.% | Tam UPavm esa. ‘THE RE PUBL, IC CHINA U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE i .'] scabies Fut THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 6844 Far Eastern Series 81 Released October 1959 Public Services Division Bureau of Public Affairs For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington 25, D.C. - Price 25 cents CONTENTS INTRODUCTION . TAIWAN THE HISTORY . THE PEOPLE AND THEIR CULTURE . THE GOVERNMENT THE ECONOMY THE “PEOPLE’S LIVELIHOOD” UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE U.S.-CHINESE CULTURAL COOPERATION FOREIGN POLICY . UNITED STATES POLICY . Page INTRODUCTION On December 8, 1949, the Government of the Republic of China, as a result of Chinese Communist military successes on the main- land, established its provisional capital at Taipei on the island of Taiwan. It was a government whose political control had been made precarious by military defeat. Its very existence was threatened with internal subversion by Communist agents and by Communist military forces massed only 100 miles away across the Formosa Strait. The armed forces of the Republic of China, al- though numbering an estimated 500,000 men, were in the depths of psychological defeat, ill-equipped and disorganized after their flight from the mainland. The Republic of China had assumed administrative control over the island of Taiwan in 1945 following the Japanese surrender. However, during the 1945-49 period the Chinese Government’s resources, depleted as a result of the war against Japan, were being expended on the civil war on the mainland and little could be done to repair the wartime destruction and dislocation on Taiwan. When the National Government established its capital on the is- land, it found the Taiwanese economy still in a state of virtual chaos. Little had been done to rebuild the large sections of the island’s major cities and harbors which had been reduced to rubble by wartime bombing. Industrial production seriously disrupted by the war had not begun to recover. Agricultural production, once sufficient to provide the island’s major exports, was at a level barely adequate to meet the basic needs of Taiwan’s burgeoning population. Transportation and communication facilities, once among the best in the Far East, were in a state of disrepair. Health and welfare services had been exhausted and for the first time in many years cholera and bubonic plague threatened. With the Government there came to Taiwan over 1.5 million 1 men and women, including members of the armed forces, who were refugees from the Communists. These refugees, seeking food, shelter, and livelihood, placed additional pressure upon the weakened economy. The influx of mainland refugees and acute shortages of goods of every kind resulted in runaway inflation which threatened to bring financial ruin to people of every eco- nomic class. Furthermore, the 7 million Taiwan-born Chinese had been made restive by dissatisfaction with the immediate postwar provincial government and looked upon the great influx of mainland arrivals with suspicion and foreboding. But the Chinese Government, although faced with these seem- ingly insurmountable problems, had a number of assets. The first was the immeasurable asset of the patriotism of the free Chinese, their will to survive as a free people, and their determination to rebuild their nation. The second asset was the economic potential of the island of Taiwan. By no means lavishly endowed with natural resources, it nevertheless contained adequate power and agricultural and mineral resources on which to build a base for free China. The third asset was the friendship of the United States, which helped first with emergency relief supplies and then provided capital, equipment, and technical assistance to help rebuild the strength of free China. Today, only 10 years later, the Government of the Republic of China can point to remarkable progress. It has grown in strength and stability. Political reforms have been undertaken to eliminate the inefficiency and corruption which came with wartime chaos and dislocation, defeat, and infiltration. Far-reaching economic and social reforms and political measures to promote local self- government mark the Republic’s progress toward democracy. The economy has made phenomenal strides. Most prewar pro- duction levels in agriculture and industry on Taiwan have been far surpassed, and these gains are reflected in a marked improvement in the standard of living of the people. The Government has acted to prevent a repetition of the ruinous inflation of the early postwar years. Security measures have eliminated the threat of Communist internal subversion. In edu- cation, in public health, and in social welfare, steps have been taken to promote the well-being of the populace. Militarily the Republic of China is the second largest non-Com- munist force in Asia. Reorganization, reequipment, training, and a strong sense of mission among members of the armed forces have resulted in a modern fighting force of high morale. 2 Today the Republic of China on Taiwan is a symbol of the fact that communism has not won a total victory in China. The Re- public of China is the voice of China in the United Nations and is recognized as the legitimate Government of China by 45 free-world governments. (Only 22 non-Communist governments recognize the Chinese Communist regime.) It offers a focus for the loyalties of some 12 million overseas Chinese in the countries of Southeast Asia who retain their sense of Chinese identity. The Republic of China is a bastion of free-world defense in the Far East and its forces are a powerful deterrent to further Chinese Communist military conquest in the area. This pamphlet is a description of the present territorial base of free China, its history, and its resources. It is an account of the progress made by the Republic of China since 1949, the problems it has overcome, its situation today, and its prospects for the future. TAIWAN Taiwan has been the Chinese name of the island for many centuries. Six- teenth-century Portuguese sailors, seeing it for the first time and struck by its breathtaking beauty, hailed it as “Ilha Formosa,” or beautiful, island, and since that time it kas been known to the West as Formosa. Taiwan is a large, semitropical island lying about 100 miles off the China mainland in the same latitude as the Hawaiian Islands. It extends some 250 miles from northeast to southwest and is about 90 miles across at its widest point. Its area of about 14,000 square miles is a little less than the combined areas of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut. The 64 islands of the Penghu (Pescadores) group about 25 miles west of Taiwan and 13 other small, virtually barren islands off Taiwan are administered by the Taiwan Provincial Government. The Republic of China also controls two groups of offshore is- lands: the Kinmen (Quemoy) group, approximately 5 miles from the mainland in Amoy Bay; and the Matsu group, about 9 miles from the mainland at the mouth of the Min River. It also controls a number of less significant islands lying off the mainland of China. Taiwan is the central link in a chain of islands bordering the east coast of Asia. It commands the heavily traveled sealanes between Japan and the ports of Southeast Asia. In testimony to its strategic location, during World War II it was a major Japa- nese military outpost and a springboard for their attacks on South China, the Philippines, and Southeast Asia. The eastern two-thirds of Taiwan is covered by rugged, high mountain ranges running from north to south. Elevations of 4 = o LAST CHINA SEA oe a MAT a N@UEH-TAO Chi -lung enor | sia IEH HSU (LITTLE QUEMOY) PACTHIC TAIWAN fe AND ~ 28044 7-59 10,000 feet are common and several peaks exceed 12,000 feet. These mountain regions, characterized by dense evergreen forests and short, swift streams running through deep gorges, give Taiwan the beautiful scenery which inspired its Western name of Formosa. Development of the extensive hydroelectric power potential af- forded by the streams and exploftation of the abundant forestry 512700 O—59——2 5 resources of this region have been hampered by the rugged terrain and the consequent transportation difficulties. The extent of the mountain region also severely limits the amount of land available for agriculture, and in the arable land in the foothills to the west of the main ranges terracing is necessary and soil erosion is a constant problem. While on the east coast the mountains drop precipitously to the sea, the western portion of Taiwan slopes downward to form a low alluvial coastal plain. In this area is concentrated the greatest part of the island’s population of almost 11 million people, most of whom live in small rural villages commonly less than one mile apart. Here virtually every acre of land is intensively cultivated. Taiwan’s climate varies from tropical to semitropical, with long wet summers and short mild winters. Rainfall follows the typical monsoon pattern and is abundant over most of the island. How- ever, since precipitation varies greatly both seasonally and locally, much of the agricultural land is dependent upon irrigation facili- ties. Mild earthquakes are common, and violent tropical storms frequently cause much damage. The warm climate and abundant rainfall are a boon to agricul- ture and make possible the cultivation of two and sometimes even three crops per year on the same land. Despite the limited amount of arable land Taiwan’s high productivity makes it self-sufficient in most basic foodstuffs. Agricultural products, particularly rice, sugarcane, and pineapples, are the island’s main exports and are the basis for its most important industry, food processing. Taiwan is not richly endowed with the mineral resources neces- sary for modern industry. However, because of the relative abundance of hydroelectric power and coal, Taiwan has been able to develop a number of important industries such as petroleum refining, aluminum processing, steel milling, and the manufacture of textiles and chemical fertilizers—all based on imported raw materials. Coal, copper, gold, sulfur, limestone, pyrites, and salt are the main commercially exploited minerals. Principal Cities Taipei, located in the northeast, has a population of over 800,000 and is the provisional capital of the Government. It is the leading city of Taiwan and the political, economic, and cultural center of free China. It is the northern focus of the main rail and highway routes. It has the largest steel mill in free China, and a number 6 of factories producing consumer goods. Chi-lung (Keelung), Taipei’s port, with a population of over 182,000, handles well over half of the island’s foreign trade. Kao-hsiung, in the south, has a population of almost 330,000 and is Taiwan’s second-ranking port and leading industrial center. Petroleum refining, aluminum processing, and the chemical industry are concentrated here. T’ai-chung, located in the northern portion of the western allu- vial plain, has a population of some 328,000 and serves as a dis- tributing center for many of the agricultural products of the region. The new provincial capital is in a suburb of T’ai-chung. T’ai-nan in the southwest with 262,000 inhabitants is the ancient capital of Taiwan and a cultural center. THE HISTORY In A.D. 605 when Ho Man, a Chinese navigator, reached Taiwan and claimed it in the name of the Sui dynasty, the island was in- habited by fierce, headhunting aborigines. For many years these inhabitants made colonization a hazardous affair. Though Taiwan officially became a protectorate of the Chinese empire in 1206, the successive dynasties maintained only a remote and tenuous control over the island. It was not until the 14th and 15th centuries that colonizers from the southern provinces began to settle the island in large numbers and to bring Chinese culture to Taiwan. In the 16th century Western navigators, then beginning to ex- ploit the trading routes to the Far East, came upon the island. During the next several centuries Portuguese, Spaniards, and Dutch made a number of unsuccessful attempts to establish perma- nent trading colonies on Taiwan. Two early Japanese expeditions of conquest likewise ended in failure. In 1661 during the Manchu conquest of China, large numbers of refugees and partisans of the Ming dynasty fled from the main- land and established a government on Taiwan loyal to the Ming. Led by General Cheng Ch’eng-kung (known as Koxinga in the West), the Chinese patriots held out against the Manchus for 20 years, using Taiwan as a base for raids against the mainland. In 1682, when the Manchu dynasty was firmly installed, the Chinese on Taiwan recognized the suzerainty of the Manchu emperors and Taiwan became administratively part of the Chinese coastal province of Fukien. Cheng Ch’eng-kung, the hero of the Ming resistance, is still venerated today by the people of Taiwan. Emigration from the mainland and expeditions against the primitive aborigines continued during the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries. Eventually the primitive tribesmen were driven into 8 the remote mountain regions and Taiwan flourished as a trading center. When China began to trade with the West after the 1858 treaties of Tientsin, two of Taiwan’s ports were of sufficient im- portance to be included as treaty ports. The commercial impor- tance of the island continued to grow and in 1884 Taiwan was separated from the province of Fukien and elevated to a provincial status of its own. Japanese Rule By the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki following the Sino- Japanese War of 1894-95, Taiwan was ceded to Japan. The people resisted this transfer to Japanese control and, led by former Chi- nese officials on the island, declared Taiwan an independent Republic on May 23, 1895, the first ever to be established in Asia. This rebellion was easily suppressed by the Japanese with their superior military force, but for years during the period of Japa- nese rule the populace continued to harass their rulers with sporadic uprisings and acts of sabotage. Taiwan remained in Japanese hands for 50 years during which it was developed economically as an integral part of the Japanese colonial empire. It became an important source of agricultural exports to supply Japan’s food needs, and it exported to Japan more than it received. The economic development undertaken by the Japanese resulted in substantial benefits for the people of the island whose standard of living was quite high by Asian standards. The Japanese built a transportation and communication network and toward the end of their rule established a number of important industries such as petroleum and aluminum refining. Taiwan became the seat of important Japanese military and naval bases, and during the latter days of World War II the island suffered heavy attack by Allied aircraft. At the wartime Cairo Conference in 1943 China, the United States, and Great Britain agreed that “all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China.” At the end of the war in 1945 the Chinese Government received the surrender of the Japanese forces on Taiwan and assumed control of the island as a province of China. It was 4 years later, with the defeat of the Nationalists on the mainland, that Taiwan be- came the seat of the Government of the Republic of China and Taipei the provisional capital. 9 THE PEOPLE AND THEIR CULTURE Population Despite 50 years of Japanese rule the people of Taiwan are thoroughly Chinese in language, culture, religion, and race. The only remnants of the non-Chinese population of Taiwan are some 150,000 aborigines who still inhabit the isolated mountain regions. According to a 1955 estimate about four-fifths of the Chinese of Taiwan were island-born descendants of the mainland Chinese who emigrated from Fukien and Kwantung provinces chiefly between the 16th and 19th centuries. The others were mainland-born Chinese (and their children) who fled from Communist oppression during and after the military conquest of the mainland. Though the overall population density of Taiwan is about 710 persons per square mile, most of the people live in the one-fourth of the land area which is suitable for cultivation, and here the population density per square mile of arable land is about 2,800 persons. One-fourth of the people live in cities of more than 50,000 inhabitants, the majority residing in small rural villages. About 83,000 Chinese live in the Pescadores Islands, concentrated in and near the town of Penghu. In addition to the garrison troops, the offshore islands have a population of about 58,000, of which about 47,000 reside in the Quemoy group. Taiwan has a high birth rate and, with its relatively high stand- ards of public health, a low death rate. The current rate of popu- lation increase has been estimated at more than 3 percent annually, which, if continued, would result in a doubling of the population within 20 years. Language and Culture The Chinese of Taiwan share the same strong cultural heritage as their brothers on the mainland. Fifty years of Japanese occu- 10 pation of the island did little to change the Chinese society there. The Japanese exerted their control through the existing social in- stitutions and customs. In particular, they exerted control through the traditional Chinese pao-chia system, under which family and village groups jointly share responsibility for the conduct of in- dividual members. The conquerors maintained distinct residen- tial areas for their own use and there was very little intermarriage between the two nationalities. In the immediate prewar years the Japanese made a serious attempt to spread their culture and ideals among the people of Taiwan in order to develop a sense of loyalty and support for the empire. By 1943 about 70 percent of the children of primary school age were being educated exclusively in the Japanese language and the school system was being used to indoctrinate young people with Japanese cultural ideals. As a result, most Taiwan-born Chinese between the ages of 25 and 40 speak Japanese as a second language. However, this educational program did not last long enough to make any fundamental change in the essentially Chinese outlook of the people. In the early postwar years a considerable amount of tension developed between the mainland-born Chinese and the Taiwanese Chinese, culminating in an uprising in 1947. This social conflict stemmed from a number of causes. Most of the mainland refugees came from the cities of China and were of the educated, profes- sional class or engaged in trade and commerce. The Taiwanese- Chinese were largely of rural background and had been denied opportunities for higher education and managerial experience dur- ing the Japanese occupation. There was a language difference— most of the Taiwanese-Chinese speaking the Fukien and Hakka dialects of their ancestors who had migrated from the southern Chinese provinces, and the majority of the new arrivals from the mainland speaking Mandarin, the national language. The policies of an inept and harsh provincial governor, at a time when the Central Government in Nanking was preoccupied with the civil war, further contributed to the estrangement of many Taiwanese-Chinese, who came to feel that they were being treated unfairly. Measures undertaken by the Government since that time have greatly changed this situation. Land reform has done much to improve the welfare of the largely Taiwan-born rural population. There has been a considerable growth in local self-government, giving villagers a greater voice in deciding their own affairs. The 11 Government has adopted a policy of equal privileges for all in the civil service, and an increasing number of Taiwan-born are hold- ing important posts. Primary education is now uniform and free and all have the same opportunities for higher education. In addi- tion, the Government’s “Speak Kuo Yu” (the national language, “Mandarin”) program, begun in 1946, has proved successful in eliminating difficulties in communication. Today virtually every youth under 20 speaks Mandarin and an adult education program has spread the use of Mandarin among older elements of the popula- tion as well. Religion With the exception of a minority of Christians and Muslims, most of the people on Taiwan are Buddhists, although their religious beliefs also include an amalgamation of the traditional Chinese practices of ancestor veneration, Taoism, and the philosophy of The Spring and Autumn Pavilion at Kao-hsiung, a tribute to General Kwan Yu, historical hero of Taiwan. Confucianism. This amalgamation lacks a generally accepted ecclesiastical hierarchy. Many of the festivals of China are basi- cally religious in nature, commemorating the feast day of popular deities or celebrating seasonal occurrences. One of the most im- portant elements of the popular religion is the respect for and com- memoration of departed ancestors, a natural outgrowth of the tradition of filial piety and respect for elders. The basis of traditional Chinese morality and ethical ideals is to be found more in the family system and the training in tradi- tional Chinese conduct given each child in his home than in any institutional religious instruction. The official policy of the Republic of China is to accord freedom and toleration toward all religions. Well-established government policy provides for the separation of church and state and pro- hibits the teaching of religion in the public schools. Education One of the strongest and most firmly established traditions of Chinese culture is a respect for scholarship and learning and a recognition of the importance of education. The government has placed considerable emphasis on improving and extending the educational facilities on Taiwan and on further raising the literacy rate which is already as high as 60 to 70 percent. Government policies provide that public school education shall have a strong ideological content, emphasizing the teaching of the doctrines of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and exposing the fallacies of Communist doctrine. Education has expanded markedly on Taiwan since the island was restored to Chinese control. Today primary education is free and compulsory for all children between the ages of 6 and 12, and a government program has as its 1961 goal the extension of the period of compulsory education for another 3 years. To achieve this goal, school construction and teacher training have received special attention. Prior to 1946 there were less than 200 students enrolled at the National Taiwan University, then the only university on the island. Total enrollment in institutions of higher learning 10 years later was over 22,000. The National Government maintains two uni- versities; the provincial government maintains two universities, two colleges, and four specialized institutions on the college level. There are, in addition, a number of private colleges. To encourage 512700 O—59—3 13 higher education many government grants and scholarships are made available to qualified students, and facilities for college and university education are being expanded. However, at the present time existing higher education facilities are insufficient to meet the demand for them; thus the competition for entrance to college is intense. The Government has developed an adult education program in which over 170,000 students had enrolled in 1955. The Press The highly literate population of Taiwan supports 28 daily news- papers, including two English-language dailies, and over 400 periodicals. There are 32 radio stations and 5 motion picture laboratories which produce documentary and educational films. While many of the important information media on Taiwan are controlled by the Government or by the Kuomintang Party, inde- pendent newsmen have considerable freedom to express their opinions. There are a number of private independent newspapers and magazines, some of which express opposition to many govern- ment policies. Because of the immediacy of the Communist threat to Taiwan the Government feels it is of vital importance to encourage national unity. However, since the general sentiment of all elements of the population is strongly anti-Communist, censorship is not neces- sary to assure press support for the Government’s basic anti- Communist goals. There is no prepublication censorship of the press on Taiwan, and the postpublication controls which exist have permitted the expression of differing opinions on matters of Government policy. 14 THE GOVERNMENT The Republic of China had its origins in the revolt against the Manchu dynasty, which began in 1911 and was led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. The aim of Dr. Sun’s followers was to substitute for the monarchy a republic based on the San Min Chu-I or “Three Prin- ciples of the People,” propounded by Dr. Sun. These were the Principle of Nationalism, the Principle of Democracy, and the Principle of the People’s Livelihood. Three Principles of the People These Three Principles of the People established the objectives of the young Republic’s national policy. They continue to guide the present Government and have acquired new significance in the course of world events. The Principle of Nationalism established the goal of the inde- pendence and liberty of the Chinese nation. As a corollary it preaches the ideal of universal brotherhood and world peace. It has guided the Republic’s policy of encouraging united international action against aggressor nations. Under the Principle of Democracy, Dr. Sun advocated that the people should have adequate power to control their government. This principle is reflected in the constitution, which gives to the people the rights of election and recall of officials, initiative, and referendum. The Principle of the People’s Livelihood teaches that social justice depends upon economic security. It states that the people have the right to be supplied with basic needs such as food, cloth- ing, shelter, and the means of communication, and advocates nationwide economic planning to produce wealth and capital for 15 all the people. In fulfillment of this principle, the Government has undertaken far-reaching measures to equalize land ownership and has engaged in economic planning to develop China’s resources for the public benefit. Three Stages of the Chinese Revolution The first task which faced the Chinese revolutionaries and their party, the Kuomintang, was the overthrow of the Manchu regime and the monarchical system and the achievement of national unity in China. There was after 1911 a long and bitter struggle against warlords who ruled large areas as though they were independent nations. Until 1928 military objectives were paramount and the Kuomintang governed through a military administration. With much of the Chinese nation under the nominal control of the Kuomintang, the revolution entered upon its second stage— that of political tutelage under the party. This period of one- party rule was essential, in the eyes of the revolutionaries, to undertake the tremendous task of building a modern nation and to prepare the Chinese people for constitutional government. This period was prolonged during World War II, when the Chinese nation was fighting for its very existence against the Japanese invaders, and later by the struggle against Communist insurrection and subversion. The period of Constitutional Government, the third and final phase of the revolution, began in 1946 when President Chiang Kai-shek’s wartime pledge was fulfilled by the calling of a nation- wide multiparty Constituent Assembly of 1381 delegates at Nan- king to formulate and adopt a constitution for the Republic of China. The Constitution The constitution which was adopted by the Assembly came into effect in 1948. It provides for a strong central government con- trolled ultimately by the people. Though the constitution reflects the influence of European and American institutions, it also em- bodies traditional Chinese features. In accordance with Dr. Sun’s theories, the constitution reserves to the people the four powers of election, recall, initiative, and referendum and makes the infringement of these and other rights 16 by public officials punishable under civil and criminal law. All citizens, both men and women, over the age of 20 have the right to vote. A broad bill of rights guarantees freedom of domicile, speech, correspondence, religion, and assembly. It provides for equality before the law and the right to prompt trial. Economic and social clauses guarantee the right to work and the right to hold property, and they commit the Government to the enactment of public health, social insurance, and labor legislation. The National Assembly The highest organ of government is the National Assembly which, according to the constitution, “exercises political power on behalf of the people.” Delegates are chosen by popular election and are of two types: those elected by district on the basis of popu- lation and those elected to represent various groups such as over- seas Chinese, occupation groups, or women’s organizations. Though the constitution provides for elections every 6 years, Communist control of the mainland has made the holding of na- tionwide elections impossible, and the present Assembly of 3,045 delegates has been in office since 1947. The National Assembly elects, and can impeach, the President and the Vice President and is empowered to amend the constitution. The Presidency The constitution provides for a strong chief executive whose powers include those usually accorded to the chief of state of a republic. The President represents the nation in foreign relations, is commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and appoints and re- moves most high-ranking civil and military officials. Because of the crisis situation caused by the Communist take- over, President Chiang Kai-shek was granted special emergency powers by the first session of the National Assembly which elected him first Constitutional President of the Republic in 1948. When President Chiang was reelected by the second session of the assem- bly in 1954 these powers were extended. Asa result of the Assem- bly’s mandate President Chiang is empowered to govern by virtual decree, and some of the civil liberties provided in the constitution have been temporarily suspended in the interests of national security. 17 In part, the personal prestige and authority of President Chiang are responsible for the degree of power wielded today by the President. As Director General of the Kuomintang since 1938 and as leader of the Chinese nation through the days of revolution, war, and reconstruction he has, through his faith, courage, and determination, become recognized as the leader of all anti-Com- munist Chinese. The legal successor to President Chiang is the Vice President, Chen Cheng, who has had a long and distinguished career as a military and government official. He also holds the important and influential position of President of the Executive Yuan, or Prime Minister. The Five Yuan The five branches of the Chinese National Government are in the form of independent councils or Yuan. The constitution defines the Executive Yuan as the highest ad- ministrative organ of government. The President of this Yuan, who is generally known as the Prime Minister, is appointed by the President of the Republic with the consent of the Legislative Yuan. The Executive Yuan directs the work of eight ministries: For- eign Affairs, National Defense, Finance, Education, Interior, Justice, Economic Affairs, and Communications, as well as the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission and the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission. The heads of the various ministries and commissions are appointed by the President upon the nomi- nation of the Prime Minister and together form the Executive Yuan Council or Cabinet. The Legislative Yuan is a popularly elected unicameral body of over 700 members which is constitutionally empowered to adopt laws, review budget estimates submitted by the ministries, ratify treaties, and declare war. This Yuan also has the right to interpel- late members of the Executive Yuan Council and can force the resignation of the Prime Minister. Its members are in theory elected for 3-year terms and are eligible for reelection. However, because it has been impossible to hold a nationwide election since the Communist conquest of the mainland, the present members have been in office since the last national election in 1948. The organization of the Judicial Yuan embodies the concept of a separate and independent judiciary. The control of the judicial 18 system is divided between this Yuan and the Ministry of Justice under the Executive Yuan, which regulates the system of courts throughout the nation. Under the Judicial Yuan are four agencies: (1) a Council of Grand Justices, which renders decisions on the interpretation of the constitution and resolves conflicts between local and national law; (2) a Committee for the Discipline of Public Functionaries; (3) the Administrative Court, which deals with charges against government agencies; and (4) the Supreme Court, which is the court of final appeal for civil and criminal cases. The Control Yuan and the Examination Yuan reflect traditional Chinese theories of the function of government. ‘The Control Yuan has the power to audit government accounts and to investi- gate and impeach government officials who can then be prosecuted through the court system. The Examination Yuan administers the system of civil service examinations for the selection of gov- ernment officials. This examination system, deeply rooted in the earliest history of China, has been modernized to include testing for modern technical and management skills. Provincial and Local Government The Government of the Republic of China has continued to main- tain.the provincial and local levels of government on Taiwan. In practice the authority of the strong central government operating under emergency powers has tended to limit the degree of local autonomy which under normal circumstances would be exercised by local bodies under the provisions of the constitution. In 1950 and 1951 the Central Government took steps to improve this situ- ation, and since that time popular elections have been held regularly for local officials. The Taiwan Provincial Government, headed by a presidentially appointed Governor, administers civil and local affairs such as education, police, health, agriculture, and forestry. Participation of Taiwan-born citizens in government affairs is steadily increas- ing. At the present time more than 50 percent of the executive positions in the Provincial Government are held by people born on Taiwan. The executive Provincial Council of 21 members is ap- pointed by the Central Government, while the legislative body, the Provincial Assembly, is composed of 57 popularly elected repre- sentatives. The Assembly reviews important Provincial Govern- ment measures, audits expenditures, receives petitions from the 19 people, and decides on regulations concerning the rights and obli- gations of citizens. It can initiate proposals to the Provincial Government and interpellate the government’s: members. On the local level free elections are now held regularly for the selection of county and municipal councilors, magistrates, and mayors. Political Parties The Kuomintang or Chinese National People’s Party, founded by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, has been the leading political influence in China since the early days of the revolution. Almost all officers of the Government today are members of the Kuomintang or adher- ents of its fundamental principles, and the party program forms the basis for the Government’s national and foreign policies. However, in recent local elections there have been increasing num- bers of successful independent and non-Kuomintang candidates. The political doctrines of the Kuomintang are based on the teach- ings of Dr. Sun and the basic writings of President Chiang. Its policies are formulated by the President in his role as party leader, assisted by a 10-man standing committee which includes Vice President Chen Cheng and other high-ranking government officials. The basic operating organ of the party is the Central Party Head- quarters, directed by a Secretary General. The vigorous and active party organization places special em- phasis upon broadening its support among farmers and workers and maintains close contact with many professional and women’s organizations and youth groups. It is active among the overseas Chinese, particularly in Southeast Asia. Its widespread publicity program, conducted through all the major information media, gives strong support to the Government’s anti-Communist activities. A party reform movement in 1950 carried out a program to reinvigorate the party, eliminate factionalism, and tighten party discipline over members. Membership has grown to an estimated 350,000. There are two other political parties on Taiwan, the Democratic- Socialist Party and the Young China Party. Neither has a wide popular following nor possesses substantial political influence. Both are strongly anti-Communist, although in opposition to some of the domestic policies of the Kuomintang. They are represented in both the National Assembly and Legislative Yuan. 20 THE ECONOMY General Characteristics Taiwan has an agricultural economy. Well over one-half of the labor force is engaged in farming, forestry, or fishing. Industry, which engages 9 percent of the working population, is concen- trated in food processing and light manufacturing and has a sec- ondary but growing role in the economy. In 1957 agricultural crop production accounted for 28 percent of the gross national product of almost $1 billion ; 23 percent was accounted for by man- ufacturing output. Since the end of World War II, the Taiwan economy has been characterized by rapidly rising levels of production in almost every field. Spurred by government planning and American economic aid, the overall production increase between 1950 and 1958 has been approximately 80 percent. While the agricultural resources of Taiwan are well developed, with almost every acre of arable land under cultivation, the in- dustrial potential is far less developed. Gains in industrial pro- duction have been much higher than those in agriculture and hold greatest promise for the future. In the 1953-56 period of the first 4-year plan, the value of manufacturing output rose by 57 percent while agricultural crop production rose only 18 percent. The current 4-year plan, to be completed in 1960, aims at a rise of 104 percent in the value of industrial production over 1956 levels and an increase of 19 percent in agricultural production. In addition to its role in national economic planning, the Gov- ernment of the Republic of China is also an important entrepreneur in the Taiwan economy. When the Government assumed control of Taiwan in 1945, most of the enterprises formerly controlled by 512700 O—59-—4 21 the Japanese were reorganized into public corporations. At the present time government enterprises control or dominate a num- ber of the important sectors of the economy—sugar refining, fer- tilizer manufacture, petroleum refining, transportation, utilities, financial facilities, and foreign trade. Government enterprises are also important in other fields. However, government control over many businesses is being gradually liquidated. It is the estab- lished policy of the Government to encourage the development and growth of new private enterprises and to sell out government in- terests in public corporations to private investors. As a result of measures taken to this end, private enterprise has supplanted government as the major producer and today accounts for the greater part of the annual gross national product. Economic Problems Though Taiwan today has a rapidly expanding economy which supports a standard of living second only to Japan in the Far East, the island has a number of major economic problems. Because of the ever-present threat of Communist invasion from the mainland, the Republic of China, as a matter of national sur- vival, is forced to maintain a large military establishment. This defense effort annually absorbs a very substantial portion of the entire national budget. It removes a substantial portion of the labor force from productive work. It prevents the accumulation of large amounts of capital which could be channeled into the de- velopment of the civilian sector of the economy. As a consequence, under present circumstances Taiwan is not economically self- sufficient. Substantial amounts of American aid are necessary both to supplement the Government’s own military defense efforts and to bolster the civilian economy so that it can support the defense establishment. A second cause of Taiwan’s economic problems is its rapidly rising population which is placing increasing pressure upon a limited resource base and a limited amount of arable land. Despite the rapid natural population growth and the influx of the mainland refugees, the phenomenal production gains of the past 10 years have caused the per capita gross national product to continue to increase. However, to maintain the present living standards for the people of Taiwan, free China must continue to expand pro- duction, utilizing the island’s agricultural, mineral, and power resources to the fullest extent. 22 If Taiwan’s production gains are to continue to keep pace with its rapid population growth and if it is to develop industries which will further alleviate its trade deficit, large amounts of investment capital will be required to expand existing production facilities and develop new ones. An estimated $807 million in investment capital will be required to achieve the production goals of the current 4-year plan. While the Government has taken measures to encourage domestic private investment and investment by over- seas Chinese and foreigners, extensive borrowing and utilization of aid funds will be necessary if the goals of the plan are to be achieved. Despite these problems, the economy of Taiwan shows promise of continued large-scale improvement. There is every reason to believe that the Government and people of free China, with U.S. assistance, can continue to raise production levels in both industry and agriculture and improve the island’s capacity for self-support. Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries Agriculture Despite a basic shortage of farm land, Taiwan’s agricultural resources are capable of further development. Reclamation meas- ures will be able to bring at least some additional land under cultivation. For example, a project is now underway to study the possibility of utilizing some 135,000 or more additional acres of tidelands bordering the Formosa Strait. The completion of the cross-island highway, scheduled for 1959, will open additional mountain land for potential development for farming and grazing. Another encouraging factor is that not all of Taiwan’s farm- lands are yet producing their maximum yields. By careful selec- tion of crops, improvement of seed, increasing the irrigation facilities, and the adoption of modern farming techniques, these yields can be brought to their potential peak. Irrigation facilities, already servicing over 60 percent of the farmland, are scheduled for extension and improvement. The completion of the Shihmen reservoir project, about 40 kilometers south of Taipei, is expected to yield water for an additional 135,000 acres of land and increase rice production by as much as 69,000 metric tons. Because of the practice of multiple cropping, the farmland of Taiwan must be heavily fertilized to maintain its productive capacity. In addition to large quantities of night soil and other 23 A Taiwan farmer smiles as he holds up a sample sheaf of rice from his fields. organic fertilizers, 600,000 tons of chemical fertilizers are required annually to maintain present production levels. The application of additional quantities of these fertilizers can be expected to raise production. Imports of fertilizers are today the largest single item in Taiwan’s foreign exchange budget, but the projected in- creases in domestic production will help to diminish reliance on foreign supplies. Another factor which has limited Taiwan’s production is that of crop pests and diseases. Estimated losses from crop pests amount to an estimated 15 percent of the rice crop and 25 percent of the sugar crop. Recently the banana weevil destroyed about one-half of the banana plantations in central Taiwan within a 2}-year period. The Chinese Government, with U.S. assistance, has under- taken a major campaign to eliminate these losses by educating farmers in the proper techniques for controlling pests and diseases and by making available the necessary implements, insecticides, and other chemicals. 24 Over 80 different crops are grown in Taiwan but only a few are of significant commercial importance. Rice and sugar alone earn almost 75 percent of the foreign exchange and produce 75 percent of the value of all farm crops. Together with sweet potatoes, tea, tobacco, peanuts, and bananas, they account for more than 90 percent of the total farm crop value. Over one-half of the total acreage of farmland is devoted to at least one crop of rice, the principal diet staple and an important export item. In the prewar period an average of 30 percent of Taiwan’s annual rice crop was exported to Japan. In recent years, with a greater population to feed and increased rice con- sumption per capita, only a small portion of the record-breaking crop has been available for export. Cane sugar is still the most important export crop, though the current production is only 70 percent of the average in the prewar years, when Taiwan supplied almost all of Japan’s sugar. Today, because of Taiwan’s increased grain needs, less land is devoted to Old and new meet. A water buffalo eyes the small power tiller destined to replace him. raising sugarcane. Taiwan’s own sugar consumption has also in- creased and a smaller percentage of the crop is available for export. Formerly a diet staple for farm families, sweet potatoes are now most important as a livestock food. Because they have a short growing season they are widely planted as a second crop. Citrus fruits, bananas, and pineapples are important fruit crops, the last having the highest commercial value. More than 10,000 tons of tea are produced annually, mostly for export. Another important crop is citronella grass which is used to make the popular insect repellent. Taiwan produces 60 percent of the world’s supply of citronella oil. Other important crops are wheat, peanuts, cassava, soybeans, jute, and tobacco. Livestock, principally hogs and poultry, ranks second in value to rice among agricultural products. Hogs alone provide an esti- mated one-sixth of the average farmer’s income. Draft animals, principally the water buffalo, are the principal source of farm power. There has been a shortage of draft animals and efforts are being made to replace them with small power cultivators. Forestry Despite its enormous potential in forestry resources, Taiwan is not now self-sufficient in all types of wood products. Develop- ment and production costs are high, because of the inaccessibility of the mountain forest regions. Timber production reached a post- war peak in 1958, and with the opening of the new cross-island highway in 1959 further production gains can be anticipated. An important forestry product and export crop is natural camphor, in which Taiwan has a virtual world monopoly. However, the world market for natural camphor products has decreased con- siderably with the development of synthetic substitutes. Fisheries Fisheries products are an important source of diet protein for Taiwan’s people. The island’s fishing fleet, with financial and technical assistance from the United States, has expanded con- siderably in recent years. Further gains in fisheries production are scheduled in the current 4-year plan, chiefly by expansion of the deep-sea fishing fleet. 26 Production Gains Taiwan’s agricultural, forestry, and fisheries production has been rising rapidly since the end of the war. In 1958 the produc- tion of rice, sweet potatoes, peanuts, wheat, soybeans, inshore fisheries, and hogs reached an alltime high. Production of tea, pineapple, citrus fruits, timber, and deep-sea fish ex- ceeded that of any year since the end of the war. These production gains would not have been possible without the hard work and efforts of the Chinese people and the programs undertaken by the Chinese Government to channel the efforts of the rural population into the most effective undertakings. In this effort to improve the agricultural sector of Taiwan’s economy, the work of the Chinese-American Joint Commission on Rural Re- construction (JCRR) has been of vital importance. The JCRR The Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction had its origins in the immediate postwar period when the United States and China established a joint agricultural mission to investigate various phases of the agricultural problems of China. On the basis of extensive studies of the land and water resources of China, this mission concluded that agricultural production could be greatly increased by the application of modern knowledge and methods. The U.S. China Aid Act of 1948 authorized the creation of the JCRR and directed it to “formulate and carry out a program for reconstruction in rural areas of China, which shall include such research and training activities as may be necessary or appro- priate.”” The Commission was established in October 1948 with its headquarters in Nanking, and in 1949 after the takeover of the mainland by the Communists, its headquarters was moved to Taiwan. Two of the JCRR directors are appointed by the President of the United States and three by the President of China. Its pro- gram is designed to bring about maximum improvements in rural Taiwan for a minimum expenditure of American dollars. As was explained in the first report of the Commission: One point which cannot be overemphasized ... is that the program was not an aid program in the ordinary sense. It was a program which was directed toward assisting the people to help themselves. It was directed to release those latent, inert impulses of the rural people to find their own solutions, to work out their problems as their needs dictate. The operations of the Commission are only partially financed 27 A young girl, her face, arms, and legs protected from insects and sunburn, helps with the pineapple harvest. with U.S. aid dollars. For example, during the 1957 fiscal year JCRR’s contribution to 480 different projects on Taiwan amounted to 40 percent of their total cost, and the various agencies in Taiwan which sponsored the projects provided 60 percent of the funds needed. Of the portion provided by the JCRR, only 6 percent was in U.S. dollars. The remaining 94 percent was in counterpart funds—in Chinese currency generated by the sale of U.S. mate- rials in Taiwan. The JCRR is not an operating agency which carries out programs for rural improvement. It merely furnishes technical and financial 28 aid to projects undertaken by the people of Taiwan themselves which are deemed to be worthy of support. More than one-half of the JCRR aid is given directly to the lower levels of government and groups such as local farmers’ associations and fishermen’s associations, which actually undertake the programs, while the remainder is channeled through the central or _ provincial government. The projects assisted by the JCRR include programs designed to increase crop production, control crop and livestock diseases, improve livestock, extend irrigation facilities, improve the health of the rural population, increase the utilization of forest resources, minimize soil erosion, and strengthen agricultural education programs. One recent JCRR project was designed to eradicate hog cholera in one county of Taiwan. Quarantine stations were established to prevent the entry of infected animals, and all hogs in the county were vaccinated. This program was so successful that it is being used as a model for similar programs in other areas. Another of the Commission’s projects was an investigation by trained engi- neers to determine the economic and technical feasibility of build- ing a new reservoir for power and water control purposes. The JCRR has also assisted the development of a 4—H program on Taiwan. Since 1952 this rural youth movement has grown to a total of about 1,200 clubs with over 10,000 members. Some of the most spectacular results of JCRR’s work have been achieved in the Kinmen (Quemoy) and Matsu island groups, about 100 miles west of Taiwan and within sight of the Communists on the mainland. Agricultural and livestock production have been boosted through the introduction of pest and disease controls and the application of modern methods. Health centers have been established and bubonic plague, once a dreaded disease on the islands, has been eliminated. Land Reform One of the most important programs which the J CRR has as- sisted is the land reform undertaken by the Chinese Government. This program was undertaken in three stages marked by the enactment of three basic measures: reduction of farm rent, the sale of government lands to farmers, and the land-to-the-tiller pro- gram. Its outstanding success can be attributed in part to the painstaking preparation which was made for each stage, largely by the JCRR, and to the extensive educational campaign undertaken 512700 O—59——_5 29 by the Government and the JCRR to acquaint individual farmers with their new rights. The land tenure system found on Taiwan after the war spelled poverty for the average farmer. Though accurate records are lacking, it has been estimated that about half of all the farmland was worked by tenants who were forced to pay as much as 60 or 70 percent of the yield of the main crop in annual rent. Most rental contracts were merely verbal agreements, and the farmer had little protection for his right to till the land. After the farmer had paid his rent and had bought seed, fertilizers, and other necessities, he had little left over to use for making improvements on his land. And since his tenure rights were insecure, he had little incentive in any case to devote any extra money which he might have to make permanent improvements on his rented farm. Farm Rent Reduction. The first phase of the land reform pro- gram was the adoption of regulations to establish the maximum percentage of the annual main crop yield which could be charged as rent by landlords. In 1949, after extensive surveys by the JCRR, the Government adopted a series of regulations regarding land tenure and in 1951 passed an act to reduce farm rent to 37.5 percent. This act also provided for written rental contracts with 2 minimum term of 6 years. The Government and the JCRR began a widespread educational campaign to acquaint the farmers with the terms of these laws and the procedures by which they could obtain their benefits. The rent reduction program bore immediate fruit. With added income the farmer was able to make improvements on his land, and with his tenure rights protected he had the incentive to do so. Sale of Government Land. The second stage of land reform was the sale by the Government of publicly owned land. More than half of the 256,359 acres of public tenanted land was offered for sale to the farmers tilling it. A portion of the public land was retained by the Government for water and soil conservation or for public enterprises. By early 1955 a total of 151,049 acres had been sold to 121,953 farm families. One-fourth of all of Taiwan’s tenant farmers were able to acquire at least some of the land they were tilling. Land-to-the-Tiller. The ultimate objective and the final phase of the Government’s land reform policy was the land-to-the-tiller program. Even after the sale of public lands about 613,581 acres of farmland were in the hands of landlords and there were still some 300,000 tenant families. One of the basic principles of the 30 Aerial view of typical farm houses and paddy fields of Taiwan. program was that these farmers would be allowed to buy the land they tilled without assuming a heavier financial burden than the annual 37.5 percent rent. In contrast to Communist “land reform” methods, fair consideration was given to the rights and interests of the landlords who had acquired their holdings legally under the prevailing land tenure system. To implement this program, the Chinese Government bought land from the landlords and sold it to its tillers at a price which was two and one-half times the annual yield of its main crop. The landlords received 70 percent of their payment in commodity bonds carrying 5 percent interest, redeemable in 5 years. The remaining 30 percent of the price was paid to them in shares in public corporations. Thus the landlord was protected against the effects of inflation since he was assured payment in terms of com- modities rather than in currency. The portion of the payment 31 made in shares in public corporations helped to promote private ownership and channeled capital from agriculture into industry. By 1957 the total tenanted land in Taiwan had been reduced to 16 percent. Today about 75 percent of Taiwan’s farmers own all or part of the land they till. With more income, farmers are making improvements on their land. They can afford better seed and modern farm implements. And with improved economic and social status the farmers are taking a greater interest in com- munity affairs and are assuming a larger share of responsibility for managing local government. These land reform measures adopted by the Republic stand in sharp contrast to the Communist-style “land reform” carried out on the mainland. There the Communists ruthlessly liquidated the “rich peasant” class and temporarily redistributed its land to the tillers. But the hapless farmers soon found that the Com- munist “reforms” meant forced collectivization of farms and compulsory deliveries to the state of far more of their produce than the landlords had ever demanded. Collectivization was fol- lowed by the even more oppressive agricultural commune policy, which completely divorced the peasants from the land and turned them into mere “production units” which could be used for what- ever tasks the state saw fit. Industry Only a small part of Taiwan’s industrial potential has been developed. Production gains in most of the major industries during the past 9 years have been phenomenal, and continued large- scale gains can be anticipated for the future. Power and Fuels A key to past and future growth of the industry of Taiwan is to be found in the development of the island’s electric power re- sources. Steep mountain streams and heavy rainfall give the island a hydroelectric potential estimated as high as 3 million kilowatts annually, only about 10 percent of which has been de- veloped. Because of the problems involved in developing these hydroelectric resources—variable rainfall, lack of adequate storage sites for water, silting of reservoirs—hydroelectric generating facilities must be supplemented with thermal generating plants which burn coal and use steam to generate electric power. For- 32 tunately, Taiwan’s coal resources are sufficient to supply the needed thermal facilities. Taiwan’s current 4-year plan has established a 1960 goal of a generating capacity of about 600,000 kilowatts from hydroelectric and thermal plants. The Chinese are well on their way to achiev- ing this goal, largely because of the substantial investment of U.S. aid funds—over $63 million—in the rehabilitation and expansion of those power plants built during the Japanese occupation, in the construction of new hydroelectric and thermal generating stations, and in the improvement of the electric power transmission and distribution system. Reinvestment of the earnings of the Govern- ment-owned Taiwan Power Company and sizable U.S. private loans have also made important contributions to financing power developments. Today Taiwan has 36 generating stations, 25 of which are hydro- electric plants. In the Far East the island is second only to Japan in power production. Power rates are among the lowest in the world, and a high percentage of the rural as well as the urban areas is supplied with electricity. Industry, particularly aluminum re- fining and the manufacture of chemical fertilizers, is the major consumer. One of the major hydroelectric undertakings now in the con- struction stage is the multipurpose Shihmen Dam, with a generat- ing capacity of 120,000 kilowatts. The Government is also explor- ing the possibility of constructing nuclear power facilities. Taiwan’s coal production is sufficient for the island’s current needs, and there is a small exportable surplus. Almost all of the island’s estimated 100-200 million metric ton reserve is in bitumi- nous coal and occurs in characteristically thin seams which are difficult and costly to mine. U.S. assistance has been devoted to the exploration and development of new mines and the modernization of present equipment and methods. The geological structure of the island gives Taiwan a good potential for being a petroleum producing area, and surveys of oil resources are now underway. Current production, however, is very small. Natural gas production is of greater importance, supplying a significant portion of domestic fuel requirements. Minerals and Mining Aside from coal mining, the extraction of minerals is a relatively minor factor in the island’s economic development. Copper is the most important industrial metal produced; however, the large 33 domestic demand exceeds current production by between 10 and 20 percent annually. Limestone is the most abundant and the most widely exploited mineral. Taiwan also produces sufficient quanti- ties of the basic construction materials such as sand, gravel, clay, building stone, and glass sand to meet all of its own requirements. It also produces all or the bulk of its requirements for gold, silver, pyrites, sulfur, and serpentine and some of its requirements of asbestos and tale. Solar salt is produced in quantities sufficient for export. Manufacturing and Processing Taiwan has over 14,000 separate manufacturing and processing enterprises. Over 40 percent of the U.S. project assistance is in- vested in the development of this sector of the economy, particu- larly in the fertilizer, paper, and chemical industries. Smaller amounts of American aid have been used to develop other indus- tries, including cement and ceramics production, wood products and logging projects, and metal production and processing. A section of the Taiwan Aluminum Corporation in Kao-hsiung, which produces aluminum ingots, machine parts, bus bodies, electric cables, and many other important products. Stacks of bagasse board, widely used in construction, await shipment from the Changhua mill of the Taiwan Sugar Corporation. Bagasse, left over from sugarcane after pressing, was formerly considered and used only for fuel. The largest earner of foreign exchange for the Taiwan economy is the sugar industry which is responsible for about 14 percent of the total industrial output. This industry is dominated by the Government-owned Taiwan Sugar Corporation, which was formed by consolidating five of the sugar companies developed by the Jap- anese. In addition to sugar, this corporation also produces molas- ses, yeast, alcohol, and bagasse board. Pineapple canning is also of high commercial importance and efforts are being made to expand the export market for pineapples. The production of fertilizer is the most important of Taiwan’s chemical industries, and, because the farming population is so dependent upon adequate supplies of reasonably priced fertilizers, it is regarded as a public utility by the Government. Next to power the fertilizer industry has received the largest amount of American 35 aid for plant expansion. Development projects underway will make the island nearly self-providing in nitrogenous fertilizers, though smaller amounts of phosphate and potash fertilizers will still have to be imported. Relatively small amounts of American aid have been invested in the textile industry which ranks second to food processing and accounts for about 16 percent of the total value of factory produc- tion. Developed almost entirely since the end of the war with refugee capital and machinery brought from the mainland, the industry’s $100 million production in 1958 filled domestic require- ments and provided some exports to Asian markets. Con- centrated in cotton today, the industry started production of rayon in the latter part of 1957. Production of basic metals, metal products, and machinery ac- counted for about 9 percent of all manufacturing in 1958. Metal production is mostly for the local market, though there are signifi- cant exports of aluminum ingots. In 1957 Taiwan produced more than half of domestic requirements for steel sheets, galvanized iron, and tinplate and about half of her total requirements for iron and steel products. The raw materials for most of these industries must be imported. Production of machinery of all types has been expanding con- siderably. Taiwan now produces threshing machines, jeeps and light trucks, tool-making machinery, refrigerators, electric fans, and light bulbs. Current development plans call for increased ex- ports in this category as markets are developed in Asia. Petroleum refining, concentrated in a Government-owned estab- lishment at Kao-hsiung, utilizes imports of Middle Eastern oil. At the end of 1958, refining capacity was about 27,000 barrels daily. Fuel oil, gasoline, kerosene, and asphalt are produced, and pro- duction of high octane aviation gasoline was begun in 1958. Other important industries are cement, plastics, wood and wood products, paper and paper products, rubber, jute processing, ship- building, and ship repair. Transportation and Communications The railroad, highway, and telecommunications systems built by the Japanese during their occupation of Taiwan were second only to their own in the Far East. These facilities were heavily damaged during the war, and repair and replacement of equipment was grossly neglected. Since 1950 U.S. aid funds have been used 36 to repair and extend these facilities which are today better and more efficient than ever before. With the exception of a scenic highway running along the high cliffs of the east coast, the major railroads and highways are concentrated in the western lowlands. The first major cross-island highway is to be completed in 1959. Railroads are the most important means of freight and pas- senger travel. The main rail system is operated by the Taiwan Railroad Administration, an agency of the Provincial Govern- ment. Its equipment, largely of Japanese manufacture, is old, though in excellent condition, and extensive modernization is underway. The system is now operating at near-capacity levels and is being expanded to keep pace with Taiwan’s industrializa- tion and growing population. A dense network of highways and allweather roads supplements the rail lines and serves the increasing number of motor vehicles— there were 11,000 in 1956. Beasts of burden, carts, and human porters are still used extensively, particularly for the transporta- tion of agricultural products. Telephones are the most important communications medium, supplemented by telegraph and microwave radio links to remote areas. Radio broadcasting reaches all parts of the island. Trade and Balance of Payments Requirements for military defense and economic development necessitate imports of capital goods and raw materials beyond the capacity of Taiwan’s export earnings. A government control policy has placed limitations upon the imports of consumer goods and nonessential items and over the past several years imports have been held at a fairly stable level. Taiwan’s most important trading partner is the United States. About 40 percent of Taiwan’s total imports—between $80 and $100 million annually—come from this country. Machinery, ve- hicles, chemicals, drugs, lubricating oil, certain foodstuffs, soy- beans for animal feed, raw cotton, and tobacco leaf are among our principal exports to Taiwan. Since the United States buys only about $4 to $6 million worth of Taiwan’s goods each year—largely citronella oil, tea, straw hat bodies, and crude feathers—Taiwan’s imports of U.S. goods are largely financed by U.S. aid dollars. Taiwan’s second most important trading partner is Japan, which in 1957 supplied one-third of the island’s imports. Under a barter 37 agreement with Japan, imports and exports are kept roughly in balance, though imports exceeded exports by $5 million in 1957. Japan is a major source for Taiwan’s imports of steel-mill products, machinery, and chemical fertilizers. The bulk of Taiwan’s exports to Japan are in sugar and rice, though bamboo, canned pineapple, hat bodies, and dried vegetable products are also important. Most of Taiwan’s requirements of crude oil for petroleum refin- ing are imported from Middle Eastern countries, while Malaya is her most important source of latex and crude rubber, bauxite, tin, iron, and iron ore. Exports from Taiwan to these countries are largely in sugar and sugar products. The future of Taiwan’s trade will depend upon the ability of the Government to decrease dependence upon imports, expand produc- tion of export products, and develop its world markets. Great advances are being made in some fields. Many consumer products such as wheat flour, cotton textiles, and window glass, once im- ported in significant quantities, are now export items. And a wide variety of the products of Taiwan’s industries are beginning to take their place in world markets. Despite a rapidly rising population which must be provided for, there unquestionably will be some improvement in Taiwan’s trade position as industrialization continues. However, so long as Tai- wan is compelled by the Communist Chinese threat to support a defense effort of present proportions, the island will continue to have a trade deficit which will have to be met by foreign assistance and loans. 38 THE “PEOPLE’S LIVELIHOOD” Dr. Sun Yat-sen, in establishing the principles guiding the Re- public of China, emphasized the Government’s responsibility to concern itself with the basic needs of the people and their social welfare. In keeping with this principle the Chinese Government has evidenced an active concern in improving the living standards of its people and, despite the sacrifices necessary to maintain its defense effort, has promoted vigorous social welfare programs. Standards of living in Taiwan today are high by Far Eastern standards. An average per capita income of $100 per year, in an economy where basic foodstuffs are cheap, is sufficient to provide at least the necessities of life for the great bulk of the population. Wages, particularly for industrial workers, have been rising faster than living costs, and welfare services of all kinds have been steadily improving. Labor While unemployment is negligible in Taiwan, there is a serious problem of underemployment, a portion of the labor force earn- ing its livelihood through seasonal or self-provided occupations. At the same time there is a shortage of skilled workers and tech- nicians to meet the needs of the growing industrial sector of the economy. Under the technical assistance program the United States has been assisting China to develop facilities in the field of vocational and technical education and has provided training in the United States and other free countries for specialists in various categories. 39 Cooperative arrangements have been established between such institutions as Pennsylvania State University and Taiwan Pro- vincial Normal University, and Purdue University and Cheng Kung University to assist the Chinese institutions in developing their technical curricula and expanding their teaching facilities. U.S. specialists have worked with the Taiwan Highway Bureau, the Taiwan Power Company, and the Taiwan Telecommunications Ad- ministration, assisting them to develop their own programs for inservice training for the skilled workers they need. The United States has also assisted in the development of model community schools which provide instruction in skills directly related to the immediate problems of the community which they serve. Labor-management relations in Taiwan are good, being gov- erned for the most part by traditional Chinese practices which clearly define the rights and duties of each party. The few labor- management disputes-which do oceur are quickly settled by ad hoc government arbitration. There are an estimated 220,000 labor union members. Social Security About 375,000 workers are now covered by a comprehensive government labor insurance scheme providing benefits for disa- bility, injury, death, old age, maternity, and disease. Social secu- rity is also provided by a number of private organizations such as the merchant guilds, rural cooperatives, and professional organiza- tions. These measures, together with the strongly ingrained traditions of family cooperation in time of distress provide the people of Taiwan with a high degree of economic security. Nutrition and Health Standards of nutrition are good and there is no shortage of basic foods for anyone. The traditional “poor man’s food” of Taiwan, the sweet potato, has now been replaced by rice as the main diet staple. Though Taiwan still has its health problems, many of the most dreaded diseases such as cholera, plague, and malaria have been entirely or virtually eliminated. Because of the lag in improve- ment of environmental sanitation, diseases such as tetanus, tra- choma, and skin and enteric disorders are still common, and 40 tuberculosis is a serious problem. However, basic health facilities are increasing rapidly and the outlook for improvement is excellent. Taiwan now has 12 general hospitals and a number of branch hospitals and specialized institutions. There is an excellent net- work of rural health stations developed with the assistance of the JCRR, and basic health education is included in the curricula of primary and secondary schools. The shortage of doctors is being alleviated by the encouragement of medical education in Taiwan and abroad. Housing The influx of two million mainland refugees to Taiwan created a drastic shortage of housing facilities which has not yet been eliminated. Even families in the middle income group are often forced to accept substandard living accommodations. With the assistance of the U.S. International Cooperation Ad- ministration, the Chinese Government has developed a self-help low-cost housing program to enable workers to build their own homes, and has encouraged housing development by the enactment of regulations conducive to investment in housing and through demonstration projects in home construction. Al UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE The basic purposes of U.S. aid to the Republic of China are to assist that country to build the military strength and economic stability necessary for its continued independence and freedom, and to increase its economic productive capacity for self-support. The tremendous efforts of the Government and the people of free China, along with U.S. aid, during these critical years on Taiwan enabled them to attain their present degree of military strength and security and to achieve their present record-breaking produc- tion levels in agriculture and industry. Changing Conditions The U.S. economic aid program for free China has been modified over the years to suit the changing conditions of the island’s econ- omy. During the early period when the economy was in a state of virtual chaos due to the destruction and dislocation of war, the U.S. program was one of relief and rehabilitation. Foodstuffs, medical supplies, textiles, and fuels were shipped to Taiwan to meet the immediate needs of the population. By the middle of 1951 the situation had been somewhat alleviated. A program of repair and replacement of basic industries began to get underway, and a large portion of U.S. aid was used for the re- habilitation of power production facilities, the transportation sys- tem, and the chemical fertilizer industry. In 1951 the United States enacted the Mutual Security Act which sparked a program of greater financial and technical assistance to China, particularly in the field of industry. Additional assistance was also provided to implement programs in public health, educa- tion, and public administration. By 1952 the efforts of the Chinese 42 Government and the U.S. aid program had brought a measure of stability to the island’s economy. Thethreat of inflation had abated and rehabilitation had been substantially completed. The economy of Taiwan moved into a new phase of development and free China began the task of expanding production facilities and developing new industries. During the 1951-57 period U.S. economic aid to the Chinese Government averaged $90 million annually. For the fiscal year ending in June 1958 it was $60 million, reflecting a general cut in U.S. aid funds throughout the world. Economic aid is administered by the International Cooperation Administration, which works closely with the Chinese Council for U.S. Aid. Military Assistance Since 1951 the United States has provided free China with a substantial amount of direct military assistance in the form of mili- tary equipment and materials for her defense forces. Under this program a U.S. Military Advisory Group has worked closely with Chinese military officials in reorganizing and training the Chinese armed forces. This military aid is administered by the Department of Defense. Defense Support To support her great defense effort Taiwan must have a stable and progressive economy. The island must produce enough food for its civilian as well as its military population. A modern defense structure requires a modern and efficient transportation and com- munications system. Taiwan’s industries must produce not only materials directly needed for defense but also consumer goods and export goods. The major portion of current U.S. economic aid to the Chinese Government—$70 million of the $73 million appropriated for fiscal year 1959—is classified as “defense support.” This aid is given for the development of power production and expansion of industry, for the improvement of agriculture, and for building and improving transportation and communications facilities. While its primary purpose, as its name indicates, is to support free China’s defense effort, it results in considerable long-range benefits to Taiwan’s civilian economy. 43 President Chiang Kai-shek and Madame Chiang inspect a temporary suspension bridge during construction of the cross-island highway. Technical Assistance Technical assistance—the sharing of knowledge, techniques, and skills—has been an important adjunct to our defense support pro- gram. The $3 million allocated to this type of assistance for fiscal year 1959 has been used to train Chinese specialists in such fields 44 as agriculture, health, education, industry, labor, transportation, housing, engineering, public administration, and similar fields directly related to economic development and improvement of standards of living. Also under this program American techni- cians and specialists have been sent to Taiwan to advise the Chinese on particular development projects or to conduct training pro- grams for Chinese technicians. Under the current program about 60 U.S. Government-employed technicians are on Taiwan as technical advisers or as instructors. In addition, more than this number are on Taiwan under contract arrangements with private industries and institutions. For ex- ample, the J. G. White Engineering Corporation has about 25 specialists on Taiwan as advisers on basic industrial development problems. Another American firm is providing engineering services for the construction of the Shihmen Dam. Since the beginning of the technical assistance program over 1,000 Chinese have come to the United States or have been sent to other countries for specialized training, particularly in the fields of agriculture and natural resources, industry and mining, educa- tion, and health and sanitation. Development Loan Fund U.S. aid to the Republic of China is also given on a loan basis through the Development Loan Fund established by Congress under the Mutual Security Act of 1957. Such aid provides a means of financing long-range economic development. A total of $300 million was appropriated by Congress for the initial operation of this fund for all underdeveloped countries. By June 30, 1959, loans totaling over $39.5 million had been approved for Taiwan, includ- ing loans to the Shihmen Development Commission, to the Taiwan Railroad Administration, to the privately owned Asia Cement Corporation, and to the Taiwan Land Bank for expansion of the deep-sea fishing fleet. Counterpart Funds In addition to American dollar funds, there are the so-called “counterpart” funds—local currency generated by the sale of com- modities furnished through U.S. assistance. These funds belong to the Chinese Government, but their use must be approved by the 45 U.S. Government to assure consistency with mutual security program objectives. Surplus Agricultural Commodities U.S. aid which is not allocated for use in specific development projects in Taiwan has been provided increasingly in the form of surplus agricultural commodities, mainly cotton and wheat. The local currency sales proceeds from these products are used to meet part of the local costs of military construction, training, and supply projects, the balance to be devoted to essential projects in the civilian economy. 46 U.S.-CHINESE CULTURAL COOPERATION There is a long tradition of cooperation in education and cultural affairs between the United States and China, and since the early 19th century many American private institutions have engaged in activities to promote understanding between the two countries. On the official level, the United States in 1924 decided to devote the remaining Boxer Indemnity Funds, paid by China, to assist Chi- nese students to obtain education in the United States. Some 2,000 Chinese came here to study under this program. During World War II the United States used $800,000 of the President’s Emer- gency Fund, together with a like amount provided by the Chinese Government, to enable over 1,700 Chinese students to complete their education in the United States. After the end of the Second World War Chinese students came to the United States in large numbers. At the beginning of the 1948-49 academic year over 3,900 were studying in the United States, supported mainly by private Chinese funds. With the Communist takeover of the mainland, many of these students found themselves in serious financial difficulties since they were no longer able to receive support from their homes. Many of the American institutions at which these students were enrolled gave what financial assistance they could in the form of scholarships and grants, but it soon became evident that private sources would be unable to provide all the money needed. The United States, therefore, instituted a Program of Emergency Aid to Chinese Students. When this program ended in June 1955, a total of $7.9 million in U.S. funds had been used to assist 3,641 students to complete their education in the United States. 47 Educational Exchange A limited program of educational exchange between the United States and the Republic of China was carried on under an agree- ment signed in 1947 under the terms of the Fulbright Act. This program became inoperative when the Chinese Government moved its seat to Taiwan. In 1952 exchange activities were resumed under the terms of the Smith-Mundt Act, which authorizes the expenditure of U.S. funds to promote exchanges of American and Chinese students, teachers, lecturers, research scholars, and specialists. On November 30, 1957, the United States and China signed an agreement reactivating the exchanges under the Fulbright pro- gram. This agreement provides for the expenditure of Chinese currency in an amount equivalent to $750,000 for the exchange of students, teachers, lecturers, and research scholars. during a 3- year period. This Chinese currency becomes available as a result of the sale of U.S. surplus agricultural commodities to Taiwan. Thus the program of educational exchanges in the future will be able to draw on Chinese currency as well as the American dollar funds appropriated under the Smith-Mundt Act. Since 1952 over 150 Chinese have come to the United States under these programs and about 25 Americans have visited Taiwan. Cultural Presentations In 1954 the United States inaugurated a program to provide as- sistance and encouragement to American cultural and athletic groups to undertake tours in countries abroad to demonstrate the cultural interests, developments, and achievements of the United States. Arrangements for such presentations are made through normal private channels and U.S. funds are used only to make up any deficit which the groups may incur as a result of their tours. Since 1955 a number of musical and athletic groups have had very successful engagements in Taiwan. These include the Los Angeles Philharmonic Orchestra, the Westminster Choir, the San Francisco Ballet, and the San Francisco Chinese-American basketball team. Several presentations are planned for the coming year. 48 U.S. Information Program The United States conducts an information program in free China to explain American policies and foster better Chinese under- standing of U.S. institutions. Chinese and English language programs, beamed at the China mainland and Southeast Asia for 1914 broadcast hours a day, are heard also on Taiwan. In addition, other brief daily U.S. broad- casts are carried over the Broadcast Corporation of China, the Voice of Free China, and a number of commercial stations on Taiwan. Six U.S. libraries and reading rooms in key centers have ex- tensive circulating collections of English- and Chinese-language books. In fiscal year 1959 a total of 169,084 readers visited these libraries and circulation of books reached 103,244. The United States also sponsors translations into Chinese of books which are intended to promote sympathetic understanding of the United States. The United States arranges exhibits, such as the very popu- lar one on atoms for peace, in the major cities of Taiwan, and small traveling photo displays are shown in smaller centers. A U.S. bimonthly publication featuring stories about American life and Chinese-American cooperation has a circulation of 30,000 per issue, larger than any other similar magazine on Taiwan. 49 FOREIGN POLICY A primary consideration underlying the policies of the Govern- ment of the Republic of China is the firm belief that all of China shall one day be free of Communist control. The policies of the Government are designed to further this end by building up the military, political, and economic strength of free China and by exploiting whatever opportunities may arise to weaken the Chi- nese Communist regime and create a situation favorable to the reestablishment of the Republic on the mainland. In 1958 President Chiang Kai-shek stated that the Republic’s leaders had “‘never conceived the struggle with the Communists in the form of a war whereby the armed forces of one country are pitted against the armed forces of another country each backed by its own people. The people on the mainland are no enemy. They are our own people, and we know definitely that they are absolutely opposed to the Communists .. . this is a revolutionary struggle for their deliverance from Communist tyranny, and we shall use 30 percent military strength and 70 percent political strength to attain our objective.” In the Sino-American joint communique issued October 23, 1958, the Chinese Government asserted that its mission of restoring freedom to the people on the mainland is to be accomplished principally by carrying out the ‘‘Three People’s Principles” of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and not by the use of force. Were the Chinese Communist regime to take a similar stand, the situation in China would be like that in Germany, Korea, and Viet-Nam—all divided countries, where neither side is attempting to overthrow its adversary by force. However, the Chinese Com- munists adamantly refuse to renounce force against Taiwan and 50 the offshore islands and insist that they have a so-called right to attack the Republic of China whenever they choose. The policy of the Government is to maintain its identity as the sole legitimate government of China and to build friendly relations with other free-world anti-Communist nations. It encourages collective defense efforts and opposition to Communist aggression - wherever it occurs and seeks to develop its own position as a lead- ing anti-Communist nation of Asia. It maintains its position as the sole representative of China in the United Nations and par- ticipates actively in the Security Council, the General Assembly, and a number of specialized agencies. The Government also seeks to retain to the highest possible degree the good will of the Chinese people in overseas Chinese com- munities. To this end it has taken measures to encourage overseas Chinese students to come to Taiwan for their education and has adopted regulations encouraging overseas Chinese to invest in enterprises on Taiwan and to support free China’s economic devel- opment. It also strives to secure the support of the population of mainland China and conducts a vigorous information campaign aimed at the mainland Chinese through shortwave radio and leaflets. Conscious of the present limited resource base of free China and its dependence upon external aid, the Government relies upon the United States for considerable military and economic assistance. A recognition of the community of many interest: of the Republic of China and the United States and of our joint stake in preserv- ing the security of Taiwan and in building up free-world strength in the Pacific in the face of militant Communist expansionism has been the basis for cordial and friendly relations between the two Governments. United as allies in World War II, the United States and free China are again associated in a close and friendly alliance against the forces of tyranny and aggression. Attitudes Toward the United States When in May of 1957 rioting broke out in Taipei resulting in damage to American Government buildings, the event was inter- preted by some as an indication of widespread anti-American sentiment among the people of Taiwan. Such is not the case. It has been established that the unfortu- nate incident was a spontaneous emotional outburst sparked by the acquittal by a U.S. Army court-martial of an American soldier 51 who had shot and killed a Chinese citizen. The Chinese Govern- ment expressed profound regret over the damage done to American property and took immediate measures to punish those hoodlum elements which were primarily responsible. It is generally recog- nized that the United States is widely respected and admired by the people of free China, who are aware of the importance of our assistance in preserving Chinese independence and of the long history of good relations between our Governments and peoples. 52 UNITED STATES POLICY The United States has consistently supported the Government of the Republic of China as the government of China and as the only government entitled to represent China in the United Nations. We have consistently opposed attempts to unseat representatives of the Chinese Government and seat representatives of the Commu- nist regime. With regard to the Communist regime, which holds power on the mainland by means of force and repression, it is U.S. policy to abstain from any act which would enhance that regime’s ability to realize its expansionist ambitions. We do not recognize the Communist regime, we oppose its seating in the United Na- tions, we maintain a strict embargo on all trade with mainland China, and we do not sanction cultural exchanges with the Peiping regime. Our fundamental policies toward China today enjoy strong sup- port in both major U.S. political parties. By virtually unanimous votes the Congress on a number of occasions has expressed its firm approval of our present policy of opposition to seating the Chinese Communist regime in the United Nations, and has by specific reso- lution endorsed our defense commitments to the Republic of China. The reasons for continued U.S. recognition of and support for the Republic of China are many. This policy, while stemming primarily from considerations of the highest national interest of the United States, is also rooted in principle. Among the most important considerations underlying our China policy are the security interest of the United States and that of the free nations of Asia, which is a part of our own security. Taiwan is a Vital link in the free world’s island chain of defense in the Pacific. If it should fall into Communist hands, Japan, the Philippines, and all of Southeast Asia would be more vulnerable to Chinese Commu- nist aggression. At the present time the strong defense forces of the Republic of China and our defense commitment to that Govern- 53 ment constitute a deterrent to further military aggression by the Peiping regime and are important to the security of the Pacific area. Were the United States to abandon its ally, the Republic of China, the other free nations of Asia who seek to remain free of Communist enslavement would feel that they could no longer rely on the United States. Without the assurance that the United States is ready to stand by its commitment to defend Taiwan, they would be under strong pressure to make the best of the situation by seeking some form of accommodation to Peiping. Another important consideration underlying our policy is the long-range interest of the Chinese people themselves. Free China on Taiwan is an important symbol and a rallying point for Chinese everywhere who seek an alternative to the harsh repression of the Communist regime. It offers an alternative focus for the loyalties of those overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia who have retained their sense of Chinese identity. Were these overseas Chinese to become automatically citizens or “wards” of Communist China, many of them could be placed under pressure to serve the interests of that regime in the countries of their residence and would have a dangerous potential for subversion. It is a fundamental assumption of U.S. policy that communism is not “the wave of the future” and that in the long run free governments will prevail. As former Secretary of State John Foster Dulles said: We can confidently assume that international communism’s rule of strict conformity is, in China as elsewhere, a passing and not a perpetual phase. We owe it to ourselves, our allies, and the Chinese people to do all that we can to contribute to that passing. The Communist regime of China, by its declared intentions and by its actions has branded itself as an international outlaw and has destroyed any claim it might have had to membership in the society of nations. Also in the words of Mr. Dulles: Internationally the Chinese Communist regime does not conform to the practices of civilized nations; does not live up to its international obliga- tions; has not been peaceful in the past and gives no evidence of being peaceful in the future. Its foreign policies are hostile to us and our Asian allies. Under these circumstances it would be folly for us to establish relations with the Chinese Communists which would enhance their ability to hurt us and our friends. It is for similar reasons that the United States opposes the seat- ing of Communist China in the United Nations. Secretary Dulles summarized our policy on the matter as follows: The Republic of China is entitled to a permanent seat and veto power in b4 the Security Council. Should a regime which in 7 years has promoted five foreign or civil wars—Korea, Indochina, Tibet, the Philippines, and Ma- laya; which itself has fought the United Nations and which today stands condemned by the United Nations as an aggressor; which defies the United Nations’ decision to reunify Korea, and which openly proclaims its con- tinuing purpose to use force—should that regime be given a permanent seat, with veto power, in the body which under the charter has “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security?” Background of U.S. Policy In June of 1950 the invasion of the Republic of Korea by Com- munist forces posed a military challenge to the whole free-world position in East Asia and had an inevitable effect on U.S. policy. Our Government determined that under the circumstances the security of Taiwan was of such importance to the United States that the U.S. Seventh Fleet should be deployed in its defense. President Truman explained this development in our policy in a statement of June 27, 1950, when ordering U.S. air and naval forces to give the forces of the Republic of Korea cover and support in resisting the Communist invasion. He said: The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that communism has passed beyond. the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed, invasion and war. It has defied the orders of the Security Council of the United Nations issued to preserve international peace and security. In these circumstances, the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area. Accordingly, I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. As a corollary of this action, I am calling upon the Chinese Gov- ernment on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. The Seventh Fleet will see that this is done. U.S. aid to the Republic of China was increased considerably in 1951 to help that Government to build up its self-defense capacity and to assist it to achieve economic stability. A U.S. Military As- sistance Advisory Group was sent to Taiwan to work closely with Chinese defense officials in reorganizing, reequipping, and training the Chinese armed forces and increasing their combat effectiveness. Orders to Seventh Fleet Amended In his first state of the Union address on February 2, 1953, President Eisenhower declared that U.S. policy with regard to ay) China would be further strengthened. Referring to President Truman’s orders to the Seventh Fleet which, in effect, had neutral- ized Formosa, Mr. Eisenhower said: . since the date of that order the Chinese Communists have invaded Korea to attack the United Nations forces there. They have consistently rejected the proposals of the United Nations Command for an armistice. . Consequently there is no longer any logic or sense in a condition that re- quired the United States Navy to assume defensive responsibilities on behalf of the Chinese Communists... . I am, therefore, issuing instructions that the Seventh Fleet no longer be employed to shield Communist China. Permit me to make this crystal clear: This order implies no aggressive intent on our part. But we certainly have no obligation to protect a nation fighting us in Korea. The First Crisis in the Offshore Islands The Korean Armistice, concluded on July 27, 1953, brought the fighting in Korea to a halt, but in no way lessened the Chinese Communist threat to Taiwan. It was still the avowed purpose of the Peiping regime to take Taiwan by any means, including armed force. In July of 1954 the Chinese Communists launched an in- tensive propaganda campaign in support of this objective. In Sep- tember the island vf Quemoy was subjected to the heaviest bom- bardment in the 5 years since the Communist takeover of the main- land. In November the Peiping regime announced the sentencing of 13 Americans to long prison terms. Eleven of them were airmen of the United Nations Command in Korea who were held in clear violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement. The Communists by word and deed revealed their blatant hostility to the United Nations and the United States and their determination to use armed force if they believed that it would achieve their aggressive ends. Mutual Defense Arrangements It was against this background that the United States and the Republic of China concluded their negotiations for a treaty of mutual defense. The treaty, signed in December of 1954, is defen- Sive in purpose. In it the parties agree that they “separately and jointly by self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and com- munist subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability.” 56 Under the terms of the treaty, “Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific Area directed against the terri- tories of either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.” The treaty further provides that any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof ‘“‘shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the meas- ures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.” The area covered by the treaty is defined as Taiwan, the Pesca- dores, and the island territories in the west Pacific under the jurisdiction of the United States and “such other territories as may be determined by mutual agreement.” However, former Secretary Dulles assured the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the treaty area would not be extended without the consent of the Senate. In an exchange of notes signed a few days later it was agreed that any use of force from any of the territories under the Republic of China’s control, including the offshore islands, would be a matter of joint Sino-American agreement, except for action of an emer- gency character which is clearly an exercise of the inherent right of self-defense. Between the time of the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty and its entry into force on March 3, 1955, the situation in the west Pacific area became even more acute. Large-scale bombardment against the offshore islands continued. Menacing concentrations of Chinese Communist forces on the shores of the Formosa Strait gave indication of an immediate threat to the security of the Re- public of China. Attacks were launched and on January 21, 1955, the island of Ichiang fell to the Communists. In early February with American assistance the Tachen Islands were evacuated as being impractical to defend. All but 19 of the island’s 14,500.popu- lation, offered a choice of evacuation to Taiwan or remaining in their homes, chose to go to free China. On January 24 the President sent a message to the Congress pointing out the strategic importance of Formosa to America’s security and calling for prompt congressional action to discourage Communist aggression against the island. The President stated that, “In unfriendly hands, Formosa and the Pescadores would seriously dislocate the existing, even if unstable, balance of moral, 57 economic, and military forces upon which the peace of the Pacific depends. It would create a breach in the island chain of the West- ern Pacific that constitutes, for the United States and other free nations, the geographical backbone of their security structure in that ocean. In addition, this breach would interrupt north-south communications between other important elements of that barrier, and damage the economic life of countries friendly to us.” The President pointed to current Chinese Communist provocative political and military actions which established “a pattern of ag- gressive purpose ... the conquest of Formosa.” The Presi- dent took note of the heavy attacks being made upon the offshore islands and called attention to the fact that “The Chinese Commu- nists themselves assert that these attacks are a prelude to the con- quest of Formosa.” Mr. Eisenhower indicated that the United States believed that it would be appropriate for the United Nations to take action to end these hostilities. He added: Meanwhile, the situation has become sufficiently critical to impel me, without awaiting action by the United Nations, to ask the Congress to participate now, by specific resolution, in measures designed to improve the prospects for peace. These measures would contemplate the use of the Armed Forces of the United States if necessary to assure the security of Formosa and the Pescadores. The joint resolution as adopted by the Congress by an almost unanimous vote states that ‘“‘the secure possession by friendly gov- ernments of the Western Pacific Island chain, of which Formosa is a part, is essential to the vital interests of the United States and all friendly nations in and bordering upon the Pacific Ocean.” It specifically authorizes the President to employ the Armed Forces of the U.S. for the protection of Formosa and for “the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa.” This resolution was not designed to enlarge the defense obliga- tions of the United States beyond the terms of the treaty then awaiting ratification. Nor was it intended to enlarge the scope of the treaty area itself. The congressional resolution was intended to discourage Communist aggression by making clear beyond any doubt that the United States was prepared ‘“‘to fight, if necessary, to preserve the vital stake of the free world in a free Formosa.” Passage of the resolution immediately brought about an improve- 58 Life goes on in the offshore islands despite Communist attack. A woman prepares a meal in the ruins of her home on Quemoy. ment in the military situation in the Formosa Strait. The intensive Communist military activity ceased, at least temporarily. How- ever, the Communists continued to threaten that they intended to take Taiwan, by force if necessary. 59 While the United States was taking these measures to insure the security of Taiwan, within the United Nations diplomatic consultations were underway looking toward U.N. action on the situation. After rejecting a fraudulent Soviet accusation against U.S. “aggression” and “intervention” in Taiwan, the United Na- tions Security Council discussed the question of arranging a cease- fire agreement with regard to the Formosa Strait. However, the Chinese Communists refused to accept the invitation of the Security Council to participate in such discussions, on the grounds that the matter was an internal one not within the competence of the United Nations. This led to an impasse and the Council adjourned without taking action. Efforts to Achieve a Cease-Fire In August of 1955 the United States began a series of discus- sions on the ambassadorial level with representatives of the Chi- nese Communist regime at Geneva, to discuss the repatriation of American civilians illegally held on the mainland and ‘other prac- tical matters now at issue.” At the beginning of these discussions the United States made clear that they did not imply any recogni- tion on our part of the Communist regime. On September 10 the Ambassadors issued an agreed announce- ment containing statements by both sides that civilian nationals would be permitted to return to their own countries. The Chinese Communist statement said in part: The People’s Republic of China recognizes that Americans in the People’s Republic of China who desire to return to the United States are entitled to do so, and declares that it has adopted and will further adopt appropriate measures so that they can expeditiously exercise their right to return. Though the Communists alleged otherwise, at that time there was no resident in the United States who had evidenced a desire to go to Communuist China and who was being prevented from doing so. That was the case before the beginning of the ambassadorial talks and has continued to be the case to the present time. The Communists ceased to honor this pledge within a few months of the time it was made. Since December 1955 no Ameri- can prisoner has been permitted to leave Communist China until he had served his full sentence. Five Americans are in Communist jails today. After this agreed announcement had been made, the two sides proceeded to discuss “other practical matters at issue between 60 them.” The U.S. negotiator, Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, pointed out that progress in further discussions could not be ex- pected in the face of continuing Communist threats to take Taiwan by military force, and suggested that both sides agree to announce that they renounced the use of force generally, and particularly in the Taiwan area. The United States made clear that this renunci- ation of the use of force was not designed to commit either side to renounce the pursuit of its national objectives by peaceful means nor would it deprive either side of the right of individual and collective self-defense. The Chinese Communists flatly rejected any proposal which made mention of the Taiwan area and the recognition of the right of self-defense. In essence, the Chinese Communist position was that they were willing to renounce the use of force only if the United States first agreed that it would not oppose their use of force against Taiwan. This was tantamount to asking the United States to denounce its mutual defense treaty with the Republic of China and was, of course, wholly unacceptable to the United States. Renewed Attack on the Offshore Islands In August 1958 the Chinese Communists once again began in- tensive military activity in the Formosa Strait area. The islands in the Quemoy group were subjected to intensive bom- bardment by Chinese Communist artillery. At the same time the official Peiping radio repeatedly announced that the purpose of these military operations was to take Taiwan as well as the off- shore islands by armed force. These Chinese Communist objec- tives were strongly supported by their ally, the Soviet Union. In the face of this Communist military threat, the United States rendered substantial logistical assistance to the forces defending the offshore islands and made clear that we would stand by our commitment to defend Taiwan. A statement made by Secretary Dulles on September 4, after reviewing the situation with the President, included the following points. Neither Taiwan (Formosa) nor the islands of Quemoy and Matsu have ever been under the authority of the Chinese Communists. . . . The United States is bound by treaty to help to defend Taiwan .. . from armed attack and the President is authorized by Joint Resolution of the Congress to employ the armed forces of the United States for the securing and protecting of re- lated positions such as Quemoy and Matsu. Any attempt on the part of the Chinese Communists now to seize these positions or any of them would be a 61 crude violation of the principles upon which world order is based, namely, that no country should use armed force to seize new territory. Referring to the authority of the President, under the 1955 con- gressional resolution on Taiwan, to employ U.S. forces to defend the offshore islands as well as Taiwan, the Secretary went on to say: .. . the President has not yet made any finding under that Resolution that the employment of the Armed Forces of the United States is required or appropriate in insuring the defense of Formosa. The President would not, however, hesitate to make such a finding if he judged that the circumstances made this necessary to accomplish the purposes of the Joint Resolution. The United States, the Secretary declared in a later speech, “will not retreat in the face of armed force.” At the same time the United States is ready, he said, to settle the Formosa Strait dis- pute “in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered.” As the Secretary pointed out, the stakes involved in the offshore islands dispute are “‘not just some square miles of real estate. What is involved is a Communist challenge to the basic principle of peace that armed force should not be used for aggression.” The United States would find ac- ceptable any arrangement which “on the one hand did not in- volve surrender to force and, on the other hand, eliminated from the situation features that could reasonably be regarded as provocative.” During the height of the crisis the forces of the Republic of China put up a heroic and resolute defense. The garrison on the Quemoy islands held out despite the intensive Communist fire and attempts to interdict their supplies. The Chinese Air Force ran up an impressive record of victories in combat with the Com- munist Air Force. The United States, in deploying powerful naval and air forces to the Western Pacific during the crisis, demon- strated clearly the speed and effectiveness with which it was able to come to the support of free-world allies threatened by aggression. This strong defense by the Republic of China, together with the firm and determined policy of the United States, deterred the Chinese Communists from pressing home their attacks, and on October 6 they announced a self-imposed cease-fire. Although they subsequently renewed their attacks on Quemoy, they finally settled down to a pattern of alternate-day firing which they have continued in desultory fashion up to the time this pamphlet went to press. The ambassadorial-level talks between the U.S. and Chinese Communist representatives, which had been suspended since De- 62 cember 1957, were resumed at Warsaw on September 15, 1958. In a report to the American people on September 11 the Presi- dent expressed America’s hope that the issue would be settled by negotiation and diplomacy. The Communists, however, have adamantly refused to agree to any arrangement for tranquilizing the situation in the Taiwan Strait. They have also repeatedly re- fused to accept the mediation of any third power or reference of the offshore island situation to the United Nations. They have made it plain that they are not interested in the offshore islands for themselves. They insist that they must be permitted to seize Taiwan, the Pescadores, and the offshore islands ‘‘as a whole” and that the United States withdraw its forces from the Taiwan area. In October 1958, Secretary Dulles and other American officials went to Taipei for consultations with President Chiang Kai-shek and other members of the Chinese Government. In the joint communique issued at the conclusion of the talks the two Gov- ernments recognized that ‘under the present conditions the de- fense of the Quemoys, together with the Matsus, is closely related to the defense of Taiwan and Penghu.” The communique re- affirmed the solidarity of the two Governments in the face of the Chinese Communist aggression then manifesting itself in the bom- bardment of the Quemoys and declared: ‘‘This aggression and the accompanying Chinese Communist propaganda have not di- vided them, as the Communists have hoped. On the contrary, it has drawn them closer together.” This communique also states that the Republic of China con- siders that “the restoration of freedom to its people on the main- land is its sacred mission.” As has been mentioned, the Chinese Government also stated that the principal means of successfully achieving this mission is ‘‘the implementation of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen’s three people’s principles (nationalism, democracy, and social well- being) and not the use of force.” The Government of the Republic of China in 10 years on Taiwan has demonstrated its capacity for progress and growth and has manifested an active concern for the welfare and happiness of the Chinese people. As the trend toward economic growth and political progress continues, the Chinese Government will stand in increasingly favorable contrast to the ruthless and oppressive regime on the mainland. As time goes on, it will increasingly act as a magnet for the loyalties of the mainland Chinese who be- come disaffected with the Communist regime and it will continue to gain in stature as the Government which represents all of the Chinese people who desire freedom. 63 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE:1959 O—512700 DATE DUE | oS = a. f