es [Reprinted from the “Indian Antiquary.”] REVIEW. BY K. Tf. TELANG, LL.B. 4 HINDU LAW: =f. t e “ ¥ OR MAYUKHA AND. YaJWAVALKY o ye he Soir i aa | “BY RAO SAHEB V. N. MANDLIK, > C81, MLR.AS., &e. &e. ee i ia Boo Laaiea Bese cat rT Pes, " a ee REVIEW. Hinpu Law: or Mayikhaand Yaéjnavalkya. By Rao Saheb V. N. Mandlik, C.8.1, M.R.A.S., &e. &.* It has been known for several years past, that Rao Saheb V. N. Mandhk was engaged on a considerable work on Hindu Law. And as the result of his labours, we now have before us the Sanskrit text of the Maytkha, and the Yajnavalkya Smriti, with English translations; an elaborate introduction on the sources of Hindu Law; and a series of Appendices discussing special topics with reference to the decisions of British tribunals. Firstly, as to the text of the Maydtkha, an important consideration concerns the apparatus eriticus by which it has been settled. There are certain deficiencies which strike one here, and which are to be regretted. It does not appear that any MS. from Nasik was consulted. Yet Nasik is, or at least was, one of our chief centres of learning in Western India. No MS. again appears to have been obtained from the Nagpur district, which having been governed by afamily of Mard- tha Raéjas, would probably have yielded some useful copies of the legal work of a Maratha Brah- mara. Lastly, no MS. from Gujarath has been consulted; the one obtained having been discarded asincorrect. This, think, wasa very great mistake, * Bombay : Education Society’s Press: 1880. 4 having regard to the established doctrine of our courts, that the Maytkha is of special authority in Gujaréth. And it was but lately that the practical importance of this was illustrated. In a case argued before a Full Bench of the High Court in 1879, a passage having been cited from the text of the Maytkha as printed, but not then published, in the volume before us, Sir Michael Westropp inquired if there was any note in Mr. Mandlik’s edition upon the genuineness of that passage; and on its being stated that there was not, His Lordship pointed out, that Mr. Borrodaile had said that the passage was not to be found in the Gujarath MSS. examined by him. (See Stokes, Hindu Law Books, p. 70.) It is manifest that, as Sir Michael Westropp said, a text constructed without reference to any Gujarath MS. whatever cannot be satisfactory on such a point as this. It is unnecessary to say anything on the text of the Ydjnavalkya Smriti, except to point out that only one MS. has been used in settling it, the other copies used being printed ones. One very important part of this volume is the translation of the Mayikha. The only trans- lation available before the present one was Mr. Borrodaile’s ; and I may add the Marathi transla- tion published in 1844 under the direction of the Go- vernment of Bombay. The latter, so faras I have examined it, is a good one, but beingin Marathi, is not readily available to all. Mr. Borrodaile’s trans- lation was made almost in the infancy of European Sanskrit scholarship, by one who was not himself an advanced Sanskritist; and it was, therefore, 5 full of obscurities, inaccuracies, and mistakes. The translation before us is much better than Mr. Borrodaile’s ; but even this is far from being all thatis to be desired, or that might have been expected. In the Introduction it is said: “TI have tried to reproduce the original as nearly as possible.” Butin the very first stanza the words— “ A small [treatise] laying down juridical rules’ — involve a very wide and a very unnecessary, departure from WNilakantha’s text. “A little { treatise] on the determination of judicial proceed- ings” appears to me to be a much more literal, and at least equally mtelligible, rendermg. The particular inaccuracy here is doubtless a very small one. But I pomt to it, first, to show that the claim of the translator to have “‘reproduced the original as nearly as possible” cannot be admitted, and secondly, to illustrate what I conceive to be the beau ideal of a translation. A translation should be, so far as the varying idioms of the language of the text and translation permit, a rendering of the original word for word, This principle, which ought to be observed in all translations, requires to be specially so in the case of a work like the Mayikha, on the interpre- tation of which by judges, often not conversant with the original, depends the decision of questions of the highest practical importance. This principle, however, appears to be but little observed in the translation before us, and the passage just commented on furnishes one example of such non- observance. Another is furnished by the defini- tions of Vyavahdra which are to be found on the same page. he translation gives three alterna- 6 tive definitions; the text gives only two. Accord- ing to the translation, a Vyavahdra or judicial proceeding is ‘“‘a transaction which inculcates rules.” The original does not give this, which is a rather strange definition. ‘‘ The determination of [the party who has commitied| the unrecognised wrong (as) between the disputing parties” is an awkward expression, and not a very lucid one. I would suggest the following rendering of the whole definition: “A judicial proceeding is an operation instrumental in making known [where] the un- known violation of right [lies] as between contend- ing parties.’ The alternative definition, which is wrongly split up into two in the translation before us, may be rendered as follows :—‘ Or it is an operation in which plaimtiff and defendant are the actors, in which there are possession witnesses and evidence, and which is instrumental in deciding between conflicting arguments.” In the translation under review, the words, ‘“‘ which proposes to decide,’ are inaccurate, and have nothing corresponding to them in the translation of the first definition, while, nevertheless, the original expression occurs in the text in both places. This variance in the translations is the more re- markable, as the expression in the original is an established form in such cases (compare the notes on Siddhdnta Kaumud4, vol. 1., 253, in Taranatha’s ed.) To proceed, however; two lines after these definitions, we read in the translation: ‘‘ The latter part [of the definition] is” &c. What is the “latter part,’ and of which of the three defi- _ nitions given in the translation? On these pomts no explanation is forthcoming. The words really K é refer to the latter part of the second definition, by which vdda and vitan!dé are excluded from the definition of judicial proceedings. Véda and vitanld, I apprehend, do not mean what the — translator says they do, but bear here the same meaning as in the Nydya philosophy. For a brief English explanation of the terms, I may refer to Colebrooke’s Essays (Ist ed.), vol. I, pp. 293, 294. I cannet dwell on other inaccuracies of this sort which occur in the earlier sections of the translation, but proceed te the section on In- heritance, which, for all practical purposes, is most important in these days, and mistakes and maceuracies in which stand in special need of eorrection. Here, too, the limits of this notice preclude the possibility even of a full enumeration —let alone a discussion—of the mistakes and inaccuracies which Ihave noted. Ican only culla few of the more important ones. And first, I note sundry instances of variances in the rendering of identical expressions. These may be, and often are, immaterial. But having regard to the possible results of such variances (cf. on this the remarks at pp. 498-513 of this volume), they ought to be earefully avoided. Pitémahopdttd in Yajnavalkya IT. 121, is translated ‘received from the grand- father” at p. 32 (see also p. 215) and “ acquired by the grandfather” at p.43. At p.39 “if the mother be past child-bearing,” and “provided the mother’s courses have ceased,” are two renderings for iden- fical words in the texts of Narada and Brihaspati. At p. 51, “the definition and the defined” im 1. 4, and “an object and its attribute” in 1. 39, both correspond to @Bea! in the original, which, 8 accurately, is equivalent to “a technical naine and that. of which it is the name.” In the same passage, ‘imply’ in 1.39 of p.51, and ‘there arises the knowledge of” in 1. 5 of p. 52 are both render- ings of OUTAat which, be it remarked too,.is ex- pressed in one place only, and is to be understood and supplied from the context in the other. This is one class of maccuracies.. Another is to be found in the denotation of what words be- long to Nilakantha and what to his translator. These imaccuracies again are only sometimes material, but they detract from the-value of the work, and it must be remembered, too, thatit is not easy to say in any given case, that the inaccuracy ean in no possible event be material. At p. 331. 20, the words ‘in the second half of the text’ are printed between brackets, thus indicating that they are the translator’s; but if so, there is a word an- antara in the orginal which remains untranslated. Similarly in p. 34.1. 16 ‘it is better to conclude’ is printed between brackets, and yuktam in the origi- nal remains untranslated. At p.47 again, anapatya (childless) is omitted, and ‘who has no other son’ 1s printed between brackets. At p. 50, 1.28 vakydt is not translated; in the next line kathamchit meets the same fate. At p. 51, 1. 26, api is omitted from the translation; and so is eva at p. 52, 1. 1. These are instances of omissions in the trans- lation. There are others of additions made by the translator which are not shown as such. At p. 40, 1.3 “could not be recovered” is the trans- lator’s; the original is “‘ had not been recovered.” Again at p: 50,1. 16 “the donee” is an addition : it is not in Manu, and seems to be inconsistent with Nilakantha’s interpretation of Manu. The words “ provided the boy be” are also an addition not marked as such. The whole text of Manu, in truth, is here translated with much looseness. At p. 59, 1. 14 the words ‘the two expressions’ are interpolated by the translator, and not merely inaccurately but erroneously. There are no two ‘expressions’ to be considered here at all. Another class of defects to be noted is the manner in which Nilakantha’s notes on texts cited by him are translated. For instance, at p. 51, 1.13 we read, “‘ Now sadrisam means alike,” &c. To one whe reads the translation only without looking at the original, this must prove something of a erux. And in this particular passage there is a very special difficulty. The passage, on which the remark quoted is made, is the passage from Manu at p. 50, which is at a considerable distance from this remark itself. And sadiigam, too, has there been already translated “of the same class,” where- as we read here that it means “alike by family and qualities, not by class.” Further remarks on this passage will be made in the sequel. Another imstance of this kind of defect occurs on the same page. At 1.35 we read “ sarvam [means] wealth.” It is not, however, necessary to multiply these instances. They appear to be scattered over the whole book. ‘The defect could have been easily avoided by saying, instead of the last sentence, for instance, ‘‘‘the whole’ [means the whole] wealth.” And so in other cases. We now come to a far more important class of defegts, those, namely, where we find positive mis- B 10 takes. At p. 34, 1. 12f. we have Nilakantha’s opinion as to the effects of partition on ownership. The translation before us is liable to exception on more than one ground. The following I suggest as more close and more correct—‘ As to that, some (say) that the pre-existing ownership attaching to the aggregate wealth is extinguished, and a new one is created in one part of it. But as the sup- position of the extinction of a pre-existing owner- ship and the creation of another, involves a breach of the law of parsimony, the correct (opinion) is, that ownership, which even at first is produced only as attaching to a portion (of the aggregate wealth), is by partition shown to attach to parti- cular articles (out of the aggregate wealth).” In the translation in the volume before us, I think ‘joint’ is wrongly construed with ‘ ownership,’ as samudita in the text goes with dravya; and ‘particular ownership” is not a very lucid phrase, besides being not a close rendering of vilakshana svatva, of which it seems to be intended as an equivalent. I say ‘‘ seems,” because at 1. 16 the expression “ particular ownership” recurs, but the text has not vilakshana svatva there, but ekadésa- sthita, which does not occur in the previous clause. At p. 35, ll. 25 et seq. the text is wrongly construed, and the translation 1s consequently erroneous, and in fact seems to make the text self-contradictory, which it by no means really is. According to our translator, the view of the Péirva Mimdmsé, as stated by Nilakantha, would be, that by the precept Visvajiti sarvasvam daddti, the gift of a son or a daughter in the visvajit sacrifice is laid down. But Nilakantha does not say so at all. He dirst 11 says that ownership and its sources are to be learnt from popular usage, not the Sdstra. And he gives an illustration. The owner of a cow is the owner of the cow’s young ones. This, he says, is learnt from popular usage, not fromthe Sdstra, which nowhere lays down that birth from one’s cow is a source of ownership in the progeny. On this an objector says—“ If so, a man will be the owner of the children born of his own wife.” Nilakantha concedes this for the sake of argument, and says, “What then ?” The objector replies—“ If a man is the owner of his children, he must give them away when he makes a visvajit sacrifice. But the Pirva Mimdamsé has decided that children must not be given away.” The objector thus resorts to a reductio ad absurdum. Nilakantha meets him by saying that his reasoning is right except at its initial stage. He says, it does not follow, be- cause the young of one’s cow are one’s property, that therefore the children of one’s wife should be also one’s property, and he assigns the reason that one’s wife is not one’s property as a cowis. This analysis will show that the representation of the doctrine ef the Parva Mimdmsé contained in the translation before us is wrong ; in fact,it makes the Pirva Mimdmsé entirely set aside a distinct Vedic text, a bold proceeding which the text of the Mimdémsé shows it did not venture upon. The translation also, as we have said, makes the passage self-contradictory. For, according toit, the Péirva Mimdémsé says children are within the rule about the gift at the visvajit sacrifice. They can be so only by being regarded as a man’s property. And thus, although the Mimdmsdé might decide that 12 ’ they are not to. be given, it would be conceding that they are property. Yet Nilakantha, who denies that they are property, is by the translator made to say, that there is no difference between his doctrine and that of the Mimdmsdé. I have dwelt at some length on this, because the mistake in construing made here is one which recurs with some frequency in the translation, and because here it could net otherwise be made clear. Indeed, I am afraid, even a fuller discussion than this might he desirable. There are other instances of this sort. Ati p. 42, 1.16 the passage about the “two shares” is confused by a. mistake in construing it. According to the trans- lation, the words “ This text relates to one having an only son.” appear to be Nilakantha’s; and the words “for in the Madana Ratna, &c.,” appear to: be added:im support of the opinion expressed in the preceding clause. This.is quite. wrong, and the translation should run. thus:—‘[It is said] im the M. R. that this relates. to an only son, on. account.of the text of Sankha and Likhita, ‘if a man has one son (THIF) he may take two shares. to himself.’” The translation, however, proceeds— “The word eka (one) is used to.denote excellence,” &e. Whose words are these ? To what do they refer? The translator gives no information. The: translation ought really after setting out the text of Sankha and Likhita to go on thus: “ [Bat} in the Pdrijdta [it is said] the word eka (one): means excellent—according to the text of Amara— eka [means] chief, others, and only. The ultimate meaning (of ekaputra) is one who has a meritorious, son.” The result is that Nilakantha has here, as 13 elsewhere, only given the conflicting opinions of other writers. But the translation, so farfrom mak- ing this clear, rather obscures it. At p. 46, 1.2 e¢ | seq. again, we havea faulty translation. But this is not soimportant as that at p. 47, 1.28, where it is positively wrong. The cerrect translation is: ‘In the event of there being only debts, however, he (namely, the unseparated son) need not pay the debts at all, without taking, a share from those pre- viously separated.” Thisis the opinion of the May- ukha and also good sense. Now contrast with this the rendering before us—“ If there be only debts, the previously separated son is not at all bound to pay debts without receiving ashare of the heritage.” This is neither correct translation nor good sense. As, by the hypothesis, there are only debts, it is difficult to perceive of what“ heritage” theseparated son is to claim a share before paying them. At p. 50, 1. 26 purushdrtha is wrongly rendered by “affect visible interests.” At p. 51,1. 13f. we have again a serious blunder. The correct translation is, “| Now | Medhatithi [ says], that alike [means alike | by family and qualities, not by easte, and that — therefore Kshatriyas and others also can become © the adopted (sons) of Brahmanas and others. But Kullika Bhatta [says] alike [means alike] by easte. And thisiscorrrect. Because Yajnavalkya, after premising all the twelve [classes of | sons [in the verses | “the legitimate son is one born of a lawfully-wedded wife,” Xe. concludes thus :— “This law is propounded by me with regard to sons ef the same caste.” If the reader will compare this rendering with that in the translation before us and both with the original, he will perceive how 14 “possible” it was to “ reproduce” that origina] much more “nearly” than the translator has done. In the latter portion he will note the omission of api which we have translated “all”; he will note that “after enumerating . .. . observes” does not correctly represent anything in the text, and on _turning to Yajnavalkya II. 183 at p. 188 of the volume, he will find also that thereis no “ enumer- ation” there as distinct fromthe “ observation”: he willnote, too, that the words “ inthis manner,” after “enumerating,” do not answer to anything in the text, and are inexplicable where they stand. Inthe former portion, the reader will perceive an error of translation which makes the Maytkha appear self- contradictory. There, according to the translation before us, Medh&tithi is cited only for the pro- position about a Kshatriya being adopted by a Braéhmana, but the interpretation of Manu in the previous sentence is put as if it was Nilakantha’s own, which it clearly is not. For in-the very next line but one, Nilakantha quotes Kullika Bhatta. against Medhatithi, and agrees with and supports the former. Lower down, on the same page at l. 27, we have again an important mistake. I translate the text thus: “This might be a prohi- bition to the giver alone, if it had the character of being a prohibition of the gift of an eldest [son]. But that [character]. does not exist, as there is no proof [that it does emist], and as [the text| is only intended to declare the discharge of the [ancestral] debt by the mere declaration— (contained) in the words ‘ becomes possessed of a son’—of the status of being possessed of a son.”” In the translation before us, the familiar expression 15 mdndbhdvat is mistranslated—“for there is a want of affirmative [command].” How this mean- ing is evolved out of the expression referred to, I cannot imagine. Nor can I understand why an “affirmative command” is required to prescribe a “prohibition.” The lines 30-32 are also exceed- ingly obscure, mainly because they do not “ repro- duce as nearly as possible” the text of Nilakantha, which is lucid enough. I cannot now dwell on the mistake in the trans- lation at p. 52, l. 7 of the sentence about the word datirima (which is left uncompleted) ; nor can I stop todo more than inquire how the boy ‘bearing the reflection of a son’ can be, what it is said he should be, same or equal; nor to show that at p. 57, 1. 21, the rendering of Teraeara by “for evident worldly reasons” is at least inaccurate; nor yet to consider the important inaccuracies (amounting, in one instance, almost to a positive error) in the passage immediately following, which are mainly due to unnecessary deviations from the text. The space at my disposal being limited, I will only add two or three more cases: of im- portant errors. The first is the sentence summing \up the discussion in the passage last referred to. The translation runs as follows: ‘“ Therefore that permission of the husband indicated for a particular state (by YAjnavalkya) is laid down here [by Katydyana following Yajnavalkya], and is not a new rule laid-down (without prior autho- rity).” This is all wrong. The translation should run thus: “ Therefore in whatever state the per- mission of the husband is already laid down, [ for | that [state] only is [it] repeated here (i.e, in the 16 text of Vasishtha). Permission not already [ pre- scribed| is not prescribed. Therefore the widow has a right (to adopt) even without the direction of the husband.” It is necessary to explain this passage, a translation alone can never suffice in such cases. Nilakantha is dealing here with the _ text of Vasishtha, in which it is said, among other things, that a woman should not adopt without the husband’s permission. Upon that the question arises—is the necessity for this permission abso- lute ? Nilakantha says—No,; this is only a special case of the general rule, that a woman cannot perform any spiritual acts without the leave of some male relations. And as the general rule is that the husband ‘superintends the wife’s pro- ceedings during his lifetime, and other relations do so after his death, so the permission of the husband required is Only for’ an adoption during his life-time—after his death his permission may be dispensed with. In the light of this explanation, | let us now examine the translation before us. In the first place this passage is in the translation made to appear as a comment on Katyayana’s text. Thisis wrong. A bare outline of the argu- ment ‘shows this. After setting out Vasishtha’s text, Nilakantha says the permission of the hus- band is only for a woman whose husband is alive, not for a widow. Therefore Yajnavalkya has laid down the doctrine of woman’s dependence on the husband only in a particular state of life, and on others in other cases, and Katyayanaalso mentions the permission of husband, father, &c.,in particular states of life only. Therefore, &. as above set out. I think this shows the correctness of my view. he That view is also supported by the fact, that the sequel of the passage is again a commentary on another expression in the same passage from Vasishtha, and by the further fact that Katyayana says nothing expressly about adoption, which is the subject of discussion throughout this section of the Mayitkha, and in the particular passage before us. Again aptrvd is translated “new, without prior authority.” In the first place, ~ this is not in accordance with the Mimdmsd acceptation of the word, which is plainly intended here by the contrast with anuvdéda. Secondly, if the question of Katyadyana’s rule being not “new” is material, is not the question of YAajnavalkya’s rule being such also material? And if it is, what answer is forthcoming of that question P The truth is, there is no question here of ‘‘ novelty” or “authority” at all. The only question is, is the rule of Vasishtha to be treated as a distinct rule | by itself,—in which case the limitations laid down in it are those which must. be followed,—or is it to be treated as a repetition, with respect to one particular subject, of a general rule laid down elsewhere—in. which case the limitations laid down elsewhere will be imported into the rule P The latter is the correct view, according to Nilakantha. We now come to another passage. At p. 61 1. 16 begins a discussion about the two classes of adoptions. This passage in the translation is quite confused, owing to the translator talking now of the phrase ‘simple adopted,’ now of the rite of simple adoption, and now of the‘ simple adopted’ son himself. That confusion has nothing answering to it in the text of the Mdyitikha. I will not, however, 18 go into details here, except to draw attention to the word ‘illegal’ in 1. 33, which ought not to be used,. the original being merely ‘ prohibited.’ Take again the passage at p. 63, 1.37. A very important word is here omitted in the translation—namely eva. The sentence is so condensed that it is difficult to render it quite satisfactorily. I suggest the follow- ing rendering: ‘“ As to that, the power belongs to all who have more than one son, only as regards giving [one] not the eldest. And as regards acceptance [7¢ belongs] to those whose sons are dead, or to whom no sons have been born.” Still another mistake occurs at p. 77, 1.24. Noting, ew passant, that in the text of Brihaspati there cited, there shduld be the word ‘even’ before ‘if partition’ (line 23), I would draw attention to the remarks on that text which follow. Here again we have a mistake in construing the original' of a similar nature to those already referred to. The ’ translation should run as follows. . . . ‘ As for the text of Brihaspati. .. . [itis said] in the Smriti Chandrikd, that that refers to a wife having no daughter, but that one having a daughter obtains the immoveables also,—[while] Madhava [says], that it is intended as a prohibition of the sale, &c., of the inmoveables without the consent of the heirs.” I need not say anythmg upon the rendering in this volume, except that the sentence “ the prohi- bition of sale,” &c. at line 26ff. requires some explanation, according to the view of the translator. As it:stands, it seems to be quite irrelevant. IT need not go into further details to support the assertion I have made, that this translation falls very far short indeed of just expectations. eit ee done 19 The defects J have shown, and they are only a few out of those I have observed, will, I think, bear out that assertion. They seem to fall into four classes. We have words inserted in the translation which are not in the original, and are not always necessary for understanding it, and which too are not always denoted as translator’s additions. We have words in the original which are not re- presented at all in the translation. We have renderings which involve quite unnecessary devia- tions from the original. And lastly, we have renderings which are based on positive misconcep- tions of the text. Before closing this branch of the subject, I have only to add, that there are sundry passages where some note by the translator in ex- planation of the text was desirable. The passages at p. 73, 1. 30f. or p. 74, 1. 20f. may be referred to among other instances. This examination of the translation of the Maytkha has occupied so much space already, that I am unwilling to embark here upon a similar examination of that of the Ydjnavalkya Smriti. And for more than one reason such an examina- . tion is not necessary. I will, therefore, proceed now to make a few remarks on what is the more original portion of fthe volume before us, namely, the Introduction and the Appendices. The former mostly deals with the sources of Hindu Law. Passing over minor ‘matters, on which some- | thing might perhaps be fairly said by way of criticism of the author’s positions, we come to the discussion of the Smriti literature. In addition to a very considerable body of interesting and useful information regarding this, we have an 20 attempt made to fix the chronological positions of several of the principal Smriti writers. As that attempt is based merely upon the quotations in each Smriti, and as the critical accuracy of these Smritis is not above suspicion, these chronological conclusions must necessarily be taken as provi- sional only. I do not, however, clearly under- stand what our author means by saying (p. xxvi.) that “the mention of ancient rishis or sages in the Rigveda as pathikritah (indicators of the right path) would be an argument in favour of the antiquity of Smritis; because no works on Dhar- masdsira are ascribed to rishis except Sdtrds and Smritis.” If it is meant that the “ indication of the right path” was given in Smritis, the argu- ment proves too much;.for these Smritis, if any such ever existed, must have been older than the Vedas. Besides being unlikely, this conclusion is inconsistent with the Sanskrit Preface (or Upodghdta), where the old orthodox view is expressed, that the authority of Smriti texts yesults only from their bemg based on the Vedas. This brings us to the suggestion made in more than one place by ourauthor, thatthe Smritis record the customary law of the people (see pp. xxvi, xlin, lix). If this-is so, it is difficult to under- stand in what sense the authority of the Smritis rests on the Vedas. Again in speaking of Yajna- valkya (p. xl), our author speaks of the penances prescribed by him as being “now merely nominal caricatures of an ideal society which probably had no existence at any period beyond the mind of the writer of that digest, but which is certamly entirely inapplicable to the Aryan society as it 21 exists at the'present day.” This sentence is not particularly lucid or precise, but it seems to say that YAajnavalkya’s rules were never the actual govern- ing rules of any existing society. These passages taken together leave a very vague and unsatis- factory impression as to what is our author’s precise view about the Smritis. Two distinct lnes of thought seem to be indicated which are not anywhere brought into harmony. In one place, it is suggested, “that each Smvriti refers to a separate Sakha.” This is not a very precise ex- pression, but I understand it to mean that each Smriti records the practices of one Sékhd or: another. I do not know of any sufficient authority for this view; and the passage from the Nirnaya Sindhu rete ed to as such appears to me rather to point the other way. We next come to the Purdnas. Our author’s language here is rather misleading. For after enu- merating the eighteen Purdnas and Upapurdnas he goes on to add that ‘the Purdnas are distinctly alluded to in the Vedas.” One not familiar with the facts on this point is lhkely to carry away from this sentence the impression, that the Purdnas “alluded to in the Vedas” are the eighteen - mentioned. But I cannot think that our author. intended to convey so entirely erroneous an im- pression. Atthe same time I must point out, that the note on the passage above cited refers to and sets ont the Bhdshya of Sayana, which specifically mentions the Brihma Purdna, as one of those referred to. If our author really thinks that the Brdhma Purdna, &ec., were those alluded in the passage cited by him, I think it 22 desirable to point out, that in the comments on the passage from the Twittirtya Aranyaka also cited by him, Sayana gives a different interpretation, and what is, perhaps, of more importance, that in the Brihadéranyaka Upanishad where Purdnas are mentioned in the same way as in the Taittirtya Brdhmana, that is to say in company with the four Vedas and Itihdsa, SankarAcharya interprets the word to mean something very different from the Bréhma and other Purdnas. I do not wish to withdraw the dissent I have already expressed elsewhere from the late Prof. Wilson’s views about the Purdnas, especially having regard to what has been recently said by Dr. Bihler on that subject in his volume on the Apastamba and Gautama Stiras. But the view which is apparently sug- _ gested in the passage under discussion seems to me to run into the opposite extreme. I cannot stop to discuss here some of the other interesting points touched on in the Introduction, - such as the identification of the Aryas and their country ; the relations between the Manusmriti (as we have it) and the Mahabharata; the confusion about Janaka and Yajnavalkya. But I may express my regret, that our author has given no indication of the ‘“ very considerable bearing” of topics such as the Sdntis and the Vratas on “all questions of partition, succession, alienation, and contract.” That those topics form part of the Hindu Dharmaégdstra is wndoubted. And I do not deny that an appreciation of those topics may be of help in understanding the underlying principles of the Ddyabhdga section of the Dharma Sdstra. ButI stillthink that Rao Saheb Mandlik 23 makes a larger claim on their behalf than is quite sustainable, and at all events that some indications should have been furnished by him of the grounds upon which he bases that claim. The first two appendices are both the result of very considerable labour, and embody some very inter- esting information. The others deal more particu- larly with questions which interest the practical lawyer. Itis unfortunate, that the Rao Saheb’s views upon the important questions discussed should have been expressed too late for any prac- tical effect on our Courts. The propositions on the law of adoption and marriage, and the Sapinda relationship,* so laboriously discussed in these Appendices, are now too well established to be upset. The last has been settled by a decision of the Privy Council; that about the adoption of an only son has been settled by a decision of a Full Bench of the High Court of Bombay; and the principle of decision regarding marriage customs | has been laid down probably by too many judges of the High Court to be now upset by any Bench whatever. The points touching the Sapinda relationship, and the adoption of an only son, are ' both difficult ones. I cannot say, however, that Mr. Mandlik’s discussion of the grounds on which the positions he assails are based is satisfactory. The appendix on customary law contains a very useful collection of facts touching marriage customs in various parts of India, which must be * IT may note here that in this Appendix the word WTATeAT is wrongly explained at p. 362. The idea is not that of defiance of opposition but direct specifica- tion. Cf. Udyoga Parvan, chap. xlv, st. 9, Commentary. 24 of interest from more than one point of view. On customary law I would remark, that custom is necessarily vague; and everybody who has any practical acquaintance with the trial of cases in our courts, i which questions of custom arise for decision, must be aware of the very great difficulty there isin getting any satisfactory in- formation with regard to such questions from the witnesses called who generally take one side or the other in the struggle. There is no disinclina- tion on the part of our courts to give effect to customs when proved, except, indeed, such customs as the courts deem to be immoral or contrary to the positive legislation binding upon them. The difficulty isin ascertaining what the customs really are. A few months ago a case was tried in the High Court, in which one party alleged a custom of the Telangi Fulmal caste to the effect that the father of a minor might cancel his marriage during his minority without reference to the minor’s wishes. The documents produced from the caste records gave no support to the allegation, showing it to be based on a confusion of two very distinct matters. And yet some respectable members of the caste came into court to support that allegation. The truth seemed to be, that the witnesses—some of them intelligent ones—could not appreciate distinc- tions, which, to others, were quite manifest. Our author says that in his opinion, “itis wrong to apply English rules of custom to the determination of our native usages.” But he does not specify what English rules he objects to. Just before this he had said, ‘It will appear from this text that our indigenous law does not support the English 20 law in respect to custom, that it must be of a4 certain kind before it can he upheld.” I cannot make out whether ‘certain’ here means invari- able, well-established. But if it does, the word nitya in the text cited (and ef pdramparyakramd- gata &c. at p. xlvi) seems to show that the Hindu rule and the English rule are not very different. If that is not the sense in which “certain” is used here, it is unfortunate that the ' Rao Saheb has not made his meaning more specific ’ and clear. This notice has already extended to such limits, that I must forego the discussion of many other topics which are suggested in the volume before us. I can only say in conclusion that the volume is evidently the outcome of a great deal of labour; and embodies a great deal of very interesting and useful information, to which, I am afraid, the very imperfect Index at the end does but scant justice. KisuinitnH TRIMBAK TELANG. BOMBAY: PRINTED AT THE EDUCATION SOCIETY’S PRESS, Sak mi tists: © ECG DRY, Slag ide BONE HS, Kal ‘ +. : eA Ld f Poke Py ate re Ape weet ee orutee he wee ae ee 4 pln wen ete ade 7 mga ‘et 4 RE BER RREO Wt