TWENTY YEARS OF PERSIAN OPIUM 
 
 (1908-1928) 
 
 A Study 
 
 by 
 
 Elizabeth P. MacCallum 
 
 
 Prepared Under the Direction of the ' 
 Opium Research Committee 
 of the 
 
 Foreign Policy Association 
 
 NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS 
 
 Eighteen East Forty-First Street 
 New York City 
 
‘Trinted 
 
 (^Ttlarch, 1928 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Foreword, by Helen Howell Moorhead 4 
 
 Persian Opium Policy in the Pre-War Period 5 
 
 The Hague Conference, 1911-1912 8 
 
 Post-War Eflforts to Control Domestic Opium 11 
 
 Persian Opium and League Control 17 
 
 Statistics of Persian Exports 20 
 
 Persia at the Second Opium Conference 24 
 
 Persian Export Policy Since the Geneva Conference 27 
 
 Conclusion 37 
 
 ANNEXES: 
 
 1. Persian Policy of Opium Restriction 39 
 
 H. Chairman’s Personal Summary of Findings of 
 
 League Commission of Enquiry 40 
 
 HI. Diminution of Opium Cultivation in Persia 44 
 
 IV. Observations of the Persian Government on the 
 
 Report by the League Commission of Enquiry 49 
 
 V. Opium Exports of Persia 54 
 
 MAPS: 
 
 Map 1. Sketch map of Persia, indicating relative 
 
 standing of provinces in production of opium 14 
 
 Map H. Sketch map of Persia showing itinerary of 
 
 League Commission of Enquiry 29 
 
FOREWORD 
 
 T he relation of Persia to the general problem of interna- 
 tional control of opium is a very important one. Persia 
 is one of the few countries producing raw opium which 
 have associated themselves continuously with efforts to improve 
 the opium situation by international action. And Persia is 
 the only country where an international body has made a study 
 of the economic disarrangement and physical difficulties which 
 might be expected to result from limitation of the opium crop. 
 Accordingly, Persia may be regarded as furnishing in a certain 
 sense a test case in determining the applicability to the world’s 
 present narcotic problem of what has become known as the 
 “American plan” — the proposal to limit the production of raw 
 materials to the medical and scientific needs of the world. 
 
 The Commission of Enquiry sent by the League of Nations 
 to conduct a study in Persia has reported that there are many 
 difficulties in the way of applying the American plan in that 
 country. But it has also reported that the difficulties, in the 
 case of Persia, are not insurmountable, granted a willingness 
 to cooperate on the part of the Persian Government, coupled 
 with a determination to move steadily forward toward achieve- 
 ment of the desired results. 
 
 It must be realized at the same time, however, that the 
 application of the American plan to other countries may be 
 attended with difficulties of a different type than those foreseen 
 in the case of Persia, and that similarly they may reveal certain 
 opportunities for success that do not exist in Persia. Thus, 
 although Persia does partake to a certain degree of the nature 
 of a test case, the present embarrassments in the Persian situa- 
 tion cannot be invoked as a reason for abandoning the attempt 
 to apply the American plan in other countries. But it must 
 be recognized that the Persian situation does make one fact 
 very clear — viz., that the American plan cannot be regarded as 
 a panacea easily applicable to all producing countries, nor as 
 one whose results will be uniformly successful in every part of 
 the world. 
 
 Helen Howell Moorhead 
 
TWENTY YEARS OF PERSIAN OPIUM 
 
 PERSIAN OPIUM POLICY IN THE PRE-WAR PERIOD 
 
 HEN the International Opium Commission met at Shanghai in 
 
 W February, 1909, to take what has been characterized as the first 
 step toward a solution of the opium problem by international action,^ 
 Persia was one of the thirteen states whose representatives participated in 
 the discussions. 
 
 The majority of the states represented on the Commission were powers 
 which enjoyed authority in regulating the policies of administrations in 
 the Far Eastern area, where opium and drug control were coming to 
 be recognized as matters of extreme importance. Persia was one of the 
 few participating states which was neither a Far Eastern country nor had 
 territorial possessions in that region. Its inclusion in the list of invited 
 states was based on the consideration that not only opium-consuming 
 countries but also all large opium-producing countries must be encouraged 
 to participate in the discussion of international opium control if the latter 
 were to be put on an effective basis. ^ 
 
 Up to the date when the International Opium Commission convened in 
 Shanghai the Persian Government had followed a policy of laisser-faire 
 in the matter of opium production. It had not itself attempted to mon- 
 opolize cultivation or sale of the drug in any way, nor had it enacted any 
 laws governing the consumption, importation or exportation of opium.® 
 It did, however, derive from the opium trade annual revenues estimated 
 by the Persian delegate, M. D. Rizaeff, to be roughly in the neighborhood 
 of 350,000 tomans.^ About one-seventh of this revenue was yielded by 
 provincial taxes on production, while the remaining six-sevenths repre- 
 sented the export duties collected by the Imperial Customs Bureau.® 
 
 In the absence of precise statistics, the Persian delegate placed the 
 annual opium production of his country at about 1,330,000 lbs. and stated 
 that of this amount one-quarter was retained for domestic consumption. 
 
 (1) Wright, Dr. Hamilton. The International Opium Commission. (American Journal 
 of Internationai Law, Voi. HI (1909). p. 648.) 
 
 (2) Willoughby, W. W.. Opium as an International Problem, 
 
 (3) International Opium Commission, Shanghai, 1909. Vol. II. Memorandum on Opium 
 Produced in Persia, p. 317, tt. 
 
 (4) For purposes of general calculation the toman may be taken as the equivalent 
 of the American dollar. 
 
 (6) International Opium Commission. Shanghai, 1909. Vol. II. Memorandum on Opium 
 Produced in Persia. 
 
 6 
 
The total value of exports of Persian opium he estimated to be about 
 $3,000,000. He further estimated that of the amount exported one- 
 fifteenth was sent to the continent of Europe and Africa, four-fifteenths 
 to Great Britain and the remaining two-thirds to Hongkong and the 
 Straits Settlements. 
 
 The Persian delegate in explaining the large amounts of Persian opium 
 consigned to Hongkong and the Straits Settlements stated that the ma- 
 jority of this opium (or about 35 per cent of Persia’s total annual pro- 
 duction) found its way ultimately to Formosa, while less than one third 
 (or 15 per cent of Persia’s total production) was re-exported from the 
 Straits Settlements and Hongkong to China. He added that no opium 
 was exported to China directly from Persia. 
 
 The Japanese delegation sharply challenged the allegation that so large 
 a proportion of Persian opium was consumed in Formosa, and produced 
 figures prepared by the Government of Formosa which indicated that 
 the average importation of Persian opium during the years 1901-07, in- 
 clusive, had been only one-quarter of the amount indicated by the Persian 
 delegation.® No one, however, challenged the accuracy of the Persian 
 statement that half of the total amount of opium produced in Persia was 
 exported annually to the Far East. 
 
 The outcome of the Shanghai deliberations was a series of nine resolu- 
 tions endorsed by all the delegations, including that of Persia. Of these 
 resolutions there were two whose implications in some degree affected 
 Persia. Resolution 2 recommended that each delegation should move its 
 own government to take measures for the gradual suppression of the 
 practice of opium smoking. Resolution 4 enjoined on each country the 
 duty of adopting all reasonable measures to prevent at ports of departure 
 the shipment of opium, its alkaloids, derivatives, or preparations to any 
 country which prohibited their entry. 
 
 To the Persian Government the foregoing resolutions represented an 
 entirely unfamiliar opium policy. Hitherto, as already recorded, there 
 had been no attempt to suppress opium smoking nor to regulate the do- 
 mestic use of opium. Nor had there been any attempt to prohibit or 
 control the shipment of opium abroad. Now the question arose as to 
 whether the Persian Government could be induced to change its policy. 
 The question was a critical one from the point of view of China, since the 
 latter was endeavoring to shut out Persian opium, along with Turkish 
 and Indian opium, from its territory. To this end the Chinese Govern- 
 ment had issued a regulation, effective January 1, 1909, whereby the im- 
 portation of Persian and Turkish opium was to be annually reduced until 
 
 (6) In Its subsequent report to Congress the American delegation avoided all reference 
 to the disputed question of Persian opium in Formosa. In view of the uncertainty attached 
 by the Persian delegate himself to the figures he submitted, the American report paraphrased 
 his statement in the following more general terms: “The Persian report exhibited the fact 
 that there is a large internal production of low-grade opium; that there is a large con- 
 sumption of it by the native population, and that a smaller part was exported to China. 
 A higher grade of opium for medicinal purposes Is also produced and exported to Europe.” 
 (Sixty-First Congress, Second Session. Senate Document S77. Feb. 21, 1910.) 
 
 6 
 
the year 1916, after which no more permits for such importation would 
 be issued and the trade in Persian and Turkish opium would be com- 
 pletely suspended.^ 
 
 The Persian Government was not slow in indicating the policy it would 
 follow. Upon receipt of the report of its delegation to Shanghai it con- 
 tinued to disavow responsibility for controlling opium exports intended 
 ultimately for the China trade. But it did initiate measures to control 
 the domestic use of the commodity. An opium law consisting of six 
 articles was adopted by the Mejliss late in 1910. It provided that after 
 seven years the use of opium should be confined to medicinal purposes 
 while the use of its derivative, shire^h of soukhteh,^ should be entirely 
 stopped. In the interval taxes imposed upon stick opium and shireh of 
 soukhteh would be gradually increased. All residue of smoked opium 
 was to be turned over to agents of the Ministry of Finance at a fixed 
 price.® This would ensure government control of the manufacture and 
 sale of shireh of soukhteh, which should not exceed the amount actually 
 required by shireh addicts (whose names were to be officially registered) 
 during the seven-year period preceding the date when all soukhteh was 
 to be destroyed.^® 
 
 The Ministries of Finance and the Interior were entrusted with the 
 task of drafting regulations to make the new opium law effective. Shireh 
 dens were henceforward to be under Government control. All opium 
 sap was to be centralized in Government warehouses for manipulation. 
 Some months later, to ensure payment of export dues, a system of stamp- 
 ing opium for export was devised.^^ 
 
 This law was already promulgated when in 1911 Mr. M. Shuster, the 
 newly-appointed American Administrator General of Finance, suggested 
 a substantial increase in opium taxes as one of a series of measures for 
 enhancing the national revenues. Approved by the Council on September 
 30, 1911, the proposal failed to become effective because of the unex- 
 pected withdrawal of Mr. Shuster from Persia before the bill could be 
 submitted to the Mejliss. 
 
 Thus, by the time when the International Opium Conference was con- 
 vened at The Hague in 1911, Persia had acquired an opium policy dis- 
 tinctly different from the one which had been in vogue when the Inter- 
 national Opium Commission first met at Shanghai in 1909. Without 
 altering its export policy or endangering in any way the substantial rev- 
 enues derived from the shipment of opium abroad, the Persian Govern- 
 
 (7) For China’s action with regard to restriction of Indian, Turkish and Persian opium, 
 see Dr. Hamilton Wright. The International Opium Commission. (American Journal of 
 International Law, Vol. Ill (1909.) pp. 835, 842.) 
 
 (8) Shireh of soukhteh, sometimes referred to as essence of opium, was the most 
 harmful opium derivative in common use in Persia. ’’Shireh” was regularly manufactured 
 from the opium dross or residue (known as soukhteh) remaining in the pipes after smoking. 
 
 (9) In 1914 an amendment to the opium law temporarily reduced this redemption prlca 
 by two-thirds. Later, to combat the resultant increase in smuggling of soukhteh, tha prlc» 
 was raised again. 
 
 (10) League of Nations. Records of the Second Opium Conference. Geneva, November 
 17th. 1924-February 19th, 192B. Vol. II. Memorandum on Persian Opium, p. 212. 
 
 (11) Ibid, p. 195. 
 
 7 
 
ment had taken an important step in the direction of suppressing domestic 
 consumption, in spite of the difficulty and expense which enforcement 
 was recognized to involve. 
 
 THE HAGUE CONFERENCE, 1911-1912 
 
 The first International Opium Conference at The Hague, convened 
 to draft an international agreement embodying the principles proposed 
 at Shanghai, was attended by a delegation from Persia headed by Mirza 
 Mahmoud Khan. The latter took an active if not always successful part 
 in the deliberations. Two proposals were suggested by him which the 
 Conference failed to accept. The first of these was a sweeping reso- 
 lution whose acceptance would have bound all of the Governments repre- 
 sented in the Conference to regard as contraband and to destroy immedi- 
 ately all opium prepared for smoking found in international transit. This 
 resolution was defeated by unanimous vote. 
 
 A later resolution proposed by Mirza Mahmoud Khan, aimed at the 
 elimination of eating-opium and low-grade smoking-opium, had the sup- 
 port of the United States delegation, but was defeated through the opposi- 
 tion of the remaining members of the Conference.^^ The resolution was 
 as follows : 
 
 “It is agreed by all the represented Powers that there should be a 
 gradual suppression of the production of opium containing less than 9 per 
 cent of morphia, and that the interested Powers should pledge themselves to 
 discourage all enterprises due to private initiative engaged in the production 
 of a lower grade of opium; and where opium is produced under Government 
 monopoly or where the system of Government monopoly is to be established, 
 they should engage within eight years to raise the quality of such opium 
 to the recognized standard.” 
 
 This attempt to limit the production of opium to the higher grades 
 suitable for manufacture of drugs for medicinal purposes was opposed 
 with special vigor by one of the British delegates, whose chief contention 
 was that it would be impossible to do away with the production of low- 
 grade opium in India as long as normal medical service in the European 
 sense of the term was not available for great masses of the population of 
 that country. 
 
 Mirza Mahmoud Khan’s proposals were merely incidents in a long 
 and busy conference, which arrived ultimately at a number of agreements 
 embodied in the so-called Hague Convention. It was the intent of the 
 International Opium Convention drawn up at this Conference to provide 
 for gradual suppression in all parts of the world of the abuse of opium, 
 morphine, cocaine and their preparations and derivatives. To this end 
 it suggested common policies to control production, manufacture and 
 trade in all parts of the world. The Convention was to become effective 
 on December 31, 1912.^* 
 
 (12) International Opium Conference, The Hague, 1911-12. Actes et Documents. 1912. 
 
 (13) League of Nations. Report of the Advisory Committee on Traffic In Opium. First 
 Session. Geneva, May 2-5, 1921. 
 
 8 
 
The action taken by Persia with respect to the Hague Convention 
 was an index to the policy it has pursued ever since the 1911-12 Con- 
 ference. The Persian delegate signed the Convention, but, in keeping 
 with his Government’s former refusal to interfere with shipments of 
 opium destined for the Far Eastern trade, he made a reservation with 
 respect to clause (a) of Article 3 which provided that contracting powers 
 should prevent the export of raw opium to countries prohibiting its 
 entry.^^ 
 
 In the case of Persia, which hitherto had assumed no responsibility 
 for the destination of opium shipped from its ports. Article 3 (a) of the 
 Hague Convention was regarded as constituting an obligation too serious 
 to be assumed immediately. The Persian delegate offered to support the 
 clause if it were amended to read: “To prevent as soon as possible the 
 export of raw opium to countries which shall have prohibited its entry 
 but when his proposal was voted down he refused to endorse the clause 
 as it stood in the text of the Convention. 
 
 The Persian reservation was not made for purely academic reasons. 
 In the interval since the Shanghai Conference of 1909, the Chinese Gov- 
 ernment, which had already made arrangements with Great Britain for 
 the reduction of Indian opium shipments to China, had further decreed 
 that importation of Persian and Turkish opium into China should cease 
 on January 1, 1912, instead of in 1916 as originally contemplated. (See 
 above, p. 6.) For the Persian Government to acquiesce in Article 3 (a) 
 would therefore have been to assume moral responsibility for seeing that 
 the lucrative trade in opium with China was terminated immediately. 
 
 The Chinese Government, anticipating difficulty in excluding Persian 
 as well as Turkish and Indian opium, attempted at the Hague Conference 
 to obtain the adhesion of the Governments there represented to the terms, 
 among other things, of its embargo on Persian opium in order that each 
 Government might make the prohibition binding on its own nationals. 
 The Persian delegate, while affirming his belief that smoking-opium must 
 be regarded as one of the most dangerous poisons — a poison which no 
 civilized nation should export or import — deprecated the Chinese pro- 
 posal to incorporate the terms of the embargo in the Hague Convention 
 itself. Since the embargo went into effect on January 1, Persian mer- 
 chants, caught with large stocks on their hands, had been faced with 
 heavy losses. He feared that, if the embargo resolution were to be in- 
 corporated in the text of the Hague Convention, Persians would blame 
 the Conference for their misfortunes. For the Persian Government, which 
 
 (14) Article 8, to a clause of which the Persian delegate objected, was one of several 
 articles dealing with the export of opium. The entire article was as follows: 
 
 "Article 3. 
 
 The Contracting Powers shall take measures : 
 
 (a) To prevent the export of raw opium to countries which shall have prohibited Its 
 entry, and 
 
 (b) To control the export of raw opium to countries which restrict its import, unless 
 regulations on the subject are already in existence." 
 
 9 
 
depended on the cooperation of its people, it was important that so seri- 
 ous a misunderstanding should be avoided, if the authorities were to 
 enjoy the support of public opinion in enforcing the main provisions of 
 the Hague Convention. Over the Persian protest, however, 'the majority 
 of the delegates agreed to the Chinese proposal to write the embargo into 
 the text of the Hague Convention. But later the Chinese delegation of 
 their own accord withdrew their suggestion, since it had become appar- 
 ent that if it remained incorporated in the text of the main instrument it 
 would stand in the way of unanimous agreement to the terms of the 
 Hague Convention. 
 
 No Persian delegate attended the Second International Opium Con- 
 ference held at The Hague in July, 1913 to secure ratification of the Con- 
 vention of 1912, but at the Third Conference in June, 1914, Mirza Mah- 
 moud Khan appeared, promising on behalf of his Government that, after 
 certain constitutional details had been attended to, Persia would ratify 
 and enforce the Hague Convention of 1912. 
 
 10 
 
POST-WAR EFFORTS TO CONTROL DOMESTIC OPIUM 
 
 I F the Great War served to delay international measures for the sup- 
 pression of opium smoking in the Far East in general and in Chinese 
 foreign concession areas in particular, it had also the result of dissipat- 
 ing the hopes or fears of those Persians who had foreseen the early sup- 
 pression of opium smoking in their own country. For Russian, British 
 and Turkish campaigns in Persia resulted in an almost complete paralysis 
 of the central government at Teheran. The country was over-run with 
 foreign troops. Russian attacks continued until 1920, and a British mili- 
 tary occupation until 1921. The internal administration of the country 
 was in a state of disorganization. The Government bureau for the re- 
 duction of the use of opium and its derivatives, formed in 1910 to enforce 
 the opium law,^ had long since disappeared. Although there were spor- 
 adic attempts to collect opium taxes, and rates of taxation were nominally 
 higher than formerly, the 1910 opium law was largely in abeyance. Cer- 
 tainly it had failed in its avowed purpose of putting an end to the use of 
 shireh of soukhteh and the smoking of opium before the year 1918. 
 
 But ultimately the tide changed. In 1921, at the time when foreign 
 troops were being withdrawn from Persia, forces were at work which 
 made for the strengthening of the central government, and with the grad- 
 ual renewal of an effective central administration the attempt of the Gov- 
 ernment to establish control over Persia’s internal opium traffic also 
 revived. 
 
 It was in 1922 that the Persian Minister of War (who was among the 
 men chiefly responsible for the unexpected regeneration of Persia’s na- 
 tional vigor) assumed responsibility for collecting domestic opium rev- 
 enues and for seeing that the regulations under the 1910 law for centraliz- 
 ing opium sap in government warehouses were carried out. In this it 
 was estimated later^ that he succeeded to the extent of bringing one-fifth 
 of the domestic trade under government control. His greatest success 
 was obtained in the provinces of Teheran, Kermanshah, Shahroud, Ker- 
 man, Hamadan and Yezd.^ 
 
 In 1922 an American Financial Mission under Dr. A. C. Millspaugh 
 undertook responsibility for reorganizing the finances of Persia. Col- 
 lection of opium revenues was therefore transferred to it by the Minister 
 of War, and one of the many duties of the American Mission was in con- 
 sequence found to consist in extending and enforcing the government’s 
 regulations for control of the domestic opium trade. 
 
 (1) International Opium Conference. The Hague, 1911-12. Actes et Documents. 1912. 
 
 (2) Millspaugh, A. C.. The American Task in Persia. 
 
 (3) League of Nations. Records of the Second Opium Conference. Geneva, Nov. 17 
 1924-Feb. 19. 1925. Vol. II. Memorandum on Persian Opium, p. 19S. 
 
 11 
 
The smuggling of opium from producing areas for consumption in 
 non-producing areas within Persia had by this time become a highly or- 
 ganized business.^ Within producing areas themselves irregular transac- 
 tions were also frequent. Thus, to enforce the regulation that all opium 
 sap must be centralized in government warehouses was to combat power- 
 ful vested interests, especially in Isfahan, where even the Minister of War 
 had been unsuccessful in his attempts to make producers, owners and 
 traders conform with the laws. 
 
 Faced everywhere with difficulties, it was in this city that the American 
 Financial Mission met the most determined opposition. It was estimated 
 that in Isfahan at least 5,000 out of a total population of 80,000 gained 
 their whole living or a substantial part of it from the opium trade.^ 
 Isfahan was the center where almost all raw opium intended for export 
 was manipulated. It had hitherto intimidated all Government agents 
 sent to enforce the 1910 laws. In 1923, when the American Financial 
 Mission in its turn undertook to establish a central warehouse in that 
 city, a crisis arose. Recalcitrant opium traders occupied the premises of 
 the Telegraph Office in protest against enforcement of the opium law and 
 induced 7,000 peasants from the surrounding countryside to enter Is- 
 fahan and join in the protest. The city bazaars closed, and a general 
 strike began. Col. D. W. MacCormack was despatched to Isfahan on 
 behalf of the American Financial Mission to enforce the regulations. In 
 less than three weeks, according to the report of the Administrator Gen- 
 eral of the Finances of Persia, he succeeded in arriving at an agreement 
 with the peasants and established a working compromise with the mer- 
 chants whereby a measure of government supervision was at last put into 
 effect, and the complaints of Isfahan traders were terminated. 
 
 Some realization of the practical problems continually faced by the 
 American Financial Mission is gained by a perusal of the quarterly re- 
 ports of the Administrator General of the Finances of Persia during 
 the period when control was being established over the opium trade. 
 
 The essential object was to gather all opium sap into the government 
 warehouses, since only in this way could the Administration be sure of 
 collecting legitimate revenues derived from local consumption and ex- 
 portation and from handling opium in the mails. Formerly opium taxes 
 had been farmed out or collected by provincial governors and tribal 
 chiefs.® The system had encouraged corruption. Centralization, although 
 more expensive, was considered preferable in every way. Soon the 
 American Mission reported that very satisfactory progress had been made 
 in centralizing opium sap,’' especially in Isfahan, where general exemp- 
 tions granted the previous year were withdrawn and the amounts of opium 
 
 (4) Mlllspaugli, A. C., The American Task in Persia. 
 
 (6) Ibid. 
 
 (6) Ibid. 
 
 (7) Administrator-General of the Finances of Persia. Eighth Quarterly Report (Juns- 
 September, 1924). 
 
 12 
 
sap entering the warehouse had more than doubled in comparison with 
 those of the previous year. The amount of opium sap entered in gov- 
 ernment warehouses was much greater now than it had been under previ- 
 ous more troubled administrations, rising from 477,659 lbs. in the year 
 1918-19 to 1,156,083 in the year 1922-23 and 1,372,650 in the year 
 1923-24. But much still remained to be done in certain of the provinces. 
 Shiraz, for example, was just beginning to come under control. Here, 
 as had been the case in Isfahan, the administration was forced at first to 
 make concessions to the merchants, who continued to use private fac- 
 tories to a certain extent for the manipulation of opium, but who agreed 
 to meet certain fixed charges in return for this privilege and to pay stated 
 transit dues on opium shipped to domestic markets or to the port of 
 Bushire. 
 
 In 1923, early in the process of centralization, steps were taken to 
 prevent losses, deficits and frauds said to have been occurring in the 
 central warehouses. Strict methods of accounting were introduced and 
 no consignment of opium was accepted until after careful examination 
 for counterfeit banderoles.* Weight and quantity were individually re- 
 corded. 
 
 In the same year, for the purpose of extending control over the sale 
 of opium dross (soukhteh) an appropriation of 20,000 tomans (approxi- 
 mately $20,000) was made. This enabled wider purchase of dross from 
 which government agents might manufacture the amounts of shireh re- 
 quired by addicts presumed to have been registered in accordance with 
 the provisions of the 1910 opium law. Special instructions were issued 
 for the preparation, collection and transport of soukhteh, but it was only 
 gradually that the government regulations were made effective. 
 
 The war on domestic smuggling of opium continued throughout the 
 entire period of the American financial administration. Illicit transac- 
 tions were relatively easy to detect in those provinces where opium was 
 not produced, and in such regions the Administration claimed to have 
 established fairly effective control. (See Map 1.) It was in the prov- 
 inces where opium was produced and where clandestine transportation 
 was a highly organized business that smuggling was most difficult to 
 suppress. 
 
 A system of transportation permits was devised, whereby the progress 
 of opium consignments could be closely watched between place of origin 
 and destination. Banderoles were surcharged with the name of the dis- 
 trict for which each package was destined. An attempt was made to im- 
 prove postal facilities for the handling of opium, so that the regulation 
 might be enforced which prohibited transportation by caravan unless 
 taxes had first been paid in cash as security. Weekly telegraphic reports 
 
 (8) Banderolea were affixed to prepared opium by agents of the government to Indicate 
 that regulations had been complied with and legal dues paid. 
 
 13 
 
of opium prices in the provinces were sent to Teheran, enabling the Ad- 
 ministration to detect cases in which a substantial amount of smuggling 
 was having the effect of lowering general prices. 
 
 Sketch Map of Persia 
 
 (Indicating relative standing of provinees in production of opium) 
 
 It was found necessary, too, to request the Prime Minister to issue an 
 order providing for the dismissal of any Government employee found 
 to be engaged in the illicit opium traffic. This order was issued early in 
 1924 _ 8 a Later a Civil Service Law provided that government employees 
 who failed within a specified time to abandon the opium habit should be 
 discharged. Opium smoking was forbidden in the army also. 
 
 In a Memorandum on Persian Opium submitted by the Persian Delega- 
 tion to the Second Opium Conference held at Geneva (November, 1924- 
 February, 1925), there were outlined a series of seven principles for 
 opium control which the Persian Government assured the League it would 
 immediately adopt. These important principles, which had the approval 
 
 (8a) Administrator-General of the Finances of Persia. Sixth Quarterly Report (Decem- 
 ber, 1923-March, 1924). 
 
 14 
 
of the American Financial Mission, are reproduced in their original form 
 in Annex I of this report. (See page 39.) 
 
 The net result of the Government’s measures to establish control over 
 the Persian opium traffic was a gradual, but generally not spectacular, 
 increase in opium revenues. The following figures culled from the re- 
 ports of the Administrator General of the Finances of Persia indicate 
 the progress made. It will be remembered that weather conditions as 
 well as the effectiveness of the work of government inspectors contributed 
 in an important way to the results quoted, as in 1925, for example, when 
 severe weather materially diminished the opium crop. 
 
 Approximate 
 
 Collection of Opium Revenue 
 Financial Administration* 
 
 {In Krans) 
 
 UNDER American 
 
 
 Lowest Figure 
 
 Highest Figure 
 
 
 Quoted 
 
 Quoted 
 
 1922-23 
 
 
 11,860,765 
 
 1923-24 
 
 10,419,222 
 
 12,064,531 
 
 1924-25 
 
 14,222,472 
 
 14,899,611 
 
 1925-26 
 
 14,779,866 
 
 16,391,084 
 
 1926-27 
 
 13,700,000t 
 
 14,655,293 
 
 1927-28 
 
 14,000,000t 
 
 
 •Since revenues are variously reported in different tables, the highest and lowest quota- 
 tions are reproduced here to indicate the approximate yield. To ascertain corresponding value 
 in American dollars divide by 10. 
 tEarly estimates. 
 
 The above collections represented financial returns from the following 
 sources, arranged in order of their revenue-producing value.® 
 
 1. A tax on smoking-opium for which the banderole or revenue stamp 
 served as a receipt. 
 
 2. An agricultural tithe charged against the proprietor’s share of the 
 opium crop. 
 
 3. Import and export dues. 
 
 4. Domestic transport charges. 
 
 5. Sale of shireh of soukhteh. 
 
 6. Fines for offenses against the opium regulations. 
 
 7. Warehouse charges. 
 
 8. Manipulation fees. 
 
 While the reports of the American Financial Mission expressed opti- 
 mism with regard to the effectiveness of measures taken to control the 
 opium traffic, it was frankly recognized that the situation left much to be 
 desired. There continued to be a certain amount of smuggling across 
 the Russian border in both directions. Poppy-growing districts were 
 widely scattered and therefore difficult to inspect. In the gardens of 
 
 (9) League of Nations. Records of the Second Opium Conference, Geneva, November 
 17. 1924-February 19, 1925. Memorandum on Persian Opium, p. 212. 
 
 15 
 
anderuns (women’s quarters) where inspections could seldom be carried 
 out, it was not unusual for opium to be grown. Cultivators were apt to 
 retain as much opium as they desired for their own use. Opposition by 
 cultivators and proprietors had been so stubborn that there were still 
 some excellent opium-producing areas where government supervision had 
 not been established. It was estimated that in 1923-24 one-third of the total 
 opium production of Persia escaped government supervision by one or 
 other of these means. Even in 1927 it was still possible for a member 
 of the American Financial Mission to admit that, whereas at some points 
 (e. g. in Teheran) the law was well enforced, there were several important 
 opium-producing and marketing centers where control was not effective, 
 owing to the fact that in these places the government had found it neces- 
 sary or expedient to relax the rigor of the enforcement law.^^ In ex- 
 plaining this phenomenon the Director of the Internal Revenue Admin- 
 istration recalled the fact that Persia had had a constitutional form of 
 government for only twenty years. There had not yet been time to build 
 up an adequate body of civil and criminal law or even to provide means 
 for the execution of the existing laws and regulations. There was an 
 intense public feeling against any legislation or regulation which infringed 
 upon the freedom of action of the individual.^^ 
 
 The impression produced by the published statements of the Director 
 of Internal Revenue Administration is one of considerable gratification 
 that in the face of political, geographical and psychological difficulties the 
 American Mission had succeeded as far as it had in extending control 
 over Persia’s domestic opium trade. It estimated that control had been 
 only twenty per cent effective when the American Mission took over re- 
 sponsibility for opium collection. Within three years, at a cost which 
 the Director of Internal Revenue Administration placed at one-tenth of 
 the opium revenue, it was again estimated that control had become almost 
 seventy per cent effective. Up to the time when the American Mission 
 withdrew in 1927, however, the Administration did not relax its efforts 
 to reach the goal of completely effective control. 
 
 (10) League of Nations. Records of the Second Opium Conference, Geneva,, Nov. 17, 
 1924-Feb. 19, 1925. Vol. II. Memorandum on Persian Opium, p. 204. 
 
 (11) League of Nations. Commission of Enquiry into the Production of Opium in Persia. 
 Report to the Council, p. 41. Also Observations of the Persian Government on the foregoing. 
 
 (12) League of Nations. Observations of the Persian Government on the Report by the 
 Commission of Enquiry into the Production of Opium in Persia^ p. 11. 
 
 16 
 
PERSIAN OPIUM AND LEAGUE CONTROL 
 
 I N November, 1919, Persia responded to an invitation to adhere to 
 the Covenant of the League of Nations. When it did so it found 
 itself once more within the orbit of international discussions concern- 
 ing world opium traffic, for by Article XXIII of the League Cov- 
 enant and the Treaty of Versailles, general supervision over the execution 
 of agreements with regard to the traffic in opium and other dangerous 
 drugs had been entrusted by signatory states to the League of Nations. 
 
 Persia, because of its failure to ratify the Hague Convention, was 
 not represented on the Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and 
 other Dangerous Drugs, which met for the first time in 1921 to per- 
 form its function of encouraging international cooperation and 
 advising the League Council in matters affecting the drug traffic. But 
 it had a representative on the Fifth Committee of the League As- 
 sembly — a body whose duties included that of advising the Assembly 
 concerning the traffic in opium. Persia thus possessed a double 
 opportunity for engaging in discussions of international measures to 
 eliminate abuse of opium and other dangerous drugs. Either 
 in the Fifth Committee or on the floor of the Assembly 
 itself Persian representatives had the right to speak and the oppor- 
 tunity to exercise to the full such influence as they enjoyed among 
 their colleagues. From them, also, the Persian Government was in 
 position to receive first-hand accounts of yearly trends in the opium 
 policy of the League. 
 
 It was soon to transpire that Persian opium policy became a 
 familiar topic of discussion at the Palais des Nations in Geneva. 
 During precisely the same period when the American Financial Mis- 
 sion in Teheran was extending administrative control over the pro- 
 duction, manipulation and domestic sale of Persian opium, there was 
 observable at Geneva a growing concern lest Persia’s export policy 
 should nullify the attempts of the League to reduce world opium 
 traffic to legitimate proportions. This concern was to reach such a 
 degree that by the time the American Mission withdrew from Persia 
 in 1927 that country’s export policy had become one of the dominant 
 themes at meetings of the Opium Advisory Committee in Geneva. 
 
 Those who advanced objections to Persia’s opium export policies 
 did so chiefly because the latter remained in 1921 substantially what 
 they had been in 1911, regardless of important Changes in the policies 
 of other states. The Persian authorities assumed no more responsibili- 
 
 17 
 
ty for control over opium exports^ than was necessary for collecting 
 opium export fees and export taxes. With the destination of ship- 
 ments they did not concern themselves. There seemed to be no indi- 
 cation in 1921 that Persia might soon become inclined to withdraw 
 its reservation to Article 3 (a) of the Hague Convention, designed 
 to prevent the export of raw opium to countries which prohibited its 
 entry. (See p. 9.) 
 
 League bodies regretted the attitude of Persia and supported the 
 interests of countries which attempted to eliminate importation of 
 foreign opium. The Council itself, on the recommendation of the 
 Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium, encouraged all states party 
 to the Convention to follow the lead of those countries which had 
 already reduced or put an end to uncontrolled opium and drug exports. 
 
 It was with the intention of providing more effective machinery 
 for controlling the international opium trade that the Advisory Com- 
 mittee on Traffic in Opium during its first session in 1921 worked 
 on a formula to ensure the legitimate entry of exported opium into 
 importing countries.^ And it was because of the importance of sec- 
 uring conformity in this respect among all opium producing and drug 
 manufacturing countries that almost no year was to pass henceforward 
 without some communication from the League Council to the Persian 
 Government, urging the latter to ratify the Hague Convention and 
 accept responsibility for exercising control over the destination of 
 opium and drug shipments. 
 
 At the 1921 session of the Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium 
 the specific question of Persia’s export policy did not arise. But 
 the Committee busied itself with certain matters which should not 
 go unnoticed, since they were to recur again and again on subsequent 
 occasions when Persia’s position in the international opium trade was 
 under discussion. 
 
 Among other things, the Committee made plans for collecting an- 
 nually from all states party to the Hague Convention information 
 concerning production, distribution, and consumption of opium and 
 concerning measures adopted to put the provisions of the Hague 
 Convention into effect. It also formulated the import certificate 
 system already alluded to. Finally it requested the League of Nations 
 to use its influence to secure ratification of the Hague Convention 
 by all member states as soon as possible. 
 
 (1) It did forbid, however, the export of morphine, cocaine and their derivatives, except 
 when special permission had been received from the Persian government. 
 
 (2) The Resolution concerned was subsequently adopted by both the League Council and 
 the Assembly. It read as follows: 
 
 ‘'Every application for the export to an importer of a supply of any of the substances 
 to which the Convention applies shall be accompanied by a certificate from the Govern- 
 ment of the importing country that the shipment of the consignment in question is ap- 
 proved by that Government and is required for legitimate purposes. In the ease of 
 drugs to which Chapter III of the Convention applies, the certificate shall state specifically 
 that they are required solely for medicinal or scientific purposes.” 
 
 18 
 
Each of these recommendations the Advisory Committee wished 
 Persia to adopt. Each of them, if adopted, would have represented 
 a departure from Persia’s traditional habits. But it was not until 
 the second session of the Advisory Committee in the spring of 1922 
 that their bearing on Persian policy as such came up for discussion 
 at Geneva. On this occasion, in view of the amounts of Persian 
 opium that were known to be finding their way to Far Eastern ports, 
 the Advisory Committee asked the Council to urge the Persian Gov- 
 ernment specifically to adhere to the Hague Convention in its entirety 
 and to put its provisions into force with as little delay as possible. 
 
 From this time forward, discussions of Persia’s export policy were 
 destined to grow in length and liveliness as time passed and as re- 
 peated efforts to induce Persia to ratify the Hague Convention and 
 put its provisions into effect failed to secure the practical results 
 desired. 
 
 The discrepancies between the suggestions of the League and the 
 accomplishments of Persia were not due to negligence on the part 
 of Persian representatives in submitting the League’s views to their 
 own Government. The Persian delegate to the Third Assembly, 
 for example, telegraphed to his Government in September, 1922, re- 
 questing it to ratify the Hague Convention and withdraw its reser- 
 vation to Article 3 (a). The reply of the Persian Government was 
 received when the Advisory Committee met for the fourth time in 
 January, 1923. The Persian Government, this reply stated, proposed 
 to submit the question of unqualified ratification to the Mejliss at 
 an early date. To reconsider the entire question of Persian opium 
 policy before the nation committed itself to ratification of the Hague 
 Convention, a committee appointed by the Persian Government soon 
 began to hold sessions in Teheran. When the Fifth Session of the 
 Advisory Committee met (May-June, 1923) it was expected that the 
 report of the Opium Committee in Teheran would shortly be laid 
 before the Mejliss. 
 
 It was not until the fall of 1923, however, that the Persian Govern- 
 ment authorized its representative at Geneva formally to announce 
 the conclusions to which it had come. Prince Arfa-ed-Dowleh stated 
 before the Fifth Committee of the Assembly (September, 1923) that 
 his Government was now ready to withdraw its reservation in regard 
 to Article 3 of the Treaty of 1912. But it could not actually take 
 this action until it was in possession of a satisfactory constructive 
 scheme providing substitutes for the cultivation of opium. As soon 
 as this happened, Persia would endorse Article 3 on the understand- 
 ing that the country would be allowed a certain period of time in 
 which to put the substitution program into practice. 
 
 (2a) League of Nations. Records of the Fourth Assembly. Minutes of the Fifth Com- 
 mittee, p. 131. 
 
 19 
 
In this connection Prince Arfa suggested to the Assembly that it 
 might be useful to send a detailed questionnaire to various producing 
 and manufacturing countries to ascertain their financial and technical 
 difficulties and to get estimates of the periods of time which it would 
 take to make the changes desired. An Economic Conference might 
 be called to consider the replies received. 
 
 The suggestion was not carried out in the form proposed, but 
 Prince Arfa’s main view that opium suppression must be accompanied 
 by a carefully planned program of crop substitution was not con- 
 tested. Meanwhile the Assembly made a laconic response to the 
 Persian delegate’s announcement that his country was ready in prin- 
 ciple and conditionally to withdraw its reservation to Article 3 (a) 
 of the Hague Convention. It adopted a resolution asking the League 
 Council to repeat its request to Persia, along with seven other tardy 
 member states, to ratify and apply the opium convention. 
 
 STATISTICS OF PERSIAN EXPORTS 
 
 By this time the Advisory Committee had begun at its various 
 meetings to discuss in some detail the volume and destination of 
 Persia’s opium exports. But the subject had its difficulties. Nothing 
 was clearer than that authoritative information was impossible to get 
 under existing circumstances. Persia had not sent annual reports to 
 Geneva. In the absence of official statistics the best that could be 
 done was to piece together information published in the records of 
 importing countries. But general statements so arrived at concerning 
 the Persian export trade were known to be incomplete, and there 
 was a feeling that their accuracy could not be depended upon. 
 
 Nevertheless, such figures were from time to time compiled and 
 published. Among the first given to the public through the medium 
 of the Advisory Committee was an estimate that in the five years from 
 1914 to 1919 Persia had exported to the United States and to the United 
 Kingdom a total of 3,294,988 lbs. of opium, while to the Far East in the 
 nine years from 1911 to 1920 there had gone consignments (transhipped 
 at Bombay) amounting to 1,832,600 Ibs.^ 
 
 At a later session it was reported that the Administrator General 
 of the Finances of Persia had placed the figure of Persian opium 
 exports for the year 1921 at 362,885 lbs., the destinations named being 
 as follows: For England, 272,644 lbs., for Russia, 32,826 lbs., for 
 Japan, 23,573 lbs., for China, 12,642 lbs., for India, 11,027 lbs., for 
 Mesopotamia, 8,651 lbs., for Egypt, 1,570 lbs., for Switzerland, 1 lb., 
 for the U. S. A., 1 Ib."^ 
 
 (3) League of Nations. Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium. Minutes of the 
 Fourth Session, January 8-14, 1923. Annex I. 
 
 (4) League of Nations. Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium. Minutes of the Fifth 
 Session, May 24-Jttne 7, 1923. 
 
 20 
 
Fragments of information such as the foregoing were welcomed 
 by the Advisory Committee, even though they lacked qualities which 
 would have made them valuable for comparative purposes. For since 
 the Hague Convention had come partially into force the Advisory 
 Committee was on the alert for any item of news which would help 
 to indicate trends in world opium traffic and an opinion existed among 
 members of the Advisory Committee that a particularly dangerous 
 trend was to be found in the movement of large quantities of Persian 
 opium to the Far East. At the third session of the Advisory Com- 
 mittee (September 1, 1922) the view had been stated by Mr. (later Sir) 
 John Campbell, representing India, that exports from India to 
 Formosa had been almost entirely replaced within the last two years 
 by exports of Turkish and Persian opium. Sir Malcolm Delevigne, 
 the Chairman, had added that since states party to the Hague Con- 
 vention had reduced their exports to the Far East in general, a very 
 serious situation had been arising through the increase of exports of 
 Turkish and Persian opium to this area. This was an opinion which 
 later figures were to support more strikingly than those already 
 quoted. 
 
 The first connected and full report on Persian opium exports which 
 the League was able to publish was contained in a memorandum on 
 Persian opium submitted by the Persian Government to the Second 
 Opium Conference in November, 1924. In an appendix to this Mem- 
 orandum the subject of destination of Persian opium shipments was 
 given more extended treatment than hitherto. The most noteworthy 
 feature of the tables prepared on this subject was the indication that 
 whereas Russia had been the declared destination for only 143,312 lbs. 
 of Persian opium in 1922-23, in the following year it had been the 
 declared destination for 451,276 lbs. The amounts consigned to 
 England had dropped from 290,141 lbs. in the earlier year to 9,802 in 
 1923-24, while there had been only a slight reduction in shipments for 
 China (166,725 lbs. in 1922-23 to 137,189 lbs. in 1923-24). 
 
 These figures are of particular interest in the light of statements 
 which were to emanate in succeeding years from the Advisory Com- 
 mittee to the effect that very little of the Persian opium consigned 
 to Russia ever reached that country, but that by far the greater part was 
 diverted to the contraband trade. It is interesting to compare these 
 figures with those in the following table, compiled from figures fur- 
 nished by the British Government and appearing in the records of 
 the seventh, eighth and ninth sessions of the Advisory Committee 
 (1925-27), at which this subject of contraband trade was discussed 
 at greater length. 
 
 21 
 
Persian Opium Known to Have Been Shipped from the Port of Bushire, 
 
 1924-19265 
 
 
 May 1, 
 
 1924- 
 
 June 
 
 1, 1925- 
 
 April 1, 
 
 1926- 
 
 Declared 
 
 May 31 
 
 , 1925 
 
 April 
 
 30, 1926 
 
 November 30, 1926 
 
 Destination* 
 
 Cases 
 
 Pounds 
 
 Cases 
 
 Pounds 
 
 Cases 
 
 Pounds 
 
 Vladivostok 
 
 4,489 
 
 718,240 
 
 5,784 
 
 925,440 
 
 2,958 
 
 473,280 
 
 Dairen 
 
 506 
 
 80,960 
 
 200 
 
 32,000 
 
 200 
 
 32,000 
 
 Keelung 
 
 371 
 
 59,360 
 
 581 
 
 92,960 
 
 50 
 
 8,000 
 
 Macao 
 
 350 
 
 56,000 
 
 
 
 
 
 Singapore 
 
 175 
 
 28,000 
 
 
 
 1,850 
 
 296,000 
 
 Hamburg 
 
 80 
 
 12,800 
 
 
 
 TT .S A . 
 
 5 
 
 800 
 
 
 
 
 
 Hongkongt 
 
 25 
 
 4,000 
 
 
 
 
 
 Kobe 
 
 
 100 
 
 16,000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Total 
 
 6,456 1,032,960 
 
 6,669 
 
 1,067,040 
 
 5,067 
 
 810,720 
 
 • It will be noted that the items listed in this table account for the majority of shipment*, 
 but not for the total amounts quoted. Some of these transactions were legitimate, others illicit, 
 t Destination believed by British authorities to be incorrectly stated. 
 
 Itemized reports of exports from Bushire during the years 1922-24 were 
 not published by the Advisory Committee. It did, however, publish a 
 summary, based on British reports, giving the totals as follows : 
 
 Persian Opium Known to Have Been Shipped from the Port of Bushire, 
 
 1922-19245a 
 
 Cases Pounds 
 
 1922 1,549 247,840 
 
 1923 5,914 946,240 
 
 1924 5,008 801,280 
 
 (Official Persian customs returns did not correspond with the above, 
 inasmuch as they indicated the total exports for 1922 to have been 257,503 
 lbs., and those for 1923 to have been 665,312 lbs.) 
 
 The disparity between the Persian and British figures does not alter 
 one of the main deductions that are to be made on the basis of the above 
 figures — viz., that between the years 1922 and 1926 Persian opium ex- 
 ports were gaining rapidly, while figures for seven months of the year 
 1926-27 indicated that there was no falling off of opium exports in the 
 latter period. 
 
 Returning to the information contained in the Persian Memoran- 
 dum submitted to the Second Opium Conference in November, 1924, 
 a second feature should be referred to, which explained the tenacity 
 with which Persia clung to the right to export all the opium for 
 which it could find a market. Opium exports, the report stated, ac- 
 
 (5) League of Nations. Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium. Seventh, Beighth and 
 Ninth Sessions. Report to the Council. 
 
 (6a) League of Nations. Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium. Seventh Session. 
 Report to the Council, p. II2. 
 
 22 
 
counted for 20 or 25 per cent® of all Persian exports exclusive of oil/ 
 In the view of the Persian Government a country possessing a per- 
 ennially adverse trade balance could not afford to overlook a fact of 
 this importance. 
 
 The total amounts of opium exported from Persia varied from 
 year to year but had not yet reached pre-war levels. The total 
 amount recorded in 1913-14 had been 770,516 lbs. — a figure exceeded 
 in the two following years. The point of lowest depression had been 
 reached in 1921-22 when 255,697 lbs. were exported. In 1923-24 the 
 figure had risen to 690,833 Ibs.^ 
 
 A third feature of the Persian memorandum was the emphasis it 
 laid upon a sudden increase in opium importation into Persia which, 
 it indicated, had taken place since 1921. In the year 1920-21 only 286 
 lbs. of opium had been imported into Persia. In 1921-22 the figure 
 had risen to 955 lbs. In 1922-23 it rose again to 15,034 lbs. and in 
 1923-24 to 22,074 lbs. This phenomenon appeared to be due in part 
 to the fact that increasingly severe export regulations encouraged 
 merchants in neighboring countries to consign their cargoes to Persia, 
 where they were transhipped at the port of Bushire. This, it was 
 said, had been true in the case of Indian opium in the year 1923-24.®®' 
 It was also true in the case of opium from Afghanistan. 
 
 Persia did not look with favor on this new development, inasmuch 
 as fictitiously augmented export figures resulted in bringing unnec- 
 essary odium upon Persia, while at the same time the new trade 
 served to depress the market value of Persian opium itself.® Rep- 
 resentations on the subject were made to the Council of Ministers, 
 who later issued a decision prohibiting the importation of foreign 
 opium into Persia or its transhipment at Persian ports. 
 
 India’s attitude in the matter had the effect of strengthening the 
 Persian Government’s hand, inasmuch as the Indian authorities now 
 
 (6) To avoid paying export taxes in full, merchants were accustomed to value their 
 shipments at a lower figure than was actually commanded in foreign markets. Thus it was 
 that although in customs statistics for the years 1919 to 1924 the percentage of opium exports 
 to total exports (exclusive of oil) ranged from 8.6 per cent to 16.1 per cent, the Persian 
 Government was willing to subscribe to the statement which placed the percentage con- 
 siderably higher. 
 
 (7) Persian oil-fields were under development by foreign concessionaires who accord- 
 ingly enjoyed the profits derived from oil exports. Persia received only a royalty, the wages 
 paid to employees of the company and the amounts spent in the purchase of supplies within 
 the country. Therefore, it was customary for oil to be listed separately or omitted entirely 
 from Persian export statistics. 
 
 (8) For full statistics, including tables showing declared destinations in 1922-24, see 
 Annex V, page 55, 
 
 (8a). The accuracy of the detailed Persian statistics regarding transhipment of Indian 
 opium at Bushire during the year 1923-24 was to be questioned by Sir John Campbell at 
 the Seventh Session of the Advisory Committee in August, 1925. 
 
 (9) LfCague of Nations. Second Opium Conference. Geneva, November 17, 1924-Pebru- 
 ary 19, 1926. Memorandum on Persian Opium, p. 205. 
 
 (10) Administrator-General of the Finances of Persia. Eighth Quarterly Report, June 
 %2-Septem'ber 22, 1924. 
 
 23 
 
prohibited all exports of opium to Persia. This was done in the belief 
 that all opium exported to Persia would go to swell the volume 
 available for the illicit trade.^^ 
 
 PERSIA AT THE SECOND OPIUM CONFERENCE 
 
 That Persia felt the pressure brought to bear on it at Geneva to 
 relinquish its doctrine of a free opium export trade is suggested in the 
 Eighth Quarterly Report of the Administrator General of the 
 Finances ( June-September, 1924), published about the time when 
 the Second Opium Conference met. Designed as a warning to 
 Persian opium producers that it might be an unfortunate thing for 
 themselves if they failed to fall in line with the opium policy which 
 the Government had proposed in its Memorandum to the Second 
 Opium Conference, the report also represented a not uncommon 
 point of view with regard to the precariousness of Persia’s hold on 
 foreign markets — a point of view which ought to be remembered 
 if the attitude adopted by Persia at Geneva is to be thoroughly under- 
 stood. The report read in part : 
 
 “It must be borne in mind that while the other powers cannot prevent 
 the cultivation of opium in Persia and cannot entirely prevent its shipment, 
 they can prevent the shipment of opium through normal channels and its 
 sale in the legitimate markets of the world. Were this done, the only sale 
 for Persian opium would be through two channels, both apparently contra- 
 band. This would mean a monopoly of purchase and consequently de- 
 pressed prices for the Persian producers and merchants. Another danger 
 of being temporarily barred from the legitimate markets of the world is 
 the fact that this would permit other opium growing countries to obtain 
 the business in legitimate opium that now goes to Persia. If they once 
 obtain such an advantage it would be difficult for Persia ever to recover 
 this trade. 
 
 “For these reasons it is of the utmost importance that opium cultiva- 
 tors and merchants fully cooperate with the Government in taking such 
 measures as are possible at present to bring about a better control over the 
 traffic. If they do this and Persia is thus enabled to show the other na- 
 tions that serious steps are being taken, it will certainly be possible to 
 obtain sufficient time to make the change gradually (i. e., substitution of 
 other crops for opium) and to retain for Persia a large share of the 
 world’s opium production, while at the same time accomplishing a ma- 
 terial improvement in the economic condition of the opium growing prov- 
 inces and of the Empire as a whole.” 
 
 Already the American Mission had devoted some thought to the 
 substitution scheme here referred to. Its suggestions were embodied 
 in the Memorandum on Persian Opium, already mentioned, which 
 Prince Arfa-ed-Dowleh presented to the Second Opium Conference 
 in November, 1924. The memorandum outlined measures Persia 
 
 (11) Leairue of Nations. Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium. Minutes of the 
 Seventh Session, August 24-31,1926. 
 
 24 
 
might take to improve its lands, its communications, its irrigation 
 system and its agricultural methods so as to increase ordinary sources 
 of revenue preparatory to experimenting in opium reduction. 
 
 In view of what had transpired in former years, the members of 
 the Second Opium Conference were interested primarily in the new 
 declaration of policy to which these suggestions served as a preface. 
 The Persian Government now declared that it was in full accord and 
 sympathy with the efforts of the League of Nations to eradicate the 
 illicit trade in dangerous drugs. It promised to withdraw its reser- 
 vation to Article 3 of the Treaty of 1912 and to accept the system of 
 opium import certificates as soon as it was economically possible to 
 do so.^2 
 
 The report went on to say that the amount of capital invested in 
 the cultivation of and commerce in opium and the number of people 
 dependent thereon for support was so great that a carefully worked 
 out plan of crop substitution, a large capital investment, and the 
 provision of adequate technical advice and direction were necessary 
 before any serious progress could be made. But if these facilities 
 were provided, it was a practical certainty that the production of 
 opium in Persia could be reduced to medicinal and scientific require- 
 ments within an approximate period of ten years. 
 
 Persia was not in a position to provide for any such heavy expen- 
 ditures as the above program would require. Its revenues were 
 barely sufficient to meet the current expenses, and prospective in- 
 creases in national revenues would have to be devoted in large 
 measure to certain reproductive public works. Furthermore, an ordi- 
 nary loan would not serve Persia’s needs in this regard, since it 
 would be difficult to meet the interest before substitute crops and 
 revenue-producing public works were established on a paying basis. 
 Thus there were three conditions which would have to be fulfilled 
 before Persia could conform to the wishes of the League in the 
 matter of its opium policy. 
 
 1. It must receive a loan of ten million tomans for twenty years at a 
 rate not to exceed S per cent, per annum, no interest being charged for 
 the first five years. One-tenth of the loan should be payable annually 
 beginning with the eleventh year.^^ 
 
 2. During the transition period, foreign Governments having claims 
 against Persia must grant a moratorium, releasing the country temporarily 
 from a financial burden of from one to two million tomans per annum 
 during the difficult period when the revenues were being reorganized. 
 
 (12) At the Second Opium Conference a more detailed scheme than that of 1921 (see 
 above, page 18) was adopted for controlling the export of opium and manufactured drugs. 
 The new measures were expected to ensure that every nation should receive only the raw 
 material or drugs necessary for its needs, and thus become fully responsible for the amount 
 of its importations. For the text of the new provisions for establishing individual export and 
 import certificates see Chapter V of the Second Opium Convention, Articles 12-18. 
 
 (13) It was pointed out that this would cost the governments concerned approximately 
 500,000 tomans annually for the first five years. Persia’s loss of revenue during the transition 
 period would be much greater. 
 
 25 
 
3. Restrictions on Persia’s liberty of action in tariff questions!^ must be 
 removed and the assistance of interested Governments secured in increasing 
 the Customs revenues. 
 
 Several considerations led the Persian Government to feel that it 
 had a right to make these demands. Although a neutral country, 
 Persia had been invaded and ravaged during the war. It had re- 
 ceived no reparations. Neither had it floated a reconstruction loan. 
 The country was on the verge of bankruptcy and could not afford 
 to complicate its financial difficulties by permitting such an economic 
 disturbance as would be caused by the suppression of the opium 
 industry, unless, prior to taking the initial steps, a practicable pro- 
 gram of substitution was before it, together with the requisite capital 
 and technical assistance. 
 
 The Persian Government reminded the League that the question 
 was one which affected a fifth of Persia’s exports, a twelfth of its 
 revenues and the means of livelihood of a very great number of its 
 citizens. It maintained that since I’ersia was an impoverished country 
 and among those least able to bear losses of revenue, it was only fair 
 to expect that the vastly richer nations “for whose sake Persia (was) 
 being asked to undertake financial sacrifice and run the risk of political 
 disturbance,” should defray the cost. 
 
 In accordance with its instructions, the Persian delegation inti- 
 mated that its government could not be expected to ratify the Second 
 Opium Convention unless the three main proposals it had put forward 
 were accepted as they stood in the Persian memorandum. Sub-Com- 
 mittee B, before which the proposals were laid, felt, however, that 
 it was impossible for it to examine the material and practical side of 
 the Persian requests in the absence of information collected by experts 
 on the spot. Mrs. Hamilton Wright, of the American delegation, 
 holding that it was necessary to get the co-operation of producing 
 countries, suggested that a small committee composed of agricultur- 
 ists, bankers, etc., should be sent to Persia and other producing coun- 
 tries to enquire into their needs and see what steps could be taken. 
 The Conference adopted this suggestion in modified form. With the 
 assent of the Persian Government it decided on December 17 to 
 recommend that a small committee of qualified experts be despatched 
 to Persia to enquire into actual conditions in that country, with a 
 view to determining the suitability of the Persian proposals. (For 
 a further account of this Commission of Enquiry see below, page 28.) 
 
 It was during the sessions of the Second Opium Conference, before 
 the decision had been made to adopt the foregoing resolution, that 
 
 (14) A series of treaties with foreign powers beginning with the Treaty of Turkmanchai 
 in 1828 established tariff rates which could not be altered except by special agreement be- 
 tween Persia and the government of the country concerned. Tariff rates varied widely. 
 Dr. A. C. Millspaugh in The American Task in Persia summarized the situation in saying that 
 commodities which were of interest to Russia bore an average tax of 4.75 per cent while 
 commodities of interest to Great Britain paid an average of 26.77 per cent. 
 
 26 
 
Prince Ar£a-ed-Dowleh entered a plea for greater attention on the 
 part of the League to the position and needs of all opium-producing 
 countries. Turkey, Afghanistan, Egypt, Turkestan, Bokhara, Khiva, 
 and Turkman, which had not yet joined the League of Nations, were 
 not represented on the Opium Committees. But they were all opium 
 producing countries. Persia, which did have a representative at 
 Geneva, had not been consulted. No one had asked the Persian dele- 
 gate what was the position of his countr)% or how the League could 
 help Persia in its difficulties. The only question asked hitherto was 
 why Persia did not destroy its poppy plantations once and for all. 
 No one seemed to realize that Persia could not decree the starvation 
 of thousands of men, women and children employed in the cultivation 
 of opium, which for centuries had been their sole means of livelihood. 
 
 PERSIAN EXPORT POLICY SINCE THE GENEVA CONFERENCE 
 
 When the Advisory Committee met again in August, 1925, to take 
 stock of the situation created by the recent Opium Conference and to 
 prepare for the Assembly meeting of the following months, certain 
 of its members objected more insistently than ever before to the 
 difficulties Persia’s opium policy was creating for the rest of the 
 world. 
 
 Longer statements than ever were transmitted to the Council on 
 the subject of Persian opium. It was pointed out that export of 
 opium from the Persian Gulf to the Far East was (next to the pro- 
 duction of opium in China) the most important factor in the illicit 
 traffic in opium carried on in the Far East. Reports in the possession 
 of the Advisory Committee showed that large quantities were declared 
 for destinations which they never reached. The Committee consid- 
 ered that measures for the effective control of the export traffic were 
 of the first importance. Complete control could only be secured by 
 the adoption and enforcement on the part of the Persian Government 
 of the system of export licenses and import certificates, and it recom- 
 mended to the Council and to the Assembly that urgent represent- 
 ations should be addressed to the Persian Government requesting it 
 to put this system into force without delay. 
 
 But merely to bring pressure to bear upon Persia by means of a 
 communication from the League repeating what it had frequently 
 said before appeared to be a futile procedure. Accordingly the Ad- 
 visory Committee varied its method by adopting two additional 
 recommendations. The first suggested that Powers whose flag was 
 carried by ships trading in the Persian Gulf should adopt measures 
 to control the conveyance of opium from the Persian Gulf on such 
 ships, and to prevent its diversion into the illicit traffic. The second 
 suggested that Powers at whose ports vessels conveying opium from 
 the Persian Gulf called should put in force at once measures described 
 
 27 
 
in Chapter V of the Second Opium Convention for controlling trans- 
 shipment of consignments of opium and dangerous drugs. 
 
 All three resolutions were forwarded in October, 1925, to the Per- 
 sian Government and to a number of other powers. But when the 
 Advisory Committee convened for its eighth session (May-June, 1926) 
 the situation had not altered appreciably, except in one respect. On 
 January 1, 1925, British regulations had gone into force to prevent 
 British vessels from being employed in the conveyance of opium ex- 
 ported from the Persian Gulf to the Far East for illicit purposes. 
 These regulations appeared to be having the effect desired so far as 
 British ships were concerned, but ships of other nationalities were 
 profiting by the opportunity to divide the former British trade among 
 themselves. 
 
 Once more the Advisory Committee appealed to the powers for 
 assistance. It stated that the bulk of the opium exported from the 
 Persian Gulf continued to be sent to the Far East under false declara- 
 tion of destination^^ and undoubtedly found its way into the illicit 
 traffic. It asked the Council to make urgent representations to the 
 Governments of those countries whose ships were still engaged in 
 the Persian Gulf traffic to take the measures necessary for control 
 of the traffic. The Committee further recommended that the Govern- 
 ments of powers having extra-territorial rights in Persia be asked to 
 institute control over their nationals in Persia on the lines of the regu- 
 lations already made by Great Britain. (The latter had provided 
 by orders-in-council issued in 1901 and 1907 that no British subject 
 might engage in the Persian opium trade unless he possessed a gen- 
 eral or special license granted by the British Consul-General.) 
 
 Seven months later when the Advisory Committee convened for its 
 ninth session, (January-Eebruary, 1927) it had the satisfaction of 
 learning that the Japanese Government had succeeded in practically 
 putting a stop to the use of Japanese ships in the Persian Gulf trade. 
 Thus its plans had advanced a second step. 
 
 It was only a month later that an event occurred which made it 
 seem not impossible that another step of a different sort might soon 
 Be made toward the settlement of the Persian opium question. This 
 event was the presentation to the Council of the completed report of 
 the League Commission of Enquiry into the Production of Opium 
 in Persia. 
 
 It was the Fifth Assembly which, acting on a suggestion from the 
 Second Opium Conference and a strong, recommendation from the 
 Fifth Committee, had provided in a resolution of September 26, 1925, 
 for the despatch of such a Commission to Persia to study the existing 
 situation with regard to the cultivation of the poppy and the replace- 
 
 (15) For statistics see page 22. 
 
 28 
 
ment of a portion of this crop by other crops. The Commission, 
 consisting of Mr. Frederic A. Delano (U.S.A.) as President and Dr. 
 Fridiano Cavara (Italy) and M. Victor Cayla (France) as members, 
 accompanied by an American agricultural expert, a general secretary, 
 private secretary and stenographer, left Geneva for Persia on March 
 11, 1926. The Commission returned to Marseilles on June 16, after 
 having spent seventy-five days in Persia. In this period it visited 
 sections of the country as wddely separated as Meshed and Muham- 
 march, Turkmanchai and Shiraz. (For itinerary of the Commission see 
 map below.) 
 
 Sketch Map of Persia 
 
 (Showing itinerary of League Commission of Enquiry) 
 
 The report to the League Council prepared by the Delano Com- 
 mission was based on a study of relevant documents, supplemented 
 by personal interviews and first-hand observation. It discussed the 
 bearing of Persia’s geographical, agricultural, and economic situation 
 upon the question of crop substitution, as well as problems of trans- 
 
 29 
 
portation, commerce, industry, land tenure and taxation. On the 
 strength of these studies the Commission expressed a conviction that 
 Persia ought to find it feasible to adopt a program for gradual cur- 
 tailment of opium production. It took the view that although such 
 curtailment would be attended by manifold difficulties, the resulting 
 economic benefit would outweigh initial disadvantages. 
 
 This conclusion was not advanced without a considerable body of 
 supporting evidence, the most convenient summary of which is to 
 be found in the personal review of the salient features of the report 
 prepared by the Chairman, Mr. Delano. No clearer conception of 
 the original findings of the Commission may be gathered from a brief 
 resume than by reading this outline, reproduced in Annex II, page 40 
 of the present study. Similarly, the general conclusions and recom- 
 mendations of the Commission may be most readily reviewed in the 
 Commission’s own outline (see Annex III, page 44), which should 
 be read in connection with the foregoing. 
 
 On comparing the proposals of the Commission of Enquiry with 
 the demands presented by the Persian delegation at the Second Opium 
 Conference in November, 1924, it is interesting to note that while the 
 League Commission maintained that Persia should be permitted a 
 free hand in readjusting its customs tariffs it said nothing whatever 
 about a moratorium nor did it advocate a foreign loan. In place of 
 these two demands formerly put forward by the Persian Government, 
 the League Commission of Enquiry now stressed the importance of 
 general revenue-producing policies. It suggested that before it under- 
 took an active reduction program, Persia should be given three years 
 to improve its internal economic condition, by beginning road con- 
 struction, adjusting import tariffs and improving agricultural meth- 
 ods. After the three-year period of preparation, the Persian Govern- 
 ment would be in a position to begin annual ten per cent reductions 
 of its opium production. But even before it reached this stage, meas- 
 ures ought to be taken to make control of present opium production 
 and distribution more effective. 
 
 The Commission made a few definite suggestions as to how this 
 control might be improved without waiting for the three-year pre- 
 paratory period to elapse. Its suggestions are embodied in the follow- 
 ing extract from the text of the Commission’s report 
 
 “1. It is at present the practice to collect very high taxes and fees on 
 the stick opium intended for home consumption, while imposing smaller 
 charges on export opium. This difference, which varies according to the 
 distance of the place of manufacture from the port of export, makes these 
 charges frequently 16 times higher in the case of opium prepared for 
 home consumption. 
 
 (16) Transmitted to the Secretary-General of the League in a letter dated April 23, 
 1927. (Council Document A. 16. 1927. XI.) 
 
 (16a) League of Nations. Heport of the Commission of Enquiry into the Production of 
 Opium in Persia, p. 41. 
 
 30 
 
“The Commission believes this difference to be unjustifiable. The tax 
 on opium for home consumption is so high as to lend itself to all kinds of 
 evasion, while the export tax might well be higher and so yield more 
 revenue. 
 
 “2. There is no form of license or registration for the ground allocated 
 to opium cultivation, and no tax collected on ground allocation except the 
 regular land tax. This should be remedied. 
 
 “3. While in some districts opium is duly delivered to the Government 
 warehouse and manufactured there into stick or cake opium, the Commis- 
 sion observed that in certain cities the Government had found it expedient 
 to leave the manufacture of opium for export entirely in private hands, 
 although under the more or less strict supervision of its officials. Where 
 the manufacture is left to private persons, it is rare for the opium to be 
 identified by marks showing place of origin, etc. 
 
 “The identity of all opium should certainly be clearly marked or stamped 
 upon each piece. 
 
 “4. Merchants, pedlars, etc., are understood to be licensed and to pay 
 a license fee. The fee is a low one and hardly commensurate with the 
 volume and character of the business transacted, while the merchants 
 (whether great or small) are not required to file any surety bond in a 
 substantial sum for the observance of the law or the payment of Govern- 
 ment fees or taxes, although it should be added that the Commission was 
 informed that merchants intending to export opium were obliged to make 
 a declaration to that effect and to give a bond for the difference between 
 the excise tax and the export duty on the amount of opium declared for export. 
 A large opium merchant told the Commission that a case of opium worth 
 750 to 800 tomans at Bushire with taxes paid would fetch 2,100 tomans at 
 Shanghai, thus indicating that Persia was selling her opium too cheaply 
 or failing to tax it at its true value. 
 
 “In its memorandum to the Second Opium Conference (Document O. D. 
 C. 24) the Persian Government estimates that, whereas 1,340,000 lbs. of 
 opium were registered with the Government as the annual production 
 for the year 1923-24, the actual production for that year was as much as 
 1,950,000 lbs. In other words, the Government assumes that 610,000 lbs. 
 or 33 per cent, evaded taxation by escaping Government supervision.” 
 
 The Persian Government was not prepared to accept the Commis- 
 sion’s general proposals in their entirety. In agreement with the 
 intention of the League of Nations and the above recommendations 
 of the Commission, it did promise to study the increase of export 
 customs duties on such opium as was exported without certificate, and 
 likewise to study changing the existing taxes on opium to other 
 taxes which would facilitate a decrease in cultivation of and commerce 
 in opium. But in the matter of the Commission’s main recommend- 
 ations, it had certain important reservations to propose. It expressed 
 willingness to enter upon a plan for the reduction of opium production 
 after a three year preparatory period, but stipulated that annual ten 
 per cent reductions should take the form of a three year experiment 
 only, at the end of which the Persian Government would reconsider 
 
 31 
 
its own economic position and observe the degree to which other 
 producing countries had curtailed their production of the raw material 
 and of the manufactured product. It would also take into account 
 reductions which had occurred during the three year period in world 
 manufacture and distribution of habit-forming drugs. But because 
 the Commission had not stated the time which, in its estimation, the 
 substitution program would require, nor what the cost of substitution 
 would be, the Persian Government maintained that it could not ask 
 the Mejliss to endorse an unqualified program of reduction. 
 
 The Persian Government promised to ask the Mejliss to grant five 
 year exemptions from land taxes in the case of areas diverted from 
 opium cultivation to that of substitute crops, and preference in agri- 
 cultural loans to cultivators who were giving up opium production. 
 
 The Persian Government’s attitude in relation to the adoption of 
 import and export certificates was expressed in the following terms : 
 It would submit to the Mejliss, with recommendation for its enact- 
 ment into law, a program lit had prepared for “acceptance of the opium 
 import certificate system with an annual reduction, beginning not 
 later than the third year after the present, of 10 per cent of the 
 quantity annually permitted to leave the country without production 
 of opium import certificates.” This was subject to the reservation 
 that, as in the case of the ten per cent reduction plan, the Persian 
 Government would later reconsider its position in relation to the 
 world situation. 
 
 Already a project of law had been prepared (see* Eighteenth 
 Quarterly Report of the Administrator General of the Finances of 
 Persia) providing for the establishment of a Government monopoly 
 of opium, tobacco and matches, together with the establishment of 
 income taxes, in a comprehensive plan for modifying an age-old land 
 tax, recognized to be placing a burden on agriculture out of all pro- 
 portion to the actual revenue returns. In this connection the Ad- 
 ministrator General of the Finances of Persia wrote: “If it is necessary 
 to obtain an increase of revenue to offset the loss of revenue from 
 the reduction or assignment of land taxes, it seems evident that the 
 new taxes should be imposed on imports of luxuries and on such 
 commodities as tobacco and opium. Tobacco is a luxury commodity 
 with a steady demand. The same considerations apply to opium, with 
 the additional consideration in the case of opium that there are 
 international obligations to be fulfilled, necessitating a larger measure 
 of governmental control.” 
 
 (17) For a highly condensed summary of the Commission’s proposals and the Persian 
 Government's counter-proposals, see Revort of the Fifth Committee to the Assembly, Septem- 
 ber, 1927. (Council Document A. 66. 1927, XI.) For the text of the Persian Government's 
 
 proposals, see Annex IV, p. 51-52. For comments of the Advisory Committee on what it 
 considered an inadequate declaration by the Persian Government, see p. 36. 
 
 32 
 
The Administrator General of the Finances of Persia had proceeded 
 to place the situation before the Persian people in the following 
 words : 
 
 “In order that the assurances given by the Persian Government to the 
 League of Nations should be carried out before the meeting of the As- 
 sembly in September, these assurances, together with a program of opium 
 control and reduction, have been embodied in the general fiscal project. 
 These provisions are believed to be in the interest of the international 
 position of Persia and also in the interest of the Persian people themselves. 
 In view of the restrictions that are being placed by the shipping nations 
 on the transport of opium, it is evident that contraband trade in opium 
 will in the near future be stopped. By adopting the import certificate 
 system, Persian opium merchants should be able to obtain a reasonable 
 share of the legitimate trade in opium. It is believed, further, that the 
 initial reduction in production can be carried out without serious hardship, 
 and that in the end the Persian landowners and peasants now engaged in 
 the cultivation of opium will benefit through the substitution for opium 
 of an exportable crop for which there may be a safe, established and 
 increasing market. It is also necessary that the Persian Government 
 should, like other governments, take steps to reduce the internal con- 
 sumption of opium. This can be done through the establishment of the 
 requisite means of control by the Government.” 
 
 The points on which the Persian Government differed from the 
 views expressed by the Commission were numerous. In this case 
 also an excellent summary exists to which the reader is referred. 
 (See Annex IV, page 49.) From a perusal of this resume it becomes 
 apparent that Persia had reduced from three to two the number of 
 conditions it now demanded as a prerequisite for any alteration of 
 its traditional opium export policy. It continued, as in 1924, to de- 
 mand tariff autonomy, but it had given up its former demands for a 
 loan and moratorium. It intimated now, however, that it would not 
 attempt to carry on indefinitely its prospective experiment in crop 
 reduction unless other producing and manufacturing nations also 
 reduced their output. Contrary to the beliefs of the Commission, it 
 Held that Persian opium was not of a quality eminently suitable for 
 use in drug manufacture. Hence it maintained that a reduction in 
 the quantity of opium produced in Persia would cause no appreciable 
 reduction in the quantity of raw material available for manufacture. 
 It asserted that in order to reduce drug manufacture, at present im- 
 measurably greater than the world’s medicinal and scientific require- 
 ments, there would have to take place a simultaneous and drastic 
 reduction in the output of every opium producing country as well as 
 in the output of countries in which the coca-leaf was produced. 
 
 Four League bodies discussed the report of the Commission of 
 Enquiry during the course of the year 1927 — first the Council, to 
 which it was originally submitted, then the Fifth Committee of the 
 
 33 
 
Assembly, whose duty it was to recommend to the Assembly a suit- 
 able course of action in relation to the report, then the Assembly 
 itself, which had the right to accept, amend or reject the recom- 
 mendations of the Fifth Committee, and finally the Advisory Com- 
 mittee on Traffic in Opium, which had certain comments to make 
 to the Council in relation to the subject-matter of the report and 
 the Persian Government’s reply and concerning questions of future 
 policy raised by both documents. 
 
 The Council in the month of March did not find itself in a position 
 to take definitive action upon the Commission’s report. It heard the 
 oral statement of Colonel D. W. MacCormack in support of the views 
 put forward by the Persian Government. But since circumstances 
 had prevented the Council from circulating the report of the Com- 
 mission and the Persian observations thereon to its members before 
 the date of meeting, it decided to place the question of opium pro- 
 duction in Persia upon the agenda of the next meeting of the Assem- 
 bly in September, it being suggested that members of the Council 
 reserve all comments on the subject until that time. 
 
 The Fifth Committee of the Assembly, when it met in September, 
 also had opportunities to listen to oral statements from Colonel Mac- 
 Cormack who, with Hussein Khan Ala, spoke on behalf of the Persian 
 Government after Mr. Frederic Delano, Chairman of the Commission of 
 Enquiry, had addressed the members of the Fifth Committee on behalf 
 of the Commission. 
 
 In its report to the Assembly, the Fifth Committee described the 
 positions assumed by the Commission of Enquiry and the Persian 
 Government respectively. It then stated that the experiment which 
 had been made in sending the Commission of Enquiry to Persia was 
 of so great value that the League ought not to lose sight of the further 
 development of the policy thus inaugurated. It suggested that the 
 Persian Government keep the League informed of further develop- 
 ments in the program it had laid down for its own guidance, and 
 expressed the firm conviction that other governments concerned 
 with the production of the raw material and with the manufacture of 
 narcotic drugs would take similar or equivalent action. It appealed 
 CO all governments who had so far failed to do so to ratify the Geneva 
 Arrangement and Convention, and to keep the League informed of all 
 enforcement measures they were adopting. 
 
 Finally, the Fifth Committee of the Assembly embodied in a resolu- 
 tion the course of action which it suggested that the Assembly should 
 adopt. The text of the resolution follows, the words here italicized 
 representing an amendment incorporated in it on the suggestion of 
 Colonel D. W. MacCormack: 
 
 “The Assembly takes note of the report of the Commission of Enquiry 
 into the production of opium in Persia, of the observations of the Persian 
 
 34 
 
Government on that report, and of the letter from the Chairman of the 
 Commission of Enquiry to the Secretary-General dated April 23rd, 1927. 
 
 “It expresses its sincere thanks to the members of the Commission 
 for their valuable work and its high appreciation of the good will shown 
 by the Persian Government in co-operation with the League in its at- 
 tempts to reach a solution of the difficult and complicated problem of 
 narcotic control. 
 
 “The Persian Government having declared that the success of its pro- 
 gramme will, in large measure, be dependent on its obtaining liberty of action 
 in tariff affairs and on the removal of the restrictive tariffs on Persian 
 prodxicts which must be substituted for opium, the Assembly expresses the 
 hope that the Governments concerned will give their earnest and favourable 
 attention to those conditions and that the Persian Government will keep the 
 League of Nations informed of the progress made in carrying out the scheme 
 proposed for the gradual diminution of the cultivation of the opium poppy 
 in Persia. 
 
 “It earnestly recommends to all countries concerned with the produc- 
 tion and manufacture of dangerous drugs and their raw material the en- 
 actment of legislation similar to that now proposed by the Government 
 of Persia, or such equivalent action as will ensure the necessary reduction 
 of raw material and the manufacture of drugs.’’ 
 
 This resolution, in practically identical form, was adopted by the 
 Assembly. 
 
 The only body which had not yet had the report of the Commission 
 officially before it was the Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium. 
 This body in its turn considered the document in conjunction with 
 the observations of the Persian Government, at its tenth session, 
 (September 28 - October 8, 1927). 
 
 Sir Malcolm Delevigne (Chairman) utilized this opportunity to 
 challenge the view expressed in the latter document that Persian 
 opium was not of a quality to be useful in the manufacture of drugs 
 and that its production had no effect on the drug traffic.® He main- 
 tained that Persian opium had been used for the manufacture of drugs 
 in the pre-war period and would undoubtedly be so used again if it 
 were again available on terms similar to those current before the war. 
 
 Sir Malcolm Delevigne then referred to a statement of great impor- 
 tance made by Colonel MacCormack in his speech to the Fifth Com- 
 mittee. Colonel MacCormack, he said, had pointed out that the 
 decision of the Indian Government to reduce the export of opium had 
 had the effect of transferring to the Persian market the demand for 
 raw opium from countries and overseas possessions where smoking 
 
 (8) The various pronouncements made on this subject before the League may be referred 
 to in the following documents; Report of the League Commission of Enquiry into the Pro- 
 duction of Opium in Persia, p. 39. Observations of the Persian Government on the foregoing, 
 pp. 1, 8-10, 23-24. Letter from the Chairman of the Commission of Enquiry to the Secretary- 
 General of the League, p'. 4. Report of the Fifth Committee to the Assembly, September 16, 
 1927, p. 2. Statement of Colonel D. W. MacCormack to Fifth Committee on September 13, 
 1927, (Third meeting). Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium. Minutes of the Fourth 
 Session (1923) p. 30. Minutes of the Tenth Session (1927) p. 30. 
 
 35 
 
of opium was still permitted. Colonel MacCormack had said, further- 
 more, that opium traders had informed him that their exports were 
 for the most part covered by the opium import certificates. This 
 was a gratifying situation, but, as Colonel MacCormack had pointed 
 out, there was a corresponding danger to be noted. This danger 
 lay in the possible augmentation of the opposition of the Persian 
 opium traders to the Government curtailment programme, in view 
 of the lucrative new business opening up before them. From this it 
 would appear that Persian cultivators and traders would try to keep 
 their hold on the old markets for which import certificates were not 
 forthcoming while at the same time attaining the new.® 
 
 An expression of disappointment followed, because of the fact that 
 the Persian Government had not seen its way clear to acquiesce in 
 the whole programme suggested by the Commission of Enquiry. De- 
 voted ever since its own establishment to the task of securing Persia’s 
 adherence to the full measure of drug control suggested for inter- 
 national observance, and faced after six years with a material increase 
 rather than reduction in Persian exports, it expressed its regret in the 
 following words, addressed to the Council of the League: 
 
 “. . . Persia has not yet ratified the Hague Convention of 1917 ; 
 and her signature of that Convention was accompanied by the impor- 
 tant reservation that she would not agree to undertake measures to 
 prevent the export of raw opium to countries which shall have pro- 
 hibited its entry. The Committee feels that, with this vital reserva- 
 tion upon a fundamental point still in force, it would be optimistic 
 to expect that much progress can be made in combating the illicit 
 trade. It would also point out that the Persian Government proposes 
 to accept the import and export certificate system three years hence; 
 from the date of such acceptance it will reduce by ten per cent each 
 year (subject to certain conditions and reservations) ‘the quantity 
 annually permitted to leave the country without production of opium 
 import certificates.’ The decision by India to reduce her exports of 
 opium has deflected to Persia a large demand of a legitimate char- 
 acter; this must, unless the total amount of opium produced by Persia 
 be increased, lead to a diminution of the quantity of opium which has 
 in the past found its way from that country into illicit channels. 
 Broadly speaking, opium which leaves Persia uncovered by import 
 certificates gets into the illicit traffic ; the undertaking is therefore a 
 conditional promise that, three years hence, the Government of Persia 
 will begin to reduce by ten per cent a year a traffic which now finds 
 its way, almost exclusively, into illicit channels. The Committee 
 cannot but regret that the Persian Government should have felt unable 
 to advance further than this. It recognizes, however, that the action 
 
 (9) It should be kept in mind that this was a conclusion arrived at by Sir Malcolm 
 Delevigne, but not expressed by Colonel MacCormack, whose statement to the Fifth Com- 
 mittee in September, 1927, will be available when the Minutes have been published, 
 
 36 
 
which that Government agrees to take constitutes a considerable step 
 in advance, and the present situation is so menacing that it welcomes 
 any amelioration of it. It will watch the progress which may be 
 achieved in this matter with the most lively and sympathetic 
 interest.” 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
 I N looking back over the Persian opium situation as it has existed 
 during the past twenty years, there appear a few salient features 
 which might perhaps be most readily summed up as follows : 
 
 Persia is one of the states which has associated itself with inter- 
 national efforts to control opium production and the traffic in drugs 
 ever since the time when those efforts first took organized form in 
 1909. One outstanding limitation has hitherto characterized its 
 participation in these international efforts — its association with other 
 nations in conferences at Shanghai, The Hague and Geneva has not 
 led hitherto to the ratification by the Persian Mejliss of either of the 
 international opium conventions. 
 
 To Persia the chief stumbling-block in the way of ratifying the 
 Hague Convention has been the clause designed to establish control 
 by national governments over the destination of opium exports. Never 
 having assumed such responsibility in the past, Persia hesitated to 
 do so now, lest one of the most profitable sources of gain to its 
 citizens and revenue to the government coffers should be stopped. 
 
 By the year 1926 fifty-seven other nations, by ratifying the Hague 
 Convention, had taken the step Persia had refused to take. Thirty- 
 six of these states had accepted the import and export certificate 
 system. Thirty-three had announced that the system had already 
 been put into force, not only in their own countries but also in ten 
 of their colonies, possessions and mandated territories. 
 
 Of certain of these states it could not be said that they were en- 
 forcing the regulations with any degree of thoroughness, and laxity 
 on the part of some was proving a source of irritation to those who 
 were endeavoring in their own case to make the regulations effective. 
 Of the states which were dilatory in enforcement the most that could 
 be said was that they had accepted the import and export system 
 in principle at least, and without attempts to secure indemnity for 
 loss of trade which that acceptance might cause. 
 
 With Persia the case was different. It had repeatedly refused to 
 endorse the principle of export and import certificates unless certain 
 specific demands were fulfilled. These demands varied in detail 
 from year to year, but retained the essential characteristic of requiring 
 first of all that Persia’s economic position should not be injured by 
 any change which the Persian Government was called upon to adopt. 
 
 37 
 
The League of Nations responded to Persia’s first demands by- 
 despatching a Commission of Enquiry to investigate on the spot the 
 actual economic requirements of the country. When the report of 
 that Commission was completed the Persian Government responded 
 by presenting fresh demands as a condition for its adoption of the 
 import and export certificate system. 
 
 These demands have already been recorded. It is significant that 
 in announcing its conditional and temporary adoption of import and 
 export certificates, the Persian Government allows itself such latitude 
 in the interpretation of the conditions it has itself laid down as a 
 pre-requisite for acceptance of the system in toto, that it becomes im- 
 possible for anyone to predict on the basis of the Persian Govern- 
 ment’s report whether or not the Persian Council of Ministers will 
 go so far as to recommend to the Mejliss sixt years from now a 
 measure finally adopting the system. Lastly, as the Persian Govern- 
 ment has pointed out, there can be no assurance that the Mejliss 
 would ratify any such measure that might in future be proposed to it. 
 This fact is one of the important features of the Persian proposals. 
 
 Meanwhile it has been hinted by the former Director General of 
 the Persian Internal Revenue Administration that a substantial 
 change is occurring in Persian exports of opium. This is due in large 
 part to the fact that Persian merchants have taken advantage of the 
 withdrawal of India from the world’s opium markets to substitute 
 Persian for Indian opium in the trade covered by import and export 
 certificates. At the same time, there is no indication that Persian 
 merchants have relinquished the trade they formerly plied in ship- 
 ments of opium not sanctioned by the terms of the Hague Convention. 
 
 This apparent increase in Persian opium exports at a time when 
 international efforts are being directed toward their drastic diminu- 
 tion is one of the circumstances which has caused the Chairman of the 
 Advisory Committee to regard the undertakings of the Persian 
 Government with a restrained optimism. This, too, is one of the 
 circumstances which has caused restraint rather than optimism to 
 characterize the tenth official report of the Advisory Committee to 
 the League Council in October, 1927. 
 
 Thus as the year 1928 advances, it appears not unlikely to Geneva 
 observers that substantial obstacles may still continue to block the 
 path to Persia’s complete acceptance of the import and export 
 certificate system. If such proves to be the case, it may well happen 
 that Geneva will look back upon the year 1927 as an incident, but 
 scarcely as a turning-point, in the progress of Persia toward com- 
 plete cooperation in international control of the traffic in opium. 
 
 38 
 
ANNEX I 
 
 PERSIAN POLICY OF OPIUM RESTRICTION 
 
 Extract from Memorandum on Persian Opium submitted by Persian 
 Delegation to Second Opium Conference at Geneva, November, 1924.* 
 
 General Policy 
 
 The Persian Government is in full accord and sympathy with the 
 efforts of the League of Nations to eradicate the illicit trade in dangerous 
 drugs, which offers so great a menace to the health and welfare of the 
 peoples of the world. It accepts the American principles for the inter- 
 pretation of the Opium Convention and will withdraw its reservation to 
 Article 3 of the Treaty of 1912 and accept the system of opium import 
 certificates as soon as it is economically possible to do so. 
 
 Unconditional Assurances 
 
 1. The regulations relative to the centralisation of the opium sap and 
 its manipulation under the Government’s supervision will be strictly 
 enforced and constantly rendered more effective. 
 
 2. Steps will be taken to register smokers, to cure present and to 
 prevent new addicts, to control opium dens, and otherwise to bring under 
 control and to reduce the present consumption of opium and its deriva- 
 tives in the Empire. 
 
 3. Control, as far as funds permit, will be exercised at the frontiers 
 to prevent opium being smuggled into or out of the country. 
 
 4. The policy as to opium cultivation will be as follows : 
 
 (a) Opium cultivation will hereafter be permitted only upon 
 permit ; 
 
 (b) No cultivation will be permitted on a greater area than 
 stated in the permit; 
 
 (c) No permit to be issued to cultivators for land not cultivated 
 in 1924, or for a greater area in the case of any individual than 
 cultivated in 1924; 
 
 (d) No permits to be issued except to cultivators who agree 
 to deliver entire crop to Government warehouses ; 
 
 (e) Efforts to be made to immediately reduce the cultivation 
 in provinces least dependent on opium for their cash crops ; 
 
 (f) Cultivation to be confined as far as practicable to provinces 
 where the best grades are grown and where the product can be 
 most easily controlled; 
 
 (g) The tax on the local consumption of opium to be progres- 
 sively increased as provided in the law. 
 
 5. The importation of opium for re-export to countries to which it 
 cannot be shipped from country of origin, will be prohibited. 
 
 6. Beginning with the present year, a careful record will be kept of 
 
 •See League of Nations. Records of the Second Opium Conference, Geneva, Nov. 17, 1924- 
 Feb. 19, 192B, Vol. 11. p. 2D1-2. 
 
 39 
 
opium cultivation in all provinces. This, taken in connection with records 
 and estimates of local consumption and customs records of exports, will 
 afford a fair basis for estimate of that smuggled out of the country and 
 enable the necessary preventive measures being taken. 
 
 7. As far as funds permit, the Government will continue its present 
 encouragement to the cultivation of cotton and tobacco and to the plant- 
 ing of mulberry trees. As these and similar measures produce results, 
 the cultivation of opium will be proportionally reduced, but it must be 
 understood that, with the limited funds available, this will be a slow 
 process. 
 
 Conditional Assurances 
 
 The following measures will be placed in effect as soon as the neces- 
 sary funds and technical assistants are obtained to afford another outlet 
 for the capital and labour employed in the opium trade, and to provide 
 new revenue sources for the Government to compensate for the loss of 
 opium revenues : 
 
 1. An annual reduction in the permits issued to the amount of one- 
 tenth of the total area authorised for cultivation in the year in which 
 the above conditions are met. This annual reduction to continue, until 
 production has been reduced to actual requirements for medicinal and 
 scientific purposes. 
 
 2. Within three years after the above conditions are met, the cultiva- 
 tion of opium will be prohibited in the provinces least dependent upon it 
 in so far as the then existing conditions permit. 
 
 3. After the cultivation has been reduced as above provided to the 
 amount required for medicinal and scientific purposes the Persian Gov- 
 ernment can successfully enforce the provisions of Article 3 of the 
 Opium Convention of 1912 and its reservation thereto will then be with- 
 drawn and the system of opium import certificates placed in effect. 
 
 ANNEX II 
 
 CHAIRMAN’S PERSONAL SUMMARY OF FINDINGS OF 
 LEAGUE COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY 
 
 Extract from a letter to the Secretary-General of the League signed by 
 
 Frederic A. Delano. 
 
 THE FINDINGS 
 
 1. Persia was once the centre of the then-known civilised world, and 
 the chief trade routes to the Far East lay across it. To-day it is off the 
 main trade routes and, at least relatively speaking, is far more inaccessible 
 than formerly. 
 
 2. North and North-West Persia have, under normal conditions, easy 
 and close trade relations with Russia, Iraq (Mesopotamia), and with 
 Turkey; while North-East Persia has close trade relations with Russian 
 Transcaucasia, Russian Turkestan and Afghanistan; and South Persia 
 close trade relations with Great Britain, with Iraq and with India. 
 
 40 
 
3. Owing to the lack of good means of communications either by land 
 or sea, internal commerce is greatly restricted, and foreign commerce 
 exists, broadly speaking, only with cities near the frontier. (The report 
 shows that the transport charges on goods moved chiefly by caravan, re- 
 duced to our nomenclature, amount to from 18 to 35 cents per ton mile.) 
 
 4. While it is probably true that Persia’s undeveloped and undiscov- 
 ered resources are large, the Persian people as a whole are poor — ^very 
 poor ; and this is due to economic conditions which have in the last hundred 
 years been driving her to the wall. During a considerable part of this 
 time, Persia’s trade balance has been against her, and the deficit has been 
 in part represented by debt, but more often in the depletion of her capi- 
 tal, in her case of those savings of the past in the form of rare art treas- 
 ures, beautiful fabrics, tiles, miniatures, and the like, which, to a con- 
 stantly increasing extent, have gone out of Persia and have found their 
 way into the collections of Europe and America. 
 
 5. By reason of famine, disease, civil wars, the causes of which may 
 be traced largely to bad economic conditions, the population of the coun- 
 try has greatly diminished in the last fifty or sixty years, and is today, 
 let us say, not in excess of one-third or one-fourth of what the country 
 under more ideal economic conditions might support. 
 
 6. Persia, being a country of very scanty rainfall (estimated at from 
 two to twelve inches per year), except in the north-western region and 
 the Caspian Littoral: 
 
 (a) The cities and towns are located at the foothills where water 
 from the melting snow is available; 
 
 (b) Broadly speaking, one-third of the country is a desert, an- 
 other one-third is mountainous and chiefly suitable for grazing; 
 
 (c) The cities are far apart, and as the means of communication 
 are poor, each city is a small empiie by itself, only feebly connected 
 with the capital ; 
 
 (d) Agriculture is chiefly dependent on irrigation, which de- 
 mands intelligent and industrious labor, but that does not permit 
 Persia to compete in the production of raw materials with those 
 countries having an abundant rainfall. In addition, Persia is at a 
 disadvantage of distance and high transport costs in reaching world 
 markets. 
 
 7. The Caspian Littoral and the Karun Valley, lying adjacent to the 
 Mesopotamian Plain, are to a considerable extent an exception to the 
 above comments. 
 
 8. There is a lack of security in Persia which accounts to a consider- 
 able extent for what is frequently termed by foreigners a lack of initiative 
 or public spirit. For example, the Commission found no disposition to 
 store grains (e. g. in ground silos) in abundant years to carry over to 
 lean years. The reason given was lack of confidence in the security, the 
 high rates of money, the want of adequate protection of private property. 
 
 41 
 
9. Land titles in the same way are indefinite and insecure. There is 
 no such thing as a land survey, or as the registration of titles. Some- 
 thing approaching it exists through the Church authorities. 
 
 10. Opium poppy is an ideal crop from several points of view, but 
 chiefly because : 
 
 (a) It is an autumn-sown crop which can be irrigated in the late 
 fall and early spring when water is plentiful. It is harvested in the 
 late spring or early summer ; 
 
 (b) It has a high value per pound and money yield per acre, say, 
 four times that of wheat and barley, which are also fall-sown crops ; 
 
 (c) Its high value per pound (say, $6 to $8) is such that it can 
 bear the terrifically high transport charges prevalent in that country ; 
 
 (d) Being largely exported, it helps Persia to pay for imports, 
 but it is not by any means certain that Persia would not be better off 
 if she did not buy so largely abroad. 
 
 11. A number of industries for which Persia was once famous are 
 dying out and Persia, instead of exporting only manufactured goods hav- 
 ing high value (and so able to bear a high transport charge), is attempting 
 to export raw material, such, for example, as wool, cotton (of inferior 
 grade), rice, etc. 
 
 12. The industries which are dying out and which might be restored, 
 are the production of : 
 
 (a) Silk, wool and cotton fabrics; 
 
 (b) Pottery, tiles, earthenware, bricks; 
 
 (c) Artistic metal-work; 
 
 (d) Woodcarving, inlaying, etc.; 
 
 (e) Painting miniatures, decorating, engrossing parchment, etc.; 
 
 (f) Sheep, lamb and goat skins, hides, leather goods. 
 
 13. In addition to the industries which are dying out and which may 
 again be put upon their feet, certain other industries can be developed, 
 for example: 
 
 (a) Those dependent on the development of mineral oil, of 
 which there is very evidently an abundance ; 
 
 (b) Vegetable oils from oil seed, such as rape seed, peanut oil, 
 castor oil, soya beans, etc. ; 
 
 (c) Making and distributing dried fruits, preserves, etc.; 
 
 (d) Making sugar, especially from sugar cane; 
 
 (e) Plaster of paris (gypsum), lime and cement. 
 
 14. The Commission noted that the methods of agriculture were very 
 primitive, but remarked that it does not follow therefrom that the farm 
 implements and tools of Western Europe and America can be applied to 
 Persian conditions, which are very different from those of Europe. The 
 Commission fully appreciated the great difficulties in the way of intro- 
 ducing new methods of cultivation and crops. 
 
 42 
 
CONCLUSIONS OF THE COMMISSION 
 
 It is apparent from the above facts : 
 
 1. That Persia is suffering seriously from wretchedly inadequate 
 means of internal communication; that this puts a very heavy tax upon 
 commerce within the country itself. It is often far cheaper for a city 
 close to the frontier to purchase from foreign countries raw materials 
 or manufactured products which are produced or might be produced in 
 Persia. The need of improved means of communication, chiefly roads for 
 wheeled vehicles, is clearly indicated, though there is also an argument, 
 supported not solely on economic grounds, but also by strong political 
 and military reasons, for building a railroad from the capital to a port on 
 the Persian Gulf. 
 
 2. Improved agricultural methods, adapted to intensive agriculture and 
 horticulture, because the country is so dependent on irrigation, were 
 urged by the Commission. Without increasing the acreage under cultiva- 
 tion, or the water consumed in irrigation, a greater product, or a product 
 of greater value per acre, was believed to be possible. 
 
 3. A careful study of the water resources, with a view not only of 
 conserving the water supply, but of securing it more efficiently and econ- 
 omically, was suggested. The use of artesian wells, oil pumps, and wind- 
 mills, was suggested as promising. 
 
 4. The need of cheap combustibles is great on account of the bearing 
 that it will have on various industries, some of them ancient industries 
 which are dying out ; also because a cheap combustible such as fuel oil or 
 coal would stay the destruction of the forests and enable the gradual re- 
 forestation of the country, which is now sadly denuded. This has had an 
 important effect in the destruction of soil through erosion, as well as by 
 its indirect effect on climate. 
 
 5. A revival of the dying industries, and the protection of Persia 
 against economic pressure of countries already highly industrialised, can 
 only be brought about by a protective tariff. It may or may not be de- 
 sirable for Persia to adopt the industrial methods of Western Europe and 
 America (and on this point the Commission does not express an opinion), 
 but, whether or not it is desirable, the country needs protection during the 
 period of adjustment, which, even under favourable conditions, would take 
 a considerable number of years to bring about. 
 
 6. The production of opium exists largely by reason of the economic 
 conditions aforesaid. The Persian Government has indicated by its own 
 actions, and by its efforts to prevent the consumption of opium at home 
 (it is absolutely forbidden in the Government service or in the army), 
 that it considers the use of opium a serious menace. The Commission 
 came to the conclusion that it was even a more serious menace than was 
 usually appreciated; that it was slowly but surely destroying the man- 
 power of the country ; that it was impossible to produce opium for export 
 and not have it also consumed in considerable quantities at home. 
 
 43 
 
ANNEX III 
 
 DIMINUTION OF OPIUM CULTIVATION IN PERSIA 
 
 Extract from Report of League Commission of Enquiry into the 
 Production of Opium in Persia, December, 1926. 
 
 Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
 From the study of the evidence submitted to it and the personal in- 
 vestigations it has conducted, the Commission, in response to the specific 
 lines of enquiry it was required to make, begs leave to report ; 
 
 1. That it has diligently and carefully studied the existing situation with 
 regard to the cultivation of the poppy in Persia, and that it has endeavoured, 
 in the report now submitted, fully to present and explain that situation. 
 
 2. That it has investigated as carefully as possible the question of the 
 replacement of a portion of this cultivation by other crops, and in doing so 
 has presented in the report now submitted what it believes may success- 
 fully be accomplished, given adequate time; (a) by the substitution of 
 “other crops”; (b) by better methods of cultivation, which will result in 
 greater yields from existing crops; and (c) by the creation of industries 
 which will make the cultivation of new crops possible. 
 
 Finally, it has arrived at the conclusion that, while difficult of ac- 
 complishment, it is possible and practically feasible, and to the economic 
 interest of Persia, to adopt a programme for the gradual diminution of 
 the cultivation of the opium poppy, and, in this connection, is glad to 
 call attention to the formal letter of the Persian Government addressed 
 to the President of the Commission under date of Teheran, June 1st, 
 1926, in which it is stated categorically that the Persian Government has 
 the intention of gradually reducing the production of opium to medical 
 needs. ^ 
 
 Having arrived at the above conclusions, the Commission begs leave 
 to submit in review its various findings in the form of a summary of 
 what has been stated more fully in the body of the report. 
 
 In view of the explanations made by the Persian Government, we must 
 consider in order the various suggestions it has made and the obstacles 
 which, in its opinion, exist. These are, first, budgetary ; second, export 
 importance and trade balance; and, third, cash yield of crop to the 
 producer. 
 
 Budget. In round figures, the national income from taxes and charges 
 against opium amount to 2,000,000 tomans per year, which is estimated 
 at about 20 per cent of the gross value of the crop and approximately 
 8 per cent of the total revenue to the State, against which must be charged 
 cost of control, cost of alimentation and other less definite items. When 
 all the factors are taken into account, the Commission believes that, 
 
 1. “It is our conviction that the production ot opium can be curtailed. . . . Nevertheless, 
 the Persian Government will take immediate measures to reduce the production of opium 
 to medicinal requirements and will prosecute these measures as rapidly as circumstances per- 
 mit. The Government is likewise determined to put a stop to the smoking of opium within 
 the country as rapidly as possible.” (Extract from letter from Persian Prime Minister to 
 President of the Commission dated June 1st, 1926.) 
 
 44 
 
viewed from the standpoint of its budget, the Government can safely 
 undertake a reasonable programme of progressive curtailment. 
 
 Balance of trade. The trade balance has been considered by the 
 Commission both from the commercial and the economic viewpoint, 
 calling attention particularly to the recent great increase in the export 
 of mineral oil and the method adopted by the State in dealing with this 
 subject. The point is also made that in the last fifty years there has 
 been an almost steady increase in the importation of manufactured articles 
 and a diminution of production of manufactures for home consumption. 
 The effect until recent years has been to create an unfavourable trade 
 balance during a large portion of this period, reflected in national debt 
 and impoverishment. The Commission believes that even if we accept 
 the Government’s method of treating the subject of oil exports, a pro- 
 gramme of substitution, based on a development of agricultural methods, 
 will enable the country to secure from food crops, from textiles, from 
 sugar, and from correlative industries more than enough to balance 
 losses in exports. As fully explained, this is a matter of time. 
 
 Cash crop. The investigations of the Commission indicate that the 
 cash yield per unit from the production of poppy to the cultivator is 
 about four times the yield from the growing of wheat. Against this 
 apparent advantage in the case of poppy there must be considered the 
 various items of direct and indirect cost. The Commission is convinced 
 that with better agricultural methods the production of various crops 
 could be increased sufficiently on the same area of ground fully to equal 
 the loss due from restricting the production of the poppy. Of course, 
 nobody proposes that the suppression of the poppy crop will be effected 
 except on some gradual and perfectly practical plan. 
 
 Transport. The great importance of transport and means of com- 
 munication in the development of Persian agriculture and other industries 
 and in opening up marketing possibilities, not to mention its importance 
 from a military and political standpoint, is fully exposed. 
 
 We now come to other but allied considerations : namely, the effect 
 which these proposals may have upon the peasant, the landowner and 
 the merchant. 
 
 Peasant. The findings of the Commission indicate that the peasant 
 is deserving of more than ordinary consideration on account of his 
 general character and capacity for development; that the growing of the 
 poppy is closely associated with a work system which is degrading and 
 that in districts where more emphasis is put upon food crops the peasants 
 are in better condition and are decidedly more prosperous. 
 
 Landowners. The landowners, especially the larger landowners and 
 those who are themselves opium merchants or associated with opium 
 merchants, fare pretty well in the cultivation of the poppy, and yet it 
 is strongly indicated that the cultivation and sale of the crop is attended 
 with considerable hazard and not as uniformly profitable as generally 
 
 45 
 
supposed. While the immediate effect of limiting the poppy culture 
 might be detrimental to the proprietor, it is the belief of the Commission 
 that more intensive agricultural methods will, because they will benefit 
 the country, benefit the landowners. 
 
 Merchants. The opium merchants, and particularly the larger mer- 
 chants, appear to the Commission to be those whose interests are most 
 strongly opposed to any change of the present cultivation. They may 
 be assumed to be solidly against it. 
 
 General economic effects of substitution. The effects of substitution 
 on the general economics of Persia have been fully discussed under the 
 following headings : 
 
 (a) Substitute Crops: Food and Other Crops. 
 
 Persia has need in her own domestic economy for more of these crops 
 than are now produced. The Commission believes that their cultivation 
 should be increased and that economy will result from more intensive 
 cultivation without increased acreage. 
 
 (b) Industries. 
 
 The Commission has pointed out a number of industries closely as- 
 sociated with various products of the land and the soil, the existence and 
 encouragement of which should increase the national wealth. These 
 are; the textile industry (silk, cotton and wool), the carpet industry, 
 sugar (especially cane sugar), the dried and preserved fruits industry, 
 the lime and cement industry and the clay products industry. Several 
 of these industries have suffered in the past for want of a cheap fuel. 
 The great expansion of the oil industry has opened the possibility of fuel 
 oil as a most important item in this development. 
 
 Preparation of a programme. The Commission considers that, instead 
 of attempting to reduce the cultivation of the poppy) immediately, the 
 Persian Government should make it an essential part of its programme 
 to take definite steps looking to and preparatory for a gradual and 
 systematic reduction, to begin three years from the promulgation of that 
 programme. Among the most difficult of the questions involved are, 
 naturally, those connected with the control of poppy cultivation. 
 
 The Commission has envisaged in its report certain suggestions for 
 registration and licensing of acreage devoted to the growing of the poppy. 
 
 The registration and licensing of, and the requirement of a surety bond 
 from, all merchants authorised to buy and sell opium are also indicated. 
 
 The Commission suggests that the Persian Government should consider 
 the advisability of revising its export and excise taxes on opium with a 
 view to reducing the wide disparity and yet securing a larger total yield. 
 
 Lastly, the adoption of identifying marks on all opium produced and 
 sold is also proposed. 
 
 Recognising the difficulty due to the widely scattered nature of the 
 cultivation and the difference of conditions that exist, the Commission 
 believes it may also be necessary to allow one year, or perhaps even two, 
 
 46 
 
for carrying out experiments in different sections of the country in order 
 to determine how the programme of retrenchment of acreage shall be 
 made effective. On the face of it, it is evident that substitution can more 
 readily be made in certain regions than in others. Where better facilities 
 of transport exist, or in the neighbourhood of large towns, things can be 
 done which cannot be done in less-favoured regions. 
 
 General programme of reduction. At the end of this preparatory 
 period of three years it is proposed to proceed with the following general 
 programme ; 
 
 (a) Continue the road programme on as big a scale as budgetary 
 expenditure will permit, including in this programme the initial 
 development of a railway system; 
 
 (b) Allot to the most promising irrigation project enough to 
 undertake it and complete it in one, two or three years ; 
 
 (c) Develop the farm demonstration work heretofore under- 
 taken, emphasizing the practical rather than the theoretical side ; 
 
 (d) Adopt a system of tariffs, which shall encourage those 
 home industries which Persia can undertake most successfully and 
 which, by reducing imports, will help the balance of trade ; 
 
 (e) Simultaneously with the announcement of these internal 
 undertakings, the Government shall formulate a programme for the 
 gradual reduction of the acreage allocated to the opium poppy. With 
 all the land so devoted properly registered, a systematic reduction 
 can be undertaken, which can be so handled as to make the reduc- 
 tion first in those localities where substitute crops or industries are 
 most possible. 
 
 The Commission believes that, beginning with the fourth year, the 
 Persian Government might safely undertake a reduction of 10 per cent 
 per year in the acreage allotted, and each year thereafter a further 
 reduction of 10 per cent of what remains. This method of reduction 
 will operate more rapidly at the start and more gradually thereafter, 
 as follows : 
 
 Beginning of 
 
 
 4th 
 
 Sth 
 
 6th 
 
 7th 
 
 8th 
 
 9th 
 
 10th 
 
 
 year 
 
 year 
 
 year 
 
 year 
 
 year 
 
 year 
 
 year 
 
 Percentage at beginning.... 
 
 . too 
 
 90 
 
 81 
 
 72.9 
 
 65.6 
 
 59 
 
 53.1 
 
 Reduction 
 
 10 
 
 9 
 
 8.1 
 
 7.3 
 
 6.6 
 
 5.9 
 
 5.3 
 
 
 90 
 
 81 
 
 72.9 
 
 65.6 
 
 59.0 
 
 53.1 
 
 47.8 
 
 As this method of reduction becomes more and more gradual, the 
 acreage at the end of the fifteenth year is reduced to 28.2 per cent and 
 in the twentieth year to 16.7 per cent. Before that time, Persia will 
 have determined her policy of substituting other crops and industries. 
 
 The Commission fully appreciates the importance of not curtailing a 
 crop yielding approximately 8 per cent of Persia’s tax revenues and 
 16 per cent in value of her gross exports without suggesting as a 
 proposal measures which will effectively offset the curtailments proposed. 
 
 47 
 
During the first three years — the years of preparation — the Commis- 
 sion believes that the revenues from the various opium taxes and from 
 a more effective control of tax collection can be increased not less than 
 1,000,000 tomans per year. 
 
 It is assumed that, as the means of communication are improved and 
 progress is made in encouraging the production of more and better cotton 
 and the introduction of cotton-spinning and weaving machinery, there 
 will be a corresponding reduction in the import of cotton piece-goods. 
 While progress should be made in this direction, it is assumed that only 
 the foundation work can be accomplished in the first three years. This 
 programme of building up the cotton textile industry in Persia must 
 necessarily include the placing of a protective tariff on cotton yams and 
 piece-goods. 
 
 Similar plans, in so far as practical, will be employed in an effort to 
 develop the wool and silk industries. 
 
 Special study and consideration must be given also to sugar-beet and 
 sugar-cane, with a view to their development and the fabrication of raw 
 sugar. While it will take all of the three years of preparation to make 
 a substantial progress in carrying out these suggestions, it is believed 
 that by the fourth year the production of home-grown sugar will begin 
 to have an effect in balancing foreign trade, because sugar is now the 
 second most important subject of import. 
 
 There are certain other taxes on imports which may be raised to ad- 
 vantage, especially where a tariff for revenue may also aid in the 
 establishment or the re-establishment of a home industry. 
 
 It is assumed that, for a period of five years, there will be no diminu- 
 tion in the receipts from the various taxes and license fees on opium 
 and that in the first three years of this period there will be the substantial 
 increase of 1,000,000 tomans per year. A further sum of 1,000,000 
 tomans per year should be realisable from other sources. 
 
 These increases in receipts it is proposed to apply to carrying out the 
 programme suggested by the Commission. 
 
 It is not possible to predict accurately receipts and expenses for 
 several years in advance, and the above suggestions are therefore simply 
 illustrative. 
 
 Presumably, as the means of communication improve, the necessity for 
 the present relatively high expenditure upon the army and gendarmerie 
 can be safely diminished and the money so saved used for productive 
 expenditure and internal improvements. The same may also be said of 
 the very large expenditure now devoted almost yearly to the Alimentation 
 Service. 
 
 The Commission fully realises that the execution of so large an under- 
 taking as here discussed necessarily involves questions of internal ad- 
 ministration, which only the Persian Government can determine. For 
 the foregoing reason, and for the further fact that the terms of its 
 mandate clearly indicate that this phase of the subject is beyond its scope, 
 these questions are not discussed. 
 
 48 
 
OBSERVATIONS OF THE PERSIAN GOVERNMENT ON THE 
 REPORT BY THE LEAGUE COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY 
 
 Extracts from a communication to the Secretary-General of the League 
 of Nations, March 4, 1927* 
 
 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
 Narcotic Control 
 
 In narcotic control the chief aim, it would seem, is the elimination of 
 the illicit trade in habit-forming drugs. It is therefore necessary to call 
 attention to the insignificant part taken by Persian opium in this traffic. 
 The statistics compiled by the Opium Section of the League of Nations 
 indicate that, if the entire opium production of Persia were suppressed, 
 the effect on drug manufacture would be practically negligible, since the 
 opium used in the manufacture of narcotic drugs is furnished almost en- 
 tirely by other countries. 
 
 Plan for Reduction 
 
 The plan for reduction proposed by the Commission does not appear 
 to take into consideration the legitimate demands for opium, and no sug- 
 gestion appears to have been made by the Commission with reference to 
 the relation that the proposed reduction in Persian cultivation should bear 
 to the reduction in other opium-producing countries, all of which have 
 better transportation facilities, better water supply, and better access to 
 markets for their products. If the hoped-for reduction in the manufac- 
 ture of narcotic drugs and in the production of their raw material is to 
 be attained, it would appear desirable that the reduction considered nec- 
 essary should be made effective about the same time in all the producing 
 and manufacturing countries. 
 
 If, however, there is to be a curtailment in opium production, a start 
 must be made, and the Persian Government proposes to submit a pro- 
 gramme of reduction to the Majliss without attending the prior ac- 
 ceptance of a similar programme on the part of other producing or man- 
 ufacturing countries. 
 
 Time and Cost of Substitution 
 
 The Commission has envisaged the problem of substitution in its gen- 
 eral rather than its particular aspects. For an eventual solution this is 
 undoubtedly correct, but the opium question is one that is pressing, not 
 only for Persia, but for the whole world. It is obvious that, given time 
 and good will, the production of the raw material of narcotic drugs and 
 their manufacture can be reduced everywhere to medicinal requirements. 
 But with the rapid increase in drug addiction, time does not permit of solu- 
 tions depending on the general acceptance of a moral conception and upon 
 gradual improvements in economic conditions for their realisation. So- 
 
 •Letter of March 4. 1927. from M. G. Kemal Hedayat to the Secretary-General of the League. 
 
 49 
 
lutions which will give prompt results are necesary, and for such solu- 
 tions not general but specific measures must be proposed. Specific meas- 
 ures require specific supporting data as to time and cost. 
 
 It will therefore be obvious that the time required and the cost of sub- 
 stitution are questions of first importance. The Commission has not 
 found it possible to submit definite estimates as to these factors. It is, 
 however, clear that, for each of the important crop substitutes, several 
 years’ preparatory work will be necessary to enable seed selection, dem- 
 onstration and improvement in quality and for the organization of the 
 trade. A period of years will also be required for the provision of the 
 additional water required, and for the road and railroad construction 
 which is necessary. 
 
 Finance 
 
 For the financing of the suggested programme of reduction, the Com- 
 mission suggests that one million tomans^ per annum be realised from 
 increased opium revenues and one million tomans from other sources. 
 The increase in opium revenues cannot be looked upon as a certainty. 
 There may be a loss if the acreage tax is put into effect, even if, as pro- 
 posed, the export duties are increased. The Commission does not indicate 
 the revenue sources from which the second million tomans is to be derived. 
 Even if the Government succeeds in obtaining the desired revenue in- 
 creases, it must be borne in mind that, in addition to the expenses inci- 
 dent to opium curtailment, there are other important and pressing de- 
 mands upon the country’s budget which cannot be indefinitely postponed. 
 
 Action Proposed by the Government 
 
 In view of the evident difficulty of estimating precisely in advance 
 either the cost or the time required for the introduction of substitute 
 crops, the provision of the necessary water and transport facilities, and 
 the creation of new industries, it would not be possible at this time for 
 the Government to ask the Parliament to approve an unconditional pro- 
 gramme of reduction. The three years’ preparatory interval suggested 
 by the Commission seems to be very short in comparison with the mag- 
 nitude of the task to be undertaken. The Government, however, accepts 
 to include it in the programme to be submitted to the Majliss and hopes 
 that it will prove adequate for the enactment of the requisite legislation 
 and for the initiation of the constructive measures necessary to enable the 
 realisation of the programme of opium substitution recommended by the 
 Commission. 
 
 In view of the necessity for a successful outcome to the proposed prac- 
 tical test of production curtailment, we are confident that Persia will not 
 be expected to undertake a programme which would in practice be in- 
 effective or which would unnecessarily discriminate against the economic 
 interests of the country. If the economic condition and likewise the 
 
 1. One toman or ten krans may be considered as approximately $1 U. S. A. 
 
 50 
 
geographic and commercial situation of Persia are taken into considera- 
 tion, it will be agreed that, in reducing the cultivation of opium, Persia 
 should enjoy a lower rate of curtailment and a larger share of produc- 
 tion than other countries for which, from other standpoints, the means 
 of economic progress are more available than for Persia. 
 
 Neither is it to be expected that the Persian Government and people 
 will continue to support a programme of reduction unless Persia is ac- 
 corded substantial equality of opportunity with regard to the world’s 
 trade in medicinal opium and unless Persia is enabled to put into effect 
 the reasonable measures which are essential for fiscal and economic re- 
 adjustments. Among these reasonable measures, the Commission of En- 
 quiry has particularly noted and recommended tariff autonomy. The 
 Persian Government is likewise convinced that the independence and 
 freedom of the Persian Government regarding the establishment of legal 
 Customs tariffs are essential for the protection and encouragement of 
 Persian substitute industries and the promotion of exports. In fact, the 
 attainment of this aim is the absolutely necessary condition of success of 
 the Persian Government in pursuance of the policy which the League of 
 Nations is considering for curtailment of the production of and commerce 
 in opium. The Government is confident that there will be a generous 
 appreciation by other Governments of this important aspect of the situ- 
 ation. It will, no doubt, be also taken in view that it is possible for other 
 Governments to lend assistance by reasonable reduction of import duties 
 and other charges and burdens which hamper Persian exports. 
 
 Parliamentary Approval 
 
 It will be appreciated that any restriction of opium cultivation or ex- 
 port will require Parliamentary approval and that, under the Persian 
 constitution, no international agreement can be entered into by the Per- 
 sian Government except after formal ratification by the Majliss. 
 
 In view of the foregoing considerations and after a careful study of 
 all aspects of the situation, the Government has prepared the following 
 programme which it will submit to the Majliss, with recommendation 
 for its enactment into law. 
 
 Programme for Opium Legislation 
 
 1. Approval of recommendation of reduction in area under poppy 
 cultivation of 10 per cent per annum after three years on the plan pro- 
 posed by the Commission of Enquiry. 
 
 Note: — The annual reduction to continue for three years, after which 
 time the Persian Government will reconsider its position, taking into account 
 the effect the reduction has had on the welfare of the cultivator, the trade 
 balance, the budget, and the general economic condition of the country, and 
 what action has been taken by other producing and manufacturing countries 
 to curtail the production of the raw material and the manufacture and dis- 
 tribution of habit-forming drugs. 
 
 51 
 
2. Acceptance of the opium import certificate system with an annual 
 reduction, beginning not later than the third year after the present, of 10 
 per cent of the quantity annually permitted to leave the country without 
 production of opium import certificates. 
 
 Note : — Subject to the reservations indicated in the note to Paragraph I. 
 
 3. An exemption from land taxes for a period of five years in the 
 case of areas diverted from the cultivation of the poppy to that of sub- 
 stitute crops. 
 
 4. Preference in the granting of agricultural loans to be given by the 
 State Bank of Persia, when established, to cultivators who divert part 
 or all of their land under opium cultivation to that of substitute crops. 
 
 5. In agreement with the intention of the League of Nations and the 
 recommendation made by the Commission, the Government promises to 
 study the increase of export Customs duties on such opium as is exported 
 without certificate, and likewise to study changing the existing taxes on 
 opium to other taxes which will facilitate and expedite the decrease of 
 the cultivation of and commerce in opium. 
 
 SUMMARY OF THE VIEWS OF THE PERSIAN GOVERNMENT 
 
 Having examined the report of the Commission in detail, the Persian 
 Government now desires to summarise its views in connection therewith 
 and to state the measures it proposes to take for a reduction in opium 
 cultivation. 
 
 Substitution of Other Crops for Opium 
 
 It is believed that silk, dried fruits, cotton, nuts, pharmaceutical raw 
 materials and flower extracts are all possible crop substitutes and meas- 
 ures will be taken to encourage their production. Measures will also be 
 taken to encourage the production of grains, cereals and vegetables to 
 the extent necessary to meet the local and any possible export demand. 
 It does not, however, seem probable that there will be any great increase 
 in the export of such foodstuffs until road and railroad construction 
 bring about a much lower transport cost than exists at present. 
 Substitutes Other Than Crops 
 
 The suggestions for the establishment of the cotton and sugar manu- 
 facturing industries and for the development of manufactures in Persia 
 offer from the point of view of the trade balance the greatest possibility 
 of reducing the necessity for opium exports. 
 
 Protective Tariff 
 
 As stated by the Commission, a protective tariff is essential to the de- 
 velopment of manufactures in Persia. This requires that the present 
 restrictions on Persia’s tariff autonomy be removed. 
 
 Transport 
 
 To provide the roads and railroads which are essential for the intro- 
 duction of practically all substitute crops and for the general economic 
 welfare of the country, an expenditure in the neighbourhood of 100,000,- 
 
 52 
 
000 tomans will be required. Of this sum, all but 20,000,000 tomans, 
 required for road construction in the next five years, has already been 
 assured by the assignment of specific revenues. 
 
 Water 
 
 It is almost impossible to foresee the expenditures required to provide 
 the additional water which will be needed if other crops are substituted 
 for opium as a cash crop for the cultivator and as an item of export. Un- 
 questionably an investment of many millions of tomans will eventually 
 be required for the completion of the programme. A single project has 
 been estimated to cost four million tomans. 
 
 Restrictive Legislation 
 
 More than half of the Persian provinces are directly interested in 
 opium cultivation. Deputies from those provinces having the welfare of 
 their constituents in view cannot be expected to approve any restrictive 
 regulation which does not afford reasonable assurance that undue losses 
 and hardships will not be imposed upon the opium-growers and upon 
 those engaged in the many allied industries. 
 
 Cost of Substitution 
 
 In this connection, it is necessary to invite special attention to the re- 
 quest made by the Persian Government to the Commission in its letter 
 of June 1st, 1926, the pertinent paragraphs of which are quoted below: 
 
 “If, after having had the benefit of the advice of your Commission, means 
 are found to substitute other crops for opium within the financial capacity 
 of the country, the adoption of such means can be assured. If, however, 
 the projects for crop substitution which you may suggest involve an ex- 
 penditure for irrigation, transportation, and other measures in excess of the 
 financial capacity of the country, such part of the accepted programme as 
 may be put into effect with the available funds will be undertaken. The carry- 
 ing out of the remainder of the programme must necessarily await the pro- 
 curement of additional funds. 
 
 “Even a gradual substitution of other crops for opium cultivation will in- 
 volve expenditure and will necessitate budgetary adjustments. Therefore, your 
 Commission will, we feel confident, agree with us that, before embarking on 
 any programme of crop substitution, there should be a clear conception, not 
 only of the difficulties to be met, but also of the expenditure involved. Your 
 attention is particularly invited to this matter, and, in view of the fact that 
 the Persian Government must be the agency for carrying out your proposals, 
 you are requested, so far as may be possible, to state, in connection with each 
 measure proposed by you, the time required and your estimate of its prob- 
 able cost.” 
 
 It will be obvious that the question of the cost of substitution is one of 
 vital importance and that Persia must ascertain the cost and determine 
 its capacity to defray it before agreeing unreservedly to any programme 
 of substitution. 
 
 It is therefore to be regretted that the Commission has not found itself 
 in a position to accede to the request of the Government and to state the 
 
 53 
 
probable cost of the measures recommended by it for the curtailment of 
 opium production. 
 
 Time Required for Substitution 
 
 The Commission has not, as requested by the Government, stated the 
 time which in its estimation would be required for the successful intro- 
 duction of each of the substitutes proposed. The important crop substi- 
 tutes are cotton, silk and dried fruits. Cotton will require at least five 
 years before the most suitable varieties can be selected and introduced 
 and the trade properly organised. Silk culture will require at least six 
 years to establish. The necessary improvements in the quality and the 
 preparation of dried or otherwise preserved fruits will take at least 
 five years. 
 
 The road construction which is necessary will take approximately five 
 years after the funds required become available. 
 
 The first line of railroad will probably take not less than six years to 
 complete and the construction of main lines north to south and east to 
 west will probably require in the neighborhood of fifteen years if built 
 from current revenues. 
 
 The Commission has envisaged the problem of substitution in its larger 
 aspects, and has arrived at the conclusion that it is possible to undertake 
 a programme of gradual curtailment. In principle this is accepted as 
 correct. In view, however, of the inability of the Commission to indi- 
 cate either the cost or the time required for the introduction of substitute 
 crops and for the development of new industries, it would not be possible 
 for the Government to ask the Majliss to endorse an unqualified pro- 
 gramme of reduction pending the determination of these vital factors 
 for the success of any plan for the curtailment of opium production. 
 
 ANNEX V 
 
 OPIUM EXPORTS OF PERSIA 
 
 Extract from Appendix to Memorandum on Persian Opium, 1924. 
 
 The total exports of opium as indicated by the Persian Customs figures 
 for the period 1292 (1913-14) — 1302 (1923-24) are given below: 
 
 Year : A. H. Solar 
 
 A. D. 
 
 Batmans 
 
 Pounds 
 
 Value: Krans* 
 
 1292 
 
 .1913-14 
 
 118,541 
 
 770,516 
 
 37,714,494 
 
 1293 
 
 .1914-15 
 
 134,641 
 
 875,166 
 
 41,446,256 
 
 1294 
 
 .1915-16 
 
 122,922 
 
 798,993 
 
 41,732,238 
 
 1295 
 
 .1916-17 
 
 118,109 
 
 767,708 
 
 41,597,275 
 
 1296 
 
 .1917-18 
 
 115,305 
 
 749,482 
 
 44,783,249 
 
 1297 
 
 .1918-19 
 
 56,201 
 
 365,306 
 
 28,595,885 
 
 1298 
 
 .1919-20 
 
 49,903 
 
 324,396 
 
 24,166,116 
 
 1299 
 
 .1920-21 
 
 56,193 
 
 365,254 
 
 22,178,390 
 
 1300 
 
 .1921-22 
 
 39,338 
 
 255,697 
 
 15,449,663 
 
 1301 
 
 .1922-23 
 
 101,638 
 
 660,647 
 
 40,908,128 
 
 4302 
 
 .1923-24 
 
 106,282 
 
 690,833 
 
 60,219,715 
 
 *1 kran Is the 
 
 approximate 
 
 equivalent of ten 
 
 cents In American 
 
 currency. 
 
 54 
 
Distribution 
 
 The following table shows the distribution of the opium exports during 
 the last two years : 
 
 It-il, 1301 (1922-23) 
 
 Declared Destination 
 
 Batmans 
 
 Pounds Value: Krans 
 
 England 
 
 44,637 
 
 290,141 
 
 18,099,420 
 
 China 
 
 25,650 
 
 166,725 
 
 11,005,000 
 
 Russia 
 
 22,048 
 
 143,312 
 
 8,372,440 
 
 British India 
 
 5,672 
 
 36,868 
 
 2,092,000 
 
 Japan 
 
 3,279 
 
 21,313 
 
 1,180,000 
 
 Mesopotamia 
 
 176 
 
 1,144 
 
 88,000 
 
 Egypt 
 
 171 
 
 1,111 
 
 70,000 
 
 Germany 
 
 4 
 
 26 
 
 1,100 
 
 France 
 
 1.8 
 
 .8 
 
 168 
 
 Totals 
 
 101,637 
 
 660,640 
 
 40,908,128 
 
 
 Tanguz-il 1302 
 
 (1923-24) 
 
 
 Russia 
 
 69,427 
 
 451,276 
 
 40,994,810 
 
 China 
 
 21,106 
 
 137,189 
 
 11,604,700 
 
 Japan 
 
 5,479 
 
 35,614 
 
 3,067,600 
 
 Arabia 
 
 7,102 
 
 46,163 
 
 2,920,000 
 
 England 
 
 1,508 
 
 9,802 
 
 841,920 
 
 United States 
 
 1,212 
 
 7,878 
 
 600,000 
 
 British India 
 
 369 
 
 2,398 
 
 147,605 
 
 Mesopotamia 
 
 77 
 
 300 
 
 42,580 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 500 
 
 Totals 
 
 106,280 
 
 690,823 
 
 60,219,715 
 
 To the 1302 figures 
 
 should be added the transhipments. 
 
 which will 
 
 probably be credited to Persia in statistics of importing country, if not 
 
 entered as contraband : 
 
 
 
 
 
 Batmans 
 
 Pounds 
 
 
 China 
 
 1,000 
 
 6,500 Value 
 
 not stated 
 
 France ... 
 
 - 243 
 
 1,579 
 
 <4 II 
 
 Hungary 
 
 9,196 
 
 59,774 
 
 II II 
 
 Total .... 
 
 10,439 
 
 67,853 
 
 
 Total exports and transhipments ....116,719 
 
 758,673 
 
 56 
 
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