THE ENGLISH IN INDIA: FROM PLASSEY TO SERINGAPATAM. A PAPER READ AT A MEETING OF THE BATH LITERARY AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION, FRIDAY, DECEMBER 4, 1891. BY SURGEON -GENERAL W. B. BEATSON, M.D. TN in [REPRINTED wiTH NorEs FROM THE “‘ BATH CHRONICLE. ”] Printed for Private Circulation. nae PA PPL amy! Siaaing THE ENGLISH IN INDIA: FROM PLASSEY TO SERINGAPATAM. A PAPER READ AT A MEETING OF THE BATH LITERARY AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION, FRIDAY, DECEMBER 4, 1891. BY SURGEON-GENERAL W. B. BEATSON, M.D. [REPRINTED WITH NoTES FROM THE ‘‘ BATH CHRONICLE.” ] Printed for Private Circulation. Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2023 with funding from Columbia University Libraries httos://archive.org/details/englishinindiafrOObeat THE ENGLISH IN INDIA: FROM PLASSEY TO SERINGAPATAM. It is not uncommonly believed that the famous battle of Plassey, fought on the 23rd of June, 1757 and won by the British, decided the future fortunes of India, but this is very far from being the truth. It is gratifying to the pride of Englishmen to be told how Clive, with his comparatively small army of 3,000 men, overcame the hosts of Suraj-ud-dowlah; but it must be remembered ,that at Plassey, Clive, born soldier though he was, owed more to his good fortune than to his military genius. Suraj-ud-dowlah was weak and cowardly, flattered but hated by his courtiers, conspired against and misguided by his ministers. His army, though it mustered in its ranks some of the best and bravest fighting men of India, was an undisciplined and divided force. When its Commander-in-Chief Meer Jaffir held back his division, he, of set purpose, gave victory to Clive, designing thereby to raise himself to power. The victory of Plassey made Clive a rich man. It made the English arbiters of the succession to the sovereignty of Bengal, but it was in no sense decisive of the fate of India. It was, indeed, a mere affair of outposts, the opening strife preceding a great duel that was to be fought by land and by sea, between the powers of France and England, for the possession of an Empire. That duel was to continue for more than forty years. It ended only in 1799, when the power of Tippoo Sultan, the 4 usurping ruler of Mysore, was overthrown, and Seringa- patam fell to the allied armies of the British and the Nizam of the Deccan. The story of the life of Clive, of his inborn military genius, untaught and developed only in the school of actual war, of his ‘‘ undaunted resolution, cool temper and presence of mind, which never left him in the midst of the greatest danger,” which made him a leader and a king of men :—That story has been told by Macaulay in an essay which will keep Clive’s memory green for ever in the minds of Englishmen. But Englishmen should never forget that the foundations of the British Empirein India were not laid by Clive alone, nor by the soldiers he led to battle. His first successes in Bengal and those of Forde, Brereton and Coote in the Carnatic, by which the power of the French in India was reduced, were made possible only by the aid of the Royal Navy of Great Britain, the Navy which was then, as it ‘must for ever be, the bulwark of her strength and the tower of her glory.” It must be confessed that the success of the British Naval Squadrons sent to India during the five years war that ended with the peace of Aix la Chapelle in 1749, was not great and gave no promise of future supremacy. The Navy of Great Britain was at that time much superior in stcength and number of ships to that of France at home, but in the Hast Indies France rather than England was mistress of the sea. Her superiority was due to her possession of a well fortified naval station in the Isles of France and Bourbon, otherwise called the Mauritius Here she had two harbours capable of containing ahundred sail and well provided with every requisite for the repair and even building of ships. Hence supplies and re- inforcements could always be dispatched to Pondicherry, the principal and well fortified settlement of the French on the Coromandel coast, sixty miles south of Madras. When the Naval Squadron, commanded by Commodore Barnett, arrived on the Coromandel coast, in 1745, it wa attacked and dispersed by a fleet sent from the Mauritius, and in the following year the French captured the British settlement of Madras. At this time the able French General and Minister, Labourdonnais, governed in the Mauritius, and Dupleix at Pondicherry. 5 These two great Frenchmen completely destroyed the naval and military prestige of the English by compelling Admiral Boscawen to abandon his attacks on the Mauritius and Pondicherry in 1748. When the siege of Pondicherry was raised, ‘‘the French, sang Te Deums, and gave as many demonstrations of joy, as if they had been relieved from the greatest calamities of war. M. Dupleix sent letters to all the Princes of Coromandel, and even to the great Mogul himself, acquainting them that he had repulsed the most formid- able attack that had ever been made on India; and he received from them the highest compliments on his own prowess, and on the military character of his nation ; this, indeed, was now regarded throughout Hindo- stan as greatly snperior to that of the English.”* In 1749, the war between France and England having been brought to a close, the rival East India Companies were no longer authorized to fight against each other, but peace between them did not become established. Madras, it is true, was delivered up, agreeably to the terms of the treaty of Aix la Chapelle, but M. Dupleix, the French Governor of Pondicherry, had formed such a plan as would in time have secured to the French not only the trade of the whole Peninsula of India, but have driven the British from any settlement on the coasts of Coromandel or Malabar. He formed alliances with several of the chief Indian Princes, and afforded them all the aid in his power against their enemies. The British were compelled to adopt similar measures and to support other native princes in their interest; and thus, in consequence of the ambitious views of M. Dupleix, hostilities continued to be carried on with various success between the two companies, as if the war in Hurope had continued. In course of these hostilities the French obtained at first the most marked success. In 1750 M. Dupleix, as a reward for his support of Chunda Sahib, a Soubahdar of the Carnatic, was declared Governor for the Mogul of all the countries situate to the South of the Kistna. In 1753, M. Bussy, by his wars and negotiations, obtained * Orme’s Military Transactions in Hindostan, Vol. I, Book 1, page 110. 6 the sovereignity of the provinces called the Northern Cirears. The French were now masters of territory in Southern India, equalling in extent the whole of France, and producing revenues aggregating anually £855,000 sterling. The English were unfortunate in their alliances, and their power seemed likely to be soon altogether extinguished. But, at this period, the military genius and valour of Clive was evoked, and suddenly turned the scale of fortune against the French. In 1752, associated with Major Lawrence, he began war in earnest against Dupleix and his native allies, and obtained many victories, but no decisive result. In 1754 the English Company finding its resources nearly exhausted, solicited the interference of the Crown, and the French Government alarmed at the ambitious projects of Dupleix, determined to recall him. His suceessor, M. Godehue, desired peace, and entered into negotiations with Mr. Saunders, the Governor of Madras, which resulted in a cessation of arms for eighteen months, but before this time expired in 1756, war had been again proclaimed between England and France, and the Companies were once more free to fight each other. In the meantime the French retained all the territories they had acquired during the war, and were in good condition to renew it. The first object of the British Council at Madras now was to wrest the Northern Circars from the hands of M, Bussy, as their revenue furnished him with the means of paying his army ; the second was to drive him out of the Deccan by means of an alliance with the Nizam. Both these projects were, for the time, defeated ; the first by the miscarriage of dispatches from England, the second by the capture of Calcutta by Suraj-ud-dowlah in June 1756, which made it necessary to relinquish every plan of hostility in the Deccan in order that a force might be spared sufficient to accomplish the recovery of Calcutta. It is scarcely possible to imagine a situation more unpromising than that of the English at this juncture, The Govemor and Council at Madras were in expecta- tion that their fort would soon be attacked. They knew that all their forces would be required for its defence. They knew that the Company’s affairs were ruined if a 7 sufficient force for the recovery of Calcutta were not sent $ they knew that they had not at their disposal the shipping necessary for the transport of such a force. The situa- tion was more than unpromising ; ib was irretrievable, had there not been a power upon the sea greater than all’ the armed might of France, the power of the Navy of Great Britain. Admiral Watson, with a squadron of three ships of the line, one of fifty guns, two frigates and a sloop, had just returned to Madras, after reducing Gheriah, the stronghold of a Mahratta pirate chief on the Malabar coast, and was under orders to return to England, but at the request of the Madras authorities, he embarked a detachment of troops under Lieut.-Colonel Clive and set sail for Calcutta. After innumerable troubles and difficulties, he arrived at that port before the end of the year and began the operations that ended with the battle of Plassey. It should ever be remembered that without the assistance and strong determination of Watson and his naval force, Clive would never have reached Calcutta, Chandernagore would not have been taken, the field of Plassey would not have been fought, and the French would have remained masters of the situation in Bengal. Scarcely was Clive’s power established when the illus- trious Admiral Watson died from the effects of the climate. His death would have been more severely felt had not the next in command been Admiral Pocock, who was happily equal to the trust now reposed in him. He had scarcely assumed the command before he had occasion to exert all his abilities to save the Company’s settle- ments on the Coromandel coast from total ruin. Arrived in Madras Roads, the Admiral was joined on the 24th March, 1758, by Commodore Stevens, with ships and reinforcements from England, and on the 28th of April a French squadron, of somewhat superior strength, commanded by the Admiral M D’Aché, appeared, and landed the Comte de Lally and his staff. On the follow- ing morning the French ships were defeated in action, and driven to take refuge under the batteries of Pondi- cherry. The British put to sea to refit, and get to wind- ward of Fort St. David, but were unable to reach it before the 27th of July. Lally, in the meantime, took 8 Fort St, David, and might easily have seized Madras had he attacked it without delay, but he preferred to wait till the change of the monsoon obliged Pocock to Jeave the coast. On the 28th July, 1758, D’Aché having sighted the re- turning British Squadron, stood out to sea, steering to the south. On the 8rd of August, after much manceuvring, be was forced to engage, badly beaten, and again obliged to seek shelter under the batteries of Pondi- cherry. On the 8rd of September he sailed for the Mauritius, and shortly afterwards Pocock withdrew with his squadron to Bombay. Lally at once put his army in motion, and uniting forces with M. Bussy, laid siege to Madras on the 14th December. The fort was vigorously defended for nine weeks, but would probably have fallen had not the Navy again come to the rescue. On the 16th of February, 1759, Captain Keinpenfelt, with two twenty gun ships and six other vessels having on board stores and rein- forcements, came to anchor in Madras Roads. The moment Lally perceived them, he made everything ready to raise the siege, and by dawn on the 17th was nearly out of sight. Retreating to Conjeveram, he made over charge to M. Soupires, and made the best of his way to Pondicherry. From this time the tide of fortune turned against the French. The native powers of the Northern Circars rose against them, took their settlement at Vizagapatam, and made overtures to Clive, then in Calcutta, for assistance. A force sent by sea from Bengal to Vizaga- patam, joined a detachment from Madras under Colonel Forde, advanced against M. Confians, the French com mmander in the Circars ; defeated him at Golapool, took the fort of Rajmundry, and on the 7th of March attacked Masulipatam. Salabat Jung, Viceroy of the Deccan, advanced to within forty miles of Masulipatam, and there, like a true eastern politician, awaited the event of the siege. On the fort surrendering, he at once entered into an alliance with the English, and signed a treaty by which he transferred the Northern Circars to them, and excluded the French from his service and dominions. The squadrons of D’Aché and Pocock returned to the . 9g Coromandel coas in August, 1759. Their disproportion was so great that the French had a superiority of 192 guns and 2,365 men, besides a great advantage in the size of their ships. This extraordinary force, the like of which had yet never been seen in the Indian seas, was chased, invited, and even provoked to fight by the weaker squadron. After several days of manceuvring both fiests began to cannonade each other. They con- tinued engaged till 4 p,m., when the French bore away, and steered to the S.S.E. under all the sail they could make. The Enghsh ships having received great damage aloft could not chase, and the French were, in conse- quence able to return to Pondicherry, and land troops and treasure which Lally greatly needed. D’Aché could not be induced to fight again, and shortly after- wards retreated to the Mauritius, never again to return. Naval warfare on the Coromandel Coast then virtually came toanend. ‘Two French frigates remained before Pondicherry, but they were ere long cut out by the boats of squadrons under Admiral Stevens and Cornish which then became simply a blockading force. After the departure of M. D’Aché’s fleet the affairs of the French went rapidly to ruin. On the 22nd of January, 1760, Colonel Eyre Coote, aided by Brereton and Monson, defeated them at Wandewash, and made M. Bussy pri- soner. Chettapat, Arcot, Carical, and other important military positions, then fell to the conquerers, and M. Lally was in the month of May driven into Pondicherry. Here he maintained an obstinate but hopeless defence through the rest of the year. At last, compelled by scarcity, disaffection and the constant fire of the English batteries, he surrendered on the 15th January, 1761. This conquest put an end to the French power on the Coromandel Coast and annihilated their Hast India Company. The British now commanded the whole com- merce of the Eastern Peninsula of India, from the Ganges to the Indus, then the most extensive and the most profitable sphere of commerce in the world. The fall of Pondicherry might perhaps have decided the fate of the French in India, had the Mauritius now been wrested from them; but a fleet sent from England toattack the islands was countermanded, and inSeptember, 10 1763, the disgraceful treaty of Paris restored to France her Indian possessions. The peace which George IIT. should have made with his aggrieved colonial subjects was granted to his defeated foreign foes, who soon again turned their swords against his power. France and Spain both leagued themselves with England’s revolted American colonies, and the Directors of the East India Company, seeing that war was inevitable, determined to expel the French from India. In August, 1778, Pondi- cherry was attacked by General Hector Munro, aided by a Naval Squadron under Sir Edward Vernon. ‘The ds- fending French ships, under M. Tronjolly, being put to flight, the garrison capitulated, after holding out reso- lutely for two months On the 14th of March, 1779, an English force took possession of Mahé on the Malabar Coast. After this conquest the French had not a flag left flying in India; but they still had a friend and ally in the great Indian general and statesman, Hyder Ali Khan. Hyder Ali was perhaps the greatest soldier ever born in India. So remarkable was his genius, thatit has been compared with that of Frederick II., of Prussia, and other great European statesmen, Of obscure birth, the son of the governor of a small fort under the Raja of Mysore, he became the most formidable and potent prince in Southern India. As a soldier of fortune he acquired the rudiments of war in the camps of the French, and served them as an auxiliary in the plains of Trichinopoly in 1753. Ten years later, having become Commander in Chief of the Mysore army, he dethroned his master and proclaimed himself Regent. In a short time he extended his dominions on every side except the Carnatic, till he was at last at the head of a state equal in extent to Great Britain, and producing a gross revenue of four millions sterling. Hyder Ali was not only an enterprising soldier, he was an able administrator and financier, a profound politi- cian, and a skilled diplomatist. Although entirely illite- rate, he was skilled in sophistry. He seldom adhered to the spirit of an inconvenient engagement, but he pro- fessed never to deviate from its letter, and the oracle of Delphos was not more skilful in framing an equivocal 11 sentence. He was austere and simple in his personal habits ; just and conciliatory when it suited him to be so, remorseless in cruelty, even to his defeated foes. His hatred of the English was intense; on their expulsion from Southern India he had set his heart.* Such was the enemy with whom the weak and vacilla- ting Council at Madras, divided against itself and in disagreement with its native ally the Nawab of the Carnatic, was now to be at war. That war began with disaster, and ended with disgrace ; and during its four years’ continuance, British prestige and power in Southern India, although sustained by prodigies of valour, was humbled to the very dust. Hyder Ali, in 1780 invaded the Carnatic with 100,000 troops, well equipped with artillery and cavalry, aided by French officers and and troops both horse and foot and amply supplied with stores from the Mauritius. In a short time he cut to pieces a detachment under Colonel Baillie, and forced Sir Hector Munro and the main body of his army to fall back upon Madras. Everything might now have been lost, but for the arrival of Sir Eyre Coote from Bengal, with a brigade of about 7,000 men, money and pro- visions. a2 Coote carried on war against Hyder during two cam- paigns, and defeated him in several hard fought fields ; but he was, for want of cavalry, never able to follow up his victories, and frequently in danger of being sur- rounded, and forced by famine to surrender. This, * Hyder Ali endeavoured by all possible means to allure to his standard military adventurers of all nations and tribes, but particularly European artificers and sepoys that had been trained in the East India Companys service. By this means he brought his established forces to a perfection in European discipline never before known among the black powers in India. But what showed most his extended ideas and ambition were his surprising endeavours to become formidable at sea. He proposed not only to become sovereign of the Indian seas, but to retaliate on the English for their invasions of India. In 1768 he had, at Mangalore, nine great ships which, were taken from him by an expedition sent from Bombay : but by the year 1781 he had almost finished six ships of the line and several frigates and sloops. He had heard something of the European seas, and under the notion of combatting with oceans of ice, he strengthened his ships with planks of great thickness.—Innes Munro’s Narrative, page 121. Pennant’s History of Hindostan, vol. 1, page 128, 12 indeed, must have been the fate of all the British forces in the Carnatic, but for the powerful aid of the Navy at the most critical period of the war.* In 1782 the French, acting in concert with Hyder Ali, had formed a plan for driving the English from the Coast of Coromandel. Having acquired a great Naval superiority in the Indian seas, they felt sure of being able to take or destroy the small English Squadron com- manded at the time by Sir Edward Hughes. Having * Such was the case of Sir Eyre Coote before the battle of Porto Novo, which at the time was thought to be decisive of the fate of India. Pennant says—‘‘ In the eruption made by Hyder Ali into these parts in 1781, he flung a garrison into this pagoda (Chilambaram). It was attacked by Sir Eyre Coote on June 18th, who was repulsed with great loss. This misfortune was speedily repaired by the great abilities of our commander. The enemy hemmed him in on every side, the sea on the other. He was threatened with destruction from an army of 80,000 men, well appointed in all respects, to which he had to oppose only 7,000, and those in danger of famine from the difficulty of supplies. The fate of India was decided near Port Novo on July Ist. The disposition and wonderful manceuvres of our commander procured the merited success : a general route ensued and Hyder’s troops fled on every side. —Pennant’s History of Hindostan, vol. 2, page 27. Innes Munro, says, ‘‘Such was the deep despair in which the army was involved by our present disastrous situation, that had the French squadron made the smallest exertion, or only cruized off Cuddalore for the space of one week, we must inevitably have laid down our arms to them without striking a blow. Happily for us, however, the squadron quitted the coast without offering the smallest molestation.” This was just before the attack on Chilambaram.—Munvro’s Narrative, page 128: With regard to the defection of the French Naval Squadron commanded by the Chevalier D’Orves, Major Malleson says, ** For some cause, to this day unexplained, D’Orves was false alike to his reputation and to his country. D’Orves had only to remain off the coast to see the last army possessed by the English, starved into surrender. Hyder in constant communication with him, pressed him to remain if only for a week longer, or, at all events to land the one French regiment he had on board. D’Orves would do neither, to the intense relief of Sir Eyre Coote and to the indignation of Hyder he bore away for the Islands on the 15th February.”—Mallison’s Decisive Battles of India, page 250. D’Orves probably left the coast to avoid meeting the squadron of Sir Edward Hughes, which was expected to arrive. Itdid not, however, make its appearance till just before the battle of Porto Novo. It gave material assistance by sending a small vessel in shore. This fired upon Hyder’s cavalry when they were wavering, killed a principal officer, and no doubt contributed materially to the defeat. 13 accomplished this, they were to assist Hyder Ali with a large body of land forces, «nd to lay siege to Madras by sea and land with their joint armies. Hyder Ali was highly pleased with this plan. A naval force sufficient to crush that of the British was what he chiefly desired from France. He knew that if he could only get the two powers to destroy each other on the sea, every thing on land would soon be at his disposal. To carry out this programme a French Squadron, com- manded by M. Suffrein, arrived on the coast on the 7th of February, and anchored off Pulicat, 22 miles north of Madras. It consisted of twelve sail of the line, one being a captured British ship of 50 guns, four frigates, six cap- tured traders, and eight large armed transports, with three thousand troops on board, under command of M. Duchemin. To oppose this powerful fleet Admiral Sir Edward Hughes had only nine line of battle ships, one frigate and a fireship, but'this small force was a greater one than the French Admiral expected to meet, and he there- fore deemed it prudent to place his convoy in safety before offering battle. Accordingly, on the 15th, he weighed anchor and stood to the southward, followed by the British Squadron. On the 16th Sir Edward Hughes succeeded in cutting off six sail of the convoy, including one of the transports, having on board many French officers, 300 men of the Lausanne regiment, and a valu- able cargo of artillery and military stores. The two squadrons then closed, and a hot action ensued off Sadras, which was fiercely fought on both sides, but not decisive. The French ships, in a very shattered con- dition, escaped to Porto Novo. There they disem- barked all their infantry and marines to join the army of Tippoo Sahib who, with this reinforcement immediately marched against Cuddalore, the garrison of which capitu- lated without a shot being fired. The English squadron having suffered considerably, proceeded to Trincomallee, and thence to Madras as speedily as possible. The British Admiral fellin again with the French fleet off Trincomallee on the 9th of April, and on the 12th fought another battle, more furious and bloody than the last, but without decisive result, the French drawing off to Battacolo, and the English entering Trincomalee harbour 14 to refit. Sir Edward Hughes was there detained for two months by the prevalence of sickness in his squadron, and by that time M. Suffrein was able to refit and pro- ceed to Cuddalore. Here he made over the remainder of his reinforcements and his prisoners to Hyder Ali, who marched his army from Arcot to Pondicherry to receive them. After this the squadrons fought two more actions, which like the first were undecisive but very disastrous to the French. In the last M. Suffrein did his best to obtain a victory by at once gallantly closing with his adversary, but after a hard fight, which was ended only by the approach of night, he had to retreat to Trincomallee, having lost 1,100 men killed and wounded. In the retreat one of his ships sunk and two struck on the rocks and might have been captured had the British ships been in a condition to pursue. They were, however, so disabled as to be totally unfit for a chase. Soon after this action Sir Edward Hughes sailed for Bombay and Suffrein to the Dutch settlement at Acheen, where it had been agreed that the Marquis de Bussy should meet him with a large reinforcement of ships and troops from the Mauritius. The naval actions, of which Sir Edward Hughes was the hero, did much to restore the prestige of the British, and probably more to bring the war to an end, than all the victories they had hitherto gained in the Carnatic. Hyder Ali now saw that the French could not beat the English on the sea or render him all the assistance they had promised. Without constant supplies from the Mauritius he could not carry on the war, the devasted Carnatic could not feed nor the revenues of Mysore pay the vast armies ke had raised. His first successes in the field had been neutralised by the serious defeats inflicted on him by Sir Eyre Coote. He feared that the Mahrattas were about to unite with the British against him. All these circumstances greatly impaired his health, and led him to make some overtures for peace, but towards the end of the year he died and his son, Tippoo Sahib, becoming Nawab of Mysore and general-in chief of its _armies, dropped the negotiation and gave every assurance to the French of his fidelity and attachment to them, 15 and of his fixed determination to prosecute a vigorous war against the English. In the first month of 1783, M. Suffrein’s fleet again appeared off Ganjam, and meeting with no British squadron threatened an attack on Madras ; but as soon as he heard of thedeath of Hyder Ali, Suffrein withdrew to Trincomalee, capturing on his way a British frigate and several traders. At 'Trincomalee he was joined by M. Bussy with three men-of-war and three thousand land troops. These he conducted to Cuddalore where they landed and proceeded to fortify themselves. On the 13th of April Sir Edward Hughes’ fleet arrived in the Bay of Bengal. The British naval force was now considerably superior to that of the French, but its efficiency was paralysed by the prevalence of scurvy among the crews and the difficulty of obtaining water. Nevertheless, falling in with the French squadron on the 20th of June, Sir Edward Hughes did not hesitate to attack. The action was, as usual, indecisive, but with it the naval war on the Coromandel coast came to an end. On the 27th of June a cessation of arms between the two commanders was agreed to, information having arrived of the signing and ratification of preliminary articles of peace between Great Britain, France, Spain and America. After the death of Hyder Ali active hostilities between Tippoo and the English ceased for some time. Tippoo, now Tippoo Sultan-Bahadur, had to turn his attention to his own capital and the establishment of his succession, which was not altogether unopposed. Probably peace might now have been arranged, but the British councils in Madras and Bombay wisely or unwisely determined upon a continuance of the war. It was supposed that an attack on the western side of Mysore would draw Tippoo from the Carnatic. It had that effect, but that part of the British plan which regarded the security of the forces employed was illconcerted. Tippoo, in consequence, reaped all the successes of the campaign and inflicted on the English disaster and defeat. He compelled General Matthews, holding Bedinore to capitulate under promise of honourable treatment, but instead of keeping his word, he made all that remained of the force prisoners of war 16 and threw them into the dungeons of Mysore, where they were made to endure starvation and misery and tortures worse than death, till many of them obtained release by suicide. At thistime, we are told, the condition of affairs in the Carnatie was such that every one in Europe had made up his mind to the certain loss of some capital settlement, or to the mutiny of one of the Indian armies for want of pay, and many persons thought that they saw the total destruction of British power and influence in India.* The action of the Madras Council was scarcely more fortunate than that of Bombay. Owing to the death of Sir Eyre Coote and the contentions of the Council with his successor, General Stuart, nothing was done till Tippoo left the Carnatic. Then, with the knowledge that peace was near at hand, they attacked the French at Cuddalore, only to reap a doubtful and worthless victory at the cost of a hecatomb of valuable lives. Tippoo now finding that the French had left him, and fearing that he would be attacked by his old enemies, the Mahrattas, condescended, though reluctantly, to make peace and matters were restored to nearly the condition they were in before the commencement of hostilities. The treaty of peace signed at Mangalore in March, 1784, was the disgrace to the English Government with which the war ended. It was concluded at a time when an effective blow might well have been struck at the cruel, crafty and insolent foe, who had murdered and held in slavery British soldiers and had made British ambassa- dors of peace the subjects of insult. It exacted from him no retribution. It restored to him all his possessions and did not stipulate for the security of all our allies. It left him a plausible pretext for recommencing hostilities, of which he did not fail afterwards to take advantage. During the cessation of actual warfare the designs of Tippoo continued uniformly hostile, and his powers of executing them considerable, while the degree of safety of the British fluctuated with the state of their military establishments and preparations, and with the distribu- tion of their force. The baneful effects of this perpetual — * Rennell’s Memoir, page 104. uy state of uncertainty and solicitude were felt, not only on the decay of agriculture and peaceful arts, but in the rebellious spirit which arose on the Coromandel and Malabar coasts, and, occasionally, throughout all India ; in the diminution of British influence at foreign courts ; in the rising hopes of the turbulent and disaffected, and in the decline of public and private credit, shaken by the repeated rumours of war, and by the constant necessity of guarding against surprise from the sudden aggression of an enemy, whom no clemency nor moderation could conciliate, and no faith could bind. Under such circumstances it was impossible that peace between Tippoo Sultan and the English could long be preserved. In 1790 it became necessary to send a force against him to relieve the Rajah of Travancore, whom he had attacked, regardless of the treaty of 1784. Of the warfare that followed very full accounts are to be found in Major Dirom’s narrative of the campaigns that terminated in 1792, and in Lieut.-Colonel Alexander Beatson’s view of the waron Tippoo Sultan, which ended with the fall of Seringapatam in 1799. These works should be read by every one who takes interest in the military history of the English in India, during the growth and establishment of that empire which forms the brightest jewel in the British crown. They are minute in detail but not altogether complete, for Colonel Beat- son’s historical monograph is, of course, silent concerning himself and the share that was his in bringing the last war with Tippoo Sultan to a successful issue by the reduction of Seringapatam, while that of Major Dirom gives an incorrect account of the action of Captain Beatson in an important affair which was the subject of much discussion at the time, and is still a matter of interest to students of military tactics. Seringapatam was first attacked by Lord Cornwallis in 1791, after the siege and capture of Bangalore, which fixed the war in the enemies’ country and was decisive of its success. But owing to the late arrival of the Mahratta army and other unfortunate circumstances, Lord Cornwallis was compelled to withdraw from the siege after destroying the greatest part of the battering train and equipment of his forces, 18 A second attempt to take the fortress by surprise was made on the night of the 6th of February, 1792, when Tippoo Sultan’s entrenched camp, within the Bound hedge of the fortress, was attacked in three columns by Lord Cornwallis. It was not entirely successful, owing to a deviation from his lordships original intentions regarding the operations of the right column under the command of General Meadows. Major Dirom states that this deviation was the consequence of the column being conducted to a wrong point by the native guides, so that it was brought immediately against a redoubt on its right, which Lord Cornwallis had determined should be left untouched. But no such mistake was made ; the column was conducted precisely to the right spot by Captain Beatson, the officer of guides attached to the column, who then pointed out to Colonel Nesbitt who led the 36th and 76th regiment, that he should turn to the left so as to co-operate with the centre column. Colonel Nesbitt, a very zealous and active officer, considered it to be his bounden duty to adhere strictly to written orders, which, unfortunately, did not clearly express Lord Cornwallis’s intention that the Eedgah redoubt should not be attacked. They directed him to turn either to the left or to the right, according to his position westward or eastward of a certain point. He decided to turn to the right, and after an obstinate struggle obtained possession of the redoubt, but he lost 11 officers and 80 men, killed and wounded, and after- wards found it impossible to join the centre column. There is reason to believe that if this unfortunate attack had not been made, if the column had turned to the left instead of to the right, Tippoo would, on this occasion, have been completely defeated, his own retreat to his citadel would have been cut off, and he would have lost all his guns and everything he had on the north side of the river long before the break of day, when his troops rallied and pressed severely on the central column under the personal command of Lord Cornwallis. * * On the following morning his Lordship sent for Captain Beatson, and demanded an explanation of his having directed the column against the redoubt. Captain Beatson instantly 19 The night attack was followed on the 7th by a battle in which the English gained a signal victory. The enemy was forced to retreat from all his redoubts and entrenchments on the north side of the river, and by the evening the whole of his field forces deserted, dispersed over the country, and never again encamped themselves or made any formidable appearance, while fifty-seven of the foreigners in Tippoo’s service, sought safety in the British Camp. On the 8th the Sultan thought it desirable to negotiate for peace. Accordingly he released two European officers} taken by him at the surrender of Coimbattore in 1791 and since detained as prisoners contrary to the rules of war. These gentlemen he sent as ambassadors with letters and excuses to Lord Cornwallis, soon following them by a small select party of horsemen instructed to surprise and assassinate the British Commander. The plot failed and Lord Cornwallis weakly yielded to the Sultan’s request and consented to admit his vakeels to confer with those of the allied armies. The vakeels duly arrived but only to carry on their work with procrastination and delay. Tippoo, in the meantime, continued to fire on the British Camp, so that it became necessary to prepare for an assault on his citadel, Lord Cornwallis was now reinforced by General Abercrombie, with an army from Bombay, and approaches were vigorously carried ont. By the 24th the breaching batteries were established and everything was ready for the assault, when a general order was issued for the cessation of hostilitles, in consequence of the Sultan having signed a preliminary treaty of peace. replied ‘‘ Here is Colonel Nesbitt, who I am sure will do me the justice to say that before we entered the Bound Hedge I positively told him the redoubt on the right was not to be attached, and that we were to turn to the left, so as to co-operate with your Lordship.” Lord Cornwallis then observed that the mistake was truly unfortunate as by it a glorious opportunity had been lost. + Lieutenants Chalmers and Nash t Major-General Robert Abercombie had taken part in the campaign of 1790 against Tippoo Sultan. He reduced Cannanore and Narkara and proceeded to Periapatam which 20 Thus was the second attack on Seringapatam put an end to according to Major Dirom ‘‘ by an advantageous. and glorious peace.” The terms of this treaty might be considered advantageous to the British, but in itself it was neither glorious nor just; for it allowed Tippoo to retain the throne his father had usurped, to the exclusion of its rightful heir, 1t granted life to the cruel tyrant, who by his many murders merited nothing but death. The treaty of 1792 left Tippoo humiliated but not crushed, and the position of the English precarious. Tippoo had ceded half of his territories and promised to pay an indemnity equal to three millions sterling. He had given up his prisoners and made over his two eldest sons as hostages. His hatred of the English and his determination to overthrow their power still burnt as fiercely as ever. He incited the ruler of Cabul, Zemaun Shah, to threaten an invasion of Bengal, he intrigued with all the native princes of India, and made fresh overtures to his old allies, the French. In the year 1796 his intrigues and military movements compelled the Governor - General to assemble an army on the Coromandel coast, and, in the autumn of 1797, such apprehensions were entertained of his designs and power as induced Lord Hobart, the governor of Fort St. George, to relinquish an expedition assembled for an attack on the Dutch settlements, which was imposed upon the English Government by the alliance of Holland with the revolutionary rulers of France, who had declared war against England in 1798. At this time British interests in India were menaced. he found deserted by its garrison. Only eighteen miles intervened between him and the army commanded by Lord Cornwallis and ready to invest Seringapatam. ‘The Sultan exerted every resource of a great mind to avert his fate. He fought a pitched battle with the British General, and suffered a complete defeat. The Lord of Hosts interfered, and deferred his destruction. The time of the Monsoons came on. The Victor was obliged to destroy part of his train and fall back to Bangalore. The swell of the Cauvery forced Abercombie to retire, worn down by sickness and fatigue, exposed to the incessant ruins which then deluged the western coast of the peninsula,’—Pennant’s History oF Hindostan, vol. 1, page 181. 21 by a combination of most serious dangers. Zemaun Shah was threatening invasion from the north-west. Our alliances in the Deccan were far from being secure. A French faction and army overruled the Nizam at Hyder- abad. The Madras army was widely distributed and could not be assembled or moved without provoking Tippoo to invade the Carnatic. Alarm and despondency increased when it became known that Tippoo had sent an embassy to the Mauritius, with letters addressed not only to the Governor of the Islands, but to the Executive Directory of France, asking the aid of an invading force, and that M. Malartic, the Governor of the Mauritius, had issued a proclamation encouraging the subjects of France to enter Tippoo’s service. In consequence of this proclamation, the French frigate ** La Preneuse” with the Sultan’s ambassadors and the French troops levied for his service, arrived at Mangalore on the 26th of April, 1798, and were warmly welcomed by Tippoo. On the same day a letter was received at Fort William from him, declaring ‘‘ that his friendly heart is disposed to pay every regard to truth and justice, and to strengthen the foundations of harmony and concord between the two nations.” Under these and other circumstances, too numerous to be now detailed, it appeared to Lord Mornington, the newly appointed Governor-General of India, that an immediate attack upon Tippoo Sultan, for the purpose of frustrating the execution of his unprovoked and un- warrantable projects of ambition and revenge, was de- manded by the soundest maxims, both of justice and policy. He therefore determined to assemble armies on the coasts of Coromandel and Malabar to oppose the landing of the French, to defend the Carnatic from the invasion of Tippoo, to attack him on two sides of his dominions and thus to compel him to surrender. It was a plan grandly conceived but not easily to be carried out, and its failure would have ensured the triumph of Tippoo, the re-establishment of French power and the fall of that of the English in Southern India :—“‘ In order to explain the reasons which led Lord Mornington to direct his principal 22 attack against the fortified capital of Mysore, it is necessary to refer not only to Lieut.-Colonel Beatson’s account of the war, but tc the records preserved by his family of his services, of which little if any mention is made either by contemporaneous or modern historians. During his previous years of service he had been employed on various military expeditions and surveys in Southern India, and had acquired high reputation as an Engineer officer.* On the 7th of July, 1798, he was sent for by Lord Mornington, and on his passage to Calcutta he prepared ‘‘ A sketch of a plan of operation against Tippoo Sultan,” in which he advocated the reduction of Seringa- patam as affording the only probable chance of shortening the war, crushing the power of the enemy or of bringing him to such terms as might be deemed wise and expedient. Although this mode of conducting the war differed from Lord Mornington’s plan of attacking the Sultan ‘‘ on both sides of his dominions” (as stated in his letter to the Court of Directors, dated the 29th March, 1799), yet being of that character which accorded with his Lordship’s natural disposition, he was pleased even upon a first view to approve it highly, and, in the course of a few days, having most minutely examined it, and Major Beatson having afforded “ satisfactory information on the extensive and arducus questions to which tt gave rise’’ upon every point connected with the for- mation of the grand army for the siege, of Seringa- patam, and his Lordship being fully satisfied of the practicability of undertaking the siege at the time * In the campaign of 1790 Captain Beatson’s intimate knowledge of the country enabled him to lead Lord Cornwallis’s army through the Muglee Pass. and thereby to completely countermarch Tippoo, who believed the pass to be impracticable. At the siege of Bangalore he suggested a change in the plan of attack which was the means of facili- tating, if not securing, the reduction of that important fortress. He also assisted in the sieges of Nandedurgum and Savendroog. Savendroog, after being reconnoitred seven times, was reported by the engineers to be impregnable, Captain Beatson assured Lord Cornwallis that it could be taken. He planned the attack, superintended and directed the siege ; and this formidable hill-fort was taken by a small division of the army under the command of Colonel James Stuart, of the 72nd Regiment, after a siege of fourteen days. 23 the proper season should arrive, he directed all his measures and preparations to that single object. Major Beatson had, however, been careful to point out that to ensure the success of his plan, it was necessary to have the assistance of the Mahrattas and the Nizam, or that both these powers should stand neutral. Lord Mornington therefore applied himself to the strengthen- ing of our alliances with them, and to the destruction of the French influence to which the Nizam had become subject. This was effected, much to the satisfaction of the Nizam, by the disarmament of the French Sepoys and the deportation of their officers, and by an increase of the subsidy and contingent force hitherto allowed him. Further, in consequence of the preparations known to be making in the Mediterranean by the French, he arranged with Admiral Ranier for the defence of the Malabar coast by a naval squadron. Finally, the news of Lord Nelson’s glorious victory on the Nile, so much improved the aspect of affairs, that the Governor-General deemed the opportunity now favourable for the opening of nego- tiations with Tippoo Sultan. The Honourable Court of Directors at this time had no desire to increase their territories by conquest, and while they granted to the Governor-General full power, they desired that he should use it with the utmost discretion, so that they might not be involved in a war without the most inevitable necessity. Accordingly, Lord Morning- ton addressed to Tippoo several amicable letters and remonstrances, and gave him every opportunity of obtaining peace on favourable terms, but to all these the Sultan turned a deaf ear, or gave only trifling and evasive replies. War being thus forced upon us, the Governor-General on the 3rd of February, 1799, directed Lieut.-General Harris to enter Mysore with the army assembled under hiscommand. Lieut.-General Stuart was warned to bein readiness to co-operate from Malabar. At the same time Admiral Rainier and the several allies of the Company were informed that the British Government in India was now at war with Tippoo Sultan. 24 Lord Mornington had already proceeded to Madras, hoping to open negotiations for peace. Major Beatson accompanied him as aide-de-camp, and was appointed Surveyor-General to the army in the field, in order that his assistance might be given to the Engineer Depart- ment. Upon the arrival of the army at Seringapatam, General Harris desired Major Beatson to reconnoitre and form aplan ofattack. It happened on this occasion, that his opinions did not accord with those already formed by the Engineers of Madras and Bombay. A meeting was held at headquarters at which were present the principal staff officers of the army, including the Hon. Colonel Wellesley, afterwards Duke of Wellington. The two plansof attack were discussed in the presence of those officers, and Major Beatson firmly adhered to his plan of attack upon the north-west angle of the fort. Colonel Sartorius, the chief engineer of Bombay, advised an attack upon the south- west, as had been at first recommended by the Madras Engineers, but would not give a final opinion till he had again examined the position. Having done so, he addressed a letter to the Commander-in-chief which was merely a confirmation of his previous opinion. This not being considered satisfactory, General Harris declared that Major Beatson’s plan should be carried into effect. This placed him in a situation of terrible responsiblity, for had the attack failed the Engineers might have said, ‘*the plan was not theirs for they had disapproved of it, and that the failure was only to be ascribed to the prefer- ence given to Major Beatson’s opinion.’”* It is deserving of notice that at the very time Major Beatson was occupied at sea in planning a campaign by which he calculated upon the capture of Seringapatam in April or May, 1799, ‘‘some officers (as Lord Mornington * Tn justice to Colonel Sartorius it is proper to record an acknowledgment he made to Major Beatson which strongly marks the liberality of his mind. Just as the troops had got possession of the ramparts, Colonel Sartorius, after he had examined the intricate works of the south west angle came up to Major Beatson, and taking him by the hand, in the most cordial manner, said, I most sincerely congratulate you upon the success of your attack, for I am now convinced it Whe the only mode by ‘which Seringapatam could have been aken. 25 states in his letter to the Coast of Directors, dated 20th March, 1799) of approved military talents, experience and integrity, at Fort St. George, declared that the army in the Carnatic could not be assembled for offensive purposes before the year 1800 ; and that a period of six months would be required for its equipment, even for the purpose of defending the Carnatic against any sudden attack.” Such being the opinion of the officers alluded to it may readily be imagined, that Lord Mornington’s orders of the 20th June, 1798, for assembling the armies, oceasioned a very considerable alarm at Madras, and that grave doubts were entertained as to the issue of the campaign that was to follow, but these were speedily } dissipated by its rapid and unexampled success. On the 9th of March, the whole of the forces under Lieut.-General Harris, consisting of British and native infantry, artillery, and cavalry, in all 30,959 fighting men, were assembled at Kelamangalum on the Eastern border of Mysore. On the 5th of April the army, having accomplished a march of a hundred miles through the enemy’s country and exposed to his frequent attacks, encamped on the west face of the fortress of Seringapatam, at a distance of 3,500 yards, and began to open trenches and construct batteries for the siege, in the face of con- stant fire from the forts and outlying entrenchments. On the night of the 20th Tippoo Sultan sent a letter to Lord Harris, expressing a desire to negotiate for peace, but on terms being submitted he refused to consent to them. By the end of the month all the batteries were in readiness and began their fire on the curtain, sixty yards to the right of the north-west bastion. On the evening of the 8rd a practicable breach was established, and on the following afternoon the proud fortress of Seringa- patam, believed by its master to be impregnable and stoutly defended by him to the last, was carried by assault. Before night fell the body of Tippoo Sultan was found in a gateway on the north face of the fort encumbered by a heap of slain. Tuippoo, the usurper of a kingdom, had fallen by the hand of a common soldier who robbed him of his jewelled belt. He who had left his palace in the morning a powerful imperious Sultan 26 full of vast ambitious projects was brought back a lump of clay, abandoned by the whole world, his kingdom overthrown, his capital taken, and his palace occupied by the very man, Major-General Baird, who about fifteen years before, had been with other victims of cruelty and tyranny, relieved from near four years of rigid confine- ment in irons, in a prison, scarce three hundred yards from the spot where the corpse of the Sultan now lay. The resistance offered by the garrison was not great, and so soon as it was overcome General Baird directed his immediate attention to the protection of the inmates of the palace and the inhabitants of the city. The worst consequences were to be apprehended from the assault of so large and rich a city by soldiersanimated with revenge against the murderer of their comrades. But ‘“‘all violence ceased with the conflict ; and it is but justice to add although about 8,000 of the enemy’s troops were killed in the assault very few of the unarmed inhabitants suffered, and these, unavoidably, from random shot, a circumstance we may venture to pronounce unprecedental, which is to be ascribed not only to the high discipline of the troops and the humane exertions of the officers, but to the happy choice of time for making the assault, which enabled them to discriminate and to their operations being confined solely to the ramparts.” On the morning of the 5th of May, Colonel Wellesley (afterwards Arthur Duke of Wellington) was appointed to the permanent command of Seringapatam, and used every possible exertion to prevent excesses of every kind. The inhabitants, who had quitted the town during the night of the storm, returned quietly to their houses and occupations. In a few days the bazaars were stored with all sorts of provisions and merchandise, for which there was a ready and advantageous sale. The main street of Seringapatam, three days after the fort was taken, was so much crowded as to be almost impassable, and exhibited more the appearance of a fair than that of a town just taken by assault. After the dispersion of the late Sultan’s armies and the surrender of the fortresses in Canara, and other parts of his dominions, the cultivators of the land returned quietly to their occupations and 27 shewed every disposition to submit to the orders of the British Government. The taking of Seringapatam by assault, was an affair in every respect different from the battle of Plassey. Plassey wasmagnificent butit was not war. Seringapatam was both. At Plassey, the rash valour of Clive placed British power upon a pinnacle from which it might at any moment be hurled down. At Seringapatam, the calm statesmanship of a Wellesley planted it on a firm base, beneath which slumbered no upheaving force. From the field of Plassey the victor reaped for himself a golden harvest, at Seringapatam he restored a kingdom to its rightful heir. The campaign that closed the Mysore war in 1799, was perhaps the shortest, the most successful and the most decisive that was ever fought in any part of the world by any military power. It was decisive for the British ; it not only excluded the French from Mysore, but by the destruction of their ally, it made their return impracticable. It relieved all Southern India from mili- tary oppression and made peace possible throughout the land. It replaced the Khuddddd Sircar of Tippoo Sultan by a government indeed given by God. In the military occupation of India by the English their enemies have affected to see nothing but unrighteousness and robbery and wrong; the triumph of a powerful and warlike race over a timid and unresisting people. Some Englishmen regarded it at first as the madness of a company of merchants extending their views from the drudgery of traffic to universal empire, and rushing on to ruin. But the history just recounted tells a different tale. Tt shows us the English in India, forced into war by the ambition of a rival European power, and by the oppres- sion and cruelty and implacability of native rulers. We see them assisted in their wars by native soldiers and races struggling to be free, leading small battalions of Europeans against overwhelming hosts, sustaining great disasters, often escaping with the skin of their teeth, yet winning great victories on land, their soldiers aided by the power of England on the sea. All this done, ata time when England herself ‘‘had entered on a conflict with 28 enemies, whose circle ever widened, till she stcod single- handed against the world.” That the English never did any wrong, were never guilty of acts of oppression, cannot be maintained. Some of the acts of Clive and Warren Hastings in Bengal, and of General Matthews at Beddenore for example, cannot be defended. All we can say is that these men were but instruments in the hands of the Almighty Ruler of the universe, whose ordinances we cannot question, whose servants we have no right to judge. Doubtless some wrong was done by the English in India in their early struggles, but the general issue has been all for good, and on the record of the wars and administration of Lords Corn- wallis and Wellesley there rests not a single stain. A hundred years have passed away since Seringa- patam was taken. What is now the condition of Southern India? Provinces once devastated by the armies of Hyder Ali and his son, Tippoo, now show no sign of military occupation, suffer from no famine caused by war. The great fortress is now a ruin traversed by a railway. Within its walls the temple of Sri-ranga and the mosque of Hyder Ali still stand side by side. The gongs of the Brahmans still sound, the muazzin still calls the Mussulman to prayer throughout the land ; but where Tippoo converted with the sword, Christian missionaries have established the religion of the Cross. Thus has the decisive victory, won at Seringapatam, advanced towards perfection the work begun by the English in India on the field of Plassey. PRINTED AT THE ‘‘BATH CHRONICLE” OFFICE.