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AUTHOR: 
 
 TITLE: 
 
 THE GREATEST 
 
 QUESTION IN 
 THEOLOGY... 
 
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 1842 
 
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 ^ i- The gi-€ate5i question m theolcgy completely 
 
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 and attributeo of' God, by 7im. Gillespie and A ref^ita- 
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THE 
 
 GREATEST QUESTION IN THEOLOGY 
 
 COMPLETELY DlSf "^SED ; 
 
 
 NAMELY, 
 
 lENT A PRIOEI lOR THE BEING 
 AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD, 
 
 BY WM. GILLESPIE, 
 
 AND 
 
 A REFUTATION THEREOF, 
 
 UNDERTAKEN IN CONSEQUENCE OF A CHALLENGE OF THE ABOVE 
 
 NAMED AUTHOR, 
 
 ( 
 
 BY ANTITHEOS. 
 
 » • 
 
 PUBLISHED BY W. 6c li. 
 
 ^ *, '^^ »•■' -»■ — ■ 
 
 MDCCCXLII. 
 
ERRATA IN THE REFUTATION. 
 
 h^ 
 
 i 
 
 Page 20, 
 
 21, 
 39, 
 42, 
 43, 
 44, 
 45, 
 
 47, 
 49, 
 65, 
 66, 
 69, 
 69, 
 74, 
 78, 
 78, 
 
 line 23, for obscurifi/, read absurdity. 
 19, for HI formed^ read i//, c^-c. 
 
 10 for reasonings read reasoni?igs. 
 13 from bottom, for omnipoience^ read omniscience. 
 
 7 from bottom, for representation^ read representative. 
 
 15, after reasoning, insert 6^^^ before ^e. 
 17^ for Jrill, read Jails. 
 
 7 from bottom, for existence^ read extension. 
 
 11 from bottom, before rvhether^ delete or. 
 9, for of subject y read //«e subject. 
 6 from bottom, for /o ^e ufider, read /o /;e?, 4'c. 
 
 13, for z**, read a*. 
 
 1 7, after objection, insert it should. 
 
 22, delete ca^^. 
 
 16, after matter, insert ? 
 5 from bottom, for censorium, read sensorium. 
 
 I CD 
 
 ICO 
 
 V ■">, '* >. K \ 
 
 X. 
 
 \ 
 
AN 
 
 ARGUMENT, A PRIORI, 
 
 FOR 
 
 THE BEING AND ATTRIBUTES 
 
 OF GOD. 
 
 BY 
 
 WM. GILLESPIE. 
 
 Spiritui iutus alit ; totamq ; infusa per artus 
 
 Alent agitat molem, & magno se corpore miscet. — JEs. vi. 
 
 Deum namq ; ire per oinnes 
 Terrasq ; Tractusq ; Maris, Coelumq; profundum. — Geor. iV. 
 
 Did it plainly appear that Space and Duration were Properties of a Substance, we 
 should have an ixitie way with the -Atheists : For it woidd at once prove demonstrably 
 an EUrrtal, yecetsary, Sdf-existent Being ; that there is but One such; and that he is 
 ttefdful in order to the existence of all other Things. — BUTLKR. 
 
 EDINBURGH : 
 PRINTED FOR WAUGH & INNES; 
 
 M. OGLE, GLASGOW; W. CURRY, JUN. & Co. DUBLIbf; 
 
 WHITTAKER & CO. 
 
 AND SMITH ELDER & CO. LONDON. 
 MDCCCXXXIII. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 LNTRODUCTION. 
 
 Division I. An Inquiry into the defects of mere a posteriori arguments for 
 the being of a Deity .... 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 Of the arg-ument from Experience. . . . , " 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 Of the argument from Miracles. .... 
 
 Division II. A Review of Dr. SI. Clarke's Demonstration of the Being and 
 Attributes of God. ..... 
 
 Division III. Necessary existence implies infinite Extension. 
 
 ARGUMENT, A PRIORI. 
 BOOK I. 
 
 PART I. 
 
 Proposition I. Infinity of Extension is, necessarily, existing. . ^ 
 
 II. Infinity of Extension is, necessarily, indivisible. 
 
 Corollary from Prop: II. Infinity of Extension is 
 necessarily immoveable. .... 
 
 III. There is, necessarily, a Being of Infinity of Extension. 
 
 IV. The Being of Infinity of Extension, is, necessarily, of 
 
 unity and simplicity. ..... 
 
 Scholium I. ..... . 
 
 Scholium II. 
 
 Page 
 
 3 
 
 11 
 
 15 
 26 
 
 37 
 38 
 
 40 
 41 
 
 43 
 45 
 
 46 
 
 V. There is, necessarily, but otic Being of Infinity of Expansion. 47 
 
 Proposition I. 
 II. 
 
 PART II. 
 
 Infinity of Duration is, necessarily, existing. . 48 
 
 Infinity of Duration, is, necessarily, indivisible. . 50 
 Corollary from Prop: II. Infinity of Duration is 
 
 necessarily immoveable. .... 50 
 
IV 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 Proposition III. There is, necessarily, a Being of Infinity of Duration. 
 
 IV, The Being of Infinity of Duration, is, necessarily, of unity 
 
 and simplicity. ...... 
 
 Scholium I. ..... . 
 
 Scholium II. . 
 
 V. There is, necessarily, but one Being of Infinity of Duration. 
 
 31 
 
 hi 
 53 
 55 
 57 
 
 Proposition I. 
 
 II. 
 
 III. 
 
 PART III. 
 
 There is, necessarily, a Being of Infinity of Expansion, 
 
 and Infinity of Duration. .... 59 
 
 The Being of Infinity of Expansion, and Infinity of Dura- 
 tion, is, necessarily, of unity and simplicity. . 61 
 
 There is, necessarily, but one Being of Infinity of Expan- 
 sion, and Infinity of Duration. 61 
 
 BOOK II. 
 
 PARTI. 
 
 Proposition. The one, simple. Being of Infinity of Expansion and Dura- 
 
 tion, is, necessarily. Intelligent and AlUknoiring. . 63 
 
 PART II. 
 
 Proposition. The one, simple. Being of Infinity of Expansion and Dura- 
 tion, that is of Intelligence, or is All-knowing, is, necessarily, 
 All-powerful. 65 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 PART III. 
 Proposition. The one, simple. Being of Infinity of Expansion and Dura- 
 tion, that is of Intelligence, or, is All-knowing, and All- 
 powerful, is, necessarily Free. 
 
 m 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 67 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 DIVISION I. 
 
 AN INQUIRY INTO THE DEFECTS OF MERE ^ P05r£iJ/0i?/ AR- 
 GUMENTS, FOR THE BEING OF A DEITY. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Of the argument from Experience, 
 
 §. 1. But two ways of proving the being of God: a priori and 
 a posteriori. — *Tis evident, on the slightest reflection, 
 that there can be no more than two ways of proving 
 the being" and attributes, or any of the attributes, of 
 God. If it be possible to establish his existence at all ; 
 'tis possible to prove, either, merely, that he is : or, 
 that, besides being, he must he. The reasonings which 
 would demonstrate his being, are called a priori : Those 
 which give probable evidence, only, for his being, a pos- 
 teriori, 
 
 §. 2. Nature of the latter argument, — The more com- 
 mon a posteriori argument may be called, the argument 
 from experience. Not that experience can discover a 
 God; but this argument infers the existence of a God, 
 by a process similar to that by which we conclude, that 
 certain appearances have been preceded by a cause, 
 which we have discovered almost as often as we have 
 set out in the search. This argument takes a survey 
 of the universe, — and examines, more minutely, one of 
 
 / * 
 
4 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Its parts; asserts, it there iWscover^ marks of design ; ^ 
 and, from these marks of design, infers the existence of 
 a designer, or an intelligent cause. It is level to all 
 men's capacities. And unless men resolve to shut their 
 eyes, and stop the operation of their understanding, they 
 cannot avoid coming to the conclusion, that the pheno- 
 mena of nature imply the existence of a cause of them. 
 §. 3. It is attended ivith difficulties.— But, though the 
 a posteriori argument he good, so far as it goes, yet its 
 discoveries reach only a little way. If we confine our- 
 selves merely to its evidence, we shall, inevitably, find 
 ourselves surrounded by many serious difficulties, — dif- 
 ficulties which will oppress, if they do not discourage, 
 the minds of the more inquisitive. 
 
 §. 4. But before taking notice of the disadvantages 
 attending this argument, if the aid of the other sort of 
 reasoning is nowise introduced, let it be premised, that 
 we are not, in any way, to enter upon the merits of 
 that argument, but shall take the validity of it, so far as 
 its evidence reaches, entirely for granted: the object, 
 here, being only to point out the defects it labours under, 
 admitting its inference to be irresistible. 
 
 §. 5. Assumes, that the succession and order of things 
 have not been eternal. — And since the validity of a poste- 
 riori reasoning, is to be taken for granted, we must, 
 also, assume the truth of those things which the very 
 entering upon such reasoning plainly pre-supposes. 
 
 §. 6. We must assume, therefore, that the succession and 
 order of all the things that the material universe con- 
 tains, have not existed from all eternity. For be it re- 
 membered, that the a posteriori argument says, it dis- 
 covers marks of a particular design in the phenomena 
 
 DIVISION I. ^ 
 
 of nature ; and a particular design, surely, implies the 
 existence of a previously existing designer. 
 
 §. 7. Indeed, unless it be possible, that the succession 
 and order of things in the material universe mag have 
 had a designing cause, it cannot, of course, be ever 
 shown that they had a designing cause. And it is not 
 possible, one would think, that the succession and order 
 of these things may have had a designing cause, if such 
 order and succession have existed from all eternity. 
 
 §. 8. The phenomena of nature cognizable bg us, finite 
 in extent.— ^oi to insist that, because the a posteriori 
 argument takes for granted the non-eternity of those 
 pirenomena of nature, which exhibit marks of design, 
 these phenomena must be held to be only of finite extent : 
 (A point beyond all question :) Nothing is plainer than 
 that the marks of design which we can discover, must be 
 
 finite in their extent. 
 
 §. 9. FIRST, One class of disadvantages attending 
 this argument, it cannot show infinitg belongs to God.— 
 First, One of the disadvantages, then, or, rather, a 
 class of disadvantages, attending mere a posteriori rea- 
 sonings, is, that they can never make it appear, that 
 infinitg belongs, in any way, to God. 
 
 §. 10. First, It onlg entitles us to infer the existence of 
 a being of finite extension.-Yiv^i, The a posteriori 
 argument can only entitle us to infer the existence 
 of a Being of finite extension: for by what rule 
 known in philosophy, can we deduce, from the existence 
 of an eff'ect finite in extent, the existence of a cause of 
 infinity of extension ? 
 
 §. 11. The Deity cannot be every iclierc present bg mere 
 energy.— \Nh'^t becomes, then, of the omnipresence of 
 the Deity, according to those who are content to rest 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 satisfied witli the reasonings from experience ? Those 
 who seek not the aid of the other species of reasoning 
 iiuist let their system of Theism preserve a cautious 
 silence upon so unaccountahle a matter. It will he vain 
 to talk of the Deity hcing present by his energy, al- 
 though he may not be present by his substance, to the 
 whole universe. For, 'tis natural to ask, not so much 
 how it is proved, that God can be virtually present, 
 though not substantially present, in every part of nature, 
 as what can be meant by being every where present by 
 If re energy ? 
 
 §. 12. Add to this, that, even admitting the foolish 
 distinction in question, a posteriori reasoning can no 
 more make out, that the Deity is omnipresent by his 
 virtue, than that he is omnipresent as to his substance. 
 Admit the distinction: 'tis of no service. 
 
 §. 13. This argument cannot prove the wisdom and 
 power of God more than finite, nor that he is entirely 
 free, — And from the inaptitude of the reasoning under 
 consideration, to show that immensity or omnipresence 
 belongs to God, it will be found to follow, directly 
 and immediately, that his wisdom and power cannot 
 be shown to be more than finite, and that he can never 
 be proved to be a free agent. 
 
 §. 14. First, It is very plain, that omnipresence, (let it 
 be only by energy,) is absolutely necessary in a Being 
 of infinity of wisdom. And, therefore, the a posteriori 
 argument is unable to evince that the Deity is in pos- 
 session of this attribute. 
 
 §. 15. Secondly, It, likewise, plainly follows from the 
 iinptitude of this argument, to show that God is omni- 
 present, that, thereby, we cannot prove infinity of power 
 to belong to him. For, if the argument cannot make 
 
 DIVISION I. ' 
 
 out that the Being it discovers is every w^here present, 
 how can it ever make out that he is every where power- 
 ful ? By careful reflection, too, we may perceive, that 
 omnipotence of another kind than power which can 
 exert itself in all places, requires the existence of im- 
 mensity. 
 
 §. 16. Thirdly, Without calling in the aid of subtle 
 reasoning to prove, that if the argument a posteriori 
 cannot show that God is omnipresent, it can never 
 evince that he is a free agent ; let those who may con- 
 tend that by the reasonings from experience, it can be 
 made to appear, the Deity is a free agent, be pleased to 
 tells us, what is that logical process by which they de- 
 duce, from the premises they have obtained, such a con- 
 clusion. Of what nature is the middle term, which 
 puts beyond doubt the agreement of subject and predi- 
 cate in the proposition, that the God whom the argument 
 from experience doth reveal is entirely free? 
 
 §. 17. If we cannot show the Deity is of infinity in a 
 certain respect, cannot show he is of infinity in any, 
 —But, indeed, without having been at pains to 
 show, that, if we cannot prove the immensity or 
 omnipresence of the Deity, we can, for that reason, 
 never show that he is omniscient — that he is omnipo- 
 tent—that he is entirely free : It had been sufficient 
 simply to say, that if the Deity cannot be proved to be 
 of infinity in any given respect, it would be nothing 
 less than absurd to suppose that he could be proved to 
 be of infinity in any other respect. 
 
 §. 18. Secondly, TJiis argument cannot male out that 
 God was from eternity.— Secondly, Not to lay any weight 
 on the truth just announced, that if we cannot prove 
 
8 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 God to have a particular infinite attribute, we can never 
 show that infinity of any kind whatever belongs to him : 
 or, not here to insist on this point, that we shall never 
 be able to make out that there is an eternal being-, if we 
 be not able to make out that there is an immense be- 
 ing ; the eternity of a being as much implying his im- 
 mensity, as his immensity would evidently infer his 
 eternity: (Truths these most unquestionable:) The 
 a posteriori argument can do no more than prove, that, 
 at the commencement of the phenomena which pass 
 under its review, there existed a cause exactly sufficient 
 to make the effects begin to be. That this cause existed 
 from eternity, the reasonings from experience can, by 
 no means, show. Nay, for aught they make known, the 
 designer himself may not have existed long before those 
 mnrks of design which betoken his workmanship. 
 
 §.19. Or, iciU he to cterniti/.— And, because reason- 
 mir of the kind in question cannot prove, that the God 
 u hum it reveals, has existed from all eternity, therefore, 
 for any thing it intimates, God may, at sometime, cease 
 to be ; and the workmanship may have an existence 
 when the workman hath fallen into annihilation. For, 
 of that being only, who never had a beginning, the non- 
 existence implies a contradiction. 
 
 §. 20. Concerning the topics alluded to, the argu- 
 ment leaves us quite at a loss. It gives some little in- 
 formation, and then is found inadequate to extend our 
 knowledge the least way farther. 
 
 §.21. And, lastly, it cannot show God is infinitely 
 good, just, Sfc.~lt would be worse than useless to ex- 
 pend many words in showing, that the argument a pos- 
 teriori, cannot prove that God is of infinite goodness. 
 
 DIVISION I. 
 
 9 
 
 and justice, and all other infinite moral perfections. 
 Without insisting that there must be infinite natural at- 
 tributes as a foundation whereon to build infinite moral 
 attributes: (A thing certain:) 'Tis evident, that the same 
 reason that prevents us from proving the first, will for 
 ever prevent us from proving the second. 
 
 §. 22. SECONDL Y, The reasonings from experience 
 cannot prove the unity af God, — Secondly, Another 
 defect that mere a posteriori reasonings labour under, is, 
 perhaps, still weightier that their inability to prove that 
 infinity, in any way, belongs to God. How can such 
 reasonings ever assure us of the iinify of the Deity ? 
 'Twill be granted that the question, as to the unity of 
 God, involves a point of much importance : the point, 
 perhaps, of greatest moment connected with our specu- 
 lations as to his existence. But, whether there be but 
 one God, or not, the argument from experience doth, by 
 no means, make clear. It discovers marks of design in the 
 phenomena of nature, and infers the existence of at least 
 one intelligent substance sufficient to produce them* 
 Farther, however, it advances not our knowledge. 
 Whether the cause of the phenomena be one God, or 
 many gods, it pretends not to determine, past all doubt. 
 
 §. 23. The contrivances we observe in nature, may 
 establish a unity of counsel : how can they establish a 
 unity of substance ? 
 
 §. 24. They cannot evince matter was created, — In the 
 phenomena that surround me, I see certain means adap- 
 ted to certain ends. Without hesitation, I conclude, 
 there was a designer. But did this designer create the 
 matter in which the design appears ? Of this, the ar- 
 
10 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 DIVISION I. 
 
 11 
 
 gument a postei-iori cannot convince us. For that ar- 
 gument does no more than infer a designing cause from 
 certain appearances ; in the same way as we wouhl in- 
 fer, from finding some well contrived machine in a de- 
 sert, that a human heing had left it there. But point 
 out marks of design, certain means adapted to certain 
 ends, in gross, untractable matter itself? 
 
 §. 25. Therefore^ cannot evince there is not a plurality 
 of the causes of things. — Now, because this reasoning 
 cannot convince us of such a creation, it cannot con- 
 vince us that there is not a plurality of deities, or of 
 the causes of things. As thus : If the designer whom 
 this argument discovers, did not create the matter con- 
 taining the design, but that was created by some supe- 
 rior agent, then here is a complete destruction of the 
 unity of God. If matter was not created at all, then 
 we are involved in the supposition of that strange plu- 
 rality of gods, in which there is, at least, one physical 
 substance, and that, it may be, the more ancient mem- 
 ber of the Ditheism. 
 
 §. 26. Though ice hold part of the universe was cre- 
 ated, no nearer a proof of the unity of God. — But even 
 though we hold, that the designing cause of the pheno- 
 mena we see, created the matter in which they appear, 
 (an opinion for which the argument in question gives us 
 no evidence,) what the nearer are we to a real proof of 
 the unity of God ? Did he who created and fashioned 
 an inconsiderable part of the universe, create and fashion 
 universal nature? Perhaps he did not. Then, we 
 have no proper evidence for the doctrine of his unity. 
 
 §. 27. Cannot prove unity, because cannot prove eternity. 
 — Besides, to insist on no other topic, if we cannot prove 
 the eternity of God, it is not possible that we can prove 
 
 the unity of Gcd. To say that, for any thing we know 
 to the contrary, he may not have existed from all eter- 
 nity, being much the same thing as saying, that, for any 
 thing we know to the contrary, there may be another 
 god or many gods, besides. 
 
 §. 28. Summary. — We see, then, what the argument 
 a jwsteriori amounts to. That, at the commencement 
 of the phenomena, or designs which do appear, there 
 existed as the cause, an intelligent substance, or seve- 
 ral intelligent substances, of sufficient extension, wis- 
 dom, power, and freeness, goodness, justice, and other 
 moral qualities, to make the effects begin to be : this is 
 all that that species of reasoning can make known. And 
 if we think that, without assistance from another source 
 than the reasonings from experience, we shall be en- 
 abled to ascend higher in our investigations, we but 
 weakly impose upon ourselves, and mistake, for the ex- 
 ercise of the understanding, the uncertain flights of the 
 fancy. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Of the Argument from Miracles. 
 
 §. 1. Some would "prove a God from miracles. — There 
 are some that would prove the existence of God, by 
 showing that rniracles have happened : a miracle affords 
 evidence that there is a God. 
 
 / 
 
12 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 §. 2. Tivo kinds of Atheists, First, Those who con- 
 tenil it is imjwssihle there can he a God. — There are two 
 distinct kinds of Atlieists. First, Those who contend 
 that it is impossible there can he a God. And, secondly, 
 those who only go the leng-th of saying, that there is no 
 God. Perhaps, this latter class of Atheists may be pro- 
 perly sunk in another class, namely, those who do but 
 maintain that, as yet, they have seen no proper evidence 
 adduced to establish the existence of a Deity. 
 
 §. 3. All the s2/st('nts oftliejirst kind of Atheists resolvahle 
 into the opinion of infinite succession, — The system of 
 Epicurus, in ancient times ; in modern, the system of 
 Spinoza, fall to be ranged along with those of the first 
 sort. And many other species of Atheism, by how^ few 
 shades soever they differ from the systems specified, or 
 from eacli other, might be pointed out as belonging to 
 the same class. All the systems of Atheism which w^ould 
 go to show, it is impossible there can be a God, may 
 be reduced to the following opinion, that there has been 
 a succession, or rather, have been successions, from eter- 
 nity, of dependent beings, in which are included all 
 things that are, or ever were, in the universe. 
 
 §. 4. A miracle presupposes Deiti/, — Now, a miracle 
 pre-supposes a God : at least, if a miracle prove the 
 existence of God, it must, beyond all contradiction, also 
 pre-suppose that existence. Does it not, indeed estab- 
 lish, by first assuming, the being of a Deity ? 
 
 §. 5. Not lo(fical, therefore, to attempt proving a God 
 
 from miracles, in a question icith this sort of Atheists, — What 
 
 sort of an error, then, in logic, do they commit who 
 
 would ask an Atheist, -of the first class, to believe in a 
 
 miracle : that is, to believe in a thing which would pre- 
 
 DIVISION I. 
 
 13 
 
 suppose the existence of what he reckons an impossi- 
 bility ? 
 
 §. 6. If chance or necesslti/ can account for all other 
 things, it can account for a miracle also, — Besides, if 
 chance, or necessity, or any other word, can account 
 for so much, what hinders it to account for a little more ? 
 If it sustain, whether or not it caused, the universe and 
 all things therein, is it incapable of making the further 
 slio-ht exertion of bringing an uncommon, or hitherto 
 unknown, event to pass, suppose the visible antece- 
 dent to be any thing whatever ? 
 
 §. 7. Secondlg, Those who maintain they have not suffi- 
 cient evidence of a God, — With regard to the other kind 
 of Atheists, or those who have not yet seen evidence suffi- 
 ciently strong to compel them to admit there is a God : ^ve 
 may demand of him who hopes to convert such men by 
 adducing the testimony in favour of miracles. Does the 
 whole visible creation, contain no evidence, or not as 
 good evidence, as it is possible there should be, of the 
 existence of a Deity, that you resort to miracles, in 
 search of proof for this ? What is the ground of the 
 preference ? None is apparent. 'Tis granted, that a 
 miracle affords evidence of a being much superior to 
 man: but do not the works of nature afford proof equally 
 worthy of being relied on, to the same purpose ? Do 
 you throw the permanent phenomena of nature aside, as 
 utterly insignificant ; and pause till you can establish a 
 miracle, before you venture to assert the existence of 
 Deitv ? 
 
 §. 8. He ivill not he convinced from miracles who is not 
 convinced hg the phenomena of nature, — After all, we 
 may despair of bringing, by miracles, to the belief 
 of a Deity, the man who is incapable of being con- 
 
14 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 vinced of the bein^ of Deity, by the phenomena that 
 surround him. If in these, he see no marks of a de- 
 signer, think you, that an event with a new and unex- 
 pected antecedent, must force him into the belief of a 
 being endowed with power and other excellencies, far 
 beyond the human ? Why should this be so ? 
 
 §. 9. Miracles, too, attended, {'tissaid,) with difficulties of a 
 pecidiar description, — But there is another consideration, 
 which should be carefully kept in mind. Miracles are 
 thought to be clogged with difficulties of a most pecu- 
 liar character. The proof against miracles from the 
 nature of the case, ('tis argued,) is as complete as any 
 proof, from testimony, in their favour, can possibly be. 
 Then, would you have men suspend their belief in a 
 God, till they get past this preliminary difficulty? 
 This were any thing but making the road to Theism 
 shorter and less difficult. 
 
 §. 10. Ttiis metliod of proof labours under all the dis- 
 advantages of the argument from experience, — Even let 
 it be supposed that miracles answer the purpose for 
 which they are thus brought forward : the proof by this 
 method of the being of a God, is attended with all the 
 defects and disadvantages which attend that argument 
 a posteriori, which is in more general use. 
 
 §. 1 1. Which of the two, — the argument in general use, 
 or the one drawn from miracles, for the existence of a 
 Deity, gives us the more enlarged, exalted, and correct 
 ideas of that Being, would constitute a question, which, 
 if it be as important as it is difficult, should be followed 
 out by the exclusive supporters of either method of 
 proving so fundamental a doctrine. 
 
 DIVISION II. 
 
 15 
 
 DIVISION II. 
 
 A REVIEW OF DR. SAMUEL CLARKE S DEMONSTRATION OF THE 
 BEING AND ATRIBUTES OF GOD. 
 
 §. 1. If there be a necessary Being, that must be capable 
 of proof The proof must be a priori. — Nothing appears 
 to be more unaccountable, than that, if there be a neces- 
 sarily existing Being, there can be no way of proving it. 
 To say so, seems absurd. And if there beany wi>y of prov- 
 ing, there is a necessarily existing Being, that must, of 
 course, be by arguments drawn from the necessity of 
 the thing. Reasonings from experience, can show what 
 may be, or, is : they cannot show what must be. To 
 say, therefore, that a priori reasoning in the matter can 
 never turn to any account, is to say, that we can never 
 prove a necessarily existing Being. Indeed, if a priori 
 reasoning in the matter can never turn to any account, 
 what does this show but that it is impossible, there can 
 be a necessarily existing Being? And for one to be- 
 lieve what he can have no proof for, and what isimpos- 
 ble, is surely extravagant. 
 
 §. 2. A necessary Being, a sine qua non of every 
 thing. Therefore, the proof easily reached, — Nay, must 
 we not suppose, that if there be, indeed, a neces- 
 sary Being, the demonstration of this existence must be 
 very easily reached, and, when set down, irresistible ? 
 If a necessarily existing Being is not one whose being 
 is a sine qua non, and must be supposed as a sine qua 
 NON, of every thing else, what can be understood by 
 
16 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 such ? And if wc must suppose that Being' as a sine 
 QUA NON of every other thing", surely, the proof of the 
 existence of that Being is not difficult to he attained to, 
 or rather, is impossible to he avoided. 
 
 §. 3. Bat one waij of exhibiting the proof. For 
 a necessary Being known only hy his modes, — And, 
 as, if there be a necessary Being, it would appear, that 
 the proof must be close within our reach, so, there can 
 be, substantially, but one way of exhibiting the demon- 
 stration. For a necessarily existing Being is one whose 
 being is a sine qua non of every other thing. We 
 can know of his existence only by his modes : His 
 modes, therefore, of existing must be the sine qua 
 NON of all else : We, surely, may easily see what 
 things are the sine qua non of every other existence. 
 We know of two things, and two only, that are the 
 sine qua non of every other existence. And 'tis at- 
 tempted to be demonstrated, that, from these two, we 
 must infer the existence of a necessarily existing Being, 
 the int(dligent cause of all things. 
 
 §. 4. J)r. Clarke has not attended to this in his " De- 
 monstration" Tlierefore that faulty, — T>r, Clarke^ in his 
 " Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God," 
 hath not attended to this, that if there be a necessary 
 Beinir, his existence must be deduced, if deduced at all, 
 from those things that are the sine qua non of all else; 
 those things being the modes of his existing. And, 
 accordingly, his Demonstration is no more than a pre- 
 tended one. It is wholly, and evidently, inconclusive. 
 
 §. 5. His whole Demonstration hangs on the second 
 proposition. If therefore^ that sophistical^ the whole 
 must he so, — The whole of that Demonstration hangs 
 \ipun the second proposition. This Dr, Clarke ackuow- 
 
 division II. 
 
 17 
 
 ledges : — " Either there has always Existed some one 
 Unchangeable and Independent Being, from which all 
 other Beings that are or ever were in the Universe, 
 have received their Original ; or else there has been an 
 infinite Succession of changeable and dependent Beings 
 produced one from another in an endless Progression, 
 without any Original Cause at all. Now this latter 
 Supposition is so very absurd, that tho' all Atheism 
 must in its Account of most things (as shall be shown 
 hereafter) terminate in it, yet I think very few Atheists 
 ever were so weak as openly and directly to defend 
 it." Here he confesses that all Atheism must, in its 
 account of most things, terminate in the supposition of 
 an infinite succession of dependent beings. It is in- 
 cumbent on him, therefore, to get over that barrier. 
 And this he has, in the place in question, undertaken 
 to do. So that, if the reasoning in this second propos- 
 ition be sophistical, the whole fabric must fall to 
 
 pieces, of itself. 
 
 §. 6. Wotdd make out his point by disproving the second 
 member of his dilemma, — How, then, does this Author 
 attempt to prove his proposition, that there has existed 
 from eternity, some one unchangeable and independent 
 Being ? Let us admit the goodness of his dilemma : 
 Let us observe how he establishes the first member, 
 and disproves the second. This he does not do by de- 
 monstrating the existence of a Being with whose exist- 
 ence the supposition of an infinite succession of depen- 
 dent beings, is utterly incompatible : But he attempts 
 to do it hj first considering and demolishing infinite suc- 
 cession ; and the second member of the dilemma being, 
 (he thinks,) removed out of the way, the first remains 
 to be true. 
 
 B 
 
18 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 §. 7. An infinite succession, an eternal succession, and this 
 a necessar// succession, — We must, then, carefully exam- 
 ine how he proceeds to demolish infinite succession. And 
 to be enabled to weigh accurately the validity of the pro- 
 cess of reasoning which he uses, it must be premised, that 
 an infinite succession is an eternal succession, and an 
 eternal succession is a necessary succession of dependent 
 h Pings. An infinite succession means a succession of 
 intinity of duration,* and this is convertible with an 
 
 * Indeed, an infinite succession is an expression most improper. This 
 may be drawn from the following passage in Afr. Locke. The Author is 
 more particularly considering one of the kinds of infinity, but the spirit 
 of the remarks is, of course, as applicable to infinity of duration, or 
 what is of infinity of duration, as to infinity of expansion.— 
 
 ''Difference between iufinil'/ (f space, and space infmUe.— Though out 
 idea of infinity arise from the contemplation of quantity, and the end- 
 less increase the mind is able to make in quantity, by the repeated ad- 
 ditions of what portions thereof it pleases ; yet I guess we cause great 
 confusion in our thoughts, when we join infinity to any supposed idea 
 of quantity the mind can be thought to have, and so discourse or reason 
 about an infinite quantity, viz., an infinite space, or an infinite duration. 
 For our idea of infinity being, as I think, an endless growing idea, by 
 the idea of any quantity the mind has, being at that time terminated in 
 that idea (for be it as great as it will, it can be no greater than it is,) 
 to join infinity to it, is to adjust a standing measure to a growing bulk j 
 and, therefore, I think it is not an insignificant subtilty, if I say, that 
 we are carefully to distinguish between the idea of the" [Strictly, perhaps 
 even the the should not be here.] " infinity of space, and the idea of a 
 space infinite. The first is nothing but a supposed endless progression 
 of the mind, over what repeated ideas of space it pleases ; but to have 
 actually in the mind the idea of a space infinite, is to suppose the mind 
 already passed over, and actually to have a view of all those repeated 
 ideas of space which an endless repetition can never totally represent 
 to it; which carries in it a plain contradiction." Essai/ concerning 
 Human Understanding, B. 2. chap. xvii. §. 7. 
 
 When, therefore, an infinite succession, or series, or similar phrases are 
 here used ; the use being improper, 'tis in compliance merely with the 
 language of the proposition which is analysed. 
 
 DIVISION II. 
 
 19 
 
 eternal succession. If an eternal succession be not a 
 necessary succession, what is a necessary succession? 
 or, why is an eternal not a necessary succession ? Let 
 it just be added, it is plain enough, that an eternal or a 
 necessary succession, is one that has not, that cannot 
 have, a cause. — We are, now, prepared to inquire into 
 the justness of Dr. darkens reasoning. 
 
 §. 8. Examination of the reasoning in Dr. ClsLrke^ s second 
 proposition, — " If we consider,'* says he, " such an in- 
 finite Progression, as Orie eniirel^ndless Series oi Depend- 
 ent Beings ; 'tis plain this whole Series of Beings can have 
 no Cause from without, of its Existence ; because in it 
 are supposed to be included all Things that are or ever 
 were in the Universe." We may add another reason 
 why an infinite progression can have no cause from 
 without : Simply, because it can have no cause at all. 
 Ex hypothesi, it is without a cause, 
 
 §. 9. Dr. Clarke goes on: " And 'tis plain it can have no 
 Reason ivithin itself of its Existence ; because no one 
 > Being in this Infinite Succession is supposed to be Self- 
 existent or Necessary, (which is the only Ground or 
 Reason of Existence of any thing, that can be imagined 
 within the thing itself, as will presently more fully ap- 
 pear,) but every one Dependent o\\ the foregoing." Here 
 an especial reason is given, why an endless series can 
 have no reason within itself of its existence : as if it 
 were not enough to say, that an endless series can have 
 no cause within itself, because it can have no cause at all. 
 That succession must sink its pretensions to bemg m- 
 finite, which has, which can have, a cause, let the cause 
 be from without, or within itself.* 
 
 * Does any meaning lie in the words, A thing has the cause of its exist- 
 ence within itself, other than this, The thing is its own cause ? And 
 
20 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 DIVISION II. 
 
 21 
 
 §. 10. '' Where no Partis necessary, 'tis manifest," con- 
 tinues Dr Clarke, " the Whole cannot be necessary." How- 
 comes it that we here meet with the parts, with the 
 whole, of an infinite succession ? The applying^ to what 
 is infinite of these terms, of all terms taken from the ca- 
 tegory of quantity^ if they are used otherwise than as 
 moro figures of speech, is absurd, in the last degree: 
 unless, (for we must limit the assertion,) what is in- 
 finite can be finite. It may be safely allowed, that the 
 words. Where no part is necessary the whole cannot 
 be necessary, w^ould be to the purpose were the question, 
 IsiXie succession infinite or necessary, or is it not? For, 
 'tis certain, no such reasoning; 'tis certain, no reasoning 
 whatever, can prove a necessary succession is not a ne- 
 cessary succession ; else, a thing might both be and 
 not be at once. 
 
 §.11. An explanation, of absolute necessity succeeds : 
 " Absolute Necessity of Existence, not being an ex- 
 trinsicli, relative, and accidental Denomination ; but an 
 imvard and essential Property of the Nature of the Thing 
 which so Exists." Could it be supposed, after what has been 
 urged, that these words lay in the way, the first labour 
 would properly be confined to the humble task of discover- 
 ing fully their meaning. But wiiatever they are intended to 
 bring out concerning absolute necessity, they cannot 
 lie in the way : for as long as it holds good, that what- 
 ever is, is, a necessary succession must continue a neces- 
 sary succession. 
 
 §. 1*2. Then follows the conclusion, at w^hich Dr, Clarke 
 arrives by virtue of the foregoing reasoning : " An infinite 
 Succession therefore of merely Dependent Beings, with- 
 
 that which is the cause of itself, existed before it existed. And that 
 a thing should be while it is not, contradicts, Whatever is, is. 
 
 out any Original Independent Cause; is a Series of Be- 
 ings, that has neither Necessity, nor Cause, nor any Rea- 
 son or Ground at all of its Existence, either within itself 
 or from icithout:'* That it required any proof, (as 
 the illative particle intimates,) to show, that a succes- 
 sion or series which can have no cause, has no cause, 
 must, under leave, be altogether denied. With the il- 
 lative particle, or without it, the passage, by itself, is 
 faultless; unless an identical proposition be something 
 
 faulty. 
 
 §. 13. Having proved, as he thinks, that an infinite suc- 
 cession of dependent beings has no cause : " That is," he 
 adds, "'tis" (to wit, an infinite series is,) " an express 
 Contradiction and Impossibilty ;" [why?] "'tis a sup- 
 posing Something to be caused, (because 'tis granted in 
 every one of its Stages of Succession, not to be necessari- 
 ly and of itself; J and yet that, in the whole, 'tis caused 
 absolutely by Nothingr So that the whole of this argu- 
 mentation at last resolves itself into this, that a suc- 
 cession which has no cause is an impossibility, for the 
 
 reason that it has no cause ! 
 
 §.14.The next sentence proceeds thus: "Which" (name- 
 ly, a supposing something to be caused thatis not caused,) 
 " every Man knows is a Contradiction to imagine done in 
 Tm^;" [Nothing more certain.] "and, because Duration 
 in this Caso makes no Difference, 'tis equally a Contradic- 
 tion to suppose it done from Eternity r Was it not 
 unnecessary to assign a reason, why it is a contradic- 
 tion, supposing something to be caused from eternity, 
 
 * Wherein is the cause of a thing a whit behind the reason or the 
 ground of it ? Let this be pointed out. 
 
 And IB an infinite or a necessary series, in truth a series that has m 
 
 necessity ? 
 
 \i 
 
22 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 tiiat is not caused ? A reason, ncvortlieless, is given : 
 Because supposing something to be caused that is not 
 caused, is a contradiction in relation to time. 
 
 §. 15. No wonder, that by such close and exact rea- 
 soning, this Author should have succeeded so well in de- 
 molishing an infinite succession of dependent beings ! 
 
 §. 16. JV/ierein (shortly) the sophistry contained in that 
 proposition lies, — In a v/ord, the sophistry, the plain so- 
 phistry, lies in assuming that a succession which can have 
 no cause, must have a cause. If we but remember what 
 infinite succession means, Dr, Clarke's reasoning will ap- 
 pear nothing more than ingenious trifling. How 
 far one might succeed in showing, that a succession of 
 dependent beings cannot be infinite, just because it is 
 a succession of dependent beings, needs not here to 
 be inquired. 'Tis certain, that once grant, a suc- 
 cession is infinite, eternal, necessary, it will never do 
 to retract the admission, and argue as if the succession 
 were not infinite, or eternal, or necessary : which you 
 do, most effectually, by assuming that it must have a 
 cause. 
 
 §. 17. To the same purpose as the preceding examina- 
 tion of what Z)r. Clarke advances in his second proposition, 
 are the following remarks of Mr, Hume : " In tracing 
 an eternal succession of objects, it seems absurd to in- 
 quire for a general cause or first author. How can 
 any thing, that exists from eternity, have a cause, since 
 that relation implies a priority in time, and a beginning 
 of existence ? 
 
 " In such a chain, too, or succession of objects, each 
 part is caused by that which preceded it, and causes 
 that which succeeds it. Where then is the difficulty ? 
 But the WHOLE, you say, wants a cause. I answer, 
 
 DIVISION II. 
 
 23 
 
 that the uniting of these parts into a whole, like the unit- 
 ing of several distinct countries into one kingdom, or 
 several distinct members into one body, is performed 
 merely by an arbitrary act of the mind, and has no 
 influence on the nature of things. Did I show you the 
 particular causes of each individual in a collection of 
 twenty particles of matter, I should think it very un- 
 reasonable, should you afterwards ask me, what was the 
 cause of the whole twenty. This is sufficiently explain- 
 ed in explaining the cause of the parts." Dialogues 
 concerning Natural Religion^ Part IX. 
 
 §. 18. Dr, Clarke was not so well satisfied with the 
 manner in which he had succeeded in destroying infinite 
 succession, but that he twice renews the attack ; but 
 what has been offered will furnish a key to open up 
 the secrets of the sophistry which may be contained in 
 what he farther advances. 
 
 §. 19. As we are considering the Demonstration of the 
 Being and Attributes of God, let us, before leaving the 
 subject, attend to the proposition by virtue of which 
 the Author was entitled to advance to the one which has 
 been examined. The faulty reasoning which we have 
 observed, is an essential defect; a defect, therefore, 
 for which no correctness throughout the rest of the 
 argument could atone: And yet, there is something 
 more that is objectionable. 
 
 §. 20. Consideration of the reasoning in Dr. Clarke's 
 first proposition,— h\ his first proposition, Dr, Clarke 
 undertakes to prove, that something always was, from 
 the postulate, something is. He does not lay it down 
 as an axiom, Whatever begins to be must have a cause : 
 by which proceeding he might have demonstrated, most 
 
24 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 strictly, that something always was. But without the 
 help of this axiom he, magnanimously, sets about prov- 
 ing, that something always was, if he is but granted 
 the premiss, something is. He is cautious enough, how- 
 ever, to say, that there is little need of he'mg particular 
 in the proof. 
 
 §. 21. "For since Something now Is, 'tis evident" (it 
 is thus he argues,) "that Something always Was* 
 Otherwise the Things that Now Are, must have been 
 produced out of Nothing, absolutely and without 
 Cause : Which is a plain Contradiction in Terms. For, 
 to say a Thing is produced, and yet that there is no 
 Cause at all of that Production, is to say that Some- 
 thing is Effected, when it is Effected hy Nothing ; that is 
 at the same time when it is not Effected at alU* 
 
 §. 22. There cannot be a better reply to this way 
 of speaking than what Mr. Hume furnishes : " What 
 ever is produced without any cause is produced by 
 nothing ; or, in other words, has nothing for its cause. 
 But nothing can never be a cause, no more than it can 
 be something, or equal to two right angles. By the 
 same intuition, that we perceive nothing not to be 
 equal to two right angles, or not to be something, we 
 perceive, that it can never be a cause ; and consequently 
 must perceive, that every object has a real cause of its 
 existence. 
 
 "I biiieve it will not be necessary to employ many 
 
 words in showing the weakness of this argument. 
 
 'Tis sufficient only to observe, that when 
 
 we exclude all causes, we really do exclude them, and 
 neither suppose nothing nor the object itself to be the 
 causes of the existence ; and consequently can draw no 
 argument from the absurdity of these suppositions to prove 
 the absurdity of that exclusion. If every thing must have 
 
 DIVISION II. 
 
 25 
 
 a cause, it follows, that, upon the exclusion of other 
 causes, we must accept of the object itself or of no- 
 thing as causes. But 'tis the very point in question, 
 whether every thing must have a cause or not; and 
 therefore, according to all just reasoning, it ought never 
 to be taken for granted." Treatise of Human Nature, 
 Book L Part UL Section HI. 
 
 §. 23. In short, it is impossible ever to set about 
 proving, that whatever begins to be must have a cause, 
 without being guilty of taking for granted the very 
 thing to be proved. If we do not lay down that pro- 
 position as an axiom, there is no alternative but univer- 
 sal scepticism: Tho', His true, that very scepticism 
 destroys itself. 
 
26 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 DIVISION^III. 
 
 NECESSARY EXISTENCE IMPLIES INFINITE EXTENSION. 
 
 §. 1. But three hypotheses as to the extension of a ne- 
 cessary substance, — Supposing, that there is a ne- 
 cessarily existing substance, the intelligent cause of 
 all things, it may be, easily, shown, that that substance 
 is infinitely extended. 
 
 §. 2. For there are but three hypotheses which can 
 possibly be framed in reference to the extension of the 
 necessarily existing substance. The Jirst is: That that 
 substance is of no extension whatever. The second: That 
 that substance is of finite extension only. The third : 
 Tluit that substance is infinitely extended. And, as these 
 hypotheses are all that can be made upon the subject ; 
 therefore, one of them must be true. 
 
 §. 3. First hypothesis. Impossible to conceive it to he 
 true, — As to the first hypothesis, that the necessarily 
 existing substance has no extension whatever : Can 
 there be conceived a greater absurdity than the asser- 
 tion, that a substance, cogitative or incogitative, neces- 
 sarily existing or not necessarily existing, may be with- 
 out any extension whatsoever ? To believe this indeed 
 defies human nature. If reason can, Avith certainty, 
 pronounce any thing, it may pronounce this decision, 
 that extension and existence are so necessary to each 
 other, that there can be no existence without exten- 
 sion. Talk of a substance which has no extension: you 
 present us with words of amusement. 
 
 division III. 
 
 27 
 
 §. 4. If there be a subject on which authority 
 should be of weight, such a subject, 'tis plain, is the 
 debate, whether we must conceive, that to deny exten- 
 sion is to deny existence. And, 'tis well, that, in be- 
 half of the position, that existence cannot be without 
 extension, there are two as great authorities, in specu- 
 lations of this nature, as can any where be found. 
 
 §. 5. '' Perhaps," (says Mr, Locke,) "it is 
 
 near as hard to conceive any existence, or to have an 
 idea of any real being, with a perfect negation of all 
 manner of expansion ; as it is to have the idea of any 
 real existence, with a perfect negation of all manner of 
 duration." Essay concerning Human Understanding, B, 
 II. ch, 15. §. 11. And to have the idea of any real exis- 
 tence with a perfect negation of all manner of duration 
 is, surely, impossible. 
 
 §. 6. The Cartesians make mind and matter to be 
 different in their essence; and make extension, (the 
 correction of Des Cartes" s opinion is, solid extension,*) 
 to be the essence of matter : Consequently, with them, 
 a thinking substance cannot be extended. Mr. Locke 
 wrote at a time when these Cartesian opinions were 
 generally received. But yet, (we see,) he held, that, 
 without extension, it is impossible to conceive existence. 
 §. 7. "Extension does not belong to Jliought" (these 
 are the words of Z)r. Samuel Clarke,) "because Tliought 
 is not a Being ; But there is Need of Extension to the 
 Existence of every Being, to a Being which has or has 
 not Thought, or any other Quality whatsoever." Second 
 Letter to Joseph Butler, of terwards Bishop of Durham. 
 
 §. 8. 'Tis true, that, in these words. Dr. Clarke does 
 not say, that he cannot conceive the existence of a bemg 
 without extension, but that, 'tis certain, is what he means. 
 
 ♦ This correction is by Dr. Isaac Watts. See Philosophical Essays. 
 
28 
 
 INTRODUCTION, 
 
 §. 9. But not to rest the decision of the present affair, 
 on the necessity we are under of conceiving, that there 
 can be no existence without extension : is there no de- 
 cisive argument, to put beyond all doubt, that extension 
 is necessary to a substance, — whether or not necessa- 
 rily existing, no matter ? 
 
 §. 10. The subjects of geometry can have no real exist- 
 ence. — A mathematical point has no magnitude. If a 
 point can have external existence, mathematical demon- 
 stration would vanish : geometry would be destroyed 
 by giving external existence to its subjects. We must 
 suppose that a mathematical point has an external ex- 
 istence, if no reason be assigned why it can have none. 
 And having such existence, all that we call mathemati- 
 cal demonstration is but a vain parade, and utterly false. 
 A conclusion, that, of itself, sufficiently overthrows the 
 premiss from which it follows. 
 
 §. 11. Now, a mathematical point can have no real 
 existence, because it has no magnitude. This is com- 
 pletely proved by the following reasoning. 
 
 §. 12. Unless lines be considered as finite, geometry 
 can have no foundation. And, what terminates a line 
 is the absence of all qualities. For, unless the absence 
 of all qualities be that which ends a mathematical line, 
 how can a mathematical line have an end ? This is per- 
 fectly decisive. 
 
 §. 13. That which has no magnitude is the termina- 
 tion of a line. How can a line not be ended, being 
 met by what has no farther extension? This is en- 
 tirely satisfactory. 
 
 §. 14. The conclusion from the whole is, that what 
 is of no magnitude is nothing. For the reasoning be- 
 ing brought into regular logical form stands thus : — 
 
 DIVISION III. 
 
 29 
 
 What terminates a line is nothing. But what has no 
 magnitude terminates a line. Therefore, what has no 
 magnitude is nothing. 
 
 §. 15. Because a point is non-extension, it is nothing, — 
 Then, because a mathematical point terminates a line,' 
 it is nothing. Because it has no magnitude, it termi- 
 nates a line. Therefore, because it has no magnitude, 
 
 it is nothing. 
 
 §. 16. And, so, cannot have real existence, — Is any 
 reasoning required to show, that nothing, or the absence 
 of all qualities, can have no external existence ? Then, 
 a mathematical point, being the absence of all qualities, 
 or, nothing, cannot exist externally. Again, it is no- 
 thing, for the reason, that it has no magnitude. There- 
 fore, because a mathematical point has no magnitude, it 
 cannot have an external existence. 
 
 §. 17. And the reason why a mathematical point can 
 have no external existence, being because it has no 
 magnitude or extension, 'tis therefore, true, that what- 
 ever has no extension can have no external existence. 
 For these two propositions : a mathematical point has 
 no extension : therefore, a mathematical point has no 
 external existence: compose an enthr/meme, of which 
 the suppressed premiss, according to the laws of Dialec- 
 tics, is, what has no extension, has no external existence. 
 §. 18. A jwint cannot have position in space,-— La,ter 
 mathematicians say, that though a point has no magni- 
 tude, it has position in space. But how that which has 
 no extension whatsoever can have position in extension, 
 any relation whatever to extension, is what can never 
 
 be made intelligible. 
 §.19. Indeed,ifamathematicalpointhavepositionin space, 
 
 then, it has a real existence ; and, so, there can be no 
 
30 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 truth in geometry. A consideration which singly suf- 
 fices to show, that a mathematical point has no relation 
 to space. 
 
 § 20. Upon the whole, one can have no hesitation in 
 saying of those who contend that the necessarily exist- 
 ing substance has no extension whatsoever, or no rela- 
 tion whatever to space, (having relation to space, and 
 having extension, being the same thing;) that, if they 
 be not but uttering words all but incomprehensible ; 
 they deny not so much the existence, as the possibility 
 of the existence, of such a substance. 
 
 §. 21. Second hijpothesis. From this it follows, first, 
 that the necessary substance has form. — As to the second 
 hypothesis, that the necessarily existing substance is of 
 finite extension only : From this it follows, in the first 
 place, that that substance has a figure, for figure is just 
 extension with limits. 
 
 §. 22. Shape inconsistent loith necessary existence, — 
 But shape is utterly inconsistent with necessary exis- 
 tence. Can any one hope to be thought knowing who 
 shall contend, that the necessarily existing substance is 
 sjfjnnre or circular, or of what other figure soever you 
 chuse? We shall search the world in vain, for a 
 greater absurdity than what such a position sets forth. 
 
 §. 23. Virtue cannot he without substance, — It may be 
 laid down as one of those truths which admit of no con- 
 tradiction, that, with regard to the uncreated substance, 
 at least, virtue cannot be without substance. Speaking 
 of this substance, Sir Isaac Newton hath these words : 
 " OmniprcBsens est non per Virtutem solam, sedetiam per 
 substantiam : nam virtus sine substantia subsistere non 
 
 DIVISION III. 
 
 31 
 
 potest,'' Newton. Princip. Mathemat. Schol. general. 
 
 sub finem. 
 
 S. 24. Tlierefore the necessary substance must be of 
 equal extent with matter,— li, then, the necessarily exist- 
 ing substance created the material universe ; (and to 
 deny this, were just to deny there is a necessary sub- 
 stance, the cause of all things;) as without substance 
 virtue cannot subsist, the necessarily existing substance, 
 must be, at the least, of equal extension with the material 
 universe : (for matter, if created, can be of no more than 
 finite extension.) 
 
 §. 25. It follows, secondly, that the necessary substance 
 is divisible,— Then, from this hypothesis it follows, in 
 the second place, that the necessarily existing substance 
 is divisible : for a limited substance, a substance of as 
 great extension as the material universe, at least, may 
 be conceived divided, to wit, the parts of it removed to 
 
 different parts of space. 
 
 §. 26. But divisibility incompatible icith necessary ex- 
 istence.— l^ow, to predicate divisibility of a substance, 
 is equal to saying, it has no necessary existence. For, 
 'tis as clear as any truth can be, that to suppose a sub- 
 stance divided, is no less than to suppose it annihilated 
 as one substance. And nothing is so impossible as this, 
 that the necessarily existing substance should be anni- 
 hilated. For that this substance may be made to cease 
 to be, is a position which amounts to this, that a sub- 
 stance, to suppose the non-existence of which is a con- 
 tradiction, may yet be supposed non-existent. Which 
 absurdity following from the hypothesis, that the necess- 
 arily existing substance is of finite extension only ; 'tis 
 plain, that hypothesis must be absurd. 
 
32 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 §,27. 21ie very supposition of a necessary substance 
 being onhj of finite extent as absurd as aught implied in it, 
 — But indeed, it were needless to show, by all that is 
 implied in the existence of a substance of finite exten- 
 sion only, that the supposition of such a substance ne- 
 cessarily being, is an absurdity. For the supposition, 
 without the least regard to what it implies, is, itself, as 
 absurd as any thing can be. This cannot be better 
 shown than in Dr, Samuel Clarke's words : " To suppose 
 Matter, or any Other Sul)stance, Necessarihj-existing in 
 a Finite determinate Quantity ; in an Inch-Cube, for in- 
 stance ; or in Any certain number of Cube-Inches, and 
 no more; is exactly the same Absurdity, as supposing it 
 to exist Necessarily, and yet for a Finite Duration only: 
 Which every one sees to be a plain Contradiction." 
 Third Letter to Joseph Butler, afterwards Bishop of 
 Durham* 
 
 • The system of the Anthropomorphites, which gives to the neces- 
 sarily existing substance the figure of a man, because it is, somehow, 
 supposed, that substance must be of some form, and a human figure is 
 esteemed the most perfect,— at least, the best adapted for a necessary 
 substance ; this system, besides that it is chargeable with all the ab- 
 surdities which follow from the hypothesis, that the necessarily existing 
 substance is of finite extension only; is attended with absurdities which 
 seem peculiar to itself. These not being consequences of that hypo- 
 thesis ?rierelt/t they with no propriety fall to be considered here. 
 
 The absurdities which are alluded to, some, at least, of these ab- 
 surdities, are, Jirst, That the necessarily existing substance is material. 
 For how can pure spirit have the form of a man ? And new absurdities 
 follow from the absurdity which makes the necessary substance, a ma- 
 terial substance in human form. But to what purpose the labour of 
 bringing them to light ? Secoiidbj, It seems to be urged with force, 
 that the human form evinces marks of design. And, 'tis a good infer- 
 ence, surely, that because man exhibits, in his shape, marks of designi 
 
 DIVISION III. 
 
 33 
 
 §. 28. Third hypothesis must therefore he true, — The 
 third hj-pothesis, then, must be true : to wit, that the 
 necessarily existing substance, the intelligent cause of 
 all things, is infinitely extended.* To deny, therefore, 
 that there is an infinitely extended substance, is to de- 
 ny, that there is a necessarily existing substance. And 
 to deny this were downright Atheism. 
 
 §. 29. We may push the matter a little farther. 
 Have we any idea of a necessarily existing substance 
 beyond what is implied by an eternal substance ? If we 
 have, to what doth that farther idea amount ? 
 
 §. 30. So that if to deny there is an infinitely ex- 
 tended substance, be to deny there is a necessarily 
 existing substance ; to maintain, there is no infinitely 
 extended substance, is to maintain there is no eternal 
 
 substance. 
 
 §. 31. Since these are the sad consequences of de- 
 nying that the necessarily existing substance, the intel- 
 ligent cause of all things, is infinitely extended, is there 
 not good reason that men should pause before they 
 express a doubt upon the matter ? Strange things may, 
 
 therefore a substance, not a man, but like a man, contains also marks 
 of design. This inference valid, a substance of that nature, so far from 
 being the first cause, would afford evidence that itself was created; and 
 we might rationally set about inquiring into the cause of the existence. 
 * The common sentiment of Theologians, that the necessary sub- 
 stance, is, at the same time, in every point of space, and every atom of 
 matter, entire, is, so far as the opinion is intelligible at all, just this third 
 hypothesis, that the necessary substance is infinitely extended : Though, 
 'tis true, all extension is denied to that substance. For to say that the 
 same substance is in different parts of extension, at once, without being 
 extended, is no more absurd than to say, extension, itself, is not 
 extended. 
 
34 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 at first, be thought to attach themselves to the doctrine : 
 But nothhicv tends so effectually to destroy a prejudice 
 as inquiring into its foundation. 
 
 ARGUMENT, &c. 
 
 » 
 
AN ARGUMENT, A PRIORI, 
 
 FOR 
 
 THE BEING AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 
 
 BOOK I. 
 PART I. 
 
 Proposition I. Infinity of Extension is necessarily 
 
 existing* 
 
 §. 1. For even when the mind endeavours to re- 
 move from it the idea of Infinity of Extension, it 
 cannot, after all its efforts, avoid leaving still there, 
 the idea of such infinity. Let there he ever so much 
 endeavour to displace this idea, that is, conceive Infi- 
 nity of Extension non-existent ; every one, hy a review, 
 or reflex examination of his own thoughts, will find, it 
 is utterly heyond his power to do so. 
 
 §. 2. Now, since even when we would remove In- 
 finity of Extension out of our mind, we prove, it must 
 exist by necessarily leaving the thought of it behind, 
 or, by substituting, (so to speak,) Infinity of Extension 
 for Infinity of Extension taken away ; from this, it is 
 manifest, Infinity of Extension is necessarily existing : 
 
 / 
 
38 
 
 ARGUMENT 
 
 PART I. 
 
 For, every thing the existence of which we cannot hut 
 believe, which we alwaijs suppose, even though we 
 2vould not, is necessarily existing. 
 
 §. 3. To deny that Infinity of Extension exists, is, 
 therefore, an utter contradiction. Just as much a con- 
 tradiction as this, 1. is equal to 1. therefore, 1. is not 
 equal to 1. but to 2.: 2. not being identical with 1.* 
 As thus : Infinity of Extension is ever present to the 
 mind, though we desire to banish it ; therefore, it can 
 be removed from the mind. This is just an application 
 of the greatest of all contradictions, A thing can be, 
 and not be, at the same time. 
 
 Proposition II. Lifinitij of Extension is necessarily 
 
 indivisible, 
 
 §. 1. That is, its parts are necessarily indivisible 
 
 from each other. 
 
 §. 2. Indivisible in this proposition means indivisible 
 either really or mentally : For there can be no objection 
 to a real, which does not apply to a mental divisibility; 
 and a mental divisibility, we are under the necessity of 
 supposing, implies an actual divisibility, of Infinity of 
 
 Extension. 
 
 §. 3. The parts, then, of Infinity of Extension 
 are necessarily indivisible from each other really or 
 
 mentally. 
 
 §. 4. For that which is divisible really, may be di- 
 
 • A contradiction which we can no more believe than that 1. is equal 
 to 1. therefore 1. is not equal to 1. &c. 
 
 PROP. II. 
 
 BOOK I. 
 
 39 
 
 vided really: and a thing which is actually divided 
 from another must have superficies of its own, every 
 way, and be removed or separated from that other 
 thing, be it by ever so little a distance. If any one 
 should say that things really divided from each other 
 have not real superficies of their own, every way ; to 
 be able to believe him, we must first be able to be- 
 lieve this, that a thing can be, and not be, at the same 
 time : And if any one should say that things which 
 are really divided from each other, which have real 
 superficies of their own every way, can possibly be 
 conceived without a certain distance, however little, 
 being between them ; as this, it could as soon be be- 
 lieved that "in a good syllogism of the first figure, the 
 conclusion does not necessarily follow from the pre- 
 mises. Being really divided, and being really separ- 
 ated, mean, thus, the same thing.* 
 
 §. 5. Now, divisibility meaning possibility of separa- 
 tion: As it is an utter contradiction to say, Infinity of Ex- 
 tension can be separated ; that is, a part of Infinity of 
 Extension separated, by a certain distance, /ro/w Infinity 
 of Extension; there remaining Infinity of Extension after 
 part of it is taken away : the part of Infinity of Extension 
 so removed, being removed from the remaining parts 
 to these very same parts ; the part, thus, being at rest ivhile 
 it is taken away ; the part so moved away, being moved 
 
 • A division by mathematical lines, (which are lines of length with- 
 out breadth,) of the real existence of Infinity of Extension, does not in- 
 fer a greater absurdity than a division of a mathematical line by some- 
 thing really existing: if the division by mathematical lines mean any 
 thing more than a partial apprehension or consideration of Infinity of Ex- 
 tension : which is allowed to be possible, just as it is possible to con- 
 sider length without breadth, or depth without breadth or length. 
 
 i 
 
 / 
 
40 
 
 ARGUMENT 
 
 PART I. 
 
 SLwajfrom itself; it still remaining, inasmuch as there is 
 necessarily Infinity of Extension ;* that is, though moved 
 awai/y being not moved away : Which could not be, unless 
 it be false, that ivhatever is^ is : As it is, thus, an utter 
 contradiction to say Infinity of Extension can be sepa- 
 rated, so it is an utter contradiction to say it is not 
 indivisible. 
 
 §. 6. The parts of Infinity of Extension being ne- 
 cessarily indivisible from each other ; it is a necessary 
 consequence^ that that, the parts of which are divisible from 
 each other, is not Infinity of Extension; nor any 
 part of it : part, in the sense of partial consideration 
 only, for otherwise Infinity of Extension can have no 
 parts.^ 
 
 §. 7. Indeed, that divisibility implies Jiniteness in 
 extension, in the very notion of it, will be evident to 
 every one who considers the relations of his clear ideas. 
 
 Corollary /rom Proposition II. Infinity of Extension 
 
 is necessarily immoveable, 
 
 §. 1. Tliat is, its parts are necessarily immoveable 
 among themselves. 
 
 §. 2. For, motion of parts supposes, of necessity, 
 separation of the parts. He who does not see that mo- 
 tion of parts supposes, of necessity, separation of the parts, 
 need never be expected to see that because every A. is 
 equal to B. therefore some B. is equal to A. And In- 
 finity of Extension being necessarily incapable of sc- 
 
 ^ Prop. L §. 2. 
 
 §.5. 
 
 PROP. III. 
 
 BOOK r. 
 
 41 
 
 paration,* is, therefore, necessarily immoveable, that is, 
 its parts are necessarily immoveable among themselves. 
 §. 3. The parts of Infinity of Extension being ne- 
 cessarily immoveable among themselves ; it is a neces- 
 sary consequence, that that, the parts of which are 
 moveable among themselves, is not Infinity of Extension ; 
 nor any part of it : part, in the sense of partial con- 
 sideration only, for otherwise Infinity of Extension can 
 
 have no parts.* 
 
 §. 4. Indeed, if this, that divisibility im^Xies finiteness 
 in extension, in the very notion of it, will be evident to 
 every one who considers the relations of his clear 
 ideas ;^ motion implying divisibility,'' it is evident that 
 motion must imply finiteness in extension, in the very 
 notion of it, to every one who considers the relations 
 of his clear ideas. 
 
 Proposition III. Tliere is necessarily a Being of 
 
 Infinity of Extension. 
 
 §. I. For, either, Infinity of Extension subsists, or, 
 (which is the same thing,) we conceive it to subsist, 
 without a support or substratum : or, it subsists not, or 
 we conceive it not to subsist, without a support or sub- 
 stratum. 
 
 §. 2. First, If Infinity of Extension subsist without 
 a substratum, then, it is a substance. And if any one 
 sliould deny, that it is a substance, it so subsisting ; to 
 prove, beyond contradiction, the utter absurdity of such 
 
 '^ Prop. II. §. 5. Prop. II, §. 7. ' §. 2. 
 
4-2 
 
 ARGUMENT 
 
 TART r. 
 
 denial, we have but to defy him to show, ivhy Infinity of 
 Extension is not a substance, so far forth as it can sub- 
 sist by itself, or without a substratum, 
 
 §. 3. As, therefore, it is a contradiction to deny that 
 Infinity of Extension exists,* so there is, on the suppo- 
 sition of its being able to subsist without a substratum, 
 a substance or beiny of Infinity of Extension necessarily 
 existing: Tho' Infinity of Extension and the being of 
 Infinity of Extension, are not different, as standing to 
 each other in the relation of mode and subject of the 
 mode, but are idc7iticaL 
 
 §. 4. Secondly, If Infinity of Extension subsist not 
 without a Substratum, then, it being a contradiction to 
 deny there is Infinity of Extension,"" it is a contradiction 
 to deny there is a Substratum to it. 
 
 §. 5. Whether or not men will consent to call this 
 Substratum Substance or Beiny, is of very little con- 
 sequence. For, 'tis certain that the word Substance or 
 Beiny, has never been employed, can never be employ- 
 ed, to stand for any thing more, at least, than the Sub- 
 stratum of Infinity of Extension. But to refuse to give 
 such Substratum that name, beiny a thing obviously most 
 unreasonable, let us call the Substratum of Infinity of 
 Extension, by the name Substance or Being, 
 
 §. 6. There is, then, necessarily, a Being of Infinity 
 of Extension. 
 
 * Prop: I. §. 3. 
 
 PROP. IV, 
 
 BOOK I. 
 
 43 
 
 Proposition IV. The Being of Infinity of Extension 
 is necessarily of unity and simplicity, 
 
 §. 1. Because Infinity of Extension is necessarily in- 
 divisible,^ therefore it is of the truest unity. For to 
 affirm that tho' it is necessarily indivisible, even so much 
 as by thought, vet it is not of the truest unity, is to af- 
 firm what is no more intelligible than would be the as- 
 sertion, that a circle, this being a figure contained by 
 one line, with every part of that line or circumference 
 equally distant from a certain point, is not round, 
 
 §. 2. And as Infinity of Extension is necessarily of the 
 truest unity, so it is necessarily of the iitmost simplici- 
 ty. What more can be included in simplicity than is 
 implied in unity caused by a thing being necessarily in- 
 divisible, we can have no conception. 
 
 §. 3. And as, on the supposition that Infinity of Ex- 
 tension subsists by itself, there is necessarily a being of 
 Infinity of Extension,^ so, this supposed, that being is 
 necessarily of unity and simplicity. 
 
 §. 4. If Infinity of Extension subsist not without a 
 Substratum; that we cannot, without an express con- 
 tradiction, deny, that the Substratum is of the truest 
 unity, and utmost simplicity, may be most easily de- 
 monstrated. 
 
 §. 5. For it is intuitively evident, that the Substratum 
 of Infinity of Extension can be no more divisible than 
 Infinity of Extension itself. If any one should affirm 
 that tho' Infinity of Extension is necessarily indivisible, 
 yet that its Substratum can be considered as divisible, 
 
 ■ Prop ■. II. §. 5. 
 
 ^ Prop : III. §. 3. 
 
44 
 
 ARGUMENT 
 
 PART I. 
 
 we could no more assent to the proposition than we 
 could believe that a subject can never be truly predi- 
 cated of itself. And, therefore, as Infinity of Extension 
 is necessarily indivisible,^ so is its Substratum. 
 
 §.6. A' ^ I niiity of Extension being necessarily of 
 unity and simplicity because necessarily indivisible,'* it8 
 Substratum is so likewise, for the same reason. 
 
 §. 7. And as, on the supposition that Infinity of Ex- 
 tension subsists not without a Substratum, there is ne- 
 cessarily a Being of Infinity of Extension,*^ so, this sup- 
 posed, that Being is necessarily of unity and simplicity. 
 
 §. 8. The Being of Infinity of Extension is necessari- 
 ly, then, of unity and simplicity, 
 
 §. 9. The Substratum of Infinity of Extension being 
 necessarily indivisible,^ that is, its parts being neces- 
 sarily indivisible from each other : It is a corollary, 
 that its parts {parts^ in the sense of partial consid- 
 eration only,**) are necessarily immoveable among them- 
 selves : For the same reason that Infinity of Extension 
 is necessarily immoveable because necessarily indivisible. 
 
 §. 10. Therefore, that, the parts of which are divisi- 
 ble from each other, is not the Substratum of Infinity of 
 Extension, nor any part of it : And, that, the parts of 
 which are moveable among themselves, is not the Sub- 
 stratum, nor any part of it : Part in the sense of par- 
 tial consideration only.^ 
 
 » Prop : II. S. ^' " §. I. & 2. " Prop . lU. § 4. & 5. *" §• 5. 
 
 PROP. IV. 
 
 BOOK. I. 
 
 45 
 
 Scholium L— §. 1. If, then, it should be maintained, 
 that the Material Universe is tlie Substratum of Infinity 
 of Extension ; (which will be maintained, as is most evi- 
 dent, if it be contended that the Material Universe is 
 of Infinity of Extension;) to put to the proof, whether 
 or not the Material Universe can be such Substratum, 
 we have but to ask. Are the parts of the Material Uni- 
 verse divisible from each other ? and. Are they move- 
 able among themselves ? For, if they be so divisible, if 
 so moveable, then the Material Universe cannot be the 
 Substratum of Infinity of Extension.^ 
 
 §. 2 Now, we know, of a certainty, that some parts of 
 the Material Universe are divisible from each other; and, 
 as far as we know, every part of it to which our mind 
 could be directed is as divisible, as are the parts which 
 we certainly know are divisible : and this is the conclu- 
 sion to which, by the rules of philosophy, we are en- 
 titled to come. 
 
 §. 3. Therefore, the Material Universe cannot be the 
 Substratum of Infinity of Extension. 
 
 §. 4. Again, we are certain, that some parts of the 
 Material Universe are moveable among themselves ; and, 
 that every part of it to which our mind could be direct- 
 ed is as moveable, as are the parts which we certainly 
 know are moveable, is, (here, as in the other case,) 
 what we are entitled to conclude. 
 
 §. 5. Therefore, again, the Material Universe cannot 
 be the Substratum of Infinity of Extension. 
 
 §. 6. And, if, because the parts of the Material Uni- 
 verse are divisible from each other, it is proved that it is 
 
 Prop : IV. § 10. 
 
46 
 
 ARGUMENT 
 
 PART I. 
 
 not the Substratum of Infinity of Extension ; then, be- 
 cause the parts of the Material Universe are divisible 
 from each other, and moveable among themselves, it is 
 proved, much more, (if that were possible,) that the 
 Material Universe is not the Substratum of Infinity of 
 Extension. It is proved that the Material Universe is 
 not the Substratum of Infinity of Extension ; nor any 
 part thereof, for the Substratum of Infinity of Exten- 
 sion can have no parts but in the sense of partial con- 
 sideration :* that is, that the Material Universe is finite 
 in extension. For were it of Infinity of Extension, it 
 would be the Substratum thereof. But it being not that 
 Substratum : Therefore, it is not of Infinity of Ex- 
 tension. 
 
 §. 7. The Material Universe, then, is finite in ex- 
 tension. 
 
 Scholium II. — §. 1. The parts of Infinity of Exten- 
 sion, or of its Substratum, if it have a Substratum, be- 
 ing" necessarily indivisible from each other,^ and im- 
 moveable among themselves :*^ and the parts of the Ma- 
 terial Universe being divisible from each other, and 
 moveable among themselves : and it, therefore, following 
 that the Material Universe is not the Substratum of 
 Infinity of Extension, but is finite in extension : Here 
 are two sorts of extension. The one sort, that 
 which the Material Universe has : And the other, the 
 extension of Infinity of Extension. And as Infinity of 
 Extension is necessarily existing,'^ and as the extension 
 
 =» Prop : IV. §. 5. f Prop : II. §. 5. & Prop : IV. §. 5. • CoroU : 
 from Prop: II. §. 2. & Prop •. IV. §. 9. ^ p^op : I. §. 2. 
 
 PROP. v. 
 
 BOOK I. 
 
 47 
 
 of the Material Universe must exist, if it exist, in the 
 extension of Infinity of Extension ; a part of this, or of 
 its Substratum, if it have a Substratum, (part, but in 
 the sense of partial consideration;^) must penetrate the 
 Material Universe, and every atom, even the minutest 
 
 atom, of it. 
 
 §. 2. It will be proper, therefore, to distinguish be- 
 tween these two kinds of extension. And, according- 
 ly, let us confine to matter, namely, to the distance of 
 the extremities of matter from each other, the name ex- 
 tension ; and apply to the extension of Infinity of Ex- 
 tension, a part of which, (part, but in the sense of par- 
 tial consideration,^) penetrates all matter to the minutest 
 atom, the name Expansion, 
 
 §. 3. And, therefore, every thing which hath been 
 proved to be true in relation to that extension which 
 matter has not, must be true with regard to Expansion. 
 
 Proposition V. There is necessarily but one Being of 
 
 Infinity of Expansion, 
 
 §. 1. For Infinity of Expansion either subsists by it- 
 self, or it subsists not without a Substratum.'' In both 
 cases there is necessarily a Being of Infinity of Expan- 
 sion.'* Now, we are under a necessity of inferring from 
 the existence of such a Being, that there is but one such 
 Being, 
 
 ^ Prop: II. §. 5. & Prop : IV. §. 5. ^ Prop: II. §. 5. ' Prop : III. §. 
 1. compared with Schol: II. §. 3. '^ Prop: III. §. 3—4. 5. & Schol ; 
 II §. 3. 
 
48 
 
 ARGUMENT 
 
 PART I. 
 
 §. 2. For, as *tis evident, there can he but one Infinity 
 of Expansion^ so, on the supposition that it subsists by 
 itself, and so is a being,* there can be but one being 
 of Infinity of Expansion. And, as 'tis evident there can 
 no more be more than one Substratum of Infinity of Ex- 
 pansion, (whatever that Substratum is,) than there can 
 be more than one Infinity of Expansion; and as, there- 
 iuiL, 'tis evident, there can be but one Substratum of 
 Infinity of Expansion: so, on the supposition that In- 
 finity of Expansion subsists not without a Substratum, 
 or Being,^ there can be but one Being of Infinity of 
 Expansion. 
 
 §. 3. And, therefore, any one that asserts he can 
 suppose two or more necessarily existing beings, each 
 of Infinity of Expansion, is no more to be argued with 
 ■^vm one that denies. Whatever is, is. The denying of 
 this proposition cannot, indeed, be regarded as more 
 curious than the afiirming of the other. 
 
 §. 4. There is then, necessarily, but one Being of In- 
 finity of Expansion. 
 
 • Prop: III. §. 3. & Schol : II. §. 3. ^ Prop: III. §. *. a. & 
 
 Schol : II. §. 3. 
 
 PART. II. 
 
 BOOK I. 
 
 49 
 
 PART II. 
 
 Proposition I. Infinity of Duration is necessarily 
 
 existing, 
 
 §. 1 The truth of this is evident from the same sort 
 of consideration as shows there is necessarily Infinity of 
 Extension ; to wit, that even when we endeavour to 
 remove from our mind the idea of Infinity of Duration, 
 we cannot, after all our efforts, avoid leaving this idea 
 still there. Endeavour as much as we may to displace 
 the idea, that is, conceive Infinity of Duration non-ex- 
 istent, we shall find, after a review of our thoughts, that 
 to do so is utterly beyond our power. 
 
 §. 2. And since, even when we would remove In- 
 finity of Duration from the mind, we necessarily leave 
 the thought of it behind, or substitute, (as it were,) In- 
 finity of Duration for Infinity of Duration taken away ; 
 'tis manifest that Infinity of Duration is necessarily ex- 
 isting : Because, (as already said,) every thing the ex- 
 istence of which we cannot Z>m# believe, which we ahvays 
 suppose^ even though we would not, is necessarily exist- 
 ing. 
 
 D 
 
50 
 
 ARGUMENT 
 
 rAUt II. 
 
 Proposition II. Injinity of Duration is necessarily/ 
 • indivisible, 
 
 §. 1. To wit, its parts are necessarily indivisible from 
 each other : indivisible really or mentally. 
 
 §. 2. For, (as laid down before,) what is divisible 
 may be divided ; and that which is divided from some- 
 thing else must have superjicies, every way, and be se- 
 parated from the other thing, be the distance ever so 
 small :— There is no difference between being divided 
 and being separated. 
 
 §. 3. Then divisibility meaning possibility of separa- 
 tion : Because the parts of Infinity of Duration are ne- 
 cessarily inseparable, they are necessarily indivisible. 
 
 Corollary from Proposition 11. Jjifinity of Dura- 
 tion is necessarily immoveable, 
 
 §. 1. To wit, its parts are necessarily immoveable 
 among themselves. 
 
 §. 2. For motion of the parts of Infinity of Duration, 
 necessarily supposes separation of its parts. And its 
 parts being necessarily incapable of separation,^ are, 
 therefore, necessarily immoveable among themselves. 
 
 « Part n. Prop. II. §. 3. 
 
 
 PROP. III. 
 
 BOOK I. 
 
 51 
 
 Proposition III. There is necessarily a Being of 
 
 Infinity of Duration, 
 
 §. 1. For, either^ Infinity of Duration exists, or is con- 
 ceived to exist, without a substratum : or, it exists not, 
 or is conceived not to exist, without a substratum. 
 
 §. 2. And if Infinity of Duration exist not without a 
 substratum, this, itself, exists without a substratum : 
 For which no other reason need be assigned but this, 
 that what can be meant bv the substratum of the Sub- 
 stratum of Infinity of Duration, is quite beyond our 
 comprehension. 
 
 §. 3. First, If Infinity of Duration exist by itself, it is 
 a substance. For should any one deny that it is a su))- 
 stance, if it so exist ; we shall prove, past contradiction, 
 the absurdity of the denial by just demanding, what is 
 the reason why Infinity of Duration is not a substance 
 if it exist without a substratum^ or by itself 
 
 §. 4. And, therefore, as there is necessarily Infinity 
 of Duration,"^ there is, supposing it to exist by itself, a 
 substance or being of Infinity of Duration necessarily ex- 
 isting : Infinity of Duration and the being of Infinity of 
 Duration being identical^ not different, 
 
 §. 5. Secondly, If Infinity of Duration exist not with- 
 out a Substratum, there is a Substance or Being of In- 
 finity of Duration. For the word Substance or Being 
 can never, it is certain, stand for any thing more, at least, 
 than such Substratum. 
 
 § 6. And as Infinity of Duration is necessarily exist- 
 ing,* so there is necessarily a Substance or Being of 
 
 "Part II. Prop. 1. §. 2. 
 
52 
 
 ARGUMENT 
 
 PART II. 
 
 Infinity of Duration, on the supposition that it exists 
 not without a Suhstratum. 
 
 § 7. There is necessarily, then, a Being of Infinity of 
 Duration. 
 
 Proposition IV. The Being of Infinity of Duration is 
 necessarily of unity and simplicity, 
 
 § 1. As Infinity of Duration is necessarily indivisi- 
 ble,* so it is necessarily of the truest unity. For, if 
 what is necessarily indivisible, even by thought, be not 
 of the truest unity, what unity consists in is altogether 
 
 unintelligible. 
 
 § 2. And because Infinity of Duration is necessarily 
 of the truest unity, it is, also, of the utmost simplicity. 
 We can have no conception, (as has been already said,) 
 of what is in simplicity that is not in unity caused by 
 a thing being necessarily indivisible. 
 
 § 3. And as there necessarily is a being of Infinity 
 of Duration, on the supposition that Infinity of Dura- 
 tion exists without a substratum,^ so, this supposed, the 
 being is necessarily of unity and simplicity. 
 
 § 4. If Infinity of Duration exist not without a Sub- 
 stratum ; that the Substratum is of the truest unity and 
 utmost simplicity, is a thing not difficult to be demon- 
 strated. 
 
 § 5. For that the substratum of Infinity of Duration 
 is no more divisible than Infinity of Duration, is a self- 
 
 « Part II. Prop : II. § 3. ^ Part II. Prop. III. S 4. 
 
 PROP. IV, 
 
 BOOK I. 
 
 53 
 
 evident truth. Therefore, because Infinity of Duration 
 is necessarily indivisible,* so is the substratum. 
 
 § 6. And Infinity of Duration, because necessarily 
 indivisible, being necessarily of unity and simplicity,^ its 
 substratum, for the same reason, is so likewise. 
 
 § 7. And as there necessarily is a Being of Infinity 
 of Duration, on the supposition that Infinity of Dura- 
 tion exists not without a Substratum,*^ so, this supposed, 
 the Being is necessarily of unity and simplicity. 
 
 § 8. The Being of Infinity of Duration is, then, ne- 
 cessarily of unity and simjMcity, 
 
 § 9. The Substratum of Infinity of Duration being 
 necessarily indivisible,'* that is, its parts being neces- 
 sarily indivisible from each other, it is a necessary conse- 
 quence, that the thing, the parts of which are divisible from 
 each other, is not such Substratum, nor any part thereof. 
 
 § 10. It is a corollary from the proposition. The 
 parts of the Substratum of Infinity of Duration are ne- 
 cessarily indivisible from each other, that they are ne- 
 cessarily immoveable among themselves : For the same 
 reason that Infinity of Duration is necessarily immove- 
 able, because necessarily indivisible. 
 
 § 11. And the parts of the Substratum of Infinity of 
 Duration being necessarily immoveable among them- 
 selves; it is a necessary consequence, that the thing, the 
 parts of which are moveable among themselves, is not such 
 Substratum, nor any part thereof. 
 
 Scholium I. — § 1. If, then, it should be contended, 
 
 Part II. Prop . II. § 3. ^ § 1 & 2. ' Part II. Prop. III. § 6. ^ § 5. 
 
54 
 
 ARGUMENT 
 
 TART II. 
 
 that a Succession of Beings finite in extension ; finite in 
 extension, for a Succession of Beings of Infinity of Ex- 
 tension were we know not what ; is the Substratum ot 
 Infinity of Duration, or any part thereof; (which will 
 be contended, if it be maintained that any Succession 
 of Beings is of Infinity of Duration. For, if any Suc- 
 cession of Beings be of Infinity of Duration, then, Infi- 
 nity of Duration cannot he without the succession. And, 
 'tis utterly impossible to conceive any reason why we 
 can have come to the conclusion, that Infinity of Dura- 
 tion cannot be without a Succession of Beings, but this, 
 because the Succession is the Substratum thereof, or, at 
 least, a part of the Substratum.) If it be contended 
 that a Succession of Beings is the Substratum of Infinity 
 of Duration, or a part thereof; to put to the proof 
 whether or not such a Succession can be that Sub- 
 stratum, or any part of it, we have but to ask. Are the 
 parts of the Succession divisible from each other ? and. 
 Are they moveable among themselves ? For if they be 
 so divisible and moveable, then the Succession cannot 
 be the substratum of Infinity of Duration, nor any part 
 thereof,* the Substratum having no parts in the sense 
 of capability of separation.^ 
 
 § 2. Now, 'tis as clear as any thing can be, that the 
 parts of a succession of beings are not only divisible, 
 but are divided, from each other, 
 
 § 3. Then, no succession of beings can be the Sub- 
 stratum of Infinity of Duration, or any part of it. 
 
 § 4. Again, 'tis clear, that the parts of a succession of 
 beings are not only moveable, but moved, among them- 
 selves. 
 
 » Part II. Prop IV. § & 11. '' Part II, Prop, \\ . § 5. 
 
 PROP. IV. 
 
 BOOK. I. 
 
 55 
 
 § 5. Then, no succession of beings can be the Sub- 
 stratum of Infinity of Duration, or any part of it. 
 
 § 6. That is, no succession of beings is of Infinity of 
 Duration. For were a succession of beings of Infinity 
 of Duration, it would be the substratum thereof, or, at 
 least, a part of the substratum. But it being not that 
 Substratum, nor any part of it : Therefore, it is not of 
 Infinity of Duration. 
 
 § 7. Every succession, then, of beings is finite in 
 duration. 
 
 Scholium II. — § 1. Again, should it be contended 
 that the Material Universe is the Substratum of Infi- 
 nity of Duration, or any part thereof; (which will be 
 contended, if it be maintained that the Material Uni- 
 verse is of Infinity of Duration : For the same reason that 
 it will be contended, that a Succession of Beings is the 
 Substratum of Infinity of Duration, or a part thereof, if 
 it be maintained that any Succession of Beings is of 
 Infinity of Duration.) Should it be contended that the 
 Material Universe is the Substratum of Infinity of Du- 
 ration, or a part thereof; to put to the proof whether 
 or not the Material Universe can be such Substratum, 
 or a part thereof, we have but to ask, Are the parts of 
 the Material Universe divisible from each other ? and. 
 Are they moveable among themselves ? For if they be 
 so divisible and moveable, the Material Universe can- 
 not be the Substratum of Infinity of Duration, nor any 
 part thereof,* the Substratum having no parts in the 
 sense of capability of separation.^ 
 
 Part II. Prop. IV. § 9& 11. 
 
 Part II. Prop. IV. § 5. 
 
56 
 
 ARGUMENT 
 
 PART II. 
 
 § 2. Now, we know^ certainly^ that some parts of the 
 Material Universe, are divisible from each other ; and 
 that every part of it to which our mind could he di- 
 rected is as divisible, as are the parts which we cer- 
 tainly know are divisible, is, (as already said,) the con- 
 clusion to which the rules of philosophy entitle us to 
 come. 
 
 §. 3. Then, the Material Universe cannot be the 
 Substratum of Infinity of Duration, nor any part 
 thereof. 
 
 § 4. Again, we know, certainly, that some parts of the 
 Material Universe are moveable among themselves ; and 
 that every part of it to which our mind could be di- 
 rected is as moveable, as are the parts which we cer- 
 tainlv know are moveable, is, (in this, as well as in the 
 oiiicr case,) the conclusion to which we are entitled to 
 come. 
 
 § 5. Then, again, the Material Universe cannot be 
 the Substratum of Infinity of Duration, nor any part 
 thereof. 
 
 § 6. That is, the Material Universe is finite in dura- 
 tion. For, were it of Infinity of Duration, it would be 
 the substratum thereof, or, at least, a part of the sub- 
 stratum. But it being not that Substratum, nor any part 
 of it : Therefore, it is not of Infinity of Duration. 
 
 § 7. The Material Universe is, then, finite in dura- 
 tion. 
 
 I 
 
 PROP. v. 
 
 BOOK I. 
 
 57 
 
 Proposition V. There is, necessarily, butoneBeingof 
 
 Infinity of Duration. 
 
 § 1. For, Infinity of Duration either exists without 
 a substratum, or, it exists not without a Substratum, 
 which itself exists without a substratum :^ And in either 
 case, there necessarily is a Being of Infinity of Dura- 
 tion, which exists without a Substratum.^ And we are 
 under the necessity of inferring from the existence of 
 such a Being, that there can be no more than one such 
 Being, 
 
 § 2. For, because, 'tis manifest there can be but one In- 
 finity of Duration, therefore, on the supposition, that it 
 exists without a substratum, and, so, is a being, *^ there 
 can be but one being of Infinity of Duration. And 
 because 'tis as manifest there can be but one Sub- 
 stratum of Infinity of Duration, as that there can be but 
 one Infinity of Duration, and because, therefore, 'tis 
 manifest there can be but one such Substratum : there- 
 fore, on the supposition that Infinity of Duration exists 
 not without a Substratum, or Being,^ there can be but 
 one Being of Infinity of Duration. 
 
 § 3. But, suppose, that from the truth, that there is 
 one necessarily existing Being of Infinity of Duration, 
 which exists by itself, or without a Substratum, it did 
 not follow, that there can be but one such Being. Now, 
 this supposition would amount to this; that there is 
 one necessarily existing Being of Infinity of Duration 
 
 '^ Part II. Prop. III. § 1 & 2. 
 " Part 11. Prop. III. § 4. 
 
 *' Part II. Prop. III. § 4 8: 6. 
 '^ Part II. Prop. III. § 5. 
 
58 
 
 ARGUMENT 
 
 TAilT II. 
 
 which exists without a Substratum, to wit, without 
 any other Being as a substratum — and if without any 
 other Being as a Substratum, then, much more, (if 
 that be possible,) without any other Being, if this be 
 not the substratum : that is, without any other Being 
 at all: to wit, without the necessitij o{ dxvj other Being 
 at all : But, that there may be another necessarily ex- 
 isting Being of Infinity of Duration which exists with- 
 out a Substratum, to wit, without any other Being as a 
 substratum— and if imthout any other Being as a sub- 
 stratum, then, much more, (if that be possible,) with- 
 out any other Being, if this be not the substratum : that 
 is, without any other Being, at all: to wit, without the 
 necessitij of any other Being at all: And so on: Which 
 would be, in effect, saying, there is not a necessarily 
 existing Being of Infinity of Duration at all; — tho' 
 there is a necessarily existing Being of Infinity of Dura- 
 tion. And this contradiction following from the sup- 
 posing, that from the proposition, there is one neces- 
 sarily existing Being of Infinity of Duration, which ex- 
 ists by itself, or without a substratum, it did not fol- 
 low, that there can be but one such Being; it is 
 proved, that the supposition is absurd. 
 
 § 4. There is, then, necessarily, but one Being of In- 
 finity of Duration. 
 
 TART. II r. 
 
 BOOK I. 
 
 59 
 
 PART III. 
 
 Proposition I. Tlicre is, necessarily, a Being ofLifi- 
 nity of Expansion and Infinity of Duration, 
 
 § 1. This will be made out, if it be proved, that the 
 necessarily existing Being of Infinity of Expansion, and 
 the necessarily existing Being of Infinity of Duration, 
 are not different Beings, but are identical. 
 
 § 2. Now, either, first, Infinity of Expansion subsists 
 by itself, and, then, it is a being :^ and. Infinity of Du- 
 ration subsists by itself, and, then, it is a being.^ 
 
 § 3. Or, secondly. Infinity of Expansion subsists not 
 without a Substratum, or Being : ^ and. Infinity of Du- 
 ration subsists not without a Substratum, or Being.'^ 
 
 § 4. First. Every part of Infinity of Expansion is in 
 every part of Infinity of Duration : That is, every part 
 of the being of Infinity of Expansion is in every part 
 of the being of Infinity of Duration : Part^ in all the 
 cases, in the sense of partial consideration only. 
 
 § 5. To wit, the whole of the being of Infinity of 
 Expansion is in the whole of the being of Infinity of 
 Duration : whole, but as ^figure, 
 
 § 6. And this being, most manifestly, impossible, if 
 the being of Infinity of Expansion and the being of In- 
 
 " Part I. Prop. III. § 1 & 3. compared with Schol. II. § 3. ^ Part 
 II. Prop. III. § 1 & 4. ' Part I. Prop. III. § 1 & 5. & Schol. II. § .3. 
 <" Part 11. Prop, III. § I k b. 
 
60 
 
 ARGUMENT 
 
 PART III. 
 
 PROP. II. 
 
 BOOK I. 
 
 61 
 
 finity of Duration be different ; it necessarily follows, 
 that they are identical. 
 
 § 7. That is, on this supposition, Infinity of Expan- 
 sion is Infinity of Duration, and Infinity of Duration is 
 Infinity of Expansion. Which conclusion being plainly 
 absurd ; and it necessarily following from the supposi- 
 tion, that Injiniti/ of Expansion subsists hxj itself, and, 
 that Infinity of Duration subsists by itself it is proved, 
 that the supposition itself is absurd. Therefore, Infi- 
 nity of Expansion camiot exist by itself, and Infinity of 
 Duration cannot exist by itself. 
 
 § 8. Then, secondly, Infinity of Expansion subsists 
 not without a Substratum or Being: and Infinity of 
 Duration subsists not without a Substratum or Being. 
 
 § 9. And, as every part of Infinity of Expansion is 
 in every part of Infinity of Duration, therefore, every 
 part of the Substratum of Infinity of Expansion, is in 
 every part of the Substratum of Infinity of Duration : 
 part, but in the sense of partial consideration. 
 
 § 10. That is, the whole of the Substratum of Infi- 
 nity of Expansion is in the whole of the Substratum of 
 Infinity of Duration : ichole, but as n figure. 
 
 § 11. And this being^most manifestly impossible, if 
 the Substratum, or Being, of Infinity of Expansion, and 
 the Substratum, or Being, of Infinity of Duration, be 
 different, it follows necessarily, that they are identical : 
 To wit, the Substratum, or Being, of Infinity of Ex- 
 pansion is, also, the Substratum, or Being, of Infinity 
 of Duration. 
 
 § 12. And this being proved, it is made out, there is. 
 
 § 1. 
 
 I 
 
 necessarily, a Being of Infinity of Expansion, and In- 
 finity of Duration.* 
 
 § 13. There is, then, necessarily, a Being of Infinity 
 of Expansion and Infinity of Duration. 
 
 Proposition II. The Being of Infinity of Expansion 
 and Infinity of Duration is, necessarily, of unity and 
 simplicity, 
 
 § 1. For the Being of Infinity of Expansion is, ne- 
 cessarily, of unity and simplicity.^ And, the Being of 
 Infinity of Duration is, necessarily, of unity and sim- 
 plicity.^ And these two being not different, but iden- 
 tical,'^ it follows, that the Being of Infinity of Expan- 
 sion and Infinity of Duration is, necessarily, of unity 
 
 and simplicity. 
 
 § 2. The Being of Infinity of Expansion and Infinity 
 of Duration is, then, necessarily, of unity and sim- 
 plicity. 
 
 Proposition III. There is necessarily but one Being 
 of Infinity of Expansion and Infinity of Duration, 
 
 § 1. For there is, necessarily, but one Being of In- 
 
 • § 1. ^ Part I. Prop. IV. § 8. compared with Schol. II. § 3. 
 
 ^ Part II. Prop. IV, § a «» Part III. Prop. I. § H. 
 
62 
 
 ARGUMENT 
 
 PART III. 
 
 TART I. 
 
 BOOK II. 
 
 r>.'^ 
 
 finity of Expansion.'' And the Being of Infinity of Ex- 
 pansion being also tlio Being of Infinity of Duration^ it 
 follows, that there is, necessarily, but one Being of In- 
 finity of Expansion and Infinity of Duration. 
 
 § 2. There is, necessarily, then, hut one Being of In- 
 finity of Expansion and Infinity of Duration. 
 
 Part I. Prop. V. § 4. 
 
 »> Part III. Prop I. §. H. 
 
 BOOK II. 
 
 PART I. 
 
 Proposition. The one, simple, Being of Infinity of 
 Expansion and Duration is, necessarily, Litelligent, and 
 All-knowing, 
 
 § 1. For there is Intelligence. And Intelligence either 
 began to be, or it never began to be. 
 
 § 2. That it never began to be, is evident in this, that 
 if it began to be, it must have had a cause ; for what- 
 ever begins to he must have a cause. And the cause of 
 Intelligence must be of Intelligence ; for what is not of 
 Intelligence cannot make Intelligence begin to be. Now, 
 Intelligence being, before Intelligence began to be, is a 
 contradiction. And this absurdity following from the 
 supposition, that Intelligence began to be, it is proved, 
 that Intelligence never began to be : To wit, is of In- 
 finity of Duration. 
 
 § 3. And as Intelligence is of Infinity of Duration, 
 and it supposes a Being : And no succession of Beings 
 is of Infinity of Duration :^ It necessarily follows that 
 there is one Being of Infinity of Duration which is of 
 Intelligence, And as there is but one Being of Infinity 
 of Duration :^ and this Being is of simplicity :^ and is 
 also of Infinity of Expansion '.^ It follows, that the one, 
 
 ^ Book I. Part II. Schol. I. § 7. ^ Book I. Part II. Prop. V. § 4. 
 ■^ Book I. Part II. Prop. IV. § 8. <" Book I. Part III. Prop. I § 11. 
 
64 
 
 ARGUMENT 
 
 PART I. 
 
 simple, Being of Infinity of Expansion and Duration is 
 necessarily of Intelligence. 
 
 § 4. And that this Being is All-knowing^ is no inference 
 from the proposition, that the one, simple, Being of In- 
 finity of Expansion and Duration is necessarily of In- 
 telligence, for it is, indeed, implied by such proposition : 
 A Being of Intelligence who is of Infinity of Expansion 
 and Duration, is conv^ertible with an All-knowing, or 
 All-wise Being. 
 
 § 5. The one, simple Being of Infinity of Expansion 
 and Duration, is, then, necessarily Intelligent, and All- 
 knoiving. 
 
 PART II. 
 
 BOOK II. 
 
 65 
 
 PART II. 
 
 Proposition. The one, simple, Being of Infinity of 
 Expansion and Duration, that is of Intelligence, oris All- 
 knowing, is, necessarily. All-powerful. 
 
 §. 1. This will be made out, if it be proved, that the 
 Being of Infinity of Expansion and Duration has some 
 poicer, and if there can be nothing external to this Be- 
 ing to restrain his acting. 
 
 § 2. It will be proved, that that Being has some 
 power, if it be proved, that he made matter begin to be. 
 
 § 3. Then, as the Material Universe is finite in dura- 
 tion,^ or began to be, it must have had a cause : for, 
 Whatever begins to be must have a cause. And as this 
 cause must be the one, simple. Being of Infinity of Ex- 
 pansion and Duration, that is of Intelligence, or is All- 
 knowing : Therefore it is proved, this Being has some 
 power.^ And, it is most clear, there can be nothing 
 external to that Being to restrain his acting. 
 
 § 4. And this being clear, and it being proved that 
 the one, simple, Being of Infinity of Expansion and Du- 
 ration, that is of Intelligence, or is All-knowing, has 
 some power ; it is made out, that this Being is, neces- 
 sarily. All-powerful.*^ 
 
 § 5. The one, simple. Being of Infinity of Expansion 
 and Duration, is, then, necessarily, All-powerful. 
 
 =• Book I. Part II. Schol : II. S 6. 
 
 §2. ^ § I. 
 
66 
 
 ARGUMENT 
 
 PART III. 
 
 BOOK II. 
 
 Proposition. The one, simple, Being of Infinity of 
 Expansion and Duration, that is of Intelliyence, or is All- 
 knowing, and All-powerful, is, necessarily. Free, 
 
 § 1. This will be made out, if it be proved, that the 
 Being of Infinity of Expansion and Duration made mo- 
 tion begin to he, 
 
 § 2. Motion implies a substance moved. Now, 'tis 
 obvious that a substance of Infinity of Extension is im- 
 moveable. Therefore, a substance which is moved 
 nmst be finite in extension. There are substances now 
 in motion : Whatever begins to be must have a cause: No 
 Succession of Substances is of Infinity of Duration -.^ 
 The Material Universe is finite in duration :^ There- 
 fore, the moving substances began to be ; and so, must 
 have had a cause. And this cause must be the one, 
 simple. Being of Infinity of Expansion and Duration, 
 that is of Intelligence, or is All-knowing, and All- 
 powerful : And, therefore, this Being made moving 
 substances, or motion, begin to be. 
 
 § a And this being proved, it is made out, that that 
 Being is, necessarily, Free.^ 
 
 § 4. The one, simple. Being of Infinity of Expansion 
 and Duration, that is of Intelligence, or is All-knowing, 
 and All-powerful, is, then, necessarily, Free. 
 
 =• Book I. Part II. Schol : I. § 6. ^ Book I. Part II. Schol : II. § 6. 
 
 67 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 « Infinity of Extension is necessarily existing." Pro- 
 position. (Page 37.) 
 
 Let the extension be of space merely, or of .natter n^ely, 
 or of space and matter together. The proposition affirms 
 that there is Infinity of Extension, but affirms nothmg more. 
 
 " What is not of Intelligence cannot make Intelligence begin 
 
 to be " In S 2. (P. 63.) 
 
 This is laid down as an axiom. But it will not be true rf 
 Intelligence be the result of figure and motion. And will 
 this be true if matter, as matter, be intelligent ? 
 
 Even supposing Intelligence to be the result of figure and 
 motion ; and that all matter, thinks : If matter, and figure 
 and motion, be not of Infinity of Duration, they must 
 themselves, have had a cause, for. Whatever beg,ns to be mnU 
 
 have a cause. 
 
 Glasgow : 
 Printed by J. Young. 
 
REFUTATION 
 
 OF THE 
 
 m 
 
 If 
 
 :> 
 
 ARGUMENT A PRIORI 
 
 FOR THE 
 
 BEINa AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD ; 
 
 SHOWING 
 
 THE IRRELEVANCY OF THAT ARGUMENT, 
 
 AS WELL AS THE 
 
 FALLACIOUS REASONING 
 
 OF 
 
 »Ax?JliJi 
 
 
 m^ 
 
 ESPECIALLY OF 
 
 MR GILLESPIE, 
 
 IN SUPPORT OF IT. 
 
 BY 
 
 ANTITHEOS. 
 
 (* 
 
 AUDI ALTERAM PARTEM. 
 
 " A man that is first in his own cause seemeth right, but his neighbour cometh 
 after him and searcheth him." 
 
 " In the present instance, as in all others, there is not a single position taken in 
 hostility to antitheistical principles, that will not also be found hostile, either to 
 physical science or sound philosophy." 
 
 GLASGOW: 
 PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY H. ROBINSON & CO., 
 
 7, BRUNSWICK PLACE, 
 
 For the Glasgow Zetetic Society, 
 AND SOLD BY THE BOOKSELLFF«2. 
 
 1838. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 The circumstance which has unexpectedly called forth the 
 following refutation is somewhat remarkable. A gentle- 
 man who, in 1833, published a volume, entitled, " An 
 Argument a priori for the Being and Attributes of God," 
 sent a challenge^ a few months ago, to a society of free- 
 thinkers in this city, " to refute the reasoning contained in 
 the aforesaid work." The tone of the communication is 
 rather fierce than gallant ; haughty and cavalier rather than 
 courteous. Perhaps the author, in his zeal of God, does not 
 conceive any great civility to be due to those who do not 
 subscribe to his ow^n creed. If so, it is only another in- 
 stance among the many that occur, of men, even men of 
 learning and talents, allowing a morose religion to hold the 
 sway over their better nature. 
 
 Mr Gillespie, the author of the argument all%ided to, had 
 been disappointed, it seems, in finding an antagonist else- 
 where, notwithstanding his anxious endeavours to provoke 
 opposition. The gauntlet was thrown down, but no one was 
 fully prepared to take it up. Tiiis may have been the 
 ground of his confidence, and of his almost triumphant anti- 
 cipations of submission in all against whom he might think 
 proper to assume a hostile bearing. If, however, hearty and 
 fair opposition be all that he desires, that object of his wishes 
 is now offered him as some compensation for his former dis- 
 appointments. 
 
 It may nevertheless of all this be mentioned, that the 
 challenge was accepted — not exactly to gratify Mr Gillespie 
 — nor because any of the individuals appealed to in the 
 affair, held himself bound to lift the gage, or answer any call 
 to refute opinions contrary to his own, — but because one of 
 them had long since purposed to write some time or other 
 upon the subject. This was at least the principal motive. 
 Another might be to vindicate openly avowed freethinkers 
 from the charge (implied in the gentleman's letter) of incom- 
 
IV 
 
 trt^h 
 
 /I 
 
 li'LftT iiselt iiidecd migiii here 
 iilv that a considerable pro- 
 
 petency t 
 
 have be 
 
 portion matter, besides containing 
 
 pa^.a-v .^- c. aid by no ^^ militate in favor of the 
 
 writ 1. but of which his respondent wishes to take no advan- 
 
 tide might have been restricted to the considera- 
 Uon !r. Gillespie's work, and to that alone. Indeed, in 
 
 liii note addressed to Mr. G. intimating that his argument 
 would be replied to, nothing was stated of any other course 
 being contemplated. But on second thoughts, it was con- 
 ceiv .1 that this would be to narrow the thing too much. 
 OLbci writers have signalized themselves in the treatment of 
 the greatest question in theology by the argument a priori : 
 — and it mi^ht have been said with justice, and without dis- 
 I u ment to any one, — that such a reply would have been 
 v< r ctive, as overlooking the first and greatest authority 
 
 if] iliu case. A supplementary answer, it is true, might have 
 btcii mnde to follow; but this plan of publication is both 
 awkward and inconvenient, and moreover, it would not have 
 squared so well with the original intention already expressed. 
 It has further to be noticed, that in replying to the argu- 
 ment a |)riori, it would be unreasonable to expect every thing 
 to be brought under consideration which the authors who 
 have adopted this strain of reasoning, have chosen to intro- 
 duce. In strict conformity with logical principle, perhaps, 
 thev oufjht not to be followed one step " out of the record," 
 1 r never far they may wander from it. 1 shall as seldom as 
 possible deviate from this principle; yet, if on an occasion, a 
 I 1 lusible argument be found thrust in, having no proper 
 
 place 
 alliii 
 
 \i] 
 
 Hi 
 
 ai' 
 
 what is going forward, I trust I shall be excused for 
 \(r to it, on the ground that it is safer to do too much 
 
 av than too little, — especially as it is too commonly 
 i)e supposed, that an argument unanswered is one 
 iinanswerable. 
 
 « 
 
 ! 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 Chapter I. Character and Irrelevancy of the Argument Page 7 
 
 II. Fallacies of Dr Clarke's Demonstration 14 
 
 III. Same Subject, continued 26 
 
 IV. Fallacies of Mr Richard Jack 33 
 
 V. Fallaciousness of Mr Gillespie's " Argument" The Intro- 
 duction 88 
 
 Vf. Fallacies of Mr Gillespie — The " Argument" 42 
 
 VII. Same Subject, continued 50 
 
 VIII. False Reasoning of Mr Gillespie — Second Part of his Work 55 
 
 IX. Fallaciousness of the Third Part of do 59 
 
 X. Mr Gillespie's Second Book — A Departure from his own 
 
 Argument ... g^ 
 
 XI. Fallacy of the Argument in favor of a Supreme Intelligence 69 
 XII. Impossibility of ascribing Moral Attributes to the Subject of 
 
 Mr Gillespie's Reasoning 77 
 
 XIII. Retrospective and Concluding Remarks qi 
 
 Glasgow, 15lh Dfc. 1837. 
 
CHAPTER I. 
 
 Character and Irrelevancy of the Argument 
 
 To hear of the existence of a god being made the subject 
 of demonstration by argument, is altogether astoundmg. 
 The announcement, on the other hand, sounds so oddly, as 
 to mitigate the effect of the first impression, if not to excite 
 ridicule at the wonderful discrepancy between the i 
 
 view, and the means laid out for the attainment of it. H . 
 however, reconciles people to the greatest absurdities: aial 
 the approval of the argument a /)non by a considerable pro- 
 portion—it might be added, the most erudite and enlight- 
 ened—of the Christian world, compels us to regard it with 
 more deference than its intrinsic merits deserve. 
 
 The legitimate mode of effecting any demonstration rela- 
 tive to the real existence of things, is by an exhibition of 
 the thing itself whose existence is the subject of proof. 
 Now, a god, in as far as this point is concerned, must be 
 held as a real being; that is, his votaries, as a mail u of 
 course, maintain this to be the fact. This granted, argumt iii 
 appears quite out of place. It would never do to talk of 
 proving the existence of the man in the moon by argument; 
 neither^'would it be of any avail to employ a syllogism or a 
 sorites to demonstrate the existence of a navigable channel 
 between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, through the arctic 
 regions of America : yet if the reasoning under review he 
 refevant, these must be so too. If an a priori argument l)t 
 capable of proving the existence of one thing, another n av 
 be proved by the same, or any other logical process. 
 
 It may be accounted indecorous, perhaps, to refer such 
 similes to the being of a god. But the tenderness of parties 
 upon certain points whereabout they are apt to feel sore, is 
 not to be taken as a reason why they should not be touched, 
 even in attempting a cure. It is convenient, I dare say, to 
 
i: I 
 
 i I 
 
 riflet 
 
 M 1 'i 
 
 8 
 
 , being pained, and to express dislike witl. respect to 
 J. oLreducing, 1 was going to say, but it really .s- 
 up, the evidence to be admitted in proving the 
 : ^^ of a deity, to the level of that which is alone ad- 
 in other cases of the same kind. It is even highly 
 cable to the interests of religion, for its more acute 
 -...sitive adherents to appear shocked themselves, and 
 .-.,. „e similar feelings in others, and the passions conse- 
 nuent upon them, at any such proposal as that now hinted a . 
 Why people should be shocked, however, why they should 
 either be disgusted or pained, I cannot well P^r"--' J^^^, 
 i, he merely from prejudice; for the nature of the subject of 
 probation certainly requires some small support from the 
 
 evidence of the senses. , , , *■ „\\ the 
 
 This kind of demonstration, all the theology ot all the 
 reli..ions in the world, cannot afford. Hut if a god is never 
 ;:.t:een now.a-days,as is pretended to have been t e case >. 
 former times, we are told to look to Nature, where we may s e 
 ( . .1 in his works. This is the common and more fosh^ 
 .,1. .., of discussing the great <,uest:on be-e "s w d^ 
 has prevailed from Philo's time to the present. It .s cal ea 
 the aroument a posteriori: it relies on experience, and de- 
 ine arj,uiMt-i.i, / , . re . Tl.ic iirocess, however, is 
 duces causes from their effects. This process, » , 
 
 quite illogical, and, although it were otherwise s ot no 
 ? t utility in irs operation. It takes for granted the ex.s^- 
 ;„ce of nn agent capable of producing the eftec s contem- 
 plated as the source of the argument-which of course . 
 begcTin.^ the principle- and only attempts to make out 
 p„wer,\nd Jisdom', and goodness, and so forth to be pro- 
 per ntiributes of that agent. As Mr Gillespie himself ha 
 well observed, it cannot prove wisdom, goodness, power, or 
 any other divine attribute to be unlimited As--"f '^^^^ 
 ■ of a .rod, it cannot demonstrate that he has always 
 it cannot demonstrate that he must exist eternally, 
 ,,rove that that existence may not have already ter- 
 „„ , ' A clock continues to indicate the lapse ot time, 
 the hand that set it in motion has ceased to be 
 
 f\ 
 
 ( • ( 
 
 "x 
 
 SI 
 
 r 
 
 i J 
 
 
 9 
 
 The idea of so grievous a defect inherently attaching to 
 evidence so much relied upon, was not to be endured, and 
 some of the consequences, although barely glanced at, were 
 too horrid for contemplation. Up starts the logician of the 
 new school, therefore, with a remedy for this great evil. A 
 scheme is devised of making every point at issue a nui r f" 
 rigid demonstration. The most exalted view of the tS 
 character is to be taken. All the attributes of deity are to 
 be drawn to the largest scale — nay, magnified to infinitude 
 itself, and borne out in a manner the most absolute, as well 
 as his eternity both past and future. It is irrefragably to be 
 proved, not only that a god does exist, but that he must exist, 
 and that too as necessarily as that two and two make four ; — 
 that his non-existence, in short, cannot even be conceived ! 
 
 A vast project this is, most undoubtedly : demanding 
 powers and ingenuity equally vast to execute. Like the 
 dogma of all things being created out of nothing, to wliich, 
 indeed, this argument is strongly allied, the thing seems im- 
 possible. Maugre every impediment, however, the attempt 
 is boldly made. A being existing by necessity is sought for ; 
 that is (according to the new logic) one whose non-existence 
 it is not in the power of man to imagine; simple in its 
 essence; indivisible: everywhere present, and without which 
 nothinnf else can be supposed to exist. To seek in nature 
 for such a being ; to ransack the whole universe for it were 
 vain. Among real and known existences it was nowhere to 
 be found. But the brain of the theologue, like the Ian- 
 thorn of Diogenes, was set to discover what the sun could 
 not reveal; and if equally honest with the cynic, his imitator 
 would have been every whit as unsuccessful. Those who 
 contrive an object for search, however, know precisely where 
 to find it. Hence, the reasoner of the anti-experimental 
 sect having laid up the thing cut and dry, in his own con- 
 ceptions, brought it forth with an air of triumph due to a 
 great discovery. 
 
 It could not escape observation among minds of an ab- 
 stract and reflective turn, that space possesses some of the 
 attributes commonly ascribed to deity, such as infiiiiij, .1 
 
/ 
 
 \ 
 
 I i 
 
 ' course, <) 
 
 be w 
 
 1 i " > ; i ;, 
 
 10 
 
 mnipresence; immateriality, and so forth : tliat 
 aut be supposed to have had a beginning, or to 
 
 * p(v vn>iHtv of ever coming to an eiu; 
 
 metaphysical tlieist, exceedingly 
 these idle and unappropriated attributes 
 iijto n useful play, and in a manner the most advan- 
 
 taat II to the common faith. Clarke and Butler, and 
 a! n followers, have accordingly talked much of these 
 n 1! , and evinced a strong predilection for them in 
 sti .h examples wherewithal to illustrate the abso- 
 lute , u infinite perfections of the divine nature. These 
 metaphysicians, in short, have made space and duration 
 usurp the station and dignity of a divine being. They have 
 taken this empty and inanimate f\ibrication, and set it up ni a 
 newly-erected shrine of curiously mathematical construc- 
 li, in, uhJ fallen down to it as the god of their idolatry. 
 
 li the theory be vague and visionary which the argument 
 a priori is introduced to support, it is not to be expected that 
 t|j,> u itself should be of a different character. A 
 
 I.I , j 1 iciple cannot well be maintained by reasoning 
 ,^i .h IS uuu. The truth is, the argument in question is 
 lu -nnrr else than an attempt to establish the application of 
 i„ uJ ml reasoning to what it has nothing in earth or 
 1,, ,v n ith,— namely, real existences; at least what is 
 
 hi id » be real by those who employ such argument. But 
 ]., ., ,,, preposterous the attempt! As well might it 
 
 \ . : . : Lci, that as the whole is in the abstract a perfect 
 
 list contain within itself all the qualities of the 
 
 of which it is composed; that as some of 
 
 K. I re small and some large, some round and 
 
 ({uai . liie black and some white; it must be white 
 
 M k. n ' ^nare and louiid, and large and small at the 
 
 n^ A lians inform us, that every souiiti aitiu- 
 
 ible of being reduced to the syllogistic form, if 
 
 s, I h . e glad to hear from their own lips an exempli- 
 
 iicaiHHi ill the present case. To my own untrained thinking, 
 
 5i hoiild run somewhat thus:— - 
 
 Whatever necessarily possesses absolute perfectioi God ; 
 
 tht/st 
 
 s C 5 1 < 1 t 
 
 SIIIVH 
 lYti'W 
 
 
 
 11 
 
 Metaphysical abstractions possess absolute perfections : 
 
 Therefore, metaphysical abstractions are ( I. 
 If this be not a fair statement of the who! ; rit in the 
 
 most logical form, I am at a loss to know is. ^^limild 
 
 it be any way wrong, and should some ardt ; . i^ 1 iLe 
 metaphysical school of theology deign hereafter to take n 
 part in this discussion, it would be well were he to cc 
 the Stagyrite and correct it. In any event, our reas 
 a priori have either to acknowledge the absurdity here set 
 forth in mood and figure, or deny that they appropriate ab- 
 stract reasoning to questions of ontological science. If their 
 god be a real being — an agent, he cannot be a heap of ab- 
 stractions: if made up of abstractions, he cannot be an 
 agent. No reasoning imaginable can make him both : yet 
 to nothing short of working out this impossibility uulz, the 
 argument aim. 
 
 It must be granted, indeed, that such parts of tl re 
 as have a bearing upon the divine actions, as well a i 
 which go to establish the moral and intellectual ch i = ; 
 deity, do not properly belong to the argument a i n u. 
 These things are either boldly thrust in where they a 
 of all keeping, or humbly introduced in forma pauper 
 so made to pass off with the rest. But after all, and with 
 every advantage, fair and foul, that can be claimed for it^ it 
 is at best but a sorry piece of patch work. Restricted to its 
 own province, it can prove nothing, demonstrate nothini • 
 be either true or false but what is necessarily/ so, in the i 
 abstract and mathematical sense of the terms. 
 
 Here, indeed, the grand secret in managing the argnnn fit 
 before us lies. It affixes a partial and out-of-the-way iii in- 
 ing to words, especially those upon which the whole qii Lo- 
 tion turns, and so, misconstrues and misapplies genenii iau- 
 guage. Necessity^ for instance, which by the way is the key- 
 stone of the structure, is different from what it is found to 
 be anywhere else, except, perhaps, in some other region of 
 mere speculation. In the premises, it is attenuated to tlie 
 utmost fineness of its mathematical acceptation, although the 
 weight of its common and real meaning is essential to the 
 
 B 
 
12 
 
 W'l' 1 1 ; 
 
 " i I, .; 
 review 
 
 the .. ' 
 
 I ! n ■ t '• ■ 
 
 t IK ! ;, 
 
 \';ii.iiiiiy of die conclusion. 5e^6.v/////rr, m like manner, is to- 
 tal iy dissimilar to any thing known by tlial name. It seems 
 an evanescent, or rather imperceptible— nothing; yet, lo ! it 
 is IouihI iii the end that something substantial was after all 
 t»j hr lintlerstood. 
 
 ilu e things, however, will be more clearly apprehended 
 wh !! we come to discuss the logic of this strange argument 
 in ill. In the meantime it may not be amiss to show, that 
 till c h I icter of irrelevancy here laid at the door of the 
 a j)ri 1 1 argianciiit, is not unwarranted by the authority of 
 , > . ? ^^es amonnr the reliorious themselves. Abundance of 
 might be adduced, but I shall content myselt 
 ict from the Edinburgh Review for October 
 .. p. 113,) in an article upon Dr Morehead's 
 : on Natural and Revealed Religion." That the 
 reasons upon theistical principles is evident from 
 on he makes to "the will of the creator," to which, 
 rk in passing, he allows the most Orthodox lati- 
 ic.cu.ve to our argument a priori he observes:— 
 he truth is, it involves a radical fallacy which not only 
 renders it useless but dangerous to the cause it is intended 
 to support. The question as to the being of a god, is 
 |Hnt Iv n question of fact: he either exists or he does not 
 evi ! It ! there is an evident absurdity in pretending to 
 demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it by argument a 
 priori; because nothing is demonstrable unless the contrary 
 a contradiction, and this can never be predicated 
 negative of any proposition which merely afiirms or 
 asserts a matter of fact. Whatever we conceive as existent, 
 V . H also conceive as non-existent, and consequently there 
 whose non-existence implies a contradiction, or, 
 HI r A lis, whose existence is a priori demonstrable. 
 
 I hi li list be evident to every one who knows what demon- 
 stration really means. It is a universal law, that all heavy 
 bodies descend to the earth in a line directed towards its 
 centre. But the contrary of this may easily be conceived, 
 htt ui^c It involves no contradiction; for bodies might have 
 tV,;!. ; upward, if we may so express it, as well as downward, 
 
 : « ! i 
 
 \ I S I ! S I. 
 
 13 
 
 had such been the will of the creator. But we cannot con- 
 ceive the opposite of one of the demonstrated truths of geo- 
 metry, as, for example, that the three angles of a triarigle 
 should be either greater or less than two right angles, be- 
 cause this, implies a contradiction. The distinction, there- 
 fore, between necessary or demonstrable truths and matters 
 of fact, consists in this,— that the contrary of the tormer 
 involves a contradiction, whereas that of the latter does not. 
 But there is no contradiction implied in conceiving the non- 
 existence of the deity; and therefore his existence is not a 
 necessary truth, a priori demonstrable." 
 
 To add any thing to the foregoing reasoning of the 
 reviewer were perhaps superfluous. It is clear and satisfiic- 
 tory. Yet I cannot well refrain from taking notice of a 
 sin^rle circumstance by way of illustration. Men have often 
 been made to suffer severely— on some occasions to the loss 
 of life— for denying the being of a god, while the great mass 
 of the people, so far from regarding these occurrences as 
 either absurd or unjust, have looked on them as well-merited 
 punishments. But was ever any one put to death, or sent 
 to the pillory, for denying that twice two make four? The 
 idea, indeed, is ridiculous ; but wherefore should it be so -^ 
 Simply because it is not possible there should be any differ- 
 ence of opinion about the matter. If, however, the dogmas 
 of theology, or even say the primary one, were capable of 
 demonstration as mathematical doctrines are, there could be 
 no difference in the respect due to doubts and denials in 
 either case ; or rather, it would be impossible to find doubt- 
 ers and deniers in the one more than in the other. I do not 
 mention the horrid penalties awarded in our barbarous laws 
 to certain kinds of unbelief, in proof of the real importance 
 of the articles of faith they have been enacted to maintain 
 by brute force. Statutes of this description are a proof of 
 nothing but legislative ignorance and the persecuting nature 
 of the religions they have been made to defend. Their very 
 existence,'^however, as well as that of the stupid prejudices, 
 alas ' but too prevalent, upon which they are founded, are 
 totally incompatible with the validity of that mode of argu- 
 
i 
 
 1 f- 
 
 incut wluiA'i would demonstrate the being of a god upon 
 ab:sir.u-(, >;':'..^^ 'les. 
 
 HiH U ^ positions and reasonings oi the different 
 auih i . V, ho have adopted the mode of procedure now shown 
 i^ hv directed so wide of the mark, must not be passed over 
 \\ ' i special notice. It is more easy to censure an argu- 
 I neral terms, than to meet all its particular parts 
 
 on i i r ail I open grounds. Even this labour, therefore, I 
 I fu . yi.iiiy undertake, that there may be nothing left to sup- 
 pose on the score of disingenuousness or pretended want of 
 inter-t in the matter. No one can be more fully aware than 
 I an >w nearly this discussion approaches in some points 
 
 ti a L ,ai dispute. But what of that? If the religious 
 w • ui ( (loose to peril their cause on grounds so insecure, upon 
 Hi elves let the dishonour of perverting things from their 
 t • i! purposes, and all its consequences, fall. Be it always 
 I I ered, too, that this argument of theirs, has repeat- 
 i n put forth as invulnerable, and that according to 
 
 iln ii uun showing, the mighty problem of the being of a 
 god (i fiends upon the result. 
 
 . i V'OC'M I i 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 Fallacies of Dr Clarke's Demonstration. 
 
 the reasonings of the theologians who have 
 le fundamental articles of their creed upon a 
 iples, the "Demonstration of the being and attri- 
 «HHcs i)\ (i I" by Dr Samuel Clarke, demands our first 
 aiit iiiion, i hi iDiith is due to the reverend divine on ac- 
 count of his acknowledged talents and great reputation, as 
 well as the early appearance ol his work. His Demonstra- 
 been too long before the public, and ranks too high 
 1 theological production, to require particular 
 1 e. This celebrated treatise is stated in twelve 
 , Mipported severally by such arguments as the 
 i.i.a ha\t deemed best calcuhited for that purpose. 
 
 I i :r . 
 
 ; ; -^ : i 
 
 tt I 
 
 ' I- 
 
 11 V 
 
 15 
 
 He introduces his subject^by^assigning certain causes for 
 the existence of atheism. These he specifies to be excessive 
 ignorance and stupidity ; or vicious habits ; or, at best, false 
 philosophy. 
 
 It is perhaps hardly worth while to contend about these 
 matters ; yet it may be observed, that if some savage tribes, as 
 inferior in intelligence as they are represented, have no no- 
 tion or belief of the being of a god ; a greater number, to the 
 full as ignorant and stupid, possess abundance of credulity 
 upon the subject ; and if we go to what is called civilised life, 
 the most ignorant and debased are not only religious, but 
 generally the most firmly fixed in their faith. The second 
 class of persons mentioned, — men who from their evil prac- 
 tices have been led to scoff at every thing religious — are not 
 atheists at all. Such characters always show, in the hour of 
 suffering and in the prospect of death, that they had never 
 been thoroughly convinced of the falsehood of religion, but 
 only that it marred their merriment and discountenanced 
 their wickedness. The form and profession of faith thrown 
 aside recklessly and without consideration, the essence re- 
 mains. It lies dormant for a time, till the storm of passion 
 which crushed it to a certain extent has subsided, when it 
 springs into activity more powerfully than ever. Slavish- 
 ness to the appetites can never convince the understanding. 
 It may drive men to disregard religion, as well as every thing 
 else of a serious nature, but it cannot make them disbelievers, 
 Disregarders and disbelievers, however, are very different 
 characters. 
 
 As to the philosophy which leads to atheism being false, 
 that is the very question to be tried in the sequel. Of those, 
 however, who take philosophy as the basis of their unbelief, 
 the Doctor has a preliminary concession to demand ; namely, 
 that the being of a god is very desirable. The demand is 
 made that they should " be very willing, nay, desirous above 
 all things to be convinced that their present opinion is an error." 
 But what opinion must be formed of the goodness of a cause 
 or the soundness of an argument, when it is found necessary 
 either to beg or demand a predisposition in its favor? The 
 
16 
 
 frame of mind most proper and most adequate to judge ot 
 any matter, is to be without desire or predisposition of any 
 kiiid, whether for or against it. Any other, indeed, is pre- 
 judicial. Let us hear, however, what his reverence has to 
 urge for the necessity of this concession. 
 
 " Man of himself," says he, '' is infinitely insufficient for 
 his own happiness ; he is liable to many evils and miseries, 
 \v} 11 ii he can neither prevent nor redress ; he is full of wants 
 wh ' he cannot supply, and compassed about with infirmi- 
 tii . wiiich he cannot remove, and obnoxious to dangers 
 ul ! he can never sufficiently provide against, &c. Under 
 wliit h evil circumstances it is evident there can be no suffi- 
 tiuiit support but in the belief of a wise and good God." 
 
 T<j make this case worth a rush, it ought to have been 
 shewn that tlie faithful are exempted, and none else, from 
 the calamities here complained of. If the belief of a god, or 
 even the real existence of such a being, is not to relieve me 
 of mv infirmities and wretchedness, why should either the 
 one or the other be any way desirable to me ? What earthly 
 good can it do a man environed with woes and worn down 
 with misery, to be assured that a god exists who either can- 
 ned or will not afford him relief? Has it not rather a strong 
 trn ""rncy to excite his chagrin? A god so poor and useless 
 be unable to affi)rd him relief, could only be an object 
 * proach and contempt; and one who could, but would 
 1 ! must appear too odious and malevolent in character to 
 he icgarded with other feelings than fear — if not hatred and 
 aversion The incredulous man is, on the contrary, much 
 more comfortably situated. If he suffers, — he estimates the 
 causes, whether moral or physical, according to their own 
 character, without looking into the terra incognito for some 
 sin n ed agency to account for them. He is not like the 
 chiti ..ho beats the floor for hurting him when befalls, or 
 ki t?s for not breaking his bones. 
 
 If ever Dr Clarke studied the interesting subject of the 
 orifnn of evil, or even thought or read upon it, he seems to 
 hnvc forgotten ail ; for the above argument is given with the 
 most admirable simplicity, although it evidently militates di- 
 
 17 
 
 rectly against himself. It is as much as to say, There is a 
 dreadful deal of evil in the world, and we cannot get quit of 
 it by any efforts of our own ; but these very circumstances 
 render it imperative on the athiest to wish that the doctrine 
 he is opposed to were true, since in that case he would have 
 a god disinclined to remedy the evil, or as incapable of doing 
 it as himself.— What ! says the unbeliever, convince us by 
 our sufferings that we should like to have a god upon \vhom 
 to father them ! This is certainly a new-fashioned way of 
 paying compliment to deity. The author, to be sure, after- 
 wards talks about the happiness of a hereafter, but to allude 
 to a matter as admitted, which does not even follow as a 
 consequence upon what he has yet to prove, is preposterous 
 in the extreme ; more especially when, with regard to the 
 primary point, he is only pleading for a favorable reception 
 of what he has to offer in evidence.— But we must now recur 
 to Dr Clarke's propositions. 
 
 His first, that " something has existed from eternity,'' no 
 one can object to. It carries its evidence along with it, and 
 must indeed be as cordially agreed to by the antitheist as the 
 most devout christian. The second, however, does not stand 
 in the same jnedicament. It is this, " There must have ex- 
 isted from eternity some one unchangeable and independent 
 
 being'' 
 
 I need say nothing of the alteration of the subject in the 
 present proposition from that of the preceding. It is perhaps 
 of little consequence any farther than indicating a certain 
 leaning, for which there ought to have been shewn some sort 
 of warrant. W^as the mere something in the one case, not 
 sufficiently pregnant in meaning to sustain the weight of dig- 
 nity awaiting the being in the other ? So at least it would 
 appear. What I particularly object to, however, is, that the 
 two terms in the predicate, " unchangeable and independ- 
 ent," are linked together as inseparable. The author does 
 not say one word in favor of this conjunction, and certainly 
 there is no necessity for it in the nature of things. In his 
 subsequent reasoning, he aims at establishing independence 
 alone, yet his conclusions are afterwards and all along drawn 
 
as if both had been tlemonstraleil. What are we to think of 
 -u li a in infiiiiu i'lccibcly this, — that the reverend theorist 
 iitent upon making out his cn^c in some sort, that an 
 ; is overleaped with surprising faciUty, and a hia- 
 
 W : l 
 
 „> li 
 
 JU: 
 
 10 ill I. reasoning regarded as of no account. 
 
 W m ii5pect to the independence of the something which 
 has ahvay existed, the author's argument amounts to this : 
 there must eitiier be one being only of independent exist- 
 ent , ri 11! infinite series of beings of dependent existence. 
 jlu! i I ot be an infinite series of the latter descrip- 
 
 11011 i ia icture, there can only be one being of independ- 
 (lii r ire — In support of his minor premiss, as here 
 
 >iau i. !)r Clarke maintains that as no individual in the 
 M the cause of itself; every one must have a cause, 
 
 mid , whole must have a cause as well as the different 
 
 |iaii . ^' li we consider," says he, " such an infinite pro- 
 fit .ion as one entii^e endless series of dependent beings, it 
 is plain this whole series of beings can have no cause from 
 without of its existence ; because in it are supposed to be in- 
 cIimI. (I all things that are or ever were in the universe: and 
 ti i^ r! iin it can have no reason within itself of its existence; 
 !m I M no one being in this infinite succession is supposed 
 t . !>e self-existent or necessary, but every one dependent on 
 Hi, iuregoing; and where no part is necessary, it is manifest 
 the n'hnle cannot be necessary." 
 
 The fallacy here lies in the use of terms totally inept, and 
 like theentireargument, inappropriate to thepurpose. Is it not 
 absurdtotalkofanythingbeing without orbeyond infinity? and 
 iiiither, to make the whole force of a dilemma rest upon such 
 absurdity? Is it not equally absurd to reason as if an end- 
 less series were to be regarded as made up of parts, everyone 
 of which may be taken into account? Did the metaphysi- 
 1 i III suppose, that by the introduction of liis distributives 
 am! collectives, he had grasped the term of that whicli is 
 iniinite? He says (in rfPect), you have told me what the 
 cause of the last individual of the series is, and of the one 
 precedinir that, and so on, but you have not told me what is 
 I h ( 1 ihu ul the first. i he reply — it is almost superfluous to 
 
 " 19 
 
 say — is, that there can be no first, or^any thing to leave an 
 idea of priority in the mind. 
 
 Dr Clarke illustrates his argument by reference to an 
 article extracted from Wollaston's Religion of Nature, com- 
 paring an infinite series to a chain " hung down out of 
 heaven from an unknown height." But the chain in this in- 
 stance is like all other things by which theists would bring 
 us to concur in their imagined cause of an infinite series. 
 The chain is evidently meant to be limited in extent. If not, 
 what is to be understood by the allusion made by the writer 
 to " what it hung upon ?" The point of suspension, although 
 at an unknown height, is certainly somewhere, and so, 
 acts as a limitation to our views, and by consequence ren- 
 ders the simile useless. We may imagine the chain car- 
 ried further off than where it is supposed to have hung 
 from ; so that if it was infinite in its extent in the first case, 
 it must be more than infinite in the second. 
 
 But what is the difference, after all, between an imagi- 
 nary chain infinitely extended, and an imaginary rod ex- 
 tended in the same manner? If there be any difference 
 relative to the point at issue, what is it? Yet the learned 
 doctor would pronounce the one independent in its exis- 
 tence, and the other necessarilv the reverse ! 
 
 The author states the same case in another form ; but as this 
 repetition of the argument is founded upon the fallacy which 
 has just been exploded, of course it must share the fate of 
 that which serves as its basis. 
 
 Dr Clarke himself seems half conscious of the inadequacy 
 of his reasoning in demanding a cause for the existence of an 
 infinite series, for he is reduced to the necessity of protest- 
 ing, as it were, against the process by which he is baulked of 
 his object. *'It is only," he says, "a driving back from one 
 step to another, and removing out of sight, the question 
 concerning the ground or reason of the existence of things." 
 What he adds about the series being neither self-existent nor 
 necessary, is an unproved extravagance, the gist of which 
 shall come under review in noticing the next proposition. — 
 But here we may ask, if the same plea would not hold equally 
 
 C 
 
«0 
 
 "I 
 
 :) 
 
 ni 
 
 I W 
 
 inc 
 
 ;il 
 
 Ur 
 
 in t ci >nigie being? it it iiatl nut existed yester- 
 Ui not exist to-day. Its continued existence, then, 
 pen its prior existence. If^ however, it were ob- 
 lat to carry back the incjuiry concerning the ground 
 ii of its existence in this manner, would be to re- 
 question out of sight altogether, — what could the 
 lave answered that would not have " removed" his 
 k objection ? 
 ike's third proposition is, that " That unchangeable 
 and iki pa lent being which has existed from eternity without 
 any frtrDfn! cause of its existence, must be self-existent, that is, 
 w/r //// existing,'* 
 
 At first sight this proposition appears to differ little from 
 lilt leading one. In glancing along what follows, however, 
 ur iieiceive that more — much more, is meant than directly 
 mills ill, eye. Here, indeed, we have the epitome of the 
 whnh ;n -nment. Here the author makes a wild, but deter- 
 mined assault upon the necessary existence of matter. 1 1 re 
 hi hriiMr- out those subtle and incomprehensible theories re- 
 iai V iu the divine nature of space and duration, and the 
 sine qua nan of existence, which are so deeply interwoven 
 with the argument, and at the same time involved in dark- 
 II r did obscurity. And here too he summons up that 
 most potent — that eldest of all existences — Necessity, which 
 he subsequently exalts above all things; even "above all 
 that I- called god and that is worshipped." — The truth is, 
 that the stress he has laid upon necessary existence is so 
 prodigious, that we are at a loss to see what he would be at. 
 Is it not enough that the eternal being should be proved 
 V n V f. !u ; that is, uncreated? "No," says Dr Clarke in 
 tfu ivf words of his seventh reply to Butler;) " necessity is 
 t! d, or reason, or foundation of existence, both of 
 
 tl me substance and all the attributes ;" and in the pa- 
 
 U preceding, he speaks of that necessity by which the 
 use exists ; and again, in his second letter, he declares 
 to be " in itself original, absolute, and in the order 
 itecedent to all existence," — so that, according to 
 i arity, even the Great First Cause of all things, 
 
 iii's' 
 
 1 : < • ./ 
 of : 
 
 21 
 
 (at least what the iheist calls by this name,) could not exist 
 
 — but for NECESSITY. 
 
 All this, of course, makes us somewhat curious to know 
 what this mighty existence is, and it is so far fortunate that 
 our curiosity does not go ungratified. We are told that it 
 is anything the contrary of which it is a plain impossibilitv, 
 or implying a contradiction to suppose : " for instance, 
 the relation of equality between twice two and four is an 
 absolute necessity, only because it is an immediate contra- 
 diction in terms to suppose them unequal. This," the 
 author continues to observe, " is the only idea we can frame 
 of absolute necessity; and to use the word in any other 
 sense, seems to be using it without any signification at all." 
 
 Proceeding upon this partial, this extravagant view of the 
 case, the reverend doctor sets about overthrowing the ne- 
 cessary existence of matter, by attempting to prove that 
 there is such a thing in nature as a vacuum. The attempt, 
 however, fcills wretchedly short of its aim, depending as it 
 does upon an lil-informed and very inadequate estimate of 
 the properties of matter. On his knowledge of material 
 things and their properties, it would almost be a want of 
 charity to expose him. He makes no account of matter be- 
 ing of various descriptions, nor of the diversity of effects 
 which must follow the operations of things so different as the 
 different species of matter. " All bodies," he sagely ob- 
 serves, " being equally heavy, it follows necessarily that 
 there must be a vacuum !" 
 
 The necessity of the sequence, I confess, I do not distinct- 
 ly perceive ; but suppose a vacuum granted, — what then ? — 
 that matter does not exist necessarily ? Upon a priori prin- 
 ciples, the theory of a vacuum was totally uncalled for. We 
 can conceive matter not to exist, and that seems quite enough 
 for the purpose. The purpose, however, goes too far : the 
 argument, as already shown, proves too much. If matter is 
 to be denied necessary existence because this supposition 
 may be made respecting it, where is the single thing that can 
 escape the same doom ? Gods and devils, angels and spi- 
 rits, heaven and hell, — supposing them all to exist — could 
 
lune fio i I'liiii to necessary tiXi^iciicc, since ii implies no con- 
 tradiction to inia<rine them not to exist. 
 
 The self-existence which depends upon Dr Clarke's neces- 
 hif\, i j: thus a mere mathematical chimera, and no where 
 U) in i .— no where in the world of realities — is a proof 
 thrst !h( 10 is something radically wrong in the argument. If 
 Mil ft :i condition as necessary or self-existence really exists, 
 —why can it not be proved? Why can it not be made 
 applicable to the material universe — to substance, the pro- 
 perties and operations of substance, and all that results from 
 them ^ Hecause in these discussions a proper view of neces- 
 sity never seems to have been taken. This is the reason, too, 
 why Hume in his essay <'Of the Idea of a Necessary Con- 
 nexion,'' nnd after him, Dr Brown, in his " Observations" 
 iH I I fume's doctrine concerning the relation of cause 
 
 iu I . have fallen into such strange heresies in philoso- 
 
 ; relation to physical subjects, they looked for ma- 
 
 thematical necessity, and if they looked in vain, it is because 
 their expectations were not founded in reason or the nature 
 of things. This statement I shall now make good, and at the 
 same time prove, which is more to the point, that matter is 
 possessed of necessary existence. 
 
 Th It which is necessary, then, I would say, is obviously 
 nnii Min[)ly, that which must be; that which is inevitable; 
 that which is impossible not to be. It is useless to talk of 
 that which is the contrary of an express contradiction. It is 
 surely enough that upon every thing else than what is neces- 
 sarv, the stamp of impossibility is allowed to be set. Con- 
 ! iie^ and contradictions only belong to metaphysics and 
 -t tuetry. Mankind, however, were conversant with mat- 
 in i^X common occurrence long before they became mathe- 
 II! ms or thought of soaring beyond physical things; and 
 even .el, how few comparatively know any thing of abstract 
 speculation or the use of its language. The usual accepta- 
 uou of the word necessity, therefore, must be held the pri- 
 m iiv and essential acce})tation ; and that which would cut it 
 duwii io the contrary of a contradiction, secondary and par- 
 ti u 1 iilv. There is as absolute a necessity that a piece of 
 
 23 
 
 wood should burn on being exposed to the action of fire, as 
 there is for the equality between twice two and four. I shall 
 be told that our ascertainment of the facts in these cases is 
 derived from entirely different sources: that although expe- 
 rience be requisite in the one case, it is not so in the other ; 
 that besides, experience can never prove a thing necessary, — 
 because while it is granted that each successive experiment 
 increases the probabilities of a result similar to that which 
 preceded, no number of probabilities can ever amount to a 
 certainty. 
 
 To this I would reply, that the doctrine here laid down 
 holds true in matters of chance, (for instance, the throwing 
 of dice or the cutting of cards,) because the tendency and 
 precision of the agency employed can never be perfectly is- 
 certained, and therefore is to be left to the calculation ui 
 the diflPerent probabilities. It is quite otherwise, however, 
 in the operations of nature. There, all is fixed and immu- 
 table as the truths of geometry themselves. An experiment 
 once fairly and fully verified, nothing remains but to adopt 
 the result as a determinate principle, from which there can- 
 not possibly be the slightest deviation. Suppose a person to 
 have been once or twice injured by burning, what should 
 even the stickler for mathematical necessity think of this 
 person, were he, nevertheless, to proceed upon the ground 
 of there being no certainty, — but only a small chance, pro- 
 portioned to the number of times he had suffered previously, 
 — at any rate, no necessity of his again experiencing pain 
 from the application of fire to his flesh ? Both in the animal 
 economy and in chemistry; — and indeed in every department 
 of physical science, — in hydraulics, in electricity, in mecha- 
 nics, — the nature and operation of a thing once being deter- 
 mined by adequate experience, uniform results are always ac- 
 counted necessary. Sometimes, it is readily granted, our aii- 
 ticipations in these matters are not realized ; that is, an experi- 
 ment fails, but what of that? Would Dr Clarke himself 
 have imputed the failure of an experiment to a want of 
 stability in the laws of nature? No; but to the mismanage- 
 ment of the operator, or else, to a difference in the causes 
 
24 
 
 III It |iii jt ' I (iilierence in the effect. This uniform rela- 
 tion between cause and effect is what may fairly and pro- 
 perly be called physical necessity ; and unless the laws of 
 nature be variable and uncertain, that necessity is as abso- 
 liife n< it is that two and two should be four. 
 
 \\ h It now becomes of Dr Clarke's absolute necessity, 
 whit li includes nothing but the reverse of what cannot be 
 conceived ? — which rejects as destitute of all meaning, what- 
 i\ I js iiot the opposite of a mathematical contradiction? 
 Wt can conceive of a man (or three men as the scripture 
 hatli it) walking unharmed in the midst of a burning, fiery 
 furnace. We can conceive of a man walking upon the fluc- 
 tuating surface of the ocean, or mounting into the air — even 
 takinir a voyage to the moon and dog-star. We can easily 
 conceive of hundreds of events running counter to the laws 
 of nature; but do these whimsical and absurd conceptions 
 brincr the things conceived within the range of possibility? 
 N 1 .ure than the equally whimsical and absurd conception 
 c t u e non-existence of matter would bring that conception 
 \ M the same range. 
 
 'I ii< necessary existence of matter, then — for all that the 
 doctor has done to it — rests precisely where it was. It had 
 lonji aero been received as an indisputable doctrine, if not an 
 axiom in philosophy, that out of nothing, no thing can come; 
 and it has never yet been shown to be essentially incorrect. 
 If, therefore, theologians do not relish this doctrine, — if, in 
 ihin ves, it looks horrible and grim, — they might surely be 
 
 i! IV trouble of showing that somethin^j can be made from 
 
 ;ii 11 1, and nothing from something, instead of resorting 
 !(i I V method of getting rid of it by a side-wind. We 
 i !! i t agree with Clarke, that something must have existed 
 tit in eternity; but the question is, what is this something? 
 Whir is it matter of whose existence everything testifies 
 in ift! strongest, the most irresistible manner; or is it an 
 iH^j; i)t imaginary perfections, physical as well as moral, 
 
 w 11 IK Lit a body for their habitation or a medium for their 
 txi tire? Whether is it somethinn: whose existence is a 
 f knowledge, a matter of absolute certainty, or some- 
 
 .t 
 
 I it 
 
 !)] 
 
 25 
 
 thing of whose existence we know nothing whatever, but is, 
 on the contrary, the very thing in question? 
 
 The necessary existence of anything, — any being, I mean, 
 such as matter is, and God is said to be, — is its self- 
 existence ; and to prove it to be self-existent, it is only in- 
 cumbent to shew cause why it should be uncreated and 
 eternal. Now this has already been done as far as a nega- 
 tive view of the question regarding matter makes admissible. 
 Another view of it is, that matter is the thing above all 
 others absolutely necessary to figure, motion, agency, colour, 
 and what not ; that it is the sine qua non of our own exist- 
 ence and that of all things else, even the stupendous tab 
 of the nniverse itself. Take away matter, and you effect the 
 taking off of every thing of which we can form the slightest 
 idea. All is annihilated except space and duration. Our 
 observations on these, however, we must reserve till we come 
 to notice the more direct treatment of them in Mr Gillespie's 
 argument. 
 
 To close this rather tedious part of the discussion, the 
 question of the self-existence of matter may be put in this 
 form. — Either it is eternal, or it is not. — If eternal, it is by 
 consequence self-existent. If not eternal, it must owe its ex- 
 istence to some cause. But to fall upon the latter alterna- 
 tive is clearly to beg the question. It is, as is done in the ar- 
 gument from final causes, to take for granted the prior - 
 ence of an agent capable of producing the effect. Tl 
 istence of such an agent, therefore, ought to be fully dem< n 
 strated before the self-existence of matter can legitimau ) be 
 questioned at all. 
 
26 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 Fallacies of Dr Clarke — continued. 
 
 Dr Clarke's fourth proposition is, " What the substance or 
 A <jf that being which is self-existent or necessai'ily exist- 
 
 iiuj is, ff'e have no idea ; neither is it at all possible for us to 
 comprehend it^^ 
 
 That we can have no knowledge whatever of the deified 
 
 something which Dr Clarke had here in his eye, — either as to 
 
 1 - • e, substance, or anything else, I most readily and most 
 
 |)(! ^^ believe. That this should be acknowledged by a 
 
 r st, is nothing strange. But strange it certainly is — 
 
 passing strange; it surely is ridiculous that the people 
 
 ^ ! ^ so stoutly assert the being of a god, and would thrust 
 
 in vstical dogmas down our throat — it is surely absurd 
 
 liese very people, for all tlieir clamour of demonstra- 
 
 — should be reduced to the miserable necessity of ac- 
 
 dging that they don't know what it is that they talk 
 
 V at would Dr Clarke liimself have said of a person who 
 |rr f nded to prove the existence of a something, till then 
 iiiii n wn in nature, but who could tell nothing about its 
 . .s, 1 1, e, — who could not tell whether it was an animal, a 
 iiiiip r iL a vegetable; — whether it was a solid substance, a 
 ii(|iii(l, a gas, or whether it possessed gravity and extension ; 
 — and yet gravely declared, that it was impossible ever to find 
 Uiii anything of this kind about it? This, it is true, is to 
 take a practical view of the case, — and although the latter is 
 certninly the most eligible way of judging of all such matters, 
 . 4 can afford to give the theologian the advantage of any 
 sort ot argument he may choose to adopt, however inappli- 
 cable to the })urpose. What, then, does this concession 
 make for the theologian in the present instance ? Absolutely 
 notliin; . If tlie theological demonstration were thoroughh' 
 
 f^-- 
 
 correct, it ought not only to affect the existence, but every 
 part of the character of deity ; — his essence, his nature, and 
 all his modes of being. Nay, this very knowledge of his 
 nature ought to enable us — by means of certain definitions, 
 axioms, and canons — to predict, with the ir \ titude, 
 
 every event in futurity. By the use of poi did 
 
 curve lines, &c., we describe (let us say) an eq; r 
 
 angle : but when the description is finished, we percei\u pro- 
 perties in the figure which enable us to demonstrate its rela- 
 tions to other species of the triangle, the quadrangle, the 
 circle, sexagon, sphere, cone, and I know not what all else. 
 Now, if a priori reasoning were as available for theological 
 as mathematical purposes, the character and 
 thing demonstrated ought to be equally c^ . 
 all who understand the terms in which the dem 
 made, and in any way capable of appreciating t 
 But, alas ! the essence, the nature, and mode of 
 god of our theologues are as yet an enigma, anc s i 
 
 for ever remain so, notwithstanding all their de? ; 
 
 respecting him. 
 
 Dr Clarke tries to get out of the difficulty in which he 
 here finds himself, by comparing the conduct of the unbe- 
 liever in denying the existence of a god, to that of a blind or 
 deaf man in denying the existence of colours or sounds, in 
 this comparison he commends the latter as infinit ' 
 reasonable than the former; for the blind or deal 
 says, can have nothing but testimony for his belief 
 ing sounds or colours, whereas the atheist, with th* -<! 
 
 of his reason, may have "undeniable demonstration ^ 
 
 there ever any other sort?) for the existence of a - 
 being. Although, however, it were admitted that | 
 ficient of any of the external senses, had no other e\ i j 1 1 
 than testimony for the existence of the objects perceived In 
 others through the medium of those senses, the comparison 
 would be altogether invalid. Upon what authority do we 
 inform a blind man of the existence of colours ? Is it not 
 upon the authority of evidence which it is not possible he 
 can either perceive or underst aiu r ? *be thei^t ' 
 
 D 
 
as 
 
 possess 
 with, til 
 can p^'- 
 
 irrt:!:n'. 
 
 ClSt'cl f 
 still li 
 
 a 1 
 
 yet It 
 of I ^ . 
 
 ]ir()Vv' 5 
 
 tlllll,'!!} 
 
 b < 'i ^'^ ■ ^ 
 
 ^cres over the athiest ? Is he favored 
 "sixth or a seventh sense, whereby he 
 
 r :.:.aurii\ things,— a race of iu;u- > .^'-nces, 
 ations, — while we remain neces^ui.j and 
 led from so noble an 1 nviable a kind of 
 If so, what is that sense, w is it exer- 
 
 •vrhwe maybe unable completely to under- 
 piion of it, or tuiiy to appreciate its benefits, 
 ly be but an act of charity to make us aware 
 .>ss of our condition. If not, why throw a 
 .Inr upon unbelief as though it were as palpable a perversity 
 as a I. aid to be for a blind man to deny the existence of 
 colours or a deaf one of sounds? Our possession of those 
 . of which such unfortunates are destitute, we can easily 
 
 em by a much stronger sort of evidence than tes- 
 !,et the religious do the same with us, and ^v h ui 
 r aiithnritv.-^The fkct of the case is, thai li 
 
 teach, are at least equally blind with those 
 ,h struct; equally ignorant with those over whom 
 
 HUM I assume such a wonderful superiority. 
 U . sort of salvo for the awkwardness of maintaining the 
 existence of a thing, of the modes of which he knows nothing, 
 the author makes a false statement respecting our ignorance 
 of all other things. " There is not," he says, " so mean an^ 
 .ont.inptibleaplant or animal, that does not confound the 
 nH>.i .nlorged understanding upon earth ; nay, even the sim- 
 l plainest of all inanimate beings have their essence 
 ce hidden from us in the deepest and most impe- 
 -urity." Now, what does he mean by a plant or 
 iiding the most enlarged understanding on 
 hp refer to their essence or substance ? In that 
 iy, that none but the worst informed are ig- 
 ituent principles entering into combina- 
 the substance of all animal as well as of vegetable 
 If it be asked what the essence of these prmciples 
 rl.on f>>r instance, or any of the fifty or sixty sub- 
 bunted simple in tin present state of chemical 
 i uld reply, that the question is impertinent. If 
 
 1 
 t 
 
 In 
 SC 
 
 i t ■ i t c. 
 
 » 
 
 the term essenct^ or substance, bears reference to anytbiiig 
 
 ;onot 
 
 de- 
 
 luore 
 
 1 to 
 
 beyond the simple elements of matter, I coi 
 
 understand its signification, and would be 
 
 fined. Were water to be resolved into coi. 
 
 simple than oxygen and hydrogen, and names i 
 
 such, it would, I dare say, be still inquired, wl. 
 
 sence of these? But let those who carp and cavil about 
 
 essence in this manner (having a more occult reference in 
 
 their eye than to the ultimate principles of things) tell us 
 
 their meaning, and we shall endeavour to meet their most 
 
 searching inquiries upon the subject. 
 
 Taking matter to be the self-existent being, the converse 
 of Dr Clarke's fourth proposition is thus fairly made out .--^-^ 
 namely, that of its essential principles we certainly have 
 some idea. But, at all events, give us something half so sa- 
 tisfactory respecting the essence, or substance, or mode of 
 the existence of a god, and we shall be pertbctly coi luu. 
 The very fact of speaking of plants and animnK. jiooi 
 
 that we know something of the modifications ot matter;— can 
 we say as much for those of deity? The very proposition 
 under notice settles this question. 
 
 The fifth proposition is, that " The self-existent being must 
 he eternal,''— that is, (not that it has existed from eternity, 
 for that has already been proved, but) that it must continue 
 for ever in existence. This proposition is but very lamely 
 supported. As there is no occasion, however, to deny that 
 the self^existent being— whatever it may be— is eti i nai. ^\e 
 need not be at the trouble of shewing the misapplies ! 
 
 the author's reasoning. 
 
 Dr Clarke's sixth proposition, viz. " That the self-existent 
 being must be infinite and omnipotent,'' rests entirely, as his 
 third does, upon a view of Necessity, which has already biiii 
 shewn to be both partial and unphilosophical. It is only 
 requisite to observe here, that the argument brought in prv ^ r 
 of the proposition is exceedingly defective. It is shortly 
 
 this; " because something must of necessity be 5^11 cxibicnr, 
 
 therefore it is necessary that it must likewise be infinite. ' 
 Vow, although it be indisputable that something must be 
 
*' — * _ ■ * 
 
 so 
 
 eterml, as it also is, that something mn^t be infinite : the 
 
 soiiiethiisg Hi tliij one case is noi \)rrixv{i \u be identical with 
 the soirietlung iii the othf'' .:-',?s not at all toiiow, 
 
 isequence, the argument amounts to nothing. To re- 
 inatter may be regarded as eternal and space in- 
 iiiust, it is true, award both attributes to the 
 I III t! ; iHit, at same time, we cannot deny to the former that 
 Mil * II IS ascribed to it. Matter, indeed, may be infinite as 
 w til as self-existent; but if so, it is not because there exists 
 betw iii ihese qualities anything like an indissoluble rela- 
 tion. 
 
 Having, in his own estimation, proved the omnipresence 
 of the something which has existed from eternity, the author 
 hence infers that it "must be a most simple, unchangeable, 
 uncorruptible being; without parts, figure^ motion^ divisibility^ 
 ' ' i i . other such properties as we find in matter." And 
 wli rf. ; ? Because " all these things do plainly and ne- 
 ily finiteness in their very notion, and are utterly 
 th complete infinity." This doctrine may be 
 1 v^ a being made up of a heap of abstractions, but 
 y sounds very strangely when applied to a being such 
 {] is represented. Even Dr Clarke himself speaks 
 a male person, possessed of certain powers and 
 iites. If therefore his own language does not 
 i cannot conceive wiiat does. Does not per- 
 f itenoss? does not agency imply the same 
 ! IS endless to follow out this contemptible 
 
 It is inconsistent and contradictory, as well as 
 
 t: *^ ■ ir. 
 
 4 t'l 
 
 t ' ! J t 
 
 till'!-* 
 
 ii 
 
 If Ith proposition is, '* 
 
 / iiuf / 
 
 ■•"; 
 
 'le. 
 
 a 
 
 t 1 1 
 
 ^hr self-existent being can be 
 )se two or more distinct beings (it is 
 iselves necessarily and independent 
 plain contradiction; that each of 
 
 tilt! I bi !ur .c|,ciiULiii ui liie other, they may, either of 
 ilti nn bi ipposed to exist alone, so that it will be no con- 
 is dib imagine the other not to exist, and consequently 
 IK - ' 111 will be necessarily existing." Here again, 
 
 as iii iiib rra-.t luiig upon the third proposition, the reverend 
 
 31 
 
 author places his whole dependence on mathematical Neces- 
 sity, But bearing in mind the evident worthlessness of such 
 dependence, T would only observe, that it is with the real 
 state of things we have to do, and not with mathematical 
 contradictions at all. If matter, for instance, as a whole, be 
 not allowed to be unique, it follows, from our previous evi- 
 dence of its eternity, that there must be at least a plurality of 
 self-existent beings. Even although the unity of matter 
 were granted, if we are to call space a being, the same con- 
 clusion appears to be unavoidable. Unless, indeed, space 
 and duration, and the diversity of matter, are to be excluded 
 from view (which would be incompatible with a priori prin- 
 ciples), this seventh proposition must for ever remain unte- 
 nable upon any reasonable grounds. 
 
 Dr Clarke's argument a priori stops here. In his eighth 
 proposition, and those following, he had to prove that the 
 self-existent being must be intelligent, and all-powerful, and 
 a free-agent, and wise, and good, and just, and so forth. 
 But this the author clearly perceived could not be made out 
 a priori. What, therefore, was to be done ? He had set out 
 with undertaking to demonstrate the being and attributes of 
 god, and the task could not, of course, be performed with- 
 out intelligence and all the rest of it sharing in the demon- 
 stration ; — how, then, was he to proceed ? — Even by being 
 contented with following the humble course of reasoninir 
 consequentially instead of necessarily. He begins by carry- 
 ing matters with a high hand ; by attempting to make out 
 every thing a flat mathematical contradiction that does not 
 quadrate with his preconceived theory : he ends by recur- 
 ring to the apologetic mode of argument adopted by others 
 many hundred years before ! And what does the doctor 
 make of all his shifts, — of all his turns to catch the cur- 
 rent as it serves, whatever point the wind may be bl* 
 from? Nothing at all to boast of: nothing even capab 
 servino" as a consolation for having been forced to so hum- 
 bling a step, for having employed so crooked and inconsis- 
 tent a policy. * 
 
 The two arguments of our author, in fact, counteract 
 
9St 
 
 C 
 
 each other. If the first be well-founded, the eecond cannot; 
 
 and if the second be well-founded, the first cannot. Sup- 
 pose ih iiad established the whole of the propositions up to 
 the seventh inclusive, we have only a something eternal, in- 
 dependent, unchangeable, unique, incomprehensible, and 
 everywhere present; whose nonexistence, whose tempo- 
 I ! . u! ose dependency, and so forth, cannot be conceived : 
 I in short, that answers to our notions of space; 
 
 tablish the existence of a deity? Are we to 
 ice not merely a being but a god ? To settle this ques- 
 we may ask, what are tlie divine attributes? Are they 
 aot, according to the author^, own description, an assem- 
 Ub ^ ^' possible perfections, and that, too, if the ex- 
 pression be allowable, in an infinite degree? Can we, then, 
 ascr infinite intelligence, or any intelligence, to such a 
 , , ...^ Caii we ascribe to it infinite power, or any 
 I . r nlill? Can we ascribe agency, whether free or not 
 't which is immoveable— to that which even ex- 
 le consideration of it the conception of motion 
 her? Dr Clarke himself has declared this to be im- 
 l>u^.u.ic. What, then, does the demonstration amount to ? 
 The existence of a mere nonentity. 
 
 On the other hand, taking the author's own absolute ne- 
 cessity as the basis of all sound demonstration, and the 
 criterion by which we are to try all that assumes this charac- 
 1,1, what does he make of the intelligence, and wisdom, 
 and goodness, and power of God? He does not so much 
 as pretend that these are necessary to the Something whose 
 existence he has demonstrated.— The conclusion, therefore, 
 to which we are necessarily driven, is,— either that his ne- 
 cessity is good for nothing in the argument— in which case 
 his whole demonstration falls to the ground— or that it leaves 
 the god of that demonstration without power, without intel- 
 ligence, justice, goodness, -truth ! ! ! 
 
 in 
 
 chui 
 
 ss 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 Fallacies of Mr Richard Jack, 
 
 It would be a fearful task to toil through the dreary wander- 
 ings of this ungainly author. In perusing his work, one 
 would imagine he had been born with theorems in his head, 
 and a rule and compasses in his hands ; — and were it not that 
 he himself tells us of certain misfortunes which befel him on 
 his flight from the Scottish capital, and its rebel occupi -. 
 in the memorable year forty-five, we should scarcely 1 
 thought him susceptible of human passions, or capabl 
 taking a share in the concerns of those stirring times, li - 
 performance is entitled, " Mathematical Principles of Th^o-^ 
 logy; or, the Existence of God geometrically demons? 
 in three books." {London, 1747. Svo. pp. S28,)— Per i ^ 
 ouffht not to notice the work at all: it is of a character so 
 prosing, formal, and roundabout. The tactician draws his 
 lines of circumvallation at so great a distance from the for- 
 tress he purposes to reduce ; his approaches are made so 
 tardily, and with so little energy, that we are apt to lose 
 patience at his over-precaution, and waste of pains as well as 
 time. If all this were a sure precursor of success, we should 
 have nothing to complain of; but even his closing positions 
 are so ill chosen, as either to be perfectly harmless, or to lie 
 entirely at the mercy of the enemy. The book is, neveriJ 
 less, a great curiosity. It fiirnishes the finest speciniun- 
 anywhere to be found, of strict mathematical reasoning as 
 applied to theology. It may therefore be amusing, if not 
 instructive, to touch upon a few of the author's happiest 
 efforts (and those upon the most important points of the 
 discussion,) were it only to show the effect even of the 
 purest logic, when pressed into the service of the argument 
 a priori for the being and attributes of a god. 
 
 The first book, consisting of forty-five propositions and 
 
on 
 
 i)i 
 
 34 
 
 theorems, is taken up in proving the self-existence of an 
 independent being. In the second, an attenrpt is made to 
 demonstrate that that being cannot be matter ; for all vision- 
 antb must have a fling at this untractable impediment to 
 their motions — this desperate eye-sore to all their specula- 
 tions. Mr Jack says, (prop, 41, theor. 40,) — "Matter is a 
 dependent being, because that being which can have any 
 chanore or mutation made on any of the powers or properties 
 11 I ubsesses, is a dependent being; but a change or mutation 
 can be made on some of the powers or qualities that matter 
 or any material being possesses ; therefore matter is a de- 
 pendent being, which was to be demonstrated." — It is to be 
 veivi 1, that a dependent being had been previousiy de- 
 i ' 'whose existence is the eflect of some other 
 
 Hior; so that this syllogism purports to be a demonstration 
 t matter having been created out of nothing! How is 
 l)V what magic is so rare a case made out? I say at 
 , by the shallow, paltry trick of equivocation. The 
 t of the major premiss, which ought to have been 
 ;il with the predicate of the definition of a dependent 
 iviously given, is totally different from it. The de- 
 finitiuii, it is true, as applied to matter, involves an impossi- 
 bility. Besides taking for granted the existence of some 
 agent, unknown and undescribed, its power of bringing 
 all material things into existence isasumed. But if the defi- 
 1 if! n in question falls, the conclusion that matter is a de- 
 pendent being, reaches to its forms only, leaving its inde- 
 pendence as to existence untouched. 
 
 this is theological demonstration. Demonstra- 
 aiii.}, much more easy, and infinitely better adapt- 
 subject in hand, than the vexatious and trouble- 
 cess of induction ; by which we are bound to pro- 
 acrent, and prove the extent of its powers and mode 
 11 — and that too by experience — before we can le- 
 y ascribe to it any effect whatever. Here, nothing 
 further is necessary than to frame a hypothesis — nothing 
 
 more than to 
 
 " Call some spirit from the vasty deep ;" 
 
 Us^ 
 
 t ■ u T ; , I 
 r ! 1 \ u 
 si Mil k: 
 
 il'tX 
 
 i) 
 
 g 
 
 111 
 
 
 35 
 
 invest it with the attributes in which popular prejudice has 
 arrayed the object of its adoration, and by t!ie flourish of a 
 conjuring wand, bid matter begone into its assumed original 
 nothingness. Mighty magicians ! If our reasoners a priori 
 could but tell us where they get the creative power of which 
 they speak so much, independent of the thing they go about 
 to destroy, they would render their argument somewhat 
 more tangible. If they could even tell us of a single change 
 effected in matter by means of their pretended agei \. k 
 information would both be new and directly to the pc 
 But, alas for them ! how should they know anything oi a 
 being necessarily prior to the existence of the material 
 world, — or (supposing such a being) its essence or inodus 
 operandi? In any of the numberless changes effected upon 
 material bodies, do we see any thing operating except other 
 bodies of the same kind ? Can we even conceive of any other 
 than material agency ? If aught else than substance operates 
 in the mutations observed in physical phenomena, Nature, 
 by denying the fact, betrays and belies its god, and science 
 and philosophy are left with a heavy account of heresy to 
 answer for. 
 
 After having demolished the self-existence of matter, .Mr 
 Jack proceeds to prove that it owes its existence to his own 
 " independent being." As the argument he employs on this 
 occasion affects to demonstrate the intelligence of the thing 
 referred to in the first book, and is the only one which 
 touches upon this highly momentous point, it is the more 
 worthy of attention. It is as follows : — 
 
 " The self-existent and independent being does possess a 
 self-determining power, or volition, and that self-determin- 
 ing power or volition is the cause of the existence of the 
 first temporary being." (Book II. prop. 32, theor. 31.) 
 
 " Let A represent the self-existent and independent being, 
 B the first temporary being : I say, the self-existing and in- 
 dependent being A is possessed of a self-determining power, 
 or volition, and that self-determining power or volition, is 
 the cause of the existence of the first temporary being B. 
 For because the existence of the first temporary being B, is 
 
 E 
 
36 
 
 the effect that arises from the exertion of some of the powers 
 
 III (jualities of the seir-exisliii«4 and independent being A, 
 lunl ill cause of the exertion of any power or quahty of the 
 siliM \i.tnig and independent being, is a self-determining 
 jH>uti. liiii the self-existing and independent being does 
 l)s)v. - : therefore the cause of the exertion of that power or 
 qii alnv nl uie self-existing and independent being A, which 
 cin . pr > hi le the existence of B, is a self-determining power 
 (.r V a that it does possess, and will be the cause of B's 
 
 tx ! -nee; consequently the self-existing and independent 
 iu isjir A. ii^es possess a self-determining power or volition, 
 whit !i . it-uetermining power or vuiition is the cause ui Uie 
 . X viriH r uftlie first temporary being B's existence. There- 
 11 f self-existiny and independent being does possess a self- 
 rf. / ///./y power, which self-determining power is the cause of 
 1 1), , ifpvce of the first temporary being, which was to be de- 
 monstrated.' 
 
 Who can doubt, after so luminous and strictly geometH- 
 
 ca 
 
 al 
 
 t IXi 
 
 demonstration, that the creation of a mathematician's 
 possesses intelligence; that by the simple act of its 
 ,n it lins called all things into existence? What signi- 
 I, alliiou'di the latter be assumed as the effect of the 
 I? What, at least, does it signify, that the introduc- 
 t)f one of the factors into the theorem is gratuitous? 
 \x no one can expect that so trivial an affair as the 
 ■1 of a temporary being by a self-existent one should 
 i ove(h Do we not see that that flict is brought in as a 
 \ of the self-determining power of A, and that this 
 next made out, in the clearest manner, to be the 
 ij\ the c.^i^^tence of B? What more than this beautiful 
 i)! reasoning does the captious infidel want? Descartes 
 bo.i.tl'uily exclaimed, in the style of Archimedes,—" Give 
 nil mutter an<! motion, and 1 will make you a universe;" 
 h)U!x with much scantier materials, our new-fangled theorists 
 nrrhiiu I <^reat deal more, — only give them A and B, and 
 {\w\ uroduce you both the universe and its creator! 
 
 Tiie <n-eatest i)aii of Mr. Jack's theorems, problems, &c. 
 ^vc. consisting of upwards of an hundred in number, is 
 
 ixin- 
 
 37 
 
 taken up in proving what stands in no need of proof, — some- 
 times even of self-evident propositions — (such as that " a 
 being cannot act before it exists; the existence of the cause 
 of any effect is antecedent to the existence of that effect : a 
 being cannot be instrumental in its own existence; a being 
 cannot act after its existence is terminated," and so forth ;) — 
 while the most arbitrary and fanciful notions are made the 
 bases of doctrines the most important in the whole argu- 
 ment. This, verily, is straining at a gnat and swallowing a 
 camel. But we have done with him. If the " Mathemati- 
 cal Principles of Theology" be destined to escape oblivion, 
 they may afford grounds for curious speculation respecting 
 that bias toward absurdity which is too frequently found to 
 beset the human mind. One of our finest critics has de- 
 scribed it to be natural : but if so, it has, in the present 
 instance, received no inconsiderable addition from the hand 
 
 of education. 
 
 On this particular, a word here may not be out of season. 
 We have often heard it, as it were, oracularly declared, that 
 a mathematical education is of great value, were it for no- 
 thing more than this, — that it habituates the mind to the 
 closest investigation, and the most unyielding rules of de- 
 duction. If, however, we are to judge from the examples 
 before us, we must adopt an opinion vastly different. The 
 trentlemen who have availed themselves of their mathemati- 
 cal acquirements in establishing the first principles of their 
 faith, have doubtless been deeply learned in the science, — and 
 yet, what have they effected ? Nothing to the purpose;— no- 
 thin^ but a perversion of the truly estimable wisdom of the 
 schools from its proper end and use, to the furtherance of 
 that which begins in weakness and ignorance, and terminates 
 in folly. The unskilful may frequently be diffuse and indi- 
 rect in the conducting of an argument, and often at a loss 
 to find the nearest and most efficient way of bringing it to a 
 close; but the learned — who seem to have cared but loo 
 litde for the respect due to their classical distinctions, — for 
 them it was reserved to confound the objects of totally dif- 
 ferent branches of study. Their error appears to be of the 
 
88 
 
 suint 1 tM-> Willi liuit of Liic Abyssinian doctor, celebrated 
 fur !;is ireatnient of elephantiasis, who grew so full of his 
 piou ; , that he judged of everything by its rules — esti- 
 ijia rits and moral character, as well as the dis- 
 
 ea> i ii u by the thickness of their legs. But matters 
 ul in ne iniiriediate concern remain to be settled with Mr 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 Fallaciousness of Air Gillespie's " Argu7nent" — The 
 
 Introduction, 
 
 The argument above referred to, is by no means the least 
 important of those now brought under notice. It does not 
 indeed possess the originality of Clarke's " Demonstration," 
 no I VI n the half-constrained and half-popular style of that 
 work ; but the latter quality is more than counterbalanced 
 by precision of purpose and exactness of arrangement. Mr 
 Gillespie^s argument, in short, is little else than the quintes- 
 sence of that of his predecessor, more directly applied and 
 more logically stated. It is perhaps as well as can be ex- 
 pected of a work of the sort, and may probably supersede every 
 thing of the kind that has gone before it. 
 
 The author, in his introduction, makes some very shrewd 
 observations relative to the character and efficiency of the 
 evidence commonly offered in support of the existence of a 
 god. These are classed in three divisions. The first pur- 
 ports to be '' An inquiry into the defects of mere a posteriori 
 
 ;. ior the being ot a deity;" the second to be " A 
 
 "* *^ miuel Clarke's demonstration of the being 
 
 of God," and the third, a proof that " neces- 
 
 sar\ i\ nplies infinite extension." 
 
 I ih I' s iitained in the first division are, generally, 
 
 I'xcriliiii .-^ikI He) V much to the poiut : but with a posteriori 
 
 39 
 
 reasoning we have here nothing to do. Tho-r wliirh imme- 
 diately follow, form a sort of apology for the ii an- 
 ment adopted by the author, and are intended to i 
 species of argument in the most advantageous light. " No- 
 thing," he says, "appears to be more unreasonable, iui 
 that, if there be a necessarily existing being, there can be no 
 way of proving it. To say so, seems absurd. And if there 
 be any way of proving there is a' necessarily existing being, 
 that must, of course, be by arguments drawn from the ne- 
 cessity of the thing. Reasoning from experience can show 
 what may be, or is : they cannot show what must be. To say 
 therefore that a priori reasoning in the matter can never 
 turn to any account, is to say that we can never prove a ne- 
 cessarily existing being." 
 
 "When we say that a priori reasoning can never be turned 
 to any account, we mean, to any account in demonstrating 
 the existence of a god, — such as any of those generally be- 
 lieved to exist ; that is, a supernatural being, a being distinct 
 from nature, and either partially or wholly, overruling the 
 affairs of the world, physical as well as moral. But our me- 
 taphysical opponents are always for stealing a march upon 
 us. They never speak out at once ; they never — neither 
 first nor last — say distinctly what god is. Humble terms are 
 employed in the outset ; such as, something^ being^ or exist- 
 ence. By and by, however, through the accession of new 
 qualities, it gradually grows, under their management, into 
 a something of vast and indescribable importance. If Mr 
 Gillespie had even told us what he meant by the word / . 
 which he so frequently makes use of, we should have 
 able to say whether it could be proved necessarily to exist 
 or not. If a mere abstraction is represented by it, wt cau 
 have no quarrel with any kind of demonstration about t he 
 pleases : but in that case his argument does nothing to the 
 question proposed. Should it, on the contrary, refer to an 
 agent of any kind — something possessing power — something 
 that acts — a thing, in short, having a real existence, in the 
 same sense as that in which we apply reality of existence to 
 common objects, there can be no objection to liis free use of 
 
10 
 
 file term. 11 " author*s subsequent reasoning involves the 
 latter construction (which construction, 1 may mention once 
 form. I .iiall uniformly ado})t,) for he makes intelligence, 
 •ifu! } ower, and freedom of agency, part of his argument. 
 1,1 iJm f. liability of his position, however, respecting the 
 fit tessary existence of such a being, according to his own 
 *)f necessity, I would refer him to what has been stated 
 III iju lirst chapter of this Refutation. 
 
 ihe reason why he thinks the thing may be proved, and 
 not only so, but easily proved, is, that necessity of existence 
 itiiplies that what exists necessarily must be the sine qua nou 
 of every thing else. But there is no being to which this con- 
 dition can be applied, except matter, and matter does not 
 exist by that necessity which alone is admitted in the argu- 
 iiH nt apriori; although it certainly exists by another neces- 
 hiiy, and that, too, of a much more rational description, be- 
 t n-( riore suitable to the subject. 
 
 If! the third division of his introduction, Mr Gillespie 
 launches out upon the proof of a point which it would be 
 premature to discuss here. Indeed, it seems altogether su- 
 perfluous. " Supposing," says he, " that there is a neces- 
 sarily existing substance, the intelligent cause of all things, it 
 may be easily shewn that that substance is infinitely extend- 
 til." Little need be said what conclusion may be thought 
 necessary to follow such a supposition, whether infinite ex- 
 it iiMon, infinite duration, or any other kind of infinity. It 
 is the supposition itself that we have to look to. If that be 
 I ilk good, he may make anything further he thinks proper 
 if not, he will have nothing of a substantial character 
 to ucar the attribute, of which he seems so forward to dis- 
 pose. 
 
 A mber of other matters are introduced to our notice 
 
 n Illy stage of the discussion, but in general they are 
 
 nf i uhordinate description, and had better be left to stand 
 ui i ii: Willi ihe main argument. There is, however, one ex- 
 ^., ptn.n — one statement which calls for some preliminary re- 
 ; nl>. Ai the conclusion of the thirteenth section, it is 
 a\ Li ltd that, «' to maintain there is no infinitely extended 
 
 41 
 
 substance, is to maintain there is no eternal substance." — 
 Now, with reference to matter, this doctrine appears to be 
 at variance with fact. No one, it is true, can logically main- 
 tain that matter is not infinitely extended ; because that pro- 
 cedure would be to engage in the proof of an absolutely 
 negative position, which it is impossible to establish. At the 
 same time it cannot be denied, that it would be a very hard 
 task to bring sufficient evidence in support of a contrary 
 affirmation: we cannot prove that it is infinitely extended. 
 The fact is, we cannot say whether matter be infinitely ex- 
 tended or not. In so far as our experience goes, and our 
 observation can carry us, we find substance completely oc- 
 cupying every part of space. This shall be shown when we 
 come to review Mr Gillespie's notions relative to the divisi- 
 bility of matter. We see worlds on worlds and systems 
 upon systems, floating around us in all directions, accompa- 
 nied by such circumstances as to prove the presence of mat- 
 ter to the utmost distance which the best telescopes can 
 reach. But what, after all, is the greatest latitude we can 
 allow to such distance compared with immensity ? Judging 
 from analogy, indeed, we might be ready to conclude even 
 the infinity of space to be filled with some substance or 
 other. Analogical reasoning, however, is necessarily false, 
 consisting, as it does, of applying to one thing the deductions 
 of our experience respecting another. It is grossly unphi- 
 losophical, therefore, to build any theory or any argument 
 upon it. 
 
 Although it be frankly admitted, then, that we neither 
 have, nor can have, any knowledge of the infinity of material 
 extension, more than we can have of its limits ; that does 
 not at all involve a denial of the eternity of matter. 1^^> 
 perceive a vast universe in existence, but were it only a sin- 
 gle atom of matter, no power of man could reduce it to anni- 
 hilation, or even conceive of a power capable of producino- 
 this effect. To suppose, therefore, that matter ever began 
 to exist, or to suppose its existence capable of termmation, 
 is to admit the occurrence of these stupendous effects without 
 a cause. This absurdity can only be avoided by assuming 
 
42 
 
 i 'I ' s 
 
 the existence of some immaterial being actim - ni agent in 
 the case, — which assumption is a double, if not a threefold 
 ahsiirdit). 1 or, lirst, we have to take for granted the ex- 
 e of what is inconceivable, namely, an immaterial be- 
 : or else that of some substance exempted, and without 
 on, from the essential laws of its nature. Next have 
 le tlie supposed being with j)ower sufficient to ac- 
 ( nu ! h (:ind mark what it is that is to be accomplished) 
 ij or annihilation of matter, — either of which is 
 
 an )ssibility. 
 
 \%' t 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 » 
 
 Fallacies of Mr Gillespie — The " Argument. 
 
 This grand argument is laid out in two books. In the first, 
 the metaphysico-theologian endeavours to prove that some 
 being exists which is the sine qua non of every other thing in 
 existence. It consists of three parts, or series of proposi- 
 n iiaintaining, first, that Space is this being; second, 
 
 h } i] ration is also a being of the same kind ; and, third, 
 fh II these are not different, but identical. The second book 
 a5eMl.c^ to the subject of the forementioned proofs, the di- 
 vine attributes of omnipresence, unlimited power, and free- 
 dom of agency. 
 
 We cannot afford time — much less can it be expected 
 ill, It others should afford patience — both to make a general 
 anuvsis of this argument, and examine the reasonings 
 brought up in support of the different parts of it. As, 
 therefore, authors are peculiarly jealous of their privileges, 
 and tetchy and froward with regard to any freedom used in 
 tin ireatment of their expressions, we shall take the most 
 laborious, nnd at the same time, least advantageous way of 
 CO ' iting Mr Gillespie's principles, — book by book, and 
 I 1 p tioi! by proposition. This course is the more neces- 
 but \j as the argument a priori, unlike that derived from 
 
 43 
 
 experience, depends upon a chain of reasoning,— not upon 
 the pointed putting of a single case, or the tautological re- 
 petition of a thousand. 
 
 The first proposition,— "//i/«iVy of extension is necessarily 
 existing,'' — it would be absurd \n the extreme to deny. No 
 more can we imagine any limit prescribable to extensiow, 
 than we can imagine the outside of a house to be in the in- 
 side of it. The same unqualified assent, however, cannot be 
 accorded to proposiuou the second; namely, that ''Infinity 
 of extension is necessarily indivisible" 
 
 Here, the author has given up his abstract necessi: v, .. 
 looks for something like experiment as alone capable oi sa- 
 tisfying him : for, notwithstanding some unmeaning talk, 
 intended to explain away this desertion of his own prin- 
 ciples, he evidently insists upon a real division— an actual 
 separation of parts, with some distance, however little be- 
 tween them, as that which he means by divisibility. U Mr 
 Gillespie pleads not guilty to this charge, I would ask him 
 how mathematicians have always regarded the smallest par- 
 ticle of matter divisible to infinity ? Do they ever contem- 
 plate actual separation of parts in such cases? No; but 
 parts— as Mr. Gillespie himself has it— in the sense of par- 
 tial consideration only. When they speak of the hemis- 
 pheres of the earth, divided either by the plane of the equa- 
 tor, or that passing from the meridian of Greenwich to the 
 180tii degree of longitude,— are they necessarily guiltv of 
 speaking unintelligibly ? If not, how is it that extension is 
 necessarily indivisible ? 
 
 It may be said, perhaps, that although matter is, menfaHv, 
 easy enough to divide, it is impossible to apply the same 
 process to extension. But is not the space occupied bv the 
 earth,— or say, its useful little representation, a twelve n i 
 twenty-inch globe,— as easily conceived to be divisible i v 
 mathematical plane, as the globe itself which is not rea h. 
 but only mentally divided ? A mathematical point has a, 
 dimensions, because whatever possesses dimensions iiiu^i |ios» 
 sess figure, and that which has figure cannot be a point. J 
 like manner, a plane cannot have thickness, since what 
 
 F 
 
44. 
 
 4^ 
 
 ;, I -. o 
 
 «; ■ 1 ' 
 
 in! ti 
 
 n f f 
 
 i. of the smallest thickness is not a plane but a solid. In 
 dividing space by abstraction, therefore, there is no necessity. 
 ir author would have us believe, of falling into the ab- 
 n-v of space divided by actual separation of the parts, 
 no space between them. 
 
 1 be of no great consequence although the second 
 I were as irrefragable as the first ; for it bears upon 
 iit all applicable to any being, whether real or ima- 
 oi„ar. But we need not always allow even gratuitous 
 fallacies to escape. The exposure, at least, shows the bad- 
 ness of the cause that renders the adoption of them neces- 
 sary. If Mr Gillespie's indivisibility be understood in an 
 abslract sense, his proposition is not true; if, in reference 
 to actual experiment, he may be applauded for having re- 
 course to inductive instead of a priori reasoning, he need 
 not so soon have neglected the principles upon which he 
 started, without intimating some ground for the change. 
 
 A corollary is here introduced, asserting the immoveabi- 
 lity of extension. It is true, that either finity or infinity of 
 extension can never be supposed capable of motion. Space 
 ( iMot be carried out of itself, nor can those parts of it oc- 
 cupied by Mont Blanc, for example, and the Peak of Tene- 
 rifFe ever be imagined to change places. To the truth of 
 what is here maintained, therefore, we must give unreserved 
 assent, independent of its nominal connection with the false 
 (hu trine immediately going before. 
 
 ;; ^• - now come to a proposition which may be said to 
 
 .ith it all the strength, if it has any, as well as the 
 
 ss, of Mr Gillespie's " Argument." It is the third 
 
 er, and announces that " There is necessarily a 
 
 Bfing uJ uijinity of extension^ 
 
 \{ we had not already seen that the author's reasoning 
 leads us to conclude that his Being is to be regarded as 
 something substantial, we should have been at a loss what 
 to make of the subject of the above predicate. As a logi- 
 cian would say, it is not distributed. But if we refer lu 
 tin n ird division of his introduction, we find him contend- 
 I a the necessary being must be of the character now 
 
 ascribed to that subject. At the twenty-third section he 
 avows that " It may be laid down as one of those truths 
 which admit of no contradiction, that with regard to the 
 uncreated substance, at least, virtue (meaning power, I pre- 
 sume,) cannot be without substance. Speaking of this sub- 
 stance," the author goes on to say, " Sir Isaac Newton hath 
 these words," — which may be rendered — "Omnipresence is 
 not by power alone, but also by substance ; for without sub- 
 stance, power cannot possibly subsist." 
 
 Not only, however, is the necessary being of Mr Gillespie 
 said to be a substance, and therefore by his own and Sir 
 Isaac Newton's showing, possessed of virtue or power, but it 
 has already been designated, " the intelligent cause of all 
 things." I am quite aware, that neither intelligence nor 
 power can be demonstrated of any thing a priori, which we 
 shall see when this author's reasoning upon those attributes 
 fail in our way. We may, nevertheless, in endeavouring 
 to bear in mind the description of Being, of whom so 
 great things are predicated, avail ourselves of any expres- 
 sion of opinion respecting it, that may be scattered through- 
 out the work. It is only on this account that I have at pre- 
 sent alluded to these after-considerations at all. 
 
 Relative to a Being of this sort, then, — at all events, relative 
 to a substantial being, the truth of the predicate is what we 
 have now to try. The evidence in support of the third pro- 
 position is stated in the form of a dilemma. " Either infinity 
 of extension subsists, or, (which is the same thing,) we con- 
 ceive it to subsist, without a support or substratum ; or, it 
 subsists not, or we conceive it not to subsist, without a sup- 
 port or substratum. First, If infinity of extension subsist 
 without a substratum, then it is a substance. — Secondly, If 
 infinity of extension subsist not without a substratum, then, 
 it being a contradiction to deny there is infinity of exten- 
 sion, it is a contradiction to deny there is a substratum 
 to it." 
 
 The conclusion deduced from the latter alternative, be- 
 sides appearing lame and impotent, is somewhat laughable. 
 But allowing its logic to pass, it may be worth while, if only 
 
 $ ■■ 
 
Ulj 
 
 
 S. I 
 
 ! Hi 
 
 i 4 ) 
 
 ■10 
 
 lU to Liv ihu lurcc of this, the negative horn of 
 . , by ascertaining what it is made of. — Tb*^ nri- 
 •on of the word substratum is, a thing lymg 
 else. ^Supposing, for instance, a bed of 
 der the soil, gravel is the substratum of that 
 ! ;; trc be sandstone below that, the sandstone is the 
 lib !r:i!ii!!i of the gravel ; if coal be found beneath the rock, 
 the substratum of it, and so on as far as we can pe- 
 netrate. To say, therefore, that space must have a substra- 
 iniiiing less than saying that it must have something 
 upon ; something to bold it up. That is, — Space 
 !iMi 1 have limits; and there must be something in existence 
 It \ its limits to keep it from falling — out of itself! If 
 
 till i L the acme of absurdity, a ship falling overboard, 
 
 :i- r ! sailors' jest goes, is no longer a joke; and the clown 
 M lio boasted that he could swallow himself, boasted of no- 
 thing that he might not be reasonably be expected to per- 
 form. 
 
 Should it be contended that the term ought to be under- 
 suM u n its secondary acceptation, and that the substratum 
 c >f !n«3 infinity ot extension subsists within itself, as any ma- 
 terial body is said to be the substratum of its own extension: 
 — I would remark, that we know of nothing possessing ex- 
 ti I! H n except matter, — nothing else that can stand as an 
 object to which extension may be ascribed as a property ; 
 nuit iliat matter, not existing by mathematical, but only by 
 I Ir. •] necessity, cannot be the substratum referred to. 
 ] : it is evident that, in material bodies, comprising all that 
 
 V now, or ca7i know of Being, it is impossible to find 
 
 I that will serve Mr Gillespie's purpose. Even this 
 
 lity overlooked, however, what is it that next meets 
 < . f — One substance occupying infinite extension, and 
 
 pjioilur occur} iiig part of this extension, if not also the whole 
 of it ; \i\ olhtr words, two things at the same time occupying 
 the same space. Theology always entangles its advocates in 
 inextricable absurdities. 
 
 A religious friend who has corresponded with me upon 
 il i> I rill, nllenfes that the substance of the substraium of in- 
 
 47 
 
 111* 
 
 ahhl 
 
 e; 
 
 used 
 
 Ui ..." 
 
 *^ It. ■ i- 
 
 finite extension is not material ; but ihii> i 
 
 something he has been taught to repeat,— I h 
 
 his sounder judgment. Substance and i 
 
 The words are synonymous and convertible. \\ Ja ii 
 
 otherwise they become unintelligible; inasmuch as wi nauht 
 
 then talk of an unsubstantial substance and imniaLei u 
 
 matter. - 
 
 But, to refer to the first proposition, — has it not been de- 
 monstrated that infinity of extension exists necessarilv ? — 
 that it exists, per se, by the most abstract and m(^!a| i \ ! 
 necessity? In what sort of predicament, then, must liiat 
 reasoning appear, which gives up a leading and univei v 
 admitted truth by placing it in a questionable position ? Mr 
 Gillespie's dilemma recognises, at least, the possibility 
 finite extension requiring a substratum to support it- 
 nite extension, which is itself necessary ! How is this ? 
 it found that although space possessed a few of the divine 
 attributes, it did not possess all, nor anything like all that 
 were deemed needful to constitute a respectable deity ? Aui- 
 wMth standing appearances, I should hope not. But, at any 
 rate, we are again landed in a quagmire of absurdity — the 
 absurdity of supposing a thing to be dependent and inde- 
 pendent at the same time. If space must be conceived 
 a priori necessary, to talk of a substratum being necessary in 
 the same sense of the word is nonsense : on the other 
 hand, if it stands in need of a substratum, the foundation 
 stone of this great argument must crumble into dust, and be 
 unfit to serve as a substratum to anything. 
 
 But if we are dissatisfied with the author's substratum, we 
 are not much better situated with the alternative left us: a r 
 according to the dilemma he has imposed upon us, i 
 obliged to conclude that infinity of existence is itseli 
 stance. I had thought infinity a mere nominal adjuiu 
 lowed to space, from the circumstance ci oor being ui 
 to conceive limits to its extent; but iIr thuibi :t m 
 thinks otherwise. Infinity, with him, i 
 On the same ground, we might conteiKi lliai J > a 
 
 stance too. Supposing, however, that space ini'nuivh 
 
 &1 i 
 
 ai- 
 
 X- 
 
 \ 
 
48 
 
 I. h! i! is \v!]:ii i> means, all tiial we can say is, that if it be 
 a substance it is no longer space, or extension, or any thing 
 t I fhan,-^ust a substance; — unless it may be both exten- 
 SHjii and substance at the same moment. But these are pro- 
 fane tiioughts. Perhaps according to the new school of 
 theolocTv. not on1v may a book be a substance, but its exten- 
 vi, ! ly also be a substance, its weight another, its colour 
 a ' , and so forth. Let us hear, however, how the divine 
 Liiuui V of infinity of extension being a substance is to be sus- 
 tained. —Mark with what boldness of reasoning it is brought 
 out. The infidel must look well to his footing and points 
 of defence, lest he be laid prostrate by its overwhelming 
 
 force. 
 
 *• 1 1 any one should deny that it is a substance, it so sub- 
 sisting;" (that is, without a support or substratum,) "to 
 I e beyond contradiction the utter absurdity of such de- 
 i we have but to defy him to show why infinity of exten- 
 di,. n not a substance, so far forth as it can subsist by itself 
 or wiiiiout a substratum." 
 
 A new era has thus dawned upon logic. A grand dis- 
 covery is on the eve of rendering her power irresistible, and 
 her reign everlasting and glorious. It is to be henceforth no 
 longer necessary for us to prove an affirmative : assert what 
 wr n nv, no one dare deny our assertions. For to prove be- 
 ; contradiction the utter absurdity of such denial, we 
 nly to put a brave face on it, and throw a defiance in 
 u. th of our opponent to prove the negative. 
 
 lUii waiving, in the meantime, our plea of want of evi- 
 dence for the affirmative, a simple man would say in relation 
 u. tlie case before us, that substance possesses attraction, 
 which extension does not ; that it is observed under a thou- 
 sand varieties of figure, density, colour, motion, taste, 
 < i:r, iuiiibustion, crystalization, &c. which neither exten- 
 or infinity ever is, or can in its nature be. He might, 
 ilcplorable ignorance, ask if ever infinity was weighed, 
 • sion analyzed and its elements reduced to gas? 
 uouitl, 1 ^iare say, only evince in the eyes of the theo- 
 . that such a person had no idea of the very conveni- 
 
 ng 
 
 or 
 
 49 
 
 ent art of applying metapiiysical language to things phy- 
 sical; whereby a mere abstraction, or at most a property of 
 something else, can so easily be charmed into a reality. I Is 
 showing why infinity of extension is not a substance, there- 
 fore, would be set down as grovelling and common-place, 
 and, by consequence, useless. 
 
 After all, however, how does the notable proposition 
 stand, that there is necessarily a Being of infinity of exten- 
 sion ? The principle of the argument brought up in support 
 of it — the dilemma, in short — gives way on every side. It 
 stands without a vestige of backing, except from the vain 
 and swelling words of a blustering defiance, the value of 
 which no one but a fool could be at a loss to estimate. 
 
 The author himself, indeed, seems not half sure of having 
 made good the doctrine he has announced: for after having 
 done all he could do, by the foisting in of a substratum 
 upon extension to the destruction of its necessary existence, 
 — he comforts himself with the reflection, that it is of very 
 little consequence whether men will or will not consent to 
 call this substratum by the name of being or substance, be- 
 cause "'tis certain that the word substance or being, has never 
 been employed, can never be employed, to stand for any- 
 thing more, at least, than the substratum of infinity of exten- 
 sion." It is, of course, of no manner of importance whether 
 men consent to do what they always have done and must 
 continue to do, or whether they will not. But how far is the 
 because and its certainty consistent with the lurking suspi- 
 cion of the honoured name of Being or substance being 
 refused to his unsupported substratum ? Yet, on the very 
 heels of this misgiving, he concludes, — "There is, then^ ne- 
 cessarily, a Being of infinity of extension." The worthy 
 old father of the church, who declared his belief of a chris- 
 tian dogma because it was impossible, is not far from having 
 a logician of the mathematical school to keep him in coun- 
 tenance. Mr Gillespie frames a most absolute conclusion 
 with his premises dubiously faltering on his lips. 
 
50 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 Fallacies of Mr Gillespie — The " Argument continued. 
 
 1 Hie fourth proposition of this argument — that " the being 
 1)1 iiiiiuitj of extension is necessarily of unity and simplicity" 
 - '^ ' .1 upon the baseless fabric of extension being 
 i of its being in itself a substance, or requiring a 
 
 support it. There is a scholium attached to 
 it, 11, which we must not entirely lose sight ofl It is 
 1 I n 1 ;igainst the unity and simplicity, and by consequence 
 ( t ! r ! or thinks) the infinity of the material universe. 
 Ji st I conceive the conclusion of this schoHum es- 
 
 c u a right view of the eternity of matter, or even the 
 
 question of the existence of a god, far less that the pre- 
 mises are so, that I make any observations upon either. 
 The self-existence of matter stands high above the reach of 
 the ariruinent a priori; but it is surely more direct and pro- 
 
 lit'!' !. i > 1 
 
 to ret 1 1 
 docs \\{ 
 
 othi"'-, 
 titlifr--;i 
 
 iH)se the weakness of that argument, than allow it 
 ! reputation for close and rigid reasoning which it 
 at all merit. In the present instance, as in all 
 lere is not a single position taken in hostility to an- 
 il principles, that will not also be found hostile, 
 1 it= 1 to physical science or sound philosophy. 
 
 r • the substratum c f the infinity of extension, is held 
 i sensible in the self-existent substance. This is 
 
 tiH pni here adopted: but in reply to a similar theory 
 
 in I >!' 1 ^^: k,/ ^ " Demons! ration," ii has been shown to be con- 
 I o o reason and the nature ui things. Upon that point, 
 th \ a! i not now going to contend. It is upon the 
 
 ii, rin« < r being finite in extension. 
 
 ! > the proof," says Mr Gillespie, " whether or 
 niiver^e tan be such substratiinj, we have 
 
 c , 
 
 >U 
 
 not Uk; iiKiU'fia! I 
 
 h\}\ to a>k, are tiie parts of the material universe divisible 
 
 51 
 
 from each other? and are they moveable among them* 
 selves ? — for if they be so divisible, if so moveable, then 
 the material universe cannot be the substratum of infinity of 
 extension." 
 
 That matter is divisible, (on a certain and special con- 
 struction of terms,) no one will deny; but that it is abso- 
 lutely so, is not true. We can divide substance by abstrac- 
 tion as we divide space. If it be of any specific body we 
 speak, we can, in reality, separate one part from another. 
 This, however, is not absolutely to divide matter. In the 
 discussion of his second proposition, the author makes 
 manifest the absurdity of supposing space really divisible, 
 since that would be to suppose the parts separated without 
 having any space between them. Now, in the same sense of 
 divisibility, matter is not more subject to it than space. I 
 grant that we may conceive of an absolute separation of sub- 
 stance generally, which we cannot do in the case of exten- 
 sion. But that is not the question. It is real and generic 
 separation we have in view. The houses on opposite sides 
 of a street stand separate ; is that to say, however, that 
 there is no substance between them ? Is it not childish to 
 suppose, that by cutting an apple in two, we have actually 
 divided matter so as to leave nothing of a material kind be- 
 tween the parts of the fruit ? It is quite common to say, a 
 bottle is empty, after the liquor it contained has been poured 
 out; and this may be a convenient enough way of expressing 
 ourselves when we have little else than eatables and drink- 
 ables to talk of; but is a vessel in this case really empty ? is 
 it completely exhausted of all kind of substance ? 
 
 But we may as well go into the hypothesis of a vacuum at 
 once, for to this point the argument obviously tends. What, 
 then, is a vacuum ? It is space, I })resume, without any 
 matter being present at all. Is such a state of things, how- 
 ever, anywhere to be found ? I think not, and that it does 
 not appear possible to find it. What is commonly called a 
 vacuum, is only a part of space, say the interior of a re- 
 ceiver deprived, in a great measure, of atmospheric air. 
 The extraction of the atmosphere, be it observed, is never 
 
 G 
 
ipletely effected. In the use of tlie pneumatic pump, 
 each succeeding stroke only brings off a certain proportion 
 of wliat the receiver contains— say one-half— so that the resi- 
 ilu bung never more than half taken away, the most con- 
 stant application of the best constructed machine can never 
 make the exclusion of the air perfect. Even in the Torri- 
 cellian operation, the alleged perfection of the vacuum de- 
 pends upon the crude notion of there being neither air nor 
 |H - ; he fluid by which it is formed, which is not the fact. 
 \.i.. iter all, supposing the air entirely shut out, is there no 
 c ! I sp-cies of matter left behind? Where is light, and 
 X l! re heat? As light, however, may be excluded to a con- 
 le extent, I would only ask whether heat be a sub- 
 stance or only a property of substance ? Taking the thing 
 at the worst, the presence of heat indicates, of course, the 
 presence of some substance, of which it is, in such instance, 
 a property. This conclusion is inevitable, unless a quality of 
 a thing may be present, where the thing itself is not. It 
 must here be remembered, that the greatest degree of cold 
 ever experienced, only indicates a lower degree of heat than 
 h It! previously been known— not that it is impossible for the 
 en (Hint of heat to be further reduced. 
 
 Should it be demanded— as it is always commendable to 
 do on such occasions— what the substance is which we deem 
 to 1k^ present in what is usually denominated a vacuum,— we 
 ,,,,, reply— the electric fluid. No substance is capable of 
 excluding it. As water seeks its level, the fluid in question 
 presses everywhere, that it may be everywhere present; and 
 with tbo tendency, it penetrates, in a manner the most irre- 
 M to: , vrry thing that can be opposed to its course. 
 
 I I of there being a vacuum in nature, is as idle as 
 
 t prove one by artificial means. 1' e demon- 
 
 sii o o oo.oi, u any case, succeed. Some of our astrono- 
 iiH r^, I iticularlv of the Newtonian sect, were obliged in a 
 ii.anner to adopt this doctrine, in order to back out their 
 theological assumptions. They supposed the planets to have 
 b < 1 ioirled from the hand of a god, like bowls by a garae- 
 ind that no new impetus of a supernatural kind being 
 
 tO 
 
 53 
 
 observed, the motion of these vast bodies must be perpetu- 
 ally retarded, unless a perfect vacuum had been wisely pro- 
 vided for them to revolve in. But the dogma is now scat- 
 tered to the winds. The single phenomenon of comets 
 describing, at each successive revolution, progressively 
 diminished orbits, settles the point. Were there no sub- 
 stance present to resist their motion, we must conclude, upon 
 the principles of the truly great Newton, that the centrifugal 
 force would necessarily and for ever counterbalance the 
 attractive. 
 
 There is, however, more extensive evidence than this. 
 Among the sublime discoveries which have rendered the 
 name of Herschel illustrious, none is more sadly interesting, 
 than that of a prevailing tendency to contraction observed in 
 the multitudinous systems of the universe. In the nebulae — 
 in the Magellanic clouds — and even the milky way, the same 
 unceasing compression is observed, and of course the 
 same evidence is offered of the presence of a resisting me- 
 dium. 
 
 The contemplation of this probable, though remote con- 
 summation of all existing relations, may excuse a remark or 
 two relative to an infinite series of beings, if secondary 
 planets are ultimately destined to fall in upon their primaries, 
 and these together upon the central bodies to which they are 
 subordinate, changes upon a vast scale must result, and new 
 formations follow. The laws occasioning these chr -. 
 acting eternally, must be the source of eternal revolutions. 
 Where, then, in these circumstances, are we to look for a 
 beginning? In the most unceasing endeavours we may 
 make to reach the starting point of nature's operations, we 
 shall find our labours vain ; and every attempt of this sort 
 as completely foiled as in seeking for their end. 
 
 Although, however, we were fully warranted in i 
 the system of change which brought along with it these 
 gloomy forebodings, of all the greatness and glory of ninn 
 being sunk in everlasting forgetfulness — although it were 
 argued, and that successfully, that the deductions made from 
 the data stated regarding the ethereal fluid are yet undeter- 
 
 

 niined, — we are not left without ample grounds, in as far as 
 our researches reach, for holding the doctrine of a plenum. 
 Wherever we turn our eyes, we observe matter in existence. 
 I> V nd the sphere of human observation we know nothing. 
 li science cannot demonstrate that matter is infinite in ex- 
 tension, much less can Mr Gillespie demonstrate that it is 
 iiui. vu. His conclusion, therefore, falls to the ground. 
 
 T need say little, I dare say, respecting the argument 
 di iivod from the motion of material bodies: it amounts to 
 iu)tf!i!ig. The different parts of matter only change places ; 
 unless, therefore, substance lose its extension, — nay, its 
 verv existence — by being moved, there can be no foundation 
 r*t (It iracting from its extension, finite or infinite, on that 
 
 iPM nut. 
 
 I have thus gone more fully than I intended, or even an- 
 ticipated, into an examination of the scholium to Mr Gil- 
 lespie's fourth proposition. The sum and substance of it is 
 liiis — (and indeed it is but a contemptible fallacy) — Because 
 matter does not agree in character and properties with a 
 mere abstraction, — that is, because it is not what it is not — it 
 cannot be the substratum of infinite extension; it cannot be 
 the sine qua non of all things ; it cannot be the self-existent 
 
 being ! 
 
 Upon the fifth and last proposition of this part of the 
 work, that " there is necessarily but one being of infinity of 
 expansion," it is hardly worth our pains to remark. The 
 existence of Mr Gillespie's being of infinity of extension 
 havino- lailed under proof, any consideration relative to its 
 supposed exclusiveness of all other necessary existences, 
 cannot be of much avail. Even admitting his substratum of 
 space, however, why may there not be two, or twenty, as 
 well as one ? No reason can be assigned why infinity of ex- 
 pansion (which the author now appropriates to space, as he 
 does extension to matter,) should have an immaterial som^- 
 thino It, keep it in existence, that would not prove that that 
 something should have something else to keep it in existence 
 
 as well. 
 
 But it is needless to fight with shadows which may be 
 
 55 
 
 raised as flist as they are demolished, '^''.^^iy are the illusions 
 of a subtle imagination, fabricated to support what cannot be 
 maintained on fair and tangible grounds. The supposition 
 of a plurality of necessary beings, against which our theorist 
 so strongly inveighs, springs from his own theogonal geo- 
 logy. This spurious, this imaginary sort of science, should 
 either not have been resorted to, or no objection should be 
 taken to its inevitable consequences. 
 
 CHAP. VIII. 
 False Reasoning of Mr Gillespie ; Second Part of his Work, 
 
 The second part of the work before us, approaches as near 
 as possible to similarity with the first. " Infinity of dura- 
 tion is necessarily existing ; infinity of duration is necessarily 
 indivisible; infinity of duration is necessarily immoveable; 
 there is necessarily a being of infinity of duration : the being 
 of infinity of duration is necessarily of unity and simplicity; 
 there is necessarily but one being of infinity of duration." — 
 These are the propositions — these the dogmas that are now 
 brought forward for discussion. And wherein do they differ 
 from those already examined and exploded ? In nothing but 
 the substitution of infinity of duration for that of extension. 
 The same process is repeated ; the same reasoning gone 
 through, almost to the very letter. 
 
 It may have been necessary, from the method of demon- 
 stration adopted, to come over the same ground and reiter- 
 ate the same deductions on the slightest alteration in the 
 subject of proof. As in mathematical affairs the validity of 
 the argument a priori may depend upon the minuteness and 
 accuracy of detail, regardless of the repulsiveness of a slavish 
 tautology. There is no reason, however, why we should 
 follow so uninviting an example. It will be sufficient to 
 show that the refutation of the doctrines sought to be esta- 
 
S6 
 
 -;ii 
 
 \\ 
 
 fii 
 
 Lin 
 
 blished in the former case, applies with equal force to those 
 iioponnrled in the latter. 
 
 I ti this application cannot be hard to accomplish. 
 It, n there be any difference between the author's 
 
 n ir in the different parts, it is worse in the second 
 
 th n ^5. Although extension may be conceived of as 
 
 bstiiiction, it is also conceivable as one of the pro- 
 if not the only indispensible property of matter. 
 ue entertain any such notion respecting duration? 
 heard of duration being a property of matter? 
 iH hypothesis of substance being infinitely extended, 
 gard it as " the substratum of infinity of exten- 
 at least we understand what is meant by such a cir- 
 being predicated of substance. But how are we 
 : I what is meant by anything being the substra- 
 ihe infinity of duration ? Yet that something is such 
 a substratum is what is broadly declared to be the fact. — 
 This is what we are unhesitatingly required to admit, or else 
 give in to the monstrous proposition, that duration is itself a 
 
 substance ! 
 
 If the author will consult '' An Analysis of the Phenomena 
 of f Ih I luman Mind," published some few years ago by Mr 
 yiiVu lie will find even the first proposition relative to dura- 
 ti 111 (|iH tioned by that philosopher. We cannot indeed 
 ^u} I MS ihiration to have had a commencement, nor imagine 
 a t riiiination for it; but the writer whose name has been 
 mentioned, concludes that the past being already out of ex- 
 istence, and the future not being yet in existence, there can 
 h, 11 ) (! I ration in existence at all. To consider the matter 
 !^ ; -^laps to consider it too curiously ; for whatever is 
 
 ^ it may require the labour of an age to effect, is 
 cessive instants of time as they pass, however 
 iiose instants may be reckoned, and however, as of 
 I >v fiMist proportionably be, rapid m liicir succes- 
 An ih I would infer i^. tliu infinity of time, if not 
 
 mil.';'' 
 
 SlOIl. 
 
 more m 
 
 consideration 
 
 ! finite space, is at all 
 
 \\ i 
 
 atum or support 
 
 57 
 
 for its existence ? Why suppose that it cannot exist of itself 
 and independently of all substance ? Or, making this sup- 
 position, why lay down as a fundamental principle, the abso- 
 lute and metaphysically necessary existence of infinity of du- 
 ration ? To reconcile these suppositions is essential to the 
 validity of Mr Gillespie's argument; but is there any way of 
 reconciling them ? The thing is impossible. 
 
 But about duration, or, as the author has it, infinity of 
 duration beiiiff a substance — what could have driven him to 
 a hypothesis so outrageously extravagant ? Nothing, I am 
 persuaded, but the sheer desperation of a dauntless advocate 
 in a sinking cause. I do not mean that at the present day 
 theism is going down — perhaps it may never go down ; for it 
 is wondrously well borne up by the inflated supports of pas- 
 sion, self-interest, and prejudice, which preserve it from its 
 otherwise certain fate. All I mean is, that casting aside its 
 unworthy, yet popular dependencies, and relying on reason 
 alone, — not the best argument in all the moods and figures 
 of the schools, could keep it from finding the bottom. 
 
 If duration were substantial, it would have to be a series 
 of substances, and so resemble the ghosts in Macbeth's vi- 
 sion, — another and another coming into view and pa^siiig 
 out in quick succession — till we should be glad to get quit of 
 the phantoms, and exclaim with the tyrant, " Til see no 
 more." Hov/ else should we have any notion of what is in- 
 dicated by the substance of duration ? Can we conceive of a 
 substance to be in existence and out of existence at the surie 
 time? If not, we may take leave to ask if the substance f 
 any part of duration already past be yet in being, while ac- 
 cording to our vulgar conceptions, unsubstantial durati o 
 itself is not? Or can we recal the hours of yesterday^ aiid 
 constantly grow younger instead of growing old? — But it is 
 in vain to attempt reducing the vagaries of a subtle imagina- 
 tion to consistency, it e order of natural relations. ^ r 
 endeavours not unfre^u aly involve us in a labyrinth * i 
 
 theoretical absurdities we would thereby Uin ivel. Wi 
 go on, by way of illustration, to suppo- -laii 
 
 — and figure, and colour, and all the of it ; or to 
 
 
58 
 
 tend that duration was of a particular density, or bore the 
 shape of an aged man with an hour-glass and scythe. The 
 shorter way, however, is to conclude at once, that when du- 
 liit!!!] becomes a substance it ceases to be duration. 
 
 In supporting the unity and simplicity of the being of in- 
 finite duration, an argument is introduced in scholium first to 
 the fourth proposition, going to show, that a succession of 
 beings cannot be the subject of what is there predicated. 
 11. rrason assigned for this deduction is, that the parts of 
 i!h lu cession are divisible from each other, and moveable 
 .! -^themselves. Now, this is what may be called hunt- 
 in^ in a wrong scent, or reasoning according to the 
 luuacy logically denominated ignoratio elenchi ; for the 
 separation of things from each other, as well as their 
 motions, relate to space, and not to duration at all. If, 
 indeed, it could be made to appear that a cause could 
 be separated at pleasure from its effect; say, the report 
 o! I piece of ordnance from the explosion of the charge, it 
 ' ' e something to the point. It would be showing, at 
 any rate, that, in as far as duration was concerned, a separa- 
 tion between the parts of a succession, might actually take 
 place, — to which the argument in hand has no reference. 
 This would be a most convenient discovery; as, upon the 
 most distant intimation of any impending calamity, we might 
 possibly divide the effect so far in the order of time from the 
 cause, as to keep ourselves clear of the consequences. A ball 
 hvvi\ ai J man might, in all likelihood, be arrested in its pro- 
 ir without the assistance of Father Murphy, who was an 
 ;! ; in these matters; or, even after being shot through 
 
 !!i head, he might be prevented fi'om suffering any mischief 
 iiW I \ IS found convenient to allow the parts of the succes- 
 sion {.{ events thus separated, to close. This brings to our 
 remembrance the curious fact of Dean Swift having put off 
 a lunar eclipse ft >r twenty-four hours or better, because he 
 was too unwell at the time to describe it to some of hiscoun- 
 u V friends; or the poet's description of the lion — 
 
 " Who look'd so horrible and wondrous grim, 
 That his own shadow durst not follow him." 
 
 I 
 
 59 
 
 Of the same nonsensical character is the idea of motion 
 among the parts of a succession. If the motion relates to 
 duration or the order of time, a son may exist antecedent to 
 his father ; a plant previous to the seed from which it sprun^r ; 
 and all the agents employed in the production either of na- 
 ture or art, after these same productions, or thousands of 
 years before them. Caesar and Napoleon, with their r > 
 spective eras, may be made to change places, or perhaps 
 made not yet to have been brought into existence. — Lul— 
 something too much of this. If the argument have reference 
 to the division and motion of things in space, it is too blun- 
 dering for serious consideration ; if to the divisibility and 
 moveability of things and events as relative to duration, it is 
 too absurd. 
 
 CHAP. IX. 
 
 Fallaciousness of the third part of Mr Gillespie's 
 
 " Argument,*' 
 
 There is very little to be met with, so curious in its rea- 
 soning, as this part of the " Argument." We have seen 
 that the first pretends to prove the existence of a being of 
 infinite extension, and the second that of a being of infinite 
 duration. In the present instance^ these hypothetical beings 
 are attempted to be made out, not different, but iden- 
 tical. 
 
 In one sense, it is true, we should have little objection to 
 the doctrine here inculcated. Matter, for example, is cer- 
 tainly eternal ; and on the ground of there being no vacuum 
 in any part of space, it must be regarded as infinite in ex- 
 tension ; and hence we have a being whose extent and dura- 
 tion both reach to infinity. But matter would not there- 
 fore be the substratum either of the one or the other: that 
 is to say, it is not necessary — not absolutely necessary- i! t 
 
 H 
 
60 
 
 t ¥ Ml extension, or space 
 
 sliouJi! !ni\'e 
 a iiu ! n 
 
 I r:i! 
 
 n f 
 
 of' n 
 
 any substratum or 
 
 ) its existence whaUM I ; niu in rpspect of duration, 
 
 nprehend what a iib tratum ut it means. This 
 
 f hmtruage in an acco} lation beyond the reach 
 
 * iision, is an adequate reason, according to 
 
 >M common sense, and of Mr Gillespie too, 
 
 .>ction of the reasoning depending upon it. What- 
 
 significd by the word, however, it must be some- 
 
 1;: ..ntl'rom matter, since duration does not depend 
 
 on iiuitter for its existence. 
 
 But the author's ''Being of infinity of expansion and 
 uvfiritv ol duration" does not suit this plain and rational 
 V. V of the subject. Taking the substratum of extension to 
 b, n 'hing more than the thing or substance extended, 
 "^irdto mathematical necessity in the matter,) we 
 Iv see room for one, while Mr Oillespie introduces 
 hen amalgamates them into unity. 
 I infinity of expansion subsists by itself," says he, 
 t is a being: and infinity of duration subsists by 
 then it is a being ; or, infinity of expansion sub- 
 it a substratum or being ; and infinity of dura- 
 .t^ not without a substratum or being. 
 ' verv part of infinity of expansion is in every 
 r duration; that is, every part of the being 
 nsion, is in every part of the being of 
 jtion ; part in all the cases, in the sense of 
 
 ^tion only. — To wit, the whole of the being 
 
 of inlinu' of expansion, is in the whole of the being of in- 
 finity of duration: whole, but as n figure. And this bting, 
 most manifestly, impossible, if the being of infinity of ex- 
 pansion and the being of infinity of duration be different: it 
 ijcn-^. iriU t>)llows that they are identical. 
 
 .•lIuMU si-condly, infinity oi cx|;.:..n!i subsists not without 
 ftgubNiiHUHH or being; and infinity 
 withoiif :i .::-^^.<'-ni Of lieiug. Anti 
 
 :,„:i of ini- 
 \\ of tlie I 
 
 I \\ It li 
 
 ii 
 
 pat 
 of 
 
 ii," 
 par 
 
 Juration subsists not 
 :'ry pan -? . a':--* i- 
 
 I ' \ s. 
 
 << i 
 
 5 ,1 
 
 'V 
 
 61 
 
 That is, the whole of the substratum of infinity of expansion, 
 is in the whole of the substratum of infinity of duration. 
 
 1 , 
 
 ti 
 
 lis being most manifestly impossible, if iJi 
 
 ratuni 
 ing 
 
 or being of infinity of expansion, and the substrai 
 of infinity of duration, be different; it follows l sarily 
 that they are identical ; to wit, the substratum or being of 
 infinity of expansion, is also the substratum or being of in- 
 finity of duration," &c. &c. 
 
 The sum and substance of all this technical argumenta- 
 tion, is, that a plurality of substances possessing any kind of 
 infinity, cannot coexist; but expansion and duration having 
 each a substratum, they may be reduced to one, which can 
 be made to serve for both. Now, supposing Mr Gillespie to 
 have proved the existence of his substrata, it does not appear 
 that the principle upon which he builds his conclusion is 
 correct. For if we cannot conceive any limit either to dura- 
 tion or space, they must equally be infinite. But there is 
 nothing absurd in holdin^: these two infinities to exist to- 
 gether ; and why? Because they are of totally different 
 kinds. They are as different as time and place, which peo- 
 ple, in their most common intercourse, regard as entirely 
 distinct. Indeed, these infinities are nothing else than time 
 and place extended beyond all bounds. The latter is com- 
 plete ; is always open to our survey; and in as far as the 
 mind can grasp it, it remains at all times within our review. 
 But the former is essentially evanescent, for even while yet 
 speaking of time, it has already fled, — a new portion come 
 into existence and again gone out. Duration never can be 
 complete; we never can recal the past, and the future, as 
 such, is eternally the future. 
 
 If therefore the infinity of duration and that of exfMmsioii 
 be so dissimilar in their nature as not to clash or be in the 
 slightest degree incompatible — why should not their sub- 
 strata be equa^^i different and equally independent of each 
 other ? Any argument that should prove the infinities spe- 
 cified to be distinct in their character, ought to prove their 
 substances no less distinct: and that which should niki mit 
 the identity of substance in such cases, ought in likr 
 
 Ii i J c r 
 
to make oi 
 
 the coiupi^ f< 
 r:!i H' , ; ■ •■ ^ 
 
 6^ 
 
 identity of the abstractions to 
 
 I idly do to tell us, that every 
 partofthesul-n { iHte expansion is in every part 
 
 of the substratum ot iiitinite duration, because this is not 
 exactly the i^irt \uuough (to shorten and f\i miliar ise the 
 phraseology, wlucii, without seeking any advantage from it, 
 we have occasionally done,) space has existed in every point 
 of time already past, it does not now exist in bygone dura- 
 tion, but only in what is present, and never can be supposed 
 
 to overtake the future. 
 
 This doctrine, however, would not quadrate with Mr 
 Gillespie's theory. It involves, according to his own de- 
 ducticH! . the existence of at least two infinite and independ- 
 ent is, which is by half too many for his purpose. 
 He e inconvenience—the obtrusive redundancy was to 
 
 be rid of on any terms and at all hazards; and hence 
 has evidently been adopted, the awkward scheme of amalga- 
 mating the substrata of space and duration, and mak- 
 ing only one of them, for which there seems to be as little 
 necessity as there is for the existence of the substrata them- 
 selves. 
 
 Besides,— what are we to make of another coexistence of 
 substances, which does not appear to have suggested itself 
 to the author's mind ? To his own thinking, he has made 
 out but one substance or being of infinite expansion and du- 
 ration, but how is he to dispose of the actual existence of 
 matter? The want of mathematical necessity for its exist- 
 ence is not sufficient to strike it out of the category of pre- 
 sent existences. To render the argument of any avail, the 
 ideal system of the bishop of Cloyne ought to have been in- 
 corporated with it ; for even with Mr Gillespie's one infinite 
 substance, the real existence of matter brings along with it 
 he is so much afraid of— namely, the absurdity of two 
 at the same time occupying the same space. On this 
 
 iiul let it be remembered that it is not requisite we 
 demonstrate the infinite extension of the material 
 
 ^rse. In as far as kdoes extend, it occupies space ; and, 
 tlie infinitdv extended substance occupying, of course, the 
 
 \\ I 
 
 DC 
 
 ur 
 
 63 
 
 !U 
 
 iU- 
 
 whole of space, must occupy that of the material universe as 
 well as any other, — if any other there be. 
 
 Let us suppose for a moment, the being of a substance of 
 infinite expansion, the intelligent agent in the production of 
 all things — and all this is contended for in the " Arguments" 
 — what was it to do when performing the miraculous 
 incomprehensible feat of creating the universe out of 
 thing? Was it to annihilate so much of its own substance 
 as would be necessary to make room for matter, in order to 
 give it verge and scope enough ? If not, either matter could 
 not be brought into being, or we must suffer ourselves to be 
 driven to the conclusion already shown to be necessary in 
 admitting the very palpable doctrine of the actual existence 
 of matter. 
 
 The orthodox dogma of the immateriality of god — what- 
 ever may be the other difficulties it has to contend with — has 
 this advantage, that it brings not two substances into a com- 
 pound occupancy of space. But independent of this advan- 
 tage, it does not pile stratum super stratum, Pelion upon 
 Ossa, and then contend that after all, they are of perfect 
 unity and simplicity : that they cannot be divided even m 
 thought, while the greatest pains are in the act of being 
 taken in order to bring us to consider them in a different 
 light. 
 
 But here, perhaps, I have gone somewhat too far ; for 
 upon second thoughts it strikes me that there is not a little 
 analogy between Mr Gillespie's system and the orthodox. 
 In the one case w^e have three substances in the godhead ; in 
 the other, two. In both, the substances are held to be one 
 and indivisible, the same in essence, equal in power and 
 glory. No less than the old dogma, is the new one entitled 
 to the most implicit credit, and to rank high among the sa- 
 cred mysteries. It might very effectively, indeed, be made 
 to serve as the basis of a confession of faith, as pompous and 
 anathemal as the creed of saint Athanasius. " If any man 
 would be a sound theist," it might run, " he must above all 
 things believe in the mystery of the dual-unity. Now the 
 mystery of the dual-unity is this, that there are two beings 
 
4JX I 
 
 64 
 
 in one being, and one being iii iwd Ijeings. Extension is 
 necessarily existent, and duration is necessarily existent, yet 
 there are not two necessary existents, but one necessary 
 III. Extension is infinite, and duration is infinite, yet 
 in lio! two infinites, but one infinite. Infinity of ex- 
 lu ; • I Mipport or substratum, or is itself a sub- 
 sian. f duration has a support or substra- 
 
 fuisi, or is itself a substance; yet there are not two 
 Mib ti ita ur substances, but one substratum or substance. 
 I he sLibstrattim of infinity of expansion is of unity and sim- 
 plicity, and the substratum of infinity of duration is of unity 
 and simplicity; yet there are not two unities and simplicities, 
 but one unity and simplicity. The substratum of infinity of 
 expaiisHai is but one, and the substratum of infinity of 
 duration i. but one, yet there are not two ones, but one 
 
 out'.'' 
 
 This would sound well, and give a gorgeous finish to the 
 1 >nk of Mr Gillespie's work ; and if it had an appro- 
 
 ] . . inkling of vivid denunciation against unbelievers, it 
 
 ^ be all the more characteristic for the addition, and 
 I he more authoritative too; for as it stands, the 
 
 s m is destitute of rational support of any kind; and I 
 I i SUV it will be confessed that for a theologian to have 
 U;icking at all, is better than to have none. 
 
 65 
 
 I 
 
 CHAP. X. 
 
 Mr Gillespie's Second Book — A Departure from his own 
 
 " Argument,^' 
 
 Mr Gillespie professes to establish a proof of the being 
 and attributes of God a priori. It is only through the first 
 grand division of his work, however, that he is able to keep 
 it up : in the second Book, as it is called, he deviates en- 
 tirely from that line of argument. But this is the fault more 
 of subject than of the author. The points contended for, 
 are, " the one simple being of infinity of expansion and du- 
 ration is necessarily intelligent and all-knowing ;" that it is 
 " necessarily all-powerful," and " necessarily free." Now, 
 it will not be any way difficult to show, that these attributes 
 are not, and cannot be, proved in the manner announced in 
 the title-page of this author's performance. 
 
 First, The principles laid down in his reasonings for the 
 necessary intelligence, power, and freedom of deity, are 
 founded in experience; and next — as by consequence it 
 must follow — these principles cannot be brought within the 
 range of the general argument. 
 
 *' There is intelligence." This is the way in which our 
 theologian goes to work, — this the foundation-stone upon 
 which it is attempted to erect the new fabric of necessary and 
 infinite intelligence. The same procedure is observed with 
 regard to freedom of agency and almighty power, — with this 
 difference, that the principle is not expressed but assumed. 
 But while no one denies the existence of power, or intelli- 
 gence, or agency — (whether free or not need not here be dis- 
 puted) — we may ask by what means we become acquainted 
 with their existence ? Is it by abstract principles? — by the 
 mathematical and absolute relation of things ? — No, but by 
 consciousness and observation. 
 
 ■'% 
 
 
Tile 
 
 66 
 
 Im-,! mode of making these matters plain and pal- 
 pable to those unaccustomed to metaphysical discussions, is 
 to illustrate them by a specific case in point. Suppose, then, 
 that two vessels were presented to the most shrewd yet un- 
 knowing inhabitant of Loo-choo, for exa;iple one charged 
 with oxygen gas, and the other with carbonic acid gas,— how 
 is he to tell the difference between them, or whether the ves- 
 sels are not full of mere atmospheric air ? Would he be able 
 li iiciuuastrate their various characters without any trial or 
 experiment ; showing that the latter naturally extinguishes 
 combustion, and that the former, in certain cases, creates it? 
 \\ re he even to make the attempt, by what sort of rea- 
 buiiiiig, I should be glad to know, would he proceed to prove 
 ihv focts? By what logic endeavour to establish their rela- 
 tion to other facts, and the constitution and nature of things ? 
 Or suppose that Mr Gillespie himself were shown a 
 newly-discovered sort of animal, would he be able to de- 
 scribe—nay, demonstrate— its intelligence, power, and kind 
 ^f .,^,encv,— its character, habits, and everything else re- 
 specting it,— independent of his previous knowledge of natu- 
 ral history and comparative anatomy— independent of all 
 analogy and experience ?— Would he make the slightest pre- 
 It iH e'to do this by purely abstract deduction, and by that 
 alone ? If so, he must be far exalted above all earthly wis- 
 dom, or fallen below any desire for its acquirement. If not, 
 what show of respect for his own ideas of sound argu- 
 u can he pretend to demonstrate that any thing, espe- 
 vliathe never saw, is necessarily all-powerful, necessa- 
 ligent, and necessarily free ? 
 
 ily free !— Why, who ever heard of such a thing 
 V freedom ? Does not the paradox convey a suf- 
 ■ contradiction to confute itself? " If," in the 
 'bach, "to he under necessity is to be free, 
 .. It to be coerced? And— of what sort of freedom is 
 vhich results from necessity?" To maintain the abso- 
 lute necessity of power and intelligence is not much better. 
 Neither of these is just so paradoxical as the necessity ot 
 freedom; but both are equally opposed to mathematical ne- 
 
 l)\ 
 
 n \ 
 
 \ 
 
 it IS 
 
 67 
 
 cessity, and as much so as that more curiously sounding 
 doctrine. In short, the principle of the particular argu- 
 ments introduced in support of the first part of his second 
 book, is announced by Mr Gillespie himself simply as a 
 /act ; and we have seen, I presume, from the reasoning of 
 the reviewers given in the preface to this refutation, that no 
 matter of fact can be proved by the argument a priori. 
 
 But if the author thought intelligence, and power, and 
 freedom of agency, necessary, in his own sense of the word, 
 why did he not include them in the class of his necessary 
 existences? Wherefore should he not have contended that 
 they are substances? that they are infinite? of unity and 
 simplicity, and so forth ? If the doctrines he would teach 
 be consistent with his own method of reasoning, why did 
 he not propound them in regular demonstrative form, ac- 
 companying each proposition with arguments similar to 
 those he adduces in demonstration of the existence of 
 extension and duration ? What could have prevented 
 him from repeating the same exact process in every indi- 
 vidual case? He is lavish enough of his demonstrations, 
 and repetitions too, where they were by no means so ur- 
 gently called for as in these instances. How, then, should 
 he have been so niggard of them now ? — now when the at- 
 tributes so essential to the character of divinity are in 
 question ; and when he could so easily establish them 
 upon grounds that cannot be shaken? These attributes 
 certainly offer a much wider opening for the introduction of 
 substrata than the objects chosen for this new-fangled 
 scheme of giving body to that which stands in need of 
 none. The reason, I am afraid, is, that he was perfectly 
 aware of the unsoundness of his theory, and dared not ven- 
 ture upon the hopeless labour of making it out in the form 
 which he evidently loves best; for we cannot think so 
 meanly of Mr Gillespie's abilities as to suppose him blind to 
 the advantage of a purely abstract deduction when it would 
 have stood in so much stead, and have been most of all 
 available. 
 
 After all, however, it is perhaps more than questionable 
 
 I 
 
68 
 
 if theology can be rationally advantaged by any theory 
 whatever! It is such a plexus of absurdities, that, once en- 
 tangled in its meshes, we cannot get clearly out. Supposing, 
 for instance, the necessary existence of intelligence, and 
 power, and so forth, what does it make for the existence of 
 a supreme intelligence ?— Nothing ; absolutely nothing. For 
 in that case they must exist either by physical necessity or 
 that which is strictly abstract. If the former— facts bemg 
 the ground-work of our reasoning— we must conclude, that 
 not only matter, but every particular thing, and every phe- 
 nomenon we observe, as well as those indicated, exist and 
 result by the same necessity : that the universe and all the 
 operations of nature are necessary— and then, where would 
 there be any occasion for a deity at all ? If, on the other 
 hand, the qualities specified are supposed to exist by mathe- 
 matical necessity, it would be impossible to conceive of their 
 nonexistence, or even their absence from any part of space : 
 uud to affirm such absence, would be as flat a contradiction 
 as to deny a subject to be predicable of itself. But further, 
 the supposition would bring a conclusion along with it 
 equally fatal to the great question at issue. Because the ne- 
 cessary existence of power, intelligence, and freedom of 
 agency, implies their existence in all places alike. To ima- 
 gine otherwise would be the same as to imagine space un- 
 equally distributed ;— a greater quantity of space in one 
 cubic foot of extension than in another— than which nothing 
 can be more absurd. But intelligence existing in all places 
 alike, precludes the possibility of that, or power, or any- 
 thing else which exists by metaphysical necessity, existing 
 in degrees— either inferior or superior. 
 
 vShould it be argued— as it probably may, for there is no- 
 thing too extraordinary for theorists, especially of the theisti- 
 cal s^chool, to argue,— that the moral attributes more imme- 
 diately under notice do exist in this way, but that being infi- 
 nitely superior to human power, intelligence, and so on, can- 
 not be regarded as of the same order ; that, in fact, the 
 latter depend upon the former, which could exist without 
 them,— I would reply, that the hypothesis rests upon nothing 
 
 69 
 
 but assertion ; assertion, too, as irrational as it would be to 
 maintain that boundless space, being infinitely superior to 
 limited space, must be sui generis, and quite capable of 
 retaining its attribute of infinity, although any portion of 
 space were struck out of existence. 
 
 There may be a want of similarity in the things here made 
 the basis of the parallel. That fault, however, does not 
 militate against the validity of the conclusion. Abstractions 
 and realities, it is true, cannot well be compared or made 
 subjects of the same process of reasoning ; but men have 
 often to encounter the foe with his own weapon. At all 
 events, who is it that sets at nought this irrefragable truth ? 
 and who has most to fear its being adopted, is the test of his 
 reasoning ?— the theist or the antitheist?— Reply were super- 
 fluous. If, upon the application of this powerful talisman to 
 the half careless, and perhaps wholly gratuitous rejoinder 
 just given to a supposed objection, fall to the ground, the 
 cumbrous but ill-constructed fabric of the argument a priori 
 comes lumbering down along with it. 
 
 CHAP. XI. 
 
 Fallacy of the " Argument " in favour of a supreine 
 
 intelligence* 
 
 In introducing into his " Argument" anything as proof for 
 divine intelligence, power, &c. Mr Gillespie has certainly 
 assumed most unwarrantable prerogatives. Dr Clarke, 
 with much more consistency and candour, gives up the a 
 priori mode of deduction the moment that the wisdom, and 
 justice, and goodness of deity became the subjects of evi- 
 dence. Prove them abstractly he saw that he could uot ; 
 and although, in form, he does not exclude these attributes 
 from his *« Demonstration," he excludes them in fact, by 
 
70 
 
 his avowed adoption of experimental reasoning. Was this 
 r ^c iTnworthy of beinir followed? or were the talents 
 
 tation of the reverend doctor not sufficiently respec- 
 quire the assignment of some reason for adhering 
 nt line of conduct? It is surely more honourable 
 a position which it is impossible to retain, than 
 ! t il lor it in the certain prospect of defeat. But his suc- 
 cessor is a brave and determined adversary. He seizes upon 
 every point, whether tenable or not, and if he cannot make 
 his stand good, he at least offers as much resistance as pos- 
 sible to any one who would dislodge him out of it. Be this 
 as h ni;i\, lit) rtc!v;Htta<£e shall be taken of his illo<<ical course, 
 ill ci to blink the present part of the argument. From 
 the I ondence giving rise to this discussion, it appears 
 
 thai Mr lu.c^pieis particularly anxious that the evidence 
 ii) Fii})}H)r[ of a supreme intelligence should not be lost sight 
 of. Hi. wishes are, of course, to be respected; but what has 
 been stated in the chapter immediately preceding must show 
 him, I presume, that this is a concession which he had no 
 rii^ht to demand. 
 
 His argument is as follows: — " Intelligence either began 
 to be, or it never began to be. That it never began to be is 
 evident in this, that if it began to be, it must have had a 
 cause ; for whatever begins to be must have a cause. And 
 the cause of intelligence must be of intelligence ; for what is 
 not of intelligence cannot make intelligence begin to be. 
 K V, telligence being before intelligence begins to be, is a 
 I ction. And this absurdity following from the sup- 
 
 position that intelligence began to be, it is proved that intel- 
 lisrence never began to be." 
 
 The pith of this argument lies in the proposition, that, 
 the cause of intelligence must be of intelligence. Now, I 
 intend to show, that the principle here laid down is not to be 
 (lep* nt!' (1 upon, in which case tliu argument proves nothing ; 
 
 ,1 .' \ tlsat, admitting the soundness of the principle, it 
 '. , ; , a 1 to the introduction of an infinite series of intelli- 
 „, Ai . \ii ili would be to prove too much. 
 
 First, then, I would ask what intelligence is ? Is it a 
 
 L 
 
 71 
 
 being— a substance— a thing that exists by itself? Or is it 
 not, on the contrary, a characteristic property of a certain 
 order of beings^ dependent upon the exercise of their exter- 
 nal senses, and, by consequence, their organization? We 
 cannot even conceive how it should exist, independent of 
 these circumstances. " To have intelligence, it is necessary 
 to have ideas : to have ideas, it is necessary to have senses : 
 and to have senses, it is necessary to be material." Intelli- 
 gence, therefore, speaking generally, is nothing more than 
 an accidental property of matter. It may be physically ne- 
 cessary to the beings wherein it is found to exist, — yet, like 
 organ! 'm, feeling and life in the same bodies — nay, like 
 form. . &c. in vegetable substances, and even in many 
 
 of those of the mineral world, — its production cannot be 
 excluded from the class of effects resulting from material 
 agency. This is strictly consistent with all facts — all obser- 
 vation ; and no doctrine of an opposite description has ever 
 been made consistent with either. 
 
 But is it a law in physics that no new property can arise 
 among substances in combination ? that nothing can result 
 from any combination, except what had previously existed 
 in these substances? 
 
 If this were the case, chemical science would be at an 
 end ; or rather, it never could have had a beginnino-; for its 
 chief object and greatest glory is to discover new properties 
 and powers in matter, and render these subservient to useful 
 purposes. Let us, however, to use Lord Bacon's expressive 
 language, " put the question to Nature." Is combustion, 
 for instance, never produced in any case, but by substances 
 previously in a state of combustion ? The very common, 
 but interesting phenomenon of fire issuing from the collision 
 of cold bodies, say flint and steel, is a sufficient reply. 
 Another is, that oxygen and hydrogen, on being subjected 
 to the agency of a sufficiently powerful heat, explode and 
 resolve into water — a substance so hostile in its nature to 
 the element from which in this case it sprung, that it is often 
 employed to put down its fearful ravages. A multitude of 
 examples of a similar description might be adduced ; such 
 
72 
 
 as the ignition of iodine upon its contact with water ; the 
 , XI ibition of phosphoric light by agitating the brine of the 
 n( 111: the production of colour by means of niixnig li- 
 quids possessing none themselves ; as well as the phenome- 
 non of solidity resulting from a compound of substances in 
 the fluid state,— but to enlarge would only be to occupy 
 time in detailing what is too well known to require re- 
 hearsal. 
 
 « Intellio-ence, it may be said, is not a spark ot tire ; 
 neither is il colour nor solidity/^ True ; but if the doctrine 
 that would deduce the character of a cause from that ot an 
 effect be found incorrect in other instances, wherefore should 
 it be correct in this? Moreover, to evince intelligence in an 
 aaent producing any thing, it is not at all requisite that the 
 same quality should be transferred to the thing produced. 
 A steam-engine-a ship— a house-a watch— all destitute of 
 intelligence, yet clearly show intelligence to have been en- 
 gaged in their construction. If this property, then, exists in 
 the cause, and not in the effect, why may it not exist m 
 the effect without being in the cause? 
 
 Throughout the whole range of our observation, indeed, 
 there is not such a thing to be found as intelligence really 
 producing intelligence. It discovers properties and powers 
 in the various species of matter ; it adapts these to its own 
 pnrposes, and contrives new modes of applying them to 
 I hDse ends. In short, intelligence is not procreative : it does 
 not generate anything of its own kind : its operations are 
 entirely confined to the improvement of things and circum- 
 stances as found to exist, which may have a tendency to 
 exhaust, but certainly not to reproduce it. 
 
 Even in the generation of the human animal, what do we 
 discover? Not the operation of intelligence adopting a spe- 
 cific procedure in order to compass an end, but what I have 
 heard physiologists denominate a process of animal chemis- 
 try. Intelligence is not, and cannot, be present in the first 
 stage of this process. Organization must, at least, be com- 
 pleted ; and hence the quality in question is evidently the 
 result of mere physical agency. If intelligence be thus 
 
 73 
 
 produced in one instance, nay, in many instances, as far as 
 observation goes, — why not in all ? 
 
 " But, original intelligence,"— I think I hear it vehement- 
 ly demanded, —"how came intelligence originally ? — By 
 physical agency too ?"— In these questions, and such like, 
 now grown very commonplace, much is usually taken for 
 granted, and not a little that it would be difficult to reconcile 
 with philosophy. It is first assumed, that at some time or 
 other, a pair of human beings, the progenitors of the order, 
 were brought into existence, and had the gift of intelligence 
 bestowed upon them ; and then that all who do not agree to 
 the truth of this theory, are obliged to satisfy the advocates 
 of it with a solution of the occurrence assumed ! In the 
 mouth of the theist, then, what are all queries of the sort, 
 but a begging of the whole question? What is it but to take 
 for granted the existence of a supernatural being, capable of 
 performing all the impossibilities ascribed to the god of the 
 common faith? To analyze these points in their various 
 bearings, would be to discuss the extensive and complicated 
 doctrine of final causes, which would be prejudiced by any 
 partial view of it that could be taken here. It will be suffi- 
 cient to remark, that, supposing the existence of a god, 
 vested with all power and all wisdom, he must either be sup- 
 posed to execute his works by mechanical means — such as 
 are employed by the artist who models the clay with his own 
 hands — or to have impressed upon matter such properties as 
 would tend to the effectuation of his purposes by o-eneral 
 laws. But the former supposition, besides being o-ross and 
 degrading, and nowhere capable of support from anything 
 like rational principle, is inadmissible on the ground that it 
 indicates an estimate of the divine attributes infinitely be- 
 neath the standard specified. The question, therefore, to be 
 settled is, (and be it always and most especially remembered 
 that everything at issue between the theist and antitheist re- 
 solves itself into this question,) — whether is it more con- 
 sistent with science and philosophy, to imagine matter ori- 
 ginally existing without properties, and then— making up 
 for this deficiency— to introduce a being whose existence is 
 
74 
 
 only supposed for argument's sake, for tlie purpose of giving 
 away what it has never been proved he had to give, namely, 
 the properties of matter to matter without properties ;— or, 
 to allow these properties to exist inherently in that which we 
 cannot exclude from our perceptions, which would be no- 
 thing— which would even be inconceivable without such pro- 
 perties. 
 
 1\. ask any man which of the alternatives is the most con- 
 
 .i.t with reason, would be offering an insult to that very 
 
 It may be very gratifying to people who have em- 
 
 -ed a favorite theory respecting the origin of intelligence, 
 
 lu u.x. those who-although they could— do not choose to 
 
 theorize upon subjects where experience alone is an adequate 
 
 guide, how they account for the phenomenon in question ; 
 
 bi iss of absurdity into which these theorists have 
 
 ft. . too open and palpable not to serve as a warning 
 
 , .a,.i the fx)olish and empty pride of thinking to account 
 
 i; r everything, and particularly for a matter upon which all 
 
 re equally ignorant. It may be a humbling duty to 
 
 .. wlcdge ignorance; but it is surely more philosophical 
 
 to in rnAt ingenuously, than to vaunt of a species of know. 
 
 h cir. which it is impossible for any one case to possess. 
 
 On the question of the origin of intelligence, then, the 
 theolo-ian stands upon much more untenable ground than 
 his unbelieving opponent. The one, in the very last re- 
 source, would only be disposed to admit physical causes 
 operating of themselves, and according to the nature of the 
 substances operating ; while the other insists upon nothing 
 else than the same causes, only encumbered with an unne- 
 cessary and good-for-nothing superintendent. But even Mr 
 Gillespie's reasoning is totally unfit to establish his theory of 
 eternal intelligence. For by a parity of reasoning, we may 
 assert that matter exists; that it must either have existed al- 
 . ,v. or have been derived from something material; tor 
 i - h is material must be of matter, and, consequently, 
 
 I ^ r is necessarily eternal. The last, indeed, is by 
 
 i best argument of the two, inasmuch as causation has 
 
 H . r bearing upon things or substances than upon mere 
 
 75 
 
 properties. Take his reasoning in this case throughout, sub- 
 stituting matter for intelligence, and we have a powerful 
 lever operating upon the fulcrum of his own principles for 
 overturning all that he has brought against the self-exist- 
 ence of the material universe, independent of what has pre- 
 viously been advanced upon the subject. 
 
 But, again, if the argument were admitted to be sound 
 that would deduce the existence of supernatural intellinfence 
 irom the fact of human and perhaps other intelligeiici - t \ 
 isting— say that of the dog, the elephant, &c.--a thousaiui 
 sequences would rush in with the admission in " the inosi 
 admired disorder," reducing natural theology to a confused 
 heap of contradictions and unmitigated folly. The form and 
 organization of the elephant, it might be alleged, is eternal; 
 because these are at present found to exist, and must there- 
 fore have had a cause. But that which bears the form and 
 organization specified must come of an agent of the same 
 structure; for no effect can result out of a cause of a differ- 
 ent description. Hence the great first cause of all things 
 would require by the argument to be of all forms, all pas- 
 sions, all dispositions and characters, even the most contra- 
 dictory and incompatible. I seek not to expose the naked- 
 ness of such a system, by distinct allusions to the baser, as 
 well as the more exalted, of the animal functions, and all the 
 considerations that belong to them ; yet I think it at least 
 pardonable, to state a case strictly analogous to the author's 
 Own, but operating to the detriment of the divine character, 
 that he may either see more clearly the fallaciousness of all 
 such reasoning as that which he has employed in endeavour- 
 ing to establish a supreme intelligence, or in the last resort, 
 admit the conclusion, together with those just hinted at. 
 
 " Moral Depravity exists. And Moral Depravity either 
 began to be. i it never began to be. — That it never began 
 to be is evident in this, that if it began to be, it must have 
 had a cause; for whatever begins to be must have a cause, 
 \ 16 cause of Moral Depravity must be of Moral Dr- 
 
 pra\i?\! for what is not of Moral Dp- ' v'm 
 ' I al Depravity begin to be. Now, Moral Di 
 
 K 
 
a 
 
 luU 
 
 I 
 
 fix( II 
 
 76 
 
 ing before Moral Depravity began to be. is a contradiction. 
 Ami this absurdity following from tin supposition that Mo- 
 , ,! 1 )ci,ravitv began to be, it is proveii that Moral Depravity 
 ,„ V, , began' to be: to wit, is of Infinity of Duration. And 
 ;,. M ^Depravity is of Infinity of Duration, and it sup- 
 Being; And no succession of beings is of infinity of 
 ,: It°necessarily follows, that there is one Being of 
 01 Duration which is of Moral Depravity." 
 ' iection therefore, to an ever-during intelligence, is 
 „^,,, .,, id settled upon the surest basis: but we have yet to 
 take notice of what the author's argument would lead to, 
 , . : vitiiuu.di we were to grant the existence of superhuman 
 j : ence,°as necessary to account for the existence ot that 
 ,, s human. It may be stated in a very few words. 
 
 In accountino- for the existence of human intelligence, it 
 a !„ necessary to look to a higher intelligence as the origin 
 of ,1. we must account for the existence of the latter in pre- 
 ciseiy the same manner. We may turn the table of ques- 
 tions upon the theist, and ask how this last has come into 
 , . tence-^ by supernatural causes, too?-The conclusionis 
 inevitable; and then the next? who gave intelligence to 
 .lv,.> Something, of course, still higher in the order of m- 
 telliffence, and still more remote in its agency. If we could 
 -. , even here, there might be some little satistaction re- 
 .r/lni? from the inquiry; but that is impossible. We can 
 lun. r-'ither here nor anywhere else. The motive that acted 
 ,n taking of the first step, urges to a second, a third, and a 
 thousandth ; and all, too, with undiminished force and 
 enercv. Once begin the series, and there can be no such 
 thing as a termination to it. It would be a substratum of 
 
 infinity of duration. 
 
 T- ib.ro nny sound reason, any rule in logic, to impugn 
 
 tb^ racy of this conclusion? Shall we be told that the 
 
 intelligence to which we owe the little share of it we possess, 
 
 ,, .finitr. underived, and necessarily existing ? Some proof 
 
 ,.0 better than an assertion; for assertion it cer- 
 
 (1 that, too, a grntuitous one. It is more ; it is 
 
 .1 the question at issue. How know we that the 
 
 77 
 
 intelliorence to which that of the human race is ascribed is 
 infinite ? By the character of its effects ? The imperfec- 
 tions of these, alas ! would justify us in coming to a very 
 different determination. The weakness and waywardness of 
 the human intellect, and the sad perversity of judgment 
 with which the best are often afflicted, have become prover- 
 bial amonnf the reli^jious themselves; and vet, from effects 
 such as these, which they deplore so much, and complain of 
 so loudly when it suits them to complain, these very people 
 would have us to believe that the cause is absolutely infi- 
 nite ! 
 
 The barrier which Mr Gillespie would place in opposition 
 to this retrogradation of causes, fails in the application. 
 Reference is made to an argument he had previously employed 
 to show that there cannot be an infinite succession of beings 
 — which we have seen to be founded on the inadequate no- 
 tion of matter being divisible. If, then, in attempting to 
 trace the source of human intelligence, we are unable to take 
 a single step beyond physical causes, without landing our- 
 selves in irremediable absurdity, what is the duty which phi- 
 losophy imposes upon us? — Most obviously and imperatively 
 this — to avoid the course that leads to consequences so irra- 
 tional. 
 
 CHAP. XII. 
 
 hnpossihility of ascribing moral attributes to the subject of 
 
 Mr Gillespie's reasoning. 
 
 One of the greatest difficulties we have to surmount in fol- 
 lowing Mr Gillespie in his conclusions, is, that of applying 
 the predicates in his second book to the subject, or rather 
 subjects, treated of throughout the first. How infinite ex- 
 tension, or infinite duration, or a compound of both — if a 
 compound of this nature can be imagined — or how even a 
 substratum of these attractions — supposing such substratum 
 
/8 ^ 
 
 --can aflfbrd a medium for the existence of intelligence, 
 |><)wer an 1 freedom of agency, passes all understanding. If 
 !! \i r |)ossible to conceive of the absence or nonexistence 
 if these powers or properties, as it is with respect to dura- 
 tion and space, there would be something in the argument. 
 But this, not being so much as pretended, we are left to ex- 
 |M ! i uce and observation in forming our judgment of the 
 modes of existence peculiar to those properties and powers. 
 Aiicl u hat do these unerring monitors teach ? Not that 
 agency and power and intelligence belong to " the one sim- 
 ple Being of Infinity of Expansion and Duration," as is here 
 !i! liriained, but to material bodies of a specific character and 
 OF'! ition, and to nothing else. 
 
 C n we describe how it is possible for intelligence to per- 
 d all space, all duration, and of course to reside in every 
 { 1(1 of matter. We have heard of the far-fetched specula- 
 tions of the Hermetists and others relative to vitality and 
 sensation existing to a certain extent in everything. Wild 
 and fantastic as such hypotheses are, however, and much as 
 they may deserve the ridicule with which they have often 
 lieti! treated; they are neither half so wild nor fantastic, nor 
 l)v iiiy means so ridiculous, as the notion of space and dura- 
 ! beino- of necessity "intelligent and all-knowing." Only 
 th i . of time and space necessarily possessing omniscience, 
 iiuil liien say if any thing can more surely evince the dis- 
 tressing extremities to which a man of learning may be 
 driven by an undue attachment to a favorite theory. Mr 
 Gillespie talks of a substance, it is true, a being of infinity of 
 expansion, &c. ; but why has he neglected to tell us of what 
 sort this substance is? If it be not matter, — if not accessi- 
 ble to any of the senses — how does he know that it exists ? 
 By what process has he acquired the information to which 
 he makes so strong pretensions? Sir Isaac Newton, I think, 
 bOiiH \ here remarks, that space is the censorium of god, 
 which indeed proves nothing more than that even the great- 
 est men talk like men in a dream, the moment they begin to 
 dogmatize in matters of theology ; but the hypothesis now 
 Hi qii s5 )n goes turther, and makes space into a god alto- 
 
 79 
 
 gather; or at most, deifies a vague something, unknown and 
 uncognisable either to sense or reason. 
 
 But whether we contemplate duration and extension, or 
 the nondescript substance necessary to keep these abstrac- 
 tions from falling out of existence, how can we suppose it to 
 have found its intelligence ? Necessary it cannot have been. 
 By what means, then, was it fallen in with ? Prior to the 
 existence of all created things (to speak after the manner of 
 the faithful), what could possibly conduce to such an end ? 
 No cause being in existence but the supposed necessary 
 substratum, and this being of absolute unity and simplicity, 
 intelligence could never follow as an effect. It is futile, 
 however, to trace out, through all its ramifications, the ex- 
 travagance of the notion of attributing the high faculty of 
 unlimited knowledge to a figment of the fancy. All we can 
 say of it is summed up in this, that the notion is incompre- 
 hensible. 
 
 The remaining characteristics said to belong to the deity 
 of the a priori school, are almighty power and freedom of 
 agency. ** The one simple being of infinity of expansion 
 and duration," ** is necessarily all powerful, and "necessa- 
 rily free." These attributes are inseparably connected. 
 Power cannot be evinced without agency of some sort, and 
 agency of no kind can be supposed to exist independent of 
 power. The question is, however, how either of these pre- 
 dicates can be made applicable to their common subject. 
 
 The method of making out the proof adopted by the 
 author in these cases, is singular in the extreme. " Al- 
 mighty power," he says, " will be 7nade out, if it be proved 
 that the being, &c. has some power, and if there be no- 
 thing external to this being to restrain his acting." Aofl 
 " it will be proved that that being has some power, if n 1 1 
 proved that he made matter begin to be:'' and the freedom of 
 agency " will be made out, if it be proved, that the be i - ul 
 infinity of expansion and duration made motion begin to 
 be" : — so that to be convinced of the rectitude and truth of 
 the propositions set forth, we have only to make up our 
 minds to the admission of a palpable — an inconceivable im- 
 
80 
 
 81 
 
 \M') 
 
 > ; t Why, how sliuuld matter be created out if 
 
 riolhinLi By what power? By what means? By what 
 a h It is easy for any one to tell us, that the material 
 
 lu . finite in extent, and therefore, according to ma- 
 
 tiHiiiiira! reasoning, is not necessarily existent ; but it is 
 not so easy to show why mathematical reasoning should be 
 made applicable to realexistences, to facts and the nature of 
 thinirs. All the a priori sophistry and nonsense which we 
 heai^ of the universe being limited in extent— although it 
 wi li capable of proof; which it is not— can never substan- 
 tiate the gross and profoundly irrational dogma of creation. 
 This is not precisely the place to detect and lay bare all the 
 absurdities of that dogma (which could easily be done to its 
 inmost core) ; but suppose we take for granted the possibi- 
 lity of the thing, and of course suppose the existence of 
 the he'incT of infinity of duration and expansion to do it, — 
 /, ."It to be done ? Did ever Mr Gillespie's prejudices 
 
 ail u luin to ask himself such a question ? His conclusions 
 :r 1 tor him in the negative. 
 
 We are to remember that his being of infinite duration 
 and expansion is of perfect unity and simplicity ; that is, that 
 it i. incapable of motion, either in whole or in any of its 
 p ,5 Its incapability of motion, indeed, is repeatedly 
 
 insisted on as one of its great excellencies. How, then, is 
 it possible for such a being to act in any manner, free or 
 constrained, or be proved to have any power at all ? One of 
 ovir rrreatest authorities in matters of science and philoso- 
 .,hyl.not in his dreaming moods, but in the shrewdest ex- 
 ercise of his acute judgment,— has laid it down as an indis- 
 putable fact, that, without substance, power cannot possi- 
 bly subsist. This authority is quoted by Mr Gillespie him- 
 self Ho might have added with equal truth— and probably 
 would liave ''added, had he contemplated the necessity of 
 such a remark,— that, without motion, no power could be 
 demonstrated, and no agency exist. But, fortunately, the 
 > f no name, however illustrious, is necessary to 
 1 truth so evident. 
 ,, and substance of Mr Gillespie's whole argument 
 
 in contradiction to this principle, is, — that the essential at- 
 tributes of unity and simplicity are proved by the fact, of 
 the substance of infinite extension and duration being im- 
 moveable ; and that the grand and necessary attribute of 
 almighty power is proved from the fact of the said sub- 
 stance being moveable, — that is, of its acting ; aye, and not 
 merely acting in the ordinary way, but performing liie 
 greatest of all actions, — the mighty act of creation, and the 
 scarcely less nn'ghty act of putting all created things in mo- 
 tion : — This savours rather too much of a contradiction in 
 terms to require any comment. It is somewhat wonderful, 
 however, that in framing his argument for the substratum of 
 duration and extension being the originator of motion, the 
 author should not have glanced at tliat in favour of divine 
 intelligence, only two or three pages back. How is it, if intelli- 
 gence must come of intelligence, that motion must not come 
 of motion ? And if motion must come of motion — what be- 
 comes of the argument for the unity and simplicity of space 
 and duration, and their sul^stratum, and, of course, that 
 against the self-existence of matter ? 
 
 \% t 
 
 CHAP. XIII. 
 
 Retrospective and Concluding Remarks. 
 
 What, now, is the utmost value we can set upon the 
 argument a priori for the being and attributes of God ? 
 Does it possess any value whatever? If it does, it has yet 
 to be shown, for in the hands of the great Rector ol '<• 
 James's, it only proves that something must have exi 
 from all eternity; and in those of a learned and fn)i' 
 logician of our northern metropolis, nothing more tiiau 
 necessary existence of infinite space and duration : n 
 which propositions were ever disputed, or make any i 
 in reality for the question. This has already been id 
 
 iCilH,,.: Ol 
 ft ■■ ^)- 
 
 i 
 
 { 
 
8^2 
 
 t K iiih e\ IK ti ill the fbregoiiig analysis of their reasonings: 
 vri It ina\ i t)e amiss to concentrate into one view the 
 < in 'f features, the shortcomings, and anomalies of this ex- 
 ij lordinary attempt to prop up, upon rational principles, 
 uh 1 h IS nothing to do with such principles, but which must 
 forever remain a mere matter of faith. 
 
 The "Something" of Dr Clarke is doubtless intended to 
 be understood as a thing different and distinct from matter. 
 Bnt how does he go about the demonstration that it is so? 
 I J finds something— that is, matter — in existence at pre- 
 sent ; and hence infers that something, whether matter or 
 1 Sling else, has always existed. Then, by showing that 
 in iU( i nay be conceived not to exist, concludes that it is not 
 tiic aiuays existing something. But mark the fallacy of his 
 deduction ! The existence of matter is evidently the basis 
 upon which his argument rests; so that by throwing matter 
 out of his reckoning, he cuts away the foundation from 
 under his own reasoning. 
 
 Allowing this undermining of his own position to pass, 
 ' ver, he seems to forget that the very objection which he 
 . to the necessary existence of matter, operates with at 
 1 equal force against that of the something for whose 
 he seeks to rob the material universe of its essential 
 r^ies. It is as easy to conceive of the nonexistence of 
 inng supposed, as to conceive of the nonexistence of 
 which we are ourselves made up, together with the 
 ve inhabit, and the countless suns and systems occu- 
 ^pace in all directions. The latter has, besides, this 
 use advantage even at the worst, that if not mathema- 
 ecessary any more than the former, it is physically 
 y, to which important attribute the other can make 
 . iier of claim. 
 ID nvDid these errors, and to make sure of the necessity 
 mucli desired, Mr Gillespie lays hold of the only two 
 things to which it ( an ii all be made applicable — duration 
 and space — and gives them substance, or a substantial sup- 
 lHii !, Uiiii Uv mov have wherewithal to designate a being — u 
 necessary 1h r.^ t f infinitv of extension and duration. But 
 
 
 11 V, 
 
 ;i> 
 
 83 
 
 in this case, as in the preceding, there i^ an odd.forgetful- 
 ness of fir^t principles. Infinite extension and infinite dura- 
 tion are either necessary of themselves — absolutely so, or 
 they are not. If necessary of themselves, then is the intro- 
 duction of Mr Gillespie's substance or substratum gratuitous 
 and absurd; if not necessary, — the primary propositions in 
 the argument are false and groundless. 
 
 Both these writers thus fiiil, as well as Mr Jack — signally 
 fail — in bringing out anything tangible — any being or agent 
 whose existence can be brought within the grasp of our com- 
 prehension. None of them seems able to afford a single 
 word of explanation or description relative to the nature and 
 specific qualities of their assumed somethings. All have 
 evidently the shadow of an abstraction in their eye, instead 
 of a real, an efficient and absolute deity. Dr Clarke, indeed, 
 at once admits and declares the impossibility of our ever be- 
 ing able to comprehend anything about it; and Mr Gillespie 
 is reduced to the dire necessity of doing what is not much 
 better. He can only insist dogmatically upon duration and 
 extension being recognized as substances, and in self-satis- 
 fied proof, challenges any one, in the most braggart and im- 
 perious tone, to show why they are not to be regarded as 
 substances ! Eheu ! eheu ! and this, they say, is reasoning 
 — this, what they are not ashamed to call by the honored 
 name of demonstration ! Reasonino^ and demonstration it 
 may be, the best that, in the circumstances, could be af- 
 forded : but only think of the consummate irrationality of 
 any system depending upon such logic for its support. 
 
 These are the particular fallacies which characterize the 
 reasoners for the being of a God according to the argument 
 a priori. But the grand error, the master fallacy of all, 
 consists of the mere construction put upon a word — a word, 
 too, that is never out of their mouth — Necessity. Yield 
 them this, and they work miracles with it. It is their ma^^^ic 
 rod by whose power they banish the material universe from 
 the class of self-existences, and foist a nonentitv into its 
 place. They turn it into a weapon of warfare too, and their 
 forte lies in the dexterous use they can make of it. They 
 
 L 
 
84 
 
 fmht with it to the last ; and even after it has broken in 
 their hands, they either beg the advantage, or desperately 
 contrive to make passes and guards with the fragments of 
 their broken reed. Deprive them of this purely abstract 
 necessity, and their argument becomes of none effect. AH 
 their quaint and technical reasonings; all their sage conclu- 
 sions, resolve themselves into worse than empty and unmean- 
 ing form. And, that mathematical rules do not apply to phy- 
 sics and morals, does not require much reflection to per- 
 ceive : and if it did, relevant grounds for the exclusion of 
 that sort of necessity from questions of this nature, have not 
 been left to the present late stage of the discussion. 
 
 The last, but by no means the most insignificant error re- 
 sulting)^ from the use of a priori reasoning is, that it shuts the 
 theist out, as has been but recently shown, from the possi- 
 bility of proving anything relative to the divine character. 
 Power, intelligence, wisdom, justice, goodness, truth, and so 
 on,— may, without the least difficulty, be conceived absent 
 from any part of infinite extension or duration, and conse- 
 quently from all ; but as nothing exists by the necessity of 
 this aro-ument, whose absence from any point of time or space 
 may be so much as imagined, the existence of these attri- 
 butes, or of any such, can never be held necessary a priori. 
 
 SeeminMy aware of having thus foreclosed themselves by 
 their own act from all consideration of the second part of 
 the subject, the advocates of theism shift their ground, and 
 now attempt making it out by the argument drawn from ex- 
 perience. This is as if we were to attempt to prove, by re- 
 gular process, the postulate of there being a line carried 
 over the British channel in the form of an arc ; and then, be- 
 cause arches extended over water are usually called bridges, 
 to conclude that the one stretching between Calais and 
 D er must be a good substantial bridge of granite, if not 
 adamant, capable of sustaining carriages of any burden, and 
 passengers to any amount. Or, as if any of us were to be 
 tried at the bar of justice, and found guilty of robbery, 
 murder, and every kind of crime, not because we had com- 
 mitted, or ever thought of committing them, but because, 
 
 85 
 
 according to certain dogmas, we are all "sinners in the 
 abstract," and therefore obnoxious to the utmost penalty 
 of human laws as well as divine. The man who should 
 submit without complaint to so hard a fate on so slight yet 
 subtle grounds, might, with perfect consistency, allow the 
 force of the a priori argument eked out by that of expe- 
 rience, but not otherwise. Whatever dissatisfaction any 
 one might have to express, would lie as an objection to the 
 niotley and incoherent juncture of the arguments now re- 
 feired to. 
 
 But, humouring the theologian in all his quirks, and 
 yielding him every advantage, what does he make of intelli- 
 gence, power, and all that? He takes for granted the 
 astounding fact of the material universe having been created 
 out of nothing, and thence infers, that that which created 
 matter, and intelligence, and motion — namely, space and du- 
 ration—must possess power, and agency, and intelligence, to 
 an illimitable extent, notwithstanding the nature of the thing 
 rendering impossible the possession of any such qualities,— 
 or indeed any quality, other than extension : — More shortly 
 thus, — The necessary existence of infinite time and space 
 )>rove the fact of creation; and the fact of creation proves 
 the possession of intelligence, power, and freedom of 
 agency, by infinite time and space. If this be not reasoning 
 in a circle, it is a very clever approach to it. It is twisting 
 the ends of things so as to make them meet somehow : it 
 is an attempt to establish as truth, at the expence of nature 
 and philosophy, that which is contradicted both by philoso- 
 phy and nature, as well as by immutable truth. 
 
 Destitute of moral attributes, then, destitute of cognisable 
 properties and even of substance, what are we to denominate 
 the subject of abstract theological reasoning ? It would be 
 ridiculous to call it god ; it would be foolish to call it matter 
 or give it the name of anything we know. Not more empty 
 and fleeting is the filmy cloud that meets the eye of the 
 mariner as it floats upon the distant horizon ; and not more 
 capable of realising the dreams respecting it, than is that de- 
 ceitful appearance of land calculated to fulfil the ardent anti- 
 
86 
 
 cipations of home, comforts, friends, and enjoyments, whicli 
 it suggests. The garden of the Hesperides, with its golden 
 fruit, may as soon be expected to spring up from the vapour 
 of the Atlantic, as that the mere abstraction brought out by 
 the argument a priori, should be proved a deity by its sus- 
 tainment of the divine character. 
 
 Meagre and unsatisfactory as this whole argument is, how- 
 ever, we are made to understand that the other arguments 
 for the being and attributes of a god are much inferior to it. 
 It is confidently held forth as the greatest, the best, and most 
 complete of alf, and the only one which is perfectly conclu- 
 sive. If this be sooth,--and it is not here that the statement 
 ninv be questioned— theology has miserably little to boast of. 
 What can be said of its first principles, but that they are 
 trite and inapplicable? what of its reasons, but that they are 
 crank and unnatural, to say nothing of their dryness and 
 total want of interest— devoid either of truth or comprehen- 
 sibilitv? and what of its inferences, but that they are far- 
 fetched and tortuous, and of course amply illogical? Theo- 
 logy must be sorely distressed for standing ground, if this be 
 its^'strongest position— its fortress— its rock— its high tower. 
 The ignorant, and those who make but slender pretensions 
 to reasoning, fly to the first and most obvious thing they can 
 find to prove the existence oUheir god. They appeal to the 
 thunder, the earthquake, the tornado. They appeal to ship- 
 wrecks, conflagrations, and the thousand disasters that fall 
 indiscriminately on the unfortunate, as well as all the evils 
 that flesh is heir to, and ask if these are not the domgs of an 
 infinitely just and benevolent deity. The half reasoner; he 
 who would be considered a votary of physical science as well 
 as of divinity ; who divides his homage between the two ; or 
 who rather— if not holding to the one and despising tlie 
 other— would reconcile religion to philosophy by rendering 
 the latter subservient to the former as the object of his great- 
 est solicitude,— appeals to a constitution of things and an or- 
 der of nature destitute of all moral regard, but where, on the 
 contrary, innocence and guilt are completely confounded, as 
 if by a blind and unintelligent fatality. But now comes the 
 
 87 
 
 mathematician to quash all these appeals as having reference 
 to limited power and limited intellect ; as having reference to 
 something which (for aught that appears to the contrary) may 
 not have always existed — nay, which at this moment may 
 have dropped altogether out of being. His objections to the 
 reasoning of his friends are certainly cogent and strong, and 
 hence his mode of proof may, after all, be justly entitled to 
 the decision he awards in its favor. But until he can anni- 
 hilate the universe by some other means than the equivoca- 
 tion of a word ; until he can demonstrate the self-existent 
 substance by a process more worthy of respect than a ridicu- 
 lous bravado; and until he is able to show that all the attri- 
 butes he would fain ascribe to the object of his search, are as 
 necessarily applicable to that object as the relation between 
 twice two and four : — till he accomplish all this, he labors 
 but in vain : he only sows the wind and reaps the whirlwind. 
 
 FINIS. 
 
 Printed and Published by U. Robinion & Co. 7, Brunswick Place. 
 
Page 20, 1 
 Page 66, 1 
 Page 69, 1 
 Page 74, 1 
 Page 78, 1 
 
 ERRATA. 
 
 ne 23, for " obscurity," read " absurdity." 
 
 ne 6 from bottom, for *' he," read " be." 
 
 ne 13, for *' is," read "as." 
 
 ne 22, dele " case." 
 
 ne 16, after matter, supply ? 
 
9 
 
 J