washington Congress met at New York in April 1789. Upon a canvass a.d. 1789 of the returns from the electoral colleges, it was found that ^ 32 General Washington had been chosen President by a unanimous vote. " As he approached the Hall of Congress, he was seen to 1 retain the firm, elastic step of a yet vigorous soldier's frame. ' His thin hair of hazel brown, covered with powder, was 1 clubbed behind, in the fashion of the day. His dress was of 1 black velvet. On his side hung a dress sword, and around 4 his neck a ribbon to which was attached, concealed, a minia- 1 ture of his wife, worn, it is stated, from his nuptials until his ' death. ' Time,' wrote Fisher Ames, ' had made havoc upon 1 his face. He addressed the two Houses in the Senate ' Chamber ; it was a very touching scene, and quite of the 1 solemn kind. His aspect grave, almost to sadness ; his ' modesty, actually shaking ; his voice deep, a little tremulous, 1 and so low as to call for close attention — added to the series 1 of objects presented to the mind, and overwhelming it, pro- 1 duced emotions of the most affecting kind upon the members. ' I sat entranced.' " l 1 Fisher Ames, 3rd May 1789, History, iv. p. 8. 183 184 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1789 The first President had the gift of seeing into the heart of 32 a situation better than most men, and he therefore doubtless understood that his unanimous election was not the begin- ning of the Millennium. He had a just pride in his fame in the world, an honourable concern for the good opinion of his fellow-countrymen, and it needed no prophetic instinct to perceive that in this new adventure both were to be placed in jeopardy. Even in his own trade of soldier it was hardly possible that he could have added to his laurels by fresh enterprises, and in the unknown trade of politician it was not unlikely he might suffer total eclipse. Nor could he hope in this hazardous undertaking to retain the all but universal affection which had rewarded his conduct of the war. Popular government in its working was predestined to result in a cleavage, and he who had been the leader of the whole people would find himself before long only the leader of a party. Beyond these considerations was a fervent desire for rest after an arduous life. ■ The business of America's happiness,' in Hamilton's phrase, ' was yet to be done.' x It was a true statement of the case, and to the younger man, whose aim was not peace but achievement, the prospect appeared radiant and delectable. With Washington, how- ever, it was entirely different. No action of his life shows a finer patriotism than his acceptance of office ; for he foresaw both the danger and the labour, and judged notwithstanding that duty left him no escape. The constitution which had been framed at Philadelphia, and afterwards accepted by the people, was as yet a lifeless thing. At the most it was only a licence to begin governing, granted to a few energetic characters who had faith in their own capacity to make the experiment succeed. Nothing appeared more likely than that this licence would be promptly withdrawn if the early years were marked with 1 History, iv. p. 2. THE FEDERALISTS 185 failure, or even if delay occurred in achieving some con- ad. 1789 spicuous success. The life of the Union being bound up in the strength of its government, the first thing to be done was to establish that strength upon sure foundations by the bold use of the powers which had been bestowed. In the weak hands of men afraid to act upon their warrant, afraid to construe it widely and even to exceed its strict and literal intention, the constitution compacted with so much care and accepted with so much misgiving must infallibly have gone to pieces. In twelve months the states, which were as yet united only upon paper, would have split again into disunion. There was no magic in the charter itself that could have drawn order out of the existing chaos. The document signed at Philadelphia was little more than an opinion and a hope. It was by the vigour and courage of Washington's administration, and by the interpretation placed upon the constitution by his boldest minister, that the United States ultimately became a nation. The enemies of Union both within and without were hopeful that a weak government would undo the work of the Convention. France, who conceived her interest to lie in a distracted league, was unfriendly to the idea of an American nation, and incredulous of the accomplishment of such a miracle. 1 The ' French ' party in the states bestirred themselves in bringing forward the name of Benjamin Franklin, whose advanced age alone was a sufficient obstacle to his efficiency. The minority, who had vainly opposed the act of union, were equally averse from the appointment of a strong president, and endeavoured in a timid and subter- ranean fashion to promote this impossible candidature. The adherents of Gates, whose personality appears at all times to have exercised a fatal fascination upon impotent intriguers, were favourable to any nomination which would 1 Instructions to De Moustier, History, iii. p. 559. 186 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1789 have excluded Washington from power. But in fact the only question worth an answer was whether Washington himself would consent to serve. In this case the issue was a foregone conclusion. The real obstacle was neither France nor Gates, but Washington's own reluctance, his ' great and sole desire to live and die in peace and retirement on my own farm.' 1 In the letters which passed between Wash- ington and Hamilton during the summer and autumn of the previous year 2 there is proof of the genuine aversion of the former from the cares of office, and of the determination of the latter that he must be compelled to make a sacrifice of his inclination. It is clear that Hamilton grasped the importance of immediate effort. The enemies of the constitution, though temporarily discouraged, were numerous and powerful. They would gladly have obstructed the creation of any government, but as that had not been possible, they were prepared, as soon as occasion offered, to pervert its inten- tion. Hamilton thoroughly understood the value attaching to the early acts of an administration charged with the perilous inauguration of a brand-new system. While he was well aware of the fatal consequences of any serious mistake, he was also aware that any delay on the part of the executive in exerting its authority would be construed as hesitation, and would restore the strength and spirit of the opposition. He sought, therefore, to impose his own policy at once, and to entrench it in such a fortress of pre- cedents that only a revolution would be able to dislodge it. While men of slower natures were looking about them stunned by defeat, or bewildered by success, unsettled and disorganised — like an establishment of servants brought up to town and deposited in a new and unfamiliar mansion — he alone, and at once, grasped the opportunity afforded 1 History, iii. p. 553. ' 1788. History, iii. pp. 550-58. THE FEDERALISTS 187 by these circumstances to a self-possessed and energetic A.D. 1789 character with a clear knowledge of his own mind. While ^ Et ' 32 public affairs were in this plastic condition, purposes could be achieved with but little difficulty that at a later date would have required stupendous efforts for their accomplish- ment. At such a time things might also be done which could never be undone. National unity was in a sense already attained ; the principle had been accepted in the most solemn fashion; but the constitution, where it was vague, imperfect, or inadequate, had still to be defined, developed and extended. The financial position was rotten. It was of paramount importance to place it at once on a sound and honest basis. The natural resources of the empire were enormous, but they needed the care of a strong and watchful sovereign to bring them into early prosperity. A continent upon the eastern side of the Atlantic, distracted by jealous rivalries, invited the American people to flattering but deadly alliances, in which Hamilton dreaded to see the new Republic en- tangled either by reckless sentiment or by a spirit of inveterate revenge. With these objects he set himself at once to extend the power and prestige of the federal government, and to curb and diminish the importance of the states; to provide for or discharge all debts according to the strict letter of the bond ; to pursue the deliberate advantage of his own country among nations, equally unmoved by affection for France and by hatred of England, and equally indifferent to the enthusiasm of most men, and to the indignation of a few, as the Revolution in Paris pursued its startling career. And in all circumstances, at every turn of events and clash of interests, he kept before his eyes the subordination of classes, industries, and states, to the national purpose and the advantage of the commonwealth. 188 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1789 The complete sovereignty of the central government over • l all citizens and states of the Union had been the chief sub- ject of controversy from the beginning. This principle, not altogether unintentionally, had been to some extent put out of sight during the discussions at Philadelphia. It was not fully admitted even by the clauses of the constitution. Still less had it been accepted by the people with all its unforeseen consequences when they ratified the action of the majority of their delegates. It was the chief object of Hamilton's policy to establish this principle so firmly that it could not be overthrown or even questioned. The chief object of his opponents was precisely the reverse. They aimed at limiting the central sovereignty, while he sought to extend it. Where the terms of the compact admitted of a doubt, they endeavoured to construe them in a sense favourable to the state legislatures, unfavourable to the federal government. Both parties admitted the need for a balance of power as a check upon rash administration, but while Hamilton was determined to produce this balance out of the forces which existed within a single nation, the opposite party held no less fervently by the old idea that the end in view could only be successfully accomplished by the competing interests of many nations within a league. This difference in political faith was fundamental. Long after Washington and Hamilton had passed away, cheerful, well-meaning men and despondent, wise men endeavoured vainly to adjust by compromise what could only be settled by victory. Any solution of the antagonism between the Federalist ideal and the pretensions of the State Rights party was wholly beyond the reach of concession or accom- modation. For the policies were in direct opposition, like two men whose sole but essential quarrel is simply for the upper hand. Bland mediation, soothing make-believe, patched-up temporary arrangements, were hopeless nego- THE FEDERALISTS 1*9 tiators, for there was in such a case no choice of alter- A.D. 1789 natives. In the end one man must prevail, the other must T ' ' submit. It is conceivable that had the times been more pro- pitious, had Hamilton been as admirable a party leader as he was a statesman, had he lived, or had the Federalist party at the beginning of the nineteenth century dis- covered some other chief capable of sustaining their spirit and guiding their counsels, the difference might have been settled by a political victory. But each year of delay added to the danger by complicating the issue with fresh interests. The growth of population, the development of territory, the increase of wealth, added strength and con- fidence to the opposing parties, so that by the time Lincoln came to undertake the government of the country T there remained only one possible solution — the stricken field. 'In campaign, battle, hospital, and prison,' it has been computed that a million of human lives were sacrificed, 2 in order ■ that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom.' 8 Certainly it was not a cheap victory. The thing which commands our admiration is that three-quarters of to. century later a man should have arisen, the equal of Washington in character, of Hamilton in perspicacity, who had the courage to maintain the Union even at this staggering price. A great nation does not for any mean or trivial difference split into two camps of eager volunteers and engage in civil war until one of the sections yields through mere exhaustion. Long before four campaigns had ended, the virus of personal hatred would have spent itself, the pre- tensions of a mere phrase would have been detected. The War of Secession would never have been fought by men, 1 March 1861. * Cambridge Modern History, vii. p. 463. * Linooln'8 Address at Gettysburg. 190 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1789 bewitched by rival logicians in dispute regarding the abstract propositions of constitutional law. The spirit which combated against union in the Philadelphia Convention, in the early Congresses and in the cabinets of Washington, was the same spirit, and engaged in the same struggle, in the cabinet of Buchanan and on the field of Gettysburg, seventy years later. It is a spirit that compels respect from its most determined opponents — a spirit of an im- practicable ideal, but still an ideal. But between the fanatics for State Rights whom we condemn, and the upholders of the dignity and utility of local authorities whom we have been taught to admire, there is in fact only a difference of degree. A commonwealth in which this spirit had ceased to exist might be safely marked as a dying race ; but in the view of the statesman it can never be allowed the upper hand. Like the steam in a boiler, it serves its purpose by its efforts to escape from imprison- ment and control ; but if these efforts are successful, there is an end of the utility. The struggle between Federalism and State Rights soon made a wide cleavage in the first cabinet. Washington's own convictions and sympathies were on the Federal side ; but he considered that his supreme duty as a Federalist, no less than as a patriot, was to compel the new constitution to prove itself capable of being worked. The country had to be governed, a political system had to be inaugurated at all costs. With this end in view he set to work reluctantly and wearily, composing differences and enduring obloquy, with the same calm judgment and undramatic courage that had directed his conduct of the war. The weight of this immense and unfamiliar character was not to be resisted. While Hamilton laboured at the founda- tions, Washington helped him to keep the enemy at bay, and approved the work, step by step, as it was accomplished. THE FEDERALISTS 191 It may well be doubted whether without this fortunate A.D. 17S9 co-operation the constitution would ever have existed except T ' as a historical document. CHAPTER II TJie Threefold Policy The governing principle of Hamilton's policy, of Washington who supported Hamilton, and of the whole Federalist party who followed him, was to establish a supreme sovereignty. The first step towards the accomplishment of this object was dull but arduous. Out of nothing the whole machinery of government had to be called suddenly into existence. Controversy was silenced for the moment by an over- whelming necessity. At this stage the difficulties were mainly those inherent in the nature of the task, and were not to any important extent the result of the spirit of faction. But so soon as the machinery was contrived, departments organised and provision made for the pressing needs of the Union, the governing principle became visible, and according to the dispositions of men it appeared ad- mirable in the eyes of some and hateful in the eyes of others. Hamilton sought his prime object by a threefold means. The idea of his financial policy was the welding of the Union, of his commercial policy the development of the estate, of his foreign policy to confirm independence. Each of these undertakings was planned upon the heroic scale in accordance with the nature of its author ; but all were subordinate to his main end, and never, even in the dust and heat of political controversy, were they permitted to escape from their true proportions. 192 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1789 The period during which Hamilton's ideas have directed the course of American history has not yet ended, and is not likely to end in our day; but the time during which his personal influence controlled the policy of government is reckoned only at twelve years, while his official career lasted for but little more than five. 1 The administration of Wash- ington began in April 1789 and ended in March 1797. Upon his retirement from political life, John Adams, also a member of the Federalist party, was chosen to succeed him. Adams was no friend to Hamilton, but his cabinet did not allow him to break the spell during the term of his administration. In March 1801 Thomas Jefferson, the founder and leader of the Democratic party, having defeated the Federalists, became President of the United States. For four-and- twenty years from that date the highest office in the Union was occupied in turn by three men 2 who not only held the whole trend of Hamilton's policy in abhorrence, but were among the bitterest of his personal enemies. The Federalist party, seriously crippled even before the death of its leader, 3 gradually crumbled into discredit when deprived of his support. In these circumstances it was only natural that the ideals of Hamilton earned but a scanty respect. Much was said about the need for undoing his work, and some- thing was attempted towards that end ; but, fortunately in one respect, his fame was so • completely obscured for the time being by the superior radiance of his successors that it was judged unnecessary to signalise the triumph of the Democrats and the ruin of the Federalists by the incon- venient process of destroying institutions which were already perceived to be indispensable to the prosperous management of affairs. 1 Federalist Administrations (Washington and Adams), April 1789-March 1801 ; Hamilton Secretary of the Treasury, September 1789- January 1795. * Jefferson, Madison and Monroe. * Hamilton's death, 11th July 1804. THE FEDERALISTS 193 The ultimate object of the threefold policy was to establish a.d. 1789 a set of principles, by weaving them into the fabric of the ^ T - 32 national tradition, before the opponents of strong govern- ment should have the opportunity of office. Hamilton sought to accomplish his ends by a series of legislative measures and by a course of steadfast conduct on the part of the executive. If these measures and this course of conduct were to fulfil his ultimate object, it was necessary, in his opinion, that each separate act should succeed in a con- spicuous manner in achieving its own particular and immediate object. Good results must be shown forthwith. The great mass of the citizens must be affected by a sudden and fortunate contrast, with a sense of a great benefit due unmistakably to the federal arrangement. And yet it was equally necessary that the policy should be wise and well grounded. For although a rapid improvement was for every reason desirable, it was above everything desirable that the measures of the first administration should possess the quality of permanence. It was essential that their purpose should not be impaired at a later date by the need for frequent alterations and adjustments which in careless or hostile hands might have endangered the existence of the essential principles. If Hamilton's threefold policy succeeded in detail, the result, in his opinion, would be to produce throughout the country a feeling of gratitude and even of reverence, not to himself personally or to his party, but towards those new institutions which were standing upon their trial. In addition to this general aim, there was also a particular intention in many of his acts, notably in those which dealt with the funding of the debts and other problems of finance, to enlist powerful interests and classes upon the side of the federal government by assuming obligations and responsibilities towards them which had previously been distributed among the separate states. N 194 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1789 It may also be said of Hamilton's policy, viewing it from iEx - 32 a different standpoint, that its object was the same as that of the war itself. The struggle with Britain had been for the sake of independence, and for that alone. After immense sacrifices the states had succeeded in getting rid of everv vestige of direct external control. Hamilton's aim was to secure the measure of independence which had been thus attained, and to extend the work a stage further by getting rid of all influence from without, not only direct but indirect, not only political in the strict sense, but generaL The aim of his financial measures (in which he succeeded) was to make the nation independent of external creditors, of European usurers, bankers and governments who had supplied the funds necessary for carrying on the war either at onerous rates, or, as in the case of France, in order to gain an influence which would enable them to promote their own political ends. The aim of his foreign policy was independence of European intrigue, and the exclusion of its diplomacy, not merely from all direct appeals to the individual states, but from a position in which it could exercise pressure upon the federal power. And in his practical and foreseeing mind he clearly understood from the beginning that if the Old World was to be kept from interference in the affairs of the New, it could only be by a stiff and unyielding refusal upon the part of the Union to be drawn upon any pretext into the quarrels of the European continent. In this aim also he succeeded; for if he did not actually secure the formula which is now known as the Monroe Doctrine in the definite phrases of a state document, he none the less by irrevocable acts laid the foundations and raised high the edifice of that foreign policy which his country has pursued from that day to this. Independence was likewise the aim of his commercial THE FEDERALISTS 195 policy, which was framed with the deliberate intention of A.D. 1780 creating a self-sufficing nation. American industry was to iET * 82 be made as free from the hazards of European markets as American politics from the influence of European govern- ments. His method was to arrive at a balance between the production of food and raw materials on the one hand, and manufactures, shipping and other forms of commerce upon the other. It was possible, in his opinion, with the prudent assistance of legislation, to come speedily to a point at which all the necessities of life and instruments of labour, and even the greater part of the luxuries that were in common demand, should be supplied from the fields and farms, the mines, mills and workshops of the new republic. A nation which was content to drift along the path of least resistance must suffer the inconveniences and dangers of a lop-sided development. A nation in which the manufacturing or the agricultural interest was in an overwhelming predominance would never be proof against foreign hostility or catastrophe, as a nation might hope to be which maintained the principle of a strong internal market for commodities of every kind. Hamilton's desire to establish his commercial policy did not succeed. It is true that he has set forth his ideas in one of the most memorable reports ever made to Congress. It is true also that his proposals were welcomed by the great majority of his own party as well as by many of his opponents. But although in certain isolated cases he was able to introduce his system of national development, it was so little advanced when his power ended that the propor- tions of the fabric did not affect the imaginations of men so as to impel them, willing or unwilling, to complete the work. Unlike his foreign and financial policies, his commercial policy did not crystallise into a tradition or an institution. The foundations were not even laid, but only staked out ; 196 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1789 ana although the elevation and the working plans existed ready to the hand of the builder, they were laid aside and soon forgotten. All that can be claimed is that the idea was perfect in his own mind. But only after many years had elapsed did it begin to assert an authority among men who, under the pressure of circumstances and not by means of their own clear foresight, had begun to travel slowly in the same direction. The fate of Hamilton's threefold policy after his death is worth noting at this stage. That part of it which dealt with finance was accomplished during the term of his office. Although his opponents had blustered heroically about their intentions, it was never undone, because it was too strong to be pulled down by peaceful means. The principles of his foreign policy were fully accepted in practice before the retirement of Washington. Their sound patriotism was too obvious to be disregarded by his successors, who, when their passions were cooled and the malice of rivalry had died away, completed the structure and confirmed the tradition. But of his com- mercial policy the plan only was bequeathed to future generations. His policy, therefore, succeeded in accomplish- ing the greater number of the particular objects it set out to accomplish. In no instance was it defeated. It was only delayed. Even when some counter idea for the moment overcame it, the victory was never followed up by effective occupation. It is true that his commercial policy did not prevail, but the doctrine of Free Trade did not usurp the vacant place. Free Trade was never even set up with success as an alternative to his commercial policy. The obstacle was merely a kind of lethargy which descended upon men in what has been termed ' the era of good feeling/ an indisposition to decide upon any new and definite policy. The spirit of the times was an easy contentment with exist- ing institutions, even though these were obviously incom- THE FEDERALISTS 197 plete Men preferred to live in an unfinished palace, despite A.D. 1788 the dangers and inconveniences attaching to their lazy iET> ^ occupation, rather than to engage in any strenuous efforts to complete the structure. When we come to consider further what was to Hamilton the main and ultimate object of his threefold policy — the firm establishment of a supreme and sovereign government — we find that here also he has been successful — successful even beyond his own hopes, but still not wholly successful. The Union still exists. The forces of disintegration have been kept at bay. This result, however, has not been attained by the peaceful means which Hamilton had planned, but only as the outcome of civil war waged upon a tremen- dous scale. In placing these limits upon the renown of his achievements, we must in fairness take into account the prodigious nature of his ambition. We are bound to remember also this fact, that if the Union, for which he sacrificed his own life, was not preserved without the further sacrifice of a million lives, it was, beyond any doubt, from the love of the institutions he had raised, and by the force of the tradition made by his great spirit, that men were found willing to pour out their blood like water to secure all that he had won for them, and nearly all that he had dreamed of winning. When we consider the course of events during the first quarter of the nineteenth century, it is impossible not to be struck by the prevalence of lethargy in the counsels of Hamilton's successors, and even in the people themselves. There is a tendency among the statesmen who followed him to leave his work for the greater part where he had left it ; if complete, complete; if half-done, half-done; if only planned but not begun, to lay the plan aside. Hamilton was as great a builder as he was an architect, as necessary in the one capacity as in the other ; and for more than half a 198 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A..D. 1789 century after his death no man was found equal to the task ' of finishing the work. When a further advance was re- quired by circumstances, his successors, like the architects and builders of an inferior age, were apt to carry out the original intention in a feeble, grotesque, or disproportioned style. In the case of the commercial policy this tendency is everywhere conspicuous. The plan lay ready to hand, but when Hamilton's successors came to put it in execution they showed at first a futile hesitation, and in the end a riotous extravagance, owing to their inability to see the problem as a whole. The fine symmetry and the noble purpose which existed in the mind of Hamilton were entirely missed. Under the shelter of his name, what he dreaded most has come to pass, and the advantage of interests and of classes has been preferred to the wellbeing of the nation. His system of foreign policy had less to fear from mutilation, for it was not only planned, but for the most part already built. Yet even here it is impossible not to detect the absence of the master's hand. Although his ends have been achieved, his wise maxims have been ignored even upon grave occasions. " There appears to me too much ' tartness in various parts of the reply," Hamilton wrote at the crisis of the negotiations with Britain. " Energy without ■ asperity seems best to comport , with the dignity of national 1 language. The force ought to be more in the idea than in ' the expression or manner." x And again, ' real firmness is good for anything ; strut is good for nothing.' The note of his system was a quiet adherence to essential things and a contemptuous aversion from exasperating methods. His preference was for the aristocratic spirit and ritual. A courteous and dignified demeanour was to his thinking a better weapon than the self-conscious, highflown aggressive- ness which delighted the hearts of the Democrats. The 1 History, vi. p. 5. THE FEDERALISTS 199 Monroe Doctrine and the modern tariff policy of the United A.D 1789 States are both in a certain sense direct inheritances from " Et# 32 Hamilton. But, viewed under another aspect, both contain an element of caricature, not only in their style, but even in their methods and ultimate aims. We miss the grand manner which despised provocation. A certain bustling assurance, with all its loud talk of business principles, does not reach the high level of his energy, while it misses many things which were firmly held in his luminous and well-proportioned view. CHAPTER III Hamiltcnis Difficulties An attempt has been made to explain the Federalist principle and to draw a rough outline of the policy by which Hamilton purposed to establish it as a precedent for future governments and as a part of the national tradition. Even this inadequate account will have been enough to indicate the splendour and audacity of his enterprise ; but for a true understanding of his character it is necessary that we should bear in mind the difficulties which surrounded him on every side. The first of these is the shortness of the period in which the work was done. Five years and a few months was the brief term of Hamilton's official career. Within seven years after his retirement from Washington's government his enemies came into power. Nor was shortness of time the greatest of Hamilton's difficulties. We must realise also that, except for the lew months between his appointment as Secretary of the Treasury in September 1789 and the meeting of the second 200 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1790 session of Congress early in the following January, there was hardly a day during the whole of his administration when he was not challenged and obstructed at every turn by a powerful opposition. While it is true that throughout the remaining term of the first Congress 1 parties were not yet organised upon a strict system, and that the cleavage was uncertain and not wholly partisan ; yet this fact had its disadvantages as well as its benefits, for the members, lacking discipline, were often and easily persuaded to sacrifice a principle to a passing sentiment. Accordingly, although upon the whole the Federalists who followed Hamilton were in a con- siderable majority, it happened on more than one occasion that Hamilton's measures were defeated, and it was the exception when any important Act was carried without some mischievous alteration or illogical curtailment. In the second Congress 2 the opposition was organised, fanatical and unscrupulous. Not only Hamilton's policy, but his personal integrity, was constantly and bitterly assailed, and although these attacks were on every occasion rolled back with disaster upon their instigators, the perti- nacity of these enemies was untiring. Apart from the distraction and annoyance, the mere time occupied in the defeat of the eager malice of the Democrats was a serious impediment to his labours. In the third Congress 3 there was, if possible, a still more savage and relentless temper. The difficulties of adminis- tration were enhanced by the fact that the Federalists now no longer held a majority in the House of Representatives, 1 The fir it session of the first Congress lasted from the beginning of April to the end of September 1789 ; the eecond session from January to August 1790 ; the third session from December 1790 to March 1791. 3 October 1791 to March 1793. 9 December 1793 to March 1795. THE FEDERALISTS 201 but were outvoted on every party division bv the Demo- a.D. 1790 crats. Moreover, during this period Hamilton was occupied JE/I - 33 for several months with the suppression of the Whisky Rebellion, 1 which had been excited by the blundering in- trigues of the opposition. A military expedition, headed by Washington, was required to restore order, and although Hamilton accompanied the Federal forces without a military command, the direction was mainly in his hands. The rapidity with which parties came into existence is hardly a matter for surprise. The ordinary man is apt to cry out lustily whenever he is hurt or inconvenienced, and, unless he be perpetually reminded that his complaints are unreasonable, there is always a danger that he will settle down into a regular opposition. The process of union or confederation must always be to some extent a painful business. As in the case of badly set limbs, bones have to be broken by the surgeon and reset before the patient can regain his proper shape and the full use of his members. It was not only bad citizens and dishonest rascals, not only men who sought a profit in disunion or in the repudiation of debts, who composed the Democratic party. There were also included in it all those who still clung, many of them unconsciously, to the doctrine of State Rights, and dreaded as if by instinct the rule of a central government which in their panic they identified with tyranny. And to these were added, in a remarkable alliance, the adherents of the new-fangled and fashionable doctrines of the Rights of Man. Gradually but swiftly, therefore, a party, compounded of malcontents of every variety and enthusiasts belonging to at least two incompatible faiths, grew up and consolidated in antagonism to the policy of the administration. To say that this party was hostile to the Union would be too sweeping 1 1794. 202 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1790 a charge; but it is none the less true that it was hostile Mr ' 33 to the conditions upon which the very existence of the Union depended, and in time it became even more hostile to the personal forces that were engaged in maintaining the Union. In many minds the necessity for strong govern- ment was only admitted at particular moments under the lash of adversity. People who had called out for a true sovereign during the crisis of the war became careless as soon as peace was declared, and many likewise who had been clamorous for Union in the intolerable dis- orders of 1787 grew lukewarm in the comparative tran- quillity of 1790. The constant tendency among this class of citizens was to be content with an instalment of comfort. They grudged paying the full price which would have ensured them a permanent possession of the whole benefit. Parliamentary opposition was neither the last nor the worst of Hamilton's difficulties. Before many months had passed the cabinet was divided no less sharply than Con- gress, till in the end the majority of its decisions were arrived at by the casting vote of the President. In such circumstances a perfect loyalty among its members would have been a difficult achievement had they been men of the nicest honour. But even an outward show of co- operation proved to be quite unattainable. Confidence was entirely destroyed. The opposition out of doors was directed, encouraged and comforted from within. The measures of government were damned in advance by a zealous Democratic press well supplied with information by its supporters in the Cabinet. It must be admitted, after the event, that Washington's original conception of cabinet government was founded on a capital error, and even that his management of his administration was marred by very grave mistakes. There THE FEDERALISTS 203 is little cause for wonder and none for reproach in such a A.D. 1790 verdict ; for though Washington was by nature a statesman T * as well as a soldier, neither by nature nor by training was he a politician. His instinct did not foresee the pitfalls that were hidden in parliamentary institutions of an entirely novel and unprecedented type. His idea of a strong cabinet was a representative cabinet. Not only was it his desire that it should be representative of geographical divisions, of north and south, of Virginia, New England, and New York, — in itself both a sound and a politic aim, — but he wished also to make it representative of the various currents of political thought, and this was necessarily disastrous. It may be urged that at the time when he chose the members of his cabinet there was no sharp division of opinion ; that to all appearance differences had been successfully ended by the compromise of Phila- delphia ; that the whole country was in an optimistic mood, and proceeded upon the assumption that every good man had rallied once and for all to the support of a government charged with the task of establishing the Union. It is difficult to withstand an enthusiasm of this character, but in Washington, who had a wide knowledge of mankind in general and of his own countrymen in particular, we must suspect a certain measure of incredulity. For he had seen the two opposing principles at work from Lexington to the Convention of Philadelphia, and was well aware of their force and essential hostility. The confidence of any people in its government is grounded in the opinion that the government knows its own mind. A cabinet which is representative of conflicting ideas can only hope to tide over some sudden crisis. Its existence supposes a common enemy. When the crisis is past it can only maintain itself by the most rigorous inaction. For with- standing some temporary danger it may have considerable 204 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1790 virtues, but for carrying through a policy it is o. miserable ^ T * 33 instrument. The result of this attempt to reconcile irreconcilable ideals was a bitter disagreement which ended in an open and public scandal. Had the opposing forces been equal, the functions of government must have been suspended by hopeless paralysis. Only the overwhelming character of Hamilton rescued the administration from disastrous failure. Washington, whose influence in a united cabinet would have been a tower of strength, was put out of action at the height of the battle. His convictions were on the side of the Federalists, but his sense of duty forced him to play the arbiter. At moments when a bold pronounce- ment was the thing most needful, he was engaged in a con- scientious examination of arguments. In political matters his mind worked slowly. Having provided himself with a ministry of conflicting principles, he felt bound to consider their conflicting advice. By his delay in coming to a decision he frequently lost the advantage of prompt action, and raised suspicions that there was room for doubt upon the merits of the case. But, further, he was guilty of a tactical error in retaining colleagues with whom he was in utter disagreement, whose characters he had come to distrust. He seems to have cherished the illusion that by adopting this course he would disarm their hostility, and would pin them down to an approval of his measures. The result was altogether dis- appointing. The reluctance of Jefferson, the Secretary of State, and of Randolph, the Attorney-General, was published upon the housetops. The scrupulous deliberation of Wash- ington bound them to nothing, but merely tolerated the presence of informers in his own camp. The well-meaning plan of a representative cabinet was therefore in the working of it a complete failure. The broad THE FEDERALISTS 205 basis proved to be a mere will-o'-the-wisp. The great matter A.D. 1790 was that the federal idea should get clear away, and to this 33 end the necessity was a cabinet of perfect sympathy, even though it was chosen upon a narrower principle of selection. The mistake of Washington lay in imagining that the strength of a government was determined by the number of its friends at the beginning. Disillusionment came too late, when he found the opposition to his administration was led by his own ministers. In addition to these difficulties arising out of the gigantic nature of the task, the shortness of the time, the growth of parties, the hostility of Congress, and the dissensions in the cabinet, Hamilton was further impeded by the rules adopted by the two Houses for the transaction of their business. If ever it may be said with safety of any man that, given the opportunity, he would have been a great parliamentarian, it may confidently be said of him. He bad the true genius for debate in addition to his other and nobler qualities. His management of the Convention of New York * is in itself a sufficient proof of his capacities in this direction. A man who could carry his party to victory against a majority of two-thirds of the convention and four-sevenths of the people would hardly have failed in persuading the triumphant Federalists in the first and second Congresses to pass in their integrity the measures necessary for the conservation of the republic. When, therefore, it was determined by the legislative bodies that not only were ministers to be ex- cluded from debate, but even their reports and recommenda- tions were to be made in writing, it was as if on the eve of battle a general were to be forbidden to make use of his artillery. Under this regulation the business of a minister was merely to prepare his measures for the consideration of Congress. The defence and explanation of the policy was 1 At Poughkeepsie, 1788, ante pp. 176-179. 206 ALEXANDER HAMILTON a.d. 1789 taken altogether out of the hands of its author and left to JE/S ' 32 friends who, however devoted and intelligent, could hardly be expected to understand its bearings in all their width and depth. Objections that should have been dealt with at the moment were left to wander at large. Opponents who should have been smitten hip and thigh upon their first hostile movement were often allowed to hold the field for want of a proper challenger. Principles were obscured by irrelevant issues, and by sudden appeals to sentiment or the authority of phrases. But the chief evil was the exclusion of that personal force which transcends all argument and tactics, which causes its will to prevail in popular assemblies not so much by an appeal to the emotions or even to the reason of men, as by the direct impact of character, asserting its mastery like the lion-tamer by some inexplicable quality inherent in the eyes, the voice and the demeanour. CHAPTER IV Secretary of the Treasury The bill to establish the Treasury department passed into law on the 2nd of September 1789, and Hamilton was appointed to the Secretaryship on the 11th of the same month. In view of the condition of the public finances, it was the hardest post under government. Having regard to the disposition of mankind when called upon to pay taxes, it was the most perilous. And under every aspect it was the most important. Friends endeavoured in vain to dissuade him from accepting a position which, while it involved the sacrifice of a lucrative practice for a stipend inadequate to cover the expenses of his household, might also destroy a career of brilliant promise by engaging him in an under- taking foredoomed, in their judgment, to failure, THE FEDERALISTS 207 The story goes that Washington consulted Robert Morris, A.D. 1789 the late Superintendent of Finance, upon the dismal pro- ^ spects of his department. ' What are we to do with this heavy debt?' 'There is but one man in the United States who can tell you,' Morris replied ; ' that is Alexander Hamilton. I am glad you have given me this opportunity to declare to you the extent of the obligations I am under to him.' l Hamilton was appointed Secretary of the Treasury at the age of thirty- two, and found himself a great minister of state, with a salary of £700 a year. He gave up his pro- fession before he had been able to effect any substantial savings, in order to undertake the office of Chancellor of the Exche M ier to an embarrassed and almost bankrupt nation, imp. 7 erished by a long and costly war. There was neither treas ry nor treasure, revenue nor staff of experts, system of accounts nor practice of audit — only a crowd of solicitous and noisy creditors, and a government without the means of paying even the modest expenses that had to be incurred from day to day. The currency was in disorder. Commercial credit, the fundamental condition of progress and prosperity, had ceased to exist. The minds of all men were filled with uncertainty, and the life of every industry was threatened by the national insolvency. One great advantage Hamilton certainly possessed, for there was nothing to undo, no creaking system and stiff traditions to be destroyed ; but against this may be set the disconcerting fact that he was without even the skeleton of a service or the remnant of an organisation. Not only had he to devise a method, create a machinery, find and train his servants ; but he was peremptorily required to furnish an immediate revenue, and, while providing it under so great pressure, to think out and establish a permanent financial policy with which these hasty expedients should not be at 1 History, iv. p. 30. 208 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1789 discord. Beyond all this he was determined so to fashion Mt. 32 t k e measures f hi s department that they should contribute, directly as well as indirectly, to the strength of the con- stitution which was on its trial. He found himself, there- fore, confronted with a labour of drudgery and detail. At the same time he was clearly aware that in his hands lay the power of affecting the destiny of his country far beyond the scope of his particular department. The distracted Congress turned to him as a saviour, and within ten days after his appointment demanded a report on ways and means. 1 The confidence with which all men regarded him in these days of confusion is a strange phenomenon. Hamilton enjoyed even at this date a great financial reputation; but when we come to investigate the basis on which it re? >ed, and the means by which it was acquired, it is impossil ^e to suppress a smile. His sole practical training for administering the finances of the republic had been those few years spent in a storekeeper's office in a West Indian sugar island, between the ages of eleven and fifteen. He was favourably known to many as a charming and handsome young soldier, who had written General Washington's despatches in a most admirable style ; who had very gallantly taken a redoubt at the crisis of the war ; who had been called to the bar, and had at once sprung into a great practice; who, ever since he was a college student, had 1 written political pamphlets, memoranda and letters ; who had had a large share in framing the constitution, and an even larger share in pro- curing its adoption by his countrymen. But these charac- teristics, qualities and accomplishments, however admirable in themselves, hardly seemed to warrant the confidence with which men saw him undertake the hardest office in the first administration. But beyond this what was there to show ? Only, so far x History, iv. pp. 32, 45, THE FEDERALISTS 209 as can be gleaned from history, the fact that while he was A.D. 1789 Washington's secretary, harassed by the want of supplies JErr ' 32 and the ill conduct of affairs, he had written and talked about finance and figures, revenue and credit, with an ease and decision that made people gape with astonishment. He had no credentials save his conversation and his letters. He was wholly without training, and had never borne an ounce of financial responsibility in the whole course of his public career. Of all political reputations the reputation for financial ability is the easiest to acquire and to lose. A man of any notoriety can almost have it for the asking. If he has but a small eminence from which to show himself to his fellow-countrymen, and a persuasive tongue, or even a sufficiently solemn aspect of silent wisdom, he need not fear that his fitness will be too severely scanned at the beginning. It is almost enough to have been a banker in order to be believed a financier. To have become suddenly wealthy by speculation, by manufactures, or by keeping shops, places his intellectual fitness beyond ques- tion, and people then only demand to be satisfied of his integrity. For the world hates boredom, and to be forced to do arithmetic is for nine-tenths of humanity the gloomiest and the most irritating of all forms of boredom. And the world also hates, except in rare moments of spiritual exalta- tion, to look its indebtedness in the face, fair and square. The suspicion of insolvency lurking in the heap of bills intensifies its natural disgust with the subject. If a per- suasive man suddenly appears, talking fluently of sinking- funds and conversions, saying, " Gentlemen, leave it all to 1 me. I see my way. I promise you everything will ' come right," or if a silent person, who is known for his private success, be pushed forward by his admiring friends, the world is usually willing, especially when times o 210 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A. D. 1789 are bad, to let the dismal burden be strapped upon his ^ T - 32 shoulders. But if confidence be easy to win in this department of human affairs, it is even easier to lose. Bankruptcy has a penetrating quality which disconcerts the efforts of the bravest charlatan who seeks to banish it with incantations. Two months before Hamilton entered Washington's cabinet the Bastille had fallen, and the ancient monarchy of France was rocking upon its foundations. For that great disturbance of society it may be fairly claimed that persuasive financiers had as large a share of the credit as incompetent monarchs or extortionate nobles or any other class of mankind. In what precisely the quality of state financier consists it is difficult to say. Only one thing is certain about him, that he must be persuasive in an altogether remarkable degree. This is not to lay down the rule that he must be smiling and bland and full of amiable prognostications of fair weather ; but he must be able to inspire confidence, not only in the tax- payers whose affairs are in his charge, but also in the moneyed classes with whom the duties of his office place him in relations. To speak in terms of his department, his credit is of even more importance than his cash. Under a certain aspect it almost seems as if, given persuasiveness, a scrupu- lous adherence to copy-book precepts will do the rest. A moderately clear head, infinite pains and a stiff back will carry him a long way. In a nation already enjoying pro- sperity these qualifications have often proved quite adequate to the purpose ; but in other and more difficult circumstances we aro conscious of something beyond, which, as it is too volatile for definition, we allude to vaguely as genius. Two or three men whose names are recorded in history have possessed it, and Hamilton is one of these. The results in such cases are the only proof; but when, impelled by curiosity, we attempt discovery of the methods by THE FEDERALISTS 211 which this peculiar success has been achieved, they continue A.D. 1789 to elude us. In Hamilton's fluent reports everything appears £50 simple, so obvious, so entirely in accordance with common- sense ; everything is so orderly and neat and inevitable, so exactly what we should ourselves have recommended un- hesitatingly in similar circumstances, that the intelligent reader, almost from a kind of modesty, and being accustomed to associate genius with a mist or an obscurity, becomes sceptical of its existence where nothing of the magician is allowed to appear. The cloak, and the hat, and the wand, and the air of mystery are all absent, and there is nothing at all remarkable except a certain lucidity. Hamilton set himself to work, and the principles of finance, like the principles of law, immediately surrendered to him. His instinct grasped the few essentials of his task firmly and clearly. When these were once established, industry and firmness did the rest. Swiftly and unhesitat- ingly he proceeded to grapple with the multitude of im- portant details, inevitable trifles, and pure irrelevancies ; not in a spirit of sightless drudgery, but like some traveller on • a frosty autumn morning who sees before him on the sunlit plain the spires and steeples that are his goal, and steps out, brisk and cheery, in the full swing of his stride, whistling and singing on his way. With insight, and with what in a sanguine financier is even rarer and more wonderful — with sufficient foresight, yet not too much — he devised his method and constructed his machine. He collected his staff as best he could, and imbued them with his own orderly and indefatigable spirit; arranged a system of audit, checks, records and divisions, good enough for his immediate purpose, and, as the event has proved, good enough for the United States until the present day. Regarded merely as an official Hamilton is a great man, 212 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1789 for he constructed his department upon principles that have never needed to be altered because they have never hampered the national development. Nothing of this work has ever been undone by succeeding generations of public servants, but has merely expanded and unfolded under the pressure of circumstances. When we consider the rapidity with which the United States have grown in population, wealth and intricacy since 1790, far exceeding the progress of any people recorded in history, and even far beyond the hopes that Hamilton himself entertained, we are amazed at the qualities of practical wisdom that en- abled him to create the Treasury. For his contrivance was like no human-made garment that is soon worn threadbare and outgrown, but rather like the bark of a tree, that from the very nature of its being is never inadequate, since it is a part of the living organism which it covers. Our admiration increases when we remember that he was not left in peace like a mathematician in his study to con- struct a system, and to emerge by and by at his leisure and apply it deliberately to the phenomena of life. He was rather in the position of a camp cook who, under a sniping fire, is required to build his oven and to supply baked bread. Congress was impatient for advice upon a multitude of questions and for practical suggestions in a great variety of perplexities. And not only the urgency of Congress, but the pressure of hard facts rendered delay impossible. At the time Hamilton accepted office the cabinet was still incomplete. Knox, the Minister for War, and Ran- dolph, the Attorney-General, were both subordinate figures. The most important office in the first administration, after the Presidency and the Secretaryship of the Treasury, was the Secretaryship of State. 1 The most important character 1 i.e. for Foreign Affairs. It is not intended to suggest that constitution- ally the Secretaryship of the Treasury is the superior office, but only that in the peculiar circumstances of the time it was the more important. THE FEDERALISTS 213 in the first administration, after Washington and Hamilton, A.D. 1789 was Thomas Jefferson, author of the Declaration of In- dependence, a prominent legislator of Virginia and Minister of the United States at the court of France, who accepted the post of Secretary of State shortly before Christmas 1789. The nomination of Jefferson, who was widely respected, had been pressed by Madison and welcomed by Washington. The new minister was, however, unable to enter upon the duties of his office until the following March, when, upon his arrival at the seat of government in New York, he found Congress plunged in an eager discussion of Hamil- ton's comprehensive plans for dealing with the public credit. It was said of Hamilton by his enemies at a later time, that he took an unconstitutional and arrogant view of his own position, and that he regarded himself not merely as the head of a department responsible solely to the President, but as something in the nature of a prime minister respon- sible on the one hand to the President, as to a monarch, and on the other hand to Congress. Although this state- ment is an ill-natured exaggeration, it is none the less true, not only that he threw the net of his department as widely as possible over the waters, but that his activity extended and his influence predominated far outside the limits of his own office. Every important proposal brought forward by his colleagues was minuted and reviewed by Hamilton, and it may be added that a large number, if not the majority, of these proposals were offered at his instiga- tion, and were drawn upon lines which he had already sketched out. From the beginning to the end of his official career the cabinet was literally overwhelmed by his wide interest and untiring industry ; and although in a short time his insistence provoked a violent resentment in certain quarters, in the main issues his policy prevailed, and the 214 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1789 government submitted to the force of his will, whether the various ministers liked it or not. The power of getting work done was one of his most remarkable qualities, and excites our astonishment alto- gether apart from his force of character. The diversity of his occupations during the first ten months of office, between the date of his appointment and the end of the next session in Congress, is little short of appalling. He organised the Treasury Department and the revenue system. He sifted and analysed the various debts, reported on the public credit, and recommended a policy with regard to it. He provided supplementary reports at every stage of the Fund- ing and the Appropriation Bills ; further reports on the much-needed amendment of the Revenue Act, and on the voluminous and intricate claims of individuals against the Treasury. He issued circulars to the collectors of customs, and framed an Act to provide more effectually for the duties on imports and tonnage. These were matters which came naturally within the scope of his department, and we marvel only at the amount of the work accomplished. When we remember, however, that no permanent service of experi- enced officers stood at his elbow to provide him with the necessary assistance, we marvel even more. But this activity was not the sum of his labours. During the same space of time he made a digest of the navigation laws ; reported on the depreciation of the currency, on the purchase of West Point for military purposes, and on the Post Office department, with regard to which he drafted a bilL He drafted bills as to official foreign intercourse, remission of fines and forfeitures, and for the establishment of lighthouses. He also made a summary of the acts for registering and clearing vessels, and drew up a plan for the sale of public lands. Nor must it be thought that the first ten months was a period of exceptional industry. He con- THE FEDERALISTS 215 tinued the same course until he resigned his office, and AD. 1790 during the later years, when foreign affairs and domestic ^ T " 33 disorders became the chief cares of government, when the attacks of his opponents were levelled, not only against his measures, but against his personal honour, the burden of work was far heavier than in this earlier period of compara- tive oalm. CHAPTER V The Public Credit When Congress met at the beginning of the new year, 1 it was obvious that the chief subject of its deliberations must be the disordered finances of the Republic. During the war with Britain both the Federal Congress and the governments of the various states had contracted a variety of onerous debts for the advantage of the common cause. The total sum that had been borrowed in this way amounted to some sixteen millions sterling. When it is a case of raising the wind at a time of national difficulty, it is beyond reason to look for a clear and uniform system. Financiers, both state and federal, had to get money how and when they could, and the result was a bewildering confusion of accounts, creditors, securities, rates of interest and principles of repayment. In many cases payment of interest was heavily in arrear, while any repayment of the capital was almost too remote a con- tingency for contemplation. ' We are in a wilderness,' wrote Madison sadly, 'without a single footstep to guide us'; 2 and Ames puts the same thought in more grandiloquent language: 'We perceive a great, unavoidable confusion ' throughout the whole scene, presenting a deep, dark and 1 dreary chaos, impossible to be reduced to order without 1 7th January 1790. * History \ iv. p. 47. 216 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1790 ' the mind of the architect is clear and capacious, and his JSt. 33 < p 0wer commensurate with the occasion." 1 Fortunately, ' the mind of the architect ' was well suitad to the needs of the problem. Fortunately, also, there was a promptitude in his action which, in the particular situation of affairs, was invaluable. On the day after Congress assem- bled Hamilton announced that he was ready to submit a full report on the public credit, and desired to be instructed whether he should discharge this duty by speech or in writing. According to some commentators Congress feared lest they might come too much under the spell of his eloquence, and it was for this reason that they signified their wish to consider a written statement of the national finances. The report was immediately placed upon the table, and the House of Representatives proceeded to consider its contents a week after they had met. 2 The principle of Hamilton's first series of financial measures was a copy-book heading; the most universal, indeed, of all that family of aphorisms— Honesty is the best Policy. He held that nations should pay their debts punctiliously, both as & matter of honour, and because it was wise. The federal debt was due partly to foreign, partly to domestic creditors; and there were besides the various debts due by the several states. Hamilton's simple and comprehensive plan was that the central government should recognise all these liabilities at their face value, should undertake full responsibility towards the various creditors, and should see to the discharge of all arrears of interest in accordance with the bonds. With these objects he proposed to consolidate the whole in a National Debt, with a proper provision for redemption by means of a sinking-fund. As the new constitution now gave a much greater security to 1 History, iv. p. 47. a 14th Jan nary 1790. THE FEDERALISTS 217 the lenders for the principal as well as for the punctual A.D. 1790 payment of interest, he considered himself entitled to pro- pose, as an equivalent for the assumption of these responsi- bilities by the federal government, a reduction of the vary- ing and exceedingly onerous terms of the original bargains to a uniform and more moderate rate. About Hamilton's proposals for dealing with the foreign debt there was little disagreement ; x but a fierce contest arose with regard to the domestic debt, and one still more fierce on his scheme for the assumption of the state debts by the central government. In the case of the federal domestic debt it was contended with some truth that there had been speculation. Many of the original holders bad parted with their securities much below the face value under the pressure of necessity or through hopelessness of redemption. The deserving patriots who had lent money, or parted with money's worth in goods or services on behalf of the national cause, would not receive the chief benefit under the proposed arrangement. A tribe of gamblers, usurers and speculators who had bought up the paper at a huge discount would derive an unholy profit. The evil was grossly exaggerated. Hamilton maintained firmly that whether honest men or rascals held the bill, a promise to pay remained a promise to pay. A self-respecting nation, like a self-respecting merchant, must honour its signature and meet its engagements as to interest and principal alike. With this solid argument he answered every opponent — the loose-tongued, loud-voiced demagogue who loved repudiation for its own charms ; and the fantastic sentimentalist who believed, in all sincerity no doubt, that hardship might be set right by injustice. It was Hamilton's fate to encounter the doctrine of repudiation at many points in his public career, and when- 1 History, iv. p. 50. 218 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1790 ever he met with it he gave no quarter. It was abhorrent to T " him as a gentleman. As a statesman he judged rightly that if successful it would prove ruinous to his country by the destruction of credit, and by corrupting the character of its citizens. This doctrine of repudiation has had a singular vitality in American politics, and has appeared on a variety of occasions in suitable disguises. Sometimes, as in the present instance, it was a moralist, eloquent upon the un- worthiness of the creditor; at others it was a strategist arguing in favour of dishonesty as a form of warfare, 1 threatening nations who had incurred the displeasure of the United States with the cancellation of all public bonds and private debts due to their subjects. Madison, Hamilton's old colleague of the Federalist, came forward with an amiable and well-meaning plan for a division between the original and the present holders of domestic federal debt. 2 By this means he pretended that the sufferings of the army might be equitably recognised. He argued warmly that soldiers who had disposed of their warrants for arrears of pay at large discounts were justly entitled to receive a further benefit when at last a stable government was in a position to redeem the pledges of its predecessor. This view of the matter was pressed upon Washington not only by Madison, but by the Secretary of State. 3 Fortunately the plausible but unsound plea ended in failure. The ' poor soldier ' argument, like the ■ poor widow' argument, was destroyed by Hamilton's vigorous commcn-sense. The case was well put by one of his supporters : ' The original holder has no claim upon the justice of the government. His claim is on its humanity.' 4 But unfortunately * humanity ' implied further taxation, and this attempt upon the part of Madison to shift the 1 e.g. History, v. pp. 523-24. a History, iv. p. 76. » History, iv. pp. 129-30. * Lawrence, History, ir. p. 79. THE FEDERALISTS 219 burden of recompensing the army from the shoulders of A.D. 1790 the citizens to the shoulders of the creditors of the Union 33 was only repudiation in a more ingenious form. The niggardly individual, anxious merely to withhold as much as possible from the tax-gatherer, does not easily find a plea that lends itself to noble-mouthed rhetoric. A society for the avoidance of personal obligations would not be felt to rest upon a strong moral basis; but if it can be pre- tended that not a private but a patriotic motive is involved, a better stand may be made. According to the practice of demagogy, the doctrine of repudiation was in this way raised to a higher moral plane. In the twilight of words and phrases the seductive idea, like a lady of doubtful virtue and waning beauty, was arranged in a charitable and be- coming shadow, and honesty was insulted by her lovers. Madison has been bitterly assailed, and not without excuse, by the admirers of Hamilton. Much has been made of apparent contradictions in his course of conduct, and of changes in his attitude, towards men and ideas. His stead- fast advocacy of the Union at the Convention of Philadelphia has been contrasted with his refusal during the first period of federal government to support the measures by which alone the Union could be turned into a reality. And from this it has been argued that a sour jealousy, and not any earnest conviction, directed his actions during Washing- ton's administration. But viewing the contest from a remoter standpoint, these contradictions and changes be- come of less importance. The accusation of a flagrant and interested inconsistency fails to convince the modern reader of its justice. Madison was an upright, unimpassioned man, but he was an idealist only under compulsion. Diffidence was his most remarkable characteristic. The impression he makes upon the mind is of something unusually formal and precise. It 220 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1790 appears altogether incredible that he was upon any occasion T " untidy in his dress; that he ever mislaid a penknife or a memorandum ; that he ever shook with laughter or shouted with joy. He is the type of the elderly young man who has pleasure only in sedate company. His intellect was power- ful but full of cobwebs. We contrast it with the intellect of Hamilton, which excites a certain measure of distrust because of its preternatural and appalling perspicacity. Men of slow wits have admired Madison for his defects, have judged him wise because he shared their own in- firmities, aud prudent because he ran away from the con- sequences of his opinions. He loved discussion, though he was averse from wrangling. In spite of his temperament he never shrank, as Jefferson always did, from meeting his enemy in the gate. He was no less conspicuous for his personal courage than for his timidity as a statesman. " I ' think him a little too much of a book politician, and too * timid in his politics," wrote Fisher Ames. ". . . He seems ' evidently to want manly firmness and energy of character." 1 The reproach, upon analysis, seems to resolve itself into this — that he was wanting not so much in the courage of his ideas, as in ideas. It was an epoch of construction, and he was deficient both in boldness and in imagination. As a critic he never lacked confidence, but criticism was not the supreme need of the moment. Madison was also peculiarly subject to personal influence. It has been considered amazing that, having supported a national policy at Philadelphia, he should have run counter to it almost from the beginning of the federal government. But it is really more amazing that he took the line he did during the convention. For his course before that event was entirely consistent with his subsequent action. It almost 1 Fisher Ames, History, ir. p. 75. THE FEDERALISTS 221 seems as if at Philadelphia he was under some kind of a.d. 17J0 enchantment, and advocated a policy which was discordant JEn ' 33 to some extent with the natural mood of his mind. It is no surprise, therefore, that he fell speedily under the influence of Jefferson, whose procedure was far more sympathetic to his disposition. We have a feeling that even at Philadelphia Hamilton frightened him. Hamilton's methods were too swift, his manner too peremptory ; his very confidence was provocative of doubt and hesitation. Madison was by nature suspicious of the constructive statesman, and inclined to the belief that inaction was usually wisdom and action folly. Consequently he was attracted by the Jeffersonian policy of drifting into danger, preferring it to strenuous efforts, even though these had for their object to escape from the fatal current. It may be true, but if true it is unimportant, that he was jealous of Hamilton; for he was in essentials too honest a man to be guided by such considerations. If his tempera- ment had been sympathetic to the policy of Hamilton, we may believe he would have supported that policy even though he had hated its projector. Even after reading the seven volumes of Hamilton the younger we decline to be convinced that Madison was anything but a good man. He was a good man in the most intolerable sense. His excessive virtue deprived him of charity. He appropriated all virtue to himself and his followers. His sincerity upon this point would be detestable if it were not so ludicrous. He believed fanatically that his opponents were utterly corrupt. He made and permitted to be made, under the shelter of his name, the grossest charges against their personal honour, charges which his common-sense must have told him clearly were nothing better than rubbish had he not been wholly possessed by this illusion as to his sole property in virtue. From the date of his opposition to Hamilton's proposals 222 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1790 for dealing with the debt his course of action towards his former friend is wanting not merely in generosity but in candour. At every point his constitutional antipathy to constructive statesmanship appears ; but there is also a more bitter and personal accent of hostility which can be traced to the resentment of one who, having been temporarily led out of his natural course by the influence of a superior character, has returned to his ancient habits and looks back upon his aberration with horror. His manner towards Hamilton from this time forward is always grudging. His favourite weapon is that of the common politician — the suggestion of motives so mean that they are wholly in- credible. The triviality of his attacks is painful. The dis- interested reader turns the pages quickly, anxious not to dwell too long upon the humiliation of a worthy gentleman, whose friends, had they been true ones, would often have drowned his eloquence in a discreet tumult or would have led him away to recover his sense and his dignity. In the end Hamilton carried his point as to the federal debts, and vindicated the sanctity of contract all along the line. He routed with equal success the people who wished to escape taxes, though they had profited by the loans, and those others who professed themselves willing to pay, pro- vided that a portion of the funds were taken away from the legal holders and given in charity. The federal debts, both foreign and domestic, were in the end recognised and con- solidated, and provision made for full payment of all the arrears of interest. The assumption of the state debts was a harder matter. States which had incurred small debts, or none, upon account of the war, were persuaded without much difficulty to regard it as monstrously unfair that the large debts of their neighbours should be saddled upon the Union. The mere difference in the amounts stank of injustice to the THE FEDERALISTS $23 simpler class of citizens, while for the more refined there a.d. 1790 was the argument that the heavily indebted states must ^ T - 33 have been negligently administered. Opponents of the government policy clamoured for a hostile and searching scrutiny of reasons, expenditure and accounts. By such means it was made to appear that a certain corporate dignity was outraged by Hamilton's high-handed procedure. Finally Congress, 1 by a majority of two, refused Hamilton's proposal to take over the war debts which the states individually had incurred for the common good. Hamilton determined to have this decision reversed, and he accomplished his end in a characteristic fashion by giving a civility in exchange for a loaf of bread. It so happened that the states of little debts, and therefore disposed against assumption, were for the most part southern states, while those of big debts were mainly northern. Each of these parties desired, for sentimental reasons, that the capital of the Federal Republic should be fixed within its own boundaries. Hamilton spoke with Jefferson, who was of the southern party, and Jefferson gave a dinner-party. Being, according to his own account, but a child in such matters, he remained silent, and allowed his guests to talk. As the result a compact was arrived at whereby the majority adverse to assumption of the state debts was converted into a minority, 2 and the south in return was allowed to possess the honour of the capital city of the Union. 8 In his treatment of the debt Hamilton was not concerned merely with the honour of his country, nor did he regard the matter only with the merchant's eye to the advantages of good credit in case of further troubles. His measures were something more than financial. They had a deliberate political intention. The constitution, as has been stated 1 12th April 1790. « July 1790. • Ford's Jeferson, i. pp. 161-62. 1790-1791 J&r. 33-34 224 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. already, did not entirely satisfy him. He felt that the plain meaning of its terms did not convey sufficient power to the administration, nor secure beyond question solidarity in the Union. His efforts accordingly were directed towards supplementing its deficiencies. The political object of his financial policy was to bind the moneyed classes firmly to the central government ; to induce them to look to that quarter for the security of their capital and the punctuality of their dividends ; to fix their interests in it rather than in the state governments. The interests of this powerful class being thus made dependent upon the existence of the Union, it was natural to suppose that they would cherish it and contribute to its strength, as the family of a man whose wealth is in annuities zealously and tenderly endeavours to prolong his days in peace. It was a legitimate aim, but it could hardly hope to escape opposition when once its purpose was fully detected. Hamilton claimed for his measures that they would ' cement more closely the union of the states ' and 'establish public order on the basis of an upright and liberal policy.' l He was fully aware that, if successful, they would strengthen the central government in comparison with the state governments — to a large extent, indeed to the detriment of the latter — by assuming a great portion of their respon- sibilities, and by identifying and allying the safety and self- interest of the creditors with the power and permanency of the federal authority. It was a deliberate aim, and it succeeded. The champions of State Rights who had opposed the constitution naturally strove against these extensions of its hated principles with the energy of despair. This zealous panic swept many of the timid and hesitating off their feet, Madison among the number. It gathered up also in its course all the disappointed, all the feeble, critical 1 Works, ii. p. 232. THE FEDERALISTS 225 and disaffected folk whose ardour and constancy were not A.D. 1790-17 Mi. 33-34 sufficiently tempered to carry them beyond the threshold of l Union on into its consequences. The establishment of the National Bank during the next session of Congress (1791) carried this policy of allying property with order a step further. Its practical advantages were obvious, the necessity for it overwhelming. Commerce was in a diseased condition, suffering from a kind of paralysis. Natural wealth and human industry existed in abundance; but any means of making capital sufficiently mobile for the uses of mankind was altogether absent. Credit and confidence were lacking. The want of the facilities of exchange and of a reliable medium of circula- tion had reduced portions of society to the primitive and laborious methods of barter. Hamilton's policy was boldly opposed to the doctrine of laisser faire. In his opinion it was the duty of the state, in these circumstances, not merely to preserve security and order, but actually to create credit. He laid this down as a legitimate function of government ; and, in spite of the opposition which deplored a further increase in the stability and influence of the central government, the practical urgency of the remedy secured its adoption by Congress. But a more serious obstacle then remained to be sur- mounted. The question of legality was raised, and the President was known to entertain doubts. Banking was alleged to be outside the four corners of the constitution ; a thing which could not be undertaken lawfully by the central government. Jefferson, Madison and others laboured this argument in minutes and memoranda which Washington carefully considered. Hamilton, in reply, set up the doctrine of implied powers. 1 If nothing could be done that was not expressly named in the articles of union, 1 Works, iv. pp. 445-95. ? 226 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1791 these articles could never fit the uses of a great and de- veloping state. The constitution under so strict an inter- pretation would be but a lifeless legal document and nothing more ; a bone for dogs to quarrel over and not a rod to govern with. This constitution, Hamilton contended, was, and was meant to be, merely an outline. It was neces- sary to look at its great intention, and to judge it to be the possessor of all the powers implied in that intention. The Secretary of the Treasury prevailed and the President signed, 1 and the. greatest jurist of the early days of the Republic 2 decided that Hamilton was right and his opponents wrong. The passing of the Bank Bill was an important landmark. The main principles of Hamilton's financial system were then established. The framework was complete. Speaking broadly, he had succeeded at every important point. His measures, it is true, had suffered certain changes during their progress through the two houses of Congress. It had been necessary to make concessions in detail in order to save the spirit of his policy. Nor do these concessions appear in any case to have been improvements upon the original plan. Where there had been a direct simplicity they introduced a certain confusion. They shrank from a full acceptance of the highest standard of financial integrity, and aimed rather at doing substantial justice than at boldly affixing the seal to any great principle of finance. 3 Con- sequently they failed to secure the absolute safety of the policy, which in subsequent sessions had to suffer many attacks and did not come off entirely scatheless. But on the whole, when we consider all the difficulties of the case, and make due allowance for the effect of Hamilton's exclu- 1 25th Feb. 1791. a John Marshall, History, iv. p. 489. • Cf. History, iv. pp. 145-50, where the measures as passed are oompared with the measures as originally drafted. THE FEDERALISTS 227 sion from the discussion, his triumph was one of the most a.d. I7«l remarkable order. For another reason also the passing of the Bank Bill was an important landmark. The cleavage in the cabinet dates from this event. Jefferson was hostile to the measure upon every ground. He regarded it as an invasion of State Rights and an infringement of the constitution. In his opinion it had no practical merits, and violated every sound principle of law directed against mortmain, alienage, descent, distribution and monopoly. After the cabinet discussions upon this question, the correspondence of Jeffer- son with Hamilton, which only a month earlier had been ' yours respectfully and affectionately/ l passes into the third person. Henceforward there was no friendship between the two men, and very soon their enmity became a public scandal. From the summer of 1790, when the assumption and funding of the debt were finally settled, there was a rapid and steady increase of prosperity throughout the country. 1 Hamilton's immediate aim was realised even beyond his hopes. A conspicuous benefit to the nation had attended his earliest measures. Within eighteen months Britain was so much impressed that she accredited an agent to the government of the United States. 3 At the beginning of 1791 a loan of two and a half millions of florins was opened in Holland, and filled in two hours upon better terms than could be obtained by any European power save Britain. 4 The subscriptions to the National Bank were completed in a single day. 6 Carried away by the sudden change from bankruptcy to credit, men lost their heads, and in spite of Hamilton's earnest protests 6 engaged in the wildest speculation. As a matter of course the panic 1 History, iv. p. 280. a Ibid. iv. pp. 281-82. » Ibid. iv. p. 286. * Ibid, B Ibid, • Ibid. iv. p. 287 88, 228 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1791 which ensued caused much distress while it lasted, but Mr ' 34 was speedily overcome. The chief evil was rather the handle it gave to the prophets of evil among the opposition than any permanent damage to the community. It was attributable in no sense to Hamilton's measures, but only to the folly and cupidity of a section of the people. The first Congress ended its existence a week after the Bank Bill had passed into law. CHAPTER VI Commerce and the Union At the beginning of December 1791, a few days after the opening of the first session of the second Congress, Hamilton submitted to the House of Representatives a report on Manufactures. 1 The policy advocated in this document was something much more than an outline or a skeleton. Its survey of existing facts and conditions was comprehen- sive; its aims definite; the action which it recommended was in full accord with the spirit of his previous measures. Self-contained and independent, it was none the less an essential part of the great federal plan. Of the important proposals introduced and urged by Hamilton this alone was not accepted by the nation during his lifetime. It has even been alleged that he did not expect it to be accepted by his contemporaries; but it seems incredible that he should have intended it merely as a legacy. For not only is it entirely contrary to our conception of the remarkably practical character of Hamilton's statesmanship that he should engage in anything which he did not believe to be ripe for accomplishment, but the internal evidence of the Report itself is conclusive. It enters into the most business- like details. It is filled with concrete arguments drawn from 1 Works, iv. pp. 70-202, THE FEDERALISTS 229 the hard facts of the year seventeen hundred and ninety-one a.d. 1791 when it was written. It is restrained and reasonable, per- ^ T " 34 suasive and disarming. Its eagerness and hope stamp it as having had an immediate object and not a remote one. A man does not write like this to give advice to posterity, but only to wring the necessary consent from to-day. Haste is visible in every page, but nowhere impatience. The docu- ment has the appearance of a letter that has been written at unnecessary length, because the occasion was pressing and the writer lacked the leisure to prune it to a more sententious form. It recalls the correspondence of Bismarck with its rough, careless logic and vigorous redundancy. It is wanting in compactness but never for a moment in lucidity. He repeats the same argument in slightly different forms, but there is never the slightest doubt either as to what he wishes to do or as to why he wishes to do it. As a state document it stands in the first rank, not only by virtue of its quality of thought, but by reason of its ultimate authority. The report on Manufactures is filled with the personal charm of the author and with the hopefulness and sincerity of youth, but at the same time it is as clear and shrewd as the letters of a banker to his agent or a merchant's valuation of his stock. It is a strange but distinguished figure among state documents in all their great variety ; but perhaps still stranger and more distinguished when it is remembered that the theme on which it is written has been named ' the dismal science.' Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations had appeared in 1776 — the first year of the American Revolution. Hamilton had studied the book with care, and had written a commentary upon it, which unfortunately has been lost. 1 The contact of 1 Mr. Sumner doubts this, but his argument does not seem conclusive against J. C. Hamilton's statements, History, ii. p. 514, on the authority of P. S. Duponceau (1783). The commentary was written while Hamilton was still a member of Congress (Sumner's Hamilton, p. 108). 230 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1791 two brains so fresh and original, and so free from cant, was too valuable to have gone into the dust-heap. Adam Smith, the absent-minded student and philosopher, educated at a Scots university, matured by seven years' study at Oxford, had been appointed in due time to lecture upon Logic and Moral Philosophy to the undergraduates of Glasgow. Friendly, interested and clear-eyed, he mixed in the society of the merchants and manufacturers of that thriving city, drank their claret and joined in their discussions ; and while he continued to lecture on logic and ethics, on rhetoric and the belles lettres, in accordance with the terms of his founda- tion, his mind began to revolve the problems of the wealth of nations as a subordinate part of " an immense design of ' showing the origin and development of cultivation and 1 law ; or, as we may perhaps put it, not inappropriately, of 1 saying how, from being a savage, man rose to be a Scots- 1 man." 1 Whatever may have been the case with the rest of his speculations, those affecting commerce were founded upon the study of the facts at first hand. Adam Smith published a book on the Moral Sentiments, and on the strength of the reputation it produced, was appointed bear-leader of the young Duke of Buccleuch, whom it was decided to send upon the grand tour. In this capacity he travelled for three years in Europe, spending most of his time in France, and studying the conditions of humanity everywhere with an eager eye. When he returned, he lived for ten years quietly with his mother in the village of Kirkcaldy in the ancient kingdom of Fife, meditating upon the plan of his life's work without excessive impa- tience. When sixty-three years of age he published the Wealth of Nations, the first instalment of this great plan and also the last; for the fame of it procured him the appointment of Commissioner of Customs, and during the 1 Bagehot, Biographical Studies, p. 255. THE FEDERALISTS 231 remaining fourteen years of his life he lived very comfort- A.D. 1791 ably in Edinburgh society, performing a task for which he ^ T * 34 was entirely unfitted. Adam Smith cannot have been conscious of the immense influence his famous work would afterwards exercise upon the fortunes of his country. He was an elderly philosopher contemplating the conditions of an old world, that had not yet begun to renew its youth, in a spirit of gentle curiosity. Hamilton was a young statesman considering the future of a great continent which he had the ambition to mould, not only by the force of his thoughts, but by the vigour of his acts. In Adam Smith he found a lucid analysis of causes he had been revolving, a discussion of systems he had been constructing in his own mind with a determination to bring them into operation as soon as opportunity should make it possible. In their conclusions there was doubtless some dis- agreement, but they were at one at least in their method ; in their preference for observation of the facts at first hand over all the other and easier ways of arriving at conclusions in political science. Hamilton's report urges the importance of the immediate establishment of manufactures upon two fundamental reasons — military security and national development. "Not only the wealth but the independence and security 1 of a country appear to be materially connected with the ' prosperity of manufactures. Every nation, with a view to 1 those great objects, ought to endeavour to possess within ' itself all the essentials of national supply. These comprise 1 the means of subsistence, habitation, clothing:, and defence. 1 The possession of these is necessary to the perfection of • the body politic ; to the safety as well as to the welfare of ' the society. The want of either is the want of an important 1 organ of political life and motion ; and in the various crises 1 which await a state it must severely feel the effects of 232 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1791 ' any such deficiency. The extreme embarrassments of the * ' United States during the late war, from an incapacity of 1 supplying themselves, are still matter of keen recollection; 1 a future war might be expected again to exemplify the * mischiefs and dangers of a situation to which that incapacity ■ is still, in too great a degree, applicable, unless changed by 1 timely and vigorous exertion. To effect this change, as * fast as shall be prudent, merits all the attention and all the ' zeal of our public councils : it is the next great work to be 1 accomplished." l But national development requires, no less than military security, manufacturers and traders in addition to farmers and planters. It is a question of good husbandry. The human and material resources of the imperial estate must both engage the attention of government. If military security calls for a self-contained and self-sufficing confederation, commercial security and national wellbeing demand a de- velopment which shall be symmetrical and not lopsided, a society of varied enterprise and multitudinous employ- ments. A nation of specialists, whether farmers or bankers, manufacturers or traders, lacks the essential condition of permanency, for its various parts do not afford an adequate support one to another. Its wealth depends upon its inter- course with foreign nations. If circumstances should arise when this intercourse is violently interrupted, if its supplies are cut off, or its surplus goods refused, it will experience a shock, ruinous to a greater or less extent. The wars, disasters and policies of strangers are a constant menace to its prosperity. It is at the mercy, not only of the malice of its rivals, but of the misfortunes of its friends. But there is an argument beyond mere commercial safety. The development of a nation will be much more rapid if it encourages a town population to support its country people ; 1 Works, iv. pp. 135, 136. THE FEDERALISTS 233 artisans to consume the produce of the fields, farmers to A.D. 1791 employ the output of the mills. The establishment of work- jT ' shops will therefore prove a benefit to the United States by ' creating in some instances a new, and securing, in all, a more certain and steady demand for the produce of the soil.' ! Moreover, in a fully developed community the natural genius, aptitude and inclination of every man desiring to earn his living will readily find work suitable to his character. It clearly makes for the wealth of any country if it can 'furnish greater scope for the diversity of talents and dis- positions which discriminate men from each other.' 1 In such a state also employment will be found for classes of the community not hitherto engaged in business: for the wives and daughters of husbandmen who would otherwise be idle, or insufficiently or less remuneratively employed. The immigration of good citizens will be stimulated. Manu- facturers and workmen of the Old World, impatient of its 'burthens and restraints,' attracted by their "greater personal 1 independence and consequence under the operation of a 1 more equal government," tempted also by the boon of " a 1 perfect equality of religious privileges . . . more precious 1 than mere "eligious toleration," will flock into such a state if only they can be inspired with the hope of being able to pursue their own trades and industries there 'with an assurance of encouragement and employment.' 8 But these men, the best and the most intelligent of the middle and working classes of Europe, will not transplant themselves without excessive provocation, if by emigrating they have no alternative to engaging in agriculture, an avocation to which they have served no training, and the pursuit of which would entail the sacrifice of all their technical skill and inherited experience. 1 Works, iv. p. 87. 3 Ibid. ■ Ibid. p. 92. 234 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A..D. 1791 To this composite and self-contained state will also accrue T * the advantages of a scientific division of labour, whereby the national prosperity is increased through men becoming experts in particular departments. And as the minds and characters of the people are like a natural field of various soils that may be cultivated, well or ill, suitably or unsuit- ably, just as much as swamps of rice, or acres of corn, or plantations of tobacco, the state which develops at the same time in a multitude of directions will reap a benefit in a political as well as in a commercial sense — both directly in its wealth and indirectly in the character of its citizens. Its varied opportunities will "cherish and stimulate the 1 activity of the human mind by multiplying the objects ' of enterprise." 1 The imaginations of the restless and ambitious spirits will be touched with a magic wand. "Every new scene which is opened to the busy nature of * man to rouse and excite itself, is the addition of a new 1 energy to the general stock of effort. The spirit of enter- 4 prise, useful and prolific as it is, must necessarily be 1 contracted or expanded, in proportion to the simplicity or ' variety of the occupations and productions which are to be 1 found in a society. It must be less in a nation of mere * cultivators than in a nation of cultivators and merchants ; 1 less in a nation of cultivators and merchants than in a 1 nation of cultivators, artificers, and merchants." * With the utmost care and tenderness, avoiding the con- tentious phrase and all words of provocation, Hamilton examines in turn a variety of arguments and opinions that had been urged and held at different times against the establishment of manufactures in general, and in the peculiar circumstances of the states. The old doctrine of Quesnay and the ficcnomistes, that agriculture is more profitable than the labour of the mill and workshop, because in the fields 1 Works, ir. p. 94. * Ibid. iv. pp. 94, 95. THE FEDERALISTS 235 man works with Nature as a partner, but in the other case A.D. 1791 man works alone, is examined at a length and with such ' respect as somewhat amazes us at the present time. Hamil- ton meets the contention that labour would be diverted from the land, and that the narrow capital of the new empire would be insufficient for engaging in a competition with Europe, and other arguments of the same character with a respectful eagerness and a good nature that are full of persuasiveness. Having established the necessity of manufactures on the grounds of military security and national development, having proved the advantages, direct and indirect, to wealth and character, to stability and progress, of a composite and well-balanced industrial society, he comes to the practical consideration — how is such a condition of things to be created ? It had never been allowed to exist in the colonies, but it showed hardly greater signs of life in the free republic. It might never exist. It certainly would not come to pass speedily if left to the action of individuals. To consummate the federalist policy a rapid prosperity was of the highest importance, and this would only be attained under the care and direction of government. It was the function of the state, according to Hamilton's argument, to provide induce- ments that would make men engage readily in manufacture ; to sustain the young industries against the ruthless and deliberate assaults of more powerful communities; to meet the commercial regulations of foreigners with a vigorous and consistent policy of national defence. He viewed his country ever as a whole. States and divi- sions meant nothing to him. Local sentiment affected him with so little sympathy that he failed, except on one occasion, 1 even to use it as a weapon. In his imagination there was a 1 Ante, p. 223. 236 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1791 great continent united by a miraculous good fortune into one 34 state, of unknown extent, of undefined limits, unexplored and uninhabited save for a fringe along the Atlantic seaboard, but surmised to be habitable and fertile throughout the length and breadth of its territories. The rapid development of this great inheritance meant much more to Hamilton's mind than the mere addition of so many families and so much wealth to the national stock. It meant the oblitera- tion of state rivalry and the sweeping out, as by a flood, of the litter and decay of ancient jealousies. Its ultimate inten- tion, like all the rest of his policy, was union. His vision was of one great nation, capable of producing within its own wide borders everything that its citizens would require for life, for comfort, and even for luxury. Independent of its neighbours, it might hope to escape from embroilment in their quarrels ; dependent on the co-operation of its members, it would be secured in the possession of internal peace. But a lopsided expansion, an absorption of nine-tenths of the inhabitants in pastoral and agricultural pursuits, was in his opinion neither a swift nor a sure means to this end. Such a development was more likely to occur, was in a sense easier and more natural than the other ; but as a gardener will take pains to secure an even and symmetrical growth in his plantation, by pruning, by the removal of obstacles at the roots, by the admission of light, by the destruction of oppressive neighbours, by defence against the winds and storms ; so, he argued, should the state regard it as one of its most important duties to promote a healthy industrial society of varied employments which gave mutual support. The reply of the economist that all this would come to pass in good time if it were really desirable, failed to satisfy him. There is no such great hurry, argued his opponents. The intelligent self-interest of the individual will produce manufactures in their proper season. His opponents spun THE FEDERALISTS 237 amiable theories on the nature of the economic man — and A.D. 1791 hazarded sanguine prophecies of his glorious destiny, if left to his own devices, without help or hindrance from government. Hamilton believed in the possibility of a commercial policy. The doctrine of laisser faire did not appeal to him any more than it would have appealed to a tobacco- planter in reference to the cultivation of his estate. The effort, it is true, can only come from the individual, as the sap can only come from the soil ; but the direction of effort, if it is not to run to waste, must come from elsewhere. There are things desirable in commerce too big, and by their nature impossible, for private citizens to achieve even in combination. In the frankest terms he disputed the pessimist creed of leaving things alone and letting men blindly wander round in hopeless circles of wasted effort. He contended that a commercial policy in a positive and not in a negative sense was necessary in the circumstances of the case. Hamilton had definitely committed himself to this solution of the problem when he founded the National Bank with the avowed object of creating commercial credit. It would be incorrect to say that the report on Manufactures carries this policy one step further ; for in reality it travels to the very end of the journey. It contains both the science and the art of modern commercial development. The policy that has slowly and awkwardly struggled into existence during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, which is pursued every year with greater confidence and perspicacity by all the great industrial nations, with the exception of the United Kingdoms, is Hamilton's policy. He thought it out for himself, keenly contemplating the commercial facts of New York and the New World, by much the same method as Adam Smith, the basis of whose speculations was the trade 238 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1791 of Glasgow and the Old World. The reality and force of 34 the writings of both men are derived from their intimate thoroughness. The foundations of their practical experience were narrow, but they were firm. Their theories grew out of the facts themselves and not out of the theories of other men. The state, in Hamilton's view of the matter, may create the industrial conditions it desires, precisely as a landowner goes about his forestry. The effort truly comes from the nature of man in the one case and of trees in the other ; but if, possessing a waste of good land, you would provide a high arching forest of oak for your great-grandson to cut, where now there is but a thin straggle of stunted trees, you will not leave the achievement of your design to random gales sowing acorns fortuitously from the sparse, indigenous trees ; but you will trench and drain, and plant, and provide artful shelter, and clear the choking undergrowth. You will not create the great woods, it is true, for that is the work of nature's unintelligent force ; but your direction is none the less a condition of its creation, without which it might never have been, or at the best would have taken as many centuries for its growth as under your plan it will require decades. Un- combined human effort is nearly as blind and unintelligent a force as the nature of trees ; and the functions of the state and of statesmen were in Hamilton's opinion the same as those of the squire and his foresters. Having established his principles, that it is the interest of the state to possess the most varied industrial society, and also its duty to attempt the creation of such conditions, he plunged into a detailed discussion of the ways and means to this end in which it is unnecessary to follow him. Duties and bounties and premiums have their various uses for lifferent objects. Land ways and waterways are to be improved and extended at the charge of government. THE FEDERALISTS 239 Inspectors of produce are to be appointed to guard ' the A.D. 1791 good name' by seeing that quality is maintained. Inven- iET - 34 tions are to be carefully secured to the inventors. A board with ample funds at its disposal is to devote itself to the encouragement of arts, agriculture, manufactures and commerce. Hamilton was out of sympathy with the orthodox French economists of the eighteenth century. He found but little virtue in their uncreative logic. He disbelieved in the Economic Man — a being without bowels, with an interior like a clock, accurately ticking the progress of the human race under the impulse of the magic spring of enlightened self-interest, and never needing to be either wound or regu- lated. The besetting vice of the economists was their pre- ference for argument over observation. They based their reasoning upon axioms when they should have gone to the facts. They conceived that they could treat the wealth of nations by a series of propositions like those of Euclid. At each stage they became more and more the victims of words that did not correspond with realities, of syllogisms that under analysis were little more than mere arrangements of phrases. To a large extent their ideas were completely dead things, like the conclusions, paradoxes and truisms of the ingenious schoolmen of the middle ages; as painfully industrious, as technically exquisite, as those samplers which were sewed by our great-grandmothers, and of nearly as much use and benefit to the world. Hamilton, on the other hand, saw the facts themselves in a magic crystal. His clear view held the closer objects in an easy and true proportion; but also, in the full meaning of the splendid common phrase, it went ' far and wide. 5 It was a vision of bold extent and distant range. He beheld a unity, where all objects fell into place as in a picture. What his mind grasped and concerned itself 240 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1791 with was not the advantage of a single trade or group ^ >r ' 34 of trades, of a single state or group of states, but the advantage of the whole inheritance. His idea of good statesmanship was good stewardship; an active direction and continuous effort towards an unmistakable goal. It was not enough, in his opinion, to remove obstructions. You do not necessarily render a river navigable for all time merely by tearing out the snags and other foreign im- pediments that lie there blocking the water-way. For there are sandbanks to be dug away, channels to be dredged, banks to be protected with piles, buttresses and groins. There are precautions against flood and drought. There are shiftings of the course, natural but unforeseen ; con- ditions that change on a sudden, and a constant wear and tear. To give the greatest freedom to the force of the river may have the undesired effect of creating, as the final result, a wide impracticable shallow through which no barge of commerce can ever hope to penetrate. CHAPTER VII Stewardship of the Estate The wisest commercial policy that ever came out of the human brain could never hope, it was contended by Hamil- ton's opponents, for a richer fruitfulness in its effect than to benefit certain classes at the expense of the community, certain trades to the detriment of commercial society, certain towns, districts, states, or groups of states against the best interests of the nation. This proposition being laid down with greater or less plausibility by many speakers and writers as one of the laws of nature, unalterable by any contrivance of man, their argument proceeded in perfect THE FEDERALISTS 241 order to the inference that Hamilton's real but unavowed a.d. 1791 intention must therefore be the advantage of private indi- Mt - 34 viduals and particular sections. Hamilton met his opponents upon both grounds. With much derail he proceeded to show how a commercial policy was capable in intelligent hands of benefiting the nation as a whole. As for the personal accusation, his career from first to last had been such as to render it incredible to any sane man, but more especially to his present critics, who, in former contests, had incessantly taunted him with his indifference to local privileges. Much more vehemently than his opponents, Hamilton held that the duty of the state in every circumstance was to look beyond the interest . of the individual and the section to the general advantage. For the state to benefit one of these units, be it merely a man or half the empire, is an evil if that benefit is the sole intended result of its action; but, on the other hand, the state should never shrink from conferring such an advantage upon particular trades or classes, if it clearly foresees that this course will ultimately conduce to the swifter develop- ment, the greater prosperity and the firmer security of the nation. An advantage given to one man does not necessarily mean, when it is fairly examined, a corresponding burden imposed upon another. You cannot argue safely from physics to politics. But even if such were the case, the burden of this year may nevertheless become a benefit in that which follows. The burden of one generation may build up a fine estate for its successor. What a man to-day is compelled to forgo may be recovered by his children and grandchildren with heavy accumulations at compound interest. There was, Hamilton maintained, a habit of exaggeration in the argument of his opponents that the immediate increase of price which his proposals might entail would Q 242 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1791 prove oppressive to the consumer. There was a tendency T also to ignore the advantage which all alike would derive when the general object of his policy was attained. The doctrine that in helping one person you are necessarily in- juring another has in it a pinch of truth, but a pinch only. It is subject to many qualifications. It is alleviated from the beginning by countervailing benefits. But supposing that it were true in that wide and absolute sense which is claimed for it by its professors, what is the alternative? If the state is to fulfil the purpose for which it was called into being, it must act ; and by its every action it must cause more or less of injury to some of its citizens, more or less of benefit to others. A complete paralysis is the only alternative. It is not only in matters affecting trade that this argument holds good, but in every department of government, and perhaps more in that of public defence than in any other. The question that awaits an answer upon the introduction of any measure is always the same : Will the proposed reform promote the health and vigour of the nation ? The action of the state ought therefore to be guided calmly to one end — the advantage of the whole in the present and in the future. All men are agreed that appeals from any class for favour should be coldly regarded. What has not been so generally perceived, is that the comple- mentary duty is of equal force; that prayers for govern- ment to stand still, to hold its hand, and to abstain from interference with existing conditions, lest a benefit should thereby accrue to some interest or industry, must be ruled by the same tests and as resolutely set aside upon the same grounds. But if division of labour among men is the cause of a rapider increase of wealth than under conditions where each has to perform for himself a hundred tasks for which he has THE FEDERALISTS 243 no inclination and but small capacity, surely, urged the A.D. 1791 opposition, the same argument applies to nations ? Let each people therefore attend to those labours in which they are most proficient, in which nature and their own inclinations will render the most admirable assistance. Hamilton con- ceded the justice of this argument, but upon one condition — 'if the system of perfect liberty to industry and com- merce were the prevailing system of nations.' " In such a state of things each country would have the 1 full benefit of its peculiar advantages to compensate for its ' deficiencies and disadvantages ... a free exchange mutually 1 beneficial, of the commodities which each was able to supply, ' on the best terms, might be carried on between them, 1 supporting, in full vigour, the industry of each. . . . And ' though the circumstances which have been mentioned, and 1 others which will be unfolded hereafter, render it probable 1 that nations, merely agricultural, would not enjoy the same ' degree of opulence, in proportion to their numbers, as those 1 which united manufactures with agriculture, yet the pro- 1 gressive improvement of the lands of the former might, in ' the end, atone for an inferior degree of opulence in the 1 meantime ; and in a case in which opposite considerations 1 are pretty equally balanced, the option ought, perhaps, 1 always to be in favour of leaving industry to its own ' direction. ' But the system which has been mentioned is far from char- 1 acterising the general policy of nations. The prevalent one 1 has been regulated by an opposite spirit. The consequence ' of it is, that the United States are, to a certain extent, in 1 the situation of a country precluded from foreign commerce. 1 They can, indeed, without difficulty, obtain from abroad ' the manufactured supplies of which they are in want ; • but they experience numerous and very injurious impedi- ' ments to the emission and vent of their own commodities. 244 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1791 ' Nor is this the case in reference to a single foreign nation ' only. The regulations of several countries, with which 1 we have the most extensive intercourse, t'irow serious * obstructions in the way of the principal staples of the ' United States. 1 In such a position of things, the United States cannot 1 exchange with Europe on equal terms ; and the want of ' reciprocity would render them the victim of a system 1 which should induce them to confine their views to agri- 1 culture, and refrain from manufactures. A constant and 1 increasing necessity, on their part, for the commodities of 1 Europe, and only a partial and occasional demand for ' their own, in return, could not but expose them to a * state of impoverishment, compared with the opulence to 1 which their political and natural advantages authorise ' them to aspire. 1 Remarks of this kind are not made in the spirit of com- 1 plaint. It is for the nations whose regulations are alluded ' to, to judge for themselves, whether, by aiming at too much, 1 they do not lose more than they gain. It is for the United * States to consider by what means they can render them- 1 selves least dependent on the combinations, right or wrong, ' of foreign policy. ... If Europe will not take from us the 1 products of our soil, upon terms consistent with our interest, 1 the natural remedy is to contract, as fast as possible, our 1 wants of her." l One may be permitted to doubt whether Hamilton would have made even this concession had he been confronted with a situation of perfect liberty in commerce between the nations. For it conflicts, to some extent, with his master principle of a varied society and multitudinous employments as the con- dition of healthy and rapid development. Even had every 1 Works, iv. pp. 100-102. See also draft of Smith's speech (January 1794) by Hamilton, Works, ir. pp. 205-24. THE FEDERALISTS 245 gateway been open throughout the world, it is probable A.D. 1791 that on this ground he would still have judged it wise, in Mrs ' " the special circumstances of the United States, with their vast natural wealth, their undeveloped resources and un- inhabited fertile tracts, to pursue a strictly national rather than a cosmopolitan policy in matters of commerce. But this condition of perfect freedom did not exist, was not likely to exist, and has in fact never existed. On the contrary, the strictly national policy has imposed itself gradually, piecemeal, but in the end completely, upon all the nations of the world save only upon Britain. Opinion has often halted. Motives have rarely been without con- fusion. The waves have slipped back upon the sand; but the tide has ever continued to advance. The concession of the principle, guarded by an impossible ' if/ was wise argu- ment; for granting the foundations of his opponents' contention, accepting their theory under ideal conditions, he was able with still greater force to establish the validity of his own counsel. Another argument with which modern ears are not unfamiliar, is " the proposition that industry, if left to itself, 1 will naturally find its way to the most useful and profitable 1 employment. Whence it is inferred that manufactures, ' without the aid of government, will grow up as soon and as 1 fast as the natural state of things and the interest of the 1 community may require. 1 Against the solidity of this hypothesis, in the full latitude 1 of the terms, very cogent reasons may be offered. These ■ have relation to the strong influence of habit and the spirit 1 of imitation ; the fear of want of success in untried enter- 4 prises ; the intrinsic difficulties incident to first essays ' towards a competition with those who have previously ' attained to perfection in the business to be attempted ; the • bounties, premiums, and other artificial encouragements with 246 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1791 ' which foreign nations second the exertions of their own • ■ citizens, in the branches in which they are to be rivalled. ' Experience teaches, that men are often so much governed 1 by what they are accustomed to see and practise, that the 1 simplest and most obvious improvements, in the most ' ordinary occupations, are adopted with hesitation, reluctance, 1 and by slow gradations. The spontaneous transition to new ■ pursuits, in a community long habituated to different ones, 1 may be expected to be attended with proportionably greater 1 difficulty. When former occupations ceased to yield a profit 1 adequate to the subsistence of their followers, or when there ' was an absolute deficiency of employment in them, owing to ' the superabundance of hands, changes would ensue; but 1 these changes would be likely to be more tardy than might ' consist with the interest either of individuals or of the 4 society. In many cases they would not happen, while a bare ' support could be insured by an adherence to ancient courses, 1 though a resort to a more profitable employment might be 1 practicable. To produce the desirable changes as early as 1 may be expedient may therefore require the incitement and 1 patronage of government." l An endeavour has been made to describe the main purpose of Hamilton's report, but the effort is quite inadequate to the occasion. In a condensed form his eager advocacy is stripped of all its charm and much of its persuasiveness. The leading quality — its practical intensity — is dimmed by the omission of a multitude of instances drawn from the pre- dicament of commerce at the time when he wrote. It would be altogether impossible to follow his methodical analysis and defeat of minor objections ; his examination in detail of the industries which, in his opinion, it was possible advantageously and at once to establish in the United States; his review 1 Wvrk*, ir. p. 104. THE FEDERALISTS 247 and consideration of the various means and resources of a.d. 1791 which government might make use for planting and foster- " Et - 34 ing manufactures; his enumeration and criticism of taxes conducive and inimical to commercial prosperity — for to attempt such an undertaking would result in reprinting at length the whole of this voluminous document. In none of his measures does Hamilton show more remarkably the great force of his instinct for reality, his piercing insight into the true conditions of things, his grasp upon the facts of the case. Like Adam Smith, he will look at matters with his own eyes in the first instance ; and having made his survey, then and only then, he goes for counsel and a second opinion to the works of others who have considered the same problems in a similar spirit. For the skilful craftsman, quick of eye and ready with his hands, tired out and hungry after his day's work, it is an irksome effort to study out of books the science of his avocation. He is aware, or at any rate he is frequently reminded, that by so doing he would sharpen his intelli- gence, improve his output, and derive much collateral profit. But under the influences of fatigue and repletion he is disinclined. Sleep steals upon his eyelids. In point of fact he is lazy, but he justifies himself by affecting to view all book-learning with contempt. For the man who works not with his muscles but with his mind, be he statesman or philosopher, laziness sits in the other scale. Books and words and syllogisms are as easy to him as the brace-and-bit and the plane to a carpenter. He is under an everlasting temptation to substitute the lazy methods of logic for the hard and uncongenial processes of observation. In his library he is happy ; but you derange his whole life, and render him miserable, if you condemn him to a week's work in a merchant's office. Tn economic science mere syllogisms have never been 248 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1791 enough. Political insight requires some more substantial Mt. 34 f 00( j ttian the insight of other men. The philosopher is required to sacrifice his leisure, to observe the facts of the world he lives in as well as to reason about them, if the results of his labour are to serve the nation and to endure. Hamilton accepted this necessity like a cheerful, winter- morning bather, plunging daily into the actual confusion of things. His opponents drew the bedclothes up to their noses, turned lazily upon the other side, and dreamed dreams of an Arcadia while a very different world was astir. BOOK IV THE DEMOCRATS A.D. 1791-179* • By-ends.— Why they, after their headstrong manner, conclude that it is their duty to rush on their journey all weathers ; and I am waiting for wind and tide. They are for hazarding all for God at a clap ; and I am for taking all advantages to secure my life and estate. They are for holding their notions, though all other men be against them ; but I am for religion in what, and so far as, the times and my safety will bear it. They are for Religion when in rags and contempt ; but I am for him when he walks in his silver slippers in the sunshine, and with applause.'— The Pilgrim's Progress. BOOK IV THE DEMOCRATS CHAPTER I Thomas Jefferson Thomas Jefferson is one of the most remarkable figures in history. Of Welsh descent, he was born in Virginia in the year 1743. At his father's death he inherited a small estate, and to this he added by shrewd purchases, so that at the date of his marriage, in his thirtieth year, he was the owner of some five thousand acres and fifty slaves. He was bred to the law, and enjoyed a lucrative chamber practice which was the chief source of his income ; but at the same time he cultivated his own land, and, like Washington, had more happiness in this pursuit than in any other. In Virginian society he was not eminent either by reason of his birth or wealth. He was merely a substantial country gentleman. His circumstances were easy from the begin* ning; and shortly after his marriage the death of his father-in-law was the means of adding largely to his resources. Hardship, therefore, of the pecuniary sort, had no share in his education. Until near the end of his days he was undisturbed by anxieties arising from any lack of funds. Jefferson was a patriotic citizen who served his country M 252 ALEXANDER HAMILTON with ungrudging labour for close on half a century. He was a member of the House of Burgesses in his own state, and of the Continental Congress both before the war began and after its conclusion. For two troubled years 1 he was the Governor of Virginia ; for five 2 he was minister at the Court of France ; for four 8 he was Secretary of State in Washington's cabinet. He was Vice-President of the United States from 1797 until his election to the Presidency in 1801, and only retired from official life at the end of his second term in 1809. He died in his eighty-fourth year By a dramatic coincidence his death occurred upon the fortieth anniversary 4 of the famous Declaration of Inde- pendence, of which he was the author. He is described by his biographer 6 as ' thin and raw-boned/ with ' red hair, and freckled face and pointed features.' His height was well over six feet. He was large in frame and loose-limbed. We are told that he was studiously unkempt, and even slovenly in his dress and person ; ■ made up ' elaborately, as his enemies suggest, for the part of a sterling democrat. His uncouth disorder upon high occasions, his disregard of the ordinary conventions and ceremonies of state, slippers down at the heel, corduroy breeches very much the worse for wear, neck-cloth awry and not overclean, do not impress the modern reader as they appear to have im- pressed the admiring citizens of his own day. We are not struck by the sincerity of a great nature contemptuous of trifles, but rather by the ingenuity of a great actor who had carefully weighed the value of the meanest accessories. The portraits of Jefferson are of a considerable variety, and difficult to reconcile one with another. There is dignity in all of them, and kindliness in most. But there is also an expression of anxious vigilance. The face suggests 1 1779-80. * 1784-89. * 1790-93. * 4th July 1828. ° Tucker THE DEMOCRATS 253 a sensitive and shrinking nature which, by the sport of circumstances, or by a perverse ambition, has been led to play the wholly unintended part of a man of action. Jeffer- son was a bold horseman, but in every other sphere where courage and swift decision are usually looked for, he was dilatory, timorous and unready. He was an affectionate friend, adored by his familiars, and brilliant under the glow of their sympathy. But as an enemy he was less admir- able : untiring, but unchivalrous ; never fighting in the open where he could avoid it, and never taking blows without a whine. He hated to hear any man applauded who was not under his immediate patronage; and, what is perhaps his strangest quality, seeing that he was a scholar and had much experience of the world, he detested whole classes of his fellow-creatures for no better reason than because they were invested by tradition with some kind of respect. When Jefferson first came into prominence certain ideas were in the air, and these ideas were believed by their lovers to be capable of forming the solid foundations of states. By their enemies, on the other hand, they were denounced as pernicious nonsense, impossible to be trans- lated into political action save at the cost of anarchy and disorder. The poetry, religion and philosophy of the revolutionary epoch had a great vogue for nearly three generations, and when Jefferson, as a member of Congress, drafted his famous Declaration of Independence, they had been in men's minds for a quarter of a century. The dominant note at this time was the love of mankind, no less intense because of its vagueness, and a bitter indignation against officers and institutions that were deemed to be the cause of human suffering. When Jefferson for a second time appeared in distin- guished pre-eminence as Secretary of State these ideas were in their second period, of which the note was a blind and 254 ALEXANDER HAMILTON bloodthirsty rage that had its origin in failure. Despite the prophets the millennium had not yet arrived. The contrivances of despots, the zeal of their minions, the cowardice of doubters, were assumed to be the causes of the delay. Ultimate defeat was held to be impossible, for the stubbornness of the facts themselves had not then begun to be suspected. To this age of impatience there succeeded an age of com- parative peace. The violence of emotion had produced a natural exhaustion. A dim perception of the things that must be rendered unto Caesar had somewhat abated the confidence of poets and the dogmatism of philanthropists. The manners and hearts of men became the objective of such revolutionaries as still maintained their faith. The institutions of the state would be moulded in the end through the awakened conscience of mankind, when the spots of the leopard were changed and the Ethiopian had become white. Roughly the revolutionary epoch lasted for three-quarters of a century. 1 Its first period was one of brotherhood, the second of rage, the third of a mild and patient aspiration. Jefferson was prominent in each of these phases. His sympathy never wavered, his hope never failed. In his own country certainly, and in other countries possibly, the majority of good men was with him from the beginning to the end of his career — the majority of the idealists, the unselfish, the thoughtful, the articulate and the unwise. They were not practical men, but they were sincere, and Jefferson was their champion and exponent. Fidelity to ideas rather than success in action was their concern. They judged their leader more by the eloquent orthodoxy of his messages and manifestoes than by any test of efficiency in office. 1 1760 to 1825. THE DEMOCRATS 255 This is the first, and the greatest, and the most worthy of the causes that made Jefferson a famous character. He was a kind of Don Quixote ; with this difference, that half the world shared his illusions. A further cause was the political exhaustion that followed upon strenuous effort. Jefferson came as chief magistrate to a people longing for peace after war, rest after revolution. 1 Independence was secured, union accomplished, a consti- tution created and set in movement. The natural temper of men in such conditions is towards the enjoyment of what has been won by so great sacrifices. They desired to go about their business, to cultivate material prosperity, to have leisure and to breathe freely. This condition in the United States coincided with the third phase of the revolutionary spirit throughout the Western world. Public opinion, while deprecating violent action, conversion by fire and sword, and all attempts upon the grand scale to translate its aspirations into statutes, was grateful to one who kept its faith alight by obiter dicta, and persuaded mankind by his glowing deliverances that the triumph of these principles, though postponed, was inevitable. Martyrdom during the first quarter of the nineteenth century was not prized among friends nor inflicted upon enemies. The period was one of easy faith. Men searched for welcome signs of conformity in their neighbours rather than for spots of heresy. The little outward forms of democracy in which Jefferson took an uncouth delight were in fact better tribute-money than a stern and rigid adherence to the formulas of equality and fraternity. The literal observance of the Rights of Man had, to tell the truth, become inconvenient and embarrassing. The virtuous citizen, while cherishing the ultimate hope, abstained from the pedantic practice of perfect brotherhood. 1 1801. 166 ALEXANDER HAMILTON Finally, there is the sound practical reason for Jefferson's pre-eminence that, very fortunately for his reputation, he had fallen upon an age of dwarfs, which had succeeded to an age of giants. After the defeat of Adams, the deaths of Washington and Hamilton, the ostracism of Burr, there were no possible rivals. We look in vain for any sign of lusty nature among his conspicuous lieutenants and suc- cessors. Madison and Monroe belong to a different breed of men. Jefferson was the last of the giants ; and consequently, while he continued in life, he was secure of his reputation, through the absence of all competition. A kind of sanctity encircled his head. He was the grand keeper of the Touch- stone of Democracy. Men voyaged from long distances, and put him to exorbitant expenses in grateful entertainment of them, merely to look upon his features and boast of it to their grandchildren ; and in the end he died, as he had lived, in the odour of phrases. It is better to concede all Jefferson's faults, and having done so to make a single bold claim that few will be found to dispute, though to some it will appear as an explanation of his success rather than as a proof of his virtue. There was a quality in him which Hamilton and other great statesmen of the constructive school have usually lacked. It is the old battle of the moralists against the evangelists, of salvation by works or by grace. Jefferson believed in humanity without any reservations, and the causes of his great influence must therefore be sought for in his faith and not in his acts. Hamilton disbelieved in humanity, unless it had the support of strong laws and the leadership of great men. To the people, craving for an affectionate confidence, these limitations implied distrust. The world which needed his works and profited by them forgot him for the time in favour of a rival who was not merely barren of achievements, but who also lacked the gaiety, courageous THE DEMOCRATS 257 bearing and charm of manner which are in the usual way strong aids to popularity. Hamilton was a master; but Jefferson men felt to be a friend. He lived in their hearts. It was useless to point to the ledger account of benefits conferred. The mass of citizens was not ungrateful to Hamilton, nor wilfully dis- respectful to his memory ; but towards Jefferson there was a homage of a wholly different order. His love for them was sincere, his faith in them was constant. Freedom and fraternity were ever on his lips, so that not only his followers in the North, but possibly even he himself, came to forget that he was a Virginian slave- owner to the last. That the manner of his climbing into power, and his way of dealing with his enemies, do not conform with his own ideals of virtue, cannot fairly be brought as evidence that he was insincere. In the case of every public character wide allowance must be made for divergence between his public professions and his private practice. He has a right to plead an imperfect world for much apparent inconsistency. And for Jefferson it is necessary to make a further excuse. In his own timid disposition he had more to fight against than most men. It led him constantly into situations from which he chose to escape by some mean device, or on some disingenuous plea, or even by plain untruth. But if it be some excuse for him as a man that he was found continu- ally acting under the influence of his fears, it is also his severest condemnation as a servant of the state. According to one of his bitterest critics, "Jefferson was 1 a practical theorist. His theory was the general credulity 4 of mankind. Upon this credulity his life was the success- 1 ful practice." l This judgment is true up to a certain point, but misses, as prejudice usually does, the real interest of his character. It is true that he practised successfully 1 J. C. Hamilton, History, iv. p. 463, B 258 ALEXANDER HAMILTON upon the credulity of mankind, but his art was to a large extent unconscious. For no man was ever yet born so clever that he could live upon popularity merely by his wits. To succeed at the game it is necessary that he should be himself a dupe. The appeals of Jefferson were in many cases so absurd that they could never have earned even a temporary assent, had he not himself believed in them with the utmost sincerity. For all his shrewdness, his character was one of an extraordinary simplicity. The things in which he believed are possibly astounding, but the fact of his belief in them is beyond aU question. In observation no statesman has excelled, and very few in the whole history of the world have equalled, Jefferson. The whole of the uppermost, emotional nature of individual men was an open book to him. Their vanities, their en- thusiasms, their ambitions, needed little study and no reasoning. He felt them by a kind of sympathy. His instinct within these limits was unerring. The profounder depths he did not understand. He saw only what was reflected in the mirrors of his own feelings. The sterner qualities of mankind were hidden from him. Steadfastness under discouragement and amidst the doubt of friends, renunciation that was silent and undramatic, volcanic passions and cold equity he could not see, for his own nature held no glass to reflect them. He did not fully understand Hamilton. He was baffled by his frankness and miscalculated, convinced it must be a cloak to conceal some interested motive. He never understood Washington beyond the fringe of his character. He was incapable by his nature of understanding the personal dignity of a Scots shep- herd, or of a Jew pedlar, or the unbreakable loyalty of a blackguard. But he looked into most men, if he did not look entirely through them. He was as superior to Walpole, who traded mainly upon their meanness, as he was inferior THE DEMOCRATS 259 to Chatham, who knew how to use their virtues. In prac- tising upon the emotions no man was ever more adroit and at the same time less self-conscious, and no man ever reaped a greater profit on his genius. Jefferson's greatest skill was in dealing with men as in- dividuals; but he was also a capable analyst of mankind in the mass. To his credit it must be set down that he made no attempt at bribery. He did not offer doles and never hinted at spoliation. There was no grossness in his method. The harmonics that he fiddled were entirely upon the strings of sentimentality. He had a flair for what was or might be made popular. He understood and interpreted what was felt at the moment, and he had the gift to foresee what would be felt at the next moment. It was less art with him than a kind of instinct, which is shared by the theatrical manager and all great showmen. He knew what the public wanted, and he knew also what it was easy and possible to educate it to want ; and what it wanted or might want he was always ready to provide. The charge against him in this respect is not dishonesty, for if any of his beliefs were sincere his belief in the Vox populi, vox Dei theory is entitled to respect. If the popular voice was truth, the part of a wise and virtuous statesman must be to listen and obey, to anticipate and prepare. It may appear to us amazing that any man should have held such views; but granting that he did, it is impossible to impeach him upon the accusation that he pandered to popu- larity. The real difficulty is at a later stage. The popular voice uttered such discordant judgments that obedience to them all would have seemed to most men to force the abandonment of the divine mansion of reason. But in Jefferson's case there was apparently no struggle. He ex- ploited an emotion until it showed signs of flagging, and then passed on to another which he had helped to kindle. 260 ALEXANDER HAMILTON Disaster was forgotten not only by himself, but by his con- stituents, in the hope and excitement of a new venture. So quick was he to seize and interpret the mood of the moment, that a grateful people easily overlooked the fact of his having championed with equal fervour some prior emotion of which they had come to repent. But just as Jefferson failed to penetrate the profound and noble qualities in his personal friends and enemies, so he missed the essential things in national affairs. The desires, indignations and enthusiasms of the majority of citizens in any country at a given moment are not necessarily synonymous with the material or spiritual needs of the people. In the former he was a sharer, and as he lived in a period of peace and not of stress (when unreality must have found him out), he had an immense reward for his sympathy. But looking beyond this sympathy what is there to show ? What institutions owe their origin to his efforts ? What problems did he solve ? The record of his actual achievements is almost negligible. The opportunities which he missed entirely dwarf his meagre accomplishment. The irony of events forced or permitted Jefferson to assume the role of a leader of men. Whatever the virtue of his qualities, it was not an executive virtue. Yet he put himself to slavery for many long years, endured endless mortifications, and, according to the computation of one of his editors, wrote upwards of forty-five thousand letters, most of them long ones, to achieve a triumph which, viewed as statesmanship, was nearly, or wholly, barren. Reading his correspondence, we doubt whether he even enjoyed the pleasures of the pursuit, for he was not a com- bative man or a sportsman. It seems rather that he was haunted by a sense of duty impelling him to snatch power out of the hands of certain dangerous characters who had THE DEMOCRATS 261 proved their iniquity by deriding a set of phrases which were more to him than all religion. His success was con- spicuous but tragic. In the end he ousted his enemies and cast down the revilers; but his phrases played him false. No power could translate them into policy or law, because they did not correspond with any translatable human facts. For the greater part they were only words, and for the rest they were the fancies of a poet. Although Jefferson outlived Hamilton by more than twenty years he was his senior by fourteen, and this fact accounts for much of the bitterness which marked their relations. When Jefferson arrived at New York in March 1790 to take up his duties of Secretary of State, Hamilton had been already at work for six months. His fame was in the mouths of all men. He was the hero of the particular crisis. Jefferson was not used to subsist upon the crumbs of applause. That he genuinely hated Hamilton's political ideals there can be no question; nor that he hated his methods and his pre-eminence even more than his ideals. Hamilton's swift, practical way of setting to work and accom- plishing his ends without allowing his opponents the luxury of phrasemaking and prolonged debate was wormwood to him. The temperaments of the two men were as far asunder as the poles; not different in the sense that they were com- plementary, which might, under favourable circumstances, have made them fast friends, but in that they were intensely antipathetic in every particular, from the philosophy of life to the cut and fashion of their clothes. And beyond all this there was the same personal rivalry which disturbed the peace of the archangels. Jefferson, the writer of the Declara- tion of Independence, which it had been the custom to con- sider the noblest and most famous document in the whole history of the world; Jefferson, the minister at the court of the most Christian king, the friend of philosophers. 262 ALEXANDER HAMILTON the philosopher of fine ladies, the counsellor of the most eminent statesmen of Europe — for such a man in the prime of his life to be dragged at the chariot wheels of an energetic young upstart was altogether intolerable, and Jefferson must have been something more than human had he accepted the position with magnanimity. It has been suggested that Hamilton regarded himself in the light of a prime minister. It is certain that he insisted upon making his policy operate in every department of the state. His clearness of thought, swiftness of decision, cogency in argument, whether spoken or written, gave him an enormous advantage, both with the cabinet and Congress. His faculty for getting his own way was little short of miraculous. Washington was his staunch supporter. General Knox, the Minister for War, always followed his lead. Even Randolph, the Attorney-General, with the bravest intentions, was constantly detached from his allegiance to Jefferson by the magnetism of his rival. 1 If it were possible to consider Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton quietly, as types of human tempera- ment and modes of thought, stripped of all personal rivalry, the whole pageantry of the times swept aside, and all the husk of fashion, prejudice and affectation torn from each character, there would still remain a violent and eternal opposition. The small accidents of their official relations merely provided a dramatic setting to an enmity which was as fundamental as that of fire and water. The ideal of Hamilton was the hive, the ideal of Jefferson was the bee. To the former the state was everything; to the latter, the divine nature of man. To Jefferson an individual was much more important than a state, a state much more important than the Union. In proportion as human life took on a corporate character and strength, 1 Jefferson to Madison, History, v. p. 344. THE DEMOCRATS 263 he became less interested in its fortunes and more apt to regard it with jealousy and suspicion. In his honest and sincere belief, a man as an amiable, prosperous individual, not the state as an aggregate of self-sacrificing men, was the true goal of politics. Never in the history of the world has there been a full realisation of Hamilton's dream. The nearest approach to it is the popular conception of the Empire of Japan — a mass of intelligent humanity, reckless of their lives, yet filled with the joy of life, eager for distinction, hungry for success, alert, practical and merry; but at the same time subordinate, humbly and piously subordinate, to a pure abstraction. With a people inspired to so high a pitch, the triumph and security of the race would dominate every individual aim, interest and affection. The maxim of such a polity is combination ; but the inevitable corollary is caste. If, as Hamilton's enemies contended, his passion for order and strong government would certainly, in the event of its full success, have bound the United States of America into a conservative Venetian republic within the space of a few generations, Jefferson's counter policy, with the same fortune, would assuredly have plunged them into anarchy and bloodshed within a decade. The passion of Jefferson was individual freedom. Often it amounted to a formula — sometimes to a quite extravagant formula; but there was a reality underlying it. He had a genuine belief in the goodness of humanity viewed as individuals. He hated the idea of the hive. He could never understand the fascination of its abstract glory, or realise that it possessed any practical utility. Sacrifices to such an end were not even a puzzle to him, but merely a foolish paradox. His nature was im- pervious to any national anthem. What was important to him, and holy, was the free growth of men, restricted no more than was absolutely necessary by laws or conventions. 264 ALEXANDER HAMILTON He desired to see them grow up in their natural shapes, and believed that these shapes would be more 'natural' on a bleak, wind-swept moorland, or in a crowded forest, than in any cared-for park or sheltered garden. He was an enthu- siast, who hoped for good with so fervent and extreme a faith, that he openly avowed a preference for government by newspapers and disparaged the virtues of a settled constitu- tion. It is hardly exaggeration to say that he would have rejoiced to see the state a dismasted hulk, so confident was he that by the action of beneficent and eternal currents, she would drift for ever upon a smiling sea, within bow-shot of the delectable islands, without the aid of sails or rudder. Hamilton lacked the same enthusiasm, was entirely wanting in such confidence. His passion was good seamanship, trim tackle and a hearty crew. To drift was for him ever the greatest of all evils ; and the advocate of such policy was in his opinion a madman, an incompetent, or a coward. Under the British system of government Hamilton must necessarily have been a head and shoulders above all other statesmen of his time and country. Jefferson, on the other hand, would not have taken any rank whatever among statesmen, but would have arrived at eminence in some different sphere. Our parliamentary plan has many faults, but certain compensations. It hinders the work of a minister and wastes his time, but at least it enables him to defend his own measures. And there is this safety in it, that our party leaders must always be men of courage. Sometimes in our haste we may permit our- selves to speak disparagingly of debate, and if the result of debate were merely the prevalence of eloquence over silence, of good arguments over bad ones, it might justly be contemned as a means of selecting men to govern the country. But debate is something a great deal more re- spectable. The glory of the British parliament is that men THE DEMOCRATS 26* subdue it by their characters to a far greater extent than by their arguments. It is required of a leader that he must be prepared at any moment to stand up to his enemies, to give blows and to take them. This test can never be escaped. Occasional brilliant appearances will never put any man in power, or keep him in power if he has happened to arrive there by some accident. Private influence or intrigue, literary gifts of the highest order, are all in vain. The system is sound, although of necessity it excludes many aspirants of shining talents. The rule is absolute that, before a man may be permitted to govern the nation, he must have proved himself capable of prevailing over his rivals in single combat and face to face. Jefferson did not shine in controversy. He hated it — it is not unjust to say that he feared it. His abstinence from debate has been explained by a huskiness of the voice, but in reality it was much more a matter of temperament. He avoided personal strife whenever it was possible to do so, and upon the whole his foresight to that end was amazingly successful. But when occasionally the unexpected happened and he found himself confronted with a determined adversary, he never hesitated to escape, nor gave much thought to the dignity of his demeanour. Many instances are alleged against him, 1 and of these the most conspicuous is his failure as governor of Virginia during the war. It is not credible, as his enemies have insinuated, that Jefferson feared for his life, or would have hesitated in the extreme necessity to give it for his country. But in any crisis he was unprepared, and emergency always 1 "He deserted from Congress instantly on hearing of the battle of Long Island. He abandoned the chief magistracy of Virginia while the enemy were in possession of that state, and when an impeachment was hanging over his head ; and he retired from the Department of State (January 1794) when everything indicated imminent peril to his country." — History, v. pp. 438-39 : alpo v. pp. 339-55 ; iii. p. 65. 266 ALEXANDER HAMILTON found him in a fluster. He was a quiet, studious, patriotic and unwarlike citizen, but as a governor, called upon suddenly to repel a bold invader supported by a mere handful of men, he was a lamentable failure. He could inspire no confidence in his legislators, because he was utterly unable to collect his own wits. He lacked the clear and practical sense of an objective, the swiftness of decision, the cheerful and cool resourcefulness that the occasion demanded. The policy of his life was to toss phrases into the ears of mankind, like honey-cakes to Cerberus. But it was impossible to deal with men who carried muskets by this easy prescription. Jefferson proved himself incom- petent as governor of Virginia to repel the British troops under Arnold, and by reason of the same defects in his character he would have been no less incompetent to deal with the funding of the national debt, for creditors are an equally obdurate class of antagonists. The contrast between Hamilton and Jefferson is forced upon us at every turn, in acts as well as in theories, in trifling fashions and in serious beliefs. Nowhere is it more remarkable than in the style of their writings. Jefferson is flowing, desultory and familiar. He has an entertaining spice of peevish humour and captious satire; an aptness in outflanking his opponent by some ingenious digression. Hamilton, on the other hand, is ever grave and eager; formal if not actually distant ; terse, vigorous and direct in attack, preferring the frontal to all other methods. He never deals in trivial annoyance. If he wounds it is not because he desires to hurt, but because his intention is to destroy. The contrast is as obvious in their opinions as in their style. Hamilton made his party round his convictions. The men who thought as he did, the men who were won over by his appeal, came to him and attached themselves. THE DEMOCRATS 267 Jefferson's opinions, on the other hand, cannot escape a suspicion of having in many cases been chosen deliberately in order to attract a party to follow him. There is no single instance where he stood out boldly against a popular cry. Hamilton, on the contrary, was more often found fighting against the sentiment of the moment than in agreement with it. He never hesitated to risk his favour with the people if his ideas of justice were opposed to their passions. He was always a leader. Jefferson at his best was never more than a patron, and usually he was only a purveyor. His unique faculty for self-persuasion alone saved him from actual dishonesty. It has been the custom to excuse Jefferson, and even to praise him, on the grounds that his feelings were stronger than those of ordinary men. But the difference was really less in the strength of his feelings than in the weakness of his control. He had the shrewdness to make a merit of a vice, and he succeeded so well that he has not only been forgiven for his lack of self-command, but has built upon it the proof of his sincerity. Like many persons who profess the widest philanthropy and are beset by loose emotions, he was vindic- tive and at times ferocious. He exulted over the suffering and degradation of individuals and classes against whom he had merely a theoretic grudge. His apologies for all that was worst in the French Revolution are painful reading. We miss not only an intelligent estimate of these events, but any semblance of magnanimity. His most solemn judgments are tainted by a morbid spirit of literary revenge ; they never arrive at that pitch of authority which overawes, and although he is often cruel, he is never stern. To search for the explanation of a great renown, and to find so little that corresponds to our ideas of a hero, is disappointing. We are wearied by apologists who concede nothing to Jefferson's dispraise except his inconsistencies, 268 ALEXANDER HAMILTON and attribute even these to an excessive honesty ; who keep harping upon his half- virtues, and would persuade us that after all tact is a kind of leadership, and perseverance a sort of courage; that eagerness for popularity is but a healthy love of approbation, and that untruthfulness which springs from timidity or the imagination is less heinous than if its origins were in some sinister ambition. It is hard, listening to such instructors, not to go the whole way with the Federalists and to rate him as a mere mountebank whose title to fame consists not in the value of his work, but in the skill with which he imposed upon his own day and generation. The ambition of a man like Hamilton is to get certain things which he believes in done, of a man like Jefferson to keep himself poised upon the top of a wave. In spite of his eloquent morality he held no opinion so firmly that he would risk his popularity to achieve it. In spite of his belief that the greatest work of God is a man and not a polity, he hated minorities, and hated even more to be in a minority. In spite of his admiration for rational as opposed to traditional government, he not only distrusted reason as many wise men have done — he detested it. An argument drawn from experience was almost as offensive to him as a hard fact. He was satisfied that he had penetrated to the heart of any matter when he had ranged it under one or other of his ready-made formulas. It is easy to understand why Jefferson should have hated Hamilton. Two so different dispositions were bound to dis- agree, and to disagree with bitterness. What is difficult to understand, unless on the ground of a peculiar temperament, is the inveteracy of Jefferson's malice. He outlived Hamil- ton for more than twenty years, and during the whole of that period his popularity had been prodigious and uninter- rupted. Towards the end of his life he became the object of THE DEMOCRATS 269 & hero-worship almost religious in its character. Men came from all parts to gaze upon his countenance, and the name of Hamilton was for the time being forgotten. In this serene and blissful atmosphere Jefferson set to work upon the revision of his correspondence and memoirs. It was with him no perfunctory task of notes and dockets, ordering of dates and filling in of initials ; but a very serious and painstaking effort to leave the golden memory of the author without a single smut or stain. Passages were re- written. Incidents where some tarnish had fastened were industriously scrubbed. His share in ancient controversies was explained in a new light. His case was fortified by evidence that flowed easily from the cells of his resourceful memory. In the end it may be believed he was well satisfied with his work, and felt entirely confident that he had painted such a portrait of a virtuous citizen as the world must ever afterwards accept as the highest type. The intended portrait of the virtuous citizen is a dull and lifeless presentment in thin and fading tints. On the canvas behind it, glowing through the transparency, is the true Jefferson in strong lines and gorgeous colours — Jeffer- son the skilful politician, the ingenious sophist, the intriguer against his enemies, the distorter of evidence and of facts ; above all, perhaps, Jefferson the unforgiving. The Anas and the Autobiography give us a masterly, but too savage like- ness, and it is no wonder that his friends and admirers have never ceased to lament their publication. The Confessions of Rousseau are less convincing, because at times we cannot keep back the suspicion that a dramatic instinct of self- abasement has inspired his candour. The value of Jefferson is not his candour, for there is none, but his inadvertence, which is without a parallel. In his efforts to enhance his own glory he considered it essential to blacken the reputa- 270 ALEXANDER HAMILTON A.D. 1791 tions of his enemies, and as a consequence he has given us a description of his own character enemy would not wish to add a line