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A UTHOR: 
 
 JONES, EMILY 
 CONSTANCE 
 
 TITLE: 
 
 PRIMER OF ETHICS 
 
 PLACE: 
 
 LONDON 
 
 DA TE: 
 
 1909 
 
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 Jones, Emily Elizabeth Constance, 1848- 
 
 A primer of ethics, by E. E. Constance Jones !.. 
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 viii, 101, [Ij p. 16i«». I 
 
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1 
 
 A PRIMER OF ETHICS 
 
MR. MURRAY'S PRIMERS 
 
 Fcap. 8vo, Is, each 
 
 PHILOSOPHY. By A. S. Rappoport, Ph.D. 
 
 PHYSIOLOGY. By E. H. Starling, F.R.S. 
 
 PSYCHOLOGY. By Laura Brackenbiiry, 
 
 M.A. (Dub.) 
 
 THE USE OF WORDS. 
 
 By Georgina Kinnear 
 ETHICS. By E. E. Constance Jones 
 
 is. 6d, 
 
 LOGIC. By E. E. Constance Jones 
 
 0^/ier Fo/iwies will foUoiv 
 
 ! 
 
 A PRIMER 
 OF ETHICS 
 
 BY E. E. CONSTANCE JONES 
 
 ■ > • 
 
 MISTRESS OF GIRTON COLLEGE 
 CAMBRIDGE 
 
 f 
 
 LONDON 
 JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W. 
 
 1909 
 
PRINTED BY 
 
 MAiCELL, WATSON ANi> VJNEY, LD., 
 
 LONDON' ANr» AYLES8UKV, 
 
 t' 
 
 PREFATORY NOTE 
 
 This little book aims only at being a very brief 
 and elementary introduction to the Science of 
 Conduct. It has no claim to originality, and is 
 substantially a compilation from those recognised 
 authorities on the subject whose views it reports, 
 and with whose works I hope that it may lead 
 the reader to make acquaintance at first hand. 
 
 I have also compiled a short Ethical Vocabulary 
 and a collection of Questions, many of which are 
 taken from published Examination Papers of the 
 University of Cambridge ; and have appended the 
 Schedule and list of books recommended for Ethics 
 in the Moral Sciences Tripos. 
 
 Miss M. Alford and Miss H. Reinherz have 
 kindly aided me by reading the proofs of the 
 chapters. 
 
 GiRTON College, Cambridge, 
 December, 1908. 
 
 *"0 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 The Theee Great Questions of Ethics . . 1 
 
 (1) What ought I to do ? 
 
 (2) How do I know what I ought to do ? 
 
 (3) Why should I do what I see to be 
 
 right ? 
 
 CHAPTER 11 
 Moral (or Ethical) Judgment . . .10 
 
 (1) What do we mean by Good, Right, 
 
 Ought ? 
 
 (2) What element is it in character or 
 
 conduct that is the object of moral 
 approval or disapproval? 
 
 CHAPTER in 
 Ethical Psychology 18 
 
 (1) The relation between Desii-e and 
 
 Pleasure. 
 
 (2) The Moral Faculty— Conscience— Prac- 
 
 tical Eeason — Moral Sentiments. 
 
 (3) Free Will and Determinism. 
 
 vii 
 
Vlll 
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 CHAFfER IV 
 Greek Common- Sense Morality 
 
 CHAPTER A 
 Philosophical Intuitionism . 
 
 CHAFFER VI 
 Ethics and Politics 
 
 Ethical Vocabulary . . . . 
 
 Questions 
 
 Examination Papers .... 
 Ethics in the Moral Sciences Tripos . 
 
 PAGE 
 . 30 
 
 . 51 
 
 . 65 
 
 . 75 
 
 . 87 
 . 97 
 . 100 
 
 
 A PRIMER OF ETHICS 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 THE THREE GREAT QUESTIONS OF ETHICS 
 
 The questions : What is the right end of action ? 
 How do we know what we ought to do ? AVhat 
 reason is there for doing as we ought? are 
 questions of universal and perennial interest. 
 
 We all give some sort of answer to these (ques- 
 tions, but it is the aim of the connected sciences 
 of Ethics and Politics to answer them in a full, 
 reasoned, and systematic manner. Ethics answers 
 them as far as right or good conduct for in- 
 dividuals is concerned, and Politics, which treats 
 of the proper fiuictions and constitution of 
 governments in ordered political societies, answers 
 them as far as governmental action is concerned. 
 
 The fundamental (juestions are always essen- 
 tially the same, and the answers to the first 
 question : What is human good, what is the 
 right end of action ? have not varied much with 
 variations of time and place. From the age of 
 
2 
 
 A PRIMER OF ETHICS 
 
 THE THREE GREAT QUESTIONS 3 
 
 Plato and Greek Common-Sense Morality onwards, 
 one or other of two answers, or a combination of 
 them, has been given, i.e, (1) the answer which 
 from a modern point of view may be called self- 
 regarding, or (2) the answer which from a modern 
 point of view may be called social, or (1) com- 
 bined with (2). The self-regarding answer is 
 that Pleasure or Happiness — 7uy otcn Pleasure or 
 Happiness— is for me the right or good end of 
 my action; the social answer is that Virtue is 
 for me the right or good end of my action. We 
 find, further, a remarkable agreement in the 
 answers which have been given to the question : 
 What is Virtue ? What is the substance of the 
 Moral Law? What are the general rules of 
 conduct which we ought to follow? 
 
 Bishop Butler seems very much in the right 
 when he declares ^ that there is in reality an 
 universally acknowledged standard of Virtue, 
 namely. Justice, Veracity, and regard to common 
 good. 
 
 Even in the narrowly individualistic ethics of 
 Aristotle (who closely follows Greek Connnon 
 Sense and does not expressly include Benevolence 
 in his list of virtues), Justice has a very important 
 place and Truthfulness is mentioned, while Friend- 
 ship looms large and includes much that to a 
 
 ' 111 Lis Dissertation 0/the Nature of Virtue. 
 
 I" 
 
 modern view could only be appropriately grouped 
 under the notion of general benevolence. 
 
 To the second question : How do I know what 
 I ought to do ? How do I know the right or 
 good end of action, and the means by which this 
 is to be attained ? the answers have been various 
 and widely divergent, and belong to what may 
 be called the Logic or Methodology of Ethics. 
 A Method of Ethics is " any rational procedure 
 by which we determine what individual human 
 beings ought — or what it is right for them — to 
 
 do." J 
 
 It is very interesting to trace the connection 
 between Common-Sense tliought about Morality 
 and the theories which have been adopted by 
 writers on ethics. This subject will be spoken 
 of at more length in a later chapter. What I 
 wish to do here is to point out (1) that the 
 connnon opinions of ordinary respectable people 
 about what is man's Good and what is Right 
 in Character and Conduct, are the facts of moral 
 life which the scientific moralist has to start 
 from and deal with, just as facts of physical 
 nature are what the physicist or botanist or 
 chemist or geologist has to start from, to 
 systematise and as far as possible to explain ; 
 (2) that Common-Sense opinion about what 
 1 Sidgwickj Methods of Ethics, p. 1 (6th ed.). 
 
 :i\ 
 
4 
 
 A PRIMER OF ETHICS 
 
 is Right or Good is comprehensive, but not 
 systematic, or even clear and consistent. It 
 holds, e.g,, that Virtue is good and should be 
 promoted, that the Moral Code ought to be 
 obeyed, that it is right to further the happiness 
 of others, and right to consider one's own 
 happiness ; but for the most part does not observe, 
 and is not troubled by, the want of connection 
 (or even the apparent inconsistency) of the 
 different views. 
 
 Nor agiiin is it generally conscious of the 
 confusion and discrepancies latent in any one 
 of the views indicated. In this respect ordinary 
 thought about morality is very similar to ordinary 
 thought on any other topic. It is often broadly 
 right, it certainly is very unlikely to be exactly 
 so in any case. Any systematic theory of morals, 
 however, must either adopt one point of view 
 to the exclusion of the others, or find a way of 
 reconciling and combining into a harmonious unity 
 those which it accepts. 
 
 We find that as a matter of fact professed 
 moralists generally take up one line to the 
 exclusion of the others, and accept, e,g., the 
 precepts of the Moral Code (Do justly. Be 
 grateful, Speak the truth, etc.) as the exclusive and 
 sufficient guide of action, in which case they are 
 called Dogmatic Intuitionists (see below, p. 51); 
 
 THE THREE GREAT QUESTIONS 5 
 
 or they hold that the agent's own happiness 
 ( = Pleasure and freedom from Pain) is his right 
 and proper end of action, in which case they 
 are Egoistic Hedonists ; or they regard the General 
 Happiness as the right end, and are therefore 
 Universalistic Hedonists. 
 
 The "Method" (or Logic) of any of these 
 theories or systems answers the question "How 
 do we know ? " and is a statement of reasons 
 for accepting that theory; e,g. an Intuitionist 
 may say either (1) that we apprehend directly 
 the meaning and bindingness of the ordinary 
 rules of Justice, Good Faith, Benevolence, and 
 so on, and that if any particular action is seen 
 to come under one of these rules, it follows 
 that it ought to be done. Or he may say 
 (2) that in the case of any given act that 
 is just, or veracious, or benevolent, he perceives 
 directly that it is good and ought to be done ; 
 and reasoning inductively from particular cases, 
 he reaches by generalisation the rules of Justice, 
 Benevolence, and so on. 
 
 The Egoistic Hedonist holds it to be unques- 
 tionable that Ms oivn h appiiiess ( = V\easme and 
 absence of Pain) is for him the one thing that is 
 worth having, and that it is reasonable for him 
 to pursue ; and that hence any action which is 
 ascertained (a) deductively or [b) inductively (or 
 
6 A PRIMER OF ETHICS 
 
 empiricallv) to tend towards this end, is ri«rht for 
 him. 
 
 The Universah*stic Hedonist (or Utih'tarian) 
 accepts as the good or right end the General 
 Hoppiness, and consequently holds that all actions 
 which are ascertained (either empirically or 
 deductively) to conduce towards this end are 
 right. 
 
 This Universalistic End may be accepted un- 
 critically, without reason given— as by Bentham ; 
 or an illogical and therefore unsatisfactory reason 
 may be given— as by Mill. MilPs "proof" of 
 the principle that the General Happiness is 
 desirable, is the right end of action, is as follows : 
 
 "The sole evidence it is possible to produce 
 that anything is desirable, is that people do 
 actually desire it. No reason can be given why 
 the general happiness is desirable, except that 
 each person, so far as he believes it to be attain- 
 able, desires his own happiness. This however, 
 being a fact, we have not only all the proof which 
 the case admits of, but all which it is possible 
 to require, that happiness is a good : that each 
 person's happiness is a good to that person, 
 and the general happiness, therefore, a good to 
 the aggregate of persons." i Also Mill holds 
 it to be " psychologically true "—true as a matter 
 ' Mill, UtilW.iricumm, pp. 52, 53 (lar^e printed.). 
 
 
 THE THREE GREAT QUESTIONS 7 
 
 of fact— that "happiness is the sole end of human 
 action," i,e, the only thing which men actually 
 do desire and seek.^ Mill argues (1) that because 
 each man desires his own happiness, therefore his 
 own happiness is to him desirable, (2) that because 
 a man's own happiness is desirable to him, 
 therefore the ^^?ieraZ happiness is desirable to each 
 person. Hence his " proof" is doubly fallacious. 
 For, granting that a man desires his own 
 happiness, it does not follow from this that his 
 happiness is desirable ; on the contrary, we know 
 that many things which are desired are not 
 desirable, i.e. good, worthy of being desired ; and 
 again, granting that a man's 07cn happiness is to 
 him desired and desirable, it does not follow that 
 other people's happiness is desired or desirable. 
 
 Further, the assumption which is the starting- 
 point of the whole argument— viz. that men 
 desire nothing but happiness— is an assumption 
 not only highly disputable but also susceptible 
 of convincing disproof. This will be dealt with 
 
 in chapter iii. 
 
 Universalistic Hedonism can of course only be 
 a really satisfactory theory if it can start from a 
 self-evident axiom, and thus exhibit a rational 
 basis. This will be further considered in chapter v. 
 
 Why ought I to believe what I see to be 
 
 * he. fit. p. 58. 
 
8 
 
 A PRIMER OF ETHICS 
 
 tiiie ? is a question which is never asked, because 
 no one can help believing what he sees to be 
 true. But unfortunately we can sometimes help 
 doing what we see to be right, and pursuing 
 the ends which we see to be good. There is 
 therefore some point in the question : Why 
 should I do what I see to be right ? And, more- 
 over, not only is the question pertinent, but also 
 the answer to it is important. Of course, if the 
 " moral motive '' were always a sufficient induce- 
 ment to action— if, that is, the impulse to do 
 what is seen to be right because it is rights were 
 always strong enough to carry the day — we 
 should be able to agree with Socrates that 
 Virtue is Knowledge. Doubtless, knowledge of 
 what is right is an indispensable condition of 
 willing it— we cannot will right without know- 
 ledge of the action that is right; doubtless, 
 also, the knowledge that an action is one we 
 ought to do is accompanied by some impulse 
 to do it. Why is this net sufficient ? Perhaps 
 light may be thrown on the matter if we can 
 get an answer to the question : Why is it in 
 any case that a man does not do what he sees 
 to be right? The following answer has been 
 suggested. A man sees, e.g., that an action 
 is in accordance with the maxim of Good Faith 
 or Fidelity to promises, and recognises that so 
 
 T, 
 
 
 THE THREE GREAT QUESTIONS 9 
 
 far he "ought" to do it. But he also sees (or 
 thinks he sees) that to do it would be injurious 
 to his. own happiness or to the general well-being, 
 and this makes him pause. Or he sees that some 
 action would be, as he believes, for the general 
 happiness. But he also sees that it is likely to 
 be very painful to him— perhaps that it may in- 
 volve loss of life to himself and those he holds 
 most dear, as in leading a forlorn hope or 
 obstinately defending a fortress which no rescuing 
 force can reach. The question : Why should I 
 do what I see to be right? could hardly arise 
 with reference to an action (1) iii^accordancejvith 
 the Moral Cod e, and also conducive both (2) to 
 tn£]generd^ and (3) to the agent's 
 
 happiness. i . *. ^ -» / 
 
 t-K? 7 >n^^<cti,^ 
 
 tv 
 
 yj 
 
 t^-V^' 
 
MORAL JUDGMENT 
 
 11 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 MORAL JUDGMENT 
 
 Approval of character or conduct as good^ or 
 of action as right or reasonable, as what it ought 
 to he, is called moral approbation ; and judgments 
 which express this approval, and the antithetic 
 disapproval of what is regarded as bad or wrong, 
 are called moral (or ethical) judgments. 
 
 Two questions are to be considered here : 
 
 (1) What do we mean by Good, Right, Ought ? 
 
 (2) What element is it in character or conduct 
 which is the object of moral approval and 
 disapproval ? 
 
 (1) It seems clear that Good, Right, Ought, 
 do not refer to mere existence— simply to what 
 is, has been, or will be. What is Good may 
 be non-existent (except in idea), what is Right 
 may fail to be done, what Ought to be may 
 remain unrealised. And what exists and what 
 is done is sometimes bad or wrong ; though, on 
 the other hand, it is often judged to be Good 
 or Right. We cannot resolve Ought into is ; the 
 meaning of the one term is not the meaning 
 
 10 
 
 of the other — their connotations are different, 
 though of course their denotations may coincide. 
 
 What then can we say of the meaning of Good 
 or Ought ? Is the notion we are here concerned 
 with susceptible of definition in the ordinary 
 sense, or is it as ultimate and unanalysable as 
 the notion of Being or Existence? 
 
 No doubt we sometimes say that a thing is 
 good, or an action right or what ought to be 
 done, when we are referring to it simply as fit 
 I and appropriate means to a given end: a pair 
 
 of scissors is good if it cuts well, a man is a good 
 artist if he paints well, a chimney is what a 
 chimney ought to be if it "draws'' well, the move 
 which will checkmate at chess is the right move. 
 "If you want to catch your train, you ought 
 to start at once," we say; "If you wish to 
 succeed, you ought to persevere," and so on. 
 But such subordinate and dependent meanings 
 do not cover all cases of what is Good and what 
 Ought to be. There must be something that is 
 Good, and that Ought to be, in its own right- 
 something that is Good-in-itself, something that 
 is unconditionally reasonable. As Aristotle in- 
 sisted, we must at some stage reach what is 
 intrinsically good ; not everything can be sought 
 only as a means, there must be something that 
 is in itself an end, in itself good. And of 
 
12 
 
 A PRIMER OF ETHICS 
 
 MORAL JUDGMENT 
 
 13 
 
 course, what is in itself good, is in itself what is 
 desirable or what ought to be desired. 
 
 " Here we are met by the suggestion that the 
 judgments or propositions which we commonly 
 call moral — in the narrower sense — really affirm 
 no more than the existence of a specific emotion 
 in the mind of the person who utters them : that 
 when I say ' Truth ought to be spoken ' or 
 ' Tmth-speaking is right,' I mean no more than 
 that the idea of truth-speaking excites in my mind 
 a feeling of approbation or satisfaction. And 
 probably some degree of such emotion, commonly 
 distinguished as ' moral sentiment,' ordinarily 
 accompanies moral judgments on real cases. But 
 it is absurd to say that a mere statement of my 
 approbation of truth-speaking is properly given 
 in the proposition ' Truth ought to be spoken ' ; 
 otherwise the fact of another man's disapproba- 
 tion might equally be expressed by saying 
 ' Tiiith ought not to be spoken ' ; and thus we 
 should have two co-existent facts stated in two 
 mutually contradictory propositions." ^ 
 
 Again, it has been maintained that what is 
 meant by " ought " is " bound under penalties " ; 
 but this too seems an inadequate and unsatisfactory 
 account, for there are many things which we 
 judge that a man "ought" to do, for the 
 ' Methock of Ethics J pp. 2C), 27. 
 
 
 omission of which no penalties are threatened or 
 awarded— so much so that we sometimes say a 
 person " ought " to be punished by law or public 
 opinion for conduct to which, as we recognise, 
 no penalties seem to be attached. And, in fact, 
 this very judgment of the appropriateness of 
 penalties, presupposes something, in the conduct 
 condemned, distinct from liability to punishment, 
 and which would justify such liability. 
 
 It is no doubt possible to give, as we have 
 already given, alternative expressions for Good, 
 Ought, etc. Good is what ought to be desired, 
 what is desirable, or reasonably desired; what 
 ought to be done, is what it is right to do ; a 
 right action is one that it is reasonable lo do. 
 AnaloiTouslv, a statement that is self-evident is one 
 that it is reasonable to believe. 
 
 But definition in the ordinary logical sense- 
 definition pe7' genus et differentiam — does not seem 
 possible, and we conclude that ought or good 
 (like is or existence) is a simple and ultimate 
 notion ; as we must find an end which is not a 
 means to something else, so we must find, as a 
 logical starting point of thought, some notion 
 which is not complex nor derived, and good or 
 ought seems to be such a notion.^ X ought to he 
 
 * For tlie wider and narrower applications of ought see 
 Vocabulary, p. 82. 
 
14 
 
 A PRIMER OF ETHICS 
 
 done is the simplest expression of the Practical 
 Judgment, as S is P is the simplest expression 
 of Positive Judgments. 
 
 (2) We pass to inquire what it is which is 
 the object of moral approval or disapproval. Is 
 it motive, or the actual results of action, or is 
 it intention, or is it character ? 
 
 Motives, consequences, intentions, character, 
 mav all be i^ood or bad, better or worse; but 
 do we judge character by consequences, or conse- 
 quences by intentions, or intentions by motives ? 
 In short, what is the ultimate object of moral 
 judgment ? 
 
 In the view of some moralists it is motive 
 which is of supreme importance. According 
 to Aristotle, for instance, no conduct is virtuous 
 which is not done for the sake of the intrinsic 
 beauty and nobleness of the virtuous act, and 
 according to Kant no act is right which is 
 not done from the moral motive — i.e. because 
 it is regarded as right. A view diametrically 
 opposed to this is held by Bentham, in whose 
 opinion not only is conduct not to be judged 
 by motive, but also motives are not in themselves 
 good or bad. " Xo motives," he says, " are either 
 constantly good or constantly bad. ... (1) A 
 boy, in order to divert himself, reads an improving 
 book ; the n)otive is accounted perhaps a good 
 
 MORAL JUDGMENT 
 
 15 
 
 one; at any rate, not a bad one. (2) He sets 
 his top a-spinning ; the motive is deemed, at 
 any rate, not a bad one. (3) He sets loose a 
 mad ox among a crowd ; his motive is now, 
 perhaps, termed an abominable one. Yet in 
 all three cases the motive may be the very same : 
 it may be neither more nor less than curiosity. 
 
 "... (1) For money you gratify a man's hatred 
 by putting his adversary to death. (2) For 
 money you plough his field for him. In the first 
 case your motive is termed lucre, and is accounted 
 corrupt and abominable ; and in the second, for 
 want of a proper appellation, it is styled industry, 
 and is looked upon as innocent at least, if not 
 meritorious. Yet the motive is in both cases 
 precisely the same : it is neither more nor less 
 than pecuniary interest." 
 
 The riixht view of motive seems to be that of 
 Bishop Butler and Professor Sidgwick, according 
 to whom an act is judged good or bad by 
 reference not to its motive but to its ifitention, 
 and motives are to be regarded as good or bad 
 according as they prompt oftenest to actions 
 which are good or bad. Benevolence, e.g., is a 
 good motive, because it generally prompts to 
 good actions ; Vindictiveness is a bad motive, 
 because it prompts predominantly to actions 
 which are bad. 
 
16 
 
 A PRIMER OF ETHICS 
 
 MORAL JUDGMENT 
 
 17 
 
 If in any case what is intended and willed is 
 good, the act is good ; every person is held ac- 
 countable for what he intentionally did, whatever 
 his motive may have been, i.e., whatever part of 
 the consequences of his act it may have been that 
 he desired, and for the sake of which he intended 
 and willed the whole foreseen result. 
 
 For instance, a shipowner may insure heavily 
 a ship which he knows to be luiseaworthy, and 
 may send her on a dangerous voyage with an 
 incompetent crew and a drunken captain, in tlie 
 expectation that the ship will be lost and that 
 he will receive the insurance money. His sole 
 motive is, as Bentham would say, pecuniary 
 interest, but it is part of his intention to risk 
 the lives of all on board, and if the ship goes 
 down he is accountable for all the consequences 
 which he foresaw and intended. 
 
 If two acts — e.g, two acts of great and beneficent 
 charity — are precisely similar in intention and 
 effect, our estimation of the one act nuist be the 
 same as that of the other. But if we further know 
 the motive of the one to be genuine benevolence, 
 while that of the other is self-advertisement and 
 ostentation, our opinion of the character of the 
 two doers is very different, because the one motive 
 prompts much more frequently to well-intentioned 
 acts than the other does. So, even in the case of 
 
 l( 
 
 character, we judge ultimately by reference to 
 
 intention. 
 
 And as regards the consequences of action, it 
 is the intended consequences only that are the 
 subject of moral judgment— a man is not blamed 
 for consequences that he did not foresee and could 
 not reasonably be expected to foresee. He may 
 of course be blamed for consequences which he 
 ought to have foreseen, and would have foreseen 
 but for carelessness or laziness, or some other 
 
 moral fault.^ 
 
 It is to be noted that, on the whole, conse- 
 quences correspond to intention, because on the 
 one hand causation is uniform, and on the other 
 hand the average person is fairly well informed 
 of the ordinary connections between causes and 
 effects. 
 
 I Read Methods of Ethics, Bk. III., chap. xii. 
 
 2 
 
ETHICAL. PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 19 
 
 CHAPTER HI 
 
 ETHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 It maj be said that (excepting the questions con- 
 cerning Good and Ought discussed in the last 
 chapter) Psychology is concerned with all the 
 subjects of ethical inquiry, since Psychology is 
 the study of the human mind or soul, and ethical 
 investigation is concerned with the psychical or 
 mental side of human life. And human Good 
 and human Duty must have relation to man's 
 nature and powers; his Good must be a good 
 of consciousness, his Duty must be something 
 which he is able to do—" ought implies can." 
 
 The questions which I shall very briefly discuss 
 in this chapter are: (1) The relation between 
 Desire and Pleasure, with some reference to the 
 antithetical relation between Aversion and Pain ; 
 (2) The Moral Faculty— Conscience— Practical 
 Reason— Moral Sentiments; (3) Free Will and 
 Determinism. 
 
 (1) The important question here is, whether as 
 a psychological fact, a fact of mind, a man van 
 
 18 
 
 •I 
 
 desire anything but his own pleasure (= agreeable 
 feeling) and absence of pain. The view that he 
 cannot (which is called Psychological Hedonism) 
 is held by many distinguished thinkers, e.g, 
 Locke, Bentham, J. S. Mill and Bain. Bentham 
 holds Psychological Hedonism in its most 
 uncompromising form, affirming that "Nature 
 has placed mankind under the governance 
 of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. 
 ... It is for them alone ... to determine what 
 we shall do . . . the chain of causes and effects 
 is fastened to their throne. They govern us in all 
 we do, in all we say, in all we think." " Nothing 
 can act of itself as a motive but the ideas of 
 pleasure and pain." 
 
 And, more precisely, " on the occasion of every 
 act he exercises, every human being is inevitably 
 led to pursue that line of conduct which according 
 to his view of the case, taken by him at the 
 moment, will be in the highest degree contri- 
 butory to his own greatest happiness." 
 
 It is interesting to note that the application 
 which Bentham assigns to pleasure and pain is 
 a very extended one. He gives a long list of 
 pleasures, distinguished by reference to their 
 causes, and enumerates the pleasures of skill, 
 amity, piety, benevolence, memory, imagination, 
 and eight other kinds— and a similar list of pains. 
 
20 
 
 A PRIMER OF ETHICS 
 
 Mill holds that " desiring a thing and finding it 
 pleasant are, in the strictness of language, two 
 modes of naming the same psychological fact." 
 
 If the doctrine of Psychological Hedonism be 
 accepted in its strictest and most general form, 
 it would seem that no place is left in human 
 life for ethics at all ; because the possibility 
 of choice vanishes, and with this must vanish 
 •' ought," which implies " can " and involves pos- 
 sibility of choice. Strict Psychological Hedonism, 
 which is a doctrine of psychological fact^ can 
 therefore have no logical connection with Ethical 
 Hedonism — a doctrine of the ethical end, ac- 
 cording to which what ouc/ht to be (not what 
 inevitably must be) sought, is Happiness. 
 
 However, Bentham\s doctrine seems palpably an 
 over-statement ; probably no one is so psycho- 
 logically hedonist as he suggests ; and Mill, in tlie 
 passage quoted, appears to confuse ichat iiijiuences 
 choice with what is felt as agreeable. 
 
 Let us therefore put the question unambigu- 
 ously, and in a less violent form, and ask whether 
 the aim of every man in acting is always merely 
 and solely some pleasure (or absence of pain) to 
 himself. It is only in this modified statement 
 that the doctrine of Psychological Hedonism 
 could be supposed to have any special connection 
 with Ethical Hedonism (or indeed any other 
 
 ETHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 21 
 
 ethical theory). The modified form would no 
 doubt still exclude, among other motives, the 
 moral motive, i.e. the desire to do right as such, 
 and the benevolent motive, i,e, the desire for the 
 good of others ; but it would seem natural, if we 
 accept it, to adopt, as our best substitute for an 
 ethical end, the supposed inevitable human aun 
 (the happiness of self) made consistent and 
 
 systematic. 
 
 " The chief arguments against the view that the 
 motive of every man in acting is some pleasure (or 
 absence of pain) to himself, have been marshalled 
 by Professor Sidgwick in Chapter IV. of Book I. 
 of his Methods of Ethics. He adduces first the 
 opinion of Bishop Butler, who "distinguishes 
 self-love or the impulse to our own pleasure 
 from 'particular movements towards particular 
 external objects— honour, power, the harm or 
 good of another ^ the actions proceeding from 
 which are ' not otherwise interested than as every 
 action of every creature must from the nature 
 of the case be; for no one can act but from a 
 desire or choice or preference of his own.^ Such 
 particular passions or appetites are, he goes on 
 to say, ' necessaiily presupposed hy the very idea 
 of an interested pursuit ; since the very idea of 
 interest or happiness consists in this, that an 
 appetite or affection enjoys its object.' We could 
 
22 
 
 A PRIMER OF ETHICS 
 
 not pursue pleasure at all, unless we had desires 
 for something else than pleasure ; for pleasure 
 consists in the satisfaction of just these 'dis- 
 interested ' impulses."" 
 
 Hume, again, allows that "there are bodily 
 wants or appetites, acknowledged by every one, 
 which necessarily precede all sensual enjoyment, 
 and carry us directly to seek possession of the 
 object. Thus hunger and thirst have eating and 
 drinking for their end ; and from the gratification 
 of these primary appetites arises a pleasure which 
 may become the object of another species of in- 
 clination that is secondary and interested/' 
 
 It seems indisputable that the considerations 
 just adduced are applicable both to the cases 
 referred to and to many others; in a great 
 variety of instances it is clear that the pleasure 
 derived from an object is due to its being one 
 which had been desired — a child wants a particular 
 toy, a collector wants a particular coin or book 
 or picture, a man desires the welfare of a par- 
 ticular person, or has an impulse to do a par- 
 ticular action because he regards it as right, or 
 to further a particular cause because he holds 
 it to be good — and it is because they have been 
 desired that the attainment o^ jmt these things 
 is a source of pleasure— the attainment of some 
 other, undesired, object would not be similarly 
 
 ETHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 23 
 
 productive of pleasure in many cases. Unless I 
 care for a thing, its attainment or possession 
 gives me no pleasure. We must however allow 
 that there are pleasures which occur without 
 being preceded by desire. A meeting with a 
 friend which we had not anticipated, a beautiful 
 view which comes into sight at a sudden turning, 
 an unexpected fragrance, an unforeseen kindness, 
 may all be causes of keen pleasure. And it must 
 further be recognised that there can exist a 
 distinct desire for one^s own pleasure, either 
 simply as a result somehow produced— as one 
 may hope vaguely that ones future life will l>e 
 happy— or as the result of a given definite cause, 
 eg, the winning a game, the climbing of a 
 mountain, the reading of a particular book, the 
 eating of a favourite fruit, smelling a favourite 
 flower, finishing a particular piece of work. 
 
 The conclusion seems to be that men can and 
 do desire their own pleasure or happiness, and 
 that they can and do desire every variety of 
 other things, except their own pain for its own 
 
 sake. 
 
 It seems even more indisputable that men have 
 an aversion to their own pain than that they have 
 a desire for their own pleasure or happiness ; and 
 even more certain that they have aversions for 
 other things besides their own pain, than that 
 
24 
 
 A PRIMER OF ETHICS 
 
 they have desires for other things besides their 
 own pleasure. 
 
 And as Butler points out, not only are men 
 moved by "extra-regarding" impulses, Le, by 
 impulses towards things other than their own 
 pleasure or relief from pain, but it may and often 
 does happen that such extra-regarding impulses 
 conflict with and overpower the self-regarding 
 impulse— the desire for one's own happiness; 
 both imprudent self-indulgence or extravagance, 
 and also virtuous or benevolent impulses, some- 
 times carry the day, although clearly recognised 
 to involve a loss of personal happiness. 
 
 (2) By the Moral Faculty is meant that faculty 
 or function of the mind which apprehends moral 
 distinctions. This has to some extent come under 
 consideration in the previous chapter, where (as 
 will be remembered) it has been regarded as a 
 function of the intellect or reason, in accordance 
 with the view of Butler that. '' moral precepts are 
 precepts the reason of which we see." Perhaps 
 the most familiar name for the Moral Faculty 
 is Conscience, and this term is used by Butler 
 for that principle of the Practical Reason which 
 is concerned with Social Duty, and the promptings 
 of which, according to him, may all be summed 
 up under the three heads of Justice, Veracity, and 
 Regard to Common Good, But Butler holds 
 
 ETHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 25 
 
 that Conscience is only one of two co-ordinate 
 supreme principles. "Reasonable self-love and 
 Conscience," he says, " are the chief or superior 
 principles in the nature of man, because an action 
 may be suitable to this nature, though all other 
 principles be violated, but becomes unsuitable if 
 either of those is. Conscience and self-love," he 
 goes on, " if we understand our true happiness, 
 always lead us the same way. Duty and interest 
 are perfectly coincident : for the most part in 
 this world, but entirely and in every instance if 
 we take in the future and the whole ; this being 
 implied in the notion of a good and perfect 
 administration of things." ^ 
 
 We come here upon that Dualism of Practical 
 Reason which is distinctive of Butler's thought 
 and is accepted by Professor Sidgwick. In this 
 doctrine, that Practical Reason is dual, i.e. that it 
 has two co-ordinate principles, there is a recogni- 
 tion of that difference between the self-regarding 
 and the universal point of view, which, whether 
 in theory or in practice, it seems impossible to 
 ignore or to explain away, especially when we 
 consider that a man's own consciousness is 
 necessarily his starting point, his own feeling and 
 cognition the only feeling and cognition of which 
 he has immediate experience. 
 
 ' Sermon III. 
 
26 
 
 A PRIMER OF ETHICS 
 
 ETHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 n 
 
 No doubt Rational Self-love — a conviction that 
 my happiness is to me on my own accoimt worth 
 having — must be the starting point and pre- 
 supposition of Rational Benevolence — i.e. of the 
 principle that the Happiness of others is, for 
 them, worth having, and to me, on their account, 
 worth promoting. And Rational Benevolence 
 sums up the dictates of Conscience, of Duty to 
 our Neighbour. But if we have neither intuition 
 nor demonstration that Duty will be rewarded, 
 that reasonable Self-love and Conscience never 
 conflict, it is clear that we need some theological 
 or philosophical assumption of the moral govern- 
 ment of the world, of the coincidence (for the 
 individual) of Duty and Happiness, and ethical 
 science (like other sciences) is seen to rest in 
 the last resort on theological or philosophical 
 principles. 
 
 Cognitions of the rightness or reasonableness 
 of conduct are generally accompanied by emotions 
 or sentiments to which the name of Moral Senti- 
 ments has been given. That the sentiment 
 depends upon, or follows, the cognition is shown 
 in cases where a man's view of what is riirht has 
 undergone change, or he sees that it is right to 
 make an exception to some general rule which 
 he has been accustomed to respect, e.g. where a 
 man's loyalty to established authority has to be 
 
 transferred from one sovereign to another, or it 
 is seen to be reasonable and right that in a given 
 case he should make an exception to the usually 
 binding mle of fulfilling a contract— the Moral 
 Sentiment follows the cognition of Right ; the 
 change of thought or breach of custom may, how- 
 ever, be made painful and difficult by the strength 
 of the pre-existing Moral Sentiment, which qua 
 moral has to be diverted to a new object, but 
 yet is inclined to cling to the old one. 
 
 (3) The question debated in the dispute between 
 Free Will and Determinism may be stated as 
 follows : " Is the self to which I refer my deliberate 
 volitions a self of strictly determinate moral 
 qualities, a definite character partly inherited, 
 partly formed by my past actions and feelings, 
 and by any physical influences that it may have 
 unconsciously received; so that my voluntary 
 action, for good or for evil, is at any moment 
 completely caused by the determinate qualities 
 of this character, together with my circum- 
 stances? ... or is there always a possibility of 
 my choosing to act in the manner that I now 
 judge to be reasonable and right, whatever my 
 previous actions and experiences may have been ? " ^ 
 It would be impossible, as well as out of place, 
 to attempt here to settle, or even to discuss at 
 ^ Methoda 0/ Ethicb-, Bk. 1.^ chap, v, 
 
28 
 
 A PRIMER OF ETHICS 
 
 length, this profound and still debatable problem. 
 It must suffice to point out that while the cumu- 
 lative argument in favour of Determinism is of 
 formidable dimensions, we can produce but few 
 reasons in support of the Free Will (or Libertarian) 
 view. In favour of Determinism — Le. of the 
 view that at any moment a man must act as his 
 character and circumstances determine, whatever 
 he may then see to be reasonable and right — it 
 may be said that we all act on this view in our 
 dealings with others, in planning our own future, 
 and explaining our own past; all legal punish- 
 ments, all educational schemes, all social forecasts, 
 all plans of reform, of religious instruction, of 
 improved hygiene, of more equitable distribution 
 of wealth, etc., assume that it is possible to 
 calculate the effects on human beings of rewards 
 and punishments, of teachers and companions, of 
 knowledge and sound health, and so on. 
 
 Over against all this may be set the innnediate 
 verdict of consciousness at the moment of action — 
 which verdict is, that, whatever may have gone 
 Ixjfore, we can always in the moment of volition 
 choose to do what seems to us right and reasonable. 
 No doubt " ought " does imply " can " in the 
 sense that what we ought to do is something 
 within our powers, provided the motive to action is 
 sufficient ; but what the Libertarian maintains is, 
 
 ETHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 29 
 
 that we can under all circumstances choose to 
 follow the moral impulse. And this is what 
 consciousness at the moment testifies ; and its 
 testimony is to me at the moment quite con- 
 vincing; looking back afterwards when I have 
 not done what I saw to be reasonable (or most 
 reasonable), I think I can explain w% it was that, 
 as a matter of fact, I did not do it ; why it was 
 that some conflicting impulse of unreason, or of 
 competing reason, carried the day ; but yet I am 
 never convinced that I was unable to do what I 
 thought right at the moment. 
 
CHAFrER IV 
 
 (iREEK (OMMON-SENSE MORALITY 
 
 Akistotlk, the first great scientific moralist, is 
 the only Greek writer who has attempted and 
 carried through a carefid and comprehensive 
 enumeration of the moral qualities approved and 
 praised as Virtues by Greek Connnon Sense. He 
 enumerates these under their current names, and 
 suppHes definition and analysis. The closeness 
 of his account to ordinary morality is not dis- 
 puted ; he shares the ordinary morality which 
 lie i-eports ; what he adds is reflective analysis, 
 (Kcasional criticism, some elimination of incon- 
 sistencies, some elements of scientific systema- 
 tisation. 
 
 By Common-Sense Morality is meant the 
 '' ordinary morality of an average man " ; it is 
 sometimes called Positive Morality, i.e. the 
 momlity that as a matter of fact is accepted at 
 any place and time by ordinary respectable 
 people— meaning by respectable people, people 
 who have average intelligence and enlightenment, 
 
 30 
 
 GREEK COMMOxN-SENSE MORALITY 31 
 
 and who really care about what is right. These 
 common opinions about what is right or good 
 in conduct are, as already observed, the facts of 
 moral life which the scientific moralist has 
 to start from and deal with, to systematise, and 
 to explain. 
 
 Aristotle's ethical treatise to which we refer, 
 and which is known by the name of the Nico- 
 machean Ethics, is, it may be noted, not only 
 epoch-making, but also a book of extraordinary 
 and permanent attractiveness, and one of those 
 that may be read with real pleasure even in a 
 translation ; it is, one feels, a book which it 
 would be worth while for a great scholar to take 
 the trouble to translate — enmlating Jowetfs 
 service to Plato. Its richness as a record of 
 thought and opinion, the writer's intense interest 
 and belief in his subject, his faith in its interest 
 for others, his confidence in himself, his keenness 
 of analysis, his breadth of outlook and wide 
 knowledge of human nature, his combined wisdom 
 and simplicity, his calm masterliness of thought, 
 are a perpetual surprise and delight to the 
 reader. 
 
 It is not possible here to go through the book 
 in detail; all that I can attempt is, following 
 accepted authorities, to trace the general outlines 
 of Aristotle's procedure, to consider in particular 
 
 
CHAFrER IV 
 
 GREEK COMMON-SENSE MORALITY 
 
 AiiisTOTLE, the first great scientific moralist, is 
 the only Greek writer who has attempted and 
 carried through a careful and comprehensive 
 enumeration of the moral qualities approved and 
 praised as Virtues by Greek Connnon Sense. He 
 enumerates these under their current names, and 
 supplies definition and analysis. The closeness 
 of his account to ordinary morality is not dis- 
 puted; he shares the ordinary morality which 
 he reports ; what he adds is reflective analysis, 
 occasional criticism, some elimination of incon- 
 sistencies, some elements of scientific systema- 
 tisation. 
 
 By Common-Sense Morality is meant the 
 "ordinary morality of an average man"; it is 
 sometimes called Positive Morality, i.e. the 
 morality that as a matter of fact is accepted at 
 any placte and time by ordinary respectable 
 people— meaning by respectable people, people 
 who have average intelligence and enlightenment, 
 
 30 
 
 GREEK COMMON-SENSE MORAIJTY 31 
 
 and who really care about what is right. These 
 common opinions about what is right or good 
 in conduct are, as already observed, the facts of 
 moral life which the scientific moralist has 
 to start from and deal with, to systematise, and 
 to explain. 
 
 Aristotle's ethical treatise to which we refer, 
 and which is known by the name of the Nico- 
 machean Ethics, is, it may be noted, not only 
 epoch-making, but also a book of extraordinary 
 and permanent attractiveness, and one of those 
 that may be read with real pleasure even in a 
 translation ; it is, one feels, a book which it 
 would be worth while for a great scholar to take 
 the trouble to translate — emulating Jowett's 
 service to Plato. Its richness as a record of 
 thought and opinion, the writer''s intense interest 
 and belief in his subject, his faith in its interest 
 for others, his confidence in himself, his keenness 
 of analysis, his breadth of outlook and wide 
 knowledge of human nature, his combined wisdom 
 and simplicity, his calm masterliness of thought, 
 are a perpetual surprise and delight to the 
 reader. 
 
 It is not possible here to go through the book 
 in detail ; all that I can attempt is, following 
 accepted authorities, to trace the general outlines 
 of Aristotle's procedure, to consider in particular 
 
32 
 
 A PRIMER OF ETHICS 
 
 his account of the moral virtues, and to inquire 
 how far he clears up and systematises the popular 
 morality which he reports. Aristotle's ethical 
 thought is, no doubt, in intimate connection and 
 fundamental agreement with that of his master 
 and immediate predecessor, Plato; but Aristotle 
 makes it very clear that it is the Common Sense 
 of his age and country which supplies both his 
 starting-point and criterion. He follows ex- 
 perience closely — experience rather of what men 
 praise cnid approve than of what they do. He 
 points out that the fundamental aim of his 
 treatise is to elicit and exhibit the truth which 
 is latent amid the confusions and contradictions 
 of common opinion. He starts with the same 
 assumption as Socrates did — that there is some 
 true End of action, something good in itself and 
 not merely as a means to something else ; and 
 that this can be known, and is what all men 
 really aim at. All men in acting, he points out, 
 have some motive, aim at some End, either 
 for itself, or as a means to some further end ; 
 but since not everything can be sought only 
 as a means, there must be something that 
 is in itself an end, in itself desirable, in itself 
 good. It is the knowledge of this that we seek 
 in ethical inquiry. This good (or end) in itself, 
 men are agreed in calling evBai/iopia, well-being. 
 
 GREEK COMMON-SENSE MORALITY 33 
 
 But then, they do not all take the same view 
 of what evhai^ovia is. There are current opinions 
 according to which it is Honour, or Wealth, or 
 the Abstract Idea of Good, or Virtue, or Pleasure ; 
 and in particular there are the opposed views 
 of previous philosophers as to which of this last 
 pair it is — i.e. whether it is Virtue or Pleasure. 
 This opposition, we may observe, is one that has 
 continued to the present day. 
 
 Here, clearly, Aristotle cannot follow Common 
 Sense, for this is inconsistent with itself; he must 
 find a way of his own. Still, he starts on this 
 way of his own, from a generalisation commonly 
 admitted, and undeniable — namely, that men are 
 distinguished into classes according to their 
 functions. 
 
 Every individual man has, according to his 
 occupation in life, his special work or function — 
 e.g. that of shoemaker or artist or soldier — and 
 he is judged to be good as artist, soldier, 
 or shoemaker in proportion as he fulfils well the 
 particular work or function which is his business 
 in life. Similarly, an eye or ear is held to he good 
 if it sees well, or hears well. 
 
 Since, then, everything is judged good or bad 
 according as it fulfils well or ill its particular 
 function in the scheme of things, it seems natural 
 and reasonable to infer that the Good of man, 
 
 3 
 
34 
 
 A PRIMER OF ETHICS 
 
 his evBai/jLovia, consists in fulfilling well his 
 function as man — i.e. "in living well, through 
 the normal term of man's existence, that life 
 of the rational soul which we recoopnise as man^s 
 crowning and distinctive attribute. '^ 
 
 And since the " divinest part "' of the rational 
 creature Man is pure speculative reason, thought 
 about thought, Aristotle holds that the most 
 perfect Well-being consists in the exercise of this ; 
 that is, in Philosophic Contemplation. But this 
 view of Human Well-being applies of course 
 only to philosophers, and Aristotle is too much 
 in sympathy with ordinary thought to put this 
 forward as the only evBaifiovlay the only human 
 good. He is, in fact, actually occupied, through 
 the greater part of his book, with the region of 
 Practical Virtue, the generally accepted secondary 
 good of the ordinary moral life, in which reason 
 regulates the non -rational or appetitive element 
 of the soul. 
 
 This practical moral life is determined by the 
 notions of the commonly recognised moral Virtues 
 or Excellences ; and it is the exercise of these, 
 moral Well-doing, that Aristotle considers to be 
 for ordinary persons the most important factor of 
 that €v8acfiovLa, that Well-being, which is the 
 End of man as man. 
 
 This moral excellence or practical virtue is 
 
 GREEK COMMON-SExNSE MORALITY 35 
 
 defined by Aristotle as " a settled habit, formed 
 by a course of actions under rule and discipline, 
 in which vicious excess and defect have been 
 avoided . . . the virtuous man, without internal 
 conflict, wills actions that hit the happy mean in 
 their effects.*" Virtue further involves " a deliberate 
 choice of virtuous acts /or the sake of their 
 intrinsic moral beauty, and not for any end 
 external to the act.*" 
 
 As regards the relation of Pleasure to that 
 virtuous activity which is Well-being, Aristotle's 
 view is that Virtue is bound up with pleasure, 
 that the best and greatest Pleasure attends the 
 best activity ; and so to the virtuous man, 
 virtuous activity is pleasurable. 
 
 It is interesting to compare with Aristotle's 
 doctrine that the virtuous man takes pleasure in 
 virtuous action, that he likes doing it, the view 
 (often expressed) that there is no virtue in doing 
 what one likes; that without effort there is no 
 virtue, and that the greater the struggle the 
 greater the merit. A solution of the question is 
 suggested in Professor Sidgwick's view that " our 
 common idea of Virtue includes two distinct 
 elements, the one being the most perfect ideal 
 of moral excellence that we are able to conceive 
 for human beings, while the other is manifested 
 in the effort of imperfect men to attain this 
 
36 
 
 A PRIMER OF ETHICS 
 
 ideal.'" ' For on the one hand a man is snrelj 
 better in proportion as he likes what is good, 
 takes pleasure in doing it, and does it easily ; on 
 the other hand, since what is right must, at any 
 rate sometimes, be hard and difficult, it is indis- 
 pensable for moral improvement, to have the 
 strength of will to follow the right even when 
 great effort is required. In those who are moral 
 geniuses, who attain to the highest human 
 excellence, there is no doubt a combination of 
 the two elements — ease and delight in particular 
 kinds of Well-doing, and a constant striving after 
 greater perfection. 
 
 The list of moral virtues which Aristotle gives, 
 is as follows : 
 
 Courage (or Valour) (avBpeia). 
 
 Temperance {atof^poavvrji). 
 
 Magnificence (fieyaXoTrpeTreia), 
 
 Liberality (eXevdepiorrj^i), 
 
 Lofty - m i ndedness {pLeyaXo-^vxia ). 
 
 Self-respect or (Due) Ambition.^ 
 
 Gentleness {irpa6Tr)s:\ 
 
 Friendliness.^ 
 
 Truthfulness {akriOeLa). 
 
 * Methods of Ethics, Bk. III., cliap. ii., § 2. 
 
 * Aristotle points out tliat the virtues here mentioned 
 in English as Due Amhition and Friendliness liad no 
 current names in Greek ethical nomenclature. 
 
 GREEK COMMON SENSE MORALITY 37 
 
 Decorous (or Polished) Wit or Seemly Jesting 
 (eurpaTreXta). 
 
 Justice (or Uprightness) (SiKatoavvtj). 
 
 Wisdom (^p6vT)<ns:). 
 
 Friendship {<i^LKla). 
 
 An interesting account of the relation between 
 popular moral thought and scientific ethics, from 
 a poet's point of view, is given in a delightful 
 Httle poem called "Development," in Robert 
 Browning's volume of verse which is entitled 
 Asolando, The poet describes how, when he was 
 a child of five, he one day finds his father 
 reading. " My father was a scholar, and read 
 Greek,'' he says; and he asks what the book is 
 about. "The Siege of Troy," answers his 
 father. " What is a siege and what is Troij ? " 
 rejoins the child. The father thereupon pro- 
 ceeds to " pile up chairs and tables for a town, 
 calls the cat " Helen," the page-boy is " Hector, 
 the pony is " Achilles," and so on ; and unfolds 
 to his son the stirring tale of heroic Valour, 
 devoted Friendship, Truth, Faith, and other 
 splendid virtues which Homer has depicted for 
 the delight of all times to come. 
 
 "Thus far I rightly understood the case at 
 five years old," the poet goes on to say; and 
 then he describes how, in course of time, he read 
 for himself first Pope's translation of the Iliad^ 
 
 V) 
 
 11 
 
38 
 
 A PRIMER OF ETHICS 
 
 GREEK COMMON-SENSE MORALITY 39 
 
 and then the Greek original of this. All lead 
 up to the Ethkfi of Aristotle, a treatise which, 
 Browning says, 
 
 "I fiiidliard 
 To rear! ariglit now that my liair is grey, 
 And I can manage tlic original." 
 
 We here have a poetic statement which 
 I)robably corresponds broadly to the historical 
 order of development in moral thought. 
 
 What we find in Aristotle is essentially a 
 transcript of current thought and opinion on 
 beauties and excellences of conduct, and reflective 
 analysis of these, together with an attempt at 
 scientific explanation and systematisation. 
 
 We will go briefly through some points in 
 Aristotle's analysis of the virtues of which we 
 have just reported the list.^ Courage or Valour 
 is defined as a mean or middle state between the 
 extremes of cowardice and foolhardiness : it is 
 most properly exhibited in the noblest dangers, 
 namelv those of war. 
 
 Temperance is regarded as concerned only with 
 the pleasures of the appetitive nature : it is a 
 mean between the excess, which is self-indulgence, 
 and the defect, which is indifference or insensi- 
 
 » Nicomachean Ethics (Williams' translation), p. 6G, etc. 
 
 bility ; but according to Aristotle this latter 
 extreme is almost non-existent. Men, he says, 
 who feel less than they ought the pleasures with 
 which Temperance is concerned are not really to 
 be met with. 
 
 The next two virtues — Liberality and Magni- 
 ficence — have to do with Wealth. Magnificence 
 lies between the extremes of meanness and in- 
 appropriate lavishness. It is concerned only with 
 matters of large expense, hence is applicable 
 only in the case of the very wealthy. Liberality 
 is a similar virtue, applying to all cases of 
 expenditure that are not on the large scale with 
 which Magnificence is concerned. It is a mean 
 between the extremes of niggardliness and 
 extravagance. 
 
 In the case of the Virtue of liofty-mindedness 
 or High-mindedness Aristotle prefers to consider 
 rather the embodiment of it — the man of a High 
 mind — than the Virtue itself. The Man of 
 High Mind is "He who being really worthy of 
 great things holds himself worthy of them. . . .'*'* 
 His " merits are extreme, but in his conduct he 
 observes the proper mean. For he holds himself 
 worthy of his exact deserts, while others either 
 over-estimate or under-estimate their own 
 merits. . . . Now the high-minded man, since 
 his deserts are the highest possible, must be 
 
40 
 
 A PRIMER OF ETHICS 
 
 among the best of men ; for the better a man is, 
 
 the higher will be his deserts, and the best man 
 
 will have the highest deserts. True high-minded- 
 
 ness, therefore, cannot but imply virtue; or 
 
 rather, the criterion of high-mindedness is the 
 
 conjoint perfection ofall the individual virtues. . . . 
 
 High-mindedness would seem to be the crown as 
 
 it were of all the virtues ; for it not only involves 
 
 their existence, but it also intensifies their lustre. 
 
 And consequently there is nothing so difficult as 
 
 to be truly high-minded, for it is impossible to 
 
 be such without perfect nobility of character.'' 
 
 For such a man, indeed— for perfect virtue — 
 
 "adequate honour cannot be found.'' Yet he 
 
 welcomes honour " from upright men, inasmuch 
 
 as they have no greater reward to offer him." * 
 
 The deficiency of High-mindedness is Little- 
 mindedness or Self-depreciation, and its excess is 
 vanity. 
 
 "The traits by which Aristotle characterises 
 in detail this flower of noble life are all the more 
 interesting from their discrepancy with the 
 Christian ideal. The high-minded man is likely 
 to be rich and well-born; he loves to confer 
 favours, but feels shame at receiving them, and 
 does not hke to be reminded of any that he may 
 have received ; he shuns all subordinate positions, 
 
 * foe, cit. 
 
 GREEK COMMON-SENSE MORALITY 41 
 
 and is inert and dilatory except when there is 
 something great to do ; he is open in his enmi- 
 ties and his friendships — for he fears no one — 
 and generally candid, except that he affects 
 irony with the common herd ; he is free from 
 malice, no gossip, careless of the little needs and 
 concerns of hfe, not given to wonder or praise ; 
 his walk is slow, his accents grave, his speech 
 deliberate." ^ 
 
 High-mindedness is concerned with great 
 honour (or reputation). But there is another 
 viiiue concerned with honour which stands 
 in the same relation to High-mindedness as 
 Liberality does to Magnificence, being concerned 
 with matters that are only moderate or small. 
 This Virtue is Self-respect or Due Ambition. 
 The extremes are excess of ambition, and defect 
 of it. 
 
 The next virtue in Aristotle's list is Gentleness, 
 which is the mean state with regard to anger. 
 The extremes are defect of due resentment or 
 poor-spiritedness on the one hand, and excess 
 of angry passion on the other. This latter fault, 
 Aristotle says, " can take almost every shape. 
 For we can be angry with those with whom we 
 ought not to be angry, and we can be more 
 angry than we ought, and we can become angry 
 
 * Sidgwick's Outlines of the History of Ethics, chap. ii. 
 
 I 
 
42 
 
 A PRIMER OF ETHICS 
 
 more quickly than we ought, and remain angry 
 for a longer time than we ought. But still 
 the same man does not fall into all of these 
 faults." 
 
 The next virtue, that of Friendliness, is a mean 
 between obsequiousness and surliness ; Truthful- 
 ness is treated as simply the mean between 
 boastfulness and mock-modestv. The truthful 
 man, Aristotle says, is one " who acknowledges 
 his own merits, and who neither exaggerates nor 
 depreciates them." 
 
 Seemly Jesting (or Polished Wit) is a happy 
 mean between undignified buffoonery on the one 
 hand and grumpiness and surliness on the other. 
 
 Aristotle distinguishes two meanings of the 
 " cardinal " Virtue of Justice (BcKaioavvrj) a 
 narrower and a wider. In the wider it is ecjuiva- 
 lent to our Uprightness, and may be held to cover 
 the whole of Virtue ; in the narrower it is the 
 opposite of all unfairness, and is divided into 
 (1) Distributive Justice, which has to do with 
 the distribution according to desert of public 
 rewards and benefits ; (2) Reparative Justice, 
 which requires that if any man has wronged 
 another, damages equivalent to the injury inflicted 
 should be exacted from him for the compensation 
 of the injured person. 
 
 The intellectual Virtue of Practical Wisdom 
 
 GREEK COMMON-SENSE MORALITY 43 
 
 ((l)p6vT)(TL^) " is really involved in vioral excellence ; 
 ... for it is required to determine in any particu- 
 lar case that due limitation of feeling and action 
 in which perfect virtue consists ; and it cannot be 
 conceived as existing apart from moral excellence 
 —we do not count a man practically wise for such 
 mere intellectual cleverness as a vicious man 
 may exhibit. The man we count wise must be 
 not merely skilful in the selection of means to any 
 ends : his ends must also be rightly chosen." ^ 
 
 Two of the ten books of Aristotle's Ethics 
 (namely Bk. VIII. and Bk. IX) deal with Friend- 
 ship, and contain, I believe, the finest treatment 
 of that subject of which we have any knowledge. 
 Francis Bacon's famous Essay is no doubt less 
 discursive and perhaps more worldly-wise, but 
 Aristotle seems in many passages to have reached 
 to the very noblest thought on this topic. He 
 is, as I have hinted, discursive ; this is because he 
 brings together here much that to a modern view 
 could only be appropriately grouped under the 
 notion of general benevolence {e.g. family affec- 
 tion and gratitude). Here perhaps more than 
 anywhere else Aristotle transcends the ordinary 
 Common-Sense Morality of his time. Certainly, 
 in parts of Bks. VIII. and IX., he seems to be 
 near the view that all social virtue may be summed 
 » Outlines of History of Ethics, chap. ii. 
 
 
44 
 
 A PRIMER OF ETHICS 
 
 up in kindliness towards others ; and there are 
 a few remarkable passages earlier in the Ethics 
 which give countenance to this idea. E.g, he 
 says that an over-liberal man is better than a 
 miser became he " benefits many others "' ; that 
 no great opprobrium attaches to vulgarity and 
 pettiness because (among other things) thei/ do 
 not injure a mans neighbours, x\nd again he 
 argues that certain faults are not to be counted 
 as vices because " they do not result in any actual 
 harm to others/'' 
 
 At the beginning of his Bk. VIII. Aristotle 
 gives in the opening sentences a brief introductory 
 account of Friendship. "Friendship," he says, 
 " if not in itself a virtue, at least involves and 
 implies virtue ; and it is moreover an absolute 
 essential for a happy life, since without friends 
 no man would choose to live, although possessed 
 of every other good thing. ... To the young 
 friendship is of aid in that it keeps them clear 
 of faults ; and to the old, in that it gives kindly 
 attention, and supplies those deficiencies in action 
 which are always the result of infirmity ; and 
 to those who are in their full prime, in that it 
 makes noble achievements easier : 
 
 The two together stepping, 
 are the better able both to think and to act. It 
 
 GREEK COMMON-SENSE MORALITY 45 
 
 would seem, moreover, that it is a law of nature 
 that the offspring should feel a love for its parent, 
 and the parent for its offspring ; . . . and, indeed, 
 that a mutual affection should exist in all beings 
 of the same kind, and most of all in men ; and 
 hence it is that we praise those who love their 
 fellowmen. In travel, too, one can see at once 
 how kindred a thing and how dear is man to 
 man. Friendship would, moreover, seem to form 
 a bond of union which holds together the body 
 politic, and about which legislators busy them- 
 selves even more than they do about justice. For 
 unanimity is a thing not unlike friendship, and 
 the two especial objects of legislators are to create 
 unanimity, and to drive out dissension ; which 
 latter is inimical to the well-being of the state. 
 Where, moreover, friendship exists, there we 
 stand in no need of justice ; but, where justice 
 exists, there we none the less stand in need of 
 friendship ; nay, more, those acts in which justice 
 is most perfectly manifested bear a close resem- 
 blance to acts of friendship. Lastly, friendship is 
 not only a necessary thing, but also a noble ; for 
 we praise those who love their friends, and to 
 have many friends is held to be a something 
 noble ; nay, more, there are some who think that 
 « good man ' and ' friend' are convertible terms." 
 Comparing the moral thought of ancient Greece 
 
 ;• 
 
46 
 
 A PRIMER OF ETHICS 
 
 with that of modern England — the fourth century 
 B.C. with the present age — we find important 
 differences in the way of looking at and treating 
 the facts of the moral life. Broadly speaking we 
 may say that instead of the ^Esthetic Intuitionism 
 of ancient Greece, which regarded the good in 
 conduct as intrinsically attractive, we now have 
 as predominant a moral code which lays down 
 maxims of Duty or Right Conduct. This change 
 of view is no doubt owing largely to Roman and 
 Christian influences — the Greek /Esthetic view 
 has on the whole given way to the Jural view, 
 in which the most essential part of Good Conduct 
 is regarded as embodied in the commands of a 
 Moral Law that prescribes a code of Duties — or 
 Right actions — to the performance of which a 
 man is morally bound. 
 
 We may note here that Duties are defined as 
 " Right Acts for the adequate performance of 
 which a Moral Motive is at least occasionally 
 necessary ; while Virtuous Conduct includes the 
 performance of Duties, as well as praiseworthy 
 acts that are thought to go beyond strict Duty, 
 and that may even be beyond the power of some 
 to perform. Virtues as commonly recognised 
 are manifested primanly in volitions to produce 
 particular right effects, .... but for the com- 
 pleteness of some Virtues (e.g. Gratitude, Loyalty, 
 
 GREEK COMMON-SENSE MORALITY 47 
 
 Patriotism) the presence of certain emotions seems 
 necessary. Moral excellence may indeed like 
 Beauty be said to elude definition ; but if we are 
 to have ethical science^ it is clear that we nnist 
 obtain definite moral axioms." ^ 
 
 The principal virtues which Greek and Modern 
 Common Sense have in common are Wisdom, 
 Justice, Liberality, Gentleness, Temperance, 
 Courage. In the Greek treatment Temperance 
 and Courage are more restricted than in the 
 modern view. Magnificence, High-mindedness, 
 Due Ambition, a Polished Wit (or Social tact), 
 do not occur in any modern list, and Friendship, 
 which is of such large scope in Aristotle's Ethics 
 and includes various particular cases of benevolent 
 affection, though regarded with sympathy and 
 admiration by modern Common Sense, is not held 
 to be exactly a moral Virtue. 
 
 The Greek list is, from our point of view, 
 seriously defective in regard to four virtues on 
 which modern (and especially Christian) morality 
 lays stress, i.e, (1) Benevolence (or Charity), (2) 
 Humility, (3) Truthfulness, (4) Purity. Benevo- 
 lence does certainly receive some incidental and 
 very partial recognition in the chapters on 
 Friendship, and in scattered passages elsewhere, 
 but Humility is not included at all, and indeed is 
 * Methods of Ethit'.<t J p. xxix. 
 
48 
 
 A PRIMER OF ETHICS 
 
 quite foreign to the Greek Common Sense which 
 Aristotle so faithfully reports. Truthfulness, 
 thout^h formally included in the Aristotelian list, 
 is very inade(|uately treated, being discussed as 
 simply concerned with a man's statements and 
 claims on his own l)ehalf, and described as the 
 mean between mock-modesty and boasting. This 
 unsatisfactory treatment of Truthfulness seems to 
 some extent due to the attempt to force upon it 
 the inappropriate doctrine of the Mean. Purity, 
 like HumiHty, is not mentioned at all. 
 
 Self-sacrifice— the deliberate giving up of one's 
 own Well-being for the sake of others— is of 
 course absent. On the other hand it may Ix) 
 noted that the unqualified condemnation of suicide 
 which characterises English Common Sense was 
 foreign to the spirit of Greek morality. 
 
 Then again, Aristotle's principle of the mean 
 {fieaoTi]^) cannot properly imply more than quanti- 
 tative regulation. This seems in many cases very 
 insufficient to indicate the relation of a Virtue to the 
 vices which are opposed to it as extremes to mean. 
 In the case of anger, e.g., Aristotle himself 
 speaks of the virtuous mean as being not merely 
 a more or less of anger ; since men, when they feel 
 anger, should further feel it as they ought, ivhen 
 they ought, uith xvhom they ought. 
 
 In the case of Truthfuhiess the mean does not 
 
 GREEK COMMON-SENSE MORALITY 49 
 
 really apply at all ; and again, in the case of High- 
 mindedness, it is obviously quite insufficient and 
 indeed inappropriate. As already observed, it is 
 a character and not a single virtue which Aristotle 
 describes here, and it has been said that what 
 really " makes the charm of the character which he 
 depicts is not the due relation between the High- 
 minded man's estimate of himself, and his deserts, 
 but a kind of magnanimity, a disregard for small 
 things, and a passionate aspiration after high things 
 which is a fine natural temper, rather than a virtue, 
 is found in more than the few, and may lead to 
 impropriety as well as to propriety of conduct." 
 
 The doctrine of the mean, in fact, does not 
 really supply an adequate principle for determin- 
 ing the different Virtues. In the treatment of 
 Courage, the limitation of this Virtue to Courage 
 or Valour as exhibited in War is unjustifiably 
 narrow, and does not penetrate beyond the surface 
 of the Common-Sense view, in which, as was 
 natural. Valour in War was prominent. Indeed, 
 as has been remarked, in Aristotle's book we 
 seem to have before us the branches but not the 
 root of Virtue, and even the condition that all 
 action to be virtuous must be done for the sake 
 of the moral Beauty of the act, only means that 
 in each special case there is a special kind of 
 Beauty that is aimed at. 
 
 4 
 
50 
 
 A PRIMER OF ETHICS 
 
 We must then, it seems, allow that, in spite of 
 the unrivalled interest and splendid merits of the 
 Ethics, Aristotle's list of virtues is seriously defec- 
 tive—that in some cases he follows too uncritically 
 the lead of Common Sense, that he does not 
 penetrate to fundamental principles, and that 
 hence his ethical theory is wanting in explanatory 
 efficacy, and in consistency and coherence. 
 
 It may be allowed to quote here Kanf s criticism 
 of Aristotle. Kant says : 
 
 " The diflference between virtue and vice cannot 
 be a matter of degree, but must depend on their 
 specific qualities or their law. To apply Aristotle's 
 famous principle : let frugality be defined as the 
 mean between two vices, prodigality and avarice. 
 Would a miser cease to be a miser by merely 
 increasing his consumption of wealth? or a 
 prodigal become virtuous by diminishing his con- 
 sumption of wealth? The explanation (1) does 
 not tell us where they are respectively to stop; 
 and (2) is in fact tautological. For when 
 Aristotle says ' one ought to avoid error by excess 
 and error by defect,' what is error by excess but 
 doing more than is right, and error by defect but 
 doing what is less than is right ? It comes to 
 this then, that it is 7ight to do neither more nor 
 less than what is rights 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 PHILOSOPHICAL INTUITIONISM 
 
 We have noted in a previous chapter that the 
 morality of modern Common Sense is sometimes 
 called by the name Dogmatic Intuitionism : 
 Doi£matic because it asks for no reason and no 
 proof ; Intuitionism because the meaning and force 
 of the maxim in each case is supposed to l>e seen 
 at once and without further inquiry. The funda- 
 mental assumption of this method is " that we can 
 discern certain general rules witli really clear and 
 finally valid intuition.'' On this view the maxims 
 of Connnon-Sense Morality — Do Justice, Be 
 honest, Fulfil promises. Requite l)enelits. Keep 
 faith, 01)ey the law, and so on — are accepted 
 as ultimate and sufficient and as carrying their 
 own authority. It is this unsystematic body of 
 maxims which the moralist finds, which as sharing 
 Common Sense he accepts, and which is his 
 material and the starting point of his ethical 
 thought. 
 
 When, however, he (!omes to reflect upon these 
 
 51 
 
 1^ 
 
52 
 
 A PRIMER OF ETHICS 
 
 rules, he observes that they are sometimes tauto- 
 logous, sometimes vague, sometimes inconsistent 
 with one another ; that to every rule, or almost 
 every rule, exceptions are allowed. For instance, 
 as Professor Sidgwick points out, the rules of 
 Wisdom and Self-control are, (1) that we ought 
 always to do what we see to be reasonable or 
 right, (2) that we ought not to yield to any 
 unreasonable impulse urging us in a contrary 
 direction. But this simply means that it is our 
 duty both generally, and also in the particular 
 case where any unreasonable impulse tempts us 
 aside, to do our duty. These maxims as com- 
 monly stated and accepted are thus seen io be 
 
 tautological. 
 
 Again, the very notions of some of the par- 
 ticular virtues an'd duties are difficult to deilne 
 clearly— as in the case of Justice, which has 
 taxed the thought of moralists from the time 
 
 of Plato. 
 
 The importance and bindingness of Justice is 
 generally admitted, yet its maxim by no means 
 fidfils the requirements of a moral axiom. 
 
 Putting aside the wide (and very vague) sense 
 of Justke ' in which it is equivalent to upright- 
 ness or right action generally, and also the sense 
 
 ^ See Siagwick, 3/^/W.v o/i://*mv, Bk. lIL^cliap. v.,aiia 
 Bk. IN'., chap, iii., and Elements of Pomh'.s, chap. iv. 
 
 
 PHILOSOPHICAL INTUITIONISM 53 
 
 in which it has the force of Law (as in the 
 
 expression Courts of Justice), a sense which is 
 
 also vague, since it is often recognised that 
 
 established laws, and even Courts of Justice, are 
 
 unjust— we find that it is not quite easy to define 
 
 what we mean by Justice. We all allow, of course, 
 
 that we ought to do what is just— e*.^. that 
 
 employers ought to give to their workpeople 
 
 a wage that is just and iiiir; but can we consider 
 
 that the wages fixed by competition in open 
 
 market are fair, or ought labourers to be rewarded 
 
 according to their needs or according to their 
 
 deserts ? Clearly, Justice is not simply synonymous 
 
 with Equality, though it must be held to exclude 
 
 arbitrary 'umpuility, and thus to require Equality 
 
 where there is no reason for the reverse. It is 
 
 sometimes regarded as meaning fulfilment of 
 
 definite agreements and understandings, and 
 
 natural and customary expectations ; this is what 
 
 lias Ixien referred to as "Conservative Justice,'' 
 
 since it is concerned with the due fulfilment of 
 
 claims arising out of the established order of 
 
 Society. But Custom may be unjust, and in such 
 
 a case we need a principle of reform by which 
 
 to improve it and remove its injustice. We need 
 
 a standard of Ideal Justice by which to rectify 
 
 actual Injustice. 
 
 Freedom is an ideal of Law which has been 
 
54 
 
 A PRIMER OF ETHICS 
 
 widely advocated, but we find that the most 
 ardent advocates of Freedom cannot conhtru(!l 
 even the semblance of a scheme of I^w or social 
 action without various and large Umitationa of 
 Freedom^ and that, supposing limitations to have 
 l)een introduced with a view to cutting down 
 Freedom in some directions so as to produce 
 (if possible) Equality of Freedom, even such 
 Equality would be a palpable absurdity. Every 
 reasonable society refuses to allow to children, 
 to madmen, to imbeciles, to convicted criminals 
 and dangerous malefactors, the same measure of 
 Freedom which is thought fit for sane and reason- 
 able and fairly well-behaved adults. And this 
 unequal distribution of Freedom is justified by 
 an appeal, not to the principle of Freedom itself— 
 how could Freedom supply a principle for its 
 own distribution ? — but to the evident advantage 
 of allowing most Freedom to those who are best 
 able to use it. This seems a view to which it is 
 impossible to refuse acceptance, and its acceptance 
 inevitably canies with it the acceptance of an 
 ultimate good which is iwt Freedom, but to 
 which Freedom within certain limits is likely to 
 conduce. 
 
 If we cannot obtain from the notion of Freedom 
 a satisfactory standard by which to estimate and 
 improve the defects of Justice in existing political 
 
 PHILOSOPHICAL INTUITIONISM 55 
 
 societies, can we get more help from the notion 
 of recjuital according to Desert, which is frequently 
 appealed to as the principle of Ideal Justice ? It 
 seems perhaps at first sight as though a satis- 
 factory solution of the difficulty were to be found 
 here : what more could we suik than that every 
 man should receive his deserts ? Would not such 
 a consummation fully satisfy not only our sense 
 of Justice, but our whole conception of a perfect 
 
 social order? 
 
 But when we come to examine further, we 
 seem to find two defects in this ideal: (1) The 
 notion of Desert is both theoretically vague and 
 practically unworkable, so that we seem no nearer 
 than we were before to a definite and satisfactory 
 account of Justice ; (2) Justice is not all that we 
 either desire or judge to be desirable. 
 
 For (1) are we to judge desert by intention 
 and effort or by accompllshnmit ? We do not 
 seem able to exclude either consideration— in 
 judging of moral worth, effort and intention can 
 certainly not be neglected. Yet neither can 
 accomplishment be excluded, for it is only of the 
 accomplished work that we can judge whether 
 it is good work or bad; and good work will 
 generally obtain, and is held to deserve, a better 
 
 price than bad. 
 
 But again, if effo^i is to be considered, how 
 
56 
 
 A PRIMER OF ETHICS 
 
 is its amount to be known, and if known, how 
 estimated ? The utmost effort of a weakling 
 cannot accomplish as much as a slight exertion 
 on the part of a giant, or even perhaps of an 
 ordinary average person ; but if we look at the 
 matter from the point of view of the producer, 
 good intention and the pain and exhaustion of 
 effort are the factors to be considered, and from 
 this point of view, why should not the painful 
 effect of ill-success be taken into the account, 
 and failure be better rewarded than success ? 
 This leads us to a direct contradiction of re(|uital 
 in proportion to accomplishment, introducing, in 
 fact, the principle of distribution according to need. 
 And (2) Need seems to be a consideration that 
 we certainly cannot omit (Distribution according 
 to Need being essentially distribution for the sake 
 of averting suffering). Consider eg, the case 
 of children, of those who are mentally weak or 
 physically disabled. And again, it does not seem 
 that in a satisfactorily ordered society appoint- 
 ment according to Fitness can be ignored. Do 
 we not hold it to be (at any rate to a large 
 extent) right that appointments should go by 
 Fitness ? This certainly seems to be the principle 
 on which, e.g,^ retirement on account of super- 
 annuation is required. And it is on this principle, 
 too, that candidates for various posts are required 
 
 PHILOSOPHICAL INTUITIONISM 57 
 
 to pass certain tests or to furnish testimonials 
 or references. 
 
 The notion of Justice has thus involved us 
 in a labyrinth of complications ; how are we 
 to find a way out of them, how explain the 
 general opinion of the peculiar sacredness of 
 Justice, how connect and reconcile the various 
 elements which are included in the notion, and 
 explain this grouping which they have in conunon 
 thought, and the way in which they seem to 
 limit each other? 
 
 Or take the case of Veracity. Here, a<;ain, is 
 11 general rule of moral conduct which Common- 
 Sense Morality lays down with great stringency 
 and special emphasis, and the general bindingness 
 and sacredness of truthfulness and the disgrace- 
 fulness of falsehood none will dispute. But even 
 here, where at first sight the simplicity and un- 
 ambiguousness of the rule seems apparent, we 
 find on examination that it is not easy to give 
 a plain definition. For are we to say that 
 Veracity (Truth-speaking) means simply (ii) 
 making our statements coiTespond with fact, or {h) 
 producing a true impression, or (c) must Veracity 
 include both (a) and {h) ? No doubt the object of 
 the rule is, that words spoken should produce a true 
 impression ; and no doubt, also, in the majority 
 of cases, if the words spoken are in accordance 
 
58 
 
 A PRIMER OF ETHICS 
 
 with fact, the impression produced will Idc so 
 too. There is generally no difficulty in producing 
 by means of true words an impression which is 
 true; but a j^rson viaij have good reason to 
 believe that by speaking the exact truth he will 
 cause inferences to be drawn which are contrary 
 to ti-uth— as in the case of Jeannie Deans, when 
 she felt that, if she spoke the exact and literal 
 truth at Effie's trial, she would inevitably lead 
 the jury to think Effie guilty of the murder of 
 her child, whereas Jeannie was absolutely con- 
 vinced of her sister^s innocence. No doubt such 
 cases are rare, but they may occur. 
 
 Further, the maxims of different duties may 
 come into conflict, e.g. Justice and Generosity; 
 and in the case of certain virtues and duties it 
 is recognised that we must sometimes admit 
 exceptions to generally received rules, e.g. in 
 the case of I^iw-observance. Important as this 
 Duty is, Conmion Sense is quite ready to admit 
 occasional exceptions to it. 
 
 In fact, the maxims of ordinary morality con- 
 stitute a collection of rules which, as they stand, 
 have often no very close connection with one 
 another, and, like the generalities of any physical 
 science, stand in need of systematisation and 
 connection. 
 
 We will turn to Professor Sidgwick's Review 
 
 PHILOSOPHICAL INTUITIONISM 59 
 
 of Common-Sense Morality in chapter xi. of 
 Book III. of Methods of Ethics, where he sum- 
 marises the points in which ordinary morality 
 falls short of the re(iuirements of scientific ethics. 
 " We require (he says) of an Axiom that it 
 should be (1) stated in clear and precise terms, 
 (2) really self-evident, (3) not conflicting with 
 any other truth, (4) supported by an adequate 
 'consensus of experts.' These characteristics 
 are not found in the moral maxims of Common 
 
 Sense.'' 
 
 As already shown, " the maxims of Wisdom 
 and Self-control are only self-evident in so far as 
 they are tautological : nor can we state any clear, 
 absolute, universally admitted axioms for deter- 
 mining the duties of the Affections : and as for 
 the group of principles that were extracted from 
 the common notion of Justice, we cannot define 
 each singly in a satisfactory manner, still less 
 reconcile them : and even the Duty of Good 
 Faith, when we consider the numerous qualifica- 
 tions of it more or less doubtfully admitted by 
 Common Sense, seems more like a subordinate 
 rule than an independent First Principle. . . . 
 Similarly with other virtues. . . . The common 
 moral maxims are adequate for practical guidance, 
 but do not admit of being elevated into scientific 
 
 axioms. 
 
 1^ 
 
60 
 
 A PRIMER OF ETHICS 
 
 Professor Sidgwick is not of course the first 
 among modem moralists to feel the need of 
 transforming Dogmatic to Philosophic Intui- 
 tionism— of making the disconnected maxims of 
 Common-Sense Morality more consistent and 
 more clear, and of penetrating to its underlying 
 principles. For instance, Kant (who is thus a 
 Philosophic Intuitionist) attempts to do this by 
 showing that all that is wanted to reduce Dog- 
 matic Intuitionism to a reasoned and coherent 
 system is accomplished by the Categorical Im- 
 perative : Act so that thou canst will the maxim 
 of thy action to be law universal. But this, 
 valuable as it is, does not give us more than the 
 form of a law or general rule— it merely says : 
 "What is right for me is right for any one 
 else in similar circumstances/' Two philosophic 
 English moralists, Clarke and Butler, make a 
 more successful attempt. Sanuiel Clarke, after 
 earnest and prolonged reflection upon the com- 
 monly received moral precepts, arrives at two 
 rules which he held to be fundamental, viz. 
 the Rule of Equity and the RuU of Ijjvc or 
 Benevolence. The Rule of Etiuity he states thus : 
 " Whatever I judge reasonable or unreasonable 
 that another should do for me, that, by the 
 same judgment, I declare reasonable or un- 
 reasonable that I should in the like case do 
 
 PHILOSOPHICAL INTUITIONISM 61 
 
 for him.'' This maxim is of course simply a 
 precise statement of the " Golden Rule " of the 
 Gospel: "Do unto others as ye would they 
 should do unto you." ^ According to the Rule of 
 Universal Love or Benevolence, " Every rational 
 creature ought in its sphere and station, according 
 to its respective powers and faculties, to do all 
 the Good it can to its fellow-creatures : to which 
 end Universal Love and Benevolence is plainly 
 the most certain direct and effectual means." 
 
 A later English moralist, Joseph Butler, 
 Bishop of Durham (whose Analogy of Religion 
 is so well known), reaches the conclusion that all 
 the commonly received maxims of social duty may 
 be reduced under three heads. Justice, Veracity, 
 and Benevolence. " For," he says, " as much as 
 it has been disputed wherein virtue consists, or 
 whatever ground for doubt there may be about 
 particulars, yet, in general, there is in reality an 
 universally acknowledged standard of it. It is 
 that which all ages and all countries have made 
 profession of in public ; it is that which every 
 man you meet puts on the show of; it is that 
 which the primary and fundamental laws of all 
 civil constitutions, over the face of the earth, 
 make it their business and endeavour to enforce 
 the practice of upon mankind ; namely, justice, 
 ^ Methodti of Ethu'fi, Bk. 111., chap. xiii. 
 
65 
 
 A PRIMER OF ETHICS 
 
 veracity, and regard to common good. ... It is 
 our business and our duty to endeavour, withhi 
 the bounds of veracity and justice, to contribute 
 to the ease, convenience, and even cheerfubiess 
 and diversion of our fellow-creatures. . . . Such 
 1)enevolent endeavour is a cultivation of that 
 most excellent of all virtuous principles, the 
 active principle of benevolence." ^ 
 
 It would be easy to show that, for a far-seeing 
 and enlightened Benevolence, there are no rules 
 of conduct more important as conducing to 
 general Happiness than the two great Rules 
 of Justice and Veracity. Indeed, Bishop Butler 
 himself, in one of his two sermons " Upon the 
 Love of our Neighbour,'' had said that " the 
 connnon virtues and the common vices of man- 
 kind may be traced up to benevolence or the 
 want of it.'' Limitations, Exceptions, Vagueness, 
 Conflicts, Complexity, are all cleared up, and at 
 the same time the general importance and validity 
 of the maxims of Justice and Veracity explained 
 and supported, by reference to this great funda- 
 mental principle of Rational Benevolence— a 
 principle which (if we agree with Clarke and 
 Professor Sidgwick) must be admitted to be 
 self-evident. 
 
 The same relation to Rational Benevolence 
 
 * Dissertation, Of the Nature of Virtue. 
 
 PHILOSOPHICAL INTUITIONISM 63 
 
 is found to exist in the case of all the other 
 common maxims of social morality, if we subject 
 them to a careful examination. Further, the 
 rule of Rational Benevolence, according to 
 which the general Happiness is the right end of 
 action, is almost universally accepted as the 
 supreme principle of government. Governmental 
 regulations can only be justified if they are for 
 the General Good, interpreted as Happiness. 
 And it is worthy of notice that this conclusion, 
 to which reflective moralists have been led by 
 careful examination of Common Sense, is in exact 
 accordance with the fundamental principle of 
 Christian Ethics, that "Love (Benevolence) is 
 the fulfilling of the Law." 
 
 And when we have thus reached the conclu- 
 sion of the efforts of Intuitional Moralists to 
 transform current morality from confusion and 
 incoherence to philosophical clearness and order, 
 we iind that not merely has Common -Sense 
 Morality, the morality of everyday Virtue and 
 Duty, been cleared up, strengthened, and justified, 
 but further, the fundamental self-evident principle 
 of liational Benevolence, by means of which this 
 service has been rendered to Common Sense, 
 turns out to furnish also the rational basis for 
 the competing ethical theory of Utilitarianism or 
 Universalistic Hedonism. Utilitarianism is now 
 
64 
 
 A PRIMER OF ETHICS 
 
 seen to rest on a fundamental Intuition, and thus 
 the effort of unifying thought which has succeeded 
 in systematising Common Sense, has also accom- 
 plished a further great constructive achievement 
 — the unification, namely, of Intuitionism and 
 the Utilitarianism of Mill and Bentham, which 
 had been regarded as thoroughly antagonistic to 
 each other. It is now seen that, as far as human 
 conduct is concerned, Virtue is the best means 
 to the General Happiness, and the principle 
 of Benevolence is the root and support of all the 
 virtues.^ 
 
 1 Read Mf thuds of Ethics, pp. xvi-xxi. 
 
 CHAFIER VI 
 
 ETHICS AND POLITICS 
 
 It has been pointed out above that while Ethics 
 and Politics cover the whole region of conduct, 
 of what ought to bo done, Ethics is concerned 
 with good or right conduct for individuals, and 
 Politics with good or right government — it treats 
 of the proper functions and constitution of 
 government in an ordered political society. 
 
 It seems clear that the relation between Ethics 
 and Politics is such that they touch at innumer- 
 able points, and that unless there is some Common 
 Measure which can be applied in the two depart- 
 ments, hopeless confusion of thought must result. 
 It is perhaps not untrue to facts to say that 
 ordinary morality is mostly of the Dogmatic- 
 Intuitionist type already explained, while the 
 end usually adopted in Politics is the General 
 Happiness, which principle, as we have seen, is 
 shown by Philosophic Intuitionism to underlie 
 and support Common Sense Morality (Dogmatic 
 Intuitionism). Politics, indeed, is consciously 
 
 C5 5 
 
66 
 
 A PRIMER OF ETHICS 
 
 ''utilitarian," and if Common-Sense Morality 
 were not unconsciously aiming at the same end (the 
 General Good interpreted as General Happiness), 
 our ethical and political action would be even 
 more inconsistent than it is, our ordinary ethical 
 and political thought even more confused. It is 
 surely indispensable that any satisfactory theory 
 of Ethics should have a corresponding theory of 
 Politics, and that any theory of Politics should 
 be considered in relation to Ethics. Further, 
 that the two should be harmonious ; for unless 
 they have a common principle, and the same 
 conception of ultimate human good, how can 
 they pretend to divide between them, and to 
 recrulate without inconsistency, the whole region 
 of human conduct ? 
 
 " It is the business of government, by laying 
 
 down and enforcing laws, to regulate the outward 
 
 conduct of the governed, not in one department 
 
 only, but in all their social relations, so far as 
 
 such conduct is a proper subject for coercive rules. 
 
 And not only ought this regulation to be in 
 
 harmony with morality— for obviously people 
 
 ought not to be compelled to do what they ought 
 
 not to do— but further, to an important extent 
 
 the Law of a man's state will properly determine 
 
 the details of his moral duty, even beyond the 
 
 sphere of legal enforcement. Thus we commonly 
 
 ETHICS AND POLITICS 
 
 67 
 
 regard it as an individuaPs moral duty, under the 
 head of Justice, to 'give every man his own,' 
 even when, through some accident, the other 
 party has not the power of legally enforcing his 
 right ; but still, in considering what is the other's 
 'own,' we assume him generally to be guided 
 by the law of his state ; if that were changed, 
 his moral duty would change with it. Similarly, 
 the mutual moral duties of husbands and wives, 
 and of children and parents, will vary in detail 
 with the variations in their legal relations." 
 
 " If we consider the relation of Ethics to Politics 
 from a Utilitarian point of view, the question, 
 What rules of conduct for the governed should 
 be fixed by legislators and applied by judges ? 
 will be determined by the same kind of forecast 
 of consequences as will be used in settling all 
 questions of private morality : we shall endeavour 
 to estimate and balance against each other the 
 effects of such rules on the general happiness. 
 In so far, however, as we divide the Utilitarian 
 theory of private conduct from that of legislation, 
 and ask which is prior, the answer would seem 
 to be different in respect of different parts of the 
 legal code. 
 
 "1. To a great extent the rules laid down 
 in a utilitarian code of law will be such as any 
 man, sincerely desirous of promoting the general 
 
68 
 
 A PRIMER OF ETHICS 
 
 ETHICS AxND POLITICS 
 
 69 
 
 happiness, would generally endeavour to observe, 
 even if they were not legally binding. Of this 
 kind is the rule of not inflicting any bodily harm 
 or gratuitous annoyance on any one, except in 
 self-defence or as retribution for wrong ; the rule 
 of not interfering with another's pursuit of the 
 means of happiness, or with his enjoyment of 
 wealth acquired by his own labour or the free 
 consent of others ; the rule of fulfilling all engage- 
 ments freely entered into with any one- at any 
 rate unless the fulfilment were harmful to others, 
 or much more harmful to oneself than beneficial 
 to him, or unless there were good grounds for 
 supposing that the other party would not perform 
 his share of a bilateral contract— and the rule 
 of supporting one's children while helpless, and 
 one's parents if decrepit, and of educating one's 
 children suitably to their future life. As regards 
 such rules as these, Utilitarian Ethics seems inde- 
 pendent of Politics, and naturally prior to it ; 
 we first consider what conduct is right for private 
 individuals, and then to how much of this they 
 can advantageously be compelled by legal penalties. 
 "2. There are other rules, again, which it is 
 clearly for the general happiness to observe, if 
 only their observance is enforced on ^others, e.g, 
 abstinence from personal retaliation of injuries, 
 and a more general and unhesitating fulfilment 
 
 of contracts than would perhaps be expedient if 
 they were not legally enforced. 
 
 " 3. But again, in the complete determination 
 of the mutual claims of members of society to 
 services and forbearances, there are many points 
 on which the utilitarian theory of right private 
 conduct, apart from law, would lead to a consider- 
 able variety of conclusions, from the great differ- 
 ence in the force of the relevant considerations 
 under different circumstances ; while at the same 
 time uniformity is either indispensable, to prevent 
 disputes and disappointments, or at least highly 
 desirable, in order to maintain effectively such 
 rules of conduct as are ^^^m%— though not 
 universalhj — expedient. Under this head would 
 come the exacter definition of the limits of appro- 
 priation — e.g, as regards property in literary 
 compositions and technical inventions — and a 
 large part of the law of inheritance, and of the 
 law regulating the family relations. 
 
 " Positive Law and Positive Morahty may be 
 distinguished by their respective sanctions. But 
 they also differ importantly, regarded merely as 
 intelligible systems : since in the former case 
 doubts as to what u law may be authoritatively 
 removed by judicial interpretation, and divergences 
 between what is and what ought to be law may 
 be removed by legislation. But with morality it 
 
70 
 
 A PRIMER OF ETHICS 
 
 is otherwise ; hence there is much greater conflict, 
 vagueness, and uncertainty in the estabhshed 
 moral code than in the established law. Positive 
 morahty limits importantly the action of govern- 
 ment ; on the other hand, positive morality is to 
 some extent modifiable by the legislator. Positive 
 morality is, further, politically important, for the 
 repression by censure of various kinds of mis- 
 chievous acts which cannot so well be repressed 
 by legal penalties, and for the encouragement by 
 approbation of beneficent acts.*" ^ 
 
 It being assumed that the ultimate aim of 
 government is to promote the happiness of the 
 governed, we may further inquire by what prin- 
 ciples governmental interference for the promotion 
 of this end should be regulated. 
 
 There are three such principles recognised and 
 used in Politics, viz. : 
 
 (1) The Individuahstic. 
 
 (2) The Paternal. 
 
 (3) The Socialistic. 
 
 (1) The Individualistic (or Laisser faire) prin- 
 ciple is that governmental interference should 
 aim chiefly at the prevention of mutual inter- 
 ference between the members of the governed 
 
 » The above account of the relation between Ethics and 
 Politics is quoted from Professor Sidgwick's Methods of 
 Ethics, pp. 16 and 457, and Elements of Politics, p. xviii. 
 
 ETHICS AND POLITICS 
 
 71 
 
 community, and with this object in view should 
 endeavour to maintain Personal Security, Rights 
 of Property, and Fulfilment of Contract— not 
 simply with a view to securing Freedom and 
 limiting coercion, but primarily for the prevention 
 of injury and annoyance. 
 
 It is never proposed to apply Laisser faire to 
 classes of the community who are unable to take 
 care of themselves ; hence, even on Individualistic 
 principles, children and those who are not of sound 
 mind have to be provided for. In particular this 
 provision is of the highest importance in the case of 
 children, since the whole future of the community 
 depends upon their existence and well-being. 
 
 (2) On the Paternal principle, government inter- 
 feres with individuals for their own good. 
 
 (3) On the Socialistic principle, people are 
 forced to contribute money or positive services 
 for the good of others. 
 
 Governmental interference for the protection of 
 children, of miners (by requiring the use of safety 
 lamps, etc.), of sailors (by condemning unsea- 
 worthy ships and so on), is of the paternal kind. 
 Prominent cases in England of Socialistic inter- 
 ference on the part of government are the Poor 
 Law, Education Rates, and Old Age Pensions. 
 
 In all these (especially the first and third) it 
 is obvious that one person is taxed for the benefit 
 
72 
 
 A PRIMER OF ETHICS 
 
 of another. It may be noted that in most govern- 
 ments there is a mixture of the three principles, 
 the Individualistic of course predominating. 
 Professor Sidgwick points out that Individualism, 
 or Laisserjaire, is based on two assumptions, the 
 one that each person is the best guardian of his 
 own interests (this excludes Paternalism), the 
 otncr, that what is for the interest of the in- 
 dividual agent is also for the good of the whole 
 community (this excludes Socialism). The two 
 assumptions are to a great extent true, but there 
 are many cases in which they do not hold, and in 
 which it appears to make for the general happi- 
 ness that Laisser faire should give way to Social 
 or Paternal action on the part of government. 
 
 In order that all this (and other) governmental 
 business may be carried on there must be a 
 Legislative body or organ for the making and 
 amending of laws, a Judicial organ for the appli- 
 cation of existing law to particular cases, an 
 Executive organ to guard against law-breaking 
 and to carry out the decisions of the Judicial 
 organ, and moreover to manage relations with 
 foreign states, and to levy taxes, in order to 
 provide for the governmental expenditure neces- 
 sarily involved in all the business above indicated, 
 including in most cases the maintenance of an 
 
 army 
 
 and 
 
 navy. 
 
 ETHICS AND POLITICS 
 
 73 
 
 Into the constitution of the different organs, 
 and their relations to one another, it is not 
 possible to enter here ; indeed I have only trenched 
 thus far on the domain of Politics in order that 
 the ethical outlook on human conduct may not 
 be left with a " ragged edge,'' but may be rounded 
 off and completed by a brief glance into the 
 adjoining region of governmental action. 
 
ETHICAL VOCABULARY! 
 
 Altruism— Care for the good of others. 
 
 Aversion— Impulse from ward ; impulse to avoid ; the antithesis 
 of Desire. 
 
 Axioms— An Axiom "should be : (I) stated in clear and precise 
 terms ; (2) really self-evident ; (3) not conflicting with any other 
 truth ; (4) supported by an adequate consensus of exi^erts." (M.) 
 
 Benevolence — prescribes promotion of others' happiness. 
 
 Cardinal Virtues— The "Cardinal Virtues" commonly so 
 called are : (1) Wisdom ; (2) Courage or Fortitude ; (3) Temper- 
 ance or Self-control ; (4) Justice or Uprightness. 
 
 These four were recognised by Plato as of chief importance 
 under the names : (1) tppovtiam or ao^Ca ; (2) avSpeCa ; (3) <rta^po<ruuri ; 
 
 (4) SiKaioavvrj, 
 
 See also above, chap. iv. But the term Cardinal was first used 
 by St. Ambrose (a.d. 340—397). See (H), pp. 133-4. 
 
 Casuistry—** (1) The systematic discussion of the application 
 of moral law to particular cases (called ' cases of conscience ') 
 in which such application is not clear and certain ; (2) the 
 over-subtle or verbal discussion of the moral equality of par- 
 ticular acts or sentiments, especially when tending towards 
 greater moral laxity than is permitted by the dominant moral 
 opinion of the time, or by the unsophisticated individual con- 
 science " (Baldwin's Dictionari/). Compare (H), p. 151, etc. 
 
 Categorical Imperative— is an unconditional rule, a command 
 which enjoins an action as binding under all circumstances ; c.^r., 
 ** Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. " According to Kant, 
 there is only one Categorical Imperative, which is : Act always 
 so that thou canst will the maxim of thy action to be law 
 universal. 
 
 » (M) stands for Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics. 
 (H) stiinda for Sidgwick's Outlines of Uistory of Ethics, 
 
 75 
 
76 
 
 A PRIMER OF ETHICS 
 
 Character—" is only known to us through its manifestation in 
 conduct ; and I conceive that in our common recognition of 
 Virtue as having value in itself, we do not ordinarily distinguish 
 character from conduct : we do not raise the qtiestion whether 
 character is to be valued for the sake of the conduct in which 
 it is manifested, or conduct for the sake of the character that 
 it exhibits and developes." (M.) 
 
 Classification of Virtues and Duties— In Classification we are 
 concerned with the relations of a number of classes. The 
 function of a classification is to systematise objects classified ; 
 a classification starts with multiplicity and reduces it to unity 
 or system. Virtues and Duties are sometimes classified under 
 the heads of Social (or Extra-regarding) and Self -regarding ; 
 sometimes as more or less important or more or less compre- 
 hensive ; sometimes as being of a more or less (1) intellectual 
 or (2) volitional nature. 
 
 Common Morality, or Common-Sense Morality -The judg- 
 ments of right and wrong which the Common Sense of mankind 
 seems intuitively to pronounce (M)— c.fjr., Do Justice, Speak 
 Truth, Obey the Law. 
 
 Conscience— The facility that apprehends duty or moral 
 quality— the Moral Faculty. *' The principle in man by which 
 he approves or disapproves of his heart, temi^er, and actions " 
 (Butler). It is sometimes sjjoken of as a Moral Sense [e.g. by 
 Shaftesbury, for whom the MorrJ Faculty is a "reflex sensi- 
 bility" of Avhich the objects a»c actions and aflfections) (H); 
 sometimes as a faculty of Practical reason {e.g. by Butler, 
 according to whom " Practico,l precepts are precepts the rea&on 
 of which we see"). Conscience is sometimes supposed to 
 apprehend the moral quality of particular acts, sometimes that 
 of general rules and fundamental principles. 
 
 Demerit (111 Desert)— That in character or conduct which 
 deserves blame or punishment. 
 
 Desire— Impulse towards ; craving or longing for : the hungry 
 man, e.g.^ desires food. 
 
 Determinism and Libertarianism— " The question at issue in 
 the Free Will controversy may Ixj stated thus : Is the self to 
 which I refer my deliberate volitions a self of strictly determinate 
 moral qualities, a definite character partly inherited, partly 
 formed by my past actions and feelings, and by any physical 
 influences that it may have unconsciously received ; so that my 
 
 ETHICAL VOCABULARY 
 
 T7 
 
 voluntary action, for good or for evil, is at any moment com- 
 pletely caused by the determinate qualities of this character, 
 together with my circumstances, or the external influences acting 
 on me at the moment— including under this latter term my 
 present bodily conditions [this is Determinism]— or is there 
 always a possibility of my choosing to act in the manner 
 that I now judge to be reasonable and right, whatever my 
 previous actions and experiences may have been?" [this is 
 Libertarianism]. (M.) 
 
 Disinterested Action— is "action disregardful of foreseen 
 balance of pleasure to ouraelves." (M.) 
 
 Dualism of the Practical Reason — The view that there are 
 two chief or superior principles in the nature of man (viz. 
 Rational Self-love, and Conscience or Rational Benevolence), each 
 of which we are under a manifest obligation to obey. (See p. 25. ) 
 
 Duties — are " Right acts, for the adequate performance of 
 which a moral motive is at least occasionally necessary. Virtu- 
 ous conduct includes the performance of duties as well as 
 praiseworthy acts that are thought to go beyond strict duty, 
 and that may even 'be beyond the power of some to perform. 
 In the recognition of conduct as 'right' is involved an 
 authoritative prescription to do it." (M.) 
 
 Egoism (Ethical) — In the widest sense, any doctrine which 
 takes the good of the agent (however interpreted) as the end 
 of action. It is, however, frequently used as synonymous with 
 Egoistic Hedonism, which again is often called by the name 
 Epicureanism. 
 
 Ends—" There are two prima facie rational Ends, Perfection 
 and Happiness : of which the latter at least may be sought for 
 oneself or universally. " (M.) 
 
 Epicureanism— See Hedonism^ Egoistic; see History of Ethics, 
 chap. ii. 
 
 Ethical— (^fliKos) has the same meaning as Moral (moralis). 
 
 Ethics and Politics—" are distinguished from positive sciences 
 by having as their special and primary object to determine 
 what ought to be, and not to ascertain what merely is. 
 
 " Ethics aims at determining what ought to be done by 
 individuals, while Politics aims at determining what the 
 government of a state or political society ought to do and 
 how it ought to be constituted. 
 
 *' Ethics is (1) sometimes considered as an investigation of the 
 
78 
 
 A PRIMER OF ETHICS 
 
 true Moral laws or rational precepts of Conduct [Jural view] ; 
 sometimes (2) as an inquiry into the nature of the ultimate 
 End of reasonable human action, anciently known as the Bonuni, 
 or Summum Bonum." (M.) (1) is called Independent, and (2) 
 Dependent Ethics. 
 
 Absohite Ethics— According to H. Spencer, Absolute Ethics 
 is Ethics which formulates normal conduct in an ideal society. 
 
 Relative j&^A/cs— According to H. Spencer, Relative Ethics 
 is a system of morals which recognises man's present imperfec- 
 tions and allows for them. 
 
 Evolutional Ethics— Thinkers of this school— c.r;. Herbert 
 Spencer— tend to substitute : '* (1) for hakmce of pleasure over 
 pain some more objective biological conception— such as the 
 preservation of human society or of the human race ; or, still more 
 generally, quantity of life— as the end by conducivenass to which 
 actions and characters are to be estimated ; (2) for empirical 
 utilitarian reasoning an attempt to deduce moral rules from 
 biological or sociological laws. " Spencer considers that * ' conduct 
 tending to the preservation of life is only good ... on the 
 assumption that life is attended with a surplus of agreeable 
 feeling,'' and " appears to hold that, for ethical purposes, actions 
 conducive to maximimi quantity of life and actions conducive 
 to maximum quantity of agreeable feeling, may be taken to 
 coincide." (H), pp. 255, 256. 
 
 Existence, Origin, and Validity of Ethical Intuitions— That 
 men have apparent cognicions, or intuitions, of what is right 
 and wrong in character and conduct is undisputed. It may be 
 questioned how far these existent cognitions are valid; but it 
 can be shown that validity is not dependent uix)n origin. 
 
 Formal and Material—" An act is formally right if the agent 
 in willing is moved by pure desire to fulfil duty, or chooses 
 duty for duty's sake ; materially right if he intends the right 
 particular effects." (M.) 
 
 Broadly speaking. Formal = General, and Material = Par- 
 ticular. 
 
 Freedom of Will-may mean : " (1) The general power of 
 choosing among different alternatives of action without a 
 motive, or against the resultant force of conflicting motives ; 
 (2) The power of choice between the promptings of reason and 
 those of appetites (or other non-rational impulses) ; (3) Merely 
 the quality of acting rationally in spite of conflicting impulses, 
 
 ETHICAL VOCABULARY 
 
 79 
 
 however strong — the nan posse peccare of the mediaeval theo- 
 logians." (H.) 
 
 Good: 
 
 Good as E7id—{\J\tim&te Good, Good without qualification, 
 the Highest or Chief Good, the Bonum or Summum Bonum, 
 Good-in-itself) is what ought to be approved, or what it is 
 reasonable to desire or promote. We may distinguish : 
 
 Goodness of Will = the intention to do right, subjective Tight- 
 ness = Virtue or moral goodness in the narrow or subjective 
 sense. liight is primarily applicable to actions. 
 
 Goodness of Feeling = Happiness. 
 
 Goodness of Cognition = Truth = What we ought to believe. 
 Truth is properly predicable of assertions only. 
 
 jEsthetic Goodness— is Beauty : any object of contemplation 
 that has beauty of whatever kind, is aesthetically good, is what we 
 ought to admire. We speak of beauty of character, and the beauty 
 of truth, as well as of beauty of sound or of visual objects, etc. 
 
 Moral Goodness, in the full sense, includes subjective rightness 
 (the will to do right) conjoined with objective rightness (the 
 true view of what is right). 
 
 Good—** was the fundamental ethical conception in the Greek 
 schools of Moral Philosophy generally ; including even the 
 Stoics, though their system, from the prominence that it gives 
 to the conception of Natural Law, forms a transitional link 
 between ancient and modern ethics." (M)— See pp. 1, 2, 63, 64. 
 
 Good as Means — See above, p. 11. 
 
 Happiness— is Pleasure and the absence of Pain. 
 
 Habit and Custom— Habit is a Uniformity (or tendency to 
 uniformity) of action in an individual resulting from past re- 
 petition. Custom is general usage — the habit of a Society. 
 
 Hedonism (Ethical)— The doctrine that Happiness is the 
 Ultimate Good. 
 
 Hedonism (Egoistic)— The doctrine that the agent's own 
 Happiness is his ethical end or Ultimate Good. 
 
 Hedonism (Universalistic) (or Rational Hedonism, or Utili- 
 tarianism)— *' The ethical theory that the conduct which under 
 any given circumstances is objectively right, is that which will 
 produce the greatest amount of happiness on the 2vhole.'^ (M.) 
 
 Hedonism (Psychological)— The doctrine that the only thing 
 which any man can or does desire is his own Pleasure and 
 freedom from Pain. 
 
80 
 
 A PRIMER OF ETHICS 
 
 ETHICAL VOCABULARY 
 
 81 
 
 Hypothetical Imperative— A rule or command which is con- 
 ditional— i.e. deix«.ndent on the acceptance of some end, a 
 means to which is formulated by the rule. 
 
 "Idealism" in Ethics.— "When we . . . inquire into the re- 
 lation of Ethics to Metaphysics, we may either start with 
 metaphysical conceptions . . . and note the point at which we 
 jjass over to ethical conceptions, or we may start with ethical 
 conceptions and consider how it is possible or logical to pass 
 from them to " [metaphysical conceptions]. " The former is the 
 method of the metaphysical moralists ; the latter the method 
 of the ethical metaphysicians" [or "ethical idealists"]. (Pro- 
 fessor Sorlcy, in Philosophical, Rci'iew for Septeml^er 1905.) 
 
 Interest- A man's " interest " means his own happiness. 
 
 Intention— '• It is best to include under the term Intention 
 all the consequences of an act that are foreseen as certain or 
 probable." (M.) 
 
 Intuitionism— The fimdaraental assumption of Intuitionisra 
 is that we have the power of seeing clearly what actions are in 
 themselves right and reasonable. 
 
 Perceptional Intuitionisvi—ln this form of Intuitionism it is 
 always the rightness of some particular action that is held to be 
 immediately known. 
 
 Dogmatic Intuit ionism—Acceiits as axiomatic the general 
 rules of Common-Sense Morality. 
 
 Philosophical Intuitionism— Xttemiit a to find a deeper ex- 
 planation for these current rules. 
 
 Esthetic Intuitionism—'' regards Virtues as excellences of con- 
 duct clearly di.scernible by trained insight, although their nature 
 does not admit of being stated in definite formulae." (M.) 
 
 Jurisprudence— The Science of Law. 
 
 Justice— See pp. 53 flf. 
 
 Kantianism— The ethical doctrine of Kant may be called 
 Philosophic Intuitionism. He regards the Moral Faculty as 
 Practical Reason, and accepts as unconditionally valid the 
 Categorical Imperative: "Act so that thou canst will the 
 maxim of thy action to be law universal." He holds that this 
 carries its own authority with it, and considers that from it may 
 be deduced all the commonly accepted moral rules, such as 
 those which enjoin repayment of debts, and helping others in 
 distress. (Other forms in which ho expresses the Categorical 
 Imperative are : (1) Act so as to treat humanity in tiiyself or 
 
 any other, as an end always, and never as a means only ; (2) 
 The ends of any subject, which is an end in himself, ought as far 
 as possible to be my ends also, if the conception of him as an 
 end in himself is to have its full effect with me.) 
 
 There is, Kant says, nothing unconditionally good except the 
 Good Will — i.e. the will to act in accordance with the Cate- 
 gorical Imperative, from the moral motive. For moral action 
 Freedom is necessary, and, in fact, it is on the moral conscious- 
 ness that our belief in freedom of will rests — Ought implies Can. 
 Duty for Duty's sake is the right end. Pleasure or Happiness 
 is the end of natural non-moral inclination. The right end of 
 action for oneself is Moral Perfection, or Rationality; for 
 others their Happiness; but the Highest (human) Good is 
 Happiness under the condition of being morally worthy of it. 
 "We must postulate a cosmical order in which the demand for 
 happiness, as merited by duty, finds satisfaction, and this 
 involves a belief in God and a hereafter which rests on an 
 ethical basis alone." (H.) 
 
 Law and Morality — "The ideal distinction taken in common 
 thought between legal and merely moral rules seems to lie in 
 the connection of the former with punishment : we think that 
 there are some things which a man ought to be compelled to 
 do, or forbear, and others which he ought to do or forbear 
 without compulsion, and that the former alone fall properly 
 within the sphere of law." (M.) 
 
 Merit (good desert) — That in character or conduct which 
 deserves praise or reward. 
 
 Method of Ethics— A Method of Ethics means "any rational 
 procedure by which we determine what individual human beings 
 * ought ' — or what is * right ' for them —to do, or to seek to 
 realise by voluntary action. " (M. ) 
 
 Moral Sense — A name sometimes used for the Moral Faculty. 
 According to Shaftesbury it means the sense of right and \vrong, 
 and indicates a feeling in the individual which accompanies right 
 or wrong action or disposition. 
 
 Hutcheson describes the Moral Sense as a superior sense by 
 which we perceive pleasure in the contemplation of the good 
 actions of others, etc. (Baldwin's Dictionary). 
 
 Moral and Quasi-Moral Sentiment— Suppose that a person 
 who is in the habit of Law-observance, and who has a strong 
 sentiment of law-abidingness, becomes convinced that in certain 
 
 6 
 
82 
 
 A PRIMER OF ETHICS 
 
 ETHICAL VOCABULARY 
 
 83 
 
 existing circumstances he oiiglit not to observe the Law. His 
 sentiment in favour of the particular breach of Law which lie 
 now thinks rirjht will be a Moral Sentiment, and liis repugnance 
 to this breach of the rule of Law-observance will be a Quasi- 
 Moral Sentiment. 
 
 Motive— may mean : (1) those among the foreseen consequences 
 of any act which the agent desired, in willing ; (2) the desire 
 of those foreseen consequences, the conscious impulse itself. (M.) 
 
 Nature, Natural— Tliis notion is highly ambiguous, and in 
 none of its senses is it capable of furnishing an ethical first 
 principle. See Methods of Ethics, Bk 1. chap. vi. § 2. 
 
 Objective — By conduct objectively right is meant conduct 
 which is judged to be right by all who think truly, or aa they 
 ought to think, on the matter. (See Subjective.) 
 
 Obligation, Legal— "The relation of a general rule or com- 
 mand, enforced by the authority of government, to the member 
 or members of the community whose civil conduct it is intended 
 to control." (Sidgwick, Elements of Politics.) 
 
 Optimism— The view that life normally, and on the whole, is 
 attended with a balance of pleasure over pain. (H.) 
 
 Ought, Right— " The fundamental notion represented by the 
 word 'ought' or 'right,' which moral judgments contain 
 expressly or by implication, is essentially different from all 
 notions representing facts of physical or psychical experience. 
 In its strictest ethical use it is unanalysable ; it is assumed to 
 be objectively valid ; and judgments in which it is used, when 
 they relate to the future conduct of the person judging, are 
 accompanied by a special kind of impulse to action. 
 
 "In the narrowest ethical sense what we judge ought to be 
 done, is always thought capable of being brought about by the 
 volition of any individual to whom the judgment applies. . . 
 In a wider sense ... I sometimes judge that I 'ought' to 
 know what a wiser man would know, or feel as a better man 
 would feel in my place, though I may know that I could not 
 directly produce in myself such knowledge or feeling by any 
 effort of Will." (M.) 
 
 Pain— is Feeling which in itself is undesirable, and which 
 stimulates to actions tending to remove or avert it. (M.) 
 
 Perfection— as ethical end, may be used as including excellence 
 of Will, of Cognition, and of Feeling. It is however more 
 commonlv confined to Moral Excellence. 
 
 Perfectionism— " The essential feature of Perfectionism, as 
 taught by the late T. H. Green and his disciples, is that it 
 makes the sumrnyim bonuin not a definite object or condition 
 v/hich can be gained and possessed, but an ideal well-being 
 which is never absolutely achievable, though capable of nearer 
 and nearer approximation. [' Of what ultimate well-being may 
 be we are unable to say anything but that it must be the 
 complete fulfilment of our capabilities.'] We cannot assert that 
 any one kind of activity or sta-te of existence is ultimately good. 
 What we mean by good is something more than our ancestors 
 meant by it, something less than our posterity will mean by it. 
 We have all used the concept of good, but its content has 
 become fuller, and in some respects different, with the progress 
 of ages. Even within the limits of individual experience a 
 development something like this takes place. The idea of good, 
 originally vague, ' gradually creates its own tilling ' ; 'it is 
 not like that of a pleasure which a man retains from an ex- 
 perience which he has had and would like to have again.' The 
 desire for good 'acting in us to begin with aa a demand whicli 
 is ignorant of what will satisfy itself, only arrives at a more 
 definite consciousness of its own nature through reflection on 
 its own creations— on habits and institutions and modes of life 
 which, as a demand not reflected upon, it has brought into 
 being.' The desire for good cannot bo satisfied by merely 
 external advantages ; nor by any sum of pleasures ; nor by 
 increase of knowledg?. It needs the completest activity for 
 human faculty, such as only can be realised in a perfect society 
 of rational, self-conscious persons. Towards this society we 
 are tending. Laws, science, art, religion, are, so to speak, the 
 incarnations of good. But for the individual, mere compliance 
 with the formal requirements of these social products does not 
 constitute good. For him the good lies, as Kant taught, in the 
 good-will. His good is to seek the good as far as he knows it. 
 
 No good i3 certain, but the stoadfusfc mind, 
 Tho undividea will to seek the good. 
 
 Yet for each of us the social arrangements are the true guide 
 to what is good." (Ry land's Ethics.) Compare Green, Frule- 
 gomena to Ethics, p. 330, etc. See above, Moral Goodness. 
 
 Pessimism— The view that human life is on tlie whole more 
 painful than i)lea sural >le. (IL) 
 
84 
 
 A TRIMER OF ETHICS 
 
 Pleasure— i8 Feeling which in itself is desirable, and which 
 is apprehended aa desirable by the sentient individual at the 
 time of feeling it. (M.) 
 
 Politics— See Ethics and Politics. 
 
 Positive Morality — The code of moral rules imposed on an 
 individual by the public opinion of the community to which he 
 belongs. (M.) 
 
 Practical Wisdom— "The virtue of Practical Wisdom compre- 
 hends all others, so far as virtuous conduct in each department 
 necessarily results from a clear knowledge and choice of the true 
 ultimate end or ends of action, and of the best means to the 
 attainment of such end or ends." (M.) 
 
 Pragmatism— The view thr.t "the whole * meaning' of a 
 conception expresses itself in Practical Consequences — that 
 Truth is due to Practical Adjustments, and that the System 
 of Truths is developed by the selection of Concrete Relation- 
 ships which ' work.- Pragmatism is an attempt to construe all 
 reality as empirical science." (Baldwin's Dictionary.) 
 
 "The central position of the pragmatist jihilosophy . . . 
 is that truth and usefulness are identical." (G. A. Bir- 
 mingham.) 
 
 Psychology — " deals with voluntary action and its springs, and 
 with moral sentiments and judgments, as actual phenomena of 
 individual human minds." (M.) 
 
 Punishment— Pain inflicted as recompense for the breach of 
 some rule, command, or requirement, {^e Sanction.) Punish- 
 ment may be regarded as : (1) Retributive, as paying out the 
 offender ; (2) Reparative, i.e. as compensating the person in- 
 jured ; or (3) as Deterrent : («) to the offender (when it may be 
 either Reformatory or Disabling) ; (6) to others. 
 
 Rational Benevolence — bids us provide for others the greatest 
 possible amount of Happiness on the whole. (M.) 
 
 Rational Self-Love — Desire for one's own Happiness on the 
 whole. 
 
 Reasonable- Reasonable Conduct means conduct that ought 
 to be done. 
 
 Right— See Ought. 
 
 A llifjht — " is an obligation regarded from the point of view of 
 the jjerson to whom the obligation is intended to be useful." 
 (Sidgwick, Elements of Politics.) 
 
 Sanctions— By the Sanctions of any rule are meant the 
 
 ETHICAL VOCABULARY 
 
 85 
 
 pleasures consequent on conformity to it, and the pains con- 
 sequent on its violation. (M.) 
 
 Self-realisation (or Self-development)— is a notion too in- 
 definite to serve as ethical end. If the whole of Self is to hd 
 developed, there is no distinction between the good and bad 
 elements in Self. If part only is to be developed, what is the 
 
 criterion ? 
 
 Sociology—" deals with voluntary action and its springs, and 
 with moral sentiments and judgments, as manifested by normal 
 members of organised societies." (M.) 
 Springs of Action— See Motives. 
 
 Stoicism—The " philosophy of the porch" (o-roa) founded by 
 Zeno was a kind of pantheism, and its rule of action was : 
 Follow Nature— i.e. live in agreement with the divine nature 
 as manifested in the physical universe and in man. According 
 to Zeno, it is good volition that constitutes the essence of good 
 life, but joy and gladness are insejmrable accompaniments of 
 virtue, and the sage was supposed to remain " griefless " amid 
 the worst tortures. (H.) 
 
 Subjective— By conduct subjectively right is meant conduct 
 which is believed by the agent to be right. What is subjectively 
 right may be objectively wrong. (See Objective.) 
 
 Truth— is what we ought to believe. Any proposition is true 
 which asserts a connection between attributes which co-exist (or 
 are) in the subject of predication. 
 
 Utilitarianism (or Rational Hedonism, or UniversaUstic 
 Hedonism)— The ethical doctrine according to which the General 
 Happiness is the right end of action. This doctrine was ac- 
 cepted simply and without attempt at justification by Bentham, 
 who was also a Psychological Hedonist, and likewise held the 
 view that the conduct which conduces to the General Happiness 
 is coincident with that which conduces to the Happiness of 
 the agent. J. S. Mill accepted both (1) Utilitarianism, and (2) 
 Psychological Hedonism, and attempted to prove (1) by (2) 
 (see above, chap. v.). Mill, however, also held that pleasures 
 differ in kind or quality as well as in quantity. He explains 
 Justice as Resentment moralised. Professor Sidgwick's view 
 is given in brief outline in chap. v. above. 
 
 Virtue— Moral Excellence or Perfection, the qualities of 
 conduct and character which men commend and admire. 
 " Virtues, as commonly recognised, are manifested primarily in 
 
86 
 
 A PRIMER OF ETHICS 
 
 volitions to produce particular right cffecta, which must at 
 least be thought by the agent to be not wrong; but for the 
 completeness of some virtues the i)resence of certain emotions 
 seems necessar}'." (M.) 
 
 Virtue and Duty — Good or excellent actions are not implied 
 to bo in our power in the same strict sense as ** right " actions ; 
 and, in fact, there are many excellences of behaviour which 
 we cannot attain by any efifort of will, at least directly and at 
 the moment. (M. ) 
 
 Virtuous cliaracter— is manifested in voluntary actions, so 
 far as intentional. (M.) 
 
 Worth, Merit, etc.— "The distinctive characteristic of ' merit ' 
 is primarily claim to reward (or comjiensation for effort) as 
 attaching to the conduct of a human Ixjing (or something else 
 jiersonified). But as etliical ideas and sentijuents grow more 
 refined, it is recognised that for the highest merit the only 
 appropriate reward is just the recognition of the quality of 
 goodness in the •meritorious ' conduct, together with emotional 
 concomitants of such recognition — love and admiration, and 
 their expression in praise and gratitude. 
 
 "In this way, the notion of reward falling into the back- 
 ground, 'merit ' comes to be hardly distinguishable from worth 
 — which, again, is not distinguished from ' goodness ' viewed 
 especially as a quality admitting of degrees." (H. Sidgwick, in 
 Baldwin's Dictiona nj. ) 
 
 1. 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 "Ethics is the science of conduct." Define the word 
 
 "science" in this connection and show which logical form its 
 reasonings naturally assume. 
 
 2. What do you understand by EiUc^^ Compare Lthics 
 
 with : 
 
 (a) Psychology; 
 
 (6) Natural Science ; 
 
 (c) Politics. , , . 1 r 1. 
 
 3 Is there any ultimate limitation to the kind of human 
 activities with which moral judgments are concerned ? Explain 
 how far you consider that moral judgments are implied in 
 such expressions as " good poet," " good mathematician. 
 
 "good citizen." , , ., • ^« 
 
 4 In what sense is it correct to say that the science of 
 Ethics is concerned witli what ought to be, rather than with 
 what is ? How far do you consider the distinction thus ex- 
 pressed to be a valid one ? . 
 
 5 In what sense and to what extent can any science which 
 investigates what u throw light upon the question what omjU 
 
 to be^ 
 
 6. What is meant by a Method of Ethics? How many 
 
 Methods of Ethics are there ? . , , 
 
 7 Can you suggest any explanation of the fact that men can 
 and do ask : Why should I do what I see to be right ? 
 
 8. What do you understand by ijood\ Distingmsh between 
 
 rifjld and good. i ui^ « 
 
 9. What is meant by saying that ougU is unanalysable ? 
 
 10. What is the proper object of moral judgment ? 
 
 11. Give reasons for and against the view that there is nothing 
 ultimately good except some mode of consciousness. 
 
 87 
 
88 
 
 A PRIMER OF ETHICS 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 89 
 
 12. 
 
 relation between moral 
 judgments on actions. 
 
 What do you understand by : 
 
 (a) Ethical Judgment ; 
 
 (b) Ought ; 
 
 (c) Dictate of reason ; 
 {d) Motive and intention. 
 
 13. Distinguish and examine the 
 judgments on character and moral 
 Discuss, Avith reference to the latter, the different views con- 
 cerning what it is in an action that determines its moral quality. 
 
 14. Characterise Moral Emotion or Sentiment, and Ethical 
 Judgment ; and consider how far either implies the other. 
 
 15. Define a voluntary action. In what sense is the i^roper 
 sphere of moral praise and blame to be defined by reference to 
 such actions? 
 
 16. Criticise the phrase Moral Sense. Analyse the state of 
 mind of a virtuous man to whom some base but tempting 
 proposal is made, e.g. a bribe. 
 
 17. Distinguish "Intention" from "Motive." Consider the 
 question whether the primary objects of moral judgments are 
 actions, intentions, or motives. 
 
 " If another is about to do what he thinks right while we 
 believe it to be wrong, and we are able to bring other motives 
 to bear upon him that may overbalance his sense of duty, the 
 question arises whether we ought thus to tempt him to realise 
 what we believe to be objective rightness against his convictions.'' 
 What answer would you give to the question thus raised ? 
 
 18. Define Intention and Motive ; and examine the conse- 
 quences, in ethical theory, of making morality dejiend (1) wholly 
 upon Intention, and (2) wholly upon Motive. 
 
 19. "Duty is to be done for duty's sake." How far does 
 this statement suggest (a) a sufficient motive, (0) a definite 
 standard for right action ? 
 
 20. " The motive may be good when the intention is bad : 
 the intention may be good when the motive is bad." Explain 
 this, and give instances. 
 
 21. " In all desire self-satisfaction is sought." 
 Explain what this means, and inquire how far it is true. 
 
 22. "His motives were good." Discuss the meaning of this 
 proposition and its relevance to the truth of ethical judgments 
 upon an action. 
 
 23. Common language recognises that some actions of some 
 
 persons are done from "moral" motives. Analyse more 
 clearly the operation of such motives, distinguishing various 
 
 phases and elements. 
 
 24. Is Disinterested Benevolence a Psychological fact ? How 
 is Ethical Theory affected by the answer to this question? 
 
 25. Discuss the influence normally exercised by Pain and 
 Pleasure respectively, as motives to human action. 
 
 Examine the following statements : 
 
 (a) " Desiring a thing and finding it pleasant are ... in 
 
 strictness of language, two modes of naming the 
 same psychological fact." (Mill.) 
 
 (b) "In desire there is the presence of some motive, a 
 
 pleasure or a pain, and a state of conflict in itself 
 painful." [Bain.) 
 2G. Explain what is meant by Psychological Hedonism, distin- 
 guishing it carefully from Ethical Hedonism, and give reasons 
 for and against the acceptance of Psychological Hedonism. 
 
 27. Are 'religious sanctions essential to morality ? Consider 
 the following : (a) " The old immoral paradox, * that my per- 
 formance of Social Duty is good not for me but for others,' 
 cannot be completely refuted by empirical arguments." (b) 
 " Practical Reason postulates a Supreme Being . .^ . endowed 
 with the sovereign power of prescribing moral laws." 
 
 28. What do you understand by Freedom of Will ? 
 
 29. State the Argument for Determinism. 
 
 30. Compare the form of Psychological Hedonism which 
 accepts qualitative difiEerences among pleasures, with that which 
 
 denies such differences. 
 
 31^ *' Love Virtue, she alone is free." 
 
 " Vice is as free as Virtue." {Aristotle.) 
 In what senses of freedom can these propositions respectively 
 be true, and what is the relation of them to one another ? 
 
 32 One of the assumptions on which Laisser fairc rests is 
 " that the common welfare is likely to be best promoted by 
 individuals promoting their private interests intelligently. 
 Does this assumption require any qualification ? 
 
 33 Explain what is meant by the " Dualism of Practical 
 Reason " ; and examine the validity of the view expressed by 
 
 this phrase. ,..,•/ j 
 
 34 Classify emotions from an ethical point of view (as good, 
 high, better, higher ; or bad, low. less good, lower) ; and consider 
 
90 
 
 A PllIMER OF ETHICS 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 91 
 
 hov/ far such a classification can be taken as the basis of an 
 Ethical System. 
 
 35. What is meant by a "Sanction"? In what way is the 
 existence of Sanctions relevant to the question Avhat actions we 
 have reason to perform ? 
 
 36. What general characteristics distinguish the treatment 
 of Ethics in Ancient Greece from that in Modern Europe? 
 Illustrate by comparing Aristotle's system with any modern 
 system. 
 
 37. "To the virtuous man," says Aristotle, " virtuous actions 
 are pleasant." It may be replied, "Then the virtuous man 
 does what he likes just as mucli as the vicious man : and there 
 is no merit in doing what one likes ; therefore there is no merit 
 in virtue." Consider how this objection may best be answered 
 without repudiating Aristotle's statement. 
 
 38. What is Aristotle's conception of the End of Action ? 
 
 39. What conclusions are established in Aristotle's Ethics 
 as to the relations of Pleasure, Well-being, and Virtue ? 
 
 40. Give a short statement of Aristotle's account of Friend- 
 ship. 
 
 41. Carefully investigate Aristotle's doctrine of the Mean, 
 and discuss its truth and utility in the determination of the 
 Virtues. 
 
 42. Discuss in general tlie Etliical Method of Aristotle. 
 
 43. Take Aristotle's whole conception of Virtue, and compare 
 it with that of some other thinker. Or examine it in the light 
 of the modern notions of Duty, Self-sacrifice, and Benevolence. 
 
 44. Criticise Aristotle's list of Moral Virtues. On what 
 principle was it drawn up? 
 
 45. Is there any merit in doing what we like to do? 
 
 46. Illustrate Aristotle's doctrine of the Mean by reference to 
 his treatment of either Courage or Temi^erance ; and examine the 
 value of the doctrine for defining the exact nature of virtue. 
 
 47. It has been said that there is no regular progress in 
 morals. Test this assertion by comparing carefully the list of 
 special virtues recognised by (1) Aristotle, (2) Modern England. 
 
 48. What do you consider to be the place of Common Sense 
 in ethical theory? 
 
 41). " The moralist's function is to introduce form, clearness, 
 consistency, into the body of opinions, on practical matters, 
 commonly held by men.* Discuss this view of Ethics. 
 
 50. Explain Intuition ism, and distinguish between : 
 
 (1) Intuitive and Inductive ; 
 
 (2) Perceptional, Dogmatic, and Philosophical, Intui- 
 
 tionism. 
 
 51. Sketch and comment on the fundamental position of In- 
 
 tuitionist Ethics. 
 
 52. How far can (a) Ethical first principles, or [h) Moral rules, 
 be rationally determined by observation of, and induction from, 
 the phenomena of men's actual desires, purposes, and voluntary 
 
 actions? . 
 
 53. Distinguish different methods of ethical reasonmg to which 
 the term "intuitive" or ''intuitional" may be applied. 
 Illustrate by comparing the principles and methods of Clarke, 
 J. S. Mill, H. Sidgwick. 
 
 54. What place, if any, is to be assigned in Ethics to 
 the immediate perception of particular actions as Right or 
 
 Wrong? , , A A 
 
 55. Do you consider that morality can always be considered 
 as the self-realisation of the individual who is acting morally? 
 
 56. Give what you consider to be the best classification of 
 duties, from the utilitarian, or any other, point of view. 
 Examine the place (if any), in such a classification, of duties 
 (a) to the lower animals, and (6) to jwsterity. 
 
 57. How far is it possible to draw a clear line of distinction 
 between "intellectual" and " moral " virtues ? Illustrate by 
 reference to the following : fair-mindedness, remembrance of 
 obligations incurred, careful use of language. 
 
 58. Analyse the notion of Justice. 
 
 59. Can Justice be defined by means of the conception of 
 
 Equality? , , •, i.- * _ 
 
 60. Is it possible to derive a system of moral duties from 
 
 Kant's Categorical Imperative? 
 
 61. Examine the claims of Hedonists to make use of the 
 maxims of Common-Sense Morality. 
 
 62. Bring out critically the chief distinctions between the 
 Utilitarianism of Bentham, J. S. Mill, and Sidgwick. 
 
 63. Examine the cases, if any, in which it would be m your 
 opinion (i) excusable, (ii) right, for a man to break the law of 
 
 ^''Distinguish between Hypothetical and Categorical Im- 
 peratives. 
 
92 
 
 A rillMER OF ETHICS 
 
 r>5. Discuss the relation between Ethics and Politics. 
 
 C6. What do you consider to lie the projxir relation between 
 legislation and the promotion of morality ? 
 
 07. Ethics has been regarded as a part of Sociology, and 
 Sociology has been regarded as Applied Ethics. Discuss these 
 views. 
 
 C8. "Every man has freedom to do all that he wills, 
 provided that he infringes not the equal freedom of any 
 other man." Discuss this as a principle of (i) Politics, 
 (ii) Ethics. 
 
 69. Consider the iX)sition of one who says that he is a Utili- 
 tarian in Politics but not in Ethics. 
 
 70. Discuss (a) the part })layed by Resentment in the historical 
 development of moral notions and sentiments, and (6) the 
 legitimate scope of Resentment in moral conduct under the 
 conditions of modern society. 
 
 71. Exi>lain the meaning of "Self" in the expressions "Self- 
 love," "Self-sacrifice," "Self-realisation." 
 
 72. "Compulsory morality is no morality at all." Explain 
 and examine this. 
 
 73. State the Golden Rule, and discuss its value as a rule 
 of conduct. 
 
 74. What is the proper signification of the term Just as 
 applied to {a) a particular action, (6) a man's character, (c) a 
 law, (df) a political constitution ? 
 
 75. Discuss the relation to Egoism of the theory that Self- 
 realisation is the ethical end. 
 
 76. Compare the Intuitionism of Butler and Kant. 
 
 77. When it is said that a feeling or action is " natural," 
 (a) What matter of fact is affirmed ? 
 
 (h) What ethical inference is intended to be drawn ? 
 
 (c) How far are affirmation and inference logically con- 
 nected ? 
 Consider these questions, referring esi)ecially to the opinions 
 of some one moralist. 
 
 78. " Love is the fulfilling of the law." Discuss the meaning 
 of this, and its adequacy as an ethical first principle. 
 
 79. Define Courage : examine the gi"ounds of its claims to be 
 considered a Moral Virtue, and the limitations of its moral 
 excellence. 
 
 80. Two persons have together committed a crime. Their 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 93 
 
 cases are exactly similar in all respects save that the one was 
 under a vastly greater temptation to commit the crime than 
 the other. Which, if either of them, should be more severely 
 punished than the other, and why ? Make clear what you mean 
 by "temptation," and if necessary point out any ambiguity m 
 the ordinary use of the word. 
 
 81. " Ignorance of fact may be a defence ; ignorance of law 
 can never be a defence." Consider this maxim and apply your 
 reasoning to (1) cases in which a person is charged with a crime, 
 (2) cases in which a person is required to perform an agreement 
 which he has entered into under a mistake. 
 
 82. What are the respective provinces of Induction, Intuition, 
 and Deduction in Ethical Science ? 
 
 83 Compare the four Principles of Ethics, that the right 
 end of moral or reasonable action is (1) personal pleasure, 
 (2) personal perfection, (3) universal pleasure, (4) universal 
 perfection. Define these more closely, and examine the con- 
 nection between them. Is it a valid inference, that if the 
 second and third are both to be preferred to the first, the fourth 
 must be truer than either ? • i . ■ 
 
 84. Examine the following passage and consider its relation 
 to Mill's ethical system: "It would be vain to attempt to 
 persuade a man who beats his wife and ill-treats his children, 
 that he would be happier if he lived in love and kindness with 
 them He would be happier if he were the kind of person who 
 could so live ; but he is not, and it is probably too late for 
 him to become that kind of person." (Mill, Representative 
 
 Government^ chap, vi.) -n i • 
 
 85. Discuss the notion of Progress in its application to Ethics : 
 
 considering 
 
 («) How far morality progresses ; 
 
 \h) How far progress is the end of morality. 
 
 86. Classify the different ways in which we arrive at a 
 knowledge of individual facts, and point out the characteristic 
 sources of error connected with each. 
 
 87. What is the relation between the conceptions of Duty 
 and of End in Ethics? 
 
 88. Compare and criticise any theories known to you of — 
 
 Friendship, 
 Or 
 
 Punishment. 
 
94 
 
 A PRIMER OF ETHICS 
 
 89. Define the following, and consider how far they are 
 related to each other : 
 
 Justice ; 
 Generosity : 
 Liberality ; 
 Extravagance ; 
 Meanness. 
 
 90. " The later life of most men is the more discerning and 
 well advised ; but the earlier years are nobler and purer ; and 
 to find the true instinct of Conscience, we may more often go 
 wth hope to the child than to the grandparents. " Do you agree ? 
 
 91. Discuss the utility of Self-realisation as a moral criterion. 
 
 92. Define " voluntary action " of human beings, regarded as 
 the subject-matter of moral judgments ; and examine the 
 different opinions that have been held as to the element in such 
 action upon which its moral value dei)ends. 
 
 93. Discuss the distinction between Moral and Non-moral 
 sentiments, and the causal connections between the two kinds 
 of feehngs. How far is the existence of the latter kind of 
 sentiments necessary or conducive to virtuous action? Give 
 illustrations. 
 
 94. How can a man Ixj said to owe duties to himself ? Discuss 
 briefly the different subdivisions of duty to self. 
 
 95. Consider the practical value of ethical theory. 
 
 9G. Examine the moral value of (1) a life of purely in- 
 tellectual activity, (2) a spirit of contentment. 
 
 97. Examine the following: "The conception of an in- 
 dividual equally endowed with all cai)abilities of pleasure is a 
 fiction. Every normally developed man, when he begins to 
 reflect ethically, finds himself with certain dispositions already 
 fixed and preponderant. He is, as the result of heredity and 
 education, a reflection of the social consciousness. Hence his 
 own independent calculation of the condition of his happiness 
 will coincide in the main with the requirements of the general 
 happiness. It follows that the sharp antithesis druwn by 
 moralists between *my happiness' and * the general happiness,' 
 has no practical significance." 
 
 98. Discuss the meaning of " disinterested " as applied 
 to feelings and actions, pointing out confusions that are liable 
 to arise from a vague use of the term. Criticise the following : 
 *'The internal sanction of duty is ... a pain more or less 
 
 QUESTIONS 
 
 95 
 
 intense . . . this feeling, when disinterested, is the essence of 
 Conscience." {J. S. Mill.) 
 
 99. Distinguish between Egoism and Self-love. 
 100 Examine the distinction of Relative and Absolute Ethics. 
 Consider the following : («) " The philosophical moralist treats 
 solely of the straight man ... a problem in which a crooked 
 man forms one of the elements, is insoluble by liim." (6) " We 
 must determine our duties to the present world of men some- 
 how ; and Ethics seeks to do this in a systematic manner." 
 
 101. Comment on the following : {a) " It is expedient that 
 one man die . . . that the whole nation perish not." (6) 'I 
 would lose my life to serve my country, but would not do a base 
 
 thing to save it." .^ , . xt 
 
 102. Analyse the sentiments commonly excued by the con- 
 templation o'f an act of generosity or of self-sacrifice, and also of 
 a noble character ; and examine the distinction and relation 
 between the Ethical and the Esthetic judgment in either 
 
 103 " We sometimes say in praise of a man that he is self- 
 forgetful, but by saying that he has forgotten himself we 
 seemin-^ly condemn what he has done, though perhaps we mean 
 to offer an excuse for him." Comment on the above statement 
 and explain the apparent contradiction. 
 
 104. Discuss how far it is ethically justifiable to allow belief 
 to be swayed by anything except evidence. , , . ^ 
 
 105 What principles should guide u, in the choice of objects 
 for the exercise of liberality ? How far is it possible to deduce 
 from these principles a clear and consistent system of rules for 
 
 practice? . . j- i.- +. 
 
 lOG Examine the question whether compassion is a distinct 
 
 principle or resolvable into others. What is the end of com- 
 
 passion, and what renders it practically important ? 
 
 107 Explain what is meant by Positive Morality. 
 
 108. Is Ethics progressive, and if so, in what respects? 
 Distinguish in your answer between advances m positive 
 morality and advances in ethical ideals or theoretical ethics. 
 
 109. Explain how it is that it may not always be riyht to do 
 what one has a llight to do. " The doctrine of Duties, which 
 is Morality, presupposes a doctrine of llight and Obhgations. 
 Consider this statement with reference to the basis and 
 character of moral truths. 
 
96 
 
 A PRIMER OF ETHICS 
 
 110. " We must not do evil that good may come." What 
 theories of Ethics, if any, allow of any intelligible meaning 
 being ascribed to this proposition, and what, in each case, 
 would the meaning be ? 
 
 111. Discuss that modification of the Utilitarian view which 
 admits that the value of pleasures may vary according to their 
 quality. 
 
 112. Discuss the definition of Justice, and the relation of 
 Justice to Equity. Discuss also the connection between Justice 
 and Retaliation. 
 
 113. Discuss the relations and mutual implication of Happi- 
 ness and Perfection as ethical ends. 
 
 114. Consider the following objections to Utilitarianism: 
 (a) Pleasures are transitory, and therefore pleasure cannot be 
 the good : {b) Pleasures are intensive quantities, and therefore 
 cannot be summed. 
 
 115. Discuss the influence of the study of Ethics on conduct. 
 11 G. Discuss how far current controversies as to the morality 
 
 of vivisection, and of marriage with a deceased wife's sister, are 
 due to differences on matters of fact or differences of ethical 
 principles. 
 
 EXAMINATION PAPERS 
 
 1. What is the fundamental assumption at the basis of a 
 science of Ethics 'I 
 
 2. How is Ethics related to (1) Psychology, (2) Law, (3) 
 Public Opinion, (4) Education? 
 
 3. What is meant by saying that moral distinctions are 
 appiehended by Reason? To what opinions is this opposed? 
 
 4. Is action always directed towards avoiding pain or obtain- 
 ing pleasure? What does Bain mean by saying that the Will 
 is biassed by Fixed Ideas ? 
 
 o. Explain and criticise the notion of Life according to 
 Nature as the basis of Ethics. 
 
 6. Distinguish between Hedonistic Egoism and other forms 
 of Egoism with which it is liable to be confounded. 
 
 7. What do you understand by Intuitionism ? Distinguish 
 the different kinds. 
 
 8. What connection is there between the origin and validity 
 of moral judgments ? 
 
 (Bif permission of Professor J. S. NicJiolson.) 
 
 II 
 
 1. Distinguish carefully between Motive and Intention. 
 Discuss the following: ** Every action is right which in 
 
 presence of a lower principle follows a higher ; every action is 
 wrong which in presence of a higher principle follows a lower." 
 (MaHi^ieaa.) 
 
 2. Explain what is meant by (1) Determinism and (2) Free- 
 dom of Will ; and state the case for Determinism as against 
 Freedom of WilL 
 
 3. (a) "The very idea of happiness or interests consists in 
 
 this : that an appetite or afiFection enjoys its object.' 
 {Butler.) 
 
 97 7 
 
98 
 
 A PRIiMER OF ETHICS 
 
 (6) "Desiring a thing and finding it pleasant ai-e, in 
 strictneaa of language, two modes of naming the 
 same psychological fact." (ilf«7/.) 
 
 (c) " In desire what is desired must in all cases be self." 
 (Bradle'i.) 
 
 Compare these views. , *^ . • ,,, 
 
 4. Consider critically the classification of Duties into (I) 
 
 Social and (2) Self-regarding. 
 
 5. Examine Herbert Si>encer's formula of Justice ("Every 
 man is free to do that which he wills, provided he infringe not 
 the equal freedom of another man "), and consider liow far it 
 presents the chai-acteristics of a scientific intuition. 
 
 6. Is it possible to exhibit a self-evident element in Any of 
 the principles of Common-Sense Morality ? 
 
 7. {a) " Tfie Good for each comes to be expressible in terms* 
 
 of man's social relations; in other words, of good 
 conduct itself." 
 (6) Nothing can possibly be conceived in the Morld, or 
 even out of it, which can be called good without qualifi- 
 cation except a Gootl Will. " 
 How far does either of the above statements supply a satis- 
 factory account of Ultimate Good ? 
 
 8. How far is Moral Effort necessary to Virtue 'i 
 
 9. What is meant by : 
 
 Moral Sentiment, 
 Non-Moral Sentiment, 
 Quasi-Moral Sentiment, 
 Dogmatic Intuitionism, 
 Common-Sense Morality, 
 Positi\e Monility, 
 Disinterested Action, 
 Moral Sanction 'i 
 
 III 
 
 1. How far is the presence of emotion necessary to Virtue ? 
 
 2. («) " It does not matter what we do so long as we do it in 
 
 the right spirit. " 
 (fj) Tliat "wherein virtue consists " is "Justice, Veracity, 
 and Regard to Common Good." 
 Compare the two standards of action here put forward. 
 
 EXAMINATION PAPERS 
 
 99 
 
 .S. (a) No "mistake can be conceived more terrible" than 
 that "of imagining the whole of virtue to consist in 
 singly aiming ... at promoting the happiness of man- 
 kind in the present state." 
 (6) " The conduct which under any given carcumstances is 
 objectively right, is that which will produce the greatest 
 amount of happiness on the whole." 
 How might a Dogmatic Intuitionist be expected to view these 
 opposed principles ? 
 4. Examine the relation between : 
 
 (a) Psychological and Ethical Hedonism ; 
 (6) I^oistic and Universalistic Hedonism ; 
 (c) Philosophical Intuitionism and Utilitarianism. 
 b. Tabulate and examine the principal objections to taking 
 Happiness as the ultimate end of action. 
 
 6. " The sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything 
 is desirable, is that people do actually desire it. . . . No reason 
 can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except 
 that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, 
 desires his own happiness. This, however, being a fact, we 
 have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but 
 all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good : 
 that each person's happiness is a good to that person, and 
 the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of 
 persons." How far does this statement provide a "proof of 
 the First Principle of UtiUtarianism ? 
 
 7. Consider the relation to Politics of : 
 
 (a) Intuitional Ethics, 
 (6) Utilitarian Ethics. 
 
 8. "Reasonable Self-love and Conscience are the two chief 
 or superior principles in the nature of man. " What reasons can 
 be urged in support of this view, and what are the difficulties 
 in the way of accepting it ? 
 
100 
 
 A PRIMER OF ETHICS 
 
 For the guidance of readers who desire to pursue the 
 subject, 1 quote below the Schedule and List of Books 
 recommended for Ethics at present in Part I. of the 
 Moral Sciences Tripos at Cambridge. 
 
 The Schedule and List are published in The CamhHdge 
 Unn^ititii Calendar, The Cambridge Univensity Reporter, 
 and The ^tudenfs Handbook to the Unimrsity and Colleges 
 of Cambridge. (The first volume of Mind contains the 
 Schedule and List as they were under the Scheme of 
 Examination in 187r».) 
 
 SCHEDULE AND LIST OF BOOKS RECOMMENDED 
 FOR ETHICS IN PART I. OF THE MORAL 
 SCIENCES TRIPOS. 
 
 I. Scope and method of Ethics ; the moral judgment, and the 
 judgments of positive science : ethical conceptions : good, right, 
 duty, virtue, worth. 
 
 II. Prolegomena to Ethics (sociological and psychological) : 
 Custom, law, and morality. Pyschology of action : impulse, 
 desire, and volition ; the function of pleasure and pain and 
 of reason in voluntary action ; psychological hedonism ; deter- 
 minism and free-will. 
 
 III. The moral consciousness : Motive, intention, and end. 
 Moral sense, conscience, practical reason. Moral standard, 
 moral law, obligation, sanction, responsibility. Relative and 
 absolute good. 
 
 IV. The moral ideal: Happiness, duty, perfection, self- 
 realisation. 
 
 V. The system of conduct : Particular duties and virtues ; 
 classification of the virtues ; types of moral character. 
 
 VI. Relation of Ethics to Politics and Jurisprudence : The 
 individual and the state; rights and duties; principles of 
 political and social justice; theories of punishment. Inter- 
 national morality. 
 
 VII. History of Ethics: Characteristics and influence of 
 
 SCHEDULE AND LIST OF BOOKS 101 
 
 Greek Ethics. Modem Ethics: development of intuitional 
 and utihtarian schools; Kant*s Ethics and its influence; the 
 theory of evolution. 
 
 List of books recommended on this subject : 
 
 Butler : Sermons on Human Nature and Mssertation on Virtue. 
 Hume : Enquirif concerning the Principles of Morals. Kant : 
 Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals. Mill: 
 Utilitarianism. Sidgwick : Methods of Ethics and Outlines of 
 the History of Ethics. Spencer : Principles of Ethics, Parts I. 
 and IV. Green : Prolegomena to Ethics^ Book III. 
 
 The following books should also be consulted : 
 
 Plato : The Republic. Aristotle : The Nicomachean Ethics. 
 Adam Smith : 3Ioral Sentiments. Benthara : Principles of 
 Morals and Legislation. Wundt : Ethics. 
 
 The Scrmoiiit of Butler which should be reatl are Sermons I., 
 IL, III., v., VIII., XI. The Preface to the Sermxyns should 
 also be read. The Dissertation Of the Nature of Virtue is 
 appended to the Analogy of Bel ig ion. In connection with 
 Spencer and Green, the student is advised to read the exposition 
 and criticism of these writers' ethical views in Sidgwick's 
 Ethics of Green, Spencer, and Martineau. 
 
 Of the books recommended in the Cambridge list, it would be 
 interesting to read fii-st Aristotle's Ethics, and the Introduction 
 and chapters i. and ii. in Sidgwick's History of Ethics. 
 
 This may be followed by Butler, Kant, Mill, and chapter iv. 
 of the Historii of Ethics. 
 
 Then, The '^Methoda of Ethics (to the analytical Table of Con- 
 tents of which special attention may be directed) should be care- 
 fully read, and finally the remainder of the books recommended. 
 
 Yov § VL it would be useful to consult also Sidgwick's 
 Elements of Politics and Mill's Representative Govem/ment. 
 
 Kant's Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morah 
 has been translated by Abbott ; Plato's Republic by Da vies and 
 Vaughan, and by Jowett ; Aristotle's Ethics, by Chase (Scott 
 Library), by Williams, by Peters, and by Welldon. 
 
 It is a counsel of perfection to go through the book one i.«* 
 studying at first rapidly, to get a general view ; then to follow 
 this by a very careful and thorough reading, and by making 
 a bi'ief abstract. After a third reading, the student ought 
 to have a good grasp of his author. 
 
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