MASTER NEGATIVE NO. 92-80492 MICROFILMED 1992 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES/NEW YORK as part of the "Foundations of Western Civilization Preservation Project" Funded by the NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE HUMANITIES Reproductions may not be made without permission from Columbia University Library COPYRIGHT STATEMENT The copyright law of the United States - Title 17, United States Code - concerns the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material... Columbia University Library reserves the right to refuse to accept a copy order if, in its judgement, fulfillment of the order would involve violation of the copyright law. AUTHOR: SANKEY, CHARLES TITLE: THE SPARTAN AND THEBAN SUPREMACIES PLACE: NEW YORK DATE: 1899 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES PRESERVATION DEPARTMENT DIBLIOCRAPIIIC MICROrORM TARHFT Master Negative # Original Material as Filmed - Existing Bibliographic Record Restrictions on Use: 094.06 Sa5l D920.8 Sa5- Sankey, Charles. ... The Spartan and Tlioban supremacies; by Charles bankey ... New York, C. Scribner's sons, 1899. xxi. 231 p. incl. plans. 2 fold, maps (incl. front) 17J"-. (Half'title: Epoclis of ancient history ...) / ^ \ ; c. Scries title also at head of t.-p. Copy in Colloco Gtuly. 1. Greece — Hist. Library of Congress r •y DF231.S4 7-^986 FILM 5lZE.__J^ji^^ TECHNICAL MICROFORM DATA REDUCTION RATIO: J/X. IMAGE PLACEMENT: lA (luT) IB IID SfJE FILMED:_^_.^^<:^_^____ INITIALS ^^ ^ . FILMED BY: RESEARCH PUBLICATION.S. INC VVOODHRinnF rr "~ LLE Association for Information and Image Management 1100 Wayne Avenue, Suite 1100 Silver Spring, Maryland 20910 301/587-8202 Centimeter 12 3 4 iiiliiii iiiiiiiiiliiiiiii|ilii|iiiiiiL Inches iiiiiiiiiiiiiiii 7 8 iiliiiiliiiil 1.0 I.I 1.25 ^ ill 9 10 11 luuluiiuiiluiUi 12 13 14 iiliiiiliiiiliiiiliiiili M 2.8 ■ 50 '^^ 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.4 1.6 TFT TTT 15 mm H MRNUFfiCTURED TO RUM STRNDfiRDS BY APPLIED IMRGE. INC. iirjitV'i^evu^vitiSpA.JKjtStiitie&'ssMfsvtaiiaia^^ i&NCIEIVT HISTORY ^^ oe ^^^ Coluittbta ®tiihfwftp LIBRARY I Q- g ^ o ^ •f^ 1 fi i i 1 1 1 1 •^ < a. LU EPOCHS OF ANCIENT HISTORY THE SPARTAN AND THEBAN i i SUPREMACIES BY CHARLES SANKEY, M.A. JOINT-EDITOR OF THE SERIES ASSISTANT-MASTER IN MARLBOROUGH COLLEGE WITH FIVE MAPS L NEW YORK CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 1899 PREFACE. The period of history covered by this httle book is full both of interest and of importance. Athens yet numbered among her sons Sokrates, Xenophon, and Thrasyboulos : Si)arta at no time in her history had l)roduced more notable citizens than Lysandros and Agesilaos ; and Thebes was lifted for a moment above her Boiotian provincialism by the military genius and broad statesmanship of Epameinondas. But, in ad- dition to the interest which must be felt in the careers of men like these, this epoch has an importance of its own. It was the transition period from the glories of the Athenian empire to the degradation of the Mace- donian conquest ; Athens had attempted in vain to weld into something like national unity the exclusive and intolerant city communities of the Hellenic world ; and the epoc h which followed her downfall exhibits the disastrous results involved in the success of the selfish policy of Sparta and the partial failure of the jKitriotic policy of Thebes. VI Preface, Accordingly, in treating this period, I have tried to bring out clearly the characters of the leading men and the causes of the chief events; and I have omitted most of the infinitely small details with which Xenophon has filled the pages of his ' Hellenika.' I have, of course, derived the greatest assistance from the works of Thirlwall, Grote, Prof. E. Curtius, and lastly from my co-editor Mr. Cox ; but the narrative is based mainly on Xenophon and Plutarch, and I have attempted to lighten to some extent the charge of dullness so often brought against the * Hellenika ' by borrowing many of the graphic touches of humour and description which frequently redeem its general dreariness. C. S. CONTENTS. B.C. 404. V CHAPTER I. THE SPARTAN SUPREMACY. Capture of Athens Conditions imposed upon her Distress to which she had been reduced Destruction of the Long Walls .... The system of Sparta a total falsification of her promises She had promised liberty But set up a crushing tyranny Influence and character of Lysandros Lysandros indispensable to Sparta in managing the allies The Harmosts The Dekarchies ....... The process of setting up these governments Great opportunity lost to Sparta .... CHAPTER H. ATHENS UNDER THE THIRTY Return of the Athenian e.viles Kritias : his character Theramenes : his character . Political clubs at Athens . Measures of the oligarchical party Board of five Ephors Arrest of democratic leaders . Appointment of the Thirty Measures of the Thirty . New Senate. Board of Eleven Dekarchy in Peiraieus . Professions of the Thirty, made to gain the ' moderates PAGE I I 2 2 3 3 4 5 5-6 7 8 9 lo 10 II 12 12 13 13 13 14 15 15 IS 15 4- Vlll B.C. 404. Contents. Condemnation of the sycophants . K.xecution of prominent democrats . A ISpartan garrison introduced into the Akropolis Story of Autolykos .... Further e.xcesses of the Thirty I*rotests of Iheramenes Institution of the Three Thousand Plunder of the ' Metoikoi ' Accusation of Theramcncs Speech of Kritias .... Answer of 'Theramenes .... Kritias condemns Theramenes to death Theramenes is seized by the Eleven And dies by the hemlock draught Keign of Terror imder the 'Thirty . Reasons for the oligarcliical excesses i. Grievances of the rich at Athens ii. Rancour of political feeling in Greece iii. Character of Kritias .... Internal policy of the Thirty CHAPTKR III. THF ' ' ORATION OF THE Al IllMAN DKMOCRACY. Change in Greek feeling ...... Conduct of Lysandros ...... Samos subdued Lysandros returns in triumph t" *^>^irta His power His arrogance Other causes of the growing unpopularity of Sparta. i. Rejection of the claims of Thebes, ii. Tribute. iii. Oligarchical enormities, iv. Broken promises Thebes gives shelter and support to Athenian exiles Thrasyl)oulos Anytos, Archinos . Position of Phyle Phvle is seized bv Thrasvboulos .... PAGB • • 16 • 16 }olis . 17 • 17 18 • 19 19 • 20 20 • 21 21 • 22 23 • 23 24 • 25 25 • 26 26 • 27 \ 28 28 29 29 29 30 3^^ 31 31 32 32 32 B.C. 404. 403- r Y Contents. Assault of the troops of the Thirty repulsed Night attack by Thrasyboulos successful 'The Thirty seize Eleusis and Salamis 'Thrasyboulos occupies the Peiraieus Battle of Mounychia Address of Thrasyboulos His victory Speech of Kleokritos .... Effects of the successes of Thrasyboulos . Board of Ten appointed, vice the 'Thirty, most of whom retire to Eleusis ..... 'The army of 'Thrasyboulos gains strength Spartan aid urgently requested . Lysandros starts with a strong force to the rescue of the oligarchs ...... jealousy against Lysandros at Sparta . Pausanias, one of the kings, sets out with a second army ....... Takes the chief command ; hears complaints against the oligarchs ..... His operations against Thrasyboulos He accepts overtures for an armistice . Embassies are sent to Sparta 'Teritis of peace finally arranged Entry of Thrasyboulos into Athens . Speech of 'Thrasyboulos Restoration of the democracy .... The remnants of the Thirty driven out of Eleusis . Moderation of the democrats beyond all praise Limitation of citizenship to Athenians of pure blood Legislation after the re-establishment of the democracy CHAPTER IV. SOK RATES. Appearance and character of Sokrates IX PAOB 34 34 35 36 36 37 37 38 38 39 40 40 41 41 42 43 43 44 44 45 45 46 46 46 47 48 49 His eloquence His temperance and courage 50 51 51 B.C. 403- 399- 403- 40I. Contents. His early life He studies physical science ..... But being dissatisfied turns to ethics His religious mission and supernatural warnings His method ; — a rigorous cross-examination His contributions to logic ; — inductive arguments and definitions His doctrine; — virtue is knowledge, and vice is igno- rance .....,.,. Positive side of his teaching His conversations were public and unpaid His band of companions The Uelphic oracle pronounces Sokrates the wisest of men ; he proves the oracle true by exposing the ignorance of the so-called wise .... Sokrates was unpopular with the i. lower orders ; ii. higher classes ; iii. priests iv. Sophists, v. Old-fashioned Athenians His life is a proof of Athenian toleration and liberality He is accused by Meletos. Anytos. and Lykon The arguments of his accusers, and his defence His condemnation and speech after sentence was pro- nounced His imprisonment and death CHAPTER V. THE TEN TIIOUS.AND. Interest and importance of the Anabasis . Cyrus fails to obtain the throne, and collects Greek troops at Sardeis March of Cyrus from Sardeis . . . , Review of Greek troops .... Advance of the army from Tarsos to Babylonia . Preparations of A rtaxer.xes .... March through Babylonia Arrangements for battle Battle of Kunaxa . 1 PAGE 53 53 54 55 55 56 56 57 58 59 59 60 61 63 63 65 66-67 67 68 68 69 70 70 70 B.C. 401. 400. yP 403- 401. Contents, Victory of the Greeks and death of Cyrus The Greeks refuse to submit to Artaxerxes, and follow the army of Tissaphernes Treachery of Tissaphernes, and death of the generals Dangers and despondency of the Greeks Energy of Xenophon, who is chosen one of the new generals . Character of Xenophon. a true .Athenian Retreat from the Zabatos to Trapezous Sight of the Sea Reception of the Cyreians by the Greeks, and its causes Futile endeavour to get ships from Byzantion March to Kotyora Difficulties of Xenophon Advance to Chr\'sopolis Dangerous tumult at Byzantion, produced by the treachery of Anaxibios ; Admirably repressed by Xenophon .... Abominable treatment of the Cyreians by the Spartans They take service under Seuthes, and then on the side of Sparta against Persia . Xenophon"s success in Asia . • • • • He perhaps goes to Athens, and returns to Asia CHAPTER VI. SPARTA: HER ALLIES AND SUBJECTS. Contrast between grievances under Athenian and Spartan rule Power of Lysandros weakened by— i. The repudiation of his conduct at Sestos ii. The condemnation of Thorax iii. His recall in consequence of the complaints of Pharnabazos .... Lysandros is tricked by Pharnabazos, and leaves Sparta Fall of the dekarchies Growmg discontent of the allies . • • • War with Elis. Its causes XI FAGS 71 71-72 72 73 74 75 76 76 77 77 78 78 79 79 80 80 81 82 83 82 83 84 84 85 85 86 86 XII Contents, B.C. 401. 400. 399 Agis invades Elis, and retires .... Agis invades Elis a second time, and mercilessly rav- ages the country ....... Unsuccessful rising of the oligarchs m the capital The Eleians submit to Sparta .... Death of Agis Schemes of Lysandros, as tukl by Plutarch . Their failure Lysandros supports the cl.i..... v.f Agesilaos to the throne Character of Agesilaos Conflicting claims of Agesilaos and Leotychides . Decided in favour of Agesilaos .... Position of kings at JSparta Agesilaos conciliates the cpliors Discontent of all the lower strata of Spartan society Change in the character of the governing class Conspiracy of Kinadon Its discovery and repression .... FACB 87 87 88 88 89 89 90 90 91 92 93 93 94 94 96 97 97-98 S98. 396. CHAPTER VII. OPER.VTIONS IN ASI.\ MINOR. The glory of Sparta tarnished by Persian aid . Cau.ses of war between Sparta and Persia i. Spartan support of Cyru ii. Appeal of .Asiatic Greeks again>st Tissaphemes iii. Weakness of Persia recently exposed . iv. Vahie to Spirta of a Hellenic policy Expedition of Thimbron . His incapacity and punishni* nt Derkyllidas attacks Pharn,il).i/<)^ Conquest of Aiolian cities Winter quarters in Hithynia .... ( onfidence of the ephors in Derkyllidas Rebuilding of the Thrakian Wall Reduction of At;irneus His march into Karia; truce with Tissaphernes 104- 99 99 100 100 100 loi lOI lOI 102 102 102 103 104 104 105 Cofititits. XIII B C. 396. Causes of the expedition of Agesilaos . i. Dangerous condition of lower classes ii. News of the form.ition of a Persian fleet under Konon ••■•••... ill. Ambition of Lysandros and Agesilaos Expedition of Agesilaos His sacrifice at Aulis, and arrival in Asia Truce with Tissaphernes Devotion of Asiatics to Lysandros, and his humili- ''^^'O" •••'.... 107 Truce broken by Tissaphernes, followed by the plun- der of the satrapy of Pharnabazos ... 108 Military preparations at Ephesos .... 395. Devastation of Lydia Defeat of Persian cavalry near Sardeis . Disgrace and death of Tissaphernes .... Truce between his successor Tithraustcs and Agesilaos Agesilaos raises a fleet and appoints Peisandros ad- miral March of Agesilaos into Paphlagonia and Phrygia Camp of Pharnabazos taken Interview between Agesilaos and Pharnabazos . Agesilaos retires into Mysia: is recalled by the ^P^^o'"^ 113- Fleet of Konon blockaded at Kaunos Revolt of Rhodes. Execution of Dorieus Konon "s journey to the Court 394. Pharnabazos joint admiral . ^ • • • • « Defeat and death of Peisandros at Knidos . CFIAPTER VHL THE CORINTHIAN WAR. Increasing discontent of Allies, and unpopularity of Sparta .... Tithraustes sends money to the Greek states Special hostility of Thebes ; its causes Outbreak of Boiotian war 395. PAGB lOS 106 106 107 107 -108 -109 109 no no III III III 112 112 1X2 114 114 116 1x6 117 X18 119 xxg V XIV B.C. 395- 394- 393- 392. 391. Contents, Spartan plan of operations Theban embassy to Athens The Athenians promise help Death of Lysandros before Haliartos, and dispersion of his army Pausanias asks for a burial-truce, and evacuates Boi- otia He is accused and condemned ; ends his life at Tegea Formation of a confederacy against Sparta . Theban successes in the north Council of war at Corinth March of the Spartans under A ristodemos Battle of Corinth. Defeat of the Allies Agesilaos at Amphipolis, in Thessaly, at Chaironeia Battle of Koroneia ....... Tremendous struggle between Theban and Spartan hoplites Agesilaos goes to Delphoi ; and returns to Sparta . Konon and Pharnabazos receive the submission of the Greek cities in Asia Abydos and Sestos hold out under Derkyllidas Pharnabazos and Konon ravage the coasts of Lakonia and garrison Kythera Pharnabazos returns to Asia Konon rebuilds the Long Walls of Athens Military operations near Corinth .... Dissensions in Corinth Admission of the Spartans within her Long Walls Iphikrates becomes noted as a leader of peltasts, and spreads terror among the Peloponnesian allies . Operations of Agesilaos and Teleutias near Corinth Overtures for peace Agesilaos. after being present at the Isthmian games, captures Peiraion Destruction of a Spartan mora by Iphikrates . Prodigious moral effects of this exploit . Recall of Iphikrates from Corinth .... Contents. XV PAGI 119 120 120 121 122 123 123 124 124 124 126 127 127 128 128 129 130 130 131 131 132 133 133 134 135 13s 136 137 138 AC. 391. 391. 389- 388. 387. 386. 385- CHAPTER IX. THE PEACE OF ANTALKIDAS. PAGB Agesilaos in Akarnania 138 Agesipolis in Argolis 138 Antalkidas is sent to Asia and gains over Tiribazos . 139 Counter embassies from Argos, Athens, Corinth, and Thebes i^q Arrest of Konon 1x0 Strouthas supersedes Tiribazos and defeats Thimbron 141 Expedition, successes, and death of Thrasyboulos 141 Anaxibios surprised and slain by Iphikrates . . 142 Piracy in Aigina ij^3 Teleutias surprises the Peiraicus .... 144 Second mission of Antalkidas is successful . . 144 Causes of the general acceptance of terms of peace . 145 Proclamation of the conditions .... 146 Theban and .Argive objections overruled by Agesilaos 146 The Peace of Antalkidas disgraceful in its form, in all its articles, and in the spirit of its execution . . 147 Mantineia punished by being split up into hamlets 149 Real weakness of Persia 150 Effect of the peace on the Asiatic Greeks, and on Euagoras 150 CHAPTER X. THE SUPPRESSION OF OLYNTHOS, AND THE LIBERATION OF THEBES. Miserable results of the war 151 i. Mercenaries, ii. Pitiless plunder, iii. Embittered party feelings, iv. Blunted patriotism . . 151-152 Sparta as executor of the peace 152 Results to Athens , 152 Results to Thebes 153 Spartan measures in Boiotia 153 Restoration of Plataia 153 xvr I.e. 384. 383- 382. 381. 380. 379. II Contents. Growth of the Olynthian confederacy Appeal of the Akanthians against Olynthos Objections of Akanthos and Apollonia Spartan expeditions against OI\ nthos Political state of Thebes ... Ismenias Plot arranged by Leontiades Kadmeia seized by Phoibidas Arrest of Ismenias ..... I'tTect of this news al Sparta . Sentence on Phoibidas Morality of the act of Phoiljidas discussed Trial and execution of Ismenias Spartan oi)erations against Olynthos Death of leleutias ..... Death of Agesipolis ... Submission of Olynt;... The moment of Sparta's great wcr Theban exiles at Athens .... Plot against Theban oligarchs Pelopidas and his companions enter Thebes Assassination of Archias and others Assassination of Leontiades Muster of the democrats. General assembly Pelopidas and his friends made Boiotarchs The Spartans evacuate the Kadmeia CHAPTER XI. THE RISE OF THERES. Character of Pelopidas Character of Epameinondas Difficulties in the way of Thebes . . . , The Sacred Band Spartan expedition against Boiotia under Kleom- brotos . . Sphodrias attempts to surprise the Peiraieus . Is tried, and acquitted Contents. XVII PAG 8 IS4 154 155 155 156 156 15^ 157 157 157 158 158 159 160 160 161 161 161 162 163 163 164 165 166 166 166 167 168 170 170 171 172 17-I B.C. 379- 378. 377-6 376. 375- 374- 373- 372. 371. Formation of a new Athenian Confederacy Its early enthusiasm and real weakness Thebes, pressed by difficulties, joins the new lea-ue ' Agesilaos takes the field against Thebes, but effects little ; not daring to engage the united Theban and Athenian armies ... The campaigns of 377 and 376 w. c. Illness of Agesilaos ... The Spartans raise a fleet, but are defeated near Naxos . Athens mcreases her naval power Thebes strengthens her authoritv in Boiotia . Especially by the defeat of the Spartans near Tegyra The Spartans send an army under Kleombrotos to help the Phokians against Thebes But refuse help to Pharsalos against Jason of Pherai Athens makes peace with Sparta Which is broken by Timotheos at Zakynthos Mnasippos lays siege to Korkvra ; but is defeated and killed . Operations of Iphikrates in command of the Athenian fleet Timotheos tried .uid acquitted; ente'rs the service of the Great King . The Thebans dismantle Thespiai. and destroy Plataia Athens and Sparta inclined to peace Antalkidas obtains a rescript from the Great King Peace Congress at Sparta. The Peace of Kallias Sparta and Athens swear to the terms of the peace- but with the Thebans a hitch arises ; and they are excluded from the treaty 18-8 Kleombrotos invades Boiotia. 'and 'encamps 'near ^" ^ Leuktra . . _ Numbers of the armies Discouragement in the Theban "camp, alleviated by the spirit of Epameinondas. and by favourable portents 186 TAG E 173 173 174-175 175 175 176 176 176 177 178 178 179 179 179 180 181 181 182 182 183 185 186 ' t ym Tki^'wfvw XVIII Contents. B.C. PAGR 371. Tactirs of Fpameinondas 187 The Spartans eager to engage . 188 The Spartan right wing defeated; Kleombrotos slain, and the whole army driven back to the camp 189-190 The Spartans acknowledge their defeat by asking for the burial truce ....... Reception of the news at Spart.i .... And at Athens Jason of Pherai arranges an armistice ; and the Spar- tans depart by night 370- 369- 190 191 191 192 CHAPTER XII. THE THEBAN SLTREM.\CY. General tendencies of Theban policy Immediate effects of Leuktra ..... The Thebans destroy Thespiai .... And obtain an Amphiktyonic condemnation of Sparta Athens becomes the head of a new league At Sparta the penalties of the law are remitted in the case of the survivors of Leuktra .... Disturbances in the Peloponnesos .... • Skytalism ' at Argos Rebuilding of Mantineia Movement for Arkadian union Influence of Lykomedes at Mantineia . Difficulties from the opposition of Orchomenos and Tf*gea ......... Expedition of Agesilaos against Mantineia . First expedition of Epameinondas to the Peloponnese His designs ........ He marches on Sparta But the energy of Agesilaos saves the city Megalopolis is founded as the capital of Arkadia Messene built, and the Messenians restored . Futile charge brought against Epameinondas on his return Alliance between Sparta and Athens 192 194 194 194 194 195 195 195 196 196 196 197 197 198 198 198 199 200 200 201 201 B.C. 368. 370. 368. 367. 366. 365. 364- 4 363. 362. Contents. Chabrias occupies the Isthmus . But Epameinondas forces his way through . Epameinondas dismissed from office , Assiissination of Jason of Pherai . Alexandros becomes Tagos Seizure and imprisonment of Pelopidas The first expedition sent to rescue him fails The second, under Epameinondas, is successful Messenian victory at Olympic games Energy and success of Arkadians .... An expedition under Archidamos into Arkadia results in the Spartan victory of ' The Tearless Battle ' Third expedition of Epameinondas to the Peloponnese His treatment of the Achaian cities reversed by Thebes Embassies despatched by the Greek states to the Persian court Success of Pelopidas in obtaining a decree in favour of Thebes ; but not a single state accepts it . Alliance between Arkadia and Athens Peace made by Corinth and Phlious with Thebes War between Arkadia and Elis • • • • Defeat of Archidamos by the Arkadians Battle of Olympia, and bravery of the Eleians Dissensions among the Arkadians lead to peace with Elis Seizure of Arkadian oligarchs at Tegea . Mantineian envoys seek redress at Thebes Reply of Epameinondas Alliance between Sparta and Mantineia Death of Pelopidas in Thessaly, when victorious over Alexandros of Pherai Fleet raised by Thebes Destruction of Orchomenos . * * * • Position of the Greek states with reference to the war Fourth expedition of Epameinondas to the Pelopon- nese XIX PACK 202 202 203 203 204 204 204 205 205 205 206 207 207 208 209 209 210 210 211 211 211 212 212 213 213 214 215 2IS 216 216 B.C. 362. 361. Contents, PAGS Xenophon's testimony to the r^rif-r ilship of Epamci- nondas ......... 216 Epameinondas attempts to surprise Sparta ; but is hafficd . . . .217 He attempts to surprise Mantineia ; but is thwarted by the Athenian cavalry ...... 218 Enthusiasm of Thebans and Arkadians for Epamei- nond.is ......... 219 The Spartans and their alHes take up a position south of Mantineia 219 Tactics of Epameinondas ..... 220 Success of the Thebans, stopped suddenly by the fiill of Epameinondas ...... 220-221 His last moments 222 His death ......... 222 Results of the battle ...... 222 Death of .\gesilaos in Egypt ..... 223 Summary 223-224 Index . 325 ■r Contents. XXI MAPS. M.AP OF roNTINKMAL GkkkcK . To face title-page Mat of Nkiciiuolrhood of Athens Map of Wkstekv \<;ia . • • • • . I'l.AN OF Battle of Leuktra . IM \\ (H- Hatti.k (.F Ma.ntineia . PAGE 33 To face 63 187 231 k THE SPARTAN AND THEBAN SUPREMACIES. CHAPTER I. THE SPARTAN SUPREMACY. The long struggle was over, and the triumph of Sparta was complete. After a resistance protracted through twenty-seven years of almost superhuman effort imperial Athens lay at the mercy of her Athens. foes. The Spartans had rejected the vin- dictive demand of their allies that no treaty should be made with the enslavers of Hellas, but that their very name should be blotted out, or, as a Theban envoy had phrased it, that the city should be razed, the inhab- itants sold into slavery, and the country turned into a sheep-walk ; for they knew well enough that the glorious memory of Athens, if destroyed, might some day be cast in their teeth as a bitter reproach, while Athens, if kept by the oligarchic faction subservient to Spartan policy, might be the most valuable instrument in their hands. Accordingly with a parade of magnanimous sentiments, which they had forgotten readily enough in the case of Plataia, they declared that they could not consent to enslave a city which had served Greece so nobly in her darkest hour of danger; and the fiat went forth that the Long Walls and the forti- Conditions imposed upon her. The Spartan Supremacy. B.C. 404. ficatioiib of the Peiraieus were to be destroyed ; that the Athenians should surrender all their fleet except twelve ships ; that they should receive back into the city their exiles— men who had no sympathy with their cherished traditions of past glory, and were openly hostile to that constitution which had made that glory possible ; that they should recognise as allies or enemies those whom the Spartans regarded as such; and that they should serve with the Spartans wherever they should lead them by sea or land. Hard as these terms must have seemed to those who still clung fondly to some slight hope that Athens would be allowed to retain either her navy or her fortifications, they were readily accepted by the majority of the citizens. Not only had the fleet of Athens been ruined and the flower of her seamen been slain, for from blows almost as crushing: as these she had previously recovered ; nor was it that the lingering agonies of a pro- tracted siege had slowly destroyed alike the power and the will to resist ; but the more f;\tal evils of treachery and disunion had been doing their work. As there had been an Adeimantos at Aigospotamoi, so there was a Theramenes at Athens; and the city divided against itself could not stand. The few who still protested against surrender, and preferred death to dishonour, could not make their voices heard. Lysandros sailed in triumph through the narrow entrance of the harbour of Peiraieus; Kritias, Charikles, and a crowd of exiles, returned to make their own gain out of their country's loss ; and the work Destruction ^^ destruction, sad enough to the Athenian Wall^ ^"^"8 hands which had to complete it, at once began. Enlivened by the glad strains of female flute-players and the joyous measures of garlanded dancing-women, the Spartans began to demolish the Long Distress to which she had been reduced. ] ) i The system of Sparta a total falsifi- cation of her pro- mises. CH. I. Falsification of Spartan Promises. 3 Walls, the most solid and magnificent of the external evidences of Athenian supremacy ; while the allies lent willing assistance, thinking in their short-sighted enthu- siasm that this was the first day of liberty for Hellas. But never have highly-wrought hopes been doomed to be more cruelly falsified. If the promises of Sparta, which had been reiterated repeatedly during the whole course of the war, could have been trusted, the allies had indeed good reason to be confident. The Corinthians had originally urged her to stand forward as the liberator of (^.reece from the thraldom of the despot-city. The ultimatum forwarded from Sparta to Athens before the declaration of war had insisted on the independence of the Greek cities. Archidamos had called upon the Plataians to fight in the same cause. Still more explic- itly had Brasidas assured the Akanthians that the lib- erty of Greece was his sole object ; that the Lake-daimo- nians had sworn most solemnly to allow full independ- ence to those who joined their alliance ; that he did not come to support any local faction, neither to strengthen the hands of the few against the many nor of the many against the few; that the end of Sparta was only the destruction of the empire of others, and not the establish- ment of empire for herself. But the twenty years which had passed since these promises were uttered had brought great changes with them. Not pro^mised only had the disasters in Sicily inflicted a ^''^^''^y' heavy blow on the power and prestige of Athens ; not only had the temporary ascendency of the Four Hundred shewn the strength of faction in her midst ; but Persian influence and Persian gold had rendered Sparta more independent of the good opinion of her Greek allies. These promises indeed were never formally withdrawn, The Spartan Supremacy. B. C. 404. and were even renewed from time to time on suitable occasions ; but the protestations grew ever less vehement and emphatic. At last when a catastrophe, more complete in its results and more stunning in its suddenness than even Lysandros could have looked for, laid the whole Grecian world prostrate before the conquering city, all previous pledges and promises were forgotten. The sentimental complaints against Athenian supremacy were changed for the positive injuries of Spartan tyranny; and the tardy, and sometimes partial, justice of a crushing the dilcasterics for the heartless indifference tyranny. ^^ ^^^ ephoVs. If thc fulc of the culturcd, civilised, and philosophic State was like the chastisement of whips, the oppression of the rough, military power was like the stinging of scorpions ; and the little finger of the Spartan harmost was thicker than the loins of the Athe- nian tax-collector. Perhaps it was that the Spartan, always drilled and never educated, and consequently narrow and intolerant, could never grasp the Greek notion of political liberty. The citizen, in the general idea of Greeks, as in the formal definition of Aristotle, was one who had a right to share in the work of govern- ment, to speak and vote in his assembly, and to act as juryman in his law-courts. But in the mouth of a Spar- tan liberty was a fair-sounding pretence under which the oligarchs could lord it over the people ; and, if they had been upbraided with their perfidious violations of all their promises, they would perhaps have replied that in sup- porting a governing class and saving the people from their sad errors of democracy, they were really securing the highest liberty to their subject states. For it was the rivalry of democrat and oligarch, no less than the principle of autonomy, which embittered the strug- gle of the Peloponnesian war, and made every single I 1 ^1? i I en. I. Pcnuvr and Character of Lysandros. 5 state and city of Hellas feel the keenest interest in its result. It was indeed a great calamity for Greece that her destinies at this time were in the hands of a man like Lysandros. Had the war been concluded by the mag- nanimous and high-principled Kallikratidas, he might possibly have seen that with all its faults the Athenian confederacy was not only a step in the right direction, but the highest point to which the Lysandros^' political development of the Greeks had attained ; and, correcting its faults, he might have made an effort to work on the same principle. Had Brasidas, with his broader views and wider sympathies, been at this crisis supreme in the councils of Sparta, he might perhaps have prevented her great name from being degraded by the support of oligarchic faction and tyranny. It would have been better had even a mere soldier like Gylippos been at the head of the Spartan forces, for he might have contented himself with military results, and have refrained from intermeddling with the political life of the cities. But Lysandros was utterly incapable of even conceiving the idea of patriotism towards Hellas, and was also con- summately able and absolutely unscrupulous in carrying out his own designs. Of noble, even of Herakleid, descent on his father's side, he was a man of boundless ambition and aspired to the highest offices in the State ; born of a mother of plebeian, if not of servile origin, he L^slndros"^ stooped to unworthy means to gain his ends. From the more vulgar vices he was free. Though reared in the strictest school of Spartan discipline, his character was not stained by those outbursts of sensual passion to which too many of the Spartan governors at this time gave way. Though brought up in poverty, he was The Spartan Supremacy. B.C. 404. superior to avarice, a vice which suUicd the reputation of many of the greatest of his fellow-citizens. Indeed Plutarch tells us that though he filled his country with riches and with the love of riches, by the vast amount of gold and silver which he sent home at the close of the war, he kept not one drachma for himself. It was this very quality which made Cyrus his firm friend ; for at a banquet given to Lysandros before his departure from Sardeis, Cyrus, pledging his guest in the wine cup, desired him to ask some favour from him, promising to refuse nothing which would gratify him ; and he heard with astonishment and admiration the request that an obol should be added to the daily pay of the seamen. Lysandros possessed pre-eminently another quality which was very rare among his countrymen, and which was especially useful in dealing with Asiatic Greeks and Persian grandees — a suppleness, tact, and pliancy, which enabled him to accommodate his manners and conversation to any com- pany, and contrasted favourably with the arrogance and harshness which was too common a result of Spartan training. Nor was he ashamed of the craft or cunning by which he gained success, openly declaring as a Hcra- kleid, that where the lion's skin of Herakles would not reach, it must be patched with that of the fox ; and, far from respecting the sanctity of a promise, he advised that men should be cheated with oaths, as boys with dice. Such was the character of the man who at this juncture was absolutely indispensable to Sparta. Lysandros had made himself useful to his countrv, and now Lysandros ^ ' ^ indispensable uas ncccssary to licr. While Other Spartan ^^^ ^ leaders had been content merely with win- ning their battles or conducting their campaigns to a successful close, Lysandros, with far-sighted prudence, had prepared beforehand all his plans for establishing the \ C H. I. The Spartan Harnunt. power of Sparta and of himself; he had gathered into his own hand all the threads of political influence, and had secured to himself a position in which neither rival nor colleague was possible. To effect ;Ke"!dHef.'"^ this, he had made good use of the office of admiral, which he had held ten years before. Fixing his headquarters at Kphesos, he had gained all possible infor- mation about the state of political parties in all the principal towns in insular and Asiatic Greece. He had even invited to Ephesos the chief party-leaders and the bolder and more ambitious citizens, promoting some to high office and honour, and exhorting others to combine more closely in political clubs ; and he had held out to all tlie prospect of absolute authority in their own cities after the downfall of Athens and the close of the war. Hence Lysandros was regarded by the oligarchic frictions in every State as their patron ; their advancement was de- pendent on his influence ; he was not merely the only Spartan who knew the right men in every city, but he was the only Spartan whom these men could fully trust. It was of course certain that the defeat of Athens was the defeat of democracy, and the triumph of Sparta the triumph of oligarchy ; such a result was clear from the tra- ditional policy of both States. But it was left for Lysan- dros to strike out a new type of oligarchy in the double government of the Spartan governor and the native Coun- cil of Ten, by which he could at once gratify all his parti- sans, secure his own personal ascendency, and yet not di- verge too widely from the ancient traditions of his country. The title of Harmost ('ordcrer' or 'governor') was not new. It had been the official name of the governors sent to manage the rural dis- tricts of the Perioikoi, or subject tribes who inhabited Lakonia and Messenia ; nor was there anything The Har- most. ■fi.. h The Spartan Supremacy. B. C. 404. offensive in the term, except so far as it implied that the allied cities were placed in the same position of inferiority as the conquered tribes of the Peloponncse. The au- thority of the harmost was supported by a body of Spartan soldiers; and his duties and his term of office were alike undefined. Directly dependent upon and responsible to the ephors, the harmosts had authority in civil as well as military affairs, and were, in short, the confidential servants of the Spartan government in the towns in which they were placed. Though they were originally men of advanced age and proved competence, the large number required at this time made it impossible that all should possess high rank or tried prudence ; and the allies were soon heard complaining that even helots were thought good enough to be placed over them as harmosts. History tells us little about them; but that little is to their discredit. Kallibios, at Athens, supported the Thirty Tyrants in their worst enormities ; Aristodemos, at Oreos, a town distin- guished beyond the rest of the Euboian cities for devo- tion to Athens, was guilty of the most brutal violence towards the son of a free citizen ; Aristarchos at Byzan- tion, where his predecessor Klearchos had made himself execrated for his cruelty, sold into slavery 400 of the Cyreian Greeks, most of whom had been left disabled by wounds or sickness; Herippidas at Herakleia massacred by hundreds the citizens who opposed him. In short, they were, as Diodoros says, governors in name, but tyrants in deed ; and it was vain to appeal to Sparta against their crimes. \j Nor was the character of the Dekarchies, or Commis- sions of Ten, such as to temper with modera- chics. tion the brutal and unscrupulous regime of the harmost. A blind devotion to the in- terests of Sparta and Lysandros, or, in other words, to i CH. I. The Dekarchies. I .1 oligarchy, had been rewarded by a position in which the lives and property of all their fellow-citizens, and especi- ally of their old political rivals, were at their mercy. Of the internal history of the towns under their rule little is known ; but from the ruthless rancour of Greek political life generally, and from the analogy of the Thirty at Athens, it may be judged that their members used their absolute liberty of action to satiate with blood their lust for vengeance, and to glut with plunder their rapacious cupidity. Isokrates, the orator, concludes a burst of strong denunciation against the Dekarchies with these indignant words : ' Exile and faction, the subversion of laws, and the overthrow of constitutions ; nay, more, outrages on boys, the shame of women, and the plunder of property, who can recount all these ? I can only aver that while one edict would easily have set aright all that went wrong under us, the massacres and illegalities committed under them are beyond the power of anyone to cure.' It was not to be expected that such governments could be quietly established in all the cities of Greece without considerable resistance and bloodshed. Everywhere, according to Plutarch, many were murdered, and many driven into exile. Friend and foe fared alike. All, whether old allies of Sparta or recent conquests from Athens, were equally obliged to submit to a dekarchy and to receive a harmost. Lysandros himself superintended the change of government in many cities, and by personally appear- ing on many scenes of bloodshed, says Plutarch, did not give the Greeks a favourable impression of Spartan rule. So on his voyage to Athens, after the catastrophe of Aigospotamoi, he arranged the internal politics of Chalke- don and Byzantion, of Mitylene and other Lesbian towns, and treacherously massacred a large number of citizens The process of setting up these govern- ments. tfi J3t» '^^.i.^ .A' ■ « ^ FO The Spartan Supremacy. B.C. 404. at Thasos, I n short, he showed conchisivcl y that the prom- ise of freedom under Sparta was a deUision and a snare. Never before had any single state wielded such power in Hellas as Sparta at this time ; never had any one man possessed the influence of Lysandros. Strong in the friendship of the (}reat King, stronger in the prestige which for generations had been gathering round her name, strongest in the gratitude of a newly-liberated Greece, Sparta had a great op[)()rtunity of conferring lasting benefits on Hellas; but narrow in all her views and stunted in her development, devoid alike of broad culture or far-sighted statesmanship, she f)ort ost to Sparta. >o7ninh^ abused her power to the worst purposes. It is true that she performed isolated acts of justice, dictated by political expediency, such as the restoration of the surviving Aiginctans and Melians, and the expulsion of Athenian and Messcnian colonists from various places ; but the prevailing charac- teristics of her rule were violence and injustice, and in bitter jest the Spartans were compared to cheating tavern- women, who trick their customers by the promise of a delicious draught, and then fill the cup with the most bit- ter and repulsive mixtures. CHAPTER 11. / ATHENS UNDER THE THIRTY. Though to the vast majority of Athenian citizens who saw the triumphant entrance of their dreaded foe, the sixteenth day of the month Mounychion had been a day of heaviness and despair, when the sun of Athenian glory set amid clouds and gloom, there was yet a party, calling itself Athenian, Return of the Athe- nian exiles. CM. II. Characters of Kritias and Theramenes. 1 1 which saw in the same circumstances a cause for the highest exultation. Many of them had been serving agamst their country with Agis, the Spartan king at Dckeleia, and had waited, the most eager and anxious of all the blockading force, for the moment of surrender. Others had remained within the beleaguered city frus- trating the efforts of the patriots to infuse harmony and coafidence into the famished multitude, accusing before the compliant Senate those who were most energetic in animating the citizens to resistance, and securing their arrest and, if necessary, their execution. Now the hour had come which crowned their efforts with success and realised their hopes to the full, assuring to them revenge for the past and ascendency in the future. Foremost among the exiles was Kritias. In him, if in any, might have been found the ideal of oligarchic per- fection. Born of ancient and honourable lineage, and possessed of hereditary wealth kritias: his K« U^^ 1 ij . ^ v-tiiiii, character. ne nad held a conspicuous position in the leading circles of Athens. The uncle of Plato and the pupil of Sokrates, he had listened to the noblest teachings in ethics and politics. He had cultivated poetry with success : and his eloquence, celebrated even in a city which was the nurse of orators, had. we may well believe a peculiar charm as contrasted with the rhetorical vul' garities of debating leather-sellers and candlestick- makers. It could not, indeed, be forgotten that he had been m his younger days an associate of the arch-traitor Alk.biades. and had been suspected, like so many other young bloods, of complicity in that mysterious act of sacrilege, the mutilation of the Hermai ; but men might hope that years of exile had taught him a wholesome les- son of self-restraint, and would remember that recently he had shown himself capable of sympathy with the op- C 12 Athens under the Thirty. B.C. 404. pressed by supporting against their masters the Penestai, or serfs of Thcssaly. But such hopes, if they were en- tertained, were doomed to disappointment. The past Hfe of Theramenes. the leader of the ohgarch- ical party within the walls, had been very different. He had risen into public notice seven years mcncs'. his before during the government of the Four character. Hundred, and had gained the reputation of a friend to liberty by deserting his party and caballing against the oligarchy. This reputation he confirmed by hunting to death the generals after the battle of Arginou- sai; and during the late siege he had been the envoy chosen to conduct the negotiations with Sparta. While absent on this mission he had spent three months with Lysandros— months of the most intense misery to the starving population of Athens, but months which had been used to the best advantage by the aristocratic party in strengthening their own position, and weakening all idea of resistance among the citizens. The most powerful engine for establishing and extend- ing oligarchic principles was found in the system of Het- airiai, or political clubs. These were no new inventions, neither were they peculiar to Athens. It has been seen that Lysandros recommended the chief oligarchs in Asia Minor to com- bine in this manner ; and such clubs had played an im- portant part in the previous history' of Athens. The mem- bers of them either devoted themselves to the service of some individual leader, or more commonly wished to secure certain definite objects, which were either posi- tively illegal or, at any rate, unrecognised by law. Thus some would combine to gain influence in the elections, others for purposes of common defence before the dikas- teries. Indeed there is reason to believe that the system Political clubs at Athens. CH. II. Arrest of Democratic Leaders. n of bril)ing these bodies of jurors was first introduced by the political clubs. But whatever was the immediate ol)ject which the association was intended to promote^ its members were bound together by a tie stronger than that of citizenship or even of blood, and by a law of honour which required that, if it was demanded by the general interests of the society, no crime was too heinous to be committed, no sacrifice too grievous to be endured. They formed, in fiict, throughout Hellas an organised con- spiracy against constitutional law and freedom. Hence as soon as the city surrendered, the oligar- chical party had their plans matured and their means ready to hand. A board of five was nominated by the members of the clubs, with the title of ephors : Kritias was one of them, and Theramenes probably another. Their duties were of course not those of gov- ernment, for the democracy still existed, but rather to look after the interests of their party generally, and especially to direct the action of the clubs. They had everything their own way. Their faction was exultant and well-organised ; their opponents were despised and demoralised. The Senate was a mere tool in their hands ; and Agis was still garrisoning the town. Yet, conscious that their measures would cause not only dissatisfaction but the deepest abhorrence among the majority of their fellow-citizens, they dared not act at once. They thought J ^ Arrest of It necessary' previously to arrest most of the democratic prominent democratic leaders, and to sum- mon Lysandros himself from the siege of Samos, the only city which had not yet surrendered to Sparta. On his arrival an assembly was called together for the special purpose of remodelling the constitution, and Lysan- dros was invited to attend the discussion. A board of Measures of the oligar- chical party. Board of five ephors. 14 Athens under the Thirty. B.C. 404. Thirty was appointed, not indeed to undertake the gov- ernment of the city, but for the ostensible purpose of codifying the ancient laws by which the future constitution of the city should be reguhitcd. But though the powers of the Thirty were so strictly limited, the proposal was received with sounds of disapprobation if not with open opposition. All the names were those of Appoint- merit of the men who were either hated or suspected by '""^y' the main body of citizens; and it was under- stood that, as a matter of course, the work of codification included the alteration of the old laws and the addition of new ones to an unlimited extent. There was also something suspicious and repugnant in the very number selected; for that, like the number and title of the five cphors recently appointed, had been adopted in humble imitation of Spartan institutions, thirty being the number of members in the Spartan Gerousia, or Senate. Lysan- dros, however, brought cogent arguments to bear upon the swelling murmurs of repugnance, which Theramenes, conscious of Spartan support, heard with a careless scorn. The victorious general reminded the assembly that the city was at his mercy ; for they had failed to Lyandro"^ demolish their fortifications within the stated time, and consequently they could not claim the protection of the treaty ; let them look to themselves, and preserve their lives, not their institutions. Hearin<^ these threats, the majority of the citizens left the assem- bly; and a few — whose character, as Lysias says, was as inconsiderable as their number — remained to give a formal assent to the proposal, and so to afford Xeno- phon some shadow of justification in passing over this memorable scene, equally discrcdital>le to his aristocratic friends and his Spartan patrons, with the few words: 'the people resolved to choose thirty men." CH. II. First Measures of the Thirty. 15 In what manner the Thirty were selected is very doubtful. It is said that ten were nominated bv Theramenes. It is said also that ten were left ostensibly to the choice of the assembly. But it is most likely ^J^'^^V':^^ °*" ■' ^ tlic thirty. that the whole list was prepared beforehand, probably by Lysandros himself. However when once appointed, they showed little readiness to perform their stated task of legislation or codification, but proceeded at once to remodel the whole ^^''^ machinery of government. A new Senate was appointed, consisting of me^i whom they knew to be compliant and trustworthy; and to this body was transferred from the less manageable di- kasteries the important duty of deciding all El?ven°^ state trials. The board of Eleven, which managed the police of the city, was reorganised, and Satyros, one of the most violent and unscrupulous adherents of the Thirty, was placed at its head as chief executioner of their victims. But it was above all necessary that the Peiraieus should be kept well under control ; for that suburb, Fetrakus^ '" being inhabited by the mercantile and sea- faring classes, was the very focus of democratic senti- ment ; and for this purpose a special Dckarchy was established. As in every community, and in every age, so there existed at Athens, at this time, a considerable body of well-to-do citizens who had never taken any enthusiastic interest in politics, but who were r^ihT'""* greatly impressed with the evils of democracv. thirty , •' ' made to Since that was the form of government most gain the fiimiliar to tlicm ; who wished to enjoy peace ''"^^^'■^^"•' and tranquillity, and thought that in what their modern representatives would term a ' strong government ' they i6 Athens under the Thirty. B.C. 404. would find a panacea for all their troubles and vexations. The Thirty lost no time in making a bid for the support of this class ; and professed that it was their object to purify the city from evil-doers, and direct the rest of the citizens into the paths of virtue and justice. Accordinj^ly, to make good the first part of their professed design, Xenophon tells us that they arrested ^ . and tried for their lives those who had gained Condemna- 1 • i- • tionofthe their livmg under the democracy by the ycop ants. practice of sycophancy, and those who were troublesome to the upper classes. These, he says, the Senate was only too glad to condemn, and they died unpitied by any except those of evil character like them- selves. As to the first class, the historian is probably tell- ing the truth. The practice of sycophancy was closely con- nected with the worst abuses of the democracy. Long ago, it is said, a law had been passed prohibiting the exportation of figs from Attica ; and it had become practically obso- lete, though formally unrepealed. Hence to accuse a citizen under this statute was regarded as malicious and vexatious ; and the name vSycophant, or a man who accused another of exporting figs, was applied to anyone who brought a frivolous charge against another. Such accusations had, however, become very common under the democracy, since the citizens were paid for every day which they spent as dikasts in the law-courts : and they had been a chief cause of the dissatisfaction which many of the wealthier citizens had felt against the constitution under which they lived. That the second class equally deserved ,, their fate is by no means probable. It is Execution • • 1 v,. *i. u of prom- certam mdeed that it included a distinguished inent demo- „ 1 • 1 crats. general, agamst whom no cnme could be alleged except the unpardonable sin of dem- ocratic sympathies ; and even if the verdict in every case CH. II. Story of Auto/ykos. 17 had been just, the means by which it was secured would have been sufficient to cause the gravest discontent. The Thirty could not fully trust even their own creatures in the Senate, and accordingly abolished the custom of secret voting. They presided in person over the trials ; and on one of two tables in front of them each senator was re- quired to place openly his voting pebble. One table was for acquittal, the other for condemnation ; and— with but one infamous exception, when a perfidious informer was at the bar— the verdict always went against the prisoner. No sooner was the slightest whisper of popular dis- affection audible than Kritias had his remedy ready. Lysandros, he thought, had left his work at Athens half completed ; the oligarchic board garmonTn- had been established ; but the crowning inflic- lo^tlli"^"! tion of a Spartan harmost and garrison had ^'^- been spared. Now, however, two of the Thirty were despatched to Sparta to ask him to persuade the ephors to send a body of troops to their assistance, who might remain until the disaffected had been put out of the way. and their government placed on a secure footing : and during this time they engaged to find them pay and maintenance. The required auxiliaries were sent without delay, with Kallibios, a rough and brutal Spartan, in command. Every Athenian, with a spark of patriotism, must have been disgusted with the selfish and unworthy policy which had introduced a foreign lord into the Akropolis, the very sanctuary of Athenian glory, and still more when he observed with what persistent obsequious- ness he was courted by those who prided themselves on being the best and finest gentlemen of Athens. One instance of this subservient Story of spirit must be mentioned. Autolvkos. an "^°^>''os- Athenian of good family, distinguished from his boyhood 1 8 Athens under the Thirty. B.C. 404. for athletic prowess, had, in some way, given offence to Kallibios. The hitter, hasty and arrogant, after the Spartan fashion, raised his truncheon to strike him. The atlilete, stooping to avoid the blow, seized Kallibios by the legs and threw him to the ground. But though the harmost got little sympathy from Lysandros, who curtly told him that he did not know how to govern freemen, the Thirty, wish- ing to gain his favour, soon after put Autolykos to death. Having secured, by conduct like this, the active sup- port and assistance of the Spartan garrison, the Thirty Further proceeded to clear all obstacles from their rhTxhTrty^ P""^^' ^y P""'"^ ^^ ^^'^^^' of^en without even the form of trial, all those whom, as Xeno- phon says, they thought least likely to endure to be quietly elbowed aside, or capable of attracting the most adherents in case of an insurrection. Among these were many who were conspicuous solely for wealth, courage, or virtue. A new race of sycophants had sprung up, more audacious and unscrupulous than those of the democracy, because they could calculate more confidently on the condemna- tion of their victims. Accordingly many citizens, not knowing on whom the blow might next fall, made their escape from the city, leaving their estates to be confis- cated by the Thirty ; and among these may be mentioned Anytos and Thrasyboulos. Others again became impli- cated against their will in the atrocities of the govern- ment, and so were forced to make common cause with them. For instance. Sokrates and four other citizens were ordered to cross over to Salamis. and bring before the Thirty, for certain condemnation, a man whose inno- cence was beyond all question. Sokrates went home : the others executed the orders which they had received, and thus made themselves accomplices, however unwil- lingly, in the crime. CH. II. The Three Thousand. 19 I But it was impossible that a body of men so numerous, and with functions so loosely defined, could long remain united ; and signs of disagreement had very soon shewn themselves. Thcramcnes had. Thera'' ""^ at first, gone in heart and soul for the work '"^"^'■ of vengeance and spoliation ; but he was too astute and sagacious not to appreciate the force of public opinion, and see the necessary conclusion to which this policy of terrorism was hurrying his colleagues ; and he thought that he might again be able to head the reaction, and to keep his position, when his rival Kritias fell. He had protested in vain, first against the introduction of the Spartan garrison, and then against the execution of inno- cent victims ; and now he broke out into open opposition, warning Kritias that if men were to be executed for having gained, or having tried to gain, popularity, they themselves might not escape. To this Kritias replied that he must be a fool if he could not understand that the rule of the Thirty was as thorough a despotism as if it were the rule of one man, and required the same uncom- promising policy. A little later, perceiving that, as executions and confiscations became more frequent,' the discontent and indignation in the city grew more serious, Theramenes urged his colleagues to place their govern- ment on a broader basis; and Kritias and the rest, their fears being now thoroughly roused, produced a list of three thousand persons to whom the privileges of citizenship should be granted. i?the Three But Theramenes, whose ends could not be '^'^^^^^^'i- advanced by the addition of a limited number of oligar- chical partisans, found fiiult with the scheme altogether; the number was too small, for they were still in a minor- ity : and it was absurd to draw a hard and fast line at three thousand, as if that number necessarily included «j»t M* iJAisi..-ie- • 20 Athens under the Thirty. B.C. 404. Plunder cf the Metoi- koi. all the good and excluded all the bad. Yet, in spite of his opposition, the Three Thousand were called out and armed ; while the arms of the rest of the citizens were taken away by a stratagem, and safely deposited under Spartan care in the Akropolis. There was no longer any possibility of a revolt. All those who could have headed such a movement had been murdered or exiled, and the mass of the citi- zens were now defenceless. Fresh victims were eagerly demanded. Kallibios and his gang of hired bravoes could be maintained and kept in good humour only at a great cost, and the Thirty them- selves became daily more rapacious. A scheme for the plunder of the temples gave only partial satisfaction, while they had left a whole class of possible victims hitherto untouched. It was known that among the Metoikoi, or aliens resident in Athens, there were many men of great wealth, and some who had little sympathy with an oli- garchical regime. It was therefore proposed that each of the Thirty should single out from this class some indi- vidual, that he should have him put to death, and should then take possession of his property. The proposal was adopted with only one dissentient voice. Theramenes declared boldly that the sycophants themselves had never committed crimes so flagrant as these which men. who called themselves the worthiest gentlemen, designed. But the bloody work went merrily on, and it was resolved that the one voice of censure should be silenced. Kritias prepared his measures for his rival's overthrow with the utmost care, for failure meant destruction. Fully aware that many of the senators, who were Accusation ^ , . , ' . , . , ^ of Thera- partakers m the crimes and not m the profits menes. ^^ ^j^^ Thirty, sympathised strongly with the views of Theramenes, he tried to gain over some by pri- CH. II. Answer of Theramenes, 31 \ vately representing to them that his opponent was no true friend to the oligarchy, and resolved to overawe the rest by introducing into the council-chamber an armed band of his most unscrupulous satellites. On the appointed day, the Senate assembled ; the band of bravoes was in wait- ing, with daggers concealed under their garments ; and when Theramenes appeared, Kritias rose to accuse him. 'No revolution,' said he, 'can Speech of Kntias. be accomplished without some sacrifice of life, and least of all a revolution in a city as populous and as devoted to liberty as Athens. Yet it was necessary, if only to please our preservers the Spartans, that an oligarchy should be established. But here among us stands Thera- menes, a foe to oligarchy ; yea, and worse than a foe, a trai- tor. Nor is treachery a new game for him to play ; but he is a traitor by nature, and is rightly nicknamed a Buskin, which can be worn on either foot. He was treacherous towards the Four Hundred, treacherous again towards the generals after Arginousai : but we know his double dealing, and must not spare him now. We all, of course, acknow- ledge the constitution of Sparta to be the best in the world : would such conduct be tolerated there in one of the ephors? Destroy the traitor; and with him the hopes of your enemies both within the city and beyond its walls.' Kritias resumed his seat, and Theramenes, possibly not wholly unprepared for the attack, sprang up at once to reply. After a few prefatory remarks, in which he de- fended his conduct after Arginousai, he turned fiercely on his accuser, ' I do not wonder at the un- Answer of scrupulous misrepresentations of Kritias; for Thera- he was not at that time present in Athens, but ™^""- was doing a demagogue's work in Thessaly. Rightly indeed he condemns the enemies of your government ; but am I your enemy, or is he ? Hear, and decide for \ 22 Athens under the Thirty, B.C. 404. yourselves. Until your authority was firmly established, and as long as sycophants were beinj^r punished, we were all of one mind: but when Kritias chose as his victims honourable j^entlemen and distinguished patriots, I at once remonstrated, even as I have opposed the spoliation of the resident aliens, the disarming of the citizens, and the introduction of a garrison of hired mercenaries. Such outrages weaken you. but strengthen your enemies ; and in opposing them 1 showed myself your friend, while Kritias by his policy is fostering the interest of Thrasy- boulos and the exiled democrats. Nor am I a turn-coat. I supported the Four Hundred till they proved traitors to their country. And. even if I deserved my nickname. surely it is better to try to suit both parties than to suit neither : Kritias spares the upper classes as little as the lower. But I myself have always been consistent, an opponent alike of the licence of the many and the tyranny of the few. Prove me wrong, and I shall die justly." At the close of this able and spirited defence a shout of applause burst forth. Hut Kritias, who knew that with Kritias himself, at any rate, it was a matter of life and The't*"'"^ death, was not to be baulked of his prey. The menes to scnators evidently could not be relied on ; left to themselves they would let the accused escape. Accordingly, after a hurried consultation with his colleagues, he left the council-chamber, and ordered his gang of assassins to come up close to the railings within which the senators sat. On his return he came forward again, and told them, that a president worthy of his position would take care to shield his friends from impos- ture : and. further, that the gentlemen standing by the railmgs would not allow them to acquit so notorious an offender. Therefore, with the consent of all his colleagues, he would strike out the name of Theramenes fronT the CH. II. Death of Theramenes. 23 list of enfranchised citizens, that he might be legally con- victed by the vote of the Thirty alone. ' And this man ' he added, 'we condemn to death.' At these words. Theramenes leaped for protection upon the altar, which stood in the council-chamber, and entreated the scnators as a suppliant to see that formal justice, at any rate should be meted out to him. ' By the gods 1 ' cried he ' I know full well that this altar will not suffice to protect me but you shall see that these men shrink from sacrilc-e as httlc as from injustice; and I marvel, worthv gentlemen that ye will not strike a blow in your own defence, for the name of any one of you can be struck out as easily as mine ' He spoke no more, for the herald of the Thirty had sum- moned the Eleven executioners. Thev entered, headed by Satyros, the most reckless and brazen-f^iced among them, and accompanied by their attendants. Kritias pointed out Theramenes as a criminal ^hera- 1 11 , "wimi menes is legally condemned, and bade them carry him "^'^^^ by off and do their duty by him. Intimidated by '^' '^'""' the armed gang within the room, and by the troops which had assembled outside, the senators looked on inactive while Satyros and his myrmidons dragged the wretched man from the altar and into the market-place beyond Then as with a loud voicehe kepton callinggods and men to behold h.s shameful treatment and testify to its injustice the brutal Satyros threatened him that he should rue it if he did not hold his peace ; ' Shall I not rue it all the same If I do? replied Theramenes. At the last, when the in- evitable hour arrived, and the hemlock draught had to be drunk, he threw the heeltap to the ground, like one who jests at a wine-party, with the partinn- \"^ dies by toast. • Here's to the charming Kritias.' The iod'^"- fearlessness of Theramenes in his last mo- ^""^^'• ments has called forth the warmest praise. Xenophon I 24 Athens under the Thirty, B.C. 404. mentions \\ with admiration, Cicero with enthusiasm : but history cannot reverse her verdict on a hfe of unscrupu- lous self-seckin*;, nor can we fori^^ct that the man now un- justly slaughtered had hounded on his countrymen to the murder of men who had charged him to carry out an or- der which he had failed to execute. Justice, though her vengeance tarried, at last secured her due. The last spark of open opposition hrd thus been trampled out; and the Thirty, to use the words of Xenophon, 'think- ing that they might now play the tyrant with- Terfor° ^"^ fear,' surpassed themselves in excess of under the licence. It is said that during the short time Thirty. for which their reign was yet to last they exe- cuted 1,500 victims without trial. Tiiough this number may not be strictly accurate, there can be no doubt that Satyros, who had probably taken the place vacated by Theramenes among the Thirty, had his hands full of work. But, just as if the plunder of individuals, however numerous, was insufficient to satiate the greed of the ty- rants, a wholesale scheme of confiscation was resolved upon. A proclamation was issued that all those whose names were not in the list of the Three Thousand should leave the city and be forbidden to enter it again ; that thus the oligarchs might see about them the faces of none whom they could suspect of even wishing to subvert their rule. Nor was this all. Not content with having seized all the houses inside the citv, thev drove the fugitives out of the rural districts also, and divided the farms among themselves and their more favoured adherents. This act may have been prompted by mere rapacity ; or perhaps Kritias may have wished to establish a new class of landed proprietors, and so to put the oligarchy on a more solid basis. Terrorism and tyranny could go no farther; and it is I. Griev- ances of the rich at Athens. CH. II. Causes of Oligarehieal Excesses. 25 perhaps worth while to try and find the reasons why they had gone so far. For it must not be supposed that the Thirty themselves were exceptionally 1^^01*5"* ^°'' bad representativesof the Athenian oli'^archs chica/ex- * cesses or promment among them for cruelty and ra- pacity. It may fairly be believed that many others as un- scrupulous, if not as able, might have been found in the ranks of the Knights or wealthiest class of citizens, for they supported the Thirty enthusiastically throughout' all their discreditable career, and fought for them vigorously to the last. The grievances of the rich under the democracy had, in their own estimation, been very serious. In peace they were taxed for the amusement of the people. Athens was noted among the cities of Greece for the number of relig- ious festivals which were observed by its inhabitants, just as m later times they are complimented by St. Paul for their scrupulous reverence for the gods. But every fes- tival had its theatrical or gymnastic exhibitions • and the opulent citizens, each according to a stated proportion were obliged to defray the expense and undertake the su- perintendence of their production. Of course the wealth- ier classes, when they undertook such duties, were fully aware that the pecuniary loss was more than compen- sated by the gam in public esteem and political influ- cnce ; but they preferred to make light of such col- lateral advantages, and exaggerated the hardship of hav- ing to entertain a lazy mob. Again, in time of war the cost of equipping both army and navy pressed very heavily upon them; and if the war was protracted longer than the ordinary resources of the state lasted, they were again called upon to contribute to special taxes ; while to make their condition worse, they lost almost all the income which they drew from their landed estates in ■\ itM lO.Mjg'-Tfy^a fwKt .S JSM..-'-'w>liaB-aji 36 Athens under the Thirty. b. c. 404. Attica, which suffered alternately from the ravages of their enemies and the requisitions of their allies. But at this they would not have grumbled so much, if they had felt that it lay only with them to decide the question of peace or war. The sober arguments of the wealthiest among them, they would say, might have but little weight in the assembly compared with the passionate clap-trap of some demagogue who had no stake in the country, and who gained popularity or notoriety by a parade of patriotism. Lastly, the rich man was perpetually exposed to the accusations of sycophants ; and whether he stood his trial and defended himself on some frivolous charge before a jury of his inferiors, or whether he bought off the insolent informer before the case was tried, the nuisance was equally galling. But not only was there so much to provoke the discontent and ill-fecl- 2. Rancour r .1 • i i n -r 1 of political ing ot the rich, but all party strife among the f^^lL"ii'" Greeks was characterised bv the extremest orecce. * rancour and violence. Changes which with us would require little more than the expulsion of one ministry from office and the appointment of another, could not be accomplished there without the banishment, if not the massacre, of a large fraction of the citizens. The fury of political passion was intensified by the smallness of the ^, area within which its action was confined. 3. Charac- ter of Some weight must also be ascribed to the Kritias. ' . ., . . , personal character of Kritias, — a compound of brilliant ability, boundless ambition, and unprin- cipled selfishness. Doubtless he urged on his col- leagues to the commission of excesses of which they might not otherwise have been guilty. But every Greek state was exposed at some period or other to similar paroxysms of civil dissension, and there are few among the atrocities of the Thirty which could not be CH. ir Internal Pohey of the Thirty. \ The Athenian oligarchs liad. however, other objects besides mere vengeance and spohation ,hey Zdt hoped to undo for ever the unrl- ^r i-i t 'onaiy Pcrikles inHtn.i. ^""^ ""'•^ o*^ Kleisthenes and t eriklts, and to change the current of their conntrv's his tory. Just as the Athens which had defied state strong m her navy, rich in colonics and "'">'• ot great commercial enterprise, the citv whirl, cK m ScV. t:;::; '" -^^-^''^ -^ conit::'idt"a' trnT/r > .? " "'"^ provincial town, without fleet Sa re r.,rr'.^;';f '"™- -^.^ -• -^ -pp--^' . > a^ncuituie. lo carry out this policy the Thirfv aT'enaT T^Tl. ^°"""'^^>' — ''--ntled ' e g e.^ arsena which had been built at the cost of , ooo talents and sold the materials for three, ,o a contractor'The p,un same wM/r r"' "•*^"^^^- •^'^ P--P'ed parUv b? he same w,sh to dnve away commerce from Athens •' for th! seafarmg mob who inhabited Peiraieus had ahvayLen em^c'c; ' r ° '"I"^' =*"" "'^ -^>- -^-k-'on of h .1 re m^Vin 'Sro^fhe : '""^'^ '"''"' «-' <^'^-^- probably no lon-cr i.^oH • f !u ^"^'^^^ Pnyx were 28 Restoration of Athenian Democracy, b. c. 404. CH. III. Athens : logic, rhetoric, ethics, politics, all were alike pro- hibited. The culture, which had led every man to think himself capable not only of holding his own opinion on political questions but of giving it too, was to be stamped out for ever, and the tree of knowledge was henceforth to bring forth fruit for the governing class alone. CHAPTER ITT. THE RESTORATION OF THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY. For about eight months the Thirty had tyrannised over the miserable city. In April Lysandros had entered Peiraieus in triumph, and the eventful year Change in , . 1 t% 1 Greek was now drawing to a close. But these fee mg. ^^^^ months had seen a marked change in Greek feeling. The hatred, which had outrun even the Spartan desire for vengeance, and had demanded that the place of Athens should henceforth be a blank on the map of Hellas, had gradually died away, or rather had been transformed into a deep pity for the unfortunate city, whose glorious past stood out in so marked a contrast to its wretched present; while the unpopularity which always attaches to supremacy, the jealousy which is inseparable from success, had been transferred from Athens to her conqueror, who could now be stigmatized with far greater justice as the despot city. Chief among the causes which weakened the influence of Sparta was the conduct of Lysandros himself. After a siege of some months' duration, he forced L°sandros^ the Samians to surrender, on condition that all the free inhabitants should depart from the town, and leave behind them all their property except The Power of Lysandros. 29 Samos subdued. Lysandros returns in triumph to Sparta. a single garment for each man. He next reinstated the oligarchical party, and placed the government in the hands of a dckarchv selected bv himself under the supervision of one of his own creatures named Thorax, whom he left as harmost ; and in humble recognition of these favours the restored citizens decreed that the national festival of Here should henceforth be called the Lysandria. Having thus stamped out the last spark of opposition, the victorious general ' sent away the ships of the allies to their respective cities, and with the Lakedaimonian fleet sailed back to Sparta, bringing with him the prow-ornaments of the ships which he had captured, and all the triremes from the Peiraieus except twelve, and the crowns which he had received from city after city as presents to himself personally, and 470 talents which yet remained of the contribution which Cyrus had given him to defray the expenses of the war, and all the other spoils which he had accumu- lated during the war.' By this simple enumeration of the actual trophies, which gave an importance hitherto unequalled in Spartan history to the return of Lysandros, Xenophon gratified the pride of Sparta without too deeply wounding Athenian sentiment; but, great as it was, the pomp of the ovation was scarcely equal to the real power of Lysandros. For he no longer held the posi- tion of a mere servant of the state however successful, but rather 'imperial Sparta was, "'" p^^'^''- as it were, personified in ' him. And yet Plutarch tells us that Lysandros, though more powerful at that time than any Greek before, was yet thought to display a pride, and affect a superiority, greater even than his power war- ranted. It was said of him, as it had been said previously of Alkibiades, that all Hellas was not big enough to hold 30 Restoration of Athenian Demoeraey. B.C. 404,. r« His arro- gance. Thebes. Tribute two Lysanders. To gratify his vanity, cities raised altars in his honour, and sacrificed to him as thouijh to a god. Poets vied with one another in singing his praise in strains of fulsome flattery ; and he even kept one of the most eminent always in his train, that none of his achievements might sink into the night of oblivion for lack of an inspired bard. Accordingly when the Thebans, after the return of Lysandros, put in a claim, in which they were probably Other backed up by the Corinthians, that the allies causes of should be allowed some share in the spoils the growing ^ ' unpopu- and profits of the war, Lysandros persuaded Sparta. his countrvmen to reject a demand which was Rejection obviously founded in equity ; so far were the of^cjanns of Spartans from seeing the value or the justice of the principle to which, above all others, Rome owed her own greatness and the fidelity of her allies. Nor was there any abatement of the tribute which had been levied previously on the subject cities by the Athenians ; but the latter had at any rate performed the duty for which the money was raised, while the Spartans pocketed the thousand talents, and at the same time delivered up the sea and the whole coast-line of the Archipelago to the dominion of Persia. Thus the minds of the Greeks were well prepared to hear with sympathis- ing pity the stories which were soon current chicaf about the enormities of the dekarchies in enormities. general, and especially about the atrocities of the Thirty ; for the sufferings of Athens naturally at- tracted a peculiar interest. They saw clearly that the spe- cious promises of Sparta had been mere lies, Broken ^^<^ though she had spoken them f;iir to serve promises. " ' her purposes, her deeds were immeasurably harsher than those of Athens ; and the deepening indig- CH. III. Thebes supports Athenian Exiles. 3J nation against Sparta was naturally accompanied by a growing compassion for her humbled rival. The change in the position of Thebes will now be understood. In April the Thebans were the most ran- corous and implacable foes to Athens and her constitu- tion ; in December their city is the very centre of the plots for its restoration. The Spartans had issued a decree that the refugees from Athens might be arrested „ . , 1 hebes wherever they were found, and at the same gives shelter time they threatened heavy penalties against ?" Athenian any who should attempt to protect them. But "''es. in spite of the power of Sparta, none but the most insig- nificant states obeyed. At Chalkis, Megara, and Elis, the exiles were hospitably received. The Argives in- dignantly bade the heralds quit their city before sunset ; while, as Plutarch informs us with the proud enthusiasm of a Boiotian patriot, the Thebans, acting in the spirit and temper of their ancient heroes, issued counter-decrees, declaring that every house and town in Boiotia should be open to any Athenian who required it, that those who refused to come to the rescue of an Athenian should be fined, and that if anyone should bear arms through Boiotia to Attica against the tyrants, they should close their eyes and ears to what was going on. Thebes therefore became the natural resort of the most active and prominent among the exiles : of Thrasyboulos, Anytos, Archinos, and many others. Thrasyboulos had previously distin- guished himself by the energy with which he had kept up the spirits of the Athenian sea- 3^7^^" men at Samos during the reign of the Four Hundred at Athens; and he had then been greatly instrumental in bringing about the restoration of the democracy. An effective orator, an able general, and a sincere patriot, he wins even from 'Xenophon a grudging 32 Restoration of Athcuidn DiJiiocracy. B.C. 404. Anytos. Archinos. testimony to his virtue. Anytos, whose name had been slurred by an imputation of wholesale bribery, and has since become notorious by his share in the prosecution of Sokratcs, was a rough, plain- spoken democrat; like Kleon, the proprietor of a tan- yard ; and, although wealthy, priding himself on his want of culture and refinement. Archinos, to whom, next to the gods at any rate, Demosthenes ascribes the greatest share in restoring the democratical regime, was a man of fine intellect, unselfish dispo- sition, and some military experience. These three men stood out as the natural leaders of the exiles, who swarmed not only in Thebes but in all the towns on the frontiers of Attica ; while in Thebes itself the native democrats formed a powerful party, though still a minority, and were prepared to furnish to the Athenians more solid assistance than mere sympathy. Near the frontiers of Attica and Boiotia stood, or rather stands, the fortress of Phyle, commanding a narrow de- file formed by Mount Aigaleos, on the south. Position of 2LTiA Mount Pamcs on the north. Through Phyle. *=» this pass ran the mountain-path that formed the direct road between Thebes and Athens ; and from the summit of the lofty crag on which the castle was built, was visible the whole Athenian plain, the heights of the Akropolis, 10 miles distant, and the blue waters of the Saronic gulf beyond. Revelling in a fool's paradise of apparent tranquillity, the Thirty had left this fortress un- garrisoned ; or, more probably, since they had ordered all the frontier fortresses to be destroyed, it Phyle IS i^^^j been partially dismantled. Thrasvbou- seized by » - Thrasy. los saw the advantages of its situation, and, crossing the border in the depth of winter, seized it with a small band of exiles, numbering, accord- CH. III. Thmsyhoiilos occupies Phyle. 33 ing to Xenophon, seventy men. Probably this number soon increased ; and the willing hands of exiles, inspired by the distant view of their beloved city, would soon put the ruined castle in a state of defence. Regarding the i. Achamal ATHENS Balamis expedition as too unimportant to require the presence of the Spartan garrison, the Thirty marched out at the head of the Three Thousand and the Knights to dislodge the in- truders. A body of the younger troops attempted at once to t 34 Rt'storatioH of Athenian Democracy, b. c. 404. carry the fort by storm ; but, as it was accessible only by a narrov path on the east side, the strenj,nh of the situation and the courage of the defenders were sufficient to repel them with no slight loss. Still, as the exiles must have been Init scantily provisioned, the Thirty resolved to reduce them by a blockade ; but, though the weather had been re- Assault of niarkably fine when they set out, this project the troops was frustrated by a heavy fall of snow, which Thirty re- occurrcd during the night, and which Thrasy- pused. boulos regarded as a distinct intervention of the gods in his behalf. The subsequent retreat was im- peded by the snow ; and, descending from their rocky fortress, the exiles intlicted further hisses on their oppo- nents, and captured probably a large portion of the bag- gage. After this the garrison became more numerous every day ; and the depredations committed by Thrasy- boulos on the farms in the neighbourhood were so exten- sive as to call for immediate repression. Accordingly the Thirty despatched almost all the Spartan garrison and a large body of cavalry, with orders to tack by encamp about two miles from I'hyle, and watch the operations of the enemy. But the band of Thrasyboulos had by this time increased to 700; and he felt himself strong enough to assume the offensive. With his full force he came down by night, and took up a position at a distance of less than half a mile from the enemy. Here, covered by the broken nature of the ground, his men remained, and watched for the dawn. Just as day was breaking, and the camp was in confusion, the night-watch going off duty, and the grooms noisily currying their horses, the exiles swept down on them at a run. There was no re- sistance ; and during the pursuit, which lasted for near'y a mile, 120 of the heavy-armed troops were slain, and a by 1 hrasy- boulos successful ) i t The Thirty seize Eleusis and Salamis. CH. III. Eleusis and Saianiis seized by the Thirty. 35 few of the cavalry. The exiles then returned ; and, having set up a trophy and collected their spoil, made their way back to their fortress, before the cavalry, who had set out from Athens to the rescue, could arrive upon the scene of action. Matters now began to look serious. The Thirty were fairly roused from their false security. The prowess even of their Spartan mercenaries had been shown to be by no means invincible ; and they resolved to secure, while it was yet possible, some refuge, of which they might avail themselves, if things came to the worst. Several circum- stances combined to make Eleusis a suitable spot for the purpose. It was at a conveni- ent distance, 12 miles, from Athens; it was near the sea, and so afforded an opportunity of escape ; it would be an advantageous position for the reception of Spartan reinforcements, which could reach it either by land or sea ; and, lastly, it was not far from Salamis, which they determined to seize as a last retreat. The crowning act of spoliation and massacre was then committed. Kritias and his colleagues, having gone to Eleusis with the Knights or wealthiest Athenians, as- sembled the citizens of the town under pretence of re- viewing them. Each man had to enter his name for military service, and was then obliged to pass out by a postern gate which opened on the beach. Here the cavalry were posted ; and every man was at once pinioned by attendants who stood ready. Three hun- dred citizens were thus seized, dragged off to Athens, and handed over to the custody of the Eleven. On the morrow Kritias summoned the Three Thousand and the Knights, and told them that the oligarchy was kept up as much for their advantage as for that of the Thirty ; that there must be a community of peril as well as of *[ 36 Restoration of Athenian Democracy. B.C. 404. privilege ; that they must condemn the captive Eleusi- mans and so identify themselves with the Thirty in all their hopes and all their fears. The Spartan garrison was drawn t,p under arms close at hand ; and tht voting TnV" . . T'" °f '""'''' "-^ E'eusinians werf condemned to death, and Xenophon adds that some of the cmzens were so unscrupulous in their rapacity as to be gratified by cnmes like these. In what manner the Thirty obtained possession of Salamis is not distinctly employed in both cases. Four days after his recent victory Thrasyboulos, who had now ,,000 men under his command, marched down Thrasy. ^^m ''bvle by night along the road to Athens occupies ^' ^^ P^'^^^d Acharnai. the largest and most .hj: Pci- hberty-loving of all the townships of Attica, some of Its sturdy yeomen may have joined hi. force ; and morning found him in possession of the Pciraieus. Though the walls of the great sea-port had been partially destroyed, i, had not suffered from depop- ulation, but had become the refuge of 5,000 citizens who had been e.xpelled from Athens. Among these Thrasy! boulos found numerous supporters ; but, as all their weapons were still safe in the Akropolis. their fighting power was not as considerable as their numerical strength Thrasyboulos, therefore, saw himself compelled to aban: don Peiraieus as a position too extensive for his handful Baui. of °f troops to defend, and, having retired to the Mou„ychia. adjacent suburb of Mounychia, he drew up h 11 .u v" ^"'"^ '" "'"'^ °"^" °" the slope of the hill, so that they entirely blocked up the road. He placed his heavy-armed troops in front, the files being ten deep • or rather'S? '™"h' ''"'"' "•" ^ "^^^ °' light-armed; or rather half-armed, troops, who were to hurl javelins o^ 1 CH. III. Victory of Thrasyboulos. 37 sling stones over the heads of the hopHtes, or heavy- armed troops, below. The Thirty advanced to the attack with all the force at their command, but the position chosen by Thrasyboulos did not allow them to reap the full advantage of their great superiority in numbers. Their files were fifty deep, but their rear ranks were of little use, except as targets for the missiles of their opponents ; nor could their cavalry render them any assistance. As the enemy advanced up the hill to the attack, Thrasyboulos, in soul-stirring words, reminded his troops of the injustice and outrage which they had suffered at the hands of the oligarchs, assured them of the favour of the gods, pointed out the advan- Address of tages of their position, and exhorted them to Thrasy- ^ , , , ,, . , , . boulos. fight boldly m a contest where the survivors would be happy in the greatness of the benefits achieved by victory, while the dead, if any were doomed to fall, would be no less blessed in the glory of their monument. After this harangue, the exiles stood patiently in their ranks, awaiting the attack of their enemies. For the soothsayer — without whose advice and consent a battle was rarely, if ever, begun — had warned them not to commence the attack before one of their comrades had been slain, and he further assured them that the day would bring victory to them as certainly as death to him ; and now to fulfil his own prediction, like a man carried away by a supernatural impulse, he sprang forth from the ranks against the advancing foe. As he fell, the battle began ; the conflict was short and sharp. So closely packed was the phalanx of the oligarchical troops, that every shot told. Of the stones and javelins which fell in showers not one missed its mark ; while the steepness of the hill added weight to the thrust of the heavy-armed troops. The supporters of His victory. ET^ijn .I'l&tf ■ tbri^-fwynbiudbiMj i I 38 Rt'storatum of Athenian Democracy, n.c. 403. the Thirty broke and fled down the hill, and the pursuit was continued till they reached the level ground. Only seventy were killed. This small loss of life was probably due to the humanity of the conquerors, who were loth to shed Athenian blood without good cause : but among the slain was Kritias himself, with two other leading oligarchs. After the battle the dead were stripped of their arms, but no further indignity was offered to them, for the exiles felt that the corpses were those of Athenians like themselves. During the truce which was Ki"kritl. granted for the burial of the dead the oppos- ing forces, mingling for a common object, were drawn into conversation. Suddenly the clear and powerful tones of Kleokritos, the sacred herald of the initiated worshippers at the Eleusinian mysteries, rang through the crowd. 'Why,' cried he. 'do you drive us into exile? Why do you wish to slay us.? We are bound to you by every bond of religion and of honour, by old associations, by companionship on flood and held. Throw off your allegiance to these iniquitous Thirty, who. merely to fill their own purses, have slain more Athenians in eight months than all the Peloponnesians slew in ten years. They are forcing us into this detestable and un- natural contest ; and assuredly our sorrow for those who have fallen to-day by our own hands is as heartfelt as yours.' So powerful was this appeal to the good feeling and common sense of the more moderate section of the Effects of oligarchical army, and so respectable the cesses^of position of the speaker, that the surviving Thrasy- gcncrals gave orders for an instant retreat *^'^"'°^- to Athens. The immediate results of this day's success, as Xeno- phon describes them, were sufficiently striking. 'On 1 1 \ 'J CH. III. Board of Trn Appointed. 39 the following day the Thirty were, as may be imagined, very dejected and solitary when they took their seats in the Senate-house ; while, wherever the various detach- ments of the Three Thousand were on guard, they were engaged in earnest discussion among themselves. For all those who had been guilty of extreme violence, and who were consequently alarmed for their own safety, were vehement in their assertion that they ought not to sub- mit to the captors of the Peiraieus ; on the other hand, those who were conscious that they had not been guilty of injustice not only began to reflect, but tried to per- suade the rest, that this miserable state of things need not continue ; and that they ought no longer to do the bidding of the Thirty, nor allow them to bring the State to utter ruin. So they determined at last to depose their present rulers, and appoint others.' A Board of Ten was accordingly elected, one from each tribe ; two of the Thirty were reappointed ; and the rest, no longer inspirited by the bril- liant eloquence of Kritias or nerved by his unscrupulous audacity, retired crest-fallen to Eleusis, probably accompanied by many of their more extreme adherents, and guarded by the Spar- tan garrison. The new board had been established as a compromise by a temporary coalition of two conflicting parties — those who having seen the evils of oligarchy wished to restore the democracy, and those who wished to retain the oligarchy purified of its violence and excess. The latter of these two policies was followed by the new government ; a peace with the exiles in Peiraieus seemed as far away as ever, though it is probable that clandes- tine negotiations were opened with Thrasyboulos and thr other leaders, by which a seat among the governing body was offered them if they would consent to betray their Board of Ten ap- pointed, 7'ice the Thirty, most of whom retire to Eleusis. \\\ 1 1* 40 Restoration of Athenian Dcnwcracy. B.C. 403. friends. These overtures were of course rejected. Dis- trust and confusion were rife in the city ; an attack from the Peiraieus was hourly expected; and the Ten, con- scious that a large section, if not a positive majority, of the Three Thousand were opposed to their policy, placed all their hopes in the fidelity of the Knights, who accord- ingly had to perform double service, patrolling as cavalry by day, and keeping guard on the walls as hoplites by night. Meanwhile the forces of Thrasyboulos were becoming more formidable. Their numbers were swelled partly by genuine Athenian citizens, especially from the rural demo- ^. crats, partly by a motley crowd attracted by The army , r j i , of Thrasy- love ot adventure, by hope of gain, or by the streiTgtif.^'"* promise of a specially privileged position as settlers in the renovated Athens, if the enter- prise should be successful. But arms were wanted more than men ; shields of wood or even of wicker-work had to serve the purpose of more solid armour. Liberal contri- butions, however, flowed in from various quarters. Elis and Boiotia sent money ; and Lysias, the professional rhetorician, in whose speeches much incidental inform.i- tion of great value has been handed down, and who had been himself the victim of one of the most outrageous crimes committed by the Thirty, supplied 200 shields, 2,000 drachmai, and also, it is said, 300 mercenaries. In the course of ten days the exiles had become strong enough to take the field, with a large force both of heavy- and light-armed troops, who were supported by a small squadron of seventy horse. The operations which ensued are of little importance. The foraging parties from Peiraieus were harassed by the cavalry from the city; and although the oligarchic infantry, being either too few or not sufficiently trustworthy, were kept carefully within CH. III. Jealousy against Lysandros, 41 the walls, the siege-works of the exiles were soon checked by the ingenuity of an Athenian engineer. The position of the oligarchs was becoming daily more critical ; their only chance lay in foreign aid. Envoys were sent simultaneously from the g ^^^^^ ^.^ Ten at Athens, and from the Thirty (as they urgently were stilled called) at Eleusis, to bid the Spar- "^^"^"^ tans haste to the rescue, as the democracy had broken loose from Spartan rule. Lysandros earnestly supported their request. If he suffered his own government to be overthrown at Athens, similar revolutions might take place elsewhere, his personal credit would be shaken, and his ascendency would be gone ; while nothing would confirm his power more than the suppression of a revolt in the very hot-bed of democracy, startTwith a and on the very eve of success. His influ- toThf reTc"e ence was strong enough to obtain a loan of of the ° oligarchs. a hundred talents for the envoys and his own appointment to the command of the land forces, while a fleet of forty ships was entrusted to his brother. In a few days the position of affairs in Attica was entirely changed. Lysandros, with a large Peloponnesian army, blockaded Peiraieus by land, while his brother prevented the intro- duction of supplies by sea. The oligarchs in the city were once again exultant. Thrasyboulos and the exiles were in the direst straits and the deepest despair ; their surrender was imminent; and the cause of liberty seemed hopeless. But help came to the beleaguered band from a most un- expected quarter. The supremacy of Lysandros, though his forethought and craft had made it abso- lutely necessary for a time, was none the less against viewed with extreme dislike and jealousy by at^sparta.* those who thought that the guidance of Spar- tan policy ought naturally to be in their own hands. The 42 Restoration of Athenian Dtmocracy. B.C. 403. CH. III. Operations against Thrasyboulos. 43 kings and the ephors, the nominal and the real rulers of the state, thrown into the background by the power of Lysandros and galled by his arrogance, were ready to seize the tirst opportunity of humbling him; and the more generous among the Spartan citizens, those in whom the spirit of Kallikratidas still breathed, had no sympathy with the Lysandrian element in the national policy, and perceived with deepening indignation that the name of Sparta was becoming throughout all Hellas a byword for broken faith and high-handed tyranny. Men whispered also that Lysandros, if again successful, would no longer be content with a subordinate position, but that he was scheming to bring about a revolution which might end in placing him as sole king on the throne of Sparta, while. if this attempt should fail, he would still be able to fall back upon Athens, which might be made the capital of an independent state and become a dangerous rival. Pausanias, the colleague of Agis in the kingship, natur- ally placed himself at the head of the anti-Lysandrian movement. Not only was he personally tolerant of democracies, but the traditional policy of his house was, perhaps, in its wider sympathy and pan-Hellenic sentiment, considerably in advance of the narrow and scltish aims be- yond which the average Spailan could see nothing and understand nothing. Having gained the consent of three out of the five ephors, he issued a pro- clamation summoning the full force of the Spartan con- federacy. A large army was soon collected; but the Corinthians and Thebans, so lately the bitterest foes of Athens, refused to take any part in the expedition, alleg- ing that Athens had not violated the treaty, and suspect- ing that the Spartans were intending to appropriate her territory. Pausanias, one of the kings, sets out with a second army ; On his arrival in Attica Pausanias at once effected a junction with the forces of Lysandros, and assumed the chief command. This done, he took up a , . position in the neighbourhood of Athens, chief which would enable him effectually to control '^^'"'"^"^• the movements of all the belligerent parties; the right wing, which was stationed nearest the Peiraieus, he kept under his own orders, and Lysandros was in command of the left. The royal tent seems to have very soon become the centre of complaints against the oppression of the Thirty ; nor could the presence even of complaints Lysandros check the freedom with which their against the ., J J oligarchs. evil deeds were exposed. Pausanias at once shewed that he was not come as the partisan of either sec- tion of the oligarchy by refusing the presents of welcome and friendship which were sent both from Athens and Eleusis;on the other hand, the Athenians in Peiraieus were undoubtedly rebels to the government which Sparta had sanctioned, and he sent at once to summon them to disperse. The summons was disobeyed, and, in the fight- ing which followed, Thrasyboulos succeeded in driving out, with considerable loss, the Spartan troops who had made their way into Peiraieus as far as the theatre. „ ,-,, Mis opera- 1 he Spartans rallied on a hill about half a *'o"s mile outside the town ; and having received ThrTsy- strong reinforcements, renewed the combat. ^°"'°'' The troops of Thrasyboulos, who were only eight deep, could not stand the charge of the heavy phalanx of their opponents, and were beaten back within their walls, leaving 150 dead upon the field. Having raised a trophy — the indispensable token of a Greek victory — and having duly impressed the democrats with a sense of his military power, the king could afford to be generous; and he lost no time in shewing that he came not as an i i I * 44 Restoration of Athenian Democracy. B.C. 403. enemy or as a conqueror, but as a peacemaker. Instead of following up his victory, he secretly encouraged the democrats to send an embassy to represent He accepts . . , . , . , ' overtures their case before himself and the two ephors Smisticc. ^'^^ accompanied him, and who were advo- cates of his policy rather than that of Lysan- dros. He is said even to have dictated to them the terms in which their proposals would be most advantageously expressed. At the same time he encouraged the oppo- nents of the Ten within the city to come out to him in a body, bringing assurances of their pacific wishes towards the occupants of Peiraicus and their continued friendli- ness towards Sparta. An armistice was concluded ; but Pausanias did not think it wise to act any longer on his own authority, and preferred that the home government should take on itself the responsibility of the final settle- Embassies "^^"^' I*-"^'oys were sent at once to Sparta are sent to not Only from the party of Thrasyboulos, but from the opponents of the Ten in Athens, while, making a despairing bid for Spartan sympathy, a counter-embassy from the Ten themselves was instructed to surrender the fortifications of Athens and all its in- habitants to the Spartans, to be dealt with just as they might please, and to insinuate that the democrats, if equally sincere in their professions of friendship, ought to make a similar surrender of Peiraieus and Mounychia. But this skilful artifice failed in its object. The influence of Pausanias seems to have guided the decision of the assembly. The complications of Athenian politics were thought too great to be settled anywhere but at Athens ; and fifteen commissioners were dispatched to co-operate with Pausanias in arranging the final conditions of peace. During the protracted negotiations which followed, the cnances of a renewal of actual hostilities became every CH. III. Thrasyboulos enters Athens. 45 t" day more remote ; and the sentiments of the majority of the citizens had time to shape and declare themselves with greater clearness. At length it was Terms of settled that all parties should keep the peace peace towards one another ; that all, including the ♦i'l-tiiy ' ' o arranged. exiles, should be restored to the possession of their own property ; and that those who felt themselves insecure in Athens should retire to Eleusis. By way of inflicting a decisive blow on the influence of Lysandros, the chief exceptions to the general amnesty were the officials whose appointment he had himself sanctioned, the Thirty, and the Ten governors of Peiraieus. With them were mentioned the Eleven who had, with such zeal and fidelity, executed their most unscrupulous com- mands ; but even these might resume their rights of citi- zenship if they thought that they could justify their official conduct before the assembly, according to the universal custom of retiring magistrates. On the conclusion of peace Pausanias at once evacuated Attica and disbanded his army. Without delay Thrasyboulos marched in at the head of his troops. Along the streets and through the market- place the armed procession swept ; and the feet of free Athenians trod once more the long slope that led up to the Akropolis. Through the spacious portico and the great bronze gates of the Propylaia, beneath the colossal shadow of the champion god- ThrSy-^ dess, the exultant exiles passed on to the ^^V'"** '"'° . Athens. matchless Parthenon itself; and there, amid the master-pieces of Pheidias and Polygnotos, on which the dull eyes of the Spartan garrison had so lately gazed with blank indifference or boorish contempt, they offered the sacrifice of thanksgiving for their safe return. After this, they descended to the Pnyx, where ThrasybouWc 46 Restoration of Athenian Democracy. B. c. 403. addressed the assembled citizens. Turning first to the adherents of the oligarchy, he reminded them that they L , were neither more just nor more courageous Speech of ■' " . 'ihrasy- than the democrats; though blessed with hereditary wealth, they had shewn them- selves monsters of selfishness and rapacity ; and, in spite of superior advantages of position, resources, and Spartan aid, they had been unable to hold their own in battle. He told them plainly that they could no longer plume themselves on their connexion with Sparta, for the Spar- tans had chained them up like snappish curs, and had left them to the mercy of their injured fx:llow-citizens. At the same time he exhorted his own followers to crown their glorious exploits, by shewing that even in the hour of triumph they could curb their passions and respect their oaths. The restoration of the democracy was now an accomplished fact ; and probably the Senate of the Five Hundred, the assembly, and the dikasteries at once re- sumed the exercise of their ancient functions, though it seems likely that the citizens were no longer Restoration ^ ^ paid for their attendance. After the year of Anarchy, as the time during which the Thirty wcie m power was always called, the First Archon again gave his name to his term of office ; and the year of Eukleides became memorable for ever in Athenian history. But if Athens was united, Attica was not. Though the popular party was ready to forget and forgive, the The rem- Thirty at Eleusis could not cease their plots nantsofthe ajrainst the rcstorcd dcmocracv. The Athe- Thirty ^ ' i • • driven out nians soon heard that the Thirty were hmng a force of mercenaries against them. Their indignation knew no bounds, and, if the account of Xsnophon may be accepted, hurried them into the of the democracy CH. III. Democratic Moderation, 47 only act which sullies the story of their triumph. They marched out in full force along the Sacred Way ; and when the generals of the oligarchic army advanced to demand a conference, they seized them and put them to death. Upon this most of their adherents were per- suaded by their kinsfolk and acquaintance to come to terms ; and the Thirty themselves, with their most un- popular supporters, made good their escape from Attica. Thus Eleusis, the chosen home of the great goddess — the Earth-mother — and the awful shrine of her mysterious worship, was reunited to Athens ; and the great schism came entirely to an end. So heinous had been the crimes of the oligarchy, and so deep the provocation which the popular party 11 lit- • , , r \ Moderation had received, that history might have found ofthedemo- a ready excuse for the restored democrats yo^ij afi if they had for a short time indulged their P'■a^^*e. revenge, and used stringent means to recover the vast amount of spoil and plunder which their opponents had accumulated at their expense. But the noble moderation and self-command which had been conspicuous after the fall of the Four Hundred was even more remarkable at the present crisis. The landed property which had been seized by the Thirty themselves was either restored to its rightful owners or confiscated for the service of the State ; but their adherents among the Three Thousand, and the Knights whose avarice had been gratified by lavish gifts of money and movable goods, were allowed to remain in the possession of their ill-gotten wealth. Many of the exiles had lost their all ; yet no distinction was made between those citizens who had jeoparded their lives in the daring enterprise of Thrasyboulos and those who had purchased security at Athens by complicity in the atrocities of the oligarchy. A thousand drachmas 48 Restoration of Athenian Detnocracy. B.C. 403. was the paltry sum allotted from the public funds to the saviours of their country. This special grant was made to defray the expense of sacrifices and votive offerings, and especially of a work of art which was presented to Thebes as a token of gratitude and good-will ; and a debt too large for any money to repay was discharged by the bestowal of wreaths of olive. The contrast between such unselfish integrity and the self-seeking greed of the oligarchs must have taught a valuable political lesson to all C^reece. Those who had arrogated to themselves the title of the ' best,' and the right to govern their fellow-citizens on the score of supe- riority in virtue, wealth, and education, had not only been proved more vicious than the worst demagogues, but had been succeeded bv democrats who were con- spicuous for all good qualities. So scrupulous was their good faith, that the hundred talents which had been borrowed from Sparta by the expiring oligarchy was made a public debt, though it might fairly have been exacted from the private wealth of the Knights. Nor can there be a greater injustice than to describe the strict observ- ance of the amnesty as due solely to fear of Spartan intervention. For the fear of offending Sparta was not found sufficient to induce the Athenians to adopt a pro- posal for limiting the franchise to those who possessed landed property in Attica. The seamen, the traders, and all the poorer citizens, 5,000 in all, would thus have been excluded. The scheme was put forward as Limitation • i^ *. i- u j j of citizen- ^ comprouiise between oligarchy and demo- Athenians cracy, which would be especially pleasing to of pure the Spartans ; but it was thought that Athens at this time had need of the services of all her sons, and the motion was rejected. A little later, however, an important limitation was introduced. The CH. III. Legislation of the Democracy. 49 spread of Athenian commerce and the establishment of Klerouchies, or settlements of Athenian citizens in for- eign countries, had caused the custom of inter-marriage with the women of other states to become very preva- lent ; and as long as Athens remained an imperial city, and adhered to her policy of pan-Hellenic union, the citizenship of the father had been sufficient to legiti- mise the children. Now, however, the sentiment of autonomy was supreme; and it was resolved to purify the city from its foreign element. Accordingly the law of Perikles was re-enacted, by which the rights of citizenship were restricted to those who were of Athenian birth on both sides ; but, to avoid ill-feeling and discontent, it was not made retrospective in its action. The work of conciliation was not found to be com- plete unless measures were taken to stop the Le^j^i^jj^n endless litigation which the recent changes after the ^ /^ V • re-€stabhsh- would naturally occasion. On the motion ment of the of Archinos, the people— the majority of democracy whom would be losers by the proposal — passed a self- denying ordinance that no prosecutions for damages should be allowed if the injury had been committed prior to the archonship of Eukleides ; and a heavy penalty, amounting to one-sixth of the sum claimed, was fixed against any prosecutor who thus violated the terms of the amnesty. But though many of the illegalities of the Thirty remained unredressed, all the legislation of the oligarchy was declared null and void. It was also found very hard to reconcile the amnesty with the terms of the existing laws of Solon and Drakon : and the opportunity seemed suitable for a general revision of their text. In these laws there was much that was obsolete in language, much that was altered in usage, much that was con- tradicted by later statutes. Four hundred legislators so Sokrates. CH. IV. CH. IV. Character of Sokrates. 51 (Nomothetai) were accordingly appointed to bring the old codes into harmony with the existing state of thing's. Another change, more interesting than important, took place in the laws at this time. Archinos proposed that they should be no longer written in the old alphabet of eighteen (or sixteen) letters, but in the new Ionic alphabet of twenty-four letters, which had been for many years in general use in Athens ; and hence the archonship of Eukleides marks an era as interesting to the philologist as to the historian, since the Atheni.m inscriptions fall naturally into two great classes. pre-Eukleidic and post- Eukleidic. CHAPTER IV. SOKRATES. The brilliant and unscrupulous Kritias or the bold and patriotic Thrasyboulos might well have fancied that his would be the name among Athenian citizens to which posterity would attach most importance. Even more surely the arrogant Lysandros would have scouted with indignant contempt the notion that there was any man in Greece whose life would be studied with a keener interest than his own. Yet there was daily to be seen at Athens, in the market-place, in the gymnasium, in the public walks, in short, wherever men most congregated, the well-known figure of one whose life and death have kindled a far profounder sympathy, whose arrcTcha^'r-'^^ thoughts and words have exercised an in- Sokra?Is. comparably deeper influence. Ungainly in movement, mean in attire, petulant in man- ner, unattractive in appearance, he was usually sur- rounded by a small group of eager listeners. In outward t, I form the talker was likened even by those who most ad- mired him to the sensual old god Seilenos, or the satyr Marsyas. His broad, flat nose, with wide open nostrils, his thick lips, his prominent eyes, his squat figure, were a standing protest against the theory which underlies so much of Greek thought, Greek custom, and Greek art, that physical and mental perfection must necessarily coexist. But the heaven-taught music made by the lips of the satyr Marsyas was not a whit more bewitching than the elo- quence which fell from the speaker's tongue. His conversation, when it first began, would ^''^ 1 1 J- 1 • I eloquence, seem to a casual passer-by ridiculous in the extreme ; but ere long he would touch the hearts of his hearers, so that the tears streamed from their eyes, and their pulses leapt quicker than in the fanatical enthusiasm of the Korybantic orgies. He would fire their imagination by setting forth images supremely beautiful, divine, and wonderful : he would enchain their reason by arguments so irresistible and so persuasive, that they must stop their ears as if against the strains of the Seirens if they did not wish to grow old in listening to his talk. He surpassed all men in physical endurance ; he could bear the longest fasts ; and the soldier's plain fare was a feast to him. He rarely drank much wine ; but at those jovial u 1- • J . . - temperance, seasons when religious duty or a spirit of good fellowship called for conviviality, he more than held his own with the strongest heads. Cold and heat were alike to him ; against the extremes of both the same clothing was sufficient defence, and with bare feet he trod the ice of Thrace more firmly than his sandalled comrades. In battle he quitted himself as a true Athenian should, and even amid the ^" courage. wreck of a routed army he bore himself so nobly that the pursuers did not venture to attack him. 52 Sokrates. CH. IV. Such are the chief traits in the description of Sokrates which is put by Plato into the mouth of Alkibiades, one of the most gifted and least worthy of his His early life, p^^jj^ Sokrates was born somewhat before 469 B. c, the son of a sculptor. For some time he followed the practice of his father's art ; and a draped group of the Graces was long preserved in the Akropolis as a proof of the proficiency to which he attained. Hut Kriton, a rich Athenian and one of his most devoted friends, is said to have discerned the intellectual promise of the young artist, and to have taken him from the chisel and the workshop to educate him in philosophy. At first, he turned his at- tention to physical science, and learnt all that "Vsicfl" ^^^ greatest teachers of the day could tell him science, about the nature of the universe, the motions of the heavenly bodies, the One and the Many, the Real and the Phenomenal, and all the vast and shadowy prob- lems to which philosophy had directed its earliest attention. But a mind so powerful and independent could not long remain satisfied with the baseless speculations and half-proved conjectures which then passed for physical science. Many others like him had seen the insufficiency of these reasonings ; but capable only of the work of criticism and not of construction, they had rashly con- cluded that Truth was unknowable, and had taken refuge in doubt or unbelief. Sokrates, on the other hand, whose whole life was one lon<7 effort to attain to the nerfert knowlod-'C of Truth, when baffled in one direction, struck out for himself an entirely new line. Though Truth might not be found by searching out the works of external nature, the world of Human Action was as yet unexplored ; and there in great moral ideas he felt that he could find a cer- tainty of truth in which his soul could rest. but being dissatisfied turns to Ethics, I CH. IV. Method of Sokrates. 53 His reli- gious mis- sion, and super- natural warnings. It was probably at this period of his life that the con- viction of a religious mission obtained in his mind an overmastering power. Yxom his childhood upwards, he had been guided in all his actions, and often in his very words, by a supernatural something {iSatiioviov ti), which exercised a restraining influence over him. He did not conceive this to be something personal, a familiar spirit or a guardian angel, but rather a divine voice or sign, preventing his feet from erring from the path which had been marked out for him. It had always thwarted any inclination which he might ever have cher- ished for a political career ; and now he could no longer doubt that to discover truth and to unmask error was the one object to which his life was henceforth to be devoted. As he pondered more deeply over the nature of man, the moral laws which he must obey, his social and political relations with his fellow-men, and other kindred topics, he became convinced (i) that there was a great deal of professed knowledge which was nothing better than plausible ignorance ; (2) that this sham knowledge and real ignorance was due largely to loose notions about the meaning of abstract terms— duty, justice, piety, and the like ; and (3) that from such ignorance sprang the greater part of moral errors. The first of these con- victions gave him his method, which was a riL^orous svstem of cross-examination. At first, probably with an unaffected modesty, but afterwards with an increasing confidence, he would accost some man of high repute for his know- ledge and wisdom. Confessing in the frankest manner his own absolute ignorance and his absorbing thirst for knowledge, Sokrates would \Nith deep humility request instruction. He would begin by asking some very simple His method : a rigorous cross-ex- amination. 4 54 Sokratt's. CH. IV. His contri- butions to Logic, In- ductive Dis- courses, and Definitions. question, which led up to an ahnost self-apparent answer. This being granted, another followed, and then another, till, lost in a maze of logical subtlety and bewildered by the dexterity of his interrogator, the reputed sage was found to have admitted premisses which led irrefragably to the most monstrous and contradictory conclusions, and was proved, to the complete satisfaction of amused bystanders, if not of himself, to have a mere semblance of knowledge without the reality. The second of his convictions prompted his most per- manent contributions to formal logic, inductive argu- ments, and the definitions of general terms. That Sokrates, partly by his personal charac- ter, and partly by these two notions, created a revolution in ancient philosophy is quite certain ; but it is difficult for us nowadays to understand how instruments, seemingly so simple as the latter, could produce a change so great. Sokrates in- sisted on his hearers having clear ideas about terms which they had been in the habit of using vaguely; and, to gain these clear ideas, he was perpetually applying the test of analogy. Such words as law, democracy, ex- pediency, were ever in the mouths of statesmen in the assembly, of orators in the law-courts, of actors on the stage ; but no one could give a definition of them which was not defective or redundant, too narrow or too broad. A jumble of ideas, more or less precise, had synthetically grown round some single word; but this process was purely unconscious ; Sokrates by a conscious effort took the word and enquired analytically what its essential meaning might be. To aid in this task he took direct or analogous instances, often trivial, sometimes fanciful and quibbling, by which to test his definition and form his general conception. Thus he was the first to use, as a I \ «« CH. IV. Philosophy of Sokrates. 55 His doctrine : virtue is knowledge, and vice ignorance. logical instrument, a rough sort of induction, not resting indeed, as in the modern sense of the word, on an elabo- rate series of exhaustive observations and crucial experi- ments, but starting from the commonest opinions and examples, and gradually correcting and completing ideas which were based on imperfect experience and careless generalisations. Thirdly, vice, he said, was ignorance ; and virtue, knowled'^c. Is a man a coward ? He knows not the real nature of death ; he thinks it is an evil, and so flees from it. Is he intemperate? He cannot estimate the consequences and is blinded by the present pleasure. If a man could see the real nature and all the results of vice, he would never choose it. Further, how can a man be virtuous who knows not the way ? Is it easier to live virtuously than to make shoes ? From this theory naturally sprang the positive side of his philosophy. Plato has left us many dialogues, in which the destructive power of the negative . . Positive dialectic of Sokrates is admirably exempli- side of his fied ; but thev advance no further than criti- teaching. cism, and lead to no positive conclusion. Xcnophon, on the other hand, who wrote to defend his great master's memory from the accusations which brought him to the hemlock-cup, and from which he had scorned to defend himself, insists repeatedly on his conception of the great end of morals — not only to secure happiness for one's self and righdy to order one's own household, but that each should do his utmost to further the happiness of all others, whether as men or as citizens. Hence Xenophon proves to his readers that, though those who knew Sokrates least might well regard him as merely an ironical quibbling questioner, this was but half his character, and those who 56 So/craf.'s. CH. IV. CH. IV. Sokratcs the Wisest of Men. 57 knew him best could testify to the frequency and the ear- nestness with which, in plain and direct language, he en- forced temperance and courage, diligence and charity, obedience to parents and fidelity to friends. Such, in brief outline, were the doctrines which Sokrates gave up his life to teach. In contented poverty he stood. day after day, year after year, in the streets sailmrweVe of Athcns or on the road to Teiraieus, con- puhiic and un- yersiniT with anvonc who chose to address paid. ** ' 1- • • him, young or old, rich or poor, politician, sophist, or artisan. Anyone might draw near to listen to his talk. His teaching was public and indiscriminate, for he took no fees, like other teachers of philosophy, who, as professed Sophists, gained their living by the work of edu- cation. It was exclusively oral, for he held that books could not teach, being unable to answer their questioners. Of all those who heard him talking as they passed, some kindred spirits would return again and again to his society ; and these formed a band of disciples, or, as he His kind of preferred to call them, companions. Among companions. « ,. , , • i c \ them were found the widest contrasts ot char- acter and of rank ; youths, high-born, high-spirited, of keen and active intellect, such as Alkibiadcs ; aspiring politi- cians, like Kritias, anxious to learn something of the art by which they too might discomfit their most confident op- ponents; brave men of action, like Xenophon, mellowing with literature and philosophy the rougher life of camps ; discontented eccentrics, such as Apollodoros, who found at last in Sokrates the satisfaction of all his longings. Chairephon, one of the most enthusiastic and im- petuous of these followers, went to Delphoi to ask the Pythian priestess whether there was any man wiser than Sokrates ; and the oracle returned answer that of all men he was the wisest. Sokrates himself was beyond i The Delphic oracle pro- nounces Sokrates the wisest of men ; the oracle true by ex- posing the ignorance of the so-called wise. measure astonished at this reply ; for he felt that on no subject could he boast of wisdom, being conscious rather of utter ignorance. lUit he knew that oracles spoke in riddles, and he set to work to find the solu- tion. He went first to a statesman, eminent for wisdom ; but after a few questions he saw that his wisdom was but a sham. Then he tried to convince the politician of his ignor- ance ; but in this he fiiiled altogether, and only gave great offence to the man himself, and to many of his friends who were standing by. The result he thus sums up: ' I am wiser than this man ; for neither of us has any knowledge of what is good or beautiful; but i^^ proves he, though ignorant, thinks that he has know- ledge ; I neither know nor think that I know ; and so in one point I have an advantage over him.' He continued his experiments among the statesmen and orators, but always with the same re- sult, and with increasing unpopularity. Next he betook himself to the poets ; but they could not tell him the mean- ing of their poems or analyse the method of their compo- sition ; so he concluded that their fine passages were writ- ten not by wisdom, but in a sort of inspired enthusiasm. Passing on last of all to the artisans, he found that they at any rate knew many curious things of which he was ignor- ant, and were so far wiser than he. But they, not satis- fied with being wise in their own handicrafts, thought that they were therefore wise in other and higher matters, an error which more than outweighed their modicum of real wisdom. Thus, in the fulfilment of the mission imposed upon him, he had proved that the god had spoken the truth, and that the wisdom of the wisest of men was only a thorough conviction of ignorance. The causes of the unpopularity of Sokrates are not far -^«&':^V,'"'. II --"--' r^^-T^i'^fiir'-.^rt-S'y^iaf.raiaWfff 58 Sokrahs. CII. IV. CII. IV. Causes of his Unpopidarify. 59 to seek. To the vulgar crowd he appeared merely as an eccentric mass of contradictions. They saw him, thoir^di poor, ill-fed, and ill clothed, yet the centre of an admiring group of respectable citizens ; they knew him as one who perpetually talked of philosophy, and yet wat"n" opposed all those whom they imagined to popular J3g jjg professors; they heard that he blamed with the '^ ■' lower many points in those democratic institutions of which, since their experience of oligarchic anarchy, they were more than ever proud ; and it had been rumoured among them that, in spite of all his fre- quent offerings and sacrifices to the gods, he was not quite sound in the faith of their ancestors, as they understood it. Hence the lower classes of the city had no sympathy with him, and would join readily in the jeers and derision of his enemies in the street, or laugh loudly when the ugly face and odd figure appeared caricatured upon the comic stage. Amongst the higher classes his mode of questioning made of necessity many enemies. No man likes to be convicted of ignorance and folly, and to be proved incapable even in his own line. The thehiRher process bccomcs still more galling when it takes place in public, and when a man's own admissions are made the instruments of his refutation. The mortification must further have been infinitely heightened by the humility and ingenuous manner of the questioner, who ' spoke as a fool,' putting forward no claim to know- ledge on his own account ; nor would it be diminished when he left his discomfited opponent with an air not of triumph but of deep disappointment, as of one who had hoped at last to find some truth, and yet again was baffled in the search. Many powerful sections of society e pries s. ^y^^^e also opposcd to him. Sacerdotal intol- erance had during the recent reaction gathered great strength among the ' god-fearing ' population of Athens; and the priests looked with suspicion on all free thought, and especially on the great exponent of a reforming philo- sophy, who was himself said to be a setter-forth of strange gods. The Sophists could not but use the great influence which they naturally possessed, as the edu- cators of the more thoughtful among the Sophists; Athenian youth, to decry a rival who was a standing reproach to all their class, making a parade of his poverty, and refusing all pay as degrading to truth, and as hampering his own freedom. The Athenians of the old school would sternly discountenance the demor- alising spirit of enquiry which shook to their very foundations the old ideas of morals and of , , . the old- politics, and they lamented the degeneracy fashioned -.., . , , I'lii- • Athenians. of Athenian youth, who stood idly listening to the prosing of a babbler in the market-place instead of strengthening their limbs in the pakestra for the service of the State. Wlicn we consider the force of all these elements of opposition, we cannot join in the indignant astonishment of Xenophon that arguments could ever have been found to sustain a capital charge proof of*^* against his master and friend ; we rather Athenian ° toleration wonder that he was allowed to pursue his and , ... T- liberality. mission so long without interruption. For a period of at least twenty-five or thirty years he had never spent an idle day. Very soon after he had begun his public conversations, Aristophanes had found that he could raise a cheap laugh by misrepresenting him as a star-gazing and unj^raclical theoriser. Nothing indeed could have protected for so long a time so intrepid a critic of his age and society but that liberality of senti- ment of which among Greeks none but the Athenians 6o Sokratrs. B.C. 399. could boast, and which was indirectly the result of their education in the law-courts and in the theatre, where they saw habitually that there were two sides to every case. A Sokrates in Sparta is absolutely inconceivable ; were he to appear even in the England of our own day, society would not perhaps put him to death, but would hint to him in a thousand ways that it were better for him to hold his peace or be gone. In 399 B.C.. this opposition was brought to a head, partly by the intensity of the hatred which was felt for Kritias, and which extended to all who had Jfaccused"' bccn known as his associates, partly by a aIi\*o1^^°*' private grudge which the inthiential but un- am? L^'kon. cultured Auytos had conceived against him. Anytos wished his son to follow his own business; Sok- rates had. it seems, told the youth that it was a shame for a young fellow of such promise to be doomed to a tanner's life. Angry at such interference, the plain citizen associated himself with a poet. Meletos. and a rhetorician. Lykon. and the trio, of whom the poet took the lead, issued a joint indictment in the following terms : Sokrates breaks the law. firstly, by not accepting the gods whom the slate accepts, but introducing other new divin- ities ; and, secondly, by corrupting the youth. Sokrates had throughout his life been rigidly scrupulous in per- forming his duties as a citizen ; he had served with dis- tinguished valour in the ranks of the hoplitcs at Delion. Poddaia, and Ami)hipolis; he had shewn that in the cause of law he dared to defy equally the tyranny of the democracy and the tyranny of the oligarchy. And now, when he had passed the threescore years and ten of man's life, he heard himself arraigned on a charge of law- breaking, and must plead against the penaUy of death What defence must he make consistent at once with CH. IV. Trill/ of Sokrates. 61 the gravity of the charge and with the dignity of his apostlcship ? Each of the three counts in the indictment was plau- sible enough. The first and second were craftily joined ; and in support of them the accusers asserted ,.,_,... 11 The areii- that in the Daimonion. or supernatural guide, nicms of his of whose warnings Sokrates had never made accusers, any secret or mystery, he had invented a new deity. The third was backed by several arguments; that he had undermined the love and respect due from children to their parents ; that Kritias had imbibed from him his pernicious principles ; that he had perpetually satirised Athenian institutions, and especially the appointment of officials by lot. Against these charges the accused made virtually no defence. Calm. and his ^ deience. grave, and dignified, he told his judges that he would not stoop to work upon their feelings by the piteous appeals, the tears and lamentations, to which they were accustomed, or to buy their favour by promises to change his way of living ; the best refutation of his accusers was the long and unsullied life which he had led among them ; further defence the divine voice had forbidden him to make. If. indeed, they should acquit him. he could only live as he had always lived, searching for truth and questioning all whom he met — a sort of moral gadfly or stimulator to the state ; for a necessity was laid upon him, and he must obey God rather than them. As to the sentence, whatever it might be, he did not fear it. About the unseen world he knew nothing ; but to disobey God he knew full well to be wicked and shameful ; and he would not choose a certain evil to escape a fancied evil, which might turn out a blessing. By such a defence Sokrates voluntarily gave up all chance of acquittal ; yet we may well marvel that out of 62 Sokratt'S. B.C. 399. more than 500 judges a majority of only five or six was found to condemn him. It is even more certain, that when once found guilty, he wished for no His con- other verdict than that of death. By Athe- nian law the accuser named his own pen- alty ; and the condemned person might propose, as an alternative, any other which he thought more suitable : the judges then selected one of the two. Meletos asked for death. Sokrates told them that the recompense which he thought he deserved at their hands was that he should be supported as a public benefactor at the public cost. Exile or imprisonment would be insupportable : he would therefore submit a tine as an alternative. His worldly goods were barely worth a mina, and he would have pro- posed that sum, had not Plato and his friends near him promised to raise thirty. The counter-proposal therefore was a fine of thirty minai ; and had this proposal been made without comment, we cannot doubt that it would have been accepted. As it was, the claim to maintenance in the Prytaneion made the fatal decision inevitable. Sentence of death was pronounced, and Sokrates once again addressed his judges. He did not and speech re<^ret the tone of his defence or the result aftey^ej^tence J ^^^ ^^.^^^ . ^^ .^ ^^^ ^,^^^^ , ^^ ^^^^^ . ^^^ ^ nounced. ^^^ ^^ escapc death, if he has no scruple about what he says or does ; but it is hard to escape un- righteousness, for unrighteousness is swifter than death. Now I, being old and slow of foot, have been overtaken by death, the slower of the two ; but my active accusers, by wickedness, which is the swifter." After warning them that they would not get rid of his doctrines by get- ting rid of him, and dilating on the pleasures which h • anticipated from the society of the heroes of old time in the world to come, he thus commended his three sons 40 \ r r .v ■ ». — _> \ \ vN.»^thens should be avenged in the flames of Persepolis, and the rotten fabric of luxurious despotism be utterly overthrown. Such was the ambition that prompted the expedition of Agesilaos, that fired the imagination of Ja- son of Pherai, and that found its ultimate accomplishment by the ardent genius of the youthful Alexander. But whatever may be the historical importance of the expedi- 66 The Ten Thoitsanif. B. c. 403. tion of the Ten Thousand, it possesses many features of deep interest. Firstly, it is the subject of that work of Xenophon which is the most read and the most readable. It is also invaluable as an authentic picture of the state of Asia under the Persian rule, and as a contribution to the ancient geography of that country. For our present purpose it is above all interesting as an illustration of the Oreek character, of its heroic courage and firm self-de- pendence, fertile in resource and ready in obedience. Darius Nothos, King of Persia, had died b. c. 404, and, since there was no fixed rule of succession, Cyrus, his younger son, had hoped that through the influence of his mother the queen Parysatis he might have supi)lanted his elder brother Artaxerxes, surnamcd by the (ireeks .. , ., Mnemon, and have obtained the throne on Cyrus f-iils to , , obtain the tlic plea that he was the eldest son born dur- ''''"^' ing his father's reign, a pretext for which the accession of Xerxes furnished a recent precedent. An-Mv at the failure of his hopes, he grew still more wroth when Tissaphernes charged him with a plot for his brother's assassination, which nearly cost him his life. The inter- cession of Parysatis not only saved him from an ignomi- nious death, but also obtained for him his former satrapy ; yet his brother's clemency entirely failed to conciliate him. On his return to Sardeis he declared war against Tissaphernes. and detached from him the Creek cities of Ionia, all of which came over to his side, except Mile- tos, where, after an unsuccessful revolt, Tissaphernes re- established his authority. Having thus avenged himself on his deceitful neighbour, the young prince devoted himself to the more arduous task of dethroning his bro- ther. Under the pretence of prosecuting the war against Tissaphernes, reducin-; Milctos, and punishing the out- rages of some border tribes, he enlisted large numbers CH. V. March of Cyrus. 67 of Greeks, whose pre-eminent superiority over his own countrymen he had early recognised. There were many just at this time who had grown up to man- hood in an epoch of perpetual warfare, whose f"'^ collects tastes and habits led them to a life of mili- troops at tary adventure, and who were thrown out of employment by the cessation of hostilities, or driven from their homes by the establishment of oligarchical rule. Cyrus was munificent and courteous, scrupulously faithful in fulfilling his engagements, and most compli- mentary in his treatment of all Greeks. These qualities attracted to his standard not only an inferior class of military adventurers, but many youths of good position from almost every state of Greece. Klearchos, who at Byzantion had made himself notorious for atrocities beyond even the wonted cruelties of Spartan harmosts, and had been dismissed from his post by order of the ephors. was the most noted leader of these mercenary bands. In command of other troops were Menon, the treacherous Thessalian, and Proxenos, a young and ambitious Boiotian ; while several other companies kept themselves under the immediate orders of their own captains, and acknowledged Cyrus himself only as their superior officer. In the spring of 401 B.C. the prince regarded his prep- arations as complete. Around him at Sardeis were gath- ered no less than 100,000 Asiatic troops, backed by a Greek force— which, as he well knew, was worth f^ir more than all these— of 7,700 hoplites and 500 peltasts. With this great army he began his march, giving out that the expedition was directed c>TusVrom against the mountain tribes of Pisidia who ^^'■^^'^• defied the king's authority. On his route the numbers of his Greek allies were increased by successive reinforce- 68 The Ten Thousand, B.C. 401. ments, while the supply of money with which he had started as rapidly diminished. His tent was repeatedly besieged by gangs of clamorous creditors, who had as often to be put off with fair words and promises, till at last he owed them arrears for a full three months. Just when things were beginning to look serious, the wife of the prince of Kilikia came to meet him with a large present of money — enough to furnish the (keeks with four months' pay — and they in return equipped them- ^ . , selves in all their best, with purple tunics Review of Greek and burnished shields, and held a grand re- roops. view. To wind up the performance, Cyrus lequested the Greeks to charge. The trumpets sounded; the Greeks presented their pikes, raised a shout, and advanced at the double. Straightway the barbarians fled in panic terror, and among them the Kilikian prin- cess, who sprang in dismay from her palanquin, while the Greeks retired with peals of laughter to their tents, and Cyrus rejoiced to see the abject dread which they inspired in Asiatic breasts. Soon after this the army passed without opposition through the impregnable pass of the Kilikian Gates, which becomes in one place so narrow as barely to leave room for the passage of a single chariot. The defence of this pass had been entrusted by the king to the prince of Kilikia; but he. wishing to keep in with both sides, fell back as soon as Menon and a body of Greeks had crossed the mountains by another pass and were threatening his rear. On their arrival at Tarsos, the Greeks perceived that Pisidia was not their real destination, and began to suspect that Cyrus was leading them against his brother. Unwilling to be absent so long from their homes and families, and shrinking from the unknown difficulties of the march, they refused to ad- Advance of the army from Tarsos to Baby- lonia. CH. V. P^'epanxtions for Battle. 69 vance. The stern threats and sterner discipline of Klear- chos failed to move his own division ; but when the Greeks reflected that to return against the will of Cyrus was a task even more difficult than to go forward, and also received the promise of a large increase of pay, they were at last induced to accompany the prince for an onward march of twelve days farther to the Euphrates. When they reached Thapsakos the whole truth was at last told them ; and, although they must have been fully prepared to hear it, murmurs and discontent again broke forth. But again a promise of further reward was suc- cessful in tempting them forward. The Euphrates was successfully forded ; and, after thirteen days of desolate and difficult marching through the desert, the army reached the fertile plains of Babylonia, about six months after its departure from Sardeis. Tissaphernes, however, had guessed at once the real object of Cyrus in mustering so large a force ; and he had hastened in person to warn Artaxerxes of the danger which threatened him. The tionro?' king began his preparations without delav • ^"^*«''*es. yet so mcompetent and infatuated were the Persian gen- erals that every position where the onward march of the pretender might have been indefinitely delayed, if not ahogcther arrested, had been given up without a struggle. First the Kilikian Gates, next the passes through Mount Amanos, and lastly the line of the Euphrates had been surrendered ; and now Cyrus found the last of all his obstacles abandoned in like manner. After a review, in which Cyrus exhorted his 13,000 Greeks not to fear the numbers and the noise of their worthless foes, but to act worthily of that freedom which he esteemed more precious than his own possessions a thousand times mul- tiplied, he marched warily onward, expecting to meet the 70 The Ten Thousand. B.C. 401. March thrmiuh vast army which his brother had collected. But when ten days of cautious progress had passed, he came upon a newly-duj^ trench, 40 miles lonj^, 30 feet broad, and 18 feet deep, with a passage of Babylonia. ^^^^, ^o fcct in breadth l)ct\veen it and the Euphrates. Not a man was left to defend so impregnable a position, and Cyrus began now to think that he would win the throne without a battle. Discipline w.is conse- quently somewhat relaxed, and the careful array which had been previously preserved was suffered to fall more or less into disorder. Suddenly on the second day news came that the royal army was marching straight upon them. Ample time was given for Cyrus to form his order of battle. The Greeks were on the right wing, Ariaios with some of the Asiatics on the left, and Cyrus himself in the centre. As the afternoon wore on, a white cloud of dust was seen . in the far distance. It soon grew darker and Arrange- ^ ^ ments for more defined ; and then the flashing of the the battle. , , , . sun on tiie brazen armour left no more room for doubt. Cyrus, in his last orders to Klearchos, wished the Greeks to charge direct on the Persian centre, where Artaxerxes would himself be found, knowing well that to break the centre would be to win the day ; but Klearchos, clinging with Spartan obstinacy to his old-fashioned no- tions, feared to expose his right flank, and held for safety to the river. He, however, assured Cyrus that all should go well ; and the Greek leaders in their turn besought the prince not to expose his own life to unnecessary risk. Had each taken the other's advice, the result of the fight would have been wholly different. The Greeks were entirely successful in anni- hilating the Persian troops opposed to them ; but every step which they made in pursuit rendered it less possible Battle of Kunaxa. CH. V. neginmug of the Retreat. 71 for them to assist Cyrus in his attack on the centre. Cyrus himself, by a furious ca\alry charge, broke the ranks of the royal troops, killing, as is said, their commander with his own hand But Y'^'l"'^'?^ .1 • , • , ^ ^"^ Greeks. m the pursuit which followed, when very few were left to guard his person, he saw his royal brother, and, giving way to a transport of rage, cried, ' I see the man ! ' and rushed on to slay him. His spear penetrated the corsletof the king, and slightly Death of wounded him, but Cyrus himself was pie'rced ^*'"'' beneath the eye by the javelin of a Karian soldier, and, falling from his horse, was quickly despatched with his few companions. 'Thus died Cyrus,' savs Xcnophon. 'a man acknowledged by all who had any acquaintance with him to have been of all Persians the most kingly and most worthy of empire since the days of Cyrus the elder." When their leader fell, the Asiatic soldiers on the centre and the left broke and fled, and the roval troops plundered their camp; so that when the victorious Greeks returned to it thcv were '^"J?eOreek« ofjliged to go supperless to sleep, though ^"''""'^ ^o they had been forced to go dinnerless to bat- '^''''''^'■"'' tie. On the morrow they heard of the death of Cyrus, and at once, as conquerors, offered the crown to Ariaios' but. before his answer could arrive, Artaxerxes sent to summon them to lay down their arms. After some con- sultation Klearchos replied that, if the Greeks were to be friends with the king, they would be of more use to him with their arms than without them ; if thev were to be enemies, they should equally require their 'weapons for their own use. Ariaios was however so fearful of the opposition of the Persian nobles that he dared not accept the dangerous offer of the Greeks, and he announced his mtention of retreat. Artaxerxes next sent a messa-e in i 72 TAc Ten Thousand. B.C. 401. t CH. V. Despondency of the Greeks. 73 which he proposed to treat on equal terms ; but Klcarchos replied again that they had nothing to eat, and no man should presume to talk to Greeks about a peace without first furnishing them with a dinner. Upon this they were conducted to some villages, where they obtained abun- dance of supplies ; and Tissaphernes soon after made his appearance as a friendly negotiator. Artaxerxes was probably genuinely anxious to get the Greeks out of Babylonia, where their presence was a standing invi- tation to his subjects to revolt, and where it may have been in his opinion by no means unlikely that they might wish to establish a permanent settlement. After three weeks' delay Tissaphernes returned with the army^of the announcement that the king had re- "^hernes luctantly given him permission to save the Greek armv, and that he would conduct them home in person. Although the Greeks were far from im- plicitly trusting the good faith of the satrap, yet they, and Klearchos especially, were so profoundly (dnvinrcd that their only chance of escape was to keep on good terms with the Persians, that they put themselves under his guidance, and began the march. An interval of three miles separated them from the troops of Tissaphernes, with whom the army of Ariaios was now united ; and in this order they passed the Wall of Media and the Tigris, and advanced as far on their northward journey as the Zabatos, or Greater Zab. Here the mutual mistrust of the two armies, which had been gradually on the increase, became so serious that ^ , Klearchos held an interview with Tissapher- Treachery - , . . of I'issa- nes for the purpose of devismg measures to deat^hoVthe remedy SO Unpleasant a State of things. The generals. satrap, drawing an over-coloured picture of the dirticulties which enct)mpassed the Greeks, and of his own power to destroy them utterly if he thought fit, assured Klearchos that he would much rather bind them by ties of gratitude, and invited him to bring all the generals to a conference on the morrow. Accordingly Klearchos, accompanied by Menon, Proxenos, and two other generals, and escorted by only 200 men, repaired to the satrap's tent to keep his appointment. The gen- erals were immediately admitted ; the escort remained outside. At a given signal, and at the same moment, those within the tent were seized and bound, and those outside were slain. One man alone, wounded and in a ghastly plight, escaped to tell the news. In the mo- mentary confusion and dismay of the Greeks, a sudden attack by the whole Persian army would probably have been entirely successful. But nothing in the campaign is more striking than the folly with which the royal generals threw away their opportunities. Ariaios with a squadron of horse came to summon the Greeks to sur- render, but was driven away with indignant reproaches. Klearchos and the other generals were beheaded after a short imprisonment, except Menon, who, after a year of insuh and torture, ended a life of perpetual perjury, de- ceit, and treachery, by a malefactor's death. Bad as the prospects of the Greeks had been imme- diately after the battle, they were now infinitely worse. To borrow the words of one who himself felt what he describes, they were conscious that Dangers • they were still at the very gates of the Great pomWy of King. They were hemmed in on all sides by '''^ ^'■^^'''• many tribes and cities, all hostile to them. No one would any longer supply them with provisions. They were not less than 10,000 stadia distant from their own country; they had no guide to show them the way, and impassable rivers intercepted their homeward course. Nay, even 74 The Ten Thousand. R.r. 40T. the Asiatics, who had served with them under Cyrus, had betrayed them ; and they were left all alone, without any cavalry to assist them, so that it was quite obvious that if they won a victory they could not follow it up, while if they lost a battle not a man of them would escape. As they pondered over these thouj^hts in deep dejection, few of them tasted a bit of food at ^upper-time, and few hghted fires. Many never even came to their quarters, but lay down, just where they hajjpened to be. unable to sleep through sorrow, and for longing after homes and parents, and wives and children, whom they never thought to see again. Such were then the feelings of all, as they lay down to rest. Hut there was in the army a man named Xenophon, who joined the expedition not as general, captain, or common soldier; but Proxenos, an old friend of his, had sent for him from home, pro!ni^ing him that, if he would come, he would place him high in the favour of Cyrus, whom, as he said, he considered to be more to him than his own country.' In these words Xenophon introduces himself to his readers, fully conscious of the im|)orlance of the crisis, yet feeling also that it needed some more than human stimulus to induce him, a mere volunteer, to take the lead among his 10,000 despairing countrymen. This heaven- sent impulse came to him in a vision of the Xenophon, "i.i^'ht; for he dreamed that a thunderbolt fell *;*^" '"^ upon his father's house and set it all ablaze. chosen one ' of the new Waking at once from his brief, uneasv slum- ber. he thought. ' Why lie I here, while the night wears away, and the dawn may see our foes upon us?' He roused without delay those captains who had served under Proxenos, and whom of course he knew in- timately ; and, taking as bright a view of their position as circumstances would permit, urged them to collect the CH. V. Character of Xenophon, 75 other officers. At a council of war, called in accordance with this advice, Xenophon again becomes the chief speaker, and, amongst other new appointments, he is nominated general in the place of his hapless young friend Proxenos. Finally, in an assembly of the whole army, the new generals were approved; and Xenophon, by a stirring harangue, raised the soldiers from their dull dejection, rekindled hope and energy in their despairing breasts, so that no thought of submission was any longer entertained, and all attempt at parley with the enemy was forbidden. In this rapid rise of Xenophon, at sunset an unknown volunteer, and at dawn of day the most influential gen- eral of 10,000 men, is seen firstly the power of oratory, and secondly the value of an Chamcter * .1 ■ J . ^^ , , of Xeno- Athenian education. Others probably among phon, a true them were his equals in daring courage, in ^^h*^"'^"- readiness of action, in military skill ; but no one possessed that gift of persuasive eloquence which here, and on many subsequent occasions, gave to Xenoplion the first place among his colleagues. Though most of the soldiers were Peloponnesians, and though Athens had not yet lost her unj)opularity, no one but an Athenian was found with enough readiness, spirit, and superior cuhure to give order and coherence to this ill-cemented host. Nor do the genuinely Athenian qualities of Xenophon show themselves more strikingly in his personal gifts than in the means which he employed to inspire unity into the motley mass, and to establish a rough public opinion and a citizen's respect for self-imposed law, as a valuable sup- plement to the soldier's mechanical discipline. The general assembly and the binding vote of the majority henceforward become important elements in the manage- ment of the army. G 76 The Ten TJioitmncf. B.C. 401. With renewed spirits the Greeks recommenced their marvellous retreat. Up the lonj^ valley of the Tigris, throuj^h the strong mountain passes of the Retrcit Kardouchoi, over the snow-spread uplands from the . ' , ' Zabatos to of Armenia, defying Persian perfidy and bar- banan valour, fordmg river after river, and facing the freezing blasts of the December north-wind, for five months the indomitable band pressed on. At last, led by a friendly guide, the vanguard gained the summit of the holy mountain Theches. With a great shout of joy they welcomed the sight of the dark waters of the Kuxine, till the cries swelled with the numbers who had reached the top, and Xenophon, in his usual position, commanding the rearguard, thought that it was the din of battle that he heard. As he hurried on, the shouts grew more distinct, and then the words ' The Sea I The Sea I ' fell Sight of the plainly on his ears. With sobs and tears the soldiers fell into each other's arms, gen- erals and officers weeping like the rest ; for they felt that they saw before them a pledge that their long toil would be crowned with success. A huge cairn rose to mark the auspicious spot ; and their guide was sent home with rich rewards. A few days' march brought them to a Greek colony, Trapezous (Trebizond) ; and being received with hospitality, they rested for a month in some villages out- side the town. Solemn sacrifices and games testified in true Hellenic fashion their gratitude and joy. Eight thou- sand hoplites with light-armed troops of various kinds raised the total of survivors to more than 10,000; and we read, with astonishment, that many women accompanied the army through all its hardships. When they had once again arrived at the sea-coast, and reached the limits of Hellenic civilisation, the march- worn soldiers might well have thought that a prosperous L'H. V. Endcavourinc!^ to procure Ships, 77 close to all their sufferings could not be far distant. Rut the space which still separated them from their homes was as great as from Sardeis to Kunaxa ; and they had yet to learn that the intrigues of Jt!lnT\^' Spartan harmosts could be as dangerous and causes. as pertinacious as had been the onslaughts of barba-ian foes. The welcome which they received from the Greek colonists on the Euxinc was not unmixed with suspicion and alarm ; for, since the Cyreians owned no law but their own consciences, and knew no government but that of their own elected generals, the inhabitants could not feel secure against the possible actions of a force so numerous and so well-disciplined that not even Sinope herself, the queen of the whole district, could stand against it. The Spartans also^ who had compromised themselves by sup- porting with their fleet the attempt of Cyrus, wished after the news of his death only to regain the favour of the Great King, and consequently refused all assistance to the Cyreians. After a month's rest at Trapezous, a council was held to consider the means of accomplishing the rest of their journey. First of all a Thourian soldier rose to speak. ' Comrades,' said he, ' I have had enough bv this time of quick march and doul)lc quick, of shouldering arms and marching in rank, of sentry duty and of hard fi'ditino-. Since we have the sea before us, I want to have done with these fatigues, to sail the rest of the way, J 1 11.1 • , • Futile en- and, lying on my back, to be carried asleep deavour to to Hellas, like Odysseus.' The enthusiastic from*"'^" applause which greeted this pithy speech '^y^-intion. shewed that the feeling of the army was unanimous; and the general of the Lakedaimonian contingent, declaring that Anaxibios, the Spartan admiral at Byzantion, was his personal friend, was commissioned to go thither to 73 The Ten Thousand. B.C. 400. get ships for their transport. During his absence they detained for their service all merchant vessels which passed along the coast ; and when at last, in spite of marauding excursions, want of provisions compelled them to leave Trapezous, the women, children, invalids, and older soldiers, were put with the baggage on board the fleet which they had collected, while the March to ^cst of the army were compelled to resume Koiyora. ^^^ labour of marching, of which they were so weary. Three days' march brought them to Kerasous; and, as there was no road— a want not yet supplied— ten days more were consumed in the journey to Kotyora. Here the position of Xenophon became very difficult and disagreeable. The expected transports from Hyzantion still tarried ; outrages committed by the disorganised soldiery were gaining them an evil name; meddlesome and ill- natured calumniators undermined the inthience of Xeno- phon, by declaring that he wished to entrap of Xeno- the troops mto remammg on the huxinc. and P^°"" founding there a great colony— a thoroughly sagacious scheme which Xenophon had really entertained, but which he neither would n(K could have carried out against the will of the army. The envoys from Sinope came with a message, not of welcome but of ill-will; and the poverty of the soldiers caused a continual increase of discontent and a corresponding decrease of discipline. But from all these difficulties Xenophon, by his ready wit and winning tongue, and by his frank appeal to public opinion freely expressed in the general assembly, emerged not only \mhurt, but triumphant in the dis- comfiture of his malicious enemies, the conciliation of the Sinopean envoys, and the increase of his own in- tluenre. After this the army, whose heavy marching was now CH. V. Repression of Mutiny at Byzantion, 79 really at an end, proceeded by sea to Sinope, and was met there by the Spartan general, who had returned with nothing more substantial than empty promises from the selfish Anaxibios. Grievously disappointed, . , ■' * *\ Advance to they were transported to Herakleia, and chryso- thence to Kalpe. Here they remained for ^"^ *^' some time in comfortable quarters; and after the concili- atory eloquence of Xenophon had again been called into play, to prevent a grave breach between the troops and the Spartan authorities, they marched on to Chrysopolis (Scutari), on the Bosporos. But Tharnabazos, the Per- sian satrap, was anxious that so formidable a force should not linger in his province ; and Anaxibios, induced by the offer of a splendid reward, persuaded the army by specious promises to cross over to Byzantion. No sooner had they been admitted within the town, than Anaxibios, who had neither the wish nor the power to Dangerous keep his word, ordered them to muster out- tumult at ' liyzantion, side the walls. But before all the army had produced passed the gates it became known that they treachery of were to be despatched on a long march and Anaxibios, to difficult service in the Chersonese. Thus they saw themselves deluded by promises of pay into leaving the rich plundering-grounds of Asia, and then deceived in all their expectations, and expelled at once from the first European city in which they had set foot. Was this, they asked, the welcome which their heroism deserved, and to which they had looked forward through all their trials ? Stung to fury by such treatment, in tumultuous mutiny they rushed against the gates, which had been hurriedly closed against them ; and those of their comrades who were still inside hewed down the bars. In guilty terror Anaxibios fled to the citadel ; and the town and all its panic-stricken inhabitants were left at the mercy of the 8o The Ten Thousand. B.C. 400. Cyreians. The soldiers flocked round Xenophon, and cried, ' Now, Xenophon, you can make yourself a man. You have a city, ycni liave a fleet, you have money, you have men hkc us. Now, if you will, you can help us, and we can make you great.' The danger fci'"i'^ecri.y was critical, but his presence of mind never Xenophon. ^_^.j^^j j^j^^^ . j j- ^j^^.^^, .^^^ ^.^^^^ wisllCS.' he replied. ' fall into rank as quickly as you can.' With instinctive discipline the army formed itself on the nearest open space, with the hoplites eight deep, and the light- armed troops on either flank. lUit Xenophon, in a speech of consummate skill, bade them reflect for a moment on the consequences that would ensue if they were to punish the Lakedaimonians, and to plunder Byzantion. All (Greece would be against them. The Athenians themselves, great as they were, could not stand against Sparta : how then could the Cyreians withstand the combined forces of Greece, Tissaphcrnes, and the Great King ? He would himself rather be buried ten thousand fathoms beneath the earth than see them sack the first Greek city into which they were admitted. Such was the force of his eloquence that the violence of their anger subsided, and they were content to come to terms with the detestable trickster Anaxibios. But the admirable discipline and self-restraint which the troops had shewn, and the extraordinary readiness and tact with which Xenophon had averted a frightful catastrophe, failed to win the slightest grati- freutlliciu'^ tude from the Spartan authorities, who saw of the ^vith pleasure the Cvreian army sink into the Cyreians ' ', ] < ^ by the Utmost distress and poverty, and become Spartans. gradually weaker from repeated dispersions. Anaxibios, on giving up the command of the fleet, specially enjoined Aristarchos, the new harmost of By- CH. V. Treachery of the Persian Satrap. 81 zantion. to sell into slavery all the Cyreians who remained invalided in the city, and who had been sheltered by his more humane predecessor. With callous brutality the new governor executed these injunctions. Nor did even this outrage satiate his Spartan spite. Anaxibios had been cruel and perfidious ; Aristarchos was at least his match in both. He next laid a trap to get Xenophon into hi:» power, by inviting him to a conference ; but the vile treachery of the Persian satrap had taught the Cyreian general to avoid the clumsy imitations of a Spartan harmost. and he escaped the snare. Soon after this the army entered the service of a Thrakian prince, who promised them liberal pay for a winter campaign against some tribes which had revolted from his rule. The expedition was success- . 1 hey take ful. but the pavment of their wages was service A delayed. Once again the suspicions of the seuthes, soldiers were roused by insidious slanders against the honesty of Xenophon ; and once again by an address to the assembled troops he reinstated himself completely in their confidence. But when the policy of Sparta towards Persia changed, it was seen that no more powerful allies could be found than the Cyreian army, now reduced in num- ber to 6,000 men. Accordingly, underthecom- f^/sp^arta mand of Xenophon, they crossed to Lampsa- against ' "^ Persia. kos, and marched thence to Pergamos. At Lampsakos Xenophon fell in with an old acquaintance, who heard with amazement that he was as poor as when he started ; and his friend being a prophet advised him to sacrifice to Zeus the Kindly, whose service Xenophon had neglected for that of Zeus the King. At once his fortunes changed. A freebooting expedition which he undertook against the castle of a wealthy Persian was 82 Sparta : her Allies and Subjects. B.C. 403. CH. VI. Decline in Power of Lysandros. 83 Xenophon's success in Asia. crowned with success. The grateful soldiers pressed their general to choose the best of the spoil ; and he returned to Athens, if he went thither at all, a famous and a wealthy man. lUit he had never really appreciated the debt which he owed to his native city and to its institutions; he had never been conscious how entirely he was himself Atlienian „ , in character and education, if not Athenian He perhaps goes to in sentiment: and now, when the name Athens, - ., , 1 1 1 1 • of Sparta was more than ever hated by his countrymen (could even Xenophon have loved it then ?), and the restored democracy more than ever popular — when again they had within a few week?* judicially mur- dered the man whom for hi^ piety, justice, temperance, and wisdom he regarded as the most virtuous and happy of all mankind — lie may have felt that Athens could be no i\\. home for him, and he returned to Asia to take service in the cause of Sparta and returns to Asia. against the Great King. CHAI'TKR VI. SPARTA : HER ALLIHS AND SUBJECTS. A VERY few months had sufficed to convince the Hellenic world that the era of freedom was vet far off. Thev had hoped that its commencement would date from the day Contrast ^"^ which the demolition of the Long Walls between began ; but a bitter experience proved that grievances ° ' ' under Athe- that day of rejoicing was only the beginning nian and f c t • i Spartan of a tar morc Oppressive tyranny. Imperial '^"'*^' Athens had doubtless made her authority respected and her will obeyed; but her subordinate offi- cials, her inspectors, and her ta.\-gatherers, had always \ been forced to keep their personal caprices within legal bounds ; and the dependent states were sure that their com- plaints would obtain from the Athenian dikasteries a re- dress which was in the main just, even though sometimes tardy. But now the steady rule of one supreme state had been changed for the capricious tyranny of innumerable oppressors. In almost every town tliere was a Spartan harmost ready to support the dekarchs in all their worst deeds of revenge and rapacity, while the dekarchs were an.xious, in their turn, to gratify the whims and glut the cupidity of the harmost, to remove out of his way his per- sonal enemies, and to make it worth his while to connive at their enormities. Nor was the oppression confined to those who held official power. Xenophon tells us, and repeats the assertion elsewhere, that in all Greek cities — even in a town so remote as Kalpe in Bithynia — the will of a single Spartan was law. Though the designs of Lysandros at Athens had been thwarted by the joint action of the kings and the ephors, his influence was still i)owerful enough to obtain for him a fresh command in Asia and Lysa^ndms the Hellespont. Here for a time he could weakened forget the serious check which his personal authority had received in continental Greece, and could enjoy to the full the pleasures of absolute power. He strengthened the oligarchical governments in the cities, in defiance of reiterated complaints against their tyranny. All sup- pliants thronged to him as the sole fountain of honour and the distributor of favours. All remon- strances against his wanton arroirance and un- ^7 ^^^ '"'T"* ° '^ diation of scrupulous support of his own creatures were his conduct systematically disregarded by the home gov- ernment. But the end was at hand. To attach the sailors of the fleet more devotedly to his service, and to secure 84 Sparta : her Allies and Subjects. B. C. 4CX). to his own uses a naval station of prime importance, Ly- sandros had expelled from Sestos not only the Athenians, but the Sestians themselves, and had parcelled out the city and its territory amon;^ the subordinate officers of his fleet. But this measure was so clearly desij^ned to further the private ends of the admiral rather than the national interests of Sparta that the ephors annulled the deed of Lysandros, and restored the citizens to their possessions. Nor was the great man any Iouj^^t allowed to be omni- potent in screenin;^^ his creatures from the consequences of their misconduct ; rather it may be fairly supposed that the harmost of Samos, Thorax, was singled out for punishment, not so much for any special enormities or excessive rapacitv, but on account of his per- by the con- ,,'•,» i <• i detmuition soual friendship With Lysandros. Some silver, of ihorax, ^^^^^ Plutarch, was found in his possession. In other words, he had used the opportunities which his posi- tion gave him, to acquire for himself money and property, in contravention of the old law of Lykourgos, which prohi- bited a Spartan from holding private property or accumu- lating money in any other shape than the unwieldy iron bars which formed the only legal coinage of Sparta. Tho- rax was summoned home by the ephors, and put to death. The remonstrances of the (ireek cities were now seconded by the more influential complaints of Pharna- bazos, the Persian satrap to whose charge the district of the Hellespont had been committed by the (ireat King. The enemies of Lvsandros at home and by his '^ ' recall in were ready enough to urge upon the govern- quence of mcnt that iujudes inflicted on so faithful an ^ bint's'^of ^'^^b' ^"^^ so potent a prince as Pharnabazos rharna- could uot safcly or honourably be disre- garded ; and an order was sent for his recall. Though he could not disobey this summons, CH. VI. Fall of the Dekarchies. 85 he yet hoped to mitigate its consequences. Accordingly, having asked and obtained an interview with Pharnaba- zos, he begged the satrap to write another despatch to the ephors. modifving, or altogether withdrawing, the com- plaints which he had previously made. The Persian con- sented ; and wrote a second letter, which gave Lysandros full satisfaction. But. according to the Greek proverb, he played Kretan against Kretan, and substituted another letter which he had written secredy, and in which he reiterated, more strongly than before, the grounds of his dissatisfaction. This was sealed and given ^^^^^^^^^ to Lvsandros, who, on his arrival at Sparta, is tricked by 1 • 11, r.-.^ Pharna- procured his own condemnation by handing ^^^os, to the ephors, with an air of the fullest con- fidence, a despatch, which, as he heard it read aloud, proved to be a bitter denunciation of the bearer. Out- witted, confused, humiliated, Lysandros left the presence of the ephors. But the rigid discipline and narrow routine of the life of a private citizen at Sparta proved unutterably wearisome after the uncontrolled licence to which he had recently grown accustomed ; and, availing himself of the pretext of an ancient vow, and probably in- tending to win support for ambitious designs, spars'"" which were as yet undeveloped, he obtained leave to make a pilgrimage to the oracle of the Lib- van Amoun. With the recall of Lysandros, in most cases the rule of the dekarchies came to an end. The complaints against these governments had been so serious that, as soon as their chief supporter was removed J^^lrchies. from power, the ephors gave permission to the subject cities to re-establish their ancient constitu- tions. But the harmost and the Spartan garrison still retained their hold on their Akropoleis, or citadels, as 86 Sparta: /ur Alius and Subjects, B.C. 401. a guarantee that Spartan interests should suffer no seri ous injury. It has been already shown that the continental allies of Sparta had not much more reason to be graiitied with .• the results of their triumph than the cities of tlix-ontei.t the Egean Islaiuls and the coasts of the ol the allies. Ikllcspont. Sparta had allowed them to participate in all the dangers of the war and in the b.irren honours of the victory ; but she had carefully monopolised the profits, and had resented, as an insult, any claim to share the spoil (p. 30). The disaffection thus produced had become so serious at Thebes and Corinth, that these states had already openly refused to send their con- tingents to the Spartan army ; and it was probably thought desirable that Sparta should at once display her real power, and shew, by a salutary e.xample, the natural fate of recalcitrant allies. Elis was the chosen victim, a state insignificant in ex- tent of territory or j)olitical imj)()rtance, but influential through the whole of Hellas, and the I'elo- Elis. ponnese especially, because the great shrine of the 01ymj)ian Zeus was situated in IHeian territory, and gave to the Kleians the right to preside over the Olympic festival. Many grievances were now remembered against her. There was a long-standin**- quarrel about a border town. Lcpreon : and the Kleians had joined the ranks of the enemies of Sparta at Mantineia. They had dared to inflict a fine on their powerful neighbours, to e.xclude them from participation in the great national festival, and even to scourge a .Spartan who by entering under false pretences had secured a prize in the chariot-race. They had refused to allow a Spartan king to offer prayer and sacrifice in the temple. And even now. when, in Its causes. CH. VI. Agis im'adrs Elis. 87 compliance with the demands or in deference to the known wishes of Sparta, oligarchical governments had been set up in every (ireek state, the Kleians on her very borders persisted in retaining their democracy, and had been prominent in sending assistance to, and showing sympathy with, the Athenian exiles in Peiraieus. Kor all these things the littb state was to be brought to iudimient. A herald was sent, requiring ih.U she should grant liberty to her dependent townsliips, who stood in the same relation to her as the Perioikoi to Sparta ; and, on her refusal, King Agis invaded her northern borders. Scarcely had he 1)egun the work i,uades of ravaging her fields, which were celebrated ^'''.'^' ^^^ , retires. for their fertility, when a shock of earthquake warned the Spartans to evacuate the territory of the sacred state. The Kleians, conscious that they were enjoying only a temporary reprieve, employed the winter in sending round to ask help from all the cities whom they knew to be ill-disposed to the Spartans. Their embassies were all in vain ; and the next year saw Agis again on the march, with the full force of . . the Lakcdaimonian confederacy. Thebes invafles and Corintii stood aloof from Sparta; but • '^ iR""* even Athens, in spite of her gratitude for recent assist- ance, was reluctantly compelled to furnish her contingent to the invading army. Agis this year selected the south- ern frontier as the point of attack. Town after town revolted to him. He made his way unopposed, accord- ing to the account of Xenophon, to the temple at Olympia, and did sacrifice there; and, laying waste the land with fire and sword, j)ushed on to ?e"sLy ^'^'"" the capital. The fruitful fields had been ravages the ' country. carefully tilled and had long enjoyed a free- dom from the ravages of war ; hence the booty, consisting 88 Sparta: her Allien and Subjects. v,a\ 401. CH. VI. Schcjnrs of Lysandros. 89 to a great extent in cattle and slaves, was so abundant that crowds of Arkadians and Achaians flocked to join the invading army, and to share the spoil. In short, says Xenophon, the exj)edition was turned into a sort of foraj^ing party for all the IVloponncsc. Tlie beautiful suburbs of the capital were then given over to plunder; but, although the town was unforlitied. Agis, knowing that he would meet with resolute resistance, and conlidentlv expecting that intern.d treachery would do the work for him, left Klis itself unassailed. and parsed on with his army into the neighbourhood of Kyllene, the chief sea- port of the district. The presence of a Sp.irtan army had emboklened the oligarchic party to at- fill rising of tempt a <<'/// ^/ , o democrats, their opponents rallied, and, de- feating the oligarchs in a tight, forced them to leave the city and join the ranks of the Lakedaimonian army. Disappointed in his hope of gaining possession of the city without a struggle, Agis drew off his main body, and left a force, including the Kleian exiles, to occupy the valley of the Alpheios and harass the inhabit. mts by perpetual depredations. The precedent of Dekeleia had taught the Spartans how effective was the annoyance of such a hostile occupation. Wearied out, the Kleians in the following summer sent to offer surrender, The Eleians ^ , ^ .. »u 1. u -i- »• submit to were forced to accept the most humiliating Sparta terms, and were deprived of every right which they valued, except the presidency of the games. Even this thev were allowed to retain onlv because the other towns in the neighbourhood, such as i'isa, were too rustic to support the office with becoming dignity. After having thus chastised the presumptuous audacity of Elis, and shewn the rest of the allies what they might expect if they dared to slight or oppose the sovereign state, Agis travelled to Delphoi and there dedicated to the god a tenth of the spoil. On his return journev, he had reached Heraia, a town on r>eath of . Agis. the Alpheios near the frontier of Arkadia, when he fell ill. He was carried home to Sparta, but soon died, far advanced in age. He had enjoyed the kingly dignity for twenty-seven years, and now was buried with the burial of a hero, not of a man. But scarcely had the days of mourning for the late king been accomplished, when a bitter contest arose about the succession. Lysandros had visited the oracle in Libya, and had been seen both at Delphoi and at Dodona. Probably at all these places he had hoped and tried to win over the officials of the sanctuary, and to obtain responses which might helj) him to gain the royal power for himself. Indeed, if the story, repeated by Plutarch, on the authority of Ephoros, deserves credit, his design was to persuade his countrymen to throw open the royal dignity to all the descendants of Herakles, as there was little doubt in his mind that, if this could be done, no Spartan would be held fitter than Lysandros, himself to wear the crown. With this object ?f, '°'^,^y he engaged an eminent rhetorician to com- pose an oration, to be delivered before the people, in which the advantages of such a change were detailed. But in dealing with a nation so superstitious as the Spar- tans, he was well aware that a line of oracle was worth a page of rhetoric; and he wished to prepare their minds for his arguments by removing their religious prejudices against innovation through the intervention of a 'deusex machina.' In one of the cities of Pontus there lived a youth, whose mother declared that he was born of no mortal father, but of the god Apollo himself. Oracles were prepared at Del- t PAtjimi^ai'.JtM'. ■ .i go Their f.iilure Sparta: her Allies and Subjects. B.C. 399. phoi declaring that it would be better for the Spartans to choose their kings out of the best citizens ; and these were hidden awav by the pnc«,ts. who gave out that they had discovered writings of untoUl antiquity, which none might read till one came bor4i of Apollo. When the air of Sparta was full of mysterious rumours, industriously cir- culated by the friends of Lysandros. the youth of Pontus was to present himself at Delj.hoi. be acknowledged by the priests as a genuine son of the god. and publicly pro- mulgate the oracles composed in favour of the change. But when the vacancy in the succession oc- curred. Lysandros was unable to take ad- vantage of it. Kither his plans were not yet ripe, or the heart of some accomplice failed at the critical moment. The scheme fell to the ground, and remained undiscovered till after his death. But, though the position of king was thus found to be bevoml hisV^^P. l^ysandros might fairly soothe him- self with the thought. th;vt the trade of king- s^rpporirrhe maker was one of equal, or even superior. claims of di>mitv He had returned to his native city. Agesuaos to vtij^n^v/- the throne. ^^^\ \y^^^ remained in comparative obscurity. No office had been offered to him. 1 lis countrymen were no longer anxious to evade, as once before, even their own express enactments to give him a ccmimand ; his partisans had been disestablished and discredited ; and his special patron. Cyrus, had fallen at Kunaxa. Still his restless and unbounded ambition urged him to action ; and his splendid abilities forbade him to despair. If he could place on the twin throne of Sparta his ancient comrade and intimate friend Agcsilaos. he might yet be king in all but name, and wield, directly or indirectly, an authority more than regal. With this view he at once prompted Agesilaos. the younger brother of the late king, to put CH. VI, Character of Agesilaos, 91 for^vard his claims to the throne in opposition to those of Leotychides. the son. Agesilaos was now of mature age, probably about forty years old ; and it seems strange that the man who was to prove himself the ablest of Spartan kings should, up to this time, in spite of the advantage of royal lineage, have done no notable deed nor held any distinguished office in the stirring times through which he had lived. His character is painted by his companion and pane^'-vrist Character of Xenophon in colours which are perhaps too '^«•''''^•''• bright for strict fidelity ; but, even when we have made allowance for the partiality of friendship, Agesilaos remains one of the most striking of (Jreek celebrities. His youth and manhood were spent in the utmost rigours of Spartan training, and for all the virtues which the Spartan loved he was distinguished. Skilled in martial exercises, he had learnt to obey and to endure. His bravery was beyond suspicion; his energy was so unwearied as to carry him, when fourscore years of age, across the sea to Egypt at the head of a Spartan army. His simplicity was destined to shame by contrast the womanish luxuries of Persian grandees: his frugality made him, like Lysandros, indif- ferent to money-getting. He was covetous only of honour, and always keen to keep the first place among his rivals.' Yet to them, as to all. he was generous : and his successes were borne with modesty and humility. Hence he gained a popularity which he was not unwilling to increase. His manners charmed all with whom he came fn contact. His address was respectful to his elders and his official superiors, and aff ible to all, while after his elevation he won the hearts of his soldiers, not merely by his own endurance of hardship, but by his considerate care for their personal comforts. His firmness in friendship led him sometimes into grave faults; for, to protect or gratify H i 92 Sparta: her Allies and Suhjrits. B.C. 399. CH. VI. Position of Kings at Sparta. 93 a friend, he would do actions which he would have scorned to do on his own behalf. Yet he must also have possessed great skill in disguising his real character and sentiments, and have schooled himself to the most watch- ful self-restraint ; for Lysandros. under whose eye he had grown up, who had trained him for political life, and who had always lived with him in the closest companionship, was utterly mistaken in him. He had expected to find Agesilaos amenable and submissive, and to make him the mouth-piece of his own wishes ; he found hmi high- spirited and ambitious, endowed with a will of his own, and intolerant of a rival in power. Never was there a truer example of the old Greek saying, ' Rule will show the man.' Yet his ambition was unlike that of Lysandros in which self took the first place. He was a sincere patriot, and the public interests were never subordinated to private ends. The title of Lcotychides to the vacant throne was disputed on the ground that his mother had been un- faithful to king Agis before his birth. It was asserted that the god Poseidon had driven Agis from his wife's society, and that she had allowed the charms of Alki- biades to prevail over her conjugal duties. Conflicting . /•.•!• \e * *i ci.iimsof The testimony of Agis himself as to the fnTLeoYy- legitimacy of Lcotychides had not been con- chides, sistcnt. He had at first disowned the parent- a<^e of the child : but a short time Ix-fore his death, won over, it is said, by the urgent entreaties of Lcotychides, he had acknowledged him to be his son. Under ordinary circumstances the word of the dying king would have been sufficient to decide the point; but the popularity and tried virtue of Agesilaos caused some hesitation. He was a man forty years old, his rival was a lad of fifteen ; and he had the support of Lysandros, skilled in intrigue, weighty in debate, and strong in the prestige of past exploits and in the gratitude which Sparta owed for past services. But when the arguments seemed evenly balanced, and the vote of the assembly wavered, Dio- peithes, a man renowned for his oracular lore, and the head of the priestly party, brought forward an apt oracle — and such oracles were never wanting — which bade Sparta beware of a lame reign, which would bring on her long and unexpected troubles, and the waves of deadly warfare. This seemed decisive, for Agesilaos was lame of one foot ; but with ready wit Lysandros rose with a cunning retort. It was no mere physical infirmity against which the god warned them, for that might be caused by accident ; but the kingdom would be halt and maimed when a king who was not a true descendant of Herakles should ascend the throne. The ingenious reply secured the election of Agesilaos ; and many who j^^ided in were then present lived to see the clouds of favour of * Agesilaos. adversity thicken round their country, doubt- less, as they thought, in fulfilment of the oracle which was so blindly and i)erversely set aside. The first object of Agesilaos after his election was to add the reality of power to the empty dignity of his posi- tion. Whatever may have been the case in position of very early ages, the power of the Spartan kings at kings had by this time become exceedingly limited. As they were traditionally the representatives of the whole people, and appointed to see that equality in property and in rights was maintained, they had no sympathy with the ruling caste, whose encroachments had narrowed the royal prerogatives, till their nominal greatness meant actual dependence. Besides the right of voting in the Senate, the chief privilege of the kings was that of commanding the forces of the state in war. But, 94 S/>arfii : her Allies and Subjects. ii.c. 399. I CH. VI. Discontent at Sparta. 95 on the one hand, the establishment of the nauarchy (or the office of Lord High Achniral) which Aristotle called a second kingship, had wholly taken away from their control an increasingly important branch of warfare ; and also since it became the custoin for the ephors to despatc h a board of counsellors to advise the king when absent from Sparta on active service, their military imj)ortancc had been vastly diminished. The Spartan kings were now dignit'ied and intluential state funi tionarics, but in their real powers the ephors had entirely supplanted them ; and the election of these officers was controlled by the Homoioi, or peers of Sparta, in whose interest the government was carried on. Accordingly most of the Spartan kings had been on unfriendly terms with the ephors, and had asserted their tradition. d superiority by an arrogant and contemptuous bearing. lUit Agesi- laos, who had been taught bv l.\sandro5 Agesilaos *^_ conciliates that the wisc man must often stoop to con- the ephors. , , ,.^^ ^ ,. , , quer, adoptetl a dnferent policy, lie was studiously respectful to the ephors, rose from his seat at their approach, conciliated them with presents, and was scrupulously observant of their orders as well as of the laws of the state. As simple in his dress and diet after his elevation as he was before, he sacrificed all the exter- nals of rank, and was rewarded by acquiring more real power than any of his predecessors. But the kings were bv no means the onlv class in Sparta who had long felt increasingly dis<^ontented with their position. The Hypomeir»nes, or inferiors, the Peri- oikoi, or rural tribes, the Helots — all were Discontent . , , . , , , • , , of .nil the dissatisfied with a system bv which thev lower strat.i • i .^ ^ ^- \ 11 i .. • .1 • of Spartan might at any time be called upon to give their society. services or even their lives for the State, and yet could under no possible circumstances rise to an equality with the governing class. This class of Homoioi, or peers, had become of late years much smaller than it had originally been ; many families had died out alto- gether, or had been killed off in the ceaseless wars of the last generation. Many more had sunk into the class of inferiors from inability to contribute their share to the Syssitia, or public messes, to which it was necessary for every Spartan citizen to belong. This last cause had been particularly active during the last few years. The vast amount of money which had been brought into Sparta since the close of the war had occasioned a general rise in prices, while private fortunes had become more unequal froni the money-making spirit which had infected many Spartans on foreign service. Hence citi- zens, whose only crime was poverty or perhaps the old Spartan virtue of contem})t for wealth, had found them- selves disfranchised, and condemned to be permanently ranked as inferiors, unless a turn of fortune or the favour of some wealthy patron should enable them to regain their lost position. Again, the class of inferiors had been re- cruited by numerous additions from below as well as from above. The bolder spirits among the Perioikoi and Helots, who had proved their value to Sparta either by serving under the standards of a Brasidas in distant campaigns, or even by acting as harmosts in subject cities, were rewarded by what was to them enfranchisement, a posi- tion among the * inferior ' citizens. Thus this class grew at once stronger and more disaffected, while the perma- nent discontent of the lower strata was aggravated by the fact that the diminution in the number of Spartan citizens made their services more valuable and even indispensable. This state of things would have been far more toler- able but for the feeling that the rigid conservatism of the highest class was only a monstrous sham. Much 96 Sparta: her Allies and Subjects. B.C. 399. that was good and noble still survived as a matter of habit and tradition. A Spartan still knew how to command and how to obey. He could despise physical thc^?£!rac- pain, and meet death with composure ; in his gmern'ing cycs the -rcv head was a crown of glory, ciii^^- and the fear of the gods the beginning of wisdom. But there was much hypocrisy in the observance of the letter of the ancient institutions. The opulent citizens who partook of the black broth and coarse bread at the public mess supplemented this meagre fare by luxurious feasts in their own houses. Men like Lysan- dros, who were careful to wear the long hair and the sim- ple dress prescribed by Lykourgos, had no scruple in re- nouncing as far as possible the Spartan type of character. External circumstances had forced upon Sparta changes which their laws were not only incapable of recognising, but were intended directly to repel. They were no longer, as of old, a Dorian army of occupation in the midst of hostile tribes in the valley of the Kurotas, but had become a nation influenced by complicated relations with the whole of Hellas and even with Asia ; and Spar- tans were in constant communication not only with all the cities of Greece, but even with that distant capital which a century before had seemed to Kleomenes almost unapproachable. Persian gold and silver had found their way to Sparta in spite of the vehement protests of old-fashioned purists. F'ormerly the public money had been sent away to Arkadia or to Delphoi, lest the sight of the forbidden thing should make the Spartan palm itch to feel it. Now the passion f(^r wealth, which had alwavs been a weakness even among eminent Spartans, burst out more strongly from its long repression, and cor- rupted not only Spartan men, but — always a most influen- tial section of Spartan society — Spartan women also. 1 1 / 1 CH. VI. Conspiracy of Kinadon. 97 Conspiracy of K.inadon. Such being the internal condition of Sparta, it is not surprising that, before the first year of the reign of Agesi- laos had come to an end, an alarming con- spiracy should have been betrayed and re- pressed. Agesilaos was offering a public sac- rifice, when the soothsayer, on inspecting the victim, told him that the gods declared the existence of a terrible con- spiracy. A second offering produced still more alarming omens; and at the third the prophet exclaimed, 'Agesi- laos, the signs tell me that we are in the very midst of our enemies.' After performing propitiatory sacrifices, the king departed; but for five days no further disclosure took place. At length the ephors were informed that a conspiracy existed, and that Kinadon was the arch-con- spirator. This young man, distinguished for his powers both of body and of mind, was one of the class of 'infe- riors.' and had been employed by the ephors on secret missions. Thus he had perhaps obtained an insight into the rapid and mysterious action of the governing body, which enabled him to defy all their usual precautions, and elude the vigilance even of their 'sbirri,' or secret police. In spite both of the jealousy and disunion of the lower classes, and also of the want of any common organ of communication, or any opportunities of common action, he had succeeded in organising a conspiracy, widely spread among both the urban and the rural population. The evidence of the informer, as given by Xenophon, is highly improbable, since it rep- J-scovery resents Kinadon as confident even to infatua- tion ; but it adds one or two graphic touches to the picture of Spartan society which has just been drawn. We are taken to the crowded market-place, and are shewn forty Spartan citizens surrounded by 4,000 of the discontented classes ; we visit the estates in the country, and find on aaacar.-. 98 Sparta : her Allies and Subjects. B. c. 399. V CH. VII. Causes of War uit/i Persia, 99 and re- pression each one enemy, the master, while Kinadon has innumer- able alhes ; we see the sullen faces which <;Iow with fury at the mere mention of a Spartan citizen, and hear the fierce curse that they would gladly eat the flesh of a Sj)artan raw. Convinced of their peril and of the necessity for prompt action, the e[)hors resolved to des- patch Kinadon on a secret mission of great importance to Aulon, a town on the frontiers of Mcssene and Elis; for his arrest would be effected more easily in this remote district than at Sparta itself. The guards who were sent with him, ostensibly to assist him in the execution of his mission, received orders to arrest him and extort from him the names of his accomplices. This was done; and the list of conspirators being sent to Sparta, the ring- leaders were seized at once before the news of Kinadon's arrest could reach the town. When he was brought back, the ephors ended the examination of their prisoner by asking his object in forming the conspiracy. * That I might be inferior to no man in Lakedaimon,' was the reply. After this Kinadon and his accomplices were fet- tered ; their hands and necks were loaded with irons ; they were scourged and goaded while they were dragged round the streets of the city ; and finally they were executed. Thus the danger was averted, and the mass of the people relapsed into their chronic state of sulky discontent. The ephors, though there was nothing new to them in the idea of a rising of the Helots and Perioikoi, must have been startled by the discovery of the fierce hatred felt by the Hypomeiones to the class above them. The extent of the ill-feeling was too great to be adequately met by ordinary precautions ; and the best safety-valve for disaffection at home was to be found in active employment on distant enterprises. CHAPTER Vn. OPERATIONS IN ASIA MINOR. As far as completeness went, the triumph of Sparta left nothing to be desired ; but from its glory there was, at any rate, one important drawback. It might possi- ^^^ ^^^^^^ bly be denied that the catastrophe of Aigospo- f^^^^^l^ tamoi was brought about through the treachery by Persian of the Athenian commanders : it could not be disputed that it was only barbarian aid, lavishly granted both in ships and money, which had made it possible for Lysandros to keep the sea at the Hellespont. And if the extent to which she profited by Persian assistance added little to her glory, the price at which she purchased it re- flected even less credit upon her. The first treaty had been so worded as to surrender to the Great King a large portion of Europe ; for it declared him to be entitled to all the territories and cities which he or his ancestors had ever possessed ; and though in a later treaty his European claims were renounced, his rights were confirmed over the Greek colonies in Asia, whose independence had been protected for half a century by the Delian confed- eracy under the supremacy of Athens. Twelve years had however elapsed since the last treaty between Sparta and Persia, and the relative position of the two powers had been entirely changed. ^^^^^^^ ^^ All Greece lay prostrate at the conqueror's w'ar with .... -^ 11 Persia. feet; and to a Spartan politician it would seem most improbable that the supremacy of his coun- ws^a-.v.-'t. lOO operations in Asia Minor. B.C. 399. 2. Appeal of Asiatic Greeks against Tis- saphernes. try should ever be so seriously endangered as to re- quire further support from the barbarian. Accordingly Sparta had declared in favour of Cyrus, and thus thrown down the gauntlet to the reigning king. I. Spartan '^ r i i i j l support of Had Cyrus been successful, she would have ^^^^^' had the strongest claims upon his gratitude ; while, if he failed, she feU that she had little to fear. The hostility of Persia was formidable only when the balance of parties in Greece was evenly poised. But the return of Tissaphernes with augmented powers and extended territories brought matters to a crisis. The Asiatic Greeks had welcomed Cyrus as their ruler in the place of the crafty and cruel Tissaphernes ; they had been treated by him with marked leniency, and had supported his cause with enthusiasm. Now Tissaphernes had returned, intending to reconquer the rebels, and gratify his resent- ment by due chastisement. K\ me was already feeling the force of his hand ; and in terror the maritime cities sent ambassadors to the Spartans to beseech them, as they were the champions of Hellas, to intervene on behalf of the Hellenes in Asia. It is possible that a few years before the ephors might have turned a deaf ear to this request, and declared that the Asiatic Greeks had been handed over to Persia by a definite treaty, that they had brought their punishment upon themselves, and must bear the consequences of their Cyreian sympathies. But, to use the phrase of a modern historian, the colossus of the Persian emp're had suddenly lost the nimbus of greatness by which it had hitherto been sur- rounded. It had been proved incapable of conquering a band of Greeks, who were without resources, without generals, and without knowledge of the country ; 3. We.nk ness of Persia recently exposed. .":» -■• •.-'—-*<- Jisa CH. VII. Causes of War with Persia. loi and the flower of the Persian army, in spite of vast superi- ority in numbers, had been unable effectively tc cope with them. Spartan troops were surely superior to a motley crew of adventurers, and could ensure victory' where the Cyreians had been satisfied with avoiding defeat. Hence the arrival of the Asiatic envoys seemed to the Spartans a grand opportunity for entering, ^ value to with little risk to themselves, on a patriotic Spanaofan policy, which might raise their reputation "tiiy"'*" among their wavering and half-hearted allies, and to a certain extent efface the reproach of having truckled to the barbarian in their hour of need. The prayer of the envoys was granted. Thimbron was despatched to Asia with 1,000 Neodamodes, or newly- enfranchised Helots, and 4,000 other Pelopon- F^pedition nesians. At his request 300 Athenian cavalry ^[ J^'""* joined him. Those who were selected for the expedition were old adherents of the Thirty ; and the peo- ple, says Xenophon, felt that they would be well rid of them if they died on foreign service. On his arrival in Asia, Thimbron collected about 3,000 soldiers from the Greek cities, and afterwards strengthened his army by the addition of the Cyreians. Pergamos and some other cities threw open their gates to him ; a few minor towns were taken by assauU. Foiled in the siege of Larissa, he received orders from the ephors to march to Karia ; but proving himself everywhere a timid com- His inca- mander and a lax disciplinarian, he was P^^^'j^^^^'^^^ superseded by Dcrkyllidas, and when he returned to Greece was fined and banished on the ground that he had allowed his troops to plunder the allies of Sparta. The new commander was a man of the Lysandrian type, so fertile in resources that he had received the nick- I02 Operations in Asia Minor. B.C. 399. name of Sisyphos, Having acted as harmost at Abydos, he was no stranger to the men with whom he had to deal ; and he determined at once to take advan- /ufas'^lttack ti^i^e of the jealousy which existed between on I'hariui- ^|^g ^^^q satraps. I'hamabazos was a gen- bazos. ' *; erous friend and a faithful ally, while Tis- saphcrnes was perfidious, cruel, and cowardly, and was moreover the direct cause of the war. Ihit to wipe out a personal affront, Derkyllidas, making a truce with Tissapherncs, turned his arms againi>t the former. Ad- vancinij from Kphesos with 8,000 men, he attacked a group of Aiolian towns lying to the north of Mount Ida, which formed a subdivision of the satrapy of I'harnabazos, and which were weakened by internal dissension. In eight days he captured nine towns, of which Gcrgis, Kebren, and Skepsis were the mcjst important, and was able to compensate his troops for the strict discipline which he had maintained upon his march by the cheering an- nouncement that he had secured money enough to pay his 8,000 men for a whole year. On the approach of winter, Derkyllidas, who was unwilling either to burden his allies with the maintenance of his army all through the winter, or to leave them exposed to the C«inqiiest of . AioiLin raids of the Persian cavalry, sent to Tharna- *^'^'*^^' bazos to propose an armistice, to w hich the satrap agreed, as he felt that even his own private resi- dence at Daskylcion was insecure as long as a hostile force was occupying his Aiolian cities. The Spartan commander at once led his troops into wes- Ju!i"rt"rs in tcm Bithynla, a proceeding which excited no Bithynia. opposition on the part of Pharnabazos; for the inhabitants, though nominally subject, were in reality hostile to him. The plunder of this country was suffi- cient to afford abundant supplies for his army ; and the tt.A-t-'itMtiilSSk a■'^^l^^^^^■^.^'1 CH. VII. DcrkvIIiihis in Asia. 103 Confidence of the ephors in 1 Jerky 1- lidas. winter passed without any incident more important than the loss of nearly 200 men by an attack of the inhabitants on an isolated camp, in which the ( aeeks were shot dow n by javelins, pent up, as Xenophon says, like sheep in a fold. In the spring Derkyllidas broke up his winter quarters and marched to Lampsakos. Here he found Arakos and two other commissioners, sent by the ephors to pro- long his term of office for another year, and to report upon the condition of the Greek cities in Asia. Nor was the extension of his command the only com- pliment which they were instructed to confer upon him. They had been specially ordered to congratulate the assembled army on its improved discipline, and to express a hope that there would be no recurrence in the future of the outrages which they had felt obliged to censure in the past. After this message had been delivered, the commander of the Cyreians stood forward, and assured the commissioners that the characters of the soldiers had not changed ; the only change had been in the generals who were appointed to lead them. But the cause of the change must not be looked for, as the speaker implied, solely in the char- acter of Derkyllidas. The Spartan general had been extremely fortunate in procuring at once abundance of pay for his army, and in bringing with him Xenophon — for the speaker was probal)ly none other — to resume his position at the head of the Cyreian troops. In fulfilment of the other part of their commission, Arakos and his companions set out to inspect the state of the Greek cities; and Derkyllidas started them on their road, with the pleasant assurance that they would find them in th enjoyment of the peace and prosperity which he h;.t secured to them by the armistices made both with Phar- nabazos and Tissapherncs. I04 Operations in Asia Minor. B.C. y<)^. To provide employment for his army, Dcrkyllidas crossed the Hellespont, and undertook the work of build- ins a wall across the Thrakian Chersonese RebuUding ^^ protect the Greek cities from the incur- Thrakian sions of the barbarian tribes. The breadth wall. .... of the penmsula m its narrowest part is a little more than four miles ; and the soldiers were doubt- less able to avail themselves of the remains of the walls which had been previously constructed by Miltiades and by Periklcs. The work was begun in the spring and fin- ished before the autumn ; and eleven cities, with a vast amount of arable land and splendid pasturage, were thus protected from Thrakian inroads. On his return to Asia he found that the general tranquillity of the Greek cities was marred by a band of Chian exiles who Reduction of ^^(^i occupied Atameus. After eight months' siege he captured the town, garrisoned it as a depot for his own use, and returned to Kphesos. In spite of these successes, the Ionian Greeks, fiincy- ing perhaps that their interests had been sacrificed for the advantage of their northern compatriots, were not satisfied with the conduct of the war. Envoys were there- fore sent to represent to the ephors that an attack upon Karia would probably force Tissapherncs to consent to the independence of the Greek cities. Dcrkyllidas con- sequently received orders to march across the Maiandros (Meander), and to co-operate with the admiral Tharax in an invasion of Karia. Here he unexpectedly His march found himself checked by the united forces of Pharnabazos and Tissaphcrnes, who had composed their private feud for the sake of expelling the public enemy. At once all the contingents from the Greek cities in Asia hid their arms in the standing corn, and took to their heels ; but in spite of the urgent entreaties of Phar- CH. VII. Causes of Expedition of Ai^esihios. 105 nabazos, Tissaphernes, remembering the prowess of the Cyreian Greeks, refused to attack, and sent instead to demand a conference. Thus the timidity of the satrap rescued Uerkyllidas from a position of imminent peril. He consented to the conference, without betraying the slightest sign of alarm or uneasiness. When the generals met. the Spartan demanded the independence of the Greek cities; Tissaphernes insisted on the ^^^^^^-^^^ withdrawal not only of the Peloponnesian i^ssa- ' , .A phernes. army, but of all Spartan harmosts. An ar- mistice was agreed upon, to allow time to refer the con- ditions to the decision of the supreme authorities at Sparta and at Sousa. During the truce the war assumed a very different and much more important character. The atti- ^^^^^^^^ tude of the lower classes at Sparta towards expeSitron the government was so alarming, that the of^Agesi- ephors were anxious at once to divert the at- tention of the people from their grievances, and to rid themselves of many dangerous subjects. At ^ Yi^^^^x- the same time they heard almost by accident ous^cun-^ that the sea-ports of Phoenicia were busied lower^ with the preparations for a great armament, to consist of not less than 300 ships of war. Nor were these reports without good foundation. Pharnabazos dur- ing the truce had repaired to Sousa to remon- strate against the incapacity of Tissaphernes, J^^ ^^^^ and to recommend especially that a war, tion of^a which had for its object the control of the J.^^^.^;;"^" maritime cities, should be fought out upon the sea. He even suggested the admiral's name; it was best that Greek should meet Greek, and Konon again com- mand a fleet against the Spartans. From the fatal beach of Aigospotamoi, the Athenian admiral, discomfited but not -"*.■ io6 Operations in Asia Minor. n.c. 396. disgraced, had with eight ships fled for refuge to Euagoras, lord of Salamis in Kypros (Cyprus), one of the noblest men and most enterprising princes of his time. The advice of Tharnabazos was supported both by Kuagoras and Parysatis, and Artaxerxes was induced to grant the satrap 500 talents for the equipment of a fleet, and to ap- point Konon to the command. Amid the universal ex- citement caused at Sparta by the rumour of 3 Ambition these preparations, Agesilaos, instigated by of Lysandros r i " *-. and Lysandros, came forward and proposed that gesi aos. ^^ should personally assume the command of an expedition against Persia. 1 le named at the same time the troops which he should want. Thirty Spartans, a num- ber as large as could be spared in the present condition of Spartan politics, and some of whom would hnvebeen forced on him in any case, were required to act, partly as a staff, partly as a board of control. Two thousand Neodamodes were to form the backbone of his army ; and Expedition of ti^^j ephors would take care that they were Agesilaos. i- • i i i i ' i the boldest and most formidable whom they could possibly select. These troops were to be further supported by 6,000 allies. There was probably little ditTicultv in raisini: a force of this mai^nitude, for many would be attracted by the hoi)c of plunder in a country which was the Kl Dorado of Hellenic imaginations; but to a long-sighted politician, if any such was to be found at Sparta, the refusal of the principal allies must have seemed ominous indeed. The Athenians professed them- selves too weak ; the Corinthians were deterred by the inundation of a temple; Thebes refused outright. The two great Spartans, at the head of the expedition, set out with widely ditlerent intentions. Lysandros, who expected to control everything, hoped to re-establish the detested dekarchies, and with them his personal ascend- cn. VII. Agesilaos in Asia. 107 ency. Agesilaos had grander notions of the conquest of Persia, and the capture of Sousa itself. Since the era of the Trojan war, no Spartan king had led an army in person into Asia ; he must therefore recall the deeds of Menelaos and Agamemnon, and do sacrifice at Aulis on his wav. In doing this he out- His sacrifice raged either Boiotian sentiment or local pre- cedent. In the midst of the ceremony a troop of horse, despatched by the Boiotarchs, rode up to forbid the sacri- fice, and even seized the victims and flung them from the altar. In high dudgeon the and arrival , 1" Asia. would-be King of Men retired to his ship, and, after touching at Geraistos to collect contingents, sailed across to Kphesos. The first act of Agesilaos, after his arrival in Asia, was to conclude a truce with Tissaphernes. Neither leader felt himself strong enough for really ^ i^ ^ J Truce with vigorous action ; and both were fully aware Tissa- of the utter hollowness of the compact. Ly- ^ sandros was at once surrounded by crowds of devoted partisans, and many more, hearing the good news of his coming, flocked to Kphesos, eagerly solicitous that he should use his influence in their behalf, and replace them in the governments from which they had been expelled. Once before Lysandros had been sent out to them in a position nominally subordinate, but really supreme ; and it seemed natural to them to treat their old „ , Devotion of patron with royal honour, and the unknown Asiatics to ... ,. ... Lysandros, Agesilaos as an ordinary personage. Nor did Lysandros, trusting fully to the submissiveness of the king, care to conceal or tone down their adulation. But to the ambitious Agesilaos and the jealous peers all this was quite unbearable ; and the king systematically refused every request which had the support of Lysandros. Still I T^W-" 1 08 Operations in Asia Minor. B.C. 396. the gratitude of the lonians for past favours was so great that^'they shewed him the greatest attention even when they knew that his good word was worse than and his useless; and Agesihios, more angry than be- hum.ii:aion. ^^^^ resolvcd to humiliate I.ysandros thor- oughly by appointing him his meat carver, with the sar- casm, • Let the lonians come now and pay court to my carver.' Such, at least, is the account of Tlutarch. who is here unsupported by Xcnophon ; both authors, however, agree in their version of the ensuing conversation. Stung by the insult, Lysandros exclaimed. 'At any rate. Agesi- laos. you know well how to degrade your friends.' ' Of course I do.' replied the king ; ' those at least who try to appear my betters; but I should be ashamed if I did not know how to reward my faithful servants.' Lysandros, feeling that he had met his match, requested that for the sake of appearances some command might be given him. in which there might be no collision between them, and where he could do good work for his country. He was despatched to the Hellespont, where he won over an important ally, Spithridates. a Persian of rank and wealth, and useful from his intimate knowledge of Pharnabazos and his territory. In this incident the conduct of Ly- sandros commands our sympathy more than that of his rival. He had the strongest claims on the gratitude of the king. and. in spite of studied and wholly unnecessary' insult, he showed no unworthy or petty resentment in the performance of the duty assigned to him. Agesilaos. now. at any rate, commander-in-chief in deed as well as in name, thought that he had Truce Vittlc to fear from the disunited satraps; and Tilsu" ^^ when Tissaphernes broke the truce by de- phernes, niaudiug that he should quit Asia at once, he gladly sent back the'detiant answer that he thanked the CH. VII. First Campaign of Agesilaos. 109 satrap for his perjury, for the gods would consequently favour the Hellenic cause. He was well aware that Tissaphernes, whose army had been strongly reinforced, was expecting an attack on Karia ; and he made elaborate preparations for a march in that direction. Having thus confirmed the previous expectations of the satrap, he set out at once for Phrygia. where Pharnabazos , , . ,^y and plunder was quite unprepared to oppose hnn. 1 he of ilie saira- bootv which he obtained, almost without ^V5, 11*^''*^' ^ nauazus. resistance, from the cities and districts on his line of march was of immense value ; and he had penetrated nearly as far as Daskyleion before his advance was checked. Here a cavalry skirmish took place, in which the superiority of the Persians was incontestable ; and Agesilaos thought it prudent to retreat to Ephesos, having gained by his first campaign little glory, but plentiful plunder. Though, however, he lost no oppor- tunities for obtaining money for the expenses of the war, and for the gratification of his friends, his clemency towards the conquered and his humanity to his captives were qualities so novel and so striking as to win for him the admiration of his contemporaries. The winter at Kj)hesos was spent in the most energetic preparations for the ensuing campaign ; and Agesilaos himself was the very life and soul of the work. He added to the confidence of his men by stripping the bodies of the Asiatic captives at the time of their sale, that the Greeks might contrast their white and delicate skin with their own hardy frames, and regard the con- ... .1 • /• Military test as one m which women were their foes. prepara- The market-place was full, not as usual of Ephesos merchants and their peaceful wares, but of horses and arms ; everywhere and always drills, athletic exercises, riding-lessons, occupied the troops ; and smiths, ■-~-. ifa'»m)^ia*!6'Ji no operations in Asia Minor. B.C. 396. CH. vii. Death of Tissaphernes. Ill curriers, painters, carpenters, drove a merry trade. Above all Agcsihios was an.xious to raise an efficient body of cavalry from the wealthier class of the Asiatic ( ireeks ; and the substitutes whom their money procured were better soldiers than they would have been themselves. 'He made,' says Xenophon enthusiastically, 'the whole town a si|;ht worth lookinj,^ at. Where men arc worshipping' the gods, practising the art of war, and gainin;:^ the habit of obedience, there no man can help cherishing the highest hopes.' At the outset of his second campaign Agesilaos gave out publicly that he would lead his army straight into the richest part of the enemy's country, the Devastation neighbourhood of Sardcis. Tissaphernes oi Lydia. determined not to be tricked a second time, and was convinced that the attack would be directed a* «WSE^SP^l^>?q^55^ 114 operations in Asia Minor. B.C. 395. CH. VII. Revolt of Rhodes. 115 accomplished. A message was brought from the ephors, ordering Agesilaos instantly to return to (ireece, as his country was in jeopardy. Intense was the disappoint- ment of the king at receiving this command ; and deep the sorrow of the Asiatic Greeks when he communicated it to them, adding the promise that he would not forget them, but would return as soon as circum- and is re- 111 i. i • 1 i- called by Stances should permit. Hut his soldiers were the ephors. j^^j^ ^^ |^,,^^.^ ^j^^ ^-^^y^ ^^j ^j^^^ ^^ ^^j.^ ^^^^ ^^^ little inclination to face the resolute onset of a (ireek pha- lanx after experiencing the weak resistance of Persian foes. Four thousand men were left to garrison the Asiatic cities ; and as their reluctance was lessened and their ar- dour stimulated by the promise of a large number of valu- able prizes, a strong body of his most efficient troops, in- cluding many Cyreians under the command of Xenophon, were induced to set out for Europe. These prizes were distributed at Sestos when the troops were safe on the European side of the Hellespont; after which Agesilaos continued his homeward march. Though the alarming rumours which had so deeply agitated the Spartan government had been indeed well- Fleet of Ko- founded, the progress of Konon was, at first, non blockaded extremely slow. At length fortv triremes were at Kaunos. 1 • 1 , 1 .' , ■ , . got ready, and with these the Athenian admi- ral at once put to sea. Advancing cautiously along the southern coast of Asia Minor, he fell in with Pharax, the Lakedaimonian admiral, wiih a fleet of 120 ships, and was compelled to seek refuge in the harbour of Kaunos. Here he remained shut in for many months, and, after patient waiting, received a reinforcement of forty ships; whereupon Pharax broke up the blockade and retired to Rhodes. Rut the Rhodian democrats, emboldened by the near neighbourhood of Konon, eagerlv seized the first opportunity for revolt, overthrew their detested oli- garchy, and drove Pharax from their harbour. In point of positive loss, their successful revolution was a heavy blow to the Spartan cause ; for ^hodes^^ Konon immediately made the island his chief station, and was enabled to capture an Egyptian fleet, which sailed unsuspectingly into the harbour, laden with a valuable cargo of corn and marine stores for Spartan use. But, as a sign of the times, it was still more serious. The actual presence of a Spartan force had always been found necessary to ensure the success of an oligarchical revolution ; but it was now proved that the mere vicinitv of an Athenian fleet was sufficient to cause the overthrow of an oligarchical government, and the actual presence of a Spartan fleet wholly unable to prevent it. So violent was the rage excited by this news at Sparta, that, blindly venting their fury on any hap- less Rhodian who came in their way, the cj)hors seized and put to death Dorieus, dis- of Uorieus. linguished no less for his enthusiastic sup- port of Spartan interests than for the splendour of his victories in the public games. When he had fallen twelve years before into the hands of the Athenians, his captors had seen in him the brilliant champion rather than the inveterate foe, and had generously spared his life. But, in spite of these successes, Konon had hard work to keep his fleet together at all. His captains were jealous of one another, as well as of their ^ J Konon s Greek commander ; the satraps were slow in journey to furnishing, and the officers forward in em- bezzling, the seamen's pay ; and for the want of it his men were almost in mutiny. Konon determined to apply in person to the fountain head. His journey to the court of the Great King was entirely successful. Though -»**J-*fMLT«Wi»t,'»- ii6 Operations in Asia Minor, B.C. 394. Pharnab;-- «os joint- adiiiiral. Konon's refusal to prostrate himself before him prevented a personal interview, Artaxerxes granted him everything he asked, and especially his request that Tharnabazos miifht share with him the command of the tleet. New Jife and vigour was at once infused into the naval opera- tions. A powerful tleet was collected ; the IMuenician ships were under the orders of i'harnal)a/.os, while Konon commanded the (keek contingent, which con- sisted partly of ships brought by Kuagoras in person, partly of those furnished by Athe- nian vuhmieers and exiles, who had flocked in great numbers to the hospitable refuge of the Kyprian Salamis. Peisandros had fixed his station at Knidos. at the head of the southern peninsula of the Keramic (iulf, with the tleet which had been raised by Age- Pefeat and •• i i • ' death of silaos. As the enemy sailed up, their supe- a^Knidur riority in numl)ers appeared so overwhelming (394 B c.) tj^.^ t]^^» Asiatic allies on the Spartan left immediately took to flight. What this superiority was is uncertain. Diodoros states that the Spartans had eighty-live ships, and their opponents ninety. Xeno- phon says that the whole fleet of Peisandros seemed far lc3^ numerous than the (ireek contingent under Konon. The battle which ensued was short and decisive. The Spartan fleet was forced by the onset of the enemy to make for the shore. Most of the vessels as they grounded were abandoned by their crews, who thus made good their escape ; Peisandros himself, scorning to desert his ship. was slain, like a true Spartan, sword in hand. Fifty ships fell into the hands of the victors, Aigospotamoi was avenged, the naval power of Sparta was annihilated at a single blow, and the maritime ascendency, which she had enjoyed for ten years, was wrested from her grasp. CH. VIII. Unpopularity of Sparta. 117 CHAPTER VIII. Increasing di^content of allies, and un- popularity of Sparta. THE CORINTHIAN WAR. Even before the departure of Agesilaos for Asia, there had not been wanting outward signs of the deep discon- tent which was working in the hearts of the allies of Sparta ; and during the two years of his absence these feelings had gathered strength, and at last had burst ftjrth into an opposition so formidable that the home gov- ernment had been reluctantly compelled to recall their victorious king in the very midst of his career of con- quest. Very soon after her hour of triumph the clouds of envy and hatred had begun to gather round Sparta more darkly even and far more rapidly than they had gathered round imperial Athens. From the first, Corinth and Thebes had refused to ol3ey her summons, a sum- mons now thrice repeated only to be thrice defied ; and the chastisement of Elis, far from fixing the yoke of the sovereign city more securely, had only served to exhibit Sparta in the unpopular and somewhat despicable char- acter of a big bully who thrashes smaller offenders un- mercifully, but is afraid to provoke a struggle with more capable antagonists. Nor had her recent parade of pa- triotism gained her either popularity or prestige. The shame of the disgraceful treaties could not so easily be blotted out ; and, since the exploits of the Ten Thousand, Greeks were not disposed to accept the outwitting of a satrap or the ravaging of a province as a great military achievement. ii8 The CorintJiian War. B.C. 395. From Asia came the spark which was to fire the train. Tithraustcs, after spendini,^ thirty talents to rid his own satrapy of Agcsilaos temporarily, thouj;ht th.it tifiy tal- ents would be well employed if by their means he could rid the whole country of him permanently. This sum ,,.. , was accordinjjlv entrusted to Timokratcs, a sends Rliodian, who was anxious to secure to his money to • 1 1 » 11 1 • . • . . the Greek own island the liberty which it had so re- states, cently regained, and was vehemently hos- tile to the state which had supported the hated oligarchs. The account given by Xenophon of this transaction is distorted even beyond his wcmt by philo-Lakonian bias. He insinuates that the money was accepted by the lead- ing democrats in Argos, Corinth, and 'I'hebes as a mere bribe, in return for which they industriously circulated calumnies against Sparta, and so created a feeling of hatred towards her. But the previous attitude of the cities renders this extremely improbable ; and also the negotiations were perfectly open. There was no attempt at concealment as in a case of personal corruj>tion ; the names of the citizens who received the money were well known and are recorded by Xenophon ; and it was ac- cepted iDy the opponents of Sparta not in the way of per- sonal profit, but as a subsidy to be spent on a definite object, and in furtherance of the policy to which they were themselves devoted. It is especially stated that none of the Persian money found its way to Athens. Either it was thought that her injuries were so great that her support was certain, or perhaps the Athenians felt themselves defenceless, and wished to avoid any prema- ture acts of hostility. Nor is it difficult to understand why the Thebans, though ten years previously the most bitter of the foes of Athens, had now become eager to take the lead in a war CH. VIM. The Boiotian War. 119 with Sparta. Their petition for a share in the spoils of the war had l)ecn resented as an insult ; they had actively assist- ed the Athenian exiles; their last refusal to join the Spartan army had not been tempered T*^^.* l'\' c J I ' I Imstility of by even the flimsiest excuse; and their last iiicbcs: its act had been a public outrage on a Spar- tan king. War was consequently inevitable ; it would be well not to defer it till that king returned in triumph. Again, the spread of Spartan jiower in the north of Greece towards the end of tlie Peloponnesian war had been very striking; and after its close the unscrupulous rigour of Herippidas had made Herakleia and its vicinity a valuable base of Spartan operations, and had enabled them to push their dominion as far as Pharsalos in Thes- saly. V>\ these aggressive movements, Thebes felt that her position as the leading state in northern Hellas was seriously compromised. A pretext for war was soon found. The Thebans either provoked, or availed themselves of, a quarrel be- tween the Phokians and the Opountian I.okrians, about a piece of borderland. The Thebans took the side of the latter, and invaded Phokis. Without delay the Pho- kians applied for aid to Sparta, representing that the invasion of their territory was a wanton piece of aggres- sion. The Spartans willingly promised assistance, being, as Xenophon says, glad to lay hold of an Outbreak of excuse for making war on the Thebans, and I'.niotian so putting a stop to their insolence. Not only were they smarting under insult and eager for revenge, but the influence of Lysandros was once again supreme in their counsels. Ever foremost in c;p^rtan the enslavement of his fellow-Hellenes, he plan of . , . ir 1 operations. managed to obtain for himself the supreme command ; and the plan of the campaign was arranged I20 The Cor in t hi AH War. B.C. 395- at once. Making Heraklci.i the base of operations, Ly- sandros was to collect the Malians and other tril)es in that neighbourhood and to advance into BoiiUia; while to I'ausanias, the ctilleague of .Agesilaos in the roy.il office, was assigned the duty of mustering the l*eloponnesian contin.yboulos, and now were superior, at any rate, in cavalry ; and a defeat would be disastrous to the whole dominion of Sparta. These considerations carried the day ; and the Thebans granted the truce, appending, contrary to Greek usage, a condi- tion that Pausanias should evacuate Boiotia without delay. This stipulation the allies heard with undisguised plea- sure ; and, after the burial of the dead, I'ausanias led away his army, while the Thebans hung on their line of march, and did not shrink from using blows to force the stragglers to keep to the beaten tracks. .LJi^^ CH. VIII. Confederacy against Sparta. 123 On his return to Sparta, Pausanias was assailed by vehement accusations. The minority in the He is 2ic- council of war declared that he had sullied the cused and honour of Sparta : the friends of Lysandros Sulfhu life asserted that he had sacrificed her greatest ^^ Tegca. citizen. It is uncertain whether he was behind the ap- pointed time, or whether Lysandros had anticipated it, and whether, in the fi)rmer case, the reluctance of the allies might not have been sufficient excuse for a sliiiht delay. But the angry people were in no mood to be told that the rash impatience of Lysandros had caused the disaster, or that the decision of Pausanias was ratified by his proper advisers. His conduct in Attica eight years befi)re was raked up against him ; and, conscious that he could not expect any fair trial, he allowed a sentence of death to be passed against him in his absence, and fled to Tegea, where he remained in sanctuary till his death : a signal proof, if proof were needed, that it is not a democracy alone which treats ill-success as a crime, and permits justice to be perverted by passion. The etTects of this Spartan reverse were at once felt. The two great states, Argos and Corinth, formed a close alliance with the two belligerents, Athens and Thebes; and the anti-Spartan confederacy T/'I'^onfede. was soon joined by the Euboians, the Akar- ^^'^^' •^k^'""* ■V T 1 , bparta. nanians, Malians, and Lokrians, by Ambra- kia, Leukas, and almost all Thessaly, especially the im- portant towns of Larissa, Krannon, Skotoussa, and Phar- salos. Corinth became the head-quarters of the confed- erates, and the contest which began as a Boiotian war is henceforward known as the Corinthian war. Active operations began with a successful campaign in Thessaly and Phokis. The Theban Ismenias, a man of wealth and ability, who had openly sympathised with K 124 The Corinthian War. B.C. 394. t CM. VIII. Battle of Corinth. 125 Council of war at Corinth. Athens in her troubles, and had felt no scruple in accept- ing the subsidy of Tithraustes, was in command of the Boiotian forces. Aided by some disaffected cesses in the citizens vvho had been left in Hcrakleia in "*^'''^- spite of the massacre made by Herippidas, he drove out the Spartans from that town, the great stronghold of their power in the north, and followed up this success by defeating the Phokians and their Spartan harmost. After this, he marched with his troops to join the general muster of the allies at Corinth. In the council which was summoned to settle the plan of the operations, there was the usual disagree- ment of states unaccustomed to united action. The interests of Thebes and Athens demanded onlv that the three passes of the isthmus should be strongly guarded and the Spartans blockaded within the Teloponnese. Hut this would not satisfy Argos and Corinth, who would be thus exposed to the ravages of the Spartan army ; and the voice of Argos could not be disregarded, as she contributed the largest contingent to the allied force. Timolaos, the Corinthian, expressed the policy of his own city in the most telling terms: 'The Lakedaimonian power,' said he, ' is like a river, insignificant at its source, but gathering strength as it flows along. Let us attack them, as men take a nest of wasps : if they wait till the wasps fly out, the task is both difficult and dangerous ; but it is easy enough if they smother the wasps in their nest.' The boldness of this language prevailed, and the council resolved to march upon Sparta itself. The determination of the allies was wise, March of \^^^ -^ ^.^^^ unfortunatelv. too late. The wasps the Spartans ' » un.lcr Aris- were alrcadv out of their nest ; the river was todemos. • /■ n -i ' hm 1 i 1 • m full tlow. \\ hilethev were losmtr time in debating about the depth of their phalanx and the order of command, the Spartans had raised a powerful army under Aristodemos, the guardian of Agesipolis, the young son of the condemned Pausanias, and had pushed on to Sikyon before the allies had proceeded farther than Nemea. As they advanced upon Corinth, their oppo- nents fell back, inflicting some damage upon them by means of their light troojis, in which branch the Spartan's were inferior. The two armies encamped about a mile apart ; the allies were numerically superior, but their dis- united generalship compensated for the lukewarmness of the Lakedaimonian allies. The Thebans began the battle by a furious attack on the Achaians. But they gave way to the usual tendency of '••^"'^ of Greek hoplites, and bore off more and more towards the right, from a natural WMsh to keep under the cover of the shield of their right-hand neighbour, and to avoid exposing their right or unprotected side. To pre- vent the line of battle from being entirely severed, the Athenians were obliged to follow their movement, and thus gave the Spartans an opj)ortunity of turning their right flank. The Lakedaimonian allies were beaten along the whole line, and the victors broke their ranks and puri^ued the fugitives: but the Spartans out-flanked and overi)owered the Athenians, and defeated ^'>^^^^\ of »i -..L 1 I r.,, . . 'he allies. them with great slaughter. 1 hen, waiting for each of the allies as they returned disordered from the pursuit, they fell on their right flank, and so defeated them in detail. Some of the fugitives found a refuge within the walls of Corinth, though the gates, at least for a time, were closed against them by the Lakonian party in the town ; the majority retiu-ned to the strong camp which they had occupied in the morning. The loss of the anti-Spartan confederates was severe, yet the results of the battle were not very decisive. The supremacy of Sparta in the Frio- i- w'Miafojsa-ii^st'agji... .. « .■~ H^liAx^^: ---■:■ 126 The Corinthian War. B.C. 394. in Thes>;ily, ponnese was secure, l)ut the temper of her allies was proved to be untrustworthy. The confederates still occu- pied the passes of the isthmus, and Aristodemos resolved to commence no fresh operations until AL;esilaos should return. DerkvUidas was at once des|)atched to carrv the news of the victory to the Spartan kin«^, and he met the ad- vancing^ army at Amphipolis. lUit the heart of A^^esilaos was still in the work which he had so reluctantly aban- doned, and hearinL,^ from Derkyllidas that the slaughter of the allies on both sides had been very a-cmI.ios at oR-at, he burst into louil lamentations over the Atni)hif)()lis, '^ deatli (»f so many ( ireeks, who, if spared to so noble a service, would have sufficed to concjuer all Asia. Sendin'T on DerkvUidas to tell the news to the friends from whom he had recently parted, he forced his way throuj^h Thessaly in sj)itc of its hostility, inflictin;^ as he passed a defeat on the Thcssalian squad- rons which hunj; upon his rear — a success which was spe- cially «;ratifyini^, since it showed that the troops which he had himself trained could cope widi the most celebrated cavalry of Greece. On the lioiotian border his army was auijmented bv conlin-ents from I'hokis and ( )rchomcnos, and especially by two Lakcdaimonian regiments (or niorai) and tifty Spartan volunteers as a body-guard. At Chaironeia an eclipse of the sun filled the armv with irloomv forebodings. The inter- pretation of the omen was not long delayed, A messenger came to tell the king that at Knidos his brother-in-l;nv was slain and his tleet annihilated. Agesilaos had not suffi- cient confidence in the allies to tell them the truth, and announcing that Peisandros had lost his life, but had won a naval victory, he hastened to fight a decisive battle be- fore the real state of the case could be known. at Chairo neia. CH. VIII. Battle of Koroneia. 127 Battle of Kuroneia. The Boiotians and their allies— Argives, Athenians, Co- rinthians, and others — were advancing from Mount Heli- kon, and Agesilaos from the valley of the Ke- phissos. The two armies met near Koroneia, and approached each other in deep silence. When they were about 200 yards apart, the Thebans and their allies raised a shout and rushed to the charge. The brunt of the onset was broken by an advance of He- rippidas and the mercenaries, including the Cyreians and Xenophon himself, and the battle became general. The troops of Agesilaos were completely successful, ex- cept on their extreme left, where the Thebans had routed their old enemies, the Orchomenians. The Argives had turned their backs without striking a blow, and the vic- torious Thebans, seeing all their allies in full flight to Mount Helikon, resolved to cut their way through to join them. Agesilaos, however, determined that they should expiate their insolence at Aulis by a bloody sacrifice, and drew up all his forces in close order to bar their progress. The crash of the opposing masses was ter- rific ; the conflict which ensued was with- out a parallel in all the experience of the veteran Xenophon. So fearful was the com- bat, that the wonted battle-cries were hushed : no sound was heard but the push of arms and the shatter- ing of shields. Agesilaos himself fell, weakened by re- peated wounds, and was rescued onlv bv the devotion of his body-guard. At length the mass of the Spartan hop- litcs grew looser, and the Thebans triumphantly forced a passage through the wavering ranks. Agesilaos had won a real victory ; for he was master of the battle-field, and of the bodies of the slain ; but the honours of the day remained with the Thebans. The ghasdy spectacle of grappling corpses and broken weapons showed how reso- Tremen- dous strug- gle between Theban and Spartan hoplites. ttIgjA> w'fc., --wfj?->:k&j'i 128 The Corinthian War, B.C. 394. 'ues to iJclphoi, uikI returns to bparta. lute the strugj^Mc IkuI been, and A«;esilaos had no wish to provoke a second enc(jiinter. His position in IJoiotia w^is obviously unlenal)lc. The wounded king withdrew to Delphoi, where he dedicated to the god 100 talents, the Aijesiluos tenth of his Asiatic spoil, so vast was the ^' T !" bo(jty which he had accumulated. The pole- march whom he left behind was slain by the Lokrians ; but Agesilaos proceeded to Sparta by sea, and disbanded his army. He was welcomed home with an enthusiasm which was heightened bv his unaltered simplicity of life and his willing conformity to the institutions of his country. After two years of un- broken success in Asia, he had not been driven out with- out the help of 10,000 Persian bowmen, for such was the witticism suggested by the figure of the archer-king on the Persian coins. He had riv.dled even Lysandros in the magnificence of his plunder, which had been won, not from Greeks, but from barbarians; and in Thessaly and Boiotia he had proved that he was able not merely to face the weak resistance of a lazy Oriental, but to hold his own against the best cavalry and hoplites of (ireece. The prompt obedience of Agesilaos to the summons which ruined his cherished hopes of Asiatic conquest is extolled by Xenophon and other ancient writers as an example of singular virtue. But even if his career had gone on unchecked by the unwelcome message, the de- feat of Peisandros at Knldos would have soon forced him to abandon his more amliitious schemes. The effects of Konon's success were quickly felt. The victorious admirals sailed from city to city on the coast and islands of the Egean, expelled the Spartan harmosts, and promised to leave the inhabitants perfectly independent, and not to fortify any citadel for themselves in the towns. Konon and Pharnahazos receive the submission of the Greek cities in Asia. W^^^iJ^^^ZZ^ CH. VIII. Derkyllidas at Abydos. 129 Everywhere these assurances were received with joyful acclamations, and a warm welcome was given not only to the Athenian admiral, but to Pharnabazos, his Persian col- league. The latter had indeed been carefully schooled by Konon in the policy which he was to adopt. He had been warned that the (ireek cities, if treated generously, would be one and all his friends, while, if he showed any wish to make himself their master, each one of them was strong enough to give him considerable trouble, and he would very probably rouse a coalition of all Hellas against himself. Even Ephcsos, so recently the head-quarters of the Spar- tan king and previously the centre of Lysandrian in- trigues, changed with the rest. To a city of merchants that system seemed most advantageous which best guar- anteed the privileges of commercial intercourse with the Persian empire. Thus, without the trouble of a single siege or skirmish, the Spartan power in Asia was annihilated and the work of Agesilaos undone. The onlv opposition ^, , " ' . Abydos and was found in the satrapy of Pharnabazos him- Sestos hold self. Abydos had been for years the staunch- Derkyiii- est of Spartan allies, and her sins were too ^^^' great to be easily forgiven. Dreading the vengeance of Pharnabazos, the inhabitants determined to resist. They welcomed hospitably the fugitive harmosts, and invited to the shelter of their walls those who had not come un- asked. Above all, Derkyllidas was in the town, declaring that the defection of all the other cities would only make their fidelity the more conspicuous and the gratitude of Sparta more hearty, and assuring them that Sparta was still quite powerful enough to reward her friends and chastise her foes. Sestos was also secured by the same skilful and energetic diplomatist, and, like Abydos, it be- came a refuge for the harmosts who were expelled from i-a'-ik.A'-iL-lr '■•-. v. Va'.J I30 The Corinthian VV\ir. B.C. 393. Europe. Vainly did Pharnabazos attempt to shake their allegiance by threats. Equally ineffectual were the joint efforts of both admirals to reduce the towns by force, and, with angry vows of vengeance, the foiled satraj) withdrew, urging Konon to reinforce his tleet during the winter from the towns on the Hellespont. The revenge which Pharnabazos promised himself was the delight of pure retaliation. He longed to harry and plunder in Lakonian territorv, like Derkvllidas and Age- silaos in his own satrapy. Willi this object Piiarnabazos early in the spring determined to make straight for the Peloponnese. But the views of Konon, wlio accompanied him, were wider and higher. Vox fourteen years he had been absent from his country, and he resolved to mark his Pharn.^- retum by raising Athens again to a position bazosand not wholly unwDrthv of her old ijlorv. From Konon • 1 1 • 1 1 ' ^ ' ravage isUind to ishmd, as it hekl on its south-west- ofVaTonl-i crly course, the allied lleet passed, and every- Kythera'"'" ^vliere the work of liberation went on. The coasts of Messenia and Lakonia were ruth- lessly ravaged, and the vengeance of Pharnabazos grati- fied. The island of Kythera was captured, and garrisoned by Athenian troops. Sailing up to the isthmus, Pharna- bazos visited Corinth as the head-quarters of the anti- Spartan league, and. exhorting the allies to be vigorous in war and faithful to the (ireat King, he left ba^zoTr^e- '^^'^^ ^^^^'"^ '^^ Vvc'^^Q. a subsidy as he could turns to spare. He had now accomplished his ob- Asia. -11 ject, and, havmg carried a Persian fleet into waters where such a sight was strange indeed, he returned to Asia. But the purposes of Konon were as yet unfultilled. He had confided to Pharnabazos his great project of re- building the Long Walls and the fortifications of the Pei- CH. VIII, Political Feuds at Corinth. 131 raieus, and had convinced him that by furthering its exe- cution he would at the same time inflict the heaviest pun- ishment on the Spartans, and win the most lasting gratitude from the Athenians. Phar- j^"""" "■*■ nabazos gave a ready consent ; and Konon, Lon'gNvalls with a fleet of eighty ships, dropped anchor in °^ '^'''^"'* the harbour of Peiraieus. The work was begun without de- lay. The crews of the fleet were busily employed, and funds furnished by Pharnabazos hired a whole army of carpen- ters and masons. The Athenians themselves lent willing assistance, and volunteers from Boiotia and elsewhere came zealously to help. The Phaleric Wall was not re- stored, having been found unnecessary ; but the rest of the work was finished by the autumn, and banquets and sacrifices celebrated the completion of Konon's design while statues and inscriptions recorded his patriotism. It was strange that the wrath of Pharnabazos at the resistance of Abydos should have prompted him to satiate his revenge by retaliation on Lakonia itself; and stranger still that the presence of the opemSns Persian fleet should have coincided with the TPr , r , Corinth. tew months durmg which the allies were able to guard the lines of the isthmus. This is indeed the most important fact connected with the military opera- tions of the year B.C. 393. A Spartan force lay at Sikyon ravaging the western borders of Corinth, and keeping up a desultory war against the allies in that town. But the Corinthians had carried off most of their cattle to a safe refuge at Peiraion. in the extreme north of their territory, and the Si)artans were not strong enough to force their way through the lines to interrupt the great work of res- toration which was going on at Athens. But Corinth was fated to suffer more from discord within than from war without. The government was >ft»Miiaft»fJiiiiMf:WBB^IS^aitjsietr' tj 132 The Corinthian War. B.C. 392. CH. VIII. Tactics of Iphikrates. 133 still, as it loriL,^ liad been, oligarchic in form, though by no means philo-Lakonian in sentiment. Rut the faction which f'lvoured Sparta, and which had closed the Dissensions . » r • • in Corinth. gatcs agamst the fugitives two years before, had grown lately more numerous and more discontented. The democrats were naturally the party of war, being bitterly opposed to Sparta ; the ranks of the peace-party were recruited from the landed pro- prietors, wliose estates were ravaged in a war with which they had no sympathy, and from the extreme oligarchs, who had no hope of gaining j)ower except by Spartan intervention. Again, many who had no wish to further the ascendency of Sparta were yet jealous of the revival of Athens, and were vexed that Corinth sliould be the seat of war. while the territories of her allies were spared. To anticipate the machinations of their oj)po- nents, the government planned and executed a massacre, which can only be characterised as ferocious, perfidious, and sacrilegious. More than a hundred of the citizens were slain ; the rest submitted to the force of circum- stances. Dut the position of Corinth as the seat of war rendered an intimate alliance with some powerful state an absolute necessity. In accordance with this need Corinth was practically, and possibly even formally, incorporated with Argos. But to the oligarchs, whose position and privileges were gone, life under such conditions seemed Admission ^"^ insupportable degradation ; and their Tani'uUhiu" l*-^^id^^rs opened to IVaxitas, the Spartan com- wLlu"""^' "i^intler who lay at Sikyon, one of the gates in the western Long Wall uniting Corinth and Lechaion. In vain Argives, Athenians, and Corinth- ians assaulted the Spartan position— the Lakedaimonian hoplites were everywhere irresistible. They made a ter- rific slaughter among their panic-stricken opponents, so Jf^ Iphikrates becomes noted as a leader of peltasts. Foremost that, to use the simile employed by Xenophon, the corpses lay in heaps like so many logs or stones. Praxitas fol- lowed uj) his victory by making a breach in the Long Walls wide enough to allow the passage of an army, by cajjturing Sidous and Krommyon, and by fortifying the position of Kpieikia on the frontiers of Epidauros. * After this,' says Xenophon, * great armies were dis- continued on both sides ; but the different cities sent garrisons — on the one side to Sikyon, on the other to Corinth — and were guarding the fortresses. Mercenaries, however, were em- j)loyed by both parties, and the war was prosecuted vigorously by means of them.' among the leaders of these mercenaries — unless, perhaps, Xenophon himself may be excepted — was the young Athenian Iphikrates. Having distinguished himself in the recent naval operations, he now turned his attention to the light-armed troops, or ' peltasts,' improving their equip- ment, and enlarging their sphere of action. As far as can be gathered from the confused accounts of these changes, he seems to have made the defensive armour lighter and the weapons of offence more formidable. Thus the shield was made smaller, a linen corselet was substituted for the coat of mail, and instead of the heavy bronze greaves a new sort of gaiters was introduced, called after the name of Iphikrates himself. On the other hand, the spear and the sword were considerably lengthened. Whether he introduced these changes at the outset of his career, or whether they were the gradual result of . , •' '^ and spreads accumulated experience, is uncertain ; at any rate, from the first he drilled and disciplined his troops with the utmost care, and soon made them a terror to the neighbouring states of the Pelo- ponnese. So roughly were the Phliasians handled that terror among the Peloponne- sian allies. 134 The CorintJiiiin War. B.C. 391 CH. VIII. Capture of Pciraion. they were forced to overcome tlieir political objection to Spartan occuj)ation, and to send for a garrison to pro- tect their city. So cowed were the Arkadians, a people of nr) mean military repute, that they allowed their country to be ravaged before their eyes, rather than take the field against them. Vet the peltasts themselves had a whole- some dread (jf the prowess of Spartan hoplites. never ap- proaching even within a javelin cast, so that the Spartans made contemptuous jokes at the expense of their allies, who ' were as frightened at the peltasts as children at hob- goblins.' But the Spartan force which was left near Corinth was Operati,..,. "''^ powerful cnough to prevent the Atheni- an.riv^iiu''' '^"^ ^'^'^"^ undoing the most important of the tias near achievements of Traxitas. As long as the Lonnth. breach in the Long Walls of Corinth lay open, Athens could not feel herself secure. Tu remedy this, the people set out in full force, with masons and carpenters, and repaired with amazing celerity the western wall to- wards Sikyon, tilling up the breach in the eastern wall more at their leisure. But the Sj)artans. having once se- cured an advantage so important, were not going to lose it without a struggle. The service was important enough to call for the personal attendance of the king; and .A^^e- silaos marched out with a full muster of Spartan troops and Peloi)onnesian allies, while his brother Teleutias. a commander of great ability and daring, and of even greater popularity, supported him with a fleet in the Cor- inthian gulf. The king as he passed took care to give the Argives some experience of the evils of the w.ir which they were themselves foremost in jiromoling. and then, advancing to the isthmus, demolished the newly-erected works of the Athenians. Teleutias also on the vcrv same day captured Lechaion. with the fleet and arsenal of the 135 T AKCsil.-ios, after being present at the Isthmian games, captures Peiraion. Corinthians, which had been furnished by the money left by rharnabazos. The importance of these operations was soon proved by the arrival at Sparta of embassies both from Athens and from Thebes, to ne<:o- tiatc terms of j)cace. These overtures pro- Overtures • , , , . lur peace. duced no dehnite result. 1 hough protracted for some months, they were at last broken off on account of a brilliant exploit which altered the whole position of the belligerents. The bitterest foes of a state are always its exiled citi- zens. The fugitives from Corinth, whose sole aim was the overthrow of the war-party in the town, were discontented as long as one sinele acre of Corinthian territory remained un- ravaged, and restlessly urged the Spartans to direct an expedition against the small peninsula in the centre of which was the fort of Peiraion, the sole remaining magazine from which the inhabitants of the town could draw supj)lies. Further, since they held that a city which submitted to Argive domination was no true Corinth, and since they themselves consti- tuted in their own estimation the genuine Corinthian people, they wished to have the honour of presiding over the Isthmian games which were held that vear. Timinjr his march so as to arrive at the isthmus precisely at the commencement of the festival. Agesilaos by his mere ap- pearance drove the competitors and spectators in terror to the town, and guarded the exiles while they went through the programme of sacrifices and contests with all due formalities ; and on his departure for Peiraion, the Corinthians came out under Argive protection and celebrated the games afresh. Finding the fort of Peiraion strongly garrisoned, he did not attack it at once, but waited till he had decoyed away most of its defenders, including ■■-I .- ,-a^;r fVV^^ . ■ 36 The CorintJiian War. B.C. 391. CH. VIII. Iphikratcs at Corinth, 137 Iphikratcs and his pdtasts, by a feint upon Corinth itself. On the next day, the occupants of Peiraion, male and female, slaves and freemen, tied for refu^^^e to the temple of Here on the neiijhbourinj; promontory. Tenaion and Oinoe, with abundance of booty, were captured at once, and the fuj^itives in the Heraion surrendered uncondi- tionally. Those who had been concerned in the massacre in Corinth were , , r U V. ami slain by ^^^ mercenaries, he rushed out trom amousn Iphikrates. ^^ ^.^ disordered enemies. The death-scene of Anaxibios was too good a close for his life of cruelty c CH. IX. Piracy in Aigina. U3 and treachery. ' And perceiving.* says Xenophon. ' that there was no' hope of safety, he said to the soldiers near him, " My men. my honour calls me to die where I now stand : but 1 bid you hasten to save yourselves before the enemy is on us." With these words he seized his shield from his shield-bearer, and fell fighting where he stood. And his bov-favourite forsook him not ; and of the Spar- tan harmosts from the city, twelve died fighting by his side, and the rest were killed as they fied.' But the war was destined not to close before Athens had herself suffered from its evils : and the saying of Perikles was again proved true, that Aigina was the ^ eye-sore of the Peiraieus. Bitter experience ^^^J^ had taught the Athenians how important it was that the inhabitams of that island should be friendly to them • and they had driven out the old population and filled their places with settlers from Attica. These in their turn had been expelled by Lysandros, who had reinstated the remnants of the original Aiginetans. But in spite of their wrongs, the dangers of hostility with Athens and the advantages of commerce had kept up friendly rela- tions between the two neighbours, and the Spartan harmost had to exert all his influence to induce the \i.rinetans to avail themselves of the letters of marque ;.hich he issued against Athens. After some months of indecisive fighting, during which the partial destruction of a squadron of Athenian ships had been skilfully aven-ed bv Chabrias. who surprised and slew the Spartan commander, Teleutias came to take the command of the ill-paid, ill-disciplined, and discontented Spartan fleet. Tust as the departure of this brilliant officer had pre- viously been marked by extravagant signs of affection and regret, so on his return he was welcomed with enthu- siastic delight. He immediately called his men together. JMfliif- iL 144 The Peace of Antalkidas. B.C. 387. and, addressing them with sympathetic eloquence, told them that thoui,di he had broir^ht no money for them, yet he was as willing to share their hardships and labours as he would be to share the success and pleasure to A'hich he would lead them. The acclamations of the sailors assured him that they would follow wherever he led the way : and he bade them be ready to start at nightfall, taking with them one day's provisions. Whither they were sailing in the darkness, no one except the admiral knew ; but daybreak found them lying about half a mile from the entrance of the harbour of Peiraieus. As he sailed in at the head of his twelve shijis, he found that the expectations which had suggested his daring enter- prise were perfectly correct. The triremes which lay in the harbour were disabled without difficulty, Telcutias ^ , . , , surprises ior crews and captains were asleep on shore. rureus^* The merchant vessels fell an easy prey. From the larger ships the cargoes and the sailors were carried off, and the smaller were towed away altogether ; some were even bold enough to leap on to the quay and kidnap all the merchants and skippers on whom they could lay hands. With the ut- most haste the full force of Athens, inf;intry and cavalry, flocked down to Peiraieus to the rescue : but Teleutias was already at sea with his prizes and plunder. On his return voyage he captured corn-ships, merchant vessels, fishing smacks, and boats full of passengers, and was able by this adventure to gratify his delighted sailors by the payment of a month's wages in advance, g The object of the Spartans in these and mission of similar operations was not so much the con- Antulkidas <- 1 • 11 is success- quest of their opponents as to make the war while it still lasted self-supporting, and to in- duce Athens to assent to terms of peace. The mission of !^^^s^^"^!vrHr i ^■!L'^-^&.££SZ.^.ss^^'*t^£:i^j^i,y'&^<-^m. CH. IX. Peace of Antalkidas. 145 Antalkidas had been renewed, and his second attempt had been more successful. The events of the last two years had justified the advice of Tiribazos, and he had conse- quently regained the favour of the Great King, who now was involved in war with his rebel subjects in Kypros and Egypt, and wished to feel that the affairs of Greece were oft" his hands. Again, the gratitude of Athens had obliged her to send help to one of these rebels, Euagoras, who had been her most fiiithful and unswerving ally, and for whom Chabrias was now gaining important victories over Persian troops. Hence the Great King had now no reason to consult her interests or wishes further than they coincided with his own. Seconded by the revived influence of Tiribazos, Antalkidas obtained from the king marks of the most distinguished favour, and easily persuaded him to agree to the proposals which he had previously made. All that now remained to be done was to obtain the consent of the Athenians, and bribery and intimidation were both brought to bear upon them. The terms of the peace were to be so modified as to recog- nise the right of the Athenians to the three islands, on condition of their abandoning the cause of Euagoras. Antalkidas also, on his return from Sousa, resumed the command of the Spartan fleet in the Hellespont, and by successive reinforcements and a series of skilful opera- tions, raised the total of his ships to the large number of eighty, and thus became completely master of the sea. His course was now clear. The Spartans were heartily tired of the protracted war, and could have no possible objection to a peace framed solely in their q^^^^^^^ interests. The Athenians, whose exchequer the general acceptance was exhausted, whose corn-ships were inter- of terms of cepted by Antalkidas, and whose coasts were p^^" harassed by privateers, began seriously to anticipate a 146 The Peace of Antalkidas. n.c. 387. repetition of the woes and agonies w hich they had suffered seventeen years before. The Argives also, aware that they could no longer protect their territory from the inroads of the Spartans by the convenient invention of a sacred truce, were as desirous of peace as the rest. Tiribazos conse- quently gave notice that all who wished to hear the terms of the peace which the king sent down for their accept- ance should come to him at Sardeis ; and the summons „ , ^vas quickly obeved. Before the assembled tion of the envoys I iribazos exhibited the royal seal, and conditions. ^^^^ ^y^^ document aloud. ' King Artaxer.\es thinks it just that the cities in Asia should belong to him, and of the islands Klazomcnai and Kypros: but that all the other Hellenic cities, small and great, should be left independent, except Lcmnos, Imbros, and Skyros ; and that these, as of old, should belong to the Athenians. And upon those states which do not accept this peace I myself will make war, in conjunction with those who assent to these terms, both by land and by sea, with ships and with money.' Such were the conditions which the envoys were author- ised to carry back to their respective cities. They were accepted without opposition, except by the Thebans, who wished to take the oath in the name of the Hoiotian con- ,.,, . federacy, and not mcrclv of the town of Ihebanand ,,,, , a -i •'.... Argive Ihebcs. Agesilaos angrily bade the depu- ovimS ^^^^^ '^^■^^ ^^'^'"c returning home for further in- Ta^s^^"'' structions, tell their countrymen that if they did not comply they would be shut out from the treaty. Eager for an opportunity of exacting a mer- ciless retribution for the insult of Aulis and the wounds of Koroncia, he had led out the forces of Sparta as far as Tegea, and was busily mustering the allies, when the en- voys returned to announce the submission of the The- CH. IX. Disgraceful Nature of the Peace, 147 bans. Agesilaos had to content himself with the hu- miliation of the haughty city instead of her destruction, and turned round on Argos. Corinth had joined Argos of her own accord, and an Argivc garrison was her only means of protection against the return of the hated ex- iles. But when the interests of Sparta pulled in the op- posite direction, it was vain to urge that a voluntary alli- ance could not be a \'iolation of the principle of inde- pendence. The Corinthians were forced to dismiss the garrison and admit their exiles ; and these, backed by the influence of Sparta, expelled their opponents, and framed their policy as governors of Corinth and keepers of the keys of the Peloponnese in strict conformity with Spartan interests. Plutarch has preserved for us the happy retort made by Agesilaos to some one who exclaimed in his presence, 'Alas for Hellas, when our Lakonians are Medising 1 ' * Rather.' replied the king, ' it is '^^f^Sas°^ the Medes (or I^ersians) who are Lakonising.' disgraceful Both Agesilaos and his friend were right : each form, in all . , , ,, . . c c ^\, • it^ articles, state, with the hrmest intention of furthering .„,j ;„ ^i.e its own advantage, had done great service to gJlecLtion!* the other. By the mere form of the treaty, all Greece was dragged down to a depth of degradation to which she had never sunk before. It had been pitiful enough for the states who were rivals for the leadership of Hellas to be rivals also in cringing for barbarian support; more pitiful still that the hatred of kinsmen should be more powerful ih.m the ties of kinsmanship, and that the enslavement of Circek to barbarian in Asia should be the price paid for the enslavement of Greek to Cireck in Europe : but this open acknowledgment of the over- lordship or suzerainty of the Great King was infmitely worse. The Great King ordered the Greeks, his subjects, "I \i^«imf,'^&^S^^^i^^W^^^S^^iB^&i^i^ \d^<;i^'i''^£h!SiilBMB^^iSi*!meM'V.^i*. n 'irMdfM 148 The PtHice of Antalkidas, B.C. 386. CH. IX. Mantineia Punished. 149 to come to hear his will : they came as they were com- manded. He sent down his proclamation, and his envoy, having shewn the royal seal, read it aloud : cowed by threats of royal displeasure, the Greeks departed and obeyed. What more had Mardonios asked a century before ? The first article of the convention was as dis- graceful as the form of the whole. It annihilated the struggles of ninety years, and abandoned to Persian tyr- anny, in spite of repeated promises, a district which was as thoroughly Greek as Lakonia itself, and had been the cradle of her poetry, her philosophy, in a word, of all her culture. The second article at any rate had an enticing sound. An announcement of universal independence flattered that instinct of self-isolation which all through their history had prevented the Hellenic cities from coalescing into an Hellenic nation. The day of hope for Hellas had dawned when Athens had tried to consolidate her empire in opposition to this tendency ; just as it was a fatal hour when Sparta succeeded in establishing her supremacy by means of it. It was so ruinously easy for enemies from within or from without to divide and con- quer. Nor was the third stipulation more satisfactory. It meant that Athens had been bribed to desert Euagoras, her ally, who had recently received from her, as he well deserved, the highest honours ; and the bribe took the form of a cession to which Sparta might appeal in justi- fication of her retention of the Lakonian and Messenian towns, if the public opinion of Greece should become dangerously outspoken. But, in their proud position as executors of the Great King's commands, the Spartans meant to appeal to no argument but the sword. Their lust of dominion was unabated, and it was soon evident that universal independence meant, not, indeed, the right of each city to set up what government it chose, but the right of Sparta to dissolve all alliances and confedera- tions which she thought dangerous to her interests. The panegyrists of Sparta may perhaps justify her treatment of Thebes and Argos by the terms of the treaty ; not even Xenophon can pretend that the attack on Man- tineia was prompted by anv motive except ,. . . ' ' ^ ' ' Mantineia a wish to punish the Mantineians for their punished slackness in the Spartan service, and to warn spiit^up^into other allies against similar lukewarmness. hamlets. The ostensible pretext was that they had sent corn to the Argives when at war with Sparta ; the real cause was the undisguised satisfaction felt by the Mantineians at Spartan reverses, and Spartan soldiers could not forget how they had skulked past the walls of Mantineia by night to avoid their bitter gibes. Envoys were sent to demand that the walls of the city should be demolished ; and when the citizens refused, Agesipolis blockaded the town, and built a wall of circumvallation. (Growing weary of the siege, he dammed up the flooded waters of the river below the town. As the stream rose higher, the walls, which were built of unbaked clay, began to totter, and the citizens were forced to surrender. The democrats were expelled and an oligarchical government established. The city was split up into the five rustic hamlets of which it was originally composed. Xenophon gravely assures us that, when once the expense of building new houses was past, the Mantineians gratefully appreciated their rural tran- quillity, and the unspeakable advantage of living so near to their farms. Such was the spirit in which the Spartans carried out the treaty ; and if to promulgate shams and get them accepted as realities be a masterpiece of diplomacy, the convention of Antalkidas well deserves that distinction. Hollow as were the promises of Sparta, the assumption *»i! *^' .TS^-e^^lfX-z ISO The Peace of Antixlkidas. B.C. 385. Effect of the peace on the Asiatic Greeks and on Kua- goras. of omnipotent sovereii^nty on the part of Persia had even less foundation in fact. The internal weakness ^eSs'jf^''^ of the vast empire was at this time more Persia. \\i,x.x\ ever notorious. Of the unwieldy a<(gre- gate of nations which owed allegiance to the Great King, two of the most powerful were in open revolt ; and before the attack of united Hellas, the whole edifice would have collapsed like a house of cards. The cession of the Asiatic (ireeks gave to Artaxerxes an increase of resources which he sorely needed. The condition of these towns became pitiable. In many of them garrisons were i)laced and citadels l)uilt ; some, probably after an at- tempted revolt, were destroyed altogether. The exactions of the tax-gatherers were almost intolerable ; the most beautiful boys and girls were transferred to the harems of Persian nobles ; their men were forced to serve against their own countrymen in Kypros. Indeed, the effects of the Peace of Antalkidas on the prospects of Kuagoras, who had been for some years in full revolt against Persia, were alto-- ^-<- towns, all of which, except Orchomenos and The P- ■^^'l been willing adherents of the confederacy, oligarchical eo ernments were established, and Spartan harn^osts Stat oned. Nor did the efforts of Sparta to secure Bo.otia end here As she could unmake cities, so she could make them. The fiat went forth that the name of ^^^^^^^^^^ I'htaia which by Spartan injustice had been „f pi^,^ia. rruellv'erased from the map of Greece forty years before, should live again, that the walls and town Ihould be rebuilt, and that the descendants of the old nh.:lnts should return. They had been ousted Irom their homes by Archidamos, and dr.ven to Athcis , tl ey Sbeen hunted by Lysandros ^^'^^ ^^^^^^^^^ Athenians had assigned them as a refuge, '-^"^ drnen to Athens again ; and now at last they were restored to thc.r _ "I !» l"*!.*'-* FajBiwiafttifeMiaaiia '54 The Supprrsshm of O/ynlhos. n.c. 383. ancient home high on tlie rugged slopes of Mount Kithai- ron, not indeed because Sparta bhishcd for her cruelty in destroying a city so brave and gloricnis. but that the new Plataia might l)e hckl as a stronghold against her tra- ditional enemy, m.l embitter still further the growing jealousy between Thebes and Athens. Soon there came to the Spartans from an entirely fresh quarter an appeal, that they, as the champions of the Appeal of pnnciple of autonomous isolation, and the the Akan- swom foes of all confederacies, should inter- against fere to repress the dangerous growth of a new power. Consider, cries the envoy, ' whether It is reasonable for you to take such care to prevent the union of lioiotia. and yet to overlook entirely the com- bination of a far greater power— a p..wer which is gain- ing strength, not only by land but also In- sea. rich in timber for ship-building, in tribute from many ports and seats of commerce, in a teeming population, and a fertile soil.' Such is the language in which the envoy sent by Growth of ^^^^ ^'^'^'"^ of Akanthos and Ap<.llonia describes the oiyn- the young confederacy of Olynthos. Of its fcderacy"' '"'^^^ 1'^^'^ is kuown. Tho King of Maced(jn had been driven from his kingdom by the at- tacks of the Illyrian and other neighbouring tribes. The cities on the sea-coast tlew to Olynthos for protection; liberal terms were granted to the suppliants— common laws, and equal rights of citizenshij). intermarriage, pro- prietorship, and commerce. The condition of the Makedonian cities under their bloody and unscrupulous monarchs could not have been enviable; and it was natural enough that the confederacy thus formed should spread rapidly, even as far as the great town of Pella. But its development was checked by two large and important cities, and the Olynthians threatened to force CFI. X, Expnfif/otis (ij^amsf Olynthos. 155 ' upon them the blessings of their alliance in spite of their old-fashioned wish to keep entirely to themselves and manage their own affairs. These recalcitrant neighbours did not deny that their admission cVf^SXs to the confederacv would probablv jrain for f*"^ ^poU them mcreased prosperity and security; and they even confessed that if they once tried the experi- ment, the citizens would be won over to the advantages of federation. Hut tlioir envoy states frankly their one objection : * We uish to use our hereditary laws and to be a city by ourselves;* and he works skilfully upon the fears of Si)arta, with hints about an Athenian and Boiotian alliance, and the divine law by which increasing power produces always a corresjjonding increase of ambition. The j^rayer of the envoy was seconded by an embassy from the Makedonian monarch; and the Spartans resolved to suppress Olynthos— a resolution consistent with the narrow and short-sighted terms of the Peace of Antalkidas, but fatal to the generous and states- manlike scheme which would have proved in years to come the most effective obstacle to Makedonian aggression. By the special request of the Akanthians, who urged that there was no time to be lost. Eudamidas was sent^'off at once with 2.000 men. lie won over Potidaia, and garrisoned some towns, but his ^Sh ^" ^''' tions force was too small for any great results. His against brother, I'hoibidas, was tr) follow with the rest ^"* °^' of the army as soon as was convenient, and his march would take him close to Thebes. Though Xcnophon. to screen the Spartans from the black guilt of the perfidy which followed, describes Phoibidas as a man who loved a brilliant exploit better than life itself, and not blessed with great reasoning powers, or even with common prudence, there can belittle doubt that the encampment of Phoibidas M I 156 TV/c Sii/ipn-ssion of 0/ynt/ws. B.C. 383. v-S CH. X. Arrest of Ismcttms. 157 near the gymnasium outside Thebes was not a pure acci- dent, and that the story is well founded, accordino^ to which he received before he started secret orders from Agesilaos and the ephors to take any opportunity for the seizure of Thebes which might present itself. In Thebes itself the strife of factions ran high, and each IxlTot party had its representative as polcmarch. or Thebes. vvar-officer, in the highest official position. Ismenias was the leader of the democrats ; he regarded the Spartan encampment outside the walls as no business of his. and kept away from it. Not so his Ismenias. colleague, Lcontiadcs. who was the most in- fluential member of the oligarchical faction. I le became a frequent visitor to the Lakedaimonian camp, and ex- plained to Phoibidas the scheme of the philo-Lakonian party inside the town. The plot was simple TangeTby enough. On the great festival of Demcter, Leoniiades, ^^^ Kadmeia, or citadel, was given up to the sole use of the Theban women, the gates were closed, and the key would be given into the custody of himself as polemarch ; and he accordingly offered to introduce Phoi- bidas and his hoplites into the citadel without bloodshed or difficulty. He assured the Si^artan general that when this was done the whole town would at once submit to the oligarchical party; and that he would thus gain not only a^aluable reinforcement for his army, but become master of a city far more important than Olynthos itself. Phoibidas could not and did not hesitate. If Spartan troops were to act with safety against Olynthos. it was fatal to leave directly on the line of march an important position in the hands of a hostile population. It must be secured at all risks, and might possibly, if the present op- portunitv were lost, cost Sparta a bloody and protracted war. In Thebes it was a day of high festival. The hearts «'w» of the democrats were relieved, for it was known that the Spartans had received orders to break up Kidmeia their camp and march northwards. The seized by , 11-1 IMioibidus sultry glare of a summer s noon had emptied the streets, and the senators, having resigned the Kadmeia to the devotions or the orgies of the women, were transacting their business in a portico near the market-place. Such was the moment skilfully chosen by Leontiadcs for the e.xccution of his impious and perfidious design. The traitor mounted his horse and rode after Phoibidas, who ordered his troops to face about, and fol- lowed his guide through the deserted streets and up the slope of the seven-gated citadel. Lcontiades then gave the keys to the Spartan general, and hastened to the Senate. Here, according to the plan previously concerted with his supporters, he announced that the Spartans were in possession of the Kadmeia, and bade the senators not to be alarmed. ' lUit 1,' he continued, 'who am, as pole- march, allowed by the law to arrest anyone who seems to be guilty of crimes worthy of death, arrest this man, Ismenias, as a stirrer up of war. And do you, guards, rise and seize him, and take him off to the place ap- pointed.' Surprised by the suddenness of the attack, intimidated by the presence of ismenias. the Spartans in the citadel, and conscious that their wives and daughters were at the mercy of the enemy, the democrats made no attempt to rescue Ismenias. Ar- chias.an oligarch, was chosen polemarch in his place, and 300 of the leading democrats made their escape to Athens. Having so easily accomplished his design, Lcontiades set off at once to take the news to Sparta. ^^^^^ ^^ . Here, as in the whole of Greece, the event this news at ., , , Sparta. created the utmost excitement. Sparta had for some years been split into two opposing parties, each 158 The Siifipression of Olynthos. n.c. 383. iS CH. X. Execution of Ismcnias. 159 headed by one of the kinjijs. AgesipoHs and his friends were the advocates of legality and moderation : they had tried to secure some respect for the ri;j;hts of the subject states, to prevent the abuse of Spartan supremacy, and to avoid the perils to which a policy of terrorism ami coercion must inevitably lead. At^esilaos, on the other hand, was the leader of the war party : with them the sword was the short and sharp remedy for all opposition ; and as they had made the peace, so they would use it, for the interests of Sparta alone. This division of feelini; may account for the verdict which, according to I'lularch, made all Greece marvel at the inconsistency which punished the doer but approved the deed. Agesilaos, when Thoibi- das was brought to trial, came forward in his defence, and stated plainly that the sole point worthy of consider- ation was whether the act of l*hoibidas was advantageous to Sparta or not ; if it was hurtful he deserved to be punished, but if it w:is for the benefit of Sparta, it was an established principle that a man might act on his own responsibility. This trenchant argument was ^•i"^^"" '^" seconded by Leontiades, with the most abject professions of subservience to Spartan advan- tage. Phoibidas was, nominally at any rate, tined and removed from his command ; but three harmosts and a strong garrison were sent to hold the Kadmeia for Sparta. The pious Xenophon regards the mingled profanity and injustice of this act as so flagrant that the gods could not overlook it but made Thebes the scourge thr;?ct'of"^ for the chastisement of Spartan wirkedness, Phoihi.las because it had been the scene of their most dibcusscd. heinous crime. Yet. by the recognised prin- ciples of Spartan policy, the act was a necessity, capable of considerable palliation. She had never regarded the democratic party in the cities of Greece as worthy of any •«^. consideration. The only real citizens were the loyal oligarchs, and the pestilent demagogues were treated as in a chronic stabe of rebellion. The Kadmeia had been seized in the interests and by the contrivance of the only class who had a right to have any voice in the matter. Nay, more, the deed had been done not only with the sanction, but under the actual leadership of the highest civic authority. There had been no theft or violence in the seizure of the keys of the citadel ; they had been voluntarily handed over to Phoibidas by the official who rightfully had them in his custody. Again, it might be urged that Thebes, having refused her contingent to the forces raised against Olynthos, and being actually in treaty with the enemy, was virtually at war with Sparta, and that the act, even if a little treacherous against bel- ligerents of equal rank, was justifiable enough against contumacious rebels. Viewed in the light of these plausible arguments, the verdict against Phoibidas was sufficiently severe ; but there is no reason to believe that it was ever enforced. The subsequent execution of Ismenias is capable of far less defence. He was dragged to Sparta, and tried before a novel tribunal, consisting of three commissioners from Sparta and one from execution of every city in alliance with her. The definite l^memas. charges brought against him were, that he had allied him- self with and received money from the Great King to do harm to (ireece, and that he had been a prime mover m all the late disturbances. ' Against these charges,' says Xenophon, * he defended himself;' and indeed it was no difficult matter to fling them back in the teeth of his accusers. ' He could not, however, make it believed that he was not a man of great and dangerous designs, so he was con- demned and executed ; but the faction of Leontiades ta»jM>^'.»'i«Matj > u ■"■ f^""«-ci'i^ens, while the priests sur- ro nded then, w,th ..trlands, and adjured the people ,0 ...ht for the,r country and their «ods. The whole aLxtbl! Gen..,, '"'" '" ''" "'^•■" '"'""ur ; and wuh shouts of assembly. applause and rin.;in- cheers, hailed them as YV ,. „ . '. ' '''■''^'^'■vers and benefactors of Ihebes y . h hedeathoftheirtyrantsd,edalsotheirnarrow , i^; Thebes was no, only to be free herself, but the he ul of n rSed't:;^^'"'''^''''''''-'-^'^''--'''^^^^^^^ called by the enthu^astic acclamations of the as- iVL.pijas scmbly ,0 form the jjovernment, received the revved tide of lioiotarchs instead of pole- marchs. tner^-y and darin- j;„ided die counsels of the new rulers. Ihe reinforce ments comm, f.ou. Pla.aia to the garrison were b ^I" back the assault on the citadel was con,mcnced with the utmost ardour, and the coura.-e of the assiil,„,c s^muhtted by the o.er of pn^es of ^S::^^ ::, daung. How far the .Athenians co-operated with their a l,c. ,s not accurately known ; but it is certain , a, one o he,r generals suffered death and another tied into eule, on account of their forwardness in the support If Thebes wlnle .V.hens was still at peace with Spar^ n:e Spartan har,r,osts, intimidated by the bold .issiults of The Spar. '""Cased numbers, offered to capitulate if tans evacu- thcv Were allf>u-.-rI f.^ r., 1 . ate the ' aiKmccl to march out with their Kadmeia. arm.. The terms were gladly accepted, and rh. , Spartans witlidrew. meetin,^ at Me-nra the army destined to relieve them Tn .1. r ^^'^'^^ excitement of tK« "^'^' confusion and excitement of the surrender, some of the ohgarchs, and I CH. XI. Charaitif of Ptlopidiu. 167 I even of their children, were slain by the more furious of the democrats ; but order was soon restored, possibly by Athenian help. Thebes was now free ; and the work of divine venge- ance thus begun was not to cease without fuller and more serious accomplishment. Throughout all Greece the tidings awakened sympathetic rejoicing, and Plutarch tells us that the exploit was called by the Greeks twin- sister to the deed of Thrasyboulos ; equal in its daring, and even greater in its results, as it broke the chains of the Spartan domination, which before seemed forged of adamant. Though much was done, more yet remained ; and it was fortunate indeed for the renovated city that she numbered among her sons Pelopidas, Pammenes, Gorgidas. and the greatest Greek of that or perhaps of any age, Epameinondas. CHAPTER XI. THE RISE OF THEBES. Of all the great citizens whom Thebes produced at this crisis, the two most eminent, Pelopidas and Epameinondas, were united in a friendship, so constant and (Character so elevated as to become the admiration of of Pdo- pulas. antic[U ly. 'Amongst a thousand i)oints for praise in both.' says Plutarch, 'the judicious esteem nothing equal to that firm friendship which they preserved from first to last.' It began in their youth, was riveted by the devotion with which TLpameinondas defended the life of his wounded friend when fighting for Sparta in the Peloponnese, and was never weakened by jealousy or rivalry during their public life. Pelopidas was noble by birth, rich by inheritance, and richer still by marriage \ ssssa^sss i68 The Rise of Thebes. B.C. 379. CH. XI. Character of Epameinondas. 169 but he was the lord and not the slave of his money. In all the externals of life he aimed at simplicity. His fare was plain ; his dress no costlier than that of the meanest Thcban ; his pleasures were inexpensive — the exercises of the gymnasium and the excitement of the chase. And yet he was no nig^jard, but em[)loyed his wealth to relieve the necessities of the most deservinji among his poorer countrymen. Honour and glory were the objects that aroused his cupidity ; yet his was a generous ambition, not centred in self alone, but tempered with patriotism. He would rise, as his country rose, or would not rise at all. Without much tincture of in- tellectual training, he had been too long associated with Epameinondas, and had drunk too deeply of the new spirit which was then agitating the minds of the nobler Thebans, to be Boiotian in the worse sense of the word ; and no mere boor could have won such distinguished re- spect at the court of the Great King. As a general, he was marked by a daring which was often little better than imprudence. But the same reckless audacity which cost him his life, had before restored to Thebes her liberty. How highly these qualities were esteemed by his country- men, is sufficiently proved by his fifteen years of uninter- rupted command, and the heartfelt grief which his soldiers manifested at his death. Like Pelopidas, Epameinondas was sprung of a noble race, and even of the ancient stock of the Spartoi, the ... . sons of the dragon's teeth ; but unlike him, of F.pi- he was born and reared, as he lived and meinundas. i- 1 • • • 1 • died, m poverty; not shrmkmg even from wounding his friend's feelings by being the only poor man in Thebes who would not be his pensioner. Distinguished for an utter contempt for wealth and pleasure, he gave himself up heart and soul to the pursuit of philosoph>. .« 1 and listened eagerly to the teaching both of the Sokratic and the Pythagorean schools. The latter had the more powerful and permanent influence on him. Ionia was its birthplace, Magna Graecia the home of its maturity, and from it Epameinondas learnt that he owed a patriotic allegiance to something wider than Thebes or Boiotia; and'^he resolved to be true in all his life and in all his aims first to Thebes, but above all to Hellas. In Pelopidas there was something of provincialism; Epameinondas may be taken as the type of perfect Hellenism. He was a musician, but not merely in the Boiotian sense. He was a skilful player on the flute, which was formed from the reeds of the Kopaic lake ; but he could play the lyre as well, and as a philosopher, had grasped the Hellenic idea of music as the grand rhythm and harmony of a well- regulated life. So in the gymnasium, he aimed not merely at the swollen muscles which were a Boiotian's pride, but at activity and suppleness, that his bodily frame might be perfectly trained for the service of his country and the use of his mind. Oratory, again, was a Hellenic not a Boiotian accomplishment ; and in this he was pre-eminent, for though it was said of him that no man ever understood more and talked less, yet he deemed it only right that a man should be able to say the right thing at the right time, to expose the false and to uphold the true. In his public life, when he resided in Thebes unmolested by the oligarchs as a man too poor and too speculative to be dangerous, he was elevating his fellow- citizens by his personal influence and teaching, that he might make them worthy of their future freedom and the new position of their country. As a general, he broke loose from the narrow systems of antiquated tacti- cians, and inspiring his own immediate division with the courage that glowed in his own breast, he made the I70 The Rise of Tlicbcs. B.C. 379. CH. XI. spartan Expedition against Boiotia. T7I physical weight of its onset so tremendous as to be well- nigh irresistible. Lastly when the victorious general was merged in the statesman, his policy was marked by the complete absence of harshness or cruelty to his conquered enemies, for he remembered that they were (Greeks like himself. His sympathies were so wide and deep that his antipathies were weak. He came to quicken and stimulate politicnl life, not to repress all signs of inde- pendence : he loved not to destroy but to construct, not to isolate but to combine not to sunder but to solder. The work which lay before these great citizens was one which would task to the utmost their powers of over- coming difticuhies, overriding o|)position, and concili- ating the jeahnisies of rivals and the prejudices of factions. Thebes was indeed free; but she could not stand alone. The key-note of the new jwlicy was struck on the very Difficiiitio ^^'^>' "^ ^^^''' I'l^cration. when her magistrates if Thebes ^'^'^^ saluted no longer as polemarchs, but Boiotarchs as of yore. All Boiotia was to share the blessings of freedom, for it was necessary that all Boiotia should share the dangers of defence. The reunion of Boiotia, which it had long been the main object of Sparta to prevent, now became the essential condition of Theban independence. Though in every town there was probably an influential faction which sympathised with this object and exulted in the expulsion of the Spartans, yet local rivalry and oligarchic selfish- ness would die hard; and the necessity for a BanJ]'*'"^'''^ ^"^b' «f trustworthy supporters caused I-.pa- meinondas and (iorgidas to revive the old Boiotian institution of the Sacred Band, which hail nearly half a century before won renown in the fight at Delion. Raised especially for the defence of the Kadmcia, this regiment, 300 strong, was armed and trained at the public expense. None were admitted to its ranks but youths of muscular prowess, tried valour, and single-hearted patri- otism ; and each man fought by the side of the friend whom he loved best. The enthusiasm of such a corps was contagious, the value of its example unspeakable ; courage had always been a Theban characteristic, and willingness to submit to discipline and drill was all that was required to make the Boiotian troops second to none in Hellas. The news of the insurrection at Thebes naturally aroused at Sparta the deepest anger and vex- ation. Of the three hannosts who had so pu- expccTuion sillanimously surrendered the Kadmeia, two '7^=!'"^* •' b(MoUa were slain before they could reach Sparta, under Kle- ,111 1 1 i- 1 1 • oinbrotos. and the third was heavily lined and sent into exile. In spite of the wintry season, the Ephors des- patched without delay an expedition against the rebel city. Agesilaos declined the command on the plea of his advanced age, and it devolved upon Klcombrotos, who had succeeded to the throne on the death of Agesipolis, and who now commanded for the first time. The campaign began with a slight success. The Lakedaimonian light troops cut to pieces the 150 liberated prisoners, who were guarding the passes near Plataia ; but the conduct of Klcombrotos, who had seemingly little sympathy with the high-handed policy of his countrymen, was so half- hearted that his men, so Xcnophon tells us, were sorely puzzled to know whether they were really at war or at peace with the Thebans. After a sixteen days' occupa- tion of Boiotian territory, where he did but little damage, he led home his army, leaving Sphodrias at Thespiai in command of a third part of his forces. This ofificer, whom Plutarch calls a man of more courage than wisdom, fired by the fame gained by Phoi- N i n 172 The Rise of Thebes. B.C. 379- CH. XI. New Athenian Confederaey. '73 bidas from his successful seizure of the Kadmeia. and ,, ^ , . rememberinir how nearly Tcleutias had suc- attempts to cecdcd in surprising the Peiraieus by sea, re- t'KeT solved to try to effect the same exploit by land : raieus ; ^^^^ ^^^ assertions of Plutarch and Xenophon, that he was stimulated to his attempt by Theban guile or gold, seem improbable. After an early supper, he marched from Thespiai, intending to reach Peiraieus before sunrise ; but when the rays of light flashing from the temples of Eleusis proclaimed the dawn, the soldiers were still in the Thriasian plain, and their hearts failed them. Ravaging the country as he went, Sphodrias returned to Thespiai. ashamed of his failure in a deed of perfidy which nothing but success could have justified even to Spartan consciences. Unbounded was the indignation of the Athe- nians when they heard of the peril which they had just escaped. But the Spartan ambassadors, who happened to be in the city, disclaimed any complicity with the attempt, and assured them that they would soon hear that Sphodrias had atoned for his treachery by suffering death at the hands of his indignant countrymen. In this the ambas- sadors spoke what they believed to be the truth ; even Sphodrias felt that his fate was sealed. To fail in such an enterprise was death ; and the strong claims of policy which urged that the just anger of the Athenians must be appeased, strengthened the weaker considerations of justice. Hut private friendship saved the cul- prit. Archidamos, the son of Agesilaos, was intimate with the son of Si)hodrias, and by his intercession the king was induced to spare Sphodrias, asserting that it would be hard indeed to put to death a man of so honourable a character, for Sparta was sorely in need of gallant men like him. When this gross miscarriage of justice became known is tried and ac- quitted. i 1 at Athens, the Athenians at once prepared for war. Not only was the Peiraieus fortified against attack 111 11 1 • r Formation by land or sea, while new ships of war were of a new built with all speed, and a new system of amfede" taxation was imposed upon the citizens, but ^^^^'^ envoys were sent round to the ii,Iands and maritime cities of the Kgean, inviting them to form a new con- federacy. The old duties and claims which had bred disaffection in the confederation of Delos were kept as far as possible in the background ; the most unpopular privileges of the presiding State were formally renounced. The envoys chosen for this mission of conciliation were Timotheos. the son of Konon and heir to his popularity, Chabrias, the famous general, and Kallistratos, the most noted orator of his time ; and so successful were they in their expedition that more than seventy cities, discon- tented with the rule of Spartan harmosts or Persian satraps, were soon enrolled under the leadership of Athens. In the first congress of the new confederacy, an armament was voted which should consist of 20,000 hoplites. 500 cavalry, and 200 triremes. But this enthu- siasm could not and did not last long. To enforce the equipment of contingents and the thuSllm*^"" payment of contributions was a difficult task ; and real weakness. and the league, which promised so well and seemed so hearty, failed in actual performance, though its moral support was doubtless of great value to Athens. Of all the allies which the Athenians gained at this time, none was so important as Thebes. Her army was becom- ing every dav more formidable ; her jxcnerals ^ . , 1 ' 1 r ^ nebes, were the equals even of a Chabrias and an pressed by Iphikrates ; and her devotion to the cause was joShT' unquestioned. Nor is it matter for surprise new league. that Thebes, destined so soon to be supreme in Greece, 174 The Rise of Thebes. H. c. 379. submitted even now to the hegemony of Athens. Epamcinondas, whose spirit inspired her counsels, was not a man to wei^di petty and provincial jealousies against the liberty of Ilellas ; and the rh«.ban position was most precarious. Plataia, Thcspiai, .md Orchomenos were held as outposts against her, to cripi)le her defensive opera- tions ; and though at the hand the i)eace-loving Kleombrotos she had suffered but little, it was not to be expected that, if in the coming campaign the rancorous and relentless Agesilaos took the field against her, bhe would escape so easily again. The Spartans had been, doubtic^-, discontented with the forbearing spirit which Kleombrotos had shown in the previous winter, and felt also that since Athens and Thebes had joined hands, and the acquittal of Sphodrias had made Spartan justice a byword throughout C.reece, the occasion demanded their utmost efforts. Hence, for the campaign of 378 n.c. Agesilaos was induceil to take command of the army, which consisted of the full force of the Lakedaimonian confederacy. The results, however, of the expedition were but small. Having traversed the passes of Kithairon without difficulty. Agesilaos reached Thespiai, but found that the Thebans had secured with trench and palisade the most takes the Valuable portions of their territory. After a Thfhes'biit g^^^'^ ^^^^^ o^ desultory fighting, he penetrat<;d cfTects ti^ig obstacle, ravaged the countrv up to little; '^ 1 ' ' ,1 the very gates of Thebes, and tmallv re- tired, leaving Phoibidas in command at Thespiai. Such is th^ account of the campaign given by Xenophon, who characteristically omits its most noteworthy feature. To check the Spartan advance, the Athenians under Chabrias, and the Thebans under Gorgidas were posted on a range of hills. Agesilaos began the attack with his light troops, B.C. 373 Agesilaos CH. XI. Campaigns against Thebes. 175 and after their repulse charged up with his hoplites. But the men of Chabrias stood firm, with their shields resting on one knee, and their spears tTen^age^ outstretched to meet the enemy ; and the *.'\*^ V"''^** . , •' 1 liebaii and troops of Gorgidas followed their example. Athenian Upon this, Agesilaos, fearing the effect of this ^'''"*^'"- novel attitude and the unshaken courage of his opponents, ordered a retreat without waiting even to cross spears. Such an incident must have had powerful moral results, not only on the troops engaged, but also throughout all Boiotia ; and the effect was increased soon after by the success of the Thebans in avenging the frequent inroads of the active Phoibidas, by slaying the captor of their citadel, and driving back his troops in headlong flight to Thespiai. Nor did the campaigns of the next two years bring to the Spartans any more decided advantage. In 377 b. c. Agesilaos, by a skilful stratagem, succeeded in penetrating the palisade and ravaging the JaignTS' country, but no decisive action was foudit • 377 and 376 • * ' B. C. while this persistent, though desultory, war- fare increased the efficiency of the Theban army so de- cidedly that the shrewd Antalkidas seeing Agesilaos wounded in a skirmish, exclaimed, 'Verily, the Thebans make thee a good requital for thy kindness in giving them lessons in war against their wills.' On his journey home his sound leg — for one was always lame — received an injury which caused him a long and serious illness, and incapacitated him for active ser- AgesUaos. vice during many years. Kleombrotos, ac- cordingly, was called to the command of the expedition of 376 B.C. The allies were weary of the war, the general had little sympathy with it ; and when his light-armed troops suffered a reverse from the Athenians and Thebans 176 The Rise of Thebes. B.C. 376. i who had occupied Kithairon. he abandoned the expedi- tion and led his army home. So urgent were the remonstrances of the aUics. who. in a congress at Sparta, complained that the spiritless con- Thc Spar- ^uct of the War was wasting their strength and fl^eet. Uuire t'^crgies, that the ephors determined to raise net'Naxos. ^l^^'^'^ ^^"^ ^^'"''^^ ^ ^\^c\sxKi, blow by sea. Sixty ships were quickly manned, and placed under the command of Pollis as admiral. The Athenians were at once reduced to great straits by the stoppage of their corn-ships. They, however, soon raised a fleet of eighty triremes, and gave Chabrias the command of it. A sharp battle ensued near Naxos. in which the Athenians were completely victorious. More than half the Pelo- ponnesian ships were taken or destroyed ; and Chabrias. according to Diodoros, might have inflicted a far greater loss had he not been warned by the consequences of the fight of Arginousai to make the safety of the crews of the eighteen Athenian wrecks his first consideration. By this victory, the first wliich an Athenian fleet had Athens in- ^^^'i^ed since the end of the Peloponnesian creases her War, Athens was relieved from the peril of naval r • 111 power. lamine; and with enlarged aml)ition. she fol- lowed up her success by sending Chabrias and the young Phokion to cruise in triumph round the Egean. while Timotheos. after the fashion of old time, sailed round the Peloponnese, strengthening the influ- ence of Athens in the western islands, and diverting the Spartans from attacking Uoiotia by land. This interval Thebes of rest was utilised by the Thebans in tight- h«au' ^"' ^'"'"K their grasp over the lioiotian towns. BoTcS;!" ^^^ those which still stood firm to Spartan alliance, the proud and ancient city of Orcho- menos was the most important. The garrison of this CH. XI. I'ietory of Thebans at Tegyra. ^77 stronghold consisted mainly of two Spartan juorat, or divisions of from five to nine hundred men, and the dar- ing Pelopidas had been long watching his opportunity for a surprise. When, however, the long-expected moment of attack arrived, Pelopidas, who had with him only the Sacred Band and a few cavalry, failed in his attempt upon the town, and. while retreating, fell in with the Spartan garrison near Tegyra. The handful of Thebans, when they saw the numbers of T^fhe^'de- their redoubtable foes, were at first dismayed, ^^-^^ ^^ ^^e and one of them exclaimed, ' We have fallen near"''"' into the hands of our enemies.' 'Why not '^"'^eyra. say that they have fallen into ours?' was the undaunted answer of Pelopidas. Then, forming his men into a close body, he charged with a vigour so irresistible that the Spartans wavered, and their two generals fell in the first onset. Supposing that after all the Thebans would be content to be allowed to escape unharmed, the Spartan troops, dividing into two bodies, made a lane to let them pass through ; but Pelopidas, attacking each of the divi- sions in turn, put the whole army to rout with great slaughter. Though the numbers engaged on either side in this encounter were insignificant, yet it was none the less important. Plutarch calls it the prelude to Leuktra, and, with the pride natural to a Boiotian, remarks that this battle first taught the rest of Hellas that men of courage and resolution were not bred onlv on the banks of the Eurotas. The Thebans were justly elated with their success. With a vastly inferior force they had routed a Spartan army, and the terror of their name brought beneath their sway all Boiotia. except Orchomenos alid Its dependency. Chaironeia. So also they became more aggressive and less conciliatory; they refused to con- tribute their quota to the joint expenses of the Athenian OS ^ •'^('.Si^^a*a36S8".SiS-.-«l«« 178 The Rise of T/ifiu!^. B.C. 375. confederacy, perhaps rescnlinj; some sij^^ns of the jealuu.^) which Athens undoubtedlv felt at her nei'di- « * 374- 1 . • , hour s rai)id rise ; and to punish their old tans send an enemies, the Phukians, for their Hiithful ad- kicuni'brotus hcsion to Sparta, they invaded their country, J. help the ^j^^j pressed them so hard that Kleombrotos aj;ainst was Sent to their aid with four Lakedaimonian moral, and a contmgent of allies. Meanwhile, far to the north, almost beyond the border of Hellas, a power was rising which seemed at one time likely to eclipse both Thebes and Sparta, and to steal the prize of Hellenic supremacy from the grasp of these con- tending rivals. Jason of I'herai, daring, energetic, crafty, and aspiring, had made himself already master of all Thessaly except the town of Tharsalos. llut Thessaly was by no means the extreme limit of his ambitious hopes. To rise from tyrant of Pherai to Tagos of Thes- salv, to train an armv and build a fleet with which not even united Greece could co{)e successfully, to extend his conquests beyond the Kgean and hurl the Great King from his throne — these were the wide designs which were said to fire the genius of this would-be Alexander. At this juncture, the most powerful and respected citizen of Pharsalos came as an envoy to Sparta to solicit some protection for his native city against its aggressive neigh- bour. But Sparta, tottering already in her proud dic- tatorship, felt that nearer home she had work enough upon her hands ; and her government w.is but refuse t i- 1 - t ' 1 • help to obliged to contess that, though it sympa- fg^lnlf"^ thised with their suit, it could give no i:i\<:c- Jason of ^j^i jjj^i tQ ijj^ Pharsalian petitioners. Phar- salos accordingly submitted, and Jason was soon after acknowledged Tagos of Thessalv. Yet just at this time Sparta was relieved from the cii. XI. Miuisi'/i/)os Dcft'iitt'd and Killed. 179 hostility of one of her foes. Jealous of the revival of Theban ascendency in Boiotia, disquieted at the building of a Theban fleet at Kreusis, makes* an^rrv at the refusal of Thebes to pav her peace with ^ ' ' - Sparta, share towards the war expenses of the con- federacy, harassed by the incursions of Aiginetan priva- teers, and weary of a conflict which was exhausting her resources for the advantage of Thebes rather than of herself, Athens concluded a separate peace with Sparta. But this new peace was not destined to endure for long. Timotheos was still in the Ionic Sea, where the purity, moderation, and maLrnanimitv of his per- , . , . '^ - * which IS sonal character had compensated for small broken by , ,. 111 'limotheos resources and scanty supplies, and had at Zakyn- enabled him to maintain the supremacy of ''■ Athens in those regions. He now received orders to return ; and on his homeward voyage he touched at Zakyn- thos to land a small body of exiles, and helped them to establish themselves in a fortified position. The Zakyn- thian government reported the outrage to Sparta, and the ephors, indignant at this breach of the peace, demanded redress from Athens. Their demands being refused, one Sjxirtan fleet was sent to help Zakynthos, and another to take Korkyra, which was then under Athenian protec- tion. On his arrival Mnasippos, the Spartan commander, defeated the Korkyraian fleet, blockaded the town, rav- aged the rich and carefuUv-tilled fields, and soon reduced the citizens to the direst straits. A small Athenian rein- forcement, which declared itself the pre- 11 . 1 J Mnasippos cursor of a much larger armament, buoyed lays siege to up their failing courage ; while Mnasippos, buris^de-' from the signs of extreme distress which met {Jj^^ed ^"^ his eyes, felt his success assured, grew over- confident, and treated his mercenaries with harshness and rs-ss i8o The Rise of Thebes. B.C. 373. CH. XI. Acquittal of Timotheos. 181 injustice. Seizing their opportunity, the Athenian pchasts and Korkyraian hophtcs made a sudden sally, slew Mnasippos, and completely routed his mutinous and half- hearted troops. After this, the general who succeeded Mnasippos in command, fearing the near approach of the long-expected reinforcement from Athens, evacuated the island in such haste that a great amount of booty, and even some of his sick and wounded, had to be left behind. At length, though tardily, the Athenian fleet arrived. Timotheos had been at first appointed to command it ; but he found great difficulty in completing Operations ^, r 1 • ,i '1 1 . of Iphjkru- the equipment of his fleet, and si)ent, though tes in com- j^^ ^jjj ^^^ waste. Considerable time in a pre- mand of the Athe nian fleet. the Athe- liminary cruise round the Egean. Discontent and disorganisation became prevalent among the allies, who were waiting for him near Kalaureia, and the Athenians, who were anxious to save Korkvra. srrew dissatisfied. During his absence, his command was taken from him and given to Iphikrates, who obtained the appointment of Kallistratos and Chabrias as his col- leagues. The new admiral showed the greatest energy in the work of equipment, and the most consummate skill in the management of the voyage. At Kephallenia, where he halted to reduce some towns and to refresh his men, he heard that the Spartans had raised the siege of Korkyra ; but, pressing onwards, he surprised and cap- tured ten triremes which Dionysios. the tyrant of Syra- cuse, had sent to the help of Mnasippos. lUit he was soon in need of money, and, while he sujiported his men by farm-work in Korkyra and military service in Akar- nania, he sent home Kallistratos to demand either an adequate supply of pay or a real and definite peace. Meanwhile the dissatisfaction which the Athenians '^T had felt against Timotheos had cooled down. His expe- dition in the Egean was seen to have borne Timotheos irood fruit, and their friends in Korkvra were tried and . i-,t'ii' J acquitted: safe. The accusation which Kallistratos and Iphikrates had lodged against him, had of course been postponed during their absence; and though it was re- newed on the return of Kallistratos, the Athenian dikasts, who were willing to deem all well that ended well, re- turned a verdict of acquittal. Jason of Phcrai and his ally, the king of Kpeiros, appeared as witnesses in his fa- vour. Timotheos gave them lodgings in his house, but so poor was this distinguished son of a father even more noble, that he was obliged to borrow from a neighbouring banker all the ordinary luxuries for their entertainment — bedding, and raiment, and two silver drinking-bowls. As to the cause of his trial, his delay after being appointed for a special and pressing object can scarcely be justified; but his chief fault, if fault it was, seems to have been that his spirit was too mild and his conscience too scrupulous to make him an efficient leader of a press-gang or a plunder- ing foray. Feeling, perhaps, that in spite of his acquittal some slur still attached to his Jhl^'servicc character, or thinking that he could serve of the his country best by looking after her inter- ests at the court of Persia, he left Athens and entered the Great King's service. Nor, during this time, had the government of Thebes relaxed their efforts towards their own aggrandisement and Boiotian consolidation. Thespiai and 11 11 The The- Plataia had acknowledged her supremacy ; bans dis- but it was felt that their fidelity was more than xhespiai, dubious, even if thev were not, as Diodoros a"d destroy ' rlataia. says, actually intriguing against her. Accord- ingly, to make matters sure, the fortifications of Thespiai Great King. I82 The Risf of Thibes. B.C. 372. were dismantled, nn.l Pla.aia was surprised by one of he Lo,o.archs at an hour when most of the male nopu- l.| .on were absent on their faru.s. The inhabitants'vere movable property with theu, ; but the hapless little city as a^am ra^ed to the «round. and its territory anne ed a sore thorn m the sule of its ,n.,re pouxrful nei.^hbour vhoilh ;' "\ ''^ '""""'"" -^'""'•^' " ~- "' .e •I'clf. I , destruction was. therefore, an act not only most luely resentment. S„,ouldering jealousy gaye Athens and "l''-'' '° ""'^-P-'ken indij^nation ; and thou-h cCr.'o" '-'"'"l-in-'n'la^* with the utmost ability d°e- pea«. lended his countrymen a-ainst the eloquent accusations of K.dlistralos and the rhetorical gradually breakinj; away from the Theban cause and Wun '",' '^'"" ""'•-•^'-'''"« -•' Sparta. The Spartans also were alanned no less In the renewal of Athenian .maritime yictories, than by th'e stri Jn" enir! y an.l ability shown in the policy of Thebes, while their st-perstitious fears were aroused by earthqu.;kes a n I . bene Th' V?", '" T 'T"" ''""'' -" "> ">^ -• beneath, for the last few years the tide of success had run steadily a-ainst them, and they too began to be an.xious for peace. I'ursuin- ,he same cotirse as fifteen years before, they sent Antalkidas to Persia to implore the aid and m enention of the Great Kin, ; and .-Vr'ta.xer.xes, who " the Greek states were at war. found a difficulty in obtain! CH. XI. Pract' of k'(i//ias. 183 Antalkidas obtains a rescript from the Great King. t B.C. 371. Peace-con- gress at Sparta. ing mercenaries to act against Egypt, granted their peti- tion, and despatched envoys to Greece, requiring that the belhgercnt states should come to terms on the principles of the Peace of Antalkidas. In May or June, 371, a congress was held at Sparta, at which the members of the Athenian and the Spartan confederacies were present. The principal envoy on the part of Thebes was Epamei- nondas, while Kallistratos was the most able of the Athenian representatives, although the peace has taken its name in history from the feebler Kallias. Kallistratos in a thoroughly statesmanlike speech pr()j)osed that the hegemony of Greece should be divided— that Athens should rule by sea, and Sparta by land. 'If,' said he, 'a firm peace were established between these states, peace would be secured in all the rest of Greece ; for that was divided, city by city, into two parties, one of which supported Sparta, and the other Athens. It was foolish for them to act like athletes, who, after a career of victory, will not retire from the arena till they have been defeated ; or like gamblers who, after one stroke of luck, go on staking double or quits till they are ruined.' At the same time it was ^Jf^Ka^ar stipulated that the universal autonomy guaran- teed by the peace should be real, and no mere sham in the interests of Sparta. The Spartan harmosts were to be everywhere withdrawn, and the armaments on both sides to be disbanded. To these terms the Spartans swore in the name of Sparta and of her confederate allies ; and c^p^^j^ ^,,j Athens and the cities of her confederacy took Athens . , swear tu the the oaths separately. When, however, the terms of turn of the Thcbans came, Epameinondas ^^ peace, declared that he must swear in the name not of Thebes 184 The Rise o/^ Thebes. B.C. J/ alone, but of the whole Boiotian confcdcracv. This A^c- silaos and the rest of the Spartans refused. askin' 'Will you.' rejoined Epameinondas. 'leave each of Ihe and they Lakonian townships independent.' ' The only the treaty. ^he name of Thebes from the treatv. and to proclaim her exclusion from it : whereupon says Xenophon. the Thebans departed in the deepest de- jection. Epameinondas. however, before he took so decided a line, must have calculated the consequences and counted the cost. It was not dejection which filled the hearts of the Thebans as they left the con \#%/V^^Mi>^ V c a. Theban'infantrx-. u '^TA ^^^^.^nder Pelopidas. *. 1 halunxof Lpameinondas. e. Infantrv '• ^^^^'^y- /. Cavalry." Should be offered at the tomb ; and. as the generals and prophets in the morning stood debating how best to do the ghostly bidding, a chestnut filly cantered up, and was hailed at once as the victim sent E^?n"°^ by the gods. no^ndas!' But the tactics of Kpameinondas in drawing up his troops were no less skilful than his means for inspiring O i88 The Rise of Thebes. B.C. 371. CII. XI. Battle of Leuktra, 189 them with courage. Xenophon, in his grossly unfair narra- tive of the battle, which is httle better tiian a tissue of friv- olous excuses for the Spartan defeat, does not even mention the name of the great Theban ; but it is nevertheless certain that the tactics adopted were due to him alone. He first, like Gideon of old, weeded his ranks of 'all who were fearful and afraid,' by a proclamation that all those who wished might depart, and the Thespian contingent at once left the camp. Next he formed his line of battle in a novel order to suit the special emergencies of the case. A philosophical tactician, he had studied all the recent im- provements in the art of war, and had noted the weak points of the old system. He knew also that if he could once overpower the solid mass of the Spartan hoplites, the resistance of the allied contingent would be incon- siderable. The strength of the Spartan phalanx lay in its disciplined cohesion, its weakness in its incapacity to meet new combinations by opening, closing, and re-form- ing its ranks with readiness. According to acknowledged principles, a Greek b.ittle began by a simultaneous attack along the whole line ; but Epameinondas had exercised the Thebans in the manttuvre of throwinij forward a heavy column of attack, and advancing in echelon or obliquely. Now he formed on the left wing, unobserved by the enemy, a compact column, fifty deep, and near this he stationed the Sacred Band under Pelopidas, in readiness for rapid and independent ac- ThcSpar- tion. The centre and right were kept back tans were '^ » eager to for the prcscnt, and ordered to support the engage. onset of the left. In the Spartan camp there reigned an arrogant and overweening confidence, which shewed itself in an im- patient eagerness to begin the conflict and secure the vic- tory. Yet Kleombrotos seems to have hung back, perhaps secretly wishing to give the Thebans a chance of escaping by surrender the worst consequences of their temerity. Rut friends and enemies alike urged him to battle, the latter with taunts, and the former with entreaties not to let slip this opportunity of clearing himself from the imputa- tion of sympathy with Thebes. Accordingly, after the noonday meal, in which Xenophon would have us believe that the soldiers drank to excess, Kleombrotos drew up his army twelve deep, posting himself and most of the Lakedaimonians, according to custom, on the right. The battle began on each side with a cavalry charge ; and theLakedaimonian squadrons, notoriously inefficient, were swept back in confusion upon their main . , , , , , , , , The Spartan body. Such a result could not have been Hgiu wing unexpected, and Kleombrotos at once ordered *^ ^'***^ ' his infantry to advance. As they met the mass of the Theban left, the shock was terrible. The Theban column wedged itself into every opening in the enemy's ranks, which the recoil of the cavalry had perhaps thrown into some disorder. The Spartan king had originally purposed to use his superiority in numbers to surround Epamcinondas, or at least to turn his flank ; but the movements of Pelopidas and the Sacred l^and had been so rapid that they were upon him before he could deploy his troops. Nothing therefore remained but to bear up, shield to shield, and man to man, against the mass that bore down upon them. In the fierce hand-to- hand combat which ensued, the king was struck with a mortal wound ; and around him. where the fight was hottest, fell Sphodrias and his son, ^'^""'i • and one of the polemarchs. As the S])artans were able to carry off the wounded monarch yet living from the field, Xenophon argues that they were at first successful. It was probably long before fortune declared JT^v^tajMBeif .Jwa8.iai»»i«a 190 The Rise of Thebes. B.C. 371. CH. XI. for either side. At Icn^nh, Epameinondas urged on his men to a crowning effort, animating them by brave words and by the example of gallant deeds. Borne down by the sheer weight of the advancing column, the weaker line of wearied Spartans broke, and in heatllong rout made for their entrenched camp. On no other part of the line had there been, aj)parently, any real fighting, for the Theban centre and right had been pur- w"hofcariny poscly kept back, and the cavalry had driven back probalilv hindered the St)artans from succour- to ♦he camp. . ' . ing their own right wing. lUit, seeing Llie discomfiture of their friends, the whole line fell back, and formed in good order behind the entrenchment of their camp, and the Thebans did not attempt to press the pursuit. But the Lakedaimonian forces were still numerically superinr to their victorious opponents ; and a few of the The Spar- surviviug Spartans, feehng keenly the dis- grace of their position, and deeming death preferable to a confession of defeat, wished to strike another blow for the honours of the field and to fight for the possession of the slain, liut the jjolcmarchs, seeing how large a proportion of the Spartans had fallen, and observing the lukewarm and spiritless temper of some of their allies and the total unconcern of others, despatched a herald to ask for the burial-truce. The request was of course granted ; but Epameinondas stipulated that the corpses of the allies should be buried before those of the Spartans. This made it impossible for the Spartans to conceal the severity of their own loss. Xenophon admits that 1,000 Lakedaimonians had fillen. and that of 700 Spartan citizens who took the field, 400 were left dead upon it. How the tale of woe was received at Sparta may be tans ac- knowledtjeti their defeat by asking; the hiirial truce. Mediation of Jason. 191 told in the words of Xenophon. ' After this, the messenger charged with bearing the news of the disaster . . Reception to Sparta arrives on the last day of the festival of the news of the ( iymnopaidia, when the chorus of men ^ ' ^'^"^ ^' was within upon the stage. And the ephors, when they heard the disaster, were grieved, as I trow they could not help being ; yet tliey did not order the chorus to with- draw, but suffered them to act out the performance. They told also the names of the slain to the kinsfolk of each, cautioning the women not to raise lamentations, but to bear their sorrow in silence. And on the morrow you might see those whose relatives had been slain parading in public with bright and cheerful faces ; but of those whose kinsmen were said to survive, you would have seen but few, and those going about with gloomy and down- cast looks.' Such a description needs no comment. The reception of the news at Athens was equally character- istic. The laurel-crowned messenger arrived when the Council happened to be sitting in Athens. the Akropolis. He told his glorious tale of victory, and bade the Athenians haste to reinforce the Thebans, for now was their time for avenging all the wrongs which they had suffered. 'But,' adds the same historian, ' it was obvious to all that the council were pro- foundly vexed ; for they offered no hospitality to the herald, and said not a word about reinforcements. And so the herald departed from Athens.' Though the ruin of Sparta meant now the freedom of Hellas, the Athenians grudged that the despised Boiotians should win the glory of its accomplishment. At Leuktra itself the intense energy of conflict was followed by a prolonged pause. For some time the viC' torious Thebans blockaded the hostile camp, till, at length, a mediator appeared on the scene. Jason of Pherai, being i 192 The Thehan SitprthiULs . B.C. 371, I CH. XII. Consequences of Leuktra. 193 summoned bv the Thcbans to their aid, arrived bv forced marches with an army of 1,500 infantry and 500 horse. The Thebans urged him to make a joint at- Phe'rarar- tack w'ith them upon the enemy's camp. But arnfi^fic'e" J^son dissuadcd tliem from the enterprise, re- mindinir them how stubbornly thcv them- selves had fou<;ht when driven to despair, and warning them that the deity delights to exalt the lowly, and bring down the high looks of the proud. An armistice was ac- cordingly agreed upon through his mediation, and the Spar- tan generals were so eager to quit the scene of their calamity, that they broke up their camp by night, and, and the fearing lest the Thebans should prove treach- Spartans ° • departed by crous, marched on by a byroad in disorder night. -Ill ' 1 1 » • 1 and terror, till they reached Aigosthena, and there met Archidamos advancing with an army to their aid. Thus the curtain falls upon the last act of the tragedy of Spartan misrule. Few events in history are more dra- matic than the short campaign of Leuktra. Twenty days since, Sparta was the arrogant interpreter of the rescripts of an alien despot ; now her troops were slinking away in dark- ness and by bypaths from foes whom they then despised. CHAPTER XII. THE THEB.XN SL'PRFMArV. The system of Spartan supremacy had been the creation of Lysandros ; like him, it was cruel, narrow, selfish. The system of Theban supremacy was the tendencies Creation of Epamciuondas, and, like its pohcy*^^^" author, was characterised by moderation, breadth of sympathy, and devotion to the general welfare of Greece. ' Divide et impera' had been f th.^ motto of Sparta ; she had aimed at absolute sway over an incoherent mass of enfeebled cities. The noble object of Thebes was to strengthen and unite, and to work in friendly alliance for the protection of Hellenic independ- ence. This was not only the worthier, but the more difficuh task. Cities and tribes which for years had been kept in thraldom, and whose jealousies had been sedu- lously fomented in the interests of the tyrant state, were accustomed to follow, but could not be taught to combine. The nine years of Theban ascendency were all too short for the unlearning of the evil lessons and the undoing of iniquities which a generation of bitter warfare and a sub- sequent generation of oppressive misgovernment had left behind them. Epameinondas saw clearly enough that, in dealing with a system so unscrupulous and selfish as that of Sparta, no half-measures were possible. No reform, no limitation could be considered; the truest statesmanship and the truest patriotism alike demanded its complete suppression. To effect this object he worked steadily through all his career. As a general, he stripped the Spartan name of its terrors; and even Arcadians became bold enough to defy their once dreaded neigh- bours. By the foundation of Megalopolis and the restor- ation of Mcssene he hoped to establish two permanent bulwarks against Spartan aggression ; and the plan in itself was wise and statesmanlike. But those for whom he laboured were unworthy and ungrateful. The old flaw showed itself again. Any union seemed too unnatural to last ; the fatal tendency to autonomy was too strong, and the scheme, so far as it failed, failed not through any fault of Epameinondas, but through the inherent defects of the Greek character. The effects of the great battle were felt immediately throughout the whole of Greece. In Thebes itself the first VaJbAJsArjiSL, »».it».:. j— - • etTects of Lcuktra. destroy Thespiai, '94 The Tht'ban Supn'niacy. b.c. ^71. impulse was to stamp out the last remnants of opposition Immediate '" ^^"^ Boiotian Confederacy. Orchomenos. which had remained firm to the last in the Spartan alliance, was onlv saved from a ter- rible punishment by the intercession of Ej)ameinondas in this case, as always, an advocate of mercy ; and the The Thespians, who had turned themselves back Thebans in the day of battle, were expelled from Boiotia, and found, like the IMataians. a refuge at Athens. The position of Thebes was thus made politically secure ; her policv next received a religious sanction. Sparta was arraigned before the Amphiktyonic Council-ihe time-honoured assembly and obtain "^^^^^ function it Was 10 watch over the tToniTS;'* ^^^^^P^'^ '^'"P^^ '" particular, and the religion of Sparta" ^^ ^^^^^'^^ '" general— ♦"■ -• '.r impious seizure of the Kadmeia. A . .-le of condemnation was secured; a fine of 500 talents was inflicted, which though doubled, was never paid. The object of 'I hebes' however, was gained; she was herself justified by the open humiliation of her enemy. But Athens did not intend to let the downfall of Sparta pass without one more attempt to regain her old position Athens be- "^^ ^^^ impcHal city. Summoning to a con- comes the gress all the states who were willing to abide nei^league. ^>' ^^^ Conditions of the Peace of Antalkidas. she made herself the head of a fresh league.' which bound itself by an oath of mutual defence and universal independence. Many of the members of the Peloponncsian confederacy joined it. though Klis stood aloof. The movement was well planned and well timed ; but the hands of Athens were no longer strong enough for the work of empire. At Sparta, the most pressing question was the treat- CH. XII. Disturbixuccs in Pcloponnesos. 195 At Sparta the penal- ties of the law are re- mitted in the case of the survivors of Leuktra. ment of the ' runaways,' as those who survived defeat were styled by the stern voice of Lykourgean discipline. The scant number of genuine Spartans had long been a source of weakness to the state ; and the conspiracy of Kina- don had shown the reality of the danger. The number and intlucnce of those now affected made it probable that they would not submit without a struggle to the abject indignities prescribed by the law ; and in spite of the unpopularity caused by the failure of his anti-Thcban policy, and by the revival of the prophecy that foretold the calamities of a * lame reign,' (p. 93) Agesilaos was entrusted with the settlement of the question. He decided that the law should lie dormant for this occa- sion only. Forty years after, when Agis was defeated and slain by Antipatros, a like exemption was decreed. In many of the Peloponncsian cities, when the power of Sparta seemed visibly on the wane, internal commo- tions had arisen, and much blood had been shed on both sides. But now Argos displayed ancerin the the most fearful example of popular furv re- f ei'>pon- corded in Greek annals, red as they are with tales of civil bloodshed. The democratic populace de- tected a conspiracy among the oligarchs, and thirty of the chief citizens were at once put to death. The excitement of the people was inflamed It^A^gos!*"' by the harangues of demagogues, and the mob, arming itself with cudgels, commenced a general massacre. When 1.200 citizens had fallen, the popular orators interfered to check the atrocities, but met with the same fate ; and, sated at length with bloodshed, the mul- titude staved the deadlv work. But where the pressure of Spartan interference had been heaviest and most constant, there the reaction was 196 The T/irhan Supremacy. B.C. 371. naturally most striking. The popular impulses which were „ ^ ., ,. at work in Arkadia found their first oudet in Rebuildmg , 1 1 i- of M.iiui- the rebuildmg of Mantineia. The convenient proximity of their farms had seemed to the citizens but a poor compensation for political effacement (p. 149); and, aided by contributions from the neigh- bouring towns, and even from the more distant Elis, they began at once to build and fortify a new city. The Spar- tans felt it a grievous slight that their permission had not been asked ; but, far from attempting to stop the work by force, they humbled themselves to send their venerable king in person to ask the Mantineians to desist till the consent of Sparta should be formally granted. On his arrival though Agesilaos assured the magistrates of Man- tineia that this consent would not be withheld, and pro- mised, further, that the Spartans would help to defray the expenses, they refused to let him address the people, and told him that the decree of the city ordered the wall to be built without delay. The Sprrtans could only pocket the insult, and stand idly by while the work of Arkadian revival went merrily forward. This country has often been called the Switzerland of Greece. Both are mountainous districts, peopled by a Movement *'''^^>' ^^ J^'irtly and warlike peasants, hunts- for Arku- men, and shepherds, who, finding little scope dian union. r \ • for their energies in the petty republics of various forms which existed in their own cantons, ven- tured forth in quest of higher pay and keener excitement as mercenary soldiers. Among the Arkadians, Lyko- medes of Mantineia, a man of high birth, Influence of 111 ... Lykomedes great wealth, and greater ambition, became nei'a.^"*' ^^^ spokesman of the popular movement. He stimulated the pride of his countrymen by telling them that they were the primitive inhabitants of CH. XII. Invasion of Arkadia. 197 i the Peloponnese, and the most numerous and warlike of all Hellenic races ; and he exhorted them not to allow them- selves any longer to be the mere tools of other powers, but to make for themselves a free and united Arkadia. But owing to the mutual jealousies of the . ^ . . ,T- y r\ \ Difficulties chief towns — Mantmeia, legea, and Orcho- from the menos — the task was one of great difficulty. "f Orlhome- The governing families of Orchomenos were J"^^ ^^^ heartily attached to the Spartan alliance, on which, probably, their power to a great extent depended ; and they would not easily sympathise with a movement which seemed to originate with Mantineia. Hence they consistently shewed the most uncompromising opposition to the policy of innovation. In Tegea, however, public opinion was divided. The city had been treated by Sparta with special consideration, and had for centuries been her faithful ally ; hence the oligarchical government looked with disfavour upon the project of union. But the demo- cratical party was powerful and unscrupulous ; and, with the help of the Mantineians, they effected a revolution, in which many were killed, and 800 exiles fled to Sparta. The Spartans, fallen as they were, could not allow the Mantineians to infringe their monopoly of intermeddling with the internal affairs of Arkadian cities, without attempting to chastise their presump- J^YgesUaos tion. Agesilaos took the field; and, after •JfJ^'J^^^j^ some minor operations, remained three days in the face of the Arkadian army, ravaging the plain in front of Mantineia. 'This he did,' says Xenophon, ' though it was mid-winter, that he might not seem to hasten his departure through fear ;' he then withdrew with the utmost haste, but with such precautions, ' that no one could say that his retreat was a flight,' so sensitive to reproach was Spartan honour now. Yet the historian 198 The Thchan Supri-macy. K.C. 370 His designs. assures us that the exploits of Agcsilaos in this campaign went far to revive his countrymen from their previous dejection. This invasion of Arkadia is chiefly important for the pretext which it furnished for Theban intervention. The Mantineians applied for help at first to Athens, and, meeting with a refusal, went on to Thebes. For this request Epameinondas must have been thoroughly pre- First expe. P^'^J'ed beforehand ; and he was soon on the ditiun J march with a powerful armv. Dut his desi«'ns Epanieinon- • • j- i 1, 1 ' '^ das tu the in invaamg the reloponnesc were by no Pdupun- means limited to the expulsion of Agesilaos from Mantineian soil. He had watched with deep interest and keen sympathy the progress of the Pan-Arkadian movement; and he was determined not only to lend every assistance in his power to the consolidation of that country, but also to re-establish the ancient Messenian race in possession of their long-lost territories. In this he designed not only to annoy Sparta for the time being, but to furnish two permanent bulwarks against any possible revival of her pernicious predominance. On his arrival in the Peloponnese, he found that Agesi- laos had already retired ; and some of the Theban gene- rals, considenng the season of the year, "n^spaJtar ^^^^^^^ ^^ ^ncc to rctum. lUit their allies from Arkadia, Argos, and Klis, as they looked at this magnificent array of 40,000 (or j)crhaps even 70.000) soldiers, marvelling at the numerous contingents from Northern (^.reecc, and admiring, above all. the smartness of the Theban troops, thought that such a force was equal to the cajiture of Spartn itself Won over by their entreaties, or, if we credit Plutarch, accord- ing t?o his own preconcerted plan, Epameinondas con- CH. XII. Agesilaos Saves the City, 199 scnted to the daring enterprise. The small detachments, which were guarding the passes leading from Arkadia into Lakonia. were easily overpowered ; and in four divi- sions the invading host streamed into the land, which accordin- to the proudest boast of its inhabitants, had felt no hostile tread for 600 years. At Sellasia. not ten miles distant from Sparta, the army re-united ; and. hav- m- plundered and burnt the town, swept down into the vaUey of the Eurotas. and marched along the left bank till it'reached the bridge opposite the city. Within Sparta itself, though a universal terror pre- vailed, one man rose equal to the emergency. W hile the men fainted in spirit as they thought how few ^^^^^ ^^^ they were, and how wide their unwalled city ; e,-xy^of while the women, who had never before seen saves the the camp-fires of an enemy, filled the streets '''^- with lamentation ; Agesilaos accepted, not without mis- trust the services of 6.000 helots, collected reinforce- ments, preserved order, suppressed conspnacy. stampea out mutiny, posted guards on every vantage-ground, and refused to be tempted to a battle by the taunts of foes or the clamours of over-eager friends. Meanwhile, Epamei- nondas had crossed the river lower down, and taken up his position at Amvklai ; but. after one unsuccessful cav- alry skirmish, the Theban general, who. in a campaign undertaken on his sole responsibility, dared not risk the chance of defeat, decided to leave the ' wasps' nest (p. I -4) untaken. He completed his work of devastation by rava<^in- the whole of southern Lakonia down to Helos andV^^heion. and then turned back into Arkadia to devote' himself to the more permanent objects of his expedition. , . It had been plain from the first that no existing city could become the centre of the Arkadian confederacy ; 200 The Theban Supremacy. b.c. 369. local jealousies made it necessary to found a new capital Megalopolis ,He' ^!"" "^ ^'^"^f ^""''^^y ^ ^" '^^^ ^^^^^^ oi is founded ^"^ ""^^' I'l^'t-T Hclisson, and at the intersection If aXI. ^^ ^^'^ "^^^i» »-oads from Lakonia and Messe- ma. rose 'the -reat city ' (Mr-aiopoli.) of Arkadia. Forty townships were combined to form its territory and people its habitations. On each side of the stream stretched the circuit of its walls, tiftv stadia in cir- cumference. Everythinj^-theatre. markei-place. parlia- ment-house-was desi^^ned on a scale of gorgeous splen- dour, and a national assembly was organised under the title of the Ten Thousand. Kven more magniticcnt was ' Messene ^^^^ ^'^>' ^^ Mcssene. whose walls encircled "he'ki^rsl '''"^ ^"^^^'^ ""''^^^^ crowned the famed height nbns^re- of Mount Ithome. 3.500 feet above the sea. W hen. by the far-seeing wisdom of Epamei- nondas. the descendants of the old Messenian stock were gathered to form a new nation from Rhegion and Mes- sene and from the parts of Lybia round Kviene. no one could have hesitated for an instant about the site of the capital. The peak of Ithome— hallowed bv tales of Ie<^en- dary glory, when Messene four centuries before resitted the encroachments of Sparta, and not so verv Ion- a-o a mount of refuge, where a handful of rebel Heh.ts for years defied the armies of their oppressors-attracted to itself not only Messenians of pure blood, but crowds of Perioikoi and Helots, who gladly threw off the Spartan yoke By thus restoring the Messenians to their ancient territorv' Epameinondas deprived Sparta at one blow of nearly half her possessions; and the best proof of the success of h.s sagacious policy is seen in the bitterness and the frequency with which the Spartans mourned their loss. At last Epameinondas had done his work ; and, leaving CH. XII. Alliance bctiueen Athens and Sparta. 201 Pammenes with a garrison in Tegea, he hastened to lead his soldiers home. At the isthmus he found p^tjig a hostile army from Athens, under the com- bmu|ht mand of Iphikrates ; for envoys had been against ' I- 1 J- hpameinon- sent by Sparta in the hour of her distress to das on his her hereditary foe ; and the Athenians, being '"''''"■"• reminded how, in their day of doom, the Thebans had urged that their city should be razed and Attica turned into a sheep-walk (p. i). had, amid general enthusiasm, girded on their arms for the rescue of Sparta. But Iphi- krates did not dare and did not care to oppose the home- ward march of the conquering Thebans ; and Epamei- nondas passed on without serious molestation. On his arrival at Thebes, the leaders of a petty faction threatened to bring him and his colleagues to trial for retaining their command for four months beyond the legal term of office. liUt Epameinondas stood up in the assembly, and told his simple tale of victorious generalship and still more triumphant statesmanship ; and the invidious cavils of snarling intriguers were at once forgotten. Sparta was indeed humiliated. Her territory was torn from her. her allies were weak and few, her prestige was gone, discontent threatened her at home, and her bitterest foes were firmly established on her frontiers. To one quarter only, however reluctantly, could she look for support. Athens had generously forgotten past enmities, and responded prompdy to her cry for help ; and it would be well for her if the alliance between , ., , 111 i Athens and thus hastily begun could be put on a perma- sparta. nent footing. With this object, deputies were sent to Athens by the Spartans and those of the Pelopon- nesian states which still adhered to them. The proposal for a divided hegemony, by which Sparta should take the lead by land and Athens by sea, seemed to recom- 202 The T/it'lhvt Supremacy. B.C. 368. mend itself thorouLjhly to the common sense of all ; but Kephisodotos, iin Athenian onitor of eminence, pointed out that by this aiTan;^^ement the best of the citizens of Athens — the horsemen and the hopliles— would be placed under the command of Sparta, while the Lakedaimonian sailors, who would be put under Athenian orders, would be not onlv few in number, but. for the m(jst part, mere Helots or hirelings. Such an arrangement he stigmatised as grossly unfair, and he proposed instead of it that the command both by sea and by land should be given alter- nately to each state for five days. This absurd amend- ment was then adopted as the basis of the new alliance. The first aim of the confederates was to occupy the passes of the isthmus with a powerful force, so as to cut off all chance of Theban support from the Argives and Arkadians, who were still keeping u|) the war in the Peloponne^.e. Chabrias, therefore, collected Chabrias ' . ^ . , , , occupies the at Cormth 10.000 men from Athens. Megara, isthmus. ^^^ I'cUene; and. being joined by an army of equal strength raised In- tlie Spartans and their allies, he began at once to fortify the isthmus. Nor was it less important to the Thebans that these measures should be checked, for her friends in the IVloponncse could not yet stand alone. Epameinondas was soon again on the march. Arriving at the isthmus, though his forces were far inferior in number, he in vain challenged the enemy but E .1- ^^ ^ pitched battle, and then proceeded to force meinondas their lines. The Spartan troops were stationed wajT'' ' where the defences were weakest. TheThe- through. ^^^^ ^^^^j ^^^^^ ^i^^j^^ jj^ ^1^^, p.^j.|y j.^^^.,-j ^^1^^^.^ they were totally unprepared ; and. without a show of resistance, their commander fell back, leaving open to the Theban advance the difficuU passage, which, in the opinion of many, he might still have defended. The c 11. XII. Epameinondas Dismissed. 203 capture of Sikyon was the immediate consequence of this brilliant exploit. The devastation of the territory of Epidauros and an unsuccessful attempt to surprise Corinth followed ; and on the arrival of reinforcements sent by Dionysios to the Spartans, Epameinondas re- turned to Thebes, feeling, doubtless, that in forcing the passage of the isthmus he had accomplished the main object of the campaign. Hut this was not his country- men's opinion. Spoilt by prosperity, they demanded from their brilliant general an unbroken series of sensa- tional successes, and in comparative failure saw onlv the wilful neglect of their interests. Epamemon- ' ^ das dis- They therefore dismissed Epameinondas missed from from the office of general. It was not long, however, before he reinstated himself in the public confidence. Jason of Pherai had been assassinated in 370 B.C. Me had given notice of his purpose to attend the Pythian festival at Delphoi, and rumour went wildly to work on the preparations and in- tentions of the great northern chief. He would come escorted by the flower of his perfectly trained battalions, and followed bv a monster hecatomb of 1,000 bulls and 10.000 other cattle. No position lower than that of pre- sident of the games would satisfy him, and it was feared that he might lay violent hands even on the sacred treasures. But the oracle reassured its timorous ques- tioners by declaring that the god would take care of his own. After a review of his cavalry, the prince took his seat in public to give audience to all who wished to ap- proach him ; and seven young men, who pretended to ask him to settle a dispute, drew ^oiTof*"* near and stabbed him. Two of the assassins Jason of were slain, but five escaped, to be received with honour in many of the cities of Greece, as men P ips 204 The Thcban Supremacy. B.C. 368. who had rid the world of a tyrant. The anarchy that ensued is the best proof of the genius of Jason. The first brother who succeeded him was assassinated by a second, but found an avenger in the person of his kins- Aiexandros "^'^"' ''^^<-"^^^"<^^''<^^. '^^ho thus became Tagos of becomes Thessaly, This tyrant, at once brutal and ''^''^- incapable, drove the Thcssalian cities to re- volt, and when they appealed to Thebes for assistance, Pelopidas volunteered his services, and was despatched into Thessaly with a powerful army. After liberating Lanssa, he obtained a personal interview with Alexandros'^ but, as it led to no good results, he himself settled the' affairs of the Thessalian cities in an apparently satisfactory manner, and left the country. Soon after his return to Thebes fresh complaints arose, and he set out again ; he had now so much confidence in himself and in the respect mspired by the Theban name that, accompanied bv his friend Ismenias, he went in the guise of an ambassador, and without military escort. The unscrupulous tyrant met Seizure and ^^^'"^ ^^'^'^ *^ ^^xim^g army, seized them, and iini.ri>on- threw them into prison. In anticipation of ment of i . • Pelopidas. ^^^ vengeance ol I hebes, Alexandros sent to ask aid from the Athenians, who were not ashamed to send 30 triremes and 1,000 hoplites to his assistance. Thus reinforced, he completely foiled the efforts of the Theban generals who were sent against him. They were forced to beat a retreat, and. hartissed by the Pheraian cavalry, the whole army was in imminent danger of destruction. But the soldiers indignantly rose The first against their incompetent leaders, and sum- sem 'to''"" moned Kpameinondas, who was serving as a rescue him private soldicr in their ranks, to take the lead. He accepted the task, and conducted them safely home. Thus the disgraced general was rn. xir. Success of the Arkadians. 205 restored to popularity, and a second force was despatched under his command against the tyrant of Pherai. Epam- cinondas had no wish to inflict upon him a 1 r 1 • 1 • , • , . ^^ second, defeat so crushing as to drive him to despair under (for that would probably have sacrificed the Ji'sTb luc"" life of his friend) ; but, by his consummate cessful. generalship, he terrified Alexandros so completely that he was glad to purchase a month's truce by the surrender of his prisoners. Hut while the attention of Thebes had thus been directed to another ([iiarter, her Peloponnesian allies had been striving to shew that, though so lately added to the roll of Greek nations, thcv had at least outjxrown her leadinjr- strings. The new state of Messene had received at Olympia her ])ublic recognition vicU)ry"at" from assembled Hellas, for a Messenian lad ^'ympic games. had gained a wreath as victor in the boys' foot-race, and thus after an interval of 300 years a Mes- senian name was again placed on the list of successful athletes. The Arkadians, too. were stimulated by the elocpiencc of Lykomedes to assert their independence of their patrons. ' otherwise,' said he, ' you will find, perhaps, that the Thebans arc only Spartans under another name.' They placed themselves and their affairs u 1 1 • 1 • 1 1 1 /• Energy and absolutely in his hands, and for a time met success of with marvellous success. From end to end of ^'■'''''^■^"'^• the Peloponnese they pushed their triumphant arms. Near Epidauros they rescued the Argive troops from an Athen- ian and Corinthian army under Chabrias. They pene- trated again to the valley of the Eurotas, and put to the sword the Lakedaimonian garrison at Pellene only a few miles north of Sparta. In the extreme south-west, at Asine. they defeated a Spartan force and slew its com- mander. In short, as Xenophon tells us, 'neither night, 2o6 The Thcban Suprrmaty. B.C. 368. nor winter, nor distance, nor inaccessible mountains could stop their march, so that at that time tliey thought themselves by far the most valiant soldiers in the worfd.* The Spartans, stung by the insolent audacity of the Arkadians. again took the field. The young and daring Ancxped. Archidamos led his trooi)s. reinforced bv AX'ia'' ^"-'^^'"-^ mercenaries from Dionysios, against mosinto the town of Karyai ; he stormed it. and nut every man in it to the sword. lUit as he pressed on into Arkadia. the Kelts declared that their term of service had expired, and hastened back towards Sparta. Their march was intercepted by a body of Messenians ; Archidamos rejoined them to free their course, and the retreat of the whole army was cut off by the main body of Argives and Arkadians. To prevent the return of the Keltic contingent, and then to force the united army to a desperate contest, seems little short of presumptuous folly, the natural result of the overweening self-conceit which Xenophon hints at. A few stirring words from their general, aided by the presence of favourable omens, aroused in the Spartan soldiers an irresistible ardour:' they swept all before them. Of the panic-stricken Arka- rcsults in ^'^'^"^' ^^■^^' ^^'^^itcd to rcceive the charge ; the v?ctof;''or '^^^'^''' .^"^^^^^ ''''''"'' ^^'"'^^ '" pursuit, and 10.000 the • Tear- Arkadians fell without, as is said the loss of less Battle' ., „;. i c- . t < . . * a single Spartan. In old times, the news of a victory excited at Sparta little emotion; but when the story of the 'Tearless Battle" was told in the city, 'they were not,' in the words of Plutarch, 'able to 'contain themselves ; but the old king went out, in stately proces- sion, with tears of joy in his eyes, to meet and emlirace his son ; and all the council attended him. The old men and the women marched out in a body as far as the river Kurotas, lifting up their hands and 'thanking the gods J CH. XII. Third Expedition of Epameinondas, zqT] that they had washed off the stain that had kitely clung to Sparta, and saying that those men now could boldly appear in the face of the sun who before, for very shame and confusion, could not shew themselves to their own wives.* This defeat probably caused little grief at Thebes, for it would prove to the arrogant Arkadians that they could not yet dispense with Theban aid ; and it ,^,, . , I hird expe- decided Epameinondas to make a third dition of ,. . . ^ , 1, 1 T^u Epanicinon- expedition into the Teloponnese. 1 he sup- das into the port of Arkadia was so uncertain that it J,,f|e^""" seemed highly desirable for Thebes to secure other allies in southern Greece ; and, with this object, Epameinondas, after traversing without difficulty the care- lessly guarded passes of the isthmus, turned his attention to the cities of Achaia, most of which had hitherto been neutral in the struggle. The prevalent form of constitution among them was oligarchical ; but since they willingly enrolled themselves as Theban allies, and gave security for their obedience, he used his influence to prevent any vio- lent changes in their governments ; and having thus gained for Thebes the control of the coast-line of the Corinthian Gulf, he returned home. But the democratic . His tre.at- factions in the Achaian cities, disappointed of mciu of their expected ascendency, pursued him with ^iUes re-*'^" comi)laints, in which the Arkadians joined ; xhebes^^ and the Thebans, incapable of appreciating the large-hearted and moderate policy which would have kept the grateful cities faithful to their new ally, proved themselves, as Lykomedes had said, ' Spartans in all but the name.' by despatching harmosts and forming govern- ments which they fancied more devoted to their interests. Yet the event proved that the measures of Epameinondas were not only more generous, but more advantageous ; -^^ Thf Tlukin Supremacy. B.C. 366. for the exiles from these cities, were so numerous and powerful, that neither Theban h.irmosts nor democratic rulers could stand a-ainst them, and Achaia was thus converted from a lukewarm neutral into an enthusiastic supporter of Sparta. In this unsettled state of (ireek politics the Thebans resolved to have recourse, like the Spartans before them, Embassies to the authority of the Great Kin-. Existinc^ desp:uch.d treaties, for which they were not "responsible*' st'.a:'to acknowled.^^ed his ri:,dit to interfere in the thej>crsian internal atlairs of Greece; and Thebes, at any rate, as her enemies were fond of remmdmg her, was doin- no violence to her earlier his- tory m seekin- his support. Even if the intluence of Epamemondas was not at this moment comparatively small, he may have thought that anything was better than a state of perpetual jealousy, suspicion, warfare, and revolution. He could secure to Thebes brilliant suc- cesses, but could not secure to Greece a fixed settlement of her difficulties. Again, two years previously, the satrap of Phrygia had sent over a worthless adventurer as his agent, furnished with money, to endeavour to nego- tiate a general peace. In the fruitless congress convoked at Delpho. in the Great King's name, little progress was made, not for the reason assigned by the pious Xenophon --that the god was not consulted as to the conditions-but because the independence of Messcne proved an in- superable obstacle. The Spartans at once despatched an envoy to the Persian court ; and to counteract his machinations and prevent themselves being represented as the obstinate disturbers of Hellenic peace, the Thebans called upon their allies to join them in sending ambassa- dors to Sousa. At the (ireat King's court the manly Pelopidas and the adroit Ismenias carried evervthing CH. XII. Success of Pelopidas. 209 before them. Artaxerxes paid them the utmost honour, and granted them a rescript which recognised ^^^^^^^ ^^ the independence of Messene and ordered J^elopi^^^^^^ the Athenians to dismantle their fleet. Of decree in the other envoys present, Antalkidas is said i^hSes, to have been so deeply chagrined at the coldness of his reception, that he committed suicide; the two Athenians quarrelled, so that one was put to death on his return ; while the sturdy athlete who represented Arkadia. vexed at the slights put upon his country and himself, declared that the Great King had bakers, cooks, and cup-bearers innumerable, but that no soldiers capable of facing the Greeks were anywhere to be seen, and that all his parade of wealth was nothing better than a sham. On the return of the envoys the Thebans summoned their allies to hear the royal rescript. The deputies who were sent were willing to listen, but nothing ^^^ ^^^ ^ more. When they were asked to swear to its -^^-^^^ conditions, they replied that their instructions would not allow them. Lykomedes and the Arkadian deputies went further. As an indirect protest against the supremacy of Thebes, they declared that the congress ou-ht to be held not always in that city, but at the actual seat of war; and. after some angry discussion, they left the synod. The whole project was a dead failure, and the attempts of Thebes to force the decree on the cities separately were not a whit more successful. After this the confusion in Greece grew infinitely worse. An accident transferred the town of Oropos-always a bone of contention— from the hands of Athens to ^^^.^^^^ those of Thebes ; and as the Pcloponnesian between allies of the Athenians refused to help them J^ Athens. to regain it, they broke with them. and. in spite of the efforts of Epameinondas, formed an alliance 2IO The Theban Supremacy. b.c. 366. with Arkadia. Lykomedes. who negotiated the treaty on behalf of his countrymen, as he returned from Athens, by some dl hap disembarked in the very midst of a band of Arkadian exiles, and was slain. The Athenians made soon after a vain attempt to seize the friendly city of Cormth, and the disgusted Corinthians, together with the Peace made citizens of Epidauros antl I'hlious, who were and^Phiious ^^'^^'^O' of the war. diregarding the bitter re- Thebe.. Proaches and eloquent appeals of Archida- mos. obtained the grudging consent of Sparta, and made a separate peace with Thebes. As soon as tranquillity was restored in one qu.irter, in another the tlame of war would again burst forth. Six War be- ^^^^^ ^°^ ^^^' Kleians had been the fust to tween lend a helping hand to the oppressed Arka- and Eiis. aians ; but no Greek state could ever grow prosperous without arrogance being bred among its citizens and jealousy among its neighbours. Causes of ill-will multiplied apace. The chief among them was the position of the Triphylian cities: Elis claimed them of old as her subjects, while they had now voluntarily joined the Arkadian confederacy, which re- fused to give them up. Furthermore, oligarchs ruled in Elis, democrats in Arkadia; and this circumstance was enough of itself to produce dissension. The desultory operations of 365 b.c. resulted in the occupation of Lasion and Pylos (in Elis) by the Arkadians and the Eleian exiles. In the following spring Elis received reinforcements from Sparta and her Achaian allies— for Sparta's best chance of security lay in her encouragement of Peloponnesian disunion. But the cause of Elis was not advanced either by the general whom Sparta sent to help her, or by a diversion which Archidamos made in her favoiir by in- vading Arkadia. Her own troops were defeated ; .\rchi- CH. XII. Dissensions among Arkadians . 211 damos, after some loss both of officers and men, was driven wounded from the country, and 100 Lakedaimo- nian prisoners subsequently fell into the hands ^^^^^^ ^^ of the enemy. The Arkadians pressed on Archidamos to Olympia, and proceeded to instal the citi- A^ikadians. zens of Pisa — who cherished an ancient claim to the position— as presidents of the Olympic festi- val. But in the midst of the games the insulted Eleians, accompanied by the Achaian reinforcements, B-^ttie of charged down upon them. Fighting with a Ji^^^'b^J'^ry heroism unparalleled in their national history, of jhe^^ and which Xenophon holds to have been the special inspiration of some favouring deity, they put their enemies to flight ; but the position occupied by the Arka- dians was strong enough to prevent the Eleians from driving them completely out of the city. The expenses of the war now pressed heavily on the Arkadian ruler. Being somewhat suspicious of the wealthier classes, who might have served without pay, they preferred to recruit the army from the poorer citi- zen's, and, in their need, they obtained the sanction of the Pisatans to appropriate to their own use the treasures of the Olympian temple. Since the death of Lykomedes, no citizen had risen among the Arkadians capable of holding together the ill-fused elements of the confederacy. Raising the cry of sacrilege, the Mantineians, who " , ,. Dissensions were jealous both of Tegea and IVIegalopolis, among the at once broke loose, and shut their gates in (^^^^^J;^"' the f:ice of the troops who were sent to enforce PfiJ^^j.^^ the fiat of the government against them. The spirit of disunion spread ; and when the Ten Thousand passed a vote that no more of the sacred treasure should be used, the poorer soldiers were driven from the army by want of pay, and richer men took their places. The - T-v* "J^n-" "^ W?- "■*-f ^A- ^l»/T* "• "" -i "^ '^''^ Theban Supremacy. B.C. 364. national policy was thus somewhat modified ; and, im- pelled by the fear of Theban intervention, the govern, ment hastened to conclude a peace with Elis, and restored the Olympian temple to her care. It is, however, perhaps incorrect to speak of any national pohcyat all in Arlcadia; for the confederacv'was no'w hopelessly divded. The mass of the Arkadians still remamed fauhful to their union and to the Theban alli- ance ; m Tegea the cause of Thebes was supported by a Boiotian garrison, and Megalopolis owed to her her very ex,s_,ence. Mantineia. on the other hand, was fast drifting to the s,de of Sparta. Nevertheless, all parties seem to have met together at Tegea to celebrate the peace. Late Sti^urt of '" ""^ evening the festivities were suddenly o1l'^r,'i'hs" '^'^'"^'^^d. The city gates were shut, and the « Tegca. democratic section of the Arkadian troops ,h» • . "'T^f ^^ "'^ '^'''=''^" Sarrison, arrested all the aristocratic leaders as they sat carousing at the feast- and so numerous were the prisoners that both gaol and town_ ha 1 were soon full. Most of the Man.inehns had ef the town to return home earlier in thedav; so that o the disappointment of the perpetrators of the outrage' there were but few of them among the prisoners. On th^ Ma„ti„da„ '°""«'ni,' niorning the Mantineian authorities reTer« af f.^"' ^"'^^^^ "'"' ^"^ '"'li^iant protest against Thebes, 'he gross illegality of the arrest, and a per- emptory demand that any imprisoned Man- t^neians should be at once set at liberty. Upon this the Theban harmost released all his prisoners, excusing his conduct by stating that he had acted on a false report of an intended surrender of the city to the Spartans-an explanation which was temporarily accepted by the ex- cited assembly though, as Xenophon says, universally d-sbeheved. Envoys were at once sent ,0 Thebes o CH. XII. Reply of Epameinondas. 213 , demand the execution of the treacherous officer ; but, far from obtaining satisfaction, were met only with bitter reproaches and terrifying threats. They were told by Epameinondas, formerly their generous champion, that the Thebans regarded the explanation of the accused harmost as entirely satisfactory ; that if he had ^^^^^ ^^ done wrong at all, it was in releasing his Epameinon- prisoncrs. not in arresting them. Against the Arkadians themselves, he continued, a charge of treachery might be brought with better reason ; for though the Thebans had, at the request and in the interests of Arkadia, undertaken the most arduous wars, they had not scrupled to make peace with the enemies of Thebes with- out her consent. But be assured, he added, that we will soon march into Arkadia, and unite our friends for the prosecution of the war. Such a rebuff, expressed in language so severe, and coming from the lips of a statesman at once so moderate and yet so resolute, could not fail to excite ^jjj^^^^ the gravest alarm in the Pcloponnese ; and the between Mantineians hastened to ally themselves with Ifaiufneik. the Spartans, who noted with delight the failure of the principle of federal union, and the disinte- gration of the confederacy. But in thus renewing their political connexion with the Spartans, they would have it clearly understood that they joined them not as inferiors, but as equals; and, accordingly, the novel condition was laid down, that the state in whose territory the war was being carried on should control the military opera- tions. Five years had elapsed since Epameinondas had last led a Theban force into the Peloponnese — years not un- eventful m the history of the city, though the order and the details of the events are involved in considerable obscurity. 2'4 The Tluban Supn-macy. b.c. 363. First of all, by the death of Pelopidas, Thebes had lost a Pr^ir, ^'"'' S""^'^^' ^"'l 'W^'neinondas a devoted -'•.■'"tlc^'"- Thebes to Tl "°f • '"'''''''''"'' """"^ '° toriQusover ""-"" to dbk protection against the mon- Ale,a„j,o» strous tyranny of Alexandres, and especially assistance A T """ ''"°P'''^'' '"'°'" '^^' ^^"' '" '^eir o ntrchin ;"■'" """'■■ '•°°° ^'™"S' ^^-^'^ °" "•« point of marchmg, when an eclipse of the sun spread general dismay through the city. In spite of the ev.l foreboding reK "/on^h • '""-'""f" ^'^^ ""' ""'> ^oo volunteer! hi tv^ant '^'Vr" 7P:.'''"'>-'' "-' hatred felt towards the tyrant. The inhabitants (locked to join him and parsing on rom Pharsalos, he marched\,pon I'h ^ali But Alcxandros, hearing that l-elopidas had but few Thebans wuh h,m, took heart to fice his old enemy and encamped wuh an army twice as nu„,erous inT t'ron^ posmon on the heights of Kynoskephalai. The ZZ was stubbornly contested; numbers and position we e pitted against valour and enthusiasm : and just as the enemy was beginning to waver, Pelopidas caught si" h of his detested and perfidious foe. In.lamed by blind ^r th he rushed forth from the ranks, and challenged him tj combat. As the tyrant tied back and hid .^mong h s body-guard Pelopidas followed in reckless pursuit, and seling his hfe dearly, fell by ,„e hands of the mercenaries' Eager to avenge their bekned leader, his troops pressed on till the wavering battle became a hopeless ro it anj he rout a ruthless carnage. Alexandros himself escaped to be assassinated some years later, when drunk by the contrivance of his wife, in revenge for an act .if o M- death of their liberator Pelopidas knew no bounds- h.s solders paid the most extrav.agant honours to his corpse the Thessahaus earnestly begged that his remains n^fh; CH. XII. Destruction of Orchomenos. 215 rest among them, and buried him with the most splendid obsequies ; while his countrymen avenged him by reduc- ing the tyrant to the position of a subject, bound to follow their lead both by land and sea. Secondly, Thebes assumed an entirely new position as a naval' power. Not only was the clause in the royal rescript which ordered the disarmament of the Athenian fleet wholly a dead letter, like all the rest of that hapless document, but the conquest of Samos and acquisition of Sestos by Timotheos, who had returned to his _^^^ country's service, had materially increased ^y'^^i-hebel the naval power of Athens. Epameinondas, accordingly, with marvellous energy, raised a fleet, and determined to cope with his rivals on their own element. He had little liking for a sailor's life; yet he took the command himself, and defied the Athenian navy by sail- ing as far as Byzantion. Though, on this its first voyage, the fleet achieved no marked successes, some of the most important maritime allies of Athens felt that a new naval power had arisen, and came over to the side of Thebes. Thirdly, the destruction of Orchomenos may. with the greatest probability, be referred to the period when Epa- meinondas was absent on his only cruise. ^^^^^^^^^^^^ After the victory at Leuktra, this ancient city of Orcho- had been spared only by the personal inHu- ence and intercession of Epameinondas ; now, during his absence, a report, whether true or false is uncertain, was brou-ht to the Theban government that the Orchomenian oligarchs were plotting to overthrow their democratic rulers. The accused persons were arrested ; and. after a hurried trial, they were condemned to death, and their town to destruction, a sentence which was executed with pitiless rigour. Epameinondas, on his return, did not disguise his grief or his abhorrence of the deed ; and 2^6 The Thcban Sitpremacy. b.c. 363. surely, as it has been well remarked, no higher homage was ever paid to the virtue of a citizen, than that his countrymen found in his absence their only occasion for gratifying their evil passions. The armies of Cireece were now gathering from all quarters for the great struggle. On the one side stood Sparta, Athens, Elis, Achaia, and a part of Arkadia, led by Mantineia: on the other side were ranged Hoiotia, Argos, Messenia, and the rest of Arkadia. while a few of the smaller states— as Phokis, Phlious. and Corinth- Position of remained neutral. Epamcinondas, who felt Sut^ whh ^^""^ ^"'>' ^^. "^ C''"^J^'"i.^ l^lf^^V could he sup- reference to press the disunion of Arkadia and secure the * '''*'"• independence of Messenia against Sparta, summoned to his standard the full forces of Thebes and her allies, including even a contingent from Alexandros Fourth ex- °^ '^'^^^^^- With these he passed the isthmus, peditionof and halted at Nemea in the hope of cuttimr tpameinon- «• ^u /\ u • i v. wi v-mnuj^ dus into the O" the Athenian troops, who were hastening ^eopon- jQ JQjj^ j^jg enej^jpg . i^^jj tricked by a report that they were coming by sea, he hastened on to Tegea. Here he was joined by his Teloponnesian alhes. The head-quarters of the enemy were at Manti- neia, where the Spartans had not yet joined them : so he made his whole army— 3o.cx)o infantry and 3.CXX) cavalry —encamp within the city walls, where their movements could not be observed. Xenophon, in his account of this campaign, seems, as Xenophon's ^.^ ^^^^^ ^^^ ^^^ ^f his task approaching', to irth?""^ "^^ ^^ ^ certain dignity of style which is, generalship Unfortunately, wanting in the rest of the non^as!"*'" ' Hellenika.' Perhaps it is that, with a father's pardonable pride, he lingers over scenes in which his sons won honourable distinction, and he tries CH. XII. Attempts to surprise Sparta. 217 also to do tardy justice to the genius of Epameinondas. The hardy veteran was, after all, too true a soldier to refuse some tribute of praise to the strategy and valour of one who was so consummate a master of his own craft ; and while singling out some points for special commen- dation, he acknowledges that, though the campaign ended unfortunately for him, he lost no opportunity of shewing the forethought and bravery of a great general. The difficulty of supporting so large an army, the near approach of harvest, and, possibly, also his limited term of office, made it necessary for Epameinondas ^p^^^j. to lose no time in striking a decisive blow. ^^^^^^^ Hearing that Agesilaos— now eighty years old surprise —was marching with all the forces of Sparta P^''^' to join the Mantineians, he marched out of Tegea at the first twilight of a summer evening, and, pushing on all through the night, arrived at Sparta the next morning, certain of finding the city wholly undefended. But the well-planned scheme fliilcd. He would have taken the city, to use the phrase of Xenophon, with as little resist- ance as boys take a bird's nest, had not a Kretan— per- haps a deserter from the Theban army— hastened across the country and warned Agesilaos of Sparta's peril. The indomitable old king at once countermarched, and sent a swift courier to warn Archidamos. who was left at home, of the impending danger. Hence Epameinondas, as he marched over the bridge into the city, found the streets barricaded, the housetops lined with ^^^'|j enemies, and the whole town in a posture of defence. To protect their wives and children, their altars and their homes, the Spartans fought with more than human courage ; and unwilling to waste time and lives, Epameinondas called back his men from the assauh. The scheme was ably designed and daringly executed. f 2i8 The T/it'bapt Supremacy. b.c. 362. and would, if successful, have ended the war at one blow. It was thwarted by the merest accident. Foiled in his first plan, Kpameinondas did not lose heart; though disappointed, he was not cast down. He attempts -^^u^iHy swift to design and to perform, he was mSST ^' ^^^>' ^" ^'^ ^^^"'■" "^^^'■ch. while the Spar- tans, who saw his watch-fires still burnin*- were expecting a renewal of the attack. }Ie knew th^t when the forces of the enemy which were encamped at Mantmeia heard of the danger of Sparta, they would lose not an mstant in marching in a body to her rescue Here. then, he saw an opening for a second surprise Mantmeia would be left unprotected ; the old men and the slaves would be unsuspectingly at work outside the walls : the flocks, and herds, and crops could be easily carried off; and even if by some mischance the attempt on the town should be baffled, he could not fail to secure plentiful plunder and provisions, which, to a general hard pressed for supplies, was in itself no slight object With this end in view, by another forced march, he hastened back to Tegea. On his arrival there, he allowed his inflmtry to enjoy the rest which they so much needed • but he urged his cavalry to press on yet ten miles further to Mantmeia. pointing out the certaintv of success and en- treating them to bear up under the fatigue. Man and horse were alike tired out ; but at the biddin- of Epa mcinondas they pursued their march. Here. a' "«^ ^^^'^ ^orscs had yet had time to get refreshment. The Mantineians, panic-strick- en at the approach of the hostile cavalry, besou-ht them to sally forth to the rescue-a request which they could CH. XII. Enthusiasm of the Thebans. 219 not refuse since their own safety depended upon it. The reputation of the Theban and Thessalian cavalry stood de- servedly high, and they were probably superior in number to the Athenians. Both sides fought bravely, but the ex- haustion of the Thebans lost them the day, even when op- posed to troops who were themselves tired with marching; and wearied out and disappointed, they returned to Tegea. Epamcinondas, we may suppose, would willingly have avoided all the misery and bloodshed of a pitched battle, which would surely be as fiercely fought as any in the annals of his country ; but both his skilful plans had been thwarted by the strangest of mischances, and it was the only resource left to him. Nor was there any occa- sion for disquietude about the probable result. His forces were numerically stronger, and nothing could ex- ceed their devotion to, and confidence in, their general. ' Marvellous, indeed, it seems to me,' writes Xenophon enthusiastically,' that he had trained his men to such perfection that they sank under no toil by night or by day, shrank from no danger, and, though their rations ran short, were yet eager to obey.' Nor were the Arkadians less zealous in his service ; they, too, received the order to prepare for battle with a joyous alacrity ; and, to shew their personal loyalty to their leader, painted upon their shields the Boiotian crest, the club of Herakles. The plain, at the two extremities of which stand Mantineia and Tegea, narrows itself about half way between the two cities, until it becomes scarcely r^^^ g ^^^ a mile in breadth. Here ran the boundary- line of the two domains ; and just to the north of the narrowest part the Spartans and their allies were drawn up to receive the Theban attack. Who was in command of their army is not known ; Q Enthusiasm of '1 hebans and Arka- dians for Epanieinon- das. tans and their allies take up a position south of Mantineia. >.aiwsftaiE..j'-.. ' I. * I ' J" ■*a.4-.V ito— .A£»«fe, fejifcwWa»te'ji.wa.-J-a«t.ght resume her former position. Her naval empire was reviving and she had still an able general'" Chabrias, and a noble citizen in Timotheos. but the citv was rotten at the core. Slothful and discontented, he Athenians delegated all active service ,0 mercenaries and remained at home to grumble at and prosecute those commanders who failed to fulfil their unreasonabe expectations Her naval powerwas obtained chiefly a, the expense of the Olyn.hians, who once again strove hard to unite their neighbours in a league of mutual advanta-^e andamity. But just as Sparta previously had crushed the brave cty of Olynthos, so now Athens put forth all her strength against its young confederacy. The last bulwark against foreign aggression was removed • and Greece lay, a defenceless mass of incoherent atoms at the mercy of the first invader. INDEX. ABY A BYDOS, 102, 129, 131, 142 ■'*• Achaians, the, 88, 125, 138, 207,208,211,216,221 Acharnai, 36 I Adeimantos, 2 i ^ n, 107 _ ' ,\ , 5; opposes Leotych ides, ^o ; character of, 90 ; becomes i"g. 93; conciliates the cphors, 94 ; represses the conspiracy of Kinadon,97; causes of expedition of, 105 ; large ideas of, 107 ; hu- miliates Lysandros, 108; plunders the satrapy of Fharnabazos, 109 ; defeats Tissaphcrnes, 110; again attacks the territory of Fharna- bazos, 112; interview of, with Fharnabazos, H2 ; recalled by the \ ephcrs, 114; returns by way ot Amphipolis.Thessaly, Chaironeia, 125, 126; wins a battle at Koro- neia, 127 ; welcomed home, 128 ; takes Feiraion, 135 ; retires to Sparta, 138; attacks Akarnania, 138 ; enforces the peace of Antal- kidas, 147; supports Fhoibidas, 158 : declines command against Thebes, 171 ; spares Sphodrias, 172; commands at^ainst Thebes, »74» '75: wounded and ill, 175; opposes Epameinondas about the Peace of Kallias, 184: excludes the Thebans from it, 184: settles the treatment of the ' runaways,' 195 ; rebuffed at Mantineia, 197 ; saves Sparta, 199 ; takes the field against Epameinondas, 217; death of, in Egypt, 223 APO Agesipolis, 125, 138, 149, 158, 161 Agis 11., IX, 13, 42, 87, 88,92 Agis III., 195 Aigai, 161 Aigaleos, Mt., 32 Aigina, 143 Aiginetans, the, 10, 143, 179 Aigospotamoi, 2, 99, 105, 116 Aigosthena, 192 Akanthos, 3, 154, 155 Akarnania, 123, 138, 151, 180 Akrokorinthos, 161 Akropolis, 17, 20, 32, 36, 45, 52, 191 Alexander the Great, 65 Alexandros of Pherai, 204, 205, 214, 216 Alkibiades, 11, 29, 52, 56, 92 Alpheios, the, 88 Amanos, Mt., 69 Ambrakia, 123 Amoun, 85 Amphiktyonic Council, the, 194 Amphipolis, 60, 126 Amyklai, 136, 199 'Anabasis,' the, 65 Anarchy, the year of, 46 Anaxibios, 77-80, 142 Antalkidas, 139, 140, 144, 145, 175, 182, 209 Antalkidas, the Peace of, 144, 145, ISO. i!^5, 183, 194 Antandros, 142 Antipatros, 195 Anytos, 18, 31, 60 Apollo, 89, 90 Apollodoros, 56, 63 ApoUonia, 154, 155 225 ^a^j^gg^^^ 'sgg^^ff'wwiniwii'wwg immiimi u-w 226 Index, ARA Arakos, 103 Archias, 157, 162-165 Archidamos II., 3, 153 Archidamos, son of Agesilaos, 17.., 206, 210, 211, 217 Archinos, 31,32,49. 5o Artiinousai, 12, 21, 176 Argivcs, the. 31. 127, 132, 134, ,35, Mf. 147. M9, 202, 205, 206, 220, 221 Argos, 27, 118, 123, 124, 132, 139, 140, '47. 195, 198, 216 Ariaios, 70, 71, 72 Aristarchos, 8, 80 Aristodemos, 8, 125, 126 Aristophanes, 59 Aristotle, 4, 04 Arkadians, the, 8, 134, ,38, 193, 196- 199, 202, 205-207, 209-213, 21Q- 221 ^ Arkadia, 89, 96, 193, 194, 206, 207, 209, 210, 212, 213, 216 Armenia, 76 Artaxerxes (Mnemon), 66, 69 71 106, 116, 146, 150, 182, 209 Asine, 205 Asklepios, 64 Asopos, the, 187 Aspendos, 142 Atarneiis, 104 Athenian culture displayed in Xeno- phon, 75 ; rule contrasted with bpartan, 82; envoys in Asia. ng. i 140 ^^' 1 Athenians forced to follow Spartans i against Elis. 87; refuse to join Agesilaos, 106. send help to 1 hebes 120; join the confederacv against Sparta, 123; defeated at Corinth, 125: defeated at Koro- . neia, 127; defeated outside Cor- I inth, 132: restore the Wall of Corinth. 134 ; consent to the Peace of Antalkidas, 144-146; try to form a new confederacy. 161. 170 • receive the Theban exiles, ife • help them to drive out the Sparl tans, 166; indignation of at the attempt of Sphodrias, 17.. • sup- port I hebes, 173-175: victorious at Naxos, 176; join the Spartans m making peace. ,82 ; accept the Peace of kallias. ,83: vexed at the news of Leuktra, 191 ; assist Sparta against Thebes. 20T 202 • assist Alexandros of Phcrai. 204 • make an alliance with the Arka- dians, 209, 210, 2i6; save Manli- COR neia, 218; fail in their attempt to regain supremacy, 224 Athens c;*pture of, 1 ; terms im- posed upon, I ; return of oligarch- ical exiles to. 10 ; p<,luical dubs at, 12; Ihirty Tyrants at, 15 grievances of the rich at. 25 enl tcred by 'I hrasyl.uulos. 45 ; toler- ationat 59; results of the Pe.-ice of Antalkidas to, 152, 153; head of new league, 194 '^4i''l8l'.^'V'';''^^'^''*3.45. 40, 40, 1^3. MJ, J65, 201 Aulis, 107, 127, 146 Aulon, 98 Autolykos, 18 I f5Al;VI.OMA,68, 70 Mciiia, the, 27 Bithynia, 83, 102 '"''isT'''^''' '''*'' '°^' '^' '7°. '8». Boiotia, 31, 40, 107, 122, 126-130 '^' '53, »54. 166, ,69, 170, ,7s, 176-179. «8i, 183-185, 191,194,2,6, 219, 221 ^ ' Bosporos, the, 79 Hrasidas, 3, 5, 95 Byzantion, 8, 9, 67, 77-80, ,42, 2,^ : C"^f''^'^S ,38. 143, 145. 150, /'L . '7.^-176. 180, 202, 205, 224 Cnairephon, 56 Chaironeia, 126, 177 Chalkedon, 9, 142 Chalkis, 31 Charikles, 2 Charon, 163, 164, 166 Chersonese, the, 79, 104 Cnrj'sopolis, 70 Cicero, 24 Corey ra, v. Korkyra Corinth. 118, 124, 125, 130-140, 147, '51, '53. 20?, 201, 210 Corinthian (iulf, t>ie. 134, ,42, 207 Corinthians claim a share in the Spartan spoil. 30; refuse to join the Spartan army, 42, 86, 106; join the anti-Spartan confederacy, 121 • defeated at Koroneia, 127: polil tical feuds among. n2 ; closely al- lied with Argives, 132; betrAycd 'Vur ""***' ^^^' "'**^*^ peace with i hebes, 210: neutral in the last struggle, 216 Index. 227 GYP HER Cyprus, V. Kypros Cyreians, 8, 65-81, 100-105, 114, 127 Cyrus the Elder, 70 Cyrus, friend to Lysandros, 6, 29 ; collects Greek troops, 66 ; marches from Sardeis, 67 ; reaches IJaby- lonia, 68 ; prepares for battle, 69 ; death of, 71, 73, 77, 90, 100 pvAIMOMON, the, of Sokrates, ^ 53.61 Daskyleion, 102, 109, 112 Dekarchies, nature of their rule, 8, 30, 83 ; fall of the, 85 Dekclcia, 11, 88 Del ion, 60, 170 Delos, 63, 173 Delphoi, 56, 89, 90, 96, 128, 194, 203, 20S Demosthenes (generaU, 137 Demosthenes (orator), 32 Derkyllidas, 102-105, 126, 129, 139, 141, 142 Diodoros, 8, 116, 176, 181 Dionysios, 203, 206 Diopeithes, 93 Dodona, 89 Dorieus, 115 Drakon, 49 EGEAN SEA, the, 128, 173, 176, 178, 180, 181 Egypt, 91, 145, 150, 183, 223 Eleusinian mysteries, the, 38 Eleusis, 35, 39, 41, 43, 45, 4^, 172 Eleven, the, 15, 23, 35, 45 Eli>, 31, 40, 86, 87, 88, 98, 117, 194, 196, 198, 210-212, 216, 221 Epameiiiondas trains the youth of Thebes, 162 ; supports Pelopidas in expelling the Spartans, 166 ; friendship of, with Pelopidas, 167; character of, 168, 169 ; revives the Sacred Band, 170; supports the Athenian alliance, 173; defends the policy of Theijcs, 182 ; refuses to withdraw the Theban claims over Boiotia, 183; excluded from the Peace of Kallias, 184; at Leuktra, 185 ; spirit and tactics of, 186-188; victorious, 18^; policy of, 192, 193 ; first invasion of the Peloponnese by, 198 ; marches on Sparta, 198, i'>9 ; founds Mcgalo- polis,and restores Mcsscuc,:^oo , ac- cused of his return to Thebes, 201 ; second invasion of the Peloponnese by, 202 ; dismissed from olfice, 203 ; rescues Pelopidas in Thessaly, 205; third invasion of the Peloponnese by, 207 ; repulses the Mantineian envoys, 213; commands the The- ban fleet, 215; fourth invasion of the Peloponnese by, 216 ; fails to surprise Sparta, 217; fails to sur- prise Maniineia, 218; tactics of, at Mantineia, 220, 221 ; wounded, 222 ; death of, 322 Epeiros, 181 Ephesos, 7, 102, 104, 107, 109, 129 F.phoros, 89 Epidauros, 133, 203, 205, 210 Epicikia, 133 Euagoras, 106, 116, 141, 145, 148, 15*^. 15 -' Euboia, 8, 123 Eudamidas, 155, 160 Eukleides. 46, 50 Euphrates, the, 69 Euripides, 64 Eurotas, the, 96, 177, 199, 205, 206 Eutresis, 187 Euxine, the, 76, 78, 142 rOUR HUNDRED, the, 3, 12,21, 22, 31, 47 r^ ERAISTOS, 107 ^-^ Gergis, 102 Gideon, 188 Gorgidas, 165, 167, 170, 174, 175 Gylippos, 5 Gymnopaidia, the, 191 Gytheion, 199 HALIARTOS, 120 Harmosts, nature of the rule of. 7, 83, 85 ; expelled by Konon, 128 ; withdrawn by the Peace of Kallias, 183 Helikon, Mt., 121, 127 Helisson, the, 200 ' Hellenika,' the, 216 Hellespont, the, 83, 84, 86, 99, 104, 108, 114, 130, 142, 145 Helos, 199 Heraia, 89 Heraion, the, 136, 137 Hcrakleia, 8, 112, 119, 124 issm 228 Index. HER Herakleia (Pontica). tq Herakles, 6, ,86. ^19 '^ Her.pp.das, 8. 112, 110 ,2^, i„ Hernial, mutilation of the n Hermos, the, no Hetairiai, 12 Homuioi, the, 94, 95 Hypomcmnes, the, 94, 98 JDA, Mt.. loa Illyrians, the, 154 Imbros, 140, 146 Ionia, ijy-141, ,69 100, I8l, 185, 201 Ismenias, ,23, 156. 157, ,59, ,^^ Isokrates, 9, 182 Isthmian (lames, the, 135 J ASON of Pherai, 65. 178, ,81. ,92. 203, 204 ' ' » y-. KAI>MElA.the,x5^,59.i6,,i65, 160, ,70. ,7,, ,9^ ^ 5. Kalatireia, 180 Kallihios 8. 17. 18,20 Ka l.krat.das. 5, 42 l^a listratos, 173, 180-182 l^'ilpe. 7'^, 83 ivardoMchoi, the, 76 Karia. 101, 104, jq^ „^, Karyai, 206 Kaunos, 114 Kebren, 102 Kelts, the, 206 Kephalienia, 180 Kephisodotos, 202 Kephissos, the, 127 Ceramic Gulf, the, 116 Kerasous, 78 K-ilikia, 68, 150 Kiliki^an Gates, the, 68, 60 K.nadon, 97, 08,195 ^ K.tha.ron, Aft., ,54, ,63. 174, 176, Klazomenai, 146 Klearchos. 8. 67 60 -m ■,, -™ Kleisthenes.V' ^'^'7*'7=''73 Kleokritos. 38 KleombroKs. 171 17^ r,- ,,0 o 186. ,83, ,89 ^ ' ^^' '75. »78. 185, Kleomenes, 96 Kleon. 32, 137 Klerouchies, 49 LYS Knidos, ri6, ia6, 128, 223 Kolossai, III Konon, ,05, ,06. 114, „5, „6 ,^ »3i, 140. 141. 173.223 Kopaic l^ke, the, 169 Korkyra, ,79, 180, 181 Korunc.a, ,27, 146, 153 Kotyora, 78 Krannon, 123 Kretan, 85, 217 Kreusis, ,79, ,85 ! Kntias returns from exile a • I character of, 1, ; in power at Athens. 13 ; .sends for a Spartan garnson, 17; overthrows fhera- menes, 20 21. 22, 23; effects of personal chai;acter of, 26 ; seizes ' Keusi>, 35; ,s killed, 38,50- his relations with Sokrales, 56.60 6i J^nton, 52, 63, 64 . 5 .00, 01 Krummyon. 133, ,37 Kunaxa, 70. 77, 90 Kyllcne, 88 Kyme. ,00, in Kyi ' ■ ilai. 214 KVi yprus), 106. ,45, ,46. X50 Kyrcne, 200, 223 ^ Kythera, 130 Kyzikos, H2 LAKOXIA, .30, ,3,. ,^8, ,84, 199. Lampsakos. 81, 103 Larissa (Asiai, jo, Larissa(Thessaly), 123,204 A^sion, 210 Lebadeia, ,86 Lc..mia,,e.. .56. .57. ,58, ,5,. ,6,, Leotychidcs, 91, 92 I eprcon, 86 Lesbos, 142 Lcukas, 123 I '"'"'iTi'"' *"■ "'■ '«'■ '9'-'9S. Libya, 89, 200 I "uT'.y^. »23. 128 Long \Va Is, destruction of the a • re.torat.on of the. ,30,13, ''• Lydia, ,,0 ' J » j» Lyko„,edes, 196. 205, 207, 209, aio, Lykon, 60 Lykourcos, 84, 96, 195 Lysandru, 29 Index, 229 LYS Lysandros enters Peiraieus, 2 ; in- fluence a!id character of, 5 ; neces- sary to Sparta, 7 ; establishes the Thirty, 14 ; subdues Samos, 29 ; returns to Sparta, 29 ; his power and arrogance, 29, 30 ; starts to the support of the Thirty, 4, ; jealousy against, 41 ; superseded by Pausa- nias, 43 ; weakened power of, 83 ; recalled, 84 ; leaves Sparta, 85 ; schemes for royal power, S9 ; sup- ports the claims of Agesilaos, 90 ; urges Agesilaos to assume the command in Asia, ,06 ; his motives, 106 ; devotion of Asiatics to, 107 ; humiliated by Agesilaos, ,08 ; ap- pointed to command in Boiotia, 119; killed in attacking Haliartos, 12,-123, 128, 139, 153, 192 Lysias, 40 AT AC F.DON, 154. 155. i6» ^ *■ Magna Graecia, 169 Maiandros (Maeander), 104 Mainalos, Mount, 220, 221 Malians, the, ,20, ,23 Mantineia, 86, ,49, 196, 197, 198, 21J, 212, 213, 2,6, 217, 218, 220 Mardonios, ,48 Marsyas, 51 Medes, ,47 Media. Wall of, 72 Megalopolis, 193, 200, 211, 212, 223 Megara, 31, ,66, 202 Meletos, 60, 62 Melians, the, 10 Mellon, ,63, 164, 166 Menelaos. 107 Menon, 67, 68, 73 Messene (city). 193, 200 Messene (Sicily), 200 Messenia, 98, 130, 200, 205, 208, 209, 2,6, 223 Messenians, the, ,0, 148, 198, 200, 205, 206 Metoikoi (resident aliens), 20, 22, 27 Miletos, 66 Miltiades, 104 Mitylene, 9 Mnasippos, 179, 180 Mounychia, 36, 44 Mysia, 113 AJAUARCHY, the,94 •'■^ Naxos, 176 PHA Nemea, 125, 216 Neodamodes, ,01, 106 Noiiioihelai, 50 (-ADYSSEUS, 77 ^^ Oinoe, 136, 137 Olympia, 87, 205, 2,1 Olynthos, ,54, ,55. ,56, ,59, 160, 324 Opountian Lokrians, the, 119 Orchomenos (Arkadia), ,97 Urchomenos (boiotia), 121, ,26, 127, 153. 174, 176, 177. '94, 215 Oreos, 8 Oropos, 209 pAKTOLOS, the, no ^ ' Palamedes,' the, 64 Pammenes, 167, 201, 224 Pamphylia, 142 Paphlagonia, 112 Parnes, Mount, 32 Parthenon, the, 45 Parysatis, 66, 106, in Paul, St., 25 Pausanias, 42-45, 120, 122, 123, 125 Peiraieus, the, ,5, 27, 36, 39-41, 56, 87. i3». M3, M4, 172, 173 Peiraion, 13,, 135, 136 Peisandros, ,n, 116, 126, 128 Pella, 154 Pellene (Achaia), 202 Pellene (Lakonia), 205 Pelopidas, plots against the oli- garchs, ,62, ,6 , ; assassinates Leontiades, 165 ; made Boiotarch, ,66; character of, ,67; wins vic- tory near Tegyra, 177; at Leuk- tra, ,86-, 90; in Thessaly, 204; at Sousa, 208 ; killed in Thessaly, 2,4 Penestai, the, ,2 Pergamos, 81, loi Perikles, 27, 49. 104, 143 Perioikoi, the, 7, 87, 9^ , 98, 200 Persepolis, 65 Persia, causes of war between Sparta and, 99 Persian aid to Sparta, 3 ; weakness of, Empire, 65, 100 ; policy towards Greece, 139 ' Phaidon,' the, 63 Phaleric Wall, the, 131 Pharax, 104, 114, 115 ■fcg^jj^gwaafiwiisjLiBafaitiiiMiiBHl .a'iuifs. Cornell Univ., Ithaca, N. Y. Illinois Coll., Jacksonville, III. Univ. of South, Scwaunee, Tenn. Weslcyan Univ.. Mt. Pleasant, la. Univ. of Cal.. Berkeley. Cal. So. Car. Coll., Columbia, S. C. Amsterdam Acad., Amsterdam, N. Y. Carleton Coll.. Northfield, Minn. Wesleyan Univ., Middletown, Mass. Albion Coll., Albion, Mich. Dartmouth Coll , Hanover. N. H. Wilmington Coll., Wilmington, O. Madi>on Univ., Hamilton, N. Y. Syracuse Univ., Syracuse, N. Y. Univ. of Wis., Madison, Wis. Union Coll.. Schenectady, N. Y. Norwich Free Acad., Norwich. Conn. Greenwich Acad., Greenwich, Conn. Univ. of Neb,. Lincoln, Neb. Kalamazoo Coll., Kalamazoo, Mich. 01:vet Coll.. Olivet, Mich. Amher>t Coll.. Amherst, Mass. Ohio Stale Univ., Columbus, O. Free Schools, Oswego, N. Y. Bishop J. F. Hurst, ex- President of Drew Theol. Sem. " It appears to me that the idea of Morris in his Epochs is stnctly in harmony with the philosophy of history— namely, that great movements should be treated not according to narrow geographical and national limits and di.^tinction, but universally, accordmg to their place in the general life of the world The historical Maps and the copious Indices are welcome additions to the volumes." EPOCHS OF ANCIENT HISTORY. A SER/ES OF BOOKS NARRATING THE HISTORY OF GREECE AND ROME, AND OF THEIR RELA TIONS TO OTHER COUNTRIES AT SUCCESSIVE EPOCHS Edited by Rev. G. W. Cox and Charles Sankey, M.A. Eleven volumes, i6mo, with 41 Maps and Plans. Sold separately. Price per vol., $1.00. The Set, Roxburgh style, gfilt top, in box, $11.00. TROY-ITS LEGEND, HISTORY, AND LITERATURE. By S. G. W. Benjamin. ** The task of the author has been to gather into a clear and very readable narrative all that is known of legendary, historical, and geographical Troy, and to tell the story of Homer, and weigh and compare the different theories in the Homeric controversy. The work is well done. His book is altogether candid, and is a very valuable and entertaining compendium. " — I/art/ord Courant. *'As a monograph on Troy, covering all sides of the ques- tion, it is of great value, and supplies a long vacant place in our fund of classical knowledge." — N, V. Christian Advocate. THE GREEKS AND THE PERSIANS. By Rev G. W. Cox. "It covers the ground in a perfectly satisfactory wav. The work is clear, succinct, and readable."— AVw; York Independent. *' Marked by thorough and comprehensive scholarship and by a skillful style." — Congregationalist. "It would be hard to find a more creditable book. The author's prefatory remarks upon the origin and growth of Greek civilization are alone worth the price of the volume.' — Christian Union, EPOCHS OF ANCIENT HISTORY THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE-From the Flight of Xerxes to the Fall of Athens. By Rev. G. VV. Cox. •* Mr. Cox writes in such a way as to bring before the reader everything which is important to be known or learned; and his narrative cannot fail to give a good idea of the men and deeds with which he is concerned."— r^^- Churchman. "Mr. Cox has done his work with the honesty of a true student. It shows persevering scholarship and a c'esire to get at the truth."— AVw York Herald. THE SPARTAN AND THEBAN SUPREMA- CIES. By Charles Sankey, M.A. *' This volume covers the period between the disasters of Athens at the close of the Pelopenesian war and the rise of Macedon. It is a very striking and instructive picture of the political life of the Grecian commonwealth at that time." — The Churchman. "It is singularly interesting to read, and in respect to arrangement, maps, etc., is all that can be desired."— i9^j/i?« Congregational St. THE MACEDONIAN EMPIRE-Its Rise and Culmination to Death of Alexander the Great. By A. M. Curteis, M.A. "A good and satisfactory history of a very important period. The maps are excellent, and the story is lucidly and vigor- ously \.o\^."—The Nation. •• The same compressive style and yet completeness of detail that have characterized the previous issues in this delightful series, are found in this volume. Certainly the art of conciseness in writing was never carried to a higher or more effective point."— /,Vj/<7« Saturday Evening Gatette. ♦*♦ ^^^ above Jive Vuiumes give a connected and complete history of Greece from the earliest timts to th^ death of Alexander. EPOCHS OF ANCIENT HISTORY EARLY ROME— From the Foundation of the City to its Destruction by the Gauls. By W. Ihne, Ph.D. " Those who want to know the truth instead of the tra- ditions that used to be learned of our fathers, will find in ^e work entertainment, careful scholarship, and sound sense.' ^ - Cincinnati Times. " The book is excellently well done. The views are those of a learned and able man, and they are presented in this volume with great force and clearness." — The Nation. ROME AND CARTHAGE-The Punic Wars. By R. BoswoRTH Smith. " By blending the account of Rome and Carthage the ac- complished author presents a succinct and vivid picture of two great cities and people which leaves a deep impression. The story is full of intrinsic interest, and was never better told." — Christian Union. ** The volume is one of rare interest and value." — Chicago Interior. "An admirably condensed history of Carthage, from its establishment by the adventurous Phoenician traders to its sad and disastrous fall." — N'ew York Herald. THE GRACCHI, MARIUS, AND SULLA. By A H. Beesley. " A concise and scholarly historical sketch, descriptive of the decay of the Roman Republic, and the events which paved the way for the advent of the conquering Caesar. It is an excellent account of the leaders and legislation of the repub- lic. "—/?^j/t7« Post. " It is prepared in succinct but comprehtT-Nive style, and is an excellent book for reading and reference." — N'ew York Observer. " No better condensed account of the two Gracchi and the turbulent careers of Marius and Sulla has yet appeared." — ■ A'ew York Independent. EPOCHS OF A.VC/E.VT iriSTOJiY THE ROMAN TRIUMVIRATES. By the \^^, Charles Merivale, D.D. '"^veryKeT. •• In brevity, clear and scholarly treatment of the subject .n.i the conventcnce of ,„ap. index, and side notes the volume IS a model. "-AVj,, York Trihum. "An admirable presentation, and in style vigorous and picturesque. ■■-//„r//WC««ra„,. »'l.orous and THE EARLY EMPIRE-From the Assasslna t.on Of Julius C^sar to the Assas^nl ?on of Domittan. liy kev. W. Wolfe Capes, MA •■ It is written with great clearness and simplicity of style «.d .s as attractive an account as has ever been le„ in Hilrt-^l:' wT '"'"«•'"« P-io'lsof Vol History. — Boston '^•'tur./aylCvtningCaHlf "It >s a clear, well-proportioned, and trustworthy perfor -n«, and well deserves to be studied."-C.ir : THE AGE OF THE ANTONINES-The Roman Empire of the Second Century By^t W. Wolfe Capfs, M.A. •• The Roman Empire during the second century is the broad subject discussed in this book, and discus^d with learning and intelligence."-AV. ,V, /^.^.^y^I The writers diction is clear and elegant, and his narra- US prolific and interest.ng theme, and in its general plan, the book IS a model of works of its class. --.V J Vor, Ljt We are glad to commend it. It is written clearly and with care and accuracy. It is also in such nea, and conipi t form as to be the more at,ractive."-a»^.,^,,„„,^,r' «\* ^v' "'*'"" "' ""''""" ^''" "" ^'"""y 0/ Xom, fro„ EPOCHS OF MODERN HISTORY. A SERIES OF BOOK'S NARRATING THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND AND EUROPE AT SUCCESSIVE EPOCHS SUBSEQUENT TO THE CHRISTIAN ERA. Edited by Edward E. Morris. Eighteen volumes, i6mo, with 74 Maps, Plans, and Tables, Sold separately. Price per vol., $i.oo. The Set, Roxburgh style, gilt top, in box, $18.00. THE BEGINNING OF THE MIDDLE AGES- England and Europe in the Ninth Century. By the Very Rev. R. W. Church. M.A. "A remarkably thoughtful and satisfactory discussion of the causes and results of the vast changes which came upon Europe during the period discussed. The book is adapted to be e.vceedingly .serviceable."— C///Va^„ ,t* TimJ ■■ It leaves nothing to be desired as regards compactness JZilZ' """'"'' "^ '"""^ execution. "L^,Z EPOCHS OF MODERN HISTORY \\ THE ERA OF THE PROTESTANT REVO- LUTION. By Frederic Seebohm. With Notes, on Books in English relating to the Reformation, by Prof. George P. Fisher, D.D. "For an impartial record of the civil and ecclesiastical changes about four hundred years ago, we cannot commend a better m^aww^X:'— Sunday- School Times. "All that could be desired, as well in execution as in plan. The narrative is animated, and the selection and grouping of events skillful and effect ive."—7^/J^ Xation. THE EARLY TUDORS-Henry VII., Henry VIII. By Rev. C. E. Moberley, M.A., late Master in Rugby School. "Isconcise, scholarly, and accurate. On the epoch of which it treats, we know of no work which equals it."— ^V. Y. Observer. *' A marvel of clear and succinct brevity and good historical judgment. There is hardly a better boc k of its kind to be named."— A^^7f; York Independent. THE AGE OF ELIZABETH. By Rev. M. Creighton, M.A. "Clear and compact in style ; careful in their facts, and just in interpretation of them. It sheds much light on the progress of the Reformation and the origin of the Popish reaction during Queen Elizabeth's reign ; also, the relation of Jesuitism to the \2.\.\^x.''—Pusbyterian Review. " A clear, concise, and just story of an era crowded with events of interest and importance." — New Ycrk World. THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR-161 8-1 648. By Samuel Ravvson Gardiner. " As a manual it will prove of the greatest practical value, while to the general reader it will afford a clear and interesting account of events. We know of no more spirited and attractive recital of the great .-ork as a very valuable treatmen^of t e Tr.a HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. By E Benja.m,n ANDREWS. D.D., LL.D.. President of bLo Univer,„y, %V ,th maps. Two vols. . crown octavo, S4.00. Boston Advertiskr :— «« We doubt if th^^^ \ u standard." ' ° ""= """" 'V""' " ""^' becon>e a Amerrcarif'^t'.'h?,::.'.;''"^ best popular, eene., histories of Td'lhtilfer.^ ""' ".oug'ufulness. 1, is the wortoT'l'sctt IMPORTANT HISTORICAL WORKS. THE HISTORY OF ROME, from the Earliest Time to the Period of Its Decline. By Dr. Theodor Mommsen. Translated by \V. P. DiCKSON, D.D., LL.D. A New Edition, Revised throughout, and embodying recent additions. Five vols., with Map. Trice per set, $io.c». *' A work of the very highest merit ; its learning is exact and profound ; its narrative full of genius and .skill ; its descriptions of men are admirably vivid." — London Times. '* Since the days of Niebuhr, no work on Roman History has appeared that combines so much to attract, instruct, and charm the reader. Its style — a rare quality in a German author — is vigorous, spirited, and animated."— Dr. Schmitz. THE PROVINCES OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE. From Caesar to Diocletian. By Theodor Mommsen. Translated by William P. Dickson, D.D., LL.D. With maps. Two vols., 8 vo, $6.00. '• The author draws the wonderfully rich and varied picture of the conquest and administration of that great circle of peoples and lands which formed the empire of Rome outside of Italy, their agriculture, trade, and manufactures, their artistic and scientific life, through all degrees of civilization, with such detail and completeness as could have come from no other hand than that of this great master of historical re- search."— -Prof. W. A. Packard, Princeton College. THE HISTORY OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC. Abridged from the History by Professor Theodor Mommsen, by C. Bryans and F. J. R. Hendy. i2mo, $1.75. •' It is a genuine boon that the essential parts of Mommsen's Rome are thus brought within the easy reach of all, and the abridgment seems to me to preserve unu.sually well the glow and movement of the original." — Prof. Tracy Peck, Yale University. "The condensation has been accurately and judiciously effected. I heartily commend the volume as the most adequate embo:t'-V ( /.•■ C"^yy/\^V\ 'r. iA l'liai?«»l' POLYAEGOS SKIATHOS ,{jo8 rV y LEUKAS \^ >•«<' .•^'*- * .// V:-x /A) EUOCMIA Prn.» "^ SKANOILe(l '^tPARETHOS 1 • ' 1 1 IRCSIA )IA 1 ,/.^ KEPHALLEN i 3X' 37 Mi "^k ••X •''' ^' ay .1 >( l|>lu»l ' p^_ K-. II '• T^*:^^ riri^h V'^'^^^K^ **""^ - ^ >•' >.i- i:i>u>is^ r>- ZAKY V ^■t'lV':!-*^- »)/... ., V ^ ^\ I.J S ^,.,,. sounlon Pr. ^,,.J,.i-' "^ - e ^ ,.. KALAURE.A.. F- ^ SPMAK 3K GREECE Tainaron Pr. A \- KYTHtRA Kvlh<-r:i ' J- "Sjv^' e;} •34 Epochs of Axcikxt History EDITED IJY REV. G. vV. COX, M. A. and C. SAXKP-T^', M. A. SPARTAN ami THE BAN SUPREMACIES C. SANKEV, M.A. EPOCHS OF ANCIENT HISTORV. Edited by Rcy. G. VV. Cox tnd Charles Sankev M \ Heven volumes, i6mo, with 41 Maps and Plans. Prirr per vol , $x.oo. The set, Roxburgh style, gilt top, in box, $11 00. TiiOY— Its Legend, History, and Literature. By S. G. W. Benjamin The Greeks and the Persians. By G. W. Cox. The Athenian Empire. By 6. VV. Cox. The Spartan and Theban Supremacies. By Charles Sankty. The Macedonian Evfire. By A. M. Curteis. Early Rome. By W. Ihne. Pome and Cartmaqe. By R. Bosworth Smith. The Gracchi, Marius, ano Sulla. By A. H. Uecsley. The Roman Triumvirates. By Charles Merivale. The Earl> Empire By \V. Wolfe Capes. The Aqe of the Antomnes. By W. \\ olfe Capes. EPOCHS OF MODERN HISTORY. Edited by Edward E. Morris. Eighteen volumes, ,6mo. with 77 Maps. Plans, and fables. Price per vol., $, <» Ihe set, Roxburgh style, gilt top, in box, $18.00. The Beoinninq of the Middle Ages By R. VV. Church. The Normans in Europe By A. H. Johnson. The Crusades By G. W. (ox. The Early Plantaqinets. By Wm. Stubbs. Edward III. By W. Warburton. The Houses of Lancaster and York. By James Gairdner. The Era of the Protestant Revolution. By Frederic Secbohm Thc Early Tuoors. By C. E. Moberly. The Age of Elizabeth. By M. Creighton The Thirty Years War, ni8-ie4s. By S R. Gardiner The Puritan Revolution. By S. R. Gardiner. The Fall of the Stuarts. By Rdw.ird Hair. The English Restoration and Louis XIV By Os.m >nc! Airy The Age of Anne. By Edward K. Monis The Early Hanoverians. By Edward E. Monis. Frederick the Great By F. W. Longman. ^he French Revolution and First Empire. Bv W (>*Cf ^ M -rris. Appendix by Andrew D. White. ••hc f ooch of Reform, itjo-isso. By Justin M».:arthv COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 0025977849 i Sv o • »-< >j' ITS OO < 00 (/> R r-n. ^r fMEUT :?.OEREt) ,, o 1987 -i J. '.•^!>a>»»