'N 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE 
 
 DEFENCELESS STATE 
 
 OF 
 
 GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 By SIR FRANCIS B. HEAD. Bart. 
 
 For oft, though Wisdom wake, Suspicion sleeps 
 At Wisdom’s gate, and to Simplicitj^ 
 
 Resigns her charge, while Goodness thinks no ill 
 
 Where no ill seems. 
 
 Milton. Book III. 
 
 SECOND EDITION . 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET. 
 
 1850 . 
 
PRINTED BY W. CLOWES AND SONS, STAMFORD STREET. 
 
THAT HALF OF OUR COMMUNITY 
 
 WHOM IT IS OUR HAPPINESS TO REGARD, 
 
 OUR DUTY TO DEFEND, 
 
 AND WHO, 
 
 UNDER THE BLESSING OF AN ALMIGHTY POWER, 
 
 HAVE, AS YET, ONLY READ OF WAR, 
 
 THIS VOLUME, 
 
 MAKING KNOWN 
 
 THEIR PRESENT UNPROTECTED CONDITION, 
 
 is 
 
 FAITHFULLY DEDICATED AND INSCRIBED 
 
 BY 
 
 THE WRITER. 
 
Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 in 2019 with funding from 
 University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
 
 https://archive.org/details/defencelessstateOOhead 
 
( v ) 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 -— - 
 
 PART I. 
 
 Chapter I. 
 
 Page 
 
 Striking contrast between young France and old England — 
 Ruinous military expenses of the one — Fatal insecurity 
 of the other — The British nation averse to the cost of 
 security — Reasons why no minister can venture to pro¬ 
 pose it — Difficulty of explaining the necessity — The 
 writer’s reasons for attempting to do so — Mode in 
 which his investigation will be conducted.1 
 
 Chapter II. 
 
 Descriptive sketch of the French Army — Of the Austrian 
 Army — The Prussian Army — The Russian Army . 10 
 
 Chapter III. 
 
 The Belgian Army — Its “ Cadres ”— Field Exercise — 
 Reviews — Arsenal. 
 
 a 3 
 
 31 
 
VI 
 
 CONTENTS.' 
 
 Chapter IV. 
 
 Page 
 
 Strength of the British Army — The British Soldier — De¬ 
 scriptive sketch of the duties of the various departments 
 of the Army — Commissariat — Engineer department 
 — Artillery — The staff of an army — Infantry and 
 cavalry — Lamentable results in Spain and Portugal 
 from the Army’s inexperience in field-discipline — Pre¬ 
 sent condition of the Army — Comparative ages of 
 the officers in the French and British services — Future 
 consequences of the British Army being debarred by the 
 nation from military education.35 
 
 Chapter V. 
 
 Hereditary aversion of the British people to any description 
 of protection designated unconstitutional—Description 
 of the progressive effects of discipline — Creates confi¬ 
 dence—Description of young soldiers first coming into 
 action — Consequences of over-excitement — Duke of 
 Wellington’s sage opinions thereon — Gradually become 
 subject to self-control—Men totally undisciplined worth¬ 
 less in war — Their courage valueless — Their confusion 
 increases with their numbers — Fallacy of relying for 
 national defence on such a power—Comparative value of 
 semi-organised bodies—Duke of Wellington’s opinions of 
 the inestimable value of old soldiers—His descriptions of 
 their conduct in the field—On the proclamation of peace, 
 impatience of the nation to rid itself of its Army—Many 
 of the pensions of our veterans commuted—Their miser¬ 
 able condition in our colonies—Their death by hunger, 
 want of clothing, and cold—Reflections .88 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 Yll 
 
 PART II. 
 
 Chapter I. 
 
 Page 
 
 Man the only animal that voluntarily goes to sea — De¬ 
 scription of a British Sailor — His successes in the late 
 War — His calm courage — Jack’s belief that an Eng¬ 
 lish Admiral is not permitted to strike his flag — Na¬ 
 tional belief that we must always conquer at sea a 
 fallacy — Exposition thereof — Description of the in¬ 
 fancy, growth, and progress of War — Reflections . . 119 
 
 Chapter II. 
 
 Description of the British system of Naval Warfare during 
 the last War — Close quarters the policy and practice of 
 Nelson — Description of yard-arm action — Its success 
 —The Americans carefully study the British system, 
 and remedy its defects.130 
 
 Chapter III. 
 
 Description of Nelson’s system of Gunnery — French and 
 British equally ignorant of the art — Illustration of the 
 extraordinary errors committed — Americans invoke the 
 aid of Science — Build larger Ships — Arm them with 
 longer and heavier Guns — Man them with British 
 Sailors — Their success — The British nation smarts 
 under the consequences — But as soon as peace was 
 obtained forget the causes — Maintain the defective 
 system under an erroneous idea of “ economy ”... 140 
 
Vlll 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 CnAPTER IV. 
 
 Page 
 
 The successes of the American Navy create a deep impres¬ 
 sion in Europe —• France especially determines to adopt 
 the successful system — Descriptive sketch of the new 
 system of Gunnery as recommended by Sir Howard 
 Douglas — Alteration in the armament of Guns — 
 Oddities in shot — Simplification of Wads — Strange 
 anecdote concerning them — Horizontal shell-firing — 
 Shells, percussion and concussion — The havoc they 
 create, even to those who use them — Sanguinary 
 effects they will probably produce in the next War — 
 Powder — Fuses — Tubes — Musket, Pistol, and Sword 
 Exercise — Action — Keflections.154 
 
 Chapter V. 
 
 Extraordinary contrast between the French and British 
 methods of manning their Navy — Admirable arrange¬ 
 ments of the French —• Description of the English 
 system of Impressment — Improvidence in turning off 
 Able Seamen as fast as they become valuable — The 
 American system — The practice of Impressment incon¬ 
 sistent with the Abolition of Slavery — Seamen must 
 now be also trained Gunners — This subject explained 
 — The nation in a fearful predicament — Impressment 
 no longer practicable —• By voluntary enlistment a suf¬ 
 ficiency of Seamen cannot be obtained — England the 
 only country in the world that has neglected to organ¬ 
 ize her maritime population — In consequence thereof 
 the nation is unable, in a moment of emergency, to 
 man her men-of-war in ordinary — Keflections . . . 180 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 IX 
 
 PART III. 
 
 Introductory Chapter. 
 
 Pjge 
 
 TJnpopularity of the investigation — Various classes by 
 whom it will be condemned—Mode in which it is pro¬ 
 posed to be conducted.215 
 
 Chapter II. 
 
 Division of the subject into past and present — Ab¬ 
 stract of Alison’s History of the threatened Invasion 
 of England by the French in 1797 — Preparations then 
 made— Napoleon abandons the design — In 1801 Napo¬ 
 leon again makes preparations — Great Britain makes 
 most powerful preparations for self-defence — Conduct 
 of the King — Of the Prince of Wales — Of both Houses 
 of Parliament — In 1803 Napoleon combines a flotilla 
 of Praams — Patriotic exertions of the British Parlia¬ 
 ment — and British people — Napoleon’s object to 
 obtain for a few davs command of the Channel — His 
 
 V 
 
 secret deep-laid project — Suspected by Collingwood — 
 Defeated by Sir R. Calder — Napoleon in rage and dis¬ 
 appointment breaks up his army at Boulogne .... 219 
 
 Chapter III. 
 
 Comparison between the present moral power of the French 
 and British nations — Reasons why the “ morale ” of 
 the French Army has increased, while that of the 
 British people has diminished, since 1803 — Evidence 
 thereof — Comparison between the present physical 
 
X 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 power of the French and British nations Sketch 
 showing the Dr. and Cr. results of the Power of Steam 
 in account with Great Britain — The invention on the 
 whole highly in favour of England — Sketch showing, 
 per contra, that the power of steam has removed the 
 uncertainties attendant upon sailing-vessels — That 
 combinations for invasion which could not before have 
 been effected, are now practicable and certain — That 
 steam has thus levelled the outworks of the defences 
 of England — That out of the profits of the invention 
 Great Britain must therefore strengthen her citadel — 
 Absolute necessity of a standing Army — Popular abhor¬ 
 rence of such protection — Inconsistent with the caution 
 that characterizes the nation — Enormous amount of 
 property insured in Great Britain from fire — From 
 other results — Accidental Death Insurance Company . 240 
 
 Chapter IV. 
 
 ON THE COMPARATIVE STRENGTH OF THE NAVAL FORCES OF 
 FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 The wealth of Great Britain creates the power of maintain¬ 
 ing a larger fleet than any other nation on the globe — 
 Evidence showing that the exercise of this power has 
 been neglected — Injudicious expenditure — Evident 
 cause thereof — The confidence reposed in the Navy based 
 on the notion that it is always ready at hand to prevent 
 invasion — Obvious fallacy of this opinion—The colo¬ 
 nial empire of Great Britain requires the protection of 
 Naval power — The impossibility of its pervading the 
 ocean and protecting the British Channel at the same 
 time — Popular illustration of this truth — Beflections . 279 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 XI 
 
 Chapter V. 
 
 ON THE COMPARATIVE STRENGTH OF THE MILITARY FORCES OF 
 FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 Enormous amount of the French army — British army 
 inadequate even to defend our colonies — Duke of Wel¬ 
 lington’s opinion of the perilous condition of the nation 
 —His opinion disregarded—Strange inconsistency—Dis¬ 
 tinguished qualifications and character of Major-General 
 Sir John Burgoyne, the nation’s chief engineer—Incon¬ 
 sistency in rejecting his professional opinion also —Words 
 of warning from old naval and military officers—offered 
 
 in vain 
 
 294 
 
Xll 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 PART IV. 
 
 Chapter I. 
 
 ON THE CAFTITRE OF LONDON RY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 Page 
 
 Descriptive sketch of the animated exertions of combined 
 naval and military forces adequate for the defence of 
 Great Britain—Lamentable contrast — Awful results— 
 
 Two fearful alternatives considered—London declared 
 indefensible—Advance of the French army—Investment 
 and capture of London.317 
 
 Chapter II. 
 
 French general proclaims parliamentary reform and redress of 
 all popular grievances — Mode of feeding his troops — 
 Skilful “ Commissaires ”— Orders to the press — Treat¬ 
 ment of refractory editors — Contributions levied from 
 the inhabitants—Concessions demanded from the British 
 people — Dreadful effects of the sudden annihilation of 
 credit—Possibility of internal riots, robbery, and rapine 339 
 
 Chapter III. 
 
 Difference between uncivilised and civilised warfare—Mercy 
 shown in the latter—Exceptions to the rule—In taking 
 a fortress by storm —Other instances — Usual conduct 
 of an invading army — Where revenge and insult are 
 desired as well as conquest, the consequences are most 
 lamentable — Reasons why these injuries are usually 
 concealed.353 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 Xlll 
 
 Chapter IV. 
 
 DISCREDITABLE POSITION OF GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 Page 
 
 The nations of the continent of Europe all perceive the 
 defenceless state of England—Strange speeches of lead¬ 
 ing members of the House of Commons boasting of the 
 nation’s excessive power—The inevitable result—Peace 
 meetings on the Continent likely to prove highly bene¬ 
 ficial— In the meanwhile Great Britain ought not to 
 remain unprotected—Glaring inconsistency in England’s 
 conquests by war, and her present inability to defend 
 herself by arras .363 
 
 Chapter V. 
 
 REMEDY. 
 
 Beneficial results of continued appeals from the friends of 
 peace to the inhabitants of the military nations of 
 Europe — In the meanwhile the British people must 
 protect themselves from the horrors of invasion, just as 
 they protect their houses from fire, their vessels from 
 storms, their persons from rain, their property from the 
 swell-mob — Peaceful and economical results of this 
 policy — Amount of military and naval force necessary 
 to attain these great blessings—Estimated cost thereof— 
 Short effectual plan showing how to obtain the money . 370 
 
 Appendix. 
 
XIV 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 Page 
 
 I.—The Duke of Wellington’s attention to details— 
 
 “ The Little Kettle Question ”.393 
 
 II.—The Duke’s warning, in 1811, of the disposition of 
 the French to invade England, and of the con¬ 
 sequences .396 
 
 III. —Present amount of military stores in France . . . 397 
 
 IV. —Capital invested in the transit trade of Great Britain 398 
 
 V.—Measures adopted by the Netherlands for the forma¬ 
 tion of a thorough system of national defence . 400 
 
 VI. —Admiral Sir Charles Napier’s letter, corroborative of 
 
 the defenceless condition of the British peojDle . 401 
 
 VII. —Mode in which the Landwehr or militia forces of the 
 
 Continent are constituted.408 
 
 The Sketch to face Chajp, V., p. 294. 
 
PART I. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
THE 
 
 DEFENCELESS STATE 
 
 OF 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Striking contrast between young France and old England — 
 Ruinous military expenses of the one — Fatal insecurity of the 
 other — The British nation averse to the cost of security — 
 Reasons why no Minister can venture to propose it — Difficulty 
 of explaining the necessity — The writer’s reasons for attempt¬ 
 ing to do so — Mode in which his investigation will be 
 conducted. 
 
 Although there is nothing more fascinating in 
 nature than the guileless simplicity, the unsus¬ 
 pecting confidence of a child, yet it is the pain¬ 
 ful, the thankless, and almost the revolting duty 
 of a faithful guardian deliberately to sully this 
 purity, by admixing with instinctive good that 
 salutary knowledge of evil without which—just 
 as the moth flies into the flame that consumes 
 
 B 
 
2 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 it—the youth of both sexes are liable, solely 
 from their innocence, to be ruined. 
 
 As regards individuals, age, by accumu¬ 
 lating experience, acquires caution. “ What! ” 
 said a young Spanish monarch to his aged 
 general, “ do you advise this from fear 1 ” 
 “ No—Sire!” was the calm, dignified reply, 
 “ es precauciON.” And yet, while every mem¬ 
 ber of a community thus daily becomes more 
 anxious to guard himself from any description 
 of evil, a nation, in proportion as it increases in 
 wealth and luxury, usually reverts to the un¬ 
 suspecting confidence of its childhood ; in short, 
 like the traveller in the fable, the sunshine of 
 prosperity almost invariably induces it to cast 
 aside—as a useless encumbrance'—the cloak of 
 protection. 
 
 This apparent anomaly is strikingly illus¬ 
 trated by the contrast which, at the present 
 moment, is exhibited between France and the 
 British people. 
 
 It is well known to our commercial men that 
 the financial state of “ la jeune France” not 
 only rests on an unsound basis, but that its 
 
 RBC 
 
 NcU 
 
Chap. I. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 3 
 
 escape from a second bankruptcy is mainly to 
 be attributed to the temporary success of a well- 
 timed action upon the currency, by an issue by 
 the Bank of France, in small notes, of a hundred 
 millions of francs, which, coming during a season 
 of perfect tranquillity both at home and abroad, 
 has fortunately caused no run upon the bank 
 for specie, and has therefore appeared to the 
 Parisians an actual creation of wealth to the 
 extent of the increase of circulation ; and yet, 
 while it is undeniable that a political or com¬ 
 mercial panic would cause this hectic flush to 
 fade, this inflation suddenly to collapse, the 
 burdens of France, as compared with those of 
 Great Britain, are enormous. For instance, 
 including all the expenses of our immense 
 colonial empire, the average annual expenditure 
 for purposes of government of old England is 
 19<s. 4 d. per head on a home population of thirty 
 millions; while young France, with scarcely any 
 colony except Algeria, pays 31s. per head for 
 the same purpose! 
 
 With little foreign commerce to protect, she 
 also maintains a standing army of 408,000 men, 
 
 b 2 
 
t 
 
 4 MILITARY WARFARE. Part I. 
 
 exclusive of a numerous and expensive national 
 guard. 
 
 Again, while the civil administration of the 
 French republic, solely supported by an unqua¬ 
 lified system of patronage, expends annually 
 308,000,000 of francs (say 12,078,431/. sterling) 
 among 598,000 employes, four-fifths of whom 
 are under the Ministers of the Interior and 
 Finance, England in the same departments 
 expends only 2,786,000/. per annum among 
 235,000 persons! 
 
 It is evident, therefore, that, independent of 
 the tax upon time and of personal liberty caused 
 by an indiscriminate conscription of the national 
 guard (the burden of which in a commercial 
 country no figures can adequately represent), 
 the provinces of France are drained to maintain, 
 besides regular troops, an immense citizen army, 
 supplying patronage and wealth to Paris; and 
 thus, with hypertrophy at the heart, the ex¬ 
 tremities are paralyzed. 
 
 Now while France, the elasticity of whose 
 resources in time of peace is truly astonishing, 
 by the unnecessary maintenance of enormous 
 
Chap. I. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 5 
 
 military forces is thus deliberately cutting her 
 own throat with her own sword, Great Britain, 
 by a diametrically opposite process of suicide, is 
 jeopardising her existence in the scale of na¬ 
 tions, and her enormous wealth, by trusting for 
 defence to an empty scabbard; in fact, there 
 cannot in nature exist a more extraordinary con¬ 
 trast than between the exaggerated length of 
 the sword of France in proportion to that of its 
 purse, and the tiny means which England pos¬ 
 sesses to protect her home-population and vast 
 property from the horrors of invasion ! 
 
 The one country, with nothing in its pocket, 
 is to be seen armed to the teeth; the other, 
 with a protuberance of wealth which attracts 
 the attention of the world, is absolutely tooth¬ 
 less ! 
 
 And yet how truly estimable are the senti¬ 
 ments of the British nation! In what other 
 region of the globe can, among any class of 
 people, be found so strong a sense of justice—so 
 anxious a desire to offend no one—so earnest a 
 wish for peace—such steady application to busi¬ 
 ness—so much patient industry—so much gene- 
 
6 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part 1. 
 
 rosity in prosperity—so much patient resignation 
 under adversity ? 
 
 But while the nation, animated by the senti¬ 
 ments we have described, has been indulging in 
 the placid belief that its disinclination for war 
 would ensure peace, and that, even if it unhap¬ 
 pily failed, its past victories would ensure future 
 protection,—several naval and military officers of 
 considerable experience—among them the Duke 
 of Wellington—have in books, pamphlets, and 
 letters declared the defences of Great Britain to 
 be totally inadequate to its defence ! 
 
 In any other country but England such cor¬ 
 roborating opinions would instantly have been 
 deemed worthy of investigation, but our states¬ 
 men of all politics had two insuperable difficulties 
 to contend with,— 
 
 1st They were perfectly sensible that, as they 
 did not understand the subject, it would be 
 extremely hazardous for them to undertake to 
 explain it; and— 
 
 2nd. That even if by great application they 
 could succeed in doing so, the whole nation was 
 so totally unacquainted with even the rudiments 
 
Chap. I. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 7 
 
 of the art of protecting a great empire, that as 
 it would be practically impossible to obtain the 
 remedy proposed—namely, money—the less said 
 about the disease the better. 
 
 It need hardly be remarked that there exists 
 nothing in these reasons sufficient to induce the 
 officers of the navy and army to alter the opin¬ 
 ions they had respectively expressed. They, how¬ 
 ever, very properly did not feel disposed to repeat 
 them excepting in private society, where, without 
 reservation, they continue to maintain them. 
 
 But there, the difficulty they encounter, even 
 among their own friends, proceeds from the fact 
 that in the great question they have to argue 
 there exist two holes, only one of which they are 
 each respectively able to stop. 
 
 For instance, if a soldier officer indisputably 
 proves that the British army is inadequate to 
 resist the invasion of the French, instead of 
 conquering his antagonist, he is invariably de¬ 
 feated by the remark, “ Oh, yes! hut tell me, 
 what would our NAVY he about ? ” 
 
 On the other hand, if a naval officer triumph¬ 
 antly, as he thinks, demonstrates that we have 
 
8 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 not force enough in the Channel to prevent 
 invasion—his opponent adroitly escapes by say¬ 
 ing, “ In the name of the British AI1MY, I 
 should just like to see 'em come ! ” 
 
 Now it really appears—as indeed it has 
 hitherto proved--to be almost hopeless and 
 impossible for any individual to attract the good 
 sense and sober attention of the country to the 
 consideration of two separate slippery subjects, 
 each of which is unpalatable and unpopular. 
 
 The stake, however, at issue is so enormous; 
 —all that we venerate, love, esteem, and value 
 are so inextricably involved in it;—it so clearly 
 affects not only the welfare of the British 
 people, but the political, moral, and commercial 
 relations of the whole globe, that we have de¬ 
 termined to undertake the task. 
 
 With this object in view, we propose, by a 
 series of unconnected sketches, to divide our 
 subject into the five following sections:— 
 
 1. Military warfare. 
 
 2. Naval warfare. 
 
 3. The invasion of England by a French 
 army. 
 
Chap. I. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 9 
 
 4. The capture of London by a French 
 army. 
 
 5. Reflections thereon. 
 
 The two first of these sections will no doubt 
 attract the criticism of the twin professions to 
 which they relate. The whole of them are 
 submitted to the calm judgment of a people 
 who of their own accord will make whatever 
 allowance they may deem to be due to the 
 difficulty of an attempt to elucidate in light 
 popular language a subject of the gravest im¬ 
 portance. 
 
10 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 SKETCH OF THE PRINCIPAL MILITARY FORCES OF 
 
 EUROPE. 
 
 Descriptive sketch of the French Army — Of the Austrian 
 Army — The Prussian Army — The Russian Army. 
 
 The French Army is composed of— 
 
 Regular troops:— 
 
 Men. 
 
 Staff ..... 
 
 3,826 
 
 Cavalry .... 
 
 58,932 
 
 Infantry, &c. 
 
 301,224 
 
 Artillery .... 
 
 30,166 
 
 Engineers .... 
 
 8,727 
 
 Pontoon Train, &c. 
 
 5,755 
 
 Total . 
 
 408,630 
 
 Garde Nationale :— 
 
 
 82 battalions of 1500 men . 
 
 123,000 
 
 2378 ditto 1000 men. 
 
 2,378,000 
 
 
 2,501,000 
 
 Of whom 2,000,000 are armed 
 
 
 with firelocks. 
 
 
 To the above are to be added :— 
 
 
 Garde Rationale of Paris 
 
 129,800 
 
 Total . 
 
 2,630,800 
 
Chap. II. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 11 
 
 From the latter total there might be formed 
 about 300 battalions of retired soldiers, perfectly 
 capable of joining the army as regular troops. 
 
 “ The Garde Nationale ” of France, instituted 
 “to maintain order and obedience to the laws; 
 to support the army in defence of the frontier 
 and coasts; to maintain the independence of 
 France and the integrity of its territory,” is 
 composed, with certain exceptions, of all French¬ 
 men from 20 to 60 years of age, formed in each 
 commune of 82 departments into companies, 
 battalions, and legions. The cavalry into squa¬ 
 drons. Each battalion has its colours, sub- 
 officers, and corporals. The expenses of this 
 extraordinary force are voted, regulated, and 
 overlooked like all other municipal charges. 
 
 Instruction .—During the monarchy there were 
 annual encampments for the purpose of instruct¬ 
 ing the regular army in field operations and ma¬ 
 noeuvres. The ground chosen was usually in the 
 neighbourhood of Compiegne or St. Omer; the 
 ordinary force from 20,000 to 25,000 infantry, 
 in two divisions, to each of which were attached 
 
12 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I* 
 
 a brigade of 1000 cavalry and a battery of 
 12 guns. 
 
 These assemblages of troops remained in camp 
 three months, commencing in August, the infan¬ 
 try under tents and the cavalry cantoned in the 
 adjacent villages. The tirst two months were 
 employed in a series of manoeuvres approved of 
 by the Staff, executed first by the troops of each 
 arm separately, and afterwards by the whole united 
 force. The last month, after the harvest had 
 been got in, was devoted to strategetic war 
 movements of attack and defence, according to 
 the features of the country. 
 
 In 1843 the Government ordered the for¬ 
 mation of four camps, at Villette, Charenton, 
 Homainville, and Ivry, in addition to which, for 
 the permanent reunion of a corps of cavalry, 
 barracks for 30 squadrons were constructed at 
 Lunenville, at which place the mounted regiments 
 in the neighbourhood assembled every year about 
 the end of April, when, under a General-in¬ 
 chief, they were formed into two divisions, to each 
 of which was attached a battery of light artillery. 
 During six months the whole of these troops were 
 
Chap. IT. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 13 
 
 exercised in grand cavalry manoeuvres, on ground 
 selected for that purpose, and during the last 
 week of their assemblage they performed cam¬ 
 paign movements. 
 
 Since the revolution of 1848, although these 
 encampments and assemblages of troops have 
 been superseded by the formation of corps 
 d’armee, required for the maintenance of tran¬ 
 quillity, as also to meet such political contingen¬ 
 cies as might arise from the disturbed state of 
 Europe, large bodies of men are occasionally 
 congregated to carry on such military exercises 
 and evolutions as may be deemed necessary for 
 their instruction. For each corps d’armee there 
 is nominated every year by the Government an 
 Inspector-General, authorised to review the 
 troops under his orders, each regiment being 
 inspected separately. The principal points to 
 which the attention of this officer is directed 
 are the discipline, instruction, clothing, ac¬ 
 counts, and promotion either for merit or long 
 service. The inspections commence July 1st, 
 and the reports must be sent to the Minister of 
 War by the 1st of December. 
 
14 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 Garrisons .—Under the Bourbons the gar¬ 
 risons of Paris and Versailles in 1830 were 
 composed of— 
 
 Garrison of Paris :— ^ eu ‘ 
 
 Household troops . . 1,000 
 
 Garde Royale, Infantry . 12,000 
 
 Ditto Cavalry . 1,440 
 
 Ditto Artillery . 1,600 
 
 Line, 4 regime ts, Infantry . 7,200 
 
 Total . . . 23,240 
 
 Garrison of Versailles :— 
 
 Household troops . . 1,000 
 
 Garde Royale, Infantry . 2,400 
 
 Ditto Cavalry . 1,440 
 
 Total . . . 4,840 
 
 In 1837 the Garrison of Paris was 
 
 augmented to 31,800 
 
 That of Versailles to . . 14,600 
 
 Between 1843 and 1848 the Gar¬ 
 rison of Paris was augmented 
 
 to.41,400 
 
 That of Versailles reduced to . 4,200 
 
 Since 1849 the army of Paris, half of which 
 is quartered in the capital and the other half in 
 
Chap. II. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 15 
 
 Versailles, and within a circle of five leagues, has 
 been composed of 11 brigades (of which two are 
 cavalry) formed into two divisions. This force, 
 under the command of General Changarnier, 
 comprehends 60 battalions of infantry, contain¬ 
 ing altogether 60,000 men, and 10 regiments of 
 cavalry, or 50 squadrons, amounting to 6000 
 horses. To the different regiments are attached 
 artillery, consisting of 20 batteries, of 120 guns, 
 besides which there are the reserve of the Ecole 
 Militaire, the Chateau of Vincennes, and the 
 siege artillery for arming the forts surrounding 
 Paris, of which about one-third are mounted in 
 battery, and the remaining two-thirds in the 
 arsenal at Bourge. To this imposing army of 
 about 80,000 men may be added the Garde 
 Nationale of Paris, composed of sixteen legions, 
 containing 128,000 infantry and 1800 cavalry—■ 
 total 129,800 ; besides which the chemins de fer 
 du Nord et de Bourge could within one day 
 transport to the army of Paris an augmentation 
 of 20,000 infantry with a numerous artillery, and 
 in a few days the army of the Alps might, leav¬ 
 ing a sufficient garrison in Lyons, also supply 
 
16 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 the capital with a reinforcement of 25,000 men ; 
 and thus could quickly be congregated under 
 experienced generals a body of, say 125,000 
 disciplined and well-appointed troops, perfect in 
 the art of war, ready to suppress domestic insur¬ 
 rection, or to join very many thousands more for 
 any foreign enterprise. 
 
 The Austrian Army 
 
 In time of war is composed of— 
 
 Men. 
 
 Infantry, 324 battalions . 
 
 489,240 
 
 Cavalry, 306 squadrons . 
 
 54,560 
 
 Artillery ..... 
 
 26,104 
 
 Engineers, Staff, Marines, &c. 
 
 56,549 
 
 Grand total 
 
 626,453 
 
 Peace total of the Austrian army 378,552 1 
 
 In addition to the above, the Landwehr, 
 forming the reserve of the regular army, is com¬ 
 posed of a force sufficient, whenever required, to 
 
 1 The Austrian army at the present moment is deficient of its 
 usual force by the temporary disbanding of 100,000 Hungarians, 
 who have not yet been re-organized. 
 
Chap. II. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 17 
 
 augment the regiments of infantry from 3 
 battalions (their number in time of peace) to 5. 
 
 Instruction .—Previous to 1848 three or four 
 divisions of the Austrian army were at irregular 
 periods of three or four years assembled together 
 in Gratz, Styria, or in Bohemia, for the purpose 
 of military manoeuvres. This course of instruction 
 lasted about a month, of which the first part was 
 occupied in brigade movements and the latter in 
 campaign evolutions, carried on in accordance 
 with the strategetic features of the country. Since 
 1848 the Austrian army has had much better 
 practice than can be afforded by camps of exer¬ 
 cise. The troops, all placed on the war estab¬ 
 lishment, are now formed into great corps, viz., 
 in Italy, Hungary, and Bohemia. Of these 
 three armies the two first are each composed of 
 upwards of 100,000 men, that of Bohemia of 
 about 60,000. 
 
 Up to the period of the war with Hungary the 
 strength of the Imperial army was about 450,000 
 men, of which there was furnished by Hungary 
 a force of about 150,000 men, consisting of 15 
 
18 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 regiments of infantry, 12 of hussars, and 13 of 
 frontier troops. The latter, composed principally 
 of Transylvanians, have almost all retained their 
 fidelity to the Emperor. 
 
 The troops of each of these armies, under the 
 command of their respective generals, have been 
 in the habit of assembling for field manoeuvres in 
 brigades and divisions, to each of which there 
 has been attached an adequate proportion of 
 artillery. 
 
 Garrisons .—The garrison of Vienna, pre¬ 
 
 vious to 1848, consisted of— 
 
 Men. 
 
 2 Regiments of Infantry . . 3,784 
 
 5 Battalions of Grenadiers . . 4,625 
 
 6 Squadrons of Cavalry of the Line 730 
 
 8 ditto Hussars and Lancers . . 1,313 
 
 1 Regiment of Artillery . . 3,720 
 
 1 Brigade of Artillerie de Place . 480 
 
 Total . . . 14,652 
 
 The above garrison, at present on the war 
 establishment, amounts to from 18,000 to 20,000 
 men, which by railroads to Bohemia now in ope¬ 
 ration might in a few days be quadrupled. 
 
Chap. II. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 19 
 
 The Prussian Army. 
 
 The devastation, destruction of property, and 
 heavy exactions which Prussia suffered while 
 under the dominion of the French have been 
 productive of extraordinary self-defensive ar¬ 
 rangements on the part of the nation to 
 prevent the recurrence of such calamities. 
 Every Prussian male subject, without exception, 
 from the King’s son downwards, is obliged 
 to serve, in time of war, from the age of 
 18 to 24, in time of peace, between the ages 
 of 20 and 25, for 3 years, in the army; after 
 which all men between 25 and 32, trained as 
 above, belong to the Landwehr of the 1st class, 
 and during that time are liable to be summoned 
 annually for drill for 14 days. In case of war 
 the Landwehr of this class are at once sum¬ 
 moned to serve in the regular army, in or out 
 of the kingdom, as required. 
 
 The Landwehr of the 2nd class, composed of 
 all men trained as soldiers between the ages of 
 32 and 39, also assemble during war to garrison 
 the fortresses. 
 
20 MILITARY WARFARE. Part 1. 
 
 All men from 40 upwards, as long as they 
 are capable of bearing arms, belong to the 
 Landsturm, and are only required to serve on 
 great emergency. 
 
 By the above arrangements the whole nation 
 —imbued with military enthusiasm as well as 
 knowledge at an age when such impressions can 
 never subsequently be effaced—is, at compara¬ 
 tively speaking a very small cost, converted into a 
 disciplined army, ready at a moment’s warning 
 to rise en masse in defence of their fatherland, 
 or for any other great national object. 
 
 The Prussian army may therefore truly be 
 said to consist of the whole male population 
 capable of bearing arms. Its total force in time 
 of war, including the 1st and 2nd Landwehr 
 bans and the reserve, is— 
 
 Infantry ..... 
 
 Men. 
 
 265,530 
 
 Cavalry ..... 
 
 49,662 
 
 Artillery ..... 
 
 23,400 
 
 Engineers ..... 
 
 4,800 
 
 Officers, Staff, Gendarmes, &c. 
 
 36,000 
 
 Total 
 
 379,392 
 
Chap. IT. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 21 
 
 To the above would be added, in 
 case of an invasion of Prussia, or 
 an offensive war beyond its limits, 
 
 the Landsturm, composed of— Men. 
 
 142 battalions of Infantry . 142,284 
 
 56 squadrons of Cavalry . 5,600 
 
 Artillery 1 16,000 
 
 Engineers, 12 companies. . 3,400 
 
 167,284 
 
 Grand total of Regular army . 546,676 
 
 Number of Guns . . . 1,163 
 
 Besides which there would remain 100,000 
 Landsturm capable of garrisoning fortified posts. 
 
 Its present force is 
 
 Men. 
 
 222,416 
 
 Landwehr force:— 
 
 142 battalions of Infantry 
 
 142,284 
 
 51 squadrons of Cavalry 
 
 5 600 
 
 Artillery 1 
 
 16,000 
 
 Engineers, 12 companies 
 
 3,400 
 
 Total 
 
 167,284 
 
 Total of Regular army and 
 
 Landwehr force . 
 
 389,700 
 
 Number of Guns . 
 
 982 
 
 1 The Prussian Landwehr artillery have no guns of their 
 
 own. 
 
22 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Pakt I. 
 
 Instruction .-—The regular army of Prussia 
 is formed into nine grand corps, including 
 that of the guards; each corps contains two 
 divisions, each division two brigades, namely, 
 one of infantry, composed of two regiments 
 of 3021 men each; the other of two regi¬ 
 ments of cavalry, of 800 men each. To 
 each division there is, moreover, attached 
 a battalion of artillery of 120 guns, with en¬ 
 gineers, pioneers, &c., in proportion: as also 
 one regiment of reserve infantry, one bat¬ 
 talion of combined reserve infantry, and one 
 division or company of riflemen. The regiments 
 are reviewed annually, but at uncertain periods; 
 and the whole of the Prussian cavalry is an¬ 
 nually inspected by General Wrangen. 
 
 Previous to the late disturbances it was the 
 practice in Prussia for contiguous garrisons to 
 assemble every year for brigade and divisional 
 manoeuvres; and at irregular periods, but 
 usually every third year, a corps d’armee, 
 of two or more divisions, was congregated for 
 manoeuvres on a larger scale. The different 
 regiments were warned in March or April, but 
 
Chap. IL MILITARY WARFARE. 23 
 
 did not march into camp till September. The 
 Minister of War fixed the locality of these 
 manoeuvres, which were always varied according 
 to the features of the country, of which, if no 
 plans existed, the staff officers of the division 
 were ordered accurately to survey and map the 
 ground. For the purpose of practically teach¬ 
 ing the army the exigencies of war, the troops 
 were kept for a month in bivouac. In the en¬ 
 campments near Berlin or Cologne there were 
 usually about 40,000 men of all arms. Previous, 
 however, to 1848, besides the field instruction 
 above described, the army of the German Con¬ 
 federation, of which Prussia forms a part, was in 
 the habit of forming for the purpose of manoeuvres 
 a camp, composed of one or two corps d’armee; 
 and with the view of drawing together more 
 closely the bonds of union which united the 
 combined forces of the Confederation, the troops 
 of one kingdom were occasionally inspected by 
 the generals of another: for instance, the Bava¬ 
 rian army was inspected by Austrian generals. 
 The troops manoeuvred as on real service, under 
 regulations which, to avoid quarrels or collisions 
 
24 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 among the troops, prescribed how near they 
 might approach each other,—when a corps 
 might advance,—and when it must return. 
 
 Garrisons .—Previous to 1848 the garrison 
 of Berlin, amounting to about 16,000 men, was 
 composed of— 
 
 2 Regiments of the Guards. 
 
 1 Battalion of Landwehr Guard. 
 
 2 Ditto ditto Line. 
 
 3 Squadrons Body Guard. 
 
 4 
 
 Ditto 
 
 Cuirassiers of the Guard. 
 
 4 
 
 Ditto 
 
 Dragoons 
 
 ditto. 
 
 4 
 
 Ditto 
 
 Lancers 
 
 ditto. 
 
 4 
 
 Ditto 
 
 Eclaireurs 
 
 ditto. 
 
 Artillery of the Guard, 12 battalions. 
 
 At present there is in garrison at Berlin a force 
 of 20,000 men, which on a war establishment 
 could be augmented to 36,000. 
 
 The garrison of Potsdam is nearly equal to 
 that of Berlin. 
 
Chap. II. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 25 
 
 The Army of Russia, 
 
 Or rather, the military forces of that vast em¬ 
 pire, are composed of— 
 
 Regular troops:— 
 Cavalry 
 Infantry 
 Artillery 
 Cossacks 
 
 Men. 
 
 950,000 
 
 The regular troops and Cossacks are divided 
 into— 
 
 1st, three active armies; 
 
 2nd, corps d’arme'e at fixed stations ; 
 
 3rd, corps beyond the circuits of those stations. 
 
 4th, grand corps of reserve. 
 
 One of these active armies—that of the Vis¬ 
 tula, whose head-quarters are at Warsaw—is 
 composed of an effective force of 180,000 
 infantry, 30,000 cavalry, and 350 guns. 
 
 In second line there is another army, whose 
 head-quarters are at Keef, composed of 200,000 
 infantry, 36,000 cavalry, and 400 guns. 
 
 c 
 
26 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 In rear is the third army, head-quarters St. 
 Petersburg, composed of 88,000 infantry, in¬ 
 cluding the guards and the corps of grenadiers, 
 19,000 cavalry, and 270 guns—making a total 
 in the three lines of— 
 
 Infantry ..... 468,000 
 
 Cavalry ..... 85,000 
 
 Guns ...... 1,020 
 
 To which are to be added :— 
 
 Cossacks .... 20,000 
 
 The troops at fixed stations, and which do not 
 belong to either of the three armies, are—Fin¬ 
 land corps, of about 10,000 infantry, 350 ca¬ 
 valry, and 36 guns. At Arenbourg 15,000 
 men. In Siberia 15,000 men. In Circassia, &c., 
 36,000 infantry, 3000 cavalry, 108 guns, and 
 10,000 Cossacks. 
 
 Instruction .—In ordinary times, for the pur¬ 
 pose of instructing this vast army in its field 
 duties, manoeuvres are carried on by regiments 
 and divisions, each of the former being regularly 
 reviewed once a-year; but in the event of a 
 journey by the Emperor, or of a concentration 
 
Chap. II. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 27 
 
 of troops being required by political events, there 
 are formed, on an extended scale, camps for 
 grand manoeuvres, which are always commanded 
 by his Majesty in person. 
 
 The garrison of St. Petersburg usually amounts 
 to 58,000 men, composed entirely of guards and 
 corps of grenadiers. 
 
 The foregoing statements faintly show the 
 exertions which the great military nations of the 
 continent of Europe, as a matter of economy , 
 very sedulously take to make their costly armies 
 efficient in the science and practice of war, and 
 thus to be applicable to the purposes for which 
 they were raised. It would be beyond our 
 limits to attempt to describe in detail or to 
 enumerate the various operations which even 
 we ourselves have witnessed. The following, 
 however, are a few of the advantages they 
 offer. 
 
 The troops of the various branches of the ser¬ 
 vice, after having learned to handle with dexterity 
 
28 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 their respective weapons,—to be steady in their 
 regimental drills,—and orderly in barracks (be it 
 OBSERVED THAT THE EDUCATION OF THE BRITISH 
 SOLDIER, BY THE WORD OF COMMAND OF THE 
 
 nation, halts here),— they are in these great 
 encampments next instructed, not only in the 
 art of living in cantonments, en bivouac, under 
 canvas, or billeted on the inhabitants, but, what 
 is infinitely more valuable, in that high moral 
 discipline and self-control necessary to enable 
 young troops, under such circumstances, to resist 
 those temptations to plunder and rapine which 
 gipsy-life always offers. While the artillery and 
 pontoon train are learning how to transport their 
 guns and boats across rough country, ravines, 
 streams, &c.—while the cavalry are learning to 
 swim their horses,—with other accomplishments 
 equally useful on active service,—the infantry are 
 practised in making fascines, gabions, &c., and 
 in rapidly throwing up field-works of various sorts, 
 the defensive advantages of which they are made 
 clearly to understand. Indeed, at Metz — the 
 great French artillery and engineer school of prac¬ 
 tice—there are frequently mock sieges lasting six 
 
Chap. II. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 29 
 
 weeks or two months, at which 12,000 troops, 1000 
 sappers, &c., go through all the forms and works of 
 a siege up to storming the breach. But Marshal 
 Saxe, in his 4 Military Maxims/ truly says that 
 “ The art of making war successful depends not so 
 much on the use of the arms as of the legs of 
 soldiers.” Accordingly, in the great continental 
 encampments, officers and soldiers of every ser¬ 
 vice not only as in real war are practised for 
 several weeks in field-of-battle manoeuvres by 
 evolutions and movements on a large scale (in 
 which all ranks take the deepest interest, and 
 which, forming invariably the general topic of 
 conversation, are subjected to severe criticism), 
 but they learn in the field the far more import¬ 
 ant acquirements necessary for moving large 
 masses of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, many 
 miles across a country, as also simultaneously by 
 its roads, so as to reach given points at given 
 times with the whole force, and in proper order, 
 a combination of arrangements always of con¬ 
 siderable difficulty, and which nothing but re¬ 
 peated 'practice can teach. In short, by these 
 and numberless other experimental exertions, the 
 
30 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 great armies of the Continent gradually become 
 provided not only with young skilful generals, 
 but with subordinate officers, non-commissioned 
 officers, and privates, all more or less instructed 
 in the higher branches of their profession, in the 
 utility of the evolutions and manoeuvres they are 
 required to perform, and, lastly, in the self-con¬ 
 trol necessary for living creditably en bivouac , 
 under canvas, or in billets. 
 
Ciiap. III. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 31 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 SKETCH OF THE SECOND AND THIRD RATE MILITARY 
 
 FORCES OF EUROPE. 
 
 The Belgian Army — Its Cadres — Field exercise — Reviews 
 
 — Arsenal. 
 
 The Belgian Army. 
 
 The system of the Belgian army is interest¬ 
 ing, not only because it shows the efforts which 
 a small quiet, agricultural, and manufacturing 
 kingdom, of a population of little more than 
 four millions, deems it prudent to make for self- 
 defence, but because it is nearly similar to the 
 sensible system pursued by all other second-rate 
 powers, such as Bavaria, Piedmont, Denmark, 
 Sweden, &c., namely, to maintain in time of 
 peace the “ Cadres,” or framework of all the 
 corps necessary in time of war. 
 
 “These Cadres,” exclaimed General Char- 
 zet, the Belgian Minister of War, in his speech 
 
32 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 in the Chamber of Representatives, on the 17th 
 of January, 1850, “are the riches, the 
 
 STRENGTH, THE SECURITY, THE HONOUR OF A 
 NATION, THE HEART AND SOUL OF AN ARMY ! ” 
 
 Belgium, during her late difference with Holland, 
 had an effective force of 112,000 men : at present 
 the “cadres” are for an army of 80,000 men; 
 they are composed of— 
 
 
 Men. 
 
 Infantry ..... 
 
 23,013 
 
 Cavalry ...... 
 
 4,634 
 
 Artillery, Engineers, Pontoon Train, 
 
 
 and Staff .... 
 
 6,704 
 
 Total .... 
 
 34,351 
 
 Reduced in winter to 
 
 28,440 
 
 As a proof of the efficiency and elasticity of 
 this system of “cadres,” it may be stated that on 
 the 24th February, 1848, the Belgian army 
 was about 30,000 men. In six days it was 
 increased to 60,000, the fortresses were armed, 
 repaired, and in a short time 160 cannon and 
 materials for a short campaign were collected. 
 
 The annual contingent of the army is 10,000 
 men, whose average duration of service is eighteen 
 
Chap. III. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 33 
 
 months. They are sent to the camps and exer¬ 
 cised. The old soldiers form the reserve, and 
 are ready to fill up the “cadres” at a moment’s 
 notice. 
 
 Besides the “cadres” of the regular army, 
 there is constituted in Belgium a garde civique, 
 “for the defence of the country, for the mainte¬ 
 nance of order and the lawf composed of all 
 men from the ages of 21 to 50, and forming a 
 grand total of 113,000 men, of whom 33,000 are 
 ready drilled, armed, and equipped. 
 
 Instruction. —The Belgian army is instructed 
 in manoeuvres and field exercise at the camps of 
 Beverloo and Bragschael, where many hundred 
 thousand cartridges and several thousand rounds 
 of ordnance are fired. In these reviews the King 
 takes himself the general direction, and appoints 
 two old soldiers who served under Napoleon in 
 his latter campaigns, the one to attack, the other 
 to defend. He also practises the assembling of 
 troops by railway, and, with a view to introduce 
 into every corps the study of the art of war, his 
 Majesty has also appointed several very distin- 
 
 c 3 
 
34 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 squished French and German officers to high 
 posts in the Belgian service. At Brussels and 
 elsewhere there are military schools of every 
 description, besides which, at each garrison there 
 is a course of evening lectures for the instruction 
 of the soldiers. 
 
 At the arsenal there is a foundry for cannon, 
 at which, since 1840, there have been cast for 
 different governments ordnance amounting in 
 price to 1,626,000,000 francs. In 1839, 3,000 
 stand of arms were made, and 3,600 old ones 
 changed to percussion. 
 
Chap. IV. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 35 
 
 CHAPTER IY. 
 
 SKETCH OF THE BRITISH ARMY. 
 
 Strength of the British Army — The British Soldier — Descrip¬ 
 tive sketch of the dirties of the various departments of the 
 Army — Commissariat — Engineer department — Artillery 
 — The Staff of an Army — Infantry and Cavalry — Lament¬ 
 able results in Spain and Portugal from the Army’s inexpe¬ 
 rience in field-discipline — Present condition of the Army — 
 Comparative Ages of the Officers in the French and British 
 services — Future consequences of the British Army being 
 debarred by the nation from Military Education. 
 
 The British Army is composed of— 
 
 Regular troops : — Cavalry, In¬ 
 fantry, Artillery, Engineers, 
 
 Men. 
 
 and Sappers .... 
 
 123,768 
 
 In Great Britain 
 
 37,843 
 
 Ireland ..... 
 
 24,005 
 
 Europe 1 
 
 j • • • 
 
 Mediterranean ) 
 
 7,915 
 
 A.S18- • • • • • 
 
 30,467 
 
 Africa ..... 
 America, New South Wales, 
 New Zealand, Van Diemen’s 
 Land, Mauritius, Bermuda, 
 
 3,703 
 
 West Indies, &c., &c., &e. . 
 
 19,835 
 
 Grand total . 
 
 123,768 
 
 1 Exclusive of the troops of the East India Company. 
 
 i 
 
36 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 Besides the above, there are in the United 
 Kingdom 30,000 enrolled pensioners, more or 
 less worn out; 8,000 dockyard-men occasionally 
 drilled; 13,441 yeomanry; and in the Channel 
 Islands 4,700 well-organised militia. By an 
 Act passed in the late session (13 and 14 Vic¬ 
 toria, cap. 46), the making of lists and the 
 ballots and enrolments for the militia of the 
 United Kingdom have been suspended for a 
 year. 
 
 The British Soldier. 
 
 Although it is the fashion, especially among 
 those who have seen but little of the surface of 
 this world, whenever they have an idle moment, 
 to abuse the English climate, yet it is undeni¬ 
 able that the repeated showers, white fogs, and 
 heavy dews,—in short, that the constant humid¬ 
 ity of which we all complain,—has not only 
 made Great Britain and Ireland the most 
 verdant region of the globe, but is highly 
 favourable to animal as well as to vegetable life. 
 The continual irrigations with which we are 
 especially blessed, nourish our pastures,—which 
 
Chap. IV. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 37 
 
 fatten our cattle,'—which feed us; and thus, 
 although we may truly enough be designated by 
 foreigners “ men of the mist,” the British nation 
 ever have been, and we believe, as long as our 
 moist soft atmosphere lasts, ever will be, more 
 robust in body, in heart, and in mind, than the 
 inhabitants of gayer, gaudier, and dustier climates. 
 But whatever may be the physical causes,— be 
 they “ in thunder, lightning, or in rain,”—the 
 cold blood, the cool courage of the English are 
 as proverbial as their muscular strength. In their 
 senate,—in their mercantile speculations,—in 
 their exertions for discovery,—in their construc¬ 
 tion of great works,—in their readiness to encoun¬ 
 ter difficulties or dangers of any sort,—in their 
 domestic games,—in their sports,—and, lastly, 
 as pioneers, backwoodsmen, or settlers in every 
 region of the globe, they have evinced a calm 
 intrepidity of character which has enabled them 
 successively to overcome the chequered diffi¬ 
 culties they have had to encounter. From an 
 utter contempt of blaster or bravado, they are, 
 however, of all civilized nations the least mili¬ 
 tary in their ideas and knowledge. Conscious 
 of their innate powers of self-defence, they dis- 
 
38 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 dain any other assistance. Instructed from their 
 cradle in the firm belief that a “ standing-army ” 
 is “unconstitutional” they are jealous even of its 
 appearance: indeed, fancying that they breathe 
 freer without it, they take every opportunity of 
 dismissing it from their presence; and thus in 
 our House of Commons, as well as out of it, 
 any proposal for u another good reduction of the 
 army,” whether expedient or inexpedient, is in¬ 
 variably designated “ apopular measure” Among 
 the labouring classes the distaste for military life 
 is still stronger. Always copying the opinions of 
 the wealthy, and observing that at an election the 
 first precaution of their magistrates and employ¬ 
 ers is to order away every soldier, they naturally 
 learn to consider them to be, in some way or 
 other, enemies of their liberty; and as a barrack 
 life has apparently no pleasures, as military dis¬ 
 cipline is evidently severe, and as it is observed 
 that soldiers, like criminals, are sooner or later 
 invariably banished, for five, seven, fourteen, or 
 twenty-one years, to countries “ beyond the seas,” 
 from which many never return, the result alto¬ 
 gether is, that, although our agricultural labour¬ 
 ers and manufacturers from various causes and 
 
Chap. IT. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 39 
 
 calamities are often suddenly thrown out of work, 
 they prefer, generally speaking, to be imprisoned 
 as paupers in a union workhouse (on the 1st 
 of July last the number of able-bodied men 
 thus incarcerated in England and Wales alone 
 amounted to 14,227) ; indeed—they would al¬ 
 most starve rather than wear the scarlet uniform 
 and eat the wholesome rations of a common 
 soldier! 
 
 The French pay great attention to the com¬ 
 fort of soldiers in their barracks. As ample 
 space is given, and as the beds therefore are 
 not required to be turned up during the day, a 
 tired man can lie down when he likes. Each 
 soldier has a bed to himself of two good mat¬ 
 tresses, one of straw, the other of well-filled 
 wool. They have good sheets, one blanket in 
 summer, and two in winter. Along the sides of 
 the rooms there are double shelves, and other 
 conveniences. The British soldier is only allowed 
 by the nation one straw mattress, one blanket 
 for winter and summer, and bare walls. 
 
 For these reasons, familiar to us all, our 
 army becomes, without metaphor, the very last 
 refuge for the destitute, and yet, strange to 
 
40 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 say, although it has ever been composed of 
 what in their adversity has been designated 
 “ the scum and refuse of our society,” yet in 
 every region of the globe it has of late years 
 by its bravery conferred glory and honour on the 
 British name, until, at the present moment, even 
 by its enemies, its steadiness under fire is the 
 admiration of the world. 
 
 Having, we trust, done justice to the deter¬ 
 mined character of the nation, as well as of its 
 army, it is necessary we should remind our 
 readers that, although in all ages the physical 
 strength and bull-dog courage of the English 
 soldier have been the same, yet that scarcely 
 half a century ago it was an axiom easier ex¬ 
 pressed than understood, that while our sailors 
 always conquered, our soldiers were invariably 
 defeated! The reason of the anomaly has 
 become evident, and we refer to it only for the 
 purpose of enabling our readers, from the facts 
 we are now about to state, to reflect, and then 
 determine whether, if similar causes shall be 
 allowed to recur, they must not be productive 
 of the same lamentable results. 
 
 Without the smallest desire to reprobate the 
 
Chap. IV. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 41 
 
 anti-military notions that exclusively character¬ 
 ise the British people, it is evident that they 
 must always have powerfully operated upon our 
 army. And thus, while in France, Russia, Prussia, 
 Austria, Belgium, and the German States, 
 every man-milliner, every barber’s clerk, has 
 been assuming the mustachio to ape the soldier, 
 the English officer, in modest compliance with 
 the general feelings of his fellow-countrymen, 
 has been, and still is, in the habit, on every op¬ 
 portunity, of shaking off his red coat to ape the 
 squire! Among the great continental powers, 
 military knowledge to a considerable degree has 
 long been common to all classes of people; 
 whereas, in English society, conversation rarely 
 turns on such subjects; indeed, as a proof of our 
 ignorance thereon, may be cited the entire ab¬ 
 sence of military literature in England, our pro¬ 
 fessional reports and reasonings having been 
 almost all founded on quotations from continental 
 authorities ; in short, the service has never 
 offered either means or opportunity to our 
 officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates, 
 to attain any higher knowledge of the art of war 
 
42 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 than that afforded by regimental drill. The 
 natural result of this national anti-military system 
 has been, that prior to the year 1808, whenever 
 the British soldier came into action, he has had 
 usually to perform not only his own duty, but,— 
 by courage unknown to any other army, and 
 which our opponents have only accounted for by 
 declaring that “ English troops never know when 
 they are beaten ”—he has almost invariably had 
 to make up for the inexperience of his General. 
 
 Without, however, any further preliminary 
 observations, we will now, by a few facts, endea¬ 
 vour to delineate to our readers th e practical 
 results of the extraordinary system we have 
 described. We propose to do so by very briefly 
 describing and contrasting with their present 
 state, the condition and duties of the various 
 departments of the British army under the Duke 
 of Wellington in Portugal, Spain, Belgium, and 
 France. 
 
 1. Commissariat. 
 
 Sir John Moore, in his despatches to Lord 
 Castlereagh, dated Lisbon, 18th of October and 
 
Chat. IV. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 43 
 
 24th of November, 1808, after reporting that “ in 
 none of the departments is there any want of 
 zeal, but in some most important ones there is 
 much want of experience,” added “nothing but 
 abundance of money and prompt payments 
 will compensate, when we begin to move, for 
 the icani of experience and ability in our com - 
 missariatf which he subsequently described as 
 “extremely zealous, but quite new and inex¬ 
 perienced in the important duties which it now 
 falls to their lot to execute.” The result, as 
 might have been anticipated, was, that on his 
 retreat to Corunna a considerable portion of this 
 “abundance of money” was abandoned, and 
 merely for want of shoes many cavalry horses 
 were shot, and many foot-sore British soldiers 
 left in the rear. 
 
 On the Duke of Wellington’s arrival in 
 Portugal, he accordingly found with his army, 
 the expense of which amounted to more than 
 200,000/. a month, a Commissary-General 
 without staff, surrounded by many hired ac¬ 
 countants, who, knowing nothing of accounts, 
 had but too often been driven to the necessity 
 
44 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 of very hastily signing vouchers or of obtaining 
 similar receipts from the inhabitants of a country 
 who proverbially “ would sign anything;” besides 
 which the army, as well as the country, w T ere 
 irreparably injured by a set of “sharks” calling 
 themselves British merchants at Lisbon, who by 
 the vilest intrigues managed, first to depreciate, 
 and then purchase, our commissariat securities. 
 
 The Duke, foreseeing the alarming conse¬ 
 quences of this want of system in the depart¬ 
 ment, and well knowing that an army without 
 provisions is infinitely icorse than muskets with¬ 
 out ammunition, on the 9th of May, 1809, and 
 subsequently, took extraordinary pains to draw 
 up with his own hand a code of minute regu¬ 
 lations for the formation of a commissariat,—for 
 the promotion of its officers,—and for their re¬ 
 spective duties, which he clearly detailed. He 
 also ordered the organization of 800 bullock- 
 carts of prescribed patterns in two grand divi¬ 
 sions, each to be superintended by an officer of 
 the commissariat: each of these divisions of 
 400 carts to be composed of eight subdivisions 
 of 50 carts, under a commissariat clerk; each 
 
Chap. IV. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 45 
 
 subdivision into two brigades of 25 carts. The 
 weight which every description of carriage was 
 to carry he prescribed ; also how the bullocks 
 were to be shod ; how much barley or Indian 
 corn, besides forage, each was to receive per day ; 
 lastly, to the whole he appointed an efficient 
 establishment of capatazes, smiths, and drivers. 
 Under similar arrangements he directed the 
 organization of brigades of mules. These pre¬ 
 liminaries having been completed, to every 
 division of the army he appointed a Deputy 
 Commissary-General, with a sufficient number 
 of clerks, interpreters, capatazes, herdsmen, &c.; 
 and to each brigade of infantry, to each troop 
 of cavalry, to the artillery, and to head-quarters, 
 he attached an assistant commissary, with as¬ 
 sistants, &c., adequate to the duties he had to 
 perform. Finally, in the rear of the army, he 
 provided, under the charge of storekeepers, for 
 the safe custody of the enormous necessary 
 amount of provisions and forage. 
 
 For the maintenance of the Portuguese army 
 he organized similar establishments placed solely 
 and exclusively under the direction of the For- 
 
46 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 tuguese Government, and of the Commander- 
 in-chief of the Portuguese army. 
 
 Under this system the commissariat depart¬ 
 ment, at great cost, became gradually accom¬ 
 plished in field-service. For instance, although 
 a corps of the army had occasionally to advance 
 20 miles per day for twenty consecutive days 
 (Sir Thomas Picton’s division marched in 1813 
 for thirty-four days through muddy roads without 
 a halt to the battle of Yittoria), its commissary 
 was enabled actually during the march to find, 
 purchase, pay for, and grind, wheat, which, by 
 the assistance of innumerable women, and by 
 order of various municipal authorities, had to be 
 kneaded, baked into bread, to be transported on 
 the backs of mules, and finally to be delivered, 
 together with rations of meat, wine, or spirits, 
 to the troops in cantonments extending say four 
 or five miles. He had, moreover, by means of 
 his assistants, to procure, transport, and dis¬ 
 tribute forage for the cavalry, artillery, and for 
 other horses of the division. Under the exi¬ 
 gencies of this service, which often required 
 ready-money payments, a young deputy-assistant 
 
Chap. IV. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 47 
 
 commissary, under due precautions, had fre¬ 
 quently to despatch, in various directions, by 
 conductors and capatazes receiving only two or 
 three shillings a day, sums of money amounting 
 to 200, 300, or 1000 dollars, to procure pro¬ 
 visions for which vouchers in triplicate were to 
 be required. Nevertheless, by the power of the 
 discipline which had been organized, a common 
 muleteer, whose clothes were literally not worth 
 ten shillings, was sometimes, almost without 
 anxiety, despatched alone in charge of a mule¬ 
 load of silver; nay, the commissary himself had 
 to ride for twenty-four or 
 eight successive hours, crossing mountains full 
 of wolves, in charge of mules laden with dollars, 
 and driven by a few trusty Spaniards in garb 
 and education exactly resembling banditti. 
 
 Besides exertions such as have been described, 
 the jaded commissary, after having managed to 
 feed his division, had at night through canton¬ 
 ments in a strange country to search among innu¬ 
 merable camp-fires for his own tent, around which 
 he was almost sure to find a crowd of mule¬ 
 teers and peasants waiting to be paid. By candle- 
 
 occasionally 
 
48 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 light he had then, under a system devised by 
 the Treasury, voluminous, vexatious, and almost 
 impracticable, to endeavour to make up his 
 accounts, arrange his vouchers, answer letters, 
 &c., until, while his papers were still before 
 him and his money-chests by his side, all of 
 a sudden the key-bugles, trumpets, &c., of the 
 reveillee , at various distances and in all direc¬ 
 tions, would be heard to sound, echo, and re¬ 
 echo, on which the canvas over his head would 
 obediently begin to flap in signal that his ser¬ 
 vant was striking the tent; in short, that his 
 office was about to vanish into pure air; and 
 thus, say at 3 a.m., the commissary had again to 
 mount his horse, and, actually before his division 
 had continued its march, to search for and trans¬ 
 port to it, wherever it might halt, sustenance for 
 both men and horses for another day! 
 
 At the conclusion of the Duke’s campaigns 
 this well-organized system of officers and subor¬ 
 dinates, thoroughly instructed in and acquainted 
 with the principles and practice of obtaining and 
 of distributing, under severe responsibilities, 
 that enormous amount of provisions and forage 
 
Chap. IV. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 49 
 
 necessary for the movement of a combined 
 army, was disbanded ; the consequence of which 
 is, that at the present moment a field commis¬ 
 sariat, the life-blood of every movement in a 
 campaign, is not in existence in the British 
 service. In lieu of it there is, however, a corps 
 of commissaries attached to the Treasury, such, 
 we readily admit, as never before existed. By 
 men of business they would justly be declared 
 better competent to keep the accounts of an 
 army than the old worn-out campaigners they 
 have succeeded. They are gentlemen of edu¬ 
 cation, of good character and conduct; but as 
 their sedentary duties are, generally speaking, 
 quite foreign to field-service, there is reason to 
 apprehend that whenever, for the exigencies of 
 war, they shall suddenly be placed on saddles, 
 in short, whenever a British army shall again 
 take the field, its General commanding will 
 probably find himself in the following predica¬ 
 ment :— 
 
 46 I have had the greatest difficulty,” wrote the 
 Duke in a despatch to Lord Castlereagh, dated La- 
 vaos, 8th of August, 1808, in organizing my com- 
 
 D 
 
50 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 missariat for the march, and that department is very 
 incompetent notwithstanding the arrangements which I 
 made with Huskisson on the subject. This depart¬ 
 ment deserves your serious attention. The existence 
 of the army depends upon it, and yet the people who 
 manage it are incapable of managing anything out of 
 
 A COUNTING-HOUSE.” 
 
 As a contrast to the above may he cited the 
 following description of the French system :— 
 
 “ It is certainly astonishing,” wrote the Duke in his 
 despatch to Lord Liverpool, dated Cartaxo, 21st of 
 December, 1810, “ that the enemy have been able to 
 remain in this country so long, and it is an extra¬ 
 ordinary instance of what a French army can do. 
 With all our money, and having in our favour the 
 good inclination of the country, I assure you that I 
 could not maintain one division in the district in which 
 they have maintained not less than 60,000 men and 
 20,000 animals for more than two months.” 
 
 In a despatch to Vice-Admiral the Hon. 
 G. Berkeley, dated 7th of Jane, 1809, the 
 Duke stated,—“ Our commissariat is very bad 
 indeed, but it is new, and will improve, I hope.” 
 
 We have shown that it not only did improve, 
 but by the end of the campaign became well 
 organised for the performance of its held duties. 
 
Chap. IV. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 51 
 
 In the mean while, however, during its progress 
 from ignorance to knowledge, within the space 
 of five years there passed through the hands of 
 that faithful public servant, Sir Robert Ken¬ 
 nedy, Commissary-in-Chief with the army in 
 the Peninsula, the enormous sum of fifty-four 
 millions ! 
 
 With these facts and figures before the mind, 
 is it not painful to reflect that, in case of war, 
 the nation will, in all probability, in the words 
 of the late gallant Sir John Moore, be again 
 fearfully admonished that “ nothing but abun¬ 
 dance of money will compensate, when we begin 
 to move , for the want of experience and ability 
 in our commissariat ” ? 
 
 2. Engineering Department. 
 
 Considering it has long been an axiom among 
 engineers, that while a well-conducted siege is 
 certain in its results, the application of labour 
 and force without science is invariably punished 
 by an enormous unnecessary expenditure of life 
 
 d 2 
 
52 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I- 
 
 and money, it will scarcely be credited that the 
 trenches, saps, mines, batteries, and other im¬ 
 portant works necessary for the recapture of 
 Olivanca, in April, 1811, the attack of Fort 
 Christoval, in May, 1811, the siege of Badajoz, 
 in May and June, 1811, the siege of Ciudad 
 Rodrigo, in 1812, the siege of Badajoz, in March, 
 and April, 1812, the escalade and capture of 
 the French works at Almaraz, in May, 1812, the 
 reduction of the French posts at Salamanca, in 
 June, 1812, the capture of the Retiro at Madrid, 
 in August, and the siege of Burgos, in Septem¬ 
 ber and October, 1812, were undertaken and 
 conducted by a British army unattended by a 
 single sapper or miner (at Olivanca there were 
 present only two military artificers, namely one 
 carpenter and one mason); that, under an in¬ 
 adequate number of officers of engineers, the 
 above works were accordingly directed by in¬ 
 fantry officers, “ appointed to act as assistant 
 engineers, and to be obeyed as suchand that 
 in lieu of a corps of sappers and miners a selected 
 body of from 100 to 200 infantry private sol¬ 
 diers, who literally had never seen a military 
 
Chap. IY. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 53 
 
 sap, mine, fascine, or gabion, were collected to 
 superintend, by night as well as by day, in sun¬ 
 shine, darkness, and in all weathers, the con¬ 
 struction of trenches, parapets, banquettes, and 
 batteries, by working parties of their fellow- 
 soldiers, amounting from 1000 to 2000 men, all 
 equally ignorant of the duties they respectively 
 were required to perform ; and yet when the 
 French besieged Badajoz, in 1811, although they 
 had, as assistants, 100 miners, 483 sappers, 60 
 artificers, it required 41 days of open trenches to 
 take the place! 
 
 The details of the extraordinary circumstances 
 above stated are briefly as follows:— 
 
 In the year 1809 there were with the army 
 in Portugal only 16 officers of Engineers, and 
 29 “ Boyal Military Artificers ” (namely 2 Ser¬ 
 jeants, 2 corporals, 2 second corporals, 7 carpen¬ 
 ters, 5 masons, 4 smiths, 1 wheelwright, 1 collar- 
 maker, 4 miners, and 1 labourer), without the 
 slightest knowledge of field duties, and without 
 any tools or implements whatever!! 
 
 The fatal consequences of such deficiency and 
 ignorance in this highly important protective as 
 
54 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 well as offensive branch of the service being ma¬ 
 nifest, the Duke with considerable difficulty 
 obtained a greater number of officers. Previous, 
 however, to their arrival from England, he 
 himself framed instructions for the creation of an 
 establishment of entrenching tools to be carried 
 on 100 mules, to accompany the army for Jield- 
 service. He also ordered to be collected and 
 arranged in a siege -depot all that was necessary 
 for that service, to be moved forwards, by extra 
 efforts, when required. Notwithstanding these 
 arrangements, the sacrifice of money, to say 
 nothing of men, from the inadequate means we 
 have described, having proved, as might have 
 been anticipated, enormous (at the second siege 
 of Badajoz, in 18] 2, the number of casualties 
 were—officers and men killed, 1035 ; wounded, 
 3787 ; missing, 63; total, 4885), the Duke, on 
 the 11th of February, 1812, wrote to Lord 
 Liverpool as follows:— 
 
 “ While on the subjeet of the artillery, I would beg 
 to suggest to your Lordship the expediency of adding 
 to the Engineers’ establishment a corps of sappers and 
 miners. It is inconceivable with what disadvantage we 
 
Chai\ IV. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 55 
 
 undertake anything like a siege, for want of assistance 
 of that description. There is no French corps cCarmde 
 which has not a battalion of sappers and a company of 
 miners. But we are obliged to depend for assistance 
 of this description upon the regiments of the line ; and 
 although the men are brave and willing, they want the 
 knowledge and training which are necessary. Many 
 casualties among them consequently occur, and much 
 valuable time is lost at the most critical period of the 
 siege.” 
 
 Although by the above recommendation the 
 Duke caused to be originated our present highly 
 educated corps of Sappers and Miners, as also 
 that admirable establishment at Chatham, which 
 by instructing them as well as our Engineer 
 officers in the theory and practice of field-forti¬ 
 fication, and especially in the scientific applica¬ 
 tion of gunpowder, for the purposes of blowing 
 open gates, throwing down palisades, &c. &c., has 
 been productive, particularly in India, of such 
 important results*, yet it was not until 1813, 
 when most of the sieges were concluded , that a 
 single company of sappers was despatched to 
 Spain. In the mean while the Engineer de¬ 
 partment of the army, notwithstanding its exer¬ 
 tions, was so inadequate to the important services 
 
56 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 to be performed, that although the utmost 
 amount of Engineer officers ever present at any 
 one time in the Peninsula was 48, the number 
 killed and wounded in the various sieges 
 amounted to 49. Indeed, the following speci¬ 
 mens of their losses will briefly show how severe 
 were the duties they were required to execute. 
 
 List of Officers of Royal Engineers present at the Siege 
 
 of St. Sebastian. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel Sir R. Fletcher, Bart., Command¬ 
 ing Engineer in the Peninsula, killed. 
 
 Lieut.-Colonel J. F. Burgoyne , 1 Director of the 
 siege, wounded. 
 
 Captains George Henderson. 
 
 Charles Rhodes, killed . 
 
 C. G. Ellicombe, Bt.-Major. 
 
 C. F. Smith, Bt.-Major. 
 
 G. G. Lewis, severely wounded. 
 
 Richard Bolden. 
 
 George Collyer, killed. 
 
 Lieuts. F. Stanway. 
 
 H. D. Jones, severely wounded on the 
 breach , and taken prisoner. 
 
 A. Marshall, wounded. 
 
 Philip Burney, wounded. 
 
 II. A. Tapp, wounded. 
 
 1 Now Major-General Sir John Burgoyne, K.C.B., Inspector- 
 General of Fortifications. 
 
Chap. IV. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 57 
 
 Lieuts. W. Reid, ivounded. 
 
 E. Matson. 
 
 L. Machele, killed. 
 
 H. Wortham. 
 
 At Badajoz, in 1812, out of 17 Engineer 
 officers who were present throughout the siege, 
 11 were killed or wounded. 
 
 In 1815, when the Allied army was organ¬ 
 ised, the Duke, having apparently determined 
 not again to be caught without the means of 
 even fortifying a position, attached to each 
 British corps from 8 to 10 officers of engineers, 
 commanding a regular travelling field-depot 
 packed into 13 Flanders waggons, properly 
 appointed with drivers and horses, and attended 
 by a body of 131 practised sappers. He, more¬ 
 over, insisted on having a reserve of 11 officers 
 of engineers, 19 waggons, 88 horses, and 197 
 sappers; and, lastly, he required to be organised 
 and attached to each corps of the army, under 
 the direction and management of 8 officers of 
 engineers, an efficient pontoon train, composed 
 altogether of 80 pontoons, 4 sub-lieutenants, 
 265 sappers, 32 civil artificers, 2 lieutenants 
 commanding 167 royal artillery drivers, 348 
 
 d 3 
 
58 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 Flemish drivers, 105 seamen, 861 horses, 4 
 wheel carriages, 4 boats, 16 Flanders waggons, 
 and 4 forge-carts. 
 
 From the foregoing statements it appears, 
 that between 1809 and 1816 the Duke of Wel¬ 
 lington gradually established, for the first time 
 in the history of the British army, an efficient 
 department for siege and field duties, com¬ 
 posed of— 
 
 1st. Officers of engineers, and a corps of 
 sappers and miners well instructed in their 
 peculiar duties. 
 
 2nd. A field supply of entrenching tools, 
 with adequate means for transporting them. 
 
 3rd. An appropriate assortment of materials, 
 &c., necessary for reducing fortified posts, or for 
 the construction as well as demolition of bridges. 
 
 4th. A collection, in depot, of all stores 
 necessary for a siege, with organised means for 
 their movement when required. 
 
 5th. A pontoon train. 
 
 The corps of Boyal Engineers as well as that 
 of Boyal Sappers and Miners still retain the 
 full benefit of the above system, and there exist, 
 
Chap. IV. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 59 
 
 therefore, reasonable grounds for believing that 
 in case of war the “personnel ” of the Engineer 
 department would be found fully prepared for 
 the scientific duties required of it; but ever 
 since the retirement of the army of occupation, 
 the “materiel” above described has remained 
 totally unorganised. 
 
 The arrangements for field service, provided 
 for Portugal and Spain, would be scarcely ap¬ 
 plicable to any other country. Those of the 
 army of occupation, though well enough devised 
 under the urgent circumstances of the moment, 
 would require thorough reconsideration. In the 
 mean while, although the French have 5587 
 horses attached to their “military equipages,” and 
 1058 horses to their “engineers,” there exists in 
 the British service no recognised field system,— 
 no carriages approved of,-—no experienced mode 
 of packing entrenching tools,—no horses, drivers, 
 or even any established regulations for either ; 
 and the British nation has therefore reason for 
 apprehending that, in case of a sudden war, the 
 Government, embarrassed by the great demand 
 for horses and means of transport for artillery 
 
60 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 and commissariat, would very possibly avert 
 their eyes from this important branch, in which 
 case, as in 1809, our officers of engineers would 
 again be attached to the army without the 
 means requisite to render their services available, 
 and thus, for a considerable length of time and 
 at enormous sacrifices of men and money, our 
 troops might have to contend with an antagonist 
 prepared to avail himself, at almost every move¬ 
 ment, of the innumerable scientific advantages 
 which field fortification offers. 
 
 As regards the pontoon train of the British 
 army, it also was broken up in 1818 : and 
 although our officers of engineers continue to be 
 fully instructed and exercised at Chatham in the 
 arrangements of balks, chesses, &c., when the 
 pontoons are once on the hanks of the river over 
 which the bridge is to be formed; yet, in the 
 infinitely more important and difficult art of con¬ 
 veying portable bridges with an army, they are 
 not only without system, but without the means 
 of devising one; and as in all the continental 
 armies a portion of the “train du genie” is 
 invariably composed of the carriages, horses, 
 
Chap. IV. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 61 
 
 and drivers of a pontoon train in complete orga¬ 
 nisation, it is but too evident that in this branch 
 of the Engineer department we are also, from 
 what the English nation firmly believe to be 
 “ economy,” in a state of lamentable inferiority, 
 that is to say, a British army suddenly taking 
 the field could not pursue over rivers which 
 without difficulty its enemy had crossed; while 
 on the other hand it might be stopped by 
 water over which by military science he with 
 the utmost facility would be able to escape. 
 
 3. Artillery. 
 
 During the French wars which terminated in 
 1794 and 1814, the British service enjoyed a 
 striking advantage in the rapid movements, 
 mechanical arrangements, and excellent practice 
 of its field artillery, which by its rude but power¬ 
 ful eloquence proved itself to be so irresistibly 
 superior to that of all other nations, that since 
 the last peace its system has been copied by 
 
62 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 almost every country in Europe. But although 
 the compliment is highly flattering, it is never¬ 
 theless equally evident that its effect will be to 
 deprive us, in future, of a certain portion of the 
 superiority which this important branch of our 
 army has hitherto enjoyed. 
 
 On the commencement of the campaign in 
 the Peninsula, it will, however, appear from the 
 following extracts, that, in point of equipment, 
 this department, like all others, was sent to 
 the field not altogether in an efficient state :— 
 
 “ I write,” said the Duke, in his despatch to Lord 
 Castlereagh, dated Villa Franca, 29th April, 1809, 
 “ in the chance that this letter may find the packet at 
 Lisbon, to inform you that I have received a very bad 
 report of the state of the artillery horses lately arrived 
 from England with the heavy dragoons, being very old , 
 diseased , and out of condition.'' 
 
 At the period in question there existed in 
 England an unwholesome hankering desire to 
 keep at home whatever was either showy or 
 serviceable, and to draft for service what re¬ 
 mained. In accordance with this feeling the 
 reinforcement of horses applied for proved to 
 
Ciiap. IV. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 63 
 
 be, in age and constitution, of about the same 
 sample as those first despatched. 
 
 44 I hope,” wrote the Duke to Lieut.-Col. Framing¬ 
 ham, It. A., in a letter dated Pombal, 5th June, 1809, 
 44 that your horses on their arrival in the Tagus will 
 not be in the unserviceable state in which you expect 
 they will he. If they should be so, I must relinquish 
 that important branch of our equipment, the British 
 artillery, and I have requested General Beresford to 
 have some brigades of Portuguese artillery in readi¬ 
 ness to join and do duty with the British army on its 
 entry into Spain.” 
 
 This threat produced its effect; by degrees 
 the artillery became properly horsed; and 
 having then a fair chance, by distinguishing 
 themselves in the manner we have stated, they 
 did full justice to their system of instruction at 
 Woolwich, thus proving, in direct opposition to 
 our national theory, the incalculable advantage of 
 educating a soldier in the way he should go. 
 
 As soon, however, as peace was obtained, it 
 was deemed necessary for “ economy ” that this 
 noble branch of the service should be reduced, 
 and to such a drastic extent has this national 
 prescription been administered, that, while the 
 
64 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 Russian army have at present 1020 guns ? the 
 Prussian army 492 guns, the French army 3759 
 field-pieces, of which 500 guns are horsed, and 
 even the Belgian army 84 guns, the British 
 army could only, for the defence of England, 
 at present, bring into the field, fully equipped, 
 and with ammunition waggons fully horsed, forty 
 guns (less than half of a line-of-battle ship’s 
 broadsides), of which more than one-third are in 
 Ireland! Our artillery, as at present organized, 
 from being underhorsed , can no doubt show 
 more guns than they could bring into the field. 
 For ordinary service in Great Britain and Ire¬ 
 land few of them, if any, have ammunition wag¬ 
 gons, but carry thirty or forty rounds on the 
 limbers, which, although ample for common 
 mob-work, would be utterly insufficient for 
 regular warfare. 
 
 The French have 13,331 artillery horses, 
 while the total number of the artillerv horses of 
 the British nation is as follows:— 
 
 Horses. 
 
 In Great Britain . . . . 756 
 
 Ireland ..... 451 
 
 Grand total . . 1207 
 
Chap. IV. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 65 
 
 One troop of six 6-pounders Horse 
 Artillery, complete, require 
 A battery of six 9-pounders (five guns 
 and one howitzer) requires 
 
 Horses could, of course, be readily purchased 
 ou an emergency, but, as soon as the guns were 
 unlimbered for action, they would probably— 
 like the Duke’s description of semi-disciplined 
 Spanish troops—“ run away frightened only by 
 the noise of their own fire l ” 
 
 Horses. 
 
 188 
 
 162 
 
 The Staff of an Army 
 
 In the field is composed of a quartermaster- 
 general’s department, an adjutant-general’s de¬ 
 partment, majors of brigade, and aides-de camp. 
 
 From the sporting habits of Old England, a 
 British army, in every climate of the globe, in 
 times of peace as well as in war. has always 
 teemed, and ever will, with officers brimfull of 
 the energy and natural qualifications requisite 
 for the above duties. A few facts, however, 
 will explain that at the commencement of the 
 
66 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 next campaign our most forward riders may 
 prove to be lamentably deficient in strategetic 
 knowledge. For instance, previous to the ad¬ 
 vance or retreat of an army, especially in an 
 enemy’s country, it is necessary for the General 
 commanding—who, of course, has not time to 
 reconnoitre everything—accurately to ascertain 
 from the quartermaster-general’s department its 
 military features; its resources as regards shelter, 
 shade, water, provisions, and forage for the 
 troops; the nature and state of its rivers, streams, 
 and fords ; the condition of its by-roads as well 
 as high-roads; whether its bridges are safe for 
 the passage, in close order, of infantry, cavalry, 
 and brigades of artillery ; if not, how much each 
 should be extended ; if unable to bear a single 
 gun and limber, whether, by unlimbering, each 
 could be hauled over separately by men and 
 drag-ropes, &c. &c. &c. 
 
 In 1809 this department in Portugal pos¬ 
 sessed, of course, but little practical acquaintance 
 with the groundwork necessary for estimating 
 such details. By experience, however, it gra¬ 
 dually improved, until, by its zealous exertions, 
 
Chap. IY. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 67 
 
 it became so highly intellectual, that the Duke 
 was enabled with confidence to transmit even to 
 his assistant quartermaster-generals queries, the 
 following specimen of which, from his own pen, 
 will very graphically explain to those unac¬ 
 quainted with the precautions necessary for the 
 movement of an army the inestimable value of 
 an efficient Staff :— 
 
 “ To Lieut.-Colonel Bourke , Assistant- Quarter master- 
 
 General. 
 
 “ Memorandum of Queries. 
 
 “ Abrantes, 21st June, 1809. 
 
 “ 1. When the French corps under Victor and 
 Sehastiani shall join near Toledo, and be reinforced 
 probably by the French garrisons in Toledo and 
 Madrid, is there any defensive position they could 
 take up ? Is such a position afforded by the Guada- 
 rama or the Manzanares, throwing their left upon the 
 Tagus ? 
 
 “ 2. What is the nature of the country between the 
 Guadarama and Manzanares ? What is the nature of 
 the banks of those rivers, particularly the upper part 
 of the former ? What the nature of the banks of 
 the Tagus between them ? Any fords or other 
 passages ? 
 
 “ 3. Are there any roads leading from Plazencia or 
 
68 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 Talavera, and of what description, to the upper part of 
 the Guadarama ? 
 
 “ 4. Supposing an enemy to retire beyond Madrid 
 upon being threatened with an attack by the three 
 combined corps under Generals Cuesta and Venegas 
 and myself, could the mountains of Castille afford him 
 any defensive position ? 
 
 “ 5. What position would be most probably taken 
 up by the French army in those mountains ? 
 
 “ 6. What are the commonly used passages through 
 them from the southward, in the whole extent of their 
 range ? 
 
 “7. What the nature of the country on this side, 
 and of the different passages through them ? 
 
 “ 8. What the nature of the country after passing 
 them ? 
 
 “ 9. Supposing the enemy to retire at once to the 
 Ebro, and take up his position upon that river, his 
 object would be most probably to secure his com¬ 
 munications with France. With that view, what 
 position would he take up? 
 
 “ 10. Is the Ebro fordable in the whole length of 
 its course ? 
 
 “11. Where the principal passages ? 
 
 “ 12. The nature of the banks generally ? 
 
 “ 13. The nature of the country on both sides? 
 
 “ 14. What Spanish corps are there in Valencia, 
 Murcia, Aragon, and Catalonia, which might be 
 brought to co-operate in a general movement upon the 
 enemy ? 
 
 “ Arthur Wellesley.” 
 
Chap. IV. 
 
 MILITARY AVARFARE. 
 
 69 
 
 To assist the Quartermaster-general’s depart¬ 
 ment the Duke organized a corps of mounted 
 guides ; the duties of which, in his despatch to 
 the Military Secretary of the Commander-in- 
 Chief, he described as follows:— 
 
 “ This corps is essentially necessary in all opera¬ 
 tions in Portugal. It is most difficult to obtain any 
 information respecting roads, or any of the local cir¬ 
 cumstances which must be considered in the decisions 
 to he formed respecting the march of troops ; and this 
 difficulty obliged me last year, and all those who have 
 since conducted operations in this country, to form a 
 corps of this description. 
 
 “ The object is not only to have a corps whose par¬ 
 ticular duty it will be to make inquiries and have a 
 knowledge of roads, hut to have a class of persons 
 in the army who shall march with the heads of co¬ 
 lumns, and interpret between the officers commanding 
 them and the people of the country guiding them, or 
 others from whom they may wish to make inquiry.” 
 
 To the Adjutant-general’s department he or¬ 
 ganized and appointed a mounted police corps 
 of two troops, denominated “ the Cavalry Staff 
 Corps in addition to which, for the purpose 
 of providing for the speedy communication of 
 intelligence between the line of posts of the 
 
70 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 combined army, he formed an establishment of 
 telegraphs. 
 
 On the termination of the Duke’s campaigns 
 his valuable staff, or rather that portion of it 
 that survived Waterloo, was broken up ; and 
 as his Quartermaster-general, Adjutant-general, 
 with many of their assistants, are now dead, the 
 remainder being too old to resume their former 
 duties, it is evident that, in case of war, the 
 Staff of a new British army, although it would 
 no doubt again be composed of officers of great 
 energy and intelligence, would inevitably prove, 
 at first , inferior in that experience and in those 
 acquirements for reconnoitring, for regulating 
 the discipline, the internal arrangements, the 
 quartering, the encamping, and the movement 
 from place to place of troops within reach of an 
 enemy’s force, which the continental armies, by 
 means of their great reviews and by other efforts, 
 are at this moment studiously maintaining in 
 full vigour, READY AT ANY TIME TO TAKE THE 
 field. From the above data our readers will 
 sufficiently judge for themselves what must be 
 the probable results of a contest between say a 
 
Chap. IV. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 71 
 
 French General fully supplied by his Quarter- 
 master-general’s department with all necessary 
 strategetic information, supported by an Adju¬ 
 tant-general’s department full of practical know¬ 
 ledge, and a British General destitute of these 
 professional advantages ! 
 
 Infantry and Cavalry. 
 
 No one, we believe, can have attentively ob¬ 
 served the lights and shades which delineate the 
 character of the British soldier, without perceiv¬ 
 ing that the former are the gifts of nature, the 
 latter the work of his fellow-countrymen. 
 
 In all times, in all countries, in all climates, 
 and under all circumstances, the indigenous 
 courage of English troops under fire has ever 
 shone with resplendent brightness. On the 
 other hand, until very lately, their general con¬ 
 duct has been sullied by the national habit of 
 hard drinking;-—a vice which, although our 
 leading statesmen, country gentlemen, and in¬ 
 deed all classes of our community, more or less 
 
72 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 every day of their lives, simultaneously com¬ 
 mitted with impunity, involved the poor soldier, 
 especially in foreign countries where wine and 
 spirits were cheap, in sorrow, misery, and dis¬ 
 grace. Haunted by this bad habit of his coun¬ 
 trymen, and stinted by his Government from all 
 practical knowledge of the art of war, he laboured 
 under disadvantages for which, it is undeniable, 
 his country rather than himself was to blame: 
 besides which, the extraordinary custom, even 
 among the lower orders of the English people, 
 of repudiating soldiers from their company— 
 (strange to say, for many years after the battle 
 of Waterloo, their very uniform precluded them 
 from entering Kensington Gardens)—naturally 
 unfitted them for any society except that indelicate 
 mixture of men, young women, and children in 
 their own barracks, to which by the regulations 
 of their sovereign they were habituated; and 
 accordingly, so soon as on active service the 
 bands of their domestic discipline became sud¬ 
 denly relaxed, it was invariably discovered, as 
 might have been expected, that in bivouac, 
 under camp, or in billets, to use a mild but 
 
Chap. IY. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 73 
 
 common expression, “ they did not know how to 
 behave themselves.” 
 
 “ I have long been of opinion,” said the Duke of 
 Wellington, in his despatch to our Minister at Lisbon, 
 dated Coimbra, 31st May, 1809, “ that a British army 
 could neither hear success nor failure ; and I have had 
 manifest proof of the truth of this opinion, in the first of 
 its branches, in the recent conduct of the soldiers of this 
 army. They have plundered the country most ter¬ 
 ribly, which has given me the greatest concern.” 
 
 Again, in his despatch to Lord Castlereagh, 
 Secretary of State, dated Abrantes, 17th June, 
 1809, he wrote :— 
 
 “ I 'cannot with propriety omit to draw your atten¬ 
 tion again to the state of discipline in the army, which 
 is a subject of serious concern to me, and well deserves 
 the consideration of his Majesty’s Ministers. It is im¬ 
 possible to describe to you the irregularities and out¬ 
 rages committed by the troops. We have a Provost 
 and no less than four assistants, and yet there is not an 
 outrage of any description which has not been com¬ 
 mitted on a people who have uniformly received us as 
 friends by soldiers who never yet for one moment suf¬ 
 fered the slightest want or the smallest privation.” 
 
 Again, in his despatch to the British Minister 
 
 E 
 
74 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part J. 
 
 at Lisbon, dated Badajoz, 8th September, 1809, 
 he wrote:— 
 
 44 I really believe that more plunder and outrage 
 has been committed by this army than by any other 
 that ever was in the field. To this I may add that I 
 have not less than seven or eight Provosts, 1 other 
 armies having usually tivo” 
 
 We beg our readers to mark the gradual con¬ 
 sequence of this resolute but severe discipline, 
 which, had our gallant soldiers been fairly dealt 
 with—had they been properly educated by their 
 country—would have been unnecessary. 
 
 44 I certainly think,” writes the Duke to Lord Liver¬ 
 pool in his despatch dated Viseu, 24th Jan. 1810, 
 44 the army are improved. They are a better army 
 than they were some months ago. But still these ter¬ 
 rible continued outrages give me reason to apprehend 
 that, notwithstanding all the precautions I have taken 
 and shall take, they will slip through my fingers, as 
 they did through Sir John Moore’s, when I shall be 
 involved in any nice operation with a powerful enemy 
 in my front.” 
 
 1 A provost-marshal has power to flog or hang on the spot any 
 soldier he may find committing outrage or plunder. 
 
Chap. IV. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 75 
 
 In his despatch to the Earl of Liverpool, dated 
 Cartaxo, 23rd February, 1811, he wrote :— 
 
 “We are becoming a more efficient and better army 
 every day.” 
 
 In his despatch to the Right Hon. Henry 
 Wellesley, dated Yillar Formoso, 8th May, 
 1811, he wrote :— 
 
 “We have had warm work in this quarter, but I 
 hope we shall succeed in the end. The French, it is 
 said, lost 5000 men, we 1200, in the affair of the 5th; 
 on .the 3rd we lost about 250 ; the French left 400 
 dead in the village of Fuentes de Onoro. We lost 
 the prisoners by the usual dash and imprudence of the 
 soldiers.” 
 
 On the 15th May, 1811, he wrote to Major- 
 General Cameron:— 
 
 “ The British troops surpassed everything they had 
 ever done before, and of which the result was most 
 honourable to His Majesty’s arms.” 
 
 On the 25th July, 1811, he wrote to Marshal 
 Sir W. C. Beresford, K.B.:— 
 
 “ I have for some time observed a visible improve¬ 
 ment in the conduct of the soldiers towards the people 
 
 E 2 
 
76 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 of the country, and certainly those crimes for which 
 so many soldiers of this army have been executed now 
 occur but rarely.” 
 
 In his despatch to the Earl of Liverpool, 
 dated Quadraseis, 29th September, 1811, after 
 describing the battles of El Bodon and near 
 Aldea del Ponte, he added :— 
 
 “ I cannot conclude this report of the occurrences of 
 the last week without expressing to your Lordship my 
 admiration of the conduct of the troops engaged in the 
 affair of the 25th inst.” 
 
 Lord Hill, in his despatch to Lord Wellington, 
 dated Merida, 30th October, 1811, describing 
 the conduct of the British troops at the battle of 
 Arroyo Molinos, added :— 
 
 “ No praise of mine can do justice to their admirable 
 conduct; the patience and goodwill shown by all ranks 
 during forced marches in the worst weather; their 
 strict attention to the orders they received ; the pre¬ 
 cision with which they moved to the attack, and their 
 obedience to command during the action.” 
 
 As might naturally be expected, the total 
 absence of instruction — and consequently of 
 knowledge of any sort—in field duties, which in 
 
Chap. IV. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 77 
 
 time of peace characterises the British army, or, 
 to speak more correctly, the British nation, ope¬ 
 rated upon the officers as strongly as it had upon 
 the soldiers under their command;—in fact, the 
 blind were leading the blind. 
 
 Accordingly, in an address “ to officers com¬ 
 manding divisions and brigades,” dated Freneda, 
 28th November, 1811, the Duke stated:— 
 
 “ I am far from questioning the zeal, still less the 
 gallantry and spirit, of the officers of the army; and I 
 am quite certain that if their minds can be convinced 
 of the necessity of minute and constant attention to 
 understand, recollect, and carry into execution the 
 orders which have been issued for the performance of 
 their duty, and that the strict performance of this duty 
 is necessary to enable the army to serve the country as 
 it ought to be served, they will in future give their 
 attention to these points. 
 
 “ Unfortunately, the inexperience of the officers of 
 the army has induced many to consider that the period 
 during which an army is on service is one of relax¬ 
 ation from all rule, instead of being, as it is, the period 
 during wdiich, of all others, every rule for the regula¬ 
 tion and control of the conduct of the soldier, for the 
 inspection and care of his arms, ammunition, accou¬ 
 trements, necessaries, and field equipments, and his 
 horse and horse appointments, for the receipt, and 
 issue, and care of his provisions, and the regulation of 
 
78 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 all that belongs to his food and the forage for his horse, 
 must be most strictly attended to by the officers of his 
 company or troop, if it is intended that an army, a Bri¬ 
 tish army in particular, shall be brought into the field 
 of battle in a state of efficiency, to meet the enemy on 
 the day of trial. 
 
 “ In regard to the food of the soldier, I have fre¬ 
 quently observed and lamented in the late cam¬ 
 paign the facility and celerity with which the French 
 soldiers cooked in comparison with those of our 
 army. 
 
 “ The cause of this disadvantage is the same w r ith 
 that of every other description—the want of attention 
 of the officers to the orders of the army and the con¬ 
 duct of their men, and the consequent want of authority 
 over their conduct. Certain men of each company 
 should be appointed to cut and bring in wood, others 
 to fetch water, and others to get the meat, &e., to be 
 cooked; and it would soon be found that if this prac¬ 
 tice were daily enforced, and a particular hour for 
 seeing the dinners, and for the men dining, named, as 
 it ought to be, equally as for parade, that cooking 
 would no longer require the inconvenient length of 
 time which it has been lately found to take, and that 
 the soldiers would not be exposed to the privation of 
 their food at the moment at which the army may be 
 engaged in operations with the enemy. 
 
 “ But I repeat that the great object of the attention 
 of the general and field officers must be to get the 
 captains and subalterns of the regiments to understand 
 and perform the duties required from them, as the 
 
Chap. IV. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE, 
 
 79 
 
 only mode by which the discipline and efficiency of the 
 army can be restored and maintained during the next 
 campaign.” 
 
 The beneficial results of the Duke of Wel¬ 
 lington’s addresses, admonitions, regulations, 
 orders, and punishments, as above quoted, will 
 sufficiently be demonstrated by the following 
 extracts from his examination on the 20th 
 February, 1836, before the Commission on 
 Military Punishments:— 
 
 Question 5834.—■“ Do you conceive that the army 
 when it left France was in as efficient a state for ser¬ 
 vice as any army can well be brought to ?” 
 
 Answer .—“ I always thought that I could have 
 gone anywhere and done anything with that army. 
 It was impossible to have a machine more highly 
 mounted, and in better order, and in a better state of 
 discipline than that army was. When I quitted that 
 army upon the Garonne, I do not think it was pos¬ 
 sible to see anything in a higher state of discipline, 
 and I believe there was a total discontinuance of all 
 punishment.” 
 
 The foregoing brief sketch of the condi¬ 
 tion of the various departments of the Bri¬ 
 tish army up to the retirement, in 1818, 
 of the Army of Occupation, will, we believe, 
 
80 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 sufficiently demonstrate that under all cir¬ 
 cumstances the intrepid courage of our troops 
 has done honour to the country of their 
 birth. There is, however, in warfare, as in 
 mechanics, a point beyond which physical resist¬ 
 ance is unable to withstand the simple combina¬ 
 tions of science, and accordingly, for the reasons 
 we have just detailed, namely, from sheer igno¬ 
 rance and inexperience in its field duties, our 
 army, though composed of the noblest elements, 
 was, until about forty years ago, almost inva¬ 
 riably defeated. By the efforts, the talents, and 
 by the experience of the Duke of Wellington, 
 who, by the minute organization we have de¬ 
 scribed, not only made the army he commanded, 
 but by doing so saved himself from inevitable 
 defeat, the wheel of fortune has since 1808 been 
 completely reversed, but the principles of the 
 machinery remain unaltered ; and therefore, for 
 the very reason that it has been indisputably 
 proved by a series of battles that a British army 
 properly commanded and controlled is, when 
 opposed to an equal force, invincible, we ought 
 —without allowing ourselves to be dazzled either 
 
Chav. IV. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 81 
 
 by the brightness of its existing character, or by 
 that prestige which, like a glorious halo, now 
 surrounds its name—prudently to consider whe¬ 
 ther the present fabric of our military power is 
 composed of perishable or imperishable mate¬ 
 rials ; or, in other words, whether for future 
 wars we can as safely rely on able generalship, 
 experienced officers, and field discipline, as we 
 undoubtedly can on the calm intrepidity of our 
 troops. 
 
 Some of the data necessary for forming a 
 judgment on this important subject are as 
 follows:— 
 
 1. Our Parliamentary Returns will show that 
 about two-thirds of the service of the British 
 soldier continues to be passed in distant colonies, 
 in which our troops, rarely exceeding 2000 or 
 3000 men, usually scattered over a vast expanse 
 of country, are almost entirely occupied in the 
 necessary guards for fortresses, stores, &c. The 
 late reductions in the army, as well as those 
 which during last session of Parliament were 
 more than half-promised by the Chancellor of 
 the Exchequer and by the Secretary-at-War, 
 
 e 3 
 
82 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 will, of course, have the effect of diluting the 
 scanty force at each of these stations, and thereby 
 of impairing, in a slight degree, the strictness 
 even of its present discipline. 
 
 2. In India the Queen’s regulars (about 
 30,000 men) are also not only, like their com¬ 
 rades in other regions of the empire, much dis¬ 
 persed, but on account of climate are not very 
 actively exercised. Excepting for war, the 
 periods for taking the field are few, short, and 
 far between ; and after all, as regards the Euro¬ 
 pean soldier, the active service he is called upon 
 to perform not only affords experience of little 
 value for an European campaign, but his re¬ 
 sidence in the country is so long, that his con¬ 
 stitution, impaired by climate and but too often 
 by intemperance, usually proves but a very little 
 longer than his period of service. 
 
 3. Excepting India, where a portion of our 
 officers have lately had opportunities of acquiring 
 knowledge in their profession, the only part of 
 the world where as many as 4000 or 5000 
 British soldiers are ever collected together is on 
 the grass plot of the Phoenix Park in Dublin; 
 
Chap. IV. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 83 
 
 indeed, with the exception mentioned, the latest 
 period at which the officers of the British army 
 have had an opportunity of witnessing the move¬ 
 ments of troops, or of acquiring any practical 
 knowledge of their profession, beyond that of 
 the care and the exercise, on a small parade, of 
 say a battalion of men, was upwards of 35 years 
 ago, when the greater number of the present 
 subalterns, captains, and many field-officers were 
 not born l No wonder, therefore, that it should 
 have been stated by the highest authority, 44 1 
 don’t believe there are five general officers in 
 our service who, if you put 70,000 men into 
 Hyde Park, could get them out again! ” 
 
 4. The comparative ages of the officers in the 
 French and British services offer a self-evident 
 moral. 
 
 For instance, to the army of Algeria—the 
 infantry of which have repeatedly marched with 
 nine days’ provisions on their backs, the cavalry 
 with five days’ provisions for themselves and 
 three or four for their horses !—the French ap¬ 
 pointed, under General Lamoriciere (the real 
 commander-in-chief), who, when he first went 
 
'84 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 to Africa, was not much above thirty years 
 old, fourteen general officers of the following 
 ages:— 
 
 1 Governor-General, a Lieutenant-General 
 
 1 Lieutenant-General commanding the Province of 
 Oran ....... 
 
 1 Major-General, chef d’Etat-major de l’armee 
 
 1 Major-General of Artillery . . . . 
 
 1 Major-General commanding the Province of Al¬ 
 geria ....... 
 
 1 Major-General commanding the Province of Con¬ 
 stantine ....... 
 
 1 Major-General commanding “ la Cavalerie In¬ 
 digene ”....... 
 
 1 Major-General at Algiers . . . . . 
 
 1 Major-General at Mideah ..... 
 
 1 Major-General at Milionah . 
 
 1 Major-General at Oran . . . . . 
 
 1 Major-General at Montanyeau . . . . 
 
 1 Major-General at Glonun . 
 
 1 Major-General at Setif . 
 
 Age. 
 
 46 
 
 46 
 
 39 
 
 53 
 
 54 
 48 
 
 39 
 46 
 38 
 45 
 41 
 
 40 
 
 37 
 
 38 
 
 Average age of all, including Lamoriciere 43-r 
 
 Now the ages of British generals are as 
 follows:— 
 
 Age. 
 
 Commander-in-Chief . . . . . . 81 £ 
 
 Generals.From 88 to 68 
 
 Lieutenant-Generals .... From 75 to 62 
 Major-Generals ..... From 70 to 61 
 
Chap. IV. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 85 
 
 The following also is a memorandum of the 
 ages of the senior and junior officers of each 
 rank in the corps of British Royal Engineers, 
 18th September, 1850 :— 
 
 Rank. 
 
 Senior. 
 
 Ages. 
 
 Junior. 
 
 Average. 
 
 Colonel-Commandant . . 
 
 824 
 
 754 
 
 79 
 
 Colonel. 
 
 644 
 
 63 
 
 631 
 
 Lieutenant-Colonel .... 
 
 604 
 
 55 f 
 
 58i 
 
 Captain. 
 
 54 
 
 354 
 
 44f 
 
 Second Captain—assumed . 
 
 35 
 
 30 
 
 324 
 
 First Lieutenant ,, . 
 
 30 
 
 22 
 
 26 
 
 Second Lieutenant „ 
 
 22 
 
 18 
 
 20 
 
 Again, the following is a statement of the 
 ages of the senior and junior officer of each rank 
 in the Royal Artillery on the 19th of September, 
 1850 
 
86 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 Rank. 
 
 Senior. 
 
 Ages. 
 
 Junior. 
 
 Average. 
 
 Colonel-Commandant 
 
 77 
 
 70 
 
 73i 
 
 Colonel . 
 
 70 
 
 62 
 
 66 
 
 Lieutenant-Colonel .... 
 
 64 
 
 54 
 
 59 
 
 Captain. 
 
 54 
 
 34 
 
 44 
 
 Second Captain. 
 
 35 
 
 26 
 
 CO 
 
 o 
 
 ti|i- 
 
 First Lieutenant. 
 
 26 
 
 20 
 
 23 
 
 Second Lieutenant .... 
 
 20 
 
 19 
 
 I9h 
 
 It is generally admitted that no commanding 
 officer of Artillery with a very small army 
 should be less than a Lieutenant-Colonel in 
 rank; and that with one of 30,000 men and 
 upwards he should be a General officer, that 
 is, among the seniors of the Colonels. 
 
 From the foregoing facts it appears to be the 
 fixed policy of England, that while the immense 
 youthful armies of Europe, in extensive encamp¬ 
 ments such as we have described, as well as in 
 garrisons, each containing a little army, are 
 studiously learning grand manoeuvres and evo¬ 
 lutions, siege duties, as well as the minutest 
 details of field-exercise and discipline, the British 
 
Chap. IV. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 87 
 
 army,—stricken in years, and deprived of every 
 opportunity of learning its duties,—shall, to 
 satiate the anti-military propensities of the na¬ 
 tion, be made to revert to the unorganised 
 condition in which its various departments ex¬ 
 isted in 1808 ; in short, that, from the difficulties 
 experienced, overcome, and pointed out in the 
 Despatches of the Duke of Wellington, we 
 shall, in the words of Napoleon, 
 
 “ Have learned nothing, and have forgot¬ 
 ten ALL !” 
 
88 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 CHAPTER Y. 
 
 ON UNDISCIPLINED AND SEMI-DISCIPLINED TROOPS. 
 
 Hereditary aversion of the British people to any description of 
 protection designated unconstitutional — Description of the 
 progressive effects of discipline — Creates confidence — De¬ 
 scription of young Soldiers first coming into action — Conse¬ 
 quences of over-excitement —■ Duke of Wellington’s sage 
 opinions thereon — Gradually become subject to self-control 
 
 — Men totally undisciplined worthless in war — Their cou¬ 
 rage valueless — Their confusion increases with their numbers 
 
 — Fallacy of relying for national defence on such a power — 
 Comparative value of semi-organized bodies — Duke of Wel¬ 
 lington’s opinions of the inestimable value of old Soldiers — 
 His descriptions of their conduct in the field — On the procla¬ 
 mation of peace, impatience of the nation to rid itself of its 
 Army — Many of the pensions of our veterans commuted — 
 Their miserable condition in our colonies — Their death by 
 hunger, want of clothing, and cold — Deflections. 
 
 The British people, from their insular position, 
 are so inexperienced in the operations, and above 
 all in the sufferings of war; so ignorant of 
 what is requisite to defend a country from the 
 devastations of a hostile army*, they are, on 
 
Chap. V. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 89 
 
 what they call “ principle,” so averse to any 
 description of protection designated “ uncon¬ 
 stitutional ,” and, on the contrary, so prone to 
 place implicit reliance on any force, however 
 imperfect, provided it bear not the odious ap¬ 
 pellation of “ regular —that it is not surprising 
 there should exist among us as national maxims 
 which we are in the habit of singing as well as 
 of saying, that “ Britons never will be slaves,” 
 that “ a free people cannot be conquered,” and as 
 a corollary thereto, that “if the French were to 
 invade us to-morrow, the whole nation would 
 rise, and with irresistible vengeance drive them 
 into the sea!” One moment’s reflection, how¬ 
 ever, will, we believe, be sufficient to overthrow 
 the works of this imaginary fortress; indeed, 
 in the very showing of the case there evidently 
 exists a serious anomaly; for if the British 
 people, as they declare themselves to be, are 
 on “ principle ” averse to military protection, 
 it is evident they are peculiarly unfit at a 
 moment’s warning,—say at the sound of a 
 trumpet,—to rise en masse , like the citizens of 
 ancient Greece and Rome, or like the present 
 
90 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I, 
 
 inhabitants of the great military nations of 
 Europe, who, accustomed from their cradles to 
 military conversation, rigorous discipline, en¬ 
 campments, and manoeuvres, gradually become 
 inflated with “ esprit militaire,” until they na¬ 
 turally consider war, plunder, rapine, and glory 
 to be synonymous. As, however, it is undeniable 
 that, in spite of its apathy, or even of its pre¬ 
 judices, the daring character of the nation has 
 attained for it the highest respect, let us endea¬ 
 vour as fairly as possible to estimate what 
 amount of physical resistance—exclusive of re¬ 
 gular troops—its inhabitants, undisciplined and 
 semi-disciplined, could offer to repel the sudden 
 invasion of say a French army. 
 
 We have already stated, that among the ranks 
 of the British army there exists—especially 
 among old soldiers—no blustering notion that 
 they are superior in courage to their brethren 
 at the plough and loom; indeed, proud of their 
 country, they would be very sorry to think so : 
 at the same time they well know, and more 
 confidently feel , that discipline has invested 
 them with a power which unorganised men are 
 
Chap. V. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 91 
 
 utterly unable to resist; and this magic result 
 may, to our unmilitary readers, briefly be ex¬ 
 plained as follows: 
 
 While a recruit who has just joined the army 
 is apparently only learning—very much against 
 his will—how to hold the back of his head up, 
 his chin in, and especially to keep his mouth 
 shut;—how to stand with his thumbs uncom¬ 
 fortably touching the seams of his trowsers ; 
 how at the word of command to advance, in 
 goose-step, with his left foot,—to turn to the 
 “right,” “left,” “right about,” “left about,” 
 “halt,” “ eyes right,” “eyes left,” stand “at¬ 
 tention,” and finally “at ease” by which time 
 he is usually sick unto death of the whole in¬ 
 comprehensible process,—his mind is undergoing 
 an invisible change; namely, by following the 
 will of his drill-serjeant instead of his own, he is 
 learning obedience. 
 
 After having been taught, throughout various 
 marchings and countermarchings, always to 
 touch his left-hand man, by which simple ar¬ 
 rangement the squad is kept compactly together, 
 he is instructed in the dexterous use of his 
 
92 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 musket, which he learns, first, to carry without 
 injuring his comrades, and then, within his small 
 allotted space, to load, prime, make ready, pre¬ 
 sent, fire, fix bayonets, and charge. In the 
 course of about six months’ instruction of this 
 sort, he is usually reported competent “ to join 
 the ranks,” and after about six months’ regi¬ 
 mental drill he may be considered a young 
 soldier. But in this year’s purgatory or pro¬ 
 bation there has been effected a moral change 
 infinitely greater than that which has deprived 
 him of his stoop, and has given lightness, smart¬ 
 ness, and activity to his movements. In his 
 room, as well as within the dry, gritty precincts 
 of his barracks, he has observed among his com¬ 
 rades occasional displays of physical strength 
 and of daring courage which have silently in¬ 
 stilled into him, not a vain conceit of his own 
 powers, but a reasonable confidence in that of 
 the company to which he belongs; and above 
 all, in the regiment of which he is but a unit: 
 and as his officers are a set of high-spirited men, 
 evidently “ up to anything,” he becomes ani¬ 
 mated with a manly conviction—the heavy tread 
 
Chap. V. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 93 
 
 of his regiment on its march is itself an emblem 
 of its power—that it will take a good deal to 
 make the old ( )th, or as he learns to term it 
 —“ our fellows” turn tail! 
 
 With this exalted but not inflated estimate 
 of his regiment’s power, he embarks for foreign 
 service, where he joins a brigade, and finally a 
 division, the irresistible strength of which, by a 
 similar process of reasoning, he teaches himself 
 to appreciate; in fact it is a military axiom, 
 that large bodies of men not only excite each 
 other, but wherever they go carry with them 
 the confidence of success; but now, just as a 
 landsman enlisted on board a man-of-war, however 
 carefully he may have been practised in harbour, 
 has to go through the ordeal of sea-sickness, so 
 has the young soldier to go through that con¬ 
 flict of feelings which assail every one on entering 
 upon active service. Before coming into action, 
 the first waggon-load of wounded men from the 
 advanced posts, sitting or lying without their 
 stocks, with their jackets unbuttoned, ghastly as 
 death, in various attitudes of mute suffering, 
 seriously affect, rather than appal, almost every 
 
94 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 man. The sight of the enemy, however, soon 
 refreshes him; and now, the difference between 
 young soldiers and old ones surely need hardly 
 be described. Although the men of a regiment 
 on a parade appear nearly all alike, and although, 
 as we have stated, they have learned to move 
 and act in union, yet in temperament there re¬ 
 mains a latent invisible moral difference, which 
 the fire of an enemy tends very strongly to 
 develop. The sudden explosion of a shell, the 
 tearing noise of cannon-shot, the thundering roll 
 of musketry, the half-singing, half-whistling 
 sound of passing bullets, the sight of comrades 
 falling, the agony they suffer—most especially 
 from grape-shot—(cannon-balls usually numb 
 the limbs they strike)—produce altogether on the 
 mind of the young soldier various effects. Some 
 get angry;—some, it need not be concealed, 
 become alarmed ;—the great mass are eager to 
 advance, and the word is no sooner given than 
 the artificial bands of the year’s discipline proving 
 not strong enough to hold together in a phalanx 
 the various degrees of impetuosity and other 
 feelings we have described, the regiment, officers 
 
Chap. V. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 95 
 
 and men, from over excitement, “ dash on ” too 
 far, until they not only suffer for their impru¬ 
 dence, but do infinite mischief. 
 
 The following calm sentiments of the Duke 
 of Wellington on this subject form a striking 
 contrast with some of the bombastic “ en avant ” 
 proclamations of Napoleon :— 
 
 “ To Major-General Alexander Campbell. 
 
 11 Villar Formoso, 15th May, 1811. ’ 
 
 “ Sir, —Adverting to your report of the transac¬ 
 tions of the morning of the 11th instant, in the pursuit 
 of the garrison of Almeida, I have to state that 
 nothing has given me more concern than the conduct 
 of Lieut.-Colonel-, of the — regiment. 
 
 “ When the enemy had passed the bridge of Barba 
 de Puerco, the further pursuit of their troops was 
 useless ; and every step taken beyond the point to 
 which the lieut.-colonel was ordered to proceed was 
 one of risk to the officers and soldiers under his com¬ 
 mand, from which the retreat was next to impossible. 
 . . . This advance, however, and his passage of the 
 bridge, was an imprudence to which all the losses of 
 the day must be attributed. The frequent instances 
 which have occurred lately of severe loss, and, in some 
 instances, of important failure, by officers leading the 
 troops beyond the point to which they are ordered, 
 and beyond all bounds—such as the loss of the pri¬ 
 soners taken in front of the village of Fuentes, on the 
 
96 " MILITARY WARFARE. Part I. 
 
 3rd and 5th instant; the loss incurred by the 13th 
 Light Dragoons, near and at Badajoz, on the 25th of 
 March; the severe loss incurred by the troops in the 
 siege of Badajoz, on the right of the Guadiana, on the 
 10th instant; and the loss incurred by Lieut.-Colonel 
 -on the 11th instant,—have induced me to deter¬ 
 mine to bring before a general court-martial, for dis¬ 
 obedience of orders, any officer who shall in future be 
 guilty of this conduct. 
 
 “ I entertain no doubt of the readiness of the officers 
 and soldiers of the army to advance upon the enemy; 
 but it is my duty, and that of every general and other 
 officer in command, to regulate this spirit, and not to 
 expose the soldiers to contend with unequal numbers 
 in situations disadvantageous to them ; and above all 
 not to allow them to follow up trifling advantages to 
 situations in which they cannot be supported, from 
 which their retreat is not secure, and in which they 
 incur the risk of being prisoners to the enemy they had 
 before beaten. 
 
 “ The desire to be forward in engaging the enemy is 
 not uncommon in the British army; but that quality 
 which I wish to see the officers possess, who are at the 
 head of the troops, is a cool , discriminating judgment in 
 action , which will enable them to decide with prompti¬ 
 tude how far they can and ought to go with propriety; 
 and to convey their orders and act with such vigour and 
 decision, that the soldiers will look up to them with 
 confidence in the moment of action, and obey them with 
 alacrity. 
 
 “ The officers of the army may depend upon it that 
 
Chap V. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 97 
 
 the enemy to whom they are opposed are not less pru¬ 
 dent than they are powerful. Notwithstanding wffiat 
 has been printed in gazettes and newspapers, we have 
 never seen small bodies, unsupported, opposed to large; 
 nor has the experience of any officer realised the stories 
 which all have read, of whole armies being driven by a 
 handful of light infantry or dragoons. 
 
 “ I trust that this letter, copies of which I propose to 
 circulate to the general officers commanding divisions, 
 with directions to circulate it among the officers of the 
 army, will have the effect of inducing them to reflect 
 seriously upon the duties which they have to perform 
 before the enemy, and to avoid the error which is the 
 subject of it, which is really become one of serious detri¬ 
 ment to the army and to the public interests. 
 
 (Signed) “Wellington.” 
 
 By experience, however, the various feelings 
 which over-animate young soldiers become sub¬ 
 ject to self-control. The habit of command on 
 one side and of obedience on the other begets 
 not only mutual confidence between officers and 
 men, but on the part of the latter that deter¬ 
 mination to obey, fearless of all consequences, 
 the spirit of the orders they receive, without 
 which the evolutions of an army cannot possibly 
 be directed. And as it is impossible for the 
 human mind, for any length of time, to continue 
 
 F 
 
98 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 under violent excitement, so by repeatedly going 
 into action soldiers learn to view with indiffer¬ 
 ence the various scenes to which they are ex¬ 
 posed. In sudden attacks, especially from ca¬ 
 valry, they learn that to be “ steady ” is to be 
 invincible ; and they therefore, in self-defence, 
 strictly obey the orders of their officers. By 
 degrees they feel proud of their power and of 
 their profession; and thus they eventually be¬ 
 come what are justly termed “ old soldiers.” 
 
 Now, if a mob of undisciplined men assemble 
 for the purpose either of defending their country 
 from invasion, or merely for riot and plunder, 
 their position is briefly as follows:—As among 
 them there are but few competent to command, 
 and none accustomed to obey,—as there exists 
 no system, no arrangements, no acquaintance 
 with the weapons to be used,—it is evident that 
 they must remain either in an immoveable mass, 
 in which state, under any sudden excitement, 
 they would, from sheer unskilfulness, prick, 
 strike, wound, and shoot each other; or if they 
 succeeded in extending themselves, they must 
 unavoidably occupy so much unnecessary ground 
 
Chap. Y. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 99 
 
 that their line, physically speaking, would amount 
 to more than double that of the same number of 
 regular troops; and thus, supposing both parties 
 to be armed with muskets, each undisciplined 
 man would have to receive two bullets, delivered 
 at least twice as fast as his own, or say four 
 well-aimed bullets for every one which under 
 feelings of violent excitement he could possibly 
 hope to fire. But the overwhelming disadvan¬ 
 tage he would have to encounter would proceed 
 from a want of the artificial support—we mean, 
 the confidence in others —we have described. 
 An English ploughman’s notion of courage— 
 and a very good one it is—is, that with his fists 
 he will fight any man breathing, or, to save his 
 life, any two men, and to this extent he is pre¬ 
 pared to go; but he knows nothing about his 
 neighbour , and accordingly, as soon as he sees a 
 . compact body of scarlet well-trained soldiers, 
 with loaded muskets and fixed bayonets, all 
 coming to attack him, he feels very clearly that 
 he cannot fight a whole regiment, and so off he 
 runs. But even supposing that he and all the 
 rest of the mob, instead of doing so, instead of 
 
 f 2 
 
100 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 forming, as they really do, a rope of sand, were 
 to determine like soldiers to rely on the courage 
 of their comrades, it is evident that, not being 
 held together by discipline, they would, as soon 
 as they found themselves under heavy fire,— 
 like animalcula in water, viewed through a solar 
 microscope,—be seen moving hurriedly in all 
 directions, at different rates of impetuosity: in 
 fact, whatever might be their bravery, they 
 would, if suddenly attacked in flank as well as 
 in front—and particularly if at the same mo¬ 
 ment a shell or two happened to explode in the 
 middle of them—be sure to run against, across, 
 and over each other; and the greater the num¬ 
 ber the direr would be the confusion. 
 
 Of course, if they had no field-pieces, or 
 having any, did not exactly understand how to 
 use them, it would not be necessary for regular 
 troops even to take the trouble to attack them, 
 as their artillery, from out of reach of musketry, 
 would effectually in double-quick time disperse 
 them. 
 
 For the above reasons—which after all are 
 only those which enable every description of 
 
Chap. V. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 101 
 
 workman to excel men who have never practised 
 his trade—it is an established maxim among old 
 soldiers that a mob of undisciplined men, “ the 
 more the merrier,” would fly before them like 
 chaff before the wind. We shall shortly have to 
 submit to our readers a very important memo¬ 
 randum, written by the Duke of Wellington in 
 1819, during the great riots in Scotland, in which 
 he fully concurs in this opinion, that a small body 
 of regular troops may safely attack undisciplined 
 men, “ be their numbers what they may ” In the 
 mean while we will conclude by observing that, 
 in a contest between disciplined and undisciplined 
 bodies, the relative superiority of the former and 
 inferiority of the latter greatly increase with the 
 proportionate numbers of each ; thus, 10,000 
 troops would contend infinitely better with 
 100,000 unorganised opponents than 10 against 
 100 or 1 against 10. 
 
 Having endeavoured to demonstrate the abso¬ 
 lute impossibility of undisciplined men contend¬ 
 ing against regular troops commanded by experi¬ 
 enced officers, we will submit—we hope for the 
 amusement of our readers—a specimen of popu- 
 
102 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 lar inconsiderate opinions on the subject, which 
 scarcely require a comment. 
 
 Extract from one of Charles Knight’s cheap 
 publications, entitled— 
 
 “ THE LAND WE LIVE IN.” 
 
 “ How soon would the rail, the coach, and the steam 
 ship tell the bold descendants of the Sea-King to 
 gird on their swords, if a foreign foe should dare to 
 plant his foot on British soil ! Invasion /—it is a joke ! 
 [a very bad joke]. Invasion!—open the map 
 of England, and show the spot, from the North Fore¬ 
 land to the Land’s End, where an army of 100,000 
 men could not be gathered in twenty-four hours. 
 How many hours would it require to empty the Arsenals 
 
 of Woolwich [great heavy ship-guns "without 
 
 carriages] upon Southampton, or Brighton, or 
 Hastings, or Folkestone, with a coast-line uninter¬ 
 ruptedly communicating with London as a common 
 centre ? No, no ! The first pulsation of the Electro- 
 Telegraph that proclaimed an hostile fleet in the 
 Channel would have an answering movement from the 
 Admiralty that would make the island throb [with 
 fear] to its remotest extremities. Invade a country 
 that could collect the sturdiest of its population upon 
 any given point within eight and forty hours, and 
 provide them with all the materials of war [from 
 whence? they do not exist.] in half the 
 same time! The thing is too ludicrous ! The col- 
 
Chap. V. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 103 
 
 liers of Northumberland would be "whirled from the 
 north to the south by the fuel that their sturdy hands 
 have brought to the surface, and they alone would be 
 a host to sweep the aggressor from the earth !” [! ! !] 
 
 With respect to senn-organised bodies, such as 
 occasionally-trained garde nationale, yeomanry, 
 militia, &c., fighting in defence of their native 
 country, it will appear from the following evi¬ 
 dence that when the bands of discipline, even of 
 the proudest nations, which hold them beautifully 
 together on a parade, prove insufficient under fire, 
 their movement is not always , as we have previ¬ 
 ously described, in advance . 
 
 “ I was apprehensive,” wrote the Duke to Lieut.- 
 Colonel Trant, dated 6th August, 1808, “ that the 
 Spaniards in Alentejo would suffer. There is nothing 
 so foolish as to push these half-disciplined troops for¬ 
 ward ; for the certain consequence must be, either 
 their early and precipitate retreat, if the enemy should 
 advance, or their certain destruction.” 
 
 Accordingly, about a year afterwards, in his 
 despatch to Lord Castlereagh, dated Merida, 
 25th August, 1809, he had occasion to state,— 
 
 “ The Spanish cavalry are, I believe, entirely without 
 discipline. They are in general well clothed, armed, 
 
104 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE, 
 
 Part I. 
 
 and accoutred, and remarkably well mounted, and their 
 horses are in good condition. But I have never heard 
 anybody pretend that in any one instance they have 
 behaved as soldiers ought to do in presence of an 
 enemy. They make no scruple of running oif, and 
 after an action are to be found in every village and 
 every shady bottom within fifty miles of the field of 
 battle.” 
 
 After describing that the discipline of the 
 Spanish infantry appeared to be confined to 
 placing them in the ranks three deep, at very 
 close order, and to the manual exercise, he adds, 
 respecting them also,— 
 
 “ This practice of running away, and throwing off 
 arms, accoutrements, and clothing , is fatal to every¬ 
 thing.Nearly 2000 ran off on the evening of 
 
 the 27th from the battle of Talavera (not 100 yards 
 from the place where I was standing), who were neither 
 attacked nor threatened with an attack, and who were 
 frightened only by the noise of their own fire” 
 
 Again, in his letter to Lieut.-General Sir 
 Brent Spencer, K.B., dated 22nd May, 1811, 
 he said,— 
 
 “ I went yesterday to Albuera, and saw the field of 
 battle. We had a very good position, and I think 
 should have gained a complete victory in it, without 
 
Chap. V. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE, 
 
 105 
 
 any material loss, if the Spaniards could have man¬ 
 oeuvred ; but unfortunately they cannot 
 
 Lastly, with respect even to well-disciplined 
 regular troops, the determined opposition which, 
 it will appear from the following extracts, the 
 Duke of Wellington made to an Aladdin pro¬ 
 posal of the Horse Guards to give him some 
 new soldiers in exchange for his old ones, 
 strikingly demonstrates the practical difference 
 which in his opinion exists between those who 
 have been drilled only on parade at home, and 
 those who have learned to perform field duties 
 under field discipline. 
 
 4 4 To His Royal Highness the Duke of York , 
 Commander-in- Chief. 
 
 “ Cadiz, 26th December, 1812. 
 
 44 Experience,” says the Duke, 44 has shown us in the 
 Peninsula that a soldier who has got through one cam¬ 
 paign is of more service than two or even three newly 
 arrived from England ; and this applies to the cavalry 
 equally with every other description of troops.” 
 
 Again : 
 
 44 To Colonel Bunbury , Under Secretary of State. 
 
 “ Freneda, 2nd February, 1813. 
 
 44 1 prefer having one officer or soldier who has 
 
 F 3 
 
106 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 served in one or two campaigns, to two or three who 
 have not.” 
 
 Again: 
 
 “ To Colonel Torrens. 
 
 “ Freneda, 2nd February, 1813. 
 
 “ His Royal Highness and I unfortunately take a 
 very different view of these questions. . . . I am of 
 opinion, from long experience, that it is better for the 
 service here to have one soldier or officer, whether of 
 cavalry or infantry, who has served one or two cam¬ 
 paigns, than it is to have two or three who have not. 
 Not only the new soldiers can perform no service, but 
 by filling the hospital they are a burden to us. ... 
 I am sure I am right on this subject; and if anybody 
 doubts it, let them look at the state of the 4th, 5th, 
 38th, 39th, and 82nd regiments, with this army, com¬ 
 pared with others. Yet these are the regiments of 
 the best reputation in the service; some of them, the 
 2nd battalion, 4th, 82nd, and 39th, have come from 
 climates not dissimilar to that in which they are now 
 serving; but it is the service in the field to which 
 neither officers nor men are accustomed, and for which 
 training and habit are required. The same is the case 
 in regard to the cavalry, and indeed it is stronger.” 
 
 Again : 
 
 “ To Earl Bathurst. 
 
 “ Freneda, 9th March, 1813. 
 
 u I can only repeat to you what I have said to 
 Colonel Torrens, viz., that when His Royal Highness, 
 
Chap. Y. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 107 
 
 or the Government, shall send me an order upon any 
 subject, they will invariably find it obeyed with the ut¬ 
 most celerity; but if they leave the execution of their 
 wishes to my judgment , they must expect that I shall 
 exercise a judgment upon the subject, and that, with 
 every desire to act as they wish, I shall not adopt a 
 measure which is in my opinion prejudicial to the ser¬ 
 vice in this country. 
 
 “ Every day’s experience has proved to me that one 
 soldier who has served one or two campaigns in this 
 country is worth two, if not three, newly sent out; and 
 it further appears that it signifies but little from what 
 part of the world regiments come, as those from 
 Gibraltar, Ceuta, Cadiz, and the Mediterranean are 
 equally inefficient with those from England and Ireland. 
 
 “ I hope that your Lordship and His Royal High¬ 
 ness will understand that I am not at all desirous of 
 throwing any difficulties in the way of the execution of 
 the plans formed at home for the service at large ; but 
 that when a point is left to my judgment, it can be ex¬ 
 ercised only upon the effects which the execution will 
 have on the service in this country.” 
 
 “ To Earl Bathurst . 
 
 “ Lesaca, 3rd September, 1813. 
 
 “ The other day the 51st lost 12 officers killed and 
 wounded, and, I believe, not quite 100 men. As to 
 sending them home, I must tell you that, in this 
 country in particular, one old soldier is worth at least 
 five new ones.” 
 
108 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 It appears from the foregoing extracts, 
 written within sight of the enemy with which 
 he was to contend, that the Duke not only per¬ 
 sisted in preferring old campaigners to new 
 ones, but that, like Falstaffs account of his 
 “men in buckram,” he estimated their compara¬ 
 tive value—first at two, then three, and at last 
 at jive to one; and as his opinion—evidently a 
 u favourite ” one—was in opposition to that as 
 pertinaciously entertained at the Horse Guards, 
 we deem it necessary that our readers should be 
 enabled to judge for themselves whether the 
 Duke’s estimate of the value of his old soldiers 
 was not triumphantly confirmed and ratified by 
 their conduct in the following battles, his de¬ 
 scriptions of which we select, because, from the 
 dates quoted, it will appear that they actually 
 took place pending the discussion of the dis¬ 
 puted theory. 
 
 “ To Earl Bathurst. 
 
 “ Lesaca, 3rd August, 1813. 
 
 “ We have,” writes the Duke, u had some desperate 
 fighting in these mountains, and I have never known 
 the troops behave so well. In the battle of the 28th 
 
Chap. V. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 109 
 
 we had hard fighting, and in my life I never saw such 
 an attack as was made by General Barnes’s brigade in 
 the 7th division upon the enemy above Echalar yester¬ 
 day ; the loss of the French is immense. I understand 
 they say themselves they have lost 15,000 men—that is 
 what I estimated their loss ; but if they acknowledge 
 that number, I ought to estimate it at 20,000 men, 
 which is the number more generally believed.” 
 
 Again: 
 
 “ To the Earl of Liverpool. 
 
 “ 4th August, 1813. 
 
 “We have about 4000 prisoners. I never saw such 
 fighting as on the 27th and 28th of July, the anniver¬ 
 sary of the battle of Talavera, nor such determination 
 as the troops showed.” 
 
 Again: 
 
 “ To Lieut.-General Lord William Bentinck, LL.B. 
 
 “ Lesaca, 5th August, 1813. 
 
 “ I never saw such fighting as we have had here. It 
 began on the 25th, and, excepting the 29th, when 
 not a shot was fired, we had it every day till the 2nd. 
 The battle of the 28th was fair bludgeon work. Our loss 
 has been severe, but not of a nature to cripple us.” 1 
 
 1 The casualties of the British army between the 25th of July 
 and the 2nd of August inclusive, 1813, were—killed 779, 
 wounded 4918, missing 672. 
 
110 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 If we were inflated by the vain-glorious 
 desire of merely extolling old soldiers, we 
 should refer seriatim to their conduct as offi¬ 
 cially reported in all the great battles, including 
 Quatre Bras and Waterloo, at which between 
 the years 1808 and 1815 they were successively 
 engaged. As, however, we have an infinitely 
 higher object in view, we will—instead of doing 
 so—very briefly observe that the concluding 
 history of the old soldiers of the Peninsula and 
 Waterloo very strikingly exemplifies the eccen¬ 
 tric propensity of the British nation to divest 
 itself, as nimbly as possible, of its military 
 power. 
 
 As soon as the allied sovereigns had con¬ 
 cluded the treaty by which 150,000 troops were 
 to occupy the northern fortresses of France for 
 three years, it of course became necessary that 
 the remainder of the combined forces should at 
 once return to their respective countries. The 
 army of occupation offered to the British 
 service a most valuable opportunity of learning 
 not only discipline in a foreign country, but 
 whatever in military science might be worth 
 
Chap. V. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Ill 
 
 copying from the various departments of the 
 Continental armies. Nevertheless the great 
 object of the war had thus scarcely been secured 
 when there was evinced throughout England the 
 usual hereditary hectic impatience to disorganise 
 the “ unconstitutional ” force by which it had 
 been obtained ; and, accordingly, although 
 France was bound by treaty to feed and lodge 
 the allied army of occupation, yet it was urged 
 in England that, for the mere miserable saving 
 in the difference of pay between our troops and 
 Hanoverians, it would be “ prudent ” that the 
 British contingent should, by a feat of dex¬ 
 terous economy, be composed of the latter as 
 the representatives of the former! I 
 
 “I received,” wrote the Duke of Wellington to 
 Major-General Sir Henry Torrens, K.C.B., in his de¬ 
 spatch dated Paris, 4th November, 1815, “last night 
 your letter of October 28th, and that of His Royal 
 Highness of the 27th. I did not understand from Lord 
 Bathurst that Government objected to give more than 
 20,000 British troops for the army of occupation, but 
 that his Royal Highness could not give more. What 
 I imagine is, that Government think they can get 
 foreign troops cheaper than they can British; and they 
 prefer to employ them, forgetting the number of years 
 
112 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 required to form the army they have got, and that, if 
 they disband it, they will destroy the military profession 
 in England. My opinion upon the whole transaction 
 is, that now that we have toiled like slaves here to 
 make the arrangement which has been made, Govern¬ 
 ment do not like it, because some newspaper-writer or 
 some friend in Parliament dislikes it, and they will not 
 carry it into execution. 
 
 “ All I beg is, to have positive orders what troops to 
 keep, and what troops to send home. 
 
 “If Government mean to carry the measure fairly 
 into execution, they should allot 30,000 real men for 
 the service from the British army now here. Let them 
 afterwards change the corps—recall some and rein¬ 
 force others, or substitute Hanoverians for them, if they 
 like ; but let us in the first instance really perform our 
 treaty to our allies and the French Government.” 
 
 But “ the dislike of the newspaper-writer, or 
 some friend in Parliament,” required still to be 
 appeased, and accordingly—it is now, alas ! a 
 matter of history—as a popular measure of 
 further “economy,” it was determined to com¬ 
 mute the hard-earned pensions of our veteran 
 disbanded soldiers for a small sum, with which 
 they were sent to our colonies, where, unversed 
 in the art of taking care of ready money,— 
 unable to resist the fatal allurements of cheap 
 
Chap. V. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 113 
 
 spirits ,— u drinking is the soldier’s pleasure,”— 
 they soon became, as might have been antici¬ 
 pated, utterly destitute ; indeed, in Canada, to 
 the discredit of the British name, these brave, 
 improvident, undecorated men expired in the 
 backwoods in hundreds—~we might say in thou- 
 sands,— miserable victims—poor fellows ! — of 
 the combined effects of hunger, sickness, want 
 of clothing, and intense cold upon constitutions 
 worn out in the service of the noblest, most 
 generous, and wealthiest nation on the surface 
 of the globe! 
 
 u Sic vos non vobis.” 
 
 Having now concluded the sketches by which 
 we have endeavoured to illustrate the compara¬ 
 tive forces of the great military nations of 
 Europe, the peculiar organisation of the British 
 army, and the results of various degrees of disci¬ 
 pline, we shall endeavour to draw—principally 
 from the latter subject—a few useful conclu¬ 
 
 sions. 
 
114 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 Although it is most readily admitted that 
 there exists no superiority in courage or in 
 physical strength between the soldiers and 
 citizens of any country, we submit that it has 
 been practically demonstrated— 
 
 1. That an unorganised mob of ploughmen, 
 weavers, townsmen, &c., are totally incapable of 
 contending against disciplined troops, and conse¬ 
 quently, that if suddenly congregated for that 
 purpose even by the proclamation of their sove¬ 
 reign, they would, especially in their retreat, by 
 pillaging, &c., under pretence of subsistence, 
 probably prove in the hour of danger to be 
 absolutely worse than useless. 
 
 2. That it is impossible to effect the great 
 moral change necessary for converting such un¬ 
 organised men into properly disciplined young 
 soldiers in less than say twelve months. 
 
 3. That although an army of such young 
 soldiers may—in home drill, and even in small 
 evolutions—equal or even excel the less active 
 movements of old troops, they are from their 
 dash and impetuosity, when they first come 
 under fire, and until they have practically 
 
Chap. Y. 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 115 
 
 learned the value of coolness and field-obedience, 
 liable to burst the bands of discipline, and, by 
 doing too much and advancing too far, to sub¬ 
 ject themselves to unnecessary slaughter, confu¬ 
 sion, and defeat. 
 
 4. That for the reasons just stated an army 
 of old soldiers may more safely be relied on 
 than one composed solely of young troops. 
 
 5. That mixed with old soldiers, young ones, 
 subdued by their example, become of equal 
 value. 
 
 6. That mixed with an equal proportion of 
 regular troops, British imperfectly trained 
 militia and yeomanry—though utterly ineffi¬ 
 cient by themselves—encouraged by their ex¬ 
 ample, would become of considerable value. 
 
 7. That troops who have served only in 
 garrisons or in colonies — who have had no 
 field practice, and who are moreover com¬ 
 manded by Generals, Lieutenant - Colonels, 
 Majors, Captains, Lieutenants, and Ensigns, 
 totally inexperienced in evolutions, manoeuvres, 
 and in the .science of moving, at the same mo¬ 
 ment, a great army from point to point, across 
 
116 
 
 MILITARY WARFARE. 
 
 Part I 
 
 country and along roads, — who have never 
 even subsisted in billets, under canvas, or in 
 bivouac,—ought not in common prudence to be 
 deemed capable of contending, at a moment’s 
 warning, with an army composed of an equal 
 number of brave veteran soldiers, commanded 
 by officers and generals, the whole of whom, 
 first in artificial warfare, and then in real war, 
 have learned seriatim the details, minute as 
 well as great, necessary for fighting, under the 
 usual variety of movements, a great battle. 
 
 Lastly, that for the reasons above stated it is, 
 in any country, a fatal delusion to believe, that 
 to maintain a military force inadequate to de¬ 
 fend the lives and properties of the community, 
 —to deprive that inadequate force of the 
 means of learning the art of war,-—and more¬ 
 over to trust for defence, in the hour of danger, 
 to cheap undisciplined men, are measures of 
 
 “ ECONOMY.” 
 
PART II. 
 
 THE NAVAL SERVICE. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
( 119 ) 
 
 CHAPTEE I. 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Man the only animal that voluntarily goes to sea — Description 
 of a British Sailor •— His successes in the late war — His calm 
 courage — Jack’s belief that an English Admiral is not per¬ 
 mitted to strike his flag — National belief that we must 
 always conquer at sea a fallacy — Exposition thereof — De¬ 
 scription of the infancy, growth, and progress of War — 
 Reflections. 
 
 However wonderful may appear the construc¬ 
 tion of a vessel capable in the boundless ocean 
 of triumphantly contending against the combined 
 forces of winds and waves,—of the wild hurri¬ 
 cane and angry sea,'—yet naval architecture, 
 when attentively considered, does not display 
 greater ingenuity than many other pieces of 
 human mechanism. But a ship, though no 
 miracle of itself, may be said to have created 
 one. Of all the animals that came out of 
 Noah’s ark, man is the only one that has since 
 shown any disposition to return to the restraints 
 and restrictions which such an existence un- 
 
120 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Part II. 
 
 avoidably imposed, and certainly it is nothing 
 less than miraculous that not only in every 
 quarter of the globe there should be found 
 immense numbers of human beings voluntarily 
 adopting as their profession a life of dangerous 
 imprisonment on a restless element, in which 
 they are weaned, sometimes for years together, 
 from their mothers, their sisters, their wives, 
 their sweethearts,—from the flowers, fruits, and 
 verdure of the vegetable world; but that such 
 apparently unnatural privations should be the 
 means of strengthening the human frame to the 
 utmost, and of developing the most generous and 
 noblest feelings of the human heart! The crew 
 of a line-of-battle ship, frigate, or any descrip¬ 
 tion of man-of-war, exhibits a picture in which 
 man, often lightly clad and always loosely 
 dressed, appears to very great advantage : in¬ 
 deed, in the character of a sunburnt, weather- 
 beaten sailor, there is usually to be found united 
 contempt for danger, patience, steady friendship, 
 manly endurance, with the honesty and guileless 
 simplicity of a child. Besides these professional 
 characteristics, naval officers of all nations, though 
 
Chap. I. 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 121 
 
 often of rough exterior, are almost invariably 
 distinguished by that indescribable refinement 
 of mind that constitutes what is termed “ a 
 gentleman.” Wherever they go they are wel¬ 
 come members of the community, and from 
 having been taught from their infancy to en¬ 
 counter emergencies of various descriptions, 
 they almost invariably, on shore, turn out to be 
 better settlers in a colony than the members of 
 any other state of society. 
 
 ‘ ‘ O’er the glad waters of the dark blue sea, 
 
 Their thoughts as boundless, and their souls as free, 
 Far as the breeze can bear the billows’ foam, 
 
 Survey their empire and behold their home. 
 
 These are their realms ! ” 
 
 THE BRITISH, FRENCH, AND AMERICAN NAVIES. 
 
 Although the French, notwithstanding their 
 nautical inexperience, have ever displayed on 
 the ocean the same bravery that has so brilliantly 
 distinguished them on shore, the figures neces¬ 
 sary to illustrate the superiority of the British 
 over their navy during the last war are so few, 
 
 G 
 
122 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Part II. 
 
 that at its conclusion they might, by order of 
 the Admiralty, as a cheap substitute for a medal, 
 have easily been tattooed with gunpowder on 
 the brawny right arm of every sailor in our 
 service, as follows :— 
 
 “ Captured and destroyed by Jack between the years 
 1793 and 1815 
 
 100 French Line of Battle Ships. 
 
 166 Frigates, 
 
 224 Corvettes, Brigs, &c., 
 
 950 Privateers, 
 
 6200 Merchant Ships, 
 
 Out of 13 general actions, Jack gained all but one. 
 
 Out of 34 single frigate actions, ending in the capture 
 or destruction of either combatant, he gained all but two. 
 
 Result of battles of the Nile and Trafalgar :—French 
 loss, 36 sail of the line and 30,000 men ! Jack not losing 
 a single ship.” 
 
 To the above facts Captain the Honourable 
 E. Plunkett, E.N., adds that it is among the 
 proud traditions of our navy, that, in our in¬ 
 numerable conflicts with the French, there 
 exists no precedent in history of a British ad¬ 
 miral striking his flag to a French fleet; in- 
 
 From French authority. 
 
 i 
 
Chap. I. 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 123 
 
 deed that among our seamen there reigns a 
 belief that an English admiral is not permitted 
 to do so. Now, inasmuch as in any series of 
 experiments on the relative strength of two dif¬ 
 ferent descriptions of timber, metal, rope, or 
 other material, a continuous corroboration of 
 results such as those we have just detailed 
 would by men of science be deemed perfectly 
 conclusive, so it was apparently not very un¬ 
 reasonable for the British nation to come to the 
 conclusion—“ We have always beaten the French 
 at sea , and therefore we always shall.” And yet 
 it is evident almost on a moment’s reflection that 
 this inference is fallacious; for although the 
 strength of any material, like its specific gravity, 
 is undeniably a fixed quantity, the power of 
 man on land, as well as at sea, is not only liable 
 to sudden alternations, but has scarcely ever 
 existed long without them ; and as our national 
 safety rests upon a clear understanding of this 
 well-known axiom in military science, we will 
 very briefly endeavour to illustrate it. 
 
 In a state of pure nature, it is evident that in 
 a duel between two animals of any sort, the 
 
 g 2 
 
124 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Part II. 
 
 strongest must conquer; and thus Cain rose up 
 against Abel and slew him. But while the 
 relative strength of brute animals, like their in¬ 
 stinct, never alters, that of human beings, by the 
 power of reason, is constantly increasing. For 
 instance, to overbalance the force of his enemy, 
 man, “ when wild in woods the noble savage ran,” 
 probably first armed himself with a club, and 
 yet, so soon as his example was followed, the su¬ 
 periority he had invented vanished. A heavier, 
 a harder, a sharper weapon, and eventually the 
 use of a shield, with various degrees of dexterity 
 in the use of each, consecutively produced a series 
 of similar ephemeral advantages obliterated by 
 similar results. In the boyhood of the science 
 of war, the next great superiority invented was 
 that of missile weapons, by which a pigmy’s arm 
 suddenly became not only many times longer 
 than that of a giant, but by throwing several 
 spears before his antagonist could stride up to 
 him, he was enabled, without receiving a blow, 
 consecutively to slay two or three enemies, the 
 larger the better. The slaughter caused by the 
 dart was soon increased by the extended range 
 
Chap. I. 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 125 
 
 of the bow and arrow, the point of the latter 
 being at first made merely sharp, then barbed ; 
 and when, by copying these prescriptions from 
 each other, hostile tribes became, as originally, 
 equal, the ingenious art of dipping the extre¬ 
 mity of the missile in poison again altered their 
 relative strength, rendering, however, the in¬ 
 ventors predominant only until the deadly 
 secret became known. 
 
 By mixing together in certain proportions 
 common sulphur, charcoal, and nitre, man next 
 discovered a new power which when applied 
 against uncivilised tribes was considered to be 
 the lightning and thunder of heaven. The reed, 
 however envenomed, now became innocuous, in 
 comparison with an ingredient, one half ounce 
 of which has (it has been proved by experiment) 
 power to drive a steel bullet through sixteen 
 elm planks placed three-quarters of an inch from 
 each other! This magic power of slaying an 
 enemy at a distance, at which he may be often 
 barely visible, retarded at first by the slow 
 match, was rendered more rapid by the inven¬ 
 tion of the lock-match ; and although it was again 
 
126 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Part II. 
 
 multiplied by the application of a flint and ham¬ 
 mer, yet until very lately the rain of heaven 
 invariably gave to muskets the word of com¬ 
 mand, “ cease firing.” 
 
 The French have just invented a new musket 
 to which they ascribe extraordinary power of 
 accuracy of fire at ranges such as have never yet 
 been in use, namely, from 600 to 1000 yards; 
 indeed, they consider that very light field artil¬ 
 lery will be totally unable to stand against it. 
 
 Gunpowder was next employed to propel, from 
 cannon, balls of an infinitely larger size, to a 
 greater distance. 1 To obtain shelter from the 
 deadly havoc these created, there were invented 
 parapets, ramparts, and other works, by placing 
 guns behind which an immense superiority was 
 obtained. As a counter invention hollow shells 
 filled with gunpowder were projected at an 
 angle of elevation which enabled them, by over- 
 
 1 The following facts will exemplify the explosive power of 
 gunpowder. A 56-pounder shell filled with lead, and thereby 
 weighing sixty-one pounds, penetrated twenty-six feet into the 
 butt at Woolwich, which was 1200 yards distant; charge of 
 powder seventeen pounds. A 24-pound shot, at 400 yards, 
 penetrated six feet into concrete. 
 
Chap. I. 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 127 
 
 riding the barriers we have described, to ex¬ 
 plode among those who had erected them. In 
 spite, however, of all that human ingenuity has 
 been able to devise, up to the present moment, 
 one thousand men in an average fortress can effec¬ 
 tually resist from six thousand to eight thousand 
 of their equals; and although all military men 
 know that to assault them is utterly impracti¬ 
 cable, yet so sure are the operations of science, 
 that by any engineer of experience it can be 
 calculated, almost to a day, how long the weaker 
 force is capable of holding out; or in other 
 words, in what precise time the stronger, by 
 sapping, trenching, mining, &c., can confidently 
 undertake to overcome the artificial advantages 
 that have been created; in short, the poet has 
 truly said — 
 
 “ War is toil and trouble, 
 
 Honour but an empty bubble ; 
 
 Never ending, still beginning ; 
 
 Fighting still, and still destroying! ” 
 
 Now, from the mere showing of the case, is it 
 not evident, that from the first conflict that took 
 place between two naked members of the human 
 
128 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Part IL 
 
 species clown to the last great battle, there has 
 never existed a single moment at which any 
 family, tribe, or nation, civilised or uncivilised, 
 could reasonably or safely have said,—“ We 
 won’t bother ourselves by reflecting on the pro¬ 
 gress of the art of war: we won’t trouble our¬ 
 selves to invent new weapons, or even to adopt 
 those which other nations may have invented. 
 In the science of the destruction of our fellow- 
 creatures we will neither lead nor follow: ice 
 have always licked our neighbouring enemy , and 
 therefore ive always shall” The Directors of a 
 great Railway Company might as well publicly 
 announce, u We will henceforwards have no 
 more alterations of machinerv. Our engines 
 are now the fleetest in the world, and therefore 
 they always must be so.” 
 
 The fallacy of such reasoning is, it is sub¬ 
 mitted, so glaring, that we will at once proceed 
 to consider the practical points which we desire 
 to elucidate, namely:— 
 
 1. What were the relative conditions of the 
 British and French navies at the conclusion of 
 the last war ? 
 
Chap. I. 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 129 
 
 2. What are their relative conditions at 
 present ? 
 
 This comparison will enable us to judge — 
 
 3. Whether, because we undeniably beat them 
 then, there exist reasonable grounds for believing 
 that we could do so now, and that, moreover, 
 we shall be able to do so for ever ? 
 
130 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Part II. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 ON THE RELATIVE CONDITION OF THE BRITISH, FRENCH, 
 AND AMERICAN NAVIES DURING THE LAST WAR. 
 
 Description of the British system of Naval Warfare during the 
 last War — Close quarters the policy and practice of Nelson 
 — Description of yard-arm action — Its success — The Ame¬ 
 ricans carefully study the British system, and remedy its 
 defects. 
 
 Nelson’s System of Warfare. 
 
 The British people, as if they were aware of 
 their innate superior strength and cool courage, 
 appear in private life to disdain to have recourse 
 to artifice of any sort. Not only is “ war to 
 the knife ” unknown to our peasantry, but when 
 they have stripped off their jackets, waistcoats, 
 neckerchiefs, and have shaken hands to fight, it 
 is considered “ foul play to strike their anta¬ 
 gonist below the belt, and above all when he is 
 down. Accordingly, animated with these senti¬ 
 ments, it is not surprising that in the constitution 
 
Chap. II. 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 131 
 
 of our naval as well as military forces there 
 should appear an instinctive propensity on the 
 part of the nation to work as much as possible 
 with the raw material; and certainly so long as 
 we were able to persuade the French navy to 
 follow our example, we adroitly secured to our¬ 
 selves those physical and moral advantages which, 
 as we have just shown, it is in the power of 
 science to annul. 
 
 Without therefore any desire to condemn the 
 system which existed under Nelson—on the 
 contrary, with a firm belief that it was far from 
 our interest to alter it—we will very briefly en¬ 
 deavour to describe what that system really was, 
 and under what circumstances it enabled us to 
 gain, one after another, the series of brilliant vic¬ 
 tories which in the naval annals of our country 
 are indelibly recorded. 
 
 During the reign of Napoleon, it need hardly 
 be stated that, while the white sails of British 
 merchant-vessels, in all weathers and in all sea¬ 
 sons, sometimes scudding and sometimes be¬ 
 calmed, were to be seen dotted over the blue 
 aqueous surface of the globe, it was dangerous 
 
132 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Part II. 
 
 even for a French line-of-battle ship to put to 
 sea; indeed in many instances where it was 
 attempted, the devoted vessel—for instance the 
 4 Kivoli ’—just launched, glided in a few hours 
 from its cradle to its grave, or, without metaphor, 
 it became the youthful prize of its enemy. Under 
 these circumstances the maritime population of 
 England, in numbers as well as in seamanship, 
 of course greatly exceeded that of France; and 
 although our system of impressment was (as we 
 shall shortly have occasion to consider) subject 
 to grave objections, yet it may equally truly 
 be said that that by which our unscrupulous 
 antagonist obtained his marine conscripts was, 
 practically speaking, very little better. 
 
 Our ships were sometimes very badly recruited. 
 The ‘Vanguard,’ Lord Nelson’s flag-ship at the 
 Nile, was so miserably manned as to seamen , 
 that the Captains of the other ships offered to 
 contribute to him a portion of good seamen 
 from each ship, in exchange for the same 
 number of his landsmen; but Nelson would 
 “ not allow a man to be changed .” The ‘ Java,’ 
 also, when she fought the American ‘ Constitu- 
 
Chap. II. 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 133 
 
 tion,’ was wretchedly manned. Captain Chads, 
 who was first lieutenant, stated “ that they had 
 not ten good sailors on board.” 
 
 Nevertheless, so soon as a British man-of-war 
 was commissioned, by hook or by crook she was 
 soon filled with a crew partly composed of hardy 
 seafaring young men, accustomed in a rough way 
 to the handling of sails in all weathers; and, 
 as every change of wind as well as every tack 
 was practice, they were soon taught by their 
 officers, and if necessary by the sudden pre¬ 
 scription of “ the boatswain’s mate,” to be quick 
 in their movements. 
 
 With such materials to work with, it was 
 the plain bulldog policy as well as practice of 
 Nelson—nearly 1 the best seaman of his day— 
 without evolutions or circumvolutions to run 
 straight at his inexperienced enemy; and as, 
 for yard-arm action, short guns are as good as 
 
 1 Nelson is not considered, by naval men, to have been so 
 good a practical seaman as Collingwood, still less in comparison 
 with Lord Exmouth, who was probably the best sailor that has 
 ever been on the list of admirals. But Nelson admirably well 
 knew what to do with a fleet, and, although he was frequently 
 sea-sick, his attacks proved the originality of his genius. 
 
134 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Part II. 
 
 long ones,— indeed, from being lighter and 
 easier worked, and consequently requiring fewer 
 men, they are, especially on the upper deck, 
 infinitely better ,—a considerable proportion of 
 the old-fashioned long cannon were exchanged 
 for carronades of the same bore, of about two- 
 thirds of their length and weight; and as, thus 
 manned and armed, our fleet bore down upon 
 its antagonists, the scene on board the assailants 
 was one strongly characteristic of the British 
 people. In many instances, especially in hot 
 latitudes, the ship’s company—as from stem to 
 stern they stood silent at their quarters, clus¬ 
 tered on each side of their respective guns, the 
 centre of each deck remaining unoccupied— 
 were naked to the waist; and although their 
 calm, noble, manly countenances, and the tran¬ 
 quillity of their powerful muscles, soon to be 
 strained to their very utmost, were indicative of 
 repose, and even of peace, yet the short prayer 
 which in every well-regulated ship was offered 
 up, the common precaution of preparing sand 
 for the deck to enable them to keep their feet 
 when it should become clotted with blood, and 
 
Chap. II. 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 135 
 
 the large tubs of water on the gratings of the 
 main hatchway, to allay the thirst invariably 
 created by the smoke of gunpowder, clearly 
 showed that, although the narrow stratum be¬ 
 tween decks—(while the crew rested on the 
 one, their heads all but touched the other)— 
 would probably, as usual, soon become the 
 temple of victory, nevertheless, to those destined 
 during the action to be thrown by their com¬ 
 rades as corpses through the very port-holes 
 through which they had fired, it was, really, 
 without metaphor, the chamber of death ! 
 
 To persons who have never witnessed the 
 destruction by wholesale of their fellow-crea¬ 
 tures, it would be impossible to describe the 
 scene of excitement that existed during an action 
 between two vessels pouring broadsides into 
 each other at occasionally so short a distance, 
 that as a necessary precaution it was, and in¬ 
 deed still is, the custom to serve out to each gun 
 a spare rope sponge, in consequence of the long 
 wooden ones, which, on being withdrawn from 
 the gun, necessarily protrude many feet through 
 the ports, having been often snatched out 
 
136 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Part II. 
 
 of the hands of our men by the crew of the 
 enemy alongside. 1 
 
 When this furious system of warfare is calmly 
 compared with the victorious results we have 
 recorded, it surely cannot be denied—at all 
 events by our antagonists—that it was admirably 
 adapted to the attainment of our object. In 
 great actions, as well as in duels between vessels 
 of all sizes, it proved invariably successful. By 
 it our naval officers and men captured almost 
 every vessel that ventured to oppose them—it 
 swept the ocean of their enemies; and such being 
 the case, how fully justified was Nelson—whose 
 maxim was to seek for every possible description 
 of danger—in not only constituting close action 
 as the rule of English warfare, but in more¬ 
 over declaring, “ I have always considered a 
 gale of wind or a dark night as a point in my 
 favour !” 
 
 Now, we are quite aware that the facts and 
 conclusions we have just submitted, appa¬ 
 rently contradict the object for which they 
 
 1 Rope sponges are also used when, from a heavy sea, it is 
 necessary to load the guns with the ports down. 
 
Chap. II. 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 137 
 
 have been adduced; and that, as an unskilful 
 advocate often ruins his client by proving too 
 much, so it may be observed that we have 
 actually substantiated that which we had endea¬ 
 voured to deny; and that, from our own show¬ 
 ing, unless we can prove that the British race 
 has degenerated, nothing but special pleading of 
 the most despicable description can attempt to 
 refute the good old English maxim, “We have 
 always licked the French at sea, and therefore 
 we always shall.” We reply, however, in the 
 words of Portia, “ Tarry a little: there is some¬ 
 thing yet J” 
 
 Relative Condition of the British and American 
 Navies during the late War. 
 
 It is evident that in warfare the policy of a 
 stout man and a weak one are not only very 
 different, but that what is good for the one is bad 
 for the other. For instance, it was proved at 
 Paris, in 1815, that a body of British highland¬ 
 ers, or lowlanders, standing “ shoulder to shoul¬ 
 der,” stretch over more ground than a similar 
 number of the inhabitants— soldiers or civilians— 
 
138 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Part II. 
 
 of any other nation in Europe; in three words, 
 they are stronger ; and consequently, without any 
 intentional disrespect to the art of war, it is 
 undeniable that, the balance of Nature being in 
 favour of our countrymen, they acted wisely— 
 so long as the choice of weapons was allowed to 
 them —in preferring everywhere to fight in buck¬ 
 ram rather than in armour, and in what is com¬ 
 monly called “ buff,” to both: in short, that they 
 could not do better on the wide ocean than fol¬ 
 low the policy which Nelson had pursued. But 
 as we have shown, it is the high privilege of 
 science, in war as well as in mechanics, to annul 
 the superiority of mere physical strength; and 
 accordingly, when the Americans (in 1812) sud¬ 
 denly declared war with us, we found out, to our 
 cost, how astutely they had pre-considered this 
 important truth. 
 
 They knew themselves to be weaker than us 
 in money; their looking-glasses told them that 
 their emaciating climate had made them lean, 
 .lengthy, sallow; in short, infinitely our inferiors 
 in physical strength: nevertheless, far exceeding 
 us in ability, they very sensibly and very 
 
Chap. II. 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 139 
 
 carefully looked into our naval system, which, 
 though admirably adapted for us —if we could but 
 have inveigled them, as Nelson had seduced the 
 French, to adopt it—was evidently most defec¬ 
 tive in that which, by recourse to science, it was 
 in their power most amply to supply, and which 
 will form the subject of the following chapter. 
 
140 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Part II. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE OLD SYSTEM OF GUNNERY. 
 
 Description of Nelson’s system of Gunnery — French and Bri¬ 
 tish equally ignorant of the art — Illustration of the extraor¬ 
 dinary errors committed — Americans invoke the aid of 
 Science — Build larger Ships — Arm them with longer and 
 heavier guns — Man them with British Sailors — Their suc¬ 
 cess — The British nation smarts under the consequences — 
 But as soon as peace was obtained forget the causes — Main¬ 
 tain the defective system under an erroneous idea of “ eco¬ 
 nomy.” 
 
 In Nelson’s glorious system of “close quarters,” 
 this science, the cultivation of which materially 
 over-rules the physical and, comparatively speak¬ 
 ing, petty advantages of stout hearts and sturdy 
 limbs, was—perhaps purposely—neglected ; at 
 all events, the Admiralty issued no orders on the 
 subject. It formed no part of the examination 
 of a midshipman or of any commissioned officer; 
 in short, with a few exceptions, it was not only 
 totally neglected, but by our gallant seamen, who 
 were taught to consider manoeuvring or prudence 
 
Chap. III. 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 141 
 
 of any sort as “unworthy of the British Flag,” 
 it was looked down upon as an artifice rather than 
 an art; and thus the only system of gunnery 
 which the English navy recognised was that 
 every captain was to have his own, which 
 amounted as nearly as possible to the old gun¬ 
 ner’s prescription: “ Don’t fire a shot till we 
 close with her, and then, my lads, give her our 
 
 -board broadside, as hot as she can such it! ” 
 
 “There must,” said the lieutenant of the 
 quarters, to the captain of a gun, the excessive 
 recoil of which had chanced to attract his atten¬ 
 tion, “ there must surely have been two shot 
 there! ” “And, plase your honour A replied the 
 man archly, as with the back of his broad thumb 
 he wiped a mixture of powder and perspiration 
 from his brow, “ there were three of them ! ” 
 How many balls hit, and how many missed, it 
 was no one’s duty to inquire, because, in due time, 
 hit or miss, down came the enemy’s flag—and 
 out burst three glorious British cheers! 
 
 In the naval actions which had taken place 
 between the French and English, the ignorance 
 on both sides of the art of gunnery was altogether 
 
142 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Part II. 
 
 beyond belief, and almost beyond description. 
 For instance, it was a maxim in our fleet, and 
 to this day it is steadfastly believed by many 
 flag-officers, decorated with medals and wounds 
 received in the late war, that “ a shot always 
 rises when it leaves a gun” whereas, from the 
 instant it does so, it theoretically as well as 
 practically begins to fall, although, for as far as 
 what is called its point-blank range, the power 
 of gravity bears so small a proportion to that of 
 the gunpowder, that its declination is imper¬ 
 ceptible. Again, strange to say, it is still an 
 old-established prejudice in our navy that “ the 
 French almost always fired at our rigging in¬ 
 stead of at our hull;” whereas the fact is, that 
 smarting under our fire, they fired at our hulls 
 to disable our guns, instead of which, true 
 enough, like the cockney who shot at a pigeon 
 and killed a crow, they usually either hit our 
 rigging, or sent their shot high between our 
 masts ! The causes of these misapprehensions 
 and mistakes may briefly be explained to un¬ 
 military people as follows: 
 
 If any one of our readers, as he is comfortably 
 
Chap. III. 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 143 
 
 seated at his fire-side, will take the trouble to 
 put a pea into his mouth, and holding a common 
 tin peashooter horizontally, and placing the far 
 end of it on the back of a chair, if he will then 
 look through it, he will distinctly see the precise 
 spot on the chimney-piece at which it points. 
 Now, if without moving his head or the far 
 extremity of the peashooter, he will lower the 
 end through which he had looked from his right 
 eye to his mouth, and then with the whole 
 power of his lungs, if he will blow out the pea, 
 he will find it hit the chimney-piece infinitely 
 higher than the mark he had observed;—the 
 obvious reason being, that by having lowered 
 one end of the peashooter considerably below 
 the horizontal line at which he had at first ad¬ 
 justed it, he had given to it a corresponding 
 angle of elevation. Now, this demonstrates ex¬ 
 actly the error in gunnery which, in the hurry 
 of action, the French almost invariably, and the 
 British very generally, committed; for, if a 
 cannon, like a tin peashooter, were of the same 
 thickness of metal throughout its whole length, 
 it is evident that by merely looking along its 
 
144 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Part II. 
 
 top surface, it might be most accurately pointed 
 at any object But in order to impart to the 
 gun the greatest amount of strength where it is 
 most necessary,—namely, at the point of ex¬ 
 plosion,—the metal at the breech (where the 
 powder is lodged) is purposely made consider¬ 
 ably thicker than at the muzzle; and as this dif¬ 
 ference of thickness, termed in gunnery “the 
 Dispart,” is in a 32-pounder gun as nearly as 
 possible equal to the distance between a man’s 
 eyes and his mouth, it is evident that in aiming 
 the said gun by looking along its upper surface 
 (which, from not being parallel with the bore, 
 pointed at a different object), the interior of the 
 breech, like the near end of the peashooter, was 
 depressed between 3 and 4 inches, and accord¬ 
 ingly the shot, like the pea, striking very con¬ 
 siderably above the mark at which—not the bore 
 of the gun but—the line of exterior metal, 
 actually pointed, it was declared, as has been 
 stated, “ that a shot always rises when it leaves 
 the muzzle of a gun and “ that the French 
 always fired at our rigging instead of at our 
 hulls!” And yet, strange to say, it was 
 
Ciiap. III. 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 145 
 
 not until many years after the peace that 
 this glaring mistake in our gunnery was at 
 last forced upon the attention of the Admiralty 
 by Sir Howard Douglas; and even then the 
 national disinclination to correct it was so strong, 
 that when the simple means of aiming guns 
 correctly, namely, by the adjustment of a 
 “sight” that need not have cost sixpence, was at 
 last supplied, it was served out only to every 
 alternate gun, thus making only half a ship’s 
 broadside efficient! 
 
 Such ignorance on the part of the French 
 and British navies of an elementary geometrical 
 fact, known for more than fifty years to every 
 artilleryman in our land-service, will probably 
 appear to our readers so incredible that we feel 
 it due to the subject we are endeavouring to 
 illustrate, to support our statement by the evi¬ 
 dence of our own naval officers. 
 
 “ An examination,” says the Honourable Captain 
 Plunkett, R.N., in his admirable work entitled 4 The 
 Past and Future of the British Navy,’ 44 of the ac¬ 
 counts, whether private or official, English or foreign, 
 of the last war, will leave us utterly at a loss to 
 account for ships cannonading each other at 4 pistol- 
 
 H 
 
146 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Part II. 
 
 shot ’ for hours without result. What became of the 
 shot ? 
 
 44 A naval officer,” continues Capt. P., 44 related 
 the following story to the House of Commons:— 4 A 
 frigate which I belonged to in 1811 chased a French 
 frigate almost into her own port, and being then com¬ 
 pelled to retire by the French batteries, gave her 
 opponent a parting broadside at a very short distance. 
 Not a single shot took effect ! ? 
 
 44 Flere is ample proof,” adds Capt. P., 44 that, 
 though we surpassed our adversaries in efficiency of 
 fire, the execution done bore no proportion to the 
 ammunition expended.” 
 
 Again, in a pamphlet published in 1847, en¬ 
 titled ‘ Remarks on the Conduct of the Naval 
 Administration of Great Britain since 1815, 
 by a Flag Officer,’ with a Preface by Rear Ad¬ 
 miral Bowles, latelv one of the Lords of the 
 Admiralty, it is stated — 
 
 44 There can be no doubt that our reverses during 
 the American war are to be attributed, not only to the 
 great superiority of the ships we engaged, but to the 
 imperfect manner in which our gunners and men had 
 been trained to the use of their guns. It will perhaps 
 hardly be credited hereafter, that there was at that 
 time no regular system established by authority in the 
 British navy, but that each ship had its own particular 
 plan and method, varying, of course, according to the 
 
Chap. III. 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 147 
 
 experience and degree of information possessed by the 
 captain, as well as to the degree of importance which he 
 attached to the subject. I need not detail the fatal 
 negligence which too often prevailed, and which be¬ 
 came only known in its full extent by its unfortunate 
 results.” 
 
 Sir Howard Douglas, in his admirable trea¬ 
 tise on Naval Gunnery, which now forms the 
 
 basis of the new naval system on board H.M.S. 
 
 */ 
 
 the ‘ Excellent,’ as well as that of the other 
 maritime nations of Europe, says : — 
 
 44 Reviewing carefully our naval actions with Euro¬ 
 pean enemies during the whole of the last war, and 
 comparing them with the battles that were fought in 
 that which immediately preceded, there appears abun¬ 
 dant proof that the navies of Europe had very much 
 deteriorated in the practice of gunnery. In the war 
 which terminated in 1783 the damage which our 
 ships sustained, even in combats with nearly equal 
 force, was, in general, much greater than in the ac¬ 
 tions of the late French war. It appears, indeed, that, 
 even in the later periods of Napoleon’s reign, when he 
 had certainly effected considerable improvements in 
 his marine, the state of practical gunnery was still so 
 wretched, that we have seen ships, fully officered, 
 superbly equipped, and strongly manned, playing 
 batteries of twenty or thirty heavy guns against our 
 vessels, crowded with men, without more effect than 
 
 h 2 
 
148 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Part II. 
 
 might easily have been produced by one or two 
 well-directed pieces; and we have seen some cases 
 in which heavy frigates have used powerful batteries 
 against our vessels for a considerable time, without 
 producing any effect at all. 
 
 u The danger of resting satisfied with superiority 
 over a system so wretched as this, has been made suf¬ 
 ficiently evident. It consisted more in relative than in 
 absolute excellence. We became too confident by 
 being feebly opposed; then slack in warlike exercise 
 by not being opposed at all ; and, lastly, in many 
 cases, inexpert for want even of drill practice. 
 
 “ If the gunners of a vessel mistake the elevated 
 sight of their carronades for the point -blank line, and 
 when close to their enemy fire at an elevation of three 
 and a half degrees, what can be expected ? I have 
 witnessed and could name distinguished authorities to 
 prove the existence of much more serious errors /” 
 
 Gunnery was, in naval warfare, in the ex¬ 
 traordinary state of ignorance we have just de¬ 
 scribed, when our lean children, the American 
 people, taught us rod in hand our first lesson in 
 the art. Undaunted by the prestige which illu¬ 
 minated the names of those gallant officers who 
 had fought under Nelson—unintimidated by 
 the number of our men of war, or by the noble 
 crews of seamen that existed between their 
 
Chap. III. 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 149 
 
 decks, they very adroitly determined to obtain, 
 partly from science and partly from a very 
 excusable description of smart legerdemain, more 
 than enough to make up for their deficiency in 
 money and physical strength. Accordingly, 
 they not only, by patient application and con¬ 
 stant drill, converted their seamen into prac¬ 
 tised gunners and expert artillerymen , but, by 
 substituting long guns instead of our short ones, 
 they secured for themselves the immense ad¬ 
 vantage of being able, without loss or danger, 
 luxuriously to pummel us to death at ranges at 
 which they had precalculated they would be 
 completely out of our reach. In short, just as 
 in civil life “ a pistol and twelve paces,” in the 
 days of duelling, at once enabled the smallest 
 man to level the physical superiority of him 
 who had got into the habit of overpowering every- 
 bodv merely because evervbody was weaker 
 than himself, so did the Americans concoct 
 similar arrangements for meeting on its native 
 element the navy of Great Britain. With this 
 object in view, they not only constructed their 
 three principal classes of ships, nominally of 
 
150 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Part IT. 
 
 the same force as our own, one-third superior in 
 size, but in the same proportion in each in¬ 
 stance they increased the calibre of their guns 
 and the number of the crew, who, be it always 
 remembered, were almost entirely composed of 
 British seamen converted into artillerymen . 
 
 44 At the navy-yard at Gosport,” says the late 
 Captain Basil Hall, R.N., in his 4 Travels in North 
 America,’ 44 there was a line-of-battle ship, the 4 New 
 York ’ (called a seventy-four), of ninety guns, and 
 the 4 St. Lawrence ’ (called a forty-four), of sixty 
 guns. 
 
 44 In the course of the same morning we visited the 
 4 Delaware’ (called a seventy-four), lying fully equip¬ 
 ped, and all ready for sea. There were mounted, 
 when X went on hoard, thirty-two long guns on the 
 lower deck, 42-pounders ; on the main-deck thirty-two 
 guns, 32-pounders; on the quarter-deck and forecastle 
 twenty-eight 42-pound carronades ; in all, ninety-two 
 guns. Eight ports were left unoccupied on the upper 
 deck, so that she may be said to be pierced for one 
 hundred guns.” 
 
 And yet, overwhelming as w r ere these advan¬ 
 tages, it will appear from the following evidence 
 that it was principally by superior gunnery and 
 artillery tactics that we were sentenced to pay to 
 
Chap, III. 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 151 
 
 the Americans the penalty ever exacted by 
 Science from whoever, relying solely upon 
 physical strength, presumes to despise her supe¬ 
 rior assistance. 
 
 “The enemy's fleet,” says Captain Sir James Yeo, 
 R.N., in his letter dated Lake Ontario, 12th September, 
 1813, “of eleven sail, having a partial wind, suc¬ 
 ceeded in getting within range of their long 24 and 32 
 pounders; and, having obtained the wind of us, I 
 found it impossible to bring them to close action. 
 We remained in this mortifying situation Jive hours, 
 having only six guns in the fleet that would, reach the 
 enemy . Not a carronade was fired . At sunset 
 a breeze sprung up from the westward, when I 
 manoeuvred to oblige the enemy to meet us on equal 
 terms. This, however, he caref ully avoided .” 
 
 Again, Captain Barclay, R.N., in his report 
 on the same action, says:— 
 
 “ The other brig of the enemy, apparently destined 
 to engage the 4 Queen Charlotte,’ supported in like 
 manner by two schooners, kept so far to windward 
 as to render the 4 Queen Charlotte’s ’ 24 pounder 
 carronades useless, whilst she and the 4 Lady Prevost ’ 
 were exposed to a heavy and destructive fire from the 
 4 Caledonian’ and four other schooners armed with 
 long and heavy guns.” 
 
 The testimony of various other British naval 
 
1 52 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Part II. 
 
 officers of rank and experience might be added, 
 each adducing facts proving the superiority of 
 American men-of-war in artillery tactics. We 
 will, however, conclude by submitting to our 
 readers the following summing up of the case 
 by that highly intelligent officer to whose work 
 we have already referred. 
 
 “ In accounting/' says Captain Plunkett, R.N., “ for 
 the defeats of the American war, Englishmen are 
 accustomed to attribute them wholly to the superior 
 size and force of the enemy's ships. It is perfectly 
 true that this superiority was sufficient to account for 
 the unfavourable result — nay, to make such result 
 inevitable ; yet candour compels us to admit that the 
 immediate and actual cause of our defeat, in several 
 instances, was the superior gunnery of the Americans. 
 That our ships should have been captured by oppo¬ 
 nents half as large again is no proof of extraordinary 
 prowess in the victors, but that half the ships taken 
 should be reduced to a sinking state and actually 
 founder , is irresistible evidence of good gunnery on the 
 part of the Americans; while the comparatively un¬ 
 injured state of the American ships shows, as many 
 other facts do, how sad was our own negligence.” 
 
 It might naturally have been expected that 
 the fatal results of this “negligence” would 
 have taught us the necessity of correcting it. 
 
Chap. III. 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 153 
 
 No sooner, however, did our war with the 
 United States end, than, just as the ruddy 
 schoolboy not only stops crying the instant the 
 ugly usher has done flogging him, but, without 
 even wiping his eyes, runs off to play, so did 
 the British nation, forgetting the castigation it 
 had publicly received, instantly revert to its 
 darling habits, prejudices, and opinions; and 
 though the art of gunnery as practised at Wool¬ 
 wich was the admiration of Europe, from our 
 national vis inertice it remained,—as if it had 
 been non-amphibious,—untransferred to sea prac¬ 
 tice. Our sailors were paid off, our men-of-war 
 were laid up in ordinary; and thus, although as 
 in the case of our army the advantages of disci¬ 
 pline and of the science of war had been most 
 clearly shown to us, and although the pages of 
 the precious volume had by the Americans 
 been actually held up before our eyes until we 
 had wept as we read them, we resolutely per¬ 
 sisted, as had been the case with our army, in 
 “learning nothing, and in forgetting all !” 
 
154 
 
 NAVAL "WARFARE, 
 
 Part IT. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 ON THE PRESENT RELATIVE CONDITION OF THE BRITISH 
 
 AND FRENCH NAVIES. 
 
 The successes of the American Navy create a deep impression 
 in Europe — France especially determines to adopt the suc¬ 
 cessful system — Descriptive sketch of the new system of 
 Gunnery as recommended by Sir Howard Douglas — Alter¬ 
 ation in the armament of guns — Oddities in shot — Simpli¬ 
 fication of wads — Strange anecdote concerning them — 
 Horizontal shell-firing — Shells, percussion and concussion — 
 The havoc they create, even to those who use them •— San¬ 
 guinary effects they will probably produce in the next war — 
 Powder — Fuses — Tubes — Musket, Pistol, and Sword ex¬ 
 ercise — Action — Pieflections. 
 
 The New System of Gunnery. 
 
 On the continent of Europe, however, the 
 case was very different. The success of the 
 American navy in suddenly breaking a talisman 
 —the magic power of which for so many years 
 had appeared to be invincible—produced such 
 a deep impression, that every maritime power, 
 especially France, resolved, more or less, to follow 
 
Chap. IV. 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 155 
 
 the example of that new system of gunnery and 
 naval tactics which had been attended with such 
 astonishing results; and as we have now to con¬ 
 sider, secondly, what are at present the relative 
 conditions of the British and French navies, it 
 is necessary that we should submit to our readers 
 a very faint sketch of the progress, since the 
 year 1815, of the art in question in both coun¬ 
 tries, Previous, however, to doing so, with 
 great satisfaction we have to observe that al¬ 
 though for more than five-and-twenty years 
 after the peace of 1814 British naval officers 
 continued not even to be examined in gunnery, 
 yet that, since 1832, in accordance with the 
 recommendations of Sir Howard Douglas, very 
 great efforts have been made by our Admiralty 
 sometimes to copy and sometimes to excel the 
 improvements adopted by the French; and it is, 
 therefore, this peaceful scientific struggle between 
 the two greatest nations on the globe that we 
 have now very briefly to review. 
 
156 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Part II. 
 
 Guns. 
 
 One of the first points to which the French 
 turned their attention was to substitute, like the 
 Americans, long , heavy cannon for short, light 
 ones. 
 
 For the British naval service there were for¬ 
 merly no less than twenty-seven different de¬ 
 scriptions of guns, principally 32, 24, 18, and 12- 
 pounders, all of which are now obsolete, except¬ 
 ing the first, which throughout our navy has 
 been constituted the principal armament for all 
 descriptions of vessels, excepting those deemed 
 large enough likewise to carry a proportionate 
 number of guns of larger calibre. 
 
 The length and weight of these 32-pounder 
 guns are various. For frigates and line-of- 
 battle ships there are no less than four descrip¬ 
 tions, differing in length from 9i to 8 feet, and 
 in weight from 56 to 45 cwt. For brigs and 
 most of the smaller vessels, 32-pounders of 25 
 cwt. have been substituted for the old carronades 
 of similar bore weighing 1/ cwt. By the above 
 alteration a most important simplification has 
 been obtained; for, as the shot of all these differ- 
 
Chap. IV. 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 157 
 
 ent 32-pounder guns are, of course, alike, it is 
 evident that those taken out of any description 
 of vessel will serve for every other. 
 
 In addition to this 32-pounder—the “jack of 
 all work ” of the British navy—there are sup¬ 
 plied to frigates and line-of-battle ships a pro¬ 
 portionate number, generally about 12, of 8- 
 inch guns, weighing 65 cwt., and throwing a 
 shot of 56 lbs. There are also supplied to 
 steamers only , a 10-inch pivot gun weighing 85 
 cwt., throwing a shot of 84 lbs., and also a 
 68-pounder pivot gun of the enormous weight 
 of 95 cwt., which, at 14/. 10,9. per ton, costs 
 78/. I7<s. 6d. Brass guns cost nearly ten times 
 as much, namely, 140/. per ton. 
 
 Shot. 
 
 For the 32-pounders of all lengths, as also for 
 the gigantic 68-pounder, solid shot are used; 
 but for the 8 and 10-inch guns, which, to pre¬ 
 vent their being too heavy, are not cast strong 
 enough to propel solid shot to a sufficient dis¬ 
 tance, there are supplied hollow shot, which of 
 course make a much larger hole than if the 
 
158 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Part II. 
 
 amount of metal contained in them had been 
 solid. Now our readers would probably sup¬ 
 pose that it could matter but little—at all events 
 to the missile—in what part of a hollow shot 
 the vacuum within it existed; it has, however, 
 lately been ascertained by experiment that if, 
 instead of being, as is usually the case, in the 
 centre, it be near the circumference, the fol¬ 
 lowing extraordinary results occur :— 
 
 If a hollow shot be placed in a gun with the 
 vacuum on the left, the projectile will be pro¬ 
 pelled to the right; if it be placed with the 
 vacuum on the right , its flight will be to the 
 left; if to the rear (that is, towards the breech of 
 the gun), the range will be slightly diminished; 
 if outwards (that is, towards the muzzle), the 
 range will be slightly increased . If in a 32- 
 pounder the internal vacuum of the shot be 
 placed upwards , the range will be from 300 to 
 400 yards less than if in the centre. If* on the 
 contrary, with the vacuum downwards , the 
 range will become from 300 to 400 yards 
 greater; the mere alteration of a hollow shot’s 
 centre of gravity thus making a difference in 
 
Chap. IV. 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 159 
 
 its range from 600 to 800 yards, besides the 
 various other changes enumerated! 
 
 In all shot called “solid,” whether of lead or 
 iron, however carefully they may be cast, there 
 is always a small vacuum; and as the centre of 
 gravity is consequently seldom or never exactly 
 in the centre, it is evident that the course and 
 range of the projectile must always slightly vary 
 according to the position in which the said 
 vacuum (unknown to the loader) happens to 
 be placed. 
 
 Besides solid and hollow shot, there are a 
 proportion of grape and case for all the guns 
 above mentioned. 
 
 It has been calculated that a moderate breeze 
 drives a shot to leeward one foot in every hun¬ 
 dred yards; a moderate gale, two feet. 
 
 Every 68 pound shot that is fired costs (at f cl. 
 per lb.) 35. 5 d. 
 
 Wads. 
 
 In order to prevent the charge within a gun 
 from moving by the motion of the sea, it was 
 deemed necessary throughout the late war to load 
 
160 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Part II. 
 
 with solid oakum wads, which, from the inside 
 of the gun getting rusty, and from various other 
 causes, occasionally became so tight that con¬ 
 siderable strength and most valuable time were 
 often expended in unscientifically attempting to 
 compress air which had no power to escape. 
 These clumsy retainers have since been super¬ 
 seded by a piece of circular rope, crossed in the 
 middle by two broad oakum bands, resembling 
 altogether a wheel of four spokes; which simple 
 contrivance, by not confining the air, not only 
 gets rid of that unnecessary difficulty, but as the 
 circumference of the rope jams the shot all the 
 way round just as a stone placed under a car¬ 
 riage-wheel touches it in one part, it answers 
 its purpose infinitely better than the old wad, 
 which, besides all the bother of insertion we have 
 described, was after all a mere tangent to the 
 exterior circumference of the shot—as unfavour¬ 
 able an application of power as could possibly 
 have been devised. 
 
 The French have lately materially improved 
 this invention by simply cutting through the 
 circumference of the wad ; which operation, 
 
Chap. IV. 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 161 
 
 completely counteracting the expansion of the 
 rope by moisture, materially facilitates its in¬ 
 sertion. But, besides this, the French have 
 adopted an infinitely greater improvement in 
 loading, which, at the time we write, has not 
 yet been introduced into our service—namely: 
 while we consecutively insert and ram down 
 powder, and then shot and wad, they do both 
 these operations at once ; by which means, with 
 infinitely less fatigue, they gain six seconds with 
 good loaders and considerably more with bad 
 ones. 
 
 We must here relate a curious anecdote. 
 In October, 1817, Sir Howard Douglas, an old 
 artillery officer, submitted to the Lords of the 
 Admiralty, in manuscript, his treatise on Naval 
 Gunnery, published in 1819, in which this mode 
 of simultaneous loading was recommended; and 
 as the treatise was translated into the French, 
 Russian, Dutch, and Swedish languages, and used 
 as their manual, as it also is by the Americans, 
 “ la feu simultanee ” was adopted by regulation 
 in the French navy, and became known to our 
 service as “ the French system of loading.’' 
 
162 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Part II. 
 
 As such it attracted the observation of the 
 Admiralty, who have recently ordered this 
 “ French ” invention to be tried on board the 
 4 Excellent,’ where it has been found to suc¬ 
 ceed so well that it is now again, as “ the French 
 invention,” under trial by our squadron of evo¬ 
 lution at sea; on which element it has long ago 
 been found by the French to answer most ad- 
 The moral of our little story is as 
 
 follows : 
 
 Had any conflict taken place between the 
 French and British fleets in 1840 or in 1844, 
 the French would, to our cost, have used against 
 us the invention of an English officer, which, 
 though printed and published to the whole world, 
 it has taken the British people upwards of thirty 
 years to adopt—indeed, which is not yet adopted. 
 
 We, however, deem it just to observe that 
 this reflects upon no particular administration, 
 Sir Howard Douglas’s recommendation having, 
 for nearly a quarter of a century, been equally 
 
 i 
 
 overlooked by all. 
 
 Again, in the French service, in aiming the 
 gun, the breech of their carronades is very quickly 
 
Chap. IV. 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 163 
 
 elevated or depressed by means of a screw, 
 whereas in the British navy both operations 
 continue to be performed by two men, two 
 handspikes, and a cumbrous wooden quoin or 
 wedge. 
 
 Shells. 
 
 Shells, lately introduced into the naval ser¬ 
 vice for horizontal practice, are principally fired 
 from the 8 and 10 inch guns, but in some cases 
 from the 32-pounders also. In several instances 
 a shell has burst within the gun, strange to say, 
 without injuring it! 
 
 The object and the effect of percussion and 
 concussion shells are the same, though the causes 
 of the explosion of each are different. In both 
 cases the shell should be able to resist the force 
 of the charge, and yet explode on striking the 
 side of a ship. 
 
 Percussion shells are constructed to explode 
 by means of some detonating or percussion 
 powder enclosed in the fuse or in the shell. 
 Various arrangements have been tried; all, 
 however, must be dangerous, as the shells carry 
 
164 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Part II. 
 
 with them the means of being exploded— 
 indeed a mere tumble on the deck, or a blow, 
 or being unskilfully rammed home, may effect 
 this. 
 
 A concussion shell, on the contrary, is per¬ 
 fectly harmless until its fuse is ignited by the 
 discharge of the gun. It cannot therefore be 
 dangerous to its employers. On its striking its 
 object, a mechanical arrangement in the fuse 
 causes the tire within it to communicate with 
 the powder in the shell, and consequently to 
 explode. No detonating or percussion powder 
 is used in concussion shells. 
 
 As the parts of a shell after bursting always go 
 onwards, never forwards, if the explosion should 
 take place in the ship’s side, just after it had 
 passed through, or in midships, the loss, if both 
 sides were manned, would probably be three or 
 four guns’ crews, forty-five men, more or less. 
 The utmost havoc would probably be caused by 
 the shell bursting just before it freed itself from 
 the inner part of the ship’s side, as then, besides 
 the chance of setting the vessel on fire, the 
 iron fragments of the shell and the splinters 
 
Chap. IV. 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 165 
 
 of the wood would inevitably cause great loss 
 of life. 
 
 Under the new system, it is supposed that a 
 broadside of shells at about 400 yards will prove to 
 be the most drastic medicine in the pharmacopoeia 
 of modern war. Between three and four hundred 
 loaded shells form the complement of a three- 
 decker. Two for each gun are at all times ready 
 on deck, and thus in action there will in a 120- 
 gun ship be no less than 240 live detonating 
 and concussion shells distributed among the 
 crew ! Whether these fearful engines will prove 
 more destructive to their friends than to their 
 enemies—whether human beings will have nerve 
 enough to fight with firearms in the middle of 
 innumerable loaded mines, one or all of which 
 by mere accidental blows may be exploded, are 
 problems which the next war will very quickly 
 demonstrate. In the mean while there is, we 
 fear, but too much cause to prophesy that in this 
 instance it will be found that Science has at 
 last overreached herself; that in naval duels the 
 two combatants, on the lone ocean, will sink 
 each other, in which case, although both may 
 
166 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Part II. 
 
 disappear with their colours flying, how truly 
 may it be said of each of them— 
 
 OH GRAVE ! WHERE IS THY VICTORY ? 
 
 The cost of loaded shells, which, of course, 
 varies according to their sizes, is as follows:— 
 
 
 £. 
 
 s. 
 
 d. 
 
 13-inch shell. 
 
 1 
 
 0 
 
 10 
 
 Wooden fuse. 
 
 0 
 
 0 
 
 8 h 
 
 5 lbs. of powder for bursting . 
 
 0 
 
 2 
 
 6 
 
 
 1 
 
 4 
 
 Oh 
 
 Maximum charge of powder, 20 lbs. 
 
 0 
 
 10 
 
 0 
 
 
 1 
 
 14 
 
 o.V 
 
 Powder. 
 
 If a cannon be era’cliarged with gunpowder, 
 the surplus, ejected before it has time to ignite, 
 (we have repeatedly seen snow covered with it,) 
 produces no more explosive effect than if it had 
 been so much sand; indeed its useless unelastic 
 weight, by deadening the force of the powder, 
 actually diminishes the range it was intended to 
 increase. On the other hand, if a gun be under- 
 charged, although its range is of course short¬ 
 ened, the damage it creates is occasionally most 
 materially increased l for it is an axiom in gun- 
 
Chap. IV. 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 167 
 
 nery, that whatever be the material through 
 which a shot passes, be it glass, wood, or brick¬ 
 work, the slower it goes, the more does it shiver, 
 splinter, and shake it. 
 
 These facts, long known to artillerymen on 
 shore, have lately induced the French and 
 British navies, instead of continuing the “ good 
 old custom ” of at all ranges blazing away the 
 same quantity of powder, “the more the better,” 
 to vary their charges according to the various 
 objects to be attained. On board the ‘ Excellent ? 
 —the discipline and practice of which are most 
 admirable—the arrangement is to have three 
 different charges of powder for every gun. 1st, 
 for the utmost possible range; 2nd, for ordinary 
 distances; and 3rd, for the minimum necessary 
 for penetration, and thereby for creating the 
 utmost amount of havoc by splinters. 
 
 The distribution during a heavy action of 
 gunpowder throughout, say a 120-gun ship, re¬ 
 quires so many precautions that it would be im¬ 
 practicable even briefly to enumerate them. As 
 soon as the drum beats to action, there is hastily 
 rigged up in the middle of each deck, and con- 
 
168 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Part II. 
 
 sequently between decks, what at first sight 
 appears to be a large flannel phantom with two 
 short arms or fins, one drawn inwards and the 
 other projecting outwards. Within this shape¬ 
 less u screen ”—concealed from view and conse¬ 
 quently from sparks of fire—there are stationed 
 
 to the running powdermen through the flannel 
 sleeve which is turned cowards a series of 
 cartridges as fast as they are handed up 
 from below, and per contra, to receive through 
 the flannel sleeve which is turned mwards the 
 leathern buckets which require to be replenished ; 
 and certainly it is impossible, even for a mo¬ 
 ment, to contemplate this operation without 
 reflecting what a strange position it is for any 
 human being to occupy, for, although he can 
 see nothing whatever of what is going on, 
 he is as much exposed to be shot as those who 
 within a few feet of him are fighting the guns! 
 
 The two magazines (one fore and the other 
 aft) from which the powder, under the direction 
 of a mate or midshipman, is with innumerable pre¬ 
 cautions handed up, and then through the sleeve of 
 
Chap. IV, 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 169 
 
 the phantom delivered on deck, are lighted by 
 external powerful lamps, which, glaring through 
 two thick glass bull’s-eyes, cast a sort of pale 
 moonlight on him whose duty it is, amidst the 
 roar of cannon vomiting forth fire and fury, 
 calmly at intervals to watch the black hands of 
 a white dial by his side, upon which are in ¬ 
 scribed the words “ distant,” “ full,” “ re¬ 
 duced,” “ stop,” and in obedience thereto to 
 select and hand out seriatim the different de¬ 
 scription of cartridges required for the three 
 ranges above indicated, and thus, although far 
 below the surface of the ocean,—out of the reach 
 of all shot,—and secluded from his thousand mess¬ 
 mates, he can guess, probably more accurately 
 than most of them, his distance from the enemy. 
 The various cartridges over which he presides 
 are respectively taken from zinc boxes, which, 
 arranged in bins separated by passages like those 
 in a wine-cellar, are so hermetically closed, 
 that if in case of fire it should suddenly be 
 deemed necessary to drown the magazine, the 
 water, it is said, would flood them without wet¬ 
 ting the powder, which would be again fit for 
 
 i 
 
170 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Part II. 
 
 action as soon as through another stop-cock the 
 fluid had been turned off into the hold. 
 
 The cost for powder alone of a single discharge 
 of the armament of a line-of-battle ship of 120 
 guns is upwards of 20 1. The cost for powder 
 alone of the firing of a morning and evening gun 
 exceeds 100/. a-year. 
 
 Fuses. 
 
 It having been ascertained by experiment 
 that the old-fashioned eight-penny wooden fuse 
 which still answers for land service, was apt to 
 be disorganised by the shell striking the side 
 of a ship, one of brass, made to screw in, has 
 been substituted. This modern improvement 
 has, however, been lately superseded by pro¬ 
 cesses we have detailed, by which shells are 
 now made to explode by percussion and also by 
 concussion; in * short, the enemy’s ship is now 
 the hammer which gives to them the fatal blow. 
 The cutting, as also the boring, of these fuses, 
 which are still to be used in the naval service 
 for firing at troops on shore, likewise the driving 
 them into shells, are operations requiring a degree 
 
Chap. IV. 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 171 
 
 of nicety which nothing but great coolness and 
 experience can attain. Each fuse costs two 
 shillings and twopence. 
 
 Tubes. 
 
 In the late war, as soon as the captain of a 
 gun, often enveloped in smoke, gave the word 
 “fire J 5 ’ the sailor, whose duty it was to execute 
 the command, after perhaps leisurely turning 
 his quid, put the burning end of a rope of 
 slow-match, which often required blowing, to 
 the powder priming, which in due time ignit¬ 
 ing, off went the gun, and away went the shot 
 in whatever direction the rolling and pitch¬ 
 ing of the vessel might at the moment com¬ 
 bine to ordain. Sometimes it went slap into 
 the sea running mountains high, and sometimes 
 bang over the mast-head of the enemy. Many 
 years after the peace of 1815 flint locks, which 
 had long been applied on shore, were used 
 by our navy, after which there were substituted 
 percussion tubes to be fired by the blow of a 
 hammer, an operation which, from the usual 
 explosion from the touchhole, was attended with 
 
 i 2 
 
172 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Part II. 
 
 difficulty and sometimes danger. There has, 
 however, lately been adopted on board the 
 4 Excellent ’ an American invention of great 
 merit, by which, and by means of a string which 
 the captain who aims the gun holds in his hand, 
 a simple piece of iron is very beautifully made 
 to strike the tube, and at the same instant glide 
 out of reach of its effects. 
 
 Musket, Pistol, and Sword Exercise. 
 
 Throughout the late war, seamen were so little 
 instructed in sword exercise, and especially in 
 the use of firearms, that in our navy pistols, 
 generally speaking, were not allowed in boarding, 
 as it was found that the men, when their blood 
 was up, were liable to shoot each other. In the 
 days of Nelson a British sailor with his breast 
 bare and with an iron ship’s cutlass in his hand, if 
 placed by his captain on the earth’s orbit, would 
 without flinching have tried to stop it; in fact, 
 provided he was awake and tolerably sober, he 
 was ready at any moment to fight anything ; and 
 as other navies, especially the French, had not 
 recourse to art, his physical strength enabled 
 
Chap. IV. 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 173 
 
 him almost always to overcome his enemy, and 
 therefore by the supporters of the old-fashioned 
 mode of warfare it was apparently truly enough 
 said, 44 What more can you want ? ” As a de¬ 
 cisive proof, however, of the enormous amount 
 of undeveloped power of a ship’s company under 
 the ancient system, we have only to observe that 
 a body of marines of one-fifth of their number 
 were always considered sufficient to conquer 
 them, not by superior courage,—not by superior 
 strength,—not by superior prestige ,—but by dis¬ 
 cipline and the ready use of firearms. It seems 
 astonishing that so glaring a moral should have 
 existed so long in vain! 
 
 In the new system, however, the self-evident 
 truth is fully appreciated, and accordingly in 
 the French service, as also on board the 4 Excel¬ 
 lent,’ every sailor is patiently drilled into an 
 expert swordsman, and into an almost unerring 
 shot with pistols, carbines, or muskets. The 
 correspondent of the 4 Times,’ an 44 officer of 
 experience,” in his admirable description, dated 
 September 9, of the late grand naval review 
 at Cherbourg, states— 
 
174 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Part II. 
 
 “ In a few moments the signal was given to man 
 the boats, which pushed off in divisions to represent 
 an attack on the steamer 4 Descartes.’ This was a 
 beautiful part of the evolutions. Upwards of 55 
 boats with heavy guns (32-pounder carronades gene¬ 
 rally) in the how, filled with small-arm men, officer, 
 and sailors, pushed out in excellent order, after pre¬ 
 paring for nearly half an hour for the attack. For 
 some time they advanced towards the steamer with 
 great regularity, the bow-guns being fired with quick¬ 
 ness, and the musketry spattering away from every 
 boat in a continuous roll, so that the advance soon 
 became obscured by the smoke.” 
 
 Action. 
 
 After the decks of a man-of-war have been 
 cleared for battle by the removal of cabin 
 partitions, and every other description of lum¬ 
 ber, worse than useless, for it creates splin¬ 
 ters,—(in the ‘Rivoli,’ however, a pet canary- 
 bird and its cage were allowed to bang between 
 decks during the whole of the action,)—and so 
 soon as the ship’s drum beats to quarters, the 
 men in apparent indescribable confusion rush 
 down the hatchways to their respective guns, 
 which, being always kept loaded at sea, they 
 have only to unlash, and run the muzzles out of 
 
Chap. IV. 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 175 
 
 the port-holes. They then, in mute silence, 
 stand to their quarters, every man facing his 
 gun excepting No. 1, called the “ captain,” who, 
 out of reach of its recoil, stands in its rear. 
 
 Over every cannon hangs suspended to the 
 upper deck a long-handled sponge ; also a ram¬ 
 mer and worm of the same length. The squad 
 at each gun are not only numbered off as “ spon¬ 
 ger,” “loader,” “assistant-sponger,” “assistant- 
 loader,” “ second captain,” “auxiliaries,” “hand¬ 
 spike-men,” and “rear-men,” but, in addition 
 to these duties, for rushing on deck, at a moment’s 
 warning, as “boarders,” “fire-men,” “sail-trim¬ 
 mers,” and “ winch-men.” It is evident, therefore, 
 that as the action proceeds, and the number of 
 the living diminish, a variety of exercises are 
 successively required : for instance, the sponges 
 and rammer, unwieldy at all times even in the 
 most skilful hands, repeatedly change their mas¬ 
 ters ; if the powder-man while about to obtain 
 cartridges falls, he must be replaced ; if the car¬ 
 riage, disabled by a shot, requires to be re¬ 
 placed, its gun, weighing nearly three tons, has, 
 by a very few men, and in the space of say two 
 
176 NAVAL WARFARE. Part II. 
 
 minutes, to be triced up close to the deck like a 
 hammock, and then lowered upon the new one. 
 Usually one gun’s crew, by dividing its strength, 
 likewise fights the gun on its right. Occasionally 
 the whole ship’s company man the guns of only 
 one side, and then all of a sudden subdivide, to 
 fire broadsides from both starboard and port. 1 
 The results of a cool, steady, well-directed fire 
 apparently need not be described, and yet the 
 advantages of quick firing and discipline com¬ 
 bined are almost greater than can be conceived. 
 For example, it requires exactly one minute and 
 twenty seconds for two ships passing each other 
 on opposite tacks, at the rate of five knots an 
 hour, to get out of each other’s fire. Now, 
 during this brief period, it is quite within the 
 power of a well-drilled ship’s company, by the 
 joint jerks of handspike levers and of tackles of 
 great power, to slue their guns to the utmost 
 extent that the ports will allow,—fire,—run in the 
 gun,—load,—run it out,—again slue it by jerks 
 in the opposite direction,—and fire ; and thus an 
 
 1 The old term larboard is abolished. 
 
Chap. IV. 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 177 
 
 efficient crew in passing would pour two broad¬ 
 sides into their enemy, who, if his discipline was 
 at all slack, would find it as utterly impossible, 
 within time, to return more than one , as it would 
 be for a man to travel by an express train who 
 by violent exertion had arrived at the railway sta¬ 
 tion half a quarter of a minute after it had started. 
 
 Considering how narrow between decks is the 
 stratum within which such a variety of manual 
 and mechanical operations have to be performed, 
 it is evident that under the serenest circum¬ 
 stances nothing but repeated practice can pre¬ 
 vent confusion; how invaluable, therefore, must 
 be the product of discipline and experience during 
 a desperate action, every pulsation of which may 
 be attended with new circumstances to agitate, 
 to excite, or inflame the passions of the crew! 
 To subdue these passions the French navy has 
 lately established a silent system of command; 
 and thus, while on board one of our largest line- 
 of-battle ships there may be heard exclaimed at 
 every gun the words, “muzzle to the right,” 
 “muzzle to the left,” “run in,” “lift,” “down,” 
 “well,” “run out,” “ready,” “fire,” &c. &c., 
 
 i 3 
 
178 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Part II. 
 
 on board its antagonist there will literally be 
 emitted no sound save the thunder of say a hun¬ 
 dred and forty cannon and the groans of the 
 dying! How this new system of signs and 
 tokens will answer in the dense smoke of an 
 action remains to be proved. In the mean while, 
 however, it clearly demonstrates the intense 
 anxiety of the French to obtain, by every pos¬ 
 sible effort, the inestimable advantages of pure 
 discipline. 
 
 In the sketch which we have now concluded 
 of the progress of Naval Gunnery since the late 
 war, it has been our particular desire not to claim 
 for the British service more credit than is due to 
 the French for the important alterations which 
 have consecutively been adopted ; indeed, we 
 have considered the two nations as allies rather 
 than rivals in a science which, morally speaking, 
 is utterly indefensible. 
 
 Without, therefore, giving the palm of prece¬ 
 dence to either, we submit that by their united 
 exertions it has been indisputably shown that in 
 
Chap. IV. 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 179 
 
 the next war naval engagements will not, as for¬ 
 merly, be decided by superior physical strength 
 and courage, but, on the contrary, by superior 
 intellect, that is to say, by superior skill in 
 gunnery and in the use of muskets, rifles, 
 pistols, and cutlasses ; in short, now that steam 
 has rendered a whole fleet independent of wind 
 and sails, and consequently of seamanship, that 
 a shipload of mere brave, old-fashioned rope- 
 liauling sailors will be no more competent to 
 contend against expert naval artillerymen, marks¬ 
 men, and swordsmen, than a good-humoured 
 heavy Englishman, seated on a platform, would 
 be able to resist, simply by his weight, the force 
 of the lever, pulley, screw, or hydraulic pressure 
 applied beneath him by a diminutive French 
 engineer; and as the next fearful conflict on the 
 ocean between the fleets of France and England 
 must therefore, to a considerable degree, be one 
 of mind against matter , we must now briefly 
 and impartially consider what is the comparative 
 state of preparation of the two countries in this 
 respect. 
 
180 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Part II. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 ON THE ART OF MANNING A NAVY. 
 
 Extraordinary contrast between tbe French and British methods 
 of manning their Navy — Admirable arrangements of the 
 French — Description of the English system of Impressment 
 — Improvidence in turning off Able Seamen as fast as they 
 become valuable — The American system — The practice of 
 Impressment inconsistent with the Abolition of Slavery — 
 Seamen must now be also trained Gunners — This subject 
 explained — The nation in a fearful predicament — Impress¬ 
 ment no longer practicable — By voluntary enlistment a 
 sufficiency of seamen cannot be obtained — England the only 
 country in the world that has neglected to organize her 
 maritime population — In consequence thereof the nation is 
 unable, in a moment of emergency, to man her men-of-war in 
 ordinarv — Reflections. 
 
 The French System. 
 
 As Nature is no respecter of persons, and, con¬ 
 sequently, as her simple laws affect equally all 
 sorts and conditions of men, it is not surprising 
 that the same principle which binds together 
 servant and master in private life should prove 
 equally applicable to public service. For in¬ 
 stance, in our domestic arrangements it is found 
 
Chap. V. 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 181 
 
 that the most efficacious as well as the oldest 
 receipt for creating good servants, is to make 
 them comfortable ,—that is to say, to make them 
 anxious to stay,—unwilling to go away; and 
 thus our great railway companies have dis¬ 
 covered that the difference between good wages 
 and bad wages being utterly insignificant, in 
 comparison to the difference between the amount 
 of care that is bestowed on valuable property, 
 by men contented and discontented,—it is false 
 economy to underpay their servants. 
 
 Again, for the London police, not only with¬ 
 out the smallest difficulty did good pay collect 
 together as many thousands of men of the height, 
 age, size, strength, and peculiar qualifications 
 required, but, by making dismissal a punish¬ 
 ment, it mainly created that admirable “ dis¬ 
 cipline ” by which they have been governed, and 
 which, it is well known, would instantly evapo¬ 
 rate, were the men by a reduction of wages to 
 be made to feel that they could readily better 
 themselves elsewhere. 
 
 Now if the laws of human nature pervade the 
 aqueous as well as the terrestrial surface of the 
 
182 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Part II. 
 
 globe, it would follow that among all nations 
 the first principle of economy in manning a navy 
 should be, a determination to make the men 
 required a little more comfortable — a trifle 
 better off—than the seamen of an ordinary mer¬ 
 chant vessel. The means to effect this are, of 
 course, good wages, good food, and kindness, 
 which combined together would, as we have just 
 shown, materially assist discipline, and, conse¬ 
 quently, diminish the necessity of severe punish¬ 
 ment ; and as a wise course in life is invariably 
 —like Euclid’s definition of a line—the shortest 
 distance between any two points, so it is satis¬ 
 factory to reflect that, when the simple solid basis 
 we have delineated has been established, all 
 further anxiety on the part of a nation about 
 manning its navy is at an end; for, first, it 
 may reasonably be expected that of their own 
 accord sailors will flow to the best market, as 
 surely as the element on which they live invari¬ 
 ably finds its own level. If from self-interest 
 they do so in great numbers, the State has the 
 advantage of selection; if, on the other hand, 
 contrary to the usual laws of human nature, sea- 
 
Chap. V. 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 183 
 
 men should prefer to remain with inferior ad¬ 
 vantages on board merchant vessels, the State, 
 having performed its duty, is evidently justified 
 either by conscription or ballot in requiring all 
 seafaring men to submit to the same liabilities 
 by which, in all countries, the able-bodied are 
 bound in time of peace to come forw r ard in 
 defence of their father-land. 
 
 But the theory we have just described is 
 precisely the highly organized, efficient, and, 
 consequently, formidable system by which the 
 French navy is recruited. For instance, to 
 make the public service attractive , many thou¬ 
 sand men at the expense of the State are 
 annually well fed and comfortably lodged in 
 barracks where, divided into what are called 
 “compagnies permanentes,” they are carefully 
 instructed in artillery practice, musket and 
 sword exercise, &c., and where they quickly im¬ 
 bibe an interest in their profession and an esprit 
 de corps which are fostered and flattered by all 
 classes of the community; and as action and re¬ 
 action are equal and contrary, so does the honour 
 paid in advance to these men produce an entliu- 
 
184 NAVAL WARFARE. Part II. 
 
 siastic desire on their part to do honour to their 
 country. Accordingly, even in time of peace, 
 many able-bodied seamen voluntarily flock to 
 this alluring provision ; and as in case of war the 
 greatest portion of the French merchant ships 
 would be obliged to remain in ports, it might 
 reasonably be expected that the whole of their 
 sailors thrown out of pay would of their own 
 accord come to the navy. The French nation, 
 however, deeming it unsafe to rest on any such 
 frail contingency, has wisely as well as justly de¬ 
 creed that her maritime districts and commercial 
 marine shall be subject to the same obligations to 
 serve their country as other classes of the com¬ 
 munity; and, accordingly, by the laws of France 
 every boy who goes to sea is required to register 
 his name on the “mscription maritime;” after 
 one year’s probation he enters into the class of 
 “ mousses” until he is sixteen, when he becomes 
 “novice,” or apprentice till eighteen, when he is 
 classed as a “ marin,” or seaman, and is, thence¬ 
 forward, at the service of the State until he is 
 fifty years of age ; besides which, about one- 
 twentieth part of the general “conscription” 
 
Chaf. Y. 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 185 
 
 throughout the inland provinces are, by law, 
 liable to serve in the navy. 
 
 By the above arrangements, it appears that 
 between the years 1835 and 1844, both inclu¬ 
 sive, 55,517 seamen answered the calls of the 
 annual “leve'e permanente,” and, moreover, that 
 very nearly the whole of the French merchant 
 seamen, amounting altogether to upwards of 
 100,000 men, must have successively passed 
 through the navy. 
 
 Under this admirable system, which, while it 
 flatters the passions and cultivates the mind, com¬ 
 fortably provides for the sailor, the French nation 
 are prepared, on any impulse, to march by beat 
 of drum, from their various quarters to their 
 respective ships, “ compagnies permanentes ” of 
 well-trained gunner-seamen, and thus at a mo¬ 
 ment’s warning, even in time of peace, to com¬ 
 plete the manning of no less than sixteen sail of 
 the line. 
 
 The English System. 
 
 During the late war, the art of manning the 
 British navy consisted in setting the simplest of 
 
186 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Part II. 
 
 the laws of nations, as well as of nature, at defi¬ 
 ance. It consisted, first of all, in offering a totally 
 inadequate bounty (to a seaman from 3/. to 51., 
 while to a soldier boy there was given 12/.), and 
 when that proved—as all persons versed in marine 
 arithmetic foretold it could not but prove— 
 ineffectual, every seafaring man was liable to be 
 collared, if at all dissatisfied with that, knocked 
 down, and dragged on board a man-of-war. 
 There was no ballot, no conscription, no act of 
 parliament, no law human or divine, no appeal; 
 in short, as Captain Plunkett, R.N., has profes¬ 
 sionally well described the process, “ We took 
 our own seamen as we took the French ones — by 
 
 FORCE.” 
 
 Impressment thus not only collected the 
 dregs of our seaports, but without reluctance or 
 remorse tore away from the outstretched arms 
 of mothers, sisters, and wives, the country’s 
 hardy, weather-beaten sailors, on their return 
 — to “ home, sweet home ” — from a long, 
 weary voyage. Our tyranny, which we face¬ 
 tiously nick-named “ right of search,” pervaded 
 the ocean as well as our ports ; in short, the 
 
CnAP. Y. 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 187 
 
 British flag, wherever it appeared, was a signal 
 to our seafaring men to coop themselves up in 
 barrels, stow themselves in the cargo, or scud 
 away in all directions. 
 
 On board our men-of-war the discipline by 
 which crews were governed accorded with the 
 means by which they had been obtained; in 
 two words, they were smartened by that which 
 they smarted under,—“ the rope’s end; ” and 
 yet, so unrevengeful is an Englishman, that, in 
 spite of this unwarrantable system, our gallant 
 blue-jackets,—noble fellows,—no sooner came 
 in sight of an enemy, than, forgetting wrongs 
 heavy enough to sink their ship,—boatswain’s 
 mate, lieutenants, captain, chaplain, admiral, and 
 all,—they stood to their guns, and generally, as 
 we have stated, in yard-arm action overcame 
 their equally brave but totally inexperienced foes. 
 
 Before sunset how many of each mess had 
 lost his comrade, need not be considered ; suffice 
 it to say, that so soon as the brief period for 
 which their vessel had been commissioned ex¬ 
 pired, those who had escaped with their lives, 
 in reward for their services—or, as it is termed 
 
188 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Part II. 
 
 in mercantile phraseology, “in full of all de¬ 
 mands”— were paid off; turned off, in fact. 
 
 “ Where they went, or how they fared, 
 
 No man knew, and no man cared.” 
 
 At a small cost, and by that trifling kindness 
 with which the owners even of American mer¬ 
 chant vessels at the end of every voyage now 
 provide for their crews, they might have been 
 kept together until their services were again 
 required; in which case their rude qualifications 
 in gunnery would not have been learned in vain. 
 Nevertheless, from the propensity of the British 
 nation always to work in war with raw mate¬ 
 rials, they were, as we have stated, discarded, 
 to engage with whomsoever they chose; and 
 thus, by always recommencing—de novo—the 
 dreadful process of impressment we have de¬ 
 scribed, we eventually, with unpractised crews, 
 had to contend against our own seamen, whom 
 we had ourselves instructed, but whom the 
 Americans—by far better judges of “ economy ” 
 than ourselves — by high bounties and high 
 wages, had allured into their service. 
 
 At the conclusion of the war it might natu- 
 
Chap. V. 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 189 
 
 rally have been expected that the mere fact of 
 the British nation having been beaten upon its 
 own element by its own sailors, driven from 
 their allegiance by hunger, improvidence, and 
 impressment, would have proved the necessity 
 of altering that unnatural system of violence 
 and injustice which had scared from its service 
 invincible seamen, whom every other maritime 
 nation on either side of the Atlantic understood 
 how to attract. Nevertheless, although every 
 individual in the country knew and felt that the 
 English system of impressment was impolitic as 
 well as indefensible, we have allowed the bless¬ 
 ings of peace to shine upon us for more than 
 five-and-thirty years without correcting it; in 
 short, neither adversity nor prosperity, foul 
 means nor fair means, have as yet been able to 
 persuade us to reform it! 
 
 The predicament in which we stand, if calmly 
 viewed, is truly alarming. In case of war, if 
 we could suddenly return to the old practice of 
 impressment, and, without bothering ourselves to 
 consider whether it was right or wrong, if we could 
 but obtain by it the same guilty glorious results, 
 
190 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Part II. 
 
 we might, with more truth than justice, say—as 
 indeed is usually said—“ We did very well last 
 war ; we have always licked the French at sea, 
 and therefore always shall.” But in morals as 
 well as in gunnery great changes have taken 
 place. Besides that reformation in the public 
 mind that has successively abolished bull-baiting, 
 prize-fighting, duelling, and, as far as is practic¬ 
 able, the punishment of death, the British 
 nation, at a cost of twenty millions, and at the 
 sacrifice of at least fifty per cent, of the value of 
 the whole of its West Indian property, has 
 abolished slavery ; and although it has not as 
 yet by Act of Parliament abolished impressment, 
 yet it would be such a glaring inconsistency for 
 us, in the face of all we have said, sung, and 
 written against slavery, to kidnap British sailors, 
 —force them to the unhealthy coast of Africa,— 
 in order that they,-—white slaves,—should there 
 prevent naked, black, white-teethed, woolly¬ 
 headed savages from kidnapping, not each 
 other as we do, but their enemies , that it is 
 generally felt rather than expressed that we 
 must not, nay, cannot again have recourse to 
 
Chap. V. NAVAL WARFARE. 191 
 
 it; in fact, that before the civilized world we 
 cannot—like our children on the other side of 
 the Atlantic—at the same moment preach free¬ 
 dom and practise slavery. 
 
 But even supposing that, on the dishonest 
 principle that “ necessity has no law,” we were 
 to consent, or, as we should mildly term it, 
 “ be forced ” to do so, the changes which, since 
 the last war, have taken place in the education 
 of the French sailor, would at once render the 
 crime its own avenger. On this important 
 subject we will offer to our readers a sailor’s 
 opinion. 
 
 ‘ 4 Supposing,” says Captain Plunkett, R.N., “ the 
 necessity for equipping a fleet—that is, the certainty of 
 war—to arrive during the recess of Parliament, we 
 believe the Government have not, strictly speaking, 
 the power of issuing press-warrants, or even of offering 
 a bounty. But allowing both those methods of pro¬ 
 curing seamen to be in operation, while we limit the 
 bounty to five pounds, it is hardly to be supposed that 
 an able seaman will rate himself at half the value of a 
 drummer-boy. This was the sum offered through the 
 last war, and the precedent was followed in 1840, of 
 course without success. The press-gang will bring us 
 men , but not the hearts and wills which animated the 
 4 Rodney’s ’ and 4 Albion’s ’ seamen the other day, and 
 
192 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Part II. 
 
 which, according to the old naval proverb, would have 
 made ‘ one volunteer worth two pressed mend The 
 time of fitting out our fleet, however, be it long or 
 short, will be one of serious and painful responsibility 
 to the heads of departments, and of harassing anxiety 
 to all subordinates.” 
 
 How fearful is the following picture ! — 
 
 “ While the drafts of sullen-looking pressed men 
 closely guarded are gradually arriving at the sea¬ 
 ports, and a few smock-frocked peasants from the 
 workhouse, with a sprinkling of ‘ civil-power ’ gentle¬ 
 men strongly recommended by the magistrates, are 
 slowly making up the force upon which the fate of 
 England will depend, we can imagine the urgent 
 exhortations to despatch which will be addressed by 
 the Admiralty to the port-admiral, and by the latter 
 to the different captains. But whatever be their zeal, 
 they cannot create men, and will have, in some cases, 
 to represent the worthlessness of those that are raised, 
 and to request their discharge.” 
 
 But the roll of the drum beats to quarters, 
 and therefore let us now, as by-standers, deeply 
 interested in the conflict, attentively mark its 
 results as delineated in the following graphic 
 sketch:— 
 
 “Let us conceive,” says Captain Plunkett, R.NY, “a 
 British and a French fleet issuing simultaneously from 
 
Chap. Y. 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 193 
 
 Spithead and Cherbourg on a calm summer morning, 
 each fleet in tow of steamers, and mutually seeking 
 each other. It will he seen that less than seven hours’ 
 towing, at the moderate rate of six miles per hour, 
 will bring the two fleets together; and between ships 
 thus towed by steamers, and thus becoming mere 
 floating batteries, it will be a contest which good gun¬ 
 nery, and not seamanship, must decide. To say that 
 any men unaccustomed to the use of heavy ordnance, 
 whether merchant sailors, ploughmen, or tailors, would 
 he useless in such a contest might seem superfluous, 
 hut for the fact that it is to such men England would 
 have to intrust her fate under her present system. 
 
 “ Yet a single glance at the heavy and well-appointed 
 tiers of a line-of-battle ship guns will satisfy any one 
 that they are no toys to be placed in the hands of 
 novices. See what formidable batteries of the heaviest 
 ordnance are there; not a gun under a 32-pounder, 
 and many 68-pounder shell-guns ! How perfect in 
 all their appointments ! How simple, yet how scien¬ 
 tific, those tangent sights by which a distant object is 
 struck with such wonderful precision ! How excellent 
 the arrangement of all the stores! How immoveable 
 do those ponderous guns, secured in their manifold 
 tackles, appear; and yet how rapidly are they disen¬ 
 gaged and manoeuvred by skilful hands! In one 
 instant that maze of rope is unravelled, the fast-hound 
 guns are free, and, as though the long black tiers had 
 suddenly become instinct with life, they fly rapidly 
 inwards and outwards, to the right and to the left, 
 under the united efforts of the well-trained crews. It 
 
 K 
 
194 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Part II. 
 
 is a striking sight to see the decks of a well-disciplined 
 man-of-war when ‘at quarters,’ her seven or eight 
 hundred men standing silent and motionless at their 
 guns awaiting the word of command. 
 
 “ Not a sound is heard until the full, clear voice of 
 the officer rings along the decks, and then at the same 
 instant every hack is bent, every sinew is strained, 
 the tackles rattle through their blocks, the handspikes 
 creak, the decks groan, the giant frame of the ship 
 trembles, as about two hundred tons of metal and near 
 a thousand men are in simultaneous motion: each 
 gun’s crew strives emulously against the next, as 
 though life and death were in the effort. For a few 
 moments all appears to the unpractised eye a confused 
 struggle, and then a motionless silence ensues. Every 
 gun now points to the same object; each captain of a 
 gun stands, trigger-line in hand, and eye fixed upon 
 the sight. The discharge of that broadside would 
 open a breach in the strongest ship through which a 
 river might enter. 
 
 “ Here we see the value of organisation, and the 
 results of that practical skill without which the best 
 appointed armaments are, like good tools in the hands 
 of incapable workmen, thrown away. Formidable as 
 these batteries are—and no such ordnance ever accom¬ 
 panied an army or thundered against an inland town—< 
 they would be contemptible in unskilful hands. Yet 
 to whom have we to intrust those destroying weapons 
 to-morrow if we commission ten or twenty sail of the 
 line ? At best to raw merchant sailors pressed out of 
 coasters and colliers; to men who never saw a gun 
 
Chap. Y. 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 195 
 
 before; to men who will blow off their own arms in 
 loading, break their own or their neighbour’s legs in 
 firing, and point, if they do point at all, as a schoolboy 
 does his new single-barrel when he aims at a rabbit 
 and shoots a beater ! 
 
 “ If the guns of a first-rate man-of-war were disem¬ 
 barked for land service, no sane man would think of 
 intrusting them to other hands than those of trained 
 artillerymen. Now it is easier to manage ordnance 
 properly on shore than afloat, just as it is easier to 
 shoot a bird sitting than a bird flying, so that there is 
 an inconsistency in leaving the future supply of naval 
 gunners to chance 
 
 By the doctrine of chances we will, however, 
 endeavour to explain the condign punishment 
 which would be inflicted on a raw British crew 
 by the seamen-gunners with whom they will 
 have to contend. 
 
 In the late war it was considered as good 
 practice to fire three broadsides of shot in five 
 minutes. The French can now fire six in 2i 
 minutes, that is to say, in yard-arm action, they 
 could pour in four broadsides for every one that 
 the crew of Nelson could have fired, while, at 
 long ranges, their superiority in the art of gun¬ 
 nery would, comparatively speaking, of course 
 
 k 2 
 
196 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Part II. 
 
 prove still more destructive ; and when it is 
 moreover considered that shells can now be hori¬ 
 zontally fired from the same guns and with the 
 same precision as shot, that a single well-directed 
 shell is sufficient to sink a ship, and conse¬ 
 quently that in future naval actions there will 
 probably, as we have already stated, often be no 
 survivor to claim the victory,— 
 
 “ APPARENT RARI NANTES IN GURGITE VASTO/’— 
 
 it is evident that such fearful engines are neither 
 to be handled nor endured by an unpractised 
 crew. 
 
 Even those who have observed the havoc 
 which the bursting of a shell in open air makes 
 among troops, can scarcely conceive what will 
 be the result at sea, when the explosion happens 
 between the decks of vessels teeming from stem 
 to stern with human beings and loaded shells. 
 The utmost we can reasonably hope is, that 
 British seamen under such circumstances will, 
 from the example of their officers, learn to do 
 their duty; at all events, that they will brave 
 such dangers as long as the sailors of any other 
 
Chap. V. 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 197 
 
 country: but for the nation to suppose for a 
 moment that undisciplined men will do so, is to 
 rest its safety on a fatal delusion. Such a crew 
 would actually be frightened at the very sight 
 of the implements of war they had to wield ; and 
 it is not exaggeration to say that, in case of the 
 ship taking fire, to save themselves from their 
 own shells, they would probably jump overboard. 
 
 u England,” says Captain Plunkett very eloquently, 
 “England expects every man to do his duty! 
 Oh ! that such a signal should he addressed to men 
 who never had a chance even of learning it!” 
 
 The evidence we have submitted will, we 
 believe, satisfy every reasonable mind that the 
 old-fashioned British art of manning the navy is 
 not only unsuited to the enlightened opinions and 
 feelings of the present day, but that, casting con¬ 
 science aside, men dragged by press-gangs from 
 the workhouse, &c., on the good old-fashioned 
 principle that u anything that has legs and arms 
 will do,” are, now-a-days, no more capable, all 
 at once, of standing against the shot and shells 
 of the marine-artillery of the French navy, than 
 they would be capable, if suddenly dressed in 
 
198 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Part II. 
 
 cuirasses and placed astride horses, of galloping 
 against the sabres of the French Garde-a-cheval. 
 While, therefore, we have been slumbering over 
 the question, impressment, by the mere ope¬ 
 ration of nature, has, like many a line-of-battle 
 ship, rotted during the peace. It is no longer 
 sea-worthy. It is the commission of a crime 
 productive of no use. It creates its own punish¬ 
 ment. In fact science, whose gifts are from the 
 Almighty, has irrevocably decreed, “ In the day 
 that thou eatest thereof , thou shalt surely die f” 
 And if it has thus morally as well as physically 
 become obsolete, there only remains to be con¬ 
 sidered what power at the present moment 
 the British nation possesses to man its fleets by 
 voluntary enrolment. 
 
 The manner in which this system is effected, 
 and its results, will be best explained by the 
 evidence of our naval officers. 
 
 1. Admiral Bowles, late one of the Lords of 
 the Admiralty, in his able pamphlet, published 
 in 1840, entitled ‘ Suggestions for the more 
 speedy Equipment and better Manning Her 
 Majesty’s Navy,’ says, 
 

 Chap. Y. NAVAL WARFARE. 199 
 
 “ Nothing can he more primitive and defective than 
 our present mode of proceeding. 
 
 “ A ship is required to relieve another for foreign 
 service. She is selected, reported ready for commis¬ 
 sion, the captain and officers are appointed, and then 
 volunteers are advertised for. They come in slowly 
 and uncertainly. If the ship is a large one, the men 
 will not enter until the heaviest part of the work of 
 fitting is completed; the equipment proceeds slowly 
 and carelessly, because energy and rapidity are imprac¬ 
 ticable, but even then those who enter first feel they 
 are unfairly worked, and the seeds of discontent and 
 desertion are sown at the very commencement of their 
 service. 
 
 “ Three or sometimes four months thus pass away 
 before the ship’s complement is complete, and in the 
 mean while little progress is made in discipline or 
 instruction. She at last sails for her destination, and 
 relieves a ship which, having been three or four years 
 on active service, is, or ought to be, in a high state of 
 efficiency ; but on its arrival in England it is disman¬ 
 tled, the officers and crew are paid off and discharged, 
 and we thus proceed on the plan of perpetually creating, 
 and as perpetually destroying, what we have with so 
 much labour and expense endeavoured to obtain—an 
 effective ship of war. 
 
 “ The objections to this mode of proceeding are so 
 numerous, but at the same time so obvious, that they 
 will at once suggest themselves to my readers. 
 
 “ To the economists the improvident expense of 
 keeping a ship intended to relieve another three or 
 
200 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Part II. 
 
 four months in commission before she can proceed, 
 will be sufficiently striking ; while professional men, 
 who view a ship also as a school for the rising gene¬ 
 ration, in which not only mere seamanship, but the 
 higher qualities of energy, promptitude, and resource 
 are to be taught, contemplate with anxiety and regret 
 a slow and slovenly system, calculated rather to damp 
 and deaden activity and exertion, and to train up the 
 young beginner in exactly the way in which he ought 
 not to walk, and wholly at variance with the first prin¬ 
 ciples of all warlike establishments, discipline, activity, 
 and instruction.” 
 
 2. Admiral Sir Thomas Cochrane, in 1826, 
 addressed to the First Lord of the Admiralty 
 the following opinions, which he also afterwards 
 printed in pamphlet form :— 
 
 “ I do not know whether it has or has not reached 
 your Lord&hip, but it is no less true, that notwith¬ 
 standing the few men employed, there is a general 
 complaint as to their inferiority, and not one captain 
 in ten that acknowledges his having a crew with whom, 
 either in strength, quality, or character, he is at all 
 satisfied; and, moreover, that although these men 
 enter voluntarily, desertion is carried on to an extent 
 never known in time of war. For this there cannot be 
 but some cause, and I think it may be traced to the 
 mode in which the peace establishment is at present 
 conducted. When a ship is first commissioned, men 
 
Chap. V. 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 201 
 
 are brought together from wherever they can be col¬ 
 lected— unknown to the officers as well as to each 
 other : after their ship shall have been nominally ready 
 for sea (which is seldom under four, five, or six 
 months), she yet has a great deal to do with respect 
 to her equipment and her internal arrangement, and it 
 is still some months more before that most necessary 
 part of their instruction is taken in hand, their gun¬ 
 nery, and on which the Admiralty have most justly 
 laid considerable stress ; and there is no captain who 
 has been employed during peace that will not tell 
 your Lordship that he did not consider his ship in all 
 points an efficient man-of-war until she had been from 
 twelve to eighteen months in commission, and par¬ 
 ticularly in relation to the management of her guns. 
 However anxious a captain may be to have his ship 
 perfect in that respect, he at first meets an obstacle at 
 every step: to exercise the guns as they ought to be, 
 breaks in upon the whole day’s work; it is therefore 
 postponed from time to time, and just enough exercise 
 performed to fill up the quarterly report. 
 
 “ About the period before mentioned, a ship be¬ 
 comes in all respects in a state a man-of-war ought to 
 be; the men know and agree with each other, they 
 work together, and are comfortable in their messes; 
 the drudgery of the exercise of sails, guns, arms, &c., 
 is over, and desertion ceases, and the officers begin to 
 reap the benefit of their exertions. The ship being 
 complete in all respects, the exercising of guns, sails, 
 &c., goes on regularly, and without interruption; and 
 this continues for a twelvemonth or a little more, when 
 
 k 3 
 
202 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Part II. 
 
 the prospect of paying off comes in view, and then 
 discipline, exercise, &c., begin to relax, and, if at 
 home, the ship is paid off at the end of three years, 
 and all belonging to her dispersed. Re-commission 
 this ship the next day, and she is perfectly a new 
 creation, and the same routine to be repeated already 
 stated to your Lordship. The men who were lately 
 in her have no more inducement to return to that 
 ship than any other, as she is but the shell they 
 formerly inhabited; and although a crew may be 
 collected, all of men lately serving in a man-of-war, 
 yet you will have the same complaint from the present 
 as from her former captain, as to their inefficiency and 
 want of union, and the same discontent will for an 
 equal period exist, and the ship be in a similar state 
 of inefficiency for a similar length of time. 
 
 44 I have always considered that a peace establish¬ 
 ment was as much a preliminary preparation for war 
 as for any other service; that consequently your ships 
 thus employed should be manned with picked men, 
 and that they should be in that state of training and 
 efficiency, that each ship, on a rupture taking place, 
 could turn over one watch to form the groundwork of 
 another vessel to be fitted out.” 
 
 The natural, or rather the unnatural conse¬ 
 quences of the British people making it a rule to 
 discard all their seamen—poor improvident fel¬ 
 lows—the moment their vessels are laid up, while 
 by the governments of all other maritime nations 
 
Chap. V. 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 203 
 
 they are considerately provided for, until again 
 required, are as follows :— 
 
 3. 44 In France,” says Captain Plunkett, B.N., 44 the 
 whole commercial navy, masters, mates, sailors, ship- 
 boys even, are under the eye and jurisdiction of the 
 Minister of Marine; nay, every fisherman, waterman, 
 ferryman, oysterdredger, boatbuilder, is registered. 
 
 44 Voluntary enlistment may be considered entirely 
 inapplicable to cases of emergency. There are no 
 means of calculating how long ships would be man¬ 
 ning, if, as would necessarily happen in cases of 
 emergency, their crews were not increased hy men 
 recently paid off from other ships. In peace there are 
 usually as many ships paid off as commissioned in a 
 year, and thus the men who leave one ship join 
 another. But even with this aid the average time 
 occupied by general line-of battle ships in completing 
 their crews we find to have been above five months. 
 In 1835-6, when we commissioned several ships of the 
 line at once, they were six months waiting for seamen, 
 and were then very ill manned. We may safely sup¬ 
 pose that were ten sail of the line commissioned at 
 this moment, and did circumstances not admit of paying 
 others off, we should not see them manned in less than 
 eight months. We may therefore say that for any case 
 of emergency simple volunteering will fail, as it always 
 has failed. 
 
 44 We may expedite the material fitting of a fleet: 
 we may move ships about our harbours, put their 
 masts in, and call them 4 demonstration ’ or 4 advance 
 
204 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Part II. 
 
 ships ; 7 we may even lit them for sea—for the dock¬ 
 yard men can do all that—but, when fitted, there they 
 must remain for months waiting for seamen. Foreign 
 powers are quite aware of this, for it is the duty of 
 their consuls at our ports to inform their governments, 
 and they must laugh at ‘the demonstration 7 by which 
 John Bull plays a trick upon —himself ! 
 
 “ It is a matter of official avowal—and we may add, 
 of personal and painful recollection—that in 1840 we 
 were unable to collect a few hundred seamen to make 
 a show of preparation. .... When England was 
 vainly trying to scrape together a few hundred seamen, 
 France had [in compagnies permanentes] upwards of 
 3000 ready in the Atlantic ports, and probably not less 
 at Toulon. 
 
 “ It is a fact as surprising as it is discreditable to 
 England, that Russia could send thirty sail of the line 
 to sea before England could send three. 
 
 “ It is scarcely an exaggeration to say we might 
 build a ship in the time required to man one. 77 
 
 Now, if the facts, allegations, and assertions 
 we have just stated and quoted be true, in what 
 an illogical dilemma, in what a fearful predica¬ 
 ment are the inhabitants of Great Britain! 
 
 In the immediate vicinity of all their great 
 dockyards are to be seen, like lions asleep, a num 
 ber of powerful, unpainted, tawny-coloured line- 
 of-battle ships, which it is conceived have only to 
 
Chap. V. 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 205 
 
 be awakened to rush upon and devour their foe. 
 On close examination, however, it appears that 
 these tremendous-looking creatures—although 
 many of them have no less than a hundred and 
 twenty mouths — have neither legs to run with, 
 teeth to bite with, nor hearts to fight with; in 
 other words, they have neither masts, guns, nor 
 crew l The two former, it is said, can be sup¬ 
 plied in a few days, nay, if necessary, almost in 
 one; but as regards the third, there remains to 
 be proposed, to be debated, and to be agreed 
 on by the three branches of the Imperial Parlia¬ 
 ment, in what manner, at what price, and by 
 what laws this “ tertium quid ” of the Admiralty 
 is to be obtained: and thus, strange to say, al¬ 
 though the British people have had thirty-five 
 years to consider the question; although as re¬ 
 gards number of ships they have the largest 
 navy in the world; and although they both 
 chant and declare that “ the wooden walls of 
 Old England ” are impregnable, they remain 
 the only civilised nation on the surface of the 
 globe that not only has forgotten to organise its 
 maritime population, but has actually, by Act of 
 
206 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Part II. 
 
 Parliament, made it an exception to that Law 
 of Nature , by which the rest of the population, 
 by militia ballot, have very properly been made 
 liable to serve their country, if required!! and 
 thus, just as in Indian mythology the Gentoos 
 believed that the world rested on a tortoise, with¬ 
 out considering how, in boundless space, that crea¬ 
 ture was to be supported ; so do they rest for pro¬ 
 tection upon “wooden walls,” which in a sudden 
 emergency they will find rest upon nothing ! 
 In fact, it may truly be said, that we are without 
 the power of manning our navy at a moment’s 
 warning, either by foul means or fair, by 
 impressment or by voluntary enrolment; and 
 although it is evident to the whole world that 
 between these two stools the gigantic power of 
 England may suddenly fall to the ground, yet 
 no one has hitherto been able to make the na¬ 
 tion even reflect on the subject. If our obduracy 
 proceeded from political infidelity,—from a dis¬ 
 belief in a future state of war,—we might at least 
 argue that it is useless to provide for a calamity 
 that can never again recur; but the sanction 
 which early in every session of our legislature is 
 

 Chap. V. NAVAL WARFARE. ' 207 
 
 annually recommended from the throne to naval 
 estimates of several millions, clearly proves that 
 the British sovereign believes and ever has 
 believed in war; and therefore, leaving mo¬ 
 rality entirely out of the question, is it not 
 incomprehensible that our statesmen of all 
 politics—although they differ on every other 
 subject—should, year after year, cordially per¬ 
 sist in rendering fruitless the expenses they 
 recommend; nay, that they should themselves 
 paralyze the right arm of the country, on the 
 defensive power of which they profess to rely, by 
 constructing at an enormous cost, in our various 
 dockyards, an iron as well as a wooden fleet, 
 
 which in their hearts thev know that the nation 
 
 •/ 
 
 has not power to man ! 
 
 Independent of all political considerations, the 
 false “economy” of such astounding neglect can 
 surely scarcely require to be demonstrated. 
 
 A line-of-battle ship commissioned for three 
 years, is, it has been truly said, unserviceable for 
 six months waiting for men; inefficient for six 
 months more, while teaching raw merchant- 
 sailors and landsmen their first duties ; and being 
 
208 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 Part II. 
 
 thus two years only out of the three a man-of- 
 war, its cost is to its use in the proportion of 
 3 to 2. 
 
 This fact has been powerfully corroborated 
 by the well-known pamphlet of “ a Flag Offi- 
 cer. 
 
 It is surely not necessary to be a “ flag officer,” 
 or even to have served before the mast, to com¬ 
 prehend the simple truth of such observations, 
 as they equally apply to all situations in life. 
 
 What should we think of the Directors of a 
 great Railway Company, were they every three 
 years to insist on engaging raw ploughmen as 
 engine-drivers ? AVhat would the Directors of 
 the Bank of England, or of any other bank, or 
 the partners in any mercantile house, say, if it 
 were proposed that with respect to their clerks, 
 cashiers, agents, &c., they should triennially 
 do the same ? And yet, while every individual, 
 high or low, who seeks for a situation deems it 
 necessary to explain his proficiency, while ser¬ 
 vants of both sexes out of place advertise their 
 qualifications, and while the whole system of 
 apprenticeship in England rests on the principle 
 
Chap. V. 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 209 
 
 of securing to masters, for seven years, the ser¬ 
 vices of those they have had the trouble to in¬ 
 struct, the British nation, from a prejudice 
 plastered like wax into the mind of every Eng¬ 
 lishman, deems it advisable, as a measure of 
 economy, to force its Navy*—to whom it so 
 confidently looks for protection •— to be ever¬ 
 lastingly discharging able seamen for raw, 
 undisciplined, uneducated merchant-sailors and 
 landsmen ! 
 
 As the cost, however, of a man-of-war is usually 
 estimated at £1000 a gun, it has been calculated 
 by advocates of Peace that, even if the enemy 
 were to capture one of our line-of-battle ships in 
 consequence of its being inefficiently manned, the 
 loss, after all, could only amount to say £120,000. 
 It is evident, however, on reflection, that their 
 estimate is as fallacious as if they were to cal¬ 
 culate that because the earthen dike which pre¬ 
 vents the ocean from flooding Holland, only cost, 
 in its construction, one shilling per cubic yard, 
 or say four thousand pounds per mile, the 
 latter amount accurately represents the sum total 
 of the loss which would be sustained by every 
 
210 
 
 NAYAL WARFARE. 
 
 Part II. 
 
 mile of the said dike which an enemy should 
 destroy—whereas any Dutchman would explain, 
 or rather exclaim, that the real value of protec¬ 
 tion depends on the amount of property protected; 
 and if this be true, the loss of a British man-of- 
 war, a portion of the wooden dikes of our vast 
 empire, is, in the strictest “economy,” infinitely 
 greater than its mere cost. 
 
 If, after due consideration of the foregoing 
 facts and evidence, the nation should be of 
 opinion that the maritime population of Great 
 Britain ought, without delay, to be organized 
 for the purpose of rendering impressment unne¬ 
 cessary, we venture to recommend— 
 
 1st. That the whole of our marines (10,000) 
 should be converted into marine artillery: the 
 increase of 4 d. per day to each man would 
 amount to 3500/. per annum, for which sum 
 there would be always 10,000 skilful gunners 
 ready for action at a moment’s warning. 
 
 2nd. That, inasmuch as it is impossible for 
 the 6 Excellent ’ to educate all the gunners that 
 may be required, branch instruction ships should 
 without delay be established at Plymouth as 
 
Chap. Y. 
 
 NAVAL WARFARE. 
 
 211 
 
 well as in any other harbour that might be 
 selected. 
 
 3rd. That when we have thus, at vast trouble 
 and expense, educated our seamen, a number 
 sufficient for the exigencies of the empire should, 
 like regular soldiers, be always retained . 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ' 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
PART 
 
 III. 
 
 ON THE INVASION OF GREAT BRITAIN, AND 
 ON THE CAPTURE OF LONDON BY A FRENCH 
 ARMY. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
( 215 ) 
 
 INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER. 
 
 UNPOPULARITY OF THE INVESTIGATION — VARIOUS 
 CLASSES BY WHOM IT WILL BE CONDEMNED—MODE 
 IN WHICH IT IS PROPOSED TO BE CONDUCTED. 
 
 As by the law of England it has been decreed 
 “ high treason to encompass or imagine the 
 death of the sovereign,” so we feel sensible that 
 by most people it will be deemed highly cul¬ 
 pable, or, at all events, inexcusably presumptuous 
 for any one by conjuration to “ imagine ” the 
 twin evils which, on due reflection, we have de¬ 
 termined to bring before the consideration of the 
 public. 
 
 Many religious men will consider it wrong to 
 doubt the continuance of that superintending 
 protection by which it has hitherto pleased 
 Almighty God—at whose will alone nations and 
 empires rise and fall, flourish and decay—to 
 protect the British people from the ravages of a 
 foreign foe. 
 
 Many learned men will consider the his- 
 
216 the invasion of England Part m. 
 
 torical fact, that since the Norman conquest 
 no nation has ever dared to invade Great 
 Britain, a practical refutation of our suppo¬ 
 sitions, to which it is impossible to reply, 
 and which it is out of the power of sophistry 
 to obscure. 
 
 “ The advocates of Peace,” —we are happy to 
 believe that, like legion, they are many,—will 
 with much apparent truth observe that, inas¬ 
 much as for many centuries there have not 
 existed between the French and British people 
 the feelings of friendship which, to the credit 
 of both, have lately been evinced, it is alike 
 unbecoming, impolitic, and above all untimely , 
 to instigate hostile conjectures which it is the 
 interest, as well as the wish, of both parties to 
 allay. 
 
 Among the advocates for economy —the most 
 respectable portion of the population of the 
 empire — millions will, probably, prwid facie , 
 disapprove of searching out for a disorder, for 
 which it is obvious to them that, if discovered, 
 the only possible remedy must be increased 
 
 TAXATION. 
 
Chap. T. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 217 
 
 Many of our great capitalists, especially the 
 holders of fluctuating stocks, will be disposed at 
 once to condemn a discussion which may de¬ 
 preciate their property by “causing unnecessary 
 alarm.” 
 
 Lastly, our leading statesmen of all parties 
 will no doubt declare, that, inasmuch as it is 
 perfectly well known that the representatives 
 in Parliament of the people of England 
 — the masters of their own means — will, 
 now-a-days, neither listen to nor support 
 any prime minister that shall dare to pro¬ 
 pose, in a period of profound peace, a con¬ 
 siderable increase of positive taxation for the 
 ideal object of providing for dangers which 
 thirty-five years of peace have shown to 
 be imaginary, it is unwise —- simply because 
 it is useless — to enter upon the inquiry 
 proposed. 
 
 Oppressed, but unappalled by these ob¬ 
 jections, we shall proceed with the task we 
 have undertaken. All we ask of the nation 
 is a patient hearing and a judgment unbiassed 
 by political party feelings. We further beg 
 
 L 
 
218 
 
 THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 
 
 Part III. 
 
 to be permitted to divide our subject into 
 several heads, and to continue to treat each 
 in the style absolutely necessary to render 
 them intelligible to the great body of the 
 people. 
 
Chap. II. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 219 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 ON THE INVASION OF GREAT BRITAIN BY A FRENCH 
 
 ARMY. 
 
 Division of the subject into past and present — Abstract of 
 Alison’s History of the threatened Invasion of England by 
 the French in 1797 —- Preparations then made — Napoleon 
 abandons the design — In 1801 Napoleon again makes prepa¬ 
 rations— Great Britain makes most powerful preparations 
 for self-defence — Conduct of the King — Of the Prince of 
 Wales — Of both Houses of Parliament — In 1803 Napoleon 
 combines a flotilla of praams — Patriotic exertions of the 
 British Parliament — And British people — Napoleon’s object 
 to obtain for a few days command of the Channel — His 
 secret deep-laid project — Suspected by Collingwood — De¬ 
 feated by Sir R. Calder—Napoleon in rage and disappoint¬ 
 ment breaks up his army at Boulogne. 
 
 If our problem were to determine in what way 
 the Emperor of Russia or the Emperor of China 
 would endeavour to invade Great Britain, the 
 details, both of the attack and the defence, would 
 involve so many unknown quantities, that the 
 subject would admit of little more than a kaleido¬ 
 scope solution, which every man, as he turned it 
 
 l 2 
 
220 
 
 THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 
 
 Part III. 
 
 in his mind, would view in a different aspect. 
 In considering, however, the probability of an 
 invasion of England by France, the unerring 
 light of history at once illumines the subject, not 
 only by revealing—what was once a dark secret, 
 namely—the enemy’s plan of attack, and the 
 preparations by which it was to be attempted, 
 but by showing also the great counter arrange¬ 
 ments by which such attack was to be re¬ 
 sisted. To this experience of the past is to be 
 added our present knowledge of the pecuniary, 
 military, and naval resources of France as offici¬ 
 ally published; and if this be not deemed suffi¬ 
 cient, any one who chooses to cross the Channel 
 may have an opportunity of moreover inspecting 
 the very men, the very muskets, bayonets, and 
 sabres, the cannon and the very cannon-balls, 
 that would be brought against him. 
 
 We will, therefore, deal consecutively with 
 these two tenses, and first, 
 
 As regards the past. In the year 1797 1 
 the Directory of the French Republic, under 
 the pretence of invading England, constructed 
 
 1 Taken from Alison's ‘ History of England,’ vols. 4, 5, and 6. 
 
Chap. II. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 221 
 
 and equipped flat-bottomed boats for trans¬ 
 porting across the Channel an army of 150,000 
 men, which had been assembled for the purpose, 
 between Brest and the Texel, under the name 
 of “ the Army of England ; ” and which, 
 to encourage the Irish insurgents to join this 
 force, was represented to them by the Direc¬ 
 tory as consisting of “ 270,000 men, all fully 
 equipped.” Of this army Napoleon Buonaparte 
 was appointed commander-in-chief, with the fol¬ 
 lowing instructions:— 
 
 “ Crown,” said Barras to him, u so illustrious a life 
 by a conquest which the great nation owes to its out¬ 
 raged dignity. Go ! and by the punishment of tlie 
 Cabinet of London, strike terror into the hearts of all 
 who would miscalculate the power of a free people ; 
 go, and chain the monster who presses on the seas ; go, 
 and punish in London the injured rights of humanity. 
 Hardly shall the tricolor flag wave on the blood¬ 
 stained shores of the Thames, ere a unanimous cry 
 will bless your arrival, and that generous nation, per¬ 
 ceiving the dawn of its felicity, will receive you as 
 liberators, who come not to combat and enslave, but to 
 put a period to its calamities ! ” 
 
 According to orders, Napoleon proceeded to 
 the coasts of the Channel, and after visiting 
 
222 
 
 THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 
 
 Part III. 
 
 Boulogne, Calais, Dunkirk, Antwerp, and 
 Flushing—after sitting up till midnight at every 
 town, interrogating the sailors, fishermen, smug¬ 
 glers, listening to their objections with patient 
 attention,—he returned to Paris, where he de¬ 
 livered the following sage opinion : “ It is too 
 
 DOUBTFUL A CHANCE. I WILL NOT RISK IT. I WILL 
 NOT HAZARD, ON SUCH A THROW, THE FATE OF 
 
 France !” 
 
 In 1801 —about four vears afterwards—Na- 
 
 •/ 
 
 poleon, of his own accord, again made prepara¬ 
 tions for the invasion of England, which excited 
 the serious attention of the British government. 
 From the Scheldt to the Garonne every creek 
 and headland was fortified to protect the small 
 craft that were to be seen creeping along the 
 shore to the general rendezvous of Dunkirk and 
 Boulogne. At the latter harbour gun-boats 
 and flat-bottomed praams were collected in great 
 quantities, and the most energetic preparations 
 made for defensive as well as offensive opera¬ 
 tions. Nothing was talked of in the French 
 newspapers but “ the approaching descent 
 upon England.” 
 
Ciiap. II. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 223 
 
 In Great Britain the preparations for self- 
 defence were worthy of the nation and of the 
 words of Faulconbridge,— 
 
 “ This England never did nor never shall 
 Lie at the proud feet of a conqueror.” 
 
 The King, George III., declared his resolution, 
 in the event of the enemy landing, to put him¬ 
 self at the head of his troops. 
 
 “ Whatever,” wrote the Prince of Wales, in his 
 letter to his royal father, dated August 3, 1801, 
 “ may some time back have been your Majesty’s objec¬ 
 tion to my being in the way of actual service, yet at a 
 crisis like this, unexampled in our history, when every 
 subject in the realm is eagerly seeking for and has his 
 post assigned him, these objections will, I humbly 
 trust, yield to the pressure of the times, and that your 
 Majesty will be graciously pleased to call me to a sta¬ 
 tion wherein I may prove myself worthy of the confi¬ 
 dence of my country, and of the high rank I hold in it, 
 by staking my life in its defence. Death would be 
 preferable to be marked as the only man in the country 
 who cannot be suffered to come forth on such an occa¬ 
 sion. Should it be my fate to fall in so glorious a 
 contest, no injury could arise to the line of the succes¬ 
 sion, on account of the number happily remaining of 
 your Majesty’s children. But were there fifty princes, 
 or only one, it would, in my humble opinion, be equally 
 
224 
 
 THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 
 
 Part III. 
 
 incumbent on them to stand foremost in the ranks of 
 danger, at so decisive a period as the present.” 
 
 But while these vigorous preparations were 
 making on both sides of the Channel, negotiators 
 were also at work for the purpose of annulling 
 them, and, the Angel of Pc%ce triumphing over 
 the Demon of War, a London Gazette extraor¬ 
 dinary announced, on the 2nd of October, 1801, 
 the signature of the preliminaries of that wel¬ 
 come treaty by which the war on the previous 
 day had been happily concluded. 
 
 On the 8th of March, 1803, although France 
 and England were nominally at peace, a message 
 from George III. to both houses of Parliament 
 announced that, “ as very considerable military 
 preparations are carrying on in the ports of 
 France and Holland, His Majesty had judged it 
 expedient to adopt additional measures of pre¬ 
 caution for the security of his dominions.” 
 
 This message was received with the most 
 animated feelings of patriotism by both houses 
 of Parliament. The address, moved by Mr. 
 Fox, passed through each without a dissentient 
 voice. A few days afterwards the militia was 
 
Chav. II. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 225 
 
 called out. Ten thousand additional men were 
 voted for the navy ; and preparations were made 
 in the principal harbours of the kingdom for the 
 most vigorous hostilities, 
 
 “ These measures,” Alison very eloquently remarks, 
 
 “ were immediately met by corresponding menaces 
 on the part of France ; and everything breathed hos¬ 
 tility and defiance in the two countries. Lord Nelson 
 was intrusted with the command of the Mediter¬ 
 ranean fleet. Lord Keith set out for Plymouth. Sir 
 Sidney Smith received orders to put to sea with a 
 squadron of observation. A hot press took place in 
 the Thames. Sixteen ships were instantly put in com¬ 
 mission. The public ardour rose to the highest pitch; 
 and England resumed her arms with a degree of 
 enthusiasm exceeding even that with which she had 
 laid them aside.” 
 
 In May, 1803, the dense smoke we have just 
 described burst into flames, and no sooner was 
 war proclaimed, than Napoleon, as First Consul, 
 not only again declared his intention to invade 
 England, but officially announced his intention to 
 put himself at the head of the expedition. From 
 the Texel to Bayonne forts and batteries were 
 constructed, to afford protection to the small 
 craft proceeding from the places where they had 
 
 l 3 
 
226 
 
 THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 
 
 Part III. 
 
 been constructed to the general place of ren¬ 
 dezvous. 
 
 The object of all these preparations was to 
 assemble at a single point — the harbour of 
 Boulogne—a flotilla capable of transporting an 
 army of a hundred and fifty thousand men , with 
 its field and siege equipage, ammunition, stores, 
 and horses; and at the same time a covering- 
 naval force for its debarkation: accordingly, at 
 every port along the coast, vessels were not only 
 constructed, but as fast as they were finished they 
 were, under the protection of the batteries, sent 
 to Cherbourg, Boulogne, Calais, and Dunkirk. 
 
 The craft assembled were of four different 
 kinds:— 
 
 1. Praams, carrying six 24-pounders, and 
 artillerymen. 
 
 2. Do., flat-bottomed, carrying four 24- 
 pounders and one howitzer; each capable, 
 moreover, of holding from 150 to 200 cavalry. 
 
 3. Do., do., carrying two 24-pounders, and 
 80 infantry soldiers. 
 
 4. Do., do., carrying one 4-pounder, one 
 howitzer, and 40 or 50 infantry men. 
 
Chap. II. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 227 
 
 The organization of this force and the disci¬ 
 pline of the troops were so studiously adjusted, 
 that it was proved by experiment that a hundred 
 thousand men , with three hundred pieces of 
 cannon , and their whole caissons and equipage , 
 could find their place in less than half an hour ! 
 
 In the course of the year 1803 there were 
 collected at Boulogne and the adjoining ports 
 1300 vessels of the above description, capable of 
 carrying 3000 pieces of heavy cannon, besides 
 lighter guns. It was calculated that a hundred 
 or more of these craft, containing 10,000 or 
 15,000 men, might be sunk by the English 
 men-of-war ; “ but,” said Napoleon truly enough, 
 “you lose a greater number every day in a 
 single battle ; and what battle ever promised such 
 results as the invasion and conquest of Eng- 
 
 LAND t 
 
 Besides these preparations, a number of trans¬ 
 ports were assembled for the reception, in the 
 presence of Napoleon, of stores and ammunition 
 for the army; and a decree directed the further 
 construction at Antwerp of a dock capable of 
 containing twenty-five ships of the line, and a 
 
228 
 
 THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 
 
 Part III. 
 
 proportionate number of frigates and smaller 
 vessels; but while these ostensible works were 
 preparing, there remained—alta mente repos- 
 tum—secret in the mind of Napoleon a deep- 
 laid project of attack, “ the most profound 
 combination,” says Alison, “ that the genius of 
 Napoleon ever formed.” 
 
 Although at the period in question the 
 army of France alone, without counting the 
 subsidiary forces of Holland, Switzerland, and 
 the Italian States, amounted to the enormous 
 aggregate of 427,000 effective men, indepen¬ 
 dent of 200,000 national and coast guards, 
 Napoleon obtained a decree for the immediate 
 calling out by forestalment 50,000 additional 
 troops liable to the conscription for the year 1803, 
 thus increasing his army to 477,000 men, of 
 whom 150,000 stationed on the coast formed 
 what he was pleased to call “ The Army of 
 England.” 
 
 His plan for transporting this force to its 
 destination was apparently the flotilla of armed 
 praams we have described; his real project, 
 however, was as follows:— 
 
Chap. II. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 229 
 
 “ But,” says Alison, 44 these naval forces [the praams 
 and transports], great as they were, constituted but a 
 part of those which were destined to be employed in 
 the invasion of Great Britain. The whole fleets of 
 France and Holland, and soon after that of Spain, 
 were engaged in the mighty enterprise. The design of 
 Napoleon, which he himself has pronounced to have 
 been the most profoundly conceived and nicely calcu¬ 
 lated which he ever formed, was to have assembled the 
 fleet destined to compose the covering naval force at 
 Martinique, by a junction of all the squadrons in the 
 harbours of Spain and the Mediterranean, in the West 
 Indies; to have brought this combined armament 
 rapidly back to the Channel, while the British block¬ 
 ading squadrons were traversing the Atlantic in search 
 of the enemy, raised the blockades of Rochefort and 
 Brest, and entered the Channel with the whole arma¬ 
 ment, amounting to seventy sail of the line. It was 
 under cover of this irresistible force that Napoleon 
 calculated upon crossing over to England at the head 
 of 150,000 men, with whom he thought he would 
 reach London in five days, and where he intended 
 instantly to proclaim parliamentary reform, the down¬ 
 fall of the oligarchy, and all the objects which the 
 English republicans had at heart. At the same time, 
 and in order to distract the attention of the enemy, a 
 descent with 20,000 men and a large store of arms was 
 to be made in Ireland, where the malcontents were 
 profuse in their promises of a general insurrection. 
 But this was a diversion only: the decisive blow, as in 
 all the enterprises of Napoleon, was to be levelled at 
 
230 
 
 THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 
 
 Paut III. 
 
 the heart of the enemy’s power in Great Britain. 
 Numerous as were the chances against the successful 
 issue of so vast a design, it will appear in the sequel 
 how near it was to succeeding, how little the English 
 were aware of the danger which really threatened 
 them, and with what signal ingratitude they treated 
 the gallant officer whose important combat defeated 
 the most profound combination that the genius of 
 Napoleon ever formed for their destruction.” 
 
 The efforts made by Great Britain not only 
 at that period corresponded with the patriotism 
 and spirit of its people, but at the present mo¬ 
 ment—as compared with our existing means of 
 repelling invasion—they offer so important a 
 moral, that we beg the particular attention of 
 our readers to their details. Independent of the 
 militia, who were 80,000 strong, and the regular 
 army of 130,000 already voted, the House of 
 Commons, departing from its usual practice, 
 agreed to raise 50,000 men in addition by con¬ 
 scription. Besides this, a bill was shortly after¬ 
 wards brought in to enable the King to levy 
 en masse all men in the United Kingdom be¬ 
 tween the ages of seventeen and fifty-five, to 
 repel the invasion of the enemy; and such was 
 
Chap- IT. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 231 
 
 the enthusiasm of the British people, that in a 
 few weeks 300,000 volunteers were enrolled, 
 armed, and disciplined in different parts of the 
 country, thus rendering the compulsory con¬ 
 scription useless. 
 
 “ The King,” says Alison, “ had everything arranged 
 for the expected invasion. He was to go himself to 
 Chelmsford or Hartford ; the Queen and the Royal Fa¬ 
 mily, with the treasure, were to be sent to Worcester; 
 the artillery and stores from Woolwich to be sent into 
 the interior by the Grand Junction Canal. In the great 
 approaching conflict every one had his post assigned to 
 him. The merchant left his counting-house, the 
 lawyer his briefs ; the farmer paused in the labours of 
 husbandry, the artisan in the toils of his handicraft; 
 the nobleman hurried from the scene of dissipation or 
 amusement, the country gentleman put himself at the 
 head of his tenantry. Everywhere were to be seen 
 uniforms, squadrons, battalions; the clang of artillery 
 was heard in the streets, the trampling of cavalry 
 resounded in the fields. Instead of the peasant re¬ 
 posing at sunset in front of his cottage, he was seen 
 hurrying with his musket on his shoulder to his rally- 
 ing-point. Instead of the nobleman wasting his youth 
 in the ignoble pleasures of the metropolis, he was to be 
 found inhaling a noble spirit amidst the ranks of his 
 rural dependants. In the general excitement even the 
 voice of faction was stilled. The heartburnings and 
 divisions on the origin of the war were forgotten ; the 
 
232 
 
 THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 
 
 Part III. 
 
 Whigs stood beside the Tories in the ranks of the vo- 
 lnnteers ; from being a war of opinion, the contest had 
 become one of nations; and, excepting in a few inve¬ 
 terate leaders of party in the Legislature, one feeling 
 
 SEEMED TO PERVADE THE WHOLE BRITISH EMPIRE.” 
 
 In order to strengthen the Navy, still greater 
 efforts were made. In addition to 50,000 
 seamen, including 12,000 marines, 10,000 were 
 granted, and 40,000 more when the war actually 
 broke out. Seventy-five ships of the line and two 
 hundred and seventy frigates and smaller vessels 
 were put in commission. 
 
 “ The harbours of France and Holland,” says Alison, 
 “ were closely blockaded; Lord Nelson rode triumphant 
 in the Mediterranean ; and, excepting when their small 
 craft were stealing round the headlands to the general 
 rendezvous at Boulogne, the dag of France, at least in 
 large fleets, disappeared from the ocean.” 
 
 On its coasts, however, the Emperor Napoleon 
 reigned triumphant. He reviewed the pre¬ 
 parations, and from the heights of Ambleteuse, 
 after gazing at the white cliffs of England, he on 
 the same evening wrote to Cambaceres, “ 1 
 
 HAVE SEEN THE COAST OF ENGLAND AS DIS- 
 
Chap. II. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 233 
 
 TINCTLY AS YOU SEE MOUNT CALVARY FROM THE 
 
 Tuileries. It is a ditch which will be passed 
 
 WHEN YOU HAVE THE COURAGE TO ATTEMPT IT ! ” 
 
 The running water of the British Channel ap¬ 
 pears, however, so far to have cooled his courage 
 that it was not until the 8th of July, 1805, that, 
 leaving Turin, he again repaired to the coast, 
 as Alison truly says, “ there to peril his crown 
 and life on the most gigantic undertaking ever 
 projected by man since the invasion of Greece 
 by the army of Xerxes.” Shortly after his 
 arrival he reviewed on the sands of Boulogne 
 100,000 men, drawn up in a line three leagues 
 in length. 
 
 “ The English,” he wrote to Admiral 
 Deeres, “ do not know what awaits them. 
 If we are masters of the Channel for two 
 hours, England has lived its time ! ” 
 
 The amount of his army, which was in the 
 most perfect state of discipline and equipment, 
 was as follows :— 
 
 Effective combatants, including 
 
 38,654 cavalry . . , 158,000 
 
 Pieces of cannon . . . 432 
 
234 
 
 THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 
 
 Part III. 
 
 For each cannon, rounds of am¬ 
 munition . 
 
 Cartridges . 
 
 Flints . 
 
 Biscuits . 
 
 Saddles . 
 
 Sheep . 
 
 200 
 
 13 , 000,000 
 
 1,200,000 
 
 2,000,000 
 
 10,000 
 
 5,000 
 
 Provisions for three months had moreover 
 been collected; and for the transportation of 
 160,000 men and 6000 horses there had been 
 congregated 2293 vessels, of which 1339 were 
 armed with above 3500 pieces of artillery, be¬ 
 sides that which accompanied the army! 
 
 This immense force, which for so long a time 
 had remained in field barracks, was divided by 
 Napoleon into corps of 20,000, each accom¬ 
 panied by its field and heavy artillery, cavalry, 
 and reserve, and under the direction of a 
 Marshal of the Empire. The remainder of the 
 heavy cavalry and dragoons he united into one 
 corps under one General. The organization of 
 the Imperial Guard, under the more immediate 
 command of the Emperor himself, was similarly 
 arranged. 
 
 The organization of the Flotilla was equally 
 
Chap. II. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 235 
 
 extraordinary and perfect. It was divided into 
 as many subdivisions as there were sections in 
 the army. The stores, baggage, and artillery 
 were on board, and the mode of embarkation 
 was by repeated practice brought to such pre¬ 
 cision, that it was found by experiment that a 
 corps of twenty-five thousand men, drawn up 
 opposite to the vessels allotted to them, could 
 be completely embarked in the space of ten 
 minutes. 
 
 “ Let us,” said Napoleon, as, in the vigour 
 of life and ambition, he conversed with his 
 generals, “ but be masters of the straits for 
 
 SIX HOURS, AND WE ARE THE MASTERS OF THE 
 WORLD ! ” 
 
 We have now to bring his vast project to its 
 close. 
 
 Notwithstanding the exclamation we have 
 quoted, Napoleon was secretly quite aware that 
 the armament of cannon on board his praams, 
 &c., was perfectly incompetent to resist the 
 broadsides of British men-of-war. This enor¬ 
 mous armament, therefore, was nothing but a 
 costly but well-devised stratagem to make the 
 
236 
 
 THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 
 
 Part III. 
 
 British confident of defeating it, while the real 
 force that was to effect the purpose was to be 
 concentrated at the remote distance of 5000 
 miles ; and accordingly, while the English fleets 
 allowed themselves to be decoyed to distant 
 parts of the globe to protect their colonies, fifty 
 French ships of the line were under secret 
 orders to assemble at Martinique, from whence 
 in a body they were to enter the British Chan¬ 
 nel, for the purpose of triumphantly convoying 
 Napoleon and his magnificent army to the 
 shores of Old England ! 
 
 “ The stratagem,” says Alison, “ thus ably con¬ 
 ceived, was completely successful: not one person in 
 the British dominions, except the sagacious Admiral 
 Collingwood, penetrated the real design. The French 
 fleets returned in safety from the West Indies to the Eu¬ 
 ropean latitudes, leaving Nelson three weeks’ sail in the 
 rear; and when the Emperor was at Boulogne in 
 August, 1805, at the head of 130,000 men, sixty 
 French ships of the line were assembled in the Bay of 
 Biscay, where the united British squadrons did not 
 amount to much more than half that force.” 
 
 On the 28th of May the French combined 
 fleet had sailed from Martinique to proceed to 
 
Chap II. BY A FRENCH ARMY. 237 
 
 Boulogne to cover the passage of the flotilla. 
 Villeneuve was ordered, if possible, to shun a 
 battle. “ The grand object of the whole 
 operations,” repeated Napoleon, “ is to pro¬ 
 cure FOR US A SUPERIORITY FOR A FEW DAYS 
 
 before Boulogne. Masters of the Channel 
 
 FOR A FEW DAYS, A HUNDRED AND FIFTY THOU¬ 
 SAND MEN WILL EMBARK IN THE TWO THOUSAND 
 VESSELS WHICH ARE THERE ASSEMBLED, AND THE 
 EXPEDITION IS CONCLUDED ! ” 
 
 While, however, the French Admiral was 
 endeavouring against foul winds to steer towards 
 England—with Nelson, who had been decoyed 
 to the mouths of the Orinoco, eighteen days’ 
 sail astern—Admiral Collingwood, on the 21st 
 of July, wrote to Nelson, describing intuitively 
 what was taking place almost as clearly as if he 
 had actually seen it. With his usual prompti¬ 
 tude, Nelson despatched to England a fast-sailing 
 vessel, with intelligence to the Admiralty, in 
 consequence of which Sir Bobert Calder, with 
 his squadron united to that of Admiral Stirling, 
 sailed to a point about sixty leagues to the 
 westward of Cape Finisterre, when, the com- 
 
 
238 
 
 THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 
 
 Part III. 
 
 bined fleets of France and Spain suddenly 
 appearing in sight, the British Admiral made 
 signal for an action, upon which the existence 
 of the power of England may be said to have 
 depended. In consequence of a heavy fog, the 
 victory of the British was incomplete. The 
 great object, however, of the battle was ob¬ 
 tained ; and accordingly, while Sir Ilobert 
 Calder steered upon the support of the British 
 Channel, Villeneuve, deeming it not prudent to 
 persevere in his course, veered away towards 
 Spain, and entered Ferrol on the 2nd of 
 August. 
 
 With all due respect to the penetration of Ad¬ 
 miral Collingwood, and with equal admiration 
 of the bravery of Sir B. Calder and his fleet, it is 
 impossible, we consider, for any just man to read 
 even our brief abstract of that ray of light which, 
 without apparent reason, shone upon the mind 
 of Collingwood,—of the adverse winds and of 
 the fogs which conjointly affected the arrange¬ 
 ments both of the French and English fleets,— 
 without feeling most deeply that the British 
 people are solely indebted, for the important 
 
Chap. II. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 239 
 
 results which occurred, to that omnipotent super¬ 
 intending Power which has hitherto protected 
 them. “Non nobis, Domine, sed Nomini tuo 
 
 DA GLORIAM.” 
 
 As soon as Napoleon received intelligence 
 that his extensive as well as deep-laid project 
 had been not only discovered, but defeated, he 
 at once exclaimed, with rage and disappoint¬ 
 ment,— 
 
 “ What a Navy ! what sacrifices for nothing ! 
 
 what an Admiral 1 all hope is gone ! it is 
 
 ALL OVER ! ” 
 
 But the powerful energies of Napoleon’s 
 mind, though chastened by adversity, were not 
 to be subdued, and accordingly, no sooner was 
 his secret project for invading England discovered 
 and defeated, than, phoenix-like, there arose out 
 of its ashes that magnificent plan of his cam¬ 
 paign of Austerlitz, and thus, says Alison, “ he 
 prepared to carry the thunder of his arms to 
 the banks of the Danube, when he was frus¬ 
 trated in his design of terminating the war in 
 the British Capital.” 
 
240 
 
 THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 
 
 Part III. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 COMPARISON BETWEEN THE MORAL POWER OF FRANCE 
 
 AND ENGLAND. 
 
 Comparison between tlie present moral power of the French and 
 British nations — Reasons why the “morale” of the French 
 Army has increased, while that of the British people has 
 diminished, since 1803 — Evidence thereof —■ Comparison be¬ 
 tween the present physical power of the French and British 
 nations — Sketch showing the Dr. and Cr. results of the 
 Power of Steam in account with Great Britain — The inven¬ 
 tion on the whole highly in favour of England — Sketch 
 showing, per contra, that the power of steam has removed the 
 uncertainties attendant upon sailing-vessels — That combina¬ 
 tions for invasion which could not before have been effected 
 are now practicable and certain —• That steam has thus levelled 
 the outworks of the defences of England — That out of the 
 profits of the invention Great Britain must therefore 
 strengthen her citadel — Absolute necessity of a standing 
 army — Popular abhorrence of such protection — Inconsistent 
 with the caution that characterizes the nation — Enormous 
 amount of property insured in Great Britain from fire — 
 From other results — Accidental Death Insurance Company. 
 
 Having in the last chapter reviewed by the 
 light of History the real modus operandi of an 
 invasion of England by a French army, in a 
 
Chap. III. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 241 
 
 past tense, we now beg leave, as we proposed, 
 to proceed to consider that important subject in 
 the present tense. 
 
 There can, we submit, be only one way of 
 doing so—namely, a comparison between the 
 agencies which the French nation at this mo¬ 
 ment could combine to conquer Great Britain; 
 and the means which at this moment the latter 
 kingdom either possesses or could readily call 
 forth for self-defence; and as these agencies are 
 moral and physical, we will consider them 
 separately. 
 
 1. The “Morale” of the French Nation. 
 
 As it is a favourite saying among French sol¬ 
 diers, “ C'est ie coeur qui fait le grenadier so 
 on a larger scale it was invariably a maxim with 
 Napoleon that the value of the “ morale ” to the 
 “ physique ” of an army was in the proportion of 
 2 to 1 ; and as a striking illustration of the preva¬ 
 lence of this sentiment, we may state, that during 
 the Peninsular war in several instances there fell 
 into the hands of our Engineer officers the go¬ 
 vernor’s daily report, during the different sieges, 
 
 M 
 
242 
 
 THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 
 
 Part III. 
 
 of the strength of his garrison, in which the 
 hourly fluctuations of “ la morale des troupes ” 
 were as carefully recorded as the motions of the 
 weathercock at our Observatory at Greenwich. 
 
 Now in case of a war between France and 
 England, the “ morale ” of the French army 
 would be more strongly excited against England 
 than in 1803, 1804, and 1805, for the following 
 simple and obvious reasons, namely, that then 
 the French soldiers had only to avenge our vic¬ 
 tories over their fleets , whereas they have now 
 to wipe out, on their own account, and by their 
 own hands, a series of disasters which under un¬ 
 toward circumstances befel these brave men from 
 the battle of Vimiera to that of Waterloo. In 
 short, the very crosses on their breasts and the 
 eagles on their standards now inspire them to 
 avenge the defeat, imprisonment, and death on 
 a lone rock, of one to whom it would be unneces¬ 
 sary further to allude. 
 
 To these high-flown feelings are to be added 
 the French soldier’s “ morale,” or incentive to 
 plunder, which, if it be proportionate to the 
 amount to be plundered, would of course be 
 
Chap. III. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 243 
 
 stronger now than at the period alluded to exactly 
 in the ratio of the increase of the wealth of 
 London then and now —say eighty millions. 
 
 The “ Morale ” of the British Nation, 
 in the years 1803, 1804, and 1805, as compared 
 with that of the present moment, may briefly 
 and truly be defined by stating that in the former 
 periods it was at its maximum , whereas it is 
 now at its minimum : indeed, in the words of 
 Burke, it might be said that “ the age of chivalry 
 has fled,” or, in still plainer words, that the mili¬ 
 tary “ morale ” of the nation is extinct. 
 
 But let us come to facts. 
 
 The patriotism that, from George III. and 
 the Prince of Wales downwards, burst forth 
 throughout the United Kingdom at the mere 
 mention of the words “ French Invasion ,” has 
 been just quoted by us from the History of Eng¬ 
 land ; and as that brilliant picture is therefore 
 fresh before the mind of our reader, let us 
 calmly compare the present amount of danger 
 with the present “ morale ” or disposition of the 
 nation to resist it. 
 
 m 2 
 
244 
 
 THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 
 
 Part III. 
 
 1. “ With the aid of steam navigation/’ says the 
 Prince de Joinville (vide his pamphlet), “ a war of most 
 daring aggression is permitted at sea. We are certain 
 of our movements and free in our actions. Time, 
 wind, and waves need no longer give us uneasiness: 
 we can calculate to the day and the hour.” . . . 
 
 “ We shall make war with safety, because we shall 
 attack two vulnerable things—the confidence of the 
 English people in their insular position, and her mari¬ 
 time commerce. 
 
 “ Our steam service would have two distinct scenes 
 of action : first, the Channel, in which our ports could 
 shelter a considerable force, which, going forth by 
 night, would defy the most numerous and most dense 
 fleet of cruisers. Nothing could prevent this force 
 from meeting before morning at any part of the 
 British coast agreed upon, where it might act with 
 impunity.” 
 
 2. “Steam,” says M. Hyppolyte Lamarche, in his 
 well-known letter to M. Thiers and M. Barrot, “ has 
 thrown hundreds of bridges across the Channel—we 
 can now pass at any time and in any weather from 
 France to England.” 
 
 “ In estimating at 85,000 men the number of 
 troops which England could raise for the defence of her 
 territory, we certainly concede more than the reality. 
 The mass of the people would be of no use to the go¬ 
 vernment. They are absolutely unacquainted with the 
 use of arms. 
 
 “ A landing may be effected upon a hundred dif¬ 
 ferent points of the English coast, and then a skilful 
 
Ctiap. III. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 245 
 
 general will not hesitate what course to adopt: he will 
 choose in his rear a point of concentration to re-unite 
 his troops, cover London, or march in force against the 
 enemy. 
 
 “ The average duration of the voyage between France 
 and England w r ould be five hours for such an expedi¬ 
 tion. Our war-steamers do not proceed worse than 
 those of our neighbours; and there is nothing to 
 compel us to accept battle, when we want only to effect 
 a passage. We shall be made to pay for it more or 
 less dearly, but it is in our power to land, if we be 
 resolved to do so. 
 
 “ The duty of a fleet of sailing-vessels, of a battle- 
 fleet during an invasion, is traced in the order Napo¬ 
 leon gave to Villeneuve, to place himself, at whatever 
 cost, before the Downs, and let himself be crushed 
 there, if it should be necessary, in order to protect the 
 passage of the flotilla. 
 
 “France has at this moment 1432 naval officers 
 and 200 students of the first class, who may be ranked 
 as the staff. If you question them on the possibility of 
 a descent upon England, in the present state of naval 
 science, I may be allowed to say that every voice would 
 answer in the affirmative.” 
 
 There is often so much empty bluster in mere 
 words, that, if there existed no more positive 
 proof of danger than the statements, arguments, 
 and threats above quoted, we might perhaps in 
 the name of “ economy ” reasonably dismiss them 
 
246 
 
 THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 
 
 Part III. 
 
 to the winds. The following evidence will, 
 however, show that the French nation, notwith¬ 
 standing the violence of the political storms which 
 have lately assailed them, and notwithstanding 
 the difference of opinion that has convulsed 
 them, have throughout the whole period of their 
 afflictions, and under almost every description 
 of government, steadily , unceasingly , and at 
 vast cost , been making preparations for per¬ 
 forming what for more than half a century 
 they have threatened, namely, the invasion of 
 England. 
 
 Extracts from the correspondence of the Times, described 
 as from “an Officer of Experience in our own Ser¬ 
 vice f —(See Times , September 10, 1850.) 
 
 “ Cherbourg, Saturday night. 
 
 “The spectacle of to-day was perhaps one of the 
 most splendid of its kind that has been ever witnessed. 
 Nothing short of the terrible glories of actual warfare 
 could have exceeded it, and, without being an alarm¬ 
 ist, I may safely say that the effect made on the mind 
 of an Englishman by such a display of force and power 
 on the part of an ally who has been our bitterest foe 
 in times gone by, in a port almost impregnable, and 
 
Chap. III. BY ‘A FRENCH ARMY. 247 
 
 within a few hours’ sail of the shores of Great Britain, 
 was not calculated to put him at ease.” 
 
 “ Cherbourg, Monday, September 10. 
 
 “ There are not many Englishmen who know that 
 within less than sixty-six miles of Portsmouth there is 
 a French port in which the most extensive works have 
 been for years carried on, till nature has given way to 
 the resources of skill and infinite art, and the sea and 
 land, alike overcome, have yielded to our ancient foe 
 one great naval entrepot,'—placed in a direct line with 
 our greatest dockyards, fortified at an enormous cost, 
 till it is impregnable to everything but desperate daring 
 and lucky hardihood, increasing day after day in force 
 and power, accessible from every point of the compass 
 and at all states of the tide to a friendly fleet, capable 
 of crushing beneath an almost irresistible fire the most 
 formidable of hostile armaments—in one word, 4 the 
 eye to watch and the arm to strike the ancient enemy.’ 
 There is no geographical necessity for such a port 
 opposite to our coast. The commerce of France does 
 not need it. Our neighbours may well remark that 
 they are justified in protecting a place which has 
 already felt the force of our arms, and that they are 
 bound to protect Cherbourg from such a contingency 
 as that which occurred in the last century, when Ad¬ 
 miral Bligh laid it in ruins; but Admiral Bligh would 
 not have attacked Cherbourg had it not been a me¬ 
 nacing warlike station ; and, talk as they may, there 
 can be no doubt that the whole of these immense works 
 are prepared for a war with Englandand with Eng- 
 
248 
 
 THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 
 
 Part III. 
 
 land alone. When I say this, of course I do not mean 
 to say that France will take any unjust advantage of 
 her position; but we ought not to shut our eyes to the 
 fact that such a place is within seven or eight hours’ 
 sail of England, and that a French fleet leaving it in 
 the evening with a leading wind could be off Ports¬ 
 mouth next morning, and could bombard any of our 
 
 towns on the southern coast.In the centre is a 
 
 large battery with lighthouse, which is nearly ready for 
 the reception of all its guns, some being already 
 mounted and in the embrasures. This breakwater, 
 called the Digue, is about two miles from the interior 
 harbour. Inside and out there is deep water, and the 
 passages leading by either extremity are capable of 
 being used by the largest men-of-war at all times of 
 tide. Commanding one of these entrances is the Fort 
 Flomet, placed on a projection of the shore, and mount¬ 
 ing no less than ninety heavy guns, casemated. On 
 an island placed across the other entrance is the Fort 
 La Pelee, which also mounts ninety heavy guns, the 
 fire of some of which crosses the fire of the guns of 
 Hornet, at right angles in the roads. At another point 
 commanding the entrance is another fort—Querque- 
 ville—which can sweep the roads with the fire of forty 
 32-pound shell guns. As if all this were not enough, 
 the arsenal walls are casemated and mounted with 
 cannon, and every height over the town is commanded 
 by a fort, while the sea-walls present all the features 
 of a regular fortification, and are plentifully provided 
 
 with cannon and casemated redoubts.And now 
 
 one word as to the fleet. I believe I only echo the 
 
Chap. III. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 249 
 
 opinions of all the naval officers present, when I say 
 that France never sent a finer armament on the waters. 
 Every improvement of which ships are capable has 
 been tried with them, and even to such points as new 
 and very excellent c stops ’ on the cables has the 
 minutest attention been paid. The officers are all 
 excellent theorists, quick and intelligent men, and full 
 of mathematics; the crews for the most part young, 
 with a want of weight and ‘beef’ about them, but 
 smart, active, and sinewy.” 
 
 On the above graphic description the editor of 
 the Times offered to the country the following 
 just remarks:— 
 
 “ It is impossible to forget—perhaps, without the 
 slightest imputation on our neighbours’ good-wdll, we 
 may say it was not intended we should forget—that 
 the fleet which issued in such magnificent style from 
 behind the Cherbourg breakwater might some day sail 
 straight across the Channel; that those heavy guns 
 might all be pointed in anger; and that each of the 
 black rakish-looking steamers might throw a thousand 
 men on a hostile shore without warning given or sus¬ 
 picion raised. Such a suggestion cannot be thought 
 out of place or ill-timed, for doings of this kind are the 
 very vocation of the vessels paraded before us. If 
 guns were not meant to be fired or steamers to be 
 employed for transport, there would be no use in 
 manufacturing either one or the other. From the 
 
 M 3 
 
250 
 
 THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 
 
 Part III. 
 
 extent of our liabilities we may measure our pre¬ 
 cautions, and it is undoubtedly not advisable that we 
 should be without the wherewithal to receive such 
 visitors as might possibly be some day despatched from 
 Cherbourg. The point is certainly a brave one for 
 the economists, who will appeal to the folly thus 
 palpably exemplified of nations urging each other 
 forward in the ruinous race of public expenditure. 
 The argument sounds very plausibly, but it is in plain 
 truth impractical.” 
 
 Lastly, during England’s late disagreement 
 with France and Russia on the subject of Greece, 
 after the French Ambassador had left this coun¬ 
 try, and w T hile the Russian Ambassador was 
 ready to leave it also, the Times , without creat¬ 
 ing the smallest excitement throughout the 
 country, informed its readers of two ominous 
 facts, namely,— 
 
 1st. That during the said discussion France 
 was increasing her number of seamen. 
 
 2nd. That as soon as the aforesaid discussion 
 ended, they were dismissed . 1 
 
 1 Of late years, whenever differences have arisen between 
 France and Great Britain, the former has invariably increased 
 her preparations for war, while the latter has almost as invariably 
 remained passive. 
 
Chap. III. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 251 
 
 In the quotations, observations, and facts just 
 concluded, we have clearly before our eyes,— 
 
 1st. Moral causes for an invasion of England 
 by the French troops. 
 
 2nd. Arguments and threats of invasion. 
 
 3rd. Extensive preparations for invasion. 
 
 In 1805 a single speech from Mr. Fox on 
 these three subjects electrified with patriotism 
 the House of Commons, the Government, and 
 the Crown, in the manner we have described. 
 
 In 1840 Admiral Bowles, M.P., late one of the 
 Lords of the Admiralty, in very cautious but sig¬ 
 nificant terms addressed the country as follows:— 
 
 “ Although I am no alarmist, and very generally 
 deprecate any hostile feeling towards France, I ought 
 not to conceal this important fact, that the government 
 of that country is preparing with all possible rapidity, 
 and regardless of expense, for great naval operations: 
 that all their establishments and arsenals (more especi¬ 
 ally those which relate to steam-vessels) are on the 
 largest and most formidable scale, and no reasonable 
 doubt can be entertained that all these preparations 
 are well calculated to realize the aspirations and hopes 
 of a strong party, who look eagerly forward to a favour¬ 
 able opportunity for avenging past defeats by some 
 sudden and disgraceful blow.” 
 
252 
 
 THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 
 
 Part IH. 
 
 On the 9th of January, 1847, the Duke of 
 Wellington, shortly after a severe illness, ad¬ 
 dressed to Major-General Sir John Burgoyne a 
 letter, which was published throughout Europe, 
 and of which the following is an extract:— 
 
 “ Strathfieldsaye, January 9, 1847. 
 
 “ My dear General, 
 
 “ Some days have elapsed, indeed a fortnight 
 has, since I received your note with a copy of your 
 observations on the possible results of a war with France 
 under our present system of military preparation. 
 
 “ You are aware that I have for years been sensible 
 of the alteration produced in maritime warfare and 
 operations by the application of steam to the propelling 
 of ships at sea. This discovery immediately exposed 
 all parts of the coasts of these islands, which a vessel 
 could approach at all, to be approached at all times of 
 tide, and in all seasons, by vessels so propelled, by all 
 quarters. We are in fact assailable, and at least 
 liable to insult, and to have contributions levied upon 
 us, on all parts of our coasts, that is, the coasts of these, 
 including the Channel Islands, which till this time, 
 from the period of the Norman conquest, have never 
 been successfully invaded. 
 
 “ I have in vain endeavoured to awaken the atten¬ 
 tion of different administrations to this state of things, 
 as well known to our neighbours ;—rivals in power, 
 at least; former adversaries; and enemies, as it is, to 
 ourselves. 
 
Chap. III. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 253 
 
 “ I hope that your paper may be attended by more 
 success than my representations have been! 
 
 “ I have above, in a few words, represented our danger.’’ 
 
 Old John o’ Gaunt, when he was breathing 
 his last counsel to his king, remarked— 
 
 “ They say the tongues of dying men 
 
 Enforce attention, like deep harmony : 
 
 When words are scarce, they are seldom spent in vain ; 
 
 For they breathe truth, that breathe their words in pain. 
 
 He that no more would say is listen’d more 
 
 Than they whom youth and ease have taught to glose; 
 
 More are men’s ends mark’d, than their lives before.” 
 
 It appears, however, from his own statement, 
 that the Duke of Wellington had totally failed 
 to raise, either in the hearts or minds of the minis¬ 
 ters of various administrations, the slightest atten¬ 
 tion to his repeated warning,—nay, by his peers 
 he has not even been interrogated on the subject! 
 in fact, it has become odious as well as unpopular ; 
 and we are, therefore, justified in concluding that, 
 while the “ morale ” or “amor sceleratus habendi” 
 of the French nation, whatever it may be worth,has 
 materially increased since the years 1803,4, and 
 5 the morale or defensive spirit of the British na¬ 
 tion has—to say the least—materially diminish ed. 
 
254 
 
 THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 
 
 Part III. 
 
 Comparison between the Physical Forces of 
 France and England. 
 
 These forces are composed of three elements, 
 namely, steam, military, and naval powers, 
 each of which we shall consider separately. 
 
 Rough Sketch showing the Dr. and Cr. Results 
 of the Power of Steam in account with Great 
 Britain. 
 
 As in war every victory, great or small, im- 
 ' portant or unimportant, has its list of casualties, 
 so every blessing which science beneficently 
 confers upon mankind, proves, in some way or 
 other, injurious to the power it supersedes ; and 
 thus in both cases, amidst the loud joyful cheers 
 of the successful, are to be heard, beneath their 
 feet, the low moans and groans of the dying. 
 
 The invention of steam power strikingly illus¬ 
 trates this fact, for, while millions of our fellow- 
 creatures are rapturously hailing its progress, 
 how many thousands of poor emaciated people, 
 incarcerated at this moment in our workhouses, 
 
Chap. III. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 255 
 
 are, to say the least, mourning over “the 
 new-fangled fire-engine ” that has thrown them 
 out of work ! 
 
 Such being the state of the case, it is evident 
 that it would not be just for us to consider to 
 what extent the naval and military defences of 
 England may have been injured by the use of 
 steam, without also as fairly weighing the amount 
 of benefit the empire has derived from the in¬ 
 vention. The balance alone will show the true 
 state of the account. 
 
 As the applications of steam power are nearly 
 eo-extensive with the manufacturing industry of 
 Great Britain, it will be necessary to estimate, 
 as far as is practicable, the value of the increased 
 consumption and diminished prices which visibly 
 as well as invisibly give luxury and comfort to 
 the community. For instance, of the 60,000,000/. 
 of British goods annually exported, nearly two- 
 thirds consist of the staple manufactures of wool, 
 cotton, flax, and silk. From them, therefore, we 
 shall be enabled to obtain some important data. 
 
 In these four fictile manufactures there are 
 employed conjointly upwards of 500,000 persons, 
 
256 
 
 THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 
 
 Part HI. 
 
 aided by the steam power of 100,000 horses, by 
 whose assistance each of these 500,000 persons 
 is enabled to do the work of at least eleven . 
 Five workers assisted by one steam-horse will, 
 therefore, do the work of 55 men, or in other 
 words, while five men are doing their own work, 
 their steam-horses are doing for them the work 
 of 50 men more. 
 
 This being the fact , we will now proceed to 
 compare the cost of each of these 50 steam men 
 with that of each of their five fellow-workmen 
 of flesh and blood. 
 
 The 500,000 human labourei's receive in 
 wages (at the rate of 25/. each) 12,500,000/. 
 per annum, and if the 100,000 steam horses, or 
 their equivalent 5,000,000 steam men, were to 
 be paid at the same rate, their wages would 
 amount to 125,000,000/., instead of which they 
 cost only 2,500,000/., to which there must be 
 added 12,500,000/. for machinery, buildings, 
 &c., forming altogether the sum of fifteen mil¬ 
 lions as the extreme cost of five millions of steam 
 men and all their tools, instead of one hundred 
 and twenty-five millions! 
 
Chap. III. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 257 
 
 But this saving of one hundred and ten mil¬ 
 lions effected by employing cheap steam men 
 whose wages amount only to 2 \d. per day, instead 
 of expensive human workmen whose wages at 
 the rate of 25 1. per annum amount to Is. 7\d. 
 per day, is not paid over to the owners of the 
 steam horses, but, on the contrary, it goes mainly 
 into the pockets, or rather it is broadcast upon 
 the back, of every consumer, who—although he 
 is probably ignorant of the services which steam 
 has rendered to him—pays in the aggregate for 
 the manufacture of his calicoes, linens, silks, and 
 woollen clothes, not above one-sixth part of the 
 prices that he must have paid for them had they 
 been manufactured by costly human hands alone. 
 
 Again, the application of steam to raising 
 coal cheapens it, first, by diminishing the ex¬ 
 pense of lifting it from moderate depths, and 
 it then cheapens it again by the greatly in¬ 
 creased quantity which its gigantic power has 
 without metaphor dragged to daylight and to 
 the market from greater depths. 
 
 The quantity of coal raised for transport by sea 
 is about ten millions of tons per annum ; about 
 
258 
 
 THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 
 
 Part III. 
 
 an equal quantity passes by railways and canals; 
 besides which a large amount is used in our 
 manufacturing districts without any considerable 
 transit by either means. Altogether 25,000,000 
 of tons is a probable estimate of the quantity of 
 coal raised per annum from a general depth 
 which we underrate by stating at 600 feet; and 
 as 2000 tons per annum is a liberal allowance 
 of work for every steam horse-power, there must 
 be required 12,500 horses to raise this coal, and 
 as many more to take off the water, making a 
 total of steam-engine power of 25,000 horses 
 employed in getting coal. 
 
 Now, if these 25,000 horses were living ones, 
 they would for maintenance and attendance not 
 cost less than 25/. each, or 625,000/. per annum ; 
 whereas steam-engines of the same power may 
 be worked at 2/. each, or 50,000/. a year; 
 and thus, making a fair allowance for wear and 
 tear, we may reasonably estimate the saving 
 effected in mechanical power alone at half a 
 million. 
 
 And yet this is a very inadequate estimate of 
 the benefit annually derived from the application 
 
CnAP. III. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 259 
 
 of steam-engines to raising our coals; for, as the 
 greater part of the most productive collieries are 
 altogether unworkable by human power alone, 
 it is not too much to say that we are indebted 
 to the steam-engine for five millions’ worth 
 of coal which could not otherwise be obtained. 
 
 Again, our mercantile steam fleet, which can¬ 
 not be valued at less than four millions, is pro¬ 
 pelled by a power of upwards of 30,000 steam 
 horses, each of which, by burning from seven 
 to ten pounds of coal, propels on an average 
 about four tons weight ten miles an hour, the 
 whole cost, including every expense for this work, 
 being one-seventh of a penny per ton per mile! 
 
 Although it is to a certain degree foreign 
 to our argument, we must here observe that in 
 ordinary times and in full work, the esta¬ 
 blishments of private builders of steam-engines 
 and ships on the Thames alone could, for the 
 purposes of war, produce, within less than twelve 
 months from the date of an order so to do, twenty 
 first-class steam-vessels of 400 horses power 
 each, armed, and ready for sea; and twenty 
 more in every succeeding period of six months. 
 
260 
 
 THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 
 
 Part III. 
 
 The builders and engineers of the Clyde could 
 produce twelve in the same time ; those of the 
 Mersey probably six; and other ports six more. 
 Thus in twelve months’ notice, if we but had it, 
 our ordinary existing establishments could turn 
 out an armed fleet of nearly fifty paddlewheel 
 steamers in a year*, the cost of which might be 
 about 3,000,000/. sterling! Stimulated how¬ 
 ever by high prices, the manufacturers of marine 
 engines could, in case of emergency, summon to 
 their aid, in the manufacture of the various parts 
 of their machines, the vast powers of other 
 establishments now employed in manufacturing 
 other descriptions of machinery, and in this way 
 they would be able greatly to increase, perhaps 
 to double , the amount we have stated. The 
 whole of the marine engine manufacturers in 
 F? *ance could perhaps construct about one-half 
 the amount of the Thames alone; indeed this 
 is a liberal estimate. Her other available manu¬ 
 factures of machinery are certainly less than 
 one-tenth part of England. 
 
 As regards our railways, although it is of 
 course scarcely feasible to make comparative 
 
Chap. III. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 261 
 
 estimates of a mode of conveyance which to all 
 other mechanical power is impossible, the advan¬ 
 tages of steam-engine power over living horse 
 power are very apparent. For example, there 
 are in England above 2,500 locomotive engines, 
 each of which is capable of drawing 50 tons 
 100 miles a day, at the rate of 30 miles an hour 
 along an ordinary line of railway, at a cost of 
 one shilling a mile. Now five tons carried along 
 a road 100 miles, at the rate of ten miles an 
 hour, is more than a days work for 40 horses, 
 and certainly could not be done at less than 
 one shilling per mile. The locomotive engine 
 therefore does the work of 400 horses at triple 
 the speed and at one-tenth part of the cost; in 
 fact, each engine, which at horses’ wages would 
 have earned 50/., feels itself well paid at hi. 
 
 Of course the capital invested in the railway 
 is one of the agents employed in effecting this 
 saving, but it must also be admitted that, at the 
 rates above mentioned, one thousand locomotives 
 running regularly would in a year, and at a cost 
 of a million and a half, not only perform work 
 which horses could not do for fifteen millions, 
 
t 
 
 262 the invasion of England part hi. 
 
 but that without the steam locomotive the mo¬ 
 dern railway would be unworkable. Indeed it is 
 quite evident that, besides the enormous savings 
 to the public, our railways, although but lately 
 termed “ prodigies and impossibilities,” have 
 benefited society to an extent which it is utterly 
 impossible to estimate in cash values. 
 
 Throughout our mining districts, tall chimneys, 
 gigantic bobs or levers slowly rising or falling, 
 and slender columns of white steam, are indices 
 everywhere to be seen of that ethereal power by 
 which ores of tin, copper, iron, or lead are raised 
 and stamped, while rivers of water are, at an 
 equally trifling cost, lifted from the lodes. In 
 short, in all parts of the British Empire—above 
 ground as well as below—crossing our lakes— 
 ascending and descending our rivers—and tra¬ 
 versing every ocean on the surface of the globe, 
 does the power of steam not only cheapen for us 
 every article we require, but, by reducing the 
 cost of a horse’s labour to 2 1. a year (1 {d. per 
 day), and a man’s labour to 2 \d. per day, it 
 enables us successfully to sell our manufactures 
 in countries with which it would otherwise 
 
 

 Ciiap. III. BY A FRENCH ARMY. 263 
 
 have been utterly impracticable for us to com¬ 
 pete. 
 
 Lastly, steam is the propagator of religion 
 and the patron of literature. 
 
 At the University Printing-office at Oxford 
 there were in the year 1848 printed by steam— 
 
 271,500 Bibles. 
 
 254,000 Testaments. 
 
 287,750 Prayer-Books. 
 
 Of the above, hundreds of thousands (at 
 prices reduced by steam as follows: Bibles, 6d. • 
 Testaments, 2cZ.; Prayer-Books, 2 id.) have, by 
 the very power that printed them, been de¬ 
 spatched to bless the inhabitants of the remotest 
 countries. 
 
 In like manner the paper for the Times 
 newspaper is made by steam; it is printed by 
 steam; and by the same power—while we are now 
 writing—it is whirling along railways to be trans¬ 
 mitted by steamers to every region of the globe! 
 
 The enormous benefit, comfort, and luxury 
 which Great Britain has amassed, and is still 
 amassing, by the power of steam, having been 
 very faintly detailed, we must now proceed, 
 
 
264 
 
 THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 
 
 Part III. 
 
 with equal fairness, to consider, or rather con¬ 
 jecture, what, per contra , will be the result of 
 the invention as regards the defences of the 
 United Kingdom. 
 
 Now the defences of England could not by 
 our Inspector-General of Fortifications, aided by 
 the whole corps of Koyal Engineers, be more 
 correctly, or half so beautifully, defined as they 
 have been by Shakspeare:— 
 
 “ This fortress, built by Nature for herself, 
 Against infection and the hand of war; 
 
 This happy breed of men, this little world; 
 This precious stone set in the silver sea, 
 Which serves it in the office of a wall, 
 
 Or as a moat defensive to a house, 
 
 Against the envy of less happy lands. 
 
 England, bound in with the triumphant sea, 
 
 Whose rocky shore beats back the envious siege 
 Of watery Neptune.” 
 
 In fact, while the coasts and boundaries of 
 other countries, at enormous cost, have been 
 protected at intervals—in many places far and 
 wide between — by towers, batteries, and fort¬ 
 resses, England has, by the inexpensive agency 
 
Cri vp. III. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 265 
 
 of salt water, been protected in the simple 
 manner above described. 
 
 This protection, however, and these defences, 
 by a power unknown to Shakspeare—the magic 
 power of steam—have, as we are about to explain, 
 been materially impaired ;*—nay, it may truly 
 be said they have been almost annihilated. 
 
 To our unmilitary readers we may observe 
 that, in order to estimate the strength of a fortress 
 on shore, it is necessary to measure the breadth 
 and depth of its ditch, and the height of its 
 rampart. But what has rendered Nature’s de¬ 
 fence of England hitherto impregnable is, that 
 prior to the invention alluded to it has been 
 beyond the genius of Napoleon, or of any hu¬ 
 man being, to estimate the defensive breadth of 
 the British Channel! We will explain our 
 meaning by figures and facts. 
 
 It appears from the following extract from a 
 very able statement which has been expressly 
 drawn up for us by the veteran harbour¬ 
 master at Bamsgate from his “ own journals/’ 
 that during last year (1849), throughout which 
 there was what is termed by him “ average 
 
266 
 
 THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 
 
 Part III a 
 
 weather,” there were no less than 125 days on 
 which, in the time of Napoleon, the invasion of 
 England would have been impossible. 
 
 “ Ordinary sailing-vessels would have deemed it 
 impracticable or unsafe to endeavour to cross the nar¬ 
 rowest portion of the British Channel from France to 
 England or from England to France, in consequence of 
 calm or light winds, storms, contrary winds, or fogs, 
 as follows :— 
 
 Calms or light winds 
 
 • 9 
 
 Days, 
 
 50 
 
 Stormy weather 
 
 • • 
 
 20 
 
 Contrary winds 
 
 e • 
 
 50 
 
 Dense fogs . 
 
 9 9 
 
 5 
 
 Schooners and other fore-and-aft 
 
 rigged vessels, 
 
 selected for despatch, being of a class easily acted 
 upon by light airs or wind, would reduce the fifty days 
 to twenty; and, as they readily beat off a lee-shore, 
 they would reduce the effect of stormy weather from 
 twenty days to ten; and as to contrary winds, a dis¬ 
 tance of twenty miles is trifling to a fast-sailing vessel. 
 Such vessels also have a great auxiliary in the tides, 
 for, either on one tack or the other, they will get the 
 tide under their lee bow, chucking them to windward 
 towards the desired ports.” .... 
 
 “ But there is a fact worth observing, on approach¬ 
 ing either coast, which requires to be guarded against 
 in sailing-vessels. It is the tendency of the wind to 
 draw off from the shore as you approach it—conse¬ 
 quent (I imagine) upon the radiation in atmospheric 
 
Chap. III. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 267 
 
 influence from the land, which, pressing upon the sea- 
 breeze, pushes its column aside and causes it to 
 diverge two or three points from its natural course. 
 Thus far, in a national point of view, the countries 
 appear to me to be on pretty equal terms; and we 
 of the old school know that their privateers cut a 
 tolerable caper in the Channel, which we assumed to 
 be ours , during the last war.” 
 
 Now, from the above data, it is evident that 
 in the days of Nelson a man might as well 
 have endeavoured, from the given longitude 
 and latitude of a ship far away at sea, to 
 have determined the captain’s age, as from any 
 data that could then have been given to him 
 to have presumed to declare what would be 
 the defensive breadth of the British Channel 
 that day three months, or even on that day week. 
 When the sea was smooth, and when wind and 
 tide were favourable, the distance was undeniably 
 exactly twenty-two miles. During a calm it 
 became a glassy surface as immeasurable as 
 infinite space. During storms it was converted 
 into mountains as impracticable to cross as 
 the Andes in winter. During foul winds its 
 breadth became either immeasurably great, or of 
 
 N 2 
 
268 
 
 THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 
 
 Part III. 
 
 a distance varying every hour with the most 
 fickle element in nature, acting in combination 
 with the tide, which, it is well known, like a 
 captain pacing the deck, or like the pendulum 
 of a clock, is everlastingly going backwards and 
 forwards. Again, even during light and favour¬ 
 able airs the distance could not always be accu¬ 
 rately determined, inasmuch as on approaching 
 the goal it was liable to be influenced by the 
 protective propensity of an antagonist wind to 
 blow, or, as the worthy harbour-master expresses 
 it, to “ draw off the shore.” Lastly, although 
 passable, the passage was occasionally totally 
 obscured by a dense fog. 
 
 Now let us for a moment practically test the 
 value of this ancient defence of England, which 
 may easily be explained as follows :—In be¬ 
 sieging a fortress on shore, it is customary for 
 the commanding engineer to report to the 
 general commanding in chief to what height 
 the breaching batteries have reduced the escarp, 
 and consequently at what period the assault 
 may reasonably be effected. But we ask, what 
 would the Duke of Wellington have said if his 
 
Chap. III. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 269 
 
 engineer had reported to him as follows:— 
 “ The scarp being at this moment only twelve 
 feet high, it could readily be surmounted by 
 scaling-ladders. It is my duty, however, to 
 inform you, that by the time the troops can get 
 to it, it may, for aught I can warrant, be a 
 hundred yards high, or any height you like to 
 name between that and its present state; be¬ 
 sides which, though the men may be close to 
 it, they will perhaps not be able to see it.” 
 Under such a report, what orders could pos¬ 
 sibly be given ? what arrangements could pos¬ 
 sibly be made for the attack ? To what con¬ 
 clusion could the Duke arrive, but to say to his 
 engineer, “ By-, if what you state is cor¬ 
 
 rect, the place is impregnable !” and thus in 
 the days of Nelson the combined forces of 
 winds, waves, tides, and fogs rendered old Eng¬ 
 land almost impregnable. 
 
 The power of steam, however, has, no doubt, 
 so far levelled the works of our fortress, that it 
 has converted what Napoleon, as on the heights 
 of Ambleteuse he gnashed his teeth at it, called 
 “ The Ditch of England,” to an esplanade 
 
270 
 
 THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 
 
 Pakt III. 
 
 from eight to twelve leagues broad, clear of 
 buildings, but which, with a very few exceptions, 
 can, almost with the regularity of a railway 
 time-table, be crossed by steamers by day or by 
 night throughout the year. But it has been 
 shown that this new power, besides operating 
 in the British Channel, is omnipresent as well 
 as omnipotent over the whole aqueous sur¬ 
 face of the globe; and as, instead of “ tide and 
 winds waiting for no man,” no man now waits 
 for them, it follows that combinations at a point 
 five thousand miles of!*, — such as Napoleon 
 devised for the invasion of England and for the 
 capture of London, but which, thanks to the un¬ 
 certainties we have described, he found to be 
 impracticable,-—could now be as securely cal¬ 
 culated upon as the arrival of the steamer 
 “ Ilindostan ” from India at Southampton, or of 
 the arrival at 10.30 p.m. of the Edinburgh 
 Express train at Euston station. 
 
 “ What then! ” it will, probably, be exclaimed, 
 
 ‘ 4 are we doomed , after all , to he ruined by the 
 invention of steam ? Has Science betrayed us ? 
 Under the hypocritical pretence of cheapening our 
 
Chap. III. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 271 
 
 calicoes, has she put into the hands of mankind a 
 loaded engine , the trigger of which the French 
 nation has only to pull to blow our brains 
 out?" To such language we have pleasure 
 in replying, that as regards that blessing which 
 the Almighty Power has conferred upon man¬ 
 kind, the balance of the account-current is 
 infinitely in favour of the British people. 
 
 If the sinews of war be money—and who will 
 deny that fact?—a small tithe of the wealth which 
 steam has created, and is still creating for us, will 
 afford us ample protection. All that is necessary 
 is, that—as in all cases of momentary danger—the 
 good sense of the nation should determine, first 
 of all, to subdue its feelings either of over-confi¬ 
 dence or of unnecessary alarm, and then calmly 
 to devise such amount of protection as altered 
 circumstances shall have rendered necessary. 
 
 We have lost our outworks, or rather, as 
 we have more correctly stated it, they have been 
 levelled by science into an extensive esplanade. 
 With a rival power within twenty-two miles of 
 us, and with upwards of four hundred thousand 
 bayonets—which without a moment’s warning 
 
 
272 
 
 THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 
 
 Part III. 
 
 may become hostile—glistening before our eyes, 
 we have no alternative but at once to remedy 
 our loss by the simple military prescription of 
 strengthening our citadel, which, the instant we 
 have the will, we have—as is well known to all 
 military men—the power of rendering as im¬ 
 pregnable as the extended works we have lost. 
 —In six words: 
 
 We must have a standing army. 
 
 But our statesmen of all parties declare, “ Oh , 
 that is impossible ! The nation wont hear of it, 
 —they have been born with a prejudice against 
 it , which—nullis medicabilis herbis—is incurable. 
 We dont dare even to think of it, much less 
 propose it. The country would rise up in arms 
 against it. The nation would sooner die than 
 submit to it! ” 
 
 We shall shortly have to take a military re¬ 
 view of these objections; but as in the present 
 chapter we are merely endeavouring, as auditors, 
 to draw out “ a Dr. and Cr. statement of the 
 results of the invention of steam in account with 
 Great Britain,” we will merely reply, that our 
 
Ciiap, III. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 273 
 
 proposal is not, as is usual in surgery, to re¬ 
 quire the patient to submit to a painful operation 
 to save his life; but it is, to show in figures that, 
 inasmuch as it is usual as well as profitable for 
 every landlord or tenant out of the profits of his 
 farm to thatch his stacks in order to keep the 
 rain off; and maintain his fences in order to pre¬ 
 vent the sheep, bullocks, and pigs belonging to 
 his neighbour from trespassing on his lands and 
 eating his crops ; so it would be only consistent 
 with such prudence and such practices for the 
 nation most cheerfully to appropriate, out of 
 every million it gains by steam, a small percent¬ 
 age for the purpose of repairing the breach which 
 the new power has made in our defences, and 
 through which, if it be not repaired , there will 
 sooner or later most surely enter—not rain,—not 
 cows,—not sheep,—not inquisitive pigs, nor even 
 pigglings, but say two hundred thousand young 
 enthusiastic French soldiers waving banners in 
 our pure English air, on which are mentally 
 inscribed three words—we almost shudder as we 
 transcribe them— 
 
 “ Booty, Beauty, and Revenge ! ” 
 
 N 3 
 
274 
 
 THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 
 
 Part III. 
 
 Our immortal poet might then but too truly 
 have exclaimed,— 
 
 “ That England that was wont to conquer others 
 
 Hath made a shameful conquest of itself ! ” 
 
 As, however, we are at present straitly con¬ 
 fined to figures, we willingly revert to them. It 
 is very powerfully urged by our economists, 
 “ Why incur a certain expense for an uncertain 
 contingency? Perhaps after all the French wont 
 come l ” We repeat the words, “ Perhaps they 
 wont! ” as heartily and as readily as we would say 
 to any one of our readers, while seated at his 
 or her fireside, “ Perhaps your house won’t be 
 burned to-night!” but it appears by the follow¬ 
 ing statements from official and private autho¬ 
 rities that in the aggregate the British nation 
 are much too wise and too prudent to be satisfied 
 with such security. 
 
 1849.—1. Duty on Fire Insurance, average 3s. 
 per cent. 
 
 Collected in England . . £1,001,470 
 
 Scotland . . 64,393 
 
 Ireland . . . 50,947 
 
 £1,116,810 
 
Chap. III. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 275 
 
 The sum that would be covered 
 
 by this amount of duty is . . £744,540,100’ 
 
 2. Life Insurance:— j 
 
 Approximate aggregate of the 
 sum insured, computed from the 14,488,910 
 various returns of stamps on 
 life policies .... 
 
 3. Marine Insurance:— 
 
 Calculated on the basis that the 
 average rates of premium in 
 3 849 were those charged by the 
 Mutual Indemnity Company : 
 the total amount of duty re¬ 
 ceived by Government in that 192,966,548 
 year being 158,749/. The 
 above calculation does not in¬ 
 clude the very large insurances | 
 effected on British account in 
 India, America, Hamburgh, 
 and other places abroad . . s 
 
 Total . . . £951,995.558 
 
 1 The ordinary rate of premium is 1$. 6d . per 100/., or one- 
 half the rate of duty. If all risks were of the ordinary kind, the 
 sum paid for insurance would therefore be 558,405/. ; but a por¬ 
 tion, which cannot be defined, are considered hazardous or 
 doublv-hazardous, and pay much higher rates of premium— 
 hazardous, 3s. per 100/. ; doubly-hazardous, 5s. and upwards— 
 according to the nature of the risk. Farming stock is exempt 
 from duty. The sum insured on it, 58,292,209/., would, at the 
 ordinary rate of premium, pay 43,719/. 
 
276 
 
 THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 
 
 Part III. 
 
 The precautionary measures adopted by the 
 poorer classes are evinced as follows :—- 
 
 The amount of money in the Savings Banks, 20th 
 November, 1848, was— 
 
 England . 
 
 £. 
 
 24,985,730 
 
 Wales 
 
 692,495 
 
 Scotland . 
 
 1,081,110 
 
 Ireland 
 
 1,355,801 
 
 Friendly Societies 
 
 28,115,136 
 
 2,003,635 
 
 
 £30,118,771 
 
 From all these figures it may surely not unrea¬ 
 sonably be inferred that, under Providence, the 
 enormous wealth and possessions of the British 
 Empire are the reward of that extraordinary 
 caution, precaution, and foresight, by which all 
 classes of people,—ship-owners, house-owners, 
 owners of every description of property, down 
 to the honest labourer who has nothing to pro¬ 
 tect but the weekly stipend earned by the sweat 
 of his brow,—have apparently combined together 
 in the custom of each giving a percentage of his 
 possessions to save the remainder from accidental 
 loss; and if this be the deliberate will and estab- 
 
Chap. III. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 277 
 
 lished habit of the nation, is it consistent for it 
 to refuse to prescribe for the safety of the whole 
 that which is universally admitted to be salutary 
 for all its parts? For instance, is it reasonable 
 for a man to say, 44 I am insured by 4 The Acci¬ 
 dental Death Insurance Company ’ from violence 
 or accident of every description. I have in¬ 
 sured my dear wife and daughters, by 4 The 
 Railway Assurance Company , against loss of 
 life or other personal injury arising from rail¬ 
 way accidents . Bankers: Messrs. Charles Hop- 
 kinson Co., Regent-street; Secretary , W. W. 
 Williams, Esq. One payment to cover an assur¬ 
 ance for the whole life. 
 
 £. s. 
 
 4 For every policy of 2000/. . . . 4 4 
 
 4 Ditto ditto 1000/. . . . 2 2’ 
 
 And yet I deliberately refuse to insure either 
 myself, my faithful wife, or any one of my five 
 blooming daughters from the merciless ravages 
 of foreign soldiers ? nay, I moreover won’t even 
 allow Science to apportion out of her earnings 
 for me one farthing in the pound to insure us all 
 seven most effectually from the smallest possi- 
 
278 
 
 THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 
 
 Part III. 
 
 bility of such a calamity! No; I’ll spend the 
 ivhole of my steam earnings; that is to say, I will, 
 during every day of my life, enjoy cheap cotton, 
 cheap silk, cheap linen, and cheap woollen clothes. 
 I will warm myself in the evening at a cheap fire ; 
 I will sleep at night between cheap sheets and 
 cheap blankets; I will travel 40 miles an hour 
 at a cheap rate; I will read a cheap newspaper; 
 say my prayers out of a cheap Bible—all cheap¬ 
 ened by steam: hut if I am called upon to con¬ 
 tribute to repair the only little injury which 
 this blessed beneficent power has created — an 
 injury to the defences of my country which 
 at any hour may deprive me and my family 
 of our property, our lives, and our honour, I 
 deliberately reply, ‘ I know nothing about your 
 new inventions. I have inherited a good old 
 English hatred to a standing army; the thing, 
 I tell ye, is unconstitutional; and besides this, I 
 can’t and won’t afford it! Q. e. d. 
 
 Without arguing this point, and without pre¬ 
 suming to dictate in what way a great nation 
 ought to spend the balance of its steam account, 
 we shall now leave the ledger for other subjects. 
 
Chap. IV. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 279 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 ON THE COMPARATIVE STRENGTH OF THE NAVAL FORCES 
 OF FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 The wealth of Great Britain—Creates the power of maintaining a 
 larger fleet than any other nation on the globe — Evidence 
 showing that the exercise of this power has been neglected — 
 Injudicious expenditure — Evident cause thereof — The con¬ 
 fidence reposed in the Navy based on the notion that it is 
 always ready at hand to prevent invasion — Obvious fallacy 
 of this opinion — The Colonial Empire of Great Britain 
 requires the protection of Naval power — The impossibility 
 of its pervading the ocean and protecting the British Channel 
 at the same time — Popular illustration of this truth — 
 Reflections. 
 
 As the Duke of Wellington, in his letter to 
 Major-General Sir J. Burgoyne, says, “ We 
 have no defence , or hope or chance of defence, 
 excepting in our fleet; ” and as the nation relies 
 very confidently on its navy for protection, the 
 above comparison is evidently one of vital 
 importance. 
 
 The construction and maintenance of a man- 
 
280 
 
 THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 
 
 Part III. 
 
 of-war are so costly, that, although the free will 
 of almost any people may, for a short time, 
 decree the building of ships, it is undeniable that 
 in such a pecuniary contest the nation that has 
 the longest purse must eventually have the 
 largest navy. Not only, therefore, does the 
 enormous wealth of Great Britain ensure to it 
 th q power of manufacturing and of maintaining 
 a larger fleet than that of any other nation on 
 the globe, but the indigenous productions of the 
 United Kingdom—coal, oak, and iron—readily 
 afford the means. 
 
 The French declare, that as regards the 
 construction of our present ships of war, we have 
 neglected to exert either this power or these 
 means. 
 
 “It must be said,” asserts a French writer in the 
 Journal des Debats , u that in general our ships of 
 the line are materially superior to the English ships in 
 the excellence of their construction, the perfection of 
 their armament, the solidity of their scantling, the 
 number of guns they mount, and the dimensions of the 
 ealibre of their guns.” 
 
 The distinguished “ Flag Officer,” whose 
 admonitions have been published by Admiral 
 
Chap. IV. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 281 
 
 Bowles, late one of the Lords of the Admiralty, 
 declares,— 
 
 “ Our present force consists chiefly of those objec¬ 
 tionable classes I have already so severely censured, 
 and being consequently, wherever they are found, 
 notoriously inferior to the enemy’s ships in that part 
 of the world, will in all probability be sought and 
 attacked with all the confidence naturally resulting 
 from the consciousness of superiority ; and even if they 
 escape capture, will be reduced to the humiliating 
 necessity of a purely defensive system, until reinforce¬ 
 ments arrive, while our merchant-ships will fall an 
 easy prey to privateers, &c. The 28-gun frigates and 
 10-gun brigs must inevitably be overpowered by any 
 vessel of war (nominally of their own class) to which 
 they may be opposed, and with which they cannot 
 honourably decline an engagement; but what will be 
 the feelings of the officers and men, whose blood and 
 honour will have been thus wantonly sacrificed, and of 
 their countrymen at large, when the light of truth 
 breaks in upon the nation ? When it is seen that 
 enormous sums have been lavished on injudicious and 
 inadequate preparations, and that after seventy mil¬ 
 lions expended in putting our navy into what was 
 considered a perfect state of equipment, we have to 
 throw aside the greatest part of our smaller ships, 
 and again recommence operations;—will not the burst 
 of public indignation be loud and tremendous, and 
 will it be admitted as a sufficient vindication to 
 allege that, in many particulars, the British Navy was 
 
282 
 
 THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 
 
 Part III. 
 
 far more inferior at the commencement of former 
 hostilities ? ” 
 
 Captain the Hon. E. Plunkett, R.N., has 
 published opinions similar to the above, and 
 Admiral Sir Charles Napier’s letters on the 
 defects of the wooden walls of Old England 
 appear to adduce unanswerable evidence in cor¬ 
 roboration of the same. 
 
 With respect to our iron navy, the result is 
 so well known, that a very few words will 
 suffice. 
 
 In July last, by repeated experiments from 
 the well-directed fire of the 4 Excellent ’ at a 
 target, 450 yards distant, of wrought-iron of the 
 exact construction and thickness necessary for 
 iron war-steamers, it was ascertained beyond all 
 doubt, that shot,—besides making large holes, 
 which do not, as in wood, collapse,—tear the 
 plates and start the surrounding rivets so fear¬ 
 fully, that a single blow between wind and 
 water would probably at once drive a ship’s 
 company from their quarters to their pumps. 
 In addition to this calamity, it was most un¬ 
 expectedly ascertained, that even 68-pound solid 
 
Chap. IV. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 283 
 
 cast iron shot, on striking plates of wrought 
 iron only five-eighths of an inch thick, shiver 
 into innumerable small pieces, and accordingly, 
 besides piercing the side of the steamer in the 
 destructive manner described, create between 
 decks the havoc of shells ! Moreover, if 
 the iron plates be lined with wood, there are 
 added nearly a similar amount of splinters; 
 and as these experiments, on a target about 
 fifteen feet square, and of a value of above five 
 pounds, indisputably proved that a wrought iron 
 vessel is unfit for action, it was very wisely de¬ 
 termined by the Admiralty that the project 
 should be condemned,—and it was condemned 
 accordingly. 
 
 But the British nation—so often accused of 
 being in its preparations for war “ penny wise 
 and pound foolish”—had previously expended 
 about a million of money in making wrought 
 iron steamers of from 1000 to 2000 tons 
 burden ; and, as soon as they were finished, it 
 then without reluctance spent five pounds more 
 in scientifically ascertaining, by the simplest 
 of all possible experiments, that its new-born 
 
284 
 
 THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 
 
 Part III. 
 
 iron fleet of war-steamers were utterly unfit for 
 war! 
 
 Lastly, it is well known to and has been la¬ 
 mented by every experienced officer in our Navy, 
 that, although in the time of Nelson the oceans 
 were not only swept clean of French vessels but 
 were dotted with British sail, yet, at the conclu¬ 
 sion of the war, naval architecture was so much 
 better understood and practised in French dock¬ 
 yards than in British electioneering ones, that 
 the construction and form of several men-of-war 
 of the blockaded country became actually the 
 models of the blockaders! 
 
 But how can all this possibly be otherwise so 
 long as the English people persist in their 
 national whim of invariably selecting as the 
 head of their Admiralty any individual of high 
 rank, polished manners, great powers of oratory, 
 and undeniable ability, provided always he can 
 clearly prove to them that he is totally ignorant 
 of naval affairs? Indeed, so immoveable are 
 they on this point, that, as soon as they consider 
 he has had time enough to learn the rudiments 
 of the art, he is usually exchanged for zero ! 
 
Chap. IY. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 285 
 
 Since the days of Nebuchadnezzar there 
 surely has never been set up an image for 
 official worship of a less intellectual invention. 
 No reasonable member of our community would 
 intrust the repair of his watch to a surgeon, his 
 clock to a chemist, his coffee-mill to a dentist—no 
 man would ever allow a farrier to bleed his wife ; 
 and yet the nation insists on committing to a 
 nobleman or gentleman of undoubted character, 
 but of no nautical experience, the most compli¬ 
 cated piece of mechanism that can possibly be 
 imagined, on the proper repair and maintenance 
 of which the whole community declare that their 
 lives, property, and political existence depend! 
 
 Although the facts we have stated are some¬ 
 what appalling, yet, as we do not require to use 
 them, we are willing to give to them no weight 
 whatever; nay, to admit that in point of con¬ 
 struction British men-of-war are equal, or, if 
 our readers would at all prefer it, are superior 
 to those of the French. 
 
 We are also willing to admit—as, indeed, we 
 are most desirous to believe—that they are as 
 fully manned with experienced gunners as the 
 
286 
 
 THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 
 
 Part III.. 
 
 French ; in short, that the nation has grounds 
 for believing that, either in general actions or in 
 duels, the English Navy is competent in any 
 part of the globe to beat the French. We 
 have therefore now only to consider what would 
 be the relative strength of these two Naval 
 Powers with respect to an invasion of England 
 by a French army. 
 
 If France and Great Britain in point of 
 commerce and colonies were upon equal terms; 
 and if, moreover, the former Power would by 
 treaty undertake—in case of any political dis¬ 
 pute—invariably to give to the latter public 
 notice, that, unless its demands should be con¬ 
 ceded within, say six months, war and invasion 
 should be the result; in that case there would 
 be reason for believing that, on the battle-ground 
 of the British Channel, the assembled English 
 fleet would destroy their antagonist, and thereby 
 effectually prevent its convoying to England a 
 French army. We will offer no doubts on this 
 subject; on the contrary, we will readily admit, 
 that, as under the circumstances we have stated, 
 and under the protection of its Navy, the nation 
 
Chap. IV. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 287 
 
 would be perfectly safe, it would be unne¬ 
 cessary— say even unjustifiable — to expend 
 money on “ a standing army ” for the citadel, 
 when the outworks alone were sufficient for 
 defence. 
 
 But France has not with Great Britain en¬ 
 tered into the imagined treaty, nor are the two 
 countries in point of colonies and commerce upon 
 equal grounds. And yet, although hypothesis 
 and superstructure must consequently both fall 
 to the ground, the nation still sleeps on, enjoy¬ 
 ing the most delightful dream of the power of its 
 navy to repel invasion ; and yet it is melancholy 
 to think how easy it is logically and mathema¬ 
 tically to expose this delusion. 
 
 As it is an axiom in philosophy that two 
 things cannot occupy the same space at the 
 same time, so it is equally indisputable that the 
 English fleet cannot be scattered over the whole 
 aqueous surface of the globe and be in the 
 British Channel at the same time. They can do 
 either, but not both. 
 
 By the laws of nature every substance is, like 
 gold leaf, weakened in proportion as it is extended. 
 
288 
 
 THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 
 
 Part HI. 
 
 The dew that in an October morning covers 
 Great Britain would, if collected, form an acre 
 of water nine feet deep. Again: a garrison of 
 10,000 men, in a fortress of a size adapted to 
 their numbers, can easily resist for, say three 
 months, 50,000. And yet if these 50,000 soldiers 
 were dotted round the circumference of Britain, 
 a boat’s crew could at any point defeat the indi¬ 
 vidual they would have to contend against. In 
 short, it is evident that the sentinel at u John o’ 
 Groat’s ” might call in vain for assistance to his 
 comrade at “ the Land’s End.” 
 
 Now Great Britain truly asserts that the sun 
 never sets on her empire, and that it moreover 
 is uninterruptedly shining on, and as it were bless¬ 
 ing, the canvas of her merchant vessels. But 
 the late Lieutenant Thomas Drummond, of the 
 corps of Engineers, as truly asserted that “ pro¬ 
 perty has its duties as well as its rights .” It 
 becomes necessary, therefore, that the property, 
 the commerce, and the subjects of Great Britain 
 should everywhere be protected; and accord¬ 
 ingly, wherever we have colonies, in the vicinity 
 of which, as in the West Indies, America, Medi- 
 
Chap. IV. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 289 
 
 terranean, &c. &c., the French have a squadron, it 
 becomes necessary that we also should there have 
 a squadron, which conjointly with the garrison 
 of each colony forms its defensive force. 
 
 At foreign stations where we have no colonies, 
 as in the Bio de la Plata, Brazil, or the Pacific, 
 the same necessity for our maintaining a naval 
 force is created by the mere fact that our rivals 
 do so; indeed, in the French blockade of 
 Mexico, in the Bio de la Plata, and especially 
 at Tahiti, experience has shown that our flag is 
 liable to insult and our commerce to vexatious 
 interference, unless both be protected by a force 
 equal to that of other powers. 
 
 Lastly. The protection which a British man- 
 of-war is enabled in distant regions to afford to 
 British subjects may be briefly exemplified by 
 the following fact:—When the late Sir John 
 Phillimore, in his way to England from Vera 
 Cruz, in 1824, put into the Havannah, he re¬ 
 ceived a letter informing him that several British 
 subjects had been unjustly imprisoned for several 
 weeks. He accordingly no sooner quietly de¬ 
 manded them, than the mere appearance of his 
 
 o 
 
290 the invasion of England part hi. 
 
 broadside released nine Englishmen from an 
 unwholesome gaol in which they would soon 
 have died. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons it is obvious, not 
 only that it is necessary for the British fleet to 
 be dispersed over the aqueous surface of the 
 globe, leaving at home to protect Great Britain 
 an average force of about three line-of-battle 
 ships, fully manned—a few weeks ago there was 
 actually only one— but that France can with 
 the greatest ease, by stratagem, attract to any 
 remote part of it an unusually strong force of 
 British men-of-war. In this stratagem the 
 Americans, without incurring the slightest risk 
 of going to war with Great Britain, might assist, 
 by a mere unfriendly demonstration, which 
 would almost inevitably decoy to it a corre¬ 
 sponding squadron of English vessels. Now, 
 while this simple stratagem was in operation, or 
 even without it, while the Navy of Great 
 Britain, on its ordinary duties, was dispersed 
 over the world, in what position would be the 
 English nation without its citadel— a standing 
 
 army ? 
 
Chap. IT. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 291 
 
 In the days of Nelson, in order to sweep the 
 British Channel clean for invasion, it was deemed 
 necessary for a French fleet secretly to assemble 
 at a distance of 5000 miles. They were then, 
 at the mercy of the wind-—which never has 
 had any mercy—to have sailed for Boulogne. 
 When they got there, they and the invading* 
 flotilla were to have waited for another fair wind, 
 and even when it arrived they would have had to 
 start with a fearful knowledge that before they 
 could cross the Channel it might become foul, 
 or that, when within a few miles of the 
 British shore, the whole fleet, men-of-war, 
 praams, transports, and boats, might suddenly 
 become water-logged by a calm, which would 
 give ample time to their opponents to throw up 
 field defences, &c. &c. &c., at the very points 
 at which the expedition was to land. 
 
 But how does the case stand now? Why, 
 exactly opposite to Portsmouth the French have, 
 before our eyes, just completed at Cherbourg a 
 capacious harbour armed to the teeth, in which 
 at the present moment there are lying five line- 
 of-battle ships, two frigates, and four war- 
 
 o 2 
 
292 
 
 TIIE INVASION OF ENGLAND 
 
 Part III. 
 
 steamers, with room for seventy or eighty 
 more, within which, in six words, they can 
 do as they like. And after they shall have 
 done so, what, we ask, is to prevent the 
 French Government—that is to say, the French 
 Army—under pretext of wrong or insult in any 
 part of the world, from beginning their nego¬ 
 tiations by making it perilous for Great Britain 
 even to take one step in her defence, namely, by 
 suddenly anchoring their fleet at the Nore, with 
 a demand for immediate satisfaction (whether 
 due or not), coupled with an intimation that 
 any naval preparations on the part of the 
 British, such as preparing seamen, preparing 
 line-of-battle ships in ordinary, &c., would be 
 considered a refusal and a declaration of war? 
 And as, under these circumstances, the naval de¬ 
 fence of England would, as we have stated, con¬ 
 sist, on an average, say of only three line-of- 
 battle ships fully manned, and as it would require 
 at least six weeks before the British people could 
 obtain the assistance of their Mediterranean fleet, 
 it is evident that, while the French navy ruled 
 in the Channel, the French army would have 
 
CiiAr. IV. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 293 
 
 abundant time, by the power of steam, to in¬ 
 vade England. 
 
 But because, since the days of Nelson, we 
 have, mainly in consequence of the invention of 
 steam, lost our outworks, it by no means follows 
 that we have lost all: on the contrary, if our 
 citadel should prove impregnable, the subtleties 
 and stratagems we have imagined would be fruit¬ 
 less, for, while the French were concentrating 
 their navy in the English Channel, our navy, in 
 due time, would bombard their towns as severely 
 as they could ours; in addition to which, they 
 could seize upon their commercial navy, and in 
 various ways punish them most severely; to say 
 the least, the penalties of war would be equally 
 distributed. 
 
 Let us, therefore, without being alarmed at 
 having lost our outworks, now proceed to esti¬ 
 mate the strength of our citadel. 
 
294 
 
 THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 
 
 Part III. 
 
 CHAPTER Y. 
 
 ON THE COMPARATIVE STRENGTH OF THE MILITARY 
 FORCES OF FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 Enormous amount of the French Army—British Army inade¬ 
 quate even to defend our Colonies—Duke of Wellington’s 
 opinion of the perilous condition of the nation—His opinion 
 disregarded—Strange inconsistency—Distinguished qualifica¬ 
 tions and character of Major-General Sir John Burgoyne, 
 the nation’s Chief Engineer—Inconsistency in rejecting his 
 professional opinion also—Words of warning from old Naval 
 and Military Officers—Offered in vain. 
 
 A. single glance at the annexed sketch will, we 
 trust, be sufficient to induce many of our readers, 
 of their own accord, to forgive an observation 
 —in our first chapter—which they may have 
 deemed somewhat offensive; namely, “ that there 
 can scarcely exist in nature a more extraordinary 
 contrast than between the preposterous length of 
 the sword of France in proportion to that of its 
 purse; and the tiny means which toothless Eng- 
 
Rough Sketch, showing the Comparative Protective Strength of the Military Forces of the Great Nations of Europe. 
 
 N.B .—Regular Troops are marked tk 
 
 us 
 
 N.B.—The strength of 
 
 NATION. 
 
 the army of a coun- 
 
 Prussian.| 
 
 try is usually pro¬ 
 portionate to its 
 
 Austrian. 
 
 amount of wealth, 
 
 population, extent of 
 
 
 
 territory, and nature 
 
 of positions to be 
 
 French . 
 
 defended. 
 
 Great Britain and Channel Islands 
 
 BRITISH. 
 
 In Great Britain, Channel Islands, and Ireland 
 
 In Europe 
 
 In Europe and Mediterranean. 
 
 In Europe, Mediterranean, and Africa . ... . 
 
 In Europe, Mediterranean, Africa, and Asia* 
 
 In Europe, Mediterranean, Africa, Asia, New South V ales, 
 New Zealand, Van Diemen’s Land, Bermuda, West Indies, 
 and America . . • • • 
 
 * Exclusive of the troops of the East India Company. 
 
 Garde Nationale, Landwehr, Landsturm , British Yeomanry , Retired Pensioners , and Dockyardmen are marked thus 
 
 Dotted lines denote that the remainder of the Population are organised to he called out if required. 
 
 Garde Nationale, containing about 30ft Battalions of retired Soldiers. 
 
 SCALE—200,000 Men to one Inch. 
 
 500,000 6 
 
 One Million Men. 
 
 To face page 294. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 M T A \A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 II 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chap. V. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 295 
 
 land possesses to protect even her home population 
 and property from the horrors of invasion” 
 
 The sketch explains so mutely the relative 
 forces of the two nations, that it will probably 
 appear unnecessary that we should disturb the 
 serious meditations it engenders by a single 
 remark. It is necessary, however, as a matter 
 of business, which no feelings can be permitted 
 to arrest, that we should proceed with our com¬ 
 parison. 
 
 The whole of the population of France capable 
 of bearing arms has been so carefully organised, 
 that, besides a standing army of 408,000 men 
 admirably officered, disciplined, and equipped, 
 and 500 guns, there exist, as has been stated, 
 among the National Guards (two millions of 
 whom have received arms), about 300 battalions 
 of retired soldiers. It is evident therefore that 
 France, without abandoning any of her fortresses, 
 could not only despatch for the invasion of 
 England 150,000 men, but if the whole of them 
 were to be drowned in crossing, she could in less 
 than a month despatch 150,000 more. Indeed 
 the following few historical figures will very 
 
296 
 
 THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 
 
 Part III. 
 
 briefly remind our readers of the extraordinary 
 elasticity of the military resources of France:— 
 In the invasion of Russia the French lost— 
 
 Killed in battle 
 By cold and hunger 
 Prisoners 
 
 Men. 
 
 125,000 
 
 132,000 
 
 193,000 
 
 Total . . . 450,000 
 
 And yet no sooner did Napoleon, leaving his 
 army on the 5th of December, 1812, arrive at 
 Paris on the 18th of December, than he imme¬ 
 diately levied, under a conscription almost unani¬ 
 mously voted by the Senate, another army of 
 350,000 men, which enabled him to gain the 
 battle of Lutzen ! Again, on his sudden return 
 to France from Elba, he was enabled in less 
 than three months very powerfully to contend 
 against the combined armies of Europe. 
 
 Now it becomes our painful duty to observe 
 that the military force of “ Great Britain and 
 the Channel Islands ,” as marked on our sketch 
 — tiny as it is — represents not an amount of 
 spare disposable power created by the nation to 
 repel invasion, but merely that pittance neces- 
 
Chap. Y. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 297 
 
 sary, first, for Ireland, and, secondly, to relieve 
 the different regiments after they have been suffi¬ 
 ciently sickened and deteriorated by the various 
 climates to which they have been subjected: in¬ 
 deed, to those acquainted with the subject, it is 
 but too well known that the existing force of Eng¬ 
 land is inadequate even to a proper defence of 
 her vast colonial possessions ! Without, however, 
 continuing remarks which we are aware cannot 
 but be unpalatable, and which may be declared 
 to be indefinite, we will at once proceed to 
 figures. 
 
 It appears by our printed Parliamentary 
 Returns—very attentively studied by the mili¬ 
 tary authorities of the great nations of Europe 
 ■—that the number of regular troops in Great 
 Britain and Ireland are as follows:— 
 
 In Great Britain and Channel Islands :— 
 
 
 Men. 
 
 Cavalry ..... 
 
 3,993 
 
 Infantry . 
 
 27,288 
 
 Engineers and Sappers . 
 
 1,080 
 
 Artillery . 
 
 5,482 
 
 Total 
 
 37,843 
 
 O 3 
 
298 
 
 THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 
 
 Part ITT. 
 
 In Ireland :— 
 
 Men. 
 
 Cavalry 
 
 Infantry 
 
 Artillery 
 
 2,988 
 
 19,636 
 
 1,381 
 
 Total 
 
 24,005 
 
 Grand total in Great Bri¬ 
 tain, Channel Islands, 
 and Ireland 
 
 61,848 
 
 Total number of Guns that could be fully 
 horsed for field service . 
 
 40 
 
 The above figures include sick and non-effectives 
 of all descriptions, besides that considerable 
 proportion of the artillery who, for want of horses, 
 would be unable to take the field: without, how¬ 
 ever, making any of these deductions, let us con¬ 
 sider what proportion of this aggregate force in 
 Great Britain, &c., of 61,848 men and 40 guns, 
 could, with due regard to the protection of na¬ 
 tional property of immense cost and of vital 
 importance, be spared to be despatched to the 
 coast of the Channel to resist invasion. 
 
 “ It is perfectly true,” says the Duke of Wellington 
 in his letter to Major-General Sir John Burgoyne, 
 “ that as we stand at present, with our naval arsenals 
 
Chap. V. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 299 
 
 and dockyards not half-garrisoned, 5000 men of all 
 arms could not be put under arms, if required, for 
 any service whatever, without leaving—standing without 
 relief—all employed on any duty, not excepting even 
 the guards over the palaces and the person of the 
 sovereign! 
 
 “ I calculate that a declaration of war should pro¬ 
 perly find our home garrisons of the strength as follows; 
 particularly considering that one of the most common 
 accusations against this country is, that the practice has 
 been to commence reprisals at sea, simultaneously with 
 a declaration of w T ar, the order for the first of which 
 must have been issued before the last can have been 
 published. 
 
 “ We ought to be with garrisons as follows at the 
 moment war is declared :— 
 
 “ Channel Islands, besides the Militia 
 
 of each, well organized, trained, Men. 
 
 and disciplined . . . 10,000 
 
 Plymouth ..... 10,000 
 
 Milford Haven .... 5,000 
 
 Cork.10,000 
 
 Portsmouth ..... 10,000 
 
 Dovor ...... 10,000 
 
 Sheerness, Chatham, and the Thames . 10,000 
 
 “ I suppose that one-half of the whole regular force 
 of the country would be stationed in Ireland, which 
 half would give the garrison for Cork. The remainder 
 must be supplied from the half of the whole force at 
 home, stationed in Great Britain. 
 
300 
 
 THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 
 
 Part III. 
 
 “ The whole force employed at home in Great 
 Britain and Ireland would not afford a sufficient 
 number of men for the mere occupation and defence , 
 on the breaking out of tear, of the works constructed for 
 the defence of the dockyards and naval arsenals 
 
 From the foregoing statement, it is evident 
 that in the opinion of the Duke of Wellington 
 the nation has neglected to provide within Great 
 Britain, the Channel Islands, and Ireland,—we 
 might almost say, within Europe,—more than 
 five thousand men that could properly be ap¬ 
 plied for the purpose of defending the United 
 Kingdom from invasion; indeed, it might be 
 further stated, without fear of contradiction, 
 that the nation, on chronic “ constitutional ” 
 principles, has been so resolutely averse to main¬ 
 taining in time of peace any army at all for 
 such purpose, that no Minister, Whig or Tory, has 
 lately even dared to propose it, or—as if it 
 were treason—in any discussion in Parliament 
 on Army Estimates even to “ imagine ” it; nay, 
 as it has been stated, it has been impracticable 
 for any Government in the present day to obtain 
 troops enough adequately to defend the home 
 
Chap. V. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 301 
 
 possessions of the empire: the natural conse¬ 
 quences are as follows:— 
 
 “ As we stand now,” says the Duke in his letter to 
 Major-General Sir John Burgoyne, “ and if it he 
 true that the exertions of the fleet are not sufficient to 
 provide for our defence, we are not safe for a 
 
 WEEK AFTER THE DECLARATION OF WAR ! . . . . 
 
 “ I was aware that our magazines and arsenals were 
 very inadequately supplied with ordnance and car¬ 
 riages, arms, stores of all denominations, and ammu¬ 
 nition. 
 
 “ You will see from what I have above written that 
 I have contemplated the danger to which you have 
 referred. I have done so for years ! I have drawn 
 to it the attention of different administrations at 
 different times. 
 
 “ I quite concur in all your views of the danger of 
 our position, and of the magnitude of the stake at 
 issue ! 
 
 Now even supposing in case of invasion it were 
 to be determined to abandon the protection of 
 our sovereign, of our arsenals, and the necessary 
 guards and duties in the interior, to our aged 
 pensioners, dockyard brigades, yeomanry, and 
 police, and to leave in Ireland only on e-thircl of 
 the amount of troops at present deemed neces¬ 
 sary for its safety —the utmost force, including 
 
302 
 
 THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 
 
 Part III. 
 
 all the Guards and troops of the line, the corps 
 of sappers, and 2000 marines, that could by any 
 means be possibly scraped together, would barely 
 amount to 45,000 men. 
 
 Reflections. 
 
 From the three comparisons which we have 
 just concluded, of the relative moral, naval, and 
 military agencies of France and Great Britain, it 
 but too clearly appears that since the threatened 
 invasion of England by Napoleon in 1797, 
 1801, 2, and 3 — 
 
 1. “ La morale ”—Anglice, the desire for re¬ 
 venge—of the French army has materially in¬ 
 creased, while, on the other hand, the inclination 
 of the British people to defend themselves from 
 invasion has—almost inversely with the increase 
 of their wealth—diminished, until it has now 
 become nearly extinct. 
 
 2. That while, in the French navy, the im¬ 
 provements in the art of gunnery,—the establish¬ 
 ment of “ compagnies permanentes ” of practised 
 
Chap. V. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 303 
 
 gunner-seamen,—the power of steam to tow ves¬ 
 sels and boats of all descriptions across the 
 British Channel during almost any weather, by 
 day or by night,—and, lastly, the construction of 
 a gigantic impregnable harbour of rendezvous at 
 Cherbourg, capable of containing more than 90 
 sail of the line,—have removed the principal 
 difficulties against which Napoleon had to con¬ 
 tend ; the British people have not yet devised 
 any practical plan for manning the ships of war 
 they have built; and that as the navy of Eng¬ 
 land have colonies and commerce to defend all 
 over the world, while the navy of France, about 
 equal to it in force, have no such errant duties 
 to perform, it is evident that by a sudden secret 
 concentration of the French fleet on the old 
 plan devised by Napoleon, or even by the 
 power of the fleet anchored at this moment in 
 the harbour of Cherbourg, a temporary com¬ 
 mand of the British Channel could easily be 
 obtained. 
 
 3. That while the French army is now nearly 
 as large, more efficient, and better appointed 
 than it was in 1803, and while their “morale” 
 
304 
 
 THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 
 
 Part III. 
 
 or disposition for invasion and plunder, is more 
 hostile than it then was, the British people, in¬ 
 stead of patriotically congregating for self-defence, 
 as they then did—an armed force, amounting to 
 130,000 regular troops, 80,000 armed militia, 
 and 300,000 armed volunteers—have gradually, 
 and almost in proportion to the increase of the 
 danger that now awaits them, culpably reduced 
 their army to a mere corps of relief for the 
 remote colonial stations of the empire; and 
 having moreover dismissed their militia, they 
 could only now, by abandoning their sovereign, 
 their dockyards, arsenals, &c., to the inefficient 
 forces we have named, scrape together by every 
 possible exertion somewhat less than 45,000 
 men to resist at various points the feigned and 
 real invasions of a well-disciplined French army 
 of say 150,000 men, guarded and protected by 
 a fleet from Cherbourg of say 12 sail of the 
 line, 12 frigates, 12 sloops, 12 war steamers, 
 with an adequate further amount of steam 
 power. Under these appalling circumstances 
 and combinations, we submit that there can 
 remain no doubt in the minds of our principal 
 
Chap. Y. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 305 
 
 naval and military authorities—especially among 
 those who witnessed the manner in which, in 
 1801, 6000 British troops, embarking at once 
 from ships many miles from the beach, landed in 
 Egypt in spite of the French infantry, a nu- 
 merous artillery, and of cavalry, who charged 
 them as they jumped on shore—that there exist 
 no professional reasons for doubting the practica¬ 
 bility of a French invading army, of the amount 
 mentioned, in the course of a few days effect¬ 
 ing A LANDING ON THE COAST OF ENGLAND ! 
 
 In the next section we shall endeavour to 
 define a few of the consequences of this catas¬ 
 trophe ; we cannot, however, even contemplate it 
 without unburdening our mind of a few more 
 reflections, in which,—in this moment of our 
 adversity,—we believe many of our readers will 
 be disposed to concur. 
 
 1. Why, we ask, have the Duke of Welling¬ 
 ton’s repeated prayers, supplications, admoni¬ 
 tions, and warnings “ to various Administrations,” 
 and through the press to the British people, been 
 so utterly disregarded ? Without offering one 
 word of adulation—we have personally no reason 
 
306 
 
 THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 
 
 Part III. 
 
 to do so—we cannot but observe, that no problem 
 in science, no theory, important or unimportant, 
 has ever been more thoroughly investigated than 
 the character of the Duke of Wellington by his 
 fellow-countrymen. 
 
 During the spring and summer of his life, the 
 attention of the British nation followed consecu¬ 
 tively each movement of his career in India, 
 Portugal, Spain, Denmark, the Low Coun¬ 
 tries, France, and latterly in the senate. In 
 the autumn of his life the secret springs which 
 had caused his principal military movements, 
 as well as his diplomatic arrangements, were 
 unveiled by the publication of despatches, let¬ 
 ters, and notes, official as well as private, 
 which without palliation or comment developed 
 the reasons,—naked as they were born,—upon 
 which he had acted, on the spur of the moment, 
 in the various predicaments in which he had 
 been placed. In the winter of his life, bent by 
 age, but with faculties matured rather than 
 impaired by time, it has been his well-known 
 practice, almost at the striking of the clock, to 
 appear in his place in the House of Lords, ready 
 
Chap. Y. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 307 
 
 not only to give any reasonable explanations 
 that might be required of him, but to disclose 
 his opinions and divulge his counsel on subjects 
 of the highest importance. Every word he has 
 uttered in public has been recorded; many of his 
 private observations have been repeated; his 
 answers to applications of every sort have usually 
 appeared in print; even his “F.M.” epigrammatic 
 notes to tradesmen and others, almost as rapidly as 
 they were written, have not only been published, 
 but in one or two instances have actually been 
 sold by auction. Wherever he walks, rides, or 
 travels, he is observed; in short, there never has 
 existed in any country a public servant whose 
 conduct throughout his whole life has been more 
 scrupulously watched, or whose sayings and 
 doings have by himself been more guilelessly 
 submitted to investigation. The result has been 
 that monuments and inscriptions in various parts 
 of London, of the United Kingdom, and 
 throughout our colonial empire, testify the 
 opinion entertained in his favour; and yet 
 although in the Poyal Palace, in both Houses 
 of Parliament, at public meetings, and in private 
 
308 
 
 THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 
 
 Part III. 
 
 society, every opportunity seems to be taken to 
 express unbounded confidence in bis military 
 judgment, sagacity, experience, integrity, and 
 simplicity of character, yet in our Legislature, in 
 the Queen’s Government, as well as throughout 
 the country, there has for many years existed, 
 and there still exists, an anomaly which foreigners 
 observe with utter astonishment, and which His¬ 
 tory will not fail to record, viz., that his opinion 
 of the defenceless state of Great Britain has, 
 by statesmen, and by a nation who almost 
 pride themselves on their total ignorance 
 of the requirements of war, been utterly 
 disregarded ! 
 
 “ The honours,” says the Times of the 22nd 
 of August last, “that were lavished on the 
 Swedish Nightingale at Liverpool, were attended 
 with much the same pomp and ceremony as 
 would have celebrated the departure of a 
 crowned head.” The British people pay simi¬ 
 lar “ honours ” to the veteran defender of their 
 country—with this difference, that when Jenny 
 Lind opens her mouth to sing, they listen with 
 mute attention; but when the Duke of Wellington 
 
Chap. V. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 309 
 
 tells them that their country is defenceless, they 
 decline to listen, and walk off! 
 
 2. Who, we ask, is Major-General Sir John 
 Burgoyne ? and as our determination in com¬ 
 mencing this volume was neither to flatter nor 
 speak unkindly of any individual, we must 
 refer our readers to the following answer from 
 “ Hart’s Army List— 
 
 “ He was present at the blockade of Malta and 
 surrender of Yaletta in 1800; campaign in Egypt in 
 1807, including the capture of Alexandria and attack 
 of Rosetta, from 7th to 18th April, 1807 ; campaigns 
 in the Peninsula, including the retreat to Corunna; 
 passage of the Douro; affair of Salamonde (blew up 
 Fort Conception in presence of the enemy, 21st July) ; 
 battle of Busaco; retreat to and occupation of the 
 Lines of Lisbon ; siege of Badajoz, 2nd to 13th June, 
 1811 ; action of El Bodon ; siege and storm of Ciudad 
 Rodrigo; siege and storm of Badajoz; siege and cap¬ 
 ture of forts at Salamanca; battle of Salamanca; 
 advance to Madrid and capture of the Retiro; siege 
 of Burgos (wounded), 19th Sept, to 21st Oct. 1812 ; 
 retreat from Burgos; advance of the army, and cross¬ 
 ing of the Ebro ; battle of Yittoria; siege and storming 
 of San Sebastian (wounded), 15th July to 13th August; 
 siege of Castle of San Sebastian, 31st August to 9th 
 September, 1813; passage of Bidassoa ; battles of the 
 Nivelle and Nive ; passage of the Adour; blockade 
 
310 
 
 THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 
 
 Part IIL 
 
 of Bayonne, and repulse of the sortie. Served after¬ 
 wards in the American war, at the attack on the Lines 
 before New Orleans, 8th January, 1815, and capture 
 of Fort Bowyer.” 
 
 Fie was with the army of occupation in 
 France, and, from his professional attainments, 
 was subsequently selected as “ Head of the 
 Board of Works of Ireland.” 
 
 From the high opinion which the late Gene¬ 
 ral Sir George Murray—who, as well as the 
 Duke of Wellington, had attentively watched 
 his career—entertained of his military qualifica¬ 
 tions, experience, and cool judgment under fire, 
 he was, over the heads of many senior officers, 
 appointed by the former, when Master-General 
 of the Ordnance, to be the General Command¬ 
 ing- in-Chief (professionally termed Inspector- 
 General of Fortifications) of the corps of Royal 
 Engineers, which appointment he now holds. 
 
 Now leaving the prestige of his well-known 
 personal character and services completely out 
 of the question, our readers will understand from 
 the foregoing statement that Major-General Sir 
 John Burgoyne is the individual who—rightly 
 
Chap. Y. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 311 
 
 or wrongly—has been selected by the nation 
 to watch over the defences of the empire. 
 “ You ,” said the Duke, in the letter referred to, 
 “ are the confidential head of the principal de¬ 
 partment of the country” And how, we ask, 
 has he performed this important duty ? Why, 
 by privately, unassumingly, but fearlessly ex¬ 
 plaining, over and over again, to the constituted 
 authorities of the nation—by figures, facts, and 
 arguments, which by the Duke of Wellington 
 have been pronounced to be unanswerable— that 
 Great Britain is in an utterly defenceless state; 
 and that, unless the country will consent to 
 provide for itself those means for protection 
 which it has been and is his especial duty to 
 enumerate, he gives the British people full 
 warning that upon their heads—not upon his-— 
 must rest the awful consequences which, in any 
 month, on any day in the week, may befall them 
 and their country! 
 
 We appeal to every steady man of business 
 in the kingdom, is it consistent for a great nation 
 or even for a paltry individual to select and ap¬ 
 point an agent, and having done so, to treat him 
 
312 
 
 THE INVASION OF ENGLAND 
 
 Part III. 
 
 with contemptuous neglect? If the Duke of 
 Wellington be not fit to be Commander-in-chief 
 of the British army, and if Major-General Sir 
 John Burgoyne be incompetent to provide for 
 the defences of the empire, the remedy is self- 
 evident ; and there can be no doubt that, 
 without a moment’s hesitation, it should be 
 applied. On the other hand, if these public 
 servants be deemed competent to the high respon¬ 
 sible duties they have to perform, it is undeniably 
 inconsistent to discard their united warnings, 
 and to refuse to supply the exigencies they 
 require! 
 
 With an army of 150,000 French soldiers 
 safely landed on our shores, how keenly will 
 young England recall to mind — when it is too 
 late — the following affecting words of dis¬ 
 tinguished individuals in our navy and army!— 
 
 “ I will conclude,” said Admiral Bowles, M.P., in 
 his able pamphlet entitled ‘ Suggestions for the better 
 Manning other Majesty’s Navy,’ published in 1840, “by 
 repeating my earnest hope that by exciting the public 
 attention to the errors and omissions which I have 
 endeavoured to point out, I may in some small degree 
 
Chap. V. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 313 
 
 contribute towards averting the dangers to which I 
 confess I cannot look forward without apprehension, 
 and that now, as well as at that time, the warning 
 voice of an officer devotedly attached to his country’s 
 service may not be raised in vain.” 
 
 “ If in the course of these observations,” said a well- 
 known and experienced veteran, in concluding his 
 pamphlet entitled ‘ Remarks on the Conduct of the 
 Naval Administration of Great Britain since 1815, by 
 a Flag Officer,’ published in 1847, U I have misstated 
 or mistaken facts bearing materially on my argument, 
 I can only assure my readers that I have spared no 
 pains to obtain the best and most accurate information, 
 and from 1816 down to the present time I have been in 
 such constant correspondence on this subject with my 
 brother officers, both at home and abroad, and have so 
 carefully rejected every circumstance of doubtful 
 authenticity, that I do not think any of my important 
 assertions can ever be seriously controverted. 
 
 “ If I can succeed in my object, my declining years 
 will not have been unprofitably employed; and I 
 sometimes fondly hope that an old officer, who has wit¬ 
 nessed the reverses as well as the successes of the ser¬ 
 vice to which he is still devotedly attached, may not 
 raise his warning voice in vain!” 
 
 “ I am bordering,” said the Duke of Wellington 
 in his letter to Major-General Sir John Burgoyne, 
 K.C.B., dated Strathfieldsaye, 9th January, 1847, 
 
 P 
 
314 
 
 FRENCH INVASION OF ENGLAND. Part III. 
 
 “ ON SEVENTY-SEVEN YEARS OF AGE, PASSED IN 
 HONOUR! 
 
 “ I hope that the Almighty may protect me 
 
 FROM BEING THE WITNESS OF THE TRAGEDY WHICH 
 I CANNOT PERSUADE MY CONTEMPORARIES TO TAKE 
 MEASURES TO AVERT. 
 
 “ Believe me, 
 
 “ Ever yours most sincerely, 
 
 “ Wellington.” 
 
PART IY. 
 
 ON THE CAPTURE OF LONDON BY A 
 FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 p 2 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
( 317 ) 
 
 CHAPTER 1. 
 
 ON THE CAPTURE OF LONDON BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 Descriptive sketch of the animated exertions of combined Naval 
 and Military forces adequate for the defence of Great Britain 
 —Lamentable contrast—Awful results—Two fearful alterna¬ 
 tives considered — London declared indefensible — Advance 
 of the French Army—Investment and Capture of London. 
 
 As soon as, by a few quivering motions of two 
 little black needles, there had almost simul¬ 
 taneously appeared upon the white dials of all 
 the electric telegraphs throughout the United 
 Kingdom the three words, “ Mene , tekel, uphar- 
 sin /” — Anglice, “ They are landing !” — what 
 a variety of sensations would be created in the 
 hearts of fundholders, landowners, placeholders, 
 owners of property of every description, parents, 
 women, children, and last, though not least, in the 
 minds of that large, philanthropic portion of our 
 community who, irrespectively of all sordid or 
 
318 
 
 ON THE CAPTURE OF LONDON 
 
 Part IV. 
 
 even political considerations, would most deeply 
 deplore the approaching sacrifice of human life ! 
 
 But however various these feelings might be, 
 one sensation only would pervade the army and 
 navy—namely, intense anxiety to get “ at ’em.” 
 
 Now, if the people of Great Britain, the 
 “ gentlemen of England who live at home in 
 ease,” in the hour of their prosperity, had, out 
 of the exuberance of their enormous wealth, but 
 cautiously insured their lives and property by 
 the creation of a standing army and a standing 
 navy, adequate, or nearly adequate, for their 
 defence, the result would probably be as follows. 
 
 In our dockyards every ship of war in ordi¬ 
 nary, like an ant-hill, would be seen swarming 
 alive with labouring creatures, each busily em¬ 
 ployed for the public good. Masts, yards, and 
 rigging, as if by magic, would assume their 
 places; and as soon as the crews of disciplined, 
 well-trained gunner seamen were mutely marched 
 on board, one vessel after another would be 
 reported “ ready,” until, in an incredibly short 
 time, England’s defensive fleet would have put 
 to sea. 
 
Chap. I. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 319 
 
 In like manner, in obedience to brief tele¬ 
 graphic orders, every barrack in Great Britain 
 and Ireland would be either partially or totally 
 deserted; and while every description of lumber 
 remained behind, the troops, rammed, jammed, 
 and crammed into first, second, third class car¬ 
 riages, bullock-waggons, ballast-waggons, and 
 trucks, would in silent joy through the verdant 
 fields of merry England be seen flying along 
 every railway in the kingdom towards the metro¬ 
 polis. To whatever cheers might there await 
 them there would be no corresponding reply. 
 Intent upon one object, they would 
 
 “ Mark not the shouts, feel not the grasp 
 Of gratulating hands 
 
 but with due despatch would proceed on Her 
 Majesty’s Service towards that part of the coast 
 at which the faithful black tiny fingers of the 
 dial-plate had told them, “ they are landing l” 
 As 150,000 invaders could not, under any cir¬ 
 cumstances, be landed on the shores of England 
 at once, but would probably be transported across 
 the Channel at repeated intervals of six or eight 
 
320 
 
 ON THE CAPTURE OF LONDON 
 
 Part IV. 
 
 hours, it is evident that the precious moment 
 for our united services to attack them would be 
 when they were in the uncomfortable, awkward 
 attitude of having one French leg on British sea 
 and the other on British shore ; we mean, when 
 only a portion of the invaders had landed. But 
 whether half or all had disembarked, the two 
 armies, when they first appeared in sight of each 
 other, would strikingly exhibit the opposite 
 characters of the contending combatants; for 
 while the French officers, with their usual 
 bravery, were exciting in every possible way 
 the enthusiasm of their troops, the great diffi¬ 
 culty which the British officers would have 
 to contend with would be to restrain their 
 men. 
 
 What, under that Providence which has 
 hitherto watched over us, would be the result, 
 it would be presumptuous as well as impractic¬ 
 able for any human being to foretell, because the 
 powers of the British soldier fighting on his own 
 soil in defence of his sovereign, his countrymen, 
 and his countrywomen, have never yet been deve¬ 
 loped. Two things, however, are quite certain; 
 
Chap. I. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 321 
 
 namely, that whenever the conflict began our 
 men would give no quarter, and that their teeth 
 would be much too firmly clenched to ash for it; 
 and under such circumstances, and in so just a 
 cause, without bravado there would be reason¬ 
 able grounds for the people of England believing 
 that the united services, by indomitable resolu¬ 
 tion, would save the great empire they had 
 sworn to defend. 
 
 Having, as above, merely imagined what 
 might possibly be the fate of a French invading 
 army if England had previously provided her¬ 
 self with a combined naval and military standing 
 force, adequate, or nearly so, for her defence; 
 we have now to conjecture, or, alas! to consider, 
 what might be the fortune of a French army 
 in case the naval and military forces of Great 
 Britain were, as at present they are, utterly 
 inadequate for its defence. 
 
 In obedience to telegraphic orders there would 
 no doubt be displayed in our dockyards the 
 same busy scene we have described; and thus, 
 by dint of almost superhuman exertions, the 
 English people would rapidly fit out their men- 
 
 p 3 
 
322 
 
 ON THE CAPTURE OF LONDON 
 
 Part IV. 
 
 of-war in ordinary; but as soon as they had 
 done so, there would suddenly arise before their 
 eyes, like a ghastly apparition, the fearful and 
 humiliating fact, that all these costly compounds 
 of hemp, iron, oak, tar, paint, ropes, canvas, 
 guns, shot, fuses, live-shells, and gunpowder, 
 were—for the especial purposes for which they 
 had been devised—as utterly useless as if, with 
 the view of frightening away the French, they 
 had, at an enormous outlay, mixed together a 
 great heap of chalk, stable-manure, salt-water, and 
 potash. “Where are the gunner-seamen?” 
 and if echo alone answered—as most surely it 
 would answer —where ? it may truly be asked, 
 for what object had such vast lifeless masses 
 and so much bustle been created? Pressgangs 
 might forcibly collect men , but, as has been 
 shown in a former chapter, for the purpose of 
 firing shot and shells against practised artillery¬ 
 men they would be men of no use, or at all events 
 of very little use ! 
 
 Again, as regards the military force of Great 
 Britain, there would, no doubt, be despatched 
 through London, with the rapidity we have 
 
Chap. I. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 323 
 
 described, the whole of the disposable troops and 
 the few guns of the United Kingdom ; and if 
 that effective force, on reaching the point of inva¬ 
 sion, perceived anything approaching to a chance 
 of success, there can exist no doubt that all due 
 efforts would be made to destroy the enemy. If, 
 however, it were found that the French fleet, 
 which by Napoleon’s old stratagem—or from 
 the harbour of Cherbourg—had secured a tem¬ 
 porary command of the Channel, were by 
 the power of their broadsides protecting the 
 landing of 150,000 men, of whom a large pro¬ 
 portion were already occupying buildings they 
 had loopholed, with other similar advantages, it 
 would then become necessary by the gravest 
 and coolest consideration to determine what 
 course should be pursued. 
 
 If the British army were to be consulted— 
 however inferior they might be in numbers and 
 in guns—they would, we believe, almost unani¬ 
 mously petition to be allowed “ to try what they 
 could do On this important question every¬ 
 body is of course at liberty to state his opinion, 
 but, as we have undertaken to discuss the subject, 
 
324 
 
 ON THE CAPTURE OF LONDON 
 
 Part IV. 
 
 we feel that it is especially incumbent, in a mo¬ 
 ment of so much danger, that we should not 
 hesitate to express ours. 
 
 Considering the vast interests at stake, we 
 submit, as an axiom, that the course to be pur¬ 
 sued ought to be that which, when divested by 
 History of all temporary feelings,—and especially 
 of the rash feelings of soldiers,—would appear 
 the most prudent that could have been devised 
 under the desperate contingencies of the case. 
 
 Now, resting on this firm basis, we submit, as 
 our humble but deliberate opinion, that if the 
 utmost force that the nation could collect should, 
 according to all military experience, prove to be 
 theoretically utterly inadequate in respect to 
 numbers, and especially in guns, to contend with 
 the amount of French troops and artillery 
 landed on the shores of England, the wisest 
 course that could be adopted would be for the 
 army and the sovereign to retire to some of our 
 fortified dockyards, or to such other points as 
 should be deemed advisable, and thus to abandon 
 the palaces, the Houses of Parliament, the public 
 buildings, the docks, the shipping, the Bank of 
 
Chap. I. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 325 
 
 England, the press, bankers, merchants, and shop¬ 
 keepers, in short, the wealth and property, the 
 lives and persons of the inhabitants — men, 
 women, and children—of London, to their fate ! 
 
 A rough sketch of what that fate would be 
 we shall shortly have occasion to submit; in the 
 mean while, the following are the reasons upon 
 which our opinion has been grounded. 
 
 If our army of say 45,000 men, unpractised 
 in great military evolutions, without any 
 reserve to support them, and with only a 
 few guns, were—as in all military probability 
 they would be—destroyed by a well-disciplined 
 French army of 150,000 men, duly provided 
 with artillery, the British nation would be 
 annihilated. Whereas if London only were 
 to be captured, the nation would be ruined, but 
 not annihilated. We will explain our meaning 
 at greater length. 
 
 To the call of their sovereign, and to an army 
 of 45,000 British soldiers thirsting for revenge, 
 there would flock the stoutest and best hearts in 
 the country; and although it would require con¬ 
 siderably more than a year to equip, train, and 
 
326 
 
 ON THE CAPTURE OF LONDON 
 
 Part IV. 
 
 organize 40,000 or 50,000 additional troops, 
 yet, in proportion as the loyal rallied round the 
 standard of England, would the laws, the order, 
 and the hopes of the nation be kept alive. Our 
 enemy would clearly see the storm that was 
 brewing, and, with this little black cloud to wind¬ 
 ward, he would probably deem it expedient not 
 to be too immoderate in his demands. 
 
 Now, on the other hand, in what predicament 
 would the British people be placed, if, contrary 
 to the admonitions of military experience, their 
 little army, in compliance with its petition, by 
 attempting an impossibility had been destroyed? 
 The answer is surely self-evident. The nation 
 would be completely at the mercy of the French 
 general. His demands, whatever they might 
 be, must be complied with. Whatever sum he 
 named we must pay—whatever colonies he de¬ 
 manded we must surrender—if he asked for the 
 whole of our fleet in ordinary, we must give it to 
 him; and, as it would be utterly impossible for 
 the British people to raise, organize, equip, and 
 officer an army sufficient to overpower him in less 
 than two or three years, he might during that 
 
Chap. I. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 327 
 
 period continue his occupation of London. But 
 would this be all ? alas ! no. As soon as it was 
 discovered that the sovereign authority of the law 
 had ceased to exist—that there existed neither 
 power nor means to levy poor-rates, and that 
 the greater portion of the industrious classes 
 were deprived of the means of earning their 
 bread,—is it not possible that, out of the shafts of 
 our collieries and of our mines, from our manu¬ 
 factories and from our fields, there might arise 
 and congregate, bodies of men who, impelled by 
 want, would begin first of all merely to help 
 themselves to food, and, finding that easily 
 obtained, to whatever else they chose ? in which 
 case the British nation, besides being ruined , 
 would, as we have stated, be annihilated ! 
 
 Having, as above, submitted to our readers 
 the reasons upon which we formed the startling 
 opinion we expressed, we will now abandon sub¬ 
 jects of mere conjecture for those of more certain 
 results. 
 
 If a small British force, such as we now pos¬ 
 sess, were on the shores of England miraculously 
 to destroy an invading army of say 150,000 men, 
 
ON THE CAPTURE OF LONDON 
 
 Part IV. 
 
 328 
 
 the subject of our consideration would of course 
 be at an end. If, on the other band, the small 
 
 British force were to retire, as we have ima- 
 
 « 
 
 gined, it is evident that the French army, as 
 soon as all its requisitions were landed, would, 
 at its leisure—without harassing the troops or 
 distressing the horses—commence its march upon 
 London, through an agricultural garden, which 
 we need not say would amply provide it not only 
 with necessaries of existence, but with almost 
 all the luxuries soldiers desire. At night the 
 neighbouring towns and villages would become 
 the dormitories of a portion of the troops, and 
 the remainder would, in a less degree, enjoy 
 themselves under the old-fashioned canopy of 
 heaven. 
 
 As, however, we have no inclination to ac¬ 
 company them, we will leave them on their 
 march to consider for a few moments an idea 
 which, though not entertained by military men, 
 is a subject of vague hope in the minds of many 
 others. 
 
Chap. I. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 329 
 
 On the Possibility of Defending London. 
 
 An entrenched line of positions round Lon¬ 
 don, requiring from their extent at least 100,000 
 armed men, would probably cost say two millions. 
 Such a measure would not only be highly un¬ 
 popular, but, as it is only applicable to a country 
 essentially military, where hundreds of thousands 
 of semi-disciplined men could be speedily col¬ 
 lected, equipped, and armed, it would, after all, 
 afford but little practical defence; certainly not 
 so much as if its cost were to be expended in the 
 organising of an efficient military force. 
 
 Taking London therefore as it is, we may ob¬ 
 serve in general terms, that, excepting in small 
 operations, where the invaders are in small num¬ 
 bers, open towns (that is, not fortified) are always 
 given up at once to the master in the field: for 
 instance, the best people in civilized Europe for 
 the defence of houses and towns are, perhaps, 
 the Spaniards, whose towns, containing con¬ 
 vents, massive premises, built of solid masonry, 
 with flat roofs and covered balconies, afford 
 
330 
 
 ON THE CAPTURE OF LONDON 
 
 Part IV. 
 
 great advantage for defence, especially to a 
 people prone to desultory warfare and to act 
 together by general impulse; and yet the un¬ 
 fortified towns of Spain, such as Madrid, Seville, 
 Salamanca, Valladolid, &c., although in all 
 preparations were started and confident hopes 
 of self-defence entertained, were always given 
 up to any French army in force. 
 
 The boasted defence of Saragossa does not alter 
 the rule, as, besides the remains of its ancient 
 fortifications, it contained, in addition to an enthu¬ 
 siastic population within its walls, a regular 
 organised army as numerous at least as the 
 besiegers, although in quality they were certainly 
 inferior to cope with them in the field. At 
 Berlin, Moscow, and Vienna, where every man 
 is more or less a soldier, no resistance was of¬ 
 fered. Even at Paris, containing an army of 
 well-equipped soldiers of the national guard, 
 its defence was not attempted. And although 
 in the late insurrectional street fighting, from 
 the lukewarm attacks of the troops, who even¬ 
 tually joined the defenders, a temporary 
 success was obtained, yet as soon as the army 
 
ClIAP. I. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 331 
 
 became staunch, the “ barriers ” proved of little 
 account. 
 
 But we are enabled to offer to our readers, if 
 possible, higher authority on this subject than 
 the statements we have just detailed. 
 
 In December, 1819, during the great riots in 
 Scotland, the authorities of the city of Glasgow 
 having applied for military protection, the com¬ 
 manding engineer, Colonel Sir Howard Elphin- 
 stone, an officer of great experience, drew up a 
 long statement detailing in what manner the 
 town might be fortified against the expected 
 attack. This paper was forwarded to the Duke 
 of Wellington, who, being at that time Master- 
 General of the Ordnance, had, of course, no 
 authority to interfere with the operations of the 
 troops. His opinion, nevertheless, was asked; 
 and as at the moment in question we had occa¬ 
 sion to read it, as also the plan of defence of Sir 
 Howard Elphinstone, before it was submitted 
 to the town council, we are enabled to lay before 
 our readers not only the Duke’s opinion on the 
 defence of great cities, but on the little reliance 
 for defence which the nation can reasonably 
 
332 
 
 ON THE CAPTURE OF LONDON 
 
 Paht IY. 
 
 place on a body, however large, of undisciplined 
 men. 
 
 (Copy.) Memorandum. 
 
 “ It is impossible to form a judgment of a plan of 
 defence such as herein suggested, without having more 
 local knowledge than can be obtained from any plan. 
 
 “ It appears to me to be judicious, however, as far 
 as it goes, and might enable a small body of troops to 
 hold the town for a short time. 
 
 “ Generally speaking, however, I should say that 
 no town of the size of Glasgow could be held long by 
 any body of troops not strong enough to meet its 
 enemy in the field; as the population of such a town 
 would require such constant and daily supplies of pro¬ 
 visions from the country, that the interruption of the 
 communication with the country would so distress the 
 town, that the strongest in the field must have the town. 
 
 “ From this foundation I should say, if you have in 
 Glasgow, or in any town so circumstanced, 500 men 
 of cavalry and infantry, and any cannon, I should 
 recommend that the field should he taken against the 
 insurgents, be their numbers ivhat they might , rather 
 than attempt to keep a footing in Glasgow, or in any 
 such town, by measures such as are proposed in the 
 enclosed papers, and which might as well be carried 
 into execution by local troops, or even constables. 
 
 “ I mention this my opinion, as these papers are 
 brought before me, and because it is wished to have 
 the sanction of my opinion to these measures, and not 
 
Chap. I. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 333 
 
 from any desire to dictate to others, whose duty it is 
 to decide upon the spot. 
 
 (Signed) “ W.” 
 
 “ Mais, revenons a nos moutons! ” 
 
 The French army, after leisurely marching 
 towards London through—say Maidstone, Tun¬ 
 bridge, and Chatham—its right resting on the 
 Thames, would probably encamp on and in the 
 neighbourhood of Blackheath, and here Wool¬ 
 wich, OUR MAIN AND ALMOST ONLY ARSENAL, ill 
 
 which all our brass guns are made,—the great 
 depot of guns and ordnance preparations for our 
 navy,—as also for the preparation of our shells, 
 rockets, fire-works, and cartridges,—would fall 
 into his hands! 
 
 Ever since the invention of steam navigation, 
 various Master-Generals of the Ordnance have 
 urged the obvious necessity of removing the 
 arsenal of the British nation into the interior; 
 but the answer has invariably been “that the 
 House of Commons would object to the expense.” 
 
 Bemaining here for a few days until his rear 
 —filled up by successive reinforcements from 
 France—had increased his force to say 200,000 
 
334 
 
 ON THE CAPTURE OF LONDON 
 
 Part IV. 
 
 men, he might then safely inform the French 
 admiral that he and his fleet, being no longer 
 required, might quietly return to Cherbourg; 
 for it is evident that if the French army, after 
 reaching Blackheath, were to be conquered, they 
 would neither as corpses nor as prisoners of war 
 require their own fleet, and that, if they were not 
 conquered, the ships and navy of England would 
 be but too happy to take them back to France 
 the instant they were disposed to return there. 
 
 About a month after the French ships had 
 anchored at Cherbourg, there would probably 
 arrive in the Channel—in a state of profuse 
 perspiration caused by eager and excessive haste 
 —the British Mediterranean fleet, the admiral 
 of which would be apprised by a communica¬ 
 tion, possibly dated “Admiralty, London,” 
 that any damage he might do to the French 
 coasts or to French shipping would, by the 
 French army in England, be duly placed to the 
 Dr. side of its account with Great Britain. 
 
 With no force to oppose him, the French 
 general might from Blackheath offer to the 
 British people peace, or rather dictate to them 
 
Chap. I. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 335 
 
 terms of submission; he would, however, most 
 probably prefer, a la Napoleon, to do so in the 
 enemy’s capital, and accordingly with drums 
 beating, bands playing, trumpets resounding, 
 and colours flying, he would continue his march 
 upon London. 
 
 On arriving at his goal, his arrangements, 
 according to the usual system of military occu¬ 
 pation, would be probably somewhat as follows: 
 
 With a view of establishing a cordon of close 
 confinement, the bulk of the army would be 
 encamped in the most open, convenient, and 
 commanding points in the vicinity of the capital, 
 such as— 
 
 1. St. James’s and Green Parks. 
 
 2. Hyde Park. 
 
 3. Regent’s Park. 
 
 4. Any convenient open ground about Hack¬ 
 ney and Bow, and between them and Regent’s 
 Park. 
 
 5. Deptford Dockyard. 
 
 6. Clapham and Camberwell. 
 
 7. Brixton and Battersea. 
 
 The strength of the corps at each of the above 
 
336 
 
 ON THE CAPTURE OF LONDON 
 
 A RT IV. 
 
 would of course be apportioned according to the 
 importance which circumstances might recom¬ 
 mend at the time. 
 
 As it is always a great object to get as many 
 men under roofs as possible, all large buildings, 
 warehouses, &c., sufficiently near to each encamp¬ 
 ment would be occupied, first for hospitals, and 
 then for barracks : efforts would especially be 
 made to obtain cover for all the horses; and as it 
 is quite usual for churches to be taken for such 
 purposes, they would, no doubt, be so applied, 
 unless other shelter could be conveniently pro¬ 
 cured. 
 
 Every officer would be billeted in the nearest 
 and best houses; he would require from two to 
 four or five rooms according to his rank, and on 
 exceedingly easy and intimate terms to live with 
 the family. 
 
 The interior of the city would of course be 
 strongly watched by powerful guards and nume¬ 
 rous patrols, supported by detachments occupy¬ 
 ing strong buildings, either commanding useful 
 positions, or in open places, such as the squares. 
 For these purposes, and for the important object 
 
Chap. T. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 337 
 
 of maintaining a communication with them and 
 the main forces encamped in the outskirts, a 
 precaution always of vital importance, the Mill- 
 bank Penitentiary, the new Houses of Parlia¬ 
 ment, the Horse Guards, Whitehall, the Admi¬ 
 ralty, up to the National Gallery and Barracks 
 adjoining, and all the other great buildings 
 round Trafalgar Square, as well as all the Club¬ 
 houses about Waterloo Place and Pall Mall, 
 would be strongly occupied; and to secure a 
 communication from these points to Regent’s 
 Park, and also to interrupt any hostile commu¬ 
 nication between the east and west portions of 
 London, the whole of Regent Street would 
 probably be strongly occupied. Lastly, to com¬ 
 mand the line of the Thames, which would of 
 course be considered of great military importance, 
 troops would hold, in considerable force, Hun- 
 gerford Market, Somerset House, the Tower, 
 St. Katherine’s and London Docks, the build¬ 
 ings of which are all most admirably adapted 
 for barracks. 
 
 These preliminary arrangements having been 
 completed, and with the additional power, by a 
 
 Q 
 
338 ON THE CAPTURE OF LONDON Part IV . 
 
 few shells, carcases, and rockets, of burning the 
 whole town to the ground, if necessary, the 
 French general would probably proceed to 
 business. 
 
Chap. II. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 339 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 French general proclaims parliamentary reform and redress of 
 all popular grievances— Mode of feeding liis troops — Skilful 
 “ commissaires ”—Orders to the press—Treatment of refrac¬ 
 tory editors — Contributions levied from the inhabitants — 
 Concessions demanded from the British people — Dreadful 
 effects of the sudden annihilation of credit — Possibility of 
 internal riots, robbery, and rapine. 
 
 What business have you here ? is the usual 
 stereotyped question which a florid, healthy 
 English country gentleman puts to any one, hap¬ 
 pening to have a ferret and snares in his pockets, 
 that he finds trespassing upon his estate. If 
 the British people were to put this query to the 
 General commanding-in-chief the French army 
 in London, his answer would probably be, 
 
 “ Meum est corrigere nefas, et debellare superbos, ;v — 
 
 Anglice, “ I have come here for indemnification 
 for all your victories, and to humble your 
 pride.” 
 
 This being the nature of his business, his pro- 
 
 q 2 
 
340 
 
 ON THE CAPTURE OF LONDON 
 
 Part IV. 
 
 cess would be two-fold ; 1st. To demand money, 
 ships, and foreign possessions ; 2nd. Humiliation. 
 
 With respect to the latter, as it is quite evi¬ 
 dent that it would be impolitic, by carrying in¬ 
 sult too far, to infuriate the nation he had come 
 to subject, he would probably copy the course 
 which Napoleon repeatedly declared he had de- 
 termined to pursue, namely, to issue a procla¬ 
 mation announcing that he had come to bestow 
 upon the British people (See Alison’s History 
 of Modern Europe) “ Parliamentary reform, the 
 downfall of the oligarchy, all the objects which 
 the English republicans had at heart, and the 
 liberation of Ireland.” 
 
 Having thus lubricated the lower orders, he 
 would first of all require the town to make per¬ 
 manent arrangements for feeding his army, in 
 order to relieve it from all further trouble of 
 helping itself. 
 
 Now in all the countries which the French 
 have forcibly possessed themselves of, they have 
 invariably had in the suite of their army a body 
 of admirable administrators, who know how to 
 turn everything to the best possible account, 
 
Chap. II. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 341 
 
 and who, without the slightest compunction for 
 the feelings of their victims, understand how to 
 obtain the greatest practicable amount of every 
 article desired. They are systematic in all their 
 calculations. Thus, if they get into a town of 
 10,000 inhabitants, they argue that it is quite 
 possible for it to feed 4000 or 5000 troops— 
 that is, share their food with them, special care 
 being taken that the troops are the first to be 
 provided. Again, if they want shoes , they cal¬ 
 culate almost to a nicety how many pairs of 
 shoes the population have been in the habit of 
 purchasing, and consequently how many per 
 week the shoemaker could be required to 
 make. 
 
 If they want money for the soldiers’ pay, they 
 either seize it themselves, or, under a skilful 
 “ sous-commissaire,” they appoint an administra¬ 
 tion of renegade citizens, who, under a semblance 
 of native authority, vigorously work out the 
 exorbitant views of the invaders by seizing on 
 every establishment, and by forcing from all 
 parties contributions of, say, half their wealth, 
 for which plate and every other article of value 
 
342 
 
 ON THE CAPTURE OF LONDON 
 
 Part IV. 
 
 is taken ; in short, the “ commissaire ” calculates 
 the value of property within the devoted city— 
 houses, furniture, wine, plate, pictures, horses, 
 carriages, merchandise, &c. &c., considering 
 each as the security for the quotum of contri¬ 
 bution required. Indeed, it is an axiom with the 
 French, “ that a military contribution in an 
 enemy s country , when put on a proper scale , is 
 easier to liaise than the ordinary taxes of a legiti¬ 
 mate government which means, that a tax- 
 gatherer, with a musket on his shoulder, a 
 sharp bayonet, and sixty rounds of ball-cart¬ 
 ridge in his pouch, can get through his business 
 quicker than a meek sleek man whose only 
 implement of persuasion is his black pocket- 
 book. In Hamburgh, where the French levied 
 heavy contributions, the “commissaire,” instead 
 of bothering himself to go round the town, took 
 the whole of any man’s goods, giving him an 
 order on his fellow-citizens for payment. For 
 instance, to build a bridge over the Elbe, they 
 took all Godefroy’s timber, paying him by a 
 cheque of this sort, hanging at the same moment 
 seven sluggish contributors, as if to explain to 
 
Chap. II. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 343 
 
 him that, after all, he might have been infinitely 
 worse off. 
 
 Besides providing food and comforts for the 
 army, one of the first duties of the “commis- 
 saire ” is to send for the editors of the leading 
 journals, whom he briefly informs that it will be 
 requisite that they should state 44 that, although 
 the aristocracy are suffering severely, th zpeople 
 at large offer no complaint, and that, on the 
 whole, the 4 morale ’ appears to be favourable to 
 the new system.” 
 
 If these orders are not complied with, the 
 44 commissaire,” either by word of mouth or by a 
 very slight movement of one eye, directs that the 
 offender be made an example of. Accordingly, 
 with the butt-ends of muskets the invaluable 
 printing apparatus is smashed, the type cast into 
 the street, and the editor, falling into the hands 
 of the soldiers, undergoes treatment which nothing 
 but the ingenuity, ferocity, and frivolity of a 
 Frenchman could devise. For instance, they 
 will perhaps, first of all, cut off one or both of 
 his mustachios,—strip him,—plaster him over 
 with thick printer’s ink,—curl his hair with it, 
 
344 
 
 ON THE CAPTURE OF LONDON 
 
 Part IV. 
 
 —dress him up in paper uniform and jack-boots 
 made from the broadsheet; if he open his mouth, 
 —“ Tiens, petit! tiens /”—feed him with pica;— 
 in short, by a series of innumerable and ever- 
 varying strange methods of what they call “joli- 
 ment arrange ing” any refractory subject they wish 
 to victimise — our military readers will, we are 
 confident, corroborate these facts—they would so 
 intimidate the press, that, like every other power 
 in the country, it would be obliged to bend to 
 the storm. 
 
 If, when called upon for his contribution, any 
 unhappy shopkeeper or householder in the 
 Strand, Oxford-street, the City, Belgravia, 
 Grosvenor-square, or elsewhere, ventured to 
 remonstrate — that is, to produce words instead 
 of money — the commissaire’s eye would have 
 scarcely twinkled once before the “ plat de 
 sabre ” of some ten or fifteen soldiers would 
 most unmercifully have punished the offence. 
 Indeed, if even a sulky look was offered, there 
 would instantly be billeted in the house a detach¬ 
 ment of cavalry or infantry, who, by day as well as 
 by night, would u jolimentarrange” the interior. 
 
Chap. II. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 345 
 
 On entering France the Duke of Wellington 
 issued proclamations to the following effect:— 
 
 “St. Jean de Luz, Feb. 1, 1814. 
 
 “ The municipality of St. Jean de Luz is author¬ 
 ised to take the sum of one hundred thousand and 
 sixty-six francs six centimes out of the money collected 
 for customs, to pay the salaries of the officers of the 
 customs to the 31st January, on a statement given to 
 me of the same date, signed by M. D. Laxalde and 
 M. Raymond St. Jean. 
 
 (Signed) “ Wellington.” 
 
 A similar indulgence would probably be 
 granted by the French General to Her Ma¬ 
 jesty’s chief commissioner of customs, to the 
 principal cashiers of railway companies, water 
 companies, gas companies, and all other com¬ 
 panies, to each of which the c< commissaire ” 
 would appoint soldiers to take all the receipts, 
 and out of them to pay wages and salaries 
 sufficient to keep up the supply. 
 
 All preliminary details having been satisfac¬ 
 torily adjusted, the great secret would at last be 
 made known, namely, the amount of the pecu¬ 
 niary indemnification, &c. &c. &c., demanded by 
 France from the British people. 
 
 q 3 
 
346 
 
 ON THE CAPTURE OF LONDON 
 
 Part IV. 
 
 On this point we shall purposely avoid even 
 imagining the demands which might be made. 
 The terms exacted in 1815 from France by the 
 allied armies under the Duke of Wellington, 
 were, we believe,—1st, the payment by France 
 of seven hundred millions of francs;—2nd, the 
 cession by France of the greater portion of all 
 countries obtained by force of arms since the 
 year 1792;—3rd, the maintenance and clothing 
 by France, for three years, of an army of occu¬ 
 pation of 150,000 men;—4th, the cession by 
 Franee of all trophies of victory, such as pictures, 
 statues, &c. &c. 
 
 But this sentence of retributive Justice can 
 give no idea whatever of the demands which In¬ 
 justice, intoxicated by success and stimulated by 
 revenge, might exact; and as they are but too 
 forcibly and fearfully conjectured in the Duke 
 of Wellington’s letter to Major-General Sir J. 
 Burgoyne, we shall say no more on the subject, 
 for this reason, namely, that however enormous 
 may be their amount,—whatever may, in the 
 words of the Duke, be “ the disgrace, the 
 indelible disgrace,” they would inflict,—they 
 
Chap. II. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 347 
 
 would be insignificant in comparison to other 
 extensive and almost incalculable results. 
 
 To any person conversant with the amount of 
 business daily transacted by the British people, 
 it will be as needless to attempt to define the 
 consequence of London falling into the hands of 
 a French army, as it would be to define to a man 
 by particulars the consequences of his being sud¬ 
 denly shot through the heart. 
 
 In a poor country, or even in such countries 
 as France, Germany, or Russia, the capitals of 
 which are, comparatively speaking, the limbs of 
 their respective empires, rather than the heart, 
 the damage done by an invading army is usually 
 limited to the amount of actual property they 
 seize, or the contributions they inflict; whereas, 
 if a French general had his head-quarters, say 
 at the Mansion-house of London, the loss and 
 injury which the nation would sustain would not 
 be in proportion to the wealth of the country, 
 but vastly greater, in consequence of the enor¬ 
 mous amount of its commercial transactions 
 based entirely upon the most perfect system of 
 credit, and the perfection of its circulating me- 
 
348 
 
 ON THE CAPTURE OF LONDON 
 
 Part IV. 
 
 dium: in fact, the sudden collapse of the former 
 would occasion an injury immeasurably greater 
 than all the gold and silver in the kingdom. As 
 the plunder of the Bank would make it impos¬ 
 sible for it to convert its notes into coin, these 
 notes would no longer be accepted in pay¬ 
 ment, and, as few people keep much coin in 
 their possession, the richest men would suddenly 
 find themselves without the means of procuring 
 the necessaries of life—for instance, Rothschild or 
 Baring carry about money for a day’s expendi¬ 
 ture, knowing that they can draw on their ba¬ 
 lances at their bankers’, or, if they should happen 
 to be exhausted, by the sale of Exchequer bills 
 or stock; but in that emergency, on the brink 
 of which the British people, at the midnight 
 hour at which we write, are securely sleeping, no 
 Government security would be convertible, and 
 consequently all trade must be resolved into a 
 system of barter ; indeed, during the panic 
 which occurred only a few years ago, persons 
 having Exchequer bills and Bank-post bills in 
 their possession actually failed, merely because, 
 in the state of alarm which even then existed in 
 
Chap. IL 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 349 
 
 the commercial world, nothing but bank-notes 
 would satisfy a creditor: but if they also were 
 discredited and rejected, it is almost impossible 
 to conceive the amount of distress that would 
 pervade all classes of the community. Such 
 a destruction of property by forced sales, the 
 disruption of commercial credit, and the alarm 
 inflicted upon capitalists, would exceed in amount 
 almost any sum that could be estimated. 
 
 With respect to our manufacturing districts, 
 as all nations engaged in commerce and manu¬ 
 factures (especially with a paper currency) are 
 more or less in an artificial state, and as Great 
 Britain is more extensively engaged in these 
 objects than any other nation on earth, its 
 monetary system, which works so beautifully in 
 time of peace and security, would be shivered 
 to atoms by the occupation of London by a 
 French army; for as the metropolis of England 
 is the great centre of money payments for the 
 whole commercial world, it is not only from 
 London that the principal payments of the 
 British manufacturers are finally settled, but it 
 is from thence chiefly that the specie is received 
 
350 
 
 ON THE CAPTURE OF LONDON 
 
 Part IV. 
 
 for the weekly payments of the manufacturing 
 operatives ; and as, the instant bank-notes 
 ceased to pass current, nothing but gold and 
 silver would answer the purpose of daily traffic, 
 the latter would immediately be seized upon and 
 hoarded up by the timid to meet their domestic 
 wants. In Lancashire, for instance, as it would 
 be quite impossible for the spinners and manu¬ 
 facturers to obtain metallic money to pay the 
 workpeople their weekly wages, it would be 
 necessary that they should be immediately dis¬ 
 charged*, and thus there would be thrown out 
 of employment six or seven hundred thousand 
 people, most of whom would soon be in a state 
 of absolute destitution: and as the same causes 
 would produce the same results in the other 
 manufacturing districts, as well as in the iron 
 and mining districts, of England and Scotland, 
 the confusion as well as misery would become 
 terrific; indeed the whole kingdom is so depend¬ 
 ent upon trade of one sort or another, that it 
 would be difficult to find a locality where the 
 paralysation of credit would not throw a large 
 population out of work. 
 
Chap. II. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 351 
 
 With respect to the funds, the capital of 
 which may be said to be imaginary, inasmuch 
 as it rests entirely on the national faith and the 
 ability of the Government to raise the necessary 
 amount of taxes, many thousands of families 
 who, on the annual interest of thirty millions, 
 had hitherto been in the enjoyment of affluence 
 or competency, would be totally ruined. 
 
 It is to be fervently hoped that, during the 
 awful visitation we have but faintly described, 
 some mode, at present unknown to us, would be 
 devised for raising from the farmers, the country 
 gentlemen, and from the inhabitants of country 
 towns, villages, &c., sufficient money—or, as that 
 probably could not possibly be obtained, money’s 
 worth —• to barter in exchange for provisions for 
 the millions of poor people who would be thrown 
 out of work. It is fervently to be hoped that, 
 during such collections, during such sufferings, 
 and during the almost total annihilation of civil 
 power, these millions of sufferers would patiently 
 bide the time when, by the blessings of capitu¬ 
 lation on almost any terms, the nation should be 
 relieved from the awful pestilence of war. Should 
 
352 
 
 ON THE CAPTURE OF LONDON 
 
 Part IV. 
 
 they, however, be instigated by wicked persons, 
 by idleness, and by want, to have recourse to 
 plunder and rapine, there might be scenes in the 
 interior of Great Britain and Ireland, especially 
 in the large lone houses of the wealthy, infinitely 
 more terrible than those that were devastating 
 the metropolis. 
 
 We should be relieved from very painful 
 feelings if we could here throw down the pen 
 with which we have been most reluctantly deli¬ 
 neating the abject condition of the British people 
 during their subjection to a French army; but 
 the bitterest portion of the cup of their afflic¬ 
 tion remains to be analysed. “ The groans of 
 the Britons ” are not yet half described. 
 
Chap. III. 
 
 BY A. FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 353 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Difference between uncivilised and civilised warfare — Mercy 
 shown in the latter — Exceptions to the rule — In taking a 
 fortress by storm — Other instances — Usual conduct of an 
 invading army—Where revenge and insult are desired as well 
 as conquest the consequences are most lamentable — Reasons 
 why these injuries are usually concealed. 
 
 * __ 
 
 On the Treatment of Women in War. 
 
 Among that long list of commonplace sayings 
 which, by the people of every country, are con¬ 
 tinually expressed without being clearly under¬ 
 stood, are that “ the men of . . . were all put to 
 the swordf and that there was “ no respect for 
 age or sex ” We deem it necessary to endeavour 
 to explain to our unmilitary readers the principle 
 and practice in war respecting these words. 
 
 Among uncivilised nations there exists no 
 medium between peace and war, and accordingly 
 the individuals of various tribes either mingle 
 with each other on the most friendly terms, or 
 on the raising of the hatchet of war they endea- 
 
354 
 
 ON THE CAPTURE OF LONDON 
 
 Part IY. 
 
 vour most furiously to exterminate each other. 
 But in civilised countries, between peace and 
 war there exists a broad neutral ground, upon 
 which the life of any combatant who surrenders 
 is safe ; and indeed, such is the politeness of 
 modern war, that there have been instances 
 where Frenchmen who have ridden to cut down 
 a British officer—too stern to surrender—sud¬ 
 denly wheeling their horses to retreat, have 
 saluted with their right hand a . . . one-armed 
 man. 
 
 But notwithstanding this creditable alleviation 
 of the worst features of war, it occasionally hap¬ 
 pens—for instance, in preventing troops cross¬ 
 ing a bridge in pursuit of a retreating army— 
 that a body of men are left in a strong loop- 
 holed building, with orders “ to defend the passage 
 to the lastin which case, though repeatedly 
 called upon to surrender, they are enabled, from 
 the advantages of their position, to slaughter a 
 considerable number of their assailants. In cases 
 of this sort, whenever, after the unequal contest, 
 the entrance to their position has been forced, 
 the defenders are what is termed “put to the 
 
Chap. III. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 355 
 
 sword” That is to say, they are massacred by 
 the butt ends and bayonets of muskets. 
 
 In like manner, when a body of men occupying 
 a fortress in a country which is in the hands of 
 their enemy refuse to surrender, it becomes neces¬ 
 sary for the besiegers, at immense disadvantage, 
 to go through the painful and bloody process of 
 a siege. For weeks, and sometimes months—by 
 day, and especially by night—the investing army 
 is exposed to a galling fire and to the inclemency 
 of the weather, while the besieged are either snug 
 in their beds, or, secure behind ramparts and 
 parapets, are firing at them through embrasures, 
 casemates, or loopholes. As the sure progress 
 of the attack advances, it is customary again to 
 call upon them to surrender that which by the 
 science of war it is impossible for them ulti¬ 
 mately to maintain. On their refusing, the 
 besiegers, notwithstanding the deadly fire to 
 which they are exposed, continue their advances 
 until, on the completion of the third parallel, 
 and on the breach in the escarp being reported 
 practicable, they are once again, by a flag of 
 truce, usually called upon “ to surrender , and 
 
356 
 
 ON THE CAPTURE OF LONDON 
 
 Part IV. 
 
 thereby to avoid the further effusion of human 
 blood” 
 
 Although, if the besieging army be of proper 
 force, success has all along been certain , yet the 
 process of mounting the breach is always more or 
 less murderous to the assailants, inasmuch as the 
 besiegers, still behind walls, can, in comparative 
 security and through loopholes, fire grape and 
 musketry,—roll down loaded shells upon them, 
 —&c. &c. 
 
 Notwithstanding these disadvantages, the su¬ 
 periority of numbers is sure eventually to pre¬ 
 vail ; and although the storming party may be 
 found all lying dead or writhing in the breach, 
 their comrades eventually ascend it, and, having 
 thus overpowered a garrison who, availing them¬ 
 selves of their lurking-places, have mercilessly 
 insisted on their assailants going through all the 
 dreadful processes we have detailed, the con¬ 
 querors consider that the “ mercy” that was 
 refused to them is not due to the refusers, and, 
 accordingly, they are usually “ put to the sword,” 
 i. e. massacred, and then “ neither age nor sex 
 are respected.” 
 
Chaf. III. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 357 
 
 Again, when armies are contending against 
 each other in the field, it is the rude maxim of 
 war to show neither consideration nor respect 
 for the females of their enemies, who, accord¬ 
 ingly—especially in a retreat, when men are 
 smarting under defeat—usually suffer treatment 
 which, if described, would, to those born and 
 fostered under the blessings of Peace, appear 
 utterly incredible. 
 
 In the hostile invasion of a country where no 
 resistance is offered, it is often difficult on the 
 march to prevail upon soldiers to perceive this 
 important distinction ; and, at all events, wher¬ 
 ever resistance, however trifling, is offered, it 
 usually becomes impossible . 
 
 In the peaceful occupation of an enemy’s 
 country, the authority of the commander-in¬ 
 chief, and the sense of justice of the army, 
 are usually sufficient to induce the troops to 
 consider the population of the invaded country 
 as occupying the neutral ground we have de¬ 
 scribed, and, consequently, as entitled to consi¬ 
 deration. Nevertheless, whenever the avowed 
 object of the invading army is revenge as well as 
 
358 
 
 ON THE CAPTURE OF LONDON 
 
 Part IV. 
 
 victory ; when the earnest desire in the heart of 
 every man composing it is to insult as well as 
 to subject, the slightest combination for resist¬ 
 ance—nay, even a trifling street quarrel-—is con¬ 
 sidered, pro tanto , as a declaration of war, and 
 dealt with accordingly ; in short, wherever the 
 lives, and, what is of more importance, the ho¬ 
 nour of the inhabitants of a country or of a great 
 city have, in point of fact, no protection but that 
 which a revengeful enemy shall deign to afford, 
 —no tribunal to appeal to but a court-martial 
 of its officers, whose maxim is that the law and 
 practice of war declare “ malheur aux vaincues” 
 —the consequences are usually productive of a 
 series of wrongs to the weaker sex, great and 
 small, of such complicated and variegated detail, 
 that it would be beyond the power of ail the 
 civil courts of Europe even to listen to them. 
 
 We feel confident that every officer-—how¬ 
 ever high may be his rank—and old soldier in 
 the United Kingdom will not only confirm the 
 general accuracy of the foregoing statement, but 
 will declare it to be a mere pen-and-ink sketch, 
 divested of the colours of a reality, to which he 
 
Chap. III. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 359 
 
 could contribute a picture infinitely more ap¬ 
 palling. Indeed we ourselves have heard from 
 French officers descriptions of the way in which 
 they treated the families of the wealthy citizens 
 of * * * * , which we have not only never 
 repeated to any human being, but which we be¬ 
 lieve—instead of the smiles with which they 
 were detailed—would be listened to with feelings 
 of unmitigated horror by every class of English 
 society ; nevertheless, rude as may be the notions 
 of propriety of the French army, especially that 
 portion of it that has served in Algeria, it will 
 appear from the following brief extract from the 
 official paper of the Austrian government in 
 Pesth, dated Sept. 1, 1850, that in time of war 
 the Russian troops are no great respecters of 
 persons :— 
 
 “ The 9th, at dawn, the regular pillage began. 
 The signal was given with trumpets; the plunder was 
 granted to every regiment by turns. After a regiment 
 had plundered, it was recalled and relieved by another. 
 The Russians not only plundered, but flogged the 
 citizens indiscriminately. The later plundering regi¬ 
 ments tore the boots from the feet of the inhabitants, 
 stripped them of their clothes, leaving them scarcely 
 a shirt. The last band, furious at finding no more 
 
360 
 
 ON THE CAPTURE OF LONDON 
 
 Part IV. 
 
 valuables, committed the most atrocious cruelties; 
 they demanded money, and, as the inhabitants had no 
 more to give, they were tortured. The officers plun¬ 
 dered with the privates. The last regiments came 
 armed with bars and perches, and destroyed everything 
 which could not be carried away. Not a chair, not a 
 table, not a door remained unbroken; they cut the 
 feather beds, and flung away the feathers; they car¬ 
 ried away in waggons the contents of the premises; 
 they bounced open the cellars, drank as much as they 
 could, and when they could drink no more they broke 
 the barrels, that the wine might run out. In their 
 intoxication they committed such beastly excesses that 
 even the Russian officers, unable to restrain them, 
 lamented the misfortune of the citizens. There is no 
 pen to describe the dreadful fate of the women; no 
 age was spared by the intoxicated ruffians. The plun¬ 
 dering lasted the whole day; the town was during this 
 time always surrounded by the Russian army, no issue 
 granted to any one.” 
 
 If would not be fair to conceal that an 
 English army has often in the moment of vic¬ 
 tory committed very dreadful excesses, and 
 yet, in 1815, after Waterloo, several of the 
 ladies at Paris used to say of the British officers 
 that they were “ doux comme des demoiselles ,” 
 as compared with the Prussians, Russians, and 
 Austrians. 
 
Chap. III. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 361 
 
 It is perfectly true that, generally speaking, 
 few or no complaints have been made of the 
 enormities at which we have only hinted; but 
 deep sorrow, like deep water, often wears an 
 unruffled surface. By the defalcations of the 
 banks of the United States of America, and 
 by the repudiation of their state loans, the 
 British people have lately incurred a loss of 
 about ten millions; and yet, though thousands 
 of honest families have been reduced to penury 
 and distress, excepting Sidney Smith there has 
 scarcely been one who has uttered in public 
 a single word of complaint against the dis¬ 
 reputable fraud over which he mourns. The 
 same silence is observed by the representatives 
 of the many millions of money that within 
 the last few years have been lost in railway 
 speculations; and if mankind are thus averse 
 to proclaim their pecuniary misfortunes, it 
 surely is not very surprising that they should 
 mutely brood over the disgrace of the names 
 they bear, and of the dishonour of their nearest 
 and dearest relations! 
 
 With considerable reluctance we have sub- 
 
 R 
 
362 ON THE CAPTURE OF LONDON Part IV. 
 
 mitted to our readers a slight and purposely 
 veiled description of the principle and practice 
 of war, as regards that half of our community to 
 whom our volume is especially dedicated, and 
 in whose behalf it has mainly been written. 
 We have done so, because, having undertaken 
 to bring “the Defenceless State of Great 
 Britain” before the patient judgment of a 
 just, a wealthy, an ancient, and a noble-minded 
 nation, we have considered that it would be 
 culpable distinctly to enumerate the enormous 
 pecuniary losses that would result from the inva¬ 
 sion of England and the occupation of London 
 by a French army, and yet, from puny feelings 
 and false delicacy, to conceal from view a loss 
 which the wealth of the whole world could not 
 compensate,—which would make our young men 
 ashamed to show their faces on the continent of 
 Europe,—and which, indeed, would bring the 
 GREY HAIRS OF OLD ENGLAND WITH SORROW TO 
 
 THE GRAVE! 
 
Chap. IV. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 363 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 DISCREDITABLE POSITION OF GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 The nations of the continent of Europe all perceive the defence¬ 
 less state of England—Strange speeches of leading members of 
 the House of Commons boasting of the nation’s excessive 
 power—The inevitable result—Peace meetings on the Conti¬ 
 nent likely to prove highly beneficial — In the mean while 
 Great Britain ought not to remain unprotected — Glaring 
 inconsistency in England’s conquests by war , and her present 
 inability to defend herself by arms. 
 
 In private life it often happens that a just 
 and high-minded man is the last who knows of 
 his own dishonour, but this observation cannot 
 be applied to the British people, because for 
 years they have been loudly warned of their 
 unprotected condition, not only by the leading 
 newspapers of their own country, but by those of 
 every civilized nation in Europe and America. 
 
 For instance, the following extract from the 
 4 Allgemeine Zeitung ’ but too truly shows how 
 clearly the defenceless state of Great Britain is 
 
 r 2 
 
364 
 
 ON THE CAPTURE OF LONDON 
 
 Part IV. 
 
 understood, even in all its details, by the nations 
 of the Continent:— 
 
 “It is known to all the icorld , and particularly to 
 those foreign Governments which perhaps hope to 
 profit by the circumstances, that England is neither 
 protected by a standing army, nor by a popular militia 
 force. 
 
 “ Immeasurable sacrifices, especially as regards the 
 military force of the nation, have been made to the 
 spirit of saving which since the peace of 1815 has 
 tied the hands of every English administration. 
 
 “ Throughout the whole of Scotland and England it 
 would hardly be possible to collect 10,000 men ; the 
 garrison troops of Ireland are, it is true, more nume¬ 
 rous, but entirely absorbed by the necessities of that 
 distracted country. 
 
 “ The people of England are, of all European nations, 
 the most unused to bearing arms, and the most averse 
 to military service ; and it is therefore necessary with 
 the English to subject them to the longest course of 
 training in order to make soldiers of them. 
 
 “ One consequence of this state of things is, an 
 essential decline of British influence abroad; as the 
 military power of the country forms a ridiculous 
 contrast to the tone which Lord Palmerston loves 
 to assume in diplomatic negotiations; and, secondly, 
 a real danger of invasion from the side of France, 
 to which the country can no longer look with in¬ 
 difference. 
 
 “A few hundred fishing-boats, towed across the 
 
Chap. IV. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 365 
 
 Channel by steamers in the course of a calm and cloudy 
 night, might easily transport a considerable French 
 force to the shores of Albion.” 
 
 To any reasonable being it must surely appear 
 almost incredible—and at all events inexplicable 
 —that the imminent danger above so minutely 
 described, in which the wealth,—the property,— 
 the men,—and the women of England have been 
 existing, and in which they still exist; in short, 
 their utterly unprotected condition,—has not only 
 been openly declared by the Duke of Wellington, 
 by the General commanding-in-chief of the corps 
 of Engineers, by naval officers of the highest dis¬ 
 tinction, but we affirm that, if the existing naval 
 Lords of the Admiralty, the Master-General of the 
 Ordnance, and other naval and military autho¬ 
 rities at the present moment in office , were to be 
 examined, they would almost unanimously con¬ 
 cur in opinion that the British nation is utterly 
 defenceless; indeed the fact is so glaring that 
 several officers of the French army have, in 
 their visits to this country lately, very signifi¬ 
 cantly remarked to British artillery and en¬ 
 gineer officers whom we could name, “that our 
 
366 
 
 ON THE CAPTURE OF LONDON 
 
 Part IY. 
 
 weakness is observed ! ” And yet the British 
 House of Commons, the representatives of the 
 wealthiest, the most just, and the most generous 
 nation on the globe, not only inexorably refuse 
 to furnish the supplies necessary for the mere 
 defence of their own property and of their own 
 honour, but, encouraged by “ clamour from 
 without,” they keep each other in countenance, 
 and bolster up the national ideas of false secu¬ 
 rity by speeches, loudly cheered , of which the 
 following are specimens. 
 
 At the moment when the French ambassador 
 had demanded his passports, and when the French 
 nation were absolutely before our eyes increasing 
 their number of sailors, evidently with a deter¬ 
 mination to invade England, one of the most 
 eloquent of our liberal speakers (for the reasons 
 we have stated we omit his name) thus gave 
 vent to those highly popular feelings which we 
 have already quoted from Charles Knight’s 
 paper entitled 4 The Land we Live in ’ (vide 
 Ti mes , 25th June last). 
 
 “ If,” said this distinguished orator, “if we talk of 
 terror and alarm and bullying, only let us look around 
 
Chap. IV. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 367 
 
 this European world of ours, and I ask where is the 
 people, save England, who could safely go to war? 
 Could France go to war ? Could Austria go to war ? 
 Where would Italy and Hungary be ? (Hear, hear.) 
 Could Russia go to war ? The fact is, we are forbear¬ 
 ing because we are so powerful. There can be no 
 doubt about it. It is the weak people, as everybody 
 well knows who knows aught of human nature—it is 
 the weak that are always the most sensitive!” 
 
 Of the above what can possibly be said by 
 the great nations of Europe, but 
 
 “ Quos Deus vult perdere, priiis dementat ” ? 
 
 Again (vide Times of the 22nd July last), 
 one of the principal ministers of the British 
 Crown, in a celebrated speech on the subject of 
 the Greek question, expressed himself as fol¬ 
 lows 
 
 “ Anxious as the people of this country are—and, to 
 their honour be it spoken, I believe no people in the 
 world are more anxious than they are—to preserve 
 peace and avoid war with any country whatsoever, yet, 
 believe me, there is no other country that is not as dis¬ 
 inclined, and that for the best of all reasons, to go to 
 war with England, as England can be to go to war with 
 them (cheers). This consciousness of strength —this 
 feeling of the national power —ought not to tempt the 
 
368 
 
 ON THE CAPTURE OF LONDON 
 
 Part IV. 
 
 Government of the people of England to commit any¬ 
 thing that is unjust or wrong; but it ought at least to 
 bear us up in pursuing the cause of justice and honour, 
 and induce us not lightly to give way to apprehensions 
 fomided on no real grounds (loud cheers). I feel that 
 we may be proud , and reasonably proud, of the country 
 in which we have the good fortune to be born. 
 (The noble Lord resumed his seat amidst enthusiastic 
 cheering.)” 
 
 If our House of Commons, whom we all desire 
 to respect, persist in relying upon fallacies such 
 as we have just quoted, and on which their 
 constituents, the British people, equally securely 
 repose, the hour will in due time arrive when 
 a highly popular speech such as above quoted 
 —asserting, amidst enthusiastic cheers, “ the fact 
 is , we are forbearing because we are so powerful 
 '—there can be no doubt of it ” —will be sud¬ 
 denly interrupted by three loud knocks at the 
 door, which, on being opened, will no sooner dis¬ 
 close to view the glittering helmet and dazzling 
 uniform of the French general in possession of 
 London, than our valued friend Sir Denis Le 
 Marchant—in virtue of his office—will be heard 
 very significantly to whisper into the ear of 
 
ClIAP. IV. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 369 
 
 Lord John Russell, in the words which General 
 Megret, the commanding engineer at the siege 
 of Frederickshall, uttered as the cannon-ball 
 that killed Charles XII. passed through his 
 body, 
 
 “ Voila la piece Jinie . . . aliens souperT 
 
370 
 
 ON THE CAPTURE OF LONDON 
 
 Part IY. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 REMEDY. 
 
 Beneficial results of continued appeals from the friends of 
 peace to the inhabitants of the military nations of Europe — 
 In the mean while the British people must protect themselves 
 from the horrors of invasion, just as they protect their houses 
 from fire, their vessels from storms, their persons from rain, 
 their property from the swell-mob — Peaceful and economical 
 results of this policy — Amount of military and naval force 
 necessary to attain these great blessings — Estimated cost 
 thereof — Short effectual plan showing how to obtain the 
 money. 
 
 Nothing, we most readily admit, can be more 
 pure and praiseworthy than the desire enter¬ 
 tained by a large portion of* our community to 
 discountenance the evil practices of war, and 
 to substitute in their stead the religious habits 
 of peace : indeed, it is impossible for any one to 
 consider the simple fact that the cost of every 
 thirteen-inch shell that is fired away would in 
 England support at least two families, and on 
 the Continent nearly four families, for a week, 
 
Chap. V. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 371 
 
 without reflecting how severe is even the pecu¬ 
 niary punishment which the art of destroying our 
 fellow-creatures inflicts upon mankind ; and if 
 this be true, however easy it may be to ridicule 
 the exertions of what are termed “ men of 
 peace,” it is equally true that every reasonable 
 being should pray that their efforts may be 
 successful,—nay, we are humbly of opinion that 
 the “ peace meetings ” they are encouraging on 
 the Continent will eventually produce the most 
 beneficial results. 
 
 To attempt to persuade the Governments of 
 Europe all of a sudden to put down their armies, 
 would, we submit, be not only utterly hopeless, 
 but would be attempting the object at the wrong 
 end; for as in those countries military govern¬ 
 ment is the only existing protector of life and 
 property, it would evidently be as erroneous in 
 theory as it would prove lamentable in practice 
 to destroy an existing fabric until a better sub¬ 
 stitute should have been provided—in fact, to 
 exchange protection—imperfect as it may be— 
 for anarchy. It is evident, therefore, that the 
 course to be pursued is precisely that which 
 
372 
 
 ON THE CAPTURE OF LONDON 
 
 Part IV. 
 
 “ the friends of peace ” are adopting, namely, to 
 endeavour, by practical appeals to their heads 
 and pockets, to explain to the inhabitants of 
 the several military nations of Europe that, by 
 free representation, Government has power to 
 protect life and property without the presence 
 of a single soldier. By assiduously and scienti¬ 
 fically working at this end of the question, 
 which is penetrable , instead of at the other, 
 which is impregnable , they will no doubt even¬ 
 tually succeed in their object. 
 
 In the mean while, however, it is equally 
 evident that Great Britain, regardless of cost, 
 must by a standing army and by a standing 
 navy protect itself from the invasion and ravages 
 of its armed neighbours, exactly in the same 
 way and exactly by the same means as the 
 British people protect themselves from the ele¬ 
 ments of nature. 
 
 For instance, instead of praying to fire not to 
 burn, the British nation by pecuniary outlay 
 have at this moment very sensibly insured 
 upwards of seven hundred millions of property 
 from its effects. 
 
Chap. Y. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 373 
 
 Instead of praying to the wind and to the 
 waves not to sink ships, at vast expense they have 
 carefully constructed their vessels seaworthy, 
 and moreover, by other pecuniary arrangements, 
 have cautiously insured ships and cargoes 
 amounting in value to considerably more than 
 one hundred and ninety-two millions. 
 
 Instead of praying to West India proprietors 
 to manumit slaves, by an outlay of twenty millions 
 they themselves nobly purchased their ransom. 
 
 Again, instead of praying to the rain not 
 to wet them, at considerable expense they slate, 
 tile, and thatch their houses, buy umbrellas, and 
 defy it. Instead of praying to an ox-fence not 
 to hurt them, our young sportsmen pay almost 
 any money for hunters that can clear it. Lastly, 
 instead of praying to the swell-mob not to break 
 their windows, not to plunder their houses, and 
 not to pick their pockets, the lord-mayor, aider- 
 men, and inhabitants of London,—overcoming 
 their ancient prejudices,—by a self-imposed tax, 
 have created a standing army of blue policemen 
 on purpose to beat the skulls and capture the 
 persons of all delinquents. 
 
374 
 
 ON THE CAPTURE OF LONDON 
 
 Part IV 
 
 Now would it not be only consistent with all 
 these habits of caution which almost exclusively 
 distinguish the British people, that, instead of 
 praying to the French Government— i. e. the 
 French army—not to invade them, they should, 
 at any expense, provide their naval and military 
 officers with men and means sufficient to kill 
 them if they come ? 
 
 The results of this peaceful policy of England, 
 thus inscribing upon her white cliffs “ men-traps 
 
 AND SPRING-GUNS ARE SET IN THESE PREMISES,” 
 
 would be immediately beneficial to the whole 
 family of mankind. Supposing that Louis Napo¬ 
 leon be—as we sincerely believe he is—desirous, 
 on high principles, not to invade England, how 
 greatly would he approve of our fortifying the 
 attractive wealth of London, which, from having 
 remained unprotected, he has probably long fore¬ 
 seen must inevitably, sooner or later, become the 
 property of the French army! Indeed, it must 
 be evident to every reflecting man that the 
 French nation, under a tempest of violent pas¬ 
 sions, has for some time been playing a game of 
 desperate expedients, the last card of which—it 
 
Chap. V. 
 
 BY A FIIENCH ARMY. 
 
 375 
 
 matters not who holds the hand —must be “ the 
 invasion of England.” 
 
 If the people of Great Britain were, as from 
 their wealth and industry they ought to be, pro¬ 
 perly protected, there is scarcely any insult that 
 the nation might not before the world with calm 
 dignity prefer to submit to, rather than inflict 
 upon humanity the horrors of war. They would 
 then, indeed, be powerful; and their forbearance 
 would be a practical lecture on peace, respected 
 and admired by every nation on the globe. 
 But instead of occupying this high position— 
 the birthright of the honest industry of the 
 nation—in what a humiliating predicament do 
 the British people at this moment appear before 
 the world ! 
 
 By force of arms they gained almost all those 
 colonial possessions on which it is said the sun 
 never sets. They have in history most carefully 
 recorded their victories—at the corners of streets 
 and squares they are painted and inscribed— 
 brazen men on horseback everywhere announce 
 them ; and yet no sooner have they acquired by 
 naval and military power all they can possibly 
 
376 
 
 ON THE CAPTURE OF LONDON 
 
 Part IV. 
 
 desire, and infinitely more than they know how to 
 govern, than all of a sudden they deprecate war;— 
 earnestly advise those whom they have defeated 
 to abandon the vile practice ;—set them the ex¬ 
 ample by reducing their army and navy to zero; 
 •—and having thus deprived their property, and, 
 above all, the honour of their women, of all 
 protection, having closed their eyes and shut 
 their ears to the horrors of invasion, which every- 
 body sees but themselves, they stroll about the 
 Continent in “ wide-awake ” hats-—objects, we 
 regret to say it, in the minds of all military and 
 naval men, of just ridicule and contempt. 
 
 “j But” our readers, wearied with the details 
 with which we have troubled them, will by this 
 time, no doubt, impatiently exclaim, “ we want 
 to know what is it that is required to place us all 
 in a state of security from the invasion of the 
 French ? ” 
 
 We request that the Duke of Wellington 
 may answer this question:— 
 
 “ There are,” says the Duke in his letter to Major- 
 General Sir J. Burgoyne, “ not less than twelve great 
 
Chat'. Y. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 377 
 
 roads leading from Brighton upon London; and the 
 French army must be much altered since the time at 
 which I was better acquainted with it, if there are not 
 now belonging to it forty chefs major-general capable 
 of sitting down and ordering the march to the coast 
 of 40,000 men; their embarkation, with their horses 
 and artillery, at the several French ports on the coast; 
 their disembarkation at named points on the English 
 coast, and of the cavalry and artillery in named ports 
 or mouths of rivers; and the assembling at named 
 points of the several columns, and the march of each 
 of these, from stage to stage, to London. 
 
 “ Let any man examine our maps and road-books, 
 consider of the matter, and judge for himself. 
 
 “ I KNOW OF NO MODE OF RESISTANCE, MUCH LESS 
 OF PROTECTION, FROM THIS DANGER, EXCEPTING BY 
 AN ARMY IN THE FIELD CAPABLE OF MEETING AND 
 CONTENDING WITH SO FORMIDABLE AN ENEMY, AIDED 
 BY ALL THE MEANS OF FORTIFICATION WHICH EXPE¬ 
 RIENCE IN WAR AND SCIENCE CAN SUGGEST.” 
 
 The Duke, however, assuming—as a national 
 axiom—that the British House of Commons 
 would constitutionally shrink from the expenses 
 of enabling Her Majesty’s Army and Navy to 
 defend the nation from invasion in the proper 
 manner, suggests the formation of a militia force 
 of 150,000 men. 
 
 “ This,” he adds, “ with an augmentation of the 
 
378 
 
 ON THE CAPTURE OF LONDON 
 
 Part IV. 
 
 force of the regular army, which would not cost 
 400,000/., would put the country on its legs in respect 
 to personal force, and I would engage for its defence, 
 
 OLD AS I AM !” 
 
 But the ink with which these chivalrous 
 words were written was scarcely dry, before 
 reflection materially modified the enthusiastic 
 declaration:— 
 
 “ I shall be deemed foolhardy/’ he adds, “ in en¬ 
 gaging for the defence of the empire with an army 
 composed of such a force of militia ! I may be so ! 
 I confess it! I should infinitely prefer, and should 
 feel more confidence in, an army of regular troops; 
 but I know that I shall not have these ; I may have 
 the others. . . . This is my view of our danger 
 
 AND OUR RESOURCE.” 
 
 Now, without any blustering appeal to na¬ 
 tional honour or national glory, we calmly 
 ask of every prudent man who has funded, 
 landed, mercantile, railway, canal, gas, shop, or 
 any other description of property to defend, or 
 who values the domestic happiness of his family, 
 has there ever existed in the history of Great 
 Britain, or of any other great nation, so affecting 
 and so humiliating a picture as that of an aged 
 
Chap. V. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 379 
 
 warrior publicly volunteering, “ old as he is” 
 to head an undisciplined force to defend his 
 country from invasion; adding in unfaltering 
 accents, at which the wealthy nation to be pro¬ 
 tected might justly blush with shame, “I shall 
 be deemed foolhardy in engaging for the defence 
 of the empire with an army composed of a 
 force of militia; I may be so—I confess it! I 
 should infinitely prefer an army of regular 
 troops, but I know I shall not have these ” ? 
 
 Surely every member of the British House of 
 Commons—especially those in whose veins there 
 flows the blood of what now-a-days is called 
 “ Young England ”—must keenly feel the severe, 
 unsarcastic reproof which these words offer; 
 namely, that while Her Majesty’s army and navy 
 are burning to do their duty, they look upon the 
 representatives of the nation, in Imperial Parlia¬ 
 ment assembled, as a body of men to whom 
 it is vain to appeal for the necessary funds for 
 defending their own properties and their own 
 families from ruin and dishonour !! 
 
 “But,” our readers will, we feel sure, by this 
 time impetuously repeat, “ we want to know 
 
380 
 
 ON THE CAPTURE OF LONDON 
 
 Part IV, 
 
 exactly what it is that is required to place us 
 all in a state of security from the invasion 
 of the French .” 
 
 We briefly reply: A small defensive tax upon 
 the whole property of the country, amounting to 
 about one-sixth per cent, of the average rates vo¬ 
 luntarily paid by the community for the insurance 
 of nine hundred millions sterling, as already 
 detailed, would protect the commerce and indus¬ 
 try of the country,—preserve our colonies and 
 our commerce,—allow every British subject to 
 enjoy the blessings of peace,—and enable the 
 nation, if war should prove unavoidable, to 
 
 DEFY INVASION AT HOME OR ABROAD. 
 
 The following is a rough sketch of what would 
 probably be required:— 
 
 Military. 
 
 1. An increase for our colonies and for home 
 service of 100,000 infantry troops, efficiently 
 armed and equipped. 
 
 2. An increase of 100 pieces of cannon fully 
 horsed. 
 
 3. A reserve of 200,000 stand of arms. 
 
Chap. V. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 381 
 
 4. Ammunition for at least a years war 
 consumption. 
 
 5. A provision of equipments and stores 
 proportionate in number to the difficulty or 
 facility of speedily obtaining them if required. 
 
 6. The principal naval arsenals, Portsmouth, 
 Plymouth, Sheerness, and Pembroke, and also 
 some of the most valuable 1 of our colonies, to he 
 put into a state that would enable small forces to 
 resist, for a moderate period, any sudden attack. 
 
 7. Dover and the mouth of the Thames, con¬ 
 taining shipping, &c., of inestimable value, to be 
 sufficiently strengthened. 
 
 N.B .—The whole cost of maintaining 100,000 
 men, including officers, would, exclusive of re¬ 
 cruiting, barracks, arms, and equipments, amount 
 per annum to about 3,670,000/. 
 
 1 The French occupation of the Mauritius, up to the time it 
 was taken by English troops, cost the British people several 
 millions of money in losses by the capture of their vessels, 
 besides the indirect loss and expenditure of working their com¬ 
 merce by powerful convoys. Now, if that valuable mercantile 
 position were adequately fortified, and had a moderate garrison, 
 the nation would ensure retaining it; whereas, at present, three 
 or four French frigates with troops could undoubtedly take it. 
 
382 
 
 ON THE CAPTURE OF LONDON 
 
 Part IV. 
 
 The whole of the fortifications proposed in 
 Nos. 6 and 7 would not comprise more work 
 than the construction of one first-rate fortress on 
 the Continent, such as France, Prussia, Austria, 
 and even Belgium, undertake at any time for 
 much slighter objects. 
 
 Naval. 
 
 1. The seafaring population of Great Britain, 
 —comprehending 22,000 seamen in Her Ma¬ 
 jesty’s service, 200,000 in the British mer¬ 
 chants’ service, and 40,000 in foreign service,— 
 to be made liable, by law, to serve by ballot in 
 the Boyal Navy. 
 
 2. A powerful standing force of able seamen- 
 gunners to be comfortably lodged, maintained, 
 drilled, and otherwise employed in our dock¬ 
 yards, ready at a moment's warning to man 
 Her Majesty’s ships in ordinary. 
 
 3. Additional Instruction-ships, similar to, and 
 under the direction of, the ‘ Excellent,’ sufficient 
 to convert Her Majesty’s raw seamen into 
 practised artillerymen. 
 
Chap. Y. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 383 
 
 4. The whole of the Marines, instead of using 
 small arms only, to be converted into a well- 
 drilled and well-disciplined Marine Artillery. 
 
 5. That the Minister or Commander-in-Chief 
 of Her Majesty’s Naval Forces be invariably an 
 officer of distinction in Her Majesty’s Navy. 
 
 The sole object of the above proposals for a 
 prudent Insurance of the Empire is to save the 
 British people from the horrors and expenses 
 of war, by rendering an invasion of Great 
 Britain by the French army impracticable: 
 indeed, the facts we have adduced will, we be¬ 
 lieve, alarmingly demonstrate the fallacy of the 
 English House of Commons considering as 
 “ economy ” any reduction of taxation that 
 jeopardises the safety of the whole community. 
 
 On the nation’s ordinary principles of Insur¬ 
 ance, the honestly-acquired wealth of Great Bri¬ 
 tain, if timely applied, is an invincible defender 
 of its interests and of its honour; no nation on 
 earth can compete against it: they all know it— 
 they all feel it. Nevertheless, as no mercantile 
 man can insure his ship after it has foundered ,•— 
 
384 
 
 ON THE CAPTURE OF LONDON 
 
 Part IV. 
 
 so it is utterly impossible for any nation to make 
 preparation for self-defence in a short time. It 
 requires at least a year to convert recruits into 
 soldiers, or raw seamen into trained gunners. It 
 requires years to construct fortifications and ships 
 of war. It requires many years, or, as the case 
 may be, many months, to fabricate arms, equip¬ 
 ments, guns, carriages, shot, shells, gunpowder, 
 &c., necessary for war-operations on a large 
 scale; and thus, though in case of invasion 
 Great Britain would inevitably be ruined , if not 
 annihilated, in three months , it would require 
 nearly three years to prevent the catastrophe. 
 In short, a man might as well begin , in a ter¬ 
 rible hurry, to construct tanks, lay pipes for 
 filling them, and advertise for tenders for the 
 construction of a fire-engine, the instant he 
 perceives that his house is on fire ,—as for the 
 British House of Commons to maintain that the 
 husbanding of a wealthy nation’s resources, and 
 an accumulation of its funds, can provide timely 
 resistance to invasion. 
 
Ciiap. y. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 385 
 
 How TO GET THE MONEY. 
 
 “ Ay, there’s the mb.”—H amlet. 
 
 However exhausting may occasionally be the 
 defender of an injured client, yet, in proportion 
 as the advocate gradually develops evidence, 
 facts, and arguments that he knows to be in com¬ 
 bination irresistible, is he usually supported by 
 an inward conviction which not only cheers him 
 in his course, but which, on closing his case—as 
 he sits down—triumphantly congratulates him 
 on the certainty of a successful verdict. In the 
 lone cause, however, which we have undertaken, 
 we have not, as we have proceeded, been re¬ 
 freshed by any such conviction, nor at this 
 moment are we enjoying even an ideal reward 
 of success. On the contrary, when we- reflect 
 “ on the difficulty” (see the Duke of Welling¬ 
 ton’s letter to Sir John Burgoyne) “ under 
 which all governments in this country labour , in 
 prevailing upon Parliament , in time of peace, to 
 take into consideration measures necessary for 
 the safety of the country in time of war ! ” we 
 
386 
 
 ON THE CAPTURE OF LONDON 
 
 Part IV. 
 
 feel that, unless we can clearly satisfy the present 
 ministers of the Crown that they will be powerfully 
 supported from without,—that the British people 
 have become not only disposed but anxious to 
 be taxed for the purpose of securing themselves 
 from invasion,—our volume, though it may alarm 
 a few, especially the timid, will be of no prac¬ 
 tical use whatever. 
 
 Of the earnest desire of the present prime 
 minister of England to protect the empire from 
 the ruin and annihilation we have described, 
 there can exist no doubt; but, however anxious 
 he may be to do so — however he may for 
 years have been inwardly convinced of the 
 fidelity and truth of the Duke of Wellingtons 
 admonitions—and however “ ready, aye ready 
 for the field” may be his well-known moral 
 courage, yet, may he not fairly argue to his col¬ 
 leagues that the very size of our volume renders 
 it for the multitude utterly valueless ? 
 
 As the case, therefore, is evidently a desperate 
 one, as the commercial interests of the whole 
 world are involved in it, and as w r e feel bound 
 — and at all events justified — in remedying, 
 
Chap. V. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 387 
 
 if possible, the disorder we have described, we 
 will at once, in the concentrated essence of our 
 volume, offer, in a very small compass, a prac¬ 
 tical prescription, which, we feel perfectly confi¬ 
 dent, would enable her Majesty’s Ministers to 
 propose and carry a protective tax to maintain 
 a standing army and standing navy sufficient 
 to protect the British people from invasion, 
 almost by acclamation. 
 
 Our proposal is briefly as follows:— 
 
 With a view to arouse a brave, a just, a 
 powerful, and a high-minded people to a sense 
 of the danger and dishonour of their sleep, we 
 propose that, on the first day of the next 
 meeting of the Imperial Parliament, some 
 member of high character of the House of 
 Lords should be prevailed upon to give notice 
 that on,—say, that day fortnight,—he should 
 feel it his duty to put to the Duke of Wel¬ 
 lington two questions respecting the defensive 
 state of Great Britain. 
 
 There can be no doubt that this notice would 
 cause very general excitement, and that, when 
 the day arrived, the House would be crowded 
 
 s 2 
 
388 
 
 ON THE CAPTURE OF LONDON 
 
 Part IV. 
 
 with peers,—peeresses,—members of the House 
 of Commons,—with their wives, daughters, &c. 
 
 &c., all eagerly anxious for the result. 
 
 In this interim with what ease and unconcern 
 would the Duke, with his usual punctuality, 
 enter the House;—how affably would he converse 
 with the leading members of various parties ;— 
 and after he had taken his seat, put on his hat, 
 folded his arms, and gradually allowed his 
 countenance to assume its usual fix, how utterly 
 impossible would it be for any one pair of all 
 the eyes that were concentrated upon it to 
 decipher either what were his opinions or what 
 would be his answer! We will, however, ven¬ 
 ture to divine that, when the anxious moment 
 arrived, the dialogue would substantially be as 
 follows:— | 
 
 Lord A .—My Lord Duke,—In the two 
 questions I am about to put, I shall not presume 
 to trouble your Grace for any opinion as to the 
 present safety of our vast Colonial empire, or of 
 the dockyards, military position, or internal 
 wealth of Great Britain; but I feel it due— 
 
Chap. V. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 389 
 
 most especially to one-half of our community— 
 to ask your Grace this plain question:— 
 
 Is your Grace of opinion that Her Majesty’s 
 army and navy, consistent with their Colonial 
 duties, are at the present moment sufficiently 
 powerful to protect, from the horrors of invasion, 
 the women of England ? 
 
 The Duke. —NO! (Sensation.) 
 
 Lord A .—My second question is as follows: 
 —In case of a declaration of war, I beg leave to 
 ask your Grace for how long a period you con¬ 
 sider that Her Majesty’s army and navy would,— 
 consistent with their foreign duties,—be enabled 
 to protect, from the horrors of invasion, the 
 women of England ? 
 
 The Duke .—I wouldn’t insure ’em for a 
 week ! (Indescribable sensation.) 
 
 Now since the days of Samson and of Solo¬ 
 mon has there, we ask, ever existed a man 
 strong enough in person, or wise enough in mind, 
 
390 
 
 ON THE CAPTURE OF LONDON 
 
 Part IV. 
 
 to stand up in such a scene, and in a voice 
 “ scarcely audible below the bar 5 ’ to say, even in 
 broken sentences, and under feelings naturally 
 of an overwhelming nature— 
 
 “ Very sorry! ... . exceedingly awkward for 
 
 them! . very awkward indeed ! ... . But 
 
 . , . . with wheat at ( ) shillings a quarter , the 
 
 nation really and truly can't afford it ” ? 
 
 Bequeathing this picture to IB, we proceed 
 to propose that by a similar notice Her Majesty’s 
 Inspector-General of Fortifications, Major-Gene¬ 
 ral Sir John Burgoyne, be required simultane¬ 
 ously to give answers to the same two questions 
 at the bar of the House of Commons ; and if* un¬ 
 moved and unawed by the severest cross-examina¬ 
 tion that our most valuable economists can suggest, 
 this experienced officer, u the confidential head 
 of the principal defensive departments of the 
 country should calmly and resolutely — as 
 there can exist no doubt he will—corroborate 
 the fearful declaration of the Commander-in- 
 chief of Her Majesty’s army;—if the Master- 
 General of Her Majesty’s Ordnance, and if 
 one or two of the most experienced of the naval 
 
Chap. V. 
 
 BY A FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 391 
 
 Lords of Her Majesty’s Admiralty, on being sent 
 for and closely examined, should also fearlessly 
 corroborate —as we declare they will —the same 
 fearful declarations,—are we wrong in stating that 
 the dormant chivalry of Great Britain will in¬ 
 stantly be aroused;—that its noblest, its purest 
 passions will be excited;—that farmers, yeomen, 
 hunting men, manufacturers, fundholders, land- 
 owners, shopkeepers—ay, and “England’s bold 
 peasantry, her country’s pride”—will, hand, heart, 
 purse, and voice, unite together, to save those 
 
 “ WHOM IT IS THEIR HAPPINESS TO REGARD, THEIR 
 
 DUTY TO PROTECT - AND WHO, UNDER THE 
 
 BLESSING OF AN ALMIGHTY POWER, HAVE AS YET 
 only read of war,” from the horrors of invasion ? 
 and thus the British empire—now on the brink 
 of ruin—will be saved! 
 
 Having now closed our arduous case, we have 
 but one remaining duty to perform—namely, 
 humbly to ask pardon of the nation for the free¬ 
 dom with which we have submitted our opinions. 
 
 Our volume has been written in absolute 
 
392 ON THE CAPTURE OF LONDON, ETC. P.rtIV. 
 
 retirement, under disadvantages which have 
 often rendered it impracticable for us to obtain 
 the information we have desired. More than 
 three-fourths of it have daily been sent to press 
 as fast as it was written ; and as there has 
 therefore been no artifice in its composition, it 
 has nothing, we are aware, to protect it from 
 criticism but its object, and, we believe, its 
 
 TRUTH. 
 
( 393 ) 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 i. 
 
 It is said that a good elephant ought to be able, with 
 his trunk, either to lift up a gun or pick up a pin. In 
 like manner, a good general has constantly to decide 
 questions of great magnitude, as well as of very minute 
 detail. 
 
 In the sieges in the Peninsula the several arrange¬ 
 ments for assaulting or escalading, containing twenty 
 or thirty different orders to the storming parties, to be 
 executed sometimes consecutively, and sometimes at 
 different points at the same moment, were mostly writ¬ 
 ten by the Duke of Wellington on the ground, after 
 he had himself carefully looked at the breach or point 
 to be escaladed ; and although the lives of thousands 
 of men depended upon the clearness and propriety of 
 these orders, the Duke usually, as fast as one side of 
 the paper was covered with his instructions, handed it 
 to his secretary Lord Fitzroy Somerset, or some other 
 staff officer, to be copied and immediately distributed. 
 
 Now, as a contrast to considerations of such vast 
 importance, we annex the following specimen of the 
 Duke’s knowledge of the details of what may be called 
 “the little kettle question.” 
 
 s 3 
 
394 
 
 APPENDIX. —L 
 
 u To Brigadier-General Robert Craufurd. 
 
 Badajoz, 29th September, 1809. 
 
 u My dear General, —I have been for some time 
 very anxious respecting a part of what forms the subject 
 of your letter of the 26th ; I mean the camp kettles ; and 
 1 am much obliged to you for your opinions on the subject. 
 Faulty as is the existing mode of carrying the camp kettles, 
 it is more efficient than that of which it is the substitute in 
 this country ; and I have written a letter to England, which 
 I hope will have the effect of making the allowance for 
 keeping up the numbers more equal to the object for which 
 it was granted than it has been hitherto. 
 
 u There is much to be said on both sides of the question 
 respecting the description of kettle which the soldiers 
 ought to have; and as the iron kettle is the best for cook¬ 
 ing, and lasts longest, and, moreover, as the use of that 
 description and size of kettle requires the employment of 
 fewer men in cooking, the choice between them resolves 
 itself into this point,—Which is most likely to be carried 
 with certainty, so as to give the soldier at all times the use 
 of a kettle? 
 
 u In deciding upon this question, much depends upon 
 the care which officers take of their men, and the degree of 
 minute attention which they give to their wants. In a 
 regiment well looked after, it is certain that the tin kettles 
 would answer best, as the officers would oblige the soldiers 
 to take care of them, and regimental arrangements would 
 be made to provide for the casual increase and diminution 
 of numbers occasioned by men coming out of and going 
 into hospital, returning from detachment, &c.; and in 
 actions they would be prevented from throwing them away ; 
 and care would be taken that the carrier of the kettle 
 
APPENDIX. — L 
 
 395 
 
 should, above all other men, not straggle or stay behind 
 his regiment till the hours for cooking should be past, or get 
 drunk and lose the kettle. But in two-thirds of the regi¬ 
 ments of this army such care would not be taken ; and 
 whether the regiment would have kettles or not would 
 depend upon that most thoughtless of animals, the soldier 
 himself, and I should very soon hear that there were 
 none. 
 
 “ According to the existing system, bad as it is, the 
 care of the camp kettles is not only the business of the 
 batman of the company, but of all the batmen of the regi¬ 
 ment and of the brigade. The officer of the baggage guard 
 is particularly interested, as with the kettles he loses the 
 mules ; and the officers commanding the regiments and the 
 brigade are not inattentive to the subject. I think also 
 that the practical effect of this system must improve as the 
 army becomes more experienced in the field. 
 
 u Upon the whole, therefore, I prefer the iron kettles to 
 the tin for general purposes; but I have no objection to 
 try the latter in some of our best regiments, in order to see 
 how the experiment may answer. 
 
 “ I agree with you about the expediency of allowing the 
 Captains of companies to ride. The forage required for 
 this purpose is no object, as forage for 200 or 300 mules 
 cannot be very difficult to procure. The objection I think 
 is the increased number of batmen and servants which will 
 be taken out of the ranks, which becomes an object of the 
 greatest consequence. 
 
 “ Believe me, &c., 
 
 “ Wellington.” 
 
396 
 
 APPENDIX. —II. 
 
 II. 
 
 It will appear, from the following document, that 
 nearly forty years ago the Duke of Wellington warned 
 the Ministers of Great Britain of the disposition of the 
 French to invade England, and of the awful conse¬ 
 quences that would ensue. 
 
 Extract from a despatch from Lord Wellington to 
 the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of State, dated— 
 
 “ Sta. Marinha, 23rd March, 1811. 
 
 u ..... . From what I have seen of the objects of 
 the French Government, and the sacrifices thev make to 
 accomplish them, I have no doubt that if the British army 
 were for any reason to withdraw from the Peninsula, and 
 the French Government were relieved from the pressure of 
 military operations on the Continent, they would incur all 
 risks to land an army in His Majesty’s dominions. Then, 
 indeed, would commence an expensive contest; then would 
 Ilis Majesty’s subjects discover what are the miseries of war, 
 of which, by the blessing of God, they have hitherto had no 
 knowledge; and the cultivation, the beauty, and prosperity 
 of the country, and the virtue and happiness of its inhabit¬ 
 ants, would be destroyed, whatever might be the result of 
 the military operations. God forbid that I should be a 
 witness, much less an actor, in the scene ; and I only hope 
 that the King’s Government will consider well what I have 
 
 above stated to your Lordship.” 
 
 “ To what are these facts to be attributed ? Certainly 
 not to the inclination of the inhabitants of the country to 
 the enemy ; certainly not to the superior abilities of the 
 officers of the civil departments of the French armies, at 
 
APPENDIX. —III. 
 
 397 
 
 least not on comparison with the civil officers of the 
 British army ; but to the system of terror on which the 
 French, and all under their authority, invariably act, and 
 to which no power in Europe ever has, or ever can have, 
 recourse.” 
 
 III. 
 
 The following memorandum, dated Paris, 15 June, 
 1850, will show the amount of the military stores, &c., 
 which France has prepared for the purposes of war :— 
 
 a The Minister-of-War has just distributed to the 
 Assembly the general statement of the materiel of his 
 department for 1848, but for the present year there is an 
 increase of 9,000,000. It appears that, on 31 Dec. 1848, 
 France possessed more than 22,000,000 (francs’) worth 
 of provisions in its military store; military equipments, 
 3,640,000; military beds, 11,000,000; 69,000 horses 
 (20,000 for artillery), the estimated value of which, 
 45,838,150 f. ; artillery stores, valued at 267,276,802 f. 
 These stores consisted of 8089 battering-guns (3124 being 
 of iron), 3,759 field-pieces, 2,883 carronades and mortars, 
 1705 siege and 2754 field howitzers. The engineer materiel 
 was valued at 16,657,653 f. The stores of powder and salt¬ 
 petre were estimated at nearly 61,000,000 f.” 
 
398 
 
 APPENDIX. — IV. 
 
 IV. 
 
 We offer to the “ Friends of Peace ” the following 
 sketch, showing a very trifling proportion of the 
 beneficial results of the industry of the British people ; 
 and although we have so strongly urged that all 
 such honestly-acquired property ought to be ade¬ 
 quately protected, yet, we ask, would it be possible for 
 an Englishman, at a great Peace-meeting on the Con¬ 
 tinent, to submit to the sober judgment of the people 
 assembled a more convincing argument in favour of 
 free, instead of military, government, than the striking 
 contrast exhibited between the wasteful, useless, 
 expensive requirements of war as detailed in the 
 French official memorandum just quoted, and the 
 following extract from English statistics ? 
 
 O O 
 
 “ Ships, Roads, Railways, Canals. 
 
 “ There are employed in the yearly transit of Great Bri¬ 
 tain, with the world and with her own shores, 33,672 sail¬ 
 ing vessels, and 1110 steam-vessels, employing 236,000 
 seamen. Calculating the value of each ship and cargo, as 
 the value has been estimated before Parliament, at 5000/., 
 we have an aggregate value—sailing-vessels, steamers, and 
 their cargoes included—of 173,910,000/. Further, suppos¬ 
 ing that the yearly wages of the seamen, including officers, 
 was 20/. per head, the amount paid in wages would be 
 4,720,000/. The railways now in operation in the United 
 Kingdom extend 6000 miles, the cost of their construction 
 (paid and to be paid) having been estimated at upwards of 
 
APPENDIX. —IV. 
 
 399 
 
 350,000,000/. Last year they supplied the means of rapid 
 travel to above 63 millions of passengers, who traversed 
 above a billion of miles. Their receipts for the year ap¬ 
 proached lli millions of money, and nearly three quarters 
 of a million of persons are dependent upon them for sub¬ 
 sistence. The turnpike and other roads of Great Britain 
 alone (independently of Ireland) present a surface of 
 120,000 miles in length, for the various purposes of inter¬ 
 change, commerce, and recreation. They are maintained 
 by the yearly expenditure of a million and a half. For 
 similar purposes the navigable canals and rivers of Great 
 Britain and Ireland furnish an extent of 4850 miles, formed 
 at a cost of probably 35,000,000/. Adding all these 
 together, we have of turnpike roads, railways, and canals 
 no less than 130,000 and odd miles formed, at an aggregate 
 cost of upwards of 386,000,000/. If we add to this the 
 54,250,000/. capital expended in the mercantile marine, 
 we have the gross total of more than 440,000,000 of money 
 sunk in the transit of the country. If the number of miles 
 traversed by the natives of this country in the course of the 
 year by sea, road, rail, river, and canal, were summed up, 
 it would reach to a distance greater than to the remotest 
 planet yet discovered.” 
 
400 
 
 APPENDIX. — Y. 
 
 y. 
 
 The following extract from a speech lately made by 
 the King of Holland shows the precautions which that 
 pacific and commercial country is about to take for 
 self-defence:— 
 
 Opening of the Session of the States-General. 
 
 The Hague, October 7, 1850. 
 
 “ This morning, at 12 o’clock, the Legislative Session of 
 the States-General took place with the usual ceremony. 
 His Majesty delivered the following speech from the 
 throne:— 
 
 “ Gentlemen, 
 
 “It is my earnest desire that the present meeting of 
 the States-General may from this time forward be the com¬ 
 plete emanation of those rights which the constitution lately 
 established, and secured to the Netherlands. 
 
 “ I am happy to find myself surrounded by the newly 
 elected representatives. Our relations with all foreign 
 powers continue to be of an amicable nature. 
 
 “ Preparatory measures which promise a favourable 
 result have been adopted for the formation of a thorough 
 system of national defence , which has long been an 
 
 OBJECT OF MY SOLICITUDE.” 
 
APPENDIX.—VI. 
 
 401 
 
 VI. 
 
 The following letter, from Admiral Sir Charles 
 Napier, which has just appeared in the Times of the 
 11th October, 1850, (after our volume was in type,) 
 very powerfully corroborates our description of the 
 defenceless condition of the British people :— 
 
 “ TO THE EDITOR OF THE £ TIMES.’ 
 
 u Sir, —The President of the French Republic, the 
 French squadron, and the gigantic works, finished and in 
 progress, which have been seen by many British officers, by 
 the Yacht Club, and by numerous English gentlemen, 
 together with the articles in the press, have done more to 
 open the eyes of the people of England to our unprotected 
 state than the celebrated letter of the Duke of Wellington, 
 and the various communications myself and others have 
 made to different members of Her Majesty’s Government, 
 both publicly and privately, and through the medium of the 
 press. They have seen, almost within sight of our own 
 shores, a splendid breakwater of nearly three miles long 
 rise from the bottom of the sea, 60 feet deep, under which 
 can lie at moorings 50 sail-of-the-line with perfect safety, 
 almost frowning on England. That breakwater, ere long, 
 will be defended by three tremendous fortifications, inde¬ 
 pendent of movable guns without number, to protect either 
 entrance that may be attacked. On the Isle of Pelee, 
 opposite the breakwater, on the eastern entrance, is Fort 
 Royal (now Fort National), mounting 90 guns casemated, 
 and guns pointing out of ports like a ship. Opposite 
 this, on the main land, is Fort de Flamands, mount- 
 
402 
 
 APPENDIX. — YI. 
 
 ing many heavy guns; in its rear is the redoubt of Tour- 
 laville. 
 
 “ Opposite the breakwater, to the west, are the Forts of 
 Querqueville, St. Anne, and Honet, and one intended to be 
 built on a rock, between the west end of the breakwater 
 and Querqueville. These forts will mount upwards of 150 
 guns. There are also strong batteries to the left of the 
 basin, bearing on the roads. Within the breakwater, exca¬ 
 vated out of rock and faced with stone, is the avant port , 
 capable of containing ten sail-of-the-line alongside the 
 quay, 30 feet deep at low-water spring-tides. In this port 
 are a dock and four slips ; in a line with this, and communi¬ 
 cating with it, is an inner basin, in which ten sail-of-the- 
 line can also lie alongside the quay. On two sides of this 
 basin are magazines ; and here also lies the sheer hulk. In 
 the rear of Fort Honet there is another small basin, and 
 two building slips. This serves as a ditch to the fort, 
 which is cut off from the mainland and island by a draw¬ 
 bridge ; from the lower tier of guns, another bridge con¬ 
 ducts you over a ditch to a large barrack-yard, casemated ; 
 and two small stairs lead up to the second tier of guns. 
 
 “ In the rear of the ctva?it port and the inner basin inland 
 there is another basin in construction, which communicates 
 with both. This basin when finished can accommodate 20 
 sail-of-the-line alongside the quay. Here are four docks 
 and five slips. To the left of the great avant port there is 
 another avant port , which leads to the steam basin, where 
 there are three slips. The storehouses are large, well 
 arranged, and close to the basins. There is also a port 
 of refuge, leading to another steam basin, where, as in 
 the other basins, the steamers can coal alongside the 
 wharf. 
 
 u This splendid dockyard is surrounded by a high wall, 
 
APPENDIX. — VI. 
 
 403 
 
 and the wall is again surrounded by regular fortifications, 
 with a wet ditch: and to protect the works, the heights in 
 the rear, and, indeed, all round from Tourlaville, there is a 
 double chain of strong redoubts. Independent of all these 
 there is a commercial basin, with gates, in which merchant- 
 vessels lie afloat. Two piers project a considerable distance 
 beyond the gates. Both the town and basin are outside the 
 fortification. 
 
 u Under this magnificent breakwater lay the French 
 squadron, consisting of two ships of 120 guns, three of 100 
 guns on two decks, two of 90 guns, and one of 96 guns; 
 one frigate of 88 guns; three large steamers of 16 and 12 
 guns, but pierced for 28, and capable of transporting to a 
 short distance upwards of 2000 men each; one screw brig, 
 one corvette, and three smaller steamers. 
 
 “ The ships, as far as we could judge, were in high order, 
 lowered and furled their sails as well as we could do, shifted 
 maintopsail and foresail by signal—the 1 Inflexible,’ the 
 best of the squadron, in 5£ minutes. They also fired five 
 broadsides with blank cartridge. 
 
 “ In the 4 Friedland,’ where we were, some of our officers 
 thought they fired slow, but half of her crew had only been 
 on board two months, and this the President took care to 
 explain. The mode of passing the powder was perfect, and 
 well worth copying. Boats were then manned and armed, 
 but not so quickly as I expected. They attacked the steamer, 
 and kept up a good fire; the boats more numerous than ours, 
 and, except the launches, much larger. This fleet mounts 
 more guns, and, generally speaking, throws a heavier 
 broadside, than our ships, with the exception of the ‘ Queen.’ 
 Their crews are also larger; in the ‘ Friedland ’ there are 
 184 men to pass along the powder and shells. 
 
 “ It is commanded by Vice-Admiral Parseval Duchesne, 
 
404 
 
 APPENDIX.— YI. 
 
 a young-looking 1 man about sixty ; the second in command, 
 Rear-Admiral Dubourdien, about forty-five, had lost a leg. 
 The captains and officers are young men, and experienced 
 men, inasmuch as they are almost constantly employed, and 
 it requires more interest for a French officer to get out of 
 employment than for an English officer to get into it. Pro¬ 
 motion is by selection, except to lieutenants, where one-half 
 rise by seniority, and, as far as I could learn, with little 
 favouritism. I am justified in saying they are commanded 
 and officered by experienced men, for they are almost 
 always afloat, while we, on the other hand, are commanded 
 by men who are employed about once in ten or fifteen 
 years, when little justice is shown in selection for promo¬ 
 tion, and not much for employment. The Minister of 
 Marine (an Admiral) was present, and could form his own 
 opinion of the fleet; whereas, had we had a review at Spit- 
 head, our Minister of Marine would have been gaping with 
 his mouth wide open, scarcely knowing the difference be¬ 
 tween a musket and a great gun. 
 
 “ With us every change of Admiralty brings a change of 
 plan. When Sir James Graham and his Admiralty came 
 into office, they replaced the efficient flag-ships with ineffi¬ 
 cient ones. After a while they found it would not answer, 
 and the efficient ships were restored. This lasted till the 
 present Board came into office, and they brought back the 
 inefficient flag-ships. They are now adopting what I re¬ 
 commended when Sir Charles Wood was secretary, ten 
 years ago, viz., to make efficient ships do the duty of the 
 ordinary, and the sooner they do the same thing with the 
 flag-ships the better; then will you see seven sail-of-the- 
 line ready. Let them take the reliefs, and instead of three 
 years’ work out of our ships we shall get five at about the 
 same expense ; and, instead of having three ships at home 
 
APPENDIX. — VI. 
 
 405 
 
 half manned, we shall have two full manned, which will 
 cost the same money. Add to them three more, and you 
 will have a respectable Channel squadron. Keep half the 
 marines of that squadron on shore to garrison your seaports 
 in peace, and fill their places with sailors, and, in the event 
 of emergency, let each ship send one watch into the flag 
 and ordinary ships ; fill them up with officers, seamen, and 
 boys, and you will immediately double your force. Let the 
 duty of labourers and convicts in the dockyards be done by 
 sailors; you would then have a fleet ready for work at a 
 moment’s warning; and if this was not enough, call in 
 your Coast-guard to fit out another squadron. By that 
 time you would be able to see whether the procla¬ 
 mation would bring the seamen from the merchant service 
 or not. 
 
 “ The affair of Syria ought to have given us a lesson. 
 When the treaty was signed by the Allied Powers to 
 reduce the power of Mehemet, Ali, France was isolated and 
 offended—the whole nation took fire, and was eager for war. 
 Foreseeing, I suppose, what would happen, they had a reserve 
 squadron at Toulon, and when they recalled their fleet from 
 the Levant I think they mustered twenty sail-of-the-line. 
 During the operations in Syria we never had more than 
 twelve. The *' Vanguard ’ was commissioned on the 2nd of 
 April, 1840, and, I think, arrived off Alexandria in Octo¬ 
 ber ; the ‘ Kodney ’ was commissioned on the 13th of May, 
 and did not arrive till after Acre was taken ; the £ Calcutta ’ 
 was commissioned on the 22nd of August, 1840, and, I 
 think, arrived at Marmorice at the end of November. The 
 menaces of France frightened us, and on the 1st of Octo¬ 
 ber the ‘ Britannia ’ and 4 Howe ’ were taken from the Port- 
 Admirals, the £ Donegal ’ was ordered from Lisbon, and I 
 believe the £ Belleisle’s’ men were draughted to man them. 
 
406 
 
 APPENDIX. — VI. 
 
 But, notwithstanding all this, they did not arrive at Mar- 
 morice till the beginning of January, after the treaty was 
 signed with Mehemet Ali. The 4 Impregnable/ another 
 flag-ship, was commissioned on the 27th of October, and 
 the 4 Monarch ’ on the 30th, and lay eight months waiting for 
 men ; so that, while the operations were going on on the 
 coast of Syria, vve had only twelve sail-of-the-line, and they 
 undermanned, scattered from Alexandria to Scandaroon, 
 two on the passage out and three fitting in England ; while 
 France had twenty sail-of-tlie-line in Toulon watching 
 events. What they had in other ports I do not know. 
 
 44 In this state of thino;s France had three courses before 
 her—the first, to have raised the blockade of Alexandria, 
 and brought out the Turco-Egyptian fleet of upwards of 
 twenty sail, to have endeavoured to cut us up in detail, or 
 at all events have driven us from off the coast, and then 
 proceeded to England or Ireland. This, I believe, was 
 Admiral Lalande’s plan. Their second course was more 
 sure and more simple, viz., to give out at Paris that the 
 Toulon fleet was ordered to Gibraltar and Cherbourg, and 
 was to sail on a fixed day. We should have got alarmed, 
 and Sir Robert Stopford would have been unquestionably 
 ordered home, or he would have sailed the moment he got 
 information of the sailing of the French fleet. When the 
 coast was clear, Mehemet Ali would have sent his fleet to 
 the coast of Syria, and made prisoners of all the Turks, 
 and thus France would have outwitted the allies and 
 gained her point, and without going to war. Why this 
 was not done I don’t know. The third course was to have 
 kept everything secret, ordered all her steamers to collect 
 on a given day at Cherbourg, and gone there themselves, 
 taking care to have had steamers at Gibraltar to have 
 towed them through the Gut. This would have given 
 
APPENDIX. — VI. 
 
 407 
 
 them at least five or six weeks the start of Stopford; and 
 I will ask any unprejudiced man what could have pre¬ 
 vented them from bringing over any number of troops 
 and inflicting on us a most severe chastisement ? There 
 would have been no breach of faith nor dishonour in this; 
 France had a cause of war, the people were all anxious 
 for it; Louis-Philippe had not nerve for such a dash, and 
 England was saved from dishonour and disgrace. 
 
 u This was not the only event France was prepared for. 
 She had assembled from foreign stations from 25 to 30 
 men-of-war (some of which were double-banked frigates) 
 in the West Indies before we had the least idea she had 
 one there, and the order was only necessary to secure the 
 whole of our West India islands. Fortunately we escaped, 
 and France lost the finest opportunity she ever had of 
 taking a full revenge on England for all the disasters she 
 met with last war. 
 
 “ One would have supposed such an escape would have 
 been a lesson—not a bit of it. Sir Robert Peel gradually 
 paid off the fleet, and when the Tahiti affair took place we 
 had only one line-of-battle ship in the Mediterranean, and, 
 by accident, the flag-ship at Spithead going to the Pacific. 
 We got out of that scrape, and I believe the indemnity to 
 Mr. Pritchard is not paid to this day. Again, when 
 France and Russia joined in the affair of Greece, and the 
 French Ambassador left this country, and the Russian 
 was ready to leave it, we had not one full-manned ship in 
 England. 
 
 “ Napoleon said Cherbourg was an eye to see and an 
 arm to strike. We had better take care, or some day it 
 will strike with a vengeance. We have Russia on our left 
 flank with a large fleet in the Baltic, and France with a 
 harbour capable of holding a large fleet in our front, 
 
408 
 
 APPENDIX.—VII. 
 
 waiting only a railroad from Paris to make it complete. 
 Should these two powers at any time fall out with us, I do 
 not think they will pay much attention to Cobden’s Peace 
 Congress. One wants to go to Constantinople, the other 
 wants to go to the Rhine, and we want to prevent both; 
 and when the pear is riper, Cobden’s preaching at Frank¬ 
 fort will not prevent them. 
 
 “ I remain, Sir, your obedient servant, 
 
 “ Charles Napier. 
 
 “ Merchistoun, Oct. 1.” 
 
 VII. 
 
 The following authentic account of the mode in 
 which the Landwehr or militia forces of the Con¬ 
 tinent are constituted, may be deemed worthy of 
 perusal :— 
 
 “ The landwehr of Austria is organized on a different 
 system from that of Prussia. It is, in fact, the reserve 
 of the regular army, and is composed of such a force as, 
 if necessary, may enable the government to augment the 
 regiments of infantry to five battalions, instead of three, 
 of which they are composed in time of peace. 
 
 “•In Austria every province has certain military regu¬ 
 lations peculiar to itself, and which have hitherto been 
 respected by the government. Thus, Hungary furnishes 
 no landwehr. Its contingent, composed of 15 regiments 
 of infantry, 13 regiments of frontier troops, and 12 regi¬ 
 ments of hussars, forms, with the Transylvanians included, 
 an effective of 115,280 men in time of war, and this force, 
 
APPENDIX. — VII. 
 
 409 
 
 on emergency, might be carried up to 145,144 men, as 
 was the case in 1809. 
 
 44 But if Austria should have to sustain a national war in 
 Hungary, and the enemy should invade the imperial terri¬ 
 tory, there would be a 4 levee en masse’ of the nobility, 
 which levee is denominated an 4 insurrection.’ This in¬ 
 surrection, in 1809, having furnished 38,444 men, added 
 to the regular army of Hungary, viz. 145,144, brought 
 the contingent of Hungary in that year up to 183,588 
 men. But this levee en masse is never resorted to 
 unless the integrity of the empire be assailed by an 
 enemy. 
 
 44 Tyrol is nearly in the same condition, furnishing in time 
 of peace a regiment of chasseurs of 4 battalions, or an 
 effective of 5240 men ; and 12 battalions of chasseurs, 
 each of an effective of 1310 men : but should the Tyrol 
 become the theatre of war. the insurrection would double 
 this contingent. 
 
 44 The Croats, Sclavonians, Carynthians, Transylvanians, 
 Dalmatians, and Illyrians, form 17 regiments of frontier 
 troops, who have the same staff as the regiments of the 
 line, the force of the battalions being in proportion to the 
 population of the districts in which they are raised. They 
 are in fact military colonies, which have in themselves all 
 the elements of a levee en masse, and at the same time, 
 certainly in the Tyrol, so far more formidable than the 
 other provinces, inasmuch as that every male inhabitant 
 of the country is habituated from childhood to the use 
 of the rifle, and admirably adapted for military ser¬ 
 vice. A portion of these frontier troops, during the late 
 insurrection in Hungary, rendered important services 
 to the Austrian government, when under the Ban 
 Jellacich. 
 
 T 
 
410 
 
 APPENDIX.—VII. 
 
 Thus, therefore, the landwehr of Austria, or the reserve 
 of the regular army, appertains solely to the German pro¬ 
 vinces ; viz. to those regiments which are raised in the 
 duchies of Austria—Moravia, Galicia, and Bohemia. It is 
 composed of men who have already served as soldiers, the 
 first battalion being formed from the youngest and most 
 vigorous, and the second from the more aged ; which last 
 are generally employed as garrisons for the fortresses. 
 Every soldier on retiring, after having served his regular 
 time, deposits his arms and accoutrements, which are num¬ 
 bered, at the depot of his regiment, receives a ticket, on 
 which is inscribed his number, and must hold himself at 
 all times ready to rally to the standard of his regiment 
 when required, the 4 cadre * of each regiment of landwehr 
 being kept up in time of peace. 
 
 “ In the Austrian provinces of Italy there is no landwehr. 
 Their contingent regiments in time of war are composed 
 each of 4198 men, including two reserve companies.” 
 
 THE END. 
 
 PRINTED BY W. CLOWES AND SONS, STAMFORD STREET. 
 
Albemarle Street, 
 
 October, 1850. 
 
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 ANNOUNCEMENTS OF NEW BOOKS. 
 
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 BY SIR FRANCIS B. HEAD, BART. 
 
 One Volume. Post 8vo. Uniform -with “ The Emigrant.” 
 
 A TREATISE ON NAVAL GUNNERY, 
 
 WITH DETAILED DESCRIPTIONS AND EXPLANATIONS OF THE NEW GUNS INTRODUCED INTO 
 THE NAVAL SERVICE SINCE THE TERMINATION OF THE LATE WAR IN 1813. 
 
 BY LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HOWARD DOUGLAS, BART., G.C.B., &c. 
 
 Third Edition. 8vo. 
 
 This work was translated into Russian in 1830 by order of the Emperor. There exist, also, French, Butch 
 and Swedish Translations, and it is used as a text-book in the United States. 
 
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 value, has been translated, and is now used as a class-book at the schools for the instruction 
 of naval gunners, established in some of the chief naval arsenals in that country agreeably 
 to its suggestions .”—Admiral Bowles on the Naval Administration of Great Britain. 
 
 “ An admirable work by Sir Howard Douglas on the necessity of establishing a system 
 of instruction in naval gunnery to be gradually extended over the whole of our maritime 
 force .”—The Times. 
 
 “ L’ouvrage du Col. Douglas nous parait fort remarquable. Le livre soumis en 1817 
 a l’examen des Ministeres de l’Ordonnance et del’Ameraute—a re^u l’accueil qu’il merite 
 sous plusieurs points de vue.”— Ch. Dupin. 
 
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 Charpentier. 
 
 CONSIDERATION'S ON 
 
 STEAM WARFARE AND NAVAL SHELL-FIRING; 
 
 WITH THE PRESENT STATE OF THE NAVAL FORCE OF ALL MARITIME NATIONS 
 
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2 
 
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 Taxation—Revenue—Expenditure. 
 
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 and Moral :—Its Political Danger. 
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 Two Yols. post 8vo. 
 
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 A MANUAL OF ELEMENTARY GEOLOGY; 
 
 OR, THE ANCIENT CHANGES OF THE EARTH AND ITS INHABITANTS. 
 
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 MILITARY EVENTS IN ITALY, 1848-9. 
 
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 5 
 
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6 
 
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10 
 
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 LIVES OF 
 
 THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF ENGLAND. 
 
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 Portrait. 8vo. 15s. 
 
 CITIES AND CEMETERIES OF ETRURIA. 
 
 BEING AN ACCOUNT OF VARIOUS VISITS TO EXPLORE THE REMAINS OF 
 
 ETRUSCAN ART IN ITALY. 
 
 BY GEORGE DENNIS, ESQ. 
 
 With Map, Plates, and Woodcuts. 2 Vols. 8vo. 425. 
 
 -<►- 
 
 AGRICULTURAL DRAINAGE. 
 
 BEING THE PRACTICAL PART OF AN ESSAY IN THE QUARTERLY REVIEW, No. CLXXI. 
 
 12mo. 
 
 THE MONASTERIES OF THE LEVANT. 
 
 BY HON. ROBERT CURZON JUN. 
 
 Third Edition. With Numerous Woodcuts. Post 8vo. 155. 
 
12 
 
 MR. MURRAY’S RECENT PUBLICATIONS. 
 
 HISTORY OF 
 
 MODERN POTTERY AND PORCELAIN. 
 
 EUROPEAN AND ORIENTAL. 
 
 WITH AN ACCOUNT OF ITS MANUFACTURE FROM THE EARLIEST PERIODS. 
 
 BY JOSEPH MARRYAT, ESQ. 
 
 With Coloured Plates and 100 Woodcuts. 8vo. 31s. 6d. 
 
 -♦- 
 
 “ Mr. Marryat is a collector of china; and when he first began to ride his hobby he 
 found the greatest difficulty in acquiring information how to get on. The existing 
 publications were either archaeological or technical—‘ either learned disquisitions upon the 
 mythology of the Greek classical paintings, or, on the other hand, mere technical details 
 of the manufacture.’ The knowledge which Mr. Marryat wanted, a knowledge of the 
 different kind of pottery and porcelain—such knowledge as the late Dr. Dibdin taught 
 of bibliography—‘ appeared limited to the dealers.’ When fairly embarked in the 
 attractive business of collecting, he made an European tour, and visited the principal 
 collections and manufactories of the Continent. He attended sales, read treatises, gathered 
 information from practical men, and turned incidental passages in miscellaneous reading 
 to account. Thus prepared, he began to compose for his amusement a manuscript work 
 upon Pottery and Porcelain; which was to be illuminated and illustrated by his friend 
 Sir Charles Price. The materials collected by Mr. Marryat were rightly deemed by his 
 friends to possess sufficient interest for publication. Mr. Murray, partaking of their opinion, 
 has embellished the work with a profusion of appropriate wood-cuts, and many coloured 
 plates of the choicest specimens of the potter’s art. 
 
 “ Mr. Marryat has done good service in presenting his knowledge to the world, and 
 in so complete a manner as regards accessories. A glossary of terms follows his historical 
 and critical sketches, illustrated like his text by wood-cuts, and containing information 
 much beyond a mere explanation of terms. This Glossary is followed by the ‘ Marks 
 and Monograms,’ distinguishing the different manufactories; by chronological tables of the 
 history of the art, after Brongniart; and a list of the private collections in Great Britain, 
 besides a variety of tables of reference. In the ‘ getting up,’ Mr. Murray has sustained 
 his reputation for taste: the volume will worthily occupy a place on the drawing-room 
 table, or among the articles of vertu it illustrates.”— Spectator. 
 
 “ The curious and interesting gossip with which Mr. Marryat’s elegant volume is replete 
 will doubtless render it an acceptable companion in every drawing-room. It would have 
 gone directly to the heart of the master of Strawberry Hill. But its interest is of a far 
 more general and more appreciable kind than to limit its attractions to mere collectors of 
 crockery. We have here really the first popular contribution towards the historical 
 development of a most ancient and instructive branch of decorative art, which will be 
 found to shed a strong explanative light on the innermost mysteries of domestic and social 
 life, from birth to death, in the most remote antiquity, and down to the present time ; and 
 in connection with the author’s own researches, which are limited to later ages, we are told 
 that early epochs are already under treatment in a similar style. 
 
 “Heretofore the majority of publications on this curious subject have been either 
 learned disquisitions on the mythology of the Greek classical paintings; or, on the 
 other hand, mere technical details of the manufacture of pottery and porcelain, while a 
 knowledge of the different kinds appears to have been limited to the dealers. The 
 work is full of curious or tasteful specimens of articles in pottery and porcelain, both 
 in shape of wood-cuts and of other engravings on a larger scale, illuminated with metallic 
 and other colours, and the whole beautifully printed throughout, and altogether a credit 
 to Mr. Murray as a publisher.”— The Builder. 
 
MR, MURRAY'S RECENT PUBLICATIONS. 
 
 13 
 
 GOTHIC ARCHITECTURE IN FRANCE. 
 
 BEING AN ENQUIRY INTO THE CHRONOLOGICAL SUCCESSION OF THE ROMANESQUE 
 
 AND POINTED STYLES; 
 
 WITH NOTICES OF THE PRINCIPAL BUILDINGS ON WHICH IT IS FOUNDED. 
 
 BY THOMAS INKERSLEY, ESQ. 
 
 With an Index. 8vo. 12s. 
 
 NINEYEII AND ITS REMAINS: 
 
 WITH AN ENQUIRY INTO THE MANNERS AND ARTS OF THE ANCIENT ASSYRIANS. 
 
 BY AUSTEN H. LAYARD, D.C.L. 
 
 Fourth Edition. With Numerous Plates. 2 Vols. 8vo. 36s. 
 
 TRAVELS IN EGYPT AND THE HOLY LAND. 
 
 BY REV. J. E. SPENCER. 
 
 Plates. 8vo. 21s. 
 
 HANDBOOK OF LONDON, PAST AND 
 
 PRESENT. 
 
 BY PETER CUNNINGHAM, F.S.A. 
 
 Second Edition. Tost 8vo. 16s. 
 
 ♦ 
 
 HANDBOOK FOR CENTRAL ITALY. 
 
 INCLUDING ROME, THE PAPAL STATES, AND CITIES OF ETRURIA. 
 New Edition revised. Maps. Post 8vo. 16s. 
 
 HANDBOOK FOR DEVON AND CORNWALL. 
 
 With Maps, Post 8vo. 6s. 
 
14 
 
 MR. MURRAY’S RECENT PUBLICATIONS. 
 
 THE LION-HUNTER OF SOUTH AFRICA, 
 
 OR, FIVE YEARS’ ADVENTURES IN THE FAR INTERIOR. 
 
 BY R. GORDON GUMMING, ESQ. 
 
 Second Edition. Woodcuts. 2 Vols. Crown 8vo. 24s. 
 
 “ Mr. Cumming had exhausted the Deer Forests of his native Scotland ; he had sighed 
 for the rolling prairies and rocky mountains of the Far West, and was tied down to military 
 routine as a Mounted Rifleman in the Cape Colony, when he determined to resign his 
 commission into the hands of Government, and himself to the delights of hunting amidst 
 the untrodden plains and forests of Southern Africa. Having provided himself with 
 waggons to travel and live in, with bullocks to draw them, and with a host of attendants; 
 a suiflciency of arms, horses, dogs, and ammunition; he set out from Graham’s Town. 
 The annals of the chase, so far as we are acquainted with them, supply no instances of 
 familiar intimacy with Lions, Elephants, Hippopotami, Rhinoceroses, Serpents, Crocodiles, 
 and other furious animals.”— Dickens' “Household Words.” 
 
 “ Sport and the free life of the hunter, not geographical description or discovery, were 
 the objects of Mr. Cumming; and he enjoyed them to the fullest extent. He has knocked 
 over half-a-dozen elephants or more at a time, chased and slaughtered cameleopards in 
 like manner, killed and carried off hippopotamuses as men do deer at home; and grew so 
 bold that two or three lions were less to him than an over-driven ox to a London Alderman. 
 He met the king of beasts in open plain, rode with them, at them, across them, and round 
 them in the execution of his tactics; knocked them over right and left. 
 
 “ The most valuable parts of Mr. Cumming’s hook are those which describe the habits 
 and appearances of the animals; as he saw them under more favourable circumstances 
 than perhaps any other observer with equal powers of observation.”— Spectator. 
 
 “ He seems a man born for adventure, and the spirit that prompts him to his perilous 
 enterprise seems fertile of expedients of combating the danger to which it exposes him. 
 From his very childhood he seemed fired with a desire to penetrate the Bush, the 
 Jungle, the Morass, and the Wilderness. The result of his roamings is set forth in the 
 work he has just issued, and verily it is a wonderful tale. The man’s courage often borders 
 on madness.”— Christian’s Penny Magazine. 
 
 “ One of the last testimonies given (to the labours of the missionary), and not the least 
 remarkable, is that from the ‘mighty Irunter,’ Mr. Gordon Cumming, of Altyre, whose 
 work, ‘ A Hunter’s Life in South Africa,’ is just published. That wondrous adventurer 
 —amidst his wilderness roamings found his way to Ruruman, when he stumbled upon 
 the missionary settlement of the Rev. Robert Moffatt. We confess to no inconsiderable 
 pride and pleasure in having such a testimony from such a man—a man of whom we 
 can scarcely give any adequate picture. To know his character the public must read his 
 book. We have read nothing in the history of romantic adventure so extraordinary. 
 That he was not devoured a hundred times can only be accounted for by the super¬ 
 intendence of a special Providence. He slaughtered lions, rhinoceroses, and elephants 
 like sheep, and many a time was he himself in the very jaws of destruction.”— Christian 
 Witness. 
 
MR. MURRAY’S RECENT PUBLICATIONS. 
 
 15 
 
 A LETTER TO THE 
 
 CHURCHWARDENS OF BRAMFORD SPEKE. 
 
 FROM THE BISHOP OF EXETER. 
 
 Second Edition. 8vo. Is. 
 
 -<s- 
 
 A LETTER 
 
 TO THE BISHOP OF CHICHESTER, 
 
 ON THE APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF THE CROWN IN MATTERS SPIRITUAL. 
 
 BY ARCHDEACON MANNING. 
 
 8vo. Is. 
 
 THE AFFAIRS OF GREECE, 
 
 AND THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE ADMINISTRATION. 
 
 BY THE RIGHT HON. W. E. GLADSTONE, M.P. 
 
 8vo. Is. 6 d. 
 
 ANTHOLOGIA POLYGLOTTA; 
 
 A SELECTION OF VERSIONS IN VARIOUS LANGUAGES, CHIEFLY FROM THE GREEK. 
 
 BY REV. HENRY WELLESLEY, D.D. 
 
 8vo. 15s. 
 
 - * - 
 
 I 
 
 PRINCIPLES OF GEOLOGY, 
 
 OR, THE MODERN CHANGES OF THE EARTH AND ITS INHABITANTS. 
 
 BY SIR CHARLES LYELL, F.R.S., P.G.S. 
 
 Eighth Edition , carefully revised to the present time. Woodcuts. 8vo. 18s. 
 Uniform with the one volume of “ LyelVs Manual of Elementary Geology 
 
 I 
 
16 
 
 MR. MURRAY’S RECENT PUBLICATIONS. 
 
 MEMOIRS OF ROBERT PLUMER WARD. 
 
 WITH HIS POLITICAL AND LITERARY CORRESPONDENCE, DIARIES, AND REMAINS. 
 
 BY THE HON. EDMUND PHIPPS. 
 
 With Portrait. 2 Yols. 8vo. 28s. 
 
 “ The public were but little prepared for the amount of anecdote and character 
 preserved in the careful jottings of Lord Malmesbury’s Diary. Still less would they have 
 expected that a man, remembered mainly by the reputation of two well-written novels, 
 would have left behind him materials which, for certain portions of the history of the times 
 to which we have referred, contain many facts and opinions which must make the present 
 a standard work on the shelves of the student of English history.”— Atlas. 
 
 “ The volumes before us consist chiefly of extracts from a diary, letters, and unpublished 
 literary remains. But Mr. Phipps has connected them with so clever a thread of narrative 
 and comment, that his comparatively humble share in the work receives importance from 
 the skill and good taste of its execution. By far the most valuable portions of Mr. Ward’s 
 diary are its illustrations of the character of the Duke of Wellington. The great soldier, 
 then in the flush of his military triumph, was also in the prime of his power and activity ; 
 and Mr. Ward gives us an insight into his business habits, his method of arguing public 
 questions, his ready resource and never-tiring energy, which possesses occasionally a 
 striking interest. ’ ’— Examiner. 
 
 -♦- 
 
 A PHYSICIAN'S HOLIDAY; 
 
 OR, A MONTH IN SWITZERLAND DURING THE AUTUMN OF 1848. 
 
 BY JOHN FORBES, M.D. 
 
 Second Edition. With Illustrations. Post 8vo. 8s. Gd. 
 
 “ Abounds with hints and precepts, both to those who would preserve and to those who 
 would recover health; to the sturdy pedestrian who with baggage on back will cover his 
 twenty miles a-day of mountain and valley, and feel the lighter for the labour; and to the 
 more delicate wanderer who has his mule and char-ci-banc at hand, reserving his feet for 
 an occasional stretch down hill or along the level turf. 
 
 “Unable to follow Dr. Forbes through the very extensive journey he managed to 
 pack into a space of six weeks, we content ourselves with indicating the valuable kind 
 of knowledge communicated. Its importance, indeed, both to the giant of health and to 
 the valetudinarian, cannot easily be over-estimated. In the dedication to his instructive 
 and interesting volume, Dr. Forbes apologises for addressing himself to a subject upon 
 which so much has already been written. The remark was unnecessary, inasmuch as few 
 subjects present themselves to an author, however often they may have been discussed and 
 exhibited, to which new interest may not be given by the happy combination of a cultivated 
 and reflecting mind, a kindly disposition, and a style at once scholarly and unaffected. 
 These qualifications our physician evidently possesses; and if on commencing the narra¬ 
 tive of his holiday tour we were not over-sanguine of novelty or amusement, it Avas our 
 gratification to suffer disappointment long before we arrived at its close. At the outset 
 Dr. Forbes confesses himself a sexagenarian, but though mature in intellect and age he 
 writes like one young in heart and spirit. His shrewd and lively observations on every¬ 
 thing he meets convince us that he is a model travelling companion, and make us envy 
 the two young men he associated with him on his tour.”— The Times. 
 
 BRADBURY AMD EVANS, PRINTERS, WIUTKFRIAR3. 
 

RARE BOOK 
 COLLECTION 
 
 THE LIBRARY OF THE 
 UNIVERSITY OF 
 NORTH CAROLINA 
 AT 
 
 CHAPEL HILL 
 
 Murray 
 
 1664