:93 Q ff, -.1-. ti ONGRESSIONAL ,3 ESEARCH Universi of Missouri - Columbia ‘°’E“V'°E Illlllllllllllll llll l||||||||I||||||||||l|||||||| LIBRARY OF ‘ _ CONGRESS 10-1 03861144 J MILITARY HANPOWER POLICY AND THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE ISSUE BRIEF NUHBER IB77032 AUTHOR: Goldich, Rober t L . Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division THE LIBRARY or conemass CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH snavxcz MAJOR ISSUES SYSTEH DATE OBIGINATED ggggggzz DATE UPDATED 9_§_4_2_gg§__Q FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL 287-5700 0521 cBs- 1 13770 32 upnnrz-o 5/20/so .”"5UE QEEIEIEIQE Between the actual end of the draft on Dec. 31, 1972, and late 1976, the ‘level of controversy about the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) dropped considerably. wBy early 1977, however, concerns were being voiced in the ,Congress, the press, and the Department of Defense (DOD) about the ability of the AVF as currently recruited and managed to provide sufficient military manpower of needed quality at reasonable cost. These concerns rose sharply during 1979 and are continuing in 1980. This revived debate on military manpower procurement and utilization policy has been stimulated by the crisis in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, as well as problems in meeting DOD-established.quantitative and qualitative requirements for the active and reserve components of the Armed Forces. To assist in enabling the All-Volunteer Force to be rapidly augmented with draftees in time of’ war or national emergency, President Carter proposed in his State of the Union message on Jan. 23, 1980, a return to standby draft registration without actual conscription. Two other options are also being discussed: a major modification of military recruiting and manpower management policies to attract and retain more volunteers; and a possible return to actual peacetime conscription. AEQ_2QLlQX--flALX§ 5 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, 1968-1972 Disenchantment with the Southeast Asia conflict coupled with traditional American antipathy to conscription resulted in increasing pressure throughout the 1960s to abolish the draft and establish an All-Volunteer Force (AVF). In February 1969, soon after assuming office, President Nixon appointed a commission chaired by former Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates to examine the subject. In February 1970 the Gates commission recommended that the country complete the transition to an AVF by July 1, 1971. 7.Though President Nixon and DOD accepted the goal of an Allrvolunteer Force in principle, the pressures of the Vietnam war and the need for a more orderly transition to an AVF necessitated deferral of the target date from July 1, 1971, to July 1, 1973. Actual inductions of men into the Armed Forces ended on Dec. 31, 1972?, and on June 30, 1973, with certain minor exceptions, the authority of the President to induct men into the Armed Forces expired. Standby draft registration continued, however, until April 1975, when it was terminated by executive order of President Ford. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING U.S. MILITARY HANPOWER PROCUREMENT POLICIES U.S. military manpower procurement policies are based on a variety of Q strategic assumptions and broad national security policies. The principal manpower-intensive military emergency involving U.S. forces Av‘ich is discussed in official DOD literature is a major war with the Soviet L ion and its Warsaw Pact allies in Europe, the Mediterranean, and the North Atlantic, with ancillary air and naval action worldwide. (Recent discussion concerning o.s. military actions in the Persian Gulf, Southwest Asia, and the Indian Ocean appears tovcenter around air land naval operations and only cRs- 2 1377032 UPDATE-05/20/80 limited use of ground forces.) In testimony before various Committees of Congress, DOD has asserted that such a NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict would begin with a period of exceptionally intense combat resulting in high casualties, and the concomitant mobilization of U.S. civilian industry and manpower tr continue the conflict as long as necessary. Such a war would require massivt manpower mobilization, particularly to meet ground force requirements for replacements and force expansion. This DOD scenario for a U.S./Soviet war in Europe has been challenged, however, principally by persons who feel that such a conflict would quickly lead to a strategic nuclear exchange between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., and that such an exchange would be so catastrophic for both sides as wto render a conventional-and/or tactical nuclear campaign in Europe irrelevant. These challenges have in turn been countered by those who argue that (1) a conventional and/or tactical nuclear war in Europe need not automatically escalate to the strategic nuclear level or (2) with proper active and passive defensive measures, strategic nuclear war, if it does occur, need not result in the total destruction of the major combatants‘ warmaking capability and economic infrastructure. Using this scenario as a starting point, a series of assumptions shape current military manpower procurement policies: 1. The United States:needs large conventional forces to permit responses to threats without resorting to strategic nuclear war (both U.S. and Soviet conventional forces have tactical nuclear capabilities). Most American analysts consider conventional military power to be a more credible deterrent and a more controllable military instrument than nuclear forces. 2. The United States faces a long-term challenge from the presence < large Soviet conyentional forces in Europe and the USSR that are configured to pose a direct threat to NATO forces in Europe, the Mediterranean, and the North Atlantic, and to U.S. national interests in the Middle East, Indian Ocean area, and East Asia. 3. Active duty military strength needs to be maintained at approximately 2.1 million, along with.combat-ready and responsive Reserve components, to ensure a prudent minimum level with which to meet initial U.S. national security commitments worldwide. 4. Major military manpower assets would be furnished by our NATO allies in the event of a conflict in Europe. 5. The manpower requirements for any contingencies more limited than a full-scale U.S./Soviet conflict -- including potential military action in the Persian Gulf-southwest Asia-Indian Ocean area -- would be less than those for the broader contingency. 6. Any military action anywhere in the world other than a comparatively minor show of force would probably require the augmentation of active duty forces with Reserves and/or draftees. [See Issue Brief 790fl9,y Military Nanpower for mobilization: The Draft, Registration, and the Selective Service System.) lsince 1972 the basic:strategy of policies designed to provider adequa military manpower to meet anticipated contingencies has been that of manning both the active and Reserve forces with volunteers in peacetime, with a responsive standby draft system theoretically capable of vquick reactivation CRS- 3 IB77032 UPDATE—05/20/80 to provide manpower needed for an emergency. The active, Reserve, and draftee military manpower requirements discussed "1 this Issue Brief are generated by the aforementioned DOD scenario and general national security policies. Acceptance of this scenario and these _policies for analytical purposes in this Issue Brief does not imply either agreement or disagreement with them. MILITARY MANPOWER PROCUREMENT ISSUES This issue brief discusses quantitative and qualitative trends in /active force and Selected Reserve strengths and recruiting, and then notes proposed methods of dealing with.active force and Selected Reserve recruiting problems within the context of an All-Volunteer Force. The report then addresses the role of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) of the Armed Forces in military manpower mobilization, current and projected IRR strengths and requirements, and possible ways of insuring adequate IRR force levels. Issues relatinge to maintenance ofta standby draft system are discussed. Finally, alternatives relating to the reinstitution of peacetime conscription for both the active and Reserve forces are examined. ACTIVE FORCE RECRUITING AND STRENGTH RESULTS, FY73-PRESENT The active Armed Forces faced nuerous quantitative and qualitative recruiting problems during FY73 and FY74. (See Tables "A," attached to the ~hard copy version which, along with "B" and "C," may be obtained by contacting major Issues System.) Adequate numbers of volunteers were barely 97 jtained. Recruit quality was comparatively poor, resulting in legislative action that temporarily restricted for FY74 the percentage of recruits with substandard intelligence or education that could he enlisted (Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1974, sec. 718; P.L. 93-238, approved Jan. 2, 1974; 87 Stat. 1041). During the latter half of FY74, FY75, and the first half of FY76, active force recruiting improved greatly. A nationwide recession and consequent rise in unemployment, a continuing decline .in authorized force levels, and the passage of enlistment bonus legislation all contributed to this improvement. Quantitative goals were met with ease and the quality of incoming recruits increased to the point that the services were able to substantially raise their minimum quality standards for enlistment. However, some decline in the rate of unemployment, the stabilization of active duty military strength at approximately 2.1 million, and (according to DOD) congressional reductions in recruiting funds and manpower resulted in slight declines in recruit education quality during FY76-77. Quantitative recruiting shortfalls tegan in the July-September 1976 transition quarter and continued through FY77 (except for the Air Force). Although the educational I" levels rebounded during the latter part of FY77, the quantitative shortfalls did not. In FY78, the services again reduced their manpower strength goals and attempted to compensate for male recruiting shortfalls by recruiting larger numbers of women for a much wider variety of military occupations. However, all four services failed to meet their recruiting objectives duringr P"79, the first such across—the-board shortfall since the AVF began on Jan. , 1973. These recruiting problems appear to be continuing in FY80. These shortfalls are responsible in large part for a decline in active duty military strength from the DOD-supported and congressionally authorized 2.1 to 2.0 million, especially in the Army's ground combat arms. There are also cns- 4 IB77032 UPDATE-O5/20/80 strong indications, according to DoD, that the number of nrecruits in below—average mental categories has been substantially understated in recent years, due to technical errors in a new set of intelligence tests first introduced in 1976 and widespread cheating by recruits. The percentage of recruits in Mental Category IV, the lowest category accepted for military service, may be as much as five times higher than the 5-6% hitherto lclaimed by the Armed Forces. Quantitative and qualitative shortfalls have occurred despite continuous downward adjustments in DOD military strength objectives in anticipation of recruiting difficulties and substantial increases in the recruiting of women to meet new, higher female strength objectives. Some additional money has been allocated to recruiting incentives; recruiting standards have been lowered; but so far the Administration has refused to support large increases in funding for recruiting, advertising, and incentives, including some advocated by DOD. A ACTIVE FORCE RETENTION PROBLEMS In addition to recruiting problems, FY79 saw increasing concern for the retention of skilled careerofficers and noncommissioned officers in all services, especially the Navy and Marine Corps. This concern has become even greater in FY80. Reenlistment rates of Navy career enlisted personnel, for example, dropped from 92% of those eligible in FY73 j- the first year of the All—Volunteer Force -- to 62% in FY79. Marine Corps career enlisted retention dropped from 82 to 52% during the same period. Navy retention problems appear to be based in large part on dissatisfaction with long family separations resulting from an increased.frequency of overseas deployments. This increased operating tempo, according to the Navy, has resultedt from a decreased number of ships in the Fleet being required to shoulder the same level -- or an increased level -- of naval deployments worldwide. There are other more specialized recruiting and retention problems in the military services as well. All services continue to have difficulty recruiting and retaining physicians; DOD anticipates that increased medical officer bonuses, more competitive medical scholarships, and an increased inflow of graduates of the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences will help alleviate this problem by the mid-1980s. The Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps have emperienced substantial declines in pilot retention rates. This appears to be related directly to increased hiring by civilian airlines to replace the massive cohort of world war II-trained pilots now reaching airline retirement age. The Air Force is also having a particular problem in recruiting and retaining engineering officers in the face of stiff competition for engineers:frcm the civilian sector. Compensation levels are believed to contribute substantially to retention problems. Pay caps coupled with inflation, according to an October 1979 DOD study on the adequacy of military compensation and an early 1980 study by former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, have decreased the purchasing power of military pay since the AMP was first established. The Joint Chiefs of staff, and in particular Admiral Thomas Hayward, the Chief of Naval Operations, have stated that a major budgetary effort to redress military pay inadequacy is required. Admiral Hayward has stated that under some circumstances it may be necessary to forego purchasing ships in order to fund pay increases to attract and retain sufficient naval manpower to man those ships already planned. Although DoD has supported some addition compensation, it has so far not supported massive increases of the level advocated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (approximately $3 to $6 billion). The White House has been even less supportive. cns- 5 IB77032t UPDATE-O5/20/80 There is a concern -- one officially rejected by DOD —— that the rising proportion of blacks in the Armed Forces -- much higher than of the U.S. wpulation as a whole -- could have problematic social and political consequences. Other observers feel that the Armed Forces, and the Army and .Marine Corps in particular, are becoming increasingly less representative of general American social indicators such as education, income level, and urban/rural origins. DOD and DOD-funded contract studies reject these ,assertions or regard the trends as irrelevant if acknowledging the existence of some of them. There are also some indications that recent incidents of recruiting malpractice and fraud are related, not to isolated cases of individuals acting improperly, but tow pressure placed on recruiters to achieve recruiting results which may be unattainable. Some of these recruiting trends are statistically documented in Tables "A" showing active force quantitative, qualitative, and race/sex recruitingv and/or strength trends since FY73 (data from FY6u, the last pre-Vietnam War fiscal year in which the draft was operating, are furnished for comparative purposes). This and other tables are available with a hard copy of this issue brief. 9 COSTS OF THE ALI.-VOLUNTEER FORCE The All-Volunteer Force has resulted in some increased expenditures. The most recent DOD estimates, contained in its Dec. 31, 1978, report on the AVF, place these at between $250 million and $2.5 billion. iThe lower figure is "the increased cost resulting from the AVF excluding the cost of a major 1971 junior enlisted pay raise and subsequent junior enlisted compensation icreases designed to attract volunteers. The larger figure is the increased cost including these junior enlisted compensation and benefit increases. This same DOD study estimates that reducing the pay of the junior three enlisted pay grades to minimum wage levels (assuming the maintenance of present force levels) would.save approximately $1.3 billion per year. A General Accounting Office study released in February 1978 estimated total AVF costs during the FY71—77 period as $18.u billion, and costs for FY73 and each fiscal year thereafter as over $3 billion. This figure includes Selective Service cost savings, recruiting costs,‘ enlistment costs and savings, compensation and benefit costs, training and education costs, recruit attrition, staffing policies and assignment.costs, civilian personnel costs and policy changes, military construction, and retirement and separation pays. Another measure of the cost impact of the AVF that has been suggested is the potential cost involved in increasing military force levels, if such an increase should become necessary. Suh costs could involve either the increased compensation. levels that would be required to attract more volunteers or the cost of paying an enlarged military force composed ‘ partially of draftees at current, AVF-generated pay rates. Proponents of the AVF assert that it is inaccurate to include most of the costs resulting from the major military pay increases of November 1971 in an accounting of AVF costs. In support of their assertion, they argue that (1) ~” ay comparability" was a DOD objective long before the draft was eliminated and (2) the Government is "morally obliged" to pay military personnel wages comparable with those in the civilian sector regardless of whether the Armed Forces are manned by draftees or volunteers. w A CRS- 6 IB77032 UPDATE-05/20/80 Some observers believe that the costs resulting froml increased enlisted turnover and personnel turbulence and the larger training establishment that would result from a return to the draft would actually increase manpower costs, unless first-term enlisted pay were reduced substantially. [See Issut Brief 79078, Defense Manpower Costs.] PROJECTED ACTIVE FORCE RECRUITING SITUATION IN THE 19805 As the effects of declining birth rates that began in the 1960s are felt, the number of men reaching prime military age (18) each year will decline from approximately 2.1 million in 1979 to 1.7 million in 1987 -— a 20% drop. According to DOD, the active Armed Forces will then have to recruit annually one out of every fl.6 18—year old males instead of the current requirement for one out of 5.6. There is a general consensus that given present military manpower procurement and utilization policies, the services will not be able to maintain current military manpower strengths in the 1980s. Available manpower will be have to be used more efficiently; more personnel will have to be retained in service after being enlisted; manpower requirements will have to be increased; or the proportion of the manpower pool actually recruited will have to be raised. Y SELECTED RESERVE STRENGTH AND RECRUITING The selected Reservescomponents off the Armed Forces provide the sole available source of trained units for immediate augmentation of the active Armed Forces upon mobilization. The Selected Reserve consists of Reservists in paid status who are required to perform approximately two weeks of active duty for training annually and usually one weekend of inactive duty trainix ("drill") per month. All members and units of the Selected Reserve are, also members of a larger category of Reserves known as the Ready Reserve. Members of the Ready Reserve --including, therefore, members of the Selected Reserve -- may be called to active duty without their consent in time of war or national emergency declared.by Congress or the President (i.e., congressional approval is not required); a maximum of 1,000,000 Ready Reserve personnel may be on active duty on this basis at any one time. In addition, Selected Reserve personnel may be called to active duty for up to 90 days without a declaration of war or Congressional or Presidential declaration of national emergency; up to 50,000 Selected Reservists may be on active duty on this basis at any one time. [See Issue Brief 790fl9, Military Manpower for Hobilization: The Draft, Registration, and the Selective Service System.] Selected Reserve strength has dropped considerably since the inception of the All-Volunteer Force; recruit quality has also declined (see Tables "B"). Selected Reserve personnel levels declined from 919,000 at the end of FY73 to 817,000 as of Feb. 29, 1980, compared with an FY80 authorized average strength of 823,500, an FY73 authorized.average strength of 977,000, and a wartime requirement of 1,017,300. Recruiting hshortfalls experienced isince the end of the draft would have been higher if it were not for the enlistment ‘ of large numbers of personnel with prior military service. I Simultaneously, since the inception of‘ the AVF the number of nonprior service Reserve enlistees (who formerly could choose enlistment in the Reserves as an alternative to the draft) has dropped significantly. 4 The intelligence and.educational levels of Selected Reserve male nonprior service enlistees (the only group for which data are available prior to FY75) has declined considerably from pre-AVF levels; in most cases, the nonprior CRS- 7 IB77032 UPDATE-O5/20/80 service recruit with above-average or superior intelligence and at college education of the draft era has been replaced by a non-high-school graduate of average or below average intelligence. These recruiting and strength trens are statistically documented in ‘Tables "B" showing Selected Reserve quantitative, qualitative, and race/sex recruiting or strength trends since FY70. ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES FOR ACTIVE FORCE AND SELECTED RESERVE RECRUITING SHORTFALLS ' Many military manpower analysts believe that a wide variety of options are available to improve-active force and/or Selected Reserve recruiting within the context of an All-Volunteer Force. These observers feel that while the DOD has worked hard to make the AVF successful, the ppotential for improvements in military manpower utilization and recruiting is still substantial. They also»assert that given the major social and political controversies that would accompany serious proposals for a return to the draft, all possible efforts should be made to keep military service voluntary. It has also been suggested that the resumption oft standby draft registration, as proposed by the President in his State of the Union message -of Jan. 23, 1980, would act as a spur to enlistments in the All-Volunteer Force by making the public more aware of the Armed Forces and of their potential military obligations as citizens, and creating the desire to avoid ~eventual conscription —- if the draft is actually reimposed - by volunteering for a branch of service of one's own choosing. The following suggestions are among those that have been made to improve active force and Selected Reserve recruiting and retention, or to reduce military manpower requirements. It should be noted that actions which improve reenlistments (or otherwise increase the length of time the average enlistee spends in service) reduce the requirements for new enlistees. More persons retained in service mean fewer persons that need to be recruited to replace those leaving service. 1I.uere.e§..in.9.._t.1;e-At;m13.er.21:_.»*$.r.1.l_i§.tme.I;:c. §.eI.;s1..B.eeu.1Li§1:.me;1.1.=§ 1. Increased use of enlistment and reenlistment bonuses and other special compensation. (Selected Reserve reenlistment bonuses were authorized for the first time by P.L. 95-79, sec. 303, July 30, 1977, the FY78 DOD Appropriation Authorization Act. Selected Reserve initial enlistment bonuses were authorized for the first time by Section non of the FY79 DOD Appropriation Authorization Act, P.L. 95-485, Oct. 20, 1978.) 2. Federal income tax adjustments for military personnel or their civilian ’ employers (in the case of Reservists). 3. Increased non-monetary benefits for ‘Reservists, similar to those enjoyed by active duty personnel, such as commissary/exchange privileges, medical care, and military base services and facilities. _ u. A more liberal Reserve compensation and/or retirement system. (The Reserve Compensation System Study (RCSS) of the Department of Defense, released June 30, 1978, ~has proposed major changes in the reserve compensation and retirement.system. These are intended to improve recruiting cRs- 3 15770 32 UPDATE-O 5/20/80 and retention of first—term and junior reserve personnel, and provide less incentive for more senior and longer service reservists to remain, in active reserve status beyond what DOD alleges is their maximum‘ usefulness to the reserve forces. DOD is expected to send a legislative proposal embodying tho RCSS recommendations to the Congress in 1980.) 5. Expanded educational assistance. (Educational assistance for members of the Selected Reserve was authorized for the first time by P.L. 95-79, sec. H02, July 30, 1977, FY78 DOD Appropriation Authorization Act. The conference report on the FY79 DOD Appropriation Authorization Act, H.Rept. 95-1fl02, requested that, in addition to a test of a 2-year enlistment program (see item 7) DOD create an enhanced post-service educational program under the Secretary of Defense's existing authority to increase the Government's contribution under the Post-Vietnam Era Veteran's Educational Assistance Program, the so—called GI Bill Improvement Act of 1977.) 6. Increased recruiting and advertising programs and personnel. when inflation is taken into account, there has been a substantial decline in real purchasing power devoted tozrecruiting efforts since the AVF began in 1973. 7. Modification of enlistment terms, including, but not limited to, (a) shorter enlistment terms or (b) combining an active force enlistment with an obligatory period of service in the Selected Reserve. The conference report on the FY79 DOD Appropriation Authorization Act, H.Rept. 95-1402, requested the Secretary of Defense "to conduct attest of a 2-year enlistment option for the combat arms skills in the Army, and the sea-going engineering ratings in the Navy, to determine whether this option will attract higher quality personnel." This test began for Army enlistees on Jan. 1, 1979; most such enlistees will serve in.Europe and be required to be high-school graduates and of above-average mental category. Participants will receive ext: Government contributions toward their educational funds provided Aunder the Post-Vietnam Era Veteran's Educational Assistance Program (see above, item 5). The Marine Corps began a similar two-year enlistment program on May 1, 1979, and the Navy on Bar. 1, 1979. Indications at the end of 1979 were that the program had failed to significantly increase enlistments, however, falling far short of service goals. 8. Improving Selected Reserve training to raise morale and motivation of Reserve personnel. ~ I.r;9re§.§i-9-..me-§ize_9£-.t1.1eAzailalzl :e._.r.1.2I.122.vz<.2r.E29.l 1. Modification of minimum physical, mental, or educational standards for enlistment. This has already been done to a considerable degree. 2. Recruitment of more women. DOD plans to increase the total number of women in the Armed Forces from 8.5% of active duty strength, or 156,900 women, as of Dec. 31, 1979, to approximately 254,300 by FY85, or 12.5% of total strength. [See Issue Brief 79005, women in the Armed Forces.) 3. Decreasing the emphasis on recruitment of young, non-prior-service personnel in the 18-19 year old bracket.and attempting to recruit more older personnel. 1 1iesi.I_1.siu9.Ai.l_i1:.e1r1-LI.a_2n 2v__er_1_?eg-i.r.s2...sm:c.§. 1. Restructuring and redefining ‘of U.S.~ national security policies, including (a) reducing U.S. military commitments abroad, (b) greater reliance CRS- 9 IB77032 UPDATE-0 5/20/80 on Allied forces, and (c) shifting away frm reliance on nanpower—intensive ground forces and toward more reliance on air and naval power and/or nuclear weapons. ‘ 2. Conversio of more military to civilian positions. 3. Increasing the length of enlistments. 4. Decreasing the use of early discharges to separate marginally undesirable personnel from the Armed Forces and placing heavier reliance on counseling and military discipline to insure effective performance from such individuals while remaining in service. 5. Substituting capital (equipment) for labor (military manpower) wherever possible. INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE In addition to the active Armed Forces‘ and units of the Selected Reserve-, the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) of the Armed Forces is designed to fill large requirements for previously-trained individual ‘Reservists to be promptly available in the event of mobilization. These individual Reservists are needed to»(1) bring undermanned units or the active force and Selected =Reserve to full war strength and (2) provide trained replacements for casualties until such time as draftees can be provided by, a reactivated Selective Service System. [See Issue Brief 79ou9, Military Manpower for -Mobilization: The Draft, Registration, and the Selective Service System.] = The IRR consists of personnel who have served on active duty, are not members of the Selected Reserve, and who have not completed their total six-year military obligation. IRR personnel are not currently required wby DOD to train periodically, although they are legally obligated to do .so if ordered. .Hembers of the IRR are also members of the Ready Reserve (along with Selected Reserve personnel). As such, they also may be called to active duty without their consent in time of war or national emergency declared by the Congress or the President, subject to the maximum of 1,000,000 Ready Reservists that may be on active duty on such a basis at any one time. Table "C" indicates in detail the major decline in IRR strength that has taken place since FY73; from 1,229,000 to u1o,ooo as of Jan. 31, 1980. 4 IRR strength has increased from 356,000 at the end of FY78 to current levels, and is expected to continue increasing slowly over the next few years as some suggested policies are implemented (seeznext section, POSSIBLE BETHODS OF MAINTAINING ADEQUATE IRR STRENGTH LEVELS). These increases, however, will be minimal compared to IRR'requirements. The projected IRR strengths. contrast with estimated IRRv mobilization ’ requirements. while an intensive interagency debate on IRR requirements has been ongoing for 18-24 months, it appears‘ that IRR strengths are short between 200,000 and 500,000 personnel. frhe Office of the Deputy Assistants Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) is currently conducting an intensive review of IRR requirements, and cautions that, in its opinion, some of .them may be overstated. It would appear, though, that even if requirements were -,duced, actual IRR strength will stil1.remain far below requirements for th forseeable future -- into the mid-1980s. y IRR strength has declined for several reasons. First, large numbers oft CBS-10 IB77032 UPDATE-O5/20/80 Vietnam-era draftees who spent only two years of their total six-year military obligation on active duty, and the remaining four in the IRR, completed their six years of service between 1973 and 1976 and left the IRR pool. Second, the advent of the AVF resulted in longer, active duty terms shortening the time remaining out of the total six-year obligation to serv in the IRR. Third, a greater proportion of active force separatees than previously is entering the Selected Reserve. Fourth, longer active duty enlistment terms and lower active duty military strengths have reduced recruiting requirements, and hence the number of persons leaving active duty and entering the IRR. F Without a peacetime draft or a quickly responsive standby Selective Service System, shortages of IRR personel would severely affect the ability of the Armed Forces to fight a major conventional (or conventional/’ tactical nuclear) war with the Soviet Union in the interval between the outbreak of hostilities and the availablility of trained draftees--now programmed for no earlier than seven months after mobilization. Even with a standby draft system capable of the most rapid reactivation considered feasible, four months would elapse between mobilization and the delivery of trained draftees to the Armed Forces, during which requirements for trained personnel could only be met by the IRR. POSSIBLE METHODS OF MAINTAINING ADEQUATE IRR STRENGTH LEVELS Among possible and actually implemented remedies for IRR strength V shortfalls within an All-Volunteer Force context are the following: 1. Eliminating automatic transfer from the IRR to the Standby Reserve after 5 years of obligated military service. while this would not. increa: the total IRR/Standby Reserve manpower pool, it would increase the size or the more easily available IRR. (This was authorized by sec. 406, FY79 DOD Appropriation Authorization Act, P.L. 95-485, Oct. 20, 1978.) 2. Extending the total military obligation beyond the current six years. 3. Requiring a fixed IRR obligation of all active duty separatees, regardless of the length of their active duty service. (The Army has begun to assign selected active and Reserve enlistees who do not complete their full enlistments to the IRR, if they are judged suitable; formerly, no such personnel were retained in the IRR.) 4. Requiring female military personnel to fulfill an IRR obligation in the same manner as male personnel; women curently incur no such obligation when they enlist in the active forces. (This was authorized by sec. 803, FY78 DOD Appropriation Authorization Act, P.L. 95-79, July 30, 1977.) 5. Identifying and designating selected retired military personnel for recall to active duty upon mobilization. (This has already begun for selected Army retirees.) 6. Reducing the length of active duty enlistments, thus increasing the proportion of the total.six-year obligation spent in the IRR unless the individual enlisted in the Selected Reserve (See Item 7, above, under Alternative Remedies for Active Force and Selected Reserve Recruiti; shortfalls.) 7. Authorizing direct enlistment and reenlistment into the IRR. Such an cns-11 1377032 UPDATE-O5/20/80 enlistment would involve entry into the IRR directly after completion of a Reservist’s initial active duty for training; he would have no further training obligations during his enlistment except to remain available for iibilization and perhaps particpate in one or two 2-week refresher sessions. The Army began a test of direct IRR enlistments in April 1979. However, the “assessment of Army officers is that so far the program has been a failure, enlisting only a few hundred personnel of which half elect to join the active Army. Lack of adequate incentives is cited as the primary reason why more people have notwenlisted in the IRR directly. STAND BY DRAFT CAPA BILITIES According to DOD, a major war with the Soviet Union in Europe or any other military contingency other than minor, short-term operations would require the reactivation of the draft to furnish manpower above and beyond that provided by the active forces, Selected Reserve, and IRR. The reactivated Selected Service System would be required to (1) certify that Standby Reserve personnel were available for mobilization and (2) furnish new draftees. These individuals would be required to provide replacements for wartime casualties and activate new military units needed in an expanded wartime force structure. [See Issue Brief 79049, Military Manpower for Mobilization: The Draft, Registration, and the Selective Service System.) The Hilitary Selective zservice Act Amendments of 1971 (P.L. 92-129, approved Sept. 28, 1971) required that after induction authority ceased on June 30, 1973, the Selective Service System be maintained as "an active ‘standby organization, with (1) a complete reqistratio and classification structure capable of immediate operations in the event of a national glergency, and (2) personnel adequate to reinstitute immediately the full operation of the system...." Progressive reductions in funding and manpower for the standby Selective Service System have substantially reduced its capabilities and responsiveness since FY73. Standby registration and classification of potential inductees was suspended by executive order in April 1975. DOD estimates it would require the system to deliver at least 650,000 personnel to the Armed Forces within 180 days after general mobilization (H+180). A variety of studies by several Government agencies all agree that as currently constituted the Selective service System falls grossly short of having the capability to meet these requirements. Both the FY79 and F180 Selective service budget requests included funds for management improvements and increased personnel and training resources which the System hoped would enable it to meet DOD manpower mobilization requirements by beginning draft registration after mobilization began. with the exception of minor funds for some increased. computer capability, the Congress rejected both requests. In his state of the Union message of Jan. 23, 1980, however, President ” Carter changed his policy. He announced that he would send legislation to the Congress in February 1980 which would provide for‘ standby draft registration to take place before mobilization. On Feb. 8, 1980, the, President sent his legislative proposals to»the Congress. He asked that the Congress approve authority to register both men and women for the "draft. ’~rsons turning 19 and 20 during 1980 would register wthis summer. .Those --rning 18 in 1980 would have to register later this year, and in 1981 and .thereafter each person would be required to»register upon reaching their 18th birthday. The President stated that he had no intention of modifying current policies or statutes that bar women from various combat assignments. Under CBS-12 IB77032 UPDATE—05/20/80 the President's plan, the initial registration of persons reaching their 19th and 20th birthdays sometime in 1980 would take place during the early summer of this year. Over a 5-day period, each registrant would go to a post officew and fill out a form listing his or her name, address, birth date, an‘ (optionally) Social Security number. Registrants would later receive - letter from the Selective Service System acknowledging compliance with the law. The registration proposal would require appropriations of $20.5 million in FY80 and $24.6 million in FY81, an increase of somewhat over 100% above current Selective Service System appropriations. (It should be noted that the President currently has authority to reimpose standby draft registration under the Military Selective Service Act -- as was taking place until April 1975 -- by executive order, although actual conscription would require a public) law. His request for legislation, therefore, would seem to result from three factors: (1) the desire to involve the Congress in a major policy decision, (2) the need to change the Military Selective Service Act, especially in regard to the inclusion of women for registration, and (3) the need for additional appropriations. [See Issue Brief 79049, Military Manpower for Mobilization: The Draft, Registration, and the Selective Service System.) w" RETURK TO A PEACETIHE DRAFT The quantitative and qualitative recruiting problems of the Aactive and Reserve forces have resulted in considerable discussion since December 1976 about returning to actual peacetime conscription.’ A return to the peacetime draft would insure that the Armed Forces could procure the quantity and quality of personnel they needed without regard 1 the vagaries of the civilian economy or transient national moods. Conscription would alsovserve the politica1/social/philosophical ends of (1) levying a requirement on all citizens, if called, to participate in the common defense and (2) insuring popular involvement in and concern over national military policies. It is by no means clear that the reinstitution of the draft would decrease defense manpower costs. While recruiting costs could be decreased, utilization and training costs resulting from increased personnel turnover and turbulence would probably rise. Military compensation costs would drop only if pay and allowance levels for first-term enlisted personnel were frozen or reduced. 9 A return to the draft could prove to be highly unpopular in the nation. some say that the Vietnam experience and subsequent clemencies and pardons of draft evaders and some military deserters have raised _doubts about whether young people would respond to draft calls. In addition, there are‘ political/philosophical issues of (1) conscription as a form of involuntary servitude or economic tax-in-kind and (2) the inequity of selective as opposed to universal or general conscription. SELECTION ISSUES Several alternative methods of selecting draftees have been proposer, including (1) universal national service with a military option (including compulsory registration, classification, and evaluation for national service, without a compulsory service requirement itself), (2) universal military Cns—13 s 1B77o32 UPDATE-O5/20/80 service, and (3) selective service. The proposals for universal service all have the advantage of being more equitable, and providing both tangible and intangible benefits to the civilian economy as a whole, as well as sufficient trained military manpower to meet any imaginable military contingency. lniversal service would also be more coercive than selective service, would .establish a principle of conscription for non-military purposes, and could produce more trained military manpower than the Armed Forces required or low—cost civilian labor than the civilian economy needed or could absorb. Selective service, on the other hand, while it would provide no more military manpower than that needed, and would rest less lightly on the shoulders of American youth, could also be more inequitable in that only a few persons would actually be drafted. Other issues regarding the selection of draftees include: 1. Possible conscription of women, involving the current debate over the legal status and sociological implications of equality of opportunity for women. 2. Deferments and exemptions involving various educational,. occupational, marital, physical, and moral categories. 3. Selection mechanisms to be used, involving a choice between a local and community-based selection apparatus, as in the old Selective Service System, or one nationally administered and centralized. UTILIZA TION I S SUBS Two broad alternatives have been mentioned in recent months for the use of :aftees, if peacetime conscription were revived: (1) conscription’ for the active forces, with a Reserve obligation capable of fulfillment according to an individual's option, or (2) conscription for the Selected Reserve only. A third alternative would involve conscription for the active forces with a Reserve option to be fulfilled along mandatory lines, without an individual option. . The first alternative would essentially involve a return to the active-Reserve relationship that existed before the termination of the draft in 1973. Active force draftees (and voluntary enlistees) would have a* Reserve obligation after release from active duty which they would fulfill in the Individual Ready Reserve; the Selected Reserve would consist largely of nonprior service personnel who enlisted to avoid conscription into the active forces. Such a system would preserve maximum freedom of choice fo the individual and continue the voluntary and local character of our Reserve Components. It would also prevent an orderly flow of fully trained personnel into the Reserves (by leaving Reserve enlistment as an individual option), continue the Reserves as a draft-avoidance route, and prevent the full integration of the active and Reserve components for purposes of preparation for war. A draft for the Selected Reserve only (followed by an IRR obligation), ” while maintaining all-volunteer active iforces, would address the current major shortfalls in Reserve recruiting without -- according to some -e orerreacting to possibly temporary and/or minor active force shortfalls. sash a Reserve draft would minimize the impact on the persons drafted, since wonly a relatively short tour of active duty (four to six months) would have to be served before the-individual returned to civilian life, with only a CBS-1Q ' IB77032 UPDATE-O5/20/30 training obligation remaining. In addition, the wider exposure to military life gained by Reserve draftees could stimulate enlistments in the active force among persons whovotherwise would.not have considered active military service. A Selected Reserve draft would not deal directly with active force recruiting problems, however, which if not critical now are considered likely to increase. It would affect the traditionally voluntary character of the Reserves. It could also result in major problems of skill-matching, given the mobility of individual Reservists and the need to fit a Reserve recruit not just into a particular military unit, but into a particular unit in a particular locality. ‘ Finally, the United States could adopt the traditional Continental European type of integrated active-Reserve military manpower procurement. Individuals would be drafted into the active force and would be involuntarily assigned to a specific Reserve unitupon release from active duty; their Reserve training obligations would vary according to the needs of the Armed Forces. The Reserve Components would be filled exclusively by persons with prior military service. Such a system would provide an orderly, manageable flow of trained personnel into the Reserves: generate large numbers of individual Reservists available for use upon mobilization; fully integrate the active force with the Reserve Components; and remove draft evasion as an incentive for Reserve service. On the other hand, the American tradition of Reserve service as voluntary would be abolished and individual options for performing military service would be substantially diminished. . SUHHARY The active Armed Forces are experiencing quantitative and qualitative recruiting problems; the difficulties of the Selected Reserve have been much greater. The strength of the Individual Ready Reserve and Standby Reserve i only a fraction of known and estimated wartime requirements. Retention of active duty career military personnel is a critical problem, especially in the Navy. Demographic: constraints will insure progressively increasing recruiting difficulties during the late 1970s and the 1980s unless current military manpower procurement, utilization, and management policies are changed. The standby Selective Service System is currently incapable of being activated in time to meet DOD reguireents for draftees after general mobilization, although the President has proposed standby draft registration to alleviate this problem. Proposed measures to deal with these problems while continuing to maintain an All—Vo1nnteer Force involve increasing the number of enlistments and reenlistments in the Armed Forces, increasing the size of the available manpower pool, and reducing military manpower requirements. some persons have suggested that a return to peacetime conscription for the active forces or Selected Reserve Components will be necessary to solve quantitative and qmalitative manpower problems within reasonable cost bounds. ‘ L§§l§L§.$ 0!! [See Issue Brief 79049, Military Manpower for Hobilization: ‘ the Draft, Registration, and the Selective Service System.] U.S. cns—15 1377032 vunnarn-05/20/30 Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Department of Defense appropriations for 1980. Part 9: Air Force Guard and Reserve programs, Navy and Marine Corps Reserve programs, reprogramming, FY 1979. Hearings, 96th Congress, 1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. p. H07-633. Department of Defense appropriations for 1980. Part 5: Manpower and training programs. Hearings, 96th Congress, 1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. 846 p. Department of Defense appropriations for 1978. Part 5: Recruiting activities, Advanced logistics systems, Testimony of Members of Congress and other individuals and organizations. Hearings, 95th Congress, 1st session. Washington, 0.5. Govt. Print. Off., 1977. P0 0 Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Military posture and H.R. 1872 (H.R. H030), Department of Defense authorization for appropriations for fiscal year 1980, and legislation concerning the Selective Service System. Part 5: Military personnel. Hearings, 96th Congress, 1st session. Washington, U.s. Govt. Print. 0ff., 1979. 1377 p. (H.A.S.C. 96-5) Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee on Military Personnel. Continuing review of the All-Volunteer Force. Hearing, 95th Congress, 2d session. July 11, 1978. Washington, 0.5. Govt. Print. 0ff.,i1978. 2n p. (H.A.S.C. 95-98) Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee on Investigations. Hearings, 95th Congress, 1st session. July 30, Sept. 26, 1977. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977. 152 p. (H.A.S.C. 95-H6) COIIQITGSS . H0056 . ---- Marine Corps recruit training and recruiting programs. U.S. Hearings, 9flth Congress, 2d session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976. (H.A.S.C. 90-59) 1 Congress. gsenate. Committee on Appropriations. Department of Defense appropriations, fiscal year 1980. Part 2: Manpower. Hearings, 96th Congress, 1st session. Washington, 0.5. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. 302 p. Congress. senate. Committee on Armed Services. Department of Defense authorization for appropriations for fiscal year 1980. Part u:i Manpower and personnel. Hearings, 96th Congress, 1st session. Washington, 0.3. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. 822 p. CRS- ‘I6 IB77032 UPDATE-0 5/20/80 Reinstitution of procedures for registration under the Military Selective Service Act. Hearings, 96th Congress, 1st session. Har. 13, may 21, July 10, 1979. Washington, 0.5. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. 239 p. 0.5. Congress. Senate. lcommittee on Armed Services. Subcommittee on Hanpower and Personnel. Military recruiting practices. Hearings, 95th Congress, 2d session. Oct. 10, 12, 1978. Washington, 0.5. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. 317 p. Status of the All-Volunteer Armed Force. Hearing, 95th Congress, 2d session. June 20, 1978. Washington, 0.5. Govt. Print. Off., 1978. 286 p. ----- Recruiting in the United States Army. Hearing, 96th Congress, 1st session. Nov. 19, 1979. Washington, 0.5. Govt. Print. Off., 1980.‘ 103 p. ----- Costs of the All-Volunteer Force. Hearing, 95th Congress, 2d session. Feb. 6, 1978. Washington, 0.5. Govt. Print. Off., 1978. 0.5. Congress. Conference Committees, 1979. Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, fiscal year 1980; conference report tc»accompany S. #28. Oct. 23, 1979. Washington, 0.5. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. su p. (96th Congress, 1st session. Report no. 96-546) 0.5. A Congress. House. Committee <11 Appropriations. Department of Defense appropriations bill, 1980; report to accompany H.R. 5359. Sept. 20, 1979. Washington, 0.5. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. #93 p. (96th Congress, 1st session. House. Report no. 96-H50) 0.5. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Department of Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1981; report to accompany H.R. 6974. may 15, Apr. 30, 1980. Washington, 0.5. Govt. Print. Off., 1980., (96th Congress, 2d session. House. Report» no.,96—916) 0.5. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee on Hilitary Personnel. Marine Corps recruit training and recruiting programs; report. Washington, 0.5. Govt. Print. Off., Sept. 29, 1979. 36 p. (H.A.S.C. 9!-I-65) 0.5. Congress. House. Selective Service Reform. Message from the President of the United States, transmitting his proposal for Selective Service reform, together with a draft of proposed legislation to amend the military Selective Service Act to allow the registration of both men and women, pursuant to Section 811 of Public Law 96-107. Feb. 12, 1980. . Washington, 0.5. Govt. Print. Off., 1980. 62 p. (96th Congress, 2nd session. House. Document no. 96-265) 0.5. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. Department cRs—17 1377032 UPDATE-05/20/so of Defense appropriations bill, 1980; report to accompany H.R. 5359. Nov. 1, 1979. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print- Off., 1979. 219 p. (96th Congress, 1st session. senate. Report no. 96-393) Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Achieving America's goals: National Service or the All-Volunteer Armed Force. February 1977. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977: 121 p. At head of title: 95th Congress, 1st session. 6 Committee print. LRS77-2100 rrrrr Authorizing appropriations for fiscal year 1980 for military procurement, research and development, active duty, selected reserve, and civilian personnel.strengths, civil defense, and for other purposes; report to accompany S. 428. May 31, 1979. Washington, U.5. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. 166 p. (96th Congress, 1st session. Senate. Report no. 96-197) ----- Requiring reinstitution of registration for certain persons under the Military Selective Service Act, and for other purposes; report to accompany S. 109. June 19, 1979. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. 46 p. (96th Congress, 1st session. Senate. Report no. 96-226) 05/13/80 -- The senate Appropriations Committee reported H.J.Res. 521, 05/07/80 - ou/29/ao - 04/22/80 -- transferring $13.3 million from DOD to Selective Service, with an amendment by Senator Hatfield requiring that registration forms inclue space for a registrant to indicate if he is a conscientious objector. During committee consideration of the bill, it was reported that Senator Hatfield presented letters from Presidential candidates Reagan, Kennedy, and Anderson in opposition to registration. Senator Hatfield also said he had received a telephone call from former President Gerald Ford who stated his opposition to registration. ’ The Senate a proposal additional from $13.3 Approriations Committee voted 17-9 against offered by Senator Hark Hatfield to cut FY80 funding for the Selective Service System million to $9.7 million. By an 8-H vote, the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on HUD-Independent Agencies approved H.Con.Res. 521 as passed by the House. The House approved 218-188 a House Appropriations Committee recommendation to transfer $13.3 million to the Selective service System in order to begin standby draft registration of 19- and 20-year-old males this summer. The funds were transferred from prior-year unobligated balances remaining in an Air Force uilitary Personnel account. The vote came on amendment to H.J.Res.rS21, which originally provided $4.7 million to upgrade the standby status an of 00H/17/80 CR3-18 IB77032 UPDATE-05/20/80 Selective Service short of requiring registration. On earlier votes the House defeated 363-Q5 (not recorded) "an amendment by Representative Duncan (Oregon) to 03/07/80 03/05/80 02/27/80 02/08/80 01/23/30 -- provide $21 million to begin registering men and women as well as a proposal by Representative Bauman to appropriate $500 million to institute registration and classification. The House also turned down 319-an an amendment offered by Representative Weaver that would have authorized voluntary registration. The House Appropriations L:N:a;EF::‘:|T’Y 5TL0w3-M9; ~”~f“**"“""'