CoIamWa 
 
 LIBRARY 
 
 SELIGMAN LIBRARY OF ECONOMICS 
 
 PURCHASED : 
 
 UNIVERSITY 
 
Ve -.m a r t s 
 
 O N. T H E- 
 
 PROPOSED PI/AN 
 
 O F A N 
 
 EMISSION of PAPER, 
 
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 MEANS OF EFFECTING IT* 
 
 Addressed to the Citizens of 
 
 U A R Y LAN D, 
 
 Br ARISTIDES.’ / 
 
 y). & A' , fr asK--- . iryk , 
 
 JVhen in a popular Government there is ajsufpcnfwn of th* 
 
 Lawsas this can proceed only from the Corruption of the Re. 
 public , the State is certainly undone, j 
 
 • Montesci. Sp. of LjS.\vs, b. 3, ch. 3. 
 
 '-„i-. .- .-/.. - 
 
 / • 
 
 A N N A P O L I S: 
 
 Printed by FREDERICK GREEN. 
 
 ■ / / 7 f : ; . 
 
R E M ARKS 
 
 ON THE 
 
 PROPOSED PLAN 
 
 O F A N 
 
 EMISSION of PAPER. 
 
 H OW long a constitution, under which we enjoy- equal 
 rights, may endure, it is not for fhort-fighted mortals to 
 predict. In the annals of the world there are few inftanccs, 
 where a direct attack has been made by any part of the citizens 
 of a free Hate, again!! the liberty of the reft. It has ever been 
 the practice of tiiofe, who meditated its deftrudtion, to avert 
 fufpicion from thcmfelvcs, by warning the people of danger 
 from others. Thus it is that a people are fometimes precipi¬ 
 tated into that ftate of anarchy and confufion, which is moft 
 favourable to infidious defigns. 
 
 Although the frequent proftitution of profeffions renders it 
 rdmoft difgraceful to ufe them, I muft allure you, that from 
 the moment I began ferioufly to reflect, your happinefs has 
 been dear to my heart. At the hazard of my peace and for- 
 : une, without the leaft hope of reward, and with the certain 
 profpect of provoking the malice of weak and wicked minds, 
 1 have for many years devoted ray attention to the public con¬ 
 cerns. On this head however I Ihould have maintained a 
 becoming filence, had not certain ungenerous remarks been 
 thrown" out in a place where it was impotable for me, in a pro¬ 
 per manner, to expofe them. Befides thefe there is a recent 
 publication, in which my real name has been ufed with an 
 unwarrantable freedom ; but this I confidcr as the cffufion of 
 habitual infolence, not meriting a more particular notice. A 
 fufficient anfwer may be colledted from the following remarks. 
 
 When a difagreement takes place between the two branches 
 of the legiflature, on a queftion involving with it other ques¬ 
 tions of Hill greater moment, every freeman in the communi¬ 
 ty is concerned in its decifion. The freedom of the prefs has 
 been indirectly attacked by men who Ihould guard it with the 
 foiidelt 
 
( 4 ) 
 
 fonder!: pare. It has been repeatedly afierted, that the officers 
 of government have exerted their influence, acquired through 
 public money, in oppofing the wifhes. of the people, and that 
 therefore they have merited puhilhment from the reprefentatives 
 of the people. An aflertion repeatedly made is generally the 
 refult of reflection. The purpofe of this is fo wound the feel¬ 
 ings of fome, reftrain others by their fears, and bind the reft 
 by their interefts. The .fpirit of a genuine republican muft 
 revolt at the idea. What ? Shall he, who in fome refpects, is 
 constituted the guardian of your rights, be himfelf debarred 
 the common right of (peaking his opinions ? Does his lituation 
 (eparate his interefts from thofe of the people, or render him 
 dels capable than ffie moft illiterate demagogue of. deciding on 
 questions of policy ? 
 
 Thus far is premifed to remove unreafonable prejudice. 
 The author has been charged with adhering to the fenate, 
 courting their favour, and repofing a faith in their decifions. 
 The truth is, on the matureft deliberation, be thinks them 
 juftiliable in rejecting the bill for an emtffion of paper; and 
 it is partly his intention to adduce fome arguments in their 
 -vindication. 
 
 When a man coolly and deliberately a els againft his intereft, 
 there is a prefumprion, that he conceives himfelf in the right. 
 It cannot efcape your penetration, that if a fervant of the peo¬ 
 ple were capable of facrificing on the altar of ambition his 
 opinion, his confluence and his duty, he would, with every 
 appearance of the moft fervent zeal, efpoufe the caufe of thofe 
 who might moft effectually requite his endeavours. 
 
 The fenate having rejected the propofed plan of an emiffion 
 upon loan, the houfe of delegates declines all overtures of a 
 conference, and determines to ciofe the feffion without making 
 any provifion for the r.scefiary fupplies. in an adclrefs to ' the 
 people they ftate the disagreement, and urge many arguments in 
 fupport of their own fyft'em; They tell them an appeal is 
 made by both branches of. the legiflature, that the opinion of 
 the people only can decide, and that both brandies will be 
 equally bound by inftruclion;. The fenate makes no direct 
 addreis; but as they conceive their fellow-citizens entitled to. 
 know the principles of their conduit, th,e meflages refpefting 
 the money bill are publifhed by their direction. In one of 
 theft is a declaration, ffiat they make no appeal; and they fug¬ 
 ged: the inconveniencies which they apprehend may flow from 
 the precedent. The houfe of delegates, adjourns to the aoth • 
 of March, and the fenate to the aoth of ApriJ.' ' ,' 
 
 ' ' ' : : This 
 
This brief narrative- fuggefts a variety of, points, a ft or o,ugh 
 JifcuiTion whereof is abfolutely neceflary,. before you can pru- . 
 
 tlendy take any ftep on this peculiar great, occafion... 
 
 ' In tile firft place it is~ proper to decide, \vhether- an .appeal 
 is made by both branches, and your intrusions reqijefted by 
 each. ■ Whatever- might pa^/y be implied, from the Senate’s 
 firft mefTage, their fubfequent exprefs declaration, ;; priblfthed 
 at the fame time, mull,tender, void that implication.r. .'This 
 conftrudtion.is conformable, tola known niaxim of lavv and comi 
 moil knk—ExpreJfum\jacit.ceJj[cire taciturn •; that is, accord¬ 
 ing to a liberal tranflation, .poftiive vtords fet ajide., that which 
 without '.'them woul^he implied. I conceive, that nothing : can 
 be fairly .cpnftrued.into' an appeal; to the people,: except an ad- 
 drefs foliciting their inftruiftiqnsjn the moft plain: unequivocal 
 terms,.,.... -, ..... ..... ... 
 
 But it is infilled by a crowd of writers, that although the 
 fenate. make, no. direct application, ,if the people fhall think 
 proper to inftr.udl, the fenate is conftitutionally bound to obey, 
 This .fecpnd ppint'.muft be determined on a view of the 
 conlfitution arid the declaration of rights, ; To me this point alfo 
 is abundantly clear, from the Tingle confideratiqn, : that the 
 conftitution creates two.diftinft branches only; and that nqi r 
 ther that nor the declaration any where intimates, that the 
 people at large, are immediately a-part of the legislature. Had 
 the refpeftable framers intended,, .that whenever a. bill propofed 
 by one is rejedled. -by the other, the people, may afterwards di- 
 re£l it to be palled "into, a law, they would have faidTo in plain 
 pofitive terms ;, but then thqy. would.have rendered pf,no avail 
 the inftitution of the t\yo branches. The/enate.-wrould have 
 been calculated for little more, than to produce,.delays,and to 
 afford- occafions for infiamirig the.'paffions,-and difturbirig the 
 public quiet.. There would ;not have been two diilindt regu¬ 
 lar, branches. to decide; but two diftindl branches to prppofe. 
 A bill propofed by either would he a law, ,-not being- diflented 
 to by the other,. or,, in.Cafe. of. a diftent,;:the-people-would con- 
 ftitute' a third..or a Jingle branch qccafipnajly.,,, No, bulinefs 
 would be fettled, in the appointed legii1ature,-unlefs the two 
 branches agreed. Had the.framers..entertained; fuch,ideas, they 
 would unqiieftionably have prescribed the manner.pf colledling 
 the peoples decifiom , ■ fri;; - < 
 
 , I believe there never; exifted,a;gpvernment, in,which,- not- 
 wi.thftanding everyfreetnan.liad a.mftfage.in framing laws, the 
 queftion- was -decided by, a. majority of iirigle voices. - In the 
 .pureil democracies, the people havp.voted ,by .claftes, tripes.-or 
 coriipanies, 
 
'( 6 ) 
 
 companies! into which they were diftributed, agreeably u> 
 fom? National principle. I pretend to ho great hifforical re- 
 learcnes. I conceive that many ages have elapfed fince any 
 civilized nation, ftate, or even fingle independent city, has 
 placed the power of legiflation in the people at large ; and I 
 think, that no virtuous citizen, who is acquainted with the 
 hif iry of ancient democracies, would wifli this power amongft 
 its to refide ctmjiwitly in the people. In abftraft theory, 
 fitch a legiflation appears confonant to their natural rights; 
 bu? the fhocking inconvenieiicies attendant on the mode, have 
 long fince occationed mankind to renounce it. It was calcu¬ 
 lated Only for fmall cities in their beginnings; and he that 
 wi'hes for it -in a ftate of equal extent and population to ours, 
 hiuft either be a political madman, or, under the convenient 
 cloak of public good, he veils the moll dark and traitorous 
 intent. 
 
 • - Let us examine the true import of the fourth article of the 
 declaration of rights ; for on that, article, if on anv, is founded 
 the doctrine' that both branches of the legiflature are bound to 
 obey the iiiliruftiohs of the people, and that by fo, doing, they 
 aft agreeably to the-conftitution. .The article fpeaks fo plain 
 a language it will be difficult for any expofition to render it 
 tnore intelligible: 
 
 : •“ That all perfons inverted with the legiflative or executive 
 “ powers of government are the truftecs of the public, and as 
 u fuen accountable for their conductwherefore, whenever the 
 “ ends of government are perverted, aiid public liberty mani- 
 <l fefljycndangered,' and all other means of redtefs are ineffec- 
 “ tual, ‘the’people may, and of right ought, to reform the old 
 “or eftabliffianew goverlimcnt; the doitrine of non-refift- 
 “ arie'e agairtft arbitrary power and oppreflion,. is abfurd, fla- 
 “ vifh, and deftruftive of the good and happinefs of mankind.” 
 
 If the period has aftually arrived, ’when it is neceflhry for 
 the people to interpole,■’ they fhould’act in a way very different 
 from that of commanding the fenate’s affent to a bill, which, 
 on the matureft. deliberation, they liave ur.animoufly rejefted. 
 Such an interference of the people might only prevent, fora 
 feafon, that, which wifhout many fubfequent interferences, 
 would be likely to take place ; and. the danger threatened from 
 the corruption of their truftees.would probably continually in- 
 creale; >The truth is, that from the obvious meaning of the 
 fourth article, and upon every found principle of government, 
 the interference of the people is a refumption of all delegated 
 powers; the whole frame is ipfo fatfo diffolvedand it becomes 
 
( 7 , ) 
 
 their bufmefs either to refornj.its errors and abufes, and to de. 
 clare it again in force, or to adopt an entire new,fyftem.- If 
 experience hath evinced two dlftindt legiflative branches to be? 
 inconvenient, they will probably abolifh that which is not of 
 their immediate appointment. Butto fay, that the fengte (hall 
 {till fubfift, and enjoy their powers and privileges uninterrupted, 
 and that notwithilanding they fhall be obliged to give their 
 aflent, which, after a full interchange of fentiment with the 
 delegates, they have unanimoufly declined, feems. Uttering' man 
 nifeft contradictions to be faying, that a thing is fo, and is not 
 fo, in the fame, fentence. 
 
 This fourth article was unneceflary, as indeed are. many 
 others. It affords a ftriking leffon to legiflators never to ufc 
 fenterices or words without neceffity or meaning. It was nen 
 verVfurely forefeen, that an article aflerting only a natural right, 
 could by. any poffibility be conftrued into a pofitive inftitution- 
 I have on many occafions lamented, that the convention- in 
 compofmg a declaration did not content themfelves with re-i 
 cognifing generally the law, and laying down certain piaxims 
 of government for the conduit of future legislatures. Inftead 
 of that they have thrown together natural rights, principles of 
 government, and particular provifions of the common law. 
 Had this and the firft article been omitted, there wpuld have 
 been no fentence or word in the whole declaration or the form 
 of government, countenancing the doctrine in queftion; and 
 yet the rights of the people would have been precifely.as they 
 are. With refpedt to the fifth article, which fpeaks of the 
 people’s right to participate in the legiflature, that, article is 
 manifeftly oppofed to the dodtrine; becaufe it explains the 
 right into a right of .immediate reprefentation, and frequent 
 elections. 
 
 When the happinefs of the people, the true end of all fo.ci- 
 ety and government, cannot be preferved on account of fame 
 original fault in the conftitution, or when the truftees -betray 
 their lacred charge, and the people are roufed by. a fenfe of. in¬ 
 juries no longer to be borne, the indelible rights of nature 
 authorife them to, enforce that redrefs to which all conftitution- 
 al means are incompetent.. This is the principle,of the Eng- 
 lifli revolution in 1668. This is the principle of the revo¬ 
 lution in America, which every good man ftill flatters himfelf 
 will be deemed the moft important era in the hiftory of the 
 world. It would be flavifh to imagine, that without the firft 
 and fourth articles, or even with one diredtly repugnant, the 
 people might not annul a compadi. intended for their good, 
 when 
 
when -experience evinces the framers of that cpmpScfto have 
 been-miftaken; or that a mode Of.government which' fuited' 
 its framers,-might : riot be change^ by their pofterity. . ■ 
 
 ipButTSdiethef a fight be inherent in the people, and whether 
 this'be a proper occafion for ufing it,' are two diftinft queftions. 
 Has-ten-year* experience demonftrated the fenate to be either 
 a dangerous-or ufelefs body ? Has.' the rejection of the paper 
 fyftem perverted- the ends of its'appointment,' or expofedyour 
 liberties to ^danger-?- - TheTwarmeft .advocates for- the'meafure 
 furelywillnot-'maintain the amrmative of thefe queftions to be 
 a felf-evident pofition. Let them remember, that the attempt 
 to ihtrcfcluce 'this very febeme mifearried two years fucceffiyely; 
 and yet the people murmured not. In the third year the 'home 
 efi-delegates were induced, to.adopt it.' The fenate unani- 
 moafly- diflerite'cL - The people ftill made no complaints. 1 In- 
 deed, : had : the cohdiicf of the feriate exc-ifed their- difpleafure, 
 it-’ might have' been eafily manifefted in the lateele&ibri.' In 
 this electionthe gentlemen moft diftinguifhed'for oppofition to 
 paper, were'honoured with almoft every fuffrage. It Will be 
 ftrarige indeed; if you can 1 now be p’erfuaded, that the new 
 fenate'-has : -perverted the ends of government .by 'declinirig'an’ 
 expedieflt rejected by the old, and by two fuCceffive houfes of 
 
 delegates; •' . ^ : '' '. . . 
 
 '-tfRieHnode"of appointing your fenate is efteemed by' wife 
 men the- 1 mofbadmirable inftitution in' all the. Uiiited.'States; 
 and-'Lmake ; mo : 'd6ubt, that in Europe it has done honour te 
 American genius. The fenate of Maryland has been conti¬ 
 nually acquiring -the efteem and confidence of the people, whilft 
 other fenates have fallen in repute. The difference arifes from 
 die different modes of election. It is 'not a'man’s popularity' 
 in a tingle county or diftrict, it is his general good .character, 
 and-his'real dignity and importance, that confer on him this 
 honour.- The fuffrage-of the electors.is a tribute paid.to worth. 
 The: arts of intrigue, arid even the magic powers of eloquence, 
 fliould thefe be effayed, will probably be' found unavailing. 
 
 In-fpite of'thefe-circumirances attempts are made to excite- 
 your fufpicions of- the fenate. You are told, that in this tiled 
 body -prevails ; a bahefiir ariftocratic fpirit. Enemy as I am to 
 arbitrary PazySfevery kind, I was at firft ftartled at the fiig- 
 geftion. But- as this was' a weighty charge, I. thought Tome 
 proof Ihpuld-'be required fuperior to the bare affertiori of any 
 'man. An ariftocracy is properly wheri the fovereign power of 
 inflate refidcs in a permanent body if men diflincl from the fcor 
 fl\ At prefentithe- fenate is pot that permanent body'; be- 
 
( 9 ) 
 
 caufeif is appointed once in five years, and the fupretne power 
 refries not in it to fo great an extent as in the houfe of dele¬ 
 gates. ’Neither of them aione can pafs a law. If an ariltocracy 
 be 1 the government of a few, uncontroled and unchecked ;y any ■ 
 other power , an ariftocratic fpirit mult mean a difpoution to 
 bring about fuch a government. In what inftance has even 
 a Angle fenator evinced an inclination to confine the powers of 
 iegillation to the fenate, or to change that branch into a per¬ 
 manent hereditary body. I now aik, whether the addrefs of 
 your delegates be not an attempt to have their owil propofition. 
 palled into a law, without the content of the fenate. I, be- 
 feech you to refleft foberly, whether this conduit of the dele¬ 
 gates does not tend indirectly to confer on them alone the 
 power of making laws. 
 
 I am thoroughly, and upon the belt grounds, perfuaded, that 
 no man in the fenate conceives himfelf at liberty to difregard 
 the wants, wilhes, or fendments of the people. He is per¬ 
 fectly apprized, that the inftitution was not intended to.cloathe - 
 individuals with honour merely for their own gratification; 
 but, like every other part of the conftitutipn, to confult the 
 general good. There may be a variety of inftances where this 
 general good is promoted by gratifying the inclination of the 
 people. But is there a man fo loll to cbmmon fenfe as not to 
 forefee, that if the people lhall take upon themfelves to decide 
 nice queffions of policy, by a majority of voices, they may 1 
 frequently'be wrought upon to choofe things which Will injure' 
 them • the molt. I repeat that their will, provided they perfift 
 long, enough to purfue effediual meafures, mull Hand for a iaw. 
 But on what ground can a man who breathes the true fpirit 
 ef patriotifm, perfuade them to exercife their will on the pre- 
 fent occafion ? Can he feriouily believe them better qualified 
 than the fenate to decide on the expediency of an emiffion ? 
 It is not fufficjent to fay, they belt know their own wants; be-' 
 caufe that is only a begging of the queltion, which is, whe¬ 
 ther an emiffion would fupply tliofe wants. Behold the glar¬ 
 ing moultrous abfurdity. The people do not immediately 
 choofe the fenate. ‘They appoint their moll intelligent men 
 to choofe for them; and their electors make.the moil diligent 
 inquiry into every corner of the Hate. Well, the fenate, after- 
 all, is ignorant of the true interefts of the ftate ; and the ge¬ 
 neral body of the people, from which they were fejedted, is to 
 fupply their wants, and enlighten their underltandingSi 
 
 If any man fays the fenate are interelted, or ptherwile cor- 
 pypt, let us have an opportunity to decide on his teltimOny; for 
 B ” confident 
 
( 10 ) 
 
 confident aiTertions, and noify declamation, will, I tnift, at 
 fell, ftaiid for nought. 
 
 It may be laid the comparifon is not proper between the 
 people and the fenate; that the people-are called to decide be¬ 
 tween their immediate reprefentatives and the fenate, on a 
 queftion, the right decifion of which is eflential to your hap- 
 piriefe; and that, until this decifion, all operations of the legis¬ 
 lature will be lufpended. In the fame way might any other 
 rejected bill be brought before the people. It is indeed natu¬ 
 ral for every projector to efteem his own fyjlem of the .lath im¬ 
 portance. In a conteft between the two branches, to be de¬ 
 termined in the propofed manner, is it at all probable, that the 
 queftion will come fairly before the people ? The number of 
 delegates exceeds that of the fenate in a ratio of five for one. 
 This circumftance could, not foil to operate, if even the arts 
 of popularity' were laid alide, the inhabitants of each county 
 afiembled, the merits fairly difcufieti, and inftructions figned 
 only at that, or a fubfequent meeting of the fame kind. The 
 delegates being far more intimately connected with their con- 
 IHtusnts, it mud be a plain queftion indeed, which the people ' 
 will decide in- favour of the fenate. Would to Heaven my 
 countrymen could fee the bufinefs in a true light. Their re¬ 
 prefentatives appeal to them for inftructions—So far I fhould 
 have no objection, if their reprefentatives were themfelves un¬ 
 determined. But thefe inftructions are to govern the fenate, 
 and at the fame time to be dictated by the delegates. In this 
 kind of ferrice the * people are not volunteers, and they feel 
 not enough to ftimulate them to a voluntary exertion. Can 
 the inteipofition of the people thus obtained, be . termed an 
 interference, dictated byafenfe of-wrongs, a defence of na¬ 
 tural rights^ and a promotion of the true ends of government? 
 Can a man wifh the free unbiased, fentiments of the people to 
 prevail,'when he exerts every ner/5' to obtain their decifion 
 before each fide oft the queftion can be fairly examined ?• A 
 draught of inftructions is circulated before the clofe of the 
 feffion. ‘Its preamble afierts the appeal of the fenate, and the 
 people arepreffed to fubfcribe before they can poffibiy examine 
 the allegation, or hear the fenate’s reafons. 
 
 : Is this fuch a mode as naturally fuggefted itfelf to men anxi¬ 
 ous in the purfuit of truth ? Were thefe inftructions in other 
 refpefts conftitutional, they would be void on one certain 
 
 * My readers will underjland, that whenever I /peak of the- 
 people^ I moan a majoriti of the great body of our citizens. 
 
 ; ’ • " ground. 
 
( 11 ) 
 
 ground. Had the fenate, being at a lofs how to decide,-reaily 
 appealed to the people, inftruftions would be ftrictl} proper; 
 but' the perfonal influence of any member of either branch, 
 would even in that cafe have been extremely improper. 
 
 Were I an advocate for the principle, I fltould be puzzled 
 rejecting the true manner of communicating the fenfe of the 
 people. Are inftructions to be figned only at public meet¬ 
 ings ? Is there to be one faceting only ? Is that meeting to 
 take place at each county court-boufe, or in each hundred ? 
 Is one general form to be purfued ? Or may each man choofe- 
 his o wn form ? By whom are the feveral papers to be collected 
 in each county or diftrift? With whom Ihall they all be lodged? 
 What thali be deemed a fufficient authentication ? On a fug- 
 geftion of forgery, how Ihall the fact be - afeertained, or the 
 crime punilhed ? A thoufand fuch queftions may be afked, and 
 the ingenuity of many gentlemen might be fufficient to pre- 
 feribe fuiiable provifions. But as to thefe queftions no anfwer 
 is found in the conftitution, the conclufion is obvious, that 
 ' its framer? had no idea of the thing, confiftent with the regu¬ 
 lar adminiftration of the government by them devifed. I re¬ 
 peat, that whenever, the great body of the people Ihall declare 
 their will (in whatever way it be done) this declaration", agree¬ 
 ably to the fourth article of the declaration, and the unaliena¬ 
 ble rights of nature, ought to be law; but then 'the whole 
 frame of the government is either diflolved or fufpended. I 
 . mean not, that any adt of violence committed by only a part, 
 and obftrufting the exercife of a conftitutional authority, would 
 amount to this diftblution i.r fufpenfion. I mean fuch an in¬ 
 terference as is mentioned in that article. I contend that, ac¬ 
 cording to the plain import of the^words, the authors had nor 
 in contemplation an interference, without a total diftblution or 
 a fufpenfion, until it could be reformed, and again declared ip 
 force. 
 
 Had the conftitution made exprefs provifion, and preferibed 
 the mapner in which inftrudlions Ihould be given, fo as to 
 bind both branches of the legiilature, the people ought never- 
 thelefs to be extremely fparing in the exercife. Were the cor- 
 'rupt motives of the fenate apparent; if by their conduft your 
 liberties were manifeftly endangered j if proving falfe to their 
 truft, they facrificed the public good to their own private 
 views—it would be proper to teach them their duty, and at 
 the feme time to addrefs .them in the terms of a fevere repri¬ 
 mand. And further, as the people are to exercife the right, 
 the people only Ihould determine on the occafion. I repeat 
 again. 
 
( 12 ') 
 
 again and again, that with or without a conftitutional provifi- 
 on, the people ought unqueftionably to interfere on occafions 
 like thefe. The difference between me and my adverfaries is, 
 whether an interference will noc abolifh or fufpend the consti¬ 
 tutional legiflature; and whether this be a proper feafon for an 
 interference. The doctrines imputed to me by fcribblers, I' 
 deteft as much as I do all infolence, domineering, fedition, rna- 
 Kce and calumny.. 
 
 I fhould imagine any prudent, cautious, difinterefted citi¬ 
 zen, who has a valuable {take in the community', whofe wel¬ 
 fare is intimately connected with the public profperity, whs 
 ■withes, no change in a government under which none hold 
 fuperior rights, who would hazard all, and could gain nothing 
 by a new revolution—I fliould imagine that fuch a man, let 
 his opinion relpecting an emiffion be wbat it may, will be in- 
 .duced .by no felicitation to fubfcribe. The point was limply, 
 whether bills of credit ihould be emitted on’loan. The houfe 
 of delegates was divided. A member whofe reputation is not 
 limited to thefe ltates, who, fometime ago, poffeffed your al- 
 moft unbounded confidence, and to whom nothing had fmce 
 been imputed, this gentleman, with about two fifths of the 
 houfe, was ftedfeftly oppofed to the plan. The fenate were 
 unanimous. But what again is the fenate ? It is a feleft body 
 of men of .enlarged minds, and unblemilhed characters, hav¬ 
 ing no intereft whatever diltindt from yours, bearing with you 
 a full proportion of burthens, and out of the fenate-houfe at 
 ■their own homes, to all intents and purpofes, compofing a 
 part of the people. If thefe fifteen men can harbour a defign 
 of erecting an arbitrary power on the ruins of'the conftitution, 
 of enjoving their dignities for life, and bequeathing them to 
 their iffue, they have conceived ideas of which I did not think 
 the brain of man fufceptible. Suppofe the lalt convention had 
 conferred the whole legiflative authority on the fenate, ap¬ 
 pointed fifteen men fenators for life, and rendered the office 
 hereditary. Is it poffible fuch an odious eftablifhment could 
 have febfifted even unto this day. No fenator under the pre- 
 fent form can meditate an extenfion of his authority, and no 
 rational being, on a moment’s reflection, can retain his fufpi- 
 cions, unlels jealoufy qf your truftees be like the jealoufy of 
 love, excited without caufe, and fubfifting on idle fancies. If • 
 a fenator were really capable of fuch defigns, he would become 
 a much fitter object of derinon, than of any well grounded 
 apprehenfion. Happy will it be for you, my countrymen, if 
 -that conftitution which perhaps owes its exi lienee, and has 
 
( i3 ) 
 
 Hone honour to, men, who no longer view it with a parent's 
 eye, /hall withftand this powerful attack. Oh! liften to. 1 a 
 man who defies' the tongue of envy and detraftion to fix one 
 improper motive for this addrefs, who has long been a-faithful 
 guardian to. that conftitution, and feels for it more than a .fa¬ 
 ther’s love. Be allured, if it muff receive a deadly wound, 
 the fatal blow willbe dealt by yourfelves, or your immediate 
 reprefentatives. Far from me be the wifh of narrowing the 
 powers of the popular branch of the legiflature. The defeft 
 of human policy, arifing from human nature, is fuch, that in 
 inftituting the frame of a government,, it is impoffible to 
 guard againft dangers on one fide, without being expofed on 
 another. Were every thing fubmitted to my difcretion, I de¬ 
 clare folemnly I would not abridge the eftablifhed power of 
 your delegates. My only wifh and aim is to.protect that facred 
 palladium of your rights, which you have fworn to defend, 
 againft all open and fecret combinations. Permit not either 
 branch, by any method, to exercife _tbe office of both. The 
 very ufe and intent of one is to check any unadvifed hafty pro¬ 
 ceedings,' or intemperate fallies of the other more numerous 
 afiembly. Think not, that a prediction for the former has 
 blinded my underftanding.' I further declare, that if it were 
 left to me to abolifh one or the other, I would by all means 
 preferve the houfe of delegates. There is nothing ‘more hate¬ 
 ful to my foul than the idea of a proud, worthlefs, tyrannical 
 order of nobility, like the fenate of Venice, But, although 
 this government may hereafter poffibly degenerate into an ar~ ; 
 bitrary one, there is no reafon to dread, that 1 it will become an 
 ariftocracy erefted by the fenate. r , , 
 
 If it be the meaning ©f the fourth article, that the peo¬ 
 ple lhall aft as an umpire, wherefore is it, that, in every in- 
 fhnce of a diflent the bill is not laid before them ? To this 
 may be faid, they are called upon only with refpeft to bills- 
 of the daft importance. The conftitution however creates- 
 no diftinftion. The conftitution contains no provifion in any 
 cafe. . . ■ 
 
 An idea has bpen ftarted, that both branches are to be con- 
 ftdered as agents of the people, and the conftitution a letter 
 of inftruftions; that as i t was impoffible for the principal t» 
 forefee the neceffity of an emiffion at this time,, he may now 
 give additional inftruftions. There is a difpoftpon in'mankind; 
 to be impofed on by fimilitudes. They captivate the imagina¬ 
 tion, and are much better received than folid argument. ,Be- 
 hold another Jimilitude.-^- 
 
 There 
 
( H ) 
 
 There are fifty perfons, the far greater part having no know¬ 
 ledge or experience in trade, who agree to join (lock, and 
 commence merchants. In a little time they find it extremely 
 incoiwenient for fo large a company to tranfacl their own af¬ 
 fairs. They enter -into articles to be binding until at two ie- 
 veral meetings of the company a majority {hail vote for diiiolv- 
 ing the partnerlhip. By the principal claufe in the indenture, 
 the bufmefs for a limited time is committed to the manage¬ 
 ment of only two, without any provifo, that if thefe two 
 fhouid differ refpedfing a propolition made by either, the matter 
 fhall be referred to the company. One of them, a fine, bold, 
 enterprizing fpirit, fcorning the ordinary profits of a flow pro- 
 greflive trade, and delighting only in capital ftrokes, propofes 
 to embark a confiderable part of the {lock in a venture to Chi¬ 
 na. His object is to import rice for (applying the want of 
 Indian corn, the apprehenfion of a fiiort crop having fuggeflcd 
 the thought. The other merchant, a cautious, calculating 
 man, confiders it as a mere chimera. The firft tiiei.mpon 
 calls a meeting of the company, produces his calculations, 
 difplays his brilliant profpetls, and actually brings over a ma¬ 
 jority. His aflfociate continues fixed. His judgment is not 
 convinced, and he adheres to his opinion. Should the law 
 authorife the majority,. notwithflanJing their agreement, to 
 difplace their agents, and Ihould they take the management 
 into their own hands, they are again in the fituation which 
 induced them to choofe managers. Again they perceive the 
 neceffity of appointing; and it is not improbable, that they 
 will truft the whole concern to him who has imprelled an high 
 opinion of his talents. 
 
 The meaning of this allegory is to guard you againfl: fophif- 
 
 try. 
 
 Let us trace the confequenees of the doclrine, that, not- 
 with(lauding the exprefs provifions of the conflitution, the 
 people, without violating or fufpending, may control a dele¬ 
 gated power. If it be good with regard to the legiflature, it mull 
 likewife be good with refpect to the executive and judiciary. 
 
 A citizen levies conftrudtive war againfl the (late. He is 
 thereon indicted in the general court, arraigned, takes his trial, 
 and is found guilty by the unanimous fuffrage of twelve men, 
 the petit jury. This man is a favourite of the people. His 
 friends make ftrenuous exertions, and a great majority of the 
 people are induced to ftgn a declaration of their will, and an 
 order, that he be difeharged. There is no doubt the prifoner 
 will efcape punilhmsnt, provided the people {Kail enforce their 
 mandate. 
 
( *5 ) 
 
 mandate. But will any man pretend, that it authorifes the 
 judje legally and conftitutionaily to pronounce the difcharge ? 
 And yet”the court may be considered the agent of the people, 
 deriving authority like every other department of government, 
 immediately or ultimately from the people. 
 
 Suppofe now the addrefs to fucceed, and in ten counties a 
 greater number to have figned the inftru&ions for an emiflion, 
 than have either figned againft it, or declined figning at all *, 
 The fenate taking the conftitution for their guide, and' finding 
 it no where exprefied, that in any cafe they fliall be bound to 
 oafs laws againft their own opinion, ftill viewing the fyirem 
 as injurious to our affairs, efteeming it their inviolable duty to 
 prefe-ve the conftitution unimpaired, and thinking too, that 
 the free unbiaffed opinion has not been obtained, will moll 
 probably continue firm in rejecting the bill. The houfe of 
 delegates will then moft probably decline for a feafon all further 
 intercourfe. The people then, or a part of them in behalf of 
 the reft, miftaking the firmnefs of virtue for an obftinate con¬ 
 tempt of their rights, will perhaps repair to the capital,, and in 
 thunder pronounce their wiil. If then the fenate, ftill holding 
 themfelves bound by fuperior obligations, and manifefting a 
 zeal for their country’s permanent happinefs, fliall difdain to 
 afi'ent to that which their judgments difapprove, and thereby 
 eftabliih a precedent, leaving to their fucceflors little more than 
 a name, and (hall either inftantly adjourn, or relinquiih their 
 feats, this pofture of affairs will, in all human probability, be 
 construed a difl'olution of government. Immediately may en- 
 fue fcenes, the bare contemplation of which muft touch the 
 ftouteft heart, not inte'refted to produce them. But palling 
 over thefe fcenes of difeord, riot, violence, and perhaps blood- 
 llied, let us calmly confider what beft can poffibly happen. 
 On a refignation of the fenate, provided fuch a meafure would 
 not be conftrued void on the principle of dureile, there can be 
 no fenate under the prefent form until the year 1791. In fuch a 
 cafe the houfe of delegates may do one of two things. They 
 may proceed, on the pretext of neeeflity, to exercife alone the 
 powers of legiflation, or they may addrefs their conftituents 
 
 '* It furely will not he maintained ., that any writing can be 
 jitfily Jlykd the declaration of a county’s fenje, unlefs more than 
 one half of the voters , or of the freemen , jhall have figned it. 
 Jf it can , where fall the line be drawn P Or what prevents a 
 paper figned by a dozen , when there is no' counter paper , from 
 
& eleS a convention. The latter being more fafe and decent, 
 will probably be adopted.' Alas, my beloved countrymen, we- 
 fhall be fortunate indeed, if the convention will recognife the 
 prefent conftitution, reforming only a few errors and abufes, 
 and rendering it from this convulfion more liable than before, 
 or if a new conftitution from its afhes fhall arife fuperior to 
 the prefent 1 The members of a convention will be compofed 
 principally of the prefent delegates, irritated and inflamed as 
 they are againft the fenate. 
 
 ■:. You will be told, that this is an attempt, by alarming your 
 fears, to intimidate you from doing that which is right. To 
 hhn who-attentively, and with a proper frame of mind, confi- 
 ders the condufj and addrefs of your delegates, the meflages 
 of the fenate and the aforegoing remarks, the condition of our 
 affairs will appear critical and alarming. If I know my own 
 heart, although I were thoroughly convinced, that bills of cre¬ 
 dit would produce the proniifed effects, I would ftedfaftly fet 
 my face againft this- mode of effecting the plan. Nothing 
 ffiort of a conviction, that on the fcheme depended your fafety 
 and happinefs, would reconcile me to the idea. At the fame 
 time were I certain that the people^ left to themfelves, would 
 feehthe want of an enuffion*-and without it could not be con¬ 
 tent, I: would renounce my opinion, and reprobate the man 
 who could-hold out againft the free voice of the people, his 
 callers.' - ' - ' ' : 
 
 cdWheni confider, - that independent.of impelling the people/ 
 like a blind machine, to break down the fixed barriers of the, 
 conftitution, the fcheme for an emifiion is pregnant with a, 
 thouiand ills, I regret the poor extent of my powers. I wifh 
 for immediate infpiration. When indeed alone, and in my. 
 ftudy, I contemplate on all thefe things, my whole frame be¬ 
 comes agitated and convulfed. I feel as it were the rcfiftlefs 
 Hnpnlfe of an invifible agent. 
 
 I PROCEED now to offer feme remarks on the nature of 
 the plan.-After the meflages of the fenate, and. another re¬ 
 
 cent publication, it is perhaps unnecefiiiry to advance any thing 
 further on bills of credit. There are however fome things- 
 which either efcaped that honourable body,'and the ingenious' 
 Commentator on that great and good man Mr. Necker, or did 
 notftrike them fo forcibly as they do ms. The conduft of the- 
 advocates for an emifiion, in the nrft inftance, affords a pre- 
 
( *7 ) 
 
 fumption that the paper will depreciate. Not a man who fub- 
 fcribes inftruffions, at the fame time obliges'himfelfto receive 
 it as fpecie. If he did, I would then remind him of the red 
 money, founded on real public property to an amount far fupe- 
 rior to the fum emitted, on private fubfcriptions, to four times 
 that’ amount, on a considerable tax payable in the bills, on the 
 folemri affociation of a great part of the people, and on their 
 authority exercifed in the appointment of committees. It came 
 out too at a time when the extreme fcarcity of a medium was 
 univerfally acknowledged. It is fuppofed, that the critical pe¬ 
 riod of that emiifion conftitutes a material difference between 
 the red money and the emiffion now propofed. With refpect to 
 the doubtful ifl'ue of the war, you well remember, that red mo¬ 
 ney funds, every particle of your property, your liberty, and 
 perhaps your lives, depended on the fame event. The red mo¬ 
 ney was, befides, the only immediate refource left to this ftate 
 for feeding the army. 
 
 The hiftory of this money might convince you, that the fea- 
 fon for bills of credit is paft. There was a time, when, in all 
 refpefts, they were equal to caffi. But we ought rather to be 
 furprifed at the circumftahce, than from it to expeft they will 
 be fo again. 
 
 Confider, Ibefeechyou, the true nature of bills of credit. 
 They are promiflory notes, for fums of money payable at a 
 diftant day. What then fhall give them value equal to fo ma¬ 
 ny fums of ready money ? A kind of popular illufion, an opini¬ 
 on univerfally, or very generally, prevailing, that they will 
 anfwer all the purpofes of fpecie, will give them this value as 
 ’ effectually as if there were a fum of money depofited in places 
 convenient to every perfon for exchanging on demand. Under 
 fuch an opinion, no man would hefitate to take them from 
 another. - 
 
 This opinion, having exiftcd before the war, was unfortu¬ 
 nately loft'by the continental bills. Every attempt to reftore 
 it has mifcarried. I will not fay, that no man poflefles a faith 
 in bills of credit; but I remark, that a very great part of the 
 people do not. There exifts not then this popular illufion, or 
 opinion. It is indeed extraordinary to contend that it does, 
 when fo many reprobate the very name of paper money. 
 
 Opinion is the fupport of almoft every fpecies of legal au¬ 
 thority. When the people in a county believe, that the IherifF 
 has power to do every aft enjoined, this belief confers the 
 power in reality.' When they want this belief, he is no more 
 than a common man. In like manner, bills of credit not be-] 
 C ing 
 
( i8 ) 
 
 iag from their nature ready cafh, if the people do not think 
 "them fo, there is nothing which can make them fo. 
 
 The loudeft clamours for an emiffion afford no proof of the 
 opinion’s exifknce. That clamour may be- raifed, becaufe 
 men conceive that an emiffion would diminifh 'the tax; be¬ 
 caufe debtors may entertain the idea either of difcharging their 
 debts with facility, or of flaying the importunity of their cre¬ 
 ditors ; becaufe die more paper is fcattered abroad, the better 
 chance have public debtors of every kind; becaufe there are 
 abundant fubjedts of fpeculation, which render it profitable to 
 barrow paper at par, and exchange it at difcount; ,becaufe 
 ; thoughdefs improvident men are ever prone to prefer prefent 
 eafe to die greateft diftant good. 
 
 The fticklers for paper appeal to the recent experience of 
 lifter ftates.. A perfon from Philadelphia has lately affured 
 die inhabitants of this city, that in Philadelphia he generally 
 agrees to take half cafh, half paper, and contrives pretty well 
 to get rid of the paper. The ftipulation of half and half de- 
 rmonftrates a difference, which indeed the houfe of delegates 
 difcovered to be ten per cent. I flatter myfelf I (hall explain 
 why it maintains fo high a value, without anfwering the pur¬ 
 pose of its emiffion. 
 
 In Pennfylvania the fum emitted is moderate. It is receiv¬ 
 able by the public in fo many ways, that there is a continual 
 demand, and numerous competitors. It changes from its ori¬ 
 ginal nature of promiffory notes, becomes an article of, mer- 
 chandife, and its value depends on principles fimilar to thofe 
 of merchandife in general. Attend to every circumftance. It 
 is the do&ine of feme men who pretend to reafon on princi¬ 
 ple, that if there be a demand, or feveral demands, exceeding 
 the amount of an emiffion, the value of the paper mult be 
 equal to that of fpecie, and a dollar of the- one will be no bet¬ 
 ter than a dollar of the other. Here is plain proof to the con¬ 
 trary, and unerring principle might have convinced them 
 without the experiment. 
 
 So long as paper will not anfwer every purpofe of fpecie, fo 
 long will a fiiver dollar be worth more than a paper dollar, 
 redeemable at a diftant day. In Pennfylvania, paper can pay 
 alt taxes and duties. A man owes taxes, and has nothing but 
 fpecie; there is no inducement for him to exchange it, unlefs 
 for fo doing he be allowed a premium. As, however, there 
 are numbers in the fame fituation, he cannot make his own 
 term=. Hence it is, that he is obliged to give £. 90 in coin 
 for £. ioc in paper. At this price have the . demands fixed 
 -• the 
 
( *9 ) 
 
 the paper. There is a general demand, calling for a greater 
 fum than is in the hands of the people; and, belides this, there 
 are feveral other demands. Superadded to this confideration, 
 almoft the whole of each demand centers in Philadelphia, and 
 very little of the paper finds its way out of the city. Advert 
 now to the main reafon alfigned for ilTuing paper.—It is to 
 increafe, throughout the ftate, the circulating medium. No 
 man in Philadelphia pretends to aflert, that the circulating me¬ 
 dium is at all increafed by the emiffion of the bills'of credit,' 
 or promiflory notes. The paper only conftitutes an additional 
 article of merchandife, which indeed Is fometimes bartered for 
 other commodities.' Shopkeepers advertife, they will take paper 
 as fpecie for their commodities. This they may well do, [for . 
 the fake of a more rapid fale, arid from having imperceptibly ; 
 raifed their prices. They know the amount of the emiffion, l' 
 of the taxes, and of the duties; and the demand created by .] 
 the ufes, cannot fail to enable them to difpofe of their paper 1 
 at a difcount, for which their amends are ample. 
 
 Now for tiie operation and effect.—The people can pay. any 
 given tax with greater facility; but then this tax being fo 
 much the lefs produftive, there is a neceffity for fupplying the 
 defect by additional taxes. The people in general therefore 
 are not benefited by the facility, arid thofe obliged to pay fpe¬ 
 cie, are more burthened than the reft. The benefit is con¬ 
 fined to a clafs, for whofe benefit the governtrient was under 
 no obligation to devife fyftems and plans. - ' , 
 
 I have that fkill in paper (and I pretend to no more than is 
 pofleffed by a thoufand others) that, let we know the amount, 
 funds, period of redemption, ufes and demands, and, from 
 fure principles, I can calculate, pretty nearly the value at which / 
 it will be at different ftages. If the fum, not very large, be .1 
 redeemable within ten years, without having created ufes and ■ 
 demands, I then calculate the value of a note of hand, paya¬ 
 ble at the end of ten years, without intereft. Suppofe the ufe 
 of money for one year to be worth twelve percent, and no 
 doubts entertained of the redemption , £. 100 will.be then worth, 
 about/. 45. 
 
 If there be any immediate ufes, the value then depends on 
 'them. The period of redemption, and the funds, are out of 
 the queftion. They become ftrictly an article of merchandife. 
 Are matters on fuch. a footing, that the.'holders.of the paper 
 'fhall feek purchafers, or thofe wanting paper fliall feelc fellers? 
 On this queftion much depends. In Philadelphia the holders ■ 
 advertife, and the ufes immediately bring them purchafers. 
 
 Let 
 
( 2 ° ) 
 
 Let us examine the plan of our delegates .—£. 250,000 to 
 be emitted on loan, and, as I apprehend, £ 100,000 to be 
 laid out in purchafes of one kind or another. 
 
 I take it as a fettled point, I reafon not with the man who 
 denies it, that, in this ftate at Icaji , opinion does not place 
 paper on a footing with fpecie. The values at which the 
 emiinons of 1780 have been held fince the peace are notori¬ 
 ous, and yet many times the amount are receivable by the 
 . treafurer as fpecie. . The value of the projected paper muft 
 depend on the funds, and a confidence that it will be redeemed, 
 or on immediate ufes. I have fully explained the firft princi¬ 
 ple. There remains fomething to be faid on the fecond. It 
 is not fufficient that a demand call for the whole of an article— 
 the demand muft be general. If one perfon only wants the 
 article, and the quantity he wants exceeds the whole quantity 
 in the ftate, which is in the hands of one hundred perfons, it 
 is evident that he has them at his mercy. If only one perfon 
 has an article, wanted by one hundred, the quantity, provided 
 it be not very great, is not of much moment. He has them 
 at his mercy, until they are fully fupplied, and then his com¬ 
 modity becomes a drug. But if there be many buyers and 
 many fellers, and the former have more than is wanted by the 
 latter, it is a drug in the beginning. 
 
 For the propofed paper of Maryland there is propofed only 
 one general demand, and that is to be created by taxes of the 
 prefent year. Suppofe their amount £. 150,000, (which by 
 the bye is much greater than can or ought to be laid) this de¬ 
 mand will not place the holders of paper in the eligible fixa¬ 
 tion of being fought by the purchasers. The demand, owing 
 to duties is fmall, and confined to the men heft acquainted 
 with the myftcry of buying and felling. Arrears of taxes in¬ 
 deed, amount pretty high ; but a great part is due from col¬ 
 lectors, and the refidue is by no means apportioned amongft 
 the people. It is chiefly due by men of large unproductive 
 eftates. With refpect to arrearages, if paper be equal to fpe¬ 
 cie, they will remain due after an emiffion, except only from 
 thofe who fhall borrow. Thefe, from the nature of the plan, 
 muft be few. In ftiort, the arrears will conflitute only a par¬ 
 ticular demand, and this will be very fmall, until a depreciation 
 fhall enfue. 
 
 Upon the whole, therefore, I do not fay, that I apprehend 
 a very confiderable appreciation. I aflert pofitiveiy, that the pa¬ 
 per, in the courfe of fix months after an emiflion, would depre¬ 
 ciate mere than thirty-three and one third per cent, and, were 
 my 
 
( 21 ) 
 
 my life depending on the truth of my prediction, I fhould feel 
 no mo e concern than if it depended on the old Chefapeake’s 
 keeping :n its channel. 
 
 It was repor.ed during the feffion, that the paper at New- 
 York was ever, by brokers exchanged at two and a half. That 
 brokers could ma ;e an advantage demonstrates, that fufpicions 
 were entertained, or, in a place abounding with cafh, there 
 could be no neceffity for applying to them. I have heard the 
 following account of that cmifiion : That parties having, run 
 high, there was a kind of compromife. In conlideration of 
 the emiffion’s not exceeding a certain fum, the enemies of the 
 fcheir.e agreed to give it fupport; and attempts to depreciate 
 it were deemed infamous. The premium to brokers was 
 deemed allowable, as a reafonable fatisfaefion for their trouble. 
 I again go hack to the hiftory of red money. For a fhort 
 feafon that r.lfo was even here faid to pafs as fpecie; that is, 
 in the few payments and purchafes made with it in the begin¬ 
 ning, there was no aciual difeount. But, fo foon as without 
 inf.unv a man might diftinguifli, you may remember how ra¬ 
 pid the d epreciation. Attend to that emiffion on another ac¬ 
 count.—It was made receivable at par for all taxes. Wheat 
 and tobacco was alfo receivable, the former at feven and fix- 
 pence, when tine a Huai value was about five {hillings. This 
 meafure foon fixed the value of red money at two for one, 
 when, according to the aforefaid principle of the paper advo¬ 
 cates, a dollar of it ought to have been worth five {hillings. 
 If men will not liften to experience, nor determine upon plain 
 evident principles, it is an error to call them rational animals. 
 With refpect however to the emiffion of New-York, the ex¬ 
 periment is not complete. We know not its exa£l circum- 
 jla.nces. Too little time has elapfed, to have the value afeer- 
 tained as at Philadelphia, on certain folid grounds. I am well 
 allured, that at the lad place the idea of bills of credit ferving 
 for a circulating medium, or anfwering any valuable purpofes, 
 is relinquilhed by its warmed friends. And thus, before our 
 emiffion could take place, will it be alfo at New-York. Why 
 do they not fpeak of the Rhode-Ifland and the Carolina paper ? 
 
 I fnall make no apology for the liberty I {hail take with the 
 delegates addrefs. We well know, that the meafures of pub¬ 
 lic bodies are not the refult of every individual’s wifdom, unit¬ 
 ing in one mind. On genuine republican principles, the ad¬ 
 drefs prefents an invitation to a general difeuffion; and this is 
 no time to refpeef perfons, or even bodies. Should they view 
 it in a different light, and’ refent this, or a fimilar attempt, I 
 would 
 
{ 22 ) 
 
 would fey, It is that body which a£is in die true fpirit of a 
 eorrupt ariftocracy. 
 
 In their addrefe there are principles either mifapplied, or ex¬ 
 plained.lb as to contradict felf-evideht pofitions. Say they, 
 “ in every ftate there ought to be as much circulating money 
 K as will reprefent all the property bought and fold for calh; 
 “ and the current money of every country ought always to be 
 “ in proportion to its trade, induftry, confumption, alienation 
 .* and taxes.” Do they mean by “reprefent” purchafe ? And 
 do (hey mean the property and labour actually fold at the fame 
 inftant, or in the courfe of a year ? Do they mean, that if 
 the'property and labour fold annually in the ftate, be worth 
 j,boo,poo of money, that there ought to be that million in 
 the ftate? If they mean the laft, they are certainly mifta- 
 ken; becaufe tile feme fum, in the courfe of a year, may per¬ 
 form a great variety of offices. 
 
 [ Were the ftate.of Maryland feparated from, and inacceffible 
 to, the reft of the world,*' i,ooolb. of gold, and 20,ooolb. of 
 "Slyer, would reprefent the property and labour bought and fold, 
 and bear a proportion to the enumerated articles, as fully as if 
 thefe quantities were trebled, fo as to produce nearly that 
 "quantity of money which the delegates think necefiary to the 
 ftate, connected with, and acceffible as it is, to the inhabitants 
 of other countries. If in the fuppofed reparation, the prefence 
 "of i,ooolb. of gold, and 20,ooolb. o’f filver, would caufe a bufhel 
 of wheat to be fold for two fhillings and fix-pence, or about 
 6dwt. of filver, the augmentation of them to thrice the quan¬ 
 tity would, in the end, occafion a bufhel of wheat to be fold 
 for feven fhillings and fix-pence, pr about i8dwt. of filver, 
 provided there were no change in the quantity or demand. So 
 that the quantity of fpecie would not be material. 
 
 But as Maryland is connected with, and acceffible to, the 
 inhabitants of other countries, there will, without the intro- 
 du&ion of paper, be always as much money as will do the 
 offices mentioned in tile addrefs. The influx and reflux. of 
 . fpecie depends on as fore principles as the flowing and ebbing 
 of the fca. 
 
 In every independent country, not having mines, or receiv¬ 
 ing tribute, the quantity of money depends on the balance of 
 trade. If her export of merchandife exceed her import, the 
 balance is brought in coin. And this will be done until the 
 
 * Thefe two quantities are worth about £. 180,000 current 
 
 quantity 
 
( 2 3 ) 
 
 quantity of cafh, by degrees, raifing the prices of her com¬ 
 modities, it no longer fuits her 'merchants to fend thefe com¬ 
 modities to other countries for the purpofe of importing for 
 them other commodities'. They then remit coin. . ■ The fii'r- 
 plus commodities now lying on hand, and the quantity of cafli 
 being leflened by thefe remittances, they again fall to that price 
 which will enable merchants to export them on better’ terms 
 thanfpecie. Again the hard metals flow into the country; 
 and again their reflux is infallibly brought about.* 
 
 On this principle, when coin is fent out becaufe the prices of 
 commodities will not allow an export, notwithftanding they 
 abound as much as ul’ual, the quantity in other countries not 
 being increafed, and the demand there continuing as it was, 
 there is a prefumption that the ftate has more than its proper fhare 
 of fpecie. But if all the furplus commodities be exported, and 
 they are infufficient to pay for the merchandife brought in their 
 Head, the balance muft be, remitted in coin, or remain a debt 
 to a foreign country. The latter was precifely our cafe before 
 the war. We imported from Great-Britain more than our to¬ 
 bacco, and fometimes wheat, and the little foreign trade allow¬ 
 ed us, would pay for. Hence arofe the “ old diflrefling” debt 
 to Britifh fubjecis. The commerce of this country was ma¬ 
 naged principally by their fadtors. Thefe did not make ample 
 remittances. For a great part of their goods they took bonds; 
 and without the revolution, the refult muft have been the veil¬ 
 ing a great part of our real property in Britifh merchants. 
 
 The fituation of America during, her vaffallage, and indeed 
 of moft dependent colonies, is different from that of indepen- 
 
 * This is a complicated fubjeft, and requires fuller explana¬ 
 tion. Confufed.writers have perplexed themfelves, and rendered 
 it unintelligible to their readers. My pofltion is not that prices 
 are coriftantly proportioned to the quantity- of circulating coin , 
 and that a fudden influx of coin would inftantly raife prices, or e 
 fudden export occafion an immediate fall. I mean , that a con- 
 flderable and permanent augmentation, or a conflderable diminu¬ 
 tion , and none-brought in its room , will, in a moderate fpace of 
 time, produce a rife or fall of thofe commodities which are in 
 conflant and general demand, allowing for accidental plenty or 
 fcarcity. Particular articles may rife even on a diminution of 
 "coin, or fall on an augmentation , the demand for thefe depending 
 on fajhion, whim or fancy. To a clear head, the whole doftrine 
 of demand is eafily unfolded, and I hope my principle is‘now fully 
 comprehended. 
 
‘ J 
 
 ( 24 ) 
 
 dent nations. This country was, in a manner, inacceffible to 
 afi'hut one people. The principle, that in every country'ihere 
 tw//~be"as much circulating cafli as will represent the labour 
 and property fold, &c. is meant only For an independent coun¬ 
 try. Not having perufe.d all the books on this fubject, I am not 
 cbrfiih " that feme of my ideas are not entirely new. They ought 
 not furely, on that account to be deemedlefs juft; and I .hope, 
 thatmy labours, will throw a ray of light on a fubject hereto¬ 
 fore deemed obfeure and impenetrable. 
 
 ' Wherefore bills of credit, bearing no intereft, and redeem¬ 
 able at a jar diftaht period, Ihould, in America alone, have 
 been on a footing with' folid coin, has never yet been fuffici- 
 
 bntly explained. 
 
 Under the circumftances of America before the war, the 
 pnees of her commodities were much higher than might have 
 b£en expefted from the quantity of her circulating calh. Thefe 
 prices were adjufted on the principle of affording a reafonable 
 profit to the merchant who purchafed the furplus for exporta¬ 
 tion. The fact was, there was a kind of barter between 
 America and her parent country, fo far as that furplus extend¬ 
 ed;' and a credit was given for the balance. Thefe colonies, 
 having no mines, and their trade nearly confined to Great- 
 Britain, it was impra&icable to obtain, the quantity of calh 
 required by their domeftic concerns, which would bear the due 
 proportion to the property and laboiir to be bought and fold, and 
 afford means of improving hew plantations. .Prices were re¬ 
 gulated to a great degree .by our intercotirfe with Great-Bri- 
 tain. Here then bras'the'true necefllty of falling on fome ex¬ 
 pedient “for-melting down folid property.” We could not in- 
 iftitute banks for want of coin. If they, had been inftituted, the 
 coin would have been drawn out by faftors to make remit¬ 
 tances, and the banks would have broken almoft as foon as in- 
 ffituted. Under thefe circumftances, with the addition that 
 ipeculation on government fecurities had never yet been thought 
 of, bills of credit, after a few bungling eflays, fucceeded to a 
 charm. Specie not being wanted for exportation, the factors 
 having regulated their operations on a different plan, and do¬ 
 meftic purpofes confHtuting almoft the entire ufe fpr a circu¬ 
 lating medium, the opinion of the people was eafily obtained; 
 and as no fufpicions of the public faith had been created by in¬ 
 fractions of public engagements, there was a mutual tacit con- 
 fent that the paper of each colony Ihould be received by its 
 neighbours. 
 
 We 
 
( 25 ) 
 
 We are now, from the lignal interpofition of Heaven, a free 
 independent people. We are on a footing with other nations, 
 and fpecie will find its level amongft us as with them. With,, 
 out going into the idle difquifition of the exact proportion of 
 circulating calh, fo as to preferve any given prices of the pro- 
 perty and labour bought and fold, I do confidently pronounce, 
 that without impolitic forcing meafures during peace, we fhall 
 find a * fufficient quantity for trade, confumption, alienation 
 and taxes. A bank on a folid rational foundation, has its ufes 
 as well as inconveniencies. But as the queftion is not con¬ 
 cerning a bank, I proceed not on that fruitful, perplexing, en¬ 
 tertaining fubjeft. 
 
 If there be a man incapable of perceiving the, difference be¬ 
 tween a time when opinion was in favour of bills, and times 
 of a general,.diftruft; between times of vaffallage, with a fevere 
 reftriction of our trade, and a period when we have taken our 
 juft ftat'.on, and our commerce courted by the world; between 
 the infancy and ripe age f of a country—if he cannot make 
 thefe plain diftindions, I could almoft fay,. that a falfe pride, 
 
 ■ a defed of underftanding, the didates of intereft, or an over¬ 
 bearing private influence, has induced him obftinately to 
 maintain opinions condemned by a vaft majority of the bell: 
 
 ’ characters J in the union. 
 
 The addrefs ftates the amount of fpecie before the war at 
 about f. 200,000, and that if even this fum be now circu¬ 
 lating amongft us, fifteen millions of property can pay only 
 £. 200,000. To the man who confiders the efficacy of a brifk 
 circulation, and the energy of a faithful adminiftration of juf- 
 tice, this ftatenient appears extraordinary indeed. In France 
 one third of their ninety millions fterling of cafh, is paid an¬ 
 nually for taxes and duties; but the amount of fums paid from 
 one to another, in the courfe of a year, amongft twenty-odd 
 
 * Extravagant imports mujl indeed diminijh for a time the 
 circulating coin ; but as thefe cannot be kept tip, the evil foon 
 regulates itfelf. ' 
 
 f A country cannot be called young, when thp-e are daily emi¬ 
 grations, which 'would perhaps be facilitated by an unufual abun¬ 
 dance of cajh. 
 
 % It is remarkable, that the faviour of his country has never 
 yet been quoted on this fubjeft. Although upon his refignation he 
 was determined to keep aloof from public affairs, he has lately 
 interpofed, with fuccefs, again/I an attempt to emit paper in his 
 native Jlate; 
 
 D millions' 
 
( 26 ) 
 
 millions of fouls, is not. to be reckoned. When £. 200,000 
 •are paid for debts to-day, what prevents it from being paid for 
 other debts to-morrow? It is not annihilated by the nrft pay¬ 
 ment. It is not like a foldier’s ration, which, if it does its 
 office to-day, is for ever gone, and another ration mull be 
 provided for to-morrow. Let juftice take its courfe, or fall 
 upon fome rational expedient for fatisfying both creditor and 
 debtor. Let us on every occaiion refpecl die public faith, and, 
 •without purfuing any other extraordinary meafures, you would 
 find, that in the courfe of one year £. 100,000 might pay debts 
 to the amount .of more than a million. 
 
 The paper is, it feems, devifed as a medium of taxes, and 
 government is to fiirnifh you with fomething, wherewithal to 
 pay itfelf. There is a novelty in the idea of a creditor’s en¬ 
 abling the 'debtor by a new loan to pay his debt, and of a 
 right medium of taxes diftinc! from a medium of commerce 
 or exchange. It may be prudent for a creditor fometimes to 
 venture a little further, in order that by aiding his/debtor to 
 execute a well laid fcheme, he may fecure his whole debt. 
 There is nothing like this promifed by the bill, and the reverfe 
 would moft probably take place. “ But the people, at prefent 
 unable to pay fcarcely anything, will be put into a condition to 
 pay a tax of thirty fhillings in the hundred pounds.” No fuch 
 thing. It is clear, that the paper would not be lent from the 
 treasury to one man in a hundred. Of the firft £. 100,000, 
 11,000 is deftined to Baltimore county. No perfon can take 
 Iefs than /. 50, and fuppofe none to take more. The fifties 
 in 11,000 are only 220, and in that county there cannot be 
 fewer than 4400 men chargeable with the tax. On thefe fup- 
 ipofitions then, only one man in twenty can borrow from the 
 public. Suppofe no perfon to borrow lefs than £. 500, and 
 only one in zoo can be. a borrower. I think in the prefent 
 ftate of credit, few will borrow for the fake of adminiftering 
 to the neceffities of their neighbours. From all this, the plan 
 appears inadequate to the purpofe of furnilhing the people with 
 the means of difcharging the tax. 
 
 But it is laid, the medium being fupplied, the people may pro¬ 
 cure it with' their produce. Should the paper be really cafh, 
 the difficulty of procuring that, and of procuring fpecie, will 
 be equal. An' idea has been propagated, that fpecie has, all 
 at once, vanifhed from the land. That is impoffible; becaufe 
 there has been very little export of cafh fince the very late 
 period, when a man could - procure a reafonable quantity for 
 anything he had to fell. Take notice that I admit, , only for 
 
( 2 7 ) 
 
 the fake of argument, that merchantable commodities or pro- 
 vifions brought to any market in-the ftate, do not command 
 fpecfe at this moment. I admit freely, that the artificial fear- 
 city of : cafli, has lately and fuddenly increafed. The expec¬ 
 tation, or the probabdity, or even the mere poflibility, of an 
 emiffion, has determined moft men not. to part with a Angle 
 fhilling pf .cafh which they can confidently preferve. Each 
 expefts to receive no more, and therefore, if he can avoid it, 
 he will pay none. Let the paper fyftem be fairly abandoned. 
 Let the legiflature infpire a confidence, that contrails fliall be 
 enforced, and the true medium which improvident laws have 
 confined to private coffers, and perhaps reburied in the earth, 
 will again circulate, and do its office. 
 
 I have been always furprifed, when men of intelligence have 
 _ inferred the actual fcarcity of coin from the low prices of ne¬ 
 groes, ftock, &c. taken in execution. The demand for thefe 
 things is much lefs than it was before the war; and as the 
 quantity at market has increafed, it has followed from the in¬ 
 variable principles of demand, that the prices are greatly dinfi- 
 ffifhed. 'The abundant articles of a gainful fpeculation have 
 abforbed all the fpar'e cafh; and leffened the demand for thofe 
 things in which favings of money were formerly inverted. To 
 them too is owing that high premium for the ufe .of money, 
 which, after all, has been much oftener talked of than really given. 
 
 The fpirit of fpeculation, however, has occafioned another 
 conclufion equally falfe. From the avidity with which a fmall 
 clafs of men has purchafed up public fecurities, is inferred a 
 confidence in government. It is pleafant to infer this from a 
 man’s purchafing at four, fix, and eight for one, when it is 
 evident that he purchafes with a view of difpofmg of them in a 
 fhort time to advantage. His reliance on the public faith would 
 indeed be effectually proved, if he purchafed at par, or hoarded 
 them as folid coin. 
 
 The moft plaufible argument for an emiffion, is the oppor¬ 
 tunity offered, if we had cafh, of finking our fhare of the con¬ 
 tinental domeftic debt with far lefs than the fum due to credi¬ 
 tors. “ Final fettlements may be procured at fix or eight for 
 “ one. Should'they not be obtained with bills of credit, thefe 
 “ bills will neverthelefs procure flour and tobacco.' And as 
 “ fpecie is not in the ftate, thefe articles are to he fent out, and 
 “ the ftate becomes a merchant.” Let us examine freely this 
 whole procefs. 
 
 How long will it be before the paper can be ftruck and if- 
 fued ? How long after that before it can be returned by way of 
 
( 28 ) - 
 
 taxes ? How much time will be confumed in procuring tobac¬ 
 co (I will not afk the price) Hupping it, and bringing back 
 coin in its ftead ? Do you fuppofe that the ftate will trade to 
 advantage ? In whom {hall it confide ? The other ftates being 
 competitors, is it not probable the price of fecurities will be 
 advanced before this procefs can fumifh the calh ? I put thefe 
 queries to evince the fuperiority of the plan mentioned by the 
 fenate. To the plan, however, of an emiffion to be exchanged 
 immediately for fecurities at a reafonable rate, it has been 
 deemed fuffirient to object the benefit which would accrue to 
 ADVENTURERS. But it would feem, that the delegates 
 
 plan would not be lefs favourable to adventurers. They are ad¬ 
 venturers chiefly from whom fecurities can now be obtained. 
 The addrefs fays, that the propofed paper can depreciate only 
 a trifle, and intimates, that the fenate’s would depreciate to a 
 great degree. Surely, the more valuable the paper, exchanged 
 for fecurities at a given rate, the more benefit will be derived to 
 adventurers. I will not be underftood to advocate the fcheme 
 hinted at by the fenate. I difdain all fpecies of deception. I 
 reprobate all kinds of paper; and, if I can fuggelt a more eli¬ 
 gible mode of obtaining facilities, this laft argument in its fa¬ 
 vour mud fall to the ground. 
 
 The addrefs compliments you on your u folid property” and 
 afierts the difficulty of difcharging the tax to be owing more to 
 the want of a medium, than to your embarrafled circum- 
 ffances. " 
 
 We may account much better for the default in collections, 
 than from the inability of the people. Does the middling and 
 mod: valuable clafs of citizens complain of the tax ? Are they 
 incapable of paring ? Are they in arrears ? If they are, is the 
 fault imputable to them? Suppofe an induftrious planter pof- 
 felled of 300 acre's of tolerable land, 4 or 5 working hands, and 
 frock, &c. in proportion. This property is perhaps afiefied to 
 /. yoo. Suppofe the produce he raifes for fale to bring only 
 £. 140. A tax of 2o/’in the £. 100 requires /. 7, the twen¬ 
 tieth part of his income. The calculation is eafy and plain. 
 Confider now the cafe of the poor, in whofe favour we have 
 heard fuch moving declamation. To men of very minute ca¬ 
 pitals it makes fcarcely a palpable difference, whether taxes be 
 high or low, receivable in paper, or in coin only. But now 
 turn to men of overgrown property, with their thoufands of 
 acres, - and hundreds of Haves. On thefe taxation is heavy; 
 becaufe their annual incomes, in proportion, are fmall. But 
 Who is there that pities a- man for owing £. 100, when the 
 
( 29 ) 
 
 debt arifes merely from his pofleffing perhaps 15,000 r After 
 all this mighty buftle then for the - poor, the clamour is, in 
 truth, raifed for the rich. Thefe are the men who have fet the 
 pernicious example of with-holding the tax. Thefe are the men 
 who declaim againft heavy impofitions, the want of a medium, • 
 and the neceflity of poftponing colleftions. It is their pernici¬ 
 ous influence, which even without their intending it, may have 
 prevented men both able and well-inclined from paying their 
 public dues, and prevented money, after being paid, from 
 coming to the treafury. 
 
 That you may not fuppofe I affeft fuperior wifdom on all 
 “ political and conftitutional queftions,” I acknowledge that 
 the original hint of the plan I mean to propofe was borrowed 
 from a member of the legiflature. And that the whole of my 
 reafoning may be more candidly received, I further acknow¬ 
 ledge, that moft of my ideas are borrowed—not' indeed prin¬ 
 cipally from books. Thefe too often contain the wild dreams 
 of vifionary projectors, or of men attached to a fine fpun theo¬ 
 ry. I would be afhamed to quote any writer beyond the At¬ 
 lantic on a fubjecft relative to bills of credit; becaufe thofe wri¬ 
 ters can reafon only on fpeculation; and becaufe, in America, 
 we have experience to give every obferving man more real 
 knowledge than could poffibly have been poflefled by fiich a 
 man as Sir James Stewart. Not that I defpife his book.' It 
 is a repofitory of much ufeful knowledge ; and where he con¬ 
 fines himfelf- to fails or principles eftablifhed by. experience, his 
 work is extremely valuable. 1 take particular notice of this la¬ 
 borious writer, becaufe his volumes have been produced on 
 account of his authority. Neither he nor Ariftides, nor any 
 other man, Ihould have any influence to which his reafons ad¬ 
 duced do not entitle him. 
 
 It is well known, that in Europe almoft any fums may be 
 borrowed on ample fecurity. The intereft is from two arid-an 
 half to five per cent. Neither congrefs, nor any individual . 
 ftate, could perhaps borrow even £. 1,000 upon any terms, on 
 the faith of government generally pledged. But fuppofe the 
 paper fcheme entirely difcardedj and an act of aflembly im- 
 pofmg a tax of 6/3 in the £. too for ten years, for the foie and 
 exprefs purpofe of procuring a loan, and authority given to pro¬ 
 per perfons to negotiate it in Europe, the principal payable one 
 tenth annually, and an intereft in the mean time, not exceed¬ 
 ing eight per cent Such a fcheme has been tried by no ftate 
 in the union. I have no doubt that this high intereft, and this 
 abundant fecurity, would tempt monied men .in Europe to ad¬ 
 vance, 
 
( 3 ° ) 
 
 vance, and that, by this expedient, we might procure cafh far 
 more fpeedily than under the -paper fyftem. -*■ . 
 
 In Europe money is frequently irxvefted in public funds, for 
 the fake of fecurity, and for eftablifhing a fure annual income, 
 
 ■ -without trouble or diminution -of the capital. Some of the 
 perfens who thus lay out their money, have no thought, at the 
 time, of ever receiving back the principal; but they have it 
 in their power at any time to receive it by felling out. Such 
 is one great advantage that a well ordered government enjoys 
 by having infpired a confidence in the public. It is not pro¬ 
 bable at this period, that men could be found willing to lend us 
 onany reafonable terms, without a ftipulation of receiving the 
 principal at a fixed time, ^therefore propofe to.borrow. two 
 - hundred thoufand pounds for ten years'.'"A' tax of fix fhillings 
 and three-pence in the £. ico, on 11,000,000 of property, 
 gives the grofs fum of £. 34,375. Suppofe it fo produce, in 
 ten years, only enough to difcharge the equivalent of a tenth 
 of the principal annually, with the intereft accruing, until the 
 whole be paid, and the expence of the negotiation. On this 
 plan we borrow immediately £. 200,000; and that fum laid out 
 in continental fecurities would purchafe, at five for one, to the 
 amount of £. 1,000,000, which is considerably more than our 
 balance of the continental domeftic debt, at prefent bearing 
 intereft; It is incumbent on me to explain how the contract 
 is to be made. 
 
 Should we agree to pay aftually a tenth of the principal an¬ 
 nually, and the whole intereft due at the end of the year, our 
 payments would be made in the following manner; In the firft 
 year wefhould have-to pay £. 20,000 of the principal, with 
 the intereft on the whole, which at eight per cent, would be 
 £. i6,oco.—Total 36,000. In the fecond year £. 20,000 
 more of the principal, and the intereft on the remaining 
 £. 180,000, which would be £. 14,400—Total £. 34,400. 
 Let us Hate every payment.— 
 
 ift year £. 36,000 6th year £. 28,000 
 
 2d year 34,400 7th year 26,400 
 
 3d year 32,800 ■ 8th year 24,800 
 
 ith year 31,200 9th year 23,200 
 
 5th year 29,600 « 10th year 21,600 
 
 Total £.288,000 
 
 But as the plan would not raife enough for the firft years, I 
 would propofe, that the grofs fum of £.28,800, being a tenth 
 . of the amount, be paid at the end of every year, and then for 
 £. 200,000 
 
( 3! ) 
 
 £.200,000 immediately advanced,' the- lender would*- in ten- 
 year?, receive £. 288,000. ■ And befides, the-annual payments 
 might be immediately placed out" by him at intereftin-Europe. 
 He would irj i'ucb cafe have to receive am intereft for nine-years 
 on the firft payment, eight years on the. fecond, feven on the 
 third, and fo on to the ninth. Now calculate his whole gains, 
 fuppofing his annual receipts placed on-fimple intereft, at four 
 percent. <" - ■ V- . : - i;;:; 
 
 His intereft on the'firft ,£.28,800 for. nine years, Would 
 * - 10,080 
 
 On the 2d for 8 years 
 3d for 7 
 - - 4th for 6 
 . 5th for 5 
 6th for 4 
 ' 7th for 3 
 8th for 2 . 
 
 9th for 1 ' 
 
 8,960 
 7>840 
 -6,720 
 - -5,600 
 4,480 
 ; 3 , 3 6 ° 
 2,240 
 1,120 
 
 50,400 
 
 Add 288,000 
 
 Total, £. 338,400 
 
 Inftead of what the principal would have amounted 
 to, if laid out in Europe at a Ample intereft of 
 four per cent, .'' ’ 280,000 
 
 Clear gain, £. 58,400 
 And the clear gain, more than an • intereft of five 
 per cent, in Europe would be, is £. 38,400 
 
 Should we calculate on compound intereft, the difference 
 would not be fo great, - although ftill very confiderable. I have 
 made the above calculation to evince, that my -fcheme Would 
 probably fucceed. The ftipulation with the lender ought to 
 be, that he fhould fuftain ho lofs from tardy payments. 
 
 I befeech cool difpaffionate men to compare the feveral plans- 
 The propofer of the laft, fears not the imputation of finifter 
 views. It is propofed in fincerity, and relied on by the author. 
 It were eafy to demonftrate how deeply fome men may be 
 interefted in an emiffion. I forbear from refpeft. I deteft 
 perfonality. . The attempt to injure my reputation excites no 
 refentment. I pity the Have to malignant paffions. Were the 
 attack even fuch as to endanger my good name, recrimination 
 would at beft be a paltry mode of defence. 
 
 The 
 
( 32 ) 
 
 ..TheOperations under the loan would be this: It would, 
 entitle ,us to draw bills, which being fold in Philadelphia, 
 would' , bring ipecie to the fete; and the agents or com- 
 miflioners of the loan might make their annual payments by 
 tobacco. 
 
 Were the hint adopted, I might fugged: other things, in the 
 draught of the bill... It might perhaps pleafe the lenders to 
 have a power of appointing their own collectors, whofe re¬ 
 ceipts, produced by the people to our collectors, might be al¬ 
 lowed and charged to their principal. Amendments might 
 occur; but I am fatisfied the outline deferves well the atten¬ 
 tion of the Iegiflature. It is a fcheme to deliver this date of 
 ■an annual burthen of £■ 60,000, at the expence of a 6/3 tax, 
 for only ten years, and this without producing difienfions 
 -among the people, or violating public faith. 
 
 .To men of felftfli contracted minds, who meafure not on 
 the large fcale of-general good, the profit to be gained by an 
 emiffion on loan, may be very alluring. The tranflator of Mr. 
 .Necker on bank-notes, has demondrated, that the gain never 
 . could be made. Suppofe it fhould; the burthen of contribut¬ 
 ing fo much to the public revenue mud fall heavily fomewhere. 
 -It would to all intents and purpofes be a tax, and a very un¬ 
 equal one. If an equal moderate tax cannot be paid, it will re¬ 
 quire fomething more than found to prove, that an unequal ont, 
 without iofs or deduction, will come into , the treafury. The 
 feel is, that public debtors .already conditute. a numerous and 
 . powerftil body; and it cannot be good policy to augment it. 
 Thefe debtors have either had value from the public, or efcaped 
 burthens borne by the red. Their debts are jud, and ought 
 . to be-paid. By increafing their number, is there no caufe to 
 apprehend a pernicious combination? Should the thought here¬ 
 after, fugged itfelf, that the bed dep for a public debtor is to 
 procure a feat in the great public councils, you will run the 
 hazard either of having your burthens greatly increafed, or' 
 of a public bankruptcy, the ruin of your creditors, con¬ 
 vulsions in tiie fete, and ultimately the dedruCtion of your 
 -freedom. 
 
 I proceed to a more invidious dangerous talk. Do thou 
 facred love of truth aflid and bear me up! It is by plain fun- 
 pie calculation to demondrate the mifekes in the delegates ad- 
 drels.- It has mifeted your refources, and exaggerated your 
 .embarraffinentSi Its errors are amazing, and the following 
 mfenees fltali edablilh .my charge: 
 
 The' 
 
( 33 ') 
 
 The debts due' from individuals to Great-Britain before 
 the war, are eftimated by them (the grounds I know not) 
 at £. 600,000 ' 0 0 fterling. 
 
 And the debt contracted in the four 
 years of peace 400,000 0 0 
 
 £. 1,000,000 0 0 fterling. 
 How can this debt arife, except from a wrong balance of 
 trade ? Examine their eftimate. 
 
 They ftate your exports at 538,333 6 8 currency. 
 
 Your imports at 600,000 0 o 
 
 Difference £.61,666 13 4 currency. 
 
 Now. fuppofe 'the whole imports to be from Great-Britain, 
 and the' whole exports to it (as nothing is faid of any other 
 part) this annual difference in four years, amounts to only 
 £.246,666 13 4, which in fterling is only 148,060 0 0 
 Inftead of 400,000 0 0 
 
 Error £. 252,000 0 0 
 
 But from their own {hewing, our exports have confi.derably 
 exceeded the imports. They have committed an error of 
 £.100,000 in the value of 700,000 bufiiels of wheat, at fix 
 millings and eight-pence, the bulhel. 
 
 They have extended it J 33^333 6 8 
 
 Inftead of ' 233.333 6 8 
 
 Difference £. 100,000 0 0 
 
 They eftimate twenty-five thoufand hoglheads of tobacco 
 at thirty {hillings per hundred, and at that rate the tobacco 
 rightly amounts to aC* .375> 000 0 0 
 
 But fince the peace, tobacco has averaged at 
 leaft a guinea. Put down then 437,500 0 o 
 
 Another difference £. 62,500 o o 
 
 They allow nothing for IkinSj flax-feed, bar and pig-iron, 
 and fmaller articles. The annual amount of thefe articles 
 cannot be {hort of £. 25,000 0 0. 
 
 They allow nothing for the export of cafli. If none has 
 been fent out, there can be no fcarcity.- If fotne has been fent 
 out, it ought to be charged in the account. Behold their di¬ 
 lemma 1 But fuppofe, as they do, a great and dreadful fcarci¬ 
 ty ; it cannot be occafioned by an annual export of lefs than 
 £.50,000 0 0 currency. 
 
( 34 ) 
 
 Caft up die four lums winch we have thus gained. 
 
 Error in extending wheat . 100,000 0 6 
 
 Short in value of tobacco 62,500 0 0 
 
 Articles omitted 25,000 0 0 
 
 Cafli ’ - 50,000 0 Q 
 
 The amount is ' - £.237,500 0 0 
 
 Which added to their amount-of exports' 538,333 6 8 
 
 - Produces ; £■ 775,833 6 8 
 
 The difference between which, and their 
 amount, of imports, 600,000 o o 
 
 k ' £■ 175,833 6 8 
 
 4 
 
 Which multiplied fay four for the four years 
 of peace, gives ' £.703,333 6 8 
 
 And this balance mull have either added to our wealth, or 
 lefiened the former debt. Suppofe the latter, and we have 
 diminilhed this debt £. 703,333 6 8 currency, inltead of 
 increafing it 400,000 iterling. But the account is not yet 
 clofed. We have flail goods on hand. Thefe will either 
 fave fnture imports, or their value mull be fet againft pall 
 imports. I do the latter; and we may furely eftimate thefe 
 goods at 296,666 13 4 
 
 . Which added to the 703,333 6 8 
 
 "Gives 1,006,000 0 p 
 
 And this total-turned into flerling at the rate 
 
 of fixty-fix two thirds, is juft 600,000 0 O 
 
 Which fubtrafted from the debt before the 
 - war of 600,000 o 0 
 
 Leaves £. 0,000,000 o o 
 
 With which I am willing to reward any noted calculator who 
 will condefcend to affiil me. 
 
 Thus taking their data, correcting their figures, and adding 
 things, which.cannot be well denied, I demonftrate that we 
 owe not one farthing to Great-Britain, except what we muft 
 have elfewhere gained, and except a fum, the value of which 
 we have on hand. But the cafe is not fo. Their data I re¬ 
 ject, and I. will correct other miftakes. The imports fince 
 the peace, have greatly exceeded £. 600,000 currency; al- 
 ; v though 
 
( 35 ) 
 
 though no proof is prefented, that the balance has been againft 
 the Hate. It is ; moll.probable, that imports and exports, upon 
 an average, have been nearly equal. The following I con¬ 
 ceive pre,tty nearly (for I choofe to be under the mark) a true 
 average ftate of our exports fince the end of the war, which 
 will continue for a few years to come, after which it cannot 
 fail to increafe: 
 
 Twenty-feven thoufand hogfheads of tobacco, 
 
 at £. 17 10 0 the hogfljead, . . £. 472,500 0 0 
 
 Four hundred thoufand bufhels of wheat, at 
 feven Miings the bufliel 140,000 0 0 
 
 One hundred thoufand barrels , of flour, at 
 37/6 the barrel, 187,500. 0 0 
 
 Indian corn and lumber 35,000 0 0 
 
 Skins, flax-feed, i ron, bread, bifeuit, and fmall- * 
 
 er articles, (allowing nothing for corn ) 25,000 0 0 
 
 . Total 860,000 0 0 
 
 The idea of private ceconomy and frugality, extricating us 
 from all embarraffinents, has been ridiculed. It has been tri¬ 
 umphantly faid, that-a free government cannot prevent men 
 from fpending their money, or liying as they pleafe. , It is true, 
 -that government cannot limit the number of difhes at a man’s 
 table, the quantity of madeira, to be confunied in a year, or 
 the kind and number of his carriages. But when men, having 
 by a thoughtlefs profufion incurred heavy debts, are obliged to 
 jetrench, and begin ferioufly to reform, the legiflature may 
 certainly forbear to furnifh them with the means of continuing 
 their extravagance, enhancing their debt, and only poftponing 
 their evil day. Would not, I pray you, an emiflion operate 
 in this way for the borrowers ? Would it not again hurry .men 
 into their wild ill concerted fchemes ? But government can go 
 further than a mere forbearance. It can encourage home ma- 
 nufaftures. It can either prohibit certain importations,., or lay 
 fuch a duty as would anfwer three good ends, an increafe of 
 its revenue, a diminution of imports, and a difcouragement of 
 luxury. The force of prejudice, and the magic of declama¬ 
 tion, muft be great in4eed, to prevent men from feeing tnefe 
 glaring truths!. 
 
 Suppofe our imports from every part to be only £. 800,000, 
 and our exports to every, part to be equal. Suppofe too our 
 embarrafled circ.umftances, aided by the prudence of our legif¬ 
 lature, to leflen the importation of merchaudife a fortieth part. 
 This gives us an annual balance of £. 20,000. The diminu. 
 
( 36 ) 
 
 tion of a twentieth gives us £. 40,000, and of a tenth £. 80,000. 
 The whole balance would be brought in folid coin, provided 
 we did not remit commodities to pay old debts. But from our 
 fitu.'Don thefe debts muft be flowly paid, and it .is proper to 
 adopt fame fair mode of compoiitio'n, or inftallment *. I will 
 fuppofe wife mcafures to be purfued, fo as to Men our imports 
 a twentieth. This might produce in our favour a balance of 
 /. 10,000 in coin, and 30,000 to be applied in difcharge of 
 thofe debts. In a few years, if we have not now coin enough, 
 we ihall have abundance, our debts f will be difcharged, and 
 we cannot be otherwife than a free and happy people. Thofe 
 fchemes, which promife all at once, without any thing on your 
 part, will be ever fallacious. Confider a little further the reftdt 
 cf an emiliion on loan. We fhall proceed in our luxuries, and 
 prov idcd credit be obtained, our imports from abroad will be 
 augmented, or (which will have a more pernicious effect) we 
 ihall get merchandife from a neighbouring ftate. Of confe- 
 quence there will be a conftant drain of our hard calh. At the 
 period aligned for redeeming the paper, we fhall find money 
 far more rare, and the people labouring under a debt far hea¬ 
 vier than that which is (aid already to bear them down. In the 
 name of common fenfe and common juftice, for the fake of 
 your neighbours, yourfelves, your pofterity, your country, reflect 
 oil all thefe things, and beftow on this fcheme, the Cure inftru- 
 ment of your dcltrudtion, fuch dccifive marks of difapprobation, 
 as :hail for ever deter its advocates, demonftrate your good 
 fenfe, retrieve the national character, and make rapid advances 
 to that grand confummation of policy--the RESTORA¬ 
 
 TION of PUBLIC and PRIVATE FAITH. 
 
 I muft note a few other remarkable pafiages in the addrefs. 
 It mrorms you of no other amount of debts, for confifcated 
 property, than the fum of £.275,600 3 it. By the audi¬ 
 tor's account, the whole fum due for principal and intereft, ex- 
 clufive of the intereft on unbonded debts, is /. 411,919 12 i [. 
 
 * This might be termed a violation of pajl contrasts, if ere* 
 dito-s were not unhr-fiify conferring to the mccjnre. 
 
 f From all the information I can get, tl>e debts due to Great- 
 Brit vn before the war cannot exceed the debts due to us more 
 than f. 300,000 currency, fappofmg the payments made into the 
 ire. f ry to b: rad. If they be good, the balance is not near fo 
 much. Although the balance of trade was formerly againjl us, 
 we tti’fl recollect, that great part of it was invefted in real pro¬ 
 perly, which has fince been confifcated. 
 
 Add 
 
197 , 3 *° *4 7 
 
 250,000 o o 
 
 ( 37 ) 
 
 Add to this the arrears of taxes equal, ac¬ 
 cording to the addrefs, to 
 And the fum propofed to be loaned 
 
 Total £.859,240 6 8j 
 
 The emiflion would afford the ftrong body of public debtors 
 fuch an acceffion of influence, as, if they plcafed, might pro¬ 
 duce a combination not to be withftood. £. 250,000 divided 
 into five hundreds, might polfibly give 500 new debtors. Di¬ 
 vided into fifties, 5000. But old debtors would be the prin¬ 
 cipal borrowers. Suppofe then an addition of only 250 debt¬ 
 ors, and thefe to be men of fome enterprize and influence. 
 How' contemptible the fufpicions fuggefted againft the fenate, 
 compared to the well grounded apprehenfions, which thefe 
 might excite ! 
 
 The addrefs fays nothing of the two and a half impoft, as a 
 produftive fund in eafe of the affeflment. I am mfl credibly 
 informed, that the produdl of this tax, in 1786, appeared to 
 the houfe to be £. 33,093 9 8. This ought undoubtedly to 
 have leffened their eftimate of an affefled rate, about 6/8 in the 
 £.100. 
 
 I come now to the account of the continental debts.* On 
 the firft of January, 1783, the foreign debt, according to the 
 publifhed eftimate of congrefs, was 7,885,085 dollars. It 
 has not fince been increafed, except by arrears of intereft, and 
 fome loans, which have been applied to pay off the old intereft, aid 
 maintain minifters and agents. Suppofe it to be now raif.d to 
 10,000,000 dollars, bearing an intereft of five per cent. Our tench 
 of that fum is only 1,000,000, equal to£. 375,000, the iute.eit 
 of which is onlv£. 18,750: So that the addrefs has erred in ftating 
 the intereft of the foreign debt to be 1,723,626 dollars ; bccaufe 
 that is an intereft at five per cent, on the enormous fum of 34, 
 472,520 dollars. Congrefs however is under an obligation to pay 
 a part of the principal of the foreign debt at this time. Hence it is, 
 that for the year 1786, they have called on the ftates for a fum, 
 not to be paid every year. And hence it is, 11:0ft probably, that 
 the addrefs has fo materially miftated the annual intereft of the 
 foreign debt. There is indeed a great difficulty in compre¬ 
 hending the exadt ftate of continental affairs, faince the year 
 1783, there has been no ftatement from congrefs that has 
 
 *' If gentlemen are pojjcjfed of any means to com,H my Jlate 
 of the debt , let them do it. When wrong, l ever wijh that I 
 may befet right 
 
 been. 
 
( 3 ^ ) 
 
 been, at the fame time, full, explicit, intelligible and clear. 
 It is no wonder that new requifitions, balances of the old, mi- 
 tcreft now due, interefts annually ariiing, a million of figures, 
 and references to ftatements not at hand, fhouid perplex an 
 ordinary brain, and produce miftakes. But a common m n, 
 'without a full comprehenfion of the fubject, would not have 
 undertaken to publifti for the information of others. From 
 the whole body of the delegates, in an appeal to their conftita- 
 ents, nothing but accuracy and precifion ought to be expc- red ; 
 and a conftderable time aiSually elapfed before I ever thought 
 of queftioning their ftatements and calculations. That 1 was 
 wrong- in taking any thing upon truft, I hope already appears. 
 
 I will now prcfentyou a more complete general view of vour 
 affairs, than any you have yet feen. My groundwork for the ftate 
 of the continental debt, is the ellimate of 17S3, which I am well 
 allured is the groundwork that has ever fince ferve-J congref- itfelf. 
 
 The continental debt arifes in a great meafure from a non- 
 compliance with their requiiitions. Suppofe the whole debt 
 to be 50,000,000 of dollars, and that although a bate has 
 not complied fully with thefe 'requifitions, it has complied in 
 as great a proportion as the reft. Now thefe fifty millions are 
 apportioned. Surely a ftate cannot owe its quota of tue debt, 
 and its balance of requifitions at the fame time. Congreis, 
 however, being difappointed in one year, in the pext year 
 makes a new requifition, and calls for the balance; of fome 
 former demand, in order to prevent the accumulation of her 
 principal debt, and to comply with her pofitive engagements. 
 Could congrefs think proper, and could all its creditors agree, 
 to convert the whole debt into a principal, bearing intereft, 
 and would the Hates obey their juft requifitions in providing 
 permanent funds, the burthen would every year be equal, their 
 affairs fimplified, and errors not likely to be made. But of 
 this hereafter. 
 
 The foreign debt paying intereft, I have before ftated in 1783 
 to be 7,885,085 dollars. 
 
 The intereft of which, partly at four, and the reft at five 
 per cent, is 369,038 dollars. Our tenth * thereof (difeard- 
 ing petty fractions, as I fliall continue to do] is 36,903— 
 equal to £.13,838 12 6. 
 
 * I am ajfured , that our quota is nearer an eleventh than a 
 tenth. This makes an important difference. Congrefs in the 
 requifition for permanent funds , made it fomething lefs than 
 which in 109,000 wouldfave us above f. 5000. 
 
 1 ” But 
 
( 39 ) 
 
 Rut fuppofe, as I have already done, the whole foreign debt 
 10,000,000 dollars, and our quota of tile intereft, being the 
 incereft on r,000,000, at five per cent, is £. 18,750 0 0. 
 
 The domellic debt, paying intereft, is 27,115,290 dollars. 
 The intereft of this at fix per cent, is 1,626,917. Our tenth 
 of this is 162,691, equal to .61,009 O O. 
 
 Againft this laft fum we have to fet the intereft due on loan- 
 office certificates, belonging to this ftate. The principal, ac¬ 
 cording to the addrefs, amounts to .80,517 49; and the 
 inteieit being ,£.4,831, deducted from our tenth, .leaves on¬ 
 ly 56)178 0 o 
 
 So that adding the two intereft fums together, 18,750 0 o 
 
 You have the balance of our quota of the an¬ 
 nual intereft now payable by congrefs, /,. 74,928 0 O 
 
 We have now- to reckon arrears of intereft, and the grofs- 
 fum not yet paying intereft. The intereft of the foreign debt 
 being already fuppofed to be confolidated with the principal, 
 and to make it 10,000,000 dollars, there is nothing to be fet 
 down for foreign arrears. 
 
 Four years intereft due on that part of the domeftic debt, 
 being 27,115,290 dollars, which pays intereft, amounts to 
 6,507,668 dollars, equal to 2,440,375 0 O 
 
 To tlais add the * commutation 5,000,000, 
 dollars, equal to 1,875,000 .0 O 
 
 £- 4 ) 3 i S) 37 S ° 0 
 
 I take it for a fettled unavoidable point, that as congrefs can¬ 
 not pay the arrears, or the commutation, thefe two articles 
 muft at laft be confolidated with the principal now bearing in¬ 
 tereft. Should congrefs be unable to reconcile foreign credi¬ 
 tors to this meafure, file may, notwithftanding, ft) foon as flic 
 is inverted with the five per cent, import, by borrowing on 
 that fund, exchange her creditors. And thus, when her pow¬ 
 ers are enlarged, and her credit eftab'iiflied, like that of other 
 fovcreign powers, a property in the American funds will be 
 transferable like the ftocks in England, without, however, 
 
 * There appears a d'fpofition in June dates to with-hold from 
 the army this commutation for their half-pay. May God pre¬ 
 vent fucb unprecedented iniquity and difgrace ! The nonpayment 
 of this mojl juft of all debts, would prove us “ dijhsnejl to our 
 neighbours, falfe to our benefactors, and ungrateful to Fro~ 
 
( 4 ° ) 
 
 that fluctuation in their value. This is “ a confummation de¬ 
 voutly to be wifhed.” Until this happy period fhall arrive, the 
 confederacy is little better than a rope of fand, to be parted 
 by the firft rude blaft. God grant that a diflolution of the uni¬ 
 on be not the fecret wifh of too many in thefe ftates. 
 
 The intereft of the new principal of f. 4,315,375, would be 
 /. 258,922 10 0, our tenth thereof would be 25,892 5 0 
 To this add the balance of our quota of the 
 intereft now payable 74,9,28 0 o 
 
 Total * £. 100,820 5 0 
 
 And this I aver to be within a trifle more or lefs, the whole 
 which we fhould have annually to contribute for intereft, fup- 
 pofing the whole continental foreign and domeftic debt confo- 
 lidated into a principal, bearing intereft. 
 
 To demonftrate this more /imply. Remember, that in 1785 
 eongrefs eftimated the whole debt at 42,000,375 dollars. Very 
 little has fince been borrowed, and even that applied chiefly to 
 difcharge intereft. Current expences and arrears of intereft have 
 raifed it to near 50,000,000 dollars. Our tenth of that is 
 5,coo,eoc—equal to £. 1,875,00c, from which we have a right 
 to deduft the arrears of intereft on our continental loan-office 
 certificates, equal to about 30,000 o 9 
 
 And cur contributions fince peace, equal per¬ 
 haps to. 120, BOO 0 0 
 
 Total 150,000 o o 
 
 Which fubtracled from 1,875,000 0 o 
 
 Leaves f. 1,725,000 o o 
 
 The intereft of which, reckoning the whole at fix per cent, 
 is 103,500 o o 
 
 The difference between which and 100,820 5 o 
 
 Is £.2,679 15 o 
 
 * Ariftidcs flutters himfelf, that he will be ever found con¬ 
 fident. In a pamphlet , publijhed in 1784, which fom of you 
 remember , he eftimated our Jhare of the continental intereft, with¬ 
 out deducting the intereft cf our continental certificates , at about 
 fi. 85,000. The accumulation fince that period , and the dif¬ 
 ference between one tenth and lefs than two twenty-one j, has oc- 
 cafioncd the difference between the two eftimates. In that publi¬ 
 cation , he breathed the very fiphit which actuates him in this 
 
( 41 )• 
 
 But as the foreign debt of 10,000,000 dollars, pays only five' 
 per cent, and the difference betweerf the- rate of five and fix 
 per cent, makes a difference on our' 1,000,000, of 10,OOO 
 dollars, equal to £. 3 , 750 - The latter calculation being a 
 lumping one, is reduced below the former more particular 
 one. 
 
 Now fubtraft from the delegates account of your annual 
 contributions for intereft, which is 137,057 12 2 
 
 My amount of 100,820 50 
 
 And we find the important difference of £ .36,237 7 2 
 
 Of which furely every friend to his country will be happy in 
 feeling a thorough convidtion. 
 
 Let me now inform you of the burthens to which you are in 
 duty bound to fubmit. 
 
 I have ftated, that an affeffment of 6/3, in ten years, would 
 releafe you from an annual burthen of 60,000 0 o 
 
 The two and an half per cent. I fhould wifh 
 not to exceed 25,000 0 o 
 
 Thefe two amount to £.85,000 0 0 
 
 Which fubtradfed from your annual charge 
 for continental intereft, 100,820 0 o 
 
 Leaves a balance of £. 15,820 
 
 Add to this the annual expences of our own 
 government; fuppofe 18,179 
 
 And the intereft on the balance of our ftate 
 debt, although the debts due to the ftate are 
 far more than fhe owes, 3,000 
 
 Total £. 37,000 0 0 
 
 To raife this laftfum, fuppofe a recourfe to the old mode of 
 aflefTment, Seven fhillings and fix-pence in the £. 100 on 
 11 millions of property, gives £.41,250 grofs, which furely 
 might produce more than £. 37,000 net. The two rates of 
 6/3 and 7/6, with the 2/6 impofed by the confolidating adt, 
 make 16/3. And this, upon the plaineft calculation, is the 
 whole burthen neceflary to be borne along with the 2; per 
 cent, for your whole continental and domeftic debt, and the 
 liberal fupport of government. To this add 3 /9 for councy 
 charges, which you are fenfible ought to be lefs than at prefent. 
 And your whole burthen is juft twenty fhillings annually for 
 every £. 100. From this 2/6 are to be fhortly dadudfeti, and 
 
. , • ( 42 . ) 
 
 6/3 more to ceafe at the end of ten years, -and then the 
 rate will be only 11/3. ... , . . 
 
 But fuppofe my fcheme for. a loan rejected, you have then' 
 to provide for an "annual intereft'of £..60,099, until we can- 
 fink the principal.. In that cafe twelve (hillings, inftead of the 
 6/3, would be required. And then your whole contribution 
 (exdullve of the 2i- duty) to congrefs, the ftate.and.the county, 
 would be 25/9 until the deduction of the 2/6, which would 
 reduce it to 23/3. But inafinuch as property is undervalued' 
 in afieilnents, perhaps die real value of £. 100 would contri¬ 
 bute only fifteen {hillings. ... 
 
 Suppoie my fcheme adopted, the five percent, impoft fet¬ 
 tled on congrefs, and our 2i per cent, of courfe dorie away, 
 there would at the end of ten years,' be an annual balance due 
 by congrefs of £.9,179 15 0, as' appears by die following 
 '{late: _ ' . . - 
 
 My fcheme finking the principal of . 60,000 9 « 
 
 Five per cent, producing 50,006 6 .0, 
 
 Total £.110,000 o' o 
 From which deduct the balance of our quota, 100,8,0. 5 0 
 
 And the-remainder is ' £.9,179 15 . o 
 
 Which I conceive would be fufficient for our contribution to 
 the expences of congrefs/ civil eftablilhment,. confidering that 
 congrefs has the back lands : ftill to difpofe of. 
 
 There would then remain only the charges of our pwn in¬ 
 ternal government, and the county expellees, for which an 
 impofition of 8/9 in the £. 100, would be more than enough. 
 
 I have iaid nothing of the refidue of our quota of the con¬ 
 tinental money, . To this may be oppofed the paper purchafed 
 by the intendant, and part of die tax arrearages. 
 
 " It is now time to clofe my remarks. On-the bill for the 
 relief of debtors, and on certain repealing bills, I fay nothing 
 at prefent. The fertility of my fubjects has already drawn me 
 too far. 
 
 I have never addrefled you, except on occafions of impor T 
 tance, and I have hitherto had the pleafing reward-of your 
 approbation. On tiiis occafion above all others, I deferve it. 
 You will at leaft acquit me of “ an officious dabbling in'poli¬ 
 tics.” I know, that when men are rooted in opinion, they 
 are difpofed to condemn all who oppofe them, and the founded 
 arguments lerve only to irritate and inflame. With an appeal 
 to the great Searcher of thoughts, I again proteft, that my 
 
( 43 ) 
 
 heart is exempt from hatred and malice. It gives me pain to 
 be obliged to ipeak in a manner difpleafing to any one, and 
 particularly to thofe whom I ftill regard, and who lately ho¬ 
 noured me with their efteem. I befeech all who have attempt¬ 
 ed to injure me, to forgive my not being hurt. They may 
 reft affined, that one of the firft wilhes of my foul, is to- live 
 in amity with all.—Let that be the principle of all! May the 
 fufferings of their country awaken a true,zeal, and uniting in 
 her caufe, they will bid fair at laft to coalefce in brotherly 
 love. 
 
 ARISTIDES. 
 
 Annapolis, Feb. 26, 1787. 
 
 , E R R A T A. 
 
 F the 7th page, near the bottom, for “ 1668,” read “ 1688.” 
 
 In the 19th page, in the 17th line from the bottom, for 
 “ let we know,” read “ let me know.” 
 
 In the 20th page, near the bottom, for “ appreciation,” read 
 “depreciation”, 
 
 Befides thefe may be others, which the candid reader wift readily 
 pxcufe. ■ •