t 
 
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SILVER VINDICATED 
 
 
 AND OTHEK ESSAYS. 
 
 HENRI CEENUSCHI. 
 
 LIVERPOOL; 
 
 D. MARPLES & CO., LIMITED, 50b, LORD STREET. 
 1879. 
 

 
 
 
SILVER VINDICATED. 
 
 Paper read before the “ Trade and Economy Section ” of the National 
 Social Science Association, Liverpool Meeting, 1870. 
 
 I. 
 
 THE SILVER CRISIS. 
 
 Up to the promulgation of the German Law of the 4th 
 December, 1871, against silver, the production of that metal 
 in the whole world had amounted for about ten years to 
 £10,000,000 sterling per annum. Since 1872 it has amoun¬ 
 ted on the average to £13,700,000 (depreciation not deducted). 
 The increase is thus £3,700,000, and this is the extent of 
 that immense excess of production so much talked of. 
 
 Since 1872 the annual production of gold has been 
 £19,000,000 a year ; it is therefore more by one-third than 
 the production of silver. 
 
 In view of these figures, it is altogether impossible, even 
 for those who have been so much afraid of the fertility of 
 silver mines, to attribute the depreciation of silver to natural 
 causes—it is wholly and exclusively due to the action of 
 legislators. 
 
 The production of gold, which was £6,000,000 a year up 
 to 1850, rose to £36,000,000 in 1852, yet gold was never 
 
4 
 
 depreciated relatively to silver. Up to 1830 the annual 
 production of silver was thrice that of gold in value; after 
 1850 the fact was just the reverse, the annual production of 
 gold becoming thrice that of silver in value; yet gold and 
 silver never altered in relative value. The reason is that 
 France was then bi-metallic, and that, through her, entire 
 Europe was, indirectly at least, in the enjoyment of 
 bi-metallism. England coined only gold, but she drew silver 
 from France, or sent it thither in exchange for gold at the 
 fixed rate of 15^. Germany coined only silver, but she drew 
 gold from France, and sent it thither in exchange for silver 
 at the fixed rate of 15^. 
 
 France being a market at the fixed rate of 15^—a market 
 always open to all nations—the 15^ was enforced on every 
 nation, i^either in England nor in America, neither at 
 Constantinople nor at Calcutta, were people willing to give 
 more than 15^ of silver for 1 of gold, nor more than 1 of gold 
 for 15^ of silver. The legal rate of France was the regu¬ 
 lating rate of the whole world. It was in this manner that 
 the relative value of gold and silver always remained 
 stationary in the world—so stationary indeed, that in English 
 statistics the quantity of silver could always be expressed in 
 gold sovereigns. A gold sovereign always represented a 
 fixed weight of silver. 
 
 Now, however, the old bi-metallic constitution is no 
 longer at work in Europe. The German law, which put a 
 stop to the coinage of silver in all the States of the Empire, 
 placed Holland, then France, and all the Continent, under 
 the necessity of entirely suspending the fabrication of silver 
 money. France now coins gold alone. Europe is making a 
 mono-metallic experiment. Here is the sole cause of 
 depreciation of silver. Nowhere does the law any longer link 
 the value of silver with the value of gold, hence the reason 
 why the value of silver will no longer have any fixity. 
 
5 
 
 II. 
 
 THE INDIAN EXCHANGE. 
 
 Between two countries having the same metal as money, 
 bills of exchange never cost more than the transport, and 
 coinage, of the metal would do. Thus, the exchange on Paris 
 can never fall lower in London than 25 francs, for, this 
 limit passed, there would be no advantage in bills of exchange ; 
 it would be cheaper to send sovereigns to the Paris Mint. 
 
 The case was just the same between India and England 
 as long as, in Europe, bi-metallic francs were coined. The 
 value of the rupee in relation to sovereigns did not then run 
 very great risk, for, at wor^t, people could get rupees sent to 
 Europe, have them coined into francs, and with those francs 
 obtain, at Paris, either bills on London, or gold at the rate 
 of 15^. 
 
 This possibility of despatching rupees to be converted' 
 into European money always sufficed to keep the Indian rate 
 of exchange within the limits of the cost of transport, and 
 coinage of the metal. 
 
 If the German law of 1871 against silver had not come 
 into being, Europe would still coin silver; that metal would 
 be still common money between Europeans and Asiatics ; 
 the Anglo-Indian exchange, thanks to French bi-metallism, 
 would still be at its old level, and the Indian Council would 
 dispose of its bills without incurring any loss. 
 
 It is not the sale of bills on India which has made silver 
 fall; it is the fall of silver, caused by laws of proscription, 
 which has lowered the value of the bills. 
 
 Whether Indian commerce was more or less prosperous, 
 whether the quantity of merchandise imported from India 
 into Europe, and from Europe into India, was more or less 
 considerable, whether India absorbed more or less silver, all 
 this would in no way have affected the Anglo-Indian exchange 
 
6 
 
 had not the old monetary system of the world been over¬ 
 turned by the mono-metallic revolution which broke out in 
 Germany. 
 
 III. 
 
 THE SUFFERINGS. 
 
 Notwithstanding the crusade in favour of gold alone, the 
 old mass of coined silver is still in circulation; but the value 
 of this silver is now only nominal, and Governments cannot 
 melt it down without incurring enormous loss. Such is the 
 situation on the Continent. 
 
 Instead of producing £15,000,000 sterling as formerly, 
 the 160,000,000 of rupees sold every year by the Indian 
 Council in London in bills on India, produce only 
 £12,000,000, and it will be worse hereafter. The Indian 
 Budget is disarranged, public works are countermanded, and 
 all administrative and financial policy in India has no longer 
 but one aim ; to recover, by no matter what reduction of 
 expenditure, what is lost by the fall in exchange. Never was 
 so paltry a programme imposed on a great government. The 
 English merchandise sold in Asia and South America is paid 
 for in silver, that is, in the metal the coinage of which in 
 Europe is at present prohibited, and with which gold can no 
 longer be procured at a fixed rate of exchange. To the risk 
 incurred by the merchandise, is added the risk which will be 
 incurred by the payments. 
 
 It is no longer possible for English capital to undertake 
 anything in India. The rupees to be gained are of too 
 uncertain and precarious a value. 
 
 The purchasing power of the rupee is not yet impaired in 
 India, but it will be so by the continuous importation of 
 silver. The ruin of the rupee will be the ruin of many; and 
 who will persuade the Hindoos that the English law cannot, 
 if it chooses, ward oflf the blow struck by the German law ? 
 
7 
 
 For the United States to resume specie payments it is 
 necessary for them to re-habilitate silver, give the silver 
 dollar the same value as the gold dollar, then accept silver at 
 the custom-houses, and be able to pay their European bond¬ 
 holders in silver dollars. To enable this plan, however, to be 
 adopted, it is first of all necessary to be sure that Europe 
 will become bi-metallic. Without this, European creditors 
 receiving silver dollars, inconvertible into European money, 
 would undergo too serious losses. The demonetisation of 
 silver in Europe is an obstacle, therefore, to the resumption of 
 specie payments in the United States, and they have still 
 such difficulties to overcome in order to emancipate them¬ 
 selves from paper money, that they cannot dream of taking 
 at the same time, as France took, the bi-metallic direction of 
 the world. 
 
 As regards the States of South America, it is evident that 
 they will be unable either to pay their debts in Europe, or to 
 buy European merchandise, if the silver yielded by their 
 mines is not a legal tender in the old world. Pernicious in 
 Europe, pernicious in Asia, pernicious in America, the 
 mono-metallic scheme has produced, and can produce, 
 nothing but disaster. 
 
 IV. 
 
 INACTION. 
 
 Having only gold money at home, Englishmen have a 
 certain disposition to speak of silver as they speak of cotton 
 or iron, sugar or coal. Silver is being depreciated; what 
 matters it ? To-day a fall, to-morrow a rise. Natural laws 
 must be left to act; they will bring back fine weather, and 
 we must trust to the energy of commercial interests; it will 
 restore the equilibrium. 
 
 Yes, if silver had only been simple merchandise, this 
 reasoning would be plausible; but silver was more than 
 
8 
 
 simple merchandise, it was a legal tender. All the new 
 silver was entitled by law to be worth, and was worth, as 
 much as the silver formerly coined; it will be no use waiting 
 years and years; silver will never recover the value which it 
 possessed when it was a legal tender in Europe. Bound up 
 with gold by the French 15^, the value of silver was as stable 
 as that of gold ; it will henceforth be as unstable as that of 
 copper. 
 
 Inaction will only aggravate the evil, and the only effective 
 action in this matter is that of legislation. Bad laws have 
 been passed ; let there be good ones. Lex abstulit, lex dabit. 
 
 V. 
 
 THE EXPEDIENTS. 
 
 “ Introduce into India gold mono-metallism." Impos¬ 
 sible for the German Empire, the expulsion of silver, and the 
 substitution of gold, are still more impossible in the Indian 
 Empire. 
 
 “ Increase the Indian taxes" or increase the weight of 
 the rupee, which comes to the same thing. If silver had 
 only fallen in value to a certain point, and stopped there, one 
 might to some extent understand this proposal, but the value 
 of silver has become, and will always remain, variable. Will 
 the amount of taxes, or the weight of the rupee, have to be 
 modified according to the changes in the value of silver? 
 Can the Hindoos be told, “You shall pay us, as annual 
 taxation, as many rupees as it will he necessary to sell in 
 order to buy every year 15,000,000 gold sovereigns?” No, 
 the plan is as impolitic as it is impracticable. 
 
 “ Coin no more rupees." Certainly, if England is quite 
 resolved to endure anything rather than act, those entrusted 
 with the Indian administration may think themselves entitled 
 to follow the example of Holland and France, which have 
 
9 
 
 ceased to fabricate silver money. But what consequences 
 would follow ? What will the ingot be worth when, already 
 rejected by Europe, it will also be rejected by the Mints of 
 Calcutta and Bombay? What will be the worth of that 
 enormous mass of silver ornaments worn by the Hindoos 
 when the conversion of them into rupees will be prohibited ? 
 The depreciation of silver will no longer have hardly any 
 limits, and all the rupees formerly coined will be, as it were, 
 converted into bronze, so greatly will be reduced their value 
 on being melted down. Is this the dream of the mono¬ 
 metallists—to decree the demonetisation of silver, and then 
 to see it circulate for ever on the footing of a metallic 
 assignat ? 
 
 The monetary mechanism of the world has been broken 
 down; we are in full cataclysm. Neither India nor any 
 State can defend itself singly; either all the States will be 
 rescued by means of a general understanding, or none will 
 be so. 
 
 VI. 
 
 THE ONLY REMEDY: UNIVERSAL 
 BI-METALLISM. 
 
 If all the monetary laws passed in Europe since 1871 
 were repealed, it is beyond doubt that silver would recover its 
 value, that the Indian Exchange would return to its old level, 
 that the £16,000,000 of Indian bills would be sold without 
 loss. But it is not possible to re-construct the past just as it 
 was. Germany cannot re-sell gold, to become again silver 
 mono-metallic, and France cannot alone, at her own risk and 
 peril, re-commence coining silver. Bi-metallism can only be 
 rehabilitated by the co-operation of all the States, India 
 included. The mischievous mono-metallism cannot be 
 abandoned without establishing a bi-metallism still more 
 
10 
 
 beneficial than the French bi-metallism-universal bi¬ 
 
 metallism. 
 
 In coming to France to get gold coined in order to take 
 back silver, or silver to take back gold, the nations could not 
 expect the operation to be entirely gratis. It was necessary 
 to pay a small premium on the metal taken away, and to this 
 expense was added the cost of transport and coinage. With 
 universal bi-metallism all these expenses would be saved. 
 
 No State being any longer mono-metallic, gold and silver 
 will everywhere circulate simultaneously. France will not be 
 the only bi-metallic dock in the world. Who will ever think 
 any more of offering gold to get silver, or vice versa, when 
 the two metals will be everywhere a legal tender at the uniform 
 rate of 15^? 
 
 VII. 
 
 OBJECTIONS. 
 
 1. “ The English sovereign will lose in value, its 
 purchasing power will be impaired, if silver 
 is allowed to circulate as an unlimited 
 legal tender.” 
 
 This is a mistake. If silver *could really be driven out of 
 circulation, the value of gold would increase. If silver had 
 never been in circulation, the value of gold would have been, 
 and would be, greater than it is. But silver has always 
 circulated, it has always competed with the value of gold; 
 it still circulates, and the reduction which this rivalry might 
 impose on the value of gold, gold has already fully under¬ 
 gone ; it has nothing more to fear. Although silver has not 
 circulated in England, the value of English gold has never 
 escaped the effects of the competition of silver. The proof of 
 this is that English gold has never been worth more than 
 French gold, circulating side by side with silver. 
 
 With French bi-metallism the gold sovereign was worth in 
 
11 
 
 silver 15^ times its weight, just the same as the franc gold. 
 The case will be the same under universal bi-metallism. The 
 circulation of silver in England will therefore strike no blow 
 at the value of the sovereign. 
 
 2. “ Breach of faith.” 
 
 The English creditors have stipulated for payment in 
 gold; if they are paid in silver they are aggrieved. This is 
 a pitiful scruple. They would be aggrieved, if a given sum in 
 silver was worth less than the same sum in gold, but they 
 are not, if the two sums are exactly equivalent; and uni¬ 
 versal bi-metallism makes them equivalent. 
 
 England has been in turn bi-metallic, silver mono-metallic, 
 again bi-metallic, and lastly gold mono-metallic, without 
 drawing on herself the reproach of having, at every change, 
 committed a breach of faith. Holland, Belgium, the United 
 States have changed their monetary metal without incurring 
 any blame. The French rentier has never troubled himself 
 whether he would he paid in gold or silver; he has always 
 been indifferent to the colour of the metal. The English 
 fundholder will be so too. English interests, Indian inter¬ 
 ests, the interests of the whole world, demand this reform, 
 which consists in declaring the coinage of silver free, even in 
 England; and this reform will injure nobody. To reject it 
 there must be good reasons, not mere pretexts or pitiful 
 scruples. 
 
 3. “ Gold is the money of rich nations—England 
 
 should have gold money.” 
 
 This is a prejudice. France, the United States, Holland, 
 Belgium, have alternately had now gold money, now silver 
 money, without being alternately more rich or less rich. 
 India had a large amount of gold money at a time when she 
 was poorer than at present with her silver money. Great 
 Britain has been prosperous with gold mono-metallism, but 
 the bi-metallic system would have insured a greater inde- 
 
12 
 
 pendence to her monetary market, which has always need of 
 exchanging one metal for the other; and bi-metallism would 
 very probably have prevented, or mitigated, more than one 
 monetary crisis. People defend themselves better with two 
 metals than with one. 
 
 4. “ Silver is too heavy.” 
 
 Gold also would be too heavy if one had to carry it in the 
 pocket. But cheques, bank notes, clearings, do away with 
 the transport of the metal, and for small payments a variety 
 of money, “gold, silver, bank notes” is preferable, and 
 preferred. 
 
 5. “ The paying power of gold is very stable, there¬ 
 
 fore gold money is the best.” 
 
 The stability of the paying power is in proportion to the 
 stability of production. The production of gold is more 
 irregular than the production of silver, the paying power of 
 gold, therefore, would per se be less stable than that of silver. 
 It is the presence of silver in general circulation, and the 
 gravitation of the French 15^, which preserved the paying 
 power of English sovereigns at the time of the influx of 
 Californian and Australian gold. Irregular the production 
 of gold, irregular the production of silver; but the two 
 irregularities neutralise each other, and the bi-metallic 
 production is very regular. For twenty-four years the total 
 production of the two metals valued at 15^ represents an 
 almost perfectly uniform annual sum of ^83,000,000 ster¬ 
 ling. Alone the bi-metallic money is of regular production, 
 and alone the bi-metallic money has stability of value. 
 
 6. “ Every reform is costly.” 
 
 Not this; the establishment of the universal 16|- involves 
 no re-coinage. All the coin in actual circulation is retained. 
 This is the very reason why no othe^ ratio must be sub¬ 
 stituted for the 15^. For England and India the innovation 
 is confined to allowing the free coinage of crowns, or double 
 
13 
 
 florins, and of gold pieces of ten, or twenty, rupees, while 
 continuing the coinage of gold sovereigns, and silver 
 rupees. 
 
 VIII. 
 
 THE IRREVOCABILITY OF THE 15^. 
 
 Would it not be advisable to agree that the ratio 15^ 
 might be modified after a certain period ? No; either the 
 ratio is irrevocable, or bi-metallism cannot stand. If the 
 French law of 1803 had provided that the weight of the 
 franc gold might subsequently be altered, and that the weight 
 of the franc silver alone would stand unalterable, the franc 
 gold would have been discredited; people would have taken 
 the precaution of contracting in franc silver. Compromised 
 in France, French bi-metallism would have no influence 
 abroad, and the relative value of the two metals would no¬ 
 where have had any fixity. 
 
 But it is urged, “ to guarantee the irrevocability of the 
 15^, is to guarantee that two merchandises, notwithstanding 
 the law of supply and demand, will always retain their 
 relative value to each other. It is to guarantee an impossi¬ 
 bility.” This is still confounding money with merchandise. 
 To speak of merchandise is to speak of competition, supply 
 and demand, purchase and sale, price. To speak of money 
 is nothing of the kind. 
 
 Whether he produces little or much, at a profit or at a 
 loss, no miner can ever sell his metal-money either dearer or 
 cheaper than other miners, for the simple reason that the 
 metal-money is not sold or bought—it is itself its price. 
 Neither offered nor demanded, as soon as it issues from the 
 mines the metal enters of full right into circulation, and its 
 paying power will be identical with that of the metal already 
 circulating—with which it proceeds to mix itself. Thus 
 there is no competition, no buying and selling, no price. 
 
14 
 
 Such are the immunities inherent in the monetary metal. 
 Gold and silver alike necessarily enjoy them when the 
 monetary law is bi-metallic. Therefore, no competition 
 possible between the producer of gold and the producer of 
 silver, no purchase and sale, no discount, no price between 
 one metal and the other. Without their being offered, 
 without their being demanded, the circulation absorbs them 
 both at the legal par, and cannot refuse them. When the 
 monetary law is bi-metallic, neither gold nor silver, coined or 
 uncoined, is merchandise. That is the secret. 
 
 Their colour is different, their weight is different, their 
 production is different—no matter; the paying power of the 
 two currencies being legally identical, no depreciation can 
 befall one metal relatively to the other, and consequently the 
 relation between the weight of the gold coin and that of the 
 silver coin never needs alteration. 
 
 Knowing that he could prescribe for perpetuity, the legis¬ 
 lator of 1803 took good care not to say that the 15^ should 
 be merely provisional and subject to modification; the 16^ 
 was never modified, and during three-quarters of a century it 
 governed the relative value of gold and silver in the entire 
 world. It will appertain to the International Congress to re¬ 
 establish it, to declare it universal, and thus to give it 
 absolute stability. This will be a great benefit for all 
 nations. 
 
15 
 
 MONETARY PACIFICATION 
 BY THE REHABILITATION OF SILVER. 
 
 I.—THEORY. 
 
 There are paying mines, and there are non-paying mines. 
 Gold may be dear, very dear, to him who extracts it, and it 
 may be cheap, very cheap. Insignificant or ruinous, it is not 
 the cost of production which determines the value of gold. 
 Let a ball of pure gold weighing a thousand ounces fall from 
 the sky; its value is written upon it before it touches the 
 ground. Every ounce of new gold is worth exactly as much 
 as every old ounce; but the more ounces there are, the less 
 precious every ounce is, the smaller its purchasing-power. It 
 is just the same with silver as with gold. 
 
 Should it be said that gold and silver are employed as 
 money, because they are precious; or should it be said that 
 gold and silver are precious, because they are employed as 
 money? To answer this question, it is necessary to be 
 acquainted with the facts. 
 
 For a long time a given weight of gold was worth, with 
 some oscillations, 15^ times the weight of silver. For some 
 years, however, the value of silver has been rapidly falling. 
 At the present time 17 of silver is necessary to obtain 1 of 
 gold. The depreciation is 10 per cent. Why this fall ? 
 Nobody is ignorant of the reason : it is that for some years the 
 monetary employment of silver has been diminished. The 
 fabrication of silver money has ceased in Germany; it has 
 been restricted in France, and elsewhere. 
 
 Let us suppose that the mono-metallic gold revolution of 
 which the German empire has made itself the champion, 
 everywhere succeeds in triumphing; that everywhere ailver is 
 
16 
 
 deprived of the legal function of money; that, save the 
 insignificant quantity employed as tokens or change, all the 
 coined silver in circulation is called in and melted—no more 
 monetary employment for silver—what will it be worth ? 
 More than copper, certainly, but not much more. 
 
 The same fate would befall gold, if the whim of legal 
 mono-metallism took the other direction. 
 
 It must be admitted, then, gold and silver, although fine 
 and splendid, are not so rare that, if people cease to employ 
 them as money, they can retain a great value. 
 
 On whom does it depend whether one or the other metal 
 is, or is not, employed as money? On the legislators of 
 each State. But is it, then, on legislators that the 
 smaller, or greater, value of gold and silver depends ? Yes, 
 evidently. 
 
 All mono-metallic gold legislation is favourable to the 
 value of gold, unfavourable to the value of silver—such is the 
 English legislation of 1816. All mono-metallic silver legis¬ 
 lation is favourable to the value of silver, unfavourable to the 
 value of gold—such was German legislation prior to 1871. 
 All bi-metallic legislation is favourable to the maintenance of 
 the relative value of the two metals according to the ratio 
 sanctioned by it—such is the French legislation of 1803, 
 which gives to the silver franc the weight of 15^ frabcs gold. 
 It is the effectiveness of legislation which determines the 
 relative value of the two metals in the general market. This 
 relative value is not stationary, because the monetary legisla¬ 
 tion of the different countries is discordant. 
 
 If discordant legislation is succeeded by an international 
 legislation, on it alone will depend the relative value of gold 
 and silver. If the international legislation is mono-metallic, 
 the metal which is not money will lose so much of its value 
 as to be no longer precious. If the international legislation 
 is bi-metallic, the relative value of gold and silver which it 
 
17 
 
 recognises will remain always, and everywhere, invariable. 
 We proceed to prove it. 
 
 Let us lay down the most extreme of hypotheses: let us 
 say that by the international legislation the relative value of 
 the two monetary metals shall be fixed, not at 1 to 15^ as in 
 France, not at 1 to 10, not at 1 to 20, but at 1 to 1. 
 
 The law is everywhere promulgated. Its first effect will 
 be to render a large number of gold-mines unremunerative, 
 and a large number of silver-mines much more remunerative. 
 The production of gold will undergo a diminution ; the pro¬ 
 duction of silver will be augmented. What will next 
 happen ? 
 
 Either the passion for gold jewels, and ornaments, is 
 strong enough to seize on the totality of coined gold—and in 
 that case gold will be worth more than silver, but there will 
 no longer be gold money, it will be the reign of silver mono¬ 
 metallism—or that passion is not powerful enough to absorb 
 the totality of gold, and in that case a certain quantity of gold 
 will circulate as money, on an equal footing with, and with the 
 same value as, silver. But, then, the gold jewellery, taken by 
 weight, will not be worth more than if it were of silver; for 
 there cannot be two golds, one worth no more than silver, the 
 other worth more. 
 
 No help for it. The most extravagant legislation, if it is 
 accepted by the nations, is itself irresistible: either one of 
 the two metals will spontaneously be demonetised by private 
 individuals, or the relative value of the two metals will 
 remain invariable. 
 
 People are at liberty to reject bi-metallism, but it is not 
 possible to prove that the bi-metallic thesis is unsound. Let 
 us sum it up. 
 
 The cost of production does not settle the value of gold 
 and silver. The value is determined by two elements—the 
 employment, and the quantity. 
 
18 
 
 The monetary employment gives great value to the metal. 
 
 It is the legislator who decides whether one, or the other, 
 metal, or both, shall be employed as money. On his decision 
 depends the smaller, or greater, value of gold and silver. 
 
 If legislation is discordant, the relative value of the two 
 metals may vary. 
 
 If there is a bi-metallic international legislation, the 
 relative value of the two metals can no longer vary. 
 
 n.—APPLICATION. 
 
 It is scarcely necessary to point out that the demonetisa¬ 
 tion of gold, effected spontaneously by private individuals 
 under the bi-metallic system, 1 to 1, could in no way be 
 anticipated under the system 1 to 15^. 
 
 If, however, under the pressure of metallic events 
 beyond all foresight, this spontaneous demonetisation should 
 happen ? Well, we should find ourselves in full silver mono¬ 
 metallism. But what a difference between that spontaneous 
 mono-metallism, and the legal mono-metallism, which we are 
 combating! 
 
 The spontaneous mono-metallism would leave us for 
 money the more abundant metal, whereas it is precisely 
 this more abundant metal which the promoters of the legal 
 mono-metallism want to have demonetised. The spontaneous 
 mono-metallism would drive out of circulation the metal 
 greedily sought for other purposes, whereas the legal mono¬ 
 metallism intends to proscribe the metal which loses its value 
 on ceasing to be money. The spontaneous mono-metallism, 
 if it ever happened, would not stop the extraction either of 
 gold or silver, and would impose no sacrifice on anybody; 
 whereas the legal mono-metallism discourages the working of 
 silver-mines, and begins by imposing on governments the 
 obligation of buying all the silver money, at par, in order to 
 resell it at ridiculous prices. 
 
19 
 
 The bi-metallic science has no special predilection for 
 the proportion 15^. Strictly speaking, any proportion is 
 admissible. But the 15|- has this advantage, that it already 
 exists, almost everywhere, on the Continent of Europe; in 
 France, in Italy, in Belgium, in Switzerland for a long time, 
 in Germany since the creation of the gold mark, which 
 circulates simultaneously with the thalers. 
 
 The bi-metallism at is conservative, therefore, in 
 France and in Germany. Would it be revolutionary in 
 England ? In no wise; no gold-piece to melt down, and, as 
 the only innovation, the public authorised to have struck, in 
 silver, five-shilling pieces. 
 
 Let us suppose the quadruple alliance signed. In Eng¬ 
 land, in France, in Germany, in the United States, the public 
 treasuries will collect the taxes and loans in bi-metallic 
 money; in bi-metallic money they will pay the interest of 
 the public debt, the employes, and the articles purchased. 
 Private individuals will follow suit; they will pay each other 
 in bi-metallic money. Gold and silver will circulate frater¬ 
 nally, themselves present, or represented by notes. No 
 money more varied, hence no money more convenient. 
 
 What will the miners, the seekers of gold and silver, say ? 
 “ Henceforth,” they will say, “ the relative value of the two 
 metals can no longer vary. So much the better. It is a risk 
 the less, in our risky occupation.” 
 
 Like the tobacco-grower in the country where the crop is 
 bought by the State at a price fixed beforehand ; the grower 
 plants for the sake of profit; he may lose, but once he plants, 
 he is certain of the value of the tobacco harvested. 
 
 To extract 1 of gold, or 15^ of silver, will be to produce 
 the same quantity of money. Never will gold and silver 
 miners have lived under a more advantageous legislation. 
 
 The equality of value between 1 of gold and 15^ of silver 
 makes a single money of the two metals. Gold becomes 
 
20 
 
 yellow and light silver; silver becomes white and heavy 
 gold. 
 
 Let 15^ be sanctioned by London, Washington, Paris, 
 Berlin, and in twenty-four hours silver goes up to 15^, and 
 maintains itself there, for ever. 
 
 At this news, all parliamentary nations, and Russia, and 
 the Mussulmans, and Japan, so prompt to imitate us, and 
 the Indies, subject as they are to Europeans, will hasten 
 to adhere to the great compact which consolidates, and 
 guarantees, the value of the two metals. 
 
 China alone will hold aloof from bi-metallism. It will 
 retain its silver mono-metallism—a rude mono-metallism, for 
 the silver is not even coined; it circulates in ingots, which 
 are neither of the same weight, nor the same standard. So 
 much the worse for it. As for us, we shall always be able 
 to receive the Chinese ingot; we shall make money with it, 
 and, with our coined silver, we shall always be able to pay the 
 Chinese. 
 
 Paris, February, 1876. 
 
21 
 
 IDENTICALNESS 
 
 OF 
 
 FRANCS, POUNDS STERLING, AND DOLLARS. 
 
 Mr. Evarts, the American Secretary of State, has just 
 addressed to the representatives of the United States abroad 
 a circular, in which he begs them to invite the Governments 
 to which they are accredited to join the United States in a 
 monetary conference. The problem which the conference 
 would have to solve is twofold. 
 
 1st. To have, in all countries, the same legal ratio 
 between the weight of the gold monetary unit, and the 
 weight of the silver monetary unit. 
 
 2ndly. To have, in all countries, though under different 
 denominations, identical coins. 
 
 It seems to us that the object would be attained if an 
 international compact sanctioned the following measures :— 
 
 France will replace her present gold money by a 25-franc 
 piece, exactly the same as the pound sterling;—the 5-franc 
 silver piece will be left untouched. 
 
 England will have a 4-shilling silver piece, exactly the 
 same as the 5-franc piece ;—the gold pound sterling will be 
 left untouched. 
 
 The United States will replace their present gold money 
 by a 5-dollar piece, exactly the same as the pound sterling;— 
 their silver dollar will be exactly the same as the 5-franc 
 piece. 
 
 In all three countries gold and silver will be admitted to 
 mintage, without restriction of quantity, and will be legal 
 tender without restriction of amount. 
 
22 
 
 It will be seen that were this international compact con 
 eluded, France and the United States would coin gold pounds 
 sterling like England; England and the United States would 
 coin 6-franc silver pieces like France. In all three countries 
 there would be seen in circulation English gold and silver 
 pieces, French gold and silver pieces, American gold and silver 
 pieces. The gold piece would be at once a pound sterling, — 
 25-francs,—5-dollars; the silver piece would be at once 
 S-francs,—4-shillings,—1-dollar. It would be perfect, abso¬ 
 lute, international bi-metallic monetary identity. 
 
 By resuming the mintage of silver simultaneously with 
 France and the United States, England secures immediately 
 with the entire world a par of exchange as fixed as if only 
 gold, everywhere, circulated. The rupee immediately recovers 
 the value in gold it possessed before 1873. The Anglo- 
 Indian Treasury, now so seriously affected by reason of the 
 famine, will no longer be burdened with the three million 
 pounds sterling which it has, yearly, been losing since 1874 
 on the exchange between the rupee (silver) and the sovereign 
 (gold). 
 
 For the French public the reform is very advantageous, 
 though it casts on the Treasury the expense of recoinage, 
 and the loss resulting therefrom; as twenty-two centimes 
 more gold will have to be put into the new 2 5-franc piece 
 than there are in twenty-five francs of the type to be 
 abolished. But by means of this recoinage what benefits for 
 France ! The two-and-a-half milliards of silver francs which 
 she possesses have, at present, only an indigenous and fictitious 
 value. Put in the crucible, the 5-franc piece loses more than 
 a tenth of its legal value. It will no longer lose anything if 
 the international compact is signed; and it will even be 
 worth more than it was worth before 1871. Five pieces 
 of 6-francs did not then make up a pound sterling; there 
 were twenty-two centimes short; they will make it up if 
 
23 
 
 the agreement is concluded. In short, the French public 
 will gain, by the rehabilitation of silver thus effected, much 
 more than the Treasury will expend in the recoinage of gold. 
 
 The 20-franc piece was necessarily of odd weight (6*425 
 grammes); the 25-franc piece will necessarily be of odd 
 weight. That was, and will be, of no consequence. What 
 is of consequence is the not tampering with the 5-franc silver 
 piece, which is of the even weight of 25 grammes, and which 
 is the basis of the French monetary system in its relations 
 with the metric system. 
 
 By coining a 5-dollar gold piece of the value of the pound 
 sterling, the United States will have to reduce the weight of 
 the dollar to 25^ grains. This reduction Mr. Sherman, the 
 Secretary of the Treasury, himself proposed in 1875, and the 
 Senate agreed to it. As regards the silver dollar, equal to 
 the 5-franc piece, the reform is, as it were, half realised. 
 All the half-dollar pieces coined since 1873 are each exactly 
 equal to half a 5-franc silver piece. The only thing, therefore, 
 will be to let the silver dollar be freely minted at double the 
 weight of the present half-dollar. 
 
 The French, English, and American legislators once 
 agreed, the two metals will really be but one metal from the 
 legal and monetary stand-point, and the legislators of other 
 countries will eagerly give their adhesion to the franc-pound- 
 dollar system. 
 
 Germany, indeed, may hesitate. She has sold, at a heavy 
 loss, half her silver; she will, perhaps, choose to persevere 
 in her gold mono-metallism to the end. Let her do as she 
 likes. The union of the great States on the Atlantic sea¬ 
 board will nevertheless render her this service, that she will 
 be able to get minted, without any loss, at Paris, London, 
 Philadelphia, the 120 or 150 million thalers she still holds. 
 
 Paris, May, 1878