. CONGRESSION RESEARCH AL SERVICE RRRRRRR OF CCCCCC SS “\“‘\'\‘*i\1&i\£‘\‘éE\!“£\Vi.\E\Ti\“1V“£“i\1T\L‘ifi““£“i‘“‘\\‘ MILITARY NANPONER FOR MOBILIZATION: THE DRAFT, REGISTRATION, AND SELECTIVE SERVICE Issun BRIEN NUMBER IB79Ou9 AKUTHOR: Zinsmeister, Paul Foreign Affai1':s"and National Defense Division THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE MAJOR ISSUES SYSTEH DATE ORIGINATED Qgggggzg DATE UPDATED 9_§4_1_t_;g§_9_ FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION cALL_28fi37OOii ’O515 cns— 1 IB79ou9 UPDATE-05/1%/80 l§§Q§-2§El!l2lQE The mounting concern over the adequacy of 0.5. military manpower, kindled by proposals to resume standby draft registration, has captured «nationwide attention. Last year, after considerable debate, the House and ‘the Senate rejected internally initiated legislative proposals that would have required draft-age American males to register with the Selective Service Ssytem. New fuel was added to the debatewhen, in his Jan. 23 state of the Union message, President Carter reversed his ‘stance and proposed to begin, registering men and women ages 19 and 20 this year. i A Two major issues are enmeshed in the manpower debate: (1) the present and future health of the active forces under the all-volunteer policy, and (2) 13.5. capability to rapidly mobilize military manpower in an emergency. While these two issue are related, this issue brief concentrates on the latter or "mobilization" issue; it will focus? on issues concerning Army Reserve forces, standby draft registration, and the Selective Service System. 1 A §&SE§§QEfl2lAE2lBQLl§l-AEALX§.§’ At the beginning of the 1970s-, the 0.5. adopted two policies that have had enormous influence on structuring the armed forces —- all-volunteer armed Q’ rces and total force planning. _The linchpin of these two policies was a Cu-3CiSi0n to reduce the size of active?-U.S. military forces by relying more on the assets of our allies. with“‘r5espect to U.S. force structuring, the National Guard and Reserve were to take on new and more active nationa.l security roles. _ Addressing these two -policies in his Mar. 15, 1971, statement on the FY72 defense budget, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird indicated that a mutually supportive alliance between the active and reserve forces was a key factor in achieving all-volunteer armed forces. In that statement, Secretary Laird emphasized the new relationship: ‘ The National Guard and Reserve will take on increasing responsibilities and will be used initially to augment active forces should the need arise, reversing the past policy of relying primarily on the draft. Activation of standby draft authority will follow Guard and Reserve call-ups, if necessary. As active forces have been much of the combat capability of the 0.5. armed forces has been vested in the reserve forces. .A.?.L.1.:.V.2l11..1.1.1:.e.§-A:=.-.e2s1....Porse.§.-.(A1r;).;...i\..§.129..l-;2z..i.n.§9.;1.fl1;s=.t while this issue brief concentratesgony the "mobilization debate," it is necessary tomention the Avrdebate, particularly in the context of the active forces, to distinguish it from the mobilization debate. 'rhe two sues, of course, are related in the sense that the three_ echelons of military manpower '-- active forces, reserve forces, and inductees -- are an integrated part of U.S. total force planning. Furthermore, there A is a substantial body of opinion that; believes peace_g3;i§me.A-7 conscription would resolve (other ‘problems n‘otwithstandi~ng) the .pro_b,1ém' currently besetting the armed forces of obtaining sufficient numbers /ofrlqualified males, as well as I providing the best hedge for rapidly expanding ’t'I.s. military forces and CRS- 2 IB7901l9 UPDATE-0 5/1'4/80 fighting a protracted land war. The AVF debate has been shrouded in controversy since its inception. Concern over the viability of the volunteer concept has heightened recently when, for the first time in the 7-year history of the volunteer policy, none of the armed services achieved its FY79 recruiting objective.( The Army fell almost 13% short of itsvFY79 male non-prior service (NPS) 'objective, its poorest showing since entering the volunteer era. [The Army recruited about 112,100 RPS males in FY79, which was about 16,000 below its objective. In FY78, the Army reported that it achieved 97.u% (about 106,500) of its NPS male objective. Its FY80 NPS male objective is about 1uo,ooo.] While (DOD officials report that the loss rate for first-term enlistees is declining and first—term reenlistments have progressed at a satisfactory pace, they also report a serious downward trend in reenlistment rates for career personnel. This problem is particularly acute in the Navy, which, according to to the Chief of Naval Operations, is short about 20,000 petty officers in grades E-5 (second class petty officer) through E-9 (master chief petty officer). Potentially the most.devasting blow to the AVF policy is the recent revelation by Defense officials that since 1976 the armed forces have been taking in 25%‘50% more non—prior service recruits in the lowest acceptable mental category (category IV) ‘than previously thought. These tentative estimates are based on the discovery that the standard test to measure the intelligence of recruits, which has been used by the armed forces since 1976, overstates the results for persons in the lower intelligence levels. The Army reported that 9% of its NPS accessions in FY79 were classified category IV, the highest proportion of (all the services. These new tentativ, estimates would raise the category IV NPS accession content to 12-1u%. There is considerable sentiment in favor of scrapping the AVF policy. Proponents of this step rate the fiyolunteer lexperiment" anywhere from disastrous to nly marginally successful. Despite a major investment in resources, they argue, the overall quantity and quality of volunteers has not been adequate to sustain the manpower needs of the active and reserve forces. The AV? critics are particularly concerned that the combat effectiveness of 0.5. military forces is being jeopardized by shortfalls in quality male volunteers. Senator John Stennis, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has stated that the AVF policy has "caused our military manpower to be the weakest link... in our national defense.“ The critics predict this situation will progressively worsen as the number of 18-year-old males -— the prime source of volunteers - starts tocdip in the 19803 because or lowered U.S. birthrates beginning in the 1960s., a Most critics of the current AVF policy see a return to peacetime conscription as inevitable for the wellébeing of the nation's security. They believe it is time to examine the best means for conducting a fair and equitable draft system. The AV? debate has stirred some interest in creating a system of national service for America's youth. Proponents of national service see it as a means of acquiring adequate military manpower while at the same time attacking pressing national social, economic, and environmental problems. 1 While supporters of the AVF policy may be somewhat muted in their praise, it is their opinion that, overall, volunteer armed f9rces*have worked better than many of its critics would have athought. _TEey also point out tthat returning to the draft is not a cure for a1l_the manpower problems besetting the armed forces, particularly retention of qualified career personnel. Many 035- 3 IB79ou9 UPDA'l'E—O5/14/80" who take this side of the.debate see peacetime conscription: or _compulsory xtional service as unconstitutional and resembling practices of totalitarian nations. some who are against conscription point out that without draft authority the executive branch is effectively thwarted from *unilateral military interventions. Advocates of the AVF policy qbelieve that, with proper ‘management and adequate resources, the armed forces will be able to sustain their manpower requirements with quality volunteers into the foreseeable future. In particular, AVF proponents believe that.mi1itary pay levels must be increased substantially and then maintained in step with the national economy. In a recent American Enterprise Institute monograph entitled "People, Not Hardware, the Highest Defense Priority," Former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird took up the standard for those who would want to preserve the AVF policy. In that paper, Mr. Laird said: "Today, we have reneged on this commitment (to maintain competitive levels of pay with civilian workers of comparable age and education) and are failing to provide this decent and competitive standard of living for personnel in the armed forces, especially at the lower enlisted levels from E¥1 to E-5." Among other things, Mr. Laird urges an immediate 17% across-the+board pay .raise for military personnel, decoupling military pay raises from General.Schedule civilian employee pay raises and indexing military pay to the Consumer Price Index. This issue of adequate compensation for military personnel could become the proxy for a decision on the future viability of the AVF policy. The quantitative and qualitative adequacy of U.S. military manpower is coming under increasing attack. - Nonetheless, reinstituting the draft entails a drastic shift in U.S. national policy. Public sentiment appears to be shifting in favor of resuming conscription -— probably reflecting a "get tough" mood toward the U-S.S.R. as a result of its take-over of Afghanistan. Yet, there is a marked difference in attitude along age lines. A March 1979 Gallup poll found public sentiment narrowly in favor of continuing volunteer forces (51-49%), but with 18-2Q year olds strongly opposed to the draft (7u-26%). A national telephone poll conducted by the Washington Post in January 1980 found those polled favoring the draft by a wide margin, 67-27%; Here again, however, the Post poll showed a sharp division by age group: 18-26 year olds favored the draft by a narrow 49-45% margin, while those over age 26 supported the draft by 72-21%. Another survey of 1,600 Americans conducted in January 1980 by NBC News/AP showed 78% favored draft registration, with 17% opposed; 62% supported starting up the draft, while 29% were against such a move. However, among those that would be most affected by a draft -- 18-24 year olds —- there was a sharp difference in attitude from the~general consensus: 55% of the males and 6fl% of the women opposed a draft. ‘ In yet anothr public opinion poll. (ABC News-Harris Survey) of 1,198 voters nationwide taken in March 1980, the results showed the same trend: a 64-3fl% majority favored returning to the draft, but 18- to 29-year-olds opposed such a move 55—#2%. The polls‘ and’ recent demonstrations would indicate that antirdraft sentiment remains strong among America's youth. Whether concern over Soviet threats to the oil life-line of the U.S. will temperpthat sentiment remains to be seen. Certainly recent events in the niddle”East and Southwest Asia have not caused a flood of volunteers for service in the armed forces. CRS— Q IB790fl9 UPDATE-O5/1Q/80 In any event, the Carter Administration is not ready to abandon ’the FAVF policy. An Administration report (Presidential Recommendations for Selective Service Reform, Feb. 11, 1980) prepared for Congress pursuant to P.L. 96-10 (FY80 DOD Appropriation Authorization Act), concluded thatj all-volunteer armed forces had “served the nation well" and "there is every reason to believe [they could] continue to do so in the future" provided Congress approves "enhancements to military pay and benefits" proposed by the Administration. In this same vein, the report also stated there is "no need for a national civilian service program at this time." [For further information on the AVF issue, see IB77032, Military Manpower Policy and the All—Volunteer Force.) The mobilization debate has focused primarily on the 0.5. commitment to its NATO allies to the defense of Western Europe. This pact has been the underpinning of U.S. national security planning for nearly three decades. While the basic Acommitment (has ‘remained unchanged over the years, its complexion has undergone considerable evolution. Over the past 20-odd years, the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies have constructed a massive and modern conventional war-fighting machine that 0.5. planners believe can be lauched into action with little advanced warning to NATO defenders. To counter this perceived threat, the U.S. is committed to early and massive reinforcement of NATO forces. I Apart from concerns over 0.5. ability to transport large numbers of troop to Europe, there is much discontent over the capacity of the U.S. to quickly muster military manpower to fight a major non-nuclear conflict in Europe. DOD officials characterize this most demanding of DOD's manpower requirements as an intensive conventional war with extremely high casualties during the initial stage, possibly followed by a prolonged war of attrition. The NATO capability to fight such a war is seen as a hedge against resorting to the use of nuclear weapons. In fact, a‘ major tenet in structuring U.S. conventional forces is to have the capability to fight a non-nuclear war for as long as the adversary. A The Army's role in this scenario predominates. For example, between 500,000 and 750,000 Army personnel alone are scheduled for deployment to Europe by m+9o (i.e., 90 days from mobilization day). Army contingency plans rely heavily on early augmentation ,of the active forces with trained, combat-ready units and individuals from its Ready Reserve structure (Army National Guard, Army Reserve, and Individual Ready Reserve). Following "the initial build—up, largeenumbers of inductees are to be injected into the ‘battle beginning around M+120. In the interim, the Individual Ready Reserve must serve as the prime pool for casualty replacements. The FY81 defense budget and establishment of the Rapid Deployment Force iemphasize 0.5. preparedness to simultaneously fight a major conventional war in Europe and a minor non-nuclear conflict elsewhere in the world, -- e.g., the Persian Gulf area. many observers in and outside the Pentagon believe that manpower problems severely, if not totally, jeopardize the Army ability to perform its one—and-a—half war mission in a conventional scenario. As evidence to support their conviction, they pointztovmth-e small size of the lactive Army (currently about 766,000), the underrstrength Army Ready Reserve, and the nearly defunct Selection Service System. ; CRS- 5 1B79ou9 uennmr-05/1n/so This Issue Brief accepts the congressionally authorized strengthd of the (”Htive Army (776,000 for FY81) as that considered prudently Fadeguate within ‘..ne context of totalaforce planning andbudget constraints. The extent to which recruiting and retention problems might affect decisions on *authorized strength levels for the active Army has not been discussed ‘in the public debate although some observers suspect this to be the case. Neither has sthe public debate over current manpower problems in the active 'Arny~ thus far evidenced a need for a larger active Army - e.g., an Army large‘ enoughy to require draftees to sustain it. Indeed in his FY81 posture statement, Secretary of Defense Brown stated that the 0.5. "appear[s] to have enough divisions and tactical air wings to meet current. demands, even if those denands should comprisessinultaneous contigencies in Central Europe and the Persian Gulf." ' i ‘ Nonetheless, Army contingency planning places considerable reliance on mobilization assets ——-the reserve components and draftees. The following pages'high1ight‘ issues relating to these two elements of total force planning. ‘ ABBY RESERVE MANPOWER The Army's reserve structure, like that of each of the armed forces, has three major elements: The Ready Reserve consisting of its two Selected Reserve components -- the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the Army Reserve (USAR) -- plus the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR); the standby Reserve; and (“He Retired Reserve. , A-Preh1em:l in T$a.1...§9 es El§.T..1.I1.L-11.3 The Armz_Ree21.2-Re§e__rve: §g;ggtgd_§g§g;gg_§agn;ng. With a substantial part of its war-fighting capability dedicated to the Selected Reserve, the ARNG and USAR are an integral) part of the Army's force-in-being. For example, these two components contain eight of the Army's 2a combat divisions, four roundout brigades (to fill short—structured active divisions), and 80% of the Army's logistical support. ‘ ARMY SELECTED RESERVE MANNING (thousands) M...“g Actual) Wartime R Peacetime ‘Object ive strength Percent Manned** Rs9.tz.i..re;-;enr§.-..£.1..«‘:.t..r.1..-....1';¥..8..<.>.£._,....F.I§.1£..(12z§.1a2)...:ar..2ea2e._.. ' ‘ .0 usan .2.2;*.9._-----z§>.2..-.s¢..-_;.<2.<2.-.s2-_....2.1_1.9__.._122.2.. 1: 20 76 Total 711.3 Ri‘670.R $59.0) ‘$92.0 l5uo.u 75 31 G * FY81 President's budget.) R R ** Actual strength vs. wartime and peacetine.plan.; CRS- 6 IB79OQ9 UPDATE-O5/1H/80 The combined strength of the ARNG and USAR, as of Dec. 31, 1979, “was 20% below their total wartime requirements (assuming full mobilization) and, more importantly, 19% below the peacetime manning level desired by the Army. 1 appears that the past pattern of declining strength has been “stemmed. Both components registered slight gains between FY78 and FY79 —- ARNG, +fl,500; USAR, +u,2oo. The upward strength trend continued into the first quarter of FY80: ARNG strength increased (3,760‘ and USAF strength went -up 1,200. However, overcoming the‘ present peacetime manning shortfall ‘presents a formidable recruiting and retention problem. Perhaps the most difficult of the two is retention: gain/loss statistics for FY79 indicated that the two components lost 135,000 enlisted members while gaining 139,000. DOD has instituted several initiatives to improve manning in the ARNG and USAR. During FY80 the two‘ components will employ about 3,800 full-time recruiters and spend about $126 million on recruiting and retention. In addition to enlistment and reenlistment financial incentives, both components will offer a range of training and enlistment options. Furthermore, during congressional consideration of the FY80 defense budget, DOD officials testified that close management attention would be given to the attrition problem. ‘ Nonetheless, DOD's projected FY80 and FY81 manning objectives indicate progress will be slow. The programmed 33,000 strength increase.for the two components in FY81 over FY80 poses a sizeable recruiting and retention challenge. A ;nQizi§nal-Esa§1-Beserzsg The IRE is a pool consisting primarily 0‘ former active-duty service members completing the remaining portion of thei 6-year military service obligation (H50). Normally, such persons do not participate in training. (The M50 is required of anyone who joins the active or reserve forces. See 10 U.S.C. 651, as amended.) As of Dec. 31, 1979, there were approximately 215,000 personel (176,000 enlisted) in the Army IRR. Army IRR strength.has been climbing steadily since the end of FY77. Like the Selected Reserve components, this trend continued in the first quarter of FY80 with Dec. 31 Army IRR strength about 9,000 above end FY79. Army contingency plans look to the IRR for trained manpower to (1) fill manning shortfalls in active and reserve units upon mobilization, (2) help man "on-paper" units that would be activated shortly after mobilization, and (3) replace casualties in combat units. The IRR pool must be adequate to the Army's needs -- in total numbers and skills -- until volunteers and inductees begin flowing in large numbers from the training bases. Much of the 1979 manpower debate concentrated on the "alarming" ,state of manning in the Army IRE. At the end of FY72, Army IRR strength stood at slightly above one million; by the end of FY77 it had plummeted to 160,000. The low state to which the Army IRR had fallen led General Bernard Rogers, then Army Chief of Staff, to break ranks with the Carter Administration. During a Mar. 12, 1979, appearance before the senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, General Rogers advocated an annual draft of 75,000-100,000 men for the IRR. Indeed, Representative G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery introduced legislation (H.R. 1901) that would have .required tbs President to draft up to 200,000 men a year for the IRR. During last year's congressional consideration ofnDOD's FY80 budget, the Army and the Office of the Assistantv Secretary ‘Bf Defense for 1Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics [OASD (nRA8L)] sharply differed on the size of the strength shortfall in the IRE; Army representatives pegged the shortfall CRS- 7 IB790fl9 UPDATE-05/1fl/80 at 500,000, while OASD, (HBAEL) said it was more like 2200,000. The "‘esident's Feb. 11, 1980, report indicates that, at current? manning levels had under the "worst case" scenario, a "shortage of 200,000 to 300,000 trained personnel for the Army would likely develop in the first few months." The disparity between Army and OASD (MRABL) estimates ofp the shortfall involves differences in opinion over two highly judgmental factors« affecting determinations of how many personnel are needed in the IRR: (1) the requirement for manning "on-paper" units, and (2) the yield rate. Essentially, the first factor is time sensitive. Apparently Army plans call for "on-paper" units to be manned shortly after mobilization. Consequently, there must be sufficient numbers of trained personnel in the Army IRR at the time of mobilization to help meet this requirement. OASD (MRA8L) takes the position that these uits have no equipment on hand and equipping them would take time. Moreover, some of these units are not needed until late in the mobilization timetable. For these reasons, OASD (MRASL) believes that the manpower to fill these units is not needed as soon as Army plans currently require thereby reducing the number of personnel needed in the Army IBB. ’" 0'7 The second and probably the most critical factor in determining the size of the IRR involves an estimate 'of the yield rate. That is: How many individuals in this pool would respond to a call-up or be available for active military service? Hbw many would have the skills to match needs? Army has used a 70% factor. Thus, if the Army would need 700,000 IRR ' rsonnel to satisfy its initial-_and early-phase mobilization requirements gar trained manpower, the strength of the IRR should be 1,000,000. A June 28, 1979, GAO report ("Can The Individual Reserves Fill Mobilization Needs?") pointed out the problems with the Army's yield rate: -- (It was) derived fro previous dissimilar mobilizations. —- (It is) universally applied regardless of ... military occupation specialty. -- (It does) not include time phasing. OASD (nnnsr) has established new yieh1—rate goals for the Army IRR (and the IRR pools of the other services as well): 80% by FY81 and 90% by FY85. That officecontends that these higher rates can be achieved by improved management of the IRR. Details on this, effort should be revealed during consideration of the FY81 defense budget.) In the final analysis, such predictions as determinants in deciding the size of the IRR seem tenuous at best. The critical need in the IBB is enlisted.personnel, both in gross numbers and in certain occupational skills._ Several initiatives have been aimed at increasing the strength of the Army IRR. Chief among these is the retention ‘ r” persons in the IRR until.they complete their full 6+year military service obligation (MSG). (In the past, IRR personnel were automatically transfered to the standby Reserve to complete the last year of their~ M50.) In the legislative area, 10 U.S.C. 651 has been amended tozextend the 6-year H50 to women service members (P.L. 95-79). and to lift the ‘former upper age restriction (i.e., 26) for those to whm the «H50 applied (P.L. 96-107). Other initiatives include: screening members discharged prior to completion cms- 8 IB79ou9 UPDATE-05/10/80 of their enlistments and assigning those with a mobilization potential to the IRR for the remaining portion of their H505, reenlisting” IRR “personnel completing their M505, and direct enlistments into the IRR. These actions are expected to increase Army IRR strength to about 350,000 by the end of FY85. lfiowever, the best way to alleviate IRR shortfalls is to reduce the manpower deficits_in the ARNG and the USAR. As the‘ strength in these two components increases, the burden on the IRR decreases‘ and, most importantly, combat readiness is improved. The DOD expects the initiatives directed at increasing personnel strengths in the.ARHG, USAR, and the Army IRR to eliminate the manpower shortfall by the mid-1980s. In the meantime, DOD plans to rely on retired personnel from the active and reserve fforces and members of the Standby Reserve to supplement the IRR. (DOD also had planned on recalling veterans who had completed their uses, but dropped’ the idea when it ran into adverse congressional reaction.) a I I The Standby -Reserve ‘is a ”miscellany' of active- and inactive-status reservists. Before a reservist in this category can be ordered to active duty involuntarily in a war or national emergency, the Director of Selective Service must determine his availability for such service. However, the Administration has submitted legislation (H.R. 5822) that would place the Standby Reserve under the direct control of the DOD. This pool has been steadily dwindling over the years. The, Army Standby Reserve numbers slightly less than 30,000, 77% of whom are officers. The numbers in this pool should continues to decline primarily because IRR personnel are being retained in the Ready Reserve for their full 6-year M50. The Army's Retired Reserve numbers about 103,000, 85% of whom are officers. Of the approximately 15,000 enlisted retirees, almost 3,000 are age 60 or over. (DOD's plan to order selected retirees to active duty in a full mobilization would.draw on former active duty service members almost exclusively.) ‘ £!.an22:<2I;-§.h.;-r'2.a.tsr.s§_;;1.-:c..11e. ........_.. Thus far, the publictdiscussion over manpower problems in the Army reserve forces has not examined in any depth missions and requirements for these components. Defense Secretary Harold Brown commented on this .essential aspect of the reserve manpower problem during a July 30, 1979, interview for U.S. News and world Report. In response to a question about personnel 0 shortages in the reserve forces in general, secretary Brown responded: ... the reserve question has difficulties not only on the recruitment side. It also has difficulties in saying exactly how we're going to use our reserves. There clearly are deficiencies in recruiting for the reserves. 3 , = ' But I don't want to say that.it's as bad as some have implied, because that.would imply that I accept their statement about how quickly you would need to use the reserves and what kind of war you were going to fight and so forth. cns- 9 IB79ou9 m>DA1-B-05/14/80 Secretary Brown's statement implies that the requirementseEissue is 'not rally resolved within the Department of, Defense. However, CBS is not competent to evaluate the requirements issue as it pertains~ to wartime missions assigned the various echelons of the Army's reserve compoents. Nonetheless, it is important that this piece of the manning shortfall problem be mentioned as a reminder that requirements cannot be overlooked in any consideration of shortfalls and consequent corrective measures. REGISTRATION AND THE SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM 1>.1_=.§.t..t.'.c.-£se.9.i§.1;—*-:..eti<.>;1..=._.A...§he.I;ge..;n.29..4;tion In his Jan. 23, 1980, State of the Union message, President carter told the second session of the 96th» Congress he would submit legislation and budget proposals to resume~ draft’ registration and to "revitalize" the Selective Service System. The President's announcement was a coplete reversal in the Administration's position and, according to news reports, ignored the advice of the Director of the Selective service that his agency could meet DOD‘s worst-case inductee requirement without peacetime registration. The Administration's new position seems to agree with the views of those i_lo have been critical of U.S.,5capability to trapidly mobilize military manpower in an emergency and who have been skeptical of the Administration's previous proposals for improving the System's standby machinery. 12izergent-§2.1.1;.ti2n§-.t9-t11e-§e9.i§1=.re.ti9.n..I.§§2e- Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff have favored peacetime registration, vthe FY79 and FY80 Carter budgets proposed to inprove the capability of the System to meet DOD's most demanding wartime inductee requirement. without requiring peacetime registration. The Administration sought an additional $1.7 million for the selective Service to be» used for upgrading the agency's automated data processing equipment (ADP), adding #8 full-time 'employees to its currenti 100—man planning staff, and expanding the number of regional offices from 6 to 10. The FY80 request of $9.8 million was to have continued these initiatives. . «On the recommendation of the House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees on DHUD-Independent Agencies, Congress 1 approved an additional FY79 appropriation of $600,000 to enable the agency to continue work on improving 1 its ADP equipment. The FY80 request was similarly cut to $7.8 million. Concurrently, there was a concerted drive in both eflouses of Congress, spearheaded by Representative G.V. (sonny) Montgomery and Senator. Sam Nunn, to pass legislation "requiring President. Carter, to resume peacetime registration. The House Armed Serviceszcommittee included7 language in its ?”80 DOB appropriation authorization bill that would have required President tlrter to begin registering 18éyear-old males beginning Jan. 1, 1981. The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) reported 5. 109, .which would have resumed registration of:males 18-26 years of age beginning Jan. 2, 1980. The HASC proposal lost by a recorded vote of 252-163. In its stead,l the House approved language requiring ~the President to submit a report ito cns-10 113790149 UPDATE—05/‘Ill/80 Congress by Feb. 9, 1980,. in which, among other things,. he would make recommendations on the feasibility and desirability of “resuming draft registration. (See Congressional Record, daily edition of Sept. 12, .1979 T for debate and vote beginning at page H7723.) The SASC measure elicited considerable debate in the Senate ychamber (see Congressional Record, daily edition, of Sept. 21, 1979, beginnings at page 513132). However, the bill was tabled and the Senate subsequently agreed to the House language. (See P;L. 96-107, included in the section entitled Legislation, for details of the report required by Congress.) President Carter's proposal to resume standby draft registration and to include both men and women significantly altered the complexion of‘ the debate. For one reason, congressional opponents of registration lost a major line of defense when the’ President :abandoned his former stance against peacetime registration; for another, his decision to include women -- despite warnings from the Speaker of the House that Congress will not go along -- pushed this highly emotional issue to the forefront. [see IB790u5, women in the Armed Forces, for further discussion of this issue.] 1 £1.a:i2r-Argnm§ut§...1Z9.r.and_£_qain..§:-13ea29:3;i1I;e-B.e9i..§:c.ra.ti<2n- Those who favor an immediate resumption of registration see such a move as necessary to the security interests of the 0.5. ‘They believe that the nation's manpower mobilization capabilities are so inadequate that the armed forces would not be able to carry out their wartime missions. Congressman Richard White, Chairman of the HASC Personnel Subcommittee that held hearings in 1979 on the issue, told members of the House :that “the impact of shortages (in the reserve forces) is exacerbated by the inadequate condition of the stand: draft mechanism -- the Selective Service System." Advocates of peacetime registrationxalso use DOD's most manpower-intensive war scenario -- a short-notice, conventional NATO—warsaw Pact war -- to support their argument. Focusing on D0's stated need for 650,000 inductees within 180 days after mobilization, they argue that a supporting plan that relies on the Selective Service System ‘reconstituting a nationwide field structure and beginning draft registration after mobilization is declared will not work. Such. a plan, they say, rests on, precise timing and unobstructed communication systems; it is doomed to failure in a period that would be fraught with national tension and chaos. Defense Secretary Brown's FY81 posture statement lends support to zthose concerned about the capacity of the 0.5. to mobilize for war. While stating that the 0.5. appeared to have enough divisions and tactical air wings to meet simultaneous contingencies in Central Europe and the Persian Gulf -- i.e., one major and oneeminor war - Secretary Brown went on to say wthat he was "not satisfied" that «the 0.5. had» acquired the necessary strategic mobility for a timely respomse or was "it clear" to him that the 0.5. had all the options necessary for "graduated or rapid and total mobilization." Those who argue againstv peacetime registration consistently raise two fundamental concerns. First, they see the argument for registration as a pretense for returning the nation to ipeacetime conscription, ‘the ultimate objective of those who Eare’ opposed to volunteer armed forces. Senatx Stennis recently reinforced this view: Speaking on the floor of the Senate on Apr. 21, 1980, he said that he; favored reinstatement ‘of registration because it will lead to the»draft. 'Secondly, manyiconservatives and liberals alike have argued that peacetime registration is an unwarranted invasion of individual privacy when there is no clear and present danger to the United cRs—11 1B79ou9 UPDATE-O5/1H/80 States. Many of those who oppose peacetime registration question the merits of a conventional NATO-Warsaw Pact war strategy. Even conceding its ‘possibility, they argue that the U.S. concept of early reinforcement and hedging against a protracted conventional war does not justify registration. They claim that, current deficiencies in.strategic air and sea lift capacity‘ aside, enemy action will deny the U.S. thew sea and aerial ports needed‘ for early reinforcement. Moreover, they question whether the United States could equip 650,000 inductees by H+180. A w It appears that the foregoing arguments for and against registration have been swept aside as the result of Soviet subjugation of Afghanistan and concern over the Russian threat.to the flow of Middle East oil. President Carter's sudden decision to resume registration was intended as a further signal to Hoscow of 0.5. national resolve. Supporters of the President's decision undoubtedly will argue that a vote against registration will be damaging to 0.5. credibility. Opponents_will counter that the preservation of D.S. interests in the Persian Gulf area does not depend on the alleged advantages of peacetime registration to the mobilization capability of the U.S. _ Since much of the registration debate revolves around the current and prospective emergency inductee delivery capability of the Selective Serivce System, the following discussion highlights this aspect of the mobilization debate. o EQQEQEQEQQ: A standby draft mechanism was a key proviso in the Gates Commission's Februray 1970.report endorsing volunteer armed forces w(Advisory Commission on All-Volunteer Armed Forces). However, neither the Commission nor Congress (during its 1971 deliberations on terminating the draft) addressed the specific structure and activities of a standby Selective Service System. The agency continued to register young men between the ages of 18 and 26 after the draft had been officially terminated (July 1, 1973) until President Ford's proclamation (No. 4360, Apr. 1, 1975, 40 F.R. 1u567) temporarily suspended registration pending new procedures. Coincident with the FY77 budget, thersystem was put into so—called “deep standby," essentially where it remains today. The agency currently has a planning staff of 100 full—time civilian employees and military personnel, plus approximately 700 reserve officers ‘designated to reactivate a field structure upon mobilization. During the last days of its first session, the 96th Congress confirmed Dr. Bernard Rostker as the Director of Selective service, replacing Acting Director Robert shuck. 1'29- .Br222.s.2;L§- .t.<.>- .I1.ee:c.. D..Q12:§- E.2§th:§a;..s.e.. L;1..<1u91:.:e.e:.- §e9.2;.i.remeI.11'-.- The following table compares the estimated worst—case inductee delivery capability of President Carter's peacetime registration plan and the * st-mobilization registration plan tenatively proposed by the. Director of selective Service in his agency's aborted Jan. 16, 1980, draft report. The estimated delivery rates are those of the Selective Service System. CBS-12 0 IB790‘-I9 UPDATE-0 5/14/80 WORST-CASE INDUCTEE REQUIREMENT vs. ESTIMATED DELIVER¥“dCAdPA‘BILITY SSS can deliver by:* DOD requirement . y P ‘pre-mobilization post4mobi1ization <1e;.i.zsr;-..----....121; sirrens-__-r~22i§tre.ti0n£._..-:+'.egi§:;a’2;2nQ 1st inductees n+3o ' n+11o u+12 n+17 1st 100,000 H+60l 5 H*150 1 H*28 M*33 Total 650,000 H*l80 H* ? H*119 U+12fl * SSS estimates. " T # President Carter's 2/11/80 report to Congress, "Presidential Recommendations For Selective Service." 3 SSS Jan. 16, .1980, draft ‘report. QQQ;§_ ;ndgg§gg_ §ggg;;g;egt.l This particular schedule for flowing inductees into the armed forces derives from DOD's worst-case manpower contingency: a full-scale conventional war between NATO and Rarsaw Pact forces that begins with little or no advanced warning. In this scenario the U.S. does not take action to expand the armed forces with inductees until or ishortly before the outbreak of hostilities (M-day). Pentagon planners see such a war requiring huge quantities of manpower to replace casualties and to prevent it from crossing the nuclear ‘threshold. However, DOD's schedule for absorbing inductees during the first 180 days eafter Congress grants the President draft authority is not based on the actual manpower such a war might demand. Rather, the flow of inductees into the armed forces is constrained by the capacity of existing training bases to acccommodate large numbers of inductees.‘ Except for a minor modification (discussed below), the planned flow of inductees basically ‘has not changed since October 1977 when DOD first notified Selective Service of the requirement. T;aining_§§§§_Qapggi§z. iBased on DOD's planned flow of inductees during the first six months following mobilization, the training bases will absorb an average of about 3,300 inductees per'day between M*30 and H+60, rising to an average of about u,600 per day between H+61 to H+180. Recently, Secretary of Defense Brown stated that the Army could accept "up to 20,000 inductees‘ during the third and fourth week after mobilization." Thus the armed forces could accept up to 120,000 inductees by M+60. Selective Service estimates the iinduction process, i.e., from issuing induction notices to examining registrants at the 66 Armed Forces- Examining and Entrance Stations (AFEES) , could produce approximately 7,000‘ inductees per day or 02,000 per six—day (two shifts per day) work week. If this estimate is correct, the potential production capability, which is app1icab7 to both pre- and post-mobilization registration plans, exceeds the estimatel capacity of the armed forces to absorb inductees during the ‘first 180 days following H-day.» This potential production rate would indicate that there is a significant margin of safety inn meeting _D6D's worst-case iinductee requirement. Furthermore, it would indicate that; the induction processing system could tolerate expansion of the training base capacity if a decision CBS-13 ‘ IB790fl9 UPDATE-05/1n/80 is made to invest in increased capacity. It is necessary to mention that Secretary Brown also has said that if Army iReserve training units were mobilized and deployed to their *designated training bases §Q_§ay§_ig_advggg§ g§_g;Qay, the Army could ‘begin daccepting inductees by u+13 «~ which coincides with the yestimatedy first-delivery capability .of the pre-nobilization ‘registration plan proposed; by the Administration -- and accommodate a total of 100,000 inductees by u+30. However, this possibility is outside the worst-case scenario upon which the DOD inductee requirement is. based‘ and, therefore, allows for other assumptions. For example, it is reasonable to speculate that the Selective Service System could be activated at the same time the Reserve training units are activated. ‘ To add to the muddle about training base capacity, the Army maintains it has the capacity to accommodate 133,000 trainees (including about 70,000 inductees) during the first month after‘ mobilization. Both the pre- and post-mobilization plans have the theoretical capability to supply that number of inductees after mobilization. :However, to reach that capacity apparently would require a reordering of equipage priorities among Army‘ units or new appropriations to have the needed equipment on hand and avoid drawing down on other units. ~_ ” ~‘a ' Finally, the reader should, be cautioned that the foregoing implies anything more than theoreticalficapabilities under favorable conditions. For example, one of the crucial factors in rapidly expanding the Army's training base is the readiness status of the Army Reserve training units. This report LS already noted gross personnel shortfalls in the Army Reserve that could present difficult problems in rapidly absorbing and training large numbers of inductees. A My 1979 GAO report ("Problems in ysetting People Into the Active Force After Mobilization," FPCD-79-00) delved into some aspects of the manpower mobilization problem. On the other hand, such problems should not preclude upgrading the responsiveness of the Selective Servicezsystem. for peacetine registration and revitalization of the Selective Service System, as modified to»exclude women,_includes these salient elements: §§1c.i-re1:.s:1.-.C.e2.eb£1.l_i.3=.L_W.i.t__h ?.e.aseti2e._.Re9i.§§re1:.i2n- The President's plan -- A senior-level Department }of..iDefense/Selective Service System Mobilization Manpower Steering Group has been establishedw to develop aplans for required support. ; ‘ “ -- Initially, men born in 1960 and 1961 (ages 19 and 20) will- register ithisi summer. Persons« born in 1962 ‘will register’ in January 1981. subsequently, therewill be continuous registration of all males reaching ag 18. A Q { —- Eligible persons will register at 34,000 local Post Offices throughout the nation giving their name, address, date of birth and, ‘at ‘their option, Social Security nunber.w Registrants will retain q9n~Ffile ‘with Selective Service until their 26th birthday and will be required to keep thew foregoingi information current. The total.file will contain; information won"about 916 million persons. - . ,_, q i . cns-1u IB79ou9 UPDATE-05/1n/80 - Registrants will not be classified. Initial classificationl actions will begin after mobilization for those persons receiving induction notice who request exemption or deferment. Such claims will be filed= with the reconstituted Selective Service area offices. -- Approximately 700 reserve officers with mobilization assignments with Selective Service form the cadre‘ for activating a field structure after mobilization., Within 24 hours after mobilization, the Selective Service System will open area offices ‘located at u3u Armed Forces Recruiting Stations. Pre-designated recruiting personnel will be detailed for duty with these area offices for up to 05 days. ' -— The Selective Service System and the Army's Military Enlisted Personnel Processing Command (HBPCOH) will develop a joint computer center to be located in Chicago, Ill., by Januarys1981. This joint venture enhances the coordination needed to move thousands of registrants to the 66 Armed Forces Entrance and_Examining Stations. In the interim, computer support will be provided by the ArmyPs uanagement.Systems Support Agency. -- To implement the President's revised plan and avert entanglement with a third concurrent resolution’ on the FY80 congressional budget, the Administration has propoed to ‘transfer $13.3, million from the Defense Department to the Selective Service System. The House approved them proposal on Apr. 22 (see Chronology for details). 2<.>§t:§21.>.:Lliza'2;9n-§.e2g:L§t.1;ati2n- Qaeanilitu- §..§l§§Ei-Z2 .S.eu.i.<.=.<-—:_' §z§:c.em:s Qg§§t_§gpggg. Prior to the Presidentfisw decision to resume face-to-fac registration, the Selective Service System had prepared a lreport in which, five options for upgrading its emergency inductee delivery capability were examined. The controversial report, dated Jan. 16, 1980, recommended a post-mobilization plan as the most cost effective. Like the plan recommended by the President, this option would utilize the United States Postal Service (USPS), the*key punching and data transmitting facilities of the Social Security Administration, and the Internal Revenue Service, DOD Recruiting Stations for establishing area offices, and a joint HEPCOH/Selective Service central computer facility. This option calls for 4 million persons to be registered ’at USPS facilities by n+u, first induction notices to be issued byt n+7, and first inductees to report to the AFEES iby u+17. (Note: Selective Service estimates that the AFEES can process 1fl,000 registrants per day, six days a week. The agency estimates it will require 35,000 induction notices to insure that 1H,000 registrants will report to the APEES. Based on historical rates, 50% of the registrants will be qualified for induction.) A key feature of this option is the_manner in which the registration forms are to be processed and.transmitted to the central computer. A lottery to T establish the order-of—call.based on the Random Sequence Number i(RSN) would be conducted before theeregistrant data is processed. USPS wouls nsort the forms by RNS and the data would be key punched and transmitted to the central computer in RSN order. This procedure would permit Selective Service conduct a lottery and issue the first 35,000 induction, notices before the central computer received the registrant data for ‘theE*entirei year-of-birth group to‘ be inducted ifirst. This procedure‘*contrasts to the former npost-mobilization plan previewed in the FY79 and PY80 budget proposals. The lottery and issuance of initial induction notices were scheduled after the‘ cns-15 113790 a9 UPDATE-0 5/14/80 registrant data on the entire primary year—of—birth group was qfiled: in the {“entral computer. Selective Service indicated that the recommended plan would ‘require the $1.4 million included in the FY80 supplemental request, plus” an additional $fl.5 million in FY81. Recurring annual.costs were estimated at $9.7 million in FY79 dollars. = "F ‘ Administration officials do not give credence to this option because they say the report was a draft prepared for the further yconsideration of an interragency wcommittee that (presumably) would have made a final recommendation to the President. lconsequently, they assert, the report reflected only the position of the pselective Service System. They also assert that, upon further reflection, the option recommended by Selective Service was considered too vulnerable to breakdown. Finally, they assert that in light of the Sowiet invasion of Afghanistan, "times have changed" and resuming face-to-face registration is a signal to Moscow of yU.s. national resolve. a - Based on the information provided in the President's Feb. 11, 1980, report it appears that the improved estimated delivery capability of the Selective Service System under either Option would be reached some time in FY81. This judgment assumes that Congress" will act with dispatch to approve the President's proposal and provide the necessary funding, and that sufficient volunteers to man local and appeal boards can be obtained and trained in ‘a timely manner. ‘F . . ‘ Qgggg;;nq_thg_ TgQ_ glans; Examining the two plans purely wfrom the standpoint of their mechanics, we find they are identical in their major details except for two obvious differences: (1) The President's proposal would reinstate peacetime registration while the plan, suggested by the Director of Selective Service would require registration incident vto a national emergency; and (2) the former proposal would cost more per year than the latter. (we do not have accurate cost data.; However, the difference in the cost between the two plans largely~ would result from personnel and ,records‘processing and maintenance costs.) The key similarities in the two plans are: - Both plans entail establishing a joint HEPCOH/Selective Service computer center. » I —— Both plans would use local United States Postal Service facilities for mregistration and the key-punching facilities of the Internal Revenue Service and the Social Security Administration for transmitting registrant data to the central computer center. .~Y —— Bothplans require peacetime training of volunteers who would man local . draft boards upon activation of the Selective Service field structure. -- Both plans would use Armed Forces Recruiting Stations and designated 1' ‘\cruiting personnel to initially constitute area offices. -- Both plans could activate the Selective Service Systemfield, structure and begin inductions before or after a national_;emergencyi.isi declared, depending upon when the President asks for and _tfié lcbngress grants draft authority. is F CBS-16 113790 n9 UPDATE-O5/11¢/801 - Both plans have the theoretical capacity to deliver 7,000 inductees per day or 42,000 per six-day work week. This production rate is well in. excess of DOD's estimated capability of existing training bases to assimilai inductees in the worst-case scenario. ‘ v ‘ -— Both plans would, in the worst-case scenario, require persons receiving induction notices to either report to the Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Stations within 10 days or apply for exemption or deferment. ‘ - Both plans appear equally vulnerable to administrative, logistical and mechanical problems after the induction process begins. Aside from political.considerations, the choice of one system over the other appears to rest on the question of cost versus perceived risk. Thus: Does the economic and perceived social cost of peacetime registration sufficiently outweigh the perceived risk involved in a plan that relys on registering up to 0 million persons after a.national emergency is declared? Or, turned around, is the perceived risk in a post-mobilization registration plan real enough to? justify restoration of peacetime registration? Furthermore, since the registration issue is directly coupled to a worst-case scenario ——»a surprise attack —- a logical question arises as to how far the U.S. should go in preparing for that eventuality? P.L. 96-107 (5. H29/H.R. 0000) 1 4 9 DOD Appropriation Authorization Act for FY80. Section 811 requires t1 President to prepare a plan for a “fair and equitable" freform of the laws governing registration and induction intxx the Armed Forces. The plan, together with any necessary implementing legislation, must be submitted to Congress by Feb. 9, 1980. Section 812 amends the Military Selective Service Act to include a congressional declaration that the Selective Service System should remain an independent agency. 5. #28 was passed by the House, amended, Sept. 1a, 1979, in lieu of 3.3.-nouo. Conferences held. Conference reports filed in the House (H.Rept. 96-521)? and in the Senate (S.Rept. 96-317) Oct. 17. A second conference report was filed in the House (H.Rept. 96-546) Oct. 23. Senate and House agreed to conference report. signed into law (P.L. 107) Nov. 9, 1979. H.R. 23 (Bennett) Requires President to begin registering males. Requires report by June 30, 1979, on best procedure for registering. Creates National Advisory ‘Committee to recommend ways to "achieveaadequate military medical personnel." Puts the Selective service System underfDOD. Requires minimum of 3 years in reserves for anyone released from active duty. Authorizes SSS access to . "age and address“ data in school recomis, or records of U.s. or state agencies to assist in registration. Introduced Jan. 15, 1979; referred to Committee on Armed Services. H.R. 1901 (nontgomeryl , Requires President to begin registering males? and_ females. 9 Prohibits suspension of registration unless authorized by laws,;Requires nPresident to draft up to 200,000 persons each year fbr the Army*individual Ready Reserve. Authorizes educational benefits for IRR draftees. Requires annual random sequence drawing for 19 yearn olds.9‘ Prohibits ‘placing SSS under another cns-17 IB79oz:9 UPDATE-0 5/11;/80 agency. Introduced Feb. 8, 1979; referred to Committee on Armed Services. 1% H.R. 2078 (Wilson of Tex.) Amends the Military Selective Service Act, as amended, to provide permissive authority t£>draft males on or after July 1, 1979, and ending June 30, 1981. Introduced Feb. 8, 1979; referred to Committee on Armed-Services. H.R. 2206 (flccloskey) National service Act. . Requires all 17-year-olds to register for National Service.m Between age 18 and 30, each person has option of: (a) two years‘ active military 'service (with u yrs. of educational benefits accruing); (b) 6 years of Ready Reserve; (c) 1 year of environmental or community service (Civilian Services Corps): or (d) none of the above, in which case they will be subject for 6 years to military draft. (Draft would be envoked if voluntary enlistments did.not meet manpower military needs. Draftees would serve 2 years, followed by a years in Ready Reserve. Draftees would be entitled to 2 years‘ educational benefits.) Creates National Youth Service Foundation operated by a 19~member Board of Trustees and 2H-member Advisory Council. Reduces pay of enlisted members in pay grades E-1, E*2 and E-3 with less than 2 years service to subsistance levels. Introduced Feb. 15, 1979; referred to Committees on Armed Services, on Education and Labor, and on Veterans Affairs. “ ' A H.R. zuou (Montgomery) Similar to H.R. 1901. Introduced Feb. 26, 1979; referred to Committee on ( smed Services. Requires President to submit by Oct. 1, 1979, a plan and any required legislation to reform existing registration and induction procedures. Requires President to register 18-year-old males beginning Jan. 1, 1981. Prohibits suspension of registration except to revise procedures and in such case the suspension is limited to 90 days. Places the Selective Service system under the Secretary of Defense while in standby status and under President when inducting. Introduced Feb. 28, 1979; referred to Committee on’ Armed Services. H.R. 3603 (Cavanaugh) . . he Public Service Act. Requires all 17 year-olds to register for Public Service. Registrants have option to,._,volunteer for 18 months active military service, or 6 months such service‘ followed by 3 years" active reserve service, or 2 years‘ civilian service (e.g. forestry, agriculture, clerical). such service) must be performed- between (ages (18 and 26, inclusive. A1ternative1Yo registrants may elect torsubnit to possible induction fa such service during iany 6-month period ‘between such ages. In such case,R registrant may choose type of service; if not available, must accept whatever is open.a Each Federal agency must designate 5% of its positions for Public Service. Replaces Selective Service System with Public Servicev System with similar organizational structure.) Introduced Apr. 10, 1979;. referred to xmittees on Armed Services and on Post Office and Civil Service. (H.R.m627u (nontgomery et.al.) I Amends the Military Selective Service Act to provide for reactivation of registration and classification under the Act, for authority for induction of CR5-18 IB79ou9 UPDATE-05/14/80 not more than 200,000 individuals each year for training and servicew in the Individual Ready Reserve of the Army Reserve, for educational assistance for individuals so inducted, and for other purposes. Introduced Jan. 23, 1980. referred to Committee on Armed Services. H.R. 6329 (Jenrette) Amends the Military Selective Service Act to provide for reactivation of registration and classification under the Act and for authority for induction - of individuals for training and service in the Ready Reserve of the Reserve components of the Armed Forces. Introduced Jan. 29, 1980; .referred to Committee on Armed Services. H.R. 6u2o (Murphy of Pa.)c Amends the Military Selective Service Act to increase the maximum age for registration under such Act from 26 to S5. Introduced Feb. 5, 1980; referred to Committee on Armed Services. H.R. 6568 (Mathis) Provides that registrants under the Military Selective Service .Act shall be automatically registered to vote in their local jurisdictions. Introduces Feb. 21, 1980; referred tot Committees on Armed’ Services and on House Administration. A? H.R. 6569 (Price, Bob Wilson, by request) Amends the Military Selective Service Act to allow the registration of both men and women. Introduced Feb. 21, 1980; referred to Committee on Armed Services. H.R. 6670 (Weaver et;al.) Provides a voluntary system of registration for the military draft and to reinstitute a mandatory registration system whenever the President declares a national emergency with respect to a threat to our national security or when there isya declaration of ‘var. Introduced Feb. 28, 1980; referred to Committee on Armed Services. H.R. 6868 (Panetta et al.) Establishes a commission to examine existing R volunteer services 6 opportunities, including those under the Domestic Volunteer Service Act of 1973, to examine alternative comprehensive national service programs, and to develop a comprehensive national service program. Introduced mar. 19, 1980; referred to Committees on Education and Labor and on Armed Services. H.J.Res. 521 (Whitten) ,- _ ~ 9 Makes additional funds available by transfer for FY80 for the Selective ‘Service System. Introduced Mar. 26, 1980; referred to the House Committee on Appropriations. Reported to the House (H.Rept. 96-885) Apr. 18. Passed the House, amended, Apr. 22; referred to the Senate Committee on Appropriation . Reported to the Senate (S.Rept. 96-865) May 13. - ' S. 109 (Byrd of Va.) As amended by the Senate Armed Services Committee, requires the President 035- 19 3:37 90 a9 UPDATE-0 5/14/80 to begin registering 18- ,to 26-year-old males,‘ effective_ Jan._ 2, 1980. fohibits the President from suspending registrationt except to modify ‘procedures, with any such suspension limited to 90 days and no more than once in any one~year period. Prohibits the classification and “examination of registrants before Jan. 1, 1981. Requires the President"to report to Congress by July 1, 1980, on recommendations for (1) revising the categories and standards for exenption_ and‘ deferment under the Military ~Selective Service Act; (2) revising registration and classification procedures; and (3) other revisions considered necessary. Requires the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) to assume responsibility for manpower mobilization planning. Requires the Secretary of Defense to annually report on his assessment of the U.S. capability to mobilize military manpower during national emergencies. Introduced Jan. 23, 1979; referred to Committee on Armed Services. Reported, with amendments, June 11 (S.Rept.v96é226). Returned to the calendar in the Senate Sept. 21, 1979. ‘ I I S. 226 (Morgan) Same as H.R. 23 except it does fnot" include reserve service provision. Introduced Jan. 25, 1979; referred to Committee on Armed Services. 5. 135a (Dole) Requires the President to conduct a study on the military manpower needs of the armed forces including an assessment. of (1) the Selective Service System's emergency manpower delivery capability and (2) the capability of the ‘med forces to feed, house, clothe, equip and train mobilized manpower. The ‘results of such study, together.Hith any necessary legislation, is to be submitted to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees not later than 120 days after enactment. Introduced June 18, 19?9; referred to the Armed Services Committee. S. 2440 (Nunn, by request) Amends the military Selective service~Act to allow the registration of both men and women. Introduced Mar. 19, 1980; referred to Committee on Armed Services. EEABLEELS. 0.5. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. - I Subcommittee on Department of Housing and Urban pDevelopnent -- Independent Agencies. Department of Housing and Urban Development - Independent agencies appropriations for FY 1980. tfiearings, 96th Congress, 1st session. iashington, 0.5. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. p. 1-72. A Department of Housing andurban Development -- Independent agencies appropriations for FY 1976. ‘Hearings, 94th Congress, 1st session. Washington, u.s. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. p. 284—35u. A --—-— Department of Housing and urban Dewelopmengygéflrndependent Agencies appropriations for 1980. Part 2;” Hearings, 96th Congress, 1st session. Washington, 0.59-. Govt. Print. 0ff., ' Po CRS’20 IB790fl9 UPDATE-05/1H/80 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee on Investigations. Selective Service System. Hearings, 9uth Congress, 2d session. Washington,i u.s. Govt. Print. Off., 1976. 188 p. (H.A.S.C. 9!:-36)‘ ---- Military Personnel Subcommittee. Military posture and- H.R. 1872 (H.R. 9040). “Department of Defense authorization for appropriations for fiscal year 1980 and legislation concerning the Selective Service System. Part 5, military personnel. Hearings, 96th Congresss, 1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. 1377 p. (H.A.S.C. 96-5) ‘ U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Subcommittee on Department of Housing and Urban Development +- Independent Agencies. Department of Housing and Urban Development -- Independent agencies appropriations for FY 1977. Hearings, 9flth Congre$, 2d session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976. p. 535-SSH. 1 6.5. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee on Hanpower and Personnel. Department of Defense authorization for appropriations for fiscal year 1980 (S. 428). Part H, manpower and personnel. Hearings, 96th Congress, 1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. 821 p. --—- Beinstitution of procedures for registration under the military Selective Service Act. Hearings, 96th Congress, . 1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. 239 p. F.i§B9.EI§-AE2..S.Q..N§1il3..$.§I.Qfl.1!L-12Q£3.L7.L1.E_IiI§ Amendment No. 3429 [Debate and vote in the Senate] Congressional record [daily ed.] v. 12h, Aug. 7, 1978: S12712—S12715; S12723—S12725; $12753-512755. Amendment No. 1610. [Debate and vote in the Senate] Congressional record [daily ed.] v. 12a, Aug. 7, 1978: $12755-512757. Selective Service System. [Debate and vote in the House] Congressional record [daily ed.] v. 12H, June 19, 1978: H5783-H5787; H5808-H5812. _'fi Selective Service System. [Debate and vote in the House] Congressional record [daily ed.] v. 122, June 22, 1976: H6427-H6428; H6429; H6u33—H6fl36: H6452-H6454. Unprinted amendment 304 to increase the appropriation for the Selective Service Systm (debate and vote in the ‘ Senate). Congressional record (daily ed.) v. 125, June 25, 1979: S837u-76; S8378-81. Proposals to reinstitute selective service registration (responses by the Acting Director Selective cns-21 IB7 90 n9 upon TE-O 5/1a/so Service to questions posed by Senator Carl Levin). _g. Congressional record (daily ed.) v. 125, July 18, 1979: 6 S9818-982$. Department of Defense Authorizations, 1980 (debate and vote in the House on section 812 requiring the President to resume military draft registration). Congressional record (daily ed.) v. 125, Sept. 12, 1979: H7710-7783. Selective Service Registration (debate in the Senate on S. 109 requiring reinstitution of military draft registration). Congressional record (daily ed.) v. 125, Sept’. 21, 1979: 513139--314; 313148--814. Selective Service transfer authority for draft registration. [Debate and vote in the House] Congressional record [daily ed.] v._,126, -Apr. 22, 1980: . H2704-H2752. (1.5. Congress. House. 7committee.on Appropriations. Department of Housing‘ and Urban Development —- Independent Agencies Appropriation Bill, 1979; report together with additional views to accompany H.R. ‘12936. Washington, 0-5. Govt. Print.’ Off., -1978. p. 42. (95th Congress, 2d session. House. Report no. 95-1255) ---- Deparment of Housing and Urban Development '-- Independent Agencies Appropriation bill, 1980, report together with additional views to acoo_m‘pan.y;H.R. u39u. Washington, 0.5. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. ‘p.’ .493-tau. (96th Congress, 1st session. House. Report no. 96-H09) ----- Making additional funds available by transfer for the Selective Service System for 1980; report with additional views to accompany H.J.Res. 521. Washington, 0.5. Govt. Print. Off., 1980. p. 8 (96th Congress, 2d session. House. Report no. 96-865) U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Department of Defense Authorization Act, fiscal year 1980; report with dissenting, additional, and individual views to accompany H.R. 40110. Washington, 0.5. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. p. 186. (96th Congress, 1st session. House. Report no. 96-166) 11.5. Congress. senate. Committee. on Armed Servics. Requiring reinstitution of registration foroertain persons under the riilitary Selective Service Act, and for other purposes; A report togetherywith additional and minority views to accompany S. 109- Washington, 13.3. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. 46 p. (96th Congress, 1st session. ‘Senate. Report no- 96-226) g 11.5 ._ Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Department of Housing and Urban Development -- Independent Agencies Appropriation Bill, 1979; report to accompany H.R. 12936. Washington, 0.5. Govt. Print. Off., 1978. p. 56-57. (95th Congress, 2d S._eS$i.on. Senate. Report no. 95-1060) . " ”" ‘ 1 05/13/80 -- 05/07/80 - Ofl/29/80 -- 04/22/80 - 0’-I/17/8l0 - 03/23/so - C35-22 IB79ou9 UPDATE-O5/1H/80 The Senate Appropriation Committee reported H.J.Res. 521, transferring $13.3 million from DOD to Selective Service, with an amendment by Senator Hatfield requiring that registration forms include space for a registrant to indicate if he is a conscientious objector. During committee consideration of the bill, it was reported that Senator Hatfield presented letters from Presidential candidates Reagan, Kennedy, and Anderson in opposition to registration. Senator Hatfield also said he had received a telephone call from former President Gerald Ford who stated his opposition to registration. s The Senate Appropriations Committee voted 17-9 against a proposal offered by Senator Hark Hatfield to cut additional FY80 funding for the Selective Service System from $13.3 million to $fl.7bmillion.. By an 8-4 vote, the Senate Appropriations subcommittee on HUD-Independent Agencies approved H.Con.Res. 521 as passed by the House. The House approved 218-188 a House Appropriations Committee recommendation to transfer $13.3 million to the Selective Service System in order to begin standby draft registration of-19- and 20-year-old males this summer. The funds were transferred from prior—year unobligated balances remaining in an Air Force Hilitary Personnel account. The vote came on amendment to H.J.Res. 521; which originally provided $4.7 million towupgrade the standby status selective Service short of requiring registration. on earlier votes the House defeated 363-H5 (not recorded) an amendment by Representative Duncan (Oregon) to provide $21 million to begin registering men and women as well as a proposal by Representative Bauman to appropriate $500 million to institute registration and classification. The».H0us2e also turned down 319-an an amendment offered by-Representative Weaver that would have authorized voluntary registration. an of \ The House Appropriations:Committee voted 26-23 to / transfer $13.3 million from the DOD to the Selective service System in order to begin the registration of males ages 19 and 20. The Washington Post reported that a meeting of the House Appropriations Committee to consider the transfer of $13.3 million from DOD to Selective Service in order to begin registration of 19-and 20-year-old males.was cancelled. Speaker O'Neill said that committee« chairman Jamie Hhitten told himythere was growing concern among committee members that authorizing 03/25/80 03/18/80 03/12/80 03/0 7/80 03/05/80 02/27/80 02/11/30 02/03/80 jj CRS-23 IB79OQ9 UPDATE-O5/ 10/80 spending in this manner was setting a bad prec_edent.. Robert Kastenmeier, Chairman of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice, said he would hold hearings to require the Administration to tell what it ‘ intends to do_about persons who refuse to register. (Current law carries a maximum penalty of $10,000 and five years imprisonment.) It was reported that ‘House Appropriations Committee Chairman’ Janie Whitten was prepared to act on an Administration request to transfer $13.3 million from the DOD to Selective Service if he had some assurance the Senatewould go along. The Senate Budget Committee would not give any indimtion of Senate action until the Administration submitted an actual request. The Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on HUD-Independent Agencies he-ld*1‘hearings on ‘President Carter's request for funds to resumeregistration. General E.C. Meyers, Army Chief of'j‘Sta»ff, was the‘ principal witness. The House Armedservices Subcommittee on Personnel voted 8 to 1 toxexcludewonen from President Carter's draft registration plan. Also it was reported that the Defense Department was the prime nominee for transferrlingg the $13.3 million needed by selective Service to start registering 19-_ and p 20-year-old males. The Administration's request for FY80 supplemental funds for Selective Service ran into a snag as Congress learned it had exceeded its spending limit for FY80. , The Administration 's qmoney proposal for registration is frozen until either Congressianends the second concurrent resolution to pernit additional spending or other funds are found in the FY80 budget that could be transferred to Selective Service. The House Appropriations Subcommittee on HUD and Independent Agencies, on a tie 6-6 vote, defeated the Administration '5 request for funds to begin draft registration. The Subcommittee recommended an appropriation of $4.5 million to enable selective service to prepare to register, butnot to begin registration. President Carter submitted a report to Congress in ‘ which he recommended face-to—face draft registration for young ten and women. The report is entitled_ "PresidentialRecommendations For Selective service Reform, A Report to Congress Prepared Pursuant to P.L. 96-107." , ‘ A ‘ President Carter announced hisiplan to require 18-20 year old men and women to'reAgist'ert“w’vit-h’ the Selective 01/31/80 01/23/80 01/23/80 09/21/79 09/12/79 07/17/79 -- cns-2u Ia79ou9 UPDATE-OS/1H/80 Service System beginning this year. House Speaker O'Neill warned that the Congress will not agree to a proposal to require women to register.- The FY81 budget for the Selective Service _ System - prepared before President Carter decided to resume peacetime registration -- was $10.98 million. In his State of the Union message to the second session of the 96th Congress, President Carter announced his intention to submit necasary legislation and budget proposals to resume peacetime standby draft registration. The Senate debated the registration issue in closed and open sessions. Senator Nunn decided to delay a Senate vote on 5.109, requiring reinstitution of (military draft registration until sometime in 1980. By a recordedvote“ of 252-163, the House defeated a measure proposed by the House Armed Services Committee in H.R. H040 (FY80 Defense appropriation authorization bill) to begin.standby draft registration of 18-year-old males in 1981. Earlier, the House had defeated (268-1un) an amendment to the Committee's proposal by Rep. Robin Beard which would have added language creating a congressional commission to study U.S. defense readiness and mobilization capability. Following these two votes, the House approved (259-155) an amendment offered by Rep. Patsy Schroeder that deleted the registration.authority but retained all other provisions of the Committee's recommendation including a requirement for the President to submit a plan to Congress covering~various matters related to the peacetime registration issue. However, the Schroeder amendment expands the scope of the study ordered by the Armed Services Committee to include recommendations on (1) the "desirability and feasibility of resuming registration" under the Military Selective Service Act in its present form, (2) the "desirability, in the interest of preservinq_discipline and morale in the Armed Forces" of creating a national youth service~program, and (3) "possible procedures" that could be instituted to help the Armed Forces meet their personnel requirements. Following a 1-7 tie vote~on a motion to delete language from H.R. 4040 (FY80 DOD authorization bill) that would reinstitute draft registration, the House Rules Committee voted 8-6 to allow the bill as reported by the House Armed Services Committee to be considered by the full House. _ . - In testimony before the Senate Armed°§ervices Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, a civilian employee at the Selective Service System's National 07/1o/79 - 06/25/79 - 05/11/79 .- males effective Jan. 2, 1980. 05/01/79 - T 03/13/79 -- 01/29/79 -I cns-25 IB79049 UPDATE-05/10/80 Headquarters said that as of Nov. 28, 1978 —— the day= he was placed on leave withot pay - the agency did not have current and detailed mobilization plans. Mr. Robert M.T. Wilson, an Operations and Evaluations Specialist, told Subcommittee Chairman Sam Nunn that‘ he was put on leave without pay and ordered to take a physical.and mental examination because he had attempted to communicate his concern over what he considered to be the agency's low state of mobilizatio preparedness directly to President Carter. During hearings on the emergency inductee delivery capability of the Selective Service System conducted by the senate‘ Armed Services Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, the former chief of the System's Mobilization Readiness Division, Col. Jack Kaufman, testified that he did not believe the System could respond to DOD's worst-case inductee requirement under the Administration's plan to:register after mobilization day. He said that the Administration's plan "hung" on registration taking place between fif1O and n+15, but the logistics of the task -- e.g., setting up 00,000 to 50,000 registration sites through state election machinery -- made the task nearly impossible. Col. Kaufman said that his views had resulted in his dismissal by the Acting Director of Selective Service. During floor debate on the FY79 supplemental appropriation for the Selective Service System, the Senate tabled an amendment offered by Senator Dole to appropriate $1.7 million requested by the Administration instead of $600,000 recommended by the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on HUD-Independent Agencies. 0 - The Senate Armed Services Committee voted 12-5 in favor of S. 109, as amended, which requires the President to commence registering 18- to 26-year-old (For details, see LEGISLATION section.) In a news briefing, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) was reported as saying that the Secretary of Defense believes that reviving peacetime draft registration should.be "looked at more closely" before taking such action. a a General Bernard Rogers, Army Chief of Staff, told senator Nunn's Senate Armed Services (SASC) Subcommittee on Hanpower'and Personnel that he cfavors a draft of 75,000 to 100,000 males annually for the Army IRR. ’In a statement issued that same day, Secretary of the Army Clifford A1exander~ said that a draft was unnecessary for;theiWactive force, the reserve or for the IRR."%” General David uJones,~‘Chairm‘an'y‘6'f the Joint O1/22/79 -- 09/30/73 -- 10/04/77 - 10/00/77 -- 08/09/76 - 01/26/76 - CBS-26 IB790l-l9 UPDATE—05/1'4/80 Chiefs of Staff, told HASC during opening hearings on FY80‘DOD authorization bill, that the JCS '5 favored resumption of registration of 18-year-old males. At the same hearing, Secretary of Defense’ Harold Brown said that registration may be necessary, but more study is needed. Secretary Brown also sai_d if registration is resumed, ‘ 7 women should be included. The Carter Administration proposed $9 .8 million FY80 budget plus $1.? million FY79 supplemental for S55. Increased funding would be used to improve System's post-mobilization inductee delivery capability. FY79 supplemental would be used to begin improvements on the System's automated data processing (ADP) equipment, expand its Readiness Regions from 6 to 10, add L18 full-time employees and 64 Guard and Reserve officers (cadre to mobilize the System) . FY80 funds. would continue to support these actions. P.L. 95-392 appropriated $7.0fl5 million for S55 for FY79 instead of $9.5 million requested by Carter budget to improve SSS post-mobilization inductee delivery capability to meet revised DOD need. Both House and senate Appropriation 's Subcommittees on HUD and Independent Agencies recommended $7.045 million. Amendments were defeated by division votes in. the/House to provide $17 million and $9.5 million. Thesenate defeated (71-16) an amendment to provide 517 million but agreed (46-42) to $9.5 million. The senate receded in Conference. A P.L. 95-119 appropriated $6.3 million for SSS for FY78 as requested by the Carter Administration. DOD notified SSS of revised inductee requirements for NATO/Warsaw Pact war: H+30 - 1st inductees; fl+60 - total of 100,000 inductees; u+180 - total of 650,000 inductees. P.L. 94-378 appropriated $6.8 million for S55 for FY77 as requested in Ford budget. This action put SSS in "deep standby." -House Appropriations Subcommittee on HUD and Independent Agencies recommended $18 million as suggested by HASC. floor debate, the subcommittee chairman advised that after further consideration the subocnmittee recommended 36 .8 million which was approved by voice vote. Senate subcommittee and floor action concurred with Ford budget proposal. During In response to request in HUD -- Independent Agencies conference report and intention of Ford Administration to put SSS in "deep standby ," HASC Inp_v_es7ti'gations h Subcommittee conducted three daysq,o“§’7‘hearings on the inductee delivery capability of_‘SSS. Following these hearings HASC recaumended to the chairman OH/19/76 10/17/75 09/00/75 OH/01/75 07/01/73 02/00/70 CBS-27 IB790fl9 UPDATE—O5/1“/80 of House Appropriations Subcommittee on HUD andgi Independent Agencies that SSS be appropriated $18 million for FY77 in order to resume registration. Defense manpower commission's report, Defense Manpower: The Keystone of National Security, noted with "grave concern" the "emasculation" of the SSS and recommended that adequate funding should be provided for SSS to maintain a capability to begin inductions within 30 days after mobilization. P.L. 9u—116 appropriated $u5.3 million for SSS for FY76’and.3—month transition quarter. Ford budget had proposed $57.2 million. Senate proposed $39.9 million. House proposed $fl8.3 million. Conference report (H.Rept. 9a-502) recommended that "responsible legislative committees" review future status of SSS as basis for funds after FY76. Based on a 1970-75 classified Total Force Study, the Secretary of Defense levied SSS for up to 390,000 inductees plus 137,000 enlisted Standby Reservists by M+180 in the event of a major NATO/Warsaw Pact war. First deliveries in both categories were required by M+30. All Standby Reservists were required by n+60. There was no specific intermediate requirement for inductees between M+30-and H+180. President Ford suspended.registration pending "new procedures which.wil1 provide for periodic registration" (Proclamation No. 4360, Apr. 40 F.R. 10567). . 1, 1975, Draft calls were suspended (P.L. 92-129, Sept. 28, 1971). Advisory Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force (Gates Commission) endorsed armed forces amnned by volunteers, but also recommended a standby draft mechanism to provide the "manpower resources for the second stage expansion" of the armed forces. " A22l2lQ§AL-BEFER§ECE 50WB§§§ The Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer U.S. Armed Force [Gates Commission]. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., Feb. 1970. 211 p. ‘ 1 Congressional Budget Office. The Selective Service System: mobilization capabilities and options for improvement. Budget issue paper for fiscal year 1980. Washington, 0.5. Govt. Print. 0ff., November j978. 53 p. Defense Manpower Commission. Defense manpower: the keystone of national security. Report to the CRS-28 IE7 90 L19 UPDATE-05/1L1/80 Presiddenft the Congress . Washington, D .5 . Govt . Print. Off., Apr. 19, 1976. 518 p. (1.5. Dept. of Defense. Manpower requirenentsreport for FY 1980. Uiashington, February 1980]. ’ ‘ ’ ----- Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics). America's volunteers: a report on the all-volunteer armed forces. Washington, Dec. 31, 1978. 390 p.. —---- The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force. Washington, Department of Defense, September 1975. 2a p. (7.5. General Accounting Office. What are the capabilities of the Selective Service System? Report to the Congres by the Comptroller General of the United States. GAO report EPCD-79-ll. Dec. 14, 1978. 10, p. -—-- DOD "total force management" - fact or rhetoric? GAO report FPCD-78-82. Jan.2Ll, 1979. -———-A Problems in getting people into the active force after mobilization. GAO report FPCD—79-L12. May 17, 1979. -—--- can the Army and Air Force Reserves support the active forces effectively? GAO report LCD-7y9—llOu. Apr. 25, 1979. Critical manpower problems’ restrict the use of National Guard and Reserve Forces. GAO report FPCD--79-58. . July 11, 1979. Weaknesses in the Selective Service System's Emergency Registration plan. GAO report PPCD-79-89. Aug. 29, 1979. 0.5. Office of Hanagement and Budgetf President's Reorganization Project. Selecive Service System reorganization study: report of the study team. Washington, Office of nanagement and Budget processed, Decenber 1978. 33 p. plus tabs 0.5. Selective Service Systen. Budget justifications, fiscal year 1980. [washington, 1979]. A 22 ~..1v_-.. s.» A. _ M 1” I: I U. r 4 . 1 . 3 V i.fi§“5§“fER3§“!w‘i7” g 335:”. Lg ‘U E';_«.‘~7_? f": « _ , . .' -- — V I ; .x..n..lan-rn-rzurr.-_.‘, r T} 1_:_-xr:3m:_1_~;,.y