VinU BOOK CARD Please keep this card in book pocket Oscar: I 1 THE LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL ENDOWED BY THE DIALECTIC AND PHILANTHROPIC SOCIETIES E470 .C17 V.4 c.2 ii C.2 This book is due at the WALTER R. DAVIS LIBRARY on the last date stamped under "Date Due." If not on hold it may be renewed by bringing it to the library. "^^^ RET DUE RET DUE ^ — rini < > 1 jjj Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2014 https://archive.org/details/armyunderpopeOOrope_0 THE ARMY UNDER POPE CAMPAIGNS OF THE CIVIL IVAR.—W. . Cf -7 THE AEMY UNDER POPE BY JOHN CODMAN ROPES, MSMBEK OF THE MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL SOCIETY, AND THE MILITARY HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF MASSACHUSETTS. Forsan et h(BC olim meminisse juvabit. NEW yor: CHAKLES SCKIBNlE'S *0N 743 AND 745 BroAway Copyright by CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 1881 Trow's Printing and Bookbinding Company 201-213 East iztk Street NEW YORK. THE MEMOEY OF MY YOUNGEST BROTHER HENRY, FIRST LIEUTENANT IN THE TWENTIETH REGIMENT OP MA6SACHUSETTS VOLUNTEERS, WHO FELL AT THE BATTLE OP GETTYSBURG, JULY 3, 1863, THIS ESSAY IS AFFECTIONATELY PEEFAOE, It may be considered presumptuous in a civilian to at- tempt a history of a campaign. I do not pro^DOse to discuss the question here, further than to say, that a civilian un- doubtedly does labor under many disadvantages as com- pared with a soldier who has seen active service. The study of military matters may, however, I suppose, be taken up at any time of life, as advantageously as in youth. It is not, to my thinking, a creditable thing to the counviy that the official reports of the war liave not long since been published. The want of them is sensibly felt by every one who endeavors to investigate any campaign. These rej)orts, both Federal and Confederate, are, however, now being- published under the authority of Government. The Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, which I have had constant need to consult, constitute a most in- teresting history of the war in Virginia ending with the Bat- tle of Fredericksburg. Of course, some allowance must be made for partisanship and strong feeling, but I will say^ that I have found most of the writers perfectly fair and can- viii PREFACE. did. The reports of Lee, Longstreet, Jackson, and, in fact, of most of the other officers, are clear, moderate in tone, in excellent taste, and show a thorough appreciation of the soldierly qualities of their antagonists. There are a few braggarts, like D. H. Hill, who, no doubt, enjoyed at the time the rude sport of belaboring the " Yankees " in their official reports, but they may safely be left to the mortifica- tion of seeing their performances exposed by the side of the calm, temperate, and self-contained narratives of their brother officers. I desire to acknowledge my indebtedness to the exhaus- tive work of General George H. Gordon on the Army of Virginia, as also to his smaller volume entitled The Sec- ond Massachusetts and Stonewall Jackson." I have endeavored throughout to be perfectly impartial. While the book is, of course, written from the Federal standpoint, it has been my endeavor to keep in mind that it is now sixteen years after the war, and that the country is, at last, in every sense, at peace. J. G. R. 53 Temple Street, Boston, October 10, 1881. COI^TElsrTS. PAGE Table of Authokities and Abbreviations, . . xi List of Maps, xiii CHAPTER I. The Situation in July, 1862, ...... 1 CHAPTER II. The Battle of Cedar Mountain, 33 CHAPTER III. On the Rappahannock, . . . . . . . 49 CHAPTER IV. Jackson's Raid, .... „ ... 74 CHAPTER V. The Pursuit of Jackson, 92 CHAPTER VI. The Battle of Gainesville, 114 CHAPTER VII. McDowell and Porter, . . . . . » . 125 CHAPTER VIII. The Battle of Groveton, ...... 154 CHAPTER IX. LONGSTREET AND PORTER, . . . • . . 170 X CONTENTS. CHAPTER X PAGE The Battle of Manassas, ... ... 195 CHAPTER XL The Battle of Chantilly, 217 CHAPTER XII. Halle( K and McClellan, 227 CHAPTER XIII. Final Reflections, 253 APPENDIX A. The Address to the Army, and General Orders, . 173 APPENDIX B. . Porter's Night March, 178 APPENDIX C. Porter's Orders and Despatches on the 29th, . . 181 APPENDIX D. The Losses in Battle, 190 APPENDIX E. The Numbers of the Two Armies, .... 193 APPENDIX F. Time of the Arrival of Kemper's Division, . . 200 APPENDIX G. Roster of the Federal and Confederate Armies at the Battle •of Manassas, otherwise called the Second Battle of Bull Run, fought on Satur- day, August 30, 1862, 204 Index, S17 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES AND ABBREYIATIOi^S. 1. General Pope's First Report, dated September 3, 1862, is to be found in the Proceedings and Report of the Board of Army Officers in the case of Fitz John Porter, vol. ii., p. 1115. It is cited as Pope's First Report, B. O., pp. 1115, 1116. 3. General Pope's corrected Report, dated January 27, 1863, is to be found in the Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War ; Supplement ; Part II., pp. 104-190. It is cited as Pope's Report, or simply as P. R., pp. 104-190. 3. Executive Document, No. 81, House of Representatives, Thirty- seventh Congress, Third Session, contains Pope's corrected Report, with the Reports of Generals McDowell, Heintzelman, Sigel, and many others. It is cited as Pope's Virginia Campaign, or simply as P. V. C. 4. The Proceedings in the Court Martial of Central Fitz John Por- ter are to be found in Executive Document No. 71, House of Repre- sentatives, 37th Congress, 3d Session. They are cited as Court-Martial, or simply as C. M. 5. The Proceedings and Report of the Board of Officers in the case xii AUTHORITIES AND ABBREVIATIOXS. of Fitz John Porter, above referred to, are cited as Board of Officers, or simply as B. O. 6. The Reports of the Committee on the Conduct of the War are cited simply as C. W., with the volume and page. 7 The Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia, Richmond, 1864, are cited as A. N. V. 8. General George H. Gordon's History of the Campaign of the Army of Virginia under Pope, Boston, 1880, is cited as Gordon's Army of Virginia, or simply as Gordon. 9. The Second Massachusetts and '^Stonewall" Jackson. History of the Second Massachusetts Regiment of Infantry. By George H. Gordon. Boston, privately printed, 1875. Cited as Second Mass. 10. Statement of General McDowell before the Court of Inquiry, February 9, 1863. Privately printed. Cited as McDowell's Statement. LIST OF MAPS. PAGE The Field of Cedar Mountain, . . . to face 23 General Map of the Campaign, 33 Jackson's March, .43 Positions on August 28th, at 8 a.m., . . . .69 8p.m 77 " *' 29th, " 12 m., . . . . 116 30th, 6 P.M., . . . .132 The Field op Chantilly, 148 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. CHAPTER I THE SITUATION IN JULY, 1862. In order to understand the military situation at tlie time when General Pope was appointed to the command of the Army of Virginia — June 26, 1862 — it will be necessary to go back a little. The Cabinet of Mr. Lincoln found itself, in the spring of 1862, in the very difficult position of having called to the chief command of the army an officer in whom it did not place entire confidence. The attitude of General McClellan on many points was disliked ; his political affiliations were distrusted ; his extreme caution, so far as his own move- ments were concerned — his easy confidence when the matter at stake was the safety of Washington — his startling plan of removing the army to the Peninsula — all combined to awaken alarm, and to deprive him of that cordial support which his great undertaking required in order to be success- ful. He had even attempted to evade the orders of the President, by taking with him to Yorktown troops supposed to be needed for the defence of Washington ; the Govern- ment had promptly interfered by detaining the entire corjDS of McDowell ; and, though two divisions of this corps were 1 2 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. afterward sent to McClellan, the fact remained that he did not have at the outset of the campaign the overwhelming force on which he had calculated. The irritation caused by this found abundant expression in his correspondence with the President and the Secretary of War. This, however, was not the worst consequence of this un- fortunate state of things. Not only had Fremont — when, late in the winter, he had been relieved from command in Missouri — been given a considerable force in West Virginia, where a department had been unnecessarily created for his benefit, but, the moment McClellan arrived on the Penin- sula, McDowell and Banks were detached from his control — the former being assigned to a new department, that of the Rappahannock, and the latter to another new depart- ment, that of the Shenandoah Valley. Here, then, were four separate and independent commands in Virginia, on the same theatre of war — a condition of things, it is safe to say, most unfavorable to military success. Nevertheless, after McClellan arrived on the Chickahom- iny, on May 24th, the plan was that McDowell, who still regained three divisions of his corps — Franklin's having been sent to McClellan — together with Shields' division of Banks' corps, which had been transferred to McDowell's command, should join the Army of the Potomac from Fred- ericksburg. In pursuance of this plan. Porter had occupied Hanover Court House after a successful action, and the dis- tance between the two forces was reduced to a matter of only twenty or thirty miles. Before the union was effected, how- ever, Jackson made his brilliant raid in the Valley of the Shenandoah, driving the diminished force of Banks before him, and creating such alarm in Washington, that, despite the earnest remonstrance of McDowell, the plan for rein- forcing McClellan from Fredericksburg was abandoned, and THE SITUATION IN JULY, 1863. 3 McDowell was ordered to strike across the country to in- tercex)t, if possible, the retreat of Jackson. In this move- ment Fremont participated; but, despite their best efforts, Jackson, though obliged to contest in some actions the pos- session of his line of retreat, made good his escape. He lin- gered, however, in the upper part of the valley, and detained so many of our troops there that the concentration of such a strong force at Fredericksburg as had been collected in May, though attemjDted by McDowell, could not be effected. Mc- Call's division of McDowell's corps was, indeed, sent to McClellan ; but Jackson's raid had postponed indefinitely all ho^De of the Army of the Potomac being reinforced by any large force coming from the North. "When satisfied that this, his chief object, had been effected, Jackson joined the main army under Lee, and almost immediately, in charge of the left wing of the enemy, conducted the turning move- ment against our right, which resulted in the abandonment of our base on the Pamunkey, and the establishment of a new base on the James. On the very day. June 26, 1862, when this movement was commenced by the action at Mechanicsville, near Eich- mond, the forces under Generals Fremont, Banks, and McDowell, were consolidated into one army, called the Army of Virginia, and Major-General John Pope, United States Volunteers, was assigned by the President to the chief command. The numbers and composition of these corps were ap- proximately as follows : FIRST CORPS,— SIGEL. First Division — Schenck. Third Division — Schurz. Indepencient Brigade — Milroy. 11 ,500 4 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. SECOND CORPS.— BANKS.* First Division — Williams. Second Division — Augur, . 14,500 THIRD CORPS.— Mcdowell. First Division — King. Second Division — Ricketts 18,500 Cavalry. Bayard. Buford. 5,000 Total 49,500 Of the officers commanding we may here say a few words. General Pope was a graduate of the Military Academy at West Point, of the Class of 1842, and a veteran of the Mexi- can war, in which he had been brevetted for his services at Monterey and Bnena Yista ; he had distinguished himself in the operations resulting in the capture of Island No. 10, in the Mississippi River, in the spring of 1862. General Sigel — who had succeeded to the command of Fremont's corps, Fremont having resigned because Pope, his junior, was ]put over him — was a German officer, who had had some military training and experience ; he had recently served with some distinction in Missouri. General Banks was a civilian, who had been Governor of Massachusetts and Speaker of the National House of Representatives. His ap- pointment to the command of a corps was certainly a hazardous experiment. He was a brave and zealous officer, but destitute of military judgment. McDowell, like Pope, * General Pope's estimate of Banks' corps is only eight thousand men ; but it is based, probably, on the number which Banks commanded in the battle of Cedar Mountain, at which time some six thousand men were on duty elsewhere, ex- clusive of the sick, etc. General Banks' force is stated by Generals Schofield, Terry, and Getty, to have numbered 10,000 on August 29th.— B. O. Report, vol. 11., p. 1807. THE SITUATION IN JULY, 1863. 5 was a graduate of West Point, of the Class of 1838, was also a veteran of the Mexican war, and, like Pope, had been brevetted for services at Buena Vista. In the year 1861 he had commanded the army in front of Washington, and had lost the battle of Bull Eun. He was well known to be an excellent officer. These forces were widely scattered. The coi-ps of Fre- mont and Banks were in the Valley of the Shenandoah. Of the two divisions of McDowell, one. King's, was at Fred- ericksburg ; the other, Eicketts' , was at Manassas Junction. General Po]3e at once took measures for a concentration of his army. Sigel was ordered to cross the Shenandoah Valley at Front Eoyal, pass through the Luray Gap and take post at Si^erryville. Banks was ordered to pass the river and mountains at the same place, and to take U}) his position near Little Washington, a few miles east of Sperryville. By an oversight of a staff officer, he marched to Warrenton, but S23eedily returned to his post. Eicketts' division, of McDowell's corps, was ordered from Manassas Junction to Waterloo Bridge, where the turnpike from Warrenton to Sperryville crosses the Eai)pahannock. These movements seem to have been judicious; the presence of such a large force near Front Eoyal Gap, sup- ported as they were by other troops, and with communi- cations with Alexandria by the Warrenton pike, would doubt- less hinder the enemy from undertaking a raid in the valley. As for King's division of McDowell's corps, Pox3e was obliged for the present, against his own judgment, to leave it at Fredericksburg. The Government deemed it of great importance to retain the line of communication on the north side of the Eappaliannock, above Fredericksburg, and to preserve the railroad between Aquia Creek and Falmouth, oioposite Fredericksburg. It is hardly necessary to say that 6 THE ARMY UKDER POPE. considerations of this sort were, as General Pope justly thought, not worth taking into account in the presence of such a problem as that which confronted the commander of the new Army of Virginia. It was of the first imxDortance that he should be unfettered in his movements so far as was possible. The preservation of the Grovemment property at Aquia Creek and Fredericksburg was a matter of small consequence, and the troops arriving from the Peninsula might as well have been landed at Alexandria as at Aquia Creek. These dispositions having been made, some time had to be spent in reorganizing the army, portions of which, especial- ly the corps of Sigel and the cavalry, needed considerable attention. Meantime the military situation had entirely changed. General McClellan had been forced, by the loss of the battle of Gaines' Mill, to give up his base on the Pamunkey ; and, though his army had well held its own in the obstinate bat- tles which followed, yet the movement to the James was universally felt to be a confession of the failure of the cam- paign. It is needless to say that the distrust felt by the Government toward General McClellan had become intensi- fied, and that his hostility to and suspicion of certain members of the administration had increased in proportion. Besides, not only did the position taken by him on the James put the entire force of the enemy between his army and that of General Pope, but this military sexDaration was accompanied by an entire lack of confidence between the two officers. Pope had very sensibly suggested, while the seven days' bat- tles were in progress, that McClellan should preserve his communications on the Pamunkey, and fall back on White House ; but this suggestion met with no approval from Mc- Clellan. After the line of the James had been adopted. THE SITUATION IN JULY, 1862. 7 Pope took some pains to bring about a cordial understand- ing with McClellan, but it soon became evident that the lat- ter aimed solely at getting such reinforcements for his own army as would make him entirely independent of any ex- trinsic aid. Under these circumstances, the armies of the United States in Virginia being hopelessly separated, and the army of General Lee being large, well commanded, and elated with victory, the Government determined to call to the gen- eral direction of military affairs an officer whose reputation at that time stood very high, and who was in no way con- nected with j)olitics — General •Henry W. Halleck. Under his general management the States of Kentucky and Ten- nessee had been recovered, and combined movements of the land and naval forces had secured to us the control of the Mississippi Eiver as far south as Yicksburg. He was a West Point graduate, of the Class of 1839, was not actively en- gaged in the Mexican War, and soon after left the army. He was a student of military matters and of international law, and had produced some quite valuable books ; but he was not a practical soldier at any time, and his lack of vigor and decision, as well as of sound military sense, gravely imperilled, as we shall have occasion to see, the fate of this campaign. He was appointed, on July 11th, General-in-Chief of all the armies of the United States, but did not arrive in Washing- ton and assume control until the latter part of the month. General Pope in the meantime was in Washington, con- ferring with the authorities there, and from thence issuing orders to his army in the field. It is probable that, until the arrival of General Halleck, his advice was largely relied on by the President and Cabinet. At any rate, in Wash- ington he remained till July 29th. During this time he pushed his forces nearer to the one- 8 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. my, and attempted to interfere with their railroad commnni- cations. King was ordered to break up the Virginia Central Bailroad, and the expeditions which he sent out accomplished their mission. On Jnly 14th, Banks was instructed to send a brigade to Culpeper, and Hatch, who commanded the cav- alry of his corps, was ordered to seize Gordonsville, where the Virginia Central meets the Orange and Alexandria Rail- road, and to destroy the railroad for ten or fifteen miles east of that place, and also to break Tip the road in the direction of Charlottesville. Had Hatch carried ont his instructions, the result would have been a very serious, though perhaps temporary interruption of the enemy's communications, and there was no good reason why the movement, as ordered, should not have been successful ; but Hatch, instead of at- tempting it with cavalry only, took with him infantry and artillery also, and, before he reached the immediate neigh- borhood of Gordonsville, it was occupied by the enemy in force. A second expedition to the vicinity of Charlottesville met with no better success. The fact is, that the possession of Gordonsville was of the first importance to the enemy. Through that town ran the railroad which connects Eichmond with the Shenandoah Valley. As soon as the expeditions sent out by King,"* of which we have just spoken, threatened this important line, Lee, though the whole Army of the Potomac was within twenty-five miles of Eichmond, did not hesitate, on July 13th, to despatch to Gordonsville his most trusted lieutenant, the justly celebrated Stonewall Jackson, with two divisions — his own (so-called), commanded by Winder, and E well's, com- prising together about 14,000 or 15,000 men. It was this force that forestalled Hatch. Then, on July 27th, A. P. Hill * Reports of A. N. V., vol. i., p. 15. THE SITUATION IN JULY, 1862. 9 was ordered u]y with his division, raising Jackson's force to something between 20,000 and 25,000 men. While these events were taking place, General Poj)e issued to his troops a proclamation, the full text of which will be found in the Appendix.* Probably no address that was ever issued to an army created, such a storm of hostile criticism as this did. It was supposed to draw injurious comparisons between the troops of the West and those of the East. It was taken to exhibit a contempt for all military rules in the man- agement of a campaign. Finally, it was considered bombas- tic and egotistic to an unheard of degree. Probably General Pope was more astonished than any one else at this result. He issued the order to the army, as he tells us,f " with the purpose to create in it a feeling of confidence and a cheerful spirit which were sadly wanting ; " and he never had, as he goes on to say, the slightest thought of reflecting upon the Army of the Potomac. The effect on the troops, however, was as has been stated, and General Pope unquestionably entered upon his campaign heavily handicaioped. He had also issued certain orders, the full text of which is given in the ApiDcndix,'^" directing the troops of his command to subsist on the country so far as i^racticable. These orders were, perhaps purposel}^, misconstrued to Pope's discredit. It is expressly ]irovided in them that supplies shall be taken by the officers of the department to which they properly be- longed (the commissariat), and only under the orders of the officer commanding the troops. Nevertheless, many persons asserted that they countenanced indiscriminate pillage, which was entirely untrue. To these orders (Nos. 5 and 6), no valid exception can be taken. Another order, of which the text will also be found in the * Appendix A. t Rep. C. W., Supp., vol. ii., p. 105. 10 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. Appendix (No. 7),^ provides that non-combatants in tlie rear of the army shall be responsible in damages for injuries done to the track of railroads, attacks on trains, assaults on sol- diers, etc., committed by guerillas — that is, by individuals not enlisted among the organized military forces of the ene- my. Any injuries to tracks, etc., are to be repaired by the neighbors, or an indemnity paid ; so, where soldiers are fired on from a house, the house shall be razed to the ground, and the occupants of it treated as prisoners. Harsh as these measures may seem to those who believe themselves to be defending their homes from an invader, it is certain that they are clearly warranted by the laws of civilized warfare. The only safety for the non-combatant population of an in- vaded country consists in the rule by which they are forbid- den acts of private hostility. There was still another order (No. 2), of which the text is also given in the Appendix."^ This provided that the oath of allegiance should be tendered to all male citizens in the lines of the army; that those who, after having taken it, violated it, should be shot, and that those who re- fused to take it should be sent beyond the lines of the army, with the threat of being treated as spies if they re- turned to their homes. For this order, it must be conceded, there is absolutely no justification. A commander in the field has nothing to do with allegiance, or oaths of allegiance, in his treatment of the enemy. He can only apply to them the well-recognized laws of war as explained above, namely, that all combatants belonging to the organized forces of the enemy shall be treated as prisoners of war, and shall be en- titled to the immunities and respect shown to prisoners of war, and that all private warfare shall be repressed by the * Appendix A. THE SITUATION IN JULY, 1862. 11 use of as mnch severity as may be found necessary to sup- press it — but that is all. No one ever heard of the Germans tendering to the French villagers the oath of allegiance to the king of Prussia ; and the only controversy on this sub- ject of any consequence, in the late Franco-German war, was caused by the doubt whether the francs-tireurs were, or were not, such a part of the organized military forces of France, as to be entitled to the treatment, when captured, of prison- ers of war. General Pope's authority on this subject was not enlarged in the slightest degree by the opinion which he entertained, or which his government entertained, that the enemy with whom he was fighting was in rebellion against the United States. He was not there as a United States marshal, acting under the orders of a court, and arresting persons against whom a grand juiy had found indictments for treason ; but he was there as an officer of the army in the field, against an enemy in arms and entitled to be treated in all respects as a foreign foe. While General Pope was in Washington, General Halleck was called upon to decide the difficult question of the ad- visability of removing the Army of the Potomac from the Peninsula. The question w^as not a purely military one. Had it been, it could have been more easily decided ; it was, in great measure, a personal question — that is, it turned on the capacity of certain officers to carry out their allotted tasks. Hence arose the chief difficulty of arriving at a de- cision. Let us explain this. Had the Government had the same confidence in General McClelJan which they had two years later in General Grant, the Army of the Potomac would, without much doubt, have been allowed to remain at Harri- son's Landing, and would have been reinforced in the late summer and autumn sufficiently to enable it to take the of- 12 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. fensive and operate, from the very advantageous position which it occupied, on either side of the James Eiver. But such was not the case. The distrust of General McClellan was greater than ever — and there were several reasons for this. First. — His campaign had been characterized by an as- sumption on his part that he was entitled to deal on an equal footing with the Government, as a sort of contracting party. Instead of doing his work as well as he could with the means he had or could procure, he was constantly attempt- ing to drive the Administration into a corner; to fasten upon it' the responsibility for the ill-success of his mili- tary movements ; to threaten it, even, with the consequences of this or that failure to do what he desired. Such a method of procedure on the part of a general is wholly without pre- cedent, and a government which understood its position would not have put up with it for a moment. Let a gen- eral, by all means, advise his superiors of all material facts, and warn them in the strongest terms of the consequences of such or such acts, but let him never forget that the dis- tribution of the responsibility for military failures is not for him to undertake ; it is the task of posterity ; it is his to do his best, let the consequences be what they may. xls an illustration of what we mean, look at McClellan's letter to Mr. Stanton, of June 14th, where he says, in reference to McDowell's troops : " If I cannot fully control all his troops, I want none of them, but would prefer to fight the battle with what I have, and let others be responsible for the re- sults." Such a remark as this shows his egotism to be ex- cessive indeed. He actually says that he wants to have his preferences gratified, whatever may be the consequences to the country. Second, — It was impossible not to discern in General Mc- THE SITUATION IN JULY, 1862. 13 Clellan's attitude toward the Administration a distinct polit- ical bias. He belonged to the Democratic party — the party which desired to prevent the slavery question from compli- cating the question now at issue in the field — that of the authority of the nation. He may, or may not, have been right as to this ; but it is very plain that, as a commander of an army, it was none of his business. Nothing is better settled than the desirability of the entire subordination of the military to the civil power in a free country ; yet we find McClellan, on July 7th, writing from Harrison's Landing a long letter to the President, in which he gives him his views on the way in which the war should be conducted in refer- ence to the institution of slavery; that military power should not be allowed to interfere with the relations of ser- vitude, either by supporting or impairing the authority of the master, except for repressing disorder, as in other cases," etc. These views may, or may not, have been sound — it is not our j)rovince to pronounce on them at all ; but it is clear that a general officer, thus going out of his way to write a long letter on the policy of the Government in regard to slavery, has taken sides in politics, which a military man in the field should never do. In fact, his friends were at this time presenting him to the country as the great Democratic general, and in two years he was the party candidate for the Presidency. Had Mr. Lincoln removed him from the command immediately on the receij^t of this letter, it would have been not only justifiable, but wise in the end. Third. — It was impossible, for any one who had carefully watched the campaign, to feel any great confidence that Mc- Clellan ever would accomplish anything. He never was satisfied with the advantages he possessed, or with the num- bers he commanded at any particular time. There was always something remaining to be done before he was ready 14 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. to move. Add to this an entire absence of that clear and cool judgment which is essential to the accomplishment of all difificult matters in this world. What we refer to may be well illustrated by the fact that, in the course of a single fortnight, McClellan had in one telegram told the Secre- tary of War that his numbers were greatly inferior to those of the enemy ; that he would, however, do all that a general could do with his army, and if it was destroyed by over- whelming numbers he could at least die with it and share its fate ; in another telegram, that he (the Secretary) must hope for the best, and he (McClellan) would not deceive the hopes he formerly placed in him ; in another telegram, that if he had ten thousand fresh troops he could take Eichmond, yet, that he lost this battle because his force was too small ; that the Secretary had done his best to sacrifice the army ; and three days after he had taken up his position at Har- rison's Landing, in this same fortnight, he found time to lay before the President, in an elaborate letter, his views • on the slavery question, in the course of which he actually said that a declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, would rapidly disintegrate our present armies." This letter winds up with this curious declaration : "I may be on the brink of eternity, and, as I hope for forgiveness from my Maker, I have written this letter with sincerity to- ward you and from love for my country." Enough has been said to show that the Administration could not feel that in McClellan the country had a really able, or a really single-minded servant. There might be, and there was, evidence of ability and character in him ; but we have shown that there were sufficient reasons to prevent entire confidence being reposed in him by the President and Cabinet. At the same time, such was the political situation that the THE SITUATION IN JULY, 1862. 15 Government did not dare to remove him. There was enough to justify his removal, as we have seen ; but political feeling in his favor ran high. Still, the breach between him and the administration had become too wide ever to be healed ; the Government could not, it was plain, continue him in his command, reinforce him, and rely on him as their chief gen- eral ; and there was no one of conspicuous fitness whom they could put in his j)lace. What then could be done ? The army might be removed to Northern Virginia, portions of it might from time to time be incorporated in the army under General Pope, and if that officer made a successful campaign, the difficulty as to McClellan would settle itself. In a cor- respondence between Halleck and McClellan on this sub- ject, Halleck, it is true, proceeds upon the supposition that McClellan's estimate of the numbers of the enemy, two hun- dred thousand men, is correct ; and argues that the army could not be kept on the Peninsula in that climate till it could be reinforced to anything like that number. But the great difficulty about the question of removal was one which could not be stated ; the Government had lost confidence in General McClellan, and the removal of the Army of the Potomac from the Peninsula provided them with a conveni- ent mode of disposing of their superfluous general. The removal of the army was determined on. General Pope tells us, before he left Washington for the front, on July 29th. It was probably the visit of General Halleck to Harrison's Landing, on the 25th, which settled it. On the 30th, McClellan was ordered to send away his sick. On August 3d, he was told that the whole army was to be sent to Aquia Creek. The next day he wi'ot6 an able letter to Halleck, remonstrating against the removal ; urging his prox- imity to Richmond ; that the reinforcement of the army was a far cheaper and wiser course than removing it to the neigh- 16 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. borliood of Fredericksburg ; that tlie army would be more or less demoralized by tlie movement ; and finally, that it was the true policy of the Government to place all the other de- partments on the defensive, and strike their most powerful blow against Eichmond. To this Halleck replied at length, dwelling, as we have said before, on the impossibility of re- inforcing the army in any reasonable space of time, to any large extent, and ^Dressing strongly upon General McClellan's attention the advantage possessed by General Lee of opera- ting against either McClellan or Pope, as he chose, and with an army superior to that of either. Here the correspondence closed, and the task of removing the army began. When General Pojdo left Washington, on July 29th, the destination of the Army of the Potomac had been decided. The task imposed on Pope was to j)revent a concentration of Lee's army upon our forces on the Peninsula, while in the confusion incident to the removal, and while -the corps com- posing them were separated. He ]3roceeded at once to the execution of this task, threatening Gordonsville again, and this time not as before, with a small body of cavalry, but with a powerful force of more than 30,000 men. After re- viewing and inspecting his various corps, he, on August 7th, ordered the division of Eicketts to join Crawford's brigade of Williams' division of Banks' corps at Culpeper Court House. The remainder of Banks' corps he pushed south from their position at Little Washington to where the Sper- ryville and Culpe^Der turnpike crosses Hazel Eiver, a point about half-way between these two towns. The cavalry of Buford, supported by one brigade from Sigel's corps, ob- served the right, with headquarters at Madison Court House. Bayard, with four regiments, watched the left, his head- quarters being at Eapidan Station. Both were excellent officers. Cavalry pickets were stationed at intervals along THE SITUATION IN JULY, 1863. 17 the Kapidan to its 11111011 with the Eappahaiinock, just above Fredericksburg. A signal-station was established on Thor- oughfare Mountain — a precaution which, as we shall after- ward see, was of great service. These dispositions were intended chiefly to provide against an attack by the enemy on his right, Buford having reported the enemy as crossing the Eapidan westward of the railroad, and advancing in lieaw force upon Madison Court House. But, consider- ing also the probability of an attem^Dt being made to turn his left by way of Eaccoon Ford and Stevensburg, and also to interrupt his communications with General King at Fred- ericksburg, Pope, on the 8tli, ordered Banks and Sigel to move to Culpeper Court House. Banks obeyed promptly, reaching that place at eleven at night. Sigel, however, in- stead of marching at once, sent word to inquire by what road he should march, when there was but one road, and that a turnpike, between Sperryville and Culpeper ; and, in conse- quence of his blunder, his corps did not arrive till the after- noon of the next day. Besides these corps. Pope, on the 8tli, ordered Crawford's brigade of Williams' division of Banks' corps, which, it will be remembered, had been at Culpeper some days, for- ward some eight miles to the neighborhood of Cedar (or Slaughter) Mountain, on the road to Orange Court House, to act as a support to Buford's cavalry. Eicketts' division of McDowell's corps was also ordered to move some three miles south of Culpeper Court House. Early the next morn- ing, the 9tli, Banks received orders to move the remainder of his corps to the front, where Crawford's brigade already was — that is, near Cedar Mountain. We-^hall recur later to the orders given to Banks ; it is time now to turn to see what Jackson was doing. " Having received information," says that oflicer in his 2 18 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. report, that only a part of General Pope's army was at Culpeper Court House, and hoping, through the blessing of Providence, to be able to defeat it before reinforcements should arrive there, Ewell's, Hill's, and Jackson's divisions were moved on the 7th, in the direction of the enemy, from their respective encampments near Gordonsville " On the 9th, as we arrived within about eight miles of Cul- peper Court House we found the enemy in our front, near Cedar Eun, a short distance west and north of Slaughter's (Cedar) Mountain." The first battle of the campaign was at hand. CHAPTEE n. THE BATTLE OF CEDAR MOUNTAIN. Generaij Banks' corps, less that portion of it which was absent on detached service, did not reach a total of 8,000 men of all arms ; of Jackson's three divisions, only two brigades, Lawton's and Gregg's, were absent. Jackson ex- pected doubtless to overwhelm the brigade of Crawford, which he knew on the 7th was supporting the cavalry. But in presence of a larger force he was not a man to hesitate, unless in face of Overwhelming odds. It may safely be as- sumed that his intention was to press our army vigorously, and that he hoped to defeat it in detail. General Pope, on the other hand, was well aware of his movements. It was his intention to offer battle, but not until he had con- centrated his army. Sigel's folly had caused a delay of twenty-four hours. Pope could not retire behind Culpe- per, for that would be to sacrifice his communications with Sigel ; nor would it be wise to give Jackson an unobstructed march, or a march obstructed by cavalry only, to Culpeper, for Jackson's activity and energy were well known. It was dangerous to forego the attempt to delay him on his march ; it was perfectly safe to make the attempt, because the troops in the immediate front could take up a strong position and be reinforced, first by Kicketts, and afterward by Sigel when he should arrive. Finally, while it was wise to send a por- tion of the troops to the front, it was necessary, on account 20 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. of keeping up the communication with Sigel, to retain a considerable force near Culpeper Court House. "With these views, General Pope sent to General Banks a verbal order through Colonel Marshall, of his staff, which, when at Banks' request it was reduced to writing by Major Pelouze, of Banks' staff, read as follows : " Culpeper, 9.45 a.m., August 9, '63. *'From Colonel Lewis Marshall : General Banks to move to the front immediately, assume command of all .forces in the front, deploy his skirmishers if the enemy advances, and attack him immediately as he approaches, and be reinforced from here." Whatever may have been the order as given by General Pope to Colonel Marshall, and whatever may have been the order which Colonel Marshall intended to give to General Banks, the above is, without question, the order which Gen- eral Banks received. If there was any mistake about it, the blame must rest, without any dispute, ujDon the superior officer, who might have put it in writing and did not. Whatever may have been the interpretation of this order, however, it was not the only one which Banks received. He tells us himself, in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, in 1864,f that after he had, in compliance with this order, put his troops in motion, he left the head of his column to see General Pope, and asked him if he had any other orders. General Pope told him that he / had sent an officer, acquainted with the country, who would designate the ground he was to holcl.X That officer — General * From a letter from Major Pelouze to General Gr. H. Gordon, in Gordon's " Second Massachusetts and Stonewall Jackson," printed but not published, p. 216. See also Eep. C. W., 1S65, vol. iii., p. 45, at the end of the volume, where the same text is given by Banks, with a few unimportant variations. tRep. C. W., 1865, vol. iii., p. 45, at the end of the volume. X The italics are ours. THE BATTLE OF CEDAR MOUNTAm. 21 Eoberts, as is claimed by Banks, urged liim to take the of- fensive. This Eoberts denies, but it seems probable that he did indulge in remarks of a kind likely to provoke a high- spirited man to hazard an engagement. But, even if this were so, the language of the written despatch — "Deploy your shirmisJiers if the enemy advances, and attack him imme- diately as he approaches,"^ and be reinforced from here" — though certainly far from explicit, does not, on examination, sustain the interpretation which General Banks put upon it. The taking up of a x)osition by our forces is implied in the reference to the advance of the enemy. The enemy are contemplated as advancing upon our troops in position ; when they advance, skirmishers are to be thrown out ; when the enemy approaches, he is to be attacked with the skirmishers, and delayed as much as possible, and reinforcements are to be at once sent for to Culpeper. The reason of the thing, also, is all one way. To suppose that Poj)e would send Banks' corps out alone to attack Jackson is absurd of itself, and, taken in connection wdth the careful and judicious hand- ling of his troops thus far in the campaign, and with the strategic needs of the moment, of which we have spoken at length above, there should have been no doubt whatever in General Banks' mind as to his duty that day. He should have taken up a strong position, pushed his j)ickets well out, and ascertained the strength, positions, and intentions of the enemy, maintained a firm countenance, and replied at once to their guns. If they advanced, he should have deployed a strong skirmish-line, and given it to the charge of some alert and courageous officer, and have immediately notified General Pope. Had he done this, there might have been no serious engagement on that day ; but if Jackson had brushed * The italics are ours. V 22 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. away tlie skirmishers and pushed his way to the main line, he ought to have been, and would probably have been re- pulsed. Still, General Pope, who might have put his in- structions in writing, and did not, must share the blame. And it is a fair criticism on the instructions that they say not one word of taking up, or of holding a j)osition. The instructions, besides, do, unquestionably, order Banks in a certain emergency to attack. It is true, he is to attack with skirmishers ; still, he is to attack. The order breathes the spirit of an active, aggressive course. If General Banks was to take up a strong position, and defend himself, why not say so, in so many words, and why not put it in black and white ? The road down which General Banks' corps marched from Culj)eper Court House, runs to Eobertson's Ford on the Bapidan, passing to the westward of Cedar Mountain. About eight miles south of Cul]3eper, the road crosses a little stream called Cedar Bun. At this j^oint it diverges to the right, around the northerly and westerly slopes of the moun- tain. General Boberts directed that all the trooxDS, with the exception of Gordon's brigade, should cross the run, which was an insignificant stream, and take ujy a strong position on a plateau just beyond it. This was done and the little army was ranged in order of battle. It consisted of two divisions of infantry, those of Williams and Augur, one brigade of cavalry under Bayard, and a full complement of artillery, and numbered in all about 7,500 men. The brigade of Gordon, belonging to Williams' division, was placed in a very strong position behind the creek, on the extreme right ; the other brigade of this division, Crawford's, was placed on the right of the road, and was the right brigade of the line of battle. On the left of the road Augur arranged his brigades from right to left, Geary being on the road and connecting with THE BATTLE OF CEDAR MOUNTAIN. 23 Crawford, then Prince on Geary's left, and then, somewhat refused, the small brigade of Greene. He had no troops in reserve. The ai'tillery were ranged on the plateau in front of the infantry. The cavalry were on the flanks and skirmished with the enemy. Jackson's army consisted of three divisions, his own, so- called, now commanded by General Charles S. Winder, Battle of Cedar Mountain. Ewell's, and A. P. Hill's, and numbered, as has been stated, between 20,000 and 25,000 men ; the latter number is proba- bly nearer the truth. He pushed Ewell forward on his right (our left) along the northerly slope of Cedar Mountain, 24 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. with two of his brigades, those of Trimble and Hayes, the latter commanded by Colonel Forno. The remaining bri- gade, that of Early, was kept much nearer the road, so that a considerable interval existed between it and the two bri- gades first mentioned. Jackson's division was directed to advance along the road, with one brigade, Campbell's, com- manded by Lientenant-Colonel Garnett on the left (our right) of the road, the brigade of General W. B. Taliaferro on their right (onr left) of the road, and the famous "Stone- wall Brigade," then commanded by Colonel Ronald, in re- serve. Behind all these troops was the powerful division of A. P. Hill, comprising the brigades of Thomas, Branch, Archer, Pender, Stafford, and Field. From noon to about three o'clock in the afternoon there had been constant artillery firing. The Confederate General "Winder was killed by a shell about half-2jast three, while directing the fire of some batteries, and his division was taken by General W. B. Taliaferro — the brigade of the latter being taken l)y Colonel A. G. Taliaferro. The enemy were pushing on in the general direction indicated above, but they moved cautiously. In time our cavalry were forced back. Our infantry were then discerned supporting the bat- teries. Then was the time for Banks to have pushed out his skirmishers, and notified Pope that an attack by the enemy could not be far off. Had he done this, he could probably have been reinforced before the attack became general by Ricketts' division of some 8,000 men, a force quite sufficient to have enabled him to hold his own. Unfortunately he de- cided on a very different course. He entirely under-esti- mated the strength of the enemy. He determined to attack himself, with his whole corps. At four o'clock he advanced his whole line forward to the further edge of the plateau. At half-past five he gave the signal of attack. THE BATTLE OF CEDAR lAlOUNTAIN. 25 The general plan was for Crawford to turn the enemy's left by assaulting the left flank of Campbell's brigade, while Geary's and Prince's brigades of Augnr's division should at- tack Taliaferro's and Early's brigades on our left of the road. The enemy suspected nothing of the sort. They had not yet fairly formed their line of battle. They were in fact cau- tiously feeling their way, preparatory to making an attack themselves. On their right, there was a great gap between Early's right and the troops of Trimble and Hayes ; on their left, Campbell's brigade was drawn up on the edge of the woods and facing a wheat-field, but its left flank was covered by thick woods, and Jackson himself told its commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Garnett, to look well to his lefb flank, and to send at once to General Taliaferro, who com- manded his division, for reinforcements. The brigade of Bonald, which was to support the brigades of Campbell and Taliaferro, had not been moved up near enough to be of im- mediate service in case of need. The officers sent by Gar- nett for assistance had not returned, when all at once the storm broke. Geary and Prince, advancing rapidly in front, assaulted with vigor the brigades of Early and Taliaferro, and the right regiment of Campbell's brigade. Suddenly Crawford's men burst upon the left regiments of this brigade. Garnett, who had been on the right of the line, hurried to the spot. He found the Federal infantry rapidly advancing, not more than fifty yards from the front of his line, and bearing down also from the left, and delivering a most galling fire. The First Virginia Battalion, thus struck unexpectedly at a great disadvantage, gave way in confusion. The Forty-second Virginia was ordered to change front to meet the flank at- tack, but its commanding officer. Major Layne, was mortally Vol. IV.— 2 26 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. wounded, and the regiment broke. Our troops now working round to their rear, the same fate met the other regiments of the brigade, in spite of the heroic efforts of their officers. Garnett himself was wounded ; Lieutenant-Colonel Cunning- ham, of the Twenty-first Virginia, was killed ; the flank-fire was most destructive ; the brigade was driven back in dis- order ; and soon the victorious troops of Crawford, pressing on without stopping an instant, struck the left of Taliaferro's brigade. Here the blow was, if anything, even more deci- sive, for Taliaferro was attacked in front hj Geary, as well as in flank and rear by Crawford, and in spite of a gallant resistance, his troops were driven back in confusion and with gTeat slaughter, exposing the left regiments of Early's brigade. Meantime that officer, seeing, in the beginning of the ac- tion, that he was likely to be outflanked on his right by the line comx30sed of our brigades of Prince and Greene, suc- ceeded in getting Thomas' brigade, of Hill's division, to take position on his right. Hardly had he done this, how- ever, when Taliaferro's brigade on his left gave way entirely and carried with it the left regiments of his command. "I found," says General Early, "that the pieces of ai-til- lery that had been advanced had been retired, and that the left regiments of my brigade, and all the troops to their left, as far as I could see, had fallen back, and the enemy were advancing up the slope of the hill." Colonel Walker of the Thii'teenth Virginia, who was on the left of the brigade, speaks of the brigade on his left (TaliafeiTo's), giving way and running off the field in disorder, and says that the panic thus begun was communicated to two or three regiments on his right, in consequence of which his regiment and the Thirty-first Virginia had to retire, being unsupported on either flank. Early, however, resolutely maintained his THE BATTLE OF CEDAR MOUNTAIN. 27 stand with the Twelfth Georgia, and parts of the Fifty- second and Fifty-eighth Virginia regiments, though attacked in front and flank. Had they given way, he admits that the day in all probability would have been lost. But they stood fast, holding their position, as Jackson says in his report of the battle, "with great firmness." Meanwhile, Eonald had at last got his brigade through the woods and fences, and came down upon the exhausted troops of Crawford's brigade. They received him with a firm countenance, and some of his regiments, especially the Twenty-seventh Virginia,"^ were roughly handled and forced back with loss. His line was badly shaken, if not giving way. t In fact, at this moment, the field was ours. Had it not been for the reserve brigades of Hill, Early and Thomas would have been compelled to fall back, leaving us masters of the field. Fortunately, however, for the enemy. Hill was within call. Three of his brigades, those of Branch, Archer, and Pender, now arrived on the ground. While Eonald was maintaining the fight with his comparatively fresh brigade in the centre, and Garnett and Taliaferro were bravely rallying their broken troops in the rear. Branch arrived on their left of the road, and under the immediate direction of Jackson himself advanced in line of battle and encountered our troops in the woods which lie beyond the wheat-field, over which they had charged. The exhausted Federal battalions fell back over the wheat-field and there halted and received the advance of the enemy. Branch's brigade took up the position from which Campbell's had been driven. For some time our men stood their ground ; but they were in no con- dition to meet fresh troops. Taliaferro's brigade having * A. N. v., Haynes' Report, vol. ii., p. 68. t A. N. v., Lane^s Report, vol. ii., p. 270. 28 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. been rallied and brought back to substantially its old posi- tion, our cavalry made a gallant charge upon them down the road, but were broken by their fire in front and the oblique fire from the regiments of Branch. Then the infantry on our left began to fall back. Augur had been wounded; Geary had been wounded ; Prince had been captured. But the remnants of Crawford's brigade, still clinging to the edge of the wheat-field, and firing across it, were now rein- forced by a fine regiment, the Tenth Maine, belonging to this brigade, which had not participated in the battle thus far. But one regiment could do but little, of course, though it obstinately held its own for nearly half an hour, losing out of its 461 officers and men 173 killed and wounded. Then, when it was too late. Banks sent for Gordon's brigade, hitherto held in reserve on the extreme right. It was a use- less, perfectly useless order, for it was evident that the enemy had been largely reinforced by fresh troops, and that the only thing possible to our exhausted men w^as to make an orderly retreat. But Banks, who was on the spot, was still uncon- vinced. He had just endeavored to get the Maine regiment to sally forth alone across the wheat-field, and now he sends for Gordon, not to cover the retreat, but to resume again the offensive. Gordon, a graduate himself of West Point, and a veteran of the Mexican war, at the head of a fine body of troops, the Second Massachusetts, into which Harvard Col- lege had sent many of her sons, the Third Wisconsin, and the Twenty-seventh Indiana, took his troops at the double- quick across the creek and to the edge of the wheat-field. But by this time the groimd was occupied only by the dead and wounded of Crawford's brigade. The Tenth Maine even had retired. The enemy had massed their forces here. In front were the troops of Archer and Branch ; on Gordon's right were Eonald and Pender. The action was brief but THE BATTLE OF CEDAR MOUNTAIN. 29 terrible. Till they were flanked, Gordon's troops stood and inflicted severe loss on their opponents, but before long Pender had gained their right and rear and the whole thing was over. The Second Massachusetts lost heavily; 12 of- ficers and 147 enlisted men killed and wounded, and 15 prisoners, 35 per cent, of the number engaged. Never was there a more useless sacrifice of brave men's lives. The enemy j^ushed the retreating forces until they took up a position behind the creek and were reinforced by Kicketts' division and Sigel's corps, the latter having arrived in the evening. Unaware of this, Jackson undertook, in his anxiety to reach Culpeper before morning, to shell the Federal troops out of their position, but succeeded in rous- ing so many sleeping batteries that he shortly discontinued his cannonade, having suffered some loss. The battle of Cedar Mountain was over. It is impossible not to regard it as a wholly needless engagement. It was not any part of General Pope's plan that it should be fought. It was followed on the day but one after by the retreat of Jackson to the Eapidan. It was a mere tactical victory for Jackson, and was won only because he had the larger army and the stronger reserves. For, as a battle between Jack- son's and Ewell's divisions and Thomas' brigade of Hill's division on the one side, and the two divisions of Banks' corps on the other, it was without controversy a victory for Banks' corps. But, as we have before said. Banks knew or should have known that the whole of Hill's division was up, and that it was no part of General Pope's plan that a battle should be fought with Jackson's command before his army was concentrated. We lost one gun, it was mired in the creek on the retreat. Jackson claims to have captured 400 prisoners, 3 colors, and 5,302 {sic) small arms. There is some mistake about this last 30 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. item doubtless — probably a misprint — as there were not many more muskets in all Banks' corps. Crawford's brigade, out of 1,767 officers and men, lost 96 killed, 397 wounded, and 374 missing ; very many of the latter being doubtless killed or wounded — in all 867 — nearly one-half.* Gordon's brigade, numbering less than fifteen hundred men, lost in killed, wounded, and missing, 466. Our whole loss f was 1,661 killed and wounded, and 723 missing; total, 2,393. Jackson reports 1,283 killed and wounded, and 31 missing ; total, 1,314. The loss in officers was very heavy on both sides. It was a hard-fought battle ; fierce, obstinate, sanguinary. * History Tenth Maine, p. 197. t Gordon's Second Massachusetts and StonewallJackson, p. 225, note, A. N. V., vol. ii., p. 7. CHAPTEK ni. ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK. Although General Pope had witli liim the strong division of Eicketts, and the two divisions of Sigel, besides the five thousand and odd men of Banks' corps, in all, say twenty-three thousand to twenty-five thousand men, besides cavalry, he very sensibly sent to Fredericksburg for King's division -of McDowell's corps, which joined him on the evening of the 11th. Meanwhile, he sent a flag of truce to Jackson to bury the dead, and the whole day of the 11th was passed in this sad duty. On the night of the 11th, Jackson, fearing to be outnum- bered, retreated to the Bapidan, followed at once by General Pope, and on the 12th our pickets watched the Eajjidan from Eaccoon Ford to the base of the Blue Eidge. On the 14th, two excellent divisions of General Burnside's corps, those of Eeno and Stevens, arrived under command of the former officer, from North Carolina. They numbered together some eight thousand men. They had come by way of Aquia Creek, Falmouth, and the north bank of the Eap- pahannock. These officers were both men of noted bravery, energy, and capacity. Thus far, it will be observed, General Pope had performed the mission with which he had been entrusted. He had substituted his single will for the different wishes of three department commanders. He had concentrated a force 32 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. which had been widely and uselessly scattered. He had menaced the enemy's communications so seriously that, be- fore a single regiment of the Army of the Potomac had left Hanison's Landing, Lee had been obliged to weaken his army by sending to oppose Pope two of his most trusted officers, Jackson and A. P. Hill, and at least twenty-five thousand of his best soldiers. Now, however, on the Peninsula, the signs of General McClellan's departure became unmistakable. General Lee had, in this state of things, his choice of three courses : he could either concentrate his whole disposable force upon the retreating army, whose corps were necessarily more or less separated, hoping to defeat them in detail ; or, he could observe us with a part of his army and endeavor to cut oft such trains or stragglers or such isolated bodies as he might find exposed ; or he could leave our army to get away as well and as fast as it could, and concentrate his whole force upon Pope, who, in the exposed position which he occupied on the Eapidan, offered a tempting prize. He chose the last ; and on August 13th, three days before McClellan moved, General Longstreet, with his powerful corps, con- sisting of twenty-one brigades of infantry, besides artillery, was ordered to the Eapidan. Stuart, also, with his cavalry, was directed upon Gordonsville. The entire force assem- bled under General Lee was not far from fifty-five thousand men of all arms. He outnumbered his adversary by more than twenty thousand men. General Pope's army, we have said, was in an exposed position. Erom Eapidan Station to Culpeper the railroad runs nearly north, from Culpeper it runs nearly east to Rappahannock Station, and thence noi^iheastward to Alex- andria. It was, therefore, possible for General Lee, on the Eapidan, to reach Brandy Station or Eappahannock Station GENERAL MAP OF THE CAMPAIGN. ON THE RAPPAHAN^^OCK. 33 almost as easily as Pope could, by moving from Eaccoon and Morton's Fords through Stevensburg. This turn in the di- rection of the railroad at Culpeper has, in fact, in all our campaigns, rendered it impossible for our army to rely on the railroad as a means of supx^ly much below Culpeper, for the reason that, on proceeding beyond Culpeper, the line of supply is at once uncovered. General Lee proposed to avail himself without delay of this weakness in his adversary's situation. The cavalry un- der Stuart were to seize Rappahannock Station, while the infantry, under Longstreet and Jackson, were to turn Pope's left. But Pope had his signal officers on the alert, and had, besides, captured Stuart's adjutant-general in one of those cavalry raids which, with his accustomed activity, he had sent out immediately on his arrival on the Rapidan, and the enemy's plan, which was fixed for the 18th, was discovered. Fortunately for us, also, there was some delay on their part. Pope acted with promptitude and decision, and the entire army retreated behind the Rappahannock on the 18th and 19th without any loss in men or material. Reno fell back by way of Stevensburg ; Banks, who was at Culi^eper, by the railroad ; McDowell, who had been in position near Cedar Mountain, followed Banks ; while Sigel, who had been on the extreme right, crossed higher up at Sulphur Si3rings. The retreat was skilfully masked by the cavalry. These movements were all safely accomplished, and the morning of the 20th saw the Federal army in position be- hind the river Rappahannock. ' A few words here concerning their antagonists will not be out of place. General Robert E. Lee was at this time fifty-five years of age. He had graduated at West Point in the Class of 1829. He had served with great distinction in the Mexican War, 3 \ 34 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. in which he had been wounded at the storming of Chapnl- tepec, and he had, as Chief of Staff to Lieutenant General Scott, contributed very largely to the success of the cam- paign. He was, besides, a man of the highest standing in point of family, which was one of the oldest and most dis- tinguished in Virginia, and he was a man of strong character and unblemished life. Lieutenant-General James Longstreet was a South Caro- linian. He graduated from West Point in the Class of 1842, served through the Mexican War, being severely wounded at Chapultepec. He commanded the right wing, w^hat was afterward the First Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia. His abilities as a corps commander are well known. The left wing, or Second Corps, w^as led by Major-Gen- eral Thomas J. Jackson. He was a Virginian, a graduate of West Point of the Class of 1846, had served through the Mexican War, being brevetted for his gallantry in several actions. His devotion to the cause which he espoused, his untiring energy, indefatigable activity, and masterly military judgment, need no description. Among the junior officers, Ewell, A. P. Hill, and Stuart were the most distinguished. All w^ere Virginians, and grad- uates of West Point— Ewell in 1840, Hill in 1847, and Stuart in 1854. All were officers of excellent ability, whose capa- city for their tasks was never questioned. With the exception of Jackson, these officers had not left the United States Army from their graduation until the breaking out of the war. There were no experiments tried in the Army of Northern Virginia. The most distinguished officers that the Govern- ment of the Southern Confederacy could find were put in the highest posts. There was hardly an officer of rank that was not a graduate of West Point. The war was conducted, ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 35 on their side, on strictly military principles ; and, without any possibility of doubt, their adherence to these principles enabled them to gain successes that would otherwise have been unattainable with their limited resources. Moreover, the feeling in this army toward the commanding general was one of entire confidence and enthusiastic devotion. This was not because it was a Southern army, or anything of that sort, but because the Army of Northern Virginia was so for- tunate as to have in Lee a man who was in every w^ay head and shoulders above his colleagues. It was a veteran army. The discipline, to be sure, was not very strict, but the trooi3s were well led. The men were sturdy and active yeomen, accustomed to an outdoor life and the use of arms ; they had had a year's campaigning, and they were full of confidence in their leaders. General Pope's retrograde movement was fully approved by General Halleck, who directed * him on the 18th to stand firm on the line of the Eappahannock till he could heli3 him. and to fight hard, for aid would soon come. For the pres- ent, too, he was ordered to maintain his communications with Falmouth, as the Government still desired to avoid, if possible, the destruction of their railroad between that place and Aquia Creek, and their wharves and store-houses at the latter place. This requirement obliged Pope to retain his hold on the lower fords, and hampered him more or less in his manoeuvres. On the 21st Halleck re- peated t his direction and exhorted Pope to stay forty-eight hours longer and he should be reinforced. Halleck had good reason to expect the immediate arrival of the Army of the Potomac from the Peninsula. That army consisted of Eeynolds' division of Pennsylvania Eeserves, *P. R., p. m t Ibid., p. 125. 36 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. whicli had once belonged to McDowell's corps (which was originally the First Corps of the Army of the Potomac), but had been incorporated with the Fifth Corps on the Penin- sula; of the Second Corps under Sumner; of the Third Corps under Heintzelman ; of the Fourth Corps under Keyes ; of the Fifth Corps under Porter ; of the Sixth Corps under Franklin, besides the cavalry. All these troops were to be sent to Aquia Creek, save Keyes' corps, which was to be left to garrison Fort Monroe and vic^inity. General McClellan seemed to be urging the movement with zeal, and there was every reason to expect the arrival of the troops to begin as early as the 21st or 22d. Consequently General Halleck told Pope to hold on to the line of the Rappahan- nock. Lee, on his part, was equally aware of the probability of his adversary being reinforced and that in a few days. Hence he was most anxious to get at Pope's army at once, before any help could reach him. On the 20th and 21st his main body came up, Jackson on the left and Longstreet on the right. The latter struck the river on the afternoon of the 20th at Kelly's Ford, a few miles below Rappahannock Station, which is the point where the railroad crosses the river. The former, on the morning of the 21st, arrived at Beverly Ford, a few miles above the station; and Stuart, who accompanied him, threw a few regiments of cavalry, under Robertson, across above Beverly Ford, and pushed a small force, under Rosser, across at Beverly Ford. But these detachments were sj)eed- ily driven back again. On the other hand our forces still held some points on the westerly side of the river ; General Hartsuff, with a brigade of Ricketts' division, occupied a tete- cle-pont at Rappahannock Station, and some small hills near by. The gTeater height of the banks on our side gave our ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK 37 artillery an advantage over that of the enemy. The river itself, though fordable every few miles, was nevertheless an obstacle, and a considerable one, as it turned out, to General Lee's advance. There was a great deal of heavy artillery firing across the river, and there were several unimportant skirmishes on both sides of the river, chiefly on the further, or right bank. General Lee, after several tentative movements, soon be- came convinced that he could not make a successful crossing anywhere between Kelly's Ford and Beverly Ford, and he consequently determined to seek a passage higher up. Ac- cordingly, on the 22d, Jackson marched up the river toward Sulphur Springs, a point about ten miles north of Eappa- hannock Station, closely observed by Sigel, who kept pace with him, for a time, on our side of the river. A spirited attack was made on the rear of Jackson's column by a bri- gade of infantry from Sigel's corps, who inflicted consider- able damage, and came near making a valuable capture of trains ; but they v/ere at length driven off, with the loss of many men, and of, at least, one valuable officer — Brigadier- General Bohlen — who commanded them. Arrived at the Springs, whither Sigel was unable to fol- low him, as his line could not safely be prolonged so far, Jackson pushed over, late in the afternoon of the 22d, Early's brigade of Ewell's division, with one additional regiment and two batteries. Immediately after this, a heavy rain- storm set in, and the river rose during the night so much as to cut off all communication between Early's command and the rest of the army. Longstreet, meanwhile, had moved up from the neighbor- hood of Kelly's Ford, and now occupied the right bank of the river, from Eappahannock Station to Beverly Ford, or even somewhat beyond that point. 38 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. General Pope, of course, recognized the intention of the enemy. It was too plain to be mistaken. Lee proposed to cross at Sulphur Springs, or at Waterloo Bridge, or at both places, to turn our right, and, marching through Warrenton, threaten our railroad communications between "Warrenton Junction and Manassas Junction, thus forcing us to fight in a disadvantageous position, and before our reinforcements had come up. Pope, with his inferior force, could not op- pose him at all points of the line, nor would it have been wise had he attempted it. A river can always be crossed by a superior force ; and the best thing for the resisting army to do is, generally speaking, to take up a position from which it can attack and overwhelm the advance of their opponents before it can be supported. Pope at first^ determined to act on this plan. He tells us in his report f that he instructed General Sigel, who occupied the right of his line, and who expressed great apprehension that his flank would be turned, and who proposed io withdraw from his position and retire toward the railroad, to stand firm and hold his ground, and to allow the enemy to cross at Sulphur Springs, and de- velop himself on the road toward Warrenton ; that, as soon as any considerable body had crossed, he would mass his army and throw it upon any force of the enemy that at- tempted to march upon Warrenton. The despatch to Sigel, to which General Pope refers, is to be found inserted in his report, t but while the instructions to Sigel are as given above, nothing whatever is said in it of General Pope's in- tention of massing his army, and attacking the enemy found marching upon Warrenton. It is possible that General Pope's memory may have been at fault here, as ifc is probable, * Pope to Halleck, August 20 ; P. E-., p. 123. Same to same, August 22, 5 P.M. ; P. R., 126. tP. R. p. 124. t Ibid., p. 129. ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 39 from another portion of his report, that this despatch to Sigel, which was undoubtedly written very early in the morning of the 23d, was penned when Pope had a very dif- ferent operation in his mind. General Pope had, in fact, conceived a most daring plan, the direct opposite of this of which we have spoken, namely, to recross the river and assail the enemy's flank and rear. At Eappahannock Station he had, as has been stated, a tete- de-po7it on the other side of the river. His artillery also commanded the fords. Writing to General Halleck at 9.15 p. M. of the 22d,* he says " I must do one of two things — either fall back and meet Heintzelman behind Cedar Eun [which is near Catlett's Station] or cross the Eappahannock with my whole force, and assail the enemy's flank and rear. I must do one or the other at daylight. Which shall it be ? I incline to the latter." And General Halleck, replying at eleven o'clock that night, says f that he thinks the latter of the two propositions the best. Pope thereupon, at 2.20 a.m. of the 23d, requests % Halleck to order all the troops coming up the river from Fredericksburg to cross the Eappahannock at the various fords, and march rapidly on Stevensburg and Brandy Station ; and that his movement will be made the next day, as soon as he finds that the enemy has passed a sufficient number of his troops over the river. It was during this night of the 22 d and 23d — an anxious night, doubtless, for General Pope, and a wakeful one, for he seems to have been up at all hours of it — that he received from Sigel the despatch of which he. speaks in his report, notifying him that the enemy had crossed near Sulphur Springs, and suggesting that his corps should be withdrawn to Bealeton. In his reply, which was doubtless an immedi- *P. R., p. 127. t lb., p. 127. X lb., p. 128. 40 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. ate one, "he orders ^ him, as lie says in his report, to stand firm, and let the enemy develop toward Warrenton, and that he desired the enemy to cross as large a force as he pleased in the direction of Warrenton. This seems to settle the question, what was the plan in General Pope's mind when he was writing to Sigel. The more troops of the enemy on our side of the river, the fewer there would be for Pope to fight on the other side. Had he intended at that time to overwhelm those who had crossed, he would hardly have thus given them permission to cross as many as they liked. The matter is not of any particular importance, ex- cept as showing that the intention of attacking on our side of the river, if it was entertained at first, was soon aban- doned for the plan of recrossing the river. But the next morning, the 23d, it was found that the rise in the river had rendered this project of a counter-attack im- practicable. It was perhaps quite as well that it was not at- tempted ; no army that had not been thoroi^ghly trained, and that was not under officers accustomed for years to act with each other, would have had much chance of success in such a dangerous operation. Pope's army had just been or- ganized. As for those troops on which he must have relied to guard the railroad during this incursion on the other side of the river, they had not yet even reported for duty. Still, the freshet which put a stop to this plan, rendered it possible to capture that part of Jackson's command which had crossed near the Springs. Accordingly, on the morning of the 23d, Sigel, whose corps had been posted between Beverly and Freeman's Fords, was ordered to move up the river to Sulphur Springs, and thence toward Waterloo Bridge, and to attack whatever force of the enemy he might * Pope to Sigel, August 23 ; P. R., p. 129. ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 41 find on otir side of the river. Nothing, however, came of this expedition. Early had retired behind Great Eun, one of the affluents of the Eappahannock, which was so much swollen by the rain that Sigel was delayed till too late in getting across it. But this was no fault of General Pope's. In this attempt to capture those of the enemy's troops that had crossed the river. Pope did not hesitate to uncover for the time being the lower fords of the KaiDpahannock. Owing to the freshet, the danger of a crossing by the enemy at these fords had very greatly diminished, if it had not entirely disappeared, for the bridges had been swept away and the fords were gone, and then there were the troops of Heintzel- man and Porter, now arriving from Alexandria and Aquia Creek, who would furnish for the moment a sufficient de- fence. He, therefore, on the morning of the 23d, ordered ^ General Sigel upon Sulphur Springs, as has just been stated, and thence, if he did not find the enemy, upon Waterloo Bridge, some few miles higher up the river. He ordered f Banks and Eeno to support Sigel, and he pushed McDowell's corps to Warrenton, where he fixed his own headquarters. To Warrenton he also directed J Eeynolds, who had come up on the 23d from Aquia Creek, with his fine division of Pennsylvania reserves — 2,500 strong — the first arrival from the Army of the Potomac — and which he attached to McDowell's command, to which it had, as we have seen, originally belonged. He also, on the 23d, abandoned his works beyond the river at Eappahannock Station and with- drew the troops ; he destroyed the bridge there ; and for the time being, at any rate, he renounced § his plan of recrossing the river. These movements were certainly wise, and they were ordered with commendable promptitude. * p. R., p. 129. tP.R., p. 132. t Pope to Banks : P. E., p. 131. § Though not definitely. Pope to Hallecii ; P. B.., 135. 42 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. While this was going on in our army, General J. E. B. Stnart, the celebrated cavalry officer, whose enterprise and audacity were justly famous, on the night of the 22d, conducted an expedition of 1,500 horse or thereabouts, to our rear, striking the railroad at Catlett's Station. The weather was horrible, and the march exceedingly severe, but the object of the expedition was in part attained, for baggage, despatches, and prisoners were taken. The trestle bridge across Cedar Eun, however, could not be destroyed. Still, the moral efifect of this raid, so far as it went, was of course favorable to the enemy. On the 24th Early succeeded in rejoining his corps. Sigel, who arrived near Sulphur Springs on the night of the 23d, having marched from Freeman's Ford, was delayed, as we have said, at Great Eun, till the morning of the 24th. Whether he could not have accomplished more than he did is still an unsettled question. Between his corps and that of Jackson there was an artillery duel all that day. Buford, with his cavalry, had pushed out to Waterloo in the forenoon of the 24th. Pope directed him to destroy the bridge there, but for some reason this was not done. Sigel was or- dered to support him, and Milroy's brigade, constituting the advance of his corps, reached Waterloo late in the afternoon of the same day. In the evening of the 24th Jackson retired to Jefferson, a place about four miles west of Sulphur Springs, and his po- sitions on the river were occupied by the corps of Longstreet. That evening. Pope's headquarters were at Warrenton ; Sigel was on the river from Waterloo to the Springs ; below him, on the river, was the corps of Banks ; the two divisions of Eeno were a short distance east of the Springs ; Eicketts' division of McDowell's corps was partly between Warrenton and Waterloo, and King's division was between Warrenton ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 43 and the Springs. Eeynolds was near Warrenton. Buford's cavalry observed the extreme right beyond Waterloo. Every- thing was ready to repel another attempt at crossing either at the Springs or at "Waterloo Bridge. Jackson's March. General Lee had been delayed longer than he expected on the banks of the Rappahannock. He had not succeeded in surprising General Pope. Wherever he had attempted a passage of the river, he had been met with adequate resist- ance. He now determined on the bold step of sending THE ARMY UNDER POPR Jackson round oiir right by way of Orleans, Salem, "White Plains, and Thoroughfare Gap, to cut our railroad communi- cations at Manassas ; a move which, if successful, would necessarily bring about a withdrawal of our army from the line of the Eappahannock. It was a dangerous move, and one which could have been entrusted to no one but Stone- wall Jackson ; and it was so dangerous that even he came within an ace of being totally defeated. Moreover, the ob- ject proposed was not worth the risk. It was not supposed by anybody that Pope's army could be materially injured by this expedition. There was nothing in the world to prevent Pope and his whole army from retiring safely behind Bull Eun and there meeting fresh supplies and reinforcements, and there was great probability, that, on the way there, he would have an opportunity to crush Jackson before Lee could possibly rejoin him, not to speak of the possibility of Jackson's encountering large bodies of troops of the Army of the Potomac. On this march Jackson started on the morning of the 25th from Jefferson,^ passing through Amissville, and crossing Hedgman's Eiver, as the Eappa- hannock above Waterloo Bridge is called, at Hinson's Mills, and thence marching by way of Orleans and reaching Salem at night. The march of this column could not of course be kept a secret. Everyone saw it — the clouds of dust were plainly visible — the signal officers reported its strength, but where * General Pope is in error when he states, as he does in his report, p. 131, that ''during the day of the 24th a large detachment of the en^my, numbering thirty- six regiments of infantry, with the usual number of batteries of artillery and a considerable cavalry force, marched rapidly to the north, in the direction of Rec- tortown." There was no force that marched in that direction but Jackson's, and that did not leave Jefferson till the morning of the 25th ; see Reports of Lee, Jackson, Early, Taliaferro, Hill, Stuart, and Boswell. Rep. A. N. V., vol. i., p. 21 ; vol. ii., pp. 92, 124, 140, 142, 171), 199, and 393. ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 45 Jackson was going was the doubtful question. He might be going into the Valley of the Shenandoah on another raid. From Orleans his troops could pass through Chester Gap. At Salem he attained the Manassas Gap Railroad, which led through Front Eoyal to Strasburg. On the other hand, from Salem he could follow the track in the other direction, marching through White Plains and Thoroughfare Gap, and strike our rear at Gainesville and Manassas Junction. Which was he intending to do ? A third course was also possible, namely, a sudden dash south from White Plains upon War- renton. W^hichever of these courses he might choose to take, how- ever, it was clearly the policy of General Pope to retire promptly to the line of Thoroughfare Gap, Gainesville, and Manassas Junction. He should, the moment he suspected the movement to have begun, say, in the afternoon of the 25th, have retired as quickly as he did from the Rapidan to the Rappahannock a few days before. Even if the enemy were going into the valley, he could not detain him by re- maining at Warrenton, and confronting the heavy bodies of troops that still remained opposite Sulphur Springs and Waterloo ; while if Jackson had either of the two other plans in his mind. Pope would certainly be taken at a great disadvantage. It needs no argument to show that the pos- session of unembarrassed lines of communication is an es- sential requisite for the successful conduct of a campaign. In this emergency General Pope, as we shall see, made the mistake of trusting to the Washington authorities to preserve his line of supplies. He remained where he was, manoeuvering in the neighborhood of Warrenton, Sulphur Springs, and Waterloo Bridge, directing General Haupt, who had charge of the transportation, to post a strong division at Manassas Junction, and requesting General Halleck to push 46 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. Franklin's corps with all speed to Gainesville. It may well be that he did not like the notion of retreating further ; yet anything was preferable to a reliance upon officers w^ho had not even reported for duty. There is no doubt, as his dis- patches * clearly show, that he inclined to the theory that the enemy were making for the Shenandoah Valley by way of Front Royal, but what sound objection could there be to his taking the safer course, and, by occupying Thoroughfare Gap and Gainesville with his own troops, forestall a possible surprise and loss ? But we are anticipating a little. On the morning of August 25th, before Jackson's move- ment had been observed. General Pope issued a General Order f for the formation of a new line running substantially north and south. McDowell's corps was to be on the right, at Warrenton ; Sigel on his left, at Fayetteville ; then Banks, from Bealeton to a creek near the river; and, finally, Reno at Kelly's Ford. These officers were ordered to throw out troops in the direction of the river to observe the enemy. McDowell was already in position. Reno, by some mis- take, retired to Warrenton Junction. Banks fell back to the neighborhood of Bealeton Station, or was between that place and Fayetteville. Sigel, who was about to retire from Waterloo and Sulphur Springs to Fayetteville, received J a verbal order from General Roberts, of Pope's staff, direct- ing him to hold his position at Waterloo Bridge at all hazards, and advising him that McDowell would support him on the right and Banks on the left. This seems to have been a repetition by Roberts of his culpable conduct on the day of Cedar Mountain, when he took upon himself to vary the orders of the commanding officer by intimating to Banks that Pope expected him to fight a battle. Sigel * Pope to McDowelJ, P. R., p. 187 ; Pope to Sigel, lb., p. 13T. t Pope's Virginia Campaign, McDoweU's Report, p. 37, ^ P. V. C, p. SI. ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 47 found the enemy assuming a very threatening aspect ; he sent to find McDowell and Banks, but they were neither of them in the position in which Eoberts had said they were ; in this emergency he is about to fall back on the aforesaid General Order to retire to Fayetteville, when he receives an order from Pope directing him to march to Warrenton, in- stead of to Fayetteville, at once. This he does, first setting fire to Waterloo Bridge, and arriving at Warrenton at two o'clock in the morning of the 26th. Before the 25th General Heintzelman, with two divisions of the Third Corps, of the Army of the Potomac, under Gen- erals Hooker and Kearney, had reported for duty. His command numbered about ten thousand five hundred men. He ha^ come direct by rail from Alexandria. On the night of the 25th he was at Warrenton Junction. General Fitz John Porter also, with the two excellent di- visions of the Fifth Corps of the Army of the Potomac, under Generals Morell and Sykes, who had come via Aquia Creek and Falmouth, and had been under the orders of General Burnside, who commanded at Falmouth, watching the low^er fords of the Rappahannock for two or three days, reported for duty on the 26th. His corps numbered rather less than nine thousand men.'^ On the night of the 25th Morell was at Kelly's Ford, and Sykes at Bealeton Station. The officers of the Army of the Potomac, w-ho had joined General Pope, were among the best in that army. General Eeynolds, who brought up the Pennsylvania Reserves, was in all respects an admirable soldier. He fell at the head of his corps — the First — on the bloody field of Gettysburg. General Meade, who commanded the army there, was one of his brigadiers. General Heintzelman, of the Third Corps, * Piatt's brigade, of Stursfis' division, was added to it on the 2Tth, raising the total to nearly or quite ten thousand men. 48 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. was a gallant old veteran, and his lieutenants, Kearney and Hooker, were men of known activity, skill, and daring. Kearney fell in the conrse of the campaign. Hooker rose to the command of the army. General Porter, who commanded the Fifth Corps, was an officer of the highest character, and had recently distinguished himself at the battle of Malvern Hill. His division commanders, Morell and Sykes, were ex- cellent men. Sykes afterward for a long time commanded this corps, and led it at Gettysburg in the successful strug- gle for the possession of Little Eound Top. These were all the reinforcements which General Pope got from the Army of the Potomac, until after the battle of Manassas. They numbered in all, including Piatt's brigade, only 23,000 men. CHAPTEE IV. JACKSON'S RAID. The reports of the signal-officers of the march of Jackson*s cohimn to our right during the day of the 25th, made such an impression on General Pope's mind, that he, on that evening, changed his plan as indicated in the General Order of that morning. He ordered McDowell to make a recon- noissance as early as possible on the next morning, the 26th, with his wdiole cor^DS (except Eeynolds' division, which was to be left at Warrenton), and ascertain w^liatwas beyond the river at Sulphur Springs ; and he ordered Sigel to force the passage of the river at Waterloo Bridge at daylight, and see what was in front of him. This order reached Sigel just as he was entering Warrenton at two o'clock in the morning, after the fatiguing night march from Waterloo, w^hich had succeeded to the perplexities and contradictory orders of the afternoon. He sent word that his men could not execute the order till they had rested, and Pope allowed him to put them in camp for a day. McDowell moved with prompti- tude early in the morning of the 26th, bringing Eicketts from his position on the Warrenton and Waterloo road toward Sulphur Springs, so as to support King, who, hav- ing been posted on the road from Warrenton to the Springs, had a shorter distance to march, and was in the advance. Pope, when he found that his orders could not be carried out by Sigel, notified McDowell to use his discretion about Vol. IV.— 4 50 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. crossing at Sulphur Springs, and requested him also to as- certain, if he could, what was passing at Waterloo Bridge. McDowell very wisely, thereupon, contented himself with observing the enemy at the Springs with King's division, and returned Ricketts' division to the position it had occupied in the morning. King's division had a cannonade with the enemy all the afternoon. King ascertained from a flag of truce that he had Anderson's division in front of 'him. McDowell also ordered Buford, w^ith all the available force of Sigel's cavalry, and some guns, and with three days cooked rations, to march at dawn of the 27th toward Chester Gap, and ascertain the direction which Jackson's force was taking. Pope also ordered a cavalry regiment to be sent from Ma- nassas to scout the railroad as far as the Gap. Reports came in from scouts that the enemy was marching for Thoroughfare Gap. With the exception of these orders, no steps were taken in consequence of this information. It was expected, perhaps, that General Halleck would be able to provide for the safety of the communications. At the close of this day — August 26th — the positions of the troops were substantially as follows : Buford with his cavalry, was on the right, near Waterloo, preparing for his expedition. Eicketts was on the road between Waterloo and Warrenton, about four miles from Warrenton. King was on the road between Warrenton and Sulphur Springs, with one brigade near the Springs. Reynolds was in Warrenton. Sigel was in camp near Warrenton. Banks was at Fayette- ville. Reno and Heintzelman were near Warrenton Junc- tion, where were General Pope's headquarters. Of Porter's corps, one division, Morell's, was at Kelly's Ford, and the other division, Sykes', five or six miles east of Bealeton Sta- tion. That same evening Stonewall Jackson was at Bristoe Sta- JACKSON'S RAID, 51 tion with his whole force, consisting of the divisions of Taliaferro, A. P. Hill, and Ewell, numbering some twenty- five thousand men. He had marched all day from Salem, through White Plains, Thoroughfare Gap, and Gainesville, and had nowhere met with the smallest opposition. He had marched all that afternoon some fifteen miles in rear of oiu* army with his twenty-five thousand men, and our army knew nothing about it. It is hardly necessary to say that this was the result of great negligence. Enough was known to de- mand the sending of parties of observation to the road which Jackson took ; nay, enough was suspected of the intentions of the enemy to make a reasonably prudent officer detach ten thousand men to Thoroughfare GajD. And what was the object in maintaining such a forward position with the army ? Why was it not the wisest course, in view of the possible movement of Jackson through Thoroughfare Gap, to fall back to that line with the whole army ? General Pope, indeed, tells us in his report (p. 140) that he confidently expected that by the afternoon of the 26th Franklin would have been at or near Gainesville ; and that the forces under Sturgis and Cox would have been at War- renton Junction. There may, undoubtedly have been a time when he did expect this."^ But he certainly did not 07i the evening of the 26th sup^Dose that Franklin was at Gainesville, for we find him writing to Porter at seven o'clock that even- ing this : " Franklin, I hope, with his corps, will, bi/ day after to-morrow night, occupy the point where the Manassas Gap Eailroad intersects the turnpike from Warrenton to Washington City, " L e. , Gainesville. And in this letter he tells * On the 24th General Haupt telegraphed him from Alexandria that thirty thousand troops, or more, demanded transportation ; and on the 25th, that he expected to send on all the troops now there, and all that were expected to ar- rive that day. P. 11 , p. 183. 52 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. him what he expects abont Cox and Sturgis, who have not yet joined him, namely, that Cox will join him in the after- noon of to-morrow, and that Sturgis will move forward the day after to-morrow. Pope, it is perfectly evident, knew, on the night of the 26th, that neither Gainesville nor the Gap were guarded. It must be remarked that the above statement in his report is misleading, as are also others on page 142. The truth is just this : he knew perfectly well, on the even- ing of the 26th, that there was no force of our army at the GajD, or near it, but he did not suppose that Jackson was coming through the Gap. On the evening of the 26th "^^ Pope determined to form a new line running substantially East and West between Warren- ton and Gainesville. He wrote McDowell at eight p.m., that he thinks the fight should be made at Warrenton. Sigel was already there. It was not necessary, of course, to issue any special orders to McDowell for the concentration of his own divisions. Banks, too, at Fayetteville, was in a good po- sition to support the new line. Eeno was ordered to move from Warrenton Junction at daylight to the neighborhood of Warrenton, and McDowell was directed, as soon as he got near Warrenton, to send him to Greenwich, a village nearly east of Warrenton, and about as far from Warrenton as War- renton is from Warrenton Junction. Why Eeno was to make this fatiguing march it is not easy to see. Greenwich is nearer the Junction than Warrenton is. Arrived at Green- wich, Reno was to throw forward four regiments and a bat- tery to Gainesville. Heintzelman, who was at the Junction, was ordered to send Kearney's division to Greenwich. Hooker was to remain near the Junction. Porter was ordered * The statement in his Report, p. 139, that he came to this determination on the evening of the 25th, is an error. The orders to Reno and Porter dated on the evening of the 26th. JACKSON'S RAID. 53 to march through Fayetteville to the vicinity of Warrenton. Of his two divisions, Morell's was at Kelly's Ford and below, and Sykes' was five miles east of Bealeton Station, as has been stated. While writing these orders General Pope was informed that the enemy's cavalry had interrupted the railroad near Manassas. He at once ordered Heintzelman " to put a regi- ment on a train of cars and send it down immediately to Manassas to ascertain what had occurred, repair the tele- graph wires, and protect the railroad there until further orders." To-pe evidently did not at this moment suppose this interruption to be a matter of very great consequence. But at midnight he writes to McDowell that the question whether the whole force of the enemy or the larger portion of it has gone round (i.e., through Thoroughfare Gap) is a question which we must settle instantly, so that we may deter- mine our plans." During the night he made up his mind to take the most prudent course and throw the main body of the army u^Don Gainesville, a thing which the direction he had the evening before given to his columns enabled him to do without difficulty. This decision was a wise one, and it was taken with General Pope's customary promp- titude. At half past eight in the morning of the 27tli, accordingly. General Pope ordered McDowell, with his own and Sigel's corps and the division of Reynolds, to pursue the turnpike from Warrenton to Gainesville so as to reach Gainesville that evening. McDowell at once ordered Sigel to send for- ward instantly a strong advance from his corps, to seize the iDOsition of Buckland Mills, on Broad Run, and to fol- low immediately with his corps. Bayard's cavalry preceded the march. Reynolds, King, and Ricketts followed. Sigel reached Buckland Mills in time to save the bridge, which 54 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. tlie enemy's cavalry wlio covered Jackson's movement had attempted to set on fire. Milroy's brigade and Schnrz's di- vision reached Gainesville that evening ; Schenck's division remained with McDowell's corps at Bnckland Mills. By the same order, Eeno, with his two divisions, was or- dered upon Greenwich from Catlett's Station, the nearest way, instead of first going to Warrenton, as directed the evening before. He was followed by Kearny's division of Heintzelman's corps. Eeno and Kearny reached their al- lotted positions that evening. By the same order, General Porter w^as to remain at "War- renton Junction till relieved by Banks, who was ordered thifcher from Fayetteville, to assume charge of all the army trains, which were to retire by a road jparallel with the rail- road, and of all the railroad trains, which were to be run back to Manassas as fast as practicable. "While Pope was issuing this order for the concentration of the army upon Gainesville he was undoubtedly of the opinion that the railroad had been cut only by the enemy's cavalry, or at least by a small force of the enemy, whether cavalry or infantry. The regiment w^hich Heintzelman had been, the evening before, directed to send out to ascer- tain the facts, reported the next morning very early that they had found the enemy in full force. At 7 A. m. of the 27th Hooker's division was sent out from Warrenton Junc- tion to drive them away. Nine miles from the Junction, near Bristoe Station, Hooker encountered Ewell's division in position. It was between two and three o'clock in the afternoon. Hooker immediately attacked the enemy, and in a sharp action, lasting till dusk, in which he manoeuvred his troops admirably, causing Ewell to think that he w^as largely outnumbered, he drove him back across Broad Eun. Ewell was directed by Jackson to retire toward Manassas if JACKSON'S RAID. 55 tlireatened by a superior force, and doubtless lie did not contest the possession of the ground so sharply as he would have done had he been expected to contest it stubbornly. Still, it appears from Early's report that Ewell was out- manoeuvred by Hooker. At the close of the action General Pope in person arrived on the field at Bristoe Station. He now for the first time learned the truth, namely, that Jackson was in front of him with his whole corps, consisting of his old division under Taliaferro, the division of Ew^ell, and the light division (so- called) under A. P. Hill. He very j^roperly sent at once for Porter to come right iii> from Warrenton Junction, about nine miles off, and for Kearny to come from Greenwich, w^iich was not more than half that distance. He would thus, in the morning, have four divisions at Bristoe, includ- ing Hooker's. Banks was ordered to take Porter's i^lace at Warrenton Junction. If necessary, there were his two di\d- sions, now entirely recovered from the losses of Cedar Moun- tain, available for some more active service than guarding trains. In fact, General Pope, had he contented himself with these orders, would have had his army admirably dis- posed the next day for any emergency. At Gainesville and in its neighborhood he would have had the three divisions of McDowell and the two divisions of Sigel. At Greenwich, he would have had the tw^o divisions of Eeno ready to march upon Gainesville or Manassas, as might be required. At and near Bristoe he would have had Hooker's and Kearny's divisions and the tw^o divisions of Porter ; and, within sup- porting distance, the two divisions of Banks — a perfectly adequate force with which to encounter Jackson. It was absolutely certain that Jackson's command was somewhere to the eastward, and this army of Pope's, in the position it w^ould then have been in, would separate Jackson's force 56 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. from the rest of Lee's army. The situation would have been as favorable as could be desired. But General Pope did not content himself with these or- ders. He ordered Eeno's divisions from Greenwich to Man- assas Junction ; and he ordered McDowell and Sigel, even, to march on the same place at daylight the next morning. But as these orders need a fuller discussion, in view of the movements of the enemy, we will postpone further mention of them until we shall have briefly narrated the exploits of Stonewall Jackson on his daring raid. On arriving, after a fatiguing march from Salem, through "White Plains, Thoroughfare Gap, and Gainesville, at a point near Bristoe Station, without any opposition, after sunset of the 26th, Jackson captured without difficulty the small force guarding the road there. As the Confederates were coming in sight, one train ran past the station toward Manassas Junction. Another, passing in the same direction, they tried to stop by firing at it, but the engineer resolutely drove ahead and escaped, carrying with him the news. A third train was thrown from the track by tearing up the rails, and the communication was now interrupted. General Jackson felt the importance o*f attacking the post of Manas- sas Junction without delay, as the news received at Alexan- dria of the appearance of his troops at Bristoe might natur- ally cause reinforcements to be sent to the garrison. He, therefore, eagerly accepted the offer of General Trimble, who imdertook with the Twenty-first North Carolina and the Twenty-first Georgia to carry the post that night. To secure success he ordered General J. E. B. Stuart, with his cavalry, to move forward, and, as the ranking officer, to take com- mand of the expedition. The escaped trains do not seem to have informed the garrison of the danger. A little after midnight the place was taken ; the resistance of the Federals JACKSON'S RAID. 57 was not desperate ; the Confederate loss was insignificant ; the booty was enormous. Considerable controversy ensued between Trimble and Stuart, as to the honor belonging to them respectively in the affair, into which we do not propose to enter here. The captures, according to Jackson's official report, amounted to eight guns, with horses, equipments, and ammu- nition ; immense supplies of commissary and quartermaster stores, upward of 200 new tents, 175 horses, 300 prisoners, and 200 negroes. The stores consisted, by the same author- ity, of 50,000 pounds of bacon, 1,000 barrels of corn beef, 2,000 barrels of salt pork, 2,000 barrels of flour, and other things in proportion. The next day, the 27th, at seven in the morning, a gallant attempt to recaj^ture the place was made by a New Jersey brigade under General Taylor. Jackson says of their ad- vance, that it was made with great spirit and determination, and under a leader worthy of a better cause. It was of course unsuccessful, as it met the divisions of Hill and Tali- aferro, and in the affair Taylor w^as mortally wounded. After furnishing to the hungry men as many of the stores as they could use or carry away, the remainder were burned. Ewell, as we have seen, after his fight with Hooker, retired from Bristoe Station late in the afternoon, destroying the bridge on Broad Kun as he retired. General Jackson could not, of course, stay at Manassas Junction. His position was, in fact, a very difficult one. He had separated his command loyigo intervallo from the rest of Lee's army. McDowell, Sigel, and Reno were at Gaines- ville, or very near it ; so that he could not go back the way he had come. Pope himself, with the three corps of Heintz- elman. Porter, and Banks, was on the railroad, certain to at- tack him if he stayed a day longer. If he should go to Cen- 3* 58 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. treville, he would certainly put Bull Run between himself and his foes, but that would be only a temporary obstacle, and then there would be nothing for him to resort to, but a retreat through Aldie Gap. This would be a result by no means in keeping with his intentions, for he had not risked all this simply for the glory of the thing, or even for the de- struction of the stores, which, though of great value to him, w^ere as nothing in the estimation of the more wealthy Fed- eral government. Should he then turn square to the right, and, keeping to the south of the railroad, fall upon our trains at Catlett's and Warrenton Junction ? General Pope says in his Report ^ that he thought this was altogether likely." General McDow^ell f also says that he was under the belief that Jackson ^^was moving to the south of us, to go entirely around and fall on our enormous wagon trains under Banks." Doubtless this course might have been taken and a considerable amount of damage inflicted. But this would have been to have made of the whole opei'ation a mere raid on our supplies ; whereas in the plan of Jackson and Lee it was a great deal more than this ; it was an opera- tion intended by the capture of our supplies in the rear of our army, to w^ork a demoralization of the troops, and to bring about a state of confusion of w^hich they could take advantage. And for this to be accomplished, it was neces- sary for Jackson to be again reunited to the main army. General Jackson took the most sagacious steps to effect this. He made up his mind, apparently, that the old battle- field of Bull Run, where he had won his first laurels, was ex- actly the place for him to retire to now. It contained good defensive positions, and was so near Haymarket and Thor- oughfare Gap that the army of Lee could join him the mo- * p. R., p. 144. t McDowell's statement, p. 57. JACKSON'S RAID. 59 ment it emerged from tlie Gap. For it was part of the gen- eral plan that Lee, having with him Longstreet's command, should follow the track of Jackson's corps, so that Jackson was certain in a day or two of reinforcements, if he could only take care of himself in the meantime. Therefore, on the night of the 27th and 28tli, the whole corps ^ retired from Manassas Junction almost simultane- ously, by three roads. Taliaferro f moved by the Sudley Springs road, which leads from the Junction due north to Sudley Springs, crossed the Warrenton Pike, and at day- light of the 28th halted on the battle-field of Bull Eun. A. P. Hill J at 1 A.M. of the 28th, moved his division to Centre- ville, and at 10 a.m. marched by the way of the pike to the same ]3lace. Ewell,| as soon as his troops were supplied with provisions, moved in the direction of Centreville, and bivouacked between Manassas and Bull Eun, and at dawn the next morning moved up to the bridge at Blackburn's Ford where he crossed Bull Eun, and then proceeded up through the fields on the easterly side of the stream, to the stone bridge on the Warrenton Pike, then crossed Bull Eun again, and marched westerly to the old battle-field. At day- light of the 28th, therefore, Taliaferro was on the old battle- field of Bull Eun, Hill was at Centreville, and Ewell across Bull Eun near Blackburn's Ford, and at noon the whole corps was united, having suffered no loss, greatly refreshed and elated by their successful expedition, and full of confi- dence in their leader. * A. N. v., Jackson's Rep., vol. ii., p. 94. t A. N. v., Taliaferro's Rep., vol. ii., p. 200. t A. N. v., Hill's Rep., vol. ii., pp. 124, 125. § A. N. v., Early's Rep., vol. ii., p. 181. See also Forno's Report, p. 252. CHAPTEE V. THE PURSUIT OF JACKSON. We return now to General Pope. The orders for the con- centration of the entire army upon Manassas Junction were written on the evening of the 27th. Porter was directed * to start at one o'clock in the morning of the 28th from Warren- ton Junction, and be at Bristoe at daylight. He was informed that Hooker had had a severe action with the enemy, who had been driven back, but were retiring along the railroad. The order was received about ten o'clock. At the urgent re- quest of his division commanders. Generals Sykes and Mo- rell, and of General Butterfield, who was the senior briga- dier in the corps, who represented that their troops, having marched from twelve to nineteen miles that day, had need of rest, that it was a very dark night, and that the road was blocked by the wagons of the whole army. General Porter postponed the hour of departure till three o'clock. This action of his constituted the foundation of one of the speci- fications under the charge of disobedience of orders, when he was tried by court-martial. We shall recur to this sub- ject later on,f and will only remark here that, had it not been for what subsequently occurred, no one probably would ever have thought of making such an ordinary exercise of dis- cretion on the part of a corps commander the foundation * P. R„ p. 144. t See Appendix B. THE PURSUIT OF JACKSON. 61 of the extremely serious charge of disobedience of orders, which is one of the gravest of military offences. Similar instructions were, at nine in the evening, sent to Kearny, who was directed upon Bristoe, and to Reno, who was ordered to move on Manassas. Banks was only told to provide for the trains. Porter's column experienced considerable difficulty from the blocking of the road by the wagons, and it was not until ten or half-past ten in the morning that his troops were in position at Bristoe Station. Porter himself rode to the front and reported to Pope two hours earlier. About eight o'clock the division of Kearny arrived from Greenwich. General Pope had now, either with him or on the road to Manassas, the two divisions of the Third Corps, ''^ the two divisions of the Fifth CorxDsf and the two divisions of the Ninth Corps, J and, some miles in reserve, the two divisions of Banks. PoiDe, however, as we have before remarked, had deter- mined to concentrate the whole army at Manassas. At 9 p.m. of the 27th he issued the following order to McDowell : ^ " At day Hght to-morrow morning, march rapidly on Manassas Junc- tion with your whole force, resting your right on the Manassas Gap Railroad, throwing your left well to the east. Jackson, Ewell, and A. P. Hill are between Gainesville and Manassas Junction. We had a severe fight with them to-day, driving them back several miles along the railroad. If you will march promptly and rapidly, at the earliest dawn of day, upon Manassas Junction, we shall bag the whole crowd. I have directed E,eno to march from Greenwich at the same hour upon Manassas Junction, and Kearny, who is in his rear, to march on Bris- toe at daybreak. Be expeditious, and the day is our own." * Those of Kearny and Hooker, under Heintzelman. t Those of Morell and Sykes, under Porter. X Those of Reno and Stevens, under Eeno. § P. li„ p. 145. 62 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. General Pope's intention was that McDowelFs command should march from Gainesville in echelon, ^ their right rest- ing on the railroad and their left sweeping through the country intervening between the track and the turnpike. He expected f doubtless, when he wrote the order, to engage Jackson himself in the morning in the neighborhood of the Junction, and he relied upon the advance of this line from Gainesville to head off any movement of retreat. Had Jackson stayed and accepted battle, the scheme would have worked admirably. Had Jackson retired during the night, as very possibly Pope thought he might do, in the direc- tion of Gainesville, he would have certainly encountered McDowell or Sigel coming to meet him. Plausible as this plan looked, however, there were grave objections to it. First and foremost, it failed to recognize the immense im- portance of preserving our central position between the two separated wings of Lee's army. So long as the troops of McDowell and Sigel were at Gainesville, we had decidedly the advantage of position. But General Pope, though he seems J on the evening before to have felicitated himself justly on the fact that McDowell was interposing completely between Jackson and the main body of the enemy, which was, he says, on that evening, still west of the Bull Eun Range and in the neighborhood of "White Plains, seems, neverthe- less, to have given, without hesitation, the order to abandon Gainesville in the morning. Secondly, Pope had a sufficient force wherewith to fight Jackson without disturbing McDowell and Sigel. He had * p. V. C, Reynolds' Rep., p. 67 ; McDoweirs statement, p. 50. + In his order to Reno, he states that Jackson, Ewell, and A. P. Hill are be- tween Gainesville and Manassas Junction. B. 0., P- 341, t P. R., p. 144. THE PURSUIT OF JACKSON. 63 six divisions — not so strong divisions as those of Jackson, to be sure, but still numbering in all nearly 30,000 men, exclusive of Banks' corps. Had it been necessary, he could at any time have called upon McDowell's command for further aid. At any rate. Pope did not hesitate to follow the enemy across Bull Eun that morning with only Kearny's division. Lastly, Pope's dis^Dositions did not take into account that Jackson might be doing something very different from what he anticipated. This was actually the case. Long before a regiment had started from Bristoe or Gainesville, Jackson was on the north side of the Warrenton pike, and the greater portion of his command were actually resting from their night-march on the battle-field of Bull Eun. So long as we held Gainesville, Jackson could not get away, unless by way of Aldie Gap, which is north of Thoroughfare Gaj), and nothing that General Pope could do could possibly pre- vent that. It would, therefore, have been wiser for Pope to have retained McDowell's command where they were — irre- spective entirely of the strategic importance of Gainesville — until he knew something about the movements of Jack- son's column. By marching that force between Gainesville tod Manassas, he actually lost a day, as we shall see. Taking it altogether, the concentration of the entire army on Manassas, ordered as it was, on the evening of the 27th, when General Pope supposed that the main body of the enemy had reached White Plains, on their road to support and .unite with Jackson, and when he did not know and could not guess with any certainty where Jackson would be the next day at noon, was an inconsiderate and ill-judged movement, and was, as we shall soon see, the parent of much disaster. Although Ewell's division, which was the last to evacuate 64 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. Manassas,"^" had by dawn of the 28th not only left the Station and bivouacked in the fields between Manassas and Bnll Enn, but had moved up to the bridge over Bull Eun, at Black- burn's Ford, nothing whatever seems to have been known of its operations or of the condition of things at Manassas, by General Pope. However impossible it may have been to dis- cover, in the obscurity of the night, what the enemy were do- ing, there was no reason whatever v/hy at dawn their move- ments should not have been watched. Had an enterprising officer been charged with this duty, he would have been sure to pick up some stragglers, overcharged with the good things with which the hungry men of Jackson's command had doubtless been surfeiting themselves, and would have found out the direction taken by A. P. Hill and Taliaferro, as well as have observed the retreat of Ewell. But nothing of the sort seems to have been attempted. Had this infor- mation been acquired by five or six o'clock in the morning, General Pope would probably have seen what Jackson's in- tention was, namely, to get to a position from which he could unite his forces to Lee's as soon as the latter should come through the Gap. He would, doubtless, have instantly countermanded the order to McDowell to come to Manassas, and would instead, if he had been wise, have urged him to occupy the Gap in force, as well as to throw out reconnoitering parties on the turnpike, to ascertain Jack- son's whereabouts. But whether he would have done this may be questioned, for although, as we shall see, the mo- ment he found that Jackson had left Manassas, he ordered McDowell to return to the turnpike, he made no provision whatever for retaining a force at Gainesville or sending one to the Gap. * Unless, perhaps, McGrOwau's brigade of Hill's division, A. N. V., McGowan's Bep., pp. 277, 278. THE PURSUIT OF JACKSON. 65 General Pope's report is in error in regard to several of these points. He says ^ that Jackson was moving from Ma- nassas toward Gentreville as late as ten or eleven o'clock in the forenoon, and that, had McDowell moved forward as directed, and at the time specified, Jackson's retreat would have been intercepted at eight o'clock in the morning, and he could not have crossed Bull Eun without heavy loss, as he would have been closely engaged with our forces. At the time he wrote this, the official reports of the Confederate officers were, of course, not accessible. It is now clear from these that Gen- eral Pope is mistaken in the above statement, and of course in the inferences which he draws from it. We have referred already to the reports of Taliaferro, Early, and Hill. But there is still other evidence. General Johnson,f of Talia- ferro's division, says he marched away from Manassas at dark, and arrived by way of the Sudley Springs road on the field of Bull Eun at midnight. Colonel Forno,J of E well's division, says he crossed Bull Eun at daylight. General McGowan,^ of A. P. Hill's division, says his brigade formed the rear guard, and that it retired at two o'clock in the morning, and followed the division across Bull Eun at Blackburn's Ford. General Pope did not, it must be confessed, begin this day of the 28th with that energy which the situation, it would seem, demanded. Hooker's division had rested all night ; Kearny's division arrived at Bristoe at eight o'clock after a short march ; Porter's divisions had made a longer march, it is true, and a more fatiguing one, owing to the obstructions in the road, but Pope says his corps was "by far the freshest *p. R., p. 147. t A. N. v., Johnson's Rep., vol. ii., p. 243. t lb., p. 252. § A. N. v., McGowan's Report, vol. ii., pp. 277, 278. 66 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. in the whole army ; " the distance from Bristoe to Manassas is only five miles ; yet General Pope reached the Junc- tion with Kearny's (and doubtless Hooker's) division and Eeno's corps not before twelve o'clock. After some hesita- tion, he, in the afternoon, pushed forward Hooker, Kearny, and Eeno upon Centreville, which was natural, as A. P. Hill had actually gone there, and Ewell had retired in that direc- tion, though not going so far. He states that he ordered Porter forward to Manassas, but as this has always been de- nied by Porter, and as no evidence of it has ever been forth- coming, this statement is probably an oversight of General Pope's. Kearny reached Centreville late in the afternoon,"^" and found a regiment of cavalry there, covering the march of Hill to Bull Kun. Hooker f not only did not get so far as Centreville, but encamped on the south ^ide of Bull Run for the night. Eeno crossed Bull Eun and encamped within supporting dirstance of Kearny. General Pope's headquarters for the night were not far from Blackburn's Ford. It must be ad- mitted that not much had been accomplished by this wing of the army. To return to McDowell. That officer and Sigel were at Buckland Mills on the evening of the 27tli. McDowell had, J it will be recollected, sent out Buford with a few regi- ments of cavalry on the morning of that day to find out what he could of the enemy. Buford, " indefatigable on this, as on every other occasion during the campaign," as General McDowell justly says, captured fifty prisoners at * p. R., p. 147. t P. V. C, Heintzelman's Rep., p. 55 ; Carres Rep,, p. 117 ; Burling's Rep., p. ISl. t Ante, p. 50. THE PURSUIT OF JACKSON. 67 Salem, and actnally forced Longstreet to halt and deploy at White Plains, detaining him an hour or more. He discov- ered that Jackson with a large force had jDassed through these villages and through Thoroughfare Gap toward Ma- nassas Junction, the day before his arrival, and that Long- street was following him w^ith a larger force. This con- vinced! McDowell that Longstreet would be coming through the Gap the next morning, and he so told Sigel. During the evening, and before 11.30 p.m., which was before General Pope's order of 9 p.m. arrived, McDow^ell took de- cided steps to hold the positions in front of the Gap. He or- dered the whole of Sigel's corps to Gainesville and Haymarket, the latter a village between Gainesville and the Gap, and he retained Eeynolds' division at Buckland Mills to operate against the flank of the enemy coming through the Gap, or to march to Haymarket as might be thought best. With King's and Eicketts' divisions, he proposed himself to find out what had become of Jackson. These dispositions show very clearly that General McDow- ell fully realized the gravity of the situation, and that he had no idea of allowing a junction to be effected between the forces of Longstreet and Jackson, if it could be avoided. He knew that time was all important for us ; that if Jackson could be kept isolated for twenty-four hours longer, he ought to be overwhelmed, horse, foot, and dragoons. And he did not hesitate in this emergency to detach half of his force to retard the advance of Longstreet. Near midnight General Pope's order of 9 p.m. arrived, di- recting him to march with his whole command upon Manas- sas Junction at daylight. This necessitated a change of the * p. V. C, McDoweirs Rep., p. 41 ; Lloyd's Rep., p. 136 ; McDoweirs statemcrxt, p. 88 ; A. N. v., Longstreet's Rep., vol. ii., p. 81. tP. V. C, p. 41. 68 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. dispositions previously made by McDowell. Sigel, whose advance was at Gainesville, was ordered to march immedi- ately, witli his right resting on the railroad. Reynolds was ordered to march in echelon with Sigel, and on his left ; King in echelon with Keynolds, and on his left ; so as to carry out the intention of General Pope, which was, as is stated in his order, that the left shonld be thrown well to the east. These orders were delivered before 3 a.m. of the 28j1i. Early in the morning, cavalry were sent to the Gap to reconnoitre, and, on their report that the enemy were advancing through the Gap, Ricketts' division, which was to bring up the rear, and which was to have followed on King's left and marched to Manassas Junction, was detached and sent to the Gap by way of Hay market, where it arrived at 3 P.M. Ricketts was seriously delayed^ by wagon trains in marching from his bivouac of the night before, west of Buck- land Mills, to the road, where he turned off to the left to go to Haymarket and the Gap. However, his troops delayed the passage of Longstreet's command through the Gaj) dur- ing the rest of the day and early part of the evening ; and the enemy were obliged to send three brigades through Hopewell Gap, to the north of Thoroughfare Gap, before our troops retired. After dark Eicketts fell back to Gaines- ville. This action of McDowell's, taken, as it was, on his own responsibility, and contrary to the letter of the order of 9 p.m., directing him to march on Manassas Junction " with his whole force," undoubtedly secured for us the whole day of the 28th in which to fight Jackson without interruption. T\'e have before expressed our wonder that Thoroughfare Gaj) should not have been strongly held several days before. But the * Sec Appendix B. THE PURSUIT OF JACKSON. 69 step taken by General McDowell, though taken late, was taken without orders, and it would seem that even when General Pope wrote his report,^' he still disapproved of McDowell's course. With the remainder of his corps, consisting of the divi- sions of King and Eeynolds, and with Sigel's corps, McDow- ell proceeded to obey the nine o'clock order. He says f that August 28, 8 am. SigeFs wagons, carried along contrary to express orders, en- cumbered the road, and that he could not get him to move with any promptness at all. Moreover, when the troops did get started, Sigel somehow misconstrued the order directing the right of the line to rest on the Manassas Gap Bailroad * p. R., pp. 147, 151. t P. V. C, McDowell's Rep., p. 4->. 70 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. as referring to the Orange & Alexandria Railroad. All these causes delayed the march, so that it was late in the after- noon before they got anywhere near Manassas. Pope's order, moreover, proceeded on the supposition that McDow- ell's whole command was at Gainesville, whereas the larger part of it w^as in rear of this town along the road from New Baltimore to Gainesville. But it really mattered not, except for the useless fatigue of the men ; for, as we have seen, they could not possibly, had they been at daybreak where Pope supposed they were, and marched promptly and rapidly oij Manassas, have found a man of Jackson's corps near Manassas. The whole movement on Manassas was a mistake. But the most remarkable thing about this tiresome and useless march of McDowell's this day of the 28th, is the curious missing of the great opportunity to engage Jackson. General McDowell's * account of this is as follows : "As soon as the Warrenton road was free [from Sigel's wagons, etc.] Reynolds' division pushed forward across the railroad [going east a short distance on the pike before turning southward toward the Junction], and after a short march the head of his column found itself opposed by the enemy with a battery of artillery posted on a hill," situated on the north of the pike. " The attack, commenced by the enemy as soon as we came in view, caused Reynolds to de- ploy his column, to bring up his artillery, and send out his - skirmishers. After a short engagement the enemy retired, so that when our skirmishers occupied the hill he left he was nowhere to be seen. Supposing from the movements of this force that it was some rear guard or cavalry party with artillery sent out to reconnoitre, the march of the division, * p. v. C, McDoweirs Rop., p. 43. Cf. McDoweirs statement, p. 54 et seq. THE PURSUIT OF JACKSON. 71 after caring for the killed and wounded, was resumed, and it turned off to the south of the road to go to Manassas." To the same effect Eeynolds in his report. * General Sigel j alone seems to have divined the truth, "and to have recog-. nized that the column had already met Jackson's corps. This force was the brigade of Bradley T. Johnson, the Second (Campbell's) Brigade of Taliaferro's (Jackson's) divi- sion, the same brigade which received the brunt of our at- tack at Cedar Mountain. His account J does not materially differ from that of McDowell. His brigade had been thrown forward to Groveton, to guard against an attack coming from the direction of Gainesville. Here then was our opportunity, and a first-rate one. Had not McDowell felt himself bound by Pope's order of the previous evening to go to Manassas Junction after Jackson, he would doubtless have found out all about this attack on his column, and the capture of a single prisoner would have revealed the whole thing to him. A. P. Hill had probably not arrived from Centreville at this time, so that we might have been able to attack the divisions of Ewell and Talia- ferro with the two corps of Sigel and McDowell. On arriving at Manassas Junction about noon, General Pope, as we have seen, found that his bird had escaped, and that the march to Manassas, which he had prescribed to the northern wing of his army under McDowell, must be coun- termanded, and the force sent in some other direction. But in what direction was the question to be settled. At first, apparently, he was inclined to think that Jackson had retired upon Centreville with the intention of making Aldie Gap. Accordingly, shortly after one, he | ordered Mc- Dowell to move on Gum Spring, a place on the Little Eiver * p. V. C, Reynolds' Rep., pp. 67, 68. t A. N. v., vol. ii., pp. 243, i>44. t lb., p. 83. § P. V. C, p. 43. 72 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. Turnpike, which leads to that Ga^D, and some fifteen miles to the north of Manassas Junction. Soon after sending this order, however, he reconsidered it, and told McDowell that he did not wish him to carry it out if he deemed it too hazardous ; said that he wanted from McDowell an expression of his views, and that he wonld support him in any way he might suggest by pushing for- ward from Manassas Junction across the turnpike. He also said, that he intended that evening to push forward Beno to Gaines\dlle and to follow with Heintzelman, unless there should be a large force of the enemy at Centreville, which he did not then believe there was. Had General Pope carried out the intentions expressed in this despatch, he would have had nearly his whole force on the turnpike that afternoon, and in the engagement which, as we shall see, took place that evening, we should have decidedly outnumbered the enemy. Besides this, we should have been able to recom- mence the fight the next morning with the troops in iDosition. But, unfortunately for General Pope, he received informa- tion during the afternoon that misled him as to the enemy's position. At a quarter past four he writes to McDowell"^ that the enemy was reported in force on the other side of Bull Bun on the Orange & Alexandria Bailroad, that is, between Manassas Junction and Alexandria, as also at Cen- treville, which is on the Warrenton and x4Llexandria Turn- pike ; and that he has, therefore, ordered Sigel (who f had reported personally to him) to march on Centreville immedi- ately, as also Kearny and Beno, with Hooker as reserve ; and that he wishes him (McDowell) to march immediately on Centreville from where he then was. * p. V. C, p. 43, Note 2. McDoweirs statement, p. 57. t P. V. C, SigeFs Rep., p. 83. The contradiction of this in the note is alto- gether inexplicable. THE PURSUIT OF JACKSON. 73 It is not to be wondered at that General Pope was thor- oughly puzzled. He seems to have had no trustworthy in- formation of the enemy's doings. His negligence early that morning, in not having Jackson's movements observed, was one cause of this perplexity. Then he had no available cavalry. The horses, overworked and ill-fed, had completely broken down. Jackson had taken the initiative, so impor- tant a thing in war, and he evidently meant to kee]3 it. All this, of course, would have been prevented by a retreat on the 25th and 26th to the line from Thoroughfare Gap to Manassas Junction, but that was not done, and there was no use now regretting it. Jackson was a person whose inten- tions it was indeed difficult to anticipate. What if the in- formation should be correct about his being in force on the other side of Bull Bun, between the army and Washington ? Pope could not afford to have him burning bridges and tear- ing up tracks and destroying magazines of supplies, again. It is true, Lee was expected very soon to come through Thoroughfare Gap, and it was likely on most accounts that Jackson would retire to some place near there and await his coming. But in the end General Pope decided to look after his rear and to send his troops to Centreville. Here, however. Pope repeated his mistake of that morn- ing, in ordering almost the whole army on this chase. lb would have been quite sufficient to send Heintzelman or Reno first, and see what came of it. Jackson could do them no harm and they were quite strong enough to detain him until reinforcements could be sent. It was possibl that Lee could be kept off a little longer yet, and it was, therefore, unwise to give up the position at Gainesville. At least it was unwise, if there was any possibility of /Jack- son having, during the day, retired to the north /of the turnpike. Vol. IV.— 4 74 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. These dispositions did not include either Bicketts or Por- ter. To them no orders were sent. Banks was directed to move his trains to Kettle Run Bridge, half-way between Cat- lett's and Bristoe Stations, and repair the damage done to the track there. Late in the afternoon, then, the various corps proceeded to execute this order to march on Centreville. The southern wing, composed of Heintzelman's and Reno's troops, went off at once, as we have before stated. But, curiously enough, Jackson himself prevented the northern wing from going to Centreville, by discovering to them the very object of their search. Laboring under the impression that we were all in full retreat for Alexandria, he undertook to harass us. He sent down his cavalry and skirmishers south of the -pike on the Sudley Springs road, and they ran into SigeFs troops. That officer, who had ap- parently since the encounter of the morning believed that Jackson was on the west side of Bull Bun, at once ceased his preparations for crossing and pushed his force northward to the pike along the Sudley Springs road, skirmishing all the way up. Reynolds heard his guns and also those of King (of which we are soon to speak) and at once marched toward the pike from near Bethlehem Church, reaching at night a point about a mile from Groveton ^ in the immediate neigh- borhood of Sigel's corps. * McDovveirs statement, p. 58. CHAPTER IV. THE BA.TTLE OF GAINESVILLE. King, it will be remembered, had brought up the rear of McDowell's column in the march of the morning, and had not in the afternoon got very far beyond Gainesville on his road to Manassas. He therefore had only a short distance to make before again finding himself on the pike, and he ac- cordingly complied with the order to march on the pike to Centreville, at once. By five o'clock or thereabouts he was marching along the turnpike eastwardly toward Centreville, perfectly unaware of there being any force of the enemy upon his left flank. Our movements this day had completely puzzled General Jackson. When he saw our troops march off in the forenoon toward Manassas, he thought * we were " in full retreat," and sent word to A. P. Hill, who was at Centreville, to move down to the fords [of Bull Eun] and intercept us." Hill, however, having captured some of our dispatches, knew that Pope had no thought of retreating, but only of attack- ing Jackson, and he proceeded to rejoin his corps with all speed on the Bull Kun battlefield. Informed by General Bradley T. Johnson of our movements toward Manassas, and yet seeing that large bodies of our troops were still coming on the pike from Gainesville, in their march from Buckland Mills, Jackson made his dispositions to attack us, based, as * A. N. v., Hill's Rep., vol. ii., p. 124. 76 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. he says,"^ " on the idea that we should continue to press for- ward on the turnpike toward Alexandria." But, fearing that King's division was intending to leave the road and incline toward Manassas, he advanced the divisions of Ewell and Taliaferro, and attacked with his customary impetuosity. But he was soon undeceived if he thought that this column was intending to escape. Our men turned savagely upon their assailants. Their batteries were at once enfiladed and compelled to change their position. Our skirmishers were immediately advanced and supported by the infantry in line, and our troops crossed the road and fiercely advanced upon the enemy. On their side their troops pushed forward with their customary hardihood to close quarters, and there en- sued, says Taliaferro,! " one of the most terrific conflicts that can be conceived. . . . For two hours and a half, with- out an instant's cessation of the most deadly discharges of musketry, round shot and shell, both lines stood unmoved, neither advancing, and neither broken nor yielding, until at last, about nine o'clock at night, the enemy slowly and sul- lenly fell back and yielded the field to our victorious troops." As to our having had the worst of it, however. General Taliaferro is in error. He is doubtless misled by the fact that when General King withdrew to Manassas, as we shall see that he did, about one o'clock in the morning, he aban- doned the field of battle. But there was no falling back for hours after the engagement had ceased. On the contrary, our troops held all the ground north of the turnpike, to which they had advanced in the beginning of the action, un- til they took up their line of march in the middle of the night for Manassas Junction. * A. N. v., Jackson's Rep., vol. ii., p. 94. t A. N. v., Taliaferro's Rep., vol. ii., p. 201. THE BATTLE OF GAINESVILLE. 77 General Taliaferro was wounded in the action himself, and may not have known the result from personal observation. General Stafford,* whose brigade seems to have been trans- ferred from A. P. Hill's to Taliaferro's division, says, "the battle commenced at five o'clock p.m., and lasted till nine o'clock P.M., resulting in the repulse of the enemy, we holding the battle-ground." ' Major Pelham,f too, whose battery was August 28th, 6 P.M. engaged, says, "we drove the enemy back." All that these officers claim is that they held their own, which is admitted by the Federal authorities. It was, in fact, a drawn battle. The attack made by us was repulsed, but that was all. * Stafford's Rep., A. N. V., vol. ii., p. 359. t Pelham's Eep., A. N. V., vol. ii., p. 421. 78 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. Our forces engaged consisted only of the brigades of Gib- bon and Doubleday, but these were strong brigades and among the best in the army and admirably commanded. The whole division of Taliaferro and two brigades of Ewell's division, at least, those of Lawton and Trimble, constituted the force of the enemy. We w^ere no doubt considerably outnumbered. Why this was so, with the brigade of Hatch in front and that of Patrick in the rear, is, perhaps, remark- able. Doubtless the darkness of the night prevented these troops from participating in the action. The losses on both sides were very severe. The enemy lost Generals Ewell and Taliaferro wounded, the former losing a leg, besides three colonels, one lieutenant-colonel, and four majors, killed and wounded. On our side it is stated ^ that " more than one-third of the Federal com- mand were left dead or wounded on the field." Truly, a *^ fierce and sanguinary conflict," as Stonewall Jackson calls it. It was also a purely accidental one. Jackson, no doubt, thought he was attacking the rear guard of a demoralized army in full retreat for the defences of Washington. But, instead of meeting troops in retreat before him, he met troops who had been all day in search of him, and he cer- tainly had his fill of fighting before the action closed. On the other hand. General Pope undoubtedly believed that Jackson was retreating from him, and that this battle arose out of King's division attempting to bar his retreat. The account which he gives in his report f of what happened that afternoon may well claim our attention. After stating X that he reached Manassas Junction with Kearny's division and Reno's corps about noon, less than an hour after Jackson in person had retired, which is cer- * Gordon, p. 223. t P. K., p. 147. t P. R., p. 147. THE BATTLE OF GAINESVILLE. 79 tainly not the case, he states that he immediately pushed forward Hooker, Kearny, and Eeno upon Centreville, and sent orders to Porter to come forward from Bristoe to Ma- nassas. The orders to Porter have never been produced, nor any evidence of their ever having been sent, proffered. As for pushing Hooker, Kearny, and Reno forward to Cen- treville immediately, we know that he contemplated sending them to Gainesville as late as 1.20 p.m.,* and that it was not till 4.15 P.M. that he notified McDowell f that he had decided to send them to Centreville. General Pope is certainly not to blame for taking a few hours to consider such an impor- tant matter ; but his taking time to consider is a fact, which should be stated exactly, if alluded to at all. Then he says X that he wrote to McDowell and stated the facts, and di- rected him to call back the whole of his force that had come in the direction of Manassas Junction, and to move forward upon Centreville, but that McDowell, having detached Eicketts' division to Thoroughfare Gap, that division was not available in this movement. This is true ; but the movements of the day had been so anomalous, that no one can guess where Ricketts' division would have been at six in the afternoon, if it had not been sent to Thoroughfare Gap. General Pope then proceeds to say that Kearny drove the enemy's rear guard out of Centreville, and that the enemy retreated toward Gainesville, burning bridges in their rear ; and finally, that McDowell with his whole force, consisting of his own corps (except Eicketts' division), Sigel's corps, and the division of Eeynolds, marching in the direc- tion of Centreville, encountered the advance of Jackson's force retreating toward Thoroughfare Gap about six o'clock in the evening of the 28th. In this statement General Pope *P. R.,p. 149. t P. V. C, p. 43, n. 2. t P. R., p. 147. 80 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. shows that he had, very naturally, misconstrued Jackson's movements. The ^'retreat" of A. P. Hill from Centreville was simply the march by which that ofl&cer rejoined the other two di^dsions of his corps. Jackson, in fact, had no thought of retreating toward Thoroughfare Gap, but took up a position in which he could flank any movement of our troops on the "Warrenton Pike, and also be ready to unite wdth Longstreet so soon as he should get through the Gaj). Nor was McDowell "with his whole force (except Eicketts' division) marching on the pike in the direction of Centre- ville." On the contrary, Sigel and Eeynolds were south of the -pike, coming near to it by the Sudley Springs road, and King alone was marching in the pike. The im^Dression which a careless reader of the report might get, that the forces of McDowell and Sigel might well have been suc- cessful in this conflict had it not been for the unauthor- ized detention of Eicketts at the Gap, though perhaps unintentionally conveyed, * may well here be expressly guarded against. Any such impression would be wholly unfounded. The fact is, that until noon that day Ewell and Taliaferro were open to attack ; that even after Hill joined them, about noon, they took up no such position as they did the next morning ; that if the whereabouts of the enemy had been ascertained early in the morning, and the army concentrated upon him, he must have been beaten ; but that our army was marched and coimtermarched in the vain endeavor to find him until, toward the close of the day, he discovered himself to us. Our battle with Jackson should have been fought on the 28th. * Compare Pope's Report, p. 151, where he says that " the disposition of the troops on the west of Jacksnn failed through Riclcetts' movement toward Thor- oughfare Gap and the consequent (sio) withdrawal of King."" THE BATTLE OF GAINESVILLE. 81 After the battle was over, General King felt himself to be in a somewhat critical position. Eicketts had retired from Thoroughfare Gap, after dark, and reported the imminent -advent of Longstreet in the morning. The fact stared them in the face, that probably nothing which they could now do could prevent the union of the two wings of the Confederate army. And it was equally plain that the first brunt of the attack would fall on them. Unfortunately for our side, they, neither of them, clearly understood the tactical importance of the positions which they held. And, still more unfortu- nately, their corps commander, McDowell, who had gone to Manassas to see Pope and confer with him, had not suc- ceeded in rejoining his command. Left to their own unas- sisted reason, they decided to fall back by way of Gainesville, Eicketts to Bristoe and King to Manassas, which was as use- less a thing as they could have done. It would not be difficult to say stronger things about this uncalled for and unmilitary retreat. Eeynolds had been wdth King that evening, having ridden over from his own di- vision, only a mile or so off, and King knew that Eeynolds' division, \7hich belonged to his own corps, was uncovered by this falling back. They also knew that Sigel was close to the pike near the Sudley Springs road. King knew, of course, that the only object of his being ordered to Manassas that morning was to find Jackson, and he knew now, from the bloody experience of the evening, exactly where Jackson w^as. They knew, therefore, that against the three divisions of Jackson's corps they could at daybreak unite their own divisions, Eeynolds' division and the two divisions of Sigel ; and they knew enough of General Pope by this time to be sure that if they attacked Jackson in the morning. Pope would bring up Heintzelman and Eeno with all speed to help. Whatever mistakes they may have laid to Pope's 4* 82 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. charge, neither they nor anyone else ever questioned his stomach for a fight ; and they knew to a certainty, that se- verely as Jackson had been handled that evening by only two of our brigades, an attack upon him the next morning at daybreak with the whole force at their disposal was the plain dictate of common sense, and was just what General Pope desired, and desired most strenuously. It is difficult to be charitable in face of such a blunder ; but we ought to re- member that King's health completely broke down the next day, and it may have been that his nerve gave way that even- ing, and that, being the ranking officer, his judgment im- posed upon Eicketts, who was undoubtedly a faithful and gallant soldier. It could not, however, impose upon Rey- nolds, whose admirable military instinct kept him at the post of duty, though both his colleagues deserted him. These two officers, by their ill-judged retreat, prevented their two divisions from participating at all in the action of the next day, except that at six or half-past six in the after- noon. Hatch took King's wearied division in for a brief but unsuccessful struggle. It is not too much to say, in fact it is perfectly clear, that this retreat of King and Eicketts affected the battle of the next day infinitely more than the inaction of Porter, of which so much has been said. Porter undoubtedly retained a large part of Longstreet's command in front of him all the after- noon. King and Eicketts simply left the stage for twenty- four hours. Yet they sat on Fitz John Porter's court-martial. CHAPTEK m Mcdowell and porter. In tlie belief, as we have seen, that Jackson was in full re- treat toward Thoroughfare Gap, and had no thought but of escaping our pursuit. Pope welcomed the sound of Gibbon's guns on the evening of Thursday, the 28th, as being evidence that Jackson's retreat had been checked, and that he could be overwhelmed by our superior forces in the morning. Hardly had the sound of the firing died away, when Pope writes from his headquarters near Blackburn's Ford the fol- lowing despatch* to General Kearny at Centreville : Headquarters Army of Virginia, Near Bull Run, August 28, 1862, 9.05 p.m. General : General McDowell has intercepted the retreat of the ene- my and is now in his front, Sigel on the right of McDowell. Unless he can escape by by-paths leading to the north to-night, he must be cap- tured. I desire you to move forward at one o'clock to-night, even if you can carry with you no more than two thousand men, though I trust you will carry the larger part of your division. Pursue the turnpike from Centreville to Warrenton. The enemy is not more than three and a half miles from you. Seize any of the people of the town to guide you. Advance cautiously and drive in the enemy's pickets to- night, and at early dawn attack him vigorously. Hooker shall be close behind you. Extend your right well toward the north, and push for- ward your right wing well in the attack. Be sure to march not later than one, with all the men you can take. JOHN POPE, Major- General Commandmg, Major-General Kearny. * P. K., p. 150. 84 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. A similar order* was sent at 10 p.m. to Heintzelman, at or near Bull Eun, to carry Hooker's division to Centreville, and thence bj the turnpike a mile and a half, to act as reserve to Kearny. At 3 A.M. of the 29th the following order was sent to Por- ter, at Bristoe Station : Headquahters, Army of Virginia, Near Bull Run, August 29, 1862, 3 a.m. General : McDowell has intercepted the retieat of Jackson. Sigel is immediately on the right of McDowell. Kearny and Hooker march to attack the enemy's rear at early dawn. Major-General Pope directs you to move upon Centreville at the first dawn of day, with your whole command, leaving your trains to follow. It is very important that you should be here at a very early hour in the morning. A severe engage- ment is likely to take place, and your presence is necessary. I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant, GEORGE D. RUGGLES, Colonel and Chief of Staff. Major-General Porter. Similar verbal orders were sent to General Beno, whose corps was in bivouac between Bull Run and Centreville, to move at once by cross roads to the turnpike, and thence to push forward in support of Heintzelman in the direction of Gainesville. We must pause a moment to notice the evident careless- ness in prescribing to Porter the route to Groveton by way of Centreville. Porter was at Bristoe, or between that place and Manassas, and he should have been ordered to march via Bethlehem Church and Newmarket, ujd the Sudley Si^rings road, which would have saved him an unnecessary march of ten miles, and brought him on the field, of course, much earlier. Porter, in fact, did not know what to make * p. B., p. 150. Mcdowell and porter. 85 of the order, as it seemed to indicate the imminence of a serious struggle at Centreville, whereas - he knew that the enemy were all west of Bull Eun. However, he obeyed it at once, and his troops had passed Manassas Junction some dis- tance on their way to Centreville, when he met a staff-ofii- ' cer ^ of General Pope's, who gave him the purport of a written order which he was carrying to General McDowell, which was to the effect that Porter was to take King's divi- sion and move to Gainesville. Porter at once counter- marched his column, and about half-past nine, when Manas- sas Junction had been repassed, he received a written order from General Pope, confirming the other. The fact was, that since the issuing of the orders of the evening before to Kearny, Heintzelman, and Eeno, and the order of three o'clock that morning to Porter, General Pope had learned, to his great surprise and indignation, of the fall- ing back of the divisions of King and Ricketts. Full of the idea that Jackson was bent on retreating to Thoroughfare Gap, his confidence that he could not escape, expressed so fully in the despatch just quoted to Kearny, was succeeded by the gravest doubts as to whether he could possibly be detained by Sigel and Reynolds, or headed off by Porter. However, he would at any rate do what he could to caj^ture him. Accordingly, he sent orders f at daylight to Sigel, who was, it will be remembered, in close proximity to Jack- son's forces, supported by Reynolds' division, ^'to attack the enemy vigorously as soon as it was light enough to see, and bring him to a stand, if it were possible for him to do so." And he sent to Porter the above-mentioned order, the tenor J of which is as follows : * Captain J. H. Piatt, B. O., vol. ii., p. 1142. tp.R., p. 151. +c. M., p. sa 86 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. Headquarters, Army of Virginia, Centreville, August 29, 1863. Push forward with your corps and King's division, which you will take with you, upon Gainesville. I am following the enemy down the Warrenton Turnpike. Be expeditious, or we will lose much. JOHN POPE, Major- 6 eneral Commandin g. Major-General Porter. Hooker and Kearny needed no new orders. Nor did the written order to Eeno, dated 5 a.m., differ essentially from the verbal instructions sent before. As for Eicketts' divi- sion, Pope did not know where that was. King's he attached to Porter's corps, because he had not been able to find McDowell. These orders were all clear, vigorous, and well intended to effect their object, which was the prevention of Jackson's retreat and his capture by the united efforts of all the corps in the army. One or two things, however, had for the moment, appar- ently, escaped General Pope's mind, so far as we can judge from the tenor of these despatches. One was the imminent probability, we may rather say, the certainty, that General Lee would come through the Gap that morning, there being no one to oppose him, and the other was, the necessity of revictualling the army. For the last day or two, both men and officers had hardly had anything to eat. How far this state of things was unavoidable, is a matter which may perhaps be doubtful. But it was an urgent question that morning. Then there was the expected advent of Lee, or rather of Longstreet, for it was his corps which the Commander-in- chief accompanied in person. This, as we know, had not only been expected, but the retirement of Eicketts from Thoroughfare Gap the afternoon before had been caused by Mcdowell and porter. 87 the pressure upon him of Longstreet's superior forces. He and King in fact brought back the unwelcome intelligence that the two wings of the Confederate army would be be- yond question united in the morning of the 29th. No human power could now prevent this. Unwelcome though the in- telligence might be, it was none the less true, and it raised, or rather, it should have raised, in General Pope's mind, the very serious question, w^hether it was possible for his ex- hausted and half-starved army to beat Jackson and Long- street together, that is, the w^hole army of General Lee ; in other words, whether he ought not first to get large reinforce- ments. Another question, also of the first importance, was, whether it w^ould be wise to fight this battle on the westerly side of Bull Eun, a stream crossed by only two or three biidges, and though fordable in places, yet a formidable ob- stacle to artillery. That it would be well worth while to call upon the Army of Virginia for an unusual effort if there was a good chance of overw^helming the corps of J ackson before he could be reinforced, may well be granted. But if Jackson w^ere now joined by the rest of Lee's army, would it not be wiser to fall back to Centreville, there take up a strong po- sition behind Bull Eun, obtain reinforcements and supplies, and receive the enemy's attack there ? There seems no rea- sonable doubt as to the answer to this question ; nor do we r'magine that General Pope intended at this time to fight his great battle on the old battle-field of Bull Eun. What he was trying this morning to do w^as precisely what he had been trying to do all the day before, and that was to concen- trate his whole army upon Jackson before Longstreet could come up. No one can read the despatches to Kearny and Heintzelman and Porter, and come to any other conclusion. Had Pope been intending to engage the whole army of Lee. would he have begun his battle by ordering Sigel and Eey- 88 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. nolds, alone and unsupported, to attack as soon as it was light enough to see, and have trusted to his corps and division com- manders to fetch their troops from the four corners of the field in season to form a line of battle ? General Pope was no such tjro as this. It is perfectly clear that his movements this day were made for the purpose of surrounding and captur- ing the three divisions of Jackson, Ewell, and A. P. Hill, and that he had no intention of undertaking to do anything else. Still, as the advent of Lee and Longstreet was believed by General Pope to be not far distant, it was necessary to issue some instructions to guide his lieutenants if, on arriving at the front, this emergency should be found to have arisen. Accordingly, we find that while the orders above cited unmistakably show that General Pope's sole purpose in the dispositions which he made that Friday morning was to at- tack Jackson's corps only, and that he still believed that this could be done, he yet did not leave his lieutenants with- out a perfectly clear expression of his intentions in the event of its being found that Jackson had been joined by Long- street. Thus he sent the following despatch from Centre- ville about noon to Generals Heintzelman, Beno, and Sigel. Headquarters, Army of Virginia, August 29, 1863. To Generals Heintzelman, Reno, and Sigel : If you find yourselves heavihj pressed hy supe7Hor number's of the enemy ^ you will not \ push matters farther. Fitz John Porter and King's division of McDowell's corps are moving on Gainesville from Manassas Junction, and will come in on your left. They have about twenty thousand men. f The command must return to this place to-night or by morning, on account of s^ibsistence and forage. JOHN POPE, Major- General Commanding. * Porter s statement, aovt. ed., 1879, p. 23, note. i The italics are ours. Mcdowell and porter. 89 The " superior numbers of the enemy " here spoken of as possibly " heavily pressing " the three corps of our army com- manded by Heintzelman, Reno, and Sigel, were, of course, the forces of Jackson augmented by those of Longstreet. Jackson's corps alone did not equal these three corps of our army. If they found these new troops fighting them, they were not " to push matters farther," but to stand on the de- fensive. The explicit statement that our troops must " to-night or by morning" return to this place (Centreville, from which some of them had started in the morning), is also significant of its not being General Pope's plan to enter upon any deci- sive operations on this day. The army needed subsistence and forage, and any j^rotracted effort was therefore not con- templated by him. To the same effect are certain expressions in an order is- sued somewhere about nine or half -past nine this morning to Generals McDowell and Porter, known as the Joint Or- der,"* It reads as follows : General Orders, No. 5. Headquarters, Army of Virginia, Centreville, August 29, 186:3. Generals McDowell and Porter : You will please move forward with your joint commands toward Gainesville. I sent General Porter written orders to that effect an hour and a half ago. Heintzelman, Sigel, and Reno are moving on the Warrenton Turnpike, and must now be not far from Gainesville. I desire that, as soon as communication is established between this force and your own, the whole command shall halt, t It may he necessary to fall hack hehind Bull liunat Centreville to-night. 1 presume it iviJl he so on acco^mt of our supplies. I have sent no orders of any description to Ricketts, and none to in- * r. E., p. 152. t Th3 itahcs arc ours. 90 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. terf ere in any way with the movements of McDowell's troops, except what 1 sent by his aide-de-camp last night, which were, to hold his po- sition on the Warrenton pike until the troops from here should fall upon the enemy's flank and rear. I do not even know Ricketts' position, as I had not been able to find out where General McDowell was until a late hour this morning. General McDowell will take immediate steps to communicate with General Ricketts, and instruct him to rejoin the other divisions of the corps as soon as practicable. If any considerable advantages are to be gained by departing from this order, it will not be strictly carried out. Oiie thing must he had in view — that the troops must occupy a position from which they can reach Bull Run to-night or by morning. The indications are, that the v^hole force of the enemy is moving in this direction at a pace that will bring them here by to-morrow night or next day. My own headquarters will be for the present with Heintzelman's corps, or at this place.* JOHN POPE, Major-General Commanding. In this order General Pope first repeats to the officers commanding his left wing the same direction as to the necessity of recrossing Bull Run that evening, on account of supplies, that he had already given to the officers command- ing his right wing. The operations of the day, it is thus implied, are to be of a merely temporary character. All the officers of rank in the army have now been informed of this. Then, the injunction that ^' the troops must occupy a po- sition from which they can reach Bull Run to-night or by morning " is reiterated, but, it will be observed, for a differ- ent reason, namely, because "the whole force f of the enemy" — the two wings of General Lee's army under Jackson and Longstreet united — is likely to be at Centreville to-morrow * Centreville. t The order says that *' the whole force of the enemy is moving in this direc- tion at a pace, etc." This is evidently a slip of the pen. Jackson was not moving " in this direction : " Longstreet, however, was, and when their junction should be effected, the whole force would move in the direction of Centreville. Mcdowell and porter. 91 night or the next day. Therefore, says General Pope, you must be able to reach Bull Run to-night or by morning. This is in fact saying : " Our movement to-day is to press Jackson and fight him if he will stand ; after to-day Jackson will be reinforced by Longstreet, and we shall fight the united army, not here, but behind Bull Run at Centreville." No exception can be taken to these orders. They show, indeed, that General Pope entertained a more hopeful belief as to the situation of Longstreet's corps than the facts really warranted — that ifc was even now twenty-four hours, or per- haps forty-eight hours distant. But it must be remembered, that he had not yet seen General Ricketts, nor heard his re- port. And besides. General 'Pope was a sanguine man. But the orders show, also, that he was perfectly well aware of the exhausted condition of his men, and that, as a prudent gen- eral, he had no intention of fighting the united Confederate army until he had got his supplies and had taken up a more advantageous position. He may reasonably also have ex- pected to meet reinforcements at Centreville, Franklin's corps or Sumner's, or both. These two orders of Friday morning the 29th, the order to Heintzelman, Reno, and Sigel, and the order to McDowell and Porter, must be kept clearly before our minds if we are to understand the story of this eventful day. They give us the key to the object which General Pope had in view, the hopes which he entertained, and the course he purposed tak- ing in case things should not turn out as he expected. We may, therefore, be pardoned for dwelling on them still a little longer. His object was the capture or destruction of Jackson's force. This no one ever questioned. But there were two things that might prevent his attaining this object — Jackson might retreat to Thoroughfare Gap, or he might be joined 92 THE ARMY UIS'DER POPE. by Longstreet. In the early morning, Pope, it will be re- membered, supposed that McDowell's corps was barring that retreat. In this belief he ordered all his forces to the attack, promising them success. Then he learned that McDowell's corps had fallen back, and that Jackson could escape if he chose. He abated nothing of his purpose on hearing this, however, but instantly ordered Porter to move with all speed n^Don Gainesville, taking King's division with him, and head Jackson off, if possible. Still later, the other possible relief for Jackson occurred to him — the possibility of his being joined by the rest of Lee's army — and though he did not deem this likely to occur during that day, still he recognized it as a thing which might occur ; and having no intention of fighting their whole army in his present posi- tion, and with his troops exhausted as they were for want of sux3plies, he tells Heintzelman, Eeno, and Sigel, that if they find that Jackson has been reinforced, so that they are pressed by superior numbers, they are not to " -push matters further," and he revokes his order to Porter to go to Gaines- ville, and, instead, directs him and McDowell to proceed in the direction of Gainesville until communication is estab- lished " with the forces on the turnpike, when it is his inten- tion, he says, that ''the whole command shall halt." He is evidently rather skeptical as to Jackson's remaining to be attacked, as he tells McDowell and Porter in the Joint Order, that Heintzelman, Sigel, and Eeno must now be ''not far from Gainesville." He impresses ujDon all his lieutenants the necessity of having their respective commands behind Bull Eun that evening or the next day. And he tells Porter and McDowell that he looks for the whole Confederate army at Centreville the next day, or the next day but one, which is stated as an additional reason why the forces under their command must be behind Bull Eun that night. Mcdowell and porter. 93 The Joint Order, qnoted in full above, was received by Generals McDowell and Porter at about the same time. In obedience to the order directing him to take King's division and march with all speed to Gainesville, Porter had, as we know, repassed Manassas Junction. He then pushed his troops past Bethlehem church — Morell's division in the ad- vance, then Sykes', then King's — until the head of his column had reached, about half-past eleven o'clock, a little (and almost dry) stream called Dawkins' Branch, where the ene- my was perceived. The command was then halted, the leading brigade, But- terfield's,"^ partially deployed across the creek, and skirmishers thrown out. Porter had his own two divisions, the brigade of Piatt, and the division of King, some 17,000 men in all. He was making arrangements to move upon the enemy in his front, when he received the Joint Order, and immediately afterward he was joined by General McDowell. It was about noon. Our skirmishers and those of the enemy were exchanging a few shots with each other. f Two or three miles to the northward, near Groveton, the generals could see the shells rising high in the air, indicating a distant artil- lery engagement. Here Sigel and Keynolds were contend- ing with Jackson. In front and somewhat to the right they could see clouds of dust on the i^ike, showing the march of Longstreet's corps to reinforce Jackson. Eicketts, as they had learned that morning, had retired from the Gap the evening before. McDowell showed Porter the following despatch : Headquarters Cavalry Briga.de, 9.30 a.m. Seventeen regiments, one battery, and five hundred cavalry passed through Gainesville three-quarters of an hour ago on the Centreville * Bulterfield's evidence, B. O., p. 461 et seq. t C. M., McDowelFs evidence, p. 84. 94 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. road. I think this division should join our forces now engaged at once. Please forward this. JOHN BUFORD, Brigadier- General. General Ricketts. The van of Longstreet's command had then arrived at Gainesville at a quarter before nine, more than three hours ago. And since that time the stream had without doubt been pouring down the pike. The junction of Longstreet's forces with Jackson's had been effected, there was no longer any question on that point. What was best to be done ? In the first place, it was j)liiin that thev could not march peaceably forward along the Gainesville road, or the railroad, until communication should be established between their own forces and those of Sigel and Reynolds. If they under- took to establish this communication by ^'mo^dng forward toward Gainesville," as the Joint Order directed, they must make the necessary dispositions for carrying the heights op- posite, they must prepare, in fact, to fight a battle. There was certainly a chance here for a bold and telling blow. Without counting Ricketts, they had some 17,000 men. He had some 7,000 more, though they were a good deal fatigued. Then there was Banks with nearly 10,000 more men a short distance off, at Bristoe. It was quite likely that the forma- tion of Longstreet's line had not been completed. At any rate there was an opportunity here to strike a powerful blow partly on his front and partly on his flank. But this idea was apparently not suggested. The terms of the Joint Order, indeed, did not encourage such a coui'se. In the next place, they could not establish the communi- cation with the right wing which the J oint Order directed, by pushing their troops up through the country lying be- tween the railroad and the turnpike ; it was too rough and McDowell and porter. 95 broken ; entirely impracticable for artillery, and very diffi- cult for infantry. McDowell and Porter rode from the head of the column to the railroad track, about half a mile, looked at this region, and concluded not to attempt to traverse it. In this emergency, either McDowell or Porter,"^ it is not certain which, suggested that, as King's division of McDow- ell's command was near Bethlehem Church, where the road on which they then were turns into the Sudley Springs road, McDowell should take that division up the Sudley Springs road, leaving Eicketts to follow. This suggestion, from whomsoever it came, met with the approval of both ; and with a few very hurried w^ords, General McDowell galloped back along the track to the fork of the roads, and gave King's division the order to march by the Sudley Springs road toward the turnpike. In taking this action, the two Generals may be supposed to have intended to carry out the spirit of the Joint Order, though deviating from its strict letter, as the Order itself authorized them to do. The intention of the Joint Order was that the right wing of the army should move west on the turnpike and the left wing northwest on the Manassas and Gainesville road, until they should establish some sort of communication with each other, when a more or less con- tinuous line should be formed, f and the whole army should halt. Now, McDowell and Porter found that the enemy were barring the westward march of the right wing, contrary to what the Joint Order indicated was General Pope's expec- tation, and they also found the enemy in their own front. It was then impossible for the two wings to establish commu- nication by marching on converging lines. Nor could they establish this communication by moving across the interven- * McDoweirs evidence, B. O., p. 813 ; Porter's statement, Gov. ed., p. 24. t Cf . McDoweirs testimony, C. M., p. 8-3. 96 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. ing country to the pike, because the intervening country was so wooded and broken as not to admit of the passage of artil- lery, or even of infantry in any regular formation. If, how- ever, part of the troops could take the road in rear and man- age to come out again to the front half way or so from their present position to the pike, the general purpose of the Joint Order would have been gained. And this is what might have been accomplished by McDowell's march by the Sudley Springs road. There was a road — the old Warren- ton and Alexandria road — south of and substantially paral- lel to the turnpike, which McDowell might have turned into, at the village of Newmarket, from the Sudley S^Drings road, and it would have led him to a point about midway between the place where the head of the column was and the turnpike. That he would do this, or something equiva- lent to this, was undoubtedly Porter's expectation, and, per- haps McDowell's ^ also, at the time. "When he rode away, shortly after twelve o'clock, it was with the intention, not indeed of forming a continuous line, but at any rate of get- ting the army more together, so as not to have the troops so separated as they then were. McDowell testified f that he said to Porter : " You put your force in here, and I will take mine up the Sudley Springs road on the left of the troops engaged at that point with the enemy," or words to that effect. " I left General Porter," he says with the belief and understanding that he would put his force in at that point." It is understood that Porter admits having heard this direction; and assuming that he did hear it, it is plain that the direction as it stood required further explanation. WJien was Porter to put his corps in there ? Was he to *B, O., p. 794, McDoweirs evidence, t C. M., 85, 92. Mcdowell and porter. 97 commence operations at once, on his own account, so to speak^ or was he to wait till McDowell had succeeded in the object of his movement, until he had placed his troops somewhere between the left of the troops engaged on the turnpike and Porter's corps? If McDowell said nothing- more to Porter than what he testified he did say, the imi3li- cation clearly was that Porter was to await the accomplish- ment of McDowelFs movement. The Joint Order, by which they were both bound, contained, indeed, a proviso, that if any considerable advantages could be gained by departing from it, it need not be strictly carried out." But to carry out an order in a different mode from the one provided is one thing, and to do something utterly unlike what the order directs should be done is surely another and a very different thing. That McDowell's troops could, by interposing some- where between the forces on the pike and Porter's corps, establish that communication between the left wing and the forces on the pike, which the Joint Order directed should be established, more easily than by marching toward Gaines- ville or attempting to get through or move in front of the woods and broken ground north of the railroad, seemed quite likely. To do this was entirely within the latitude allowed in the Order ; it was carrying the Order out, but it was not carrying it out strictly. But for McDowell to leave Porter where he was, at Dawkins' Branch, and go up and join the main army by a road in the rear, without establishing or seeking ^ to establish any communication between his corps and Porter's, is such a total departure from, or rather viola- tion of the Joint Order, that no one can be surprised that Porter never understood it to be intended by McDowell. * McDowell did, on his arrival at the pike, direct King to take post on the left of Reynolds, but this was countermanded by Pope, P. V. C, p. 45. B. 0., p. tOl, ad finem. YoL, IV,— 5 98 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. Most certainly any such radical departure from their instruc- tions should have been made matter of explicit nnderstand- ing ; there should have been no room left for misconception. McDowell should have said something equivalent to this : " You will act to-day entirely independent of me ; I shall very likely be where you cannot connect with me or commu- nicate with me at all ; you must act on your own responsi- bility." Otherw^ise, it was as clearly implied as possible that Porter was to wait for communication with McDowell's corps to be established before undertaking anything of a serious character. We say, implied as clearly as possible, and we mean it. The two officers had been acting together ; they had been addressed together in o. joint order; the movement of McDowell would not have been thought of* except as a more expeditious mode of putting King and Ricketts on Reynolds' left and so establishing the communication be- tween the wings of the army enjoined by the Joint Order. If then, the understanding was that McDowell's corps was to reappear shortly somewhere to the north of the railroad and communicate with Porter, it Vv'ould have been simi:)ly culpa- ble, if Porter had, while the movement was being made, compromised his corps by attacking before McDowell was in a position to support the attack. It would have been repeating the mistake of Banks at Cedar Mountain. That Porter supposed that McDowell's object in going around by the back road was to effect this, is, in our judg- ment, beyond question. He certainly had a right to suppose so, unless explicitly informed that McDowell intended to separate the commands definitely for the rest of the day, and he certainly was not so informed. He, therefore, expected during the afternoon, and he had a right to expect, that *B. 0., McDowell's evidence, p. 791. Mcdowell and porter. 99 McDowell would get into some position whicli would enable him to establish some sort of communication with his corps. And during this period of exT)ectation he could do nothing- else than stand on the defensive. And he expected, and ho had a right to expect, to be informed the moment McDowell had succeeded in his movement. If McDowell, as would seem likely, took a different view of the latitude allowed to him under the Joint Order, that ifc warranted liim'^ in " dissolving the joint operations of the two corps," all we can say is that it is i^erfectly i>lain that this should have been clearly communicated to General Porter. McDowell says,t that when he left Porter, he had arranged to separate the two corj^s, " leaving him alone on the Gaines- ville road, whilst I went ui? the Sudle}^ Springs road." He also claims J that his order to Porter, to put his troops in there, given as it was whilst they were both at a distance from the Commander-in-Chief, was binding on Porter, § under the 62d Article of War, and that he was bound by it until ifc should be revoked by superior authority. It is too obvious to need any argument that there are very serious difficulties in the way of the conclusion at which General McDowell ar- rived, in regard to liis latitude of action under the Joint Order. The Order contemj^lated joint action by the two corps ; for this he substituted their independent action. The Order contemplated the establishment of communication be- tween the widely apart wings of the army ; he deprived the left wing of half its strength, and lef fc it, separated by broken and difficult country from the right wing. The Order, by necessary implication, postponed active operations until this * C. M., p. 92. t C. M , p. 87. t C. M., p. 92, B. O., p. 802. § It does not seem to us that McDowell concerned himself particularly as to the situation of P )rtcr after he sho Id have left him. He does not f-eem to have realized the responsibility invo ved in giving such an order. 100 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. communication should have been established between the wings of the army ; he undertook to order a separate and isolated attack on an enemy of unknown strength by one corps. Finally, the Joint Order insisted upon a return be- hind Bull Eun that night, and not only coupled this injunc- tion with a reminder as to the lack of subsistence and forage, but repeated it in connection with the expected advent of the balance of Lee's army, thereby giving the corps commanders to know that the commanding general intended that the great battle, which was certainly impending, between the army of which they were component parts and the united army of Gen- eral Lee, was not to be fought there, where they were, on the west side of Bull Run, but at Centreville. Yet McDowell, as he claims, ordered Porter to attack the troops of Longstreet which they saw coming from Gainesville,* and that at a time when, for all that they knew, or could infer from the distant artillery fire going on near Groveton, General Pope might adhere to his resolution not to risk a general engagement that day. Now, we need not insist further that General McDowell was not justified in the interpretation which he put upon the Joint Order ; but we do say, that whether he was or was not so justified, General Porter should have been informed in most explicit terms about this interpretation of McDow- ell's, and as to the situation in which he would be left, and as to the independent operation which it was expected he would undertake. All this being in direct contravention of the plain object to gain which the Joint Order was issued, Porter should have been explicitly informed that he was to act independently, and was expected to fight. And he cer- tainly was not so informed. Not having been so informed, * I took it for granted that there would be other forces come up." McDoweira evidence, B. O., p. 803. Mcdowell and porter. 101 he remained under the impression that the Joint Order was to be carried out. He decided that for him to undertake active operations in his isolated situation would have been to disobey his orders, and besides, he was, after the first two hours or so, mo- mentarily expecting to hear from McDowell. Not hearing from him, he sent scouting parties through the woods to the north, to see if they could find anything of his corps, and he communicated with him by the Sudley Springs road from time to time during the afternoon ; but inasmuch as Mc- Dowell never succeeded in putting King's division in on the left of Reynolds, Porter's scouts could find nothing, of course. Thus Porter remained quiescent during the after- noon, finishing the posting of his infantry and artillery, so as to cover the approaches to his front, throwing his skir- mishers across the Branch into the woods opposite ; watch- ing the enemy, and waiting for orders."^ * See Appendix C. CHAPTEE Vin. THE BA.TTLE OF GROVETOK It is time that we return, from wliat has, we are afraid, X:>rovecl a tedions discussion, though a necessary one, to the operations of the right wing. At daybreak on Friday, the 29th, it will be remembered, Slgel and Eeynolds were on or near the turnpike in imme- diate proximity to Jackson's forces. General Eeynolds' divi- sion was near Groveton, on the south side of the turnpike. General Sigel's two divisions under Generals Schenck and Schurz, witli the independent brigade of Milroy were farther to the eastward, near the crossing of the Sudley Springs road. At daylight our troops were put in motion to attack the enemy. Jackson was found to occupy a long line, stretching from Catharpin Creek, near Sudley Springs, on the north, to a point near and on the heights above the turnpike near Groveton ; he was fronting east or southeast. Jackson's old division under Starke, Taliaferro having been wounded the evening before, occupied the right ; Ewell's division under Lawton, Ewell having been also wounded the evening be- fore, held the centre ; while A. P. Hill's division was on the loft. Their main line rested on the excavation * of an un- finished railroad, which ran in a northeasterly direction to- ward Sudley Mill. In front of the greater part of this old * Jackson's Eep., A. N. V., vol. ii., p. 95. THE BATTLE OF GBOVETOK. 103 railroad were tolerably thick woods, wliich were occupied bj their skirmishers. Our forces advanced, moving westerly, Eeynolds being on the extreme left, as he was already the farthest in the front. Next to him, and on his right, came Schenck. Both these divisions moved on the south side of the turnpike. Just north of the pike and next to Schenck, came Milroy's inde- pendent brigade ; then, on our extreme right, the division of Schurz. The troo^os advanced with spirit, their batteries shelling the woods, and their skirmishers driving the enemy before them. On our extreme left, Eeynolds, on arriving near the battlefield of the evening before, changed front to the north and advanced Meade's brigade across the pike with the intention of turning the enemy's right. Whatever might have come of this attack, however, had it been prop- erly supjDorfced, ifc soon ceased, owing to General Schenck, who was supporting the movement, being obliged to send one of his brigades, Stahel's, to the temporary relief of Mil- roy, who was hard pressed. Our line then fell back, Eey- nolds retiring some distance behind Schenck. The contest here in the morning was mostly with artilleiy and skir- mishers. On the right of the turnpike, Milroy advanced his brigade, with skirmishers deployed beyond Groveton, Schurz's divi- sion being on his right. Near the i^iece of woods on the field of battle of the evening before he turned away from the pike and inclined to the right, Schurz having also more or less got separated from him by inclining to the north. There was then a gap between Milroy and Schenck, and another between Milroy and Schurz. The latter was filled by Schurz, but at the expense of weakening his line. The former was, as we have seen, filled by Schenck's detaching Stahel's brigade to come in on Milroy's left. But the line was too thin. Per- 104 THE ARMY UNDER POPK ceiving this, the enemy adTanced vigoronslY from theii* jdo- sition from behind the raih'oad embankment* and broke Schni'z's line. At this juncture there was a good deal of musketry as well as of artillery firing. Toward noon Schurz renewed the attack, drove the enemy through the woods, and Schimmelpfening's brigade even gained possession of a portion of the raili"oad embankment, and held it against the re]3eated attacks of the enemy, until about two o'clock in the afternoon, when the whole division was relieved by fi-esh troops. On the whole, the work of the forenoon had equalled expectations. Our forces had moved with commendable promptitude and activity ; had asceiiained the exact location of the enemy's line ; had diiven him from his cover in the outlying woods to his raih'oad intrenchment, for such it really was ; and had paved the way for such telling blows as might be delivered when the rest of the army should arrive. An hour or two before noon Heintzelman came up with the two divisions of Kearny and Hooker, and Eeno with his own and Stevens' divisions. By this time Sigel's troops, who had been manoeuvring and fighting since five* o'clock, were exhausted ; and as General Pope expected the co- operation of McDowell and Porter in the afternoon, the troops were allowed to rest, and nothing of importance f oc- curred from twelve to about four in the afternoon. Some severe skirmishing took place, and there was constant artil- lery firing, of course ; but this was mainly a time of rest and of preparation for the heavy blows which General Pope intended to deliver so soon as he should hear from his left; wing. * In some places this is an embankment and in others an excavation. + P. K. pp., 153, 154. THE BATTLE OF GROVETON. 105 He had no doubt now of winning his long-deferred vic- tory over Jackson. He had heard nothing of the arrival of Longstreet, nor were any of Longstreet's troops, up to five or six o'clock, oj)posed to our advance in this part of the field. He, therefore, expected that McDowell and Porter would move up from the railroad across the country, and strike Jackson in flank and rear. So far as he knew, there not only was no reason why they should not do this, but every reason in the world why they should. There is a curious statement in General Pope's first or original report^ dated September 3, 1862, only five days af- ter this battle, which shows us exactly what he expected. As soon as I found that the enemy had been brought to a halt, and was being vigorously attacked along the Warren- ton turnpike, I sent orders to McDowell to advance rapidly on our left, and attack the enemy on his flank, extending his right to meet Reynolds' left, and to Fitz John Porter to keep his right well closed on McDowell's left and to attack the enemy in flank and rear while he was pushed in front. This would have made the line of battle of McDowell and Porter at right angles to that of the other forces engaged." General Pope's memory was at fault here, as he sent no such order as he here speaks of ; but he may very possibly have had it in his mind to send such an order, and at any rate this shows us exactly what he expected would be done by McDowell and Porter. It is to be observed that the ex- pectation is, that they would act together, and together at- tack the enemy in flank and rear. Accordingly, towards the latter part of the afternoon General Pope ordered Heintzelman to organize two simul- taneous attacks, to be made by the divisions of Hooker and 5* * B. 0., 1115, 1116. 106 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. Kearny. General Hooker selected Grover's brigade to lead his attack, whicli was to be directed against the centre of the enemy's line. The brigade consisted of the First, Eleventh, and Sixteenth Massachusetts regiments, the Second New Hampshire, and the Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania. The charge was one of the most gallant and determined of the war. The men were ordered to load their pieces, fix bayonets, move slowly and steadily until they felt the enemy's fire, then deliver their own fire, and then cany the i3osition by main force, reh-ing on the bayonet only. These orders were literally obeyed. The railroad embankment was carried after a brief but des^jerate resistance, in which bayonets and clubbed muskets were freely used. Beyond the embank- ment this gallant brigade pursued, overtln*owing a second line of their o^Dponents, until overpowered by superior num- bers, when it reared, ha^dng lost nearly five hundi*ed men in about twenty minutes. It seems almost certain that if this splendid assault had been properly supioorted, it v>'ould have succeeded in breaking the centre of Jackson's line. Why it was not sup^Dorted we do not know. If there were not troops enough to sustain it, it ought not to have been ordered. General Kearny's attack was to have been made simulta- neously with that of Grover, but farther on his right, against A. P. Hill's division. For some reason not given, it was not made until Grover had been driven back. It was gallantly led by that gallant soldier General Kearny, and was sui3- l^orted well by the division of the equally gallant Stevens. At first it was successful. Hill's troops had suffered greatly in all the skirmishing and fighting of the day, and had now run short of ammunition. Kearny's attack, so violent and determined, rolled uj) their line, and it seemed as if their left was really turned. Hill says that the chance of victory THE BATTLE OF GROVETON. 107 trembled in the balance. His own troops could hardly stand this new charge. Gregg's brigade lost 613 officers and men killed and wounded, including all the field-officers in the brigade but two. But Crregg told Hill that he would hold his position with the bayonet. The tenacity of the soldiers could be relied on to the last. Yet the Federals in their impetuous outset bore them down as it were by main force. Fortunately for Hill, he was able to call in two bri- gades of Ewell's division on his right, those of Lawton and Early, and these troo^os, striking ours when exhausted and disorganized, as troops always are, even by a victorious charge, drove us out of the xDosition we had so hardly won. Finally, betw^een five and six o'clock in the afternoon, McDowell arrived, bringing King's division with him, com- manded by Hatch, as King had broken down with severe illness. Bicketts' division had not yet been able to come up. When Hatch arrived, the enemy was readjusting his, line of battle after all the fighting of the day, and the impression arose in the minds of our generals that he was retreating. Nothing as yet api:)ears to have been known by our generals here of the arrival of Longstreet. Hatch was, therefore, huiTied along the pike toward Groveton, to press them in their retreat and, if possible, convert it into a rout. He carried with him three of his brigades. About half past six he encountered the enemy advancing to meet him. It w^as a part of Hood's division of Longstreet's corj^s, Hood's Texas brigade and Colonel Law's brigade. The action was very sharp, and veiy bloody. It is said * that " at one period General Hatch sat complacently on his horse, while every man who approached him pitched and fell headlong before he could deliver his message." The action lasted some * Gordon, p. 335. 108 THE ARMY Ul!^DER POPE. three quarters of an hour, when Hatch's wearied men re- tired in good order, leaving one gun in the hands of the enemy.* This gun, says Colonel Law,t " continued to fire, until my men were so near it as to have their faces burnt by its discharges." What higher praise could be given either to the gunners or to their antagonists? On our extreme left, south of the pike, Eeynolds under- took, late in the afternoon, to renew the attack, but the artillery fire of the enemy in his front was too severe to be encountered, and he retired. This ended the battle of Groveton. Like all the battles in this campaign, it was desperately fought. There is abso- lutely no criticism to make on the behavior of the troops on both sides. The Federals fought to win to-day, and they at- tacked with great daring and perseverance. The Confed- erates fought that they might win to-morrow, and they re- sisted with inflexible resolution and courage. The losses had been severe on our side. General Pope estimated his loss at six or eight thousand men.J He also estimated the loss of the enemy as twice as great as our own. In this he was probably in error, as we were almost uniformly the at- tacldng party. § The only attack made upon us was made at the close of the day upon tiatcli's division, and then it was itself advancing to the attack of the enemy. Among the losses on the Confederate side were Brigadier- General Field, and Colonel Forno, commanding Hays' brigade, both of A. P. Hill's division, and Brigadier-General Trimble, of Ewell's division, all severely wounded. On our side no general officer, singularly enough, seems to have been hit. * This even was not carried off ; its wheels were cut down, and it was left on the ground. Longstreet's Rep., A. N. V., vol. ii., p. 82. t Law's Rep., A. N. V., vol. ii., p. 307. tP. R. p. 155 ; C. W., vol. i., 1st series, p. 466. § See Appendix D. THE BATTLE OF GROVETON. 109 General Pope apparently considered the result as a great victory. This estimate of his success was excessive indeed, although the advantage had certainly been with his army. It had driven the enemy from a great deal of ground which they held in the morning. This retirement of the enemy's line, and other movements of theirs which we now know were merely preparatory to taking the offensive the next day, were naturally misinterpreted by Pope as indicating that they felt themselves defeated, and intended to retreat. His despatch is couched in most triumphant and encouraging language. It begins thus ; Headquarters, Battle, near Groveton, Va., 5 a.m., 30. We fought a terrific battle here j'esterday with the combined * forces of the enemy, which lasted with continuous fury from daylight until dark, by which time the enemy was driven from the field, which we now occupy. Our troops are too much exhausted yet to push matters, though I shall do so in the course of the morning, as soon as General F. J. Porter comes up from Manassas. The enemy is still in our front, but badly used up. We have lost not less than 8,000 men, killed and wounded, but from the appearance of the field, the enemy lost at least two to our one. He stood strictly on the defensive, and every assault was made by ourselves. The battle was fought on the identical battle- fieivi of Bull Run, which greatly increased the enthusiasm of the men. The news just reaches me from the front, that the enemy is retiring toward the mountains ; I go forward at once to see. We have made great captures, but I am not able yet t to form an idea of their extent. Our troops behaved splendidly. JOHN POPE, Major- Q eneral. Major-General Halleck, General-in- Chief. * Jackson's and Longstreet's corps. t Kor are we now. 110 THE ar:?j[y uxder pope. "^'e have no doubt in our own minds that Pope, who was, as we have said, a sanguine man, oveiiDersuaded himself into belieTiiig that this estimate of the day's doings was sub- stantially a correct one. Yet this only shows the tenible mis- take which a man makes who closes his eyes to facts. We had not driven the enemy from their xDosition behind the railroad embankment : we had not in any way disintegrated their ai-my ; there it was, in line of battle, every unwounded man with his colors, every battery in position. And what was vastly more important. Pope now knew for a certainty that Longstreet had joined Jackson. He says this in his despatch. Was there, then, such gTound for trium^jh as he tries to be- lieve there was? There was assuredly no reason to feel de- spondent ; there was eveiy reason to feel cheer-ful ; Porter and Bicketts would be up in the morning, which would give us more than fifteen thousand additional trooiDS ; but still the situation was a grave or_e= The Confederate anny was all there before him : and it was a serious question what had better be done. Our troops were exhausted from hard marching, hard fighting, and want of food. Would it not have been wiser to adhere to the detennination formed in the morning, before the elation of this x:)artial victory had disturbed his judgment, and to have fallen back to the other side of Bull Eun ? This, however, does not seem to have occurred to General Before we leave the consideration of this hard-fought bat- tle, we desire to recall what we have said in regard to the uselessness of Jackson's brilliant i-aid on our communications. Here we find him standing on the defensive all day, having lost two of his best lieutenants and many valuable officers and men in a drawn battle the evening before, and, notwith- standing the chapter of accidents, which we have given at length, had i30stponed the day of his trial till Lee had come THE BATTLE OF GROVETON. Ill up and supx)orted him with Longstreet's corps, still very sorely pressed and in great -peTil. And when we remember also, that it was due to no foresight of his that this battle was not fought on the day before, that it was the merest ac- cident in the world that the attack upon Reynolds by Brad- ley Johnson's brigade early on Thursday morning did not draw down upon the divisions of Ewell and Taliaferro the entire Federal army, we should abate something of that pop- ular belief that, by his march to Manassas, Jackson brought about the defeat of Pope's army. On the contrary, he did nothing of the sort, but, instead, he came wiihin an ace of seeing his own corps routed and captured. In a word, the rules of war allow of no such dangerous movement as Jack- son's, unless the object is a far more important one than the one which on this occasion he j)roposed to himself. The attack which he made on the Eleventh coi*ps at Chan- cellorsville may be said to have in its results justified the daring flank march by which he arrived on our extreme right, and the situation of Lee's army that night was one that called for desperate measures. But no such emergency had arisen on the Eappahannock, when on August 25, 1862, Jackson entered on an expedition which for forty-eight hours put it in the i^ower of the Federal army to overwhelm him. He succeeded, indeed, and doubtless his handling of his troops was admirable, and his courage and skill perfect; but, after all, great is the fortune of war ! CHAPTEK IX. LONGSTREET AND PORTER. Geneeal Lee accompanied tlie inarch of Lieutenant-Gen eral Longstreet, who commanded the divisions which were soon afterward organized as the First Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia. The troops under him consisted of the divisions of Hood, Kemper, D. E. Jones, and "Wilcox, and the brigade of Evans, comprising twelve brigades of in- fantry, besides artillery, making a force of about 25,000 to 30,000 men."^ Following these troops, but at a considerable distance, was the division of E. H. Anderson, some 6,500 strong or thereabouts. We left Longstreet's command emerging from Thorough- fare Gap. Buf ord had seen a portion of them — estimated by himf at about 14,000 men, and there was no officer in the army better qualified to observe the enemy than General Buf ord was — passing through Gainesville shortly before nine on Friday morning, as has been already stated. These troops undoubtedly got into position between ten and eleven o'clock in the forenoon. There is no earthly reason to suppose that there was any needless delay in the arrival of Longstreet's troops upon the ground, but the time of Longstreet's arrival and his disposi- tions after his arrival have been so much controverted that we must devote a brief space to considering them. *B. 0., Marshall, p. 168. tC. M., p. 188. $ Ante, p. 93. LONGSTREET AND PORTER. 113 General Lee says in his Official Eeport * tliat Jones and Wilcox bivouacked, on the night of the 28th, east of the mountain at Thoroughfare Gap, " and, on the morning of the 29th, the whole command resumed the march, the sound of the cannon at Manassas announcing that Jackson was al- ready engaged." Longstreet himself reports f as follows : "Early on the 29th the columns were united,^ and the ad- vance to join General Jackson w^as resumed. The noise of battle was heard before we reached Gainesville. The marcli was quickened to the extent of our capacitij.\ The excitement of battle seemed to give new life and strength to our jaded men, and the head of my column soon reached a position in rear of the enemy's left flank and within easy cannon shot.'* General Hood || says in his Report : ''Our forces were able to bivouac for the night beyond the Gap. . . . Early in the day we came up with the main body of the enemy on the plains of Manassas, engaging General Jackson's forces." Gen- eral Kemper's report we do not have.^ General D. R. Jones reports that on the night of the 28th he bivouacked beyond the Gap. "^'^ He continues: ''Early on the morning of the 29th I took up the line of march in the direction of the old battle-ground of Manassas, whence heavy firing was heard ; arriving on the ground about noon, my command w^as sta- tioned on the extreme right of our whole line." Wilcox, ff who went through Hopew^ell Gap, says that they bivouacked * A. N. v., vol. i., p. 2'1 + A. N. V., vol. ii., p. 81. X That is, those which had gone round by Hopewell Gap and those which had moved by a footpath were united to the main force which took the road through Thoroughfare Gap. § The italics are ours in this and in the citations which follow. II A. N. v., vol. ii., p. 209. If General Corse, commanding Kemper"'s brigade of Kemper''s division, says that he *' halted about three miles east of Gainesville about 12 o'clock." Southern Hist. Soc, vol. viii., p. 538. ** A. N. v., vol. ii., p. m. ft A. N. V., vol. ii., p. 227. 114 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. beyond the pass : "Early tlie following morning our march was resumed and the command * rejoined at half past nine A.M. the remainder of the division f at the intersection of the two roads leading from the Gaps above mentioned." This is about a mile to the westward of Haymarket, and about two miles and a half from Gainesville. He then continues : "Pursuing our line of march, together with the division,! we passed by Gainesville, and advancing some three miles beyond, my three brigades w^ere formed in line of battle on the left and at right angles to the turnpike." Evans says nothing about the hour of his arrival in his report. General Wilcox testified before the Board J of Officers in the Porter Hearing that his division, on arriving at the in- tersection of the roads, found the rest of the corps passing over the Gainesville road, and that he w^aited to let them go by. As regards the placing of the troops, General Longstreet says in his report : § " On approaching the field, some of Brigadier General Hood's batteries were ordered into posi- tion, and his division was deployed on the right and left of the turnpike at right angles with it and supported by Briga- dier General Evans' brigade. . . . Three brigades, under General Wilcox, were throwm forward to the support of the left, and three others, under General Kemper, to the sup- port of the right of these commands. General T>. E.Jones' division was jDlaced upon the Manassas Gap Eailroad, to the right and in echelon with the last three brigades." At the Board Hearing, an aide || of General Jones testified that the * Consisting- of three brigades. t He means Longstreet's division, so-called, consisting of Kemper's and Wil- cox's divisions. Southern Hist. Soc., vol. viii., p. 217. $ B. 0., p. 230. § xl. N. v., vol. ii., p. 81. II Williams' evidence, B. 0., p. 221. LONGSTREET AND PORTER. 115 division was in position on the railroad before twelve o'clock. At tlie same hearing General Longstreet testified ^' that he thought his troops had been deployed by eleven o'clock. It conld not, he thought, have been later than that. He also said that Jones' division extended a li!:tl3 beyond the rail- road. At the same hearing, Colonel Charles Marshall, of General Lee's staff, testified f to the same efi'ect. He found the divisions of Hood, Kemper, and Jones in or near the turn- pike, not very far from Groveton, not later than half past nine. Part of the troox^s had not then been deployed. At the same hearing General Robertson, who commanded a brigade of cavalry in Lee's army, testified t that he rode over to meet General Lee on the morning of the 29th, and found him, between eight and half past eight, not yet ar- rived at Gainesville, but that at that time one-third of the troops, probably one-half, had passed the point where Gen- eral Lee was. This evidence, i!: will be observed, tallies re- markably with the statement made by our General Buford of what he saw passing through Gainesville shortly before nine. General Robertson then goes on to state that he assisted personally in j)utting the troops in position, locating their batteries, and so forth ; and that when Longstreet's line was formed, he took his position on D. R. Jones' right, trJiich ex- tended across the Manassas Gap Bailroad some distance. He says that the line was complete at Imlf past eleven o'clock. As regards the position of Longstreet's corps, the lines in- dicated on the Warren maj), used at the Hearing, by General Longstreet, by Mr. Williams, who Avas jn General Jones' * B. O., pp. 60, 73. tB. 0., p. 158. JB. 0., p. 175. 116 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. staff, and by General Robertson, who was, as we have seen, familiar with the location of Jones' division (it being the August 29th, 12 M. nearest body of troops to his own brigade) agree substan- tially. D. E. Jones' division occupied a wooded height situated athwart the Manassas Gap Eailroad, and about a mile from Dawkins Branch. This ridge runs about north and south ; 1 LONGSTREET AND PORTER. 117 tlie enemy's batteries were placed on the eminences ; their infantry were generally concealed by the woods, into which their skirmishers were advanced. In echelon with J ones, and occupying the same general line farther to the north, was the division of Kemper, reaching to the pike. Kemper's division is stated by General Longstreet to have numbered about 6,100 men; Jones' about 6,300 men. Then, on the left of the turnpike, supporting Jackson's command, was the division of Hood and Evans' brigade, and for a time, supporting them, the division of Wilcox, consist- ing of about 6,300 men. At a late hour in the day," says General Longstreet in his report,* " Major-General Stuart reported the approach of the enemy in hea\y columns against my extreme right. I withdrew General Wilcox with his three brigades from the left, and placed his command in iDOsition to support Jones, in case of an attack against my right. After some few shots the enemy withdrew his forces, moving them around to- ward his front, and about four o'clock in the afternoon be- gan to press forward against General Jackson's position." Wilcox's brigades were moved back to their former position. General Wilcox in his report says,f " At half past four or five P.M., the three brigades were moved across to the right of the turnpike a mile or more to the Manassas Gap Rail- road. While here, musketry was heard to our left on the turnpike. This firing continued with more or less vivacity until sundown. Now the command was ordered back to the turnpike." What it was exactly which excited the alarm of General Stuart, and caused him to ask for this reinforcement to be sent to the extreme right, we do not precisely know. It was, * A. N. v., vol. ii., p. 82. tA. N. v., vol. ii., p. 228. 118 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. however, beyond doubt, some movement made by Porter's^ command. But, at any rate, this was not the occurrence mentioned by General Stuart in his report,^ which has been the subject of so much controversy. He says that he met the head of Long- street's column before it had arrived at Gainesville ; he there saw General Lee ; then rode down directly toward Manas- sas. General Eobertson, who was nearer Manassas, reported the enemy in his front. Stuart then ordered detachments of cavalry to drag brush up and down the road from the direc- tion of Gainesville to deceive the enemy — " a ruse which," he says, ''Porter's report shows was successful," and notified Lee that Longstreet's flank and rear were seriously threat- ened, and of the importance of the ridge which he, Suuarfc, then held. " Immediately upon the receij^t of that intelli- gence," he goes on to state, "Jenkins', Kemper's, and D. R. Jones' brigades, and several pieces ox artillery, were ordered to me by General Longstreet, and being i^laced in position fronting Bristoe, awaited the enemy's advance. After ex- changing a few shots vrith rifle pieces, the corps f withdrew toward Manassas, leaving artillery and supports to hold the position till night." General Stuart is here endeavoring to claim for himself the credit of having had Jones' division placed in posi- tion between eleven and twelve in the morning as far to the enemy's right as the railroad. It may be that he is entitled to it ; though it is quite likely that this position .on the commanding ridge occupied by Jones w^ould have been selected for him to occupy, independently of any suggestion by General Stuart. What makes it certain thau he is referring to this and not to the subsequent transfer * A.N. v., vol. ii., p. 145. t /. e., the Federal corps. 1 LONGSTHEET AND PORTER. 119 of "Wilcox from the left of their line, is, in tlie first place, the time of the occurrence, — it was immediately after he had seen General Lee ; secondly, that Longstreet says that Wil- cox was sent to supi^ort Jones, not Stuart ; and lastly, the 7i(imes of tlie hrigades which he says were sent to him by General Longstreet, The first two points are sufficiently obvious ; we will, however, dwell for a moment on the last, a^ it has, we believe, hitherto escaped observation. The brigade,! sent were Jackson's, Kemper's, and D. R. Jones' brigades. It will be granted that Stuart refers either to W^ilcox' i division or to D. R. Jones'. Now, at the time of the battle, Wilcox"^ had his own brigade (so-called), and those of Pryor and Featherston. D. B. Jones' division f consisted of tho brigades of Anderson, Drayton, a-nd Toombs. Anderson'::; brigade, vvhich consisted J of the First, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Georgia Regiments, was originally known as D. R. Jones' brigade. ? One of the three brigade.] he had under him, then, at Manassas, was known in the army as D. R. Jones' brigade. Then we find that on the 6th of Sex^tember Jones' command || was enlarged by add- ing to it Pickett's brigade, and also Kemper's and Jenkins' brigades ; so that, on the 6th of September, which was loss than ten days after the battle, Jenkins', Kemper's, and D. R. Jones' brigades were all under the command of General D. R. Jones. Stuart, writing his report in February, 1863, made a mistake as to two of the brigades. He named, in- deed, one that was at that time in Jones' division ; he made a natural mistake about the two others, which did not go under J ones' control until a few days afterwards ; but in * Wilcox's Rop., A. N. V., vol. ii., pp.227, 231. t Jones' Rep., A. N. V., vol. ii., p. 216. $ A. N. V., vol. i., p. 50. § Cf. Jones' Rep., A. N. V., vol. i., 109, with Longstreet's Report, A. N. V., vol. i., p. 128. Also Longstreet's Rep., A. N. V., vol. ii , pp. 80, 85, 87. II D. E. Jones' Rep., A. N. V., vol. ii., p. 218. 120 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. speaking of the forces sent by Longstreet that morning he is unquestionably speaking of the division of D. E. Jones. He says, moreover, that Porter's column was seen "ap- proaching," that he then notified General Lee, who was close by — " then opposite to me on the turnpike " — and that the three brigades were sent "immediately." This force, being then "placed in position,"^ "awaited the enemy's (our) advance." This, of course, implies that it was in position before we withdrew, i.e., before Butterfield's bri- gade fell back across Dawkins' Branch, a movement which was mistaken, for the moment, by Stuart for the withdrawal of the whole force. Under the erroneous supposition that Stuart's narrative referred to the sending of Wilcox's division to support Jones, some very elaborate arguments have been made to show that, until "Wilcox arrived, at five o'clock in the after- noon, there was no force in front of Porter but a few cav- alry, t As for his retiring, the withdrawal of Butterfield's brigade, just after its advance at twelve o'clock, from beyond Daw- kins' Branch to the woods in its rear, where it supported our batteries during the rest of the afternoon, is beyond question referred to. When the division of King was withdrawn and General McDowell went away to take up another position, going round by the Sudley Springs road. Porter relin- quished his preparations for an attack, and withdrew Butter- field's brigade. As for the brush. General Eosser's deposition,! which was put in evidence before the Board, was to the effect that he did see to it in person, on Meadowville lane, which runs in the * Fronting Bristoe," says General Stuart. At its extreme right, Jones' di vi- sion made a crotchet to its right, so that a portion of the command faced Bristoe. A. N. v., vol. ii., p. 145. t B. O., p. 1152 et seq. J See Appendix F. LONGSTREET AND PORTER. 121 rear of the position taken up by Longs treet's right. It seems certainly not unlikely that it may have deceived our officers, though its effect was probably much exaggerated by Stuart. At any rate, it appears from Stuart^ s repoi^t, that when our forces appeared to withdraw, that is, when Butterfield re- tired, i.e., at noon, Jones was in position on the crest ; and that General Porter's skirmish line was not long in finding this out, no one can have any reasonable doubt. It is possibly rather remarkable that Stuart should not have mentioned his sending again, late in the afternoon, for reinforcements to be sent to support Jones ; but he wrote his report long after the battle ; and, after all, Wilcox, though sent, was not needed, and was soon withdrawn, and it cer- tainly was nothing to boast of that he, Stuart, should have unnecessarily procured the withdrawal of troops from the left, where they were really needed. One thing, however, is certain, and that is, that the pres- ence of Porter's corps that afternoon not only retained Jones on the railroad, but for a certain space of time brought over "Wilcox also from the turnpike. It is understood that General Lee wanted to attack that day, and that General Longstreet was opposed to it. If he had attacked that day, he would have had certain advantages which he did not have the following day. The divisions of King and Ricketts, as well as those of Porter, were all out of position on Friday. If Lee had attacked Reynolds and Schenck at three o'clock in the afternoon, when McDowell's corps was in the Sudley Springs road, with the divisions of Hood and Wilcox, and the brigade of Evans, supported, if need be, by a portion of KemxDer's division, leaving Jones and the balance of Kemper's troops to prevent Porter from flanking his attack, he might have been successful. Or, he might have attacked Porter with the divisions of Jones, G— IV. 122 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. Kemper, and Wilcox. Wliatever the reason, General Lee did very little on Friday afternoon. He may have exagger- ated the force of our left wing, though this is hardly likely. But so long as this force was there, a turning movement like that of the next day would have been exposed to Porter's flank fire, and a portion of his force, probably a large portion, would have been required to observe or defeat Porter. Aitev General McDowell left him. General Porter threw out his skirmishers into the woods which sku'ted Dawkins' Branch on his left front, and pushed them well out to the enemy's x^osition. Between the road on which he had marched up and the railroad, a distance of about half a mile, he planted his guns, and posted his infantry in the woods near them, as a support. On this front, the ground was open for a mile or so. From time to time he made more or less movement in his command, but at no time did he do anything to invite or to threaten an attack. He was ready to meet one had it come. He was satisfied, from his own observation and from the reports of the officers in the skir- mish line, that he was confronted by a large force of the enemy — how large, of course he could not know without making a reconnoissance — and not having heard anything from General McDowell as to his having reached a place from which communications might be opened, he very justly felt that he was in no position to undertake anything of an offensive character. One thing certainly was clear, and it grew clearer during the afternoon. It w^as not possible for him to go across the country and strike Jackson's command in flank. In making such a movement as this, he would have exposed his own left flank to the batteries and infantry now facing him. The moment he should emerge from his position and march out LONGSTREET AND PORTER. 123 to the north or northwest, across the broken though open country to his right and front, and endeavor to make his way over the two miles or so that separated him from the turnpike, he would be assailed from all the batteries on the lidge, and would be compelled to halt and carry them first. The question, therefore, was — Was this expected of him? Was it in accordance with his orders ? Was it the dictate of common sense and of a soldier's feelings ? Let us stop a moment here. The question with him was, not whether he should march to the sound of the cannon, to the relief of his brothers in arms on the turnpike, but whether he should engage the enemy in his own front, who were not fighting his brothers in arms on the turnpike, but were quietly observing him ; that is, whether he should have a little battle, all by himself, in this part of the field. The considerations in such a case are, of course, the usual ones which should be weighed before fighting any battle. And first of all comes this : Is it a part of the general ]3lan that I should, here and now, hazard a battle? We have already intimated that the Joint Order cautioned the offi- cers to whom it was addressed against compromising them- selves in a battle with the combined forces of the enemy. It seems to us that it is a necessary inference from the Joint Order, that if Longstreet should be found to have actually joined Jackson, the general commanding did not intend to take the offensive. It is almost needless to say, or rather it ought to be, that unless the general commanding an army can impress upon his subordinates the duty of waiting until his preparations are made and his positions selected, all strategy is at an end. If every general, every time he comes across the enemy is going to pitch right in," regardless of orders, regardless of supports, like an Irishman at a Donnybrook Fair, we may 124 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. as well shut up our Military Schools. It might very possi- bly have been the duty of General Porter, under certain cir- cumstances, to make just such an attack as this, but in this particular case he was without supports and reserves, with- out even communication with McDowell — Banks several miles away. There was, moreover, no possibility of his assisting in the contest that was going on on the pike, un- less, indeed, the troops observing him were so few in num- ber that Lee would be obliged to detach reinforcements to aid them from the troops in front of Pope, which of course was certainly possible, though contrary to his own observa- tion and information. Then there was the chance of failure, which might very seriously interfere with the plans of his commanding officer. Besides, he was detaining in front of his corps a considerable body of the enemy already ; and last of all, he had, as we have pointed out, good reason to infer, from the language of the Joint Order, that no battle was to be fought on this ground with the united forces of the enemy. General Eobertson * was asked what in his judgment would have been the result if Porter's force had undertaken to pass up to the right in front of the woods and over Dawkins' Branch, so as to make a connection with the other Federal troops in the neighborhood of Groveton, and he replied, "I think it would have been perfectly ruinous to do that. . . . From the position that the Federal troops (Porter's command) held at that time, to go to the right and effect a junction with General Eeynolds . . . they had to pass over a table land in front of artillery, in front of our troops. I think if it had been made, with no roads to facilitate the movement, that it would have been a very disastrous one ; I tliink the result would have been fatal to them." * B. O., llobertson's evidence, p. ITS. LONGSTREET AND PORTER. 125 General Eobertson, it will be remembered, was on that part of the field, and his judgment is, therefore, of value. General Porter acted under the Joint Order till about six o'clock, unless it be thought that General McDowell had given him orders which he was bound to obey after that officer left him. For our part, we do not regard the Sixty- second Article of War as conferring upon the senior officer the power to compel the obedience of his junior, except where both officers are together in the absence of the officer who commands them both. The power conferred by the Sixty-second Article of War is conferred simply to secure unity of action at a given place and at a particular time ; not to enable a lieutenant, by giving orders to his junior in the absence of their common superior, to control the action of that junior after he leaves him. We therefore hold that it is entirely immaterial what orders McDowell gave to Porter ; McDowell went away at once, after giving what he chose to call an order ; and at once Porter's obligation to obey ceased. He remained bound to obey the orders of their common superior, General Pope, and of no one else. But, after all, it is to our mind clear that Porter supposed that all the change that McDowell undertook to make in the carrying out of the Joint Order was a change as to the mode of carrying it out, as we have before fully explained, and that it was still for them both to act together, as soon as McDowell should have taken his new position. For this, accordingly, he waited, and waited anxiously. His situation he knew, was open to misconstruction. He tried to commu- nicate with McDowell's corps through the woods, but he tried in vain.^ He saw the impossibility of marching across the country to the turnpike. He saw he was holding some * See Appendix C. 126 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. of the enemy's troops in. front of liim, and therefore he thought he ought not to fall back and rejoin the army by the Sudley Springs road. He heard nothing and conld have heard nothing till late in the afternoon, of an infantry en- gagement near Groveton, for, as we know, until four or five o'clock there was nothing but skirmishing and artillery fire to hear.* He thought at one time the army was falling back behind Bull Eun, and he thought that if this were so he ought to fall back likewise ; and in this, he, commanding an isolated wing of the army, was clearly right. He was left, by the retirement of McDowell, exactly in the position in which an outlying body of cavalry is often left on one wing of the army, watching the enemy, bound of course to fall back if the main army does. The construction placed upon the despatch of General Porter's, in which he expresses to General McDowell this decision, has always seemed to us monstrously unfair. In the position in which he was, so long as it was an isolated position, he could do nothing else but follow the example of the main army. If it fell back, he must fall back. If you complain of him for remaining in that isolated position, the question arises, How is he going to get out of it ? He can get out of it only in two ways, first, by attacking the enemy, against what he had every rea- son to suppose was the plan of his superiors and against his own judgment as to the result of an attack, or by retreating, which, so long as the main army held its advanced position at Groveton, he did not dream of doing. He did neither, and he did right. Finally, however, about six o'clock, came an order f from the Commanding General : * Ante, p. 104. t C. M., p. r. LONGSTREET A]N'D PORTER. 127 Headquarters in the Field, August 29th, 4.30 p.m. Your line of march brings you in on the enemy's right flank. I de- sire you to push forward into action at once, on the enemy's flank, and if possible, on his rear, keeping your right in communication with Gen- eral Reynolds. The enemy is massed in the woods in front of us, but can be shelled out as soon as you engage their flank. Keep heavy reserves and use your batteries, keeping well closed to your right all the time. In case you are obliged to fall back, do so on your right and rear, so as to keep you in close communication with the right wing. JOHN POPE, Major -General Commanding. Major-General Porter. The first thing that strikes one about this order is that it is a conditional order. It orders a certain attack made, be- cause, in the mind of the Commanding General, certain con- ditions exist — which is the same thing as making the per- formance of the order to depend on the existence of these conditions. These conditions are : 1. That Porter's line of march brings him in on the enemy's right flank. This, as well as the statement that the enemy is massed in the woods in front of General Pope, was no doubt true, if the enemy be Jackson, and Jackson only ; but how, if in addition to the enemy, whose flank is exposed to Porter's march, there is another enemy directly in front of Porter ? How if, in addition to the enemy massed in the woods in front of General Pope, there is another enemy occupying in force the heights directly in Porter's front ? 2. That his right should be kept in communication with General Eeynolds. But his corps was nowhere near Gen- eral Reynolds' division. Porter was isolated from every one, unless, by some independent operations of his own, under- taken in face of a new enemy posted directly opposite to him, he could establish some communication with the rest of 128 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. the army. It was absolutely impossible for him to fulfil this condition. The order was one that by its very terms did not demand obedience in any of the modified forms in which obedience could be rendered. In truth it could not be literally obeyed. Had the order been received at one o'clock in the afternoon, there would have been nothing for Porter to do but to report to Pope the precise state of affairs, and ask for further orders. Yet this order was construed by the court-martial as if it had read: "You will move at once to strike the flank of Jackson's corps, keeping as near to my left as you can." The question of how the order could be obeyed was, however, not a practical one. The order was not received until it was too late to be obeyed. For Porter to have marched out in the front of the enemy on the ojDposite heights, after dark, and endeavored to make his way to Rey- nolds, or to strike the right of Jackson, would have been simply folly. And how could he have carried his guns with him on that ground ? This will end what we have to say about the conduct of Major-General Fitz John Porter. We fear we have already spoken at more length about this controversy than our readers will approve. But it is a question where it is -pev- fectly possible for persons who have not mastered the facts of the case, to take a very unjust view. In our judgment General Fitz John Porter tried as hard to do his duty — and his task was a very perplexing one after McDowell left him — on that day of the twenty -ninth of August, as any officer in the army. CHAPTER X. THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS, The next day was fought the Second Battle of Bull Run, as we call it ; the battle of Manassas, as the Confederates call it. As they won it, perhaps they have the best right to give it a name. It was the morning of Saturday, the thirtieth day of Au- gust, 1862. General Pope had, as we have seen, got it into his head that the enemy were bent upon retreating, that they had, on the day before, suffered a severe defeat. He found indications in the morning that confirmed him. The enemy were readjusting their line, and had really fallen back over ground which had been disputed the evening before. Then, although he knew, from the fact of Hatch having been repulsed by Hood's and Evans' commands late in the previous afternoon, that a part of Longstreet's force had joined Jackson, this very fact, that nothing had been seen of them till very late in the day,' convinced him, being, as we have before remarked, a sanguine man, that the reinforcement had been but small, and that ifc had only come up late in the afternoon. General Porter, who had been sent for during the night to join the main army, and had come up early in the morn- ing, saw General Pope and endeavored to disabuse his mind of the belief that the mass of Longstreet's command was not 130 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. yet up. He recounted his own observation, and that of his officers. But in General Pope's preoccupied mind, these facts, when stated by Porter, partook rather of the character of excuses for very culpable inactivity and disobedience of orders, than of information of the enemy's position and strength. He could not, or would not, see that it was all- important to him to know the facts as to Lee's strength south of the turnpike the afternoon before ; and that it stood to reason, that by sending for Porter, Morell, Butter- field, and others, he would get the facts. He preferred to act on the belief which his own limited observation of the field justified, and he w^ould not listen to information com- ing from officers of whose good faith he chose to entertain doubts. Such a course by a general in his position was ex- tremely culpable ; it was thoroughly wrong-headed. We need not, we are sure, do more here than to remind our readers that it was, on the morning of the day before, very clearly General Pope's judgment,"^" that it would not be wise for him to engage the united forces of Jackson and Longstreet on the westerly side of Bull Eun, but that it w^ould be better, in the event of the junction of the two wdngs of the enemy's army, to retire behind Bull Eun to Centreville, supply his exhausted army, and receive such re- inforcements from the Army of the Potomac as General Hal- leck might be able to send him. This opinion was clearly a sound one, warranted by the highest military reasons, and in his cool moments General Pope entertained it, and meant to act on it. But his mind was now disturbed by two causes : first, by the excitement of the bloody battle which he had been fighting, and by the success, such as it was, which he had gained in it ; and secondly, by vexation and indignation * See ante, pp. 88 etscq. THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS. 131 at Porter's not having snx)ported him by an attack on Jack- son's flank ; and he would listen to nothing in excuse or ex- planation of this. It unfortunately happened that the very things which Porter had to urge by way of excuse and ex- planation were the most important things Pope could have known, with reference to his plan of action on Saturday — that is, they were the results of Porter's observation and in- formation as to the strength and dispositions of the enemy. But he would not hearken to anything of the sort. Accordingly, having sent out reconnoissances in his front, north of the pike, and ascertained, as he supposed, that the enemy were in full retreat, he issued the following order : * [Special Order No.—] Headquarters, near Groveton, August 30, 1862, 12 m. The following forces will be immediately thrown forward in pursuit of the enemy, and press him vigorously during the whole day. Major- General McDowell is assigned to the command of the pursuit. Major-General Porter's corps will push forward on the Warre nton turn- pike, followed by the divisions of Brigadier-Generals King and Reynolds. The division of Brigadier- General Ricketts will pursue the Hay mar- ket road, followed by the corps of Major-General Heintzelman ; the necessary cavalry will be assigned to these columns by Major-General McDowell, to whom rei^ular and frequent reports will be made. The General Headquarters will be somewhere on the Warren ton turn- pike. By command of Major-General Pope. GEO. D. RUGGLES, Colonel a7id Chief of Staff. * P. V. C. p. 47. It is difRcnlt to reconcile the sanguine and confident tone of this order with what General Pope tells us in his Report, p. 15(3, of his feeling that morning discouraged and nearly hopeless of any successful i^sne to his opera- tions ; that his object in fighting this battle was to cripple the enemy as much as possible, and delay his further advance toward the capital. These reflections and intentions, we are disposed to think, should bear a date subsequent to this Order of Pursuit, 132 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. It will be observed that the corps of Sigel and Eeno are not mentioned in this order, Thej were to constitute the reserves. A brief glance at the field will be in place here. Positions on August SOth, 6 p.m. The Warrenton turnpike rnns east and west ; the Sndlej Springs road runs north and south ; the Haymarket road runs parallel to the Warrenton pike, and about a mile and a THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS. 133 half to the north of it. The forces marching on the Hay- market road were therefore attempting to turn the enemy's left, and even cut him off from Haymarket and the Gap. On the sonth of the turnpike were woods, mostly very thick, with occasional clear places. There were two consid- erable hills south of the turnpike and near to it, with more or less clear land near them — the Henry House Hill, just east of the crossing of the Sudley Springs road with the turn- pike, and the Bald Hill, some distance to the west of- the Henry House Hill, but still east of Groveton. Near the Bald Hill was a house known as the Chinn House." The pos- session of these was of the first importance to us, as will presently appear. The reconnoissances which our forces had made in the forenoon seem to have satisfied General Lee that his adver- sary was j)reparing to attack him on the north side of tlio turnpike. Seeing that we were making a mistake, he al- lowed our movement to go on. He desired that w^e should expend a portion of our strength in attacking again Jackson's embankment, the approaches to which the guns of Long- street, now advanced somewhat, swept with a destructive fire. Lee had been reinforced during the night by the di- vision of E. H. Anderson, of Longstreet's command. General Pope's plan was that Porter's corps should move forward, their left on the turnpike, supported by King's division, under Hatch. On Porter's left and on the south of the pike was to be Eeynolds, to look out for the left flank. On the right of Porter were to be Heintzelman's two divi- sions under Hooker and Kearny, and, supporting them, the division of Eicketts. Shortly before the engagement fairly opened, Eeynolds discovered the enemy in force on the south of the pike, and facing it, concealed in the woods, and preparing a seriouri 131 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. attack on our flank. On reporting tliis lie was ordered to form his division to resist this attack, which he proceeded to do. Porter, meantime, about four o'clock, pushes Morell's divi- sion in front, the brigades of Barnes and Butterfield ^ lead- ing. They drive the enemy from the outlying woods, back upon the old railroad entrenchment. Sykes' division of reg- ulars is in reserve. To the right. Hatch pushes in King's division. The attack is made with great resolution. Jack- son's veterans resist with their never-failing tenacity and pluck. Our officers and men push up to the embankment. It is a powerful attack and is pressed home, and for a mo- ment Jackson is afraid he cannot resist it. He sends to Lee for reinforcements, says he is " severely pressed " and Lee orders Longstreet to send them from his hitherto unem- ployed command. But that officer has, with a soldier's eye for position, placed his guns where their fire enfilades any trooj)s attacking the front of Jackson's position. There is no need of reinforcements, the guns do the work. "As it was evident," says General Longstreet, **that the attack against General Jackson could not be continued ten minutes under the fire of these batteries, I made no movement with my troops. Before the second battery could be placed in position the enemy began to retire, and in less than ten minutes the ranks were broken, and that portion of the army put to flight." Jackson says his " entire line was engaged in a fierce and sanguinary struggle. As one line was repulsed, another took its place, and pressed forward, as if determined, by force of numbers and fury of assault, to drive us from our positions. So impetuous and well- sustained were these on- * Only Barnes' and Buttcrficld's brigades were ;:iresen1., Griffin's having, by an unaccountable blunder, gone to Ccntrevillc. THE BATTLE OP MANASSAS. 135 sets as to induce me to send to tlie Commanding General for reinforcements." Porter's and Hatch's attack had failed, but it is plain, from what Jackson himself says of it, that it was a very gallant and a very well-sustained attack."^ It may be that had it not been for the enfilading fire of Longstreet's guns, our brave troops might have effected a lodgment in the embankment. General Hatch was slightly wounded. On the extreme right, Hooker's division, or rather a part of it, for Gr over's brigade was not put in again after its heavy losses the day before, drove the enemy from some woods, but does not seem to have made a serious attack. Fm'ther to our right, Kearny and Eicketts were to have at- tacked by the Haymarket road. The movement failed, owing to the withdrawal of a large portion of Eicketts' command, to be used on the Warrenton pike, or to the south of it, against the enemy, who were rapidly developing a very seri- •ous movement against our left flank. On the retirement of Morell and Hatch, General Pope in- cautiously ordered Eeynolds to leave the commanding posi- tion which he had taken up on the left flank of the army, south of the turnpike, and cross over to the north of the turnpike and sup^Dort Porter's corps.f This seems to have been unnecessary, as well as incautious, for Sykes' division had not been severely engaged in the attack. The effect of * Pope, in his Report, p. 157, says the attack of Porter was neither vigoyon, R. Jones, composed of the brigades of Toombs and G. T. Anderson (D. R. Jones), numbering 3,713 " To which the brigade of Draylon was attached before the battles, numbering about 1,725 " The division of Hood, comprising the brigades of Whiting and Hood 3,852 To which Evans' brigade was attached before the battles, numbering about „ 2,875 " The division of R. H. Anderson, consisting of the brigades of Mahone, Wright, and Armi- stead 6,117 " The cavalry of Fitz Hugh Lee 2,500 " Artniery . . . . 2,500 " Total brought up by General Lee . , 31,768 Add Jackson's force as above given 22,500 " Grand- total 54,268 * These three brigades were known as Kemper^s division, t These were known as Wilcox's division. APPENDIX E. 199 This Colonel Allan believes "to be an outside estimate of the Confederate strength." This exceeds Colonel Taylor's estimate by 5,191 men. He gives only 49,077 men. Mr. White gives only 47,000 men. It would seem, therefore, that General Pope's army out- numbered that of his antagonist, on August 30th, by about 10,000 men. It may not be out of place here to state our conviction that, had General Pope supposed that he was to fight General Lee's whole army that day, he would have made such dispositions as would have secured him against defeat. The gallantry and obstinacy of our troops was most marked in this campaign ; there was not the least reason to fear the event of any fight where we were not placed, as we* were on the 30th, at a great disadvantage. On that day almost the entire army was thrown forward in a supposed pursuit of the enemy ; our line of retreat was left exposed to the attpck of Longstreet's whole command, and was de- fended only by such movements of our troops as could be hastily improvised. APPENDIX F. TIME OF THE AEEIVAL OF KEMPEE'S DF^ISION. Besides the supposition given in the text, that it was D. E. Jones' division which was sent to the Manassas Gap Eiilroad on Stuart's application, early in the forenoon, there is another supposition which is also tenable, and may be the true one. In the Southern Historical Society Papers, vol. viii., page 538, is the report of Colonel M. D. Corse, who commanded Kemper's brigade in this campaign. The report is dated September, 1862, and is made to General J. L. Kemper, who commanded Kemper's division, which consisted of three brigades, Kemper's, Pickett's (formerly Garnett's), commanded by Colonel Hunton, and Jenkins'. Colonel Corse says : On the morning of the 29th this brigade marched, with the others of your command, from its bivouac near Thorough- fare Gap, and halted about three miles east of Gainesville, about 12 o'clock. "We were at once placed in line of battle, in rear of Jenkins' brigade, near the Manassas Gap Eailroad. After remaining in this position for a short time the brigade moved forward east of the railroad. The Twenty-fourth Virginia was here detached and sent to support Eogers' bat- tery, stationed near the house. The rest of the brigade, by your order, was then moved west of the railroad, forming line of battle a few yards from the outskirts of a wood. The APPENDIX F. 201 Seventh Virginia went forward in skirmishing order across a field, some three hundred yards to the front. In the last movement the brigade was subjected to a heavy shelling from a battery of the enemy, distant about twelve hundred yards. Eemaining in this position for half an hour, I re- ceived, through your Acting Adjutant-General, Captain Fry, an order to move forward, and to the right ; to withdraw the Seventh, connect it with my line, and occupy a wood in front, distant about four hundred yards. "In obeying this order the brigade was forced to move in full view of the above-mentioned battery, which kept a con- stant fire upon us. Nothing daunted, however, the line moved steadily forward and took the position designated. I threw out Captain Simpson's company (Seventeenth Regi- ment) as skirmishers to the front and right. In a short time he encountered the enemy's skirmishers on our right and in rear of our line. Not being aware that any of our troops were on my right, and seeing the enemy a few mo- ments before display a considerable force in front, which at once moved to the right under cover of a wood, I deemed it prudent to fall back a short distance, feeling sure that the enemy was in force behind his skirmishers. I now sent Major Herbert (Seventeenth Eegiment) to ascertain whether or not we had any troops on my right. On his return, he informed me * there were none immediately on our right.' At this time Major Palmer rode up, and I made him ac- quainted with the fact. I informed him of our situation, and suggested that some troops should be placed on our right. He went off, and in a short time General Drayton (with his brigade) reported with orders to relieve me. I then moved east of the railroad, and connected with the Twenty-fourth in line in rear of the house, keeping in front a line of 9* 2C2 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. pickets until the morning of the 30th, connecting with Gen- eral Drajton on the right, and Colonel Benning, command- ing Toombs' brigade, on the left." It is a pitj that we have not the report of General Kemper hijnself. But it is plain from this narrative that the bri- gades of D. R. Jones' and Kemper's divisions were all in line together. The brigades between which Corse took up his final position belonged to D. B. Jones' division. It would seem as if Kemper's brigade, being the right brigade of Kem- per's division, was moved to the south across the railroad in the direction of the Vessel House, and somewhat, no doubt, in rear of the front line of D. E. Jones' division, being sub- jected to the fire of Porter's batteries in so doing, and that Corse then threw out skirmishers in the wood that lies south of the railroad, there encountering Porter's skirmishers. It appears that two of D. B, Jones' brigades, at least, were in immediate proximity to Kemper's brigade ; and there is, of course, no reason to doubt that the two divisions of Kemper and Jones were supporting each other. It also appears dis- tinctly that the enemy's movements were cautiously made, and that they fully recognized that their antagonists were " in force " opposite them. It would seem that Kemper's bri- gade was marched to the south of the railroad, and in face of Porter's skirmishers, somewhere about one o'clock. Corse's movement to the south (or, as he terms it, west) of the rail- road was recognized ^ at the time by Colonel E. G. Mar- shall, Thirteenth New York, who reported to General Morell that the enemy was in much larger force than he could see — he should suppose it was a brigade — and that they were endeavoring to come in on his left, and had been advancing. * Ante, p. 184, No. 34. APPENDIX F. 203 The two divisions of Kemper and D. K. Jones numbered about 10,000 men. This is ascertained as follows : Longstreet's ^ division consisted of Kemper's brigade, composed of five regiments ; Jenkins' brigade, five and one-half regiments ; Picketts' (or Garnett's), five regi- ments ; under Kemper. Wilcox's brigade, four regiments ; Prjor's brigade, four regiments ; Featherston's brigade, three and one-half regiments ; under Wilcox. Total, twenty-seven regiments. His entire strength was 8,486 men. As the three brigades under Kemper comprised fifteen and one-half regi- ments out of these twenty- seven, it is reasonable to suppose that they numbered, at least, 4,562 men. The brigades of Toombs and Anderson (formerly D. R. Jones) numbered 3,713 men. The brigades of Drayton and Evans consisted, Dray- ton's of three, and Evans' of five regiments, together num- bering 4,600 men, of which Drayton's proportion is 1,725 men, making in all, for the six brigades, 10,000 men. This fcx'ce occupied the heights opposite Porter's position during the entire afternoon. * Relative Stren.^th at Second Manassas. By Colonel William Allan, late Chief of Ordnance, Second Corps, A. N. V. Southern Historical Society Papers, vol, viii., pp. 217 et seq. APPENDIX G. BOSTEE OF THE FeDEEAL AND CoNFEDEEATE AeMIES AT THE Battle of Manassas, otheewise called the Second Battle of Bull Eun, fought on Satueday, August 30, 1862. FEDEEAL AEMY. Majoe-Geneeal JOHN POPE, U.S.V., Commanding. FIRST CORPS, ARMY OF VIRGINIA. Major-General FRANZ SIGEL, U.S.V. FIRST DIVISION. Major-General EOBEET C. SCHENCK,* U.S.V. First Brigade. Brig. -Gen. Julius H. Stahel, U.S.V. 27th Pennsylvania, Colonel Bushbeck. 8th New York, Colonel Hedterich. 41st " Lieut.-Col. Holmstedt. 45th " Lieut.-Col. Tkatislaw. Second Brigade, Col. N. C. McLean, 75th Ohio. 25th Ohio, Col. Richardson. 55th " Col. J. C. Lee. 73d " Col. O. Smith. 75th " Major Reilly. SECOND DIVISION. Merged in the others. THIRD DIVISION. Brigadier-G-eneral carl SCHURZ, U.S.V. First Brigade, f Second Brigade. Col. A. Schimmelpfennig. Col. W. Krtzanowski. 61st Ohio, Lieut.-Col. McGroarty. 54th New York, Lieut.-Col. Ashby. 74th Pennsylvania, Major Blessing. 58th " Major Henkel.J 8th Virginia. 75th Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Col. Mahler. t Wounded on August 80th ; appointed Major-General of Volunteers on the same day. t Brigadier- General Henry Bohlen had been killed at Freeman's Ford on August 22d. X Wounded on August 30th. APPENDIX G. 205 Third Brigade, Independent Brigade. Col. John A. Koltes.* Brig.-Gen. Robert H. Milroy, U.S.V. 29th New York,t Major Hartman. 2d Virginia. 68th " Lieut.-Col. Kleefisch.t 3d 73d Pennsylvania, Lieut. -Coi. Miibleck. 5th " Col. Zeigler. 8th " 82d Ohio.§ ARTILLERY OF THE FIRST CORPS, A. V. Battery I, 1st Ohio Artillery, Captain H. Dilger. Battery K, " " Lieutenant George B. Haskins. Schirmer's Battery, Lieutenant Blume. Dickman's " Johnson's " DeBeck's " Romer's || *' Hampton's |! " Battery I, 1st New York Artillery, Captain M, Weidrick. Buell's Battery, Captain Frank Buell.* SECOND CORPS, ARMY OF VIRGINIA. Major-General NATHANIEL P. BANKS, U.S.V. FIRST DIVISION. Beigamer-General ALPHEUS S. WILLIAMS, U.S.V. First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Samuel W. Crawford, U.S.V. 10th Maine, Colonel George L. Beal. 46th Pennsylvania. 28th New York. 5th Connecticut. Second Brigade, Merged in the others. Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. George H. Gordon, U.S.V. 2d Massachusetts, Colonel George L. Andrews. 29th Pennsylvania. 3d Wisconsin, Colonel Thomas H. Ruger. 27th Indiana, Colonel Colgrove. * Killed on August SOth. t Colonel Soest had been wounded on August 29th. X Wounded on August 30th. § Colonel Cantwell had been killed on August 29th. II Belonging to the Second Corps, A. V., but attached temporarily to the First Corps, A, V. 206 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. SECOND DIVISION.* Brigadier-Genebal GEORGE S. GREENE, U S.V. First Brigade.f 5th Ohio. 7tli " 66th " 21)th " 26th. Pennsylvania. iSecond Brigade.^ 111th Pennsylvania. 109th Maryland. 3d 102d New York. 8th U. S. Infantry. 12th " 4th Maine Infantry. Third Brigade.% 1st District of Columbia. 78th New York. 6Uth Purnell Legion, Maryland. ARTILLERY OF THE SECOND CORPS, A.V. McGilvery's Battery. Best's Battery. Knapp'a " Robinson's Geary's Muhlenberg's Battery, Cothran'a Battery, THIRD CORPS, ARMY OF VIRGIK[A. Major-General IRVIN McDOWELL, U.S.V. FIRST DIVISION.!! Beigadieb-General JOHN P. HATCH, t U.S.Y. First BtHgade. ** Col. Sullivan. 2d N. Y. Sharpshooters, Col. Post. 30th " Col. Frisby.tt 14th " Lieut.-Col. Fowler. 1[ Third Brigade. Brig.-Gen. M. R. Patrick, U.S.V. 20th New York, Col. Pratt. ft 21st " 23d " 25th " Second Brigade. Brig.-Gen. Abner Doubledat, XJ.fj.V. 56th Pennsylvania, Lieut. Col. Hoffmann. 76th New York, Col, Wainwright. 95th Fourth Brigade. Brig.-Gen. John Gibbon, U.S.V. 2d Wisconsin. §§ 19th Indiana, Col. S. Meredith. 6th Wisconsin. !| || 7th Wisconsin. SECOND DIVISION. Brigadier-General JAMES B. RICKETTS, U.S.V. First Brigade. Second Brigade. Gen. A. Duryee, U. S. V.1" Brig.-Gen. L. B. Tower,^ U. S. V. 94th New York, Col. Root.t * Brigadier-General C. C. Augur had bceen wounded at the battle of Cedar Mountain. t Brigadier-General John W. Geary had been wounded at the battle of Cedar Mountain. X Brigadier-General Henry Prince had been taken prisoner at the battle of Ce- dar Mountain. § Brigadier- General George S. Greene, had been promoted to the command of the division, vice Augur, wounded. !| Brigadier- General Rufus King had been relieved on the 29th, on account of illness. 1" Wounded on August 30th. ** Formerly Hatch's, ft Killed on August 30th. §§ Colonel O'Connor had been killed in the action near Gainesville on August 28th. 11 ll Colonel Gather had been severely wounded on the 28th. 11 Colonel Robertson, Lieutenant -Colonel Hamilton, and Major Bells had been wounded on the 28th. APPENDIX G. 207 Third Brigade.'^ Fourth Brigade. Col. Stiles. 1st Virginia, Col. Thorburn.t 11th Pennsylvania, Col. Coulter. 88d New York. 12th Massachusetts. 13th Massachusetts. PENNSYLVANIA RESERVES. Brigadier-General JOH^T F. REYNOLDS.J First Brigade. Second Brigade. Brig.-Gen. G-eorge G. Meade, U.S.V. Brig.-Gen. Truman Seymour, U.S.V. 1st Rifles, Col. McNeil. 1st Infantry, Col. Roberts. 3d Infantry, Col. Sickles. 2d " Col. McCandless.t 4th " Col. Magillon. 5th " Maj. Fentmyet. 7th '* Lieut.-Col. Henderson. 6th " Col. Sinclair. 8th *' Capt. Lemon. Third Brigade. Brig.-Gen. C. P. Jackson. § U. S. V. 9th Infantry, Col. ^ nderson. lUth " Col. Kirk. 11th " Lieut. Col. Jackson. 12th Col. Hardin.t ARTILLERY OP THE THIRD CORPS, A.V. Major TELLSON, Chief of Artillery. Battery 4th New York Artillery. Campbell's Battery. Rhode Island Munroe's. Leppier's " A, Ifet Pennsylvania Artillery. Mathews' '* " B. 1st " " Shippen's " " G, 1st " '* Reynolds' " C, St*-. Artiller3% Ransom's. Cooper's '* *' — 1st Maine Artillery, Hall's. Naylor's " " — 2d Maryland " Thompson's. Gerrish'a " of Howitzers. CAVALRY OF THE ARMY OF VIRGINIA. CAVALRY OP THE PIRST CORPS. Buford's Brigade. Brig. Gen. John Buford,|| U. S. V. 9th New York, Col. J. Beardsley. 4th " " Lieut.-Col. P. Nazet. 6th Ohio, Col. W. R. Lloyd. 1st Maryland, Lieut.-Col. Wetschky. CAVALRY OP THE THIRD CORPS. Bayard'f} Brigade. Brig.-Gen. George D. Bayard,^ U. S. V. 1st New Jersey, Lieut.-Col. Karge. 1st Pennsylvania, Col. Owen Jones. 1st Rhode Island, Col. Duffie. 1st Maine, Col. Allen. * Brigadier- General George L. Hartsuff had been relieved on account of illness. t Wounded on August 30 th. t Killed at Gettysburg, July 1, 1863. § Killed at Predericksburg, Dec. 13, 1862. II Died of disease, December 16, 1863. i Died of wounds received at the battle of Predericksburg, Dec. 14, 1862. 203 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. THIRD CORPS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. Major-General SAMUEL P. HEINTZELMAN, U.S.V. riKST DIVISION. Majoe-Genekal PHILIP KEARNY,* U.S.V. Fi7'8t Brigade, Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen., John C. Robinson, U.S.V. 20th Indiana, Col. William L. Brown. t 6Sd Pennsylvania, Col. Alexander Hays.:|: ~ lOSth Capt. Craig. § 30th Ohio (5 companies). Brig. -Gen., David B. Birney, U.S.V. 88th New York. 40th " Col. Egan. 101st " Lieut.-Col. Gesner. 57th Pennsylvania. 3d Maine, Col. Champlin, 4th ^' Col. Walker. Third Brigade. Col. O. M. Roe, 2d Michigan Volunteers. 37th New York. 2d Michigan. 3d 5th *' 99th Pennsylvania. SECOND DIVISION. Major-General JOSEPH HOOKER, U.S.V. Firbt Brigade. Second (or Excelsior) Brigade, Brig. -Gen. Cuvier Grover, U.S.V. Col. Taylor, 72d New York. 1st Massachusetts, Col. R. Cowdin. 70th New York. 2d New Hampshire, Col. G. Marston. 71st *' 11th Massachusetts, Col. W. Blaisdell.|j 72d " 16th " Maj. G. Banks. 73d " 26th Pennsylvania, Maj. R. L. Bodine. 74th ' Third Brigade. Colonel Joseph B. Carr, 2d New York. 2d New York, Capt. Park. 5th New Jersey, Lieut.-Col. W. J. Sewell. % 6th " Lieut.-Col. G. C. Burling. f 7th " Col. Joseph W. Revere. 8th " Capt. D. Blauvelt, Jr.** 115th Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Col. Robert Thompson. ARTILLERY OF THE THIRD CORPS, A.P. Graham's Battery. Randolph's " E, 1st Rhode Island Artillery. * Killed at Chantilly or Ox Hill, September 1, 1862. t Killed on August 80th. X Wounded on August 30th. Killed as Brigadier- General of Volunteers at the battle of the Wilderness, May 5. 1864. § Wounded on August 30th. II Killed at Petersburg, June 23, 1864. 1^ Colonel G. Mott had been wounded on August 29th. ** Lieutenant-Colonel William Ward had been wounded, and Acting-Major Euite had been killed on August 29th. APPENDIX G. 2C9 FIFTH CORPS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. Major-General FITZ JOHN PORTER, U.S.V. FIKST DIVISION. Major-Geneeal GEORGE \V. MORELL, U.S.V. Fi7''st Brigade. Col. James Barnes, 18th Massachusetts. 2d Maine, Col. Charles Roberts. 18th Massachusetts, Capt. Stephen Thomas. 22d " Major Mason W. Burt. 18th New York. 1st Michigan, Col. H. S. Roberts.* Second Brigade. Brig.-Gen. Charles Griffin, U.S.V. Not in action. Third Brigade. Brig.-Gen. Dan Butterfifld, U.S.V. 17th New York, Col. Lansing. 44th 12th 16th Michigan. 83d Pennsylvaoia, Lieut.-Col. Campbell.f 1st U. S. Sharpshooters, Col. Berdan.t SECOND DIVISION. Brigadier-General GEORGE SYKES, U.S.V. First Brigade. Lieut.-Col. R. C. Buchanan. 4th Infantry. 3d Infantry, Capt. John D. Wilkins. 4th " Capts. J. B. Collins * and H. Dryer. 12th " 1st battalion, Capt. Blunt. 14th " 1st Capt. J. D. O'Connell.t 14th " 2d " Capt. D. B. McKibben.t Second Brigade. Lieut.-Col. William Chapman, 3d In- fantry. 2d Infantry ) -, 10th 6th 11th 17th Major C. S. Lovell. Capt. L. C. Bootes. Major D. L. Floyd- Jones, Major G. L. Andrews. Third Brigade. Col. GOUVERNEUR K. Warren, 5th New York, 5th New York, Capt. C. Winslow. 10th Col. Bendix. PiaWs Brigade. Brig.-Gen. A. Sanders Piatt. Sfith New York, Col. Bailey. 63d Indiana, Capt. Bruce. ARTILLERY OF THE FIFTH CORPS, A. P. Smead's % Battery, 5th U. S. Artillery. Randol's Battery, 1st U. S. Artillery: Weed's " Martin's Massachusetts Artillery. Van Reed's '* '* Battery C, Rhode Island Artillery. Hazlett'a * Killed on August 30th. t Wounded on August 30th. X Capt. Smead was killed on August 30th. 210 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. NINTH CORPS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. Brigadier-General J. L. RENO,* U. S. V. FIRST DIVISION. Brigadier-General ISAAC I. STEVE^^S.t First Brigade. Seco?id Brigade, Col. Christ, SOLIi Pennsylvania. Col. Leasure. 8th Michigan. 100th Pennsylvania, 50th Pennsylvania. 45th~N'ew York, 46th Third Brigade. Col. Farnsworth, 79th New York. 79th New York. 28th Massachusetts. SECOND DIVISION.$ First Brigade. Second Brigade. Col. Nagle, 48th Pennsylvania. Col. Ferrero, 51st New York, 48th Pennsylvania. 51st New York. I^d Maryland. 51st Pennsylvania. 9th New Hampshire. Slst Massachusetts. 6th " 85th ARTTLLBRY OP THE NINTH CORPS, A. P. Battery E, 2d U. S. Artillery, Captain Benjamin, and doubtless other batteries. There was no cavalry of the Army of the Potomac, AEMY OF NOETHEEN VIEGINIA. General EOBEET E. LEE, CoMMANDiNa. EIGHT WING. Lteutenant-General JAMES LONGSTEEET. INFANTRY. EYANS' DIVISION. Brigadter-G-enbral N. GEORGE EVANS. (Comprising Whiting's (or Hood's) Division. Brigadier-General John B. Hood.) Rood\s Brigade. 1st Texas, Lieut.-Col. P. A. Work. 4th " Lieut.-Col. B. F. Carter. 5th " Col. J. B. Robertson. § 18th Georgia, Col. W. T. WofEord. Hampton Legion, Lieut.-Col. M. W. Gary. * Killed at South Mountain, September 14, 1862. t Killed at Chantilly, or Ox Hill, September 1, 1862. X Under the special command of Brigadier-General Reno. § Wounded on August 30th. APPENDIX G. 211 W7iitmr/''s {or Law's) Brigade, Col. E. M. Law, 4th Alabama. 4th Alabama, Lieut.-Col, McLemore. 6th North Carolina. Maj. R. F. Webb. 2d Mississippi, Col. J. M. Stone. 11th " Col. P. F. Liddell. Evans' Brigade, Col. P. F. Stevens, Holcombe Legion. 17th South Carolina, Col. J. H. Means.* l^th " " Col. J. M. Gadberry.t 22d u . ^ 23d " " Col. H. L. Benbow.t Holcombe Legion Maj. F. G-. Palmer. $ WILCOX'S DIVISION. Brigadiek-Genekal CADMUS M. WILCOX. Wilcox''s Brigade. % Pry or' s Brigade, 8th Alabama, Maj. Herbert. Brig.-Grcn. Roger A. Pryob. 9th " Maj. Williams. 5th Florida. 10th " JVjaj. Cauldwell 8th 11th ** Capt. Saunders.* 3d Virginia. 14th Alabama, Feather store s Brigade. Brig.-Gen. W. S. Featherston. 12th Mississippi. 16th 19th 2d " KEMPER S DIVISION. Brigadier-General JAMES L. KEMPER. Kemver's Brigade. Jenkins' B igade. Col. M. D. Corse, 17th Virginia. Brig.-Gen. M. Jenkins. 1st Virginia, -Lieut.-Col. Skinner. 1st South Carolina. • 7th Col. W. T. PatLon. 5th '* 11th " Maj. Clements. 6th " " 17th Lieut.-Col. Marye.^ 2d " " Rifles. 24th " Col. W. R. Terry. Palmetto Sharpshooters. 4th SouLh Carolina Battalion. Pickett's {or Garnett's) Brigade, Col, Eppa Hunton, 8th Virginia, 8th Virginia. 18th " 19th 28th " 56 th " * Mortally wounded on August 30th. t Killed on August £Or,h. X Wounded on August 80th. § Commanded by (4eneral Wilcox in person. II Killed at the Battle of the Wilderness, May 6, 864. 212 THE ARMY UKDER POPE. D. K. JONES' DIVISION. Brigadier-GtENEral DAVID R. JONES. Anderson'' s (or B. JR. Jone?:^) Brigade. Toonibs' Brigade. Col. GT. T. Anderson, 11th Greorgia. Col. Henry L. Benning, 17th Georgia. 1st Georgia, Major Walker. 2d Georgia, Lieut.-Col. Holmes. Tth Col. W. T. Wilson.t 15th " Colonel Willican. 8th *' Lient.-Col. J. R. Towers. 17th " Maj. Pickett.t 0th Col. Beck. 20th '* Maj. Waddell. 11th " Lieut.-Col. Luffman. Braiiton^s Brigade. Brig.-Gen. Thomas F. Drayton, 15th South Carolina. 50th Georgia. 51st " R. H. ANDERSON'S DIVISION. Major-General R. H. ANDERSON. Mahone''8 Brigade. Wright's Brigade. ArmisteacTs Brigade. Brig.-Gen. Wm. Mahone. Brig.-Gen. A. R. Wright. Brig.-Gen. L. A. Armis- 6th Virginia. 12th 16th 41st 49th 3d Georgia. 22d »' 48th " 44th Alabama. TEAD.<^ 9th Virginia. 14th 28th " 53d " 57th « ARTILLERY. BATTALION OP LIGHT ARTILLERY. Colonel STEPHEN D. LEE. Eubank's Battery. Parker's " Rhett's Battery, Jordan's '* Taylor's Battery. BATTALION OF WASHINGTON ARTILLERY. Colonel J. B. WALTON. Squiers' Battery. Richardson's Battery. Miller's " Eshleman's " Probers Battalion, Maj. B. W. Frobel. Rcilly's Battery. Bachman's Battery. Garden's " OTHER COMMANDS. Dixie Artillery. Rodgers' Battery. Stribling's Battery. Brown's " Maurin's " Grimes' " Leake's " Anderson's Battery. * A. N. v., Longstreet's Rep., vol. ii., pp. 80-81. + Killed August 30th. t Wounded August 30th. § Killed at Gettysburg, July 3, 1863, APPENDIX G. 213 LEFT WING. Major-General THOMAS J. JACKSON.* EWELL'S DIVISION. Brigadier-General A. R. LAWTON.t Early's Brigade. "Brig. -Gen. J. A. Early. 13th Virginia, Col. J. E, B. Terrill. 25th 31st " Col. Hoffmann. 44th " Col. William Smith. 49th " 52d 58th LaiDton''s Brigade. Col. M. Douglass, i 13th Georgia. 13th Georgia. 20th 31st 38th 6(jth " 61st Hays'' Brigade.% Colonel Strong, 6th Louisiana, 5th Louisiana, Maj. Meuger. 6th 7th 8th " Maj. Lewis 9th Trimble'' s Brigade. || Captain Brown. 1" 12th Georgia. 21st Georgia, Maj. Glover. 21st North Carolina, Lieut.-Col. Fulton. 15th Alabama, Maj. Luther. 12th Georgia. LIGHT DIVISION. Major-General AMBROSE P. HILL.** £r:^nc7i's Brigade, Gregg'' s (afterward Mc Gowan's) Brigade. Brig.-Gen. Louis O'B. Branch. +t Brig.-Gen. Maxcy Gregg. 33d North Carolina. Orr's Rifles.tt 7th " 1st South Carolina. §§ 28th " 12Lh|l|i " 37th " " ISthlfl " 18th " *• 14th****' * Died of wounds received at Chancellorsville, May 10, 1^63. t Major-General Richard S. Ewell had been wounded in the action near Gaines- ville, August 28th. X Killed at Sharpsburg, September 17, 1862. § Colonel H. Forno, 5th Louisiana, who commanded the brigade Aug,;st 29th, had been wounded on that day, II Brigadier J. R. Trimble had been wounded August 29th. i" Killed at Chantilly, September 1st. ** Killed before Petersburg, April 2, 1865. tt Killed at Sharpsburg, September 17, 1S62. XX Colonel J. Foster Marshall and Lieutenant- Colon el D. A, Ledbetter had been killed on August 29th. §§^Lieutenant-Colonel McCready, commanding this regiment, had been wounded on August 29th. II II Colonel Dixon Barnes and Lieutenant-Colonel McCorkle had been wounded on Ausrust 29th. Colonel Barnes was killed at Sharpsburg, Sepi ember 17th. i"! Colonel O. E. Edwards and Lieutenant-Colonel T. S. Farron had been wounded on August 29th. *** Colonel S. McGowan had been wounded on August 29th. 214 THE ARMY UNDER POPE. Field's Brigade.* Col. J. M. Brockenbrough, 40th Va. 55th Virginia. 47th 2d " Battalion, Pender's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. William D. PBNDER.t 22d North Carolina, Major Cole. Kith " " Capt. Stone.J 88th " " Capt. Ashford.§ 34th " Col. Riddick.ll Archer'' s Brigade, Brig.-Gen. J. L. Archer. 1st Tennessee, Col, P. Turney. 7th " Major Sheppard. 14th " Ci.l. W. A. Forbes.t 19th Georgia, Capt. L. Johnson. 5t;h Alabama,** Battalion, Lieut. H Thomas'' Brigade. Col. Edward L. Thomas, 35th Ga. 14th Georgia, Col. R. W. Folsoin. 35th " 45th " Major W. L. Grice. 49th " Lieut.-Col. J. R. Man- ning. JACKSON'S DIVISION.tt Brigadier-General WILLIAM E. STARKE.tJ '■^ StoneioalV Brigade. CamphelVs {or J. R. Jo7ies') Brigade. Col. W. S. H. Baylor, §§ 5th Va. Col. Bradley T. Johnson. 2d Virginia.ini 1st Virginia Battalion. Capt. Henderson. 4th ' " 21st Capt. Witcher. 5th " Ao^y. a J Lieut. V. Dabney.§ 27thtir " I Cant. Goldsborough.§ 33d*** " 42d " Capt. Penn. Taliaferro's Brigade. Staford's (or Starke's) Brigade. Col. A. G. Taliaferro, 23d Virginia. Col. L. A. Stafford, 9th Louisiana. 10th Virginia. 1st Louisiana, Lieut.-Col. Nolan. 23d " 2d " Col. J. M. WiUiams. 37th 9th 47th Alabama. 10th 48th " 15th " Col. Edmond Pendleton. Coppen's Battalion. * Brigadier-General Charles W. Field had been wounded August 29th. t Died, July 18, 1863, of wounds received at Gettysburg. t Wounded at Ox Hill, or Chantilly, September 1, 1862. I Wounded on August 30th. II Mortally wounded at Ox Hill, or Chant lly, September 1, 1862. Mortally wounrled on August 30th. ** Captain Bush, commanding this battalion, had been killed on August 29i;h. tt Brigadier General William B. Taliaferro had been wounded in the action near Gainesville, Ausrust 28th. Xt Killed at Sharpsburg, September 17, 1862. §1 Killed on August SOth. nil Colonel Botts had been mortally wounded on August 28th. Colonel Grigsby had been woimdcd on August 28th. *** Colonel Neff had been killed on August 28th. APPENDIX a 215 AETILLERY OF THE LEFT WING-. Colonel STAPLETON CRUTCHFlELD, Chief of Artillery. Lieut.-Col. R. L. Walker. Balthis' Brown's D'Aquin's Demerit's Latimer'' 3 f Braxton's j Crenshaw's J Davidson's * 1 Latham's ! Mcintosh's l^Pegram's Brockenbrough's Carpenter's C aside's Poague's Raines' Wooding' s Cutchaw's Garber's Job li son's Rice's Battery with Swell's Divisi Hill's Jackson's Unattached. CAVALRY CORPS, Major-Gen ERAL J. E. B. STUART.* Fitz Ru jh Lee's Brigade. Brig.-Gen. Fitz Hugh Lee 1st Virginia, Col. Brien. 3d Col. Wickham. Col. T. M. Rosser. 4th 5th 9th Uohertson^H Brigade. Brig.-Gen. B. H. Robertson. 2(1 Virginia, Col. T. T. Munford. 6th 7th llth 12th 10th Col. A. W. Harman. Battalion, Col. Funsten. Note. — The Roster above given is necessarily imperfect in some of its details. Still, it is in the main correct. It is to be hoped that it will interest the survi- vors of that hard-fought day. * Died of wounds received at Yellow Tavern, Virginia, May 12, 1864. IKDEX. Note. — Regiments^ batteries, etc.^ are indexed under the names of their States^ excepting batteries called by their captain's or by some other special name. These are indexed under Batteries. Aldie Gap, Va., 58, 63, 71, 147 Alexandria, 51, 56, 72, 74, 76, 96, 147, 152-156, 159, 160, 162- 164, 194, 197 Allan, Colonel William, 197-199, 203 Anandale, lo9-163 Anderson, G. T., 50, 198 Anderson, General R. H., 112, 119, 133, 136, 137, 139, 198, 203 Antietam, 170, 197 Appendix A, 173-177 ; B, 178-180 ; C, 181-189; D, 190-192; E, 193-199 ; F, 200-203 ; G, 204, 205 Aquia Creek, 151-153, 161 Archer, General J. L., at Cedar Mountain, 24 et seq. Armistead, 198 Army of Northern Virginia: its leaders and character, 33 et seq. Army of the Potomac : its compo- sition, 35-130, 146; size of, 147, 151, 168-170, 191, 196 10— IV. Army of Virginia : its strength and composition, 3, 4 Augur, General C. C. : commands the second division of the Second Corps, A. V. , 3 ; at the battle of Cedar Mountain, 23 et seq. ; is wounded there, 28, 193 Bald Hill, 133, 138, 140, 145 Banks, General N. P. : assigned to the Department of the Shenan- doah, 2 ; retreats before Jack- son, 2 ; his corps in the Army of Virginia, 3 ; its strength and composition, 4, note ; his pre- vious history, 4 ; ordered to Little Washington, 5 ; ordered to Culpeper, 16, 17 ; his orders prior to Cedar Mountain, 20 et seq. ; strength of his corps and its composition, 22 ; fights the battle of Cedar Mountain, 22 et seq. ; retreats to the Rappa- hannock, 33 ; movements on 218 INDEX. the Rappahannock, 41 et seq. ; is ordered to provide for the trains in the movement to the rear, 61-73 ; at Bristoe on the 29th, 94, 98, 124, 193-195, 197 Barnes, General, 134 Barstov^, Major, 179 Bartow, General, 141 Batteries: Hazlitt's, 181, 182; Pelham's, 77; Rogers', 200 Bayard, General G. D. : commands a brigade of cavalry of the Army of Virginia, 4 ; his char- acter, 16 ; on the Rapidan, 16, 53, 171, 197 Baylor, Colonel, 143 Bealeton Station, Va. , 50, 53 Beck with, Colonel, 187 Bee, General, 141 Benning, General, 139, 202 Bethlehem Church, 74, 84, 93, 95 Blackburn's Ford, Va., 59, 64, 65, 66, 83 Bliicher, 165 Bohlen, General H., killed in ac- tion near Beverly Ford, 37 Boswell, Captain J. K., 44, note Branch, General L. O'B., at Cedar Mountain, 24 et seq., 149 Bristoe Station, Va., 50, 54, 55-57, 60, 61, 63, 65, 66, 74, 79, 81, 84, 94, 118, 155 Broad Run, 53, 54, 57 Buchanan, General, 140, 142 Buckland Mills, 53, 54, 66-68, 75, 179 Buford, General J. : commands a brigade of cavalry of the Army of Virginia, 4 ; his character, 16 ; on the Rapidan, 16, 17 ; ordered to ascertain the direc- tion of Jackson's march, 50 ; ' his indefatigable energy, 66, 67 ; his despatch to Rickett's and McDowell, 93, 94, 112, 115 Bull Run, Va., 58, 59, 62-66, 72- 75, 83-85, 87, 89, 90-92, ICO, 109, 110, 126 ; battle of, 129- 143, 144, 147, 162, 165, 167, 168, 179, 188, 196 Burling, Lieutenant-Colonel G. C, 66, note Burnside, General, 152 Butterfield, General D. : advises postponing march on 28th, 60 ; his brigade deployed across Dawkir.s' Branch, 93, 120, 121, 130, 134, 180 Campbell, General, 71 Carr, Colonel J. B. , 66, note Casey, General, 155 Casualties at Cedar Mountain, 30 ; at Gainesville, 77 ; at Grove- ton, 108 Catharpin Creek, 102 Catlett's Station, 54, 58, 74, 179 Cedar Mountain, battle of, 19 et seq., 55, 71, 98, 163, 194, 197, 198 Centre ville, Va., 57, 59, 65, 66, 71-75, 79, 80, 83-92, 93, 100, 130, 134, 141, 144, 146, 147, 153, 160, 162, 163, 165, 168, 169, 183, 187, 188 Chain Bridge, 163 Chancellorsville, Jackson's attack there. 111, 197 Chantilly, battle of, 144, 150, 151, 190 Chapman, General, 140 Chester Gap, 50 Chinn House, 133, 139 INDEX. 219, Connecticut, Battery of First, 155 Corse, Colonel M. D., 113, 200, 202 Cox, General, 51, 52, 155, 158, 162, 163 Crawford, General S. W. : com- mands a brigade in Williams' Division of Banks' Corps, 16 ; is ordered to Culpeper, 16; and thence to Cedar Mountain, 17 ; hicj famous charge in the battle of Cedar Mountain, 26 et seq. ; strength and loss of his brigade, 30 Culpeper, 179 Cunningham, Lieutenant-Colonel, Twenty -first Va., killed at Cedar Mountain, 26 Dawkins' Branch, 93, 97, 116, 120, 122, 124 Doubleday, General A., at the battle of Gainesville, 77, 78 Drayton, General, 119, 201-203 Early, General J. A. : at Cedar Mountain, 24 et seq. ; crosses the Rappahannock, 37 ; re- crosses the river, 42 ; report of, 55, 65, 107, 135, 149 Ewell, General R. S. : commands a division under Jackson, 8 ; at the battle of Cedar Mountain, 24 et seq. ; is attacked and de- feated by Hooker at Bristoe, 54, 55 ; is engaged with King's division at Gainesville, 76 ; and severely wounded, 77, 80, 88, 102, 107, 108, 111, 197, 135, 149 Evans, General N. G. : commands a brigade in Longstreet's com- mand, 112, 114, 117, 121, 129, 137, 139, 198, 203 Fairfax Court House, 147, 148, 159, 170 Fayette ville, Va., 50, 52, 54 Featherston, General, 119, 137, 198, 203 Field, General C. L. : at Cedar Mountain, 24 et seq. ; is severe- I ly wounded at Groveton, 108 Forno, Colonel : at Cedar Moun- tain, 24 et seq., 65 ; is severe- ly wounded at Groveton, 108 Fortress Monroe, 151 Franklin, General : his division sent to McCleilan, 2 ; com- mands the Sixth Corps, A. P., 36, 51, 91, 144, 147-149, 151- 165, 167, 168 Fremont, General J. C. : assigned to the Department of West Virginia, 2 ; is superseded by Pope, and resigns, 4, 193 Fry, Captain, 201 Front Royal, 194 Gaines' Mills, 146 Gainesville, Va., 51-57, 61-64, 67, 68, 70-73, 75 ; battle of, 78, 79, 81, 84-86, 89, 92-95, 97, 99, 100, 112, 113, 114, 115, 118, 155, 178, 179, 185, 190, 200 Garnett, Lieutenant-Colonel T. S.: at Cedar Mountain, 24 et seq. ; is wounded there, 26 Geary, General : at Cedar Moun- tain, 22 et seq. ; is wounded there, 28, 194 Georgia, Regiments of : First, 110 ; Seventh, 119; Eighth, 119; 220 INDEX. Ninth, 119; Eleventh, 119; Twelfth, 2? ; Twenty-first, 56 | Getty, Colonel, 180 \ Getty, General George W. : his es- j timate of the strength of ; Banks' Corps, 4, note 1 Gibbon, General J. : at the battle i of Gaiaesville, 77, 78, 83, 140 Gordon, General G. H.: at Cedar Mountain, 22 ; his share in the battle, 28, 29; strength and losses of his brigade, 30, 196, 198 Greene, General George S., at Ce- dar Mountain, 23 et seq., 193 Greenwich, 52, 54, 56, 61 Gregg, General M., at the battle of Groveton, 107, 149 Griffin, General, 3, 134, 181, 184, 188 Grover, General C, his famous : charge at the battle of Grove- , ton, 1C6, 135 j Groveton, Va., 71, 74, 84, 93, 100; I battle of, 102, 103, 107-109, 124, 126, 130, 131, 133, 137, 182, 187, 190 Gum Spring, Va., 71 Halleck, General H. W.: called to the chief command of the army, 7 ; his character and previous services, 7 ; decides to remove the Army of the Po- tomac from the Peninsula, 11 ; his reasons, 11 et seq. ; his correspondence with McClel- lan, 15, 16 ; directs Pope to stand firm on the Rappahan- nock, 35, 50, 109, 130, 143, 145-147, 151 ; incapacity of, ' 152-164, 166, 170, 171 ^ Hartsuff, General G. L., at Rap^ pahannock Station, 36 Hatch, General John P.: ordered to seize Gordonsville, 8 ; at the battle of Gainesville, 77 ; com- mands King's division at the battle of Groveton, and is se- verely engaged, 107, 108, 129, 133, 134 ; wounded, 135, 136 ; wounded, 143 Haupt, General H., engaged in transporting troops to the front, 51, note Haven, Captain, 179 Hayes, President, 180 Haymarket, Va., 58, 67, 68, 114, 131-133, 135 Haynes, Captain C. L., Twenty- seventh Virginia : his account of Cedar Mountain, 27, note Hays, General, 108, 149 Hazlitt, Captain, 181, 182 Heintzeiman, General S. P. : com- mands the Third Cori3s, A. P., 36 ; arrives from the Peninsu- la, 47 ; strength of his corps, 47 ; his character, 47, 48 ; his niovements near Warrenton, 50 et seq. ; his corps ordered to Centreville, 72 ; and thence toward Groveton, 84 ; is or- dered, if ' ' heavil}' pressed by superior numbers,'' not " to push matters further," 88; his part in the battle of Groveton, 104 et seq., ISl ; his position in battle, 133, 130, 1 38, 148 ; bears the brunt of battle, 150-152, 159, 180; his diary, 182 ; his corps, 194-1C6 Henry House Hill, 133, 138, 140, 141 INDEX. 221 Herbert, Major, 201 Hill, Gerxcral A. P. : is sent from Kichmond to join Jackson, 8, 9 ; strength and composition of his division at Cedar Moun- tain, 24 ; his share in the bat- tle, 27 et seq. ; arrives at Bris- toe Station, 50, 51 ; retreats to Centre ville and Bull Run bat- tle-field, 59, 65, notes ; his position at the battle of Groveton ; is attacked by Kearny and Stevens, but re- pulses them, 106, 107 ; at the battle of Chantilly, 149, 197 Hood, General J. B. : at the battle of Groveton, 107 ; commands a division in Longstreet's com- mand, 112 ; time of his arrival on the field, 114, 115, 117, 121. 1:29, 137, 139, 198 Hooker, General J. : commands a division in Heintzelman's corps, 47 ; his character. 48 ; defeats Ewell at Bristoe Sta- tion, 54, 55 ; ordered to Centre- ville, 72 ; his part in the battle of Groveton, 104 et seq. ; gal- lant charge of, 106, 133, 135, 194 Hopewell Gap, 68, 113, 114 Horton, Colonel Chas. P., 194 Hotchkiss, Colonel, 197 Hunton, Colonel, 200 Indiana, Regiment of : Twenty- seventh, 29 Jackson, General T. J. (Stone- wall) : his raid in the Valley, 2, 3; joins Lee, 3 ; sent to Gor- donsville with two divisions, 8 ; is joined by A. P. Hill, 8 ; his total strength, 9 ; advances from Gordonsville, 17, 18 ; fights the battle of Cedar Mountain, 19 et seq. ; retreats to the Rapidan, 31 ; his char- acter and previous services, 34 ; advances to the Rappahan- nock, 36 ; movements on the Rappahannock, 37 et seq. ; his great raid in rear of our army, 44, 45, 50, 51, 56 et seq. ; re- tires to the battlefield of Bull Run, 59, 65 ; advances upon Sigel, 73 ; fights the battle of Gainesville, 75 et seq.; fights the battle of Groveton, 102 et seq. ; comments on his course, 110, 111, 113, 117, 119, 122, 123, 127 ; joined by Longstreet's force, 129-131, 133-138, 142, 146-149, 170 ; number of guns he claims having captured, 190, 1 91 ; strength of his com- mand, 197, 198 James River, 146 Jenkins, Colonel, 118, 119, 193, 200, 203 Johnson, Colonel B. T. : encoun- ters Reynolds' division on the 28th, 70, 71, 75, 111, 135 Joint Order. — See McDowell, Por- ter Jones, General D. R. : commands a division in Longstreet's com- mand, 112 ; arrives on the field of Groveton, 113 ; time of his arrival and his position, 113 et seq., 121, 137, 139, 198, 200, 202, 203 Kane, Colonel, 141 222 INDEX. Kearny, General P. : commands a division inHeintzelman's corps 47 ; his character, 48 ; is or- dered to Greenwich, 52; thence to Bristoe, 55 ; to Centreville, 66, 72 ; thence toward Grove- ton, 83 ; arrives on the field, 104 ; his furious attack on A. P. Hill, 106, 107 ; his position in battle of Manassas, 133, 135 ; killed in the front of the bat- tle of Chantilly, 150, 194 Kelly's Ford, 50, 53 Kemper, General J. L. , commands a division in Longstreet's command, 112 ; time of his arrival on the field of Grove- ton, 113, note; 114, 115, 117- 119, 121, 122,137, 178, 200, 2C2, 203 Kettle Run Bridge, 74 Keyes, General E. D., commands the Fourth Corps, A. P., 151 King, General Ruf us : commands the First Division of the Third Corps, A. v., and its strength, 4 ; his division at Fredericks- burg, 5 ; breaks up the rail- road, 8 ; joins the main army on the 11th of August, 31 ; his movements on the Rappahan- nock, 42 et seq. ; is ordered upon Manassas, 68 et seq, ; brings up the rear of the corps, 75 ; his division at the battle of Gainesville, 75 et seq. ; re- treats to Manassas, 80 et seq. ; his health fails, 82, 85-88, 92, 93, 95, 97, 98, 101 ; severe ill- ness of, 107, 120, 121, 131,133, 134, 136, 138, 151, 182, 183, 185, 187 Koltes, Colonel, John A. , 138 ; fall of, 139, 142, 205 Krzyanowski, Colonel W., 139, 204 Lane, General J.H., his account of Cedar Mountain, 27, note, 149 Law, Colonel E. M., at the battle of Groveton, 107, 108, 137 Lawton, General A. R., commands E well's division at the battle of Groveton, 102, 107, 197 Layne, Major, Second Virginia, mortally wounded at Cedar* Mountain, 26 Lee, General Fitz Hugh, 198 Lee, General R. E. : his operations on the Peninsula, 3 ; sends Jackson to Gordonsville, 8 ; determines to move against Pope, 32 ; strength of his army, 32 ; forces Pope to fall back to the Rappahannock, 33 ; his character and previous ser- vices, 33, 34 ; advances to the Rappahannock, 36 ; operations on that river, 36 et seq. ; de- termines on sending Jackson in our rear, 43, 44 ; arrives with Longstreet's command on the 29th, 112 ; report of, 113, 115, 118-122, 124, 130; takes ad- vantage of our mistake, 133, 134 ; his capture in battle of Manassas, 142 ; losses of his army, 144, 146 ; pushes on after the victory, 147 ; crosses the Rappahannock, 169, 190, 197- 199 Leski, Captain, 179 Lincoln, President : his orders to McClellan disregarded, 1 ; de- tains McDowell's corps, 1 ; INDEX. 223 creates new departments, 2 ; | assigns Pope to command of \ the corps of Fremont, Banks, and McDowell, 5 ; he asks for news from Manassas, 160 ; his correspondence with McClel- lan, 161-163, 166 Little River Turnpike, T.?, 147, 149, 170 Lloyd, 67 Locke, Colonel, 187 Longstreet, General J.: ordered from Richmond to the Rapi- dan, 32 ; strength of his com- mand, 32 ; his character and services, 34 ; advances to the Rappahannock, 36 ; move- ments on the Rappahannock, 37 et seq. ; follows Jackson, and encounters Buford at White Plains, 67 ; is delayed by Ricketts at Thoroughfare Gap, 6S ; arrives on the bat- tle-field of Groveton, 112 ; time of his arrival and of his taking position, 113 et seq. ; report of, 117-121, 123; at Manassas, 129 et seq. ; ordered to reinforce Jackson, 134, 135 ; his description of the charge, 137, 138, 142, 147, 148, note, 150,167, 170, 178, 179; num- ber of guns he claims having captured, 190, 191 ; strength of his division, 198, 199, 203 McCall, General, his division sent to McClellan, 3 McClellan, General George B. : distrust of him by the Admin- istration, 1, 2, 6 ; loses the battle of Gaines' Mill, and re- treats to the James, 6, 7 ; causes of the distrust felt in him, 11 et seq. ; the removal of his army from the Penin- sula, 11 et seq., 146 ; vindica- tion of, 15L-154, 155-159; re- port to Lincoln, 160 ; letters from, 161, 162-164, 166, 167, 171, 196, 197 McDowell, General Irvin : detach- ed from the Army of the Po- tomac, 2 ; hi^ corps in the Army of Virginia, 3 ; its strength and composition, 4 ; his previous services, 4, 5 ; his movements on the Rappahan- nock, 31 et seq.; orders Buford to follow Jackson, 50 ; marches upon Buckland Mills and Gainesville, 53, 54 ; is ordered upon Manassas, 61 ; takes measures to hold Thorough- fare Gap, 67 et seq. ; moves upon Manassas, 69 ; receives the joint order, 89 et seq. ; situation of his corps and Por- ter's, 93 ; he takes his corps up the Sudley Springs Road, 95 et seq. ; arrives on the field, 107 ; and becomes engaged with Hood and Law, 107, 120- 126, 128, 131 ; perceives our mistake, 136, 138, 140, 141; statement before Court of In- quiry, 178-180, 182-186, 193- 196 McGowan, General S., retires from Manassas, 65 McLean, Colonel N. C, 138, 142, 204 Mahone, General, 198 Maine, regiment of : Tenth, 28, 29 224 INDEX. Manassas, Va., 50-57, 59-67, 69- 73, 75, 76, 78, 79, 81, 84, 85, 88, 93, 95, 109, 111, 113-115, 117-119; battle of, 129-144, 146, 147, 149, 152, 154-160, 162, 182, 183, 190, 191. 200, 203 Maps: August 28th, 8 a.m., 67; August 28th, 6 P.M., 77; Au- gust 29th, 12 M., 116 ; August 30, 132; field of Chantilly, 148 Marshall, Colonel Charles, 115 Marshall, Colonel E. G., 181, 184, 202 Marshall, Colonel L. H., of Pope's staff, gives Banks an order from Pope before Cedar Mountain, 20 Massachusetts, regiments of : First, 1C6 ; second, 29, 197 ; Eleventh, 106 ; Twelfth, 139 ; Sixteenth, 1C6 Meade, General G. G. : commands a brigade in Keynolds' Divi- sion, 47 ; commands the army at Gettysburg, 47, 138, 143, 169 Meadowville Lane, 120 Mexico, 140 Milroy, General R. H. : commands an independent brigade in the First Corps, A.V., 3 ; at the battle of Groveton, 102 et seq. Molino del Rey, 140 Monroe, Fort. — See Fort Monroe Monteith, General, 180 Morell, General G. W. : commands a division in Porter's corps, 47 ; his character, 48, 50, 53, 60, 61, 93, 130, 134, 135, 138, 167, 180, 181-187, 202 Myer, General, 180 New Baltimore, Ya., 70 New Hampshire, Regiment of: Second, 106 New Jersey Brigade unsuccess- fully attacks Manassas Junc- tion, 57 j Newmarket, 84, 96 New York, Regiment of: Thir- teenth, 184, 202 North CaroHna, Regiment of : Twenty-first, 56 OXHILL, 148 Palmer, Major, 201 Patrick, General, 78 Pelham, Major J., at the battle of Gainesville, 177 Pelouze, Major L. H., of Banks' staff, writes down Pope's order to Banks, before Cedar Moun- tain, 20, note Pender, General W. D., at Cedar Mountain, 24 et seq. Pennsylvania, Regiments of : Twelfth Cavalry, 155 ; Twen- ty-sixth, 106 Piatt, Captain J. H., 85, note Piatt, General A. S., commands a brigade in Sturgis' division, 47, note ; 93, 188, 195 Pickett, General, 119, 198, 200, 203 Pony Mountain, 194 Pope, General John : appointed to the command of the Army of Yirginia, 1, 3 ; his previous services, 4 ; concentrates his army, 5 ; sends on expedition against Gordon svilie, 6 ; issues an address to his army, and INDEX. 225 orders as to the treatment of the non-combatant population in Virginia, 9 et seq. ; ad- vances toward Culpeper, 16 et seq. ; his orders to General Banks before Cedar Mountain, 20 et seq. ; battle of Cedar Mountain, 22 et seq. ; advances to the Rapidan, 31 ; falls back to the Rappahannock, 32, 33 ; operations on the Rappahan- nock, 36 et seq.; learns of Jackson's raid, 53 ; orders the army to move on Gainesville, 53 ; action at Bristoe Station, 51; orders the army to move on Manassas, 61 et seq.; move- ments on the 28th, 65 et seq. ; battle of Gainesville, 75 et seq. ; orders Kearny to attack Jack- son, 83 ; his orders to Heintz- elman, Reno, and Porter on the 29th, 84 et seq.; precau- tionary order to Heintzelman, Reno, and Sigel, 88, 89 ; joint order to McDowell and Porter, 89 et seq. ; fights the battle of Groveton, 102 et seq.; his ex- pectations of support from McDowell and Porter, 105 ; his estimate of the losses on both sides, 108 ; his dispatch after the battle, 109 ; his exaggera- ted estimate of his success, 110 ; his order to Porter, 127 ; his misconception of the ene- my's force, 129 et seq.; his special order, 131 ; his defeat ' at Bull Run, 141 ; dispatch of, 145 ; injustice toward, 146 ; end of his campaign, 150, 151, 157-165 ; reflections on, 166, 10* 167 ; his address to his army, 173 ; his orders, 174-177, 179, 182, 187, 190-197, 199, 204 Porter, General F. J. : commands the Fifth Corps, A. P., 36; arrives from the Peninsula, 47 ; strength and composition of his command, 47 ; his char- acter, 48 ; ordered to march from Warrenton Junction to Bristoe at 1 a.m. of 28th, 60; his marching at 3 a.m., 60 and Appendix ; is not ordered to Manassas, 78 ; is ordered to Centreville, 84 ; and to Gaines- ville, 85, 86 ; the joint order, 89 et seq. ; arrives at Dawkins' Branch, 93 ; consultation with McDowell, 93 et seq. ; their understanding with each other, 96 et seq. ; remains at Daw- kin's Branch, 101, 104 ; at bat- tle of Groveton, 105, 109, 110, 114, 118-122, 124; acts under joint order, 125 ; misconstruc- tion of dispatch of, 126 ; Pope's order to, 127-131, 133-136, 151, 152, 166, 167, 178 ; completely exonerated, 180 ; orders of, 181-189, 194-197, 202, 203 Pratt, General, 195 Prince, General H. : at Cedar Mountain, 22 et seq. ; is taken prisoner there, 28 Pryor, General, 119, 137, 198, 203 Rapidan, 146, 169 Rappahannock, 111, 146, 151, ICS, 169, 171, 191, 194 Reno, General J. L. : arrives from North Carolina with two divi- sions of Burnside's (Ninth) 226 IISDEX. corps, 31 ; his character, 31 ; operations on the Rappahan- nock, 33 et seq. ; ordered to Warrenton and Gainesville, 52 ; to Greenwich, 54 ; to Manassas, 61 ; to Centreville, 66 ; toward Gainesville, 84, 86; precautionary order to him, 88, 91, 92 ; arrives on the field of Groveton, 104, 132, 136 ; with- stands Jackson's advance at battle of Manassas, 138, 148 ; brunt of battle of Chantiily borne by his troops, 150 ; sent to join Pope, 159, 194, 195 Reynolds, General J. F. : com- mands the Pennsylvania Re- serves, 35 ; arrives on the 23d from Aquia Creek, 41 ; strength of his division, 41-^ his charac- ter, 47; is killed at Gettys- burg, 47 ; his movements near Warrenton, 49 et seq. ; is or- dered to Manassas, 69 ; en- counters B. T. Johnson's brigade, 69, 70 ; he refuses to retire from Groveton, 82 ; at the battle of Groveton, 102 et seq., 103, 105, 108, 111, 121, 124, 127, 128, 131, 133, 135, 136, 138, 142, 151, 187, 194, 195 Richmond, Va., 146, 198 Ricketts, General James B. : com- mands the Second Division of the Fifth Corps, A. V., and its strength, 4; his divi- sion at Manassas Junction, 5 ; is ordered to Waterloo Bridge, 5 ; is ordered to Culpeper and beyond it, 16, 17 ; his move- ments on the Rappahannock, 42 et seq. ; is ordered to Gaines- ville, 53 ; is sent to Thorough- fare Gap, and there checks Longstreet's advance, 68 ; re- tires from the Gap, and re- treats to Bristoe, 68 et seq. ; this movement considered, 81, 82 ; marches back to the turn- pike, 95, 98, 107, 110, 121, 131, 183 ; withdraws a large p-art of his command from battle of Manassas, 135, 136 ; part of his division sent for, 138, 139, 178-180, 185, 187 Roberts, General B. S., of Pope's staff: at Cedar Mountain, 20, 21 ; selects a position for the corps, 22 ; gives an unauthor- ized order to Sigel, 46 Robertson, General B. H. : near Beverly Ford, 36 ; arrives on the field of Groveton, 115 ; and locates the position of D. R. Jones' division, 115, 116, 118; opinion of, respecting Porter, 124 Rogers, Captain, 200 Ronald, Colonel C. A., at Cedar Mountain, 24 et seq. Rosser, Colonel T. L., at Beverly Ford, 36, 120 Ruggles, Colonel George D., 84, 131, 174-177 Salem, 51, 56, 67 Schenck, General R. C, com- mands the First Division of the First Corps, A. V., 3, 54 ; at the battle of Groveton, 102 et seq., 121 ; severely wound- ed, 138, 143 Schimmelpfennig, General A., at INDEX. 227 the battle of Groveton, 104, 141, 204 Schofield, General J. M., his esti- mate of the strength of Banks' corps, 4, note ; 180 Schriver, Colonel, 179 Schurz, General C. : commands the Third Division of the First Corps, A. V., 3, 54 ; at the battle of Groveton, 103 et seq. ; sent to the aid of Mc- Lean in battle of Manassas, 138 ; withdraws in direction of Ball Run, 140, 141 ; Third Division of Federal Army under him, 204 Seymour, General, 138 Shenandoah, Valley of the, 175 Shields, General James, his divi- sion transferred to McDowelFs command, 2 Sigel, General F. : numbv^rs and composition of his corps, 3 ; his previous services, 4 ; or- dered to Sperryville, 5 ; his corps needs reorganization, 6 ; ordered to Calpeper, 17 ; op- erations on the Rappahan- nock, 37 et seq. ; his experi- ence at Waterloo Bridge, 46, 47 ; is ordered to Gainesville, and seizes Buckland Mills, 53 ; is ordered to Manassas, 68 ; his wagons, 69 ; is ordered to Centreville, 72 ; encounters Jackson's forces, 73 ; is or- dered to attack on the morn- ing of the 29th, 85 ; but not to push matters if heavily pressed, 88; at the battle of Groveton, 102 et seq., 104, 132, 136 ; occupies and holds Bald Hill, 138, 141 ; his wagons, 178-179, 182, 183, 194, 195, 204 Simpson, Captain, 201 Slaughter Mountain, or Cedar Mountain, 18 South Mountain, 170 Stafford, Colonel L. A. : at Cedar Mountain, 24 et seq. ; at the battle of Gainesville, 177 Stahel, General J. H., at the bat- tle of Groveton, 103 et seq., 138, 204 Stanton, Edwin M., Secretary of War, McClellan's correspond- ence with him, 2, 12, 106 Starke, General W. E., commands Jackson's division at the bat- tle of Groveton, 102 Stevens, General 1. 1. : commands a division of Reno's command, 31 ; his character, 31, 61 ; at the battle of Groveton, 104; attacks A. P. Hill there, 106 ; killed, 150 Stone Bridge, 140 Stuart, General J. E. B. : his Ad- jutant-General captured, 33 ; notice of him, 34 ; on the Rap- pahannock, 36 ; his raid on Catlett's Station, 42 ; attacks Manassas Junction, 56, 57, 117; report of, 118-121 Sturgis, General S. D. : expected by Pope, 51, 52 ; Piatt's bri« gade of his division, 47, note ; 51, 52, 188, 189 Sudley Ford, 147, 148 Sudley Mill, 102 Sudley Springs, 59, 65, 74, 80, 81, 84, 95, 96, 99, 101, 102, 120, 121, 126, 133, 137 Sulphur Springs, 49, 50, 169, 194 228 INDEX. Sumner, General E. V., commands the Second Corps. A. P., eS6, 91, 144, 147, 148, 149, 151, 153, 157, 159, 161-164, 167, 168, 1C6 Sykes, General G. : commands a division in Porter's corps, 47 ; his character, 48 ; commands the Fifth Corps at Gettysburg, 48, 50, 53 ; urges Porter to de- lay marching till 3 a.m. of the 28th, 60, 61, 93, 136, 138, 140, 180, 184, 188, 189 Taliaferro, Colonel A. G., at Cedar Mountain, 24 et seq. Taliaferro, General W. B. : at Cedar Mountain, 24 et seq. ; his division engaged at Gaines- ville, and his account of the battle, 76 ; is wounded there, 77, 78, 80, 102, 111 Taylor, Colonel Walter H. , 197, 199 Taylor, General G. W. : gallantly and unsuccessfully attacks Manassas Junction, and is killed, 57 ; brigade of, 154, 155 Terry, General Alfred H. : his estimate of the strength of Banks' corps, 4, note, 180 Thomas, General E. C, at Cedar Mountain, 24 et seq. Thoroughfare Gap, 50, 51, 53, 56, 58, 59, 63, 67, 68, 73, 79, 80, 81, 83, 85, 86, 91, 112-114, 160, 178, 179, 200 Toombs, General, 119, 198, 202, 203 Tower, General, 138; severely wounded, 139, 142, 143 Trimble, General L E,. : at Cedar Mountain, 24 et seq. ; captures Manassas Junction, 56 etseq.-, severely wounded at Groveton, 108, 149 Tyler, General, 155, 158, 163 Union Mills, 183 Vessel House, 202 Virginia, Regiments of : Seventh, 201; Thirteenth, 27; Seven- teenth, 201 ; Twenty-first, 26 ; Twenty-fourth, 200, 201 ; Twenty-seventh, 27 ; Thirty- first, 27 ; Forty-second, 26 ; Fifty - second, 27 ; Fifty- eighth, 27 ; First Battalion, 26 Walker, Colonel J. A., Thir- teenth Virginia, at Cedar Mountain, 27 Warren, General G. K., 136, 138, 184 Warrenton Junction, Va., 60, 52, 54, 55, 58, 60 Warrenton Pike, 63, 72, 80, 86, 89, 90, 96, 105, 131, 132, 135, 149, 178 Warrenton, Va., 49-54, 70, 83, 178, 179 Washington, D. C, 73, 78, 144, 150, 152, 153, 155, 156, 159-162, 164, 166 Washington, Va., 51 Waterloo, Battle of, 165 Waterloo Bridge, 49, 50, 169 Webster, Colonel Fletcher, 139 Wellington, Duke of, 165 I White Plains, 51, 56, 62, 67 I White, Thomas, 197, 199 Whiting, General, 137, 198 INDEX. Wilcox, General CM., commands a Division in Longstreet's com- mand, 112; arrives on the field of Groveton, 113 et seq. ; report of, 117-122, 137 ; report of, 141, 198,203 Williams, C. W., 114, 115 Williams, General A. S., com- mands the First Division of the Second Corps, A. V. , 3 ; at the battle of Cedar Moun- tain, 22 et seq., 205 229 Winder, General C. S. : commands Jackson's Division, A. N. V., 8, 24 ; is killed at the battle of Cedar Mountain, 24 Wisconsin regiment : Third, 29 Wright, 190 YoRKTOWN, Va., 155 Young's Branch, 141 MESSRS. CH:\RLES SCRIBNER'S SONS have much pleasure in announcing that an undertaking which they have had in progress for several years is now completed ; and that they have begun the publication of a work which they believe will prove the most important of recent contributions to American History. Under the general title of THE they will issue a series of volumes, contributed at their soli- ciation by a number of leading actors in and students of the great conflict of 1 86 1 -'65, with a view to bringing together, for the first time, a full and authoritative military history of the suppression of the Rebellion. The final and exhaustive form of this great narrative, in which every doubt shall be settled and every detail covered, may be a possibility only of the futm-e. But it is a matter for surprise that twenty years after the beginning of the Rebellion, and when a whole generation has grown up needing such knowledge, there is no authority which is at the same time of the highest rank, intelligible and trustworthy, and to which a reader can turn for any general view of the field — for a strong, vivid, concise but truly proportioned story of the great salient events. The many reports, regimental histories, memoirs, and other materi- als of value for special passages, require, for their intelligent reading, an ability to combine and proportion them which tlie ordinary reader does not possess. There have been no attempts at general histories which have supplied this satisfactorily to any large part of the public. Undoubtedly there has been no such narrative as would be especially welcome to men of the new generation, and would be valued by a very great class of readers;— and there has seemed to be great danger that Campaigns of the the time would be allowed to pass when it would be possible to give to such a work the vividness and accuracy that come from personal recollection. These facts led to the conception of the present work. Its possi- bility depended first of all on the consent of the circle of authors to whom, only, the publishers could look to carry it out worthily : — but the cordial reception which the suggestion at once received from them and from all others consulted, speedily removed all doubt upon this subject. From every department of the Government, from the officers of the army, and from a great number of custodians of records and special information everywhere, both authors and publishers have received every aid that could be asked in this undertaking ; and it announcing the issue of the work the publishers take this occasion to convey the thanks which the authors have had individual opportunities to express elsewhere. The volumes of the series will be duodecimos of about 250 pages each, illustrated by maps and plans prepared under the direction of the authors. They will appear, as far as possible, in the chronological order of the Campaigns of which they treat ; and by their preliminary and concluding chapters will be so far connected that the completed work will practically cover the entire field of the war. The price of each volume will be $1.00. The following volumes are now ready, or far advanced in preparation, and will appear at short intervals : I.— THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. By John G. NiCOLAY, Esq., Private Secretary to President Lincoln; late Consul-General to France, etc. A preliminary vokime, describing the opening of the war, and covering the period from the election of Lincoln to the end of the first Battle of Bull Run. II. — FROM FORT HENRY TO CORINTH. By the Hon. M. F. Force, Justice of the Superior Court, Cincinnati ; late Brigadier- General and Bvt. Maj. Gen'l, U.S.V., commanding First Division, 17th Corps: in 1862, Lieut. Colonel of the 20th Ohio, commanding the regiment at Shiloh ; Treasurer of the Society of the Army of the Tennessee. The narrative of events in the West from the Summer of 1861 to May, 1862 ; covering the capture of Fts. Henry and Donelson, the Battle of Shiloh, etc., etc. III. — THE PENINSULA. By Alexander S. Webb, LL.D., President of the College of the City of New York ; Assistant Chief of Artillery, Army of the Potomac, 1S61-62; Inspector General Fifth Army Corps; General Commanding 2d Div., 2d Corps ; Major-General Assigned, and Chief of Staff, Army of the Potomac. The history of McClellan's Peninsula Campaign, from his appointment to the end of the Seven Days' Fight. IV. — THE ARMY UNDER POPE. By John C. Ropes, Esq., of the Military Society of Massachusetts, the Massa- chusetts Historical Society, etc. From the appointment of Pope to command the Army of Virginia, to the appoint- ment of McClellan to the general command in September, 1862. v.— THE ANTIETAM AND FREDERICKSBURG. By Francis Winthrop Palfrey, late Colonel 20th Mass. In- fantry, and Bvt. Brigadier GenU U.S.V. ; Lieut. Col. of the 20th Massachusetts at the battle of the Antietam ; Member of Military Society of Massachusetts, of the Massachusetts His- torical Society, etc. From the appointment of McClellan to the general command, Sept. 1862, to the end of the Battle of Fredericksburg. VI.— CHANCELLORSVILLE AND GETTYSBURG. By Abner Doubleday, Bvt. Maj. Gen'l, U.S.A.; and late Major Gen'l, U.S. v.; commanding the First Corps at Gettysburg, etc. From the appointment of Hooker, through the campaigns of Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, to the retreat of Lee after the latter battle. VII.— THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. By Henry M. Cist, Brevet Brig Genl U S.V.; A.A.G. on the staff of Major Gen'l Rosecrans, and afterward on that of Major GenU Thomas, Corresponding Secretary of the Society of the Army of the Cumberland. From the formation of the Army of the Cumberland to the end of the battles at Chattanooga, November, 1863. IX. — THE CAMPAIGN OF ATLANTA. By the lion. Jacob D. Cox, Ex-Governor of Ohio ; late Secretary of the Interior of the United States; Major General U. S.V. , com- manding Twenty- thnd Corps during the campaigns of Atlanta and the Carolinas, etc., etc. From Sherman's first advance into Georgia in May, 1864, to' the beginning of the ^Slarch to the Sea. X. — THE MARCH TO THE SEA— FRANKLIN AND NASHVILLE. By the Hon. Jacob D. Cox. From the beeinning of the ?^Iarch to the Sea to the Surrender of Johnston — including also the operations of Thomas in Tennessee. XI. — THE CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT IN VIRGINIA. By Andrew A. Humphreys, Brigadier General and Bvt. Major-General, U.S.A.; late Chief of Engineers; Chief of Staff, Army of the Potomac, i863-'64; commanding Second Corps, i864-'65, etc., etc. Ccvering the Virginia Campaigns of 1S64 and '65, to Lee's surrender. VIII.— THE MISSISSIPPI, and one other volume, completing the series, are in course of preparation, and their contents and authors will be announced in a short time. The above hooks for sale by all booksellers, or luill be sent^ post-paid^ upon receipt of price by CHARLES SCRIBXER'S SONS, 743 AND 745 Broadway, New York.