ESSE'NTIALS ^ f OF A V 1 ( ’ Veace with Japan ADDRESS BY John Fostcf Dullcs MARCH 31, 1951 Th Department of State THIS ADDRESS BY JOHN FOSTER DULLES WAS DELIV- ERED AT WHITTIER COLLEGE, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, ON MARCH 31, 1951^ DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 4171 Far Eastern Series 40 Released April 1951 Division of Publications Office of Public Affairs Essentials of a Peace with Japan I AM GRATEFui. to Whittier College for giving me this opportunity to make a progress report on peace in the Pacific. That subject is, I sup- pose, of particular interest to Americans who live on our west coast. Actually peace in the Pacific is equally important to all of us, for danger and effort can no longer be localized. Two principal postwar goals of the Soviet Com- munists are Japan and Germany. If Russia’s rulers could exploit the industrial and human po- tential of either Japan or Germany, it would be a sad day for peace. That would involve such a shift in the balance of world power that these new imperialists might calculate that they could start a general war with good prospect of success. They know that Japan, even alone, was able seriously to menace the free world in the Pacific and they imagine vast possibilities out of a combination, under their direction, of the Asiatic power of Rus- sia, China, and Japan. Fortunately the Japanese people do not want that combination, which would make them the front line of a new aggression which in the end would mean disaster far greater than that which they have already suffered. They are in a mood to reject militarism in all of its aspects, and they want fellowship with the nations which genuinely seek peace through collective security in accord- ance with the principles of the United Nations. Thus there is the opportunity to make a Japanese peace which will not only end the old war but give new strength and hope to those who strive to prevent another war. To achieve that kind of peace is the President’s mandate to the mission which I have the honor to head, and President Truman, Secretary Ache- son, and Secretary Marshall are each of them giv- ing this effort their close personal attention, to the end that this great goal shall be achieved. Since our mission was established last January, we have had a busy time. All or some of us B38267— 61 I have been to Japan, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and England. We have consulted in Washington with ambassadors of other na- tions and also with the many in the executive and legislative branches of our Government wihose wisdom, judgment, and special knowledge can be helpful. The Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, its Far Eastern subcommittee, and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House have ex- tended the utmost cooperation. As a result of all this, we have seen the possibility of formulating peace terms which should command general sup- port here at home, which should involve no in- soluble differences with our allies, and which should be acceptable to Japan, which we consider has now earned the right to be consulted. So this week we have begun to discuss, with our allies principally concerned in the Pacific war, actual texts which might be incorporated in an eventual treaty. These texts are still “working papers,” tentative and suggestive only. We contemplate a simple document, limited to the essentials of peace. PREAMBLE Our present thought is to have a preamble to the treaty which would afford the Japanese people the opportunity to express their intentions as to matters which are important but which for one reason or another do not lend themselves to abso- lute contractual undertakings. For example, Japan might indicate its inten- tion to apply for membership in the United Na- tions. There is no doubt about the reality of that intention, but we think that J apan’s applica- tion for membership, when it comes, should bear the unmistakable imprint of Japan’s own desire without the slightest taint of external compulsion. Similarly the Japanese may want to express their intention to carry forward the new ideals as to human rights and like matters which are largely embodied in Japanese legislation under the occu- pation and which are the subject of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They may want to declare their intention, in pub- lic and private trade and commerce, to conform to international accepted fair practices. Japan’s intentions in these respects are vitally important and go to the heart of our future rela- tions. But except as these matters have already been spelled out in international conventions which Japan could and would adopt, they do not lend themselves to peace-treaty obligations, which should only be such as can be precisely formulated so that the parties will clearly know just what are their rights and duties. TERRITORY The treaty proper would prescibe the territory over which the Japanese will hereafter be sov- ereign. It is contemplated generally speaking that Japan’s sovereignty should be limited in ac- cordance with the agreed surrender terms. That would mean sovereignty over the four home islands and minor adjacent islands. There would be a renunciation by Japan of all rights, titles, and claims to Korea, Formosa, the Pescadores, and the Antarctic area. Also the treaty might contem- plate' that in the Kyukyu and Bonin islands there could be United Nations trusteeship and continu- ing United States administrative responsibility. The South Sakhalin and Kurile Islands were allotted to Russia at Yalta and are actually in Russian possession. Any peace-treaty validation of Russia’s title should, we suggest, be dependent upon Russia’s becoming a party to that treaty. SECURITY The security of Japan itself should, we think, be worked out through individual and collective self-defense arrangements authorized by the United Nations Charter. Thus the peace treaty itself need only affirm that, upon the coming into force of the peace, Japan would in fact possess what the Charter of the United Nations refers to as the “inherent right” of sovereign nations in these respects. CONIIVIERCIAL As regards commercial arrangements, we do not think that the treaty of peace should itself at- tempt to define what should be the future per- 3 manent relations between the allies and Japan. These might better be left for subsequent negotia- tion between a free Japan and other friendly na- tions. However, to prevent confusion and to minimize discrimination immediately following the coming into force of the treaty, Japan might, for such a period as 3 years, agree to accord most- favored-nation treatment to the Allied Powers, except that Japan would not, in any matter, be required to extend more favorable treatment than is accorded it. Similarly, as regards civil air- traffic rights, Japan might for 3 years, and pend- ing the conclusion of civil air-transport agree- ments, grant the Allied Powers not less favorable conditions than those prevailing at the time of the coming into force of the treaty. PROPERTY AND CLAUDS With respect to property and claims, the treaty of peace might give the Allied Powers the right generally to vest, retain, and dispose of Japanese property within their territory, while Japan should return prewar allied property in Japan and validate prewar claims belonging to Allied Powers and their nationals. The foregoing matters can, we believe, now be dealt with with considerable precision. There are others which are still subject to exploration and development. JAPAN'S SECURITY Since Japan is now thoroughly disarmed and materially and legally unable to maintain armed forces, there is need for provisional security meas- ures. Accordingly, with the authority of the President, and following conversations with com- mittees of Congress, I stated publicly in Japan that, if the Japanese wanted it, the United States would sympathetically consider the retention of United States armed forces in and about Japan, so that the coming into force of a treaty of peace would not leave J apan a vacuum of power and, as such, an easy prey to such aggression as has already shown itself in nearby Korea. This suggestion of mine was warmly welcomed by the Japanese Gov- ernment and the people generally so that it is 4 now in order to study the implementation of such an arrangement. Since Japan is an island, its security is strongly influenced by sea and air power — power which the United States is in a position to exercise in the Pacific. The defense of Japan need not re- quire, either now from the United States or ul- timately from Japan, as large ground forces as might be thought to be necessary if Japan had common land boundaries with militaristic powers. PACIFIC SECURITY Bound up with the problem of Japan’s security is the broader problem of security in the Pacific. Japan should hereafter make some contribution of its own to security, but this should never be the pretext for militarism that could be an ag- gressive threat. Thus the problem has a dual aspect. No nation able to make a dependable contribu- tion to security should get a “free ride.” In our Senate, the Vandenberg Kesolution has laid down for the United States the basic proposition that collective-security arrangements should be based upon “continuous and effective self-help and mu- tual aid.” The United Nations Charter also estab- lishes that all peace-loving states should stand ready to contribute armed forces, assistance, and facilities for the purpose of maintaining interna- tional peace and security. That is one aspect of the problem. The other side of the problem is that Japan should never again develop armament which could be an offensive threat or serve other than to promote peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. The peace we seek is one which will for all time liberate Japan’s neighbors and indeed the Japanese people from the nightmare of militarism. When we were in Canberra, Australia, our mis- sion had significant discussions on this subject with the Governments of Australia and New Zea- land. They made convincingly clear the attitude of their peoples on this sub j ect. N o w we are work- ing actively to find the ways to secure the desired results. We believe that out of our discussions, which are now well advanced, there will emerge a series of arrangements which on the one hand will enable the Japanese to make their own indispensable 5 contribution to preventing tbeir nation’s being forced into the service of the new imperialism, that ominously threatens from the mainland and which on the other hand will effectively assure that there will be no unbridled rearmament which could become an offensive threat. The United States is able and daily growing more able to exert a mighty influence for peace and to make peace in the Pacific more secure than it has ever been before. We can see the way to remove the pall of fear which results from Japan’s past conduct and from the present Communist menace. But that is not a task which we would or should undertake single-handed and alone. In the Pacific, as elsewhere, security is a coopera- tive enterprise. Those who wish to cooperate for security can share the protection of immense deter- rent power which, in the words of the United Nations Charter, “shall not be used, save in the common interest.” Since the arrangements for peace and security in the Pacific will in part be outside of the peace treaty and since the whole problem is not yet fully explored, we consider that any presently suggested treaty provisions are to be supplemented in the light of the outcome of the promising exchanges of views which are now taking place and to which we attach the utmost importance. No one should assume that the United States takes this problem lightly or that we shall accept a solution that will be illusory. REPARATIONS As regards reparations, the United States doM not question the inherent justice of the proposi- tion that Japan should make good the damage done to others by its aggression. Reparation is, how- ever, not merely a matter of what is just but of what is economically practicable, without disas- trous consequences. We have closely examined this problem. Considerable industrial machinery has already been removed from Japan and given to countries having reparation claims. Also there is substantial Japanese property within allied countries which, as indicated, should be applicable to the satisfaction of claims. It is, however, not easy to see the possibility of Japan’s providing future reparation out of her remaining capital as- sets or as a surplus from her current economic activity over coming years. 6 One of the gravest problems which confront Japan, and it equally concerns the reparation creditors, is whether Japan, deprived of its for- merly owned sources of raw material and with a population of 85 million on four relatively small and barren islands, can maintain the standard of living and employment necessary to prevent wide- spread social unrest. This, if it occurred, would inevitably give rise to dangerous expansionist and explosive tendencies, which Japan’s Communist neighbors would joyously exploit. The United States, to prevent social and eco- nomic unrest within Japan since the occupation be- gan, has advanced about 2 billion dollars for re- lief and economic assistance. That is a realistic measure of how seriously the United States views this problem and its responsibility as principal occuping power. However, the United States is not prepared after the occupation ends to continue indefintely such economic relief. Neither is it willing in effect to pay Japanese reparations by putting into Japan what reparation creditors would take out. The United States considers in- deed that its postwar advances have a certain pri- ority status. We doubt that it is practicable to get the es- sential over- all and long-range results which are sought, if the treaty also seeks to extract repara- tion payments other than in terms of the Japa- nese assets already received from Japan or with- in the territory of the Allied Powers. However, the United States has not closed its mind on this subject, and it is, with an open mind, actively ex- changing views with countries which were most grievously damaged by Japanese aggression. ECONOMIC DISABILITIES Some suggestions have been made as to impos- ing upon the J apanese economic disabilities as, for example, requiring a dismantling of a part of Japan’s industrial plants, particularly her ship- building capacity. As experience in Germany has shown, such provisions cannot be carried out with- out arousing great public bitterness. If the peace treaty required the first postwar Japanese Gov- ernment physically to decimate Japan’s indus- trial equipment, it would impose an almost in- human burden, and the consequences would almost surely be against the best interests of the Allied Powers. 7 FISHERIES It has been suggested, particularly alon^ the Pacific coast, that the treaty of peace might itself attempt permanently to regulate the problem of Japanese participation in high-seas fisheries. To attempt that would almost surely postpone indefi- nitely both the conclusion of peace and the obtain- ing of the results which are desired. There is, I believe, a considerable possibility of agreement between the United States and Jap- anese fishing interests. However, the treaty of peace is not a treaty merely between the United States and Japan; it is a treaty which we hope will be signed by all of the 53 allies. Most of these nations have their own fishing problems and their own theories of solution, which differ widely. No quick results can be won by attempting to make the peace treaty into a universal convention on higl^seas fishing. When I was in Japan, the Prime Minister ad- vised me that the Japanese Government stood ready to negotiate fisheries agreements as soon as peace restores to Japan the possibility of inde- pendent sovereign action. He said that in the meantime the Japanese Government would pro- hibit Japanese nationals and Japanese vessels from going into conserved fisheries in all waters, and he mentioned specifically those off the coasts of the United States, Canada, and Alaska. The J apanese now see the importance of avoid- ing practices which in the past brought Japan much ill will, and, if we can hold to our tentative timetable, there can, I believe, be an early and equitable settlement of this thorny problem. A PEACE OF RECONCILIATION From the foregoing it can be seen that the Jap- anese peace settlement we seek, while it would confirm the cut-back of Japan’s territory to her home islands, would contemplate that Japan would be a sovereign and sustaining member of the free world. She would contribute in due course to collective security in accordance with her means but without developing armament which could be an offensive threat. Also, from an economic standpoint, Japan would be expected to get along without such subsidies as the United States has been providing during the occupation. 8 On the other hand Japan would be restored to a po- sition of equality, free of burdensome and dis- criminatory conditions. In essence the peace would be one of reconciliation. That is not the kind of peace which victors usually grant to a vanquished nation which has committed armed aggression on a vast scale. It is not surprising that some, made bitter and dis- trusting by Japan’s past conduct, would like ta impose upon Japan continuing burdens and re- strictions. Some of these taken separately seem to have justification, and perhaps no one of them alone would be of decisive historical significance. In the aggregate, however, they would fundamen- tally change the character of the peace settle- ment. The major objective of any Japanese peace treaty is to bring the Japanese people hereafter to live with others as good neighbors. That does not require that the Japanese people should be pampered. It does mean that the victors should not take advantage of Japan’s present helpless state to impose for the future unequal conditions. It means that the peace settlement should restore the vanquished to a position of dignity and equal- ity among the nations. The peace would be a peace of trust, not because the past justifies trust but because the act of ex- tending trust usually evokes an effort to merit trust. It would be a peace of opportunity, in that it would afford the Japanese people the same op- portunity to develop peacefully their domestic economy and their international relations as are- enjoyed by most of the other free nations of th& world. UNITED STATES RESPONSIBILITY In proposing that kind of peace, the United States assumes a serious responsibility, for the re- sults cannot be guaranteed. We have, however, a duty to exercise our best judgment as to the kind of peace which will endure. Circumstances have made our duty inescapable. In the great war in the Pacific, we had valiant allies who, through long, hard years, poured out life and treasure according to their means. But the United States possessed most of the means- required for victory in the Pacific. The United States has carried the responsibility of occupa- tion, and the accomplishments of General Mac- 9 Arthur as Supreme Commander represent a moral investment to which his countrymen can- not honorably be indifferent. The United States has contributed the economic aid which has pre- vented the postwar misery which would have exposed Japan to capture by communism. The United States is the member of the free world which possesses large present and prospective military power in the western Pacific, and today we are the principal contributor to the United Na- tions effort in Korea, which fends off danger to Japan, to our Pacific allies, as well as to ourselves. These are some of the circumstances which re- quire the United States to exercise an initiative for peace; to do so while there is still time; and to shape that initiative with all of the wisdom and all of the vision that is available. For a mis judg- ment as to timing or as to substance can bring incalculable disaster to all mankind. The United States does not consider that it has any monopoly of responsibility nor any monopoly of experience, wisdom, and enlightenment that are required. We have no desire to “go it alone,” nor have we the slightest thought of dictating. We continuously have sought and shall seek the views of others, and indeed our present sugges- tions are a composite, not deriving from any single source. They reflect the ideas of many, and the United Kingdom and Australia are two import- ant sources of actual language that we accept. However, in the last analysis the United States cannot, in justice to our own people or indeed to others, become cosponsor of a peace settlement which in our judgment, made after ample consid- eration without arrogance and in humbleness of spirit, would throw unnecessary and intolerable burdens of a military or economic character upon the United States and jeopardize the lasting peace that the war was fought to win. NO VETO Happily the exchanges of views which have taken place have, with one exception, been alto- gether cordial, and no basic disagreements have developed. The Government of the Soviet Union is perhaps an exception. For 3 months its repre- sentative joined with us in full and frank discus- sions. But now that a peace treaty with Japan seems actually to be in the offing, the Soviet lead- ers seem to have taken fright. The Soviet Gov- 10 ernment has publicly announced that it will not resume discussions with us. When peace is far off, the Russian leaders speak lovingly of peace. But when peace comes near, they shun peace like the plague. We continue to hope that the Soviet leaders will join in a treaty of peace which would cost them nothing and which would start a relaxing of tensions which would be felt all around the globe. We are ready to give scrupulously full considera- tion to any views they may express. We shall steadily urge that they join in the Japanese peace. Fortunately, however, Soviet participation is not indispensable. The Soviet Union has no legal power to veto. It has no moral due bills, for its vast takings in Manchuria, Port Arthur, Dairen, Sakhalin, and the Kuriles repay it a thousandfold for its 6 days of nominal belligerency. Japan, unlike Germany and Austria, is not divided by zones of occupation. In relation to Japan there is the opportunity to show which of the Allies of World War II now have the genuine will for peace. There is the opportunity for them to make peace so righteous that the example will hearten and Uplift men everywhere. That is the opportunity; and to its challenge we are determined worthily to respond. U, S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1951 II • 1 ,!/' ; '■' '^, : . - - . . v.„: ,; ,/j ., , >; ,„r;.'^ ^51- ..■■,;^,',,^,^^viU V,'''>’ :^'i''rf:V, ■ri^iv ';,..ri 5 t^* .,' iij I ] iti'j'i' O' wV?’ "’'"■ <'' ; ",');■ w ■ I' j -r < ',^|i.'.r''f5| •yK: ::-i^M.ii3f*- ' io'^i. V't!^ -■ ' ''‘ o ■.■■''' ■I’- ^ »,r"ii;>n"vwi <;. 7 ^';| -/. ' ^ " y.r'. ■ ■ '■ ,,;. iii''V 5 ;'»i, t' , ' i, ■ j. I iV'';"'. ’ I ' ''‘l! . ' /V'#/',:'> .'%;y' ■,.■■, '^1,'^ y yi.r y‘:'i i,i-J ■ - o..)'; V/iC? I'"*.' . w.'o -•;■'( '■■ ' ,ii.. " ■' .■'* • laV'is"'; Y. :V :'( yi:{‘i4A'Wv /’ .y ■ ■' - ' ■ '■"..■/'V ',y i