THUCYDIDES 
 
 JOWETT 
 
 VOL. I. 
 
 a 
 
Honfoon 
 
 HENRY FROWDE 
 
 OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS WAREHOUSE 
 
 7 PATERNOSTER ROW 
 
THUCYDIDES 
 
 TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH 
 
 WITH INTRODUCTION , MARGINAL ANALYSIS , 
 NOTES , INDICES 
 
 BY 
 
 B. JOWETT, M.A. 
 
 MASTER OF BALLIOL COLLEGE 
 
 REGIUS PROFESSOR OF GREEK IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD 
 DOCTOR IN THEOLOGY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF LEYDEN 
 
 IN TWO VOLUMES 
 VOL. I, CONTAINING THE TEXT 
 
 <& jrfarli 
 
 AT THE CLARENDON PRESS 
 
 I 88 I 
 
 \ All rights reserved ] 
 
TO THE 
 
 RIGHT HONOURABLE VISCOUNT SHERBROOKE, 
 
 ONE OF THE 
 
 BEST GREEK SCHOLARS IN ENGLAND, 
 
 WHOSE 
 
 GENUINE LOVE OF ANCIENT CLASSICAL LITERATURE 
 (THOUGH SOMETIMES DISSEMBLED) 
 
 IS AS WELL KNOWN TO HIS FRIENDS, 
 
 AS THE KINDNESS OF HIS HEART, 
 
 AND THE CHARM OF HIS CONVERSATION. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 The text which has been followed in this trans¬ 
 lation (except where a departure from it is indicated 
 at the foot of the page) is that of the first smaller 
 edition of Poppo (1843-1851), which adheres more 
 closely to the authority of the MSS. than the later 
 edition begun by Poppo and continued by Stahl. 
 It was originally intended that the work should 
 contain a series of essays on subjects connected 
 with Thucydides. But the accomplishment of this 
 part of the design has been unavoidably delayed. 
 The writer hopes to complete what is wanting in 
 the course of a year or two. 
 
 He gratefully acknowledges the valuable help of 
 more than one friend; first, and above all, of W. H. 
 Forbes, Fellow of Balliol College, who during several 
 years has been his unwearied and disinterested 
 fellow-labourer in a long and necessarily tedious 
 work. Few persons take as much conscientious 
 pains about their own writings as he has taken 
 about those of another. To his admirable scholar¬ 
 ship is due mainly the degree of accuracy which 
 the translator has been able to attain; and he is 
 indebted to him for many excellent remarks and 
 suggestions. The essay on Inscriptions in the 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 viii 
 
 second volume has been in great measure compiled 
 from data which he has collected and analysed. 
 The translator will always reckon the days which 
 they have passed together in the study of Thucy¬ 
 dides to have been among the happiest and most 
 useful of his life. 
 
 To his friend Professor Campbell of St. Andrews, 
 besides many other obligations, his best thanks are 
 due for the correction of several errors in the notes. 
 
 The full and well-arranged index to the text is 
 the work of Mr. Matthew Knight, who has given 
 an amount of thought and care to it rarely bestowed 
 on such ungracious tasks. 
 
 The translator has had the advantage of being 
 anticipated by Mr. Crawley, late Fellow of Wor¬ 
 cester College, and in part by Mr. Wilkins, Fellow 
 of Merton College. He has not refrained from 
 consulting their translations in several passages, 
 and desires to express his gratitude for the assist¬ 
 ance which he has received from them. He has 
 also occasionally referred to the clear and elegant 
 French translation of Betant, but much more fre¬ 
 quently to his invaluable lexicon. The old version 
 of Hobbes, though bearing a famous name, is very 
 rough and inaccurate, and has been sometimes 
 praised a good deal beyond its real merits. An 
 interest would attach to Dr. Smith’s translation, if 
 it could be believed that Lord Chatham (who. it 
 may be remembered, gave special instructions that 
 his son William Pitt should read Thucydides at 
 College) had contributed to the work ‘the Funerai 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 IX 
 
 Oration.’ But the hand of the great Orator is no¬ 
 where discernible in the performance. 
 
 The edition of Dr. Arnold has given a powerful 
 stimulus to the study of Thucydides in England. 
 Himself inspired with the love of his author, he 
 inspired the love of him in others. He certainly 
 possessed that quality of a Commentator from which 
 an ancient writer rains so much, the gift of in- 
 telligent appreciation. He first showed how Thucy¬ 
 dides might be translated with elegance and accuracy. 
 Though not a great philologer or a learned enquirer, 
 and adding little to actual knowledge, he created an 
 interest about geography and archaeology, and even 
 about the interpretation of difficult passages, such 
 as never existed before among his countrymen. 
 His notes are often models of good English and 
 good sense. It is to be regretted that, amid the 
 variety of his pursuits, he never gained an intimate 
 and idiomatic acquaintance with the language of 
 Thucydides, and never formed a sound notion of 
 textual criticism. He is frequently led away by 
 fanciful comparisons of things Biblical and Classical, 
 of Greek and English constructions, and of events 
 ancient and modern. The influence of Niebuhr 
 over him is perceptible in his speculations about 
 ancient Greek races. But he had a true feeling for 
 Greek history and life, and all students of Thucy¬ 
 dides have reason to be thankful to him. When a 
 great man undertakes the office of an interpreter he 
 throws a light upon the page which the merely verbal 
 critic is incapable of communicating, and it would 
 
 a 
 
 o 
 
X 
 
 INTRODUCTION . 
 
 be ungrateful to scan too closely his deficiencies in 
 scholarship. 
 
 A new epoch in the knowledge of Thucy¬ 
 dides was made by Poppo’s edition, beginning in 
 the year 1815 with ‘ Commentationes Criticae,’ and 
 ending in the year 1856 with a ‘ Commentatio de 
 Historia Thucydidis.’ The bulk of the work is 
 contained in two volumes of prolegomena, and in 
 eight volumes of text and scholia, and of anno¬ 
 tations on them. This grand edition may be criti¬ 
 cised on the grounds of old-fashioned scholarship, 
 of imperfect judgment of the MSS., of deficiency in 
 historical imagination, and of immoderate prolixity. 
 But Poppo has the great merit of being almost 
 always right. There is no trace of the mind and 
 genius of Arnold to be discovered in his pages; 
 they are not written in a form either attractive or 
 suggestive to the student of history. Yet the true 
 scholar will look with respect and admiration on the 
 twelve volumes, not merely as a vast thesaurus in 
 which nearly everything illustrative of Thucydides 
 has been accumulated, but because the editor mani¬ 
 fests a real insight into the meaning of his author. 
 For Poppo was the first who saw that the language 
 of Thucydides had a law of its own, and was not 
 merely to be judged of by the precepts of gram¬ 
 marians, whether ancient or modern. Taking the 
 accusations of Dionysius of Halicarnassus as his 
 basis, he proceeds to show that the supposed irre¬ 
 gularities of Thucydides, the confusions of persons, 
 genders, numbers, voices, moods, tenses, are not 
 
INTRODUCTION . 
 
 xi 
 
 real confusions or irregularities, but are attributable 
 to an imperfect or unfixed state of grammar or 
 language, and have a principle underlying them. 
 Either they follow some analogy or verbal associa¬ 
 tion ; or they obey the sequence of thought rather 
 than the rules of grammar; or they are due to some 
 attraction of soujid or sense; or they blend the 
 language of poetry and prose at a time when the 
 two were not yet accurately distinguished. Of two 
 legitimate usages, that which afterwards fell into 
 disuse, and which therefore appears to be irregular, 
 is sometimes preferred. Many of the so-called sole¬ 
 cisms are at variance, not so much with grammar, as 
 with the practice of later Greek; or, if they are un¬ 
 grammatical, we must enlarge our notions of gram¬ 
 mar that we may be able to embrace them. At the 
 same time it would be maintained by Poppo that 
 Thucydides has rarely, if ever, allowed himself 
 liberties not to be found somewhere in other writers. 
 These principles he bases upon a large induction of 
 examples, and partially succeeds by the help of them 
 in emancipating himself and his author from gram¬ 
 matical superstitions. 
 
 Poppo’s edition is eminently distinguished by 
 sobriety of judgment. Trained in the school of 
 Hermann (although the Master in later life forgot 
 his own lesson), he had been early warned against 
 the licence of conjectural emendation; and his 
 familiar acquaintance with the language of Thucy¬ 
 dides enabled him to see that conjecture is unne¬ 
 cessary, where a scholar of a more general type 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 xii 
 
 would have pronounced against the genuineness of 
 the text. It must be admitted that he has not the 
 gift of clear exposition or of exhibiting the parts 
 of an argument in their true relation to one another; 
 and in winding through the long notes of the larger 
 edition we have sometimes a difficulty in separating 
 his own view from that of others whom he is con¬ 
 futing. But though his meaning is not always 
 apparent on the surface, there is to be found at 
 the bottom good sense and true philological tact. 
 The life-time devoted by him to the study of Thucy¬ 
 dides was by no means wasted, for he restored to a 
 great writer natural principles of interpretation. 
 
 Later editors have added comparatively little to 
 him, and would probably have done better if they 
 had followed more closely in his footsteps. The 
 most distinguished of his successors, Classen, while 
 equalling, or perhaps exceeding him, in subtle 
 analysis of the language, falls very far short in 
 soundness of judgment. The translator is never¬ 
 theless bound to acknowledge that he is under con¬ 
 siderable obligations to his work, as well as to the 
 useful edition of Bohme. Some valuable contribu¬ 
 tions to the study of Thucydides have been made by 
 the minute learning of Kruger : of these he has also 
 availed himself. 
 
 The language of Thucydides presents a curious 
 and interesting problem, because it belongs to a 
 period when the uses of words and constructions 
 were not yet fixed, and an original writer had much 
 greater freedom in varying them than was possible 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 xiii 
 
 in the Alexandrian times. As centuries went on, 
 
 ‘ the individual withered ’ and ‘ the world ’ of lan¬ 
 guage ‘ was more and more.’ There was no force 
 of mind seeking expression for itself, trying experi¬ 
 ments, or struggling against the conventionalities 
 which were imposed upon it. The daily practice 
 of oratory, the precepts of a thousand grammarians, 
 reduced the mighty genius of Hellas to the level of 
 a later generation. Men instead of wrestling with 
 language and logic, fell under the dominion of them. 
 No one in the age of Aristotle would have dared 
 to write like Hischylus or Thucydides ; as no one in 
 our own day would attempt to imitate Shakespeare. 
 Poetry sooner submitted to the yoke than prose, 
 which had hitherto been used only in the current 
 eipo/uLevtj and was incapable of expressing the 
 
 higher thoughts of men, in the age when the heaven 
 of abstractions, 
 
 ‘ Won from the void and formless infinite/ 
 was just beginning to appear. Thucydides came 
 under the influence of that new intellectual world 
 which broke upon the Greek in the fifth century 
 before Christ, and which is never sufficiently ap¬ 
 preciated by us because we have inherited it and 
 habitually live in it. But not at once was language 
 adequate to receive or take up into itself the ideas 
 which were asking for expression. The forms of 
 speech and writing were slowly adjusted to the 
 mental movement of the age. Words had to be 
 distinguished from things, arguments from fallacies. 
 The grammatical construction and the logical con- 
 
XIV 
 
 INTRODUCTION . 
 
 nection of clauses and sentences were still clumsy 
 and irregular, especially in Attic, though the sense 
 of art was not wanting, and the sophist was busy 
 elaborating his new rules and formulas, which had 
 a remarkable fascination for the minds of the 
 Athenians. 
 
 Hence we see in the same writer the perfection 
 of art and the greatest want of art, good taste and 
 errors of taste, the meagre and false artificiality of 
 the Sophist combined with an antique beauty and 
 masterly power in the delineation of facts. The 
 speeches of Thucydides everywhere exhibit the an¬ 
 titheses, the climaxes, the plays of words, the point 
 which is no point, of the rhetorician, yet retain amid 
 these defects of form a weight of thought to which 
 succeeding historians can scarcely show the like. The 
 narrative on the other hand is natural and simple, 
 in the highest degree picturesque and dramatic, 
 often deeply pathetic by its very severity, generally 
 intelligible, and only getting into a tangle when at¬ 
 tempting to express political and philosophical 
 reflections, as in the Corcyraean sedition. He who 
 considers that Thucydides was a great genius writing 
 in an ante-grammatical age, when logic was just be¬ 
 ginning to be cultivated, who had thoughts far 
 beyond his contemporaries, and who had great 
 difficulty in the arrangement and expression of them, 
 who is anxious but not always able to escape tauto¬ 
 logy, will not be surprised at his personifications, at 
 his confusion of negatives and affirmatives, of con¬ 
 sequents and antecedents, at his imperfect antitheses 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 xv 
 
 and involved parentheses, at his employment of the 
 participle to express abstract ideas in the making, at 
 his substitution of one construction for another, at 
 his repetition of a word, or unmeaning alteration of 
 it for the sake of variety, at his over-logical form, at 
 his forgetfulness of the beginning of a sentence be¬ 
 fore he arrives at the end of it. The solecisms*or 
 barbarisms of which he is supposed to be guilty are 
 the natural phenomena of a language in a time of 
 transition ; and though not always, as Poppo main¬ 
 tains, common to other Greek writers, yet having 
 some analogy by which they may be defended. 
 They are also to be ascribed to a strong individ¬ 
 uality, which subtilizes, which rationalizes, which 
 concentrates, which crowds the use of words, which 
 thinks more than it can express yap 
 
 eouce). Dionysius of Halicarnassus is right in attri¬ 
 buting the obscurity of Thucydides to himself as 
 well as to his age ; for his contemporaries Antiphon, 
 Andocides, Lysias, Xenophon are far from obscure. 
 
 It is a commonplace, but one which cannot be 
 too often repeated, that we must interpret an ancient 
 writer by himself and by his own age, and not by 
 modern notions. We must not add on to him our 
 mysteries and moralities, or translate his confused 
 modes of thought into our more distinct ones (more 
 distinct at least to us). Neither must we measure 
 him by our standards of right and wrong. His range 
 of view may be limited, but we cannot safely enlarge 
 it. Nor can we argue from his inconsistencies or 
 omission of details; nor draw inferences from his 
 
XVI 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 precise words, because we cannot expect him to 
 use legal accuracy. The whole manner of ancient 
 writing was different from our own ; we do not know 
 whether the words or sentences of Thucydides were 
 written down as soon as they occurred to the mind, 
 or were long preserved in the treasure-house of 
 memory. At what time the successive portions of 
 his history were completed must for ever remain 
 uncertain to us. The sources from which the 
 ancient historian gathered his narrative are very 
 dissimilar to those which are at the disposal of the 
 modern, the first meagre and oral, the latter often 
 overwhelming the compiler by the very mass of 
 his written and printed materials. A few ancient in¬ 
 scriptions at Athens or Delphi, the brief narrative 
 of a writer like Hellanicus (i. 97), whom we can 
 easily believe to have been ‘inaccurate in his chrono¬ 
 logy,’ or of Antiochus the Syracusan (though there 
 is no evidence that he was acquainted with the 
 latter), the witness to events which was afforded 
 by statues and buildings, such as the ‘ columns 
 taken from sepulchres ’ which were inserted in the 
 walls of Athens, the decrees of the senate, people, 
 and magistrates, thh best old traditions (i. 9 init.)— 
 these are about all the subsidia which Thucydides 
 had to use. Modern history is gathered out of a 
 multitude of books. Thucydides drew his narrative 
 fresh from the lips of men after hearing the dif¬ 
 ferent accounts of the contending parties (v. 26 fin.). 
 Whether his views are true or false we can only de¬ 
 termine by internal evidence; for it is useless to 
 
INTRODUCTION . 
 
 xvn 
 
 balance them against the ever-diminishing truth and 
 ever-increasing fiction of a later generation. Nor 
 can we supplement the one by the other. Thucy¬ 
 dides may possibly have been unjust to Cleon, but 
 the suspicion is not confirmed by the statement of 
 Marcellinus that Cleon was the proposer of the decree 
 by which he was banished ; for such an anecdote 
 is more likely to be invented than not. When, as 
 in modern histories of ancient Greece, the good 
 cloth of Herodotus or Thucydides or Xenophon 
 is patched with the transparent gauze of Diodorus 
 and Plutarch, the whole garment becomes unequal 
 and ragged. There is a special impropriety in com¬ 
 bining the fictions of later writers with the narrative 
 of Thucydides, who stands absolutely alone among 
 the historians, not only of Hellas, but of the world, 
 in his impartiality and love of truth. 
 
 We must accept ancient historians as they are, 
 with their limited ideas and restricted means of 
 knowledge, with their Hellenic conceptions of 
 morality and of nature. They are disappointing, 
 like the Elgin marbles, to those who expect to find 
 in them modern sentimentalism or a modern political 
 philosophy. But, like the Elgin marbles, to those who 
 can appreciate their simplicity, their beauty, their 
 originality, they will seem to be worth all the rest. 
 
 There have been many commentaries on the 
 Classics both in ancient and modern times; and 
 a kind of commentary on them is furnished by the 
 ideas which the ancients themselves entertained 
 about their great writers. But most of the ancient 
 
xviii INTR OD UCTION. 
 
 commentaries, and some of the modern, rather in¬ 
 terpret to us the age in which they were written 
 than the author who is supposed to be illustrated 
 by them. The treatise of Dionysius of Halicar¬ 
 nassus on the style of Thucydides, except in so far 
 as it confirms the text in a multitude of passages, 
 adds nothing to our knowledge of the book ; 
 but it throws a striking light on the narrow and 
 feeble intelligence of the Graeco-Roman rhetorician 
 and historian of the first century b.c., and of the 
 world for which he wrote. Early criticism consists 
 almost entirely in adapting the past to the present, 
 in obtruding the notions of a later age upon an 
 earlier one. And it is only by degrees that man¬ 
 kind have been able to exclude the subjective 
 element which is always reappearing, and have 
 learned to interpret an author from himself, or in 
 the study of an age to confine themselves to the 
 range of its ideas. 
 
 Hitherto each age seems to have required its 
 own interpretation or adaptation of Scripture, or 
 of the Classics, and to have been dissatisfied with 
 that of any other. It may be asked whether, as 
 philology progresses and words are understood to 
 have a fixed meaning—not that ‘ which we bring to 
 them/ but that which is contained in them—the art 
 of interpretation must be always going on, like the 
 labour of the Danaides, pouring into a sieve know¬ 
 ledge which is perpetually flowing out, and in every 
 generation requiring to be replenished. Must we 
 during every ten or twenty years have new Com- 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 xix 
 
 mentaries on the Gospels and Epistles, new editions 
 of Homer, Thucydides, Aristotle ? No sooner does 
 one appear than it begins to be forgotten, and 
 another is with some anxiety expected. Such a 
 perennial stream of interpretation tends to discredit 
 itself, and may suggest the thought that it would be 
 better to reprint old books instead of writing new 
 ones. But there is really some answer to be made 
 to the objection. In the first place, we have not so 
 completely got rid of the ‘ subjective ’ element as we 
 are sometimes inclined to imagine. And after all the 
 pains and labour which have been bestowed upon 
 them by German and English scholars, we cannot 
 be said even now to have editions of the principal 
 Classics in which nothing is superfluous and nothing 
 wanting. The old failings of the commentator, 
 want of proportion, ostentation of learning, love of 
 emendation, perverse ingenuity, the habit of contro¬ 
 versy, still cling to him. Secondly, although many 
 old editions are better than most new ones, the 
 subtle advance of philological criticism, even during 
 the last thirty or forty years, does make the cor¬ 
 rection of old-fashioned opinions necessary; there is 
 hardly any book written in this century which does 
 not require such a purgation almost equally with 
 those of preceding centuries. Little if anything can 
 now be added to the sources of our knowledge, but 
 there is a higher standard of evidence by which 
 our materials have to be estimated; and more dis¬ 
 crimination is needed in separating what is really 
 certain from matters of opinion and conjecture. All 
 
XX 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 criticism requires to be criticised before we can make 
 a nearer approach to the truth. The traditions of 
 famous scholars have not unfrequently to be re¬ 
 pudiated in the light of facts. The wheat has to be 
 separated from the chaff; the voluminous learning of 
 past ages to be recast in easier and more manageable 
 forms. And if Greek literature is not to pass away, 
 it seems to be necessary that in every age some one 
 who has drunk deeply from the original fountain 
 should renew the love of it in the world, and once 
 more present that old life, with its great ideas and 
 great actions, its creations in politics and in art, 
 like the distant remembrance of youth, before the 
 delighted eyes of mankind. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 In referring to the dates placed in the margin of the English 
 text, it must be remembered that Thucydides’ ‘year’ or the ‘ year 
 of the war ’ begins about three months after the corresponding year 
 b.c., and about three months before the corresponding Olympic 
 year. For example, the attempt on Potidaea of iv. 135 belongs 
 to 422, not to 423 b.c.; and the treaty of v. 47 to 01. 89. 4, 
 not to 01. 90. 1. 
 
 For the list of Corrigenda see end of Volume II 
 
THUCYDIDES. 
 
 BOOK I. 
 
 Thucydides, an Athenian, wrote the history of the 
 war in which the Peloponnesians and the Athenians 
 fought against one another. He began to write when 
 they first took up arms, believing that it would be great 
 and memorable above any previous war. For he argued 
 that both states were then at the full height of their 
 military power, and he saw the rest of the Hellenes 
 either siding or intending to side with one or other 
 of them. No movement ever stirred Hellas more 
 deeply than this; it was shared by many of the Bar¬ 
 barians, and might be said even to affect the world at 
 large. The character of the events which preceded, 
 whether immediately or in more remote antiquity, 
 owing to the lapse of time cannot be made out with 
 certainty. a But, judging from the evidence which I 
 am able to trust after most careful enquiry a , I should 
 imagine that former ages were not great either in their 
 wars or in anything else. 
 
 The country which is now called Hellas was not 
 regularly settled b in ancient times b . The people were 
 
 a Or, connecting au with paKporarov : 1 But after carrying the 
 enquiry to the furthest point at which any trustworthy evidence 
 can be obtained.’ 
 
 b Or, taking ov rraikai closely together: ‘ until recent times.' 
 
 I. I. 
 
 Greatness 
 of the 
 war. 
 
 2 . 
 
 Early con¬ 
 dition of 
 Hellas: 
 
EARLY INHABITANTS OF HELLAS. 
 
 I. migratory, and readily left their homes whenever they 
 readiness of were overpowered by numbers. There was no com- 
 
 the early r J , 
 
 tribes to merce, and they could not safely hold intercourse with 
 th?rfcher one another either by land or sea. The several tribes 
 more C un- the cultivated their own soil just enough to obtain a main- 
 settied; tenance from it. But they had no accumulations of 
 
 some of the J . 
 
 poorer, like wealth, and did not plant the ground ; for, being with- 
 
 reaiity'the out walls, they were never sure that an invader might 
 perou£ r ° S " not come an< 3 despoil them. Living in this manner and 
 knowing that they could anywhere obtain a bare sub¬ 
 sistence, they were always ready to migrate; so that 
 they had neither great cities nor any considerable 
 resources. The richest districts were most constantly 
 changing their inhabitants ; for example, the countries 
 which are now called Thessaly and Boeotia, the greater 
 part of the Peloponnesus with the exception of Arcadia, 
 and all the best parts of Hellas. For the productive¬ 
 ness of the land a increased the power of individuals ; 
 this in turn was a source of quarrels by which com¬ 
 munities a were ruined, while at the same time they were 
 more exposed to attacks from without. Certainly Attica, 
 of which the soil was poor and thin, enjoyed a long free¬ 
 dom from civil strife, and therefore retained its original 
 inhabitants. And a striking confirmation of my argu¬ 
 ment is afforded by the fact b that Attica through im¬ 
 migration increased in population more than any other 
 region. For the leading men of Hellas b , when driven 
 out of their own country by war or revolution, sought an 
 asylum at Athens; and from the very earliest times, being 
 admitted to rights of citizenship, so greatly increased 
 
 a Or, ‘gave to some communities greater power; this was a source 
 of quarrels, by which they ’ etc. 
 
 b Or, taking is ra ak\a in another sense: ‘ that Attica through 
 immigration increased in population quite out of proportion to her 
 increase in other respects;’ or, supplying rrjv l E Wdda and taking 
 IxeroiKias in-another sense: ‘And here is a striking confirmation of 
 my argument that the constant migrations were the cause which 
 prevented the rest of Hellas from increasing equally with Attica. 
 The leading men of Hellas,’ etc. 
 
MINOS. 
 
 3 
 
 the number of inhabitants that Attica became incapable I. 
 of containing them, and was at last obliged to send out 
 colonies to Ionia. 
 
 The feebleness of antiquity is further proved to me 3 . 
 by the circumstance that there appears to have been No unit y 
 
 x A among the 
 
 no common action in Hellas before the Trojan War. early in- 
 And I am inclined to think that the very name was Sfcwnmon 
 not as yet given to the whole country, and in fact did or 
 
 not exist at all before the time of Hellen, the son of Barbarians : 
 
 or common 
 
 Deucalion ; the different tribes, of which the Pelasgian action in 
 was the most widely spread, gave their own names to f or e the 
 different districts. But when Hellen and his sons be- ^r°j. an 
 came powerful in Phthiotis, their aid was invoked by 
 other cities, and those who associated with them 
 gradually began to be called Hellenes, though a long 
 time elapsed before the name prevailed over the whole 
 country. Of this Homer affords the best evidence; for 
 he, although he lived long after the Trojan War, nowhere 
 uses this name collectively, but confines it to the followers 
 of Achilles from Phthiotis, who were the original Hel¬ 
 lenes ; when speaking of the entire host he calls them 
 Danaans, or Argives, or Achaeans. Neither is there any 
 mention of Barbarians in his poems, clearly because there 
 were as yet no Hellenes opposed to them by a common 
 distinctive name. Thus a the several Hellenic tribes (and 
 I mean by the term Hellenes those who, while forming 
 separate communities, had a common language, and were 
 afterwards called by a common name) a , owing to their 
 weakness and isolation, were never united in any great 
 enterprise before the Trojan War. And they only made 
 the expedition against Troy after they had gained con¬ 
 siderable experience of the sea. 
 
 Minos is the first to whom tradition ascribes the 4* 
 possession of a navy. He made himself master of a o f e ^ a ]Jg” gs 
 
 tion: Minos 
 
 a Or, supplying nX^Bevres with both clauses: ‘ those who suc¬ 
 cessively acquired the Hellenic name, which first spread among the 
 several tribes speaking the same language, and afterwards became 
 universal.’ 
 
4 
 
 P IRA C Y. 
 
 I. great part of what is now termed the Hellenic sea; he 
 
 conquers conquered the Cyclades, and was the first coloniser of 
 
 the islands , . . . - . 
 
 and clears most of them, expelling the Canans and appointing his 
 pirates! ° f own sons to govern in them. Lastly, it was he who, 
 from a natural desire to protect his growing revenues, 
 sought, as far as he was able, to clear the sea of pirates. 
 5- For in ancient times both Hellenes and Barbarians, as 
 well the inhabitants of the coast as of the islands, when 
 they began to find their way to one another by sea had 
 recourse to piracy. They were commanded by powerful 
 chiefs, who took this means of increasing their wealth 
 and providing for their poorer followers. They would 
 fall upon the unwalled and straggling towns, or rather 
 villages, which they plundered, and maintained them¬ 
 selves by the plunder of them ; for, as yet, such an 
 occupation was held to be honourable and not disgrace¬ 
 ful. This is proved by the practice of certain tribes on 
 the mainland who, to the present day, glory in piratical 
 exploits, and by the witness of the ancient poets, in whose 
 verses the question is invariably asked of newly-arrived 
 voyagers, whether they are pirates a ; which implies that 
 neither those who are questioned disclaim, nor those 
 who are interested in knowing censure the occupation. 
 The land too was infested by robbers ; and there are 
 parts of Hellas in which the old practices still continue, 
 as for example among the Ozolian Locrians, Aetolians, 
 Acarnanians, and the adjacent regions of the continent. 
 The fashion of wearing arms among these continental 
 6. tribes is a relic of their old predatory habits. For in 
 Old cus- ancient times all Hellenes carried weapons because their 
 
 toms which 
 
 are still ex- homes were undefended and intercourse was unsafe ; like 
 some parts the Barbarians they went armed in their every-day life. 
 t^dressSf And the continuance of the custom in certain parts of 
 Athenians the country proves that it once prevailed everywhere. 
 Spartans. The Athenians were the first who laid aside arms 
 and adopted an easier and more luxurious way of life. 
 Quite recently the old-fashioned refinement of dress still 
 a Od. iii. 73 ff.; ix. 252 ; Hymn to Apoll. 452 ff. 
 
OTHER ANCIENT CUSTOMS. 
 
 5 
 
 lingered among the elder men of their richer class, who I. 
 wore under-garments of linen, and bound back their hair 
 in a knot with golden clasps in the form of grasshoppers; 
 and the same customs long survived among the elders of 
 Ionia, having been derived from their Athenian ancestors. 
 
 On the other hand, the simple dress which is now com¬ 
 mon was first worn at Sparta ; and there, more than any¬ 
 where else, the life of the rich was assimilated to that of 
 the people. The Lacedaemonians too were the first who 
 in their athletic exercises stripped naked and rubbed 
 themselves over with oil. But this was not the ancient 
 custom; athletes formerly, even when they were con¬ 
 tending at Olympia, wore girdles about their loins, a 
 practice which lasted until quite lately, and still prevails 
 among Barbarians, especially those of Asia, where the 
 combatants at boxing and wrestling matches wear girdles. 
 
 And many other customs which are now confined to the 
 Barbarians might be shown to have existed formerly in 
 Hellas. 
 
 In later times, when navigation had become general 7* 
 and wealth was beginning to accumulate, cities were Fortifi ed 
 
 00 1 towns begin 
 
 built upon the sea-shore and fortified; peninsulas too to be built; 
 were occupied and walled-off with a view to commerce land, after- 
 and defence against the neighbouring tribes. But the ^sea- 11 
 older towns both in the islands and on the continent, in shore - 
 order to protect themselves against the piracy which so 
 long prevailed, were built inland ; and there they remain 
 to this day. For the piratical tribes plundered, not only 
 one another, but all those who, without being sailors, 
 lived on the sea-coast. 
 
 The islanders were even more addicted to piracy than 8, 
 the inhabitants of the mainland. They were mostly The pirates 
 Carian or Phoenician settlers. This is proved by the islands of 
 fact that when the Athenians purified Delos a during the Phoenician 
 Peloponnesian War and the tombs of the dead were ongin. 
 opened, more than half of them were found to be 
 Carians. They were known by the fashion of their 
 
 a Cp. iii. 104 init. 
 
6 
 
 THE TROJAN EXPEDITION. 
 
 I. arms which were buried with them, and by their mode 
 of burial, the same which is still practised among them. 
 
 After Minos had established his navy, communication 
 by sea became more general. For, he having expelled 
 the pirates a when he colonised the greater part of the 
 islands, the dwellers on the sea-coast began to grow 
 richer and to live in a more settled manner; and some 
 of them, finding their wealth increase beyond their ex¬ 
 pectations, surrounded their towns with walls. The love 
 of gain made the weaker willing to serve the stronger, 
 b and the command of wealth enabled the more powerful 
 to subjugate the lesser cities b . This was the state of 
 society which was beginning to prevail at the time of 
 the Trojan War. 
 
 9 . I am inclined to think that Agamemnon succeeded 
 Rise of the i n collecting the expedition, not because the suitors of 
 the wealth Helen had bound themselves by oath to Tyndareus, 
 whtchAga- but because he was the most powerful king of his time, 
 memnon in- c Those Peloponnesians who possess the most accurate 
 
 hentedfrom x x 
 
 Atreus and traditions say that c originally Pelops gained his power 
 babied 1 him by the great wealth which he brought with him from 
 the a chiSs ble Asia into a poor country, whereby he was enabled, 
 atTroy Sht though a stranger, to give his name to the Pelo¬ 
 ponnesus ; and that still greater fortune attended his 
 descendants after the death of Eurystheus, king of 
 Mycenae, who was slain in Attica by the Heraclidae. 
 For Atreus the son of Pelops was the maternal uncle 
 of Eurystheus, who, when he went on the expedition, 
 naturally committed to his charge the kingdom of 
 Mycenae. Now Atreus had been banished by his father 
 on account of the murder of Chrysippus. But Eurys¬ 
 theus never returned; and the Mycenaeans, dreading 
 the Heraclidae, were ready to welcome Atreus, who was 
 considered a powerful man and had ingratiated himself 
 
 a Cp. i. 4. 
 
 b Or, ‘and incited the more powerful, who now had wealth at 
 their command, to subjugate the lesser cities.’ 
 
 c Or, ‘ Those who possess the most accurate traditions respecting 
 the history of Peloponnesus say that ’ etc. 
 
AGAMEMNON. 
 
 7 
 
 with the multitude. So he succeeded to the throne of 
 Mycenae and the other dominions of Eurystheus. Thus 
 the house of Pelops prevailed over that of Perseus. 
 
 And it was, as I believe, because Agamemnon inherited 
 this power and also because he was the greatest naval 
 potentate of his time that he was able to assemble the 
 expedition ; and the other princes followed him, not from 
 good-will, but from fear. Of the chiefs who came to 
 Troy, he, if the witness of Homer be accepted, brought 
 the greatest number of ships himself, besides supplying 
 the Arcadians with them. In the ‘ Handing down of 
 the Sceptre’ he is described as ‘The king of many 
 islands, and of all Argos a .’ But, living on the mainland, 
 he could not have ruled over any except the adjacent 
 islands (which would not be ‘many’) unless he had 
 possessed a considerable navy. From this expedition 
 we must form our conjectures about the character of 
 still earlier times. 
 
 When it is said that Mycenae was but a small place, 
 or that any other city which existed in those days is 
 inconsiderable in our own, this argument will hardly 
 prove that the expedition was not as great as the 
 poets relate and as is commonly imagined. Suppose 
 the city of Sparta to be deserted, and nothing left but 
 the temples and the ground-plan, distant ages would be 
 very unwilling to believe that the power of the Lacedae¬ 
 monians was at all equal to their fame. And yet they 
 own two-fifths of the Peloponnesus, and are acknow¬ 
 ledged leaders of the whole, as well as of numerous 
 allies in the rest of Hellas. But their city is not 
 regularly built, and has no splendid temples or other 
 edifices ; it rather resembles a straggling, village like 
 the ancient towns of Hellas, and would therefore make 
 a poor show. Whereas, if the same fate befell the 
 Athenians, the ruins of Athens would strike the eye, 
 and we should infer their power to have been twice 
 as great as it really is. We ought not then to be unduly 
 a II. ii. 108. 
 
 IO. 
 
 That the 
 ancient 
 greatness of 
 Mycenae, 
 or of any 
 other city, 
 is not to be 
 estimated 
 by present 
 appear¬ 
 ances, 
 proved 
 from the 
 comparison 
 of Athens 
 and Sparta. 
 
8 
 
 NUMBERS OF THE EXPEDITION. 
 
 I. sceptical. The greatness of cities should be estimated 
 Homer’sac- by their real power and not by appearances. And we 
 number of Gm ay fairly suppose the Trojan expedition to have been 
 the forces. g rea j- er than any which preceded it, although according 
 to Homer, if we may once more appeal to his testimony, 
 not equal to those of our own day. He was a poet, and 
 may therefore be expected to exaggerate; yet, even 
 upon his showing, the expedition was comparatively 
 small. For it numbered, as he tells us, twelve hundred 
 ships, those of the Boeotians a carrying one hundred and 
 twenty men each, those of Philoctetes b fifty; and by these 
 numbers he may be presumed to indicate the largest and 
 the smallest ships ; else why in the catalogue is nothing 
 said about the size of any others? That the crews were 
 all fighting men as well as rowers he clearly implies 
 when speaking of the ships of Philoctetes; for he tells 
 us that all the oarsmen were likewise archers. And it 
 is not to be supposed that many who were not sailors 
 would accompany the expedition, except the kings and 
 principal officers ; for the troops had to cross the sea, 
 bringing with them the materials of war, in vessels with¬ 
 out decks, built after the old piratical fashion. Now if 
 we take a mean between the crews, the invading forces 
 will appear not to have been very numerous when we re¬ 
 member that they were drawn from the whole of Hellas. 
 
 11. The cause of the inferiority was not so much the want 
 Considem- of men as the want of money; the invading army was 
 specting the limited by the difficulty of obtaining supplies to such a 
 War. number as might be expected to live on the country in 
 which they were to fight. After their arrival at Troy, 
 when they had won a battle (as they clearly did, for 
 otherwise they could not have fortified their camp), even 
 then they appear not to have used the whole of their 
 force, but to have been driven by want of provisions to 
 the cultivation of the Chersonese and to pillage. And in 
 consequence of this dispersion of their forces, the Trojans 
 were enabled to hold out against them during the whole 
 a If ». 509, 510. b 11. ii. 7 j 9 ) 7 2o. 
 
RETURN OF THE HERACLIDAE. 
 
 9 
 
 ten years, being always a match for those who remained I. 
 on the spot. Whereas if the besieging army had brought 
 abundant supplies, and, instead of betaking themselves 
 to agriculture or pillage, had carried on the war per¬ 
 sistently with all their forces, they would easily have 
 been masters of the field and have taken the city; 
 since, even divided as they were, and with only a part of 
 their army available at any one time, they held their 
 ground. Or, again, they might have regularly invested 
 Troy, and the place would have been captured in less 
 time and with less trouble. Poverty was the real reason 
 why the achievements of former ages were insignificant, 
 and why the Trojan War, the most celebrated of them all, 
 when brought to the test of facts, falls short of its fame 
 and of the prevailing traditions to which the poets have 
 given authority. 
 
 Even in the age which followed the Trojan War, 12. 
 Hellas was still in process of ferment and settlement, Southward 
 and had no time for peaceful growth. The return of in Hellas 
 the Hellenes from Troy after their long absence led to Trojan 6 
 many changes: quarrels too arose in nearly every city, ^s’de 060 " 
 and those who were expelled by them went and founded scend out of 
 
 . . . ... _ Thessalia; 
 
 other cities. Thus in the sixtieth year after the fall of Dorian oc- 
 Troy, the Boeotian people, having been expelled from the Peio-° f 
 Arne by the Thessalians, settled in the country formerly P° nnesus : 
 called Cadmeis, but now Boeotia: a portion of the tribe Dorian 
 
 . . colonies. 
 
 already dwelt there, and some of these had joined in the 
 Trojan expedition. In the eightieth year after the war, 
 the Dorians led by the Heraclidae conquered the Pelo¬ 
 ponnesus. A considerable time elapsed before Hellas 
 became finally settled ; after a while, however, she re¬ 
 covered tranquillity and began to send out colonies. 
 
 The Athenians colonised Ionia and most of the islands; 
 the Peloponnesians the greater part of Italy and Sicily, 
 and various places in Hellas. These colonies were all 
 founded after the Trojan War. 
 
 ; As Hellas grew more powerful and the acquisition of 1 - 3 * 
 wealth became more and more rapid, the revenues of her navies in 
 
I. 
 
 Hellas : 
 
 Corinth, 
 
 Corcyra, 
 
 Ionia, 
 
 Samos, 
 
 Phocaea, 
 
 14 - 
 
 Scarcity of 
 triremes. 
 Smallness 
 of the Athe¬ 
 nian and 
 Aeginetan 
 fleets. 
 
 IO CORINTHIAN AND OTHER NAVIES. 
 
 cities increased, and in most of them tyrannies were 
 established ; they had hitherto been ruled by hereditary 
 kings, having fixed prerogatives. The Hellenes likewise 
 began to build navies and to make the sea their element. 
 
 The Corinthians are said to have first adopted something 
 like the modern style of ship-building, and the oldest 
 Hellenic triremes to have been constructed at Corinth. 
 
 A Corinthian ship-builder, Ameinocles, appears to have 
 built four ships for the Samians ; he went to Samos 
 about three hundred years before the end of the Pelo- B.c. 704. 
 ponnesian War. And the earliest naval engagement on 0L I9 ' 
 record is that between the Corinthians and Corcyraeans 
 which occurred about forty years later. Corinth, being b.c. 664. 
 seated on an isthmus, was naturally from the first a 01 * 29 ' 
 centre of commerce ; for the Hellenes within and with¬ 
 out the Peloponnese in the old days, when they commu¬ 
 nicated chiefly by land, had to pass through her territory 
 in order to reach one another. Her wealth too was a 
 source of power, as the ancient poets testify, who speak 
 of ‘Corinth the rich a .’ When navigation grew more com¬ 
 mon, the Corinthians, having already acquired a fleet, 
 were able to put down piracy; they offered a market 
 both by sea and land, and with the increase of riches 
 the power of their city increased yet more. Later, in the B.c. 559- 
 time of Cyrus, the first Persian king, and of Cambyses 0155, 2- 
 his son, the Ionians had a large navy; they fought with 
 Cyrus, and were for a time masters of the sea around 521.’ 529_ 
 their own coasts. Polycrates, too, who was tyrant of 6^' ^ 2 ’ 4 ~ 
 Samos in the reign of Cambyses, had a powerful navy B - c - 54 6 - 
 and subdued several of the islands, among them Rhenea, 01. 58, 3- 
 which he dedicated to the Delian Apollo b . And the 6 °' 3 ‘ 
 Phocaeans, when they were colonising Massalia, defeated b.c. 600. 
 the Carthaginians in a sea-fight. 01 ‘ 45 ‘ 
 
 These were the most powerful navies, and even these, 
 which came into existence many generations after the 
 Trojan War, appear to have consisted chiefly of fifty- 
 oared vessels and galleys of war, as in the days of Troy; 
 a II. ii. 570. b Cp. iii. 104 init. 
 
wo 
 
 WAR BETWEEN CHALCIS AND ERETRIA. li 
 
 as yet triremes were not common. But a little before I. 
 j C ^ 4 8 5 - the Persian War and the death of Darius, who succeeded 
 Cambyses, the Sicilian tyrants and the Corcyraeans 
 had them in considerable numbers. No other maritime 
 powers of any consequence arose in Hellas before the 
 expedition of Xerxes. The Aeginetans, Athenians, and 
 a few more had small fleets, and these mostly consisted 
 of fifty-oared galleys. a Even the ships which the 
 Athenians built quite recently at the instigation of 
 Themistocles, when they were at war with the Aegine¬ 
 tans and in expectation of the Barbarian, even these 
 ships with which they fought at Salamis were not com¬ 
 pletely decked a . 
 
 So inconsiderable were the Hellenic navies in recent 15. 
 as well as in more ancient times. And yet those who The chief 
 applied their energies to the sea obtained a great acces- Hellas° 
 sion of strength by the increase of their revenues and warsby 
 the extension of their dominion. For they attacked laad iaaon ' 
 
 J siderable. 
 
 and subjugated the islands, especially when the pressure 
 of population was felt by them. Whereas by land, no 
 conflict of any kind which brought increase of power 
 ever occurred; what wars they had were mere border 
 feuds. Foreign and distant expeditions of conquest the 
 Hellenes never undertook ; they were not as yet ranged 
 under the command of the great states, nor did they 
 form voluntary leagues or make expeditions on an equal 
 footing. Their wars were only the wars of the several 
 neighbouring tribes with one another. Jt was in the 
 ancient conflict between the Chalcidians and the Ere- 
 trians that the rest of Hellas was most divided and took 
 the greatest part b . 
 
 There were different impediments to the progress of 16. 
 the different states. The Ionians had attained great Im pedi- 
 
 ^ . 0 ments to 
 
 prosperity when Cyrus and the Persians, having over- progress: 
 
 a Or, 1 It was quite at a recent period, when the Athenians were 
 at war with the Aeginetans and in expectation of the Barbarian, that 
 Themistocles persuaded them to build the ships with which they 
 fought at Salamis; and even these were not completely decked.’ 
 
 b Herod, v. 99. 
 
12 
 
 OVERTHROW OF THE TYRANTS. 
 
 I. 
 
 (i) The 
 rising power 
 of the 
 Persians. 
 
 i7- 
 
 (2) The 
 petty aims 
 and cau¬ 
 tious na¬ 
 tures of the 
 tyrants. 
 
 l8. 
 
 They were 
 at length 
 overthrown 
 by Sparta, 
 which for 
 four hun¬ 
 dred years 
 has been 
 well 
 
 governed. 
 
 thrown Croesus and subdued the countries between the B.c 546. 
 river Halys and the sea, made war against them and 01 ' 5 ' 3 
 enslaved the cities on the mainland. Some time after- b.c. 493. 
 wards, Darius, strong in the possession of the Phoenician ’ 7 ' 4 
 fleet, conquered the islands also. 
 
 Nor again did the tyrants of the Hellenic cities ex¬ 
 tend their thoughts beyond their own interest, that is, 
 the security of their persons, and the aggrandisement 
 of themselves and their families. They were extremely 
 cautious in the administration of their government, and 
 nothing considerable was ever effected by them ; they 
 only fought with their neighbours, as in Sicily, where 
 their power attained its greatest height. Thus for a 
 long time everything conspired to prevent Hellas from 
 uniting in any great action and to paralyse enterprise 
 in the individual states. 
 
 At length the tyrants of Athens and of the rest of b.c. 510. 
 Hellas (which had been under their dominion long before 01 * 6? ’ 3 " 
 Athens), at least the greater number of them, and with 
 the exception of the Sicilian the last who ever ruled, 
 were put down by the Lacedaemonians. For although 
 Lacedaemon, after the conquest a of the country by the 
 Dorians who now inhabit it, remained long unsettled, 
 and indeed longer than any country which we know, 
 nevertheless she obtained good laws at an earlier period 
 than any other, and has never been subject to tyrants; 
 she has preserved the same form of government for 
 rather more than four hundred years, reckoning to the B.c. 804- 
 end of the Peloponnesian War. It was the excellence of oi 4 95 . 
 her constitution which gave her power, and thus enabled 
 her to regulate the affairs of other states. Not long after 
 the overthrow of the tyrants by the Lacedaemonians, the 
 battle of Marathon was fought between the Athenians b.c. 490. 
 and the Persians ; ten years later, the Barbarian returned OL 72 ’ 3> 
 
 ... 1 • 1 B.C. 480. 
 
 with the vast armament which was to enslave Hellas. 01. 75. 
 
 In the greatness of the impending danger, the Lacedae¬ 
 monians, who were the most powerful state in Hellas, 
 a Reading Krrjaiv. 
 
THE PERSIAN WAR. 
 
 3 
 
 assumed the lead of the confederates. The Athenians, I. 
 
 as the Persian host advanced, resolved to forsake their The Hel¬ 
 lenes, who 
 
 city, broke up their homes, and, taking to their ships, had been 
 became sailors. The Barbarian was repelled by a com- resisting the 
 mon effort; but soon the Hellenes, a as well those who ^ 0 e ^^ ke 
 had revolted from the King as those who formed the u p tWQ 
 original confederacy a , took different sides and became cies. 
 the allies, either of the Athenians or of the Lacedae¬ 
 monians ; for these were now the two leading powers, 
 the one strong by land and the other by sea. The 
 league between them was of short duration ; they 
 speedily quarrelled and, with their respective allies, 
 went to war. Any of the other Hellenes who had 
 differences of their own now resorted to one or other 
 of them. So that from the Persian to the Peloponnesian 
 War, the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians were per¬ 
 petually fighting or making peace, either with one another 
 or with their own revolted allies; thus they attained mili¬ 
 tary efficiency, and learned experience in the school of 
 danger. 
 
 The Lacedaemonians did not make tributaries of * 9 - 
 those who acknowledged their leadership, but took 
 care that they should be governed by oligarchies inoftheAthe- 
 
 ... a i • nian an d 
 
 the exclusive interest of Sparta. The Athenians, on spartan 
 the other hand, after a time deprived the subject cities league ' 
 of their ships and made all of them pay a fixed tri¬ 
 bute, except Chios and Lesbos b . And the single power 
 c of Athens 0 at the beginning of this war was greater 
 than that of Athens and Sparta together at their great¬ 
 est, while the confederacy remained intact. 
 
 Such are the results of my enquiry into the early state ) 20. 
 
 of Hellas. d They will not readily be believed upon a Vulgar 
 
 J J errors. 
 
 a Or , 1 as well those who had revolted from the King, as those who 
 had joined with him.’ 
 
 b Cp. i. 96, 99; iii. 39 init.; vi. 85 med.; vii. 57 init. 
 
 c Or, ‘ either of Athens or Sparta/ 
 
 d Or (1), ‘They may not obtain entire credit, even when the 
 proofs of them are all set down in order.* Or (2), taking re^pia) 
 immediately after mo-revo-ai : ‘ Such are the results of my enquiries, 
 
14 
 
 EMENDATIONS OF HISTORY. 
 
 I. bare recital of all the proofs of them d . Men do not dis¬ 
 criminate, and are too ready to receive ancient traditions 
 about their own as well as about other countries. For 
 example, most Athenians think that Hipparchus was 
 actually tyrant when he was slain by Harmodius and 
 Aristogeiton; they are not aware that Hippias was the 
 eldest of the sons of Peisistratus, and succeeded him, and 
 that Hipparchus and Thessalus were only his brothers a . 
 At the last moment, Harmodius and Aristogeiton sud¬ 
 denly suspected that Hippias had been forewarned by 
 some of their accomplices. They therefore abstained 
 from attacking him, but, wishing to do something before 
 they were seized, and not to risk their lives in vain, they 
 slew Hipparchus, with whom they fell in near the temple 
 called Leocorium as he was marshalling the Panathenaic 
 procession. There are many other matters, not obscured 
 by time, but contemporary, about which the other 
 Hellenes are equally mistaken. For example, they 
 imagine that the kings of Lacedaemon in their council 
 have not one but two votes each b , and that in the army 
 of the Lacedaemonians there is a division called the 
 Pitanate division c ; whereas they never had anything of 
 the sort. So little trouble do men take in the search 
 after truth ; so readily do they accept whatever comes 
 first to hand. 
 
 21. Yet any one who upon the grounds which I have given 
 Uncertainty arrives at some such conclusion as my own about those 
 
 of early . i i i r T T . 
 
 history. ancient times, would not be far wrong. He must not be 
 mated by misled by the exaggerated fancies of the poets, or by the 
 loponnesimi ta ^ es °f chroniclers who seek to please the ear rather 
 greaterthan than to speak the truth. Their accounts cannot be tested 
 ing war. by him ; and most of the facts in the lapse of ages have 
 passed into the region of romance. At such a distance 
 of time he must make up his mind to be satisfied with 
 
 though the early history of Hellas is of a kind which forbids im¬ 
 plicit reliance on every particular of the evidence.’ Or (3), ‘ It is 
 difficult to set down all the proofs in order, so as to make the 
 
 account credible.’ 
 a Cp. vi. 54 seqq. 
 
 b Herod, vi. 57. 
 
 c Herod, ix. 53. 
 
 « O 
 
TRUTHFULNESS OF HIS OWN NARRATIVE. 15 
 
 conclusions resting upon the clearest evidence which can I. 
 be had. And, though men will always judge any war in 
 which they are actually fighting to be the greatest at the 
 time, but, after it is over, revert to their admiration of 
 some other which has preceded, still the Peloponnesian, 
 if estimated by the actual facts, will certainly prove to 
 have been the greatest ever known. 
 
 As to the speeches which were made either before or 22. 
 during the war, it was hard for me, and for others who The , 
 
 0 speeches 
 
 reported them to me, to recollect the exact words. I have could not 
 
 therefore put into the mouth of each speaker the senti- reported. 7 
 
 ments proper to the occasion, expressed as I thought he to inS 
 
 would be likely to express them, while at the same time ^ e t r ^j£ 
 
 I endeavoured, as nearly as I could, to give the general about 
 
 • events 
 
 purport of what was actually said. Of the events of the 
 war I have not ventured to speak from any chance infor¬ 
 mation, nor according to any notion of my own; I have 
 described nothing but what I either saw myself, or learned 
 from others of whom I made the most careful and par¬ 
 ticular enquiry. The task was a laborious one, because 
 eye-witnesses of the same occurrences gave different 
 accounts of them, as they remembered or were interested 
 in the actions of one side or the other. And very likely 
 the strictly historical character of my narrative may be 
 disappointing to the ear. But if he who desires to have 
 before his eyes a true picture of the events which have 
 happened, and of the like events which may be expected 
 to happen hereafter in the order of human things, shall 
 pronounce what I have written to be useful, then I shall 
 be satisfied. My history is an everlasting possession, not 
 a prize composition which is heard and forgotten. 
 
 The greatest achievement of former times was the 23. 
 Persian War; yet even this was speedily decided in two Length of 
 battles by sea and two by land. But the Peloponnesian which was 
 War was a protracted struggle, and attended by calami- aiiT^of 7 
 ties such as Hellas had never known within a like period ordinal' 
 of time. Never were so many cities captured and de- and . extra- 
 populated—some by Barbarians, others by Hellenes Among y the 
 
I. 
 
 latter might 
 be enume¬ 
 rated earth¬ 
 quakes, 
 eclipses, 
 droughts, 
 and lastly, 
 the plague. 
 
 24. 
 
 The story 
 of Epi- 
 damnus. 
 Civil strife 
 and war 
 with the 
 barbarians. 
 
 16 CAUSES OF THE WAR. 
 
 themselves fighting against one another; and several of 
 them after their capture were repeopled by strangers. 
 Never were exile and slaughter more frequent, whether 
 in the war or brought about by civil strife. And rumours, 
 of which the like had often been current before, but rarely 
 verified by fact, now appeared to be well grounded. 
 There were earthquakes unparalleled in their extent and 
 fury, and eclipses of the sun more numerous than are re¬ 
 corded to have happened in any former age ; there were 
 also in some places great droughts causing famines, and 
 lastly the plague which did immense harm and destroyed 
 numbers of the people. All these calamities fell upon 
 Hellas simultaneously with the war, which began when 
 the Athenians and Peloponnesians violated the thirty 
 years’ truce concluded by them after the recapture of 
 Euboea a . Why they broke it and what were the grounds 
 of quarrel I will first set forth, that in time to come no 
 man may be at a loss to know what was the origin of 
 this great war. The real though unavowed cause I believe 
 to have been the growth of the Athenian power, which 
 terrified the Lacedaemonians and forced them into war; 
 but the reasons publicly alleged on either side were as 
 follows. 
 
 The city of Epidamnus is situated on the right hand 
 as you sail up the Ionian Gulf. Near it dwelt the 
 Taulantians, a barbarian tribe of the Illyrian race. The 
 place was colonised by the Corcyraeans, but under the 
 leadership of a Corinthian, Phalius, son of Eratocleides, 
 who was of the lineage of Heracles; he was invited, 
 according to ancient custom, from the mother city, and 
 Corinthians and other Dorians joined in the colony. Irj. 
 process of time Epidamnus became great and populous, 
 but there followed a long period of civil commotion, and 
 the city is said to have been brought low in a war against 
 the neighbouring barbarians, and to have lost her ancient 
 power. At last, shortly before the Peloponnesian War, 
 the notables were overthrown and driven out by the 
 a Cp. i. 115, 146. 
 
THE EPIDA MNIA NS AT CORINTH. 
 
 17 
 
 B.c. 435 or people; the exiles went over to the barbarians, and, I. 
 ol '86, 2 or uniting with them, plundered the remaining inhabitants 
 3 * both by sea and land. These, finding themselves hard The prayer 
 
 pressed, sent an embassy to the mother-city Corcyra, damnians 
 begging the Corcyraeans not to leave them to their (sheeted 
 fate, but to reconcile them to the exiles and put down ^ y 0 jjj^ city 
 their barbarian enemies. The ambassadors came, and Corcyra. 
 sitting as suppliants in the temple of Here preferred 
 their request; but the Corcyraeans would not listen to 
 them, and they returned without success. The Epidam- 25. 
 nians, finding that they had no hope of assistance from 
 Corcyra, knew not what to do, and sending to Delphi 
 enquired of the God whether they should deliver up the 
 city to their original founders, the Corinthians, and en¬ 
 deavour to obtain aid from them. The God replied 
 that they should, and bade them place themselves under 
 the leadership of the Corinthians. So the Epidam- They place 
 nians went to Corinth, and informing the Corinthians under the 
 of the answer which the oracle had given, delivered £f coSmh 
 up the city to them. They reminded them that the 
 original leader of the colony was a citizen of Corinth; 
 and implored the Corinthians to come and help them, 
 and not leave them to their fate. The Corinthians 
 took up their cause, partly in vindication of their own 
 rights (for they considered that Epidamnus belonged 
 to them quite as much as to the Corcyraeans), partly 
 too because they hated the Corcyraeans, who were 
 their own colony but slighted them. In their common 
 festivals they would not allow them the customary privi¬ 
 leges of founders, and at their sacrifices denied to a 
 Corinthian the right of receiving first the lock of hair cut 
 from the head of the victim, an honour usually granted 
 by colonies to a representative of the mother-country. 
 
 In fact they despised the Corinthians, for they were more 
 than a match for them in military strength, and as rich 
 as any state then existing in Hellas. They would often 
 boast that on the sea they were very far superior to 
 them, and would appropriate to themselves the naval 
 
 C 
 
26. 
 
 The Corin¬ 
 thians send 
 troops and 
 colonists to 
 Epidamnus. 
 The Corcy- 
 raeans de¬ 
 mand their 
 dismissal; 
 on being 
 refused they 
 besiege the 
 city. 
 
 27. 
 
 The Corin¬ 
 thians pre¬ 
 pare for war 
 and pro¬ 
 claim a 
 
 18 SIEGE OF EPIDAMNUS. 
 
 renown of the Phaeacians, who were the ancient in¬ 
 habitants of the island. Such feelings led them more 
 and more to strengthen their navy, which was by no 
 means despicable; for they had a hundred and twenty 
 triremes when the war broke out. 
 
 Irritated by these causes of offence, the Corinthians 
 were too happy to assist Epidamnus; accordingly they 
 invited any one who was willing to settle there, and for 
 the protection of the colonists dispatched with them Am- 
 bracian and Leucadian troops and a force of their own. 
 All these they sent by land as far as Apollonia, which 
 is a colony of theirs, fearing that if they went by sea 
 the Corcyraeans might oppose their passage. Great was 
 the rage of the Corcyraeans when they discovered that 
 the settlers and the troops had entered Epidamnus and 
 that the colony had been given up to the Corinthians. 
 They immediately set sail with five and twenty ships, 
 followed by a second fleet, and in insulting terms bade 
 the Epidamnians receive the exiled oligarchs, who had 
 gone to Corcyra and implored the Corcyraeans to re¬ 
 store them, appealing to the tie of kindred and pointing 
 to the sepulchres of their common ancestors a . They also 
 bade them send away the troops and the new settlers. 
 But the Epidamnians would not listen to their demands. 
 Whereupon the Corcyraeans attacked them with forty 
 ships. They were accompanied by the exiles whom they 
 were to restore, and had the assistance of the native Il¬ 
 lyrian troops. They sat down before the city, and made 
 proclamation that any Epidamnian who chose, and the 
 foreigners, might depart in safety, but that all who re¬ 
 mained would be treated as enemies. Being met by a 
 refusal, the Corcyraeans proceeded to invest the city, 
 which is built upon an isthmus. 
 
 When the news reached the Corinthians that Epi¬ 
 damnus was besieged, they equipped an army and 
 proclaimed that a colony was to be sent thither; all 
 who wished might go and enjoy equal rights of citizen- 
 a Cp. iii. 58 med., 59 init. 
 
 B.C. 435 
 434 - 
 
 Ol. 86, 2 
 3 - 
 
EMBASSY FROM CORCYRA TO CORINTH . 19 
 
 b.c. 435 or ship ; but any one who was unwilling to sail at once I. 
 
 OL 86, 2 or might remain at Corinth, and, if he made a deposit of 
 3 * fifty Corinthian drachmae, might still have a share in Megara 
 
 the colony a . Many sailed, and many deposited the friendly 
 money. The Corinthians also sent and requested the nf s h S a fur ~ 
 Megarians to furnish them with a convoy in case the convoy. 
 Corcyraeans should intercept the colonists on their 
 voyage. The Megarians accordingly provided eight 
 ships, and the Cephallenians of Pale four; the Epi- 
 daurians, of whom they made a similar request, five ; 
 the Hermionians one; the Troezenians two; the Leu- 
 cadians ten ; and the Ambraciots eight. Of the Thebans 
 and Phliasians they begged money, and of the Eleans 
 money, and ships without crews. On their own account 
 they equipped thirty ships and three thousand hoplites. 
 
 When the Corcyraeans heard of their preparations 28. 
 they came to Corinth, taking with them Lacedaemonian The Cor- 
 and Sicyonian envoys, and summoned the Corinthians propose ar- 
 to withdraw the troops and the colonists, telling them offering 1 ’ 
 that they had nothing to do with Epidamnus. If they Virion be 
 made any claim to it, the Corcyraeans expressed them- given to 
 
 ... . withdraw 
 
 selves willing to refer the cause for arbitration to such their troops 
 Peloponnesian states as both parties should agree upon, ihiam C with- 
 and their decision was to be final; or, they were willing allow ’ 
 to leave the matter in the hands of the Delphian oracle. both to re- 
 But they deprecated war, and declared that, if war there Epidamnus 
 must be, they would be compelled by the Corinthians menf. ree ' 
 in self-defence to discard their present friends and seek 
 others w r hom they would rather not, for help they must 
 have. The Corinthians replied that if the Corcyraeans 
 would withdraw the ships and the barbarian troops they 
 would consider the matter, but that it would not do for 
 them to be litigating while Epidamnus and the colonists 
 were in a state of siege. The Corcyraeans rejoined that 
 they would consent to this proposal if the Corinthians on 
 
 a Fifty Corinthian drachmae are equivalent to eighty-three Attic 
 drachmae: reckoning the Attic drachma at 9the sum would 
 amount to 3/. 7 s. 6 d. 
 
 C % 
 
20 
 
 CAPTURE OF EPIDAMNUS. 
 
 I. their part would withdraw their forces from Epidamnus : B.c. 435 or 
 a or again, they were willing that both parties should ol 86 , 2 or 
 remain a on the spot, and that a truce should be made 3 ‘ 
 until the decision was given. 
 
 2 9 - The Corinthians turned a deaf ear to all these over- 
 thkn^re- 11 " * ures ’ an d, when their vessels were manned and their 
 fuse, and allies had arrived, they sent a herald before them to 
 
 declare war. . . 
 
 Sailing to declare war, and set sail for Epidamnus with seventy- 
 they are nUS five ships and two thousand hoplites, intending to give 
 attacked by battle to the Corcyraeans. Their fleet was commanded 
 the Corey- by Aristeus the son of Pellichus, Callicrates the son of 
 
 raeans and ' # J 
 
 completely Callias, and Timanor the son of Timanthes ; the land 
 On the ’ forces by Archetimus the son of Eurytimus, and Isarchi- 
 Epridamnus ^ as the son I sarc hus. When they arrived at Actium 
 surrenders. j n the territory of Anactorium, at the mouth of the 
 Ambracian gulf, where the temple of Apollo stands, 
 the Corcyraeans sent a herald to them in a small boat 
 forbidding them to come on. Meanwhile their crews 
 got on board ; they had previously equipped their fleet, 
 strengthening the old ships with cross-timbers, so as to 
 make them serviceable. The herald brought back no 
 message of peace from the Corinthians. The Corcyraean 
 ships, numbering eighty (for forty out of the hundred 
 and twenty were engaged in the blockade of Epidamnus), 
 were now fully manned ; these sailed out against the 
 Corinthians and, forming line, fought and won a complete 
 victory over them, and destroyed fifteen of their ships. 
 
 On the very same day the forces besieging Epidamnus 
 succeeded in compelling the city to capitulate, the terms 
 being that the Corinthians until their fate was deter¬ 
 mined should be imprisoned and the strangers sold. 
 
 3 °- After the sea-fight the Corcyraeans raised a trophy 
 cyraeans" on Leucimme, a promontory of Corcyra, and put to 
 having com- death all their prisoners with the exception of the 
 
 mand of the . . 1 
 
 sea, plunder Corinthians, whom they kept in chains. The defeated 
 Corinth. 5 ° f Corinthians and their allies then returned home, and 
 
 a Or, ‘ or again, they would agree to arbitration on the condition 
 that both parties should remain’ etc. 
 
CORINTHIAN AND CORCYRAEAN EMBASSIES. 21 
 
 B.C. 435 or 
 434 - 
 
 Ol. 86, 2 or 
 3 - 
 
 B.C. 434, 
 433 - 
 
 Ol. 86, 3, 4. 
 
 B.C. 433. 
 Ol. 86, 4. 
 
 the Corcyraeans (who were now masters of the Ionian I. 
 sea), sailing to Leucas, a Corinthian colony, devastated ^ 
 the country. They also burnt Cyllene, where the thians form 
 Eleans had their docks, because they had supplied the pro^t ° 
 Corinthians with money and ships. And, during the them - 
 greater part of the summer after the battle, they retained 
 the command of the sea and sailed about plundering the 
 allies of the Corinthians. But, before the season was 
 over, the Corinthians, perceiving that their allies were 
 suffering, sent out a fleet and formed a camp at Actium 
 and near the promontory of Cheimerium in Thesprotia, 
 that they might protect Leucas and other friendly places. 
 
 The Corcyraeans with their fleet and army stationed 
 themselves on the opposite coast at Leucimme. Neither 
 party attacked the other, but during the remainder of 
 the summer they maintained their respective positions, 
 and at the approach of winter returned home. 
 
 For the whole year after the battle, and for a year 3l« 
 after that, the Corinthians, exasperated by their defeat, ^n?pre- 
 were busy in building ships. They took the utmost pare to 
 
 renew the 
 
 pams to create a great navy: rowers were collected war, and 
 from the Peloponnesus and from the rest of Hellas by Jaeansfo 7 " 
 the attraction of pay. The Corcyraeans were alarmed anembaSy 
 at the report of their preparations. They reflected that to^Athens, 
 they had not enrolled themselves in the league either of they are 
 the Athenians or of the Lacedaemonians, and that allies corintfoarf 
 in Hellas they had none. They determined to go to envoys * 
 Athens, join the Athenian alliance, and get what help 
 they could from them. The Corinthians, hearing of their 
 intentions, also sent ambassadors to Athens, fearing lest 
 the combination of the Athenian and Corcyraean navies 
 might prevent them from bringing the war to a satisfac¬ 
 tory termination. Accordingly an assembly was held at 
 which both parties came forward to plead their respective 
 causes ; and first the Corcyraeans spoke as follows :— 
 
 ‘Men of Athens, those who, like ourselves, come to 3 2 * 
 others who are not their allies and to whom they have Speech of 
 
 J the Corcy- 
 
 never rendered any considerable service and ask help raeans. 
 
SPEECH OF THE CORCYRAEANS . 
 
 22 
 
 I. of them, are bound to show, in the first place, that the B - c ^433 
 Sditywas S ran ^ n S °f their request is expedient, or at any rate ' ' 4 
 
 a mistake, not inexpedient, and, secondly, that their gratitude will 
 us isolated be lasting. If they fulfil neither requirement they have 
 of the Co- Cy no right to complain of a refusal. Now the Corcyraeans, 
 rinthians w hen they sent us hither to ask for an alliance, were 
 
 and their ' . 
 
 allies. confident that they could establish to your satisfaction 
 both these points. But, unfortunately, we have had a 
 practice alike inconsistent with the request which we 
 are about to make and contrary to our own interest 
 at the present moment:—Inconsistent; for hitherto we 
 have never, if we could avoid it, been the allies of others, 
 and now we come and ask you to enter into an alliance 
 with us:—Contrary to our interest; for through this 
 practice we find ourselves isolated in our war with the 
 Corinthians. The policy of not making alliances lest 
 they should endanger us at another’s bidding, instead 
 of being wisdom, as we once fancied, has now unmis¬ 
 takably proved to be weakness and folly. True, in 
 the last naval engagement we repelled the Corinthians 
 single-handed. But now they are on the point of 
 attacking us with a much greater force which they have 
 drawn together from the Peloponnesus and from all 
 Hellas. We know that we are too weak to resist them 
 unaided, and may expect the worst if we fall into their 
 hands. We are therefore compelled to ask assistance of 
 you and of all the world; and you must not be hard 
 upon us if now, renouncing our indolent neutrality which 
 was an error but not a crime, we dare to be inconsistent. 
 
 33 * ‘To you at this moment the request which we are 
 the afcurf ma king offers a glorious opportunity. In the first place, 
 
 Athens,who y G u will assist the oppressed and not the oppressors : 
 
 will thus J rr ’ 
 
 assist the secondly, you will admit us to your alliance at a time 
 andgSn 1 ’ when our dearest interests are at stake, and will lay up 
 affechon ing a treasure °f gratitude in our memories which will have 
 She should the most abiding of all records. Lastly, we have a navy 
 
 not reject J J 
 
 the offer of greater than any but your own. Reflect; what good 
 raean navy. fortune can be more extraordinary, what more annoying 
 
SPEECH OF THE CORCYRAEANS. 
 
 2 3 
 
 ) 3 - to your enemies than the voluntary accession of a power I. 
 
 4 ’ for whose alliance you would have given any amount of 
 money and could never have been too thankful ? This 
 power now places herself at your disposal; you are to 
 incur no danger and no expense, and she brings you a 
 good name in the world, gratitude from those who seek 
 your aid, and an increase of your own strength. Few 
 have ever had all these advantages offered them at once; 
 equally few when they come asking an alliance are able 
 to give in the way of security and honour as much as 
 they hope to receive. 
 
 4 And if any one thinks that the war in which our services For war is 
 may be needed will never arrive, he is mistaken. He does imminent - 
 not see that the Lacedaemonians, fearing the growth of 
 your empire, are eager to take up arms, and that the 
 Corinthians, who are your enemies, are all-powerful with 
 them. They begin with us, but they will go on to you, 
 that we may not stand united against them in the bond 
 of a common enmity; they will not miss the chance of 
 weakening us and strengthening themselves. And it is 
 our business to strike first, we offering and you accepting 
 our alliance, and to forestall their designs instead of 
 waiting to counteract them. 
 
 ‘ If they say that we are their colony and that therefore 34. 
 you have no right to receive us, they should be made to True, we 
 understand that all colonies honour their mother-city iony of the 
 when she treats them well, but are estranged from her burtharis 5 ’ 
 by injustice. For colonists are not meant to be the n ? reason 
 
 J J # why we 
 
 servants but the equals of those who remain at home, should be 
 And the injustice of their conduct to us is manifest: for themf ed by 
 we proposed an arbitration in the matter of Epidamnus, 
 but they insisted on prosecuting their quarrel by arms 
 and would not hear of a legal trial a . When you see how 
 they treat us who are their own kinsmen, take warning: 
 if they try deception, do not be misled by them; and if 
 they make a direct request of you, refuse. For he passes 
 through life most securely who has least reason to re¬ 
 proach himself with complaisance to his enemies. 
 a Cp. i. 29 init. 
 
24 
 
 SPEECH OF THE CORCYRAEANS. 
 
 I. ‘ But again, you will not break the treaty with the Lace- B.c. 433. 
 
 ....,« 01.86,4. 
 
 35. daemonians a by receiving us : for we are not allies either 
 
 Reasons of you or of them. What says the treaty?—‘Any Hel- 
 
 Athenians lenic city which is the ally of no one may join whichever 
 
 ceiVe^he" l ea g ue it pleases.’ And how monstrous, that they should 
 
 Corcyrae- man their ships, not only from their own confederacy, but 
 ans into 1 
 
 alliance. from Hellas in general, nay, even from your subjects, 
 notTreak while they would debar us from the alliance which natu- 
 the treaty. m j]y Q ff ers anc j f r0 m every other, and will denounce it 
 as a crime if you accede to our request. With far better 
 reason shall we complain of you if you refuse. For you 
 will be thrusting away us who are not your enemies and 
 are in peril; and, far from restraining the enemy and 
 the aggressor, you will be allowing him to gather fresh 
 forces out of your own dominions. How unjust is this! 
 
 Surely if you would be impartial you should either 
 prevent the Corinthians from hiring soldiers in your 
 dominions, or send to us also such help as you can be 
 induced to send ; but it would be best of all if you would 
 openly receive and assist us. Many, as we have already 
 intimated, are the advantages which we offer. Above 
 all, our enemies are your enemies, which is the best 
 guarantee of fidelity in an ally; and they are not weak 
 but well able to injure those who secede from them. 
 
 Again, when the proffered alliance is that of a maritime 
 and not of an inland power, it is a far more serious 
 matter to refuse. You should, if possible, allow no one 
 to have a fleet but yourselves ; or, if this is impossible, 
 whoever is strongest at sea, make him your friend. 
 
 36. ‘Some one may think that the course which we recom- 
 They can- men d is expedient, but he may be afraid that if he is 
 
 not afford 
 
 to be convinced by our arguments he will break the treaty. 
 COTc^a 0 ^ ’ To him we reply, that if he will only strengthen himself 
 to sidiy^ y h e ma y ma ^ e a present of his fears to the enemy, but 
 and is one that if he reject the alliance he will be weak, and then 
 great man- his confidence, however reassuring to himself, will be 
 ofHeiias erS anything but terrifying to enemies who are strong. It 
 
 a Cp. i. 115 init. 
 
wo 
 
 SPEECH OF THE CORINTHIANS. 
 
 c. 433. is Athens about which he is advising, and not Corcyra: I. 
 
 ’ 4 ‘ will he be providing for her best interests if, when war is 
 imminent and almost at the door, he is so anxious about 
 the chances of the hour that he hesitates to attach to him 
 a state which cannot be made a friend or enemy with¬ 
 out momentous consequences? Corcyra, besides offering 
 many other advantages, is conveniently situated for the 
 coast voyage to Italy and Sicily; it stands in the way 
 of any fleet coming from thence to the Peloponnesus, 
 and can also protect a fleet on its way to Sicily. One 
 word more, which is the sum of all we have to say, and 
 should convince you that you must not abandon us. 
 
 Hellas has only three considerable navies:—there is 
 ours, and there is yours, and there is the Corinthian. 
 
 Now, if the Corinthians get hold of ours, and you allow 
 the two to become one, you will have to fight against 
 the united navies of Corcyra and the Peloponnesus. 
 
 But, if you make us your allies, you will have our navy 
 in addition to your own ranged at your side in the im¬ 
 pending conflict.’ 
 
 Thus spoke the Corcyraeans: the Corinthians replied 
 as follows :— 
 
 ‘Since these Corcyraeans have chosen to speak, not 37. 
 only of their reception into your alliance, but of our The neu - 
 
 . . . 1 • 1 1 1 trality of 
 
 misdoings and of the unjust war which has been forced the Corcy- 
 upon them by us, we too must touch on these two pretence 
 points before we proceed to our main argument, that you ^ e y con 
 may be better prepared to appreciate our claim upon ceal their 
 
 , , . r ... . crimes. 
 
 you, and may have a good reason for rejecting their pe¬ 
 tition. They pretend that they have hitherto refused to 
 make alliances from a wise moderation, but they really 
 adopted this policy from a mean and not from a high 
 motive. They did not want to have an ally who might 
 go and tell of their crimes, and who would put them to 
 the blush whenever they called him in. Their insular 
 position makes them judges of their own offences against 
 others, and they can therefore afford to dispense with 
 judges appointed under treaties; for they hardly ever 
 
26 SPEECH OF THE CORINTHIANS . 
 
 I. visit their neighbours, but foreign ships are constantly 
 driven to their shores by stress of weather. And all the 
 time they screen themselves under the specious name of 
 neutrality, making believe that they are unwilling to be 
 the accomplices of other men's crimes. But the truth is 
 that they wish to keep their own criminal courses to 
 themselves: where they are strong, to oppress: where 
 they cannot be found out, to defraud; and whatever they 
 may contrive to appropriate, never to be ashamed. If 
 they were really upright men, as they profess to be, the 
 greater their immunity from attack the more clearly they 
 might have made their honesty appear by a willingness 
 to submit differences to arbitration. 
 
 38. ‘But such they have not shown themselves either to- 
 Wegoto wards us or towards others. Although they are our 
 them be- colony they have always stood aloof from us, and now 
 
 cause they . - . . 1111 
 
 have they are fighting against us on the plea that they were 
 andin- d not sent out to be ill used. To which we rejoin that we 
 suited us. did no t senc ] them out to be insulted by them, but that 
 we might be recognised as their leaders and receive 
 proper respect. At any rate our other colonies honour 
 us; no city is more beloved by her colonies than Corinth. 
 That we are popular with the majority proves that the 
 Corcyraeans have no reason to dislike us; a and, if it 
 seems extraordinary that we should go to war with them, 
 our defence is that the injury which they are doing us is 
 unexampled a . Even if we had been misled by passion, 
 it would have been honourable in them to make allow¬ 
 ance for us, and dishonourable in us to use violence when 
 they showed moderation. But they have wronged us 
 over and over again in their insolence and pride of 
 wealth; and now there is our colony of Epidamnus 
 which they would not acknowledge in her distress, but 
 when we came to her rescue, they seized and are now 
 holding by force. 
 
 39. ‘They pretend that they first offered to have the matter 
 
 a Or, ‘and there is nothing extraordinary in our going to war 
 with them, for they are doing us an unexampled injury.’ 
 
 PQO 
 
KO 
 
 SPEECH OF THE CORINTHIANS. 
 
 27 
 
 •C. 433- decided by arbitration. The appeal to justice might have I. 
 
 ' 4 ’ some meaning in the mouth of one a who before he had re- The Corc y- 
 
 ^ . raeans pro- 
 
 course to arms acted honourably, as he now talks fairly a , posearbi- 
 
 , ... . r ... . , tration and 
 
 but not when it is made from a position of security and request your 
 advantage. Whereas these men began by laying siege when°they 
 to Epidamnus, and not until they feared our vengeance ^ e n ^ r 
 did they put forward their specious offer of arbitration. 
 
 And as if the wrong which they have themselves done at 
 Epidamnus were not enough, they now come hither and 
 ask you to be, not their allies, but their accomplices in 
 crime, and would have you receive them when they are 
 at enmity with us. But they ought to have come when 
 they were out of all danger, not at a time when we are 
 smarting under an injury and they have good reason to 
 be afraid. You have never derived any benefit from their 
 power, but they will now be benefited by yours, and, 
 although innocent of their crimes, you will equally be 
 held responsible by us. If you were to have shared 
 the consequences with them, they ought long ago to 
 have shared the power with you b . 
 
 * We have shown that our complaints are justified and 40. 
 that our adversaries are tyrannical and dishonest; we You win 
 
 . break the 
 
 will now prove to you that you have no right to receive treaty by 
 them. Admitting that the treaty allows any unenrolled them^and 
 cities to join either league, this provision does not apply usto^eyour 
 to those who have in view the injury of others, but only enemies, 
 to him who is in need of protection,—certainly not to 
 one who forsakes his allegiance and who will bring war 
 instead of peace to those who receive him, or rather, if 
 they are wise, will not receive him on such terms. And 
 war the Corcyraeans will bring to you if you listen to 
 them and not to us. For if you become the allies of the 
 
 a Or, ‘ whose actions corresponded to his professions, before he 
 entered on the struggle.’ 
 
 h The last words of the chapter are omitted by Poppo on the 
 authority of several of the best MSS. ; they may perhaps be a gloss. 
 
 If they are retained they may be translated: ‘ But you ought not 
 to share all the consequences of their crimes, while in the crimes, 
 and in them alone, you have no part.’ 
 
SPEECH OF THE CORINTHIANS. 
 
 We did not 
 encourage 
 your rebel¬ 
 lious sub¬ 
 jects, and 
 you should 
 not receive 
 ours. 
 
 I. Corcyraeans you will be no longer at peace with us, but B.c. 433. 
 will be converted into enemies ; and we must, if you take ' ' 4 ' 
 
 their part, in defending ourselves against them, defend 
 ourselves against you. But you ought in common justice 
 to stand aloof from both; or, if you must join either, 
 you should join us and go to war with them ; to Corinth 
 you are at all events bound by treaty, but with Corcyra 
 you never even entered into a temporary negotiation. 
 
 And do not set the precedent of receiving the rebellious 
 subjects of others. At the revolt of Samos a , when the b.c. 440. 
 other Peloponnesians were divided upon the question of 01 ‘ 85 ’ 
 giving aid to the rebels, we voted in your favour and 
 expressly maintained ‘ that every one should be allowed 
 to chastise his own allies.’ If you mean to receive and 
 assist evil-doers, we shall assuredly gain as many allies 
 of yours as you will of ours ; and you will establish a 
 principle which will tell against yourselves more than 
 against us. 
 
 ‘ Such are the grounds of right which we urge ; and 
 they are sufficient according to Hellenic law. And may 
 we venture to recall to your minds an obligation of which 
 we claim the repayment in our present need, we and you 
 being not enemies who seek one another’s hurt, nor yet 
 friends who freely give and take ? There was a time B.c. 491. 
 before the Persian invasion when you were in want of 01 ‘ 72 ’ 2 ‘ 
 ships for the Aeginetan war, and we Corinthians lent you 
 twenty: the service which we then rendered to you gave 
 you the victory over the Aeginetans b , as the other, which 
 prevented the Peloponnesians from aiding the Samians, 
 enabled you to punish Samos. Both benefits were con¬ 
 ferred on one of those critical occasions when men in 
 the act of attacking their enemies are utterly regardless 
 of everything but victory, and deem him who assists 
 them a friend though he may have previously been a 
 foe, him who opposes them a foe, even though he may 
 happen to be a friend ; nay, they will often neglect 
 their own interests in the excitement of the struggle. 
 
 41. 
 
 We lent you 
 twenty ships 
 in the Aegi¬ 
 netan war. 
 
 Cp. i. 115. 
 
 1j Cp. Herod, vi. 89. 
 
PQO 
 
 •C. 433 . 
 1. 86, 4. 
 
 SPEECH OF THE CORINTHIANS . 29 
 
 ‘ Think of these things ; let the younger be informed I. 
 of them by their elders, and resolve all of you to render 42 . 
 like for like. Do not say to yourselves that this is just, 
 but that in the event of war something else is expedient; 
 for the true path of expediency is the path of right. The 
 war with which the Corcyraeans would frighten you into 
 doing wrong is distant, and may never come; is it worth 
 while to be so carried away by the prospect of it, that 
 you bring upon yourselves the hatred of the Corinthians 
 which is both near and certain ? Would you not be 
 wiser in seeking to mitigate the ill-feeling which your 
 treatment of the Megarians has already inspired a ? The 
 later kindness done in season, though small in comparison, 
 may cancel a greater previous wrong. And do not be To do no 
 attracted by their offer of a great naval alliance ; for to better than a 
 do no wrong to a neighbour is a surer source of strength f^ance - ^ 1 
 than to gain a perilous advantage under the influence of 
 a momentary illusion. 
 
 ‘ We are now ourselves in the same situation in which 43- 
 you were, when we declared at Sparta that every one so 
 placed should be allowed to chastise his own allies; and 
 we claim to receive the same measure at your hands. You 
 were profited by our vote, and we ought not to be injured 
 by yours. Pay what you owe, knowing that this is our 
 time of need, in which a man’s best friend is he who does 
 him a service, he who opposes him, his worst enemy. 
 
 Do not receive these Corcyraeans into alliance in despite 
 of us, and do not support them in injustice. In acting 
 thus you will act rightly, and will consult your own true 
 interests.’ 
 
 Such were the words of the Corinthians. 
 
 The Athenians heard both sides, and they held two 44- 
 assemblies ; in the first of them they were more in- T he At J ie “ 
 fluenced by the words of the Corinthians, but in the somehesita- 
 second they changed their minds and inclined towards into a de- 
 the Corcyraeans. They would not go so far as to make han^e^t'h 
 an alliance both offensive and defensive with them ; for Corc y ra - 
 a Cp. i. 67 fin. 
 
Motives of 
 the Athe¬ 
 nians. 
 
 45 - 
 
 They send 
 ten ships to 
 Corcyra, 
 giving them 
 orders to 
 act on the 
 defensive. 
 
 46. 
 
 The Corin¬ 
 thian fleet 
 sails against 
 Corcyra. 
 
 30 ALLIANCE OF ATHENS WITH CORCYRA. 
 
 then, if the Corcyraeans had required them to join in an 
 expedition against Corinth, the treaty with the Pelopon¬ 
 nesians would have been broken. But they concluded a 
 defensive league, by which the two states promised to 
 aid each other if an attack were made on the territory 
 or on the allies of either. For they knew that in any 
 case the war with Peloponnesus was inevitable, and they 
 had no mind to let Corcyra and her navy fall into the 
 hands of the Corinthians. Their plan was to embroil 
 them more and more with one another, and then, when 
 the war came, the Corinthians and the other naval powers 
 would be weaker. They also considered that Corcyra 
 was conveniently situated for the coast voyage to Italy 
 and Sicily. 
 
 Under the influence of these feelings, they received 
 the Corcyraeans into alliance; the Corinthians departed; 
 and the Athenians now despatched to Corcyra ten ships 
 commanded by Lacedaemonius the son of Cimon, Dio- 
 timus the son of Strombichus, and Proteas the son of 
 Epicles. The commanders received orders not to engage 
 with the Corinthians unless they sailed against Corcyra 
 or to any place belonging to the Corcyraeans, and at¬ 
 tempted to land there, in which case they were to resist 
 them to the utmost. These orders were intended to 
 prevent a breach of the treaty a . 
 
 The Corinthians, when their preparations were com¬ 
 pleted, sailed against Corcyra with a hundred and 
 fifty ships,—ten Elean, twelve Megarian, ten Leucadian, 
 twenty-seven Ambraciot, one from Anactorium, and 
 ninety of their own. The contingents of the several 
 cities were commanded by their own generals. The 
 Corinthian commander was Xenocleides the son of Eu- 
 thycles, with four others. The fleet sailed from Leucas, 
 and, arriving at the mainland opposite Corcyra, came 
 to anchor at Cheimerium in the country of Thesprotia. 
 b Cheimerium is a harbour b ; above it, at some distance 
 
 a Cp. i. 40 init. 
 
 b Or, 1 Here there is a harbour.’ 
 
 PQO 
 
SEA-FIGHT NEAR CHEIMERIUM. 31 
 
 b.c. 432. from the sea, in that part of Thesprotia called Eleatis, I. 
 
 01 ‘ S? ' lies the city of Ephyr£, near which the Acherusian lake 
 finds a way into the sea ; the river Acheron, whence 
 the name is derived, flows through Thesprotia and falls 
 into the lake. Another river, the Thyamis, forms the 
 boundary of Thesprotia and Cestrine, and the promontory 
 of Cheimerium runs out between these two rivers. Here 
 the Corinthians anchored and encamped. 
 
 The Corcyraeans, observing their approach, manned 47. 
 a hundred and ten ships. These, which were placed ;^£° sition 
 under the command of Meiciades, Aesimides, and Eury- forces, 
 batus, took up a position off one of the islands called 
 Sybota ; the ten Athenian ships accompanied them. 
 
 The land forces occupied the promontory of Leucimme, 
 whither a thousand Zacynthians had come to the aid 
 of Corcyra. The Corinthians on their part were sup¬ 
 ported by a large force of barbarians, which collected on 
 the mainland ; for the inhabitants of this region have 
 always been well disposed towards them. 
 
 The Corinthians had now made their preparations, and, 48. 
 taking with them three days’ provisions, put off by night 
 from Cheimerium, intending to give battle: at break of 
 day they descried the Corcyraean fleet, which had also 
 put out to sea and was sailing to meet them. As soon 
 as they saw one another, they ranged themselves in order 
 of battle. On the right Corcyraean wing were the Athe¬ 
 nian ships. The Corcyraeans themselves occupied the 
 centre and the left wing, and were drawn up in three 
 divisions, each under the command of one of the generals. 
 
 On the right wing of the Corinthians were the Megarian 
 and Ambraciot ships, in the centre the contingents of their 
 other allies; they themselves with their swiftest vessels 
 formed the left wing, which was oj^Dosed to the Athenians 
 and to the right division of the Cordyraeans. 
 
 The standards were now raised on both sides, and the 49. 
 two fleets met and fought. The decks of both were Character 
 crowded with heavy infantry, with archers and with jave- gagement. 
 lin men; for their naval arrangements were still of the 
 
32 
 
 SEA-FIGHT NEAR CHEIMERIUM. 
 
 I. old clumsy sort. The engagement was obstinate, but more 
 courage than skill was displayed, and it had almost the 
 appearance of a battle by land. When two ships once 
 charged one another it was hardly possible to part com¬ 
 pany, for the throng of vessels was dense, and the hopes of 
 victory lay chiefly in the heavy-armed, who maintained a 
 steady flght upon the decks, the ships meanwhile remaining 
 motionless. There were no attempts to break the enemy’s 
 line. Brute force and rage made up for the want of tactics. 
 Everywhere the battle was a scene of tumult and confu¬ 
 sion. At any point where they saw the Corcyraeans 
 distressed, the Athenians appeared and kept the enemy 
 in check; but the generals, who were afraid of disobeying 
 their instructions, would not begin the attack themselves. 
 Partial sue- The Corinthians suffered most on their right wing. For 
 Corcyrae- the Corcyraeans with twenty ships routed them, drove 
 fe^t wing 16 them in disorder to the shore, and sailed right up to their 
 and their encampment; there landing, they plundered and burnt 
 
 complete 1 ; J r 
 
 defeat on the deserted tents. In this part of the battle the Corim 
 the right. t jq ans anc j q ie i r allies were worsted, and the Corcyraeans 
 prevailed. But the left wing of the Corinthians, where 
 their own ships were stationed, had greatly the advan¬ 
 tage, because the Corcyraeans, whose numbers were 
 originally inferior, had now twenty vessels detached in 
 The Athe- the pursuit. When the Athenians saw the distress of the 
 in the en- Corcyraeans, they began to assist them more openly, 
 gagement. £ rst t h e y h ac [ a b sta i nec [ f rom ac t U al collision, but 
 
 when the Corcyraeans fled outright and the Corinthians 
 pressed them hard, then every man fell to work; all dis¬ 
 tinctions were forgotten ;—the time had arrived when 
 Corinthian and Athenian were driven to attack one 
 another. 
 
 50. The Corinthians, having put to flight their enemies, 
 never stopped to take in tow the hulls of the vessels 
 which they had disabled, but fell upon the men ; they 
 rowed up and down and slew them, giving no quarter, 
 and unintentionally killing their own friends ; for they 
 were not aware that their right wing had been defeated. 
 
 PQ O 
 
MORE ATHENIAN VESSELS. 
 
 33 
 
 ^43, There were so many ships on one side and on the other, I. 
 and they covered so great an extent of water, that, when 
 the engagement had once begun, it was hard among 
 conquerors and conquered to distinguish friend from foe* 
 
 For never before had two Hellenic navies so numerous 
 met in battle. 
 
 When the Corinthians had chased the Corcyraeans to 
 the shore, they turned their attention to their own wrecks 
 and dead bodies. Most of these were recovered by them 
 and conveyed to Sybota, a desert harbour of Thesprotia, 
 whither their barbarian allies had come to support them. 
 
 They then formed afresh and once more made a move¬ 
 ment towards the Corcyraeans, who, taking such vessels 
 as had not been disabled, and any others which they had 
 in their docks, together with the Athenian ships, put out 
 to meet them, dreading a descent upon Corcyra. It was 
 now late in the day and the Paean had .been already 
 sounded for the onset, when the Corinthians suddenly 
 began to row astern. They had descried sailing towards Sudden 
 them twenty vessels which the Athenians had sent to of'twenty^ 
 reinforce the former ten, fearing what had actually hap- ^pg man 
 pened, that the Corcyraeans would be defeated, and 
 that the original squadron would be insufficient to protect 
 them. 
 
 The Corinthians, who had the first view of these vessels, 51. 
 suspecting that they were Athenian and that there were The two 
 more of them than they saw, were beginning to retreat, separate. 
 The Corcyraeans, owing to their position, could not see 
 them, and they wondered why the Corinthians rowed 
 astern. At length some one who spied the advancing 
 fleet exclaimed, ‘Yonder are ships coming; 5 and then 
 the Corcyraeans, as it was getting dark, likewise retired, 
 and the Corinthians turned about and sailed away. Thus 
 the two fleets separated after a battle which lasted until 
 nightfall. The twenty ships which came from Athens 
 under the command of Glaucon the son of Leagrus, and 
 Andocides the son of Leogoras, made their way through 
 the wrecks and corpses and sailed into the Corcyraean 
 
 D 
 
34 
 
 MESSAGE OF THE CORINTHIANS. 
 
 I. 
 
 52 - 
 
 The Corin¬ 
 thians want 
 to return 
 home. 
 
 They hold 
 a parley 
 with the 
 Athenians. 
 
 54 - 
 
 The Corin¬ 
 thians re¬ 
 
 station at Leucimme almost as soon as they were sighted. 
 At first in the darkness the Corcyraeans feared that they 
 were enemies, but they soon recognised them and the 
 Athenian vessels came to anchor. 
 
 On the next day the thirty Athenian and all the 
 Corcyraean ships which were fit for service, wanting to 
 ascertain whether the Corinthians would fight, sailed to 
 the harbour at Sybota where their fleet lay. The Corin¬ 
 thians, putting out into deep water, drew up their ships 
 in line and so remained, but they did not intend to begin 
 the battle. For they saw that fresh ships, which had re¬ 
 ceived no damage in the action, had arrived from Athens, 
 and their own position was one of great difficulty. They 
 had to guard the prisoners in their vessels, and there were 
 no means of refitting in such a desert place. They were 
 more disposed to consider how they should get home 
 than to fight. For they feared that the Athenians, deem¬ 
 ing the peace, now that blows had been exchanged, to be 
 already broken, would intercept their return. 
 
 They therefore determined to send a few men in a boat 
 without a flag of truce to the Athenians, and so test their 
 intentions. The men were to deliver the following mes¬ 
 sage: c You do wrong, Athenians, to begin war and 
 violate the treaty. We were only chastising our enemies, 
 and you come with a hostile force and place yourselves 
 between us and them. If it is your intention to hinder 
 us from sailing to Corcyra, or whithersoever we choose, 
 and you are going to break the treaty, take us first and 
 deal with us as enemies. 5 Whereupon all the Corcyraeans 
 who were within hearing cried out ‘Take and kill them. 5 
 But the Athenians replied: ‘Men of Peloponnesus, we are 
 not beginning war, and we are not violating the treaty; 
 we are only aiding the Corcyraeans, who are our allies. 
 If you mean to sail against Corcyra or any place belong¬ 
 ing to the Corcyraeans, we will do our utmost to prevent 
 you, but, if you want to go anywhere else, you may. 5 
 
 Reassured by this reply, the Corinthians prepared to 
 sail home, first setting up a trophy at the Sybota which 
 
 E.C. 432. 
 Cl. 87. 
 
Oto 
 
 THE CORCYRAEAN CAPTIVES . 
 
 35 
 
 c. 432. is on the mainland. The Corcyraeans took up the wrecks I. 
 
 and dead bodies which were carried towards them, the tu ™ home * 
 
 1 capturing 
 
 current and the wind which had risen during the night Anactorium 
 having scattered them in all directions. They then set voyage, 
 up a rival trophy on the island of Sybota. Both parties 
 claimed the victory, but on different grounds. The 
 Corinthians had retained the advantage in the sea- fight 
 until nightfall, and had thus secured a greater number of 
 wrecks and dead bodies ; they had taken not less than a 
 thousand prisoners and had disabled about seventy ships. 
 
 The Corcyraeans, on the other hand, had destroyed 
 some thirty sail, and when reinforced by the Athenians 
 had taken up the wrecks and dead bodies which had 
 drifted in their direction; whereas the enemy on the 
 evening of the battle had rowed astern at sight of the 
 Athenian ships, and after their arrival had not come out 
 against them from Sybota. Upon these grounds both 
 sides raised trophies and claimed the victory. On their 55 * 
 homeward voyage the Corinthians took by stratagem 
 Anactorium, a town situated at the mouth of the Am- 
 bracian Gulf, which they and the Corcyraeans held in 
 common; there they placed colonists of their own, and 
 returned to Corinth. Of their Corcyraean captives eight 
 hundred who were slaves they sold, but two hundred and 
 fifty they detained in prison, treating them with much 
 consideration, in the hope that, when they returned, they 
 would win over Corcyra to the Corinthian interests a : it 
 so happened that the majority of them were among the 
 most influential men of the state. Thus the war ended 
 to the advantage of Corcyra, and the Athenian fleet re¬ 
 turned home. This was the first among the causes of 
 the Peloponnesian war, the Corinthians alleging that the 
 Athenian fleet had taken part with the Corcyraeans and 
 had fought against them in defiance of the treaty. 
 
 There soon arose another cause of quarrel between the 56. 
 Athenians and Peloponnesians. Potidaea, which is situ- Affair of 
 ated on the isthmus of Pallene, was originally a Corinthian The Athe- 
 a Cp. iii. 70. 
 
 D % 
 
3 6 
 
 DEFECTION OF PERDICCAS. 
 
 I. colony, although at this time the tributary and ally of B.C. 432, 
 nianscom- Athens. Now the Corinthians were forming plans of 01,8/ * 
 
 mand the . , . 
 
 Potidaeans vengeance, and the Athenians, who suspected their m- 
 waiiTand 6 ^ tentions, commanded the Potidaeans to raze their walls 
 hosTages on s ^ e an d give hostages; also to send 
 
 away and not to receive for the future the magistrates 
 whom the Corinthians annually sent to them. For they 
 were afraid lest the Potidaeans might be persuaded by 
 the Corinthians and Perdiccas to revolt, and might induce 
 the rest of Chalcidice to follow their example. 
 
 57 * These measures of precaution were taken by the 
 quarrels^ Athenians immediately after the sea-fight off Corcyra. 
 
 Ath 1 th < e ^he hostility °f the Corinthians was no longer doubtful, 
 and tries to and Perdiccas, king of Macedon, the son of Alexander, 
 between Pe- hitherto the friend and ally of Athens, had now become an 
 and°Athens enem y* He had quarrelled with the Athenians because 
 they had made an alliance with his brother Philip and 
 with Derdas, who were leagued against him. Alarmed 
 by their attitude, he sent envoys to Sparta and did all he 
 could to stir up a war between Athens and the Pelopon- 
 nese. He also sought the alliance of Corinth, for he had 
 an eye to the revolt of Potidaea; and he proposed to 
 the Chalcidians and to the Bottiaeans that they should 
 join in the revolt, thinking, that if he had the assistance 
 of the neighbouring peoples, the difficulties of the war 
 would be diminished. The Athenians became aware of 
 his designs and resolved to forestall the revolt of the 
 cities. They were already intending to send against 
 Perdiccas thirty ships and a thousand hoplites under the 
 command of Archestratus the son of Lycomedes, and 
 ten others, and they told their admirals to take hostages 
 from the Potidaeans and to demolish their wall. They 
 were also to keep a watch over the towns in the neigh¬ 
 bourhood and prevent any attempt at rebellion. 
 
 58. Meanwhile the Potidaeans sent envoys to the Athenians 
 daeamsend in ^ k°P e °f persuading them to take no strong mea- 
 envoys to sures; but at the same time other envoys of theirs accom- 
 Spart n a S . and panied a Corinthian embassy to Lacedaemon and exerted 
 
ow 
 
 REVOLT OF POTJDAEA. 
 
 37 
 
 •Cg 432. themselves to procure assistance in case of need. A long I. 
 negotiation was carried on at Athens which ended in They re- 
 
 9 * * ceive pro- 
 
 nothing, and made no difference; the ships destined for mises of 
 Macedonia were also sent against Potidaea. But at Lace- f r om tance 
 daemon they were promised by the magistrates that if Sparta * 
 the Athenians attacked Potidaea they would invade At¬ 
 tica. So they seized the opportunity and revolted : the 
 Chalcidians and Bottiaeans swore alliance with them and 
 joined in the revolt. Perdiccas persuaded the Chalcidians 
 to abandon and pull down their towns on the sea-coast, 
 and settling at Olynthus inland, there to form one strong 
 city. On their removal he gave them part of his own 
 territory of Mygdonia about the lake Bolbe to cultivate 
 while the contest lasted. So, dismantling their cities, they 
 settled up the country and made preparation for war. 
 
 The Athenians, when the thirty ships arrived in Chal- 59 * 
 cidice, found that Potidaea and the other cities had The Aihe : 
 
 1 mans under 
 
 already revolted. Whereupon the generals, thinking that Archestra- 
 
 t tus arrive in 
 
 they were not strong enough without more troops to Chaicidic<b. 
 act against the rebels as well as against Perdiccas, di- atta^Ma- 
 rected their attention to Macedonia, which was their cedoma - 
 original destination, and there carried on a regular cam¬ 
 paign in concert with Philip and the brothers of Derdas, 
 who had invaded the country from the interior. 
 
 Now that Potidaea had revolted and the Athenian 60. 
 ships were on the coast of Macedonia, the Corinthians The Corin- 
 grew anxious about the town ; they felt that the danger troops to 
 came home to them, and dispatched thither volunteers p 0 e ti daea f 
 of their own and other troops whom they attracted by under th ® 
 
 A J J command 
 
 pay from various parts of the Peloponnese, numbering of Aristeus. 
 in all sixteen hundred hoplites and four hundred light¬ 
 armed. Their commander was Aristeus the son of 
 Adeimantus, who had always been a great friend of the 
 Potidaeans; it was mainly out of regard for him that 
 most of the Corinthian soldiers volunteered on the ex¬ 
 pedition. They arrived in Chalcidic£ forty days after the 
 revolt of Potidaea. 
 
 The news of the revolt in Chalcidice quickly reached 61. 
 
38 
 
 ARRIVAL OF THE ATHENIANS. 
 
 Athenian 
 reinforce¬ 
 ments under 
 Callias ar¬ 
 rive in 
 Macedonia; 
 the Athe¬ 
 nians make 
 a temporary 
 peace with 
 Perdiccas 
 and move 
 on to Po- 
 tidaea. 
 
 Engage¬ 
 ment at the 
 Isthmus of 
 Pallene. 
 
 Athens, and the Athenians, when they heard that Aris- 
 teus had come with reinforcements, sent against the re¬ 
 volted towns forty ships and two thousand of their own 
 hoplites under the command of Callias the son of Cal- 
 liades, and four others. The expedition, sailing first of 
 all to Macedonia, found that the former thousand had just 
 taken Therme and were blockading Pydna; they joined in 
 the siege themselves; but before long the Athenian army 
 were constrained to come to an understanding and make 
 an alliance with Perdiccas. For Potidaea, now that Aris- 
 teus had arrived, urgently demanded their presence; so 
 they prepared to quit Macedonia. They first marched out 
 of their way to Beroea, which they attempted to take with¬ 
 out success. Returning to their route, they moved on by 
 land towards Potidaea with three thousand hoplites of 
 their own and a large force of allies; they had also six 
 hundred Macedonian horse, who fought under Philip and 
 Pausanias; meanwhile their ships, in number seventy, 
 sailed along the coast. Proceeding by slow marches, they 
 arrived on the third day at Gigonus and there encamped. 
 
 The Potidaeans and the Peloponnesian force under 
 Aristeus had now taken up a position at the Isthmus 
 on the side towards Olynthus, where they awaited 
 the coming of the Athenians ; they held their market 
 outside the walls of Potidaea. The allies had chosen 
 
 Aristeus general of all the infantry, and of the cavalry 
 Perdiccas, for he had no sooner joined than he again 
 deserted the Athenians and was now fighting on the 
 side of the Potidaeans, having appointed Iolaus a to be 
 his lieutenant at home a . The plan of Aristeus was as 
 follows :—His own army was to remain on the Isthmus 
 and watch for the approach of the Athenians, while the 
 Chalcidians, their allies from beyond the Isthmus, and the 
 two hundred horse furnished by Perdiccas were stationed 
 at Olynthus ; and as soon as the Athenians attacked 
 Aristeus and his army, they were to fall upon them in 
 
 a Or, ‘ to take his place with the expedition ; ’ cp. infra , rpv -napa 
 UepdiKKov diaKoaiav innov. 
 
 oa 
 
CQO 
 
 ATHENIAN VICTORY. 
 
 39 
 
 .c. 432. the rear; thus the enemy would be assailed on both I. 
 
 ' 8? ' sides. But Callias the Athenian general and his col¬ 
 leagues sent the Macedonian horse and a few of the 
 allied troops towards Olynthus that they might check 
 any movement in that quarter, while they themselves, 
 quitting their position, marched against Potidaea. When 
 they had reached the Isthmus and saw the enemy pre¬ 
 paring for battle, they did the same. The two armies 
 soon closed. The wing led by Aristeus, which was 
 composed of his Corinthian followers and other picked 
 troops, routed their opponents and pursued them far 
 away; but the rest of the army, both Potidaeans and 
 Peloponnesians, were defeated by the Athenians and 
 fled into the city. 
 
 Aristeus, when he returned from the pursuit and 63. 
 perceived that the other wing of his army was defeated, Tte army 
 hesitated whether he should make for Olynthus or return is partially 
 to Potidaea. Both courses were hazardous; but at last ^succeeds 
 he determined to contract his troops into the smallest ! n makl J llg ', 
 
 r his way back 
 
 compass and force his way at full speed into Potidaea. to Potidaea. 
 Harassed by the missiles of the enemy he pushed forward 
 through the water a along the bank in front of the sea-wall, 
 not without loss; but he contrived to save the greater 
 part of his army. When the battle ‘began, the allies of 
 the Potidaeans in Olynthus, which is only about seven 
 miles b distant, and is visible from Potidaea, seeing the 
 standards raised, came out a little way to support their 
 friends; and the Macedonian horse drew up in order of 
 battle to oppose them. But victory quickly declared for 
 the Athenians; and when the standards were torn down 
 the Olynthian auxiliaries retired within the walls, and 
 the Macedonians rejoined the Athenians: thus on neither 
 side did the cavalry take any part in the action. The 
 Athenians raised a trophy and granted the Potidaeans 
 a truce for the burial of their dead. Of the Potidaeans 
 
 a Cp. Herod, viii. 129. 
 
 b Sixty stadia, the stadium being reckoned at two hundred and 
 two yards. 
 
40 
 
 BLOCKADE OF POTIDAEA. 
 
 I. and their allies, there fell somewhat less than three 
 hundred ; of the Athenians, a hundred and fifty, and 
 their general Callias. 
 
 64. The Athenians instantly blockaded the town on the 
 TheAthe- side towards the Isthmus, raising a wall, which they 
 adePoti- guarded; but the side towards Pallene was left open, 
 first only They were conscious that they were too weak both to 
 tmvardsfhe g uar ^ the Isthmus and, crossing over to Pallene, there 
 isthmus ; to build another wall; they feared that if they divided 
 
 afterwards, ' 
 
 by the help their forces, they would be attacked by the Potidaeans 
 mentsunder and their allies. Afterwards, when the Athenians at 
 on the side h° me heard that on the side towards Pallene Potidaea 
 towards was no t invested, they sent out sixteen hundred hoplites 
 of their own under the command of Phormio the son of 
 Asopius. On his arrival in Pallene he made Aphytis his 
 head-quarters, and brought his army by slow marches up 
 to Potidaea, wasting the country as he went along. No 
 one came out to meet him, and so he built a wall towards 
 Pallene. Potidaea was now closely invested on both 
 sides, while the Athenian ships, cruising about, cut off 
 all communication from the sea. 
 
 65. Aristeus despaired of saving the place unless aid came 
 Aristeus from Peloponnesus or he was relieved in some unforeseen 
 tidaea and manner. Being anxious to husband provisions, he pro- 
 thewar°out- posed to the garrison that they should avail themselves 
 wafis the *he f avoura -kl e wind and sail away, leaving be¬ 
 hind five hundred men, of whom he offered to be one. 
 But they would not listen to him ; so, wanting to do 
 the best he could, and to further the Peloponnesian 
 interests beyond the walls, he sailed out undiscovered 
 by the Athenian guard-ships. He did not leave the 
 country, but assisted the Chalcidians in carrying on the 
 war. He succeeded in cutting off a large force of Sermy- 
 lians by an ambuscade which he laid near their city; he 
 also exerted himself to obtain aid from Peloponnesus. 
 Phormio with his sixteen hundred hoplites, now that 
 Potidaea was invested, ravaged Chalcidice and Bottice, 
 and captured several places. 
 
 OCd 
 
wo 
 
 .C. 432. 
 
 1.87. 
 
 MEETING OF ALLIES AT SPARTA. 41 
 
 Such were the causes of ill-feeling which at this time I. 
 existed between the Athenians and Peloponnesians: 66. 
 
 the Corinthians complaining that the Athenians were 
 blockading their colony of Potidaea, which was occu¬ 
 pied by a Corinthian and Peloponnesian garrison ; the 
 Athenians rejoining that the Peloponnesians had excited 
 to revolt a state which was an ally and tributary of 
 theirs, and that they had now openly joined the Poti- 
 daeans, and were fighting on their side. The Pelopon¬ 
 nesian war, however, had not yet broken out; the peace 
 still continued ; for thus far the Corinthians had acted 
 alone. 
 
 But now, seeing Potidaea besieged, they bestirred them- 6 7. 
 selves in earnest. Corinthian troops were shut up within Excitement 
 the walls, and they were afraid of losing the town ; so rinthians." 
 without delay they invited the allies to meet at Sparta. o/^Aegl- 
 There they inveighed against the Athenians, whom they netans and 
 
 0 0 J Meganans. 
 
 affirmed to have broken the treaty and to have wronged 
 the Peloponnesians. The Aeginetans did not venture to 
 send envoys openly, but secretly they acted with the 
 Corinthians, and were among the chief instigators of 
 the war, declaring that they had been robbed of the 
 independence which the treaty guaranteed them. The 
 Lacedaemonians themselves then a proceeded to summon 
 any of the allies who had similar charges a to bring 
 against the Athenians, and calling their own ordinary 
 assembly told them to speak. Several of them came 
 forward and stated their wrongs. The Megarians alleged, 
 among other grounds of complaint, that they were ex¬ 
 cluded from all harbours within the Athenian dominion 
 and from the Athenian market, contrary to the treaty. 
 
 The Corinthians waited until the other allies had stirred 
 up the Lacedaemonians; at length they came forward, 
 and, last of all, spoke as follows :— 
 
 ‘ The spirit of trust, Lacedaemonians, which animates 68. 
 
 a Or, adopting the inferior reading tcou crvfxixd^u re teal et ns : 
 
 ‘ proceeded to summon any of their own allies, and any one else, 
 who had similar charges,’ etc. 
 
4 ^ 
 
 SPEECH OF THE CORINTHIANS. 
 
 I. your own political and social life, a makes you distrust 
 The Corin- others who, like ourselves, have something unpleasant 
 
 thians com- . i r . , , 
 
 plain of the to say a , and this temper of mind, though favourable to 
 Spartans, the moderation, too often leaves you in ignorance of what 
 is going on outside your own country. Time after time 
 we have warned you of the mischief which the Athenians 
 would do to us, but instead of taking our words to heart, 
 you chose to suspect that we only spoke from interested 
 motives. And this is the reason why you have brought 
 the allies to Sparta too late, not before but after the in¬ 
 jury has been inflicted, and when they are smarting under 
 the sense of it. Which of them all has a better right to 
 speak than ourselves, who have the heaviest accusations 
 to make, outraged as we are by the Athenians, and neg¬ 
 lected by you ? If the crimes which they are commit¬ 
 ting against Hellas were being done in a corner, then you 
 might be ignorant, and we should have to inform you of 
 them : but now, what need of many words ? Some of us, 
 as you see, have been already enslaved ; they are at this 
 moment intriguing against others, notably against allies 
 of ours; and long ago they had made all their pre¬ 
 parations in expectation of war. Else why did they 
 seduce from her allegiance Corcyra, which they still hold 
 in defiance of us, and why are they blockading Potidaea, 
 the latter a most advantageous post for the command 
 of the Thracian peninsula, the former a great naval 
 power which might have assisted the Peloponnesians ? 
 
 69. ‘And the blame of all this rests on you; for you 
 who have originally allowed them to fortify their city after the 
 HeliaTby Persian War b , and afterwards to build their Long Walls 0 ; 
 vent mg'her and to this hour y° u have g° ne on defrauding of liberty 
 mern ve " their un f° rtunate subjects, and are now beginning to take 
 it away from your own allies. For the true enslaver of 
 a people is he who can put an end to their slavery but 
 has no care about it; and all the more, if he be reputed 
 the champion of liberty in Hellas.—And so we have met 
 
 a Or, 1 makes you distrustful of us when we bring a charge against 
 others.’ b Cp. i. 90-92. c Cp. i. 107. 
 
wo 
 
 SPEECH OF THE CORINTHIANS. 
 
 43 
 
 c. 432. at last, but with what difficulty! and even now we have I. 
 
 ‘ 87 ‘ no definite object. By this time we ought to have been 
 considering, not whether we are wronged, but how we are 
 to be revenged. The aggressor is not now threatening, 
 
 , but advancing; he has made up his mind, while we are 
 resolved about nothing. And we know too well how by 
 slow degrees and with stealthy steps the Athenians en¬ 
 croach upon their neighbours. While they think that you 
 are too dull to observe them, they are more careful, but, 
 when they know that you wilfully overlook their aggres¬ 
 sions, they will strike and not spare. Of all Hellenes, 
 'Lacedaemonians, you are the only people who never do 
 anything : on the approach of an enemy you are content 
 to defend yourselves against him, not by acts, but by 
 intentions, and seek to overthrow him, not in the infancy 
 but in the fulness of his strength. How came you to be 
 considered safe? That reputation of yours was never 
 justified by facts. We all know that the Persian made 
 his way from the ends of the earth against Peloponnesus 
 before you encountered him in a worthy manner; and 
 now you are blind to the doings of the Athenians, who 
 are not at a distance as he was, but close at hand. 
 
 Instead of attacking your enemy, you wait to be attacked, 
 and take the chances of a struggle which has been de¬ 
 ferred until his power is doubled. And you know that 
 the Barbarian miscarried chiefly through his own errors; 
 and that we have oftener been delivered from these very 
 Athenians by blunders of their own, than by any aid 
 from you. Some have already been ruined by the 
 hopes which you inspired in them ; for so entirely did 
 they trust you that they took no precautions themselves. 
 
 These things we say in no accusing or hostile spirit—let 
 that be understood—but by way of expostulation. For 
 men expostulate with erring friends, they bring accusa¬ 
 tion against enemies who have done them a wrong. 
 
 £ And surely we have a right to find fault with our 7 °* 
 neighbours, if any one ever had. There are important ^° n ^ r t a h s * of 
 interests at stake to which, as far as we can see, man and 
 
I. 
 
 Spartan 
 
 characters. 
 
 44 SPEECH OF THE CORINTHIANS. 
 
 you are insensible. And you have never considered 
 what manner of men are these Athenians a with whom 
 you will have to fight, and how utterly unlike your¬ 
 selves. They are revolutionary, equally quick in the 
 conception and in the execution of every new plan; 
 while you are conservative—careful only to keep what 
 you have, originating nothing, and not acting even when 
 action is most necessary. They are bold beyond their 
 strength; they run risks which prudence would con¬ 
 demn ; and in the midst of misfortune they are full of 
 hope. Whereas it is your nature, though strong, to act 
 feebly; when your plans are most prudent, to distrust 
 them ; and when calamities come upon you, to think 
 that you will never be delivered from them. They are 
 impetuous, and you are dilatory; they are always abroad, 
 and you are always at home. For they hope to gain 
 something by leaving their homes ; but you are afraid 
 that any new enterprise may imperil what you have 
 already. When conquerors, they pursue their victory 
 to the utmost; when defeated, they fall back the least. 
 Their bodies they devote to their country as though 
 they belonged to other men ; their true self is their mind, 
 which is most truly their own when employed in her 
 service. When they do not carry out an intention which 
 they have formed, they seem to have sustained a personal 
 bereavement; when an enterprise succeeds, they have 
 gained a mere instalment of what is to come; but if they 
 fail, they at once conceive new hopes and so fill up the 
 void. With them alone to hope is to have, for they lose not 
 a moment in the execution of an idea. This is the life¬ 
 long task, full of danger and toil, which they are always 
 imposing upon themselves. None enjoy their good things 
 less, because they are always seeking for more. To do 
 their duty is their only holiday, and they deem the quiet 
 of inaction to be as disagreeable as the most tiresome 
 business. If a man should say of them, in a word, that 
 
 a For descriptions of Athenian character, cp. ii. 37 ff.; iii. 38; 
 42, 43 ; vi. 76 ; 87. 
 
 O 53 
 
SPEECH OF THE CORINTHIANS. 
 
 45 
 
 kc 432. they were born neither to have peace themselves nor to I. 
 allow peace to other men, he would simply speak the truth. 
 
 c In the face of such an enemy, Lacedaemonians, you 
 persist in doing nothing. You do not see that peace is 7 1, 
 best secured by those who use their strength justly, but ^emonians 
 
 whose attitude shows that they have no intention of sub- must la y 
 
 . . . aside their 
 
 mitting to wrong. Justice with you seems to consist in policy of 
 giving no annoyance to others and a in defending your- * nactlon - 
 selves only against positive injury a . But this policy 
 
 would hardly be successful, even if your neighbours were 
 like yourselves ; and in the present case, as we pointed 
 out just now, your ways compared with theirs are old- 
 fashioned. And, as in the arts, so also in politics, the ■ 
 new must always prevail over the old. In settled times 
 the traditions of government should be observed: but 
 when circumstances are changing and men are compelled 
 to meet them, much originality is required. The Athe¬ 
 nians have had a wider experience, and therefore the 
 administration of their state has improved faster than 
 yours. But here let your procrastination end ; send an 
 army at once into Attica and assist your allies, espe¬ 
 cially the Potidaeans, to whom your word is pledged b . 
 
 Do not allow friends and kindred to fall into the hands 
 of their worst enemies; or drive us in despair to seek 
 the alliance of others; in taking such a course we 
 should be doing nothing wrong either before the Gods 
 who are the witnesses of our oaths, or before men whose 
 eyes are upon us. For the true breakers of treaties 0 are 
 not those who, when forsaken, turn to others, but those 
 who forsake allies whom they have sworn to defend. We 
 will remain your friends if you choose to bestir yourselves; 
 for we should be guilty of an impiety if we deserted you 
 without cause; and we shall not easily find allies equally 
 congenial to us. Take heed then: you have inherited 
 from your fathers the leadership of Peloponnesus; see 
 that her greatness suffers no diminution at your hands.’ 
 
 a Or, ‘in running no risk even in self-defence.’ b Gp. i. 58 med. j 
 c Cp. i. 123 fin. 
 
4 6 
 
 SPEECH OF THE ATHENIANS. 
 
 I. 
 
 72 . 
 
 Some Athe¬ 
 nian envoys 
 who happen 
 to be at 
 Sparta de¬ 
 sire to ad¬ 
 dress the 
 assembly. 
 
 73 - 
 
 They recall 
 the memory 
 of their 
 services in 
 the Persian 
 War. 
 
 Thus spoke the Corinthians. Now there happened to 
 be staying at Lacedaemon an Athenian embassy which 
 had come on other business, and when the envoys heard 
 what the Corinthians had said, they felt bound to go be¬ 
 fore the Lacedaemonian assembly, not with the view of 
 answering the accusations brought against them by the 
 cities, but they wanted to put before the Lacedaemonians 
 the whole question, and make them understand that they 
 should take time to deliberate and not be rash. They 
 also desired to set forth the greatness of their city, re¬ 
 minding the elder men of what they knew, and inform¬ 
 ing the younger of what lay beyond their experience. 
 They thought that their words would sway the Lace¬ 
 daemonians in the direction of peace. So they came 
 and said that, if they might be allowed, they too would 
 like to address the people. The Lacedaemonians invited 
 them to come forward, and they spoke as follows :— 
 
 ‘We were not sent here to argue with your allies, but 
 on a special mission ; observing, however, that no small 
 outcry has arisen against us, we have come forward, not 
 to answer the accusations which they bring (for you are 
 not judges before whom either we or they have to plead), 
 but to prevent you from lending too ready an ear to 
 their bad advice and so deciding wrongly about a very 
 serious question. We propose also, in reply to the wider 
 charges which are raised against us, to show that what 
 we have acquired we hold rightfully and that our city is 
 not to be despised. 
 
 c Of the ancient deeds handed down by tradition and 
 which no eye of any one who hears us ever saw, why 
 should we speak ? But of the Persian War, and other 
 events which you yourselves remember, speak we must, 
 a although we have brought them forward so often that 
 the repetition of them is disagreeable to us a . When we 
 faced those perils we did so for the common benefit: in 
 the solid good you shared, and of the glory, whatever 
 
 a Or, ‘although it may be disagreeable to you to hear what we 
 are always bringing forward.’ 
 
 Odd 
 
Q td 
 
 SPEECH OF THE ATHENIANS. 
 
 47 
 
 c. 432. good there may be in that, we would not be wholly de- I. 
 prived. Our words are not designed to deprecate hos¬ 
 tility, but to set forth in evidence the character of the 
 city with which, unless you are very careful, you will 
 soon be involved in war. We tell you that we, first and 
 alone, dared to engage with the Barbarian at Marathon, 
 and that, when he came again, being too weak to defend 
 ourselves by land, we and our whole people embarked 
 on shipboard and shared with the other Hellenes in the 
 victory of Salamis. Thereby he was prevented from 
 sailing to the Peloponnesus and ravaging city after city; 
 for against so mighty a fleet how could you have helped 
 one another? He himself is the best witness of our 
 words ; for when he was once defeated at sea, he felt 
 that his power was gone and quickly retreated with the 
 greater part of his army. 
 
 4 The event proved undeniably that the fate of Hellas 74 * 
 depended on her navy. And the three chief elements of 
 success were contributed by us; namely, the greatest 
 number of ships, the ablest general, the most devoted 
 patriotism. The ships in all numbered four hundreds 
 and of these, our own contingent amounted to nearly 
 two-thirds. To the influence of Themistocles our general 
 it was chiefly due that we fought in the strait, which was 
 confessedly our salvation ; and for this service you your¬ 
 selves honoured him above any stranger who ever visited 
 you. Thirdly, we displayed the most extraordinary 
 courage and devotion; there was no one to help us by 
 land ; for up to our frontier those who lay in the enemy’s 
 path were already slaves ; so we determined to leave our 
 city and sacrifice our homes. Even in that extremity 
 we did not choose to desert the cause of the allies who 
 still resisted, and by dispersing ourselves to become use¬ 
 less to them; but we embarked and fought, taking no 
 offence at your failure to assist us sooner. We maintain 
 then that we rendered you a service at least as great as 
 you rendered us. The cities from which you came to 
 a Reading with the great majority of MSS. TerpaKoa-las. 
 
4 8 
 
 SPEECH OF THE ATHENIANS. 
 
 I. help us were still inhabited and you might hope to re¬ 
 turn to them ; your concern was for yourselves and not 
 for us; at any rate you remained at a distance while we 
 had anything to lose. But we went forth from a city 
 which was no more, and fought for one of which there 
 was small hope; and yet we saved ourselves, and bore 
 our part in saving you. If, in order to preserve our land, 
 like other states, we had gone over to the Persians at 
 first, or afterwards had not ventured to embark because 
 our ruin was already complete, it would have been use¬ 
 less for you with your weak navy to fight at sea, but 
 everything would have gone quietly just as the Persian 
 desired. 
 
 75 - ‘ Considering, Lacedaemonians, the energy and sagacity 
 
 VjTiyshouid we then displayed, do we deserve to be so bitterly 
 
 hated for hated by the other Hellenes merely because we have an 
 
 having ' 
 
 saved Hei- empire P That empire was not acquired by force; but 
 empire was you would not stay and make an end of the Barbarian, 
 pation U but" an d allies came of their own accord and asked us to 
 the growth he their leaders. The subsequent development of our 
 
 of circum- . x t 
 
 stances. power was originally forced upon us by circumstances; 
 
 fear was our first motive; afterwards ambition, and then 
 interest stepped in. And when we had incurred the 
 hatred of most of our allies ; when some of them had 
 already revolted and been subjugated, and you were no 
 longer the friends to us which you once had been, but 
 suspicious and ill-disposed, how could we without great 
 risk relax our hold ? For the cities as fast as they fell 
 away from us would have gone over to you. And no 
 man is to be reproached who seizes every possible ad¬ 
 vantage when the danger is so great. 
 
 ‘At all events, Lacedaemonians, we may retort that you, 
 The Lace- in the exercise of your supremacy, manage the cities of 
 wouTdhave 3 Peloponnesus to suit your own views; and that if you, 
 than they 6 anc ^ not we ’ persevered in the command of the allies 
 were. long enough to be hated, you would have been quite as 
 intolerable to them as we are, and would have been com¬ 
 pelled, for the sake of your own safety, to rule with a 
 
 CQO 
 
CQO 
 
 SPEECH OF THE ATHENIANS. 
 
 49 
 
 c. 432. strong hand. An empire was offered to us: can you L 
 1 8? ‘ wonder that, acting as human nature always will, we ac¬ 
 cepted it and refused to give it up again, constrained by 
 three alj-po>yerful motives, am bitiQii^Xeap interest. We 
 are not the first who have aspired to rule ; the world has 
 ever held that the weaker must be kept down by the 
 stronger. And we think that we are worthy of power; 
 and there was a time when you thought so too; but now, 
 when you mean expediency you talk about justice. Did 
 justice ever deter any one from taking by force whatever 
 he could ? Men who indulge the natural ambition of 
 empire deserve credit if they are in any degree more 
 careful of justice than they need be. How moderate we 
 are would speedily appear if others took our place; 
 indeed our very moderation, which should be our glory, 
 has been unjustly converted into a reproach. 
 
 ‘For because in our suits with our allies, regulated by 77 - 
 treaty, we do not even stand upon our rights, but have The y were 
 
 J r & thought to 
 
 instituted the practice of deciding them at Athens and be litigious, 
 by Athenian law, we are supposed to be litigious. None they aiiow- 
 of our opponents observe why others, who exercise do- subjects a 
 minion elsewhere and are less moderate than we are in L ? w other 
 
 than the 
 
 their dealings with their subjects, escape this reproach, law of the 
 Why is it ? Because men who practise violence have no stronser * 
 longer any need of law. But we are in the habit of 
 meeting our allies on terms of equality, and, therefore, if 
 through some legal decision of ours, or exercise of our 
 imperial power, contrary to their own ideas of right, they 
 suffer ever so little, they are not grateful for our modera¬ 
 tion in leaving them so much, but are far more offended 
 at their trifling loss than if we had from the first plun¬ 
 dered them in the face of day, laying aside all thought 
 of law. For then they would themselves have admitted 
 that the weaker must give way to the stronger. Man¬ 
 kind resent injustice more than violence, because the one 
 seems to be an unfair advantage taken by an equal, the 
 other is the irresistible force of a superior. They were 
 patient under the yoke of the Persian, who inflicted on 
 
 E 
 
5° 
 
 SPEECH OF THE A THE AVANS. 
 
 I. 
 
 The ruler of 
 the day is 
 always un¬ 
 popular. 
 
 /O. 
 
 The Lace¬ 
 daemonians 
 should not 
 go to war at 
 the instiga¬ 
 tion of 
 others. 
 
 79 - 
 
 them far more grievous wrongs; but now our dominion is b.c. 432. 
 odious in their eyes. And no wonder : the ruler of the 
 day is always detested by his subjects. And should your 
 empire supplant ours, may not you lose the good-will 
 which you owe to the fear of us ? Lose it you certainly 
 will, if you mean again to exhibit the temper of which you 
 gave a specimen when, for a short time, you led the con¬ 
 federacy against the Persian. For the institutions under 
 which you live are incompatible with those of foreign 
 states ; and further, when any of you goes abroad, he 
 respects neither these nor any other Hellenic laws a . 
 
 ‘ Do not then be hasty in deciding a question which is 
 serious; and do not, by listening to the misrepresenta¬ 
 tions and complaints of others, bring trouble upon your¬ 
 selves. Realise, while there is time, the inscrutable 
 nature of war ; and how when protracted it generally 
 ends in becoming a mere matter of chance, over which 
 neither of us can have any control, the event being 
 equally unknown and equally hazardous to both. The 
 misfortune is that in their hurry to go to war, men begin 
 with blows, and when a reverse comes upon them, then 
 have recourse to words. But neither you, nor we, have 
 as yet committed this mistake; and therefore while both 
 of us can still choose the prudent part, we tell you not to 
 break the peace or violate your oaths. Let our differences 
 be determined by arbitration, according to the treaty. If 
 you refuse we call to witness the Gods, by whom you 
 have sworn, that you are the authors of the war; and 
 we will do our best to strike in return.’ 
 
 When the Lacedaemonians had heard the charges 
 
 brought by the allies against the Athenians, and their 
 rejoinder, they ordered everybody but themselves to 
 withdraw, and deliberated alone. The majority were 
 agreed that there was now a clear case against the 
 Athenians, and that they must fight at once. But 
 Archidamus their king, who was held to be both an 
 
 a For the misconduct of Spartan officers abroad, cp. i. 95 ; i. 130 ; 
 iii. 32 ;jii. 93 fin.; viii. 84 init. Contrast Brasidas, iv. 81. 
 
SPEECH OF ARCHIDAMUS. 
 
 51 
 
 B.c. 432. able and a prudent man, came forward and spoke as I. 
 
 01 - 87 ' follows:- 
 
 ‘At my age, Lacedaemonians, I have had experience 80. 
 of many wars, and I see several of you who are as old as We are n ° 
 
 match for 
 
 I am, and who will not, as men too often do, desire war the Athe- 
 because they have never known it, or in the belief that it 
 is either a good or a safe thing. Any one who calmly 
 reflects will find that the war about which you are now 
 deliberating is likely to be a very great one. When we 
 encounter our neighbours in the Peloponnese, their forces 
 are like our forces, and they are all within a short march. 
 
 But when we have to do with men whose country is a 
 long way off, and who are most skilful seamen and 
 thoroughly provided with the means of war,—having 
 wealth, private and public, ships, horses, infantry, and 
 a population larger than is to be found in any single 
 Hellenic territory, not to speak of the numerous allies 
 who pay them tribute,—is this a people against whom we 
 can lightly take up arms or plunge into a contest unpre¬ 
 pared? To what do we trust? To our navy? There 
 we are inferior; and to exercise and train ourselves until 
 we are a match for them, will take time. To our money? 
 
 Nay, but in that we are weaker still; we have none in 
 our treasury, and we are never willing to contribute out 
 of our private means. 
 
 ‘Perhaps some one maybe encouraged by the superior 81. 
 quality and numbers of our infantry, which will enable We have 
 us regularly to invade and ravage their lands. But their i?tes!buF 
 empire extends to distant countries, and they will be extends to 6 
 able to introduce supplies by sea. Or, again, we may distant . 
 
 11 J ° 1 ' countries, 
 
 try to stir up revolts among their allies. But these are by which 
 mostly islanders, and we shall have to employ a fleet in supported 1 * 
 their defence, as well as in our own. How then shall we “vage their 
 carry on the war? For if we can neither defeat them at Jgg S dlsuse ' 
 sea, nor deprive them of the revenues by which their 
 navy is maintained, we shall get the worst of it. And 
 having gone so far, we shall no longer be able even to 
 make peace with honour, especially if we are believed to 
 E 2 
 
52 SPEECH OF ARCHIDAMUS. 
 
 I. have begun the quarrel. We must not for one moment 
 flatter ourselves that if we do but ravage their country the 
 war will be at an end. Nay, I fear that we shall bequeath 
 it to our children ; for the Athenians with their high 
 spirit will never barter their liberty to save their land, 
 or be terrified like novices at the sight of war. 
 
 82. ‘Not that I would have you shut your eyes to their 
 Do not take designs and abstain from unmasking them, or tamely 
 up arms yet. su ^ er ^ em to i n j ure our allies. But do not take up arms 
 yet. Let us first send and remonstrate with them: we 
 need not let them know positively whether we intend to 
 go to war or not. In the meantime our own preparations 
 may be going forward ; we may seek for allies wherever 
 we can find them, whether in Hellas or among the Bar¬ 
 barians, who will supply our deficiencies in ships and 
 money. Those who, like ourselves, are exposed to 
 Athenian intrigue cannot be blamed if in self-defence 
 they seek the aid not of Hellenes only, but of Barbarians. 
 And we must develope our own resources to the utmost. 
 If they listen to our ambassadors, well and good ; but, if 
 not, in two or three years 5 time we shall be in a stronger 
 position, should we then determine to attack them. Per¬ 
 haps too when they begin to see that we are getting 
 ready, a and that our words are to be interpreted by our 
 actions a , they may be more likely to yield ; for their 
 fields will be still untouched and their goods undespoiled, 
 and it will be in their power to save them by their 
 decision. Think of their land simply in the light of a 
 hostage, all the more valuable in proportion as it is 
 better cultivated ; you should spare it as long as you 
 can, and not by reducing them to despair make their 
 resistance more obstinate. For if we allow ourselves to 
 be stung into premature action by the reproaches of our 
 allies, and waste their country before we are ready, we 
 shall only involve Peloponnesus in more and more diffi¬ 
 culty and disgrace. Charges brought by cities or persons 
 against one another can be satisfactorily arranged; but 
 a Or, ‘and that our words too sound a note of war.’ 
 
 Otd 
 
wo 
 
 SPEECH OF ARCHIDAMUS. 
 
 53 
 
 •C. 432. when a great confederacy, in order to satisfy private I. 
 
 * S? ' grudges, undertakes a war of which no man can foresee 
 the issue, it is not easy to terminate it with honour. 
 
 And let no one think that there is any want of courage 83. 
 in cities so numerous hesitating; to attack a single one. There is no 
 The allies of the Athenians are not less numerous; they in hesita- 
 
 - .. . . rr . r tion;weare 
 
 pay them tribute too; and war is not an affair of arms, fighting 
 but of money which gives to arms their use, and which ^then^but 
 is needed above all things when a continental is fighting 
 against a maritime power: let us find money first, and man em- 
 then we may safely allow our minds to be excited by the pire * 
 speeches of our allies. We, on whom the future respon¬ 
 sibility, whether for good or evil, will chiefly fall, should 
 calmly reflect on the consequences which may follow. 
 
 ‘ Do not be ashamed of the slowness and procrastina- 84. 
 tion with which they are so fond of charging you ; if you Too much 
 begin the war in haste, you will end it at your leisure, little speed, 
 because you took up arms without sufficient preparation. ° Q u n r and^’ 
 Remember that we have always been citizens of a free discipline 
 
 J are the se- 
 
 and most illustrious state, and that for us the policy cret of our 
 
 which they condemn may well be the truest good sense wTmust 
 and discretion. It is a policy which has saved us from vaiue^uT" 
 growing insolent in prosperity or giving way under 
 adversity, like other men. We are not stimulated by must not 
 the allurements of flattery into dangerous courses of [une 0n f ° r 
 which we disapprove ; nor are we goaded by offensive 
 charges into compliance with any man’s wishes. Our 
 habits of discipline make us both brave and wise; brave, 
 because the spirit of loyalty quickens the sense of honour, 
 and the sense of honour inspires courage; wise, because 
 we are not so highly educated that we have learned to 
 despise the laws, and are too severely trained and of too 
 loyal a spirit to disobey them. We have not acquired 
 that useless over-intelligence which makes a man an 
 excellent critic of an enemy’s plans, but paralyses him 
 in the moment of action. We think that the wits of our i 
 enemies are as good as our own, and that the element of 
 fortune cannot be forecast in words. Let us assume that 
 
54 THE short speech of sthenelaidas. 
 
 I. they have common prudence, and let our preparations be, 
 not words, but deeds. Our hopes ought not to rest on 
 the probability of their making mistakes, but on our own 
 ; caution and foresight. We should remember that one 
 i man is much the same as another, and that he is best 
 j who is trained in the severest school. 
 
 85. ‘These are principles which our fathers have handed 
 \Ve can af- down to us, and we maintain to our lasting benefit; we 
 and should’ must not lose sight of them, and when many lives and 
 tion a first ra ' much wealth, many cities and a great name are at stake, 
 we must not be hasty, or make up our minds in a few 
 short hours ; we must take time. We can afford to wait, 
 when others cannot, because we are strong. And now, 
 send to the Athenians and remonstrate with them 
 both about Potidaea, and about the other wrongs of 
 which your allies complain. They say that they are 
 willing to have the matter tried ; and against one who 
 offers to submit to justice you must not proceed as 
 against a criminal until his cause has been heard. In 
 the meantime prepare for war. This decision will be 
 the best for yourselves and the most formidable to your 
 enemies.’ 
 
 Thus spoke Archidamus. Last of all, Sthenelaidas, at 
 that time one of the Ephors, came forward and addressed 
 the Lacedaemonians as follows :— 
 g5 # ‘ I do not know what the long speeches of the Athenians 
 
 We must mean. They have been loud in their own praise, but 
 aiHes by ° Ur they do not pretend to say that they are dealing honestly 
 with our allies and with the Peloponnesus. If they be¬ 
 haved well in the Persian War and are now behaving 
 badly to us they ought to be punished twice over, because 
 they were once good men and have become bad. But 
 we are the same now as we were then, and we shall not 
 do our duty if we allow our allies to be ill-used, and put 
 off helping them, for they cannot put off their troubles. 
 Others may have money and ships and horses, but we 
 have brave allies and we must not betray them to the 
 Athenians. If they were suffering in word only, by words 
 
 CQO 
 
m o pq o 
 
 .C. 432. 
 
 1. 87. 
 
 C. 445. 
 • 83, 4. 
 
 THE TREATY HAS BEEN BROKEN. 55 
 
 and legal processes their wrongs might be redressed ; but I. 
 now there is not a moment to be lost, and we must help 
 them with all our might. Let no one tell us that we 
 should take time to think when we are suffering injustice. 
 
 Nay, we reply, those who mean to do injustice should 
 take a long time to think. Wherefore, Lacedaemonians, 
 prepare for war as the honour of Sparta demands. With¬ 
 stand the advancing power of Athens. Do not let us 
 betray our allies, but, with the Gods on our side, let us 
 attack the evil-doer.’ 
 
 When Sthenelaidas had thus spoken he, being Ephor, 87. 
 himself put the question to the Lacedaemonian as- The La- 
 sembly. Their custom is to signify their decision by nians, in- 
 cries and not by voting. But he professed himself unable chfefl^by 
 to tell on which side was the louder cry, and wishing J}jg^ r e of 
 to call forth a demonstration which might encourage nians, re- 
 the warlike spirit, he said, ‘ Whoever of you, Lacedae- to war° S ° 
 monians, thinks that the treaty has been broken and 
 that the Athenians are in the wrong, let him rise and 
 go yonder’ (pointing to a particular spot), c and those who 
 think otherwise to the other side/ So the assembly rose 
 and divided, and it was determined by a large majority 
 that the treaty had been broken. The Lacedaemonians 
 then recalled the allies and told them that in their judg¬ 
 ment the Athenians were guilty, but that they wished 
 to hold a general assembly of the allies and take a vote 
 from them all; then the war, if they approved of it, 
 might be undertaken by common consent. Having ac¬ 
 complished their purpose, the Peloponnesians returned 
 home ; and the Athenian envoys, when their errand was 
 done, returned likewise. Thirteen years of the thirty 
 years’ peace which was concluded after the recovery of 
 Euboea had elapsed and the fourteenth year had begun 
 when the Lacedaemonian assembly decided that the 
 treaty had been broken. 
 
 In arriving at this decision and resolving to go to war, 88. 
 the Lacedaemonians were influenced, not so much by the 
 speeches of their allies, as by the fear of the Athenians 
 
5 ^ 
 
 RISE OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE. 
 
 I. 
 
 89. 
 
 The Athe¬ 
 nians after 
 the retreat 
 of the 
 Persians 
 continue 
 the war. 
 
 90 . 
 
 The Lace¬ 
 daemonians 
 at the insti¬ 
 gation of 
 their allies 
 try to pre¬ 
 vent the 
 Athenians 
 from re¬ 
 building 
 their walls. 
 
 and of their increasing power a . For they saw the greater 
 part of Hellas already subject to them. 
 
 How the Athenians attained the position in which 
 they rose to greatness I will now proceed to describe. 
 When the Persians, defeated both by sea and land, had re¬ 
 treated from Europe, and the remnant of the fleet, which 
 had escaped to Mycale, had there perished, Leotychides, 
 the Lacedaemonian king, who had commanded the Hel¬ 
 lenes in the battle, returned home with the allies from Pe¬ 
 loponnesus. But the Athenians and their allies from Ionia 
 and the Hellespont, who had recently revolted from the 
 king, persevered and besieged Sestos, at that time still 
 in the hands of the Persians. Remaining there through 
 the winter they took the place, which the Barbarians 
 deserted. The allies then sailed back from the Helles¬ 
 pont to their respective homes. Meanwhile the Athenian 
 people, now quit of the Barbarians, fetched their wives, 
 their children, and the remains of their property from 
 the places in which they had been deposited, and set to 
 work, rebuilding the city and the walls. Of the old line 
 of wall but a small part was left standing. Most of the 
 houses were in ruins, a few only remaining in which the 
 chief men of the Persians had lodged. 
 
 The Lacedaemonians knew what would happen and 
 sent an embassy to Athens. They would rather them¬ 
 selves have seen neither the Athenians nor any one else 
 protected by a wall; but their main motive was the 
 importunity of their allies, who dreaded not only the 
 Athenian navy, which had until lately been quite small, 
 but also the spirit which had animated them in the Per¬ 
 sian War. So the Lacedaemonians requested them not 
 to restore their walls 13 , but on the contrary to join with 
 them in razing the fortifications of other towns outside 
 the Peloponnesus which had them standing. They did 
 not reveal their real wishes or the suspicion which they 
 entertained of the Athenians, but argued that the Bar¬ 
 barian, if he again attacked them, would then have no 
 a Cp. i. 23 fin. b Cp. i. 69 init. 
 
 CQO 
 
THE ATHENIANS REBUILD THEIR WALLS. 57 
 
 B.c. 479- strong place which he could make his head-quarters as I. 
 
 OL 75, 2, 3. he had lately made Thebes. Peloponnesus would be a 
 sufficient retreat for all Hellas and a good base of opera¬ 
 tions. To this the Athenians, by the advice of Themis- 
 tocles, replied, that they would send an embassy of their 
 own to discuss the matter, and so got rid of the Spartan 
 envoys. He then proposed that he should himself start 
 at once for Sparta, and that they should give him col¬ 
 leagues who were not to go immediately, but were to 
 wait until the wall reached the lowest height which could 
 possibly be defended. The whole people, men, women, 
 and children, should join in the work, and they must spare 
 no building, private or public, which could be of use, but 
 demolish them all. Having given these instructions and 
 intimated that he would manage affairs at Sparta, he de¬ 
 parted. On his arrival he did not at once present him¬ 
 self officially to the magistrates, but delayed and made 
 excuses ; and when any of them asked him ‘ why he did 
 not appear before the assembly,’ he said ‘that he was 
 waiting for his colleagues, who had been detained by 
 some engagement; he was daily expecting them, and 
 wondered that they had not appeared.’ 
 
 The friendship of the Lacedaemonian magistrates for 91. 
 Themistocles induced them to believe him ; but when The Lace- 
 everybody who came from Athens declared positively are out- 
 that the wall was building and had already reached a Themisto- 
 considerable height, they knew not what to think. He, cles - 
 aware of their suspicions, desired them not to be misled 
 by reports, but to send to Athens men whom they could 
 trust out of their own number who would see for them¬ 
 selves and bring back word. They agreed; and he at the 
 same time privately instructed the Athenians to detain 
 the envoys as quietly as they could, and not let them go 
 until he and his colleagues had got safely home. For 
 by this time Habronichus the son of Lysicles, and Aris¬ 
 tides the son of Lysimachus, who were joined with him 
 in the embassy, had arrived, bringing the news that the 
 wall was of sufficient height; and he was afraid that the 
 
53 
 
 THEMISTOCLES AT SPARTA. 
 
 I. Lacedaemonians, when they heard the truth, might not B.c.479- 
 allow them to return. So the Athenians detained the 01. 75, 2, 3. 
 envoys, and Themistocles, coming before the Lacedae¬ 
 monians, at length declared in so many words that Athens 
 was now provided with walls and could protect her 
 citizens; henceforward, if the Lacedaemonians or their 
 allies wished at any time to negotiate, they must deal 
 with the Athenians as with men who knew quite well 
 what was for their own and the common good. When 
 they boldly resolved to leave their city and go on board 
 ship, they did not first ask the advice of the Lacedae¬ 
 monians, and, when the two states met in council, their 
 own judgment had been as good as that of any one. 
 
 And now they had arrived at an independent opinion 
 that it was better far, and would be more advantageous 
 both for themselves and for the whole body of the allies, 
 that their city should have a wall; when any member of 
 a confederacy had not equal military advantages, his 
 counsel could not be of equal weight or worth. Either 
 all the allies should pull down their walls, or they should 
 acknowledge that the Athenians were in the right. 
 
 Q2. On hearing these words the Lacedaemonians did not 
 But appear- openly quarrel with the Athenians; for they professed 
 maintained, that the embassy had been designed, not to interfere with 
 r^no^ open t1xlen h but to °ff er a suggestion for the public good ; be- 
 quarrei. sides at that time the patriotism which the Athenians 
 had displayed in the Persian War had created a warm 
 feeling of friendliness between the two cities. They were 
 annoyed at the failure of their purpose, but they did not 
 show it. And the envoys on either side returned home 
 without any formal complaint. 
 
 93. In such hurried fashion did the Athenians rebuild the 
 walls of their city. To this day the structure shows evi¬ 
 dence of haste. The foundations are made up of all 
 sorts of stones, in some places unwrought, and laid just 
 as each worker brought them; there were many columns 
 too, taken from sepulchres, and many old stones already 
 cut, inserted in the work. The circuit of the city was 
 
ffiO 
 
 COMPLETION OF THE PIRAEUS. 
 
 59 
 
 B.c. 478 or extended in every direction, and the citizens, in their I. 
 
 01 7 s, 3 or ardour to complete the design, spared nothing. 
 
 75, 4 ‘ Themistocles also persuaded the Athenians to finish Constmc- 
 
 .c. 481? the Piraeus, of which he had made a beginning in his Piraeus, 
 
 1 74, 4? year of office as Archon. The situation of the place, 
 
 which had three natural havens, was excellent; and now maritime 
 that the Athenians had become sailors, he thought that Athens, 
 a good harbour would greatly contribute to the extension 
 of their power. For he first dared to say that ‘ they must 
 make the sea their domain,’ and he lost no time in laying 
 the foundations of their empire. By his advice, they 
 built the wall of such a width that two waggons carrying 
 the stones could meet and pass on the top ; this width 
 may still be traced at the Piraeus ; inside there was no 
 rubble or mortar, but the whole wall was made up of 
 large stones hewn square, which were clamped on the 
 outer face with iron and lead. The height was not more 
 than half what he had originally intended ; he had hoped 
 by the very dimensions of the wall to paralyse the de¬ 
 signs of an enemy, and he thought that a handful of the 
 least efficient citizens would suffice for its defence, while 
 the rest might man the fleet. His mind was turned in 
 this direction, as I conceive, from observing that the 
 Persians had met with fewer obstacles by sea than by 
 land. The Piraeus appeared to him to be of more real 
 consequence than the upper city. He was fond of telling 
 the Athenians that if they were hard pressed they should 
 go down to the Piraeus and fight the world at sea. 
 
 Thus the Athenians built their walls and restored their 
 city immediately after the retreat of the Persians. 
 
 Pausanias the son of Cleombrotus was now sent from 94. 
 Peloponnesus with twenty ships in command of the Hel- Cyprus and 
 
 . . Byzantium 
 
 lemc forces; thirty Athenian ships and a number of the taken. 
 
 allies sailed with him. They first made an expedition L^un- 7 
 against Cyprus, of which they subdued the greater part; of Pau- nt7 
 and afterwards against Byzantium, which was in the sanias - 
 hands of the Persians, and was taken while he was still 
 in command. 
 
6o PA US AN I AS DEPOSED FROM HIS COMM AMD. 
 
 I. 
 
 95 - 
 
 The allies 
 transfer 
 themselves 
 to the Athe¬ 
 nians. 
 
 96. 
 
 Confedera¬ 
 cy of Delos. 
 
 He had already begun to be oppressive, and the allies b.c. 477 
 were offended with him, especially the Ionians and others OL’75, 4 
 who had been recently emancipated from the king. So 7 6 - 
 they had recourse to their kinsmen the Athenians and 
 ' begged them to be their leaders, and to protect them 
 against Pausanias, if he attempted to oppress them. The 
 Athenians took the matter up and prepared to interfere, 
 being fully resolved to manage the confederacy in their 
 own way. In the meantime the Lacedaemonians sum¬ 
 moned Pausanias to Sparta, intending to investigate 
 certain reports which had reached them; for he was ac¬ 
 cused of numerous crimes by Hellenes returning from 
 the Hellespont, and appeared to exercise his command 
 more after the fashion of a tyrant than of a general. 
 
 His recall occurred at the very time when the hatred 
 which he inspired had induced the allies, with the ex¬ 
 ception of the Peloponnesians, to transfer themselves to 
 the Athenians. On arriving at Lacedaemon he was 
 punished for the wrongs which he had done to particular 
 persons, but he had been also accused of conspiring with 
 the Persians, and of this, which was the principal charge 
 and was generally believed to be proven, he was ac¬ 
 quitted. The government however did not continue him 
 in his command, but sent in his place Dorcis and certain 
 others with a small force. To these the allies refused 
 allegiance, and Dorcis, seeing the state of affairs, returned 
 home. Henceforth the Lacedaemonians sent out no more 
 commanders, for they were afraid that those whom they 
 appointed would be corrupted, as they had found to be the 
 case with Pausanias; they had had enough of the Persian 
 War; and they thought that the Athenians were fully able 
 to lead, and at that time believed them to be their friends. 
 
 Thus the Athenians by the good-will of the allies, who 
 detested Pausanias, obtained the leadership. They im¬ 
 mediately fixed which of the cities should supply money 
 and which of them ships for the war against the Bar¬ 
 barians, the avowed object being to compensate them¬ 
 selves and the allies for their losses by devastating the 
 
THE ATHENIANS LEAD THE ALLIES. 61 
 
 B.C. 477 or 
 476. 
 
 Ol. 75, 4 or 
 76. 
 
 B.C. 476- 
 466. 
 
 01.76-78,3. 
 
 King’s country. Then was first instituted at Athens I* 
 the office of Hellenic treasurers (Helleno-Tamiai), who 
 received the tribute, for so the impost was termed. The 
 amount was originally fixed at 460 talents a . The island 
 of Delos was the treasury, and the meetings of the allies 
 were held in the temple. 
 
 At first the allies were independent and deliberated in 9 7 * 
 a common assembly under the leadership of Athens. ™ b ^; n 
 But in the interval between the Persian and the Pelo- the Persian 
 
 and Pelo¬ 
 ponnesian Wars, by their military success and by policy ponnesian 
 
 in dealing with the Barbarian, with their own rebellious SdlnTost 
 allies and with the Peloponnesians who came across their hlstones - 
 path from time to time, the Athenians made immense 
 strides in power. I have gone out of my way to speak 
 of this period because the writers who have preceded 
 me treat either of Hellenic affairs previous to the Persian 
 invasion or of that invasion itself; the intervening portion 
 of history has been omitted by all of them, with the ex¬ 
 ception of Hellanicus ; and he, where he has touched 
 upon it in his Attic history, is very brief, and inaccurate 
 in his chronology. The narrative will also serve to ex¬ 
 plain how the Athenian empire grew up. 
 
 First of all under the leadership of Cimon, the son of gg # 
 Miltiades, the Athenians besieged and took from the The Athe- 
 Persians Eion upon the Strymon, and sold the inhabit- j£ct n Eion," 
 ants into slavery. The same fate befell Scyros, an island ^rystus 
 in the Aegean inhabited by Dolopes ; this they colonised Naxos, 
 themselves. They also carried on a war with the Cary- 
 stians of Euboea, who, after a time, capitulated; the other 
 Euboeans took no part in the war. Then the Naxians 
 revolted, and the Athenians made war against them and 
 reduced them by blockade. This was the first of the 
 allied cities which was enslaved contrary to Hellenic law; 
 the turn of the others came later. 
 
 The causes which led to the defections of the allies 99. 
 were of different kinds, the principal being their neglect Most of the 
 
 , .. r . . . . . . allies contri- 
 
 to pay the tribute or to furnish ships, and, in some cases, bute money 
 a About ^110,400. 
 
6 2 
 
 WHO BEGIN TO BE VOLT. 
 
 I. failure of military service. For the Athenians were ex- b.c. 476- 
 instead of acting and oppressive, using coercive measures towards o 6 L76-78,3. 
 As^hey men who were neither willing nor accustomed to work 
 the^Athe-^ 61 " hard. And for various reasons they soon began to prove 
 mans be- less agreeable leaders than at first. They no longer fought 
 oppressive, upon an equality with the rest of the confederates, and 
 they had no difficulty in reducing them when they re¬ 
 volted. Now the allies brought all this upon themselves; 
 for the majority of them disliked military service and 
 absence from home, and so they agreed to contribute a 
 regular sum of money instead of ships. Whereby the 
 Athenian navy was proportionally increased, while they 
 themselves were always untrained and unprepared for 
 
 war when they revolted. 
 
 A little later the Athenians and their allies fought two b.c. 466. 
 
 battles, one by land and the other by sea, against the 01 ?8 ' 3 ‘ 
 
 Persians, at the river Eurymedon in Pamphylia. The 
 
 fig^Ta/the Athenians, under*the command of Cimon the son of 
 
 medon Ury ' ^lihiades, on the same day conquered in both, and took 
 
 Revolt of and destroyed Phoenician vessels numbering in all two 
 Thasos. 
 
 Attempted hundred. After a while the Thasians revolted ; a quarrel B.c. 465. 
 ofAm S phi- n had arisen between them and the Athenians about the 01 ?8, 4 ' 
 polls. Thracian market and the mine on the Thracian coast 
 
 IOO. 
 
 The Athe¬ 
 nians con¬ 
 quer in a 
 
 opposite, of which the Thasians received the profits. The 
 Athenians sailed to Thasos and, gaining a victory at sea, 
 landed upon the island. About the same time they sent 
 ten thousand of their own people and of their allies to 
 the Strymon, intending to colonise the place then called 
 the Nine Ways and now Amphipolis. They gained 
 possession of the Nine Ways, which were inhabited by 
 the Edoni, but, advancing into the interior of Thrace, 
 they a were destroyed at Drabescus in Edonia by the 
 united Thracians a , whose country was threatened by the 
 new settlement. 
 
 IO1. The Thasians, now defeated and blockaded, had re¬ 
 course to the Lacedaemonians and entreated them to 
 
 a Or, reading avfj.navT€s, as Poppo is inclined to do, ‘ were de¬ 
 stroyed to a man by the Thracians.’ 
 
O W Opt) 
 
 THE SIEGE OF THASOS AND ITHOME. 63 
 
 .C.464. invade Attica. Unknown to the Athenians they agreed, I. 
 
 ' 79 ' and were on the point of setting out when the great 
 
 earthquake occurred and was immediately followed by who seize 
 the revolt of the Helots and the Perioeci of Thuria and 
 Aethaea, who seized Ithome. These Helots were mostly 
 the descendants of the Messenians who had been en¬ 
 slaved in ancient times, and hence all the insurgents were 
 called Messenians. 
 
 .c. 463. While the Lacedaemonians were thus engaged, the 
 . 79, 2. w h 0 had now b een blockaded for more than 
 
 two years, came to terms with the Athenians; they 
 pulled down their walls and surrendered their ships; they 
 also agreed to pay what was required of them whether 
 in the shape of immediate indemnity or of tribute for the 
 future; and they gave up their claim to the mainland 
 and to the mine. 
 
 B.c. 463- The siege of Ithome proved tedious, and the Lacedae- 102. 
 ol 79, 2-4. monians called in, among other allies, the Athenians, The Athe- 
 who sent to their aid a considerable force under Cimon. to the as- 
 The Athenians were specially invited because they were theTace^ 
 reputed to be skilful in siege operations, and the length 
 of the blockade proved to the Lacedaemonians their own being sus- 
 deficiency in that sort of warfare; else why had they them, they 
 not taken the place by assault ? This expedition of the e?and™o S ~ 
 Athenians led to the first open quarrel between them a ^ ay m a 
 and the Lacedaemonians. For the Lacedaemonians, not 
 succeeding in storming the place, took alarm at the bold 
 and original spirit of the Athenians. They reflected that 
 they were aliens in race, and fearing that, if they were 
 allowed to remain, they might be tempted by the Helots 
 in Ithome to change sides, they dismissed them, while 
 they retained the other allies. But they concealed their 
 mistrust, and merely said that they no longer needed 
 their services. Now the Athenians saw that their dis¬ 
 missal was due to some suspicion which had arisen and 
 not to the less offensive reason which was openly avowed; 
 they felt keenly that such a slight ought not to have been 
 offered them by the Lacedaemonians; and so, on their 
 
ATHENIAN EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 
 
 ^4 
 
 I. return home, they forthwith abandoned the alliance which B.c. 463- 
 they had made with them against the Persians and went o\’ 79t 2 - 
 over to their Argive enemies. At the same time both 75, 4- 
 Argos and Athens bound themselves to Thessaly by a 
 common oath of alliance. 
 
 103. In the tenth year of the siege the defenders of Ithome B.c. 455. 
 
 Fail of were unable to hold out any longer, and capitulated to 
 
 The Athe- the Lacedaemonians. The terms were as follows : They 
 
 the^xhed 6 were to leave Peloponnesus under a safe-conduct, and 
 
 Messemans were never again to return : if anv of them were taken 
 
 at Naupac*- & . 
 
 tus. on Peloponnesian soil, he was to be the slave of his 
 
 captor. Xow an ancient oracle of Delphi was current 
 among the Lacedaemonians, bidding them let the sup¬ 
 pliant of Ithomaean Zeus go free. So the Messenians 
 left Ithome with their wives and children; and the 
 Athenians, who were now the avowed enemies of Sparta, 
 gave them a home at Xaupactus, a place which the}- had 
 just taken from the Ozolian Locrians. 
 
 Athens The Athenians obtained the alliance of the Megarians. B.c. 461- 
 
 aniance of ^rho revolted from the Lacedaemonians because the Co- or 79, 4 - 
 
 Megara as rinthians were pressing them hard in a war arising out of 8o - 
 
 well as of r & 
 
 Argos^and a question of frontiers. Thus they gained both Megara 
 and Pegae; and they built for the Megarians the long 
 walls, extending from the city to the port of Xisaea, 
 which they garrisoned themselves. This was the original 
 and the main cause of the intense hatred which the 
 Corinthians entertained towards the Athenians. 
 
 104. Meanwhile Inaros the son of Psammetichus, king of b.c. 460. 
 
 Egyptian the Libyans who border on Egypt, had induced the 01 ‘ 8o ' 
 
 revolt. , 
 
 greater part ot Egypt to revolt from Artaxerxes the 
 King. He began the rebellion at Mareia. a city opposite 
 the island of Pharos, and, having made himself ruler of 
 the country, called in the Athenians. They were just 
 then carrying on war against Cyprus with two hundred 
 ships of their own and of their allies ; and, quitting the 
 island, they went to his aid. They sailed from the sea 
 into the Xile, and, getting possession of two-thirds of 
 Memphis, proceeded to attack the remaining part called 
 
VICTORIES OF THE ATHENIANS. 
 
 6 J 
 
 b.c. 460- the White Castle, in which the Persians and Medes had I. 
 ol 8 o, 1- taken refuge, and with them such Egyptians as had not 
 4 ' joined in the revolt. 
 
 An Athenian fleet made a descent upon Halieis, where 105* 
 a battle took place against some Corinthian and Epidau- J^ s ^g f g" at 
 rian troops; the Athenians gained the victory. Soon the Aegine- 
 afterwards the Athenians fought at sea off Cecryphaleia tureseventy 
 with a Peloponnesian fleet, which they defeated. A war ^ege nd 
 next broke out between the Aeginetans and the Athe- Aegina.. 
 nians, and a great battle was fought off the coast of thians in- 
 Aegina, in which the allies of both parties joined ; the gara . 
 Athenians were victorious, and captured seventy of the 
 enemy’s ships ; they then landed on Aegina and, under 
 the command of Leocrates the son of Stroebus, besieged 
 the town. Thereupon the Peloponnesians sent over to 
 the assistance of the Aeginetans three hundred hoplites 
 who had previously been assisting the Corinthians and 
 Epidaurians. The Corinthians seized a on the heights of 
 Geraneia ; and thence made a descent with their allies 
 into the Megarian territory, thinking that the Athenians, 
 who had so large a force absent in Aegina and in Egypt, 
 would be unable to assist the Megarians ; or, if they did, 
 would be obliged to raise the siege of Aegina. But the 
 Athenians, without moving their army from Aegina, 
 sent to Megara under the command of Myronides a 
 force consisting of their oldest and youngest men, who 
 had remained at home. A battle was fought, which 
 hung equally in the balance; and when the two armies 
 separated, they both thought that they had gained the 
 victory. The Athenians, who did however get rather 
 the better, on the departure of the Corinthians erected 
 a trophy. And then the Corinthians, irritated by the re¬ 
 proaches of the aged men in the city, after twelve days’ 
 preparation came out again, and, claiming the victory, 
 raised another trophy. Hereupon the Athenians sallied 
 out of Megara, killed those who were erecting the trophy, 
 and charged and defeated the rest of the army. 
 
 a Omitting the stop after KareXa^ov. 
 
 F 
 
66 
 
 LACEDAEMONIANS IN BOEOTIA. 
 
 I* The Corinthians now retreated, but a considerable B.c. 460- 
 
 - . 457. 
 
 106. number of them were hard pressed, and missing their 01. 80, 1-4. 
 They suffer way got into an enclosure belonging to a private person, 
 
 m^heir SS which was surrounded by a great ditch and had no exit, 
 retreat. The Athenians, perceiving their situation, closed the 
 entrance in front with heavy-armed troops, and, placing 
 their light troops in a circle round, stoned all w T ho had 
 entered the enclosure. This was a great blow to the 
 Corinthians; but still the main body of their army 
 returned home. 
 
 107. About this time the Athenians began to build their 
 The Athe- long walls extending to the sea, one to the harbour of 
 
 mans build 0 0 
 
 their long Phalerum, and the other to the Piraeus. The Phocians B.c. 457. 
 Battle of made an expedition against the Dorians, who inhabit ' °’ 4 ' 
 lanagra. Boeum, Citinium, and Erineum, and are the mother 
 people of the Lacedaemonians ; one of these towns they 
 took. Thereupon the Lacedaemonians under the com¬ 
 mand of Nicomedes the son of Cleombrotus, who was 
 general in the place of the king Pleistoanax the son of 
 Pausanias (he being at that time a minor), came to the 
 assistance of the Dorians with fifteen hundred hoplites 
 of their own, and, of their allies, ten thousand, and com¬ 
 pelled the Phocians to make terms and to restore the 
 town. They then thought of returning; but there were 
 difficulties. Either they might go by sea across the 
 Crisaean Gulf, in which case the Athenian fleet would be 
 sure to sail round and intercept them, or they might march 
 over Mount Geraneia ; but this seemed dangerous when 
 the Athenians were holding Megara and Pegae. The pass 
 was not easy, and was always guarded by the Athenians, 
 who were obviously intending to stop them by that route 
 also. So they determined to remain in Boeotia and con¬ 
 sider how they could best get home. They had another 
 motive :—Certain Athenians were privately making over¬ 
 tures to them, in the hope that they would put an end to 
 the democracy and the building of the long walls. But 
 the Athenians were aware of their embarrassment, and 
 they also suspected their design against the democracy. 
 
WO WO pq o 
 
 BATTLES OF TANAGRA AND OENOPHYTA, 67 
 
 .c 457. So they went out to meet them with their whole force, I. 
 
 °’ 4 ‘ including a thousand Argives and contingents from the 
 other allies; they numbered in all fourteen thousand men. 
 
 Among them were some Thessalian cavalry, who came 
 to their aid in accordance with the treaty a , but these 
 deserted to the Lacedaemonians during the engagement. 
 
 The battle was fought at Tanagra in Boeotia, and the 108. 
 Lacedaemonians and their allies, after great slaughter on Battle of 
 
 11*1 >ii • Oenophyta. 
 
 both sides, gained the victory. They then marched into Surrender 
 the Megarian territory, and, cutting down the fruit-trees, of Aegina - 
 returned home by way of Geraneia and the Isthmus. 
 
 •C. 456. But on the sixty-second day after the battle, the Athe¬ 
 nians made another expedition into Boeotia under the 
 command of Myronides, and there was a battle at Oeno¬ 
 phyta, in which they defeated the Boeotians and became 
 masters of Boeotia and Phocis. They pulled down the 
 walls of Tanagra and took as hostages from the Opuntian 
 Locrians a hundred of their richest citizens. They then 
 completed their own long walls. Soon afterwards the 
 Aeginetans came to terms with the Athenians, dis¬ 
 mantling their walls, surrendering their ships, and agree- 
 c. 455- ing to pay tribute for the future. The Athenians, under 
 ' the command of Tolmides the son of Tolmaeus, sailed 
 round Peloponnesus and burnt the Lacedaemonian dock¬ 
 yard b . They also took the Corinthian town of Chalcis, 
 and, making a descent upon Sicyon, defeated a Sicyonian 
 force. 
 
 The Athenians and their allies were still in Egypt, 109. 
 where they carried on the war with varying fortune. At After an in- 
 first they were masters of the country. The King sent to attempt to 
 Lacedaemon Megabazus a Persian, who was well supplied °i^ance S " 
 with money, in the hope that he might persuade the 
 Peloponnesians to invade Attica, and so draw off the the Persian 
 Athenians from Egypt. He had no success ; the money kigftfsuc- 
 was being spent and nothing done; so, with what re- driving\he 
 mained of it, he found his way back to Asia. The King Athenians 
 
 J 0 out of 
 
 then sent into Egypt Megabyzus the son of Zopyrus, a Memphis. 
 a Cp. i. 102 fin. b i.e. Gythium. 
 
68 END OF THE EGYPTIAN EXPEDITION . 
 
 I. Persian, who marched overland with a large army and 
 defeated the Egyptians and their allies. He drove the 
 Hellenes out of Memphis, and finally shut them up in 
 the island of Prosopitis, where he blockaded them during 
 eighteen months. At length he drained the canal and 
 diverted the water, thus leaving their ships high and dry 
 and joining nearly the whole island to the mainland. 
 He then crossed over with a land force, and took the 
 island. 
 
 IIO. Thus, after six years 5 fighting, the cause of the Hellenes 
 Nearly the in Egypt was lost. A few survivors of their great army 
 expedition ' found their way through Libya to Cyrene ; by far the 
 including larger number perished. Egypt again submitted to the 
 a reinforce- Persian yoke, although Amyrtaeus, the king in the fens, 
 triremes, is still held out. He escaped capture owing to the extent 
 destroyed- f ens anc j bravery of their inhabitants, who are 
 
 the most warlike of all the Egyptians. Inarus the king 
 of Libya, the chief author of the revolt, was betrayed and 
 impaled. Fifty additional triremes, which had been sent 
 by the Athenians and their allies to relieve their other 
 forces, in ignorance of what had happened, sailed into 
 the Mendesian mouth of the Nile. But they were at 
 once attacked both from the land and from the sea, 
 and the greater part of them destroyed by the Phoeni¬ 
 cian fleet, a few ships only escaping. Thus ended the 
 great Egyptian expedition of the Athenians and their 
 allies. 
 
 ill. About this time Orestes, the exiled son of the Thes- 
 Attempted sa lian king Echecratides, persuaded the Athenians to 
 
 restoration ° . A 
 
 of Orestes, restore him. Taking with them a force of the Boeo- 
 lian exile, tians and Phocians, who were now their allies, they 
 marched against Pharsaius in Thessaly. They made 
 themselves masters of the country in the neighbourhood 
 of their camp, but the Thessalian cavalry stopped any 
 further advance. They could not take the place, and 
 none of their plans succeeded ; so they returned and 
 brought back Orestes. 
 
 TheAthe- A short time afterwards a thousand Athenians, under 
 
 nians under 
 
 fflO 
 
FIVE YEARS' TRUCE. 6 9 
 
 B.c. 454. the command of Pericles the son of Xanthippus, em- I. 
 
 ’ 8l ' 3 ' barking on board the fleet which they had at Pegae, ^^ ] t e t s he 
 now in their possession, coasted along to Sicyon, and Sicyonians. 
 there landing, defeated the Sicyonians who came out 
 to meet them. With the least possible delay taking on 
 board Achaean troops and sailing to the opposite coast, 
 they attacked and besieged Oeniadae, a town of Acar- 
 nania ; but failing to reduce it, they returned home. 
 b.c. 450. After an interval of three years a five years’ truce was 112. 
 
 2 ' 3 ‘ concluded between the Peloponnesians and Athenians. Truce for 
 The Athenians now abstained from war in Hellas itself, Expedition 
 but made an expedition to Cyprus with two hundred More ships 
 ships of their own and of their allies, under the com- sent to 
 
 Egypt. 
 
 mand of Cimon. Sixty ships were detached from the Death of 
 armament and sailed to Egypt, at the request of Amyr- Battles at 
 taeus the king in the fens; the remainder proceeded to cypm S S m 
 b.c. 449. blockade Citium. Here Cimon died, and a famine arose 
 2 ’ 4 ’ in the country; so the fleet quitted Citium. Arriving off 
 Salamis in Cyprus they fought at sea and also on land 
 with Phoenician and Cilician forces, Gaining a victory 
 in both engagements, they returned home, accompanied 
 by the ships which had gone out with them and had now 
 come back from Egypt. After this the Lacedaemonians 
 engaged in the so-called Sacred War and took posses¬ 
 sion of the temple of Delphi, which they handed over to 
 the Delphians. But no sooner had they retired than the 
 Athenians sent an expedition and recovered the temple, 
 which they handed over to the Phocians. 
 
 B.c. 447. Some time afterwards the Athenians, under the com- 113. 
 01 ‘ 83 ' 2 ' mand of Tolmides the son of Tolmaeus. with a thousand Defeat of 
 
 . . the Athe- 
 
 hoplites of their own and contingents of their allies, made mans at 
 an expedition against Orchomenus, Chaeronea, and cer- Revolution 
 tain other places in Boeotia which were in the hands m Boeotia ‘ 
 of oligarchical exiles from different Boeotian towns, and 
 still remained hostile to them. They took Chaeronea, 
 and leaving a garrison there, departed. But while they 
 were on their march, the exiles who had occupied Orcho¬ 
 menus, some Locrians, some Euboean exiles and others 
 
114- 
 
 Revolt of 
 Euboea. 
 Slaughter 
 of the 
 Athenian 
 garrison at 
 Megara. 
 Invasion of 
 Attica. 
 Retirement 
 of the Pelo¬ 
 ponnesians, 
 and re¬ 
 covery of 
 Euboea. 
 
 11 5 * 
 
 The Athe¬ 
 nians agree 
 to restore 
 the places 
 held by 
 them in Pe¬ 
 loponnesus. 
 Revolt of 
 the Sami¬ 
 ans, who 
 are assisted 
 by the 
 Byzantians. 
 
 70 IXCRFASIXu DIFFICULTIES OF ATHEXS . 
 
 of the same party, set upon them at Coronea and de- b c 447- 
 r J 1 .01. 83,2. 
 
 feated them, killing many and taking many prisoners. 
 
 The Athenians then agreed to evacuate Boeotia upon 
 condition that the prisoners should be restored. And 
 so the Boeotian exiles returned to their homes, and all 
 the Boeotians regained their independence. 
 
 Not long afterwards Euboea revolted from Athens. B.C. 445. 
 
 . . . . . 01. 83,4. 
 
 Pericles had just arrived in the island with an Athenian 
 
 army when the news came that Megara had likewise re¬ 
 volted, that the Peloponnesians were on the point of in¬ 
 vading Attica, and that the Megarians had slaughtered 
 the Athenian garrison, of whom a few only had escaped to 
 Nisaea. The Megarians had introduced a force of Corin¬ 
 thians. Sicyonians, and Epidaurians into the city, and by 
 their help had effected the revolt. Pericles in haste with¬ 
 drew his army from Euboea. The Peloponnesians then 
 invaded Attica under the command of Pleistoanax son 
 of Pausanias, the Lacedaemonian king. They advanced 
 as far as Eleusis and Thria but no further, and after 
 ravaging the country, returned home. Thereupon the 
 Athenians under the command of Pericles again crossed 
 over to Euboea and reduced the whole country; the 
 Hestiaeans they ejected from their homes and appropri¬ 
 ated their territory; the rest of the island they settled 
 by agreement. 
 
 Soon after their return from Euboea they made a truce 
 for thirty years with the Lacedaemonians and their al¬ 
 lies, restoring Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen and Achaia, which 
 were the places held by them in Peloponnesus. Six years B.c. 440. 
 later the Samians and Milesians fell out about the posses- 01 ’ 85 ' 
 sion of Priene, and the Milesians, who were getting worsted 
 in the war, came to Athens and complained loudly of the 
 Samians. Some private citizens of Samos, who wanted 
 to overthrow the government, supported their complaint. 
 Whereupon the Athenians, sailing to Samos with forty 
 ships, established a democracy, and taking as hostages 
 fifty boys and fifty men whom they deposited at Lemnos, 
 they returned leaving a garrison. But certain of the 
 
COT 
 
 THIRTY YEARS' TRUCE. REVOLT OF SAMOS. Ji 
 
 .c. 440. Samians who had quitted the island and fled to the main- I. 
 land entered into an alliance with the principal oligarchs 
 who remained in the city, and with Pissuthnes the son of 
 Hystaspes, then governor of Sardis, and collecting troops 
 to the number of seven hundred they crossed over by 
 night to Samos. First of all they attacked the victorious 
 populace and got most of them into their power; then 
 they stole away the hostages from Lemnos, and finally 
 revolted from Athens. The officers and garrison of the 
 Athenians whom they captured were delivered by them 
 into the hands of Pissuthnes. They at once prepared to 
 make an expedition against Miletus. The Byzantians 
 joined in their revolt. 
 
 When the Athenians heard of the insurrection they 116. 
 sailed to Samos with sixty ships. But of this number The Athe- 
 
 nians defeat 
 
 they sent away sixteen, some towards Cana to keep a the Samians 
 look out for the Phoenician fleet, others to summon aid at sea ' 
 from Chios and Lesbos. With the remaining forty-four 
 ships they fought at sea under the command of Pericles 
 and nine others, near the island of Tragia, against seventy 
 Samian vessels, all sailing from Miletus, of which twenty 
 were transports; the Athenians gained the victory. After 
 receiving a reinforcement of forty ships from Athens and 
 of twenty-five from Chios and Lesbos they disembarked, 
 and having the superiority on shore, invested the city with 
 three walls ; they also blockaded it by sea. At the same 
 time Pericles took sixty ships of the blockading force and 
 sailed hastily towards Caunus in Caria, news having ar¬ 
 rived that a Phoenician fleet was approaching; Stesagoras 
 and others had already gone with five ships from Samos 
 to fetch it. 
 
 Meanwhile the Samians made a sudden sally, and at- 11 7. 
 tacking the naval station of the Athenians which was Temporary 
 unprotected, destroyed the guard-ships and engaged and final subjec- 
 defeated the other vessels which put out to meet them. samians he 
 During some fourteen days they were masters of the sea 
 about their own coasts, and carried in and out whatever 
 they pleased. But when Pericles returned, they were 
 
72 CAUSES OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 
 
 I. 
 
 The Byzan- 
 tians also 
 submit. 
 
 118 . 
 
 The history 
 is resumed 
 from chap. 
 88 . The 
 Lacedae¬ 
 monians, 
 having de¬ 
 cided to go 
 to war, ob¬ 
 tain the 
 sanction 
 of the 
 Delphian 
 oracle. 
 
 again closely blockaded ; and there soon arrived from 
 Athens forty additional ships under Thucydides, Hag- 
 non, and Phormio, twenty more under Tlepolemus and 
 Anticles, and thirty from Chios and Lesbos. The Sa¬ 
 mians made a feeble attempt at a sea-fight, but soon 
 they were unable to resist, and after nine months were 
 forced to surrender. The terms of capitulation were as 
 follows :—They were to raze their walls, give hostages, 
 surrender their ships, and pay a full indemnity by regu¬ 
 lar instalments. The Byzantians too agreed to return to 
 their allegiance. 
 
 Not long afterwards occurred the affairs of Corcyra 
 and Potidaea, which have been already narrated, and the 
 various other circumstances which led to the Pelopon¬ 
 nesian War. Fifty years elapsed between the retreat of 
 Xerxes and the beginning of the war ; during these years 
 took place all those operations of the Hellenes against 
 one another and against the Barbarian which I have 
 been describing. The Athenians acquired a firmer hold 
 over their empire and the city itself became a great 
 power. The Lacedaemonians saw what was going on, 
 but during most of the time they remained inactive and 
 hardly attempted to interfere. They had never been of 
 a temper prompt to make war unless they were com¬ 
 pelled ; and they were in some degree embarrassed by 
 enemies near home. But the Athenians were growing 
 too great to be ignored and were laying hands on their 
 allies. They could now bear it no longer: they made 
 up their minds that they must put out all their strength 
 and overthrow the Athenian power by force of arms. 
 And therefore they commenced the Peloponnesian War. 
 They had already voted in their own assembly that the 
 treaty had been broken and that the Athenians were 
 guilty a ; they now sent to Delphi and asked the god if 
 it would be for their advantage to make war. He is 
 reported to have answered that, if they did their best, 
 
 a But cp. vii. 18 med. 
 
 CQ O 
 
gw 
 
 THE ALLIES AT SPARTA. 
 
 C. 432. 
 .. 87. 
 
 73 
 
 they would be conquerors, and that he himself, invited I. 
 or uninvited, would take their part. 
 
 So they again summoned the allies, intending to put 11 9 * 
 to them the question of war or peace. When their repre- ^tivity_ °_ f 
 sentatives arrived, an assembly was held ; and the allies thians in 
 
 ... pressing on 
 
 said what they had to say, most of them complaining the war. 
 of the Athenians and demanding that the war should 
 proceed. The Corinthians had already gone the round 
 of the cities and entreated them privately to vote for 
 the war; they were afraid that they would be too late 
 to save Potidaea. At the assembly they came forward 
 last of all and spoke as follows :— 
 
 ‘Fellow allies, we can no longer find fault with the 120. 
 Lacedaemonians: they have themselves resolved upon No more 
 
 ’ , , . . - , . , fault to be 
 
 war and have brought us hither to confirm their de- found with 
 cision. And they have done well; for the leaders of a mo^an? 6 
 confederacy, while they do not neglect the interests of Jans^re" 
 their own state, should look to the general weal: as they ^ n § er °£ s 
 are first in honour, they should be first in the fulfilment Men should 
 of their duties. Now those among us who have ever ^ fi^ht? S 
 had dealings with the Athenians, do not require to be shouidbe 
 warned against them ; but such as live inland and not equally 
 on any maritime highway should clearly understand that, cease from 
 if they do not protect the sea-board, they will not be able fightmg - 
 to carry their produce to the sea, or to receive in return 
 the goods which the sea gives to the land. They should 
 not lend a careless ear to our words, for they nearly 
 concern them ; they should remember that, if they de¬ 
 sert the cities on the sea-shore, the danger may some 
 day reach them, and that they are consulting for their 
 own interests quite as much as for ours. And therefore 
 let no one hesitate to accept war in exchange for peace. 
 
 Wise men refuse to move until they are wronged, but 
 brave men as soon as they are wronged go to war, and 
 when there is a good opportunity make peace again. 
 
 They are not intoxicated by military success ; but 
 neither will they tolerate injustice from a love of peace 
 and ease. For he whom pleasure makes a coward will 
 
74 
 
 SPEECH OF THE CORINTHIANS. 
 
 I 2 T. 
 
 We are su¬ 
 perior to the 
 Athenians 
 in numbers, 
 in military 
 skill, in una¬ 
 nimity, and 
 our fleet will 
 soon be on 
 a level with 
 theirs. 
 
 But we must 
 find money. 
 
 quickly lose, if he continues inactive, the delights of ease 
 which he is so unwilling to renounce; and he whose 
 arrogance is stimulated by victory does not see how 
 hollow is the confidence which elates him. Many 
 schemes which were ill-advised have succeeded through 
 the still greater folly which possessed the enemy, and 
 yet more, which seemed to be wisely contrived, have 
 ended in foul disaster. The execution of an enterprise 
 is never equal a to the conception of it in the confident 
 mind of its promoter ; for men are safe while they are 
 thinking, but, when the time of action comes, then they 
 lose their presence of mind and fail. 
 
 c We, however, do not make war upon the Athenians 
 in a spirit of vain-glory, but from a sense of wrong ; 
 there is ample justification, and when we obtain redress, 
 we will put up the sword. For every reason we are 
 likely to succeed. First, because we are superior in 
 numbers and in military skill; secondly, because we all 
 obey as one man the orders given to us. If they are 
 strong at sea, we too will provide a navy, for which the 
 means can be supplied partly by contributions from each 
 state, partly out of the funds at Delphi and Olympia. A 
 loan will be granted to us, and by the offer of higher pay we 
 can draw away their foreign sailors. The Athenian power 
 consists of mercenaries, and not of their own citizens ; 
 but our soldiers are not mercenaries, and therefore cannot 
 so be bought, for we are strong in men if poor in money. 
 Let them be beaten in a single naval engagement and 
 they are probably conquered at once; but suppose they 
 hold out, we shall then have more time in which to 
 practise at sea. As soon as we have brought our skill up 
 to the level of theirs our courage will surely give us the 
 victory. For that is a natural gift which they cannot 
 learn, but their superior skill is a thing acquired, b which 
 we must attain by practice 13 . 
 
 c And the money which is required for the war, we will 
 
 a Reading ofioia. 
 
 b Or, ‘which we must overcome by practice.’ 
 
 KO 
 
HO 
 
 SPEECH OF TEIE CORINTHIANS. 
 
 75 
 
 •c. 432. 
 
 1.87. 
 
 provide by a contribution. What! shall their allies never 
 fail in paying the tribute which is to enslave them, and 
 shall we refuse to give freely in order to save ourselves 
 and be avenged on our enemies, or rather to prevent 
 the money which we refused to give from being taken 
 from us by them and used to our destruction ? 
 
 ‘ These are some of the means by which the war may 
 be carried on ; but there are others. We may induce 
 their allies to revolt,—a sure mode of cutting off the 
 revenues in which the strength of Athens consists ; or 
 we may plant a fort in their country; and there are 
 many expedients which will hereafter suggest them¬ 
 selves. For war, least of all things, conforms to pre¬ 
 scribed rules; it strikes out a path for itself when the 
 moment comes. And therefore he who has his temper 
 under control in warfare is safer far, but he who gets 
 into a passion is, through his own fault, liable to the 
 greater fall. 
 
 I. 
 
 By gaining 
 over their 
 allies we 
 may cut off 
 their re¬ 
 sources. 
 
 c If this were merely a quarrel between one of us and if W e quietly 
 our neighbours about a boundary line it would not shaiTde We 
 matter; but reflect: the truth is that the Athenians s f rve to be 
 
 slaves. 
 
 are a match for us all, and much more than a match 
 for any single city. And if we allow ourselves to be 
 divided or are not united against them heart and soul 
 —the whole confederacy and every nation and city in 
 it—they will easily overpower us. It may seem a hard 
 saying, but you may be sure that defeat means nothing 
 but downright slavery, and the bare mention of such a 
 possibility is a disgrace to the Peloponnese :—shall so 
 many states suffer at the hands of one? Men will say, 
 some that we deserve our fate, others that we are too 
 cowardly to resist: and we shall seem a degenerate 
 race. For our fathers were the liberators of Hellas, but 
 we cannot secure even our own liberty; and while we 
 make a point of overthrowing the rule of a single man 
 in this or that city, we allow a city which is a tyrant 
 to be set up in the midst of us. Are we not open to 
 one of three most serious charges—folly, cowardice, or 
 
-6 
 
 SPEECH OF THE CORINTHIANS. 
 
 I. carelessness? a For you certainly do not escape such 
 imputations by wrapping yourselves in that contemp¬ 
 tuous wisdom which has so often a brought men to ruin, 
 as in the end to be pronounced contemptible folly. 
 
 123. ‘ But why should we dwell reproachfully upon the past, 
 in going to except in the interest of the present? We should rather, 
 hav/the looking to the future, devote our energies to the task 
 feehng of he which we have immediately in hand. By labour to win 
 Hellas on v i r t U e,—that is the lesson which we b have learnt from 
 
 your side, 
 
 and you will our fathers, and which you ought not to unlearn, because 
 the treaty, you chance to have some trifling advantage over them 
 in wealth and power ; for men should not lose in the 
 time of their wealth what was gained by them in their 
 time of want. There are many reasons why you may 
 advance with confidence. The God has spoken and has 
 promised to take our part himself. All Hellas will fight 
 at our side, from motives either of fear or of interest. 
 And you will not break the treaty,—the God in bidding 
 you go to war pronounces it to have been already broken, 
 
 ■—but you will avenge the violation of it. For those who 
 attack others, not those who defend themselves, are the 
 real violators of treaties c . 
 
 124. ‘ On every ground you will be right in going to war: 
 We cannot ft [ s our un ited advice ; d and if you believe community 
 
 go on as we J J 
 
 are. of interests to be the surest ground of strength both to 
 
 way to individuals and states, send speedy aid d to the Poti- 
 
 peacemay 1 daeans, who are Dorians and now besieged by Ionians 
 to war Way ^ or ^ mes h ave changed), and recover the liberties which 
 the rest of the allies have lost. We cannot go on as we 
 are : for some of us are already suffering, and if it is 
 known that we have met, but do not dare to defend 
 ourselves, others will soon share their fate. Acknow- 
 
 a Or, ‘For we cannot suppose that, having avoided these errors, 
 you have wrapped yourselves in that contemptuous wisdom, which 
 has so often ’ etc. 
 
 b Reading 37/xti/. c Cp. i. 71 fin. 
 
 d Reading Taira : or, with all the MSS. retaining Taira : ‘And as 
 it is most certain that the policy which we recommend is for our 
 advantage both as states and individuals, send speedy aid ’ etc. 
 
 mo 
 
EMBASSIES SENT TO AND FRO. 77 
 
 b.c. 432. ledging then, allies, that there is no alternative, and I. 
 
 0L 87 ‘ that we are advising you for the best, vote for war; 
 and be not afraid of the immediate danger, but fix your 
 thoughts on the durable peace which will follow. For by 
 war peace is assured, but to remain at peace when you 
 should be going to war may be often very dangerous. 
 
 The tyrant city which has been set up in Hellas is a 
 standing menace to all alike ; she rules over some of 
 us already, and would fain rule over others. Let us 
 attack and subdue her, that we may ourselves live safely 
 for the future and deliver the Hellenes whom she has 
 enslaved. 5 
 
 Such were the words of the Corinthians. 
 
 The Lacedaemonians, having heard the opinions of all 125. 
 the allies, put the question to them all, one after the other, Nearly a 
 
 ii i-i 11 . _ yearisspent 
 
 great and small alike, and the majority voted for war. in prepara- 
 But, although they had come to this decision, they were tlon ' 
 not ready, and could not take up arms at once; so they 
 determined to make the necessary preparations, each for 
 themselves, with the least possible delay. Still nearly 
 a whole year was passed in preparation before they 
 invaded Attica and commenced open hostilities. 
 
 During this year they sent embassies to Athens and 126. 
 made various complaints that their grounds for going The story of 
 
 • 1 1 f, 1 . 1 a 1 • Cylon told 
 
 to war might be all the stronger in case the Athenians in explana- 
 refused to listen. The first ambassadors desired the cu^eonhe 
 Athenians to drive out ‘ the curse of the Goddess. 5 The Goddess - 
 B.c. 620? curse to which they referred was as follows:—In the 
 01, 40 ? days of old there was an Athenian named Cylon, who 
 had been an Olympic victor; he was powerful and of 
 noble birth ; and he had married the daughter of The- 
 agenes, a Megarian who was at that time tyrant of 
 Megara. In answer to an enquiry which Cylon made 
 at Delphi, the God told him to seize the Acropolis of 
 Athens at the greatest festival of Zeus. Thereupon he 
 obtained forces from Theagenes, and, persuading his 
 friends to join him, when the time of the Olympic 
 festival in Peloponnesus came round, he took possession 
 
7 » 
 
 THE CURSE OF THE GODDESS . 
 
 of the Acropolis, intending to make himself tyrant. He 
 thought that this was the greatest festival of Zeus, and, 
 having been an Olympic victor, he seemed to have an 
 interest in it. But whether the greatest festival spoken 
 of was in Attica or in some other part of Hellas was a 
 question which never entered into his mind, and the 
 oracle said nothing about it. (For the Athenians also 
 have a greatest festival of Zeus—the festival of Zeus a the 
 Gracious, or Diasia, as it is called—this is held outside 
 the city and the whole people sacrifice at it, some, 
 ordinary victims, others, a kind of offering peculiar to 
 the country.) However, Cylon thought that his inter¬ 
 pretation was right, and made the attempt at the Olym¬ 
 pic festival. The Athenians, when they saw what had 
 happened, came in a body from the fields and invested 
 the Acropolis. After a time they grew tired of the 
 siege and most of them went away, committing the 
 guard to the nine Archons, and giving them full powers 
 to do what they thought best in the whole matter; 
 for in those days public affairs were chiefly adminis¬ 
 tered by the nine Archons b . Cylon and his companions 
 were in great distress from want of food and water. So 
 he and his brother made their escape ; the rest, being 
 hard pressed, and some of them ready to die of hunger, 
 sat as suppliants at the altar which is in the Acropolis. 
 When the Athenians, to whose charge the guard had 
 been committed, saw them dying in the temple, they 
 bade them rise, promising to do them no harm, and 
 then led them away and put them to death. They even 
 slew some of them in the very presence of the awful 
 Goddesses at whose altars, in passing by, they had 
 sought refuge. The murderers and their descendants 
 are held to be accursed, and offenders against the 
 Goddess. These accursed persons were banished by 
 the Athenians ; and Cleomenes, the Lacedaemonian king, 
 again banished them from Athens in a time of civil 
 
 a Placing the comma before instead of after Luio-ta. 
 
 b Cp. Herod, v. 71. 
 
PQO 
 
 THE CURSE OF TAENARUS. 
 
 79 
 
 strife by the help of the opposite faction, expelling the I. 
 living and disinterring and casting forth the bones of 
 the dead a . Nevertheless they afterwards returned, and 
 to this day their race still survives in the city. 
 
 The Lacedaemonians desired the Athenians to drive 127. 
 away this curse, as if the honour of the Gods were their This curse 
 
 J m ’ attached to 
 
 first object, but in reality because they knew that the Pericles, 
 curse attached to Pericles, the son of Xanthippus, by 
 his mother’s side, and they thought that if he were 
 banished they would find the Athenians more manage¬ 
 able. They did not really expect that he would be 
 driven into exile, but hoped to discredit him with the 
 citizens and make them believe that his misfortune was 
 to a certain extent the cause of the war. For he was 
 the leader of the state and the most powerful man of 
 his day, and his policy was utterly opposed to the 
 Lacedaemonians. He would not suffer the Athenians 
 to give way, but was always urging upon them the 
 necessity of war. 
 
 The Athenians retaliated by demanding that the Lace- 128. 
 daemonians should drive away the curse of Taenarus. The Athe- 
 They referred to the murder of certain Helots who had taiiateby 
 taken refuge in the temple of Poseidon at Taenarus ; Lacedae- the 
 these the Lacedaemonians, having; first raised by the momans 
 
 & J to purge 
 
 hand, had then led away and slain. The Lacedae- away other 
 monians themselves believe this act of theirs to have The curse 
 been the cause of the great earthquake which visited dessex?° d " 
 Sparta b . The Athenians also bade them drive out the P^ od t0 
 curse of Athene of the Brazen House. The story is murder of 
 .c. 477. as follows :—When Pausanias the Lacedaemonian was pliant 1 SUP 
 L 75, 4 ' originally summoned by the Spartans to give an account S^curse of 
 of his command at the Hellespont 0 , and had been tried ^^zen 
 and acquitted, he was no longer sent out in a public House was 
 
 . ii-i . . T T . , .. caused by 
 
 capacity, but he hired a trireme of Hermione on his own the death of 
 account and sailed to the Hellespont, pretending that he inThe pre- 
 had gone thither to fight in the cause of the Hellenes. ^pi° fher 
 In reality he wanted to prosecute an intrigue with the 
 a Cp. Herod, v. 70, 72. b Cp. i. 101, 102. c Cp. i. 95. 
 
So 
 
 STORY OF PA USA NIA S. 
 
 I. King, by which he hoped to obtain the empire of Hellas. 
 
 He had already taken the first steps after the retreat 
 from Cyprus, when he captured Byzantium. The city b.c. 478 or 
 was at that time held by the Persians and by certain 0L 75, 3 or 
 relatives and kinsmen of the King, who were taken *+• 
 prisoners. These he restored to the King without the 
 knowledge of the allies, to whom he declared that they 
 had made their escape. This act was the beginning 
 of the whole affair, and thereby he originally placed the 
 King under an obligation to him. His accomplice was 
 Gongylus the Eretrian, to whose care he had entrusted 
 Byzantium and the captives. To this same Gongylus 
 he also gave a letter addressed to the King, of which, as 
 was afterwards discovered, the terms were as follows :— 
 ‘Pausanias, the Spartan commander, desiring to do 
 you a service, sends you back these captives of his spear. 
 
 And I propose, if you have no objection, to marry your 
 daughter, and to bring Sparta and the rest of Hellas 
 under your sway. I think that I can accomplish this if 
 you and I take counsel together. Should you approve 
 of my proposal, send a trusty person to the sea and 
 through him we will negotiate.’ Thus far the letter. 
 
 129. Xerxes was pleased, and sent Artabazus the son of 
 Pausanias f Ph arnaces to the sea, commanding him to assume the 
 with government of the satrapy of Dascylium in the room of 
 
 Xerxes. _ _ . A 
 
 Megabates. An answer was entrusted to him, which he 
 was to send as quickly as possible to Pausanias at Byzan¬ 
 tium ; he was to show him at the same time the royal 
 seal. If Pausanias gave him any order about his own 
 affairs, he was to execute it with all diligence and fidelity. 
 Artabazus came down to the sea, as he was desired, and 
 transmitted the letter. The answer of the King was as 
 follows:— 
 
 ‘Thus saith Xerxes, the King, to Pausanias. The bene¬ 
 fit which thou hast done me in saving the captives who 
 were taken at Byzantium beyond the sea is recorded in 
 my house for ever, and thy words please me. Let neither 
 day nor night hinder thee from fulfilling diligently the 
 
PA US AN IAS SUMMONED TO SPARTA. 8 r 
 
 4 6 k 477 ° r P rom * se which’thou hast made to me ; spare not gold or 
 01. 75, 4 silver, and take as large an army as thou wilt, where- 
 
 I. 
 
 or 76 ff. 
 
 soever it may be required. I have sent to thee Arta- 
 bazus, a good man; act with him for my honour and 
 welfare, and for thine own, and be of good courage. 5 
 
 Pausanias received the letter. He had already ac- jg 0 
 quired a high reputation among the Hellenes when in Pausanias, 
 command at Plataea, and now he was so great that he awayby 
 could no longer contain himself or live like other men. P ride i 
 
 0 # manifests 
 
 As he marched out of Byzantium he wore Persian ap- his am- 
 parel. On his way through Thrace he was attended by designs, 
 a body-guard of Medes and Egyptians, and he had his 
 table served after the Persian fashion. He could not 
 conceal his ambition, but indicated by little things the 
 greater designs which he was meditating. He made 
 himself difficult of access, and displayed such a violent 
 temper towards everybody that no one could come near 
 him; and this was one of the chief reasons why the 
 confederacy transferred themselves to the Athenians. 
 
 The news of his behaviour soon reached the Lacedae¬ 
 monians ; who recalled him in the first instance on this He is 
 ground a . And now, when he had sailed away in the ship secon/time 
 of Hermione without leave, and was evidently carrying d y the 
 
 .L/3.C6QcL6- 
 
 on the same practices ; when he had been forced out of monians 
 Byzantium and the gates had been shut against him by into prison, 
 the Athenians; and when, instead of returning to Sparta, come°°out 
 he settled at Colonae in Troas, and was reported to the ^mselfTor 
 Ephors to be negotiating with the Barbarians, and to be trial, 
 staying there for no good purpose, then at last they made 
 up their minds to act. They sent a herald to him with a 
 despatch rolled on a scytale, commanding him to follow 
 the officer home, and saying that, if he refused, Sparta 
 would declare war against him. He, being desirous as 
 far as he could to avoid suspicion and believing that he 
 could dispose of the accusations by bribery, returned for 
 the second time to Sparta. On his return he was at once 
 thrown into prison by the Ephors, who have the power 
 
 131 . 
 
 Cp. 
 
 1. 95 mit. 
 G 
 
82 
 
 HIS INTRIGUES WITH THE HELOTS. 
 
 I. 
 
 132. 
 
 Sufficient 
 evidence 
 cannot be 
 obtained. 
 
 At last his 
 confidential 
 servant 
 opens a 
 letter 
 which he 
 was to 
 carry to 
 the Persian 
 satrap, and 
 finding an 
 order for 
 his own 
 death, 
 turns 
 informer. 
 
 to imprison the king himself. But after a time he con¬ 
 trived to come out, and challenged any one who asserted 
 his guilt to bring him to trial. 
 
 As yet however neither his enemies among the citizens 
 nor the Spartan government had any trustworthy evi¬ 
 dence such as would have justified them in inflicting 
 punishment upon a member of the royal family holding 
 royal office at the time. For he was the guardian as 
 well as cousin of the king, Pleistarchus son of Leonidas, 
 who was still a minor. But his disregard of propriety 
 and affectation of Barbarian fashions made them strongly 
 suspect that he was dissatisfied with his position in the 
 state. They examined into any violation of established 
 usage which they could find in his previous life ; and they 
 remembered among other things how in past times he 
 had presumed on his own authority to inscribe on the 
 tripod at Delphi, which the Hellenes dedicated as the 
 hrstfruits of their victory over the Persians, this elegiac 
 couplet:— 
 
 ‘ Pausanias, captain of the Hellenes, having destroyed the Persian 
 host, 
 
 Made this offering to Phoebus for a memorial.’ 
 
 The Lacedaemonians at once effaced the lines and in¬ 
 scribed on the tripod the names of the cities which had 
 taken part in the overthrow of the Barbarian and in the 
 dedication of the offering. But still this act of Pausa¬ 
 nias gave offence at the time, and now that he had 
 again fallen under suspicion, seemed to receive a new 
 light from his present designs. They were also in¬ 
 formed that he was intriguing with the Helots; and 
 this was true, for he had promised them emancipation 
 and citizenship if they would join him in an insurrec¬ 
 tion and help to carry out his whole design. Still the 
 magistrates would not take decided measures ; they even 
 refused to believe the distinct testimony which certain 
 Helots brought against him; their habit having always 
 been to be slow in taking an irrevocable decision against 
 
HE IS BETRAYED BY HIS SERVANT. 83 
 
 a Spartan without incontestable proof. At last a certain I. 
 man of Argilus, who had been a favourite and was still a 
 confidential servant of Pausanias, turned informer. He 
 had been commissioned by him to carry to Artabazus 
 the last letters for the King, but the thought struck him 
 that no previous messenger had ever returned ; he took 
 alarm, and so, having counterfeited the seal of Pausanias 
 in order to avoid discovery if he were mistaken, or if 
 Pausanias, wanting to make some alteration, should ask 
 him for the letter, he opened it, and among the directions 
 given in it found written, as he had suspected, an order 
 for his own death. 
 
 He showed the letter to the Ephors, who were now 133* 
 more inclined to believe, but still they wanted to hear His servant 
 
 i t takes sanc- 
 
 something from Pausanias own mouth ; and so, accord- tuary at 
 ing to a plan preconcerted with them, the man went to where h^’ 
 Taenarus as a suppliant and there put up a hut divided ^ c e e ^ f s 
 by a partition. In the inner part of the hut he placed Ephors. 
 
 . Pausanias 
 
 some of the Ephors, and when Pausanias came to him coming to 
 and asked him why he was a suppliant, the whole truth reason^e - 6 
 was at once revealed to them. There was the man re- 
 proaching Pausanias with the directions which he had 
 found in the letter, and going into minute details about 
 the whole affair; he protested that never on any occa¬ 
 sion had he brought him into any trouble when sent on 
 his service in this matter to the King: why then should 
 he share the fate of the other messengers, and be re¬ 
 warded with death? And there was Pausanias, admit¬ 
 ting the truth of his words, and telling him not to be 
 angry at what had happened, offering to raise him by 
 the hand that he might safely leave the temple, and 
 bidding him go about the business at once and not 
 make difficulties. 
 
 The Ephors, who had heard every word, went away 134. 
 for the present, intending, now that they had certain The Ephors 
 
 r J attempt to 
 
 knowledge, to take Pausanias in the city. It is said that arrest 
 he was on the point of being arrested in the street, when He flies to * 
 the face of one of them as they approached revealed to ^ e A \ e h ^ e 
 
 G 2 
 
DEATH OF PA USA NIAS. 
 
 »4 
 
 I. 
 
 and is 
 there shut 
 in and 
 starved 
 to death. 
 
 1 35 - 
 
 Themisto- 
 cles is 
 implicated 
 in the plot, 
 and officers 
 are sent to 
 take him. 
 
 him their purpose, and another who was friendly warned 
 him by a hardly perceptible nod. Whereupon he ran 
 and fled to the temple of Athene of the Brazen House 
 and arrived before them, # for the precinct was not far 
 off. There, entering into a small house which be¬ 
 longed to the temple, that he might not suffer from 
 exposure to the weather, he remained. When his pur¬ 
 suers, who had failed in overtaking him, came up, they 
 unroofed the building, and having made sure that he was 
 within and could not get out, they built up the doors, 
 and, investing the place, starved him to death. He was 
 on the point of expiring in the temple where he lay, 
 when they, observing his condition, brought him out; 
 he was still breathing, but as soon as he was brought 
 out he died. The Spartans were going to cast his body 
 into the Caeadas, a chasm into which they throw male¬ 
 factors, but they changed their minds and buried him 
 somewhere in the neighbourhood. The God of Delphi 
 afterwards commanded them to transfer him to the place 
 where he died, and he now lies in the entrance to the 
 precinct, as the inscription on the column testifies. The 
 oracle also told them that they had brought a curse 
 upon themselves, and must offer two bodies for one to 
 Athene of the Brazen House. Whereupon they made 
 two brazen statues, which they dedicated, intending them 
 to be an expiation for Pausanias. 
 
 To this judgment of the God himself the Athenians 
 referred when they retorted on the Lacedaemonians, 
 telling them to banish the curse. 
 
 Now the evidence which proved that Pausanias was in 
 league with Persia implicated Themistocles ; and the 
 Lacedaemonians sent ambassadors to the Athenians 
 charging him likewise with treason, and demanding that 
 he should receive the same punishment. The Athe¬ 
 nians agreed, but having been ostracised he was living 
 at the time in Argos, whence he- used to visit other 
 parts of the Peloponnese. The Lacedaemonians were 
 very ready to join in the pursuit; so they and the 
 
 C w 
 
THEMISTOCLES AND ADMETUS. 
 
 8 5 
 
 Athenians sent officers, who were told to arrest him I. 
 wherever they should find him. 
 
 Themistocles received information of their purpose, 136. 
 and fled from the Peloponnesus to the Corcyraeans, who H e seeks 
 
 . . refuge 
 
 were under an obligation to him. The Corcyraeans said among the 
 that they were afraid to keep him, lest they should incur ansTthey 
 the enmity of Athens and Lacedaemon ; so they con- ^ e A a t hens 
 veved him to the neighbouring continent, whither he was and Lace - 
 
 J ° 0 daemon, 
 
 followed by the officers, who constantly enquired in which and send 
 direction he had gone and pursued him everywhere. toEpiml 
 Owing to an accident he was compelled to stop at the 
 house of Admetus, king of the Molossians, who was not of Admetus, 
 
 5 * king of the 
 
 his friend. He chanced to be absent from home, but Molossians, 
 
 Themistocles presented himself as a suppliant to his suppliant a 
 wife, and was instructed by her to take their child and dearth 
 sit at the hearth. Admetus soon returned, and then 
 Themistocles told him who he was, adding that if in 
 past times he had opposed any request which Admetus 
 had made to the Athenians, he ought not to retaliate on 
 an exile. He was now in such extremity that a far 
 weaker adversary than he could do him a mischief; but 
 a noble nature should not be revenged by taking at 
 adisadvantage one as good as himself. Themistocles 
 further argued that he had opposed Admetus in some 
 matter of business, and not when life was at stake; 
 but that, if Admetus delivered him up, he would be 
 consigning him to death. At the same time he told 
 him who his pursuers were and what was the charge 
 against him. 
 
 Admetus, hearing his words, raised him up, together 
 with his own son, from the place where he sat holding Admetus 
 the child in his arms, which was the most solemn form of p^te^tiSi 
 supplication. Not long afterwards the Athenians and and when 
 
 rr 0 . the officers 
 
 Lacedaemonians came and pressed him to give up the arrive in 
 
 fugitive, but he refused ; and as Themistocles wanted to sends h’im 
 go to the King, sent him on foot across the country to the ^ence^e 
 sea at Pydna (which was in the kingdom of Alexander), 
 
 There he found a merchant vessel sailing to Ionia, in 
 
86 THEMISTOCLES AT THE PEES/AN COURT. 
 
 I. which he embarked ; it was driven, however, by a storm b.c. 466. 
 to the station of the Athenian fleet which was blockading OL ?8, 3 * 
 Naxos. He was unknown to his fellow passengers, but, 
 fearing what might happen, he told the captain who 
 he was and why he fled, threatening if he did not save 
 his life to say that he had been bribed to take him on 
 board. The only hope was that no one should be allowed 
 to-leave the ship while they had to remain off Naxos; 
 if he complied with his request, the obligation should be 
 abundantly repaid. The captain agreed, and after anchor¬ 
 ing in a rough sea for a day and a night off the Athenian 
 station, he at length arrived at Ephesus. Themistocles 
 rewarded him with a liberal present; for he received soon 
 afterwards from his friends the property which he had 
 deposited at Athens and Argos. He then went up the 
 country with one of the Persians who dwelt on the coast, 
 and sent a letter to Artaxerxes the son of Xerxes, who b.c. 465. 
 His letter had just succeeded to the throne. The letter was in the 01 ’ 781 4 ‘ 
 to the Kmg. f Q q 0W i n g WO rds :— £ I, Themistocles, have come to you, I 
 who of all Hellenes did your house the greatest injuries 
 so long as I was compelled to defend myself against 
 your father ; but still greater benefits when I was in 
 safety and he in danger during his retreat. And there 
 is a debt of gratitude due to me 1 (here he noted how 
 he had forewarned Xerxes at Salamis of the resolution 
 of the Hellenes to withdraw a , and how through his in¬ 
 fluence, as he pretended, they had refrained from break¬ 
 ing down the bridges) 13 . ‘Now I am here, able to do 
 you many other services, and persecuted by the Hellenes 
 for your sake. Let me wait a year, and then I will 
 138. myself explain why I have come.’ 
 
 Going to The King is said to have been astonished at the bold- 
 
 the Court ... 
 
 of Persia, ness of his character, and told him to wait a year as he 
 tife^avour 5 proposed. In the interval he made himself acquainted, 
 andrecdves as ^ ar as C0U H with the Persian language and the 
 great ho- manners of the country. When the year was over, he 
 
 nour, but . 
 
 shortly after arrived at the court and became a greater man there 
 
 dies. 
 
 a Cp. Herod, viii. 75. b Cp. Herod, viii. 108. 
 
PQO 
 
 C. 432. 
 .87. 
 
 CHARACTER OF THEMISTOCLES. 87 
 
 than any Hellene had ever been before. This was due I. 
 partly to his previous reputation, and partly to the hope The great- 
 which he inspired in the King’s mind that he would character, 
 enslave Hellas to him ; above all, his ability had been acuteness 3- 
 tried and not found wanting. For Themistocles was a ^t^This 
 man whose natural force was unmistakeable; this was P ower of 
 
 persuasion, 
 
 the quality for which he was distinguished above all his readi- 
 other men ; from his own native acuteness, and without emergency, 
 any study either before or at the time, he was the ablest 
 judge of the course to be pursued in a sudden emergency, 
 and could best divine what was likely to happen in the 
 remotest future. Whatever he had in hand he had the 
 power of explaining to others, and even where he had no 
 experience he was quite competent to form a sufficient 
 judgment; no one could foresee with equal clearness the 
 good or evil event which was hidden in the future. In a 
 word, Themistocles, by natural power of mind and with 
 the least preparation, was of all men the best able to ex¬ 
 temporise the right thing to be done. A sickness put 
 an end to his life, although some say that he poisoned 
 himself because he felt that he could not accomplish 
 what he had promised to the King. There is a monu¬ 
 ment of him in the agora of the Asiatic Magnesia, where 
 he was governor—the King assigning to him, for bread, 
 Magnesia, which produced a revenue of fifty talents 3, 
 in the year ; for wine, Lampsacus, which was considered 
 to be the richest in wine of any district then known ; and 
 Myus for meat. His family say that his remains were 
 carried home at his own request and buried in Attica, 
 but secretly; for he had been accused of treason and 
 had fled from his country, and he could not lawfully 
 be interred there. Such was the end of Pausanias the 
 Lacedaemonian, and Themistocles the Athenian, the two 
 most famous Hellenes of their day. 
 
 Thus the demand for the banishment of the accursed 139. 
 made by the Lacedaemonians on the occasion of their The Lace- 
 
 J daemomans 
 
 first embassy was met by a counter demand on the make a 
 
 7 final de- 
 
 a About 12,000. mand for 
 
88 
 
 SPEECH OF PERICLES. 
 
 I. part of Athens. Later they came again and told the 
 the restora- Athenians that they must raise the siege of Potidaea and 
 dependence restore Aegina to independence. Above all, and in the 
 Hellenes, plainest terms, they insisted that if they wanted to 
 Perfdes° f avert war > they must rescind the decree which excluded 
 the Megarians from the market of Athens and the har¬ 
 bours in the Athenian dominions. But the Athenians 
 would not listen to them, nor rescind the decree ; al¬ 
 leging in reply that the Megarians had tilled the holy 
 ground and the neutral borderland, and had received 
 their runaway slaves. Finally, there came from Sparta 
 an embassy, consisting of Rhamphias, Melesippus, and 
 Hegesander, who said nothing of all this, but only, c The 
 Lacedaemonians desire to maintain peace, and peace 
 there may be if you will restore independence to the 
 Hellenes.’ Whereupon the Athenians called an assembly 
 and held a discussion ; it seemed best to them to make 
 up their minds and to give a complete and final answer. 
 Many came forward to speak, and much was said on 
 both sides, some affirming that they ought to go to war, 
 and others that this decree about the Megarians should 
 be rescinded and not stand in the way of peace. At last 
 Pericles the son of Xanthippus, who was the first man 
 of his day at Athens, and the greatest orator and states¬ 
 man, came forward and advised as follows :— 
 
 140. f Athenians, I say, as I always have said, that we must 
 1 still give never yield to the Peloponnesians, although I know that 
 
 you my old . . . . 
 
 advice— men are persuaded to go to war in one temper of mind, 
 peidUo anc * act when the time comes in another, and that their 
 the Pelo- resolutions change with the changes of fortune. But I 
 
 ponnesians. . 0 
 
 see that I must give you the same, or nearly the same, 
 advice which I gave before, and I call upon those whom 
 my words may convince to maintain our united deter¬ 
 mination, even if we should not escape disaster ; or else, 
 if our sagacity be justified by success, to claim no share 
 of the credit a . The movement of events is often as 
 wayward and incomprehensible as the course of human 
 a Cp. ii. 64 init. 
 
 OH 
 
wo 
 
 SPEECH OF PERICLES . 
 
 89 
 
 ,c. 432. thought; and this is why we ascribe to chance whatever 
 L S? ' belies our calculation. 
 
 ‘For some time past the designs of the Lacedaemonians 
 have been clear enough, and they are still clearer now. 
 The treaty says that when differences arise, the two 
 parties shall refer them to arbitration, and in the mean 
 time both are to retain what they have. But for arbitra¬ 
 tion they never ask; and when it is offered by us, they 
 refuse it. They want to redress their grievances by arms 
 and not by argument; and now they come to us, using 
 the language, no longer of expostulation, but of com¬ 
 mand. They tell us to quit Potidaea, to leave Aegina 
 independent, and to rescind the decree respecting the 
 Megarians. These last ambassadors go further still, and 
 announce that we must give the Hellenes independence. 
 I would have none of you imagine that he will be fight¬ 
 ing for a small matter if we refuse to annul the Megarian 
 decree, of which they make so much, telling us that its 
 revocation would prevent the war. You should have no 
 lingering uneasiness about this; you are not really going 
 to war for a trifle. For in the seeming trifle is involved 
 the trial and confirmation of your whole purpose. If 
 you yield to them in a small matter, they will think 
 that you are afraid, and will immediately dictate some 
 more oppressive condition ; but if you are firm, you will 
 prove to them that they must treat you as their equals. 
 Wherefore make up your minds once for all, either to 
 give way while you are still unharmed, or, if we are 
 going to war, as in my judgment is best, then on no plea 
 small or great to give way at all ; we will not con- 
 
 The de¬ 
 demands 
 of the 
 Lacedae¬ 
 monians 
 may seem 
 trifling, but 
 submission 
 to them 
 will only 
 provoke 
 fresh de¬ 
 mands and 
 implies the 
 loss of 
 our inde¬ 
 pendence. 
 
 141. 
 
 Unless you 
 mean to 
 give way 
 now, you 
 
 descend to possess our own in fear. Any claim, the 
 smallest as well as the greatest, imposed on a neighbour at au. Nor 
 and an equal when there has been no legal award, can fear th° U 
 mean nothing but slavery. yo S uhave° r 
 
 ‘ That our resources are equal to theirs, and that we Stages" 
 shall be as strong in the war, I will now prove to you p^p he 
 in detail. The Peloponnesians cultivate their own soil, nesians; 
 and they have no wealth either public or private. Nor p h 0 e 0 y r ^nd 
 
I. 
 
 till their 
 own land, 
 they are 
 unaccus¬ 
 tomed to 
 great wars, 
 and divided 
 in race. 
 
 142. 
 
 They can¬ 
 not do you 
 any real 
 harm by 
 building 
 a rival city 
 
 90 SPEECH OF PERICLES. 
 
 have they any experience of long wars in countries 
 beyond the sea; their poverty prevents them from 
 fighting, except in person against each other, and that for 
 a short time only. Such men cannot be often manning 
 fleets or sending out armies. They would be at a dis¬ 
 tance from their own properties, upon which they must 
 nevertheless draw, and they will be kept off the sea 
 by us. Now wars are supported out of accumulated 
 wealth, and not out of forced contributions. And men 
 who cultivate their own lands are more ready to serve 
 with their persons than with their property a ; they do not 
 despair of their lives, but they soon grow anxious lest 
 their money should all be spent, especially if the war in 
 which they are engaged is protracted beyond their calcu¬ 
 lation, as may well be the case. In a single pitched 
 battle the Peloponnesians and their allies are a match for 
 all Hellas, but they are not able to maintain a war 
 against a power different in kind from their own b ; they 
 have no regular general assembly, and therefore cannot 
 execute their plans with speed and decision. The con¬ 
 federacy is made up of many races ; all the representa¬ 
 tives have equal votes, and press their several interests. 
 There follows the usual result, that nothing is ever done 
 properly. For some are all anxiety to be revenged on 
 the enemy, while others only want to save their money. 
 The members of such a confederacy are slow to meet, 
 and when they do meet, they give little time to the con¬ 
 sideration of any common interest, and a great deal to 
 schemes which further the interest of their particular 
 state. Eveiy one fancies that his own neglect will do no 
 harm, but that it is somebody else^s business to keep a 
 look-out for him, and this idea, cherished alike by each, 
 is the secret ruin of all. 
 
 ‘Their greatest difficulty will be want of money, which 
 they can only provide slowly; delay will thus occur, and 
 war waits for no man. Further, no fortified place which 
 they can raise against us c is to be feared any more than 
 a Cp. i. 121 med. b Cp. viii. 96 fin. c Cp. i. 122 init. 
 
 Opo 
 
OM 
 
 SPEECH OF PERICLES. 
 
 91 
 
 ■c. 432. their navy. As to the first, even in time of peace it I. 
 
 1 87 ’ would be hard for them to build a city able to compete or f ° rtlfied 
 with Athens ; and how much more so when they are in an Attica: 
 enemy’s country, and our walls will be a menace to them they, mere 
 quite as much as theirs to us ! Or, again, if they simply aTtheyTre, 
 raise a fort in our territory, they may do mischief to some ^vai you at 
 part of our lands by sallies, and the slaves- may desert to 
 them ; but that will not prevent us from sailing to the 
 Peloponnese and there raising forts against them, and in 
 other ways by the help of our navy, which is our strong 
 arm, retaliating upon them. For we have gained more 
 experience of fighting on land from warfare at sea than 
 they of naval affairs from warfare on land. And they 
 will not easily acquire nautical skill a ; even you your¬ 
 selves, who have been practising ever since the Persian 
 War, are not yet perfect. How can they, who are not 
 sailors, but tillers of the soil, do much ? They will not 
 even be permitted to practise, because a large fleet will 
 constantly be lying in wait for them. If they were 
 watched by a few ships only, they might run the risk, 
 trusting to their numbers and forgetting their inexperi¬ 
 ence ; but if they are kept off the sea by our superior 
 strength, their want of practice will make them unskilful 
 and their want of skill timid. Maritime skill is like skill 
 of other kinds, not a thing to be cultivated by the way 
 or at chance times; it is jealous of any other pursuit 
 which distracts the mind for an instant from itself. 
 
 ‘Suppose, again, that they lay hands on the treasures 143. 
 at Olympia and Delphi, and tempt our mercenary sailors °v r foreign 
 with the offer of higher pay b , there might be serious not be 
 danger, if we and our metics c embarking alone were not ©ffere of by 
 still a match for them. But we are a match for them : hi £ h .pay, 
 
 and if they 
 
 and, best of all, our pilots are taken from our own are, we can 
 citizens, while no sailors are to be found so good or them, 
 so numerous as ours in all the rest of Hellas. No 
 mercenary will choose to fight on their side for the sake 
 of a few days’ high pay, when he will not only be an 
 a Cp. i. 121 med. b Cp. i. 121 init. c Cp. iii. 16 init. 
 
I. 
 
 We must 
 guard the 
 city and the 
 sea, and 
 not mind 
 about our 
 houses and 
 lands in the 
 country. 
 
 144 - 
 
 Let our 
 answer be : 
 We will 
 grant inde¬ 
 pendence 
 to our 
 allies, if the 
 Lacedae¬ 
 monians 
 will allow 
 their sub¬ 
 jects to 
 choose 
 their own 
 form of 
 govern¬ 
 ment. 
 
 9 % SPEECH OF PERICLES. 
 
 exile, but will incur greater danger, and will have less 
 hope of victory. 
 
 f Such I conceive to be the prospects of the Pelopon¬ 
 nesians. But we ourselves are free from the defects 
 which I have noted in them ; and we have great ad¬ 
 vantages. If they attack our country by land, we shall 
 attack theirs by sea ; and the devastation, even of part 
 of Peloponnesus, will be a very different thing from that 
 of all Attica. For they, if they want fresh territory, must 
 take it by arms, whereas we have abundance of land both 
 in the islands and on the continent; such is the power 
 which the empire of the sea gives. Reflect, if we were 
 islanders, who would be more invulnerable ? Let us 
 imagine that we are, and acting in that spirit let us give 
 up lands and houses, but keep a watch over the city and 
 the sea. We should not under any irritation at the loss 
 of our property give battle to the Peloponnesians, who 
 far outnumber us. If we conquer, we shall have to fight 
 over again with as many more; and if we fail, besides the 
 defeat, our confederacy, which is our strength, will be 
 lost to us ; for our allies will rise in revolt when we are 
 no longer capable of making war upon them. Mourn 
 not for houses and lands, but for men; men may gain 
 these, but these will not gain men. If I thought that you 
 would listen to me, I would say to you, “Go yourselves 
 and destroy them, and thereby prove to the Pelopon¬ 
 nesians that none of these things will move you. 55 
 
 ‘ I have many other reasons for believing that you will 
 conquer, but you must not be extending your empire 
 while you are at war, or run into unnecessary dangers. 
 I am more afraid of our own mistakes than of our 
 enemies’ designs. But of all this I will speak again when 
 the time of action comes ; for the present, let us send 
 the ambassadors away, giving them this answer : “ That 
 we will not exclude the Megarians from our markets 
 and harbours, if the Lacedaemonians will not exclude 
 foreigners, whether ourselves or our allies, from Sparta; 
 for the treaty no more forbids the one than the other. 
 
 oa 
 
NEAR APPROACH OF THE IVAP. 
 
 93 
 
 B.C. 432. 
 01. 87. 
 
 That we will concede independence to the cities, if they I. 
 were independent when we made the treaty, and as soon ^twar^ 
 as the Lacedaemonians allow their subject states to be bu 3 offbr 
 
 f arbitration. 
 
 governed as they choose, not for the interest of Lace- still, peace 
 daemon, but for their own. Also that we are willing to and we 
 offer arbitration according to the treaty. And that we 
 do not want to begin war, but intend to defend ourselves war m a 
 
 & . . spirit 
 
 if attacked.” This answer will be just, and bents the worthy of 
 dignity of the city. We must be aware however that our 
 war will come; and the more willing we are to accept the 
 situation, the less ready will our enemies be to lay hands 
 upon us. Remember that where dangers are greatest, 
 there the greatest honours are to be won by men and 
 states. Our fathers, when they withstood the Persian, 
 had no such empire as we have ; what little they had 
 they forsook : not by good fortune but by wisdom, and 
 not by power but by courage, they repelled the Bar¬ 
 barian and raised us to our present height of greatness. 
 
 We must be worthy of them, and resist our enemies 
 with all our might, that we may hand down our empire 
 unimpaired to posterity/ 
 
 Such were the words of Pericles. The Athenians, 145. 
 approving, voted as he told them, and on his motion The Athe- 
 answered the Lacedaemonians in detail as he had sug- pericie^° pt 
 gested, and on the whole question to the effect ‘ that advice * 
 they would do nothing upon compulsion, but were ready 
 to settle their differences by arbitration upon fair terms 
 according to the treaty.’ So the ambassadors went home 
 and came no more. 
 
 These were the causes of offence alleged on either 146. 
 side before the war began. The quarrel arose imme- War, 
 diately out of the affair of Epidamnus and Corcyra. fo°mln y n0t 
 But, although the contest was imminent, the contending P^j! 11ed ’ 
 parties still kept up intercourse and visited each other, nent - 
 without a herald, but not with entire confidence. For 
 the situation was really an abrogation of the treaty, and 
 might at any time lead to war. 
 
II. I. 
 
 Outbreak 
 of the war. 
 
 2 . 
 
 The The¬ 
 bans enter 
 Plataea by 
 night. 
 
 BOOK II. 
 
 And now the war between the Athenians and 
 Peloponnesians and the allies of both actually began. 
 Henceforward the struggle was uninterrupted, and they 
 communicated with one another only by heralds. The 
 narrative is arranged according to summers and winters 
 and follows the order of events. 
 
 For fourteen years the thirty years’ peace which was 
 concluded after the recovery of Euboea remained un¬ 
 broken. But in the fifteenth year, when Chrysis the 
 high-priestess of Argos was in the forty-eighth year of 
 her priesthood, Aenesias being Ephor at Sparta, and at 
 Athens Pythodorus having two months of his archon- 
 ship to run, in the sixth month after the engagement at 
 Potidaea and at the beginning of spring, about the first 
 watch of the night an armed force of somewhat more 
 than three- hundred Thebans entered Plataea, a city of 
 Boeotia, which was an ally of Athens, under the com¬ 
 mand of two Boeotarchs, Pythangelus the son of Phy- 
 leides, and Diemporus the son of Onetorides. They 
 were invited by Naucleides, a Plataean, and his partisans, 
 who opened the gates to them. These men wanted to 
 kill certain citizens of the opposite faction and to make 
 over the city to the Thebans, in the hope of getting the 
 power into their own hands. The intrigue had been con¬ 
 ducted by Eurymachus the son of Leontiades, one of 
 the chief citizens of Thebes. There was an old quarrel 
 between the two cities, and the Thebans, seeing that war 
 
 O td 
 
THE THEBANS SURPRISE PLATAEA. 
 
 95 
 
 B.C. 431. 
 01. 87, 2. 
 
 was inevitable, were anxious to surprise the place while II. 
 the peace lasted and before hostilities had actually 
 broken out. No watch had been set; and so they were 
 enabled to enter the city unperceived. They grounded 
 their arms in the Agora, but instead of going to work 
 at once and making their way into the houses of their 
 enemies, as those who invited them suggested, they re¬ 
 solved to issue a conciliatory proclamation and try to 
 make friends with the citizens. The herald announced 
 that if any one wished to become their ally and return 
 to the ancient constitution of Boeotia, he should join 
 their ranks. In this way they thought that the in¬ 
 habitants would easily be induced to come over to 
 them. 
 
 The Plataeans, when they found that the city had been 3. 
 surprised and taken and that the Thebans were within The Pia- 
 their walls, were panic-stricken. In the darkness they r ifi e d by the 
 were unable to see them and greatly over-estimated their ^d^corne 
 numbers. So they came to terms, and accepting the 
 proposals which were made to them, remained quiet, the wards, 
 more readily since the Thebans offered violence to no fhe C weak- S 
 one. But in the course of the negotiations they some- ^emy^ they 
 how discovered that their enemies were not so numerous collect and 
 
 fall upon 
 
 as they had supposed, and concluded that they could the The- 
 easily attack and master them. They determined to 
 make the attempt, for the Plataean people were strongly 
 attached to the Athenian alliance. They began to col¬ 
 lect inside the houses, breaking through the party-walls 
 that they might not be seen going along the streets; 
 they likewise raised barricades of waggons, unyoking the 
 beasts which drew them, and took other measures suit¬ 
 able to the emergency. When they had done all which 
 could be done under the circumstances, they sallied 
 forth from their houses, choosing the time of night just 
 before daybreak, lest, if they put off the attack until 
 dawn, the enemy might be more confident and more a 
 match for them. While darkness lasted they would be 
 timid, and at a disadvantage, not knowing the streets so 
 
9 6 
 
 DEFEAT OF TEIE THEBANS. 
 
 II. 
 
 4 - 
 
 The The¬ 
 bans, after 
 some resist¬ 
 ance, turn 
 and fly. 
 Being igno¬ 
 rant of the 
 way, many 
 are slain in 
 the streets: 
 a few es¬ 
 cape ; the 
 remainder 
 surrender. 
 
 well as themselves. So they fell upon them at once 
 hand to hand. 
 
 When the Thebans found that they had been deceived 
 they closed their ranks and resisted their assailants on 
 - every side. Two or three times they drove them back. 
 
 But when at last the Plataeans charged them with a great 
 ‘ shout, and the women and slaves on the housetops 
 screamed and yelled and pelted them with stones and 
 tiles, the confusion being aggravated by the rain which 
 had been falling heavily during the night, they turned and 
 fled in terror through the city. Hardly any of them knew 
 the way out, and the streets were dark as well as muddy, 
 for the affair happened at the end of the month when 
 there was no moon ; whereas their pursuers knew well 
 enough how to prevent their escape; and thus many of 
 them perished. The gates by which they entered were 
 the only ones open, and these a Plataean fastened with 
 the spike of a javelin, which he thrust into the bar instead 
 of the pin. So this exit too was closed and they were 
 chased up and down the city. Some of them mounted 
 upon the wall and cast themselves down into the open. 
 Most of these were killed. Others got out by a deserted 
 gate, cutting through the bar unperceived with an axe 
 which a woman gave them ; but only a few, for they 
 were soon found out. Others lost themselves in different 
 parts of the city, and were put to death. But the greater 
 number kept together and took refuge in a large building 
 abutting upon the wall, of which the doors on the near 
 side chanced to be open, they thinking them to be the 
 gates of the city, and expecting to find a way through 
 them into the country. The Plataeans, seeing that they 
 were in a trap, began to consider whether they should 
 not set the building on fire, and burn them where they 
 were. At last they and the other Thebans who were 
 still alive, and were wandering about the city, agreed to 
 surrender themselves and their arms unconditionally. 
 Thus fared the Thebans in Plataea. 
 
 The main body of the Theban army, which should 
 
 5- 
 
 mo 
 
SLAUGHTER OF THE THEBAN PRISONERS. 97 
 
 B.C. 431. 
 Ol. 87, 2. 
 
 have come during the night to the support of the party II. 
 entering the city in case of a reverse, having on their 
 march heard of the disaster, were now hastening to the from 
 
 r Thebes. 
 
 rescue. Plataea is about eight miles distant irom The Pia- 
 
 Thebes, and the heavy rain which had fallen in the sus 
 night delayed their arrival; for the river Asopus had ^ b l ^ s 
 swollen, and was not easily fordable. Marching in the intend to 
 
 7 * seize tlieir 
 
 rain, and with difficulty crossing the river, they came up citizens out- 
 
 too late, some of their friends being already slain and ^aUsfsend 
 others captives. When the Thebans became aware 
 the state of affairs, they resolved to lay hands on the withanoath 
 Plataeans who were outside the walls; for there were to the The- 
 men and property left in the fields, as would naturally countft 0 
 happen when a sudden blow was struck in time of peace, p^^ers 6 
 And they meant to keep any one whom they caught as if theThe- 
 
 1 1 1 , . r r : 53 bans re- 
 
 a hostage and exchange him for one of their own men, tired, 
 if any of them were still alive. But before they had ^nereare 
 executed their plan, the Plataeans, suspecting their in- P^to 
 tentions, and fearing for their friends outside, sent a 
 herald to the Thebans protesting against the crime of 
 which they had been guilty in seizing their city during 
 peace, and warning them not to touch anything which 
 was outside the walls. If they persisted they threatened 
 in return to kill the prisoners ; but if they retired, they 
 would give them up. This is the Theban account, and 
 they add that the Plataeans took an oath. The Plataeans 
 do not admit that they ever promised to restore the 
 captives at once, but only if they could agree after nego¬ 
 tiations ; and they deny that they took an oath. How¬ 
 ever this may have been, the Thebans withdrew, leaving 
 the Plataean territory unhurt; but the Plataeans had no 
 sooner got in their property from the country than they 
 put the prisoners to death. Those who were taken were 
 a hundred and eighty in number, and Eurymachus, with 
 whom the betrayers of the city had negotiated, was one 
 of them. 
 
 When they had killed their prisoners, they sent a 6. 
 messenger to Athens and gave back the dead to the P he Athe- 
 
 ^ 0 mans.know- 
 
98 PREPARATIONS FOR THE WAR. 
 
 II. Thebans under a flag of truce; they then took the neces- 
 mg only of sar y measures for the security of the city. The news had 
 on e the^city! already reached Athens, and the Athenians had instantly 
 Piataeans- seized any Boeotians who were in Attica, and sent a 
 spare their herald to Plataea bidding them do no violence to the 
 Learning Theban prisoners, but wait for instructions from Athens, 
 they garri- The news of their death had not arrived. For the first 
 and remove messenger had gone out when the Thebans entered, and 
 and^hii~ en the secon d when they were just defeated and captured ; 
 dren. but of what followed the Athenians knew nothing ; they 
 sent the message in ignorance, and the herald, when 
 he arrived, found the prisoners dead. The Athenians 
 next despatched an army to Plataea, and brought in the 
 harvest. Then leaving a small force in the place they 
 conveyed away the least serviceable of the citizens, to¬ 
 gether with the women and children. 
 
 7. The affair of Plataea was a glaring violation of the 
 
 Both sides thirty years’ truce, and the Athenians now made pre¬ 
 now pre- . . 
 
 pare for the parations for war. The Lacedaemonians and their allies 
 struggle. mac j e similar preparations. Both they and the Athenians 
 meditated sending embassies to the King a , and to the 
 other Barbarian potentates b from whom either party 
 might hope to obtain aid ; they likewise sought the 
 alliance of independent cities outside their own dominion. 
 The Lacedaemonians ordered their friends in Italy and 
 Sicily, in addition to the ships which they had on the 
 spot, to build others in number proportioned to the size 
 of their cities; for they intended to raise the Pelopon¬ 
 nesian navy to a total of five hundred. The cities were 
 also required to furnish a fixed sum of money; they 
 were not to receive more than a single Athenian ship, 
 but were to take no further measures until these pre¬ 
 parations had been completed. The Athenians reviewed 
 their confederacy, and sent ambassadors to the places 
 immediately adjacent to Peloponnesus — Corcyra, Ce- 
 phallenia, Acarnania, and Zacynthus. They perceived 
 that if they could only rely upon the friendship of these 
 a Gp. ii. 67 init.; iv. 50. Cp. ii. 29, 67 . 
 
 mo 
 
wo 
 
 GENERAL SYMPATHY WITH LACEDAEMON . 99 
 
 i C 87 3 2 sta ^ esa ’ they might completely surround Peloponnesus II. 
 
 ' with war. 
 
 On neither side were there any mean thoughts ; they 8. 
 were both full of enthusiasm: and no wonder, for all men Excitement 
 are energetic when they are making a beginning. At siasm in 
 that time the youth of Peloponnesus and the youth 0 f Hellas ' 
 Athens were numerous; they had never seen war, and 
 were therefore very willing to take up arms. All Hellas 
 was excited by the coming conflict between her two chief 
 cities. Many were the prophecies circulated and many 
 the oracles chanted by diviners, not only in the cities 
 about to engage in the struggle, but throughout Hellas. 
 
 Quite lately the island of Delos had been shaken by an 
 earthquake for the first time within the memory of the 
 Hellenes; this was interpreted and generally believed to 
 be a sign of coming events. And everything of the sort 
 which occurred was curiously noted. 
 
 The feeling of mankind was strongly on the side of the Universal 
 Lacedaemonians; for they professed to be the liberators feaT of the* 
 of Hellas. Cities and individuals were eager to assist Athenlans - 
 them to the utmost, both by word and deed ; and where 
 a man could not hope to be present, there it seemed to 
 him that all things were at a stand. For the general 
 indignation against the Athenians was intense; some 
 were longing to be delivered from them, others fearful of 
 falling under their sway. 
 
 Such was the temper which animated the Hellenes, 9. 
 and such were the preparations made by the two powers List of the 
 
 , . ... allies on 
 
 for the war. Their respective allies were as follows:— either side. 
 The Lacedaemonian confederacy included all the Pelo¬ 
 ponnesians with the exception of the Argives and the 
 Achaeans—they were both neutral; only the Achaeans of 
 Pellene took part with the Lacedaemonians at first; after¬ 
 wards all the Achaeans joined them b . Beyond the borders 
 of the Peloponnese, the Megarians, Phocians, Locrians, 
 Boeotians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Anactorians 
 
 a Taking / 3 e/ 3 a/cos with el atfilat (f)L\ia ravra e”rj. 
 b Cp. v. 82 init. 
 
SPEECH OF ARC El ID A M US . 
 
 II. were their allies. Of these the Corinthians, Megarians, 
 Sicyonians, Pellenians, Eleans, Ambraciots, and Leuca- 
 dians provided a navy, the Boeotians, Phocians, and 
 Locrians furnished cavalry, the other states only in¬ 
 fantry. The allies of the Athenians were Chios, Lesbos, 
 Plataea, the Messenians of Naupactus, the greater part 
 of Acarnania, Corcyra, Zacynthus, and cities in many 
 other countries which were their tributaries. There was 
 the maritime region of Caria, the adjacent Dorian 
 peoples, Ionia, the Hellespont, the Thracian coast, the 
 islands that lie to the east within the line of Pelopon¬ 
 nesus and Crete, including all the Cyclades with the 
 exception of Melos and Thera. Chios, Lesbos, and 
 Corcyra furnished a navy; the rest, land forces and 
 money. Thus much concerning the two confederacies, 
 and the character of their respective forces. 
 
 10. Immediately after the affair at Plataea the Lacedae- 
 TheLace- monians determined to invade Attica, and sent round 
 summon word to their Peloponnesian and other allies, bidding 
 to e meet ieS them equip troops and provide all things necessary for 
 isthmus a f° re ig n expedition. The various states made their 
 
 preparations as fast as they could, and at the appointed 
 
 time, with contingents numbering two-thirds of the forces 
 
 of each, met at the Isthmus. When the whole army was 
 
 assembled, Archidamus, the king of the Lacedaemonians, 
 
 and the leader of the expedition, called together the 
 
 Speech of crenerals of the different states and their chief officers 
 Archida- ° 
 
 mus. and most distinguished men, and spoke as follows :— 
 
 11. ‘Men of Peloponnesus, and you, allies, many are the 
 We have expeditions which our fathers made both within and 
 
 had great __ 1 
 
 experience without the Peloponnese, and the veterans among our- 
 
 in war, and . ... ° 
 
 our army selves are experienced in war ; and we never went forth 
 finer neV But with a grater army than this. But then we should 
 be^reof remem ber that, whatever may be our numbers or our 
 haste, and valour, we are going against a most powerful city. And 
 
 not hold our i_ i i i J 
 
 enemy too we are bound to show ourselves worthy of our fathers, 
 cheap< and not wanting to our own reputation. Lor all Hellas 
 is stirred by our enterprise, and her eyes are fixed upon 
 
 Speech of 
 Archida- 
 
 WO 
 
SPEECH OF ARCHIDAMUS. 
 
 IOI 
 
 B.c. 431. us : she is friendly and would have us succeed because II. 
 
 OL 87 ' 2 ’ she hates the Athenians. Now although some among 
 you, surveying this great host, may think that there is 
 very little risk of the enemy meeting us in the held, 
 we ought not on that account to advance heedlessly; 
 but the general and the soldier of every state should be 
 always expecting that his own division of the army will 
 be the one first in danger. War is carried on in the 
 dark ; attacks are generally sudden and furious, and often 
 the smaller army, animated by a proper fear, has been 
 more than a match for a larger force which, disdaining 
 their opponent, were taken unprepared by him. When 
 invading an enemy’s country, men should always be 
 confident in spirit, but they should fear too, and take 
 measures of precaution ; and thus they will be at once 
 most valorous in attack and impregnable in defence. 
 
 ‘ And the city which we are attacking is not so utterly For they are 
 powerless, but is in the best possible state of preparation, prepared! 7 
 and for this reason our enemies may be quite expected fgast^keiy 
 to meet us in the held. Even if they have no such in- ofalln b en 
 
 J to sit idly 
 
 tention beforehand, yet as soon as they see us in Attica, by while we 
 
 , . . . . , . ... waste their 
 
 wasting and destroying their property, they will cer- i an ds. 
 tainly change their mind. For all men are angry when 
 they not only suffer but see, and some strange form of 
 calamity strikes full upon the eye; the less they reflect 
 the more ready they are to fight; above all men the 
 Athenians, who claim imperial power, and are more 
 disposed to invade and waste their neighbour’s land than 
 to look on while their own is being wasted. Remem¬ 
 bering how great this city is which you are attacking, 
 and what a fame you will bring on your ancestors and 
 yourselves for good or evil according to the result, 
 follow whithersoever you are led ; maintain discipline and 
 caution above all things, and be on the alert to obey 
 the word of command. A great army is most assured of 
 glory and safety when visibly animated by one spirit.’ 
 
 Having thus spoken, Archidamus dismissed the as- 12. 
 sembly. His first step was to send Melesippus, the son ^J^sends 
 
II. 
 
 Melesippus 
 to Athens, 
 but he is 
 refused ad¬ 
 mission to 
 the city, 
 and imme¬ 
 diately sent 
 across the 
 frontier. 
 
 13 - 
 
 Pericles, 
 suspecting 
 that Archi- 
 damus 
 will spare 
 his lands, 
 either from 
 friendship, 
 or to pre¬ 
 judice him 
 with the 
 Athenians, 
 promises to 
 give them to 
 the public 
 if they are 
 uninjured 
 by the 
 enemy. 
 
 102 THE LAST ENVOY FROM SPARTA. 
 
 of Diacritus, a Spartan, to Athens in the hope that the 
 Athenians might after all give way, when they saw their 
 enemies actually on the march. But they would not 
 admit him to the assembly, nor even into the city. For 
 Pericles had already carried a motion to the effect that 
 they would have nothing to do with herald or embassy 
 while the Lacedaemonians were in the field. So Mele¬ 
 sippus was sent away without a hearing and told that 
 he must cross the frontier before sunset; if the Lacedae¬ 
 monians wanted to hold any parley with the Athenians, 
 they must go home first. He was attended by an escort 
 in order to prevent his communicating with any one. 
 When he arrived at the Athenian frontier, and was about 
 to leave them, he uttered these words: ‘ This day will 
 be to the Hellenes the beginning of great sorrows.’ On 
 the return of the herald to the camp Archidamus learned 
 that the Athenians were not as yet at all in the mood 
 to yield; so at last he moved forward his army and 
 prepared to enter Attica. The Boeotians who had sent 
 their contingent of two-thirds, including their cavalry, to 
 the Peloponnesian army, marched to Plataea with the 
 remainder of their forces and wasted the country. 
 
 While the Peloponnesians were gathering at the 
 Isthmus, and were still on their way, but before they 
 entered Attica, Pericles the son of Xanthippus, who 
 was one of the ten Athenian generals, knowing that the 
 invasion was inevitable, and suspecting that Archidamus 
 in wasting the country might very likely spare his lands, 
 either out of courtesy and because he happened to be his 
 friend, or by the order of the Lacedaemonian authorities 
 (who had already attempted to raise a prejudice against 
 him a when they demanded the expulsion of the polluted 
 family, and might take this further means of injuring 
 him in the eyes of the Athenians), openly declared in 
 the assembly that Archidamus was his friend, but not 
 to the injury of the state, and that supposing the enemy 
 did not destroy his lands and buildings like the rest, he 
 a Cp. i. 126 init. and 127. 
 
 PQO 
 
O W 
 
 •C. 431. 
 1. 87, 2. 
 
 THE RESOURCES OF ATHENS . 103 
 
 would make a present of them to the public; and he II. 
 desired that the Athenians would have no suspicion of 
 him on that account. As to the general situation, he 
 repeated his previous advice; they must prepare for war 
 and bring their property from the country into the city; 
 they must defend their walls but not go out to battle; 
 they should also equip for service the fleet in which lay 
 their strength. Their allies should be kept well in hand, 
 for their power depended on the revenues which they 
 derived from them; military successes were generally 
 gained by a wise policy and command of money. The He reminds 
 state of their finances was encouraging; they had on an nians of 
 average six hundred talents a coming in annually from mous en ° r " 
 their allies, to say nothing of their other revenue; and wea l th and 
 there were still remaining in the Acropolis six thousand and naval 
 
 resources 
 
 talents of coined silver. (The whole amount had once telling them 
 been as much as nine thousand seven hundred talents b , is certain ” 7 
 but from this had to be deducted a sum of three thousand lf * he y 
 
 act with 
 
 seven hundred expended on various buildings, such as prudence, 
 the Propylaea of the Acropolis, and also on the siege of 
 Potidaea.) Moreover there was uncoined gold and silver 
 in the form of private and public offerings, sacred vessels 
 used in processions and games, the Persian spoil and 
 other things of the like nature, worth at least five hun¬ 
 dred talents 0 more. There was also at their disposal, 
 besides what they had in the Acropolis, considerable 
 treasures in various temples. If they were reduced to 
 the last extremity they could even take off the plates 
 of gold with which the image of the goddess was over¬ 
 laid ; these, as he pointed out, weighed forty talents, and 
 were of refined gold, which was all removable. They 
 might use these treasures in self-defence, but they were 
 bound to replace all that they had taken. By this 
 estimate of their wealth he strove to encourage them. 
 
 He added that they had thirteen thousand hoplites, be¬ 
 sides the sixteen thousand who occupied the fortresses 
 
 a About ^144,000. b About ^2,328,000. 
 
 c About 120,000. 
 
104 THE ATHENIANS REMOVE INTO THE CITY. 
 
 II. or who manned the walls of the city. For this was the 
 number engaged on garrison duty at the beginning of 
 the war a , whenever the enemy invaded Attica ; they were 
 made up of the elder and younger men, and of such 
 metics as bore heavy arms. The Phaleric wall extended 
 four miles from Phalerum to the city walls: the portion 
 of the city wall which was guarded was somewhat less 
 than five miles; that between the Long Wall and the 
 Phaleric requiring no guard. The Long Walls running 
 down to the Piraeus were rather more than four and a- 
 half miles in length ; the outer only was guarded. The 
 whole circuit of the Piraeus and of Munychia was not 
 quite seven miles, of which half required a guard. The 
 Athenian cavalry, as Pericles pointed out, numbered 
 twelve hundred, including mounted archers ; the foot- 
 archers, eighteen hundred ; of triremes fit for service the 
 city had three hundred. The forces of various kinds 
 which Athens possessed at the commencement of the 
 war, when the first Peloponnesian invasion was impending, 
 could not be estimated at less. To these Pericles added 
 other arguments, such as he was fond of using, which 
 were intended to prove to the Athenians that victory 
 was certain. 
 
 14. The citizens were persuaded, and brought into the city 
 The citi- their children and wives, their household goods, and even 
 
 zens, fol- . o ? 
 
 lowing the wood-work of their houses, which they took down, 
 gathe/into Their flocks and beasts of burden they conveyed to 
 the city; Euboea and the adjacent islands. 
 
 The removal of the inhabitants was painful; for the 
 Athenians had always been accustomed to reside in the 
 
 15. country. Such a life had been characteristic of them 
 
 but re- more than of any other Hellenic people, from very early 
 
 forAeyhad times. In the days of Cecrops and the first kings, down 
 a^ountiy 1 to tlle rei g n of Theseus, Attica was divided into com¬ 
 bines Uiey d munes ’ having their own town halls and magistrates, 
 lived in Except in case of alarm the whole people did not 
 
 communes, assemble in council under the king, but administered 
 
 a Cp. what is said of the citizens on garrison duty, vii. 28 init. 
 
 CQO 
 
B.C. 431. 
 Gl. 87, 2. 
 
 THE EARLY DAYS OF ATHENS. 105 
 
 their own affairs, and advised together in their several II. 
 townships. Some of them at times even went to war until The- 
 
 seus united 
 
 with him, as the Eleusinians under Eumolpus with Erec- them into 
 theus. But when Theseus came to the throne, he, being of A°thlis. ty 
 a powerful as well as a wise ruler, among other improve¬ 
 ments in the administration of the country, dissolved the 
 councils and separate governments, and united all the 
 inhabitants of Attica in the present city, establishing 
 one council and town hall. They continued to live on 
 their own lands, but he compelled them to resort to 
 Athens as their metropolis, and henceforward they a were 
 all inscribed in the roll of her citizens a . A great city 
 thus arose which was handed down by Theseus to his 
 descendants, and from his day to this the Athenians 
 have regularly celebrated the national festival of the 
 Synoecia, or £ union of the communes’ in honour of the 
 Goddess Athene. 
 
 Before his time, what is now the Acropolis and the Small ex¬ 
 ground lying under it to the south was the city. Many andenV 116 
 reasons may be urged in proof of this statement:—The Clty - 
 temples of Athene and of other divinities are situated in 
 the Acropolis itself, and those which are not, lie chiefly 
 thereabouts; the temples of Olympian Zeus, for ex¬ 
 ample, and of the Pythian Apollo, and the temple of 
 Earth and of Dionysus in the Marshes, in honour of 
 whom the more ancient Dionysia are celebrated on 
 the twelfth day of the month Anthesterion b , a festival 
 which also continues to be observed by the Ionian de¬ 
 scendants of the Athenians. In the same quarter are 
 other ancient temples, and not far off is the fountain 
 now called Enneacrounos, or the Nine Conduits, from 
 the form given to it by the tyrants, but originally, be¬ 
 fore the springs were covered in, Callirrhoe, or the Fair 
 Stream. The water of this fountain was used by the 
 ancient Athenians on great occasions; and at marriage 
 rites and other ceremonies the custom is still retained. 
 
 To this day the Acropolis or Citadel is called by the 
 a Or, ‘all paid taxes to Athens.’ b February-March. 
 
II. 
 
 i6. 
 
 I 7- 
 
 The new¬ 
 comers, 
 having no 
 homes of 
 their own, 
 occupy the 
 temples and 
 waste 
 spaces in 
 the city. 
 
 106 CROWDING OF THE CITY. 
 
 Athenians Polls, or City, because that neighbourhood 
 was first inhabited. 
 
 Thus for a long time the ancient Athenians enjoyed a 
 country life in self-governing communities; and although 
 they were now united in a single city, they and their 
 descendants, down to the time of this war, from old habit 
 generally resided with their households in the country 
 where they had been born. For this reason, and also 
 because they had recently restored their country-houses 
 and estates after the Persian War, they had a disinclina¬ 
 tion to move. They were depressed at the thought of 
 forsaking their homes and the temples which had come 
 down to them from their fathers and were the abiding 
 memorials of their early constitution. They were going 
 to change their manner of life, and in leaving their 
 villages were in fact leaving what to each of them had 
 been his own city. 
 
 When they came to Athens, only a few of them had 
 houses or could find homes among friends or kindred. 
 The majority took up their abode in the vacant spaces of 
 the city, and in the temples and shrines of heroes, with 
 the exception of those on the Acropolis, the Eleusinium, 
 and any other precinct which could be securely closed. 
 The Pelasgian ground, as it was called, which lay at the 
 foot of the citadel, was under a curse forbidding its occu¬ 
 pation. There was also a half-line of a Pythian oracle 
 to the same effect:— 
 
 ( Better the Pelasgian ground left waste.’ 
 
 Yet even this was occupied under the sudden pressure 
 of necessity. And to my mind the oracle came true in 
 a sense exactly contrary to the popular expectation; for 
 the unlawful occupation to which men were driven was 
 not the cause of the calamities which befell the city, but 
 the war was the cause of the occupation ; and the oracle 
 without mentioning the war foresaw that the place would 
 be inhabited some day for no good. Many also estab¬ 
 lished themselves in the turrets of the walls, or in any 
 
 PQO 
 
CQO 
 
 INVASION OF ATTICA . 
 
 107 
 
 c. 431. other place which they could find; for the city could not II. 
 
 ‘ 87 ’ 2 ‘ contain them when they first came in. But afterwards 
 they divided among them the Long Walls and the 
 greater part of the Piraeus. At the same time the 
 Athenians applied themselves vigorously to the war, 
 summoning their allies, and preparing an expedition of 
 a hundred ships against the Peloponnese. 
 
 While they were thus engaged, the Peloponnesian 18. 
 army was advancing : it arrived first of all at Oeno£, The Pe !°- 
 
 J # ponnesians 
 
 a fortified town on the confines of Attica and Boeotia, advance to 
 which was garrisoned by the Athenians in time of war, which they 
 and was the point at which the Peloponnesians intended ^ain^oVap- 
 to commence their invasion. There they encamped and t ure - 
 prepared to assault the walls by means of engines and 
 siege works. But these and other operations took up 
 time and detained them in the neighbourhood. Archi- 
 damus was severely blamed for the delay; he was also 
 thought not to have been energetic enough in levying 
 war, and to have done the Athenians good service by 
 discouraging vigorous action. After the muster of the 
 forces he was accused of delay at the Isthmus, and of 
 loitering on the march. But his reputation was most 
 affected by his halt at Oenoe. For the Athenians em¬ 
 ployed the interval in getting away their property; and 
 the Peloponnesians fancied that, if they had advanced 
 quickly and he had not lingered, they could have seized 
 everything before it was conveyed within the walls. 
 
 Such were the feelings entertained towards Archidamus 
 by his troops during the halt. He is said to have held 
 back in the belief that the Athenians, while their lands 
 were still unravaged a , would yield, and that the thought 
 of allowing them to be devastated would be too much 
 for them. 
 
 But when they had assaulted Oenoe, and after leaving 19. 
 no means untried were unable to take it, and no herald Leaving 
 came from the Athenians, at last they marched on, and enter At- 
 about the eightieth day after the entry of the Thebans ^ch to 
 
 a Cp. i. 82 med. 
 
 Acharnae, 
 
lo8 THE PELOPONNESIANS AT ACHARNAE. 
 
 II. into Plataea, in the middle of the summer, when the corn 
 was in full ear, invaded Attica, under the command of 
 Archidamus the son of Zeuxidamus the Lacedaemonian 
 king. They encamped and ravaged, first of all, Eleusis 
 and the plain of Thria, where they put to flight some 
 Athenian horse near the streams called Rheiti ; they 
 then advanced, keeping Mount Aegaleos on the right 
 hand, through the district of Kropeia until they reached 
 Acharnae, which is the largest of the Athenian town¬ 
 ships or demes, as they are called; and at Acharnae 
 they encamped, and remained there a considerable time 
 ravaging the country. 
 
 20. In this first invasion Archidamus is said to have 
 where they lingered about Acharnae with his army ready for battle, 
 
 linger, m # ° ' 
 
 the hope instead of descending into the plain, in the hope that the 
 Athenians Athenians, who were now flourishing in youth and 
 ^ — t num bers and provided for war as they had never been 
 before, would perhaps meet them in the field rather than 
 allow their lands to be ravaged. When therefore they 
 did not appear at Eleusis or in the plain of Thria, he 
 tried once more whether by encamping in the neigh¬ 
 bourhood of Acharnae he could induce them to come 
 out. The situation appeared to be convenient, and the 
 Acharnians, being a considerable section of the city and 
 furnishing three thousand hoplites, were likely to be 
 impatient at the destruction of their property, and would 
 communicate to the whole people a desire to fight. Or 
 if the Athenians did not come out to meet him during 
 this invasion, he could henceforward ravage the plain with 
 more confidence, and march right up to the walls of the 
 city.. The Acharnians, having lost their own possessions, 
 would be less willing to hazard their lives on behalf of 
 their neighbours, and so there would be a division in the 
 Athenian counsels. Such was the motive of Archidamus 
 in remaining at Acharnae. 
 
 21. The Athenians, so long as the Lacedaemonians were in 
 Rage and the neighbourhood of Eleusis and the plain of Thria, en- 
 
 excitement 0 1 
 
 of the tertained a hope that they would come no further. They 
 
 PQO 
 
PERICLES RESTRAINS THE ATHENIANS . 109 
 
 B.C. 431. 
 Ol. 87, 2. 
 
 remembered how, fourteen years before a , the Lacedae- II. 
 monian king 1 , Pleistoanax the son of Pausanias, invaded Athenians. 
 
 0 . Unpopu- 
 
 Attica with a Peloponnesian army, and how after ad- larity of 
 vancing as far as Eleusis and Thria he came no further, but 
 retreated. And indeed this retreat was the cause of his 
 exile ; for he was thought to have been bribed. But 
 when they saw the army in the neighbourhood of 
 Acharnae, and barely seven miles from the city, they felt 
 the presence of the invader to be intolerable. The 
 devastation of their country before their eyes, which the 
 younger men had never seen at all, nor the elder except 
 in the Persian invasion, naturally appeared to them a 
 horrible thing, and the whole people, the young men 
 especially, were anxious to go forth and put a stop to 
 it. Knots were formed in the streets, and there were 
 loud disputes, some eager to go out, a minority resisting. , 
 Soothsayers were repeating oracles of the most different 
 kinds, which all found in some one or other enthusiastic 
 listeners. The Acharnians, who in their own estimation 
 were no small part of the Athenian state, seeing their 
 land ravaged, strongly insisted that they should go out 
 and fight. The excitement in the city was universal; 
 the people were furious with Pericles, and, forgetting all 
 his previous warnings, they abused him for not leading 
 them to battle, as their general should, and laid all their 
 miseries to his charge. 
 
 But he, seeing that they were overcome by the irrita- 22. 
 tion of the moment and inclined to evil counsels, and He refuses 
 confident that he was right in refusing to go out, would with°their 
 not summon an assembly or meeting of any kind, lest, wlshes ' 
 coming together more in anger than in prudence, they 
 might take some false step. He maintained a strict 
 watch over the city, and sought to calm the irritation as 
 far as he could. Meanwhile he sent out horsemen from 
 time to time to prevent flying parties finding their way 
 into the fields near the city and doing mischief. A 
 skirmish took place at Phrygia between one of the 
 a Cp. i. 1T4 fin. 
 
no 
 
 END OF THE FIRST INVASION. 
 
 II. 
 
 Skirmish 
 at Phrygia, 
 in which 
 the Athe¬ 
 nians are 
 worsted. 
 
 23 - 
 
 The Athe¬ 
 nians send 
 one hun¬ 
 dred ships 
 to cruise 
 round Pelo¬ 
 ponnesus. 
 The enemy 
 retire from 
 Attica. 
 
 divisions of the Athenian horse assisted by their Thes- B.c. 431. 
 salian allies on the one hand, and the Boeotian cavalry 01 ‘ 87, 2 ’ 
 on the other, in which the Athenians and Thessalians 
 were at least a match for their opponents, until, the 
 Boeotian infantry coming up to support the horse, they 
 were compelled to fly. The Athenians and Thessalians 
 lost a few men, but recovered their bodies on the same 
 day without asking for a truce. On the morrow the 
 Peloponnesians raised a trophy. The forces which the 
 Thessalians brought to the aid of the Athenians, ac¬ 
 cording to the terms of their old alliance a , consisted of 
 Larissaeans, Pharsalians, Cranonians, Pyrasians, Gyrto- 
 nians, and Pheraeans. The leaders of the Larissaeans 
 were Polymedes and Aristonous, one from each of the 
 two leading factions of their city; the Pharsalians were 
 commanded by Meno. The forces of the other cities 
 had likewise generals of their own. 
 
 When the Peloponnesians found that the Athenians 
 did not come out to meet them, they moved their army 
 from Acharnae, and ravaged some of the townships 
 which lie between Mount Parnes and Mount Brilessus. 
 
 While they were still in the country, the Athenians sent 
 the fleet of a hundred ships which they had been equip¬ 
 ping on an expedition rodnd the Peloponnese. These 
 ships carried on board a thousand hoplites and four 
 hundred archers; they were under the command of 
 Carcinus the son of Xenotimus, Proteas the son of 
 Epicles, and Socrates the son of Antigenes. After the 
 departure of the fleet the Peloponnesians remained in 
 Attica as long as their provisions lasted, and then, taking 
 a new route, retired through Boeotia. In passing by 
 Oropus they wasted the country called Peiraike b , in¬ 
 habited by the Oropians, who are subjects of the Athe¬ 
 nians. On their return to Peloponnesus the troops 
 dispersed to their several cities. 
 
 a Cp. i. 102 fin., 107 fin.; iv. 78 med. 
 
 b Reading with the MSS. ty]v yr\v ttjv UcipaiK^v. Cp. iii. 91 med., 
 cs 'Sipombv rrjs nepav yrjs, i. e. the coast opposite Euboea. 
 
BRAS IDAS SAVES METHONE. 
 
 Ill 
 
 B.c. 431. When they had retreated, the Athenians posted guards II. 
 
 01.87, 2. ^ keep W atch both by land and sea, a precaution which 24. 
 
 they maintained throughout the war. They then passed The Athe- 
 
 J , • 1 a 1 • nians set 
 
 a decree reserving of the treasure in the Acropolis a aside a 
 thousand talents a : this sum was set apart and was not [aients^d 
 to be expended unless the enemy attacked the city with 
 a fleet and they had to defend it at sea. In any other case of an 
 case, he who brought forward or put to the vote a sea!° k by 
 proposal to touch the money was to be punished with 
 death. They also resolved to set apart yearly a hundred 
 triremes, the finest of the year, and to appoint trierarchs 
 for them ; these they were only to use at the same time 
 with the money, and in the same emergency. 
 
 The Athenian forces, which had lately been despatched 25. 
 to Peloponnesus in the hundred vessels, and were assisted ^ r ° s C of d t he 
 by the Corcyraeans with fifty ships and by some of the Athenian 
 allies from the same region, did considerable damage on 
 the Peloponnesian coast. They disembarked and attacked 
 Methon&, a fortress in Laconia, which was weak and had 
 no regular garrison. Now Brasidas the son of Tellis, a 
 Spartan, happened to be in those parts keeping guard, and, 
 seeing the danger, he came to the aid of the inhabitants 
 with a hundred hoplites. He made his way through the 
 scattered parties of Athenian troops, whose attention 
 was occupied with the fortress, and threw himself into 
 Methon£, suffering a slight loss; he thus saved the 
 place. The exploit was publicly acknowledged at 
 Sparta, Brasidas being the first Spartan who obtained 
 this distinction in the war. The Athenians, proceeding 
 on their voyage, ravaged the territory of Pheia in Elis for 
 two days, and defeated three hundred chosen men from 
 the vale of Elis, as well as some Elean perioeci from the 
 neighbourhood of Pheia who came to the rescue. But a 
 violent storm arose, and there was no harbour in which 
 the fleet could find shelter; so the greater part of the 
 army re-embarked and sailed round the promontory 
 called Ichthys towards the harbour of Pheia. Mean- 
 a About ,£240,000. 
 
112 EXPULSfOX OF THE AEGIXETAXS. 
 
 II. while the Messenians and others who were unable to 
 get on board marched by land and captured Pheia. The 
 fleet soon sailed into the harbour and took them up ; 
 they then evacuated Pheia and put to sea. By this time 
 the main army of the Eleans had arrived ; whereupon 
 the Athenians proceeded on their way to other places, 
 which they ravaged. 
 
 26. About the same time the Athenians sent thirty ships 
 Thirty ships f- 0 cru i se off Locris, having an eye also to the safety of 
 
 are sent to 0 J J 
 
 Locris. Euboea. Theopompus the son of Cleinias was their 
 commander. He made descents on the Locrian coast 
 and ravaged various places. He also captured Thronium, 
 taking hostages of the inhabitants, and at Alope defeated 
 the Locrians who came to defend the place. 
 
 27. In the same summer the Athenians expelled the 
 TheAthe- Aeginetans and their families from Aegina, alleging that 
 the Aegi- they had been the main cause of the war. The island 
 from their lies close to Peloponnesus, and they thought it safer to 
 
 send thither settlers of their own, an intention which they 
 shortly afterwards carried out. The Lacedaemonians 
 gave the Aeginetan exiles the town of Thyrea to occupy 
 and the adjoining country to cultivate, partly in order to 
 annoy the Athenians, partly out of gratitude to the 
 Aeginetans, who had done them good service at the time 
 of the earthquake and the revolt of the Helots. The 
 Thyrean territory is a strip of land coming down to the 
 sea on the borders of Argolis and Laconia. There some 
 of them found a home; others dispersed over Hellas. 
 
 During the same summer, at the beginning of the 
 lunar month (apparently the only time when such an 
 event is possible), and in the afternoon, there was an 
 eclipse of the sun, which took the form of a crescent, and 
 then became full again ; during the eclipse a few stars 
 were visible. 
 
 In the same summer, Nymphodorus the son of Pythes, 
 a native of Abdera and a man of great influence with 
 Nympho-" Sitalces who had married his sister, was made by the 
 proxenus, 11 " Athenians their proxenus at that place and invited by 
 
 country. 
 Some of 
 the exiles 
 are settled 
 by the 
 Lacedae¬ 
 monians in 
 Thyrea. 
 
 28. 
 
 Eclipse of 
 the sun. 
 
 29. 
 
 The Athe- 
 
 PQO 
 
OM 
 
 ALLIANCE WITH SITALCES AND PERDICCAS. 113 
 
 .c. 431. them to Athens. He had formerly been considered their II. 
 
 L S?> 2 ' enemy, but now they hoped that he would gain over to hoping that 
 
 J m 0 he will gain 
 
 their alliance Sitalces, who was the son of Teres and over sitai- 
 king of Thrace. ofThlafe. 
 
 This Teres, the father of Sitalces, was the first founder 29. 
 of the great Odrysian empire, which he extended over a ™ as 
 large part of Thrace, although many of the Thracian Teres, the 
 tribes are still independent. He has no connection with the Odry- 
 Tereus who took to wife from Athens, Procne, the e ™" his 
 daughter of Pandion: they do not even belong to the Teres has 
 same Thrace. For Tereus dwelt in Daulia, a part of the tionwith 
 region which is now called Phocis but in those days was of mytho- 
 inhabited by Thracians, and in that country Itys suffered logy< 
 at the hands of the women Procne and Philomela. 
 
 Many of the poets when they make mention of the 
 nightingale (Philomela) apply to the bird the epithet 
 Daulian. Further, Pandion would surely have formed a 
 marriage connection for his daughter among his neigh¬ 
 bours with a view to mutual protection, and not at a 
 distance of so many days’ journey, among the Odrysian 
 Thracians. And the Teres of whom I am speaking, and 
 who was the first powerful king of the Odrysae, has not 
 even the same name a . 
 
 Now Sitalces, whom the Athenians made their ally, Sitalces be- 
 was the son of this Teres; they wanted him to assist ai°™of an 
 them in the conquest of Chalcidice and of Perdiccas. So hi^on'is^ 
 Nymphodorus came to Athens, negotiated the alliance 
 with Sitalces, and got his son Sadocus enrolled an citizen: 
 Athenian citizen. He also undertook to terminate the is also re¬ 
 war in Chalcidice, promising that he would persuade conciled - 
 Sitalces to send the Athenians an army of Thracian 
 horsemen and targeteers. He further reconciled Per¬ 
 diccas with the Athenians, and persuaded them to restore 
 Therme to him b . Whereupon Perdiccas joined the Athe¬ 
 nian army under Phormio c , and with him fought against 
 the Chalcidians. Thus Sitalces the son of Teres king of 
 
 a i.e. is called Teres, not Tereus. 
 b Cp. i. 61 init, c Cp. i. 64 med. 
 
 I 
 
il 4 
 
 DEVASTATION OF MEGARA. 
 
 II. Thrace, and Perdiccas son of Alexander king of Mace¬ 
 donia, entered into the Athenian alliance. 
 
 3 °- The Athenians, in the hundred ships which were still 
 The Athe- cruising- about Peloponnesus, took Sollium, a town he- 
 
 mans cap- & r 5 
 
 ture Sol- longing to the Corinthians, which they handed over to 
 Astacus, the Palaereans of Acarnania, giving to them alone of the 
 over^Ce- 1 Acarnanians the right of occupying the city and country, 
 phaiiema. They also stormed the town of Astacus, and driving out 
 Evarchus who was tyrant there, added it to the Athenian 
 confederacy. They next sailed to the island of Cephal- 
 lenia, which they gained over without fighting. The 
 island lies over against Acarnania and Leucas, and con¬ 
 tains four cities inhabited by the Paleans, Cranians, 
 Samaeans, and Pronnaeans. Soon afterwards the fleet 
 proceeded on its voyage homewards. 
 
 31. About the end of the summer the entire Athenian 
 The Athe- force, including the metics, invaded the territory of 
 
 mans under 0 
 
 the com- Megara, under the command of Pericles the son of 
 Percies Xanthippus. The Athenian fleet had reached Aegina on 
 theMegarid its wa y home, and when the commanders heard that the 
 and ravage w hole armed force of the city was in Megara, they sailed 
 
 the country. # > J 0 ’ J 
 
 thither and joined them. This was the largest army 
 which the Athenians ever had in one place ; for the city 
 was still in her full strength, and had not as yet suffered 
 from the plague. The Athenians themselves numbered 
 not less than ten thousand hoplites, exclusive of the 
 remaining three thousand who were engaged at Potidaea. 
 A force of metics amounting to at least three thousand 
 took part in the invasion, and also a large number of 
 light-armed troops. After ravaging the greater part of 
 the country they retired. They repeated the invasion, 
 sometimes with cavalry, sometimes with the whole Athe¬ 
 nian army, every year during the war until Nisaea was 
 taken a . 
 
 32. At the end of this summer the island of Atalante, 
 
 Sansfmtify which lies off the coast of the Opuntian Locrians and 
 the island of had hitherto been uninhabited, was fortified and made a 
 
 Atalante. 
 
 a Cp. iv. 66 init., 69 fin. 
 
 PQO 
 
Ota 
 
 PUBLIC FUNERAL AT ATHENS. II5 
 
 • C g4 3 ** guard-station by the Athenians. They wanted to prevent II. 
 pirates sailing from Opus and other places in Locris and 
 plundering Euboea. Such were the events which occurred 
 during the remainder of the summer after the Pelopon¬ 
 nesians had retired from Attica. 
 
 During the following winter, Evarchus the Acarna- 33 * 
 nian, desiring to be restored to Astacus, persuaded the Jnthian's 
 Corinthians to sail with forty ships and fifteen hundred restore the 
 hoplites and reinstate him, he himself hiring some Evarchus 
 mercenaries. Of this expedition Euphamidas the son onthdr US ’ 
 of Aristonymus, Timoxenus the son of Timocrates, an d^[ackCe- y 
 Eumachus the son of Chrysis, were the commanders, phaiienia, 
 They sailed to Astacus, and restored Evarchus; they feated. 
 then tried to gain over certain other towns on the coast 
 of Acarnania ; but, failing in their attempt, they pro¬ 
 ceeded homewards. Touching at Cephallenia on their 
 voyage, they made a descent on the country of the 
 Cranians, but being entrapped by means of a pretended 
 agreement, and then unexpectedly attacked, they lost a 
 part of their forces; at length, not without a severe 
 struggle, they put to sea again and returned home. 
 
 During the same winter, in accordance with an old 34. 
 national custom, the funeral of those who first fell in this The Athe -, 
 
 mans ce i e- 
 
 war was celebrated by the Athenians at the public brate the 
 charge. The ceremony is as follows : Three days before t heir dti- 
 the celebration they erect a tent in which the bones of ^addiedin 
 the dead are laid out, and every one brings to his own the war - 
 dead any offering which he pleases. At the time of the 
 funeral the bones are placed in chests of cypress wood, 
 which are conveyed on hearses; there is one chest for 
 each tribe. They also carry a single empty litter decked 
 with a pall for all whose bodies are missing, and cannot 
 be recovered after the battle. The procession is ac¬ 
 companied by any one who chooses, whether citizen or 
 stranger, and the female relatives of the deceased are 
 present at the place of interment and make lamentation. 
 
 The public sepulchre is situated in the most beautiful 
 spot outside the walls; there they always bury those 
 I 2 
 
n6 
 
 FUNERAL SPEECH OF PERICLES. 
 
 II. who fall in war; only after the battle of Marathon the B-C. 43 *- 
 
 . . . . Ol. 87, 2. 
 
 dead, in recognition of their pre-eminent valour, were 
 interred on the field. When the remains have been laid 
 in the earth, some man of known ability and high reputa¬ 
 tion, chosen by the city, delivers a suitable oration over 
 them; after which the people depart. Such is the manner 
 of interment; and the ceremony was repeated from time 
 to time throughout the war. Over those who were the 
 first buried Pericles was chosen to speak. At the fitting 
 moment he advanced from the sepulchre to a lofty 
 stage, which had been erected in order that he might 
 be heard as far as possible by the multitude, and spoke 
 as follows:— 
 
 (funeral speech.) 
 
 35. c Most of those who have spoken here before me have 
 The law commended the lawgiver who added this oration to our 
 
 which en- . . 
 
 joins this other funeral customs ; it seemed to them a worthy 
 
 been°often S thing that such an honour should be given at their 
 
 praised. burial to the dead who have fallen on the field of battle. 
 
 But I 
 
 should pre- But I should have preferred that, when men’s deeds have 
 
 fer to praise 
 
 the brave been brave, they should be honoured in deed only, and 
 oniyfnot with such an honour as this public funeral, which you 
 thehrepu- are now witnessing. Then the reputation of many would 
 tation on not have been imperilled on the eloquence or want of 
 
 the skill of .... ? . 
 
 the orator, eloquence of one, and their virtues believed or not as 
 ancestors he spoke well or ill. For it is difficult to say neither too 
 approved little nor too much ; and even moderation is apt not to 
 
 the prac- ’ -v 
 
 tice, and I give the impression of truthfulness. The friend of the 
 
 must obey. .... . . 
 
 dead who knows the facts is likely to think that the 
 words of the speaker fall short of his knowledge and of 
 his wishes; another who is not so well informed, when 
 he hears of anything which surpasses his own powers, 
 will be envious and will suspect exaggeration. Man¬ 
 kind are tolerant of the praises of others so long as each 
 hearer thinks that he can do as well or nearly as well 
 himself, but, when the speaker rises above him, jealousy 
 is aroused and he begins to be incredulous. However, 
 
ow 
 
 FUNERAL SPEECH OF PERICLES . 
 
 ii 7 
 
 .c. 431. since our ancestors have set the seal of their approval II. 
 
 lm S? ’ 2 ' upon the practice, I must obey, and to the utmost of my 
 power shall endeavour to satisfy the wishes and beliefs 
 of all who hear me. 
 
 C ‘ I will speak first of our ancestors, for it is right and 36* 
 becoming that now, when we are lamenting the dead, a 1 wil1 first 
 tribute should be paid to their memory. There has rateourpre- 
 never been a time when they did not inhabit this land, w ho gave 
 which by their valour they have handed down from and^mpire. 
 generation to generation, and we have received from An ^ before 
 
 0 0 . praising the 
 
 them a free state. But if they were worthy of praise, dead, 1 will 
 still more were our fathers, who added to their inherit- how Athens 
 ance, and after many a struggle transmitted to us their great- 
 sons this great empire/) And we ourselves assembled ness - 
 here to-day, who are still most of us in the vigour of 
 life, have chiefly done the work of improvement, and 
 have richly endowed our city with all things, so that she 
 is sufficient for herself both in peace and war. Of the 
 military exploits by which our various possessions were 
 acquired, or of the energy with which we or our fathers 
 drove back the tide of war, Hellenic or Barbarian, I will 
 not speak ; for the tale would be long and is familiar to 
 you. But/before I praise the dead, I should like to 
 point out by what principles of action we rose a to power, 
 and under what institutions and through what manner 
 of life our empire became great/) For I conceive that 
 such thoughts are not unsuited to the occasion, and that 
 this numerous assembly of citizens and strangers may 
 profitably listen to them. 
 
 OOur form of government does not enter into rivalry 37- 
 with the institutions of others. We do not copy our 0ur g? vern - 
 neighbours, but are an example to them. It is true that democracy, 
 
 .... r 1 1 • • ... but we ho- 
 
 we are called a democracy, for the administration is in nourmenof 
 the hands of the many and not of the few. But while therrich h or 
 the law secures equal justice to all alike in their private j^biieiST 
 disputes, the claim of excellence is also recognised ; and is free fron i 
 
 r . . .. . exclusive- 
 
 when a citizen is in any way distinguished, he is preferred ness, our 
 
 a Reading ffkOofxev. 
 
II. 
 
 private 
 from sus¬ 
 picion ; yet 
 vc revere 
 alike the in¬ 
 junctions 
 of law and 
 custom. 
 
 We find re¬ 
 laxation in 
 our amuse¬ 
 ments, and 
 in our 
 homes ; 
 and the 
 whole world 
 contributes 
 to our en¬ 
 joyment. 
 
 39 - 
 
 In war we 
 singly are 
 a match 
 for the 
 Pelopon¬ 
 nesians 
 united ; 
 though we 
 have no 
 secrets and 
 undergo no 
 laborious 
 training. 
 
 118 FUNERAL SPEECH OF PERICLES. 
 
 to the public service, not as a matter of privilege, but as 
 the reward of merit. Neither is poverty a bar, but a 
 man may benefit his country whatever be the obscurity 
 of his condition. There is no exclusiveness in our public 
 life, and in our private intercourse we are not suspicious 
 of one another, nor angry with our neighbour if he does 
 what he likes ; we do not put on sour looks at him which, 
 though harmless, are not pleasant. While we are thus 
 unconstrained in our private intercourse, a spirit of rever¬ 
 ence pervades our public acts; we are prevented from 
 doing wrong by respect for authority and for the laws, 
 having an especial regard to those which are ordained 
 for the protection of the injured as well as to those un¬ 
 written laws which bring upon the transgressor of them 
 the reprobation of the general sentiment.; 
 
 ‘ And we have not forgotten to provide for our weary 
 spirits many relaxations from toil; we have regular 
 games and sacrifices throughout the year; at home the 
 style of our life is refined ; and the delight which we 
 daily feel in all these things helps to banish melancholy. 
 Because of the greatness of our city the fruits of the 
 whole earth flow in upon us; so that we enjoy the 
 goods of other countries as freely as of our own. 
 
 £ Then, again, our military training is in many respects 
 superior to that of our adversaries. Our city is thrown 
 open to the world, and we never expel a foreigner or 
 prevent him from seeing or learning anything of which 
 the secret if revealed to an enemy might profit him. 
 We rely not upon management or trickery, but upon our 
 own hearts and hands. And in the matter of education, 
 whereas they from early youth are always undergoing 
 laborious exercises which are to make them brave, we 
 live at ease, and yet are equally ready to face a the 
 perils which they face a . And here is the proof. The 
 Lacedaemonians come into Attica not by themselves, 
 but with their whole confederacy following ; we go alone 
 
 a Or, ‘perils such as our strength can bear; ’ or ‘perils which are 
 enough to daunt us.’ 
 
 wo 
 
■GOT 
 
 FUNERAL SPEECH OF PERICLES. 
 
 119 
 
 i C 87 3 2 a ne *ghk our ’ s country; and although our opponents II. 
 are fighting for their homes and we on a foreign soil, we 
 have seldom any difficulty in overcoming them. Our 
 enemies have never yet felt our united strength ; the care 
 of a navy divides our attention, and on land we are obliged 
 to send our own citizens everywhere. But they, if they 
 meet and defeat a part of our army, are as proud as if 
 they had routed us all, and when defeated they pretend 
 to have been vanquished by us all. 
 
 ‘ If then we prefer to meet danger with a light heart 
 but without laborious training, and with a courage which 
 is gained by habit and not enforced by law, are we not 
 greatly the gainers ? Since we do not anticipate the pain, 
 although, when the hour comes, we can be as brave as 
 |those who never allow themselves to rest; and thus too 
 — lour city is equally admirable in peace and in war. For 40. 
 
 \ we are lovers of the beautiful, yet simple in our tastes, and We are 
 * we cultivate the mind without loss of manliness. Wealth vated by 
 I we employ, not for talk and ostentation, but when there ^Igarised 
 |is a real, use for it. To avow poverty with us is no ^eTreaii 
 J disgrace; the true disgrace is in doing nothing to avoid interested 
 f it. An Athenian citizen does not neglect the state affairs, be- 
 | because he takes care of his own household; and even noISng^s 1 
 those of us who are engaged in business have a very fair ^sciSsion 6 
 idea of politics. We alone regard a man who takes no ° ur g° od - 
 
 r \ ° ness to 
 
 l interest in public affairs, not as a harmless, but as a others 
 i useless character ; and if few of us are originators, we are noVfrom 
 t all sound judges of a policy. The great impediment to frojn e the bUt 
 I action is, in our opinion, not discussion, but the want of generous 
 
 I . confidence 
 
 i that knowledge which is gained by discussion preparatory of freedom. 
 
 to action. For we have a peculiar power of thinking before 
 we act and of acting too, whereas other men are courage¬ 
 ous from ignorance but hesitate upon reflection. And 
 they are surely to be esteemed the bravest spirits who, 
 having the clearest sense both of the pains and pleasures 
 of life, do not on that account shrink from danger/) In 
 doing good, again, we are unlike others; we make our 
 friends by conferring, not by receiving favours. Now he 
 
120 
 
 FUNERAL SPEECH OF PERICLES. 
 
 II. who confers a favour is the firmer friend, because he 
 would fain by kindness keep alive the memory of an 
 obligation; but the recipient is colder in his feelings, 
 because he knows that in requiting another’s generosity 
 he will not be winning gratitude but only paying a debt. 
 We alone do good to our neighbours not upon a calcu¬ 
 lation of interest, but in the confidence of freedom and 
 in a frank and fearless spirit. To sum upifl say that 
 4 1 - Athens is the school of Hellas, and that the individual 
 Athens’ is Athenian in his own person seems to have the power of 
 the school adapting himself to the most varied forms of action with 
 
 of Hellas. , ... , 
 
 She alone in the utmost versatility and grace. This is no passing and 
 tria/rises 0f idle word, but truth and fact; and the assertion is verified 
 reputation b y the position to which these qualities have raised the 
 Her citizens state. For in the hour of trial Athens alone among her 
 
 need no . . _ _ 
 
 poet to contemporaries is superior to the report of her. No 
 pmfsesTfor enemy who comes against her is indignant at the re- 
 belrswit- verses which he sustains at the hands of such a city; no 
 valour thdr sub i ect complains that his masters are unworthy of hinkj 
 And we shall assuredly not be without witnesses ; there 
 are mighty monuments of our power which will make us 
 the wonder of this and of succeeding ages; we shall not 
 need the praises of Homer or of any other panegyrist 
 whose poetry may please for the moment a , although his 
 representation of the facts will not bear the light of day. 
 For (we have compelled every land and every sea to open 
 a path for our valour,, and have everywhere planted 
 eternal memorials of our friendship and of our enmity. 
 Such is the city for whose sake these men nobly fought 
 and died; they could not bear the thought that she 
 might be taken from them; and every one of us who 
 survive should gladly toil on her behalf..^ 
 
 42. C ‘I have dwelt upon the greatness of Athens because I 
 The praise wa nt to show you that we are contending for a higher 
 
 of the city . & 
 
 is the praise prize than those who enjoy none of these privileges, and 
 men,“or to establish by manifest proof the merit of these men 
 
 her y great. e w h° m 1 am now commemorating.jTheir loftiest praise has 
 a Cp. i. io med., and 21. 
 
 CQ O 
 
FUNERAL SPEECH OF PERICLES. 121 
 
 c. 431. been already spoken. For in magnifying the city I have IT. 
 
 ' 8?> 2 ' magnified them, and men like them whose virtues made 
 
 „_Jher glorious. And of how few Hellenes can it be said as and poor 
 
 ^ cilikc pre- 
 
 of them, that their deeds when weighed in the balance ferred death 
 
 have been found equal to their fame ! (Methinks that a honour, 
 death such as theirs has been gives the true measure of a 
 man’s worth ; it maybe the first revelation of his virtues, 
 but is at any rate their final seal. For even those who 
 come short in other ways may justly plead the valour 
 with which they have fought for their country; they 
 have blotted out the evil with the good, and have bene¬ 
 fited the state more by their public services than they 
 have injured her by their private actions. None of these 
 men were enervated by wealth or hesitated to resign the 
 pleasures of life; none of them put off the evil day in 
 the hope, natural to poverty, that a man, though poor, 
 may one day become rich. But, deeming that the pun¬ 
 ishment of their enemies was sweeter than any of these 
 things, and that they could fall in no nobler cause, they 
 determined at the hazard of their lives to be honourably 
 avenged, and to leave the rest. They resigned to hope 
 their unknown chance of happiness ; but in the face of 
 death they resolved to rely upon themselves alone. And 
 when the moment came they were minded to resist and 
 suffer, rather than to fly and save their lives ; they ran 
 away from the word of dishonour, but on the battle-field 
 their feet stood fast, and a in an instant, at the height of 
 their fortune, they passed away from the scene, not of 
 their fear, but of their glory a /) 
 
 c Such was the end of these men ; they were worthy of 43. 
 Athens, and the living need not desire to have a more Contem- 
 heroic spirit, although they may pray for a less fatal issue, love Athens, 
 The value of such a spirit is not to be expressed in words. know 
 (Any one can discourse to you for ever about the ad- th^ ovalue 
 vantages of a brave defence which you know already. The y were 
 
 a Or, taking Tvxrjs with Kaipov: ( while for a moment they were 
 in the hands of fortune, at the height, not of terror but of glory, 
 they passed away.’ 
 
I 22 
 
 FUNERAL SPEECH OF PERICLES. 
 
 II. 
 
 united in 
 their deaths, 
 but their 
 glory is 
 separate 
 and single. 
 Their se¬ 
 pulchre is 
 the remem¬ 
 brance of 
 them in the 
 hearts of 
 men. Fol¬ 
 low their 
 example 
 without 
 fear : it is 
 the pros¬ 
 perous, not 
 the unfor¬ 
 tunate, who 
 should be 
 reckless. 
 
 44 - 
 
 The parents 
 of the dead 
 are to be 
 comforted 
 rather than 
 pitied. 
 
 But instead of listening to him I would have you day by 
 day fix your eyes upon the greatness of Athens, until 
 you become filled with the love of her; and when you 
 are impressed by the spectacle of her glory, reflect that 
 this empire has been acquired by men who knew their 
 duty and had the courage to do it, who in the hour of 
 conflict had the fear of dishonour always present to them, 
 and who, if ever they failed in an enterprize, would not 
 allow their virtues to be lost to their country, but 
 freely gave their lives to her as the fairest offering which 
 they could present at her feast. The sacrifice which 
 they collectively made was individually repaid to them; 
 for they received again each one for himself a praise 
 which grows not old, and the noblest of all sepulchres^) 
 I speak not of that in which their remains are laid, but 
 of that in which their glory survives, and is proclaimed 
 always and on every fitting occasion both in word and 
 deed. (For the whole earth is the sepulchre of famous 
 men; not only are they commemorated by columns and 
 inscriptions in their own country, but in foreign lands 
 there dwells also an unwritten memorial of them, graven 
 not on stone but in the hearts of men. Make them your 
 examples, and. esteeming courage to be freedom and 
 freedom to be happiness, do not weigh too nicely the 
 perils of war.^)The unfortunate who has no hope of a 
 change for the better has less reason to throw away his 
 life than the prosperous who, if he survive, is always liable 
 to a change for the worse, and to whom any accidental 
 fall makes the most serious difference. To a man of 
 spirit, cowardice and disaster coming together are far 
 more bitter than death striking him unperceived at a 
 time when he is full of courage and animated by the 
 general hope. 
 
 ‘ Wherefore I do not now commiserate the parents of 
 the dead who stand here ; I would rather comfort them. 
 You know that your life has been passed amid manifold 
 vicissitudes; and that they may be deemed fortunate 
 who have gained most honour, whether an honourable 
 
 OCd 
 
Otd 
 
 FUNERAL SPEECH OF PERICLES. 
 
 123 
 
 .c. 431. death like theirs, or an honourable sorrow like yours, II. 
 l ' 8? ’ 2 * and whose days have been so ordered that the term of Some of 
 
 . . . . . them may 
 
 their happiness is likewise the term of their life. I know yet have 
 how hard it is to make you feel this, when the good for- ^hcfwm 
 tune of others will too often remind you of the gladness ]l s htentheir 
 which once lightened your hearts. And sorrow is felt and serve 
 
 1 rill- 1-1 the state ; 
 
 at the want 01 those blessings, not which a man never while others 
 knew, but which were a part of his life before they were member 6 " 
 taken from him. Some of you are of an age at which ^^share 
 they may hope to have other children, and they ought to of happi- 
 
 1 , . . . • 1 1 t • 1 , ness has 
 
 bear their sorrow better; not only will the children who been, and 
 may hereafter be born make them forget their own lost £y the glory 
 ones, but the city will be doubly a gainer. She will not ofthosewho 
 be left desolate, and she will be safer. For a man’s 
 counsel cannot have equal weight or worth, when he 
 alone has no children to risk in the general danger. CTo 
 those of you who have passed their prime, I say : “ Con¬ 
 gratulate yourselves that you have been happy during 
 the greater part of your days ; remember that your life of 
 sorrow will not last long, and be comforted by the glory 
 of those who are gone. For the love of honour alone 
 is ever young, and not riches, as some say, but honour 
 is the delight of men when they are old and useless.’L) 
 
 ‘ To you who are the sons and brothers of the departed, 45 - 
 I see that the struggle to emulate them will be an Sons and 
 arduous one. For all men praise the dead, and, how- wil1 find 
 
 . . . . .. ... their ex- 
 
 ever pre-eminent your virtue may be, hardly will you ample hard 
 be thought, I do not say to equal, but even to approach formelfare 
 them. The living have their rivals and detractors, but |f al< ^ s of 
 when a man is out of the way, the honour and good-will but envy 
 which he receives is unalloyed. And, if I am to speak the dead, 
 of womanly virtues to those of you who will henceforth widows re- 
 be widows, let me sum them up in one short admonition : nafil^.i heir 
 To a woman not to show more weakness than is natural weakness, 
 
 and avoid 
 
 to her sex is a great glory, and not to be talked about for both praise 
 
 . r .1 and blame. 
 
 good or for evil among men. 
 
 c I have paid the required tribute, in obedience to the 46- 
 law, making use of such fitting words as I had. The p ai J^due 
 
II. 
 
 tribute of 
 words to the 
 dead. The 
 city will pay 
 them in 
 deeds, as 
 by this fune¬ 
 ral, so too 
 by the main¬ 
 tenance of 
 their chil¬ 
 dren. 
 
 47- 
 
 Second in¬ 
 vasion of 
 Attica ; 
 outbreak 
 of the 
 plague, 
 
 48. 
 
 which com¬ 
 menced in 
 Aethiopia. 
 The origin 
 and causes 
 of it are 
 unknown, 
 but I shall 
 confine my¬ 
 self to the 
 
 124 THE PLAGUE. 
 
 tribute of deeds has been paid in part; for the dead B.c. 431. 
 have been honourably interred, and it remains only that ’ 8? ' 2 ' 
 their children should be maintained at the public charge 
 until they are grown up : this is the solid prize with 
 which, as with a garland, Athens crowns her sons living 
 and dead, after a struggle like theirs. For where the 
 rewards of virtue are greatest, there the noblest citizens are 
 enlisted in the service of the state. And now, when you 
 have duly lamented, every one his own dead, you may 
 depart.’ 
 
 Such was the order of the funeral celebrated in this 
 winter, with the end of which ended the first year of the 
 Peloponnesian War. As soon as summer returned, the b.c. 430. 
 Peloponnesian army, comprising as before two-thirds of L 8?>3 ‘ 
 the force of each confederate state, under the command 
 of the Lacedaemonian king Archidamus, the son of 
 Zeuxidamus, invaded Attica, where they established 
 themselves and ravaged the country. They had not 
 been there many days when the plague broke out at 
 Athens for the first time. A similar disorder is said 
 to have previously smitten many places, particularly 
 Lemnos, but there is no record of such a pestilence 
 occurring elsewhere, or of so great a destruction of 
 human life. For a while physicians, in ignorance of 
 the nature of the disease, sought to apply remedies; but 
 it was in vain, and they themselves were among the 
 first victims, because they oftenest came into contact 
 with it. No human art was of any avail, and as to 
 supplications in temples, enquiries of oracles, and the 
 like, they were utterly useless, and at last men were 
 overpowered by the calamity and gave them all up. 
 
 The disease is said to have begun south of Egypt in 
 Aethiopia; thence it descended into Egypt and Libya, 
 and after spreading over the greater part of the Persian 
 empire, suddenly fell upon Athens. It first attacked 
 the inhabitants of the Piraeus, and it was supposed 
 that the Peloponnesians had poisoned the cisterns, no 
 conduits having as yet been made there. It afterwards 
 
cdo 
 
 THE PLAGUE. 
 
 .C. 430. 
 1. 87, 3 . 
 
 !25 
 
 reached the upper city, and then the mortality became II. 
 far greater. As to its probable origin or the causes ^y S s elf ^ was 
 which might or could have produced such a disturbance sufferer, 
 of nature, every man, whether a physician or not, will 
 give his own opinion. But I shall describe its actual 
 course, and the symptoms by which any one who knows 
 them beforehand may recognise the disorder should it 
 ever reappear. For I was myself attacked, and witnessed 
 the sufferings of others. 
 
 The season was admitted to have been remarkably free 49 - 
 from ordinary sickness; and if anybody was already ill ^teStics 
 of any other disease, it was absorbed in this. Many who of the 
 were in perfect health, all in a moment, and without any 
 apparent reason, were seized with violent heats in the 
 head and with redness and inflammation of the eyes. 
 Internally the throat and the tongue were quickly suffused 
 with blood, and the breath became unnatural and fetid. 
 
 There followed sneezing and hoarseness; in a short time 
 the disorder, accompanied by a violent cough, reached 
 the chest; then fastening lower down, it would move the 
 stomach and bring on all the vomits of bile to which 
 physicians have ever given names ; and they were very 
 distressing. An ineffectual retching producing violent 
 convulsions attacked most of the sufferers ; a some as soon 
 as the previous symptoms had abated, others not until long 
 afterwards a . The body externally was not so very hot to 
 the touch, nor yet pale ; it was of a livid colour inclining 
 to red, and breaking out in pustules and ulcers. But the 
 internal fever was intense ; the sufferers could not bear to 
 have on them even the finest linen garment; they insisted 
 on being naked, and there was nothing which they longed 
 for more eagerly than to throw themselves into cold 
 water. And many of those who had no one to look after 
 them actually plunged into the cisterns, for they were 
 tormented by unceasing thirst, which was not in the 
 least assuaged whether they drank little or much. They 
 
 a Or, taking XaxprjaavTa with crnaa-fxov : ‘ these convulsions in some 
 cases soon abated, in others not until long afterwards.’ 
 
126 
 
 THE PLAGUE. 
 
 II. could not sleep ; a restlessness which was intolerable b.c. 430. 
 never left them. While the disease was at its height the * 37,3 ' 
 body, instead of wasting away, held out amid these 
 sufferings in a marvellous manner, and either they died 
 on the seventh or ninth day, not of weakness, for their 
 strength was not exhausted, but of internal fever, which 
 was the end of most; or, if they survived, then the 
 disease descended into the bowels and there produced 
 violent ulceration; severe diarrhoea at the same time set 
 in, and at a later stage caused exhaustion, which finally 
 with few exceptions carried them off. For the disorder 
 which had originally settled in the head passed gradually 
 through the whole body, and, if a person got over the 
 worst, would often seize the extremities and leave its 
 mark, attacking the privy parts and the fingers and the 
 toes ; and some escaped with the loss of these, some 
 with the loss of their eyes. Some again had no sooner 
 recovered than they were seized with a forgetfulness of 
 all things and knew neither themselves nor their friends. 
 
 50. The malady took a form not to be described, and the 
 Even the fury with which it fastened upon each sufferer was too 
 
 animals and 
 
 birds of much for human nature to endure. There was one 
 to toucii the circumstance in particular which distinguished it from 
 corpses. ordinary diseases. The birds and animals which feed 
 on human flesh, although so many bodies were lying 
 unburied, either never came near them, or died if they 
 touched them. This was proved by a remarkable 
 disappearance of the birds of prey, who were not to be 
 seen either about the bodies or anywhere else; while in 
 the case of the dogs the fact was even more obvious, 
 because they live with man. 
 
 51. Such was the general nature of the disease: I omit 
 Nothing many strange peculiarities which characterised individual 
 against the cases. None of the ordinary sicknesses attacked any one 
 disease. w hft e ft lasted, or, if they did, they ended in the plague. 
 
 Some of the sufferers died from want of care, others 
 equally who were receiving the greatest attention. No 
 single remedy could be deemed a specific; for that 
 
CQO 
 
 THE PLAGUE. 
 
 127 
 
 .c. 430. which did good to one did harm to another. No con- II. 
 
 1 8?> 3 ‘ stitution was of itself strong enough to resist or weak Rapidity 
 enough to escape the attacks ; the disease carried off all the infec- 
 alike and defied every mode of treatment. Most appalling None^couki 
 was the despondency which seized upon any one who felt 
 himself sickening: for he instantly abandoned his mind impunity 
 
 0 J except those 
 
 to despair and, instead of holding out, absolutely threw who had 
 away his chance of life. Appalling too was the rapidity beenat- 
 with which men caught the infection ; dying like sheep if ^j_ and 
 they attended on one another ; and this was the principal covered, 
 cause of mortality. When they were afraid to visit one 
 another, the sufferers died in their solitude, so that many 
 houses were empty because there had been no one left to 
 take care of the sick ; or if they ventured they perished, 
 especially those who aspired to heroism. For they 
 went to see their friends without thought of themselves 
 and were ashamed to leave them, even at a time when 
 the very relations of the dying were at last growing 
 weary and ceased to make lamentations, overwhelmed 
 by the vastness of the calamity. But whatever instances 
 there may have been of such devotion, more often the 
 sick and the dying were tended by the pitying care of 
 those who had recovered, because they knew the course 
 of the disease and were themselves free from appre¬ 
 hension. For no one was ever attacked a second time, 
 or not with a fatal result. All men congratulated them, 
 and they themselves, in the excess of their joy at the 
 moment, had an innocent fancy that they could not die 
 of any other sickness. 
 
 The crowding of the people out of the country into 52. 
 the city aggravated the misery; and the newly-arrived The misery 
 suffered most. For, having no houses of their own, but by^hTover- 
 inhabiting in the height of summer stifling huts, the of 
 
 mortality among them was dreadful, and they perished 
 in wild disorder. a The dead lay as they had died, one 
 upon another, while others hardly alive wallowed a in the 
 
 a More literally: ‘ They, dying, lay dead one upon another, or 
 wallowed hardly alive ’ etc. 
 
T28 
 
 THE PLAGUE. 
 
 streets and crawled about every fountain craving for 
 water. The temples in which they lodged were full of 
 the corpses of those who died in them ; for the violence 
 of the calamity was such that men, not knowing where 
 to turn, grew reckless of all law, human and divine. The 
 customs which had hitherto been observed at funerals 
 were universally violated, and they buried their dead each 
 one as best he could. Many, having no proper appli¬ 
 ances, because the deaths in their household had been 
 so frequent, made no scruple of using the burial-place of 
 others. When one man had raised a funeral pile, others 
 would come, and throwing on their dead first, set fire to 
 it; or when some other corpse was already burning, before 
 they could be stopped would throw their own dead upon 
 it and depart. 
 
 There were other and worse forms of lawlessness which 
 the plague introduced at Athens. Men who had hitherto 
 concealed their indulgence in pleasure now grew bolder. 
 For, seeing the sudden change,—how the rich died in a 
 the plague* moment, and those who had nothing immediately in¬ 
 herited their property,—they reflected that life and riches 
 were alike transitory, and they resolved to enjoy them¬ 
 selves while they could, and to think only of pleasure. 
 Who would be willing to sacrifice himself to the law of 
 honour when he knew not whether he would ever live to 
 be held in honour ? The pleasure of the moment and any 
 sort of thing which conduced to it took the place both of 
 honour and of expediency. No fear of God or law of man 
 deterred a criminal. Those who saw all perishing alike, 
 thought that the worship or neglect of the Gods made no 
 difference. For offences against human law no punish¬ 
 ment was to be feared ; no one would live long enough to 
 be called to account. Already a far heavier sentence 
 had been passed and was hanging over a man’s head ; 
 before that fell, why should he not take a little pleasure? 
 
 54. Such was the grievous calamity which now afflicted 
 the Athenians ; within the walls their people were dying, 
 and without, their country was being ravaged. In their 
 
 II. 
 
 General 
 violation of 
 ancient cus¬ 
 toms of 
 burial. 
 
 00 - 
 All legal 
 and reli¬ 
 gious re¬ 
 straint dis- 
 
 Otd 
 
CONTINUANCE OF THE INVASION 
 
 I2Q 
 
 B.C. 430. 
 01. 87, 3. 
 
 troubles they naturally called to mind a verse which the II. 
 elder men among them declared to have been current 
 long ago:— 
 
 ‘ A Dorian war will come and a plague with it.’ 
 
 There was a dispute about the precise expression ; some Dispute 
 saying that hmos , a famine, and not loimos , a plague, was ancient 
 the original word. Nevertheless, as might have been ex- Aether 
 pected, for men’s memories reflected their sufferings, the 
 argument in favour of loimos prevailed at the time. But the word, 
 if ever in future years another Dorian war arises which 
 happens to be accompanied by a famine, they will pro¬ 
 bably repeat the verse in the other form. The answer 
 of the oracle to the Lacedaemonians when the God was 
 asked ‘ whether they should go to war or not,’ and he 
 replied c that if they fought with all their might, they 
 would conquer, and that he himself would take their 
 part a , 5 was not forgotten by those who had heard of it, 
 and they quite imagined that they were witnessing the 
 fulfilment of his words. The disease certainly did set 
 in immediately after the invasion of the Peloponnesians, 
 and did not spread into Peloponnesus in any degree 
 worth speaking of, while Athens felt its ravages most 
 severely, and next to Athens the places which were most 
 populous. Such was the history of the plague b . 
 
 After the Peloponnesians had wasted the plain they 55. 
 entered what are called the coast lands ( Paralus) and The Pel °- 
 
 1 a 1 • ponnesians 
 
 penetrated as far as Launum, where the Athenians have atLaunum. 
 their silver mines. First they ravaged that part of the fun re - 5 
 coast which looks towards Peloponnesus, and afterwards ^0^ from 
 that situated towards Euboea and Andros. But Pericles, s° in g out » 
 
 .... . but sends 
 
 who was still general, continued to insist, as in the former a hundred 
 invasion, that the Athenians should remain within their vage S peio a -" 
 walls. P° &nnesus * 
 
 Before, however, the Peloponnesians had left the plain 56. 
 and moved forward into the coast lands he had begun 
 to equip an expedition of a hundred ships against Pelo¬ 
 ponnesus. When all was ready he put to sea, having on 
 a Cp. i. 118 fin. lj Cp. iii. 87. 
 
 K 
 
130 THE PLAGUE AT POTIDAEA . 
 
 II. board four thousand Athenian hoplites and three hundred 
 cavalry conveyed in horse transports which the Athenians 
 then constructed for the first time out of their old ships. 
 The Chians and Lesbians joined them with fifty vessels. 
 The expedition did not actually put to sea until the 
 Peloponnesians had reached the coast lands. Arriving 
 at Epidaurus in Peloponnesus the Athenians devastated 
 most of the country and attacked the city, which at 
 one time they were in hopes of taking, but did not quite 
 succeed. Setting sail again they ravaged the territory 
 of Troezen, Halieis, and Hermione, which are all places 
 on the coast of Peloponnesus. Again putting off they 
 came to Prasiae, a small town on the coast of Laconia, 
 ravaged the country, and took and destroyed the place. 
 They then returned home and found that the Pelopon¬ 
 nesians had also returned and were no longer in Attica. 
 
 5 7 * All the time during which the Peloponnesians remained 
 The Pelo- j n the country and the armament of the Athenians con- 
 
 ponnesians ' 
 
 leave Attica tinued at sea the plague was raging both among the 
 offorty Stay troops and in the city. The fear which it inspired was 
 days> said to have induced the enemy to leave Attica sooner 
 than they intended ; for they heard from deserters that 
 the disease was in the city, and likewise saw the burning 
 of the dead. Still in this invasion the whole country 
 was ravaged by them, and they remained about forty 
 days, which was the longest stay they ever made. 
 
 58. In the same summer, Hagnon the son of Nicias, and 
 Expedition Cleopompus the son of Cleinias, who were colleagues 
 Poddfea. of Pericles in his military command, took the fleet which 
 breaks mlt 6 he had employed and sailed forthwith against the Thra- 
 among the cian Chalcidians and against Potidaea, which still held 
 
 troops, and 0 ’ 
 
 therein- out. On their arrival they brought engines up to the 
 
 forcements ... - , . , r 
 
 return to walls, and tried every means of taking the town. But 
 Athens. they did no t succeed ; nor did the result by any means 
 correspond to the magnitude of their armament; for 
 thither too the plague came and made dreadful havoc 
 among the Athenian troops. Even the soldiers who 
 were previously there and had been in good health 
 
 m O 
 
SPEECH OF PERICLES . 
 
 1 3 1 
 
 b . c . 430. caught the infection from the forces under Hagnon. II. 
 
 01 ‘ 8? ’ 3 ‘ But the army of Phormio a escaped ; for he and his 
 sixteen hundred troops had left Chalcidice. And so 
 Hagnon returned with his fleet to Athens, having lost by 
 the plague out of four thousand hoplites a thousand 
 and fifty men in forty days. But the original armament b 
 remained and prosecuted the siege. 
 
 After the second Peloponnesian invasion, now that 59 * 
 Attica had been once more ravaged, and the war and T . he Athe " 
 the plague together lay heavy upon the Athenians, a for peace 
 change came over their spirit. They blamed Pericles rejected, 
 because he had persuaded them to go to war, declaring p e ™ 
 that he was the author of their troubles : and they were c } e f- Hls 
 
 ’ J * defence. 
 
 anxious to come to terms with the Lacedaemonians. 
 Accordingly envoys were despatched to Sparta, but they 
 met with no success. And now, being completely at 
 their wit’s end, they turned upon Pericles. He saw that 
 they were exasperated by their misery and were behaving 
 just as he had always anticipated that they would. And 
 so, being still general, he called an assembly, wanting to 
 encourage them and to convert their angry feelings into 
 a gentler and more hopeful mood. At this assembly he 
 came forward and spoke as follows:— 
 
 * I was expecting this outburst of indignation; the 60. 
 causes of it are not unknown to me. And I have sum- ^°ncon- ger 
 moned an assembly that I may remind you of your siderate and 
 
 J unmanly; 
 
 resolutions and reprove you for your inconsiderate anger you forget 
 against me, and want of fortitude in misfortune. In fortunes of 
 my judgment it would be better for individuals them- ^draide- 
 selves that the citizens should suffer and the state flourish P end on 
 
 1 • • those of 
 
 than that the citizens should flourish and the state suffer, the state. 
 
 A private man, however successful in his own dealings, lieved that 
 
 if his country perish is involved in her destruction ; but 
 
 if he be an unprosperous citizen of a prosperous city he interested, 
 
 L 1 1 1 J when you 
 
 is much more likely to recover. Seeing then that states consented 
 can bear the misfortunes of individuals, but individuals why should 
 cannot bear the misfortunes of the state, let us all stand LTnow? 
 a Cp. i. 64 med. b Cp. i. 59, 61 init. 
 
 K 2 
 
1 3 2 
 
 SPEECH OF PERICLES . 
 
 II. by our country and not do what you are doing now, who 
 because you are stunned by your private calamities are 
 letting go the common hope of safety, and condemning 
 not only me who advised, but yourselves who consented 
 to, the war. Yet I with whom you are so angry venture 
 to say. of myself, that I am as capable as any one of 
 devising and explaining a sound policy; and that I am 
 a lover of my country, and incorruptible. Now a man 
 may have a policy which he cannot clearly expound, 
 and then he might as well have none at all; or he may 
 possess both ability and eloquence, but if he is disloyal 
 to his country he cannot, like a true man, speak in her 
 interest; or again he may be unable to resist a bribe, 
 and then all his other good qualities will be sold for 
 money. If, when you determined to go to war, you 
 believed me to have somewhat more of the statesman 
 in me than others, it is not fair that I should now be 
 charged with anything like crime. 
 
 61. ‘I allow that for men who are in prosperity and free 
 
 changed 1 c ^ oose it ls g rea 1 folly to make war. But when they 
 
 but you are must either submit and at once surrender independence, 
 changed by A 
 
 misfortune, or strike and be free, then he who shuns and not he who 
 change is meets the danger is deserving of blame. For my own 
 irjthe 111 " P ar b I am the same man and stand where I did. But 
 citizens of y 0U are changed ; for you have been driven by misfortune 
 you should to recall the consent which you gave when you were yet 
 sorrows, ° Ur unhurt, and to think that my advice was wrong because 
 only of tiie y our own characters are weak. The pain is present and 
 good° comes home to each of you, but the good is as yet un¬ 
 realised by any one; and your minds have not the 
 strength to persevere in your resolution, now that a 
 great reverse has overtaken you unawares. Anything 
 which is sudden and unexpected and utterly beyond 
 calculation, such a disaster for instance as this plague 
 coming upon other misfortunes, enthralls the spirit of a 
 man. Nevertheless, being the citizens of a great city 
 and educated in a temper of greatness, you should not 
 succumb to calamities however overwhelming, or darken 
 
CQO 
 
 SPEECH OF PERICLES. 
 
 l 33 
 
 C . 430. the lustre of your fame. For if men hate the presump- H* 
 
 L 3 ' tion of those who claim a reputation to which they have 
 no right, they equally condemn the faint-heartedness of 
 those who fall below the glory which is their own. You 
 should lose the sense of your private sorrows and lay 
 fast hold of the common good. 
 
 c As to your sufferings in the war, if you fear that they 62. 
 may be very great and after all fruitless, I have shown Sa^your^ 
 you already over and over again that such a fear is 
 groundless. If you are still unsatisfied I will indicate less ? 1 tell 
 
 53 / ..... . you that 
 
 a one element of your superiority which appears to have you are 
 escaped you a , although it nearly touches your imperial maSer^of 
 greatness. I too have never mentioned it before, nor 
 would I now, because the claim may seem too arrogant, half the 
 
 world. 
 
 if I did not see that you are unreasonably depressed. What are 
 You think that your empire is confined to your allies, but sessLnfin 
 I say that of the two divisions of the world accessible to S P fret° n 
 man, the land and the sea, there is one of which you are d° m? Keep 
 
 ... that, and 
 
 absolute masters, and have, or may have, the dominion you will 
 to any extent which you please. Neither the great King therest 5 ^ 
 nor any nation on earth can hinder a navy like yours demies ^ 
 from penetrating whithersoever you choose to sail. When ^hh dis- 
 we reflect on this great power, houses and lands, of which having a 
 the loss seems so dreadful to you, are as nothing. We conviction 
 ought not to be troubled about them or to think much superiority 
 of them in comparison; they are only the garden of the 
 house, the superfluous ornament of wealth ; and you may 
 be sure that if we cling to our freedom and preserve that, 
 we shall soon enough recover all the rest. But, if we 
 are the servants of others, we shall be sure to lose not 
 only freedom, but all that freedom gives. And where 
 your ancestors doubly succeeded, you will doubly fail. 
 
 For their empire was not inherited by them from others 
 but won by the labour of their hands, and by them pre- 
 
 a Or, taking vndpxou vpdv absolutely: ‘ a consideration which, 
 however obvious, appears to have escaped you.’ 
 
 Or, again, taking peyeOovs %epi with evdvp.T)drjvcii: ‘one element of 
 your superiority which nearly touches your empire, but of which 
 you never seem to have considered the importance.’ 
 
134 SPEECH OF PERICLES. 
 
 II. served and bequeathed to us. And surely to be robbed 
 of what you have is a greater disgrace than to fail in 
 obtaining more. Meet your enemies therefore not only 
 with spirit but with disdain. Any coward or fortunate 
 fool may brag and vaunt, but he only is capable of dis¬ 
 dain whose conviction that he is stronger than his enemy 
 rests, like our own, on grounds of reason. Courage 
 fighting in a fair field is fortified by the intelligence 
 which looks down upon an enemy; an intelligence re¬ 
 lying, not on hope, which is the strength of helplessness, 
 but on that surer foresight which is given by reason 
 and observation of facts. 
 
 63. ‘Once more, you are bound to maintain the imperial 
 ^nTisTt" di S nit y y° ur city i n which you all take pride ; for you 
 stake, and should not covet the glory unless you will endure the 
 to resign it ; toil. And do not imagine that you are fighting about a 
 already^in - 6 simple issue, freedom or slavery; you have an empire to 
 hatred of G ^ ose ’ and there 1S the danger to which the hatred of your 
 mankind, imperial rule has exposed you. Neither can you resign 
 
 your power, if, at this crisis, any timorous or inactive 
 spirit is for thus playing the honest man. For by this 
 time your empire has become a tyranny which in the 
 opinion of mankind may have been unjustly gained, but 
 which cannot be safely surrendered. The men of whom 
 I was speaking, if they could find followers, would soon 
 ruin a city, and if they were to go and found a state of 
 their own, would equally ruin that. For inaction is 
 secure only when arrayed by the side of activity; nor 
 is it expedient or safe for a sovereign, but only for a 
 subject state, to be a servant. 
 
 64. ‘You must not be led away by the advice of such 
 
 Nothing citizens as these, nor be angry with me ; for the resolu- 
 
 hashap- . 0 y ’ 
 
 pened, ex- tion m lavour 01 war was your own as much as mine, 
 p^aguefbut What if the enemy has come and done what he was 
 anticipated^ 1 certain to do when y ou refused to yield ? What too if 
 when we the plague followed? That was an unexpected blow, 
 
 agreed on . 1 
 
 war. Do but we might have foreseen all the rest. I am well 
 the spirit aware that your hatred of me is aggravated by it. But 
 
 PQO 
 
OM 
 
 SPEECH OF PERICLES. 135 
 
 c. 430. how unjustly, unless to me you also ascribe the credit 
 " S? ’ 3 ’ of any extraordinary success which may befall you a ! 
 The visitations of heaven should be borne with resigna¬ 
 tion, the sufferings inflicted by an enemy with manliness. 
 This has always been the spirit of Athens, and should 
 not die out in you. Know that our city has the greatest 
 name in all the world because she has never yielded to 
 misfortunes, but has sacrificed more lives and endured 
 severer hardships in war than any other; wherefore also 
 she has the greatest power of any state up to this day; 
 and the memory of her glory will always survive. Even 
 if we should be compelled at last to abate somewhat of 
 our greatness (for all things have their times of growth 
 and decay), yet will the recollection live, that, of all 
 Hellenes, we ruled over the greatest number of Hellenic 
 subjects ; that we withstood our enemies, whether single 
 or united, in the most terrible wars, and that we were 
 the inhabitants of a city endowed with every sort of 
 wealth and greatness. The indolent may indeed find 
 fault, but b the man of action b will seek to rival us, and 
 he who is less fortunate will envy us. To be hateful and 
 offensive has ever been at the time the fate of those who 
 have aspired to empire. But he judges well who accepts 
 unpopularity in a great cause. Hatred does not last 
 long, and, besides the immediate splendour of great 
 actions, the renown of them endures for ever in men’s 
 memories. Looking forward to such future glory and 
 present avoidance of dishonour, make an effort now and 
 secure both. Let no herald be sent to the Lacedae¬ 
 monians, and do not let them know that you are de¬ 
 pressed by your sufferings. For the greatest states and 
 the greatest men, when misfortunes come, are the least 
 depressed in spirit and the most resolute in action.’ 
 
 By these and similar words Pericles endeavoured to 
 appease the anger of the Athenians against himself, 
 
 a Cp. i. 140 init. 
 
 b Or, taking Ka\ avros with fiovXofxwos: ‘he who is ambitious like 
 ourselves.’ 
 
 II. 
 
 which has 
 made 
 Athens 
 great, and 
 even though 
 she fall will 
 render her 
 glorious for 
 all time. 
 
 65- 
 
 The Athe¬ 
 nians follow 
 
II. 
 
 Pericles’ 
 advice, 
 but are not 
 appeased 
 until they 
 have fined 
 him. He 
 soon re¬ 
 gains their 
 esteem, and 
 takes the 
 lead of af¬ 
 fairs. After 
 his death 
 his wisdom 
 was even 
 better ap¬ 
 preciated 
 than during 
 his life. 
 
 His advice 
 about the 
 war was 
 sound if the 
 Athenians 
 would only 
 have fol¬ 
 lowed it. 
 But they 
 were con¬ 
 tinually em¬ 
 barking on 
 rash enter¬ 
 prises, and 
 the city was 
 distracted 
 by the 
 struggles of 
 rival dema¬ 
 gogues, 
 whereas 
 Pericles had 
 been their 
 natural 
 leader. 
 
 136 THE POLICY OF PERICLES. 
 
 and to divert their minds from their terrible situation. 
 In the conduct of public affairs they took his advice, and 
 sent no more embassies to Sparta ; they were again eager 
 to prosecute the war. Yet in private they felt their suffer¬ 
 ings keenly; the common people had been deprived even 
 of the little which they possessed, while the upper class 
 had lost fair estates in the country with all their houses 
 and rich furniture. Worst of all, instead of enjoying 
 peace, they were now at war. The popular indignation 
 was not pacified until they had fined Pericles; but, soon 
 afterwards, with the usual fickleness of the multitude, 
 they elected him general and committed all their affairs 
 to his charge. Their private sorrows were beginning to 
 be less acutely felt, and for a time of public need they 
 thought that there was no man like him. During the 
 peace while he was at the head of affairs he ruled with 
 prudence; under his guidance Athens was safe, and 
 reached the height of her greatness in his time. When 
 the war began he showed that here too he had formed a 
 true estimate of the Athenian power. He survived the 
 commencement of hostilities two years and six months ; 
 and, after his death, his foresight was even better ap¬ 
 preciated than during his life. For he had told the 
 Athenians that if they would be patient and would 
 attend to their navy, and not seek to enlarge their do¬ 
 minion wjiile the war was going on, nor imperil the 
 existence of the city, they would be victorious; but 
 they did all that he told them not to do, and in matters 
 which seemingly had nothing to do with the war, from 
 motives of private ambition and private interest they 
 adopted a policy which had disastrous effects in respect 
 both of themselves and of their allies ; their measures, 
 a had they been successful, would only have brought a 
 honour and profit to individuals, and, when unsuccess¬ 
 ful, crippled the city in the conduct of the war. The 
 reason of the difference was that he, deriving authority 
 from his capacity and acknowledged worth, being also 
 
 a Or, ‘while they continued to succeed, only brought.’ 
 
 PQO 
 
CQO 
 
 C. 430. 
 • 87, 3 - 
 
 ERRORS OF THE ATHENIANS. 137 
 
 a man of transparent integrity, was able to control II. 
 the multitude in a free spirit; he led them rather than 
 was led by them; for, not seeking power by dishonest 
 arts, he had no need to say pleasant things, but, on the 
 strength of his own high character, could venture to 
 oppose and even to anger them. When he saw them 
 unseasonably elated and arrogant, his words humbled 
 and awed them; and, when they were depressed by 
 groundless fears, he sought to reanimate their confidence. 
 
 Thus Athens, though still in name a democracy, was in 
 fact ruled by her greatest citizen. But his successors 
 were more on an equality with one another, and, each 
 one struggling to be first himself, they were ready to 
 sacrifice the whole conduct of affairs to the whims of the 
 people. Such weakness in a great and imperial city led 
 to many errors, of which the greatest was the Sicilian 
 expedition ; not that the Athenians miscalculated their 
 enemy's power, but they themselves, instead of con¬ 
 sulting for the interests of the expedition which they 
 had sent out, were occupied in intriguing against one 
 another for the leadership of the democracy a , and not 
 only grew remiss in the management of the army, but 
 became embroiled, for the first time, in civil strife. And Even after 
 yet after they had lost in the Sicilian expedition the disaster ian 
 greater part of their fleet and army, and were distracted ouTagainst 
 by revolution at home, still they held out three years their old 
 
 r . . enemies 
 
 not only against their former enemies, but against the and many 
 
 Sicilians who had combined with them, and against and wereat 
 
 most of their own allies who had risen in revolt. Even las . 1 oal Z 
 
 ruined by 
 
 when Cyrus the son of the King; joined in the war and themselves. 
 
 1 • 1 1 -r» 1 . . So that 
 
 supplied the Peloponnesian fleet with money, they con- Pericles was 
 tinued to resist, and were at last overthrown, not by after aih ht 
 their enemies, but by themselves and their own internal 
 dissensions. So that at the time Pericles was more than 
 justified in the conviction at which his foresight had 
 arrived, that the Athenians would win an easy victory 
 over the unaided forces of the Peloponnesians. 
 
 a Cp. vi. 28. 
 
138 PELOPONNESIAN ENVOYS SENT TO PERSIA. 
 
 II. During the same summer the Lacedaemonians and their 
 
 55 allies sent a fleet of a hundred ships against the island of 
 The Lace- Zacynthus, which lies opposite Elis. The Zacynthians 
 attack manS are colonists of the Peloponnesian Achaeans, and were 
 Zacynthus a ip es 0 f the Athenians. There were on board the fleet 
 
 without re¬ 
 sult. a thousand Lacedaemonian hoplites, under the command 
 
 of Cnemus the Spartan admiral. They disembarked and 
 ravaged the greater part of the country; but as the in¬ 
 habitants would not come to terms, they sailed away home. 
 
 67. At the end of the same summer, Aristeus the Corin- 
 Envoyssent thian, the Lacedaemonian ambassadors Aneristus, Nico- 
 Peiopon- laus and Stratodemus, Timagoras of Tegea, and Pollis 
 to the King Argos who had no public mission, were on their way 
 by sftSces d to Asia * n h°P e of persuading the King to give them 
 and given money and join in the war. They went first of all to 
 Athenians. Sitalces son of Teres, in Thrace, wishing if possible to 
 carried detach him from the Athenians, and induce him to lead 
 Athens and an arm y to the relief of Potidaea, which was still block- 
 
 put to J 
 
 death. aded by Athenian forces ; they also wanted him to con¬ 
 vey them across the Hellespont on their intended journey 
 to Pharnaces, the son of Pharnabazus, who was to send 
 them on to the king. At the time of their arrival two 
 Athenian envoys, Learchus the son of Callimachus, and 
 Ameiniades the son of Philemon, chanced to be at the 
 court of Sitalces ; and they entreated his son Sadocus, 
 who had been made an Athenian citizen a , to deliver the 
 envoys into their hands, that they might not find their 
 way to the King and so injure a city which was in some 
 degree his own. He consented, and, sending a body of 
 men with Learchus and Ameiniades, before they em¬ 
 barked, as they were on their way through Thrace to the 
 vessel in which they were going to cross the Hellespont, 
 seized them ; they were then, in accordance with the 
 orders of Sadocus, handed over to the Athenian envoys, 
 who conveyed them to Athens. On the very day of their 
 arrival the Athenians, fearing that Aristeus, whom they 
 considered to be the cause of all their troubles at Potidaea 
 a Cp. ii. 29 fin. 
 
 oca 
 
CQO 
 
 WAR BETWEEN AMBRACIA AND A MPHIL 0 CHI A . 139 
 c. 430. and in Chalcidice,would do them still further mischief if he II. 
 
 87 q 
 
 ' escaped, put them all to death without trial and without 
 hearing what they wanted to say; they then threw their 
 bodies down precipices. They considered that they had a 
 right to retaliate on the Lacedaemonians, who had begun 
 by treating in the same way the traders of the Athenians 
 and their allies when they caught their vessels off the coast 
 of Peloponnesus. For at the commencement of the war, all 
 whom the Lacedaemonians captured at sea were treated 
 by them as enemies and indiscriminately slaughtered, 
 whether they were allies of the Athenians or neutrals. 
 
 About the end of the same summer the Ambraciots, 68. 
 with a large Barbarian force which they had called out, The Am- 
 made war upon the Amphilochian Argos and upon Am- make war 
 philochia. The original cause of their enmity against cess'upon 0 " 
 the Argives was as follows:—The Amphilochian terri- f he . An \ phi ' 
 
 0 . r locian Ar- 
 
 tory had been occupied and the city founded by Amphi- gives, 
 lochus the son of Amphiaraus, who on returning home 
 after the Trojan War was dissatisfied at the state of 
 Argos. He fixed the site on the shore of the Ambra- 
 cian Gulf, and called the new city by the name of his 
 native place ; it was the greatest city in that region, and 
 its inhabitants were the most powerful community. 
 
 Many generations afterwards, these Amphilochians in 
 a time of distress invited their neighbours the Ambraciots 
 to join in the settlement, and from them they first learned 
 the Hellenic language which they now speak; the other 
 Amphilochians are Barbarians. After a while the Ambra¬ 
 ciots drove out the Amphilochian Argives and themselves 
 took possession of the city. The expelled Amphilochians 
 placed themselves under the protection of the Acarna- 
 nians, and both together called in the Athenians, who 
 sent them a fleet of thirty ships under the command of 
 Phormio. When Phormio arrived, they stormed Argos, 
 and sold the Ambraciots into slavery; and the Amphi¬ 
 lochians and Acarnanians dwelt together in the place. 
 
 The alliance between the Acarnanians and Athenians 
 then first began. The hatred of the Ambraciots towards 
 
140 
 
 SURRENDER OF POTIDAEA. 
 
 II. the Amphilochian Argives commenced with the enslave¬ 
 ment of their countrymen ; and now when the war 
 offered an opportunity they invaded their territory, ac¬ 
 companied by the Chaonians and some others of the 
 neighbouring Barbarians. They came as far as Argos 
 and made themselves masters of the country; but not 
 being able to take the city by assault they returned, 
 and the several tribes dispersed to their own homes. 
 Such were the events of the summer. 
 
 69. In the following winter the Athenians sent twenty 
 Phormio at ships on an expedition round Peloponnesus. These were 
 
 Naupactus. . 
 
 Meiesander placed under the command of Phormio, who, stationing 
 led tribute himself at Naupactus, guarded the straits and prevented 
 and Caria an Y one ^ rom sailing either out of or into Corinth and 
 is defeated the Crisaean Gulf. Six other vessels were sent to collect 
 
 and slam. 
 
 the tribute in Lycia and Caria ; they were under the 
 command of Meiesander, who was to see that Pelopon¬ 
 nesian privateers did not establish themselves in those 
 parts, and damage merchant vessels coming from Phaselis 
 and Phoenicia and all that region. But he, going up the 
 country into Lycia with an army composed of Athenians 
 taken from the crews and of allied troops, was defeated, 
 and himself and a part of his forces slain. 
 
 70. In the same winter the Potidaeans, who were still block- 
 
 The Poti- aded, found themselves unable to hold out; for the Pelo- 
 
 daeans are . . 
 
 compelled ponnesian invasions of Attica did not make the Athenians 
 to sur^ ger withdraw ; and they had no more food. When they had 
 The Athe- su ff ere d every sort of extremity, even to the eating of 
 mans blame human flesh, they entered into communications with the 
 
 their gene- ... 
 
 rais for Athenian generals, Xenophon the son of Euripides, 
 Srms geaSy Hestiodorus the son of Aristocleides, and Phanomachus 
 
 the son of Callimachus, to whom the siege had been en¬ 
 trusted. They, seeing that the army was suffering from 
 the exposed situation, and considering that the city had 
 already spent two thousand talents a on the siege, ac¬ 
 cepted the terms proposed. The Potidaeans, with their 
 wives and their children, and likewise the foreign troops b , 
 
 a ^480,000. 
 
 b Cp. i. 60. 
 
 PQ O 
 
B.C. 430. 
 01 . 87, 3 - 
 
 B.C. 429. 
 01. 87, 4. 
 
 THE PELOPONNESIANS ATTACK PLATAEA. 141 
 
 were to come out of the city, the men with one garment, II. 
 the women with two, and they were allowed a certain fixed 
 sum of money for their journey. So they came out under 
 a safe-conduct, and went into Chalcidice, or wherever 
 they could find a home. But the Athenians blamed 
 the generals for coming to terms without their authority, 
 thinking that they could have made the city surrender at 
 discretion. Soon afterwards they sent thither colonists 
 of their own. Such were the events of the winter. And 
 so ended the second year in the Peloponnesian War of 
 which Thucydides wrote the history. 
 
 In the following summer the Peloponnesians and the Jl. 
 allies under the command of Archidamus the son of Expedition 
 
 • 1 • • of the 
 
 Zeuxidamus, the Lacedaemonian king, instead of in- Peiopon- 
 vading Attica, made an expedition against Plataea. Under Ar- 
 There he encamped and was about to ravage the ^nst US 
 country, when the Plataeans sent envoys to him bearing Plataea. 
 the following message :— 
 
 c Archidamus, and you Lacedaemonians, in making Protest 
 
 • -1 , . of the 
 
 war upon Plataea you are acting unjustly, and in a Plataeans. 
 manner unworthy of yourselves and of your ancestors. You are 
 
 violating 
 
 Pausanias the son of Cleombrotus, the Lacedaemonian, the promise 
 when he and such Hellenes as were willing to share the pe ndence 
 danger with him fought a battle in our land and liberated ^iasmade 
 Hellas from the Persian, offered up sacrifice in the Agora j^[ ter f the 
 of Plataea to Zeus the God of Freedom, and in the Plataea. 
 presence of all the confederates then and there restored 
 to the Plataeans their country and city to be henceforth 
 independent; no man was to make unjust war upon them 
 at any time or to seek to enslave them ; and if they were 
 attacked, the allies who were present promised that they 
 would defend them to the utmost of their power. These 
 privileges your fathers granted to us as a reward for the 
 courage and devotion which we displayed in that time of 
 danger. But you are acting in an opposite spirit; for 
 you have joined the Thebans, our worst enemies, and 
 have come hither to enslave us. Wherefore, calling to 
 witness the Gods to whom we all then swore, and also 
 
142 ARCHIDAMUS AND THE PLATAEANS. 
 
 II. the Gods of your race and the Gods who dwell in our 
 country, we bid you do no harm to the land of Plataea. 
 Do not violate your oaths, but allow the Plataeans to be 
 independent, and to enjoy the rights which Pausanias 
 granted to them.’ 
 
 72. To this appeal Archidamus rejoined :— 
 
 Archida- ‘ What you say, Plataeans, is just, but your acts should 
 
 mus offers . , . 
 
 peace if correspond to your words. Lnjoy the independence 
 ddier'join which Pausanias granted to you, and assist us in freeing 
 daemonSn the °ther Hellenes who were your sworn confederates in 
 confederacy that time of danger and are now in subjection to the 
 
 or remain 
 
 neutral. Athenians. With a view to the emancipation of them 
 and of the other subject states, this great war has been 
 undertaken and all these preparations made. It would 
 be best for you to join with us, and observe the oaths 
 yourselves which you would have us observe. But if you 
 prefer to be neutral, a course which we have already once 
 proposed to you, retain possession of your lands, and re¬ 
 ceive both sides in peace, but neither for the purposes of 
 war; and we shall be satisfied.’ 
 
 The Pia- The Plataean ambassadors then returned to the city 
 that n they Ply an d reported these words of Archidamus to the people, 
 withouMhe wbo ma< ^ e answer that they could not do what they were 
 Athenians, asked without the sanction of the Athenians, in whose 
 that they power they had left their wives and children, and that 
 Thebans the they also feared for the very existence of their state. 
 
 When the Lacedaemonians were gone the Athenians 
 might come and not allow them to carry out the treaty; 
 or the Thebans, who would be included in the clause 
 requiring them ‘ to receive both sides,’ might again 
 attempt to seize their town. To this Archidamus, 
 wanting to reassure them, made the following answer: — 
 Archida- ‘ Then deliver over your city and houses to the Lace- 
 ££ them daemonians; mark the boundaries of your land, and 
 Ihe'citTtiii 1 " number y° ur fr ui1 >trees and anything else which can be 
 the end of counted. Go yourselves whithersoever you please, while 
 the war lasts, and on the return of peace we will give 
 back to you all that we have received. Until then we 
 
 O td 
 
o« 
 
 THE PLATAEANS WILL NOT DESERT ATHENS. 143 
 
 429. will hold your property in trust, and will cultivate your II. 
 
 7 ' 4 ' ground, paying you such a rent as will content you.'* 
 
 Upon hearing these words the envoys again returned 73 - 
 into the city, and, after holding a consultation with the The Pla - 
 
 1 taeans, ob- 
 
 people, told Archidamus that they wished first to com- taining per- 
 municate his proposals to the Athenians, and if they insult the 
 could get their consent they would do as he advised : in Athenians * 
 the meantime they desired him to make a truce with couraged 
 
 by them to 
 
 them, and not to ravage their land. So he made a truce resist, 
 which allowed sufficient time for their ambassadors to 
 return from Athens ; and meanwhile he spared their 
 land. The Plataean envoys came to Athens, and after 
 advising with the Athenians they brought back the 
 following message to their fellow-citizens :— £ Plataeans, 
 the Athenians say that never at any time since you first 
 became their allies 3, have they suffered any one to do you 
 wrong, and that they will not forsake you now, but will 
 assist you to the utmost of their power ; and they conjure 
 you, by the oaths which your fathers swore, not to forsake 
 the Athenian alliance.’ 
 
 When the answer came, the Plataeans resolved not to 74 - 
 desert the Athenians, but patiently to look on, if they reply 
 must, while the Lacedaemonians wasted their country, cannot 
 and to endure the worst. No one was henceforward to Lacedae- 6 
 leave the town, but answer was to be made from the p r opo S n als 
 walls that they could not possibly consent to the Lace¬ 
 daemonian proposal. King Archidamus, as soon as he 
 received the reply, before proceeding to action, fell to 
 calling upon the Gods and heroes of the country in the 
 following words :— 
 
 ‘ O ye Gods and heroes who possess the land of Plataea, Archida- 
 be our witnesses that our invasion of this land in which peals to the 
 our fathers prayed to you before they conquered the Gods ‘ 
 Persians, and which you made a field of victory to the 
 Hellenes, has thus far been justified, for the Plataeans 
 first deserted the alliance ; and that if we go further 
 we shall be guilty of no crime, for we have again and 
 a Herod, vi. 108. 
 
144 
 
 SIEGE OF PLATAEA . 
 
 75 - 
 
 The siege 
 operations 
 begin : the 
 Pelopon¬ 
 nesians 
 raise a 
 mound, 
 which the 
 Plataeans 
 counteract 
 by raising 
 the height 
 of a part 
 of their wall 
 and by 
 drawing 
 away earth 
 from the 
 mound. 
 
 again made them fair proposals and they have not 
 listened to us. Be gracious to us and grant that the 
 real authors of the iniquity may be punished, and that 
 they may obtain revenge who lawfully seek it. 5 
 
 After this appeal to the Gods he began military opera¬ 
 tions. In the first place, the soldiers felled the fruit-trees 
 and surrounded the city with a palisade, that henceforth 
 no one might get out. They then began to raise a 
 mound against it, thinking that with so large an army 
 at work this would be the speediest way of taking the 
 place. So they cut timber from Cithaeron and built on 
 either side of the intended mound a frame of logs placed 
 cross-wise in order that the earth might not scatter. 
 Thither they carried wood, stones, earth, and anything 
 which would fill up the vacant space. They continued 
 raising the mound seventy days and seventy nights 
 without intermission ; the army was divided into relays, 
 and one party worked while the other slept and ate. 
 The Lacedaemonian officers who commanded the con¬ 
 
 tingents of the allies stood over them and kept them at 
 work. The Plataeans, seeing the mound rising, con¬ 
 structed a wooden frame, which they set upon the top of 
 their own wall opposite the mound ; in this they inserted 
 bricks, which they took from the neighbouring houses; 
 the wood served to strengthen and bind the structure 
 together as it increased in height; they also hung cur¬ 
 tains of skins and hides in front; these were designed 
 to protect the wood-work and the workers, and shield 
 them against blazing arrows. The wooden wall rose 
 high, but the mound rose quickly too. Then the Pla¬ 
 taeans had a new device;—they made a hole in that 
 part of the wall against which the mound pressed and 
 drew in the earth. 
 
 76. The Peloponnesians discovered what they were doing, 
 and threw into the gap clay packed in wattles of reed, 
 which would not scatter and give way like the loose 
 earth. Whereupon the Plataeans, baffled in one plan, 
 resorted to another. Calculating the direction, they dug 
 
 Otd 
 
O W 
 
 SIEGE OF PLATAEA. 
 
 J 45 
 
 c. 429. a mine from the city to the mound and again drew the H- 
 " 8? ' 4 ’ earth inward. For a long time their assailants did not Single- 
 find them out, and so what the Peloponnesians threw on gated, the 
 was of little use, since the mound was always being drawn build a 
 off below and settling into the vacant space. But in ii ne of de¬ 
 spite of all their efforts, the Plataeans were afraid that [hei?oid hm 
 their numbers would never hold out against so great an Y^ a11 m . the 
 army; and they devised yet another expedient. They crescent, 
 left off working at the great building opposite the mound, 
 and beginning at both ends, where the city wall returned 
 to its original lower height, they built an inner wall pro¬ 
 jecting inwards in the shape of a crescent, that if the first 
 wall were taken the other might still be defensible. The 
 enemy would be obliged to carry the mound right up 
 to it, and as they advanced inwards would have their 
 trouble all over again, and be exposed to missiles on both 
 flanks. While the mound was rising the Peloponnesians 
 brought battering engines up to the wall ; one which 
 was moved forward on the mound itself shook a great 
 part of the raised building, to the terror of the Plataeans. 
 
 They brought up others too at other points of the wall. 
 
 But the Plataeans dropped nooses over the ends of these By ingeni- 
 engines and drew them up; they also let down huge °hey disable 
 beams suspended at each end by long iron chains from ^ rams^f 
 two poles leaning on the wall and projecting over it. the enemy. 
 These beams they drew up at right angles to the ad¬ 
 vancing battering ram, and whenever at any point it 
 was about to attack them they slackened their hold of 
 the chains and let go the beam, which fell with great 
 force and snapped off the head of the ram. 
 
 At length the Peloponnesians, finding that their 77. 
 engines were useless, and that the new wall was rising The Peio- 
 opposite to the mound, and perceiving that they could nearly S suc- 
 not without more formidable means of attack hope seuLg the 
 to take the city, made preparations for a blockade. Clt ^ on fire - 
 But first of all they resolved to try whether, the wind 
 favouring, the place, which was but small, could not 
 be set on fire; they were anxious not to incur the 
 L 
 
146 
 
 SIEGE OF PLATAEA. 
 
 II. expense of a regular siege, and devised all sorts of plans 
 in order to avoid it. So they brought faggots and 
 threw them down from the mound along the space 
 between it and the wall, which was soon filled up 
 when so many hands were at work; then they threw 
 more faggots one upon another into the city as far as 
 they could reach from the top of the mound, and casting 
 in lighted brands with brimstone and pitch, set them all 
 on fire. A flame arose of which the like had never before 
 been made by the hand of man ; I am not speaking of 
 fires in the mountains, when the woods have sponta¬ 
 neously blazed up from the action of the wind and 
 mutual attrition. There was a great conflagration, and 
 the Plataeans, who had thus far escaped, were all but 
 destroyed; a considerable part of the town was un¬ 
 approachable, and if a wind had come on and carried 
 the flame that way, as the enemy hoped, they could not 
 have been saved. It is said that there was also a violent 
 storm of thunder and rain, which quenched the flames 
 and put an end to the danger. 
 
 78. The Peloponnesians, having failed in this, as in their 
 Failing in former attempts, sent away a part of their army but 
 tempt, they retained the rest a , and dividing the task among the 
 double wail contingents of the several cities, surrounded Plataea with 
 round the a wa ]l. Trenches, out of which they took clay for the 
 
 city and J J 
 
 retire, leav- bricks, were formed both on the inner and the outer side 
 of g them^ ard of the wall. About the rising of Arcturus b all was com- 
 andthe pleted. They then drew off their army, leaving a guard 
 Boeotians. G n one half of the wall, while the other half was guarded 
 by the Boeotians; the disbanded troops returned to their 
 homes. The Plataeans had already conveyed to Athens 0 
 their wives, children, and old men, with the rest of their 
 unserviceable population. Those who remained during 
 the siege were four hundred Plataeans, eighty Athenians, 
 and a hundred and ten women to make bread. These 
 were their exact numbers when the siege began. There 
 
 a Retaining in the text to de \olttov afpevres. 
 b i. e. about the middle of September. c ii. 6 fin. 
 
 « o 
 
OCd 
 
 EXPEDITION AGP INST CHALCID 1 CE. 147 
 
 c. 429. was no one else, slave or freeman, within the walls. The II. 
 
 ‘ 87 ’ 4 ’ blockade of Plataea was now complete. 
 
 During the same summer, when the corn was in full 79 - 
 ear, and about the time of the attack on Plataea, the Jansattack 
 Athenians sent an expedition against the Chalcidians of Spartoius. 
 
 . . An engage- 
 
 Thrace and against the Bottiaeans, consisting of two ment takes 
 thousand heavy-armed troops of their own and two wiS they 
 hundred horsemen under the command of Xenophon ^ctoriouf 
 the son of Euripides, and two others. They came close but Chaici- 
 
 A ' dian rem- 
 
 up to the Bottian Spartoius and destroyed the crops, forcements 
 They expected that the place would be induced to yield engage?’ 16 
 to them by a party within the walls. But the opposite ^ewed 
 party sent to Olynthus and obtained from thence a and they 
 garrison, partly composed of hoplites, which sallied out of with loss. 
 Spartoius and engaged with the Athenians under the walls 
 of the town. The Chalcidian hoplites and with them 
 certain auxiliaries were defeated and retreated into Spar¬ 
 toius, but their cavalry and light-armed troops had the 
 advantage over those of the Athenians. They were 
 assisted by a few targeteers, who came from the district 
 called Crusis. The engagement was scarcely over when 
 another body of targeteers from Olynthus came up to 
 their aid. Encouraged by the reinforcement and their 
 previous success, and supported by the Chalcidian horse 
 and the newly-arrived troops, the light-armed again 
 attacked the Athenians, who began to fall back upon 
 the two companies which they had left with their 
 baggage : as often as the Athenians charged, the enemy 
 retired; but when the Athenians continued their retreat, 
 they pressed upon them and hurled darts at them. The 
 Chalcidian cavalry too rode up, and wherever they pleased 
 charged the Athenians, who now fled utterly disconcerted 
 and were pursued to a considerable distance. At length 
 they escaped to Potidaea, and having recovered their 
 dead under a flag of truce, returned to Athens with the 
 survivors of their army, out of which they had lost four 
 hundred and thirty men and all their generals. The 
 Chalcidians and Bottiaeans, having set up a trophy and 
 
T 4 8 THE PELOPONNESIANS INVADE ACARNANIA. 
 
 II. carried off their dead, disbanded and dispersed to their 
 several cities. 
 
 8o. In the same summer, not long afterwards, the Ambra- 
 The Am- c i 0 ts an d Chaonians, designing to subjugate the whole of 
 persuade Acarnania and detach it from the Athenian alliance, per- 
 daemonkns suaded the Lacedaemonians to equip a fleet out of the 
 laifdand confederate forces, and to send into that region a thousand 
 sea force hoplites. They said that if the Lacedaemonians would 
 
 under Cne- 1 
 
 mus against join with them and attack the enemy both by sea and 
 Disembark- land, the Acarnanians on the sea-coast would be unable 
 troops he to ass i s t the inland tribes, and they might easily conquer 
 is joined by Acarnania. Zacynthus and Cephallenia would then fall 
 
 a number of y # 
 
 barbarous into their hands, and the Athenian fleet would not so 
 marches easily sail round Peloponnesus. They might even hope 
 Stratus 5 t° take Naupactus. The Lacedaemonians agreed, and 
 at once despatched Cnemus, who was still admiral a , with 
 the thousand hoplites in a few ships; they ordered the rest 
 of the allied navy to get ready and at once sail to Leucas. 
 The interests of the Ambraciots were zealously supported 
 by Corinth, their mother city. The fleet which was to 
 come from Corinth, Sicyon, and the adjacent places was 
 long in preparation ; but the contingent from Leucas, 
 Anactorium, and Ambracia was soon equipped, and 
 waited at Leucas. Undiscovered by Phormio the com¬ 
 mander of the twenty Athenian ships which were keep¬ 
 ing guard at Naupactus, Cnemus and his thousand 
 hoplites crossed the sea and began to make preparations 
 for the land expedition. Of Hellenes he had in his 
 army Ambraciots, Leucadians, Anactorians, and the 
 thousand Peloponnesians whom he brought with him,— 
 of Barbarians a thousand Chaonians, who, having no 
 king, were led by Photius and Nicanor, both of the 
 governing family and holding the presidency for a year. 
 With the Chaonians came the Thesprotians, who, like 
 them, have no king. A Molossian and Atintanian force 
 was led by Sabylinthus, the guardian of Tharypas the 
 king, who was still a minor; the Paravaeans were led by 
 a Cp. ii. 66 . 
 
 O to 
 
BATTLE OF STRATUS. 
 
 ‘49 
 
 RC 429. their king Oroedus, and were accompanied by a thousand II. 
 Orestians placed at the disposal of Oroedus by their king 
 Antiochus. Perdiccas also, unknown to the Athenians, 
 sent a thousand Macedonians, who arrived too late. With 
 this army Cnemus, not waiting for the ships from Corinth, 
 began his march. They passed through the Argive 
 territory and plundered Limnaea, an unwalled village. 
 
 At length they approached Stratus, which is the largest 
 city in Acarnania, thinking that, if they could take it, 
 the other places would soon come over to them. 
 
 The Acarnanians, seeing that a great army had invaded 81. 
 their territory, and that the enemy was threatening; them The Acar_ 
 
 * J 0 namans 
 
 by sea as well as by land, did not attempt any united being re¬ 
 action, but guarded their several districts, and sent to phormio, by 
 Phormio for aid. He replied that a fleet of the enemy themselves 
 was about to sail from Corinth, and that he could not to the 
 
 fence of 
 
 leave Naupactus unguarded. Meanwhile the Peloponne- their cities, 
 sians and their allies marched in three divisions towards marches on 
 Stratus, intending to encamp near and try negotiations; fhree U divh 
 if these failed, they would take stronger measures and s‘° ns - , 
 assault the wall. The Chaonians and the other Barba- Hellenes 
 rians advanced in the centre ; on the right wing were the the Chao- 
 Leucadians, Anactorians, and their auxiliaries ; on the ^foi-ward' 
 left was Cnemus with the Peloponnesians and Ambra- attem pt to 
 
 A storm the 
 
 ciots. The three divisions were a long way apart, and place, but 
 at times not even in sight of one .another. The Hellenic ambmh^ 
 troops maintained order on the march and kept a look touted 6 
 out, until at length they found a suitable place in which 
 to encamp ; the Chaonians, confident in themselves, and 
 having a great military reputation in that part of the 
 country, would not stop to encamp, but they and the 
 other Barbarians rushed on at full speed, hoping to take 
 the place by storm and appropriate to themselves the 
 glory of the action. The Stratians perceiving their 
 approach in time, and thinking that, if they could over¬ 
 come them before the others arrived, the Hellenic forces 
 would not be so ready to attack them, set ambuscades 
 near the city. When they were quite close, the troops 
 
150 SEA-FIGHT NEAR NAUPACTUS. 
 
 II. came out of the city and from the ambuscades and fell 
 upon them hand to hand. Whereupon the Chaonians 
 were seized with a panic and many of them perished ; 
 the other Barbarians, seeing them give way, no longer 
 stood their ground, but took to flight. Neither of the 
 Hellenic divisions knew of the battle; the Chaonians 
 were far in advance of them, and were thought to have 
 hurried on because they wanted to choose a place for 
 their camp. At length the Barbarians in their flight 
 broke in upon their lines; they received them, and the 
 two divisions uniting during that day remained where 
 they were, the men of Stratus not coming to close 
 quarters with them, because the other Acarnanians had 
 not as yet arrived, but slinging at them from a distance 
 and distressing them greatly. For they could not move 
 a step without their armour. Now the Acarnanians are 
 famous for their skill in slinging. 
 
 82. When night came on, Cnemus withdrew his army in 
 c nemu s haste to the river Anapus, which is rather more than 
 his troops nine miles from Stratus, and on the following day car- 
 dae^whence ried 0 ff his dead under a flag of truce. The people of 
 conveyed Oeniadae were friendly and had joined him; to their city 
 home. therefore he retreated before the Acarnanians had col¬ 
 lected their forces. From Oeniadae all the Peloponnesian 
 troops returned home. The Stratians erected a trophy 
 of the battle in which they had defeated the Barbarians. 
 
 83. The fleet from Corinth and the other allied cities on 
 The fleet of the Crisaean Gulf, which was intended to support Cnemus 
 ponnesians and to prevent the Acarnanians on the sea-coast from 
 intendecfto assisting their friends in the interior of the country, 
 ofe^us is never arrived, but was compelled, almost on -the day of 
 compelled the battle of Stratus, to fight with Phormio and the 
 
 to engage . 
 
 by Phor- twenty Athenian ships which were stationed at Nau- 
 mK> pactus. As they sailed by into the open sea, Phormio 
 
 was watching them, preferring to make his attack outside 
 the gulf. Now the Corinthians and their allies were not 
 equipped for a naval engagement, but for the conveyance 
 of troops into Acarnania, and they never imagined that 
 
 m' o 
 
O pd 
 
 .C. 429. 
 1.87, 4. 
 
 DEFEAT OF THE PELOPONNESIANS. 151 
 
 the Athenians with twenty ships would venture to engage II. 
 their own forty-seven. But, as they were coasting along 
 the southern shore, they saw the Athenian fleet following 
 their movements on the northern; they then attempted 
 to cross the sea from Patrae in Achaea to the opposite 
 continent in the direction of Acarnania, when they again 
 observed the enemy bearing down upon them from 
 Chalcis and the mouth of the river Evenus. They had 
 previously endeavoured to anchor under cover of night, 
 but had been detected. So at last they were compelled 
 to fight in the middle of the channel. The ships were 
 commanded by generals of the cities which had furnished 
 them ; the Corinthian squadron by Machaon, Isocrates, 
 and Agatharchidas. The Peloponnesians arranged their Their ships 
 ships in such a manner as to make the largest possible circle, 
 circle without leaving an inlet, turning their prows out¬ 
 wards and their sterns inwards; within the circle they 
 placed the smaller craft which accompanied them, and 
 five of their swiftest ships that they might be close at 
 hand and row out at whatever point the enemy charged 
 them. 
 
 The Athenians ranged their ships in a single line and 84. 
 sailed round and round the Peloponnesian fleet, which The Axe¬ 
 they drove into a narrower and narrower space, almost round and 
 touching as they passed, and leading the crews to sup- t ni the 
 pose that they were on the point of charging. But they riles 
 had been warned by Phormio not to begin until he gave and throws 
 
 1 • 1 r 1 , • 1 1 , 0 the enemy’s 
 
 the signal, for he was hoping that the enemy s ships, not vessels into 
 having the steadiness of an army on land, would soon fall whenThey 
 into disorder and run foul of one another; they would ^acVand 
 be embarrassed by the small craft, and if the usual win a 
 
 ... complete 
 
 morning breeze, for which he continued waiting as he victory, 
 sailed round them, came down from the gulf, they would 
 not be able to keep still for a moment. He could attack 
 whenever he pleased, because his ships were better sailers; 
 and he knew that this would be the right time. When 
 the breeze began to blow, the ships, which were by this 
 time crowded into a narrow space and were distressed 
 
152 WRATH OF THE LACEDAEMONIANS. 
 
 II. at once by the force of the wind and by the small craft B.c. 429. 
 which were knocking up against them, fell into confusion; ' 871 * 
 
 ship dashed against ship, and they kept pushing one 
 another away with long poles ; there were cries of ‘ keep 
 off* and noisy abuse, so that nothing could be heard 
 either of the word of command or of the coxswains’ giving 
 the time ; and the difficulty which unpractised rowers had 
 in lifting their oars in a heavy sea made the vessels 
 disobedient to the helm. At that moment Phormio gave 
 the signal; the Athenians, falling upon the enemy, began 
 by sinking one of the admirals’ vessels, and then where- 
 ever they went made havoc of them ; at last such was 
 the disorder that no one any longer thought of resisting, 
 but the whole fleet fled away to Patrae and Dyme in 
 Achaea. The Athenians pursued them, captured twelve 
 ships, and taking on board most of their crews, sailed 
 away to Molycreium. They set up a trophy on Rhium, 
 and having there dedicated a ship to Poseidon, retired to 
 Naupactus. The Peloponnesians likewise, with the re¬ 
 mainder of their fleet, proceeded quickly along the coast 
 from Dyme and Patrae to Cyllene, where the Eleans 
 have their docks. Cnemus with the ships from Leucas, 
 which should have been joined by these, arrived after the 
 battle of Stratus at Cyllene. 
 
 85. The Lacedaemonians at home now sent to the fleet 
 The Lace- three commissioners, Timocrates, Brasidas, and Lyco- 
 send Brasi- phron, to advise Cnemus. He was told that he must 
 two others contrive to fight again and be more successful; he should 
 to advise no t a p 0 w a few ships to keep him off the sea. The 
 recent sea-fight had been the first attempt of the Lace¬ 
 daemonians, and they were quite amazed and could not 
 imagine that their own fleet was so inferior to that of the 
 enemy. They suspected that there had been cowardice, 
 not considering that the Athenians were old sailors and 
 that they were only beginners a . So they despatched 
 the commissioners in a rage. On their arrival they and 
 Cnemus sent round to the allied cities for ships, and 
 a Cp. i. 142. 
 
PREPARATIONS FOR A SECOND ENGAGEMENT. 153 
 
 B.C. 429. 
 01. 87, 4. 
 
 equipped for action those which were on the spot. Phor- II. 
 mio likewise sent home messengers to announce the The Athe- 
 
 . . nians send 
 
 victory, and at the same time to inform the Athenians reinforce- 
 of the preparations which the enemy were making. He pernio, 
 told them to send him immediately as large a reinforce- 
 ment as possible, for he might have to fight any day. to Crete 
 They sent him twenty ships, but ordered the commander 
 of them to go to Crete first; for Nicias of Gortys in 
 Crete, who was the proxenus of the Athenians, had 
 induced them to send a fleet against Cydonia, a hostile 
 town which he promised to reduce. But he really 
 invited them to please the Polichnitae, who are neigh¬ 
 bours of the Cydonians. So the Athenian commander 
 took the ships, went to Crete, and joined the Polichnitae 
 in ravaging the lands of the Cydonians ; there, owing to 
 contrary winds and bad weather, a considerable time 
 was wasted. 
 
 While the Athenians were detained in Crete the Pelo- 86. 
 ponnesians at Cyllene, equipped for a naval engagement, The Peio- 
 coasted along to Panormus in Achaia, whither the Pelo- and^ho^ 
 ponnesian army had gone to co-operate with them. U^Vposi- 
 Phormio also coasted along to the Molycreian Rhium and t ° ppo " 
 anchored outside the gulf with the twenty ships which each other, 
 had fought in the previous engagement. This Rhium Crisaean 
 was friendly to the Athenians; there is another Rhium Gulf ‘ 
 on the opposite coast in Peloponnesus; the space between 
 them, which is rather less than a mile, forms the mouth 
 of the Crisaean Gulf. When the Peloponnesians saw 
 that the Athenians had come to anchor, they likewise 
 anchored with seventy-seven ships at the Rhium which 
 is in Achaia, not far from Panormus where their land 
 forces were stationed. For six or seven days the two 
 fleets lay opposite one another, and were busy in prac¬ 
 tising and getting ready for the engagement—the one 
 resolved not to sail into the open sea, fearing a recurrence 
 of their disaster, the other not to sail into the strait, 
 because the confined space was favourable to their 
 enemies. At length Cnemus, Brasidas, and the other 
 
154 SPEECH OF PELOPONNESIAN COMMANDERS. 
 
 II. Peloponnesian generals determined to bring on an en¬ 
 gagement at once, and not wait until the Athenians too 
 received their reinforcements. So they assembled their 
 
 soldiers and, seeing that they were generally dispirited 
 at their former defeat and reluctant to fight, encouraged 
 them in the following words :— 
 
 87. ‘The late sea-fight, Peloponnesians, may have made 
 
 You are 
 terrified by 
 our late 
 mishap. 
 But you 
 were then 
 unpre¬ 
 pared. 
 
 Your 
 
 superior 
 
 courage 
 
 outweighs 
 
 some of you anxious about the one which is impending, 
 but it really affords no just ground for alarm. In that 
 battle we were, as you know, ill-prepared, and our whole 
 expedition had a military and not a naval object. For¬ 
 tune was in many ways unpropitious to us, and this 
 being our first sea-fight we may possibly have suffered 
 a little from inexperience. The defeat which ensued 
 
 their 
 
 superior 
 
 skill, for 
 
 without 
 
 courage 
 
 skill is 
 
 useless. 
 
 We for 
 our part 
 will arrange 
 the attack 
 better. But 
 
 was not the result of cowardice; nor should the un¬ 
 conquerable quality which is inherent in our minds, and 
 refuses to acknowledge the victory of mere force, be 
 depressed by the accident of the event. For though 
 fortune may sometimes bring disaster, yet the spirit of 
 a brave man is always the same, and while he retains his 
 courage he will never allow inexperience to be an excuse 
 
 aiTd^your for misbehaviour. And whatever be your own inex- 
 duty. perience, it is more than compensated by your superiority 
 in valour. The skill of your enemies which you so greatly 
 dread, if united with courage, may be able in the moment 
 
 of danger to remember and execute the lesson which it 
 
 has learned, but without courage no skill can do anything 
 at such a time. For fear makes men forget, and skill 
 which cannot fight is useless. And therefore against 
 their greater skill set your own greater valour, and 
 against the defeat which so alarms you set the fact that 
 you were unprepared. But now you have a larger fleet; 
 this turns the balance in your favour; and you will fight 
 close to a friendly shore under the protection of heavy¬ 
 armed troops. Victory is generally on the side of those 
 
 who are more numerous and better equipped. So that 
 we have absolutely no reason for anticipating failure. 
 Even our mistakes will be an additional advantage, 
 
 mo 
 
m o 
 
 .C. 429. 
 
 1. 87, 4. 
 
 SPEECH OF PHORMIO. 155 
 
 because they will be a lesson to us. Be of good courage, II. 
 then, and let every one of you, pilot or sailor, do his 
 own duty and maintain the post assigned to him. We 
 will order the attack rather better than your old com¬ 
 manders, and so give nobody an excuse for cowardice. 
 
 But, if any one should be inclined to waver, he shall be 
 punished as he deserves, while the brave shall be honoured 
 with the due rewards of their valour.’ 
 
 Such were the words of encouragement addressed to gg # 
 the Peloponnesians by their commanders. Phormio too, Phormio, 
 fearing that his sailors might be frightened, and observing sanoi| hlS 
 that they were gathering in knots and were evidently dls P in ted, 
 
 J & & J assembles 
 
 apprehensive of the enemy’s numbers, resolved to call and ad- 
 
 dresses 
 
 them together and inspirit them by a suitable admoni- them, 
 tion. He had always been in the habit of telling them 
 and training their minds to believe that no superiority of 
 hostile forces could justify them in retreating. And it 
 had long been a received opinion among the sailors that, 
 as Athenians, they were bound to face any number of 
 Peloponnesian ships. When, however, he found them 
 dispirited by the sight which met their eyes, he deter¬ 
 mined to revive their drooping courage, and, having 
 assembled them together, he spoke as follows :— 
 
 ‘ Soldiers, I have summoned you because I see that 89. 
 you are alarmed at the numbers of the enemy, and I 1 see that 
 would not have you dismayed when there is nothing to th^number 
 fear. In the first place, the reason why they have pro- °nemy 
 
 vided a fleet so disproportionate is because we have Yet (d their 
 
 fleet onl y 
 
 defeated them already, and they can see themselves that so large 
 they are no match for us ; next, a as to the courage which defeated 7011 
 they suppose to be native to them and which is thef^^) 
 ground of their confidence when they attack us a , that the y boast 
 
 , • • . . , of their 
 
 reliance is merely inspired by the success which their courage.but 
 experience on land usually gives them, and will, as they cVurageon 
 fancy, equally ensure them by sea. But the superiority ^ 
 
 a Or, taking the antecedent to w as supplied by the clause ov 
 aXko tl Bapa-ova-Lv .. KciTopdovvTts : 1 as to the ground of the con¬ 
 fidence with which they attack us as if courage were native to them.’ 
 
SPEECH OF PHORMIO. 
 
 unwillingly 
 to battle, 
 for (4) they 
 believe that 
 your very 
 dispropor¬ 
 tion shows 
 your su¬ 
 periority. 
 
 I will not, 
 if possible, 
 sail into 
 the gulf, 
 where the 
 confined 
 space would 
 baffle your 
 skill. Do 
 you keep 
 your pre¬ 
 sence of 
 mind, for 
 the mari¬ 
 time su¬ 
 premacy of 
 Athens is 
 at stake. 
 
 which we allow to them on land we may justly claim 
 r for ourselves at sea ; for in courage at least we are their 
 r equals, and the superior confidence of either of us is 
 really based upon greater experience. The Lacedae¬ 
 monians lead the allies for their own honour and glory; 
 the majority of them are dragged into battle against 
 their will ; if they were not compelled they would never 
 have ventured after so great a defeat to fight again at 
 sea. So that you need not fear their valour ; they are 
 A far more afraid of you and with better reason, not only 
 because you have already defeated them, but because 
 they cannot believe that you would oppose them at all if 
 you did not mean to do something worthy of that great 
 victory. a For most men when, like these Peloponnesians, 
 they are a match for their enemies a rely more upon 
 their strength than upon their courage ; but those who 
 go into battle against far superior numbers and under no 
 constraint must be inspired by some extraordinary force 
 of resolution. Our enemies are well aware of this, and 
 are more afraid of our surprising boldness than they would 
 be if our forces were less out of proportion to their own. 
 Many an army before now has been overthrown by 
 smaller numbers owing to want of experience ; some 
 too through cowardice ; and from both these faults we 
 are certainly free. If I can help I shall not give battle 
 in the gulf, or even sail into it. For I know that where 
 a few vessels which are skilfully handled and are better 
 sailers engage with a larger number which are badly 
 managed the confined space is a disadvantage. Unless 
 the captain of a ship see his enemy a good way off he 
 cannot come on or strike properly; nor can he retreat 
 when he is pressed hard. The manoeuvres suited to fast¬ 
 sailing vessels, such as breaking of the line or returning 
 to the charge, cannot be practised in a narrow space. 
 The sea-fight must of necessity be reduced to a land- 
 fight b in which numbers tell. For all this I shall do my 
 
 a Or, ‘For men who, like these Peloponnesians, are numerically 
 superior to the enemy whom they face.’ b Cp. vii. 62. 
 
 PQ O 
 
0QO 
 
 THE ATHENIANS OUT-MANCEUVRED. 157 
 
 c. 429. best to provide. Do you meanwhile keep order and II. 
 
 7 ’ 4 remain close to your ships. Be prompt in taking your 
 instructions, for the enemy is near at hand and watching 
 us. In the moment of action remember the value of 
 silence and order, which are always important in war, 
 especially at sea. Repel the enemy in a spirit worthy of 
 your former exploits. There is much at stake ; for you 
 will either destroy the rising hope of the Peloponnesian 
 navy, or bring home to Athens the fear of losing the sea. 
 
 Once more I remind you that you have beaten most of 
 the enemy’s fleet already; and, once defeated, men do 
 not meet the same dangers with their old spirit.’ Thus 
 did Phormio encourage his sailors. 
 
 The Peloponnesians, when they found that the Athe- 90. 
 nians would not enter the straits or the gulf, determined The Peio- 
 to draw them in against their will. So they weighed byTfdgned 
 anchor early in the morning, and, ranging their ships Naupactus 
 four deep, stood in towards the gulf a along their own <J raw the 
 coast a , keeping the order in which they were anchored, into the 
 The right wing, consisting of twenty of their fastest fSfdeniy’ 
 vessels, took the lead. These were intended to close uponAem, 
 upon the Athenians and prevent them from eluding of 
 their attack and getting beyond the wing in case their ves- 
 Phormio, apprehending an attack upon Naupactus, shore. P ° n 
 should sail along shore to its aid. He, when he saw 5 r e y s . of 
 them weighing anchor, was alarmed, as they anticipated, senians - 
 for the safety of the town, which was undefended. Against 
 his will and in great haste he embarked and sailed along 
 for the shore; the land forces of the Messenians followed. 
 
 The Peloponnesians, seeing that the enemy were in 
 single file and were already within the gulf and close to 
 land, which was exactly what they wanted, at a given 
 signal suddenly brought their ships round, and the whole 
 line faced the Athenians and bore down upon them, 
 every ship rowing at the utmost speed, for they hoped 
 
 a Reading napa for ini with the Laurentian and three other MSS. 
 
 Or, adopting the conjecture eKelvcov for eavr&v: ‘making for the 
 enemy’s shore, and ’ etc. 
 
158 EXPLOIT OF AN ATHENIAN SHIP. 
 
 II. to cut off all the Athenian fleet. Eleven vessels which 
 were in advance evaded the sudden turn of the Pelopon¬ 
 nesians, and rowed past their right wing into the open 
 water ; but they caught the rest, forced them aground, 
 and disabled them. All the sailors who did not swim 
 out of them were slain. Some of the empty ships they 
 fastened to their own and began to tow away; one they 
 had already taken with the crew, but others were saved 
 by the Messenians, who came to the rescue, dashed armed 
 as they were into the sea, boarded them, and, fighting 
 from their decks when they were being already towed 
 away, finally recovered them. 
 
 91. While in this part of the engagement the Lacedae- 
 The Lace- monians had the victory and routed the Athenian ships, 
 
 daemonians . . . 
 
 chase the their twenty vessels on the right wing were pursuing the 
 n\ajfships^" eleven of the Athenians which had escaped from their 
 escaped^ attac ^ into the open water of the gulf. These fled and, 
 to Naupac-^ W ith the exception of one, arrived at Naupactus before 
 these by a their pursuers. They stopped off the temple of Apollo, 
 sink^her 1 ™ and, turning their beaks outward, prepared to defend 
 pursuer. themselves in case the enemy followed them to the land. 
 
 The Peloponnesians soon came up ; they were singing a 
 paean of victory as they rowed, and one Leucadian ship 
 far in advance of the rest was chasing the single Athe¬ 
 nian ship which had been left behind. There chanced 
 to be anchored in the deep Avater a merchant vessel, 
 round which the Athenian ship rowed just in time, 
 struck the Leucadian amidships, and sank her. At this 
 sudden and unexpected feat the Peloponnesians were 
 dismayed ; they had been carrying on the pursuit in 
 disorder because of their superiority. And some of them, 
 dropping the blades of their oars, halted, intending to 
 await the rest, which was a foolish thing to do when the 
 enemy were so near and ready to attack them. Others, 
 not knowing the coast, ran aground. 
 
 92. When the Athenians saw what was going on their 
 The Athe- hopes revived, and at a given signal they charged their 
 taking ad- enemies with a shout. The Lacedaemonians did not 
 
 mo 
 
ow 
 
 VICTORY OF THE ATHENIANS. 
 
 l 59 
 
 c. 429. long resist, for they had made mistakes and were all in II. 
 
 1 8? ‘ 4 ’ confusion, but fled to Panormus, whence they had put to ^ 
 
 sea. The Athenians pursued them, took six of their sion, turn 
 
 . upon the 
 
 ships which were nearest to them, and recovered their enemy and 
 own ships which the Peloponnesians had originally dis- Complete 
 abled and taken in tow near the shore. The crews of vlctor y- 
 the captured vessels were either slain or made prisoners. 
 Timocrates the Lacedaemonian a was on beard the Leu- 
 cadian ship which went down near the merchant vessel; 
 when he saw the ship sinking he killed himself; the 
 body was carried into the harbour of Naupactus. The 
 Athenians then retired and raised a trophy on the place 
 from which they had just sailed out to their victory. 
 
 They took up the bodies and wrecks which were floating 
 near their own shore, and gave back to the enemy, under 
 a flag of truce, those which belonged to them. The 
 Lacedaemonians also set up a trophy of the victory 
 which they had gained over the ships destroyed by them 
 near the shore; the single ship which they took they 
 dedicated on the Achaean Rhium, close to the trophy. 
 
 Then, fearing the arrival of the Athenian reinforcements, 
 they sailed away under cover of night to the Crisaean 
 Gulf and to Corinth, all with the exception of the Leu- 
 cadians. And not long after their retreat the twenty 
 Athenian ships from Crete, which ought to have come 
 to the assistance of Phormio before the battle, arrived at 
 Naupactus. So the summer ended. 
 
 At the beginning of winter, Cnemus, Brasidas, and the 93. 
 other Peloponnesian commanders, on the suggestion of The Peio- 
 some Megarians, before the fleet which had returned to determine 3 
 Corinth and the Crisaean Gulf dispersed, determined an Attempt 
 to make an attempt on Piraeus, the harbour of Athens. 
 
 The entrance was unclosed and unguarded; as was but losing 
 
 . 1 a 1 • r heart, only 
 
 natural, since the Athenians were complete masters of sail to 
 the sea. Each sailor was to carry his cushion and his and ravage 
 oar with its thong, and cross on foot with all haste from the lsland - 
 
 Cp. ii. 85 init. 
 
160 THE PIRAEUS IN BANGER. 
 
 II. Corinth to the Athenian side of the Isthmus ; they were B. 
 to go to Megara and from Nisaea, the harbour of Megara, ° J 
 to launch forty ships which happened to be lying in the 
 docks; thence they were to sail straight for the Piraeus. 
 No guard ships were stationed there, for no one ever 
 expected a that the enemy would attempt a surprise of 
 this kind. As to an open and deliberate attack, how was 
 he likely to venture on that? and if he even entertained 
 such a design, would he not have been found out in time a ? 
 The plan was immediately carried out. Arriving at night, 
 they launched the ships from Nisaea and sailed away, 
 but not to the Piraeus; the danger seemed too great, 
 and also the wind is said to have been unfavourable. 
 
 So they gave up their original idea and made for the 
 projecting point of Salamis which looks towards Megara; 
 here there was a fort, and three ships were stationed 
 in order to prevent anything being conveyed by sea into 
 or out of Megara. This fort they assailed, towed away 
 the ships without their crews, and ravaged the rest of 
 Salamis which was unprepared for their attack. 
 
 94 * By this time fire-signals had carried the alarm to 
 Temporary Athens. Nothing which had happened in the war caused 
 
 panic at 0 L 1 
 
 Athens. a greater panic. The inhabitants of the city thought 
 
 Relief is , , r , , . , , 
 
 immedi- that the enemy had already sailed into the Piraeus ; the 
 
 uTsakmis, belief in the Piraeus was that Salamis had been taken 
 Pefopon- anc ^ enem y were on the point of sailing into the 
 
 nesians harbour, which, if they had been bolder, they might easily 
 have done, and no wind would have prevented them. 
 But as soon as day dawned, the Athenians, coming down 
 with the whole strength of the city to the Piraeus, 
 launched their ships and, embarking in tumultuous haste, 
 sailed to Salamis, while their land-forces remained and 
 guarded the Piraeus. When the Peloponnesians saw the 
 fleet coming they sailed quickly back to Nisaea, but not 
 
 a Or, taking eW differently, and kq 6 ' rjo-vxtav in the sense of ‘with¬ 
 out interference:’ ‘that the enemy would make a sudden attack of 
 this kind. An attempt so bold and open was not likely to be unop¬ 
 posed, or the very design, if entertained, to escape detection.’ 
 
 C. 429. 
 L 8 7 > 4 - 
 
OM 
 
 C. 429. 
 . 87, 4. 
 
 SITALCES MAKES WAR UPON PERDICCAS. 161 
 
 until they had ravaged the greater part of Salamis and II. 
 taken many prisoners and much spoil, as well as the 
 three ships which lay off the fort of Budorum. There 
 was some apprehension about their own ships ; for they 
 had long been lain up and were not sea-worthy. Arriving 
 at Megara they marched back again to Corinth, and the 
 Athenians having failed to overtake them in Salamis, 
 sailed back likewise. Henceforth they kept more careful 
 watch over the Piraeus, among other precautions closing 
 the entrance to the harbour. 
 
 About the same time, at the beginning of winter, 95. 
 Sitalces the Odrysian, the son of Teres, king of Thrace, Sitaices 
 
 , h • 1 r a in- r kin S of 
 
 made war upon Perdiccas, the son of Alexander, king of Thrace, 
 Macedon, and upon the Thracian Chalcidians. There ™ t ^ liance 
 were two promises, of which he wished to perform one, Stacks'Per- 
 and exact fulfilment of the other. The promise of d ^ cc ^ s h and 
 which he claimed fulfilment had been made to him by cian Chal- 
 Perdiccas, when, being hard pressed at the beginning Cldians * 
 of the war, he wanted Sitalces to reconcile him to 
 the Athenians a , and not to restore and place on the 
 throne his brother Philip, who was his enemy; but Per¬ 
 diccas did not keep his word. The other was a promise 
 which Sitalces had himself made to the Athenians when 
 he entered into alliance with them, that he would put an 
 end to the Chalcidian war. For these two reasons he 
 invaded the country, taking with him Amyntas the son 
 of Philip, whom he intended to make king of Macedon, 
 and also certain Athenian envoys who had just come to 
 remind him of his engagement, and the Athenian com¬ 
 mander Hagnon. For the Athenians on their part were 
 bound to assist him against the Chalcidians with ships 
 and with as large an army as they could provide. 
 
 Accordingly Sitalces, beginning with the Odrysae, 96. 
 
 made a levy of all his Thracian subjects dwelling be- The forces 
 
 ^ of Sitalces. 
 
 tweeen Mount Haemus and Mount Rhodope as far as 
 the shores of the Euxine and of the Hellespont. Beyond 
 
 a The reconciliation had been effected through the instru¬ 
 mentality of Nymphodorus; ii. 29. 
 
 M 
 
1 6 % THE KINGDOM OF SITALCES. 
 
 II. the Haemus he made a levy of the Getae and of all the 
 nations lying towards the Euxine on this side of the 
 Ister. Now the Getae and their neighbours border on 
 the Scythians, and are equipped like them, for they are 
 all horse-archers. He also summoned to his standard 
 many of the highland Thracians, who are independent 
 and carry dirks ; they are called Dii, and most of them 
 inhabit Mount Rhodope; of these some were attracted by 
 pay, while others came as volunteers. He further called 
 out the Agrianians, the Laeaeans, and the other Paeonian 
 nations who were his subjects. These tribes were the last 
 within his empire; they extended as far as the Graaean 
 Paeonians and the river Strymon, which rises in Mount 
 Scombrus and flows through the country of the Graaeans 
 and Laeaeans ; there his dominion ended and the inde¬ 
 pendent Paeonians began. In the direction of the 
 Triballi, who are likewise independent, the Treres and 
 the Tilataeans formed his boundary. These tribes dwell 
 to the north of Mount Scombrus and reach westward as 
 far as the Oscius. This river rises in the same mountains 
 as the Nestus and the Hebrus, a wild and extensive 
 range which adjoins Rhodope. 
 
 97 - The empire of the Odrysae measured by the coast- 
 Extent line reaches from the city of Abdera to the mouth of the 
 
 and wealth 
 
 of the Ister in the Euxine. The voyage round can be made 
 empire^ 11 by a merchant vessel, if the wind is favourable the 
 whole way, at the quickest in four days and as many 
 nights. Or an expeditious traveller going by land from 
 Abdera to the mouth of the Ister, if he takes the shortest 
 route, will accomplish the journey in eleven days. Such 
 was the extent of the Odrysian empire towards the sea : 
 up the country the land journey from Byzantium to 
 the Laeaeans and to the Strymon, this being the longest 
 line which can be drawn from the sea into the interior, 
 may be accomplished by an expeditious traveller in 
 thirteen days. The tribute which was collected from the 
 Hellenic cities and from all the barbarous nations in the 
 reign of Seuthes, the successor of Sitalces, under whom 
 
 o w 
 
CQO 
 
 SITALCES MARCHES INTO MACEDONIA . 163 
 
 c. 429. the amount was greatest, was valued at about four hun- II. 
 
 7 ’ 4 ’ dred talents of coined money a , reckoning only gold and 
 silver. Presents of gold and silver equal in value to the 
 tribute, besides stuffs embroidered or plain and other 
 articles, were also brought, not only to the king himself, 
 but to the inferior chiefs and nobles of the Odrysae. For 
 their custom was the opgjesite of that which prevailed in 
 the Persian kingdom ; they were more ready to receive 
 than to give, and he who asked and was refused was not so 
 much discredited as he who refused when he was asked. 
 
 The same custom prevailed among the other Thracians 
 in a less degree, but among the Odrysae, who were 
 richer, more extensively; nothing could be done without 
 presents. By these means the kingdom became very 
 powerful, and in revenue and general prosperity ex¬ 
 ceeded all the nations of Europe which lie between the 
 Ionian Sea and the Euxine, in the size and strength of 
 their army being second only, though far inferior, to the 
 Scythians. For if the Scythians were united, there is 
 no nation which could compare with them, or would 
 be capable of resisting them b ; I do not say in Europe, 
 but even in AsiaF— not that they are at all on a level 
 with other nations in sense, or in that intelligence which 
 uses to advantage the ordinary means of life. 
 
 Such was the great country over which Sitalces ruled. 98. 
 When he had collected his army and his preparations Sitalces 
 were complete he marched into Macedonia, passing first army enter 
 of all through his own territory, and then through Cercine, Macedoma - 
 a desert mountain which lies between the Sinti and the 
 Paeonians. He went by the road which he had himself 
 constructed when he made his expedition against the 
 Paeonians and cut down the forest. As he left the 
 Odrysian territory in going through the mountain he 
 had on the right hand the Paeonians and on the left 
 hand the Sinti and Maedi; on quitting the mountain he 
 arrived at Doberus in Paeonia. He lost no part of his 
 army on the march, except by sickness, but rather 
 a ^96,000. b Gp. Herod, iv. 46. 
 
 M 2 
 
THE HOST OF SITALCES. 
 
 164 
 
 II. increased it; for many of the independent Thracian 
 tribes followed him of their own accord in hopes of 
 plunder. The whole number of his forces was estimated 
 at a hundred and fifty thousand, of which about two-thirds 
 were infantry and the rest cavalry. The largest part 
 of the cavalry was furnished by the Odrysae themselves, 
 and the next largest by the Getae. Of the infantry, 
 those armed with dirks who came from the independent 
 tribes of Mount Rhodope were the most warlike. The 
 remainder of the army was a mixed multitude, chiefly 
 formidable from its numbers. 
 
 99. Having mustered at Doberus, they made ready to 
 Early his- descend over the heights into the plains of Macedonia, 
 Macedo- 6 which were the territory of Perdiccas. There is an 
 dom kmg ~ u PP er Macedonia, which is inhabited by Lyncestians, 
 Elimiots, and other tribes; these are the allies and tribu¬ 
 taries of the lower Macedonians, but have kings of their 
 own. The maritime country which we now call Mace¬ 
 donia was conquered and formed into a kingdom by 
 Alexander the father of Perdiccas and his ancestors the 
 Temenidae, who originally came from Argos a . They 
 defeated and drove out of Pieria the Pierians, who 
 afterwards settled in Phagres and other places at the 
 foot of Mount Pangaeus, beyond the Strymon ; the 
 land which lies under Mount Pangaeus towards the 
 sea is still called the Pierian vale. They also drove out 
 of Bottia, as it is called, the Bottiaeans, who are now the 
 neighbours of the Chalcidians, and they acquired a 
 narrow strip of Paeonia by the river Axius, reaching 
 down to Pella and the sea. Beyond the Axius they 
 possess the country called Mygdonia reaching to the 
 Strymon, out of which they have driven the Edonians. 
 They expelled from the country still called Eordia the 
 Eordians, of whom the greater part perished, but a small 
 remnant of them settled in the neighbourhood of Physca; 
 and from Almopia the Almopians. They and their 
 subjects further subdued and still hold various places 
 
 a Herod, viii. 137-139. 
 
 CC O 
 
CQO 
 
 PROGRESS OF THE INVASION. 165 
 
 .c. 429. belonging to other tribes, Anthemus, Grestonia, Bisaltia, II. 
 
 1 87 ’ 4 and a great part of the original Macedonia. But the 
 whole of this country is now called Macedonia, and was 
 under the rule of Perdiccas the son of Alexander at 
 the time of the invasion of Sitalces. 
 
 The Macedonians were unable to defend themselves IOO. 
 against the onset of such a vast host: they therefore The Mace - 
 
 # m domans 
 
 retired into their strongholds and forts, which at that retire into 
 time were few. For those which now exist were built s trong- 
 by Archelaus the son of Perdiccas, who, when he became 
 king, made straight roads and in various ways improved cavalr y 
 
 0 0 J 1 oppose the 
 
 the country. In his force of cavalry and infantry and in invaders, 
 his military resources generally he surpassed all the compelled 
 eight kings who preceded him. inferiority 
 
 The Thracian army leaving Doberus, invaded first of ofr > umbers 
 
 J to desist, 
 
 all the country which had formerly been the principality 
 
 of Philip, and took Eidomene by storm. Gortynia, Ata- 
 lante, and some other towns came to terms out of regard 
 for Amyntas the son of Philip, who accompanied the 
 expedition. They also besieged but failed to take 
 Europus ; they next advanced into that part of Mace¬ 
 donia which lay on the left of Pella and Cyrrhus. 
 
 Farther south into Bottiaea and Pieria they did not 
 penetrate, but were content to ravage the territory of 
 Mygdonia* Grestonia, and Anthemus. The Macedonians 
 had no idea of facing them with infantry, but sent for 
 additional cavalry from their allies in the upper part of 
 the country, and, although a handful of men, dashed in 
 amongst the great Thracian host wherever they pleased. 
 
 No one withstood their onset; for they were excellent 
 horsemen and well protected with coats of mail. But 
 hemmed in as they continually were by a multitude 
 many times their own number, they ran into great danger. 
 
 At last, feeling that they were not strong enough to 
 encounter such superiority of force, they desisted. 
 
 Sitalces now held a conference with Perdiccas touching 101. 
 the matters which gave occasion to the war. The fleet Sitalces 
 which the Athenians had promised never arrived ; for conference 
 
II. 
 
 with Per- 
 diccas, and 
 after an un¬ 
 successful 
 campaign 
 in Bottice 
 and Chal- 
 cidice, is 
 persuaded 
 by his 
 nephew 
 Seuthes 
 (who had 
 been gained 
 over by 
 Perdiccas) 
 to return 
 home. 
 Alarm 
 in Hellas. 
 
 102 . 
 
 The Athe¬ 
 nians, under 
 Phormio, 
 make an 
 expedition 
 into Acar- 
 nania. 
 
 166 RETURX OF SITALCES. 
 
 not believing that Sitalces would come, they only sent 
 gifts and envoys to him. After waiting for them in vain 
 he despatched a part of his army against the Chalcidians 
 and Bottiaeans, and, driving them within their walls, 
 devastated the country. While he was encamped in 
 these parts, the Thessalians, who lie towards the south, 
 the Magnesians and other dependants of the Thessalians, 
 and all the Hellenes as far as Thermopylae were afraid 
 that his army would move on them, and took measures 
 of precaution. Those independent Thracian tribes to 
 the north beyond the Strymon who dwelt in the plains, 
 namely the Panaeans, Odomantians, Droans, and Der- 
 saeans, were also in great alarm. A belief arose, which 
 spread far and wide among the enemies of Athens, that 
 the Athenians meant to lead their Odrysian allies against 
 the rest of Hellas. Meanwhile Sitalces overran and 
 ravaged Chalcidice, Bottice, and Macedonia, but could 
 not effect his objects ; and, his army being without food 
 and suffering from the winter, he was persuaded by his 
 nephew, who next to himself had the greatest authority, 
 Seuthes the son of Spardacus a , to return home at once. 
 Now Perdiccas had secretly gained over Seuthes, pro¬ 
 mising to give him his sister in marriage, with a portion. 
 And so Sitalces and his army, having remained thirty 
 days in all, of which eight were passed among the Chal¬ 
 cidians, returned home in haste. Perdiccas in fulfilment 
 of his promise gave his sister Stratonice in marriage to 
 Seuthes. Thus ended the expedition of Sitalces. 
 
 During the same winter the Athenian forces at Nau- 
 pactus, after the Peloponnesian fleet had dispersed, made 
 an expedition under the command of Phormio into the 
 centre of Acarnania with four hundred hoplites of their 
 own taken from the fleet b and four hundred Messenian 
 hoplites. They first coasted along towards Astacus 0 
 and disembarked. From Stratus, Coronta, and other 
 places they expelled those of the inhabitants whom they 
 
 a Cp. iv. ioi fin. b Cp. ii. 83 init.; 92 fin. 
 
 c Cp. ii. 30; 33. 
 
 Offl 
 
B.C. 429. 
 01. 87, 4. 
 
 THE STORY OF ATOM AEON. 167 
 
 distrusted, and restoring Cynes the son of Theolytus to jp 
 Coronta, they returned to their ships. Oeniadae, of Oeniadae 
 which the inhabitants, unlike the rest of the Acarnanians, Showing 
 were their persistent enemies, was unapproachable in |°J h 0 e f ^e d ' 
 winter. For the town is in the midst of a marsh formed Acheious. 
 
 ... Opposite to 
 
 by the river Acheious, which, rising in Mount Pindus the town 
 and passing first through the territory of the Dolopians, Echinades, 
 Agraeans, and Amphilochians, and then through the fo^ed by 
 Acarnanian plain, at some distance from its mouth flows the deposits 
 
 .. of the river. 
 
 by the city of Stratus and finds an exit into the sea near Here Aic- 
 Oeniadae: an expedition in winter is thus rendered the murder 
 impossible by the water. Most of the islands called is 
 
 Echinades are situated opposite to Oeniadae and close said have 
 
 L A . found a 
 
 to the mouth of the Acheious. The consequence is that home which 
 the river, which is large, is always silting up: some of the ca t e d to 
 islands have been already joined to the mainland, and ^^acie 
 very likely, at no distant period, they may all be joined of Apollo, 
 to it. The stream is wide and strong and full of mud ; 
 and the islands are close together and serve to connect 
 the deposits made by the river, not allowing them to 
 dissolve in the water. For, lying irregularly and not 
 one behind the other, they prevent the river from finding 
 a straight channel into the sea. These islands are small 
 and uninhabited. The story is that when Alcmaeon the 
 son of Amphiaraus was wandering over the earth after 
 the murder of his mother, he was told by Apollo that 
 here he should find a home, the oracle intimating that he 
 would never obtain deliverance from his terrors until he 
 discovered some country which was not yet in existence 
 and not seen by the sun at the time when he slew his 
 mother; there he might settle, but the rest of the earth 
 was accursed to him. He knew not what to do, until at 
 last, according to the story, he spied the deposit of earth 
 made by the Acheious, and he thought that a place 
 sufficient to support life must have accumulated in the 
 long time during which he had been wandering since his 
 mother's death. There, near Oeniadae, he settled, and, 
 becoming ruler, left to the country the name of his son 
 
168 RETURN OF PHORMIO, 
 
 II. Acarnan. Such is the tradition which has come down 
 to us concerning Alcmaeon. 
 
 103. The Athenians under Phormio sailed back from Acar- 
 TheAthe- nania to Naupactus, and later at the beginning of spring 
 
 nians return t A r , _ . . , , & ® , 
 
 to Naupac- returned to Athens, bringing with them the ships which 
 the spring they had captured, besides the prisoners of free birth 
 toAthens w ^ om they had taken in the naval engagements. They 
 were exchanged man for man. And so the winter ended, 
 and with it the third year in the Peloponnesian War of 
 which Thucydides wrote the history. 
 
 c ro 
 
BOOK III. 
 
 B.C 428. 
 01 . 88 . 
 
 In the following summer, when the corn was in full 
 ear, the Peloponnesians and their allies, under the com¬ 
 mand of Archidamus, the son of Zeuxidamus, the Lace¬ 
 daemonian king, invaded Attica, and encamping wasted 
 the country. The Athenian cavalry as usual attacked 
 them whenever an opportunity offered, and prevented 
 the great body of the light-armed troops from going 
 beyond their lines and injuring the lands near the city. 
 The invaders remained until their supplies were ex¬ 
 hausted ; they were then disbanded, and returned to 
 their several homes. 
 
 No sooner had the Peloponnesians quitted Attica than 
 the whole people of Lesbos, with the exception of the 
 Methymnaeans, revolted from Athens. They had enter¬ 
 tained the design before the war began, but the Lace¬ 
 daemonians gave them no encouragement. And now 
 they were not ready, and were compelled to revolt sooner 
 than they had intended. For they were waiting until they 
 had completed the work of closing their harbours, raising 
 walls, and building ships, and they had not as yet 
 received from Pontus the force of archers, the corn and 
 the other supplies for which they had sent. But the in¬ 
 habitants of Tenedos, who were not on good terms with 
 them, and the Methymnaeans, and individual citizens 
 who were of the opposite faction and were proxeni of 
 Athens, turned informers and told the Athenians that 
 the Mitylenaeans were forcing the other inhabitants of 
 
 III. 1. 
 
 Third in¬ 
 vasion of 
 Attica by 
 the Pelo¬ 
 ponnesians. 
 
 2 . 
 
 The Les¬ 
 bians, with 
 the excep¬ 
 tion of the 
 Methym¬ 
 naeans, 
 revolt, but 
 sooner than 
 they had in¬ 
 tended, in¬ 
 formation of 
 their plans 
 having been 
 sent to 
 Athens from 
 Tenedos, 
 Methymna, 
 and Mity- 
 lene itself. 
 
REVOLT OF LESBOS. 
 
 170 
 
 III. the island into Mitylene ; that the preparations which 
 they were pressing forward had been throughout under¬ 
 taken by them in concert with the Lacedaemonians and 
 with their Boeotian kinsmen, and meant revolt ; and 
 that if something were not immediately done, Lesbos 
 would be lost to Athens. 
 
 3. The Athenians, who were suffering severely from the 
 
 TheAthe- plague and from the war, of which they had begun to 
 
 nians deter-f r „ _ , , . J . 
 
 mine to feel the full effects, reflected that it was a serious matter 
 
 Mitylene at to bring upon themselves a second war with a naval 
 amPsend P ower like Lesbos, whose resources were unimpaired ; 
 cieippides and so, mainly because they wished that the charges 
 
 thither with J J 0 
 
 forty ships, might not be true, they at first refused to listen to them. 
 tants^re 131 " But, when they had sent envoys to Mitylene and found 
 forewarned. j-pe Mitylenaeans, i n spite of remonstrances, con¬ 
 tinued their preparations and persisted in gathering the 
 inhabitants of the country into the town, they took alarm 
 and determined to be beforehand with them. Without 
 losing a moment, they sent to Lesbos, under the com¬ 
 mand of Cieippides the son of Deinias, and two others, 
 forty ships which had been intended to cruise about 
 Peloponnesus. They had heard that there was a festival 
 of Apollo Maloeis held outside the walls in which the 
 whole population took part, and that if they made haste 
 they might hope to surprise them. The attempt would 
 very likely succeed ; but, if not, they might bid the 
 Mitylenaeans give up their fleet and dismantle their 
 walls, and in case they refused they might go to war 
 with them. So the ships sailed ; and as there happened 
 to be at Athens ten Mitylenaean triremes, serving in 
 accordance with the terms of the alliance, the Athenians 
 seized them and threw their crews into prison. But the 
 Mitylenaeans were warned by a messenger from Athens, 
 who crossed to Euboea and went on foot to Geraestus ; 
 there he found a merchant vessel just about to sail; he 
 took ship, and arriving at Mitylene on the third day after 
 he left Athens, announced the coming of the Athenian 
 fleet. Whereupon the Mitylenaeans abstained from 
 
 CQ O 
 
CQ O 
 
 ENVOYS GO TO SPARTA. 
 
 171 
 
 c. 428. going out to the temple of Apollo Maloeis. They also III. 
 
 1 88 * kept good watch about their walls and harbours, and 
 barricaded the unfinished works. 
 
 Soon afterwards the Athenians arrived. The com- 4. 
 manders of the fleet, seeing that they were foiled, The Mity- 
 delivered the message entrusted to them ; the city re- after a ' 
 fused to yield and they commenced hostilities. Taken ^stance at 
 by surprise, and unprepared for the war which was sea - ne go- 
 
 / . r ’ 1 1 tiate an 
 
 forced upon them, the Mitylenaeans came out once armistice, 
 and made a show of fighting a little in front of the iLvoys end 
 harbour; but they were soon driven back by the Athe- Athens 10 
 nian ships, and then they began to parley with the secretly to 
 generals, in the hope of obtaining tolerable terms of 
 some kind, and getting rid of the fleet for the time. 
 
 The Athenian generals accepted their proposals, they 
 too fearing that they were not strong enough to make 
 war against the whole island. Having got the armistice, 
 the Mitylenaeans sent envoys to Athens ; one of them 
 was a person who had given information against his 
 fellow-citizens, but was now repentant. They had a 
 faint hope that the Athenians would be induced to 
 withdraw their ships and believe in their good inten¬ 
 tions. But as they did not really expect to succeed in 
 their Athenian mission, they also sent an embassy to 
 Lacedaemon, unperceived by the Athenian fleet, which 
 was stationed at Malea a to the north of the city a . After 
 a troublesome voyage through the open sea, the envoys 
 arrived at Lacedaemon and solicited aid for their 
 countrymen. 
 
 The other envoys who had been sent to Athens met 5. 
 with no success. When they returned, the Mitylenaeans Th e envoys 
 
 y \ J return from 
 
 and the rest of Lesbos, with the exception of Methymna, Athens 
 commenced hostilities ; the Methymnaeans, with the Im- success, 
 brians, Lemnians, and a few of the allies, had come to ^ues^in 
 the support of the Athenians. The Mitylenaeans with whlch * e 
 
 a Or, to avoid the geographical contradiction (see notes), we may 
 take the words with anoa-riWovaiv : 1 they also sent an embassy . . . 
 northward from the city.’ 
 
III. 
 
 Mitylenae- 
 ans have 
 the advan¬ 
 tage ; but 
 they remain 
 inactive, 
 awaiting 
 aid from Pe¬ 
 loponnesus. 
 
 6 . 
 
 The Athe¬ 
 nians block¬ 
 ade Mity¬ 
 lene by sea. 
 
 7 - 
 
 Asopius 
 with thirty 
 Athenian 
 ships 
 
 ravages the 
 Laconian 
 coast, and, 
 dismissing 
 eighteen, 
 sails to 
 Oeniadae, 
 which he is 
 unable to 
 capture. 
 
 IJ2 BLOCKADE OF MITYLENE. 
 
 their whole force sallied out against the Athenian camp, 
 and a battle took place, in which they got the better ; 
 but they had no confidence in themselves, and, instead of 
 encamping on the field, retired. They then remained 
 quiet, being unwilling to risk an engagement without 
 the additional help which they were expecting from 
 Peloponnesus and elsewhere. For Meleas a Lacedae¬ 
 monian, and Hermaeondas a Theban, had now arrived 
 at Mitylene ; they had been sent before the revolt, but 
 the Athenian fleet anticipated them, and they sailed in by 
 stealth after the battle in a single trireme. The envoys 
 recommended the Mitylenaeans to send an embassy of 
 their own in another trireme to accompany them on 
 their return to Sparta ; which they accordingly did. 
 
 The Athenians, greatly encouraged by the inactivity 
 of their adversaries, summoned their allies, who came all 
 the more readily because they saw that the Lesbians 
 displayed no energy. They then anchored the fleet 
 round the south of the city, and having fortified two 
 camps, one on either side of it, they established a 
 blockade of both the harbours. Thus they excluded 
 the Mitylenaeans from the sea. They likewise held the 
 country in the immediate neighbourhood of their two 
 camps ; but the Mitylenaeans and the other Lesbians, 
 who had now taken up arms, were masters of the rest 
 of the island. At Malea the Athenians had, not a camp, 
 but a station for their ships and for their market. 
 
 Such was the course of the war in Lesbos. In the 
 same summer, and about the same time, the Athenians 
 sent thirty ships to Peloponnesus; they were placed under 
 the command of Asopius, the son of Phormio ; for the 
 Acarnanians had desired them to send out a son or rela¬ 
 tion of Phormio to be their leader. The ships in passing 
 ravaged the coast of Laconia, and then Asopius sent most 
 of them home, but kept twelve, with which he sailed to 
 Naupactus. Next he made a general levy of the Acarna¬ 
 nians and led his forces against Oeniadae, his ships sailing 
 up the river Achelous, while his army ravaged the country 
 
 PQ O 
 
SPEECH OF THE MITYLENAEANS. 
 
 1 73 
 
 oi C 88 428 ' ^ anc ^- As inhabitants refused to yield, he dis- HI. 
 
 banded his land-forces, but himself sailed to Leucas and killed 
 made a descent upon Nericum, where he and part of his scent upon 
 army in returning to their ships were slain by the in¬ 
 habitants, assisted by a few Peloponnesian guards. The 
 Athenians then put to sea, and received their dead from 
 the Leucadians under a flag of truce. 
 
 The envoys whom the Mitylenaeans had sent out in 8. 
 their first vessel were told by the Lacedaemonians to The Mityie- 
 come to the Olympic festival, in order that the allies, "oys meet 
 as well as themselves, might hear them and determine the al k es in 
 
 ° council at 
 
 what should be done. So they went to Olympia. The Olympia. 
 Olympiad was that in which the Rhodian Dorieus was speech, 
 conqueror for the second time. When the festival was 
 over, the allies met in council, and the ambassadors 
 spoke as follows :— 
 
 ‘We know, Lacedaemonians and allies, that all Hel- p. 
 
 lenes entertain a fixed sentiment against those who in There is 
 time of war revolt and desert an old alliance. Their feeUng ral 
 new allies are delighted with them in as far as they those who 
 profit by their aid ; but they do not respect them, for desert their 
 
 . friends, but 
 
 they deem them traitors to their former friends. And the friend- 
 this opinion is reasonable enough ; but only when the berea? 131 
 rebels, and those from whom they sever themselves, are and equal * 
 naturally united by the same interests and feelings and 
 equally matched in power and resources, and when there 
 is no reasonable excuse for a revolt. But our relation to 
 the Athenians was of another sort, and no one should be 
 severe upon us for deserting them in the hour of danger 
 although we were honoured by them in time of peace. 
 
 ‘ Since an alliance is our object, we will first address io. 
 ourselves to the question of justice and honour. We Before ask- 
 know that no friendship between man and man, no Lnfancefwe 
 league between city and city, can ever be permanent Safwe de- 
 unless the friends or allies have a good opinion of each serve y° ur 
 
 C L respect. 
 
 other’s honesty, and are similar in general character. 
 
 For the diversity in men’s minds makes the difference 
 in their actions. 
 
SPEECH OF THE MITYLENAEANS . 
 
 III. 
 
 We became 
 allies of the 
 Athenians 
 because we 
 wanted to 
 complete 
 the deliver¬ 
 ance of 
 Hellas 
 from the 
 Persians. 
 But when 
 we saw the 
 allies, ex¬ 
 cepting the 
 Chians and 
 ourselves, 
 successively 
 enslaved by 
 them, what 
 wonder 
 that we lost 
 confidence 
 in them ! 
 
 I I. 
 
 We were an 
 offence to 
 them, but 
 they left us 
 free be¬ 
 cause (i) 
 our volun¬ 
 tary adher¬ 
 ence was a 
 testimony 
 to their cha¬ 
 racter, (2) 
 they wanted 
 to use the 
 strong 
 against 
 the weak, 
 and so 
 isolate us, 
 (3) they 
 feared our 
 navy, (4) we 
 paid court 
 to their 
 dema¬ 
 gogues. 
 
 c Now our alliance with the Athenians first began 
 when you ceased to take part in the Persian War, and 
 they remained to complete the work. But we were 
 never the allies of the Athenians in their design of 
 subjugating Hellas; we were really the allies of the 
 Hellenes, whom we sought to liberate from the Persians. 
 And while in the exercise of their command they claimed 
 no supremacy, we were very ready to follow them. But 
 our fears began to be aroused when we saw them relaxing 
 their efforts against the Persians and imposing the yoke 
 of their dominion upon the allies, who could not unite 
 and defend themselves, for their interests were too 
 various. And so they were all enslaved, except our¬ 
 selves and the Chians. We forsooth were independent 
 allies, free men — that was the word—who fought at 
 their side. But, judging from previous examples, how 
 could we any longer have confidence in our leaders? 
 For they had subjugated others to whom, equally with 
 ourselves, their faith was pledged ; and how could we 
 who survived expect to be spared if ever they had the 
 power to destroy us ? 
 
 ‘ Had all the allies retained their independence, we 
 should have had better assurance that they would leave 
 us as we were ; but when the majority had been subju¬ 
 gated by them, they might naturally be expected to 
 take offence at our footing of equality; they would con¬ 
 trast us who alone maintained this equality with the 
 majority who had submitted to them ; they would also 
 observe that in proportion as their strength was increas¬ 
 ing, our isolation was increasing too. Mutual fear is the 
 only solid basis of alliance; for he who w r ould break faith 
 is deterred from aggression by the consciousness of in¬ 
 feriority. And why were we left independent ? Only 
 because they thought that to gain an empire they must 
 use fair words and win their way by policy and not by 
 violence. On the one hand, our position was a witness to 
 their character. For, having an equal vote with them, 
 we could not be supposed to have fought in their wars 
 
 ffj o 
 
SPEECH OF THE MITYLENAEANS. 
 
 175 
 
 B.c. 428. against our will, but those whom they attacked must HI. 
 
 OL88 ‘ have been in the wrong. On the other hand, they were 
 thus enabled to use the powerful against the weak ; they 
 thought that they would leave us to the last ; when the 
 lesser states were removed, the stronger would fall an 
 easier prey. But if they had begun with us while the 
 power of the allies was still intact, and we might have 
 afforded a rallying-point, they would not so easily have 
 mastered them. Besides, our navy caused them some 
 apprehension ; they were afraid that we might join you, 
 or some other great power, and that the union would be 
 dangerous to them. For a time, too, we saved ourselves 
 by paying court to the people and to the popular leaders 
 of the day. But we were not likely to have survived long, 
 judging by the conduct of the Athenians towards others, 
 if this war had not arisen. 
 
 ‘ What trust then could we repose in such a friendship 12. 
 or such a freedom as this ? The civility which we showed it was not 
 
 mutual love 
 
 to one another was at variance with our real feelings, but mutual 
 They courted us in time of war because they were afraid u^tedu? 
 of us, and we in time of peace paid a like attention to ^because 
 them. And the faith which is generally assured by mu- we were not 
 tual good-will had with us no other bond but mutual ity with 
 fear; from fear, and not from love, we were constrained were always 
 to maintain the alliance, and whichever of us first thought attacked be 
 that he could safely venture would assuredly have been and were 
 
 . therefore at 
 
 the first to break it. And therefore if any one imagines their mercy, 
 that we do wrong in striking first, because they delay 
 the blow which we dread, and thinks that we should 
 wait and make quite sure of their intentions, he is mis¬ 
 taken. If we are really on an equality with them and 
 in a position to counteract their designs and imitate 
 their threatening attitude, how is it consistent with this 
 equality that we must still be at their mercy? The 
 power of attack is always in their hands, and the power 
 of anticipating attack should always be in ours. 
 
 ‘These are the reasons which we have to plead, Lace- 13. 
 daemonians and allies, in defence of our revolt. They 
 
i;6 
 
 SPEECH OF THE MIT YLENAEANS. 
 
 III. 
 
 Our revolt, 
 though pre¬ 
 mature, was 
 not rash; 
 it had a 
 double 
 motive : we 
 feared the 
 Athenians 
 and sympa¬ 
 thised with 
 Hellas. 
 
 But we 
 look to you 
 for help. 
 
 Now is your , 
 opportunity 
 for attack¬ 
 ing Athens 
 by sea. 
 
 The battle 
 must be 
 fought in 
 the coun¬ 
 tries on 
 which 
 Athens 
 depends. 
 
 are clear enough to prove to our hearers the justice of 
 our cause, and strong enough to alarm us and drive us 
 to seek some deliverance. We have acted from no 
 sudden impulse; long ago, before the war began, we 
 sent envoys to you, and proposed to revolt. But we 
 could not, because you refused our request. Now, 
 however, when the Boeotians have invited us, we have 
 at once obeyed the call. We were intending to make 
 a double severance of ourselves, from the Hellenes and 
 from the Athenians; from the guilt, that is, of oppress¬ 
 ing the Hellenes, in concert with the Athenians, instead 
 of aiding in their liberation, and from the ruin which the 
 Athenians were sooner or later sure to bring upon us, 
 unless we anticipated them. But the step has been 
 taken hastily and without due preparation ; hence you 
 are the more bound to receive us into alliance and to 
 send us speedy help, thereby showing that you are 
 ready to protect those who have claims upon you and 
 to strike a blow at your enemies. Never was there such 
 an opportunity before. The Athenians are exhausted by 
 pestilence and by a costly war; some of their ships are 
 cruising about your shores ; the remainder are threaten¬ 
 ing us; so that they are not likely to have many to 
 spare if you, in the course of this summer, make a 
 second attack upon them by land and by sea. They 
 will not be able to meet you at sea; or, if they do, they 
 will have to withdraw their forces both from Lesbos and 
 from Peloponnesus. And let no one say to himself that 
 he is going to incur a danger which will be his own on 
 behalf of a country which is not his own. He may 
 think that Lesbos is a long way off; but he will find 
 that the help which we bring will be very near him. 
 For the war will not be fought in Attica, as might be 
 imagined ; but in those countries by which Attica is 
 supported. The revenues of the Athenians are derived 
 
 from their allies, and, if they subdue us, will be greater 
 than ever; no one will revolt again, and our resources 
 will be added to theirs; and we shall suffer worse things 
 
 mo 
 
ow 
 
 LESBOS RECEIVED INTO ALLIANCE . 177 
 
 ■C. 428. than those who have been enslaved already. But, if III. 
 you assist us heartily, you will gain the alliance of a 
 great naval power, and a navy is your chief want; you 
 will draw away the allies of the Athenians, who will 
 fearlessly come over to you ; thus you will more easily 
 overthrow the power of Athens. And you will no longer 
 incur, as in times past, the reproach of deserting those 
 who revolt a . If you come forward as their liberators 
 your final triumph will be assured. 
 
 ‘ Do not then for very shame frustrate the hopes 14* 
 which the Hellenes rest on you, or dishonour the name Do not then 
 
 . betray us, 
 
 of Olympian Zeus in whose temple we are in a manner for our 
 suppliants, but be our allies and helpers. Do not be- cause of the 
 tray us : we, the people of Mitylene, risk our lives alone Hellas * 
 in the common cause of Hellas: universal will be the 
 benefit which we confer if we succeed, and still more 
 universal the ruin if you are inflexible and we fall. 
 Wherefore prove yourselves worthy of your reputation 
 in Hellas, and be such as we in our fear would have 
 you.’ 
 
 These were the words of the Mitylenaeans. 
 
 The Lacedaemonians and the allies immediately ac- 15. 
 cepted their proposals and took the Lesbians into alliance. The Mi ty- 
 
 0-1 1 . lenaeansare 
 
 The confederates, who were present at Olympia, were taken into 
 told to make ready quickly for another expedition into and the 
 Attica, and to assemble at the Isthmus, bringing the ^Jare 
 usual contingent of two-thirds. The Lacedaemonians directed to 
 
 0 1 1 • t • meet at the 
 
 arrived first, and at once set to work making machines isthmus, 
 for hauling ships over the Isthmus, from Corinth to the slowly. 
 Saronic Gulf. For they intended to attack the Athe¬ 
 nians both by sea and land. But although they were 
 energetic themselves, the other allies assembled slowly; 
 they were gathering in their harvest and in no mood for 
 war. 
 
 The Athenians, perceiving that the activity of the 16. 
 
 Lacedaemonians was due to a conviction of their weak- J he Lace¬ 
 daemonians 
 
 ness, determined to show them their mistake, and to for the first 
 a Cp. i. 40 fin.; i. 69. 
 
 N 
 
III. 
 
 time pre¬ 
 pare to at¬ 
 tack Attica 
 by sea, but 
 the Athe¬ 
 nians man 
 a hun¬ 
 dred ships, 
 and the 
 attempt 
 is given up. 
 
 i7- 
 
 Perfection 
 of the Athe¬ 
 nian navy 
 at this time. 
 Great ex¬ 
 penditure 
 on the navy 
 and the 
 siege of 
 Potidaea in 
 the first 
 year of the 
 war. 
 
 178 NAVAL STRENGTH OF ATHENS. 
 
 prove that, without moving the fleet from Lesbos, they 
 were fully able to repel this new force which threatened 
 them. They manned a hundred ships, in which they 
 embarked, both metics and citizens a , all but the highest 
 class and the Knights ; they then set sail, and, after dis¬ 
 playing their strength along the shores of the Isthmus, 
 made descents upon the Peloponnesian coast wherever 
 they pleased. The Lacedaemonians were astounded, 
 and thought that the Lesbians had told them what was 
 not true. Their allies too had not yet arrived, and they 
 heard that the Athenians in the thirty ships b which 
 had been sent to cruise around Peloponnesus were 
 wasting their country districts; and so, not knowing 
 what else to do, they returned home. However, they 
 afterwards prepared a fleet to go to Lesbos, and ordered 
 the allies to equip forty ships: these they placed under 
 the command of Alcidas, who was to take them out. 
 When the Athenians saw that the Peloponnesians had 
 gone home, they and their fleet of a hundred ships did 
 the same. 
 
 At the time when the fleet was at sea, the Athenians 
 had the largest number of ships which they ever had 
 all together, effective and in good trim, although the 
 mere number was as large or even larger at the com¬ 
 mencement of the war. For then there were a hundred 
 which guarded Attica, Euboea, and Salamis, and another 
 hundred which were cruising off Peloponnesus c , not in¬ 
 cluding the ships employed in blockading Potidaea and 
 at other places; so that in one and the same summer 
 their fleet in all numbered two hundred and fifty. This 
 and the money spent in the war against Potidaea was 
 the chief call upon their treasury. Every one of the hop- 
 lites engaged in the siege received two drachmae d a-day, 
 one for himself, and one for his servant ; the original 
 force amounted to three thousand e , and this number 
 was maintained as long as the siege lasted. Sixteen 
 
 a Cp. i. 143 init. Cp. iii. 7 init. c Cp. ii. 17 fin. 
 
 d About is. 7 d. e Cp. i. 57 fin.; 61 init. 
 
 O co 
 
CQO 
 
 BLOCKADE OF MITYLENE. 
 
 179 
 
 c. 428. hundred more came with Phormio, but went away be- III. 
 
 88 
 
 fore the end a . The sailors in the fleet all received the 
 same pay as the soldiers. So great was the drain on 
 the resources of the Athenians in the early part of the 
 war, and such was the largest number of ships which 
 they ever manned. 
 
 While the Lacedaemonians were at the Isthmus, the 18. 
 Mitylenaeans and their allies marched against Methymna, The Mity- 
 which they expected to be betrayed to them, but, making make an 
 an assault, and finding that they were mistaken, they fuUttempt 
 went off to Antissa, Pyrrha, and Eresus; and, having JJfymna 6 " 
 strengthened the walls of these places and established The Me - 
 
 1 • • .1 1 -ii 1 a thymnaeans 
 
 their interest in them, they quickly returned. As soon attack An¬ 
 as they had retired, the Methymnaeans retaliated by are de- Ut 
 making an expedition against Antissa; but the people Rekiforce- 
 of Antissa and their auxiliaries sallied out and defeated ^ nts from 
 
 Athens ar- 
 
 them with heavy loss ; the survivors made a hasty re- rive under 
 treat. The Athenians heard that the Mitylenaeans were blockades 
 masters of the country, and that their own troops in Les- 
 bos were not sufficient to confine them within the walls. 
 
 So about the beginning of autumn they sent to Mity¬ 
 lene, under the command of Paches the son of Epicurus, 
 a thousand Athenian hoplites who handled the oars 
 themselves. On arriving, they surrounded the town 
 with a single line of wall; and in some strong places 
 forts were erected which formed part of the wall. Thus 
 Mitylene was effectually blockaded both by sea and 
 by land. The winter now began to set in. 
 
 The Athenians, being in want of money to carry on 19. 
 the siege, raised among themselves for the first time a The Athe - 
 
 , nians raise 
 
 property-tax of two hundred talents b , and sent out a property- 
 twelve ships to collect tribute among the allies, under Lysiciests 
 the command of Lysicles and four others. He sailed tribute- 
 to various places and exacted the tribute; but as he he is killed 
 
 in Caria. 
 
 was going up from Myus in Caria, through the plain 
 of the Maeander, he was attacked at the hill of Sandius 
 
 a Cp. i. 64 med.; ii. 58 med. 
 
 N 2 
 
 b ^4 8,000. 
 
III. 
 
 20 . 
 
 The Pla- 
 taeans re¬ 
 solve to 
 break out 
 of Plataea, 
 but only 
 two hun¬ 
 dred and 
 twenty per¬ 
 severe. 
 
 They esti¬ 
 mate the 
 height of 
 the enemy’s 
 wall by the 
 layers of 
 bricks. 
 
 2 T. 
 
 Plan of the 
 Pelopon¬ 
 nesian wall 
 
 180 SIEGE OF PLATAEA. 
 
 by the Carians and the people of Anaea a , and, with a 
 great part of his army, perished. 
 
 During the same winter the Plataeans, who were still 
 besieged by the Peloponnesians and Boeotians, began to 
 suffer from the failure of provisions. They had no hope 
 of assistance from Athens and no other chance of de¬ 
 liverance. So they and the Athenians who were shut 
 up with them contrived a plan of forcing their way 
 over the enemy’s walls. The idea was suggested by 
 Theaenetus the son of Tolmides, a diviner, and Eumol- 
 pides the son of Dai'machus, one of their generals. At 
 first they were all desirous of joining, but afterwards 
 half of them somehow lost heart, thinking the danger 
 too great, and only two hundred and twenty agreed to 
 persevere. They first made ladders equal in length to 
 the height of the enemy’s wall, which they calculated 
 by help of the layers of bricks on the side facing the 
 town, at a place where the wall had accidentally not been 
 plastered. A great many counted at once, and, although 
 some might make mistakes, the calculation would be 
 oftener right than wrong; for they repeated the process 
 again and again, and, the distance not being great, they 
 could see the wall distinctly enough for their purpose. 
 In this manner they ascertained the proper length of the 
 ladders, taking as a measure the thickness of the bricks. 
 
 The Peloponnesian wall was double, and consisted 
 of an inner circle looking towards Plataea, and an outer 
 . intended to guard against an attack from Athens; they 
 were at a distance of about sixteen feet from one 
 another. This interval of sixteen feet was partitioned 
 off into lodgings for the soldiers, by which the two 
 walls were joined together, so that they appeared to 
 form one thick wall with battlements on both sides. At 
 every tenth battlement there were large towers, filling 
 up the space between the walls, and extending both 
 to the inner and outer face; there was no way at the 
 side of the towers, but only through the middle of them. 
 a Cp. iii. 32 init.; iv. 75 med. 
 
 OM 
 
« O 
 
 THE ESCAPE FROM PLATAEA. 181 
 
 .c. 428. During the night, whenever there was storm and rain, III. 
 the soldiers left the battlements and kept guard from the 
 towers, which were not far from each other and were 
 covered overhead. Such was the plan of the wall with 
 which Plataea was invested. 
 
 When the Plataeans had completed their preparations 2 2. 
 they took advantage of a night on which there was a The Pia- 
 
 r . . taeans sail) 
 
 storm 01 wind and ram and no moon, and sallied forth, forth. 
 They were led by the authors of the attempt. First discovered 
 of all they crossed the ditch which surrounded the town: b .y anac - 
 then they went forward to the wall of the enemy. The Their 
 guard did not discover them, for the night was so dark the city 
 that they could not be seen, while the clatter of the Sckfronf 1 
 
 storm drowned the noise of their approach. They °PP°" 
 
 marched a good way apart from each other, that the 
 clashing of their arms might not betray them; and 
 they were lightly equipped, having the right foot bare 
 that they might be less liable to slip in the mud. They 
 now set about scaling the battlements, which they knew 
 to be deserted, choosing a space between two of the 
 towers. Those who carried the ladders went first and 
 placed them against the wall; they were followed by 
 
 twelve others, armed only with sword and breastplate, 
 
 under the command of Ammeas the son of Coroebus: 
 he was the first to mount; after him came the twelve, 
 six ascending each of the two towers on the right and 
 left. To these succeeded more men lightly armed with 
 short spears, others following who bore their shields, that 
 they might have less difficulty in mounting the wall; 
 the shields were to be handed to them as soon as they 
 were near the enemy. A considerable number had now 
 ascended, when they were discovered by the guards. One 
 of the Plataeans, taking hold of the battlements, threw 
 down a tile which made a noise in falling: immediately 
 a shout was raised and the enemy rushed out upon the 
 wall; for in the dark and stormy night they did not 
 know what the alarm meant. At the same time, in 
 order to distract their attention, the Plataeans who were 
 
182 THE PASSAGE OF THE ENEMY'S WALL. 
 
 III. left in the city made a sally against the Peloponnesian 
 wall on the side opposite to the place at which their 
 friends were getting over. The besiegers were in great 
 excitement, but every one remained at his own post, 
 and dared, not stir to give assistance, being at a loss 
 to imagine what was happening. The three hundred 
 who were appointed to act in any sudden emergency 
 marched along outside the walls towards the spot from 
 which the cry proceeded; and fire-signals indicating 
 danger were raised towards Thebes. But the Plataeans 
 in the city had numerous counter signals ready on the 
 wall, which they now lighted and held up, thereby 
 hoping to render the signals of the enemy unintelligible, 
 that so the Thebans, misunderstanding the true state of 
 affairs, might not arrive until the men had escaped and 
 were in safety. 
 
 23. Meanwhile the Plataeans were scaling the walls. The 
 The Pia- first party had mounted, and, killing the sentinels, had 
 tecfeTby 0 gained possession of the towers on either side. Their 
 STenwho followers now began to occupy the passages, lest the 
 towers h first enem y should come through and fall upon them. Some 
 get over the of them placed ladders upon the wall against the towers, 
 
 wall ; they r At ° . 
 
 then cross and got up more men. A shower of missiles proceed- 
 the ditch. ^ both from the upper and lower parts of the towers 
 kept off all assailants. Meanwhile the main body of the 
 Plataeans, who were still below, applied to the wall 
 many ladders at once, and, pushing down the battle¬ 
 ments, made their way over through the space between 
 the towers. As each man got to the other side he halted 
 upon the edge of the ditch, whence they shot darts and 
 arrows at any one who came along under the wall and 
 ' attempted to impede their passage. When they had all 
 passed over, those who had occupied the towers came 
 down, the last of them not without great difficulty, and 
 proceeded towards the ditch. By this time the three 
 hundred were upon them; they had lights, and the 
 Plataeans, standing on the edge of the ditch, saw them 
 all the better out of the darkness, and shot arrows and 
 
 O td 
 
KO 
 
 SAFE ARRIVAL AT ATHENS . 183 
 
 .c. 428. threw darts at them where their bodies were exposed ; III. 
 
 88 ‘ they themselves were concealed by the darkness, while 
 the enemy were dazed by their own lights. And so the 
 Plataeans, down to the last man of them all, got safely 
 over the ditch, though with great exertion and only after 
 a hard struggle ; for the ice in it was not frozen hard 
 enough to bear, but was half water, as is commonly the 
 case when the wind is from the east and not from the 
 north. And the snow which the east wind brought in 
 the night had greatly swollen the water, so that they 
 a could scarcely accomplish the passage a . It was the 
 violence of the storm, however, which enabled them to 
 escape at all. 
 
 From the ditch the Plataeans, leaving on the right 24. 
 hand the shrine of Androcrates, ran all together along They first 
 
 nr-i 'T'l 1 , , go towards 
 
 the road to 1 hebes. I hey made sure that no one would Thebes, 
 ever suspect them of having fled in the direction of their ^“^over 
 enemies. On their way they saw the Peloponnesians *f n ™° un “ 
 pursuing them with torches on the road which leads to Athens. 
 Athens by Cithaeron and Dryoscephalae. For nearly a 
 mile the Plataeans continued on the Theban road ; they 
 then turned off and went by the way up the mountain 
 leading to Erythrae and Hysiae, and so, getting to the 
 hills, they escaped to Athens. Their number was two 
 hundred and twelve 15 , though they had been originally 
 more, for some of them went back to the city and never 
 got over the wall ; one who was an archer was taken 
 at the outer ditch. The Peloponnesians at length gave 
 up the pursuit and returned to their lines. But the 
 Plataeans in the city, knowing nothing of what had 
 happened, for those who had turned back had informed 
 them that not one was left alive, sent out a herald at 
 daybreak, wanting to make a truce for the burial of the 
 dead; they then discovered the truth and returned. 
 
 Thus the Plataeans scaled the wall and escaped. 
 
 a Taking vnepex^iv in the sense of ‘superare:’ or, ‘ could hardly 
 keep above the surface in crossing.’ 
 
 b Cp. iii. 20 med. 
 
III. 
 
 25 - 
 
 Salaethus is 
 sent from 
 Lacedae¬ 
 mon to 
 Mitylene, 
 with the 
 news that 
 help is on 
 the way. 
 
 26. 
 
 After de¬ 
 spatching a 
 fleet under 
 Alcidas to 
 Lesbos, the 
 Pelopon¬ 
 nesians in¬ 
 vade Attica, 
 causing 
 great dis¬ 
 tress . 
 
 27. 
 
 Salaethus, 
 
 despairing 
 
 184 FOURTH INVASION OF ATTICA. 
 
 At the end of the same winter Salaethus the Lace¬ 
 daemonian was despatched in a trireme from Lacedae¬ 
 mon to Mitylene. He sailed to Pyrrha, and thence, 
 proceeding on foot, made his way, by the channel of a 
 torrent at a place where the line of the Athenian wall 
 could be crossed, undiscovered into Mitylene. He told 
 the government that there was to be an invasion of 
 Attica, and that simultaneously the forty ships which 
 were coming to their assistance would arrive at Lesbos; 
 he himself had been sent in advance to bring the news 
 and take charge of affairs. Whereupon the Mitylenaeans 
 recovered their spirits, and were less disposed to make 
 terms with the Athenians. So the winter ended, and 
 with it the fourth year in the Peloponnesian War of 
 which Thucydides wrote the history. 
 
 With the return of summer the Peloponnesians de¬ 
 spatched the two and forty ships which they intended 
 for Mitylene in charge of Alcidas, the Lacedaemonian 
 admiral. They and their allies then invaded Attica, in 
 order that the Athenians, embarrassed both by sea and 
 land, might have their attention distracted from the 
 ships sailing to Mitylene. Cleomenes led the invasion. 
 He was acting in the place of his nephew, the king 
 Pausanias, son of Pleistoanax, who was still a minor. 
 All the country which they had previously overrun, 
 wherever anything had grown up again, they ravaged 
 afresh, and devastated even those districts which they 
 had hitherto spared. This invasion caused greater dis¬ 
 tress to the Athenians than any, except the second. For 
 the Peloponnesians, who were daily expecting to hear 
 from Lesbos of some action on the part of the fleet, 
 which they supposed by this time to have crossed the 
 sea,, pursued their ravages far and wide. But when none 
 of their expectations were realised, and their food was 
 exhausted, they retired and dispersed to their several 
 cities. 
 
 Meanwhile the Mitylenaeans, finding as time went on 
 that the ships from Peloponnesus never came, and that 
 
 $ . w o w 
 
PQO 
 
 •C. 427. 
 
 1 . 88, 2, 
 
 SURRENDER OF MITYLEnA. 185 
 
 , their provisions had run short, were obliged to make III. 
 terms with the Athenians. The immediate cause wasofheip.^ 
 as follows :—Salaethus himself began to despair of the people, who 
 arrival of the ships, and therefore he put into the hands Jhenobies. 
 of the common people (who had hitherto been light¬ 
 armed) shields and spears, intending to lead them out 
 against the Athenians. But, having once received arms, 
 they would no longer obey their leaders ; they gathered 
 into knots and insisted that the nobles should bring out 
 the corn and let all share alike; if not, they would 
 themselves negotiate with the Athenians and surrender 
 the city. 
 
 The magistrates, knowing that they were helpless, and 28. 
 that they would be in peril of their lives if they were left The g°- 
 
 . vernment, 
 
 out of the convention, concluded a general agreement feeling their 
 
 with Paches and his army stipulating that the fate of ness^sur- 
 
 the Mitylenaeans should be left in the hands of the ^ d t e ^ the 
 
 Athenians at home. They were to receive him and his Paches > on 
 
 . condition 
 
 forces into the city; but might send an embassy to that the 
 Athens on their own behalf. Until the envoys returned, athome 
 Paches was not to bind, enslave, or put to death any Jde on the 
 Mitylenaean. These were the terms of the capitulation, fate of the 
 
 J x inhabitants. 
 
 Nevertheless, when the army entered, those Mityle¬ 
 naeans who had been principally concerned with the 
 Lacedaemonians were in an agony of fear, and could 
 not be satisfied until they had taken refuge at the 
 altars. Paches raised them up, and promising not to 
 hurt them, deposited them at Tenedos until the Athe¬ 
 nians should come to a decision. He also sent triremes 
 to Antissa, of which he gained possession, and took such 
 other military measures as he deemed best. 
 
 The forty ships of the Peloponnesians, which should 29. 
 have gone at once to Mitylen&, lost time about the The Peio- 
 Peloponnese, and proceeded very leisurely on their voyage. fleetTn-^ 
 They were not discovered bv any ships from Athens, MUyienfe* 
 and arrived safely at Delos ; but on touching at Icarus ^ c ^ s time ‘ 
 and Myconus they heard, too late, that Mitylene was hearing of 
 
 , ; „ r . 7 , ’. . . ' r . ^ its fall, 
 
 taken. Wanting to obtain certain information, they sails to 
 
 Embatum, 
 
III. 
 
 and holds 
 a council. 
 Speech of 
 Teutiaplus. 
 
 30 . 
 
 Let us 
 hurry on to 
 Mitylene. 
 We'shall 
 find the 
 Athenians 
 off their 
 guard. 
 
 The art of 
 the general 
 is to sur¬ 
 prise others, 
 never to be 
 surprised. 
 
 31 - 
 
 It is also 
 proposed to 
 occupy 
 some town, 
 and raise a 
 revolt in 
 Ionia. But 
 Alcidas re¬ 
 jects both 
 proposi¬ 
 tions. He 
 hurries 
 home. 
 
 186 SPEECH OE TEUTIAPLUS. 
 
 sailed to Embatum in Erythrae, which they reached, but 
 not until seven days after the fall of Mitylene. Having 
 now made sure of the fact, they consulted as to what 
 measures should next be taken, and Teutiaplus, an 
 Elean, addressed them as follows :— 
 
 ‘My opinion, Alcida6, and you, my fellow-commanders 
 of the Peloponnesian forces, is that we should attack 
 Mitylene at once, just as we are, before our arrival is 
 known. In all probability we shall find that men who 
 have recently gained possession of a city will be much 
 off their guard, and entirely so at sea, on which element 
 they do not fear the attack of an enemy, and where our 
 strength at present chiefly lies. Probably too their land 
 forces, in the carelessness of victory, will be scattered up 
 and down among the houses of the city. If we were to 
 fall upon them suddenly by night, with the help of our 
 friends inside, should there be any left, I have no doubt 
 that Mitylene would be ours. The danger should not 
 deter us ; for we should consider that the execution of 
 a military surprise is always dangerous, and that the 
 general who is never taken off his guard himself, and 
 never loses an opportunity of striking at an unguarded 
 foe, will be most likely to succeed in war. 5 
 
 His words failed to convince Alcidas; whereupon 
 some Ionian exiles and the Lesbians who were on 
 board the fleet a recommended that, if this enterprise 
 appeared too hazardous, he should occupy one of the 
 Ionian towns or the Aeolian Cyme : having thus es¬ 
 tablished their head-quarters in a city, the Pelopon¬ 
 nesians might raise the standard of revolt in Ionia. 
 There was a good chance of success, for every one was 
 glad of his arrival; they might cut off a main source of 
 Athenian revenue ; and although they themselves would 
 incur expense, for the Athenians would blockade them b , 
 the attempt was worth making. Pissuthnes might very 
 likely be persuaded to co-operate. But Alcidas ob- 
 
 a i. e. the envoys who had been sent to Sparta. Cp. iii. 4 fin., 5 fin. 
 
 b Adopting with Bekker the conjecture e(j)opfxovcnv. 
 
 OB 
 
CQQ 
 
 RETURN OF ALCIDAS. 
 
 187 
 
 -C. 427-jected to this proposal equally with the last; his only III. 
 
 1. 88, 2. was ^ now that he had failed in saving Mitylene, to 
 get back as fast as he could to Peloponnesus. 
 
 Accordingly he sailed from Embatum along the coast, 3 2 * 
 touching; at Myonnesus in the territory of Teos ; he there The Sa " 
 slew most of the captives whom he had taken on his remonstrate 
 voyage. He then put into harbour at Ephesus, where f or his im- 
 a deputation from the Samians of Anaea a came to him. siaymgAe 
 They told him that he had an ill manner of liberating captives 
 Hellas, if he put to death men who were not his enemies had taken, 
 and were not lifting a hand against him, but were allies 
 of Athens from necessity: if he went on in this way he 
 would convert few of his enemies into friends, and many 
 of his friends into enemies. He was convinced by them, 
 and allowed such of the Chian prisoners as he had not 
 yet put to death and some others to go free. They had 
 been easily taken, because, when people saw the ships, 
 instead of flying, they came close up to them under the 
 idea that they were Athenian; the thought never entered 
 into their minds that while the Athenians were masters 
 of the sea, Peloponnesian ships would find their way 
 across the Aegean to the coast of Ionia. 
 
 From Ephesus Alcidas sailed away in haste, or rather 33 * 
 fled; for while he was at anchor near Clarus he had been sa ji s , 
 
 5 from Ephe- 
 
 sighted by the Athenian sacred vessels, Paralus and sus direct 
 Salaminia, which happened to be on a voyage from ponnesus, 
 Athens. In fear of pursuit he hurried through the ^J^by 11 
 open sea, determined to stop nowhere, if he could ^ e ^P}^s^ a " 
 it, until he reached Peloponnesus. News of him and his Salaminia, 
 fleet was brought to Paches from the country of Erythrae, suedaffar 
 and indeed kept coming in from all sides. For Ionia not by Paches. 
 being fortified, there was great apprehension lest the 
 Peloponnesians, as they sailed along the coast, might 
 fall upon the cities and plunder them, even though they 
 had no intention of remaining. And the Paralus and 
 Salaminia reported that they had themselves seen him 
 at Clarus. Paches eagerly gave chase and pursued him 
 a Cp. iii. 19 fin.; iv. 75 med. 
 
188 
 
 PACHES AT NOTIUM. 
 
 III. as far as the island of Patmos, but, seeing that he was no 
 longer within reach, he returned. Not having come up 
 with the fleet of the Peloponnesians upon the open sea, 
 he congratulated himself that they had not been over¬ 
 taken somewhere near land, where they would have been 
 forced to put in and fortify themselves on shore, and the 
 Athenians would have had the trouble of watching and 
 
 34 - 
 
 Paches on 
 his return 
 puts in at 
 Notium, 
 the port of 
 Colophon, 
 on the in¬ 
 vitation of 
 an anti- 
 Persian 
 faction 
 which had 
 been driven 
 out. 
 
 He takes 
 the citadel, 
 and treach¬ 
 erously 
 kills the 
 commander 
 Hippias. 
 The Athe¬ 
 nians re¬ 
 establish 
 the Colo¬ 
 phonians 
 in Notium. 
 
 blockading them. 
 
 As he was sailing along the coast on his return he 
 touched at Notium, the port of Colophon. Here some 
 inhabitants of the upper town had taken up their abode; 
 for it had been captured by Itamenes and the Barba¬ 
 rians, who had been invited into the city by a certain 
 local faction. The capture took place about the time of 
 the second invasion of Attica. The refugees who settled 
 in Notium again quarrelled among themselves. The one 
 party, having introduced Arcadian and Barbarian auxili¬ 
 aries whom they had obtained from Pissuthnes, stationed 
 them in a fortified quarter of the town; the Persian faction 
 from the upper city of Colophon joined them and were 
 living with them. The other party had retired from the 
 city, and being now in exile, called in Paches. He pro¬ 
 posed to Hippias, the commander of the Arcadians in 
 the fortress, that they should hold a conference, under¬ 
 taking, if they could not agree, to put him back in the 
 fort, safe and sound. So he came out, and Paches kept 
 
 him in custody without fetters. In the meantime he 
 made an attack upon the unsuspecting garrison, took 
 the fortress, and slaughtered all the Arcadians and 
 Barbarians whom he found within. He then conducted 
 
 Hippias into the fort, according to the agreement, and 
 when he was inside seized him and shot him to death 
 
 with arrows. He next handed over Notium to the Colo¬ 
 
 phonians. excluding the Persian party. The Athenians 
 afterwards gathered together all the Colophonians who 
 could be found in the neighbouring cities and colonised 
 the place, to which they gave laws like their own, under 
 regular leaders whom they sent out from Athens. 
 
 O to 
 
wo 
 
 THE DECREE AGAINST MITYLENE. 189 
 
 .c. 427. On returning to Lesbos, Paches reduced Pyrrha and III. 
 
 L 88, 2 'Eresus, and finding Salaethus, the Lacedaemonian go- 35. 
 vernor, concealed in Mitylen£, sent him to Athens. He Salaethus^ 
 also sent thither the Mitylenaeans whom he had de- and sent to 
 posited in Tenedos, and any others who seemed to 
 have been implicated in the revolt. He then dismissed 
 the greater part of his army, and, by the aid of the 
 remainder, settled as seemed best to him the affairs 
 of Mitylen£ and Lesbos. 
 
 When the captives arrived at Athens the Athenians 36. 
 instantly put Salaethus to death, although he made T .he Athe- 
 
 ' L . . mans put 
 
 various offers, and among other things promised to Salaethus to 
 procure the withdrawal of the Peloponnesians from order’the 
 Plataea, which was still blockaded. Concerning the 
 other captives a discussion was held, and in their grown-up 
 
 citizens of 
 
 indignation the Athenians determined to put to death Mityien 6 . 
 not only the men then at Athens, but all the grown- day they 
 up citizens of Mitylene, and to enslave the women and pg£J^° d re ' 
 children ; the act of the Mitylenaeans appeared inexcus- , the Mlt y - 
 able, because they were not subjects like the other states envoys per- 
 which had revolted, but free. That Peloponnesian ships magistrates 
 should have had the audacity to find their way to Ionia another 
 and assist the rebels contributed to increase their fury, assembl y- 
 and led them to suspect that the revolt a was a long 
 premeditated affair a . So they sent a trireme to Paches 
 announcing their determination, and bidding him put 
 the Mitylenaeans to death at once. But on the follow¬ 
 ing day a kind of remorse seized them ; they began to 
 reflect that a decree which doomed to destruction not 
 only the guilty, but a whole city, was cruel and monstrous. 
 
 The Mitylenaean envoys who were at Athens b per¬ 
 ceived the change of feeling, and they and the Athenians 
 who were in their interest prevailed on the magistrates 
 to bring the question again before the people; this they 
 were the more willing to do, because they saw themselves 
 that the majority of the citizens were anxious to have an 
 opportunity given them of reconsidering their decision. 
 a Or, ‘ was part of an extensive scheme.’ b Cp. iii. 28 med. 
 
190 
 
 SPEECH OF CLEON. 
 
 III. An assembly was again summoned, and different opinions 
 were expressed by different speakers. In the former as¬ 
 sembly, Cleon the son of Cleaenetus had carried the de¬ 
 cree condemning the Mitylenaeans to death. He was the 
 most violent of the citizens, and at that time exercised 
 Speech of by far the greatest influence over the people a . And now 
 he came forward a second time and spoke as follows :— 
 37. ‘I have remarked again and again that a democracy 
 You do not cannot manage an empire, but never more than now, 
 
 know how . .... 
 
 to manage when I see you regretting your condemnation of the 
 youTre^ ’ Mitylenaeans. Having no fear or suspicion of one 
 kind^o 7 another in daily life b , you deal with your allies upon the 
 your allies, same principle, and you do not consider that whenever 
 
 who do not . ...... 
 
 love you; you yield to them out of pity or are misled by their 
 your'quick specious tales, you are guilty of a weakness dangerous 
 wits are to yourselves, and receive no thanks from them. You 
 
 always J 5 
 
 changing should remember that your empire is a despotism 0 ex- 
 
 your minds. . 
 
 ercised over unwilling subjects, who are always con¬ 
 spiring against you ; they do not obey in return for any 
 kindness which you do them to your own injury, but in 
 so far as you are their masters ; they have no love of you, 
 but they are held down by force. Besides, what can 
 be more detestable than to be perpetually changing our 
 minds ? \Ye forget that a state in which the laws, 
 though imperfect, are unalterable, is better off than one 
 in which the laws are good but powerless d . Dulness 
 and modesty are a more useful combination than clever¬ 
 ness and licence; and the more simple sort generally 
 make better citizens than the more astute. For the 
 latter desire to be thought wiser than the laws e ; they 
 want to be always taking a lead in the discussions of 
 the assembly; they think that they can nowhere have 
 a finer opportunity of speaking their mind f , and their 
 folly generally ends in the ruin of their country; whereas 
 the others, mistrusting their own capacity, admit that the 
 laws are wiser than themselves : they do not pretend to 
 
 a Cp. vi. 21 med. b Cp. i. 68 init. c Cp. ii. 63 med. 
 
 d Cp. vi. 18 fin. 6 Cp. i. 84 med. f Cp. iii. 40 init. 
 
 Otd 
 
K o 
 
 SPEECH OF CLEON. 
 
 C. 427. 
 . 88, 2. 
 
 I 9 I 
 
 criticise the arguments of a great speaker ; and being 
 impartial judges, not ambitious rivals, they are generally 
 in the right. That is the spirit in which we should act; 
 not suffering ourselves to be so excited by our own 
 cleverness in a war of wits as to advise the Athenian 
 people contrary to our own better judgment. 
 
 c I myself think as I did before, and I wonder at those 
 who have brought forward the case of the Mitylenaeans 
 again, thus interposing a delay which is in the interest 
 of the evil-doer. For after a time the anger of the 
 sufferer waxes dull, and he pursues the offender with 
 less keenness; but the vengeance which follows closest 
 upon the wrong is most adequate to it and exacts 
 the fullest retribution. And again I wonder who will 
 answer me, and whether he will attempt to show that 
 the crimes of the Mitylenaeans are a benefit to us, or 
 that when we suffer, our allies suffer with us. Clearly 
 he must be some one who has such confidence in his 
 powers of speech as to contend a that you never adopted 
 what was most certainly your resolution a ; or else he 
 must be some one who, under the inspiration of a bribe, 
 elaborates a sophistical speech in the hope of diverting 
 you from the point. In such rhetorical contests the 
 city gives away the prizes to others, while she takes 
 the risk upon herself. And you are to blame, for you 
 order these contests amiss. When speeches are to be 
 heard, you are too fond of using your eyes, but, where 
 actions are concerned, you trust your ears ; you estimate 
 the possibility of future enterprises from the eloquence 
 of an orator, but as to accomplished facts, instead of 
 accepting ocular demonstration, you believe only what 
 ingenious critics tell you b . No men are better dupes, 
 sooner deceived by novel notions, or slower to follow 
 approved advice. You despise what is familiar, while 
 you are*worshippers of every new extravagance. Not 
 a man of you but would be an orator if he could ; 
 
 III. 
 
 38. 
 
 Why is 
 their 
 
 punishment 
 delayed ? 
 Will any 
 one pretend 
 that their 
 crimes do 
 us good ? 
 or would 
 any one 
 speak on 
 their behalf 
 if he was 
 not well 
 paid, and 
 you were 
 not blind 
 to facts 
 and at the 
 mercy of 
 every clever 
 talker ? 
 
 a Or, ‘ that what all men believe to be true is absolutely false.’ 
 b Cp. vii. 48 med. 
 
I 9 2 
 
 SPEECH OF CLEON. 
 
 III. when he cannot, he will not yield the palm to a more 
 successful rival: he would fain show that he does not 
 let his wits come limping after, but that he can praise 
 a sharp remark before it is well out of another’s mouth ; 
 he would like to be as quick in anticipating what is said, 
 as he is slow in foreseeing its consequences. You are 
 always hankering after an ideal state, but you do not 
 give your minds even to what is straight before you. 
 In a word, you are at the mercy of your own ears, and 
 sit like spectators attending a performance of sophists, 
 but very unlike counsellors of a state. 
 
 39* ‘ I want you to put aside this trifling, and therefore 
 
 doneus so* ^ sa ^ to y° u ^at no single city has ever injured us so 
 much harm deeply as Mitylene. I can excuse those who find our 
 lendffnone rule too heavy to bear, or who have revolted because 
 soTitti? the enemy have compelled them. But islanders who 
 OuHndul h a d wa ^ s » an d were unassailable by our enemies, except 
 gencehas at sea, and on that element were sufficiently protected 
 insolent, by a fleet of their own, who were independent and 
 people and treated by us with the highest regard, when they act 
 should be thus they h ave no t revolted (that word would imply 
 
 punished J v J 
 
 alike, for that they were oppressed), but they have rebelled, and 
 an°equally entering the ranks of our bitterest enemies, have con- 
 f^youpar- spired with them to seek our ruin. And surely this is 
 don them f ar mo re atrocious than if they had been led by motives 
 
 your other J J 
 
 subjects of ambition to take up arms against us on their own 
 encouraged account. They learned nothing from the misfortunes 
 andwe 1 ’ their neighbours who had already revolted and been 
 lecfour^" su bdued by us, nor did the happiness of which they were 
 enemies to in the enjoyment make them hesitate to court destruc- 
 own allies, tion. They trusted recklessly to the future, and cherish¬ 
 ing hopes which, if less than their wishes, were greater 
 than their powers, they went to war, preferring might to 
 right. No sooner did they seem likely to win than they 
 set upon us, although we were doing them no wrong. 
 Too swift and sudden a rise is apt to make cities in¬ 
 solent, and in general, ordinary good-fortune is safer 
 than extraordinary. Mankind apparently find it easier 
 
 CQ O 
 
SPEECH OF CLEON . 
 
 J 9 3 
 
 B.C. 427. 
 01. 88, 2. 
 
 to drive away adversity than to retain prosperity. We III. 
 should from the first have made no difference between 
 the Mitylenaeans and the rest of our allies, and then 
 their insolence would never have risen to such a height; 
 for men naturally despise those who court them, but 
 respect those who do not give way to them. Yet it is 
 not too late to punish them as their crimes deserve. 
 
 And do not absolve the people while you throw the 
 blame upon the nobles. For they were all of one mind 
 when we were to be attacked. Had the people deserted 
 the nobles and come over to us, they might at this 
 moment have been reinstated in their city; but they 
 considered that their safety lay in sharing the dangers 
 of the oligarchy, and therefore they joined in the revolt. 
 
 Reflect: if you impose the same penalty upon those of 
 your allies who wilfully rebel and upon those who are 
 constrained by the enemy, which of them will not revolt 
 upon any pretext however trivial, seeing that, if he suc¬ 
 ceed, he will be free, and, if he fail, no irreparable evil 
 will follow? We in the meantime shall have to risk 
 our lives and our fortunes against every one in turn. 
 
 When conquerors we shall recover only a ruined city, 
 and, for the future, the revenues which are our strength 
 will be lost to us a . But if we fail, the number of our 
 adversaries will be increased. And when we ought to 
 be employed in repelling our regular enemies, we shall 
 be wasting time in fighting against our own allies. 
 
 f Do not then hold out a hope, which eloquence can 40. 
 secure or money buy, that they are to be excused and 
 that their error is to be deemed human and venial, pity, fine 
 Their attack was not unpremeditated ; that might have forg^ng^ a 
 been an excuse for them; but they knew what they were yo^Thave 
 doing. This was my original contention, and I still n ° ri ? ht to 
 
 m CllclStlSG 
 
 maintain that you should abide by your former decision, rebels, you 
 and not be misled either by pity, or by the charm of right to 
 words, or by a too forgiving temper. There are no them 
 three things more prejudicial to your power. Mercy as the y> 
 a Cp. iii. 46 med. 
 
 O 
 
194 
 
 SPEECH OF CLEON . 
 
 III. should be reserved for the merciful, and not thrown 
 fearing your away upon those who will have no compassion on us, and 
 
 vengeance, J i 
 
 would have who must by the force of circumstances always be our 
 Yo^wm 011 ’ enemies. And our charming orators will still have an 
 troubiTwith arena a 5 but one in which the questions at stake will not 
 your allies k e so a- rave and the city will not pay so dearly for her 
 
 when they 5:3 ' . . J Aii 
 
 know that brief pleasure in listening to them, while they for a good 
 wiifbe° n speech get a good fee. Lastly, forgiveness is naturally 
 by death, shown to those who, being reconciled, will continue 
 friends, and not to those who will always remain what 
 they were, and will abate nothing of their enmity. In 
 one word, if you do as I say, you will do what is just 
 to the Mitylenaeans, and also what is expedient for your¬ 
 selves ; but, if you take the opposite course, they will 
 not be grateful to you, and you will be self-condemned. 
 For, if they were right in revolting, you must be wrong 
 in maintaining your empire. But if, right or wrong, you 
 are resolved to rule, then rightly or wrongly they must 
 be chastised for your good. Otherwise you must give 
 up your empire, and, when virtue is no longer dangerous, 
 you may be as virtuous as you please. Punish them 
 as they would have punished you; let not those who 
 have escaped appear to have less feeling than those 
 who conspired against them. Consider : what might not 
 they have been expected to do if they had conquered ? 
 —especially since they were the aggressors. For those 
 who wantonly attack others always rush into extremes, 
 and sometimes, like these Mitylenaeans, to their own de¬ 
 struction. They know the fate which is reserved for them 
 if their enemy is spared: b when a man is injured without 
 a cause he is more dangerous if he escape than the 
 enemy who has only suffered what he has inflicted 15 . 
 Be true then to yourselves, and recall as vividly as you 
 can what you felt at the time ; think how you would 
 a Cp. iii. 37 fin. 
 
 b Or, referring the words to the Mitylenaeans: ‘He who has 
 gone out of his way to bring a calamity upon himself is more dan¬ 
 gerous if he be allowed to escape than the enemy who only re¬ 
 taliates.’ 
 
 PQ O 
 
B.C. 427. 
 01. 88, 2, 
 
 SPEECH OF DI 0 D 0 TUS. 195 
 
 . have given the world to crush your enemies, and now III. 
 
 ' take your revenge. Do not be soft-hearted at the sight 
 of their distress, but remember the danger which was 
 once hanging over your heads. Chastise them as they 
 deserve, and prove by an example to your other allies 
 that rebellion will be punished with death. If this is 
 made quite clear to them, your attention will no longer 
 be diverted from your enemies by wars against your 
 own allies/ 
 
 Such were the words of Cleon; and after him Dio- 41. 
 dotus the son of Eucrates, who in the previous assembly Speech of 
 had been the chief opponent of the decree which con¬ 
 demned the Mitylenaeans, came forward again and spoke 
 as follows :— 
 
 ‘ I am far from blaming those who invite us to re- 42. 
 consider our sentence upon the Mitylenaeans, nor do I Weare 
 
 1 . 1 1 1 1 right in re- 
 
 approve of the censure which has been cast on the considering 
 practice of deliberating more than once about matters Mity° f 
 so critical. In my opinion the two things most adverse ^^fooi 
 to good counsel are haste and passion; the former is jsh, even 
 generally a mark of folly, the latter of vulgarity and honest, who 
 narrowness of mind. When a man insists that words no ddibera- 
 ought not to be our guides in action a , he is either want- tlon : stl1 / 
 ing in sense or wanting in honesty: he is wanting in who in¬ 
 sense if he does not see that there is no other way in which that his 
 we can throw light on the unknown future; and he is incorrupt, 
 not honest if, seeking to carry a discreditable measure, 
 and knowing that he cannot speak well in a bad cause, him b y fair 
 
 ~ arguments. 
 
 he reflects that he can slander well and terrify his op- The wise 
 ponents and his audience by the audaciousness of his ro^for^ 
 calumnies. Worst of all are those who, besides other 
 topics of abuse, declare that their opponent is hired to favour to 
 make an eloquent speech. If they accused him of 
 stupidity only, when he failed in producing an impres¬ 
 sion he might go his way having lost his reputation 
 for sense but not for honesty; whereas he who is ac¬ 
 cused of dishonesty, even if he succeed, is viewed with 
 a Cp. ii. 40 med. 
 
 O 2 
 
SPEECH OF DIO DOT US. 
 
 19 6 
 
 III. suspicion, and, if he fail, is thought to be both fool and 
 rogue. And so the city suffers ; for she is robbed of 
 her counsellors by fear. Happy would she be if such 
 citizens could not speak at all, for then the people would 
 not be misled. The good citizen should prove his supe¬ 
 riority as a speaker, not by trying to intimidate those 
 who will follow him in debate, but by fair argument; and 
 the wise city ought not to give increased honour to her 
 best counsellor, any more than she will deprive him of 
 that which he has; while he whose proposal is rejected 
 not only ought to receive no punishment, but should 
 be free from all reproach. Then he who succeeds will 
 not say pleasant things contrary to his better judgment 
 in order to gain a still higher place in popular favour, 
 and he who fails will not be striving to attract the mul¬ 
 titude to himself by like compliances. 
 
 43 - ‘ But we take an opposite course ; and still worse, 
 
 are too 1 Even when we know a man to be giving the wisest 
 clever: you counsel, a suspicion of corruption is set on foot; and 
 
 are always 
 
 suspecting from a jealousy which is perhaps groundless, we allow 
 speaker has the state to lose an undeniable advantage. It has come 
 terefted" to this, that the best advice when offered in plain terms 
 motive. i s as much distrusted as the worst; and not only he who 
 
 You punish < # J 
 
 the giver of wishes to lead the multitude into the most dangerous 
 and not ’ courses must deceive them, but he who speaks in the 
 for U fonow- cause of right must make himself believed by lying, 
 ing him. j n fais city, and in this city only, to do good openly 
 and without deception is impossible, because you are 
 too clever; and, when a man confers an unmistakeable 
 benefit on you, he is rewarded by a suspicion that, in 
 some underhand manner, he gets more than he gives. 
 But, whatever you may suspect a , when great interests 
 are at stake, we who advise ought to look further and 
 weigh our words more carefully than you whose vision 
 is limited. And you should remember that we are ac¬ 
 countable for our advice to you, but you who listen 
 are accountable to nobody. If he who gave and he who 
 a Reading d £ i ovvti. 
 
 m o 
 
wo 
 
 SPEECH OF DIODOPUS. 
 
 197 
 
 c. 427. followed evil counsel suffered equally, you would be III. 
 
 ' 88, 2 ’ more reasonable in your ideas ; but now, whenever you 
 meet with a reverse, led away by the passion of the 
 moment you punish the individual who is your adviser 
 for his error of judgment, and your own error you con¬ 
 done, if the judgments of many concurred in it. 
 
 ‘ I do not come forward either as an advocate of the 44. 
 Mitylenaeans or as their accuser; the question for us The ques- 
 
 • 1 1 *11- 1 1 • • tion e one 
 
 rightly considered is not, what are their crimes? but, of policy, 
 what is for our interest? If I prove them ever so Youranger 
 guilty, I will not on that account bid you put them 
 to death, unless it is expedient. Neither, if perchance you prefer 
 there be some degree of excuse for them, would I have expediency, 
 you spare them, unless it be clearly for the good of 
 the state. For I conceive that we are now concerned, 
 not with the present, but with the future. When Cleon 
 insists that the infliction of death will be expedient and 
 will secure you against revolt in time to come, I, like 
 him taking the ground of future expediency, stoutly 
 maintain the contrary position ; and I would not have 
 you be misled by the apparent fairness of his proposal, 
 and reject the solid advantages of mine. You are angry 
 with the Mitylenaeans, and the superior justice of his 
 argument may for the moment attract you ; but we are 
 not at law with them, and do not want to be told what 
 is just; we are considering a matter of policy, and de¬ 
 sire to know how we can turn them to account. 
 
 c To many offences less than theirs states have affixed 45. 
 the punishment of death ; nevertheless, excited by hope, Experience 
 men still risk their lives. No one when venturing on a proves that 
 perilous enterprise ever yet passed a sentence of failure ofdeath lty 
 on himself. And what city when entering on a revolt 1 d s e ^ e ° rrent 
 ever imagined that the power which she had, whether Men - and 
 her own or obtained from her allies, did not justify the states, are 
 attempt? All are by nature prone to err both in public awayby 
 and in private life, and no law will prevent them. Men and 
 have gone through the whole catalogue of penalties in by mist in 
 the hope that, by increasing their severity, they may 
 
198 
 
 SPEECH OF DIO DOT US. 
 
 III. suffer less at the hands of evil-doers. In early ages B.c. 427. 
 the punishments, even of the worst offences, would na- ' 88,2 ' 
 turally be milder; but as time went on and mankind 
 continued to transgress, they seldom stopped short of 
 death. And still there are transgressors. Some greater 
 terror then has yet to be discovered ; certainly death 
 deters nobody. For poverty inspires necessity with 
 daring ; and wealth engenders avarice in pride and in¬ 
 solence ; and the various conditions of human life, as 
 they severally fall under the sway of some mighty and 
 fatal power, through the agency of the passions lure 
 men to destruction. Desire and hope are never wanting, 
 the one leading, the other following, the one devising 
 the enterprise, the other suggesting that fortune will be 
 kind ; and they do immense harm, for, being unseen, 
 they far outweigh the dangers which are seen. Fortune 
 too assists the illusion, for she often presents herself un¬ 
 expectedly, and induces states as well as individuals to 
 run into peril, however inadequate their means ; and 
 states even more than individuals, because they are 
 throwing for a higher stake, freedom or empire, and 
 because when a man has a whole people acting with 
 him, : 'he exaggerates the importance of his aims 9, out 
 of all reason. In a word then, it is impossible, and 
 simply absurd to suppose, that human nature when bent 
 upon some favourite project can be restrained either by 
 the power of law or by any other terror. 
 
 46. ‘We ought not therefore to act hastily out of a mistaken 
 The threat reliance on the security which the penalty of death affords, 
 punishment Nor should we drive our rebellious subjects to despair; 
 rebels flight the y must not th ink tliat there is no place for repentance, 
 andMf we' or that ^y ma y not at an y moment wipe out their 
 succeed,^we offences. Consider: at present, although a city may 
 gain a actually have revolted, when she becomes conscious of 
 Ou? e tme lty " her weakness she will capitulate while still able to defray 
 
 prevention, the cost of the war and to P a y tri tmte for the future; 
 not punish- but if we are too severe, will not the citizens make better 
 
 ment. 
 
 a Or, reading avruv : i he magnifies himself.’ 
 
O W 
 
 SPEECH OF DIO DOT US. 
 
 199 
 
 .c. 427. preparations, and, when besieged, resist to the last, know- III. 
 
 1 88, 2 ' ing that it is all the same whether they come to terms 
 early or late ? Shall not we ourselves suffer ? For we 
 shall waste our money by sitting down before a city 
 which refuses .to surrender ; when the place is taken it 
 will be a mere wreck, and we shall in future lose the 
 revenues derived from it a ; and in these revenues lies 
 our military strength. Do not then weigh offences with 
 the severity of a judge, when you will only be injuring 
 yourselves, but have an eye to the future ; let the 
 penalties which you impose on rebellious cities be mo¬ 
 derate, and then their wealth will be undiminished and 
 at your service. Do not hope to find a safeguard in the 
 severity of your laws, but only in the vigilance of your ad¬ 
 ministration. At present we do just the opposite ; a free 
 people under a strong government will always revolt in 
 the hope of independence ; and when we have put them 
 down we think that they cannot be punished too severely. 
 
 But instead of inflicting extreme penalties on free men 
 who revolt, we should practise extreme vigilance before 
 they revolt, and never allow such a thought to enter their 
 minds. When however they have been once put down 
 we ought to extenuate their crimes as much as possible. 
 
 ‘Think of another great error into which you would 47 - 
 fall if you listened to Cleon. At present the popular If y° u de_ 
 
 . r r . stroy the 
 
 party are everywhere our friends; either they do not join Mityienae- 
 with the oligarchs, or, if compelled to do so, they are their dty PUt 
 always ready to turn against the authors of the revolt ; h^nds^you 
 and so in going to war with a rebellious state you have wil1 show 
 
 1 i- i -i -n. -r , ingratitude 
 
 the multitude on your side. But if you destroy the andaiienate 
 
 people of Mitylene who took no part in the revolt, and party every- 
 
 who voluntarily surrendered the city as soon as they got Eventf 
 
 arms into their hands : in the first place they were your the y were 
 
 r J J guilty, it 
 
 benefactors, and to slay them would be a crime; in the would be 
 second place you will play into the hands of the ruling pedient^to 
 oligarchies, who henceforward, when they can induce a 
 city to revolt, will at once have the people on their side; 
 a Cp. iii. 39 fin. 
 
200 
 
 SPEECH OF DIO DOT US. 
 
 III. for you will have proclaimed to all that the innocent and 
 the guilty will share the same fate. Even if they were 
 guilty you should wink at their conduct, and not allow 
 the only friends whom you have left to be converted into 
 enemies. Far more conducive to the maintenance of our 
 empire would it be to suffer wrong willingly, than for the 
 sake of justice to put to death those whom we had better 
 spare. Cleon may speak of a punishment which is just 
 and also expedient, but you will find that, in any pro¬ 
 posal like his, the two cannot be combined. 
 
 48. ‘Assured then that what I advise is for the best, and 
 Pass sen- yielding neither to pity nor to lenity, for I am as un- 
 leisure on willing as Cleon can be that you should be influenced 
 soners sent by any such motives, but simply weighing the arguments 
 Paches by which I have urged, accede to my proposal: Pass sentence 
 and spare a t y 0 ur leisure on the Mitylenaeans whom Paches, deem- 
 
 the rest. J J 
 
 ing them guilty, has sent hither; but leave the rest of the 
 inhabitants where they are. This will be good policy for 
 the future, and will strike present terror into your ene¬ 
 mies. For wise counsel is really more formidable to an 
 enemy than the severity of unmeaning violence.’ 
 
 49. Thus spoke Diodotus, and such were the proposals on 
 The motion either side which most nearly represented the opposing 
 
 of Diodotus . , , 
 
 is just parties. In spite of the reaction there, was a struggle 
 a trireme is between the two opinions ; the show of hands was very 
 wh S ^hby ed ' nea b but the motion of Diodotus prevailed. The Athe- 
 great exer- nians instantly despatched another trireme, hoping that, 
 
 tions arrives J - 0 
 
 in time if the second could overtake the first a , which had a 
 Mityienfc. start of about twenty-four hours, it might be in time to 
 save the city. The Mitylenaean envoys provided wine 
 and barley for the crew, and promised them great 
 rewards if they arrived first. And such was their energy 
 that they continued rowing whilst they ate their barley, 
 kneaded with wine and oil, and slept and rowed by turns. 
 Fortunately no adverse wind sprang up, and, the first of 
 the two ships sailing in no great hurry on her untoward 
 errand, and the second hastening as I have described, 
 a Reading devrepas. 
 
 Ots 
 
O pc! 
 
 ■ C. 427- 
 
 1 . 88, 2. 
 
 TAKING OF MI NO A. 201 
 
 the one did indeed arrive sooner than the other, but not III. 
 much sooner. Paches had read the decree and was 
 about to put it into execution, when the second ap¬ 
 peared and arrested the fate of the city. 
 
 So near was Mitylene to destruction. 
 
 The captives whom Paches had sent to Athens as being 50. 
 the most guilty numbered about a thousand, or rather The cap- 
 more ; these the Athenians, upon the motion of Cleon, Athens are : 
 put to death. They razed the walls of the Mitylenaeans death! 
 and took away their fleet. Then, instead of imposing 
 tribute on them, they divided the whole island, exclusive are divided 
 of the territory of Methymna, into three thousand por- Athenian 
 tions, of which they dedicated three hundred to the cltlzens ‘ 
 Gods ; the remainder they let out to cleruchi a taken 
 from their own citizens, whom they chose by lot and 
 sent to Lesbos. The Lesbians undertook to pay them 
 a yearly rent of two minae b for each portion and culti¬ 
 vated the land themselves. The Athenians also took 
 possession of the towns on the continent which the 
 Mitylenaeans held 0 , and these henceforward v r ere sub¬ 
 ject to Athens. 
 
 Thus ended the revolt of Lesbos. 
 
 During the same summer, after the recovery of Lesbos, 5 I. 
 
 the Athenians, under the command of Nicias the son of The Athe¬ 
 nians under 
 
 Niceratus, made an expedition against the island of Nicias cap- 
 Minoa, which lies in front of Megara ; the Megarians fonifythe 
 had built a fort there and used the island as a military 
 station. But Nicias wanted the Athenians to keep a * 
 
 watch over Megara, not as hitherto from Budorum in 
 Salamis, but from this spot, which was nearer; the 
 Peloponnesians would then be no longer able to send 
 out triremes, as they had already done on one occa¬ 
 sion d , or privateers from the harbour unobserved, and 
 nothing could be brought in by sea to Megara. First 
 of all he took e two projecting towers on the side of 
 a Cleruchi, literally ‘ portioners,’ Athenians who received land in 
 a conquered country, but remained citizens. 
 
 b 8/. 2 s. 6 d. c Cp. iv. 52 med. d Cp. ii. 93, 94. 
 
 c Or, ‘two towers projecting from Nisaea.’ 
 
202 
 
 SURRENDER OF PLATAEA. 
 
 III. the island towards Nisaea 6 by the help of engines from 
 the sea, and, having thus freed a way into the channel 
 dividing Minoa from the coast of Megara, he fortified the 
 point nearest the mainland, where, by a bridge through 
 a lagoon, aid could be brought to the island, lying as 
 it did at that point close to the shore. The work was 
 completed in a few days. Nicias then proceeded to 
 build a fort on the island, and, leaving a garrison, re¬ 
 turned with the rest of his army. 
 
 52. In this summer and about the same time the Plataeans, 
 The pi a- who had exhausted their food and could no longer hold 
 
 taeans . . 
 
 surrender out, capitulated to the Peloponnesians. The enemy had 
 Lacedae- assaulted their wall and they were unable to defend 
 anTfive 5 ’ themselves. But the Lacedaemonian commander knew 
 men are their weakness, and was desirous that the place should 
 
 sent from 
 
 Sparta to be surrendered and not stormed ; he had instructions 
 fate. from home to this effect, the intention being that if some 
 ta^nleave day a treaty of peace were concluded, and both parties 
 the S ir mvn 11 a £ ree d to £P ve U P the places which they had taken 
 defence. by force of arms a , Plataea might be excepted on the 
 ground that the inhabitants had come to terms of their 
 own accord. So he sent a herald to enquire whether 
 they would surrender the place to the Lacedaemonians 
 and submit to their decision ; the guilty were to be 
 punished, but no one without a just cause. The Pla¬ 
 taeans, now in the last stage of weakness, surrendered 
 the city; and for a few days, until the five men who 
 were appointed judges came from Lacedaemon, the 
 Peloponnesians supplied them with food. On the ar¬ 
 rival of the judges no accusation was brought against 
 them ; they were simply asked one by one, Whether 
 they had done any kind of service to the Lacedae¬ 
 monians or to their allies in the present war. Before 
 making their reply they requested leave to speak at 
 length, and appointed two of their number, Astyma- 
 chus the son of Asopolaus, and Lacon the son of 
 Aeimnestus, who was the Lacedaemonian proxenus, 
 a Cp. v. 17 med. 
 
 oca 
 
Otd 
 
 SPEECH OF THE PLATAEANS. 
 
 c. 427. to be their advocates. They came forward and spoke 
 “ 88, 2 ‘ as follows :— 
 
 c Men of Lacedaemon, we surrendered our city be¬ 
 cause we had confidence in you ; we were under the 
 impression that the trial to which we submitted would 
 be legal, and of a very different kind from this ; and 
 when we accepted you and you alone to be our judges, 
 which indeed you are, we thought that at your hands we 
 had the best hope of obtaining justice. But we fear that 
 we are doubly mistaken, having too much reason to sus¬ 
 pect that in this trial our lives are at stake, and that you 
 will turn out to be partial judges. So we must infer, 
 because no accusation has been preferred against us 
 calling for a defence, but we speak at our own re¬ 
 quest ; and because your question is a short one, to 
 which the answer, if true, condemns us, and, if false, is 
 exposed at once. In the extremity of our helplessness, 
 our only and our safest course is to say something, what¬ 
 ever may be our fate; for men in our condition are sure to 
 reproach themselves with their silence, and to fancy that 
 the unuttered word, if spoken, would have saved them. 
 
 £ But by what arguments can we ever convince you ? 
 If we were unacquainted with one another we might with 
 advantage adduce in evidence matters of which you were 
 ignorant, but now you know all that we can say; and we 
 are afraid, not that we are criminals in your eyes because 
 you have decided that we fall short of your own standard 
 of virtue a , but that we are being sacrificed to please others, 
 and that the cause which we plead is already prejudged. 
 
 f Still we may urge our claims of justice against our 
 Theban enemies, and our claims of gratitude upon you 
 and the other Hellenes; the recollection of our good 
 deeds may perhaps move you. To your short question, 
 “ Whether in this war we have done any service to the 
 Lacedaemonians and their allies,” we reply that “ if we 
 are enemies you are not wronged, because you have 
 received no good from us; and if you deem us friends, 
 a Gp. iii. 57 init. 
 
 We hoped 
 to have a 
 legal trial 
 and to 
 receive 
 justice at 
 your hands, 
 but we are 
 disap¬ 
 pointed. 
 
 We now 
 fear that 
 we are to 
 be sacrificed 
 to the 
 Thebans. 
 
 54 - 
 
 Treat us 
 either as 
 friends or 
 as open 
 enemies. 
 Remember 
 our conduct 
 (1) in the 
 Persian 
 War, (2) in 
 the revolt 
 of the 
 Helots. 
 
-°4 
 
 SPEECH OF THE PLATAEAXS. 
 
 III. you who have made war upon us, and not we, are to 
 blame.” During the late peace and in the Persian War 
 our conduct was irreproachable; we were not the first to 
 violate the peace, and we were the only Boeotians who 
 took part in repelling the Persian invader and in the 
 liberation of Hellas. Although we are an inland city, 
 we joined in the sea-fight of Artemisium ; we were at 
 your side when you fought in our land under Pausanias, 
 and, whatever dangers the Hellenes underwent in those 
 days, we took a share beyond our strength in all of them. 
 And you, Lacedaemonians, more especially should re¬ 
 member how at the time when Sparta was panic-strickea 
 by the rebellion of the Helots, who seized Ithome after 
 the earthquake a , we sent a third part of our own citizens 
 to your aid ; these are things not to be forgotten. 
 
 55. 'Such was the spirit which animated us in the great 
 We only days of old ; not until later did we become your enemies, 
 
 left you .... _ , , 
 
 when you and that was originally your own fault. Por when we 
 " tC> sought your help against the violence of the Thebans, 
 iiTebans 116 y° u re j ecte d us an d bade us turn to the Athenians, who 
 and told us were near, whereas you were at a distance. Yet even in 
 
 to go to the 
 
 Athenians, this war you have neither suffered nor were ever likely 
 helped us to suffer anything very atrocious at our hands. If we 
 howcouW re ^ use< ^ revolt from the Athenians at your bidding, we 
 we abandon were quite right; for they assisted us against the Thebans 
 
 them? . 1 1 r 1 . T r ... 
 
 when you shrank from the task ; and after this it would 
 have been dishonourable to betray them. They had been 
 our benefactors; we had been at our own request admitted 
 to their alliance, and we shared the rights of citizen¬ 
 ship with them. How could we refuse to respond loyally 
 to their call ? When you or they in the exercise of your 
 supremacy have acted, it may be, wrongly and led your 
 allies into evil courses, the leaders and not the followers 
 are to be blamed. 
 
 56. ‘The Thebans have inflicted many injuries upon us, 
 The The- and their latest crime, as you are well aware, is the 
 tacked us cause of our present misfortunes. They came, not only 
 
 a Cp. i. 101. 
 
 O td o 00 
 
ow 
 
 .C. 427- 
 
 1 . 88, 2. 
 
 SPEECH OF THE PLATAEANS . 205 
 
 in time of peace, but at a holy season, and attempted III. 
 to seize our city; we righteously and in accordance in time of 
 
 y ^ . peace: 
 
 with universal law defended ourselves and punished were we 
 the aggressor, and there is no reason why we should resSfng 
 now suffer for their satisfaction. If you take your own Jf^ ? have 
 present advantage and theft present hatred to be the erred at alI » 
 
 r . ... r is not the 
 
 measure of justice, you will prove yourselves, not upright error out- 
 and impartial judges, but the slaves of expediency. The our^orme/ 
 Thebans may appear serviceable now, but of far greater ^ t t n t ^ sm ? 
 service to you were we and the other Hellenes when J rin ' 
 you were in far greater danger. For now you invade which we 
 and menace others, but in those days the Barbarian was made us Gn * 
 threatening to enslave us all, and they were on his side, [^v^the 
 May we not fairly set our former patriotism against our Athenians, 
 present offence, if indeed we have offended? You will 
 find that the one more than outweighs the other ; for 
 our service to you was performed at a time when very 
 few Hellenes opposed their courage to the power of 
 Xerxes; they were then held in honour, not a who, looking 
 to their own advantage, made terms with the invader a 
 and were safe, but who, in the face of danger, dared the 
 better part. Of that number were we, and there was 
 a time when we received the highest honour at your 
 hands, but now we fear that these same principles, which 
 have led us to prefer a just alliance with the Athenians 
 to an interested alliance with you, will be our destruc¬ 
 tion. And yet the consistency of men’s conduct should 
 be consistently acknowledged. For true expediency is 
 only this—to have an enduring sense of gratitude to¬ 
 wards good allies whose virtues are recognised by us, 
 while we do not neglect our own immediate interest. 
 
 ‘Consider, before you act, that hitherto you have been 57. 
 
 generally esteemed among Hellenes to be a pattern of Remember 
 
 nobility; if you decide unjustly (and this judgment can- reputation: 
 
 not be hidden, for you, the judges, are famous, and we, o° t J^ e 
 
 who are judged by you, are of good repute), mankind Hellenic 
 *' ^ ' sentiment 
 
 a Or, reading avrols, and referring the word to the Persians: ‘who, 
 looking to advantage, forwarded the course of the invader.’ 
 
20 6 
 
 SPEECH OF THE PLATAEANS. 
 
 III. 
 
 by allowing 
 Plataea, 
 whose name 
 your fathers 
 inscribed on 
 the Del¬ 
 phian tri¬ 
 pod, to 
 be blotted 
 out in 
 order to 
 please the 
 Thebans. 
 
 will be indignant at the strange and disgraceful sentence 
 which you will have passed against good men (although 
 you may be better yourselves) a . They will not endure 
 to see spoils taken from us, the benefactors of Hellas, 
 dedicated by our enemies in the common temples. Will 
 it not be deemed a monstrbus thing that the Lacedae¬ 
 monians should desolate Plataea; that they, whose fathers 
 inscribed the name of the city on the tripod at Delphi 
 in token of her valour b , should for the sake of the 
 
 Thebans blot out the whole people from the Hellenic 
 world? P"or to this we have come at last. When 
 
 the Persians conquered our land, we were all but ruined ; 
 and now, when we plead before you, who were once our 
 dearest friends, the Thebans have prevailed against us. 
 We have had to meet two terrible trials, the danger first 
 of starvation, if we had not given up the city; and se¬ 
 condly, of condemnation to death. The Plataeans, who 
 were zealous in the cause of Hellas even beyond their 
 strength, are now friendless, spurned and rejected by all. 
 None of our old allies will help us, and we fear that 
 you, O Lacedaemonians, our only hope, are not to be 
 depended upon. 
 
 58. ‘Yet once more for the sake of those Gods in whose 
 
 Do not name we made a league of old, and for our services to 
 
 famy upon the cause of Hellas, relent and change your minds, if 
 
 byTiaying the Thebans have at all influenced you : c in return for 
 
 Youran- tS ’ tke w i cke d request which they make of you, ask of 
 
 cestors are them the righteous boon that you should not slay us 
 buried in J 
 
 our land, to your own dishonour c . Do not bring upon yourselves 
 honoured' 6 an ev il name merely to gratify others. For, although 
 ycady b |ifts. ^ ou ma y q uickl y take our hves, you will not so easily 
 Win you obliterate the infamy of the deed. We are not enemies 
 
 give them .... 
 
 up to their whom you might justly punish, but friends who were 
 and" enslave compelled to go to war with you ; and therefore piety 
 
 a Cp. iii. 53 fin. b Cp. i. 132 init. 
 
 c Or, ‘ ask of them the boon that you should not kill those whom 
 you ought not, and receive an honest gratitude from us, instead of 
 a disgraceful gratitude from them.’ 
 
 O td 
 
PQ O 
 
 C. 427 
 .. 88. 2 
 
 SPEECH OF THE PLATAEANS . 207 
 
 . demands that you should spare our lives. Before you III. 
 
 ‘ pass judgment, consider that we surrendered ourselves, f^which^ 7 
 and stretched out our hands to you ; the custom of the^reedom 
 Hellas does not allow the suppliant to be put to death. was won ? 
 Remember too that we have ever been your benefactors. 
 
 Cast your eyes upon the sepulchres of your fathers slain 
 by the Persians and buried in our land, whom we have 
 honoured by a yearly public offering of garments, and 
 other customary gifts. We were their friends, and we 
 gave them the firstfruits in their season of that friendly 
 land in which they rest; we were their allies too, 
 who in times past had fought at their side ; and if you 
 now pass an unjust sentence, will not your conduct 
 strangely contrast with ours ? Reflect: when Pausanias 
 buried them here, he thought that he was laying them 
 among friends and in friendly earth. But if you put 
 us to death, and make Plataea one with Thebes, are you 
 not robbing your fathers and kindred of the honour 
 which they enjoy, and leaving them in a hostile land in¬ 
 habited by their murderers ? Nay more, you enslave the 
 land in which the Hellenes won their liberty; you bring 
 desolation upon the temples in which they prayed when 
 they conquered the Persians ; and you take away the 
 sacrifices which our fathers instituted from the city 
 which ordained and established them. 
 
 ‘These things, O Lacedaemonians, would not be for 59 * 
 your honour. They would be an offence against the We f ntr fat 
 
 J J 0 you by the 
 
 common feeling of Hellas and against your ancestors, common 
 You should be ashamed to put us to death, who are your Hellas! by 
 benefactors and have never done you any wrong, in fathers’ 
 order that you may gratify the enmity of another. °Q{Jg S t ’ r ^ s 
 Spare us, and let you heart be softened towards us ; be We did not 
 
 . , • 1 • , surrender 
 
 wise, and have mercy upon us, considering not only to the 
 how terrible will be our fate, but who the sufferers are ; we would* 
 think too of the uncertainty of fortune, which may strike ^ed e Q f have 
 any one however innocent. We implore you, as is be- hunger: if 
 coming and natural in our hour of need, by the Gods hearts, n0t 
 whom the Hellenes worship at common altars, to listen STour dt? k 
 
III. 
 
 and let us 
 •meet our 
 fate. 
 
 60. 
 
 The The¬ 
 bans also 
 obtain leave 
 to speak. 
 
 61. 
 
 We should 
 not have 
 spoken if 
 the Pla- 
 taeans had 
 not. 
 
 But you 
 must hear 
 our case 
 as well 
 as theirs. 
 They se¬ 
 parated 
 
 208 SPEECH OF THE PLATAEANS. 
 
 to our prayers. We appeal to the oaths which your 
 fathers swore, and entreat you not to forget them. We 
 kneel at your fathers’ tombs, and we call upon the dead 
 not to let us be betrayed into the hands of the Thebans, 
 their dearest friends to their bitterest enemies. We 
 remind you of the day on which we shared in their 
 glorious deeds—we who on this day are in danger of 
 meeting a fearful doom. And now we say no more ; 
 to men in our case, though we must, there is nothing 
 harder than to make an end ; for with the end comes 
 the decisive hour. Our last word is that we did not 
 surrender Plataea to the Thebans,—far rather would we 
 have perished from hunger, the most miserable of deaths, 
 —but to you, in whom we trusted, and, if you will not 
 listen to us, you ought at least to replace us in the same 
 position, and allow us to choose our destiny, whatever it 
 may be. We adjure you not to deliver us, the Plataeans, 
 who were so loyal to the cause of Hellas, and who are 
 now suppliants to you, O Lacedaemonians, out of your 
 own hands and your own good faith, into the hands of 
 the Thebans, our worst enemies. Be our saviours. You 
 are liberating the other Hellenes ; do not destroy us. 5 
 
 Such were the words of the Plataeans ; whereupon 
 the Thebans, fearing that the Lacedaemonians might 
 give way, came forward and said that since, against their 
 judgment, the Plataeans had been allowed, instead of 
 answering the question, to make a long defence, they 
 too wished to speak. Permission was granted, and they 
 spoke as follows :— 
 
 ‘We should never have asked to speak, if the Plataeans 
 had briefly answered the question which was put to 
 them a , and had not turned upon us and arraigned us 
 while they made a long and irrelevant defence of their 
 own doings, excusing themselves from charges which 
 nobody brought against them, and praising what nobody 
 blamed. We must answer their accusations of us, and 
 look a little closely into their glorification of themselves, 
 a Cp. i. 37 init. 
 
 wo 
 
PQ O 
 
 REPLY OF THE THEBANS . 209 
 
 C.427. that neither our baseness nor their superior reputation III. 
 
 ' 88, 2 ' may benefit them, and that, before you judge, you may 
 
 hear the truth both about us and them. Our quarrel own nation 
 
 .11 ■, r' ■ - and went 
 
 with them arose thus :—borne time after our first occu- over to the 
 pation of Boeotia a we settled Plataea and other places, Athemans - 
 out of which we drove a mixed multitude. But they 
 refused to acknowledge our leadership according to the 
 original agreement, and, separating themselves from the 
 other Boeotians, deserted the traditions of their ancestors. 
 
 When force was applied to them they went over to the 
 Athenians, and, assisted by them, did us a great deal of 
 mischief ; and we retaliated. 
 
 ‘They say that when the Barbarian invaded Hellas 62. 
 they were the only Boeotians who did not join the Jat 3 w?’ y 
 Persian; and this is their great glory, and our great re- sided with 
 proach. But we say that if they did not side with the in the war 
 Persians, it was only because the Athenians did not; Son^To 
 and on the same principle, they alone of all the Boeotians Jepi^that 
 afterwards sided with the Athenians when the liberties we were n °t 
 
 our own 
 
 of Hellas were attacked by them. But, consider how masters, 
 different were the circumstances in which we and they aftemards 
 acted. In those days our state was not governed by an coron£ tat 
 oligarchy which granted equal justice to all, nor yet by ^ e *® ion 
 a democracy; the power was in the hands of a small of Hellas, 
 cabal, than which nothing is more opposed to law or to now fight- 
 true political order, or more nearly resembles a tyranny. mg for ll * 
 The rulers of the state, hoping to strengthen their 
 private interest if the Persian won, kept the people 
 down and brought him in. The city at large, when she 
 acted thus, was not her own mistress; and she cannot 
 be fairly blamed for an error which she committed when 
 she had no constitution. After the Persian departed and 
 she obtained a constitution, you may see how we fought 
 against the Athenians when they became aggressive and 
 endeavoured to subjugate us as well as the rest of Hellas. 
 
 Owing to our divisions they actually conquered the 
 greater part of the country; but we defeated them at 
 a Cp. i. 12. 
 
 P 
 
210 
 
 REPLY OF THE THEBANS. 
 
 III. Coronea, and liberated Boeotia a ; and at this moment B.c 427. 
 we are zealously co-operating in the liberation of Hellas, 
 providing cavalry and munitions of war more largely 
 than any of the allies. Thus much in answer to the 
 charge respecting our Persian tendencies. 
 
 63. \J ‘And now we will proceed to show that you, and 
 But they of no t we, have done the greater wrong to Hellas, and are 
 
 their own ° 0 
 
 free-will deserving of every sort of punishment. You say that 
 Athenians you became allies and citizens of Athens in order that 
 aggressions y° u t> e protected against us. If so, you ought to 
 
 have invited their aid only against us, and not to have 
 They plead assisted them in their attacks upon others ; such a course 
 
 obligation, . . , . r 
 
 but no was certainly open to you : even 11 you were in some 
 canfustify degree coerced by the Athenians, you had previously 
 a crime. made the alliance with the Lacedaemonians against the 
 Persians, to which you are so fond of appealing. That 
 alliance would at any rate have restrained our hands, 
 and above all would have secured to you freedom of de¬ 
 liberation. You were your own masters and no longer 
 under compulsion when you made common cause with 
 the Athenians. Your allegation is that they were your 
 benefactors and that you could not honourably betray 
 them ; but how far more dishonourable and wicked to 
 betray all the Hellenes with whom you had sworn alli¬ 
 ance, than the Athenians only, the one the liberators, 
 the other the enslavers of Hellas I The return which 
 you made to them is unequal, nay, infamous; you say 
 that you invited them to assist you because you were 
 wronged, and then you became their accomplices in 
 wronging others. Surely ingratitude is shown in refusing 
 to return an honourable kindness, when it can be done 
 honourably, not in refusing to return a kindness which, 
 however justly due, cannot be returned without a crime. 
 
 64. ‘You have thus made plain that when you alone 
 When they among the Boeotians refused to join the Persian cause, 
 
 Persian it this was not out of any love for Hellas, but because the 
 cmise^he 136 Athenians did not; b and that you wanted b to act with 
 
 a Cp. iv. 92 fin. b Or, ‘and because you wanted’ etc. 
 
o w 
 
 REPLY OF THE THEBANS . 
 
 211 
 
 them and not with us ; and now you claim the benefit 
 ' of the virtue which others inspired in you. But this is ^ 
 not reasonable ; having once chosen the Athenians, fight t 
 on their side, and do not at the last moment be saying s 
 that the old alliance ought to save you. For you have [ 
 abandoned it, and by the violation of it, instead of j 
 striving to prevent, have aided in the enslavement of the f 
 . Aeginetans and of other members of the alliance. And t 
 you were not, like us, under compulsion, but free, living 1 
 under your ancient laws. Moreover, you persisted in 
 refusing that last offer of peace and neutrality which 
 we made to you before the siege began a . Who more 
 thoroughly than you deserve the hatred of the Hellenes? 
 than you who have only displayed your virtues to their 
 injury? You have given proof that the merit which 
 you claim for your former actions does not properly 
 belong to you! Your true nature and constant desire 
 are now revealed in the light of day; for you have 
 followed the Athenians in the path of injustice. Thus 
 much we have to say as to our involuntary dealings 
 with the Persians, and your voluntary dealings with the 
 Athenians. 
 
 ‘ The last offence which you lay to our charge is that 
 we unlawfully assailed your city in time of peace, and at' 
 a holy season ; even in that affair we do not think our- i 
 selves more in fault than you. We do not deny that we ■ 
 were wrong if of our own mere motion we went to your \ 
 city, fought with you, and ravaged your land. But when ] 
 certain of the noblest and richest of your citizens, who ( 
 wished to withdraw you from a foreign alliance and to ) 
 bring you back to the national institutions of Boeotia, : 
 came and invited us, wherein are we to blame ? As you 
 say yourselves, the leaders rather than the followers are 
 the transgressors b . But in our opinion, neither we nor 
 they were really guilty. Like yourselves they were citi¬ 
 zens, and they had a greater stake in the country than 
 you have; they opened their own gates and received 
 
 a Cp. ii. 72, 73. b Cp. iii. 55 fin. 
 
 P 2 
 
 Athenians 
 resisted 
 him. They 
 have now 
 shown 
 themselves 
 in their true 
 light, and 
 have for¬ 
 feited all 
 their claims 
 
 65 - 
 
 They say 
 that we 
 broke into 
 their city. 
 True, be¬ 
 cause we 
 were invited 
 by the most 
 influential 
 and pa¬ 
 triotic of 
 their citi- 
 
212 
 
 REPLY OF THE THEBANS. 
 
 III. us into their native city, not as her enemies but as 
 her friends. They desired that the bad among you 
 should not grow worse, and that the good should have 
 their reward. They wanted to reform the principles of 
 your citizens, and not to banish their persons; they 
 would have brought them back into a natural union 
 with their kindred, that Plataea might be the ally of 
 all and the enemy of none. 
 
 66. ‘ And the proof that we acted in no hostile spirit is 
 wereready 7 tb at we did no h arm to an y ° ne j but made a proclama- 
 to join us, tion that whoever wished to live under the national 
 
 but after ... 
 
 awhile institutions of Boeotia should join us. You came to 
 uponus, us gladly, and, entering into an agreement, for a time 
 our citizens °^ ere d no opposition ; but afterwards, when you dis- 
 whom they covered that we were few, you turned upon us. Even 
 
 had sworn ' x 
 
 to spare, allowing that we did act somewhat inconsiderately in 
 entering your town without the consent of your whole 
 people, still how different was your conduct and ours! 
 For if you had followed our example you would have 
 used no violence, but thought only of getting us out 
 by persuasion, whereas you broke the agreement and 
 attacked us. Now we do not so much complain of the 
 fate of those whom you slew in battle—for they indeed 
 suffered by a kind of law—but there were others who 
 stretched out their hands to you ; and although you 
 gave them quarter, and then promised to us that you 
 would spare them, in utter defiance of law you took 
 their lives—was not that a cruel act? Here are three 
 crimes which you committed within a few hours ; the 
 breach of the agreement, the slaughter of the prisoners 
 which followed, and the lying promise which you made 
 to us that you would not slay them if we did no in¬ 
 jury to your property in the fields; and yet you insist 
 that we are the criminals, and that you ought to be 
 acquitted. Not so; if the Lacedaemonians give just 
 judgment: but for all these offences you shall suffer. 
 
 67. ‘We have entered into particulars, Lacedaemonians, 
 You should both for your sakes and for our own, that you may know 
 
 know the 3 J J 
 
 w o 
 
B.C. 4 2 7- 
 . 01 . 88 , 2 . 
 
 REPLY OF THE THEBANS. 213 
 
 the sentence which you are going to pass on them to III. 
 be righteous, and still more righteous the vengeance 
 which we have taken. Do not let your hearts be taeans. if 
 softened by tales about their ancient virtues, if they the virtues 
 ever had any; such virtues might plead for the injured, [hey h p?e- 
 but should bring a double penalty a on the authors of a ey 
 base deed, because they are false to their own character, a double 
 Let them gain nothing by their pitiful lamentations, or ment. Pity 
 by appealing to your fathers’ tombs and their own fpeir ’ 
 desolate condition. We tell you that a far sadder pQj™ s eir 
 fate was inflicted by them on our murdered youth, of misfortunes 
 
 J J they may 
 
 whose fathers some fell at Coronea in the act of bring- thank them¬ 
 ing Boeotia to join you, while others are left in their old the V questfon 
 age by their solitary hearths, and entreat you, with far 
 better reason, to punish the Plataeans. Men who suffer 
 an unworthy fate are indeed to be pitied, but there should 
 be joy over those who suffer justly, as these do. For 
 their present desolation they may thank themselves ; 
 they might have chosen the worthier alliance, but they 
 wilfully renounced it. We never injured them, until 
 they first sinned against us ; the spirit of hatred and not 
 of justice possessed them, and even now they are not 
 punished half enough. For they are going to suffer 
 by a lawful sentence, not, as they pretend, stretching 
 out their suppliant hands on the field of battle, but 
 delivering themselves up to justice under the terms of 
 a capitulation. Maintain then, Lacedaemonians, the 
 common Hellenic law which they 'have outraged, and 
 give to us, who have suffered contrary to law, the just 
 recompense of our zeal in your cause. Do not be 
 moved by their words to spurn and reject us b , but 
 show Hellas by example that, when a cause is tried 
 at your tribunal, deeds and not words will prevail. If 
 the deeds be good, a brief statement of them is enough ; 
 if they be evil, speeches full of fine sentiments do but 
 veil them. If all persons in authority were like you, 
 and would sum up a case in a short question, and pass 
 a Cp. i. 86 init. b Cp. iii. 57 fin. 
 
214 FATE OF THE PLATAFAXS. 
 
 III. sentence upon all the offenders at once, men would be 
 less tempted to seek out fair words in order to excuse 
 foul deeds.’ 
 
 68. Thus spoke the Thebans. The Lacedaemonian judges 
 The Pia- thought that no objection could be made to their ques- 
 
 taeans are ° J 
 
 put to tion, whether the Plataeans had done them any service 
 their city in the war. a For they pretended to have expected 
 ground the neutrality from them in the times before the war, on the 
 strength of the original treaty concluded with Pausanias 
 after the defeat of the Persians. And just before the 
 siege they had made to them a proposal a of neutrality 
 in accordance with the terms of the same treaty; but 
 the Plataeans had refused. Considering that they had 
 been wronged by them, and that they were now released 
 from the obligations of the treaty by the failure of their 
 just intentions, they again brought up the Plataeans 
 one after another, and asked each of them separately, 
 Whether he had done any service to the Lacedae¬ 
 monians and their allies in the war? When he said 
 No, they took him away and slew him ; no one was 
 spared. They put to death not less than two hundred 
 Plataeans, as well as twenty-five Athenians who had 
 shared with them in the siege ; and made slaves of the 
 women. For about a year the Thebans gave possession 
 of the city to certain Megarians, who had been driven 
 out by a revolution 13 , and to any surviving Plataeans 
 who were of their own party; but they afterwards razed 
 the whole place to the very foundations, and built near 
 the precinct of Here an inn forming a square of two 
 hundred feet; it had two stories, and chambers all 
 round. They used the roofs and the doors of the 
 Plataeans ; and of the brass and iron articles of furniture 
 found within the walls they made couches, which they 
 
 a Or, taking ow in a different sense, and repeating it before kol 
 ore varepov: ‘ For they had been constantly requesting them, as they 
 said, to remain neutral in the times before the war,. . . and they had 
 repeated the request when just before the siege they had made 
 to them a proposal ’ etc. 
 b Cp. iv. 66 init. 
 
 Ota 
 
£C O 
 
 B.C. 427. 
 01. 88, 2. 
 
 C. 519. 
 • 65, 2. 
 
 LACEDAEMONIAN EXPEDITION TO CORCYRA. 215 
 
 dedicated to Here; they also built in her honour a stone III* 
 temple a hundred feet long. The Plataean territory 
 they converted into public land, and let it out for terms 
 of ten years ; some of their own citizens occupied it. 
 Throughout the whole affair the severity shown by the 
 Lacedaemonians to the Plataeans was mainly promoted 
 by a desire to gratify the Thebans, who seemed likely to 
 be useful allies to them in the war then just beginning. 
 
 Such was the fate of Plataea, which was overthrown 
 ninety-three years after the Plataeans entered into 
 alliance with Athens a . 
 
 The forty Peloponnesian ships which had been sent 69. 
 to the aid of Lesbos, as they fled through the open sea ^?^ s of 
 pursued by the Athenians 15 , were caught in a storm He and 
 near Crete, and, making their way in a straggling ready 
 condition from Crete to the Peloponnesus, found at ^ t ion P to 
 Cyllene thirteen Leucadian and Ambraciot triremes, Corcyra. 
 and Brasidas the son of Tellis, who had been sent out 
 as a commissioner to advise Alcidas. The Lacedae¬ 
 monians at home, after the failure of their attempt on 
 Lesbos, had determined to increase their navy and sail 
 to Corcyra, which was in a state of revolution. The 
 Athenian squadron at Naupactus consisted of twelve 
 ships only, and the Lacedaemonians wanted to reach 
 the island before any more vessels could arrive from 
 Athens. Brasidas and Alcidas made their preparations 
 accordingly. 
 
 Now Corcyra had been in an unsettled state ever 70. 
 since the return of the prisoners who were taken at sea Unsettled 
 in the Epidamnian war c , and afterwards released by the Corcyra, 
 Corinthians. They were nominally ransomed for a sum f^theln- 2 
 of eight hundred talents d on the security of their T gues of 
 
 0 . J the prison- 
 
 proxeni, but in reality they had been induced to try ers who had 
 and gain over Corcyra to the Corinthian interest. They from 
 went from one citizen to another, and solicited them to Corinth * 
 revolt from Athens. On the arrival of an Athenian and 
 
 Cp. Herod, vi. 108. 
 Cp. i. 55 med. 
 
 b Cp. iii. 33. 
 d ^192,000. 
 
III. 
 
 Trial of 
 Peithias, the 
 popular 
 leader. His 
 acquittal. 
 Trial of the 
 oligarchs, 
 and murder 
 of Peithias 
 and of sixty- 
 others . 
 
 7 1 - 
 
 Temporary 
 triumph of 
 the oli¬ 
 garchs. 
 
 2l6 THE CORCYRAEAN SEDITION / 
 
 also of a Corinthian vessel conveying ambassadors, there b.c. 427. 
 was a discussion in the assembly, and the Corcyraeans 01 * 88,2 ‘ 
 voted that they would continue allies of Athens accord¬ 
 ing to their agreement a , but would renew their former 
 friendship with the Peloponnesians. A certain Peithias, 
 who voluntarily acted as the proxenus of the Athenians 
 and was the popular leader, was summoned by the 
 partizans of the Peloponnesians to take his trial, they 
 affirming that he wanted to bring Corcyra under the 
 yoke of Athens. He was acquitted, and then he in turn 
 summoned their five richest men, declaring that they 
 were in the habit of cutting poles for vines in the sacred 
 precinct of Zeus and Alcinous; now for each pole the 
 penalty was fixed at a stater b . They were condemned ; 
 but the fine was so excessive that they went and sat as 
 suppliants in the temple of Zeus and Alcinous, begging 
 that they might pay the money by instalments. Peithias, 
 who happened to be a member of the senate as well as 
 the popular leader, persuaded the senators to put the law 
 in execution. The culprits, knowing that the law was 
 against them, and perceiving that Peithias c as long as he 
 remained in the senate would try to induce the people c 
 to make an alliance offensive and defensive with Athens, 
 conspired together, and, rushing into the council chamber 
 with daggers in their hands, slew him and others to the 
 number of sixty, as well private persons as senators. A 
 few who were of the same party with him took refuge in 
 the Athenian trireme, which had not yet left. 
 
 The next step taken by the conspirators was to 
 assemble the people and tell them that they had 
 acted for the best, and in order to secure them- against 
 the tyranny of Athens. For, the future they should 
 receive neither Athenians nor Peloponnesians, unless 
 they came peaceably with one ship ; to bring more 
 
 a Cp. i. 44. 
 
 b If the gold stater, about 1 6 j. ; iFjthe silver Athenian stater, 
 about is. 3 d .; if the silver Corinthian stater (ten Aeginetan obols), 
 about 2 s. 2d. 
 
 c Or, ‘ before he ceased to be a senator would persuade the people.’ 
 
B.C. 427. 
 01. 88, 2. 
 
 THE CORCYRAEAN SEDITION . 217 
 
 should be deemed the act of an enemy; and this pro- III. 
 posal they compelled the people to ratify. They also 
 sent envoys to Athens, who were to put the most favour¬ 
 able colour on the affair, and to dissuade the refugees 
 who had fled thither from taking any inconvenient step 
 which might lead to a counter-revolution. 
 
 When the envoys arrived, the Athenians arrested them 7 2 * 
 as disturbers of the peace, and deposited them in Aegina, 
 together with any of the refugees whom they had gained cyra are 
 over. In the meantime, the Corcyraean oligarchs who Athens, 
 were now in power, on the arrival of a Corinthian trireme Jh?popular 
 and Lacedaemonian envoys, attacked and defeated the party- 
 people, who at nightfall took refuge in the Acropolis and 
 the higher parts of the city, and there concentrated their 
 forces. They also held the Hyllaic harbour ; the other 
 party seized the Agora, where most of them lived, 
 and the adjacent harbour which looked towards the 
 continent. 
 
 On the following day they skirmished a little, and 73. 
 both parties sent messengers round the country in- Reinforce- 
 
 .... ... . . . . merits ar- 
 
 vitmg the slaves to join them, and promising them rive, 
 liberty; the greater number came to the aid of the 
 people, while the other faction was reinforced by eight 
 hundred auxiliaries from the mainland. 
 
 After resting a day they fought again, and the people, 74. 
 who had the advantage in numbers and in the strength in a second 
 of their positiQns, gained the victory. Their women ^eopieVre 5 
 joined vigorously in the fray, hurling tiles from the v 1010110113 - 
 housetops, and showing amid the uproar a fortitude 
 beyond their sex. The conflict was decided towards 
 evening ; the oligarchy, fearing lest the people should 
 take the arsenal with a sudden rush and so make an 
 end of them, set fire to the private houses which sur¬ 
 rounded the Agora, as well as to the larger blocks of 
 buildings, sparing neither their own property nor that of 
 any one else in their determination to stop them. Much 
 merchandise was burnt, and the whole city would have 
 been destroyed if the wind had carried the flame in 
 
THE CORCYRAEAN SEDITION. 
 
 III. that direction. Both parties now left off fighting, and 
 kept watch in their own positions during the night. 
 When the popular cause triumphed, the Corinthian 
 vessel stole away and most of the auxiliaries crossed 
 over unobserved to the continent. 
 
 75. On the following day, Nicostratus the son of Diitre- 
 Arrivai of phes, an Athenian general, arrived from Naupactus with 
 Athenian twelve ships and five hundred Messenian hoplites. He 
 xicostra^ er tr ^ e( ^ to effect a reconciliation between the two parties, 
 tus, who and on pi s suggestion they agreed to bring to trial ten of 
 
 vainly tries ^ J ° > 13 
 
 to reconcile the most guilty persons, who immediately fled. The rest 
 tending were to live together, and to make a truce with one 
 
 parties. another, and with Athens an alliance offensive and de¬ 
 
 fensive. Having accomplished his purpose he was about 
 to sail away, when the leaders of the people induced him 
 to leave five of his own vessels, that the enemy might be 
 less inclined to stir, promising to man five ships of their 
 own and send them with him. He agreed, and they 
 selected the crews of the ships out of the opposite 
 faction. But the men were afraid of being sent to 
 Athens, and sat as suppliants in the temple of the 
 Dioscuri. Nicostratus sought to raise them up and 
 reassure them, but they would not trust him ; where¬ 
 upon the people armed themselves, arguing that their 
 mistrust and unwillingness to sail was a proof of their 
 evil designs. They took their enemies’ arms out of their 
 houses, and some of them whom they chanced to meet 
 would have been slain if Nicostratus had not interfered. 
 The rest, to the number of about four hundred, when 
 they saw what was going on took refuge anew in the 
 temple of Here. But the people, fearing that they would 
 resort to violence, persuaded them to rise and conveyed 
 them at once to the island that lies in front of the 
 temple of Here, whither provisions were regularly sent 
 to them. 
 
 76. At this stage of the revolution, on the fourth or fifth 
 Appearance day after the suppliants had been conveyed to the island, 
 
 of the Pelo- X 1 J ’ 
 
 ponnesian the fifty-three Peloponnesian ships from Cyllene, which 
 
 fleet. " " * 
 
 O a 
 
GQ O 
 
 THE CORCYRAEAN SEDITION . 219 
 
 c. 427. since the expedition to Ionia had been in harbour III. 
 
 ' there a , arrived on the scene, still under the command 
 of Alcidas. Brasidas his adviser was on board. They 
 anchored for the night at Sybota, a harbour on the 
 mainland, and when the morning broke they sailed 
 upon Corcyra. 
 
 The whole place was in an uproar ; the people dreaded 77 * 
 their enemies within the city no less than the Pelo- Confused 
 
 y . . battle of 
 
 ponnesian fleet. They hastened to equip sixty ships, the Corcy- 
 and as fast as they were manned sent them out against Ad^nians 
 the Peloponnesians, although the Athenians entreated ^lopo^ 6 
 to be allowed to sail out first, leaving them to follow as nesians - 
 soon as they had got their fleet together. But when in 
 this straggling fashion their ships approached the enemy, 
 two of them at once deserted ; in others the crews were 
 fighting with one another, and everything was in dis¬ 
 order. The Peloponnesians, seeing the confusion, em¬ 
 ployed twenty ships only against the Corcyraeans, and 
 opposed the remainder of their fleet to the twelve 
 Athenian ships, of which two were the Salaminia and 
 Paralus. 
 
 The Corcyraeans, coming up few at a time and in this 78. 
 disorderly fashion, had trouble enough among themselves. Diversion 
 The Athenians, afraid of being surrounded by superior theAthe by 
 numbers, did not attack the main body nor the centre slowly7 e-° 
 of those opposed to them, but fell upon the wings and treat - 
 sank a single ship ; then, the enemy forming in a circle, 
 they sailed round them and endeavoured to throw them 
 into confusion. But those who were opposed to the 
 Corcyraeans, seeing this movement and fearing a repe¬ 
 tition of what happened at Naupactus b , came to the 
 rescue, and the united fleet charged the Athenians. 
 Thereupon they rowed astern, hoping that by retreat¬ 
 ing very leisurely they might give the Corcyraeans 
 .time to escape, especially as the attack of the enemy 
 was now directed against themselves. The naval en¬ 
 gagement ended at sunset. 
 
 a Cp. iv. 69. b Cp. ii. 84. 
 
220 
 
 THE CORCYRAEAN SEDITION. 
 
 III. 
 
 79 * 
 
 The Pelo¬ 
 ponnesian 
 fleet.instead 
 of attacking 
 the city, 
 retire ; 
 
 8o. 
 
 and soon 
 afterwards, 
 hearing 
 that sixty 
 Athenian 
 vessels are 
 approach¬ 
 ing, return 
 home. 
 
 81. 
 
 Massacre 
 of the 
 oligarchs. 
 
 The Corcyraeans, who were afraid that the victorious 
 enemy would sail to the city and have recourse to some 
 decisive measure, such as taking on board the prisoners 
 in the island, conveyed them back to the temple of Here 
 and guarded the city. But the Peloponnesians, although 
 they had won the battle, did not venture to attack the 
 city, but returned to their station on the mainland with 
 thirteen Corcyraean ships which they had taken. On 
 the next day they still hesitated, although there was 
 great panic and confusion among the inhabitants. It 
 is said that Brasidas advised Alcidas to make the at¬ 
 tempt, but he had not an equal vote with him. So they 
 only disembarked at the promontory of Leucimme and 
 ravaged the country. 
 
 Meanwhile the people of Corcyra, dreading that the 
 fleet of the Peloponnesians would attack them, held 
 a parley with the other faction, especially with the 
 suppliants, in the hope of saving the city; they even 
 persuaded some of them to go on board the fleet; for 
 the Corcyraeans still contrived to man thirty ships. 
 But the Peloponnesians, after devastating the land till 
 about midday, retired. And at nightfall the approach 
 of sixty Athenian vessels was signalled to them from 
 Leucas. These had been sent by the Athenians under 
 the command of Eurymedon the son of Thucles, when 
 they heard of the revolution and of the intended ex¬ 
 pedition of Alcidas to Corcyra. 
 
 The Peloponnesians set out that very night on their 
 way home, keeping close to the land, and transporting 
 the ships over the Leucadian isthmus, that they might 
 not be seen sailing round a . When the Corcyraeans 
 perceived that the Athenian fleet was approaching, while 
 that of the enemy had disappeared, they took the Mes- 
 senian troops, who had hitherto been outside the walls, 
 into the city, and ordered the ships which they had. 
 manned to sail round into the Hyllaic harbour. These 
 proceeded on their way. Meanwhile they killed any of 
 a Cp. iv. 8 init. 
 
 mo 
 
THE CORCYRAEAN SEDITION. 221 
 
 B.c. 427. their enemies whom they caught in the city. On the III. 
 
 01 88, 2. arr j va i G f j-j le ships they disembarked those whom they 
 had induced to go on board, and despatched them a ; 
 they also went to the temple of Here, and persuading 
 about fifty of the suppliants to stand their trial, con¬ 
 demned them all to death. The majority would not 
 come out, and, when they saw what was going on, de¬ 
 stroyed one another in the enclosure of the temple 
 where they were, except a few who hung themselves 
 on trees, or put an end to their own lives in any other 
 way which they could. And, during the seven days 
 which Eurymedon after his arrival remained with his 
 sixty ships, the Corcyraeans continued slaughtering those 
 of their fellow-citizens whom they deemed their enemies ; 
 they professed to punish them for their designs against 
 the democracy, but in fact some were killed from motives 
 of personal enmity, and some because money was owing 
 to them, by the hands of their debtors. Every form of 
 death was to be seen, and everything, and more than 
 everything that commonly happens in revolutions, hap¬ 
 pened then. The father slew the son, and the suppliants 
 were torn from the temples and slain near them ; some 
 of them were even walled up in the temple of Dionysus, 
 and there perished. To such extremes of cruelty did 
 revolution go ; and this seemed to be the worst of revo¬ 
 lutions, because it was the first. 
 
 For not long afterwards the whole Hellenic world 82. 
 was in commotion; in every city the chiefs of the de- The conflict 
 mocracy and of the oligarchy were struggling, the one.cracyand 
 to bring in the Athenians, the other the Lacedaemonians, enfouraged 
 Now in time of peace, men would have had no excuse for a , s il is b y 
 
 the hope of 
 
 introducing either, and no desire to do so, but when they Athenian 
 were at war b and both sides could easily obtain allies to monian ae ~ 
 
 a Reading, with Poppo, airexp^ro instead of avex&prjo-av, which 
 gives no sense. 
 
 b Or, taking £vfipaxtas with eVaycoyai, and pabloos in a different 
 sense: ‘ the introduction of a foreign alliance on one side or the 
 other to the hurt of their enemies and the advantage of themselves 
 was easily effected by the dissatisfied party.’ 
 
222 REFLECTIONS ON REVOLUTION. 
 
 HI. the hurt of their enemies and the advantage of them- 
 
 stat P e S ruinS selves > the dissatisfied party were only too ready to in- 
 
 and dis- yoke foreign aid b . And revolution brought upon the 
 organises ...... - - 
 
 society. cities of Hellas many terrible calamities, such as have 
 been and always will be while human nature remains the 
 same, but which are more or less aggravated and differ in 
 character with every new combination of circumstances. 
 In peace and prosperity both states and individuals are 
 actuated by higher motives, because they do not fall 
 under the dominion of imperious necessities ; but war 
 which takes away the comfortable provision of daily 
 life is a hard master, and tends to assimilate men’s 
 characters to their conditions. 
 
 Changes When troubles had once begun in the cities, those who 
 moraYprin- followed carried the revolutionary spirit further and fur- 
 cipies and ther, anc [ determined to outdo the report of all who had 
 ofianguage. preceded them by the ingenuity of their enterprises and 
 the atrocity of their revenges. The meaning of words 
 had no longer the same relation to things, but was changed 
 by them as they thought proper. Reckless daring was 
 held to be loyal courage; prudent delay was the ex¬ 
 cuse of a coward ; moderation was the disguise of un¬ 
 manly weakness ; to know everything was to do nothing. 
 Frantic energy was the true quality of a man. A con¬ 
 spirator who wanted to be safe was a recreant in dis¬ 
 guise. The lover of violence was always trusted, and his 
 opponent suspected. He who succeeded in a plot was 
 deemed knowing, but a still greater master in craft was 
 he who detected one. On the other hand, he who 
 plotted from the first to have nothing to do with plots 
 was a breaker up of parties and a poltroon who was 
 afraid of the enemy. In a word, he who could outstrip 
 another in a bad action was applauded, and so was he 
 who encouraged to evil one who had no idea of it. 
 The tie of party was stronger than the tie of blood, 
 because a partisan was more ready to dare without 
 asking why. (For party associations are not based upon 
 any established law, nor do they seek the public good; 
 
 PQO 
 
do 
 
 ,C. 427. 
 1. 88, 2. 
 
 REFLECTIONS ON REVOLUTION . 223 
 
 they are formed in defiance of the laws and from self- III. 
 interest.) The seal of good faith was not divine law, 
 but fellowship in crime. If an enemy when he was in 
 the ascendant offered fair words, the opposite party re¬ 
 ceived them not in a generous spirit, a but by a jealous 
 watchfulness of his actions a . Revenge was dearer than 
 self-preservation. Any agreements sworn to by either 
 party, when they could do nothing else, were binding as 
 long as both were powerless. But he who on a favour¬ 
 able opportunity first took courage and struck at his 
 enemy when he saw him off his guard, had greater 
 pleasure in a perfidious than he would have had in an 
 open act of revenge ; he congratulated himself that he 
 had taken the safer course, and also that he had over¬ 
 reached his enemy and gained the prize of superior 
 ability. In general the dishonest more easily gain credit 
 for cleverness than the simple for goodness ; men take 
 a pride in the one, but are ashamed of the other. 
 
 The cause of all these evils was the love of power, Causes and 
 originating in avarice and ambition, and the party-spirit the revo- 
 which is engendered by them when men are fairly em- sp^f 1817 
 barked in a contest. For the leaders on either side used Disregard 
 
 of all laws, 
 
 specious names, the one party professing to uphold the human and 
 constitutional equality of the many, the other the wisdom 
 of an aristocracy, while they made the public interests, 
 to which in name they were devoted, in reality their 
 prize. Striving in every way to overcome each other, 
 they committed the most monstrous crimes; yet even 
 these were surpassed by the magnitude of their revenges 
 which they pursued to the very utmost b , neither party 
 observing any definite limits either of justice or public 
 expediency, but both alike making the caprice of the 
 moment their law. Either by the help of an unrighteous 
 sentence, or grasping power with the strong hand, they 
 were eager to satiate the impatience of party-spirit. 
 
 Neither faction cared for religion ; but any fair pretence 
 
 a Or, ‘ but by active precautions.’ 
 
 h Placing the comma after fielfavs instead of after re. 
 
224 
 
 REFLECTIONS ON REVOLUTION. 
 
 III. which succeeded in effecting some odious purpose was 
 greatly lauded. And the citizens who were of neither 
 party fell a prey to both; either they were disliked 
 because they held aloof, or men were jealous of their 
 
 surviving. 
 
 83. Thus revolution gave birth to every form of wicked- 
 Universal ness j n Hellas. The simplicity which is so large an 
 
 distrust. # r J 
 
 Force of element in a noble nature was laughed to scorn and dis¬ 
 not in tel-' appeared. An attitude of perfidious antagonism every- 
 vTiied. re " where prevailed ; for there was no word binding enough, 
 nor oath terrible enough to reconcile enemies. Each 
 man was strong only in the conviction that nothing was 
 secure ; he must look to his own safety, and could not 
 afford to trust others. Inferior intellects generally suc¬ 
 ceeded best. For, aware of their own deficiencies, and 
 
 fearing the capacity of their opponents, for whom they 
 were no match in powers of speech, and whose subtle 
 wits were likely to anticipate them in contriving evil, 
 they struck boldly and at once. But the cleverer sort, 
 presuming in their arrogance that they would be aware 
 
 in time, and disdaining to act when they could think, 
 were taken off their guard and easily destroyed. 
 
 84. Now in Corcyra most of these deeds were perpetrated, 
 (1) Fury of an d f or the first time. There was every crime which men 
 
 the op¬ 
 pressed, a might be supposed a to perpetrate in revenge who had 
 
 content of been governed not wisely, but tyrannically, and now had 
 (3) 6 pany t ^ le oppressor at their mercy. There were the dishonest 
 hatred designs of others who were longing to be relieved from 
 equals, their habitual poverty, and were naturally animated by 
 great in- a passionate desire for their neighbour’s goods ; and 
 crime GS t0 there were crimes of another class which men commit, 
 
 Human no t from covetousness, but from the enmity which 
 
 nature when t J 
 
 inspired by equals foster towards one another until they are carried 
 to^much away by their blind rage into the extremes of pitiless 
 conicience, cruelty. At such a time the life of the city was all 
 or pru- j n disorder, and human nature, which is always ready 
 
 dence. . J J 
 
 to transgress the laws, having now trampled them under 
 
 a Or, supplying tiv with the optative : ‘ may be supposed.’ 
 
 Otd 
 
PQO 
 
 THE AFFAIRS OF SICILY. 
 
 225 
 
 .C^427. foot, delighted to show that her passions were ungovern- III. 
 able, that she was stronger than justice, and the enemy 
 of everything above her. If malignity had not exercised 
 a fatal power, how could any one have preferred revenge 
 to piety, and gain to innocence ? But, when men are 
 retaliating upon others, they are reckless of the future, 
 and do not hesitate to annul those common laws of 
 humanity to which every individual trusts for his own 
 hope of deliverance should he ever be overtaken by 
 calamity: they forget that in their own hour of need 
 they will look for them in vain. 
 
 Such were the passions which the citizens of Corcyra 85. 
 first of all Hellenes displayed towards one another. After The sur- 
 the departure of Eurymedon and the Athenian fleet the gLrchs°eize 
 surviving oligarchs, who to the number of five hundred o^theop- 
 had escaped, seized certain forts on the mainland, and positecoast, 
 
 but soon 
 
 thus became masters of the territory on the opposite return to 
 coast which belonged to Corcyra. Thence issuing forth, and occupy 
 they plundered the Corcyraeans in the island, and did 
 much harm, so that there was a great famine in the city. 
 
 They also sent ambassadors to Lacedaemon and Corinth, 
 begging that they might be restored, but, failing of their 
 object, they procured boats and auxiliaries, and passed 
 over to Corcyra about six hundred in all; then, burning 
 their boats, that they might have no hope but in the 
 conquest of the island, they went up the mount Istone, 
 and building a fort there, became masters of the country, 
 and despoiled the inhabitants of the city. 
 
 At the end of the same summer the Athenians sent 86. 
 twenty ships to Sicily under the command of Laches War in 
 the son of Melanopus, and Charoeades the son of Euphi- tween the 
 letus. Syracuse and Leontini were now at war with one an^S!^ 
 another. All the Dorian cities, except Camarina, were f mes • L the 
 
 5 r ’ latter obtain 
 
 in alliance with Syracuse ; they were the same which at assistance 
 
 the beginning of the war were reckoned in the Lacedae- Athens, 
 monian confederacy, but they had taken no active part a . 
 
 The allies of the Leontines were the Chalcidian cities and 
 a Cp. ii. 7 med. 
 
 Q 
 
22 6 
 
 RETURN OF THE PLAGUE. 
 
 III. Camarina. In Italy the Locrians sided with the Syra¬ 
 cusans, and the Rhegians with the Leontines, who were 
 their kinsmen. The Leontines and their allies sent to 
 Athens, and on the ground, partly of an old alliance, 
 partly of their Ionian descent, begged the Athenians to 
 send them ships, for they were driven off both sea and 
 land by their Syracusan enemies. The Athenians sent 
 the ships, professedly on the ground of relationship, but 
 in reality because they did not wish the Peloponnesians 
 to obtain corn from Sicily. Moreover they meant to try 
 what prospect they had of getting the affairs of Sicily 
 into their hands. So the commanders of the fleet came 
 to Rhegium in Italy, where they established them¬ 
 selves, and carried on the war in concert with their 
 allies. Thus the summer ended. 
 
 Reappear¬ 
 ance of the 
 plague after 
 it had 
 abated. 
 
 At the same 
 time nu¬ 
 merous 
 earthquakes 
 occur. 
 
 Fruitless 
 expedition 
 against the 
 Aeolian 
 islands. 
 
 In the following winter the plague, which had never 
 entirely disappeared, although abating for a time, again 
 attacked the Athenians. It continued on this second oc¬ 
 casion not less than a year, having previously lasted for 
 two years. To the power of Athens certainly nothing was 
 more ruinous ; not less than four thousand four hundred 
 Athenian hoplites who were on the roll died, and also 
 three hundred horsemen, and an incalculable number of 
 the common people. This too was the time when the 
 frequent earthquakes occurred at Athens, in Euboea, 
 and in Boeotia, especially at Orchomenos a . 
 
 During the same winter the Athenians in Sicily and 
 the Rhegians made an expedition with thirty ships 
 against the islands of Aeolus, as they are called, which 
 in summer time cannot be attacked owing to the want 
 of water. These islands belong to the Liparaeans, who 
 are colonists of the Cnidians : they inhabit one of them, 
 which is not large, and is called Lipara ; from this they 
 go and cultivate the rest, Didyme, Strongyle, and Hiera. 
 The inhabitants believe that the forge of Hephaestus is 
 in Hiera, because the island sends up a blaze of fire in 
 the night-time and clouds of smoke by day. The Aeolian 
 
 a Cp. ch. 89, and i. 23 med. 
 
 ow 
 
o to ow 
 
 STRANGE NATURAL PHENOMENA. 
 
 227 
 
 .c. 427. islands lie off the territory of the Sicels and Messenians ; III. 
 
 1. 88, 2. thgy W ere in alliance with Syracuse. The Athenians 
 wasted the country, but finding that the inhabitants 
 would not yield, sailed back to Rhegium. And so ended 
 the winter, and with it the fifth year in the Pelopon¬ 
 nesian War of which Thucydides wrote the history. 
 
 .c. 426. In the ensuing summer the Peloponnesians and their 89. 
 
 1 88, 3 ' allies, under the command of Agis the son of Archi- The earth- 
 damus, the Lacedaemonian king, came as far as the ?eivecTby° n ~ 
 Isthmus. They intended to invade Attica, but were ^have^ 65 
 deterred from proceeding by numerous earthquakes a , ^use^f the 
 and no invasion took place in this year. About the time great ebb 
 when these earthquakes prevailed, the sea at Orobiae in the sea at 
 Euboea, retiring from what was then the line of coast Euboea m 
 and rising in a great wave, overflowed a part of the city; 
 and although it subsided in some places, yet in others 
 the inundation was permanent, and that which was for¬ 
 merly land is now sea. All the people who could not 
 escape to the high ground perished. A similar inun¬ 
 dation occurred in the neighbourhood of Atalante, an 
 island on the coast of the Opuntian Locri, which carried 
 away a part of an Athenian fort b , and dashed in pieces 
 one of two ships which were drawn up on the beach. 
 
 At Peparethus also the sea retired, but no inundation 
 followed ; an earthquake, however, overthrew a part of 
 the wall, the Prytaneum, and a few houses. I conceive 
 that, where the force of the earthquake was greatest, the 
 sea was driven back, and the suddenness of the recoil 
 made the inundation more violent; and I am of opinion 
 that this was the cause of the phenomenon, which 
 would never have taken place if there. had been no 
 earthquake. 
 
 During the same summer war was going on in various 90. 
 parts of Sicily, the Hellenes in Sicily fighting against Capture by 
 one another, the Athenians helping their own allies. I Myie in 
 will mention the chief actions in which the Athenians submission 
 took part, whether by the help of their allies attacking, or of Messene. 
 
 a Cp. ch. 87. b Cp. ii. 32. 
 
 Q 2 
 
228 EXPEDITIONS TO MELOS AND TANAGRA. 
 
 91 - 
 
 Thirty 
 
 Athenian 
 
 III. attacked by their enemies. Charoeades, the Athenian 
 general, had been killed in battle by the Syracusans, 
 and Laches having taken the entire command of the 
 fleet, he and the allies made an expedition against 
 Myle, a town belonging to Messene. Two tribes of the 
 Messenians were keeping guard there, and they had set 
 an ambuscade for the force which they were expecting 
 to land ; but the Athenians and their allies put to flight 
 with heavy loss the troops which came out of the am¬ 
 bush. Then, attacking the fortress, they compelled its 
 defenders to come to terms, surrender the citadel, and 
 march with them against Messene. Finally, upon the 
 approach of the Athenians and their allies, the Mes¬ 
 senians themselves came to terms, giving hostages and 
 the other pledges which were required of them. 
 
 In the same summer the Athenians sent thirty ships 
 round the Peloponnese under the command of Demos- 
 shfps under thenes the son of Alcisthenes, and Procles the son of 
 theneTsaii Theodorus. They also sent sixty ships and two thou- 
 Peiopon 16 san d hoplites to Melos, under the command of Nicias 
 nese. Sixty the son of Niceratus, wishing to subdue the Melians, 
 
 more under . 
 
 Nicias go to who, although they were islanders, resisted them and 
 afmrravag- would not join their alliance a . So they ravaged their 
 country country, but finding that the Melians would not yield, 
 put in at they sailed away to Oropus, opposite Euboea. There 
 At Tanagra they put in at nightfall, and the hoplites disembarking 
 in^oncert’ went at once by land to Tanagra in Boeotia. Mean- 
 AAeJdan w bhe the entire Athenian force, under the command of 
 defeatThe 5 ' biipponicus the son of Callias, and Eurymedon the son 
 inhabitants, of Thucles, upon a signal given marched to meet them at 
 the same spot. There they encamped, and all together 
 devastated the country, remaining at Tanagra during 
 that day and the following night. On the morrow they 
 defeated the Tanagraeans who sallied out upon them, 
 and also some Thebans who had come to their aid ; they 
 then took up the arms of the slain, raised a trophy, and 
 returned, the one part of the forces back again to the 
 a Cp. v. 84. 
 
 o to 
 
o» 
 
 FOUNDATION OF HER AC LEA. 229 
 
 ^426. city, the other to their ships. Nicias with his sixty HI. 
 
 ’ 3 ‘ ships then sailed to the coast of Locris ; after ravaging 
 the country he returned home. 
 
 About the same time the Lacedaemonians founded 92. 
 Heraclea, their colony in Trachinia. The intention was To help the 
 as follows:—The Trachinians are one of the three Malian and their 
 tribes ; the other two being the Paralians and the Hie- stete^oris^ 
 reans. These Trachinians, having suffered greatly in war t , he Laca_ 
 
 0 0 J daemomans 
 
 from their neighbours the Oetaeans, at first thought of found the 
 attaching themselves to the Athenians, but, fearing that Heraclea. 
 they could not trust them, sent Tisamenus, whom they 
 appointed their envoy, to Lacedaemon. Doris, which 
 is the mother state of Lacedaemon, joined in the 
 embassy and also requested help, for the Dorians too 
 were suffering from the Oetaeans. The Lacedaemonians 
 heard their appeal, and, being desirous of assisting both 
 the Trachinians and Dorians, made up their minds to 
 send out a colony. They also thought that the situation 
 of the new city would be convenient for carrying on the 
 war against the Athenians. There a navy could be 
 equipped if they wanted to attack Euboea, which was 
 quite near, and the station would be handy for the 
 conveyance of troops to Chalcidice. For every reason 
 they were eager to colonise the place. First they en¬ 
 quired of the God at Delphi; he bade them go, and 
 they sent out settlers taken from their own citizens and 
 the Perioeci, announcing that any Hellenes who desired, 
 not being of the Ionian, Achaean, or certain other races, 
 might accompany them. The leaders of the colony were 
 three Lacedaemonians, Leon, Alcidas, and Damagon. 
 
 They set to work and built afresh the walls of the city, 
 which received the name of Heraclea, and is situated 
 about four miles and a-half from Thermopylae and a 
 little more than two from the sea. They also con¬ 
 structed docks, beginning the works near Thermopylae, 
 at the pass, that the city might be perfectly defended. 
 
 While the new colonists were collecting at Heraclea, 93 - 
 the Athenians grew alarmed; the scheme appeared to be ^J^new 
 
230 
 
 FAILURE OF THE LEW COLONY . 
 
 III. 
 
 gradually 
 
 aimed at Euboea, for Cape Cenaeum on the opposite coast B.c. 426. 
 is within a short sail. But their fears were not realized ; ' 88 ’ 3 ' 
 
 by the per- no harm whatever ensued. The reasons were these :— 
 position of In the first place the Thessalians are strong in that part of 
 sahanlTand the coun try> and fearing that Heraclea, which was built to 
 brutality of con ^ ro ^ them, would be a powerful and dangerous neigh- 
 the Lace- bour, they carried on uninterrupted war against the new 
 governors, settlers until they completely wore them out, although 
 
 originally they had been very numerous. For every 
 one joined without hesitation, encouraged by the pro¬ 
 mise of security which a Lacedaemonian colony seemed 
 to offer. But another great cause of the ruin and de¬ 
 population of the place was the conduct of the governors 
 sent out from Lacedaemon, who frightened the people 
 
 away by their severe and often unjust administration a . 
 
 Thus the Heracleans fell an easy prey to their neigh¬ 
 
 bours. 
 
 94. During the same summer, and about the same time 
 Attackupon when the Athenians were engaged at Melos, the troops 
 Demos- which were cruising in the thirty Athenian ships about 
 steadof 11 " Peloponnesus set an ambuscade at Ellomenus in Leucadia 
 th^biock 5 an< ^ a few of the guards of the country. They 
 
 ade, is per- next attacked Leucas itself with a larger armament, 
 the Messe- consisting of the Acarnanians, who followed them with 
 invade 10 their whole forces, all but the inhabitants of Oeniadae b , 
 Aetoha. an d sorne Zacynthians and Cephallenians, together with 
 fifteen ships from Corcyra. The Leucadians saw their 
 territory both on the mainland and within the Isthmus, 
 where the town of Leucas and the temple of Apollo 
 are situated, ravaged by the enemy; but being power¬ 
 less against a superior force, they remained inactive. 
 The Acarnanians begged Demosthenes, the Athenian 
 general, to cut them off by a wall, thinking that they 
 could easily take the city and so rid themselves of an 
 old enemy. But just then he was persuaded by the 
 Messenians that, having such an army in the field, he 
 
 Cp. v. 52 init. 
 
 b Cp. ii. 102 init. 
 
CQO 
 
 DEMOSTHENES IN AETOLIA. 
 
 231 
 
 c. 426. would gain honour by attacking the Aetolians : they III. 
 
 ' 3< were the enemies of Naupactus, and if he defeated 
 them he would easily subjugate the adjoining part of 
 the mainland to the Athenians. The Aetolians, they 
 said, though a warlike nation, dwelt in unwalled villages, 
 which were widely scattered, and as they had only 
 light-armed soldiers, they would be subdued without 
 difficulty before they could combine. They told him 
 that he should first attack the Apodotians, then the 
 Ophioneans, and after them the Eurytanians. The last 
 are the largest tribe of the Aetolians; they speak a 
 language more unintelligible than any of their neigh¬ 
 bours, and are believed to eat raw flesh. They said 
 that, if he conquered these, the rest would readily come 
 over to him. 
 
 He was influenced by his regard for the Messenians, 95. 
 and still more by the consideration that without rein- He deter- 
 forcements from Athens, and with no other help than Sake his 
 that of the allies on the mainland, to whom he would AefoUa^nd 
 add the Aetolians, he could make his way by land to £ hoci ? mto 
 attack Boeotia. He might proceed through the Ozolian which he 
 Locri to the Dorian Cytinium, keeping Mount Parnassus attack with 
 on the right, until he came down upon the Phocians. fSce lied 
 They would probably be eager to join in the expedition 
 because they had always been friendly to Athens, or, if 
 unwilling, they might be coerced ; and once in Phocis he 
 would be on the bonders of Boeotia. So he left Leucas 
 with all his army, much against the will of the Acarna- 
 nians, and sailed to Sollium. He there communicated 
 his design to them, but they would not accompany him 
 because he had refused to blockade Leucas; so with the 
 remainder of his army, which consisted of Cephallenians, 
 Messenians, Zacynthians, and three hundred marines be¬ 
 longing to the Athenian fleet a , the fifteen Corcyraean 
 vessels having left, he marched against the Aetolians, 
 starting from Oeneon in Locris. The Ozolian Locrians 
 
 Cp. ch. 94 init. 
 
PROGRESS OF THE EXVASIOX . 
 
 III. 
 
 96. 
 
 The Aeto- 
 lians col¬ 
 lect their 
 forces. 
 
 97 - 
 
 Demos¬ 
 thenes hur¬ 
 ries on 
 against the 
 Aetolian 
 villages, 
 but receives 
 a check at 
 Aegitium. 
 
 2 3 z 
 
 were allies of the Athenians, and they were to meet him 
 with their whole force in the interior of the country. 
 They dwelt on the border of the Aetolians, and as they 
 were armed in a similar manner and knew their country 
 and ways of fighting, their help in the expedition seemed 
 likely to be very valuable. 
 
 He encamped the first night at the temple of Nemean 
 Zeus, where the poet Hesiod is said to have been killed 
 by the inhabitants in fulfilment of an oracle which 
 foretold that he should die at Nemea. Early the next 
 morning he proceeded on his march into Aetolia. On 
 the first day he took Potidania, on the second Crocy- 
 leium, on the third Teichium. There he stayed and 
 sent back the spoils to Eupalium in Locris. For he did 
 not intend to attack the Ophioneans yet; when he had 
 subjugated the rest of the country he would return to 
 Naupactus and make a second expedition against them 
 if they continued to resist. The Aetolians were aware 
 of his designs from the very first; and no sooner did he 
 enter their territory than they all collected in great force; 
 even the most distant of the Ophioneans, the Bomieans 
 and Callieans who reach down towards the Malian Gulf, 
 came to the aid of their countrymen. 
 
 The Messenians repeated the advice which they had 
 originally given to Demosthenes. They assured him that 
 there would be no difficulty in conquering the Aetolians, 
 and told him to march as quickly $.s he could against 
 the villages. He should not wait until they could com¬ 
 bine and meet him with an army, but should endeavour 
 to take any place which was nearest. He, trusting to 
 their advice, and confident in his good fortune since 
 everything was going favourably, did not wait for the 
 Locrians, who should have supplied his deficiency in 
 javelin men, but at once marched towards Aegitium, 
 which he attacked, and forced his way in. The in¬ 
 habitants had stolen away and taken up a position on 
 the top of the hills overhanging the town, which was 
 itself built upon heights at a distance of about nine 
 
 CQO 
 
■wo 
 
 DISASTER OF AEGITIUM. 
 
 233 
 
 .c 426. miles from the sea. The other Aetolians, who had by III. 
 
 ' 3 ’ this time come to the rescue of Aegitium, attacked the 
 Athenians and their allies, Some ran down from one 
 hill and some from another and hurled darts at them; 
 when the Athenian army advanced they retired, and 
 when the Athenians retired they pressed upon them. 
 
 The battle, which lasted long, was nothing but a series 
 of pursuits and retreats, and in both the Athenians were 
 at a disadvantage. 
 
 While their archers had arrows and were able to use pg. 
 them, the Athenians maintained their ground, for the The Aeto- 
 Aetolians, being light-armed, were driven back by the upon die S 
 arrows. But at length the captain of the archers was 
 slain, and the forces under his command no longer kept length fly. 
 
 . r The sur _ 
 
 together. The Athenians themselves grew weary of the vivors with 
 long and tedious struggle. The Aetolians came closer retunfto 
 and closer, and never ceased hurling darts at them. At ^^hence 
 last they turned and fled, and falling into ravines, out to Athens. 
 
 11 . Demos- 
 
 of which there was no way, or losing themselves in a thenes 
 strange country, they perished. Their guide, Chromon behind, 
 the Messenian, had been killed. The Aetolians, who 
 were light-armed and swift of foot, followed at their 
 heels, hurling darts, and caught and slew many of them 
 in their flight. The greater number missed their way 
 and got into the woods, out of which no path led; and 
 their enemies brought fire and burnt the wood about 
 them. So the Athenian army tried every means of 
 escape and perished in all manner of ways. The sur¬ 
 vivors with difficulty made their way to the sea at 
 Oeneon in Locris, whence they had set out. Many of 
 the allies fell, and of the Athenian heavy-armed about 
 a hundred and twenty, all in the flower of their youth ; 
 they were the very finest men whom the city of Athens 
 lost during the war. Procles, one of the two generals, 
 was also killed. When they had received the bodies 
 of their dead under a flag of truce from the Aetolians, 
 they retreated to Naupactus, and returned in their 
 ships to Athens. Demosthenes remained behind in 
 
234 LACEDAEMONIAN ATTACK UPON NAUPACTUS. 
 
 III. 
 
 99 . 
 
 The Sicilian 
 
 Locrians 
 
 defeated. 
 
 IOO. 
 
 The Aeto- 
 lians per¬ 
 suade the 
 Lacedae¬ 
 monians to 
 send an ex¬ 
 pedition 
 against 
 Naupactus. 
 
 IOI. 
 
 Eurylochus 
 the Lace¬ 
 daemonian 
 commander 
 starts from 
 Delphi and 
 marches 
 through 
 Locris. 
 
 Naupactus and the neighbourhood ; for, after what had 
 happened, he feared the anger of the Athenians. 
 
 About the same time the Athenian forces engaged in 
 Sicily, sailing to the territory of Locri and there dis¬ 
 embarking, defeated the Locrians who came out to meet 
 them, and took a small garrison fort, which was situated 
 upon the river Halex. 
 
 During the same summer the Aetolians, who had some 
 time before despatched Tolophus the Ophionean, Bo- 
 riades the Eurytanian, and Tisander the Apodotian on 
 an embassy to Corinth and Lacedaemon, induced the 
 Lacedaemonians to aid them by sending an army against 
 Naupactus, in order to punish the inhabitants for inviting 
 the Athenian invasion a . So in the autumn they sent 
 out three thousand hoplites of their allies, including five 
 hundred from Heraclea, the newly-founded city in Tra- 
 chis. Eurylochus, a Spartan, was general, and with him 
 were associated in the command Macarius and Mene- 
 daeus, also Spartans. 
 
 When the army was collected at Delphi, Eurylochus 
 sent a herald to the Ozolian Locrians, for he had to pass 
 through their country on the way to Naupactus; and he 
 also wished to detach them from the Athenian alliance. 
 Of the Locrians, the inhabitants of Amphissa were most 
 willing to co-operate with him, wanting to be protected 
 against their enemies the Phocians ; they were the first 
 who gave hostages, and by them the other Locrians, who 
 were alarmed at the impending invasion, were persuaded 
 to do the like :—first their neighbours the Myoneans, who 
 commanded the most difficult pass into Locris ; then the 
 Ipneans, Messapians, Tritaeeans, Chalaeans, Tolopho- 
 nians, Hessians, and Oeantheans ; all these tribes also 
 joined the expedition. The Olpaeans gave hostages but 
 did not join : the Hyaeans would not give hostages until 
 the Lacedaemonians had taken one of their villages, 
 called Polis. 
 
 When everything was ready, and Eurylochus had de- 
 a Cp. iii. 94 raed. 
 
 102 . 
 
 OB 
 
o w 
 
 DEMOSTHENES STILL AT NAUPACTUS. 235 
 
 .c. 426. posited the hostages at Cytinium in Doris, he marched III. 
 
 ' 3 ‘ with his army against Naupactus, through the territory ^™ e ° s s ^ vith 
 of the Locrians. On his march he took Oeneon a and the help of 
 Eupalium b , two Locrian towns which refused to come to n ians saves 
 terms. When they had arrived in the territory of Nau- Thc*Lace-’ 
 pactus and the Aetolians had at length joined them, daemonians 
 
 1 J retire, and 
 
 they devastated the country, and after taking the un- in concert 
 walled suburbs of the town marched against Molycreium, Ambraciots 
 a colony of the Corinthians subject to Athens, which attadforT 
 they captured. But Demosthenes the Athenian, who } he , Amphi- 
 
 ' A 0 lochian 
 
 after his misfortune in Aetolia was still in the neigh- Argos, 
 bourhood of Naupactus, having previous intelligence, and 
 fearing for the town, went and persuaded the Acarna- 
 nians, much against their will, for they had not for¬ 
 gotten his withdrawal from Leucas, to assist Naupactus. 
 
 So they sent with him on board the Athenian ships 0 
 a thousand hoplites; these got in and saved the place, 
 which was in danger of having to capitulate, owing to 
 the extent of the wall and the paucity of its defenders. 
 Eurylochus and his soldiers, when they saw that the 
 garrison had been reinforced, and that there was no 
 possibility of taking the city by storm, instead of going 
 back to Peloponnesus, retired into the country of Aeolis, 
 which is now called by the names of the towns Calydon 
 and Pleuron, and to other places in the neighbourhood ; 
 also to Proschium in Aetolia. For the Ambraciots sent 
 and persuaded them to take part in an attack on the 
 Amphilochian Argos and the rest of Amphilochia and 
 Acarnania, declaring that, if they gained possession of 
 these places, the whole continent would at once come 
 over to the Lacedaemonians. Eurylochus assented, and 
 dismissing the Aetolians, waited with his army in that 
 region until the time came for the Ambraciots to make 
 their expedition and for him to join them in the neigh¬ 
 bourhood of Argos. Thus the summer ended. 
 
 In the following winter the Athenians in Sicily and 103. 
 
 their Hellenic allies made an attack upon Inessa, a Sicel The Athe¬ 
 nians are 
 
 a Cp. iii. 95 fin. b Cp. iii. 96 med. c Cp iii, 105‘fin. 
 
2 3 6 
 
 OPERATIONS IN SICILY. 
 
 town of which the citadel was held by the Syracusans. 
 They were joined by many of the Sicels, who had 
 formerly been allies of the Syracusans, and having been 
 held down by them, had now revolted to the Athe¬ 
 nians. The attempt failed, and they retreated. But 
 during their retreat the Syracusans sallied out and fell 
 upon the allies w 7 ho were in the rear of the Athenians, 
 routed them, and put to flight a part of their forces with 
 great loss. Soon afterwards, Laches and the Athenians 
 in the fleet made several descents upon Locris. At the 
 river Caecinus they defeated about three hundred Lo- 
 crians who came out to meet them under Proxenus the 
 son of Capaton, took arms from the slain, and returned. 
 
 In the same winter the Athenians, by command of 
 an oracle, purified the island of Delos. Pisistratus the 
 thepmific^ tyrant had already purified it, but imperfectly, for the 
 Deios^and purification only extended to that part which was within 
 restore sight of the temple. The whole island was now purified 
 
 the Delian . , . r . r 
 
 games. in the following manner:—The Athenians took away the 
 dead out of all the sepulchres which were in Delos a , and 
 passed a decree that henceforward no one should die or 
 give birth to a child there, but that the inhabitants when 
 they were near the time of either should be carried 
 across to Rheneia. Now Rheneia is near to Delos, so 
 near indeed that Polycrates the tyrant of Samos, who 
 for a time had a powerful navy, attached this island, 
 which he conquered with the rest of the islands and 
 dedicated to the Delian Apollo, by a chain to Delos. 
 After the purification, the Athenians for the first time 
 celebrated the Delian games, which were held every 
 four years. There had been in ancient days a great 
 gathering of the Ionians and the neighbouring islanders 
 at Delos ; whither they brought their wives and children 
 to be present at the Delian games, as the Ionians now 
 frequent the games at Ephesus. Musical and gymnastic 
 contests were held there, and the cities celebrated choral 
 dances. The character of the festival is attested by 
 a Cp. i. 8 init.; v. r. 
 
 III. 
 
 defeated at 
 Inessa, but 
 are vic¬ 
 torious in 
 Locris. 
 
 IO4. 
 The Athe- 
 
 mo 
 
wo 
 
 PURIFICATION OF DELOS. 
 
 237 
 
 c. 426. Homer in the following verses, which are taken from 
 ' 3 ‘ the hymn to Apollo :— 
 
 ‘ At other times, Phoebus, Delos is dearest to thy heart, 
 
 Where are gathered together the Ionians in flowing robes, 
 With their wives and children in thy street: 
 
 There do they delight thee with boxing and dancing and song. 
 Making mention of thy name at the meeting of the assembly.’ 
 
 III. 
 
 The old 
 festival of 
 Delos is 
 celebrated 
 by Homer. 
 
 And that there were musical contests which attracted 
 competitors is implied in the following words of the 
 same hymn. After commemorating the Delian dance 
 of women, Homer ends their praises with these lines, 
 in which he alludes to himself:— 
 
 4 And now may Apollo and Artemis be gracious, 
 
 And to all of you, maidens, I say farewell. 
 
 Yet remember me when I am gone; 
 
 And if some other toiling pilgrim among the sons of men 
 Comes and asks : O maidens, 
 
 Who is the sweetest minstrel of all who wander hither, 
 
 And in whom do you delight most ? 
 
 Make answer with one voice, in gentle words, 
 
 The blind old man of Chios’ rocky isle.’ 
 
 Thus far Homer, who clearly indicates that even in 
 days of old there was a great gathering and festival at 
 Delos. In after ages the islanders and the Athenians sent 
 choruses and sacrificed. But the games and the greater 
 part of the ceremonies naturally fell into disuse, owing to 
 the misfortunes of Ionia. The Athenians now restored 
 the games and for the first time introduced horse-races. 
 
 During the same winter the Ambraciots, in fulfilment 105, 
 of the promise by which they had induced Eurylochus Euryiochus 
 and his army to remain a , made an expedition against the Ambraciots 
 Amphilochian Argos with three thousand hoplites. They thdfforces 
 invaded the Argive territory and seized Olpae, a strong ^^ 1( J he 
 fort on a hill by the sea-side, which in former days the chian 
 Acarnanians had fortified and used as a common hall whfch’the 
 of justice. The place is about three miles from Argos, nlS, 10 ' 
 which is also on the sea-shore. One division of the A . carna ’ J 
 
 mans, and 
 
 Acarnanians came to the aid of Argos, while another Athenians 
 encamped at a spot called the Wells, where they could protect. 
 a Cp. iii. 102 fin. 
 
III. 
 
 The Am- 
 braciots 
 seize Olpae, 
 and send 
 for rein¬ 
 forcements. 
 
 106. 
 
 March of 
 the Pelo¬ 
 ponnesians, 
 who effect 
 a junction 
 with the 
 Ambraciots 
 at Olpae. 
 
 IO7. 
 
 Athenian 
 reinforce¬ 
 ments 
 arrive. 
 Demos¬ 
 thenes takes 
 the com¬ 
 mand. He 
 encamps 
 near Olpae, 
 
 238 THE A MPHIL 0 CHI A N ARGOS. 
 
 lie in wait for Eurylochus and the Peloponnesians, and 
 prevent them from joining the Ambraciots unobserved. 
 They also despatched a messenger to Demosthenes, who 
 had led the Athenian expedition into Aetolia, asking him 
 to be their commander, and sent for twenty Athenian 
 ships which were just then cruising about the Pelopon- 
 nese under the command of Aristoteles the son of Timo- 
 crates, and Hierophon the son of Antimnestus. The 
 Ambraciots sent a messenger from Olpae to their own 
 citizens, bidding them come and help them with their 
 entire force; for they were afraid that Eurylochus and 
 his followers might not be able to make their way 
 through the Acarnanians, and then they would have 
 either to fight alone, or to attempt a hazardous retreat. 
 
 Eurylochus and the Peloponnesians, when they heard 
 that the Ambraciots had arrived at Olpae, left Pro- 
 schium and went with all speed to help them. Passing 
 over the river Achelous they marched through Acar- 
 nania, leaving the city and garrison of Stratus on the 
 right hand, and the rest of Acarnania on their left. The 
 land was deserted, for the inhabitants had gone to the 
 assistance of Argos. Crossing the territory of Stratus 
 they proceeded through Phytia and by the extreme 
 border of Medeon, and so through Limnaea ; at last 
 they left Acarnania, and reached the friendly country 
 of the Agraeans. Then taking to Mount Thyamus, 
 which is a wild district, they marched on and descended 
 into the plain of Argos after dark. Making their way 
 unobserved between the city of Argos and the Acar- 
 nanian force stationed at the Wells, they at length 
 reached the Ambraciots at Olpae. 
 
 The two armies having effected this junction moved 
 at break of day to a place called Metropolis, and there 
 encamped. Soon afterwards the Argives received the 
 expected reinforcement of twenty Athenian ships, which 
 arrived in the Ambracian Gulf. With them came Demos¬ 
 thenes, who brought two hundred Messenian hoplites and 
 sixty Athenian archers. The ships anchored about the 
 
 Ota 
 
otfl 
 
 BATTLE OF OLPAE. 
 
 *39 
 
 .c. 426. hill of Olpae, while the Acarnanians and a few of the III. 
 
 ’ 3 ’ Amphilochians (the greater part of them were prevented wh ^ e Pf® - 
 from stirring by the Ambraciots a ), having mustered at action he 
 Argos, were now preparing to give battle. They as- Troops in an 
 sociated Demosthenes with their own generals in the ambuscade - 
 command of the allied forces. He led them to the 
 neighbourhood of Olpae, and there encamped at a place 
 where they were divided from the enemy by a great 
 ravine. During five days they remained inactive; on 
 the sixth day both armies drew up in battle array. 
 Demosthenes, fearing that he would be surrounded by 
 the Peloponnesians who were more numerous and ex¬ 
 tended beyond his own line, placed hoplites and light¬ 
 armed troops, numbering altogether four hundred, in a 
 deep lane overgrown with brushwood, intending them 
 to lie in wait until the moment of conflict, when they 
 were to rush out from the rear on the line of -the enemy 
 where it overlapped. The preparations of both armies 
 were now complete and they engaged. Demosthenes 
 led his own right wing, on which were the Messenians 
 and a few Athenians, while the other was held by the 
 Acarnanians, who were disposed according to their cities, 
 and by the Amphilochian javelin-men who were in the 
 battle. The Peloponnesians and Ambraciots were inter¬ 
 mingled, with the exception of the Mantineans, who 
 were all collected on the left wing; but the extremity 
 of the wing was occupied by Eurylochus and his 
 division, who were opposed to the Messenians under 
 Demosthenes. 
 
 When the two armies were at close quarters, the left 108. 
 wing of the Peloponnesians out-flanked the right wing Th e Peio- 
 
 ponnesian 
 
 of their opponents and threatened to surround them; left wing 
 whereupon the Acarnanians, coming upon them from be- Sncken'by 
 hind out of the ambuscade, charged and turned them. coming°out 
 They fled without striking a blow, and their panic caused of the am_ 
 
 J 0 r bush, and 
 
 the greater part of the army to run with them. For, when flies. The 
 they saw Eurylochus and their best troops routed, they victorious 13 
 a Gp. iii. 114 fin. 
 
240 DEFEAT OF LACEDAEMONIANS AND ALLIES. 
 
 III. lost whatever courage they had. The Messenians, who 
 at first, but were in this part of the field under the command of 
 driven back Demosthenes, were foremost in the work. The right 
 to oipae. w j n g Q f j-j ie enem y ? however, and the Ambraciots, who 
 are the most warlike nation in those parts, vanquished 
 their opponents and drove them back to Argos. But, 
 returning, they saw the greater part of the army de¬ 
 feated, and were hard pressed by the victorious division 
 of the Acarnanians, whereupon, escaping with difficulty, 
 they made their way to Oipae. Numbers of the de¬ 
 feated were killed, for they dashed into the fort wildly 
 and in confusion, except the Mantineans, who kept to¬ 
 gether and retreated in better order than any other part 
 of the army. The battle, which had lasted until evening, 
 now ended. 
 
 109. On the next day Menedaeus took the command, for 
 ofAeL ieS Eur y lochus an< ^ Macarius, the two other generals, had 
 daemonian been slain a . He knew not what to do after so serious 
 mauder, a defeat. He could not hope, if he remained, to stand 
 tiates^fth" a hemmed in as he was by land, and at sea 
 
 Demos- blockaded by the Athenian ships: neither could he 
 
 thenes a J _ x 
 
 secret treaty safely retire; so entering into a parley with Demosthenes 
 ponesians and the Acarnanian generals about the burial of the 
 only * dead, he tried to negotiate with them at the same time 
 for a retreat. The Athenians gave back to the enemy 
 their dead, erected a trophy, and took up their own dead, 
 in number about three hundred. They would not openly 
 agree to the proposal for a general retreat, but Demos¬ 
 thenes and his Acarnanian colleagues made a secret 
 treaty with the Mantineans, and Menedaeus, and the 
 other Peloponnesian generals and chief persons, allow¬ 
 ing their army to depart. He wanted partly to isolate 
 the Ambraciots and their foreign mercenary troops, but 
 much more to take away the character of the Lacedae¬ 
 monians and Peloponnesians among the Hellenes in those 
 parts and convict them of selfishness and treachery. Ac¬ 
 cordingly the Peloponnesians took up their dead, and 
 a Cp. iv. 38 init. 
 
 Otd 
 
Otd 
 
 TREACHERY OF THE PELOPONNESIANS. 341 
 
 •C^426. burying them quickly as well as they could, consulted III. 
 
 ’ 3 ’ secretly how those who had permission could best depart. 
 
 Meanwhile news was brought to Demosthenes and the 110. 
 Acarnanians that the whole remaining force of the Am- Approach 
 
 . . 0 of the main 
 
 braciots, who some time previously had been summoned army of the 
 from the city a to join the troops in Olpae, were now ^s. ra ’ 
 on their way through the territory of the Amphilochians ^e™° S p re _ 
 and were in entire ignorance of what had occurred. P ares to cut 
 
 _ TT1 , _ , . , . them off. 
 
 Whereupon he at once sent forward a part of his army 
 to lie in ambush in the roads and to occupy the strong 
 places, himself at the same time preparing to support 
 them with the rest of his forces. 
 
 In the meantime the Mantineans and the others who ill. 
 were included in the truce went out on pretence of The Pel °- 
 
 ponnesians 
 
 gathering herbs and sticks, and stole away one by one, steal away 
 picking up as they went along what they pretended Sde?cape' 
 to be looking for. But, as they got farther away from xh^Am- a 
 Olpae, they quickened their steps, and then the Am- ^ r ra ^ 0 ^j^ 0 
 braciots and others who happened to collect on the them are 
 instant, when they saw that they were leaving, ran after 
 them at full speed, wanting to get up with them. The 
 Acarnanians at first thought that none of those who 
 were going away were protected by a truce, and pur¬ 
 sued the Peloponnesians. Some of the generals tried 
 to keep them back and explained how matters stood ; 
 whereupon a soldier, suspecting that there was treachery, 
 hurled a javelin at them. At length the soldiers under¬ 
 stood, and let the Mantineans and Peloponnesians go, 
 but began to kill the Ambraciots. There was great 
 dispute and uncertainty as to who was an Ambraciot 
 and who a Peloponnesian. Of the former they killed 
 about two hundred; the Peloponnesians escaped into 
 the neighbouring country of Agraea, and were received 
 by king Salynthius who was their friend. 
 
 Meanwhile the reinforcement from the city of Am- 112. 
 
 bracia had reached Idomen£, which is the name of two Demos¬ 
 thenes 
 
 lofty peaks. The higher of the two had been already having sent 
 a Cp. iii. 105 fin. 
 
 R 
 
2 4 2 
 
 BATTLE OF IDOMENt. 
 
 III. occupied unobserved at nightfall by the troops which 
 on forces Demosthenes had sent forward; of the lower the Am- 
 
 which oc- . . i 4.1 
 
 cupy the hill braciots first obtained possession and encamped there. 
 
 thaTwhere- As soon as it was dark, after supper, Demosthenes ad- 
 
 bradotfare vance d with the rest of his army, himself leading half 
 
 encamped G f them towards the pass between the mountains, while 
 at Idomene, # L . 
 
 surprises the rest made their way through the Amphilochian hills. 
 
 them° UtS At the first dawn of day he fell upon the Ambraciots, who 
 were still half-asleep, and so far from knowing anything 
 of what had happened, that they imagined his troops to 
 be their own comrades. For Demosthenes had taken 
 care to place the Messenians in the first rank and desired 
 them to speak to the enemy in their own Doric dialect, 
 thereby putting the sentinels off their guard; and as it was 
 still dark, their appearance could not be distinguished. 
 So they fell upon the Ambraciots and routed them. 
 Most of them were slain on the spot; the remainder 
 fled over the mountains. But the paths were beset; 
 the Amphilochians were lightly-armed and in their own 
 country which they knew, while their enemies were 
 heavy-armed and the country was strange to them. 
 And so, not knowing which way to turn, they fell into 
 ravines and into ambuscades which had been set for 
 them, and perished. Every means of escape was tried. 
 Some even fled to the sea which was not far distant, 
 and seeing the Athenian ships which were sailing by 
 while the action was taking place, swam out to them, 
 thinking in the terror of the moment that they had 
 better be killed, if die they must, by the Athenians in 
 the ships than by their barbarous and detested enemies 
 the Amphilochians. So the Ambraciots were cut to 
 pieces, and but few out of many returned home to their 
 city. The Acarnanians, having despoiled the dead and 
 raised trophies, returned to Argos. 
 
 113. On the following day there arrived a herald from the 
 Despair of Ambraciots who had escaped out of Olpae to the 
 
 the herald 1 
 
 who came Agraeans. He came to recover the bodies of the dead 
 fugitive 6 who had been slain subsequently to the first engagement, 
 
 o to 
 
wo 
 
 LOSS OF THE AMBRACIOTS. 243 
 
 .c. 426. when, unprotected by the treaty, they tried to get out III. 
 
 ’ 3 ’ of Olpae in company with the Mantineans and others Ambraciots 
 
 when he 
 
 protected by it. The herald saw the arms of the Am- heard of the 
 braciot troops from the city and wondered at the number greater 
 of them ; he knew nothing of the later disaster, and he defeat - 
 imagined that they belonged to his own division of the 
 army. Some one else thought that the herald had come 
 from the army defeated at Idomene, and asked why he 
 looked so astonished, and how many of their men had 
 fallen; he replied, ‘about two hundred 91 ;’ whereupon the 
 other rejoined, ‘These which you see are not the arms of 
 two hundred men, but of more than a thousand.’ The 
 herald replied, 6 Then they cannot be the arms of our 
 men.’ The other answered, ‘ They must be, if you were 
 fighting yesterday at Idomene.’ c But yesterday we did 
 not fight at all; it was the day before, in the retreat.’ 
 
 ‘ All I know is that we fought yesterday with these men, 
 who were marching to your aid from Ambracia.’ When 
 the herald heard these words, and knew that the army 
 coming from the city had perished, he uttered a cry 
 of anguish, and, overwhelmed by the greatness of the 
 blow, went away at once without doing his errand, 
 no longer caring to demand the dead. And indeed in 
 the whole war no such calamity happened within so few 
 days to any Hellenic state b . I have not ventured to 
 set down the number of those who fell, for the loss 
 would appear incredible when compared with the size 
 of the city. Of this I am certain, that if the Acarnanians 
 had been willing to destroy Ambracia as Demosthenes 
 and the Athenians desired, they might have taken it at 
 the first onset. But they were afraid that the Athe¬ 
 nians, if they once got possession of the place, would 
 be more troublesome neighbours than the Ambraciots c . 
 
 After assigning a third part of the spoils to the Athe- 114. 
 nians, the Acarnanians divided the remainder among Division of 
 their cities. The spoils of the Athenians were captured the SF ° lls ' 
 on the voyage. But three hundred panoplies which 
 a Cp. iii. hi fin. 1 Cp. vii. 30 fin. c Cp. iii.92 init. 
 
 R 2 
 
III. 
 
 Return of 
 Demos¬ 
 thenes 
 and the 
 Athenian 
 fleet. 
 
 Treaty 
 between the 
 Acama- 
 nians and 
 Amphi- 
 lochians. 
 
 ” 5 - 
 
 The Athe¬ 
 nians re¬ 
 solve to 
 take a more 
 active part 
 in the 
 affairs of 
 Sicily. 
 
 They send 
 out Pytho- 
 dorus. 
 
 244 TERMS OF PEACE . 
 
 were allotted to Demosthenes he brought home with 
 him, and they are still preserved in the Athenian 
 temples. This good service of his enabled him to return 
 to Athens with less apprehension after his misfortune 
 in Aetolia. The twenty Athenian ships sailed away to 
 Naupactus. The Acarnanians and Amphilochians, after 
 the Athenians and Demosthenes had left them, granted 
 a truce to the Ambraciots and Peloponnesians who had 
 fled to Salynthius and the Agraeans ; they were thus 
 enabled to return home from Oeniadae, whither they 
 had removed from the country of Salynthius. The 
 Acarnanians and Amphilochians now made a treaty of 
 alliance for one hundred years with the Ambraciots, 
 of which the terms were as follows :— { The Ambraciots 
 shall not be required to join the Acarnanians in making 
 war on the Peloponnesians, nor the Acarnanians to join 
 the Ambraciots in making war on the Athenians. But 
 they shall aid in the defence of one another’s territory. 
 The Ambraciots shall give up such places or hostages 
 of the Amphilochians as they possess a , and they shall 
 not assist Anactorium ’ (which was hostile to the Acar¬ 
 nanians) b . Upon these terms they put an end to the 
 war. Soon afterwards the Corinthians sent a force of 
 their own, consisting of three hundred hoplites under the 
 command of Xenocleidas the son of Euthycles, to guard 
 Ambracia, whither they made their way with some 
 difficulty by land. Such was the end of the Ambra- 
 cian war. 
 
 During the same winter the Athenian fleet in Sicily, 
 sailing to Himera, made a descent upon the country in 
 concert with the Sicels, who had invaded the extreme 
 border of the Himeraeans from the interior ; they also 
 attacked the Aeolian Isles. Returning to Rhegium, they 
 found that Pythodorus son of Isolochus, one of the 
 Athenian generals, had superseded Laches in the com¬ 
 mand of the fleet. The allies of the Athenians in Sicily 
 had sailed to Athens, and persuaded the Athenians to 
 a Cp. iii. 107 init. b Cp. i. 55 init. 
 
 mo 
 
wo 
 
 THE ATHENIANS IN SICILY. 
 
 ^45 
 
 c 4 2 6. send a larger fleet to their aid ; for their territory was in III. 
 
 ’ 3 ’ the power of the Syracusans, and they were kept off the 
 sea by a few ships only; so they were preparing to 
 resist, and had begun to collect a navy. The Athenians 
 manned forty ships for their relief, partly hoping to finish 
 the war in Sicily the sooner, partly because they wanted 
 to exercise their fleet. They despatched one of the 
 commanders, Pythodorus, with a few ships, intending to 
 send Sophocles the son of Sostratides, and Eurymedon 
 the son of Thucles, with the larger division of the fleet 
 afterwards. Pythodorus, having now succeeded Laches 
 in the command, sailed at the end of the winter against 
 the Locrian fort which Laches had previously taken a , 
 but he was defeated by the Locrians and retired. 
 
 In the early spring a stream of fire, not for the first 116. 
 time, issued from Mount Aetna, which is the highest Eruption 
 mountain in Sicily, and devastated a portion of the terri- e a ' 
 tory of the Catanaeans who dwell on the skirts of Aetna. 
 
 The last eruption is said to have taken place fifty years 
 before ; and altogether three eruptions are recorded 
 since the Hellenes first settled in Sicily. Such were the 
 events of the winter; and so ended the sixth year in 
 the Peloponnesian War of which Thucydides wrote the 
 history. 
 
 Cp. iii. 99. 
 
BOOK IV. 
 
 IV. i. In the following summer, about the time when the 
 The Syra- corn comes into ear, ten Syracusan and ten Locrian 
 
 cusans and # ... 
 
 Locrians ships took possession of Messene in Sicily, whither they 
 Messenfe had gone by the invitation of the inhabitants. And so 
 from^he Messene revolted from the Athenians. The Syracusans 
 Th^Lo 115 t00 ^ P art affair chiefly because they saw that 
 
 crians at Messene was the key to Sicily. They were afraid that 
 
 time invade the Athenians would one day establish themselves there 
 ofRheghmn an d come and attack them with a larger force. The 
 Locrians took part because the Rhegians were their 
 enemies, and they wanted to crush them by sea as well 
 as by land. They had already invaded the territory of 
 Rhegium with their whole army, in order to hinder the 
 Rhegians from assisting the Messenians ; they were also 
 partly instigated by certain Rhegian exiles who had 
 taken refuge with them. For the Rhegians had been 
 for a long time torn by revolution, and in their present 
 condition could not resist the Locrians, who for this 
 very reason were the more disposed to attack them. 
 After wasting the country, the Locrians withdrew their 
 land forces ; but the ships remained to protect Messene. 
 Another fleet which the allies were manning was in¬ 
 tended to lie in the harbour of Messene, and to carry on 
 the war from thence. 
 
 2. During the spring and about the same time, before 
 “ the corn was in full ear, the Peloponnesians and their 
 Attica. allies invaded Attica, under the command of Agis the 
 
 o w 
 
DEMOSTHENES AT PYLOS. 
 
 B.C. 425. 
 Ol. 88, 4. 
 
 *47 
 
 son of Archidamus, the Lacedaemonian king. They 
 encamped and ravaged the country. 
 
 The Athenians sent to Sicily the forty ships a , which 
 were now ready, under the command of Eurymedon and 
 Sophocles, the third general, Pythodorus, having gone 
 thither beforehand. Orders were given to them, as they 
 passed Corcyra, to assist the Corcyraeans in the city, 
 who were harassed by the exiles in the mountain 15 . 
 The Peloponnesians had already sent sixty ships to the 
 assistance of the exiles, expecting to make themselves 
 masters of the situation with little difficulty; for there 
 was a great famine in the city. Demosthenes, since his 
 return from Acarnania, had been in no command, but 
 now at his own request the Athenians allowed him to 
 make use of the fleet about the Peloponnese according 
 to his judgment. 
 
 When they arrived off the coast of Laconia and heard 
 that the Peloponnesian ships were already at Corcyra, 
 Eurymedon and Sophocles wanted to hasten thither, 
 but Demosthenes desired them first to put in at Pylos 
 and not to proceed on their voyage until they had done 
 what he wanted. They objected, but it so happened that 
 a storm came on and drove them into Pylos. Instantly 
 Demosthenes urged them to fortify the place; this being 
 the project which he had in view when he accompanied 
 the fleet c . He pointed out to them that there was abund¬ 
 ance of timber and stone ready to their hand, and that the 
 position was naturally strong, while both the place itself 
 and the country for a long way round was uninhabited. 
 Pylos is distant about forty-six miles from Sparta, and 
 is situated in the territory which once belonged to the 
 Messenians; by the Lacedaemonians it is called Cory- 
 phasium. The other generals argued that there were 
 plenty of desolate promontories on the coast of Pelo¬ 
 ponnesus which he might occupy if he wanted to waste 
 the public money. But Demosthenes thought that this 
 
 a Cd. iii. 115 med. b Cp. iii. 85 fin. 
 
 c Reading with many good MSS. gvi /eVXeuae. 
 
 IV. 
 
 The Athe¬ 
 nians send 
 forty ad¬ 
 ditional 
 ships to 
 Sicily. 
 Demos¬ 
 thenes ac¬ 
 companies 
 them on 
 a special 
 commis-r 
 sion. 
 
 O' 
 
 Demos¬ 
 thenes 
 wants the 
 generals 
 to fortify 
 Pylos. 
 They 
 
 ridicule his 
 arguments. 
 
2 4 8 
 
 CONSTRUCTION OF THE FORT. 
 
 IV. particular spot had exceptional advantages. There was 
 a harbour ready at hand ; the Messenians, who were the 
 ancient inhabitants of the country and spoke the same 
 language with the Lacedaemonians, would make de¬ 
 scents from the fort and do the greatest mischief; 
 and they would be a trusty garrison. 
 
 4 * As neither generals nor soldiers would listen to him, 
 ^ c A a t !l e ' he at last communicated his idea to the officers of divi- 
 
 lildllb die 
 
 detained by s i ons . w ho would not listen to him either. The weather 
 
 stress of 
 
 weather. was still unfit for sailing ; he was therefore compelled to 
 the idea is remain doing nothing ; until at length the soldiers, who 
 andcamed were standing about idle, were themselves seized with 
 out by the a d es i re to fortify the place forthwith. So they put 
 
 common J J g 
 
 soldiers. their hands to the work ; and, being unprovided with 
 iron tools, brought stones which they picked out and put 
 them together as they happened to fit; if they required 
 to use mortar, having no hods, they carried it on their 
 backs, which they bent so as to form a resting-place for 
 it, clasping their hands behind them that it might not 
 fall off. By every means in their power they hurried on 
 the weaker points, wanting to finish them before the 
 Lacedaemonians arrived. The position was in most 
 places so strongly fortified by nature as to have no 
 need of a wall. 
 
 5. The Lacedaemonians, who were just then celebrating 
 The fort is a festival a , made light of the news, being under the 
 
 completed . ... & 
 
 in six days; impression that they could easily storm the fort when¬ 
 ce ieft PS ever they chose to attack it, even if the Athenians did 
 mosthenes, not run awa > T °f themselves at their approach. They 
 the rest § ° were also delayed by the absence of their army in 
 Corcyra. Attica. In six days the Athenians finished the wall on 
 the land side, and in places towards the sea where it 
 was most required; they then left Demosthenes with 
 five ships to defend it, and with the rest hastened on 
 their way to Corcyra and Sicily. 
 
 6. The Peloponnesian army in Attica, when they heard 
 
 the C peio f ^ lat ^ lac ^ k een occupied, quickly returned home, 
 
 a Cp. v. 54 ; v. 82 init. 
 
 OOT 
 
ow 
 
 REASSEMBLING OF THE PELOPONNESIANS. 249 
 
 •C. 425. Agis and the Lacedaemonians thinking that this matter IV. 
 
 ' 4 ’ touched them very nearly. The invasion had been made ponnesians 
 
 quite early in the year while the corn was yet green, 
 and they were in want of food for their soldiers ; more¬ 
 over the wet and unseasonable weather had distressed 
 them, so that on many grounds they were inclined to 
 return sooner than they had intended. This was the 
 shortest of all the Peloponnesian invasions; they only 
 remained fifteen days in Attica. 
 
 About the same time Simonides, an Athenian general, 7 - 
 collecting a few troops from the Athenian garrisons, and 
 a larger force from their allies in that neighbourhood, subsequent 
 took Eion in Chalcidice, a colony of Mende, which had place called 
 
 been hostile to Athens; the place was betrayed to Elon ' 
 
 him. But the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans quickly came 
 to the rescue, and he was driven out with consider¬ 
 able loss. 
 
 On the return of the Peloponnesians from Attica, the 8. 
 Spartans and the Perioeci a in the neighbourhood of the The Spar- 
 
 1 1 T tallS g° t0 
 
 city a went at once to attack Pylos, but the other Lace- p y ios ; they 
 daemonians, having only just returned from an expe- thdrames 
 dition, were slower in arriving. A message was sent sJ^ s sl ^ ich 
 round the Peloponnesus bidding the allies come without they had 
 a moment s delay and meet at Pylos ; another message Corcyra. 
 summoned the sixty Peloponnesian ships from Corcyra. 
 
 These were carried over the Leucadian isthmus b , and, 
 undiscovered by the Athenian ships, which were by 
 this time at Zacynthus, reached Pylos, where their land 
 forces had already assembled. While the Peloponnesian 
 fleet was still on its way, Demosthenes succeeded in 
 despatching unobserved two vessels to let Eurymedon 
 and the Athenian fleet know of his danger, and to bid 
 them come at once. 
 
 While the Athenian ships were hastening to the assist¬ 
 ance of Demosthenes in accordance with his request, the 
 Lacedaemonians prepared to attack the fort both by 
 sea and by land; they thought that there would be 
 
 a Or, ‘in the neighbourhood of Pylos.’ b Cp. iii. 81 init. 
 
IV. 
 
 The Lace¬ 
 daemonians 
 prepare to 
 attack the 
 fort. 
 
 The har¬ 
 bour of 
 Pylos is 
 formed by 
 the island 
 Sphac- 
 teria, which 
 the Lace¬ 
 daemonians 
 occupy with 
 four hun¬ 
 dred and 
 twenty 
 men. 
 
 9 - 
 
 Skilful use 
 made by 
 Demos- 
 
 250 THE SCENE OF ACTION . 
 
 little difficulty in taking a work hastily constructed 
 and defended by a handful of men. But as they ex¬ 
 pected the speedy arrival of the Athenian fleet they 
 meant to close the entrances to the harbour, and pre¬ 
 vent the Athenians from anchoring there should they 
 fail in taking the fort before their arrival. 
 
 The island which is called Sphacteria stretches along 
 the land and is quite close to it, making the harbour safe 
 and the entrances narrow; there is only a passage for 
 two ships at the one end, which was opposite Pylos and 
 the Athenian fort, while at the other the strait is wide 
 enough to admit eight or nine. The length of the island 
 is about a mile and three-quarters ; it was wooded, and 
 being uninhabited had no roads. The Lacedaemonians 
 were intending to block up the mouths of the harbour 
 by ships placed close together with their prows out¬ 
 wards ; meanwhile, fearing lest the Athenians should 
 use the island for military operations, they conveyed 
 thither some hoplites, and posted others along the shore 
 of the mainland. Thus both the island and the main¬ 
 land would be hostile to the Athenians ; and nowhere on 
 the mainland would there be a possibility of landing. For 
 on the shore of Pylos itself, outside the entrance of the 
 strait, and where the land faced the open sea, there were no 
 harbours, and the Athenians would find no position from 
 which they could assist their countrymen. Meanwhile the 
 Lacedaemonians, avoiding the risk of an engagement at 
 sea, might take the fort, which had been occupied in a 
 hurry and was not provisioned. Under this impression 
 they conveyed their hoplites over to the island, selecting 
 them by lot out of each division of the army. One de¬ 
 tachment relieved another ; those who went over last and 
 were taken in the island were four hundred and twenty 
 men, besides the Helots who attended them ; they were 
 under the command of Epitadas the son of Molobrus. 
 
 Demosthenes, seeing that the Lacedaemonians were 
 about to attack him both by sea and by land, made 
 his own preparations. Lie drew up on shore under 
 
 OQO 
 
cw 
 
 DISPOSITION OF THE ATHENIAN TROOPS. 251 
 
 c 425- the fort the three triremes remaining to him out of 
 ’ 4 ’ the five which had not gone on to Corcyra, and pro¬ 
 tected them by a stockade ; their crews he armed with 
 shields, but of a poor sort, most of them made of 
 wicker-work. In an uninhabited country there was no 
 possibility of procuring arms, and these were only 
 obtained from a thirty-oared privateer and a light 
 boat belonging to some Messenians who had just ar¬ 
 rived. Of these Messenians about forty were hoplites, 
 whom Demosthenes used with the others. He placed 
 the greater part both of his heavy and light-armed forces 
 upon the side of the place which looks towards the 
 mainland and was stronger and better fortified ; these 
 he ordered, if they should be attacked, to repel the 
 land forces, while he himself selected out of the whole 
 body of his troops sixty hoplites and a few archers, 
 and marched out of the fort to the sea-shore at the 
 point where the Lacedaemonians seemed most likely 
 to attempt a landing. The spot which he chose lay 
 towards the open sea, and was rocky and dangerous ; 
 but he thought that the enemy would be attracted 
 thither and would be sure to make a dash at that point 
 because the fortifications were weaker. For the Athe¬ 
 nians, not expecting to be defeated at sea, had left the 
 wall just there less strong, knowing that if their enemies 
 could once force a landing the place would in any case 
 easily be taken. Accordingly, marching down to the 
 very edge of the sea, he there posted his hoplites; he 
 was determined to keep the enemy off if he could, and 
 in this spirit he addressed his men :— 
 
 ‘ My companions in danger, let none of you now on 
 the eve of battle desire to display his wits by reckoning 
 up the sum of the perils which surround us; let him 
 rather resolve to meet the enemy without much thought, 
 but with a lively hope that he will survive them all. In 
 cases like these, when there is no choice, reflection is 
 useless, and the sooner danger comes the better. I am 
 sure that our chances are more than equal if we will 
 
 IV. 
 
 thenes of 
 the small 
 means at 
 his disposal. 
 
 IO. 
 
 Demos¬ 
 thenes ad¬ 
 vises his 
 men not 
 to think 
 too much 
 before they 
 fight. 
 
 The 
 
 chances are 
 in their 
 favour. 
 
252 SPEECH OF DEMOSTHENES, 
 
 IV. only stand firm, and, having so many advantages, do not 
 The place take fright at the numbers of the enemy and throw them 
 
 is inacces- . , . c , 
 
 sibie if they all away. The inaccessibility of the place is one ot tnem; 
 ground!but this, however, will only aid us if we maintain our position; 
 if they re- w p en we have once retreated, the ground, though difficult 
 accessible } n itself, will be easy enough to the enemy, for there will 
 They are be no one to oppose him. And if we turn and press 
 the^nemy upon him he will be more obstinate than ever ; for his 
 Let'them retreat will be next to impossible. On ship-board the 
 stand firm, Peloponnesians are easily repelled, but once landed they 
 
 and keep x . . 
 
 him off the are as good as we are. Of their numbers again we need 
 not be so much afraid; for, numerous as they are, few 
 only can fight at a time, owing to the difficulty of bring¬ 
 ing their ships to shore. We are contending against an 
 army superior indeed in numbers, but they are not our 
 equals in other respects; for they are not on land but on 
 water, and ships require many favourable accidents before 
 they can act with advantage. So that I consider their 
 embarrassments to counterbalance our want of numbers. 
 You are Athenians, who know by experience the diffi¬ 
 culty of disembarking in the presence of an enemy, and 
 that if a man is not frightened out of his wits at the 
 splashing of oars and the threatening look of a ship 
 bearing down upon him, but is determined to hold his 
 ground, no force can move him. It is now your turn to 
 be attacked, and I call on you to stand fast and not to 
 let the enemy touch the beach at all. Thus you will 
 save yourselves and the place/ 
 
 II. The Athenians, inspirited by the words of Demos- 
 Difficulty of thenes, went down to the shore and formed a line along 
 a landing, the water’s edge. The Lacedaemonians now began to 
 ^reatfy dis- move, and assaulted the fort with their army by land, and 
 himseff 65 their fleet, consisting of forty-three ships, by sea. 
 
 The admiral in command was Thrasymelidas, son of 
 Cratesicles, a Spartan ; he made his attack just where 
 Demosthenes expected. The Athenians defended them¬ 
 selves both by sea and land. The Peloponnesians had 
 divided their fleet into relays of a few ships—the space 
 
 O td 
 
ow 
 
 C. 425, 
 . 88, 4. 
 
 THE GALLANTRY OF BRAS ID AS. 253 
 
 . would not allow of more—and so resting - and fighting by IV. 
 turns they made their attack with great spirit, loudly ex¬ 
 horting one another to force back the enemy and take the 
 fort. Brasidas distinguished himself above all other men 
 in the engagement; he was captain of a ship, and seeing 
 his fellow-captains and the pilots, even if they could 
 touch anywhere, hesitating and afraid of running their 
 ships on the rocks, he called out to them : ‘ Not to be 
 sparing of timber when the enemy had built a fort in 
 their country; let them wreck their ships and force 
 a landing:’ this he said to his own countrymen, and to 
 the allies that ‘they should not hesitate at such a moment 
 to make a present of their ships to the Lacedaemonians, 
 who had done so much for them ; they must run aground, 
 and somehow or other get to land and take the fort and 
 the men in it.’ 
 
 While thus upbraiding the others he compelled his 12. 
 own pilot to run his ship aground, and made for the Butheis 
 
 • . .. . . , wounded 
 
 gangway. But in attempting to disembark he was and loses 
 struck by the Athenians, and, after receiving many paradoxical 
 woupds, he swooned away and fell into the fore part the Mule ° f 
 of the ship ; his shield slipped off his arm into the 
 sea, and, being washed ashore, was taken up by the 
 Athenians and used for the trophy which they raised 
 after their victory. The Peloponnesians in the other 
 ships made great efforts to disembark, but were unable 
 on account of the roughness of the ground and the 
 tenacity with which the Athenians held their position. 
 
 It was a singular turn of fortune which drove the Athe¬ 
 nians to repel the Lacedaemonians, who were attacking 
 them by sea, from the Lacedaemonian coast, and the 
 Lacedaemonians to fight for a landing on their own soil, 
 now hostile to them, in the face of the Athenians. For 
 in those days it was the great glory of the Lacedae¬ 
 monians to be an inland people distinguished for their 
 military prowess, and of the Athenians to be a nation 
 of sailors and the first naval power in Hellas. 
 
 The Peloponnesians, having continued their efforts 13. 
 
254 RETURN OF THE ATHENIAN FLEET. 
 
 IV. 
 
 For two 
 days the 
 Peloponne¬ 
 sians con¬ 
 tinue their 
 efforts. 
 Fifty Athe¬ 
 nian ships 
 arrive and 
 pass the 
 night at 
 Prote. 
 
 14 . 
 
 The Athe¬ 
 nians rush 
 in at both 
 mouths of 
 the harbour, 
 which the 
 enemy had 
 neglected 
 to close. 
 The Lace¬ 
 daemonians 
 are defeated 
 after a sharp 
 conflict, 
 and the 
 men sta¬ 
 tioned in 
 the island 
 are cut off. 
 
 during this day and a part of the next, at length B.C. 425. 
 desisted ; on the third day they sent some of their ' ' 4 ‘ 
 
 ships to Asine for timber with which to make engines, 
 hoping by their help to take the part of the fort looking 
 towards the harbour where the landing was easier, al¬ 
 though it was built higher. Meanwhile the Athenian 
 ships arrived from Zacynthus ; they had been increased 
 in number to fifty by the arrival of some guard-ships 
 from Naupactus and of four Chian vessels. Their com¬ 
 manders saw that both the mainland and the island were 
 full of hoplites, and that the ships were in the harbour 
 and were not coming out: so, not knowing where to find 
 anchorage, they sailed away for the present to the island 
 of Prote, which was close at hand and uninhabited, and 
 there passed the night. Next day, having made ready 
 for action, they put off to sea, intending, if, as they hoped, 
 the Peloponnesians were willing to come out against them, 
 to give battle in the open; if not, to sail into the harbour. 
 
 The Peloponnesians did not come out, and had somehow 
 neglected to close the mouths as they had intended. 
 
 They showed no sign of moving, but were on shore, 
 manning their ships and preparing to fight, if any one 
 entered the harbour, which was of considerable size. 
 
 The Athenians, seeing how matters stood, rushed in 
 upon them at both mouths of the harbour. Most of the 
 enemies’ ships had by this time got into deep water and 
 were facing them. These they put to flight and pursued 
 them as well as they could in such a narrow space, 
 damaging many and taking five, one of them with the 
 crew. They charged the remaining vessels even after 
 they had reached the land, and there were some which 
 they disabled while the crews were getting into them 
 and before they put out at all. Others they succeeded 
 in tying to their own ships and began to drag them away 
 empty, the sailors having taken flight. At this sight 
 the Lacedaemonians were in an agony, for their friends 
 were being cut off in the island ; they hurried to the 
 rescue, and dashing armed as they were into the sea, 
 
ow 
 
 BATTLE IN THE HARBOUR . 
 
 255 
 
 .c. 425. took hold of the ships and pulled them back; a that IV. 
 
 1. 88, 4’ • 1 
 
 was a time when every one thought that the action 
 was at a stand where he himself was not engaged 31 . 
 
 There was a tremendous conflict; the two combatants 
 in this battle for the ships interchanging their usual 
 manner of fighting ; for the Lacedaemonians in their 
 excitement and desperation did, as one may say, carry 
 on a sea-fight from the land, and the Athenians, who 
 were victorious and eager to push their good-fortune 
 to the utmost, waged a land fight from their ships. At 
 length, after great efforts and much damage inflicted on 
 both sides, they parted. The Lacedaemonians saved 
 their empty ships, with the exception of those which were 
 first taken. Both sides retired to their encampments ; 
 the Athenians then raised a trophy, gave up the dead, 
 and took possession of the wrecks. They lost no time 
 in sailing round the island and establishing a guard Over 
 the men who were cut off there. But the Peloponnesians 
 on the mainland, who had now been joined by all their 
 contingents, remained in their position before Pylos. 
 
 At Sparta, when the news arrived, there was great 15. 
 consternation; it was resolved that the magistrates Consterna- 
 should go down to the camp and see for themselves ; Sparta, 
 they could then take on the spot any measures which Saulofhing 
 they thought necessary. Finding on their arrival that ^^ e the 
 nothing could be done for their soldiers in the island, Spartans 
 
 . . . make a 
 
 and not liking to run the risk of their being starved to truce and 
 death or overcome by force of numbers b , they decided blssadors 
 that with the consent of the Athenian generals they p° for 
 would suspend hostilities at Pylos, and sending ambas¬ 
 sadors to ask for peace at Athens, would endeavour to 
 recover their men as soon as possible. 
 
 The Athenian commanders accepted their proposals, 16. 
 and a truce was made on the following conditions : — the true? 
 
 £ The Lacedaemonians shall deliver into the hands of The Lace - 
 
 a Or, taking KeKcoXvcrdai with eKao-ros : ‘ that was a time when 
 every one felt that he was under a restraint because he was unable 
 to be everywhere and to do everything.’ 
 
 b Omitting rj after (iiavOevTas. 
 
THE TRUCE. 
 
 IV. 
 
 daemonians 
 agree to 
 give up all 
 their ships 
 of war to 
 the Athe¬ 
 nians while 
 the truce 
 lasts. 
 
 i7- 
 
 We use few 
 or many 
 words as 
 the occa¬ 
 sion re¬ 
 quires. 
 
 You have 
 now a great 
 opportunity 
 of placing 
 yourselves 
 above the 
 chances of 
 fortune. 
 
 256 
 
 the Athenians at Pylos the ships in which they fought, B.c. 425. 
 and shall also bring thither and deliver over any other ' 4 ‘ 
 ships of war which are in Laconia ; and they shall make 
 no assault upon the fort either by sea or land. The 
 Athenians shall permit the Lacedaemonians on the 
 mainland to send to those on the island a fixed quantity 
 of kneaded flour, viz. two Attic quarts a of barley-meal 
 for each man, and a pint of wine, and also a piece of 
 meat ; for an attendant, half these quantities ; they shall 
 send them into the island under the inspection of the 
 Athenians, and no vessel shall sail in by stealth. The 
 Athenians shall guard the island as before, but not land, 
 and shall not attack the Peloponnesian forces by land or 
 by sea. If either party violate this agreement in any 
 particular, however slight, the truce is to be at an end. 
 
 The agreement is to last until the Lacedaemonian am¬ 
 bassadors return from Athens, and the Athenians are to 
 convey them thither and bring them back in a trireme. 
 
 When they return the truce is to be at an end, and the 
 Athenians are to restore the ships in the same condition 
 in which they received them.’ Such were the terms of 
 the truce. The ships, which were about sixty in number, 
 were given up to the Athenians. The ambassadors went 
 on their way, and arriving at Athens spoke as follows :— 
 
 4 Men of Athens, the Lacedaemonians have sent us to 
 negotiate for the recovery of our countrymen in the 
 island, in the hope that you may be induced to grant 
 us terms such as will be at once advantageous to you 
 and not inglorious to us in our present misfortune. If we 
 speak at length, this will be no departure from the custom 
 of our country. On the contrary, it is our manner not to 
 say much where few words will suffice, but to be more 
 liberal of speech b when some weighty communication 
 has to be made and words are the ministers of action b . 
 
 a The choenixwas about two pints, dry measure; the cotyle about 
 half a pint. 
 
 b Or, taking Xuyois with SiSu o-kovtcis: ( when some weighty com¬ 
 munication has to be made by words, if anything is to be really done.’ 
 
SPEECH OF THE LACEDAEMONIANS. 2 $J 
 
 b.c. 4 2 5- Do not receive what we say in a hostile spirit, or imagine IV. 
 
 01.88, 4 * that we deem you ignorant and are instructing you, but 
 regard us simply as putting you in mind a of what you 
 already know to be good policy. For you may turn 
 your present advantage to excellent account, not only 
 keeping what you have won, but gaining honour and 
 glory as well. You will then escape the reverse which 
 is apt to be experienced by men who attain any unusual 
 good fortune ; for, having already succeeded beyond all 
 expectation, they see no reason why they should set any 
 limit to their hopes and desires. Whereas they who have 
 oftenest known the extremes of either kind of fortune 
 ought to be most suspicious of prosperity; and this may 
 naturally be expected to be the lesson which experience 
 has taught both us and you. 
 
 ‘Look only at the calamity which has just overtaken 18. 
 us, who formerly enjoyed the greatest prestige of any Take warn- 
 
 tt 11 1 i-i ^ r ingfromour 
 
 Hellenic state, but are now come hither to ask of you disaster, 
 the boon which at one time we should have thought our- hour°of 
 selves better able to confer. You cannot attribute our prosperity 
 
 show that 
 
 mishap to any want of power; nor to the pride which you know 
 
 • / r nr . . when to 
 
 an increase of power fosters. We were neither stronger stop, 
 nor weaker than before, but we erred in judgment, and 
 to such errors all men are liable. Therefore you should 
 not suppose that, because your city and your empire are 
 powerful at this moment, you will always have fortune on 
 your side. The wise ensure their own safety by not 
 making too sure of their gains, and when disasters come 
 they can tell better where they are; they know that war 
 will go on its way whithersoever chance may lead, and 
 will not be bound by the rules which he who begins to 
 meddle with it would fain prescribe. They of all men 
 will be least likely to meet with reverses, because they 
 are not puffed up with military success, and they will 
 be most inclined to end the struggle in the hour of 
 victory. It will be for your honour, Athenians, to act 
 thus towards us. And then the victories which you have 
 a Cp. iv. 95 init.; iv. 126 init.; v. 69 fin. 
 
 S 
 
258 SPEECH OF THE LACEDAEMONIANS. 
 
 IV. gained already cannot be attributed to mere luck; as 
 they certainly will be if, rejecting our prayer, you should 
 hereafter encounter disasters, a thing which is not un¬ 
 likely to happen. But you may if you will leave to 
 posterity a reputation for power and wisdom which no 
 danger can affect. 
 
 19. ‘The Lacedaemonians invite you to make terms with 
 We invite them and to finish the war. They offer peace and al- 
 makepeace. liance and a general friendly and happy relation, and 
 enmities they ask in return their countrymen who are cut off 
 recondied ' m ^ ie island. They think it better that neither city 
 when the should run any further risk, you of the escape of the 
 
 victor is . . . 
 
 generous besieged, who may find some means of forcing their 
 his adver- way out, we of their being compelled to surrender and 
 byTies of m P ass ^ n & a.bsolutely into your hands. We think that great 
 gratitude, enmities are most effectually reconciled, not when one 
 party seeks revenge and, getting a decided superiority, 
 binds his adversary by enforced oaths and makes a 
 treaty with him on unequal terms, but when, having in 
 his power to do all this, he from a generous and equitable 
 feeling overcomes his resentment, and by the modera¬ 
 tion of his terms surprises his adversary, who, having 
 suffered no violence at his hands, is bound to recompense 
 his generosity not with evil but with good, and who 
 therefore, from a sense of honour, is more likely to keep 
 his word. And mankind are more ready to make such 
 a concession to their greater enemies than to those with 
 whom they have only a slight difference a . Again, they 
 joyfully give way to those who first give way them¬ 
 selves, although against overbearing power they will risk 
 a conflict even contrary to their own better judgment. 
 
 20. ‘Now, if ever, is the time of reconciliation for us both, 
 Reconcilia- before either has suffered any irremediable calamity, 
 
 tion is still ... , 1 • 1 1 ,. J 
 
 possible; which must cause, besides the ordinary antagonism of 
 Irreparable” contending states, a personal and inveterate hatred, and 
 penecL P " w!11 de P rive y ou of the advantages which we now offer. 
 Who began While the contest is still undecided, while you may 
 
 the war is a J J 
 
 a Cp. v. 91 init. 
 
 Otd 
 
wo 
 
 CLEON THE POPULAR LEADER. 2$9 
 
 ■C. 425. acquire reputation and our friendship, and while our IV. 
 
 ' 4 ‘ disaster can be repaired on tolerable terms, and disgrace disputed 
 
 r 5 0 point, but 
 
 averted, let us be reconciled, and choosing peace instead you win 
 of war ourselves, let us give relief and rest to all the credit of 
 Hellenes. The chief credit of the peace will be yours. on dl e glt ’ 
 Whether we or you drove them into war is uncertain; unite A we 
 
 * are the 
 
 but to give them peace lies with you, and to you they lords of 
 will be grateful. If you decide for peace, you may assure 
 to yourselves the lasting friendship of the Lacedaemo¬ 
 nians freely offered by them, you on your part em¬ 
 ploying no force but kindness only. Consider the great 
 advantages which such a friendship will yield. If you 
 and we are at one, you may be certain that the rest of 
 Hellas, which is less powerful than we, will pay to both 
 of us the greatest deference/ 
 
 Thus spoke the Lacedaemonians, thinking that the 2 I. 
 Athenians, who had formerly been desirous of making The Athe- 
 terms with them, and had only been prevented by their instigation 
 refusal a , would now, when peace was offered to them, ° n f S jJon 
 joyfully agree and would restore their men. But the ]m P° sslbl e 
 Athenians reflected that, since they had the Lacedae¬ 
 monians shut up in the island, it was at any time in 
 their power to make peace, and they wanted more. 
 
 These feelings were chiefly encouraged by Cleon the 
 son of Cleaenetus, a popular leader of the day who had 
 the greatest influence over the multitude 13 . He per¬ 
 suaded them to reply that the men in the island must 
 first of all give up themselves and their arms and be 
 sent to Athens; the Lacedaemonians were then to re¬ 
 store Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaia. Now these 
 places had not been taken in war, but had been sur¬ 
 rendered under a former treaty 0 in a time of reverse, 
 when the Athenians d were more anxious to obtain peace 
 than they now were d . On these conditions they might 
 recover the men and make a treaty of such duration as 
 both parties should approve. 
 
 a Cp. ii. 59. b Cp. iii. 36 fin. c Cp. i. 115 init. 
 
 d Or, ‘were making and not receiving offers of peace.’ 
 
 S 2 
 
260 pretended violation of the truce. 
 
 IV. To this reply the Lacedaemonians said nothing, but 
 
 22. only requested that the Athenians would appoint com- 
 The pro- missioners to discuss with them the details of the agree- 
 Lacedae- he ment and quietly arrive at an understanding about them 
 discuss S t0 if they could. This proposal was assailed by Cleon in un¬ 
 matters of measured language : he had always known, he said, that 
 private is they meant no good, and now their designs were unveiled; 
 rejected! 7 for they were unwilling to speak a word before the 
 'compelled P eo pl e > but wanted to be closeted with a select few a ; 
 
 to break off jf they had any honesty in them, let them say what 
 negotia- j j j 
 
 tions. they wanted to the whole city. But the Lacedaemo¬ 
 nians knew that, although they might be willing to make 
 concessions under the pressure of their calamities, they 
 could not speak openly before the assembly, (for if they 
 spoke and did not succeed, the terms which they offered 
 might injure them in the opinion of their allies); they 
 saw too that the Athenians would not grant what was 
 asked of them on any tolerable conditions. So, after a 
 fruitless negotiation, they returned home. 
 
 23. Upon their return the truce at Pylos instantly came 
 TheAthe- to an end, and the Lacedaemonians demanded back 
 
 nians refuse . 
 
 to restore their ships according to the agreement. But the Athe- 
 ponnesian nians accused them of making an assault upon the fort, 
 lVonsome an d °f some other petty infractions of the treaty which 
 fractloiTof seeme d hardly worth mentioning. Accordingly they re- 
 the treaty, fused to restore them, insisting upon the clause which 
 ade SphS said that if ‘ in any particular, however slight, 5 the agree- 
 term. ment were violated, the treaty was to be at an end. The 
 Lacedaemonians remonstrated, and went away protest¬ 
 ing against the injustice of detaining their ships. Both 
 parties then renewed the war with the utmost vigour. 
 The Athenians had two triremes sailing round Sphac- 
 teria in opposite directions throughout the day, and at 
 night their whole fleet was moored about the island, 
 except on the side towards the sea when the wind was 
 high. Twenty additional ships had come from Athens 
 to assist in the blockade, so that the entire number was 
 a Cp. v. 85. 
 
 O td 
 
B.C. 425 
 01 . 88 , 
 
 AFFAIRS OF SI OILY. 261 
 
 seventy. The Peloponnesians lay encamped on the IV. 
 mainland and made assaults against the fort, watching 
 for any opportunity which might present itself of rescuing 
 their men. 
 
 Meanwhile in Sicily the Syracusans and the allies 24. 
 brought up the fleet which they had been equipping a J^Syra-^ 
 to Messene, and joining the other fleet which was keep- Locrians 
 ing guard there, carried on the war from thence. They waTagainst 
 were instigated chiefly by the Locrians, who hated the 
 Rhegians, and had already invaded their territory with ^opeTof 
 their whole force. They were eager to try their fortune the Syra- 
 in a naval engagement, for they saw that the Athenians cusans ‘ 
 had only a few ships actually on the spot, the larger 
 portion of the fleet which had been despatched to Sicily 
 being, as they heard, engaged in the siege of Sphac- 
 teria. If they conquered at sea they hoped to blockade 
 Rhegium both by sea and land; they would easily master 
 the place, and their affairs would then be really gaining 
 strength. Rhegium, the extreme point of Italy, and 
 Messene, of Sicily, are close to one another; and if 
 Rhegium were taken the Athenians would not be able 
 to lie there and command the strait. Now the strait 
 is that portion of sea between Rhegium and Messene 
 where Sicily is nearest to the continent; it is the so- 
 called Charybdis by which Odysseus is said to have 
 passed. The channel was naturally considered dangerous; 
 for the strait is narrow, and the sea flowing into it from 
 two great oceans, the Tyrrhenian and Sicilian, is full of 
 currents. 
 
 In this strait the Syracusans and their allies, who had 25. 
 somewhat more than thirty ships, were compelled to 
 flcht late in the day for a vessel which was sailing Syracusan 
 
 . . a 1 • 1 fleet b y the 
 
 through. 1 hey put out against sixteen Athenian and Athenians 
 eight Rhegian ships ; but, being defeated by the Athe- ^anfkfthe 
 nians, they made a hasty retreat, each ship as it best 
 could, to their stations at Messene and near Rhegium ; 
 one ship was lost. Night closed the engagement. After 
 a Cp. iv. 1 fin. 
 
262 THE A THEN IANS AND THEIR SICILIAN ALLIES. 
 
 IV. 
 
 Partial suc¬ 
 cess of the 
 Syracusans, 
 who take 
 two Athe¬ 
 nian ships. 
 
 Unsuccess¬ 
 ful attempts 
 of the 
 Messenians 
 upon 
 
 Naxos, and 
 of the 
 Leontines 
 and Athe¬ 
 nians upon 
 Messene. 
 The Athe¬ 
 nians for 
 a time 
 withdraw 
 from the 
 contest. 
 
 this the Locrians quitted the Rhegian territory, and the 
 Syracusans and their confederates united their fleet and 
 anchored at the promontory of Pelorus near Messene, 
 where their land-forces were also stationed. The Athe¬ 
 nians and Rhegians, sailing up to them, and seeing that 
 the crews were not there, fell upon the empty vessels, but 
 an iron grapnel was thrown out at them, and they in their 
 turn lost a ship, from w r hich the crew escaped by swim¬ 
 ming. Then the Syracusans embarked, and, as they 
 were being towed along the shore towards Messene, the 
 Athenians again attacked them. Making a sudden twist 
 outwards they struck the first blow at the Athenians, 
 who lost another ship. Thus both in the movement 
 along the coast and in the naval engagement which 
 ensued, the Syracusans proved themselves quite a match 
 for the Athenians, and at length made their way into 
 the harbour at Messene. 
 
 The Athenians, hearing that Camarina was being 
 betrayed to the Syracusans by a certain Archias and 
 his confederates, sailed thither. Meanwhile the Messe¬ 
 nians, with their whole power by land and with the 
 allied fleet, made war upon Naxos, a Chalcidian city 
 which was their neighbour. On the first day they forced 
 the Naxians to retire within their walls and ravaged the 
 country; on the morrow they sailed round to the river 
 Acesines, again ravaged the country, and with their land- 
 forces made incursions in the neighbourhood of the city. 
 But in the meantime a large body of Sicels came down 
 over the heights to assist the Naxians against the Messe¬ 
 nians. Perceiving this they took heart, and shouting to 
 one another that the Leontines and their other Hellenic 
 allies were coming to succour them, they sallied out of 
 the city, charged the Messenians, and put them to flight 
 with a loss of more than a thousand men ; the rest with 
 difficulty escaped, for the barbarians fell upon them in 
 the roads and destroyed most of them. The allied 
 fleet, putting into Messene, broke up and returned home. 
 Whereupon the Leontines and their allies, in concert with 
 
 pa o 
 
ffiO 
 
 ■C. 425- 
 
 1. 88, 4. 
 
 THE SITUATION AT PYLOS. 263 
 
 the Athenians, marched against the now enfeebled Mes- IV. 
 sene. The Athenian fleet attempted an assault of the 
 harbour while the army attacked the city. But the 
 Messenians and a Locrian garrison under Demoteles, 
 which after their disaster at Naxos had been left to 
 protect the place, suddenly falling upon them put to 
 flight the main body of the Leontines with great loss; 
 whereupon the Athenians disembarked, came to their 
 aid, and, falling on the Messenians while they were still 
 in confusion, chased them back to the city. They then 
 erected a trophy and retired to Rhegium. After this 
 the Hellenes in Sicily went on fighting against one 
 another by land ; but the Athenians took no part in 
 their operations. 
 
 At Pylos meanwhile the Athenians continued to 26. 
 blockade the Lacedaemonians in the island, and the The 
 
 • 1 • 1 1 . blockade of 
 
 Peloponnesian army on the mainland remained m their Pylos was 
 old position. The watch was harassing to the Athe- owfiigp) to 
 nians, for they were in want both of food and water; 
 there was only one small well, which was inside the fort, water ^ 
 and the soldiers were commonly in the habit of scraping confined 
 away the shingle on the sea-shore, and drinking any (3^0 the 
 water which they could get. The Athenian garrison of 
 was crowded into a narrow space, and, their ships having; anchoring 
 
 r 1 1:5 in shore; 
 
 no regular anchorage, the crews took their meals (4) to the 
 on land by turns; one half of the army eating while takenby S 
 the other lay at anchor in the open sea. The unex- daemonkms 
 pected length of the siege was a great discouragement for the in - 
 to them ; they had hoped to starve their enemies out of supplies, 
 in a few days, for they were on a desert island, and had 
 only brackish water to drink. The secret of this pro¬ 
 tracted resistance was a proclamation issued by the 
 Lacedaemonians offering large fixed prices, and free¬ 
 dom if he were a Helot, to any one who would convey 
 into the island meal, wine, cheese or any other provision 
 suitable for a besieged place. Many braved the danger, 
 especially the Helots ; they started from all points of 
 Peloponnesus, and before daybreak bore down upon the 
 
264 
 
 FEARS OF THE ATHENIANS. 
 
 IV. 
 
 27. 
 
 The situa¬ 
 tion is re¬ 
 ported to 
 be critical. 
 Cleon de¬ 
 nies the 
 reports. 
 
 The Athe¬ 
 nians want 
 to send 
 commis¬ 
 sioners to 
 Pylos. 
 
 Cleon 
 blames the 
 generals, 
 and pro¬ 
 poses to 
 send, not 
 commis¬ 
 sioners, but 
 a fleet. 
 
 He would 
 soon take 
 the men if 
 he were 
 general. 
 
 shore of the island looking towards the open sea. They 
 took especial care to have a strong wind in their favour, 
 since they were less likely to be discovered by the 
 triremes when it blew hard from the sea. The blockade 
 was then impracticable, and the crews of the boats 
 were perfectly reckless in running them aground ; for 
 a value had been set upon them, and Lacedaemonian 
 hoplites were waiting to receive them about the landing- 
 places of the island. All however who ventured when 
 the sea was calm were captured. Some too dived and 
 swam by way of the harbour, drawing after them by a 
 cord skins containing pounded linseed and poppy-seeds 
 mixed with honey. At first they were not found out, 
 but afterwards watches were posted. The two parties 
 had all sorts of devices, the one determined to send in 
 food, the other to detect them. 
 
 When the Athenians heard that their own army was 
 suffering and that supplies were introduced into the 
 island, they began to be anxious and were apprehensive 
 that the blockade might extend into the winter. They 
 reflected that the conveyance of necessaries round the 
 Peloponnese would then be impracticable. Their troops 
 were in a desert place, to which, even in summer, they 
 were not able to send a sufficient supply. The coast 
 was without harbours; and therefore it would be im¬ 
 possible to maintain the blockade. Either the watch 
 would be relaxed and the men would escape ; or, taking 
 advantage of a storm, they might sail away in the ships 
 which brought them food. a Above all they were afraid 
 that the Lacedaemonians, feeling the strength of their 
 position, would make no more overtures to them a , and 
 they regretted having rejected their advances. Cleon, 
 knowing that he was an object of general mistrust 
 because he had stood in the way of peace, challenged 
 the reports of the messengers from Pylos; who re- 
 
 a Or, ‘ Above all they feared that the Lacedaemonians, who no 
 longer made overtures to them, must now be reassured of the 
 strength of their own position.’ 
 
 ffiO 
 
CLEON AND NIC/AS. 
 
 265 
 
 6.0^425. j°in e d that, if their words were not believed, the Athe- IV. 
 
 ’ 4 nians should send commissioners of their own. And 
 so Theagenes and Cleon himself were chosen commis¬ 
 sioners. As he knew that he could only confirm the 
 report of the messengers whom he was calumniating, 
 or would be convicted of falsehood if he contradicted 
 them, observing too that the Athenians were disposed to 
 take active measures, he advised them not to send com¬ 
 missioners, which would only be a loss of valuable time, 
 but, if they were themselves satisfied with the report, to 
 send a fleet against the island. Pointedly alluding to 
 Nicias the son of Niceratus, who was one of the generals 
 and an enemy of his, he declared sarcastically that, if the 
 generals were good for anything, they might easily sail 
 to the island and take the men, and that this was what 
 he would certainly do himself if he were general. 
 
 Nicias perceived that the multitude were murmuring 28. 
 at Cleon, and asking ‘ why he did not sail—now was The P eo P le 
 
 ’ ^ J . murmur at 
 
 his time a if he thought the capture of Sphacteria to be him. 
 such an easy matter ; 5 and hearing him attack the signs in his 
 generals, he told him that, as far as they were con- He°at r first 
 cerned, he might take any force which he required and back » 
 try. Cleon at first imagined that the offer of Nicias afterwards 
 
 .... , compelled 
 
 was only a pretence, and was willing to go ; but finding to sail, 
 that he was in earnest, he tried to back out. and said Jeckres 
 that not he but Nicias was general. He was now th f the wl11 
 alarmed, for he never imagined that Nicias would go victorious 
 
 1 • ■ . tv t • • within 
 
 so far as to give up his place to him. Again Nicias twenty 
 bade him take the command of the expedition against The Athe- 
 Pylos, which he formally gave up to him in the presence at^hdrn^ 211 
 of the assembly. And the more Cleon declined the 
 proffered command and tried to retract what he had 
 said, so much the more the multitude, as their manner is, 
 urged Nicias to resign and shouted to Cleon that he 
 should sail. At length, not knowing how to escape 
 from his own words, he undertook the expedition, and, 
 coming forward, said that he was not afraid of the 
 a Reading o rt. 
 
266 THE ATHENIANS AND CLEON. 
 
 IV. Lacedaemonians, and that he would sail without with¬ 
 drawing a single man from the city if he were allowed 
 to have the Lemnian and Imbrian forces now at Athens, 
 the auxiliaries from Aenus, who were targeteers, and four 
 hundred archers from other places. With these and 
 with the troops already at Pylos he gave his word that 
 within twenty days he would either bring the Lace¬ 
 daemonians alive or kill them on the spot. His vain 
 words moved the Athenians to laughter; nevertheless 
 the wiser sort of men were pleased when they reflected 
 that of two good things they could not fail to obtain 
 one—either there would be an end of Cleon, which they 
 would have greatly preferred, or, if they were disappointed, 
 he would put the Lacedaemonians into their hands. 
 
 29. When he had concluded the affair in the assembly, 
 He selects and the Athenians had passed the necessary vote, he 
 thenes to made choice of Demosthenes, one of the commanders 
 colleague, at Pyl° s > to be his colleague, and proceeded to sail with 
 hearing all S p e ed. He selected Demosthenes because he heard 
 already that he was already intending to make an attack upon 
 anattack g the island; for the soldiers, who were suffering much 
 island!^ 16 from the discomfort of the place, in which they were 
 is encour? 11 rat h er besieged than besiegers a , were eager to strike a 
 aged hy an decisive blow. He had been much encouraged by a fire 
 fire. which had taken place in the island. It had previously 
 been nearly covered with wood and was pathless, having 
 never been inhabited ; and he had feared that the nature 
 of the country would give the enemy an advantage. For, 
 however large the force with which he landed, the Lace¬ 
 daemonians might attack him from some place of am¬ 
 bush and do him much injury. Their mistakes and the 
 character of their forces would be concealed by the 
 wood ; whereas all the errors made by his own army 
 would be palpable, and so the enemy, with whom the 
 power of attack would rest, might come upon them sud¬ 
 denly wherever they liked. And if they were compelled 
 to go into the wood and there engage, a smaller force 
 a Cp. vii. 11 fin. 
 
 PQO 
 
ow 
 
 THE PLAN OF DEMOSTHENES. 
 
 267 
 
 c. 425. which knew the ground would be more than a match IV. 
 
 1 . 88, 4. larger number who were unacquainted with it. 
 
 Their own army, however numerous, would be destroyed 
 without knowing it, for they would not be able to see 
 where they needed one another’s assistance. 
 
 Demosthenes was led to make these reflections from 3 °* 
 his experience in Aetolia a , where his defeat had been in 7 he bu™- 
 a great measure owing to the forest. However, while the wood dis- 
 
 1 1 _ covers the 
 
 Athenian soldiers were taking their midday meal, with a number and 
 guard posted in advance, at the extremity of the island, fheenemy. 
 being compelled by want of room to land on the edge of 
 the shore at meal-times, some one unintentionally set fire 
 to a portion of the wood ; a wind came on, and from this 
 accident, before they knew what was happening, the 
 greater part of it was burnt. Demosthenes, who had 
 previously suspected that the Lacedaemonians when 
 they sent in provisions to the besieged had exaggerated 
 their number, saw that the men were more numerous 
 than he had imagined. He saw too b the increased zeal 
 of the Athenians, who were now convinced that the 
 attempt was worth making, and the island seemed to him 
 more accessible. So he prepared for the descent and 
 despatched messengers to the allies in the neighbour¬ 
 hood for additional forces. Cleon sent and announced 
 to Demosthenes his approach, and soon afterwards, 
 bringing with him the army which he had requested, 
 himself arrived at Pylos. On the meeting of the two 
 generals they first of all sent a herald to the Lace¬ 
 daemonian force on the mainland, proposing that they 
 should avoid any further risk by ordering the men in 
 the island to surrender with their arms; they were to 
 be placed under surveillance but well treated until a 
 general peace was concluded. 
 
 Finding that their proposal was rejected, the Athe- 31. 
 
 nians waited for a day, and on the night of the day Disposition 
 * ' " of* the Lace- 
 
 following put off, taking with them all their heavy- daemonian 
 
 armed troops, whom they had embarked in a few ships. threeVta- 
 
 _ . „ j- / / tions, the 
 
 a Cp. ill. 98. b Reading to re. 
 
268 THE ATTACK UPON THE ISLAND. 
 
 IV. 
 
 main body 
 occupying 
 the centre 
 of the 
 island. 
 
 32 . 
 
 The Athe¬ 
 nian hop- 
 lites land. 
 The first of 
 the three 
 garrisons is 
 cut down. 
 The rest of 
 the Athe¬ 
 nian forces 
 which land 
 later are 
 distributed 
 in small 
 parties and 
 occupy the 
 higher 
 points of the 
 island. 
 
 A little before dawn they landed on.both sides of the 
 island, towards the sea and towards the harbour, a force 
 amounting in all to about eight hundred men. They 
 then ran as fast as they could to the first station on the 
 island. Now the disposition of the enemy was as follows: 
 This first station was garrisoned by about thirty hoplites, 
 while the main body under the command of Epitadas was 
 posted near the spring in the centre of the island, where 
 the ground was most level. A small force guarded b the 
 furthest extremity of the island opposite Pylos, which 
 was precipitous towards the sea, and on the land side 
 the strongest point of all, being protected to some extent 
 by an ancient wall made of rough stones, which the 
 Spartans thought would be of use to them if they were 
 overpowered and compelled to retreat. Such was the 
 disposition of the Lacedaemonian troops. 
 
 The Athenians rushed upon the first garrison and cut 
 them down, half asleep as they were and just snatching 
 up their arms. They had not seen the enemy land, and 
 fancied that their ships were only gone to keep the cus¬ 
 tomary watch for the night. When the dawn appeared, 
 the rest of the army began to disembark. They were 
 the crews of rather more than seventy ships, including 
 all but the lowest rank of rowers, variously equipped. 
 There were also archers to the number of eight hundred, 
 and as many targeteers, besides the Messenian auxiliaries 
 and all who were on duty about Pylos, except the guards 
 who could not be spared from the walls of the fortress. 
 Demosthenes divided them into parties of two hundred 
 more or less, who seized the highest points of the island 
 in order that the enemy, being completely surrounded 
 and distracted by the number of their opponents, might 
 not know whom they should face first, but might be 
 exposed to missiles on every side. For if they attacked 
 those who were in front, they would be assailed by those 
 behind; and if those on one flank, by those posted on the 
 other ; and whichever way they moved, the light-armed 
 
 a Reading avro to ecr^arou, or, avro rovV^nroi/. 
 
 OB 
 
PQ O 
 
 .C. 425. 
 1. 88, 4. 
 
 THE LA CEDA EM ONI ANS AT A DISADVANTA GE. 269 
 
 troops of the enemy were sure to be in their rear. These IV. 
 were their most embarrassing opponents, because they 
 were armed with bows and javelins and slings and stones, 
 which could be used with effect at a distance. Even to 
 approach them was impossible, for they conquered in 
 their very flight, and when an enemy retreated, pressed 
 close at his heels. Such was the plan of the descent 
 which Demosthenes had in his mind, and which he 
 now carried into execution. 
 
 The main body of the Lacedaemonians on the island 33. 
 under Epitadas, when they saw the first garrison cut to The Lace ~ 
 
 . daemonian 
 
 pieces and an army approaching them, drew up in battle hopiites are 
 array. The Athenian hopiites were right in front, and copewith 
 the Lacedaemonians advanced against them, wanting 
 to come to close quarters; but having light-armed ad- Athenian 
 versaries both on their flank and rear, they could not get 
 at them or profit by their own military skill, for they were 
 impeded by a shower of missiles from both sides. Mean¬ 
 while the Athenians instead of going to meet them re¬ 
 mained in position, while the light-armed again and 
 again ran up and attacked the Lacedaemonians, who 
 drove them back where they pressed closest. But 
 though compelled to retreat they still continued fight¬ 
 ing, being lightly equipped and easily getting the start 
 of their enemies. The ground was difficult and rough, 
 the island having been uninhabited; and the Lacedae¬ 
 monians, who were incumbered by their arms, could not 
 pursue them in such a place. 
 
 For some little time these skirmishes continued. But 34. 
 soon the Lacedaemonians became too weary to rush out The y are 
 upon their assailants, who began to be sensible that their distressed, 
 resistance grew feebler. The sight of their own number, 
 which was many times that of the enemy, encouraged 
 them more than anything; they soon found that their 
 losses were trifling compared with what they had ex¬ 
 pected ; and familiarity made them think their oppon¬ 
 ents much less formidable than when they first landed 
 cowed by the fear of facing Lacedaemonians. They now 
 
270 
 
 THE CONFLICT DEEPENS. 
 
 IV. despised them and with a loud cry rushed upon them in a 
 body ; hurling at them stones, arrows, javelins, whichever 
 came first to hand. The shout with which they accom¬ 
 panied the attack dismayed the Lacedaemonians, who 
 were unaccustomed to this kind of warfare. Clouds of 
 dust arose from the newly-burnt wood, and there was no 
 possibility of a man’s seeing what was before him, owing 
 to the showers of arrows and stones hurled by their assail¬ 
 ants which were flying amid the dust. And now the Lace¬ 
 daemonians began to be sorely distressed, for their felt 
 cuirasses did not protect them against the arrows, and the 
 points of the javelins broke off where they struck them. 
 They were at their wits’ end, not being able to see out of 
 their eyes or to hear the word of command, which was 
 drowned by the cries of the enemy. Destruction was 
 staring them in the face, and they had no means or 
 hope of deliverance. 
 
 35. At length, finding that so long as they fought in the 
 They re-] same narrow spot more and more of their men were 
 fortification wounded, they closed their ranks and fell back on the 
 tremftyof last fortification of the island, which was not far off, and 
 and^defend w h ere their other garrison was stationed. Instantly the 
 themselves light-armed troops of the Athenians pressed upon them 
 
 with greater . 
 
 success with fresh confidence, redoubling their cries. Those of 
 
 they are the Lacedaemonians who were caught by them on the 
 
 exposed wa y were killed, but the greater number escaped to the 
 fort and ranged themselves with the garrison, resolved to 
 defend the heights wherever they were assailable. The 
 Athenians followed, but the strength of the position made 
 it impossible to surround and cut them off, and so they 
 attacked them in face and tried to force them back. For 
 a long time, and indeed during the greater part of the 
 day, both armies, although suffering from the battle and 
 thirst and the heat of the sun, held their own; the one 
 endeavouring to thrust their opponents from the high 
 ground, the other determined not to give way. But the 
 Lacedaemonians now defended themselves with greater 
 ease, because they were not liable to be taken in flank. 
 
 O to 
 
ow 
 
 c. 425- 
 
 . 88, 4. 
 
 PARLEY WITH THE ENEMY . 27I 
 
 There was no sign of the end. At length the general IV. 
 of the Messenian contingent came to Cleon and Demos- 36. 
 thenes and told them that the army was throwing away The Mes- 
 its pains, but if they would give him some archers and general 
 light-armed troops and let him find a path by which he 
 might get round in the rear of the Lacedaemonians, he the rocks 
 
 0 and reap- 
 
 thought that he could force his way in. Having obtained pears sud- 
 his request he started from a point out of sight of the S-Vear. 
 enemy, and making his way wherever the broken ground 
 afforded a footing and where the cliff was so steep that 
 no guards had been set, he and his men with great diffi¬ 
 culty got round unseen and suddenly appeared in the 
 rear, striking panic into the astonished enemy and re¬ 
 doubling the courage of his own friends who were 
 watching for his reappearance. The Lacedaemonians 
 were now assailed on both sides, and to compare a 
 smaller thing to a greater, were in the same case with 
 their own countrymen at Thermopylae. For as they 
 perished when the Persians found a way round by the 
 path, so now the besieged garrison were attacked on both 
 sides, and no longer resisted. The disparity of numbers, 
 and the failure of bodily strength arising from want of 
 food, compelled them to fall back, and the Athenians 
 were at length masters of the approaches. 
 
 Cleon and Demosthenes saw that if the Lacedae- 37. 
 monians gave way one step more they would be de- ^f on s and 
 stroyed by the Athenians; so they stopped the engage- thenes 
 ment and held back their own army, for they wanted, if Lacedae- 
 possible, to bring them alive to Athens. They were in ^^ 3 ^° 
 hopes that when they heard the offer of terms their 
 courage might be broken, and that they might be in¬ 
 duced by their desperate situation to yield up their arms. 
 Accordingly they proclaimed to them that they might, 
 if they would, surrender at discretion to the Athenians 
 themselves and their arms. 
 
 Upon hearing the proclamation most of them lowered 38. 
 their shields and waved their hands in token of their The Lace- 
 willingness to yield. A truce was made, and then Cleon orthe°mS 3 S - 
 
2/2 THE LACEDAEMONIANS SURRENDER. 
 
 IV. 
 
 land give 
 their con¬ 
 sent, and 
 the offer is 
 accepted. 
 The 
 
 prisoners 
 brought to 
 Athens 
 number two 
 hundred 
 and ninety- 
 two, of 
 whom a 
 hundred 
 and twenty 
 are Spar¬ 
 tans. 
 
 39 - 
 
 Duration 
 of the 
 blockade. 
 Supply of 
 food. 
 
 and Demosthenes on the part of the Athenians, and B.c. 425. 
 
 •T Q] gg ^ 
 
 Styphon the son of Pharax on the part of the Lacedae¬ 
 monians, held a parley. Epitadas, who was the first in 
 command, had been already slain ; Hippagretas, who 
 was next in succession, lay among the slain for dead ; 
 and Styphon had taken the place of the two others, 
 having been appointed, as the law prescribed, in case 
 anything should happen to them. He and his com¬ 
 panions expressed their wish to communicate with the 
 Lacedaemonians on the mainland as to the course which 
 they should pursue. The Athenians allowed none of them 
 to stir, but themselves invited heralds from the shore; and 
 after two or three communications, the herald who came 
 over last from the body of the army brought back word, 
 f The Lacedaemonians bid you act as you think best, but 
 you are not to dishonour yourselves.’ Whereupon they 
 consulted together, and then gave up themselves and 
 their arms. During that day and the following night the 
 Athenians kept guard over them ; on the next day they 
 set up a trophy on the island and made preparations to 
 sail, distributing the prisoners among the trierarchs. The 
 Lacedaemonians sent a herald and conveyed away their 
 own dead. The number of the dead and the prisoners 
 was as follows :—Four hundred and twenty hoplites in 
 all passed over into the island; of these, two hundred and 
 ninety-two were brought to Athens alive, the remainder 
 had perished. Of the survivors the Spartans numbered 
 about a hundred and twenty. But few Athenians fell, 
 for there was no regular engagement. 
 
 Reckoned from the sea-fight to the final battle in the 
 island, the time during which the blockade lasted was 
 ten weeks and two days. For about three weeks the 
 Lacedaemonians were supplied with food while the 
 Spartan ambassadors were gone to solicit peace, but 
 during the rest of this time they lived on what was 
 brought in by stealth. A store of corn and other pro¬ 
 visions was found in the island at the time of the 
 capture; for Epitadas the general had not served out 
 
wo 
 
 FULFILMENT OF CLEON'S PROMISE. 273 
 
 • C. 425. 
 1. 88, 4. 
 
 full rations. The Athenians and Peloponnesians now IV. 
 withdrew their armies from Pylos and returned home. 
 
 And the mad promise of Cleon was fulfilled; for he 
 did bring back the prisoners within twenty days as he 
 had said. 
 
 Nothing which happened during the war caused 4 °* 
 greater amazement in Hellas ; for it was universally 
 imagined that the Lacedaemonians would never give Hellas at 
 up their arms, either under the pressure of famine or der of the 
 in any other extremity, but would fight to the last and monians' 
 die sword in hand. No one would believe that those 
 who surrendered were men of the same quality with 
 those who perished. There is a story of a reply made 
 by a captive taken in the island to one of the Athenian 
 allies who had sneeringly asked f Where were their brave 
 men—all killed ?’ a He answered that ‘The spindle 5 
 (meaning the arrow) ‘would be indeed a valuable weapon 
 if it picked out the brave. 5 He meant to say that the 
 destruction caused by the arrows and stones was in¬ 
 discriminate. 
 
 On the arrival of the captives the Athenians resolved 4 1 • 
 
 to put them in chains until peace was concluded, but The pn ‘ 
 
 r r 7 soners are 
 
 if m the meantime the Lacedaemonians invaded Attica, detained as 
 . , , securities 
 
 to bring them out and put them to death. 1 hey placed for Attica. 
 
 a garrison in Pylos; and the Messenians of Naupactus, senian^of 
 regarding the place as their native land (for Pylos is 
 situated in the territory which was once Messenia), sent Pyi°s^ 
 thither some of themselves, being such troops as were daemonians 
 best suited for the service, who ravaged Laconia and did tressed and 
 great harm, because they spoke the same language with ^® c f ° r 
 the inhabitants. The Lacedaemonians had never before 
 experienced this irregular and predatory warfare; and 
 finding the Helots desert, and dreading some serious 
 domestic calamity, they were in great trouble. Although 
 not wishing to expose their condition before the Athe¬ 
 nians, they sent envoys to them and endeavoured to 
 
 a Literally, ‘ Were their dead brave ? ’ implying that the living 
 were not. 
 
 T 
 
274 ATHENIAN EXPEDITION TO CORINTH. 
 
 IV. recover Pylos and the prisoners. But the Athenians 
 only raised their terms, and at last, after they had made 
 many fruitless journeys, dismissed them. Thus ended 
 the affair of Pylos. 
 
 42. During the same summer and immediately afterwards 
 Athenian the Athenians attacked the Corinthian territory with 
 
 troops land 
 
 nearSoiy- eighty ships, two thousand heavy-armed, and cavalry 
 The Conn- to the number of two hundred conveyed in horse trans- 
 are a warned° P orts - They were accompanied by allies from Miletus, 
 from Argos, Andros, and Carystus. Nicias the son of Niceratus, and 
 
 come out to g 
 
 meet them, two others, were in command. Very early in the morn¬ 
 ing they put in between the promontory Chersonesus 
 and the stream Rheitus, to that part of the coast which 
 is overhung by the Solygeian ridge; there in ancient 
 times Dorian invaders had taken up their position and 
 fought against their Aeolian enemies in Corinth, and 
 to this day there is a village, called Solygeia, on the hill 
 which they occupied. From the beach where the crews 
 landed this village is distant nearly a mile and a-half, the 
 city of Corinth about seven miles, and the Isthmus about 
 two miles and a quarter. The Corinthians, having had 
 previous intimation from Argos of the intended invasion, 
 came in good time to the Isthmus. The whole popula¬ 
 tion, with the exception of those who dwelt to the north 
 of the Isthmus and five hundred troops who were em¬ 
 ployed in protecting Ambracia and Leucadia a , was on 
 the watch to see where the Athenians would land. But, 
 having sailed in before day-light, they were not dis¬ 
 covered ; the Corinthians however were soon informed 
 by signals of their landing; and so, leaving half their 
 troops at Cenchreae in case the Athenians should attack 
 Crommyon, they came to the rescue with all speed. 
 
 43. Battus, one of the two generals who were present in 
 Obstinate the engagement, taking a single division of the force, 
 
 conflict on 0 r . . . 
 
 the hill of went to Solygeia, intending to protect the village, which 
 TheMtwo' was not fortified; Lycophron with the remainder of 
 one Another the arm y attacked the enemy. The Corinthians first 
 
 a Cp. iii. 114 fin. 
 
 PQ O 
 
ow 
 
 BATTLE OF SOLYGEIA . 
 
 z 75 
 
 c 425. of all assailed the right wing of the Athenians, which IV. 
 had only just landed in front of the Chersonesus, and backwards 
 then engaged with the rest. The conflict was stubborn, wards, 
 and all hand to hand. The Athenians, who were on the 
 right wing, and the Carystians, who were on the extreme 
 right, received the Corinthians, and with some difficulty 
 drove them back. They retired behind a loose stone 
 wall, and the whole place being a steep hill-side, threw 
 the stones down from above; but soon they raised the 
 Paean and again came on. Again the Athenians re¬ 
 ceived them, and another hand to hand fight ensued, 
 when a division of the Corinthians coming to the aid 
 of their left wing, forced back the right wing of the 
 Athenians and pursued them to the sea; but the Athe¬ 
 nians and Carystians in their turn again drove them 
 back from the ships. Meanwhile the rest of the two 
 armies had been fighting steadily. On the right wing 
 of the Corinthians, where Lycophron was opposed to 
 the Athenian left, the defence was most energetic ; for 
 he and his troops were apprehensive that the Athenians 
 would move on the village of Solygeia. For a long time 44. 
 neither would give way, but at length the Athenians, The Athe- 
 having an advantage in cavalry, with which the Corin- ™partiai m 
 thians were unprovided, drove them back, and they alarmed^t’ 
 retired to the summit of the ridge; where they grounded jj^chof 
 their arms and remained inactive, refusing to come down, areinforce- 
 In this defeat of their right wing the Corinthians in- Suo^ 
 curred the heaviest loss, and Lycophron their general their ships * 
 was slain. The whole army was now forced back upon 
 the high ground, where they remained in position ; they 
 were not pursued far, and made a leisurely retreat. The 
 Athenians seeing that they did not return to the attack, 
 at once erected a trophy and began to spoil the enemies’ 
 dead and take up their own. The other half of the 
 Corinthians who were keeping guard at Cenchreae, lest 
 the Athenians should sail against Crommyon, had their 
 view of the battle intercepted by Mount Oneium. But 
 when they saw the dust and knew what was going on, 
 
 T 2 
 
276 THE ATHENIANS AT METHON &. 
 
 IV. they instantly came to the rescue. The elder men of 
 Corinth hearing of the defeat likewise hastened to the 
 spot. The united army then advanced against the 
 Athenians, who fancying that a reinforcement had come 
 from the neighbouring states of Peloponnesus, quickly 
 retreated to their ships, taking their spoils and their own 
 dead, with the exception of two whom they could not 
 find; they then embarked and sailed to the neighbour¬ 
 ing islands. Thence they sent a herald asking for a 
 truce, and recovered the two dead bodies which were 
 missing. The Corinthians lost two hundred and twelve 
 men ; the Athenians hardly so many as fifty. 
 
 45. On the same day the Athenians sailed from the islands 
 
 Second to Crommyon, which is in the territory of Corinth, 
 theAthe° nearly fourteen miles from the city, and, there anchoring, 
 the^errito^r they ravaged the country and encamped during the 
 Afterravag On the following day they sailed along the 
 
 ing the coast to Epidaurus, where they made a descent, and 
 hoodof 1 ^ then passed onward and came to Methone, which is 
 andThe^of situated between Epidaurus and Troezen. ' They built 
 they cutoff a wa ^ across the isthmus, and so cut off the peninsula 
 Method by on which Methone stands. Leaving a garrison, they 
 
 a wall and . . , r 
 
 leave a continued for some time to ravage the country 01 
 gamson. T roezenj Halieis, and Epidaurus. The fleet, when the 
 fortification was completed, returned home. 
 
 46. J us t about this time Eurymedon and Sophocles, who 
 TheAthe- had started from Pylos on their voyage to Sicily with 
 their way to the Athenian fleet, arrived at Corcyra, and in concert 
 a^Corcpra w hh the popular party attacked the Corcyraean oli- 
 Theoii- garchs, who after the revolution had crossed over into 
 
 garchs in 0 
 
 Mount the island and settled in Mount Istone. They became 
 surrender masters of the country again, and were doing great 
 on condi- m i S chief a . The Athenians assaulted and took their 
 
 tion that 
 
 their fate fortress ; the garrison, who had fled in a body to a peak 
 left to the of the hill, came to terms, agreeing to give up their 
 peopie. an auxiliaries and surrender their arms, but stipulating that 
 their own fate should be decided by the Athenian 
 a Cp. iii. 85. 
 
 cq'O 
 
B.C. 421 
 01 . 88 , ; 
 
 THE END OF THE CORCYRAEAN OLIGARCHS. 277 
 
 >• people. The garrison themselves were conveyed by the IV. 
 
 [ generals to the island of Ptychia and kept there under 
 a promise of safety until they could be sent to Athens ; 
 on condition however that if any of them were caught 
 attempting to escape, they should all lose the benefit 
 of the agreement. Now the leaders of the Corcyraean 
 democracy feared that when the captives arrived at Athens 
 they would not be put to death ; so they devised the fol¬ 
 lowing trick :—They sent to the island friends of the 
 captives, whom with seeming good-will they instructed 
 to tell them that they had better escape as fast as they 
 could, for the fact was that the Athenian generals were 
 about to hand them over to the Corcyraean democracy; 
 they would themselves provide a vessel. 
 
 The friends of the captives persuaded a few of them, 47. 
 and the vessel was provided. The prisoners were taken The captive 
 
 oligarchs 
 
 sailing out; the truce was at an end, and they were all are induced 
 instantly delivered up to the Corcyraeans. The feeling ^brea? 
 which the Athenian generals displayed greatly con- and^re™ 16 
 tributed to the result; for, being compelled to proceed ^ eli t ^ e ^ 
 to Sicily themselves, they were well known to wish that vengeance 
 no one else should gain the credit of bringing the prisoners cyraeans. 
 to Athens; b and therefore the agreement was interpreted 
 to the letter 15 , and the contrivers of the trick thought 
 that they could execute it with impunity. The Cor¬ 
 cyraeans took the prisoners and shut them up in a large 
 building; then leading them out in bands of twenty at 
 a time, they made them pass between two files of armed 
 men; they were bound to one another and struck and 
 pierced by the men on each side, whenever any one saw 
 among them an enemy of his own; and there were men 
 with whips, who accompanied them to the place of exe¬ 
 cution and quickened the steps of those who lingered. 
 
 In this manner they brought the prisoners out of 48. 
 the building-, and slew them to the number of sixty The y are 
 
 11111 cruelly 
 
 undiscovered by the rest, who thought that they were massacred. 
 
 a Or, { and so the pretext turned out to be the exact truth; ’ or, 
 
 < and so the pretext seemed to correspond to the facts.’ 
 
278 NIGHT CLOSED UPON THEIR SUFFERINGS. 
 
 IV. taking them away to some other place. But soon they b.c .425. 
 
 ° J . Ill Ol. 00, 4. 
 
 The Athe- found out what was happening, for some one told them, 
 manders, and then they called upon the Athenians, if they wanted 
 lanuhenf them to die, to take their lives themselves. Out of the 
 bv b othe?s ied building they refused to stir, and threatened that into it, 
 to Athens, jf they could help, no one should enter. The Corcy- 
 
 look on . . c r . 
 
 with in- raean populace had not the least intention ot iorcing 
 They G now a way in by the door, but they got upon the roof and, 
 voya-eto 6 ^ ma king an opening, threw tiles and shot arrows down 
 Sicily. f rom above. The prisoners sought to shelter themselves 
 as they best could. Most of them at the same time 
 put an end to their own lives ; some thrust into their 
 throats arrows which were shot at them, others strangled 
 themselves with cords taken from beds which they found 
 in the place, or with strips which they tore from their 
 own garments. This went on during the greater part 
 of the night, which had closed upon their sufferings, until 
 in one way or another, either by their own hand or by 
 missiles hurled from above, they all perished. At day¬ 
 break the Corcyraeans flung the dead bodies cross-wise 
 on waggons and carried them out of the city. The 
 women who were taken in the fortress on Mount Istone 
 were reduced to slavery. Thus the Corcyraeans in the 
 mountain were destroyed by the people, and, at least 
 while the Peloponnesian war lasted, there was an end 
 of the great sedition ; for there was nothing left of the 
 other party w r orth mentioning. The Athenians then 
 sailed for Sicily, their original destination, and there 
 fought in concert with their allies. 
 
 49. At the end of the summer the Athenian forces in 
 Anactorium Naupactus and some Acarnanians made an expedition 
 
 is occupied 1 
 
 by the against Anactorium, a Corinthian town at the mouth 
 ^ans! a °f the Ambracian Gulf, which was betrayed to them. 
 
 The Acarnanians expelled the Corinthians, and sent a 
 colony of their own, taken from the whole nation, to 
 occupy the place. So the summer ended. 
 
 50. During the ensuing winter Aristides the son of Ar- 
 Seizure of a chippus, one of the commanders of the Athenian vessels 
 
 Persian L x 
 
CQO 
 
 •C. 425- 
 
 1. 88, 4. 
 
 B.C. 424. 
 01. 89. 
 
 SEIZURE OF ARTAPHERNES. 279 
 
 which collected tribute from the allies, captured at Eion, IV. 
 upon the Strymon, Artaphernes a Persian, who was on 
 his way from the King to Sparta. He was brought to spatches 
 Athens, and the Athenians had the despatches which he King, in 
 was carrying and which were written in the Assyrian ^p^s 
 character translated, and read them ; there were many of the 
 
 y Spartans. 
 
 matters contained in them, but the chief point was a The Athe- 
 remonstrance addressed to the Lacedaemonians by the him back 
 King, who said that he could not understand what they gntoy of 
 wanted: for, although many envoys had come to him, } heir mvn - 
 no two of them agreed. If they meant to make them- at the time 
 
 0 of Arta- 
 
 selves intelligible, he desired them to send to him another xerxes’ 
 embassy with the Persian envoy. Shortly afterwards embassy* 16 
 the Athenians sent Artaphernes in a trireme to Ephesus, returns - 
 and with him an embassy of their own, but they found 
 that Artaxerxes the son of Xerxes had recently died ; 
 for the embassy arrived just at that time. Whereupon 
 they returned home. 
 
 During the same winter the Chians dismantled their 51. 
 new walls by order of the Athenians, who suspected that The Chians, 
 
 J x __ suspected 
 
 they meant to rebel, not however without obtaining from of rebellion, 
 the Athenians such pledges and assurances as they todismantie 
 could, that no violent change should be made in their their walls * 
 condition. So the winter came to an end ; and with it 
 the seventh year in the Peloponnesian War of which 
 Thucydides wrote the history. 
 
 Early in the ensuing summer there was a partial eclipse 52. 
 of the sun at the time of the new moon, and within the An eclipse 
 
 of the sun 
 
 first ten days of the same month an earthquake. and an 
 
 The main body of the refugees who had escaped from occ*? uake 
 Mitylen£ and the rest of Lesbos had established them- The Les- 
 
 J , . ,-r^ i-i r bian refu- 
 
 selves on the continent. They hired mercenaries from gees, who 
 Peloponnesus or collected them on the spot, and took ^hecon- 
 Rhoeteium, but on receiving a payment of two thousand £koeteium 
 Phocaean staters a , they restored the town uninjured, and Antan- 
 They then made an expedition against Antandrus and 
 
 a The value of the Phocaean stater is not precisely known : it was 
 somewhat less than that of the Attic stater (about i6j.) 
 
28 o 
 
 CAPTURE OF CYTHERA. 
 
 IV. took the city, which was betrayed into their hands. They 
 hoped to liberate the other so-called c cities of the coast,’ 
 which had been formerly in the possession of the Mity- 
 lenaeans and were now held by the Athenians a . but their 
 principal object was Antandrus itself, which they in¬ 
 tended to strengthen and make their head-quarters. 
 Mount Ida was near and would furnish timber for ship¬ 
 building, and by the help of a fleet and in other ways 
 they could easily harass Lesbos which was close at 
 hand, and reduce the Aeolian towns on the continent. 
 Such were their designs. 
 
 53 - During the same summer the Athenians with sixty 
 nianssend s hip s > two thousand hoplites, and a few cavalry, taking 
 an expedi- a l so certain Milesian and other allied forces, made 
 
 tion against 
 
 Cythera. an expedition against Cythera, under the command of 
 impOTtanec as SQn yq cera t USj Nicostratus the son of 
 
 island. Diotrephes. and Autocles the son of Tolmaeus. Cythera 
 is an island which lies close to Laconia off Cape Malea ; 
 it is inhabited by Lacedaemonian Perioeci, and a Spartan 
 officer called the Judge of Cythera was sent thither 
 every year. The Lacedaemonians kept there a garrison 
 of hoplites, which was continually relieved, and took 
 great care of the place. There the merchant vessels 
 coming from Egypt and Libya commonly put in; the 
 island was a great protection to the Lacedaemonians 
 against depredation by sea, on which element, though 
 secure by land, they were exposed to attack, for the 
 whole of Laconia runs out towards the Sicilian and 
 Cretan seas b . 
 
 54. The Athenian fleet appeared off Cythera, and with 
 TheAthe- a detachment of ten ships and two thousand Milesian 
 
 nians 
 
 capture hoplites took Scandeia, one of the cities on the sea- 
 A*n engage- shore. The rest of their army disembarked on the side 
 place S keS °f Eland looking towards Malea, and moved on to 
 which the the lower city of the Cytherians, which is also on the 
 
 Cythenans 
 
 arede- sea-coast; there they found all the inhabitants encamped 
 anVthe in force. A battle was fought in which the Cytherians 
 a Cp. iii. 50 fin. 
 
 Cp. Herod, vii. 235. 
 
 ow 
 
ow 
 
 DESPONDENCY OF THE LACEDAEMONIANS. 281 
 
 c. 424. held their ground for some little time, and then, be- 
 
 ” 89 ’ taking themselves to flight, retired to the upper city. 
 They at length surrendered to Nicias and his colleagues, 
 placing themselves at the disposal of the Athenians, but 
 stipulating that their lives should be spared. Nicias 
 had already contrived to enter into communication with 
 some of them, and in consequence the negotiations were 
 speedier, and lighter terms were imposed upon them 
 both at the time and afterwards a . Else the Athenians 
 would have expelled them, because they were Lacedae¬ 
 monians and their island was close to Laconia. After 
 the capitulation they took into their own hands Scandeia, 
 the city near the harbour, and secured the island by a 
 garrison. They then sailed away, made descents upon 
 Asine, Helos, and most of the other maritime towns of 
 Laconia, and, encamping wherever they found convenient, 
 ravaged the country for about seven days. 
 
 The Lacedaemonians seeing that the Athenians had 
 got possession of Cythera, and anticipating similar de¬ 
 scents on their own shores, nowhere opposed them with 
 their united forces, but distributed a body of hoplites 
 in garrisons through the country where their presence 
 seemed to be needed. They kept strict watch, fearing 
 lest some domestic revolution should break out. Already 
 a great and unexpected blow had fallen upon them at 
 Sphacteria ; Pylos and Cythera were in the hands of the 
 Athenians, and they were beset on every side by an 
 enemy against whose swift attacks precaution was vain. 
 Contrary to their usual custom they raised a force of 
 four hundred cavalry and archers. Never in their his¬ 
 tory had they shown so much hesitation in their military 
 movements. They were involved in a war at sea, an 
 element to which they were strange, against a power 
 like the Athenians, in whose eyes to miss an opportunity 
 was to lose a victory 15 . Lortune too was against them, 
 and they were panic-stricken by the many startling 
 reverses which had befallen them within so short a 
 a Cp. iv. 57 fin. b Cp. i. 70 med. 
 
 IV. 
 
 island 
 capitulates. 
 The Athe¬ 
 nians 
 ravage 
 the coast of 
 Laconia. 
 
 55 - 
 
 The Lace¬ 
 daemonians 
 lose confi¬ 
 dence in 
 themselves. 
 They act on 
 the defen¬ 
 sive. 
 
 Hesitation 
 in their 
 counsels 
 and panic 
 at their 
 reverses. 
 
282 ATHENIAN ATTACK ON THYREA. 
 
 IV. time. They feared lest some new calamity like that 
 of the island might overtake them ; and therefore they 
 dared not venture on an engagement, but expected all 
 their undertakings to fail; they had never hitherto 
 known misfortune, and now they lost all confidence in 
 their own powers. 
 
 56. While the Athenians were ravaging their coasts they 
 The small hardly ever stirred ; for each garrison at the places 
 
 garrisons J 0 
 
 stationed in where they happened to land considered in their de- 
 are afraid 17 pressed state of mind that they were too few to act. 
 to move. Q ne th em however, which was in the neighbourhood 
 of Cotyrta and Aphrodisia, did offer some resistance, 
 and by a sudden rush put to flight the scattered light¬ 
 armed troops ; but, being encountered by the hoplites, 
 they again retired with the loss of some few men and 
 arms. The Athenians, raising a trophy, sailed away to 
 Cythera. Thence they coasted round to Epidaurus 
 Limera and, after devastating some part of its territory, 
 to Thyrea, which is situated in the country called Cy- 
 nuria, on the border of Argolis and Laconia. The 
 Lacedaemonians, who at that time held the town, 
 had settled there the Aeginetan exiles% whom they 
 wished to requite for services rendered to them at the 
 time of the earthquake and the Helot revolt, and also 
 because they had always been partizans of theirs, al¬ 
 though subjects of the Athenians. 
 
 57 - Before the Athenian ships had actually touched, the 
 attackupon Aeginetans quitted a fort on the sea-shore which they 
 Thyrea, were just building and retired to the upper city, where 
 Aeginetan they lived, a distance of rather more than a mile. One 
 seated^ 6 °f the country garrisons of the Lacedaemonians which 
 daemoSan was helping to build the fort was entreated by the 
 garrisons Aeginetans to enter the walls, but refused, thinking that 
 
 refuse to . . . . , . 0 
 
 enter the to be shut up inside them would be too dangerous. 
 i^takenl 11011 S° they ascended to the high ground, and then, con- 
 habitants" siderin g the enemy to be more than a match for them, 
 put to death would not come down. Meanwhile the Athenians landed, 
 
 by the 
 
 Athenians. a £p. jj # 27. 
 
 ow 
 
mo 
 
 GENERAL CONGRESS OF SICILIAN STATES. 283 
 
 .c.^424. marched straight upon Thyrea with their whole army, IV. 
 
 9 and took it. They burnt and plundered the city, and 
 carried away with them to Athens all the Aeginetans 
 who had not fallen in the battle, and the Lacedaemonian 
 governor of the place, Tantalus the son of Patrocles, 
 who had been wounded and taken prisoner. They also 
 had on board a few of the inhabitants of Cythera, whose 
 removal seemed to be required as a measure of pre¬ 
 caution. These the Athenians determined to deposit 
 in some of the islands ; at the same time they allowed 
 the other Cytherians to live in their own country, paying 
 a tribute of four talents a . They resolved to kill all 
 the Aeginetans whom they had taken in satisfaction of 
 their long standing hatred, and to put Tantalus in chains 
 along with the captives from Sphacteria. 
 
 During the same summer the people of Camarina and 58. 
 Gela in Sicily made a truce, in the first instance with A confe , r - 
 
 ence is held 
 
 one another only. But after a while all the other at Geia 
 Sicilian states sent envoys to Gela, where they held a representa- 6 
 conference in the hope of effecting a reconciliation, sidiian* 6 
 Many opinions were expressed on both sides; and the states - 
 representatives of the different cities wrangled and put 
 in claims for the redress of their several grievances. At 
 length Hermocrates the son of Hermon, a Syracusan, 
 b who had been the chief agent in bringing them toge¬ 
 ther b , stood forward in the assembly and spoke as 
 follows :— 
 
 ‘Sicilians, the city to which I belong is not the least 59. 
 
 in Sicily, nor am I about to speak because Syracuse Speech of 
 
 J x J Hermo- 
 
 sufifers more than other cities in the war, but because I crates. 
 
 want to lay before you the policy which seems to me best ^Sngo 0 
 fitted to promote the common good of the whole country, 
 
 You well know, and therefore I shall not rehearse to you the y expect 
 
 . to gam 
 
 at length, all the misery of war. Nobody is compelled more than 
 to go to war by ignorance, and no one who thinks that lose. WlU 
 he will gain anything from it is deterred by fear. The los^ 7 
 
 a £96°' 
 
 b Or, ‘whose words chiefly influenced their decision.’ 
 
1 84 
 
 SPEECH OF HERMOCRA TES. 
 
 IV. truth is that the aggressor deems the advantage to be 
 greater than the suffering; and the side which is attacked 
 
 more than 
 they gain 
 
 they had would sooner run any risk than suffer the smallest im- 
 
 better make 
 peace. 
 
 60. 
 
 mediate loss. But when such feelings on the part of 
 either operate unseasonably, the time for offering counsels 
 of peace has arrived., and such counsels, if we will only 
 listen to them, will be at this moment invaluable to us. 
 Why did we go to war ? Simply from a consideration 
 of our own individual interests, and with a view to our 
 interests we are now trying by means of discussion to ob¬ 
 tain peace ; and if, after all. we do not before we separate 
 succeed in getting our respective rights, we shall go to 
 war again. But at the same time we should have the sense 
 to see that this conference is not solely concerned with 
 our private interests, but with those of the whole country. 
 
 The inter¬ 
 ests of the 
 whole 
 
 notoTuSi- Sicily is at this moment imperilled by the designs of the 
 ckiesoniy Athenians, and we must try, if not too late, to save her. 
 For^he^ 6 Athenians are a much more convincing argument 
 Athenians of peace than any words of mine can be. They are the 
 nr 6u P°n us -greatest power in Hellas; they come hither with a few 
 ships to spy out our mistakes; though we are their 
 natural enemies, they assume the honourable name of 
 allies, and under this flimsy pretence turn our enmity to 
 good account. For when we go to war and invite their 
 assistance (and they are fond of coming whether they 
 are invited or not) we are taxing ourselves for our own 
 destruction, and at the same time paving the way for 
 the advance of their empire. And at some future day, 
 when they see that we are exhausted, they are sure to 
 come again with a larger armament, and attempt to 
 bring all Sicily under their yoke a . 
 
 e And yet if we must call in allies and involve our¬ 
 selves in dangers, as men of sense, looking to the interest 
 of our several states, we should set before us the pros¬ 
 pect of gaining an increase of dominion, not of losing 
 what we already have. We should consider that internal 
 quarrels more than anything else are the ruin of Sicily 
 a Cp. iv. 1 med. 
 
 6l. 
 
 We gain 
 nothing by- 
 war. 
 
 We only 
 invite the 
 common 
 enemy. 
 The Athe¬ 
 nians care 
 
 CCO 
 
B.C. 424. 
 01. 89. 
 
 SPEECH OF HERMOCRATES. 285 
 
 and her cities ; we Sicilians are fighting against one IV. 
 another at the very time when we are threatened by a nothing 
 common enemy. Knowing this, we should be reconciled Dorian and 
 man to man, city to city, and make an united effort for Jhe^want 
 the preservation of all Sicily. Let no one say to him- Sici b- 
 self, “The Dorians among us may be enemies to the 
 Athenians, but the Chalcidians, being Ionians, are safe 
 because they are their kinsmen.” For the Athenians do 
 not attack us because we are divided into two races, of 
 which one is their enemy and the other their friend, 
 but because they covet the good things of Sicily which 
 we all share alike a . Is not their reception of the Chal- 
 cidian appeal a proof of this ? b They have actually 
 gone out of their way to grant the rights and privileges 
 of their old treaty to those who up to this hour have 
 never aided them as required by the terms of that treaty. 
 
 The ambition and craft of the Athenians are pardonable 
 enough. I blame not those who wish to rule, but those 
 who are willing to serve. The same human nature which 
 is always ready to domineer over the subservient, bids 
 us defend ourselves against the aggressor. And if, 
 knowing all these things, we continue to take no thought 
 for the future, and have not every one of us made up our 
 minds already that first and foremost we must all deal 
 wisely with the danger which threatens all, we are 
 grievously in error. 
 
 ‘Now a mutual reconciliation would be the speediest Let us 
 way of deliverance from this danger; for the Athenians ^dthen^ 6 
 do not come direct from their own country, but first f he y wl11 
 plant themselves in that of the Sicilians who have footing in 
 invited them. Instead of finishing one war only to SlClly ’ 
 begin another, we should then quietly end our differ¬ 
 ences by peace. And those who came at our call and 
 had so good a reason for doing wrong will have a still 
 better reason for going away and doing nothing. 
 
 ‘ Such is the great advantage which we obtain by 62. 
 sound policy as against the Athenians. And why, if why 
 
 should we 
 
 a Cp. vi. 77, 79* b Cp. id. 86. 
 
286 
 
 SPEECH OF HERMOCRATES. 
 
 IV. peace is acknowledged by all to be the greatest of bless- 
 not secure ings, should we not make peace among ourselves ? YVhat- 
 ingsofpeace ever good or evil is the portion of any of us, is not peace 
 reiving on more likely than war to preserve the one and to alleviate 
 the chances the other? And has not peace honours and glories of her 
 
 of war ? 
 
 own unattended by the dangers of war? (But it is un¬ 
 necessary to dilate on the blessings of peace any more 
 than on the miseries of war.) Consider what I am saying, 
 and instead of despising my words, may every man seek 
 his own safety in them ! And should there be some one 
 here present who was hoping to gain a permanent ad¬ 
 vantage either by right or by force, let him not take his 
 disappointment to heart. For he knows that many a 
 man before now who has sought a righteous revenge, far 
 from obtaining it, has not even escaped himself; and 
 many an one who in the consciousness of power has 
 grasped at what was another’s, has ended by losing what 
 was his own. The revenge of a wrong is not always 
 successful merely because it is just; nor is strength most 
 assured of victory when it is most full of hope. The in¬ 
 scrutable future is the controller of events, and, being 
 the most treacherous of all things, is also the most bene¬ 
 ficent; for when there is mutual fear, men think twice 
 before they make aggressions upon one another. 
 
 6?. ‘And now, because we know not what this hidden 
 Send away future may bring forth, and because the Athenians, who 
 
 the Athe- 1 J & . ’ A. 
 
 nians : even are dangerous enemies, are already at our gates,—having 
 pun£h your these two valid reasons for alarm, let us acquiesce, in our 
 they^viu disappointment, deeming that the obstacles a to the ful- 
 make you filment of our individual hopes a are really insuperable. 
 
 the enemies 
 
 of your Let us send out of the country the enemies who threaten 
 
 us, and make peace among ourselves, if possible for ever; 
 but if not, for as long as we can, and let our private 
 enmities bide their time. If you take my advice, rest 
 assured that you will maintain the freedom of your several 
 cities; from which you will go forth your own masters, 
 
 a Or, reading e/raaros n : ‘to the accomplishment of those things 
 w hich each of us in whatever degree was hoping to effect.’ 
 
 O ro 
 
m o 
 
 .C. 424. 
 1. 89. 
 
 THE SICILIANS AGREE TO MAKE PEACE. 287 
 
 and recompense, like true men, the good or evil which is IV. 
 done to you. But if you will not believe me, and we are 
 enslaved by others, the punishment of our enemies will 
 be out of the question. Even supposing we succeed in 
 obtaining vengeance to our hearts’ content, we may 
 perhaps become the friends of our greatest enemies, we 
 certainly become the enemies of our real friends. 
 
 *As I said at first, I am the representative of a great 64. 
 city which is more likely to act on the aggressive than on Though 1 
 the defensive; and yet with the prospect of these dangers ^eaTcity 1 
 before me I am willing to come to terms, and not to tcTmake 112 
 injure my enemies in such a way that I shall doubly g™^ 63- 
 injure myself. Nor am I so obstinate and foolish as to and 1 ask 
 
 others to do 
 
 imagine that, because 1 am master of my own will, I can the like, 
 control fortune, of whom I am not master ; but I am dis- brethren, 
 posed to make reasonable concessions. And I would ask ^ IsJii- 
 the other Sicilians to do the same of their own accord, ia ns. 
 and not to wait until the enemy compels them. There 
 is no disgrace in kinsmen yielding to kinsmen, whether 
 Dorians to Dorians, or Chalcidians to the other Ionians. 
 
 Let us remember too that we are all neighbours, in¬ 
 habitants of one island home, and called by the common 
 name of Sicilians. When we see occasion we will fight 
 among ourselves, and will negotiate and come to terms 
 among ourselves. But we shall always, if we are wise, 
 unite as one man against the invader ; for when a single 
 state suffers, all are imperilled. We will never again 
 introduce allies from abroad, no, nor pretended media¬ 
 tors. This policy will immediately secure to Sicily two 
 great blessings ; she will get rid of the Athenians, and of 
 civil war. And for the future we shall keep the island free 
 and our own, and none will be tempted to attack us.’ 
 
 Such were the words of Hermocrates. The Sicilians 65. 
 took his advice and agreed among themselves to make Terms of 
 peace, on the understanding that they should all retain < u tipoS- 
 what they had ; only Morgantine was handed over to the ^heAthe- 
 Camarinaeans, who were to pay in return a fixed sum to ™ans are 
 
 - ii 1 a 1 dissatisfied 
 
 the Syracusans. The cities in alliance with Athens sent with their 
 
288 UNDUE ELATION OF THE ATHENIANS. 
 
 IV. 
 
 generals, 
 and believe 
 that they 
 might have 
 conquered 
 Sicily if 
 they had 
 not been 
 bribed. 
 
 66 . 
 
 The citizens 
 of Megara, 
 thinking it 
 better to 
 have one 
 enemy than 
 two, pro¬ 
 pose to 
 restore the 
 exiles. 
 
 The popu¬ 
 lar leaders 
 in alarm 
 enter into 
 negotia¬ 
 tion with 
 the Athe¬ 
 nians. 
 
 for the Athenian generals and told them that a treaty 
 was about to be made in which they might join if they 
 pleased. They assented ; the treaty was concluded ; and 
 so the Athenian ships sailed away from Sicily. When 
 the generals returned the Athenians punished two of 
 them, Pythodorus and Sophocles, with exile, and im¬ 
 posed a fine on the third, Eurymedon, believing that 
 they might have conquered Sicily but had been bribed 
 to go away. For in their present prosperity they were 
 indignant at the idea of a reverse; they expected to 
 accomplish everything, possible or impossible, with any 
 force, great or small. The truth was that they were 
 elated by the unexpected success of most of their enter¬ 
 prises, which inspired them with the liveliest hope. 
 
 During the same summer the citizens of Megara were 
 hard pressed by the Athenians, who twice every year in¬ 
 vaded the country with their whole army a , as well as by 
 their own exiles in Pegae, who had been driven out by 
 the people in a revolution 13 , and were continually harassing 
 and plundering them. So they conferred together upon 
 the advisability of recalling the exiles, lest they should 
 expose the city to destruction from the attacks of two 
 enemies at once. The friends of the exiles became aware 
 of the movement and ventured to urge the measure more 
 openly than hitherto. But the popular leaders, knowing 
 that their partizans were in great extremity and could 
 not be trusted to hold out in support of them much 
 longer, took alarm and entered into negotiation with the 
 Athenian generals, Hippocrates the son of Ariphron, and 
 Demosthenes the son of Alcisthenes. They thought that 
 they would incur less danger by surrendering the city to 
 them than by the restoration of the exiles whom they had 
 themselves expelled. So they agreed that the Athenians 
 should in the first i place seize their Long Walls 0 , which 
 were a little less than a mile in length and extended 
 from the city to their harbour Nisaea. They wanted to 
 prevent the Peloponnesians interfering from Nisaea, of 
 a Cp. ii. 31. b Cp. iii. 68 med. c Cp. i. 103 fin. 
 
 Ota 
 
OM 
 
 LONG WALLS OF MEGARA TAKEN. 289 
 
 c. 424. which they formed the sole garrison, being stationed IV. 
 
 ' 89> there to secure Megara. The conspirators were then to 
 try and place in the hands of the Athenians the upper 
 city, which would be more ready to come over when 
 they once had possession of the Long Walls. 
 
 Both parties had now made all necessary preparations, 67. 
 both in word and act. The Athenians sailed at nightfall Disposition 
 to Minoa, the island in front of Megara, with six hundred Athenian 
 hoplites under the command of Hippocrates. They then before 
 took up their position not far from the Long Walls, in a gates 
 trench out of which the bricks for the walls had been are opened 
 dug. A second division of the Athenian army, con- by their 
 sisting of light-armed Plataeans and of a part of the ^nfeder- 
 force employed in guarding the frontier, under the com- ^es, and^ 
 mand of Demosthenes the other general, lay in ambush the Long 
 at the temple of Ares, which is nearer still. During the 
 night no one knew what they were about, except the men 
 who were immediately concerned. Just before daybreak 
 the conspirators executed their plan. They had long ago 
 provided that the gates should be open when required ; 
 for by the permission of the commander, who supposed 
 them to be privateering, they had been in the habit of 
 conveying a sculling-boat out of the town by night. This 
 they placed upon a waggon, and carried it down to the 
 sea through the trench ; they then sailed out, and just 
 before day broke the boat was brought back by them on 
 the waggon and taken in at the gates; their object being, 
 as they pretended, to baffle the Athenian watch at Minoa, 
 since the vessel would never appear in the harbour at all. 
 
 The waggon had just arrived at the gates, which were 
 opened for the boat to enter, when the Athenians, with 
 whom the whole affair had been preconcerted, seeing this 
 movement, rushed out of the ambuscade, wanting to get 
 in before the gates were shut again and while the waggon 
 was still in them, and prevented them from being closed. 
 
 At the same instant their Megarian confederates cut 
 down the guards stationed at the gates. First of all the 
 Plataeans and the frontier guard under Demosthenes 
 
 U 
 
290 
 
 MEGARA STILL HOLDS OUT. 
 
 IV. rushed in where the trophy now stands. No sooner 
 were they within the gates than the Peloponnesians 
 who were nearest and saw what was going on hastened 
 to the rescue; but they were overpowered by the 
 Plataeans, who secured the gates for the entrance of 
 the Athenian hoplites as they came running up. 
 
 68. Then the Athenians entered, and one after another 
 The Peio- proceeded to mount the wall. A few Peloponnesian 
 
 ponnesians, 1 
 
 supposing guards at first resisted and some of them were killed ; 
 riansuf 21 but the greater part took to flight; they were terrified 
 over to° ne at night attack of the enemy, and fancied, when they 
 j^ e t ^ nemy ’ saw the Megarians who were in the conspiracy fighting 
 Nisaea. against them, that all the Megarians had betrayed them, 
 is detected It had occurred at the same time to the Athenian herald, 
 gLcWcai" without orders, to make proclamation that any Megarian 
 party in w h 0 pleased might join the ranks of the Athenians. 
 
 time to save r 0 . 
 
 Megara When the Lacedaemonians heard the proclamation none 
 of them remained any longer, but thinking that the Athe¬ 
 nians and Megarians had really combined against them 
 they fled into Nisaea. 
 
 When the morning dawned and the Long Walls were 
 already captured, Megara was in a tumult, and those who 
 had negotiated with the Athenians and a large number of 
 others who were in the plot insisted upon opening the 
 gates and going out to battle. Now they had agreed 
 that the Athenians should immediately rush in; and they 
 were themselves to be anointed with oil; this was the 
 mark by which they were to be distinguished, that they 
 might be spared in the attack. There was the less danger 
 in opening the gates, since there had now arrived four 
 thousand Athenian hoplites and six hundred horse, who 
 by a previous arrangement had come from Eleusis during 
 the night. When they were anointed and had collected 
 about the gates some one in the secret acquainted the 
 other party, who instantly came upon them in a compact 
 body and declared that there should be no going out; 
 even when they were stronger than at present they had 
 not ventured to take the field ; the danger to the city 
 
 CQ O 
 
CQ O 
 
 BUT NISAEA SURRENDERS. 
 
 291 
 
 C. 424. was too palpable ; if any one opposed them the battle IV. 
 
 89 ' would have to be fought first within the walls. They did 
 not betray their knowledge of the plot, but assumed the 
 confident tone of men who were recommending the best 
 course. At the same time they kept watch about the 
 gates ; and thus the conspiracy was foiled. 
 
 The Athenian generals became aware that some diffi- 69. 
 culty had arisen, and that they could not carry the city by The Athe - 
 
 . . mans cut 
 
 storm. So they immediately set about the circumvalla- off Nisaea 
 tion of Nisaea, thinking that, if they could take it before waii. Cr ° SS 
 any assistance arrived, Megara itself would be more likely whicMshi 
 to capitulate. Iron and other things needful, as well as danger of 
 
 A . starvation, 
 
 masons, were quickly procured from Athens. Beginning capitulates, 
 from the wall which they already held they intercepted 
 the approach from Megara by a cross wall, and from that 
 drew another on either side of Nisaea down to the sea. 
 
 The army divided among them the execution of the 
 trench and walls, obtaining stones and bricks from the 
 suburbs of the town. They also cut down timber and 
 fruit-trees and made palisades where they were needed. 
 
 The houses in the suburbs were of themselves a sufficient 
 fortification, and only required battlements. All that day 
 they continued working; on the following day, towards 
 evening, the wall was nearly finished, and the terrified 
 inhabitants of Nisaea having no food (for they depended 
 for their daily supplies on the upper city), and imagining 
 that Megara had gone over to the enemy, despairing too 
 of any aid soon arriving from Peloponnesus, capitulated 
 to the Athenians. The conditions were as follows :— 
 
 They were to go free, every man paying a fixed ransom 
 and giving up his arms ; but the Athenians might deal 
 as they pleased with the Lacedaemonian commander 
 and any Lacedaemonian who was in the place. Upon 
 these terms they came out, and the Athenians, having 
 severed the communication of Megara with the Long 
 Walls, took possession of Nisaea and prepared for further 
 action. 
 
 It so happened that Brasidas, son of Tellis, the Lace- 70. 
 
 U 2 
 
ENERGY OF BRAS ID AS. 
 
 Brasidas 
 collects 
 troops and 
 sends to 
 the Boeo¬ 
 tians for an 
 army. 
 
 but neither 
 faction is 
 as yet 
 willing to 
 receive him 
 
 7 2 . 
 
 The Boeo- 
 
 daemonian, who was equipping an expedition intended 
 for Chalcidice, was in the neighbourhood of Sicyon and 
 Corinth at the time. Hearing of the capture of the 
 Long Walls, and fearing for the safety of the Pelopon¬ 
 nesians in Nisaea, and of Megara itself, he sent to the 
 Boeotians, desiring them to bring an army and meet him 
 with all speed at Tripodiscus. The place so called is 
 a village of Megara situated under Mount Geraneia. 
 Thither he also came himself, bringing two thousand 
 seven hundred Corinthian, four hundred Phliasian, and 
 six hundred Sicyonian hoplites, as well as the followers 
 whom he had previously collected a . He had hoped to 
 find Nisaea still untaken ; but the news of the capture 
 reached him at Tripodiscus, where he did not arrive 
 until night. He immediately took with him a body of 
 three hundred chosen men, and before his arrival in the 
 country was reported reached Megara, undiscovered by 
 the Athenians, who were near the sea. He professed that 
 he wanted, and he really meant if he could, to attempt 
 the recovery of Nisaea ; but the great point was to get 
 into Megara and make that safe. So he demanded 
 admission and held out hopes of regaining Nisaea. 
 
 The two factions in Megara were both equally afraid to 
 receive him—the one lest he should introduce the exiles 
 and drive them out, the other lest the people, fearing this 
 very thing, should set upon them and ruin the city, which 
 would then be distracted by civil war and at the same time 
 beset by the Athenians. And so both parties determined 
 to wait and see what would happen. For they both ex¬ 
 pected a battle to ensue between the Athenians and the 
 army which had come to the relief of the city, and when 
 the victory was won the party whose friends had con¬ 
 quered could more safely join them. Brasidas, thus 
 failing in his purpose, returned to the main body of 
 his troops. 
 
 At dawn of day the Boeotians appeared. Even before 
 they were summoned by Brasidas they had intended to 
 a Cp. iv. 80 fin. 
 
 PQ O 
 
o w 
 
 C. 424. 
 8 9- 
 
 NEITHER SIDE TAKE THE OFFENSIVE . 293 
 
 relieve Megara ; for the danger came home to them; and IV. 
 their whole force was already collected at Plataea. When indecisive 
 
 ' Boeotian 
 
 his messenger arrived they were more resolved than ever, action of 
 and sent forward two thousand two hundred heavy-armed n ian 
 and six hundred horse, allowing the greater number to cavalry ‘ 
 return. The entire army of Brasidas now amounted to 
 six thousand hoplites. The Athenian hoplites were 
 drawn up near Nisaea and the sea, their light-armed 
 troops were scattered over the plain, when the Boeotian 
 cavalry came riding up, fell upon the light-armed, and 
 drove them to the shore. The attack was unexpected, 
 for in no former invasion had aid come to the Megarians 
 from any quarter. The Athenian cavalry now rode for¬ 
 ward and there was a long engagement, in which both 
 parties claim to have won a victory. The Athenians 
 drove the general of the Boeotian cavalry and a few 
 other horsemen up to the walls of Nisaea, and there 
 slew them and took their arms. As they retained pos¬ 
 session of the dead bodies, and only restored them under 
 a flag of truce, they raised a trophy. Still in respect of 
 the whole engagement neither side when they parted had 
 a decided advantage. The Boeotians retired to their 
 main body, and the Athenians to Nisaea. 
 
 Brasidas and his army then moved nearer to the sea 73 * 
 and to the town of Megara, and there, taking up a con- The Pe !°- 
 
 # o j. ponnesians, 
 
 venient position and marshalling their forces, they re- having 
 mained without moving. They were expecting the they are 
 Athenians to attack them, and knew that the Mega- en^e°do 
 rians were waiting to see who would be the conquerors. ^skabTttie 
 They were very well satisfied, for two reasons. In the The Athe- 
 first place they were not the assailants, and had not gone even more 
 out of their way to risk a battle, although they had clearly fig^th&n 10 
 shown that they were ready to engage; and so they might the Pelo_ 
 fairly claim a victory without fighting. Again, the result The result 
 in regard to Megara was good : for if they had not put Brasidas is 
 in an appearance they would have had no chance at all, fn^Megara 
 but would have been as good as beaten, and beyond a of ig l J r e chical 
 doubt would immediately have lost the city. Whereas party. 
 
294 
 
 REVOLUTION IN ME GAR A. 
 
 IV. 
 
 74 - 
 
 Megara 
 now passes 
 into the 
 hands of 
 the Oli¬ 
 garchs, who 
 cruelly and 
 treacher¬ 
 ously put 
 to death 
 their op¬ 
 ponents. 
 
 now the Athenians themselves might be unwilling to 
 fight; and, if so, they would gain their object without 
 striking a blow. And this turned out to be the fact; for 
 the Megarians did in the end receive Brasidas. At first 
 the Athenians came out and drew up near the Long 
 Walls, but not being attacked they likewise remained 
 inactive. The generals on their side were restrained 
 by similar reflections. They had gained the greater 
 part of what they wanted; they would be offering 
 battle against a superior force; and their own danger 
 would be out of proportion to that of the enemy. 
 They might be victorious and take Megara, but if 
 they failed the loss would fall on the flower of their 
 infantry. Whereas the Peloponnesians were naturally 
 more willing to encounter a risk which would be divided 
 among the several contingents making up the army now 
 in the field ; and each of these was but a part of their 
 whole force, present and absent. Both armies waited for 
 a time, and, when neither saw the other moving, the 
 Athenians first of the two retired into Nisaea and the 
 Peloponnesians returned to their previous position. 
 Whereupon the party in Megara friendly to the exiles 
 took courage, opened the gates, and received Brasidas 
 and the generals of the other cities, considering that the 
 Athenians had finally made up their minds not to fight, 
 and that he was the conqueror. They then entered into 
 negotiations with him ; for the other faction which had 
 conspired with the Athenians was now paralysed. 
 
 After this the allies dispersed to their several cities 
 and Brasidas returned to Corinth, where he made prepa¬ 
 rations for his expedition into Chalcidice, his original 
 destination. When the Athenians had also gone home, 
 such of the Megarians as had been chiefly concerned 
 with them, knowing that they were discovered, at once 
 slipped away. The rest of the citizens after conferring 
 with the friends of the exiles recalled them from Pegae, 
 first binding them by the most solemn oaths to consider 
 the interests of the state and to forget old quarrels. But 
 
 OM 
 
mo 
 
 THE COAST OF ASIA MINOR . 
 
 295 
 
 .c. 424. no sooner had they come into office than, taking the IV. 
 
 1 89 ' opportunity of a review and drawing up the divisions 
 apart from one another, they selected about a hundred 
 of their enemies, and of those who seemed to have been 
 most deeply implicated with the Athenians, and com¬ 
 pelled the people to give sentence upon them by an 
 open vote; having obtained their condemnation, they put 
 them to death. They then established in the city an ex¬ 
 treme oligarchy. And no government based on a counter 
 revolution effected by so few ever lasted so long a time. 
 
 During the same summer Demodocus and Aristides, 75 * 
 two commanders of the Athenian fleet which collected had’ 
 the tribute from the allies, happened to be in the neigh- become the 
 
 x L 0 head-quar- 
 
 bourhood of the Hellespont; there were only two of ters of the 
 them, the third, Lamachus, having sailed with ten ships exiles, is 
 into the Pontus. They saw that the Lesbian exiles were 
 going to strengthen Antandrus as they had intended a , and Athenians, 
 they feared that it would prove as troublesome an enemy 
 to Lesbos as Anaea had been to Samos b ; for the Samian 
 refugees, who had settled there, aided the Peloponnesian 
 navy by sending them pilots; they likewise took in fugi¬ 
 tives from Samos and kept the island in a state of per¬ 
 petual alarm. So the Athenian generals collected troops 
 from their allies, sailed to Antandrus, and, defeating a 
 force which came out against them, recovered the place. 
 
 Not long afterwards Lamachus, who had sailed into the 
 Pontus and had anchored in the territory of Heraclea at 
 the mouth of the river Calex, lost his ships by a sudden 
 flood which a fall of rain in the upper country had brought 
 down. He and his army returned by land through the 
 country of the Bithynian Thracians who dwell on the 
 Asiatic coast, and arrived at Chalcedon, a Megarian 
 colony at the mouth of the Pontus. 
 
 In the same summer, and immediately after the with- 76. 
 drawal of the Athenians from Megara, the Athenian The Athe- 
 general Demosthenes arrived at Naupactus with forty illto com-** 
 ships. A party in the cities of Boeotia who wanted to J^Xthe 011 
 a Cp. iv. 52. b Cp. iii. 19; iii. 32 init. 
 
29 6 
 
 DESIGNS UPON BOEOTIA. 
 
 IV. 
 
 democrati- 
 cal party 
 in Boeotia, 
 who under¬ 
 take to 
 betray Si- 
 phae, while 
 the Athe¬ 
 nians seize 
 Delium. 
 
 77 - 
 
 Demos¬ 
 thenes with 
 a fleet from 
 Naupactus 
 and Hippo¬ 
 crates with 
 an army 
 from 
 
 overthrow their constitution and set up a democracy like b.c. 424. 
 that of Athens, had entered into communications with 018g ' 
 him and with Hippocrates, and a plan of operations had 
 been concerted, chiefly under the direction of Ptoeodorus, 
 a Theban exile. Some of the democratical party under¬ 
 took to betray Siphae, which is a seaport on the Crisaean 
 Gulf in the Thespian territory, and certain Orchomenians 
 were to deliver up to the Athenians Chaeronea, which is 
 a dependency of the Boeotian, or as it was formerly 
 called the Minyan, Orchomenus. A body of Orcho- 
 menian exiles had a principal hand in this design and 
 kept a Peloponnesian force in their pay. The town of 
 Chaeronea is at the extremity of Boeotia near the 
 territory of Phanoteus in Phocis, and some Phocians 
 took part in the plot. The Athenians meanwhile were 
 to seize Delium, a temple of Apollo which is in the 
 district of Tanagra looking towards Euboea. In order 
 to keep the Boeotians occupied with disturbances at 
 home, and prevent them from marching in a body to 
 Delium, the whole movement was to be made on a 
 single day, which was fixed beforehand. If the attempt 
 succeeded and Delium was fortified, even though no 
 revolution should at once break out in the states of 
 Boeotia, they might hold the places which they had 
 taken and plunder the country. The partizans of demo¬ 
 cracy in the several cities would have a refuge near 
 at hand to which in case of failure they might retreat. 
 Matters could not long remain as they were ; and in 
 time, the Athenians acting with the rebels, and the 
 Boeotian forces being divided, they would easily settle 
 Boeotia in their interest. Such was the nature of the 
 proposed attempt. 
 
 Hippocrates himself with a force from the city was 
 ready to march into Boeotia when the moment came. 
 
 He had sent Demosthenes beforehand with the forty 
 ships to Naupactus, intending him to collect an army of 
 Acarnanians and other allies of the Athenians in that 
 region and sail against Siphae, which was to be betrayed 
 
ow 
 
 C. 424. 
 . 89. 
 
 BRASIDAS IN THESSALY. 297 
 
 to them. These operations were to be carried out simul- IV. 
 taneously on the day appointed. a^reeTto 
 
 Demosthenes on his arrival found that the confederate ijy ade 
 
 Boeotia on 
 
 Acarnanians had already compelled Oeniadae to enter a fixed day. 
 the Athenian alliance. He then himself raised all the P eniadae 
 
 forced 
 
 forces of the allies in those parts and proceeded first to into the 
 
 oil- 1 1 A _T Athenian 
 
 make war upon balynthius and the Agraeans a . Having alliance, 
 subdued them, he took the necessary steps for keeping 
 his appointment at Siphae. 
 
 During this summer, and about the same time, 78. 
 Brasidas set out on his way to Chalcidice with seven- Brasidas,^ 
 teen hundred hoplites. When he arrived at Heraclea the leading 
 in Trachis he despatched a messenger to Pharsalus, ™unt°ry! he 
 where he had friends, with a request that they would ™ a k es hls 
 conduct him and his army through the country. Ac- through 
 cordingly there came to meet him at Melitia, in Achaea His politic 
 Phthiotis, Panaerus, Dorus, Hippolochidas, Torylaus, and lan s ua s e * 
 Strophacus who was the proxenus of the Chalcidians. 
 
 Under their guidance he started. Other Thessalians 
 also conducted him ; in particular, Niconidas a friend of 
 Perdiccas from Larissa. Under any circumstances it 
 would not have been easy to cross Thessaly without 
 an escort, and certainly for an armed force to go through 
 a neighbour’s country without his consent was a pro¬ 
 ceeding which excited jealousy among all Hellenes. 
 
 Besides, the common people of Thessaly were always 
 well disposed towards the Athenians. And if the tra¬ 
 ditions of the country had not been in favour of a close 
 oligarchy, Brasidas could never have gone on ; even as it 
 was, some of the opposite party met him on his march at 
 the river Enipeus and would have stopped him, saying 
 that he had no business to proceed without the consent 
 of the whole nation. His escort replied that they would 
 not conduct him if the others objected, but that he had 
 suddenly presented himself and they were doing the 
 duty of hosts in accompanying him. Brasidas himself 
 added that he came as a friend to the Thessalian land 
 a Cp. iii. 111 fin. 
 
IV. 
 
 79 - 
 
 Brasidas 
 
 reaches 
 
 Perdiccas. 
 
 8o. 
 
 The Lace¬ 
 daemonians 
 encourage 
 the expe¬ 
 dition of 
 Brasidas in 
 the hope of 
 making a 
 
 298 BRASIDAS ARRIVES IE CHALCIDICE. 
 
 and people, and that he was making war upon his 
 enemies the Athenians, and not upon them. He had 
 never heard that there was any ill-feeling between the 
 Thessalians and Lacedaemonians which prevented either 
 of them from passing through the territory of the other ; 
 however, if they refused their consent, he would not and 
 indeed could not go on ; but such was not the treatment 
 which he had a right to expect from them. Upon this 
 they departed, and he by the advice of his escort, fearing 
 that a large force might collect and stop him, marched 
 on at full speed and without a halt. On the same day on 
 which he started from Melitia he arrived at Pharsalus, 
 and encamped by the river Apidanus. Thence he went 
 on to Phacium, and thence to Perrhaebia. Here his 
 Thessalian escort returned ; and the Perrhaebians, who 
 are subjects of the Thessalians, brought him safe to 
 Dium in the territory of Perdiccas, a city of Mace¬ 
 donia which is situated under Mount Olympus on 
 the Thessalian side. 
 
 Thus Brasidas succeeded in running through Thessaly 
 before any measures were taken to stop him, and reached 
 Perdiccas and Chalcidice. He and the revolted tribu¬ 
 taries of the Athenians, alarmed at their recent suc¬ 
 cesses, had invited the Peloponnesians. The Chalcidians 
 were expecting that the first efforts of the Athenians 
 would be directed against them. The neighbouring 
 cities, although they had not revolted, secretly joined 
 in the invitation. Perdiccas was not a declared enemy 
 of Athens, but was afraid that the old differences be¬ 
 tween himself and the Athenians might revive, and he 
 was especially anxious to subdue Arrhibaeus, king of the 
 Lyncestians. 
 
 The Lacedaemonians were the more willing to let the 
 Chalcidians have an army from Peloponnese owing to 
 the unfortunate state of their affairs. For now that the 
 Athenians were infesting Peloponnesus, and especially 
 Laconia, they thought that a diversion would be best 
 effected if they could retaliate on them by sending 
 
ow 
 
 THE SPARTANS AND THEIR HELOTS . 299 
 
 c. 424. troops to help their dissatisfied allies, who moreover IV. 
 
 ' 89 ' were offering to maintain them, and had asked for an^d^Sting 
 assistance from Sparta with the intention of revolting. ^° f ts the 
 They were also glad of a pretext for sending out of Their 
 the way some of the Helots, fearing that they would cruelty and 
 take the opportunity of rising afforded by the occupa- treachel r- 
 tion of Pylos. Most of the Lacedaemonian institutions 
 were specially intended to secure them against this source 
 of danger. Once, when they were afraid of the number 
 and vigour of the Helot youth, this was what they did :— 
 
 They proclaimed that a selection would be made of 
 those Helots who claimed to have rendered the best 
 service to the Lacedaemonians in war, and promised 
 them liberty. The announcement was intended to test 
 them; it was thought that those among them who were 
 foremost in asserting their freedom would be most 
 high-spirited, and most likely to rise against their mas¬ 
 ters. So they selected about two thousand, who were 
 crowned with garlands and went in procession round 
 the temples; they were supposed to have received their 
 liberty; but not long afterwards the Spartans put them 
 all out of the way, and no man knew how any one of 
 them came by his end. And so they were only too 
 glad to send with Brasidas seven hundred hoplites who 
 were Helots. The rest of his army he hired from Pelo¬ 
 ponnesus a . He himself was even more willing to go 
 than they were to send him. The Chalcidians too de- 81. 
 sired to have him, for at Sparta he had always been Justice and 
 
 moderation 
 
 considered a man of energy. And on this expedition of Brasidas 
 he proved invaluable to the Lacedaemonians. At the bered after¬ 
 time he gave an impression of justice and moderation ^dfaV 11 
 in his behaviour to the cities, which induced many of 
 them to revolt, while others were betrayed into his 
 hands. Thus the Lacedaemonians were able to lighten 
 the pressure of war upon Peloponnesus; and when 
 shortly afterwards they desired to negotiate, they had 
 places to give in return for what they sought to recover. 
 
 , a Cp. iv. 70 med. 
 
IV. 
 
 82. 
 
 The Athe¬ 
 nians de¬ 
 clare 
 Perdiccas 
 an enemy. 
 
 The alliance 
 between 
 Perdiccas 
 and Brasi- 
 das soon 
 begins to 
 cool. 
 Dispute 
 about Ar- 
 rhibaeus. 
 
 300 BRASIDAS AND PERDICCAS. 
 
 And at a later period of the war, after the Sicilian ex¬ 
 pedition, the honesty and ability of Brasidas which some 
 had experienced, and of which others had heard the fame, 
 mainly attracted the Athenian allies to the Lacedaemo¬ 
 nians. a For he was the first Spartan who had gone out 
 to them, and he proved himself 1 to be in every way a 
 good man. Thus he left in their minds a firm conviction 
 that the others would be like him. 
 
 The Athenians, hearing of the arrival of Brasidas in 
 Chalcidice, and believing that Perdiccas was the insti¬ 
 gator of the expedition, declared the latter an enemy 
 and kept a closer watch over their allies in that region. 
 
 Perdiccas, at once uniting the soldiers of Brasidas with 
 his own forces, made war upon Arrhibaeus the son of 
 Bromerus, king of the Lyncestians, a neighbouring people 
 of Macedonia; for he had a quarrel with him and wanted 
 to subdue him. But when he and Brasidas and the 
 army arrived at the pass leading into Lyncus, Brasidas 
 said that before appealing to arms he should like to try 
 in person the effect of negotiations, and see if he could 
 not make Arrhibaeus an ally of the Lacedaemonians. 
 He was partly influenced by messages which came from 
 Arrhibaeus expressing his willingness to submit any 
 matter in dispute to the arbitration of Brasidas : and 
 the Chalcidian ambassadors who accompanied the ex¬ 
 pedition recommended him not to remove from Per- 
 diccas^ path all his difficulties, lest, when they were 
 wanting him for their own affairs, his ardour should cool. 
 Besides, the envoys of Perdiccas when at Sparta had 
 said something to the Lacedaemonians about his making 
 many of the neighbouring tribes their allies, and on this 
 ground Brasidas claimed to act jointly with Perdiccas 
 in the matter of Arrhibaeus. But Perdiccas answered 
 that he had not brought Brasidas there to arbitrate in 
 the quarrels of Macedonia; he had meant him to destroy 
 
 a Or, taking Trpcoros closely with do£as: ‘For of all the Spartans 
 who had been sent out, he was the first who proved himself’ 
 etc. 
 
 O Cd 
 
KO 
 
 ■C. 424- 
 
 1. 89. 
 
 BRASIDAS AT ACANTHUS. 301 
 
 his enemies when he pointed them out. While he, Per- IV. 
 diccas, was maintaining half the Lacedaemonian army, 
 
 Brasidas had no business to be holding parley with 
 Arrhibaeus. But in spite of the opposition and resent¬ 
 ment of Perdiccas, Brasidas communicated with Arrhi¬ 
 baeus, and was induced by his words to withdraw his 
 army without invading the country. From that time 
 Perdiccas thought himself ill-used, and paid only a third 
 instead of half the expenses of the army. 
 
 During the same summer, immediately on his return 84. 
 from Lyncus, and a little before the vintage, Brasidas, Brasidas is 
 reinforced by Chalcidian troops, marched against Acan- j nto Acan¬ 
 thus, a colony of Andros. The inhabitants of the city addresses 
 were not agreed about admitting him ; those who in the citizens, 
 concert with the Chalcidians had invited him being 
 opposed to the mass of the people. So he asked them 
 to receive him alone, and hear what he had to say be¬ 
 fore they decided ; and to this request the multitude, 
 partly out of fear for their still ungathered vintage, were 
 induced to consent. Whereupon, coming forward to the 
 people (and for a Lacedaemonian he was not a bad 
 speaker), he addressed them as follows :— 
 
 ‘Men of Acanthus, the Lacedaemonians have sent me 85. 
 out at the head of this army to justify the declaration Wecome 
 which we made at the beginning of the war—that we tte y 2bera- 
 were going to fight against the Athenians for the liber- Hellas- 
 ties of Hellas. If we have been long in coming, the wh y do 
 
 0 0 you close 
 
 reason is that we were disappointed in the result of the your gates 
 
 war nearer home; for we .had hoped that, without in- Yourre— 
 volving you in danger, we might ourselves have made admVus 
 a speedy end of the Athenians. And therefore let no ^ in have a 
 
 r J bad effect 
 
 one blame us ; we have come as soon as we could, and on other 
 with your help will do our best to overthrow them. But Weare 
 how is it that you close your gates against me, and do to 
 not greet my arrival ? We Lacedaemonians thought that J^p y° u - 
 
 & We were 
 
 we were coming to those who even before we came in act too strong 
 were our allies in spirit, and would joyfully receive us; Athenians 
 having this hope we have braved the greatest dangers, at Nlsaea - 
 
3°2 
 
 SPEECH OF BRASIDAS. 
 
 IV. marching for many days through a foreign country, 
 and have shown the utmost zeal in your cause. And 
 now, for you to be of another mind and to set your¬ 
 selves against the liberties of your own city and of all 
 Hellas would be monstrous! The evil is not only that 
 you resist me yourselves, but wherever I go people will 
 be less likely to join me; they will be offended when 
 they hear that you to whom I first came, representing 
 a powerful city and reputed to be men of sense, did 
 not receive me, and I shall not be able to give a satis¬ 
 factory explanation, a but shall have to confess either 
 that I offer a spurious liberty, or that I am weak 3 
 and incapable of protecting you against the threatened 
 attack of the Athenians. And yet when I brought 
 assistance to Nisaea in command of the army which 
 I have led hither, the Athenians, though more numerous, 
 refused to engage with me; and they are not likely now, 
 when their forces must be conveyed by sea, to send an 
 army against you equal to that which they had at 
 86. Nisaea. And I myself, why am I here ? I come, not 
 i am not to injure, but to emancipate the Hellenes. And I have 
 sentative of bound the government of Lacedaemon by the most 
 and^shaif solemn oaths to respect the independence of any states 
 not enslave w hi c h I may bring over to their side. I do not want 
 few or the to gain your alliance by force or fraud, but to give you 
 Lacedae- e ours, that we may free you from the Athenian yoke, 
 uniikeuhe 1 think that you ought not to doubt my word when 
 have a ianS ' ^ °ff er y° u most s °l emn pledges, nor should I be 
 character regarded as an inefficient champion; but you should 
 
 to lose. . . 
 
 confidently join me. 
 
 ‘ If any one among you hangs back because he has a 
 personal fear of anybody else, and is under the impression 
 that I shall hand over the city to a party, him above all 
 I would reassure. For I am not come hither to be the 
 tool of a faction ; nor do I conceive that the liberty 
 which I bring ybit is of an ambiguous character ; I 
 
 a Or, taking eVt^epea' after ahlav e£co: ‘ but shall be deemed 
 either to offer a spurious liberty, or to be weak.’ 
 
 O cd 
 
wo 
 
 SPEECH OF BRASIDAS. 
 
 3°3 
 
 •Cg W should forget the spirit of my country were I to en- IV. 
 slave the many to the few, or the minority to the 
 whole people. Such a tyranny would be worse than 
 the dominion of the foreigner, and we Lacedaemonians 
 should receive no thanks in return for our trouble, but 
 instead of honour and reputation, only reproach. We 
 should lay ourselves open to charges far more detest¬ 
 able than those which are our best weapons against 
 the Athenians, who have never been great examples of 
 virtue. For to men of character there is more disgrace 
 in seeking aggrandisement by specious deceit than by 
 open violence a ; the violent have the justification of 
 strength which fortune gives them, but a policy of in¬ 
 trigue is insidious and wicked. 
 
 ‘ So careful are we where our highest interests are at 8 7. 
 stake. And not to speak of our oaths, you cannot have if you will 
 better assurance than they give whose actions, when Mends^we 
 compared with their professions, afford a convincing 
 proof that it is their interest to keep their word. ™ ies - 
 
 A # Having a 
 
 * But if you plead that you cannot accept the pro- duty to 
 posals which I offer, and insist that you ought not to w?camiot 
 suffer for the rejection of them because you are our you^oppo- 
 friends ; if you are of opinion that liberty is perilous sition - 
 and should not in justice be forced upon any one, but 
 gently brought to those who are able to receive it,—I 
 shall first call the Gods and heroes of the country to 
 witness that I have come hither for your good, and that 
 you would not be persuaded by me: I shall then use 
 force and ravage your country without any more scruple. 
 
 I shall deem myself justified by two overpowering argu¬ 
 ments. In the first place, I must not permit the Lace¬ 
 daemonians to suffer by your friendship, and suffer they 
 will through the revenues which the Athenians will con¬ 
 tinue to derive from you if you do not join me; and 
 in the second place, the Hellenes must not lose their 
 hope of liberation by your fault. On any other ground 
 we should certainly be wrong in taking such a step ; it 
 a Cp. i. 77 med. 
 
304 the mistake of the day . 
 
 IV. is only for the sake of the general weal that we Lace¬ 
 daemonians have any right to be forcing liberty upon 
 those who would rather not have it. For ourselves, we 
 are far from desiring empire, but we want to overthrow 
 the empire of others. And having this end in view, 
 we should do injustice to the majority if, while bringing 
 independence to all, we tolerated opposition in you. 
 Wherefore be well advised. Strive to take the lead in 
 liberating Hellas, and lay up a treasure of undying fame. 
 You will save your own property, and you will crown 
 your city with glory. 5 
 
 88. Thus spoke Brasidas. The Acanthians, after much 
 
 TheAcan- had been said on both sides, partly under the attrac¬ 
 tions, who . , 
 
 are afraid tion of his words, and partly because they were afraid 
 thei^vint- °f losing their vintage, determined by a majority, voting 
 mine d to ter " secre tly 3 to revolt from Athens. They pledged Brasidas 
 revolt from to stand by the engagement to which the government 
 of Sparta had sworn before they sent him out, and to 
 respect the independence of all whom he brought over 
 to the Lacedaemonian alliance. They then admitted 
 his army; and shortly afterwards Stageirus, a colony of 
 the Andrians, revolted also. Such were the events of 
 the summer. 
 
 89. Meanwhile the betrayal of Boeotia into the hands of 
 The plot Hippocrates and Demosthenes, the Athenian generals, 
 
 for the , r .. ’ . , t . . 
 
 betrayal was on the eve of accomplishment. At the beginning 
 
 “ a of the ensuing winter Demosthenes and his fleet were 
 covered. to a pp ear a t Siphae, and Hippocrates simultaneously to 
 march upon Delium. But there was a mistake about 
 the day, and Demosthenes, with his Acarnanian and 
 numerous other allies drawn from that neighbourhood, 
 sailed to Siphae too soon. His attempt failed ; for the 
 plot was betrayed by Nicomachus a Phocian, of the town 
 of Phanoteus, who told the Lacedaemonians, and they 
 the Boeotians. Whereupon there was a general levy of 
 the Boeotians, for Hippocrates, who was to have been 
 in the country and to have distracted their attention, 
 had not yet arrived ; and so they forestalled the Athe- 
 
 O td 
 
Otd 
 
 THE ATHENIANS EORTIFY DELIUM. 305 
 
 ^89 24 n * ans k y the occupation of Siphae and Chaeronea. IV. 
 When the conspirators in the Boeotian cities saw that 
 there had been a mistake they made no movement from 
 within. 
 
 Hippocrates had called out the whole force of Athens, 9 °- 
 metics as well as citizens, and all the strangers who ^^uSder 
 were then in the city. But he did not arrive at Delium Hi PP°- 
 until after the Boeotians had retired from Siphae. He fortify 
 encamped and fortified Delium, which is a temple ofTheniain 
 Apollo. His army dug a trench around the temple and ^ 
 the sacred precinct, the earth which they threw up out ^aves the 
 of the trench forming a rampart; along this rampart territory, 
 they drove in a palisade, and cutting down the vines 
 in the neighbourhood of the temple threw them on 
 the top. They made a like use of the stones and 
 bricks of the houses near, which they pulled down, and 
 by every means in their power strove to increase the 
 height of the rampart. Where the temple buildings 
 did not extend they erected wooden towers at con¬ 
 venient places; the cloister which had once existed 
 had fallen down. They began their work on the third 
 day after their departure from Athens, and continued 
 all this and the two following days until the mid-day 
 meal. When it was nearly finished the army retired 
 from Delium to a distance of a little more than a mile, 
 intending to go home. The greater part of the light¬ 
 armed troops proceeded on their march, but the hoplites 
 piled their arms and rested. Hippocrates, who had 
 remained behind, was occupied in placing the guards at 
 their posts, and in superintending the completion of that 
 part of the outworks which was still unfinished. 
 
 Meanwhile the Boeotians were gathering at Tanagra. 91. 
 
 All the forces from the different cities had now arrived. The Boeo- 
 They saw that the Athenians were already marching 
 homewards, and most of the Boeotarchs (who are in d^dftTr- 
 number eleven) disapproved of giving battle, because the mine to 
 enemy had left the Boeotian territory. For when the Fenians 6 
 Athenians rested in their march they were just on the border* 6 ' 
 x 
 
3°6 
 
 SPEECH OF PAGOXI)AS. 
 
 IV. borders of Oropia. But Pagondas the son of Aeoladas, 
 one of the two Boeotarchs from Thebes, who was in 
 command at the time (the other being Arianthidas the 
 son of Lysimachidas), a wanted to fight % believing that 
 the risk was worth encountering. So calling the sol¬ 
 diers to him in successive divisions, that they might not 
 all leave their arms at once, he exhorted the Boeotians 
 
 to march against the Athenians and to hazard battle, in 
 
 the following words :— 
 
 92. ‘Men of Boeotia, no one among us generals should 
 
 The Athe- ev er have allowed the thought to enter his mind that 
 our in- we ought not to hght with the Athenians, even although 
 enemies, we may not overtake them on Boeotian soil. They 
 \ve 6 find er have crossed our frontier; it is Boeotia in which they 
 
 them. 
 
 They are 
 the aggres¬ 
 sors, and 
 we must 
 defend 
 ourselves 
 against 
 them 
 without 
 stopping 
 to think. 
 Neighbours 
 are always 
 dangerous, 
 and they are 
 the most 
 dangerous 
 of all. 
 
 Once we 
 were at their 
 
 have built a fort, and Boeotia which they intend to lay 
 waste. Our enemies they clearly are wherever we find 
 
 them, and therefore in that country out of which they 
 came and did us mischief. But perhaps not to fight 
 may appear to some one to be the safer course. Well 
 
 then, let him who thinks so think again. When a man 
 being in full possession of his own goes out of his way 
 to attack others because he covets more, he cannot re¬ 
 flect too much; but when a man is attacked by another 
 and has to fight for his own, prudence does not allow 
 of reflection. In you the temper has been hereditary 
 which would repel the foreign invader, whether he be in 
 
 weS’ bUt anotker ’ s country or in your own ; the Athenian invader 
 covered our above all others should be thus repelled, because he 
 
 liberty at . 
 
 Coronea, is your next neighbour. For among neighbours an- 
 againshow tagonism is ever a condition of independence, and 
 weTannot a g ainst men like these, who are seeking to enslave not 
 be attacked only near but distant countries, shall we not fi°\ht to 
 punity. the last? Look at their treatment of Euboea just over 
 the strait, and of the greater part of Hellas. I would 
 have you know, that whereas other men fight with their 
 neighbours about the lines of a frontier, for us, if we 
 
 a Or, omitting the words ‘ who was in command at the time : ’ 
 ‘wanted to fight while he held the command.’ 
 
 03 0 
 
B.C. 424. 
 01. 89. 
 
 B.C. 447. 
 01. 83, 2. 
 
 THE BOEOTIANS PREPARE TO FIGHT. 307 
 
 are conquered, there will be no more disputing about IV. 
 frontiers, but one fixed boundary, including our whole 
 country, for the Athenians will come in and take by 
 force all that we have. So much more dangerous are 
 they than ordinary neighbours. And men who, like 
 them, wantonly assail others, will not hesitate to attack 
 him who remains quietly at home and only defends 
 himself; but they are not so ready to overbear the 
 adversary who goes out of his own country to meet 
 them, and when there is an opportunity strikes first. 
 
 We have proved this in our own dealings with the 
 Athenians. Once, owing to our internal dissensions, 
 they took possession of our land, but we overcame 
 them at Coronea, and gave Boeotia that complete se¬ 
 curity which has lasted to this day a . Remember the 
 past: let the elder men among us emulate their own 
 earlier deeds, and the younger who are the sons of those 
 valiant fathers do their best not to tarnish the virtues 
 of their race. Confident that the God whose temple 
 they have impiously fortified and now occupy will be 
 our champion, and relying on the sacrifices, which are 
 favourable to us, let us advance to meet them. They 
 may satisfy their greed by attacking those who do not 
 defend themselves; but we will show them that from 
 men whose generous spirit ever impels them to fight 
 for the liberties of their country, and who will not see 
 that of others unjustly enslaved,—from such men they 
 will not part without a battle.’ 
 
 With this exhortation Pagondas persuaded the Boeo- 93 * 
 tians to march against the Athenians, and quickly moved The Boe °- 
 
 & 7 x J tian army, 
 
 his army forward (for the day was far advanced). As soon numbering 
 
 , t , , . . : . . about 
 
 as he approached the enemy he took up a position where eighteen 
 a hill intercepted the view, and there drew up his army ^hun- 
 and prepared for action. Hippocrates, who was still at Theban 
 Delium, heard that the Boeotians were advancing, and division 
 
 1 , . , . arranged 
 
 sent a message to the army bidding them get into twenty-five 
 position. He himself came up shortly afterwards, deep ' ap " 
 a Cp. iii. 62 fin. 
 
 X 2 
 
3°8 
 
 DISPOSITION OF THE FORCES. 
 
 IV. 
 
 pears over 
 the crest 
 of a hill. 
 
 94 - 
 
 Numbers 
 of the 
 Athenian 
 hoplites 
 about the 
 same as of 
 the Boeo¬ 
 tian : they 
 are drawn 
 up eight 
 deep. 
 
 95 - 
 
 We are 
 fighting not 
 only to gain 
 
 having left three hundred cavalry at Delium, in order 
 that they might protect the place if assailed, and also 
 might watch their opportunity and attack the Boeotians 
 while the battle was going on. To these the Boeotians 
 opposed a separate force. When everything was ready 
 they appeared over the crest of the hill, and halted in 
 the order which they proposed to maintain in the engage¬ 
 ment ; they numbered about seven thousand hoplites, 
 more than ten thousand light-armed troops, a thousand 
 cavalry, and five hundred targeteers. The Thebans and 
 the Boeotians of the adjoining district occupied the right 
 wing. In the centre were the men of Haliartus, Coronea, 
 and Copae, and the other dwellers about the Lake 
 Copais. On the left wing were the Thespians, Tanag- 
 raeans, and Orchomenians ; the cavalry and light-armed 
 troops were placed on both wings. The Thebans were 
 formed in ranks of five and twenty deep ; the formation 
 of the others varied. Such was the character and array 
 of the Boeotian forces. 
 
 All the hoplites of the Athenian army were arranged 
 in ranks eight deep ; their numbers equalled those of 
 their opponents ; the cavalry were stationed on either 
 wing. No regular light-armed troops accompanied them, 
 for Athens had no organised force of this kind. Those 
 who originally joined the expedition were many times 
 over the number of the enemy; but they were to a great 
 extent without proper arms, for the whole force, strangers 
 as well as citizens, had been called out. Having once 
 started homewards, there were but few of them forth¬ 
 coming in the engagement. When the Athenians were 
 ranged in order of battle and on the point of advancing, 
 Hippocrates the general, proceeding along the lines, 
 exhorted them as follows: — 
 
 ‘ Men of Athens, there is not much time for exhorta¬ 
 tion, but to the brave a few words are as good as many; 
 I am only going to remind, not to admonish you a . Let 
 
 Cp. iv. 17 med., 126 init.; v. 69 fin. 
 
 wo 
 
OW 
 
 BATTLE OF DELIUM. 
 
 309 
 
 .c 424. no man think that because we are on foreign soil we are IV. 
 running into great danger without cause. Although in Boeotia < 
 
 ■Da.* • but for the 
 
 .Boeotian territory we shall be fighting for our own. If safety and 
 we are victors, the Peloponnesians, deprived of the A^hens S ° f 
 Boeotian cavalry, will never invade our land again, so ^have Sht 
 that in one battle you win Boeotia and win at the same a s P irit r 
 
 . . worthy of 
 
 time ior Attica a more complete freedom. Meet them her, worthy 
 in a spirit worthy of the first city in Hellas—of that vfctors at 
 Athens which we are all proud to call our country; ° eno P h y ta * 
 in a spirit too worthy of our fathers, who in times past 
 under Myronides at Oenophyta overcame these very 
 Boeotians and conquered their land/ 
 
 Thus spoke Hippocrates, and had gone over half the 96. 
 army, not having had time for more, when the Boeotians The ri s ht 
 
 / 1 . . wing of the 
 
 (to whom Pagondas just before engaging had been Athenians 
 making a second short exhortation) raised the Paean, °heBoS>- S 
 and came down upon them from the hill. The Athe- 
 nians hastened forward, and the two armies met at a run. win s of the 
 
 '-pi . . Boeotians 
 
 I he extreme right and left of either army never engaged, overcomes 
 
 for the same reason ; they were both prevented by water- n ians. 
 
 courses. But the rest closed, and there was a fierce 
 
 struggle and pushing of shield against shield. The left appearance 
 
 . r 1 -A • r ? • 1 ofsome 
 
 wing of the Boeotians as far as their centre was worsted Boeotian 
 by the Athenians, who pressed hard upon this part of AthenfanT 
 the army, especially upon the Thespians. For the troops defeated 7 
 ranged at their side having given way they were sur¬ 
 rounded and hemmed in ; and so the Thespians who 
 perished were cut down fighting hand to hand. Some of 
 the Athenians themselves in surrounding the enemy were 
 thrown into confusion and unwittingly slew one another. 
 
 On this side then the Boeotians were overcome, and fled 
 to that part of the army which was still fighting ; but 
 the right wing, where the Thebans were stationed, over¬ 
 came the Athenians, and forcing them back, at first step 
 by step, were following hard upon them, when Pagondas, 
 seeing that his left wing was in distress, sent two squad¬ 
 rons of horse unperceived round the hill. They suddenly 
 appeared over the ridge ; the victorious wing of the Athe- 
 
310 THE BOEOTIAN AND ATHENIAN HERALDS. 
 
 IV. nians, fancying that another army was attacking them, 
 was struck with panic; and so at both points, partly 
 owing to this diversion, and partly to the pressure of the 
 advancing Thebans who broke their line, the rout of the 
 Athenian army became general. Some fled to the sea 
 at Delium, others towards Oropus, others to Mount 
 Parnes, or in any direction which gave hope of safety. 
 The Boeotians, especially their cavalry and that of the 
 Locrians which arrived when the rout had begun, pursued 
 and slaughtered them. Night closed upon the pursuit, 
 and aided the mass of the fugitives in their escape. On 
 the next day those of them who had reached Oropus and 
 Delium, which, though defeated, they still held, were 
 conveyed home by sea. A garrison was left in the 
 place. 
 
 97. The Boeotians, after raising a trophy, took up their 
 TheAthe- own dead, and despoiled those of the enemy. They 
 
 nians are . . r , . . . 
 
 refused then left them under the care of a guard, and retiring 
 tobury 10n to Tanagra concerted an attack upon Delium. The 
 then dead, h era id Q f the Athenians, as he was on his way to ask 
 ground for their dead, met a Boeotian herald, who turned him 
 have been back, declaring that he would get no answer until he 
 sacrilege, had returned himself. He then came before the Athe¬ 
 nians and delivered to them the message of the Boeo¬ 
 tians, by whom they were accused of transgressing the 
 universally recognised customs of Hellas. Those who 
 invaded the territory of others ever abstained from 
 touching the temples, whereas the Athenians had forti¬ 
 fied Delium and were now dwelling there, and doing all 
 that men usually do in an unconsecrated place. They 
 were even drawing, for common use, the water which the 
 Boeotians themselves were forbidden to use except as 
 holy water for the sacrifices. They therefore on behalf 
 both of the God and of themselves, invoking Apollo 
 and all the divinities who had a share in the temple, 
 bade the Athenians depart and carry off what belonged 
 to them. 
 
 98. Upon the delivery of this message the Athenians sent 
 
 O to 
 
oa 
 
 DISPUTE ABOUT THE TEMPLE. 311 
 
 ■C. 424- to the Boeotians a herald of their own, who on their IV. 
 
 9 behalf declared that they had done no injury to the The Athe ' 
 
 J j j mans 
 
 temple, and were not going to do any if they could help; defend 
 they had not originally entered it with any injurious against the 
 intent, but in order that from it they might defend sacrifege! 
 themselves against those >vho were really injuring them. upon, 
 According to Hellenic practice, they who were masters their op- 
 of the land, whether much or little, invariably had posses- P 
 sion of the temples, to which they were bound to show the 
 customary reverence, but in such ways only as were pos¬ 
 sible. There was a time when the Boeotians themselves 
 and most other nations, including all who had driven 
 out the earlier inhabitants of the land which they now 
 occupied, attacked the temples of others, and these had 
 in time become their own. So the Boeotian temples 
 would have become theirs if they had succeeded in 
 conquering more of Boeotia. So much of the country 
 as they did occupy was their own, and they did not 
 mean to leave it until compelled. As to meddling with 
 the water, they could not help themselves ; the use of 
 it was a necessity which they had not incurred wantonly; 
 they were resisting the Boeotians who had begun by 
 attacking their territory. When men were constrained 
 by war, or by some other great calamity, there was every 
 reason to think that their offence was forgiven by the 
 God himself. He who has committed an involuntary 
 misdeed finds a refuge at the altar, and men are said 
 to transgress, not when they presume a little in their 
 distress, but when they do evil of their own free-will. 
 
 The Boeotians, who demanded a sacred place as a 
 ransom for the bodies of the dead, were guilty of a far 
 greater impiety than the Athenians who refused to make 
 such an unseemly bargain. They desired the Boeotians 
 to let them take away their dead, not adding the con¬ 
 dition “ if they would quit Boeotia,” for in fact they 
 were in a spot which they had fairly won by arms and 
 not in Boeotia, but simply saying “ if they would make 
 a truce according to ancestral custom." 5 
 
IV. 
 
 99 - 
 
 The 
 
 Boeotians 
 quibble 
 about the 
 spot in 
 which the 
 dead 
 
 bodies lie. 
 
 IOO. 
 
 They 
 
 attack, and, 
 by the help 
 of an in¬ 
 genious 
 machine, 
 take Delium 
 seventeen 
 days after 
 the battle. 
 
 312 DELIUM TAKEN BY THE BOEOTIANS. 
 
 The Boeotians replied that if they were in Boeotia 
 they might take what belonged to them, but must 
 depart out of it; if they were in their own land they 
 could do as they pleased. They knew that the territory 
 of Oropus, in which the dead lay (for the battle took 
 place on the border), was actually in the possession of 
 Athens, but that the Athenians could not take them away 
 without their leave, a and they were unwilling as they 
 pretended to make a truce respecting a piece of ground 
 which did not belong to them a . And to say in their 
 reply ‘that if they would quit Boeotian ground they 
 might take what they asked for/ sounded plausible. 
 Thereupon the Athenian herald departed, leaving his 
 purpose unaccomplished. 
 
 The Boeotians immediately sent for javelin-men and 
 slingers from the Malian Gulf. They had been joined 
 after the battle by the Corinthians with two thousand 
 hoplites, and by the Peloponnesian garrison which had 
 evacuated Nisaea b , as well as by some Megarians. 
 They now marched against Delium and attacked the 
 rampart, employing among other military devices an 
 engine, with which they succeeded in taking the place; 
 it was of the following description. They sawed in two 
 and hollowed out a great beam, which they joined 
 together again very exactly, like a flute, and suspended 
 a vessel by chains at the end of the beam ; the iron 
 mouth of a bellows directed downwards into the vessel 
 was attached to the beam, of which a great part was itself 
 overlaid with iron. This machine they brought up from 
 a distance on carts to various points of the rampart 
 where vine stems and wood had been most extensively 
 used, and when it was quite near the wall they applied 
 a large bellows to their own end of the beam, and blew 
 through it. The blast, prevented from escaping, passed 
 
 a Or, taking Brjdev with vnep rrjs tKelvcov : ‘and they were unwil¬ 
 ling to make a truce respecting a piece of ground which was claimed 
 by the Athenians.’ 
 
 b Cp. iv. 69 fin. 
 
 OCd 
 
gw Qw 
 
 - 424- 
 
 89. 
 
 C . 497 - 
 . 70 , 4 - 
 
 EXPEDITION AGAINST AMPHIPOLIS . 313 
 
 into the vessel which contained burning coals and sul- IV. 
 phur and pitch; these made a huge flame, and set fire 
 to the rampart, so that no one could remain upon it. 
 
 The garrison took flight, and the fort was taken. Some 
 were slain ; two hundred were captured ; but the greater 
 number got on board their ships and so reached home. 
 
 Delium was captured seventeen days after the battle. IOI. 
 The Athenian herald came shortly afterwards in igno- The y now 
 
 J 0 give up 
 
 ranee of its fate to ask again for the dead, and now the the dead, 
 Boeotians, instead of repeating their former answer, gave aboutT^ 
 them up. In the battle the Boeotians lost somewhat among^he’m 
 less than five hundred ; the Athenians not quite a thou- is Hi PP°- 
 
 1 crates the 
 
 sand, and Hippocrates their general; also a great number general, 
 of light-armed troops and baggage-bearers. 
 
 Shortly after the battle of Delium, Demosthenes, on Failure of 
 the failure of the attempt to betray Siphae, against madeby 
 which he had sailed with forty ships a , employed the ^nefon 
 Agraean and Acarnanian troops together with four Sicyoma. 
 hundred Athenian hoplites whom he had on board in 
 a descent on the Sicyonian coast. Before all the fleet 
 had reached the shore the Sicyonians came out against 
 the invaders, put to flight those who had landed, and 
 pursued them to their ships, killing some, and making 
 prisoners of others. They then erected a trophy, and 
 gave back the dead under a flag of truce. 
 
 While the affair of Delium was going on, Sitalces the Death of 
 Odrysian king died ; he had been engaged in an ex- who is ’ 
 pedition against the Triballi, by whom he was defeated by C his ded 
 in battle. Seuthes the son of Spardocus b , his nephew, 
 succeeded him in the kingdom of the Odrysians and 
 the rest of his Thracian dominions. 
 
 During the same winter, Brasidas and his Chalcidian 102. 
 allies made an expedition against Amphipolis upon the The first, 
 
 _ .... . . . second, and 
 
 river Strymon, the Athenian colony. I he place where third foun- 
 the city now stands is the same which Aristagoras of Amphi-° f 
 Miletus in days of old, when he was flying from King polls - 
 Darius, attempted to colonise; he was driven out by 
 a Cp. iv. 77 init., 89. b Cp. ii. 101 fin. 
 
3 H 
 
 BRAS IDAS AT AMPHIPOLIS. 
 
 IV. 
 
 103. 
 
 Brasidas 
 is received 
 by the 
 inhabitants 
 of Argilus, 
 who con¬ 
 duct his 
 army to 
 the bridge 
 near Am- 
 phipolis. 
 
 the Edonians a . Two and thirty years afterwards the B.c. 424. 
 Athenians made another attempt; they sent a colony ' 8g ’ 
 of ten thousand, made up partly of their own citizens, B.c. 465. 
 partly of any others who liked to join; but these also 01, 78 ' 4 ‘ 
 were attacked by the Thracians at Drabescus, and 
 perished 13 . Twenty-nine years later the Athenians came 
 again, under the leadership of Hagnon the son of Nicias, 
 drove out the Edonians, and built a town on the same B.c. 437. 
 spot, which was formerly called £ The Nine Ways. 5 Their 0L 85, 4 ‘ 
 base of operations was Eion, a market and seaport 
 which they already possessed, at the mouth of the river, 
 about three miles from the site of the present town, which 
 Hagnon called Amphipolis, because on two sides it is 
 surrounded by the river Strymon, and strikes the eye 
 both by sea and land. Wanting to enclose the newly- 
 founded city, he cut it off by a long wall reaching from 
 the upper part of the river to the lower. 
 
 Against Amphipolis Brasidas now led his army. Start¬ 
 ing from Arnae in Chalcidice, towards evening he reached 
 Aulon and Bromiscus at the point where the lake Bolbe 
 flows into the sea; having there supped, he marched on 
 during the night. The weather was wintry and some¬ 
 what snowy; and so he pushed on all the quicker ; he was 
 hoping that his approach might be known at Amphi¬ 
 polis only to those who were in the secret. There dwelt 
 in the place settlers from Argilus, a town which was 
 originally colonised from Andros; these and others 
 aided in the attempt, instigated some by Perdiccas, 
 others by the Chalcidians. The town of Argilus is not 
 far off, and the inhabitants were always suspected by 
 the Athenians, and were always conspiring against Am¬ 
 phipolis. For some time past, ever since the arrival of 
 Brasidas had given them an opportunity, they had been 
 concerting measures with their countrymen inside the 
 walls for the surrender of the city. They now revolted 
 from the Athenians, and received him into their town. 
 
 On that very night they conducted the army onwards 
 
 a Cp. Herod, v. 124. b Cp. i. 100 fin. 
 
ow 
 
 THUCYDIDES. 
 
 3 T 5 
 
 .C. 424. 
 
 1. 89. 
 
 to the bridge over the river, which is at some distance IV. 
 from the town. At that time no walls had been built 
 down to the river, as they have since been ; a small 
 guard was posted there. Brasidas easily overcame the 
 guard, owing partly to the plot within the walls, partly 
 to the severity of the weather and the suddenness of his 
 attack; he then crossed the bridge, and at once became 
 master of all the possessions of the Amphipolitans out¬ 
 side the walls. For they lived scattered about in the 
 country. 
 
 The passage of the river was a complete surprise to the 104. 
 citizens within the walls. Many who dwelt outside were The 
 
 J country 
 
 taken. Others fled into the town. The Amphipolitans outside the 
 were in great consternation, for they suspected one an- now at 
 other. a It is even said that Brasidas, if, instead of allow- ^ s e ^ ercy ' 
 ing his army to plunder, he had marched direct to the ^e^he* 0 
 place, would probably a have captured it. But he merely place before 
 occupied a position, and overran the country outside the arrives, 
 walls; and then, finding that his confederates within 
 failed in accomplishing their part, he took no further 
 step. Meanwhile the opponents of the conspirators being 
 superior in number prevented the immediate opening of 
 the gates, and acting with Eucles, the general to whose 
 care the place had been committed by the Athenians, 
 sent for help to the other general in Chalcidice, Thucy¬ 
 dides the son of Olorus, who wrote this history; he 
 was then at Thasos, an island colonised from Paros, and 
 distant from Amphipolis about half a day’s sail. As 
 soon as he heard the tidings he sailed quickly to Am¬ 
 phipolis with seven ships which happened to be on the 
 spot; he wanted to get into Amphipolis if possible 
 before it could capitulate, or at any rate to occupy Eion. 
 
 Meanwhile Brasidas, fearing the arrival of the ships 105. 
 from Thasos, and hearing that Thucydides had the and there- 
 right of working gold mines in the neighbouring dis- moderate 5 
 trict of Thrace, and was consequently one of the leading terms> 
 
 a Or, ‘ It is said to have been the impression that Brasidas ’ etc., 
 omitting ‘probably.’ 
 
3 l6 
 
 SURRENDER OF AMPHIPOLIS. 
 
 IV. men of the country, did his utmost to get possession of 
 the city before his arrival. He was afraid that, if Thucy¬ 
 dides once came, the people of Amphipolis would no 
 longer be disposed to surrender. For their hope would 
 be that he would bring in allies by sea from the islands, 
 or collect troops in Thrace, and relieve them. He there¬ 
 fore offered moderate terms, proclaiming that any Am- 
 phipolitan or Athenian might either remain in the city 
 and have the enjoyment of his property.on terms of 
 equality; or if he preferred, might depart, taking his 
 goods with him, within five days. 
 
 106. When the people heard the proclamation they began 
 which are to waver ; for very few of the citizens were Athenians, 
 byThehL the greater number being, a mixed multitude. Many 
 ThucycUdes within the walls were relatives of those who had been 
 Sfushio 11 ’ ca Ptured outside. In their alarm they thought the 
 late to terms reasonable ; the Athenian population because they 
 
 save Am- . , , 
 
 phipolis. were too glad to withdraw, reflecting how much greater 
 their share of the danger was, and not expecting speedy 
 relief; the rest of the people because they retained all 
 their existing rights, and were delivered from a fate 
 which seemed inevitable. The partisans of Brasidas 
 now proceeded to justify his proposals without disguise, 
 for they saw that the mind of the whole people had 
 changed, and that they no longer paid any regard to the 
 Athenian general who was on the spot. So his terms 
 were accepted, and the city was surrendered and de¬ 
 livered up to him. On the evening of the same day 
 Thucydides and his ships sailed into Eion, but not until 
 Brasidas had taken possession of Amphipolis, missing 
 Eion only by a night. For if the ships had not come 
 to the rescue with all speed, the place would have been 
 in his hands on the next morning. 
 
 107. Thucydides now put Eion in a state of defence, de- 
 Stfdown t0 P roy ide not only against any immediate attempt 
 
 the river to of Brasidas, but also against future danger. He received 
 fails in U the fugitives who had chosen to quit Amphipolis accord- 
 piacef ’ m S to the agreement and wished to come into Eion. 
 
 PQO 
 
PQ O 
 
 ALARM OF THE ATHENIANS. 317 
 
 .a 424. Brasidas suddenly sailed with a number of small craft IV. 
 down the river to Eion, hoping that he might take the 
 point which runs out from the wall, and thereby com¬ 
 mand the entrance to the harbour ; at the same time 
 he made an attack by land. But in both these attempts 
 he was foiled. Whereupon he returned, and took mea¬ 
 sures for the settlement of Amphipolis. The Edonian 
 town of Myrcinus joined him, Pittacus the king of the 
 Edonians having been assassinated by the children of 
 Goaxis and Brauro his wife. Soon afterwards Galepsus 
 and Aesyme (both colonies from Thasos) came over to 
 him. Perdiccas likewise arrived shortly after the taking 
 of Amphipolis, and assisted him in settling the newly- 
 acquired towns. 
 
 The Athenians were seriously alarmed at the loss of 108. 
 Amphipolis; the place was very useful to them, and The Athe- 
 supplied them with a revenue, and with timber which aiarmed^t 
 they imported for ship-building. As far as the Strymon of Amphi- 
 the Lacedaemonians could always have found a way to P olis h . e ~ 
 
 J J cause it 
 
 the allies of Athens, if the Thessalians allowed them to opens the 
 pass; but until they gained possession of the bridge other allies 1 * 
 they could proceed no further, because, for a long way The revolt- 
 above, the river forms a large lake, and below, towards in s ci | ies 
 
 5 . miscalcu- 
 
 Eion, it was guarded by triremes. All difficulty seemed jated, but 
 now to be removed, and the Athenians feared that more natural that 
 of their allies would revolt. For Brasidas in all his actions be e in- Sh ° uld 
 showed himself reasonable, and whenever he made a JJ ueaced 
 
 7 . by the 
 
 speech lost no opportunity of declaring that he was sent character of 
 r . TT ti t *t . . ... . . Brasidas. 
 
 to emancipate Hellas. The cities which were subject jealousy 
 to Athens, when they heard of the taking of Amphipolis enterprises 
 and of his promises and of his gentleness, were more at Sparta ’ 
 impatient than ever to rise, and privately sent embassies 
 to him, asking him to come and help them, every one of 
 them wanting to be first. They thought that there was 
 no danger, for they had under-estimated the Athenian 
 power, which afterwards proved its greatness and the 
 magnitude of their mistake ; they judged rather by their 
 own illusive wishes than by the unerring rule of prudence. 
 
3 1 8 EXCITEMENT AMONG A THENIAN SUBJECTS . 
 
 IV. For such is the manner of men ; what they like is always B. 
 seen by them in the light of unreflecting hope, what 
 they dislike they peremptorily set aside by an arbitrary 
 conclusion. Moreover,’the Athenians had lately received 
 a blow in Boeotia, and Brasidas told the allies what 
 was likely to attract them, but untrue, that at Nisaea 
 the Athenians had refused to fight with his unassisted 
 forces a . And so they grew bold, and were quite con¬ 
 fident that no army would ever reach them. Above all, 
 they were influenced by the pleasurable excitement of 
 the moment; they were now for the first time going to 
 find out of what the Lacedaemonians were capable when 
 in real earnest, and therefore they were willing to risk 
 anything. The Athenians were aware of their disaffec¬ 
 tion, and as far as they could, at short notice and in 
 winter time, sent garrisons to the different cities. Bra¬ 
 sidas also despatched a message to the Lacedaemonians 
 requesting them to let him have additional forces, and 
 he .himself began to build triremes on the Strymon. 
 But they would not second his efforts because their 
 leading men were jealous of him, and also because they 
 preferred to recover the prisoners taken in the island 
 and bring the war to an end. 
 
 109. In the same winter the Megarians recovered their 
 
 Recovery of long walls which had been in the hands of the Athe- 
 their long . 
 
 walls by the mans , and razed them to the ground. 
 
 De^riotion After the taking of Amphipolis, Brasidas and his allies 
 of Actfe and marched to the so-called Acte, or coast-land, which 
 Brasidas runs out from the canal made by the Persian King and 
 thither^and extends into the peninsula; it is bounded by Athos, a 
 mos^of 1 b> mountain projecting into the Aegean sea c . There 
 them. are cities in the peninsula, of which one is Sane, an 
 Andrian colony on the edge of the canal looking towards 
 the sea in the direction of Euboea; the others are 
 Thyssus, Cleonae, Acrothous, Olophyxus, and Dium; 
 their inhabitants are a mixed multitude of barbarians, 
 
 a Cp. iv. 85 fin. b Cp. iv. 68, 69. 
 
 c Cp. Herod, vii. 22. 
 
mo 
 
 C. 424. 
 . 89. 
 
 BRAS I DAS AT TO RONE. 319 
 
 speaking Greek as well as their native tongue. A few IV. 
 indeed are Chalcidian ; but the greater part are Pelas- 
 gians (sprung from the Tyrrhenians who once inhabited 
 Lemnos and Athens), or Bisaltians, Crestonians, Edo- 
 nians. They all dwell in small cities. Most of them 
 joined Brasidas, but Sane and Dium held out; where¬ 
 upon he remained there for a time and wasted their 
 territory. 
 
 Finding that they would not yield, he promptly made 110. 
 an expedition against Toron£ in Chalcidice, which was Brasidas 
 held by the Athenians. He was invited by a few of the Spedition 
 inhabitants, who were ready to deliver the city into his ^onL 
 hands. Arriving at night, or about daybreak, he took 
 up a position at the temple of the Dioscuri, which is town, and 
 distant about three furlongs from the city. The great introduce 
 body of the inhabitants and the Athenian garrison never soidTerf. hlS 
 discovered him; but those Toronaeans who were in his 
 interest, and knew that he was coming, were awaiting 
 his approach ; some few of them had privately gone to 
 meet him. When his confederates found that he had 
 arrived, they introduced into the city, under the com¬ 
 mand of Lysistratus an Olynthian, seven light-armed 
 soldiers carrying daggers (for of twenty who had been 
 originally appointed to that service, only seven had the 
 courage to enter). These men slipped in undiscovered by 
 way of the wall where it looks towards the sea. They 
 ascended the side of the hill on which the city is built, 
 and slew the sentinels posted on the summit; they then 
 began to break down the postern-gate towards the pro¬ 
 montory of Canastraeum. 
 
 Meanwhile Brasidas advanced a little with the rest m. 
 of his army, and then halting, sent forward a hundred They and 
 targeteers, that as soon as any of the gates were opened, sar^hf 1 
 and the signal agreed upon displayed, they might rush breSTopen 
 in first. There was a delay, and they, wondering what g a ^° stern 
 had happened, drew by degrees nearer and nearer to the 
 city. Their partisans in Torone, acting with the soldiers 
 who had already got inside, had now broken through 
 
320 
 
 CAPTURE OF T0R0NE. 
 
 IV. the postern-gate, and proceeded to cut the bar which 
 fastened the gates near the market-place. They then 
 brought round some of the targeteers by way of the 
 postern-gate, and introduced them into the city, hoping 
 to strike panic into the unconscious citizens by the sudden 
 appearance of an armed force in their rear and on both 
 sides of them at once. Their next step was to raise the 
 fire-signal according to agreement; they then received 
 the rest of the targeteers through the gates by the market¬ 
 place 
 
 IT 2. Brasidas, when he saw the signal, gave his army the 
 The army word to advance, and ran forward. Raising with one 
 
 of Brasidas, . . _ 
 
 on a signal voice a shout which struck terror into the souls of 
 fhe e town, m the inhabitants, they followed him. Some of them 
 rush m. dashed in by the gates ; others found a way in at a place 
 where the wall had fallen down and was being repaired, 
 getting up by some planks which were placed against it, 
 intended for drawing up stones. He himself with the 
 main body of his army ascended to the upper part of 
 the city, wanting to make the capture thorough and 
 secure ; the rest of his soldiers overran the town. 
 
 113. While the capture was proceeding the Toronaeans 
 TheAthe- generally, who knew nothing about the plot, were in 
 
 nian garri- 0 . . A 
 
 son take confusion. The conspirators and their party at once 
 Lecythus. joined the assailants. Of the Athenian hoplites, who 
 to the number of fifty chanced to be sleeping in the 
 Agora, a few were cut down at once, but the greater 
 number, when they saw what had happened, fled, some 
 by land, others to the Athenian guard-ships, of which 
 two were on the spot, and reached safely the fort of 
 Lecythus, a high point of the city which the Athenians 
 had occupied and retained in their own hands; it runs 
 out into the sea, and is only joined to the mainland by 
 a narrow isthmus; thither fled also such Toronaeans as 
 were friendly to the Athenians. 
 
 114. It was now daylight, and the city being completely in 
 Brasidas his power, Brasidas made proclamation to the Toronaeans 
 the Athe- who had taken refuge with the Athenians, that if they 
 
 PQO 
 
OCd 
 
 MODERATION OF BRAS IDAS. 321 
 
 •C- 4 24 - liked they might come out and return to their homes; 
 they would suffer no harm in the city. He also sent a 
 herald to the Athenians, bidding them take what was 
 their own and depart under a flag of truce out of Lecythus. 
 The place, he said, belonged to the Chalcidians, and not 
 to them. They refused to go, but asked him to make a 
 truce with them for a day, that they might take up their 
 dead, and he granted them two days. During these two 
 days he fortified the buildings which were near Lecythus, 
 and the Athenians strengthened the fort itself. He then 
 called a meeting of the Toronaeans, and addressed them 
 much in the same terms which he had used at Acanthus a . 
 He told them that they ought not to think badly of those 
 citizens who had aided him, much less to deem them 
 traitors; for they were not bribed and had not acted 
 with any view of enslaving the city, but in the interest 
 of her freedom and welfare. Those of the inhabitants 
 who had not joined in the plot were not to suppose that 
 they would fare worse than the rest; for he had not 
 come thither to destroy either the city or any of her 
 citizens. In this spirit he had made the proclamation 
 to those who had taken refuge with the Athenians, and 
 he thought none the worse of them for being their friends; 
 when they had a similar experience of the Lacedae¬ 
 monians their attachment to them would be still greater, 
 for they would recognise their superior honesty; they 
 were only afraid of them now because they did not know 
 them. They must all make up their minds to be faith¬ 
 ful allies, and expect henceforward to be held responsible 
 if they offended; but in the past the Lacedaemonians 
 had not been wronged by them ; on the contrary, it was 
 they who had been wronged by a power too great for 
 them, and were to be excused if they had opposed him. 
 
 With these words he encouraged the citizens. On the 
 expiration of the truce he made his intended attack upon 
 Lecythus. The Athenians defended themselves from 
 the fortress, which was weak, and from some houses 
 a Cp. iv. 85-87. 
 
 Y 
 
 IV. 
 
 nians to 
 surrender. 
 At their 
 request 
 he grants 
 them a 
 short truce. 
 He ad¬ 
 dresses 
 pacific 
 words to 
 the people 
 of ToronY 
 
 115- 
 
 The fall of 
 a wooden 
 tower 
 frightens 
 the Athe- 
 
322 TAKING OF LECYTHUS. 
 
 IV. which had battlements. For a whole day they repulsed 
 nians.jvho the assault; but on the morrow an engine was brought 
 ships. against them, from which the Lacedaemonians proposed 
 to throw fire upon the wooden bulwarks. Just as the 
 army was drawing near the wall, the Athenians raised 
 a wooden tower upon the top of a building at a point 
 where the approach was easiest and where they thought 
 that the enemy would be most likely to apply the 
 engine. To this tower they carried up numerous jars 
 and casks of water and great stones; and many men 
 mounted upon it. Suddenly the- building, being too 
 heavily weighted, fell in with a loud crash. This only an¬ 
 noyed and did not much alarm the Athenians who were 
 near and saw what had happened, but the rest were ter¬ 
 rified, and their fright was the greater in proportion as 
 they were further off. They thought that the place had 
 been taken at that spot, and fled as fast as they could to 
 the sea where their ships lay. 
 
 116. Brasidas witnessed the accident and observed that 
 Brasidas they were abandoning the battlements. He at once 
 fort of rushed forward with his army, captured the fort, and 
 and y puts S to P ut t° death all whom he found in it. Thus the Athe- 
 death those n i ans we re driven out; and in their ships of war and 
 found in it. other vessels crossed over to Pallene. There happened 
 to be in Lecythus a temple of Athene ; and when Brasi¬ 
 das was about to storm the place he had made a pro¬ 
 clamation that he who first mounted the wall should 
 receive thirty minae a ; but now, believing that the cap¬ 
 ture had been effected by some more than human power, 
 he gave the thirty minae to the Goddess for the service 
 of the temple, and then pulling down Lecythus and 
 clearing the ground, he consecrated the whole place. 
 The rest of this winter he spent in settling the adminis¬ 
 tration of the towns which he already held, and in con¬ 
 certing measures against the rest. At the end of the 
 winter ended the eighth year of the war. 
 
 11 7. Early in the following spring the Lacedaemonians and 
 
 a About £ 122. 
 
 QW 
 
wo 
 
 TRUCE BETWEEN ATHENS AND LACEDAEMON. 323 
 
 .c. 423. Athenians made a truce for a year. The Athenians IV. 
 
 1. 89, 2. , j . J 
 
 hoped to prevent Brasidas from gaining over any more The Athe- 
 
 of their allies for the present; the interval would give cause they 
 them leisure for preparation ; and hereafter, if it was for henSve^" 
 their interest, they might come to a general understand- Rowing 
 ing. The Lacedaemonians had truly divined the fears success of 
 of the Athenians, and thought that, having enjoyed an the Lace- 
 intermission of trouble and hardship, they would be becauise ianS 
 more willing to make terms, restore the captives taken 
 in the island, and conclude a durable peace. Their main thecaptives, 
 
 , . . make peace 
 
 object was to recover their men while the good-fortune for a year, 
 of Brasidas lasted ; on the other hand, they feared that, 
 if he continued in his successful career and established a 
 balance between the contending powers, they might still 
 be deprived of them. a And the loss would not be com¬ 
 pensated by their equality with the enemy or by the 
 prospect of victory a . So they made a truce for them¬ 
 selves and their allies in the following terms:— 
 
 ‘ I. Concerning the temple and oracle of the Pythian 118. 
 Apollo, it seems good to us that any one who will Terms of 
 
 . peace. 
 
 shall ask counsel thereat without fraud and without 
 fear, according to his ancestral customs. To this we, 
 the Lacedaemonians and their allies here present, agree, 
 and we will send heralds to the Boeotians and Phocians, 
 and do our best to gain their assent likewise. 
 
 £ IL Concerning the treasures of the God, we will take 
 measures for the detection of evil-doers, both you and 
 we, according to our ancestral customs, and any one else 
 who will, according to his ancestral customs, proceeding 
 always with right and equity. Thus it seems good to 
 the Lacedaemonians and their allies in respect of these 
 matters. 
 
 * III. It further seems good to the Lacedaemonians 
 and their allies that, if the Athenians consent to a 
 truce, either party shall remain within his own territory, 
 
 a Or, ‘ And although they would then be fighting on an equality 
 with the Athenians, the final victory would still be doubtful.’ 
 
 Y 2 
 
3 2 4 
 
 TERMS OF TRUCE. 
 
 IV. retaining what he has. The Athenians at Coryphasium 
 shall keep within the hills of Buphras and Tomeus. 
 They shall remain at Cythera a , but shall not communi¬ 
 cate with the Lacedaemonian confederacy, neither we 
 with them nor they with us. The Athenians who are 
 in Nisaea b and Minoa c shall not cross the road which 
 leads from the gates of the temple of Nisus to the temple 
 of Poseidon, and from the temple of Poseidon goes direct 
 to the bridge leading to Minoa ; neither shall the Mega- 
 rians and their allies cross this road; the Athenians shall 
 hold the island which they have taken, neither party com¬ 
 municating with the . other. They shall also hold what 
 they now hold at Troezen d , according to the agreement 
 concluded between the Athenians and Troezenians. 
 
 # IV. At sea the Lacedaemonians and their allies may 
 sail along their own coasts and the coasts of the con¬ 
 federacy, not in ships of war, but in any other rowing 
 vessel whose burden does not exceed five hundred 
 talents e . 
 
 ‘V. There shall be a safe-conduct both by sea and 
 land for a herald, with envoys and any number of at¬ 
 tendants which may be agreed upon, passing to and fro 
 between Peloponnesus and Athens, to make arrange¬ 
 ments about the termination of the war and about the 
 arbitration of disputed points. 
 
 £ VI. While the truce lasts neither party, neither we 
 nor you, shall receive deserters, either bond or free. 
 
 f VII. And we will give satisfaction to you and you 
 shall give satisfaction to us according to our ancestral 
 customs, and determine disputed points by arbitration 
 and not by arms. 
 
 ‘ These things seem good to us, the Lacedaemonians, 
 and to our allies. But if you deem any other condition 
 more just or honourable, go to Lacedaemon and explain 
 your views ; neither the Lacedaemonians nor their allies 
 will reject any just claim which you may prefer. 
 
 a Cp. iv. 53, 54. b Cp. iv. 69. c Cp. iii. 51. 
 
 d Cp. iv. 45. e About 12 tons. 
 
 O td 
 
PROVISION FOR A PERMANENT PEACE. 325 
 
 B.C. 423. 
 01. 89, 2. 
 
 c And we desire you, as you desire us, to send envoys IV. 
 invested with full powers. 
 
 c This truce shall be for a year.’ 
 
 The Athenian people passed the following decree. During the 
 The prytanes were of the tribe Acamantis, Phaenippus heralds^ 
 was the registrar, Niciades was the president. Laches are^pass 5 
 moved that c a truce be concluded on the terms to which to and fro 
 
 and discuss 
 
 the Lacedaemonians and their allies had consented ; and the terms 
 might it be for the best interests of the Athenian people ! 5 maneru" 
 Accordingly the assembly agreed that ‘ the truce shall peace- 
 last for a year, beginning from this day, being the four¬ 
 teenth day of the month Elaphebolion a . During the year 
 of truce ambassadors and heralds are to go from one 
 state to another and discuss proposals for the termination 
 of the war. The generals and prytanes shall proceed to 
 hold another assembly, at which the people shall discuss, 
 first of all, the question of peace, whatever proposal the 
 Lacedaemonian embassy may offer about the termina¬ 
 tion of the war. The embassies now present shall bind 
 themselves on the spot, in the presence of the assembly, 
 to abide by the truce just made for a year.’ 
 
 To these terms the Lacedaemonians assented, and 119. 
 they and their allies took oath to the Athenians and F 0 ™ 1 * 1 . 
 
 J ratification 
 
 their allies on the twelfth day of the Spartan month of the truce. 
 
 Gerastius. Those who formally ratified the truce were, 
 on behalf of Lacedaemon, Taurus the son of Echetimi- 
 das, Athenaeus the son of Pericleidas, Philocharidas the 
 son of Eryxidaidas; of Corinth, Aeneas the son of Ocytus, 
 Euphamidas the son of Aristonymus ; of Sicyon, Damo- 
 timus the son of Naucrates, Onasimus the son of Mega- 
 cles ; of Megara, Nicasus the son of Cecalus, Menecrates 
 the son of Amphidorus ; of Epidaurus, Amphias the son 
 of Eupaidas; and on behalf of Athens, Nicostratus the 
 son of Diitrephes, Nicias the son of Niceratus, Autocles 
 the son of Tolmaeus. Such were the terms of the armis¬ 
 tice ; during its continuance fresh negotiations for a final 
 peace were constantly carried on. 
 
 a March—April. 
 
IV. 
 
 120 . 
 
 Meanwhile 
 Scione 
 revolts. 
 Brasidas 
 sails thither 
 by night in 
 a small 
 boat, and 
 having 
 summoned 
 the citizens, 
 warmly 
 praises 
 their con¬ 
 duct. 
 
 I 2 I. 
 
 Honours 
 showered 
 on Brasidas. 
 He enters 
 into com¬ 
 munication 
 with Mende 
 and Poti- 
 daea. 
 
 326 SCIONE RECEIVES BRASIDAS. 
 
 While in the course of the negotiations the Athenian 
 and Lacedaemonian envoys were passing to and fro, 
 Scione, a town of Pallene, revolted from the Athenians 
 and joined Brasidas. The Scionaeans, according to their 
 own account, sprang originally from Pellene in Pelopon¬ 
 nesus, but their ancestors returning from Troy were 
 carried by the storm which the Achaean fleet encoun¬ 
 tered to Scione, where they took up their abode. Brasi¬ 
 das, when he heard of the revolt, sailed thither by night, 
 sending before him a friendly trireme, while he himself 
 followed at some distance in a small boat, thinking that 
 if he met any vessel, not a trireme, larger than the boat, 
 the trireme would protect him a , while if another trireme 
 of equal strength came up, it would fall, not upon the 
 boat, but upon the larger vessel, and in the meantime he 
 would be able to save himself. He succeeded in crossing, 
 and having summoned a meeting of the Scionaeans, he 
 repeated what he had said at Acanthus and Torone, 
 adding that their conduct was deserving of the highest 
 praise; for at a time when the Athenians were holding 
 Potidaea and the isthmus of Pallene, and they, being cut 
 off from the mainland, were as defenceless as if they had 
 been islanders, they had taken the side of liberty un¬ 
 bidden. They were not such cowards as to wait until 
 they were compelled to do what was obviously for their 
 own interest; and this was a sufficient proof that they 
 would endure like men any hardships, however great, if 
 only their aspirations could be realised. He should 
 reckon them the truest and most loyal friends of the 
 Lacedaemonians, and pay them the highest honour. 
 
 The Scionaeans were inspirited by his words ; and one 
 and all, even those who had previously been against 
 the movement, took courage and determined to bear 
 cheerfully the burdens of the war. They received 
 Brasidas with honour, and in the name of the city 
 crowned him with a golden crown as the liberator of 
 
 a Reading avrC ; or, reading avrr], ‘ the mere presence of the 
 trireme would protect him.’ 
 
 CQO 
 
EFFECT OF THE TRUCE IN CHALCIDICE . 327 
 
 B.C 423. 
 01. 89, 2. 
 
 Hellas ; many too, in token of their personal admiration, 
 placed garlands on his head, and congratulated him, as 
 if he had been a victor in the games. For the present 
 he left a small garrison with them and returned, but 
 soon afterwards again crossed the sea with a larger army, 
 being desirous, now that he had the help of the Scio- 
 naeans, to attempt Mende and Potidaea ; he made sure 
 that the Athenians would follow him with their ships to 
 Pallene, which they would consider an island ; and he 
 wished to anticipate them. Moreover he had entered 
 into negotiations with these cities, and had some hope 
 of their being betrayed to him. 
 
 But before he had executed his intentions, a trireme 
 arrived conveying the ambassadors who went round to 
 proclaim the truce, Aristonymus from Athens, and 
 Athenaeus from Lacedaemon. His army then returned 
 to Torone, and the truce was formally announced to 
 him. All the allies of the Lacedaemonians in Chalcidice 
 agreed to the terms. Aristonymus the Athenian as¬ 
 sented generally, but finding on a calculation of the 
 days that the Scionaeans had revolted after the con¬ 
 clusion of the truce, refused to admit them. Brasidas 
 insisted that they were in time, and would not surrender 
 the city. Whereupon Aristonymus despatched a mes¬ 
 sage to Athens. The Athenians were ready at once 
 to make an expedition against Scione. The Lacedae¬ 
 monians, however, sent an embassy to them and pro¬ 
 tested that such a step would be a breach of the truce. 
 They laid claim to the place, relying on the testimony 
 of Brasidas, and proposed to have the matter decided 
 by arbitration. But the Athenians, instead of risking 
 an arbitration, wanted to send an expedition instantly; 
 for they were exasperated at discovering that even the 
 islanders were now daring to revolt from them, in a 
 futile reliance on the Lacedaemonian power by land. 
 The greater right was on their side ; for the truth was 
 that the Scionaeans had revolted two days after the 
 truce was made. They instantly carried a resolution, 
 
 IV. 
 
 122 . 
 
 Meanwhile 
 he is 
 
 stopped in 
 his career 
 by the 
 announce¬ 
 ment of the 
 truce, which 
 had really 
 been made 
 before the 
 revolt of 
 Scione. 
 Brasidas 
 refuses to 
 give the 
 place up. 
 Fury of the 
 Athenians. 
 
328 
 
 REVOLT OF MENDE . 
 
 IV. moved by Cleon, to destroy Scione and put the citizens 
 to the sword ; and, while abstaining from hostilities else¬ 
 where, they prepared to carry out their intentions. 
 
 123. In the meantime Mende, a city of Pallene and an 
 Brasidas Eretrian colony, revolted from them. Brasidas felt justi- 
 Mendaeans tied in receiving the Mendaeans, although, when they 
 declaration came to him, the peace had unmistakably been declared, 
 of the truce, because there were certain points in which he too 
 
 charged the Athenians with violating the treaty. His 
 attitude was encouraging to them ; they saw his zeal 
 in the cause, which they likewise inferred from his 
 unwillingness to hand over Scione to the Athenians. 
 Moreover the persons who negotiated with him were few 
 in number, and having once begun, would not give up 
 their purpose. For they feared the consequences of 
 detection, and therefore compelled the multitude to act 
 contrary to their own wishes. When the Athenians heard 
 of the revolt they were more angry than ever, and made 
 preparations against both cities. Brasidas, in expectation 
 of their attack, conveyed away the wives and children 
 of the Scionaeans and Mendaeans to Olynthus in Chal- 
 cidice, and sent over five hundred Peloponnesian hop- 
 lites and three hundred Chalcidian targeteers, under the 
 sole command of Polydamidas, to their aid. The two 
 cities concerted measures for their defence against the 
 Athenians, who were expected shortly to arrive. 
 
 124. Brasidas and Perdiccas now joined their forces, and 
 Brasidas made a second expedition to Lyncus against Arrhibaeus. 
 diccasagain Perdiccas led his own Macedonian army and a force 
 country of hoplites supplied by the Hellenic inhabitants of 
 Arrhibaeus the country. Brasidas, beside the Peloponnesians who 
 
 and defeat J 1 r 
 
 his army, remained with him, had under his command a body of 
 Chalcidians from Acanthus and other cities, which sup¬ 
 plied as many troops as they severally could. The 
 entire heavy-armed Hellenic forces numbered about 
 three thousand ; the Chalcidian and Macedonian cavalry 
 nearly a thousand, and there was also a great multitude 
 of barbarians. They entered the territory of Arrhibaeus, 
 
 o w 
 
O pi 
 
 IV. 
 
 PANIC IN THE ARMY OF PERDICCAS. 329 
 
 ^89 2 2 anC ^ ^ ere ^ n( ^i n §‘ the Lyncestians ready for battle, they 
 took up a position in face of them. The infantry of the 
 two armies was stationed upon two opposite hills, and 
 between them was a plain, into which the cavalry of both 
 first descended and fought. Then the Lyncestian heavy¬ 
 armed troops began to advance from the hill, and form¬ 
 ing a junction with their cavalry, offered battle. Brasidas 
 and Perdiccas now drew out their army and charged ; 
 the Lyncestians were put to flight and many slain ; the 
 rest escaped to the high ground, and there remained 
 inactive. The conquerors raised a trophy, and waited 
 for two or three days expecting the arrival of some 
 Illyrians whom Perdiccas had hired. Then Perdiccas 
 wanted, instead of sitting idle, to push on against the 
 villages of Arrhibaeus, but Brasidas was anxious about 
 Mende, and apprehensive that the Athenians might sail 
 thither and do some mischief before he returned. The 
 Illyrians had not appeared ; and for both reasons he was 
 more disposed to retreat than to advance. 
 
 But while they were disputing, the news arrived that 125. 
 the Illyrians had just betrayed Perdiccas and joined Meanwhile 
 
 aim 1 lit 11 J some Illy- 
 
 Arrhibaeus, whereupon they both resolved to retreat; rians who 
 for they were afraid of the Illyrians, who are a nation hMby 1 
 of warriors. Owing to the dispute nothing had been ^^Arrhi- 
 ■ determined respecting the time of their departure. Night ^ us - 
 came on, and the Macedonians and the mass of the treachery 
 barbarians were instantly seized with one of those un- panicTand 
 accountable panics to which great armies are liable a . the 
 
 They fancied that the Illyrians were many times their Perd iccas. 
 real number, and that they were close at their heels; 
 so, suddenly betaking themselves to flight, they hastened 
 homewards. And they compelled Perdiccas, when he 
 understood the state of affairs, which at first he did not, 
 to go away without seeing Brasidas, for the two armies 
 were encamped at a considerable distance from one 
 another. At dawn Brasidas, finding that Arrhibaeus 
 and the Illyrians were coming on and that the Mace- 
 a Cp. vii. 80 med. 
 
SPEECH OF BRASIDAS. 
 
 The Illy¬ 
 rians 
 pursue. 
 Brasidas 
 m encourages 
 his troops: 
 You are 
 few against 
 many, but 
 so you are 
 at home; 
 and you are 
 fighting 
 against 
 barbarians. 
 Do not be 
 frightened 
 by their 
 outlandish 
 cries and 
 gestures. 
 They make 
 a vain 
 flourish but 
 have no 
 discipline, 
 and, if 
 withstood 
 quietly, 
 retreat. 
 
 donians had already decamped, resolved to follow them. 
 So he formed his hoplites into a compact square, and 
 placed his light-armed troops in the centre. He selected 
 the youngest of his soldiers to run out upon the enemy 
 at whatever point the attack might be made. He himself 
 proposed during the retreat to take his post in the rear 
 with three hundred chosen men, meaning to stop the fore¬ 
 most of his assailants and beat them off. Before the 
 Illyrians came up he exhorted his soldiers, as far as the 
 shortness of the time permitted, in the following words:— 
 
 ‘ Did I not suspect, men of Peloponnesus, that you 
 may be terrified because you have been deserted by 
 your companions and are assailed by a host of bar¬ 
 barians, I should think only of encouraging and not 
 of instructing you a . But now that we are left alone in 
 the face of numerous enemies, I shall endeavour in a few 
 words to impress upon you the main points which it con¬ 
 cerns you to be informed of and to remember. For you 
 ought to fight like men not merely when you happen to 
 have allies present, but because courage is native to you; 
 nor should you fear any number of foreign troops. 
 Remember that in the cities from which you come, 
 not the many govern the few, but the few govern the 
 many, and have acquired their supremacy simply by 
 successful fighting. Your enemies are barbarians, and ‘ 
 you in your inexperience fear them. But you ought 
 to know, from your late conflicts with the Macedonian 
 portion of them b —and any estimate which I can form, 
 or account of them which I receive from others, would 
 lead me to infer—that they will not prove so very formid¬ 
 able. An enemy often has weak points which wear the 
 appearance of strength; and these, when their nature is 
 explained, encourage rather than frighten their oppo¬ 
 nents. As, on the other hand, where an army has a real 
 advantage, the adversary who is the most ignorant is 
 also the most foolhardy. The Illyrians, to those who 
 have no experience of them, do indeed at first sight 
 a Cp. iv. 17 med.; iv. 95 init.; v. 69 fin. b Cp. iv. 124 med. 
 
 o w 
 
CQO 
 
 REPULSE OF THE BARBARIANS. 331 
 
 .c. 423. present a threatening aspect. The spectacle of their IV. 
 
 L 89 ' 2 ’ numbers is terrible, their cries are intolerable, and 
 the brandishing of their spears in the air has a 
 menacing effect. But in action they are not the men 
 they look, if their opponents will only stand their 
 ground ; for they have no regular order, and therefore 
 are not ashamed of leaving any post in which they 
 are hard pressed ; to fly and to advance being alike 
 honourable, no imputation can be thrown on their 
 courage. When every man is his own master in battle 
 he will readily find a decent excuse for saving himself. 
 
 They clearly think that to frighten us at a safe distance 
 is a better plan than to meet us hand to hand ; else why 
 do they shout instead of fighting ? You may easily see 
 that all the terrors with which you have invested them 
 are in reality nothing; they do but startle the sense of 
 sight and hearing. If you repel their tumultuous onset, 
 and, when opportunity offers, withdraw again in good 
 order, keeping your ranks, you will sooner arrive at a 
 place of safety, and will also learn the lesson that mobs 
 like these, if an adversary withstand their first attack, do 
 but threaten at a distance and make a flourish of valour, 
 although if he yields to them they are quick enough to 
 show their courage in following at his heels when there 
 is no danger.’ 
 
 Brasidas, having addressed his army, began to retreat. 127. 
 Whereupon the barbarians with loud noise and in great The I1] y- 
 
 1 nans, find- 
 
 disorder pressed hard upon him, supposing that he was mg that 
 flying, and that they could overtake and destroy his ^Tmpres 6 - 
 troops. But, wherever they attacked, the soldiers ap- ^passorT 
 pointed for the purpose ran out and met them, and the border. 
 Brasidas himself with his chosen men received their 
 charge. Thus the first onset of the barbarians met with 
 a resistance which surprised them, and whenever they 
 renewed the attack the Lacedaemonians received and 
 repelled them again, and when they ceased, proceeded 
 with their march. Thereupon the greater part of the 
 barbarians abstained from attacking Brasidas and his 
 
33 2 
 
 PERDICCAS AND BRASIDAS. 
 
 IV. Hellenes in the open country; but leaving a certain 
 number to follow and harass them, they ran on after the 
 fugitive Macedonians and killed any with whom they 
 fell in. They then secured beforehand the narrow pass 
 between two hills which led into the country of Arrhi- 
 baeus, knowing that this was the only path by which 
 Brasidas could retreat. And as he was approaching the 
 most dangerous point of the defile they began to sur¬ 
 round him in the hope of cutting him off. 
 
 128. Perceiving their intention, he told his three hundred to 
 Brasidas leave their ranks and run every man as fast as he could 
 them,'and to the top of one of the hills, being the one which he 
 nofurthen thought the barbarians would be most likely to occupy; 
 111-feeiing an d before a larger number of them could come up and 
 
 increases 0 _ r 
 
 between surround them, to dislodge those who were already there a . 
 and Per- They accordingly attacked and defeated them ; and so 
 diccas. the main body of his army more easily reached the 
 summit; for the barbarians, seeing their comrades de¬ 
 feated and driven from the high ground, took alarm; 
 they considered too that the enemy were already on the 
 borders of the country, and had got away from them, 
 and therefore followed no further. Brasidas had now 
 gained the high ground and could march unmolested ; 
 on the same day he arrived at Arnissa, which is in the 
 dominion of Perdiccas. The soldiers were enraged at 
 the hasty retreat of the Macedonians, and when they 
 came upon carts of theirs drawn by oxen, or any baggage 
 which had been dropped in the flight, as was natural in a 
 retreat made in a panic and by night, they of themselves 
 loosed the oxen and slaughtered them, and appropriated 
 the baggage. From that time forward Perdiccas regarded 
 Brasidas in the light of a foe, and conceived a new hatred 
 of the Peloponnesians, which was not a natural feeling in 
 an enemy of the Athenians. Nevertheless, disregarding 
 his own nearest interests, he took steps to make terms 
 with the one and get rid of the other. 
 
 Adopting with Poppo the correction enovras. 
 
 Odd 
 
CQO 
 
 SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF MENDE. 333 
 
 .c. 423. Brasidas returned from Macedonia to Torone, and IV. 
 
 1,89 ' 2 ‘when he arrived there found the Athenians already 129. 
 in possession of Mende. Thinking it now too late to Nicias at- 
 cross over to Pallene and assist Mende and Scione, he takeMendfe, 
 remained quiet and guarded Torone. While he was but fails ' 
 engaged with the Lyncestians, the Athenians, having 
 completed their preparations, had sailed against Mende 
 and Scione with fifty ships, of which ten were Chian, 
 conveying a thousand hoplites of their own, six hundred 
 archers, a thousand Thracian mercenaries, and targeteers 
 furnished by their allies in the neighbourhood. They 
 were under the command of Nicias the son of Niceratus, 
 and Nicostratus the son of Diitrephes. Sailing from 
 Potidaea and putting in near the temple of Poseidon 
 they marched against the Mendaeans. Now they and 
 three hundred Scionaeans who had come to their aid, 
 and their Peloponnesian auxiliaries, seven hundred hop¬ 
 lites in all, with Polydamidas their commander, had just 
 encamped outside the city on a steep hill. Nicias, 
 taking with him for the assault a hundred and twenty 
 Methonaean light-armed troops, sixty select Athenian 
 hoplites and all the archers, made an attempt to ascend 
 the hill by a certain pathway, but he was wounded and 
 failed to carry the position Nicostratus with the re¬ 
 mainder of his troops approaching the hill, which was 
 hard of access, by another and more circuitous route was 
 thrown into utter confusion, and the whole army of the 
 Athenians was nearly defeated. So on this day the 
 Athenians, finding that the Mendaeans and their allies 
 refused to give way, retreated and encamped; and when 
 night came on, the Mendaeans likewise returned to the 
 city. 
 
 On the following day the Athenians sailed round to 130. 
 the side of Mende looking towards Scione ; they took the Soon, in con- 
 
 1 • , sequence of 
 
 suburb, and during the whole of that day devastated the internal 
 
 country. No one came out to meet them ; for a division f^piace 
 
 had arisen in the city, and on the following night the [Viands 
 
 three hundred Scionaeans returned home. On the next of the 
 
 Athenians. 
 
334 
 
 SIEGE OF SCIONE. 
 
 IV. 
 
 The Pelo¬ 
 ponnesians 
 are shut 
 up in the 
 citadel. 
 
 131 . 
 
 The 
 
 Athenians, 
 
 blockade 
 
 day Nicias with half his army went as far as the Scio- 
 naean frontier and devastated the country on his march, 
 while Nicostratus with the other half sat down before the 
 upper gates of Mende, out of which the road leads to 
 Potidaea. In this part of the city within the walls the 
 Mendaeans and their allies chanced to have their arms 
 deposited, and Polydamidas, arraying his forces in order 
 of battle, was just exhorting the Mendaeans to go forth. 
 Some one of the popular faction answered in the heat of 
 party that he would not go out, and that he did not care 
 to fight, but no sooner had he uttered the words than he 
 was seized by the Peloponnesian commander and roughly 
 handled. Whereupon the people lost patience, caught up 
 their arms, and made a furious rush upon the Pelopon¬ 
 nesians and the opposite party who were in league with 
 them. They soon put them to flight, partly because the 
 onslaught was sudden, and also because the gates were 
 thrown open to the Athenians, which greatly terrified 
 them. For they thought that the attack upon them was 
 premeditated. All the Peloponnesians who were not 
 killed on the spot fled to the citadel, which they had 
 previously kept in their own hands. Nicias had now 
 returned and was close to the city, and the Athenians 
 rushed into Mende with their whole force. As the 
 gates had been opened without any previous capitula¬ 
 tion they plundered the town as if it had been stormed ; 
 and even the lives of the citizens were with difficulty 
 saved by the efforts of the generals. The Mendaeans 
 were then told that they were to retain their former 
 constitution, and bring to trial among themselves any 
 whom they thought guilty of the revolt. At the same 
 time the Athenians blockaded the garrison in the Acro¬ 
 polis by a wall extending to the sea on either side and 
 established a guard. Having thus secured Mende, they 
 proceeded against Scione. 
 
 The inhabitants of Scione and the Peloponnesian 
 garrison had come out to meet them and occupied a 
 steep hill in front of the city. The hill had to be taken 
 
 Otd 
 
PERDICCAS REJOINS THE ATHENIANS . 335 
 
 B.C. 423. 
 Gl. 89, 2. 
 
 by the Athenians before they could effect the circum- IV. 
 vallation of the place. So they made a furious attack ^ on< ^- 
 and dislodged those who were stationed there a ; they rison g of 
 then encamped, and after raising a trophy, prepared forc^their 
 to invest the city. Soon afterwards, while they were 
 engaged in the work, the Peloponnesian auxiliaries who 
 were besieged in the Acropolis of Mende, forcing their 
 way out by the sea-shore, broke through the watch 
 and came to Scione by night. Most of them eluded 
 the Athenians who were encamped outside, and got into 
 the town. 
 
 While the circumvallation of Scion£ was proceeding, 132. 
 Perdiccas, who, after what had occurred in the retreat Perdiccas 
 from Lyncus, hated Brasidas, sent heralds to the Athe- alliance 
 nian generals, and came to an understanding with them, Atheni'ans. 
 b which without loss of time he took measures to carry J° P rove 
 
 •' his sincerity 
 
 out b . It so happened that Ischagoras the Lacedae- he P uts a 
 
 11 r 1 • sto P to 
 
 monian was then on the eve ot marching with an army the passage 
 to reinforce Brasidas. Perdiccas was told by Nicias that, ponnesian 
 having now made friends with the Athenians, he should 
 give them some evidence of his sincerity. He himself too trough 
 no longer wished the Peloponnesians to find their way 
 into his country. And so by his influence over the Thes¬ 
 salian chiefs, with whom he was always on good terms, 
 he put a stop to the whole expedition ; indeed, the Lace¬ 
 daemonians did not even attempt to obtain the consent 
 of the Thessalians. Nevertheless, Ischagoras, Ameinias, 
 and Aristeus, who had been sent by the Lacedaemonian 
 government to report on the state of affairs, found their 
 way to Brasidas. They brought with them, though con¬ 
 trary to law, certain younger Spartans, intending to make 
 them governors of the cities, instead of leaving the care 
 of them to chance persons. Accordingly Brasidas ap¬ 
 pointed Clearidas the son of Cleonymus governor of 
 
 a Reading ircovras. 
 
 b Or, ‘having commenced negotiations immediately after the 
 retreat’ (cp. iv. 128 fin.); in which case, however, evSvs rore ap^dfxevos 
 and eYiry^az'e rore must refer to different times. 
 
336 CHRYSIS, THE ARGIVE PRIESTESS. 
 
 IV. Amphipolis, and Pasitelidas a the son of Hegesander 
 governor of Torone. 
 
 133. During the same summer the Thebans dismantled the 
 Harshness wa ll of the Thespians, charging them with Athenian 
 tutteofthe tendencies. This was an object which they always had 
 ward^the 10 " ' m view, and now they had their opportunity, because 
 Burning^ ^ ower °f the Thespian army had fallen in the battle 
 the^tempie G f Delium b . During the same summer the temple of 
 at Argos. Here at Argos was burnt down ; Chrysis the priestess 
 had put a light<00 near the sacred garlands, and had then 
 gone to sleep, so that the whole place took fire and was 
 consumed. In her fear of the people she fled that very 
 night to Phlius; and the Argives, as the law provided, 
 appointed another priestess named Phaeinis. Chrysis 
 had been priestess during eight years of the war and half 
 of the ninth when she fled. Towards the close of the 
 summer Scione was completely invested, and the Athe¬ 
 nians, leaving a guard, retired with the rest of their army. 
 
 134 - In the following winter the Athenians and Lacedae- 
 indecisive monians remained inactive, in consequence of the armis- 
 
 action # 
 
 between the tice ; but the Mantineans and the Tegeans with their 
 and Man- respective allies fought a battle at Laodicium in the 
 tmeans. territory of Orestheum ; the victory was disputed. For 
 the troops of both cities defeated the allies on the wing 
 opposed to them, and both erected trophies, and sent 
 spoils to Delphi. The truth is that, although there was 
 considerable slaughter on both sides, and the issue was 
 still undecided when night put an end to the conflict, the 
 Tegeans encamped on the held and at once erected a 
 trophy, while the Mantineans retreated to Bucolium and 
 raised a rival trophy, but afterwards. 
 
 135. At the close of the same winter, towards the beginning 
 Unsuccess- 0 f spring, Brasidas made an attempt on Potidaea. He 
 
 ful attempt i i r 
 
 made by approached the place by night and planted a ladder 
 Pcrtidaea ° n against the walls. Thus far he proceeded undiscovered ; 
 
 a Reading, according to Dobree’s conjecture, UaaiTtYiSav, not 
 ’EmreXldav. Pasitelidas is mentioned, v. 3, as governor of Torone. 
 b Cp. iv. 96 med. 
 
NIGHT ATTEMPT UPON POTIDAEA . 337 
 
 B.C. 423. 
 01. 89, 2. 
 
 for the ladder was fixed at a point which the sentinel IV. 
 who was passing on the bell had just quitted, and before 
 he had returned to his post. But Brasidas had not yet 
 mounted the ladder when he was detected by the gar¬ 
 rison : whereupon he withdrew his army in haste without 
 waiting for the dawn. So the winter ended, and with 
 it the ninth year in the Peloponnesian War of which 
 Thucydides wrote the history. 
 
BOOK V. 
 
 V. i. WITH the return of summer the year of the truce ex- 
 
 Expiration pi re d but hostilities were not resumed until after the 
 of the truce r . 
 
 and sub- Pythian games. During the armistice the Athenians 
 resumption removed the Delians from Delos; they considered them 
 ties!° Stlll ~ impure and unworthy of their sacred character by reason 
 Se cond 0 f a cer tain ancient offence. The island had been puri- 
 
 punncation . r 
 
 of Delos, fied before, when they took the dead out of their sepul¬ 
 chres as I have already narrated a ; but this purification, 
 which seemed sufficient at the time, was now thought 
 unsatisfactory because the inhabitants had been suffered 
 to remain. Pharnaces gave to the Delians an asylum 
 at Adramyttium in Asia, and whoever chose went and 
 settled there. 
 
 2 . When the armistice was over, Cleon, having obtained 
 Cleon sails the consent of the people, sailed on an expedition to the 
 dic&, and Chalcidian cities with thirty ships conveying twelve 
 fngat tOUCh " hundred Athenian hoplites, three hundred Athenian 
 Sciondi horsemen, and numerous allies. Touching first at Scione 
 Toron<b. (which was still blockaded), and taking from thence some 
 hoplites of the besieging force, he sailed into the so- 
 called Colophonian port, which was near the city of 
 Torone ; there learning from deserters that Brasidas was 
 not in Torone, and that the garrison was too weak to 
 resist, he marched with his army against the town, and 
 sent ten ships to sail round into the harbour. First he 
 a Cp. i. 8 init.; iii. 104 init.; v. 32 init.; viii. 108 med. 
 
 B.C. 422. 
 01. 89, 3. 
 
o w 
 
 CAPTURE OF TORONE. 
 
 339 
 
 ,c. 422. came to the new line of wall which Brasidas had raised V. 
 
 L 89 ’ 3 * when, wanting to take in the suburbs, he broke down a 
 part of the old wall and made the whole city one. 
 
 But Pasitelidas, the Lacedaemonian governor, and the 3 * 
 garrison under his command came to the defence of this While Pasi_ 
 
 tenaas is 
 
 quarter of the town, and fought against their assailants, defending 
 who pressed them hard. Meanwhile the Athenian fleet theAthe- 
 was sailing round into the harbour, and Pasitelidas feared satis £to 
 that the ships would take the city before he could return harbour 
 and defend it, and that the new fortifications would be town is 
 captured and himself in them. So he left the suburb Betrayal of 
 and ran back into the city. But the enemy were too Panactum - 
 quick; the Athenians from the ships having taken 
 Toron£ before he arrived ; while their infantry followed 
 close upon him, and in a moment dashed in along with 
 him at the breach in the old wall. Some of the Pelo¬ 
 ponnesians and Toronaeans were slain upon the spot, 
 others were captured, and among them Pasitelidas the 
 governor. Brasidas was on his way to the relief of 
 Torone at the time, but, hearing that the place was taken, 
 he stopped and returned; he was within four miles and 
 a-half at the time of the capture. Cleon and the Athe¬ 
 nians erected two trophies, one at the harbour and the 
 other near the new wall. The women and children were 
 made slaves; the men of Torone and any other Chal- 
 cidians, together with the Peloponnesians, numbering in 
 all seven hundred, were sent to Athens. The Pelopon¬ 
 nesian prisoners were liberated at the peace which was 
 concluded shortly afterwards; the rest were exchanged 
 man for man against the prisoners whom the Olynthians 
 had made. About the same time Panactum, a fortress 
 on the Athenian frontier, was betrayed to the Boeotians. 
 
 Cleon, putting a garrison into Torone, sailed round 
 Mount Athos, intending to attack Amphipolis. 
 
 About the same time three envoys, of whom one was 4. 
 Phaeax the son of Erasistratus, were sent by the Athe- 
 nians with two ships to Italy and Sicily. After the The oii- 
 general peace and the withdrawal of the Athenians from fhehdp^f 
 
ATHENIAN EMBASSY TO SICILY. 
 
 V. 
 
 the Syracu¬ 
 sans drive 
 out the 
 people. 
 They then 
 settle in 
 Syracuse, 
 but some of 
 them soon 
 grow dis¬ 
 contented 
 and return 
 home, when 
 they are 
 joined by 
 the people. 
 They fight 
 against 
 Syracuse. 
 The Athe¬ 
 nians try to 
 combine 
 Sicily 
 against 
 Syracuse. 
 
 5 - 
 
 The Italian 
 Locrians 
 make a 
 treaty with 
 Athens. 
 
 Sicily a , the Leontines had enrolled many new citizens, B.c. 422. 
 and the people contemplated a redistribution of the land. 18g ’ 3r 
 The oligarchy, perceiving their intention, called in the 
 Syracusans and drove out the people, who separated and 
 wandered up and down the island. The oligarchy then 
 made an agreement with the Syracusans; and, leaving 
 their own city deserted, settled in Syracuse, and received 
 the privileges of citizenship. Not long afterwards some 
 of them grew discontented, and, quitting Syracuse, occu¬ 
 pied a place called Phoceis, which was a part of the 
 town of Leontini, and Brycinniae, a fortress in the Leon- 
 tine territory. Here they were joined by most of the 
 common people who had been previously driven out, and 
 from their strongholds they carried on a continual war¬ 
 fare against Syracuse. It was the report of these events 
 which induced the Athenians to send Phaeax to Sicily. 
 
 He was to warn the Sicilians that the Syracusans were 
 aiming at supremacy, and to unite the allies of Athens, 
 and if possible the other cities, in a war against Syracuse. 
 
 The Athenians hoped that they might thus save the 
 Leontine people. Phaeax succeeded in his mission to 
 the Camarinaeans and Agrigentines, but in Gela he 
 failed, and, convinced that he could not persuade the 
 other states, went no further. Returning by land through 
 the country of the Sicels, and by the way going to Bri- 
 cinniae and encouraging the exiles, he arrived at Catana, 
 where he embarked for Athens. 
 
 On his voyage, both to and from Sicily, he made pro¬ 
 posals of friendship to several of the Italian cities. He 
 also fell in with some Locrian settlers who had been 
 driven out of Messene. After the agreement between 
 the Sicilian towns, a feud had broken out at Messene, 
 and one of the two parties called in the Locrians, who 
 sent some of their citizens to settle there ; thus Messene 
 was held for a time by the Locrians. They were re¬ 
 turning home after their expulsion when Phaeax fell in 
 with them, but he did them no harm ; for the Locrians 
 a Cp. iv. 65 init. 
 
CQO 
 
 CLEON SAILS AGAINST AMPHIPOLIS. 341 
 
 .c. 422. had already agreed with him to enter into a treaty with V. 
 
 ’ 89, 3 * the Athenians. At the general reconciliation of the Sici¬ 
 lians, they alone of the allies had not made peace with 
 Athens. And they would have continued to hold out 
 had they not been constrained by a war with the Itoneans 
 and Melaeans, who were their neighbours and colonists 
 from their city. Phaeax then returned to Athens. 
 
 Cleon had now sailed round from Torone against Am- 6. 
 phipolis, and, making Eion his head-quarters, attacked Cleon 
 Stageirus a , a colony of the Andrians, which he failed to Eion wait- 
 take. He succeeded, however, in storming Galepsus b , refnforce- 
 a Thasian colony. He sent an embassy to Perdiccas, 
 desiring him to come with an army, according to the ascends the 
 terms of the alliance c , and another to Polles, the king of dyiium to 
 the Odomantian Thracians, who was to bring as many reconnoitre * 
 Thracian mercenaries as he could ; he then remained 
 quietly at Eion waiting for reinforcements. Brasidas, 
 hearing of his movements, took up a counter-position on 
 Cerdylium. This is a high ground on the right bank 
 of the river, not far from Amphipolis, belonging to the 
 Argilians. From this spot he commanded a view of the 
 country round, so that Cleon was sure to be seen by him 
 if, as he expected, despising the numbers of his op¬ 
 ponents, he should go up against Amphipolis without 
 waiting for his reinforcements. At the same time he pre¬ 
 pared for a battle, summoning to his side fifteen hundred 
 Thracian mercenaries and the entire forces of the Edo- 
 nians, who were targeteers and horsemen; he had already 
 one thousand Myrcinian and Chalcidian targeteers, in 
 addition to the troops in Amphipolis. His heavy-armed, 
 when all mustered, amounted to nearly two thousand, 
 and he had about three hundred Hellenic cavalry. Of 
 these forces about fifteen hundred were stationed with 
 Brasidas on Cerdylium, and the remainder were drawn 
 up in order of battle under Clearidas in Amphipolis. 
 
 Cleon did nothing for a time, but he was soon com- 7. 
 
 celled to make the movement which Brasidas expected. Feelings of 
 r the soldiery 
 
 a Cp. iv. 88 fin. b Cp. iv. 107 fin. c Cp. iv. 132 init. 
 
342 CLEON LOOKING DOWN UPON AMPHIPOLIS. 
 
 V. For the soldiers were disgusted at their inaction, and B.c. 422. 
 towards drew comparisons between the generals ; what skill and L 8g ' 3 ’ 
 
 Cleon con- . 1 , , , 
 
 trasts enterprise might be expected on the one side, and what 
 Wsown^b ignorance and cowardice on the other. And they re¬ 
 in himself mem hered how unwilling they had been to follow Cleon 
 At length w hen they left Athens. He, observing their murmurs, 
 peiied by and not wanting them to be depressed by too long a 
 mursto” stay in one place, moved onwards. He went to work in 
 ward fhe same confident spirit which had already been suc- 
 
 ascends a cessful at Pylos, and of which the success had given him 
 manding a a high opinion of his own wisdom. That any one would 
 country. e come out to fight with him he never even imagined ; 
 
 he said that he was only going to look at the place. 
 
 If he waited for a larger force, this was not because he 
 thought that there was any risk of his being defeated 
 should he be compelled to fight, but that he might 
 completely surround and storm the city. So he stationed 
 his army upon a steep hill above Amphipolis, whence he 
 surveyed with his own eyes the lake formed by the river 
 Strymon, and the lie of the country on the side to¬ 
 wards Thrace. He thought that he could go away 
 without fighting whenever he pleased. For indeed there 
 was no one to be seen on the walls, nor passing through 
 the gates, which were all closed. He even imagined 
 that he had made a mistake in coming up against the 
 city without siege-engines ; had he brought them he 
 would have taken Amphipolis, for there was no one to 
 prevent him. 
 
 8* No sooner did Brasidas see the Athenians in motion, 
 descends than he himself descended from Cerdylium, and went 
 dyiham er " * nto Amphipolis. He did not go out and draw up 
 Fearing the his forces in order of battle ; he feared too much the 
 onhs°ovm inferiority of his own troops, not in their numbers (which 
 determines were a bout equal to those of the enemy) but in quality; 
 to fail upon f 0 r the Athenian forces were the flower of their army, 
 
 the Athe- c J 
 
 niansintwo and they were supported by the best of the Lemnians 
 detach- 6 and Imbrians. So he determined to employ a manoeuvre, 
 ments. thinking that, if he showed them the real number and 
 
SPEECH OF BRASIDAS . 
 
 343 
 
 B.C. 422. 
 01. 89, 3. 
 
 meagre equipment of his soldiers, he would be less likely V. 
 to succeed than if he came upon them before there had 
 been time to observe him, and when as yet they had no 
 real grounds for their contempt of him. Selecting a 
 hundred and fifty hoplites, and handing over the rest 
 to Clearidas, he resolved to make a sudden attack be¬ 
 fore the Athenians retired, considering that, if their 
 reinforcements should arrive, he might never again have 
 an opportunity of fighting them by themselves. So he 
 called together all his troops, and wishing to encourage 
 them, and explain his plan, spoke as follows :— 
 
 e Men of Peloponnesus, I need not waste words in 9. 
 telling you that we come from a land which has always Weare 
 been brave, and therefore free, and that you are Dorians a , and may 
 and are about to fight with Ionians whom you have ^ bgj t ected 
 beaten again and again. But I must explain to you my 
 plan of attack, lest you should be disheartened at the must under- 
 seeming disproportion of numbers, because we go into plan. my 
 battle not with our whole force but with a handful of men. ^of?theu: 
 Our enemies, if I am not mistaken, despise us; they s u a a d r ^ t ^ nd 
 believe that no one will come out against them, and so retreat 
 they have ascended the hill, where they are busy looking sally’forth 
 about them in disorder, and making but small account of gaL? f then 
 us. Now, he is the most successful general b who discerns |^ ridas 
 most clearly such mistakes when made by his enemies, another, 
 and adapts his attack to the character of his own forces, 
 not always assailing them openly and in regular array, 
 but acting according to the circumstances of the case. 
 
 And the greatest reputation is gained by those strata¬ 
 gems in which a man deceives his enemies most com¬ 
 pletely, and does his friends most service. Therefore 
 while they are still confident and unprepared, and, if 
 I read their intentions aright, are thinking of with¬ 
 drawing rather than of maintaining their ground, while 
 they are off their guard and before they have recovered 
 their presence of mind, I and my men will do our best 
 
 a Cp. i. 124 init.; vi. 77 med.; vii. 5 fin.; viii. 25 med. & fin. 
 
 Cp. iii. 29 fin. 
 
344 
 
 SALLY OF BRASIDAS. 
 
 V. to anticipate their retreat, and will make a rush at the 
 centre of the army. Then, Clearidas, when you see me 
 engaged, and I hope striking panic into them, bring up 
 your troops, the Amphipolitans and the other allies, 
 open the gates suddenly, run out, and lose no time in 
 closing with them. This is the way to terrify them; 
 for reinforcements are always more formidable to an 
 enemy than the troops with which they are already en¬ 
 gaged. Show yourself a brave man and a true Spartan, 
 and do you, allies, follow manfully, remembering that 
 readiness, obedience, and a sense of honour are the 
 virtues of a soldier. To-day you have to choose between 
 freedom and slavery; between the name of Lacedae¬ 
 monian allies, which you will deserve if you are brave, 
 and of servants of Athens. For even if you should be so 
 fortunate as to escape bonds or death, servitude will be 
 your lot, a servitude more cruel than hitherto ; and what 
 is more, you will be an impediment to the liberation of 
 the other Hellenes. Do not lose heart; think of all that 
 is at stake; and I will show you that I can not only 
 advise others, but fight myself.’ 
 
 IO. When Brasidas had thus spoken, he prepared to sally 
 Cleon forth with his own division, and stationed the rest of his 
 
 orders his 
 
 army to army with Clearidas at the so-called Thracian gates, 
 he^s a sud- Ut that they might come out and support him, in ac- 
 auacked by cordance with his instructions. He had been seen 
 brasidas, descending from Cerdylium into Amphipolis, a and then 
 seconded by offering up sacrifice at the temple of Athene within the 
 TheAthe- walls ; for the interior of the city was visible from the 
 routed^ 6 surrounding country. While he was thus employed, a 
 wounded^ re P ort was brought to Cleon, who a had just gone for- 
 mortaiiy ward to reconnoitre, that the whole army of the enemy 
 sia?n Cle ° n could plainly be seen collected inside the town, and that 
 hears^of the the fe et of num erous men and horses ready to come 
 die? 17 and f° rt k were visible under the gate. He went to the spot 
 
 a Or, taking the words <di ravra npaararouros as subordinate to 
 (fiavepov yevopeuov : ( and then offering up sacrifice at the temple of 
 Athene within the walls, for the interior of the city, etc.,. .and making 
 preparations. A report was brought to Cleon, who’ etc. 
 
 O pa 
 
PQQ 
 
 C. 422. 
 • 89, 3. 
 
 DEFEAT AND DEATH OF CLEON. 345 
 
 and saw for himself; but not wishing to hazard a regular V. 
 en g a g emen t until his allies arrived, and thinking he 
 could get away soon enough, he gave a general signal 
 for retreat, at the same time ordering his forces to retire 
 slowly on the left wing, which was the only direction 
 possible, towards Eion. They appeared to linger ; where¬ 
 upon he caused his own right wing to wheel round, and 
 so with his unshielded side exposed to the enemy 
 began to lead off his army. Meanwhile Brasidas, seeing 
 that the Athenians were on the move and that his op¬ 
 portunity was come, said to his companions and to the 
 troops : ‘ These men do not mean to face us ; see how 
 their spears and their heads are shaking ; such behaviour 
 always shows that an army is going to run away. Open 
 me the gates as I ordered, and let us boldly attack them 
 at once.’ Thereupon he went out himself by the gate 
 leading to the palisade and by the first gate of the long 
 wall which was then standing, and ran at full speed 
 straight up the road, where, on the steepest part of the 
 hill, a trophy now stands : he then attacked the centre 
 of the Athenians, who were terrified at his audacity and 
 their own disorder, and put them to flight. Then 
 Clearidas, as he was bidden, sallied forth by the Thra¬ 
 cian gates with his division, and charged the Athenians. 
 
 The sudden attack at both points created a panic among 
 them. Their left wing, which had proceeded some little 
 way along the road towards Eion, was cut off, and 
 instantly fled. They were already in full retreat, and 
 Brasidas was going on to the right wing when he was 
 wounded ; the Athenians did not observe his fall, and 
 those about him carried him off the field. The right 
 wing of the Athenians was more disposed to stand. 
 
 Cleon indeed, who had never intended to remain, fled 
 at once, and was overtaken and slain by a Myrcinian 
 targeteer. But his soldiers rallied where they were on 
 the top of the hill, and repulsed Clearidas two or three 
 times. They did not yield until the Chalcidian and 
 Myrcinian cavalry and the targeteers hemmed them in 
 
346 VICTOR V AND DEATH OF BRAS IDAS. 
 
 V. and put them to flight with a shower of darts. And so 
 the rout became general, and those of the Athenians 
 who were not slain at once in close combat or de¬ 
 stroyed by the Chalcidian horse and the targeteers, 
 hard-pressed and wandering by many paths over the 
 hills, made their way back to Eion. Brasidas was car¬ 
 ried safely by his followers out of the battle into the 
 city. He was still alive, and knew that his army had 
 conquered, but soon afterwards he died. The rest of 
 the army returning with Clearidas from the pursuit, 
 spoiled the dead, and erected a trophy. 
 
 11. Brasidas was buried in the city with public honours 
 Funeral of in front of what is now the Agora. The whole body of 
 TheAmphi- the allies in military array followed him to the grave, 
 give^him the The Amphipolitans enclosed his sepulchre, and to this 
 honours of <-i a y they sacrifice to him as to a hero, and also celebrate 
 founder, games and yearly offerings in his honour. They like- 
 Hagno e n mg wise made him their founder, and dedicated their colony 
 their Teal t° him, pulling down a the buildings which Hagnon had 
 founder. erected a , and obliterating any memorials which might 
 
 have remained to future time of his foundation b . For 
 they considered Brasidas to have been their deliverer, 
 and under the present circumstances the fear of Athens 
 induced them to pay court to their Lacedaemonian allies. 
 That Hagnon should retain the honours of a founder, 
 now that they were enemies of the Athenians, seemed 
 to them no longer in accordance'with their interests, 
 and was repugnant to their feelings. 
 
 They gave back to the Athenians their dead, who 
 numbered about six hundred, while only seven were slain 
 on the other side. For there was no regular engage¬ 
 ment, but an accident led to the battle; and the Athe¬ 
 nians were panic-stricken before it had well begun. 
 After the recovery of the dead the Athenians went 
 home by sea. Clearidas and his companions remained 
 and administered the affairs of Amphipolis. 
 
 12. At the end of the summer, a little before this time, 
 
 a Or, ‘the shrine of Hagnon.’ b Cp. iv. 102 fin. 
 
 ffiO 
 
MO 
 
 CESSATION 01 MILITARY MOVEMENTS. 347 
 
 i C 8 9 42 3 a reinforcement of nine hundred heavy-armed, under the V. 
 
 command of the Lacedaemonian generals Rhamphias, A reinforce- 
 Autocharidas, and Epicydidas, set out for Chalcidice. bytheLace- 
 Coming first to Heraclea in Trachis, they regulated 
 whatever appeared to them to be amiss. Thev were poks 
 staying there when the battle of Amphipolis occurred, at Heraclea, 
 And so the summer came to an end. 
 
 The following winter Rhamphias and his army went 13. 
 as far as Pierium in Thessaly, but as the Thessalians but is not 
 would not let them proceed, and Brasidas, for whom topaS* 
 these reinforcements were intended, was dead, they re- ThSy 
 turned home, thinking that the time for action had gone 
 by. They felt that they were not competent to carry 
 out the great designs of Brasidas, and the Athenians had 
 now left the country defeated. But their chief reason for 
 not proceeding was that the Lacedaemonians, at the time 
 when they left Sparta, were inclined towards peace. 
 
 After the battle of Amphipolis and the return of 14. 
 Rhamphias from Thessaly, neither side undertook any Both the 
 military operations. Both alike were bent on peace. The ^J emans 
 Athenians had been beaten at Delium, and shortly after- moihans" 
 wards at Amphipolis ; and so they had lost that con- alike 
 fidence in their own strength which had indisposed them pointed in 
 to treat at a time when temporary success seemed to no^dS?' 
 make their final triumph certain. They were afraid too peace - 
 that their allies would be elated at their disasters, and 
 that more of them would revolt; they repented that after 
 the affair at Pylos, when they might honourably have done 
 so, they had not come to terms. The Lacedaemonians 
 on the other hand inclined to peace because the course 
 of the war had disappointed their expectations. There 
 was a time when they fancied that, if they only de¬ 
 vastated Attica, they would crush the power of Athens 
 within a few years a ; and yet they had received a blow at 
 Sphacteria such as Sparta had never experienced until 
 then ; their country was continually ravaged from Pylos 
 and Cythera; the Helots were deserting, and they were 
 a Cp. i. 81 fin. 
 
348 MOTIVES OF THE TWO GREAT ROWERS. 
 
 V. always fearing lest those who had not deserted, relying b.c. 422. 
 on the help of those who had, should seize their oppor- 01, 89, 3 * 
 tunity and revolt, as they had done once before. More¬ 
 over, a truce for thirty years which they had made with 
 Argos was on the point of expiring; the Argives were 
 unwilling to renew it unless Cynuria were restored 
 to them, and the Lacedaemonians deemed it impossible 
 to fight against the Argives and Athenians combined. 
 
 They suspected also that some of the Peloponnesian 
 cities would secede and join the Argives, which proved 
 to be the case. 
 
 13. Upon these grounds both governments thought it de- 
 
 The desire sirable to make peace. The Lacedaemonians were the 
 
 daemonians more eager of the two, because they wanted to recover the 
 
 stronger prisoners taken at Sphacteria ; for the Spartans among 
 
 because them were of high rank, and all alike related to them- 
 
 theywantto ° 
 
 recover the selves. They had negotiated for their recovery immedi- 
 pnsoners. after they were taken, but the Athenians, in the hour 
 
 of their prosperity, would not as yet agree to fair terms a . 
 
 After their defeat at Delium, the Lacedaemonians were 
 well aware that they would now be more compliant, and 
 therefore they had at once made a truce for a year, during 
 which the envoys of the two states were to meet and ad- 
 16. vise about a lasting peace. When Athens had received a 
 and S cieon secon d blow at Amphipolis, and Brasidas and Cleon, who 
 for very had been the two greatest enemies of peace,—the one be- 
 
 different . . , , . . . 
 
 reasons had cause the war brought him success and reputation, and the 
 enemies ^ other because he fancied that in quiet times his rogueries 
 BuTnow wou ld be more transparent and his slanders less credible, 
 they are —had fallen in the battle, b the two chief aspirants for po- 
 
 dead, and . 
 
 Nicias and litical power at Athens and Sparta, Pleistoanax b the son 
 f h 1 e 1 two naX> Pausanias, king of the Lacedaemonians, and Nicias the 
 o?therr men son Ni cera t us the Athenian, who had been the most 
 respective fortunate general of his day, became more easrer than 
 
 states, have ° & 
 
 a Cp. iv. 41 fin. 
 
 b Or, omitting oi iv before inaTepa : ‘ these (i. e. Cleon and Bra¬ 
 sidas) being at the time the two great champions for the supremacy 
 of their respective states; Pleistoanax ’ etc. , 
 
NIC/AS AND PLEISTOANAX. 
 
 349 
 
 B.c. 4S2. ever to make an end of the war. Nicias desired, whilst he V. 
 
 1 89 ' 3 ‘ was still successful and held in repute, to preserve his good each a mo _ 
 fortune ; he would have liked to rest from toil, and to give tive for 
 the people rest; and he hoped to leave behind him to endtcfthe 
 other ages the name of a man who in all his life had never war ' 
 brought disaster on the city. He thought that the way 
 to gain his wish was to trust as little as possible to for¬ 
 tune, and to keep out of danger; and that danger would 
 be best avoided by peace. Pleistoanax wanted peace, 
 because his enemies were always stirring up the scruples 
 of the Lacedaemonians against him, and insisting when¬ 
 ever misfortunes came that they were to be attributed to 
 his illegal return from exile. For they accused him and 
 Aristocles his brother of inducing the priestess at 
 Delphi, whenever Lacedaemonian envoys came to en¬ 
 quire of the oracle, constantly to repeat the same 
 answer: ‘ Bring back the seed of the hero son of 
 Zeus from a strange country to your own ; else you 
 will plough with a silver ploughshare: 5 Until, after a 
 banishment of nineteen years, he persuaded the Lace¬ 
 daemonians to bring him home again with dances and 
 sacrifices and such ceremonies as they observed when 
 they first enthroned their kings at the foundation of 
 Lacedaemon. He had been banished on account of 
 his retreat from Attica, when he was supposed to have 
 been bribed a . While in exile at Mount Lycaeum he had 
 occupied a house half within the sacred precinct of Zeus, 
 through fear of the Lacedaemonians. 
 
 He was vexed by these accusations, and thinking that 17. 
 in peace, when there would be no mishaps and the Lace- 
 daemonians would have recovered the captives, he would proceed. 
 
 , , . it Both parties 
 
 himself be less open to attack, whereas in war leading agree to 
 men must always have the misfortunes of the state 
 laid at their door, he was very anxious to come to ^ d a ^ ned 
 terms. Negotiations were commenced during the winter. Only the 
 Towards spring the Lacedaemonians sounded a note retain Pia- 
 of preparation by announcing to the allies that their ^Athl 
 a Cp. i. 114; ii. 21 init. 
 
V. 
 
 nians 
 Nisaea, 
 which had 
 been sur¬ 
 rendered. 
 
 18. 
 
 Terms of 
 the treaty. 
 
 350 CLAIMS URGED ON BOTH SIDES . 
 
 services would be required in the erection of a fort; they 
 thought that the Athenians would thereby be induced 
 to listen to them. At the same time, after many confer¬ 
 ences and many demands urged on both sides, an under¬ 
 standing was at last arrived at that both parties should 
 give up what they had gained by arms. The Athenians, 
 however, were to retain Nisaea, for when they demanded 
 the restoration of Plataea the Thebans protested that 
 they had obtained possession of the place not by force 
 or treachery, but by agreement a ; to which the Athenians 
 rejoined that they had obtained Nisaea in the same 
 manner 15 . The Lacedaemonians then summoned their 
 allies; and although the Boeotians, Corinthians, Eleans, 
 and Megarians were dissatisfied, the majority voted for 
 peace. And so the peace was finally concluded and 
 ratified by oaths and libations, the Lacedaemonians 
 binding themselves to the Athenians and the Athenians 
 to the Lacedaemonians in the following terms :— 
 
 The Athenians and Lacedaemonians and their respec¬ 
 tive allies make peace upon the following terms, to 
 which they swear, each city separately:— 
 
 I. Touching the common temples, any one who pleases 
 may go and sacrifice in them and enquire at them, on 
 behalf either of himself or of the state, according to the 
 custom of his country, both by land and sea, without fear. 
 
 II. The precinct and the temple of Apollo at Delphi 
 and the Delphian people shall be independent, and shall 
 retain their own revenues and their own courts of justice, 
 both for themselves and for their territory, according to 
 their ancestral customs. 
 
 III. The peace between the Athenians and their 
 confederates and the Lacedaemonians and their con¬ 
 federates shall endure fifty years, both by sea and 
 land, without fraud or hurt. 
 
 IV. They shall not be allowed to bear arms to the 
 hurt of one another in any way or manner; neither 
 the Lacedaemonians and their allies against the Athe- 
 
 a Cp. iii. 52 init. b Cp. iv. 69 fin. 
 
 B.C. 42* 
 01. 89, 3. 
 
THE TERMS OF PEACE. 35 1 
 
 B.C. 422. nians and their allies, nor the Athenians and their allies 
 ‘ 89 ' 3 ‘ against the Lacedaemonians and their allies ; and they 
 shall determine any controversy which may arise be¬ 
 tween them by oaths and other legal means in such sort 
 as they shall agree. 
 
 V. The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall restore 
 Amphipolis to the Athenians. 
 
 VI. The inhabitants of any cities which the Lace¬ 
 daemonians deliver over to the Athenians may depart 
 whithersoever they please, and take their property with 
 them. The said cities shall be independent, but shall 
 pay the tribute which was fixed in the time of Aristides. 
 After the conclusion of the treaty the Athenians and 
 their allies shall not be allowed to make war upon them 
 to their hurt, so long as they pay the tribute. The 
 cities are these—Argilus a , Stageirus b , Acanthus 0 , Scolus, 
 01ynthus d , Spartolus e : these shall be allies neither of 
 the Lacedaemonians nor of the Athenians, but if the 
 Athenians succeed in persuading them, having their 
 consent, they may make them allies. 
 
 VII. The Mecybernians, Sanaeans f , and Singaeans 
 shall dwell in their own cities on the same terms as 
 the Olynthians and Acanthians. 
 
 VIII. The Lacedaemonians and the allies shall restore 
 Panactum 8 to the Athenians. The Athenians shall re¬ 
 store to the Lacedaemonians Coryphasium h , Cythera 1 , 
 Methone k , Pteleum, and Atalante 1 . 
 
 IX. The Athenians shall surrender the Lacedaemo¬ 
 nian captives whom they have in their public prison, or 
 who are in the public prison of any place within the 
 Athenian dominions, and they shall let go the Pelopon¬ 
 nesians who are besieged in Scione, and any other allies 
 of the Lacedaemonians who are in Scione, and all whom 
 Brasidas introduced into the place" 1 , and any of the allies 
 
 a Cp. iv. 103 med. 
 d Cp. i. 58 med. 
 g Cp. v. 3 fin. 
 k Cp. iv. 45. 
 
 b Cp. iv. 88 fin. 
 e Cp. ii. 79 init. 
 h Cp. iv. 3 med. 
 1 Cp. ii. 32. 
 
 c Cp. iv. 88. 
 f Cp. iv. 109 fin. 
 1 Cp. iv. 54. 
 m Cp. iv. 123 fin. 
 
 V. 
 
352 
 
 CONCLUSION OF THE TREATY. 
 
 V. of the Lacedaemonians who are in the public prison at b.c. 42 
 Athens, or in the public prison of any place within the 01 ' 89 ’ 
 Athenian dominions. The Lacedaemonians and their 
 allies in like manner shall restore those of the Athenians 
 and their allies who are their prisoners. 
 
 X. Respecting Scione a , Torone b , and Sermyle, or any 
 cities which are held by the Athenians, the Athenians 
 shall do with the inhabitants of the said cities, or of any 
 cities which are held by them, as they think fit. 
 
 XI. The Athenians shall bind themselves by oath to 
 the Lacedaemonians and their allies, city by city, and the 
 oath shall be that which in the several cities of the two 
 contracting parties is deemed the most binding. The 
 oaths shall be in the following form :—‘ I will abide by 
 this treaty and by this peace truly and sincerely/ The 
 Lacedaemonians and their allies shall bind themselves 
 by a similar oath to the Athenians. This oath shall be 
 renewed by both parties every year; and they shall 
 erect pillars at Olympia, Delphi, and the Isthmus, at 
 Athens in the Acropolis, at Lacedaemon in the temple 
 of Apollo at Amyclae. 
 
 XII. If anything whatsoever be forgotten on one side 
 or the other, either party may, without violation of their 
 oaths, take honest counsel and alter the treaty in such 
 manner as shall seem good to the two parties, the Athe¬ 
 nians and Lacedaemonians. 
 
 19. The treaty begins, at Lacedaemon in the Ephorate of 
 Ratifica- Pleistolas, and on the twenty-seventh day of the month 
 Artemisium, and at Athens in the Archonship of Alcaeus, 
 on the twenty-fifth day of the month Elaphebolion c . 
 
 The following persons took the oaths and ratified the 
 treaty:—On behalf of the Lacedaemonians, Pleistolas, 
 Damagetus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Diathus, 
 Ischagoras, Philocharidas, Zeuxidas, Antippus, Tellis, 
 Alcinidas, Empedias, Menas, Laphilus ; on behalf of 
 the Athenians, Lampon, Isthmionicus, Nicias, Laches, 
 Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Hagnon, Myrtilus, 
 a Cp. v. 32 init. b Cp. v. 3. c March—April. 
 
o» 
 
 OPPOSITION OF THE CHALCIDIANS. 353 
 
 ;C. 42f. Thrasycles, Theagenes, Aristocrat es, Iolcius, Timocrates, V. 
 
 1. 89, 3- Leon, Lamachus, Demosthenes. 
 
 This treaty was concluded at the end of winter, just 20. 
 at the beginning of spring, immediately after the City The war 
 Dionysia. Ten years, with a difference of a few days, almost 
 had passed since the invasion of Attica and the com- years ! 7 ten 
 mencement of the war. I would have a person reckon 
 the actual periods of time, and not rely upon catalogues 
 of the archons or other official personages whose names 
 may be used in different cities to mark the dates of past 
 events. For whether an event occurred in the beginning, 
 or in the middle, or whatever might be the exact point, of 
 a magistrate’s term of office is left uncertain by such a 
 mode of reckoning. But if he measure by summers and 
 winters as they are here set down, and count each summer 
 and winter as a half year, he will find that ten summers 
 and ten winters passed in the first part of the war. 
 
 The Lacedaemonians—for the lot having fallen upon 21. 
 them they had to make restitution first—immediately The Lace- 
 
 J . daemonians 
 
 released their prisoners, and sending three envoys, Ischa- restore their 
 goras, Menas, and Philocharidas, to Chalcidice, com- but cieari- 
 manded Clearidas to deliver up Amphipolis to the to S d eifver S 
 Athenians, and the other cities to accept the articles up Amphi- 
 of the treaty which severally concerned them. But the Chaici- 
 they did not approve of the terms, and refused. wil i not 
 Clearidas, who acted in the interest of the Chalcidians, the 
 would not give up the place, and said that it was not in 
 his power to do so against their will. Accompanied by 
 envoys from the Chalcidian cities, he himself went direct 
 to Lacedaemon, intending to defend himself in case 
 Ischagoras and his colleagues should accuse him of 
 insubordination ; he also wanted to know whether the 
 treaty could still be reconsidered. On his arrival he 
 found that it was positively concluded, and he himself 
 was sent back to Thrace by the Lacedaemonians, who 
 commanded him to give up Amphipolis, or, if he could 
 not, at any rate to withdraw all the Peloponnesian forces 
 from the place. So he returned in haste. 
 
 A a 
 
354 
 
 DISCONTENT OF THE ALLIES. 
 
 V. 
 
 22 . 
 
 The allies 
 are dissatis¬ 
 fied ; but the 
 Lacedae¬ 
 monians, 
 fearing a 
 renewal of 
 hostilities 
 from Argos, 
 dismiss 
 them and 
 form an al¬ 
 liance with 
 Athens. 
 
 23 - 
 
 Terms of 
 the alliance. 
 
 The representatives of the other allies were present at B.c. 42?. 
 
 1 ti 01. 89,3. 
 
 Lacedaemon, and the Lacedaemonians urged the re¬ 
 luctant states to accept the treaty. But they refused 
 for the same reasons as before a , and insisted that they 
 must have more equitable conditions. Finding that 
 they would not come in, the Lacedaemonians dismissed 
 them, and proceeded on their own account to make 
 an alliance with the Athenians. They thought that 
 the Argives, whose hostile intentions had been mani¬ 
 fested by their refusal to renew the peace at the request 
 of Ampelidas and Lichas, the Lacedaemonian envoys 
 who had gone thither, being now unsupported by the 
 Athenians, would thus be least dangerous and that the 
 rest of Peloponnesus would be least likely to stir. For 
 the Athenian alliance, to which they would otherwise 
 have had recourse, would now be closed to them. There 
 were present at the time Athenian envoys, and after a 
 negotiation the two parties took oaths, and made an 
 alliance, of which the terms were as follows :— 
 
 The Lacedaemonians shall be allies of the Athenians 
 for fifty years, on the following conditions :— 
 
 I. If any enemy invade the Lacedaemonian territory 
 and harm the Lacedaemonians, the Athenians shall 
 assist the Lacedaemonians in any way which they 
 can, and to the utmost of their power; and if the 
 enemy ravage their territory and depart, the offending 
 city shall be the enemy of the Lacedaemonians and 
 Athenians, and shall suffer at the hands of both of 
 them, and neither city shall cease from war before 
 the other. These things shall be performed honestly, 
 and zealously, and sincerely. 
 
 II. If any enemy invade the Athenian territory and 
 harm the Athenians, the Lacedaemonians shall assist 
 them in any way which they can, and to the utmost of 
 their power; and if the enemy ravage their territory and 
 depart, the offending city shall be the enemy of the 
 Athenians and Lacedaemonians, and shall suffer at the 
 
 a Cp. v. 17 fin. 
 
ALLIANCE OF ATHENS AND SPARTA. 355 
 
 oi C 89 2 | ^ an< ^ s both of them, and neither city shall cease from V. 
 war before the other. These things shall be performed 
 honestly, and zealously, and sincerely. 
 
 III. If the slaves rebel, the Athenians shall aid the 
 Lacedaemonians with all their might and to the utmost 
 of their power. 
 
 IV. These provisions shall be sworn to on both sides 
 by the same persons who swore to the former treaty. 
 
 Every year the Lacedaemonians shall go to Athens 
 at the Dionysia and renew the oath, and the Athenians 
 shall go to Lacedaemon at the Hyacinthia and renew 
 the oath. Both parties shall erect pillars, one in Lace¬ 
 daemon at the temple of Apollo in Amyclae, another 
 at Athens in the Acropolis at the temple of Athene. 
 
 V. If the Lacedaemonians and Athenians agree that 
 anything shall be added to or taken away from the 
 treaty of alliance, whatever it be, this may be done 
 without violation of their oaths. 
 
 On behalf of the Lacedaemonians there took the 24. 
 oaths, Pleistoanax, Agis, Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Ratifica- 
 Metagenes, Acanthus, Dai'thus, Ischagoras, Philocha- 
 ridas, Zeuxidas, Antippus, Alcinadas, Tellis, Empedias, 
 
 Menas, Laphilus. On behalf of the Athenians there 
 took the oaths, Lampon, Isthmionicus, Laches, Nicias, 
 Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Hagnon, Myrtilus, 
 Thrasycles, Theagenes, Aristocrates, Iolcius, Timocrates, 
 
 Leon, Lamachus, Demosthenes. 
 
 This alliance was made shortly after the treaty; at Restoration 
 the same time the Athenians restored to the Lace- soners Pn " 
 daemonians the prisoners taken at Sphacteria. The Sf^cferia 
 summer of the eleventh year then began. During the 
 previous ten years the first war, of which the history 
 has now been written, went on without intermission. 
 
 The treaty and the alliance which terminated the ten 25. 
 years’ war were made in the Ephorate of Pleistolas at First 
 
 Corinth and 
 
 Lacedaemon, and the Archonship of Alcaeus at Athens, other p e io- 
 Those who accepted the treaty were now at peace ; but cities^and 
 the Corinthians and several of the Peloponnesian cities theAthe- 3 
 
 A a 3 
 
V. 
 
 nians them¬ 
 selves, show 
 signs of 
 discontent. 
 
 26. 
 
 The peace 
 was merely 
 nominal, 
 and may 
 fairly be 
 reckoned in 
 the twenty- 
 seven years’ 
 war. 
 
 The pre¬ 
 diction of 
 ‘ thrice nine 
 years ’ was 
 the only 
 oracle 
 which was 
 verified by 
 the event. 
 
 I myself 
 lived 
 
 through the 
 whole war, 
 and being 
 for twenty 
 years in 
 banish¬ 
 ment had 
 the oppor¬ 
 tunity of 
 knowing 
 both sides. 
 
 35<5 
 
 THUCYDIDES. 
 
 
 did what they could to disturb the arrangement. And so *^421. 
 before long a new cause of quarrel set the allies against L 8g ’ 4 ’ 
 the Lacedaemonians; who also, as time went on, incurred 
 the suspicion of the Athenians, because in certain par¬ 
 ticulars they would not execute the provisions of the 
 treaty. For six years and ten months the two powers 
 abstained from invading each other’s territories, but 
 abroad the cessation of arms was intermittent, and they 
 did each other all the harm which they could. At last they 
 were absolutely compelled to break the treaty made at the 
 end of the first ten years, and to declare open war. 
 
 The same Thucydides of Athens continued the his¬ 
 tory, following the order of events, which he reckoned 
 by summers and winters, up to the destruction of the 
 Athenian empire and the taking of Piraeus and the 
 Long Walls by the Lacedaemonians and their allies. 
 Altogether the war lasted twenty-seven years, for if any 
 one argue that the interval during which the truce con¬ 
 tinued should be excluded, he is mistaken. If he have 
 regard to the facts of the case, he will see that the term 
 ‘peace’ can hardly be applied to a state of things in 
 which neither party gave back or received all the places 
 stipulated ; moreover in the Mantinean and Epidaurian 
 wars and in other matters there were violations of the 
 treaty on both sides ; the Chalcidian allies maintained 
 their attitude of hostility towards Athens, and the 
 Boeotians observed an armistice terminable at ten days’ 
 notice. So that, including the first ten years’ war, the 
 doubtful truce which followed, and the war which fol¬ 
 lowed that, he who reckons up the actual periods of 
 time will find that I have rightly given the exact number 
 of years with the difference only of a few days. He will 
 also find that this was the solitary instance in which 
 those who put their faith in oracles were justified by the 
 event. For I well remember how, from the beginning 
 to the end of the war, there was a common and often- 
 repeated saying that it was to last thrice nine years. 
 
 I lived through the whole of it, and was of mature years 
 
 o w 
 
B.C. 421. 
 01. 89, 4. 
 
 MOVEMENTS OF CORINTH AND ARGOS. 357 
 
 and judgment, and I took great pains to make out the V. 
 exact truth. For twenty years I was banished from my 
 country after I held the command at Amphipolis, and 
 associating with both sides, with the Peloponnesians quite 
 as much as with the Athenians, because of my exile, 
 
 I was thus enabled to watch quietly the course of events. 
 
 I will now proceed to narrate the quarrels which after 
 the first ten years broke up the treaty, and the events 
 of the war which followed. 
 
 After the conclusion of the fifty years 5 peace and of 27. 
 the subsequent alliance, the ambassadors who had been The Corin ™ 
 
 A thians go 
 
 invited to the conference from the other states of Pelo- to Argos 
 ponnesus left Lacedaemon. They all went home except the Argives 
 the Corinthians, who turned aside to Argos and opened notior^that 
 communication with certain of the Arrive magistrates, , the y mus f 
 saying that the Lacedaemonians had made peace and centre of 
 alliance with the Athenians, hitherto their mortal ene- pSopon- 
 mies, to no good end, but for the enslavement of Pelo- f e e d S era C y° n ' 
 ponnesus, and that the Argives were bound to take 
 measures for its deliverance. They ought to pass a vote 
 that any independent Hellenic city which would allow 
 a settlement of disputes on equal terms might enter into 
 a defensive alliance with them. The negotiation should 
 not be carried on with the assembly, but the Argives 
 should appoint a few commissioners having full powers, 
 lest if any states appealed to the people and were re¬ 
 jected, their failure should become public. They added 
 that hatred of the Lacedaemonians would induce many 
 to join them. Having offered this recommendation, the 
 Corinthians returned home. 
 
 The Argive magistrates, after hearing these proposals, 28. 
 referred them to their colleagues and the people. The The Argives, 
 Argives then passed a vote, and elected twelve com- warwth a 
 missioners; through these any of the Hellenes who 
 pleased might make an alliance with them, except the 
 Athenians and Lacedaemonians, who could only be ad- toieadPeio 
 mitted to the league with the sanction of the Argive enter 
 people. The Argives were the more inclined to take t ^™ 1 e ^ mtQ 
 
358 MANTINEA JOINS THE NEW ALLIANCE. 
 
 V. this course because, their truce with the Lacedaemonians B.c. 421. 
 
 ' , 1 . . 01. 89,4. 
 
 being about to expire, they saw that war was imminent. 
 Moreover they were encouraged by the hope of be¬ 
 coming the leaders of Peloponnesus. For at this time 
 the reputation of Lacedaemon had fallen very low; her 
 misfortunes had brought her into contempt, while the 
 resources of Argos were unimpaired. For the Argives 
 had not taken part in the war with Athens, and, being at 
 peace with both parties, had reaped a harvest from them. 
 
 29. The first to enter the alliance offered by the Argives 
 The Man- to any Hellenes who were willing to accept it were the 
 th^Argivesl Mantineans and their allies, who joined through fear of 
 ^nessVs Lacedaemonians. For, during the war with- Athens, 
 the pavers they had subjected a part of Arcadia, which they thought 
 which the that the Lacedaemonians, now that their hands were free, 
 
 treaty £^ave 
 
 to the Athe- would no longer allow them to retain. So they gladly 
 Lacedae- joined Argos, reflecting that it was a great city, the 
 momans. constant enemy of Sparta, and, like their own, governed 
 by a democracy. When Mantinea seceded, a murmur 
 ran through the other states of Peloponnesus that they 
 must secede too ; they imagined that the Mantineans had 
 gone over to the Argives because they had better infor¬ 
 mation than themselves, and also they were angry with 
 the Lacedaemonians, chiefly on account of that clause 
 in the treaty with Athens which provided that the 
 Lacedaemonians and Athenians, if agreed, might add to 
 or take away from them whatever they pleased a . This 
 clause aroused great uneasiness among the Pelopon¬ 
 nesians, and made them suspect that the Lacedaemonians 
 meant to unite with the Athenians in order to enslave 
 them b ; they argued that the power of altering the treaty 
 ought to have been given only to the whole confederacy. 
 Entertaining these fears they generally inclined towards 
 Argos, and every state was eager to follow the example 
 of Mantinea and form an alliance with her. 
 
 30. The Lacedaemonians perceived that great excitement 
 The Lace- prevailed in Peloponnesus, and that the Corinthians had 
 
 daemonians 
 
 a Cp. V. 18. § 12. b Cp. iv. 20 fin. 
 
ffiO 
 
 C. 421. 
 . 89, 4. 
 
 LACEDAEMONIANS AT CORINTH. 359 
 
 inspired it and were themselves on the point of making V. 
 a treaty with Argos. So they sent envoys to Corinth, ^Jinthians 
 desiring to anticipate what might happen. They laid of deserting 
 the blame of having instigated the whole movement on ance; to 
 the Corinthians, and protested that, if they deserted corintMans 
 them and joined the Argives, they would be foresworn ; ^e} y cannot 
 indeed they were already much to blame for not accept- betray the 
 mg the peace made with Athens, although there was an cities, 
 article in their league which said that what the majority 
 of the allies voted should be binding unless there was 
 some impediment on the part of gods or heroes. Now 
 the Corinthians had previously summoned those of the 
 allies who, like themselves, had rejected the treaty: 
 and, replying in their presence, they were unwilling to 
 speak out and state their grievances, of which the chief 
 was that the Lacedaemonians had not recovered for 
 them Sollium a or Anactorium b . But they pretended 
 that they could not betray their allies in Thrace, to 
 whom, when they originally joined in the revolt of 
 Potidaea, they had sworn a separate oath c , and had 
 afterwards renewed it. They denied therefore that they 
 were violating the terms of the league by refusing to 
 join in the peace with the Athenians ; for, having sworn 
 in the name of the Gods to the Potidaeans, they would 
 be violating their oaths if they betrayed them : the 
 treaty said ‘ unless there was some impediment on the 
 part of Gods and heroes,’ and this did appear to them 
 to be an impediment of that nature. Thus far they 
 pleaded their former oaths; as to the Argive alliance 
 they would take counsel with their friends, and do what¬ 
 ever was right. So the Lacedaemonians returned home. 
 
 Now there happened to be at that time Argive envoys 
 present at Corinth who urged the Corinthians to join 
 the alliance without more delay, and the Corinthians 
 told them to come to their next assembly. 
 
 Soon afterwards envoys from Elis likewise arrived at 31. 
 
 Corinth, who, first of all making an alliance with the The Le - 
 
 preans. 
 
 a Cp. ii. 30 init. b Cp. iv. 49. c Cp. i. 58. 
 
360 DISPUTE BETWEEN ELIS AND LEPREUM. 
 
 V. Corinthians, went on to Argos, and became allies of the B.c. 421 
 having Arrives in the manner prescribed. Now the Eleans 0L 89 ’ 4 
 
 agreed & 1 . 
 
 to pay a had a quarrel with the Lacedaemonians about the town 
 
 Eleans, of Lepreum. A war had arisen between the Lepreans 
 
 5 -eement. and certain Arcadian tribes, and the Eleans having 
 
 They are been called in by the Lepreans came to assist them, 
 
 by the on condition of receiving half their territory. When 
 
 monians. they had brought the war to a successful end the 
 
 in^a rage anS Eleans allowed the inhabitants of Lepreum to culti- 
 
 iSgive 6 va -te the land themselves, paying a rent of a talent to 
 
 Th^c ' 01 y m P ian Zeus. Until the Peloponnesian war they 
 
 thiansand had paid the talent, but taking advantage of the war 
 
 jchnhife 1 ? 115 they ceased to pay, and the Eleans tried to compel 
 
 so the Boeo- them. The Lepreans then had recourse to the Lace- 
 
 tiansand daemonians, who undertook to arbitrate. The Eleans 
 Megarians. 
 
 suspected that they would not have fair play at their 
 hands; they therefore disregarded the arbitration and 
 ravaged the Leprean territory. Nevertheless the Lace¬ 
 daemonians went on with the case and decided that 
 Lepreum was an independent state, and that the Eleans 
 were in the wrong. As their award was rejected by the 
 Eleans, they sent a garrison of hoplites to Lepreum. 
 
 The Eleans, considering that the Lacedaemonians had 
 taken into alliance a city which had seceded from them, 
 appealed to the clause of the agreement which provided 
 that whatever places any of the confederates had held 
 previous to the war with Athens should be retained by 
 them at its conclusion, and acting under a sense of in¬ 
 justice they now seceded to the Argives and, like the 
 rest, entered into the alliance with them in the manner 
 prescribed. Immediately afterwards the Corinthians and 
 the Chalcidians of Thrace joined ; but the Boeotians and 
 the Megarians agreed to refuse a , and, jealously watched 
 by the Lacedaemonians, stood aloof; for they were well 
 aware that the Lacedaemonian constitution was far more 
 congenial to their own oligarchical form of government 
 than the Argive democracy. 
 
 a Cp. v. 38 init. 
 
wo 
 
 THE CORINTHIANS WAVER. 
 
 361 
 
 c. 421. During the same summer, and about this time, the 
 1 - 8 9 . 4 - Athenians took Scione, put to death all the grown-up 
 men, and enslaved the women and children ; they then 
 gave possession of the land to the Plataeans. They 
 also replaced the Delians in Delos a , moved partly by 
 the defeats which they had sustained, partly by an oracle 
 of the Delphic God. About this time too the Phocians 
 and Locrians went to war. The Corinthians and Argives 
 (who were now allies) came to Tegea, which they hoped 
 to withdraw from the Lacedaemonian alliance, thinking 
 that if they could secure so large a district of Pelo¬ 
 ponnesus they would soon have the whole of it. The 
 Tegeans however said that they could have no quarrel 
 with the Lacedaemonians ; and the Corinthians, who had 
 hitherto been zealous in the cause, now began to cool, 
 and were seriously afraid that no other Peloponnesian 
 state would join them. Nevertheless they applied to the 
 Boeotians and begged them to become allies of them¬ 
 selves and of the Argives, and generally to act with 
 them; they further requested that they would accompany 
 them to Athens and procure an armistice terminable 
 at ten days’ notice, similar to that which the Athe¬ 
 nians and Boeotians had made with one another shortly 
 after the conclusion of the fifty years’ peace. If the 
 Athenians did not agree, then the Corinthians demanded 
 of the Boeotians that they should renounce the armis¬ 
 tice and for the future make no truce without them. 
 The Boeotians on receiving this request desired the 
 Corinthians to say no more about alliance with the 
 Argives. But they went together to Athens, where 
 the Boeotians failed to .obtain the armistice for the 
 Corinthians, the Athenians replying that the original 
 truce b extended to them, if they were allies of the Lace¬ 
 daemonians. The Boeotians however did not renounce 
 their own armistice, although the Corinthians expostu¬ 
 lated, and argued that such had been the agreement. 
 
 V. 
 
 32 . 
 
 Capture of 
 Scion6. 
 Restoration 
 of the 
 Delians. 
 The Te¬ 
 geans refuse 
 to join 
 the new 
 alliance. 
 The Corin¬ 
 thians get 
 frightened 
 and have 
 recourse 
 to the 
 Boeotians. 
 
 Cp. v. 1. 
 
 Cp. v. 18. 
 
362 THE PRISONERS FROM THE ISLAND. 
 
 V. 
 
 33 - 
 
 The Lace¬ 
 daemonians 
 free the 
 Parrhasians 
 from the 
 Manti- 
 neans. 
 
 34 - 
 
 The Helots 
 who served 
 with Brasi- 
 das are 
 emanci¬ 
 pated and 
 settled at 
 Lepreum. 
 The prison¬ 
 ers from 
 the island 
 are for a 
 time de¬ 
 prived of 
 citizenship. 
 
 Thus the Corinthians had only a suspension of hostilities b.c. 421 
 with Athens, but no regular truce. ' 89 ' 4 
 
 During the same summer the Lacedaemonians with 
 their whole force, commanded by their king Pleistoanax 
 the son of Pausanias, made war upon the Parrhasians of 
 Arcadia, who were subjects of’the Mantineans a . They 
 had been invited by a faction among the Parrhasians; 
 and moreover they wanted to demolish a fortress in the 
 Parrhasian town of Cypsela, threatening the Laconian 
 district of Sciritis, which the Mantineans had built and 
 garrisoned. The Lacedaemonians devastated the country 
 of the Parrhasians; and the Mantineans, leaving the 
 custody of their own city to a force of Argives, them¬ 
 selves garrisoned the territory of their allies. But being 
 unable to save either the fort of Cypsela or the cities of 
 Parrhasia, they went home again ; whereupon the Lace¬ 
 daemonians, having demolished the fort and restored the 
 independence of the Parrhasians, returned home likewise. 
 
 In the course of the same summer the troops serving 
 in Thrace, which had gone out under Brasidas and were 
 brought home by Clearidas after the conclusion of peace, 
 arrived at Lacedaemon. The Lacedaemonians passed a 
 vote that the Helots who had fought under Brasidas 
 should be free and might dwell wherever they pleased. 
 
 Not long afterwards, being now enemies of the Eleans, 
 they settled them, together with the Neodamodes, at 
 Lepreum, which is on the borders of Laconia and 
 Elis. Fearing lest their own citizens who had been 
 taken in the island and had delivered up their arms 
 might expect to be slighted in consequence of their mis¬ 
 fortune, and, if they retained the privileges of citizens, 
 would attempt revolution, they took away the right of 
 citizenship from them, although some of them were 
 holding office at the time. By this disqualification they 
 were deprived of their eligibility to offices, and of the 
 legal right to buy and sell. In time, however, their 
 privileges were restored to them. 
 
 a Cp. v. 29 init. 
 
DISPUTES ABOUT THE TREATY. 363 
 
 B.C. 421. 
 01. 89, 4. 
 
 During this summer the Dictidians took Thyssus, a 
 town of Mount Athos, which was in alliance with the 
 Athenians. During the whole summer intercourse con¬ 
 tinued between the Athenians and Peloponnesians. But 
 almost as soon as the peace was concluded both Athe¬ 
 nians and Lacedaemonians began to mistrust one another, 
 because the places mentioned in the treaty were not 
 given up. For the Lacedaemonians, who were to make 
 restitution first, according to the lot, had not surren¬ 
 dered Amphipolis and the other less important places 
 which they held, and had not made their allies in 
 Chalcidice, nor the Boeotians, nor the Corinthians accept 
 the treaty, but only kept declaring that they would join 
 the Athenians in coercing them if they continued to 
 refuse. They even fixed a time, though they did not 
 commit themselves in writing, within which those who 
 would not come into the treaty were to be declared the 
 enemies of both parties. The Athenians, seeing that 
 nothing was being really done, suspected the Lacedaemo¬ 
 nians of dishonesty, and therefore they would not give up 
 Pylos when requested to do so by the Lacedaemonians ; 
 they even repented that they had restored the prisoners 
 taken at Sphacteria, and resolved to keep the other 
 places until the Lacedaemonians had fulfilled their part 
 of the contract. The Lacedaemonians replied that they 
 had done what they could. They had delivered up the 
 Athenian prisoners who were in their hands, and had 
 withdrawn their soldiers from Chalcidice ; they had neg¬ 
 lected nothing which lay within their power. But they 
 could not give away Amphipolis, of which they were not 
 entirely masters ; they would however try to bring the 
 Boeotians and Corinthians into the treaty, to get back 
 Panactum, and recover all the Athenian captives who 
 were in the hands of the Boeotians. They still con¬ 
 tinued to insist on the restoration of Pylos, or at any 
 rate on the withdrawal of the Messenians and Helots, 
 now that the Lacedaemonians had withdrawn their troops 
 from Chalcidice; the Athenians might, if they liked. 
 
 V. 
 
 35 - 
 
 The Lace¬ 
 daemonians 
 do not give 
 up Amphi¬ 
 polis. 
 
 The Athe¬ 
 nians retain 
 Pylos. 
 
 They agree 
 however to 
 withdraw 
 the Messe¬ 
 nians and 
 Helots. 
 
V. 
 
 New 
 Ephors 
 come into 
 office, who 
 are in the 
 interest of 
 the war 
 party. 
 
 They sug¬ 
 gest that 
 the Boeo¬ 
 tians shall 
 first join the 
 Argive and 
 Corinthian 
 alliance 
 and then 
 reconcile 
 the Argives 
 with the 
 Lacedae¬ 
 monians. 
 
 37 - 
 
 The Boeo¬ 
 tians agree. 
 Two 
 Argives 
 make a 
 similar 
 proposal to 
 them. 
 
 364 WAR PARTY IN POWER AT SPARTA. 
 
 garrison the place themselves. After many long con¬ 
 ferences held during the summer, they persuaded the 
 Athenians to withdraw the Messenians, Helots, and 
 Lacedaemonian deserters: these the Athenians settled 
 at Cranii in Cephallenia. So during this summer there 
 was peace and intercourse between Athens and Sparta. 
 
 Before the following winter the Ephors under whom 
 the peace was concluded were succeeded by others, of 
 whom some were actually opposed to it. During the 
 winter embassies from the allied states arrived at Sparta, 
 including representatives of Athens, Boeotia, and Corinth. 
 Much was said with no result. As the ambassadors were 
 departing, Cleobulus and Xenares, the Ephors who were 
 most desirous of renewing the war, entered into a private 
 negotiation with the Boeotians and Corinthians, recom¬ 
 mending them to unite as closely as possible, and sug¬ 
 gesting that the Boeotians should first enter the Argive 
 alliance and then try and make the Argives, as well as 
 themselves, allies of the Lacedaemonians. The Boeo¬ 
 tians would thus escape the necessity of accepting the 
 peace with Athens; for the Lacedaemonians would 
 prefer the friendship and alliance of Argos to anything 
 which they might lose by the enmity of Athens and the 
 dissolution of the treaty. The two Ephors knew that a 
 satisfactory alliance with Argos was an object which the 
 Lacedaemonians always had at heart, perceiving as they 
 did that it would enable them to carry on the war beyond 
 the Peloponnesus with greater freedom. At the same 
 time they entreated the Boeotians to give up Panactum 
 to the Lacedaemonians, in order that they might ex¬ 
 change it for Pylos, and so be in a better position for 
 renewing the war with Athens. 
 
 The Boeotians and Corinthians, having received from 
 Xenares and Cleobulus and their other Lacedaemonian 
 friends the instructions which they were to convey to 
 their own governments, returned to their respective cities. 
 On their way home two Argives high in office, who had 
 been waiting for them on the road, entered into com- 
 
 era 
 
o w 
 
 ARGIVES NEGOTIATE WITH BOEOTIANS. 365 
 
 .c 421. munications with them, in the hope that the Boeotians, V. 
 
 9 ’ 4 like the Corinthians, Eleans, and Mantineans, might join 
 their alliance; if this could only be accomplished, and 
 they could act together, they might easily, they said, go 
 to war or make peace, either with Lacedaemon or with 
 any other power. The Boeotian envoys were pleased at 
 the proposal, for it so happened that the request of the 
 Argives coincided with the instructions of their Lace¬ 
 daemonian friends. Whereupon the Argives, finding 
 that their proposals were acceptable to the Boeotians, 
 promised to send an embassy to them, and so departed. 
 
 When the Boeotians returned home they told the Boeo- 
 tarchs what they had heard, both at Lacedaemon and 
 from the Argives who had met them on their way. The 
 Boeotarchs were glad, and their zeal was quickened when 
 they discovered that the request made to them by their 
 friends in Lacedaemon fell in with the projects of the 
 Argives. Soon afterwards the envoys from Argos ap¬ 
 peared, inviting the Boeotians to fulfil their engagement. 
 
 The Boeotarchs encouraged their proposals, and dis¬ 
 missed them; promising that they would send envoys 
 of their own to negotiate the intended alliance. 
 
 In the meantime the Boeotarchs and the envoys from 38. 
 Corinth, Megara, and Chalcidice determined that they But the 
 would take an oath to one another, pledging themselves tion after- 
 to assist whichever of them was at any time in need, Jhrough lls 
 and not go to war or make peace without the consent mismana se- 
 of all. When they had got thus far, the Megarians 
 and Boeotians, who acted together in the matter a , were 
 to enter into an agreement with the Argives. But 
 before the oath was sworn, the Boeotarchs communi¬ 
 cated their intentions to the Four Councils of the 
 Boeotians, whose sanction is always necessary, and urged 
 that oaths should be offered to any cities which were 
 willing to join with them for mutual protection. But 
 the Boeotian Councils, fearing that they might offend the 
 Lacedaemonians if they took oaths to the Corinthians 
 a Cp. v. 31 fin. 
 
3 66 
 
 PYLOS AND PAN ACTUM. 
 
 V. who had seceded from them, rejected their proposals. 
 For the Boeotarchs did not tell them what had passed 
 at Lacedaemon, and how two of the Ephors, Cleobulus 
 and Xenares, and their friends had advised them first 
 to become allies of Argos and Corinth, and then to 
 make a further alliance with the Lacedaemonians. They 
 thought that the Councils, whether informed of this or 
 not, would be sure to ratify their foregone decision when 
 it was communicated to them. So the plan broke down, 
 and the Corinthian and the Chalcidian envoys went away 
 without effecting their purpose. The Boeotarchs, who 
 had originally intended, if they succeeded, to extend the 
 alliance if possible to the Argives, gave up the idea of 
 bringing this latter measure before the Councils. They 
 did not fulfil their promise of sending envoys to Argos, 
 but the whole business was neglected and deferred. 
 
 39. During the same winter the Olynthians made a sudden 
 The attack upon Mecyberna a , which was held by an Athe- 
 monians, nian garrison, and took it. The Athenians and Lace- 
 recovef l ° daemonians still continued to negotiate about the places 
 suadethe*" had not been restored, the Lacedaemonians hoping 
 
 Boeotians, that, if the Athenians got back Panactum from the 
 they make Boeotians, they might themselves recover Pylos. So 
 aSce^to they sent an embassy to the Boeotians, and begged of 
 Panacuim. them to give up Panactum and the Athenian prisoners 
 to themselves, that they might obtain Pylos in return 
 for them. But the Boeotians refused to give them up 
 unless the Lacedaemonians made a separate alliance 
 with them as they had done with the Athenians. Now 
 the Lacedaemonians knew that, if they acceded to this 
 request, they would be dealing unfairly with Athens, 
 because there was a stipulation which forbade either 
 state to make war or peace without the consent of the 
 other; but they were eager to obtain Panactum and 
 thereby, as they hoped, recover Pylos. At the same time 
 the party who wished to break the peace with Athens were 
 zealous on behalf of the Boeotians. So they made the 
 a Cp. v. 18. § 7. 
 
 PQO 
 
OOd 
 
 ALARM AT ARGOS. 
 
 3 6 7 
 
 c. 420. alliance about the end of winter and the beginning of V. 
 spring. The Boeotians at once commenced the demolition 
 of Panactum ; and the eleventh year of the war ended. 
 
 Immediately on the commencement of spring, the 40. 
 Argives, observing that the envoys whom the Boeotians T . he Ar - 
 promised to send had not arrived, that Panactum was alarmed at 
 being demolished, and that a private alliance had been agreement 
 made between the Lacedaemonians and the Boeotians, Boeotians 
 began to fear that they would be isolated, and that the 
 whole confederacy would go over to the Lacedaemonians, monians, 
 For they thought that the Boeotians were demolishing they sup- 
 Panactum by the desire of the Lacedaemonians, and Athenians 
 had likewise been induced by them to come into the 1 ?^] 11- 
 Athenian treaty; and that the Athenians were cognisant 
 of the whole affair. But, if so, they could no longer 
 form an alliance even with Athens, although they had 
 hitherto imagined that the enmity of the two powers 
 would secure them an alliance with one or the other, 
 and that if they lost the peace with Lacedaemon, they 
 might at any rate become allies of the Athenians. So 
 in their perplexity, fearing that they might have to fight 
 Lacedaemon, Tegea, Boeotia, and Athens all at once, 
 the Argives, who at the time when they were proudly 
 hoping to be the leaders of Peloponnesus had refused 
 to make a treaty with Lacedaemon, now sent thither 
 two envoys, Eustrophus and Aeson, who were likely to 
 be well regarded by the Spartans. For under present 
 circumstances it seemed to them that nothing better 
 could be done than to make a treaty with the Lace¬ 
 daemonians on whatever terms, and keep out of war. 
 
 The envoys arrived, and began to confer with the 4 1 - 
 Lacedaemonians respecting the conditions on which the The y send 
 
 A ° envoys to 
 
 peace should be made. The Argives at first demanded Lacedae- 
 that the old quarrel about the border-land of Cynuria, a after' 
 district which contains the cities of Thyrea and An- 
 thene and is occupied- by the Lacedaemonians, should 
 be referred to the arbitration of some state or person. Cynuria, 
 Of this the Lacedaemonians would not allow a word Sncfude^ 
 
V. 
 
 a peace 
 with the 
 Lacedae¬ 
 monians for 
 fifty years. 
 
 42. 
 
 Indignation 
 of the 
 Athenians 
 at the 
 separate 
 alliance 
 and at the 
 demolition 
 of Panac¬ 
 tum, which 
 should have 
 been re¬ 
 stored 
 intact. 
 
 368 ARGIVES NEGOTIATE AT LACEDAEMON. 
 
 to be said, but they professed their readiness to renew b.c. 420. 
 the treaty on the old terms. The Argives at length 01 ^ 
 induced them to make a fifty years’ peace, on the 
 understanding however that either Lacedaemon or Argos, 
 provided that neither city were suffering at the time 
 from war or plague, might challenge the other to 
 fight for the disputed territory, as they had done once 
 before when both sides claimed the victory; but the 
 conquered party was not to be pursued over their own 
 border. The Lacedaemonians at first thought that this 
 proposal was nonsense ; however, as they were desirous 
 of having the friendship of Argos on any terms, they 
 assented, and drew up a written treaty. But they desired 
 the envoys, before any of the provisions took effect, to 
 return and lay the matter before the people of Argos ; if 
 they agreed, they were to come again at the Hyacinthia 
 and take the oaths. So they departed. 
 
 While the Argives were thus engaged, the envoys 
 of the Lacedaemonians—Andromedes, Phaedimus, and 
 Antimenidas—who were appointed to receive Panac- 
 tum and the prisoners from the Boeotians, and give 
 them up to the Athenians, found Panactum already 
 demolished by the Boeotians. They alleged that the 
 Athenians and Boeotians in days of old had quar¬ 
 relled about the place, and had sworn that neither 
 of them should inhabit it, but both enjoy the use of 
 it. However, Andromedes and his colleagues conveyed 
 the Athenian prisoners who were in the hands of the 
 Boeotians to Athens, and restored them ; they further 
 announced the destruction of Panactum, a maintaining 
 that they were restoring that too a , inasmuch as no 
 enemy of the Athenians could any longer dwell there. 
 
 Their words raised a violent outcry among the Athe¬ 
 nians ; they felt that the Lacedaemonians were dealing 
 unfairly with them in two respects : first, there was the 
 demolition of Panactum, which should have been de- 
 
 a Or, ‘ maintaining that this,’ i. e. its destruction, ‘ was equivalent 
 to its restoration’ (kci'i tovto , rrjv Kadaipecriv, anoboviv Aval). 
 
PQO 
 
 ALCIBIADES . 
 
 3 6 9 
 
 c. 420. livered standing ; secondly, they were informed of the V. 
 
 ' 9 °' separate alliance which the Lacedaemonians had made 
 with the Boeotians., notwithstanding their promise that 
 they would join in coercing those who did not accept 
 the peace. They called to mind all their other short¬ 
 comings in the fulfilment of the treaty, and conscious 
 that they had been deceived, they answered the envoys 
 roughly, and sent them away. 
 
 When the difference between the Lacedaemonians 43. 
 and Athenians had gone thus far, the war party at Alcibiades, 
 
 . . . , . 1 J the youthful 
 
 Athens in their turn lost no time in pressing their views. Athenian 
 Foremost among them was Alcibiades the son of Cleinias, latedatnle 
 a man who would have been thought young in any other Confidence 
 city, but was influential by reason of his high descent: shown in 
 
 J J J & him by the 
 
 he sincerely preferred the Argive alliance, but at the Lacedae- 
 same time he took part against the Lacedaemonians opposes ’ 
 from temper, and because his pride was touched. For ^thCis! 
 they had not consulted him, but had negotiated the 
 peace through Nicias and Laches, despising his youth, 
 and disregarding an ancient connection with his family, 
 who had been their proxeni ; a connection which his 
 grandfather had renounced, and he, by the attention 
 which he had paid to the captives from Sphacteria, had 
 hoped to have renewed. Piqued at the small respect 
 which was shown to all his claims, he had originally 
 opposed the negotiations; declaring that the Lacedae¬ 
 monians were not to be trusted, and that their only 
 object in making terms was that they might by Athe¬ 
 nian help crush the Argives, and afterwards attack the 
 Athenians themselves when they had no friends. As 
 soon as the rupture occurred he promptly despatched 
 a private message to the Argives, bidding them send an 
 embassy as quickly as they could, together with repre¬ 
 sentatives of Mantinea and Elis, and invite the Athenians 
 to enter the alliance ; now was the time, and he would 
 do his utmost to assist them. 
 
 The Argives received his message, and thus became 44. 
 aware that the alliance with the Boeotians had been Atjiis^sug- 
 B b 
 
37 o 
 
 THE SPARTAN EMBASSY. 
 
 V. made without the consent of the Athenians, and that a 
 Argives, violent quarrel had broken out between Athens and 
 
 who are . • 
 
 partly in- Lacedaemon. So they thought no more about tneir 
 b fl y Th C e ed ambassadors who were at that very moment negotiating 
 arfancientf P eace with Lacedaemon, but turned their thoughts 
 
 connexion, towards Athens. They reflected that Athens was a city 
 
 partly by ... 
 
 democratic which had been their friend of old a ; like their own it 
 and also by was governed by a democracy, and would be a powerful 
 a^navai* 6 ° f a ^y to th em at sea, if they were involved in war. 
 Ain the They at once sent envoys to negotiate an alliance 
 Athenians, with the Athenians; the Eleans and Mantineans joined 
 in the embassy. Thither also came in haste three envoys 
 from Lacedaemon, who were thought likely to be ac¬ 
 ceptable at Athens—Philocharidas, Leon, and Endius b . 
 They were sent because the Lacedaemonians were afraid 
 that the Athenians in their anger would join the Argive 
 alliance. The envoys while they demanded the restora¬ 
 tion of Pylos in return for Panactum, were to apologise 
 
 for the alliance with the Boeotians, and to explain that it 
 was not made with any view to the injury of Athens. 
 
 45 * They delivered their message to the council, adding 
 
 Alcibiades 
 by a trick 
 deceives 
 the Lace¬ 
 daemonian 
 envoys. 
 They are 
 persuaded 
 to deny 
 in the as¬ 
 sembly the 
 powers 
 which they 
 have ac- 
 
 that they came with full power to treat about all differ¬ 
 ences. Alcibiades took alarm; he feared that if the 
 envoys made a similar statement to the people they would 
 win them over to their side, and that the Argive alliance 
 would be rejected. Whereupon he devised the following 
 trick: he solemnly assured the Lacedaemonians that if 
 they would not communicate to the people the extent 
 of their powers, he would restore Pylos to them, for he 
 
 fn thi ledged wou ld use his influence in their favour instead of against 
 
 council. them, and would arrange their other differences. But 
 his real aim all the time was to alienate them from 
 Nicias, and to bring about an alliance with Argos, 
 Elis, and Mantinea, which he hoped to effect, if he could 
 only discredit them in the assembly, and create the 
 impression that their intentions were not honest, and 
 that they never told the same tale twice. And he 
 
 a Cp. i. 102 fin. 
 
 b Cp. viii. 6 med. 
 
 B.C. 420. 
 01. 90. 
 
mo 
 
 IRRITATION AT ATHENS . 
 
 371 
 
 c. 420. succeeded; for when the envoys appeared before the V. 
 assembly, and in answer to the question whether they 
 had full powers replied ‘No,’ in direct contradiction 
 to what they had said in the council, the patience of 
 the Athenians was exhausted, and Alcibiades declaimed 
 against the Lacedaemonians more violently than ever. 
 
 The people were carried away and were ready to have 
 in the Argives, and make an alliance with them and 
 their confederates on the spot. But an earthquake 
 occurred before the final vote was taken, and the as¬ 
 sembly was adjourned. 
 
 The trick which had deceived the Lacedaemonians 46. 
 themselves completely deceived Nicias, who could not Thetrick 
 
 J deceives 
 
 understand the disavowal of their powers. Neverthe- Nicias, 
 less in the assembly which met on the following day thdess^ 
 he still continued to maintain that the Athenians ought to^up^ 6S 
 to prefer the friendship of Sparta, and not to conclude P^tjhe 
 the Argive alliance until they had sent to the Lacedae- monians ; 
 monians and ascertained their intentions. He urged self sent to 
 them not to renew the war now, when it could be put ^faction 
 off with honour to themselves and discredit to the Lace- s P arta ~ 
 
 J he nego- 
 
 daemonians; they were successful and should seek to tiation fails, 
 preserve their good-fortune as long as they could, but 
 the Lacedaemonians were in a bad way, and would be 
 only too glad to fight as soon as possible at all hazards. 
 
 And he prevailed on them to send envoys, of whom he 
 was himself one, requiring the Lacedaemonians, if they 
 were sincere in their intentions, to rebuild and restore 
 Panactum, to restore Amphipolis, and to renounce their 
 alliance with the Boeotians unless they came into the 
 treaty, according to the stipulation which forbade the 
 contracting parties to make a new alliance except by 
 mutual consent. If we, they added, had wanted to deal 
 unfairly, we should already have accepted an alliance 
 with the Argives, whose ambassadors have come hither 
 to offer it. They entrusted the representation of these 
 and their other grievances to Nicias and his colleagues, 
 and sent them away to Sparta. On their arrival they 
 B b % 
 
372 TREATY BETWEEN ATHENS AND ARGOS. 
 
 V. delivered their message, which they concluded by de¬ 
 claring that unless the Lacedaemonians renounced their 
 alliance with the Boeotians in case the latter still refused 
 to accept the peace, the Athenians on their part would 
 enter into an alliance with the Argives and their con¬ 
 federates. The Lacedaemonians refused to give up their 
 Boeotian alliance, Xenares the Ephor, with his friends 
 and partisans, carrying this point. However they con¬ 
 sented to ratify their former oaths at the request of 
 Nicias, who was afraid that he would return without 
 having settled anything, and would incur the blame of 
 failure, as indeed he did, because he was held to be 
 responsible for the original treaty with the Lacedae¬ 
 monians. When the Athenians learned on his return 
 that the negotiations with Sparta had miscarried, they 
 were furious; and acting under a sense of injustice, 
 entered into an alliance with the Argives and their 
 allies, whose ambassadors were present at the time, for 
 Alcibiades had introduced them on purpose. The terms 
 were as follows :— 
 
 47. I. The Athenians and the Argives, Mantineans, and 
 Terms of Eleans, on their own behalf and that of the allies over 
 
 an alliance 
 
 between the whom they severally rule, make a peace to continue 
 and the nS f° r a hundred years both by sea and land, without fraud 
 federTcy 011 " or ^ ur ^- The Argives, Eleans, Mantineans, and their 
 allies shall not make war against the Athenians and 
 the allies over whom they rule, and the Athenians and 
 their allies shall not make war against the Argives, 
 Eleans, Mantineans, and their allies, in any sort or 
 manner. 
 
 II. Athens, Argos, Elis, and Mantinea shall be allied 
 for a hundred years on the following conditions:— 
 If enemies invade the territory of the Athenians, the 
 Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans shall go to Athens 
 and render the Athenians any assistance which they may 
 demand of them, in the most effectual manner, and to 
 the utmost of their power. And if the enemy spoil 
 their territory and depart, the offending city shall be an 
 
 OBJ 
 
TREA TY BETWEEN ATHENS AND ARGOS. 373 
 
 B.C. 420. 
 01.90. 
 
 enemy to Argos, Mantinea, Elis, and Athens, and suffer V. 
 at the hands of all these cities ; and it shall not be law¬ 
 ful for any of them to make peace with the offending 
 city, unless they have the consent of all the rest. . And 
 if enemies shall invade the territory of the Eleans or 
 Argives or Mantineans, the Athenians shall go to Argos, 
 Mantinea, or Elis, and render these cities any assistance 
 which they may demand of them, in the most effectual 
 manner, and to the utmost of their power. If an enemy 
 spoil their territory and depart, the offending city shall 
 be an enemy to Athens, Argos, Mantinea, and Elis, and 
 shall suffer at the hands of all these cities; and it shall 
 not be lawful for any of them to make peace with the 
 offending city, unless they have the consent of all the 
 rest. 
 
 III. The confederates shall not allow armed men to 
 pass through their own territory, or that of the allies 
 over whom they severally rule or may rule, or to pass 
 by sea, with hostile intent, unless all the cities have 
 formally consented to their passage—that is to say, 
 Athens, Argos, Mantinea, and Elis. 
 
 IV. The city which sends troops to help another shall 
 supply them with provisions for thirty days, counting 
 from t£e time of their arrival at the city which summons 
 them; it shall also provide for them at their departure. 
 
 But if the city which summons the troops wishes to 
 employ them for a longer time, it shall give them pro¬ 
 visions at the rate of three Aeginetan obols a a day for 
 heavy-armed and light-armed troops and for archers, 
 and an Aeginetan drachma b for cavalry. 
 
 V. The city which sent for the troops shall have the 
 command when the war is carried on in her territory. 
 
 Or, if the allied cities agree to send out a joint expedi¬ 
 tion, then the command shall be equally shared among 
 all the cities. 
 
 VI. The Athenians shall swear to the peace on their 
 own behalf and on that of their allies; the Argives, 
 
 a About 8 d. b About is, 4 d. 
 
V. 
 
 Provisions 
 for the rati¬ 
 fication of 
 the treaty 
 and for 
 changes. 
 
 48. 
 
 The Co¬ 
 rinthians 
 refuse to 
 join the 
 Argives 
 in the 
 Athenian 
 alliance. 
 
 374 TREATY BETWEEN ATHENS AND ARGOS. 
 
 Mantineans, and Eleans, and their allies shall swear 
 city by city. The oath shall be taken over full-grown 
 victims, and shall be that oath which in the countries 
 of the several contracting parties is deemed the most 
 binding. The form of oath shall be as follows :— 
 
 ‘ I will be true to the alliance, and will observe the 
 agreement in all honesty and without fraud or hurt; 
 I will not transgress it in any way or manner/ 
 
 At Athens the senate and the home magistrates shall 
 swear, and the Prytanes shall administer the oath; at 
 Argos the senate and the council of eighty and the 
 Artynae shall swear, and the eighty shall administer 
 the oath; at Mantinea the demiurgi and the senate 
 and the other magistrates shall swear, and the theori 
 and the polemarchs shall administer the oath. At Elis 
 the demiurgi and the supreme magistrates and the six 
 hundred shall swear, and the demiurgi and the guardians 
 of the law shall administer the oath. Thirty days be¬ 
 fore the Olympian games the Athenians shall go to 
 Elis, to Mantinea, and to Argos, and renew the oath. 
 Ten days before the Great Panathenaea the Argives, 
 Eleans, and Mantineans shall go to Athens and renew 
 the oath. The agreement concerning the treaty and 
 the oaths and the alliance shall be inscribed on a stone 
 column in the Acropolis by the Athenians, by the Ar¬ 
 gives on a similar column in the temple of Apollo in 
 the Agora, and by the Mantineans in the temple of 
 Zeus in the Agora. They shall together erect at Olympia 
 a brazen column at the coming Olympic games. And 
 if these cities think it desirable to make any change in 
 the treaty, they shall add to the provisions of it. What¬ 
 ever the cities agree upon in common shall hold good. 
 
 Thus the peace and the alliance were concluded. 
 Nevertheless the previous treaty between the Lacedae¬ 
 monians and the Athenians was not on that account 
 renounced by either party. The Corinthians, although 
 allies of the Argives, took no part in the new alliance ; 
 they had already refused to swear to an offensive and 
 
 o to 
 
CQO 
 
 C. 420. 
 - 90. 
 
 ELIS AND LACEDAEMON . 375 
 
 defensive alliance which the Eleans, Argives, and Man- V. 
 tineans had previously made with one another. They 
 said that they were satisfied with the original defensive 
 alliance which bound them only to assist one another 
 when attacked, but not to join in offensive movements. 
 
 Thus the Corinthians severed themselves from the allies, 
 and were again beginning to turn their thoughts to the 
 Lacedaemonians. 
 
 During the summer the Olympic games were cele- 49. 
 brated, the Olympiad being that in which Androsthenes, The Lace - 
 
 . . daemonians 
 
 an Arcadian, won his first victory in the pancratium, are ex- 
 The Lacedaemonians were excluded from the temple by the d oiym°- m 
 the Eleans, and so could neither sacrifice nor contend P nthe meS 
 in the games. For they had refused to pay the fine 
 which, according to Olympic law, the Eleans had im- attacked 
 posed upon them, alleging that they had brought an rnd^ntered 
 armed force against the fortress of Phyrcus, and had dunn^Se 
 introduced some hoplites of their own into Lepreum 01 y m P ic 
 
 x truce, and 
 
 during the Olympic truce. The fine amounted to two had refused 
 thousand minae * being two minae b for each hoplite, fine mi- 6 
 which is the penalty imposed by the law. The Lace- upon 
 daemonians sent envoys who argued that the sentence 
 was unjust, for at the time when their troops entered 
 Lepreum the truce had not been announced at Lace¬ 
 daemon. The Eleans replied that the truce (which they 
 always proclaim first to themselves) had already begun 
 with them, and that while they were quietly observing 
 the truce, and expecting nothing less, the Lacedaemo¬ 
 nians had treacherously attacked them. The Lacedae¬ 
 monians rejoined by asking why the Eleans proclaimed 
 the truce at all at Lacedaemon if they considered them 
 to have broken it already—they could not really have 
 thought so when they made the proclamation; and from 
 the moment when the announcement reached Lacedae¬ 
 mon all hostilities had ceased. The Eleans were still 
 positive that the Lacedaemonians were in the wrong, and 
 said that they would never be persuaded of the contrary. 
 a About ^8125. b About ^8 2j. 6 d. 
 
V. 
 
 50 - 
 
 Fear of a 
 disturbance 
 at the 
 games, 
 which turns 
 out to be 
 unfounded. 
 
 37 6 THE OLYMPIC GAMES. 
 
 But if the Lacedaemonians were willing to restore Le- B.c. 420. 
 
 . ,01. 90. 
 
 preum to them, they offered to remit their own share 
 of the penalty, and pay on their behalf that part which 
 was due to the God. 
 
 As this proposal was rejected, the Eleans made an¬ 
 other : the Lacedaemonians need not give up Lepreum 
 if they did not like, but since they wanted to have access 
 to the temple of Olympian Zeus, they might go up to 
 his altar and swear before all the Hellenes that they 
 would hereafter pay the fine. But neither to this offer 
 would the Lacedaemonians agree ; they were therefore 
 excluded from the temple and from the sacrifices and 
 games, and sacrificed at home. The other Hellenes, 
 with the exception of the inhabitants of Lepreum, sent 
 representatives to Olympia. The Eleans however, fear¬ 
 ing that the Lacedaemonians would force their way 
 into the temple and offer sacrifice, had a guard of young 
 men under arms; there came to their aid likewise a 
 thousand Argives, and a thousand Mantineans, and 
 certain Athenian horsemen, who had been awaiting 
 the celebration of the festival at Argos. The whole 
 assembly were in terror lest the Lacedaemonians should 
 come upon them in arms, and their fears were redoubled 
 when Lichas, the son of Arcesilaus, was struck by the 
 officers. As a Lacedaemonian he had been excluded 
 from the lists, but his chariot had been entered in the 
 name of the Boeotian state, and was declared victorious. 
 
 He had then come forward into the arena and placed a 
 garland on the head of his charioteer, wishing to show 
 that the chariot was his own. When the blows were 
 given the anxiety became intense, and every one thought 
 that something serious would happen. But the Lace¬ 
 daemonians did not stir, and the festival passed off 
 quietly. 
 
 The Olympic games being over, the Argives and their 
 allies went to Corinth, and requested the Corinthians 
 to join them. An embassy from Lacedaemon was also 
 present. After much discussion nothing was concluded, 
 
£ 9 © 
 
 B.C. 420. 
 01. 90. 
 
 .C. 419. 
 1. go, 2. 
 
 ALCIBIADES IN PELOPONNESUS. 377 
 
 for an earthquake broke up the assembly, and the envoys V. 
 from the several states returned home. So the summer 
 ended. 
 
 In the following winter there was a battle between 51 . 
 the Heracleans of Trachis and the Oenianians, Dolopes, The Hera- 
 
 . cleans de- 
 
 Malians, and certain Thessalians. These were neigh- feated by 
 bouring tribes hostile to the place, for it was in order to bouring h 
 control them that the place was originally fortified ; they tnbes * 
 had been enemies to it from the first, and had done it all 
 the damage in their power. In this battle they gained 
 a victory over the Heracleans. Xenares, son of Cnidis, 
 the Lacedaemonian governor, and many of the Hera¬ 
 cleans were killed. Thus ended the winter, and with it 
 the twelfth year of the war. 
 
 At the beginning of the following summer the Boeo- 5 2, 
 tians took possession of Heraclea, which after the battle T he B ° eo ' 
 
 A tians take 
 
 was in a miserable plight. They dismissed Hegesippidas, possession 
 the Lacedaemonian governor, for his misconduct a , and 
 occupied the place themselves. They were afraid that 
 now, when the Lacedaemonians were embroiled in Pelo¬ 
 ponnesus, the Athenians would take it if they did not. 
 
 But, for all that, the Lacedaemonians were offended. 
 
 During the same summer, Alcibiades, the son of Activity of 
 Cleinias, now one of the Athenian generals, acting in i n Achaia 
 concert with the Argives and their allies, led into Pelo- part s °of er 
 ponnesus a small Athenian force of hoplites and archers. 
 
 He collected other troops from the Athenian allies in the 
 Peloponnese, and, marching with his army through the 
 country, organised the affairs of the confederacy. Coming 
 to Patrae, he persuaded the citizens to build walls reach¬ 
 ing down to the sea. He was intending also to erect a fort 
 himself on the promontory of Rhium in Achaia. But the 
 Corinthians, Sicyonians, and others to whose interests the 
 fort would have been injurious, came and prevented him. 
 
 In the same summer there broke out a war between the 53* 
 Epidaurians and the Argives. The occasion of the war ^^ ^flimsy S 
 was as follows :—The Epidaurians were bound to send a pretext 
 a Cp. iii. 93 fin. 
 
37 8 
 
 THE MONTH CARNE US. 
 
 V. 
 
 make war 
 against the 
 Epidauri- 
 ans. 
 
 54 - 
 
 The Lace¬ 
 daemonians 
 intending to 
 make war 
 upon Argos 
 are deterred 
 by the sacri¬ 
 fices and 
 the sacred 
 month. 
 
 The latter 
 obligation is 
 evaded by 
 the Argives, 
 who go on 
 with the 
 expedition 
 against 
 Epidaurus. 
 
 55 - 
 
 Conference 
 held at 
 Mantinea. 
 War be¬ 
 tween Epi¬ 
 daurus and 
 Argos inter¬ 
 mitted and 
 then re¬ 
 newed. 
 
 victim as a tribute for a the water meadows a to the B.c. 419. 
 temple of Apollo Pythaeus over which the Argives had ' 9 °’ 2 ‘ 
 chief authority, and they had not done so. But this 
 charge was a mere pretext; for in any case Alcibiades 
 and the Argives had determined, if possible, to attach 
 Epidaurus to their league, that they might keep the 
 Corinthians quiet, and enable the Athenians to bring 
 forces to Argos direct from Aegina instead of sailing 
 round the promontory of Scyllaeum. So the Argives 
 prepared to invade Epidauria, as if they wished on their 
 own account to exact payment of the sacrifice. 
 
 About the same time the Lacedaemonians with their 
 whole force, under the command of king Agis the son 
 of Archidamus, likewise made an expedition. They 
 marched as far as Leuctra, a place on their own frontier 
 in the direction of Mount Lycaeum. No one, not even 
 the cities whence the troops came, knew whither the 
 expedition was going. But at the frontier the sacrifices 
 proved unfavourable ; so they returned, and sent word to 
 their allies that, when the coming month was over, which 
 was Carneus, a month held sacred by the Dorians, they 
 should prepare for an expedition. When they had re¬ 
 treated, the Argives, setting out on the twenty-seventh 
 day of the month before Carneus, and continuing the 
 observance of this day during the whole time of the 
 expedition, invaded and devastated the territory of 
 Epidaurus. The Epidaurians summoned their allies, 
 but some of them refused to come, pleading the sanctity 
 of the month; others came as far as the frontier of 
 Epidauria and there stopped. 
 
 While the Argives were in Epidauria, envoys from the 
 different cities met at Mantinea, on the invitation of the 
 Athenians. A conference was held, at which Euphamidas 
 the Corinthian remarked that their words and their 
 actions were at variance ; for they were conferring about 
 peace while the Epidaurians and their allies were in the 
 field against the Argives; first let envoys from both 
 
 a Or, reading / 3 ora/xiW, a ana £ 'Keyop.zvov, simply ‘the meadows.’ 
 
'Q’w 
 
 C. 419. 
 1. 90, 2. 
 
 WAR BETWEEN EPIDAURUS AND ARGOS . 379 
 
 parties go and induce the armies to disband, and then V. 
 they might come back and discuss the peace. His 
 advice was approved ; so they went straight to the 
 Argives and compelled them to withdraw from Epi- 
 dauria. But, when they re-assembled, they were still 
 unable to agree, and the Argives again invaded and 
 began to ravage the Epidaurian territory. Whereupon 
 the Lacedaemonians likewise made an expedition as far 
 as Caryae ; but again the sacrifices at the frontier proved 
 unfavourable, and they returned home. The Argives, 
 after devastating about one-third of Epidauria, also 
 returned home. One thousand Athenian hoplites, under 
 the command of Alcibiades, had come to their aid. But 
 hearing that the Lacedaemonian expedition was over, 
 and seeing that there was no longer any need of them, 
 they departed. And so passed the summer. 
 
 In the following winter the Lacedaemonians, unknown 56. 
 to the Athenians, sent by sea to Epidaurus a garrison of The Lace- 
 
 daemonians 
 
 three hundred under the command of Agesippidas. The send a 
 
 Argives came to the Athenians and complained that, by^eaTo 
 
 notwithstanding the clause in the treaty which forbade f 
 
 the passage of enemies through the territory of any of ^ 0 ^ rate 
 
 the contracting parties a , they had allowed the Lacedae- Athenians 
 
 monians to pass by sea along the Argive coast. If they the Lace- 
 
 did not retaliate by replacing the Messenians and Helots f 0 a pa S 0 s nianS 
 
 in Pylos, and letting them ravage Laconia, they, the kn 
 
 Arrives, would consider themselves wronged. The declare the 
 
 7 • treaty 
 
 Athenians, by the advice of Alcibiades, inscribed at bro ken. 
 
 the foot of the column on which the treaty was re¬ 
 corded 15 words to the effect that the Lacedaemonians 
 had not abided by their oaths, and thereupon conveyed 
 the Helots recently settled at Cranii c to Pylos that 
 they might plunder the country, but they took no 
 further steps. During the winter the war between 
 the Argives and Epidaurians continued ; there was no 
 regular engagement, but there were ambuscades and 
 incursions in which losses were inflicted, now on one 
 a Cp. V. 47. §3. b Cp. v. 18. § 4; 23. § 5. 0 Cp. v. 35 fin, 
 
380 LACEDAEMONIANS MAKE WAR UPON ARGOS. 
 
 V. side, now on the other. At the end of, winter, when 
 the spring was approaching, the Argives came with 
 scaling-ladders against Epidaurus, expecting to find 
 that the place was stripped of its defenders by the 
 war, and could be taken by storm. But the attempt 
 failed, and they returned. So the winter came to an 
 end, and with it the thirteenth year of the war. 
 
 57 - In the middle of the following summer, the Lacedae- 
 daemonians mon i ans 3 seeing that their Epidaurian allies were in 
 tak lG th th S rea t distress, and that several cities of Peloponnesus 
 field in had seceded from them, while others were disaffected, 
 Thdj S liiies and knowing that if they did not quickly take measures 
 Plifius 1 at precaution the evil would spread, made war on Argos 
 with their whole forces, including the Helots, under the 
 command of Agis the son of Archidamus, the Lacedae¬ 
 monian king. The Tegeans and the other Arcadian 
 allies of the Lacedaemonians took part in the expedi¬ 
 tion. The rest of their allies, both from within and 
 without the Peloponnesus, mustered at Phlius. Among 
 the other contingents there came from Boeotia five 
 thousand heavy-armed, and as many light-armed, five 
 hundred cavalry, and attached to each horseman a foot- 
 soldier; and from Corinth two thousand heavy-armed, 
 while the Phliasians joined with their whole force, be¬ 
 cause the army was to assemble in their country. 
 
 58. The Argives, having had previous notice of the Lace- 
 TheArgi ves daemonian preparations, and seeing that they were 
 allies march actually on their march to join the rest of the army 
 dia° there at Phlius, now took the field themselves. The Manti- 
 the y Lace- neans and their allies and three thousand Elean hop- 
 daemonians lites came to their aid. -They advanced to Methvdrium 
 
 isolated. . A .. 1 , J 
 
 But Agis in Arcadia, where they fell in with the Lacedaemonians. 
 and d fo S in h s em The two armi es each occupied a hill, and the Argives, 
 the army f thinking that they now ka d the Lacedaemonians alone, 
 at Phlius. prepared for action. But in the night Agis removed 
 his forces unknown to them and joined the allies at 
 Phlius. At dawn the Argives became aware of his 
 departure, and moved first to Argos, then to the 
 
 mo (no 
 
MOVEMENTS OF THE TWO ARMIES. 381 
 
 BjC. 418. Nemean road, by which they expected the Lacedae- V. 
 monians and their allies to descend into the plain. But 
 Agis, instead of taking the road by which he was 
 expected, led the Lacedaemonians, Arcadians, and Epi- 
 daurians by a more difficult path, and so made his way 
 down ; the Corinthians, Pellenians, and Phliasians went 
 by another steep pass; the Boeotians, Megarians, and 
 Sicyonians he commanded to descend by the Nemean 
 road, where the Argives had taken up their position, in 
 o; der that, if the Argives should return and attack his 
 own division of the army in the plain, they might be 
 pursued and harassed by their cavalry. Having made 
 these dispositions, and having come down into the 
 plain, he began to devastate Saminthus and the neigh¬ 
 bourhood. 
 
 It was now daylight, and the Argives, who had be- 59. 
 come aware of his movement, quitted Nemea and went The Argives 
 in search of the enemy. Encountering the Phliasian rounded by 
 and Corinthian forces, they killed a few of the Phlia- *ho enter' 
 sians, and had rather more of their own troops killed by the , Ar & ive 
 
 1 territory 
 
 the Corinthians. The Boeotians, Megarians, and Sicyo- in three 
 nians marched as they were ordered towards Nemea, but they are in 
 found the Argives no longer there, for by this time they dange^of 
 had descended from the high ground, and seeing their ^rewhSiy 
 lands ravaged were drawing up their troops in order of unconsd- 
 battle. The Lacedaemonians prepared to meet them, two'of their 
 The Argives were now surrounded by their enemies ; propofea 611 
 for on the side of the plain the Lacedaemonians and truce * 
 their division of the army cut them off from the city; 
 from the hills above they were hemmed in by the Co¬ 
 rinthians, Phliasians and Pellenians, towards Nemea by 
 the Boeotians, Sicyonians, and Megarians, and in the 
 absence of the Athenians, who alone of their allies had 
 not arrived, they had no cavalry. The main body of 
 the Argives and their allies had no conception of their 
 danger. They thought that their position was a favour¬ 
 able one, and that they had cut off the Lacedaemonians 
 in their own country and close to the city of Argos. 
 
382 
 
 HASTY PEACE CONCLUDED. 
 
 V. But two of the Argives, Thrasyllus one of the five b.c. 418* 
 generals, and Alciphron t e proxenus of the Lacedae- ‘ 901 3 ‘ 
 monians, came to Agis when the armies were on the 
 point of engaging, and urged him privately not to fight; 
 the Argives were ready to offer and accept a fair arbi¬ 
 tration, if the Lacedaemonians had any complaint to 
 make of them ; they would gladly conclude a treaty, 
 and be at peace for the fut re. 
 
 60. These Argives spoke of their own motion; they had 
 The truce no authority from the people ; and Agis, likewise on his 
 own authority, accepted their proposals, not conferring 
 nificent ag " with his countrymen at large, but only with one of the 
 fhePeio Lacedaex.onian magistrates who accompanied the ex- 
 ponnesians pedition. He made a treaty with the Argives for four 
 home. months, within which they were to execute their agree- 
 greal fault ment ; and then, without saying a word to any of the 
 with their a lli es he at once withdrew his army. The Lacedae- 
 
 command- / __ J 
 
 ers, monians and their allies followed Agis out of respect for 
 
 the law, but they blamed him severely among them¬ 
 selves. For they believed that they had lost a glorious 
 opportunity; their enemies had been surrounded on 
 every side both by horse and foot ; and yet they were 
 returning home having done nothing worthy of their 
 great effort. No finer Hellenic army had ever up to that 
 day been collected ; its appearance was most striking at 
 Nemea while the host was still one ; the Lacedaemo¬ 
 nians were there in their full strength ; arrayed by their 
 side were Arcadians, Boeotians, Corinthians, Sicyonians, 
 Pellenians, Phliasians, and Megarians, from each state 
 chosen men—they might have been thought a match not 
 only for the Argive confederacy, but for another as large. 
 
 So the army returned and dispersed to their homes, 
 much out of humour with Agis. 
 
 and the The Argives on their part found still greater fault 
 stiifgreater. with those who had made the peace, unauthorised by 
 the people; they too thought that such an opportunity 
 would never recur, and that it was the Lacedaemonians 
 who had escaped, for the combat would have taken 
 
GQO 
 
 MORE ATHENIAN TROOPS IN PELOPONNESE. 383 
 
 c. 418. place close to their own city, and they had numerous V. 
 
 * 9 °‘ 3 ‘ and brave allies. And so, as they were retreating and 
 had reached the bed of the Charadrus, where they hold 
 military trials before they enter the city, they began to 
 stone Thrasyllus. He saved his life by flying to the 
 altar, but they confiscated his property. 
 
 Soon afterwards there arrived an Athenian reinforce- 61. 
 
 ment of a thousand hoplites and three hundred horse, 
 
 under the command of Laches and Nicostratus. The allies refuse 
 
 Argives, although dissatisfied with the truce, were re- ledge the 
 
 luctant to break it, so they bade them depart; and, when TheArgives 
 
 they desired to treat, they would not present them to 
 
 the assembly until they were compelled by the im- its violation. 
 
 /. . __ . , t-i ii- iit Their united 
 
 portumty of their Mantinean and Llean allies, who had forces be- 
 
 not yet left Argos. The Athenians then, speaking by cSSnis, 
 the mouth of their ambassador Alcibiades, told the | ur ~ 
 Argives in the presence of the rest that they had no to them, 
 right to make the truce at all independently of their 
 allies, and that, the Athenians having arrived at the 
 opportune moment, they should fight at once. The 
 allies were convinced, and they all, with the exception 
 of the Argives, immediately marched against Orcho- 
 menus in Arcadia; the Argives, though consenting, did 
 not join them at first, but they came afterwards. Their 
 united forces then sat down before Orchomenus, which 
 they assailed repeatedly; they were especially anxious 
 to get the place into their hands, because certain Ar¬ 
 cadian hostages had been deposited there by the 
 Lacedaemonians. The Orchomenians, considering the 
 weakness of their fortifications and the numbers of the 
 enemy, and beginning to fear that they might perish 
 before any one came to their assistance, agreed to join 
 the alliance: they were to give hostages of their own 
 to the Mantineans, and to deliver up those whom the 
 Lacedaemonians had deposited with them. 
 
 The allied force, now in possession of Orchomenus, 62. 
 considered against what town they should next P ro " 
 ceed ; the Eleans wanted them to attack Lepreum, the allies now 
 
V. 
 
 quarrel 
 among 
 themselves. 
 The Eleans 
 return 
 home ; the 
 rest of the 
 allies pre¬ 
 pare to at¬ 
 tack Tegea. 
 
 63 - 
 
 The Lace¬ 
 daemonians 
 are furious 
 with Agis. 
 He pacifies 
 them. 
 Neverthe¬ 
 less they 
 appoint ten 
 Spartans 
 to be his 
 advisers. 
 
 64. 
 
 The Lace¬ 
 daemonians 
 again lead 
 forth their 
 whole force 
 to the sup¬ 
 port of 
 Tegea. 
 
 384 EXASPERATION OF LACEDAEMONIANS. 
 
 Mantineans Tegea. The Argives and Athenians sided B^c. 418. 
 with the Mantineans ; whereupon the Eleans, indignant ’ 901 3 ' 
 that they had not voted for the expedition against Le- 
 preum, returned home, but the remainder of the allies 
 made preparations at Mantinea to attack Tegea. They 
 were assisted by a party within the walls who were ready 
 to betray the place to them. 
 
 The Lacedaemonians, when after making the four 
 months’ truce they had returned home, severely blamed 
 Agis because he had not conquered Argos, and had lost 
 an opportunity of which, in their own judgment, they 
 had never before had the like. For it was no easy 
 matter to bring together a body of allies so numerous 
 and brave. But when the news came that Orchomenus 
 had fallen they were furious, and in a fit of passion, 
 which was unlike their usual character, they had almost 
 made up their minds to raze his house and fine him in 
 the sum of a hundred thousand drachmae a . But he 
 besought them not to punish him, promising that he 
 would atone for his error by some brave action in the 
 field ; if he did not keep his word they might do as 
 they pleased with him. So they did not inflict the fine 
 or demolish his house, but on this occasion they passed 
 a law which had no precedent in their history, providing 
 that ten Spartans should be appointed his counsellors b , 
 who were to give their consent before he could lead the 
 army out of the city. 
 
 Meanwhile word was brought from their friends in 
 Tegea that they must come at once, since Tegea was 
 about to secede and had almost seceded already to the 
 Argives and their allies. Whereupon the Lacedae¬ 
 monians led out their whole force, including the Helots, 
 with an alacrity which they had never before displayed, 
 and marched to Orestheum in Maenalia. They told 
 
 a About £ 6 joo, supposing the sum to be given in Aeginetan 
 drachmae. 
 
 b Cp. the cases of Cnemus, ii. 85 init.; Alcidas, iii. 69 med.; As- 
 tyochus, viii. 39 med., for a somewhat similar proceeding. 
 
CQO 
 
 MEETING OF THE TWO ARMIES. 385 
 
 .c. 418. their Arcadian allies to assemble and follow them at V. 
 
 ' 9 °' 3 ‘ once to Tegea. When the army had proceeded as far 
 as Orestheum they dismissed the sixth part, including 
 the elder and the younger men, who were to keep guard 
 at home, and arrived at Tegea with the rest of their 
 troops. Not long afterwards the Arcadian allies ap¬ 
 peared. They had also sent to the Corinthians, and to the 
 Boeotians, Phocians, and Locrians, whom they summoned 
 to meet them with all speed at Mantinea. But the notice 
 given to the allies was short, and their passage was barred 
 by the enemies’ country, which they could not easily 
 traverse unless they waited for one another and came 
 all together. However, they did their best. The Lace¬ 
 daemonians, accompanied by their Arcadian allies, in¬ 
 vaded the territory of Mantinea, and pitching their camp 
 near the temple of Heracles, wasted the country. 
 
 When the Argives and their allies saw the enemy 65. 
 they took up a steep and hardly assailable position, and TheArgives 
 arranged themselves in order of battle. The Lacedae- hm Upy a 
 monians instantly charged them, and had proceeded Jaemonians 
 within a iavelin or stone’s throw when one of the elder ( J iar & e 
 
 J m them. 
 
 Spartans, seeing the strength of the ground which they Agis nearly 
 were attacking, called out to Agis that he was trying to second fatal 
 mend one error by another; he meant to say that his fnduced U to S 
 present mistaken forwardness was intended to repair the ^3^^ 
 discredit of his former retreat. And, either in con- Afterawhiie 
 sequence of this exclamation or because a some new who are 
 thought suddenly struck him a , he withdrew his army in sf t tsfi e d S " 
 haste without actually engaging. He marched back into *i® ir 
 the district of Tegea, and proceeded to turn the water follow him. 
 into the Mantinean territory. This water is a constant 
 source of war between the Mantineans and Tegeans, on 
 account of b the great harm which is done b to one or other 
 of them according to the direction which the stream takes. 
 
 Agis hoped that the Argives and their allies when they 
 
 a Or, ‘ some new thought, or the same thought (which had oc¬ 
 curred to the Spartan elder), suddenly struck him.’ 
 
 b Or, ‘ the harm which is commonly done.’ 
 
 C C 
 
386 THE LACEDAEMONIANS DISAPPEAR. 
 
 V. heard of this movement would come down from the hill 
 and try to prevent it; he could then fight them on level 
 ground. Accordingly he stayed about the water during 
 the whole day, diverting the stream. Now the Argives 
 and their confederates were at first amazed at the sudden 
 retreat of their enemies when they were so near, and did 
 not know what to think. But when the Lacedaemonians 
 had retired and disappeared from view, and they found 
 themselves standing still and not pursuing, they once 
 more began to blame their own generals. Their cry 
 was that they had already let the Lacedaemonians slip 
 when they had them at a disadvantage close to Argos ; 
 and now they were running away and no one pursued 
 them ; the enemy were just allowed to escape, while 
 their own army was quietly betrayed. The commanders 
 were at first bewildered by the outcry; but soon they 
 quitted the hill, and advancing into the plain took up 
 a position with the intention of attacking. 
 
 66 . On the following day the Argives and their allies 
 The Lace- drew themselves up in the order in which they intended 
 
 daemonians , J 
 
 are sur- to fight should they meet with the enemy. Meanwhile 
 
 Organ’isa- the Lacedaemonians returned from the water to their 
 army° f their encampment near the temple of Heracles. There 
 
 they saw quite close to them the Argive army, which 
 had moved on from the hill, and was already in order 
 of battle. Never within living memory were the Lace¬ 
 daemonians more dismayed than at that instant; not 
 a moment was to be lost : immediately they hurried 
 every man to his own place, the king Agis, according 
 to the law, directing their several movements. For 
 when the king is in the field nothing is done without 
 him ; he in person gives orders to the polemarchs, which 
 they convey to the commanders of divisions; these 
 again to the commanders of fifties, the commanders of 
 fifties to the commanders of enomoties, and these to 
 the enomoty. In like manner any more precise in¬ 
 structions are passed down through the army, and 
 quickly reach their destination. For almost the whole 
 
 o w 
 
cd o 
 
 ARRAY OF THE TWO ARMIES. 387 
 
 c. 418. Lacedaemonian army are officers who have officers under V. 
 
 ' 9 °’ 3 ‘ them, and the responsibility of executing an order de¬ 
 volves upon many. 
 
 On this occasion the Sciritae formed the left wing, a 67. 
 position to which in the Lacedaemonian army they have Disposition 
 
 1- 1 , . . , \ 1 . . of the 
 
 a peculiar and exclusive right. Next to the Sciritae troops, 
 were placed the troops who had served in Chalcidice 
 under Brasidas, and with them the Neodamodes. Next 
 in order were ranged the several divisions of the Lace¬ 
 daemonian army, and near them the Heraeans of Ar¬ 
 cadia ; next the Maenalians, and on the right wing the 
 Tegeans, and a few Lacedaemonians at the extreme 
 point of the line ; the cavalry were placed on both wings. 
 
 This was the order of the Lacedaemonians. On the 
 right wing of the enemy were placed the Mantineans, 
 because the action was to be fought in their country, and 
 next to them such of the Arcadians as were their allies. 
 
 Then came the select force of a thousand Argives, 
 whom the city had long trained at the public expense 
 in military exercises; next the other Argives, and after 
 them their allies, the Cleonaeans and Orneatae. Last 
 of all the Athenians occupied the left wing, supported 
 by their own cavalry. 
 
 Such was the order and composition of the two armies: 68. 
 
 that of the Lacedaemonians appeared to be the larger, Numbers 
 but what the number was, either of the several con- army could 
 tingents, or of the total on either side, I cannot pretend rateiyTscer- 
 exactly to say, for the secrecy of the government did tained - 
 not allow the strength of the Lacedaemonian army to 
 be known, and the numbers on the other side were 
 thought to be exaggerated by the vanity natural to men 
 when speaking of their own forces. However, the fol¬ 
 lowing calculation may give some idea of the Lacedae¬ 
 monian numbers. There were seven divisions in the 
 field, besides the Sciritae who numbered six hundred ; 
 in each division there were four pentecosties, in every 
 pentecosty four enomoties, and of each enomoty there 
 fought in the front rank four. The depth of the line 
 C c % 
 
388 LAST WORDS OF THE GENERALS. 
 
 V. was not everywhere equal, but was left to the discretion B.c. 418. 
 of the generals commanding divisions ; on an average it ‘ 901 3 ' 
 was eight deep. The front line consisted of four hundred 
 and forty-eight men, exclusive of the Sciritae a . 
 
 69. The two armies were now on the point of engaging, 
 
 The Man- but first the several commanders addressed exhortations 
 
 givS?and r to their own contingents. The Mantineans were told 
 
 received 155 they were not only about to fight for their country, 
 
 eloquent ex- b u t WO uld have to choose between dominion b or slavery: 
 hortations 
 
 from their having tried both, did they want to be deprived of the 
 But the one, or to have any more acquaintance with the other ? 
 monians" The Argives were reminded that in old times they had 
 “ been sovereign, and more recently the equals of Sparta, 
 in the Peloponnese; would they acquiesce for ever in 
 the loss of their supremacy, and lose at the same time 
 the chance of revenging themselves upon their hateful 
 neighbours, who had wronged them again and again? 
 
 The Athenians were told that it was glorious to be 
 fighting side by side with a host of brave allies and to 
 be found equal to the bravest. If they could conquer 
 the Lacedaemonians in Peloponnese, they would both 
 extend and secure their dominion, and need never fear 
 an invader again. Such were the exhortations addressed 
 to the Argives and to their allies. But the Lacedae¬ 
 monians, both in their war-songs and in the words which 
 a man spoke to his comrade, did but remind one another 
 of what their brave spirits knew already 0 . For they had 
 learned that true safety was to be found in long previous 
 training, and not in eloquent exhortations uttered when 
 they were going into action. 
 
 70. At length the two armies went forward. The Argives 
 The Argives an d their allies advanced to the charge with great fury 
 
 march into . y & 
 
 battle with and determination. The Lacedaemonians moved slowly 
 teL»' and to the music of many flute-players, who were sta- 
 “r tioned in their ranks, and played, not as an act of religion, 
 
 a The whole number of the Lacedaemonians is 3584 without the 
 Sciritae, or with them 4184. 
 
 b Cp. v. 29 init. c Cp. iv. 17 med., 95 init., 126 init. 
 
ow 
 
 AGIS CHANGES FRONT IN FACE OF ENEMY. 389 
 
 ■C. 418. but in order that the army might march evenly and in V. 
 
 ‘ 9 °' 3 ' true measure, and that the line might not break, as often the sound 
 
 1 . . of music. 
 
 happens in great armies when they go into battle. 
 
 Before they had actually closed a thought occurred to 71. 
 Agis. All armies, when engaging, are apt to thrust out- A s is trie s to 
 wards their right wing ; and either of the opposing forces left wing by 
 tends to outflank his enemy’s left with his own right, H the 
 because every soldier individually fears for his exposed [husieavSg 
 side, which he tries to cover with the shield of his com- a gap which 
 rade on the right, conceiving that the closer he draws in vours to 
 the better he will be protected. The first man in the Schmern 6 " 
 front rank of the right wing is originally responsible for hls 
 the deflection, for he always wants to withdraw from the 
 enemy his own exposed side, and the rest of the army, 
 from a like fear, follow his example. In this battle the 
 line of the Mantineans, who were on the Argive right 
 wing, extended far beyond the Sciritae; and still further, 
 in proportion as the army to which they belonged was 
 the larger, did the Lacedaemonians and Tegeans on the 
 Lacedaemonian right wing extend beyond the Athenian 
 left. Agis was afraid that the Lacedaemonian left wing 
 would be surrounded, and, thinking that the Mantineans 
 outflanked them too far, he signalled to the Sciritae and 
 the old soldiers of Brasidas to make a lateral movement 
 away from his own division of the army, and so cover the 
 line of the Mantineans : to fill up the space thus left 
 vacant he ordered Hipponoidas and Aristocles, two of the 
 polemarchs, to bring up their two divisions from the right 
 wing, thinking that he would still have more troops than 
 he wanted there, and that he would thus strengthen that 
 part of his line which was opposed to the Mantineans. 
 
 He had given the order at the last moment, when the 7 2 - 
 charge had already begun, and Aristocles and Hipponoi- t ^m<Lt e ~ 
 das refused to make the movement. (For the cowardice refusing to 
 which they were supposed to have shown on this occa- Mantineans 
 sion they were afterwards banished from Sparta.) The ru S h ArglVes 
 enemv were upon him before he was ready, and as the through the 
 
 J 1 , 1 • 1 1 1 r 1 & a P and de ~ 
 
 two divisions would not advance into the place left by feat the left 
 
39 ° 
 
 BATTLE OF MANTINEA. 
 
 V. the Sciritae, Agis ordered the Sciritae themselves to close 
 wing^f the U p 5 b u t he found that it was too late, and that neither 
 monians. could they now fill the vacant space. Then the Lace¬ 
 daemonians showed in a remarkable manner that, al¬ 
 though utterly failing in their tactics, they could win by 
 their courage alone. When they were at close quarters 
 with the enemy, the Mantinean right put to flight the 
 Sciritae and the soldiers of Brasidas. The Mantineans 
 and their allies and the thousand chosen Argives dashed 
 in through the gap in the Lacedaemonian ranks and 
 completed their defeat; they surrounded and routed 
 them, and so drove them to their waggons, where they 
 killed some of the elder men who were appointed to 
 guard them. In this part of the field the Lacedae¬ 
 monians were beaten, but elsewhere, and especially in 
 the centre of the army, where the king Agis and the 
 three hundred Knights, as they are called, who attend 
 him, were posted, they charged the elder Argives, the 
 Five Divisions as they are termed, the Cleonaeans, Ornea- 
 tae, and those of the Athenians who were ranged with 
 them, and put them to flight. Most of them never even 
 struck a blow, but gave way at once on the approach of 
 the Lacedaemonians ; some were actually trodden under 
 foot, being overtaken by the advancing host. 
 
 73. When the allies and the Argives had yielded in this 
 Danger of quarter, they became severed from their companions to 
 
 theAthe- , , r ’ J „ . . , . , r , .. 
 
 nians, the left as well as to the right of the line; meanwhile 
 oniyaverted the extended right wing of the Lacedaemonians and the 
 tiremenf of Tegeans threatened to surround the Athenians. They 
 the Lace- were in great danger; their men were being hemmed 
 
 daemomans 0 
 
 on the right in at one point and were already defeated at another; 
 goto'theas- and but for their cavalry, which did them good service, 
 thekown f wou ^ have suffered more than any other part of 
 
 defeated the army. Just then Agis, observing the distress of the 
 the left. Lacedaemonian left wing, which was opposed to the 
 daemonians Mantineans and the thousand select Argives, com- 
 battie^but ma nded his whole forces to go and assist their own 
 su e n far PUr " defeated troops. Whereupon the Athenians, when their 
 
 mo 
 
THE GEE A TEST OF HELLENIC BATTLES. 391 
 
 c. 418. opponents turned aside and began to move away from V. 
 
 • 9 °> 3 * th e m, quietly made their escape, and along with them 
 the defeated Argives. The Mantineans and their allies 
 and the chosen force of Argives, seeing their army con¬ 
 quered and the Lacedaemonians bearing down upon 
 them, gave up all thoughts of following up their advan¬ 
 tage and fled. The loss incurred by the chosen Argives 
 was small, that of the Mantineans more serious. The 
 pursuit was not fierce nor the flight protracted, for the 
 Lacedaemonians fight long and refuse to move until 
 they have put an enemy to flight, but, having once 
 defeated him, they do not follow him far or long. 
 
 Thus, or nearly thus, went the battle, by far the 74. 
 greatest of Hellenic battles which had taken place for Numbers 
 a long time, and fought by the most famous cities. The 
 Lacedaemonians exposed the arms of the enemies' dead, 
 and made a trophy of them ; they then plundered the 
 bodies, and taking up their own dead carried them away 
 to Tegea, where they were buried; the enemies’ dead 
 they gave back under a flag of truce. Of the Argives, 
 Orneatae, and Cleonaeans there fell seven hundred, of the 
 Mantineans two hundred, and of the Athenians, including 
 their settlers in Aegina a , two hundred, and both their 
 generals. As to the Lacedaemonians, their allies were 
 not hard pressed and did not incur any considerable loss ; 
 how many of themselves fell it was hard to ascertain 
 precisely, but their dead are reported to have numbered 
 about three hundred. 
 
 Just before the battle, Pleistoanax, the other king, 75 - 
 led out of Sparta a reinforcement composed of the ^emonians 
 elder and younger citizens b ; he had proceeded as far as go home 
 Tegea when he heard of the victory, and returned. The brate the 
 Lacedaemonians sent and countermanded the reinforce- Greatmorai 
 ments from Corinth and beyond the Isthmus ; they then j^ct of the 
 went home themselves and, dismissing the allies, cele¬ 
 brated the festival of the Carnea, for which this hap¬ 
 pened to be the season. Thus, by a single action, they 
 a Cp. ii. 27 med. b Cp. v. 64 med. 
 
392 
 
 THE CARNE A AGAIN. 
 
 V. wiped out the charge of cowardice, which was due to B.c. 418. 
 their misfortune at Sphacteria, and of general stupidity ' 901 3 ’ 
 and sluggishness, then current against them in Hellas. 
 
 They were now thought a to have been hardly used by 
 fortune a , but in character to be the same as ever. 
 
 The very day before the battle, the Epidaurians with 
 their whole force invaded the territory of Argos, expect¬ 
 ing to find it deserted ; they killed many of the soldiers 
 who had been left to protect the country when the main 
 army took the field b . After the battle three thousand 
 Elean hoplites came to the aid of the Mantineans, and a 
 second detachment of a thousand from Athens. While 
 the Lacedaemonians were still celebrating the Carnea 
 they marched all together against Epidaurus, and began 
 to surround the city with a wall, dividing the task among 
 them. The other allies did not persevere, but the Athe¬ 
 nians soon completed their own portion, the fortification 
 of the promontory on which the temple of Here stood. 
 
 In this part of the works a garrison was left, to which 
 all furnished a contingent; they then returned to their 
 several cities. So the summer ended. 
 
 76. At the very beginning of the following winter, after 
 The Lace- the celebration of the Carnea, the Lacedaemonians led 
 
 daemonian 
 
 party at out an army as far as Tegea, whence they sent proposals 
 terSin^to of peace to the Argives. There had always been some 
 thedeiHS- P artizans of Lacedaemon in the city, who had wanted to 
 cracy, make p U t down the democracy. After the battle it was far 
 
 peace. J 
 
 easier for this party to draw the people into an alliance 
 with Sparta. Their intention was to make first of all a 
 peace, and then an alliance, with the Lacedaemonians, 
 and, having done so, to set upon the people. And now 
 there arrived in Argos, Lichas the son of Arcesilaus, the 
 proxenus of the Argives, offering them one of two alter¬ 
 natives : There were terms of peace, but they might also 
 have war if they pleased. A warm discussion ensued, 
 for Alcibiades happened to be in the place. The party 
 
 a Or, c to have incurred disgrace through a mishap.’ 
 b Reading i^ekdovTav avrcov. 
 
TREATY OF PEACE. 
 
 393 
 
 B.c. 418. which had been intriguing for the Lacedaemonians, and 
 9 ’ 3 had at last ventured to come forward openly, persuaded 
 the Argives to accept the terms of peace, which were as 
 follows:— 
 
 ‘It seems good to the Lacedaemonian assembly to 
 make an agreement with the Argives on the following 
 terms:— 
 
 I. The Argives shall restore to the Orchomenians a 
 the youths/and to the Maenalians the men whom they 
 hold as hostages, and to the Lacedaemonians a the men 
 who were deposited in Mantinea. 
 
 II. They shall also evacuate Epidauria, and demolish 
 the fortifications which they have erected there. If the 
 Athenians refuse to evacuate Epidauria, they shall be 
 enemies to the Argives and Lacedaemonians, and to the 
 allies of the Lacedaemonians, and to the allies of the 
 Argives. 
 
 III. If the Lacedaemonians have any youths be¬ 
 longing to any of the allies in their country, they shall 
 restore them to their several cities. 
 
 IV. Concerning the sacrifice to the God, the Epi- 
 daurians shall be permitted to take an oath which the 
 Argives shall formally tender to them. 
 
 V. The cities in Peloponnesus, both small and great, 
 shall be all independent, according to their ancestral laws. 
 
 VI. If any one from without Peloponnesus comes 
 against Peloponnesus with evil intent, the Pelopon¬ 
 nesians shall take counsel together and shall repel the 
 enemy; and the several states shall bear such a share in 
 the war as may seem equitable to the Peloponnesians. 
 
 VII. The allies of the Lacedaemonians without Pelo¬ 
 ponnesus shall be in the same position as the other allies 
 of the Lacedaemonians and the allies of the Argives, 
 and they shall retain their present territory. 
 
 VIII. Both parties b may if they think fit show this 
 
 a Cp. v. 61 fin. 
 
 b Or, taking avrois of the allies: ‘ may show this agreement to 
 their allies and make terms with them if the allies think fit; ’ or, 
 
 V. 
 
 77 - 
 
 The terms 
 of the first 
 treaty. 
 
394 
 
 TREATY OF ALLIANCE. 
 
 V. agreement to their allies and make terms with them b , but 
 if the allies raise any objection, they shall dismiss them 
 to their homes. 5 
 
 78. When the Argives had accepted these propositions in 
 The ai- the first instance the Lacedaemonian army returned 
 Argos with home from Tegea. The two states now began to hold 
 Athens,'and intercourse with one another, and not long afterwards 
 the same party which had negotiated the treaty con¬ 
 trived that the Argives should renounce their alliance 
 with Mantinea, Athens, and Elis, and make a new 
 treaty of alliance with Lacedaemon on the following 
 terms:— 
 
 c It seems good to the Lacedaemonians and to the 
 Argives to make peace and alliance for fifty years on 
 the following conditions :— 
 
 I. They shall submit to arbitration on fair and equal 
 terms, according to their ancestral customs. 
 the^Peio a11 ^he ot ^ er cities of Peloponnesus shall participate 
 
 ponnesian in the peace and alliance, and shall be independent and 
 
 cities, with . .... . . 
 
 fuller their own masters, retaining their own territory and 
 fortheirin- submitting to arbitration on fair and equal terms, ac- 
 dependence cor di n g to their ancestral customs. 
 
 and m case *> 
 
 of dispute III. All the allies of the Lacedaemonians outside 
 
 for arbitra- . 
 
 tion. Peloponnese shall share in the same terms as the 
 Lacedaemonians, and the allies of the Argives shall 
 be in the same position as the Argives, and shall retain 
 their present territory. 
 
 IV. If it shall be necessary to make an expedition in 
 common against any place, the Lacedaemonians and 
 the Argives shall consult together and fix the share 
 in the war which may be equitably borne by the allies. 
 
 V. If any of the states, either within or without Pelo¬ 
 ponnesus, have a dispute about a frontier, or any other 
 matter, the difference shall be duly settled. But should 
 
 referring ^v^akiaBai to the original agreement and giving a 
 different sense to the words at ko. avrois Soar} : ‘ may show the 
 agreement to their allies before they conclude it, in case they are 
 willing to come into it.’ 
 
 Elis is dis¬ 
 solved. 
 
 79 - 
 
 The terms 
 of the 
 second 
 treaty in¬ 
 clude an 
 alliance 
 which ex- 
 
 O to 
 
wo 
 
 SPARTA AND ARGOS AGAINST ATHENS. 395 
 
 .C. 418. a quarrel break out between two of the allied cities, they V. 
 
 9 °' 3 shall appeal to some state which both the cities deem to 
 be impartial. 
 
 VI. Justice shall be administered to the individual 
 citizens of each state according to their ancestral 
 customs.’ 
 
 Thus the peace and the alliance were concluded, and 80. 
 the Lacedaemonians and Argives settled with each The Lace- 
 
 0 daemonians 
 
 other any difference which they had about captures and Argives 
 
 made in the war, or about any other matter. They now tether 
 
 acted together, and passed a vote that no herald or 
 
 embassy should be received from the Athenians, unless The y in¬ 
 duce the 
 
 they evacuated the fortifications which they held in Chaicidian 
 Peloponnesus and left the country; they agreed also p^diccas 
 that they would not enter into alliance or make war 
 except in concert. They were very energetic in all ^ f V g p l | ation 
 their doings, and both Lacedaemonians and Argives sent daurus. 
 ambassadors to the Chaicidian cities in Thrace, and 
 to Perdiccas whom they persuaded to join their con¬ 
 federacy. He did not, however, immediately desert 
 the Athenians, but he was thinking of deserting, being 
 influenced by the example of the Argives ; for he was 
 himself of Argive descent a . The Argives and Lacedae¬ 
 monians renewed their former oaths to the Chalcidians 
 and swore new ones b . The Argives also sent envoys to 
 the Athenians bidding them evacuate the fortifications 
 which they had raised at Epidaurus. They, seeing that 
 their troops formed but a small part of the garrison, sent 
 Demosthenes to bring them away with him. When he 
 came he proposed to hold a gymnastic contest outside 
 the fort; upon this pretext he induced the rest of the 
 garrison to go out, and then shut the gates upon them. 
 
 Soon afterwards the Athenians renewed their treaty 
 with the Epidaurians, and themselves restored the fort 
 to them. 
 
 When the Argives deserted the alliance the Manti- 81. 
 neans held out for a time, but without the Argives they The 
 a Cp. ii. 99 iniL b Cp. i. 58 med.; v. 31 fin. 
 
396 THE ARGIVE DEMOCRACY REVIVES. 
 
 V. were helpless, and so they too came to terms with the B.c. 418. 
 
 • 1 1 • 1 • 01 . QO. Q. 
 
 Jerms with Lacedaemonians, and gave up their claim to supremacy 
 daemo- over the cities in Arcadia which had been subject to 
 TheArgive them a . Next the Lacedaemonians and the Argives, 
 put^down 7 eac ^ providing a thousand men, made a joint expedi- 
 by force, tion ; fi rs t the Lacedaemonians went alone and set up a 
 more oligarchical government at Sicyon ; then they and 
 the Argives uniting their forces put down the democracy 
 at Argos, and established an oligarchy which was in the 
 interest of the Lacedaemonians. These changes were 
 effected at the close of winter towards the approach 
 of spring, and so ended the fourteenth year of the war. 
 
 82. In the ensuing summer the people of Dium in Mount B.c. 417. 
 The popu- Athos revolted from the Athenians to the Chalcidians ; 0L 9 °' 4 ’ 
 zx Axgos, and the Lacedaemonians resettled the affairs of Achaia 
 themsefves u P on a footing more favourable to their interests than 
 of a Lace- hitherto. The popular party at Argos, reconstituting 
 
 daemoman 1 1 1 J 0 & 
 
 festival, at- themselves by degrees, plucked up courage, and, taking 
 
 t a ck and ^ 
 
 defeat the advantage of the festival of the Gymnopaediae at Lace- 
 Th^renew daemon, attacked the oligarchy. A battle took place in 
 nknai he " ^he : P°P u ^ ar P art y won, and either killed or ex- 
 
 liance and pelled their enemies. The oligarchy had sought help from 
 bund long their friends the Lacedaemonians, but they did not come 
 wails to the p or some time ; at last they put off the festival and went 
 to their aid. When they arrived at Tegea they heard 
 that the oligarchs had been defeated. They would pro¬ 
 ceed no further, but in spite of the entreaties of the 
 fugitives returned home and resumed the celebration of 
 the festival. Not long afterwards envoys came to them 
 both from the party now established in Argos and from 
 those who had been driven out, and in the presence of 
 their allies, after a long debate, they passed a vote con¬ 
 demning the victorious faction ; they then resolved to 
 send an expedition to Argos, but delays occurred and 
 time was lost. Meanwhile the democracy at Argos, 
 fearing the Lacedaemonians, and again courting the 
 Athenian alliance in which their hopes were centred, 
 a Cp. v. 29 init. 
 
B.C. 417 - 
 01. go, 4. 
 
 B.C. 416. 
 Ol. 91. 
 
 PERDICCAS AGAIN. 397 
 
 built Long Walls to the sea, in order that if they were V. 
 blockaded by land they might have the advantage, with 
 Athenian help, of introducing provisions by water. 
 
 Certain other states in Peloponnese were privy to this 
 project. The whole Argive people, the citizens them¬ 
 selves, their wives, and their slaves, set to work upon 
 the wall, and the Athenians sent them carpenters and 
 masons from Athens. So the summer ended. 
 
 In the ensuing winter the Lacedaemonians, hearing of 83. 
 the progress of the work, made an expedition to Argos The un- 
 with their allies, all but the Corinthians ; there was also wails are 
 a party at Argos itself acting in their interest. Agis the aSfde^ 
 son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, led the f tr °y ed 
 army. The support which they expected to find at Lacedae- 
 Argos failed them ; the walls however, which were ^j^ ians ' 
 not yet finished, were captured by them and razed to blockade 3 
 the ground ; they also seized Hysiae, a place in the Perdiccas. 
 Argive territory, and put to death all the free men whom 
 they caught ; they then withdrew, and returned to their 
 several cities. Next the Argives in their turn made 
 an expedition into the territory of Phlius, which they 
 ravaged because the Phliasians had received their exiles, 
 most of whom had settled there; they then returned 
 home. During the same winter the Athenians blockaded 
 Perdiccas in Macedonia, complaining of the league which 
 he had made with the Argives and Lacedaemonians ; and 
 also that he had been false to their alliance at a time 
 when they had prepared to send an army against the 
 Chalcidians and against Amphipolis under the com¬ 
 mand of Nicias the son of Niceratus. The army was 
 in fact disbanded chiefly owing to his withdrawal. So 
 he became their enemy. Thus the winter ended, and 
 with it the fifteenth year of the war. 
 
 In the ensuing summer, Alcibiades sailed to Argos 84. 
 
 with twenty ships, and seized any of the Argives who Alcibiades 
 
 were still suspected to be of the Lacedaemonian faction, suspected 
 
 three hundred in number; and the Athenians deposited t^ 1 Athe- 
 
 them in the subject islands near at hand. The Athe- nians > en¬ 
 raged at 
 
39<S ATHENIAN EXPEDITION TO MELOS. 
 
 V. nians next made an expedition against the island of 
 theinde- Melos with thirty ships of their own, six Chian, and 
 of the island two Lesbian, twelve hundred hoplites and three hun- 
 send thither dred archers besides twenty mounted archers of their 
 don Xped " own > an d about fifteen hundred hoplites furnished by 
 But first their allies in the islands. The Melians are colonists of 
 
 they try 
 
 negotiation, the Lacedaemonians who would not submit to Athens 
 like the other islanders. At first they were neutral and 
 took no part. But when the Athenians tried to coerce 
 them by ravaging their lands, they were driven into 
 open hostilities a . The generals, Cleomedes the son of 
 Lycomedes and Tisias the son of Tisimachus, encamped 
 with the Athenian forces on the island. But before 
 
 85 - 
 
 Since we 
 are to be 
 closeted 
 with you, 
 let us con¬ 
 verse and 
 not make 
 speeches. 
 
 86 . 
 
 We do not 
 object. But 
 discussion 
 between 
 you and 
 us is a 
 mockery, 
 and can 
 only end in 
 our ruin. 
 
 they did the country any harm they sent envoys to 
 negotiate with the Melians. Instead of bringing these 
 envoys before the people, the Melians desired them to 
 explain their errand to the magistrates and to the chief 
 men. They spoke as follows :— 
 
 £ Since we are not allowed to speak to the people, lest, 
 forsooth, they should be deceived by seductive and un¬ 
 answerable b arguments which they would hear set forth 
 in a single uninterrupted oration (for we are perfectly 
 aware that this is what you mean in bringing us before a 
 select few), you who are sitting here may as well make 
 assurance yet surer. Let us have no set speeches at all, 
 but do you reply to each several statement of which you 
 disapprove, and criticise it at once. Say first of all how 
 you like this mode of proceeding.’ 
 
 The Melian representatives answered:—‘The quiet 
 interchange of explanations is a reasonable thing, and 
 we do not object to that. But your warlike movements, 
 which are present not only to our fears but to our eyes, 
 seem to belie your words. We see that, although you 
 may reason with us, you mean to be our judges; and 
 that at the end of the discussion, if the justice of our 
 cause prevail and we therefore refuse to yield, we may 
 expect war ; if we are convinced by you, slavery.’ 
 a Cp. iii- 9 i k>it. b Or, 4 unexamined.’ 
 
 ow 
 
THE ME LI AN CONTROVERSY. 
 
 399 
 
 B.C. 416. 
 
 01. 91. 
 
 Ath. ‘Nay, but if you are only going to argue from V. 
 fancies about the future, or if you meet us with any other 8 7. 
 
 purpose than that of looking your circumstances in the Nay, but 
 face and saving your city, we have done; but if this is fookatfacts, 
 your intention we will proceed. 5 
 
 Mel. ‘ It is an excusable and natural thing that men 88. 
 in our position should have much to say and should it must be 
 
 . . J as you, and 
 
 indulge in many fancies. But we admit that this con- not as we, 
 ference has met to consider the question of our preser- please ‘ 
 vation; and therefore let the argument proceed in the 
 manner which you propose. 5 
 
 Ath. ‘Well, then, we Athenians will use no fine 89. 
 words : we will not go out of our way to prove at length No use in 
 
 , , . t 1 1 , talking 
 
 that we have a right to rule, because we overthrew the about right; 
 Persians a ; or that we attack you now because we are f s X the wSrd. 
 suffering any injury at your hands. We should not 
 convince you if we did ; nor must you expect to con¬ 
 vince us by arguing that, although a colony of the 
 Lacedaemonians, you have taken no part in their ex¬ 
 peditions, or that you have never done us any wrong. 
 
 But you and we should say what we really think, and 
 aim only at what is possible, for we both alike know 
 that into the discussion of human affairs the question of 
 justice only enters where the pressure of necessity is 
 equal, and that the powerful exact what they can, and 
 the weak grant what they must/ 
 
 Mel. ‘ Well, then, since you set aside justice and invite 90. 
 us to speak of expediency, in our judgment it is cer- For your 
 tainly expedient that you should respect a principle S, S ft S’ 
 which is for the common good ; ar d that to every man tSyoT 
 when in peril a reasonable claim should be accounted ^etolfstrict 
 a claim of right, and any plea which he is disposed to 
 urge, even if failing of the point a little, should help 
 his cause. Your interest in this principle is quite as 
 great as ours, b inasmuch as you, if you fall, will incur 
 
 a Cp. vi. 83 init. 
 
 b Or, ‘ inasmuch as you, if you disregard it, will by your example 
 
400 
 
 THE MELIAN CONTROVERSY. 
 
 V. the heaviest vengeance, and will be the most terrible 
 example to mankind V 
 
 91. Ath. ‘The fall of our empire, if it should fall, is 
 For our- no t an event to which we look forward with dismay; 
 have no for ruling states such as Lacedaemon are not cruel to 
 itTs S you their vanquished enemies. a And we are fighting not 
 leam^Uie tC> so mu ch against the Lacedaemonians, as against our 
 lesson of own subjects who may some day rise up and overcome 
 
 what is ex- J , 
 
 pedient their former masters a . But this is a danger which you 
 and h you. US may leave to us. And we will now endeavour to show 
 that we have come in the interests of our empire, and 
 that in what we are about to say we are only seeking 
 the preservation of your city. For we want to make you 
 ours with the least trouble to ourselves, and it is for the 
 interests of ns both that you should not be destroyed. 5 
 
 92. Mel. ‘ It may be your interest to be our masters, but 
 For you, how can it be ours to be your slaves? 5 
 
 yes. But J 
 
 how for us? Ath. c To you the gain will be that by submission you 
 
 93 - will avert the worst; and we shall be all the richer for 
 
 You will . , 
 
 suffer less your preservation. 
 
 gain'more! U Mcl. ‘But must we be your enemies? Will you not 
 
 94. receive us as friends if we are neutral and remain at 
 
 May we not p eace ^[th. you ?* 
 be neutral ? r J 
 
 92. Ath. ‘No, your enmity is not half so mischievous 
 Oursubjects to us as your friendship ; for the one is in the eyes of 
 
 would not r J 
 
 understand our subjects an argument of our power, the other of 
 that. •. 3 
 
 our weakness. 
 
 96. Mel. ‘But are your subjects really unable to distin- 
 Butweare guish between states in which you have no concern, and 
 of yours.° ny those which are chiefly your own colonies, and in some 
 cases have revolted and been subdued by you? 5 
 
 97 - Ath. c Why, they do not doubt that both of them have 
 
 justify others in inflicting the heaviest vengeance on you should 
 you fall.’ 
 
 a Or, taking ecrri de ... 6 aycov as a parenthesis and giving a 
 different sense to 7 rov and avrol : ‘ With the Lacedaemonians, how¬ 
 ever, we are not now contending; the real danger is from our many 
 subject states, who may of their own motion rise up and overcome 
 their masters.’ 
 
 B.C. 416. 
 Ol. 91. 
 
o,w 
 
 THE ME LI AN CONTROVERSY. 401 
 
 .c. 416. a good deal to say for themselves on the score of justice, V. 
 
 9 but they think that states like yours are left free because 
 
 they are able to defend themselves, and that we do not about jus- 
 attack them because we dare not. So that your sub- we Tay that 
 jection will give us an increase of security, as well as allow free- 
 an extension of empire. For we are masters of the sea, d . om c to in_ 
 
 t significant 
 
 and you who are islanders, and insignificant islanders islanders, 
 too, must not be allowed to escape us.’ 
 
 Mel. ‘ But do you not recognise another danger? For, 98. 
 once more, since you drive us from the plea of justice Butwi11 not 
 
 A J your policy 
 
 a and press upon us your doctrine of expediency a , we convert ail 
 must show you what is for our interest, and, if it be Tntoene- 
 for yours also, may hope to convince you:—Will you mies? 
 not be making enemies of all who are now neutrals? 
 
 When they see how you are treating us they will expect 
 you some day to turn against them ; and if so, are you 
 not strengthening the enemies whom you already have, 
 and bringing upon you others who, if they could help, 
 would never dream of being your enemies at all ?’ 
 
 Ath. ‘We do not consider our really dangerous ene- 99. 
 mies to be any of the peoples inhabiting the mainland The neutral 
 who, secure in their freedom, may defer indefinitely any the mSn°- f 
 measures of precaution which they take against us, but ^thingTo 
 islanders who, like you, happen to be under no control, J s ar a ^ m 
 and all who may be already irritated by the necessity therefore we 
 
 . . - . . have no- 
 
 of submission to our empire — these are our real enemies, thing to fear 
 for they are the most reckless and most likely to bring ou^subj^ts 
 themselves as well as us into a danger which they cannot fs^nde^are 
 but foresee.’ our danger. 
 
 Mel. ‘ Surely then, if you and your subjects will brave IOO. 
 all this risk, you to preserve your empire and they to be fo^empSe* 
 quit of it, how base and cowardly would it be in us, who a ^ e y c ° t s r for 
 retain our freedom, not to do and suffer anything rather freedom, 
 
 shall we 
 
 than be your slaves. be slaves ? 
 
 Ath. ‘Not so, if you calmly reflect: for you are not 101. 
 fighting against equals to whom you cannot yield without J 0 ^ a rdTce° 
 disgrace, but you are taking counsel whether or no you in yielding 
 a Or, ‘ and insist upon our compliance with your interests.’ 
 
 D d 
 
402 
 
 THE MELI AN CONTROVERSY. 
 
 V. shall resist an overwhelming force. The question is not 
 force Pen ° r one honour but of prudence.’ 
 
 102 . Mel. ‘But we know that the fortune of war is some- 
 SaVfortune ^ mes impartial, and not always on the side of numbers, 
 may be- If we yield now, all is over; but if we fight, there is yet 
 
 friend us. , 
 
 a hope that we may stand upright. 
 
 T03. AthN Hope is a good comforter in the hour of danger, 
 Hope is a and when men have something else to depend upon, al- 
 ceiver ^and though hurtful, she is not ruinous. But when her spend- 
 tectelfwhen thrift nature has induced them to stake their all, a they 
 men are see h er as s h e j s [ n the moment of their fall, and not 
 
 already 
 
 ruined. till then. While the knowledge of her might enable 
 them to be ware of her, she never fails a . You are weak 
 and a single turn of the scale might be your ruin. Do 
 not you be thus deluded; avoid the error of which so 
 many are guilty, who, although they might still be saved 
 if they would take the natural means, when visible 
 grounds of confidence forsake them, have recourse to 
 the invisible, to prophecies and oracles and the like, 
 which ruin men by the hopes which they inspire in 
 them.’ 
 
 104. Mel. ‘We know only too well how hard the struggle 
 heaven will must be against your power, and against fortune, if she 
 right and does not mean to be impartial. Nevertheless we do not 
 daemonians despair of fortune; for we hope to stand as high as you 
 will succour j n t he f avour G f heaven, because we are righteous, and 
 
 you against whom we contend are unrighteous; and we 
 are satisfied that our deficiency in power will be com¬ 
 pensated by the aid of our allies the Lacedaemonians ; 
 they cannot refuse to help us, if only because we are 
 their kinsmen, and for the sake of their own honour. 
 And therefore our confidence is not so utterly blind as 
 you suppose.’ 
 
 105. Atk. ‘As for the Gods, we expect to have quite as 
 That the much of their favour as you: for we are not doing or 
 
 stronger J 0 
 
 a Or, 1 they see her as she is in the moment of their fall; and 
 afterwards, when she is known and they might be ware of her, she 
 leaves them nothing worth saving.’ 
 
 O W 
 
PQO 
 
 THE ME LI AN CONTROVERSY ,. 
 
 403 
 
 c. 416. claiming anything which goes beyond common opinion V. 
 
 9 about divine or men’s desires about human things. For shouldrule 
 of the Gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a weaker is a 
 law of their nature wherever they can rule they will, common to 
 This law was not made by us, and we are not the first and 
 who have acted upon it; we did but inherit it, and shall Therefore 
 
 , , . . the Gods 
 
 bequeath it to all time, and we know that you and all are as likely 
 mankind, if you were as strong as we are, would do as as you. 
 we do. So much for the Gods ; we have told you why Lacedae- 
 we expect to stand as high in their good opinion as you. 5£°£ iaa i yto 
 And then as to the Lacedaemonians—when you imagine their in- 
 that out of very shame they will assist you, we admire 
 the simplicity of your idea, but we do not envy you 
 the folly of it. The Lacedaemonians are exceedingly 
 virtuous among themselves, and according to their na¬ 
 tional standard of morality a . But, in respect of their 
 dealings with others, although many things might be 
 said, a word is enough to describe them,—of all men 
 whom we know they are the most notorious for identify¬ 
 ing what is pleasant with what is honourable, and what 
 is expedient with what is just. But how inconsistent 
 is such a character with your present blind hope of 
 deliverance! ’ 
 
 Mel. ‘That is the very reason why we trust them; 106. 
 they will look to their interest, and therefore will not But their 
 be willing to betray the Melians, who are their own inducethem- 
 colonists, lest they should be distrusted by their friends to assist us ' 
 in Hellas and play into the hands of their enemies.’ 
 
 Ath . c But do you not see that the path of expediency 107. 
 is safe, whereas justice and honour involve danger in Not when 
 practice, and such dangers the Lacedaemonians seldom danger. any 
 care to face?’ 
 
 Mel. ‘ On the other hand, we think that whatever perils 108. 
 there may be, they will be ready to face them for our But the y 
 
 J J may need 
 
 sakes, and will consider danger less dangerous where our aid, and 
 we are concerned. For b if they need our aid b we are £nlmen.° ur 
 
 a Cp. i. 68 init. b Or, ‘ when we need their aid.’ 
 
 D d % 
 
404 
 
 THE MELT AN CONTROVERSY. 
 
 V. close at hand, and they can better trust our loyal feeling 
 because we are their kinsmen.’ 
 
 109. Ath. ‘Yes, but what encourages men who are invited 
 The aid join in a conflict is clearly not the good-will of those 
 
 which you J . , . - . 
 
 can give is who summon them to their side, but a decided supe- 
 cSnt 1 !?" riority in real power. To this no men look more keenly 
 ra?fn£ em than the Lacedaemonians ; so little confidence have they 
 danger for j n their own resources, that they only attack their neigh- 
 
 your sakes. 
 
 They will bours when they have numerous allies, and therefore 
 aione^an they are not likely to find their way by themselves to 
 island. an j s i anc ^ w h en we are masters of the sea/ 
 
 110. Mel . ‘ But they may send their allies : the Cretan sea 
 Their ships is a large place; and the masters of the sea will have 
 thefr way to more difficulty in overtaking vessels which want to 
 may Aem 6 - 7 escape than the pursued in escaping. If the attempt 
 selves in- should fail they may invade Attica itself, and find their 
 and draw way to allies of yours whom Brasidas did not reach : 
 allies y0Ur and then you will have to fight, not for the conquest 
 
 of a land in which you have no concern, but nearer 
 home., for the preservation of your confederacy and of 
 
 111. 
 
 Wait and 
 you will see. 
 Nothing 
 which you 
 say is to the 
 point. 
 
 You are de¬ 
 luded by a 
 false sense 
 of honour. 
 Think 
 again. 
 
 your own territory/ 
 
 Ath. ‘Help may come from Lacedaemon to you as 
 it has come to others, and should you ever have actual 
 experience of it, then you will know that never once 
 have the Athenians retired from a siege through fear 
 of a foe elsewhere. You told us that the safety of your 
 city would be your first care, but we remark that, in 
 this long discussion, not a word has been uttered by 
 you which would give a reasonable man expectation of 
 deliverance. Your strongest grounds are hopes deferred, 
 and what power you have is not to be compared with 
 that which is already arrayed against you. Unless after 
 we have withdrawn you mean to come, as even now 
 you may, to a wiser conclusion, you are showing a great 
 want of sense. For surely you cannot dream of flying 
 to that false sense of honour which has been the ruin 
 
 of so many when danger and dishonour were staring 
 them in the face. Many men with their eyes still open 
 
 wo 
 
o-ca 
 
 ANSWER OF THE MELIANS. 
 
 405 
 
 .C. 416. to the consequences have found the word “honour” too V. 
 
 ‘ 9I ’ much for them, and have suffered a mere name to lure 
 them on, until it has drawn down upon them real and 
 irretrievable calamities; through their own folly they 
 have incurred a worse dishonour than fortune would 
 have inflicted upon them. If you are wise you will 
 not run this risk ; you ought to see that there can be 
 no disgrace in yielding to a great city which invites you 
 to become her ally on reasonable terms, keeping your 
 own land, and merely paying tribute; and that you will 
 certainly gain no honour if, having to choose between 
 two alternatives, safety and war, you obstinately prefer 
 the worse. To maintain our rights against equals, to 
 be politic with superiors, and to be moderate towards 
 inferiors is the path of safety. Reflect once more when 
 we have withdrawn, and say to yourselves over and over 
 again that you are deliberating about your one and only 
 country, which may be saved or may be destroyed by 
 a single decision/ 
 
 The Athenians left the conference : the Melians, after 112. 
 consulting among themselves, resolved to persevere in The ^ 
 their refusal, and made answer as follows :—‘ Men of refuse to 
 Athens, our resolution is unchanged; and we will not yield ' 
 in a moment surrender that liberty which our city, 
 founded seven hundred years ago, still enjoys; we will 
 trust to the good-fortune which, by the favour of the 
 Gods, has hitherto preserved us, and for human help to 
 the Lacedaemonians, and endeavour to save ourselves. 
 
 We are ready however to be your friends, and the 
 enemies neither of you nor of the Lacedaemonians, and 
 we ask you to leave our country when you have made 
 such a peace as may appear to be in the interest of 
 both parties. 5 
 
 Such was the answer of the Melians; the Athenians, 113. 
 as they quitted the conference, spoke as follows:—‘Well, Last words 
 we must say, judging from the decision at which you Athenians, 
 have arrived, that you are the only men who deem the 
 future to be more certain than the present, and regard 
 
40 6 
 
 SIEGE OF MELOS . 
 
 V. things unseen as already realised in your fond anticipa- B.c. 416. 
 tion, and that the more you cast yourselves upon the 9 
 Lacedaemonians and fortune,, and hope, and trust them, 
 the more complete will be your ruin.’ 
 
 114. The Athenian envoys returned to the army; and the 
 The generals, when they found that the Melians would not 
 
 Athenians & J . 
 
 blockade yield, immediately commenced hostilities. They sur- 
 M ei°s. ro unded the town of Melos with a wall, dividing the 
 work among the several contingents. They then left 
 troops of their own and of their allies to keep guard both 
 by land and by sea, and retired with the greater part of 
 their army; the remainder carried on the blockade. 
 
 115. About the same time the Argives made an inroad into 
 
 inroad of Phliasia, and lost nearly eighty men, who were caught in 
 Phiiasia. an ambuscade by the Phliasians and the Argive exiles. 
 at"p^c^? S The Athenian garrison in Pylos took much spoil from 
 Quarrel Lacedaemonians ; nevertheless the latter did not 
 
 between , 
 
 Athens and renounce the peace and go to war, but only notified 
 
 Corinth. 1 -r • 
 
 Check of by a proclamation that if any one of their own people 
 before had a mind to make reprisals on the Athenians he 
 Melos. might. The Corinthians next declared war upon the 
 Athenians on some private grounds, but the rest of the 
 Peloponnesians did not join them. The Melians took 
 that part of the Athenian wall which looked towards the 
 agora by a night assault, killed a few men, and brought 
 in as much corn and other necessaries as they could ; 
 they then retreated and remained inactive. After this 
 the Athenians set a better watch. So the summer 
 ended. 
 
 116. In the following winter the Lacedaemonians had 
 The Lace- intended to make an expedition into the Argive terri- 
 
 daemonians .. , . _ , . , , ° . 
 
 intending tory, but finding that the sacrifices which they offered 
 Argoh^are at the frontier were unfavourable a they returned home, 
 terredby The Argives, suspecting that the threatened invasion 
 the sacri- was instigated by citizens of their own, apprehended 
 
 fices. r 1 11 
 
 some of them ; others however escaped. 
 
 About the same time the Melians took another 
 
 a Cp. v. 54, 55. 
 
SURRENDER OF MELOS. 407 
 
 b.c. 416. part of the Athenian wall ; for the fortifications were 
 01 ‘ 91 ‘ insufficiently guarded. Whereupon the Athenians sent 
 fresh troops, under the command of Philocrates the son 
 of Demeas. The place was now closely invested, and 
 there was treachery among the citizens themselves. So 
 the Melians were induced to surrender at discretion. 
 The Athenians thereupon put to death all who were of 
 military age, and made slaves of the women and children. 
 They then colonised the island, sending thither five 
 hundred settlers of their own. 
 
 V. 
 
 Melos taken 
 and the 
 male in¬ 
 habitants 
 put to 
 death. 
 
BOOK VI. 
 
 VI. I. DURING the same winter the Athenians conceived a 
 The Athe- desire of sending another expedition to Sicily, larger 
 noranVof than that commanded by Laches and Eurymedon a . 
 resourceTof They hoped to conquer the island. Of its great size and 
 the island, numerous population, barbarian as well as Hellenic, 
 
 determine * A 
 
 to send a most of them knew nothing, and they never reflected 
 dition to that they were entering on a struggle almost as arduous 
 Slclly ‘ as the Peloponnesian War. The voyage in a merchant- 
 vessel round Sicily takes up nearly eight days, and this 
 great island is all but a part of the mainland, being 
 divided from it by a sea not much more than two miles 
 in width. 
 
 2 . I will now describe the original settlement of Sicily, 
 Thucydides and enumerate the nations which it contained. Oldest 
 the races by of all were (i) the Cyclopes and Laestrygones, who are 
 island was sa ^ to have dwelt in a district of the island; but who 
 i nh The ted * were, whence they came, or whither they went, I 
 
 mythical cannot tell. We must be content with the legends of 
 
 Cyclopes 1 ° 
 
 and Lae- the poets, and every one must be left to form his own 
 strygones. 0 pj n i on# The Sicanians appear to have succeeded 
 from ni Spain t ^ lese earl y races > although according to their own ac- 
 said to be count they were still older; for they profess to have 
 
 autoch- 1-11 r i -it-. Jr 
 
 thons. been children of the soil. But the fact is that they were 
 Trojans! Iberians, and were driven from the river Sicanus in 
 Phonan^ 6 Ikerioi by the Ligurians. Sicily, which was originally 
 
 a Cp. iii. 115. 
 
 CQO 
 
THE RACES AND CITIES OF SICILY. 409 
 
 called Trinacria, received from them the name Sicania. VI. 
 To this day the Sicanians inhabit the western parts 
 the island. (3) After the capture of Troy, some Trojans after the fail 
 who had escaped from the Achaeans came in ships to 5. The 
 Sicily; they settled near the Sicanians, and both took from 
 the name of Elymi. The Elymi had two cities, Eryx p h ^i- 
 and Egesta. (4) These were joined by certain Phocians, cians. 
 who had also fought at Troy, and were driven by a storm 
 first to Libya and thence to Sicily. (5) The Sicels were 
 originally inhabitants of Italy, whence they were driven 
 by the Opici, and passed over into Sicily;—according to 
 a probable tradition they crossed upon rafts, taking 
 advantage of the wind blowing from the land, but they 
 may have found other ways of effecting a passage ; there 
 are Sicels still in Italy, and the country itself was so 
 called from Italus a Sicel king. They entered Sicily 
 with a large army, and defeating the Sicanians in battle, 
 drove them back to the southern and western parts of 
 the country; from them the island, formerly Sicania, 
 took the name of Sicily. For nearly three hundred years 
 after their arrival until the time when the Hellenes came 
 to Sicily they occupied the most fertile districts, and 
 they still inhabit the central and southern regions. (6) 
 
 The Phoenicians at one time had settlements all round 
 the island. They fortified headlands on the sea-coast, 
 and settled in the small islands adjacent, for the sake of 
 trading with the Sicels; but when the Hellenes began 
 to find their way by sea to Sicily in greater numbers 
 they withdrew from the larger part of the island, and 
 forming a union established themselves in Motya, Soloeis, 
 and Panormus, in the neighbourhood of the Elymi, partly 
 trusting to their alliance with them, and partly because 
 this is the point at which the passage from Carthage to 
 Sicily is shortest. Such were the Barbarian nations who 
 inhabited Sicily, and these were their settlements. 
 
 (7) The first Hellenic colonists sailed from Chalcis in 3. 
 Euboea under the leadership of Thucles, and founded 7- The 
 Naxos ; there they erected an altar in honour of Apollo colonies 
 
410 
 
 THE CITIES OF SICILY. 
 
 VI. 
 
 (1) Naxos, 
 from Chal- 
 cis, about 
 
 735 B - c - 
 
 (2) Syra¬ 
 cuse, from 
 Corinth, 
 about 
 734 B.C. 
 
 (3) Leontini, 
 73 ° B -C., 
 and (4) Ca- 
 tana, from 
 Naxos. 
 
 the Founder, a which is still standing without the city 3 , 
 and on this altar religious embassies sacrifice before they 
 sail from Sicily. (8) In the following year Archias, one 
 of the Heraclidae, came from Corinth and founded 
 Syracuse, first driving the Sicels out of the island of 
 Ortygia; and there the inner city, no longer surrounded 
 by the sea, now stands b ; in process of time the outer 
 city was included within the walls and became populous. 
 (9) In the fifth year after the foundation of Syracuse 
 Thucles and the Chalcidians went forth from Naxos, and 
 driving out the Sicels by force of arms, founded first 
 Leontini, then Catana. The Catanaeans however chose 
 
 a founder of their own, named Evarchus. 
 
 4. (lo) About the same time Lamis came from Megara 
 (sjTrouiu 5 , bringing a colony to Sicily, where he occupied a place 
 sus, and called Trotilus, upon the river Pantacyas ; but he soon 
 Hybiaean afterwards joined the settlement of the Chalcidians at 
 from^ Leontini; with them he dwelt a short time, unti] he was 
 Megara, driven out ; he then founded Thapsus, where he died. 
 
 about . r 
 
 728 b.c. His followers quitted Thapsus and founded the city 
 from e th aUS ' which is called the Hybiaean Megara; Hyblon, a Sicel 
 Megam an king, had betrayed the place to them and guided them 
 \g) Geia" thither. There they remained two hundred and forty- 
 from five years, and were then driven out of their town and 
 and Crete, land by Gelo the tyrant of Syracuse; but before they 
 q 9 o°) Agr’i- were driven out, and a hundred years after their own 
 from^Geia foundation, they sent out Pamillus and founded Selinus; 
 582 b.c. he had come from Megara, their own mother state, to take 
 
 (n) Zancle .. . , . _ , _ _ 
 
 orMessene, part m the new colony. (11) In the forty-fifth year after 
 
 from Cyme. foundation of Syracuse, Antiphemus of Rhodes and 
 
 Entimus of Crete came with their followers and together 
 
 built Gela. The city was named from the river Gela, 
 
 but the spot which is now the Acropolis and was first 
 
 fortified is called Lindii. The institutions of the new 
 
 settlement were Dorian. Exactly a hundred and eight 
 years after their own foundation the inhabitants of 
 
 a Or, ‘ which is now outside the city.’ 
 h Reading TrcpiK\v(oix€vr) with all the MSS. 
 
Qw ots 
 
 THE CITIES OF SICILY. 
 
 411 
 
 Gela founded Agrigentum, which they named from the VI. 
 river Acragas ; they appointed Aristonous and Pystilus 
 founders of the place, and gave to it their own institutions. 
 
 (12) Zancle was originally colonised by pirates who 
 came from Cyme, the Chalcidian city in Opicia ; these 
 were followed by a large body of colonists from Chalcis 
 and the rest of Euboea, who shared in the allotment of 
 the soil. The first settlement was led by Perieres of 
 Cyme, the second by Crataemenes of Chalcis. Zancle 
 was the original name of the place, a name given by the 
 Sicels because the site was in shape like a sickle, for 
 which the Sicel word is Zanclon. These earlier settlers 
 were afterwards driven out by the Samians and other 
 
 .c. 494. Ionians, who when they fled from the Persians found 
 
 1. 71, 3. 
 
 their way to Sicily a . Not long afterwards Anaxilas, the 
 tyrant of Rhegium, drove out these Samians. He then 
 repeopled their city with a mixed multitude, and called 
 the place Messene after his native country, 
 c. 648? Himera was colonised from Zancle by Eucleides, 
 
 . 33? J . ’ VJ 
 
 Simus, and Sacon. Most of the settlers were Chalcidian, MHimera, 
 but the Myletidae, Syracusan exiles who had been (13) Acrae, 
 defeated in a civil war, took part in the colony. Their andfi^"’ 
 language was a mixture of the Chalcidian and Doric g 6 ^ 6 ' 
 dialects, but their institutions were mainly Chalcidian. from Syra- 
 
 (13) Acrae and Casmenae were founded by the Syracu- (15) Cama- 
 sans, Acrae seventy years after Syracuse, and Casmenae Syracuse!* 
 nearly twenty years after Acrae. Camarina was origin- 599 B,c - 
 
 . ally founded by the Syracusans exactly a hundred and 
 thirty-five years after the foundation of Syracuse; the 
 founders were Dascon and Menecolus. But the Cama- 
 rinaeans revolted, and as a punishment for their revolt 
 were violently expelled by the Syracusans. After a 
 B.c. 498- time Hippocrates the tyrant of Gela, receiving the terri- 
 01! 70> 3- tory of Camarina b as the ransom of certain Syracusan 
 72 ' 2 " prisoners, became the second founder of the place, which 
 he colonised anew. The inhabitants were once more 
 
 Cp. Herod, vi. 22, 23. 
 
 Cp. Herod, vii. 154. 
 
MOTIVES OF THE ATHENIANS. 
 
 VI. 
 
 6 . 
 
 Ambition 
 was the real 
 motive of 
 the Sicilian 
 expedition, 
 for which 
 the Athe¬ 
 nians found 
 an occasion 
 in the war 
 between 
 Egesta and 
 Selinus. 
 
 The Eges- 
 
 taean 
 
 envoys. 
 
 412 
 
 driven out by Gelo, a who himself colonised the city for B.c. 491- 
 the third time a . 0l 7 2, 2- 
 
 These were the nations, Hellenic or Barbarian, who 75> 3 * 
 inhabited Sicily, and such was the great island on which oi 9 i l6 ‘ 
 the Athenians were determined to make war. They 
 virtuously professed that they were going to assist their 
 own kinsmen and their newly-acquired allies 15 , but the 
 simple truth was that they aspired to the empire of 
 Sicily. They were principally instigated by an embassy 
 which had come from Egesta and was urgent in re¬ 
 questing aid. The Egestaeans had gone to war with the 
 neighbouring city of Selinus about certain questions of 
 marriage and about a disputed piece of land. The 
 Selinuntians summoned the Syracusans to their assist¬ 
 ance, and their united forces reduced the Egestaeans 
 to great straits both by sea and land. The Egestaean 
 envoys reminded the Athenians of the alliance which 
 they had made with the Leontines under Laches in the 
 former war c , and begged them to send ships to their 
 relief. Their chief argument was, that if the Syracusans 
 were not punished for the expulsion of the Leontines, 
 but were allowed to destroy the remaining allies of the 
 Athenians, and to get the whole of Sicily into their own 
 hands, they would one day come with a great army, 
 Dorians assisting Dorians, who were their kinsmen, and 
 colonists assisting their Peloponnesian founders, and 
 would unite in overthrowing Athens herself. Such being 
 the danger, the Athenians would be wise in combining . 
 with the allies who were still left to them in Sicily 
 against the Syracusans, especially since the Egestaeans 
 would themselves provide money sufficient for the war. 
 
 These arguments were constantly repeated in the ears of 
 the Athenian assembly by the Egestaeans and their 
 partisans; at length the people passed a vote that they 
 
 a Or, adopting the conjecture reA.cocoi': ‘ and the city was colonised 
 for the third time by the inhabitants of Gela.’ This accords with 
 the statement of Diodorus, xi. 76. 
 
 b The Camarinaeans and Agrigentines, v. 4 fin., and some of the 
 Sicels, iii. 103 init., 115 init. c Cp. iii. 86. 
 
SMALL WARS IN ARGOLIS AND MACEDONIA. 413 
 
 B.c. 416. would at all events send envoys to ascertain on the spot VI. 
 
 01 ‘ 9I * whether the Egestaeans really had the money which they 
 professed to have in their treasury and in their temples, 
 and to report on the state of the war with Selinus. So 
 the Athenian envoys were despatched to Sicily. 
 
 During the same winter the Lacedaemonians and their 7 * 
 allies, all but the Corinthians, made an expedition into T he La ? e “ 
 
 . . 1 daemomans 
 
 the Argive territory, of which they devastated a small invade Ar- 
 
 part, and, having brought with them waggons, carried fettle’at hey 
 away a few loads of corn. They settled the Argive °™ e v a e e the 
 exiles at Orneae, where they left a small garrison, exiles > w ^° 
 and having made an agreement that the inhabitants of ousiy at- 
 Orneae and the Argives should not injure one another’s the^rg^e 
 land for a given time, returned home with the rest of^g°^ y a th e 
 their army. Soon afterwards the Athenians arrived with Athenians, 
 
 J but escape. 
 
 thirty ships and six hundred hoplites. They and the 
 people of Argos with their whole power went out and 
 blockaded Orneae for a day, but at night the Argive 
 exiles within the walls got away unobserved by the 
 besiegers, who were encamped at some distance. On 
 the following day the Argives, perceiving what had hap¬ 
 pened, razed Orneae to the ground and returned. Soon 
 afterwards the Athenian fleet returned likewise. 
 
 The Athenians also conveyed by sea cavalry of their The 
 own, and some Macedonian exiles who had taken refuge ^ e g e ians 
 with them, to Methon£ on the borders of Macedonia, Macedonia, 
 and ravaged the territory of Perdiccas. Whereupon the 
 Lacedaemonians sent to the Thracian Chalcidians, who 
 were maintaining an armistice terminable at ten days’ 
 notice with the Athenians, and commanded them to 
 assist Perdiccas, but they refused. So the winter ended, 
 and with it the sixteenth year in the Peloponnesian War 
 of which Thucydides wrote the history. 
 
 B.c. 415. Early in the next spring the Athenian envoys returned 8. 
 
 01. 91 , 2. f rom Si c py # They were accompanied by Egestaeans who The Athe- 
 brought sixty talents a of uncoined silver, being a month’s the return 
 pay for sixty vessels which they hoped to obtain from envoyf 
 a £ha°°- 
 
VI. 
 
 convoke an 
 assembly, 
 which de¬ 
 cides in 
 favour of 
 war. 
 
 At a second 
 assembly, 
 called for 
 the purpose 
 of voting 
 supplies, 
 Nicias still 
 endeavours 
 to deter 
 them from 
 goingtowar 
 at all. 
 
 9 - 
 
 I must say 
 what I be¬ 
 lieve to be 
 the truth. 
 This war is 
 impolitic 
 and ill- 
 timed. 
 
 414 THE ATHENIANS DECIDE FOR WAR. 
 
 Athens. The Athenians called an assembly, and when 
 they heard both from their own and from the Egestaean 
 envoys, amongst other inviting but untrue statements, 
 that there was abundance of money lying ready in the 
 temples and in the treasury of Egesta a , they passed a 
 vote that sixty ships should be sent to Sicily; Alcibiades 
 the son of Cleinias, Nicias the son of Niceratus, and La- 
 machus the son of Xenophanes were appointed com¬ 
 manders. They were told to assist Egesta against Seli- 
 nus; if this did not demand all their military strength 
 they were empowered to restore the Leontines, and 
 generally to further in such manner as they deemed 
 best the Athenian interest in Sicily. Five days after¬ 
 wards another assembly was called to consider what 
 steps should be taken for the immediate equipment of 
 the expedition, and to vote any additional supplies 
 which the generals might require. Nicias, who had 
 been appointed general against his will, thought that 
 the people had come to a wrong conclusion, and that 
 upon slight and flimsy grounds they were aspiring to 
 the conquest of Sicily, which was no easy task. So, 
 being desirous of diverting the Athenians from their 
 purpose, he came forward and admonished them in the 
 following terms:— 
 
 ‘ I know that we are assembled here to discuss the 
 preparations which are required for our expedition to 
 Sicily, but in my judgment it is still a question whether 
 we ought to go thither at all; we should not be hasty 
 in determining a matter of so much importance, or allow 
 ourselves to rush into an impolitic war at the instigation 
 of foreigners. Yet to me personally war brings honour; 
 and I am as careless as any man about my own life: 
 not that I think the worse of a citizen who takes a little 
 thought about his life or his property, for I believe that 
 the sense of a man’s own interest will quicken his in¬ 
 terest in the prosperity of the state. But I have never 
 been induced by the love of reputation to say a single 
 a Cp. vi. 46. 
 
 OCd 
 
ow 
 
 SPEECH OF NIC I AS. 
 
 415 
 
 .C. 415. 
 1. 91, 2. 
 
 word contrary to what I thought; neither will I now: I VI. 
 will say simply what I believe to be best. If I told you to 
 take care of what you have and not to throw away present 
 advantages in order to gain an uncertain and distant 
 good, my words would be powerless against a temper like 
 yours. I would rather argue that this is not the time, 
 and that your great aims will not be easily realised. 
 
 £ I tell you that in going to Sicily you are leaving 10. 
 many enemies behind you, and seem to be bent on The state of 
 bringing new ones hither. You are perhaps relying i n Hellas is 
 upon the treaty recently made, which if you remain quiet an^wS 
 may retain the name of a treaty: for to a mere name the' ve are . , 
 
 J J 5 dreaming of 
 
 intrigues of certain persons both here and at Lacedae- conquests 
 
 1 ii. .... abroad we 
 
 mon have nearly succeeded in reducing it. But if you shall be 
 meet with any serious reverse, your enemies will be upon enemies It 
 you in a moment, for the agreement was originally ex- Th^chai- 
 tracted from them by the pressure of misfortune, and the cidians are 
 discredit of it fell to them and not to us a . In the treaty beiiion. 
 itself there are many disputed points; and, unsatisfactory 
 as it is, to this hour several cities, and very powerful 
 cities too, persist in rejecting it. Some of these are at 
 open war with us already 15 ; others may declare war at 
 ten days’ notice 0 ; and they only remain at peace because 
 the Lacedaemonians are indisposed to move. And in 
 all probability, if they find our power divided (and such 
 a division is precisely what we are striving to create), 
 they will eagerly join the Sicilians, whose alliance in the 
 war they would long ago have given anything to obtain. 
 
 These considerations should weigh with us. The state 
 is far from the desired haven, and we should not run 
 into danger and seek to gain a new empire before we 
 have fully secured the old. The Chalcidians in Thrace 
 have been rebels all these years and remain unsubdued, 
 and there are other subjects of ours in various parts of 
 the mainland who are uncertain in their allegiance. 
 
 And we forsooth cannot lose a moment in avenging the 
 
 a Cp. v. 46 init. b Cp. v. 115 med. 
 
 c Cp. v. 26 med., vi. 7 fin. 
 
VI. 
 
 II. 
 
 Sicily, even 
 if con¬ 
 quered, 
 cannot be 
 retained. 
 
 The Si¬ 
 cilians, if 
 they were 
 united, 
 would not 
 help Sparta 
 to make war 
 upon you, 
 because 
 they would 
 fear that a 
 united Hel¬ 
 las might 
 make war 
 upon them. 
 The less an 
 enemy is 
 known, the 
 more he is 
 feared. 
 Familiarity 
 makes you 
 despise the 
 Lacedae¬ 
 monians, 
 but they 
 are biding 
 their time. 
 
 416 SPEECH OF NIC!AS. 
 
 wrongs of our allies the Egestaeans, while we still defer 
 the punishment of our revolted subjects, whose offences 
 are of long standing. 
 
 ‘ And yet if we subdue the Chalcidian rebels we may 
 retain our hold on them ; but Sicily is a populous and 
 distant country, over which, even if we are victorious, we 
 shall hardly be able to maintain our dominion. And 
 how foolish is it to select for attack a land w T hich no 
 conquest can secure, while he who fails to conquer will 
 not be where he was before! 
 
 c I should say that the Sicilians are not dangerous to 
 you,—certainly not in their present condition, and they 
 would be even less so if they were to fall under the sway 
 of the Syracusans (and this is the prospect with which 
 the Egestaeans would fain scare you). At present indi¬ 
 viduals might cross the sea out of friendship for the 
 Lacedaemonians ; but if the states of Sicily were all 
 united in one empire they would not be likely to make 
 war upon another empire. For whatever chance they 
 may have of overthrowing us if they unite with the Pelo¬ 
 ponnesians, there will be the same chance of their being 
 overthrown themselves if the Peloponnesians and Athe¬ 
 nians are ever united against them a . The Hellenes in 
 Sicily will dread us most if we never come; in a less 
 degree if we display our strength and speedily depart; 
 but if any disaster occur, they will despise us and be 
 ready enough to join the enemies who are attacking us 
 here. We all know that men have the greatest respect 
 for that which is farthest off, and for that of which the 
 reputation has been least tested; and this, Athenians, 
 you may verify by your own experience. There was a 
 time when you feared the Lacedaemonians and their 
 allies, but now you have got the better of them, and 
 because your first fears have not been realised you 
 despise them, and even hope to conquer Sicily. But 
 you ought not to be elated at the chance mishaps of 
 your enemies; before you can be confident you should 
 a Cp. viii. 46. 
 
 ow 
 
SPEECH OF NIC I AS. 
 
 417 
 
 B.c. 415. have gained the mastery over their minds a . Remember VI. 
 
 ' 9I ' ' that the Lacedaemonians are sensitive to their disgrace, 
 and that their sole thought is how they may even yet 
 find a way of inflicting a blow upon us which will re¬ 
 trieve their own character ; the rather because they have 
 laboured so earnestly and so long to win a name for 
 valour. If we are wise we shall not trouble ourselves 
 about the barbarous Egestaeans in Sicily; the real ques¬ 
 tion ’is how we can make ourselves secure against the 
 designs of an insidious oligarchy. 
 
 f We must remember also that we have only just re- 12. 
 covered in some measure from a great plague and a We have 
 great war, and are beginning to make up our losses in work at 
 men and money. It is our duty to expend our new had better 
 resources upon ourselves at home, and not upon begging adventurers 
 exiles who have an interest in successful lies ; who find to , them - 
 
 selves. 
 
 it expedient only to contribute words, and let others 
 fight their battles; and who, if saved, prove ungrateful; 
 if they fail, as they very likely may, only involve their 
 friends in a common ruin. 
 
 ‘ I dare say there may be some young man here who Alcibiades 
 is delighted at holding a command, and the more so tc/com- 11 * 12 
 because he is too young for his post b ; and he, regarding ™ a ex P e- Ch 
 only his own interest, may recommend you to sail; he ^ ti °^ y and 
 may be one who is much admired for his stud of horses, wants to in- 
 and wants to make something out of his command which taste for 
 will maintain him in his extravagance. But do not you Republic 
 give him the opportunity of indulging his own magnifi- expense, 
 cent tastes at the expense of the state. Remember that 
 men of this stamp impoverish themselves and defraud 
 the public. An expedition to Sicily is a serious busi¬ 
 ness, and not one which a mere youth can plan and 
 carry into execution off-hand. The youth of whom I 13 - 
 am speaking has summoned to his side young men like has his 
 himself, whom, not without alarm, I see sitting by him supporters, 
 
 5 ’ , . 1 11 who rather 
 
 in this assembly, and I appeal against them to you elder alarm me. 
 
 a Gp. ii. 87 init.; vi. 72 init. 
 b Omitting the comma after iunXCiv. 
 
 E e 
 
VI. 
 
 They will 
 charge 
 you with 
 cowardice, 
 but never 
 mind that. 
 Do not 
 interfere in 
 Sicily ; 
 let the 
 Egestaeans 
 fight their 
 own battles. 
 
 14 . 
 
 The Pry- 
 tanis need 
 not fear to 
 bring before 
 you once 
 more the 
 question of 
 the expe¬ 
 dition itself. 
 
 15- 
 
 The Athe¬ 
 nians refuse 
 to rescind 
 the former 
 vote. 
 
 The war is 
 strongly ad¬ 
 vocated by 
 Alcibiades, 
 who wants 
 
 418 CHARACTER OF ALCIBIADES. 
 
 citizens. If any of you should be placed next one of his 
 supporters. I would not have him ashamed, or afraid, of 
 being thought a coward if he does not vote for war. Do 
 not, like them, entertain a desperate craving for things 
 out of your reach ; you know that by prevision many 
 successes are gained, but few or none by mere greed. 
 On behalf of our country, now on the brink of the 
 greatest danger which she has ever known, I entreat you 
 to hold up your hands against them. Do not interfere 
 with the boundaries which divide us from Sicily. I mean 
 the Ionian gulf which parts us if we sail along the coast, 
 the Sicilian sea if we sail through the open water; these 
 are quite satisfactory. The Sicilians have their own 
 country; let them manage their own concerns. And let 
 the Egestaeans in particular be informed that, having 
 originally gone to war with the Selinuntians on their own 
 account, they must make peace on their own account. 
 Let us have no more allies such as ours have too often 
 been, whom we are expected to assist when they are in 
 misfortune, but to whom we ourselves when in need may 
 look in vain. 
 
 ‘And you, Prytanis, as you wish to be a good citizen, 
 and believe that the welfare of the state is entrusted to 
 you, put my proposal to the vote, and lay the question 
 once more before the Athenians. If you hesitate, re¬ 
 member that in the presence of so many witnesses there 
 can be no question of breaking the law, and that you will 
 be the physician of the state at the critical moment. 
 The first duty of the good magistrate is to do the very 
 best which he can for his country, or, at least, to do her 
 no harm which he can avoid/ 
 
 Such were the words of Nicias. Most of the Athe¬ 
 nians who came forward to speak were in favour of war, 
 and reluctant to rescind the vote which had been already 
 passed, although a few took the other side. The most 
 enthusiastic supporter of the expedition was Alcibiades 
 the son of Cleinias ; he was determined to oppose Nicias, 
 who was always his political enemy and had just now 
 
SPEECH OF ALCIDIADES. 
 
 419 
 
 B.c. 415. spoken of him in disparaging terms; but the desire to VI. 
 
 ‘ ’ 9 ’ command was even a stronger motive with him. He togainai \ 
 was hoping that he might be the conqueror of Sicily and to pay his 
 Carthage; and that success would repair his private Thucydides 
 fortunes, and gain him money as well as glory. He had that his wild 
 a great position among the citizens and was devoted to cours ® s 
 horse-racing and other pleasures which outran his means, ruin the 
 And in the end his wild courses went far to ruin the notwith- 
 Athenian state. For the people feared the extremes to hS^xtrl- 
 which he carried his lawless self-indulgence, and the far- 
 reaching purposes which animated him in all his actions, was not 
 They thought that he was aiming at a tyranny and set and the 
 themselves against him. And therefore, although his the war was 
 
 talents as a military commander were unrivalled, they ^ hiferio? 
 entrusted the administration of the war to others, because m en. 
 
 they personally objected to his private life; and so they 
 speedily shipwrecked the state. He now came forward 
 and spoke as follows :— 
 
 ‘I have a better right to command, men of Athens, 16. 
 than another; for as Nicias has attacked me, I must M y private 
 begin by praising myself; and I consider that I am gance is 
 worthy. Those doings of mine for which I am so much benefit. 0 
 cried out against are an honour to myself and to my f h n 0 ^ h ^ en 
 ancestors, and a solid advantage to my country. In complain 
 
 . of being 
 
 consequence of the distinguished manner in which I looked 
 represented the state at Olympia, the other Hellenes by'th e U fo?- n 
 formed an idea of our power which even exceeded the 
 reality, although they had previously imagined that we 
 were exhausted by war. I sent into the lists seven unfortunate 
 chariots,—no other private man ever did the like 5 I Great men 
 was victor, and also won the second and fourth prize; ambitfons! 
 and I ordered everything in a style worthy of my victory. ^ ri * e ^ e 
 The general sentiment honours such magnificence; and notacknow- 
 
 , & , , . , , . . c ledged 
 
 the energy which is shown by it creates an impression ot during their 
 power. At home, again, whenever I gain eclat by pro- The foolish 
 viding choruses or by the performance of some other y° u f * | 
 public duty, although the citizens are naturally jealous the Argive 
 of me, to strangers these acts of munificence are a new 
 
 E e % 
 
420 
 
 SPEECH OF ALCIBIADES . 
 
 VI. 
 
 i7- 
 
 And now 
 abide by 
 your in¬ 
 tention. 
 There is 
 nothing to 
 fear in 
 Sicily. 
 
 The Sici¬ 
 lians are a 
 
 argument of our strength. There is some use in the RC. 415. 
 folly of a man who at his own cost benefits not only ' 91 ’ 2# 
 himself, but the state. And where is the injustice, if I 
 or any one who feels his own superiority to another re¬ 
 fuses to be on a level with him ? The unfortunate keep 
 their misfortunes to themselves. We do not expect to be 
 recognised by our acquaintance when we are down in the 
 world; and on the same principle why should any one 
 complain when treated with disdain by the more fortu¬ 
 nate? He who would have proper respect shown to him 
 should himself show it towards others. I know that men 
 of this lofty spirit, and all who have been in any way 
 illustrious, are hated while they are alive, by their equals 
 especially, and in a lesser degree by others who have to • 
 do with them ; but that they leave behind them to after¬ 
 ages a reputation which leads even those who are not of 
 their family to claim kindred with them, and that they 
 are the glory of their country, which regards them, not as 
 aliens or as evil-doers, but as her own children, of whose 
 character she is proud. These are my own aspirations, 
 and this is the reason why my private life is assailed ; 
 but let me ask you, whether in the management of 
 public affairs any man surpasses me. Did I not, with¬ 
 out involving you in any great danger or expense, 
 combine the most powerful states of Peloponnesus 
 against the Lacedaemonians, whom I compelled to stake 
 at Mantinea all that they had upon the fortune of one 
 day ? and even to this hour, although they were victo¬ 
 rious in the battle, they have hardly recovered courage. 
 
 f These were the achievements of my youth, and of 
 what is supposed to be my monstrous folly; thus did I 
 by winning words conciliate the Peloponnesian powers, 
 and my heartiness made them believe in me and follow 
 me. And now do not be afraid a of me because I am 
 young, but while I am in the flower of my days and 
 Nicias enjoys the reputation of success, use the services 
 
 a Adopting the conjecture ne^ofirjo-de, and placing a full stop after 
 eVeio-e. 
 
SPEECH OF A L CIB I A DES. 
 
 421 
 
 B.c. 415. of us both. Having determined to sail, do not change VI. 
 
 * 91 ’ ’ your minds under the impression that Sicily is a great mui- 
 power. For although the Sicilian cities are populous, provided 
 their inhabitants are a mixed multitude, and they readily f an try ; and 
 give up old forms of government and receive new ones 
 from without. No one really feels that he has a city of bar . ians w* 11 
 his own ; and so the individual is ill-provided with arms. At home 
 and the country has no regular means of defence. A more than 
 man looks only to what he can win from the common f h “pe£- for 
 stock by arts of speech or by party violence ; hoping, if ponnesians. 
 he is overthrown, at any rate to carry off his prize and 
 enjoy it elsewhere. They are a motley crew, who are 
 never of one mind in counsel, and are incapable of any 
 concert in action. Every man is for himself, and will 
 readily come over to any one who makes an attractive 
 offer ; the more readily if, as report says, they are in a 
 state of revolution. They boast of their hoplites, but, as 
 has proved to be the case in all Hellenic states, the 
 number of them is grossly exaggerated. Hellas has 
 been singularly mistaken about her heavy infantry; and 
 even in this war it was as much as she could do to 
 collect enough of them. The obstacles then which will 
 meet us in Sicily, judging of them from the information 
 which I have received, are not great; indeed, I have 
 overrated them, for there will be many barbarians who, 
 through fear of the Syracusans, will join us in attacking 
 them a . And at home there is nothing which, viewed 
 rightly, need interfere with the expedition. Our fore¬ 
 fathers had the same enemies whom we are now told 
 that we are leaving behind us, and the Persian besides; 
 but their strength lay in the greatness of their navy, and 
 by that and that alone they gained their empire. Never 
 were the Peloponnesians more hopeless of success than at 
 the present moment; and let them be ever so confident, 
 they can only invade us by land, which they will equally 
 do whether we go to Sicily or not. But on the sea they 
 
 Cp. vi. 88 init., 98 init., 103 med. 
 
VI. 
 
 i8. 
 
 Why then 
 hesitate ? 
 For an 
 imperial 
 power the 
 true policy 
 of defence 
 is to attack. 
 We cannot 
 lose, and 
 we shall 
 probably 
 become 
 masters of 
 Hellas. 
 
 Let young 
 and old act 
 together 
 and not 
 allow the 
 state to rust 
 from want 
 of energy. 
 
 42 2 SPEECH OF ALCIBIADES. 
 
 cannot hurt us, for we shall leave behind us a navy 
 equal to theirs. 
 
 ‘ What reason can we give to ourselves for hesitation ? 
 what excuse can we make to our allies for denying 
 them aid ? We have sworn to them, and have no right 
 to argue that they never assisted us a . In seeking their 
 alliance we did not intend that they should come and 
 help us here, but that they should harass our enemies 
 in Sicily, and prevent them from coming hither. Like 
 all other imperial powers, we have acquired our dominion 
 by our readiness to assist any one, whether Barbarian or 
 Hellene, who may have invoked our aid. If we are all 
 to sit and do nothing, or to draw distinctions of race 
 when our help is requested, we shall add little to our 
 empire, and run a great risk of losing it altogether. For 
 mankind do not await the attack of a superior power, 
 they anticipate it. We cannot cut down an empire as 
 we might a household ; but having once gained our 
 present position, we must keep a firm hold upon some, 
 and contrive occasion against others; for if we are not 
 rulers we shall be subjects. You cannot afford to regard 
 inaction in the same light as others might, unless you 
 impose a corresponding restriction -on your policy. 
 Convinced then that we shall be most likely to in¬ 
 crease our power here if we attack our enemies there, 
 let us sail. We shall humble the pride of the Pelopon¬ 
 nesians when they see that, scorning the delights of 
 repose, we have attacked Sicily. By the help of our 
 acquisitions there, we shall probably become masters of 
 all Hellas; at any rate we shall injure the Syracusans, 
 and at the same time benefit ourselves and our allies. 
 Whether we succeed and remain or depart, in either 
 case our navy will ensure our safety; for at sea we shall 
 be more than a match for all Sicily. Nicias must not 
 divert you from your purpose by preaching indolence, 
 and by trying to set the young against the old; rather 
 in your accustomed order, old and young taking counsel 
 a Cp. iv. 61 med. 
 
SECOND SPEECH OF NICIAS. 
 
 423 
 
 B 4!S-together, after the manner of your fathers who raised VI. 
 Athens to this height of greatness, strive to rise yet 
 higher. Consider that youth and age have no power 
 unless united ; but that the lighter and the more exact 
 and the middle sort of judgment, when duly attempered, 
 are likely to be most efficient. The state, if at rest, like 
 everything else will wear herself out by internal friction. 
 
 Every pursuit which requires skill will bear the impress 
 of decay, whereas by conflict fresh experience is always 
 being gained, and the city learns to defend herself, not 
 in theory, but in practice. My opinion in short is, that 
 a state used to activity will quickly be ruined by the 
 change to inaction; and that they of all men enjoy the 
 greatest security who are truest to themselves and their 
 institutions even when they are not the best.’ 
 
 Such were the words of Alcibiades. After hearing 19. 
 him and the Egestaeans and certain Leontine exiles The people 
 
 # are bent on 
 
 who came forward and earnestly entreated assistance, war : Nicias 
 reminding the Athenians of the oaths which they had SnTheniag- 
 sworn a , the people were more than ever resolved upon ^e U fo rc ° f s 
 war. Nicias, seeing that his old argument would no required, 
 longer deter them, but that he might possibly change 
 their minds if he insisted on the magnitude of the force 
 which would be required, came forward again and spoke 
 as follows :— 
 
 ‘ Men of Athens, as I see that you are thoroughly 20. 
 determined to go to war, I accept the decision, and The Hei- 
 
 i-i • 1 1 mi lenic cities 
 
 will advise you accordingly, trusting that the event will in Sicily are 
 be such as we all wish. The cities which we are about powerful; 
 to attack are, I am informed, powerful, and independent numerous 
 of one another; they are not inhabited by slaves, who hopiitesand 
 
 J . cavalry. 
 
 would gladly pass out of a harder into an easier con¬ 
 dition of life ; and they are very unlikely to accept our 
 rule in exchange for their present liberty b . As regards 
 numbers, although Sicily is but one island, it contains 
 a great many Hellenic states. Not including Naxos 
 and Catana (of which the inhabitants, as I hope, will be 
 a Cp. iii. 86. b Cp. vii. 55 fin. 
 
 
424 
 
 SECOND SPEECH OF NICIAS. 
 
 VI. our allies because they are the kinsmen of the Leontines), 
 there are seven other cities fully provided with means 
 of warfare similar to our own, especially Selinus and 
 Syracuse, the cities against which our expedition is 
 particularly directed. For they have numerous hoplites, 
 archers, and javelin-men, and they have many triremes 
 which their large population will enable them to man; 
 besides their private wealth, they have the treasures of 
 the Selinuntian temples ; and the Syracusans receive a 
 tribute which has been paid them from time imme¬ 
 morial by certain barbarian tribes. Moreover, they have 
 a numerous cavalry, and grow their own corn instead of 
 importing it: in the two last respects they have a great 
 advantage over us. 
 
 ‘ Against such a power more is needed than an in¬ 
 significant force of marines; if we mean to do justice 
 to our design a we must embark a multitude of infantry; 
 neither must we allow ourselves to be kept within our 
 lines by the numbers of their cavalry®. For what if the 
 ^ f Sicilians in terror combine against us, and we make no 
 javelin-men friends except the Egestaeans who can furnish us with 
 for d we C sh 3 i horsemen capable of opposing theirs? To be driven 
 distant from the island or to send for reinforcements, because 
 country. we were wanting in forethought at first, would be dis¬ 
 graceful. We must take a powerful armament with us 
 from home, in the full knowledge that we are going to a 
 distant land, and that the expedition will be b of a kind 
 very different from any which you have hitherto made 
 among your subjects against some enemy in this part 
 of the world, yourselves the allies of others. Here a 
 friendly country is always near, and you can easily 
 obtain supplies. There c you will be dependent on a 
 country 0 which is entirely strange to you, and whence 
 
 
 21 . 
 
 And we 
 must take 
 with us a 
 correspond¬ 
 ing force 
 of hoplites, 
 and if 
 not of 
 
 a Or, ‘and not to be kept within our lines by the numbers of 
 their cavalry, we must embark a multitude of infantry.’ 
 b Reading arpaTevaopevoi and a.TTapTr]<TOVTCs. 
 
 c Or, ‘you will be removed to a country;’ or, reading with 
 Bekker anapTrjcravTe v, ‘you will find yourselves dependent on,’ or 
 ‘ will have been removed to a country.’ 
 
 
 BO 
 
CQO 
 
 •C. 415. 
 1. 91, 2, 
 
 SECOND SPEECH OF NICIAS. 425 
 
 during the four winter months hardly even a message VI. 
 can be sent hither. 
 
 ‘I say, therefore, that we must take with us a large 22. 
 heavy-armed force both of Athenians and of allies, Food must 
 
 11 , . . be brought 
 
 whether our own subjects or any Peloponnesians whom from home, 
 we can persuade a or attract by pay b to our service ; also must-have 
 plenty of archers and javelin-men to act against the ^ndofthe 
 enemy’s cavalry. Our naval superiority must be over- sea that we 
 
 , . . - y may be able 
 
 whelming, that we may not only be able to fight, but to procure 
 
 may have no difficulty in bringing in supplies. And frSJfeise- 
 there is the food carried from home, such as wheat and where * 
 parched barley, which will have to be conveyed in 
 merchant-vessels ; we must also have bakers, drafted in 
 a certain proportion from each mill, who will receive pay, 
 but will be forced to serve, in order that, if we should be 
 detained by a calm, the army may not want food ; for it 
 is not every city that will be able to receive so large a 
 force as ours. We must make our preparations as com¬ 
 plete as possible, and not be at the mercy of others; 
 above all, we must take out with us as much money 
 as we can ; for as to the supplies of the Egestaeans which 
 are said to be awaiting us, we had better assume that 
 they are imaginary. 
 
 ‘ Even supposing we leave Athens with a force of our 23. 
 own, not merely equal to that of the enemy, but in every We must 
 way superior, except indeed as regards the number of thing to 
 hoplites which they can put into the field, for in that chance * 
 respect equality is impossible, still it will be no easy task 
 to conquer Sicily, or indeed to preserve ourselves. You 
 ought to consider that we are like men going to found a 
 city in a land of strangers and enemies, who on the very 
 day of their disembarkation must have command of the 
 country; for if they meet with a disaster they will have no 
 friends. And this is what I fear. We shall have much 
 dnee of prudence; still more of good-fortune (and who 
 can guarantee this to mortals?). Wherefore I would trust 
 
 a Cp. vi. 29 med. 
 b Cp. vi. 43 med.; vii. 57 fin. 
 
426 ENTHUSIASM FOR THE EXPEDITION . 
 
 VI. myself and the expedition as little as possible to accident, 
 and would not sail until I had taken such precautions as 
 will be likely to ensure our safety. This I conceive to 
 be the course which is the most prudent for the whole 
 state, and, for us who are sent upon the expedition, a 
 security against danger. If any one thinks otherwise, 
 to him I resign the command/ 
 
 24. These were the words of Nicias. He meant either to 
 TheAthe- deter the Athenians by bringing home to them the 
 notdetOTed vastness of the undertaking, or to provide as far as 
 forcere^ cou ^ for the safety of the expedition if he were 
 qi eater’the e com P e hed to proceed. The result disappointed him. 
 preparation Far from losing their enthusiasm at the disagreeable 
 theya?e G as- prospect, they were more determined than ever; they 
 safety ° f approved of his advice, and were confident that every 
 
 chance of danger was now removed. All alike were 
 seized with a passionate desire to sail, the elder among 
 them convinced that they would achieve the conquest of 
 Sicily,—at any rate such an armament could suffer no 
 disaster; the youth were longing to see with their own 
 eyes the marvels of a distant land, and were confident of 
 a safe return ; the main body of the troops expected to 
 receive present pay, and to conquer a country which 
 would be an inexhaustible mine of pay for the future. 
 The enthusiasm of the majority was so overwhelming 
 that, although some disapproved, they were afraid of 
 being thought unpatriotic if they voted on the other 
 side, and therefore held their peace. 
 
 25. At last an Athenian came forward, and calling upon 
 Nicias gives Nicias, said that they would have no more excuses and 
 sionaiesti- delays; he must speak out and say what forces the 
 forces 0 re- he people were to vote him. He replied, with some un- 
 quired. willingness, that he would prefer to consider the matter 
 
 at leisure with his colleagues, but that, as far as he could 
 see at present, they ought to have at least a hundred 
 triremes of their own ; of these a certain number might 
 be used as transports a , and they must order more 
 a Cp. ch. 31 init., 43 init. 
 
 Opo 
 
mo 
 
 THE MUTILATION OF THE HERMAE. 427 
 
 i C ^2 ^ r ^ remes frora their allies. Of heavy-armed troops they VI. 
 
 ' 9If 2 ’ would require in all, including Athenians and allies, 
 not less than five thousand, and more if they could 
 possibly have them; the rest of the armament must 
 be in proportion, and should comprise archers to be 
 procured both at home and from Crete, and slingers. 
 
 These forces, and whatever else seemed to be required, 
 the generals would make ready before they started. 
 
 Upon this the Athenians at once decreed that the 26. 
 generals should be empowered to act as they thought Prepara- 
 best in the interest of the state respecting the numbers of war! f ° r 
 the army and the whole management of the expedition. 
 
 Then the preparations began. Lists for service were 
 made up at home and orders given to the allies. The 
 city had newly recovered from the plague and from the 
 constant pressure of war; a new population had grown 
 up ; there had been time for the accumulation of money 
 during the peace ; so that there was abundance of 
 everything at command. 
 
 While they were in the midst of their preparations, 27. 
 the Hermae a or square stone figures carved after the Meanwhile 
 ancient Athenian fashion, and standing everywhere at outrage on 
 the doorways a both of temples and private houses, in mae^the 
 one night had nearly all of them throughout the city 
 their faces mutilated. The offenders were not known, it are sus- 
 but great rewards were publicly offered for their detec- des[gns° f 
 tion, and a decree was passed that any one, whether democracy, 
 citizen, stranger, or slave, might without fear of punish¬ 
 ment disclose this or any other profanation of which he 
 was cognizant. The Athenians took the matter greatly 
 to heart—it seemed to them ominous of the fate of the 
 expedition; and they ascribed it to conspirators who 
 wanted to effect a revolution and to overthrow the 
 democracy. 
 
 Certain metics and servants gave information, not 28. 
 
 a or Kara to eVt^copioi/ may be taken with 7roXXoi: ‘ or square 
 figures of carved stone which, after the ancient Athenian fashion, 
 usually stand at the doorways ’ etc. 
 
VI. 
 
 Informa¬ 
 tion is 
 given about 
 some other 
 profane 
 acts. 
 
 Alcibiades 
 and others 
 are accused 
 of cele¬ 
 brating the 
 mysteries 
 in private 
 houses. 
 
 29 . 
 
 He begs to 
 be tried 
 before he 
 sails ; but 
 his enemies 
 think that 
 they will 
 have more 
 chance of 
 obtaining a 
 condemna¬ 
 tion if the 
 trial is 
 deferred. 
 
 428 THE SUPPOSED PLOT. 
 
 indeed about the Hermae, but about the mutilation of 
 other statues which had shortly before been perpetrated 
 by some young men in a drunken frolic : they also said 
 that the mysteries were repeatedly profaned by the 
 celebration of them in private houses, and of this im¬ 
 piety they accused, among others, Alcibiades. A party 
 who were jealous of his influence over the people, which 
 interfered with the permanent establishment of their 
 own, thinking that if they could get rid of him they 
 would be supreme a , took up and exaggerated the 
 charges against him, clamorously insisting that both 
 the mutilation of the Hermae and the profanation of the 
 mysteries were part of a conspiracy against the democracy, 
 and that he was at the bottom of the whole affair. In 
 proof they alleged the excesses of his ordinary life, 
 which were unbecoming in the citizen of a free state. 
 
 He strove then and there to clear himself of the 
 charges, and also offered to be tried before he sailed 
 (for all was now ready), in order that, if he were guilty, 
 he might be punished, and if acquitted, might retain 
 his command. He adjured his countrymen to listen 
 to no calumnies which might be propagated against 
 him in his absence; and he protested that they would 
 be wiser in not sending a man who had so serious an 
 imputation hanging over him on a command so im¬ 
 portant. But his enemies feared that if the trial took 
 place at once he would have the support of the army; 
 and that the people would be lenient, b and would not 
 forget that b he had induced the Argives and some 
 Mantineans to join in the expedition. They therefore 
 exerted themselves to postpone the trial. To this end 
 they suborned fresh speakers, who proposed that he 
 should sail now and not delay the expedition, but 
 should return and stand his trial within a certain num¬ 
 ber of days. Their intention was that he should be 
 
 a Cp. ii. 65 fin. 
 
 b Or, supplying avrov with Oepanevcov: ‘being well disposed to 
 him because ’ etc. 
 
 PQO 
 
CQO 
 
 THE FAREWELL. 
 
 429 
 
 C gi I 2 reca ^ e< ^ an d tried when they had stirred up a stronger VI. 
 feeling against him, which they could better do in his 
 absence. So it was decided that Alcibiades should sail. 
 
 About the middle of summer the expedition started 30. 
 for Sicily. Orders had been previously given to most Conflict of 
 of the allies, to the corn-ships, the smaller craft, and amongthe 
 generally to the vessels in attendance on the arma- at^he 13,118 
 ment, that they should muster at Corcyra, whence the mon ? ent of 
 
 1 J 5 parting. 
 
 whole fleet was to strike across the Ionian gulf to the 
 promontory of Iapygia. Early in the morning of the day ✓ 
 appointed for their departure, the Athenians and such 
 of their allies as had already joined them went down 
 to the Piraeus and began to man the ships. The entire 
 population of Athens accompanied them, citizens and 
 strangers alike. The citizens came to take farewell, one 
 of an acquaintance, another of a kinsman, another of 
 a son; the crowd as they passed along were full of 
 hope and full of tears; hope of conquering Sicily, tears 
 because they doubted whether they would ever see their 
 friends again, when they thought of the long voyage 
 on which they were sending them. At the moment 
 of parting the danger was nearer; and terrors which 
 had never occurred to them when they were voting the 
 expedition now entered into their souls. Nevertheless 
 their spirits revived at the sight of the armament in 
 all its strength and of the abundant provision which 
 they had made. The strangers and the rest of the 
 multitude came out of curiosity, desiring to witness an 
 enterprise of which the greatness exceeded belief. 
 
 No armament so magnificent or costly had ever been 31. 
 sent out by any single Hellenic power, though in mere Beauty and 
 number of ships and hoplites that which sailed to Epi- of e the° n 
 daurus under Pericles and afterwards under Hagnon to 
 Potidaea 3, was not inferior. For that expedition consisted connected 
 of a hundred Athenian and fifty Chian and Lesbian with it. 
 triremes, conveying four thousand hoplites all Athenian 
 citizens, three hundred cavalry, and a multitude of 
 a Cp. ii. 56, 58. 
 
43 ° 
 
 THE ATHENIAN ARMADA . 
 
 VI. allied troops. Still the voyage was short and the equip¬ 
 ments were poor, whereas this expedition was intended 
 to be long absent, and was thoroughly provided both 
 for sea and land service, wherever its presence might 
 be required. On the fleet the greatest pains and 
 expense had been lavished by the trierarchs and the 
 state. The public treasury gave a drachma a a day to 
 each sailor, and furnished empty hulls for sixty swift 
 sailing vessels, and for forty transports carrying hoplites. 
 All these were manned with the best crews which could 
 be obtained. The trierarchs, besides the pay given by 
 the state, added somewhat more out of their own means 
 to the wages of the upper ranks of rowers and of b the 
 petty officers 13 . The figure-heads and other fittings 
 provided by them were of the most costly description. 
 Every one strove to the utmost that his own ship 
 might excel both in beauty and swiftness. The infantry 
 had been well selected and the lists carefully made 
 up. There was the keenest rivalry among the soldiers 
 . in the matter of arms and personal equipment. And 
 while at home the Athenians were thus competing with 
 one another in the performance of their several duties, 
 to the rest of Hellas the expedition seemed to be a 
 grand display of their power and greatness, rather than 
 a preparation for war. If any one had reckoned up 
 the whole expenditure (i) of the state, (2) of individual 
 soldiers and others, including in the first not only what 
 the city had already laid out, but what was entrusted to 
 the generals, and in the second what either at the time 
 or afterwards private persons spent upon their outfit, 
 or the trierarchs upon their ships, the provision for the 
 long voyage which every one may be supposed to have 
 carried with him over and above his public pay, and 
 what soldiers or traders may have taken for purposes 
 of exchange, he would have found that altogether an 
 
 a 9 * d - 
 
 b Others translate ‘ the crews generally,’ or ‘ the soldiers’ 
 servants.’ 
 
 Opd 
 
B.C. 415- 
 01. 91, 2. 
 
 PRAYERS AND LIBATIONS. 431 
 
 immense sum amounting to many talents was withdrawn VI. 
 from the city. Men were quite amazed at the boldness of 
 the scheme and the magnificence of the spectacle, which 
 were everywhere spoken of, no less than at the great 
 disproportion of the force when compared with that of 
 the enemy against whom it was intended. Never had 
 a greater expedition been sent to a foreign land ; never 
 was there an enterprise in which the hope of future 
 success seemed to be better justified by actual power. 
 
 When the ships were manned and everything required 32. 
 for the voyage had been placed on board, silence was p ^ aye ^ s b 
 proclaimed by the sound of the trumpet, and all with thewho^e 
 one voice before setting sail offered up the customary b^the ™ 1 
 prayers ; these were recited, not in each ship, but by a xhe^aSors 
 single herald, the whole fleet accompanying him. On make liba - 
 
 & , . ’ , _ . . . . tionsand 
 
 every deck both officers and men, mingling wine in raise the 
 bowls, made libations from vessels of gold and silver. The ships 
 The multitude of citizens and other well-wishers who ^Aegina 7 
 were looking on from the land joined in the prayer. 
 
 The crews raised the Paean, and when the libations 
 were completed, put to sea. After sailing out for some 
 distance in single file, the ships raced with one another 
 as far as Aegina; thence they hastened onwards to 
 Corcyra, where the allies who formed the rest of the 
 army were assembling. 
 
 Meanwhile reports of the expedition were coming in Rumours of 
 to Syracuse from many quarters, but for a long time tionTeach 
 nobody gave credit to them. At length an assembly Syracuse - 
 was held. Even then different opinions were expressed, 
 some affirming and others denying that the expedition 
 was coming. At last Hermocrates the son of Hermon, 
 believing that he had certain information, came forward, 
 and warned the Syracusans in the following words :— 
 
 C I dare say that, like others, I shall not be believed 33* 
 when I tell you that the expedition is really coming; and H P ermo- 0f 
 
 I am well aware that those who are either the authors crates. 
 
 . . , They are 
 
 or reporters of tidings which seem incredible not only coming and 
 
 fail to convince others, but are thought fools for their ^eparefor 
 
4 32 
 
 SPEECH OF HERMOCRATES. 
 
 VI. 
 
 them. 
 
 If you are 
 prepared 
 there is 
 nothing 
 to fear ; 
 Sicily will 
 unite 
 against 
 them ; and 
 great ex¬ 
 peditions 
 never come 
 to good. 
 
 pains. Yet, when the city is in danger, fear shall not 
 stop my mouth; for I am convinced in my own mind 
 that I have better information than anybody. The 
 Athenians, wonder as you may, are coming against us 
 with a great fleet and army; they profess to be assist¬ 
 ing their Egestaean allies and to be restoring the 
 Leontines. But the truth is that they covet Sicily, and 
 especially our city. They think that, if they can conquer 
 us, they will easily conquer the rest. They will soon 
 be here, and you must consider how with your present 
 resources you can make the most successful defence. 
 You should not let them take you by surprise because 
 you despise them, or neglect the whole matter because 
 you will not believe that they are coming at all. But 
 to him who is not of this unbelieving temper I say:— 
 And do not you be dismayed at their audacity and 
 power. They cannot do more harm to us than we can 
 do to them ; the very greatness of their armament may 
 be an advantage to us ; it will have a good effect on 
 the other Sicilians, who will be alarmed, and in their 
 terror will be the more ready to assist us. Then, again, 
 if in the end we overpower them, or at any rate drive 
 them away baffled, for I have not the slightest fear of 
 their accomplishing their purpose, we shall have achieved 
 a noble triumph. And of this I have a good hope. Rarely 
 have great expeditions, whether Hellenic or Barbarian, 
 when sent far from home, met with success. They are 
 not more numerous than the inhabitants and their neigh¬ 
 bours, who all combine through fear; and if owing to 
 scarcity of supplies in a foreign land they miscarry, al¬ 
 though their ruin may be chiefly due to themselves, they 
 confer glory on those whom they meant to overthrow. 
 The greatness of these very Athenians was based on 
 the utter and unexpected ruin of the Persians a , who 
 were always supposed to have directed their expedition 
 against Athens. And I think that such a destiny may 
 very likely be reserved for us. 
 
 a Cp. i. 69 fin. 
 
 Ota 
 
wo 
 
 ■ C. 415. 
 1. 91, 2, 
 
 SPEECH OF HERMOCRATES. 433 
 
 ‘Let us take courage then, and put ourselves into a VI. 
 state of defence ; let us also send envoys to the Sicels, 34. 
 and, while we make sure of our old allies, endeavour to Let us 
 gain new ones. We will despatch envoys to the rest of our old 
 Sicily, and point out that the danger is common to all; and^pake 
 we will also send to the Italian cities in the hope that one ®* 
 they may either join us, or at any rate refuse to receive tain help 
 the Athenians. And I think that we should send to rest of 
 the Carthaginians ; the idea of an Athenian attack is carthag^ 7, 
 no novelty to them ; they are always living in appre- ^^and 
 hension of it. They will probably feel that if they leave Corinth, 
 us to our fate, the trouble may reach themselves, and would take 
 therefore they may be inclined in some way or other, would, 
 secretly, if not openly, to assist us. If willing to help, ^°g t n f he 
 of all existing states they are the best able ; for they Athenians 
 have abundance of gold and silver, and these make war, w e Slid 
 like other things, go smoothly. Let us also send to the defeat 1 dy 
 Lacedaemonians and Corinthians and entreat them to *en ifwe 
 come to our aid speedily, and at the same time to revive dM not 
 the war in Hellas. I have a plan which in my judgment should still 
 is the best suited to the present emergency, although it them?^* 5 
 is the last which you in your habitual indolence will might 
 readily embrace a . Let me tell you what it is. If all the dismayed 
 
 J . by our 
 
 Sicilian Greeks, or at least if we and as many as will boldness 
 join us, taking two months' provisions, would put out to thf ex¬ 
 sea with all our available ships and meet the Athenians pedltlon * 
 at Tarentum and the promontory of Iapygia, thereby 
 proving to them that before they fight for Sicily they 
 must fight for the passage of the Ionian Sea, we should 
 strike a panic into them. They would then reflect that 
 at Tarentum (which receives us), we, the advanced guard 
 of Sicily, are among friends, and go forth from a friendly 
 country, and that the sea is a large place not easy to 
 traverse with so great an armament as theirs. They 
 would know that after a long voyage their ships will be 
 unable to keep in line, and coming up slowly and few 
 at a time will be at our mercy. On the other hand, if 
 a Cp. i. 143 fin. 
 
 F f 
 
434 
 
 SPEECH OF HERMOCRATES . 
 
 they lighten their vessels and meet us in a compact 
 body with the swifter part of their fleet, they may have 
 to use oars, and then we shall attack them when they 
 are exhausted. Or if we prefer not to fight, we can retire 
 again to Tarentum. Having come over with slender 
 supplies and prepared for a naval engagement, they will 
 not know what to do on these desolate coasts. If they 
 remain we can blockade them ; if they attempt to sail 
 onwards they will cut themselves off from the rest of 
 their armament, and will be discouraged ; for they will 
 be far from certain whether the cities of Italy and Sicily 
 will receive them. In my opinion the anticipation of these 
 difficulties will hamper them to such a degree, that they 
 will never leave Corcyra. While they are holding con¬ 
 sultations, and sending out spies to discover our number 
 and exact position, they will find themselves driven into 
 winter; or in dismay at the unexpected opposition, they 
 may very likely break up the expedition ; especially if, 
 as I am informed, the most experienced of their generals 
 has taken the command against his will, and would 
 gladly make any considerable demonstration on our part 
 an excuse for retreating. I am quite sure that rumour 
 will exaggerate our strength. The minds of men are 
 apt to be swayed by what they hear; and they are most 
 afraid of those who commence an attack, or who at any 
 rate show to the aggressor betimes that he will meet 
 with resistance; for then they reflect that the risk is 
 equally divided. And so it will be with the Athenians. 
 They are now attacking us because they do not believe 
 that we shall defend ourselves, and in this opinion they 
 are justified by our refusal to join with the Lacedae¬ 
 monians in putting them down. But, if they see a us 
 enterprising almost to rashness a , they will be more dis¬ 
 mayed at our unexpected resistance than at our real 
 power. Take my advice; if possible, resolve on this 
 bold step, but if not, adopt other measures of defence as 
 
 a Or, 1 that they were mistaken, and that we boldly venture,’ etc. 
 Cp. ii. 89 med. 
 
PQQ 
 
 FACTION AT SYRACUSE. 
 
 435 
 
 .c. 415. quickly as possible. Remember each and all of you 
 ' 91 ' 2 ' that the true contempt of an invader is shown by deeds 
 of valour in the field, and that meanwhile the greatest 
 service which you can render to the state is to act as if 
 you were in the presence of danger, considering that safety 
 depends on anxious preparation a . The Athenians are 
 coming; I am certain that they are already on the sea 
 and will soon be here.’ 
 
 VI. 
 
 Thus spoke Hermocrates. Great was the contention 35. 
 which his words aroused among the Syracusan people, People said, 
 some asserting that the Athenians would never come, never 
 and that he was not speaking truth, others asking, ‘And w™at’harm 
 if they should come, what harm could they do to us ™ u ? 
 nearly so great as we could do to them?’ while others saw the 
 
 . . . . . . danger. 
 
 were quite contemptuous, and made a jest of the whole 
 matter. A few only believed Hermocrates and realised 
 the danger. At last Athenagoras, the popular leader, 
 who had at that time the greatest influence with the 
 multitude, came forward and spoke as follows :— 
 
 ‘He is either a coward or a traitor who would not 3 ^* 
 rejoice to hear that the Athenians are so mad as to come |^ena-° f 
 hither and deliver themselves into our hands. The goras. 
 
 Th ese 
 
 audacity of the people who are spreading these alarms alarms are 
 does not surprise me, but I do wonder at their folly traitors, 
 if they cannot see that their motives are transparent, ^verf 
 Having private reasons for being afraid, they want to 
 strike terror into the whole city b that they may hide from tiieir 
 themselves b under the shadow of the common fear. s ig ns . 
 
 And now, what is the meaning of these rumours ? They °!f_ 
 do not grow of themselves; they have been got up by 
 persons who are the troublers of our state. And you, 
 if you are wise, will not measure probabilities by their 
 reports, but by what we may assume to be the intentions 
 of shrewd and experienced men such as I conceive the 
 Athenians to be. They are not likely to leave behind 
 them a power such as Peloponnesus. The war which 
 
 a Cp. ii. 11 med. 
 
 *> Or, 4 that they may 
 
 hide their own consciousness of guilt.’ 
 Ff 2 
 
436 SPEECH OF ATHEXAGORAS. 
 
 VI. they have already on their hands is far from settled, and 
 will they go out of their way to bring upon themselves 
 another as great ? In my opinion they are only too 
 glad that we are not attacking them, considering the 
 number and power of our states. 
 
 37 - ‘Even if the rumour of their coming should turn out 
 Sicily is be true, I am sure that Sicily is more able than 
 
 more than 5 J 
 
 a match for Peloponnesus to maintain a great war. The whole island 
 mans ; and is better supplied in every way, and our own city is 
 Syracuse, herself far more than a match for the army which is 
 possessicm sal d to be threatening us ; aye, and for another as great, 
 of it, could j know that they will not bring cavalry with them, and 
 
 not conquer # J 0 J 
 
 Syracuse, will find none here, except the few horsemen which they 
 may procure from Egesta. They cannot provide a force 
 of hoplites equal to ours a , for they have to cross the 
 sea ; and to come all this distance, if only with ships and 
 with no troops or lading, would be work enough 15 . I 
 know too that an armament which is directed against 
 so great a city as ours will require immense supplies 0 . 
 Nay, I venture to assert that if they came hither, having 
 at their command another city close upon our border as 
 large as Syracuse, and could there settle and carry on 
 war against us from thence, they would still be destroyed 
 to a man ; how much more when the whole country will 
 be their enemy (for Sicily will unite), and when they 
 must pitch their camp the moment they are out of their 
 ships, and will have nothing but their wretched huts 
 and meagre supplies, being prevented by our cavalry 
 from advancing far beyond their lines ? Indeed I hardly 
 think that they will effect a landing at all. So far supe¬ 
 rior, in my judgment, are our forces to theirs. 
 
 38. ‘The Athenians, I repeat, know all that I am telling 
 The Athe- you, and do not mean to throw away what they have 
 
 nians are T . J 
 
 a shrewd got : I am pretty sure of that. But some of our people 
 a Cp. vi. 23 init. 
 
 b Placing a comma after eXdouras, omitting the comma after Set, 
 and taking /zeya yap .. KofU(T@T)vai as a parenthesis. 
 c Cp. vi. 21 med. 
 
 wo 
 
o« 
 
 SPEECH OF ATHENAGORAS. 
 
 437 
 
 c. 415. are fabricating reports which neither are, nor are ever VI. 
 
 " 9I ’ 2 ‘ likely to be, true. I know, and have always known, that people and 
 
 J 5 not likely 
 
 by words like these, and yet more mischievous, if not by to ruin 
 acts, they want to intimidate you, the Syracusan people, ThZf V6S * 
 and make themselves chiefs of the state. And I am fabricated 6 
 afraid that if they persevere they will succeed at last, b y 0 } { :. , 
 
 J A J 1 garchical 
 
 and that we shall be delivered into their hands before conspira- 
 we have had the sense to take precautions or to detect want to get 
 and punish them. This is the reason why our city is menUnto 1 " 
 always in a state of unrest and disorganisation, fighting f h s e ^|j ands ’ 
 against herself quite as much as against foreign enemies, resist them 
 and from time to time subjected to tyrants and to 
 narrow and wicked oligarchies. If the people will only 
 support me I shall endeavour to prevent any such mis¬ 
 fortunes happening in our day. With you I shall use 
 persuasion, but to these conspirators I shall apply force ; 
 and I shall not wait until they are detected in the act 
 (for who can catch them ?), but I shall punish their in¬ 
 tentions and the mischief which they would do if they 
 could. For the thoughts of our enemies must be punished 
 before they have ripened into deeds. If a man does not 
 strike first, he will be the first struck. As to the rest Tirade 
 of the oligarchical party, I must expose them and have the young 
 an eye on their designs; I must also instruct them: oll s archs - 
 that, I think, will be the way by which I can best deter 
 them from their evil courses. Come now, young men, 
 and answer me a question which I have often asked 
 myself. “ What can you want ?” To hold office already ? 
 
 But the law forbids. And the law was not intended to 
 slight you had you been capable; it was passed because 
 you were incapable. And so you would rather not 
 be on an equality with the many ? But when there is 
 no real difference between men, why should there be a 
 privileged class ? 
 
 c I shall be told that democracy is neither a wise nor 39 - 
 a just thing, and that those who have the money are The^tme 
 most likely to govern well. To which I answer, first composed 
 of all, that the people is the name of the whole, the elements ; 
 
438 
 
 SPEECH OF ATHENAGORAS. 
 
 VI. oligarchy of a part; secondly, that the rich are the best 
 while an guardians of the public purse, the wise the best coun- 
 
 oligarchy ° A 
 
 takes all sellors, and the many, when they have heard a matter 
 and gives discussed, the best judges a ; and that each and all of 
 their fun 16 these classes have in a democracy equal privileges. 
 ^ re ° f the Whereas an oligarchy, while giving the people the full 
 share of danger, not merely takes too much of the good 
 things, but absolutely monopolises them. And this is 
 what the powerful among you and the young would like 
 to have, and what in a great city they will never obtain. 
 
 40. ‘ O most senseless of men, for such you are indeed 
 
 Blind fools, jf you d 0 no t see the mischief of your own schemes: 
 
 if you are J J 
 
 not knaves, never in all my experience have I known such blindness 
 never t^ 1 among Hellenes, or such wickedness if you have your 
 uponby eyes open to what you are doing. Yet even now learn 
 
 you. if y 0U are s tupid, repent if you are guilty; and let your 
 
 aim be the welfare of the whole country. Remember 
 that the good among you will have an equal or larger 
 share in the government of it than the people b ; while if 
 you want more you will most likely lose all. Away 
 with these reports; we know all about them, and are 
 determined to suppress them. Let the Athenians come, 
 and Syracuse will repel her enemies in a manner worthy 
 of herself; we have generals who will look to the matter. 
 But if, as I suspect, none of your tales are true, the 
 state is not going to be deceived, and will not in a 
 moment of panic admit you to power, or impose upon, 
 her own neck the yoke of slavery. She will take the 
 matter into her own hands, and when she gives judgment 
 will reckon words to be equally criminal with actions. 
 She will not be talked out of her liberty by you, but will 
 do her utmost to preserve it ; she will be on her guard, 
 and will put you down with a strong hand.’ 
 
 Thus spoke Athenagoras. Whereupon one of the 
 One of the generals rose, and suffering no one else to come forward, 
 deprecates closed the discussion himself in the following words :— 
 bad l ian-° f ‘ There is little wisdom in exchanging abuse or in 
 a Cp. ii. 40 med. b Cp. ii. 37 init. 
 
 PQ O 
 
crio 
 
 THE ATHENIANS CROSS THE SEA . 439 
 
 C. 415- 
 . 91, 2. 
 
 sitting by and listening to it; let us rather, in view of VI. 
 the reported danger, see how the whole city and every : th h e e 
 man in it may take measures for resisting; the invaders report of 
 
 1 *i ttti 1111 the danger 
 
 worthily. Why should not the city be richly furnished a good 
 with arms, horses, and all the pride and pomp of war ; f^ncreas^ 
 where is the harm even if they should not be wanted ? ^y he 
 We, who are generals, will take in hand all these matters 
 and examine into them ourselves ; and we will send 
 messengers to the neighbouring cities in order to obtain 
 information, and for any other purpose which may be 
 necessary. Some precautions we have taken already, 
 and whatever occurs to us we will communicate to you. 5 
 When the general had thus spoken, the assembly dis¬ 
 persed. 
 
 The Athenians and their allies were by this time col- 42. 
 lected at Corcyra. There the generals began by holding The Athe- 
 a final review of the ships, and disposed them in the order Corcyra 
 in which they were to anchor at their stations. The STai^eview 
 fleet was divided into three squadrons, and one of them lament 
 assigned by lot to each of the three generals, in order 
 to avoid any difficulties which might occur, if they sailed into three 
 together, in finding water, anchorage, and provisions 
 where they touched ; they also thought that the presence 
 of a general with each division would promote good 
 order and discipline throughout the fleet. They then 
 sent before them to Italy and Sicily three ships, which 
 had orders to find out what cities in those regions would 
 receive them, and to meet them again on their way, that 
 they might know before they put in. 
 
 At length the great armament proceeded to cross 43. 
 from Corcyra to Sicily. It consisted of a hundred and At length 
 
 J y . they cross 
 
 thirty-four triremes in all, besides two Rhodian vessels the sea in 
 of fifty oars. Of these a hundred were Athenian; and thirty- 
 sixty being swift vessels, and the remaining forty trans- ^e mes 
 ports : the rest of the fleet was furnished by the Chians p"jJ t * wo 
 and other allies. The hoplites numbered in all five corners, 
 thousand one hundred, of whom fifteen hundred were fivITthou? 
 Athenians taken from the roll, and seven hundred who hundred 
 
440 THE ATHENIANS ARRIVE AT RHEGIUM. 
 
 VI. served as marines were of the fourth and lowest class of 
 four hun Athenian citizens. The remainder of the hoplites were 
 dredand furnished by the allies, mostly by the subject states; 
 archers, but five hundred came from Argos, besides two hundred 
 hundred and fifty Mantinean and other mercenaries. The archers 
 ahundred were m f° ur hundred and eighty, of whom eighty were 
 and twenty Cretans. There were seven hundred Rhodian slingers, 
 
 Megarian . . 
 
 light- a hundred and twenty light-armed Meganans who were 
 thirty 1 ’ and exiles a , and one horse transport which conveyed thirty 
 
 horsemen. h orsemen an d horses. 
 
 44 * Such were the forces with which the first expedition 
 included crossed the sea. For the transport of- provisions thirty 
 thirty mer- merchant-ships, which also conveyed bakers, masons, 
 
 chant-ships 1 .... 
 
 and a hun- carpenters, and tools such as are required m sieges, were 
 vessels* 113 ^ 1 included in the armament. It was likewise attended by 
 Rhe^ium at a hundred small vessels ; these, as well as the merchant- 
 they are vessels, were pressed into the service. Other merchant- 
 
 refused 
 
 admittance vessels and lesser craft in great numbers followed of their 
 Sty, but are own accord for purposes of trade. The whole fleet now 
 withpro- struck across the Ionian sea from Corcyra. They arrived 
 aiio\ved a to d P rom ontory of Iapygia and at Tarentum, each 
 
 anchor. ship taking its own course, and passed along the coast of 
 Italy. The Italian cities did not admit them within their 
 walls, or open a market to them, but allowed them 
 water and anchorage ; Tarentum and Locri refused even 
 these. At length they reached Rhegium, the extreme 
 point of Italy, where the fleet reunited. As they were 
 not received within the walls they encamped outside the 
 city at the temple of Artemis ; there they were provided 
 by the inhabitants with a market, and drawing up their 
 ships on shore they took a rest. They held a conference 
 with the Rhegians, and pressed them, being Chalcidians 
 themselves, to aid their Chalcidian kinsmen the Leon- 
 tines. But the Rhegians replied that they would be 
 neutral, and would only act in accordance with the 
 
 decision of all the Italian Greeks. The Athenian com¬ 
 manders now began to consider how they could best 
 
 a Cp„ iv. 74 = 
 
 PQO 
 
OB' 
 
 BAD NEWS FROM EGESTA . 
 
 441 
 
 .c. 415. commence operations in Sicily. Meanwhile they were VI. 
 
 9 ' expecting the ships which had gone on and were to meet 
 them from Egesta ; for they wanted to know whether 
 the Egestaeans really had the money of which the mes¬ 
 sengers had brought information to Athens. 
 
 From many quarters the news began to reach the 45. 
 Syracusans that the Athenian fleet was at Rhegium, The Syra- 
 and the report was confirmed by their spies. They now resolve to 
 no longer doubted, but fell to work heart and soul. To themselves 
 some of the Sicel towns they sent troops, to others in earnest * 
 envoys; they also garrisoned the forts in the territory 
 of Syracuse, and within the city itself inspected the 
 horses and arms, and saw that they were in good con¬ 
 dition. In short, they made every preparation for a 
 war which was rapidly approaching, and almost at their 
 gates. 
 
 The three ships which had gone forward to Egesta 46. 
 now returned to the Athenians at Rhegium; they re- Trick 
 ported that of the money which had been promised by the 
 thirty talents a only were forthcoming and no more. The wh?had nS# 
 spirits of the generals fell at once on receiving this their Opiate 
 first discouragement. They were also disappointed at which the 
 the unfavourable answer of the Rhegians, whom they envoys 
 had asked first, and might naturally have expected to Egesta. 
 join them because they were kinsmen of the Leontines, 
 and had always hitherto been in the Athenian interest. 
 
 Nicias expected that the Egestaeans would fail them b ; 
 to the two others their behaviour appeared even more 
 incomprehensible than the defection of the Rhegians. 
 
 The fact was that when the original envoys came from 
 Athens to inspect the treasure, the Egestaeans had prac¬ 
 tised a trick upon them. They brought them to the 
 temple of Aphrodite at Eryx, and showed them the 
 offerings deposited there, consisting of bowls, flagons, 
 
 'censers, and a good deal of other plate. Most of the 
 vessels were only of silver, and therefore they made 
 a show quite out of proportion to their value. They 
 a £ 7200. b Cp. vi. 22 fin. 
 
442 
 
 COUNCIL OF WAR. 
 
 VI. also gave private entertainments to the crews of the 
 triremes : on each of these occasions they produced, as 
 their own, drinking-vessels of gold and silver not only 
 collected in Egesta itself, but borrowed from the neigh¬ 
 bouring towns, Phoenician as well as Hellenic. All of 
 them exhibiting much the same vessels and making 
 everywhere a great display, the sailors were amazed, 
 and on their arrival at Athens told every one what heaps 
 of wealth they had seen. When the news spread that 
 the Egestaeans had not got the money, great was the 
 unpopularity incurred throughout the army by these 
 men, who having been first imposed upon themselves 
 had been instrumental in imposing upon others. 
 
 47. The generals now held a council of war. Nicias was 
 Opinions of opinion that they should sail with the whole fleet 
 
 of the three . . .. . . , r . 
 
 generals, against Selmus, which was their main errand: if the 
 would sail Egestaeans provided pay for all their forces, they would 
 ^hnus shape their course accordingly; if not, they would de- 
 making the mand maintenance for sixty ships, the number which the 
 
 Egestaeans . 
 
 pay. Egestaeans had requested a , and remain on the spot until 
 Jspiajing 1 they had brought the Selinuntians to terms either by 
 of Athens ^ orce or b Y negotiation. They would then pass along 
 he would the coast before the eyes of the other cities and display 
 
 return . . y x J 
 
 home. the visible power of Athens, while they proved at the 
 same time her zeal in the cause of her friends and allies; 
 
 after this they would return home, unless a speedy way 
 of relieving the Leontines or obtaining support from 
 some of the other cities should unexpectedly present 
 itself. But they should not throw away their own 
 resources and imperil the safety of Athens. 
 
 48. Alcibiades urged that it would be a disgrace to have 
 Aicibiades gone forth with so great an armament and to return 
 
 would do 0 0 
 
 more ; without achieving anything. They should send envoys 
 attackboth to every city of Sicily, with the exception of Selinus 
 SyTacus^, nd and Syracuse; they should also negotiate with the Sicels, 
 over Ae ning ma -^ n S friends of the independent tribes, and persuading 
 other the rest to revolt from the Syracusans. They would 
 
 a Cp. vi. 8 init. 
 
 Q2 O 
 
wo- 
 
 OPINIONS OF THE GENERALS. 
 
 443 
 
 c. 415- 
 
 . 91, 2. 
 
 thus obtain food and reinforcements. They should first VI. 
 appeal to the Messenians, whose city being on the Sicilian 
 highway of traffic was the key of Sicily, and possessed 
 a harbour from which the Athenian forces could most 
 conveniently watch the enemy. Finally, when they had 
 brought the cities over to them and knew who would 
 be on their side in the war, they should attack Selinus 
 and Syracuse, unless the Selinuntians would come to 
 terms with the Egestaeans, and the Syracusans would 
 permit the restoration of the Leontines. 
 
 Lamachus was of opinion that they ought to sail 49. 
 direct to Syracuse, and fight as soon as possible under ^^ chus 
 the walls of the city, while the inhabitants were un- that the 
 prepared and the consternation was at its height. He should sail 
 argued that all armies are most terrible at first; if the an^fight USe 
 appearance of them is long delayed the spirits of men ^ h °y Ce * 
 revive, and, when they actually come, the sight of them should 
 only awakens contempt a . If the Athenians could strike their fleet 
 suddenly, while their opponents were still in fear and at Megara ‘ 
 suspense, that would be the best chance of victory. Not 
 only the sight of the armament which would never seem 
 so numerous again, but the near approach of suffer¬ 
 ing, and above all the immediate peril of battle, would 
 create a panic among the enemy. Many of the Syra¬ 
 cusans would probably be cut off in the country, not 
 believing in the approach of an invader; and while the 
 villagers were trying to convey their property into the 
 city, their own army, which would be encamped close 
 under the walls, would be masters of the field and 
 could have no lack of provisions. In the end, the other 
 Sicilian Greeks, instead of joining the Syracusan alli¬ 
 ance, would come over to them, and would no longer 
 hesitate and look about them to see which side would 
 conquer. He was also of opinion that they should 
 make Megara their naval station, b the fleet returning 
 
 a Cp. vii. 42 med. 
 
 b Reading tyopixurBevras, a conjecture of Schaefer’s adopted by 
 
444 ALCIBIADES AT NAXOS AND CAT AN A. 
 
 VI. 
 
 5 °- 
 
 The plan of 
 Alcibiades 
 is pursued, 
 and he 
 himself 
 goes as 
 envoy to 
 Messene, 
 but is not 
 admitted. 
 An Athe¬ 
 nian force 
 is received 
 at Naxos, 
 but ex¬ 
 cluded at 
 Catana. 
 They go on 
 to Syracuse. 
 
 5 1 - 
 
 They return 
 to Catana, 
 where the 
 soldiers find 
 a way in 
 
 thither from Syracuse and anchoring in the harbour b . b.c. 415. 
 The place was deserted, and was not far distant from ' 91 ‘ 2 ' 
 Syracuse either by land or by sea. 
 
 Lamachus having thus spoken nevertheless gave his 
 own voice for the proposal of Alcibiades. Whereupon 
 Alcibiades sailed across in his admiral’s ship to Messene 
 and proposed an alliance to the inhabitants. He failed 
 to convince them, for they refused to receive the Athe¬ 
 nians into the city, although they offered to open a 
 market for them outside the walls. So he sailed back 
 to Rhegium. The generals at once manned sixty ships, 
 selecting the crews indifferently out of the entire fleet, 
 and taking the necessary provisions coasted along to 
 Naxos ; they left the rest of the army and one of them¬ 
 selves at Rhegium. The Naxians received them into 
 their city,, and they sailed on to Catana; but the Cata- 
 naeans, having a Syracusan party within their walls, 
 denied admission to them; so they moved to the river 
 Terias and there encamped. On the following day they 
 went on to Syracuse in long file with all their ships, except 
 ten, which they had sent forward to sail into the great 
 harbour and see whether there was any fleet launched. 
 
 On their approaching the city a herald was to proclaim 
 from the decks that the Athenians had come to restore 
 their allies and kinsmen the Leontines to their homes, 
 and that therefore any Leontines who were in Syracuse 
 should regard the Athenians as their friends and bene¬ 
 factors, and join them without fear. When the pro¬ 
 clamation had been made, and the fleet had taken a 
 survey of the city, and harbours, and of the ground 
 which was to be the scene of operations, they sailed 
 back to Catana. 
 
 The Catanaeans now held an assembly, and although 
 they still refused to receive the army, they told the 
 generals to come in and say what they had to say. 
 
 While Alcibiades was speaking and the people of the 
 
 Poppo ; or, following the MSS. and reading i^op^Bevras: ‘there 
 taking up a secure position and thence attacking Syracuse.’ 
 
RECALL OF ALCIBIADES . 
 
 445 
 
 B.C. 415. 
 01. 91, 2. 
 
 city had their attention occupied with the assembly, VI. 
 the soldiers broke down unobserved a postern gate while Aici- 
 
 ’ r . biades is 
 
 which had been badly walled up, and finding their way speaking, 
 into the town began to walk about in the market-place, feet r£° le 
 Those of the Catanaeans who were in the Syracusan ™? t ^ rfrom 
 interest, when they saw that the enemy had entered, Rhegium. 
 took alarm and stole away. They were not numerous, 
 and the other Catanaeans voted the alliance with the 
 Athenians, and told them to bring up the rest of their 
 army from Rhegium. The Athenians then sailed back 
 to Rhegium, and with their entire force moved to 
 Catana, where on their arrival they began to establish 
 their camp. 
 
 But meanwhile news came from Camarina that if they 52. 
 would go thither the Camarinaeans would join them. The Athe- 
 
 . nians sail 
 
 They also heard that the Syracusans were manning a first to 
 navy. So they sailed with their whole force first to wWdThas 
 Syracuse, but they found that there was no fleet in a ^ yet j 1 ® 
 preparation: they then passed on to Camarina, and t0 Cama- 
 
 • ’ , , , , , , - , rina, but 
 
 putting in to the open beach they sent a herald J:o the they are not 
 
 city. The citizens would not receive them, declaring ^ere!^ 
 that their oath a bound them not to receive the Athe¬ 
 nians if they came with more than one ship, unless 
 they themselves sent for a greater number. So they 
 sailed away without effecting their purpose. They then 
 disembarked on a part of the Syracusan territory, which 
 they ravaged. But a few Syracusan horse coming up 
 killed some of their light-armed troops who were 
 straggling. They then returned to Catana. 
 
 There they found that the vessel Salaminia had come 53 * 
 from Athens to fetch Alcibiades, who had been put upon Tlie . Sala_ 
 
 7 L r mmia 
 
 his trial by the state and was ordered home to defend comes to 
 
 fetch 
 
 himself. With him were summoned certain of his soldiers, Alcibiades. 
 who were accused, some of profaning the mysteries, of X the ement 
 others of mutilation of the Hermae. For after the de- Athenians, 
 
 who con- 
 
 parture of the expedition the Athenians prosecuted both nect the 
 enquiries as keenly as ever. They did not investigate 0 f the 
 a Cp. iv. 65 init. 
 
446 RECOLLECTIONS OF THE TYRANTS. 
 
 VI. the character of the informers, but in their suspicious B.c. 415. 
 
 Hermae: moo d listened to all manner of statements, and seized ' 91 ‘ 2? 
 
 with the , i_ 1 • * 
 
 tradition of and imprisoned some of the most respectable citizens 
 
 tratidae?" on the evidence of wretches; they thought it better to 
 sift the matter and discover the truth; and they would 
 not allow even a man of good character against whom 
 an accusation was brought to escape without a thorough 
 investigation, merely because the informer was a rogue. 
 
 For the people, who had heard by tradition that the 
 tyranny of Pisistratus and his sons ended in great op¬ 
 pression, and knew moreover that their power was 
 overthrown, not by Harmodius or any efforts of their 
 own, but by the Lacedaemonians a , were in a state of 
 incessant fear and suspicion. 
 
 54 - 
 
 Not Hip- 
 pias the 
 reigning 
 tyrant, but 
 Hipparchus 
 his brother, 
 was slain by 
 Harmodius 
 and Aris- 
 togiton. 
 
 The at¬ 
 tempt arose 
 out of a 
 love affair. 
 The Pisis- 
 tratidae, 
 though 
 tyrants, 
 were not 
 without 
 virtues or 
 wanting in 
 modera- 
 
 Now the attempt of Aristogiton and Harmodius arose 
 out of a love affair, which I will narrate at length; and 
 the narrative will show that the Athenians themselves 
 give quite an inaccurate account of their own tyrants, 
 and of the incident in question, and know no more than 
 other Hellenes 13 . Pisistratus died at an advanced age B.c. 527. 
 in possession of the tyranny, and then, not, as is the 01 ‘ 6s ’ ^ 
 common opinion, Hipparchus, but Hippias (who was 
 the eldest of his sons) succeeded to his power.—Har- b.c. 514* 
 modius was in the flower of youth, and Aristogiton, a ° 
 citizen of the middle class, became his lover. Hip¬ 
 parchus made an attempt to gain the affections of 
 Harmodius, but he would not listen to him, and told 
 Aristogiton. The latter was naturally tormented at the 
 
 01. 66, 3. 
 
 retained the *^ ea5 an 6 fearing that Hipparchus who was powerful 
 ancient would resort to violence, at once formed such a plot 
 kept their as a man in his station might for the overthrow of the 
 thtoffices. tyranny- Meanwhile Hipparchus made another attempt; 
 
 he had no better success, and thereupon he determined, 
 not indeed to take any violent step, but to insult 
 Harmodius c in some secret place 0 , so that his motive 
 
 a Cp. Herod, v. 65. b Cp. i. 20. 
 
 c Reading tottm with all the MSS.; or, reading rpo7r<B: ‘in some 
 underhand manner.’ 
 
■gw 
 
 HIPPIAS THE ELDER SON. 
 
 447 
 
 c. s r 4- could not be suspected. To use violence would have VI. 
 
 .. 66, 3. . 
 
 been at variance with the general character of his ad¬ 
 ministration, which was not unpopular or oppressive 
 to the many; in fact no tyrants ever displayed greater 
 merit or capacity than these. Although the tax on 
 the produce of the soil which they exacted amounted 
 only to five per cent., they improved and adorned the 
 city, and carried on successful wars ; they were also in 
 the habit of sacrificing in the temples. The city mean¬ 
 while was permitted to retain her ancient laws; but 
 the family of Pisistratus took care that one of their 
 own number should always be in office. Among others 
 who thus held the annual archonship at Athens was 
 Pisistratus, a son of the tyrant Hippias. He was named 
 after his grandfather Pisistratus, and during his term of 
 office he dedicated the altar of the Twelve Gods in the 
 Agora, and another altar in the temple of the Pythian 
 Apollo. The Athenian people afterwards added to 
 one side of the altar in the Agora and so concealed 
 the inscription upon it; but the other inscription on 
 the altar of the Pythian Apollo may still be seen, 
 although the letters are nearly effaced. It runs as 
 follows:— 
 
 < Pisistratus the son of Hippias dedicated this memorial of his 
 archonship in the sacred precinct of the Pythian Apollo. 
 
 That Hippias was the eldest son of Pisistratus and 55 * 
 succeeded to his power I can positively affirm from Various 
 special information which has been transmitted to me. more or 
 
 t less con- 
 
 But there is other evidence. Of the legitimate sons of vincing, 
 Pisistratus he alone had children; this is indicated by 
 the altar just mentioned, and by the column which the jjjf c ;' d “ 
 Athenians set up in the Acropolis to commemorate son. 
 the oppression of the tyrants. For on that column no 
 son of Thessalus or of Hipparchus is named, but five 
 of Hippias who were born to him of Myrrhine the 
 daughter of Callias the son of Hyperechides ; now there 
 is a presumption that the son who married first would 
 
448 HA RMODIUS AND A RIS T O GIT ON. 
 
 VI. be the eldest. Moreover, his name is inscribed a on the 
 same column a immediately after his father’s ; this again 
 is a presumption that he was his eldest son and suc¬ 
 ceeded him. I think too that Hippias would have 
 found a difficulty in seizing the tyranny if Hipparchus 
 had been tyrant at the time of his death and he had 
 tried to step into his place. As it was, owing to the 
 habitual dread which he had inspired in the citizens, 
 and the strict discipline which he maintained among 
 his body-guard, he held the government with the most 
 perfect security and without the least difficulty. Nor 
 did he behave at all like a younger brother, who would 
 not have known what to do b because he had not been 
 regularly used to command b . Yet Hipparchus by 
 reason of his violent end became famous, and obtained 
 in after ages the reputation of having been the tyrant. 
 
 56. When Hipparchus found his advances repelled by 
 The rest of Harmodius he carried out his intention of insulting him. 
 There^ 7 ’ There was a young sister of his whom Hipparchus and 
 Hannodius friends first invited to come and carry a sacred 
 giton^ St °" i n a procession, and then rejected her, declaring 
 
 that she had never been invited by them at all because 
 she was unworthy. At this Harmodius was very angry, 
 and Aristogiton, for his sake, more angry still. They and 
 the other conspirators had already laid their prepara¬ 
 tions, but were waiting for the festival of the great 
 Panathenaea, when the citizens who took part in the 
 procession assembled in arms ; for to wear arms on any 
 other day would have aroused suspicion. Harmodius 
 and Aristogiton were to begin the attack, and the rest 
 were immediately to join in, and engage with the guards. 
 The plot had been communicated to a few only, the 
 better to avoid detection ; but they hoped that, however 
 
 a Or, reading with nearly all the MSS. £v rjj Tzparri <ttt)\t} : ( on the 
 front part of the column.’ But the words can hardly bear this 
 meaning. The word npoorr] is probably derived from 7 rpayros which 
 follows. 
 
 b Or, giving a more precise sense to gwexa>s: because he had 
 succeeded to the command and not been used to it.’ 
 
 O td 
 
ASSASSINATION OF HIPPARCHUS. 
 
 449 
 
 oi C 66 14 ’ ^ eW struc k blow, the crowd who would be armed; VI. 
 
 ' 3 ‘ although not in the secret, would at once rise and assist 
 in the recovery of their own liberties. 
 
 The day of the festival arrived, and Hippias went out 57 * 
 of the city to the place called the Ceramicus, where he Harmodius 
 was occupied with his guards in marshalling the pro- togiton, 
 cession. Harmodius and Aristogiton, who were ready thatthey S 
 with their daggers, stepped forward to do the deed. But Grayed 11 
 seeing one of the conspirators in familiar conversation leave Hip- 
 with Hippias, who was readily accessible to all, they feiTupon 
 took alarm and imagined that they had been betrayed, 
 and were on the point of being seized. Whereupon they ^. e 0 “^’ 
 determined to take their revenge first on the man who and^their 
 had outraged them and was the cause Of their desperate 
 attempt. So they rushed, just as they were, within the 
 gates. They found Hipparchus near the Leocorium, as 
 it was called, and then and there falling upon him with 
 all the blind fury, one of an injured lover, the other of a 
 man smarting under an insult, they smote and slew him. 
 
 The crowd ran together, and so Aristogiton for the 
 present escaped the guards ; but he was afterwards taken 
 and not very gently handled. Harmodius perished on 
 the spot. 
 
 The news was carried to Hippias at the Ceramicus; 58. 
 he went at once, not to the place, but to the armed men Hippias, 
 
 . . - , . dissembling 
 
 who were to march in the procession and, being at a his feelings, 
 distance, were as yet ignorant of what had happened. SrmThe 0 
 Betraying nothing in his looks of the calamity which had a r rest n thT d 
 befallen him, he bade them leave their arms and go to a suspected, 
 certain spot which he pointed out. They, supposing 
 that he had something to say to them, obeyed, and then 
 bidding his guards seize the arms, he at once selected 
 those whom he thought guilty, and all who were found 
 carrying daggers ; for the custom was to march in the 
 procession with spear and shield only. 
 
 SucR was the conspiracy of Harmodius and Aristogiton, 59. 
 which began in the resentment of a lover; the reckless ^ 
 attempt which followed arose out of a sudden fright, grows op- 
 Gg 
 
45° 
 
 DEPOSITION OF HIPPIAS. 
 
 VI. To the people at large the tyranny simply became more b.c. 514. 
 pressive. oppressive, and Hippias, after his brother’s death living ' ' 3 ‘ 
 
 Sposed in great fear, slew many of the citizens ; he also began 
 Lacedae- to look abroad in hope of securing an asylum should 
 monians, a revolution occur. Himself an Athenian, he married 
 
 and goes to 
 
 the court his daughter Archedice to a Lampsacene, Aeantides, son 
 Epitaph” of Hippocles the tyrant of Lampsacus ; for he observed 
 daughter that the family of Hippocles had great influence with 
 Archedic6. King Darius. Her tomb is at Lampsacus, and bears 
 this inscription:— 
 
 ‘ This earth covers Archedice the daughter of Hippias, 
 
 A man who was great among the Hellenes of his day. 
 
 Her father, her husband, her brothers, and her sons were 
 tyrants, 
 
 Yet was not her mind lifted up to vanity.’ 
 
 Hippias ruled three years longer over the Athenians. 
 
 In the fourth year he was deposed by the Lacedae- b.c. 51a 
 monians and the exiled Alcmaeonidae. He retired 016?r * 
 under an agreement, first to Sigeium, and then to 
 Aeantides at Lampsacus. From him he went to the 
 court of Darius, whence returning twenty years later 
 with the Persian army he took part in the expedition to 
 Marathon, being then an old man. 
 
 60. The Athenian people, recalling these and other b.c. 41s* 
 The Athe- traditions of the tyrants which had sunk deep into 0L 9h 
 
 nians be- . . . 
 
 come more their minds, were suspicious and savage against the 
 exdted° re supposed profaners of the mysteries ; the whole affair 
 actsofir- seeme d to them to indicate some conspiracy aiming at 
 whmh they ok S arck y or tyranny. Inflamed by these suspicions they 
 believe to had already imprisoned many men of high character. 
 someTde- There was no sign of returning quiet, but day by day 
 th^demo” 51 tke movement became more furious and the number of 
 Confession arrests increased. At last one of the prisoners, who 
 of one was believed to be deeply implicated, was induced by a 
 prisoners, fellow-prisoner to make a confession—whether true or 
 false I cannot say; opinions are divided, and no one 
 knew at the time, or to this day knows, who the offenders 
 were. His companion argued that even if he were not 
 
mo 
 
 •C. 415. 
 1. 91, 2, 
 
 THE MYSTERY OF THE HERMAE. 451 
 
 guilty he ought to confess and claim a pardon a ; he VI. 
 would thus save his own life, and at the same time 
 deliver Athens from the prevailing state of suspicion. 
 
 His chance of escaping would be better if he confessed 
 his guilt in the hope of a pardon, than if he denied it 
 and stood his trial. So he gave evidence both against 
 himself and others in the matter of the Hermae. The 
 Athenians were delighted at finding out what they 
 supposed to be the truth ; they had been in despair at 
 the thought that the conspirators against the democracy 
 would never be known, and they immediately liberated 
 the informer and all whom he had not denounced. The 
 accused they brought to trial, and executed such of them 
 as could be found. Those who had fled they condemned 
 to death, and promised a reward to any one who would 
 kill them. No one could say whether the sufferers were 
 justly punished ; but the beneficial effect on the city at 
 the time was undeniable. 
 
 The enemies of Alcibiades, who had attacked him 61. 
 before he sailed, continued their machinations, and popu- s y s P ic .i°. n 
 lar feeling was deeply stirred against him. The Athe- des in- 
 nians now thought that they knew the truth about the the^ppear- 
 Hermae, and they were more than ever convinced that LacedL- 
 the violation of the mysteries which had been laicTto his Ionian 
 charge was a part of the same conspiracy, and was to isthmus, 
 be explained in the same way. It so happened that are beside 
 while the city was in this state of excitement a small Th^us- 63 * 
 Lacedaemonian force proceeded as far as the Isthmus, P icioi \ 
 having something to do in Boeotia. They were supposed Argos, 
 to have come, not in the interest of the Boeotians, but by m i n i a is 
 a secret understanding with Alcibiades; and the Athe- ^sthim, 
 nians really believed that but for their own alacrity in but he + 
 arresting the accused persons the city would have been Thurii and 
 
 ® * crosses to 
 
 betrayed. For one whole night the people lay in arms in Pelopon- 
 the temple of Theseus which is within the walls. About nesus * 
 this time too the friends of Alcibiades at Argos were sus¬ 
 pected of conspiring against the Argive democracy, and 
 a Cp. vi. 27. 
 
 Gg 2 
 
452 ALCIBIADES CONDEMNED TO DEATH . 
 
 VI. accordingly the Argive hostages who had been deposited 
 in the islands a were at once given up by the Athe¬ 
 nians to the vengeance of the Argive people. From 
 every quarter suspicion had gathered around Alcibiades, 
 and the Athenian people were determined to have him 
 tried and executed; so they sent the ship Salaminia to 
 Sicily bearing a summons to him and to others against 
 whom information had been given. He was ordered to 
 follow the officers home and defend himself, but they 
 were told not to arrest him; the Athenians, having re¬ 
 gard to their interests in Sicily, were anxious not to cause 
 excitement in their own camp or to attract the attention 
 of the enemy, and above all not to lose the Mantineans 
 and Argives, whom they knew to have been induced by 
 his influence to join in the expedition 15 . He in his own 
 ship, and those who were accused with him, left Sicily 
 in company with the Salaminia, and sailed for Athens. 
 When they arrived at Thurii they followed no further, 
 but left the ship and disappeared, fearing to return and 
 stand their trial when the prejudice against them was so 
 violent. The crew of the Salaminia searched for them, 
 but after a time, being unable to find them, gave up the 
 search and went home. Alcibiades, now an exile, crossed 
 not long afterwards in a small vessel from Thurii to Pelo¬ 
 ponnesus, and the Athenians on his non-appearance 
 sentenced him and his companions to death. 
 
 62. The two Athenian generals who remained in Sicily 
 Expedition now divided the fleet between them by lot, and sailed to- 
 
 to Egesta. ,. , _ , J 5 
 
 Capture of wards Selinus and Egesta; they wanted to know whether 
 TheAthe- the Egestaeans would give them the promised money, 
 ?eti^sby and also t0 ascertain the condition of the Selinuntians 
 Catana and na ^ ure their quarrel with the Egestaeans. 
 Failure to Sailing along the north coast of Sicily, which looks 
 take Hybia. towards t h e Tyrrhenian Gulf, they touched at Himera, 
 the only Hellenic city in this part of the island. But 
 they were not received, and passed on. On their voyage 
 they took Hyccara, a city on the sea-shore which, although 
 a Cp. v. 84 init. b Cp. vi. 29. 
 
oca 
 
 ATHENIANS IN THE NORTH OF SICILY . 453 
 
 .c. 415. of Sicanian origin, was hostile to the Egestaeans a . They VI. 
 
 9 ' reduced the inhabitants to slavery, and handed the place 
 over to the Egestaeans, whose cavalry had now joined 
 them. The Athenian troops then marched back through 
 the country of the Sicels until they arrived at Catana ; 
 the ships which conveyed the prisoners going round the 
 coast to meet them. Nicias had sailed straight from 
 Hyccara to Egesta, where he did his business, and 
 having obtained thirty talents b of silver, rejoined the 
 army at Catana. The Athenians on their return disposed 
 of their slaves c ; the sum realised by the sale was about 
 a hundred and twenty talents d . They next sailed round 
 to their Sicel allies and bade them send reinforcements. 
 
 Then with half of their army they marched against 
 Hybla Geleatis, a hostile town, which they failed to take. 
 
 And so ended the summer. 
 
 Early in the ensuing winter the Athenians made 63. 
 
 preparations for an attack upon Syracuse ; the Syra- Syra- 
 
 cusans likewise prepared to take the offensive. For begin to 
 
 • • • despise the 
 
 when they found that their enemies did not assail them Athenians. 
 
 at once, as in their first panic they had expected, day by 
 day their spirits rose. And now the Athenians, after 
 cruising about at the other end of Sicily, where they 
 seemed to be a long way off, had gone to Hybla, and 
 their attack upon it had failed. So the Syracusans 
 despised them more than ever. After the manner of the 
 populace when elated, they insisted that since the Athe¬ 
 nians would not come to them, their generals should 
 lead them against Catana. Syracusan horsemen, who 
 were always riding up to the Athenian army and watch¬ 
 ing their movements, would ask insultingly whether, 
 instead of resettling the Leontines in their old home, 
 they were not themselves going to settle down with their 
 good friends the Syracusans in a new one. 
 
 The generals were aware of the state of affairs. They 64. 
 determined to draw the whole Syracusan army as far The A l he - 
 
 * J mans de- 
 
 Cp. vi. 2 med. 
 Gp. vii. 13 fin. 
 
 b Cp. vi. 46 init. 
 d ^28,800. 
 
454 
 
 THE SYRACUSANS AT CATANA. 
 
 VI. 
 
 ceive the 
 Syracusans 
 by a ficti¬ 
 tious mes¬ 
 sage and 
 draw 
 them off 
 to Catana, 
 
 65 - 
 
 while they 
 quietly sail 
 
 as possible out of the city, and then in their absence sail B.c. 415. 
 thither by night and take up a convenient position un- * 9h 2 * 
 molested. They knew that they would fail of their 
 purpose a if they tried to disembark their men in the 
 face of an enemy who was prepared to meet them, or 
 if they marched openly by land and were discovered, 
 for they had no cavalry of their own, and the Syracusan 
 horse which were numerous would do great harm to their 
 light-armed troops and their camp-followers. Whereas 
 if they sailed thither by night they would be enabled to 
 take up a position in which the cavalry could do them 
 no serious mischief. The exact spot near the temple of 
 Olympian Zeus which they afterwards occupied was 
 indicated by Syracusan exiles who accompanied them. 
 Accordingly the generals devised the following plan; 
 they sent to Syracuse a man of whose fidelity they were 
 assured, but whom the Syracusan leaders believed to be 
 a friend of theirs. He was a Catanaean, and professed 
 to come from adherents of their party whose names were 
 familiar to them, and whom they knew to be still re¬ 
 maining in Catana b . He told them that the Athenians 
 lay within the city every night away from the camp in 
 which their arms were deposited, and if at dawn on a 
 set day the Syracusans with their whole force would 
 come and attack the troops left in the camp, their 
 partisans in Catana would themselves c shut the Athe¬ 
 nians up in the town c and fire their ships; meanwhile 
 the Syracusans might assault the palisade, and easily 
 take the camp — preparations had been made d , and 
 many of the Catanaeans were in the plot; from them 
 he came. 
 
 The Syracusan generals were already in high spirits, 
 and before this proposal reached them had made up 
 
 a Omitting ml before el e*c rav vecov. 
 
 b Cp. vi. 51. 
 
 c Reading avrovs after airoKkrja-eiv'. or, reading rovs instead of 
 avrovs : ‘ shut up those of the Athenians who were in the town.’ 
 
 d Placing a comma after rjdr]. 
 
CQO 
 
 THE ATHENIANS AT S YR AC USE. 455 
 
 ■c. 4 * their minds to have all things in readiness for a march VI. 
 to Catana. So they trusted the man the more recklessly, awa ^ b y. 
 
 1 riii . J night and 
 
 and at once fixed the day on which they would arrive, disembark 
 They then sent him back, and issued orders for an ex- atSyracuse ' 
 pedition to their whole army, including the Selinuntians 
 and the rest of the allies, who had now joined them. 
 
 When they were ready and the appointed day drew 
 near they marched towards Catana, and encamped by 
 the river Symaethus in the Leontine territory. The 
 Athenians, aware of the approach of the Syracusans, 
 took all their own army and Sicel or other allies on 
 board their ships and smaller craft, and sailed away at 
 nightfall to Syracuse. At dawn they disembarked op¬ 
 posite the temple of Olympian Zeus, intending to seize 
 a place for their camp ; almost at the same moment the 
 Syracusan horse who had advanced before the rest to 
 Catana discovered that the whole Athenian army had 
 put out to sea, whereupon they returned and told the 
 infantry; and then all together hurried back to protect 
 the city. 
 
 The distance from Catana to Syracuse was considerable, 66. 
 and in the meantime the Athenians had quietly estab- They 
 lished themselves in an advantageous position, where strong 7 a 
 they could give battle whenever they pleased, and the Th^Syra- 
 Syracusan horse were least likely to harass them either cusans 
 
 J J return from 
 
 before or during the engagement. On one side they were Catana. 
 protected by walls, and houses, and trees, and a marsh ; 
 on another by a line of cliffs. They felled the trees 
 near, and bringing them down to the sea made a 
 palisade to protect their ships; on the shore of Dascon 
 too they hurriedly raised a fortification of rough stones 
 and logs at a point where the ground was most accessible 
 to the enemy, and broke down the bridge over the river 
 Anapus. No one came out from the walls to hinder 
 them in their work. The first to appear at all were the 
 returning cavalry; after a while the infantry came up 
 and re-formed. They at once marched right up to the 
 Athenian position, but the Athenians did not come out 
 
45*5 
 
 SHORT SPEECH OF NICIAS. 
 
 VI. 
 
 67. 
 
 The Athe¬ 
 nians pre¬ 
 pare for 
 battle ; 
 they are 
 drawn up 
 eight deep 
 and the 
 Syracusans 
 sixteen 
 deep. 
 
 68 . 
 
 We are 
 picked men, 
 and they 
 are the 
 populace 
 of a city. 
 They de¬ 
 spise us, 
 but will not 
 fight us. 
 
 We are 
 far from 
 home and 
 retreat is 
 impossible. 
 
 to meet them ; so they retired and encamped on the B.c. 415. 
 other side of the Helorine Road. ’ 9 *’ 2 ’ 
 
 On the next day the Athenians and their allies pre¬ 
 pared to give battle. Their order was as follows :—The 
 Argives and Mantineans formed the right wing, the 
 Athenians held the centre; on the left wing were the 
 remaining allies. Half of their army which formed the 
 van was ranged eight deep. The other half was drawn 
 up likewise eight deep close to their sleeping-places, in 
 a hollow oblong. The latter were told to watch the 
 engagement, and to move up to the support of any part 
 of the line which might be distressed. In the midst of 
 the reserve thus disposed were placed the baggage- 
 bearers. The Syracusans drew up their heavy-armed 
 sixteen deep ; the army consisted of the whole Syracusan 
 people and their allies, chiefly the Selinuntians, who were 
 in the city; they had also two hundred horsemen from 
 Gela, and twenty, with about fifty archers, from Camarina. 
 
 The cavalry, numbering in all twelve hundred, were 
 placed upon the right wing, and beside them the javelin- 
 men. The Athenians determined to begin the attack. 
 
 Just before the battle Nicias went up and down, and 
 addressed the following words to all and each of the 
 various peoples who composed the army:— 
 
 ‘ What * need, soldiers, is there of a long exhortation 
 when we are all here united in the same cause a ? The 
 mere sight of this great army is more likely to put 
 courage into you than an eloquent speech and an infe¬ 
 rior force b . We are Argives and Mantineans, and Athe¬ 
 nians and the chief of the islanders; and must not the 
 presence of so many brave allies inspire every one of 
 us with a good hope of victory, especially when we 
 reflect that our opponents are not like ourselves picked 
 soldiers, but a whole city which has turned out to meet 
 us. They are Sicilians too, who although they may 
 despise us, will not stand their ground against us ; for 
 their skill is not equal to their courage. Consider again 
 a Cp. vii. 61 init. b Cp. v. 69 fin.; vii. 61 fin., 77 med. 
 
Ott 
 
 THE FIRST ENGAGEMENT. 
 
 4 57 
 
 c. 415. that we are far from home, and that there is no friendly VI. 
 
 1.91,2. . j 1 J 
 
 land near but what you can win with your swords a . 
 
 The generals of the enemy, as I know well, are appealing 
 to very different motives. They say to them, “ you are 
 fighting for your own country,” but I say to you that 
 you are fighting in a country which is not your own, 
 and from which, if you do not conquer, retreat will be 
 impossible, for swarms of cavalry will follow at your 
 heels. Remember your own reputation, and charge 
 valiantly, deeming the difficulties of your position and 
 the necessity which constrains you to be more formidable 
 than the enemy. 5 
 
 Nicias having thus exhorted his men led them at 69. 
 once to the charge. The Syracusans did not expect The Syra- 
 that they would have to fight just at that moment, and unprepared 
 some of them had even gone away into the city, which attack; 
 was close at hand ; others came running up as fast as p^ t y a J f e 
 they could, and, although late, joined the main body one courage,but 
 by one at the nearest point. For they showed no want in skill, 
 of spirit or daring in this or any other engagement; in the tw? ° f 
 courage they were not a whit inferior to their enemies, armies - 
 had their skill only been adequate, but when it failed, 
 they could no longer do justice to their good intentions. 
 
 On this occasion they were compelled to make a hasty 
 defence, for they never imagined that the Athenians 
 would begin the attack. Nevertheless they took up their 
 arms and immediately went forward to meet them. For 
 a while the throwers of stones, and slingers, and archers 
 skirmished in front of the two armies, driving one an¬ 
 other before them after the manner of light-armed 
 troops. Then the soothsayers brought out the customary 
 victims, and the trumpets sounded and called the infantry 
 to the charge. The two armies advanced ; the Syracusans 
 to fight for their country, and every man for life now, 
 and liberty hereafter; on the opposite side the Athe¬ 
 nians to gain a new country, and to save the old from 
 defeat and ruin ; the Argives and the independent allies 
 a Cp. vii. 77 fin. 
 
458 DEFEAT OF THE SYRACUSANS. 
 
 VI. eager to share the good things of Sicily, and, if they 
 returned victorious, to see their own homes once more. 
 The courage of the subject allies was chiefly inspired by 
 a lively consciousness that their only chance of life was 
 in victory; they had also a distant hope that, if they 
 assisted the Athenians in overthrowing others, their own 
 yoke might be lightened. 
 
 7 °- The armies met, and for a long time the issue was 
 The Syra- d ou btful. During the battle there came on thunder and 
 
 cusans are . . & 
 
 defeated, lightning, and a deluge of rain ; these added to the 
 
 but they . . . 
 
 are saved in terror of the inexperienced who were fighting for the 
 by^thefr^ 1 first time, but experienced soldiers ascribed the storm 
 cavalry. to the time of year, and were much more alarmed 
 a at the stubborn resistance of the enemy®. First the 
 Argives drove back the left wing of the Syracusans; 
 next the Athenians the right wing which was opposed 
 to them. Whereupon the rest of the army began to 
 give way and were soon put to flight. Their opponents 
 did not pursue them far, for the Syracusan horsemen, 
 who were numerous and had not shared in the defeat, 
 interposed, and wherever they saw hoplites advancing 
 from the ranks attacked and drove them back. The 
 Athenians pursued in a body as far as they safely could, 
 and then returned and raised a trophy. The Syracusans 
 rallied on the Helorine Road, and did their best to re¬ 
 form after their defeat. They did not neglect to send 
 some of their forces as a guard to the Olympieum, fear¬ 
 ing lest the Athenians should plunder the treasures of 
 the temple. The rest of the army returned to the city. 
 
 7 1. The Athenians, however, did not go to the temple at 
 The Athe- all, but collecting their dead, and laying them on a pyre, 
 sibie of they passed the night where they were. On the follow- 
 fidency in ing day they gave back the Syracusan dead under a 
 remi^to fla & of truce ’ and g ather ed from the pyre the bones of 
 Naxos 8, and own dead. There had fallen of the Syracusans 
 where they and of their allies about two hundred and sixty; of the 
 
 b Or, giving a slightly different meaning to the present: 4 at the 
 prospect of the enemy’s success.’ 
 
 wo 
 
RETURN OF ATHENIANS TO CAT AN A. 459 
 
 01°' i 41 !' Athen!ans and their allies not m ore than fifty. The VI. 
 Athenians then taking with them the spoils of their intend to 
 enemies, sailed back to Catana. Winter had now set while they 
 in, and they thought that before they could do anything forcemeat"" 
 more at Syracuse they must send for horsemen from , 
 
 Athens, and collect others from their Sicilian allies; Sicil y- 
 without them they would be at the mercy of the Syra¬ 
 cusan cavalry. They also wanted to obtain both in 
 Sicily and from Athens a supply of money, and to gain 
 over some of the Sicilian cities. These would be more 
 willing to listen to them after their victory. They had 
 likewise to provide food, and to make the other requisite 
 preparations for attacking Syracuse in the spring. Ac- 72. 
 cordingly they sailed away to Naxos and Catana, in¬ 
 tending to winter. 
 
 The Syracusans, after burying their dead, called an Hermo- 
 assembly. Hermocrates the son of Hermon, a man of points out 
 first-rate ability, of distinguished bravery, and also of c^ans^he 1 " 
 great military experience, came forward and encouraged ^^ e of 
 them. He told them not to be disheartened at the feat, 
 result of the battle ; for their resolution had not been Souid have 
 defeated a ; but they had suffered from want of disci- gen^ais 
 pline. Yet they had proved less unequal than might with more 
 have been expected ; and they should remember that better disd- 
 they had been contending against the most experienced greater 
 soldiers of Hellas; they were unskilled workmen, and secrec y* 
 the Athenians masters in their craft b . Another great 
 source of weakness had been the number of generals 
 (there were fifteen of them); the division of authority 
 had produced disorganisation and disorder among the 
 troops. If they had a few experienced generals, and 
 during the winter got their hoplites into order, providing 
 arms for those who had none, and so raising the number 
 of their forces to the utmost, while at the same time they 
 insisted on strict drill and discipline, they would have 
 a good chance of victory; for they had courage already, 
 and only wanted steadiness in action. Both qualities 
 a Gp. ii. 87 init.; vi. 11 fin. b Reading x.<EipoTex vat S' 
 
460 GOOD ADVICE . OF HERMOCRATES. 
 
 VI. would improve together ; they would learn steadiness in 
 the school of danger, and their natural courage would 
 be reinforced by the confidence which skill inspires. 
 The generals whom they elected should be not only 
 few but entrusted with full power, the people taking 
 a solemn oath to them that they would be allowed to 
 command according to their own judgment. The secrets 
 of the army would then be better kept, and everything 
 would be done in a more orderly and straightforward 
 manner. 
 
 73 - The Syracusans listened to him, and voted all that 
 cusans yra " desired. They chose three generals and no more ; 
 follow his Hermocrates himself, Heraclides the son of Lysimachus, 
 
 advice, and ' 
 
 send envoys and Sicanus the son of Execestus. They also sent am- 
 and Lace- bassadors to Corinth and to Lacedaemon requesting 
 daemon. a id 5 an( } ur g ec } the Lacedaemonians to make war openly 
 and decidedly against the Athenians on their behalf; 
 thus they would either draw them off from Sicily, or at 
 any rate prevent them from sending reinforcements to 
 the army which was there already. 
 
 74 - No sooner had the Athenians returned in the fleet to 
 hiving con- Catana than they sailed to Messen£, expecting that the 
 Messen^ at would be betrayed to them. But they were dis- 
 shouid be appointed. For Alcibiades, when he was recalled and 
 nowlbetrays gave up his command, foreseeing that he would be an 
 trayers. exile > communicated to the Syracusan party at Messene 
 nians\ake plot °f which he was cognisant a . They at once put 
 up their to death the persons whom he indicated; and on the 
 
 winter r 1 a 1 • 
 
 quarters at appearance of the Athenians the same party, rising and 
 Naxos ' arming, prevented their admission. The Athenians re¬ 
 mained there about thirteen days, but the weather was 
 bad. their provisions failed, and they had no success. 
 So they went to Naxos, and having surrounded their 
 camp with a palisade, proposed to pass the winter there. 
 They also despatched a trireme to Athens for money 
 and cavalry, which were to arrive at the beginning of 
 spring. 
 
 Cp. vi. 50 init. 
 
 CQO 
 
HERMOCRATES AT CAM ARINA. 
 
 461 
 
 b.c. 415. The Syracusans employed the winter in raising a wall VI. 
 
 ’ 9I ’ ‘near the city, which took in the shrine of Apollo 75 * 
 
 Temenites and extended all along that side of Syracuse TheS y ra - 
 which looks towards Epipolae ; they thus enlarged the tend the 
 area of- the city, and increased the difficulty of investing their walls, 
 it in case of defeat. They fortified and garrisoned Athenian 
 Megara, and also raised a fort at the Olympieum a , ^ 
 besides fixing palisades at all the landing-places along and send an 
 the shore. They knew that the Athenians were wintering Camarina. 
 at Naxos, and so, marching out with their whole army to 
 Catana, they ravaged the country and burnt the huts and 
 the camp of the Athenians; they then returned home. 
 
 They heard that the Athenians were sending an embassy 
 to gain over the Camarinaeans on the strength of their 
 former alliance, which had been made under Laches b } 
 and they despatched a counter embassy of their own. 
 
 They suspected that the Camarinaeans had not been 
 over-zealous in sending their contingent to the first 
 battle, and would not be willing to assist them any 
 longer now that the Athenians had gained a victory; 
 old feelings of friendship would revive, and they would 
 be induced to join them. Accordingly Hermocrates 
 came with an embassy to Camarina, and Euphemus 
 with another embassy from the Athenians. An assembly 
 of the Camarinaeans was held, at which Hermocrates, 
 hoping to raise a prejudice against the Athenians, spoke 
 as follows: — 
 
 ‘ We are not here, Camarinaeans, because we suppose 76. 
 that the presence of the Athenian army will dismay We fear 
 you ; we are more afraid of their as yet unuttered words, swords but 
 to which you may too readily lend an ear if you hearofthe^ S 
 them without first hearing us. You know the pretext The^pre-' 
 on which they have come to Sicily, but we can all guess 
 their real intentions. If I am not mistaken they want, but they ' 
 not to restore the Leontines to their city, but to drive us enslavers 
 out of ours. Who can believe that they who desolate abroad^ 
 the cities of Hellas mean to restore those of Sicily, or J^^the 
 a Cp. vii. 4 fin. b Cp. iii. 86. 
 
462 speech of hermocrates . 
 
 VI. that the enslavers and oppressors of the Chalcidians 
 newmasters £ n Euboea have any feeling of kindred towards the 
 HenTs has colonists of these Chalcidians in Leontini ? In their 
 conquests at home, and in their attempt to conquer 
 Sicily, is not the principle upon which they act one and 
 the same ? The Ionians and other colonists of theirs 
 who were their allies, wanting to be revenged on the 
 Persian, freely invited them to be their leaders; and 
 they accepted the invitation. But soon they charged 
 them, some with desertion, and some with making war 
 upon each other a ; any plausible accusation which they 
 could bring against any of them became an excuse for 
 their overthrow. It was not for the liberties of Hellas 
 that Athens, or for her own liberty that Hellas, fought 
 against the Persian ; they fought, the Athenians that 
 they might enslave Hellas to themselves instead of him, 
 the rest of the Hellenes that they might get a new 
 master, who may be cleverer, but certainly makes a 
 more dishonest use of his wits. 
 
 ‘ However, the character of the Athenians is known to 
 you already, and we do not come here to set forth their 
 enormities, which would be an easy task, but rather to 
 accuse ourselves. We have had a warning in the fate of 
 shan dhere the Hellenes elsewhere ; we know that they were reduced 
 we allow to slavery because they would not stand by one another. 
 
 ourselves to . , 
 
 be taken in And when the same tricks are practised upon us b , and 
 and^o m we hear the old tale once more about the restoration of 
 one^none? “ our kinsmen the Leontines,” and the succour of “our 
 allies the Egestaeans,” why do we not all rise, as one 
 man and show them that here they will find, not Ionians, 
 nor yet Hellespontians, nor islanders, who must always 
 be the slaves, if not of the Persian, of some other master; 
 but Dorians c and free inhabitants of Sicily, sprung from 
 the independent soil of Peloponnesus ? Are we waiting 
 till our cities are taken one by one, when we know 
 that this is the only way in which we can be conquered ? 
 
 a Cp. i. 99. b Cp. iv. 61 med. 
 
 c Cp. i. 124 init.; v. 9 init.; vii. 5 fin.; viii. 25 med. 
 
 taken in 
 exchange 
 for the 
 Persians. 
 
 The old 
 tales and 
 the old 
 tricks are 
 being re- 
 
 Otd 
 
SPEECH OF HERMOCRATES. 
 
 463 
 
 B.C. 415, We see what their policy is: how in some cases their VI. 
 
 ' 9 ' cunning words sow ill-feeling ; in others they stir up war 
 by the offer of alliance; or again, by some well-invented 
 phrase specially agreeable to an individual state they do 
 it all the mischief which they can. And does any one 
 suppose that, if his countryman at a distance perishes, 
 the danger will not reach him, or that he who suffers 
 first will have no companions in ruin? 
 
 ‘ If any one fancies that not he, but the Syracusan, is j 8 . 
 the enemy of the Athenian, and asks indignantly “ why Jo r b | hti " ^ 
 should I risk myself for you?” let him consider that in are fighting 
 fighting for my country he will be at the same time S eives. Ur 
 fighting in mine for his own a . And he will fight with ^ ™f 0 ht 
 less danger, because I shall still be in existence ; he will b® bu ™ bled ’ 
 not carry on the struggle alone, for he will have me for cannot 
 an ally b . Let hirn consider that the Athenian is not right 6 e 
 really seeking to chastise the enmity of the Syracusan, humiiS-^ 
 but under pretence of attacking me may be quite as a * d 
 desirous of drawing hard and fast the bonds of friendship are fallen 
 with him. And if any one from envy, or possibly from want to 
 fear (for greatness is exposed to both), would have Syra- £ a ^ us 
 cuse suffer that we may receive a lesson, but survive for b°ve offered 
 his own security, he is asking to have a thing which help, and 
 
 _ . not have 
 
 human power cannot compass. For a man may regulate waited to 
 his own desires, but he is not the dispenser of fortune c ; be asked * 
 and the time may come when he will find himself mis¬ 
 taken, and while mourning over his own ruin he may 
 possibly wish that he could still have my prosperity 
 to envy. But he cannot bring me back again when 
 he has once abandoned me and has refused to take his 
 share in the common danger, which, far from being 
 imaginary, is only too real. For though in name you 
 may be saving me, in reality you will be saving your¬ 
 selves. And you especially, Camarinaeans, who are our 
 next neighbours, and on whom the danger will fall next, 
 should have anticipated all this, and not be so slack in 
 
 a Cp. iii. 13 med. b Reading eprjpos. 
 
 c Cp. iv. 64 init. 
 
464 
 
 SPEECH OF HERMOCRATES. 
 
 VI. 
 
 79 - 
 
 You may 
 pretend im¬ 
 partiality, 
 but you 
 will really 
 be con¬ 
 spiring 
 with your 
 enemies 
 against 
 your 
 friends. 
 
 80. 
 
 Union will 
 be strength. 
 If you join 
 neither side, 
 you will 
 really be 
 untrue to 
 both. 
 
 your alliance. Instead of our coming to you, you should 
 have come to us. Suppose the Athenians had gone to 
 Camarina first, would you not at this moment be praying 
 and begging for assistance ? Then why did not you 
 present yourselves at Syracuse, and say to us in our 
 time of danger, “Never yield to the enemy”? But, 
 hitherto, neither you nor any of the Sicilians have shown 
 a spirit like this. 
 
 ‘You may perhaps disguise your cowardice under the 
 pretence of impartiality; you may balance between us 
 and the invaders, and plead.that you have an alliance with 
 the Athenians. But that alliance was made on the sup¬ 
 position that you were invaded by an enemy, not against a 
 friend; and you promised to assist the Athenians if they 
 were wronged by others, not when, as now, they are doing 
 wrong themselves. Are the Rhegi*ans who are Chalci- 
 dians so very anxious to join in the restoration of their 
 Leontine kinsmen a ? And yet how monstrous that they, 
 suspecting the real meaning of this plausible claim, 
 should display a prudence for which they can give 
 no reason ; and that you, who have every reason for 
 a like prudence, should be eager to assist your natural 
 enemies, and to conspire with them for the destruction 
 of those who by a higher law are your natural kinsmen. 
 This should not* be. You must make a stand against 
 them. And do not be afraid of their armament. There 
 is no danger if we hold together; the danger is in dis¬ 
 union, and they want to disunite us. Even when they 
 engaged with our unaided forces b , and defeated us in 
 battle, they failed in their main purpose, and quickly 
 retired. 
 
 £ If then we can once unite, there is no reason for dis¬ 
 couragement. But there is every reason why you, who 
 are our allies, should meet us more cordially. We may 
 be sure that help will come to us from Peloponnesus, 
 and the Peloponnesians are far better soldiers than the 
 Athenians. Let no one think that the caution which 
 a Cp. vi. 44 fin., 46 init. b But cp. vi. 65 init., 67 med. 
 
 O to 
 
SPEECH OF EUPHEMUS. 
 
 4 6 5 
 
 01° i*2 P ro ^ esses league with both, and therefore gives VI. 
 
 aid to neither, is just to us or safe for you. Such a 
 policy, though it may pretend to impartiality, is really 
 unjust. For if through your absence the victor over¬ 
 comes and the vanquished falls, have you not abandoned 
 the one to his fate, and allowed the other to commit 
 a crime ? How much nobler would it be to join your 
 injured kinsmen, and thereby maintain the common in¬ 
 terest of Sicily and save the Athenians, whom you call 
 your friends, from doing wrong ! 
 
 ‘To sum up:—We Syracusans are quite aware that You who 
 there is no use in our dilating to you or to any one else shou?dnot S 
 on matters which you know as well as ourselves. But betray your 
 
 ' kinsmen to 
 
 we prefer a prayer to you ; and solemnly adjure you j°™ ans * 
 to consider, that, if you reject us, we, who are Dorians conquer, 
 like yourselves, are betrayed by you to Ionians, our absorbed 36 
 inveterate enemies, who are seeking our ruin. If the h 7 them: 
 Athenians subdue us, your decision will have gained q uer > we . 
 them the day; but the honour will be all their own, and you. 
 the authors of their victory will be the prize of their 
 victory. If on the other hand we conquer, you who have 
 brought the peril upon us will have to suffer the penalty. 
 
 Reflect then, and take your choice: will you have pre¬ 
 sent safety and slavery, or the hope of delivering your¬ 
 selves and us, and thereby escaping the dishonour of 
 submitting to the Athenian yoke, and the danger of our 
 enmity, which will not be short-lived?’ 
 
 Thus spoke Hermocrates. Euphemus, the Athenian 81. 
 envoy, replied as follows :— 
 
 ‘We had come to renew our former alliance, but the 82. 
 
 attack made upon us by the Syracusan envoy renders it Tru ®> 
 
 r J J J are Ionians, 
 
 necessary for us to vindicate our title to empire a . He and the 
 himself bore the strongest witness in our favour when he Dorian and 
 said that Dorians and Ionians are inveterate enemies. Jhe justi- 
 And so they are. We Ionians dwelling in the neighbour- ^ ^° n 
 
 hood of the Peloponnesians (who are Dorians and more empire. 
 
 1 We bad 
 
 numerous than ourselves) have had to consider the best to defend 
 
 a Cp. i. 73 init. 
 H h 
 
VI. 
 
 ourselves, 
 and if we 
 enslaved 
 our kins¬ 
 men, they 
 were slaves 
 already, 
 and would 
 have made 
 slaves of 
 us. 
 
 83 - 
 
 We come 
 hither for 
 our own 
 sake as well 
 as for 
 
 yours ; and 
 for yours 
 as well as 
 for our 
 own. 
 
 466 SPEECH OF E UPHEM US. 
 
 way of securing our independence. After the Persian 
 War we were delivered by the help of our newly-acquired 
 navy from the rule and supremacy of Lacedaemon; they 
 had no more right to domineer over us than we over 
 them, except the right of the stronger, which at the time 
 they possessed. We then assumed the leadership of the 
 King’s former subjects, which we still retain ; if we were 
 not to be the slaves of the Peloponnesians we thought 
 that we must have the means of self-defence. And what 
 if we did subjugate those kinsmen of ours whom the 
 Syracusans say that we have enslaved, the Ionians and 
 the islanders ? On the strictest principles, where was 
 the injustice ? For we were their mother-city, and they 
 joined in the Persian invasion. They had not the courage 
 to revolt from him and to destroy their homes, as we 
 did when we left our city. But they chose slavery for 
 their own portion, and would have imposed it upon us. 
 
 ‘We rule then, in the first place, because we deserve 
 to rule; for we provided the largest navy and showed 
 the most patriotic alacrity in the cause of Hellas a ; while 
 those who became our subjects were willing slaves to the 
 Persian, and were doing us mischief. And secondly, 
 we were anxious to gain additional strength against the 
 Peloponnesians. We do not tell you in grandiloquent 
 words that we have a right to rule on the ground that 
 we alone overthrew the Barbarians b , nor do we pretend 
 that we fought for the liberty of our allies, and not 
 equally for our own and the general liberty 0 . Can 
 any man be blamed because he makes the natural 
 provision for his own safety d ? The same care of our 
 safety has brought us hither, and we can see that our 
 presence here is for your benefit as well as for our own. 
 This we will prove to you ; and our proofs shall be 
 drawn from the calumnies of our enemies, and from the 
 suspicions and fears which most sway your minds. For 
 we know that those who are timorous and mistrustful 
 
 a Gp. i. 74 init. b Cp. v. 89 init. 
 
 c Cp. vi. 76 fin. d Cp. i. 75 fin. 
 
 PQO 
 
»o 
 
 SPEECH OF EUPHEMUS. 
 
 4 67 
 
 .C. 415. may be won for the moment by alluring words, but VI. 
 
 9 ' that when the time of action comes they follow their 
 own interests. 
 
 ‘We have told you already that fear makes us main¬ 
 tain our empire at home; and that a like fear brings us 
 to your shores. For we desire by the help of our 
 friends to secure our position in Sicily. And we have 
 not come to enslave you, but to save you from being 
 enslaved. Let no one imagine that your welfare is no 84. 
 business of ours, for if you are preserved, and are strong it is for our 
 enough to hold out against the Syracusans, they will you should 
 be less likely to aid the Peloponnesians, and so to injure pendent, 
 us. Thus you become at once our first concern. And We are 
 
 # J quite con- 
 
 we are quite consistent in restoring the Leontines, not sistent in 
 like their kinsmen in Euboea to be subjects, but to be th^Chaf- 
 as strong as ever we can make them, that from their ^stdiy 
 position on the border they may harass the Syracusans an 5 in .- 
 
 r J J J subjecting 
 
 and do our work. In Hellas we are a match for ourtheChai- 
 enemies single-handed ; and as to our subjection of the Euboea. 
 Chalcidians at home, which Hermocrates finds so in¬ 
 consistent with our emancipation of the Chalcidians here, 
 it is for our advantage, on the one hand, that the cities 
 of Euboea should have no armed force and contribute 
 money only, and, on the other hand, that the Leontines 
 and our friends in Sicily should be as independent as 
 possible. 
 
 ‘Now to a tyrant or to an imperial city a nothing is 85. 
 inconsistent which is expedient, and no man is a kins- We act . 
 
 x upon prm- 
 
 man who cannot be trusted. In each case we must cipie, and 
 make friends or enemies according to circumstances, cipiere - 1 
 and here our interest requires, not that we should weaken ^'^ent 
 our friends, but that our friends should be too strong P°JL lc y ia 
 for our enemies. Do not mistrust us. In Hellas we act cases, 
 upon the same principle, managing our allies as our 
 interest requires in their several cases. The Chians 
 and Methymnaeans furnish us with ships, and are their 
 own masters; the majority are less independent, and 
 a Cp. ii. 63 ; iii. 37 init. 
 
 H ll 3 
 
4 68 
 
 SPEECH OF E UP HEM US. 
 
 VI. pay a tribute; others, although they are islanders and b.c. 415. 
 might be easily conquered, enjoy complete freedom, be- ‘ 91 ‘ 2 ‘ 
 cause they are situated conveniently for operations about 
 Peloponnesus a . So that in Sicily too our policy is 
 likely to be determined by our interest, and, as I was 
 saying, by our fear of the Syracusans. For they desire 
 to be your masters, but first they must unite you in 
 a common suspicion of us, and then either by force, or 
 through your isolation when we have failed and retired, 
 they will dominate Sicily. This is inevitable if you 
 now join them. Your united power will be more than 
 we can manage, and the Syracusans, when we are gone, 
 
 86 . will be too much for you. He who thinks otherwise 
 Y °th t( t ld * s conv ^ cte< ^ ou t ^' ls own mouth. For when you 
 Syracuse originally invited us, the danger which we should incur 
 JSitiiy! and if we allowed you to fall into the hands of the Syra- 
 bacfyouj 11 cusans was precisely what you held before our eyes, 
 words. and now you ought not to distrust the argument by 
 
 You have J 
 
 nothing which you hoped to convince us. Nor should you sus- 
 us^vho^re pect us because we bring hither a force larger than 
 tane^but b e f° re > f° r we have to contend against the power of 
 much to Syracuse. Much more to be mistrusted are they. 
 
 fear from Jl . 
 
 theSyra- Without your aid we cannot even remain where we are, 
 
 cusans, who . . r ... . . . . , 
 
 are your an d if we were so dishonourable as to make conquests 
 and can UrS we should be unable to retain them b , for the voyage is 
 at W ou get l° n £’ an d ^ wou ld be a hopeless task to garrison great 
 You will be cities which, though situated on an island, have the 
 day^hat 116 resources of a continent. Whereas these men are your 
 lost us VS nearest neighbours. And they dwell, not in a camp, 
 but in a city far more powerful than the forces which 
 we have brought to Sicily; they are always scheming 
 against you, and never miss a chance, as they have 
 often shown, especially in their conduct towards the 
 Leontines. And now they have the impudence to stir 
 you up against those who resist them, and have thus far 
 saved Sicily from passing under their yoke. As if you 
 had no eyes! Far more real than the security offered 
 a Cp. ii. 7 fin.; vii. 57 med. b Cp. vi. 11 init. 
 
SPEECH OF E UP HEM US. 
 
 469 
 
 B.c. 415. by them is that to which we invite you, a security which VI. 
 
 ^ 91 • 2 ‘ we and you gain from one another, and we beseech you 
 not to throw it away. Reflect: the Syracusans are so 
 numerous that with or without allies they can always 
 find their way to you, but you will not often have the 
 chance of defending yourself with the aid of an army 
 like ours. And if from any suspicion you allow us to 
 depart unsuccessful, or perhaps defeated, the time may 
 come when you will desire to see but a fraction of 
 that army, although, if it came, it would be too late to 
 save you. 
 
 ‘But we would not have either you, Camarinaeans, 3^ 
 or others moved by their calumnies. We have told you Enough of 
 the whole truth about the suspicions which are enter- p*ic?ons US " 
 tained of us; we will now sum up our arguments, and ^y 0 C y r ™ 
 we think that they ought to convince you. We rule invitation ; 
 
 1 . . - , . . and you 
 
 over the cities of Hellas in order to maintain our in- had better 
 dependence, and we emancipate the cities of Sicily that we can be 
 they may not be used against us. And we are com- °^ lse to 
 pelled to adopt a policy of interference because we Do not 
 
 , judge or 
 
 have many interests to guard. Lastly, we come now, advise us, 
 as we came before, not uninvited, but upon your own yourselves 
 invitation to assist those of you who are suffering 
 wrong. Do not sit in judgment upon our actions, or which is 
 
 ° . . . everywhere 
 
 seek to school us into moderation and so divert us from the terror 
 our purpose (the time for good advice has gone by), oppressor 
 but in as far as our busy, meddlesome spirit can be of 
 service to you as well as to ourselves, take and use us: of the , 
 
 J oppressed, 
 
 remember that these qualities, so far from being in- in your 
 jurious to all alike, actually benefit great numbers of contest 316 
 the Hellenes. For in all places—however remote from sy^c^ans. 
 our sphere—both he who fears and he who intends 
 injustice, the one because he has a lively hope that 
 from us he will obtain redress, and the other because 
 he may well be alarmed for the consequences if we 
 answer to the call, must both alike submit, the one to 
 learn moderation against his will, the other to receive 
 at our hands a deliverance which costs him nothing. 
 
47 ° 
 
 CAMARINA IS NEUTRAL. 
 
 VI. 
 
 88 . 
 
 The Cama- 
 rinaeans 
 suspect the 
 designs 
 of the 
 Athenians 
 and are 
 afraid of 
 their Syra¬ 
 cusan 
 
 neighbours. 
 They re¬ 
 solve to 
 assist, if 
 either, the 
 Syracusans, 
 but to 
 profess 
 neutrality. 
 
 The Athe¬ 
 nians in 
 the Sicel 
 
 Do not reject the common salvation which is offered 
 to you at this moment, as well as to all who seek it, 
 but following the example of your countrymen join with 
 us, and instead of having always to watch the Syra¬ 
 cusans, assert your equality and threaten them as they 
 have long been threatening you. 5 
 
 Thus spoke Euphemus. Now the Camarinaeans were 
 swayed by opposite feelings; they had a good will to 
 the Athenians, tempered by a suspicion that they might 
 be intending to enslave Sicily, whereas the Syracusans, 
 from their proximity, were always at feud with them. 
 But they were not so much afraid of the Athenians as 
 of their Syracusan neighbours, who, as they thought, 
 might win without their assistance. This was the reason 
 why they sent them the small body of horse which took 
 part in the first battle; and in a like spirit they now 
 determined that for the future they would give real as¬ 
 sistance only to the Syracusans, but to a very moderate 
 extent. For the present however, that they might seem 
 to deal equal justice to the Athenians, especially after 
 their recent victory, they resolved to return the same 
 answer to both. Such were the considerations which 
 led them to reply, that as two of their allies were at 
 war with one another, they thought that under the 
 circumstances the best way of observing their oaths 
 would be to assist neither. So the two embassies de¬ 
 parted. 
 
 The Syracusans proceeded with their own prepara¬ 
 tions for the war, and the Athenians who were en- 
 
 Theyre- camped at Naxos tried by negotiation to* gain over as 
 Nails f T 0 m man y t ^ le Sicels as they could. The dwellers in 
 
 Catana, the plain who were subjects of the Syracusans mostly 
 to Carthage stood aloof, but the Sicel settlements in the interior 
 nia! and he " ( w ^ich had always been independent) at once, with a 
 the P s 1 eg e f °of *" ew exce pti° ns J joined the Athenians, and brought down 
 Syracuse, food to the army; in some cases money also. Against 
 
 those who were recalcitrant, troops were despatched by 
 
 the Athenians; and some of them were forced into 
 
 ec O 
 
SYRACUSANS AT CORINTH AND SPARTA. 4 71 
 
 B.C. 415. submission, but others were protected by the garrisons VI. 
 
 ' gi ’ 2 ' which the Syracusans sent to their aid. They then 
 transferred their station from Naxos to Catana, and 
 reconstructing the camp which had been burnt by the 
 Syracusans a , passed the winter there. In the hope of 
 obtaining assistance they sent a trireme to Carthage 
 with a proposal of friendship ; likewise to Tyrrhenia, 
 since some of the cities there were offering of themselves 
 to join in the war: to the various Sicel tribes b and to the 
 Egestaeans they issued orders that they were to send as 
 many horse as possible. They further prepared bricks, 
 tools, and whatever else was requisite for siege opera¬ 
 tions, intending, when the spring arrived, to prosecute 
 the war with vigour. 
 
 The envoys whom the Syracusans had sent to The Corin- 
 Corinth and Lacedaemon 0 endeavoured on the voyage the first 
 to persuade the Italian Greeks that they were equally aid" 
 threatened by the Athenian designs, and should take *° the 
 
 J 0 Syracusan 
 
 an interest in the war. When they arrived at Corinth envoys, 
 they appealed to the Corinthians for aid on the ground with 7 them 
 of relationship. The Corinthians, taking the lead of all ^ h e? e arta ’ 
 the Hellenic states, with the utmost enthusiasm voted ™® et 
 
 Alcibiades, 
 
 the aid which was asked. They sent with the Syracusan who had 
 envoys ambassadors of their own to the Lacedaemo- thither 
 nians, bearing a joint request that they would resume conduct.^ 6 * 
 open hostilities at home, and unite with them in sending 
 help to Sicily. At Lacedaemon the Corinthian am¬ 
 bassadors met Alcibiades and his fellow exiles. He 
 had sailed at once from Thurii in a trading vessel to 
 Cyllen£ in Elis, and thence proceeded to Lacedaemon 
 on the invitation of the Lacedaemonians themselves, 
 first obtaining a safe-conduct; for he was afraid of them 
 after his proceedings in the matter of the Mantinean 
 leagued And so it came to pass that the Corinthians, 
 the Syracusans, and Alcibiades appeared simultaneously 
 in the Lacedaemonian assembly, and concurred in urging 
 
 a Cp. vi. 75 med. b Cp. vi. 98 init. 
 
 c Cp. vi. 73. d Cp. v. 43 if., 61 ff. 
 
ALCIBIADES AT SPARTA. 
 
 I must offer 
 explana¬ 
 tions. 
 
 I wanted to 
 serve you, 
 but you 
 were un¬ 
 grateful, 
 and I re¬ 
 taliated. 
 
 I was not a 
 demagogue 
 but an 
 hereditary 
 leader of 
 the state as 
 a whole. 
 Democracy, 
 however 
 liable to 
 abuse, was 
 our natural 
 form of 
 govern¬ 
 ment, and 
 we could 
 not change 
 it. 
 
 the same request. The Ephors and the magistrates 
 were already intending to send envoys to the Syra¬ 
 cusans bidding them make no terms with the Athe¬ 
 nians, although they were not disposed to assist them 
 actively. But now Alcibiades came forward and stimu¬ 
 lated the energies of the Lacedaemonians in the follow¬ 
 ing words:— 
 
 ‘I must endeavour first of all to remove a prejudice 
 against myself, lest through suspicion of me you should 
 turn a deaf ear to considerations of public interest. My 
 ancestors in consequence of some misunderstanding re¬ 
 nounced the office of Lacedaemonian Proxenus ; I myself 
 resumed it, and did you many good offices, especially 
 after your misfortune at Pylos. My anxiety to serve 
 you never ceased, but when you were making peace with 
 Athens you negotiated through my enemies, thereby 
 conferring power on them, and bringing dishonour upon 
 me a . And if I then turned to the Mantineans and 
 Argives and opposed you in that or in any other way 
 you were rightly served, and any one who while the 
 wound was recent may have been unduly exasperated 
 against me should now take another and a truer view. 
 Or, again, if any one thought the worse of me because 
 I was inclined to the people, let him acknowledge that 
 here too there is no real ground of offence. Any 
 power adverse to despotism is called democracy, and 
 my family have always retained the leadership of the 
 people in their hands because we have been the per¬ 
 sistent enemies of tyrants. Living too under a popular 
 government, how could we avoid in a great degree 
 conforming to circumstances ? However, we did our 
 best to observe political moderation amid the prevailing 
 licence. But there were demagogues, as there always 
 have, been, who led the people into evil ways, and it 
 was they who drove me out b . Whereas we were the 
 leaders of the state as a whole 0 , and not of a part 
 
 Cp. v. 43. 
 
 Cp. vi. 39 init. 
 
 Cp. viii. 65 med. 
 
 mo 
 
SPEECH OF ALCIDIADES. 
 
 473 
 
 B.c. 415. only; it was our view that all ought to combine in VI. 
 
 ' 91 ’ 2 * maintaining that form of government which had been 
 inherited by us, and under which the city enjoyed the 
 greatest freedom and glory. Of course, like all sensible 
 men, we knew only too well what democracy is, and 
 I better than any one, who have so good a reason for 
 abusing it. The follies of democracy are universally 
 admitted, and there is nothing new to be said about 
 them. But we could not venture to change our form 
 of government when an enemy like yourselves was so 
 near to us. 
 
 ‘ Such is the truth about the calumnies under which 90. 
 
 I labour. And now I will speak to you of the matter The Athe- 
 which you have in hand, and about which I, in so far signs em- 
 as I have better information, am bound to instruct sitiiy d 
 you. We sailed to Sicily hoping in the first place to Car ' 
 conquer the Sicilian cities : then to proceed against the if we suc - 
 
 ceeded we 
 
 Hellenes of Italy; and lastly, to make an attempt on were going 
 the Carthaginian dominions, and on Carthage itself. p e iopon- 
 If all or most of these enterprises succeeded, we meant ^^4 ^ 
 finally to attack Peloponnesus, bringing with us the Hellas^ 
 whole Hellenic power which we had gained abroad, have been 
 besides many barbarians whom we intended to hire— ° urs ‘ 
 Iberians and the neighbouring tribes, esteemed to be 
 the most warlike barbarians that now are a . Of the 
 timber which Italy supplies in such abundance we meant 
 to build numerous additional triremes, and with them to 
 blockade Peloponnesus. At the same time making in¬ 
 roads by land with our infantry, we should have stormed 
 some of your cities and invested others. Thus we hoped 
 to crush you easily, and to rule over the Hellenic world. 
 
 For the better accomplishment of our various aims our 
 newly-acquired territory would supply money and pro¬ 
 visions enough, apart from the revenue which we receive 
 in Hellas. 
 
 ‘You have heard the objects of our expedition from 91. 
 him who knows them best; the generals who remain Sic } l y is lost 
 
 ‘ " unless you 
 
 a Reading /xa^ijuwrarous and placing a comma after e/cet. 
 
474 
 
 SPEECH OF ALCIBIADES. 
 
 VI. 
 
 come to the 
 rescue. 
 
 The Sicil¬ 
 ians will 
 not unite, 
 and Syra¬ 
 cuse alone 
 is no match 
 for the 
 Athenians. 
 Send hop- 
 lites and 
 a Spartan 
 commander 
 at once, 
 and fortify 
 Decelea. 
 
 I know best 
 what the 
 Athenians 
 most dread. 
 You must 
 be up and 
 doing. 
 
 will persevere and carry them out if they can. And B.C. 415. 
 now let me prove to you that if you do not come to the 
 rescue Sicily will be lost. If the Sicilian cities would 
 all unite they might even now, notwithstanding their 
 want of military skill, resist with success ; but the Syra¬ 
 cusans alone, whose whole forces have been already 
 defeated, and who cannot move freely at sea, will be un¬ 
 able to withstand the power which the Athenians already 
 have on the spot. And Syracuse once taken, the whole 
 of Sicily is in their hands ; the subjugation of Italy will 
 follow ; and the danger which, as I was saying, threatens 
 you from that quarter, will speedily overwhelm you. 
 
 And therefore remember every one of you that the 
 safety, not of Sicily alone, but of Peloponnesus, is at 
 stake. No time should be lost. You must send to 
 Sicily a force of hoplites who will themselves handle the 
 oars and will take the field immediately on landing. A 
 Spartan commander I conceive to be even more indis¬ 
 pensable than an army; his duty will be to organise the 
 troops which are already enlisted, and to press the un¬ 
 willing into the service. Thus you will inspire confidence 
 in your friends and overcome the fears of the wavering. 
 
 Here too in Hellas you should make open war. The 
 Syracusans, seeing that you have not forgotten them, 
 will then persevere in their resistance, while the Athe¬ 
 nians will have greater difficulty in reinforcing their 
 army. You ought above all to fortify Decelea in Attica ; 
 the Athenians are always in dread of this ; to them it 
 seems to be the only calamity which they have not 
 already experienced to the utmost in the course of the 
 war. And the way to hurt an enemy most surely is 
 to inform yourself exactly about the weak points of 
 which you see that he is conscious, and strike at them. 
 
 For every man is likely to know best himself the dangers 
 which he has most to fear. I will sum up briefly the 
 chief though by no means all the advantages which you 
 will gain, and the disadvantages which you will inflict, 
 by the fortification of Decelea. The whole stock of the 
 
SPEECH OF ALCIBIADES. 
 
 475 
 
 B.C. 415- 
 01. 91, 2. 
 
 country will fall into your hands. The slaves will come VI. 
 
 over to you of their own accord ; what there is besides 
 will be seized by you. The Athenians will at once be 
 deprived of the revenues which they obtain from the 
 silver mines of Laurium, and of all the profits which 
 they make by the land or by the law courts : above all, 
 the customary tribute will fail ; for their allies, when 
 they see that you are now carrying on the war in earnest, 
 will not mind them. How far these plans are executed, 9 2 * 
 and with how much speed and energy, Lacedaemonians, 
 depends on you ; for I am confident that they are 
 practicable, and I am not likely to be mistaken. 
 
 ‘You ought not in fairness to think the worse of me Athens has 
 because, having been once distinguished as a lover of my me to be 
 country, I now cast in my lot with her worst foes and shelsnS 7 ' 
 attack her with all my might; or suspect that I speak only 
 with the forwardness of an exile. An exile I am indeed ; Yet 1 do 
 I have lost an ungrateful country, but I have not lost only that 1 
 the power of doing you service, if you will listen to me. ™ e ^ 7 regain 
 The true enemies of my country are not those who, like 
 you, have injured her in open war, but those who have 
 compelled her friends to become her enemies. I love 
 Athens, not in so far as I am wronged by her, but in so 
 far as I once enjoyed the privileges of a citizen. The 
 country which I am attacking is no longer mine, but a 
 lost country which I am seeking to regain. He is the 
 true patriot, not who, when unjustly exiled, abstains from 
 attacking his country, but who in the warmth of his 
 affection seeks to recover her without regard to the 
 means. I desire therefore that you, Lacedaemonians, 
 will use me without scruple in any service however 
 difficult or dangerous, remembering that, according to 
 the familiar saying, “the more harm I did you as an 
 enemy, the more good can I do you as a friend.” For 
 I know the secrets of the Athenians, while I could only 
 guess at yours. Remember the immense importance of 
 your present decision, and do not hesitate to send an 
 expedition to Sicily and Attica. By despatching a 
 
47 6 
 
 DEC ELEA . G YL1PP US. 
 
 VI. fraction of your forces to co-operate in Sicily you may 
 save great interests, and may overthrow the Athenian 
 power once and for ever. And so henceforward you 
 may dwell safely yourselves and be leaders of all Hellas, 
 which will follow you, not upon compulsion, but from 
 affection.’ 
 
 03. Thus spoke Alcibiades : the Lacedaemonians, who had 
 The Lace- been intending to send an army against Athens, but 
 
 daemonians ...... . . 
 
 determine were still hesitating and looking about them, were greatly 
 DecSea" strengthened in their resolution when they heard all 
 Gyiippus^o th ese points urged by him who, as they thought, knew 
 Syracuse, best. Accordingly they now turned their thoughts to 
 the fortification of Decelea, and determined to send im¬ 
 mediate assistance to the Syracusans. They appointed 
 Gylippus the son of Cleandridas commander of the 
 Syracusan forces, and desired him to co-operate with 
 the Syracusan and Corinthian representatives, and send 
 aid to Sicily in the speediest and most effective manner 
 which the circumstances admitted. Whereupon he told 
 the Corinthians to despatch immediately two ships to 
 him at Asine, and to fit out as many more as they 
 meant to send; the latter were to be ready for sea when 
 the season arrived. Coming to this understanding the 
 envoys departed from Lacedaemon. 
 
 About this time the trireme which the Athenian 
 generals had despatched from Sicily for money and 
 cavalry a arrived at Athens. The Athenians hearing their 
 request, voted supplies of food and a force of cavalry 
 for the army. So the winter ended, and with it the 
 seventeenth year in the Peloponnesian War of which 
 Thucydides wrote the history. 
 
 94. At the very beginning of the following spring the 
 Operations Athenians quitted Catana, and sailed along the coast 
 nians in the towards the Sicilian Megara; this place, as I have already 
 dSSSof mentioned b , in the days of Gelo the tyrant was de- 
 A^vai of P°P u ^ atec ^ by the Syracusans, who still retain possession 
 horsemen of the country. They disembarked, and after ravaging 
 a Cp. vi. 74 fin. b Cp. vi. 4 init. 
 
 WO CQO 
 
PC o 
 
 ARGIVES AND LACEDAEMONIANS. 477 
 
 c. 414. the fields proceeded to attack a small Syracusan fortress a , VI. 
 
 “ 91 ’ 3 ‘ but without success ; they then moved on some by land and m3ne y 
 
 J J from 
 
 and some by sea to the river Terias, and going up Athens. 
 
 . the country wasted the plain and burned the corn. 
 
 They encountered a few Syracusans, some of whom they 
 killed, and setting up a trophy returned to their ships. 
 
 They then sailed back to Catana, and having taken in 
 provisions marched with their whole force against Cento- 
 ripa, a Sicel town, which capitulated. Thence they 
 returned, and on their way burned the corn of the 
 Inessians and the Hyblaeans. Arriving at Catana they 
 found that the horsemen to the number of two hundred 
 and fifty had come from Athens according to order, with 
 their equipments, but without horses, which they ex¬ 
 pected to procure on the spot. Thirty mounted archers 
 and three hundred talents of silver b had arrived also. 
 
 During the same spring the Lacedaemonians led an 95. 
 army against Argos, and advanced as far as Cleonae, A Lace - 
 
 ^ r daemoman 
 
 but retired in consequence of an earthquake. The invasion 
 
 Argives in their turn invaded the neighbouring district stoppfdby 
 of Thyrea, and took a great deal of spoil from the Lace- 
 daemonians, which was sold for no less than twenty-five Argives 
 
 invade 
 
 talents c . Somewhat later the populace of Thespiae d Thyrea. 
 made an attack upon the government, but the attempt Thespiae. 
 did not succeed ; for the Thebans came to the rescue. 
 
 Some of the insurgents were apprehended, others fled 
 to Athens. 
 
 The Syracusans heard that the Athenians had re- 96. 
 ceived their cavalry, and that they would soon be upon The Syra- 
 them. They considered that, unless the Athenians determine 
 gained possession of Epipolae (which was a steep place 
 looking down upon Syracuse), the city could not easily ^^p ated 
 be invested, even if they were defeated in battle ; they while 
 
 , holding a 
 
 therefore determined to guard the paths leading to tne review, by 
 summit that the enemy might not get up by stealth, ^anff 6 ' 
 At all other points the place was secure, as it lies high 
 
 a Cp. vi. 75 init. b ,£72,000. 
 
 c ,£6,000. d Cp. iv. 133 init. 
 
ATHENIANS SURPRISE EPIPO LAE. 
 
 97 ■ 
 
 who land, 
 unobserved, 
 north of the 
 city. 
 
 They gain 
 the summit 
 of Epipolae 
 and put to 
 flight the 
 Syracusan 
 hoplites. 
 
 and slopes right down to the city, from the interior of 
 which it can all be seen ; the Syracusans call it Epi¬ 
 polae (or the plateau), because it is above the level of 
 the adjacent country. Hermocrates and his colleagues 
 had now entered upon their command. The whole 
 people went out at break of day to the meadow 
 skirting the river Anapus, and proceeded to hold a 
 review of their forces. A selection was at once made 
 of six hundred hoplites, who were appointed to guard 
 Epipolae, and to run in a body to any point at which 
 they were needed. They were commanded by Diomilus, 
 an Andrian exile. 
 
 On the very same morning the Athenians were like¬ 
 wise holding a muster of their army. They had come 
 from Catana with their whole force, and had put in 
 unobserved near a place called Leon, which is distant 
 from Epipolae not quite a mile; there they disem¬ 
 barked their troops. Their ships cast anchor at Thap- 
 sus, which is a peninsula with a narrow isthmus, running 
 out into the sea, and not far from Syracuse either by 
 land or water. The Athenian sailors made a palisade 
 across the isthmus and remained at Thapsus, while the 
 troops ran to Epipolae, and gained the summit by the 
 way of the Euryelus before the Syracusans saw them 
 or could come up to them from the meadow where the 
 review was going on. Nevertheless Diomilus with his 
 six hundred hurried to the spot, accompanied by the 
 rest of the army, each man running as fast as he could; 
 but the distance from the meadow which they had to 
 traverse before they could engage was not less than 
 three miles ; consequently they were in disorder when 
 they closed with the Athenians. They were defeated 
 in the engagement which ensued on Epipolae, and re¬ 
 tired into the city. Diomilus and about three hundred 
 others were slain. The Athenians erected a trophy, and 
 gave up to the Syracusans the bodies of the dead under 
 a flag of truce. On the following day they went down 
 to the city itself, but as the Syracusans did not come 
 
 CQO 
 
THE WALL AND THE FIRST CROSS-WALL. 479 
 
 §i C 9i^3 ° Ut a £ a * nst they retired and built a fort upon VI. 
 
 Labdalum, at the edge of the cliffs of Epipolae looking 
 towards Megara, in order that when they advanced 
 either to fight or to construct lines, the place might 
 serve as a depository for their baggage and their pro¬ 
 perty. 
 
 Not long afterwards the Athenians were joined by 98. 
 three hundred Egestaean horsemen, and about a hun- The Athe- 
 dred more furnished by the Sicels, Naxians, and others, muste^six 
 They had two hundred and fifty of their own, for some andfifty 
 of whom they received horses from the Egestaeans and d ° rse v • 
 
 ^ ° They begin 
 
 Latanaeans; other horses they bought. The whole to construct 
 number of their cavalry was now raised to six hundred round 
 and fifty. They placed a garrison in Labdalum and |h?Syra- 
 went down to Syce, where they took up a position and ^sans &° 
 immediately commenced building a wall round the city. meet them, 
 The Syracusans were amazed at the celerity of the and some 
 work. They saw that they must interfere, and made clvairy are 
 up their minds to go out and fight. The two armies defeated - 
 were already preparing to engage when the Syracusan 
 generals, seeing that their forces were in disorder and 
 were forming with difficulty, led them back into the city, 
 all but a detachment of the cavalry, who, remaining 
 on the spot, prevented their opponents from gathering 
 stones for the wall, and compelled them to keep together. 
 
 At length, advancing with one division of their hoplites 
 and all their cavalry, the Athenians attacked the Syra¬ 
 cusan horse, whom they put to flight, and killed some 
 of them ; they then erected a trophy. 
 
 On the following day some of the Athenians proceeded 99. 
 with the construction of that part of the circle which lay Th e Syra- 
 
 11 11 cusans raise 
 
 towards the north; others began to collect wood and a palisade 
 stones and lay them along the intended course of the wall wan C ° unter ~ 
 towards Trogilus, where the distance was shortest from 
 the Great Harbour to the outer sea. The Syracusans 
 by the advice of their commanders, chiefly of Hermo- 
 crates, determined to risk no more general engagements. 
 
 They thought it better to raise a counter-wall across the 
 
480 ATHENIAN ATTACK ON THE CROSS-WALL. 
 
 VI. line along which the Athenian wall was building. If they 
 were first they would intercept them. They might indeed 
 be attacked by the Athenians while thus engaged, but 
 then they could oppose them with a part of their army; 
 and there would be time to run a palisade across, if not 
 a wall, before any attack took place. The Athenians 
 on the other hand would have to leave their work, 
 and employ their whole army against them. So they 
 came out and drew a cross-wall, beginning at their own 
 city, from a point below the circle of the Athenian 
 wall, cutting down the olive-trees in the precinct of 
 Apollo and erecting wooden towers. As yet the Athe¬ 
 nian ships had not sailed round from Thapsus into 
 the Great Harbour; the Syracusans were still masters 
 of their own coasts, and the Athenians brought their 
 necessaries from Thapsus by land. 
 
 IOO. The Athenians did not interfere with their work, for 
 These, they were afraid of dividing and weakening their forces ; 
 
 when partly y & & 
 
 finished, and they were pressing forward that part of the line on 
 by 6 a sudden which they were employed. So when the Syracusans 
 oFthe had sufficiently completed a part of their palisade and 
 Athenians, cross-wall, leaving one division to guard the work, they 
 retreated into the city with the rest of their army. The 
 Athenians now destroyed their conduits, which were 
 laid underground to bring drinking-water into the city. 
 Then, choosing their time at noon when the Syracusan 
 guard remained within their tents (some of them had 
 even retired into the city) and when the vigilance of 
 their sentinels at the palisade was relaxed, they took a 
 body of three hundred chosen hoplites of their own 
 and some light-armed troops, picked soldiers, to whom 
 they gave heavy arms, and bade them run quickly to 
 the cross-wall. The rest of the army proceeded in two 
 divisions under the two generals, one towards the city 
 in case the enemy should come to the rescue, the other 
 to that part of the palisade which adjoined the postern- 
 gate of the city. The three hundred attacked and 
 captured the further end of the palisade, from which 
 
 Obd 
 
SECOND COUNTER WORK. 
 
 B.C. 414. 
 . 01 . 9 1 . 3 - 
 
 48 r 
 
 the guards retired and fled inside the new outer wall VI. 
 which enclosed the shrine of Apollo Temenites a . The 
 pursuers pressed forward and made their way in after 
 them; but they were forced out again by the Syra¬ 
 cusans ; and some Argives and a few of the Athenians 
 fell there. Then the whole army, turning back, de¬ 
 stroyed the cross-wall, tore up the palisades, carried the 
 stakes to their camp, and raised a trophy. 
 
 On the following day the Athenians, beginning at 101. 
 one end of the unfinished circle, proceeded to bring the The Athe- 
 
 mans pro- 
 
 wall b down over b the cliff which on this side of Epi-ceedto 
 polae looks across the marsh towards the Great Harbour, ^^south- 
 intending to carry on the line by the shortest way ^ds 
 to the harbour right through the level of the marsh. 
 Meanwhile the Syracusans also came out, and begin- They take 
 ning from the city, proceeded to carry another palisade a de which 
 through the middle of the marsh, with a ditch at the Jofatercept 
 side, in order to prevent the Athenians from completing * f ^ de 
 their line to the sea. The latter, having finished their feating the 
 work as far as the cliff, attacked the new Syracusan &^fen ans 
 palisade and ditch. They ordered the ships to sail coMuslon^ 
 round from Thapsus into the Great Harbour of the Lamachus 
 Syracusans ; with the first break of day they descended is slain, 
 themselves from Epipolae to the level ground; and 
 passing through the marsh where the soil was clay and 
 firmer than the rest, over planks and gates which they 
 laid down, they succeeded at sunrise in taking nearly 
 the whole of the palisade and the ditch, and the re¬ 
 mainder not long afterwards. A battle took place in 
 which the Athenians were victorious, and the Syra¬ 
 cusans on the right wing fled to the city, those on 
 the left along the river. The three hundred chosen 
 Athenian troops pressed on at full speed towards the 
 bridge, intending to stop their passage, but the Syra¬ 
 cusans, fearing that they would be cut off, and having 
 most of their horsemen on the spot, turned upon the 
 three hundred, and putting them to flight, charged the 
 a Gp. vi. 75 init. b Or, ‘ along.’ 
 
482 NARROW ESCAPE OF NICIAS. 
 
 VI. right wing of the Athenians. The panic now extended 
 to the whole division at the extremity of the wing. 
 Lamachus saw what had happened, and hastened to the 
 rescue from his own place on the left wing, taking with 
 him a few archers and the Argive troops; but pressing 
 forward across a certain ditch he and a few who had 
 followed him were cut off from the rest, and he fell with 
 five or six others. The Syracusans hastily snatched 
 up their bodies, and carried them across the river out 
 of the reach of the enemy. But when they saw the rest 
 of the Athenian army advancing towards them they 
 retreated. 
 
 102. Meanwhile the Syracusans who fled first into the city, 
 Meanwhile observing the resistance made by the left wing, took 
 sans^attack courage, and coming out drew up against that part of the 
 wai^orT^ Athenian line which was opposed to them. They also 
 Splpdae, sent a detachment against the wall of circumvallation on 
 on^saved Epipolae, supposing that it was undefended, and might 
 setting fire be taken. They did indeed take and demolish the out- 
 tirnber and work, which was about a thousand feet in length ; but 
 engines. Nicias, who happened to have been left there because 
 
 he was ill, saved the lines themselves. He commanded 
 the attendants of the camp to set fire to the engines 
 and to the timber which had been left lying in front of 
 the wall, for being without troops he knew that there 
 was no other way of escape. The expedient succeeded ; 
 and in consequence of the fire the Syracusans gave up 
 the attack. The Athenian army too was now hastening 
 from the plain to the circle, with the intention of beat¬ 
 ing off the enemy; while the ships, as they had been 
 ordered, were sailing from Thapsus into the Great 
 Harbour. The Syracusans on the heights, seeing this 
 combined Movement, quickly retreated, together with 
 the rest of the army, into the city, -thinking that with 
 their present force they were no longer able to prevent 
 the completion of the line of wall towards the sea. 
 
 103. The Athenians then erected a trophy and restored 
 the S Syra-° f Syracusan dead under a flag of truce. The Syra- 
 
 Ora 
 
wo 
 
 HOPES OF THE ATHENIANS. 
 
 483 
 
 .C. 414. cusans delivered to them the bodies of Lamachus and VI. 
 
 ’’ 9I ' 3 ’ his companions. The whole Athenian forces, both naval cusans at 
 
 . 7 the progress 
 
 and military, were now on the spot, and they proceeded of the wail, 
 to cut off the Syracusans by a double wall, beginning at parley with 
 the southern cliff of Epipolae and extending to the sea. aresus-^ 
 Provisions came to their army in abundance from various P ici . ous of 
 
 . . their gene- 
 
 parts of Italy. Many of the Sicel tribes who had nils, whom 
 hitherto been hesitating now joined the Athenians, and theydepose * 
 three penteconters came from the Tyrrhenians. Every¬ 
 thing began to answer to their hopes. The Syracusans 
 despaired of saving the city by arms, for no help reached 
 them even from Peloponnesus. Within the walls they 
 were talking of peace, and they began to enter into 
 communications with Nicias, who, now that Lamachus 
 was dead, had the sole command. But no definite 
 result was attained ; although, as might be expected 
 when men began to feel the pressure of the siege and 
 their own helplessness, many proposals were made to 
 him, and many more were discussed in the city. Their 
 calamities even made them suspicious of one another; 
 accordingly they deposed their generals, attributing the 
 misfortunes which had befallen the city since they were 
 appointed either to their ill-luck or to their treachery. In 
 their room they chose Heraclides, Eucles, and Tellias. 
 
 Meanwhile Gylippus the Lacedaemonian and the 104. 
 
 ships from Corinth a were already at Leucas hastening Gylippus 
 
 r 1 • r arnves at 
 
 to their relief. They were alarmed at the reports which Tarentum. 
 
 were continually pouring in, all false, but all agreeing despises the 
 that the Athenian lines round Syracuse were now com- ^hi^force. 
 plete. Gylippus had no longer any hope of Sicily, but 
 thought that he might save Italy; so he and Pythen 
 the Corinthian sailed across the Ionian Gulf to Taren¬ 
 tum as fast as they could, taking two Laconian and 
 two Corinthian ships. The Corinthians were to man 
 ten ships of their own, two Leucadian, and three Am- 
 bracian, and to follow. Gylippus on his arrival at 
 Tarentum went on a mission to Thurii, of which his 
 a Cp. vi. 93 med. 
 
 I i 2 
 
VI. 
 
 105 . 
 
 Athenians 
 violate the 
 peace 
 with the 
 Lacedae¬ 
 monians 
 by devas¬ 
 tating the 
 Laconian 
 coast. 
 
 484 ATHENIANS LAND IN LACONIA. 
 
 father had formerly been a citizen ; he had hoped to 
 gain over the Thurians, but failed; he then continued 
 his voyage from Tarentum along the coast of Italy. 
 He was caught in the Terinaean gulf by a wind which 
 in this region blows violently and steadily from the 
 north, and was carried into the open sea. After ex¬ 
 periencing a most violent storm he returned to Taren¬ 
 tum, where he drew up those of his ships which had 
 suffered in the gale and refitted them. Nicias heard 
 of his approach, but despised the small number of his 
 ships; in this respect he was like the Thurians. He 
 thought that he had come on a mere privateering ex¬ 
 pedition, and for some time set no watch a . 
 
 During the same summer, about the same time, the 
 Lacedaemonians and their allies invaded Argolis and 
 wasted most of the Argive territory. The Athenians 
 assisted the Argives with thirty ships. The use which 
 they made of them was a glaring violation of the treaty 
 with the Lacedaemonians. Hitherto they had only gone 
 out on marauding expeditions from Pylos ; when they 
 landed, it was not upon the shores of Laconia, but 
 upon other parts of the Peloponnese ; and they had 
 merely fought as the allies of the Argives and Man- 
 tineans. The Argives had often urged them just to 
 land soldiers on Lacedaemonian ground, and to waste 
 some part of Laconia, however small, without remaining, 
 and they had refused. But now, under the command 
 of Pythodorus, Laespodias, and Demaratus, they landed 
 at Epidaurus called Limera, Prasiae, and other places, 
 and wasted the country. Thereby the Athenians at last 
 gave the Lacedaemonians a right to complain of them 
 and completely justified measures of retaliation. After 
 the Athenian fleet had departed from Argos, and the 
 Lacedaemonians had likewise retired, the Argives in¬ 
 vaded Phliasia, and having ravaged the country and 
 killed a few of the Phliasians, returned home. 
 
 a Cp. vii. 1 med. 
 
 MO 
 
BOOK VII. 
 
 B.c. 414. GYLIPPUS and Pythen, after refitting their ships at VII. I. 
 
 ' 9I ’ 3 ' Tarentum, coasted along to the Epizephyrian Locri. Gyiippus 
 
 rpi . . , arrives a,t 
 
 1 hey now learned the truth, that Syracuse was not as Himera 
 yet completely invested, but that an army might still an^rm* 
 enter by way of Epipolae. So they considered whether aboutThrfe 
 they should steer their course to the left or to the right thousand 
 
 r r>* rp. . 0 in all, 
 
 01 Sicily. They might attempt to throw themselves into marches 
 Syracuse by sea, but the risk would be great; or they Syracuse, 
 might go first to Himera, and gathering a force of the 
 Himeraeans, and of any others whom they could induce 
 to join them, make their way by land. They deter¬ 
 mined to sail to Himera. Nicias, when he heard that 
 they were at Locri, although he had despised them at 
 first, now sent out four Athenian ships to intercept them ; 
 but these had not as yet arrived at Rhegium, and came 
 too late. So they sailed through the strait, and touching 
 by the way at Rhegium and Messene, reached Himera. 
 
 There having drawn up their ships on the beach they 
 persuaded the Himeraeans to make common cause with 
 them, and not only to join in the expedition themselves, 
 byt to supply arms to all their unarmed sailors. They 
 then sent to the Selinuntians and told them to come 
 and meet them with their whole army at an appointed 
 place. The Geloans and certain of the Sicels also pro¬ 
 mised to send them a small force; the latter with the 
 more alacrity because Archonides, a Sicel king in these 
 parts who was a powerful man and friendly to the 
 Athenians, had recently died, and because Gyiippus 
 
4 86 
 
 ARRIVAL OF GONG YL US. 
 
 VII. 
 
 2 . 
 
 The Syra¬ 
 cusans are 
 about to 
 make 
 
 terms when 
 Gongylus 
 sails in and 
 encourages 
 them with 
 the news 
 that Gylip- 
 pus is at 
 hand. 
 
 They go 
 out to meet 
 him. 
 
 seemed to have come from Lacedaemon with hearty 
 good-will. And so, taking with him about seven hundred 
 of his own sailors and marines for whom he had obtained 
 arms, about a thousand Himeraean infantry, heavy 
 and light-armed included, and a hundred Himeraean 
 horsemen, some light-armed troops and cavalry from 
 Selinus, a few more from Gela, and of the Sicels about 
 a thousand in all, Gylippus marched towards Syracuse. 
 
 In the meantime the Corinthian ships a had put to 
 sea from Leucas and were coming with all speed to the 
 aid of the besieged. Gongylus, one of the Corinthian 
 commanders, who started last in a single ship, arrived at 
 Syracuse before the rest of the fleet, and a little before 
 Gylippus. He found the citizens on the point of hold¬ 
 ing an assembly at which the question of peace was to 
 be discussed; from this intention he dissuaded them by 
 the encouraging announcement that more ships, and 
 Gylippus the son of Cleandridas, whom the Lacedaemo¬ 
 nians had sent to take the command, were on their way. 
 Whereupon the Syracusans were reassured, and at once 
 went forth with their whole army to* meet Gylippus, 
 who, as they were informed, was now close at hand. He 
 had shortly before captured the Sicel fort Getae on his 
 march, and drawing up his men in readiness to fight, 
 came to Epipolae, taking the path by the Euryelus ; 
 where the Athenians had found a way before him b . 
 Having formed a junction with the Syracusans, he 
 marched against the Athenian lines. He arrived just 
 at the time when the Athenians had all but finished 
 their double wall c , nearly a mile long, reaching to the 
 Great Harbour ; there remained only a small portion 
 toward the sea, upon which they were still at work. 
 Along the remainder of the line of wall, which extended 
 towards Trogilus and the northern sea, the stones were 
 mostly lying ready; a part was half-finished, a part 
 
 a Cp. vi. 93 med., 104 med. 
 
 c Cp. vi. 103 init. 
 
 b Cp. vi. 97 med. 
 
 OCd 
 
BO 
 
 C. 414. 
 i. 9 1 * 3- 
 
 GY LIP PUS JOINS THE SYRACUSANS. 487 
 
 had been completed and left. So near was Syracuse VII. 
 to destruction. 
 
 The Athenians, though at first disconcerted by the 3 - 
 sudden advance of Gylippus and the Syracusans, drew the S 
 up their forces in order of battle. He halted as he Syracusans 
 
 111 111 1 „ offer battle 
 
 approached, and sent a herald to them offering a truce to Nicias 
 if they were willing to quit Sicily within five days lae/bu? 0 " 
 taking what belonged to them. But they despised his ^hdraw 
 offer, and sent away the herald without an answer. Nicias re_ 
 
 11 • mains by 
 
 Whereupon both armies set themselves in order ofthe Athe- 
 battle. Gylippus, seeing that the Syracusans were in LabdXm 
 confusion, and could with difficulty form, led back his s^acusans! 
 troops to the more open ground. Nicias did not follow, 
 but lay still, close to his own wall. When Gylippus 
 observed that the Athenians remained where they were, 
 he led away his army to the height called Temenites ; 
 there they passed the night. On the following day he 
 stationed the greater part of his troops in front of the 
 Athenian wall that they might not despatch a force to 
 any other point, and then sent a detachment against the 
 fort of Labdalum, which was out of sight of the Athe¬ 
 nian lines. He took the place, and killed every one 
 whom he found in it. On the same day an Athenian 
 trireme which was keeping watch over the harbour of 
 the Syracusans was taken by them. 
 
 The Syracusans and their allies now a began to build a 4 * 
 a single line of wall starting from the city and running The third 
 upwards across Epipolae at an angle with the Athenian work, 
 wall; this was a work which, unless it could be stopped an attack 
 by the Athenians, would make the investment of the Athenian 
 city impossible. Towards the sea the Athenian wall was lmes * 
 now completed, and their forces had come up to the high 
 ground. Gylippus, knowing that a part of the wall was 
 weak, instantly went by night with his army to attack 
 it. But the Athenians, who happened to be passing the 
 night outside the walls, perceived this movement and 
 marched to oppose him ; whereupon he at once with- 
 
 a Or, omitting 4 upwards: ’ ‘ began to build on the high ground.’ 
 
488 FORTIFICATION OF PLEMMYRIUM. 
 
 The Athe¬ 
 nians by 
 the fortifi¬ 
 cation of 
 Plemmy- 
 rium obtain 
 greater 
 command 
 of the 
 harbour ; 
 but the 
 removal of 
 the army 
 exposes 
 their 
 foragers 
 to the 
 Syracusan 
 cavalry. 
 
 drew. They then raised the weak portion of their wall 
 higher ; and guarded it themselves, while they posted 
 the allies on the other parts of the fortification in the 
 places severally assigned to them. 
 
 Nicias now determined to fortify Plemmyrium, a pro¬ 
 montory which runs out opposite the city and narrows 
 the entrance to the Great Harbour. He thought that 
 this measure would facilitate the introduction of sup¬ 
 plies a . His forces would then be able to watch the 
 harbour of the Syracusans from a nearer point, whereas 
 they had hitherto been obliged to put out from the 
 further corner of the Great Harbour whenever a Syra¬ 
 cusan ship threatened to move. He was inclined to pay 
 more attention than hitherto to naval operations; for 
 since the arrival of Gylippus the Athenian prospects by 
 land were not so encouraging. Having therefore trans¬ 
 ferred his ships and a portion of his army to Plemmy¬ 
 rium, he built three forts in which the greater part of 
 the Athenian stores were deposited ; and the large boats 
 as well as the ships of war were now anchored at this 
 spot. The removal was a first and main cause of the 
 deterioration of the crews. For when the sailors went 
 
 out to procure forage and water, of which there was 
 little, and that only to be obtained from a distance, they 
 were constantly cut off by the Syracusan cavalry, who 
 were masters of the country, a third part of their force 
 having been posted in a village at the 01ympieum b 
 expressly in order to prevent the enemy at Plemmyrium 
 from coming out and doing mischief. About this time 
 Nicias was informed that the rest of the Corinthian fleet 0 
 was on the point of arriving, and he sent twenty ships, 
 which were ordered to lie in wait for them about Locri 
 and Rhegium and the approach to Sicily. 
 
 5* While Gylippus was building the wall across Epipolae, 
 Gylippus, employing the stones which the Athenians had pre- 
 thf Athf- viously laid there for their own use, he at the same time 
 
 nians in a 
 
 a Cp. vii. 13 init., 24 fin. 
 
 c Cp. vii. 2 init. 
 
 b Cp. vi. 75 init. 
 
 O ro 
 
B.C. 414. 
 01. 91, 3. 
 
 DEFEAT AND VICTORY OF GYLIPPUS. 489 
 
 constantly led out and drew up in front of the wall the VII. 
 Syracusans and their allies, and the Athenians on their confined 
 part drew up in face of them. When he thought that tween the 
 the moment had arrived he offered battle; the two defeated, 
 armies met and fought hand to hand between the walls. 
 
 But there the Syracusan cavalry was useless ; the Syra¬ 
 cusans and their allies were defeated, and received their 
 dead under a flag of truce, while the Athenians raised 
 a trophy. Gylippus then assembled his army and con¬ 
 fessed that the fault was his own and not theirs ; for by 
 confining their ranks too much between the walls he had 
 rendered useless both their cavalry and their javelin-men. 
 
 But he meant to make another attempt. And he re¬ 
 minded them that while in material force they were equal 
 to their enemies, in energy of purpose they ought to be 
 far superior. That they, who were Peloponnesians and 
 Dorians a , should allow a mixed rabble of Ionians and 
 islanders to remain in the country and not resolve to 
 master them and drive them out, was a thing not to be 
 thought of. 
 
 On the first opportunity he led them out again. 6. 
 Nicias and the Athenians had determined that, whether Butrenew- 
 the Syracusans would offer battle or not, they must not conflict on 
 allow them to carry on their counterwork. For already ™°und Pen 
 their wall had almost passed the end of the Athenian wher , e his 
 
 A . cavalry can 
 
 wall, and if the work advanced any further it would make act, he is 
 no difference to the Athenians whether they fought and The cross- 
 conquered in every battle, or never fought at all. So ca?ied n ° W 
 they went out to meet the Syracusans. Gylippus before ^eJfian 
 engaging led his heavy-armed further outside the walls wail, 
 than on the former occasion; his cavalry and javelin- 
 men he placed on the flanks of the Athenians in the 
 open space between the points at which their respective 
 lines of wall stopped. In the course of the battle the 
 cavalry attacked the left wing of the Athenians which 
 was opposed to them, and put them to flight; the defeat 
 became general, and the whole Athenian army was 
 a Cp. i. 124 init.; v. 9 init.; vi. 77 med.; viii. 25 med. 
 
490 THE CROSS-WALL PASSES THE WALL. 
 
 VII. 
 
 7 - 
 
 Arrival of 
 fresh rein¬ 
 forcements. 
 Gylippus 
 collects 
 allies in 
 Sicily. 
 Second 
 embassy to 
 Corinth 
 and Lace¬ 
 daemon. 
 Syracusans 
 man a navy. 
 
 8 . 
 
 Day by day 
 the Syracu¬ 
 sans are 
 gaining 
 and the 
 Athenians 
 losing 
 strength. 
 Nicias 
 writes to 
 Athens. 
 
 driven back by main force within their lines. On the 
 following night the Syracusans succeeded in carrying 
 their wall past the works of the enemy. Their operations 
 were now no longer molested by them, and the Athe¬ 
 nians, whatever success they might gain in the field, 
 were utterly deprived of all hope of investing the city. 
 
 Not long afterwards the remaining Corinthian with the 
 Ambraciot and Leucadian ships a sailed in, under the 
 command of Erasinides the Corinthian, having eluded 
 the Athenian guardships. They assisted the Syracusans 
 in completing what remained of the Syracusan wall up 
 to the Athenian wall which it crossed. Gylippus mean¬ 
 while had gone off into Sicily to collect both naval and 
 land forces, and also to bring over any cities which 
 either were slack in the Syracusan cause or had stood 
 aloof from the war. More ambassadors, Syracusan and 
 Corinthian, were despatched to Lacedaemon and Corinth, 
 requesting that reinforcements might be sent across the 
 sea in merchant-ships or small craft, or by any other 
 available means, since the Athenians were sending for 
 assistance. The Syracusans, who were in high spirits, 
 also manned a navy, and began to practise, intending to 
 try their hand at this new sort of warfare. 
 
 Nicias observing how they were employed, and seeing 
 that the strength of the enemy and the helplessness of 
 the Athenians was daily increasing, sent to Athens a 
 full report of his circumstances, as he had often done 
 before, but never in such detail. He now thought the 
 situation so critical that, if the Athenians did not at once 
 recall them or send another considerable army to their 
 help, the expedition was lost. Fearing lest his mes¬ 
 sengers, either from inability to speak or b from want of 
 intelligence 13 , or because they desired to please the 
 people, might not tell the whole truth, he wrote a 
 letter, that the Athenians might receive his own opinion 
 of their affairs unimpaired in the transmission, and so 
 
 a Cp. vii. 4 fin. 
 
 b Or, reading fxvrjixrjs instead of yvS^rjs : ‘ from defect of memory,’ 
 
erio 
 
 THE ATHENIANS ON THE DEFENSIVE. 491 
 
 .C-414.be better able to judge of the real facts of the case. VII. 
 
 • 9 1 * 3 * messengers departed carrying his letter and taking 
 verbal instructions. He was now careful to keep his 
 army on the defensive, and to run no risks which he 
 could avoid. 
 
 At the end of the same summer, Euetion an Athenian <9. 
 general, in concert with Perdiccas and assisted by a Failure of 
 large force of Thracians, made an attack upon Amphi- uponAm- 
 polis, which he failed to take. He then brought round P hl P° lls - 
 triremes into the Strymon and besieged the place from 
 the river, making Himeraeum his head-quarters. So 
 the summer ended. 
 
 In the following winter the messengers from Nicias 10. 
 arrived at Athens. They delivered their verbal instruc- The mes- 
 
 . , . , • 1 • 1 - sengers of 
 
 tions, and answered any questions which were put to Nicias 
 them. They also presented his letter, which the registrar ^thlns!* 
 of the city, coming forward, read to the Athenian people. 
 
 It ran as follows :— 
 
 e Athenians, in many previous despatches I have re- 1 j. 
 ported to you the course of events up to this time, but The arrival 
 now there is greater need than ever that you should has^entirefy 
 inform yourselves of our situation, and come to some de- pos^on^ 
 cision. After we had engaged the Syracusans, against T he be_ 
 
 00 * 0 siegers are 
 
 whom you sent us, in several battles, and conquered in now be- 
 most of them, and had raised the lines within which sieged * 
 we are now stationed, Gylippus a Lacedaemonian ar¬ 
 rived, bringing an army from Peloponnesus and from 
 certain of the cities of Sicily. In the first engagement 
 he was defeated by us, but on the following day we were 
 overcome by numerous horsemen and javelin-men, and 
 retired within our lines. We have therefore desisted 
 from our siege-works and remain idle, since we are over¬ 
 powered by the superior numbers of the enemy, and 
 indeed cannot bring our whole army into the field, for 
 the defence of our wall absorbs a portion of our heavy¬ 
 armed. The enemy meanwhile have built a single wall 
 which crosses ours, and we cannot now invest them, un¬ 
 less a large army comes and takes this cross-wall. So 
 
VII. 
 
 12 . 
 
 The Syra¬ 
 cusans are 
 collecting 
 reinforce¬ 
 ments, and 
 they are 
 going to 
 attack us 
 by sea. 
 Their ships 
 and crews 
 are in good 
 order ; 
 whereas our 
 ships are 
 decaying. 
 
 13 - 
 
 Our sup¬ 
 plies are 
 with dif¬ 
 ficulty 
 conveyed 
 to us ; our 
 crews are 
 demoralised 
 and our 
 sailors de¬ 
 sert. 
 
 492 LETTER OF NICIAS. 
 
 that we, who are supposed to be the besiegers, are 
 really the besieged a , at least by land ; and the more 
 so because we cannot go far even into the country, 
 for we are prevented by their horsemen. 
 
 ‘Moreover they have sent ambassadors to Pelopon¬ 
 nesus asking for reinforcements, and Gylippus has gone 
 to the cities in Sicily intending to solicit those who are 
 at present neutral to join him, and to obtain from his 
 allies fresh naval and land forces. For they purpose, as 
 I hear, to attack our walls by land, and at the same time 
 to make an effort at sea. And let no one be startled 
 when I say “ at sea.” Our fleet was originally in first- 
 rate condition : the ships were sound and the crews were 
 in good order, but now, as the enemy are well aware, 
 the timbers of the ships, having been so long ex¬ 
 posed to the sea, are soaked, and the efficiency of the 
 crews is destroyed. We have no means of drawing up 
 our vessels and airing them, because the enemy’s fleet 
 is equal or even superior in numbers to our own, and 
 we are always expecting an attack from them. They 
 are clearly trying their strength ; they can attack us 
 when they please, and they have far greater facilities 
 for drying their ships, since they are not, like us, en¬ 
 gaged in a blockade. 
 
 ‘ Even if we had a great superiority in the number of 
 our ships, and were not compelled as we are to employ 
 them all in keeping guard, we could hardly have the 
 like advantage. For our supplies have to pass so near 
 the enemy’s city that they are with difficulty conveyed 
 to us now, and if we relax our vigilance ever so little we 
 shall lose them altogether. 
 
 It has been, and continues to be the ruin of our crews, 
 that the sailors, having to forage and fetch water and 
 wood from a distance, are cut off by the Syracusan 
 horse b , while our servants, since we have been reduced 
 to an equality with the enemy, desert us. Of the 
 foreign sailors, some who were pressed into the service 
 a Cp. iv. 29 init, b Cp. vii. 4 fin. 
 
 Ota 
 
mo 
 
 LETTER OF NIC I AS. 
 
 493 
 
 .c.414. run off at once to the Sicilian cities ; others, having been VII. 
 originally attracted by high pay, and fancying that they 
 were going to trade and not to fight, astonished at the 
 resistance which they encounter, and especially at the 
 naval strength of the enemy, either find an excuse for 
 deserting to the Syracusans, or they effect their escape 
 into the country; and Sicily is a large place. Others, 
 again, have persuaded the trierarchs to take Hyccarian 
 slaves in their room while they themselves are busy 
 trading ; and thus the precision of the service is lost. 
 
 ‘ I am writing to those who know that the crew of a 14. 
 vessel does not long remain at its prime, a and that the 1 cannot 
 sailors who really start the ship and keep the rowing these 
 together are but a fraction of the whole number a . The fo^your 
 most hopeless thing of all is that, although I am general, ampere will 
 I am not able to put a stop to these disorders, for tempers 
 like yours are not easily controlled. And we cannot piine. 
 even fill up the crews, whereas the enemy can obtain i n danger 
 recruits from many sources. Our daily waste in men ° t f a rved g 0 ut 
 and stores can only be replaced out of the supplies which l } is better 
 
 J r rr that you 
 
 we brought with us ; and these we have no means of should 
 increasing, for the cities which are now our confederates, truth, 
 Naxos and Catana, are unable to maintain us. There p a JS t r 
 is only one advantage more which the Syracusans can 
 gain over us : if the towns of Italy from which our 
 provisions are derived, seeing our reduced condition and 
 your neglect of us, go over to the enemy, we shall be 
 starved out, and they will have made an end of the war 
 without striking a blow. I could have written you 
 tidings more cheering than these, but none more profit¬ 
 able ; for you should be well-informed of our circum¬ 
 stances if you are to take the right steps. Moreover I 
 know your dispositions ; you like to hear pleasant things, 
 but afterwards lay the fault on those who tell you them 
 if they are falsified by the event; therefore I think it 
 safer to speak the truth. 
 
 a Or ‘and that there are few sailors who can start a ship and 
 keep the rowing together.’ 
 
VII. 
 
 15 - 
 
 We have 
 done our 
 duty, but 
 the enemy 
 and their 
 allies are 
 too much 
 for us ; I 
 am sick and 
 want to 
 resign. 
 Whatever 
 you do, do 
 quickly. 
 
 16. 
 
 The Athe¬ 
 nians re¬ 
 solve to 
 send a 
 second ex¬ 
 pedition, of 
 which De¬ 
 mosthenes 
 and Eury- 
 medon are 
 appointed 
 com¬ 
 manders. 
 
 J 7 - 
 
 The Athe¬ 
 nians and 
 
 494 A SECOND EXPEDITION DECREED. 
 
 c And now, do not imagine that your soldiers and their 
 generals have failed in the fulfilment of the duty which 
 you originally imposed upon them. But when all Sicily 
 is uniting against us, and the Syracusans are expecting 
 another army from Peloponnesus, it is time that you 
 should make up your minds. For the troops which we have 
 here certainly cannot hold out even against our present 
 enemies, and therefore you ought either to recall us or to 
 send another army and fleet as large as this, and plenty 
 of money. You should also send a general to succeed 
 me, for I have a disease in the kidneys and cannot 
 remain here. I claim your indulgence ; while I retained 
 my health I often did you good service when in com¬ 
 mand. But do whatever you mean to do at the very 
 beginning of spring, and let there be no delay. The 
 enemy will obtain reinforcements in Sicily without 
 going far, and although the troops from Peloponnesus 
 will not arrive so soon, yet if you do not take care they 
 will elude you; their movements will either be too 
 secret for you, as they were before a , or too quick.’ 
 
 Such was the condition of affairs described in the 
 letter of Nicias. The Athenians, after hearing it read, 
 did not release Nicias from his command, but they joined 
 with him two officers who were already in Sicily, 
 Menander and Euthydemus, until regular colleagues 
 could be elected and sent out, for they did not wish 
 him to bear the burden in his sickness alone. They 
 also resolved to send a second fleet and an army of 
 Athenians taken from the muster-roll and of allies. As 
 colleagues to Nicias they elected Demosthenes the son 
 of Alcisthenes, and Eurymedon the son of Thucles. 
 Eurymedon was despatched immediately to Sicily about 
 the winter solstice; he took with him ten ships conveying 
 a hundred and twenty talents b of silver, and was to tell 
 the army in Sicily that they should receive assistance 
 and should not be neglected. Demosthenes remained 
 behind, and was busied in getting ready the expedition 
 a Cp. vii. 2 init. b ^28,800. 
 
 O to 
 
m O 
 
 THE LACEDAEMONIAN CONSCIENCE. 495 
 
 .C. 414. 
 1. 91. 3- 
 
 which he was to bring out in the spring. He announced VII. 
 to the allies that troops would be required, and collected Peiopon- 
 money, ships, and hoplites at Athens. The Athenians ready their 
 also sent twenty ships to cruise off the Peloponnesian forces ' 
 coast and intercept any vessels trying to pass from the 
 Peloponnesus or Corinth to Sicily. The Sicilian envoys a 
 had now arrived at Corinth, and the Corinthians had 
 heard from them that affairs were looking better in 
 Sicily. Seeing how opportune had been the arrival of 
 the ships which they had already despatched they were 
 more zealous than ever. They prepared to convey 
 hoplites to Sicily in merchant-vessels; the Lacedae¬ 
 monians were to do the like from Peloponnesus. The 
 Corinthians also proceeded to man twenty-five ships of 
 war, intending to hazard a naval engagement against the 
 Athenian squadron stationed at Naupactus. They hoped 
 that, if the attention of the Athenians was diverted by an 
 opposing force, they would be unable to prevent their 
 merchant-vessels from sailing. 
 
 The Lacedaemonians also prepared for their already 18. 
 projected invasion of Attica b . They were partly stimu- The 
 lated by the Syracusans and Corinthians, who having monians, 
 heard of the reinforcements which the Athenians were gation of* 1 " 
 sending to Sicily, hoped that they might be stopped by 
 the invasion. Alcibiades was always at hand insisting fortify 
 upon the importance of fortifying Decelea and of carrying i n the 
 on the war with vigour. Above all, the Lacedaemonians [heTac™ 
 were inspirited by the thought that the Athenians ^™guii a ty S 
 would be more easily overthrown now that they had of violating 
 two wars on hand, one against themselves, and another inAis^the 
 against the Sicilians. They considered also that this Athemans - 
 time they had been the first offenders against the treaty, 
 whereas in the former war the transgression had rather 
 been on their own side. For the Thebans had entered 
 Plataea in time of peace 0 , and they themselves had 
 refused arbitration when offered by the Athenians, 
 
 a Cp. vii. 7. b Cp. vi. 93 init. 
 
 c Cp. ii. 2 foil.; iii. 56 init. 
 
496 FORTIFICATION OF DECFLEA. 
 
 VII. although the former treaty forbade war in case an 
 adversary was willing to submit to arbitration a . They 
 felt that their ill-success was deserved, and they took 
 seriously to heart the disasters which had. befallen them 
 at Pylos and elsewhere. But now the Athenians with a 
 fleet of thirty ships had gone forth from Argos and 
 ravaged part of the territory of Epidaurus and Prasiae, 
 besides other places b ; marauding expeditions from Pylos 
 were always going on; and whenever quarrels arose about 
 disputed points in the treaty and the Lacedaemonians 
 proposed arbitration, the Athenians refused it. Reflecting 
 upon all this, the Lacedaemonians concluded that the 
 guilt of their former transgression was now shifted to the 
 Athenians, and they were full of warlike zeal. During 
 the winter they bade their allies provide iron, and them¬ 
 selves manufactured tools for the fortification of Decelea. 
 
 They also prepared, and continually urged the other 
 Peloponnesians to prepare, the succours which they in¬ 
 tended to send in merchant-vessels to the Syracusans. 
 
 And so the winter ended, and with it the eighteenth 
 year in the Peloponnesian War of which Thucydides 
 wrote the history. 
 
 19. At the very beginning of the next spring, and earlier B.c.413. 
 The Lace- than ever before, the Lacedaemonians and their allies 01 ‘ 9I * 4 ‘ 
 
 daemomans # 5 
 
 enter Attica entered Attica under the command of Agis the son of 
 Decelea. y Archidamus the Lacedaemonian king. They first de¬ 
 vastated the plain and its neighbourhood. They then 
 began to fortify Decelea, dividing the work among the 
 cities of the confederacy. Decelea is distant about four¬ 
 teen miles from Athens, and not much further from 
 Boeotia. The fort was designed for the devastation of 
 the plain and the richest parts of the country, and was 
 erected on a spot within sight of Athens. 
 
 Reinforce- While the Peloponnesians and their allies in Attica 
 £?"were thus engaged, the Peloponnesians at home were 
 Jh°e^uen- Ch despatching hoplites in merchant-vessels to Sicily. The 
 tionofthe Lacedaemonians selected the best of the Helots and 
 a Cp. i. 78 fin., 85, 140 med. 
 
 b Cp. vi. 105. 
 
 OCd 
 
cdo 
 
 REINFORCEMENTS SENT TO BOTH SIDES. 497 
 
 .c.413. Neodamodes, numbering in all six hundred, and placed VII. 
 
 9 ' 4 ' them under the command of Eccritus, a Spartan. The ^dfrerted 
 Boeotians furnished three hundred hoplites, who were b y the 
 
 1 -i , 1 Corinthians 
 
 commanded by two Thebans, Xenon and Nikon, and at Nau- 
 Hegesander, a Thespian. These started first and put out pactus ‘ 
 into the open sea from Taenarus in Laconia. Not long 
 afterwards the Corinthians sent five hundred heavy¬ 
 armed, some of them from Corinth itself, others who 
 were Arcadian mercenaries ; they were all placed under 
 the command of Alexarchus, a Corinthian. The Sicyo- 
 nians also sent with the Corinthians two hundred hoplites 
 under the command of Sargeus, a Sicyonian. Meanwhile 
 the twenty-five ships which the Corinthians had manned 
 in the winter lay opposite to the twenty Athenian ships 
 at Naupactus until the merchant-vessels conveying the 
 heavy-armed troops had got safely off. So the design 
 succeeded, and the attention of the Athenians was 
 diverted from the merchant-ships to the triremes. 
 
 At the beginning of spring, whilst the Lacedaemonians 20. 
 were fortifying Decelea, the Athenians sent thirty ships c ^ ri t ^ s 
 under the command of Charicles the son of Apollodorus shi^sent 7 
 to cruise about Peloponnesus. He was told to touch at Th^second 
 Argos, and there to summon and take on board a force underDe- 
 of heavy- armed which the Argives, being allies of the mosthenes 
 Athenians, were bound to furnish. Meanwhile they Aegina. 
 despatched under Demosthenes their intended expe¬ 
 dition to Sicily: it consisted of sixty Athenian ships and 
 five Chian, twelve hundred heavy-armed Athenians taken 
 from the roll, and as many others as could possibly be 
 obtained from the different islanders ; they also collected 
 from their subject-allies supplies of all sorts for the war. 
 Demosthenes was told first of all to co-operate with 
 Charicles on the coast of Laconia. So he sailed to 
 Aegina, and there waited until the whole of his arma¬ 
 ment was assembled and until Charicles had taken on 
 board the Argives. 
 
 In the same spring and about the same time Gylip- 21. 
 pus returned to Syracuse, bringing from each of the 
 K k 
 
498 THE SYRACUSANS MAN A GREAT FLEET. 
 
 VII. cities which he had persuaded to join him as many 
 mocrates troops as he could obtain. He assembled the Syra- 
 
 incite the 1 111 1 
 
 Syracusans cusans and told them that they should man as large 
 
 seaTthey a fleet as possible and try their fortune at sea ; he hoped 
 
 imitate the to obtain a decisive result which would justify the risk. 
 
 daring Hermocrates took the same view, and urged them 
 
 spirit of 0 
 
 their foes, strongly not to be faint-hearted, but to attack the 
 enemy with their ships. He said that the Athenians 
 had not inherited their maritime skill, a and would not 
 retain it for ever a ; there was a time when they were 
 less of a naval people than the Syracusans themselves b , 
 but they had been made sailors from necessity by the 
 Persian invasion. To daring men like the Athenians 
 those who emulated their daring were the most formid¬ 
 able foes. The same reckless courage which had often 
 enabled the Athenians, although inferior in power, to 
 strike terror into their adversaries might now be turned 
 against them by the Syracusans. He well knew that 
 if they faced the Athenian navy suddenly and unex¬ 
 pectedly, they would gain more than they would lose ; 
 the consternation which they would inspire would more 
 than counterbalance their own inexperience and the supe¬ 
 rior skill of the Athenians. He told them therefore to 
 try what they could do at sea, and not to be frightened. 
 Thus under the influence of Gylippus, Hermocrates, and 
 others, the Syracusans, now eager for the conflict, began 
 to man their ships. 
 
 2 2. When the fleet was ready, Gylippus, under cover of 
 Gylippus led f ort h ^e whole land-army, intending to attack 
 
 attacks the in person the forts on Plemmyrium. Meanwhile the 
 piemmy- triremes of the Syracusans, at a concerted signal, sailed 
 th U eh’fleet lle forth, thirty-five from the greater harbour and forty-five 
 e 1 nco A ul ? ters from the lesser, where they had their arsenal. These 
 mans in the latter sailed round into the Great Harbour, intending to 
 ar ° ur ' form a junction with the other ships inside and make 
 a combined attack on Plemmyrium, that the Athenians, 
 assailed both by sea and land, might be disconcerted. 
 a Or, ‘ or been sailors from all time.’ h Cp. i. 14. 
 
 «' O 
 
ow 
 
 THEIR DEFEAT IN THE FIRST SEA-EIGHT 499 
 
 C. 413. The Athenians however quickly manned sixty ships; and VII. 
 
 9 4 with twenty-five of them engaged the thirty-five of the 
 Syracusans which were in the Great Harbour: with the 
 remainder they encountered those which were sailing 
 round from the arsenal. The two squadrons met at once 
 before the mouth of the Great Harbour: the struggle 
 was long and obstinate, the Syracusans striving to force 
 an entrance, the Athenians to prevent them. 
 
 Meanwhile Gylippus, quite early in the morning, while 23. 
 the Athenians in Plemmyrium who had gone down to The forts 
 
 1 . *i 1 are ta ken, 
 
 the water-side had their minds occupied by the sea- but in the 
 fight, made a sudden attack upon their forts. He the Syra- 
 captured the largest of them first, then the two lesser, defeated^ 
 their garrisons forsaking them when they saw the largest 
 so easily taken. Those who escaped from the fort¬ 
 ress first captured, getting into a merchant-vessel and 
 some boats which were moored at Plemmyrium, found 
 their way to the main station of the Athenians, but 
 with difficulty; for they were chased by a swift trireme, 
 the Syracusans at that time having the advantage in 
 the Great Harbour. But when the two lesser fortresses 
 were taken, the Syracusans were already losing the 
 day, and the fugitives got past them with greater ease. 
 
 For the Syracusan ships which were fighting before the 
 mouth of the harbour, having forced their way through 
 the enemy, entered in disorder, and falling foul of one 
 another gave away the victory to the Athenians, who 
 routed not only these, but also the others by whom they 
 were at first worsted inside the harbour. Eleven Syra¬ 
 cusan ships were disabled; the crews in most of them 
 were slain, in three, made prisoners. The Athenians 
 themselves lost three ships. They now drew to land 
 the wrecks of the Syracusan ships, and erecting a trophy 
 on the little island in front of Plemmyrium returned 
 to their own station. 
 
 But although the Syracusans were unsuccessful in 24. 
 the sea-fight, still they had taken the fortresses of The loss 
 Plemmyrium. They erected three trophies, one lor myrium 
 K k 2 
 
VII. 
 
 disastrous 
 to the 
 Athenians. 
 
 25 - 
 
 The Syra¬ 
 cusans send 
 a third 
 embassy to 
 Pelopon¬ 
 nesus, and 
 despatch 
 a squadron 
 which inter¬ 
 cepts some 
 Athenian 
 supplies. 
 
 The Athe¬ 
 nians pull 
 up the 
 palisade 
 which the 
 Syracusans 
 had driven 
 
 500 BUT TAKE PLEMMYRIUM. 
 
 each fort. Two out of the three forts they repaired 
 and garrisoned, but one of the two which were cap¬ 
 tured last they demolished. Many perished and many 
 prisoners were made at the capture of the forts, and 
 abundant spoil of different kinds was taken, for the 
 Athenians used them as a store, and much corn and 
 goods of traders were deposited in them ; also much 
 property belonging to the trierarchs, including the sails 
 and other fittings of forty triremes, and three triremes 
 which had been drawn up on the beach. The loss of 
 Plemmyrium was one of the greatest and severest blows 
 which befell the Athenians. For now they could no 
 longer even introduce provisions with safety, but the 
 Syracusan ships lay watching to prevent them, and they 
 had to fight for the passage a . General discouragement 
 and dismay prevailed throughout the army. 
 
 The Syracusans next sent out twelve ships under the 
 command of Agatharchus, a Syracusan. One of these 
 hastened to Peloponnesus conveying envoys who were 
 to report their improved prospects, and to urge more 
 strongly than ever the prosecution of the war in Hellas. 
 The remaining eleven sailed to Italy, hearing that ships 
 laden with supplies were on their way to the Athenians. 
 They fell In with and destroyed most of these ships, 
 and burnt a quantity of ship-timber which was lying 
 ready for the Athenians in the territory of Caulonia. 
 Then they came to Locri, and while they were at 
 anchor there, one of the merchant-vessels from Pelo¬ 
 ponnesus sailed in, bringing some Thespian hoplites b . 
 These the Syracusans took on board, and sailed home¬ 
 wards. The Athenians watched for them near Megara 
 with twenty ships and took one ship with the crew, 
 but the rest made their escape to Syracuse. 
 
 There was some skirmishing in the harbour about 
 the palisades which the Syracusans had fixed in the 
 sea in front of their old dock-houses, that their ships 
 might ride at anchor in the enclosed space, where they 
 a Cp. vii. 4 med., 13 init. b Cp. vii. 19 med. 
 
 OCd 
 
SKIRMISHING IN THE HARBOUR . 501 
 
 b.c. 413. could not be struck by the enemy, and would be out VII. 
 01. 9 r » 4- h arm ’ s wa y. The Athenians brought up a ship of 1 ^ c t t ° t ^ 1 °" 
 ten thousand talents a burden, which had wooden towers ships, 
 and bulwarks; and from their boats they tied cords to 
 the stakes and b wrenched and tore them up b ; or dived 
 and sawed them through underneath the water. Mean¬ 
 while the Syracusans kept up a shower of missiles from 
 the dock-houses, which the men in the ship returned. 
 
 At length the Athenians succeeded in pulling up most 
 of the palisades. The stakes which were out of sight 
 were the most dangerous of all, there being some which 
 were so fixed that they did not appear above the water; 
 and no vessel could safely come near. They were like 
 a sunken reef, and a pilot, not seeing them, might easily 
 catch his ship upon them. Even these were sawn off 
 by men who dived for hire; but the Syracusans drove 
 them in again. Many were the contrivances employed 
 on both sides, as was only natural, when two armies 
 confronted each other at so short a distance. There 
 were continual skirmishes, and they practised all kinds 
 of stratagems. 
 
 The Syracusans also sent to the Sicilian cities Corin- a second 
 thian, Ambraciot, and Lacedaemonian ambassadors an- asking for 
 nouncing the taking of Plemmyrium, and explaining that ^tfrom 
 in the sea-fight they had been defeated, not so much by Syracuse to 
 the superior strength of the enemy, as through their own Sicily, 
 disorder. They were also to report their great hopes 
 of success, and to ask for assistance both by land and 
 sea. They were to add that the Athenians were ex¬ 
 pecting reinforcements; and if they could succeed in 
 destroying the army then in Sicily before these arrived, 
 there would be an end of the war. Such was the course 
 of events in Sicily. 
 
 Demosthenes, when the reinforcements which he was 26. 
 to take to Sicily had all collected, sailed from Aegina J ) f e ^ s c t ^ n 
 to Peloponnesus and joined Charicles and his thirty and erection 
 
 a About 250 tons. 
 
 b Or, 1 wrenched them up and broke them off.’ 
 
502 PROGRESS OF THE SECOND EXPEDITION. 
 
 VII. 
 
 of a second 
 Pylos 
 opposite 
 Cythera. 
 Demos¬ 
 thenes, 
 having 
 assisted in 
 these opera¬ 
 tions, sails 
 forward to 
 Corcyra. 
 
 27 . 
 
 The Dian 
 Thracians 
 arrive too 
 late to join 
 the expedi¬ 
 tion. 
 
 ships a . He embarked the Argive hoplites, and, pro¬ 
 ceeding to Laconia, first devastated some part of the 
 lands of Epidaurus Limera. Next the Athenians landed 
 in the district of Laconia opposite Cythera, where there 
 is a temple of Apollo. They ravaged various parts of 
 the country, and fortified a sort of isthmus in the neigh¬ 
 bourhood, that the Helots of the Lacedaemonians might 
 desert and find a refuge there, and that privateers might 
 make the place, as they did Pylos, their head-quarters 
 for marauding expeditions. Demosthenes assisted in 
 the occupation, and then sailed to Corcyra, intending to 
 collect additional forces from the allies in that region, 
 and to make his way with all speed to Sicily. Charicles 
 waited until he had completed the fort, and then leaving 
 a garrison, he sailed home with his thirty ships, accom¬ 
 panied by the Argives. 
 
 During the same summer there arrived at Athens 
 thirteen hundred Thracian targeteers of the Dian race, 
 who carried dirks; they were to have sailed with De¬ 
 mosthenes to Sicily, but came too late, and the Athe¬ 
 nians determined to send them back to their native 
 country. Each soldier was receiving a drachma 15 per 
 day; and to use them against Decelea would have been 
 too expensive. 
 
 Thucydides For during this summer Decelea had been fortified by 
 speakof t0 the whole Peloponnesian army, and was henceforward 
 sufferings re g u l ar ly occupied for the annoyance of the country by 
 caused by a succession of garrisons sent from the allied cities, 
 fication of whose incursions did immense harm to the Athenians: 
 
 Decelea, 
 which per¬ 
 manently 
 commanded 
 the whole 
 country. 
 Desertion 
 of twenty 
 thousand 
 slaves; 
 great de¬ 
 struction of 
 cattle and 
 injury to 
 cavalry. 
 
 the destruction of property and life which ensued was a 
 chief cause of their fall. Hitherto the invasions had been 
 brief and did not prevent them from gathering the pro¬ 
 duce of the soil in the interval; but now the Pelo¬ 
 ponnesians were always on the spot; and sometimes 
 they were reinforced by additional troops, but always 
 the regular garrison, who were compelled to find their 
 own supplies, overran and despoiled the country. The 
 a Cp. vii. 20 init. b 9 \d. 
 
 oro 
 
PQO 
 
 •C. 413- 
 1. 91, 4. 
 
 DISTRESS OF ATHENIANS AT HOME. 503 
 
 Lacedaemonian king, Agis, was present in person, and VII. 
 devoted his whole energies to the war. The sufferings 
 of the Athenians were terrible. For they were dis¬ 
 possessed of their entire territory; more than twenty 
 thousand slaves had deserted a , many of them artisans; 
 all their sheep and cattle had perished, and now that 
 the cavalry had to go out every day and make descents 
 upon Decelea or keep guard all over the country, their 
 horses were either wounded by the enemy, or lamed by 
 the roughness of the ground and the incessant fatigue. 
 
 Provisions, which had been formerly conveyed by the 28. 
 shorter route from Euboea to Oropus and thence over- Provisions 
 
 . brought a 
 
 land through Decelea, were now carried by sea round the long way 
 promontory of Sunium at great cost. Athens was obliged citizens on 
 to import everything from abroad, and resembled a fort fu^in^he 
 rather than a city. In the day-time the citizens guarded 
 the battlements by relays ; during the night every man population 
 was on service except the cavalry; some at their places summerand 
 of arms, others on the wall b , summer and winter alike, Tw^wars 
 until they were quite worn out. But worse than all was 1 < ^! a ^ 1 g f 
 the cruel necessity of maintaining two wars at once, and besiegers 
 
 . besieged. 
 
 they carried on both with a determination which no The great 
 one would have believed unless he had actually seen it. paradox - 
 That, blockaded as they were by the Peloponnesians, 
 who had raised a fort in their country, they should refuse 
 to let go Sicily, and, themselves besieged, persevere in the 
 siege of Syracuse, which as a mere city might rank with 
 Athens, and—whereas the Hellenes generally were ex¬ 
 pecting at the beginning of the war, some that they would 
 survive a year, others two or perhaps three years, certainly 
 not more, if the Peloponnesians invaded Attica—that in 
 the seventeenth year from the first invasion, after so 
 exhausting a struggle, the Athenians should have been 
 strong enough and bold enough to go to Sicily at all, 
 and to plunge into a fresh war as great as that in 
 which they were already engaged—how contrary was all 
 this to the expectation of mankind ! Through the vast 
 a Cp. viii. 40 med. b Cp. ii. 13 fin.; viii. 69 init. 
 
TERRIBLE FATE OF MYCALESSUS. 
 
 VII. 
 
 New 
 
 financial 
 
 measure. 
 
 29 . 
 
 The Thra¬ 
 cians are 
 sent home 
 by the 
 Athenians, 
 who cannot 
 afford to 
 keep them. 
 Being 
 desired to 
 do what 
 mischief 
 they can by 
 the way, 
 they sack 
 Mycalessus. 
 The pa¬ 
 thetic tale 
 of its 
 sufferings 
 moves 
 Thucydides 
 to pity. 
 
 expense thus incurred, above all through the mischief B.c. 413. 
 done by Decelea, they were now greatly impoverished. ‘ 91 ’ 4 ' 
 It was at this time that they imposed upon their allies, 
 instead of the tribute, a duty of five per cent, on all 
 things imported and exported by sea, thinking that 
 this would be more productive. For their expenses be¬ 
 came heavier and heavier as the war grew in extent, 
 and at the same time their sources of revenue were 
 dried up. 
 
 And so, being in extreme want of money, and desirous 
 to economise, they at once sent away the Thracians who 
 came too late for Demosthenes, ordering Diitrephes to 
 convey them home, but, as they must needs sail through 
 the Euripus, to employ them in any way which he could 
 against the enemy. He landed them at Tanagra and 
 there made a hasty raid; in the evening he sailed from 
 Chalcis in Euboea across the Euripus, and disembarking 
 his troops in Boeotia led them against the town of Myca¬ 
 lessus. He passed the night unperceived at the temple 
 of Hermes, which is distant from Mycalessus about 
 two miles, and at the dawn of day he assaulted and 
 captured the city, which is not large. The inhabitants 
 were taken off their guard ; for they never imagined 
 that an enemy would come and attack them at so great 
 a distance from the sea. The walls were weak, and in 
 some places had fallen down ; in others they were built 
 low ; while the citizens, in their sense of security, had left 
 their gates open. The Thracians dashed into the town, 
 sacked the houses and temples, and slaughtered the 
 inhabitants. They spared neither old nor young, but 
 cut down, one after another, all whom they met, the 
 women and children, the very beasts of burden, and 
 every living thing which they saw. a For the Thracians, 
 when they dare, can be as bloody as the worst bar¬ 
 barians 9 '. There in Mycalessus the wildest panic ensued, 
 and destruction in every form was rife. They even fell 
 
 a Or, 4 For the Thracians, like all very barbarous tribes, are most 
 bloody when they are least afraid.’ 
 
DEMOSTHENES IN THE IONIAN GULF. 505 
 
 B.C. 413. 
 .01. 91, 4. 
 
 upon a boy’s school, the largest in the place, which the VII. 
 children had just entered, and massacred them every one. 
 
 No greater calamity than this ever affected a whole city; 
 never was anything so sudden or so terrible. 
 
 When the news reached the Thebans they hastened 30. 
 to the rescue. Coming upon the Thracians before they The The- 
 had gone far, they took away the spoil, and putting them come upon 
 to flight, pursued them to the Euripus, where the ships [he^are d 
 which had brought them were moored. Of those who driven back 
 fell, the greater number were slain in the attempt to to their 
 embark; for they did not know how to swim, and the ships ‘ 
 men on board, seeing what was happening, had anchored 
 their vessels out of bow-shot. In the retreat itself the 
 Thracians made a very fair defence against the Theban 
 cavalry which first attacked them, running out and 
 closing in again, after the manner of their country; 
 and their loss was trifling. But a good many who 
 remained for the sake of plunder were cut off within 
 the city and slain. The whole number who fell was 
 two hundred and fifty, out of thirteen hundred. They 
 killed, however, some of the Thebans and others who 
 came to the rescue, in all about twenty, both horse¬ 
 men and hoplites. Scirphondas, one of the Theban 
 Boeotarchs, was slain. A large proportion of the My- 
 calessians perished. Such was the fate of Mycalessus; 
 considering the size of the city, no calamity more de¬ 
 plorable occurred during the war a . 
 
 Demosthenes, after helping to build the fort on the 31. 
 Laconian coast, sailed away to Corcyra b . On his way Demos- 
 thither he destroyed a merchant-vessel anchored at samng up 
 Pheia in Elis, which was intended to convey some of the coLTmeets 
 Corinthian hoplites to Sicily. But the crew escaped, 
 and sailed in another vessel. He went on to Zacynthus brings news 
 and Cephallenia, where he took on board some hoplites, Th^coiiect 
 and sent to the Messenians of Naupactus for others; he siciiyVnd 
 
 then passed over to the mainland of Acarnania, and * end rein - 
 r . forcements 
 
 touched at Alyzia and Anactonum c , which were at that to Naupac¬ 
 tus. 
 
 a Cp. iii. 113 fin. b Cp. vii. 26. c Cp. iv. 49 ; v. 30 med. 
 
50 6 DESTRUCTION OF SYRACUSAN ALLIES. 
 
 VII. time occupied by the Athenians. While he was in 
 those regions he met Eurymedon returning from Sicily, 
 whither he had been sent during the winter in charge of 
 the money which had been voted to the army a ; he re¬ 
 ported, among other things, the capture of Plemmyrium 
 by the Syracusans, of which he had heard on his voyage 
 home. Conon too, the governor of Naupactus, brought 
 word that the twenty-five Corinthian ships b which were 
 stationed on the opposite coast were still showing a 
 hostile front, and clearly meant to fight. He requested 
 the generals to send him reinforcements, since his own 
 ships—eighteen in number—were not able to give battle 
 against the twenty-five of the enemy. Demosthenes 
 and Eurymedon sent ten ships, the swiftest which they 
 had, to the fleet at Naupactus, while they themselves 
 completed the muster of the expedition. Eurymedon, 
 sailing to Corcyra, ordered the Corcyraeans to man 
 fifteen ships, and himself levied a number of hoplites. 
 He had turned back from his homeward voyage, and was 
 now holding the command, to which, in conjunction with 
 Demosthenes, he had been appointed. Demosthenes 
 meanwhile had been collecting slingers and javelin-men 
 in the neighbourhood of Acarnania. 
 
 32. The ambassadors from Syracuse who had gone to the 
 Part of the cities of Sicily after the taking of Plemmyrium, and had 
 mentssent persuaded them to join in the war, were now about to 
 of Skiiy tl6S bring back the army which they had collected. Nicias, 
 are^de- CUSe having previous information, sent word to the Sicel 
 stroyed allies of Athens who commanded the road, such as the 
 buscadeby Centoripes and Alicyaei, and told them not to let the 
 ames ofthe forces of the enemy pass, but to unite and stop them; 
 Athenians, there was no likelihood, he said, that they would even 
 think of taking another road, since they were not allowed 
 to go through the country of the Agrigentines. So 
 when the forces of the Sicilian towns were on their way, 
 the Sicels, complying with the request of the Athenians, 
 set an ambush in three divisions, and falling upon them 
 a Cp. vii. 16 fin. b Cp. vii. 17 fin., 19 fin. 
 
 mo 
 
ow 
 
 DEMOSTHENES ON THE COAST OF ITALY. 507 
 
 •C. 413. suddenly when they were off their guard, destroyed VII. 
 
 ' 91 ’ 4 ’ about eight hundred of them, and all the envoys except 
 the Corinthian; he brought the survivors, numbering 
 fifteen hundred, to Syracuse. 
 
 About the same time arrived a reinforcement from 33 - 
 Camarina 3 of five hundred hoplites, three hundred javelin- Rein force- 
 men, and three hundred archers. The Geloans also sent Camarina 
 five ships with four hundred javelin-men and two hundred Nearly the 
 horsemen. Hitherto the Sicilian cities had only watched Sciiyunites 
 the course of events, but now the whole island, with ^u inst the 
 
 \ J Athenians. 
 
 the exception of Agrigentum, which was neutral, united 
 with the Syracusans against the Athenians. 
 
 After their misfortune in the Sicel country, the Syra- The Athe- 
 cusans deferred their intended attack for a time. The cross^to 
 forces which Demosthenes and Eurymedon had collected ^hey^re 
 from Corcyra and the mainland were now ready, and received 
 
 J J at Thurii, 
 
 they passed over the Ionian Sea to the promontory of where they 
 
 Iapygia. Proceeding onwards, they touched at the review. 
 Iapygian islands called Choerades, and took on board 
 a hundred and fifty Iapygian javelin-men of the Mes- 
 sapian tribe. After renewing an ancient friendship with 
 Artas, a native prince who had furnished the javelin^ 
 men, they went on to Metapontium in Italy. They 
 persuaded the Metapontians, who were their allies, to 
 let them have two triremes and three hundred javelin- 
 men; these they took with them and sailed to Thurii. 
 
 At Thurii they found that the party opposed to the 
 Athenians had just been driven out by a revolution. 
 
 Wishing to hold another muster and inspection of their 
 whole army, and to be sure that no one was missing, 
 they remained there for some time. They also did their 
 best to gain the hearty co-operation of the Thurians, 
 and to effect an offensive and defensive alliance with 
 them, now that they had succeeded in expelling the 
 anti-Athenian party. 
 
 About the same time the Peloponnesians in their fleet 34. 
 
 of twenty-five ships, which was stationed opposite the indecisive 
 J 1 naval action 
 
 a Cp. vi. 88 init. 
 
508 sea-fight off the coast of achaia. 
 
 VII. 
 
 in the 
 Corinthian 
 gulf be¬ 
 tween the 
 Corinthians 
 and the 
 Athenians. 
 The former 
 greatly 
 assisted by 
 an improve¬ 
 ment in the 
 structure of 
 their ships. 
 
 Athenian fleet at Naupactus to protect the passage of 
 the merchant-vessels going to Sicily, made ready for 
 action. They manned some additional ships, which 
 raised their number nearly to that of the Athenians, 
 and anchored at Erineus of Achaia, which is in the 
 territory of Rhypae. The bay in which they were 
 stationed has the form of a crescent, and the infantry of 
 the Corinthians and of the allies, which had come from 
 the country on both sides to co-operate with the fleet, 
 was disposed on the projecting promontories. The 
 ships, which were under the command of Polyanthes 
 the Corinthian, formed a close line between the two 
 points. The Athenians sailed out against them from 
 Naupactus with thirty-three ships, under the command 
 of Diphilus. For a while the Corinthians remained 
 motionless; in due time the signal was raised and they 
 rushed upon the Athenians and engaged with them. 
 The battle was long and obstinate. Three Corinthian 
 ships were destroyed. The Athenians had no ships 
 absolutely sunk, but about seven of them were rendered 
 useless ; for they were struck full in front by the beaks 
 of the Corinthian vessels, which had the projecting 
 beams of their prows designedly built thicker, and their 
 bows were stoven in. The engagement was undecided 
 and both sides claimed the victory; but the Athenians 
 gained possession of the wrecks because the wind blew 
 them towards the open sea and the Corinthians did not 
 put out again. So the two fleets parted. There was 
 no pursuit, nor were any prisoners taken on either side. 
 For the Corinthians and Peloponnesians were fighting 
 close to the land and thus their crews escaped, while 
 on the Athenian side no ship was sunk. As soon as 
 the Athenians had returned to Naupactus the Corin¬ 
 thians set up a trophy, insisting that they were the 
 victors, because they had disabled more of the enemy’s 
 ships than the enemy of theirs. They refused to ac¬ 
 knowledge defeat on the same ground which made 
 the Athenians unwilling to claim the victory. For the 
 
 PQO 
 
Otd 
 
 SECOND ENGAGEMENT IN THE HARBOUR. 509 
 
 .c. 413. Corinthians considered themselves conquerors, if they VII. 
 
 L 911 4 * were not severely defeated ; but the Athenians thought 
 that they were defeated because they had not gained a 
 signal victory. When however the Peloponnesians had 
 sailed away and the land-army was dispersed, the Athe¬ 
 nians raised another trophy in Achaia, at a distance of 
 about two miles and a quarter from the Corinthian station 
 at Erineus. Such was the result of the engagement. 
 
 Demosthenes and Eurymedon, when the Thurians had 35 * 
 determined to help them, and had furnished seven hun- T he T h . u “ 
 
 L nans join 
 
 dred hoplites and three hundred javelin-men, commanded the Athe- 
 the ships to sail towards the territory of Crotona, and The Athe- 
 themselves, after holding a review of all their infantry at ai^army 
 the river Sybaris, led them through the territory of ]^e i^an 
 Thurii. On their arrival at the river Hylias the people coasts to 
 of Crotona sent to them, and said that they could not Rheglum ‘ 
 allow the army to march through their country. So 
 they directed their march down to the sea and passed 
 the night at the mouth of the river, where they were met 
 by their ships. On the following day they re-embarked 
 the army and coasted along, touching at the cities which 
 they passed, with the exception of Locri a , until they came 
 to the promontory of Petra near Rhegium. 
 
 The Syracusans, hearing of their approach, desired to 36. 
 have another trial of the fleet, and to use the army which The s Y ra - 
 
 ‘. cusans 
 
 they had collected with the express purpose of bringing make pre- 
 on an engagement before Demosthenes and Eurymedon for another 
 arrived in Sicily. Profiting by the experience which they xhey S ado P t 
 had acquired in the last sea-fight, they devised several 
 improvements in the construction of their vessels. They tion of 
 
 111 flattening 
 
 cut down and strengthened the prows, and also made t he prows 
 the beams which projected from them thicker ; these sJipsTnd 
 latter they supported underneath with stays of timber ^g 6a gg hen " 
 extending from the beams through the sides of the ship projecting 
 
 & . . , beams, 
 
 a length of nine feet within and nine without, after the a device 
 fashion in which the Corinthians had refitted their prows ^the 11 ^ 
 before they fought with the squadron from Naupactus. narrow 
 a Cp. vi. 44 med. 
 
510 IMPROVED FORM OF SYRACUSAN SHIPS. 
 
 VII. For the Syracusans hoped thus to gain an advantage 
 s P^ c e, m over the Athenian ships, which were not constructed to 
 Athenians resist their improvements, but had their prows slender, 
 room to because they were in the habit of rowing round an 
 amT^The’ en e m y and striking the side of his vessel instead of 
 sknurftheir mee ^^ n S him prow to prow. The plan would be the 
 own pilots, more effectual, because they were going to fight in the 
 Great Harbour, where many ships would be crowded in 
 a narrow space. They would charge full in face, and 
 presenting their own massive and solid beaks would 
 stave in the hollow and weak forepart of their enemies’ 
 ships a ; while the Athenians, confined as they were, 
 would not be able to wheel round them or break their 
 line before striking, to which manoeuvres they mainly 
 trusted—the want of room would make the one im¬ 
 possible, and the Syracusans themselves would do their 
 best to prevent the other. What had hitherto been con¬ 
 sidered a defect of skill on the part of their pilots, the 
 practice of striking beak to beak, would now be a great 
 advantage, to which they would have constant recourse; 
 for the Athenians, when forced to back water, could only 
 retire towards the land, which was too near, and of which 
 but a small part, that is to say, their own encampment, 
 was open to them. The Syracusans would be masters 
 of the rest of the harbour, and, if the Athenians were 
 hard pressed at any point, they would all be driven 
 together into one small spot, where they would run foul 
 of one another and fall into confusion. (Which proved to 
 be the case; for nothing was more disastrous to the 
 Athenians in all these sea-fights than the impossibility 
 of retreating, as the Syracusans could, to any part of the 
 harbour.) Again, while they themselves had command 
 of the outer sea and could charge from it and back water 
 into it whenever they pleased, the Athenians would be 
 unable to sail into the open and turn before striking b ; 
 besides, Plemmyrium was hostile to them, and the mouth 
 of the harbour was narrow. 
 
 a Omitting the comma at avro'is. b Cp. ii. 91 med. 
 
 PQO 
 
O to 
 
 C. 413. 
 • 91, 4. 
 
 ATTACK BY SEA AND LAND. 511 
 
 Having thus adapted their plans to the degree of VII. 
 naval skill and strength which they possessed, the Syra- 37. 
 cusans, greatly encouraged by the result of the previous Gyiippus 
 engagement, attacked the Athenians both by sea and Tand-forces 
 land. A little before the fleet sailed forth, Gyiippus led Athenian 6 
 the land-forces out of the city against that part of the line ^ and 
 Athenian wall which faced Syracuse, while some of the time eighty 
 heavy-armed troops, which together with the cavalry siups'sSi' 
 and light infantry were stationed at the Olympieum, deniy^they 
 approached the lines of the enemy from the opposite are met ]?y 
 
 A 1 J 11 seventy-five 
 
 side. Nearly at the same instant the ships of the Syra- Athenian 
 cusans and their allies sailed out. The Athenians at first ships ' 
 thought that they were going to make an attempt by 
 land only, but when they saw the ships suddenly bearing 
 down upon them they were disconcerted. Some mounted 
 the walls or prepared to meet their assailants in front of 
 them; others went out against the numerous cavalry and 
 javelin-men, who were hastening from the Olympieum 
 and the outer side of the wall; others manned the ships 
 or prepared to fight on the beach. When the crews had 
 got on board they sailed out with seventy-five ships ; 
 the number of Syracusan ships being about eighty. 
 
 During a great part of the day the two fleets continued 38. 
 advancing and retreating and skirmishing with one Slight result 
 another. Neither was able to gain any considerable first day’s 
 advantage, only the Syracusans sank one or two ships 5 fidas i re- 
 of the Athenians ; so they parted, and at the same time ^ips and 
 the infantry retired from the walls. On the following P lace £ am 
 day the Syracusans remained quiet and gave no sign vessels so 
 of what they meant to do next. Seeing how close the tect°them if 
 conflict had been, Nicias expected another attack; he defeated - 
 therefore compelled the trierarchs to repair their ships 
 wherever they were injured, and anchored merchant- 
 vessels in front of the palisades which the Athenians 
 had driven into the sea so as to form a kind of dock for 
 the protection of their own ships ; these he placed at a 
 distance of about two hundred feet from one another, in 
 order that any ship which was hard-pressed might have 
 
VII. 
 
 39 - 
 
 The second 
 day is 
 wearing 
 away with¬ 
 out a serious 
 engage¬ 
 ment, 
 when the 
 Syracusans 
 retire and 
 take their 
 midday 
 meal on 
 the beach. 
 
 40. 
 
 They sqon 
 return,to 
 the great 
 surprise 
 of the 
 Athenians, 
 who are 
 now com¬ 
 pelled to 
 charge and 
 fight. 
 
 512 THE BATTLE RENEWED ON THE NEXT DA V. 
 
 a safe retreat and an opportunity of going out again at 
 leisure. These preparations occupied the Athenians for 
 a whole day from morning to night. 
 
 On the next day, in the same manner as before but 
 at an earlier hour, the Syracusans attacked the Athenians 
 both by sea and land. Again the ships faced one an¬ 
 other, and again a great part of the day was passed in 
 skirmishing. At length Ariston the son of Pyrrhichus, 
 a Corinthian, who was the ablest pilot in the Syracusan 
 fleet, persuaded the commanders to send a message to 
 the proper authorities in the city desiring them to have 
 the market transferred as quickly as possible to the 
 shore, and to compel any one who had food for sale to 
 bring his whole stock thither. The sailors would thus 
 be enabled to disembark and take their midday meal 
 close to the ships ; and so after a short interval they 
 might, without waiting until the next day, renew the 
 attack upon the Athenians when least expected. 
 
 The generals, agreeing to the proposal, sent the 
 message, and the market was brought down to the 
 shore. Suddenly the Syracusans backed water and 
 rowed towards the city; then disembarking they at 
 once took their meal on the spot. The Athenians, 
 regarding their retreat as a confession of defeat, dis¬ 
 embarked at leisure, and among other matters set about 
 preparing their own meal, taking for granted that there 
 would be no more fighting that day. Suddenly the 
 Syracusans manned their ships and again bore down 
 upon them; the Athenians, in great disorder and most 
 of them fasting, hurried on board, and with considerable 
 difficulty got under weigh. For some time the two 
 fleets looked at one another, and did not engage; after 
 a while the Athenians thought they had better not delay 
 until they had fairly tired themselves out, but attack at 
 once. So, cheering on one another, they charged and 
 fought. The Syracusans remained firm, and meeting 
 the enemy prow to prow, as they had resolved, stove in 
 by the strength of their beaks a great part of the bows 
 
 mo 
 
ttO 
 
 •C. 4 * 3 - 
 1 . 91. 4 - 
 
 VICTORY OF THE SYRACUSANS. 513 
 
 of the Athenian ships. Their javelin-men on the decks VII. 
 greatly injured the enemy. Still more mischief was 
 done by Syracusans who rowed about in light boats and 
 dashed in upon the blades of the enemy’s oars, or ran up 
 alongside and threw darts at the sailors. 
 
 • By such expedients as these the Syracusans, who 41. 
 made a great effort, gained the victory; and the Athe- The Athe¬ 
 nians, retreating between the merchant-vessels, took defeated 6 
 refuge at their own moorings. The ships of the enemy tothd^™ 
 pursued them as far as the entrance, but they were 
 prevented from following further by leaden dolphins, loss of 
 which were suspended aloft from beams placed in the Two Syra-' 
 merchant-vessels. Two Syracusan ships, in the exulta- vessels 
 tion of victory, approached too near and were disabled ; {°o°ctoseiy 
 one of them was taken with its whole crew. The Syra- are caught 
 
 in the en- 
 
 cusans damaged many of the Athenian ships and sank trance to 
 seven; the crews were either killed or taken prisoners. the dock ’ 
 They then retired and raised trophies of the two sea- 
 fights. They were now quite confident that they were 
 not only equal but far superior to the Athenians at 
 sea, and they hoped to gain the victory on land as 
 well. So they prepared to renew the attack on both 
 elements. 
 
 But in the midst of their preparations Demosthenes 42. 
 and Eurymedon arrived with the Athenian reinforce- While the 
 
 J m byracusans 
 
 ments. They brought a fleet, including foreign ships, of are making 
 
 about seventy-three sail, carrying five thousand heavy uon^for 
 infantry of their own and of their allies, numerous javelin- ^ e c s £ De _ 
 men, slingers, and archers, both Hellenic and Barbarian, mosthenes 
 
 ’ 0 e arrives. 
 
 and abundant supplies of every kind. The Syracusans Being 
 and their allies were in consternation. It seemed to to strike 
 them as if their perils would never have an end when aumce^he 
 they saw, notwithstanding the fortification of Decelea, on 
 
 another army arriving nearly equal to the former, and the Syracu- 
 Athens displaying such exuberant strength; while the waii C by SS 
 first Athenian army regained a certain degree of confi- E^eius! 6 
 dence after their disasters. Demosthenes at once saw 
 how matters stood; he knew that there was no time to 
 L 1 
 
VII. 
 
 43- 
 
 Failure of 
 an attempt 
 to take 
 the wall 
 in front. 
 
 514 ARRIVAL OF DEMOSTHENES . 
 
 be lost, and resolved that it should not be with him as it 
 had been with Nicias. For Nicias was dreaded at his 
 first arrival, but when, instead of at once laying siege to 
 Syracuse, he passed the winter at Catana, he fell into 
 contempt, and his delay gave Gylippus time to come 
 with an army from Peloponnesus. Whereas if he had 
 struck hard at first, the Syracusans would never even 
 have thought of getting fresh troops; strong in their 
 own self-sufficiency, they would have recognised their 
 inferiority only when the city had been actually in¬ 
 vested, and then, if they had sent for reinforcements, 
 they would have found them useless. Demosthenes, 
 reflecting on all this, and aware that he too would never 
 again be in a position to inspire such terror as on the 
 day of his arrival, desired to take the speediest advan¬ 
 tage of the panic caused by the appearance of his army. 
 Accordingly, seeing that the cross-wall of the Syracusans 
 which had prevented the Athenians from investing them 
 was but a single line, and that if he could gain the com¬ 
 mand of the way up to Epipolae and take the camp 
 which was on the high ground the wall would be easily 
 captured, for no one would remain to withstand them, 
 he resolved to make the attempt at once. This would 
 be the shortest way of putting an end to the war. If 
 he succeeded, Syracuse would fall into his hands; if he 
 failed, he meant to bring away the expedition; he would 
 no longer wear out the Athenian army, and weaken the 
 state to no purpose. 
 
 The Athenians began by ravaging the fields of the 
 Syracusans about the Anapus, and regained their former 
 superiority both by sea and land. At sea the Syracusans 
 no longer opposed them; and on land they merely sent 
 out parties of cavalry and javelin-men from the Olym- 
 pieum. 
 
 Before he attacked Epipolae, Demosthenes wished to 
 try what could be effected with engines against the 
 counter-wall. But the engines which he brought up 
 were burnt by the enemy, who fought from the wall, 
 
 P 3 0 
 
no 
 
 NIGHT ATTACK ON EPIPO.LAE. 
 
 *c. 413- and, after making assaults at several points, the Athe- 
 ’ 91 ' 4 ‘ nian forces were repulsed. He now determined to delay 
 no longer, and persuaded Nicias and his colleagues to 
 carry out the plan of attacking Epipolae. To approach 
 during the daytime and ascend the heights undetected 
 appeared to be impossible; so he resolved to attack by 
 night. He ordered provisions for five days, and took 
 with him all the masons and carpenters in the army; 
 also a supply of arrows and of the various implements 
 which would be required for siege-works if he were 
 victorious. About the first watch he, Eurymedon, and 
 Menander led out the whole army and marched towards 
 Epipolae. Nicias was left in the Athenian fortifications. 
 Reaching Epipolae at the Euryelus, where their first 
 army had originally ascended a , and advancing undis¬ 
 covered by the garrison to the fort which the Syracusans 
 had there erected, they took it and killed some of the 
 guards. But the greater number made good their escape 
 and carried the news to the three fortified camps, one 
 of the Syracusans, one of the other Sicilians, and one of 
 the allies, which had been formed on Epipolae; they 
 also gave the alarm to the six hundred who were an 
 advanced guard stationed on this part of Epipolae b . 
 They hastened to the rescue, but Demosthenes and the 
 Athenians came upon them and, in spite of a vigorous 
 resistance, drove them back. The Athenians imme¬ 
 diately pressed forward; they were determined not to 
 lose a moment or to slacken their onset until they had 
 accomplished their purpose. Others took the first part 
 of the Syracusan counter-wall and began to drag off 
 the battlements; the guards ran away. Meanwhile the 
 Syracusans, the allies, and Gylippus with his own troops, 
 were hurrying from the outworks. The boldness of this 
 night attack quite amazed them. They had not re¬ 
 covered from their terror when they met the Athenians, 
 who were at first too strong for them and drove them 
 back. But now the conquerors, in the confidence of 
 a Cp. vi. 97 med. b Cp. vi. 96 fin. 
 
 L 1 % 
 
 Leaving 
 Nicias in 
 the camp, 
 Demos¬ 
 thenes 
 proceeds 
 before mid¬ 
 night by 
 way of the 
 Euryelus 
 with his 
 army to 
 ascend Epi¬ 
 polae ; he 
 takes the 
 first fort 
 and drives 
 back Gylip¬ 
 pus and 
 his troops, 
 who are 
 amazed at 
 the sudden 
 onset. 
 
 The Athe¬ 
 nians are 
 hurrying 
 forward 
 when they 
 are met 
 by the 
 Boeotians 
 and put to 
 flight. 
 
516 
 
 VICTORY ENDING IN DEFEAT. 
 
 VII. 
 
 44 - 
 
 All now 
 
 becomes 
 
 confusion. 
 
 Those 
 
 behind 
 
 press on 
 
 those 
 
 before, 
 
 who are 
 
 already 
 
 turning 
 
 back. 
 
 The moon¬ 
 light, the 
 dense 
 
 masses, the 
 narrow 
 space, the 
 watchword, 
 the Paean, 
 contribute 
 to the rout. 
 Friends 
 attack 
 friends. 
 Many throw 
 themselves 
 from the 
 cliffs, leav¬ 
 ing their 
 arms be¬ 
 hind; others 
 miss their 
 way in the 
 dark and 
 are cut off. 
 
 victory, began to advance in less order; they wanted RC. 413. 
 to force their way as quickly as they could through all ‘ 9Ij 4 ’ 
 that part of the enemy which had not yet fought, and 
 they were afraid that if they relaxed their efforts the 
 Syracusans might rally. The Boeotians were the first 
 to make a stand: they attacked the Athenians, turned, 
 and put them to flight. 
 
 The whole army now fell into utter disorder, and the 
 perplexity was so great that from neither side could the 
 particulars of the conflict be exactly ascertained. In 
 the daytime the combatants see more clearly; though 
 even then only what is going on immediately around 
 them, and that imperfectly—nothing of the battle as a 
 whole. But in a night engagement, like this in which 
 two great armies fought—the only one of the kind which 
 occurred during the war—who could be certain of any¬ 
 thing ? The moon was bright, and they saw before them, 
 as men naturally would in the moonlight, the figures of 
 one another, but were unable to distinguish with cer¬ 
 tainty who was friend or foe. Large bodies of heavy¬ 
 armed troops, both Athenian and Syracusan, were moving 
 about in a narrow space; of the Athenians some were 
 already worsted, while others, still unconquered, were 
 carrying on the original movement. A great part of 
 their army had not yet engaged, but either had just 
 mounted the heights, or were making the ascent; and no 
 one knew which way to go. For in front they were de¬ 
 feated already; there was nothing but confusion, and all 
 distinction between the two armies was lost by reason of 
 the noise. The victorious Syracusans and their allies, 
 who had no other means of communication in the dark¬ 
 
 ness, cheered on their comrades with loud cries as they 
 received the onset of their assailants. The Athenians 
 were looking about for each other; and every one who 
 met them, though he might be a friend who had turned 
 and fled, they imagined to be an enemy. They kept 
 constantly asking the watchword (for there was no other 
 mode of knowing one another), and thus they not only 
 
o w 
 
 THE ATHENIANS ARE DRIVEN BACK. 517 
 
 E- 413. caused great confusion among themselves by all asking VII. 
 
 ‘ 9I * 4 * at once, but revealed the word to the enemy. The watch¬ 
 word of the Syracusans was not so liable to be discovered, 
 because being victorious they kept together and were more 
 easily recognised. So that when they were encountered 
 by a superior number of the enemy they, knowing the 
 Athenian watchword, escaped; but the Athenians in a like 
 case, failing to answer the challenge, were killed. Most 
 disastrous of all were the mistakes caused by the sound 
 of the Paean, which, the same being heard in both armies, 
 was a great source of perplexity. For there were in the 
 battle Argives, Corcyraeans, and other Dorian allies of 
 the Athenians, and when they raised the Paean they 
 inspired as much alarm as the enemy themselves; so 
 that in many parts of the army, when the confusion had 
 once begun, not only did friends terrify friends and 
 citizens their fellow-citizens, but they attacked one an¬ 
 other, and were with difficulty disentangled. The greater 
 number of those who were pursued and killed perished 
 by throwing themselves from the cliffs; for the descent 
 from Epipolae is by a narrow path. The fugitives who 
 reached the level ground, especially those who had 
 served in the former army and knew the neighbourhood, 
 mostly escaped to the camp. But of the newly-arrived 
 many missed their way, and, wandering about until day¬ 
 break, were then cut off by the Syracusan cavalry who 
 were scouring the country. 
 
 On the following day the Syracusans erected two 45. 
 trophies, one on Epipolae at the summit of the ascent, Syracusans 
 the other at the spot where the Boeotians made the trophies? 
 first stand. The Athenians received their dead undfcr a Jh^deaT 
 flag of truce. A considerable number of them and of taken - 
 their allies had fallen ; there were however more arms 
 taken than there were bodies of the slain ; for those who 
 were compelled to leap from the heights, whether they 
 perished or not, had thrown away their shields.. 
 
 The confidence of the Syracusans was restored by 46. 
 their unexpected success, and they sent Sicanus with Encouraged 
 
 by their 
 
518 DEMOSTHENES PROPOSES TO DEPART. 
 
 VII. fifteen ships to Agrigentum, then in a state of revolution, b.c. 413 
 success the that he might win over the place if he could. Gylippus ' 9I ' 4 
 
 Syracusans ° . . 
 
 seek for the had gone off again by land to collect a new army in the 
 aidinSicfiy. other parts of Sicily, hoping after the victory of Epipolae 
 In attS^pt 6 to carry the Athenian fortifications by storm, 
 gentiun" Meanwhile the Athenian generals, troubled by their 
 recent defeat and the utter discouragement which pre- 
 Athenian va il e d i n the army, held a council of war. They saw 
 council of that their attempts all failed, and that the soldiers were 
 
 war. \ ii*i 
 
 There is weary of remaining. For they were distressed by sick- 
 the camp n ness, proceeding from two causes : the season of the year 
 soldiers are w as that in which men are most liable to disease; and 
 Demos ed ’ place in which they were encamped was damp 
 thenes votes and unhealthy. And they felt that the situation was 
 diatTde- in every way hopeless. Demosthenes gave his voice 
 parture. against remaining ; he said that the decisive attack upon 
 Epipolae had failed, and, in accordance with his original 
 intention, he should vote for immediate departure, while 
 the voyage was possible, and while with the help of the 
 ships which had recently joined them they had the 
 upper hand at any rate by sea. It was more expedient 
 for the city that they should make war upon the Pelo¬ 
 ponnesians, who were raising a fort in Attica, than 
 against the Syracusans, whom they could now scarcely 
 
 hope to conquer; and there was no sense in carrying on 
 the siege at a vast expense and with no result. This 
 was the opinion of Demosthenes. 
 
 Nicias in his own mind took the same gloomy view of 
 Nidas, who their affairs; but he did not wish openly to confess their 
 swayed^by weakness, or by a public vote given in a numerous 
 from^yra- 1 assem My to let their intention reach the enemy’s ears, 
 cuse, is and so to lose the advantage of departing secretly when- 
 ownmind ever they might choose to go. Pie had moreover still 
 But e in ded ’ some reason to suppose that the Syracusans, of whose 
 refuses^to condition he was better informed than the other generals, 
 They will were likely to be worse off than themselves if they would 
 be censured only persevere in the siege; they would be worn out by 
 and even the exhaustion of their resources ; and now the Athe- 
 
GQO. 
 
 • C. 413. 
 1 . 9 i» 4 - 
 
 DOUBTS AND FEATS OF NICIAS. 519 
 
 nians with their additional ships had much greater com¬ 
 mand of the sea, There was a party in Syracuse itself 
 which wanted to surrender the city to the Athenians, 
 and they kept sending messages to Nicias and advising 
 him not to depart. Having this information he was still 
 wavering and considering, and had not made up his 
 mind. But in addressing the council he positively 
 refused to withdraw the army; he knew, he said, that 
 the Athenian people would not forgive their departure if 
 they left without an order from home. The men upon 
 whose votes their fate would depend would not, like 
 themselves, have seen with their own eyes the state of 
 affairs ; they would only have heard the criticisms of 
 others, and would be convinced by any accusations which 
 a clever speaker might bring forward a . Indeed many 
 or most of the very soldiers who were now crying out 
 that their case was desperate would raise the opposite 
 cry when they reached home, and would say that the 
 generals were traitors, and had been bribed to depart; 
 and therefore he, knowing the tempers of the Athenians, 
 b would for his own part rather take his chance and fall, 
 if he must, alone by the hands of the enemy,' than 
 die b unjustly on a dishonourable charge at the hands 
 of the Athenians. And, after all, the Syracusans were 
 in a condition worse than their own; for they had to 
 maintain mercenary troops; they were spending money 
 on garrisons, and had now kept up a large navy for a 
 whole year ; already in great difficulties, they would soon 
 be in greater; they had expended two thousand talents 0 , 
 and were heavily in debt; the whole of their large 
 army had to be fed, and if there were any lack of pro¬ 
 visions their affairs would be ruined. For they depended 
 on mercenaries, who, unlike the Athenian allies, were 
 under no compulsion to serve. Therefore he said they 
 
 a Cp. iii. 38 med. 
 
 b Or ‘ would for his own part rather take his chance, and fall, 
 if he must, by the hands of the enemy, like any private soldier, 
 than die.’ 0 
 
 VII. 
 
 accused of 
 treason by 
 their own 
 soldiers. 
 Better to 
 die at the 
 hands of 
 enemies 
 than of 
 friends. 
 
 And the 
 Syracusans, 
 in debt and 
 dependent 
 on mercen¬ 
 aries, are 
 worse off 
 than them¬ 
 selves. 
 
520 
 
 NIC I AS REFUSES TO DEPART. 
 
 VII. ought to persevere in the siege, and not go away a dis¬ 
 heartened by the greatness of the expense, for they 
 were far richer than the enemy a . 
 
 49 * Nicias spoke thus decidedly because he knew exactly 
 Demos- how matters stood in Syracuse ; he was aware of their 
 Eurymedon want of money, and of the secret existence of that party 
 insist that within the walls which wished well to the Athenians, and 
 tionThaii 1 " was continually sending word to him not to depart; and 
 leave Syra- ^h e confidence in his navy, if not in his army, which now 
 encamp possessed him was greater than ever. But Demosthenes 
 but they ' would not hear for an instant of persisting in the siege ; 
 hesitate^ 5 ifj he said, the army must remain and ought not to be 
 thaTXcias removed without a vote of the assembly, then they should 
 has some retire to Thapsus or Catana, whence they might overrun 
 reason for the whole country with their land-forces, maintaining 
 remaining, themselves at the expense of the enemy and doing him 
 great damage. They would thus fight their battles, not 
 cooped up in the harbour, which gave an advantage to 
 the enemy, but in the open sea, where their skill would 
 be available and their charges and retreats would not be 
 circumscribed by the narrow space which now hampered 
 their movements whenever they had to put in or out. In 
 a word, he wholly disapproved of the Athenians con¬ 
 tinuing in their present position ; they should with all 
 speed break up the siege and be gone. Eurymedon took 
 the same side. Still Nicias resisted; there was delay 
 and hesitation, and a suspicion that he might have some 
 ground which they did not know for his unwillingness 
 to yield. And so the Athenians stayed on where they 
 were. 
 
 5 °* Meanwhile Gylippus and Sicanus returned to Syracuse, 
 returnswith Sicanus h a d not succeeded in his design upon Agrigen- 
 reinforce- turn; for while he was at Gela on his way the party inclined 
 
 ments. •iir- J r j 
 
 Failure of to friendship with the Syracusans had been driven out. 
 desfgnon 11 Gylippus brought back a large army, together with the 
 Agrigen- hoplites who had been sent in merchant-vessels from Pelo- 
 
 a Or, ‘ disheartened at the idea of the enemy’s riches; for they 
 were far richer themselves.’ 
 
 ow 
 
CQO 
 
 ECLIPSE OF THE MOON. 
 
 521 
 
 c. 413. ponnesus in the spring a , and had come by way of Libya to VII. 
 
 ” 9I * 4 * Selinus. They had been driven to Libya by stress of ^ d p 2 i^ ures 
 weather, and the Cyrenaeans had given them two triremes ponnesian 
 and pilots. On their voyage they had made common cause their way 
 with the Evesperitae, who were besieged by the Libyans. ^h^Syra- 
 After defeating the Libyans they sailed on to Neapolis, cusanspre- 
 
 0 J # / r j p are a new 
 
 a Carthaginian factory which is the nearest point to attack. 
 Sicily, the passage taking two days and a night only nian gene- 
 thence they crossed and came to Selinus. On their agree°to 
 arrival, the Syracusans immediately prepared to renew ^en the 
 their attack upon the Athenians, both by land and sea. moon is 
 And the Athenian generals, seeing that their enemy had Nicaas and 
 been reinforced by a new army, and that their own affairs, Jefuse 1 ^ 3 
 instead of improving, were daily growing worse in every stir * 
 respect, and being especially troubled by the sickness of 
 their troops, repented that they had not gone before. 
 
 Even Nicias now no longer objected, but only made the 
 condition that there should be no open voting. So, 
 maintaining such secrecy as they could, they gave orders 
 for the departure of the expedition ; the men were to 
 prepare themselves against a given signal. The prepara¬ 
 tions were made and they were on the point of sailing, 
 when the moon, being just then at the full, was eclipsed. 
 
 The mass of the army was greatly moved, and called 
 upon the generals to remain. Nicias himself, who was 
 too much under the influence of divination and omens, 
 refused even to discuss the question of their removal until 
 they had remained thrice nine days, as the soothsayers 
 prescribed. This was the reason why the departure of 
 the Athenians was finally delayed. 
 
 And now the Syracusans, having heard what had 51. 
 
 happened, were more eager than ever to prosecute the The Syra- 
 
 rr , , . r it a .li cusans de- 
 
 war to the end ; they saw in the intention of the Athe- termine not 
 nians to depart a confession that they were no longer eneSiesgo. 
 superior to themselves, either by sea or land ; and they J t ^ k a 2* in 
 did not want them to settle down in some other part of Athenians 
 Sicily where they would be more difficult to manage, a small 
 
522 
 
 DEATH OF EURYMEDON. 
 
 VII. 
 
 them withii 
 their lines. 
 
 52. 
 
 Third sea- 
 fight in the 
 harbour. 
 Eurymedon 
 is cut off 
 and the 
 Athenians 
 are de¬ 
 feated. 
 
 53 - 
 
 The defeat 
 is partially- 
 compen¬ 
 sated by an 
 advantage 
 which the 
 Tyrrhe¬ 
 nians and 
 Athenians 
 gain over 
 Gylippus 
 near the 
 marsh. 
 
 The fire¬ 
 ship fails. 
 
 but sought to compel them forthwith to fight at sea 
 1 under the disadvantages of their present position. So 
 they manned their ships and exercised for as many days 
 as they thought sufficient. When the time came they 
 began by attacking the Athenian lines. A small number 
 both of the hoplites and of the cavalry came out of 
 some of the gates to meet them; they cut off however 
 a portion of the hoplites, and, putting the whole body 
 to flight, drove them within their walls. The entrance 
 was narrow, and the Athenians lost seventy horses and 
 a few infantry. 
 
 The Syracusan army then retired. On the morrow 
 their ships, in number seventy-six, sailed forth, and 
 at the same time their land-forces marched against 
 the walls. The Athenians on their side put out with 
 eighty-six ships ; and the two fleets met and fought. 
 Eurymedon, who commanded the right wing of the 
 Athenians, hoping to surround the enemy, extended 
 his line too far towards the land, and was defeated 
 by the Syracusans, who, after overcoming the Athenian 
 centre, shut him up in the inner bay of the harbour. 
 There he was slain, and the vessels which were under 
 his command and had followed him were destroyed. 
 The Syracusans now pursued and began to drive ashore 
 the rest of the Athenian fleet. 
 
 Gylippus, observing the discomfiture of the enemy, 
 who were being defeated and driven to land beyond their 
 own palisade and the lines of their camp, hastened with 
 a part of his army to the causeway which ran along the 
 harbour, intending to kill all who landed, and to assist 
 the Syracusans in capturing the ships, which could be 
 more easily towed away if the shore was in the hands of 
 their friends. The Tyrrhenians, who guarded this part 
 of the Athenian lines, seeing Gylippus and his forces 
 advance in disorder, rushed out, and attacking the fore¬ 
 most put them to flight, and drove them into the marsh 
 called Lysimeleia. But soon the Syracusans and their 
 allies came up in greater numbers. The Athenians in 
 
ANOTHER ATHENIAN DEFEAT AT SEA . 523 
 
 B.C. 413. 
 01. 91, 4. 
 
 fear for their ships advanced to the support of the VII, 
 Tyrrhenians, and joined in the engagement; the Syra¬ 
 cusans were overcome and pursued, and a few of their 
 heavy-armed slain. Most of the Athenian ships were 
 saved and brought back to the Athenian station. Still 
 the Syracusans and their allies took eighteen, and killed 
 the whole of their crews. Then, hoping to burn the 
 remainder of the fleet, they procured an old merchant- 
 vessel, which they filled with faggots and brands; these 
 they lighted, and as the wind blew right upon the enemy 
 they let the ship go. The Athenians, alarmed for the 
 safety of their fleet, contrived means by which they ex¬ 
 tinguished the flames, and succeeded in keeping the fire¬ 
 ship at a distance. Thus the danger was averted. 
 
 The Syracusans now raised a trophy of their naval 54 * 
 victory, and another marking their interception of the The s y ra " 
 hoplites on the higher ground close to the wall at the raise two 
 place where they took the horses. The Athenians raised th° P Athe- 
 a trophy of the victory over the land-forces whom the 
 Tyrrhenians drove into the marsh, and of that which tro P h y- 
 they had themselves gained with the rest of the army. 
 
 The Syracusans, who up to this time had been afraid 55. 
 of the reinforcements of Demosthenes, had now gained The Athe- 
 a brilliant success by sea as well as by land ; the Athe- despair ; 
 nians were in utter despair. Great was their surprise nevermore 
 at the result, and still greater their regret that they had ^ 6 a ded 
 ever come. The Sicilian were the only cities which democratic 
 
 ...... . and popu- 
 
 they had encountered similar in character to their own a , lous city 
 enjoying the same democratic institutions and strong in own. their 
 ships, cavalry, and population. They were not able by 
 holding out the prospect of a change of government to 
 introduce an element of discord among them which might 
 have gained them over b , nor could they master them 
 c by a c decided superiority of force. They had failed 
 at almost every point, and were already in great straits, 
 when the defeat at sea, which they could not have thought 
 possible, reduced their fortunes to a still lower ebb. 
 
 a Cp. viii. 96 fin. b Cp. vi. 20 init. c Or, ‘by their.’ 
 
524 EXULTATION OF THE SYRACUSANS. 
 
 VII. The Syracusans at once sailed round the shore of the 
 harbour without fear, and determined to close the mouth, 
 TheSyra- that the Athenians might not be able, even if they 
 prepare to wanted, to sail out by stealth. For they were now 
 mouthof skiving, no longer to achieve their own deliverance, but 
 the har- to cut off the escape of the Athenians ; they considered 
 They aspire their position already far superior, as indeed it was, and 
 lead h? the they hoped that if they could conquer the Athenians 
 hberati° n an d their allies by sea and land, their success would be 
 glorious in the eyes of all the Hellenes, who would at 
 once be set free, some from slavery, others from fear. 
 For the Athenians, having lost so much of their power, 
 would never be able to face the enemies who would rise 
 up against them. And the glory of the deliverance 
 would be ascribed to the Syracusans, who would be 
 honoured by all living men and all future ages. a The 
 conflict was still further ennobled by the thought that 
 they were now conquering a , not only the Athenians, but 
 a host of their allies. And they themselves were not 
 alone, but many had come to their support; they were 
 the leaders of a war in which Corinth and Lacedaemon 
 were their partners ; they had offered their own city to 
 bear the brunt of the encounter, and they had made an im¬ 
 mense advance in naval power. More nations met at Syra¬ 
 cuse than ever gathered around any single city, although 
 not so many as the whole number of nations enrolled in 
 this war under the Athenians and Lacedaemonians. 
 
 57. I will now enumerate the various peoples who came 
 Athenian to Sicily as friends or enemies, to share either in the con- 
 
 ames. . 
 
 quest or in the defence of the country, and who fought 
 before Syracuse b , choosing their side, not so much from 
 a sense of right or from obligations of kinship, as from 
 the accident of compulsion or their own interest. 
 
 (A) In Hei- The Athenians themselves, who were Ionians, went of 
 
 las Proper. 
 
 a Or, taking the words as a reflection, not of the Syracusans, but 
 of Thucydides himself: ‘ And indeed there was everything to 
 ennoble the conflict; for they were now conquering 9 etc. 
 b Adopting the conjecture 'EvpaKovams . 
 
 PQO 
 
FINAL ENUMERATION OF THE FORCES. 525 
 
 B.c. 413. their own free-will against the Syracusans, who were 
 • 9 1 * 4 - j) or i ans . they were followed by the Lemnians and Im- 
 brians, and the then inhabitants of Aegina% and by the 
 Hestiaeans dwelling at Hestiaea in Euboea b : all these 
 were their own colonists, speaking the same language 
 with them, and retaining the same institutions. 
 
 Of the rest who joined in the expedition, some were 
 subjects, others independent allies, some again mercen¬ 
 aries. Of the subjects and tributaries, the Eretrians, 
 Chalcidians, Styreans, and Carystians came from Eu¬ 
 boea ; the Ceans, Andrians, and Tenians from the 
 islands; the Milesians, Samians, and Chians from Ionia. 
 Of these however the Chians 0 were independent, and 
 instead of paying tribute, provided ships. All or nearly 
 all were Ionians and descendants of the Athenians, with 
 the exception of the Carystians, who are Dryopes. 
 They were subjects and constrained to follow, but still 
 they were Ionians fighting against Dorians. There were 
 also Aeolians, namely, the Methymnaeans d , who fur¬ 
 nished ships but were not tributaries, and the Tenedians 
 and Aenians, who paid tribute. These Aeolians were 
 compelled to fight against their Aeolian founders, the 
 Boeotians, who formed part of the Syracusan army. 
 The Plataeans were the only Boeotians opposed to 
 Boeotians; an antagonism which was natural, for they 
 hated one another. The Rhodians and Cytherians were 
 both Dorians ; the Cytherians, although Lacedaemonian 
 colonists, bore arms in the Athenian cause against the 
 Lacedaemonians who came with Gylippus; and the 
 Rhodians, though by descent Argive, were compelled 
 to fight against the Syracusans, who were Dorians, and 
 against the Geloans, who were actually their own 
 colony®, and were taking part with Syracuse. Of the 
 islanders around Peloponnesus, the Cephallenians and Za- 
 cynthians were independent; still, being islanders, they 
 
 VII. 
 
 (i) Their 
 own settlers. 
 
 (ii) Subjects 
 and tribu¬ 
 taries who 
 were (1) 
 Ionians. 
 
 (2) Aeolians, 
 
 partly 
 
 subjects. 
 
 (3) Dorians, 
 kindred 
 against 
 kindred. 
 
 (iii) Allies 
 called 
 indepen¬ 
 dent, who 
 were really 
 
 Cp. ii. 27 med. 
 Cp. vi. 85 med. 
 Cp. vi. 4 med. 
 
 b Cp. i. 114 fin. 
 d Cp. iii. 50 med.; vi. 85 med. 
 f Cp. ii. 7 fin.; vi. 85 med. 
 
VII. 
 
 compelled, 
 
 either (i) 
 
 islanders, 
 
 or (2) cities 
 
 having 
 
 special 
 
 enmities. 
 
 (iv) Volun¬ 
 tary allies. 
 
 (B) Allies 
 in Italy 
 and Sicily, 
 
 5^6 THE ATHENIANS AND THEIR ALLIES . 
 
 followed under a certain degree of constraint; for the 
 Athenians were masters of the sea. The Corcyraeans, 
 who were not only Dorians but actually Corinthians, 
 were serving against Corinthians and Syracusans, al¬ 
 though they were the colonists of the one and the kins¬ 
 men of the other ; they followed under a decent appear¬ 
 ance of compulsion, but gladly, because they hated the 
 Corinthians a . The Messenians too, as the inhabitants 
 of Naupactus were now called, including the garrison of 
 Pylos, which was at that time held by the Athenians, 
 were taken by them to the war. A few Megarians b , 
 having the misfortune to be exiles,, were thus induced 
 to fight against the Selinuntians, who were Megarians 
 like themselves 0 . 
 
 The service of the remaining allies was voluntary. 
 The Argives d , not so much because they were allies 
 of Athens, as because they hated the Lacedaemonians, 
 and individually for the sake of their own immediate 
 advantage, followed the Athenians, who were Ionians, 
 being themselves Dorians, to fight against Dorians. 
 The Mantineans and other Arcadians were mercenaries 
 accustomed to attack any enemy who from time to time 
 might be pointed out to them, and were now ready, if 
 they were paid, to regard the Arcadians, who were in 
 the service of the Corinthians e , as their enemies. The 
 Cretans and Aetolians also served for hire ; the Cretans, 
 who had once joined with the Rhodians in the founda¬ 
 tion of Gela f , came with reluctance; nevertheless for 
 pay they consented to fight against their own colonists. 
 Some of the Acarnanians came to aid their Athenian 
 allies, partly from motives of gain, but much more out of 
 regard for Demosthenes g and good-will to Athens. All 
 these dwelt on the eastern side of the Ionian Gulf. 
 
 Of the Hellenes in Italy, the Thurians and Meta- 
 pontians, compelled by the necessities of a revolutionary 
 
 a Cp. i. 25 med. b Cp. iv. 74; vi. 43 fin. c Cp. vi. 4 init. 
 d Cp. vi. 43. e Cp. vii. 19 fin. 
 
 f Cp. vi. 4 med. 8 Cp. iii. 105 foil.; vii. 31 fin. 
 
 PQO 
 
HO 
 
 THE SYRACUSANS AND THEIR ALLIES. 527 
 
 .c. 413. period, joined in the enterprise; of the Hellenes in VII. 
 
 1 91 ' 4 'Sicily, the Naxians and Catanaeans. Of Barbarians, 
 there were the Egestaeans, who invited the expedition, 
 and the greater part of the Sicels, and, besides native 
 Sicilians, certain Tyrrhenians a who had a quarrel with 
 the Syracusans ; also Iapygians b , who served for hire. 
 
 These were the nations who followed the Athenians. 
 
 The Syracusans, on the other hand, were assisted by 58. 
 the Camarinaeans, who were their nearest neighbours, Syracusan 
 and by the Geloans, who dwelt next beyond them ; and ^ inhabit- 
 then (for the Agrigentines, who came next, were neutral) |J?ny f (i) 
 by the still more distant Selinuntians. All these' in- fro ™ the 
 
 J # southern, 
 
 habited the region of Sicily which lies towards Libya. (2) from the 
 On the side looking towards the Tyrrhenian Gulf the district. 
 Himeraeans, the only Hellenic people in those parts, 
 were also their only allies. These were the Hel¬ 
 lenic peoples in Sicily who fought on the side of the 
 Syracusans; they were Dorians and independent. As 
 for Barbarians, they had only such of the Sicels as had 
 not gone over to the Athenians. 
 
 Of Hellenes who were not inhabitants of Sicily, the (ii) inhabit- 
 Lacedaemonians provided a Spartan general; the Lace- i as Proper, 
 daemonian forces were all Neodamodes and Helots. 
 
 (The meaning of the word Neodamode is freedman.) 
 
 The Corinthians were the only power which furnished 
 both sea and land forces. Their Leucadian and Am- 
 braciot kinsmen accompanied them; from Arcadia came 
 mercenaries sent by Corinth ; there were also Sicyonians 
 who served under compulsion c ; and of the peoples 
 beyond the Peloponnese, the Boeotians.—This external 
 aid however was small compared with the numerous 
 troops of all kinds which the Sicilians themselves sup¬ 
 plied ; for they dwelt in great cities, and had collected 
 many ships and horses and hoplites, besides a vast 
 multitude of other troops. And again, the proportion 
 furnished by the Syracusans themselves was greater 
 
 a Gp. vi. 103 med. b Cp. vii. 33 med. 
 
 c Cp. v. 81 med.; vi. 19 fin. 
 
528 
 
 CLOSING OF THE HARBOUR. 
 
 VII. 
 
 59 - 
 
 These were 
 all. 
 
 The Syra¬ 
 cusans 
 begin to 
 close the 
 harbour. 
 
 60. 
 
 The Athe¬ 
 nians pre¬ 
 pare for 
 a last 
 struggle. 
 They with¬ 
 draw from 
 the higher 
 ground, 
 and deter¬ 
 mine to 
 fight their 
 way out by 
 sea, or if 
 defeated, 
 by land. 
 
 than that of all the rest put together, on account of the B.c. 413. 
 size of the city and the magnitude of their own danger. ' 91 ‘ 4 ' 
 
 Such were the allies who were assembled on both 
 sides. At that time they were all on the spot, and no¬ 
 thing whatever came afterwards to either army. 
 
 The Syracusans and the allies naturally thought that 
 the struggle would be brought to a glorious end if, after 
 having defeated the Athenian fleet, they took captive 
 the whole of their great armament, and did not allow 
 them to escape either by sea or land. So they at once 
 began to close the mouth of the Great Harbour, which 
 was about a mile wide, by means of triremes, merchant- 
 vessels, and small boats, placed broadside, which they 
 moored there. They also made every preparation for 
 a naval engagement, should the Athenians be willing to 
 hazard another; and all their thoughts were on a grand 
 scale. 
 
 The Athenians, seeing the closing of the harbour and 
 inferring the intentions of the enemy, proceeded to hold 
 a council. The generals and officers met and considered 
 the difficulties of their position. The most pressing was 
 the want of food. For they had already sent to Catana, 
 when they intended to depart, and stopped the supplies; 
 and they could get no more unless they recovered the 
 command of the sea. They resolved therefore to quit 
 their lines on the higher ground and to cut off by a 
 cross-wall a space close to their ships, no greater than 
 was absolutely required for their baggage and for their 
 sick ; after leaving a guard there they meant to put on 
 board every other man, and to launch all their ships, 
 whether fit for service or not; they would then fight a 
 decisive battle, and, if they conquered, go to Catana; 
 but if not, they would burn their ships, and retreat by 
 land in good order, taking the nearest way to some 
 friendly country, Barbarian or Hellenic. This design 
 they proceeded to execute, and withdrawing quietly 
 from the upper walls, manned their whole fleet, com¬ 
 pelling every man of any age at all suitable for service 
 
CQQ 
 
 SPEECH OF NIC I AS TO HIS MEN. $2 9 
 
 C. 413. 
 1. 91, 4. 
 
 to embark. The entire number of the ships which they 
 manned was about a hundred and ten. They put on 
 board numerous archers and javelin-men, Acarnanians, 
 and other foreigners, and made such preparations for 
 action as the nature of the plan imposed upon them by 
 their necessities allowed. When all was nearly ready, 
 Nicias, perceiving that the soldiers were depressed by 
 their severe defeat at sea, which was so new an ex¬ 
 perience to them, while at the same time the want of 
 provisions made them impatient to risk a battle with 
 the least possible delay, called his men together, and 
 before they engaged exhorted them as follows:— 
 
 4 Soldiers of Athens and of our allies, we have all the 
 same interest in the coming struggle 11 ; every one of us 
 as well as of our enemies will now have to fight for his 
 life and for his country, and if only we can win in the 
 impending sea-fight, every one may see his native city 
 and his own home once more. But we must not be 
 faint-hearted, nor behave as if we were mere novices in 
 the art of war, who when defeated in their first battle 
 are full of cowardly apprehensions and continually re¬ 
 tain the impress of their disaster. You, Athenians, 
 have had great military experience; and you, allies, are 
 always fighting at our side. Remember the sudden 
 turns of war; let your hope be that fortune herself may 
 yet come over to us ; and prepare to retrieve your de¬ 
 feat in a manner worthy of the greatness of your own 
 army which you see before you b . 
 
 * We have consulted the pilots about any improve¬ 
 ments which seemed likely to avail against the crowding 
 of ships in the narrow harbour, as well as against the 
 troops on the enemy’s decks, which in previous engage¬ 
 ments did us so much harm, and we have adopted them 
 as far as we had the means. Many archers and javelin- 
 men, will embark, and a great number of other troops, 
 whom if we were going to fight in the open sea we should 
 not employ because they increase the weight of the ships, 
 a Cp. vi. 68 init. b Cp. vi. 68 init.; vii. 77 med. 
 
 M m 
 
 VII. 
 
 Nicias 
 seeing the 
 dejection 
 of his 
 soldiers 
 strives to 
 encourage 
 them. 
 
 6l. 
 
 If we win 
 we may see 
 our homes 
 once more. 
 We are not 
 mere tyros, 
 and ought 
 not to be 
 cast down 
 by reverses. 
 
 62. 
 
 We are 
 going to 
 fight a land- 
 battle at 
 sea ; and 
 have new 
 devices 
 suggested 
 by our 
 recent 
 experience. 
 
SPEECH OF NIC/AS TO HIS MEN. 
 
 VII. and therefore impede our skill; but here, where we are B.c, 413, 
 obliged to fight a land-battle on ship-board a , they will be 01 91 ' 4 * 
 useful. We have thought of all the changes which are 
 . necessary in the construction of our ships, and in order 
 to counteract the thickness of the beams on the enemy’s 
 prows, for this did us more mischief than anything else, 
 we have provided iron grapnels, which will prevent the 
 ship striking us from retreating if the marines are quick 
 and do their duty. For, as I tell you, we are positively 
 driven to fight a land-battle on ship-board, and our best, 
 plan is neither to back water ourselves nor to allow the 
 enemy to back water after we have once closed with him. 
 Recollect that the shore, except so far as our land-forces 
 
 extend, is in their hands, 
 
 63. ‘Knowing all this, you must fight to the last with all 
 To the your strength, and not be driven ashore. When ship 
 1 say : strikes ship refuse to separate until you have swept the 
 
 engaged^ enemy's heavy-armed from their decks. I am speaking 
 you must to the hoplites rather than to the sailors ; for this is the 
 
 not separate r 
 
 until you special duty of the men on deck. We may still reckon 
 the enemy’s on the superiority of our infantry. The sailors I would 
 To the exhort, nay I would implore them, not to be paralysed 
 You have hy their disasters ; for they will find the arrangements 
 
 more and 
 better ships. 
 To the 
 allies : 
 Remember 
 the glory 
 and the 
 advantages 
 which you 
 derived 
 from your 
 connexion 
 with 
 Athens. 
 Show that 
 your weak¬ 
 ness is 
 
 on deck improved, and the numbers of the fleet increased, 
 Some among you have long been deemed Athenians, 
 though they are not; and to them I say, Consider how 
 precious is that privilege, and how worthy to be de¬ 
 fended. You were admired in Hellas because you spoke 
 our language and adopted our manners, and you shared 
 equally with ourselves in the substantial advantages of 
 our empire, while you gained even more than we by the 
 dread which you inspired in subject-states and in your 
 security against injustice. You alone have been free 
 
 another’s 11 P artners in that empire ; you ought not to betray it now. 
 strength. And so, despising the Corinthians whom you have beaten 
 
 again and again, and the Sicilians who never dared to 
 
 withstand us when our fleet was in its prime, repel your 
 
 Cp. i. 49 init. 
 
do- 
 
 SPEECH OF GYLIPPUS TO HIS MEN . 531 
 
 c. 413* enemies* and show that your skill even amid weakness VII. 
 
 ’ 9I ' 4 ‘ and disaster is superior to the strength of another in the 
 hour of his success. 
 
 * Let me appeal once more to you who are Athenians, 64. 
 and remind you that there are no more ships like these And you, 
 in the dockyards of the Piraeus, and that you have no must not 
 more recruits fit for service. In any event but victory [^safety* 
 your enemies here will instantly sail against Athens, while f^Xat 
 our countrymen at home, who are but a remnant, will be ho ™ e is at , 
 
 stake ; and 
 
 unable to defend themselves against the attacks of their that the 
 former foes reinforced by the new invaders. You who STgiory 
 are in Sicily will instantly fall into the hands of the ° s f ^^ed 
 Syracusans (and you know how you meant to deal to y° u - 
 with them), and your friends at Athens into the hands 
 of the Lacedaemonians. In this one struggle you have 
 to fight for yourselves and them. Stand firm therefore 
 now, if ever, and remember one and all of you who are 
 embarking that you are both the fleet and army of your 
 country, and that on you hangs the whole state and the 
 great name of Athens : for her sake if any man exceed 
 another in skill or courage let him display them now ; 
 he will never have a better opportunity of doing good 
 to himself and saving his country/ 
 
 Nicias, as soon as he had done speaking, gave orders 65. 
 to man the ships. Gylippus and the Syracusans could The Syra- 
 see clearly enough from the preparations which the meet the 
 Athenians were making that they were going to fight, i^prove- 
 But they had also previous notice, and had been told 
 of the iron grapnels ; and they took precautions against improve- 
 this as against all the other devices of the Athenians. Gylippus 
 They covered the prows of their vessels with hides, ex- them r . tS 
 tending a good way along the upper part of their sides, 
 so that the grapnels might slip and find no hold. 
 
 When all was ready, Gylippus and the other generals 
 exhorted their men in the following words :— 
 
 ‘ That our recent actions have been glorious, and that 66. 
 in the coming conflict we shall be fighting for a glorious Our past 
 prize, most of you, Syracusans and allies, seem to be a pledge 
 Mm^ 
 
SPEECH OF GYLIPPUS TO HIS MEN. 
 
 success, 
 as the 
 defeats of 
 the enemy- 
 in former 
 engage¬ 
 ments are 
 ominous of 
 his defeat 
 in this. 
 They came 
 hither to 
 enslave us 
 with their 
 navy, but 
 now the 
 power of 
 the sea has 
 departed 
 from them 
 to us. 
 
 courage. 
 Their new 
 inventions 
 are bad 
 imitations 
 of ours, 
 which they 
 cannot use. 
 Their ships 
 are weighed 
 down with 
 fighting- 
 men. 
 
 They are 
 
 simply 
 
 desperate. 
 
 aware : what else would have inspired you with so much 
 energy ? But if any one is not so quick in apprehending 
 these things as he ought to be, he shall hear of them 
 from me. The Athenians came hither intending to 
 enslave first of all Sicily, and then, if they succeeded, 
 Peloponnesus and the rest of Hellas, they having already 
 the largest dominion of any Hellenic power, past or 
 present. But you set mankind the example of with¬ 
 standing that invincible navy; which you have now 
 defeated in several engagements at sea, and which you 
 will probably defeat in this. For when men are crippled 
 in what they assume to be their strength, any vestige of 
 self-respect is more completely lost than if they had 
 never believed in themselves at all. When once their 
 pride has had a fall they throw away the power of 
 resistance which they might still exert. And this we 
 may assume to be the condition of the Athenians. 
 
 ‘ Far otherwise is it with us. The natural courage, 
 which even in the days of our inexperience dared to 
 risk all, is now better assured, and when we go on to 
 reflect that he is the strongest who has overcome the 
 strongest, the hopes of every one are redoubled. And 
 in all enterprises the highest hopes infuse the greatest 
 courage. Their imitation of our modes of fighting will 
 be useless to them. To us they come naturally, and w 6 
 shall readily adapt ourselves to any arrangements of ours 
 which they have borrowed. But to them the employment 
 of troops on deck is a novelty; they will be encumbered 
 with crowds of hoplites and of javelin-men, Acarnanians 
 and others, who are mere awkward landsmen put into a 
 ship, and will not even know how to discharge their darts 
 when they are required to keep their places. Will they 
 not imperil the ships? And their own movements will 
 be so unnatural to them that they will all fall into utter 
 confusion. The greater number of the enemy’s ships 
 will be the reverse of an advantage to him, should any of 
 you fear your inequality in that respect; for a large fleet 
 confined in a small space will be hampered in action and 
 
 mo 
 
m o 
 
 THE EVE OF THE CONFLICT . 
 
 533 
 
 c. 413. far more likely to suffer from our devices. And I would VII. 
 
 9,4 have you know what I believe on the best authority to 
 be the simple truth. Their misfortunes paralyse them, 
 and they are driven to despair at finding themselves 
 helpless. They have grown reckless, and have no con¬ 
 fidence in their own plans. They will take their chance 
 as best they can, and either force a way out to sea, or in 
 the last resort retreat by ‘land ; for they know that they 
 cannot in any case be worse off than they are. 
 
 c Against such disorder, and against hateful enemies 68. 
 whose good-fortune has run away from them to us, let Now is the 
 us advance with fury. We should remember in the first revenge, 
 place that men are doing a most lawful act when they detest of 6 
 take vengeance upon an enemy and an aggressor, and 
 that they have a right to satiate their heart’s animosity; have ai- 
 secondly, that this vengeance, which is proverbially the lSus do 
 sweetest of all things, will soon be within our grasp. I 
 need not tell you that they are our enemies, and our V ould have 
 
 J J ? done to us. 
 
 worst enemies. They came against our land that they We may 
 
 . gciin every- 
 
 might enslave us, and if they had succeeded they would thing, and 
 have inflicted the greatest sufferings on our men, and the much* l0Se 
 worst indignities upon our wives and children, and would 
 have stamped a name of dishonour upon our whole city. 
 Wherefore let no one’s heart be softened towards them. 
 
 Do not congratulate yourselves at the mere prospect of 
 getting safely rid of them. Even if they conquer they can 
 only depart. But supposing that we obtain, as we most 
 likely shall, the fulness of our desires, in the punishment 
 of the Athenians and in the confirmation to Sicily of the 
 liberties which she now enjoys, how glorious will be our 
 prize! Seldom are men exposed to hazards in which 
 they lose little if they fail, and win all if they succeed. 5 
 
 When Gylippus and the other Syracusan generals 69. 
 had, like Nicias, encouraged their troops, perceiving the The peril 
 Athenians to be manning their ships, they presently did nearer and 
 the same. Nicias, overwhelmed by the situation, and Mdas’once 
 seeing how great and how near the peril was (for the ™° r t ® ^' the 
 ships were on the very point of rowing out), feeling too, trierarchs 
 
534 
 
 NIC I AS CANNOT SAY ENOUGH. 
 
 VII. 
 
 the old tale 
 of free¬ 
 dom and 
 country, 
 wives and 
 children, 
 and their 
 fathers’ 
 Gods. 
 
 They then 
 go on 
 board. 
 
 70. 
 
 Disposition 
 of the 
 Syracusan 
 fleet. 
 
 The Athe¬ 
 nians rush 
 to the 
 mouth of 
 the harbour. 
 The Syra¬ 
 cusans bear 
 down upon 
 them. 
 
 Fury and 
 disorder 
 of the 
 conflict. 
 
 as men do on the eve of a great struggle, that all which B.c. 413. 
 he had done was nothing, and that he had not said half ' 91 ' 4 * 
 enough, again addressed the trierarchs, and calling each 
 of them by his father’s name, and his own name, and 
 the name of his tribe, he entreated those who had made 
 any reputation for themselves not to be false to it, and 
 those whose ancestors were eminent not to tarnish their 
 hereditary fame. He reminded them that they were 
 the inhabitants of the freest country in the world, and 
 how in Athens there was no interference with the daily 
 life of any man a . He spoke to them of their wives and 
 children and their fathers’ Gods, as men will at such a 
 time; for then they do not care whether their common¬ 
 place phrases seem to be out of date or not, but loudly 
 reiterate the old appeals, believing that they may be of 
 some service at the awful moment. When he thought 
 that he had exhorted them, not enough, but as much as 
 the scanty time allowed, he retired, and led the land- 
 forces to the shore, extending the line as far as he 
 could, so that they might be of the greatest use in en¬ 
 couraging the combatants on board ship. Demosthenes, 
 Menander, and Euthydemus, who had gone on board 
 the Athenian fleet to take the command, now quitted 
 their own station, and proceeded straight to the closed 
 mouth of the harbour, intending to force their way to 
 the open sea where a passage was still left. 
 
 The Syracusans and their allies had already put out 
 with nearly the same number of ships as before. A de¬ 
 tachment of them guarded the entrance of the harbour; 
 the remainder were disposed all round it in such a manner 
 that they might fall on the Athenians from every side 
 at once, and that their land-forces might at the same 
 time be able to co-operate wherever the ships retreated 
 to the shore. Sicanus and Agatharchus commanded 
 the Syracusan fleet, each of them a wing; Pythen and 
 the Corinthians occupied the centre. When the Athe¬ 
 nians approached the closed mouth of the harbour the 
 a Cp. ii. 37. 
 
FINAL STRUGGLE IN THE HARBOUR. 535 
 
 B.C. 413. 
 01. 91, 4. 
 
 violence of their onset overpowered the ships which VII. 
 were stationed there; they then attempted to loosen the Manoeuvres 
 fastenings. Whereupon from all sides the Syracusans courage of 
 and their allies came bearing down upon them, and the cra^ a of neS * 
 conflict was no longer confined to the entrance, but ^oiitsof 
 extended throughout the harbour. No previous engage- boatswains, 
 
 1 11^ , , . ^ , theAthe- 
 
 ment had been so fierce and obstinate. Great was the nians fight- 
 eagerness with which the rowers on both sides rushed Jjff/Sie 
 upon their enemies whenever the word of command was 
 given; and keen was the contest between the pilots as w m they 
 
 . . find a home 
 
 they manoeuvred one against another. The marines among their 
 too were full of anxiety that, when ship struck ship, the wnuhey 
 service on deck should not fall short of the rest; every r f s° m the 
 one in the place assigned to him was eager to be fore¬ 
 most among his fellows. Many vessels meeting—and 
 never did so many fight in so small a space, for the two 
 fleets together amounted to nearly two hundred—they 
 were seldom able to strike in the regular manner, because 
 they had no opportunity of first retiring or breaking the 
 line; they generally fouled one another as ship dashed 
 against ship in the hurry of flight or pursuit. All the 
 time that another vessel was bearing down, the men on 
 deck poured showers of javelins and arrows and stones 
 upon the enemy; and when the two closed, the marines 
 fought hand to hand, and endeavoured to board. In 
 many places, owing to the want of room, they who had 
 struck another found that they were struck themselves ; 
 often two or even more vessels were unavoidably en¬ 
 tangled about one, and the pilots had to make plans of 
 attack and defence, not against one adversary only, but 
 against several coming from different sides. The crash 
 of so many ships dashing against one another took away 
 the wits of the sailors, and made it impossible to hear 
 the boatswains, whose voices in both fleets rose high, as 
 they gave directions to the rowers, or cheered them on 
 in the excitement of the struggle. On the Athenian 
 side they were shouting to their men that they must 
 force a passage and seize the opportunity now or never 
 
VII. 
 
 7 1 - 
 
 Fearful 
 anxiety of 
 the men 
 drawn up 
 on shore, 
 especially 
 when the 
 battle 
 wavers. 
 They ac¬ 
 company 
 the conflict 
 with cries 
 and move¬ 
 ments of 
 the body. 
 At length 
 the Athe¬ 
 nians are 
 driven 
 ashore. 
 
 The army 
 seeing the 
 ships lost 
 know 
 themselves 
 to be lost, 
 like the 
 Lacedae¬ 
 monians at 
 Pylos. 
 
 536 AGONY OF THE SPECTATORS . 
 
 of returning in safety to their native land. To the 
 Syracusans and their allies was represented the glory 
 of preventing the escape of their enemies, and of a 
 victory by which every man would exalt the honour 
 of his own city. The commanders too, when they saw 
 any ship backing water without necessity, would call the 
 captain by his name, and ask, of the Athenians, whether 
 they were retreating because they expected to be more 
 at home upon the land of their bitterest foes than upon 
 that sea a which had been their own so long a ; on the 
 Syracusan side, whether, when they knew perfectly well 
 that the Athenians were only eager to find some means 
 of flight, they would themselves fly from the fugitives. 
 
 While the naval engagement hung in the balance the 
 two armies on shore had great trial and conflict of soul. 
 The Sicilian soldier was animated by the hope of in¬ 
 creasing the glory which he had already won, while 
 the invader was tormented by the fear that his for¬ 
 tunes might sink lower still. The last chance of the 
 Athenians lay in their ships, and their anxiety was 
 dreadful. The fortune of the battle varied; and it was 
 not possible that the spectators on the shore should 
 all receive the same impression of it. Being quite close 
 and having different points of view, they would some 
 of them see their own ships victorious; their courage 
 would then revive, and they would earnestly call 
 upon the Gods not to take from them their hope of 
 deliverance. But others, who saw their ships worsted, 
 cried and shrieked aloud, and were by the sight alone 
 more utterly unnerved than the defeated combatants 
 themselves. Others again, who had fixed their gaze on 
 some part of the struggle which was undecided, were in 
 a state of excitement still more terrible; they kept 
 swaying their bodies to and fro in an agony of hope and 
 fear as the stubborn conflict went on and on ; for at 
 every instant they were all but saved or all but lost. 
 
 a Or, reading ttovov after dXtyov : ‘ which by the labour of years 
 they had made their own.’ 
 
 Op} 
 
CEO 
 
 THE GREAT DEFEAT OF THE ATHENIANS . 537 
 
 c. 413. And while the strife hung in the balance you might VII. 
 
 ' 911 4 ’ hear in the Athenian army at once lamentation, shouting, 
 cries of victory or defeat, and all the various sounds 
 which are wrung from a great host in extremity of 
 danger. Not less agonising were the feelings of those 
 on board. At length the Syracusans and their allies, 
 after a protracted struggle, put the Athenians to flight, 
 and triumphantly bearing down upon them, and en¬ 
 couraging one another with loud cries and exhortations, 
 drove them to land. Then that part of the navy which 
 had not been taken in the deep water fell back in 
 confusion to the shore, and the crews rushed out of the 
 ships into the camp a . And the land-forces, no longer 
 now divided in feeling, but uttering one universal groan 
 • of intolerable anguish, ran, some of them to save the 
 ships, others to defend what remained of the wall; but 
 the greater number began to look to themselves and to 
 their own safety. Never had there been a greater panic 
 in an Athenian army than at that moment. They now 
 suffered what they had done to others at Pylos. For at 
 Pylos the Lacedaemonians, when they saw their ships 
 destroyed, knew that their friends who had crossed over 
 into the island of Sphacteria were lost with them b . 
 
 And so now the Athenians, after the rout of their fleet, 
 knew that they had no hope of saving themselves by 
 land unless events took some extraordinary turn. 
 
 Thus, after a fierce battle and a great destruction of 72. 
 ships and men on both sides, the Syracusans and their Demos - 
 
 . 1 , . thenes 
 
 allies gained the victory. Ihey gathered up the wrecks desires to 
 and bodies of the dead, and sailing back to the city, conflict.^ 
 erected a trophy. The Athenians, overwhelmed by their ^orslre 
 misery, never so much as thought of recovering their paralysed 
 
 r 1 • 1 & and refuse 
 
 wrecks or of asking leave to collect their dead. Their to embark, 
 intention was to retreat that very night. Demosthenes decided to 
 came to Nicias and proposed that they should once more f a e ^ rt by 
 man their remaining vessels and endeavour to force the 
 passage at daybreak, saying that they had more ships 
 a Cp. vii. 41 init., 74 fin. b Cp. iv. 14 init. 
 
538 THE DEVICE OF HERMOCRATES . 
 
 VII. fit for service than the enemy. For the Athenian fleet 
 still numbered sixty, but the enemy had less than fifty. 
 Nicias approved of his proposal, and they would have 
 manned the ships, but the sailors refused to embark ; for 
 they were paralysed by their defeat, and had no longer 
 any hope of succeeding. So the Athenians all made up 
 their minds to escape by land. 
 
 73. Hermocrates the Syracusan suspected their intention, 
 Hermo- and dreading what might happen if their vast army, re- 
 ticipating treating by land and settling somewhere in Sicily, should 
 wants'thf n ’ choose to renew the war, he went to the authorities, 
 and represented to them that they ought not to allow 
 keeping ^ the Athenians to withdraw by night (mentioning his 
 intercept own suspicion of their intentions), but that all the Syra- 
 ttemag^s- cusans and their allies should march out before them, 
 declaring wall U P the roads, and occupy the passes with a guard, 
 impossible ^hey thought very much as he did, and wanted to carry 
 he per- ' out his plan, but doubted whether their men, who were 
 
 suades the , _ 
 
 Athenians too glad to repose after a great battle, and in time 01 
 todeiay VeS festival—for there happened on that very day to be a 
 their march; sacr ifi ce to Heracles—could be induced to obey. Most 
 of them, in the exultation of victory, were drinking and 
 keeping holiday, and at such a time how could they ever 
 be expected to take up arms and go forth at the order 
 of the generals? On these grounds the authorities de¬ 
 cided that the thing was impossible. Whereupon Her¬ 
 mocrates himself, fearing lest the Athenians should gain 
 a start and quietly pass the most difficult places in 
 the night, contrived the following plan: when it was 
 growing dark he sent certain of his own acquaintances, 
 accompanied by a few horsemen, to the Athenian camp. 
 They rode up within earshot, and pretending to be 
 friends (there were known to be men in the city who 
 gave information to Nicias of what went on) called to 
 some of the soldiers, and bade them tell him not to 
 withdraw his army during the night, for the Syracusans 
 were guarding the roads; he should make preparation 
 at leisure and retire by day. Having delivered their 
 
 Otd 
 
THE BEATEN HOST BEGINS TO MOVE. 539 
 
 messa g e they departed, and those who had heard them VII. 
 informed the Athenian generals. 
 
 On receiving this message, which they supposed to be 74 * 
 genuine, they remained during the night. And having 
 once given up the intention of starting immediately, 
 they decided to remain during the next day, that the 
 soldiers might, as well as they could, put together their 
 baggage in the most convenient form, and depart, taking 
 with them the bare necessaries of life, but nothing else. 
 
 Meanwhile the Syracusans and Gylippus, going forth and so 
 before them with their land-forces, blocked the roads in lyrlciSans 
 the country by which the Athenians were likely to pass, {JSckthe 
 guarded the fords of the rivers and streams, and posted roads * 
 themselves at the best points for receiving and stopping 
 them. Their sailors rowed up to the beach and dragged 
 away the Athenian ships. The Athenians themselves 
 burnt a few of them, as they had intended, but the rest 
 the Syracusans towed away, unmolested and at their 
 leisure, from the places where they had severally run 
 aground, and conveyed them to the city. 
 
 On the third day after the sea-fight, when Nicias and 75 * 
 Demosthenes thought that their preparations were com- of 
 plete, the army began to move. They were in a dread- parture. 
 ful condition; not only was there the great fact that sights of* 5 
 they had lost their whole fleet, and instead of their where^the" 
 expected triumph had brought the utmost peril upon 
 Athens as well as upon themselves, but also the sights are left 
 which presented themselves as they quitted the camp cursing 
 were painful to every eye and mind. The dead were comrades • 
 unburied, and when any one saw the body of a friend theva . st 
 
 5 J J army is 
 
 lying on the ground he was smitten with sorrow and in tears ; 
 dread, while the sick or wounded who still survived of disgrace, 
 but had to be left were even a greater trial to the offoSf 
 living - , and more to be pitied than those who were and the 
 
 o' r t contrast 
 
 gone. Their prayers and lamentations drove their com- between 
 panions to distraction; they would beg that they might and their 
 be taken with them, and call by name any friend or quhe^ove^ 
 relation whom they saw passing ; they would hang upon P° e ^ r 
 
54 ° THE UTTER MISERY OF THE ARMY. 
 
 VII. 
 
 Yet more 
 overwhelm¬ 
 ing is the 
 thought of 
 the future. 
 
 their departing comrades and follow as far as they could, 
 and when their limbs and strength failed them and they 
 dropped behind many were the imprecations and cries 
 which they uttered. So that the whole army was in 
 tears, and such was their despair that they could hardly 
 make up their minds to stir, although they were leaving 
 an enemy’s country, having suffered calamities too great 
 for tears already, and dreading miseries yet greater in 
 the unknown future. There was also a general feeling 
 of shame and self-reproach,—indeed they seemed, not 
 like an army, but like the fugitive population of a city 
 captured after a siege; and of a great city too. For the 
 whole multitude who were marching together numbered 
 not less than forty thousand. Each of them took with 
 him anything he could carry which was likely to be of 
 use. Even the heavy-armed and cavalry, contrary to 
 their practice when under arms, conveyed about their 
 persons their own food, some because they had no at¬ 
 tendants, others because they could not trust them; for 
 they had long been deserting, and most of them had 
 gone off all at once. Nor was the food which they 
 carried sufficient; for the supplies of the camp had 
 failed. Their disgrace and the universality of the misery, 
 although there might be some consolation in the very 
 community of suffering, was nevertheless at that moment 
 hard to bear, especially when they remembered from what 
 pomp and splendour they had fallen into their present low 
 estate. Never had an Hellenic army 3, experienced such 
 a reverse. They had come intending to enslave others, 
 and they were going away in fear that they would be 
 themselves enslaved. Instead of the prayers and hymns 
 with which they had put to sea, they were now departing 
 amid appeals to heaven of another sort. They were no 
 longer sailors but landsmen, depending, not upon their 
 fleet, but upon their infantry. Yet in face of the great 
 danger which still threatened them all these things 
 appeared endurable. 
 
 Omitting tco. 
 
 Opo 
 
LAST WORDS OF NICIAS. 
 
 541 
 
 B.C. 413. 
 Ol. 91, 4. 
 
 Nicais, seeing the army disheartened at their terrible 
 fall, went along the ranks and encouraged and consoled 
 them as well as he could. In his fervour he raised his 
 voice as he passed from one to another and spoke louder 
 and louder, desiring that the benefit of his words might 
 reach as far as possible. 
 
 ‘ Even now, Athenians and allies, we must hope : men 
 have been delivered out of worse straits than these, and 
 I would not have you judge yourselves too severely on 
 account either of the reverses which you have sustained 
 or of your present undeserved miseries. I too am as 
 weak as any of you; for I am quite prostrated by my 
 disease, as you see. And although there was a time 
 when I might have been thought equal to the best of 
 you in the happiness of my private and public life, I am 
 now in as great danger, and as much at the mercy of 
 fortune, as the meanest. Yet my days have been passed 
 in the performance of many a religious duty, and of 
 many a just and blameless action. Therefore my hope 
 of the future remains unshaken, a and our calamities do 
 not appal me as they might a . Who knows that they 
 may not be lightened ? For our enemies have had their 
 full share of success, and if our expedition provoked the 
 jealousy of any God b , by this time we have been punished 
 enough. Others ere now have attacked their neighbours; 
 they have done as men will do, and suffered what men 
 can bear. We may therefore begin to hope that the 
 Gods will be more merciful to us; for we now invite 
 their pity rather than their jealousy. And look at your 
 own well-armed ranks ; see how many brave soldiers you 
 are, marching in solid array c , and do not be dismayed; 
 bear in mind that wherever you plant yourselves you are 
 a city already, and that no city of Sicily will find it easy 
 to resist your attack, or can dislodge you if you choose 
 
 VIL 
 
 76. 
 
 Address of 
 Nicias. 
 
 We have 
 suffered 
 more than 
 we deserve; 
 and I as 
 much as 
 any one; 
 though my 
 life has 
 been blame¬ 
 less. 
 
 But we 
 may hope 
 that the 
 Gods will 
 now take 
 pity upon 
 us. 
 
 Look at 
 your own 
 numbers, 
 and remem¬ 
 ber that 
 there is 
 nowhere 
 a refuge 
 for the 
 coward, but 
 everywhere 
 for the 
 brave. 
 
 We must 
 get to the 
 Sicels at 
 once, for 
 we have no 
 more food. 
 While 
 Athenians 
 live, Athens 
 lives. 
 
 a Or, taking /car dglav closely with (frofiovai: ‘ and our calamities 
 do not appal me, as if they were deserved; ’ or, ‘ although our cala¬ 
 mities, undeserved as they are, do certainly appal me.’ 
 
 b Cp. vii. 50 fin. c Cp. vi. 68 init.; vii. 61 fin. 
 
543 
 
 THE WAY BARRED. 
 
 VII. 
 
 78. 
 
 The Athe¬ 
 nians move 
 on in two 
 divisions, 
 one under 
 Nicias, and 
 the other 
 under De¬ 
 mosthenes. 
 They suc¬ 
 ceed in 
 passing 
 the river 
 Anapus, 
 and pro¬ 
 ceed a few 
 miles south¬ 
 ward. 
 
 The Syra¬ 
 cusans 
 overtake 
 them and 
 occupy a 
 steep pass 
 on their 
 route. 
 
 to settle. Provide for the safety and good order of your 
 own march, and remember every one of you that on 
 whatever spot a man is compelled to fight, there if he 
 conquer he may find a home and a fortress. We must 
 press forward day and night, for our supplies are but 
 scanty. The Sicels through fear of the Syracusans still 
 adhere to us, and if we can only reach any part of their 
 territory we shall be among friends, and you may con¬ 
 sider yourselves secure. We have sent to them, and 
 they have been told to meet us and bring food. In a 
 word, soldiers, let me tell you that you must be brave ; 
 there is no place near to which a coward can fly a . And 
 if you now escape your enemies, those of you who are 
 not Athenians may see once more the home for which 
 they long, while you Athenians will again rear aloft the 
 fallen greatness of Athens. For men, and not walls or 
 ships in which are no men, constitute a state.’ 
 
 Thus exhorting his troops Nicias passed through the 
 army, and wherever he saw gaps in the ranks or the men 
 dropping out of line, he brought them back to their 
 proper place. Demosthenes did the same for the troops 
 under his command, and gave them similar exhortations. 
 
 The army marched disposed in a hollow oblong: the 
 division of Nicias leading, and that of Demosthenes fol¬ 
 lowing ; the hoplites enclosed within their ranks the 
 baggage-bearers and the rest of the army. When they 
 arrived at the ford of the river Anapus they found a force 
 of the Syracusans and of their allies drawn up to meet 
 them; these they put to flight, and getting command 
 of the ford, proceeded on their march. The Syracusans 
 continually harassed them, the cavalry riding along¬ 
 side, and the light-armed troops hurling darts at them. 
 
 On this day the Athenians proceeded about four and 
 a-half miles and' encamped at a hill. On the next Secondday. 
 day they started early, and, having advanced more than 
 two miles, descended into a level plain, and encamped. 
 
 The country was inhabited, and they were desirous of 
 a Cp. vi. 68 med. and fin. 
 
 mo 
 
THE ATHENIANS ARE TURNED BACK. 543 
 
 B.C. 4*3- obtaining food from the houses, and also water which VII. 
 OL 9^ 4. might- carry with them, as there was little to be had 
 for many miles in the country which lay before them. 
 Meanwhile the Syracusans had gone on before them, 
 and at a point where the road ascends a steep hill called 
 the Acraean height, and there is a precipitous ravine on 
 Third day. either side, were blocking up the pass by a wall. On the 
 next day the Athenians advanced, although again im¬ 
 peded by the numbers of the enemy’s cavalry who rode 
 along-side, and of their javelin-men who threw darts at 
 them. For a long time the Athenians maintained the 
 struggle, but at last retired to their own encampment. 
 
 Their supplies were now cut off, because the horsemen 
 circumscribed their movements. 
 
 Fourth day. In the morning they started early and resumed their 79. 
 
 march. They pressed onwards to the hill where the way The Athe- 
 was barred, and found in front of them the Syracusan So ?m™ a 6 
 infantry drawn up to, defend the wall, in deep array, ^the n 
 for the pass was narrow. Whereupon the Athenians ad- Syracusan 
 
 A e 1 position. 
 
 yanced and assaulted the barrier, but the enemy, who 
 were numerous and had the advantage of position, threw 
 missiles upon them from the hill, which was steep, and 
 so, not being able to force their way, they again retired 
 and rested. During the conflict, as is often the case in 
 the fall of the year, there came on a storm of rain and 
 thunder, whereby the Athenians were yet more dis¬ 
 heartened, for they thought that everything was con¬ 
 spiring to their destruction®. While they were resting, 
 Gylippus and the Syracusans despatched a division of 
 their army to raise a wall behind them across the road 
 by which they had come; but the Athenians sent some 
 of their own troops and frustrated,their intention. They 
 then retired with their whole army in the direction of the 
 Fifth day. plain and passed the night. On the following day they 
 again advanced. The Syracusans now surrounded and 
 attacked them on every side, and wounded many of them. 
 
 If the Athenians advanced they retreated, but charged 
 a Cp. vi. 70 init. 
 
544 CHANGE OF ROUTE AND MIDNIGHT PANIC . 
 
 VII. 
 
 80. 
 
 The con¬ 
 dition of the 
 Athenians 
 grows 
 worse and 
 worse. 
 
 At night 
 they change 
 their route 
 and go 
 towards 
 the sea. 
 
 A panic 
 occurs. 
 Nicias 
 crosses the 
 Cacyparis. 
 
 them when they retired, falling especially upon the B.C. 413. 
 hindermost of them, in the hope that, if they could put ‘ gi> 4 ‘ 
 to flight a few at a time, they might strike a panic into 
 the whole army. In this fashion the Athenians struggled 
 on for a long time, and having advanced about three- 
 quarters of a mile rested in the plain. The Syracusans 
 then left them and returned to their own encampment. 
 
 The army was now in a miserable plight, being in 
 want of every necessary; and by the continual assaults 
 of the enemy great numbers of the soldiers had been 
 wounded. Nicias and Demosthenes, perceiving their 
 condition, resolved during the night to light as many 
 watch-fires as possible and to lead off their forces. They 
 intended to take another route and march towards the 
 sea in the direction opposite to that from which the 
 Syracusans were watching them. Now their whole line 
 of march lay, not towards Catana, but towards the other 
 side of Sicily, in the direction of Camarina and Gela, and 
 the cities, Hellenic or Barbarian, of that region. So 
 they lighted numerous fires and departed in the night. 
 
 And then, as constantly happens in armies a , especially 
 in very great ones, and as might be expected when 
 they were marching by night in an enemy’s country, and 
 with the enemy from whom they were flying not far off, 
 there arose a panic among them, and they fell into 
 confusion. The army of Nicias, which led the way, 
 kept together, and was considerably in advance, but that 
 of Demosthenes, which was the larger half, got severed 
 from the other division, and marched in less order. 
 
 At daybreak they succeeded in reaching the sea, and Sixth day. 
 striking into the Helorine road marched along it, in¬ 
 tending as soon as they arrived at the river Cacyparis 
 to follow up the stream through the interior of the 
 island. They were expecting that the Sicels for whom 
 they had sent would meet them on this road. When 
 they had reached the river they found there also a 
 guard of the Syracusans cutting off the passage by a. 
 a Cp. iv. 125 init. 
 
ONE DIVISION IS SURROUNDED. 
 
 545 
 
 B.c. 413. wall and palisade. They forced their way through, and VII. 
 
 ’ 91 ‘ 4 ' crossing the river, passed on towards another river which 
 is called the Erineus, this being the direction in which 
 their guides led them. 
 
 When daylight broke and the Syracusans and their 81. 
 allies saw that the Athenians had departed, most of The Syra- 
 them thought that Gylippus had let them go on pur- overtake 
 pose, and were very angry with him. They easily found ofDemos- 11 
 the line of their retreat, and quickly following, came up *^ s, is 
 with them about the time of the midday meal. The surrounded 
 troops of Demosthenes were last; they were marching by them 
 slowly arid in disorder, not having recovered from the 
 panic of the previous night, when they were overtaken 
 by the Syracusans, who immediately fell upon them and 
 fought. Separated as they were from the others, they 
 were easily hemmed in by the Syracusan cavalry and 
 driven into a narrow space. The division of Nicias was 
 as much as six miles in advance, for he marched faster, 
 thinking that their safety depended at such a time, not 
 in remaining and fighting, if they could avoid it, but in 
 retreating as quickly as they could, and resisting only 
 when they were positively compelled. Demosthenes, on 
 the other hand, who had been more incessantly harassed 
 throughout the retreat, because marching last he was 
 first attacked by the enemy, now, when he saw the 
 Syracusans pursuing him, instead of pressing onward, 
 had ranged his army in order of battle. Thus lingering 
 he was surrounded, and he and the Athenians under his 
 command were in the greatest danger and confusion. 
 
 For they were crushed into a walled enclosure, having 
 a road on both sides and planted thickly with olive- 
 trees, and missiles were hurled at them from all points. 
 
 The Syracusans naturally preferred this mode of attack 
 to a regular engagement. For to risk themselves against 
 desperate men would have been only playing into the 
 hands of the Athenians. Moreover, every one was sparing 
 of his life; their good fortune was already assured, and 
 they did not want to fall in the hour of victory. Even 
 N n 
 
54^ 
 
 DEMOSTHENES SURRENDERS . 
 
 VII. 
 
 82. 
 
 The troops 
 are worn 
 out; offers 
 of freedom 
 to the 
 islanders 
 generally 
 refused. 
 But at last 
 the whole 
 force is 
 driven to 
 capitulate. 
 
 83. 
 
 Nicias 
 being in¬ 
 formed 
 of the 
 surrender 
 of Demos¬ 
 thenes tries 
 in vain to 
 negotiate 
 with 
 
 Gylippus. 
 He at¬ 
 tempts to 
 steal away 
 by night, 
 but fails. 
 Three 
 hundred 
 escape 
 in the 
 darkness. 
 
 by this irregular mode of fighting they thought that ac. 413. 
 they could overpower and capture the Athenians. 
 
 And so when they had gone on all day assailing them 
 with missiles from every quarter, and saw that they were 
 quite worn out with their wounds and all their other 
 sufferings, Gylippus and the Syracusans made a pro¬ 
 clamation, first of all to the islanders, that any of them 
 who pleased might come over to them and have their 
 freedom. But only a few cities accepted the offer. At 
 length an agreement was made for the entire force under 
 Demosthenes. Their arms were to be surrendered, but 
 no one was to suffer death, either from violence or from 
 imprisonment, or from want of the bare means of life. 
 
 So they all surrendered, being in number six thousand, 
 and gave up what money they had. This they threw 
 into the hollows of shields and filled four. The captives 
 were at once taken to the city. On the same day Nicias 
 and his division reached the river Erineus, which he 
 crossed, and halted his army on a rising ground. 
 
 On the following day he was overtaken by the Syra- Seventh 
 cusans, who told him that Demosthenes had surrendered, day ’ 
 and bade him do the same. He, not believing them, 
 procured a truce while he sent a horseman to go and 
 see. Upon the return of the horseman bringing as¬ 
 surance of the fact, he sent a herald to Gylippus and 
 the Syracusans, saying that he would agree, on behalf 
 of the Athenian state, to pay the expenses which the 
 Syracusans had incurred in the war, on condition that 
 they should let his army go ; until the money was paid 
 he would give Athenian citizens as hostages, a man 
 for a talent. Gylippus and the Syracusans would not 
 accept these proposals, but attacked and surrounded this 
 division of the army as well as the other, and hurled 
 missiles at them from every side until the evening. 
 
 They too were grievously in want of food and neces¬ 
 saries. Nevertheless they meant to wait for the dead 
 of the night and then to proceed. They were just re¬ 
 suming their arms, when the Syracusans discovered them 
 
o w 
 
 SLAUGHTER AT THE ASSINARUS. 54 7 
 
 .c. 413. and raised the Paean. The Athenians, perceiving that VII. 
 
 ‘ gl ’ 4 ' they were detected, laid down their arms again, with the 
 exception of about three hundred men who broke through 
 the enemy’s guard, and made their escape in the dark¬ 
 ness as best they could. 
 
 Eighth day. When the day dawned Nicias led forward his army, 84. 
 
 and the Syracusans and the allies again assailed them The troo P s 
 
 ..... . 0 of Nicias 
 
 on every side, hurling javelins and other missiles at hurry on 
 them. The Athenians hurried on to the river Assi- Assinarus 1 - 
 narus. They hoped to gain a little relief if they forded 
 the river, for the mass of horsemen and other troops the y ^ 
 
 * r attacked by 
 
 overwhelmed and crushed them ; and they were worn the enemy, 
 out by fatigue and thirst. But no sooner did they mns^ood, 
 reach the water than they lost all order and rushed in ; fjv^and 
 every man was trying to cross first, and, the enemy ^died 
 pressing upon them at the same time, the passage of the together in 
 river became hopeless. Being compelled to keep close 
 together they fell one upon another, and trampled each 
 other under foot: some at once perished, pierced by 
 their own spears ; others got entangled in the baggage 
 and were carried down the stream. The Syracusans 
 stood upon the further bank of the river, which was 
 steep, and hurled missiles from above on the Athenians, 
 who were huddled together in the deep bed of the stream 
 and for the most part were drinking greedily. The 
 Peloponnesians came down the bank and slaughtered 
 them, falling chiefly upon those who were in the river. 
 Whereupon the water at once became foul, but was 
 drunk all the same, although muddy and dyed with 
 blood, and the crowd fought for it. 
 
 At last, when the dead bodies were lying in heaps 85. 
 upon one another in the water and the army was , Nicias at 
 
 r .... l ast sur- 
 
 utterly undone, some perishing in the river, and any who renders to 
 escaped being cut off by the cavalry, Nicias surrendered The^hree 
 to Gylippus, in whom he had more confidence than in brought hT 
 the Syracusans. He entreated him and the Lacedae- Q f r ^ ness 
 monians to do what they pleased with himself, but not slaughter, 
 to go on killing the men. So Gylippus gave the word prisoners 
 N n 2 
 
N1CIAS SURRENDERS. 
 
 .-,48 
 
 VII. to make prisoners. Thereupon the survivors, not in-B.c. 413. 
 become the eluding however a large number whom the soldiers con- 
 the sowTers, cealed, were brought in alive. As for the three hundred 
 escape any who had broken through the guard in the night, the 
 Syracusans sent in pursuit and seized them. The total 
 of the public prisoners when collected was not great; for 
 many were appropriated by the soldiers, and the whole of 
 Sicily was full of them, they not having capitulated like 
 the troops under Demosthenes. A large number also 
 perished; the slaughter at the river being very great, quite 
 as great as any which took place in the Sicilian war ; and 
 not a few had fallen in the frequent attacks which were 
 made upon the Athenians during their march. Still many 
 escaped, some at the time, others ran away after an in¬ 
 terval of slavery, and all these found refuge at Catana. 
 
 86 . The Syracusans and their allies collected their forces 
 The public and returned with the spoil, and as many prisoners as 
 areconfined they could take with them, into the city. The captive 
 quarries ; Athenians and allies they deposited in the quarries, 
 
 Demos and they thought would be the safest place of confine- 
 
 thenesare ment. Nicias and Demosthenes they put to the sword, 
 death. although against the will of Gylippus. For Gylippus 
 thought that to carry home with him to Lacedaemon 
 the generals of the enemy, over and above all his other 
 successes, would be a brilliant triumph. One of them, 
 Demosthenes, happened to be the greatest foe, and the 
 other the greatest friend of the Lacedaemonians, both in 
 the same matter of Pylos and Sphacteria. For Nicias 
 had taken up their cause a , and had persuaded the Athe¬ 
 nians to make the peace which set at liberty the prisoners 
 taken in the island. The Lacedaemonians were grateful 
 to him for the service, and this was the main reason 
 why he trusted Gylippus and surrendered himself to him. 
 
 But certain Syracusans, who had been in communica¬ 
 tion with him, were afraid (such was the report) that 
 on some suspicion of their guilt he might be put to the 
 torture and bring trouble on them in the hour of their 
 a Cp. v. 16 med. 
 
cc o 
 
 •C. 413- 
 
 1. 91, 4. 
 
 FATE OF THE PRISONERS. 549 
 
 prosperity. Others, and especially the Corinthians, feared VII. 
 that, being rich, he might by bribery escape and do 
 them further mischief. So the Syracusans gained the 
 consent of the allies and had him executed. For these 
 or the like reasons he suffered death. No one of the 
 Hellenes in my time was less deserving of so miserable 
 an end ; for he lived in the practice of every virtue. 
 
 Those who were imprisoned in the quarries were at 87. 
 the beginning of their captivity harshly treated by the Sufferings 
 Syracusans. There were great numbers of them, and prisoners 
 they were crowded in a deep and narrow place. At ^1, C ° ld ' 
 first the sun by day was still scorching and suffocating, 
 for they had no roof over their heads, while the autumn scanty 
 
 allowance 
 
 nights were cold, and the extremes of temperature of food 
 engendered violent disorders. Being cramped for room The whole 
 they had to do everything on the same spot. The ^ 
 corpses of those who died from their wounds, exposure at* 0111 se y en 
 
 1 thousand. 
 
 to the weather, and the like, lay heaped one upon another. 
 
 The smells were intolerable; and they were at the 
 same time afflicted by hunger and thirst. During eight 
 months they were allowed only about half a pint of 
 water and a pint of food a day. Every kind of misery 
 which could befall man in such a place befell them. 
 
 This was the condition of all the captives for about ten 
 weeks. At length the Syracusans sold them, with the 
 exception of the Athenians and of any Sicilian or Italian 
 Greeks who had sided with them in the war. The whole 
 number of the public prisoners is 4iot accurately known, 
 but they were not less than seven thousand. 
 
 Of all the Hellenic actions which took place in this Thus ended 
 war, or indeed of all Hellenic actions which are on record, ofan reateSt 
 this was the greatest—the most glorious to the victors, H^ e n n s lc 
 the most ruinous to the vanquished; for they were 
 utterly and at all points defeated, and their sufferings 
 were prodigious. Fleet and army perished from the 
 face of the earth ; nothing was saved, and of the many 
 who went forth few returned home. 
 
 Thus ended the Sicilian expedition. 
 
VIII. I. 
 
 At first the 
 Athenians 
 will not 
 believe the 
 truth, and 
 are furious 
 when they 
 know it. 
 Their pros¬ 
 pects are 
 hopeless. 
 However, 
 they deter¬ 
 mine not 
 to yield. 
 They ap¬ 
 point a 
 council of 
 elders, 
 and are 
 disposed to 
 economise 
 and to be¬ 
 have well. 
 
 BOOK VIII. 
 
 The news was brought to Athens, but the Athenians 
 could not believe that the armament had been so com¬ 
 pletely annihilated, although they had the positive 
 assurances of a the very soldiers who a had escaped from 
 the scene of action. At last they knew the truth; 
 and then they were furious with the orators who had 
 joined in promoting the expedition—as if they had not 
 voted it themselves 15 —and with the soothsayers, and 
 prophets, and all who by the influence of religion had 
 at the time inspired them with the belief that they would 
 conquer Sicily. Whichever way they looked there was 
 trouble ; they were overwhelmed by their calamity, and 
 were in fear and consternation unutterable. The citizens 
 mourned and the city mourned ; they had lost a host of 
 cavalry and hoplites and the flower of their youth, and 
 there were none to replace them c . And when they saw 
 an insufficient number of ships in their docks, and no 
 crews to man them, .nor money in the treasury, they 
 despaired of deliverance. They had no doubt that their 
 enemies in Sicily, after the great victory which they had 
 already gained, would at once sail against the Piraeus. 
 Their enemies in Hellas, whose resources were now 
 doubled, would likewise set upon them with all their 
 might both by sea and land, and would be assisted by 
 their own revolted allies. Still they determined under 
 any circumstances not to give way. They would procure 
 
 a Or, taking tt aw with crrpaTiaiTcov : ‘ trustworthy soldiers who.’ 
 b Gp. ii. 60 med., 61 med. c Cp. vii. 64. 
 
 criO 
 
Ota 
 
 C. 413. 
 . 91, 4' 
 
 ALL HELLAS UP IN ARMS . 551 
 
 timber and money by whatever means they might, and VIII. 
 build a navy. They would make sure of their allies, 
 and above all of Euboea. Expenses in the city were to 
 be economised, and they were to choose a council of the 
 elder men, who should advise together, and lay before 
 the people the measures which from time to time might 
 be required. After the manner of a democracy, they 
 were very amenable to discipline while their fright 
 lasted. They proceeded to carry out these resolutions. 
 
 And so the summer ended. 
 
 During the following winter all Hellas was stirred 2. 
 by the great overthrow of the Athenians in Sicily. The The neutral 
 states which had been neutral determined that the time Lacedae- 
 had come when, invited or not, they could no longer Athenian 1111 
 stand aloof from the war ; they must of their own accord a )} ies - area11 
 
 7 J alike eager 
 
 attack the Athenians. They considered, one and all, to have a 
 that if the Sicilian expedition had succeeded, they would war which 
 sooner or later have been attacked by them. The war be nearly 0 
 would not last long, and they might as well share in the 
 glory of it. The Lacedaemonian allies, animated by a involve no 
 
 , danger. 
 
 common feeling, were more eager than ever to make a Hopes 
 speedy end of their protracted hardships. But none Lacedae- 
 showed greater alacrity than the subjects of the A the- momans * 
 nians, who were everywhere willing even beyond their 
 power to revolt; for they judged by their excited 
 feelings a , and would not admit a possibility that the 
 Athenians could survive another summer. To the Lace¬ 
 daemonians all this was most encouraging; and they 
 had in addition the prospect that their allies from Sicily 
 would join them at the beginning of spring with a large 
 force of ships as well as men ; necessity having at last 
 compelled them to become a naval power. Everything 
 looked hopeful, and they determined to strike promptly 
 and vigorously. They considered that by the successful 
 termination of the war they would be finally delivered 
 from dangers such as would have surrounded them if the 
 Athenians had become masters of Sicily b . Athens once 
 a Cp. iv. 108 med. b Cp. vi. 90. 
 
AGIS AT DEC ELEA. 
 
 55 ^ 
 
 VIII. overthrown, they might assure to themselves the undis- B.c. 413. 
 
 . 01. 91, 4. 
 
 puted leadership of Hellas. 
 
 3- At the beginning therefore of this winter, Agis the 
 Agis carries Lacedaemonian king led out a body of troops from 
 
 away the ° J 
 
 cattle of the Decelea, and collected from the allies contributions 
 and exacts towards the expenses of a navy. Then passing to the 
 fromThe Malian Gulf, he carried off from the Oetaeans, who were 
 of C phth?a enemies a , the greater part of their cattle, and exacted 
 The Lace- money of them ; from the Achaeans of Phthia, and from 
 
 daemonians . 
 
 and allies the other tribes m that region, although the Thessalians, 
 Thundred^ to whom they were subject, were very wroth and pro¬ 
 ships. tested, he likewise extorted money and took hostages, 
 whom he deposited at Corinth, and tried to force upon 
 them the Lacedaemonian alliance. The whole number 
 of ships which the allies were to build was fixed at a 
 hundred : twenty-five were to be built by the Lacedae¬ 
 monians themselves and twenty-five by the Boeotians, 
 fifteen by the Phocians and Locrians, fifteen by the 
 Corinthians, ten by the Arcadians, Pellenians, and Si- 
 cyonians, ten by the Megarians, Troezenians, Epidau- 
 rians, and Hermionians. Every sort of preparation was 
 made, for the Lacedaemonians were determined to pro¬ 
 secute the war as soon as the spring set in. 
 
 4* The Athenians also carried out their intended pre- 
 nians^buM P ara ti° ns during this winter. They collected timber 
 a fleet and built ships; they fortified Sunium for the protec- 
 
 and fortify r , , . , 
 
 Sunium. tion of their corn-ships on the voyage to Athens; also 
 down ex- they abandoned the fort in Laconia which they had 
 keep^eye erecte d while sailing to Sicily b , and cut down any 
 upon their expenses which seemed unnecessary. Above all, they 
 kept strict watch over their allies, apprehending revolt. 
 
 First the During the same winter, while both parties were as 
 then (2) the intent upon their preparations as if the war were only 
 wWre 5 ' J ust beginning, first among the Athenian subjects the 
 by P their ed Euboeans sent envoys to negotiate with Agis. Agis 
 Boeotian accepted their proposals, and summoned from Lace- 
 negotiate daemon Alcamenes the son of Sthenelaidas, and Melan- 
 a Cp. iii. 92 foil. b Cp. vii. 26 med> 
 
B.C. 413. 
 01. 91, 4. 
 
 STATES WANTING TO REVOLT. 553 
 
 thus, that they might take the command in Euboea. VIII. 
 They came, accompanied by three hundred of the Neo- with Agis, 
 damodes. But while he was making ready to convey more power 
 them across the strait, there arrived envoys from Lesbos, home 
 which was likewise anxious to revolt; and as the Boeo- ^ e v ^ t rn ' 
 tians a were in their interest, Agis was persuaded to defer 
 the expedition to Euboea while he prepared to assist the 
 Lesbians. He appointed Alcamenes, who had been 
 designed for Euboea, their governor ; and he further 
 promised them ten ships, the Boeotians promising ten 
 more. All this was done without the authority of the 
 Lacedaemonian government; for Agis, while he was 
 with his army at Decelea, had the right to send troops 
 whithersoever he pleased, to raise levies, and to exact 
 money. And at that particular time he might be said 
 to have far more influence over the allies than the 
 Lacedaemonians at home, for he had an army at his 
 disposal, and was dreaded wherever he went. 
 
 While he was supporting the Lesbians, certain Chians 5* 
 and Erythraeans (who were also ready to revolt) had 
 recourse, not to Agis, but to Lacedaemon; they were Erythraeans 
 accompanied by an envoy from Tissaphernes, whom Tissa- 
 King Darius the son of Artaxerxes had appointed to be aidfrom ask 
 governor of the provinces on the coast of Asia. Tissa- ^h^King's 
 phernes too was inviting the assistance of the Lacedae- tribute in 
 monians, and promised to maintain their troops ; for the questl0n * 
 King had quite lately been demanding of him the 
 revenues due from the Hellenic cities in his province, 
 which he had been prevented by the Athenians from col¬ 
 lecting, and therefore still owed. He thought that if he 
 could weaken the Athenians he would be more likely to get 
 his tribute; he hoped also to make the Lacedaemonians 
 allies of the King, and by their help either to slay or take 
 alive, in accordance with the King’s orders, Amorges the 
 natural son of Pissuthnes, who had revolted in Caria. 
 
 While the Chians and Tissaphernes were pursuing 6. 
 
 their common object, Calligeitus the son of Laophon, (4) Pharna- 
 
 bazus, who 
 
 a Cp. iii. 2 fin., 5 med., 13 init.; viii. 100 med. 
 
554 TISSAPHERNES AND PHARNABAZUS. 
 
 VIII. 
 
 sends over 
 money, 
 invites the 
 Lacedae¬ 
 monian 
 fleet to the 
 Hellespont. 
 The Chians 
 having the 
 support of 
 Alcibiades 
 are first re¬ 
 ceived into 
 alliance; 
 they are 
 promised 
 the assist¬ 
 ance of a 
 Peloponne¬ 
 sian fleet. 
 
 a Megarian, and Timagoras the son of Athenagoras, a 
 Cyzicene, both exiles from their own country, who were 
 residing at the court of Pharnabazus the son of Pharnaces, 
 came to Lacedaemon. They had been commissioned by 
 Pharnabazus to bring up a fleet to the Hellespont; like 
 Tissaphernes he was anxious, if possible, to induce the 
 cities in his province to revolt from the Athenians, that 
 he might obtain the tribute from them ; and he wanted 
 the alliance between the Lacedaemonians and the King 
 to come from himself. The two parties—that is to say, 
 the envoys of Pharnabazus and those of Tissaphernes—■ 
 were acting independently; and a vehement contest 
 arose at Lacedaemon, the one party urging the Lace¬ 
 daemonians to send a fleet and army to Ionia and 
 Chios, the other to begin with the Hellespont. They 
 were themselves far more favourable to the proposals 
 of the Chians and Tissaphernes; for Alcibiades was 
 in their interest, and he was a great hereditary friend 
 of Endius, one of the Ephors of that year. Through 
 this friendship the Lacedaemonian name of Alcibiades 
 came into his family; for Alcibiades was the name of 
 Endius’ father a . Nevertheless the Lacedaemonians, be¬ 
 fore giving an answer, sent a commissioner, Phrynis, one 
 of their Perioeci, to see whether the Chians had as many 
 ships as they said, and whether the power of the city was 
 equal to her reputation. He reported that what they 
 had heard was true. Whereupon they at once made 
 alliance with the Chians and Erythraeans and voted 
 them forty ships—there being at Chios already, as the 
 Chians informed them, not less than sixty. Of the forty 
 ships they at first intended to send out ten themselves 
 under the command of Melancridas their admiral; but 
 an earthquake occurred ; so instead of Melancridas they 
 appointed Chalcideus, and instead of the ten ships they 
 prepared to send five only, which they equipped in 
 
 a Literally, ‘ for Endius was called Endius the son of Alcibiades; ’ 
 implying that in the family of Endius the names Endius and Alci¬ 
 biades alternated. 
 
 wo 
 
CQ O 
 
 CHIOS , LESBOS , AND THE HELLESPONT. S55 
 
 ■C. 412. Laconia. So the winter ended, and with it the nine- VIII. 
 teenth year in the Peloponnesian War of which Thucy- 
 dides wrote the history. 
 
 At the beginning of the next summer the Chians 7* 
 pressed the Lacedaemonians to send the fleet at once. The 
 
 L. are to be 
 
 For their proposals, like those of the other allies, had dragged 
 been made secretly, and they were afraid that the isthmus. 
 Athenians would detect them. Thereupon the Lace¬ 
 daemonians sent to Corinth three Spartans, who were 
 to give orders that the ships then lying at the Isthmus 
 should be as quickly as possible dragged over from the 
 Corinthian gulf to the coast on the other side. They 
 were all to be despatched to Chios, including the ships 
 which Agis had intended for Lesbos. The allied fleet 
 then at the Isthmus numbered in all thirty-nine. 
 
 Calligeitus and Timagoras, who represented Pharna- 8. 
 bazus, took no part in the expedition to Chios, nor did ^ s ^ ho 
 they offer to contribute towards the expenses of it the ginaiiy 
 money which they had brought with them, amounting Lesbos, 
 to twenty-five talents a ; they thought of sailing later fn Ae SCeS 
 with another expedition. Agis, when he saw that the 
 Lacedaemonians were bent on going to Chios first, 
 offered no opposition; so the allies held a conference 
 at Corinth, and after some deliberation determined to 
 sail, first of all to Chios, under the command of Chalci- 
 deus, who was equipping the five ships in Laconia, 
 then to proceed to Lesbos, under the command of Alca- 
 menes, whom Agis had previously designed to appoint 
 to that island, and finally to the Hellespont; for this 
 last command they had selected Clearchus the son of 
 Rhamphias. They resolved to carry over the Isthmus 
 half the ships first; these were to sail at once, that the 
 attention of the Athenians might be distracted between 
 those which were starting and those which were to 
 follow. They meant to sail quite openly, taking it for 
 granted that the Athenians were powerless, since no 
 navy of theirs worth speaking of had as yet appeared. 
 a ^6000. 
 
VIII. 
 
 9- 
 
 The Corin¬ 
 thians are 
 delayed 
 by their 
 Isthmian 
 games. 
 Meanwhile 
 the Athe¬ 
 nians detect 
 the treason 
 of the 
 Chians 
 and exact 
 pledges of 
 them. 
 
 IO. 
 
 The first 
 Pelopon¬ 
 nesian 
 squadron 
 is driven 
 by the 
 Athenians 
 into Pei- 
 raeum and 
 the com¬ 
 mander, 
 Alcamenes, 
 slain. 
 
 556 THE CHIAN CONSPIRACY DETECTED. 
 
 In pursuance of their plans they conveyed twenty-one B.c. 412. 
 ships over the Isthmus. 
 
 They were in a hurry to be off, but the Corinthians 
 were unwilling to join them until the conclusion of the 
 Isthmian games, which were then going on. Agis was 
 prepared to respect their scruples and to take the re¬ 
 sponsibility of the expedition on himself. But the 
 Corinthians would not agree to this proposal, and there 
 was delay. In the meantime the Athenians began to 
 discover the proceedings of the Chians, and despatched 
 one of their generals, Aristocrates, to accuse them of 
 treason. They denied the charge; whereupon he de¬ 
 sired them to send back with him a few ships as a 
 pledge of their fidelity to the alliance; and they sent 
 seven. They could not refuse his request, for the Chian 
 people were ignorant of the whole matter, while the 
 oligarchs, who were in the secret, did not want to break 
 with the multitude until they had secured their ground. 
 
 And the Peloponnesian ships had delayed so long that 
 they had ceased to expect them. 
 
 Meanwhile the Isthmian games were celebrated. The 
 Athenians, to whom they had been formally notified, 
 sent representatives to them ; and now their eyes began 
 to be opened to the designs of the Chians. On their re¬ 
 turn home they took immediate measures to prevent the 
 enemy’s ships getting away from Cenchreae unperceived. 
 
 When the games were over, the Peloponnesians, under 
 the command of Alcamenes, with their twenty-one ships 
 set sail for Chios ; the Athenians, with an equal number, 
 first sailed up to them and tried to draw them into the 
 open sea. The Peloponnesians did not follow them far, 
 but soon turned back to Cenchreae; the Athenians like¬ 
 wise retired, for they could not depend on the fidelity 
 of the seven Chian ships which formed a part of their 
 fleet. So they manned some more ships, making the 
 whole number thirty-seven, and when the Peloponne¬ 
 sians resumed their voyage along the coast they pur¬ 
 sued them into Peiraeum. a lonely harbour, the last 
 
FIRST ATHENIAN SUCCESS AT SEA. 557 
 
 B.c. 412. in the Corinthian territory before you reach Epidauria. VIII. 
 
 92 ‘ One ship was lost by the Peloponnesians at sea, but 
 they got the rest together and came to anchor in the 
 harbour. Again the Athenians attacked them, not only 
 on the water, but also after they had landed ; there was 
 a fierce struggle, but no regular engagement; most of 
 the enemy’s ships were damaged by the Athenians on 
 the beach, and their commander, Alcamenes, was slain. 
 
 Some Athenians also fell. 
 
 When the conflict was over, the conquerors left a suffi- 11. 
 cient number of ships to watch the enemy, and with the The shi P s 
 
 . 1 , , are block- 
 
 remainder they lay to under a little island not far oil, aded by the 
 where they encamped, and sent to Athens, requesting Discourage- 
 reinforcements. For on the day after the battle the La^dae-^ 
 Corinthians had come to assist the Peloponnesian ships, monians, 
 and the other inhabitants of the country quickly fol- doomed to 
 lowed them. Foreseeing how great would be the labour failure ' 
 of keeping guard on so desolate a spot, the Pelopon¬ 
 nesians knew not what to do ; they even entertained the 
 idea of burning their ships, but on second thoughts they 
 determined to draw them high up on shore, and with 
 their land-forces stationed near to keep guard over them, 
 until some good opportunity of escape should occur. 
 
 Agis was informed of their condition, and sent Thermon, 
 a Spartan, to them. The first tidings which had reached 
 Sparta were to the effect that the ships had left the 
 Isthmus (the Ephors having told Alcamenes to send a 
 horseman announcing the fact), and immediately they 
 determined to send out the five ships of their own which 
 they had ready, under the command of Chalcideus, who 
 was to be accompanied by Alcibiades. But when they 
 were on the point of departure, a second messenger re¬ 
 ported that the other squadron had been chased into 
 Peiraeum ; and then, disheartened by finding that they 
 had begun the Ionian war with a failure, they deter¬ 
 mined to give up sending the ships from Laconia, and 
 even to recall some others which had already sailed. 
 
 Alcibiades, seeing the state of affairs, advised Endius 12 , 
 
VIII. 
 
 They are 
 going to do 
 nothing ; 
 but Alci- 
 biades 
 insists that 
 the Lace¬ 
 daemonian 
 contingent 
 shall at 
 once put 
 to sea. 
 
 x 3- 
 
 Return of 
 some ships 
 from Sicily. 
 
 14 . 
 
 (1) Chios, 
 then (2) 
 Erythrae, 
 (3) Clazo- 
 menae, are 
 induced to 
 revolt by 
 Chalcideus 
 and Alci- 
 biades. 
 
 558 ALCIBIADES AND HIS FRIEND ENDIUS. 
 
 and the Ephors to persevere in the expedition. They 
 would arrive, he said, before the Chians had heard of 
 the misadventure of the ships. He would himself, as 
 soon as he reached Ionia, represent to the cities the 
 weakness of the Athenians and the alacrity of the Lace¬ 
 daemonians, and they would revolt at once; for they 
 would believe him sooner than any one. To Endius he 
 argued in private a that he would gain honour if he were 
 the instrument of effecting a revolt in Ionia, and of 
 gaining the alliance of the King a ; he should not allow 
 such a prize to fall into the hands of Agis. Now Agis 
 was a personal enemy of Alcibiades. Endius and the 
 other Ephors were persuaded by him. So he put to sea 
 with the five ships, accompanied by Chalcideus the Lace- 
 monian, and hastened on his way. 
 
 About this time sixteen Peloponnesian ships which 
 had remained with Gylippus to the end of the Sicilian 
 war were returning home. They were caught in the 
 neighbourhood of Leucadia and roughly handled by 
 twenty-seven Athenian vessels, under the command of 
 Hippocles the son of Menippus, which were on the 
 watch for ships coming from Sicily; but all except one 
 of them escaped the Athenians and sailed into Corinth. 
 
 Chalcideus and Alcibiades on their voyage seized 
 every one whom they met in order that their coming 
 might not be reported. They touched first at the pro¬ 
 montory of Corycus on the mainland, and there re¬ 
 leasing their prisoners, they held a preliminary con¬ 
 ference with certain of the Chians, who were in the plot, 
 and who advised them to give no notice of their inten¬ 
 tion, but to sail at once to the city. So they appeared 
 suddenly at Chios, to the great wonder and alarm of the 
 people. The oligarchs had contrived that the council 
 should be sitting at the time. Chalcideus and Alci¬ 
 biades made speeches and announced that many more 
 ships were on their way, but said nothing about the 
 
 a Or, ‘that he would win honour by effecting a revolt in Ionia 
 and gaining the alliance of the King : Alcibiades would help him.’ 
 
 PQO 
 
Ops 
 
 CHIOS, ERYTHRAE , CLAZOMENAE REVOLT . 559 
 
 c. 412. blockade of Peiraeum. So Chios first, and afterwards VIII. 
 
 ' 92 ' Erythrae, revolted from Athens. They then sailed with 
 three vessels to Clazomenae, which they induced to 
 ’ revolt. The Clazomenians at once crossed over to the 
 mainland and fortified Polichne, intending in case of 
 need to retreat thither from the little island on which 
 Clazomenae stands. All the revolted cities were occu¬ 
 pied in raising fortifications and preparing for war. 
 
 The news of the revolt of Chios soon reached Athens; 15. 
 and the Athenians realised at once the magnitude of the The Athe - 
 
 rr^i . nians, alive 
 
 danger which now surrounded them. The greatest city to their 
 of all had gone over to the enemy, and the rest of their pSfa 0n ’ 
 allies were certain to rise. In the extremity of their afiowfngthe 
 alarm they abrogated the penalties denounced against ^serve 
 any one who should propose or put to the vote the em- ships to 
 ployment of the thousand talents which throughout the used edy 
 war they had hitherto jealously reserved®. They now re¬ 
 passed a decree permitting their use, and resolved to ^nd \ eet 
 man a large number of ships ; also to send at once to to Asia. 
 Chios eight ships which had been keeping guard at 
 Peiraeum, and had gone away under the command of 
 Strombichides the son of Diotimus in pursuit of Chalci- 
 deus, but not overtaking him had returned. Twelve 
 other ships, under the command of Thrasycles, were to 
 follow immediately; these too were to be taken from 
 the blockading force. They also withdrew the seven 
 Chian ships wdiich were assisting them in the blockade 
 of Peiraeum; and setting free the slaves in them, put 
 the freemen in chains. Other ships were then quickly 
 manned by them and sent to take the place of all those 
 which had been subtracted from the blockading squadron, 
 and they proposed to equip thirty more. They were full 
 of energy, and spared no effort for the recovery of Chios. 
 
 Meanwhile Strombichides with his eight ships arrived 16. 
 at Samos, and thence, taking with him an additional S jj r ° mbi ^ 
 Samian vessel, sailed to Teos and warned the inhabitants Teos. 
 against revolt. But Chalcideus with twenty-three ships ^wiy ar ’ 
 a Cp. ii. 24. 
 
VIII. 
 
 escapes 
 Chalcideus 
 and Alci- 
 biades, by 
 whom he 
 is chased 
 into Samos. 
 (4) Teos 
 revolts. 
 
 i7- 
 
 Chalcideus 
 and Alci- 
 biades raise 
 a revolt in 
 (5) Miletus, 
 in their turn 
 narrowly 
 escaping 
 Strombi- 
 chides and 
 Thrasycles, 
 who anchor 
 at Lade. 
 
 560 MILETUS JOINS IN THE REVOLT. 
 
 was on his way from Chios to Teos, intending to attack 
 it; he was assisted by the land-forces of Clazomenae 
 and Erythrae, which followed his movements on the 
 shore. Strombichides saw him in time, and put out to 
 sea before he arrived. When fairly away from land he 
 observed the superior numbers of the fleet coming from 
 Chios, and fled towards Samos, pursued by the enemy. 
 The land-forces were not at first received by the Teans, 
 but after the flight of the Athenians they admitted 
 them. The troops waited a little for the return of 
 Chalcideus from the pursuit, but as he did not come 
 they proceeded without him to demolish the fort which 
 the Athenians had built for the protection of Teos on 
 the land side. A few barbarians under the command 
 of Stages, a lieutenant of Tissaphernes, came and joined 
 in the work of demolition. 
 
 Chalcideus and Alcibiades, when they had chased 
 Strombichides to Samos, gave heavy arms to the crews 
 of the ships which they had brought from Peloponnesus, 
 and left them in Chios. Then, having manned their own 
 vessels and twenty others with Chians, they sailed to 
 Miletus, intending to raise a revolt. For Alcibiades, 
 who was on friendly terms with the principal Milesians, 
 wanted to gain over the place before any more ships 
 from Peloponnesus arrived, and, using the Chian troops 
 and those of Chalcideus only, to spread revolt far and 
 wide among the cities of Ionia. Thus he would gain 
 the chief credit of the expedition for the Chians, for 
 himself, for Chalcideus; and, in fulfilment of his pro¬ 
 mise a , for Endius, who had sent him out. They were 
 not observed during the greater part of their voyage, 
 and, although narrowly escaping from Strombichides, 
 and from Thrasycles who had just arrived with twelve 
 ships from Athens and had joined Strombichides in the 
 pursuit, they succeeded in raising a revolt in Miletus. 
 The Athenians followed close behind them with nine¬ 
 teen ships, but the Milesians would not receive them, 
 a Cp. viii. 12. 
 
 
mo 
 
 .C. 412. 
 1. 92. 
 
 FIRST TREATY WITH PERSIA. 561 
 
 and they came to anchor at Lade, the island opposite VIII. 
 the town. Immediately after the revolt of Miletus the 
 Lacedaemonians made their first alliance with the King 
 of Persia, which was negotiated by Tissaphernes and 
 Chalcideus. It ran as follows :— 
 
 c The Lacedaemonians and their allies make an alliance 18. 
 with the King and Tissaphernes on the following terms:— Treaty of 
 'I. All the territory and all the cities which are in ail that 
 possession of the King, or were in possession of his fore- subjecTto 
 fathers, shall be the King’s a , and whatever revenue or of e P ^f s 
 other advantages the Athenians derived from these sha . n be .„ 
 
 ... r . . theirs still. 
 
 cities, the King, and the Lacedaemonians and their 
 allies, shall combine to prevent them from receiving 
 such revenue or advantage. 
 
 ‘ II. The King, and the Lacedaemonians and their al¬ 
 lies, shall carry on the war against the Athenians in com¬ 
 mon, and they shall not make peace with the Athenians 
 unless both parties—the King on the one hand and the 
 Lacedaemonians and their allies on the other—agree. 
 
 c III. Whosoever revolts from the King shall be the 
 enemy of the Lacedaemonians and their allies, and 
 whosoever revolts from the Lacedaemonians and their 
 allies shall be the enemy of the King in like manner/ 
 
 Such were the terms of the alliance. 
 
 Shortly afterwards the Chians manned ten more 19. 
 ships and sailed to Anaea, wanting to hear whether the Zeal of the 
 attempt on Miletus had succeeded, and to draw fresh The Athe- 
 cities into the revolt. A message however was brought fou?of ake 
 from Chalcideus, bidding them return, and warning them 
 that Amorges was coming thither by land at the head (6) Lebedus 
 of an army. So they sailed to the Temple of Zeus b , Erae.^ 
 where they caught sight of sixteen Athenian ships 
 which Diomedon, following Thrasycles, was bringing 
 from Athens. They instantly fled ; one ship to Ephesus, 
 the remainder towards Teos. Four of them the Athe¬ 
 nians took empty, the crews having got safe to land ; 
 
 a Cp. viii. 43 med. 
 
 b A place so called between Lebedus and Colophon. 
 
 O o 
 
VIII. 
 
 20 . 
 
 Escape of 
 the ships 
 blockaded 
 at Piraeum. 
 They pre¬ 
 pare to start 
 for Chios. 
 
 Teos once 
 more re¬ 
 ceives the 
 Athenians. 
 
 21 . 
 
 The people 
 of Samos 
 rise against 
 the nobles 
 and set up 
 a demo¬ 
 cracy. 
 
 The Athe¬ 
 nians grant 
 them inde¬ 
 pendence. 
 
 22 . 
 
 The Chians 
 send a fleet 
 to Lesbos. 
 
 562 RE VOLUTION IN SAMOS . 
 
 the rest escaped to Teos. The Athenians then sailed 
 away to Samos. The Chians with their remaining ships 
 put to sea, and, assisted by the land-forces of their allies a , 
 caused first Lebedus, and afterwards Erae, to revolt. 
 Both the army and the fleet then returned home. 
 
 About the same time the twenty Peloponnesian ships 
 which had been chased into Piraeum, and were now block¬ 
 aded by a like number of Athenian ships, made a sally, 
 defeated the Athenians, and took four ships ; they then 
 got away to Cenchreae, and once more prepared to sail to 
 Chios and Ionia. At Cenchreae they were met by Asty- 
 ochus, the admiral from Lacedaemon, to whom the whole 
 of the Peloponnesian navy was about to be entrusted. 
 
 By this time the land-forces of Clazomenae and 
 Erythrae had retired from Teos, and Tissaphernes, who 
 had led a second army thither in person arid overthrown 
 what was left of the Athenian fort, had retired also. 
 Not long after his departure, Diomedon arrived with 
 ten ships, and made an agreement with the Teans, who 
 promised to receive the Athenians as well as the Pelo¬ 
 ponnesians. He then sailed to Erae, which he attacked 
 without success, and departed. 
 
 About the same time a great revolution occurred in 
 Samos. The people, aided by the crews of three Athe¬ 
 nian vessels which happened to be on the spot, rose 
 against the nobles, slew in all about two hundred of them, 
 and banished four hundred more; they then distributed 
 their land and houses among themselves. The Athenian 
 people, now assured of their fidelity, granted them inde¬ 
 pendence ; and henceforward the city was in the hands 
 of the democracy. They denied to the former landed 
 proprietors all the privileges of citizenship, not even 
 allowing them to contract marriage with any family be¬ 
 longing to the people, nor any of the people with them. 
 
 The zeal of the Chians did not abate. They had 
 already begun to go out with armies and raise revolts 
 independently of the Peloponnesians b , and they wished 
 a Cp. viii. 16 init. Cp. viii. 19. 
 
 DQO 
 
mo 
 
 REVOLT AND RECOVERY OF MITYLENE. 563 
 
 .c. 412. to draw as many cities as they could into their own VIII. 
 
 92 ‘ danger. During the same summer they sent out a Aland 
 
 J army co- 
 
 Chian fleet numbering thirteen ships. The expedition operates 
 
 was directed first against Lesbos, the Lacedaemonians They in- ’ 
 having originally instructed their officers to proceed from 
 Chios to Lesbos, and thence to the Hellespont a . It and (9) 
 
 1 Methymna 
 
 was placed under the command of Deiniadas, one of the to revolt. 
 Chian Perioeci. Meanwhile the infantry of the Pelopon¬ 
 nesians and of the neighbouring allies, under Evalas, a 
 Spartan, moved along the shore towards Clazomenae and 
 Cymb. The fleet sailed to Lesbos, and first induced 
 Methymna to rebel; there leaving four of their ships, 
 with the remainder they raised a revolt in Mitylene. 
 
 Meanwhile Astyochus the Lacedaemonian admiral, 23. 
 with four ships, set forth, as he intended, from Cen- T . he Athe - 
 
 A ^ # mans first, 
 
 chreae, and arrived at Chios. On the third day after and after- 
 
 his arrival a division of the Athenian fleet, numbering Astyochus, 
 twenty-five ships, sailed to Lesbos under the command J^wiyS- 
 of Leon and Diomedon ; Leon had arrived from Athens rived from 
 
 Cenchreae, 
 
 later than Diomedon with a reinforcement of ten ships, sail to 
 On the same day, towards evening, Astyochus put to Mityien^ is 
 sea, and taking with him one Chian ship, sailed to byuie 1 
 Lesbos, that he might render any assistance which he Athenians, 
 could to the Chian fleet. He came to Pyrrha, and on Chian ships 
 the following day to Eresus, where he heard that Attempt to 
 Mitylen£ had been taken by the Athenians at the first Methymna, 
 blow. The Athenian ships had sailed right into the which fails, 
 harbour when they were least expected, and captured plans of 
 the Chian vessels ; the men on board had then landed, ^L^sbos. 
 and defeating in a battle a Mitylenean force which came JaL^- 6 " 
 out to meet them, had taken possession of the city. 
 Astyochus heard the news from the Eresians, and from Lesbos, 
 the Chian ships which had been left with Eubulus at wards cia- 
 Methymna. They had fled when Mitylene was taken, zomenae - 
 and had now fallen in with him ; but only three out of 
 the four, for one of them had been captured by the Athe¬ 
 nians. Upon this, instead of going on to Mitylene, he 
 a Cp. viii. 8 med. 
 
 0 0 2 
 
564 DECLINE OF LACEDAEMONIAN AFFAIRS. 
 
 VIII. 
 
 24. 
 
 The Athe¬ 
 nians at 
 Lade make 
 a descent 
 upon Mi¬ 
 letus. 
 
 Chalcideus 
 is slain. 
 
 The Athe¬ 
 nians at 
 Lesbos 
 carry on 
 the war 
 against 
 the Chians, 
 who are 
 defeated 
 in three 
 battles and 
 undergo 
 great suffer¬ 
 ings. 
 
 Yet they 
 had been 
 very rich, 
 and their 
 government 
 was wise 
 and mo¬ 
 derate . 
 
 raised a revolt in Eresus, and armed the inhabitants : he B.c. 412. 
 then disembarked the heavy-armed from his ships and 92 ‘ 
 sent them by land to Antissa and Methymna under the 
 command of Eteonicus ; and with his own and the three 
 Chian ships coasted thither himself, hoping that the 
 Methymnaeans would take courage at the sight of them 
 and persevere in their revolt. But everything went 
 against him in Lesbos; so he re-embarked his troops 
 and sailed back to Chios. The land-forces from the 
 ships which were intended to go to the Hellespont also 
 returned to their several homes. Not long afterwards 
 six ships came to Chios from the allied forces of the 
 Peloponnesians now collected at Cenchreae. The Athe¬ 
 nians, when they had re-established their influence in 
 Lesbos, sailed away, and having taken Polichne on the 
 mainland, which the Clazomenians were fortifying a , 
 brought them all back to their city on the island, except 
 the authors of the revolt, who had escaped to Daphnus. 
 
 So Clazomenae returned to the Athenian alliance. 
 
 During the same summer the Athenians, who were 
 stationed with twenty of their ships at the island of 
 Lad£ b and were watching the enemy in Miletus, made 
 a descent upon Panormus in the Milesian territory. 
 Chalcideus the Lacedaemonian general with a few fol¬ 
 lowers came out to meet them, but was killed, Three 
 days later they again sailed across and set up a trophy, 
 which the Milesians pulled down, because the Athenians 
 were not really masters of the ground at the time when 
 they erected it. Leon and Diomedon, who were at 
 Lesbos with the rest of the Athenian fleet, stationed 
 their ships at the islands called Oenussae which lie in 
 front of Chios, at Sidussa and Pteleum, which were forts 
 held by them in the Erythraean territory, and at Lesbos 
 itself, and carried on the war by sea against the Chians. 
 
 The marines whom they had on board were hoplites 
 taken from the roll and compelled to serve. They made 
 descents upon Cardamyle and Bolissus, and having 
 a Cp. viii. 14 fin. b Cp. viii. 17 fin. 
 
THE DOWNFALL OF CHIOS . 
 
 565 
 
 B.c. 412. defeated with heavy loss the Chians who came out to VIII. 
 
 ' 92 ‘ meet them, they devastated all that region. In another ^ or was 
 battle at Phanae they defeated them again, and in a imprudence 
 third at Leuconium. Henceforward the Chians remained revolt, 
 within their walls. The Athenians ravaged their country, ^their”^ 
 which was well stocked, and from the Persian War losse j i a 
 until that time had never been touched by an invader, now sets in, 
 No people as far as I know, except the Chians andtobesup- 
 Lacedaemonians (but the Chians not equally with the pressed ' 
 Lacedaemonians), have preserved moderation in pros¬ 
 perity, and in proportion as their city has gained in’ 
 power have gained also in the stability of their govern¬ 
 ment. In this revolt they may seem to have shown 
 a want of prudence, yet they did not venture upon it 
 until many brave allies were ready to share the peril 
 with them, and until the Athenians themselves seemed 
 to confess that after their calamity in Sicily the state of 
 their affairs was hopelessly bad. And, if they were 
 deceived through the uncertainty of human things, this 
 error of judgment was common to many who, like them, 
 believed that the Athenian power would speedily be 
 overthrown. But now that they were driven off the 
 sea and saw their lands ravaged, some of their citizens 
 undertook to bring back the city to the Athenians. The 
 magistrates perceived their design, but instead of acting 
 themselves, they sent to Erythrae for Astyochus the 
 admiral. He came with four ships which he had on the 
 spot, and they considered together by what means the 
 conspiracy might be suppressed with the least violence, 
 whether by taking hostages or in some other way. 
 
 The Lacedaemonians were thus engaged in Chios 25. 
 when towards the end of the summer there came from Athenian 
 Athens a thousand Athenian hoplites and fifteen hun- ments 
 dred Argives, of whom five hundred were originally light- Ablttie 
 armed, but the Athenians gave them heavy arms; also ^fo^the 6 
 a thousand of the allies. They were conveyed in forty- wails of 
 
 . , Miletus, in 
 
 eight ships, of which some were transports, under the which the 
 command of Phrynichus, Onomacles, and Scironides. defeaTthe 
 
566 THE ATHENIANS AT MILETUS. 
 
 VIII. 
 
 Pelopon¬ 
 nesians and 
 the Argives 
 are defeated 
 by the 
 Milesians. 
 Alcibiades 
 is fighting 
 in the Mile¬ 
 sian army. 
 Attempt to 
 invest 
 Miletus. 
 
 26. 
 
 Approach 
 of thirty- 
 three Pelo¬ 
 ponnesian 
 and twenty- 
 two Sicilian 
 vessels 
 under Her- 
 mocrates. 
 Alcibiades 
 advises 
 them to go 
 instantly to 
 the relief 
 of Miletus. 
 
 Sailing first to Samos they crossed over to Miletus, and 
 there took up a position. The Milesians with a force 
 of eight hundred heavy-armed of their own, the Pelopon¬ 
 nesians who came with Chalcideus, and certain foreign 
 mercenaries of Tissaphernes, who was there in person 
 with his cavalry, went out and engaged the Athenians 
 and their allies. The Argives on their own wing dashed 
 forward, and made a disorderly attack upon the troops 
 opposed to them, whom they despised; they thought 
 that, being Ionians, they would be sure to run away a . 
 But they were defeated by the Milesians, and nearly 
 three hundred of them perished. The Athenians first 
 overcame the Peloponnesians, and then forced back the 
 barbarians and the inferior troops. But they never en¬ 
 gaged the Milesians, who, after routing the Argives, when 
 they saw their other wing defeated, returned to the city. 
 The Athenians, having won the day, took up a position 
 close under the walls of Miletus. In this engagement 
 the Ionians on both sides had the advantage of the 
 Dorians; for the Athenians vanquished the Pelopon¬ 
 nesians who were opposed to them, and the Milesians 
 vanquished the Argives b . The Athenians now raised a 
 trophy, and prepared to build a wall across the isthmus 
 which separates the city from the mainland, thinking 
 that, if they could reduce Miletus, the other cities would 
 quickly return to their allegiance. 
 
 But meanwhile, late in the afternoon, news was brought 
 to them that a fleet of fifty-five ships from Peloponnesus 
 and Sicily was close at hand. Hermocrates the Syra¬ 
 cusan had urged the Sicilians to assist in completing the 
 overthrow of Athens. Twenty ships came from Syracuse, 
 two from Selinus, and with them the Peloponnesian ships 
 which had been in preparation 0 . The two squadrons 
 were entrusted to Theramenes, who was to conduct them 
 to Astyochus the admiral. They sailed first to Eleus d , 
 
 a Cp. i. 124 init.; v. 9 init.; vi. 77 med.; vii. 5 fin. 
 
 b Cp. iv. 12 fin. c Cp. viii. 6 fin. 
 
 d Or, according to the reading of the Vatican MS. adopted by 
 Bekker, ‘Leros:’ cp. infra, 27 init. 
 
 ffl O 
 
mo 
 
 PHRYNICHUS INSISTS ON RETREATING. 567 
 
 .C. 412. 
 1. 92. 
 
 an island lying off Miletus. Thence, finding that the VIII. 
 Athenians were at Miletus, they sailed away to the 
 Iasian Gulf, wanting to ascertain the fate of the town. 
 Alcibiades came on horseback to Teichiussa in the 
 Milesian territory, the point of the gulf at which the 
 fleet had passed the night, and from him they received 
 news of the battle. For he had been present, and had 
 fought on the side of the Milesians and Tissaphernes. 
 
 And he recommended them, if they did not mean to 
 ruin their cause in Ionia and everywhere else, to assist 
 Miletus at once, and break up the blockade. 
 
 They determined to go at daybreak and relieve the 27. 
 place. But Phrynichus the Athenian general had cer-They agree; 
 tain information from Leros of their approach, and, al- Athenians 
 though his colleagues wanted to remain and risk a battle, £f thei? 
 he refused and declared that he would neither himself a PP roach 
 
 on the 
 
 fight, nor allow them or any one else to fight if he evening of 
 could help it. For when they might discover the exact victory, 
 number of the enemy’s ships and the proportion which advice of 
 their own bore to them, and, before engaging, make Phrynichus, 
 adequate preparations at their leisure, he would not be rules his 
 so foolish as to risk all through fear of disgrace. There withdSw S ’ 
 was no dishonour in Athenians retreating before an to bamos * 
 enemy’s fleet when circumstances required. But there 
 would be the deepest dishonour under any circumstances 
 or in a defeat; and the city would then not only incur 
 disgrace, but would be in the utmost danger. Even if 
 their preparations were complete and satisfactory, Athens 
 after her recent disasters ought not to take the offensive, 
 or in any case not without absolute necessity; and now 
 when they were not compelled, why should they go out 
 of their way to court danger? He urged them to put 
 on board their wounded, and their infantry, and all the 
 stores which they had brought with them, but to leave 
 behind the plunder obtained from the enemy’s country, 
 that their ships might be lighter; they should sail back 
 to Samos, and there uniting all their forces, they might 
 go on making attacks upon Miletus when opportunity 
 
568 THE PELOPONNESIANS AT MILETUS. 
 
 VIII. 
 
 Character 
 of Phry- 
 nichus. 
 
 28. 
 
 The Pelo¬ 
 ponnesians 
 at the sug¬ 
 gestion of 
 Tissa- 
 phemes 
 attack and 
 take Iasus. 
 Amorges is 
 made pri¬ 
 soner. 
 Pedaritus 
 sets out for 
 Chios, of 
 which he 
 had been 
 appointed 
 governor. 
 
 offered. His advice was followed. And not on this 
 occasion only, but quite as much afterwards, whenever 
 Phrynichus had to act, he showed himself to be a man 
 of great sagacity a .—So the Athenians departed that 
 very evening from Miletus without completing their 
 victory, and the Argives, hurrying away from Samos 
 after their disaster, went home in a rage. 
 
 At dawn the Peloponnesians sailed from Teichiussa, 
 and on their arrival at Miletus found that the Athenians 
 had left: after remaining one day, on the morrow they 
 took the Chian ships which under the command of 
 Chalcideus had previously been chased into Miletus b , 
 and resolved to go back to Teichiussa and fetch the naval 
 stores of which they had lightened the ships. There they 
 found Tissaphernes, who had come with his infantry; he 
 persuaded them to sail against Iasus, in which his enemy 
 Amorges lay. So they attacked Iasus, which they‘took 
 by a sudden assault; for it never occurred to the inhabi¬ 
 tants that their ships were not Athenian. The Syracu¬ 
 sans distinguished themselves greatly in the action. The 
 Peloponnesians took captive Amorges the natural son 
 of Pissuthnes, who had rebelled, and gave him to Tissa¬ 
 phernes, that, if he liked, he might convey him to the 
 King in obedience to the royal command 0 . They then 
 plundered Iasus, and the army obtained a great deal of 
 treasure; for the city had been rich from early times. 
 They did no harm to the mercenaries of Amorges, but 
 received them into their own ranks; for most of them 
 came from Peloponnesus. The town, and all their 
 prisoners, whether bond or free, were delivered by them 
 into the hands of Tissaphernes, who engaged to give 
 them a Daric stater d for each man ; they then returned 
 to Miletus. Thence they despatched by land as far as 
 Erythrae Pedaritus the son of Leon, whom the Lacedae¬ 
 monians had sent out to be governor of Chios ; he was 
 escorted by the mercenaries who had been in the service 
 
 a Cp. viii. 68 med. b Cp. viii. 17 fin. 
 
 c Cp. viii. 5 fm. cl Twenty Attic drachmae, about i6j-. 
 
 CQO 
 
o w 
 
 .C. 412. 
 1. 92. 
 
 TISSAPHERNES REDUCES THE PAY . 569 
 
 of Amorges. Philip, who was on the spot, was to remain VIII. 
 and take charge of Miletus. So the summer ended. 
 
 During the following winter, Tissaphernes, after he 29. 
 had put a garrison in Iasus, came to Miletus. There he Q f e p^ tlon 
 distributed one month 3 s pay among all the ships, at the Tissa- 
 
 r a • 1 1 1 1 • phernes 
 
 rate of an Attic drachma a a day per man, as his envoy agrees to 
 
 had promised at Lacedaemon ; in future he proposed to fatentlTto 
 
 give half a drachma only until he had asked the King’s ^. e 
 
 leave, promising that if he obtained it he would pay the rather more 
 . t 1 ^ , /tt than three 
 
 entire drachma. On the remonstrance, however, of Her- obois a-day 
 mocrates the Syracusan general (Theramenes not being saifor* 
 himself admiral, but only taking charge of the ships 
 which he was to hand over to Astyochus, took no 
 interest in the matter of the pay), he promised to each 
 man a payment of somewhat more than three obois, 
 reckoning the total sum paid to every five ships. For he 
 offered to every five ships, up to the number of fifty-five b , 
 three talents a month, and to any ships in excess of this 
 number he agreed to give at a like rate. 
 
 During the same winter there arrived at Samos from 30. 
 Athens thirty-five ships, under the command of Char- Arrival of 
 
 .. remforce- 
 
 minus, Strombichides, and Euctemon. Whereupon the ments. 
 generals assembled their whole fleet, including the ships Samos* and 
 engaged at Chios c , their purpose being to make a distri- ^of the 
 bution of their forces by lot. The principal division was ^ t enian 
 to continue watching Miletus, while a second force of Thirty-three 
 ships and soldiers was to be sent to Chios. Accordingly t^Chfos 1 ! 
 Strombichides, Onomacles, and Euctemon, with thirty reSTat^ 
 ships, besides transports in which they conveyed a por- Samos - 
 tion of the thousand heavy-armed who joined the army 
 at Miletus d , sailed away to Chios, the duty which the lot 
 assigned to them. The other generals remaining at 
 Samos with seventy-four ships, and having the mastery 
 of the sea, prepared to make a descent upon Miletus. 
 
 Astyochus was at Chios selecting hostages as a pre- 3 1 * 
 caution against the betrayal of the island to Athens e , 
 
 a g^d. b Retaining, with the MSS., Kal irevT^KovTa after vaus. 
 
 c Cp. viii. 24 init. d Cp. viii. 25 init. 6 Cp. viii. 24 fin. 
 
57 ° 
 
 ILL-FORTUXE OF ASTYOCHUS. 
 
 VIII. 
 
 attack on 
 
 Pteleum 
 
 and Cla- 
 
 zomenae. 
 
 The 
 
 weather 
 
 is much 
 
 against 
 
 him. 
 
 32. 
 
 The Les¬ 
 bians are 
 again 
 desirous 
 to revolt. 
 Astyochus 
 is willing 
 to assist, 
 but Pedari- 
 tus, the new 
 governor 
 of Chios, 
 and the 
 Chians, 
 refuse to 
 join. 
 
 but when he heard of the reinforcements which Thera- B.C. 412. 
 menes had brought, and of the improved prospects of 92 ’ 
 the allies, he desisted, and taking with him his own 
 Peloponnesian ships, ten in number a , and ten Chian, he 
 put to sea. Failing in an attack upon Pteleum he sailed 
 on to Clazomenae, and demanded that the Athenian 
 party should settle at Daphnus b on the mainland, and 
 come over to the Peloponnesians : Tamos, one of the 
 Persian lieutenants of Ionia, joined in the demand. But 
 the Clazomenians would not listen to him ; whereupon 
 he assaulted the city (which was unwalled), but being 
 unable to take it, sailed away with a strong wind. He 
 was himself carried to Phocaea and Cyme, and the re¬ 
 mainder of the fleet put into the islands, Marathussa, 
 
 Pele, and Drymussa, which lie off Clazomenae. There, 
 being detained eight days by the weather, they spoiled 
 and destroyed part of the property of the Clazomenians 
 which had been deposited in the islands, and, taking 
 part on board, they sailed away to Phocaea and Cyme, 
 where they rejoined Astyochus. 
 
 While Astyochus was there, envoys came to him from 
 Lesbos; the Lesbians were once more eager to revolt, 
 and he was willing to assist them ; but the Corinthians 
 and the other allies were disheartened by the previous 
 failure. So he put to sea and sailed back to Chios. His 
 ships were scattered by a storm, and reached Chios from 
 various places. Soon afterwards Pedaritus and his army c 
 having come by land from Miletus to Erythrae, where he 
 crossed the channel, arrived in Chios. On his arrival he 
 found at his disposal the sailors whom Chalcideus had 
 taken from his five ships d and left in Chios fully armed, 
 to the number of five hundred. Some of the Lesbians 
 renewing their proposal to revolt, Astyochus suggested 
 to Pedaritus and the Chians that they should go with 
 the fleet to Lesbos and raise the country; they would 
 thus increase the number of their allies, and, even if the 
 
 Cp. viii. 23 init. and fin. 
 Cp. viii. 28 fin. 
 
 b Cp. viii. 23 fin. 
 d Cp. viii. 17 init. 
 
HIS NARROW ESCAPE. 
 
 571 
 
 B.c. 412. attempt did not wholly succeed, they would injure the VIII. 
 
 ' 92# Athenians. But they would not listen, and Pedaritus 
 refused to let him have the Chian ships. 
 
 So Astyochus took five Corinthian ships a and a sixth 33 - 
 from Megara, one from Hermione, and the Lacedae- for 
 
 monian ships which he had brought with him b , and set Miletus 
 sail for Miletus in order to assume his command. Hethecom- 
 , threatened the Chians, again and again, that he would Sefleeif. 
 certainly not help them when their time of need came, 
 Touching at Corycus in Erythraea he passed the night escapes the 
 
 gV / . . _ r b Athenian 
 
 there. The Athenian ships from Samos were now on squadron 
 their way to Chios ; they had put in at a place where to^Chfos. 
 they were only divided from the Peloponnesians by a hill, J r e 1C £^ 
 and neither fleet knew that the other was so near. But thraean 
 
 • 1 1 1 r _ prisoners. 
 
 that night there came a despatch from Pedaritus in¬ 
 forming Astyochus that certain Erythraean prisoners had 
 been released by the Athenians from Samos on con¬ 
 dition of betraying Erythrae, and had gone thither with 
 that intention. Whereupon Astyochus sailed back to 
 Erythrae. So narrowly did he escape falling into the 
 hands of the Athenians. Pedaritus sailed over to meet 
 him. They then enquired about the supposed traitors, 
 and found that the whole matter was a trick which the 
 men had devised in order to get away from Samos ; so 
 they acquitted them of the charge, and Pedaritus re¬ 
 turned to Chios, while Astyochus resumed his voyage to 
 Miletus. 
 
 In the meantime the Athenian fleet, sailing round the 34. 
 
 promontory of Corycus towards Arginus, lighted upon Three 
 
 three Chian ships of war, to which they gave chase. A s hi ps in 
 
 great storm came on, and the Chian ships with difficulty three ChLi 
 
 escaped into their harbour, but of the Athenian ships the are wrecked 
 r m 1 # in a storm. 
 
 three which were most zealous in the pursuit were dis¬ 
 abled and driven ashore near the city of Chios; the 
 crews were either lost or taken captive. The remainder 
 of the fleet found shelter in the harbour called Phoenicus, 
 lying under Mount Mimas, whence again setting sail 
 a Cp. viii. 23 fin. b Cp. viii. 23 init. 
 
VIII. 
 
 35 - 
 
 (io) Cnidus, 
 which has 
 revolted 
 from 
 Athens, 
 is attacked 
 by the 
 Athenians. 
 They take 
 six newly- 
 arrived 
 ships of the 
 allies, and 
 are nearly 
 but not 
 quite suc¬ 
 cessful in 
 taking the 
 town. 
 
 36 . 
 
 The Mile¬ 
 sians are in 
 earnest. 
 The spoils 
 of Iasus 
 maintain 
 the army. 
 The Pelo¬ 
 ponnesians 
 repent of 
 their first 
 treaty with 
 Persia, and 
 make an¬ 
 other, 
 
 37 - 
 
 In this 
 treaty the 
 
 572 THE ATHENIANS AT CNIDUS. 
 
 they put in at Lesbos, and made preparations for build¬ 
 ing the fort which they meant to establish in Chios. 
 
 During the same winter, Hippocrates the Lacedae¬ 
 monian sailed from Lacedaemon with one Laconian, one 
 Syracusan, and ten Thurian ships; of these last Dorieus 
 the son of Diagoras and two others were the commanders. 
 They put in at Cnidus, which under the influence of 
 Tissaphernes a had already revolted from Athens. The 
 Peloponnesian authorities at Miletus, when they heard 
 of their arrival, ordered one half of these ships to pro¬ 
 tect Cnidus, and the other half to cruise off Triopium 
 and seize the merchant-vessels which put in there from 
 Egypt. This Triopium is a promontory in the district 
 of Cnidus on which there is a temple of Apollo. The 
 Athenians, hearing of their intentions, sailed from Samos 
 and captured the six ships which were keeping guard at 
 Triopium; the crews escaped. They then sailed to Cni¬ 
 dus, and attacking the town, which was unwalled, all but 
 took it. On the following day they made a second attack, 
 but during the night the inhabitants had improved their 
 hasty defences, and some of the men who had escaped 
 from the ships captured at Triopium had come into the 
 city. So the Athenian assault was less destructive than 
 on the first day; and after devastating the territory of 
 Cnidus they departed and sailed back to Samos. 
 
 When Astyochus came to Miletus and took the com¬ 
 mand of the fleet he found the Peloponnesians still 
 abundantly provided with all requisites. They had 
 sufficient pay; the great spoils taken at Iasus were in 
 the hands of the army, and the Milesians carried on the 
 war with a will. The Peloponnesians however considered 
 the former treaty made between Tissaphernes and Chal- 
 cideus defective and disadvantageous to them ; so before 
 the departure of Theramenes they made new terms of 
 alliance, which were as follows :— 
 
 ‘ The Lacedaemonians and their allies make agreement 
 with King Darius and the sons of the King, and with 
 a Cp. viii, 109 init. 
 
 m o 
 
SECOND TREATY WITH PERSIA. 573 
 
 B.C. 412 
 01. 92. 
 
 . Tissaphernes, that there shall be alliance and friendship VIIL 
 between them on the following conditions :— Kmg are* 16 
 
 1 1 . Whatever territory and cities belong to King less directly 
 Darius, or formerly belonged to his father, or to his i n the 
 ancestors, against these neither the Lacedaemonians former * 
 nor their allies shall make war, or do them any hurt, 
 nor shall the Lacedaemonians or their allies exact tribute 
 of them. Neither Darius the King nor the subjects of 
 the King shall make war upon the Lacedaemonians or 
 their allies, or do them any hurt. 
 
 ‘ II. If the Lacedaemonians or their allies have need of 
 anything from the King, or the King have need of any¬ 
 thing from the Lacedaemonians and their allies, what¬ 
 ever they do by mutual agreement shall hold good. 
 
 ‘ III. They shall carry on the war against the Athenians 
 and their allies in common, and if they make peace, shall 
 make.peace in common. 
 
 ‘ IV. The King shall defray the expense of any number 
 of troops for which the King has sent, so long as they 
 remain in the King’s country. 
 
 c V. If any of the cities who are parties to this treaty 
 go against the King’s country, the rest shall interfere and 
 aid the King to the utmost of their power. And if any 
 of the inhabitants of the King’s country or any country 
 under the dominion of the King shall go against the 
 country of the Lacedaemonians or their allies, the King 
 shall interfere and aid them to the utmost of his power/ 
 
 After the conclusion of the treaty, Theramenes, having 38. 
 delivered over the fleet to Astyochus, sailed away in a The Chians 
 small boat and was no more heard of. The Athenians, to inaction, 
 who had now crossed over with their troops from Lesbos ^toreare 
 to Chios, and had the upper hand both by land and sea, 
 began to fortify Delphinium, a place not far distant from government 
 the town of Chios, which had the double advantage of a close 
 being strong by land and of possessing harbours. The pelaritu^ 
 Chians meanwhile remained inactive; they had been complains 
 
 • 111 - - , . to oparta of 
 
 already badly beaten in several battles, and their in- Astyochus. 
 ternal condition was far from satisfactory; for Tydeus 
 
VIII. 
 
 39 - 
 
 The Lace¬ 
 daemonians 
 resolve to 
 assist 
 Phama- 
 bazus at the 
 Hellespont. 
 They send 
 eleven 
 assessors 
 to control 
 Astyochus. 
 
 574 MISERABLE STATE OF CHIOS. 
 
 the son of Ion and his accomplices had been executed 
 by Pedaritus on a charge of complicity with Athens, and 
 the city was reduced by the strong hand to a mere 
 oligarchy. Hence they were in a state of mutual dis¬ 
 trust, and could not be persuaded that either they or 
 the mercenaries a brought by Pedaritus were a match 
 for the enemy. They sent however to Miletus and re¬ 
 quested the aid of Astyochus, but he refused. Where¬ 
 upon Pedaritus sent a despatch to Lacedaemon, com¬ 
 plaining of his misconduct. So favourable to the Athe¬ 
 nians was the course of affairs in Chios. The main fleet, 
 which they had left at Samos, from time to time made 
 threatening movements against the enemy at Miletus, 
 but as they would never come out, the Athenians at 
 length retired to Samos and there remained. 
 
 During the same winter, about the solstice, twenty 
 ships which Calligeitus of Megara and Timagoras of 
 Cyzicus, the agents of Pharnabazus, had persuaded the 
 Lacedaemonians to fit out in his interest 11 , sailed for 
 Ionia : they were placed under the command of Antis- 
 thenes, a Spartan. The Lacedaemonians sent at the 
 same time eleven Spartans to act as advisers 0 to Astyo¬ 
 chus, one of whom was Lichas the son of Arcesilaus d . 
 Besides receiving a general commission to assist in the 
 direction of affairs to the best of their judgment, they 
 were empowered on their arrival at Miletus to send on, 
 if they saw fit, these ships, or a larger or smaller number, 
 to Pharnabazus at the Hellespont under the command 
 of Clearchus e the son of Rhamphias, who sailed with 
 them. The eleven might also, if they thought good, 
 deprive Astyochus of his command and appoint Antis- 
 thenes in his place, for the despatch of Pedaritus had 
 excited suspicion against him. So the ships sailed from 
 Malea over the open sea until they came to Melos. 
 There they lighted on ten Athenian ships; of these 
 
 a Cp. viii. 28 fin. b Cp. viii. 6 init. 
 
 c Cp. ii. 85 init.; iii. 69 med.; v. 63 fin. 
 d Cp. v. 50 med. e Cp. viii. 8 med. 
 
 CQ O 
 
O GJ 
 
 ASTYOCHUS AND THE CHIANS AGAIN. S7 5 
 
 .c. 412. they took three without their crews and burned them. VIII. 
 
 ' 92 ‘ But then, fearing that the remainder which had escaped 
 would, as in fact they did, give information of their ap¬ 
 proach to the fleet at Samos, they took the precaution 
 of going by a longer route. And sailing round by Crete 
 they put in at Caunus in Asia. They thought that they 
 were now safe, and sent a messenger to the fleet at 
 Miletus requesting a convoy. 
 
 Meanwhile the Chians and Pedaritus continued to 40. 
 send messengers to Astyochus, who continued to delay. The^chians 
 They implored him to come to their help with his whole aded. 
 fleet, saying that they were blockaded, and that he should desert SlaVeS 
 not allow the chief ally of Sparta in Ionia to be cut off iast US 
 from the sea and overrun and devastated by land. Now in o d J^ e t d e *° 
 the Chians had more domestic slaves than any other state aid. 
 with the exception of Lacedaemon, and their offences 
 were always more severely punished because of their 
 number; so that, when the Athenian army appeared 
 to be firmly settled in their fortifications, most of them 
 at once deserted to the enemy \ And they did the 
 greatest damage, because they knew the country. The 
 Chians pressed upon the Lacedaemonians the necessity 
 of coming to their assistance while there was still hope 
 of interfering to some purpose; the fortification of 
 Delphinium, though not yet completed, was in pro¬ 
 gress, and the Athenians were beginning to extend the 
 lines of defence which protected their army and ships. 
 Astyochus, seeing that the allies were zealous in the 
 cause, although he had fully meant to carry out his 
 threat, now determined to relieve the Chians. 
 
 But in the meantime he received a message from 41. 
 Caunus, informing him that the twenty-seven ships and 
 his Lacedaemonian advisers had arrived. He thought the twenty- 
 that everything should give way to the importance of^inging^ 
 convoying so large a reinforcement which would secure ^loners 
 to the Lacedaemonians greater command of the sea, and f rom Lace - 
 
 0 _ daemon, 
 
 that he must first of all provide for the safe passage of and coasts 
 a Cp. vii. 27 fin. 
 
576 SHIPS OF ASTYOCHUS IN THE MIST. 
 
 VIII. 
 
 southward 
 to meet 
 them. 
 
 He is 
 persuaded 
 by the 
 Cnidians 
 to sail 
 against 
 twenty 
 Athenian 
 ships which 
 are watch¬ 
 ing for 
 them. 
 
 the commissioners who were to report on his conduct. 
 So he at once gave up his intended expedition to Chios 
 and sailed for Caunus. As he coasted along he made 
 a descent on the island of Cos Meropis. The city was 
 unfortified and had been overthrown by an earthquake, 
 the greatest which has ever happened within our memory. 
 The citizens had fled into the mountains; so he sacked 
 the town and overran and despoiled the country, but let 
 go the free inhabitants. From Cos he came by night to 
 Cnidus, and was prevailed upon by the importunity of 
 the Cnidians, instead of disembarking his men, to sail at 
 once, just as he was, against twenty Athenian ships with 
 which Charminus (one of the generals at Samos) was 
 watching for the twenty-seven ships expected from Pelo¬ 
 ponnesus, being those which Astyochus was going to 
 escort. The Athenians at Samos had heard from Melos 
 of their coming, and Charminus was cruising off the 
 islands of Syme, Chalce, and Rhodes, and on the coast 
 of Lycia ; he had by this time discovered that they 
 were at Caunus. 
 
 42. So Astyochus sailed at once to Syme before his arrival 
 His ships was reported, in the hope that he might come upon the 
 way in the Athenian squadron m the open sea. The ram and 
 left wing ^ cloudy state of the atmosphere caused confusion among 
 and C de- d ships, which lost their way in the fog. When dawn 
 
 th^Athe 7 broke, the fleet was dispersed and the left wing alone 
 mans, who was visible to the Athenians, while the other was still 
 turn 1 fly at straggling off the shore of the island. Charminus and 
 appearance t ^ ie Athenians put out to sea with less than their twenty 
 rest^of the S ^T S} su PP os i n g that these were only the squadron from 
 fleet. Caunus for which they were watching. They at once 
 attacked them, sank three of them, disabled others, and 
 were gaining the victory, when to their surprise there 
 appeared the larger part of the Lacedaemonian fleet 
 threatening to surround them. Whereupon they fled, 
 and in their flight lost six ships, but with the rest gained 
 the island of Teutlussa, and thence Halicarnassus. The 
 Peloponnesians touched at Cnidus, and there uniting 
 
 Odd 
 
o W 
 
 LICHAS DENOUNCES THE TREATIES. 577 
 
 c. 412. with the twenty-seven ships from Caunus, they all sailed VIII. 
 
 * 92 ' to Sym£ and raised a trophy; they then returned and 
 put into port again at Cnidus. 
 
 As soon as the Athenians heard the result of the sea- 43- 
 fight they sailed from Samos to Syme with their whole The Pe . 10 " 
 
 . J ponnesians, 
 
 fleet. They did not attack the Peloponnesians at Cnidus, whoarenow 
 nor the Peloponnesians them ; but they carried away the confer with 
 stores of their own ships which had been left at Syme, and p^rn'es. 
 touching at Loryma, a place on the mainland, returned Li ? has 
 to Samos. The Peloponnesians were now all together the con- 
 at Cnidus, and were making the repairs necessary after fnvoivedin 
 the battle, while the Lacedaemonian commissioners con- Beaties, 
 ferred with Tissaphernes (who was himself on the spot) T _ lssa ~ 
 
 r v 1 1 phernes 
 
 as to any matters in his past dealings with them at goes away 
 which they were displeased, and as to the best manner m a rage ’ 
 of securing their common interests in the future conduct 
 of the war. Lichas entered into the enquiry with great 
 energy; he took exception to both the treaties; that of 
 Chalcideus and that of Theramenes were equally objection¬ 
 able. For the King at that time of day to claim power 
 over all the countries which his ancestors had formerly 
 held was monstrous. If either treaty were carried out, 
 the inhabitants of all the islands, of Thessaly, of Locris, 
 and of all Hellas, as far as Boeotia, would again be re¬ 
 duced to slavery; instead of giving the Hellenes free¬ 
 dom, the Lacedaemonians would be imposing upon them 
 the yoke of Persia. So he desired them to conclude 
 some more satisfactory treaty, for he would have nothing 
 to say to these; he did not want to have the fleet main¬ 
 tained upon any such terms. Tissaphernes was indig¬ 
 nant, and without settling anything went away in a rage. 
 
 Meanwhile the Peloponnesians had been receiving 44 . 
 communications from the chief men of Rhodes, and The Pel °- 
 
 . ponnesians 
 
 resolved to sail thither. They hoped to gam over an persuade 
 island which was strong alike in sailors and in infantry; torevoit^ 
 if successful, they might henceforward maintain their 
 navy by the help of their own allies without asking ^ r d s £ ips 
 Tissaphernes for money. So in the same winter they nothing 
 
 pp 
 
57 8 THE LACEDAEMONIANS AT RHODES. 
 
 VIII. sailed from Cnidus against Rhodes, and first attacked R 
 for eleven Cameirus with ninety-four ships. The inhabitants, who 
 The Athe- were in ignorance of the plot and dwelt in an unfortified 
 arrive too city, were alarmed and began to fly. The Lacedaemo- 
 hindS the nians re-assured them, and assembling the people not 
 revolt, make on jy Q f Cameirus, but of Lindus and Iasus, the two 
 
 descents J 
 
 upon the other cities of Rhodes, persuaded all of them to revolt 
 1 ‘ from the Athenians. Thus Rhodes went over to the 
 
 Peloponnesians. Nearly at the same time the Athenians, 
 who had heard of their intentions, brought up the fleet 
 from Samos, hoping to forestall them ; they appeared in 
 the offing, but finding that they were just too late, sailed 
 to Chalce, and thence back to Samos. They now fought 
 against Rhodes, making descents upon it from Chalce, 
 Cos, and Samos, while the Peloponnesians, having col¬ 
 lected thirty-two talents a from the Rhodians, drew up 
 
 their ships, and did nothing for eleven weeks. 
 
 45- Before the Peloponnesians had removed to Rhodes 
 
 Aidbiades, a ff a i rs took a new turn. After the death of Chalcideus 
 
 m fear of 
 
 his life and the engagement at Miletus b , Alcibiades fell under 
 Spartans, suspicion at Sparta, and orders came from home to 
 TSapher- Astyochus that he should be put to death. For he was 
 
 nes, whom hated by Agis, and generally distrusted. In fear he 
 with argu- retired to Tissaphernes, and soon, by working upon 
 against him, did all he could to injure the Peloponnesian cause, 
 ponnesians He was *n s constant adviser, and induced him to cut 
 and in- down the pay of the sailors from an Attic drachma 
 
 structs m r J 
 
 various to half a drachma 0 , and this was only to be given 
 By 7 his at irregular intervals. Tissaphernes was instructed by 
 pay is cur- him to tell the Peloponnesians that the Athenians, with 
 therevoited ex P er i ence of naval affairs, gave half a drachma 
 
 cities who only, not from poverty, but lest their sailors should 
 
 beg for i • i 
 
 money are be demoralised by high pay, and spend their money 
 refused. on pleasures which injured their health, and thereby 
 impaired their efficiency; d the payment too was made 
 irregularly, that the arrears, which they would forfeit by 
 
 ^7680. b Cp. viii. 24 init., 25. c About 5 d. 
 
 Others translate (omitting The payment too was made irregu- 
 
ALCIBIADES ADVISES TISSAPEIERNES. 579 
 
 B.C. 412. 
 01. 92. 
 
 desertion, might be a pledge of their continuance in the VIII. 
 serviced He also recommended him to bribe the 
 trierarchs and the generals of the allied cities into con¬ 
 senting. They all yielded with the exception of the 
 Syracusans: Hermocrates alone stood firm on behalf 
 of the whole alliance. When the allies who had revolted 
 came asking for money, Alcibiades drove them away 
 himself, saying on behalf of Tissaphernes that the Chians 
 must have lost all sense of shame ; they were the richest 
 people in Hellas, and now, when they were being saved 
 by foreign aid, they wanted other men, not only to risk 
 life, but to expend money in their cause. ' To the other 
 cities he replied that, having paid such large sums to 
 the Athenians before they revolted, they would be inex¬ 
 cusable if they were not willing to contribute as much 
 and even more for their own benefit. He represented 
 further that Tissaphernes was now carrying on the war 
 at his own expense, and must be expected to be careful. 
 
 But if supplies should come from the King he would 
 restore the full pay, and do whatever was reasonable 
 for the cities. 
 
 Alcibiades also advised Tissaphernes not to be in a 46. 
 hurry about putting an end to the war, and neither to Tissa - 
 
 J . phernes 
 
 bring up the Phoenician fleet which he was preparing, should 
 nor to give pay to more Hellenic sailors ; he should not contending 
 be so anxious to put the whole power both by sea and P°^ r s s t one 
 land into the same hands. Let the dominion only another and 
 
 " ' ' .. ' finally get 
 
 remain divided, and then, whichever of the two rivals rid of both, 
 was troublesome, the King might always use the other nians are 
 against him. But if one defeated the other and became naturaT 6 
 supreme on both elements, who would help Tissaphernes ^ng be* 6 
 to overthrow the conqueror? He would have to take cause they 
 the field in person and fight, which he might not like, at empireat 6 
 great risk and expense. The danger would be easily ^not™ 1 
 averted at a fraction of the cost, and at no risk to himself, P™ f ess to 
 if he wore out the Hellenes in mutual strife. Alcibiades liberators 
 
 of Hellas. 
 
 larly’), ‘also lest they should get away from their ships too freely, 
 leaving the pay still owing them as a pledge.’ 
 
 Pp2 
 
VIII. 
 
 Tissa- 
 phernes 
 approves, 
 and at once 
 begins to 
 pursue the 
 policy in¬ 
 dicated to 
 him. 
 
 47- 
 
 Alcibiades 
 intrigues 
 with the 
 leading men 
 at Samos 
 for his own 
 restoration. 
 He would 
 make Tissa- 
 phernes 
 the friend 
 of Athens. 
 
 5(So THE BALANCE OF POWER. 
 
 also said that the Athenians would be more suitable B.c. 412. 
 partners of empire, because they were less likely to 
 encroach by land, and both their principles and their 
 practice in carrying on the war accorded better with the 
 King’s interest. For if he helped them to subject the 
 element of the sea to themselves, they would gladly help 
 him in the subjugation of the Hellenes who were in his 
 country, whereas the Lacedaemonians came to be their 
 liberators. But a power which was at that very moment 
 emancipating the Hellenes from the dominion of another 
 Hellenic power like themselves would not be satisfied to 
 leave them under the yoke of the Barbarian a if they 
 once succeeded in crushing the Athenians®. So he 
 advised him first to wear them both out, and when he 
 had clipped the Athenians as close as he could, then to 
 get the Peloponnesians out of his country. To this 
 course Tissaphernes was strongly inclined, if we may 
 judge from his acts. For he gave his full confidence to 
 Alcibiades, whose advice he approved, and kept the 
 Peloponnesians ill-provided, at the same time refusing 
 to let them fight at sea, and insisting that they must 
 wait until the Phoenician ships arrived; they would 
 then fight at an advantage. In this manner he ruined their 
 affairs and impaired the efficiency of their navy, which 
 had once been in first-rate condition. There were many 
 other ways in which he showed openly and unmistake- 
 ably that he was not in earnest in the cause of his 
 allies. 
 
 In giving this advice to Tissaphernes and the King, 
 now that he had passed over to them, Alcibiades said 
 what he really thought to be most for their interests b . 
 
 But he had another motive; he was preparing the way 
 for his own return from exile. He knew that, if he did 
 not destroy his country altogether, the time would come 
 when he would persuade his countrymen to recall him ; 
 and he thought that his arguments would be most 
 
 a More literally: ‘unless they failed at some time or other to 
 crush the Athenians.’ b Cp. v. 43 init. 
 
«o 
 
 C. 412. 
 I. 92. 
 
 ALCIBIADES AND THE ATHENIANS. 581' 
 
 effectual if he were seen to be on intimate terms with VIII. 
 Tissaphernes. And the result proved that he was right. But there 
 The Athenian soldiers at Samos soon perceived that he dition 
 had great influence with him, and he sent messages to the democracy, 
 chief persons among them, whom he begged to remember 
 him to all good men and true, and to let them know 
 that he would be glad to return to his country and cast 
 in his lot with them. He would at the same time make 
 Tissaphernes their friend ; but they must establish an 
 oligarchy, and abolish the villainous democracy which 
 had driven him out. Partly moved by these messages, 
 but still more of their own inclination, the trierarchs and 
 leading Athenians at Samos were now eager to over¬ 
 throw the democracy. 
 
 The matter was stirred in the camp first of all, and 48. 
 introduced into the city afterwards. A few persons went Afew of the 
 
 x oligarchs 
 
 over from Samos to Alcibiades, and conferred with him : confer with 
 to them he held out the hope that he would make, first They form a 
 of all Tissaphernes, and secondly the King himself, their fnthecanr. 
 friend, if they would put down democracy; the King The Kin s’ s 
 
 J x J pay proves 
 
 would then be better able to trust them. And so the a telling 
 nobles, on whom the heaviest burdens are apt to fall a , Ph^chus 
 conceived great hopes, not only that they would overcome t^L^of 
 their enemies, but that they would get the government ^at P does* 
 into their own hands. Returning to Samos, the envoys Alcibiades 
 drew all such as seemed desirable accomplices into a oligarchy? 
 conspiracy, while the language held in public to the main 
 bodv of the army was that the King would be their friend cities care? 
 ana would supply them with money if Alcibiades was should the 
 restored and democracy given up. Now the multitude ^nif make 
 were at first dissatisfied with the scheme, but the prospect 
 of the King’s pay was so grateful to them that they^estte^ 
 offered no opposition ; and the authors of the movement, 
 after they had broached the idea to the people, once more 
 considered the proposals of Alcibiades among themselves 
 and the members of their clubs. Most of them thought 
 the matter safe and straightforward enough. Phrynichus, 
 a Cp. viii. 63 fin. 
 
OLIGARCHY AMD THE ALLIES. 
 
 5*2 
 
 VIII. who was still general, was of another mind. He main- B.C. 412. 
 tained, and rightly, that Alcibiades cared no more tor 
 oligarchy than he did for democracy, and in seeking to 
 change the existing form of government was only con¬ 
 sidering how he might be recalled and restored to his 
 country at the invitation of the clubs ; whereas their one 
 care should be to avoid disunion. Why should the King 
 go out of his way to join the Athenians whom he did 
 not trust, when he would only get into trouble with the 
 Peloponnesians, who were now as great a naval power, 
 and held some of the most important cities in his 
 dominion ?—it would be much easier for him to make 
 friends with them, who had never done him any harm. As 
 to the allies, to whom they had promised the blessings of 
 oligarchy which they were now about to enjoy themselves, 
 he would be bound that the revolted cities would not 
 return to them, nor would their old allies be a whit more 
 loyal in consequence. The form of government was 
 indifferent to them if they could only be free, but they 
 did not want to be in subjection either to an oligarchy 
 or to a democracy. And as for the so-called nobility, the 
 allies thought that they would be quite as troublesome 
 as the people; they were the persons who suggested 
 crimes to the popular mind ; who provided the means 
 for their execution; and who reaped the fruits themselves. 
 
 As far as it rested with the oligarchy the punishment of 
 death would be inflicted unscrupulously, and without 
 trial, whereas the people brought the oligarchs to their 
 senses, and were a refuge to which the oppressed might 
 always have recourse. Experience had taught the cities 
 this lesson, and he was well aware of their feelings. 
 
 Pie was therefore himself utterly dissatisfied with the 
 proposals of Alcibiades, and disapproved of the whole 
 affair. 
 
 49. But the conspirators who were present were not at all 
 
 The con- shaken in their opinion. They accepted the plan and 
 
 spirators are . , 
 
 unshaken, prepared to send reisander and other envoys to Athens, 
 
 sent^o^ 61- that they might manage the recall of Alcibiades and the 
 
 Athens. 
 
PQO 
 
 ASTUTENESS OF PHRYNICITUS. 
 
 5*3 
 
 c. 412. overthrow of the democracy, and finally make Tissa- VIII. 
 
 9 * phernes a friend of the Athenians. 
 
 Phrynichus now knew that a proposal would be made 5 °* 
 for the restoration of Alcibiades, which the Athenians ^ 1 1 -Xng huS ' 
 would certainly accept ; and having opposed his return to betray 
 
 1 - t 1 a 1 m 7 , .r 1 11 1 111 Alcibiades 
 
 he feared that Alcibiades, if he were recalled, would do to Astyo- 
 him a mischief, because he had stood in his way. So he himself be- 
 had recourse to the following device. He secretly sent a J^^both 
 letter to Astyochus, the Lacedaemonian admiral, who He con- 
 was still at Miletus, informing him that Alcibiades was make 
 gaining over Tissaphernes to the Athenians and ruining proposals 16 
 the Peloponnesian interests. He gave full particulars, to them: 
 adding that Astyochus must excuse him if he sought to 
 harm an enemy even at some cost to his country 3 -. Now 
 Astyochus had no idea of punishing Alcibiades, who 
 moreover no longer came within his reach. O11 the 
 contrary, he went to him and to Tissaphernes at Mag¬ 
 nesia, and, turning informer, told them of the letter 
 which he had received from Samos. (He was believed 
 to have sold himself to Tissaphernes, to whom he now 
 betrayed everything; and this was the reason why he 
 was so unwilling to bestir himself about the reduction 
 of the pay b .) Alcibiades immediately sent a despatch 
 denouncing to the leaders of the army at Samos the 
 treason of Phrynichus, and demanding that he should 
 be put to death. Phrynichus was confounded 0 , and in 
 fact the revelation placed him in the greatest danger. 
 
 However he sent again to Astyochus, blaming him for 
 having violated his former confidence. He then pro¬ 
 ceeded to say that he was ready to give the Pelo¬ 
 ponnesians the opportunity of destroying the whole 
 Athenian army, and he explained in detail how Samos, 
 which was unfortified, might best be attacked; adding 
 that he was in danger of his life for their sakes, and that 
 he need no longer apologise if by this or any other means 
 he could save himself from destruction at the hands of his 
 
 a Cp. vi. 92 for a similar excuse. b Cp. viii. 45 med. 
 
 c Placing the comma after Qpvvixos: 
 
584 ALCIBIADES AND PHRYNICHUS. 
 
 VIII. worst enemies. Again the message was communicated 
 by Astyochus to Alcibiades. 
 
 51* Now Phrynichus was well aware of his treachery, and 
 of which he h e knew that another letter from Alcibiades giving 
 
 also gives . . . -or 
 
 information further information was on the point of arriving, -before 
 
 Athenians, its arrival he himself warned the army that, Samos being 
 is purged of un 'waited and some of the ships not anchoring within 
 his treason, ^e harbour, the enemy were going to attack the fleet; 
 
 and outwits 5 J t 
 
 Alcibiades, of this he had certain knowledge. They ought therefore 
 thought to to fortify the place as quickly as they could, and to take 
 from spite, every precaution. As he was in command he could 
 execute his proposals by his own authority. So they 
 set to work, and in consequence Samos, which would 
 have been fortified in any case, was fortified all the 
 sooner. Not long afterwards the expected letter came 
 from Alcibiades warning the Athenians that the army 
 was being betrayed by Phrynichus, and that the enemy 
 were going to make an attack. But Alcibiades was 
 not trusted ; he was thought to have attributed to 
 Phrynichus out of personal animosity complicity in the 
 enemy’s designs, with which he was himself acquainted. 
 Thus he did him no harm, but rather strengthened his 
 
 position by telling the same tale. 
 
 52. Alcibiades still continued his practices with Tissa- 
 Tissapher- phernes,. whom he now sought to draw over to the 
 the influ- Athenian interest. But Tissaphernes was afraid of the 
 Alcibiades Peloponnesians, who had more ships on the spot than the 
 
 would 
 have liked 
 to join the 
 Athenians. 
 For he 
 had already 
 quarrelled 
 
 Athenians. And yet he would have liked, if he could, to 
 have been persuaded ; especially when he saw the oppo¬ 
 sition which the Peloponnesians raised at Cnidus to the 
 treaty of Theramenes a . For his quarrel with them had 
 
 Peiopon broken out before the Peloponnesians went to Rhodes, 
 nesians at ^ where they were at present stationed b ; and the words 
 the protest of Alcibiades, who had previously warned Tissaphernes 
 confirmed that the Lacedaemonians were the liberators of all the 
 
 whicfThe 11 ^ cities °f Hellas, were verified by the protest of Lichas, 
 
 had re- who declared that ‘for the King to hold all the cities 
 ceived 0 
 
 a Cp. viii. 43. b Cp. viii. 45 init. 
 
 Otd 
 
SHALL ALCIBIADES BE RECALLED? 585 
 
 B.C. 412. 
 01. 92. 
 
 which he or his ancestors had held was a stipulation VIIT. 
 not to be endured/ Alcibiades, who was playing for 
 a great stake, was very assiduous in paying his court But he 
 
 . is afraid. 
 
 to Tissaphernes. 
 
 Peisander and the other envoys who had been sent 53 * 
 from Samos arrived at Athens and made their proposals Peisander 
 
 and his 
 
 to the people. They said much in few words, insisting colleagues 
 above all that if the Athenians restored Alcibiades and Athenfand 
 modified their democracy they might secure the alliance J-ecanof the 
 of the King and gain the victory over the Pelopon- ^^ e des 
 nesians. There was great opposition to any change in modifica- 
 the democracy, and the enemies of Alcibiades were loud democracy, 
 in protesting that it would be a dreadful thing if he were Agnation 
 permitted to return in defiance of the law. The Eumol- is aroused - 
 pidae and Ceryces called heaven and earth to witness 
 that the city must never restore a man who had been 
 banished for profaning the mysteries. Amid violent 
 expressions of indignation Peisander came forward, and 
 having up the objectors one by one he pointed out 
 to them that the Peloponnesians had a fleet ready for 
 action as large as their own, that they numbered more 
 cities among their allies, and that they were furnished 
 with money by Tissaphernes and the King ; whereas 
 the Athenians had spent everything: he then asked 
 them whether there was the least hope of saving the 
 country unless the King could be won over. They all 
 acknowledged that there was none. He then said to 
 them plainly:— 
 
 ‘ But this alliance is impossible unless we are governed 
 in a wiser manner, and office is confined to a smaller 
 number : then the King will trust us. Do not let us be 
 dwelling on the form of the constitution a , which we may 
 hereafter change as we please, when the very existence of 
 Athens is at stake. And we must restore Alcibiades, 
 who is the only man living capable of saving us. 5 
 
 The people were very angry at the first suggestion 54 - 
 of an oligarchy; but when Peisander proved to them that ^ r g S any 
 a Reading (SovKevconev with most MSS. 
 
5 86 
 
 THE SUCCESS OF PEISANDER. 
 
 VIII. 
 
 alternative? 
 It is at last 
 agreed that 
 Peisander 
 shall go and 
 negotiate 
 with 
 
 Alcibiades. 
 
 55 - 
 
 The Athe¬ 
 nians com¬ 
 mand 
 Rhodes 
 from 
 Chalce. 
 
 The 
 
 blockade 
 of Chios. 
 The Chians 
 make a 
 sally, in 
 which after 
 a partial 
 success they 
 are defeated 
 and Pedari- 
 tus is slain. 
 
 they had no other resource, partly in fear, and partly in B.c. 412. 
 hope that it might be hereafter changed, they gave way. ' 92 ’ 
 So a decree was passed that Peisander himself and ten 
 others should go out and negotiate to the best of their 
 judgment with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades. Peisander 
 also denounced Phrynichus, and therefore the people 
 dismissed him and his colleague Scironides from their 
 commands, and appointed Diomedon and Leon to be 
 admirals in their room. Peisander thought that Phry¬ 
 nichus would stand in the way of the negotiations with 
 Alcibiades, and for this reason he calumniated him, al¬ 
 leging that he had betrayed Iasus and Amorges. Then 
 he went, one after another, to all the clubs which already 
 existed in Athens for the management of trials and 
 elections, and exhorted them to unite, and by concerted 
 action put down the democracy. When he had com¬ 
 pleted all the necessary preparations and the plot was 
 ripe, he and his colleagues proceeded on their voyage to 
 Tissaphernes. 
 
 During the same winter Leon and Diomedon, who 
 had now entered upon their command, made a descent 
 upon Rhodes. They found the Peloponnesian fleet 
 drawn up out of their reach, but they landed, and 
 defeated the Rhodians who came out to meet them. 
 
 From Rhodes they retired to Chalce a , which henceforth 
 they made their base of operations rather than Cos, 
 because they could there better command any move¬ 
 ment which might be made by the Peloponnesian fleet. 
 
 About this time Xenophantidas, a Lacedaemonian, 
 brought word to Rhodes from Pedaritus, the governor 
 of Chios, that the Athenian fortification was now com¬ 
 pleted b , and that if the Peloponnesians with their whole 
 fleet did not at once come to the rescue Chios would be 
 lost. So they determined to send help. Meanwhile 
 Pedaritus in person with his mercenaries c and the whole 
 Chian army attacked the lines which protected the 
 
 a Cp. viii. 44 fin., 60 fin. b Cp. viii. 40 fin. 
 
 c Cp. viii. 28 fin., 38 med. 
 
ow 
 
 THE ATHENIANS AND TISSAPHERNES . 587 
 
 c. 412. Athenian fleet; he took a part of the wall and obtained VIII. 
 
 92 ‘ possession of certain ships which were drawn up on 
 shore. But the Athenians rushed out upon them, and 
 first putting to flight the Chians, soon defeated the rest 
 of his forces. Pedaritus himself was slain, together with 
 many of the Chians, and a great quantity of arms was 
 taken. 
 
 The Chians were now blockaded more closely than 56. 
 ever both by sea and land, and there was a great famine Peisander 
 in the place. Meanwhile Peisander and his colleagues Tissapher- 
 came to Tissaphernes and proposed an agreement. But does not 
 Alcibiades was not as yet quite sure of Tissaphernes, p^^ded 
 who was more afraid of the Peloponnesians than of the and to 
 
 a 1 • . . Alcibiades, 
 
 Athenians, and was still desirous, in accordance with the who does 
 lesson which he had been taught by Alcibiades himself, be thought 0 
 to wear them both out. So he had recourse to the device J^suading f 
 of making Tissaphernes ask too much, that the negotia- g™' hey 
 tions might be broken off. And I imagine that Tissa- demand too 
 phernes himself equally wanted them to fail; he was theAthe> d 
 moved by his fears, while Alcibiades, seeing that his fJave^a 75 
 reluctance was insuperable, did not wish the Athe- ra s e at the 
 
 tricks of 
 
 mans to think that he was unable to persuade him—he Alcibiades. 
 wanted them to believe that Tissaphernes was already 
 persuaded and anxious to make terms but could not, 
 because they themselves would not grant enough. And 
 so, speaking on behalf of Tissaphernes who was himself 
 present, he made such exorbitant demands that, although 
 for a time the Athenians were willing to grant anything 
 which he asked, at length the responsibility of breaking 
 off the conference was thrown upon them. He and 
 Tissaphernes demanded, first the cession of all Ionia to 
 the King, then that of the neighbouring islands; and 
 there were some other conditions. Thus far the Athe¬ 
 nians offered no opposition. But at last, fearing that his 
 utter inability to fulfil his promise would be exposed, at 
 the third interview he demanded permission for the King 
 to build ships, and sail along his own coast wherever and 
 with as many vessels as he pleased. This was too much; 
 
588 TISSAPHERNES AND THE ALLIES. 
 
 VIII. the Athenians now perceived that matters were hopeless, B.C.-412. 
 and that they had been duped by Alcibiades. So they ' 92 ‘ 
 departed in anger to Samos. 
 
 57 * Immediately afterwards, and during the same winter, 
 ne^hoMing Tissaphernes came down to Caunus wishing to bring 
 the balance, back the Peloponnesians to Miletus, and once more to 
 
 now thinks .11 . . 
 
 that the make a treaty with them on such terms as he could get; 
 
 “o he was willing to maintain them, for he did not want to 
 
 other treaty b ecome wholly their enemy, and was afraid that if their 
 with the large fleet were at a loss for supplies they might be 
 monians. compelled to fight and be defeated, or their crews might 
 desert; in either case the Athenians would gain their 
 ends without his assistance. Above all he feared lest 
 
 58. 
 
 This treaty, 
 made in the 
 name of 
 Tissapher- 
 nes on the 
 King’s be¬ 
 half, does 
 not extend 
 the recogni¬ 
 tion of the 
 King’s 
 rights 
 beyond 
 Asia. 
 
 The ob¬ 
 noxious 
 clause is 
 omitted. 
 
 they should ravage the adjoining mainland in search of 
 food. Taking into account all these possibilities, and 
 true to his policy, which was to hold the balance evenly 
 between the two contending powers, he sent for the 
 Lacedaemonians, furnished them with supplies, and made 
 a third treaty with them, which ran as follows 
 
 ‘ In the thirteenth year of the reign of Darius the King, 
 when Alexippidas was Ephor at Lacedaemon, a treaty 
 was made in the plain of the Maeander between the 
 Lacedaemonians and their allies on the one hand, and 
 Tissaphernes, Hieramenes, and the sons of Pharnaces 
 on the other, touching the interests of the King, and of 
 the Lacedaemonians and their allies. 
 
 ‘ I. All the King’s country which is in Asia shall con¬ 
 tinue to be the King’s, and the King shall act as he 
 pleases in respect of his own country. 
 
 ‘II. The Lacedaemonians and their allies shall not go 
 against the King’s country to do hurt, and the King 
 shall not go against the country of the Lacedaemonians 
 and their allies to do hurt. If any of the Lacedaemonians 
 or their allies go against the King’s country and do hurt, 
 the Lacedaemonians shall interfere: and if any of the 
 dwellers in the King’s country shall go against the 
 country of the Lacedaemonians and their allies, and do 
 hurt, the King shall interfere. 
 
o w 
 
 THIRD TREATY WITH PERSIA. 
 
 .C. 412. 
 1. 92. 
 
 5^9 
 
 c III. Tissaphernes shall provide food for the number 
 of ships which the Lacedaemonians have at present, 
 according to the agreement, until the King’s ships arrive. 
 When they have arrived, the Lacedaemonians and their 
 allies may either maintain their own ships, or they may 
 receive the maintenance of their ships from Tissaphernes. 
 But in this latter case the Lacedaemonians and their 
 allies shall at the end of the war repay to Tissaphernes 
 the money which they have received. 
 
 ‘ IV. When the King's ships have arrived, the ships of 
 the Lacedaemonians and of their allies and of the King 
 shall carry on the war in common, as may seem best to 
 Tissaphernes and to the Lacedaemonians and their 
 allies: and if they wish to make peace with the Athe¬ 
 nians both parties shall make peace on the same terms.’ 
 
 Such was the treaty. Tissaphernes now prepared to 
 bring up the Phoenician ships, as he had promised, and 
 to fulfil his other pledges. He was anxious at all events 
 to be seen making a beginning. 
 
 Towards the end of the winter, Oropus, which was 
 occupied by an Athenian garrison, was betrayed to the 
 Boeotians. Certain of the Eretrians and of the Oropians 
 themselves, both having an eye to the revolt of Euboea, 
 were concerned in the enterprise. For Oropus, facing 
 Eretria, while held by the Athenians could not be other 
 than a serious annoyance, both to Eretria and to the 
 whole of Euboea. Having now possession of Oropus 
 the Eretrians came to Rhodes, and invited the Pelopon¬ 
 nesians to Euboea. They were however more disposed 
 to relieve the distress of Chios, and thither they sailed 
 from Rhodes with their whole fleet. Near Triopium 
 they descried the Athenian ships in the open sea sailing 
 from Chalce : neither fleet attacked the other, but both 
 arrived safely, the one at Samos, and the other at Miletus. 
 The Lacedaemonians now saw that they could no longer 
 relieve Chios without a battle at sea. So the winter 
 ended, and with it the twentieth year in the Pelopon¬ 
 nesian War of which Thucydides wrote the history. 
 
 VIII. 
 
 59 - 
 
 60. 
 
 Oropus, by 
 the help 
 of certain 
 Eretrians, 
 is betrayed 
 to the 
 Boeotians. 
 Instead of 
 going to 
 Euboea, 
 the Pelo¬ 
 ponnesians 
 determine 
 to relieve 
 Chios, but 
 are hindered 
 by the ap¬ 
 pearance of 
 the Athe¬ 
 nian fleet. 
 Both fleets 
 return to 
 their origi¬ 
 nal stations 
 at Samos 
 and at Mile¬ 
 tus. 
 
VIII. 
 
 6i. 
 
 The Chians, 
 assisted by 
 their new 
 governor, 
 Leon the 
 Spartan, 
 with twelve 
 ships, make 
 a sally with 
 thirty-six 
 ships and 
 gain an 
 advantage 
 over thirty- 
 two Athe¬ 
 nian ships. 
 
 62. 
 
 Dercyllidas 
 arrives at 
 the Helles¬ 
 pont and 
 induces 
 (12) Abydos 
 and (13) 
 Lampsacus 
 to revolt. 
 Strombi- 
 chides pur¬ 
 sues him 
 and re¬ 
 covers 
 Lampsacus, 
 but not 
 Abydos. 
 
 In the 
 absence of 
 Strombi- 
 
 590 PELOPONNESIANS AT THE HELLESPONT . 
 
 At the beginning of the following spring, Dercyllidas, 
 a Spartan, was sent at the head of a small army along 
 the coast to the Hellespont. He was to effect the revolt 
 of Abydos, a Milesian colony. The Chians, while Astyo- 
 chus was doubting whether he could assist them, were 
 compelled by the pressure of the blockade to fight at 
 sea. While he was still at Rhodes they had obtained 
 from Miletus, after the death of Pedaritus, a new 
 governor, Leon, a Spartan, who had come out as a marine 
 with Antisthenes a ; he brought with him twelve ships, 
 five Thurian, four Syracusan, one from Anaea, one 
 Milesian, and one which was Leon’s own; they had 
 been employed in guarding Miletus. The Chians made 
 a sally with their whole force, and seized a strong 
 position ; their ships at the same time, to the number of 
 thirty-six, sailed out and fought with the thirty-two of 
 the Athenians. The engagement was severe ; the Chians 
 and their allies had rather the advantage, but evening 
 had came on; so they retired to the city. 
 
 Soon afterwards Dercyllidas arrived at the Hellespont 
 from Miletus; Abydos, and two days later Lampsacus, 
 revolted to him and Pharnabazus. Strombichides, having 
 intelligence, hastened thither from Chios with twenty- 
 four Athenian ships, of which some were transports con¬ 
 veying hoplites. Defeating the Lampsacenes who came 
 out against him, he took Lampsacus, which was unforti¬ 
 fied, at the first onset. He made a seizure of the slaves 
 and property which he found there, and, reinstating the 
 free inhabitants, went on to Abydos. But the people of 
 Abydos would not yield, and though he attempted to 
 take the place by assault, he failed ; so he crossed over 
 to Sestos, a city of the Chersonese opposite Abydos, 
 which the Persians had formerly held. There he placed 
 a garrison to keep watch over the entire Hellespont. 
 
 Meanwhile the Chians regained the command of the 
 sea, and Astyochus and the Peloponnesians at Miletus, 
 hearing of the naval engagement and of the withdrawal 
 a Cp. viii. 39 init. 
 
 PQO 
 
gw 
 
 C. 411. 
 . 92, 2. 
 
 .OLIGARCHY AT SAMOS. 59r 
 
 of Strombichides and his ships, took courage. Sailing 
 to Chios with two ships, Astyochus -fetched away the 
 fleet which was there, and with his united forces made a 
 demonstration against Samos. But the Athenian crews, 
 who were in a state of mutual distrust, did not go out to 
 meet him ; so he sailed back again to Miletus. 
 
 For about this time, or rather sooner, the democracy 
 at Athens had been subverted. Peisander and his fellow 
 envoys, on their return to Samos after their visit to Tissa- 
 phernes, had strengthened their interest in the army, and 
 had even persuaded the chief men of Samos to join them 
 in setting up an oligarchy, a although they had lately risen 
 against their own countrymen a in order to put down oli¬ 
 garchy 15 . At the same time conferring among themselves, 
 the Athenian leaders at Samos came to the conclusion 
 
 VIII. 
 
 chides, the 
 Chians 
 regain con¬ 
 trol of the 
 sea, and 
 Astyochus 
 offers battle 
 to the 
 Athenians. 
 The con¬ 
 spirators 
 at Samos 
 give up 
 Alcibiades, 
 but, with 
 the help of 
 some of the 
 Samians, 
 resolve to 
 persevere in 
 their plan. 
 
 that since Alcibiades would not join they had better leave 
 him alone; for indeed he was not the sort of person who 
 was suited to an oligarchy. But they determined, as 
 they were already compromised, to proceed by them¬ 
 selves, and to take measures for carrying the movement 
 through; they meant also to persevere in the war, 
 and were willing enough to contribute money or any¬ 
 thing else which might be wanted out of their own 
 houses, since they would now be labouring, not for 
 others, but for themselves 0 . 
 
 Having thus encouraged one another in their purpose 64. 
 they sent Peisander and one half of the envoys back to They want 
 Athens. They were to carry out the scheme at home, democracy 11 
 and had directions to set up an oligarchy in the subject- jetties!" 
 cities at which they touched on their voyage. The other But the 
 
 J . allies, espe- 
 
 half were despatched different ways to other subject- daily the 
 
 cities. Diotrephes, who was then at Chios, was sent to having 
 assume the command in Chalcidice and on the coast off^^ 1 
 Thrace, to which he had been previously appointed. On ^ r ^ t e ^ e 
 arriving at Thasos he put down the democracy. But to retain 
 within about two months of his departure the Thasians nectionwith 
 
 Athens. 
 
 a Or, ‘although there had just been an insurrection in Samos itself.’ 
 b Cp. viii. 21, 73 init. c Cp. viii. 48 init. 
 
OLIGARCHY AT ATHENS. 
 
 65 - 
 
 Peisander 
 returns to 
 Athens, 
 where he 
 finds the 
 work al¬ 
 ready half 
 done. 
 Assassina¬ 
 tion of 
 Androcles, 
 the enemy 
 of Alci- 
 biades. 
 Programme 
 of the new 
 party. 
 
 began to fortify their city; they did not want to have an 
 aristocracy dependent on Athens when they were daily 
 expecting to obtain their liberty from Lacedaemon. For 
 there were Thasian exiles who had been driven out by 
 the Athenians dwelling in Peloponnesus, and they, with 
 the assistance of their friends at home, were exerting 
 themselves vigorously to obtain ships and effect the 
 revolt of Thasos. The recent change was exactly what 
 they desired ; for the government had been reformed 
 without danger to themselves, and the democracy, who 
 would have opposed them, had been overthrown. Thus 
 the result in the case of Thasos, and also, as I imagine, 
 of many other states, was the opposite of what the oli¬ 
 garchical conspirators had intended. For the subject- 
 cities, having secured a moderate form of government, 
 and having no fear of being called to account for 
 their proceedings, aimed at absolute freedom; they 
 scorned the sham independence proffered to them by 
 the Athenians. 
 
 Peisander and his colleagues pursued their voyage and, 
 as they had agreed, put down the democracies in the dif¬ 
 ferent states. From some places they obtained the as¬ 
 sistance of heavy-armed troops, which they took with 
 them to Athens a . There they found the revolution more 
 than half accomplished by the oligarchical clubs. Some 
 of the younger citizens had conspired and secretly assas¬ 
 sinated one Androcles, a great man with the people, who 
 had been foremost in procuring the banishment of Alci- 
 biades b . Their motives were two-fold : they killed him 
 because he was a demagogue; but more because they 
 hoped to gratify Alcibiades, whom they were still ex¬ 
 pecting to return, and to make Tissaphernes their friend. 
 A few others who were inconvenient to them they made 
 away with in a like secret manner. Meanwhile they 
 declared in their public programme that no one ought to 
 receive pay who was not on military service; and that 
 not more than five thousand should have a share in the 
 a Cp. viii. 69 med. b Cp. vi. 89 fin. 
 
 PQO 
 
THE REIGN OF TERROR AT ATHENS. 593 
 
 b.c. 411. government; those, namely, who were best able to serve VIII. 
 01. 9 2 » 2. j n person and with their money. 
 
 These were only pretences intended to look well in the 66. 
 eyes of the people; for the authors of the revolution fully T1 ? e con- 
 
 . . spiratorsfor 
 
 meant to retain the new government in their own hands, a time reign 
 The popular assembly and the council of five hundred they put out 
 were still convoked; but nothing was brought before secretly any 
 them of which the conspirators had not approved : the inconve- 
 
 A 1 L ment per- 
 
 speakers were of their party and the things to be said sons; the 
 had been all arranged by them beforehand. No one any faSfmu- 
 longer raised his voice against them ; for the citizens ^ ^ 
 were afraid when they saw the strength of the conspiracy, 
 and if any one did utter a word, he was put out of the combine 
 way in some convenient manner. No search was made taiiate. 
 for the assassins; and though there might be suspicion, 
 no one was brought to trial; the people were so de¬ 
 pressed and afraid to move that he who escaped violence 
 thought himself fortunate, even though he had never said 
 a word. Their minds were cowed by the supposed num¬ 
 ber of the conspirators, which they greatly exaggerated, 
 having no means of discovering the truth, since the size 
 of the city prevented them from knowing one another. 
 
 For the same reason a man a could not conspire and re¬ 
 taliate a , because he was unable to express his sorrow or 
 indignation to another; for he could not make a con¬ 
 fidant of a stranger, and he would not trust his acquaint¬ 
 ance. The members of the popular party all approached 
 one another with suspicion ; every one was supposed to 
 have a hand in what was going on. Some were con¬ 
 cerned whom no one would ever have thought likely to 
 turn oligarchs; their adhesion created the worst mistrust 
 among the multitude, and by making it impossible for 
 them to rely upon one another, greatly contributed to 
 the security of the few. 
 
 Such was the state of affairs when Peisander and his 67. 
 colleagues arrived at Athens. They immediately set to Thefinai 
 
 a Or, taking emfiovXevaavTa as the object: ‘could not defend 
 himself against the wiles of another.’ 
 
 Q q 
 
594 
 
 THE NEW CONSTITUTION . 
 
 VIII. work and prepared to strike the final blow. First, they 
 First the called an assembly and proposed the election of ten com- 
 ranomon ' missioners, who should be empowered to frame for the 
 then P on the city the best constitution which they could devise; this 
 Pd P a°nder° f was to be laid before the people on a fixed day. When 
 magis- tmg the y arrived they summoned an assembly to meet in 
 trades are the temple of Poseidon at Colonus without the walls, 
 
 abolished 
 
 and re- and distant rather more than a mile. But the commis- 
 board^f 7 a sioners only moved that any Athenian should be allowed 
 creatls^ 1 to propose whatever resolution he pleased — nothing 
 of four 1- more; threatening at the same time with severe penab 
 hundred, ties anybody who indicted the proposer for unconsti¬ 
 tutional action, or otherwise offered injury to him. The 
 whole scheme now came to light. A motion was made 
 to abolish all the existing magistracies and the payment 
 of magistrates, and to choose a presiding board of five ; 
 these five were to choose a hundred, and each of the 
 hundred was to co-opt three others. The Four Hundred 
 thus selected were to meet in the council-chamber; 
 they were to have absolute authority, and might govern 
 as they deemed best; the Five Thousand were to be 
 summoned by them whenever they chose. 
 
 68 . The mover of this proposal, and to outward appearance 
 The leading the most active partizan of the revolution, was Peisander, 
 
 intellect 77 
 
 of the but the real author and maturer of the whole scheme, 
 wasAn- w ho had been longest interested in it, was Antiphon, a 
 had hitherto man inferior in virtue to none of his contemporaries, and 
 tired life- P ossesse d of remarkable powers of thought and gifts of 
 he was ’ speech. He did not like to come forward in the as- 
 adviserof sembly, or in any other public arena. To the multitude, 
 whTnhis^ who were suspicious of his great abilities, he was an 
 own turn object of dislike; but there was no man who could 
 the best do more for any who consulted him, whether their 
 himself. business lay in the courts of justice or in the assembly. 
 and^The-^ And when the government of the Four Hundred was 
 w^e also overt brown and became exposed to the vengeance of 
 men of the people, and he being accused of taking part in the 
 ability, and plot had to speak in his own case, his defence was 
 
 Otd 
 
ANTIPHON—PHR YNICH US — THERA MENES. 595 
 
 B.C. 411. 
 01. 92, 2. 
 
 undoubtedly the best ever made by any man tried on VIII. 
 a capital charge down to my time. Phrynichus also 
 showed extraordinary zeal in the interests of the oli- accomplish 
 
 . the arduous 
 
 garchy. He was afraid of Alcibiades, whom he knew task, 
 to be cognizant of. the intrigue which when at Samos 
 he had carried on with Astyochus a , and he thought 
 that no oligarchy would ever be likely to restore him. 
 
 Having once set his hand to the work he was deemed 
 by the others to be the man upon whom they could best 
 depend in the hour of danger. Another chief leader 
 of the revolutionary party was Theramenes the son of 
 Hagnon, a good speaker and a sagacious man. No 
 wonder then that, in the hands of all these able men, 
 the attempt, however arduous, succeeded. For an easy 
 thing it certainly w r as not, one hundred years after the 
 fall of the tyrants, to destroy the liberties of the Athe¬ 
 nians, who not only were a free, but during more than 
 one half of this time had been an imperial people. 
 
 The assembly passed all these measures without a dis- 69. 
 sentient voice, and was then dissolved. And now the The °. ld 
 
 council of 
 
 Four Hundred were introduced into the council-chamber, the five 
 
 The manner was as follows :—The whole population were brokenup S 
 always on service, either manning the walls or drawn up ^ ™ em " 
 at their places of arms, for the enemy were at Decelea b . P art as 
 
 A they are 
 
 On the day of the assembly those who were not in the bidden, 
 conspiracy were allowed to go home as usual, while the pay wth 611 " 
 conspirators were quietly told to remain, not actually by them - 
 their arms, but at a short distance ; if anybody opposed 
 what was doing they were to arm and interfere. There 
 were also on the spot some Andrians and Tenians, three 
 hundred Carystians, and some of the Athenian colonists 
 from Aegina c , who received similar instructions; they 
 had all been told to bring with them from their homes 
 their own arms for this especial purpose d . Having dis¬ 
 posed their forces the Four Hundred arrived, every one 
 with a dagger concealed about his person, and with them 
 
 a Cp. viii. 50, 51. b Cp. vii. 28 init. c Cp. ii. 27. 
 d Cp. viii. 65 init. 
 
 Q q 2 
 
596 DISSOLUTION OF THE FIVE HUNDRED. 
 
 VIII. 
 
 70. 
 
 They are 
 replaced by 
 the Four 
 Hundred, 
 who govern 
 despotically 
 and try to 
 make peace 
 with Lace¬ 
 daemon. 
 
 7i- 
 
 Agis, think¬ 
 ing that 
 the city is 
 now at his 
 mercy, re¬ 
 fuses to 
 treat with 
 them. 
 
 But ap¬ 
 proaching 
 too near 
 the wall, 
 he is un¬ 
 deceived. 
 The Four 
 Hundred 
 by his 
 advice 
 send an 
 
 a hundred and twenty Hellenic youth, whose services b.g. 411 
 they used for any act of violence which they had in 
 hand. They broke in upon the council of five hundred 
 as they sat in the council-chamber, and told them to 
 take their pay and begone. They had brought with 
 them the pay of the senators for the remainder of their 
 yearly term of office, which they handed to them as they 
 went out. 
 
 In this manner the council retired without offering 
 any remonstrance; and the rest of the citizens kept 
 perfectly quiet and made no counter movement. The 
 Four Hundred then installed themselves in the council- 
 chamber; for the present they elected by lot Prytanes 
 of their own number, and did all that was customary in 
 the way of prayers and sacrifices to the Gods at their 
 entrance into office. Soon however they wholly changed 
 the democratic system ; and although they did not recall 
 the exiles, because Alcibiades was one of them, they 
 governed the city with a high hand. Some few whom 
 they thought would be better out of the way were put 
 to death by them, others imprisoned, others again exiled. 
 
 They also sent heralds to Agis, the Lacedaemonian 
 king, who was at Decelea, saying that they desired to 
 conclude a peace with him; and that they expected 
 him to be more ready to treat with them than with the 
 perfidious democracy. 
 
 But he, thinking that the city must be in an unsettled 
 state and that the people would not so quickly yield up 
 their ancient liberty, thinking too that the appearance of 
 a great Lacedaemonian army would increase their ex¬ 
 citement, and far from convinced that civil strife was not 
 at that very moment raging among them, gave unfavour¬ 
 able answers to the envoys of the Four Hundred. He 
 sent to Peloponnesus for large reinforcements, and then, 
 with the garrison at Decelea and the newly arrived troops, 
 came down in person to the very walls of Athens. He 
 expected that the Athenians, distracted by civil strife, 
 would be quite at his mercy; there would be such a 
 
WO 
 
 THE FIVE THOUSAND A GOOD PRETENCE . 597 
 
 .c. 411. panic created by the presence of enemies both within VIII. 
 
 " 92 ' 2 * and without the walls, that he might even succeed in ^bassyto 
 taking the city at the first onset; for the Long Walls daemon, 
 would be deserted, and he could not fail of capturing 
 them. But when he drew near there was no sign of the 
 slightest disorder within; the Athenians, sending out 
 their cavalry and a force of heavy and light-armed 
 troops and archers, struck down a few of his soldiers 
 who had ventured too far, and retained possession of 
 some arms and dead bodies; whereupon, having found 
 out his mistake, he withdrew to Decelea. There he and 
 the garrison remained at their posts; but he ordered the 
 newly arrived troops, after they had continued a few 
 days in Attica, to return home. The Four Hundred 
 resumed negotiations, and Agis was now more ready 
 to listen to them. By his advice they sent envoys to 
 Lacedaemon in the hope of coming to terms. 
 
 They also sent ten commissioners to Samos, who were 7 2 - 
 to pacify the army, and to explain that the oligarchy ^eyaiso 
 was not established with any design of injuring Athens embassy to 
 or her citizens, but for the preservation of the whole arete*’ W ° 
 state. The promoters of the change were five thousand, “ ^ogy 
 not four hundred; but never hitherto, owing to the for them - 
 pressure of war and of business abroad, had so many 
 as five thousand assembled to deliberate even on the 
 most important questions. They instructed them to say 
 anything else which would have a good effect, and sent 
 them on their mission as soon as they themselves were 
 installed in the government. For they were afraid, and 
 not without reason as the event showed, that the Athe¬ 
 nian sailors would be impatient of the oligarchical 
 system, and that disaffection would begin at Samos and 
 end in their own overthrow. 
 
 At the very time when the Four Hundred were estab- 73 * 
 lishing themselves at Athens, a reaction had set in But a 
 against the oligarchical movement at Samos. Some set in at 
 Samians of the popular party, which had originally IhTslmian 
 (risen up against the nobles, changed sides again when 
 
598 DEMOCRACY AT SAMOS. 
 
 VIII. Peisander came to the island a , and persuaded by him b.c. 411 
 themselves anc i fog Athenian accomplices at Samos, they formed ’ g2> 2 
 
 changed 1 
 
 sides, begin a body of three hundred conspirators and prepared 
 violence, to attack the rest of the popular party who had 
 previously been their comrades. There was a certain 
 demagogue, Hyperbolus, an Athenian of no character, who, not for 
 sinated by any fear of his power and influence, but for his villany, 
 their Athe- and because the city was ashamed of him, had been 
 cornpiices. ostracised. This man was assassinated by them, and 
 ofthe^ee^ they were abetted in the act by Charminus, one of the 
 rise and generals, and by certain of the Athenians at Samos, to 
 down. whom they pledged their faith. They also joined these 
 Athenians in other deeds of violence, and were eager to 
 fall upon the popular party. But the people, discovering 
 their intention, gave information to the generals Leon 
 and Diomedon, who were impatient of the attempted 
 oligarchy because they were respected by the multitude, 
 to Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, one of whom was a 
 trierarch and the other a private soldier, and to others 
 who were thought to be the steadiest opponents of the 
 oligarchical movement. They entreated them not to 
 allow the Samian people to be destroyed, and the island 
 of Samos, without which the Athenian empire would never 
 have lasted until then, to be estranged. Thereupon the 
 generals went to the soldiers one by one, and begged 
 them to interfere, addressing themselves especially to 
 the Parali, or crew of the ship Paralus, all freeborn 
 Athenians, who were at any time ready to attack 
 oligarchy, real or imaginary. Leon and Diomedon, 
 whenever they sailed to any other place, left some ships 
 for the protection of the Samians. And so, when the 
 three hundred began the attack, all the crews, especially 
 the Parali, hastened to the rescue, and the popular party 
 gained the victory. Of the three hundred they slew 
 about thirty, and the three most guilty were banished; 
 the rest they forgave, and henceforward all lived together 
 under a democracy. 
 
 Cp. yiii. 21, 63 med. 
 
OLIGARCHY AT ATHENS . 
 
 599 
 
 B.C. 411. 
 01. 92, 2. 
 
 Chaereas the son of Archestratus, an Athenian, who VIII. 
 had been active in the movement, was quickly de- 74. 
 spatched by the Samians and the army in the ship The Paraii, 
 Paralus to Athens, there to report the defeat of the ^report 7 
 Samian oligarchy, for as yet they did not know that the Joimion to 
 government was in ■ the hands of the Four Hundred. Athens, 
 
 ° are very 
 
 No sooner had he arrived than the Four Hundred coldly 
 
 imprisoned two or three of the Paraii, and taking away chaereas 
 their ship transferred the rest of the crew to a troop- escapes^ 
 ship which was ordered to keep guard about Euboea. Samos, and 
 Chaereas, seeing in an instant how matters stood, had manner of 
 Contrived to steal away and get back to Samos, where the oii- 
 he told the soldiers with much aggravation the news garchs ' 
 from Athens, how they were punishing everybody with 
 stripes, and how no one might speak a word against the 
 government; he declared that their wives and children 
 were being outraged, and that the oligarchy were going 
 to take the relations of all the men serving at Samos who 
 were not of their faction and shut them up, intending, if 
 the fleet did not submit, to put them to death. And he 
 added a great many other falsehoods. 
 
 When the army heard his report they instantly 75 * 
 rushed upon the chief authors of the oligarchy who were J t h g a ^™ y 
 present, and their confederates, and tried to stone them. are beside 
 But they were deterred by the warnings of the moderate But instead 
 party, who begged them not to ruin everything by° f J[ a a [ ng 
 violence while the enemy were lying close to them, ^ as a ^ s 
 prow threatening prow. Thrasybulus the son of Lycus, persuaded 
 and Thrasyllus, who were the chief leaders of the syll'us and : 
 reaction, now thought that the time had come for the buiuTto 
 open proclamation of democracy at Samos, and they ^ cl s ^™’ r 
 
 bound the soldiers, more especially those of the oligar- allegiance 
 
 . . to, the de- 
 
 chical party, by the most solemn oaths to maintain a mocracy. 
 democracy and be of one mind, to prosecute vigorously mkns unite 
 the war with Peloponnesus, to be enemies to the Four 
 
 Hundred, and to hold no parley with them by heralds. 
 All the Samians who were of full age took the same 
 oath, and the Athenian soldiers determined to make 
 
6 oo THE PATRIOTISM■ OF THE FLEET. 
 
 VIII. 
 
 76. 
 
 Thrasyllus 
 and Thra- 
 sybulus are 
 elected 
 generals. 
 The sailors 
 encourage 
 one an¬ 
 other. 
 
 They are 
 few, we 
 are many. 
 They have 
 revolted 
 from us, 
 not we from 
 them. 
 
 We receive 
 the tribute; 
 we hold 
 Samos ; 
 we guard 
 Piraeus ; 
 we can 
 drive them 
 off the sea. 
 They are 
 no loss ; 
 they have 
 neither 
 money nor 
 sense nor 
 virtue. 
 
 And 
 
 Alcibiades 
 will gain 
 over the 
 King. 
 
 common cause with the Samians in their troubles and B.c. 411. 
 dangers, and invited them to share their fortunes. They ' 92 ’ 2 ' 
 considered that neither the Samians nor themselves had 
 any place of refuge to which they could turn, but that, 
 whether the Four Hundred or their enemies at Miletus 
 gained the day, they were doomed. * 
 
 There was now an obstinate struggle; the one party 
 determined to force democracy upon the city, the other 
 to force oligarchy upon the fleet. The soldiers proceeded 
 to summon an assembly, at which they deposed their 
 former generals, and any trierarchs whom they sus¬ 
 pected, and chose others. Among the new generals 
 Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus naturally found a place. 
 
 One after another the men rose and encouraged their 
 comrades by various arguments. ‘ We ought not to 
 despond,’ they said, ‘ because the city has revolted from 
 us, for they are few and we are many; they have lost 
 us and not we them, and our resources are far greater. 
 
 Having the whole navy with us we can compel the 
 subject states to pay us tribute as well as if we sailed 
 forth from the Piraeus ; Samos is our own—no weak 
 city, but one which in the Samian war all but wrested 
 from Athens the dominion of the sea; and the position 
 which we hold against our Peloponnesian enemies is as 
 strong as heretofore. And again, with the help of the 
 fleet we are better able to obtain supplies than the 
 Athenians at home. Indeed the only reason why the 
 citizens have so long retained the command of the 
 Piraeus is that we who are stationed at Samos are the 
 advanced guard of the Piraeus itself. And now if they 
 will not agree to give us back the constitution, it will 
 come to this—that we shall be better able to drive them 
 off the sea than they us. The help which the city gives us 
 against our enemies is poor and worthless; and we have 
 lost nothing in losing them. They have no longer any 
 money to send’ (the soldiers were supplying themselves). 
 c They cannot aid us by good counsel; and yet for what 
 other reason do states exercise authority over armies? 
 
TROUBLES OF THE PELOPONNESIANS. 601 
 
 B.C. 411. 
 01. 92, 2. 
 
 But in this respect too they are useless. They have VIII. 
 gone altogether astray, and overthrown the constitution 
 of their country, which we maintain and will endeavour 
 to make the oligarchy maintain likewise. Our advisers 
 in the camp then are at least as good as theirs in the 
 city. Alcibiades, if we procure his recall and pardon, 
 will be delighted to obtain for us the alliance of the King. 
 
 And above all, if these hopes fail entirely, yet, while we 
 have our great navy, there are many places of refuge 
 open to us in which we shall find city and lands. 
 
 Having met and encouraged one another by these and 77. 
 similar appeals, they displayed a corresponding energy The oii- 
 in their preparations for war. And the ten commissioners voys remain 
 whom the Four Hundred had sent out to Samos, hearing at Delos - 
 when they reached Delos how matters stood, went no 
 further. 
 
 Meanwhile the Peloponnesians in the fleet at Miletus 78. 
 had likewise troubles among themselves. The sailors The Peio- 
 complained loudly to one another that their cause was Sd?ors Sian 
 ruined by Astyochus and Tissaphernes. ‘Astyochus,’ b^tteri^of 
 they said, ‘refused to fight before a , while we were strong ^ y Ttesa- 
 and the Athenian navy weak, and will not fight now phernes. 
 when they are reported to be in a state of anarchy, and 
 their fleet is not as yet united. We are kept waiting 
 for Tissaphernes and the Phoenician ships, which are a 
 mere pretence and nothing more, and we shall soon be 
 utterly exhausted. Tissaphernes never brings up the 
 promised reinforcement, and he destroys our navy by 
 his scanty and irregular payments : the time has come 
 when we must fight.’ The Syracusans were especially 
 vehement in the matter. 
 
 Astyochus and the allies became aware of the outcry, 79. 
 and had resolved in council to fight a decisive battle. Astyochus 
 This resolution was confirmed when they heard of the hundred 
 confusion at Samos. So they put to sea with all their scoffers 
 ships, in number a hundred and twelve, and ordering the A^henkn? 6 
 Milesians to march along the coast towards Mycale, The y prefer 
 
 to await the 
 
 a Cp. viii. 38 fin., 44 fin., 55 init., 60 fin. 
 
6o2 
 
 MOVEMENTS OF THE FLEETS. 
 
 VIII. 
 
 return of 
 Strom- 
 bichides, 
 whose ships 
 arriving 
 raise their 
 number to 
 a hundred 
 and eight. 
 They in 
 their turn 
 offer battle 
 to the 
 Pelopon¬ 
 nesians, 
 who de¬ 
 cline it. 
 
 So. 
 
 The Pelo¬ 
 ponnesians, 
 disgusted 
 with Tissa- 
 phernes, ac¬ 
 cept the 
 invitation of 
 Pharnaba- 
 zus and the 
 Byzantians, 
 and send 
 forty ships 
 to the Hel¬ 
 lespont. 
 
 Ten of them 
 arrive and 
 effect the 
 revolt of 
 (14) Byzan¬ 
 tium. 
 
 sailed thither themselves. But the Athenians with their b.C. 411. 
 fleet of eighty-two ships, which had come out of Samos ' 93 ’ 2 ‘ 
 and were just then moored at Glauce on the promontory 
 of Mycale, a point of the mainland not far off, saw the 
 Peloponnesians bearing down upon them, and returned, 
 thinking that with their inferior numbers they were not 
 justified in risking their all. Besides, having previous 
 information from Miletus that the Peloponnesians were 
 anxious to fight, they had sent a messenger to Strom- 
 bichides at the Hellespont, and were waiting for him 
 to come to their aid with the ships from Chios which 
 had gone to Abydos a . So they retreated to Samos, 
 and the Peloponnesians sailed for Mycale and there 
 established themselves, together with the land-forces of 
 Miletus and of the neighbouring cities. On the following 
 day they were on the point of attacking Samos, when 
 news came that Strombichides had arrived with the fleet 
 from the Hellespont; whereupon the Peloponnesians 
 immediately retired towards Miletus, and the Athenians 
 themselves, thus reinforced, sailed against Miletus with 
 a hundred and eight ships. They had hoped to fight a 
 decisive battle, but no one came out to meet them, and 
 they returned to Samos. 
 
 The Peloponnesians had not gone out because - they 
 thought b that even with their united force they could not 
 risk a battle b . But not knowing how to maintain so 
 large a fleet, especially since Tissaphernes never paid 
 them properly, they at once while the summer lasted 
 sent Clearchus the son of Rhamphias with forty ships to 
 Pharnabazus, this being the commission which he had 
 originally received from Peloponnesus 0 . Pharnabazus 
 had been inviting them to come, and promised to main¬ 
 tain them ; the Byzantians likewise had been sending 
 envoys to them proposing to revolt. The Pelopon¬ 
 nesian squadron put out into the open sea that they 
 
 a Cp. viii. 62. 
 
 b Or, ‘ that they were not a match for the now united forces of 
 the enemy.’ c Cp. viii. 8 med. 
 
B.C. 411. 
 01. 92, 2. 
 
 ALCIBIADES AT SAMOS . 603 
 
 might not be seen on their voyage by the Athenians. VIII. 
 They were caught in a storm; Clearchus and most of 
 his ships found refuge at Delos, and thence returned to 
 Miletus. He himself proceeded later by land to the 
 Hellespont and assumed his command. But ten ships 
 under Helixus of Megara arrived safely, and effected the 
 revolt of Byzantium. The Athenians at Samos, re¬ 
 ceiving information of these movements, sent a naval 
 force to guard the Hellespont; and off Byzantium a 
 small engagement was fought by eight ships against 
 eight. 
 
 Ever since Thrasybulus restored the democracy at 81 . 
 Samos he had strongly insisted that Alcibiades should Alcibiades 
 be recalled; the other Athenian leaders were of the same to theAthe- 
 mind, and at last the consent of the army was obtained s^mos* 
 at an assembly which voted his return and full pardon. th ® sac * 
 
 J > 1 misunder- 
 
 Thrasybulus then sailed to Tissaphernes, and brought standing 
 Alcibiades to Samos, convinced that there was no help arisen about 
 for the Athenians unless by his means Tissaphernes ^™^esthe 
 could be drawn away from the Peloponnesians. An as- whole fleet 
 
 J r with hopes 
 
 sembly was called, at which Alcibiades lamented the cruel of victory, 
 and unjust fate which had banished him; he then spoke phemeswiii 
 at length of their political prospects ; and bright indeed f 0 ° r a t heS mS 
 were the hopes of future victory with which he inspired 
 them, while he magnified to excess his present influence 
 over Tissaphernes. He meant thereby first to frighten 
 the oligarchy at home, and effect the dissolution of their 
 clubs; and secondly, to exalt himself in the eyes of the 
 army at Samos and fortify their resolution ; thirdly, to 
 widen the breach between Tissaphernes and the enemy, 
 and blast the hopes of the Lacedaemonians. Having 
 these objects in view, Alcibiades carried his fulsome 
 assurances to the utmost. Tissaphernes, he said, had 
 promised him that if he could only trust the Athenians 
 they should not want for food while he had anything to 
 give, no not if he were driven at last to turn his own bed 
 into money; that he would bring up the Phoenician 
 ships (which were already at Aspendus) to assist the 
 
VIII. 
 
 82. 
 
 They want 
 to sail to the 
 Piraeus, but 
 are re¬ 
 strained by 
 Alcibiades. 
 
 83 - 
 
 The dislike 
 of the 
 Pelopon¬ 
 nesians to 
 Tissa- 
 phemes 
 increases 
 more and 
 more. 
 
 The sailors 
 are ready 
 to mutiny. 
 
 604 GREAT HOPES IN THE ATHENIAN FLEET . 
 
 Athenians instead of the Peloponnesians ; but that he 
 could not trust the Athenians unless Alcibiades were 
 restored and became surety for them. 
 
 Hearing all this, and a great deal more, the Athe¬ 
 nians immediately appointed him a colleague of their 
 other generals, and placed everything in his hands; no 
 man among them would have given up for all the world 
 the hope of deliverance and of vengeance on the Four 
 Hundred which was now aroused in them ; so excited 
 were they that under the influence of his words they 
 despised the Peloponnesians, and were ready to sail at 
 once for the Piraeus. But in spite of the eagerness 
 of the multitude he absolutely forbade them to go 
 thither and leave behind them enemies nearer at hand. 
 Having been elected general, he said, he would make the 
 conduct of the war his first care, and go at once to Tis- 
 saphernes. And he went straight from the assembly, in 
 order that he might be thought to do nothing without 
 Tissaphernes; at the same time he wished to be honoured 
 in the eyes of Tissaphernes himself, and to show him 
 that he had now been chosen general, and that a time 
 had come when he could do him a good or a bad turn. 
 Thus Alcibiades frightened the Athenians with Tissa¬ 
 phernes, and Tissaphernes with the Athenians. 
 
 The Peloponnesians at Miletus, who had already con¬ 
 ceived a mistrust of Tissaphernes, when they heard of 
 the restoration of Alcibiades were still more exasperated 
 against him. About the time of the threatened attack 
 of the Athenians on Miletus, Tissaphernes, observing 
 that the Peloponnesians would not put out to sea and 
 fight with them, had become much more remiss in 
 paying the fleet; and previously to this a dislike of him, 
 arising out of his connection with Alcibiades, had gained 
 ground. He was now more hated than ever. As before, 
 the soldiers began to gather in knots and to express 
 discontent ; and not only the soldiers, but some men 
 of position complained that they had never yet received 
 their full pay, and that the sum given was too small. 
 
 MO 
 
B.C. 411. 
 Ql. 92, 2. 
 
 ASTYOCHUS AND HIS SAILORS. 6 05 
 
 while even this was irregularly paid ; if they did not VIII. 
 fight, or go where they could obtain food, the men would 
 desert. All these grievances they laid to the charge of 
 Astyochus, who humoured Tissaphernes for his own gain. 
 
 While these thoughts were passing in their minds the 84. 
 behaviour of Astyochus gave occasion to an outbreak. Their dis- 
 
 content 
 
 The Syracusan and Thurian sailors were for the most breaks out 
 part free men, and therefore bolder than the rest in vkrfence 11 
 assailing him with demands for pay. Astyochus answered ^yochus. 
 them roughly and threatened them ; he even raised his The Miie- 
 
 . . sians m a 
 
 stick against Dorieus of Thurii who was pleading the like spirit 
 cause of his own sailors. When the men saw the action the garrison 
 they, sailor-like, lost all control of themselves, and rushed £^^5" 
 upon him, intending to stone him ; but he, perceiving 
 what was coming, ran to an altar, where taking refuge he Lichas, 
 escaped unhurt, and they were parted. The Milesians, proo f they 
 who were likewise discontented, captured by a sudden 
 assault a fort which had been built in Miletus by Tissa¬ 
 phernes, and drove out the garrison which he had placed 
 there. Of this proceeding the allies approved, especially 
 the Syracusans; Lichas, however, was displeased, and 
 said that the Milesians and the inhabitants of the King’s 
 country should submit to the necessary humiliation, and 
 manage to keep on good terms with Tissaphernes until 
 the war was well over. His conduct on this and on 
 other occasions excited a strong feeling against him 
 among the Milesians ; and afterwards, when he fell sick 
 and died, they would not let him be buried where his 
 Lacedaemonian comrades would have laid him. 
 
 While the Lacedaemonians were quarrelling in this 85. 
 manner with Astyochus and Tissaphernes, Mindarus Mindarus 
 
 succeeds 
 
 arrived from Lacedaemon; he had been appointed to Astyochus. 
 succeed Astyochus, who surrendered to him the com- phern" e s 
 mand of the fleet and sailed away. Tissaphernes sent ^ y 
 with him an envoy, one of his own attendants, a Carian Sparta, who 
 named Gaulites, who spoke both Greek and Persian a . him against 
 He was instructed to complain of the destruction of the SatSand 
 a Cp. iv. 109 med. 
 
606 ENVOYS OF THE OLIGARCHY AT SAMOS. 
 
 VIII. fort by the Milesians, and also to defend Tissaphernes b.c. 411. 
 leSarfs" a S a * nst charges. For he knew that Milesian envoys 01, g2> 2 ‘ 
 
 Malignity were going to Sparta chiefly to accuse him, and Hermo- 
 phernes crates with them, who would explain how he, aided by 
 Hermo- Alcibiades, was playing a double game and ruining the 
 crates. Peloponnesian cause. Now Tissaphernes owed Hermo- 
 crates a grudge ever since they quarrelled about the 
 payment of the sailors a . And when afterwards he had B.c. 410. 
 been exiled from Syracuse, and other generals, Potamis, ' 92 ' 3 ’ 
 Myscon, and Demarchus, came to take the command of 
 the Syracusan ships at Miletus b , Tissaphernes attacked 
 him with still greater violence in his exile, declaring 
 among other things that Hermocrates had asked him 
 for money and had been refused, and that this was the 
 reason of the enmity which he conceived c against him. 
 
 And so Astyochus, the Milesians, and Hermocrates 
 sailed away to Lacedaemon. Alcibiades had by this 
 time returned from Tissaphernes to Samos. 
 
 86. The envoys whom the Four Hundred had sent to 
 The envoys pacify the army and give explanations left Delos d and 
 
 of the Four r J ^ r r ,-aim.. 
 
 Hundred came to Samos after the return of Alcibiades, and an 
 Samos after assembly was held at which they endeavoured to speak. 
 ofAJd-™ ^ rst s °ldiers would not listen to them, but 
 biades. shouted ‘Death to the subverters of the democracy.’ 
 roughly When quiet had been with difficulty restored, the 
 by C< the d envoys told them that the change was not meant for 
 whowam’ destruction but for the preservation of the state, and 
 to sail at that there was no intention of betraying Athens to the 
 
 once to the , ' ° 
 
 Piraeus. enemy, which might have been effected by the new 
 arepre- 7 government already if they had pleased during the 
 AidbfadJs, recent invasion. They declared that all the citizens 
 who dis- were in turn to become members of the Five Thousand, 
 
 masses the 
 
 envoys with and that the families of the sailors were not being out- 
 words. raged, as Chaereas slanderously reported, or in any way 
 semce ter naolested; they were living quietly in their respective 
 never done homes. They defended themselves at length, but the 
 
 to Athens. J ® 5 
 
 a Cp. viii. 45 med. b Cp. Xen. Hell. i. i. 27 foil. 
 
 c Or, ‘ displayed.’ d Cp. viii. 77. 
 
FIVE THOUSAND, NOT FOUR HUNDRED. 607 
 
 C. 411. 
 • 92, 2. 
 
 more they said, the more furious and unwilling to listen VIII. 
 grew the multitude. Various proposals were made; 
 above all they wanted to sail to the Piraeus. Then 
 Alcibiades appears to have done as eminent a a service 
 to the state as any man ever did. For if the Athenians 
 at Samos in their excitement had been allowed to sail 
 against their fellow-citizens, the enemy would instantly 
 have obtained possession of Ionia and the Hellespont. 
 
 This he prevented, and at that moment no one else 
 could have restrained the multitude : but he did restrain 
 them, and with sharp words protected the envoys against 
 the fury of individuals in the crowd. He then dismissed 
 them himself with the reply that he had nothing to say 
 against the rule of the Five Thousand, but that the Four 
 Hundred must be got rid of, and the old council of Five 
 Hundred restored. If they had reduced the expendi¬ 
 ture in order that the soldiers on service might be better 
 off for supplies, he highly approved. For the rest he 
 entreated them to stand firm, and not give way to the 
 enemy; if the city was preserved, there was good hope 
 that they might be reconciled amongst themselves, but 
 if once anything happened either to the army at Samos 
 or to their fellow-citizens at home, there would be no 
 one left to be reconciled with. 
 
 There were also present envoys from Argos, who prof- The Paraii 
 
 who have 
 
 fered their aid ‘to the Athenian people at Samos.’ Alci- escaped 
 biades complimented them, and requested them to come bringoi- en! 
 with their forces when they were summoned; he then ^ s 0 s rom 
 dismissed them. These Argives came with the Paraii °ff erin s 
 who had been ordered by the Four Hundred to cruise off 
 Euboea in a troop-ship b ; they were afterwards employed 
 in conveying to Lacedaemon certain envoys sent by the 
 Four Hundred, Laespodias, Aristophon, and Melesias. 
 
 But when they were near Argos on their voyage the 
 crews seized the envoys, and, as they were among the 
 chief authors of the revolution, delivered them over to 
 the Argives ; while they, instead of returning to Athens, 
 a Reading nparos. b Cp. viii. 74 med. 
 
VIII. 
 
 8 7 . 
 
 Tissa- 
 phemes 
 goes to 
 fetch the 
 Phoenician 
 ships. 
 
 What was 
 his real 
 intention ? 
 There were 
 various 
 answers. 
 Thucydides 
 is convinced 
 that he was 
 only pur¬ 
 suing his 
 neutralising 
 policy. 
 
 608 WHY TISSAPHERNES WENT TO AS PEN DUS. 
 
 went from Argos to Samos, and brought with them in 
 their trireme the Argive ambassadors. 
 
 During the same summer, and just at the time when 
 the Peloponnesians were most offended with Tissa- 
 phernes on various grounds, and above all on account 
 of the restoration of Alcibiades, which finally proved 
 him to be a partizan of the Athenians, he, as if he were 
 wanting to clear himself of these suspicions, prepared to 
 go to Aspendus and fetch the Phoenician ships ; and he 
 desired Lichas to go with him. He also said that he 
 would assign the charge of the army to his lieutenant 
 Tamos, who would provide for them during his absence. 
 Why he went to Aspendus, and having gone there never 
 brought the ships, is a question not easy to answer, and 
 which has been answered in various ways. For the 
 Phoenician fleet of a hundred and forty-seven ships came 
 as far as Aspendus—there is no doubt about this; but 
 why they never came further is matter of conjecture. 
 Some think that, in going to Aspendus, Tissaphernes was 
 still pursuing his policy of wearing out the Pelopon¬ 
 nesians ; at any rate Tamos, who was in charge, supplied 
 them no better, but rather worse. Others are of opinion 
 that he brought up the Phoenician fleet to Aspendus in 
 order to make money by selling the crews their dis¬ 
 charge; for he certainly had no idea of using them in 
 actual service. Others think that he was influenced by 
 the outcry against him which had reached Lacedaemon ; 
 and that he wanted to create an impression of his 
 honesty: ‘Now at any rate he has gone to fetch the 
 ships, and they are really manned. 5 I believe beyond 
 all question that he wanted to wear out and to neutralise 
 the Hellenic forces; his object was to damage them both 
 while he was losing time in going to Aspendus, and to 
 paralyse their action, and not strengthen either of them 
 by his alliance. For if he had chosen to finish the war, 
 finished it might have been once for all, as any one may 
 see: he would have brought up the ships, and would in 
 all probability have given the victory to the Lacedae- 
 
 mo 
 
THE OLIGARCHY BEGINS TO BREAK UP. 609 
 
 B.C. 411. 
 01. 92, 2. 
 
 monians, who lay opposite to the Athenians and were VIII. 
 fully a match for them already. The excuse which he 
 gave for not bringing them is the most conclusive evi¬ 
 dence against him ; he said that there was not as many 
 collected as the King had commanded. But if so, the 
 King would have been all the better pleased, for his 
 money would have been saved and Tissaphernes would 
 have accomplished the same result at less expense. 
 Whatever may have been his intention, Tissaphernes 
 came to Aspendus and conferred with the Phoenicians, 
 and the Peloponnesians at his request sent Philip, a 
 Lacedaemonian, with two triremes to fetch the ships. 
 
 Alcibiades, when he learned that Tissaphernes was 88. 
 going to Aspendus, sailed thither himself with thirteen Alcibiades, 
 ships, promising the army at Samos that he would not ^hatTifsa- 
 fail to do them a great service. He would either bring ^™ eS 
 the Phoenician ships to the Athenians, or, at any rate, “J^ded to 
 make sure that they did not join the Peloponnesians, the Phoe- 
 He had probably known all along the real mind of promises to 
 Tissaphernes, and that he never meant to bring them * 
 at all. He wanted further to injure him as much as 
 possible in the opinion of the Peloponnesians when 
 they observed how friendly Tissaphernes was towards 
 himself and the Athenians; their distrust would compel 
 him to change sides. So he set sail and went on 
 his voyage eastward, making directly for Phaselis and 
 Caunus. 
 
 The commissioners sent by the Four Hundred re- 89. 
 turned from Samos to Athens and reported the words The «m- 
 of Alcibiades—how he bade them stand firm and not language of 
 give way to the enemy, and what great hopes he enter- indicates to 
 tained of reconciling the army to the city, and of over- 
 coming the Peloponnesians. The majority of the oli- °[.^ chs 
 garchs, who were already dissatisfied, and would have a path of 
 gladly got out of the whole affair if they safely could, Thera- 
 were now much encouraged. They began to come toge- ^stocratl 
 ther and to criticise the conduct of affairs. Their leaders 
 were some of the oligarchical generals and actually in the Five 
 
 *' - Thousand. 
 
THE MALCONTENT OLIGARCHS . 
 
 6 io 
 
 VIII. office at the time, for example, Theramenes the son 
 another 6 Hagnon and Aristocrates the son of Scellius. They 
 revolution had been among the chief authors of the revolution, 
 
 coming, and 
 
 each man a but now, fearing, as they urged, the army at Samos, and 
 tak^the being in good earnest afraid of Alcibiades, fearing also 
 lead m it. j es t t heir colleagues, who were sending envoys to Lace¬ 
 daemon 13 , might, unauthorised by the majority, betray 
 the city, they did not indeed openly profess a that they 
 meant to get rid of extreme oligarchy, but they main¬ 
 tained that the Five Thousand should be established in 
 reality and not in name, and the constitution made more 
 equal. This was the political pretext of which they 
 availed themselves, but the truth was that most of them 
 were given up to private ambition of that sort which is 
 more fatal than anything to an oligarchy succeeding a 
 democracy. For the instant an oligarchy is established 
 the promoters of it disdain mere equality, and everybody 
 thinks that he ought to be far above everybody else. 
 Whereas in a democracy, when an election is made, a 
 man is less disappointed at a failure because he has not 
 been competing with his equals. The motives which 
 most sensibly affected them were the great power of 
 Alcibiades at Samos, and an impression that the oli¬ 
 garchy was not likely to be permanent. Accordingly 
 every one was struggling hard to be the first champion 
 of the people himself. 
 
 90 . The leading men among the Four Hundred most 
 Aristarchus vl °l en tly opposed to the restoration of democracy 
 Peisander, were Phrynichus, who had been general at Samos, 
 
 and Anti- 1111 • ° 
 
 phon, the and had there come into antagonism with Alcibiades c , 
 going^oii- Aristarchus, a man who had always been the most 
 fea r dy S t 0 are thorough-going enemy of the people, Peisander, and 
 betray Antiphon. These and the other leaders, both at the 
 
 a Or, retaining eVe/nro*/; ‘and now fearing, as they urged, the 
 army at Samos, and being in good earnest afraid of Alcibiades, they 
 joined in sending envoys to Lacedaemon, but only lest, if left 
 to themselves, the envoys should betray the city. They did not 
 openly profess ’ etc. 
 b Cp. viii. 90 init. 
 
 c Cp. viii. 48. 
 
 Ocd 
 
PQO 
 
 THE LACEDAEMONIAN EAETY AT ATHENS. 6 II 
 
 .C. 411. 
 1. 92, 2. 
 
 first establishment of the oligarchy a , and again later VIII. 
 when the army at Samos declared for the democracy b , Athens to 
 sent envoys of their own number to Lacedaemon, and iftheycan 
 were always anxious to make peace; meanwhile they own power, 
 continued the fortification which they had begun to for e t he end ' 
 build at Eetioneia. They were confirmed in their pur- third time, 
 poses after the return of their own ambassadors from to Sparta, 
 Samos; for they saw that not only the people, but even oS^th* 7 
 those who had appeared steadfast adherents of their own increase ^ 
 
 1 1 vigour the 
 
 party, were now changing their minds. So, fearing what fortification 
 might happen both at Athens and Samos, they sent Anti- neiaf 10 ' 
 phon, Phrynichus, and ten others, in great haste, authoris¬ 
 ing them to make peace with Lacedaemon upon anything 
 like tolerable terms ; at the same time they proceeded 
 more diligently than ever with the fortification of Eetio¬ 
 neia. The design was (so Tfieramenes and his party 
 averred) not to bar the Piraeus against the fleet at Samos 
 should they sail thither with hostile intentions, but rather 
 to admit the enemy with his sea and land-forces when¬ 
 ever they pleased. This Eetioneia is the mole of the 
 Piraeus and forms one side of the entrance; the new 
 fortification was to be so connected with the previously 
 existing wall which looked towards the land, that a 
 handful of men stationed between the two walls might 
 command the approach from the sea. For the old wall 
 looking towards the land, and the new inner wall in 
 process of construction facing the water, ended at the 
 same point in one of the two forts which protected the 
 narrow mouth of the harbour. A cross-wall was added, 
 taking in the largest storehouse in the Piraeus and the 
 nearest to the new fortification, which it joined; this 
 the authorities held themselves, and commanded every 
 one to deposit their corn there, not only what came in 
 by sea but what they had on the spot, and to take from 
 thence all that they wanted to sell. 
 
 For some time Theramenes had been circulating whis- 91. 
 pers of their designs, and when the envoys returned from The envoys 
 
 r are unsuc- 
 
 a Cp. viii. 71 fin. b Cp. viii. 86 fin. 
 
 R r 2 
 
612 
 
 THE FORT OF EETIONEIA. 
 
 VIII. Lacedaemon without having effected anything in the 
 aTacedae 11 nature °f a trea ty f° r the Athenian people, he de- 
 monian dared that this fort was likely to prove the ruin of 
 hovering 1 Athens. Now the Euboeans had requested the Pelo- 
 coas?seems ponnesians to send them a fleet, and just at this time 
 to be acting two an d f or ty ships, including Italian vessels from Taren- 
 
 in concert J 1 ° . 
 
 with the turn and Locri and a few from Sicily, were stationed at 
 party! Las in Laconia, and were making ready to sail to Euboea 
 under the command of Agesandridas the son of Age- 
 sander, a Spartan. Theramenes insisted that these ships 
 were intended, not for Euboea, but for the party who 
 were fortifying Eetioneia, and that if the people were 
 not on the alert, they would be undone before they 
 knew where they were. The charge was not a mere 
 calumny, but had some foundation in the disposition of 
 the ruling party. For what would have best pleased 
 them would have been, retaining the oligarchy in any 
 case, to have preserved the Athenian empire over the 
 allies; failing this, to keep merely their ships and walls, 
 and to be independent; if this too proved impracticable, 
 at any rate they would not see democracy restored, and 
 themselves fall the first victims, but would rather bring 
 in the enemy and come to terms with them, not caring 
 if thereby the city lost walls and ships and everything 
 else, provided that they could save their own lives. 
 
 9 2 * So they worked diligently at the fort, which had 
 ^ h aJsas C - hUS entrances and postern-gates and every facility for intro- 
 sinated. ducing the enemy, and did their best to finish the 
 
 The ene- ....... . 
 
 miesofthe building in time. As yet the murmurs of discontent 
 secretly 17 ’ had been secret and confined to a few; when suddenly 
 by St Thera- Phrynichus, after his return from the embassy to Lace- 
 menes, now daemon, in a full market-place, having just quitted the 
 bolder. council-chamber, was struck by an assassin, one of the 
 who were GrS force employed in guarding the frontier, and fell dead. 
 
 thefor? The man W ^° dealt the bl° w escaped ; his accomplice, 
 
 seize the an Argive, was seized and put to the torture by order of 
 
 oligarch 
 
 Aiexicies. the Four Hundred, but did not disclose any name or 
 
 menes" sa y who had instigated the deed. All he would confess 
 
 Offl 
 
ow 
 
 THERAMENES THE TRIMMER. 613 
 
 .C. 411. was that a number of persons used to assemble at the VIII. 
 
 ‘ 92 ' 2 ' house of the commander of the frontier guard, and in promises 
 
 0 the Four 
 
 other houses. No further measures were taken ; and so Hundred to 
 Theramenes and Aristocrates, and the other citizens, f^ease him. 
 whether members of the Four Hundred or not, who were 
 of the same mind, were emboldened to take decided rate the 
 
 soldiers, 
 
 steps. For the Peloponnesians had already sailed round but in 
 from Las, and having overrun Aegina had cast anchor Sves at C ° n 
 at Epidaurus ; and Theramenes insisted that if they had con ' 
 been on their way to Euboea they would never have gone After a r 
 up the Saronic gulf to Aegina and then returned and tumult, in 
 anchored at Epidaurus, but that some one had invited two parties 
 them for the purposes which he had always alleged ; ^ b^ows^ 1116 
 it was impossible therefore to be any longer indifferent, f e , 
 
 After many insinuations and inflammatory harangues, to the cry 
 the people began to take active measures. The hop- Five Thou- 
 lites who were at work on the fortification of Eetioneia sand mle ' 
 in the Piraeus, among whom was Aristocrates with his 
 own tribe, which, as taxiarch, he commanded, seized 
 Alexicles, an oligarchical general who had been most 
 concerned with the clubs, and shut him up in a house. 
 
 Others joined in the act, including one Hermon, who 
 commanded the Peripoli stationed at Munychia ; above 
 all, the rank and file of the hoplites heartily approved. 
 
 The Four Hundred, who were assembled in the council- 
 house when the news was brought to them, were ready 
 in a moment to take up arms, except Theramenes and 
 his associates, who disapproved of their proceedings; to 
 these they began to use threats. Theramenes protested, 
 and offered to go with them at once and rescue Alexicles. 
 
 So, taking one of the generals who was of his own 
 faction, he went down to the Piraeus. Aristarchus and 
 certain young knights came also to the scene of conflict. 
 
 Great and bewildering was the tumult, for in the city the 
 people fancied that the Piraeus was in the hands of the 
 insurgents, and that their prisoner had been killed, and 
 the inhabitants of the Piraeus that they were on the point 
 of being attacked from the city. The elder men with 
 
THE FORT IS DEMOLISHED. 
 
 614 
 
 VIII. difficulty restrained the citizens, who were running up 
 and down and flying to arms. Thucydides of Pharsalus, 
 the proxenus of Athens in that city, happening to be on 
 the spot, kept throwing himself in every man’s way and 
 loudly entreating the people, when the enemy was lying 
 in wait so near, not to destroy their country. At length 
 they were pacified, and refrained from laying hands on 
 one another. Theramenes, who was himself a general, 
 came to the Piraeus, and in an angry voice pretended to 
 rate the soldiers, while Aristarchus and the party opposed 
 to the people were furious. No effect was produced on 
 the mass of the hoplites, who were for going to work at 
 once. They began asking Theramenes if he thought 
 that the fort was being built to any good end, and 
 whether it would not be better demolished. He 
 answered that, if they thought so, he thought so too. 
 And immediately the hoplites and a crowd of men 
 from the Piraeus got on the walls and began to pull 
 them down. The cry addressed to the people was, 
 ‘Whoever wishes the Five Thousand to rule and not 
 the Four Hundred, let him come and help us.’ For 
 they still veiled their real minds under the name of 
 the Five Thousand, and did not venture to say outright 
 ‘ Whoever wishes the people to rule; ’ they feared that 
 the Five Thousand might actually exist, and that a man 
 speaking in ignorance to his neighbour might get into 
 trouble. The Four Hundred therefore did not wish the 
 Five Thousand either to exist or to be known not to 
 exist, thinking that to give so many a share in the 
 government would be downright democracy, while at 
 the same time the mystery tended to make the people 
 afraid of one another. 
 
 93. The next day the Four Hundred, although much dis- 
 Thesoldiers turbed, met in the council-chamber. Meanwhile the 
 
 march from . 
 
 the Piraeus hoplites in the Piraeus let go Alexicles whom they had 
 Th^Four’ seized, and having demolished the fort went to the 
 send'depu- t ^ lea l :re °f Dionysus near Munychia ; there piling arms 
 ties to they held an assembly, and resolved to march at once to 
 
 CQO 
 
cc O 
 
 .C. 411. 
 1. 92, 2, 
 
 APPEARANCE OF A SPARTAN FLEET. 615 
 
 the city, which they accordingly did, and again piled VIII. 
 
 ' arms in the temple of the Dioscuri. Presently deputies them and 
 
 J 1 try nego- 
 
 appeared sent by the Four Hundred. These con- tiation. 
 versed with them singly, and tried to persuade the mise to 
 more reasonable part of them to keep quiet and re- ^amesof 16 
 strain their comrades, promising that they would publish ^ Q ^ a e nd 
 the names of the Five Thousand, and that out of these out of whom 
 the Four Hundred should be in turn elected in such a Hundred 
 manner as the Five Thousand might think fit. In the e[ected be 
 meantime they begged them not to ruin everything, or 
 to drive the city upon the enemy. The discussion 
 became general on both sides, and at length the whole 
 body of soldiers grew calmer, and turned their thoughts 
 to the danger which threatened the commonwealth. 
 
 They finally agreed that an assembly should be held 
 on a fixed day in the theatre of Dionysus to deliberate 
 on the restoration of harmony. 
 
 When the day arrived and the assembly was on the 94 - 
 point of meeting in the theatre of Dionysus, news came 
 that Agesandridas and his forty-two ships had crossed Lacedae- 
 
 c tv/r i • 1. , . monism 
 
 over irom Megara, and were sailing along the coast squadron 
 of Salamis. Every man of the popular party thought nearer^and 
 that this was what they had been so often told by there 
 
 J J general con- 
 
 Theramenes and his friends, and that the ships were sternation. 
 sailing to the fort, happily now demolished. Nor is 
 it impossible that Agesandridas may have been hovering 
 about Epidaurus and the neighbourhood by agreement; 
 but it is equally likely that he lingered there of his own 
 accord, with an eye to the agitation which prevailed at 
 Athens, hoping to be on the spot at the critical moment. 
 
 Instantly upon the arrival of the news the whole city 
 rushed down to the Piraeus, a thinking that a conflict 
 with their enemies more serious than their domestic 
 strife a was now awaiting them, not at a distance, but 
 at the very mouth of the harbour. Some embarked in 
 
 a Omitting r\ with one MS. Otherwise, retaining rj with a great 
 majority of MSS.: ‘thinking that a conflict among themselves more 
 serious than the attack of their enemies ’ etc. 
 
VIII. 
 
 95 - 
 
 The ships 
 pass on¬ 
 ward to 
 Euboea 
 and put in 
 at Oropus. 
 A small 
 Athenian 
 fleet follows 
 them, but 
 being con¬ 
 strained 
 to fight 
 hurriedly, 
 are utterly 
 defeated, 
 and the 
 Pelopon¬ 
 nesians 
 obtain pos¬ 
 session of 
 the whole 
 island, 
 which 
 revolts (15). 
 
 616 REVOLT OF EUBOEA . 
 
 the ships which were lying ready; others launched fresh 
 ships ; others manned the walls and prepared to defend 
 the entrance of the Piraeus. 
 
 The Peloponnesian squadron, however, sailed onward, 
 doubled the promontory of Sunium, and then, after 
 putting in between Thoricus and Prasiae, finally pro¬ 
 ceeded to Oropus. The Athenians in their haste were 
 compelled to employ crews not yet trained to work 
 together, for the city was in a state of revolution, and 
 the matter was vital and urgent; Euboea was all in all to 
 them now that they were shut out from Attica a . They 
 despatched a fleet under the command of Thymochares 
 to Eretria ; these ships, added to those which were at 
 Euboea before, made up thirty-six. No sooner had they 
 arrived than they were constrained to fight; for Agesan- 
 dridas, after his men had taken their midday meal, 
 brought out his own ships from Oropus, which is distant 
 by sea about seven miles from the city of Eretria, and 
 bore down upon them. The Athenians at once began to 
 man their ships, fancying that their crews were close at 
 hand; but it had been so contrived that they were 
 getting their provisions from houses at the end of the 
 town, and not in the market, for the Eretrians inten¬ 
 tionally sold nothing there that the men might lose time 
 in embarking ; the enemy would then come upon them 
 before they were ready, and they would be compelled to 
 put out as best they could. A signal was also raised at 
 Eretria telling the fleet at Oropus when to attack. The 
 Athenians putting out in this hurried manner, and 
 fighting off the harbour of Eretria, nevertheless resisted 
 for a little while, but before long they fled and were 
 pursued to the shore. Those of them who took refuge 
 in the city of Eretria, relying on the friendship of the 
 inhabitants, fared worst, for they were butchered by 
 them ; but such as gained the fortified position which 
 the Athenians held in the Eretrian territory escaped, 
 and also the crews of the vessels which reached Chalcis. 
 a Cp. vii. 27 fin., 28 init. 
 
 Opa 
 
«o 
 
 C. 41i. 
 . 92, 2. 
 
 PANIC AT ATHENS. 617 
 
 The Peloponnesians, who had taken twenty-two Athe¬ 
 nian ships and had killed or made prisoners of the men, 
 erected a trophy. Not long afterwards they induced all 
 Euboea to revolt, except Oreus of which the Athenians 
 still maintained possession. They then set in order the 
 affairs of the island. 
 
 When the news of the battle and of the defection of 
 Euboea was brought to Athens, the Athenians were 
 panic-stricken. Nothing which had happened before, 
 not even the ruin of the Sicilian expedition, however 
 overwhelming at the time, had so terrified them. The 
 army at Samos was in insurrection ; they had no ships 
 in reserve or crews to man them; there was revolution 
 at home—civil war might break out at any moment: 
 and by this new and terrible misfortune they had lost, 
 not only their ships, but what was worse, Euboea, on 
 which they were more dependent for supplies than on 
 Attica itself. Had they not reason to despair? But 
 what touched them nearest, and most agitated their 
 minds, was the fear lest their enemies, emboldened by 
 victory, should at once attack the Piraeus, in which no 
 ships were left; indeed they fancied that they were all 
 but there. And had the Peloponnesians been a little 
 more enterprising they could easily have executed such 
 a plan. Either they might have cruised near, and would 
 then have aggravated the divisions in the city; or by 
 remaining and carrying on a blockade they might have 
 compelled the fleet in Ionia, although hostile to the oli¬ 
 garchy, to come and assist their kindred and their native 
 city; and then the Hellespont, Ionia, all the islands be¬ 
 tween Ionia and Euboea, in a word, the whole Athenian 
 empire, would have fallen into their hands. But on this as 
 on so many other occasions the Lacedaemonians proved 
 themselves to be the most convenient enemies whom the 
 Athenians could possibly have had. For the two peoples 
 were of very different tempers ; the one quick, the other 
 slow; the one adventurous, the other timorous a ; and the 
 a Cp. i. 70. 
 
 VIII. 
 
 96 . 
 
 The Athe¬ 
 nians have 
 reason to 
 despair ; 
 for they see 
 the army 
 revolting, 
 Euboea 
 lost, no 
 more ships, 
 the enemy 
 all but in 
 the Piraeus. 
 But they are 
 saved by 
 the supine¬ 
 ness of the 
 Lacedae¬ 
 monians. 
 
6i8 DEPOSITION OF THE FOUR HUNDRED. 
 
 VIII. 
 
 97 - 
 
 They im¬ 
 mediately 
 depose the 
 Four Hun¬ 
 dred, and 
 establish 
 a new go¬ 
 vernment 
 (the best 
 which 
 Thucydides 
 had known) 
 of Five 
 Thousand, 
 being the 
 citizens 
 who sup¬ 
 plied them¬ 
 selves with 
 arms. 
 
 Pay for 
 
 offices 
 
 abolished. 
 
 Alcibiades 
 
 recalled. 
 
 98. 
 
 Betrayal of 
 Oenoe to 
 the Pelo¬ 
 ponnesians 
 by Aristar¬ 
 chus. 
 
 Lacedaemonian character was of great service to the 
 Athenians, the more so because the empire for which 
 they were fighting was maritime. And this view is 
 confirmed by the defeat of the Athenians at Syracuse; 
 for the Syracusans, who were most like them a , fought 
 best against them. 
 
 When the news came the Athenians in their extremity 
 still contrived to man twenty ships, and immediately 
 summoned an assembly (the first of many) in the place 
 called the Pnyx, where they had always been in the 
 habit of meeting; at which assembly they deposed the 
 Four Hundred, and voted that the government should 
 be in the hands of the Five Thousand ; this number was 
 to include all who could furnish themselves with arms. 
 No one was to receive pay for holding any office, on pain 
 of falling under a curse. In the numerous other assem¬ 
 blies which were afterwards held they re-appointed No- 
 mothetae, and by a series of decrees established a con¬ 
 stitution. This government during its early days was 
 the best which the Athenians ever enjoyed within my 
 memory. Oligarchy and Democracy were duly attem¬ 
 pered. And thus after the miserable state into which 
 she had fallen, the city was again able to raise her head. 
 The people also passed a vote recalling Alcibiades and 
 others from exile, and sending to him and to the army 
 in Samos exhorted them to act vigorously. 
 
 When this new revolution began, Peisander, Alexi- 
 cles, and the other leaders of the oligarchy stole away to 
 Decelea; all except Aristarchus, who, being one of the 
 generals at the time, gathered round him hastily a few 
 archers of the most barbarous sort and made his way to 
 Oenoe. This was an Athenian fort on the borders of 
 Boeotia which the Corinthians b , having called the Boeo¬ 
 tians to their aid, were now besieging on their own ac¬ 
 count, in order to revenge an overthrow inflicted by the 
 
 a Cp. i. 141 med.; vii. 55. 
 
 b Or, ‘which Corinthian volunteers,’ omitting ‘on their own 
 account.’ 
 
 mo 
 
CQO 
 
 .C. 411. 
 1. 92, 2. 
 
 THE TRAITOR ARISTARCHUS . 619 
 
 garrison of Oenoe upon a party of them who were going VIII. 
 home from Decelea. Aristarchus entered into communi¬ 
 cation with the besiegers, and deceived the garrison by 
 telling them that the Athenian government had come to 
 terms with the Lacedaemonians, and that by one of the 
 conditions of the peace they were required to give up 
 the place to the Boeotians. They, trusting him, whom 
 they knew to be a general, and being in entire ignorance 
 of what had happened because they were closely in¬ 
 vested, capitulated and came out. Thus Oeno£ was taken 
 and occupied by the Boeotians; and the oligarchical re¬ 
 volution at Athens came to an end. 
 
 During this summer and about the same time Min- 99 - 
 darus transferred the fleet of the Peloponnesians to the No sign 
 
 r . of the 
 
 Hellespont. They had been waiting at Miletus. But Phoenician 
 none of the commissioners whom Tissaphernes on going tSTpcIo- 
 to Aspendus appointed to supply the fleet gave them now n be- anS 
 anything; and neither the Phoenician ships nor Tissa- ^ e T ^ re 
 phernes himself had as yet made their appearance; phernes is 
 Philip, who had been sent with Tissaphernes, and dishonest! 7 
 Hippocrates a Spartan, then in Phaselis, had informed thdr fleet^ 
 the admiral Mindarus that the ships would never 1 ° Pharna - 
 come, and that Tissaphernes was thoroughly dishonest the Hehes- 
 in his dealings with them. All this time Pharnabazus They are 
 was inviting them and was eager to secure the assistance chk)T. ed at 
 of the' K fleet; he wanted, like Tissaphernes, to raise a 
 revolt, whereby he hoped to profit, among the cities in his 
 own dominion which still remained faithful to Athens. 
 
 So at length Mindarus, in good order and giving the 
 signal suddenly, lest he should be discovered by the 
 Athenians at Samos, put to sea from Miletus with 
 seventy-three ships, and set sail for the Hellespont, 
 whither in this same summer a Peloponnesian force had 
 already gone in sixteen ships, and had overrun a portion 
 of the Chersonese. But meeting with a storm Mindarus 
 was driven into Icarus, and being detained there five or 
 six days by stress of weather, he put in at Chios. 
 
 When Thrasyllus at Samos heard that he had started 100. 
 
6^0 
 
 THE ATHENIANS IN LESBOS. 
 
 VIII. from Miletus he sailed away in all haste with fifty-five 
 The Athe- ships, fearing that the enemy might get into the Helles- 
 pursue pont before him. Observing that Mindarus was at 
 Observing Chios, and thinking that he could keep him there, he 
 areatOnos pl ace d scouts at Lesbos and on the mainland oppo- 
 s he, that he might be informed if the ships made any 
 to watch attempt to sail away. He himself coasted along the 
 during island to Methymna and ordered a supply of barley- 
 besiege ay mea l and other provisions, intending, if he were long 
 Eresus (16), detained, to make Lesbos his head-quarters while at- 
 revolted, tacking Chios. He wanted also to sail against the 
 Lesbian town of Eresus, which had revolted, and, if 
 possible, to destroy the place. Now certain of the chief 
 citizens of Methymna who had been driven into exile 
 had conveyed to the island about fifty hoplites, partizans 
 of theirs, from Cym<b, besides others whom they hired 
 on the mainland, to the number of three hundred in all. 
 They were commanded by Anaxander, a Theban, who 
 was chosen leader because the Lesbians were of Theban 
 descents They first of all attacked Methymna. In 
 this attempt they were foiled by the timely arrival of the 
 Athenian garrison from Mitylene, and being a second 
 time repulsed outside the walls, had marched over the 
 mountains and induced Eresus to revolt. Thither Thra- 
 syllus sailed, having determined to attack them with 
 all his ships. He found that Thrasybulus had Already 
 reached the place, having started from Samos with five 
 ships as soon as he heard that the exiles had landed. 
 But he had come too late to prevent the revolt, and was 
 lying off Eresus. There Thrasyllus was also joined by 
 two ships which were on their way home from the Helles¬ 
 pont, and by a squadron from Methymna. The whole 
 fleet now consisted of sixty-seven ships, from the crews 
 of which the generals formed an army, and prepared by 
 the help of engines and by every possible means to take 
 Eresus. 
 
 Meanwhile Mindarus and the Peloponnesian fleet at 
 a Cp. iii. 2 fin., 5 med., 13 init.; viii. 5 init. 
 
 IOI. 
 
 Cpa 
 
ow 
 
 LACEDAEMONIANS AT THE HELLESPONT. 621 
 
 C. 411. 
 .. 92, 2. 
 
 Chios, having spent two days in provisioning, and having VIII. 
 received from the Chians three Chian tesseracosts a for The Peio- 
 
 ponnesian 
 
 each man, on the third day sailed hastily from Chios, fleet steai- 
 not going through the open sea, lest they should fall in ^for^dawn 
 with the ships blockading Eresus, but making directly J n OI J 1 h g hlos ’ 
 for the mainland and keeping Lesbos on the left. They evening of 
 
 1 . 1 ^e second 
 
 touched at the harbour of the island Cartena, which day arrives 
 belongs to Phocaea, and there taking their midday Hellespont, 
 meal, sailed past the Cumaean territory, and supped at 
 Argennusae on the mainland over against Mitylene. 
 
 They sailed away some time before dawn, and at 
 Harmatus, which is opposite Methymna on the main¬ 
 land, they again took their midday meal; they quickly 
 passed by the promontory of Lectum, Larissa, Hamaxi- 
 tus, and the neighbouring towns, and finally arrived at 
 Rhoeteium in the Hellespont before midnight. Some 
 of the ships also put into Sigeium and other places 
 in the neighbourhood. 
 
 The Athenians, who lay with eighteen ships at Sestos b , 102. 
 knew from the beacons which their scouts kindled, and The Athe_ 
 
 nian 
 
 from the sudden blaze of many watch-fires which ap- squadron 
 peared in the enemy’s country, that the Peloponnesians escapes° S 
 were on the point of sailing into the strait. That very 
 night, getting close under the Chersonese, they moved loss > 
 towards Elaeus, in the hope of reaching the open sea 
 before the enemy’s ships arrived. They passed unseen 
 the sixteen Peloponnesian ships c which were at Abydos, 
 and had been told by their now approaching friends to 
 keep a sharp look-out if the Athenians tried to get 
 away. At dawn of day they sighted the fleet of Min- 
 darus, which immediately gave chase; most of them 
 escaped in the direction of Imbros and Lemnos, but 
 the four which were hindermost were caught off Elaeus. 
 
 One which ran ashore near the temple of Protesilaus 
 
 a A small Chian coin of which the exact value is unknown: if it 
 amounted to th of the gold stater (20 drachmae) it would be 
 worth 3 obols, nearly 5 d. 
 
 b Cp. viii. 80 fin. c Cp. viii. 99 fin. 
 
622 
 
 THE ATHENIANS FOLLOW. 
 
 VIII. 
 
 103. 
 
 and rejoins 
 the rest 
 of the 
 Athenian 
 fleet, which 
 on finding 
 that the 
 Peloponne¬ 
 sians had 
 gone north¬ 
 ward, had 
 immedi¬ 
 ately pur¬ 
 sued them. 
 
 IO4. 
 
 Battle of 
 Cynossema 
 between 
 eighty-eight 
 Peloponne¬ 
 sian and 
 seventy-six 
 Athenian 
 ships. 
 
 The Pelo¬ 
 ponnesians 
 try to shut 
 up their 
 enemies in 
 the strait. 
 
 A counter 
 movement 
 of Thrasy- 
 bulus, which 
 weakens 
 the centre 
 of the 
 Athenians, 
 nearly 
 proves fatal 
 to them. 
 
 the Peloponnesians took, together with the crew; two 
 others without the crews ; a fourth they burnt on the 
 shore of Imbros; the crew escaped. 
 
 For the rest of that day they blockaded Elaeus with 
 the ships from Abydos which had now joined them ; the 
 united fleet numbering eighty-six; but as the town 
 would not yield they sailed away to Abydos. 
 
 The Athenians, whose scouts had failed them, and 
 who had never imagined that the enemy’s fleet could 
 pass them undetected, were quietly besieging Eresus; 
 but on finding out their mistake they instantly set sail 
 and followed the enemy to the Hellespont. They fell 
 in with and took two Peloponnesian ships, which during 
 the pursuit had ventured too far into the open sea. On 
 the following day they came to Elaeus, where they re¬ 
 mained at anchor, and the ships which had taken refuge 
 at Imbros joined them ; the next five days were spent 
 in making preparations for the impending engagement. 
 
 After this they fought, and the manner of the battle 
 was as follows. The Athenians began to sail in column 
 close along the shore towards Sestos, when the Pelo¬ 
 ponnesians, observing them, likewise put to sea from 
 Abydos. Perceiving that a battle was imminent, the 
 Athenians, numbering seventy-six ships, extended their 
 line along the Chersonese from Idacus to Arrhiani, 
 and the Peloponnesians, numbering eighty-eight ships, 
 from Abydos to Dardanus. The Syracusans held the 
 right wing of the Peloponnesians; the other wing, on 
 which were the swiftest ships, was led by Mindarus him¬ 
 self. Thrasyllus commanded the left wing of the Athe¬ 
 nians, and Thrasybulus the right; the other generals 
 had their several posts. The Peloponnesians were eager 
 to begin the engagement, intending, as their left wing 
 extended beyond the right of the Athenians, to prevent 
 them, if possible, from sailing again out of the straits, and 
 also to thrust their centre back on the land which was 
 near. The Athenians, seeing their intention, advanced 
 from the land the wing on which the enemy wanted to 
 
 Ota 
 
COO 
 
 BATTLE OF CYNOSSEMA. 6 23 
 
 C. 411. cut them off, and succeeded in getting beyond them. VIII. 
 
 ‘ 92 ’ 2 ’ But their left wing by this time had passed the pro¬ 
 montory of Cynossema, and the result was that the 
 centre of their line was thinned and weakened—all the 
 more since their numbers were inferior and the sharp 
 projection of the shore about Cynossema hindered those 
 who were on one side from seeing what was taking place. 
 on the other. 
 
 So the Peloponnesians, falling upon the centre of the 105. 
 Athenian fleet, forced their enemies’ ships back on the But in the 
 
 r 1 .... n . moment of 
 
 beach, and having gained a decisive advantage, dis- victory the 
 embarked to follow up their victory. Neither Thrasy- nesianT" 
 bulus on the right wing, who was pressed hard by ^fusion 
 superior numbers, nor Thrasyllus on the left, was able to and are 
 
 defeated by 
 
 assist them. The promontory of Cynossema hindered a sudden 
 the left wing from seeing the action, and the ships of the Thrasybu- 
 Syracusans and others, equal in number to their own, lus ‘ 
 kept them fully engaged. But at last, while the victo¬ 
 rious Peloponnesians were incautiously pursuing, some 
 one ship, some another, a part of their line began to 
 fall into disorder. Thrasybulus remarked their con¬ 
 fusion, and at once left off extending his wing; then 
 turning upon the ships which were opposed to him, 
 he repulsed and put them to flight; he next faced a the 
 conquering and now scattered ships of the Pelopon¬ 
 nesian centre, struck at them, and threw them into such 
 a panic that hardly any of them resisted. The Syra¬ 
 cusans too had by this time given way to Thrasyllus, 
 and were still more inclined to fly when they saw the 
 others flying. 
 
 After the rout the Peloponnesians effected their 106. 
 
 escape, most of them to the river Meidius first, and then Effect of 
 
 to Abydos. Not many ships were taken by the Athe- 0 n the 
 
 nians; for the Hellespont, being narrow, afforded a Athenians*! 6 
 
 retreat to the enemy within a short distance. Never- J^ y can 
 
 theless nothing could have been more opportune for believe 
 
 , ... r . • .1 their good- 
 
 them than this victory at sea ; for some time past they fortune. 
 
 a Or, * intercepted.’ 
 
62 4 RETURN OF ALCIBIADES TO SAMOS. 
 
 VIII. had feared the Peloponnesian navy on account of their 
 Twenty-one disaster in Sicily, as well as of the various smaller defeats 
 the enemy which they had sustained a . But now they ceased to 
 and. 6 fifteen depreciate themselves or to think much of their enemies’ 
 ownTost. seamanship. They had taken eight Chian vessels, five 
 Corinthian, two Ambracian, two Boeotian, and of the 
 Leucadians, Lacedaemonians, Syracusans, and Pelle- 
 nians one each. Their own loss amounted to fifteen 
 ships. They raised a trophy on the promontory of 
 Cynossema, and then collecting the wrecks, and giving 
 up to the enemy his dead under a flag of truce, sent 
 a trireme carrying the news of the victory to Athens. 
 On the arrival of the ship the Athenians could hardly 
 believe their good-fortune, and after the calamities which 
 had befallen them in Euboea and during the revolution, 
 they were greatly encouraged. They thought that their 
 affairs were no longer hopeless, and that if they were 
 energetic they might still win. 
 
 107. The Athenians at Sestos promptly repaired their 
 Pefoponne 6 S ^P S ’ and were proceeding against Cyzicus, which had 
 sian ships revolted, when, seeing the eight Peloponnesian ships b 
 theAthe- by from Byzantium anchored at Harpagium and Priapus, 
 ™hey they bore down upon them, and defeating the land- 
 recover forces which were acting with them, took the ships. 
 
 Cyzicus (17) 0 \ ' r 
 
 which has They then went and recovered Cyzicus, which was 
 unwalled, and exacted a contribution from the in¬ 
 habitants. Meanwhile the Peloponnesians sailed from 
 Abydos to Elaeus, and recovered as many of their 
 own captured vessels as were still sea-worthy; the rest 
 had been burnt by the Elaeusians. They then sent 
 Hippocrates and Epicles to Euboea to bring up the 
 ships which were there. 
 
 X08. About the same time Alcibiades sailed back with his 
 Aicibiades thirteen ships 0 from Caunus and Phaselis to Samos, 
 from^Tissa- announcing that he had prevented the Phoenician fleet 
 whonThe f rom com i n g to the assistance of the enemy, and that he 
 
 a Cp. viii. 95, 102. 
 
 c Cp. viii. 88 init. 
 
 b Cp. viii. 80 fin. 
 
 CQO 
 
B.C. 4* 1 
 01 . 9 2 » 2 ' 
 
 ARSACES AND THE DELIANS . 625 
 
 . had made Tissaphernes a greater friend of the Athe- VIII. 
 
 ' nians than ever. He then manned nine additional ships, professes to 
 
 A have made 
 
 and exacted large sums of money from the Halicarnas- a fast friend 
 sians. He also fortified Cos a , where he left a governor, Athenians, 
 and towards the autumn returned to Samos. 
 
 When Tissaphernes heard that the Peloponnesian Tissa- 
 fleet had sailed from Miletus to the Hellespont, he broke marches 
 up his camp at Aspendus and marched away towards to The 
 
 Ionia. Now after the arrival of the Peloponnesians at cmel ^y and 
 
 A treachery 
 
 the Hellespont, the Antandrians, who are Aeolians, had of his 
 procured from them at Abydos a force of infantry, which Arsaces 11 
 they led through Mount Ida and introduced into their ^man^ 6 
 city. They were oppressed by Arsaces the Persian, a to 
 lieutenant of Tissaphernes. This Arsaces, when the garrison 
 Athenians, wishing to purify Delos, expelled the in- p e iopon- 
 habitants and they settled in Adramyttium b , professing nesians * 
 to have a quarrel which he did not wish to declare 
 openly, asked their best soldiers to form an army for 
 him. He then led them out of the town as friends and 
 allies, and, taking advantage of their midday meal, 
 surrounded them with his own troops, and shot them 
 down. This deed alarmed the Antandrians, who thought 
 that they might meet with some similar violence at his 
 hands; and as he was imposing upon them burdens 
 which were too heavy for them, they expelled his 
 garrison from their citadel. 
 
 Tissaphernes, who was already offended at the ex- 109. 
 pulsion of his garrison from Miletus 0 , and from Cnidus d , Tissa- 
 
 phernes de- 
 
 where the same thing had happened, perceived that this termines to 
 new injury was the work of the Peloponnesians. He Peiopom 6 
 felt that they were now his determined enemies, and was nesians and 
 
 J t # accuse 
 
 apprehensive of some further injury. He was also dis- them, while 
 gusted at discovering that Pharnabazus had induced himself? 
 the Peloponnesians to join him, and was likely in less 
 time and at less expense to be more successful in the 
 war with the Athenians than himself. He therefore 
 
 a Cp. viii. 41 med. 1} Cp. v. 1. 
 
 c Cp viii. 84 med. d Cp. viii. 35 init. 
 
 S S 
 
6 26 
 
 TISSAPHERNES. 
 
 VIII. 
 
 He stops on 
 his way at 
 Ephesus, 
 and sacri¬ 
 fices to 
 Artemis 
 
 determined to go to the Hellespont, and complain of 
 their conduct in the affair of Antandrus, offering at the 
 same time the most plausible defence which he could 
 concerning the non-arrival of the Phoenician fleet and 
 their other grievances. He first went to Ephesus, and 
 there offered sacrifice to Artemis. . . . 
 
 [With the end of the winter which follows this sum¬ 
 mer the twenty-first year of the Peloponnesian War is 
 completed.] 
 
 o to 
 
INDEX. 
 
 The compilation of this Index has been greatly assisted by the Geo¬ 
 graphical and Historical Index prepared by Mr. Tiddeman for the 
 later editions of Arnold’s Thucydides. 
 
 The subdivision of the chapters not agreeing in different editions, each 
 chapter is referred to in three parts, marked, init., med., fin. 
 
 A. 
 
 Abdera, situation of, ii. 97 init.; 
 Nymphodorus of Abdera, ii. 29. 
 
 Abydos, a Milesian colony, viii. 61 
 init.; revolts to the Lacedaemo¬ 
 nians, ib. 62 ; Strombichides re¬ 
 called from, ib. 79 med.; the Pelo¬ 
 ponnesian head-quarters, ib. 102- 
 108. 
 
 Acamantis, an Athenian tribe, iv. 
 
 • 118 fin. 
 
 Acanthus, an Andrian colony, iv. 84 
 init.; revolts from Athens, ib. 84- 
 88 ; provision respecting, in the 
 treaty between Lacedaemon and 
 Athens, v. 18, vi ; speech of 
 Brasidas at, iv. 85—87,114 med., 
 120 med.; Acanthian troops with 
 Brasidas, ib. 124 init. 
 
 Acanthus, a Lacedaemonian, swears 
 to the Treaty of Peace and the 
 Alliance, v. 19 med., ib. 24 init. 
 
 Acarnan, eponymous hero of Acar- 
 nania, ii. 102 fin. 
 
 Acarnania, named after Acar¬ 
 nan, ii. 102 fin. ; opposite to 
 Cephallenia, ii. 30 fin.; invaded 
 by the Ambraciots, ib. 80-82 ; 
 the Acarnanians always carry 
 arms, i. 5 fin. ; skilful slingers, ii. 
 81 fin., vii. 31 fin. ; their com¬ 
 mon council, iii. 105 init.; allies 
 of Athens [except Oeniadae, ii. 
 102 init.], ii. 7 fin., 9 med., 68 fin., 
 iii. 95 med., 102 med., iv. 77 med., 
 89, 101 med., vii. 57 fin., 60 fin., 
 67 med. ; expedition of Phormio 
 against Oeniadae, ii. 102 ; request 
 as their commander a relation of 
 Phormio, iii. 7 ; attack Leucas, 
 
 iii. 94 init. med.; defeat the Am¬ 
 braciots, ib. 105-113; conclude 
 a treaty with Ambracia, ib. 114 
 med.; colonize Anactorium,iv.49. 
 
 Acesines, a river in Sicily, iv. 25 med. 
 
 Achaea [in Peloponnesus], restored 
 by the Athenians, i. 115 init. [cp. 
 
 i. 111 fin.]; redemanded from the 
 Lacedaemonians by Cleon, iv. 
 21 med. ; resettled by the Lace¬ 
 daemonians, v. 82 init.; Achae- 
 ans, the original Hellenes, i. 
 3 med.; founders of Zacynthus, 
 
 ii. 66; found Scion& on their 
 return from Troy, iv. 120 init.; 
 allies of the Athenians, i. 111 fin.; 
 at first neutral in the war, except 
 the Pellenes, ii. 9 init.; not al¬ 
 lowed to join in the foundation 
 of Heraclea, iii. 92 fin.; support 
 the Peloponnesians in the en¬ 
 gagement offErineum,vii. 34 init. 
 
 Achaea [Pthiotis], iv. 78 init.; sub¬ 
 ject to the Thessalians, viii. 3 med. 
 
 Acharnae, the largest of the Athe¬ 
 nian Demes, ii. 19 fin., ib. 21 fin., 
 23 init.; ravaged by the Pelopon¬ 
 nesians, ib. 19 fin. 
 
 Achelous, ii. 102 med., iii. 7 med., 
 106 init.; description of its Delta, 
 ii. 102 med. 
 
 Acheron, a river in Thesprotis, i. 
 46 fin. 
 
 Acherusian lake, in Thesprotis, i. 
 46 med. 
 
 Achilles, followers of, the original 
 Hellenes, i. 3 med. 
 
 Acrae, founded by the Syracusans, 
 vi. 5 init. 
 
 Acraean height, in Sicily, vii. 78 fin. 
 
 Acragas, a river in Sicily, vi. 4 med. 
 
 2 
 
6 2 8 
 
 IN D E X. 
 
 Acragas, see Agrigentum. 
 
 Acropolis of Athens: ii. 13 med., 
 15 med.; taken by Cylon, i. 126; 
 anciently called Polis, ii. 15 fin.; 
 preserved from occupation in 
 the plague, ii. 17 init.; treaties of 
 peace recorded on tablets there, 
 v. 18, xi; 23, iv; 47 fin.; inscription 
 in, commemorating the oppres¬ 
 sion of the tyrants, vi. 55 init. 
 
 Acrothous, in Act£, iv. 109 med. 
 
 Act£, the peninsula of, iv. 109. 
 
 Actium, the Corinthian fleet met by 
 a Corcyraean herald at,i. 29 med.; 
 the Corinthians encamp near, ib. 
 30 fin. 
 
 Adeimantus, father of Aristeus, a 
 Corinthian, i. 60 med. 
 
 Admetus, king of Molossians, pro¬ 
 tects Themistocles, i. 136, 137. 
 
 Adramyttium, settled by the Deli¬ 
 ans, v. 1 fin., viii. 108 fin. 
 
 Aeantides, son-in-law of Hippias 
 the tyrant, vi. 59 fin. 
 
 Aegaleos, Mount, in Attica, ii. I9fin. 
 
 Aegean Sea, i. 98 med., iv. 109 med. 
 
 Aegina, on the direct route from 
 Athens to Argos, v. 53 fin.; 
 colonized from Athens, ii. 27, 
 vii. 57 init., viii. 69 med.; Corcy¬ 
 raean envoys deposited in, iii. 72 
 init.; the settlers in Aegina at 
 Mantinea, v.74 fin.; at Syracuse, 
 vii. 57 init.; aid in the oligar¬ 
 chical conspiracy at Athens, viii. 
 69 med.; the Sicilian expedition 
 races as far as, vi. 32 med.; the 
 reinforcements stay at, vii. 20 fin., 
 26 init.; ravaged by the Pelopon¬ 
 nesians, viii. 92 med.; former 
 naval power of the Aeginetans, 
 i. 14 fin.; first war between the 
 Aeginetans and Athenians, ib. 14 
 fin., 2'^. 41 init.; second, ib. 105; 
 come to terms with the Athe¬ 
 nians, ib. 108 fin.; the Aegine¬ 
 tans secretly urge on the war, 
 ib. 67 med.; the Lacedaemonians 
 demand their independence, ib. 
 139 init., 140 med.; expelled by 
 the Athenians, ii. 27 init.; settled 
 by the Lacedaemonians at Thy- 
 rea, ib. med.; assist the Lacedae¬ 
 monians in the war of Ithom£, ib. 
 fin.; attacked by the Athenians in 
 
 Thyrea, iv. 56 fin., 57 init.; the sur¬ 
 vivors put to death, ib. fin. 
 
 Aegitium, in Aetolia, iii. 97 med. 
 
 Aeimnestus, a Plataean, father of 
 Lacon, iii. 52 fin. 
 
 Aeneas, a Corinthian, iv. 119 med. 
 
 Aenesias, Ephor at Sparta, ii. 2 init. 
 
 Aenianians, in Malis, v. 51 init. 
 
 Aenus, in Thrace, iv. 28 med.; 
 founded from Boeotia, vii. 57 
 med.; tributary to Athens, ib. 
 
 Aeoladas, a Theban, father of Pa- 
 gondas, iv. 91 med. 
 
 Aeolian countries and cities, Boeo¬ 
 tia, vii. 57 med.; Lesbos, ib. [cp. 
 iii. 2 fin., 5 med., 13 init., viii. 4 
 med., 100 med.]; Tenedos, vii. 
 57; Aenus, ib.\ Cum£, iii. 31 init.; 
 Antandros, viii. 108 med. 
 
 Aeolian islands, see Liparaean 
 islands. 
 
 ' Aeolian subjects of the Athenians 
 at Syracuse, vii. 57 med. 
 
 Aeolians, ancient occupants of Co¬ 
 rinth, iv. 42 med. 
 
 Aeolis, former name of Calydon 
 and Pleuron, iii. 102 med. 
 
 Aesimides, a Corcyraean com¬ 
 mander, i. 47 init. 
 
 Aeson, an Argive envoy to Lacedae¬ 
 mon, v. 40 fin. 
 
 Aethea, Lacedaemonian Perioeci 
 of, i. 101 init. 
 
 Aethiopia, plague said to have be¬ 
 gun in, ii. 48 init. 
 
 Aetna, eruption of, iii. 116; the third 
 since the Hellenic settlements 
 of Sicily, ib. 
 
 Aetolia, customs of the Aetolians, i. 
 
 5 fin., iii. 94 fin.; disastrous cam¬ 
 paign of the Athenians in, ib. 94 
 mecL-98 [cp. iv. 30 init.]; the 
 Aetolians persuade the Lacedae¬ 
 monians to send an expedition 
 against Naupactus, ib. 100; join in 
 the expedition, ib. 102 init.; Aeto¬ 
 lians before Syracuse, vii. 57 fin. 
 
 Agamemnon, power of, i. 9; pos¬ 
 sessed a great navy, ib. 
 
 Agatharchidas, a Corinthian com¬ 
 mander, ii. 83 fin. 
 
 Agatharchus, a Sicilian com¬ 
 mander, vii. 25 init., 70 init. 
 
 Agesander, father of Agesandridas, 
 a Spartan, viii. 91 med. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 6 % 9 
 
 Agesandridas, a Spartan com¬ 
 mander, viii. 91 med., 94, 95. 
 
 Agesippidas, a Lacedaemonian 
 commander, v. 56 init. 
 
 Agis, king of Lacedaemon, iii. 89 
 init., iv. 2 init.; invades Attica, 
 ib. 2 init., 6; swears to the Treaty 
 of Alliance, v. 24 init.; marches 
 towards Argos, but retires, ib. 
 54; attacks Argos, ib. 57; sur¬ 
 rounds the Argives, ib. 58, 59; 
 makes a truce with the Ar¬ 
 gives, ib. 60 init.; blamed for his 
 conduct, and threatened with 
 punishment, ib. 60 med., 63; 
 nearly commits a second error, 
 ib. 65 init.; draws the Argives 
 into the plain, ib. fin.; surprised 
 by the enemy before Mantinea, 
 ib. 66 init.; defeats the enemy, ib. 
 70-74; leads a new expedition to 
 Argos, ib. 83 init.; invades Attica, 
 and fortifies Decelea, vii. 19 init., 
 27 med.; raises money for a navy, 
 viii. 3 init.; his great powers, viii. 
 4 fin.; rejects the peace proposals 
 of the Athenian oligarchs, ib. 70 
 fin.; repulsed from the walls of 
 Athens, ib. 71; advises the Four 
 Hundred to send ambassadors to 
 Sparta, ib. fin.; an enemy of 
 Alcibiades, viii. 12 fin., 45 init. 
 
 Agraeans, in yEtolia, ii. 102 med., 
 
 iii. 106 med.; ib. 111 fin., 114 med.; 
 forced into the Athenian alliance, 
 
 iv. 77 fin.; employed in a descent 
 upon Sicyon, ib. 101 med. 
 
 Agrianians, in Paeonia, ii. 96 
 med. 
 
 Agrigentum, founded from Gela, 
 vi. 4 med.; gained over by Phaeax 
 to the Athenian alliance, v. 4 
 fin.; remains neutral in the war 
 beween Syracuse and Athens, vii. 
 32 med., ib. 33 init., ib. 58 init.; 
 falls into revolution, vii. 46; vic¬ 
 tory of the anti-Syracusan party, 
 ib. 50 init. 
 
 Alcaeus, Archon at Athens, v. 19 
 init., ib. 25 init. 
 
 Alcamenes, a Lacedaemonian com¬ 
 mander, viii. 4; ordered to Les¬ 
 bos by Agis, ib. 8 med.* driven 
 into Piraeum by the Athenians 
 and slain, ib. 10 fin. 
 
 Alcibiades, the name Lacedaemo¬ 
 nian, viii. 6 med.; his extravagant 
 character, vi. 12 fin.; had a great 
 share in the ruin of Athens, 
 ib. 15; his victories at Olympia, 
 ib. 16 init.; head of the war party 
 at Athens, v. 43 init., vi. 15 init.; 
 irritated by the contempt of the 
 Lacedaemonians, v. 43 med.; ne¬ 
 gotiates an alliance with Argos, 
 Mantinea and Elis, ib. 44, 46; 
 deceives the Lacedaemonian en¬ 
 voys, ib. 45 ; his activity in Pelo¬ 
 ponnesus, ib. 52 fin., 53, 55 [cp. 
 vi. 16 fin]; persuades the Athe¬ 
 nians to declare the treaty broken 
 and resettle the Helots at Pylos, 
 ib. 56med.; ambassador at Argos, 
 ib. 61 med.,76med.; seizes a num¬ 
 ber of suspected Argives, ib. 84 
 init.; appointed one of the gene¬ 
 rals in Sicily, vi. 8 med.; speech 
 of, ib. 16-18 ; accused of mutilat¬ 
 ing the Hermae and celebrating 
 the mysteries in private houses, 
 ib. 28 init.; begs in vain to be 
 tried before sailing, zA 29; opinion 
 of, in a council of war, ib. 48; 
 summoned home, ib. 53 init., 61; 
 escapes at Thurii, ib. fin.; con¬ 
 demned to death, z'A; causes the 
 failure of a plot to betray Messina, 
 ib. 74 init.; goes to Lacedaemon, 
 ib. 88 fin.; his speech there, ib. 
 89-92; persuades the Lacedae¬ 
 monians to fortify Decelea, vii. 18 
 init.; supports the Chians at 
 Sparta, viii. 6med.; persuades the 
 S partan govern ment not to give up 
 the Chian expedition, viii. 12; sent 
 to Ionia with Chalcideus, ib. 12 
 fin.; induces the revolt of Chios, 
 Erythrae, Clazomenae, ib. 14; 
 chases Strombichides into Sa¬ 
 mos, ib. 16; causes the revolt of 
 Teos, ib. fin.; and of Miletus, ib. 
 17; present at an engagement 
 before Miletus, ib. 26 fin.; falls 
 into disfavour with the Lacedae¬ 
 monians, ib. 45 init.; retires to 
 Tissaphernes, and endeavours 
 to ruin the Peloponnesian cause, 
 ib. med.; repulses the revolted 
 cities when they beg money, ib. 
 fin.; instructs Tissaphernes to 
 
6 3 o 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 balance the Athenians and Lace¬ 
 daemonians against each other, 
 ib. 46 ; conspires with some Athe¬ 
 nians at Samos to overthrow the 
 democracy, ib. 47-49 ; opposed 
 by Phrynichus, ib. 48 fin.; whom 
 he endeavours unsuccessfully to 
 ruin, ib. 50, 51; seeks to draw 
 Tissaphernes over to the Athe¬ 
 nian cause, ib. 52 init.; persuades 
 Tissaphernes to demand impos¬ 
 sible terms from Peisander, ib. 
 56 ; recalled by the Athenians at 
 Samos, ib. 81 init.; encourages 
 them with extravagant hopes, ib. 
 81; restrains them from sailing 
 to the Piraeus, ib. 82 ; made 
 commander-in-chief, ib.\ goes to 
 Tissaphernes, ib.\ again restrains 
 the people from sailing to the 
 Piraeus, and thus performs an 
 eminent service, ib. 86 med.; sails 
 to Aspendus, promising to keep 
 the Phoenician fleet back, ib. 88 ; 
 recalled by the Athenians at 
 home, ib. 97 fin.; returns from 
 Caunus, professing to have se¬ 
 cured Tissaphernes’ friendship 
 for Athens, ib. 108 init.; returns 
 to Samos, ib. med. 
 
 Alcidas, takes command of the Pe¬ 
 loponnesian fleet sent to Lesbos, 
 iii. 16 fin., 26 init.; arrives too 
 late, ib. 29; determines to return, 
 ib. 31 ; slaughters his captives, 
 ib. 32 ; is chased to Patmos by 
 the Athenians, ib. 33, 69 init.; 
 sails to Corcyra, ib. 69, 76; en¬ 
 gages the Athenians, ib. 77, 78; 
 retires, ib. 79-81; helps in the 
 foundation of Heraclea, ib. 92 fin. 
 
 Alcinadas, a Lacedaemonian,swears 
 to the Treaty of Peace and the 
 Alliance, v. 19 med.; ib. 24 init. 
 
 Alcinous, Temple of Zeus and Al- 
 cinous at Corcyra, iii. 70 med. 
 
 Alciphron, an Argive, makes terms 
 with Agis, v. 59 fin., 60 init. 
 
 Alcisthenes, an Athenian, father of 
 Demosthenes, iii. 91 init., iv. 66 
 med., vii. 16 fin. 
 
 Alcmaeon, the story of, ii. 102 fin. 
 
 Alcmaeonidae, aid in the deposi¬ 
 tion of Hippias, vi. 59 fin. 
 
 Alexander, the father of Perdiccas, 
 
 king of Macedonia, i. 57 init, ib. 
 137 init.; of Argive descent, ii. 
 99 init. 
 
 Alexarchus, a Corinthian com¬ 
 mander, vii. 19 med. 
 
 Alexicles, an Athenian general of 
 the oligarchical party, seized by 
 the popular party, viii. 92 med.; 
 released, 93 init.; flees to Dece- 
 lea, 98 init. 
 
 Alexippidas, Ephor at Lacedaemon, 
 viii. 58 init. 
 
 Alicyaei, in Sicily, vii. 32 med. 
 
 All things have their times of growth 
 and decay, ii. 64 med. 
 
 Allies [of the Athenians], ii. 9 fin.; 
 character of the league, i. 19; 
 used to meet at Delos, i. 96 
 fin.; formerly independent, ib. 97 
 init.; their gradual subjugation, 
 ib. 99 [cp. iii. 10, 11, vi. 76]; 
 those present before Syracuse, 
 vii. 57; admired in Hellas for 
 their adoption of Athenian lan¬ 
 guage and manners, vii. 63 med. 
 
 Allies [of the Lacedaemonians], ii. 
 9 init.; formation of the league, 
 i. 18 ; its character, ib. 19 ; allies 
 summoned to Sparta, i. 67 ; again 
 summoned, ib. 119 ; vote for war, 
 ib. 12 $. 
 
 Almopia, in Macedonia, ii. 99 fin. 
 
 Alope, in Locris, ii. 26 fin. 
 
 Altar, of Apollo the Founder, at 
 Naxos, vi. 3 init.; the Pythian 
 Apollo, erected by Pisistratus at 
 Athens, ib. 54 fin.; [Athen&] in 
 the Acropolis, i. 126 med.; the 
 awful Goddesses at Athens, ib.\ 
 the Twelve Gods at Athens, vi. 
 54 fin.; Olympian Zeus, v. 50 init. 
 
 Altars, a sanctuary and refuge, iv. 
 98 fin.; viii. 84 med. 
 
 Alyzia, in Acarnania, vii. 31 init. 
 
 Ambracia, a Corinthian colony, ii. 
 80 med., vii. 58 med.; an ally of 
 the Lacedaemonians, ii. 9 init.; 
 the Ambraciots the most warlike 
 of the Epeirots, iii. 108 med.; 
 they send troops to Epidamnus, 
 i. 26init.; furnish ships to Corinth, 
 ib. 27 fin., ib. 46 init., 48 fin.; de¬ 
 feated in the engagement off Sy- 
 bota, ib. 49 med.; attack the Am- 
 philochian Argives, ii. 68 ; invade 
 
INDEX. 
 
 6 3 1 
 
 * 
 
 Acarnania, ib. 80; retire, ib. 82 ; 
 send reinforcements to Alcidas, 
 
 iii. 69 ; persuade the Lacedae¬ 
 monians to attack the Amphilo- 
 chian Argos, ib. 102 fin.; join the 
 Lacedaemonians in the expedi¬ 
 tion, ib. 105, 106; defeated by 
 the Acarnanians, under Demos¬ 
 thenes, ib. 107, 108 ; deserted by 
 the Peloponnesians, #.109,111; 
 total destruction of their rein¬ 
 forcements, ib. 112, 113; great¬ 
 ness of the calamity, ib. 113 fin.; 
 conclude a treaty with the Acar¬ 
 nanians, ib. 114 med.; receive a 
 garrison from Corinth, ib. fin.; 
 assist Gylippus with ships, vi. 
 104 med., vii. 4 fin., 7 init., 58 
 med.; present at Cynossema, viii. 
 106 med.; Ambraciot envoys sent 
 by the Syracusans to the Sicilian 
 cities after the capture of Plem- 
 myrium, vii. 25 fin.; slain by the 
 Sicels, ib. 32. 
 
 Ambracian gulf, i. 29 med., 55 init. 
 
 Ameiniades, Athenian ambassador 
 to Seuthes, ii. 67 med. 
 
 Ameinias, a Lacedaemonian envoy, 
 
 iv. 132 fin. 
 
 Ameinocles, the Corinthian ship¬ 
 builder, i. 13 init. 
 
 Ammeas, a Plataean commander, 
 iii. 22 med. 
 
 Amorges, the bastard son of Pis- 
 suthnes, revolts in Caria, viii. 5 
 fin., 19 init.; captured by the 
 Peloponnesians, and handed over 
 to Tissaphernes, ib. 28 med.; said 
 by Peisander to have been be¬ 
 trayed by Phrynichus, ib. 54 med. 
 
 Ampelidas, a Lacedaemonian envoy 
 to Argos, v. 22 med. 
 
 Amphiaraus, father of Amphilochus, 
 ii. 68 init.; of Alcmaeon, ii. 102 
 med. 
 
 Amphias, an Epidaurian, iv. 119 
 med. 
 
 Amphidorus,aMegarian,iv.i I9med. 
 
 Amphilochia, colonized by Amphi¬ 
 lochus, ii. 68 init.; the Amphi- 
 lochians barbarians, ib. med., iii. 
 112 fin.; learnt Greek from the Am- 
 braciots, ii. 68 med.; expelled by 
 the Ambraciots, ii. 68 med.; rein¬ 
 stated by Athenian aid, ib. fin.; 
 
 attacked by the Ambraciots and 
 Lacedaemonians, iii. 105 ; join 
 Demosthenes at Olpae, ib. 107 
 init.; defeated, 108 med.; destroy 
 the Ambraciot fugitives from 
 Idomen&, ib. 112 ; make a treaty 
 with Ambracia, ib. 114 med. 
 
 Amphilochian Hills, iii. 112 init. 
 
 Amphipolis, formerly called ‘The 
 Nine Ways, 5 i. 100 fin., iv. 102 
 med.; origin of the name, iv. 102 
 fin.; attempted colonization of, 
 by Aristagoras, iv. 102 init.; un¬ 
 successful settlement of, by the 
 Athenians, i. 100fin., iv. 102 init.; 
 colonized by Hagnon, iv. 102 
 med., v. 11 init.; ‘Thracian gates 5 
 of, v. 10 init., med.; temple of 
 Athene at, ib.; captured by Brasi- 
 das, iv. 102-106; battle of, v. 
 6-11, 12 fin.; ordered to be sur¬ 
 rendered under treaty, v. 18, v; 
 not surrendered, ib. 21, 35, 46; 
 abandonment of an Athenian 
 expedition against, v. 83 fin.; 
 unsuccessfully attacked by the 
 Athenians, vii. 9; the Amphipoli- 
 tans make Brasidas their founder, 
 
 v. 11 init. 
 
 Amphissa, in Ozolian Locris, iii. 101 
 init. 
 
 Amyclae, temple of Apollo at, v. 18, 
 xi: ib. 23, iv. 
 
 Amyntas, son of Philip, ii. 95 fin., 
 ib. 100 med. 
 
 Amyrtaeus, the Egyptian king in 
 the fens, i. no init., ib. 112 med. 
 
 Anactorium, i. 29 med.; sends aid 
 to Corinth, ib. 46 init., ii. 9 init.; 
 hostile to the Acarnanians, iii. 114 
 fin.; held by the Corinthians and 
 Corcyraeans in common, i. 5 5 init.; 
 captured by the Corinthians, ib.; 
 betrayed to the Athenians, iv. 49 
 init.; colonized by the Acarna¬ 
 nians, ib. fin.; occupied by the 
 Athenians, vii. 31 init.; not sur¬ 
 rendered in the Treaty of Peace, 
 v. 30 med.; Anactorians assist 
 in the invasion of Acarnania, ii. 
 80 med., 81 med. 
 
 Anaea, viii. 19 init.; occupied by 
 Samian refugees, iii. 19 fin., iv. 
 75 med.; the Anaeans destroy an 
 Athenian army under Lysicles, 
 
6s 2 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 iii. 19 fin.; remonstrate with Alci- 
 das for the slaughter of his cap¬ 
 tives, ib. 32 ; aid the Chians, viii. 
 61 med. 
 
 Anapus,riverinAcarnania,ii.82init. 
 
 Anapus, river in Sicily, vi. 96 fin., 
 
 vii. 42 fin., 78 init.; bridge over, 
 vi. 66 med. 
 
 Anaxander, a Theban commander, 
 
 viii. 100 med. 
 
 Anaxilas, tyrant of Rhegium, vi. 4 
 fin.; founder of Messen£, ib. 
 
 Andocides [the orator], commands 
 the reinforcements sent to Cor- 
 cyra after Sybota, i. 51 med. 
 
 Androcles, an Athenian popular 
 leader, viii. 65 init.; active in pro¬ 
 curing the banishment of Alcibi- 
 ades, ib.-, murdered by the oli¬ 
 garchical conspirators, ib. 
 
 Androcrates, the shrine of, at Pla- 
 taea, iii. 24 init. 
 
 Andromedes, a Lacedaemonian en¬ 
 voy, v. 42 init. 
 
 Andros, island of, ii. 55; the Andri¬ 
 ans subjects and tributaries of the 
 Athenians, iv. 42 init., vii. 57 init.; 
 Andrians employed by the oli¬ 
 garchs at Athens, viii. 69 med.;— 
 Andrian colonies: Acanthus,iv.84 
 init.; Argilus, ib. 103 med.; San6, 
 
 iv. 109 med.; Stageira, ib. 88 fin. 
 
 Androsthenes, Olympic victor, v. 49 
 
 init. 
 
 Aneristus, Lacedaemonian ambas¬ 
 sador to Persia, ii. 67 init. 
 
 Antagonism, a condition of inde¬ 
 pendence, iv. 92 med. 
 
 Antandrus, an Aeolian town, viii. 
 108 med.; captured by the Les¬ 
 bian refugees, iv. 52 fin.; recap¬ 
 tured by the Athenians, ib. 75 
 med.; introduces a Lacedaemo¬ 
 nian garrison, expelling the Per¬ 
 sians, viii. 108 med. 
 
 Anthemus, in Macedonia, ii. 99 fin., 
 100 med. 
 
 Anthene, on the borders of Argos 
 and Lacedaemon, v. 41 init. 
 
 Anthesterion, the Attic month, ii. 
 15 fin. 
 
 Anticles, an Athenian commander, 
 i. 117 med. 
 
 Antigenes, father of Socrates, an 
 Athenian, ii. 23 med. 
 
 Antimenidas, a Lacedaemonian en¬ 
 voy, v. 42 init. 
 
 Antimnestus, father of Hierophon, 
 an Athenian, iii. 105 fin. 
 
 Antiochus, king of the Orestians, ii. 
 80 fin. 
 
 Antiphemus, joint founder with En- 
 timus of Gela, vi. 4 med. 
 
 Antiphon, the soul of the oligarchi¬ 
 cal conspiracy at Athens, viii. 68 
 init., 90 init.; his abilities and vir¬ 
 tue, ib.] disliked by the people, z’A; 
 afterwards tried for his share in 
 the plot, ib.\ sent to make peace 
 with Lacedaemon, ib. 90 med. 
 
 Antippus, a Lacedaemonian, swears 
 to the Treaty of Peace and the 
 Alliance, v. 19 med.; ib. 24 init. 
 
 Antiquity, inferiority of, i. 1 fin.; 
 poverty of, i. 11 fin. 
 
 Antissa, in Lesbos, viii. 23 med.; the 
 Antissaeans defeat the Methym- 
 naeans, iii. 18 init.; Antissa taken 
 by the Athenians, ib. 28 fin. 
 
 Antisthenes, a Spartan, viii. 39 med., 
 61 med. 
 
 Aphrodisia, in Laconia, iv. 56 init. 
 
 Aphrodite, Temple of, at Eryx, vi. 
 46 med. 
 
 Aphytis, in Pallene, i. 64 fin. 
 
 Apidanus,riverinThessaly,iv.78fin. 
 
 Apodotians, in Aetolia, iii. 94 fin. 
 
 Apollo, Polycrates dedicates Rhe- 
 neia to, i. 13 fin., iii. 104 init.; 
 temple of, at Actium, i. 29 med.; 
 at Amyclae, v. 18, xi; 23, iv; at 
 Argos, ib. 47 fin.; opposite Cy thera, 
 vii.26med.; atDelium,iv.76med., 
 90 init., 97 init.; at Leucas, iii. 94 
 med.; at Naupactus, ii. 91 init.; 
 on Triopium, viii. 35 med.; of the 
 Pythian Apollo, at Athens, ii. 15 
 med.; at Delphi, iv. 118, i; v. 
 18, ii; of Apollo Pythaeus, at Ar¬ 
 gos [?], v. 53 init.; altar of, Apollo 
 ‘the Founder’ at Naxos, in Sicily, 
 vi. 3 init.; of the Pythian Apollo 
 in the Athenian Agora, vi. 54 fin.; 
 festival of Apollo Maloeis, iii. 3 
 med.; shrine of Apollo Temenites 
 at Syracuse, vi. 75 init., 99 fin., 
 100 fin.; ancient oracle of Apollo 
 to Alcmaeon, ii. 102 fin.; Homeric 
 Hymn to Apollo quoted, iii. 104 
 med. 
 
Apollodorus, father of Charicles, an 
 Athenian, vii. 20 init. 
 
 Apollonia, a colony of Corinth, i. 26 
 init. 
 
 Arcadia, did not change its inhabit¬ 
 ants anciently, i. 2 med.; portion 
 of, subjected by the Mantineans, 
 v. 29 init.; Arcadians supplied by 
 Agamemnon with ships for the 
 Trojan War, i. 9 fin.; Arcadian 
 mercenaries at Notium, iii. 34; 
 in the Athenian service before 
 Syracuse, vii. 57 med.; on the 
 Syracusan side, vii. 19 fin., 58 
 med.; Arcadian allies of the Lace¬ 
 daemonians join them in invading 
 Argos, ib. 57med., 58fin., 60med.; 
 summoned by the Lacedaemoni¬ 
 ans to Tegea, ib. 64; present at 
 Mantinea, ib. 67 med., 73 init.; 
 furnish ships to the Lacedaemoni¬ 
 ans, viii.3 fin.; war between some 
 Arcadian tribes and the Lepreans, 
 v. 31. [See also Heraeans, Mae- 
 
 nalia, Mantinea, Orchomenus, 
 Parrhasians, Tegea.] 
 
 Arcesilaus, father of Lichas, a 
 Lacedaemonian, v. 50 med., 76 
 med., viii. 39 init. 
 
 Archedicb, daughter of Hippias the 
 tyrant, vi. 59 med.; her epitaph, ib. 
 
 Archelaus, son of Perdiccas, king of 
 Macedonia, ii. 100 init. 
 
 Archers, at Athens, numbers of the 
 horse and foot archers, ii. 13 fin.; 
 horse archers sent to Melos, v. 
 84 med.; to Sicily, vi. 94 fin.; bar¬ 
 barian archers, viii. 98 init. 
 
 Archestratus, an Athenian com¬ 
 mander, i. 57 fin.; father of Chae- 
 reas, viii. 74 init. 
 
 Archetimus, a Corinthian com¬ 
 mander, i. 29 init. 
 
 Archias, the founder of Syracuse, 
 vi 3 med.; [of Camarina] betrays 
 Camarina to the Syracusans, iv. 
 25 med. 
 
 Archidamus, king of Lacedaemon, 
 i. 79 fin.; father of Agis, iii. 89 
 init.; his prudent character, ib. 
 fin.; friend of Pericles, ii. 13 init.; 
 speech of, i. 80-85 ; leader of the 
 first expedition into Attica, ii. 10 
 fin.; second speech, ib. 11 ; sends 
 a herald to Athens, ib. 12; leads 
 
 the army to Oenob, ib. 18 init.; 
 blamed for delay, ib. med.; enters 
 Attica, ib. 19init.; halts at Achar- 
 nae, ib. 20; retires, ib. 23 fin.; in¬ 
 vades Attica a second time, ib. 47 
 init., 55-57; attacks Plataea, #.71 
 init.; offers terms to the Plataeans, 
 ib. 71-74; invades Attica a third 
 time, iii. 1. 
 
 Archippus, father of Aristides, an 
 Athenian, iv. 50 init. 
 
 Archonides, a Sicel king, friend of 
 the Athenians, vii. 1 fin. 
 
 Archons, their former power at 
 Athens, i. 126 med.; Pisistratus, 
 vi. 54 fin.; Themistocles, i.93init.; 
 Pythodorus, ii. 2 init.; Alcaeus, v. 
 19 init., 25 init.; Archonship kept 
 by the Pisistratidae in their own 
 family, vi. 54 fin. 
 
 Arcturus, rising of, ii. 78 init. 
 
 Ares, Temple of, at Megara, iv. 67 
 init. 
 
 Argennusae, a town opposite Mity- 
 lenb, viii. 101 med. 
 
 Argilus, a colony from Andros, iv. 
 103 init.; provision respecting, in 
 the treaty of peace, v. 18, vi; the 
 Argilians assist Brasidas in his 
 attempt on Amphipolis, iv. 103 
 med.; the Argilian servant of 
 Pausanias, i. 132, 133 ; Cerdylium 
 in Argilian territory, v. 6 med. 
 
 Arginus, Mount, opposite Chios, viii. 
 34 init. 
 
 Argos [the Amphilochian], iii. 102 
 fin., 105 init., 107 init.; founded 
 by Amphilochus, ii. 68 init. \See 
 also Amphilochia.] 
 
 Argos [in Peloponnesus], residence 
 of Themistocles there, after his 
 ostracism, i. 135 med., 137 med.; 
 forms alliance with the Athenians, 
 i. 102 fin.; the Corinthians warned 
 from Argos of the intended Athe¬ 
 nian invasion, iv. 42 med.; hostile 
 to Lacedaemon, i. 102 fin., v. 22 
 med.; truce for 30 years between 
 Lacedaemon and Argos, v. 14 fin.; 
 magistrates of Argos, ib. 47 fin.; 
 its democratical constitution, v. 29 
 med., 44 med.; temple of Herb at 
 Argos, iv. 133 init.; time reckoned 
 there by the succession of high 
 priestesses, ii. 2 init.; kings of 
 
634 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Macedonia originally from Ar¬ 
 gos, ii. 99 init.; Argives used as a 
 general name for the Hellenes by 
 Homer, i. 3 med.; Argives assist 
 the Athenians at Tanagra, i. 107 
 fin.; neutralatthebeginning ofthe 
 war, ii. 9 init.; refuse to renew 
 the peace with Lacedaemon, v. 14 
 fin., 22 med.; head a confederacy 
 against the Lacedaemonians, ib. 
 27, 28 foil.; aspire to lead Pelo¬ 
 ponnesus, ib. 28 med. [cp. 69 med.]; 
 ally themselves with the Man- 
 tineans, ib. 29; Eleans, ib. 31; 
 Corinthians and Chalcidians, ib. 
 31 fin.; the Lacedaemonians seek 
 their alliance, ib. 36; the Argives 
 fail in attempting an alliance with 
 the Boeotians, z A 37, 38 ; are com¬ 
 pelled to make terms with Sparta, 
 ib. 40, 41; send envoys to Athens 
 at Alcibiades’ invitation, ib. 43, 
 44; ally themselves to Athens, ib. 
 46 fin., 47; aid the Eleans to ex¬ 
 clude the Lacedaemonians from 
 the Olympic games, ib. 50 med.; 
 aid Alcibiades in organizing the 
 affairs of the confederacy, ib. 52 
 med.; make war on Epidaurus, 
 ib. 53* 54 55 56 fin.; take 
 
 the field against the Lacedaemo¬ 
 nians, ib. 58 init.; surrounded by 
 the Lacedaemonians, ib. 59med.; 
 unaware of their danger, ib.; 
 obtain through Thrasyllus and 
 Alciphron a truce, ib. 59 fin., 
 60 init.; blame them for their 
 conduct, 60 fin., 61 init.; cap¬ 
 ture Orchomenus, ib. 61 fin.; pre¬ 
 pare against Tegea, ib. 62 fin.; 
 again attacked by the Lacedae¬ 
 monians, ib. 64 ; dissatisfied with 
 their generals, ib. 65 ; found bythe 
 Lacedaemonians unexpectedly in 
 battle array, ib. 66, 67; defeated 
 by the Lacedaemonians at Man- 
 tinea, ib. 70-74; make peace and 
 alliance with the Lacedaemoni¬ 
 ans, ib. 76-80; renounce their al¬ 
 lies,^. 78 ; have their government 
 changed by the Lacedaemonians 
 and the oligarchical party, ib. 81 
 fin.; the popular party defeat the 
 oligarchs and renew the Athenian 
 alliance, ib. 82; the Thousand se¬ 
 
 lect Argives trained by the city, 
 ib. 67 fin., 72 med., 73 fin.; begin 
 the Long Walls, 82 fin.; ravage 
 Phliasia, ib. 83 med., again, ib. 115 
 init.; three hundred Argives ofthe 
 Lacedaemonian party deported 
 by Alcibiades, ib. 84 init.; given 
 up to the Argives for execution, 
 
 vi. 61 med.; the Argives suspect 
 some of their citizens of instigat¬ 
 ing a Lacedaemonian invasion, 
 v. 116 init.; treacherously attack 
 and capture Orneae, vi. 7 med.; 
 induced by Alcibiades to join the 
 Sicilian expedition, vi. 29 med., 
 43 fin., vii. 57 med.; present in the 
 various engagements before Syra¬ 
 cuse, vi. 67 init., 70 med., 100 fin., 
 
 vii. 44 fin.; cause confusion in the 
 night attack on Epipolae by their 
 Doric Paean, vii. 44 fin.; invade 
 the Thyraean territory, vi. 95 
 med.; have their lands wasted by 
 the Lacedaemonians, ib. 105 init.; 
 aid the Athenians in ravaging the 
 Lacedaemonian coast, ib. med.; 
 ravage Phliasia, ib. fin.; reinforce 
 the Athenians before Miletus, viii. 
 25 init.; defeated bythe Milesians, 
 ib. med.; go home in a rage, ib. 27 
 fin.; send envoys to the Athenians 
 at Samos, ib. 86 fin.; an Argive 
 one of the murderers of Phryni- 
 chus, ib. 92 init. 
 
 Arianthidas, a Theban Boeotarch 
 at Delium, iv. 91 med. 
 
 Ariphron, father of Hippocrates, an 
 Athenian, iv. 66 med. 
 
 Aristagoras, of Miletus, attempts to 
 found a colony at Enoea Hodoi, 
 iv. 102 init. 
 
 Aristarchus, a conspicuous leader 
 of the oligarchical party, viii. 90 
 init.; endeavours vainly to pre¬ 
 vent the destruction of the fort 
 Eetioneia, ib. 92 fin.; betrays 
 Oenoe to Boeotia, ib. 98. 
 
 Aristeus, son of Adeimantus, a 
 Corinthian, takes command of 
 the forces sent from Corinth to 
 Potidaea, i. 60 ; made general of 
 the Chalcidian forces, ib. 62 init.; 
 engages the Athenians, ib. fin.; 
 fights his way into Potidaea, ib. 
 63 init.; sails out of Potidaea, ib. 
 
INDEX. 635 
 
 65 med.; defeats the Sermylians, 
 ib. fin.; sent as ambassador to 
 the King, ii. 67 init.; given up 
 by the Thracians to the Athe¬ 
 nians, ib. med.; put to death, 
 ib. fin. 
 
 Aristeus, son of Pellichus, a Co¬ 
 rinthian commander, i. 29 init. 
 
 Aristeus, a Lacedaemonian envoy, 
 iv. 132 fin. 
 
 Aristides, son of Archippus, an 
 Athenian general, captures Arta- 
 phernes at Eion, iv. 50 init.; re¬ 
 covers Antandrus, ib. 75 init. 
 
 Aristides, son of Lysimachus, goes 
 on an embassy to Sparta, i. 91 
 init.; settlement of Athenian 
 tribute in his time, v. 18, vi. 
 
 Aristocleides, father of Hestiodorus, 
 an Athenian, ii. 70 init. 
 
 Aristocles, brother of Pleistoanax, 
 accused of bribing the Delphian 
 priestess, v. 16 med. 
 
 Aristocles, a Spartan polemarch, v. 
 71 fin.; banished for cowardice 
 at Mantinea, ib. 72 init. 
 
 Aristocrates, an Athenian, swears 
 to the Treaty of Peace and the 
 Alliance, v. 19 fin., 24 med.; sent 
 to enquire into the suspected 
 treachery of the Chians, viii. 9 
 med. 
 
 Aristocrates, son of Scellius, a chief 
 author in the oligarchical revolu¬ 
 tion, viii. 89 init.; heads a moderate 
 party in the oligarchy, ib. 89; aids 
 in the destruction of Eetioneia, 
 ib. 92 med. 
 
 Aristogiton, slays Hipparchus, i. 20 
 med., vi. 54 init., ib. 56-58. 
 
 Ariston, a Corinthian, the ablest 
 pilot in the Syracusan fleet, vii. 
 39 med. 
 
 Aristonous, joint founder with Pys- 
 tilus of Agrigentum, vi. 4 med. 
 
 Aristonous, of Larissa, a Thessalian 
 commander, ii. 22 fin. 
 
 Aristonymus, an Athenian, one of 
 the ambassadors sent to proclaim 
 the one year’s truce, iv. 122 ; re¬ 
 fuses to admit Scion£, ib. 
 
 Aristonymus, father ofEuphamidas, 
 a Corinthian, ii. 33 med., iv. 119 
 med. 
 
 Aristophon, an envoy from the 
 
 Four Hundred to Sparta, viii. 
 86 fin. 
 
 Aristoteles, an Athenian command¬ 
 er, iii. 105 med. 
 
 Arms, custom of carrying arms once 
 common to all Hellenes, i. 5 fin., 
 6 init.; the custom first abandoned 
 by the Athenians, ib. 6 init. 
 
 Arnae, in Chalcidic£, iv. 103 init. 
 
 Arn&, Boeotians expelled from, i. 
 12 med. 
 
 Arnissa, in Macedonia, iv. 128 med. 
 
 Arrhiani, in the Thracian Cherson- 
 nese, viii. 104 init. 
 
 Arrhibaeus,king of the Lyncestians, 
 
 iv. 79 fin.; attacked by Perdic- 
 cas, ib. 83; defeated, ib. 124; 
 Perdiccas’ Illyrian troops desert 
 to him, ib. 125 init.; the pass into 
 his country, ib. 127 fin. 
 
 Arsaces, a lieutenant of Tissapher- 
 nes, viii. 108 med.; massacres the 
 Delians, ib. fin. 
 
 Artabazus, son of Pharnaces, sent 
 by Xerxes with letters to Pau- 
 sanias, i. 129 init., 132 fin. 
 
 Artaphernes, a Persian ambassador 
 to Sparta, intercepted by the 
 Athenians, iv. 50. 
 
 Artas, an Iapygian prince, furnishes 
 javelin men to the Athenians, 
 vii. 33 med. 
 
 Artaxerxes, son of Xerxes, king of 
 Persia, i. 104 init.; succeeds to 
 the throne, ib. 137 med.; his re¬ 
 ception of Themistocles, ib. 138 ; 
 his death, iv. 50 fin.; the father 
 of Darius Nothus, viii. 5 init. 
 
 Artemis, Temple of, at Rhegium, 
 vi. 44 fin.; at Ephesus, viii. 109 fin. 
 
 Artemisium, a month at Sparta, v. 
 19 init. 
 
 Artemisium, battle of, iii. 54 med. 
 
 Arts: in the arts, as in politics, the 
 new must prevail over the old, i. 
 71 init. 
 
 Artynae, the magistrates at Argos, 
 
 v. 47 fin. 
 
 Asia: the Barbarians of Asia wear 
 girdles in wrestling and boxing 
 matches, i. 6 fin.; Pelops brought 
 his wealth from Asia, ib. 9 init.; 
 no single nation, even in Asia, 
 could compare with the Scythians 
 if united, ii. 97 fin.; Magnesia in 
 
6 3 6 
 
 IN D E X. 
 
 Asia, i. 138 fin.; the Thracians 
 of Asia, iv. 75 fin.; “the King’s 
 country in Asia,” viii. 58. 
 
 Asin£, a city in Laconia, iv. 13 init., 
 54 fin., vi. 93 med. 
 
 Asopius, father of Phormio, an 
 Athenian, i. 64 med. 
 
 Asopius, son of Phormio, ravages 
 the Laconian coast, iii. 7 init.; 
 attacks Oeniadae, ib. med.; falls 
 in a descent upon Leucas, ib. fin. 
 
 Asopolaus, father of Astymachus, 
 a Plataean, iii. 52 fin. 
 
 Asopus, river in Boeotia, ii. 5 init. 
 
 Aspendus, viii. 81 fin., 87 med., 88 
 init., 99 init., 108 med. 
 
 Assembly, the Athenian, summoned 
 by a general, ii. 59 fin.; forms of, 
 iv. 118 fin.; usually held in the 
 Pnyx, viii. 97 init.; Peisander 
 summons an assembly at Colonus, 
 ib. 67 med.; the assembly sum¬ 
 moned to the temple of Dionysus 
 in Munychia for ‘ the restoration 
 of harmony,’ ib. 93 fin., 94 init.; 
 the oligarchs pretend that so 
 many as 5000 citizens never met 
 in one assembly, ib. 72 med. 
 
 Assembly, the Lacedaemonian, 
 mode of voting at, i. 87 init. 
 
 Assinarus, river in Sicily, capture of 
 Nicias’ division at, vii. 84. 
 
 Assyrian character, used by the 
 Persians, iv. 50 med. 
 
 Astacus, in Acarnania, captured by 
 the Athenians, who expel the 
 tyrant Evarchus, ii. 30 med.; the 
 town is retaken and Evarchus 
 restored by the Corinthians, ib. 
 33 init.; landing of Phormio near 
 Astacus, ib. 102 init. 
 
 Astymachus, a Plataean, one of those 
 chosen to plead before the Lace¬ 
 daemonians, iii. 52 fin. 
 
 Astyochus, a Lacedaemonian ad¬ 
 miral, viii. 20 med.; entrusted with 
 the command of the whole navy 
 in Asia, ib. ; arrives at Lesbos, ib. 
 23 init.; fails to save Lesbos from 
 the Athenians, ib. med., fin.; sum¬ 
 moned to Chios to avert a revo¬ 
 lution, ib. 24 fin., ib. 31 init.; fails 
 to recover Clazomenae and Pte- 
 leum, ib. 31 med.; enraged with 
 the Chians for refusing to assist 
 
 in the revolt of Lesbos, ib. 32 fin., 
 33 init., 38 fin., 39 med.; narrowly 
 escapes the Athenians, 33 med.; 
 he is complained of to Sparta by 
 Pedaritus, ib. 38 ; the Spartans 
 send out commissioners to him, 
 ib. 39 fin.; at last determines to 
 aid the Chians, ib. 40 fin.; hear¬ 
 ing that reinforcements were com¬ 
 ing, goes to meet them, ib. 41; 
 defeats an Athenian squadron, 
 ib. 42 ; receives orders from 
 Sparta to put Alcibiades to death, 
 ib. 45 init.; betrays Phrynichus 
 to Alcibiades, ib. 50 ; believed to'- 
 have sold himself to Tissaphernes, 
 ib. 50 med., ib. 83 fin.; sails to 
 Miletus with a view to relieve 
 Chios, ib. 60 fin.; offers battle to 1 
 the Athenians, ib. 63 init.; excites 
 by his conduct great dissatisfac¬ 
 tion in the fleet, ib. 78 ; offers 
 battle to the Athenians, but de¬ 
 clines when they offer afterwards, 
 ib. 79 ; stoned by the sailors for 
 offering to strike Dorieus, ib. 84 
 init.; superseded by Mindarus, 
 ib. 85 init. 
 
 Atalantfc, island off Locris, fortified 
 by the Athenians, ii. 32; inunda¬ 
 tion of the sea there, iii. 89 med.; 
 ordered to be surrendered by the 
 treaty, v. 18, viii. 
 
 Atalant£, in Macedonia, ii. 100 med. 
 
 Athenaeus, a Lacedaemonian, iv. 
 
 119 init., ib. 122. 
 
 Athenagoras, a popular leader at 
 Syracuse, vi. 35 fin.; speech of, 
 ib. 36-40. 
 
 Athenagoras, father of Timagoras 
 of Cyzicus, viii. 6 init. 
 
 Athene of the Brazen House, curse 
 of, i. 128; temple of, at Lecythus, 
 iv. 116; at Amphipolis, v. 10 init.; 
 at Athens, v. 23 fin.; image of, in 
 the Acropolis at Athens, ii. 13 
 med. 
 
 Athenian Empire, foundation of, i. 
 14 fin., ib. 18 med., ib. 74 med., ib. 
 93; rise of, ib. 19, 89-118, ib. 
 
 118 ; character of, ib. 19 ; justifi¬ 
 cation of, ib. 75, vi. 82, 83. 
 
 Athens, once inhabited by Tyrrhe¬ 
 nians, iv. 109 fin. [cp. ii. 17 med.]; 
 formed by Theseus from the 
 
INDEX. 
 
 637 
 
 ancient communes, ii. 15 init.; 
 small extent of ancient Athens, ib. 
 
 15 med.; largeness of the popula¬ 
 tion, i. 80 med.; appearance of, 
 compared to Sparta, i. 10 init.; 
 destruction of, in the Persian war, 
 i. 89 fin.; building of the City 
 Walls, i. 90, 91, 93 ; of the Long 
 Walls, ib. 107 init., 108 med.; 
 plague of Athens, ii. 47-54, 58, 
 iii. 87 ; resources of Athens, ii. 
 13 ; the revolution at Athens, viii. 
 47-72 : restoration of the demo¬ 
 cracy, ib. 73-77, 86, 89-93, 97; 
 the government immediately after 
 the restoration the best within 
 Thucydides’ recollection, viii. 97 
 fin.; ‘the school of Hellas,’ ii. 41 
 init.; freedom of life in, ii. 37, 
 vii. 69 med. [See also Attica.] 
 Athenians, of Ionian race, vi. 82 
 init., vii. 57 init.; have always 
 inhabited the same land, i. 2 
 fin.; their colonies to Ionia and 
 the islands, i. 2 fin., 12 fin.; the 
 first Hellenes to adopt luxurious 
 habits, i. 6 med.; their ignorance 
 of their own history, ib. 20 init., 
 vi. 53 fin., 54, 55 ; their activity 
 and restlessness, especially in con¬ 
 trast with the Lacedaemonian 
 character, i. 69, 70, 102 med., iv. 
 55 med., vi. 87 med., viii. 96 fin.; 
 treatment of their allies, i. 19, 76, 
 99, iii. 10, vi. 76, 84, 85 ; general 
 detestation of them in Hellas, 
 
 i. 119 med., ii. 8 fin., 11 init., 63 
 init.; their wealth and military 
 resources, ii. 13 med.; their fond¬ 
 ness for a country life, ib. 15 init.; 
 become sailors, i. 18 med. [cp. iv. 
 12 fin., vii. 21 med.]; assured of 
 empire by their naval superiority, 
 
 ii. 62; willing to face any odds 
 at sea, ib. 88 fin.; perfection 
 of their navy, iii. 17; mode of 
 burying the dead in the war, ii. 
 34; their greatness and glory, ii. 
 37-41, 63, 64; for half a cen¬ 
 tury an imperial people, viii. 68 
 fin.; maintain the children of the 
 fallen at the public expense, ii. 
 46; their mistakes in the war, ib. 
 65 ; their love of rhetoric, iii. 38 
 med., 40 init.; their over clever¬ 
 
 ness and suspiciousness, ib. 43 ; 
 their fickle temperament, vii. 48 
 med.; their elation at success, 
 iv. 65 fin.; their impatience of 
 discipline, vii. 14 init. fin.; ‘never 
 retired from a siege through fear 
 of another foe,’ v. iii init.; the 
 most experienced soldiers in Hel¬ 
 las, vi. 72 med., vii. 61 fin. [b.C. 
 510]; the Athenians governed by 
 tyrants, i. 18 init., vi. 53 fin-59; 
 the tyrants put down by the La¬ 
 cedaemonians, i. 18 init., vi. 53 
 fin.; the Athenians make war on 
 theAeginetans[B.c. 491], i. 14611.; 
 their services in the Persian war, 
 ib. 73, 74, ii. 36 med.; the Athe¬ 
 nians build their walls and the 
 Piraeus, i. 91, 93 [b.C. 480-B.c. 
 439]; the Athenians join in the 
 capture of Byzantium and Cyprus, 
 ib. 94; obtain the leadership of the 
 allies, ib. 95,96, 99 [cp. ib. 18,19]; 
 subject Lion, Scyros, Carystus, 
 Naxos, ib. 98; conquer the Per¬ 
 sians at the Eurymedon, ib. 100 
 init.; subdue the revolted Tha- 
 sians, ib. 100, 101; fail in an at¬ 
 tempt to colonize Amphipolis, ib. 
 100 fin.; called in by the Lace¬ 
 daemonians during the siege of 
 Ithom&, ib. 101, 102 ; dismissed by 
 the Lacedaemonians, ib. 102med.; 
 offended at the Lacedaemonians 
 and form alliance with Argos, ib. 
 fin.; settlethe Helotsat N aupactus, 
 ib. 103 med.; make alliance with 
 the Megarians, ib. 103 fin.; occu¬ 
 py Nisaea, ib.; aid the revolted 
 Egyptians, ib. 104; defeated by 
 the Corinthians and Epidaurians 
 at Halieis, ib. 105 init.; defeat the 
 Peloponnesians off Cecryphaleia, 
 ib.; go to war again with the 
 Aeginetans [b.C. 459], ib. 105 ; de¬ 
 feat the Aeginetans at sea, ib. 
 init.; gain a slight advantage 
 over the Corinthians, ib. fin.; in¬ 
 flict a severe defeat on them, ib. 
 106; build their Long Walls, ib. 
 107 init., 108 med.; are defeated 
 by the Lacedaemonians at Tana- 
 gra, ib. 107 fin., 108 init.; defeat 
 the Boeotians at Oenophyta, 
 ib. 108 med.; compel Aegina to 
 
6 3 8 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 surrender, ib. 108fin.; takeChalcis 
 and defeat the Sicyonians, ib. fin.; 
 driven out of Memphis, ib. 109; 
 their reinforcements destroyed, ib. 
 no; unsuccessfully attack Phar- 
 salus, ib. hi init.; defeat the Si¬ 
 cyonians and make an attempt on 
 Oeniadae, ib. fin.; send ships to 
 Egypt, ib. 112 init.; fight in Cy¬ 
 prus, ib. med.; take Chaeronea 
 but are defeated at Coronea, ib. 
 113; their garrison in Megara 
 is slaughtered, ib. 114 init.; first 
 invasion of Attica, ib. med.; Eu¬ 
 boea revolts, ib. init.; is reduced, 
 ib. fin.; the Athenians make a 
 truce with the Lacedaemonians, 
 ib. 115 init.; establish a demo¬ 
 cracy at Samos, ib. med.; the Sa¬ 
 mians and Byzantines revolt, ib. 
 the Athenians defeat the Samians, 
 ib. 116 med.; blockade Samos, ib. 
 fin.; send reinforcements to Sa¬ 
 mos, ib. 117; capture Samos, ib. 
 fin. [cp. i. 40 fin., 41 init.] [The 
 Peloponnesian War] ; the Athe¬ 
 nians enter into alliance with 
 Corcyra, ib. 44; send assistance 
 to Corcyra, ib. 45; fight with the 
 Corcyraeans at sea against the 
 Corinthians, ib. 49 fin.; send re¬ 
 inforcements, ib. 50 fin., 51; order 
 the Potidaeans to raze their walls, 
 ib. 56 med.; quarrel with Perdic- 
 cas, ib. 57 init.; despatch troops 
 to Potidaea, ib. 57 fin., 61 init., 64 
 med.; come to terms with Perdic- 
 cas, ib. 61 med.; defeat the Chalci- 
 dians, ib. 62, 63 ; invest Potidaea, 
 ib.6 4; ill-feeling of,against the Co¬ 
 rinthians, ib. 66,103 fin.; exclude 
 the Megarians from their har¬ 
 bours, ib. 67 fin., 139 init. [cp. iv. 
 66 init.]; speech of at Sparta, ib. 
 72-78; desire the Lacedaemo¬ 
 nians to take away the curse 
 of Taenarus and of Athene, 
 ib. 128, 135 init.; discuss the 
 demands of the Lacedaemoni¬ 
 ans, ib. 139; make a final offer 
 of arbitration to the Lacedae¬ 
 monians, ib. 145 ; seize the Boeo¬ 
 tians in Attica and garrison Pla- 
 taea, ii. 6; meditate sending an 
 embassy to the king, ib. 7 init.; 
 
 send ambassadors to places ad¬ 
 jacent to Peloponnesus, ib. fin.; 
 their allies, ib. 9 med.; refuse to 
 hear a messenger from Archi- 
 damus, ib. 12 init.; collect into the 
 city by Pericles’ advice, ib. 14-16; 
 send an expedition round the 
 Peloponnese, ib. 17 fin., 23, 25, 
 30; are angry with Pericles for 
 not leading them out, ib. 21; de¬ 
 feated at Phrygia, ib. med.; re¬ 
 ceive aid from the Thessalians, ib. 
 22 fin.; set apart a reserve for the 
 war, ib. 24 [cp. viii. 15 med.]; send 
 a fleet to Locris, ib. 26; expel the 
 Aeginetans, ib. 27 init.; make 
 Nymphodorus their Proxenus, 
 and become allies of Sitalces, 
 ib. 29; invade Megara, ib. 31; 
 fortify Atalante, ib. 32 ; celebrate 
 the funeral of the fallen, ib. 34; suf¬ 
 fer from the plague, ib. 47-54, 58; 
 again restrained by Pericles from 
 sallying out against the Lacedae¬ 
 monians, z'A 55fin.; send an expe¬ 
 dition round Peloponnese, ib. 56 ; 
 unsuccessfully attack Potidaea, 
 ib. 58 ; send envoys to Sparta, ib. 
 59 med.; turn upon and fine 
 Pericles, ib. 59-65 init.; elect him 
 general, ib. 65 init.; capture Aris- 
 teus of Corinth and other envoys 
 to Persia, and put them to death, 
 ib. 67; send Phormio to aid the 
 Amphilochians,z£.68; send Phor¬ 
 mio with a fleet round Pelopon¬ 
 nese, ib .6 9 init.; despatch ships to 
 collect money in Asia, ib. fin.; cap¬ 
 ture Potidaea, ib. 70 init.; blame 
 their generals, ib. med.; send 
 colonists to Potidaea, ib. fin.; en¬ 
 courage the Plataeans to resist, 
 ib. 73; send an expedition to 
 Chalcidice, ib. 79; are defeated, 
 ib. ; defeat the Peloponnesians at 
 sea, ib. 83, 84 ; gain a second 
 victory, ib. 86, 92 ; thrown into a 
 panic by the news of' Brasidas’ 
 landing in Salamis, ib. 93, 94 ; 
 make an expedition into Acar- 
 nania, ib. 102; receive warning of 
 the Lesbian revolt, iii. 2 ; attempt 
 to surprise Mitylene, ib. 3 ; suc¬ 
 cessfully engage the Lesbians, 
 ib. 4 ; blockade Mitylene by sea, 
 
IN D E X. 
 
 6 39 
 
 ib. 6; send an expedition round 
 Peloponnese, ib. 7, i6med.; send 
 another expedition, ib. 16 ; their 
 great expenditure on the war, 
 ib. 17 ; the perfection of their 
 navy, ib. ; despatch reinforce¬ 
 ments to Mitylene, ib. 18 fin.; 
 complete the blockade, ib. ; raise 
 a property tax, ib. 19 init.; at¬ 
 tempt to collect money from the 
 allies, ib. fin.; gain possession of 
 Mitylene, ib. 27, 28 ; take Noti- 
 um, ib. 34 ; reduce Pyrrha and 
 Eresus, ib. 35 ; put Salaethus to 
 death and order the slaughter of 
 all the grown-up citizens of Mity¬ 
 lene, ib. 36 init.; repent, ib. med.; 
 summon a second assembly, ib. 
 fin.; send a ship in time to save 
 Mitylene, ib. 49 ; put to death the 
 Lesbians judged most guilty, ib. 
 50 init.; divide the island among 
 Athenian colonists, ib. med.; 
 occupy Minoa, ib. 51 ; arrest en¬ 
 voys from Corcyra, ib. 72 init.; 
 send a fleet to Corcyra, ib. 75 ; 
 engage at sea with the Pelopon¬ 
 nesians, ib. 77, 78 ; send twenty 
 ships to Sicily, ib. 86 init.; the 
 plague reappears, ib. 87; the Athe¬ 
 nians ravage the Aeolian islands, 
 ib. 88 ; proceedings in Sicily, ib. 
 90, 99, 103, 115, iv. 24, 25; send a 
 fleet round the Peloponnese, iii. 
 91 init.; land at Oropus, and win 
 a battle at Tanagra, ib. med., 
 fin.; terrified by the founding of 
 Heracleia, ib. 93 init.; attack Leu- 
 cas, ib. 94 init., med.; disastrous 
 expedition of, into Aetolia, ib. 
 95-98 ; purify Delos and restore 
 the festival, ib. 104 ; send rein¬ 
 forcements to Sicily,/A 115; fortify 
 Pylos, iv. 4 ; take and lose again 
 Eion, ib. 7 ; repulse the Spartans, 
 ib. 11,12 ; defeat the Spartans in 
 the harbour, ib. 14 ; cut off the 
 troops in Sphacteria, ib. 15 ; grant 
 a truce to the Lacedaemonians, ib. 
 16 ; demand impossible terms, ib. 
 21, 22 ; renew the blockade, ib. 23 ; 
 find the blockade difficult, ib. 26; 
 despatch Cleon with reinforce¬ 
 ments, ib. 27, 28 ; attack Sphac¬ 
 teria and compel the surrender 
 
 of the Lacedaemonians, zA 31-38 ; 
 again reject the peace proposals 
 of the Lacedaemonians, ib. 41 fin.; 
 invade the Corinthian territory, 
 
 etc. , ib. 42-45 ; aid the Corcyrae- 
 ans to capture I stone, ib. 46 ; de¬ 
 liver the prisoners to the Corcy- 
 raeans, ib. 47 ; proceed to Sicily, 
 ib. 48 fin.; aid the Acarnanians to 
 capture Anactorium, ib. 49; cap¬ 
 ture a Persian ambassador to 
 Sparta, ib. 50 init.; send him back 
 with an embassy of their own, ib. 
 
 fin. ; order the Chians to dis¬ 
 mantle their walls, ib. 51 ; capture 
 Cythera, ib. 53, 54; ravage the La¬ 
 cedaemonian coast, ib. 54 fin., 55 ; 
 capture Thyrea, ib. 57 ; quit Sicily, 
 ib.6$ med.; punish their generals, 
 ib.\ unsuccessfully attempt Mega- 
 ra, ib. 66-68; capture N isaea, ib. 69; 
 engage the Boeotian cavalry, ib. 
 72 ; unwilling to fight with Bras- 
 idas, ib. 73; recapture Antan- 
 drus, ib. 7 5 med.; plan an invasion 
 of Boeotia, ib. 76,77 ; declare Per- 
 diccas an enemy, ib. 82 ; defeated 
 at Delium, ib. 90-96 ; the Boeo¬ 
 tians refuse to give up the dead, 
 ib. 97-99 ; the Athenian garrison 
 in Delium is capturedby theBoeo- 
 tians, and the dead are then given 
 up, ib. 100,101 init.; repulsed by 
 the Sicyonians, ib. 101 med.; lose 
 Amphipolis, ib. 102-106 ; Thucy¬ 
 dides saves Eion, ib. 105 ; driven 
 from the long walls of Megara, 
 ib. 109 init.; lose Acte, ib. med., 
 fin.; Torone, ib. 110-113; Lecy- 
 thus, ib. 114-116; make a truce 
 for a year with the Lacedaemo¬ 
 nians, ib. 117-119; Scion& revolts, 
 and the Athenians exclude it from 
 the treaty, ib. 120, 122 init.; they 
 decree its total destruction, ib. 
 fin.; defeated by the Mendae- 
 ans, who also revolt, ib. 129 ; 
 capture Mende, ib. 130fin.; invest 
 Scion&, ib. 131; come to an un¬ 
 derstanding with Perdiccas, ib. 
 132 init.; again purify Delos, v. 1 ; 
 send Cleon to Chalcidice, ib. 2 ; 
 capture Torone, ib. 3 ; send an 
 embassy under Phaeax to Sicily, 
 ib. 4, 5; defeated at Amphipolis, 
 
640 
 
 INDEX . 
 
 ib. 6-12 ; become eager for peace, 
 ib. 14 init.; make a treaty with 
 the Lacedaemonians, ib. 17-19; 
 conclude an alliance with the 
 Lacedaemonians, ib. 22 fin-24 ; 
 release the prisoners from the 
 island, ib. 24 fin.; take and de¬ 
 stroy Scione, ib. 32 init.; replace 
 the Delians in Delos, ib.\ refuse 
 a ten days’ armistice to the 
 Corinthians, ib. med.; begin to 
 mistrust the Lacedaemonians, ib. 
 35; withdraw the Helots from 
 Pylos, ib. 35 fin.; send ambassa¬ 
 dors to Sparta, ib. 36 init.; nego¬ 
 tiate uselessly with the Lacedae¬ 
 monians, ib. 39 init.; indignant 
 at the destruction of Panactum, 
 ib. 42 fin.; the war party at Athens 
 intrigue for the abrogation of the 
 treaty, ib. 43 ; the Athenians make 
 alliance with the Argives, ib. 46 
 fin., 47; replace the Helots at 
 Pylos, ib. 56 med.; solemnly re¬ 
 cord that the Lacedaemonians 
 had broken their oaths, ib.\ send 
 a force to Argos, ib. 61 init.; share 
 in the battle of Mantinea, ib. 69, 
 72-74; invest Epidaurus, ib. 75 
 fin.; their alliance is renounced 
 by the Argives, ib. 78; withdraw 
 their troops from Epidaurus, ib. 
 80 fin.; the Dians revolt, ib. 82 
 init.; the Argives renew their alli¬ 
 ance, and, with Athenian help, 
 build their Long Walls, ib. fin.; 
 the Athenians blockade Perdic- 
 cas,/^.83fin.; carry off300Argives 
 whom they suspect, ib. 84 init.; 
 attack Melos, ib. med.; hold 
 a conference with the Melian au¬ 
 thorities, ib. 85-113; blockade 
 Melos, ib. 114, 115 fin., 116 med.; 
 capture Melos, destroy or enslave 
 the inhabitants, and colonize the 
 island, ib.\ spoil, from Pylos, the 
 Lacedaemonians, ib. 115 init.; the 
 Corinthians declare war upon 
 them, ib.\ the Athenians deter¬ 
 mine to send an expedition to 
 Sicily, vi. 1, 6 init.; send envoys 
 to Egesta, ib. 6 fin.; decide on 
 war, ib. 8 ; assist the Argives in 
 the capture ofOrneae, ib. 7 med.; 
 ravage Macedonia, ib. fin.; the 
 
 envoys return from Sicily, ib. 8 
 init.; debate in the Assembly, ib. 
 9-23 ; seized with enthusiasm for 
 the expedition, ib. 24 ; greatly dis¬ 
 turbed by the mutilation of the 
 Hermae, ib. 27 fin.; Alcibiades is 
 accused, and the Athenians are 
 persuaded by his enemies to de¬ 
 cree his immediate departure for 
 Sicily, ib. 28, 29 ; the expedition 
 starts for Sicily, ib. 30-32 ; review 
 of the troops at Corcyra, ib. 42 ; 
 the Athenians arrive at Rhegium, 
 ib. 43, 44 ; deceived by the Eges- 
 teans, ib. 46 ; the generals hold a 
 council of war, ib. 47-49 ; Alci¬ 
 biades’ opinion prevails, ib. 50; 
 the Athenians sail to Syracuse, 
 ib. 50 ; obtain possession of Ca- 
 tana, ib. 51; not received at Ca- 
 marina, ib. 52 ; the excitement 
 about the mutilation of the Her¬ 
 mae continues, ib. 53, 60 ; the 
 Athenians send to arrest Alci¬ 
 biades, ib. 53, 61 init.; condemn 
 him to death, ib. 61 fin.; proceed¬ 
 ings of, in Sicily, ib. 62, 63 ; cap¬ 
 ture Hyccara, ib. 62 init.; sail to 
 Syracuse, ib. 64, 65 ; defeat the 
 Syracusans, ib. 66-71; fail in an 
 attempt on Messen£, which Alci¬ 
 biades betrays, ib. 74 ; send home 
 for money and cavalry, ib. fin. 
 [cp. 93 fin., 94 fin.]; send an em¬ 
 bassy to Camarina, ib. fin., 75 ; 
 Euphemus’ speech, ib. 81-87 ; fail 
 to win over the Camarinaeans, ib. 
 88 init.; negotiate with the Sicels, 
 ib. med.; winter at Catana and 
 prepare for a spring campaign, 
 ib. fin.; receive aid from home, ib. 
 93 fin., 94 fin.; prosecute the cam¬ 
 paign, ib. 94; capture Epipolae 
 and fortify Labdalum, ib. 96, 97; 
 receive Sicilian reinforcements, 
 ib. 98 init.; begin to build a wall of 
 circumvallation, anddefeat the Sy¬ 
 racusans in various engagements, 
 ib. 98-101; repulse the Syracusans 
 from Epipolae, ib. 102; begin a 
 double wall from Epipolae to the 
 sea, ib. 103 init., vii. 2 fin.; openly 
 violate the peace with the La¬ 
 cedaemonians, vi. 105; Athenian 
 ships arrive at Rhegium too late. 
 
INDEX . 
 
 641 
 
 to stop Gylippus, vii. 1 init.; re¬ 
 turn no answer to Gylippus’ de¬ 
 mand that they shall quit Sicily, 
 ib. 3 init.; are driven out of Lab- 
 dalum, ib. fin.; repulse an attack 
 on their lines, ib. 4 init.; fortify 
 Plemmyrium, ib .; defeat the Syra¬ 
 cusans, ib. 5med.; defeated by the 
 Syracusans, ib. 6; the Athenians, 
 aided by Perdiccas, make an at¬ 
 tempt upon Amphipolis, ib. 9 ; 
 the Athenians at home receive 
 the despatch of Nicias, ib. 10-15 5 
 send a second expedition to Sicily 
 under Demosthenes, ib. 16 ; send 
 a fleet round Peloponnese, ib. 20 ; 
 conquer the Syracusans at sea, 
 but lose Plemmyrium, ib. 22, 23 ; 
 skirmish with the Syracusans in 
 the harbour, ib. 25 med.; ravage 
 the Laconian coast, and fortify an 
 isthmus there, ib. 26 ; resolve to 
 send back some Thracians who 
 have come too late to join the 
 reinforcements to Sicily, ib. 27 
 init. [who sack Mycalessus on 
 their way, 29, 30] ; suffer terribly 
 from the occupation of Decelea 
 by the Lacedaemonians, ib. 27, 
 
 28 ; Demosthenes meets Eury- 
 medon with news from Sicily, ib. 
 
 31 init.; Demosthenes and Eu- 
 rymedon collect troops in Acar- 
 nania and Corcyra, ib. fin.; the 
 Athenians in Sicily induce the 
 Sicels to destroy reinforcements 
 on their way to Syracuse, z'A 32 ; 
 Demosthenes arrives at Thurii,zA 
 
 33 ; the Athenians at Naupactus 
 fight an indecisive engagement 
 at sea with the Corinthians, ib. 
 
 34 ; consider themselves defeated 
 because not signally the victors, 
 ib. fin.; defeated at sea by the Sy¬ 
 racusans, ib. 37-41 ^repulsed in a 
 night attack on Epipolae, ib. 43- 
 45 ; the Athenian generals hold 
 a council, ib. 47-49 Nicias 
 wishes to delay and Demosthenes 
 yields, ib. 49 fin.; Nicias at last con¬ 
 sents to move, but terrified by an 
 eclipse remains another 27 days, 
 ib. 50 ; the Athenians are again 
 defeated at sea by the Syracusans, 
 ib. 52 ; gain a slight advantage by 
 
 T t 
 
 land, ib. 53 ; give themselves up 
 to despair, ib. 55 ; the list of their 
 allies before Syracuse, ib. 57 ; de¬ 
 termine to fight their way out, ib. 
 60 ; Nicias addresses the troops, 
 ib. 61-64 ; and the trierarchs, ib. 
 69 ; the Athenians are completely 
 defeated at sea, ib. 70, 71; over¬ 
 whelmed by misery refuse to re¬ 
 new the struggle, ib. 72 ; are 
 misled by false information and 
 delay their retreat three days, ib. 
 73, 74 ; their misery and terror 
 when commencing the retreat, ib. 
 75 ; encouraged and consoled by 
 Nicias, ib. 76,77; during four days 
 are harassed and at length con¬ 
 fronted by the enemy, ib. 78, 79; 
 fall back, ib. 79 fin.; recommence 
 retreat,changing their route, ib. 80 
 init.; seized with a panic, ib. med.; 
 the second division is overtaken 
 and compelled to surrender, ib. 
 81, 82 ; the first meets the same 
 fate on the Assinarus, ib. 83-85 ; 
 three hundred escape, ib. 83 fin.; 
 but are captured, ib. 85 med.; 
 Nicias and Demosthenes are put 
 to death, ib. 86 ; the prisoners are 
 cruelly treated by the Syracusans, 
 ib. 87 ; the Athenians at home in 
 fury and terror, but determined 
 not to yield, viii. 1; suspect the 
 Chians of treason, ib. 9, 10 init.; 
 defeat a Peloponnesian squadron 
 and blockade them in Peiraeum, 
 ib. 10, 11 init.; intercept, but do 
 not succeed in capturing, a Pelo¬ 
 ponnesian fleet, ib. 13 ; on the 
 news of the revolt of Chios pass 
 a decree allowing the use of their 
 reserve fund and ships, ib. 15 init.; 
 prepare a great fleet for Asia 
 under Strombichides and Thra- 
 sycles, ib. fin.; Strombichides is 
 chased from Teos, ib. 16 ; arrives 
 at Miletus too late to stop a re¬ 
 volt, ib. 17 ; captures four Chian 
 ships, ib. 19 ; the Athenians at 
 Peiraeum lose four ships in a 
 sally of the Peloponnesian fleet, 
 ib. 20 init.; Diomedon recovers 
 Teos, but fails to take Erae, ib. 
 fin.; the Athenians grant the Sa¬ 
 mians independence after a demo- 
 
642 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 cratic revolution, ib.2i\ recon¬ 
 quer Lesbos which had revolted, 
 and Clazomenae, ib. 23 ; win a 
 slight advantage at Miletus, ib. 
 24 init.; fight three successful 
 battles against the Chians, ib. 
 med.; win a victory before Mile¬ 
 tus, ib. 25 ; withdraw to Samos 
 on the approach of a Pelopon¬ 
 nesian fleet, ib. 27 fin.; receive 
 reinforcements from home, ib. 25 
 init., 30 init.; prepare to attack 
 Miletus, ib. 30 fin.; lose three 
 ships in a storm, ib. 34 init.; fail 
 to take Cnidus which had re¬ 
 volted, ib. 35 ; blockade Chios, 
 ib. 38 init., 40 ; cannot induce the 
 Peloponnesians at Miletus to 
 fight, ib. 38 fin.; defeated at sea, 
 ib. 41,42,43 init.; Rhodes revolts, 
 the Athenians attack it from 
 Chalce, Cos, and Samos, ib. 44 ; 
 the oligarchical party at Samos, 
 by Alcibiades’ instigation, pre¬ 
 pare the way for a revolution, ib. 
 47, 48 init.; Phrynichus resists, 
 ib. 48 med.; Peisander is sent 
 to Tissaphernes, ib. 49 ; Phryni¬ 
 chus out-manoeuvres Alcibiades, 
 who seeks to ruin him, ib. 50, 51 ; 
 those at home agree to change 
 the government, ib. 53, 54 ; send 
 Peisander to negotiate with Al¬ 
 cibiades, ib. 54 init.; remove 
 Phrynichus and appoint Leon 
 and Diomedon generals, ib. med.; 
 Leon and Diomedon make a de¬ 
 scent upon Rhodes, ib. 55 init.; 
 the Athenians at Chios defeat the 
 Chians and press on the blockade, 
 ib. 55 fin., 56 init.; Peisander’s 
 embassy fails through Alcibia¬ 
 des’ unreasonable demands, ib. 56 
 med.; Oropus is betrayed to the 
 Boeotians, ib. 60 init.; the Athe¬ 
 nian fleet retire to Samos for the 
 winter, passing in sight of the 
 Peloponnesians, ib. fin.; they are 
 worsted at sea by the Chians, ib. 
 61 fin.; Lampsacus and Abydos 
 revolt, ib. 62 init.; Strombichides 
 retakes Lampsacus but fails at 
 Abydos, ib. med.; the Athenians 
 at Samos decline Astyochus’ offer 
 of battle, ib. 63 init.; the conspi¬ 
 
 rators at Samos give up Alci¬ 
 biades, but prosecute their plan, 
 ib. 63 fin.; order Peisander to put 
 down democracy in the cities, ib. 
 64; the conspirators at home 
 declare for a pretended govern¬ 
 ment of 5000, ib. 65 ; crush oppo¬ 
 sition by terrorism, ib. 66 ; repeal 
 the graphs paranomon, ib. 67 
 init.; propose a government of 
 400, ib. 67 fin.; description of the 
 leaders of the conspiracy, ib. 68 ; 
 they instal the 400 in the place 
 of the senate, ib. 69, 70 ; send 
 heralds to Agis at Decelea, ib. 70 
 fin.; despatch envoys to Sparta, 
 ib. 71 fin.; and to Samos, ib. 72 ; 
 the Athenians at Samos defeat 
 an oligarchical conspiracy, ib. 73; 
 send Chaereas in the Paralus to 
 Athens, ib. 74 ; on his return with 
 an unfavourable report the army 
 and the Samians swear allegiance 
 to the democracy, z'A 7 5 ; the army 
 appoints Thrasyllus and Thrasy- 
 bulus generals, z A 76 init.; the men 
 encourage each other, ib. med.; 
 the commissioners sent by the 400 
 do not venture beyond Delos, ib. 
 77; the Athenians at Samos refuse 
 battle with Astyochus, but after¬ 
 wards offer it, ib. 79; recall Alcibia¬ 
 des, ib. 81 init.; the army eager to 
 sail to the Piraeus, Alcibiades re¬ 
 strains them, ib. 82 init.; the envoys 
 of the Four Hundred now come 
 to Samos, ib. 86 [cp. 72 init., 77]; 
 they are roughly received by the 
 army, ib. 86 init.; Alcibiades again 
 dissuades the army from sailing 
 to Athens, ib. med.; the Argives 
 offer assistance, ib. fin.; the Four 
 Hundred in alarm send envoys 
 to Lacedaemon for peace on any 
 terms, ib. 90 med.; fortify Eeti- 
 oneia, ib. fin.; the envoys return 
 unsuccessful, z'^.91 init.; Therame- 
 nes begins to withdraw from the 
 oligarchs, z'A passim ; the hoplites 
 under his instigation destroy Eeti- 
 oneia, ib. 92; panic in the city, ib. 
 med.; the Four Hundred induce 
 the people to fix a day for an 
 assembly ‘to restore harmony,’ 
 ib. 93 ; a Lacedaemonian squad- 
 
I N DE X. 
 
 6 43 
 
 ron approaches and the Athenians 
 hurriedly equip a fleet, ib. 94 ; 
 utterly defeated at sea and lose 
 Euboea, ib. 95 ; panic-stricken by 
 their defeat, ib. 96 init.; depose 
 the 400, ib. 97; recall Alcibia- 
 des, ib. fin.; the leaders of the 
 oligarchs retire to Decelea, ib. 98; 
 the Athenian fleet sails to the 
 Hellespont, ib. 100; attacks Ere- 
 sus on the way, ib. fin.; the Athe¬ 
 nian squadron at Sestos is chased 
 by the Lacedaemonian fleet, ib. 
 102; the fleet at Lesbos at once sails 
 from Eresus to Elaeus, ib. 103; 
 they defeat the Lacedaemonians 
 at sea off Cynossema, ib. 104, 105 ; 
 almost incredulous of their good 
 fortune, ib. 106; capture eight Pelo¬ 
 ponnesian ships, ib. 107 ; recover 
 Cyzicus, which had revolted, ib. 
 107 med.; Alcibiades returns to 
 Samos, professing to have secured 
 Tissaphernes’ friendship for them, 
 ib. 108 init. 
 
 Athletes, used to wear girdles in 
 gymnastic contests, i. 6 fin.; ho¬ 
 nours paid to, iv. 121 med. 
 
 Athos, Mount, iv. 109 med., v. 3 
 fin., 35 init., 82 init. 
 
 Atintanians, a people in Epirus, ii. 
 80 fin. 
 
 Atreus, son of Pelops, i. 9 passim. 
 
 Attica, early history of, i. 2 fin.; 
 Ionia colonized from, ib., ib. 12 
 fin.; ii. 15 fin.; anciently divided 
 into communes, ii. 15 init.; in¬ 
 vaded by the Lacedaemonians, i. 
 114 med.; ii. 21 init.; invasion in 
 first year of the War, ii. 18-23; in 
 the second year, ib. 47, 55, 56; in 
 the fourth year, iii. 1; in the fifth 
 year, ib. 26; in the sixth year 
 averted by an earthquake, ib. 89 
 init.; in the seventh year, iv. 2 
 init., 6; in the nineteenth year, 
 vii. 19 init. 
 
 Aulon, in Chalcidic£, iv. 103 init; 
 
 Autocharidas, a Lacedaemonian 
 general, v. 12. 
 
 Autocles, son of Tolmaeus, an 
 Athenian general, iv. 53 init., 
 
 119 fin. 
 
 Axius, river in Macedonia, ii. 99 
 med. 
 
 B. 
 
 Barbarians, term not used in 
 Homer, i. 3 med.; carry arms in 
 daily life, ib. 6 init.; various bar¬ 
 barous races: the Aetolians, iii. 
 94 fin.; the Amphilochians, ii. 
 68 init.; in Athos, iv. 109; the 
 Epirots, ii. 80-82; the Illyrians, 
 iv. 126 med.; in Sicily, vi. 2; ib. 11 
 fin.; the Taulantians, i. 24 init.; 
 the Thracians, ii. 96-98, 101; iv. 
 75 fin.; vii. 27; Xerxes called ‘ the 
 Barbarian, 5 i. 14 fin., 18. 
 
 Battus, a Corinthian commander, 
 iv. 43 init. 
 
 Bells, use of by sentinels, iv. 135 
 med. 
 
 Beroea, in Macedonia, i. 61 med. 
 
 Bisaltia, in Macedonia, ii. 99 fin. 
 
 Bisaltians [in Athos], iv. 109 fin. 
 
 Bithynian Thracians, iv. 75 fin. 
 
 Boeotarchs, Pythangelus, ii. 2med.; 
 Diemporus, ib.\ Pagondas, iv. 91 
 med.; Arianthidas, ib.\ Scirphon- 
 das, vii. 30 fin.; their powers, v. 
 37 , 38 . 
 
 Boeotia, early history, i. 2 med., iii. 
 61 med.; formerly called Cad- 
 meis, i. 12 med.; fertility of, ib. 
 2 med.; bordered on one side by 
 Phocis, iii. 95 init.; the Four 
 Councils of Boeotia, v. 38; earth¬ 
 quakes in Boeotia, iii. 87 fin. 
 
 Boeotians, the, expelled from Arn& 
 by the Thessalians, i. 12 med.; 
 all but the Plataeans joined the 
 Persians, iii. 62 init. [cp. viii. 43 
 fin.]; subdued by the Athenians 
 after Oenophyta, i. 108 med.; 
 become allies of the Athenians, 
 ib. iii init.; regain their freedom 
 at Coronea, ib. 113 fin., iii. 62 fin., 
 67 med., iv. 92 fin.; the Boeo¬ 
 tians in Attica seized after the 
 attempt on Plataea, ii. 6 med.; 
 furnish cavalry to the Lacedae¬ 
 monians at the opening of the 
 War, ib. 9 med., 12 fin.;, ravage 
 Plataea, ib. 12 fin.; worst the 
 Athenians in a cavalry skirmish 
 at Phrygia in Attica, ib. 22 med.; 
 supply half the besieging force at 
 Plataea, ib. 78 med.; invaded by 
 the Athenians, iii. 91; assist Bra- 
 
 T t 2 
 
644 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 sidas to save Megara from the 
 Athenians, iv. 70, 72; the demo¬ 
 cratic party in Boeotia concert 
 an Athenian invasion, ib. 76, 77; 
 the plot is betrayed, ib. 89 ; the 
 Athenians under Hippocrates 
 arrive and fortify Delium, ib. 90; 
 the Boeotians defeat the Athe¬ 
 nians at Delium, ib. 91-96; quib¬ 
 ble with the Athenians about 
 giving up the dead, ib. 97-99; 
 capture Delium, ib. 100; the 
 Lacedaemonians promise to in¬ 
 vite the Boeotians to join the 
 Truce, ib. uSinit.; Panactum is 
 betrayed to the Boeotians, v. 3 fin.; 
 refuse to join in the fifty years’ 
 Peace, ib. 17 fin.; had only a ten 
 days’ armistice with the Athe¬ 
 nians, ib. 26 med., 32 med.; re¬ 
 fuse to join the Argive alliance, 
 ib. 31 fin.; 32 med.; fail to 
 gain from the Athenians a ten 
 days’ armistice for the Corin¬ 
 thians, ib. fin.; the Lacedae¬ 
 monians promise to try to bring 
 the Boeotians into the Treaty, ib. 
 35 fin.; the new Lacedaemonian 
 ephors propose to the Boeotians 
 that they should enter the Ar¬ 
 give alliance, ib. 36; the Boeo¬ 
 tians at first agree, ib. 37; the 
 Boeotian Councils reject the offer, 
 ib. 38; the Boeotians form a 
 separate alliance with Lacedae¬ 
 mon, surrendering Panactum and 
 their Athenian prisoners to them, 
 ib. 39; take possession of Hera- 
 clea, ib. 52 init.; take part in the 
 LacedaemonianinvasionofArgos, 
 ib. 57 fin.-60; summoned by the 
 Lacedaemonians to Mantinea, 
 ib. 64 med.; invite a small body 
 of Lacedaemonian troops to the 
 Isthmus, and thus raise suspicion 
 at Athens against Alcibiades, vi. 
 61 init.; send aid to Sicily, vii. 
 19med., 58 med.; these engaged 
 against their Plataean country¬ 
 men, ib. 57 init.; make the first 
 stand against the Athenians on 
 Epipolae, ib. 43 fin.; sack of My- 
 calessus by the Thracians, ib. 29, 
 30 ; the Boeotians furnish the 
 Lacedaemonians with ships, viii. 
 
 3 fin.; aid the revolt of Lesbos, 
 ib. 4 fin.; Oropus is betrayed to 
 the Boeotians, ib. 60 init.; Oenoe 
 is betrayed to the Boeotians, ib. 
 98; the Boeotians lose two ships 
 at Cynossema, ib. 106 med. 
 
 Boeum, in Doris, i. 107 init. 
 
 Bolbe, Lake, in Macedonia, i. 58 
 fin., iv. 103 init. 
 
 Bolissus, in Chios, viii. 24 med. 
 
 Bomieans, in Aetolia, iii. 96 fin. 
 
 Boriades, an Aetolian envoy, iii. 
 100 init. 
 
 Bottiaea, ii. 100 med.; the Bot- 
 tiaeans expelled from, by the 
 Macedonians, ii. 99 med. 
 
 Bottic£, revolts from Athens, i. 
 56-58; devastated by Phormio, 
 ib. 65 fin.; ravaged by Sitalces, 
 
 ii. 101; the Bottiaeans defeat the 
 Athenians, ib. 79; aid the Chalci- 
 dians to expel the Athenians 
 from Eion, iv. 7. 
 
 Brasidas, saves Methon£, ii. 25 
 med.; the first Spartan to gain 
 distinction in the War, ib.\ sent 
 out as adviser of Cnemus, ib. 85 
 init.; concerts with the other com¬ 
 manders an attack on the Piraeus, 
 ib. 93; sent as adviser of Alcidas, 
 
 iii. 69 med., ib. 76 med.; advises 
 Alcidas to attack Corcyra, ib. 79 
 fin.; distinguishes himself at Py- 
 los, iv. 11 med.; wounded, ib. 12 
 init.; saves Megara, ib. 70-73; 
 marches through Thessaly to 
 Chalcidic6, ib. 78; favourable im¬ 
 pression produced by him, ib. 81, 
 108 med.; a good speaker, ib. 84 
 fin.; his army, Peloponnesian 
 mercenaries and Helots, ib. 80fin. 
 [cp. ib. 70 med.]; allies himself 
 with Perdiccas, ib. 83 init.; quar¬ 
 rels with him, ib. fin.; gains over 
 Acanthus and Stageirus, ib. 84- 
 88; speech of, at Acanthus, ib. 
 85-87; captures Amphipolis, ib. 
 103-106; repulsed from Eion, 
 ib. 107 init.; brings over Myr- 
 cinus, Galepsus, and Aesyme, ib. 
 fin.; takes Torone and Lecythus, 
 ib. 110-116; receives honours 
 from the Scionaeans, ib. 121; 
 refuses to surrender Scion 5 under 
 the Truce, ib. 122; receives the 
 
INDEX. 645 
 
 Mendaeans in defiance of the 
 Truce, ib. 123 init.; garrisons 
 Mende and Scion&, ib. fin.; de¬ 
 feats the Lyncestians, ib. 124 ; 
 deserted by the Macedonians, ib. 
 125; his speech to his soldiers, 
 ib. 126; defeats the Illyrians, ib. 
 127, 128; receives commissioners 
 from Lacedaemon, ib. 132 fin.; 
 attempts Potidaea, ib. 135; de¬ 
 feats the Athenians at Amphi- 
 polis, v. 6-10; speech of, ib. 9; 
 his death, ib. 10 fin.; buried in 
 the Agora of Amphipolis, ib. 11 
 init.; receives the honours of a 
 founder from the Amphipolitans, 
 ib. 11 med.; a great enemy to 
 peace, ib. 16 init.; his Helot sol¬ 
 diers settled at Lepreum, ib. 34 
 med.; his old soldiers present at 
 Mantinea, ib. 67 init., 71 fin., 72 
 med. 
 
 Brauro, helps in the assassination 
 of her husband, Pittacus, king of 
 the Edonians, iv. 107 fin. 
 
 Bridge over the Strymon, iv. 103 
 fin.; over the Anapus, vi. 66 med. 
 
 Brilessus, Mount, in Attica, ii. 23 
 init. 
 
 Bromerus, father of Arrhibaeus the 
 king of the Lyncestians, iv. 83 init. 
 
 Bromiscus, in Chalcidice, iv. 103 
 init. 
 
 Brycinniae, in Leontine territory, 
 
 v. 4 med. 
 
 Bucolium, in Arcadia, iv. 134 fin. 
 
 Budorum, a station in Salamis from 
 which the Athenians usedto watch 
 Megara, ii. 94 fin., iii. 51 med. 
 
 Buphras, in Laconia, iv. 118 med. 
 
 Burial, Carian mode of, i. 8 init. 
 
 Byzantium, captured by Pausanias, 
 and entrusted to Gongylus, i. 
 94, 128 med., 129 med.; expul¬ 
 sion of Pausanias from Byzan¬ 
 tium, ib. 131 init.; insignificant 
 engagementat sea off Byzantium, 
 viii. 80 fin. [cp. ib. 107 init.]; the 
 Byzantines revolt from Athens, i. 
 115 fin.; submit, ib. 117 fin.; re¬ 
 volt again, viii. 80. 
 
 C. 
 
 Cacyparis, river in Sicily, vii. 80 fin. 
 
 Cadmei's, old name of Boeotia, i. 12 
 med. 
 
 Caeadas, a chasm into which male¬ 
 factors were flung at Sparta, i. 
 134 med. 
 
 Caecinus, a river of Locris in Italy, 
 iii. 103 fin. 
 
 Calex, a river near Heraclea on the 
 Pontus, iv. 75 fin. 
 
 Callias, father of Callicrates, a 
 Corinthian, i. 29 init. [Athenians] 
 (I) son of Hyperechides, father- 
 in-law of Hippias the tyrant, vi. 
 55 init.; (II) father of Hipponi- 
 cus, iii. 91 med.; (Ill) son of 
 Calliades, an Athenian com¬ 
 mander, i. 61 init., ib. 62 med.; 
 killed at Potidaea, ib. 63 fin. 
 
 Callicrates, a Corinthian com¬ 
 mander, i. 29 init. 
 
 Callieans, an Aetolian tribe, iii. 96 fin. 
 
 Calligeitus, a Megarian exile at the 
 Court of Pharnabazus, viii. 6 init.; 
 goes as envoy to Sparta, ib ., ib. 
 8 init., 39 init. 
 
 Callimachus, father of Learchus, an 
 Athenian, ii. 67 med.; father of 
 Phanomachus, an Athenian, ii. 
 70 init. 
 
 Callirrhoe,ancientname of the foun¬ 
 tain Enneacrounos at Athens, ii. 
 15 fin. 
 
 Calydon, name given to the ancient 
 Aeolis, iii. 102 med. 
 
 Camarina, founded from Syracuse, 
 
 vi. 5 med.; recolonized by Hip¬ 
 pocrates, ib. fin.; by Gela, ib.\ in 
 alliance with Leontini, iii. 86 init.; 
 plan to betray it to Syracuse, iv. 
 25 med.; Camarinaeans make a 
 truce with Gela, ib. 58 init.; receive 
 Morgantine from the Syracusans, 
 ib. 65 init.; refuse to receive the 
 Athenian expedition, vi. 52; send a 
 small force to the Syracusans, ib. 
 67 fin.; receive andhear embassies 
 both from Athens and Syracuse, 
 ib. 75-87; resolve on neutrality, 
 ib. 88 init.; send aid to Syracuse 
 after the capture of Plemmyrium, 
 
 vii. 33 init., 58 init. 
 
 Cambyses, son of Cyrus, king of 
 
 Persia, the Ionians in his time 
 masters of the sea about their 
 own coast, i. 13 fin. 
 
646 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Cameirus, in Rhodes, revolts from 
 Athens, viii. 44 med. 
 
 Canal, cut by the Persians across 
 the Isthmus of Athos, iv. 109 init. 
 
 Canastraeum, promontory of, in 
 Pallene, iv. 110 fin. 
 
 Capaton, father of Proxenus, an 
 Italian Locrian, iii. 103 fin. 
 
 Carcinus, an Athenian commander, 
 ii. 23 med. 
 
 CardamyR, in Chios, viii. 24 med. 
 
 Caria, Carians expelled by Minos 
 from the Cyclades, i. 4 ; addicted 
 to piracy, ib. 8 init.; their mode 
 of burial, ib. init.; the Athenians 
 send look-out ships to the Carian 
 coast in the Samian insurrection, 
 ib. 116init.; maritime Caria sub¬ 
 ject to the Athenians, ii. 9 fin.; 
 the Athenians send a squadron to 
 the Carian coast to protect their 
 Phoenician trade, ib. 69 med.; 
 Carians destroy an Athenian ex¬ 
 pedition, iii. 19 fin.; Amorges in 
 Caria revolts from the King, viii. 
 5 fin.; Gaulites, a Carian speaking 
 Greek and Persian, ib. 85 init. 
 
 Carnea, feast at Lacedaemon, v. 75, 
 76 init. 
 
 Carneus, sacred month among the 
 Dorians, y. 54 med. 
 
 Carteria, a Phocaean island, viii. 
 101 med. 
 
 Carthage, ambitious plans of Alci- 
 biades for attacking Carthage, vi. 
 15 med., 90 init.; always in fear 
 of an Athenian invasion, ib. 34 
 init.; relations of the Phoenician 
 colonies in Sicily to Carthage, 
 ib. 2 fin.; Carthaginians de¬ 
 feated at sea by the Phocaeans, 
 i. 13 fin. 
 
 Caryae, in Laconia, v. 55 med. 
 
 Carystus, in Euboea, of Dryopian 
 origin, vii. 57 med.; subjected by 
 the Athenians, i. 98 med.; the 
 Carystians become allies of the 
 Athenians, iv. 42 init., vii. 57 med. 
 
 Casmenae, founded by the Syra- 
 
 . cusans, vi. 5 med. 
 
 Castle, the White, a portion of 
 Memphis, i. 104 fin. 
 
 Catana, founded by Thucles and 
 Evarchus, vi. 3 fin.; lies under 
 mount Aetna, iii. 116 init.; at first 
 
 refuses to receive the Athenian 
 expedition, vi. 50med.; after the 
 entry of some Athenian soldiers 
 votes an alliance with Athens, ib. 
 
 51 fin., vii. 57fin., 85 fin.; becomes 
 the Athenian station, vi. 51 fin., 
 
 52 fin., 62 fin.; the Syracusans 
 eager to attack Catana, ib. 63 fin.; 
 the Athenians by a false message 
 draw the Syracusans to Catana 
 while they sail to Syracuse, ib. 
 64, 65; the Athenians retire to 
 Catanaat the beginning ofwinter, 
 ib. 72 init.; start from Catana on 
 an expedition against Messene, 
 ib. 74; the Syracusans destroy 
 the Athenian encampment at 
 Catana, ib. 75 med.; the Athe¬ 
 nians rebuild their camp, ib. 88 
 med.; start from thence on various 
 expeditions, ib. 94; abandon Ca¬ 
 tana, ib. 97 init.; are supplied 
 with horses from Catana, ib. 98 
 init.; Catana and Naxos men¬ 
 tioned by Nicias as unable to 
 support the Athenian forces, vii. 
 14 med.; Demosthenes on his 
 arrival thinks the winter spent at 
 Catana a mistake, ib. 42 med.; 
 after Epipolae wishes to retire to 
 Catana, ib. 49 med.; the Athenian 
 army at Syracuse fed from Ca¬ 
 tana, ib. 60 init.; at first wish to 
 retreat by sea to Catana, ib. 
 med., 72; the Athenian line of 
 retreat in the opposite direction 
 to Catana, ib. 80 init.; the Athe¬ 
 nian fugitives find a refuge at 
 Catana, ib. 85 fin. 
 
 Caulonia, in Italy, vii. 25 init. 
 
 Caunus, in Caria, called ‘ Caunus 
 in Asia, 5 viii. 39 fin.; Pericles 
 sails towards Caunus in the Sa¬ 
 mian revolt, i. 116fin.; the Lace¬ 
 daemonian commissioners to 
 Astyochus put in at Caunus, viii. 
 39 fin. [cp. 42 med.]; Astyochus 
 sails for Caunus, ib. 41 init.; 
 Tissaphernes comes to Caunus, 
 ib. 57 init.; Alcibiades sails for 
 Caunus, ib. 88 fin. [cp. 108 init.] 
 
 Cecalus, father of Nicasus, a Me- 
 garian, iv. 119 med. 
 
 Cecrops, state of Attica in his time, 
 ii. 15 init. 
 
INDEX. 647 
 
 Cecryphaleia, victory of the Athe¬ 
 nians off, i. 105 init. 
 
 Cenaeum, in Euboea, iii. 93 init. 
 
 Cenchreae, the port of Corinth, the 
 Corinthians leave half their 
 troops at Cenchreae to guard 
 Crommyon, iv. 42 fin., 44 med.; 
 a Lacedaemonian fleet starting 
 for Chios from Cenchreae is 
 driven into PAraeum, viii. 10 
 init.; escapes and returns to Cen¬ 
 chreae, ib. 20 init.; Astyochus 
 starts from Cenchreae, ib. 23 
 init. 
 
 Centoripa, a Sicel town, captured 
 by the Athenians, vi. 94 med.; 
 allied to Athens, vii. 32 med. 
 
 Ceos, the Ceans subjects of the 
 Athenians, vii. 57 init. 
 
 Cephallenia, repulse of the Corin¬ 
 thians in a descent upon Cephal¬ 
 lenia, ii. 33 fin.; an important 
 station to the Athenians, ib. 80 
 init. [cp. 7fin.]; the Cephallenians 
 [of Pale] furnish a convoy to the 
 Corinthians, i. 27 fin.; become 
 allies of the Athenians, ii. 7 fin., 
 30 fin., iii. 94 init., 95 med., vi. 
 85 med., vii. 31 init., 57 med.; 
 the Messenians from Pylos set¬ 
 tled by the Athenians at Cranii 
 in Cephallenia, v. 35 fin.; with¬ 
 drawn, ib. 56 med. 
 
 Ceramicus, at Athens, vi. 57 init., 
 58 init. 
 
 Cercine, Mount, in Macedonia, ii. 
 98 init. 
 
 Cerdylium, Mount, near Amphi- 
 polis, v. 6-10. 
 
 Ceryces, the, at Athens, protest 
 against the return of Alcibiades, 
 viii. 53 med. 
 
 Cestrine, in Epirus, i. 46 fin. 
 
 Chaereas, an Athenian, sent as 
 envoy from the army at Samos, 
 viii. 74 init.; escapes from Athens 
 and brings an exaggerated report 
 to Samos, ib. fin., 86 init. 
 
 Chaeronea, in Boeotia, its situation, 
 iv. 76 med.; a dependency of the 
 Boeotian Orchomenus, ib.; taken 
 by the Athenians under Tolmides, 
 i. 113; Orchomenian exiles plot 
 its betrayal to the Athenians, iv. 
 76 med.; the plot fails, ib. 89. 
 
 Chalaeans, a tribe of Ozolian Lo- 
 crians, iii. 101 fin. 
 
 Chalet, island of, near Rhodes, 
 viii. 41 fin., 44 fin., 55 init., 60 fin. 
 
 Chalcedon, a Megarian colony, iv. 
 
 75 
 
 Chalcideus, a Spartan admiral, viii. 
 6 fin., 8 init.; sent to Ionia with 
 Alcibiades, ib. 11 fin., 12 fin.; is pur¬ 
 sued by the Athenians on his way, 
 ib. 15 med.; induces the revolt 
 of Chios, Erythrae, Clazomenae, 
 ib.14; chases Strombichides into 
 Samos, ib. 16; causes the revolt of 
 Teos, ib. fin.; and of Miletus, ib. 
 17; garrisons Chios, ib. 17 init. 
 [cp. 32 med.]; negotiates a treaty 
 between the King and Sparta, 
 ib. 18, 36, 43 med.; falls in a skir¬ 
 mish at Panormus, ib. 24 init.; 
 his forces afterwards engaged 
 before Miletus, ib. 25 med. 
 
 Chalcidian cities, the, of Sicily, 
 founded from Chalcis in Euboea, 
 vi. 3-5; akin to the Athenians, 
 iv. 61 med., 64 med.; the Chalci¬ 
 dian dialect, vi. 5 init.; invite the 
 Athenians to Sicily, iii. 86 med., 
 iv. 61 med. 
 
 Chalcidice [on the coast of Thrace], 
 revolts from Athens, i. 56-58; 
 devastated by Phormio, ib. 65 
 fin.; by Sitalces, ii. 95 init., 101; 
 Cleon’s expedition against Chal- 
 cidic6, v. 2-11; Thucydides in 
 command there, iv. 104 fin.; the 
 Chalcidians pull down their 
 cities and retire to Olynthus, i. 
 58 fin.; defeat the Athenians, ii. 
 79; retake Eion from the Athe- 
 
 . nians, iv. 7; invite Brasidas, ib. 
 79, 80 init.; Chalcidian ambassa¬ 
 dors accompany Brasidas in his 
 Macedonian campaign, ib. 83 
 med.; the Chalcidians instigate 
 the revolt of Amphipolis, ib. 103 
 med.; aid in garrisoning Mend6 
 and Scion£, ib. 123 fin.; supply 
 Brasidas with troops against Ar- 
 rhibaeus, ib. 124 init.; the Chal¬ 
 cidian prisoners taken in Toron6 
 are sent to Athens, and after¬ 
 wards exchanged, v. 3 fin.; Chal¬ 
 cidian forces at the battle of 
 Amphipolis, ib. 6fin.; pursue the 
 
6 4 8 
 
 / N D E X. 
 
 retreating Athenians, ib. iofin.; 
 provisions respecting the Chalci- 
 dian cities in the Treaty of Peace, 
 ib. 1 8 , v-vii, ix, x; the Chalci- 
 dians refuse to accept the Treaty, 
 ib. 21 med.; join the Argive 
 alliance, ib. 31 fin.; renew the 
 alliance with Lacedaemon, ib. 80 
 med.; receive the Dians who 
 had revolted from the Athenians, 
 ib. 82 init.; maintain a ten days’ 
 armistice with the Athenians, vi. 
 7 fin. 
 
 Chalcis, in Aetolia, taken by the 
 Athenians, i. 108 fin., ii. 83 med. 
 
 Chalcis, in Euboea, vii. 29init.; the 
 mother city of the Chalcidian 
 cities in Sicily, vi. 3-5; of Cym6 
 in Italy, ib. 4 fin.; war between 
 Chalcis and Eretria, i. 15 fin.; 
 Chalcis subject to the Athenians, 
 
 vi. 76 init., vii. 57 init.; the Athe¬ 
 nians retreat to Chalcis after the 
 sea-fight off Eretria, viii. 95 fin. 
 
 Chance, to chance men ascribe 
 whatever belies their calculation, 
 
 i. 140 init. 
 
 Chaones, apeople in Epirus, are bar¬ 
 barians, ii. 68 fin.; have no king, 
 ib. 80 fin.; their military reputa¬ 
 tion, ib. 81 med.; assist in the in¬ 
 vasion of Acarnania, ib. 80 fin.; 
 defeated by the Stratians, ib. 81. 
 
 Charadrus, scene of military trials 
 at Argos, v. 60 fin. 
 
 Charicles, an Athenian commander, 
 
 vii. 20, 26. 
 
 Charminus, an Athenian com¬ 
 mander, viii. 30 init., 41 fin.; de¬ 
 feated by the Lacedaemonians, 
 ib. 42 ; abets the murder of Hy¬ 
 perbolus, ib. 73 med. 
 
 Charoeades, an Athenian command¬ 
 er in Sicily, iii. 86 init.; killed in 
 action, ib. 90 init. 
 
 Charybdis, the whirlpool of, iv. 24 fin. 
 
 Cheimerium, in Thesprotia, i. 30 
 fin.; situation of, ib. 46 med.; 
 Corinthian fleet anchors there, ib. 
 
 Chersonesus, inCorinthian territory, 
 iv. 42 init., 43 init. 
 
 Chersonnese, the Thracian, culti¬ 
 vated by the Greek armament at 
 Troy, i. 11 med.; ravaged by 
 the Lacedaemonians, viii. 99 fin.; 
 
 naval operations off its coast, ib. 
 102-105. 
 
 Children, a man without children has 
 no stake in the country, ii. 44 fin. 
 
 Children of the fallen maintained 
 at the public charge in Athens, 
 
 ii. 46 fin. 
 
 Chionis, a Lacedaemonian, swears 
 to the Treaty of Peace and the 
 Alliance, v. 19 med., 24 init. 
 
 Chios, its moderate and stable go¬ 
 vernment, viii. 24 med.; its naval 
 power, ib. 6 fin. [cp. i. 19 init., 
 
 ii. 9 fin., 56 med.]; its riches, viii. 
 24 med.; great number of slaves 
 there, ib. 40 med.; Chios and 
 Lesbos the only free allies of 
 Athens, iii. 10 med., vi. 85 med., 
 vii. 57 init.; Homer at Chios, 
 
 iii. 104 fin.; the Chians assist the 
 Athenians against the Samians, 
 i. 116, 117; furnish ships in the 
 siege of Potidaea, ii. 56 med., vi. 
 31 init.; Alcidas puts some Chian 
 prisoners to death, iii. 32 init.; re¬ 
 leases the remainder on a remon¬ 
 strance from the Samian exiles, 
 ib. fin.; Chians aid the Athenians 
 at Pylos, iv. 13 med.; ordered by 
 the Athenians to dismantle their 
 walls, ib. 51; furnish ships against 
 Mende and Scion6, ib. 129 init.; 
 against Melos, v. 84 init.; aid the 
 Athenians at Syracuse, vi. 43 init., 
 85 med., vii. 20 med., 57 init.; ne¬ 
 gotiate with the Lacedaemonians 
 about revolting, viii. 5 init.; re¬ 
 ceived into alliance, ib. 6; send 
 the Athenians ships as a pledge 
 of fidelity, ib. 9 med.; revolt, ib. 14 
 med.; employed by Alcibiades to 
 raise revolt in Ionia, beginning 
 with Miletus, ib. 17 ; four of their 
 ships are taken by the Athenians, 
 ib. 19 init.; induce Lebedus and 
 Erae to revolt, ib. fin.; then Me- 
 thymna and Mitylene, ib. 22 ; lose 
 a few ships off Lesbos, ib. 23 med.; 
 defeated in three battles by the 
 Athenians, ib. 24 med.; their suf¬ 
 ferings lead some to negotiate 
 with the Athenians, ib. 24 fin., 31 
 init., 38 med.; aid in the capture 
 of Iasus, ib. 28 init.; the Athe¬ 
 nians prepare to attack them, ib. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 649 
 
 30; the Chians refuse to assist 
 Astyochus in procuring the revolt 
 of Lesbos, ib. 32 fin.; three Chian 
 ships are chased by the Atheni¬ 
 ans into Chios, ib. 34 init.; have 
 their government changed by the 
 Lacedaemonians, ib. 38 med.; 
 completely blockaded, ib. 40; im¬ 
 plore the aid of Astyochus, ib. 38 
 fin., 40 init.; defeated by the 
 Athenians and more closely block¬ 
 aded, ib. 55 fin., 56 init.; gain an 
 advantage at sea over the Athe¬ 
 nians, viii. 61 fin.; regain the com¬ 
 mand of the sea, on the with¬ 
 drawal of a part of the Athenian 
 fleet, ib. 62 init., 63 init.; the 
 Athenians plan a fresh attack on 
 Chios, on the arrival of a Lace¬ 
 daemonian fleet under Mindarus, 
 ib. 100; the Lacedaemonians slip 
 away, ib. 101; the Chians lose 
 eight ships at Cynossema, ib. 106 
 med.; Chian tesseracosts, viii. 
 101 init. 
 
 Choenix, an Athenian measure, iv. 
 16 med. [See note.] 
 
 Choerades, Iapygian islands, vii. 33 
 med. 
 
 Choruses, once sent by the Atheni¬ 
 ans to the festival at Delos, iii. 
 104 fin. 
 
 Chromon, Demosthenes’ Messenian 
 guide in Aetolia, iii. 98 med. 
 
 Chrysippus, murdered by Atreus, i. 
 9 med. 
 
 Chrysis, priestess of Here at Argos, 
 ii. 2 init., iv. 133 med.; causes 
 the conflagration of the temple, 
 iv. 133 med.; flees to Phlius, ib. 
 
 Chrysis, father of Eumachus, a 
 Corinthian, ii. 33 med. 
 
 Cilicians: the Cilicians and Phoe¬ 
 nicians defeated at Salamis[in Cy¬ 
 prus] by the Athenians, i. 112 med. 
 
 Cimon, son of Miltiades, captures 
 Eion, i. 98 init.; conquers the 
 Persians at the Eurymedon, ib. 
 100 init.; commands the Athenian 
 reinforcements at the siege of 
 Ithome, ib. 102 init.; dies in Cy¬ 
 prus, ib. 112 med. 
 
 Cimon, father of Lacedaemomus, 
 an Athenian, i. 45. . . 
 
 Cithaeron, Mt., ii. 75 imt -> m * 2 4 imt - 
 
 Cities, ancient cities small,i. 2 med.; 
 resembled scattered villages, ib. 
 10 init.; at first built inland, 
 afterwards on the sea-shore, ib. 
 7 ; the cities of Ionia unfortified, 
 iii. 33 med.; ‘ The City,’ name for 
 Acropolis at Athens, ii. 15 fin. 
 
 Citium, in Cyprus, i. 112 med. 
 
 Citizen, the citizen must be sacri¬ 
 ficed to the state, ii. 60 init., 61 fin. 
 
 Citizenship, the Lacedaemonians 
 deprive those who had been 
 prisoners at Sphacteria of citizen¬ 
 ship, v. 34 fin. 
 
 Clarus, in Ionia, iii. 33 init. 
 
 Classes of the citizens at Athens, 
 iii. 16 init., vi. 43 med. 
 
 Clazomenae, built on an island, viii. 
 14 fin.; the Clazomenians re¬ 
 volt from Athens, ib.; fortify Po- 
 lichne, ib.; aid in the revolt of 
 Teos, ib. 16; the Peloponnesian 
 infantry march towards Clazo¬ 
 menae, ib. 22 fin.; they are sub¬ 
 dued by the Athenians, ib. 23fin.; 
 repulse a Peloponnesian attack, 
 ib. 31 med. 
 
 Cleaenetus, father of Cleon, an 
 Athenian, iii. 36 fin. 
 
 Cleandridas, father of Gylippus, a 
 Spartan, vi. 93 med. 
 
 Clearchus, a Lacedaemonian com¬ 
 mander, viii. 8 med.; appointed to 
 the Hellespont, ib. 39 med., 80. 
 
 Clearidas, a Lacedaemonian, made 
 governor of Amphipolis, iv. 132 
 fin.; commands with Brasidas at 
 the battle of Amphipolis, v. 6-11; 
 refuses to surrender Amphipolis, 
 ib. 21 med; brings home the 
 troops of Brasidas, ib. 34 init. 
 
 Cleinias, the father of Alcibiades, 
 an Athenian, v. 43 init.; another, 
 father of Theopompus [?], ii. 26; 
 another, father of Cleopompus, 
 ib. 58. 
 
 Cleippides, an Athenian com¬ 
 mander, iii. 3 med. 
 
 Cleobulus, ephor at Sparta, v. 36 
 init.; favours the war party, ib.; 
 negotiates with the Boeotians 
 and Corinthians, ib. 36-38. 
 
 Cleombrotus, father of Pausanias, 
 a Lacedaemonian, i. 94 init.; of 
 Nicomedes, ib. 107 init. 
 
650 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Cleomedes, an Athenian general in 
 the attack on Melos, v. 84 fin. 
 
 Cleomenes, king of Sparta, expels 
 the ‘ accursed persons 5 from 
 Athens, i. 126 fin. 
 
 Cleomenes, the uncle of king Pau- 
 sanias, iii. 26 med. 
 
 Cleon, a great popular leader, iii. 
 36 fin., iv. 21 med.; hostile to 
 Nicias, iv. 27 fin.; a great enemy 
 to peace, v. 16 init.; his arrogance, 
 ib. 7 med.; carries the decree 
 condemning the Mitylenaeans to 
 death, iii. 36 fin.; his speech 
 against its repeal, ib. 37-40; 
 moves and carries the slaughter 
 of 1000 Mitylenaean captives at 
 Athens, ib. 50 init.; causes the 
 breaking off of negotiations with 
 Sparta, iv. 21, 22; is sent in place 
 of Nicias to Pylos, ib. 27, 28; 
 selects Demosthenes as his col¬ 
 league, ib. 29 init.; makes with 
 Demosthenes an attack on 
 Sphacteria, ib. 31-37; compels 
 the surrender of the Lacedaemo¬ 
 nians, ib. 38; carries a decree for 
 the destruction of Scione, ib. 122 
 fin.; captures Toron£, v. 2, 3; 
 takes Galepsus, and attempts 
 Stageirus, ib. 6 init.; defeated 
 and slain at Amphipolis, ib. 6-11. 
 
 Cleonae, in Act6, iv. 109 med. 
 
 Cleonae, in Argolis, in alliance with 
 Argos, v. 67 fin.; sends troops 
 to Mantinea, ib. 72 fin., 74 med.; a 
 Lacedaemonian army invading 
 Argos turns back at Cleonae in 
 consequence of an earthquake, 
 vi. 95 init. 
 
 Cleonymus, father of Clearidas, a 
 Lacedaemonian, iv. 132 fin. 
 
 Cleopompus, an Athenian com¬ 
 mander, ii. 58 init. 
 
 Cleruchi, in Lesbos, iii. 50 med. 
 
 Clubs, the, at Athens, viii. 48 
 med., 54 fin., 81 med. [cp. iii. 82 
 med.] 
 
 Cnemus, a Lacedaemonian com¬ 
 mander, ravages Zacynthus, ii. 
 66; invades Acarnania, ib. 80-82; 
 defeated by Phormio, ib. 83, 84; 
 receives Brasidas and two other 
 commissioners from Lacedae¬ 
 mon, ib. 85 init.; second defeat 
 
 of, ib. 86-92; concerts with Brasi¬ 
 das an attack upon the Piraeus, 
 ib. 93, 94. 
 
 Cnidis, father of Xenares, a Lace¬ 
 daemonian, v. 51 fin. 
 
 Cnidus, revolts from Athens, viii. 
 35 init.; attacked by the Athe¬ 
 nians, ib. fin.; the Cnidians per¬ 
 suade Astyochus to attack the 
 Athenians under Charminus, ib. 
 41 fin.; fleet of the Lacedaemo¬ 
 nians assembles at; their commis¬ 
 sioners confer with Tissaphernes, 
 ib. 42-44init. [cp. 52 init.]; Tissa¬ 
 phernes 5 garrison expelled from, 
 ib. 109 init.; Lipara a Cnidian 
 colony, iii. 88 init.; Triopium in 
 Cnidian territory, viii. 35 med. 
 
 Colonae, in the Troad, i. 131 init. 
 
 Colonies, how anciently founded, i. 
 4 init., 24 init.; honours given 
 by colonies to their mother city, 
 ib. 25 fin. [cp. ib. 34, 38]; shares 
 in a colony secured by a deposit, 
 without immediately quitting 
 home, ib. 27 init.; magistrates 
 sent by the mother city, ib. 56 
 fin.; laws given by the mother 
 city, iii. 34 fin. [cp. vi. 4, 5]; 
 foundation of the Lacedaemo¬ 
 nian colony, Heraclea, iii. 92, 
 93; the honours of the founda¬ 
 tion of Amphipolis transferred 
 to Brasidas, v. 11 init.; leaders 
 chosen from the mother city, viii. 
 loomed.; the Hellenic colonies 
 of Sicily, vi. 3-5. 
 
 Colonus, near Athens, Temple of 
 Poseidon at, viii. 67 med. 
 
 Colophon, taken by Paches, iii. 34 
 init.; made an Athenian colony, 
 ib. fin. 
 
 Colophonian Port, near Toron£, v. 
 2 med. 
 
 Columns, an inscription recording 
 the oppression of the tyrants in¬ 
 scribed on a column at Athens, 
 vi. 55 init.; treaties ordered to be 
 inscribed on columns, v. 18, xi; 
 23, iv; 47 fin.; the infraction of 
 the treaty inscribed on the same 
 column by the Athenians, ib. 56 
 med. 
 
 Commanders, speech of the Pelo- 
 ponesian, ii. 87. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 651 
 
 Commissioners, sent by the Lace¬ 
 daemonians as advisers to their 
 officers, ii. 85 init., iii. 69 med., 
 76; v. 63 fin.; viii. 39 init. 
 
 Common places, of speeches at 
 critical moments, vii. 69 med. 
 
 Confederacy, a confederacy lacks a 
 central power, i. 141 fin. 
 
 Conon, an Athenian, governor of 
 Naupactus, vii. 31 med. 
 
 Controversy, Melian, v. 85-113. 
 
 Copae, on Lake Copais, in Boeotia, 
 iv. 93 fin. 
 
 Corcyra, mother city of Epidamnus, 
 i. 24 init.; formerly inhabited by 
 the Phaeacians, ib. 25 fin.; under 
 obligation to Themistocles, but 
 afraid to shelter him, ib. 136 
 init.; its importance, i. 36 fin., 
 44 fin., 68 fin., ii. 7 fin.; the 
 Sicilian expedition musters at 
 Corcyra, vi. 30 init., 32 med., 
 34 med., 42, 43 init.; Demos¬ 
 thenes sails to Corcyra with the 
 reinforcements for Sicily, vii. 26 
 fin.; collects troops there, ib. 31, 
 33 med.; naval engagement be¬ 
 tween the Corinthians and Cor- 
 cyraeans [b.C. 664], ib. 13 med.; 
 the Corcyraeans colonists of the 
 Corinthians, i. 25 med.; their 
 detestation and neglect of their 
 mother city, ib., ib. 38 [cp. vii. 57 
 med.]; they refuse aid to the 
 Epidamnians, i. 24 fin.; besiege 
 Epidamnus, ib. 26; send an 
 embassy to Corinth, ib. 28; con¬ 
 quer the Corinthians at sea, 
 ib. 29; slaughter their prisoners 
 [except the Corinthians] after 
 the battle, ib. 30 init.; send an 
 embassy to Athens, ib. 31; their 
 speech, ib. 32-36; obtain alliance 
 with the Athenians, ib. 44; fight 
 at sea with the aid of the Athe¬ 
 nians against the Corinthians, ib. 
 48-51 ; offer the Corinthians 
 battle, ib. 52; want to kill the 
 Corinthian messengers, ib. 53 
 med.; set up a trophy on Sybota, 
 ib. 54 init.; claim the victory, ib. 
 fin.; driven from Anactorium by 
 the Corinthians, ib. 55 init.; the 
 Corinthians intrigue with their 
 Corcyraean prisoners, ib. med.; 
 
 the Corcyraeans receive an em¬ 
 bassy from Athens, ii. 7 fin.; fur¬ 
 nish the Athenians with ships, ib. 
 9 med., 25 init.; fall into sedition, 
 iii. 69 fin., 70 init.; the prisoners 
 return and promote a revolt from 
 Athens, ib. 70 init.; oligarchs 
 worsted in a law suit by Peithias, 
 ib. med.; they murder him and his 
 partizans, ib. fin.; try to win over 
 the people, ib. 71; on the arrival 
 of a Corinthian trireme they 
 attack and defeat the people, ib. 
 72; receive aid from the main¬ 
 land but cannot induce the slaves 
 to join them by offers of freedom, 
 ib. 73; the people defeat the 
 oligarchs, ib. 74; Nicostratus the 
 Athenian commander tries to 
 effect a reconciliation, ib. 75; 
 on the proposal of the popular 
 leaders five ships are manned 
 from the opposite party, but the 
 crews take sanctuary, ib. med.; 
 the people disarm and remove 
 the others from the temple of 
 Here to an island, ib. fin.; the 
 Corcyraeans and Athenians en¬ 
 gage the Lacedaemonians, and 
 are defeated, ib. 77, 78; replace 
 the prisoners in the temple of 
 Her&, ib. 79 init.; persuade some 
 of the aristocratic party to help 
 to man a fleet, ib. 80; the Lace¬ 
 daemonian fleet retires on the 
 approach of the Athenians, and 
 the people massacre their oppo¬ 
 nents, ib. 81; this massacre the 
 first example of the horrors of re¬ 
 volutionary warfare in Hellas, ib. 
 85 init.; the surviving oligarchs 
 occupy Mount Istone, ib. 85, iv. 
 2 med. ib. 46; the people cap¬ 
 ture Istone, ib. 46 med.; treach¬ 
 erously massacre their prisoners, 
 ib. 46 fin-48; send aid to the 
 Athenians against Syracuse, vii. 
 31 fin., 44 fin., 57 med.; alarm 
 the Athenians at Epipolae by 
 their Dorian Paean, ib. 44 fin. 
 
 Corinth, once inhabited by Aeolians, 
 iv. 42 med.; triremes first built at 
 Corinth, i. 13 init.; an early centre 
 of commerce, ib. med.; d0moV, 
 ib.; its naval power, ib. 36 fin.; 
 
influence of Corinth among the 
 barbarous races of Epirus, ib. 
 47 fin.; naval engagement be¬ 
 tween the Corcyraeans and Co¬ 
 rinthians [b.c. 664], ib. 13 med.; 
 [b.C. 491] the Corinthians lend 
 ships for the Aeginetan war to 
 Athens, ib. 41 init.; [B.C. 461-445] 
 make war upon the Megarians, 
 ib. 103 med.; defeat the Athe¬ 
 nians at Halieis, ib. 105 init.; in¬ 
 vade Megara, ib. 105 med.; are 
 defeated, ib. 105 fin.; suffer great 
 loss, ib. 106 ; assist the Megarians 
 to revolt, ib. 114 med.; [the Pelo¬ 
 ponnesian war] the Corinthians 
 take the Epidamnians under their 
 protection, ib. 25 med.; hatred 
 of, to the Corcyraeans, ib.\ send 
 aid to Epidamnus, ib. 26 init.; 
 and a colony, ib. 27 init.; receive 
 an embassy from Corcyra, ib. 28 ; 
 conquered at sea by the Corcy¬ 
 raeans, ib. 29; send an embassy 
 to Athens, ib. 31 fin.; speech of, 
 ib. 37-43 ; sail against Corcyra, 
 ib. 46 init.; fight at sea with the 
 Corcyraeans, ib. 48-50; retire 
 before the Athenian reinforce¬ 
 ments, ib. 51; hold a parley with 
 the Athenians, ib. 53 ; return 
 home, ib. 54 ; set up a trophy at 
 Sybota, ib. init.; claim the vic¬ 
 tory, ib. med.; on the road cap¬ 
 ture Anactorium, ib. 55 init.; their 
 alliance is sought by Perdiccas, 
 ib. 57 med.; they send troops to 
 Potidaea, ib. 60 [cp. ii. 70 med.]; 
 had a bitter hatred of the Athe¬ 
 nians, i.66, of old, 103 fin.; invite 
 the allies to Sparta, ib. 67 init.; 
 speech of their ambassadors, ib. 
 68-71; urge on the war, ib. 119 
 fin.; second speech of, ib. 120- 
 124 ; furnish the Lacedaemonians 
 with ships, ii. 9 med.; lose Sol- 
 lium, ib. 30 init.; restore Evar- 
 chus, ib. 33 init.; are defeated in 
 Cephallenia, ib. fin.; prepare with 
 others a fleet to assist the Lace¬ 
 daemonian expedition against 
 Acarnania, ib. 80 med.; arriving 
 too late they are attacked and 
 defeated by Phormio, ib. 83, 84 ; 
 suffer a second defeat, ib. 90-92; 
 
 share in the projected surprise of 
 the Piraeus, ib. 93-95 ; induce 
 their Corcyraean prisoners [see 
 i. 55] to attempt an oligarchical 
 revolution at Corcyra, iii. 70 init.; 
 send back an embassy with them, 
 ib ., ib. 74 fin.; refuse to aid the 
 oligarchs in Istone, ib. 85 med.; 
 garrison Ambracia, ib. 114 fin., 
 iv. 42 fin.; repulse an Athenian 
 invasion, iv. 43, 44 ; driven out 
 of Anactorium by the Athenians 
 and Acarnanians, ib. 49 ; receive 
 and aid Brasidas, ib. 70 med., 
 74 init.; join in the one year’s 
 Truce, ib. 119 med.; dissatisfied 
 with the treaty between the Lace¬ 
 daemonians and Athenians, v. 17 
 fin., 25 init., 35 init.; send envoys 
 to Argos, ib. 27 ; the Lacedae¬ 
 monians remonstrate with them, 
 ib. 30; they join the Argive 
 alliance, ib. 31 fin.; apply to the 
 Boeotians, ib. 32 med.; the new 
 Spartan ephors wish them in 
 concert with the Boeotians to 
 bring the Argives into the Lace¬ 
 daemonian alliance, ib. 36 ; the 
 negotiation fails, ib. 38 ; the Co¬ 
 rinthians refuse to join the Athe¬ 
 nian and Argive alliance, ib. 48, 
 50 fin.; prevent the construction 
 of a fort at Rhium by Alcibiades, 
 ib. 52 fin.; the Argives attack 
 Epidaurus hoping by its capture 
 to check the Corinthians, ib. 53 ; 
 a Corinthian envoy attends a 
 conference at Mantinea, ib. 55 ; 
 the Corinthians send a contin¬ 
 gent to meet the Lacedaemonians 
 at Phlius, ib. 57 fin.; engage the 
 Argives, z'A59init.; are too late for 
 Mantinea, ib. 64 med., 75 init.; do 
 not join the Lacedaemonians in 
 an expedition against Argos, ib. 
 83 init.; declare war against the 
 Athenians, ib. 115 med.; again 
 withhold support from a Lace¬ 
 daemonian attack on Argos, vi. 7 
 init.; receive an embassy from 
 Syracuse, ib. 73, 88 med.; vote the 
 Syracusans aid, ib. 88 fin.; send 
 envoys with them to Sparta, ib.\ 
 send ships and troops to Sicily, 
 ib. 93 med., 104 init., vii. 2 init., 
 
INDEX. 653 
 
 4 fin., 7 init., 17 med., 19 med., 31 
 init.; Corinthian ambassadors go 
 from Syracuse to the Sicilian 
 states,vii. 25 fin.; fight at sea with 
 the Athenians, after preparing 
 their fleet in a special manner, 
 ib. 34 ; claim the victory because 
 not severely defeated, ib. fin.; 
 their forces before Syracuse, ib. 
 58 med.; one of their pilots, 
 Ariston, the ablest in the whole 
 fleet, ib. 39 ; their ships fight in 
 the last battle in the harbour, ib. 
 70 init.; the Corinthians said to 
 have instigated the execution of 
 Nicias and Demosthenes, ib. 86 
 fin.; Agis deposits Pthiote Achae¬ 
 an hostages with them, viii. 
 3 med.; the Corinthians contri¬ 
 bute ships to the Lacedaemonian 
 fleet, ib. fin.; the allies meet in 
 conference at Corinth, ib. 8 ; the 
 Corinthians refuse to join the 
 Chian expedition until after the 
 Isthmian Games, ib. 9 init.; the 
 fleet is chased into Peiraeum by 
 the Athenians, ib. 10; the Co¬ 
 rinthians come to assist them, ib. 
 11 init.; the fleet breaks the 
 blockade, ib. 20 init.; the Corin¬ 
 thians discourage a second Les¬ 
 bian revolt, ib. 32 init.; send out 
 five ships to Astyochus, ib. 33 
 init. [cp. 23 fin.]; besiege Oenoe, 
 ib. 98 ; lose five ships at Cynos- 
 sema, ib. 106 med. 
 
 Coroebus, father of Ammeas, a 
 Plataean, iii. 22 med. 
 
 Coronea, in Boeotia, iv. 93 fin.; de¬ 
 feat of the Athenians there, i. 
 113, iii. 62 fin., 67 med., iv. 92 
 fin. 
 
 Coronta, in Acarnania, ii. 102 
 init. 
 
 Corycus, promontory in Erythraea, 
 viii. 14 init., 33 init., 34 init. 
 
 Coryphasium, the Lacedaemonian 
 name of Pylos, iv. 3 med., ib. 118, 
 iii; ordered to be restored under 
 treaty, v. 18, viii. 
 
 Cos Meropis, devastated by an 
 earthquake, viii. 41 med.; ravaged 
 by the Peloponnesians, ib.\ for¬ 
 tified by the Athenians, ib. 108 
 init. [cp. 44 fin., 55 init.] 
 
 Cotyle, a measure of capacity, iv. 
 16 med. [cp. vii. 87 med.] 
 
 Cotyrta, in Laconia, iv. 56 init. 
 
 Councils : Council of 80 at Argos, 
 v. 47 fin.; the Four Councils of 
 the Boeotians, ib. 38 ;—the Coun¬ 
 cil at Athens,viii. 66 init.; formed 
 into one body by Theseus from 
 the Communes, ii. 15 init.; ex¬ 
 pelled by the oligarchs, viii. 69; 
 Alcibiades demands its restora¬ 
 tion, ib. 86 med.; — Council of 
 Elders appointed at Athens, after 
 the defeat before Syracuse, viii. 
 1 fin. 
 
 Counsel, the two things most ad¬ 
 verse to good counsel, iii. 42 init.; 
 wise counsel more formidable to 
 an enemy than over-severity, ib. 
 48 fin. 
 
 Courts, profits derived by the Athe¬ 
 nians from, vi. 91 fin. 
 
 Cranii, in Cephallenia, settlement 
 of the Helots at, v. 35 fin.; their 
 removal to Pylos, ib. 56 med.; 
 Cranians, ii. 30 fin., ib. 33 fin. 
 
 Cranonians, of Thessaly, ii. 22 fin. 
 
 Crataemenes, one of the founders 
 of Zancl£, vi. 4 fin. 
 
 Cratesicles, father of Thrasyme- 
 lidas, a Lacedaemonian,’ iv. 11 
 init. 
 
 Crestonians, in Acte, iv. 109 fin. 
 
 Cretan Sea, the, iv. 53 fin., v. no 
 init. 
 
 Crete, campaign of the Athenians 
 in, ii. 85 fin.; Alcidas caught in a 
 storm off, iii. 69 init.; Cretan and 
 Rhodian origin ofGela, vi. 4 med., 
 vii. 57 med.; Cretan archers, vi. 
 25 fin., 43 fin.; Cretan merce¬ 
 naries in the Athenian army 
 before Syracuse, vii. 57 med. 
 
 Crisaean Gulf, the, i. 107 med., ii. 
 69 init., 83 init.; its mouth, ii. 86 
 init.; Siphae on the Crisaean 
 Gulf, iv. 76 init. 
 
 Crocyleium, in Aetolia, iii. 96 med. 
 
 Croesus, conquered by Cyrus, i. 16. 
 
 Crommyon, near Corinth, iv. 42 fin., 
 44 med., 45 init. 
 
 Crotona, refuses passage to an Athe¬ 
 nian army, vii. 35 med. 
 
 Crusis, in Mygdonia, ii. 79 med. 
 
 Cyclades, colonized by Minos, i. 4 ; 
 
654 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 all subject to Athens, except Melos 
 and Cythera, ii. 9 fin. 
 
 Cyclopes, the, oldest inhabitants of 
 Sicily, vi. 2 init. 
 
 Cydonia, in Crete, ii. 85 fin. 
 
 Cyllen£, the Elean dockyard, i. 30 
 med., ii. 84 fin., 86 init., iii. 69 
 init., 76 init., vi. 88 fin.; burnt by 
 the Corcyraeans, i. 30 med. 
 
 Cylon, the story of, i. 126 init, 
 
 Cymk, in Aeolis, iii. 31 init., viii. 
 22 fin., 31 fin., 100 med.; the Cu- 
 maean territory, viii. 101 med. 
 
 Cym£, in Italy, a colony from Chal- 
 cis in Euboea, vi. 4 fin. 
 
 Cynes, an Acarnanian, ii. 102 init. 
 
 Cynossema, a promontory in the 
 Hellespont, viii. 104 fin., 106 fin.; 
 battle of, ib. 104-106. 
 
 Cynuria, on the border of Argos 
 and Laconia, iv. 56 med.; quar¬ 
 rel between the Lacedaemonians 
 and the Argives respecting, v. 14 
 fin.; stipulation about, in the 
 treaty between the Lacedaemo¬ 
 nians and Argives, ib. 41. 
 
 Cyprus subdued by Pausanias, i. 94, 
 128 med.; attacked by the Athe¬ 
 nians, ib. 104 med., 112 med. 
 
 Cypsela, in Arcadia, v. 33 med. 
 
 Cyrene, i. no init.; Cyrenaeans 
 assist a Lacedaemonian fleet on 
 the way to Syracuse, vii. 50 init. 
 
 Cyrrhus, in Macedonia, ii. loomed. 
 
 Cyrus, king of Persia [father of 
 Cambyses], i. 16; [son of Darius], 
 ii. 65 fin. 
 
 Cythera, inhabited by Lacedaemo¬ 
 nian Perioeci, iv. 53 med.; the 
 ‘Judge of Cythera, 5 zA; import¬ 
 ance of the island, ib. fin.; cap¬ 
 tured by the Athenians, ib. 54 ; 
 the Athenians plunder Laconia 
 from, v. 14 med.; ordered to be 
 restored under treaty, ib. 18, viii; 
 the Cytherians in the Athenian 
 service before Syracuse, vii. 57 
 med. 
 
 Cytinium, in Doris, i. 107 init., iii. 
 95 init., 102 init. 
 
 Cyzicus revolts from Athens, viii. 
 107 init.; retaken, ib. med.; Ti- 
 magoras,a Cyzicene exile in Phar- 
 nabazus 5 service, ib. 6 init., 8 init., 
 39 init. 
 
 D. 
 
 Daimachus, father of Eumolpides, 
 a Plataean, iii. 20 init. 
 
 Damagetus, a Lacedaemonian, 
 swears to the Treaty of Peace 
 and the Alliance, v. 19 med., 
 24 init. 
 
 Damagon, a Lacedaemonian, one 
 of the founders of Heraclea, iii. 
 92 fin. 
 
 Damotimus, a Sicyonian, iv. 119 
 med. 
 
 Danaans, a name for the Hellenes 
 in Homer, i. 3 med. 
 
 Daphnus, near Clazomenae, viii. 23 
 fin., 31 med. 
 
 Dardanus, on the Hellespont, viii. 
 104 init. 
 
 Daric Staters, viii. 28 fin. 
 
 Darius, king of Persia, succeeds 
 Cambyses, i. 14 med.; reduces the 
 islands, ib. 16; Aristagoras of 
 Miletus and Darius, iv. 102 init.; 
 influence of the tyrants of Lamp- 
 sacus with him, vi. 59 med.; 
 Hippias takes refuge with him, 
 ib. fin. 
 
 Darius II, son of Artaxerxes, king 
 of Persia, viii. 5 init., 37, 58 init. 
 
 Dascon, joint founder with Mene- 
 colus of Camarina, vi. 5 med. 
 
 Dascon, near Syracuse, vi. 66 med. 
 
 Dascylium, satrapy of, in Asia 
 Minor, i. 129 init. 
 
 Daulia, an ancient name of a part 
 of Phocis, ii. 29 med.; the ‘ Dau- 
 lian bird, 5 ib. 
 
 Death, the penalty of, proved by 
 experience to be no deterrent, 
 iii. 45- 
 
 Decelea, fortification of, suggested 
 by Alcibiades, vi. 91 med.; vii. 
 18 init.; determined on and car¬ 
 ried out by the Lacedaemonians, 
 vi. 93 init., vii. 18 fin., 19 init.; 
 terrible mischief thus occasioned 
 to the Athenians, ib. 27, 28; 
 Agis at Decelea, viii. 4 fin.; the 
 occupation of Decelea causes the 
 whole Athenian population to be 
 on service, ib. 69 init.; the 400 
 send heralds to Agis there, ib. 70 
 fin.; Agis marches from Decelea 
 to Athens, ib. 71 init.; returns, 
 
INDEX. 
 
 655 
 
 ib. fin.; the 400 resume negotia¬ 
 tions with Agis there, ib.; Corin¬ 
 thian troops in the garrison, ib. 
 98 med. 
 
 Deiniadas, a Chian commander, 
 viii. 22 fin. 
 
 Deinias, father of Cleippides, an 
 Athenian, iii. 3 med. 
 
 Delium, a temple of Apollo, near 
 Tanagra, iv. 76 med.; fortified 
 by the Athenians, ib. 90: cap¬ 
 tured by the Boeotians, ib. 100; 
 battle of, ib. 93-96 ; effect of their 
 defeat upon the Athenians, v. 14 
 init., 15 fin.; the Boeotians charge 
 the Athenians with sacrilege for 
 occupying it, ib. 97, 98. 
 
 Delos, iii. 29, viii. 77, 80 med., 86 
 init.; purified by Pisistratus, iii. 
 104 init.; purified by the Athe¬ 
 nians, i. 8 init., iii. 104 init.; 
 second purification of, v. 1 ; the 
 first treasury of the Athenian Al¬ 
 liance, i. 96 fin.; earthquake in, 
 ii. 8 med.; ancient games at, iii. 
 104 med.; restored by the Athe¬ 
 nians, ib. fin.; the Delians settled 
 at Adramyttium, v. 1 fin., viii. 
 108 fin.; restored by the Athe¬ 
 nians, v. 32 init.; treacherous 
 massacre of those at Adramyt¬ 
 tium by the Persians, viii. 108 
 fin. 
 
 Delphi, temple of, v. 18, xi; hand¬ 
 ed over by the Lacedaemonians 
 to the Delphians, i. 112 fin.; by 
 the Athenians to the Phocians, 
 ib.; provision respecting, in the 
 treaty between the Lacedaemo¬ 
 nians and Athenians, v. 18, ii; 
 spoils sent to, iv. 134 med.; al¬ 
 leged corruption of the priestess 
 by Pleistoanax, v. 16 med.; trea¬ 
 sury of, i. 121 med., ib. 143 init.; 
 tripod of, i. 132 init., iii. 57 med. 
 
 Delphian Oracle, see Oracle. 
 
 Delphinium, in Chios, fortified by 
 the Athenians, viii. 38 init., 40 
 fin. 
 
 Demaratus, an Athenian com¬ 
 mander, vi. 105 fin. 
 
 Demarchus, a Syracusan general, 
 viii. 85 fin. 
 
 Demeas, father of Philocrates, an 
 Athenian, v. 116 fin. 
 
 Demiurgi, the, a magistracy at 
 Mantinea, v. 47 fin.; at Elis, ib. 
 
 Democracy, the democracy every¬ 
 where the friend of Athens, iii. 
 47 init., 82 init.; Pericles 5 de¬ 
 scription of the Athenian demo¬ 
 cracy, ii. 37-40 ; Cleon’s, iii. 37 
 foil.; Diodotus 5 , iii. 42 foil.; the 
 people the best judges of a 
 matter, ii. 40 init., vi. 39 ; de¬ 
 mocracies manageable enough 
 when under the influence of ter¬ 
 ror, viii. 1 fin.; the weaknesses 
 of a democracy, ii. 65 init., iii. 
 37., vi. 89 med.; democracy more 
 stable than oligarchy, viii. 89 fin. 
 
 Demodocus, an Athenian general, 
 iv. 75 init. 
 
 Demosthenes, commands an expe¬ 
 dition round Peloponnese, iii. 91 
 init.; ravages Leucas, ib. 94 
 init.; invades Aetolia, ib. fin.- 
 98 ; retires to Naupactus after 
 his failure, ib. 98 fin.; saves Nau¬ 
 pactus, ib. 102 med.; takes com¬ 
 mand of the Acarnanians against 
 the Ambraciots, ib. 105 med. [cp. 
 vii. 57 fin.]; defeats the Am¬ 
 braciots, iii. 107-m; destroys 
 the Ambraciot reinforcements, 
 ib. 112, 113; returns to Athens, 
 ib. 114 init.; sent on a special 
 commission, iv. 2 fin.; fortifies 
 Pylos, ib. 3-5 ; prepares to meet 
 the Lacedaemonians, ib. 9; 
 speech of, ib. 10: repulses the 
 Lacedaemonians, ib. 11, 12 ; se¬ 
 lected by Cleon as his col¬ 
 league, ib. 29 init.; plans and 
 executes an attack on Sphac- 
 teria, ib. 29-37 ; forces the La¬ 
 cedaemonians to surrender, ib. 
 38 ; attempts Megara, ib. 66-68; 
 captures Nisaea, ib. 69 ; plans 
 an invasion of Boeotia, ib. 76, 77; 
 failure of the attempt, ib. 89 init.; 
 invades Sicyonia, ib. 101 med.; 
 swears to the Treaty of Peace 
 and the Alliance, v. 19 fin., 24 
 med.; sent to Epidaurus, ib. 80 
 fin.; chosen as a colleague of Ni- 
 cias, vii. 16 fin., 20 ; ravages the 
 Laconian coast and fortifies an 
 isthmus there on his way, ib. 26; 
 meets Eurymedon at Corcyra 
 
INDEX. 
 
 656 
 
 and sends reinforcements to 
 Naupactus, ib. 31 ; holds a re¬ 
 view at Thurii, ib. 33 fin.; arrives 
 at Syracuse, ib. 42 init.; resolves 
 to strike a blow at once, ib. 42 
 med.; fails in a night attack on 
 Epipolae, ib. 43-45 ; votes in a 
 council of war for immediate 
 departure, ib. 47 ; when Nicias 
 resists, proposes moving the 
 camp, ib. 49 ; commands in the 
 last sea fight, ib. 69-71 fin.; 
 anxious to renew the engage¬ 
 ment, ib. 72 ; commands one 
 division in the retreat, vii. 78 foil.; 
 overtaken and compelled to sur¬ 
 render, ib. 81, 82; put to death by 
 the Syracusans, ib. 86. 
 
 Demoteles, a Locrian commander, 
 iv. 25 fin. 
 
 Dercyllidas, a Spartan, sent to the 
 Hellespont, viii. 61 init.; effects 
 the revolt of Abydos and Lamp- 
 sacus, ib. 62. 
 
 Derdas, a Macedonian, i. 57 init., 
 
 59 fin - 
 
 Dersaeans, a Thracian tribe, ii. 101 
 med. 
 
 Desertion of slaves, injury caused 
 by, vii. 27 fin., viii. 40 med. 
 
 Deucalion, father of Hellen, i. 3 init. 
 
 Diacritus, father of Melesippus, a 
 Spartan, ii. 12 init. 
 
 Diagoras, father of Dorieus, a Thu- 
 rian, viii. 35 init. 
 
 Diasia, the festival of Zeus the 
 Gracious, at Athens, i. 126 med. 
 
 Diathus, a Lacedaemonian, swears 
 to the Treaty of Peace and the 
 Alliance, v. 19 med., ib. 24 init. 
 
 Dictidians, in Mt. Athos, v. 35 init. 
 
 Didyme, one of the Aeolian islands, 
 iii. 88 med. 
 
 Diemporus, a Theban Boeotarch, 
 ii. 2 med. 
 
 Dii, a Thracian tribe, ii. 96 med., 
 98 fin.; come too late to Athens 
 to join Demosthenes’ expedition 
 to Sicily, vii. 27 init.; on their way 
 back sack Mycalessus, ib. 29, 30. 
 
 Diitrephes, father of Nicostratus, an 
 Athenian, iii. 75 init., iv. 53 init., 
 119; another leads a number of 
 Thracian mercenaries home, vii. 
 29, 30. 
 
 Diodotus, an Athenian, opposes the 
 slaughter of the Mitylenaeans, 
 iii. 41; his speech, ib. 42-48. 
 
 Diomedon, an Athenian com¬ 
 mander, viii. 19 med.; popular 
 with the people, ib. 73 med.; 
 makes agreement with the Teans, 
 ib. 20 fin.; fails to capture Erae, 
 ib.; regains Lesbos which had 
 revolted, ib. 23 ; carries on war 
 successfully against Chios, ib. 24 
 med.; appointed with Leon to 
 the chief command at Samos, 
 ib. 54 med.; makes a descent 
 upon Rhodes, ib. 55 init.; aids 
 the democratic reaction at Samos, 
 ib. 73 fin. 
 
 Diomilus, an Andrian exile, vi. 96 
 fin.; made commander of a chosen 
 body of Syracusan troops, ib.; 
 slain in battle, ib. 97 fin. 
 
 Dionysia, the ancient, ii. 15 med.; 
 the City Dionysia, v. 20 init., 
 23> iv. 
 
 Dionysus, temple of, ‘ in the 
 Marshes,’ ii. 15 med.; temple of, 
 at Corcyra, iii. 81 fin.; theatre of, 
 near Munychia, viii. 93 init., fin., 
 94 init. 
 
 Dioscuri, temple of the, at Athens, 
 viii. 93 init.; at Corcyra, iii. 75 
 med.; at Toron6. iv. no init. 
 
 Diotimus, son of Strombichus, an 
 Athenian commander, i. 45 ; fa¬ 
 ther ofStrombichides, viii. 15 med. 
 
 Diotrephes, an Athenian com¬ 
 mander, sent to take command 
 in Chalcidic£, viii. 64 init.; puts 
 down the democracy in Thasos, 
 ib. [? Diitrephes, supr.] 
 
 Diphilus, an Athenian commander, 
 vii. 34 med. 
 
 Dium, in Macedonia, iv. 78 fin. 
 
 Dium, in Mount Athos, iv. 109 ; re¬ 
 volts from the Athenians, v. 82 
 init. 
 
 Divers, employed at Sphacteria, iv. 
 26 fin.; and at Syracuse, vii. 25 
 med. 
 
 Doberus, in Paeonia, ii. 98 med., 
 99 init., 100 init. 
 
 Dockyard, the Lacedaemonian [Gy- 
 thium], burnt by the Athenians, 
 i. 108 fin. 
 
 Dolopes, in Thessaly, v. 51 init. 
 
INDEX. 657 
 
 Dolopes, the old inhabitants of 
 Scyros, i. 98 init. 
 
 Dolopians, in Epirus, ii. 102 init. 
 
 Dolphins, leaden, i.e. heavy weights 
 used to sink an enemy’s ship, vii. 
 41 init. 
 
 Dorcis, a Lacedaemonian, sent out 
 to succeed Pausanias in his com¬ 
 mand, i. 95 fin. 
 
 Dorians, attack Corinth, iv. 42 med.; 
 conquer the Peloponnesus, i. 12 
 med.; colonize Lacedaemon, ib. 
 18 init., 107 init., iii. 92 init.; 
 attacked by the Phocians, i. 107 
 init.; contrasted with Ionians, ib. 
 124 init., v. 9 init., vi. 77 med., 
 80 fin., 82 init., vii. 5 fin., 57 
 init. and med., viii. 25 med.; 
 hold the month Carneus sacred, 
 v. 54 med.; opposed to Dorians 
 in the siege of Syracuse, vii. 57 
 med.; Dorians in Asia, Athenian 
 subjects, ii. 9 fin.; Dorians in 
 Sicily, vi. 4, 5, 77 med.; allies of 
 the Syracusans, iii. 86 init., iv. 
 61 med., 64 med., vi. 6 med., 80 
 fin., vii. 58 init.; Dorian dialect 
 spoken by the Messenians, iii. 
 112 med., iv. 41 med.; mixed with 
 Chalcidian at Himera, vi. 5 init.; 
 Dorian Paean, alarm caused by 
 the Paeans of their Dorian allies 
 to the Athenians at the attack 
 on Epipolae, vii. 44 fin. 
 
 Dorieus, of Rhodes, twice conqueror 
 at Olympia, iii. 8. 
 
 Dorieus, sent out in command of 
 ten Thurian ships, viii. 35 init.; 
 threatened with violence by As- 
 tyochus, ib. 84 init. 
 
 Dorus, a Thessalian, iv. 78 init. 
 
 Drabescus, in Thrace, Athenian 
 colonists slaughtered there by 
 the Thracians, i. 100 fin., iv. 102 
 med. 
 
 Drachmae, Aeginetan, v. 47, iv; 
 Attic, one Attic drachma paid 
 each day per man by Tissapher- 
 nes, viii. 29 init.; the Athenians 
 paid but half a drachma, ib. 45 
 init.; Corinthian, i. 27 init. 
 
 Droans, a Thracian tribe, ii. 101 
 med. 
 
 Droughts during the Peloponnesian 
 War, i. 23 med, 
 
 Drymussa, an island off Clazome- 
 nae, viii. 31 fin. 
 
 Dryopes, Carystus in Euboea in¬ 
 habited by, vii. 57 init. 
 
 Dryoscephalae, in Boeotia, iii. 24 
 init. 
 
 Dym£, in Achaia, ii. 84 med. and fin. 
 
 E. 
 
 Earth, { the whole earth is the 
 sepulchre of famous men,’ ii. 43 
 med. 
 
 Earth, Temple of, at Athens, ii. 15 
 med. 
 
 Earthquakes, frequency of, during 
 the Peloponnesian War, i. 23 med.; 
 great earthquake before the siege 
 of Ithom£, i: 101 init., 128 init., 
 iii. 54 fin.; at Delos, ii. 8 med.; in 
 the fifth year of the war, iii. 87 fin., 
 89 init.; the probable cause of 
 an extraordinary ebb and flow 
 of the sea, ib. 89 ; Lacedaemo¬ 
 nian expeditions stopped by, ib. 
 89 init., vi. 95 init.; at the be¬ 
 ginning of the eighth year of 
 the War, iv. 52 init.; assemblies 
 interrupted by, v. 45 fin., 50 fin.; 
 earthquakes at Athens, ib. 45 
 fin.; at Corinth, ib. 50 fin.; at 
 Cleonae, vi. 95 init.; at Sparta, 
 viii. 6 fin.; at Cos, ib. 41 med.; 
 the Lacedaemonians supersede 
 an admiral because of an earth- 
 
 , quake, ib. 6 fin. 
 
 Eccritus,a Spartan commander, vii. 
 19 med. 
 
 Echecratides, king of Thessaly, i. 
 
 . iii init. 
 
 Echetimidas, father of Taurus, a 
 Lacedaemonian, iv. 119 init. 
 
 Echinades, islands at the mouth of 
 the Achelous, ii. 102 med. 
 
 Eclipses of the sun, ii. 28, iv. 52 
 init.; great number of,during the 
 Peloponnesian War, i. 23 med.; 
 only occur at the new moon, ii. 
 28 [cp. iv. 52]; eclipse of the 
 moon, vii. 50 fin. 
 
 Edoni, iv. 109 fin.; old inhabitants 
 of Amphipolis, i. 100 fin., iv. 102 
 med.; drive out Aristagoras of 
 Miletus, iv. 102 init.; destroy the 
 Athenian settlers, ib.\ expelled 
 
 U u 
 
6 5 8 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 by the Macedonians from Myg- 
 donia, ii. 99 med.; Myrcinus, an 
 Edonian town, iv. 107 fin.; Pit- 
 tacus, king of the Edonians, ib. ; 
 Brasidas summons their whole 
 forces, v. 6 med. 
 
 Eetioneia, part of the Piraeus, 
 fortified by the oligarchs, viii. 90 
 med., 91 med., 92 init.; destroyed 
 by the soldiers at the instigation 
 of Theramenes, ib. 92. 
 
 Egesta, Trojan origin of, vi. 2 init., 
 
 vii. 57 fin.; Egesteans at war with 
 Selinus, vi. 6 med.; send envoys 
 to Athens, ib.; deceive the Athe¬ 
 nians about their wealth, ib. 8 
 init., 46 ; their cavalry aid the 
 Athenians to capture Hyccara, 
 ib. 62 med.; they supply the Athe¬ 
 nians with thirty talents, ib.\ the 
 Athenians send to them for 
 horses, ib. 88 med. [cp. 98 init.]; 
 the Egestaeans furnish the Athe¬ 
 nians with cavalry, ib. 98 init. 
 
 Egypt revolts from the King, i. 104 
 init.; subdued by the Persians, 
 ib. 109,110; destruction of the 
 Athenian reinforcements in, ib. 
 
 . 110 fin.; third Athenian fleet sent 
 to Egypt without results, ib. 112 
 med.; visited by the plague, ii. 
 48 init.; Egyptians in the fens 
 most warlike, i. no med.; Egypt¬ 
 ian body-guard of Pausanias, ib. 
 130 init.; Egyptian vessels at 
 Cythera, iv. 53 fin.; at Triopium, 
 
 viii. 35 med. 
 
 Eidomene, in Macedonia, ii. 100 
 med. 
 
 Eighty, Council of, at Argos, v. 47 fin. 
 
 Eion, in Chalcidict;, a colony of 
 Mende, iv. 7. 
 
 Eion, upon the Strymon, iv. 50 init., 
 108 init., v. 6-12 ; taken by the 
 Athenians, i. 98 init., iv. 102 fin.; 
 saved by Thucydides, iv. 106 fin., 
 107 init.; Artaphernes, a Persian 
 envoy to Sparta, captured by the 
 Athenians there, ib. 50 init. 
 
 Elaeus, in the Thracian Cherson- 
 nese, viii. 102, 103, 107 fin. 
 
 Elaphebolion, a month at Athens, 
 iv. 118 fin., v. 19 init. 
 
 Eleatis, part of Thesprotia, i. 46 
 med. 
 
 Eleus \cil. Leros], viii. 27 init. 
 
 Eleusinium, a temple at Athens, ii. 
 
 17 init. 
 
 Eleusis, in Attica, i. 114 fin., ii. 19 
 med., 20 init., 21 init., iv. 68 
 med.; war of the Eleusinians 
 with Erechtheus, ii. 15 init. 
 
 Elimiots, a Macedonian tribe, ii. 99 
 init. 
 
 Elis, ii. 25 med., 66 init.; Eleans 
 furnish the Corinthians with 
 ships, i. 27 fin., 46 init.; the Cor- 
 cyraeans burn their dockyard at 
 Cyllene, ib. 30 med.; supply a 
 naval contingent to the Lacedae¬ 
 monian confederacy, ii. 9 med.; 
 defeated by the Athenians, ib. 
 25 med.; dissatisfied with the 
 treaty between the Lacedaemo¬ 
 nians and Athenians, v. 17 fin.; 
 join the Argive alliance, ib. 31 
 init.; quarrel with the Lacedae¬ 
 monians about Lepreum, ib. med.; 
 make an alliance with Athens, 
 ib. 43 fin., 44 med., 46 fin., 47 ; ex¬ 
 clude the Lacedaemonians from 
 the Olympic games, v. 49, 50; 
 aid the Argives, ib. 58 init.; go 
 home, on the other allies refusing 
 to attack Lepreum, ib. 62 ; aid 
 the Mantineans against Epidau- 
 rus, ib. 75 fin.; the Argives desert 
 them, ib. 78 ; Teutiaplus, an 
 Elean in Alcidas 5 army, iii. 29 
 fin. 
 
 Ellomenus, in Leucadia, iii. 94 init. 
 
 Elymi, a partly Trojan race in 
 Sicily, vi. 2 med. 
 
 Embatum, near Erythrae, iii. 29 
 fin., 32 init. 
 
 Empedias,aLacedaemonian, swears 
 to the Treaty of Peace and the 
 Alliance, v. 19 med., 24 init. 
 
 Empire, the three things most fatal 
 to, iii. 40 init.; an empire cannot 
 be cut down like a household, vi. 
 
 18 med.; an empire once gained 
 cannot be abandoned, i. 75, ii. 63 ; 
 those who seek empire always 
 arouse hatred, i. 76, ii. 64 fin., 
 iii. 37 init. 
 
 Endius, envoy to Athens, v. 44 fin.; 
 Ephor at Sparta, viii. 6 med.; an 
 hereditary friend of Alcibiades, ib .; 
 persuaded by Alcibiades not to 
 
INDEX . 659 
 
 r' give up the expedition to Chios, 
 zb. 12. 
 
 Enemies, great enemies more read- 
 
 • ily forgiven than small ones, iv. 
 19 fin. [cp. v. 91 init.]; complais¬ 
 ance to an enemy a mistake, i. 
 34 fin.; men neglect their own 
 interests when attacking an ene¬ 
 my, ib. 41 fin. 
 
 Engines, battering, used at the 
 siege of Plataea, ii. 76 med.; en¬ 
 gine to set fire to a wooden wall 
 used at Delium, iv. 100; at Le- 
 cythus, zA 115 med. 
 
 Enipeus, a river of Thessaly, iv. 78 
 med. 
 
 Enmity,best reconciled by generous 
 treatment, iv. 19 med. 
 
 Ennea Hodoi, see Amphipolis and 
 Nine Ways. 
 
 Enneacrounos, a fountain at Athens, 
 ii. 15 fin. 
 
 Enomoties, the smallest division in 
 the Lacedaemonian army, v. 68. 
 
 Entimus, joint founder with Anti- 
 phemus of Gela, vi. 4 med. 
 
 Envy, does not follow the dead, ii. 
 45 med. 
 
 Eordia, a region of Macedonia, ii. 
 99 fin. 
 
 Ephesus, Themistocles reaches 
 Ephesus in his flight, i. 137 med.; 
 Alcidas at Ephesus, iii. 32 init., 
 33 init.; Athenian ambassadors 
 to the King return thence, iv. 
 50 fin.; a Chian ship chased by 
 the Athenians escapes to Ephe¬ 
 sus, viii. 19 med.; Tissaphernes 
 sacrifices to Artemis at Ephesus, 
 ib. 109 fin.; Ionian festival at 
 Ephesus, iii. 104 med. 
 
 Ephors, at Sparta; their powers, i. 87 
 init., 131 fin.; Sthenelaidas, ib. 
 85 fin.; Aenesias, ii. 2 init.; Pleis- 
 tolas, v. 19 init.; Cleobulus, ib. 36 
 init.,37init.; Xenares,z'A; Endius, 
 viii. 6 med.; Alexippidas, ib. 58 
 init. 
 
 Ephyre, in Thesprotia, i. 46 med. 
 
 Epicles, father of Proteas, an Ather 
 nian, i. 45 med., ii. 23 med. 
 
 Epicles, a Lacedaemonian general, 
 viii. 107 fin. 
 
 Epicurus, father of Paches, an 
 Athenian, iii. 18 fin. 
 
 Epicydidas, a Laced&emoniah gene¬ 
 ral, v. 12. 
 
 Epidamnus, a colony of the Corcy- 
 raeans, i. 24 init.; situation of, 
 ib. 26 fin.; the Epidamnians seek 
 aid from Corcyra, ib. 24 fin.; are re¬ 
 fused, ib .; ordered by the Oracle to 
 apply to Corinth, ib. 25 init.; re¬ 
 ceive colonists from .Corinth, ib. 
 26 init.; are besieged by the 
 Corcyraeans, ib. fin.; surrender 
 their city, ib. 29 fin.; the affair 
 of Epidamnus one of the avowed 
 causes of the Peloponnesian War, 
 ib. 23 fin., 146 ; the Corcyraean 
 prisoners taken in it won over by 
 the Corinthians, iii. 70. 
 
 Epidaurus, its territory ravaged by 
 the Athenians, ii. 56 med. [cp. vi. 
 31 init.]; again, iv. 45 ; adjoins the 
 Corinthian, viii. 10 fin.; attacked 
 by Argos, v. 53, 54 fin., 55 fin., 56 
 fin.; garrisoned by the Lacedae¬ 
 monians, ib. 56 init.; a Pelopon¬ 
 nesian fleet anchors there, viii, 
 92 med., 94 med.; besieged by 
 the Argive allies, ib. 75 fin.; the 
 Argives agree by treaty to eva¬ 
 cuate Epidaurus, ib. 76, ii, iv ; the 
 Athenians evacuate Epidaurus, 
 ib. 80 ; Epidaurians defeated by 
 the Athenians at Halieis, i. 105 ; 
 assist the Megarians to revolt, ib. 
 
 114 med.; furnish a convoy to 
 Corinth, zA 27 fin.; invade Argos, 
 v. 75 med.; supply ships to the 
 Lacedaemonian navy, viii. 3 fin. 
 
 Epidaurus Limera, in Laconia, iv. 
 56 med., vi. 105 fin., vii. 18 med., 
 26 init. 
 
 Epipolae, situation and importance 
 of, vi. 96, vii. 2 ; captured by the 
 Athenians, vi. 97 ; fortified, ib. 
 ioiinit.; unsuccessfully attacked 
 by the Syracusans, ib. 102 ; Gy- 
 lippus enters Syracuse by way 
 of, vii. 1, 2 ; the Syracusans de¬ 
 feated there, ib. 5 ; the Syracu¬ 
 sans defeat the Athenians and 
 carry their cross wall past the 
 Athenian wall on Epipolae, ib. 
 
 6 ; night engagement upon, ib. 
 
 43 - 45 . . . 
 
 Epirus, Epirot tribes join the 
 expedition of Cnemus, ii. 80 fin. 
 
 U u 2 
 
66 o 
 
 INDEX . 
 
 Epitadas, the Spartan commander 
 in Sphacteria, iv. 8 fin., 31 med., 
 33 init., 39 med.; death of, ib. 38 
 init. 
 
 Erae, in the territory of Teos, re¬ 
 volts from Athens, viii. 19 fin.; 
 unsuccessfully attacked by the 
 Athenians, ib. 20 fin. 
 
 Erasinides, a Corinthian com¬ 
 mander, vii. 7 init. 
 
 Erasistratus, father of Phaeax, an 
 Athenian, v. 4 init. 
 
 Eratocleides, father of Phalius, a 
 Corinthian, i. 24 init. 
 
 Erechtheus, king of Athens, ii. 15 
 init. 
 
 Eresus, strengthened by the re¬ 
 volted Lesbians, iii. 18 init.; cap¬ 
 tured by Paches, ib. 35 init.; 
 Astyochus goes there and raises 
 a revolt, viii. 23 med.; again re¬ 
 volts, ib. 100 med.; besieged by 
 the Athenians, ib. fin., 101 init., 
 103 med. 
 
 Eretria, war of the Eretrians with 
 the Chalcidians, i. 15 fin.; subject 
 to Athens, vii. 57 init.; betray 
 Oropus to the Boeotians, viii. 60 
 init.; the Eretrians go to Rhodes 
 and ask assistance from the 
 Lacedaemonians, ib. med.; aid 
 the Peloponnesians to defeat the 
 Athenians at sea, ib. 95 ; Mend£, 
 an Eretrian colony, iv. 123 init. 
 
 Erineum, in Doris, i. 107 init. 
 
 Erineus, in Achaia, vii. 34 init., 
 fin. 
 
 Erineus, river in Sicily, vii. 80 fin., 
 82 fin. 
 
 Eruption of Aetna, iii. 116; of 
 Hiera, in the Lipari islands, ib. 
 88 med. 
 
 Erythrae, in Boeotia, iii. 24 med. 
 
 Erythrae, in Ionia, iii. 33 med.; re¬ 
 volts from Athens, viii. 5, 6, 14 
 med.; the Erythraeans assist in 
 the revolt of Teos, ib. 16 med.; 
 the Athenians hold two forts in 
 the Erythraean territory, ib. 24 
 init.; Pedaritus sails from Eryth¬ 
 rae for Chios, ib. 28 fin., 32 med.; 
 Astyochus, narrowly escaping the 
 Athenians, returns thither from 
 Corycus, ib. 33 ; trick of certain 
 Erythraean prisoners, ib. 
 
 Eryx, in Sicily, vi. 2 med.; temple 
 of Aphrodite there, ib. 4*6 
 med. 
 
 Eryxidaidas, father of Philochari- 
 das, a Lacedaemonian, iv. 119 
 med. 
 
 Eteonicus, a Lacedaemonian com¬ 
 mander, viii. 23 med. 
 
 Euboea, Carystus revolts, the other 
 Euboeans remain quiet, i. 98; 
 Euboea revolts from Athens, ib. 
 114 init.; is subdued, ib. fin. [cp. 
 23 fin.], iv. 92 med., vi. 76, 84 ; 
 the Athenians remove their flocks 
 to Euboea before the Pelopon¬ 
 nesian invasion, ii. 14 ; the Athe¬ 
 nians take precautions for the 
 safety of Euboea, ib. 26 [cp. iii. 
 17 init.], viii. 1 fin.; plundered by 
 Locrian pirates, ii. 32 fin.; the 
 Lacedaemonians form designs 
 upon Euboea, iii. 92, 93 ; the 
 Euboeans negotiate with Agis 
 about a fresh revolt, viii. 4 [cp. 
 60 init.]; all Euboea, except Oreus, 
 revolts, ib. 95 fin.; Athens sup¬ 
 plied from, vii. 28 init.,viii. 96 init.; 
 effect of its loss on the Athenians, 
 viii. 95 init., 96 init.; Hestiaea 
 colonized by the Athenians, vii. 
 57 init. ; the thirty years’ peace 
 after the taking of Euboea, i. 
 23 fin., 146 ; earthquakes in Eu¬ 
 boea, iii. 87, 89 init. 
 
 Eubulus, a Chian (?) commander, 
 viii. 23 med. 
 
 Eucleides, one of the founders of 
 Himera, vi. 5 init. 
 
 Eucles, an Athenian general, iv. 
 104 med. 
 
 Eucles, a Syracusan general, vi. 
 103 fin. 
 
 Eucrates, father of Diodotus, an 
 Athenian, iii. 41. 
 
 Euctemon, an Athenian com¬ 
 mander, viii. 30. 
 
 Euetion, an Athenian general, un¬ 
 successfully attacks Amphipolis, 
 vii. 9. 
 
 Eumachus, a Corinthian com¬ 
 mander, ii. 33 med. 
 
 Eumolpidae, their protest against 
 the return of Alcibiades, viii. 53 
 med. 
 
 Eumolpides, a Plataean, iii. 20 init. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 66 X 
 
 Eupajdas, father of Amphias, an 
 Epidaurian, iv. 119 fin. 
 
 Eupalium, a town in Ozolian Locris, 
 
 iii. 96 med., 102 init. 
 
 Euphamidas, a Corinthian, ii. 33 
 
 init., iv. 119 med., v. 55 init. 
 
 Euphemus, an Athenian envoy, vi. 
 7 5 hn.; speech of, at Camarina, 
 ib. 82-88. 
 
 Euphiletus, father of Charoeades, 
 an Athenian, iii. 86 init. 
 
 Euripides, father of Xenophon, an 
 Athenian, ii. 70 init., 79 init. 
 
 Euripus, the, strait between Eu¬ 
 boea and the mainland,vii. 29 init. 
 
 Europus, in Macedonia, ii. loomed. 
 
 Eurybatus, a Corcyraean com¬ 
 mander, i. 47 init. 
 
 Euryelus, the highest point of 
 Epipolae, vi. 97 med., vii. 2 med., 
 43 med. 
 
 Eurylochus, commands a Lacedae¬ 
 monian expedition against Nau- 
 pactus, iii. 100 ; subdues Lo¬ 
 cris, ib. 101; fails to take Nau- 
 pactus, ib. 102 init.; retires to 
 Aeolis, ib. med.; joins the Am- 
 braciots at Olpae, ib. 106 ; de¬ 
 feated, ib. 107, 108 ; his death, ib. 
 109 init. 
 
 Eurymachus, a Theban, the chief 
 agent in the surprise of Plataea, 
 ii. 2 med.; killed by the Plataeans, 
 ib. 5 fin. 
 
 Eurymedon, river in Pamphylia, de¬ 
 feat of the Persians there, i. 100 
 init. 
 
 Eurymedon, an Athenian com¬ 
 mander, brings an Athenian fleet 
 to Corcyra, iii. 80 fin.; commands 
 in Boeotia, ib. 91 med.; sent with 
 
 . a fleet to Sicily, ib. 115 fin., iv. 2 
 med., 46 init., 47; summoned by 
 Demosthenes to his aid at Pylos, 
 
 iv. 8 init.; conduct of, at Corcyra, 
 ib. 46 ; fined by the Athenians, 
 ib. 65 med.; sent to Sicily as a 
 colleague of Nicias, vii. 16 fin.; 
 meets Demosthenes at Corcyra, 
 ib. 31 med.; commands under 
 Demosthenes in the attack on 
 Epipolae, ib. 43 med.; supports 
 Demosthenes against Nicias in 
 the council of war, ib. 49 fin.; 
 falls in a sea fight, ib.. .52* 
 
 Eurystheus, slain in Attica by the 
 Heraclidae, i. 9 med. 
 
 Eurytanians, an Aetolian tribe,, iii. 
 94 fin. 
 
 Eurytimus, father of Archetimus, a 
 Corinthian, i. 29 init. 
 
 Eustrophus, an Argive envoy, v. 40 
 fin. 
 
 Euthycles, father of Xenocleides, a 
 Corinthian, i. 46 init., iii. 114 fin. 
 
 Euthydemus, an Athenian, swears to 
 the Treaty of Peace and the Alli¬ 
 ance, v. 19 fin., 24 med.; joined with 
 Nicias in command before Syra¬ 
 cuse, vii. 16 init.; commands un¬ 
 der Demosthenes in the last sea 
 fight, ib. 69 fin. 
 
 Euxine, the, ii. 96 init., 97 fin. 
 
 Execestus, father of Sicanus, a 
 Syracusan, vi. 73. 
 
 Evalas, a Spartan commander, viii. 
 22 fin. 
 
 Evarchus, driven from Astacus by 
 the Athenians, ii. 30 med.; re¬ 
 stored by the Corinthians, ib. 
 33 mit. 
 
 Evarchus, founder of Catana, vi. 
 3 fin. 
 
 Evenus, a river in Aetolia, ii. 83 
 med. 
 
 Evesperi.tae, in Libya, vii. 50 init. 
 
 Exiles, the faults of, vi. 12 init. 
 
 Expediency and justice, i. 36, 42. 
 init., 76, iii. 40 med., 44, 56, 82 
 fin., v. 90, 98,107. 
 
 F. 
 
 Famines, famine in Cyprus, i. 112 
 med.; during the war,i. 23 med.; 
 in Potidaea during the siege, ii. 
 70 init.; in Corcyra, iv. 2 fin.; in 
 Plataea,iii. 52 init., med.; famine, 
 the most miserable of deaths, iii. 
 59 fin. 
 
 Fear, renders skill useless, 11. 87 
 med.; the only solid basis of 
 alliance, iii. 11 init., 12 init. 
 
 Festivals, of Zeus ‘the Gracious/ 
 i. 126 med.; the Synoecia at 
 Athens, ii. 15 med.; the Dionysia 
 at Athens, ib. v. 23, iv ; of Apollo 
 Maloeis at Mitylen&, iii. 3 med.; 
 the Hyacinthia at Sparta, v. 23, 
 iv; ib. 41 fin.; the Great Pana- 
 
£ 6 % 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 thenaea at Athens, ib. 47 fin., vi. 
 56 med.; the Gymnopaediae at 
 Sparta, v. 82 init.; the Carnea at 
 Sparta, ib. 54 med., 75 med., 76 
 init.; Heracles at Syracuse, vii. 
 73 med.; rigid observance of 
 festivals by the Lacedaemonians, 
 iv. 5 init., v. 54, 82 init. 
 
 Fines, Pericles fined, ii. 65 init.; 
 fines imposed on members of 
 the oligarchical party at Cor^ 
 cyra, iii. 70 med.; on Euryme- 
 don by the Athenians, iv. 65 ; 
 on the Lacedaemonians by the 
 Eleans, v. 49 ; on Agis by the 
 Lacedaemonians, ib. 63. 
 
 Five Hundred, council of, or Senate, 
 at Athens, viii. 66 init.; broken 
 up by the oligarchs, ib. 69 ; its 
 restoration demanded by Alci- 
 biades, ib. 86 med. 
 
 Five Thousand, the sham govern¬ 
 ment of, offered by the oligar¬ 
 chical conspirators, viii. 65 fin., 
 67 fin., 72 med., 86 med.; used 
 as a cloak for the restoration 
 of democracy, ib. 89 med., 92 
 fin.; the oligarchs promise to 
 publish the names of the 500, 
 ib. 93 ; established by the people, 
 ib. 97 ; excellence of the consti¬ 
 tution, ib. 
 
 Flute players, employed in the 
 Lacedaemonian army, v. 70. 
 
 Fortune, uncertainty of, iii. 59 init.; 
 man not the master of fortune, 
 iv. 64 init., vi. 23 med., 78 med. 
 
 Fortune, good, the nemesis which 
 follows upon, iv. 17 med.; ordi¬ 
 nary good fortune better than 
 extraordinary, iii. 39 med. 
 
 Four Flundred, government of, 
 
 . introduced by the oligarchical 
 conspirators at Athens, viii. 67- 
 70 ; despatch heralds to Agis 
 and afterwards to Sparta, ib. 70 
 fin., 71 fin.; send commissioners 
 to Samos, ib. 72 init.; detain the 
 crew of the Paralus, who bring 
 news of the revolution, ib. 74 ; 
 reception of their envoys at Sa¬ 
 mos, ib. 86 init., med.; their en¬ 
 voys to Sparta captured by the 
 Parali who had escaped, ib. fin.; 
 dissensions mrise, tb. . 89 ; , the 
 
 leaders willing to betray Athens 
 to the enemy to save their own 
 power, ib. 90 init., 91 fin.; fortify 
 Eetioneia, ib. 90 med., 91 med.; 
 enter into negotiations with the 
 popular party after the destruc¬ 
 tion of Eetioneia, ib. 93 ; deposed, 
 ib. 97 init. 
 
 Funeral, public, of those who first 
 fell in the war, ii. 34; of Brasidas, 
 v. 11 init. 
 
 Future, the, the controller of events, 
 
 iv. 62 fin., 63 init. 
 
 G. 
 
 Galepsus, in Thrace, a Thasian 
 colony, iv. 107 fin.; revolts from 
 Athens, ib.\ stormed by the Athe¬ 
 nians, v. 6 init. 
 
 Games, Delian, iii. 104 med.; Ephe¬ 
 sian, ib .; Pythian, v. 1 init.; Olym¬ 
 pian, iii. 8, v. 47 fin., 49, 50. 
 Garments, offered at sepulchres, 
 
 iii. 58 med. 
 
 Gates, the Thracian, at Amphipolis, 
 
 v. 10 init. 
 
 Gaulites, a Carian, viii. 85 init. 
 Gela, a river in Sicily, vi. 4 med. 
 Gela, founded from Rhodes by Anti- 
 phemus and Entimus, vi. 4 med., 
 
 vii. 57 med.; Agrigentum founded 
 from, vi. 4 med.; borders on Ca- 
 marina, vii. 58 init.; conference at, 
 
 iv. 58 ; receives and assists Gy- 
 lippus, vii. 1 fin.; sends aid to 
 Syracuse, ib. 33 init., 57 med. 
 
 Gelo, tyrant of Syracuse, vi. 4 init.; 
 expels the Megareans, ib ., ib. 94 
 init.; colonizes Camarina a third 
 time, ib. 5 fin. 
 
 General, speech of a Syracusan, vi. 
 
 41. 
 
 Geraestus, in Euboea, iii. 3 fin. 
 Geraneia, Mount, in Megaris, i. 105 
 med., 107 med., 108 init., iv. 70 
 med. 
 
 Gerastius, a Spartan month, iv. 119 
 init. 
 
 Getae, a Sicel fort, vii. 2 med. 
 Getae, a people bordering on the 
 Scythians, ii. 96 init., 98 fin. 
 Gigonus, in Chalcidice, i. 61 fin. 
 Glauce, in the territory of Mycale, 
 
 viii. 79 init. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 66 3 
 
 Glaucon, an Athenian commander, 
 i. 51 med. 
 
 Goaxis, sons of, kill Pittacus, king 
 of the Edonians, iv. 107 fin. 
 
 Goddess, curse of the, i. 126. 
 
 Gods, the, portions of land dedicated 
 to, in the confiscation of Lesbos, 
 iii. 50 med.; the, worshipped at 
 common altars, ib. 59 init.; altar 
 of the Twelve Gods at Athens, v. 
 54 fin. 
 
 Gods, the, protect the right, i. 86 
 fin., v. 104 ; approve the principle, 
 
 • 4 That they should rule who can, 5 
 v. 105 init.; their jealousy, vii. 77 
 med. 
 
 Gold mines in Thrace worked by 
 Thucydides, iv. 105 init. 
 
 Gongylus, an Eretrian, an envoy 
 of Pausanias 5 , i. 128 med. 
 
 Gongylus, a Corinthian commander, 
 vii. 2 init. 
 
 Gortynia, in Macedonia, ii. 100 
 med. 
 
 Gortys, in Crete, ii. 85 med. 
 
 Graaeans, a Paeonian tribe, ii. 96 
 med. 
 
 Graphe paranomon, at Athens, re¬ 
 pealed by the oligarchy, viii. 67. 
 
 Grappling irons, see Ships. 
 
 Grasshoppers, ornaments in the 
 form ot, once worn at Athens, i. 
 6 med. 
 
 Greatness exposed to the attacks 
 both ofenvyand of fear,vi. 78 med, 
 
 Grestonia, a district of Macedo¬ 
 nia, ii. 99 fin., 100 med. 
 
 Guardians of the Law, a magis¬ 
 tracy at Elis, v. 47 fin. 
 
 Gulf, the Ambracian, r. 55 init., ii. 68 
 init., iii. 107 init. ; Crisaean, i. 107 
 
 - med., ii. 69 med., 83 init., 84 init., 
 90-92 fin., iv. 76 init.; Iasian, viii. 
 26 med.; Ionian, i. 24 init., ii. 97 
 fin., vi. 13 med., 30 init., 34 med., 
 44 init., 104 init., vii. 33 med., 57 
 fin.; Malian, iii. 96 fin., iv. 100 
 
 . init., viii. 3 init.; Saronic, iii. 15, 
 
 • viii. 92 init.; Terinaean, vi.. 104 
 med.; Tyrrhenian, vi. 62 init., 
 
 ; vii. 58 init. 
 
 Gylippus appointed commander of 
 the Syracusan forces by the La¬ 
 cedaemonians, vi. 93 med.; ar¬ 
 rives at Tarentum, ib. 104 init.; 
 
 fails in a mission to Thurii, ib. 
 med.; makes his way into Syra¬ 
 cuse, vii. 1, 2 ; offers battle on 
 Epipolae, ib. 3 init.; captures Lab- 
 dalum, ib. fin.; fails in an attack 
 on the Athenian lines, ib. 4 init.; 
 is defeated, ib. 5 ; defeats the 
 Athenians, ib. 6 ; goes into Sicily 
 to collect allies, ib. 7 med. [cp. 12 
 init.]; returning, he urges the 
 Syracusans to try their fortune 
 at sea, ib. 21; captures Plemmy- 
 rium, ib. 23 ; makes a diversion by 
 land while the Syracusan fleet 
 attacks the Athenians, ib. 37 ; 
 goes to collect reinforcements, ib. 
 46 fin., 50 init.; sustains a slight 
 defeat, ib. 53 ; exhorts the Syra¬ 
 cusans before the battle in the 
 harbour, ib. 66-68 ; blocks the 
 roads against the Athenian re¬ 
 treat, ib. 74 ; compels the sur¬ 
 render first of Demosthenes’, and 
 then of Nicias 5 division, ib. 78-85; 
 opposes theputting to death of Ni- 
 cias and Demosthenes, ib. 86 init. 
 
 Gymnopaediae, festival of, at Lace¬ 
 daemon, v. 82 init. 
 
 Gyrtonians, a Thessalian people, ii. 
 22 fin. 
 
 H. 
 
 Habronichus, Athenian ambassa¬ 
 dor to Sparta with Themistocles, 
 j. 91 init. 
 
 Haemus, mount, in Thrace, ii. 96 init. 
 
 Hagnon, an Athenian commander, 
 son of Nicias, ii. 58 ; colleague of 
 Pericles at Samos [B.C. 439], i. 
 117 med.; the colonizer of Am- 
 phipolis, iv. 102, v. 11 init.; brings 
 reinforcements to Potidaea, ii. 
 58, vi. 31 init.; commander in 
 Chalcidic6, ii. 95 fin.; swears to 
 the Treaty of Peace and the 
 Alliance, v. 19 fin., 24 med. 
 
 Hagnon, father of Theramenes, viii. 
 68 fin., 89 init. 
 
 Halex, a river of Locris in Italy, 
 iii. 99. 
 
 Haliartus, in Boeotia, iv. 93 fin. 
 
 Halicarnassus, an Athenian fleet 
 escapes thither^ viii. 42 fin.; the 
 Athenians exact mongy from 
 them, ib. 108 init 
 
664 
 
 I N D E X. 
 
 Halieis, defeat of the Athenians 
 there, i. 105 init.; ravaged by the 
 Athenians, ii. 56 fin.; again, iv. 
 45 - 
 
 Halys, river in Asia Minor, 1. 16. 
 
 Hamaxitus, in the Troad, viii. 101 
 fin. 
 
 Harbour, the Great, of Syracuse, vi. 
 101 med., vii. 4 med., 22 fin.; de¬ 
 feat of the Syracusans at the 
 mouth of, vii. 23 ; second sea fight 
 there, ib . 37-41 ; third sea fight, 
 ib. 52 ; fourth and greatest, ib. 
 70, 71 ; the lesser harbour, ib. 
 22 init. 
 
 Harmatus,opposite Methymna, viii. 
 101 fin. 
 
 Harmodius and Aristogeiton, con¬ 
 spiracy of, against Hipparchus, 
 i. 20 med., vi. 54 init., 56—58. 
 
 Harpagium, on the Propontis, viii. 
 107 init. 
 
 Hebrus, the river, in Thrace, ii. 96 
 fin. 
 
 Hegesander, ambassador from 
 Sparta to Athens, i. 139 med.; 
 father of Pasitelidas, a Lacedae¬ 
 monian, iv. 132 fin. 
 
 Hegesander, a Thesbian com¬ 
 mander, vii. 19 med. 
 
 Hegesippidas, Lacedaemonian go¬ 
 vernor of Heraclea, v. 52 init.; 
 dismissed by the Boeotians, ib. 
 
 Helen, the suitors of, i. 9 init. 
 
 Helixus, a Megaraean commander, 
 viii. 80 fin. 
 
 Hellanicus, inaccuracy of, i. 97 fin. 
 
 Hellas, early condition of, i. 2 ; 
 Trojan War first common action 
 of, ib. 3 init. and fin.; name 
 derived from Hellen, and not 
 given at first to the whole country, 
 ib. 3 med.; Minos first possessor 
 of a navy in, ib. 4 init.; piracy, 
 honourable in, ib. 4, 5 ; ancient 
 custom of carrying arms in, ib. 6 
 init.; its older towns built inland, 
 ib. 7 ; rise of tyrannies in, ib. 13 
 init.; sends out colonies, ib. 12 ; 
 the headship of Hellas trans¬ 
 ferred from Lacedaemon to 
 Athens, i. 18, 95, 96 ; the war 
 between Chalcis and Eretria the 
 first in .which Hellas was divided 
 into parties, ib, 15 fin.; ;agitation 
 
 in Hellas before the War, i. 1 med., 
 ii. 8, 11 init.; after the failure of 
 the Syracusan expedition, viii. 2 
 init.; astonishment in Hellas at 
 the surrender of the Spartans in 
 Sphacteria, iv. 40 init.; popular 
 delusion about the number of 
 heavy infantry in Hellas, vi. 17 
 med.; Hellenes, word not used 
 by Homer, i. 3 med.; in ancient 
 times always carried arms, ib. 6 
 init.; once had many barbarous 
 customs, ib. 5 and 6 ; their igno¬ 
 rance of their own history, i. 
 20, vi. 54 init.; generally under¬ 
 estimated the Athenian power, iv. 
 108 med., vii. 28 fin., viii. 2 med., 
 24 fin. 
 
 Hellen, gave name to Hellas, i. 3 
 med. 
 
 Helleno-Tamiai, the officers who 
 received the tribute of the Allies 
 at Athens, i. 96. 
 
 Hellespont, the allies in the Persian 
 War at the Hellespont, i. 89 med.; 
 Pausanias in command there, ib. 
 95 med., 128 med.; Athenian 
 allies at the Hellespont, ii. 9 fin. 
 
 . [cp. vi. 77 med.]; Athenian tribute 
 ships in the Hellespont, iv. 75 
 init.; Pharnabazus, satrap at the 
 Hellespont, seeks aid of Lace¬ 
 daemon, viii. 6; the Lacedae¬ 
 monians determine to send a 
 fleet there under Clearchus, ib. 
 8 med.; the land forces intended 
 for the Hellespont disperse, ib. 
 23 fin.; Dercyllidas is sent thither 
 overland, ib. 61, 62 ; the Athe¬ 
 nian fleet leaves the Hellespont 
 for Samos, ib. 79; Clearchus pro- 
 
 . ceeds thither, Byzantium revolts, 
 viii. 80 ; the Hellespont saved to 
 Athens by Alcibiades 5 resolution 
 in preventing the fleet sailing to 
 the Piraeus, ib. 86 med. [cp. 96 
 med.]; the Peloponnesian fleet 
 sets sail for the Hellespont, ib. 
 99 ; the Athenians follow, ib. 100; 
 operations in the Hellespont and 
 battle of Cynossema, ib. 102-107 ; 
 Tissaphemes is annoyed on hear¬ 
 ing that the Peloponnesians had 
 gone to the Hellespont, ib. 108 
 med., 109 init. 
 
/ A' D E X . 
 
 665 
 
 Helorine Road, near Syracuse, vi, 
 66 fin., 70 fin., vii. 80 fin. 
 
 Helos, in Laconia, iv. 54 fin. 
 
 Helots, murder of, at Taenarus, i. 
 128 init.; massacre of, iv. 80 med.; 
 intrigue with Pausanias, i. 132 
 med.; revolt from the Lacedae¬ 
 monians, ib. 101, ii. 27 fin., iii. 54 
 fin., iv. 56 fin.; surrender, i. 103 
 init.; settled at Naupactus by the 
 Athenians, ib. 11,9 med.; carry 
 supplies into Sphacteria, iv. 26 
 med.; desert to the Messenians 
 . in Pylos, iv. 41 init.; withdrawn 
 . from Pylos, v. 35 fin.; replaced, 
 ib. 56 med.; taken by the Athe¬ 
 nians to Syracuse, vii. 57 med. 
 [cp. ib. 31 init.] ; Demosthenes 
 fortifies an isthmus in Laconia 
 in order that the Helots may 
 desert there, ib. 26 med.; seven 
 hundred sent with Brasidas, 
 
 iv. 80 fin.; afterwards settled 
 at Lepreum, v. 34 med.; the 
 Lacedaemonians send a body of 
 Helots and Neodamodes to 
 Sicily, ib. 19 med., 58 med. [Com¬ 
 pare Messenians.] 
 
 Hephaestus, the forge of, believed 
 to be in Hiera, iii. 88 med. 
 Heraclea, in Trachis, iv. 78 init.; 
 founded by the Lacedaemonians, 
 iii. 912, 100 fin.; failure of the 
 colony, ib. 93 ; regulated by the 
 Lacedaemonians, v. 12 fin.; the 
 Heracleans are defeated by the 
 neighbouring tribes, ib. 51; He¬ 
 raclea taken over by the Boeo¬ 
 tians, ib. 52. 
 
 Heraclea, in Pontus, iv. 75 fun 
 Heracles, Temple of, at Mantinea, 
 
 v. 64 fin., 66 init.; festival of, at 
 Syracuse, vii. 73 med. 
 
 Heraclidae, slay Eurystheus in 
 Attica, i. 9 med.; conquer the 
 Peloponnesus, ib. 12 med.; Pha- 
 lius, a Corinthian of the Heraclid 
 race, ib. 24 init.; Archias, founder 
 of Syracuse, an Heraclid, vi.3 med. 
 Heraclides, one of the Syracusan 
 generals, vi. 73 ; deposed on a 
 charge of treachery, ib. 103 fin. 
 Heraeans, of Arcadia, v. 67 init. 
 Her6, Temple of, at Argos, iv. 133 ; 
 at Corcyra, i. 24 fin. r iii. 75 fin., 
 
 79 init., 81 med.; at Epidaurus, 
 v. 75 fin.; at Plataea, iii. 68 fin. 
 
 Hermae, mutilation of the, vi. 27, 
 28 ; excitement at Athens about, 
 ib. 53, 60 ; confession of one of 
 the prisoners, ib. 60 med. 
 
 Hermaeondas, a Theban, iii. 5 med. 
 
 Hermes, Temple of, near Mycales- 
 sus, vii. 29 med. 
 
 Hermion£, i. 128 med., 131 init.; 
 its territory ravaged by the Athe¬ 
 nians, ii. 56 med.; the Hermioni- 
 ans furnish a convoy to Corinth, 
 i. 27 fin.; supply ships to the 
 Lacedaemonian navy, viii. 3 fin. 
 [cp. ib. 33 init.] 
 
 Hermocrates, speech of, iv. 59-64 ; 
 second speech of, vi. 33, 34 ; en¬ 
 courages the Syracusans after 
 defeat, ib. 72 ; made general with 
 two others, ib. 73 init., 96 med., 
 99 init.; speech at Camarina, ib. 
 76-80; deposed, ib. 103 fin.; 
 encourages the Syracusans to 
 prepare a fleet, vii. 21 fin.; con¬ 
 trives by a stratagem to delay 
 the Athenian retreat, ib. 73 ; 
 brings a fleet to Asia, viii. 26 
 
 , init.; remonstrates with Tissa- 
 phernes for reducing the ships’ 
 pay, ib. 29 med.; again, ib. 45 
 med.; incurs the hatred of Tissa- 
 phernes, ib. 85 ; goes to Sparta 
 to expose him, ib .; exiled, ib. fin. 
 
 Hermon, an Athenian, commander 
 of the Peripoli, viii. 92 med. 
 
 Hermon, father of Hermocrates, a 
 Syracusan, iv. 58 fin., vi. 32 fin. 
 
 Hesiod, said to have been killed at 
 Nemea, iii. 96 init. 
 
 Hessians, an Ozolian Locrian tribe, 
 iii. 101 fin. 
 
 Hestiaea, in Euboea, expulsion of 
 the Hestiaeans by the Athenians, 
 i. 114 fin.; colonized from Athens, 
 vii. 57 init. 
 
 Hestiodorus, an Athenian com¬ 
 mander, ii. 70 init. 
 
 Hiera* one of the Liparean islands, 
 iii. 88 med. 
 
 Hieramenes, mentioned with Tissa- 
 phernes in the third treaty with 
 the Lacedaemonians, viii. 58 init. 
 
 Hiereans, a Malian tribe, iii. 92 
 init. 
 
666 
 
 INDEX . 
 
 Hierophon, an Athenian com¬ 
 mander, iii. 105 med. 
 
 Himera, colonized from Zancle, vi. 
 5 init.; the only Hellenic city on 
 the north coast, ib. 62 init.; the 
 Athenians and Sicels invade its 
 territory, iii. 115 ; the Himeraeans 
 aid Gylippus, vii. 1, 58 init. 
 
 Himeraeum, in Thrace, vii. 9 fin. 
 
 Hippagretas, one of the Spartan 
 commanders at Sphacteria, iv. 38 
 init. 
 
 Hipparchus, son of Peisistratus, 
 never actually tyrant, i. 20 init., 
 vi. 54 init., 55 fin.; slain by Har- 
 modius and Aristogeiton, i. 20, vi. 
 54, 56-58 ; left no children, vi. 55 
 init. 
 
 Hippias, commander of the garrison 
 at Notium, treacherously seized 
 by Paches, iii. 34 med. 
 
 Hippias, eldest son of Peisistratus, 
 i. 20 init., vi. 54 init., 55 init.; his 
 children, vi. 55 ; becomes more 
 oppressive, ib. 59 init.; deposed 
 by the Lacedaemonians, ib. fin.; 
 goes to Persia and returns to 
 take part at Marathon, ib. 
 
 Hippias, father of Peisistratus, vi. 
 54 fin. 
 
 Hippocles, an Athenian com¬ 
 mander, viii. 13. 
 
 Hippoclus, tyrant of Lampsacus, 
 vi. 59 med. 
 
 Hippocrates, an Athenian general, 
 fellow commander with Demos¬ 
 thenes, iv. 66 med.; attempts 
 Megara and captures Nisaea, ib. 
 66-69 5 plans with Demosthenes 
 an invasion of Boeotia, ib.j6 , 77; 
 fortifies Delium, ib. 90 ; speech 
 of, ib. 95 ; defeated and slain, ib. 
 96, 101 init. 
 
 Hippocrates, a Lacedaemonian 
 commander, loses part of his 
 fleet off Triopium by an Athe¬ 
 nian attack, viii. 35 ; informs 
 Mindarus of the treachery of 
 Tissaphernes, ib. 99 med.; sent 
 to Euboea, ib. 107 fin. 
 
 Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, vi. 5 
 fin.; refounds Camarina, ib. 
 
 Hippolochidas, a Thessalian, aids 
 Brasidas in his march through 
 Thessaly, iv. 78 init. 
 
 Hipponicus, an Athenian general, 
 iii. 91 med. 
 
 Hipponoidas, a Spartan polemarch, 
 v. 71 fin.; banished for cowardice 
 at Mantinea, ib. 72 init. 
 
 Homer quoted, (II. ii. 108), i. 9,fin.; 
 (ii. 570), ib. 13 med.; (from the 
 Hymn to Apollo), iii. 104 med.; 
 the testimony of, shows the com¬ 
 parative smallness of the Trojan 
 War, i. 10 med.; his use of the 
 name Hellenes, ib. 3 med. [See 
 • Poets.] 
 
 Honour is ever young, ii. 44 fin.; 
 often lures men to destruction, v. 
 iii med. 
 
 Hope, the deceitfulness of, iii. 39 
 med., 45, iv. 108 med., v. 103 ; 
 the higher the hope, the greater 
 the courage, vii. 67 init. 
 
 Hyacinthia, festival of, at Lacedae¬ 
 mon, v. 23, iv ; 41 fin. 
 
 Hyaeans, an Ozolian Locrian tribe, 
 iii. 101 fin. 
 
 Hybla Geleatis, in Sicily, unsuc¬ 
 cessfully attacked by the Athe¬ 
 nians, vi. 62 fin., 63 med.; the 
 Hyblaeans have their corn burnt 
 by the Athenians, ib. 94 fin. 
 
 Hyblon, a Sicel king, vi. 4 init. 
 
 Hyccara, in Sicily, captured by the 
 Athenians, vi. 62 med. [cp. vii. 
 T 3 fin.] _ 
 
 Hylias, a river in Italy, vii. 35 med. 
 
 Hyllaic harbour at Corcyra, iii. 72 
 fin., 81 init. 
 
 Hyperbolus,an Athenian,ostracized, 
 viii. 73 init.; murdered by the 
 oligarchical conspirators, ib. med. 
 
 Hyperechides, father of Callias, an 
 Athenian, vi. 55 init. 
 
 Hysiae, in Argos, captured by the 
 Lacedaemonians, v. 83 med. 
 
 Hysiae, in Boeotia, iii. 24 med. 
 
 Hystaspes, father of Pissuthnes, a 
 Persian, i. 115 med, 
 
 I. 
 
 Ialysus, in Rhodes, viii. 44 med. 
 
 Iapygia, promontory of, vi. 30 init., 
 34 med., vii. 33 med.; Iapygian 
 mercenaries hired by the Athe¬ 
 nians against Syracuse, vii. 33 
 med., 57 fin. 
 
INDEX . 
 
 667 
 
 Iasian Gulf, viii. 26 med. 
 lasus, in Ionia, its wealth, viii. 28 
 med.; captured by the Pelopon¬ 
 nesians, ib.\ Peisander accuses 
 Phrynichus of having betrayed 
 it, ib. 54. 
 
 Iberians, the Sicanians originally 
 Iberians, vi. 2 init.; the most 
 warlike of barbarians, ib. 90 
 med. 
 
 Icarus, an island in the Aegaean, 
 iii. 29 init., viii. 99 fin. 
 
 Ichthys, promontory of, in Elis, ii. 
 25 fin. 
 
 Ida, mount, in the Troad, iv. 52 
 fin., viii. 108 med. 
 
 Idacus, in the Thracian Cherson- 
 nese, viii. 104 init. 
 
 Idomene, a hill in Amphilochia, iii. 
 
 ”2, 113 - 
 
 Ilium, see Troy. 
 
 Illyrians hired by Perdiccas, iv. 124 
 fin.; desert, ib. 125 init.; attack 
 and are defeated by Brasidas, 
 ib. 127, 128 ; the Taulantians, an 
 Illyrian tribe, make war upon 
 Epidamnus, i. 24 init.; aid the 
 Corcyraeans to besiege Epidam- 
 ( nus, ib. 26 fin. 
 
 Imbros, colonized from Athens, 
 vii. 57 init.; Imbrian troops at 
 Athens, iv. 28 med.; Imbrians 
 ' serve under Cleon at Amphipolis, 
 v. 8 init.; the Imbrians support 
 the Athenians in the Lesbian 
 revolt, iii. 5 init.; an Athenian 
 squadron escapes to Imbros, viii. 
 102, 103. 
 
 Imperial powers acquire empire by 
 assisting all who invoke their 
 aid, vi. 18 init.; to imperial 
 powers nothing is inconsistent 
 which is expedient, ib. 85. 
 
 I'narus, king of the Libyans, revolts 
 from the King, i. 104 init.; calls 
 in the Athenians, ib .; is betrayed 
 and impaled, ib. no med. 
 
 Inessa, a Sicel town, attacked by 
 the Athenians, iii. 103 init.; the 
 Inessians have their crops burnt 
 by the Athenians, vi. 94 fin. 
 Inexperience, in war, no excuse for 
 . misbehaviour, ii. 87 med. 
 Injustice, more resented than vio¬ 
 lence, i. .76 med., iv. 86 med.; 
 
 not those who suffer, but those 
 who do injustice, should take 
 time to think, i. 86 fin. 
 
 Intelligence, folly of over-, i. 84 fin., 
 iii. 43 med., 83 fin. 
 
 Iolaus, the lieutenant of Perdiccas, 
 i. 62 med. 
 
 Iolcius, an Athenian, swears to the 
 Treaty of Peace and the Alliance, 
 v. 19 fin., 24 med. 
 
 Ion, father of Tydeus, a Chian, viii. 
 38 med. 
 
 Ionia, colonized from Attica, i. 2 
 fin., 12 fin., 95 init., ii. 15 med., 
 iii. 86 med., iv. 61 med., vii. 57 
 init.; habits of life common to 
 the older Athenians and Ionians, 
 i. 6 med.; Ionians possessed a 
 great fleet in the time of Cyrus, 
 ib. 13 fin.; subdued by Cyrus and 
 Darius, ib. 16; the Ionians fleeing 
 from the Persians found colonies 
 in Sicily, vi. 4 fin.; the Ionians 
 put themselves under the head¬ 
 ship of Athens, i. 95 init., vi. 76 
 med.; Ionian exiles urge the 
 Lacedaemonians to raise a re¬ 
 volt in Ionia, iii. 31 ; the Lace¬ 
 daemonians exclude the Ionians 
 from their colony of Heraclea, 
 ib. 92 fin.; the Ionians and Tissa- 
 phernes beg aid at Sparta for a 
 revolt, viii. 5, 6; Ionia revolts, ib. 
 14-22 ; Tissaphernes demands all 
 Ionia for the king, ib. 56 fin. 
 
 Ionians contrasted with Dorians, 
 i. 124 init., v. 9 init., vi. 77 med., 
 80 fin., 82 init., vii. 5 fin., 57 
 init. and med., viii. 25 med. 
 
 Ionian Gulf, the, i. 24 init., ii. 97 
 fin., vi. 13 med., 30 init., 34 med., 
 44 init., 104 init., vii. 33 med., 
 57 fin. 
 
 Ionian festival of the Dionysia, ii. 
 15 med.; at Delos, iii. 104 med.; 
 at Ephesus, ib. med. 
 
 Ipneans, an Ozolian Locrian tribe, 
 iii. 101 fin. 
 
 Isarchidas, a Corinthian com¬ 
 mander, i. 29 init. 
 
 Isarchus, father of Isarchidas, a 
 Corinthian, i. 29 init. 
 
 Ischagoras, a Lacedaemonian com¬ 
 mander, iv. 132 ; swears to the 
 
 - Treaty of Peace and the Alliance, 
 
668 
 
 / N D E X . 
 
 v. 19 init., 24 init.; goes as envoy 
 to Chalcidic£, ib. 21. 
 
 Isocrates,a Corinthian commander, 
 ii. 83 fin. 
 
 Isolochus, father of Pythodorus, an 
 Athenian, iii. 115 init. 
 
 Ister, the river, ii. 96 init., 97 init. 
 
 Isthmian Games, viii. 9 init., 10 init. 
 
 Isthmionicus, an Athenian, swears 
 to the Treaty of Peace and the 
 Alliance, v. 19 fin., 24 med. 
 
 Isthmus, of Corinth, advantage¬ 
 ously situated for trade, i. 13 
 med.; its situation, iv. 42 med.; 
 the Lacedaemonians summon 
 the allies to the Isthmus, ii. 10, 
 13 init., 18 med.; again, iii. 15 ; 
 earthquakes stop the Lacedae¬ 
 monian army at the Isthmus, 
 ib. 89 init.; the Treaty of Peace 
 ordered to be inscribed on a 
 
 . pillar at the Isthmus, v. 18, xi; 
 a small Lacedaemonian force 
 comes to the Isthmus during the 
 excitement about the Hermae 
 at Athens, vi. 61 init. 
 
 Isthmus, of Leucas, iii. 81 init., iv. 
 8 init. 
 
 Isthmus, of Pallen£, i. 56 init., 62 
 init., 64 init. 
 
 Istone, mount, occupied by the 
 Corcyraean oligarchs, iii. 85, iv. 
 2 med., 46 init.; capture of, ib. 
 46 med. 
 
 Italus, a Sicel king who gave his 
 name to Italy, vi. 2 med. 
 
 Italy, named from King Italus, vi. 
 2 med.; the mother country of the 
 Sicels, ib.; most of the Hel¬ 
 lenic colonies in, founded from 
 Peloponnesus, i. 12 fin.; the Lace¬ 
 daemonians order their Italian al¬ 
 lies to furnish a naval contingent, 
 ii. 7 med.; the Locrians side with 
 the Syracusans, the Rhegians 
 with the Leontines, iii. 86 med. 
 [cp. iv. 1 med., 24]; the Athenians 
 send an embassy to, v. 4, 5 ; Her- 
 mocrates advises the Syracusans 
 to seek allies in, vi. 34; the Italian 
 cities refuse to receive the Athe¬ 
 nian expedition to Syracuse, ib. 
 44 ; the Syracusans send envoys 
 to the Italian cities, ib. 88 fin.; 
 the Athenians obtain supplies 
 
 from them, ib. 103 init. [cp. vii. 14 
 med., 25 init.]; Gylippus goes to 
 Thurii and Tarentum, vi. 104; 
 the second Athenian expedition 
 reaches Italy, vii. 33 ; Italian 
 allies of the Athenians before 
 Syracuse, ib. 57 fin.; the Syra¬ 
 cusans retain their Italian, Sici¬ 
 lian, and Athenian prisoners after 
 the others were sold, ib. 87 fin.; 
 Italian vessels join the Lace¬ 
 daemonians, viii. 91 init. 
 
 Itamenes, a Persian commander, 
 iii. 34 init. 
 
 Ithome, mount, seized by the He¬ 
 lots, i. 101 init., iii. 54 fin.; be¬ 
 sieged by the Lacedaemonians, 
 i. 102 init.; surrendered, ib. 103. 
 
 Itonaeans, colonists of the Italian 
 Locrians, v. 5 fin. 
 
 Itys, the legend of, ii. 29 init. 
 
 j. 
 
 Justice, an idle word to the strong, 
 i. 76 fin., v. 89 fin.; justice and 
 expediency, i. 36, 42 init., 76, iii. 
 40 med., 44, 56, 82 fin., v. 90, 98, 
 107; the Lacedaemonian con¬ 
 ception of, a ‘ do nothing 5 policy, 
 i. 71 init. 
 
 K. 
 
 Kindness, a little, done in season 
 may cancel a greater previous 
 wrong, i. 42 fin. 
 
 Kings of Lacedaemon, common 
 mistake that they have two votes 
 in council, i. 20 fin.; could be 
 imprisoned by the Ephors, ib. 
 131 fin.; the government carried 
 on by regents in their minority, 
 i. 107 init., 132 init.; give all 
 orders in the field, v. 66 med. 
 
 Kings of Persia : Cyrus, i. 13 fin.; 
 Cambyses, ib .; Darius, ib. 14 
 med.; Xerxes, z'A, 129; Artaxerxes, 
 ib. 104 init., 137 med., iv. 50 fin.; 
 Darius Nothus, viii. 5 init., 18, 
 37 , 58 . 
 
 Kings in ancient Hellas, their con¬ 
 stitutional character, i. 13 init. 
 
 Knights, the, at Athens, iii. 16 init.; 
 the Three Hundred (so called) 
 at Sparta, v. 72 fin. 
 
 Kropeia (in Attica), ii. 19 fin. 
 
INDEX . 
 
 669 
 
 L. 
 
 Labdalum, a fort built by the Athe¬ 
 nians on Epipolae, vi. 97 fin., 98 
 med.; captured by Gylippus, 
 vii. 3. 
 
 Lacedaemon contrasted with Ath¬ 
 ens, i. 10 init.; founded by the 
 Dorians, ib. 18 init., 107 init.; long 
 unsettled, ib. 18 init.; never subj ect 
 to tyrants, ib.; its excellent con¬ 
 stitution, ib.; common mistakes 
 about, ib. 20 fin.; the Lacedae¬ 
 monians a pattern of nobility in 
 Hellas, iii. 53 fin.,'57 init.; ‘liber¬ 
 ators of Hellas,’ i. 69 init., ii. 8 fin., 
 
 iii. 59 fin., iv. 85 init., 108 init.,v. 9 
 fin., viii. 43 fin., 46 med., 52 fin.; 
 their slothful character, especially 
 in contrast with the Athenians, 
 i. 69, 70, 84 init., 102 med., iv. 
 55 med., viii. 96 fin.; their free¬ 
 dom from passion, v. 63 med.; 
 force strict oligarchies on their 
 subjects, i. 19 init. [cp. 76 init., 
 I44med.,iv. 132 fin.], v.81 fin.,viii. 
 38 med.; bad administration of 
 their subject states, iii. 93 fin., v.52 
 init.; different character of, at 
 home and abroad, v. 105 fin.; their 
 bad conduct abroad, i. 77 fin. 
 [cp. ib. 95 fin.]; their slaughter of 
 traders, ii. 67 fin., iii. 32 ; their 
 treatment of the Helots, i. 128 init., 
 
 iv. 80med.; the great number of 
 their slaves, viii. 40 med.; sim- 
 plipity of Lacedaemonian life, i. 6 
 med.; the Lacedaemonians first 
 to strip naked in the games, ib .; 
 decide by cries, not by voting, ib. 
 87 init.; observance of omens,&c., 
 iii. 89 init., v. 54 med., 55 med., 116 
 init., vi. 95 init., viii. 6 fin.; import¬ 
 ance attached by them to religious 
 observances, iv. 5 init., v. 54 med., 
 75 init., 82 init.; their brevity of 
 speech, iv. 17 init.; their military 
 prowess, ib. 12 fin.; their pres¬ 
 tige, ib. 18 init.; the common be¬ 
 lief that they would never sur¬ 
 render, ib. 40 init.; secrecy of their 
 government, v. 54 init., 68 init., 
 74 fin.; its moderation and sta¬ 
 bility, viii. 24 med.; their exclu¬ 
 sion of foreigners, i. 144 init. [cp. 
 
 ii. 39 init.]; powers of their kings, 
 
 v.66 med.,viii.4 fin.; organization 
 of their army, iii. 109 init., iv. 8 fin., 
 38 init.,v.66 fin.,68 fin.; sometimes 
 send out commissioners to advise 
 a general, ii. 85 init., iii. 69 med., 
 76, v. 63 fin., viii. 39 init.; march 
 to the sound of music, v. 70 ; do 
 not pursue a defeated enemy far, 
 ib. 73 fin.; recovery of their influ¬ 
 ence after Mantinea, ib. 77 med. 
 Lacedaemonians, the, put down 
 the tyrants, i. 18 init., vi. 53 fin., 59 
 fin.; become one of the leading 
 powers of Hellas, ib. 18 fin. [cp. ib. 
 10 init.]; endeavour to prevent the 
 Athenians from building their 
 walls, ib. 90 init.; deceived by 
 Themistocles, ib. 90-92 ; their 
 friendly feeling toward the Athe¬ 
 nians after the Persian War, ib. 
 92 ; summon Pausanias* to Lace¬ 
 daemon, ib. 95 init., 131 init.; the 
 Helots revolt, ib. 101 init.; the 
 Lacedaemonians call in the Athe¬ 
 nians, ib. 102 init.; dismiss them 
 and so cause the first open quar¬ 
 rel between themselves and the 
 Athenians, ib. med.; assist the 
 Dorians against the Phocians, 
 ib. 107 init.; defeat the Athenians 
 at Tanagra, ib. fin., 108 init.; en¬ 
 gage in the ‘ Sacred War,’ ib. 112 
 fin.; invade Attica, ib. 114 med.; 
 conclude a thirty years’ truce 
 with the Athenians, ib. 115 init.; 
 take alarm at the growth of the 
 Athenian empire, ib. 118; promise 
 aid to the Potidaeans, ib. 58 med.; 
 summon the allies, ib. 67 med.; 
 vote that the treaty was broken,#. 
 79, 87 ; their reasons, ib. 88,118 ; 
 consult the oracle, ib. 118 fin.; 
 summon the allies a second time, 
 ib. 119 init.; vote for war, ib. 125 ; 
 send embassies to Athens, ib. 
 126 init.; make a final demand 
 from the Athenians, ib. 139; medi¬ 
 tate sending embassies to the 
 King, ii. 7 init.; the list of their 
 allies, #.9init.; summon the allies 
 to the Isthmus, before invading 
 Attica, ib. 10 ; unsuccessfully at¬ 
 tack Oeno6, ib. 18; enter and 
 ravage Attica, ib. 19-22 ; defeat 
 
I N D E X. 
 
 6 70 
 
 the Athenians at Phrygia, ib. 22 
 med.; retire, ib. 23 fin.; settle the 
 Aeginetans at Thyrea, ib. 27 ; 
 again invade Attica, ib. 47 init.; 
 reach Laurium, ib. 55 ; quit At¬ 
 tica, ib. 57 ; reject offers of peace, 
 ib. 59 med.; attack Zacynthus, ib. 
 66; send ambassadors to the 
 King, ib. 67 ; attack and finally 
 blockade Plataea, ib. 71-78 ; in¬ 
 vade Acarnania, ib. 80 ; defeated 
 at sea by the Athenians, ib. 83, 
 84 ; send commissioners to assist 
 their admiral, ib. 85 init.; again 
 defeated, ib. 86-92 ; meditate an 
 attack on Piraeus, ib. 93 init. ; 
 ravage Salamis, ib. fin.; in¬ 
 vade Attica, iii. 1; send the Mity- 
 lenaean envoys to Olympia, ib. 8 ; 
 receive the Mitylenaeans into al¬ 
 liance, ib. 15 init.; summon the 
 allies to the Isthmus, ib. med.; 
 send a fleet to Lesbos, ib. 16 fin.; 
 send Salaethus to Mitylen6, ib. 25 
 init.; invade Attica, ib. 26 ; arrive 
 too late to save Lesbos, ib. 29 ; 
 compel Plataea to surrender, ib. 
 52 init.; put the Plataeans to death, 
 ib. 68 ; raze Plataea, ib. ; prepare 
 an expedition to Corcyra, ib. 69 ; 
 engage the Athenians and Corcy- 
 raeans, ib. 76-78; retire, ib. 79-81 
 init.; deterred byearthquakes from 
 the invasion of Attica, ib. 89 init.; 
 colonize Heraclea, ib. 92, 93,100; 
 send an army against Naupactus, 
 ib. 100-102 ; invade Amphilochia, 
 ib. 105,106 ; defeated, ib. 107,108; 
 desert the Ambraciots, ib. 109, 
 iii; invade Attica, iv. 2 init.; re¬ 
 turn on the news of the capture 
 of Pylos, ib. 6 ; occupy Sphacte- 
 ria, ib. 8 fin.; unsuccessfully assault 
 Pylos, ib. 11, 12 ; defeated in the 
 harbour, ib. 14 ; make a truce 
 with the Athenians, and send am¬ 
 bassadors to Athens, ib. 15, 16; 
 their speech, ib. 17-20 ; the Lace¬ 
 daemonians break off negotia¬ 
 tions, ib. 21, 22 ; their troops in 
 Sphacteria attacked and forced to 
 surrender, ib. 31-38 ; they sue for 
 peace, ib. 41 ; negotiate with the 
 King, ib. 50 med.; the Athenians 
 take Cythera, ib. 53,54; the Lace¬ 
 
 daemonians are panic-stricken at 
 their ill success in the war, ib. 
 55 ; their garrison in Nisaea sur¬ 
 renders to the Athenians, ib. 
 69 fin.; they encourage the expedi¬ 
 tion of Brasidas into Chalcidic6, 
 ib. 80 init.; capture Amphipolis, 
 ib. 103-106 ; make a truce for a 
 year with the Athenians, ib. 117- 
 119 ; Brasidas attempts Potidaea, 
 ib. 135 ; defeats the Athenians at 
 Amphipolis, v.6-11; the Lacedae¬ 
 monians become eager for peace, 
 ib. 14; bring back Pleistoanax 
 from exile, ib. 16 fin.; make a 
 treaty with the Athenians, ib. 
 17-19 ; conclude an alliance with 
 the Athenians, ib. 22 fin-24 I fall 
 into contempt with and displease 
 the Peloponnesians, ib. 28 fin., 29 
 fin.; send envoys to Corinth, ib. 
 30 ; support the Lepreans against 
 Elis, ib. 31 med.; make war upon 
 the Parrhasians, ib. 33 ; emanci¬ 
 pate the Helot soldiers of Brasi¬ 
 das, and disfranchise the prison¬ 
 ers from Pylos, ib. 34 ; conclude 
 an alliance with the Boeotians in 
 order to gain Panactum, ib. 39; 
 receive Argive envoys and pre¬ 
 pare to conclude a treaty with 
 them, ib. 40,41; announce the 
 destruction of Panactum at 
 Athens, ib. 42 ; their envoys at 
 Athens are tricked by Alcibia- 
 des, ib. 43-45 ; refuse to give up 
 the Boeotian alliance at the de¬ 
 mand of the Athenians, ib. 46 
 med.; excluded by the Eleans 
 from the Olympic games, ib. 49 ; 
 expelled from Heraclea by the 
 Boeotians, ib. 51, 52 ; start on an 
 expedition against Argos but turn 
 back, ib. 54 init.; again start and 
 return, ib. 55 med.; garrison Epi- 
 daurus, ib. 56 init.; march against 
 Argos, ib. 57 ; surround the Ar- 
 gives, ib. 58, 59; furious with 
 Agis for making a truce with the 
 Argives, ib. 60 med., 63 ; march 
 to the support of Tegea, ib. 64 
 init.; surprised by the Argives be¬ 
 fore Mantinea, ib. 66 init.; gain a 
 great victory, ib. 70-74 ; make al¬ 
 liance with Argos, ib. 76-79; send 
 
INDEX . 
 
 671 
 
 an expedition to Argos, ib. 82 
 med., 83 init.; again start against 
 Argos, but are turned back by 
 unfavourable sacrifices, ib. 116 
 init.; ravage Argos, vi. 7 init.; 
 settle the Argive exiles at Orneae, 
 zb.; order the Chalcidians to 
 assist Perdiccas, ib. fin.; they re¬ 
 fuse, ib.; send a force to the 
 Isthmus, which increases the 
 panic at Athens after the muti¬ 
 lation of the Hermae, ib. 61 init.; 
 receive Corinthian and Syracusan 
 ambassadors, ib. 73 init., 88 fin.; 
 Alcibiades speaks in their behalf, 
 ib. 89-92 ; the Lacedaemonians 
 appoint Gylippus commander of 
 the Syracusan army, ib. 93 med.; 
 invade Argos, but are stopped by 
 an earthquake, ib. 95 ; consider the 
 Athenians guilty of first breaking 
 the treaty [cp. vi. 105 init.] and 
 prepare for war with a good spirit, 
 vii. 18 ; invade Attica and fortify 
 Decelea, ib. 19 init.; send troops 
 to Sicily, ib. ij fin., 19 med., 58 
 med.; Nicias surrenders himself 
 to them, trusting to their friendly 
 feeling for him, ib. 85 init., 86 med.; 
 the Lacedaemonians derive hope 
 from the failure of the Sicilian ex¬ 
 pedition, viii. 2 fin.; raise money 
 and order ships to be built, ib. 3 ; 
 Agis at Decelea negotiates with 
 the Lesbians and Euboeans who 
 desire to revolt, ib. 4 ; the Lace¬ 
 daemonians send a commissioner 
 to Chios, ib. 6 fin.; ally themselves 
 to Chios and Erythrae, ib. ; order 
 a fleet to Chios, ib. 7, 8 ; defeated 
 at sea and driven into Peiraeum, 
 ib. 10,11; discouraged by this 
 unfortunate beginning, ib. 11 fin.; 
 persuaded by Alcibiades not to 
 give way, ib. 12 ; cause the revolt 
 of Chios, Erythrae, Clazomenae, 
 Teos, Miletus, ib. 14-17 ; make 
 an alliance with the King, ib. 18 ; 
 break out of Peiraeum, ib. 20 init.; 
 induce Mitylene and Methymna 
 to revolt, ib. 22 ; baffled in their 
 plans on Lesbos, ib. 23 ; defeated 
 by the Athenians before Miletus, 
 ib. 25 ; capture Iasos, ib. 28 ; fail 
 to retake Clazomenae, ib. 31; sur¬ 
 
 prised and lose six ships off Tri¬ 
 opium, ib. 35 med.; make a new 
 treaty with the King, ib. 36, 37 ; 
 alter the government of Chios, 
 ib. 38 med.; send aid to Pharna- 
 bazus, ib. 39 init., 80 ; send ad¬ 
 visers to Astyochus, ib. 39 init.; 
 defeat an Athenian squadron, ib. 
 42 ; distrust Alcibiades and order 
 his death, ib. 45 init.; Astyochus 
 is believed to have sold himself 
 to Tissaphernes, ib. 50 med.; Pe- 
 daritus, their governor at Chios, 
 is killed in battle, ib. 55 
 fin.; they make a third treaty 
 with the Persians, ib. 57, 58 ; are 
 invited by the Eretrians to Eu¬ 
 boea, ib. 60 med.; send Dercyl- 
 lidas to the Hellespont, ib. 61 init., 
 62 init.; offer the Athenians battle 
 off Samos, ib. 63 init.; Agis at 
 Decelea receives heralds from the 
 Four Hundred, ib. 70 fin.; he 
 sends them to Sparta, ib. 71 fin.; 
 the sailors at Miletus complain 
 of Astyochus and Tissaphernes, 
 ib. 78; Astyochus again offers 
 battle to the Athenians, ib. 79 
 init.; but declines to engage the 
 Athenians when they offer, ib. fin.; 
 the Lacedaemonians send aid to 
 Pharnabazus, and cause the re¬ 
 volt of Byzantium, ib. 80 ; the 
 sailors at Miletus break out into 
 open violence against Astyochus, 
 ib. 84 init.; the Lacedaemonians 
 send Mindarus to succeed As¬ 
 tyochus. ib. 85init.; receive twelve 
 ambassadors from the oligarchs 
 at Athens, ib. 90 med.; do not 
 come to terms with them, ib. 91 
 init.; despatch a fleet to Euboea, 
 ib. 91 init.; defeat the Athenians 
 at sea, ib. 95 ; do not follow up 
 their success, ib. 96 ; leave Tissa¬ 
 phernes in disgust and sail to the 
 Hellespont, ib. 99 ; arrive at 
 Rhoeteium, ib. 101 fin.; chase 
 the Athenian squadron at Sestos, 
 and capture a few vessels, ib. 
 102; defeated at sea by the 
 Athenians off Cynossema, ib. 104, 
 105 ; lose eight more ships, ib. 
 107 init.; aid in expelling the 
 Persian garrison fromAntandros, 
 
672 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 ib. 108 med., and from Cnidus, 109 
 init. [See also for the latter part, 
 Astyochus, Alcibiades, Lichas, 
 Pedaritus, Tissaphernes, &c.] 
 
 Lacedaemonius, son of Cimon, an 
 Athenian commander, i. 45. 
 
 Laches, an Athenian, commands an 
 expedition to Sicily, iii. 8§ init., 
 vi. 1 init., 6 med., 75 med.; his 
 proceedings in Sicily, ib. 90, 99, 
 103, 115 init.; superseded by Py- 
 thodorus, ib. 115 init.; moves the 
 conclusion of the one year’s truce, 
 
 iv. 118 fin.; swears to the Treaty 
 of Peace and the Alliance, v. 19 
 fin., 24 med. [cp. 43 med.]; brings 
 an Athenian force to Argos, ib. 
 61; reduces Orchomenus, ib. fin.; 
 slain at Mantinea, ib. 74 fin. 
 
 Lacon, a Plataean, iii. 52 fin. 
 
 Lade, an island opposite Miletus, 
 viii. 17 fin., 24 init. 
 
 Laeaeans,aPaeonian tribe,ii.96 med. 
 
 Laespodias, an Athenian general, 
 vi. 105 fin.; goes as an envoy from 
 the Four Hundred to Sparta, viii. 
 86 fin. 
 
 Laestrygones, oldest inhabitants of 
 Sicily, vi. 2 init. 
 
 Lamachus, an Athenian com¬ 
 mander, leads an expedition into 
 the Pontus, iv. 75 ; swears to the 
 Treaty of Peace and the Alliance, 
 
 v. 19 fin., 24 med.; made one of 
 the generals in Sicily, vi. 8 med.; 
 advocates in a council of war 
 an immediate attack on Syracuse, 
 ib. 49 ; votes with Alcibiades, ib. 
 50 init.; falls in battle, ib. 101 fin., 
 103 init. med. 
 
 Lamis, founder of Trotilus and 
 Thapsus, vi. 4 init. 
 
 Lampon, an Athenian, swears to 
 the Treaty of Peace and the Al¬ 
 liance, v. 19 fin., 24 med. 
 
 Lampsacus, given to Themistocles 
 by the King, i. 138 fin.; famous 
 for wine, ib.; becomes the refuge 
 of Hippias, vi. 59 ; its tyrants, zb.; 
 revolts from Athens, viii. 62 init.; 
 retaken, ib. med. 
 
 Laodicium, in Arcadia, battle of, iv. 
 134 . 
 
 Laophon, father of Calligeitus, a 
 Megarian, viii. 6 init. 
 
 Laphilus, a Lacedaemonian, swears 
 to the Treaty of Peace and the Al¬ 
 liance, v. 19 med., 24 init. 
 
 Larissa, on the Hellespont, viii. 101 
 fin. 
 
 Larissa, in Thessaly, iv. 78 init.; the 
 Larissaeans assist the Athenians 
 in the first invasion of Attica, ii. 
 22 fin.; their two factions, ib. 
 
 Las, in Laconia, viii. 91 med., 92 init. 
 
 Laurium, silver mines of, ii. 55 init., 
 
 vi. 91 fin. 
 
 Laws, not lightly to be altered, iii. 
 37 med.; the unwritten law of 
 society, ii. 37 fin. 
 
 Lawsuits, between the Athenians 
 and their allies decided by Athe¬ 
 nian law, i. 77 init. 
 
 Leagrus, father ofGlaucon, an Athe¬ 
 nian, i. 51 med. 
 
 Learchus, an Athenian ambassador 
 to Sitalces, ii. 67 med. 
 
 Lebedus, in Ionia, revolts from 
 Athens, viii. 19 fin. 
 
 Lectum, promontory of, viii. 101 fin. 
 
 Lecythus, a high point of Toron£, 
 
 iv. 113 fin.; captured by Brasidas, 
 ib. 114-116 ; dedicated by Brasi¬ 
 das to Athene, ib. 116. 
 
 Lemnos, viii. 102 fin.; once in¬ 
 habited by Tyrrhenians, iv. 109 
 init.; colonized from Athens, iv. 
 28 fin., vii. 57 init.; visited by the 
 plague, ii. 47 med.; the Athenians 
 deposit Samian hostages there, 
 i. 115 med.; the Lemnians 
 support the Athenians in the 
 Lesbian revolt, iii. 5 init.; fight 
 under Cleon at Sphacteria, iv. 28 
 fin.; at Amphipolis, v. 8 init.; 
 present before Syracuse, vii. 57 init. 
 
 Leocorium, a temple at Athens, i. 
 20 med., vi. 57 fin. 
 
 Leocrates, an Athenian commander, 
 i. 105 init. 
 
 Leogoras, father of Andocides, an 
 Athenian, i. 51 med. 
 
 Leon, a Lacedaemonian, one of the 
 founders of Heraclea, iii. 92 fin.; 
 another, goes as envoy to Athens, 
 
 v. 44 fin.; another, father of Pe¬ 
 daritus, viii. 28 fin.; another, suc¬ 
 ceeds Pedaritus at Chios, ib. 61 
 med.; gains an advantage over 
 the Athenians at sea, ib. fin. 
 
IN D E X. 
 
 673 
 
 Leon, an Athenian, swears to the 
 Treaty of Peace and the Alliance, 
 
 v. 19 fin., 24 med.; an Athenian 
 general [?the same], viii. 23 init.; 
 popular with the multitude, ib. 73 
 med.; comes with reinforcements 
 to Diomedon, ib. 23 init.; re¬ 
 gains Lesbos which had revolt¬ 
 ed, ib. 23 med.; carries on 
 war successfully against Chios, 
 ib. 24 med.; appointed with Di¬ 
 omedon to the chief command at 
 Samos, ib. 54 med.; makes a 
 descent upon Rhodes, ib. 55 init.; 
 aids the democratic reaction at 
 Samos, ib. 73 fin. 
 
 Leon, near Syracuse, vi. 97 init. 
 
 Leonidas, father of Pleistarchus 
 king of Sparta, i. 132 init. 
 
 Leontiades, father of Eurymachus 
 a Theban, ii. 2 med. 
 
 Leontini, founded from Chalcis in 
 Euboea by Thucles, vi. 3 fin.; 
 the Leontines of Ionian descent, 
 iii. 86 med., vi. 44 fin., 46 init., 50 
 fin., 76 med., 77 init., 79 med.; 
 at war with Syracuse, ib. 86 init.; 
 obtain assistance from Athens, 
 ib. fin.; unsuccessfully attack 
 Messene, iv. 25 fin.; revolution 
 in, v. 4 init.; the Athenians es¬ 
 pouse their cause as an excuse 
 for the conquest of Sicily, ib. fin., 
 
 vi. 8 med., 19 init., 33 init., 47 fin., 
 48 fin., 63 fin., 76 init., 77 init., 84 
 med. 
 
 Leotychides, king of Sparta, i. 89 
 init. 
 
 Lepreum, gives rise to a quarrel 
 between the Eleans and Lace¬ 
 daemonians, v. 31 ; the Lace¬ 
 daemonians settle the Helots 
 and Neodamodes there, ib. 34 
 med.; they break the Olympic 
 Truce by bringing a garrison into 
 Lepreum, ib. 49 init.; the Le- 
 praeansdo not attend the Olympic 
 festival, ib. 50 init.; the Eleans 
 are angry with their allies for not 
 attacking Lepreum, ib. 62. 
 
 Leros [al. Eleus], viii. 26 init., 27 
 init. 
 
 Lesbos : the Lesbians kindred of 
 the Boeotians, iii. 2 fin., vii. 57 
 
 , med., viii. 4 med., 100 med. [cp. 
 
 iii. 5 med., 13 init.]; with the 
 Chians, the only independent 
 allies of Athens, i. 19, vi. 85 
 med., vii. 57 init.; furnish ships 
 to the Athenians, ii. 9 fin., 56 
 med., vi. 31 init.; the Lesbians 
 aid the Athenians against the 
 Samians, i. 116, 117; revolt from 
 Athens, iii. 2 [see Mitylen^]; are 
 received into the Lacedaemonian 
 confederacy, ib. 15 init.; the affairs 
 of Lesbos set in order by Paches, 
 ib. 35 ; the land divided among 
 Athenian citizens, ib. 50; the 
 Lesbian refugees capture Antan- 
 drus, iv. 52 med. [which the 
 Athenians recover, ib. 75 med.]; 
 the Lesbians negotiate with Agis 
 about a fresh revolt, viii. 4 med.; 
 revolt and are again subdued, ib. 
 22, 23 ; renew negotiations with 
 Astyochus, ib. 32 init.; Pedaritus 
 refuses them aid from Chios, ib. 
 fin.; the Athenian fleet on the 
 way to the Hellespont puts in 
 at Lesbos, and prepares to attack 
 Eresus, ib. 100. 
 
 Leucas, a Corinthian colony, i. 30 
 init.; devastated by the Corcy- 
 raeans, ib.\ attacked by the Athe¬ 
 nians, iii. 94 init., 95 med., 102 
 med. 
 
 Leucadian Isthmus, iii. 81 init., 94 
 med., iv. 8 init.; garrisoned by 
 the Corinthians, iv.42 fin.; naval 
 engagement between the Pelo¬ 
 ponnesians returning from Sicily, 
 and the Athenians, off Leucadia, 
 viii. 13; the Leucadians send 
 troops to Epidamnus, i. 26 init.; 
 furnish ships to Corinth, ib. 27 
 fin., 46init.; Corinthian fleet sails 
 from Leucas, ib. 46 med.; the 
 Leucadians supply the Lacedae¬ 
 monians with ships, ii. 9 med.; 
 assist in the invasion of Acarnania, 
 ib. 80 fin., 81 med.; a Leucadian 
 vessel is sunk by an Athenian off 
 Naupactus, ib. 91 med., 92 med.; 
 the Leucadians repulse an Athe¬ 
 nian descent, iii. 7 ; send a squad¬ 
 ron to Cyllene to reinforce Alci das, 
 ib. 69 med.; aid Gylippus with a 
 fleet, vi. 104 init., vii. 4 fin., 7 init.; 
 present before Syracuse, vii. 58 
 
 x x 
 
674 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 med.; lose one ship in the battle 
 of Cynossema, viii. 106 med. 
 
 Leucimm£, Corcyraeans raise a 
 trophy on, i. 30 init.; Corcyraean 
 station at, ib. fin., 47 med., 51 fin.; 
 the Peloponnesians land there, 
 iii. 79 fin. 
 
 Leuconium, in Chios, viii. 24 med. 
 
 Leuctra, in Laconia, v. 54 init. 
 
 Libya, visited by the plague, ii. 48 
 init.; trade between Libya and 
 Laconia, iv. 53 fin.; Phocians 
 returning from Troy are driven 
 to Libya, vi. 2 med.; a Pelopon¬ 
 nesian fleet on the way to Syra¬ 
 cuse is driven to Libya, vii. 50 
 init.; the Libyans besiege the 
 Evesperitae, ib.\ Inaros, king of 
 the Libyans, i. 104 init., no 
 med. 
 
 Lichas, a Lacedaemonian, victor at 
 Olympia, v. 50 med.; struck by 
 the officers, ib.) envoy to Argos, 
 ib. 22 med.; again, ib. 76 med.; 
 goes with ten others as adviser 
 to Astyochus, viii. 39 init.; objects 
 to the treaties made with the 
 king, ib. 43, 52 fin.; goes with 
 Tissaphernes to Aspendus, ib. 87 
 init.; rebukes the Milesians for 
 driving out a Persian garrison, 
 ib. 84 med.; his unpopularity 
 at Miletus, ib. fin.; dies there, ib. 
 
 Ligurians, the, drove the Sicanians 
 out of Iberia, vi. 2 init. 
 
 Limnaea, in Acarnania, ii. 80 fin., 
 iii. 106 med. 
 
 Lindii, the Acropolis of Gela, vi. 4 
 med. 
 
 Lindus, in Rhodes, viii. 44. 
 
 Liparaean [or Aeolian] islands : 
 the Liparaeans colonists of the 
 Cnidians, iii. 88 ; invaded by the 
 Athenians, zA; again, ib. 115 init. 
 
 Locrians [Opuntian], subjected by 
 the Persians, viii. 43 fin.; allies 
 of the Lacedaemonians, v. 64 
 med.; give hostages to the Athe¬ 
 nians, i. 108 med.; present at 
 the battle of Coronea, ib. 113; 
 furnish the Lacedaemonians with 
 cavalry, ii. 9 med.; Atalant6, in 
 Locris, seized by the Athenians 
 to prevent privateering, ib. 32 init. 
 [cp. v. 18, viii]; the Locrians de¬ 
 
 feated by the Athenians, ii. 26 ; 
 inundation of the sea on the 
 
 Locrian coast, iii. 89 med.; the 
 
 Locrian coast ravaged by the 
 
 Athenians, ib. 91 fin.; Locrian 
 
 cavalry pursue the Athenians 
 after Delium, iv. 96 fin.; the 
 Locrians supply the Lacedaemo¬ 
 nians with ships, viii. 3 fin. 
 
 Locrians, [Ozolian], always carry 
 arms, i. 5 fin.; old inhabitants of 
 Naupactus, ib. 103 med.; allied to 
 the Athenians, iii. 95 fin., 97 med.; 
 subdued by the Lacedaemonians, 
 ib. 101; go to war with the Pho¬ 
 cians, v. 32 init. 
 
 Locris, in Italy : the Locrians in 
 alliance with the Syracusans, iii. 
 86 med.; defeated by the Athe¬ 
 nians, ib. 99 ; again, ib. 103 fin.; 
 cause Messene to revolt, iv. 1 
 init.; join the Syracusans in at¬ 
 tacking the Rhegians, ib. 24, 25 ; 
 invited to Messen& during a 
 revolution, v. 5 init.; expelled, z'A; 
 make a treaty with Athens, z'A fin.; 
 hostile to the Athenian expedi¬ 
 tion to Sicily, vi. 44 med. [cp. vii. 
 35 fin.]; send ships to the Lace¬ 
 daemonians, viii. 91 init. 
 
 Loryma, in Caria, viii. 43 init. 
 
 Lot, use of the lot to determine 
 which side should first execute a 
 treaty, v. 21 init.; in the distribu¬ 
 tion of an army between a num¬ 
 ber of generals, viii. 30 init. 
 
 Lycaeum, Mount, in Arcadia, v. 
 16 fin., 54 init. 
 
 Lycia, ii. 69 med., viii. 41 fin. 
 
 Lycomedes, father of Archestratus, 
 an Athenian, i. 57 fin.; another, 
 father of Cleomedes, v. 84 fin. 
 
 Lycophron, a Lacedaemonian, sent 
 out as adviser to Cnemus, ii. 85 
 init. 
 
 Lycophron, a Corinthian general, 
 iv. 43 ; death of, ib. 44 init. 
 
 Lycus, father of Thrasybulus, an 
 Athenian, viii. 75 init. 
 
 Lyncus, in Upper Macedonia, ii. 
 99 init.; under the rule of Arrhi- 
 baeus, iv. 83 init.; invaded by 
 Perdiccas and Brasidas, ib .; in¬ 
 vaded a second time by them, 
 ib. 124 init.; Brasidas retreats 
 
INDEX. 
 
 675 
 
 through Lyncus, ib. 125-128, 129 
 init. 
 
 Lysicles, father of Habronichus, an 
 Athenian, i. 91 init.; another, 
 sent to exact money in Caria and 
 Lycia, iii. 19 init.; falls in battle, 
 ib. fin. 
 
 Lysimachidas, father of Arian- 
 thidas, a Theban, iv. 91 med. 
 
 Lysimachus, father of Aristides, 
 an Athenian, i. 91 init. 
 
 Lysimachus, father of Heraclides, a 
 Syracusan, vi. 73 init. 
 
 Lysimeleia, a marsh near Syracuse, 
 
 vii. 53 med. 
 
 Lysistratus, an Olynthian, iv. no 
 fin. 
 
 M. 
 
 Macarius, a Spartan commander, 
 iii. 100 fin.; falls at the battle of 
 Olpae, ib. 109 init. 
 
 Macedonia, its early history, ii. 99 ; 
 kings of Macedonia originally 
 from Argos, ib. init., v. 80 med.; 
 the Athenians send an expedi¬ 
 tion against Macedonia, i. 57-61; 
 Macedonian troops sent by Per- 
 diccas too late for the Lacedae¬ 
 monian expedition into Acarna- 
 nia, ii. 80 fin.; the Thracians 
 invade Macedonia under Sital- 
 ces, ib. 95-101 ; the military 
 strength of Macedonia much 
 increased by Archelaus, ib. 100 
 init.; Brasidas in Macedonia, iv. 
 
 78 fin., 82, 83 ; second expedi¬ 
 tion of Brasidas into Macedonia, 
 ib. 124-128; the Athenians block¬ 
 ade Macedonia, v. 83 fin.; Mace¬ 
 donia ravaged from Methon& by 
 the Athenians, vi. 7 fin. 
 
 Machaon, a Corinthian commander, 
 ii. 83 fin. 
 
 Maeander, plain of the, iii. 19 fin., 
 
 viii. 58 init. 
 
 Maedi, a Thracian tribe, ii. 98 med. 
 
 Maenalia, part of Arcadia, v. 64 
 init.; Maenalians at Mantinea, 
 ib. 67 med.; hostages taken from 
 the Maenalians by the Argives to 
 be given up under treaty, ib. 77, i. 
 
 Magistrates, the good magistrate 
 is not always bound by the letter 
 of the law, vi. 14. 
 
 x x 
 
 Magnesia, in Asia, given to Themi- 
 stocles by the king, i. 138 fin.; 
 Astyochus goes to Tissaphernes 
 and Alcibiades at Magnesia, viii. 
 50 med. 
 
 Magnesians, dependents of Thes¬ 
 salians, ii. 101 med. 
 
 Malea, Cape, in Lesbos, iii. 4 fin., 
 6 fin. 
 
 Malea, Cape, in Laconia, iv. 53 
 med., 54 init., viii. 39 med. 
 
 Malian Gulf, the, iii. 96 fin., viii. 
 3 init.; darters and slingers from 
 the Malian Gulf, iv. 100 init. 
 
 Malians, iii. 92 init., v. 51 init. 
 
 Maloeis, Apollo, festival of, at Mity- 
 len&, iii. 3 med. 
 
 Mantinea, defeat of Mantinean 
 troops sent by the Lacedaemo¬ 
 nians into Acarnania, iii. 107, 
 108; they escape by a secret 
 treaty with Demosthenes, ib. 109, 
 iii ; the Martineans fight with 
 the Tegeans, iv. 134 [cp. v. 65 
 med.] ; conquer a part of Arcadia, 
 v. 29 init.; secede from the Lace¬ 
 daemonian to the Argive alliance, 
 ib .; driven from Parrhasia by the 
 Lacedaemonians, z$. 33 ; send, at 
 Alcibiades’ bidding, an embassy 
 to Athens, ib. 43 fin., 44 ; make an 
 alliance with Athens, ib. 46, 47 
 [cp. ib. 105 med.]; send a guard 
 to the Olympic games, ib. 50 
 med.; conference between the 
 Argive allies at Mantinea, ib. 55 
 init.; the Mantineans aid the 
 Argives when invaded by the 
 Lacedaemonians, ib. 58 init.; 
 compel the Argives to break 
 their truce with the Lacedaemo¬ 
 nians, ib. 61, 62 ; their territory 
 invaded by the Lacedaemonians, 
 ib. 64 fin., 65 ; battle of Mantinea, 
 ib. 66-74 ; one of the greatest of 
 Hellenic battles, ib. 74 init.; 
 its moral effect, ib. 75 init.; the 
 Mantineans invade Epidaurus 
 with their allies, ib. fin.; frequent 
 violations of the Treaty of Peace 
 in the Mantinean and Epidaurian 
 wars, ib. 26 med.; the Mantinean 
 alliance renounced by the Ar¬ 
 gives, ib. 78 ; the Mantineans are 
 compelled to come to terms with 
 
/ W D E X. 
 
 67 6 
 
 the Lacedaemonians, ib. 81 init.; 
 induced by Alcibiades, join the 
 Athenian expedition against Syra¬ 
 cuse, vi. 29med., 43 fin., 61 med., 
 67 init., 68 init.; the Mantinean 
 
 . troops before Syracuse mercen¬ 
 aries, vii. 57 fin. 
 
 Marathon, battle of, i. 18 med.; the 
 Athenians boast that they fought 
 alone there, ib. 73 fin.; the dead 
 buried on the field, ii. 34 med.; 
 Hippias at Marathon, vi. 59 fin. 
 
 Marathussa, an island off Clazo- 
 menae, viii. 31 fin. 
 
 Mareia, in Egypt, i. 104 init. 
 
 Marriage, questions about marriage 
 occasion a war between Selinus 
 and Egesta, vi. 6 init.; marri¬ 
 ages between the nobles and the 
 people forbidden at Samos, viii. 
 21 fin.; the water of the fountain 
 Callirrhoe used at Athens in 
 marriage rites, ii. 15 fin. 
 
 Massalia, colonised by the Pho- 
 caeans, i. 13 fin. 
 
 Mecybema, in Chalcidice, provision 
 respecting, in the Treaty of 
 Peace, v. 18, vii; captured by the 
 Olynthians, ib. 39 init. 
 
 Medeon, in Acarnania, iii. 106 med. 
 
 Medes, part of the garrison of the 
 White Castle in Memphis, i. 104 
 fin.; in Pausanias’ body guard, ib. 
 130 med. [See Persia, and War, 
 The Persian.] 
 
 Megabates, Persian satrap of Das- 
 cylium, i. 129 init. 
 
 Megabazus, a Persian, ambassador 
 to Lacedaemon, i. 109 init. 
 
 Megabyzus, son of Zopyrus, a Per¬ 
 sian, reconquers Egypt, i. 109 
 med., no. 
 
 Megacles, father of Onasimus, a 
 Sicyonian, iv. 119 med. 
 
 Megara, Theagenes, tyrant of Me- 
 gara [b.c. 620?], i. 126 init.; the 
 Megarians, pressed in war by 
 the Corinthians, revolt from Lace¬ 
 daemon to Athens, ib. 103 fin.; 
 the Athenians build the Long 
 Walls of Megara, ib.-, Megara 
 is invaded by the Corinthians, 
 ib. 105 med.; the Megarian 
 territory ravaged by the Lace¬ 
 daemonians, ib. 108 init.; the 
 
 Megarians revolt from Athens, 
 ib. 114 init.; furnish aid to Co¬ 
 rinth against Corcyra, ib. 27 
 med., 46 init., 48 fin.; are ex¬ 
 cluded by the Athenians from 
 their harbours ib. 67 fin. [cp. ante 
 42 fin]; complain against the 
 Athenians at Sparta, ib .; the La¬ 
 cedaemonians require the Athe¬ 
 nians to remove this restriction, 
 ib. 139 init.; the Athenians bring 
 counter charges against the Me¬ 
 garians, ib. med.; the Megarians 
 furnish the Lacedaemonians with 
 ships, ii. 9 init.; the Athenians 
 invade Megara, ib. 31 ; do this 
 yearly until the capture of Ni- 
 saea, ib. [cp. iv. 66 init.] ; some 
 Megarians suggest to Brasidas 
 an attack on the Piraeus, ii. 93, 
 94 ; Minoa, the island in front 
 of Megara, is captured by the 
 Athenians, iii. 51 ; the Megarian 
 exiles sheltered for a year by the 
 Thebans at Plataea, ib. 68 med.; 
 the popular leaders at Megara 
 attempt to bring in the Athe¬ 
 nians, iv. 66, 67 ; the Athenians 
 capture the Long Walls and Ni- 
 saea, ib. 68, 69 ; Megara saved 
 by Brasidas, ib. 70-73 ; he is re¬ 
 ceived into the city, ib. 73 fin.; 
 the exiles recalled, ib. 74 ; their 
 cruel revenge, ib.\ long duration 
 of the oligarchical government 
 at Megara, ib. fin.; the Mega¬ 
 rians reinforce the Boeotians 
 after Delium, ib. 100 init.; assent 
 to the one year’s truce, ib. 119 
 med.; dissatisfied with the treaty 
 between the Lacedaemonians 
 and Athenians, v. 17 fin.; refuse 
 to join the Argive alliance, ib. 31 
 fin.; act with the Boeotians, ib. 
 38 init.; aid the Lacedaemo¬ 
 nians in the invasion of Argos, 
 ib. 58 fin., 59 med., 60 med.; 
 Megarian exiles accompany the 
 Athenians to Sicily, vi. 43 fin., 
 vii. 57 med.; the Megarians fur¬ 
 nish ships to the Lacedaemo¬ 
 nians, viii. 3 fin., 33 init. 
 
 Megara, in Sicily, founded from 
 Thapsus, mother city of Selinus, 
 vi. 4 init.; depopulated by Gelo, 
 
z'A, ib. 94 init.; Lamachus wishes to 
 make Megarathe Athenian naval 
 station, ib. 49 fin.; fortified by the 
 Syracusans, ib. 75 init.; its lands 
 ravaged by the Athenians, ib. 94 
 init.; the Athenians capture a 
 Syracusan ship off Megara, vii. 
 25 init.;—Megarian colonies in 
 Sicily, vi. 4 init.; Chalcedon, a 
 Megarian colony, iv. 75 fin. 
 
 Meiciades, a Corcyraean com¬ 
 mander, i. 47 init. 
 
 Meidius, a river near Abydos, viii. 
 106 init. 
 
 Melaeans, a people in Italy, colo¬ 
 nists of the Locrians, v. 5 fin. 
 
 Melancridas, a Spartan admiral, 
 viii. 6 fin. 
 
 Melanopus, father of Laches, an 
 Athenian, iii. 86 init. 
 
 Melanthus, a Lacedaemonian com¬ 
 mander, viii. 4 med. 
 
 Meleas, a Lacedaemonian com¬ 
 mander, iii. 5 med. 
 
 Melesander, an Athenian com¬ 
 mander, sent to levy money in 
 Lycia and Caria, ii. 69 med. 
 
 Melesias, an envoy from the Four 
 Hundred to Sparta, viii. 86 
 fin. 
 
 Melesippus, a Lacedaemonian, sent 
 to Athens with the final demands 
 of the Lacedaemonians, i. 139 
 med.; sent by Archidamus to 
 Athens, ii. 12 ; words of, on 
 quitting Attica, ib. fin. 
 
 Melitia, in Achaea Phthiotis, iv. 78 
 init. and fin. 
 
 Melos, one of the Cyclades, ii. 9 
 fin.; a colony of the Lacedae¬ 
 monians, v. 84 med.; hostile to 
 the Athenians, iii. 91 init.; rav¬ 
 aged by the Athenians, ib.\ again 
 attacked by the Athenians, v. 84 
 fin.; conference of the Melians 
 with the Athenians, ib. 85-113. 
 Melos blockaded by the Athe¬ 
 nians, ib. 114, 115 fin., 116 med.; 
 captured, ib. 116 fin.; fate of 
 the citizens, ib. ; capture of three 
 Athenian ships off Melos, viii. 
 39 fin., 41 fin. 
 
 Memphis, attacked by the Athe¬ 
 nians, i. 104 med.; captured by 
 the Persians, ib. 109 fin. 
 
 Menander, an Athenian com¬ 
 mander in Sicily, vii. 16 init.; 
 commands under Demosthenes 
 in the attack on Epipolae, ib. 
 43 med.; and in the last sea 
 fight, ib. 69 fin. 
 
 Menas, a Lacedaemonian, swears 
 to the Treaty of Peace and the 
 Alliance, v. 19 med., 24 init.; 
 goes as envoy to Chalcidice, 
 ib. 21. 
 
 Mende, an Eretrian colony, iv. 123 
 init.; mother city of Eion in 
 Chalcidice, ib. 7 ; revolts to Bra- 
 sidas, ib. 121 fin., 123 init.; the 
 Mendaeans repulse the Athe¬ 
 nians, ib. 129 ; the city is taken 
 by the Athenians, ib. 130 ; the 
 Peloponnesian garrison escapes 
 to Scion£, ib. 131 fin. 
 
 Mendesian mouth of the Nile, i. 
 no fin. 
 
 Menecolus, joint founder with Das- 
 con of Camarina, vi. 5 med. 
 
 Menecrates, a Megarian, swears to 
 the one year’s truce, iv. 119 
 med. 
 
 Menedaeus, a Spartan commander, 
 iii. 100 fin.; deserts his Ambra- 
 ciot allies, ib. 109, iii. 
 
 Menippus, father of Hippocles, an 
 Athenian, viii. 13. 
 
 Meno, a Thessalian of Pharsalus, 
 ii. 22 fin. 
 
 Mercenaries, Arcadian, iii. 34 init., 
 vii. 19 med., 58 med. [cp. ib. 48 
 fin.], [Mantineans], iii. 109 med., 
 vii. 57 fin.; Aetolian, vii. 57 fin.; 
 Cretan, vii. 57 fin.; lapygian, vii. 
 33 med., 57 fin.; Peloponnesian, 
 i. 60, iv. 52 init., 76 med., viii. 
 28 fin.; Thracian, iv. 129 med., v. 
 6 fin., vii. 27 init., 29, 30.; under 
 Tissaphernes, viii. 25 init. 
 
 — foreign sailors in the Athenian 
 service, i. 121 med., 141 init., vii. 
 13 med. 
 
 Messapians, an Ozolian Locrian 
 tribe, iii. 101 fin.; an lapygian 
 tribe, vii. 33 med. 
 
 Messene, in Sicily, originally named 
 Zancle, vi. 4 fin.; re-peopled by 
 Anaxilas, ib.\ geographical im¬ 
 portance of, iv. 1 init., vi. 48 fin.; 
 the Messenians come to terms 
 
6;8 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 with the Athenians, iii. 90 fin.; 
 revolt from Athens, iv. 1 init.; 
 Messene becomes the head¬ 
 quarters of the Syracusans in 
 the war with Rhegium, ib. 24 ; 
 the Messenians attack and are 
 defeated by the Naxians, ib. 25 
 med.; quarrels in Messene, v. 5 
 init.; the Messenians refuse to 
 receive Alcibiades, vi. 50 init.; 
 attempt to betray Messene to 
 the Athenians frustrated by Al¬ 
 cibiades, ib. 74. 
 
 Messenians in Peloponnesus, old 
 inhabitants of Laconia, i. 101 
 med., iv. 41 init.; use the Doric 
 dialect, iii. 112 med., iv. 3 fin., 
 41 init.; settled by the Athenians 
 at Naupactus, i. 103, ii. 9 med.; 
 accompany the Athenians on an 
 expedition round Peloponnesus, ii. 
 25 fin.; aid Phormio at Naupactus, 
 ib. 90 ; serve under Phormio in 
 Acarnania, ib. 102 init.; under Ni- 
 costratus at Corcyra, iii. 75 init., 
 81 init.; persuade Demosthenes 
 to attack Aetolia, ib. 94-98 ; serve 
 under Demosthenes at Olpae, ib. 
 107 init., 108 med., 112 med.; De¬ 
 mosthenes wishes to settle them 
 at Pylos, iv. 3 fin.; a Messenian 
 privateer joins him there, ib. 9 
 med.; the Messenians assist in 
 the capture of Sphacteria, ib. 32 
 med.; stratagem of their general, 
 ib. 36 ; garrison Pylos, ib. 41 init.; 
 withdrawn, v. 35 fin.; replaced, 
 ib. 56 ; taken by the Athenians 
 to Syracuse, vii. 57 med. [cp. ib. 
 31.] [Compare Helots.] 
 
 Metagenes, a Lacedaemonian, 
 swears to the Fifty Years’ Peace 
 and the Alliance, v. 19 med.; ib. 
 24 init. 
 
 Metapontium, in Italy, allied to the 
 Athenians, vii. 33 med.; lends aid 
 against Syracuse, ib ., ib. 57 fin. 
 
 Methon£, between Epidaurus and 
 Troezen, iv. 45 ; ordered to 
 be restored under treaty, v. 18, 
 viii. 
 
 Methon&, in Macedonia, vi. 7 fin.; 
 Methonaean light-armed troops 
 under Nicias at Mend£, iv. 129 fin. 
 
 Methon£, in Laconia, ii. 25 init. 
 
 Methydrium, in Arcadia, v. 58 init. 
 
 Methymna, colonised from Boeotia, 
 
 vii. 57 med.; opposite Harmatus, 
 
 viii. 101 fin.; the Methymnaeans 
 independent allies of Athens, iii. 
 50 med., vi. 85 med., vii. 57 
 med.; refuse to join in the re¬ 
 volt of Lesbos, iii. 2 init., 5 init.; 
 defeated in an attack on Antissa, 
 ib. 18 med.; revolt from Athens, 
 viii. 22 fin.; re-conquered by the 
 Athenians, ib. 23 fin.; Methym- 
 naean exiles attempt Methymna, 
 viii. 100 med.; induce Eresus to 
 revolt, ib. fin. 
 
 Metics, metic hoplites at Athens, 
 ii. 13 fin., 31 fin., iv. 90 init.; 
 serve in the fleet, i. 143 init., iii. 
 16 init. [cp. vii. 63 med.] 
 
 Metropolis, in Acarnania, iii. 107 
 init. 
 
 Might before right, i. 77, iii. 39 med. 
 
 Migrations in ancient Hellas, i. 2,12. 
 
 Miletus, situated on a peninsula, 
 viii. 25 fin.; the Milesians, Io- 
 nians, and tributaries of the 
 Athenians, vii. 57 init.; quarrel 
 with the Samians, i. 115 init.; the 
 Athenians defeat the Samians 
 sailing from Miletus, ib. 116 med.; 
 Milesian hoplites accompany the 
 Athenians in the expedition 
 against Corinth, iv. 42 init.; aid 
 in the capture of Cythera, ib. 53, 
 54; the Milesians, at Alcibiades’ 
 persuasion, revolt from Athens, 
 viii. 17; defeated by the Athe¬ 
 nians, ib. 24 init.; conquer the 
 Argive allies of the Athenians, 
 but forced to retreat by the Athe¬ 
 nians, ib. 25 [this defeat causes 
 Alcibiades to fall into suspicion 
 at Sparta, ib. 45 init.]; Alcibiades 
 urges the Peloponnesian fleet to 
 relieve Miletus, ib. 26 fin.; the 
 Athenians retire from Miletus, 
 ib. 27 fin.; Philip is put in com¬ 
 mand of Miletus, ib. 28 fin.; Tis- 
 saphernes comes there, ib. 29 
 init.; a division of the Athenian 
 army watches Miletus, ib. 30 
 med.; Astyochus assumes com¬ 
 mand of the fleet at Miletus, ib. 
 33 init.; the Peloponnesians at 
 Miletus, ib. 35, 36, 39; Astyochus 
 
INDEX. 
 
 679 
 
 leaves Miletus, ib. 41; Tissa- 
 phernes invites the Pelopon¬ 
 nesians to Miletus, ib. 57 init., 
 60 fin.; the fleet at Miletus offers 
 battle to the. Athenians, ib. 63 
 init.; discontent of the Pelopon¬ 
 nesian sailors at Miletus, ib. 78; 
 the Milesians, acting in concert 
 with the fleet, offer the Athenians 
 battle, ib. 79; the Peloponnesians 
 at Miletus send a fleet to the 
 Hellespont, ib. 80; the sailors at 
 Miletus break out into open vio¬ 
 lence against Astyochus, ib. 83, 
 84 init.; the Milesians expel the 
 Persian garrison, ib. 84 med.; 
 resent the reproof which they re¬ 
 ceive from Lichas, ib. fin.; send 
 envoys to Sparta to complain of 
 Astyochus, ib. 85 init., fin.; the 
 Peloponnesian fleet leaves Mile¬ 
 tus for the Hellespont, ib. 99, 
 100 init., 108 med. 
 
 Miltiades, the great, father of Ci- 
 mon, i. 98 init., 100 init. 
 
 Mimas, Mount, viii. 34 fin. 
 
 Mindarus, sent from Lacedaemon 
 to succeed Astyochus, viii. 85 
 init.; sails to the Hellespont, ib. 
 99; escapes the Athenian watch, 
 ib. 101; captures four of the 
 Athenian squadron in the Helles¬ 
 pont, ib. 102; defeated by the 
 Athenians off Cynossema, ib. 104, 
 105 - 
 
 Mines, gold, on the coast opposite 
 Thasos, i. 100 med., iv. 105 init.; 
 silver, at Laurium, ii. 55, vi. 91 
 fin. 
 
 Minoa, an island off Megara, cap¬ 
 tured by Nicias, iii. 51, iv. 67 
 init.; retained by the Athenians 
 under the truce for a year, ib. 
 118, iii. 
 
 Minos, first possessor of a navy 
 in Hellas, i. 4; conquers the 
 Cyclades, ib. ; expels the Carians, 
 ib.', puts down piracy, ib., ib. 8 
 med. 
 
 Minyans, the Minyan Orchomenus, 
 iv. 76 med. 
 
 Mitylene, the Mitylenaeans revolt 
 from Athens, iii. 2; send envoys 
 to Lacedaemon and Athens, ib. 4: 
 to Sparta again, ib. 5 fin.; the 
 
 Athenians blockade Mitylene by 
 sea, ib. 6 ; the Mitylenaean 
 envoys attend the Olympic festi¬ 
 val at the bidding of the Lace¬ 
 daemonians, ib. 8; their speech, 
 ib. 9-14; the Mitylenaeans are 
 taken into alliance by the Lace¬ 
 daemonians, ib. 15 init.; unsuc¬ 
 cessfully attack Methymna, ib. 
 18 init.; Mitylen6 is blockaded 
 by land, ib. fin.; Salaethus is 
 sent from Lacedaemon to Mity- 
 iene, ib. 25; Salaethus arms the 
 people, who insist on surrender¬ 
 ing the city, ib. 27, 28; the news 
 reaching the Peloponnesian fleet, 
 Teutiaplus advises an immediate 
 attack on Mitylen£, ib. 29, 30 ; 
 Paches sends Salaethus, and 
 the most guilty of the Mity¬ 
 lenaeans to Athens, ib. 35; all 
 the grown up citizens condemned 
 to death by the Athenians, ib. 36 
 init.; feeling at Athens changes, 
 ib. fin.; speech of Cleon against 
 the recall of the decree, ib. 37- 
 40; of Diodotus in favour of re¬ 
 calling it, ib. 41-48; the decree 
 is recalled, ib. 49 init.; the second 
 ship sent to stay the slaughter 
 arrives in time by great exertions, 
 ib. fin.; the captives at Athens 
 put to death, their fleet and de¬ 
 pendencies taken away, the walls 
 of Mitylene razed, ib. 50; Lesbian 
 refugees take Rhoeteium and 
 Antandrus, iv. 52; driven out 
 again by the Athenians, ib. 75 
 med.; Mitylen£ revolts a second 
 time, viii. 22 fin.; recaptured by 
 the Athenians, ib. 23 med.; gar¬ 
 risoned by the Athenians, viii. 
 100 med. 
 
 Molobrus, father of Epitadas, a 
 Lacedaemonian, iv. 8 fin. 
 
 Molossians, Admetus, king of the 
 Molossians, shelters Themisto- 
 cles, i. 136, 137; the Molossians 
 assist in the Lacedaemonian 
 invasion of Acarnania, ii. 80 fin. 
 
 Molycreium, a Corinthian colony, 
 subject to Athens, ii. 84 fin., 
 iii. 102 init.; taken by the Pelo¬ 
 ponnesians, iii. 102 init.; the 
 Molycreian Rhium, ii. 86 init. 
 
68 o 
 
 I A D E X. 
 
 Morgantin&, handed over to the 
 Camarinaeans, iv. 65 init. 
 
 Motya, a Phoenician settlement in 
 Sicily, vi. 2 fin. 
 
 Munychia, a maritime suburb of 
 Athens, ii. 13 fin.; Peripoli sta¬ 
 tioned at Munychia, viii. 92 med.; 
 Dionysiac Theatre near, ib. 93 
 init. 
 
 Mycale, battle of, i. 89 init.; Athe¬ 
 nian and Peloponnesian fleets at 
 Mycale, viii. 79. 
 
 Mycalessus, in Boeotia, vii. 29 init.; 
 sacked by Thracians in Athe¬ 
 nian pay, ib. 29, 30. 
 
 Mycenae, kingdom of, i. 9; the 
 small remains of Mycenae do 
 not disprove its former greatness, 
 ib. 10. 
 
 Myconus, one of the Cyclades, iii. 
 29 med. 
 
 Mygdonia, part of, assigned to the 
 Chalcidians by Perdiccas, i. 58 
 fin.; once inhabited by the Edo- 
 nians, ii. 99 med.; ravaged by 
 Sitalces, ib. 100 med. 
 
 Myle, a town of Messene in Sicily, 
 
 iii. 90 med.; captured by the 
 Athenians, ib. fin. 
 
 Myletidae, Syracusan exiles, take 
 part in colonizing Himera, vi. 5 
 init. 
 
 Myoneans, an Ozolian Locrian 
 tribe, iii. 101 med. 
 
 Myonnesus, near Teos, iii. 32 init. 
 
 Myrcinus, an Edonian town, joins 
 Brasidas, iv. 107 fin.; Myrcinian 
 targeteers at the battle of Am- 
 phipolis, v. 6 fin.; Myrcinian 
 cavalry there, ib. 10 fin.; Cleon 
 killed by a Myrcinian targeteer,/^. 
 
 Myronides, an Athenian, defeats 
 the Corinthians in Megaris, i. 
 105 fin.; defeats the Boeotians 
 at Oenophyta, ib. 108 med. [cp. 
 
 iv. 95 fin.] 
 
 Myrrhin£, wife of Hippias, the 
 tyrant of Athens, vi. 55 med. 
 
 Myrtilus, an Athenian, swears to 
 the Treaty of Peace and the 
 Alliance, v. 19 fin., 24 med. 
 
 Myscon, a Syracusan general, viii. 
 85 fin. 
 
 Mysteries, profanation of the mys¬ 
 teries at Athens, vi. 28 med.; 
 
 Alcibiades accused ,ib.; supposed 
 to be part of a plot against the 
 democracy, ib. fin., 60 init., 61 
 init.; Alcibiades and some of his 
 comrades summoned home from 
 Sicily, ib. 53 init., 61 med. 
 
 Myus, a city in Caria, iii. 19 fin.; 
 given by the King to Themisto- 
 cles, i. 138 fin. 
 
 N. 
 
 Nature, human, ‘ always ready to 
 transgress the laws, 5 iii. 84 med.; 
 ‘ prone to domineer over the sub¬ 
 servient, 5 iv. 61 med., v. 105 init.; 
 prompts men to accept a proffered 
 empire, i. 76 med.; ever credu¬ 
 lous, ib. 20; jealous, ii. 35 fin.; 
 changes with the changes of for¬ 
 tune, i. 84 init., 140 init., ii. 61, 
 iii. 39 med., iv. 17 fin.; prone to 
 error, iii. 45 init., iv. 18 init.; 
 misled in its judgments by hope, 
 iii. 39 med., iv. 108 med.; yields 
 when met in a yielding spirit, iv. 
 19 fin.; inherent vanity of, v. 68 
 init.; sameness of, i. 21 fin., 76 
 med., iii. 45 fin., 82 init. 
 
 Naucleides, a Plataean, invites the 
 Thebans to Plataea, ii. 2 med. 
 
 Naucrates, father of Damotimus, 
 a Sicyonian, iv. 119 med. 
 
 Naupactus, settled by the Helots 
 from Ithome, i. 103 med.; allied 
 to the Athenians, ii. 9 med.; be¬ 
 comes the head-quarters of an 
 Athenian fleet, ib. 69, 84 fin., 
 92 fin., iii. 114 init., iv. 13 
 med.; the Peloponnesians hope 
 to take it, ii. 80 med.; victory 
 of the Athenians off Naupactus, 
 ib. 83, 84 [cp. iii. 78]; feigned 
 attack of the Peloponnesians 
 upon, ii. 90 init.; second victory 
 of the Athenians off, ib. 91, 92 ; 
 Phormio makes an expedition 
 from Naupactus into Acarnania, 
 ib. 102, 103 ; Phormio’s son, Aso- 
 pius, succeeds him at Naupactus, 
 iii. 7 ; Nicostratus sails to Cor- 
 cyra from Naupactus, z'A 75 init.; 
 theMessenians of Naupactus per¬ 
 suade Demosthenes to attack 
 Aetolia, ib. 94 fin-98 ; Demos- 
 
INDEX. 
 
 681 
 
 thenes remains at Naupactus 
 after his defeat, ib. 98 fin.; the 
 Aetolians persuade the Lacedae¬ 
 monians to make an expedition 
 against Naupactus, ib. 100; De¬ 
 mosthenes, by the aid of the 
 Acarnanians, saves the place, ib. 
 102 ; Athenian ships from Nau¬ 
 pactus come to Pylos, iv. 13 med.; 
 the Messenians of Naupactus 
 send a garrison to Pylos, ib. 41 
 init.; the Athenian forces at Nau¬ 
 pactus capture Anactorium, ib. 
 49 ; Demosthenes comes to Nau¬ 
 pactus to aid Hippocrates in the 
 invasion of Boeotia, ib. 76, 77 ; 
 the Corinthians prepare a fleet 
 to attack the Athenians at Nau¬ 
 pactus, vii. 17 fin., 19 fin.; De¬ 
 mosthenes and Eurymedon send 
 reinforcements, ib. 31 med.; in¬ 
 decisive action off Naupactus, ib. 
 34; the Messenians of Naupactus 
 send a force to Sicily, ib. 31 init., 
 57 med. 
 
 Naval Tactics : unskilfulness of 
 ancient tactics, i. 49 init. [cp. vii. 
 62]; Athenian naval tactics, ii. 
 83, 84, 89 med., 91, iii. 78, vii. 36, 
 49 med. 
 
 Navy : Minos the first possessor of 
 a navy, i. 4 ; the fleet which 
 carried the Hellenes to Troy, 
 ib. 9 fin., 10 med.; the early 
 Hellenic navies, ib. 13, 14 [ C P- 
 104 init.]; progress of naval in¬ 
 vention, ib. 13 init., 14 fin. [see 
 Ships]; importance of its navy to 
 Athens, ib. 93,ii. 13 init.,vii.66init., 
 viii. 66 [see Athens]; the greatest 
 number reached by the Athenian 
 navy, iii. 17 init.; composition and 
 number of the Lacedaemonian 
 fleet, ii. 7 fin., viii. 3 fin.; quick 
 deterioration of ancient navies, 
 vii. 14 init. 
 
 Naxos, subjugated by the Atheni¬ 
 ans, i. 98 fin.; Themistocles 
 is carried to Naxos in his flight, 
 and narrowly escapes the Athe¬ 
 nians there, ib. 137 init. 
 
 Naxos [in Sicily], founded from 
 Chalcis by Thucles, vi. 3 init.; 
 altar of Apollo the Founder at, 
 ib.\ the Naxians kinsmen of the 
 
 Leontines, vi. 20 med.; defeat the 
 Messenians, iv. 25 ; receive the 
 Athenian expedition, vi. 50 med.; 
 become allies of Athens, vii. 
 14 med., ib. 57 fin.; Naxos is 
 made the winter quarters of the 
 Athenians, vi. 72 init., 74 fin., 75 
 med.; they abandon it for Catana, 
 ib. 88 med.; the Naxians furnish 
 the Athenians with cavalry, ib. 
 98 init. 
 
 Neapolis, a Carthaginian factory in 
 Libya, vii. 50 init. 
 
 Neighbours ever enemies, iv. 95 
 med. [cp. v. 69 med., vi. 88 init.] 
 
 Nemea, in Locris, death of Hesiod 
 at, iii. 96 init.; temple of Ne- 
 mean Zeus, ib. 
 
 Nemea, in Argolis, v. 58-60. 
 
 Neodamodes, meaning of the word, 
 vii. 58 med.; settled with the 
 Helots at Lepreum, v. 34 med.; 
 Neodamodes at Mantinea, ib. 67 
 init.; sent to Syracuse with the 
 Helots by the Lacedaemonians, 
 vii. 19med., 58 med.; three hun¬ 
 dred Neodamodes sent out to 
 Agis, viii. 4 med. 
 
 Nericum, in Leucas, iii. 7 fin. 
 
 Nestus, a river in Thrace, ii. 96 fin. 
 
 Nicanor, a Chaonian leader, ii. 8ofin. 
 
 Nicasus, a Megarian, swears to the 
 one year’s Truce, iv. 119 med. 
 
 Niceratus, father of Nicias, an 
 Athenian, iii. 51 init., 91 init., iv. 
 27 fin., 42 init., 53 init., 119 fin., 
 129 med., v. 16 init., 83 fin., vi. 
 8 med. 
 
 Niciades, an Athenian, president 
 at the passing of the one year’s 
 Truce, iv. 118 fin. 
 
 Nicias, of Gortys, ii. 85 fin. 
 
 Nicias, father of Hagnon, an Athe¬ 
 nian, ii. 58 init., iv. 102 med. 
 
 Nicias, his religiousness, vii. 77 
 med., 86 fin.; his superstitious 
 temper, ib. 50 fin.; his dilatori¬ 
 ness, ib. 42 med.; his ill health, 
 vi. 102 med., vii. 15 fin., 77 init.; 
 captures Minoa, iii. 51 init.; rav¬ 
 ages Melos, ib. 91 init.; defeats 
 the Tanagraeans, ib. fin.; ravages 
 Locris, ib.\ yields his command 
 at Pylos to Cleon, iv. 27, 28 ; 
 leads an expedition into the Co- 
 
682 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 rinthian territory, ib. 42-45 ; cap¬ 
 tures Cythera, ib. 53, 54 ; swears 
 to the one year’s Truce, ib. 119 
 fin.; wounded in an attempt to 
 take Mend<b, ib. 129; his anxiety 
 for peace, v. i6init., 43 med. [cp. 
 vii. 86 med.]; swears to the 
 Treaty of Peace and the Alliance, 
 v. 19 fin., 24 med.; goes on an 
 unsuccessful embassy to Sparta, 
 ib. 46; designed for the command 
 of an expedition to Chalcidice, 
 which Perdiccas frustrates, ib. 83 
 fin.; appointed one of the generals 
 in Sicily, vi. 8 med.; speech of, 
 ib. 9-14; second speech of, ib. 
 20-23; gives an estimate of the 
 forces required, ib. 25 ; argues in 
 a council of war for an attack on 
 Selinus, ib. 47; goes to Egesta, 
 ib. 62; defeats the Syracusans, 
 ib. 67-70; saves Epipolae, ib. 102 ; 
 becomes sole commander after 
 the death of Lamachus, ib. 103 fin.; 
 negotiates with the Syracusans, 
 ib. [cp. vii. 48 init., ib. 49 init., 
 ib. 73 fin., ib. 86 fin.]; fails to 
 prevent the coming of Gylippus, 
 vii. 1, 2; fortifies Plemmyrium, 
 ib. 4 med.; defeated by the Syra¬ 
 cusans, ib. 6; sends a despatch 
 to Athens, ib. 8, 10, 11-15; de¬ 
 stroys by an ambush the Syra¬ 
 cusan reinforcements, ib. 32 ; left 
 in the Athenian lines while De¬ 
 mosthenes attacks Epipolae, ib. 
 43 med.; swayed by information 
 from Syracuse and fear of public 
 opinion at home, he refuses to 
 abandon the siege, ib. 48, 49; 
 yields at last, ib. 50 med.; but, an 
 eclipse of the moon happening, 
 decides to remain thrice nine 
 days, ib. 50 fin.; exhorts the army 
 before the battle in the harbour, 
 ib. 61-64; addresses the trierarchs, 
 ib. 69; endeavours to encourage 
 his retreating soldiers, ib. 76, 77 ; 
 commands one division in the 
 retreat, ib. .78 init. foil.; overtaken 
 and compelled to surrender, ib. 
 83-85 ; put to death by the Syra¬ 
 cusans, ib. 86. 
 
 Nicolaus, a Lacedaemonian am¬ 
 bassador to Persia, ii. 67 init. 
 
 Nicomachus, a Phocian, betrays to 
 the Lacedaemonians the Athe¬ 
 nian plan for the conquest of 
 Boeotia, iv. 89 init. 
 
 Nicomedes, a Lacedaemonian, 
 general in place of King Pleis- 
 toanax, i. 107 init. 
 
 Nicon, a Boeotian, commands the 
 reinforcements to Syracuse, vii. 
 19 med. 
 
 Niconidas, a Thessalian, escorts 
 Brasidas through Thessaly, iv. 
 78 init. 
 
 Nicostratus, an Athenian general, 
 sails to Corcyra, iii. 75; becomes 
 the colleague of Nicias, iv. 53 
 init.; assists in the capture of 
 Cythera, ib. 53, 54; of Mende, ib. 
 129, 130 ; and in the blockade of 
 Scione, ib. 131; swears to the one 
 year’s Truce, ib. 119 fin.; brings 
 with Laches an expedition to Ar¬ 
 gos, v. 61 init.; falls in the battle 
 of Mantinea, ib. 74 fin. 
 
 Nightingale, called by the Poets 
 the ‘ Daulian Bird,’ ii. 29 init. 
 
 Nile, i. 104 med., no fin. 
 
 Nine Ways, old name of Amphi- 
 polis, i. 100 fin., iv. 102 med. 
 
 Nisaea, the harbour of Megara, ii. 
 93 init., iv. 66 fin.; connected with 
 the city by the Long Walls, i. 103 
 fin.; occupied by the Athenians, 
 ib.,ib. 114 init.; restored under the 
 thirty years’ Peace, ib. 115 init.; 
 Cleon demands its surrender with 
 other places after the blocade of 
 Sphacteria, iv. 21 fin.; garrisoned 
 by Peloponnesian forces, ib. 66 
 fin.; captured by the Athenians, 
 ib. 69; Brasidas arrives too late 
 to save it, ib. 70 fin.; cavalry en¬ 
 gagement before Nisaea, ib. 72 
 fin.; the Athenians at Nisaea re¬ 
 fuse battle with Brasidas, ib. 73 
 [cp. Brasidas’ account, ib. 85 fin., 
 108 med.] ; not given up under 
 the treaty, v. 17 med. 
 
 Nisus, Temple of, at Nisaea, iv. 
 
 118, iii. 
 
 Nomothetae, reappointed at Athens 
 after the deposition of the Four 
 Hundred, viii. 97 med. 
 
 Notium, seditions there, Paches 
 gains the city by a trick, iii. 34; 
 
INDEX. 
 
 683 
 
 handed over to the Colophonians 
 by the Athenians, ib. fin. 
 
 Nymphodorus, of Abdera, ne¬ 
 gotiates an alliance between his 
 brother-in-law Sitalces and the 
 Athenians, ii. 29. 
 
 O. 
 
 Obols, Aeginetan, v. 47, iv. 
 
 Ocytus, father of Aeneas, a Corin¬ 
 thian, iv. 119 med. 
 
 Odomantians, a people in Thrace, 
 
 ii. 101 med.; Polles, their king, v. 
 6 init. 
 
 Odrysians, a people in Thrace, 
 their empire founded by Teres, 
 
 ii. 29 init.; Sitalces, their king, 
 becomes the ally of the Atheni¬ 
 ans, ib. fin.; his campaign against 
 Perdiccas, ib. 95, 98-101; the 
 greatness and wealth of his king¬ 
 dom, ib. 96, 97. 
 
 Odysseus, his passage through 
 Charybdis, iv. 24 fin. 
 
 Oeantheans, an Ozolian Locrian 
 tribe, iii. 101 fin. 
 
 Oeneon, a town in Ozolian Locris, 
 
 iii. 95 fin., 98 fin., 102 init. 
 
 Oeniadae, in Acarnania, its situa¬ 
 tion, ii. 102 init.; hostile to the 
 Athenians, ib. 82, 102 init., iii. 
 94 init.; besieged by Pericles, 
 i. iii fin.; attacked by Asopius, 
 iii. 7 med.; the fugitives from 
 Olpae find refuge there, ib. 114 
 med.; compelled to enter the 
 Athenian alliance, iv. 77 fin. 
 
 Oenoe, an Athenian fort on the 
 Boeotian frontier, ii. 18 init.; un¬ 
 successfully attacked by the Lace¬ 
 daemonians, ib. 19 init.; besieged 
 by the Corinthians, viii. 98 ; be¬ 
 trayed to the Boeotians by Aris¬ 
 tarchus, ib. 
 
 Oenophyta, battle of, i. 108 med. 
 [cp. iv. 95 fin.] 
 
 Oenussae, islands before Chios, 
 viii. 24 init. 
 
 Oesyme, in Thrace, a Thasian 
 colony, revolts from Athens, iv. 
 107 fin. 
 
 Oetaeans, a people in Thessaly, iii. 
 92 init., viii. 3 init. 
 
 Oligarchy, oligarchies quickly fall 
 
 a victim to private ambition, viii. 
 89 fin.; their cruelty and un¬ 
 scrupulousness, ib. 48 fin.; their 
 selfishness, vi. 39 fin.; the oli¬ 
 garchies everywhere hostile to 
 Athens, i. 19 init., 76 init., 144 
 med., iii. 47 med., 82 init. 
 
 Olophyxus, in Act£, iv. 109 med. 
 
 Olorus, father of Thucydides, iv. 
 
 104 fin. 
 
 Olpae, a hill fort in Acarnania, iii. 
 
 105 init.; battle of Olpae, ib. 106- 
 109; the Peloponnesians steal 
 away from Olpae under truce 
 with Demosthenes, ib. 111; de¬ 
 struction of the Ambraciot rein¬ 
 forcements on the way to Olpae, 
 ib. no, 112, 113. 
 
 Olpaeans, a people in Locris, iii. 
 101 fin. 
 
 Olympia, treasury at, i. 121 med., 
 143 init.;—the Mitylenaean en¬ 
 voys meet the allies in council 
 at Olympia, iii. 8 ; treaties in¬ 
 scribed on pillars there, v. 18, xi; 
 47 fin.;—games at Olympia, i. 
 126 init., iii. 8, v. 49, 50; the 
 treaty between Athens and Argos 
 ordered to be renewed thirty 
 days before the festival, v. 47 fin.; 
 exclusion of the Lacedaemonians 
 by the Eleans, ib. 49.;—Olympic 
 victors : Cylon, i. 126 init.; Do- 
 rieus, iii. 8 ; Androsthenes, v. 49 
 init.; Lichas, ib. 50 med.; — 
 Olympic Truce, ib. 49 med.;— 
 Olympian Zeus, ib. 31 med., 50 
 init. 
 
 Olympieum, temple at Syracuse, 
 vi. 64 med., 65 fin., 70 fin., 75 
 init., vii. 4 fin., 37, 42 fin. 
 
 Olympus, Mount, between Thessaly 
 and Macedonia, iv. 78 fin. 
 
 Olynthus, in Chalcidic^, its situa¬ 
 tion, i. 63 med.; the Chalcidians 
 leave their towns on the coast 
 and settle at,#. 58fin.; battle of,#. 
 62, 63 ; Olynthian reinforcements 
 decide an engagement before 
 Spartolus, ii. 79 ; Brasidas sends 
 the women and children from 
 Mend& and Scione to Olynthus, 
 
 iv. 123 fin.; the Olynthians ex¬ 
 change prisoners with the Athe¬ 
 nians, v. 3 fin.; provision respect- 
 
684 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 ing Olynthus in the Treaty of 
 Peace, ib. 18, vi ; the Olynthians 
 capture Mecyberna, ib. 39 init. 
 
 Omens eagerly sought for at the 
 commencement of the War, ii. 8 
 med. 
 
 Onasimus, a Sicyonian, swears to 
 the one year’s Truce, iv. 119 med. 
 
 Oneium, Mount, in Corinthian ter¬ 
 ritory, iv. 44 med. 
 
 Onetorides, father of Diemporus, a 
 Theban, ii. 2 med. 
 
 Onomacles, an Athenian com¬ 
 mander, viii. 25 init., 30 med. 
 
 Ophioneans, an Aetolian tribe, iii. 
 94 fin., 96 med.; Tolophus, an 
 Ophionean, ib. 100 init. 
 
 Opici, drove the Sicels out of Italy, 
 vi. 2 med.; Opicia, vi. 4 med. 
 
 Opus, in Locris, ii. 32. 
 
 Oracle, Delphian, consulted by Cy- 
 lon, i. 126 init.; by the Epidam- 
 nians, ib. 25 init.; by the Lace¬ 
 daemonians before beginning the 
 war, ib. 118 fin., 123 med., ii. 54 
 med.; before colonizing Heraclea, 
 
 iii. 92 fin.; orders Pausanias to 
 be buried in the temple of 
 Athene, i. 134 fin.; provision re¬ 
 specting, in the one year’s Truce, 
 
 iv. 118, i ;—ancient oracle about 
 the suppliant of Ithomaean Zeus, 
 current among the Lacedaemo¬ 
 nians, i. 103 med.; about Alc- 
 maeon, ii. 102 fin.; about Hesiod, 
 iii. 96 init.; about the Pelasgian 
 ground, ii. 17 med.; current at 
 Athens during the plague, ib. 54 
 init.; about the restoration of 
 Pleistoanax, v. 16 med.; about 
 the restoration of the Delians, 
 ib. 32 init.; about the thrice nine 
 years, current at the beginning 
 of the War, ib. 26 fin.; the only 
 one justified by events, ib.; — 
 oracles recited by soothsayers 
 and diviners at the beginning of 
 the War, ii. 8 med., 21 fin.;—the 
 oracles helpless in the plague, 
 ib. 47 fin.; often the ruin of those 
 who trust them, v. 103 fin. 
 
 Orchomenus, in Arcadia, besieged 
 by the Argives and Athenians, v. 
 61 med.; surrenders, ib. fin. 
 
 Orchomenus, in Boeotia, i. 113 init.; 
 
 earthquakes at, iii. 87 fin.; for¬ 
 merly called the 1 Minyan,’ iv. 
 76 init.; conspiracy to betray the 
 city to the Athenians, ib. 
 
 Orestes, exiled son of a Thessalian 
 king, i. iii init. 
 
 Orestheum, in Maenalia, iv. 134 
 med., v. 64 init. 
 
 Orestians, a people in Epirus, ii. 
 80 fin. 
 
 Oreus, the only city retained by 
 Athens in Euboea after the second 
 revolt, viii. 95 fin. 
 
 Orneae, in Argolis, the Orneatae on 
 the Argive side at Mantinea, v. 
 67 fin.,72 fin.,74 med.; the Argive 
 exiles settled at Orneae, vi. 7 
 init.; the town treacherously cap¬ 
 tured by the Argives, ib. med. 
 
 Orobiae, in Euboea, iii. 89 init. 
 
 Oroedus, king of the Paravaeans, 
 ii. 80 fin. 
 
 Oropus, subject to the Athenians, 
 ii. 23 fin., iii. 91 med., iv. 96 fin.; 
 on theAthenian border, iv. 9 imed., 
 99 med.; provisions brought from 
 Euboea to Athens through Oro¬ 
 pus, vii. 28 init.; betrayed to the 
 Boeotians, viii. 60 init.; a Pelo¬ 
 ponnesian squadron puts in at 
 Oropus, ib. 95. 
 
 Ortygia, the first city of Syracuse, 
 vi. 3 med. 
 
 Oscius, a river in Thrace, ii. 96 fin. 
 
 Ostracism of Themistocles, i. 135 ; 
 of Hyperbolus, viii. 73 init. 
 
 P. 
 
 Paches, an Athenian commander, 
 sent with reinforcements to Mity- 
 lene, iii. 18 fin.; obtains posses¬ 
 sion of the city, ib. 27, 28 ; chases 
 Alcidas to Patmos, ib. 33 med.; 
 captures Notium by treachery, 
 ib. 34 ; reduces Pyrrha and Ere- 
 sus, ib. 35 init.; sends Salaethus 
 captive to Athens with the most 
 guilty of the Mitylenaeans, ib., ib. 
 50init.; receives orders to put to 
 death all the grown up citizens 
 of Mitylen£, ib. 36 ; a counter¬ 
 mand reaches him in time tP 
 save the city, ib. 49 fin. 
 
 Paean, confusion occasioned at 
 
I N D E X. 685 
 
 Epipolae by the Doric Paeans 
 of the Athenian allies, vii. 44 fin. 
 
 Paeonians, subjects of Sitalces, ii. 
 96 med., 98 med. 
 
 Pagondas, one of the Boeotarchs 
 from Thebes, iv. 91 med.; his 
 speech to his soldiers, ib. 92 ; 
 defeats the Athenians at Delium, 
 ib. 93, 96. 
 
 Palaereans, in Acarnania, Sollium 
 given to them by the Athenians, 
 ii. 30 init. 
 
 Pale, in Cephallenia, ii. 30 fin.; the 
 Palaeans furnish four ships to the 
 Corinthians, i. 27 fin. 
 
 Pallene, peninsula in Chalcidice, i. 
 
 56 init., 64, iv. 116 init., 120 init., 
 123 init., 129 init.; its isthmus, i. 
 64 init., iv. 120 med. 
 
 Pamillus colonizes Selinus from 
 Megara in Sicily, vi. 4 init. 
 
 Pamphylia, i. 100 init. 
 
 Panactum, an Athenian fortress on 
 the Boeotian border, betrayed to 
 the Boeotians, v. 3 fin.; ordered 
 to be restored under the Treaty 
 of Peace, ib. 18, viii ; the Lace¬ 
 daemonians promise to get it 
 back for the Athenians, ib. 35 
 fin.; they entreat the Boeotians 
 to give it up to them, ib. 36 fin.; 
 the Boeotians demolish it, ib. 39 
 fin., 42 init.; rage of the Athe¬ 
 nians at its destruction, ib. 42 fin.; 
 the Lacedaemonians demand Py- 
 los in return for Panactum, ib. 44 
 fin.; the Athenians request the 
 Lacedaemonians to rebuild and 
 restore it, ib. 46 med. 
 
 Panaeans, in Thrace, ii. 101 med. 
 
 Panaerus, a friend of Brasidas in 
 Thessaly, iv. 78 init. 
 
 Panathenaea, the Great, at Athens, 
 v. 47 fin., vi. 56 med. ; the Pana- 
 thenaic procession, i. 20 fin., vi. 
 
 57 init. 
 
 Pancratium, Androsthenes victor in 
 the, at Olympia, v. 49 init. 
 
 Pandion, king of Athens, ii. 29 init. 
 
 Pangaeus, Mount, in Thrace, ii. 99 
 med. 
 
 Panic, liability of great armies to 
 panics, iv. 125 init. 
 
 Panormus, in Achaia, ii. 86 med., 
 92 init. 
 
 Panormus, in Milesian territory, 
 viii. 24 init. 
 
 Panormus, in Sicily, a Phoenician 
 settlement, vi. 2 fin. 
 
 Pantacyas, a river in Sicily, vi. 4 init. 
 
 Paralians, part of the Malians, iii. 
 92 init. 
 
 Paralus, a district in Attica, ii. 55 
 init. 
 
 Paralus, the Athenian sacred vessel, 
 iii. 33? 77 fin.; the crew all free¬ 
 men and ardent enemies of oli¬ 
 garchy, viii. 73 fin.; assist the 
 democratic revolution at Samos, 
 ib. ; go to Athens, and are ill 
 received by the oligarchs, ib. 74 ; 
 sent to cruise ofif Euboea, ib ., ib. 
 86 fin.; ordered to convey ambas¬ 
 sadors to Sparta, ib. 86 fin.; mu¬ 
 tiny and give up the ambassadors 
 to the Argives, ib.\ come to Sa¬ 
 mos with Argive envoys, ib. 
 
 Paravaeans, a people in Epirus, 
 ii. 80 fin. 
 
 Parnassus, Mount, in Phocis, iii. 95 
 init. 
 
 Parnes, Mount, in Attica, ii. 23 init. 
 
 Paros, Thasos a Parian colony, iv. 
 104 fin. 
 
 Parrhasians, in Arcadia, campaign 
 of the Lacedaemonians against, 
 v - 33 - 
 
 Party associations, evil of, iii. 82 
 med.; party spirit, growth of, in 
 Hellas, ib. fin. 
 
 Pasitelidas, a Lacedaemonian, made 
 governor of Torone, iv. 132 fin.; 
 defeated and captured by the 
 Athenians, v. 3 med. 
 
 Passions, fatal influence of the, iii. 
 45 med. 
 
 Patmos, iii. 33 med. 
 
 Patrae, in Achaia, ii. 83 med., 84 
 fin., v. 52 fin. 
 
 Patrocles, father of Tantalus, a 
 Lacedaemonian, iv. 57 med. 
 
 Pausanias, guardian of Pleistar- 
 chus, i. 132 init.; the victor of 
 Plataea, ii. 71 med., iii. 54 fin., 
 58 med., 68 init.; takes com¬ 
 mand of the Hellenic forces, i. 94; 
 captures Byzantium, ib ., ib. 129 
 med.; becomes unpopular, ib. 95 
 init.; summoned to Sparta, ib.; 
 acquitted of conspiracy with 
 
686 
 
 INDEX . 
 
 Persia, ib ., ib. 128 init.; negotiates 
 with Xerxes, ib. 128-130; re¬ 
 called to Sparta and imprisoned, 
 ib. 131 ; intrigues with the Helots, 
 132 med.; betrayed by his servant, 
 ib. fin., 133 ; escapes to the temple 
 of Athene, ib. 134 init.; is starved 
 to death, ib. med.; ordered by 
 the Delphian oracle to be buried 
 in the temple, ib. fin. 
 
 Pausanias, son of Pleistoanax, king 
 of Sparta, iii. 26 med. 
 
 Pausanias, a Macedonian, brother 
 of Derdas, i. 61 fin.,cp.z'A 59 fin. 
 
 Pay for holding office abolished 
 by the oligarchs at Athens, viii. 
 65 fin., 67 fin.; the same pro¬ 
 vision adopted in the new con¬ 
 stitution, ib. 97 med.; pay of the 
 Athenian senate, ib. 69 fin.;— 
 pay of sailors usually half a 
 drachma, viii. 29 init., 45 init.; 
 Tissaphernes pays a drachma 
 for a month, ib. 29 init.; the 
 double rate paid to the sailors 
 in the fleet at Potidaea and to 
 those engaged in the Sicilian ex¬ 
 pedition, iii. 17 fin., vi. 31 med.;— 
 pay of Athenian heavy armed, iii. 
 17 med.-; rates of pay fixed by the 
 treaty between Athens and Argos 
 for various troops, v. 47, iv; pay 
 of Thracian mercenaries, vii. 27 
 init. 
 
 Peace of five years between Pelo¬ 
 ponnesians and Athenians, i. 112 
 init.; of thirty years after the 
 recovery of Euboea, ib. 67 med., 
 87 fin., 115 init. 146, ii. 2 init.; vio¬ 
 lated by the attack on Plataea,zA7 
 init.; treaty of peace and alliance 
 for fifty years at the end of the 
 first ten years of the War, v. 18; 
 this peace only nominal, ib. 26; 
 peace and alliance for one hun¬ 
 dred years between the Acarna- 
 nians and Ambraciots, iii. 114 
 med.; treaty of peace between 
 Argos and Lacedaemon, v. 77 ; 
 treaty of alliance, ib. 79; the 
 three treaties between Lacedae¬ 
 mon and Persia, viii. 17 fin., 18, 
 36, 37, 57 fin., 58 ; treaties in¬ 
 scribed on columns, v. 18, xi ; 23, 
 iv ; 47 fin., 56 med. 
 
 Peace, ‘has honours and glories of 
 her own, 5 iv. 62 init. 
 
 Pedaritus, a Lacedaemonian, sent 
 from Lacedaemon as governor 
 of Chios, viii. 28 fin.; arrives 
 there, ib. 32 med.; refuses to aid 
 Astyochus in the revolt of Lesbos, 
 ib. fin.; deceived by a trick of 
 certain Erythraean prisoners, ib. 
 33 fin.; alters the government of 
 Chios, ib. 38 med.; requests the 
 aid of Astyochus, ib. 38 fin., 40 
 init.; complains to Sparta of As¬ 
 tyochus, 38 fin.; falls in an en¬ 
 gagement before Chios, ib. 55 
 fin. 
 
 Pegae, in Megaris, commands the 
 pass over Mount Geraneia, i. 
 107 med.; becomes subject to 
 the Athenians, ib. 103 fin., ill 
 med.; restored under the thirty 
 years 5 peace, ib. 115 init.; de¬ 
 manded with other places by the 
 Athenians after the blockade of 
 Sphacteria, iv. 21 fin.; occupied 
 by Megarian exiles, ib. 66 init., 
 74 init. (cp. iii. 68 med.). 
 
 Peiraeum, a harbour in the Co¬ 
 rinthian territory, viii. 10 fin., 11 
 init., 14 med., 15 fin., 20 init. 
 
 Peiraeus, fortified by Themistocles, 
 
 i. 93; the circuit of Peiraeus and 
 Munychia not quite seven miles, 
 
 ii. 13 fin.; Peiraeus inhabited by 
 the refugees from Attica, ib. 17 
 fin.; visited by the plague, ib. 48 
 init.; the Lacedaemonian com¬ 
 manders plan an attack on the 
 Peiraeus, but do not carry it out, 
 ib. 93 , 94 ; the Athenians expect 
 the enemy at the Peiraeus after 
 the disaster in Sicily, viii. 1 med.; 
 Peiraeus protected from attack 
 by the army at Samos, ib. 76 
 med.; the army at Samos want 
 to sail to the Peiraeus, ib. 82 init., 
 86 med.; the oligarchs fortify 
 Eetioneia in order to secure the 
 Peiraeus, ib. 90; tumult in Pei¬ 
 raeus, the people destroy the 
 fort, ib. 92; the hoplites in Pei¬ 
 raeus march to Athens, ib. 93 
 init.; a Lacedaemonian fleet ap¬ 
 pearing off Salamis, the citizens 
 rush down to the Peiraeus, ib. 94; 
 
INDEX . 687 
 
 the Athenians expect an attack 
 upon the Peiraeus after their de¬ 
 feat off Euboea, ib. 96 med.; its 
 final capture by the Lacedaemo¬ 
 nians, v. 26 init. 
 
 Peira'ice, ii. 23 fin. 
 
 Peisander, one of the leading oli¬ 
 garchs at Athens, viii. 90 init.; 
 sent to Athens to forward the 
 oligarchical conspiracy, ib. 49; 
 gains the consent of the people, 
 ib. 53, 54; is sent to negotiate 
 with Alcibiades and Tissa- 
 phernes, ib. 54 init.; baffled by 
 Alcibiades, ib. 56; sent home 
 with orders to put down demo¬ 
 cracy in the cities, ib. 64, 65 init.; 
 proposes to substitute a govern¬ 
 ment of Four Hundred for the 
 democracy, ib. 67; breaks up the 
 old senate and installs the Four 
 Hundred, ib. 69, 70; stirs up an 
 oligarchical revolution at Samos, 
 ib. 73 init.; retreats to Decelea on 
 the dissolution of the Four Hun¬ 
 dred, ib. 98 init. 
 
 Peisistratidae, moderate character 
 of their government, vi. 54 med.; 
 overthrown by the Lacedae¬ 
 monians, ib. 53 fin., 59 fin. 
 
 Peisistratus, tyrant of Athens, i. 20, 
 vi. 53 fin., 54; his purification of 
 Delos, iii. 104 init. 
 
 Peisistratus [grandson ofthe tyrant], 
 vi. 54 fin. 
 
 Peithias, a Corcyraean popular 
 leader murdered by the oli¬ 
 garchs, iii. 7 °. 
 
 Pelasgians, most widely spread of 
 ancient Hellenic tribes, i. 3 init.; 
 the Pelasgians of Act£, iv. 109 
 fin.; the ‘Pelasgian Ground 5 at 
 Athens, ii. 1 7 med. 
 
 Pel b, an island off Clazomenae, 
 viii. 31 fin. .. 
 
 Pella, in Macedonia, 11. 99 med., 
 100 med. 
 
 Pellen£, in Achaea, said by the 
 Scionaeans to be their mother 
 city, iv. 120 init.; the Pellenaeans 
 allies of Lacedaemonians, ii. 9 
 init.; join Lacedaemonians in 
 the invasion of Argos, v. 58 fin., 
 59 med., 60 med.; furnish Lace¬ 
 daemonians with ships, viii. 3 fin.; 
 
 lose one ship in the battle of Cy- 
 nossema, ib. 106 med. 
 
 Pellichus, father of Aristaeus, a 
 Corinthian, i. 29 init. 
 
 Peloponnesus, its name derived 
 from Pelops, i. 9 init.; frequent 
 changes of its ancient inhabitants, 
 ib. 2 med.; its conquest by the 
 Heraclidae, ib. 12 med.; divided 
 into five parts, ib. 10 init.; the 
 greater part of Sicily and Italy 
 colonized from Peloponnesus, ib. 
 12 fin. [cp. vi. 77 med.]; all, ex¬ 
 cept Argos and Achaea, included 
 in the Lacedaemonian alliance, 
 ii. 9 init.; the plague little felt in 
 Peloponnesus, ib. 54 fin.; pro¬ 
 visions respecting the Pelopon¬ 
 nesian cities in the treaties 
 between Lacedaemon and Argos, 
 v. 77, v, vi ; 79, ii, iv, v, vi; em¬ 
 ployment of Peloponnesian mer¬ 
 cenaries, i. 60, iii. 34 init., 109 
 med., iv. 52 init., 76 med., vii. 
 19 med., 57 fin., 58 med. [cp. 
 ib. 48 fin.], viii. 28 fin.; Pericles’ 
 account of the Peloponnesian 
 character,i. 141,142. [For actions 
 performed under Lacedaemonian 
 leadership, see Lacedaemon.] 
 
 Pelops, gave his name to the Pe¬ 
 loponnesus, i. 9 init. 
 
 Pelorus, promontory near Messene 
 in Sicily, iv. 25 init. 
 
 Penalties, increased severity of 
 penalties does not add to their 
 effectiveness, iii. 45. 
 
 Pentecosties, a division of the 
 Lacedaemonian army, v. 68. 
 
 Politics, in politics, as in the arts, 
 the new must prevail over the 
 old, i. 71 init.; general interest in 
 politics at Athens, ii. 40 init. 
 
 Peparethus, island of, earthquake 
 there, iii. 89 fin. 
 
 Perdiccas,king of Macedonia, quar¬ 
 rels with the Athenians, i. 56, 57; 
 sends envoys to Sparta, ib. 57 
 med.; persuades the Chalcidians 
 to revolt, ib. 57, 58; assigns the 
 Chalcidians part of Mygdonia, 
 ib. 58 fin.; reconciled to the 
 Athenians, ib. 61 med.; deserts 
 them, ib. 62 init., 63; again recon¬ 
 ciled to the Athenians, ii. 29 fin.; 
 
688 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 sends assistance to the Ambra- 
 ciots, ib. 80 fin.; his perfidy to 
 Sitalces, ib. 95 med.; attacked 
 by Sitalces, ib. 95-101; gains 
 over Seuthes, ib. 101 fin.; mar¬ 
 ries his sister to Seuthes, ib.; 
 invites Brasidas, iv. 79; declared 
 an enemy by the Athenians, ib. 
 82; in concert with Brasidas 
 makes war upon Arrhibaeus, ib. 
 83; assists Brasidas at Amphi- 
 polis, ib. 103 med., 107 fin.; Per- 
 diccas and Brasidas defeat the 
 Lyncestians, ib. 124; Perdiccas 
 loses his army by a panic, ib. 125 
 init.; quarrels with Brasidas, ib. 
 128 fin.; joins the Athenians, ib. 132 
 init.; Cleon demands reinforce¬ 
 ments from him, v. 6 init.; joins 
 the Lacedaemonian and Argive 
 alliance, ib. 80 med.; blockaded 
 by the Athenians, ib. 83 fin.; has 
 his territory ravaged by the Athe¬ 
 nians, vi. 7 fin.; aids the Athe¬ 
 nians to attack Amphipolis, vii. 9. 
 
 Pericleidas, father of Athenaeus, a 
 Lacedaemonian, iv. 119 init. 
 
 Pericles, the Athenian statesman, 
 leads an expedition to Sicyon and 
 to Oeniadae, i. hi fin.; subdues 
 Euboea, ib. 114; conquers Samos, 
 ib. 116, 117; under the ‘ curse of 
 the Goddess, 5 ib. 127 init.; leader 
 of the Athenian state, ib. fin.; 
 opposed to the Lacedaemonians, 
 ib.; his speech, ib. 140-144; the 
 Athenians follow his counsel, ib. 
 145, ii. 12 init.; he promises his 
 lands to the public if spared by 
 the enemy, ii. 13 init.; his advice 
 to the Athenians, ib ., ib. 22 init.; 
 the Athenians grow angry with 
 him when the Lacedaemonians 
 appear in Attica, ib. 21, 22; he 
 commands in the invasion of 
 Megara, ib. 31 init.; his funeral 
 speech, ib. 35-46; commands an 
 expedition round Peloponnese, 
 ib. 56 [cp. vi. 31 init.]; blamed 
 and fined by the Athenians, ii. 
 59, 65; his defence, ib. 60-64; 
 elected general, ib. 65 init.; his 
 death and eulogy, ib. 65 med. 
 
 Perieres, one of the founders of 
 Zancle, vi. 4 fin. 
 
 Perioeci, the, of Thuria and 
 Aethaea aid the Helots to re¬ 
 volt, i. 101 init.; the Perioeci 
 of Elis defeated by the Athe¬ 
 nians, ii. 25 fin.; the Lacedae¬ 
 monian Perioeci assist in the 
 foundation of Heraclea, iii. 92 
 fin.; present at the attack on 
 Pylos, iv. 8 init.; the Perioeci of 
 Cythera, ib. 53 med.; Phrynis, 
 one of the Perioeci, sent as com¬ 
 missioner to Chios, viii. 6 fin.; 
 Chian Perioeci, ib. 22 fin. 
 
 Peripoli, at Athens, or ‘frontier 
 guard, 5 iv. 67 init., viii. 92 med.; 
 Phrynichus assassinated by one 
 of them, viii. 92 init. 
 
 Perrhaebia, in Thessaly, iv. 78 
 fin. 
 
 Persia, visited by the plague, ii. 48 
 init.; Persians prefer giving to 
 receiving, z A 97 med.; Persian ap¬ 
 parel and luxury affected by Pau- 
 sanias, i. 130; Persian language 
 learned by Themistocles, ib. 138 
 init.; Persian dispatches written 
 in the Assyrian character, iv. 50 
 init.; Persian nobles quartered 
 at Athens, i. 89 fin.; Persians 
 form part of the garrison in 
 Memphis, ib. 104 fin.; Persian 
 spoil in the Acropolis at Athens, 
 ii. 13 med. [See Kings, Persian, 
 Medes, and War, The Persian.] 
 
 Perseus, i. 9 med. 
 
 Petra, promontory near Rhegium, 
 vii. 35 fin. 
 
 Phacium, in Thessaly, iv. 78 fin. 
 
 Phaeacians, their ancient naval re¬ 
 nown, i. 25 fin. 
 
 Phaeax, an Athenian envoy in 
 Sicily, v. 4, 5. 
 
 Phaedimus, a Lacedaemonian en¬ 
 voy, v. 42 init. 
 
 Phaeinis, priestess of Here at Ar¬ 
 gos, iv. 133 fin. 
 
 Phaenippus, an Athenian, registrar 
 at the conclusion of the one 
 year’s Truce, iv. 118 fin. 
 
 Phagres, in Thrace, ii. 99 med. 
 
 Phalerum, one of the harbours at 
 Athens, i. 107 init., ii. 13 fin.; 
 Phaleric Wall, ib ., ib. 
 
 Phalius, a Corinthian, the founder 
 of Epidamnus, i. 24 init. 
 
INDEX . 689 
 
 Phanae, in Chios, viii. 24 med. 
 
 Phanomachus, an Athenian, com¬ 
 mander at Potidaea, ii. 70 init. 
 
 Phanoteus, in Phocis, iv. 76 med., 
 89 med. 
 
 Pharax, father of Styphon, a Lace¬ 
 daemonian, iv. 38 init. 
 
 Pharnabazus, (i) satrap of the Hel¬ 
 lespont, viii. 6 init., 62 init.; begs 
 aid from Lacedaemon, ib. 8 init., 
 39 init., 80 med., 99 med., 108 
 med., 109 init.; (ii) father of 
 Pharnaces, ii. 67 med. 
 
 Pharnaces, three Persians, (i) fa¬ 
 ther of Artabazus, i. 129 init.; 
 (ii) son of Pharnabazus, ii. 67 
 med.; settles the Delians at 
 Adramyttium, v. 1 fin. [cp. viii. 
 108 med.] ; (iii) father of Phar¬ 
 nabazus, satrap of the Helles¬ 
 pont, viii. 8 init. [? same as ii]. 
 
 Pharnaces, the sons of, viii. 58 
 init. 
 
 Pharos, in Egypt, i. 104 init. 
 
 Pharsalus, in Thessaly, attacked by 
 the Athenians, i. 111 init.; sends 
 aid to the Athenians, ii. 22 fin.; 
 friends of Brasidas there, iv. 78 
 init.; Thucydides of Pharsalus, 
 proxenus of Athens, viii. 92 med. 
 
 Phaselis, in Lycia, ii. 69 fin., viii. 
 88 fin., 99 med., 108 init. 
 
 Pheia, in Elis, vii. 31 init.; cap¬ 
 tured by the Messenians, ii. 
 25 med. 
 
 Pheraeans, in Thessaly, ii. 22 fin. 
 
 Philemon, father of Ameiniades, an 
 Athenian, ii. 67 med. 
 
 Philip, a Lacedaemonian, governor 
 of Miletus, viii. 28 fin.; goes to 
 fetch the Phoenician fleet from 
 Aspendus, ib. 87 fin., 99 med. 
 
 Philip, a Macedonian, brother of 
 Perdiccas, i. 57 init., ii. 95 med.; 
 father of Amyntas, ii. 95 fin., 100 
 med.; joins with the Athenians, 
 i. 57 init., 59, 61 fin. 
 
 Philocharidas, a Lacedaemonian, 
 swears to the one year’s Truce, 
 
 iv. 119 init.; swears to the Treaty 
 of Peace and the Alliance, v. 19 
 med., 24 init.; commissioner in 
 Chalcidic6, ib. 21 ; ambassador 
 at Athens, ib. 44 fin. 
 
 Philocrates, an Athenian com¬ 
 
 mander, brings reinforcements 
 to Melos, v. 116 fin. 
 
 Philoctetes, his ships the smallest 
 that went to Troy, i. 10 med. 
 
 Philomela, story of, ii. 29 init. 
 
 Phlius, in Peloponnesus, the Corin¬ 
 thians request money for the 
 expedition against Epidamnus 
 from the Phliasians, i. 27 fin.; 
 Phliasian troops with Brasidas 
 at Megara, iv. 70 med.; the 
 priestess Chrysis flies for refuge 
 to Phlius, ib. 133 fin.; the Lace¬ 
 daemonian alliance meets at 
 Phlius for the invasion of Argos, 
 
 v. 57; the whole Phliasian force 
 takes part in the campaign, ib. 
 fin., 58 med., 59 med., 60 med.; 
 Phlius three times invaded by 
 the Argives, ib. 83 med., 115 init., 
 
 vi. 105 fin. 
 
 Phocaea, in Ionia, viii. 31 fin.; the 
 Phocaeans found Massalia, i. 13 
 fin.; conquer the Carthaginians 
 at sea, ib.\ Carteria, in Phocaean 
 territory,viii. 101 med.; Phocaean 
 staters, iv. 52 med. 
 
 Phoceis, part of Leontini, v. 4 
 med. 
 
 Phocis, formerly inhabited by Thra¬ 
 cians, ii. 29 init.; some of the 
 Phocians settle in Sicily after 
 the Trojan War, vi. 2 init.; the 
 Phocians attack the Dorians, i. 
 107 init.; are defeated, ib. med.; 
 become the allies of the Athe¬ 
 nians, ib. hi init.; receive the 
 temple of Delphi from the Athe¬ 
 nians,/^. 112 fin.; in the Lacedae¬ 
 monian alliance at the beginning 
 of the War, ii. 9 med.; Demos¬ 
 thenes intends to gain them over, 
 
 iii. 95 med.; the Phocians at en¬ 
 mity with the Locrians of Am- 
 phissa, ib. 101 init.; certain Pho¬ 
 cians engage in the Athenian plan 
 for the subjugation of Boeotia, 
 
 iv. 76 med.; a Phocian, Nico- 
 machus, betrays the plan, ib. 89 
 med.; the Phocians go to war 
 with the Locrians, v. 32 init.; are 
 summoned by the Lacedaemo¬ 
 nians to Mantinea, ib. 64 med.; 
 furnish the Lacedaemonians with 
 ships, viii. 3 fin. 
 
690 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Phoenicians, the, addicted to piracy, 
 i. 8 init.; their colonization of 
 Sicily, vi. 2 fin. [cp. ib. 46 med.] ; 
 services of their fleet under the 
 Persian kings, i. 16 fin., 100 init., 
 112 med., 116 init.; trade between 
 Attica and Phoenicia, ii. 69; 
 Tissaphernes prepares a Phoe¬ 
 nician fleet, viii. 46 init., 59 [cp. 
 ib . 58, iii, iv] ; keeps the Pelopon¬ 
 nesians waiting for the ships, ib. 
 46 fin.; the Peloponnesians grow 
 impatient, ib. 78 ; Alcibiades pre¬ 
 tends that he will secure the 
 Phoenician ships for the Athe¬ 
 nians, ib. 81, 88, 108; Tissa¬ 
 phernes goes to Aspendus to 
 fetch the Phoenician ships : why 
 did he not bring them ? ib. 87 ; 
 the Peloponnesians abandon all 
 hope of the Phoenician fleet, ib. 
 99 init.; Tissaphernes deter¬ 
 mines to excuse himself to the 
 Peloponnesians for not bringing 
 up the ships, ib. 109. 
 
 Phoenicus,an harbour under Mount 
 Mimas, viii. 34 fin. 
 
 Phormio, an Athenian commander, 
 sent to Potidaea, i. 64 med., ii. 
 29 fin.; ravages Chalcidice, i. 
 65 fin.; brings reinforcements to 
 Samos, ib. 117 med.; aids the 
 Acarnanians, ii. 68 fin.; stations 
 himself at Naupactus, ib. 69 init., 
 80 med., 81 init.; defeats the La¬ 
 cedaemonians, ib. 83, 84; asks for 
 reinforcements, ib. 85 med. ; his 
 second victory, ib. 86-92 ; his 
 speech, ib. 89 ; leads an expe¬ 
 dition into Acarnania, ii. 102 ; 
 sails back to Athens, ib. 103. 
 
 Photius, a Chaonian leader, ii. 
 80 fin. 
 
 Phrygia, in Attica, ii. 22 med. 
 
 Phrynichus, an Athenian com¬ 
 mander, brings reinforcements 
 from Athens, viii. 25 init.; over¬ 
 rules his colleagues, and removes 
 the fleet to Samos, ib. 27 ; op¬ 
 poses the proposals of Alcibiades 
 to overthrow the democracy, ib. 
 48 med.; outwits him when he at¬ 
 tempts his ruin, ib. 50, 51 ; de¬ 
 posed from his command, ib. 54 
 med.; takes a great part in the 
 
 oligarchical conspiracy, ib. 68 
 med., 90 init.; sent to make peace 
 with Lacedaemon, ib. 90 med.; 
 returns unsuccessful, ib. 91 init.; 
 assassinated, ib. 92 init.; his 
 sagacious temper, ib. 27 fin., 68 
 med. 
 
 Phrynis, one of the Lacedaemonian 
 Perioeci, goes as commissioner 
 to Chios, viii. 6 med. 
 
 Phthiotis, see Achaia (Pthiotis). 
 
 Phyleides, father of Pythangelus, 
 a Theban, ii. 2 med. 
 
 Phyrcus, fortress in Elis, v. 49 
 init. 
 
 Physca, in Macedonia, ii. 99 fin. 
 
 Phytia, in Acarnania, iii. 106 med. 
 
 Pieria, in Macedonia, ii. 99 med., 
 100 med.; ‘the Pierian Vale, 5 ib. 
 99 med. 
 
 Pierium, in Thessaly, v. 13 init. 
 
 Pindus, Mount, in Thessaly, ii. 102 
 init. 
 
 Piracy, honourable in ancient Hel¬ 
 las, i. 5 ; put down by Minos, 
 ib. 4 fin.; by the Corinthians, ib. 
 
 ‘^3 fin- 
 
 Pissuthnes, a Persian, satrap of 
 Lower Asia, iii. 31 fin.; aids 
 the Samians to revolt, i. 115 
 med.; sends assistance to the 
 Persian party at Notium, iii. 
 .34 i nit - 
 
 Pitanate Division, never existed at 
 Lacedaemon, i. 20 fin. 
 
 Pittacus, king of Edonia, his assas¬ 
 sination, iv. 107 fin. 
 
 Plague, the, at Athens, i. 23 med., 
 ii. 47-52 ; first appeared at Lem¬ 
 nos, ii. 47 med.; lawlessness 
 caused by the plague, ib. 53 ; 
 not serious in the Peloponnese, 
 ib. 54 fin.; breaks out at Poti¬ 
 daea, ib. 58 ; second outbreak at 
 Athens, iii. 87. 
 
 Plataea, the city small, ii. 77 init.; 
 eight miles from Thebes, ib. 5 
 init.; conduct of the Plataeans 
 during the Persian War, iii. 54, 
 55 ; their care of the sepulchres 
 of the fallen at Plataea, ib. 58 
 med.; they receive their inde¬ 
 pendence from Pausanias, ii. 71 
 med.; send assistance to Sparta 
 during the Helot revolt, iii. 54 
 
INDEX. 
 
 691 
 
 fin.; their hostility to Thebes, 
 ii. 71 fin., iii. 55 init., 57 med., 
 
 58 init., 59 med., 61 ; allied to 
 Athens, ii. 73 fin., iii. 3 init., 
 
 55 init., 62, 63, 68 fin.; attacked 
 at night by the Thebans in time 
 of peace, ii. 2, iii. 65 [cp. vii. 
 
 18 med.] ; surrender, ii. 3 init.; 
 rally, attack and defeat them, ib .; 
 kill their prisoners, ib. 5 fin., 6 ; 
 receive a garrison from Athens, 
 ib. 6 fin.; their territory ravaged 
 by the Boeotians, ib. 12 fin.; 
 Plataea is attacked by the Lace¬ 
 daemonians, ib. 70 init.; the 
 Plataeans protest, zA med.; vainly 
 negotiate with Archidamus, ib. 
 72-74 ; baffle the enemy by 
 various stratagems, ib. 75-77 ; 
 are blockaded, ib. 78 ; part of 
 them break out of the town, iii. 
 20-24 ; reason why the Lacedae¬ 
 monians did not storm Plataea, 
 ib. 52 init.; the Plataeans surren¬ 
 der, ib. med.; their speech to the 
 Lacedaemonian judges, ib. 53-59; 
 they are put to death, and Pla¬ 
 taea razed, ib. 68; the Lacedae¬ 
 monians do this in order to 
 gratify the Thebans, ib. fin.; light- 
 armed Plataeans serve with the 
 Athenians at Megara, iv. 67 ; the 
 Boeotians collect at Plataea, in¬ 
 tending to relieve Megara, ib. 72 
 init.; Plataea not given up under 
 the Treaty of Peace, v. 17 med. 
 [cp. iii. 52 init.]; the Athenians 
 give Scion& to the Plataeans, v. 
 
 32 init.; the Plataeans serve 
 against their Boeotian country¬ 
 men at Syracuse, vii. 57 med. 
 
 Plataea, battle of, i. 130 init., iii. 
 
 54 med., 58 med. 
 
 Pleistarchus, king of Sparta, Pau- 
 sanias his guardian, i. 132 init. 
 
 Pleistoanax, king of Lacedaemon, 
 Nicomedes his guardian, i. 107 
 init.; brother of Cleomenes, fa¬ 
 ther of king Pausanias, iii. 26 
 med.; invades Attica, ib. 114 
 med.; accused of having been 
 bribed to retreat, ii. 21 init., v. 
 
 16 fin.; said to have tampered 
 with the Delphian oracle, v. 16 
 med.; restored, ib.; anxious for 
 y y 
 
 peace, ib.; swears to the Alliance, 
 ib. 24 init.; leads an expedition 
 against the Parrhasians, ib. 33 ; 
 leads reinforcements to Agis, but 
 returns when the victory of Man- 
 tinea is reported, ib. 75 init. 
 
 Pleistolas, Ephor at Lacedaemon, 
 swears to the Treaty of Peace 
 and the Alliance, v. 19 med., 24 
 init., 25 init. 
 
 Plemmyrium, a promontory oppo¬ 
 site Syracuse, fortified by Nicias, 
 vii. 4 med.; captured by Gylip- 
 pus, ib. 22 init., 23, init.; garri¬ 
 soned by the Syracusans, ib. 24 
 init.; disastrous consequences to 
 the Athenians from its loss, ib. 
 24, 36 fin.; Eurymedon, meeting 
 Demosthenes on his way, reports 
 its capture, ib. 31 med. 
 
 Pleuron, in Aetolia, iii. 102 fin. 
 
 Pnyx, place where the Athenian as¬ 
 sembly met, viii. 97 init. 
 
 Poets, untrustworthy witnesses to 
 history, i. 10 med., 21 init., ii. 41 
 med. 
 
 Polemarchs, magistrates at Man- 
 tinea, v. 47 fin.; officers in the 
 Lacedaemonian army, ib. 66 med. 
 
 Polichn£, near Clazomenae, forti- 
 tified by the Clazomenians, viii. 
 14 fin.; retaken by the Athenians, 
 ib. 23 fin. 
 
 Polichnitae, inhabitants of Polichn& 
 in Crete, ii. 85 fin. 
 
 Polis, in Locris, iii. 101 fin. 
 
 Polles, king of the Odomantians, 
 v. 6 init. 
 
 Pollis, an Argive who went to the 
 King, ii. 67 init. 
 
 Polyanthes, a Corinthian com¬ 
 mander, vii. 34 init. 
 
 Polycrates, tyrant of Samos, had a 
 large navy, i. 13 fin., iii. 104 init.; 
 dedicates Rhenea to Apollo, i. 
 13 fin., iii. 104 init. 
 
 Polydamidas, a Lacedaemonian, iv. 
 123 fin.; defeats the Athenians 
 at Mende, ib. 129 med.; at¬ 
 tacked by the Mendaeans, ib. 130 
 med. 
 
 Polymedes, of Larissa, ii. 22 fin. 
 
 Pontus, the Lesbians send to the 
 Pontus for troops and supplies, 
 iii. 2 init.; Lamachus sails into 
 
 2 
 
692 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 the Pontus, iv. 75; Chalcedon 
 situated at its mouth, ib. fin. 
 
 Poseidon, Temple of, at Colonus, 
 viii. 67 med.; ships dedicated to 
 him after a victory, ii. 84 fin., 
 92 fin.; at Nisaea, iv. 118, iii; 
 on coast of P aliens, ib. 129 med.; 
 at Taenarus, i. 128 init., 133 init. 
 
 Potamis, a Syracusan general, suc¬ 
 ceeds Hermocrates at Miletus, 
 viii. 85 med. 
 
 Potidaea, a Corinthian colony, i. 56 
 init.; a tributary of Athens, ib.; 
 importance of its situation, iv. 120 
 fin.; the Potidaeans ordered by 
 the Athenians to pull down their 
 walls, i. 56 med., 57 fin.; send 
 embassies to Athens and Sparta ; 
 they are encouraged by the Lace¬ 
 daemonians and revolt, ib. 58, 
 118 init.; receive aid from 
 Corinth, ib. 60 ; the Athenians 
 send an expedition against Po¬ 
 tidaea, ib. 57 fin., 61; battle of 
 Potidaea, ib. 62, 63; Aristeus 
 retreats into Potidaea, ib. 63 init.; 
 Potidaea invested, ib. 64 ; Aris¬ 
 teus leaves Potidaea, ib. 65 ; the 
 affair causes great ill-feeling be¬ 
 tween Corinth and Athens, ib. 66; 
 the Corinthians complain at Spar¬ 
 ta, ib. 67; beg assistance, ib. 71 
 med.; Archidamus urges mode¬ 
 ration, ib. 85; the Corinthians, 
 anxious to save Potidaea, press 
 on the war, ib. 119, 124 init.; the 
 Lacedaemonians bid the Atheni¬ 
 ans quit Potidaea, ib. 139 init., 
 140 med.; Hagnon brings fresh 
 troops to Potidaea; the plague 
 breaks out among them, ii. 58 ; 
 Aristeus endeavours to gain Si- 
 talces’ assistance for Potidaea, ib. 
 67 ; Potidaea surrenders, ib. 70; 
 is colonized by the Athenians, 
 ib. fin.; expense of the siege, ii. 
 13 med., 70 med., iii. 17 med., 
 
 vi. 31 init.; three thousand Athe¬ 
 nian troops engaged in the siege, 
 ii. 31 med.; the Athenians escape 
 to Potidaea after the battle of 
 Spartolus, ii. 79 fin.; Brasidas 
 plans an attack on Potidaea, iv. 
 121 fin.; Nicias starts from Po¬ 
 tidaea against Mend£, ib. 129 
 
 med.; Brasidas unsuccessfully 
 attempts Potidaea, ib. 135. 
 Potidania, in Aetolia, iii. 96 med. 
 Poverty, no bar to success and no 
 disgrace at Athens, ii. 37 med., 
 40 init.; the hope natural to 
 poverty of one day becoming 
 rich, ib. 42 med.;—poverty of an¬ 
 tiquity, i. 11. 
 
 Prasiae, in Attica, viii. 95 init. 
 Prasiae, in Laconia, destroyed by 
 the Athenians, ii. 56 fin.; they 
 ravage its territory, vi. 105 fin., 
 
 vii. 18 med. 
 
 Priapus, on the Propontis, viii. 107 
 init. 
 
 Pride, the Nemesis of, vii. 77 med. 
 Priene, in Ionia, i. 115 init. 
 Prisoners of War, provision respect¬ 
 ing, in the Treaty of Peace, v. 18, 
 ix (cp. ib. 3 fin.). 
 
 Procles, (i) an Athenian com¬ 
 mander, iii. 91 init.; falls in the 
 Aetolian expedition, ib. 98 fin.: 
 (ii) another, swears to the Treaty 
 of Peace and the Alliance, v. 19 
 fin., ib. 24 med. 
 
 Procne, wife of Tereus, the Thracian 
 king, ii. 29 init. 
 
 Pronnaeans, in Cephallenia, ii. 30 fin. 
 Prophecies, current before the War, 
 
 ii. 8 init. 
 
 Prophets, present with armies, vi. 
 69 med.; the Athenians indignant 
 with the prophets who had en¬ 
 couraged the Sicilian expedition, 
 
 viii. 1 init. [See Oracles.] 
 Propylaea of the Acropolis at 
 
 Athens, ii. 13 med. 
 
 Proschium, in Aetolia, iii. 102 fin., 
 106 init. 
 
 Prosopitis, an island in the Nile, 
 i. 109 fin. 
 
 Prote, an island near Pylus, iv. 13 
 med. 
 
 Proteas, an Athenian commander, 
 sent to Corcyra, i. 45 ; and to 
 cruise round Peloponnesus, ii. 
 23 med. 
 
 Protesilaus, Temple of, near Elaeus, 
 viii. 102 fin. 
 
 Proxenus, a Locrian commander, 
 
 iii. 103 fin. 
 
 Prytanes, at Athens, iv. 118 fin., v. 
 47 fin., vi. 14 init., viii. 70 init. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 6 9 3 
 
 Psammetichus, father of Inarus, i. 
 104 init. 
 
 Pteleum [of uncertain locality], or¬ 
 dered to be restored under the 
 Peace, v. 18, viii. 
 
 Pteleum, a fort in Erythraean ter¬ 
 ritory, viii. 24 init., 31 med. 
 
 Ptoeodorus, a Theban exile, iv. 76 
 init. 
 
 Ptychia, a small island near Cor- 
 cyra, iv. 46 med. 
 
 Punishment of death does not pre¬ 
 vent crime, iii. 45 ; too severe 
 punishment of rebels inexpedient, 
 ib. 46. 
 
 Pydna,in Macedonia,i. 137 init.; be¬ 
 sieged bytheAthenians,i.6i med. 
 
 Pylos, in Messenia, called Cory- 
 phasium by the Lacedaemonians, 
 iv. 3 med., v. 18, viii; forty-six 
 miles from Sparta, iv. 3 med.; 
 fortified by the Athenians, ib. 
 3-5 ; the news recalls the Lace¬ 
 daemonians from Attica, ib. 6 ; 
 unsuccessfully assaulted by the 
 Lacedaemonians, ib. 11, 12 ; the 
 Athenian fleet defeats the Lace¬ 
 daemonian, and cuts off the troops 
 in Sphacteria, ib. 13, 14; the 
 Lacedaemonians make a truce 
 with the Athenians at Pylos, and 
 send ambassadors toAthens, ib. 15, 
 16; the truce ends, the Athenians 
 retain the Peloponnesian ships, 
 ib. 23 ; sufferings of the Athe¬ 
 nians at Pylos while blockading 
 Sphacteria, ib. 26; garrisoned 
 by the Messenians, ib. 41 init.; 
 the Lacedaemonians in dread 
 of a Helot revolt, while the Athe¬ 
 nians were at Pylos, ib. 80 init.; 
 Cleon’s success at Pylos increases 
 his confidence at Amphipolis, v. 7 
 med.; the Athenians repent that 
 they did not make peace after 
 Pylos ; the Lacedaemonians dis¬ 
 heartened by its capture, ib. 14 ; 
 the Athenians replace the Mes¬ 
 senians at Pylos by a garrison of 
 their own, ib. 35 fin.; the Lace¬ 
 daemonians negotiate at Athens 
 with a view to the exchange of 
 Pylos for Panactum, ib. 36 fin., 39 
 med., 44-46 ; the Athenians put 
 the Helots back in Pylos, ib. 56 
 
 med.; marauding expeditions of 
 the Athenians from Pylos, ib. 115 
 init., vi. 105, vii. 18 med., 26 med.; 
 Alcibiades pretends to have done 
 the Lacedaemonians service after 
 Pylos, vi. 89 init.; the Lacedae¬ 
 monians consider that their mis¬ 
 fortune at Pylos was deserved, 
 because they began the war, vii. 
 18; the Messenians from Pylos 
 serve with the Athenians before 
 Syracuse,zA 57 med.; comparison 
 between the naval engagement 
 at Pylos and the last battle in 
 the Great Harbour at Syracuse, 
 ib. 71 fin.; Demosthenes the 
 greatest foe of the Lacedaemo¬ 
 nians, Nicias their greatest friend, 
 in the matter of Pylos, ib. 86 med. 
 
 [See Sphacteria.] 
 
 Pyrasians, people of Pyrasus in 
 Thessaly, ii. 22 fin. 
 
 Pyrrha, in Lesbos, iii. 18 init., 25 
 init., viii. 23 init.; taken by 
 Paches, iii. 35 init. 
 
 Pyrrhichus, father of Ariston, a 
 Corinthian, vii. 39 init. 
 
 Pystilus, joint founder with Aris- 
 tonous of Agrigentum, vi. 4 med. 
 
 Pythangelus, a Theban Boeotarch, 
 ii. 2 med. 
 
 Pythen, a Corinthian, sails with 
 Gylippus to Sicily, vi. 104, vii. 
 
 1 init.; in command at the last 
 fight in the harbour, vii. 70 init. 
 
 Pythes, of Abdera, father of Nym- 
 phodorus, ii. 29 init. 
 
 Pythian Games, v. 1 init. \See 
 Apollo, Delphi, Oracle.] 
 
 Pythodorus, an Athenian, archon 
 at the commencement of the War, 
 ii. 2 init.; supersedes Laches in 
 Sicily, iii. 115 med., iv. 2 med.; 
 sent into exile, iv. 65 med.; swears 
 to the Treaty of Peace and the 
 Alliance, v. 19 fin., 24 med.; has 
 a command in an expedition 
 to Laconia, which violates the 
 Treaty, vi. 105. 
 
 0 . 
 
 Quarries, at Syracuse, used as a 
 prison for the Athenian captives, 
 vii. 86, 87. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 694 
 
 R. 
 
 Religion, is lost amid party strife, iii. 
 82 fin.; all religious restraint dis¬ 
 appears during the plague, ii. 53. 
 
 Reserve fund and ships set apart by 
 the Athenians, ii. 24, viii. 15 init. 
 
 Revenge not always successful be¬ 
 cause just, iv. 62 fin.; sweetness 
 of revenge, ii. 42 fin., iii. 40 fin., 
 vii. 68 init. 
 
 Revenue, the Athenian, raised by 
 tribute from the allies, i. 122 init., 
 
 ii. 13 med., 69, iii. 13 fin., 19, 39 
 fin., 46 init., iv. 87 fin., vi. 91 fin.; 
 from mines at Laurium, ii. 55, vi. 
 91 fin.; by a property tax, iii. 19 ; 
 from profits made by the land, 
 and the law courts, vi. 91 fin.; 
 the tribute commuted for a duty 
 of 5 per cent, on imports and 
 exports, vii. 28 fin. 
 
 Revolutions, horrors of the revolu¬ 
 tion at Corcyra, iii. 81, 84, iv. 46- 
 48 ; growth of the revolutionary 
 spirit in Hellas, iii. 82, 83 [cp. vii. 
 57 fin.] ; the oligarchical revolu¬ 
 tion at Megara, iv. 74. 
 
 Rhamphias, (i) a Lacedaemonian, 
 brings with others the last de¬ 
 mands of the Lacedaemonians 
 to Athens, i. 139 med.; sets out 
 to Chalcidic6, but returns on 
 news of Brasidas’ death, v. 12, 13 : 
 (ii) another [?], father of Clear- 
 chus, viii. 8 med., 39 med., 80 init. 
 
 Rhegium, its important position, 
 iv. 24 med.; Anaxilaus, tyrant of, 
 vi. 4 fin.; the Rhegians, Ionians, 
 and kindred of the Leontines, iii. 
 86 med., vi. 44 fin., 46 init., 79 
 med.; the Athenians aid them, 
 
 iii. 86 fin.; they sail with the 
 Athenians against the Lipari 
 islands, ib. 88 ; Athenian rein¬ 
 forcements arrive at Rhegium, ib. 
 115 ; the Rhegians fall into se¬ 
 dition and are attacked by the 
 Locrians, iv. 1 med., 24, 25 ; re¬ 
 fuse to receive the Athenian expe¬ 
 dition to Sicily, vi. 44 ; the Athe¬ 
 nians disappointed at this refusal, 
 ib. 46 init.; part of the Athenians 
 stay at Rhegium till assured of 
 a reception at Catana, ib. 50, 51 ; 
 Gylippus puts in there, on his way 
 
 to Syracuse,vii. 1 med.; the Athe¬ 
 nians lie in wait for a Corin¬ 
 thian fleet off Rfliegium, ib. 4 fin. 
 
 Rheiti, in Attica, ii. 19 med. 
 
 Rheitus, in Corinthian territory, iv. 
 42 init. 
 
 Rhenea, the island near Delos, 
 dedicated to Apollo by Poly¬ 
 crates, i. 13 fin., iii. 104 init. 
 
 Rhium, in Achaia, ii. 86 init., 92 
 fin., v. 52 fin.;—the Molycreian, 
 ii. 84 fin., 86 init. 
 
 Rhodes, viii. 41 fin.; colonized from 
 Argos, vii. 57 med.; assists in the 
 colonization of Gela, vi. 4 med., 
 vii. 57 fin.; Rhodian troops serve 
 in the expedition to Sicily, vi. 43, 
 
 vii. 57 med.; Rhodes revolts from 
 Athens, viii. 44 ; the Peloponne¬ 
 sians take up their station there, 
 ib ., ib. 52 med.; the Athenians 
 make descents upon Rhodes, ib. 
 44 fin., 55 init.; the Peloponne¬ 
 sians quit Rhodes, ib. 60. 
 
 Rhodop£, Mount, in Thessaly, ii. 
 96 init. 
 
 Rhoeteum, in the Troad, viii. 101 
 fin.; captured by the Lesbian 
 refugees, iv. 52 init. 
 
 Rhypae, in Achaia, vii. 34 init. 
 
 Roll [«:araXoyos] of persons liable to 
 military service at Athens, iii. 87, 
 vi. 31 med., 43 init., vii. 20 med., 
 
 viii. 24 init. 
 
 Ruling States not cruel to the van¬ 
 quished, v. 91 init. 
 
 S. 
 
 Sabylinthus, a Molossian, guardian 
 of the king Tharypas, ii. 80 fin. 
 
 Sacon, one of the founders of Hi- 
 mera, vi. 5 init. 
 
 Sacrilege, committed, by the slaugh¬ 
 ter of Cylon’s adherents, i. 126 ; 
 by the murder of the Helots at 
 Taenarus, ib. 128 init.; by the 
 starving to death of Pausanias, 
 ib. 134 ; in the Corcyraean se¬ 
 dition, iii. 81; provision against, 
 in the one year’s Truce, iv. 118, ii ; 
 the Athenians charged with, by 
 the Boeotians, on account of the 
 occupation of Delium, ib. 97-99. 
 
 Sadocus, son of Sitalces king of the 
 Odrysians, made an Athenian 
 
INDEX. 
 
 695 
 
 citizen, ii. 29 fin.; gives up Aris- 
 teus and the Lacedaemonian am¬ 
 bassadors to the Athenians, ib. 67. 
 
 Safety depends on preparation, vi. 
 34 fin. 
 
 Salaethus, a Lacedaemonian, sent 
 to Mitylene, iii. 25 init.; arms the 
 people, ib. 27 ; captured by the 
 Athenians, ib. 35 init.; put to 
 death by them, ib. 36 init. 
 
 Salaminia, the Athenian sacred ves¬ 
 sel, iii. 33 med., 77 fin., vi. 53 
 init., 61. 
 
 Salamis, battle of, i. 73 fin., 137 fin.; 
 the island ravaged by the Lace¬ 
 daemonians, ii. 93, 94 ; Attic ships 
 guard it, iii. 17 init.; the Atheni¬ 
 ans blockade Megara from Sa¬ 
 lamis, ii. 93 fin., 94 fin., iii. 51 
 init.; the appearance of a Pelo¬ 
 ponnesian fleet off Salamis causes 
 a panic at Athens, viii. 94. 
 
 Salamis, in Cyprus, victory of the 
 Athenians there, i. 112 med. 
 
 Salynthius, king of the Agraeans, 
 iii. iii fin., 114 med.; subdued by 
 the Athenians, iv. 77 fin. 
 
 Samaeans, in Cephallenia, ii. 30 fin. 
 
 Saminthus, in Argolis, v. 58 fin. 
 
 Samos, ‘ no small city/ viii. 76 med.; 
 one of the first Hellenic States 
 to possess a navy, i. 13 init., fin.; 
 Polycrates tyrant of, ib. 13 fin., 
 
 iii. 104 init.; Samians expel the 
 Chalcidians from Zancle, and are 
 themselves driven out by Ana- 
 xilas, vi. 4 fin.; the Samians 
 quarrel with the Milesians, i. 115 
 init.; revolt from Athens, i. 40 
 fin., 41 med., 115, viii. 76 med.; 
 are defeated, i. 116 init.; defeat 
 the Athenians, ib. 117 init.; sur¬ 
 render, ib. fin.; Samian exiles 
 settle at Anaea, iii. 19 fin., 32 init., 
 
 iv. 75 med.; Strombichides with 
 an Athenian fleet sails to Samos, 
 viii. 16, 17 init., 19 fin.; the Sami¬ 
 ans revolt and establish a de¬ 
 mocracy, the Athenians grant 
 them independence, ib.21 ; Samos 
 becomes the headquarters of the 
 Athenian fleet, ib. 25 init., 27 fin., 
 30 init., 33 med., 35 med., 39 fin., 
 41 fin., 44 fin., 60 fin., 63 init., 79 ; 
 the leading Athenians at Samos, 
 
 instigated by Alcibiades, begin to 
 plot the overthrow of the de¬ 
 mocracy, ib. 47-54, 63 fin.; the 
 Samians, with the aid of Athe¬ 
 nian sailors, crush the revolution 
 attempted by the oligarchs at 
 Samos, ib. 73 ; the Samians 
 unite with the Athenians against 
 the Four Hundred, ib. 75-77 ; 
 part of the Athenian fleet leaves 
 Samos for the Hellespont, ib. 
 80 fin.; the Athenians at Samos 
 recall Alcibiades, ib. 81 init.; 
 Alcibiades at Samos, ib. 81, 82 ; 
 envoys from the Four Hundred 
 come to Samos, ib. 86 init.; the 
 Argives offer aid, ib. fin.; Alci¬ 
 biades leaves Samos to join Tis- 
 saphernes, ib. 88 ; the Pelopon¬ 
 nesians sailing for the Hellespont 
 try to evade the Athenians at Sa¬ 
 mos, ib. 99 ; the Athenians pursue 
 them from Samos, ib. 100; Alci¬ 
 biades returns to Samos, ib. 108. 
 
 Sandius, a hill in Caria, iii. 19 fin. 
 
 Sane, an Andrian colony in Athos, iv. 
 109 med.; provision respecting 
 Sane in the Treaty of Peace, v. 
 18, vii. 
 
 Sardis, i. 115 med. 
 
 Sargeus, a Sicyonian commander 
 at Syracuse, vii. 19 fin. 
 
 Saronic Gulf, iii. 15 med.,viii. 92 init. 
 
 Scandea, in Cythera, iv. 54. 
 
 Scellias, father of Aristocrates, an 
 Athenian, viii. 89 med. 
 
 Scion£, founded by Pellenians re¬ 
 turning from Troy, iv. 120 init.; 
 revolts from Athens, ib.; the Sci- 
 onaeans crown Brasidas, ib. 121 
 init.; the Athenians and Lacedae¬ 
 monians disagree about Scione, 
 ib. 122 ; the Athenians decree its 
 destruction, ib. fin.; the Athenians 
 prepare to attack Scione, ib. 129 
 init.; the Scionaeans aid the Men- 
 daeans, ib. med., 130 init.; the 
 Peloponnesian garrison of Mende 
 flees to Scione, ib. 131 fin.; Scion& 
 is invested, ib. 132 init., 133 fin.; 
 provisions respecting Scione in 
 the Treaty of Peace, v. 18, ix, x ; 
 captured by the Athenians, the 
 citizens slain, and the city given 
 to the Plataeans, ib. 32 init. 
 
6 g 6 
 
 I N D E X. 
 
 Sciritis, a district of Laconia, v. 
 33 med.; the Sciritae form the 
 left wing of the Lacedaemonian 
 army, ib. 67 init.; present at the 
 battle of Mantinea, ib. 68 med., 
 71 med., 72 med. 
 
 Scironides, an Athenian com¬ 
 mander, viii. 25 init.; dismissed, 
 54 med. 
 
 Scirphondas, a Theban Boeotarch, 
 vii. 30 fin. 
 
 Scolus, in Chalcidic£, provision re¬ 
 specting, in the Treaty of Peace, 
 
 v. 18, vi. 
 
 Scombrus, mountain in Thrace from 
 which the Strymon rises, ii. 96 fin. 
 
 Scyllaeum, promontory near Troe- 
 zen, v. 53 fin. 
 
 Scyros, island of, subdued and colo¬ 
 nized by the Athenians, i. 98 init. 
 
 Scytal&, use of, at Lacedaemon, i. 
 131 med. 
 
 Scythians, ii. 96 med., 97 fin. 
 
 Sea, Aegaean, i. 98, iv. 109 init.; 
 Cretan, iv. 53 fin., v. no init.; 
 Hellenic, i. 4 init.; Sicilian, iv. 24 
 fin., 53 fin., vi. 13 med.; Tyrrhe¬ 
 nian, iv. 24 fin. [See Gulf.] 
 
 Sea, mastery ofthe, gained by Minos, 
 i. 4, 8 med.; by the Corinthians, 
 the Ionians, and by Polycrates, 
 ib. 13 ; by the Athenians, see 
 Athenians. 
 
 Selinus, founded by Pamillus from 
 Megara, vi. 4 init. [cp. vii. 57 
 med.]; the Selinuntians make 
 war on Egesta, vi. 6 init., 13 fin.; a 
 large and powerful city, ib. 20 fin.; 
 Nicias in a council of war urges 
 an immediate attack on Selinus, 
 ib. 47 ; the Athenian generals 
 sail towards Selinus, ib. 62 init.; 
 the Selinuntians join the Syra¬ 
 cusans, ib. 65 med.,67 med.; they 
 receive and assist Gylippus, vii. 
 1 fin., 58 init.; contribute to the 
 Sicilian fleet which is despatched 
 to Asia, viii. 26 init. 
 
 Sermyle, in Sithonia, provision re¬ 
 specting, in the Treaty of Peace, 
 v. 18, x ; defeat of the Sermylians 
 by Aristeus, i. 65 fin. 
 
 Sestos, siege and capture of (in the 
 Persian War), i. 89 med., viii. 62 
 fin.; becomes the Athenian head¬ 
 
 quarters in the Hellespont, viii. 
 62 fin., 102 init., 104 init., 107 init. 
 
 Seuthes, king of the Odrysians, the 
 successor of Sitalces, ii. 97 med., 
 iv. 101 fin.; gained over by Per- 
 diccas, ii. 101 fin.; marries Per- 
 diccas’ sister, ib. 
 
 Ships in ancient times had no decks, 
 i. 10 fin.; the ships in the fleet at 
 Salamis not completely decked, 
 ib. 14 fin.; invention of triremes, 
 ib. 13 init.; the prows of ships 
 built thicker, in order to disable 
 the lighter Athenian vessels, vii. 34 
 med., 36,62 med.; use of grappling 
 irons to catch an enemy’s ship, iv. 
 25 init., vii. 62 fin.; ships covered 
 with hides in order to prevent the 
 grapnels holding, vii. 65 ;—ships, 
 dedicated to Poseidon as trophies 
 of a victory, ii. 84 fin., 92 fin. 
 
 Sicania, an old name of Sicily, vi. 
 2 init.; the Sicanians Iberian by 
 descent, ib .; Hyccara of Sicanian' 
 origin, ib. 62 med. 
 
 Sicanus, river in Iberia, vi. 2 init. 
 
 Sicanus, a Syracusan general, vi. 73, 
 96 ; deposed, ib. 103 fin.; sent to 
 Agrigentum, vii. 46; fails in his 
 mission, ib. 50 init.; commands a 
 division of the Syracusan fleet in 
 the last sea fight, ib. 70 init. 
 
 Sicels, their occupation of Sicily, vi. 
 2 med., 3 fin.; gave name to the 
 island, ib. 2 med.; district in¬ 
 habited by them, v. 4 fin., vi. 62 
 med., 94 med.; those in the in¬ 
 terior independent, vi. 88 med.; 
 Zancl& named from the Sicel 
 word for a sickle, ib. 4 fin.; Hy- 
 blon, Archonides, Sicel kings, ib. 
 4 init., vii. 1 fin.; the greater part 
 of the Sicels join the Athenians, 
 iii. 103 init., 115 init., iv. 25 med., 
 
 vi. 65 med., 88 med., 98 init., 103 
 med., vii. 57 fin.; the Syracusans 
 try to gain them over, vi. 45 [cp. 
 ib. 34 init., 88 med.]; Alcibiades 
 wishes to secure their friendship 
 before attacking Syracuse, ib. 48 
 init.; some of them aid Gylippus, 
 
 vii. 1 fin., 58 init.; he captures 
 Getae, a Sicel fort, ib. 2 med.; 
 the Sicel allies of the Athenians 
 destroy the reinforcements sent 
 
I N D E X. 
 
 697 
 
 by the Sicilian cities to Syracuse, 
 ib . 32 ; the Athenians expect aid 
 from the Sicels on their retreat, 
 ib. 77 fin., 80 fin. 
 
 Sicily, its original settlement, vi. 2 ; 
 Hellenic colonies there, ib. 3-5 [cp. 
 i. 12 fin.]; anciently called Trina- 
 cria and Sicania, vi. 2 init.; the 
 Sicilian tyrants, i. 14 med., 17, 18 
 init.; populousness and democra¬ 
 tic character of the Sicilian states, 
 vi. 17 init., 20,vii. 28 med., 55, viii. 
 96 fin.; the Lacedaemonians order 
 their Sicilian allies to furnish a 
 fleet,ii. 7 med. [cp.iii.86 init.] ; the 
 Athenians send an expedition un¬ 
 der Laches to Sicily, iii. 86, 88, 90, 
 99,103 ; reinforcements under Py- 
 thodorus arrive in Sicily, ib. 115 ; 
 eruption of Aetna, ib. 116 ; pro¬ 
 ceedings of the second Athenian 
 expedition in Sicily, iv. 2, 24, 25, 
 65 fin.; conference of the Sicilian 
 states at Gela, ib. 58-65 init.; em¬ 
 bassy of Phaeax from Athens to 
 Sicily, v. 4, 5 ; third and great 
 expedition against Sicily: the 
 preparation, vi. 1, 6, 8-29 ; the 
 armament leaves Piraeus, ib. 30, 
 32 ; its magnitude and complete¬ 
 ness, ib. 31, 43, vii. 76 fin.; the 
 reception of the news in Sicily, 
 vi. 33-41 ; the Athenian fleet 
 reaches Catana,/^. 42-52 ; course 
 of the campaign until the invest¬ 
 ment of Syracuse, ib. 62-104 5 
 Gylippus arrives in Sicily and 
 enters Syracuse, vii. 1, 2 ; the 
 good fortune of the Athenians 
 begins to decline, ib. 3-16 ; the 
 Athenians determine to send De¬ 
 mosthenes with reinforcements, 
 ib. 17, 18 init., 20 ; the Athenians 
 at Syracuse lose command of the 
 sea, ib. 21-25, 36-41; Demos¬ 
 thenes proceeds to Sicily, ib. 26, 
 3 L 33 , 35 ; the attack on Epipolae, 
 ib. 42-45 ; the Syracusans gain a 
 fresh victory at sea, ib. 46-56 ; 
 enumeration of the hostile forces 
 in Sicily, ib. 57, 58 ; the last battle 
 in the harbour, ib. 59-71 ; the 
 retreat and final surrender, ib. 
 72-87 ; a Sicilian contingent is 
 sent to the Lacedaemonian fleet 
 
 in Asia, viii. 2 fin., 26 init., 28 
 med., 29, 35 init., 45 med., 78 fin., 
 84 init., 85 fin., 106 med.; Sicilian 
 ships in the fleet destined for 
 Euboea, ib. 91 init. 
 
 Sicyon, the Sicyonians defeated by 
 the Athenians, i. 108 fin., 111 fin.; 
 aid the Megarians to revolt, ib. 
 114 med.; furnish the Lacedae¬ 
 monians with ships, ii. 9 med.; 
 prepare ships for the Lacedae¬ 
 monian expedition against Acar- 
 nania, ib. 80 med.; with Brasidas 
 at Megara, iv. 70 med.; defeat 
 the Athenians, ib. 101 med.; aid 
 in preventing Alcibiades 5 plan for 
 fortifying Rhium, v. 52 fin.; join 
 the Lacedaemonians in the inva¬ 
 sion of Argolis, ib. 58-60 ; have 
 their government changed by the 
 Lacedaemonians, ib. 81 fin.; send 
 troops to Sicily, vii. 19 fin., 58 
 med.; contribute ships to the 
 Lacedaemonian fleet, viii. 3 fin. 
 
 Sidussa, a fort in the Erythraean 
 territory, viii. 24 init. 
 
 Sigeium, in the Hellespont, viii. 
 101 fin. 
 
 Simonides, an Athenian general, 
 iv. 7. 
 
 Simplicity, a large element in a 
 noble nature, iii. 83 init. 
 
 Simus, one of the founders of Hi- 
 mera, vi. 5 init. 
 
 Singaeans, inhabitants of Singe in 
 Sithonia, provision respecting, in 
 the Treaty of Peace, v. 18, vii. 
 
 Sinti, a people on the borders of 
 Macedonia, ii. 98 init. 
 
 Siphae, port of Thespiae, in Boeo- 
 tia, plan to betray the city, iv. 76 
 init., 77 med.; failure of the plot, 
 ib. 89 init., 101 med. 
 
 Sitalces, king of the Odrysians, be¬ 
 comes the ally of Athens, ii. 29 
 fin., 95 med.; makes war upon 
 Perdiccas, ib. 95-101 ; dies and 
 issucceeded bySeuthes,iv.ioi fin. 
 
 Six Hundred, the, the Council at 
 Elis, v. 47 fin. 
 
 Skill only to be acquired by in¬ 
 cessant application, i. 142 fin., vi. 
 18 fin.; inspires confidence, vi. 72 
 fin., vii. 67 init.; without courage 
 useless, ii. 87 med. 
 
6 9 8 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Slaves, more than twenty thousand 
 Athenian slaves desert during the 
 occupation of Decelea, vii. 27 fin.; 
 great numbers of the Chian slaves, 
 viii. 40 init.; they desert to the 
 Athenians, ib. med. 
 
 Socrates, an Athenian commander, 
 
 ii. 23 med. 
 
 Sollium, in Acarnania, taken by the 
 Athenians, ii. 30 init.; Demos¬ 
 thenes comes to Sollium on his 
 way to Aetolia, iii. 95 med.; the 
 Corinthians complain that the 
 Lacedaemonians did not recover 
 Sollium for them, v. 30 med. 
 
 Soloeis, a Phoenician settlement in 
 Sicily, vi. 2 fin. 
 
 Solygeia, a village in the Corinthian 
 territory, iv. 42, 43 ; Solygeian 
 ridge, a position once occupied 
 by the Dorian invaders of Co¬ 
 rinth, iv. 42 init. 
 
 Soothsayers, see Prophets, Ora¬ 
 cles. 
 
 Sophocles, an Athenian commander, 
 sent with reinforcements to Sicily, 
 
 iii. 115 fin., iv. 2 med., 46 init.; 
 his conduct at Corcyra, iv. 47 ; 
 condemned to exile, ib. 65 med. 
 
 Sostratides, father of Sophocles, an 
 Athenian, iii. 115 fin. 
 
 Spardacus, father of Seuthes, a 
 Thracian, ii. 101 fin., iv. 101 fin. 
 
 Sparta, see Lacedaemon. 
 
 Spartolus, in Bottice, defeat of the 
 Athenians there, ii. 79; pro¬ 
 vision respecting, in the Treaty 
 of Peace, v. 18, vi. 
 
 Speeches, Thucydides only vouches 
 for their general accuracy, i. 
 22 init.; speech of Alcibiades 
 at Athens, vi. 16-18 ; at Sparta, 
 ib. 89-92 ; Archidamus (1), i. 80- 
 85, (2) ii. 11 ; the Athenians at 
 Sparta, i. 73-78 ; Athenagoras, 
 vi. 36-40 ; Brasidas at Acanthus, 
 
 iv. 85-87 ; to his soldiers in Ma¬ 
 cedonia, ib. 126 ; at Amphipolis, 
 
 v. 9 ; Cleon, iii. 37-40 ; Corin¬ 
 thians at Athens, i. 37-43 ; at 
 Sparta (1), ib. 68-71, (2) ib. 120- 
 124; Corcyraeans, i. 32-36 ; De¬ 
 mosthenes, iv. 10 ; Diodotus, iii. 
 42-48 ; Euphemus, vi. 82-87 ; 
 Gylippus, vii. 66-68 ; Hermo- 
 
 crates at Gela, iv. 59-64; at Syra¬ 
 cuse, vi. 33, 34; at Camarina, vi. 
 76-80 ; Hippocrates, iv. 95 ; the 
 Lacedaemonian ambassadors, iv. 
 17-20; Mitylenaeans, iii. 9-14 ; 
 Nicias at Athens (1), vi. 9-14, (2) 
 ib. 20-23; at Syracuse (1), ib. 68, 
 (2) vii. 61-64, (3) ib. 77 ; Pagon- 
 das, iv. 92 ; Peloponnesian com¬ 
 manders, ii. 87 ; Pericles (1), i. 
 140-144, (2) [funeral speech], ii. 
 35-46, (3) ib. 60-64 ; Phormio, ii. 
 89 ; Plataeans, iii. 53—59; Sthene- 
 laidas, i. 86 ; Thebans, iii. 61-67; 
 Teutiaplus, iii. 30. 
 
 Sphacteria, the island in Laconia, 
 iv. 8 med.; occupied by the Lace¬ 
 daemonians, ib.; blockaded by 
 the Athenians, ib. 14 fin., 26 ; suc¬ 
 cessful attack upon, ib. 31-39; 
 restoration of the prisoners taken 
 in, v. 24 fin.; their treatment at 
 Sparta, ib. 34 fin.; the surrender 
 of Sphacteria the severest blow 
 Sparta had ever experienced, ib. 
 14 med. 
 
 Stageirus, in Chalcidice, an An¬ 
 drian colony, iv. 88 fin.; revolts 
 from Athens, ib.; unsuccessfully 
 attacked by the Athenians, v. 6 
 init.; provision respecting, in the 
 Treaty of Peace, ib. 18, vi. 
 
 Stages,a lieutenant of Tissaphernes, 
 viii. 16 fin. 
 
 State, a, is composed not of walls 
 or ships, but of men, vii. 77 fin. 
 [cp. i. 143 fin.]. 
 
 Stesagoras, a Samian commander, 
 i. 116 fin. 
 
 Sthenelaidas, a Lacedaemonian 
 Ephor, his speech, i. 85 fin., 86 ; 
 [? the same] father of Alcamenes, 
 viii. 4 med. 
 
 Stratodemus, a Lacedaemonian, 
 ambassador to the King, ii. 67 
 init. 
 
 Stratonice, sister of Perdiccas, wife 
 of Seuthes, ii. 101 fin. 
 
 Stratus, in Acarnania, ii. 80 fin.; 
 the Stratians defeat the Chao- 
 nians, ib. 81 med.; certain Stra¬ 
 tians expelled by the Athenians, 
 ib. 102 init.; the Peloponnesians 
 on their way to Olpae pass by 
 Stratus, iii. 106. 
 
I N D E X. 699 
 
 Stroebus, father of Leocrates, an 
 Athenian, i. 105 init. 
 
 Strombichides, an Athenian, sent 
 in command of an expedition 
 against Chios, viii. 15 med.; pur¬ 
 sues Chalcideus, ib.\ is chased 
 into Samos, ib. 16 ; arrives too 
 late to prevent the revolt of 
 Miletus, ib. 17 fin.; sent to Chios, 
 ib. 30 fin.; fails to recover Abydos, 
 which had revolted, ib. 62 fin.; 
 returns to Samos, ib. 79 fin. 
 
 Strombichus, father of Diotimus, 
 an Athenian, i. 45. 
 
 Strongyle, one of the Aeolian 
 islands, iii. 88 med. 
 
 Strophacus, a friend of Brasidas in 
 Thessaly, iv. 78 init. 
 
 Strymon, the river, in Thrace, i. 
 100 fin.,ii. 99 med.,iv.i02,108init., 
 vii. 9 fin.; rises in Mount Scom- 
 brus, ii. 96 fin.; lake formed by 
 it, v. 7 fin. 
 
 Styphon, one of the Lacedaemonian 
 commanders at Sphacteria, iv. 38 
 init. 
 
 Styreans, people of Styra in Eu¬ 
 boea, subjects of the Athenians, 
 vii. 57 init. 
 
 Sunium, promontory of, in Attica, 
 vii. 28 init., viii. 95 init.; fortified 
 by the Athenians, viii. 4 init. 
 
 Superstition, earthquakes cause, ex¬ 
 peditions to be abandoned, iii. 89 
 init., vi. 95 init.; a commander 
 changed, viii. 6 fin.; assemblies 
 broken up, v. 45 fin., 50 fin.; an 
 eclipse of the moon causes the 
 fatal delay at Syracuse, vii. 50 fin.; 
 unpropitious sacrifices lead to the 
 abandonment of an expedition, v. 
 54 med., 55 med., 116 init.; super¬ 
 stitious observance of festivals by 
 the Lacedaemonians, iv. 5 init., 
 v. 54 med., 75 init., 82 init. 
 
 Sybaris, a river in Italy, vii. 35 med. 
 
 Sybota, (1) islands off Thesprotia, 
 i. 47, 54 init.: (2) an harbour 
 in Thesprotia, ib. 50 med., 52 
 init., 54 init., iii. 76 fin. 
 
 Syce, near Syracuse, vi. 98 med. 
 
 Symaethus, a river in Sicily, vi. 65 
 med. 
 
 Syme, island of, viii. 41 fin., 42 fin., 
 43 init. 
 
 Synoecia, a festival at Athens, ii. 15 
 med. 
 
 Syracuse, founded from Corinth by 
 Archias, vi. 3 med.; mother city 
 of various states in Sicily, ib. 5 ; 
 equal in size and resources to 
 Athens, ib. 20, vii. 28 [cp. vi. 17 
 init.] ; fought the best of all Hel¬ 
 lenic States against the Athe¬ 
 nians, viii. 96 fin. [cp. vii. 55 init.]; 
 constantly in revolution, vi. 38 
 med.; the Syracusans go to war 
 with Leontini, iii. 86 init.; defeat 
 the Athenians,z‘A 103 med.; cause 
 Messen& to revolt, iv. 1 init.; at¬ 
 tack the Rhegians, ib. 24, 25 ; 
 hand over Morgantin6 to Cama- 
 rina, ib. 65 init.; aid the oligarchi¬ 
 cal party at Leontini, v. 4 ; the 
 news of the Athenian expedition 
 arrives, the Syracusans first 
 doubt, then prepare, ib. 32 fin.- 
 41, 45 ; the Athenians sail to 
 Syracuse, and return to Catana, 
 ib. 50-52 ; the Syracusans repulse 
 an Athenian landing with loss, ib. 
 52 fin.; they are encouraged by 
 the inactivity of the Athenians, 
 ib. 63 ; the Athenians entice them 
 to Catana in order to cover their 
 landing, ib. 64, 65 ; the Syra¬ 
 cusans are defeated by the Athe¬ 
 nians, ib. 66-71 ; encouraged by 
 Hermocrates, ib. 72; send envoys 
 to Peloponnesus, ib. 73 ; extend 
 their walls and send an em¬ 
 bassy to Camarina, ib. 75 ; pro¬ 
 mised aid by the Corinthians, ib. 
 88 fin.; the Lacedaemonians ap¬ 
 point Gylippus to command the 
 Syracusan forces, ib. 93 med.; 
 the Syracusans resist the Athe¬ 
 nians in various landings, ib. 94 ; 
 defeated in an engagement on 
 Epipolae, ib. 96, 97 ; receive 
 another check and raise a coun¬ 
 ter wall, which the Athenians 
 destroy, ib. 98-100 ; again suffer 
 a defeat, ib. 101; repulsed in an 
 attack on Epipolae, ib. 102 ; fall 
 into despair and negotiate unsuc¬ 
 cessfully with Nicias, ib. 103 ; 
 change their commanders, ib. 
 fin.; on the point of surrendering, 
 vii. 2 init.; hearing of the coming 
 
7 co 
 
 I N D E X. 
 
 of Gylippus go out to meet him, 
 ib. 2 fin.; take Labdalum, ib. 3 
 fin.; build a counter wall, ib. 4 
 init.; fail in an attack on the 
 Athenian lines, ib .; defeated by 
 the Athenians, ib. 5 ; defeat the 
 Athenians and carry their cross 
 wall past the Athenian wall, 
 ib. 6 ; begin to form a navy, ib. 
 7 fin., 12, 21 ; Gylippus brings 
 in reinforcements from the Si¬ 
 cilian cities, ib. 21 init.; the Syra¬ 
 cusans capture Plemmyrium, but 
 are defeated at sea, ib. 22, 23 ; 
 send a third embassy to Pelo- 
 ponnese, and despatch a fleet to 
 intercept the Athenian convoys, 
 ib. 25 init.; skirmish with the 
 Athenians in the harbour, ib. 
 med.; send envoys to the Sicilian 
 cities, zA fin.; more Sicilian rein¬ 
 forcements arrive, ib. 33 init.; 
 the Syracusans rebuild their fleet, 
 adopting the Corinthian inven¬ 
 tion of flatter and stronger prows, 
 ib. 36 ; fight an indecisive en¬ 
 gagement, ib. 38 ; renew the 
 attack suddenly the next day, 
 and gain a complete victory, ib. 
 39-41 ; become filled with confi¬ 
 dence, ib. 41 fin.; their spirits are 
 dashed by the arrival of Demos¬ 
 thenes, ib. 42 init.; defeat the 
 Athenians in a night engagement 
 on Epipolae, ib. 43-45 ; a party 
 among them willing to surrender, 
 ib. 48 init., 49 init., 73 fin., 86 
 med.; the Syracusans attack the 
 Athenians by sea and land, 
 ib. 51-54; encouraged by their 
 success, ib. 56 ; the Syracusan 
 allies enumerated, ib. 58 ; close 
 the mouth of the harbour, ib. 59 ; 
 prepare for a final struggle at 
 sea, ib. 65 ; win a complete vic¬ 
 tory, ib. 70-71; prevent the retreat 
 of the Athenians and force them 
 to surrender, ib. 78-85; kill Nicias 
 and Demosthenes, ib. 86 init.; 
 cruelly treat their prisoners, ib. 
 87 ; send a fleet under Her- 
 mocrates to Asia, viii. 26 init., 35 
 init.; distinguish themselves in 
 the capture of Iasos, ib. 28 med.; 
 their sailors mostly freemen, ib. 84 
 
 init.; their boldness in demanding 
 full pay of Tissaphernes, ib. 45 
 med., 78 fin., 84 init.; change their 
 commanders and banish Hermo- 
 crates, ib. 85 fin.; take part in the 
 battle of Cynossema, ib. 104-106. 
 
 T. 
 
 Taenarus, promontory of, vii. 19 
 med.; temple of Poseidon at, i. 
 128 init., 133 init.; the ‘curse of 
 Taenarus,’ ib. 128 init. 
 
 Tamos, a Persian, lieutenant of 
 Tissaphernes, viii. 31 med., 87. 
 
 Tanagra, defeat of the Athenians 
 there, 107 fin., 108 init.; its walls 
 razed by the Athenians, ib. 108 
 med.; the Tanagraeans are de¬ 
 feated by the Athenians,iii.91 fin.; 
 the Boeotians gather at Tanagra 
 before the battle of Delium, iv. 91 
 init.; the Tanagraeans on the left 
 wing at Delium, ib. 93 fin.; the 
 Boeotians retire to Tanagra after 
 Delium, ib. 97 init.; the territory 
 of Tanagra ravaged by Thracians 
 under Diitrephes, vii. 29 init. 
 
 Tantalus, a Lacedaemonian, gover¬ 
 nor of Thyrea, iv. 57. 
 
 Tarentum, vi. 34 med., 104 med., 
 vii. 1 init.; hostile to the Athenian 
 expedition to Sicily, vi. 44 med.; 
 ships from Tarentum join the 
 Lacedaemonian fleet intended for 
 Euboea, viii. 91 med. 
 
 Taulantians, an Illyrian race, near 
 Epidamnus, i. 24 init. 
 
 Taurus, a Lacedaemonian, swears 
 to one year’s Truce, iv. 119 init. 
 
 Tax, property, of two hundred 
 talents at Athens, iii. 19; of 5 per 
 cent, on the produce of the soil 
 imposed by the Peisistratidae, 
 vi. 54 med.; on imports by the 
 Athenians, vii. 28 fin. 
 
 Tegea, in Arcadia, constantly at 
 war with Mantinea, v. 65 med.; 
 the Tegeans fight with the Man- 
 tineans, iv. 134 ; refuse to join 
 the Argive alliance, v. 32 init.; 
 take part in the Lacedaemonian 
 expedition against Argos, ib. 57 
 med.; the Argive confederacypre- 
 
INDEX . 
 
 JOl 
 
 pare to attack Tegea, ib. 62 ; the 
 Lacedaemonians occupy Tegea, 
 ib. 64med.; the Tegeans fight on 
 the right wing at Mantinea, ib. 
 67-74 ; the Lacedaemonian dead 
 buried at Tegea, ib. 74 med.; the 
 Lacedaemonian reinforcements 
 do not proceed beyond Tegea, 
 ib. 75 init.; the Lacedaemonians 
 march thither in order to make 
 terms with the Argives, ib. 76 
 init., 78 ; the Lacedaemonians 
 march to support the oligarchy 
 at Argos, but turn back at Tegea, 
 ib. 82 init. 
 
 Teichium, in Aetolia, iii. 96 med. 
 
 Teichiussa, in Milesian territory, 
 viii. 26 med., 28 init. 
 
 Tellias, a Syracusan general, vi. 
 103 fin. 
 
 Tellis, a Lacedaemonian, father of 
 Brasidas, ii. 25 init., iii. 69 med., 
 iv. 70 init.; swears to the Treaty 
 of Peace and the Alliance, v. 19 
 med., 24 init. 
 
 Temenidae, ancestors of the Mace¬ 
 donian kings, ii. 99 init. 
 
 Temenites, part of Syracuse, vii. 3 
 med.; shrine of Apollo Temenites, 
 vi. 75 init., 99 fin., 100 fin. 
 
 Temple, see under the various 
 deities. 
 
 Temple of Zeus, a place between 
 Lebedus and Colophon, viii. 19 
 med. 
 
 Tenedos, founded from Boeotia, vii. 
 57 med.; tributary to Athens, ib.; 
 the inhabitants warn the Athe¬ 
 nians of the Lesbian revolt, iii. 2 
 init.; the Athenians place their 
 Mitylenaean prisoners there for 
 a time, ib. 28 fin., 35. 
 
 Tenos, one of the Cyclades; the 
 Tenians tributary to Athens, vii. 
 57 init.; Tenians in the service 
 of the oligarchs at Athens, viii. 
 69 med. 
 
 Teos, iii. 32 init.; revolts from 
 Athens,viii. 16, 19fin.; theTeans 
 agree with the Athenians, and 
 promise neutrality, ib. 20 fin. 
 
 Teres, the great Odrysian king, 
 father of Sitalces, ii. 29 init., 67 
 init., 95 init.; not the same as the 
 Tereus, in mythology, ib. 29 init. 
 
 Tereus, the ancient Thracian king, 
 
 ii. 29 init. 
 
 Terias, a river in Sicily, vi. 50 med., 
 94 init. 
 
 Terinaean Gulf, in southern Italy, 
 vi. 104 med. 
 
 Terror, the reign of, at Athens, viii.66. 
 
 Tessaracosts, a Chian coin, viii. 
 101 init. 
 
 Teutiaplus, an Elean, his speech, 
 
 iii. 30. 
 
 Teutlussa, an island near Rhodes, 
 viii. 42 fin. 
 
 Thapsus, near Syracuse, founded 
 from Megara by Lamis, vi. 4 init.; 
 peninsula of, ib. 97 init., 99 fin., 
 101 med., 102 fin., vii. 49 med. 
 
 Tharypas, king of the Molossians, 
 
 ii. 80 fin. 
 
 Thasos, a Parian colony, iv. 104 
 fin.; mother city of Galepsus and 
 (Esym£, ib. 107 fin., v. 6 init.; 
 revolts from the Athenians, i. 100 
 med. [cp. viii. 64 med.]; asks the 
 Lacedaemonians toinvade Attica, 
 i. 101 init.; surrenders, ib. fin.; 
 Thucydides at Thasos, iv. 104 fin., 
 105 init.; the Thasians have their 
 government changed by the oli¬ 
 garchical conspirators at Samos, 
 ib. 64 init.; prepare to revolt, ib. 
 
 Theaenetus, a Plataean diviner, 
 suggests the plan for breaking 
 out of Plataea, iii. 20 init. 
 
 Theagenes, tyrant of Megara, father- 
 in-law of Cylon, i. 126 init. 
 
 Theagenes, an Athenian, chosen 
 with Cleon as Commissioner to 
 Sphacteria, iv. 27 med.; swears 
 to the Treaty of Peace and the 
 Alliance, v. 19 fin., 24 med. 
 
 Theatre of Dionysus, near Muny- 
 chia, viii. 93 init. 
 
 Thebes, once allied to Persia, i. 90 
 med., iii. 56 med., 58 fin., 59, 62; 
 its hostility to Plataea, ii. 71 med., 
 72 med., iii. 55 init., 57 med., 58 
 init., 59 med.; Theban Boeo- 
 tarchs, iv. 91 med.; the Thebans 
 furnish the Corinthians with 
 money for the expedition against 
 Epidamnus, i. 27 fin.; surprise 
 Plataea in time of peace, ii. 2, 
 
 iii. 56 init., vii. 18 med.; are 
 defeated, ii. 3; surrender, ib. 4 ; 
 
702 
 
 INDEX . 
 
 send reinforcements, ib . 5 init.; 
 come to terms, ib. fin.; their 
 speech against the Plataeans, iii. 
 61-67 ; their treatment of Plataea, 
 ib. 68 fin.; defeated by the Athe¬ 
 nians at Tanagra, ib. 91 fin.; a 
 Theban exile, Ptoeodorus, plots 
 with the Athenians to betray 
 Boeotia, iv. 76 init.; the Thebans 
 on the right wing at Delium, ib. 93 
 fin.; their formation there, ib.\ 
 they dismantle the walls of 
 Thespiae, ib. 133 init.; suppress 
 a rising at Thespiae, vi. 95 fin.; 
 send aid to Syracuse, vii. 19 med.; 
 drive the Thracians to their ships 
 after the sack of Mycalessus, ib.30. 
 
 Themistocles, founder of the naval 
 power of Athens, i. 14 fin., 93 ; 
 the victor at Salamis, ib. 74 init. 
 [cp. ib. 137 fin.]; honours paid 
 to him by the Lacedaemonians, 
 ib. 74 init., 91 init.; outwits the 
 Lacedaemonians, ib. 90, 91 ; 
 
 builds the Piraeus, ib. 93 ; ostra¬ 
 cised, ib. 135 init.; implicated in 
 the plot of Pausanias, ib.\ takes 
 refuge with Admetus, ib. 136; 
 flees to Ephesus, ib. 137 init.; 
 goes to the Persian court, ib. 138 ; 
 dies, ib. fin.; said to have been 
 buried in Attica, ib. ; his character, 
 ib. med. 
 
 Theodorus, father of Procles, an 
 Athenian, iii. 91 init. 
 
 Theolytus,father of Cynes [tyrant ?] 
 of Coronta, ii. 102 init. 
 
 Theopompus, an Athenian com¬ 
 mander, ii. 26 [? Cleopompus]. 
 
 Theori, a magistracy at Mantinea, 
 v. 47 fin.; Alcibiades as Geopd? 
 of Athens at Olympia, vi. 16 init.; 
 the Athenians send Theori to the 
 Isthmian Games, viii. ioinit.; Si¬ 
 cilian Theori before sailing sacri¬ 
 fice to Apollo at Naxos, vi. 3 init. 
 
 Thera, one of the Cyclades, not 
 allied to the Athenians, ii. 9 fin. 
 
 Theramenes, an Athenian, a chief 
 leader in the oligarchical revolu¬ 
 tion at Athens, viii. 68 fin.; begins 
 with others to form a party within 
 the oligarchy, ib. 89, 90 med., 91; 
 instigates the soldiers to destroy 
 the fort Eetioneia, ib. 92, 94 init. 
 
 Theramenes, a Lacedaemonian 
 commander, brings reinforce¬ 
 ments to Astyochus, viii. 26 init., 
 29 med.; persuaded by Alcibiades 
 to go to the relief of Miletus, ib. 
 26 fin., 27 init., 28 init.; negotiates 
 a treaty with the King, ib. 36, 37, 
 43 med.; lost at sea, ib. 38 init. 
 
 Therm£, in Macedonia, taken by 
 the Athenians, i. 61 med.; re¬ 
 stored to Perdiccas, ii. 29 fin. 
 
 Thermon, a Spartan, sent by Agis 
 to Peiraeum, viii. 11 med. 
 
 Thermopylae, ii. 101 init., iii. 92 
 fin.; battle of Thermopylae com¬ 
 pared to that of Sphacteria, iv. 
 36 fin. 
 
 Theseus, unites the Attic communes 
 into one city, ii. 15 init.; temple 
 of, at Athens, vi. 61 med. 
 
 Thespiae, in Boeotia, iv. 76 init.; 
 the Thespians on the left wing at 
 Delium, ib. 93 fin.; suffer severe 
 loss, ib. 96 med., 133 init.; have 
 their walls dismantled by the 
 Thebans, ib. 133 init.; popular 
 revolution there, quelled by the 
 Thebans, vi. 95 fin.; the Thes¬ 
 pians send aid to Syracuse, vii. 
 19 init., 25 med. 
 
 Thesprotia, i. 30 fin., 46 med., 50 
 med.; the Thesprotians have no 
 king, ii. 80 fin. 
 
 Thessaly, its early history, i. 12 
 med.; once held by the Per¬ 
 sians, viii. 43 fin.; forms alliance 
 with the Athenians, i. 102 fin. 
 [cp. ib. 107 fin., iv. 78 med.]; 
 the Thessalians desert from the 
 Athenians at Tanagra, i. 107 
 fin.; assist the Athenians in the 
 first invasion of Attica, ii. 22 
 med.; take alarm at the expedi¬ 
 tion of Sitalces, ib. 101 med.; 
 make war on Heraclea, iii. 93 
 med.; some of the leading Thes¬ 
 salians escort Brasidas through 
 Thessaly, iv. 78 ; the Thes¬ 
 salians refuse Rhamphias and 
 the Peloponnesians passage, v. 
 13 ; certain Thessalians aid in a 
 defeat of the Heracleans, ib. 51 
 init.; the Thessalians angry with 
 Agis for extorting money from 
 the Achaeans of Pthia, viii.3 med. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 703 
 
 Thessalus, brother of Hippias, i. 20 
 med., vi. 55 init. 
 
 Thoricus, in Attica, viii. 95 init. 
 
 Thousand Argives, the, a select 
 force trained at the expense of 
 the state, v. 67 fin., 72 med., 73 
 fin. 
 
 Thrace, European, divided among 
 various tribes : Agrianians, ii. 96 
 med.; Dersaeans, ib. 101 med.; 
 Dii, ib. 96 med., 98 fin., vii. 27 
 init.; Droans, ii. 101 med.; Edo- 
 nians, i. 100 fin., ii. 99 med., iv. 
 102 med., 107 fin., 109 fin., v. 
 6 fin.; Getae, ii. 96 init., 98 fin.; 
 Graaeans, ib. 96 fin.; Laeaeans, 
 ib. 96 med.; Maedi, ib. 98 med.; 
 Odomantians, ib. 101 med.; Odry- 
 sians, ib. 29, 96 init., 97, 98 fin., 
 101 med.; Paeonians, ib. 96 fin., 
 98 med.; Panaeans, ib. 101 med.; 
 Sinti, ib. 98 med.; Tilataeans, ib. 
 96 fin.; Treres, ib. 96 fin.; Triballi, 
 ib. 96 fin., iv. 101 fin.;—gold 
 mines in Thrace, i. 100 med., iv. 
 105 init.;—the Thracians prefer 
 receiving to giving, ii. 97 med.; 
 wanting in sense, ib. fin.; their 
 ferocity, vii. 3ofin.; once inhabited 
 Phocis, ii. 29 init.; destroy the 
 Athenian colonists at Ennea 
 Hodoi, i. 100 fin., iv. 102 med.; 
 march, under the leadership of 
 Sitalces, against Perdiccas, ii. 95- 
 101. [See Odrysians, Perdiccas, 
 Sitalces.] Thracian mercenaries 
 in Athenian service at Mende, iv. 
 129 init.; the Thracians are asked 
 for aid by Cleon at Amphipolis, 
 v. 6init.; the Edonian and Myrci- 
 nian Thracians serve under Bra- 
 sidas, ib. fin., 10 fin.; Thracian 
 mercenaries sent home from 
 Athens sack Mycalessus, vii. 27 
 init., 30. 
 
 Thracians, the Bithynian, in Asia, 
 iv. 75 fin. 
 
 Thrasybulus, an Athenian, one of 
 the steadiest opponents of the 
 oligarchs at Athens, viii. 73 med.; 
 persuades the army and the Sa¬ 
 mians to swear allegiance to the 
 democracy, ib. 75; appointed 
 with Thrasyllus general, ib. 76 
 init.; procures the restoration of 
 
 Alcibiades, ib. 81 init.; sails to 
 Eresus which had revolted, ib. 
 100 fin.; aids Thrasyllus at Cy- 
 nossema, ib. 104,105. 
 
 Thrasycles, an Athenian, swears to 
 the Treaty of Peace and the 
 Alliance, v. 19 fin., 24 med.; 
 sent with twelve ships to Chios, 
 viii. 15 med., 17 fin., 19 med. 
 
 Thrasyllus, one of the steadiest 
 opponents of the oligarchs at 
 Athens, viii. 73 med.; persuades 
 the army and the Samians to 
 swear allegiance to the demo¬ 
 cracy, ib. 75 ; appointed with 
 Thrasybulus general, ib. 76 init.; 
 follows Mindarus to Chios, ib. 
 100 init.; sets about besieging 
 Eresus, ib. 100fin., 103 init.; pur¬ 
 sues Mindarus to the Hellespont, 
 ib. med.; defeats him off Cynos- 
 sema, ib. 104,105. 
 
 Thrasyllus, an Argive general, 
 makes terms with Agis, v. 59 
 fin., 60 init.; attacked by the 
 Argives, ib. 60 fin. 
 
 Thrasymelidas, a Spartan, admiral 
 in command at Pylos, iv. 11 
 init. 
 
 Thria, in Attica, i. 114 fin., ii. 19 
 med., 20 init., 21 init. 
 
 Thronium, in Locris, ii. 26. 
 
 Thucles, the founder of Naxos in 
 Sicily, vi. 3 init.; of Leontini and 
 Catana, ib. fin. 
 
 Thucles, father of Eurymedon, an 
 Athenian, iii. 80 fin., 91 med., 
 vii. 16 fin. 
 
 Thucydides, motives for writing his 
 history, i. 1; its truthfulness, ib. 
 21-23, v. 26 fin.; the speeches 
 only generally accurate, i. 22 init.; 
 reasons for describing the period 
 between the Persian and Pelo¬ 
 ponnesian ^Wars, ib. 97 ; his reason 
 for reckoning his history by sum¬ 
 mers and winters, v. 20 ; at¬ 
 tacked by the plague, ii. 48 fin.; 
 appointed general in Thrace, iv. 
 104 fin.; a leading man in Thrace, 
 ib. 105 init.; fails to save Amphi¬ 
 polis, ib. 106 fin.; repulses Brasi- 
 das from Eion, ib. 107 init.; 
 exiled, v. 26 fin.; lived through¬ 
 out the war, ib. 
 
7 C 4 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Thucydides, an Athenian com¬ 
 mander at Samos, i. 117 med. 
 
 Thucydides, of Pharsalus, proxenus 
 of Athens, viij. 92 med.; helps to 
 prevent the panic after the de¬ 
 struction of Eetioneia, ib. 
 
 Thunder-storm, effect of, on armies, 
 vi. 70 init., vii. 79 med. 
 
 Thuria, in Laconia, Perioeci of, i. 
 101 init. 
 
 Thurii, in Italy, Alcibiades conceals 
 himself there, vi. 61 fin., 88 fin.; 
 the Thurians refuse to receive 
 Gylippus, ib. 104 med.; expel an 
 anti-Athenian party, vii. 33 fin., 
 35 init., 57 fin.; send ships to the 
 Peloponnesians in Asia, viii. 35 
 init., 61 med.; the sailors mostly 
 freemen, ib. 84 init.; their bold¬ 
 ness in demanding full pay from 
 Tissaphernes, ib. 78 fin., 84 init. 
 
 Thyamis, a river on the borders of 
 Thesprotia, i. 46 fin. 
 
 Thyamus, Mount, in Aetolia, iii. 
 106 fin. 
 
 Thymochares, an Athenian com¬ 
 mander, viii. 95 init. 
 
 Thyrea, in Laconia, given to the 
 Aeginetans by the Lacedaemo¬ 
 nians, ii. 27 med., iv. 56 fin.; cap¬ 
 tured by the Athenians, iv. 57 ; 
 the Argives in their treaty with 
 Lacedaemon insert a stipulation 
 that they and the Lacedaemo¬ 
 nians should fight for Thyrea, v. 
 41 med.; the district of Thyrea 
 invaded by the Argives, vi. 95. 
 
 Thyssus, in Athos, iv. 109 med.; al¬ 
 lied with the Athenians, v. 35init.; 
 captured by the Dictidians, ib. 
 
 Tilataeans, aThracian tribe, ii. 96 fin. 
 
 Timagoras, a Cyzicene exile at the 
 court of Pharnabazus, viii. 6 init.; 
 goes as envoy to Sparta, zA, ib. 8 
 init., 39 init. 
 
 Timagoras, a Tegean ambassador 
 to Persia, ii. 67. 
 
 Timapor, a Corinthian commander, 
 i. 29 init. 
 
 Timanthes, father of Timanor, a 
 Corinthian, i. 29 init. 
 
 Timocrates, an Athenian, father of 
 Aristoteles, iii. 105 fin.; swears 
 to the Treaty of Peace and the 
 Alliance, v. 19 fin., 24 med. 
 
 Timocrates, a Spartan, sent out as 
 adviser to Cnemus, ii. 85 init.; 
 kills himself, ib. 93 med. 
 
 Timocrates, father of Timoxenus, 
 a Corinthian, ii. 33 init. 
 
 Timoxenus, a Corinthian com¬ 
 mander, ii. 33 init. 
 
 Tisamenus, a Trachinian, envoy to 
 Sparta, iii. 92 init. 
 
 Tisander, an A.etolian, envoy to 
 Sparta, iii. 100 init. 
 
 Tisias, an Athenian general at 
 Melos, v. 84 fin. 
 
 Tisimachus, father of Tisias, an 
 Athenian, v. 84 fin. 
 
 Tissaphernes, governor of the pro¬ 
 vinces on the coast of Asia, viii. 
 5 init.; sends an envoy to ask the 
 aid of Sparta, zA; negotiates a 
 treaty between Sparta and the 
 King, ib. 17 fin., 18 ; demolishes 
 a fort at Teos, ib. 20 fin.; present 
 at an engagement before Miletus, 
 ib. 25 init.; persuades the Pelo¬ 
 ponnesians to attack Iasus, ib. 
 28 init.; reduces the pay of the 
 Peloponnesian fleet, ib. 29; causes 
 Cnidus to revolt, ib. 35 init. (cp. ib. 
 109); makes a second treaty with 
 the Lacedaemonians, ib. 37; en¬ 
 raged at Lichas for objecting to 
 the treaties with the King, ib. 43 
 fin.; instructed by Alcibiades to 
 balance the contending parties, 
 ib. 45, 46 [cp. ib. 87]; persuaded 
 by Alcibiades to offer impossible 
 terms to Peisander, ib. 56; makes 
 a third treaty with the Lacedae¬ 
 monians, ib. 57, 58 ; now shows 
 himself more ready to fulfil his 
 engagements, ib. 59 ; his dilatory 
 conduct, ib. 78, 80 init.; becomes 
 more and more hateful to the 
 Lacedaemonian fleet, ib. 83 ; puts 
 a garrison in Miletus, which the 
 Milesians drive out, ib. 84 med.; 
 sends an envoy to Sparta, ib. 
 85 init.; his malignity against 
 Hermocrates, ib. fin.; goes to 
 fetch the Phoenician ships, ib. 87; 
 why he did not bring them, ib.; 
 marches towards Ionia, viii. 108 
 med.; starts for the Hellespont 
 to remonstrate with the Lacedae¬ 
 monians, ib. 109; goes to Ephesus 
 
INDEX. 
 
 7 ° 5 
 
 and offers sacrifice to Artemis, ib. 
 fin. 
 
 Tlepolemus, an Athenian com¬ 
 mander at Samos, i. 117 med. 
 
 Tolmaeus, (i) father of Tolmides, 
 an Athenian, i. 108 fin., 113 init.; 
 (ii) another, father of Autocles, 
 iv. 53 init., 119 fin. 
 
 Tolmides, an Athenian, commands 
 an expedition round Peloponne¬ 
 sus, i. 108 fin.; defeated at Coro- 
 nea, ib. 113. 
 
 Tolmides, father of Theaenetus, a 
 Plataean, iii. 20 init. 
 
 Tolophonians, an Ozolian Locrian 
 tribe, iii. 101 fin. 
 
 Tolophus, an Aetolian, ambassador 
 to Corinth, iii. 100 init. 
 
 Tomeus, Mount, in Laconia, iv. 118, 
 
 iii. 
 
 Torone, in Chalcidice, iv. 120 med., 
 122 init., 129 init.; captured by 
 Brasidas, iv. 110-114 ; entrusted 
 by him to Pasitelidas, ib. 132 fin.; 
 retaken by the Athenians, v. 2, 3 ; 
 provision respecting, in the treaty 
 between Athens and Lacedae¬ 
 mon, ib. 18, x. 
 
 Torylaus, a friend of Brasidas in 
 Thessaly, iv. 78 init. 
 
 Trachinians, one of the Malian 
 tribes, iii. 92 init. [See Hera- 
 clea.] 
 
 Trade, no trade in ancient Hellas, 
 i. 2 init.; ancient trade chiefly by 
 land, ib. 13 med.; trade in corn at 
 Athens, viii. 4 init. [cp. vi. 20 fin.]; 
 trade between Egypt and Athens, 
 viii. 35 med.; between Africa and 
 Peloponnesus, iv. 53 fin. 
 
 Tradition, Peloponnesian traditions, 
 i. 9 init.; ancient traditions too 
 readily received, ib. 20 init. 
 
 Tragia, an island off Samos, Athe¬ 
 nian victory there, i. 116 med. 
 
 Treasury of the Athenian confede¬ 
 racy originally at Delos, i. 96 ; 
 contents of the Athenian trea¬ 
 sury in the Acropolis, ii. 13 med.; 
 treasuries of Delphi and Olympia, 
 i. 121 med., 143 init. 
 
 Treaties, see Peace. 
 
 Treres, a Thracian tribe, ii. 96 fin. 
 
 Triballi, a Thracian tribe, ii. 96 fin., 
 
 iv. 101 fin. 
 
 Tribute of the Athenian allies, its 
 amount, i. 96 fin., ii. 13 med.; its 
 first imposition, i. 96 init.; its 
 amount as fixed in the time of 
 Aristides, v. 18, vi; changed to a 
 duty of 5 per cent., vii. 28 fin.;— 
 tribute collected by the Odrysian 
 Empire, ii. 97 med. 
 
 Trierarchs, at Athens, vi. 31 init., 
 
 vii. 69 init., 70 fin. 
 
 Trifles may involve important prin¬ 
 ciples, i. 140 fin. 
 
 Trinacria, the ancient name of 
 Sicily, vi. 2 init. 
 
 Triopium, promontory near Cnidus, 
 
 viii. 35, 60 fin.; temple of Apollo 
 there, ib. 35 med. 
 
 Tripod, at Delphi, dedicated as a 
 memorial of the Persian War, i. 
 132 med., iii. 57 med. 
 
 Tripodiscus, in Megara, iv. 70. 
 
 Triremes, first built at Corinth, i. 
 13 init. [See Ships.] 
 
 Tritaeans, an Ozolian Locrian tribe, 
 iii. 101 fin. 
 
 Troezen, in Peloponnesus, restored 
 by the Athenians under the 
 Thirty Years’ Peace, i. 115 init.; 
 the Troezenians furnish a convoy 
 to Corinth, ib. 17 fin.; the ter¬ 
 ritory of Troezen ravaged by the 
 Athenians, ii. 56 fin.; Cleon per¬ 
 suades the Athenians to demand 
 the restitution of Troezen, iv. 21 
 fin.; the Athenians seize Methone 
 and ravage the territory of Troe¬ 
 zen, ib. 45 [cp. ib. 118, iii] ; the 
 Troezenians furnish the Lacedae¬ 
 monians with ships, viii. 3 fin. 
 
 Trogilus, near Syracuse, vi. 99 init., 
 vii. 2 fin. 
 
 Trojan, colonists in Sicily, vi. 2 
 med.; took, together with the Si- 
 canians, the name of Elymi, ib. 
 
 Trotilus, founded from Megara by 
 Lamis, vi. 4 init. 
 
 Troy, see War, Trojan. 
 
 Truce, for a year between the La¬ 
 cedaemonians and Athenians, iv. 
 117-119; with ten days’ notice, 
 between the Athenians and the 
 Boeotians, v. 26 med., 32 med.; 
 between the Athenians and the 
 Chalcidians, vi. 7 fin. [cp. ib. 10 
 med.] 
 
706 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Truth, little sought after by man¬ 
 kind, i. 20 fin. [cp. vi. 54 init.] ; 
 pains taken by Thucydides to 
 ascertain the truth, i. 22, v. 25 fin. 
 
 Twelve Gods, altar of the, in the 
 Athenian Agora, vi. 54 fin. 
 
 Tydeus, a Chian, executed on a 
 charge of conspiracy with the 
 Athenians, viii. 38 med. 
 
 Tyndareus, the oath of the suitors 
 of Helen to him, i. 9 init. 
 
 Tyrannies, rise of, in Hellas, i. 13 
 init.; the Sicilian tyrants, ib . 14 
 med., 17, 18 init.; policy of the 
 early tyrants, ib. 17 ; the tyrants 
 overthrown by the Lacedaemo¬ 
 nians, ib. 18 init., vi. 53 fin., 59 fin. 
 
 Tyrants, Anaxilas of Rhegium, vi. 
 4 fin.; Evarchus of Astacus, ii. 30 
 med., 33 init.; Hippocles of 
 Lampsacus, vi. 59 med.; Hip¬ 
 pocrates of Gela, ib. 5 fin.; the 
 Pisistratidae at Athens, i. 20, vi. 
 53 fin-59 ; Polycrates of Samos, 
 i. 13 fin., iii. 104 med. 
 
 Tyrrhenia [Etruria], the Tyrrhe¬ 
 nians friendly to Athens, vi. 88 
 med.; send the Athenians aid, 
 ib. 103 med., vii. 53, 54, 57 fin. 
 
 Tyrrhenian Gulf, vi. 62 init., vii. 58 
 init.;—Sea, iv. 24 fin. 
 
 Tyrrhenians, the old Pelasgian in¬ 
 habitants of Lemnos and Athens, 
 iv. 109 fin. 
 
 U. 
 
 Unfortunate, the unfortunate man 
 does not expect to be recognized 
 by his acquaintances, vi. 16 med. 
 
 V. 
 
 Vengeance, the vengeance which 
 follows closest upon a wrong the 
 most adequate, iii. 38 init.; sweet¬ 
 ness of vengeance, ii. 42 fin., iii. 
 40 fin., vii. 68 init. 
 
 Vote, vulgar error that the kings of 
 Lacedaemon have two votes, i. 
 20 fin. 
 
 W. 
 
 Walls, the Long Walls [of Athens], 
 i. 69 init., 107 init., 108 med., ii. 
 13 fin.; [of Megara], built by the 
 
 Athenians, i. 103 fin.; razed by 
 the Megarians, iv. 109 init.; [of 
 Patrae], v. 52 fin.; [of Argos], ib. 
 82 ; destroyed by the Lacedae¬ 
 monians, ib. 83 init.; the Walls 
 of Athens, ib. 90-93 ; of the 
 Piraeus, ib. 93, ii. 13 fin.; of 
 Phalerum, ii. 13 fin. 
 
 War, Peloponnesian, continues, 
 without a break, ten years to 
 the Treaty of Peace, v. 20; its 
 length and greatness, i. 23 ; its 
 causes, ib. fin., 55 fin., 56-66, 146; 
 state of feeling before, ib. ' 66 
 med., ii. 8, 11 init.; reasons of 
 the Lacedaemonians for enter¬ 
 ing upon, i. 23 fin., 88 ; prepar¬ 
 ations and allies of either side, 
 ii. 7-9; actual commencement 
 of the War, i. 118 init., ii. 1 ; 
 lasted 27 years, as foretold by an 
 oracle, v. 26. 
 
 End of 1st year, ii. 47 init. 
 
 „ 2nd „ „ 70 fin. 
 
 „ 3rd „ 103 fin. 
 
 „ 4th „ iii. 25 fin. 
 
 „ 5th „ „ 88 fin. 
 
 „ 6th „ „ 116 fin. 
 
 „ 7th „ iv. 51 fin. 
 
 „ 8th „ „ 116 fin. 
 
 „ 9 * ,, » 135 - 
 
 „ 10th „ v. 20 init. 
 
 » nth „ „ 39 fin. 
 
 „ 12th „ ,,51 fin. 
 
 „ 13th „ „ 56 fin. 
 
 „ 14th „ „ 81 fin. 
 
 „ 15th „ „ 83 fin. 
 
 „ 16th „ vi. 7 fin. 
 
 „ I7th „ „ 93 fin. 
 
 „ 18th „ vii. 18 fin. 
 
 „ 19th „ viii. 6 fin. 
 
 „ 20th „ „ 60 fin. 
 
 „ 21st „ „ 109 fin. 
 
 War, the Persian, i. 14 med., 18 fin., 
 
 23 init., 41 init., 69 med., 73, 
 74, 89, 90 init., 93 fin., 95 fin., 
 97, 142 med., vi. 82 init., viii. 
 
 24 med.; events of—Marathon, 
 i. 18 med., vi. 59 fin.; Thermo¬ 
 pylae, iv. 36 fin.; Artemisium, iii. 
 54 med.; Salamis, i. 73 fin., 137 
 fin.; Mycal6, i. 89 init.; Plataea, 
 ib. 130 init., iii. 54 med., 58 med.; 
 capture of Byzantium, i. 128 med.; 
 of Eion, Scyros, Naxos, ib. 98 ; 
 
INDEX. 
 
 4 
 
 battle of the Eurymedon, ib. ioo 
 init.; Persian occupation of Ses- 
 tos alluded to in viii. 62 fin.; 
 dedication of the tripod at Del¬ 
 phi, i. 132 med., iii. 57 med.; its 
 object principally the destruction 
 of Athens, vi. 33 fin. 
 
 War, the Sacred, i. 112 fin. 
 
 War, Trojan, first common action 
 of Hellas, i. 3 init. and fin.; not 
 equal to more modern wars, ib. 
 9-1T; reason of its length, ib. 
 11 ; changes in Hellas after the 
 return from Troy, ib. 12 [cp. ii. 
 68 init.] 
 
 War, maxims of, ‘ war a matter of 
 money,’ i. 83 ; c war waits for no 
 man,’ ib. 142 init.; ‘ the battle not 
 always to the strong,’ ii. 11 med., 
 89 med., v. 102 ; necessity of dis¬ 
 cipline, ii. 11 fin.; courage is forti¬ 
 fied by justifiable contempt, ib. 
 62 fin.; ‘victory on the side of 
 the greatest battalions,’ ib. 87 
 fin.; much to be learned from 
 mistakes, zb.; a good general 
 is never off his guard, iii. 30 fin., 
 v. 9 init.; when danger has to be 
 faced reflection is useless, iv. 10 
 init.; war much a matter of 
 chance, i. 78 init., 120 fin., iv. 
 18 med., vii. 61 fin.; importance 
 of reinforcements brought up at 
 the right time, v. 9 med.; ‘find 
 out an enemy’s weak points,’ iv. 
 126 med., vi. 91 fin.;—deteriora¬ 
 tion of character caused by 
 war, iii. 82 init.; its inscrutable 
 nature, i. 78 init.; no experienced 
 man believes that war is a good 
 or safe thing, ib. 80 init.; wars are 
 supported out of accumulated 
 wealth, not out of forced con¬ 
 tributions, ib. 141 med.; misery 
 of war, iv. 59 init. 
 
 Weak, the, must go to the wall, v. 
 89 fin. 
 
 ‘Wells,’ in Acarnania, the, iii. 105 
 init., 106 fin. 
 
 Wisdom, contemptuous wisdom 
 brings men to ruin, i. 122 fin. 
 
 Women, the glory of woman to re¬ 
 strain her weakness, and avoid 
 both praise and blame, ii. 45 
 fin. 
 
 707 
 
 X. 
 
 Xanthippus, father of Pericles, an 
 Athenian, i. iii med., i. 127 init. 
 
 Xenares, (i) Ephor at Sparta, v. 36 
 init., 46 fin.; favours the war 
 party, ib. 36 med.; negotiates with 
 the Boeotians and Corinthians, 
 ib. 36-38 : (ii) another, the Lace¬ 
 daemonian governor of Heraclea, 
 v. 51 fin.; slain in battle, ib. 
 
 Xenocleides, a Corinthian com¬ 
 mander, i. 46 init., iii. 114 fin. 
 
 Xenon, a Theban commander at 
 Syracuse, vii. 19 med. 
 
 Xenophanes, father of Lamachus, 
 an Athenian, vi. 8 med. 
 
 Xenophantidas, a Lacedaemonian, 
 viii. 55 med. 
 
 Xenophon, an Athenian com¬ 
 mander at Potidaea, ii. 70 init.; 
 in Chalcidic£, ib. 79. 
 
 Xenotimus, father of Carcinus, an 
 Athenian, ii. 23 med. 
 
 Xerxes, king of Persia, father of 
 Artaxerxes, i. 137 med., iv. 50 
 fin.; his expedition against Hel¬ 
 las, i. 14 med., 118 init., iii. 56 
 med.; forewarned by Themis- 
 tocles at Salamis, i. 137 fin.; his 
 letter to Pausanias, ib. 129. 
 
 Z. 
 
 Zacynthus, an island opposite Elis, 
 an Achaean colony, ii. 66 ; its 
 importance to the Athenians, ib. 
 7 fin., 80 init.; the Zacynthians 
 assist the Corcyraeans, i. 47 ; 
 become the allies of Athens, ii. 
 7 fin., 9 med., 66, iv. 8 init., 13 
 med., vii. 57 med.; Zacynthus is 
 ravaged by the Lacedaemonians, 
 ii. 66 ; the Zacynthians furnish 
 Demosthenes with troops for ser¬ 
 vice in Sicily, vii. 31 init., 57 med. 
 
 Zancl& : Messene in Sicily origin¬ 
 ally so called from the Sicel word 
 for a sickle, vi. 4 fin. [See Mes¬ 
 sene.] 
 
 Zeus, Ithomean, i. 103 med.; ‘the 
 Gracious,’ ib. 126 med.; the ‘ God 
 of Freedom,’ ii. 71 init.; Olym¬ 
 pian, iii. 14 init., v. 31 init.; Ne- 
 mean, iii. 96 init.; Lycaean, v. 
 
 16 fin.; temples of Zeus, at Athens, 
 
 Z z 2 
 
708 
 
 INDEX . 
 
 ii. 15 med.; Corcyra, iii. 70 
 med.; Mount Lycaeum, v. 16 fin.; 
 between Lebedus and Colophon, 
 viii. 19 med.; Mantinea, v. 47 
 fin.; Olympia, iii. 14 init., v. 50 
 init.; Syracuse, vi. 64 med., 65 
 fin., 70 init., 70 fin., 75 init., vii. 4 
 fin., 37 fin., 42 fin. 
 
 Zeuxidamus, father of Archidamus 
 the Lacedaemonian king, ii. 19 
 med., 47 init., iii. 1 init. 
 
 Zeuxidas, a Lacedaemonian, swears 
 to the Treaty of Peace and the 
 Alliance, v. 19 med., 24 init. 
 
 Zopyrus, father of Megabyzus, a 
 Persian, i. 109 med.