MASTER NEGA TIVE NO. 91-80376-11 MICROFILMED 1 99 1 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES/NEW YORK as part of the "Foundations of Western Civilization Preservation Project" Funded by the NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR THE HUMANTTIES Reproductions may not be made without permission from Columbia University Library COPYRIGHT STATEMENT The copyright law of the United States ~ Title 17, United States Code — concerns the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material... Columbia University Library reserves the right to refuse to accept a copy order if, in its judgement, fulfillment of the order would involve violation of the copyright law. AUTHOR: PETRIE, SIR CHARLES ALEXANDER TITLE: TWO ESSAYS IN SPANISH HISTORY PLACE: LONDON DA TE : 1922 Restrictions on Use; COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES PRESERVATION DEPARTMENT DIDLIOCRA PHIC MirRQ FORM TAUHFT Master Negative # —ltS0374_-lt Original Material as Filmed - Existing Dibliograpliic Record •PP ^if^mmft Alexander Aiexanaer Pe trie. Sir Charles ij|bt., 1895- Tt70 essays in Spanish history, by C, A. Petrie • .. London, Egorton, 192??. 43 p. 23?:- on. Contents, — The Arab conquest of Spain.— The evolution of Spanish history (711-1833)- 1 » • V TECHNICAL MICROFORM DATA DATE FILMED :^Z//^0r__ INITIALS ^ HLMEDBY: RESEARCH PII BLICATIONJc; TNC WOOnHRrnnF rr c Association for information and Image {Management 1 1 00 Wayne Avenue, Suite 1 1 00 Silver Spring. Maryland 20910 301/587-8202 IT Centimeter ill 123456789 10 llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllMlllllllllllllIM I I TTT 11 12 13 14 15 mm iiliiiilmiliiiiliiii liiiilmili m Inches 1.0 I.I 1.25 1^ |2.8 15.0 ^^^ 2.5 ^ i^- 2.2 |63 no 2.0 t^ fci u SiUtL 1.8 1.4 1.6 MPNUFfiCTURED TO flllM STRNDRRDS BY APPLIED IMRGE, INC. €1 TWO ESSAYS IN SPANISH HISTORY By C. A. PETRIE, Ni.A., F.R.Hist.S. i» L„^^ ^-m* London : Messrs. HUGH EGERTON & Co Ltd 40 CHARLWOOD STREET, WESTMINSTER. MCMXXIL y K^^^Wr *p™^'™Wf ^ ii^imss^m. E^^T^^ If -SAi!^ '*W^"*^ ""'V 'MIWJSJMtylWMP*^ " "mi^m- ■J ^\^ T^^ £^U^' 1) Columfata iliuiiei. intfieCitpaf^etoi^orfe LIBRARY ? COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES This book is due on the date Indicated below, or at the expiraUon of a definite period after the date of borrowing, as provided by the Ubrary rules or by special arrangement with the Librarian in charge. DATS BORROWCO DATE DUE iui g e 19W DATE BORROWED DATE DUE C28 (449)M50 J TWO ESSAYS IN SPANISH HISTORY .'> Bi T i y "f i rifffi ii M;. i iiii i ffnriHiffiMri iMi iTiMr i w m i 6 i Miaij^iiwMBM«i Ftrst Published^ August^ 1922 ' i> TWO ESSAYS IN SPANISH HISTORY By C. A. PETRIE, M.A., F.R.Hist.S. U LONDON: Messrs. HUGH EGERTON & Co., Ltd. ♦o CHARLWOOD STREET, WESTMINSTER. MCMXXII. a ^ c^ 2^3- ^7^(.7 C>» *-. .. THE ARAB CONQUEST OF SPAIN THE last years of the Visigothic monarchy are so wrapt in obscurity that it is not surprising to learn that a large number of writers have endeavoured to find a solution of the problems presented by the Arab invasion of the Iberian Peninsula. Within the last decade several important theories have been advanced, and it may not be entirely without interest to see what fresh light is thus shed upon the year 711 and the events connected with it. To attain a true perspective of the difficulties of the subject it is necessary to trace the development of opinion from the last half of the 18th century when the views of Mariana still held sway. That writer ' narrates the story of Roderick in the form in which it had been told for many centuries before his day. Roderick, the last Visigothic monarch, was a usurper, and although Mariana does not expressly say so, he obviously regarded the defeat of the king as a just retribution for his usurpation of the throne. At this time the governor of Ceuta was a certain Count Julian, whose daughter, Cava, had been sent to court to acquire the accomplishments of the day, as appears to have been the usual custom. Roderick fell in love with the maiden and when she rejected his advances, raped her. Mariana then quotes at length the letter' which Cava at once wrote to her father. Except Juan de Mariana : Historin General de Espafia. " Ibid, bk. vi., ch. 21. Valencia, 1785. for one sentence it is of no importance, being purely apocryphal: — *' .... En una palabra : vuestra hija, vuestra sangre, y de la alciina Real de los Godos, por el Rey D.Rodrigo, al qual estaba (mal pecado) encomendada, como la oveja al lobo, con un maldad increible ha sido afrentada .... Julian dissembled his anger until he had persuaded Roderick to send the bulk of his troops to the North on the pretext of danger in that quarter : he then invited the Arabs into Spain, and in opposing them Roderick was killed at the Battle of the Guadalete. The story as told by Mariana is closely related to several legends on the same subject, and it is also interesting as being the popular belief before modern historical criticism was in existence. One cannot help wondering if the passage in Cava's letter about her royal descent is the only solid fact in the whole narrative, namely, that the Arabs came in the first place as the auxiliaries of an overthrown dynastic faction. As will be seen, this view has been adopted by later writers, but not in connection with the legend of Cava. The next account of the events of this period is that of Lafuente,' who obviously does not agree with the story as told by Mariana but refuses to commit himself definitely to any one view. He very properly commences by raising the question' why Roderick alone among the Visigothic kings is called Don, an appellation also given to Julian and Pelayo at this period but not generally used until the 10th century. Lafuente says that Ceuta is believed ('*Se cree que") to have belonged to the Visigoths since the time of Sisebut, but he makes the ground of Julian's opposition to Roderick to be his support of the sons of Witiza, who had been robbed. of their inheritance by the usurper. Lafuente repeats the time-honoured story of Cava, but does so expressly on the authority of the chronicles and points out that in Arabic Cava 4) (> 'Modesto Lafuente: Historia General de Espafia. * Ibid. vol. ii.. ch. 8. 6 Madrid. 1850. is used for a woman of ill-repute ; he also states that her real name was Florinda. This cautious attitude stands midway between the indiscriminating mixture of fact and fiction contained in Mariana's narrative and the various conjectures which have recently been put forward. Lafuente goes on to say that in July, 710, there was a preliminary raid by Tarifa on the Andalucian coast, and in April of the following year Tarik landed at Algeciras with 12,000 Berbers and a few hundred Arabs and took Gibraltar : Theodomir, governor of Andalucia, tried to bar the invaders' progress but was defeated ; Musa, the governor of Africa, then sent 5,000 horsemen to join Tarik, and the final battle with the Visigoths took place on the banks of the Guadalete near Jerez de la Frontera on 31st July, 711, when Roderick was killed. On these points Lafuente is clear, and he does not mention any second important battle, though he does give an account of a treaty with Theodomir with respect to Murcia.' After Lafuente's work was published several articles' and monographs' appeared on the subject, but the most important contribution was undoubtedly that made by Saavedra." After discussing the primary authorities, to whom allusion will be made later, he casts serious suspicion upon the possession of Ceuta by the Visigoths ; he says that they may have laid claim to the coasts of North Africa but suggests that their authority was limited to that, and compares with it some of the titles of modern Spanish monarchs. Saavedra dismisses the story of Florinda either as a myth or an event of no ^ Ibid, vol. iii., ch. 1. * The most important of these were :— Oliver y Hurtado : De la Batalla de Vejer o del Kago de la Janda. (Revista de Espana XL). Perez de Castro: La Batalla de Guadalete. (Revista de Espana XX.). ' The most noteworthy are those of Fernandez Guerra : Caida y riiina dd imperio Visigotico Espanol. Madrid, 1883; and the same author's —Don Rodrigo y la Cava. Madrid, 1877; also G. Barzanallana : La Batalla de Guadalete. Madrid, 1890. * Eduardo Saavedra : Estudio sobre la Invasion de los Arabes en Espana. Madrid, 1892. •- 1" 'irwiairtiM irin importance, and points out that no mention of it is made in the Latin chronicles until the Monk of Silos^ in 1110. The most important departure, however, in Saavedra's treatise is his statement, on the authority of the Moorish writer, Rasis, that Roderick was not killed in his first battle against the Arabs but in a second one which took place at Segoyuela. The end of the last, and the beginning of the present, century saw several additions to the literature which had sprung up concerning the reign of Roderick," and in 1906 a very able article appeared from the Rev. R. D. Shaw, D.D., summing up the evidence as it existed at that time." After discussing the cause of the weakness of the Visigothic kingdom in a more or less general manner he investigates the difficulties which have been raised, and says that the position of Musa is hard to under- stand. Why he should have had any doubt on this matter it is not easy to see, for it seems perfectly clear that Musa was governor of Africa, i.e., all the country to the West of Egypt, and that Tarik merely acted under his orders. Dr. Shaw dismisses the story of Cava as a pure myth, but considers that Julian was a real person and was Byzantine exarch of Ceuta : he distinguishes carefully between the raid of Tarifa in 710 and the invasion of Tarik in the following year, and places the site of the battle with Roderick at the Lake of La Janda ; Dr. Shaw leaves the question of Segoyuela in abeyance. The increasing tendency of historians to doubt the story of Julian and his daughter is noteworthy, but, as will be shown later, these legends in no way conflict with the modern theories. * Among the articles which appeared were the following : — Victor Valaguer : Las dos "Cavas." (La Alhanibra L). Krancisco Codera : El llamado Condc D. Julian. (Revista de Aragon IIL). Of the monographs cf : — Cid y Tarpon : La conqnista de Espana por los arabes. Avlla, 1894 Mancheno y Olivares : I^a Batalla de Barbate. Arcos de la Frontera, 1899. '" English Historical Review, vol. xx'i. 8 V» % In 1912 a book" was published in which the invasion of the Arabs was attributed solely to the sons of Witiza, who is described as the last legitimate king of the Goths— a title to which he could in nowise lay claim. More importance may be attached to the arguments in this book which support the theory that the Lake of La Janda was the scene of the great battle, and on this point the authors' local knowledge is of course invaluable." In the Cambridge Mediaeval History'' two views are put forward, by Sefior Altamira and Prof. Becker respectively : the former considers the legend of Julian to be a pure fable, first mentioned by the Monk of Silos, and adopts Saavedra's theory that Roderick was killed at Segoyuela ; Prof. Becker, on the other hand, is inclined to believe that Julian existed in some form, but he definitely states that Roderick never appeared again after his first encounter with the invaders : both writers agree that this battle took place at the Lake of La Janda. In his own work," Sefior Altamira goes more fully into details and favours the theory that Ceuta was Byzantine, not Visigothic ; he also fixes the date of the death of Roderick at Segoyuela in September, 713. The most recent writer, Sefior Bleye, in his admirable short history," adopts the views of Sefior Altamira, and makes the interesting suggestion that Julian may have been a Berber chief dependent on the Byzantine Empire. Such are the theories which have been advanced since historians began to break away from the traditional view which found its place in the narrative of Mariana. It is now necessary to examine the original authorities. f 1 11 Bernhard and Ellen Whishaw : Arabic Spain. London, 1912. '" Cf. also Roas y Lopez: El lugar en que se dio la batalla del Guadalete. Seville, 1911. Cambridge Mediaeval History, vol. ii., cf. ch. vi. by Rafael Altamira and ch. xii. by Prof. Becker. Rafael Altamira : Historia de Espana y de la Civilizacion Espafiola. Barcelona, 1913. " P- Aguado Bleye : Historia de Espana. Bilbao, 1918. 13 14 Dr. Shaw quotes'" several Latin writers, but agrees with Saavedra that only two of them were contemporary with the events they relate. Of these two, John of Biclaro is useless, since his narrative is based upon marginal notes which have become incorporated with the text.'' This leaves Isidorus Pacensis, Isidore of Beja, or '^Anonyme de Cordoue," as he is variously known." From internal evidence this writer must have lived in the South of Spain, and in view of this fact it is interesting to note that he says nothing of either Julian or Cava. His silence on the battle at Segoyuela is not nearly so conclusive since he makes no mention of Pelayo or of the other early rulers in the North. The later chroniclers lived too long after the event to be of much use," but it is to be noted that until the time of the Monk of Silos they did not materially differ from Isidore. The Arabs were dependent upon oral tradition until 976, and their accounts'" must therefore be received with the greatest caution. It is thus upon one chronicle, whose author is uncertain, that history is dependent for its know- ledge of one of the most important events of all time : it is, therefore, upon the authority of the celebrated '^Anonyme de Cordoue" that the following account of the last days of the Visigothic monarchy is based, supplemented by the suggestions of later writers.'' The Visigoths had been without a hereditary royal house ever since the extinction of that of the Baits, and this lack had seriously compromised the "^ English Historical Review, vol. xxi. '' Cf. Saavedra supra. " His work is entitled "Isidori Pacensis Episcopi Epitome Imperatorum et Arabum una cum Hispaniae Chronicon," and was published at Pamplona in 1615. Cf. also the edition of P. J. Tailhan. Paris, 1885. " Cf. Chronicon Albendense, and Sebastiani Chronicon nomine Alfonsi Tertii recens vulgatum. (Espafia Sagrada XHI.). " The chief Arab authorities are Ibn Abd El-Hakam, Ibn El-Kuthiya and Fatho-b-Andaluci. * ^' The works of such writers as Dozy, who were ignorant of the geography of the South of Spain, have been ignored. 10 ^''. ^ political stability of the State. At the beginning of the 8th century a determined effort appears to have been made by Witiza to render the crown hereditary in his family, but on his death the nobles were sufficiently strong to thwart his purpose. "Huius temporibus in era DCCXLVliii anno imperii eius quarto Arabum LXXXXII. Ulit sceptra regni quinque per annos retinente Rudericus tumultuose regnum hortante senatu invadit."" These words make it clear that Roderick's election was irregular and that his support came from the nobles, for no other construction can be put upon ''hortante senatu" : it may also imply some hesitation on Roderick's part, though that is more doubtful, and one rnust guard against weighing too carefully the meaning of individual words in 8th century Latin. Sefior Altamira ' says that Witiza died naturally at Toledo in 708 or 709, and that on his death a rebellion at once broke out against his son and successor, Achila, who was overthrown by Roderick. Achila may have been regarded as king by his father's immediate entourage, but the crown was cleariy elective : one is tempted to think that he is a purely fictitious personage, because he never appears again, and his brothers Sisebut and Ebas are afterwards regarded as Witiza's rightful heirs; they together with Oppas, metropolitan of Sevilla, fled to Africa. It is at this point that the Cava incident is supposed to take place, and it must be repeated that the pseudo-Isidore makes no mention either of it or of Julian, while, as has been shown above, several modern writers have refused to accept it. On the other hand, although the legend has as its sponsors only the Monk of Silos and Arab oral tradition it is too old to be altogether ignored. With regard to Cava or Florinda it is safe to say that no such person existed, and it may well be that the 22 Anonyme de Cordoue. Historia de Espana : vide supra. 11 m '.'• m, r A story of her misfortunes arose from the fact that Kodenck was extremely partial to the opposite sex and that the ladies of his court were not remark- able for their virtue, as appears to have been the case. Julian, on the other hand, probably did exist and Senor Bleye's conjecture ' is doubtless not very far from the truth. The Moslem conquest ot Morth Africa was extremely recent and it i& quite likely that there were a number of semi- independent chieftains who still professed allegiance to Constantinople : in view of the danger to his capital the Emperor could give no material support, but he may very well have advised Julian to embroil Musa with the Visigoths in the hope of thus diverting a portion of the Caliph's forces to the Western Mediterranean. That part of the legend of Cava which connects Julian with the Ciothic royal house probably arises from a miscon- ception based on the presence of Witiza's sons in Africa, which gave a dynastic aspect to the earlier stages of the struggle. The preliminary raid of Tarifa is so probable that It may be accepted without question, as also may the distinction between its leader and that of the final invasion. The repulse of Theodomir bears every mark of probability, and on these points, as has been shown, there is no great conflict of opinion : it is the scene of the battle with Roderick that has given rise to the greatest discussion. The old view that it took place on the Guadalete is almost certainly wrong : Tarik was unlikely to advance so far from his base at Algeciras and Seiior Bleye is probably right when he attributes' the theory to the fact that the Arab name for the Barbate was Guadabeca, which was confused with the neighbouring river. It can, therefore be said with considerable confidence that the battle took place on the banks of the Barbate near its junction 24 Historia de Espana : vide supra. " Ibid. •f..< with the Lake of La Janda, and the testimony of nearly all modern authorities is in favour of this site. Roderick had hurried down from the North — even the legends say that the main Visigothic armies were in that quarter — collecting troops as he came, while Tarik was marching on Seville at the instiga- tion of Witiza's sons whose adherents were waiting for them there.'" Unless fresh contemporary evidence becomes available it is improbable that we shall ever get nearer the exact truth than this. The pseudo-Isidore has no doubt that Roderick was killed in this battle and he definitely fixes the length of his reign — "Regnat annum'' ; but the burden of probability is against him. It is in the last degree unlikely that the whole of Spain sur- rendered after one battle, and Isidore is quite ignorant of what happened in the North, as is proved by his silence about Pelayo. Rasis lived too long after the events he narrates to be reliable in matters of detail, but the escape of Roderick in 711 and his death at Segoyuela two years later bear the stamp of truth and we can safely follow him on this particular point. It is highly improbable that the cloud which hangs over the history of these years will ever be completely dissipated, but research has already laid bare not only the weakness of the Visigothic monarchy on the eve of its overthrow but also the fact that when the Arabs landed in the Peninsula either in the course of a raid or as the allies of some dynastic faction they had little idea that they were taking a step which was to carry the Crescent to Tours and to make a Moslem Cordova one of the wonders of the World. xt Cf. Arabic Spain supra. », '■f "-^ t s *s 12. 18 <^^ f ! .1 f M'"^ »-*p5V ">- and this chiefly in two ways : the power of the nobility was greatly weakened as many of its leaders were in exile owing to their support of Charles VI:, while Philip V. abolished the ''\fueros" of the Kingdom of Aragon on the plea that 'it had supported his rival : the insignificance of the Cortes can be gauged by the fact that it was never summoned to confirm the will of Charles II. With these exceptions the new dynasty made little altera- tion in the time-honoured traditions of Spain; but its mere advent brought the country more into touch with the rest of Europe and the effect of this can be judged by the relative position of Spain and Portugal in the 17th and 18th centuries — in the former there was little difference in their internal condition, in the latter Spain was far ahead of her neighbour. Unfortunately the advantages which were eventually to accrue from the change of dynasty were not at first apparent owing to the influence of Elizabeth Farnese, the second wife of Philip V. This extraordinary w^oman desired to recover the possessions in Italy which Spain had lost at Utrecht and to divide them among her sons, for she feared that both their position and her own would become exceedingly insecure when her step-son, Ferdinand, ascended the throne ; in fact she desired Naples and Parma as a dower-house for herself after her husband's death. As this policy was essentially dynastic and not national it is not surprising that it was carried out by the agertcy of foreigners such as Alberoni and Ripperda, and indeed during the whole of the reign of Philip V. foreign and particu- larly Italian influence at Madrid was very marked. Opposed to this purely dynastic policy were those who urged that the right course for Spain to pursue was to develop her possessions in America and to maintain a strict neutrality in all European struggles. It is the vacillation of Philip between these two policies which explains many of the difficulties encountered in understanding Spanish history in the 24 T i e- f A early 18th century. In both' cases there was the threat of war ; if the views of Elizabeth prevailed there was a casus belli for Austria who desired to retain Italy under her own control, while if the* policy of her opponents were adopted hostilities with England were certain. In addition there was" the close relationship between the Kings of France and Spain — later to be rendered even more binding by the Family Compact — to be taken into account, and after Louis XV. had attained his majority his uncle was always susceptible to any appeal of a purdy dynastic nature : while the French King was still in his infancy Philip had never regarded his residence in Spain as more than temporary and had lived in hourly hope of being summoned to mount the throne of St. Louis. In spite of these differences the reign of Philip V. was not inglorious for Spain ; if the acquisition of Naples and Parma was of little benefit to the country as a whole, the wars which took place to secure them demonstrated to Europe that the evil days of Charles II. were things of the past, while the severe check inflicted upon England at Cartagena proved that the Spanish possessions in America were not as vulnerable as the exploits of the 17th century Buccaneers might have led men to suppose. Internally the progress made was remarkable, and if no special innovations w^ere introduced the old machinery everywhere worked more smoothly, while the improvement in the army and navy is witnessed by all con- temporaries. The purely pacific policy of Ferdinand VI. gave Spain a period of repose to which she had been a stranger for centuries and prepared her for the reforms of his brother. Charles III. ranks with Frederick 11. of Prussia as the most practical of the benevolent Despots but little of his work survived the reign of his son : roads, bridges, and canals were allowed to fall into decay and soon became useless, while the enlightened spirit which he endeavoured to breathe into the national institu- 25 } # '«•■' If, ,'21 ■,I'M '^i tions was powerless against the frenzy of reaction caused by the excesses of the French Revolution : a small class only became inspired with the principles of liberalism, and they were of a doctrin- aire nature not only utterly alien to the character of Charles III. but also quite useless in the sphere of practical politics ; unfortunately these people had learnt nothing by experience when events, threw the government of Spain into their hands in the following century. Abroad Charles pursued a commercial and national policy, but the dynastic interests of the House of Bourbon induced him to* participate in the Seven Years' War, and Spain had to pay dearly for his mistake. Conflict with England was inevitable if her aggressions in America were to be prevented and Charles realized this : extensive preparations were made for a number of years and when the War of American Independence began the Spanish government joined that of France in support of the revolted colonists. Except for the failure to reduce Gibraltar the war which followed was eminently successful, and the gains which were made by Spain were secured to her by the Treaty of Versailles. Charles did not live ta see the evil effects of supporting the American rebels of George III. but there can be little doubt that it was the example which they set that was followed in Spanish America a generation later. Charles III. loomed larger in the eyes of his con- temporaries than he has done in those of posterity : his reign was too brief to allow his reforms to be permanently accepted and his successor was too- feeble to carry out his policy even if the French Revolution had not made it dangerous to dally with liberalism ; yet Charles fully realized the resources of his country and if he achieved little of permanent value he pointed out the road for others to tread. He was certainly the greatest monarch that united Spain had yet produced. Charles IV. was a weak if not a vicious man, and he had the misfortune to ascend the throne at ■^ t^ a time when only statesmanship of a very high order could have steered his country safely through the dangers which surrounded her : he was completely under the influence of his wife whose passion for Godoy made the latter the real ruler of Spain. The outbreak of the French Revolution created such a panic that the liberal measures of the preceding generation were at once abandoned, and as no effort was made to substitute any new system in their place chaos rapidly ensued : the army and navy, which had been so successful in the War of American Independence, were allowed to decay and were consequently useless when required for active service. Above all no attempt was made to work out a foreign policy suitable to the changed political conditions of Europe : Spain was too weak to stand alone, and to continue her alliance with France was at once opposed to her interests and to her principles; she must, temporarily at any rate, throw in her lot with the Coalition, and as it was largely composed of those who had been her enemies up to a very recent date her relations with these new allies would require extremely careful adjustment. Godoy, however, cared for none of these things : his only wish was to retain his own position and if he could make the troubled condition of Europe suit his ends so much the better ; but he had to proceed warily for he was hated by many of his countrymen and he was faced at almost every turn by the opposition of the Prince of Asturias. The vacillations of Spanish policy during these critical years can be explained by the fact that they were dictated by the favourite's determination to re- tain power at all costs, and as it suited his ambitions Spain was made to play the part of the champion of the monarchial principle or that of the only friend of Napoleon. No nation in Europe changed front so completely and so often during these momentous years except possibly Prussia, and she suffered the same fate in the end. When the final blow came and Napoleon determined to abolish the Pyrenees 27 'f.' ,^. iJ.- 3' ^^' -^^ i- 'W'^ l'''^*! i|^,t^i*-T jwS*^ )7 ^s Louis XIV. had done Spain hard neither strength to Resist nor allies to help her, for the policy of Godoy had merely emboldened her enemies and alrenated her friends. For centuries Spain had sacrificed everything to Church and King but' neither saved her in the hour of need : the former was sunk in the torpor common to all eccelsiastical establishments in the 18th century, while the latter dimmed for two generations the lustre of the crown in the ignominious proceedings at Bayonne. The events of the year 1808 proved to be of vital importance in the evolution of the history of Spain but they in no way represented a break in its continuity. The Peninsular War once more brought the country into contact with Western Europe and thus was rather the cause of a revival than of an interruption in the national life. If Spanish history after that struggle seems widely different to what it had been during the 18th century the reason must be sought in the isolated position of the country prior to the invasion of the French : in Germany, Italy, and the Low Countries revolutionary ideas had gained a footing even before they had attained to supremacy in France so that the ground was already well prepared : in Spain, on the other hand, nothing had occurred to rouse the country from its long sleep s6 that when the storm burst it did so with redoubled violence. Yet the results of the six years of war were to bring out the sterling qualities of the Spaniard and even the turmoil of the 19th century was largely only the concomitant of a national renaissance, infinitely preferable to the placidity of decay which had marked its prede- cessor. The captivity of Ferdinand and the inability of the governing class to cope with the difficulties which appeared in every quarter made it impossible to conduct the struggle against Napoleon by the bid methods, and the new ideas whicbwere engendered by the heat of the struggle were not likely to be completely abandoned when the French were driven across the Pyrenees. 2(i \K C > A Two facts emerged most clearly from the welter of these terrible years — that the royal authority was not a sine qua non of the national existence, and that the Liberals were almost entirely visionaries and theorists. The central power armed with the name of Ferdinand had done little to bring the war to a victorious conclusion, while the reformers had been more intent upon devising constitutions than upon providing munitions. That the angien regime could not permanently be restored in its entirety was obvious to all save those whose pre- judice obscured their reason, but it was still doubt- ful to what extent new methods of government should be introduced and in what manner the new ideas were to be adjusted to the ancient polity. These were the questions which it took two genera- tions to decide. Of all the tragic blunders committed in 1808 perhaps the most important in its ultimate conse- quences was the mistake which Ferdinand made in placing himself in the power of Napoleon instead of withdrawing into Andalucia and putting himself at the head of the popular movement : had he adopted this course the royal authority would not have received the blows which it was destined to suffer during the next six years and the effect upon the history of Spain in the 19th century had Ferdinand anticipated the patriotism of Albert of Belgium is an interesting, if somewhat futile, speculation. The desperate nature of the struggle which began on the 2nd of May, 1808, has often obscured the fact that Spain was not unanimously in arms on behalf of the absent Ferdinand : it is true that there were few who desired the restora- tion of Charles IV., but among the educated classes Napoleon did not fail to make some converts to the idea of substituting for the House of Bourbon a Bonaparte dynasty in the person of Joseph. The French Em.peror endeavoured to cover his acts with a cloak of legality by convening at Bayonne a meeting of Spanish notables which received at his . 29 M .^. »' Si a hands a constitution on the French model, while Ferdinand sank so low as to oflEer his congratulations to his supplanter. Napoleon's clemency was use- less. In spite of the fact that Joseph was infinitely superior to Ferdinand both as a man and as a monarch, and that the new constitution was far in advance of anything that Spain had hitherto possessed the country would tolerate neither the new king nor his methods. It soon became obvious that a new phenomenon was being witnessed in the shape of a popular rising, and although the French armies easily overcame all organized resistance the methods which had been successful in Prussia were quite ineffective. The provinces fought for themselves, and although the struggle was every- where carried on in the name of the absent Ferdinand the leaders in the field took little notice of any central authority. Those Spaniards who were prepared to acquiesce in the change of dynasty were held up to the universal execration of their fellow-countrymen under the title of **los afrancesados,'' while the notables who had refused Napoleon's invitation to Bayonne became at once the objects of popular adoration. The details of the campaigns of the Peninsular War more vitally affect European than Spanish history, and it is the political changes to which they gave rise that so greatly affected the future. For so long had the whole administration of the government been centred in the monarch that when he was removed no one knew who was to exercise authority in his place : the Council of Castile made a hesitating attempt to secure the reins of power but it was too uncertain of its position, and some of its members were too strongly suspected of sympathy with the invader for the effort to be successful. Meanwhile Juntas sprang up all over Spain as the struggle against the French proceeded and they all owed a more or less nominal allegiance to a Central Junta which changed its place of residence in accordance with the vicissitudes of the military 30 \\ situation ; this body was intensely loyal to Ferdinand and all business was transacted in his name : it is also interesting to note that the colonies were asked to send delegates. In 1810 the Central Junta repaired to Cadiz, which at that time was one of the r few towns still in the hands of the patriots, and resigned its power to a Council of Regency, but before doing so it convoked a Cortes of all Spain in two houses, which was subsequently altered to a single chamber. This was a purely revolutionary measure since no such body was known to the constitution : the union of the crowns of Aragon and Castile had not been followed by the formation of a single Cortes as had been the case when Leon and Castile became united, and if the Cortes of Aragon had been almost forgotten during the 18th century it was due to the measures of Philip V. ^ which have already been mentioned. The assembly met in September, 1810, and it at once became evident that two parties were struggling for mastery : on the one side there were those who realized how little Spain desired representative government and how angry Ferdinand would be at such a step having been taken in his absence, while on the other were the men who were infected with the ideas to which the French Revolution had given birth and were determined to take advantage of the suspension of all regular government to put them into practice. The strength of this latter faction lay in the sea-ports which have always been the home of Radicalism, and as the coast-towns were at that date almost the only part of Spain able to send representatives to the Cortes it is not sur- prising that the extremists had a majority in that body. The Council of Regency soon found itself unable to work with the new masters of Spain and resigned, only to be succeeded by another more in harmony with the views of the majority o£ the deputies. At length, in 1812, the Cortes completed V§f' the work upon which it had been engaged — to the almost complete neglect of the conduct of the war ^ |> -si ^ I 31 against Napoleon — and promulgated the memor- able Constitution which has since become famous as that of 1812. The main points of this extraordinary document were that Spain was to be governed by a moderate hereditary monarchy with the right of making laws vested in the crown and one chamber ; for the election of the latter all males over the age of twenty-five were to posses the franchise but the actual selection of the deputies was indirect and involved four separate processes. Whether this constitution would have worked in a country which had been accustomed to representative government for several centuries is a moot point, but that it was totally unsuited to Spain at the beginning of the 19th century cannot be for a moment in doubt : it placed in a subordinate position both the King and the Church, and yet these were the only two institutions which the country had known since the days of Ferdinand and Isabella. More important than the actual details of the Constitution of 1812 — for it proved quite useless when put into practice — is the influence which it came to wield in the politics of Southern Europe : for nearly a generation after the fall of Napoleon every popular rising not only in Spain itself but in Portugal, Piedmont, and Naples, demanded the immediate enactment of the Constitution of 1812 and it was not until the rise of began to pass into oblivion : this curious situation ^;^epublicanism in the middle of the century that it "^an only be compared — and the parallel is by no means exact — with the distorted vision of Magna Carta possessed by the opponents of Charles I. and the use they made as a war-cry of the provisions of that somewhat ambiguous document. It soon became apparent that the opponents of this measure had gauged the feelings of their fellow- countrymen more accurately than those who supported it, for as the provinces were liberated from the French and their deputies began to attend the Cortes the Liberal majority rapidly sank, while 82 " <•/ the members of that party became more violent in their demands when they realized that power was passing from them. Such was the situation when the Constituent Cortes was dissolved and a new Cortes was elected in October, 1813 ; the most desperate efforts of the Liberals had only secured them a very narrow majority in the new house and they were at once faced with the prospect of Ferdinand*s immediate return from exile. In vain they attempted to regulate his movements and to compel him to take an oath to observe the Con- stitution of 1812 : Ferdinand temporized until he had ascertained for himself the state of public opinion, but his journey through Catalonia in March was so triumphal a progress that he realized there was no need for further procrastination and at Valencia on the 4th May, 1814, he condemned the Consititution of 1812 and restored the status quo ante bellum in every detail. This step was accompanied by the arrest of all the leading Liberals and thus brought to an end a by no means unim- portant epoch. This early constitutional struggle brought into being the two parties which were to divide the government betw^een them for the next hundred years. The Conservatives comprised the clergy, a large section of the aristocracy, and the over- whelming majority of the nation : the Liberals depended for their support upon the middle-classes and, later, upon the mobs in the larger towns, but it was not until the commencement of the Carlist movement divided the ranks of their opponents that they could hope for anything more than a temporary triumph : similarly it was the dissipation of the Liberal strength owing to the failure of the Republic and the growth of Socialism that gave the Conservatives the opportunity of which they made such good use in 1874. Yet the cleavage between the two parties has always been purely political and never social in its nature, and many of the oldest names in Spain may be found among the members 38 •t "; 4 • %J i J ^ 'Jij '%} '^t of the Radical and Republican parties. More important, perhaps, than the p6litical results of the Peninsular War was the general unrest which it caused all over the country : men who had achieved fame owing to the success of their resistance to the French had no mind to return to the obscurity from which they had emerged even if they desired ta resume a more peaceful occupation, which was very rarely the case : it was this class that was very largdy responsible for the disorder which characterized so much of the 19th century. The war had also gone far to revive the old provincial feeling and the country had learned how much could be effected without the aid of the central government. It was the combination of these various elements of discontent with the remains of the Liberal party which threatened the calm of Ferdinand's reign, in spite of the chorus of approval which greeted his con- demnation of the Cx)nstitution of 1812. The real cause of the decline of Spain at this time lay in the character of the monarch himself. Ferdinand returned to the Peninsula almost entirely unknown to his subjects, and himself real- izing little of the changes which had been brought about by six years of war. The French invasion had obliterated from the memory of most of his subjects the ignominious abdication of the Bourbons and the even more disgraceful events which had preceded it, and few restored monarchs have returned from exile wlith more advantages than Ferdinand VII. Unfortunately he was not the man to avail himself of the favourable circumstances in which he was placed : he was obstinate and narrow- minded, and although in later years he displayed certain statesmanlike qualities, the period immedi- ately following his restoration was marked by reactionary measures of a particularly stupid nature; unlike Charles X., Ferdinand learnt moderation by experience but it was not until several years after his return from exile that he gave any proof of having assimilated the lesson. The 84 v\ ^ I "^^ King's anger was principally directed against the **afrancesados" and the Liberals: the members of the former party must have repented bitterly of the step they had taken, for during the reign of Joseph the burden of taxation had fallen entirely upon them since it was from them alone that it was possible for the invader's government to collect the revenue, while their lives were forfeit whenever they encountered their more patriotic fellow- countrymen : after the return of Ferdinand the *'afrancesados" were treated as public enemies, and those who had not taken the precaution of following Joseph into France were left to face the prison and the scaffold. Ferdinand's hand was no less heavy upon the Liberals, and he made no distinction between the moderate and the extremist — the same dungeon held both the Jacobin and the supporter of a constitutional monarchy. Mean- while the prestige of Spain was rapidly dwindling away and at Vienna she was even refused the status of a first-class Power : at home the public services were sinking into decay and such improve- rnents of Charles III. as had survived the reign of his son now ceased to exist. Ferdinand had neither the men nor the skill to govern the country on the old lines and although sporadic Liberal revolts were easily crushed it became evident that some change must take place before long. It was not the despotism of the restored monarchy — Spain did not mind that — which precipitated the crisis but its stupidity, and the first blow was struck by its own chosen implement, the army. During the greater part of the year 1819 there had been a considerable concentration of troops in the neighbourhood of Cadiz in preparation for another attempt to recover the revolted colonies in America, for the early years of Ferdinand's reign had been marked by successful risings in almost all the Spanish possessions in the New World. This spirit of independence had been greatly aided by the reorganisation which had taken 35 I 'fk % n ■4'::'. ! - ■*« "■ ' « ■■'*'H place in the 18th century : previously the Spanish Empire on the mainland had practically been divided between the Vice-Royalties of Mexico and Peru, with the result that these territories were so vast that the inhabitants had little or nothing in common with one another ; under the new arrange- ment, however, there were four Vice-Royalties— Mexico, New Granada, Peru, and the River Plate —and the same number of Captaincies-General— Guatemala, Venezuela, Chile, and Cuba : this re- distribution created smaller districts whose popula- tion gradually began to think and act as a whole in a way that was quite impossible under the old system. Even in the 18th century there were numerous risings against governments by Viceroys and Audiencias and once or twice against Spanish sovereignity itself : Aranda, the minister of Charles III., realised the danger and in 1783 made the inter- esting suggestion that three kingdoms should be created in Spanish America for the Infants and that the King of Spain should take the title of Emperor : this plan was never adopted nor was a similar pro- posal of Godoy,'and when Spanish control was relaxed as a result of Napoleon's invasion of the Peninsula the angien regime was still in full swing. The example of the United States was always before the eyes of the discontented and the ideas to which the French Revolution had given birth were widely spread : the chaos in Spain from 1808 to 1814 gave the discontented their chance and the autonomy which the colonies enjoyed during that period rendered a return to the old regime impossible. The three centres of the revolt were in Mexico, Venezuela, and the Argentine, and the struggle went on from year to year with increasing want of success on the part of the Spaniards. In 181^ Ferdinand determined to make one last attempt to reassert his authoritv and collected all the avail- able forces at Cadiz : unfortunately, his administra- tion had exercised so demoralizing an effect upon the Spanish marine that there were no transports 36 ft available and the troops were kept in idleness pending the arrival of some ships which were sent by the Czar. It was during this period of enforced inactivity that the Liberal propaganda was so eflEec- tive, with the result that Riego was encouraged to raise the standard of revolt. At first the attempt met with little success and its author was compelled to take to flight, but at the very moment when the Liberal cause appeared most hopeless the towns began to rally to it : Ferdinand was too astute not to realize that open opposition would certainly be futile and might prove dangerous so he took the oath to observe the revived Constitution of 1812. The movement, however, which had brought about this change was very different to those which were producing similar results in other parts of Europe : there was little or no popular feeling behind it, and it was in fact the first of the long series of **pronunciamientos'' which marred the progress of Spain throughout so large a part of the 19th century : Riego's rising formed a precedent of a particularly dangerous kind and it was one that was to be followed frequently in the near future. Moreover the Liberals had changed considerably since 1814 : persecution and exile had embittered their feelings and their Left wing — the **exaltados" — made little secret of their suspicion of Ferdinand ; indeed it was at this time that the person of the monarch ceased to be the object of reverence which it had been for centuries, and it became the declared object of a definite party in the state to decry the occupants of the throne. The Cortes met in July and among its members were thirty deputies who had been chosen in Spain to represent the American colonies, although most of them had already asserted their independence. At first men of moderate views were in the majority but, as is almost invariably the case in all revolutionary movements, the power soon passed into the hands of the extremists. Riego w^as the hero of the Radical mobs and the position 37 1 •« V .01 I . r r-:iii of Ferdinand was rapidly approximating to that of Louis XVI. after the events of 1789, when the Liberal attack on the Church gave the Royalists an opportunity of recovering much of the ground which they had lost. To the political demands of the Liberals the majority of the nation was com- pletely indifferent and those who took any interest in such matters probably supported the reformers, but when the Church was called into question every peasant realized that a vital principle was at stake : the position was the same as in England in the 17th century when Charles L could get little support in the attitude which he had adopted until the action of the Puritans in attacking episcopacy sent half the population into his camp. So it was in Spain, where Ferdinand's adherents formed the Junta Apostolica and commenced to harrass their opponents at all points. Meanwhile the situation had attracted the attention of the rest of Europe and it was one of the most important questions before the Congress of Verona. The revolutions in Piedmont and Naples which had followed upon the exploit of Riego had been crushed by Austria, but Portugal was very disturbed and South America was, of course, in open rebellion. Great Britain from the first refused to interfere, but the Duke of Wellington probably gave the assembled strategists the benefit of his experience of warfare in the Peninsula. The Czar was prepared to send troops to the support of Ferdinand, but the other European governments disliked the idea of large Russian forces within their frontiers and the scheme came to nothing. At length the "mandate"— to use a term so popular a century later — was entrusted to France, partly on account of her proximity to the scene of operations, but chiefly because Louis XVIIL felt considerable alarm for the safety of his relative at Madrid. In April, 1823, a large French army under the Duke of Angouleme crossed the Bidassoa and Spanish Liberalism collapsed like a house of cards : the extremists 38 >v carried Ferdinand with them from Madrid to Seville and then to Cadiz, and at the latter place they even suspended him from the exercise of his royal functions, but they could only postpone for a short time the inevitable result. The French met with no resistance and were everywhere received as friends : the Duke of Angouleme hastened to Cadiz, and the Radicals realizing that their position was hopeless allowed Ferdinand to proceed to the French camp. The reign of Liberalism was over. It was not to be expected that the Royalists would immediately forget the insults which had been inflicted upon them, nor was such the case : Riego was executed, and a veritable reign of terror ensued for all who had taken any prominent part in the events of the last two and a half years. Yet this . period of Liberal predominance was not withoutr!*^ enduring results. It had rendered hopeless the attempt to recover the colonies, and by 1826 the_ Spanish flag had ceased to fly upon the mainland of America, although Spain did not officially acknow- ledge her loss until a later date ; but even more important was the prestige lost for the throne by the inglorious attitude of Ferdinand. He had pleased neither party, for the Royalists distrusted him for not combating the rising with more vigour in its initial stages, while the Liberals could never forgive the proscription which followed the Duke of Angouleme's invasion. Even the condonation by Charles IV. of his wife's adultery had not weakened the power of the crown to anything like the same extent as did the political ineptitude of his successor, and the Spanish people cannot be blamed for the discrimination which thev made : in a monarchy where the sovereign not only reigns but governs the private life of the occupant of the throne is of small importance compared with his capability — an Edward IV. is preferable in any age to a Henry VI. Ferdinand triumphed over the Liberals more because he had successfully played upon the fears of the Holy Alliance than on account of any merit 89 %A - "^ 4«tt' |.g.,. ■As- |»'5|>fiS^' is^ f'-« - ■^'' . .L^-.-iWB»wa^-*'3i 5' ,,3iM-"- p^ ft^-^-f^ne^i^". of his own, but the office which he occupied lost in respect immeasurably in the process. With the victory of the Duke of Angouleme there began the last period of Ferdinand's troubled reign and— too late to save the prestige of the monarchy— it soon became apparent that the King had at last learnt the lesson of his repeated mis- fortunes. When the fury of the first outburst of reactionarv fervour was over, no repetition of its excesses was tolerated, and although as Minister of Justice Calomarde vigorously repressed all attempts at sedition his measures and those of his. royal master were not sufficiently drastic to please the ultra-Royalists : these latter placed all their hopes in Don Carlos, the King's brother, and im- patiently awaited the day when he would ascend the throne of his ancestors in place of the childless Ferdinand. A situation had thus arisen similar to that by which France was at the same moment being faced: Ferdinand was compelled to hold the balance between the Constitutionalists .and the Absolutists in exactly the same way as Louis XV lit. was doing on the other side of the Pyrenees, or as Charles II. of England had done a century and a half earlier. Yet Don Carlos was a far finer character than either the Comte d Artois or James, Duke of York : he firmly believed in the Divine Right of Kings but he was perfectly prepared to wait for his brother's death before attempting to put his ideas into practice, and he was m no way connected with the various plots which were con- tinually being hatched in his name. The hopes of the extreme Right were, however doomed to be disappointed for in 1830 Ferdinand married as his fourth wife Maria Cristina of Naples, and ere long it was announced that the queen was pregnant. This event at once raised a constitutional ques- tion of the first importance, and to understand thoroughlv the political and personal passions to which it gave rise it is necessary to remember that the principle of the succession to the Spanish throne 40 A ^ had not at that time been settled beyond all question- — in fact the very reverse was the case. The Siete Partidas had recognised the right of females to succeed to the throne of Castile and Leon in default of male heirs of an equally near degree of consan- guinity, and that this light had also been admitted in practice is proved by the succession of Isabella I., while that of Charles 1., whose claim was through his mother Juana the Mad, shows that it was allowed in the case of Aragon also. Philip V., however, introduced the Salic Law in 1713 and it was upon this that Don Carlos based his claim in the event of the expected infant being a girl : in reply it was asserted that in 1789 Charies IV. for some unknown reason had convoked the Cortes in secret session and on his initiative a resolution had been passed requesting him to revert to the old order of succession ; this decree had never been promul- gated. In March, 1830, Ferdinand under the influence of his wife piomulgated the Pragmatic Sanction of Charles IV. and in June of the same year he made a will in which he left the crown to the child which was about to be born : Don Carlos at once protested, not against the principle of leaving the crown by will for it was owing to a similar action on the part of Chailes II. that the House of Bourbon had ascended the throne of Spain, but against the promulgation of the Pragmatic Sanction by which alone the will had the power of placing the crown upon the head of a woman. Ferdinand at one time gave way and revoked the Pragmatic Sanction, but under the influence of Cristina he destroyed the revocation, while the birth of Isabella made it clear that the question would have to be fought to a finish. The Cortes in its old form recognised the Infanta as heiress-apparent, but the position in Portugal where a civil war was taking place between uncle and niece over exactly the same question left little room for doubt that the death of the King would be followed by an attempt on the part of the Carlists to seize the reins of power ; in 41 '^i^Mr '< '■?- -3 ?s 4 ' '■* -*^- 't^" i jirii SS«5' f 42 the meantime whatever the threats of his followers the attitude of Don Carlos himself was perfectly correct, and to avoid any trouble during the remainder of his brother's lifetime he withdrew from the country. Abroad the last years of Ferdinand's reign were tr- equally disturbed. The Three Glorious Days of 1830 had overthrown legitimate monarchy m France, and thus deprived the Spanish Bourbons of a support which had proved their salvation seven years earlier : in fact the position was now reversed and the French Royalists looked to the King of Spain for aid against their domestic enemies, while Louis Philippe in return began to intrigue with the Liberals in the Peninsula and to aftord a refuge to those who had been exiled by Ferdinand. All the American colonies on the mainland had long been lost and only Cuba and the Philippine Islands i remained of the vast dominions of Charles L and Philip IL The army was in little better a plight than it had been in the days of the last Hapsburg, while to such a condition had the navy been reduced that the Dutch were paid to protect the coast against the Barbarv corsairs. It was thus at a time of Spain's lowest fortunes that Ferdinand died on 29th September, 1833. His character is a most difficult one to estimate correctly, and most historians have been content to describe him as wholly bad : that he was a coward is proved by his conduct not only as Prince of Asturias but also by his relations with ^ Napoleon and bv his attitude during the events which followed the rising of Riego, and a coward is always contemptible whether as monarch or peasant. •On the other hand the last ten years of Ferdinand's reign are in many ways a marked advance upon the eariier ones and at times he displayed something very nearly approaching real statesmanship in steering a middle course between the demands of the Cariists and the Constitutionalists, but there can be little doubt that those who hold Ferdinand y responsible for most of the ills to which Spain was <^ subject in the 19th century do not greatly err. By his weakness and the incompetence of his administra- tion he gave Liberalism a raison d'etre which it had never before possessed, and, as has been frequently mentioned, his total lack of dignity went a long way to destroy the old Spanish respect for the occupant of the throne. If Ferdinand VII. is not to be compared with the weakest of his predecessors, Henry IV. and Charles II. , it must be confessed that he was not far removed from them, and the difference is merely one of degree and by no means one of kind. The death of Ferdinand marks the close of a chapter in the history of Spain but it does not interrupt the sequence of the narrative : it was not new forces which were arrayed against each other during the stormy riegn of his daughter but rather the old ones in a new form. The desire for provincial autonomy and the consequent opposition to centralization were at least as old as Ferdinand and Isabella, and that this was the driving-force behind the anti-monarchial factions ts shown by the centrifugal tendencies developed by the Republic as soon as it was established. For a time the parties became confused owing to the pretensions of Don Carlos, but the death of Ferdinand resulted not in the creation of new forces but in the liberation of old ones in a new guise, which he had succeeded in keeping in subjection during the last ten years of his reign. The curtain was about to rise upon a new act, but the players were the same as in the previous ones although their costumes had been altered. 48 «y I \ \^M ""■>¥i ■t I**' ^1 r -r*: 'i^ \J Uniform with this Edition: THE EARRING A Comedy in One Act By Egerton Clarke 2/6 Nett THREE PLAYS By Frances Petersen 3/6 Nett .1 ■■: ¥-1 r- ^ > f I ■Ji* f - 5 '.1 .AoriK "* COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY UBRARIES 0021052336 4't1 > -#;■ ^.^ ^ "IPI^ I <*««.,