NGRESSIONAL SEARCH SERVICE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS |ll|Illiil'l'I ivefsi of M IIITIIIIIII -1 o 00 SOUl'l 61 fl 3 "||l°ll‘|’ll'i'll'lr|'ltl’lilalllIlll O28 ...._,......,...s. ..i 4- ‘A .._.n_ _ NUCLEAR ENERGY: ENRICHHENT AND REPROCESSING OF NUCLEAR FUELS ISSUE BRIEF NUMBER IB77126 AUTHOR: Civiak, Robert L. Science Policy Research Division THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE HAJOR ISSUES SYSTEM DATE ORIGINATED Qlglggzg DATE UPDATED Q FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL 287-5700 0318 CRS- 1 IB77126 UPDATE-O3/18/80 ‘§Q§-2§§l§L$l.§ Host nuclear reactors require that the fuel used be enriched in its content of uranium-235 over that which is_ found in naturally occurring uranium. The Federal Government has traditionally been involved in supplying ’enriched uranium to commercial users from plants which were built to meet U.S. defense needs. Additional capacity for enriching uranium will be required to meet the demand for uranium in the 19805 and 19905. Various methods are available for meeting this demand. At issue is the choice of technology for enriching uranium which will minimize the possibilities of proliferation of nuclear weapons; the speed of development of enrichment facilities necessary to ensure domestic needs and foreign commitments for enriched uranium; and the pricing and contracting policy for sales of enriched uranium by the;Department of Energy. While the necessity for uranium enrichment is clear, debate over whether spent fuel should be reprocessed at all is intense. when spent fuel is removed from a nuclear power plant, it still contains large quantities of fissionable materials, which can be reprocessed and used to make new reactor fuel, but which also can be used to fabricate nuclear weapons. Fearful of the diversion of nuclear materials to the production of weapons, the Carter ~Administration has ‘declared a temporary moratorium on spent fuel reprocessing. Opponents of this decision claim that not. to reprocess is wasteful of needed energy resources, and that technologies exist which would "make diversion of fissionable materials very difficult. EACKGEQQND A§D_PQLl§X_A!-L-§l§ ‘The overall process by which nuclear powerxis produced begins with the mining of uranium, ends with the disposal of radioactive wastes, and is called the nuclear fuel cycle. As nuclear power was developed in this country, it was envisaged that the steps in the fuel cycle would include: 1. nining and milling of uranium ore; 2. Enrichment of the uranium in its content of fissionable material; 3. Fabrication of fuel; u. Operation of a nuclear reactor; 5. Reprocessing of spent fuel and recycling of its useable fuel content and; 6. Disposal of radioactive wastes. Currently, this fuel cycle is not being completed as there is a moratorium on reprocessing activities in the United States and no radioactive wastes have been permanently disposed of as yet. A This Issue Brief will focus on steps 2 and 5 of the above fuel cycle. Step 6, disposal of radioactive wastes, is discussed in IB75012. Issues vconcerning the operation of conventional nuclear reactors is discussed in fIR77100, and the operation of breeder reactors, which produce more useable . 31 that can be recycled than they consume in operation, is discussed in IB77088. The fuel cycle sketched out above is called the uranium-plutonium (U-Pu) fuel cycle, because its origional fuel is uranium and both uranium and plutonium may be recycled as useable fuels. Alternative cycles based on thorium and uranium (Th-U fuel cycles) are possible and are discussed briefly cRs- 2 1377125 UPDATE-03/18/80 below. A major factor of concern regarding the enrichment and reprocessing stages of the fuel cycle is that fissionable material may be diverted to weapon" production during these operations by terrorist organizations or nation which operate civilian nuclear power programs, but do not yet have nuclear weapons capabilities. This Issue Brief will discuss technological means of deterring that occurrence.. Political and ‘institutional arrangements for restricting the diversion of fissionable materials to weapons production from any point in the fuel cycle are discussed in.IB78001 and IB77011. ranin2.§n£isheen2 Uranium, as it is found in nature, contains only 0.7% U-235, which is the fissionable isotope that can be used as a nuclear fuel. The remaining uranium is U-238, which does not readily fission and is unusable as a fuel. In order to be used as fuel for light water reactors (LWRs), the predominent type of nuclear power reactor used in the United States, the concentration of 0-235 in the uranium must be increased to between 2% and 3%.m By contrast, uranium for nuclear weapons needs to be highly enriched to more than 90% 0-235. The process of increasing the percentage of 0-235 in a supply of uranium is called enrichment, and it can be accomplished using various techniques which will be described below. ; The qa§§gg§_gif§3§i9g process was developed in the United States during the second world war to provide highly enriched uranium for weapons production. Plants were built in the late 19nOs and early 1950s for thfic purpose in Oak Ridge, Tenn., Paducah, Ky., and Portsmouth, Ohio. with mint adjustments, these plants can produce the slightly enriched uranium used in most power reactors and, until recently, were essentially the only source of enriched uranium for power reactors outside the Soviet Union. 4 Enrichment by the gaseous diffusion process, as well as most other processes, requires that the uranium first be converted into uranium hexaflouride (UF6), which is a gas at temperatures near room temperature. The gaseous diffusion process is based on the principle that in a mixture of gases of different molecular weights, lighter molecules will, on the average, travel faster than heavier molecules. They will thus hit the walls of their container more often and, if one of the walls is porous, the light molecules (containing U—235) will diffuse through at a faster rate than the heavy molecules (containing U-238). Since the weight difference between the uranium isotopes is small, this separation process must be repeated many times in order to enrich the outgoing stream to 3% U-235. The gas ‘is consecutively passed through as many as 1500 separate diffusion chambers, each one fifty feet tall, housed in a single plant. ‘ Tremendous amounts of electric power are needed to run the pumps and compressors used in this a process. Power is the predominent cost in enriching uranium by this technique. An enrichment plant currently being built in France will use four large nuclear power plants simply to provide power for the enrichment operation. The only other technique which has been used to enrich uranium on a. lar scale is the ggntgifugeyprocess. This pprocess also relies on the small weight difference between uranium hexaflouride molecules containing the two uranium isotopes. When the -gas is contained in a vrapidly spinning centrifuge, the heavier molecules tend to be forced vto the outside. This CBS- 3 IB77126 UPDATE-O3/18/80 produces a slight separation of the two species, which can be utilized. Although a European consortium has recently‘ begun operation of two large centrifuge enrichment plants, the technique is still somewhat unproven. The rability of the centrifuges, which rotate so fast that the walls are moving at nearly 1,000 miles per hour, is not known. About 25 consecutive stages dare still needed to obtain 3% enrichment and several thousand centrifuges must be used to obtain a reasonable quantity of enriched uranium. The _advantage of this process is that it requires only 5% to 10% as much power as the gaseous diffusion process, and thus may be considerably cheaper. The efficiency of the enrichment process could be greatly improved if the currently experimental lg§§§_ ggpgratigg technique proves feasible. In principle, laser light could be "tuned" to knock an electron off of uranium hexaflouride molecules containing U-235, while leaving those with 0-238 atoms unaffected. This process could also be applied directly to uranium atoms, maintained in a gaseous state at very high temperatures. Once one species has been "ionized" (by removing an electron), it is a relatively simple matter to collect that species. Enrichment could proceed in a single stage with such a technique. 9 Another advantage of laser separation, is that it might be practical with initial supplies of uranium containing very small amounts of 0-235. Gaseous diffusion and centrifuge plants presently produce two outputs. one stream contains the 3% enriched uranium desired, and the "waste stream" contains vfron 0.2% to 0.3% U-235, which is too costly to recover. The amount of 0-235 contained in the waste is called the tails assay. Large supplies of uranium containing low tails assays of 0-235 have been accumulated. If laser ‘separation proves to be an economical means of using this U-235, it could tend uranium resources by as much as 30%. A chemical enrichment technique which has been under development in France since 1968 could provide enrichment with no threat of proliferation. This technique could produce the 2 to H% enriched uranium needed for light water reactors in a relatively short time, but would require over 30 years to produce nuclear weapon grade material. The U.S. DOE and the French Atomic Energy Commission signed an agreement in. September 1979 to conduct joint experiments with this process which could lead to a pilot plant as early as 1985. when the laser separation technique was first discussed, there was much concern that this would make uranium enrichment too easy and thus run counter to U.S. efforts to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, most pexperts now believe that, the difficulty in building and operating ‘the complex laser systems necessary- to use this technique, and other technological complications, will make this an unattractive method for use by developing countries or terrorist organizations trying to obtain highly enrichedturanium. other techniques for uranium enrichment have received some attention. A jet nozzle technique has been developed, which, it is believed, will be used in an enrichment plant to be built in South Africa in the late 1980s. The ‘jet nozzle technique obtains a slight separation of isotopes by shooting ’uranium hexaflouride out of a nozzle at very high speeds. Another approach, called the Haga process, developed by an Austrian engineer, relies on turbulences set up in a specially designed chamber to separate the gaseous species of different weights.‘ It is expected that a pilot plant using this process will be built in West Germany or in the United CRS- L; IB77126 UPDATE-O3/18/80 States in the near future. Until recently the three gaseous diffusion enrichment plants built by the United States in the 1940s and early 1950s were essentially the only source of enriched uranium outside the Soviet Union.‘ These plants are owned by the Government and operated by contractors on a cost plus fixed fee contract. Prices for the uranium are set on a cost recovery basis in accordance with provisions in the Atomic Energy Act of 195a. Provision for sufficient enrichment capacity to meet the demands of the domestic and international nuclear power industry has been an issue for many years. Prior to 1974, the Atomic Energy Commission required purchasers of enriched uranium to make commitments ten years in advance. In the early 1970s, optimism regarding the future of nuclear power resulted in orders which the Atomic Energy Commission believed would fully commit its facilities despite plans to increase the capacity of the diffusion plants by 50%. Because of this, in July 197a, the AEC stopped taking new orders for uranium enrichment. This action and the oil embargo, caused several countries to reevaluate their need for energy independence and to begin plans to construct their own enrichment facilities. While the United States is presently still the predominent Western supplier of enriched uranium, this situation is likely to change in a few years. The table below shows the current status of major worldwide uranium enrichment plants. CRS- 5 IB77126 UPDATE-O3/18/80 Worldwide Uranium Enrichment Capacity -- Existing and Planned Existing and Planned Capacity ---_--_12illi2n-§EQszx;-----_-_ Plant Type 1979 1981 1985 1990 United States « oak Ridge, Tenn. diffusion 5.6 7.5 7.5 7.5 Paducah, Kentucky diffusion 8.7 11.5 11.5 11.5 Portsmouth, Ohio diffusion 6.2 8.3 8.3 8.3 Portsmouth, Ohio centrifuge -- --- 0.2 2.2* SUBTOTAL §6T§""§7T§""§5T§"'"§§T§' Soviet Union 1 Siberia diffusion 7-10 7-10 10+ 10+ Urenco (Britain, Netherlands, W. Germany) Almela, Xeth. centrifuge 0.3 0.5 1.0 1-5 7 Capenhurst, G.B centrifuge 0.3 0.5 1.0 1-5 7 Gronau, W.G. centrifuge -- -+- 1 ? 1-5 ? SUBTOTAL 5T§"i 7.0 5-3 2-10 Eurodif (France, Italy, Belgium, Spain, Iran) Tricastin, France diffusion 2.6 9 10.8 10.8 Coredif (France and others) no site diffusion -- -- --- 5-10 ? South Africa Valindaba jet nozzle ? -- --- 5 5 ? Japan . Tokai aura centrifuge -- --- 5 ? 5 ? TOTAL §1—3u ’ uEZE5"'§§Z€§"'€§3§§ * Additional capacity may be added in 1.1 million SWU increments. CRS- 6 IB77126 UPDATE-O3/18/80 A note about units is in order. A separate work unit (SWU) is a measure of separation of isotopes which can be performed. A yearly recharge for a 1,000 MW reactor requires about 0.1 million SWUS to be performed on a supply of naturally occurring uranium. However, this can be reduced, at the expense of consuming more uranium, if a larger tails assay is used. The tails assay is the amount of U—235 remaining in the waste stream of the enrichment plant. Operating with a tails assay of 0.37% U-235, would use up about 40% more natural uranium to obtain enough enriched uranium for a standard reactor reload than a tails assay of 0.15%. However, the separative work required to enrich this uranium would be about 65% less. The above figure of 0.1 million SHU for a 1,000 nw reactor is based on a tails assay of 0.25%. E In 1978, Congress recognized that adequate U.S. enrichment capacity was important to the goals of nuclear non-proliferation. The Nuclear Non—Proliferation Act of 1978, P.L. 95-242, declares that it will be national policy to “provide a reliable supply of nuclear fuel to those nations and groups of nations which adhere to policies designed to prevent [nuclear weapons] proliferation." In addition, it directs the Secretary of the Department of Energy (DOE) to initiate activities for expansion of uraniumm enrichment capacity. Consistent with this policy, funds were authorized for 1978 for the construction of a new centrifuge enrichment plant of 8.8 million SWU, and in May 1978, DOE began accepting new orders for enrichment services. The DOE also began an aggressive marketing program for U.S. enrichment services and liberalized the contract requirements, including reducing the commitment by the purchaser to five years rather than ten. It is unclear if this will be successful in retaining a dominent share or worldwide enrichment activity for the United States. Although the 0.5. price for enriched uranium is lower than that of Western competitors, there is also apprehension among foreign customers that there will be restrictions placed on the reprocessing of uranium enriched in the United States. In June 1979, the Anglo-Dutch-German enrichment consortium, Urenco, announced that it had obtained contracts from European customers for 7.3 million SWU of enrichment services, valued at $400 million, which had previously been with DOE. A virtually complete halt in new orders for nuclear reactors and the cancellation of several plants which had obtained‘ construction permits, together with prospects for more foreign enrichment plants, has recently caused the Department of Energy to delay the schedule for the new Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant (GCEP) which is being built in Portsmouth, Ohio. Originally targeted to have 8.8 million SWUs capacity in 1986, it‘ is now scheduled to have its first 2.2 million Sins available in 1988. Decisions on additional capacity in units of 1.1 million swash will be made at ifuture dates. This slowdown has been criticized as being counter to U.S. efforts towards non-proliferation. However, since the U.S. stockpile of enriched uranium has grown to nearly 00 million SWO, the Administration believes that current plans will provide adequate enrichment capacity for domestic and V international needs through the 1980s. The currently scheduled enrichment capacity for 1990, operating at 0.20” tails assay, could supply enough enriched uranium for 2H5 gigawatts \ nuclear generating capacity. iThe latest DOE projection for domestic capacity for 1990 is 152 gigawatts. pThis would leave enough enrichment capacity for 93 gigawatts of foreign nuclear electricity generation. Thel Administration ens- 7 1377 126 UPDATE -0 3/18/80 estimates that the demand for U.S. enrichment services from foreign sources will be 90 gigawatts in 1990. If domestic or foreign demand should increase faster than these projections, additional enriched uranium could be supplied “ increasing the tails assay above the current 0.20% or by speeding construction of new centrifuge capacity. Reprocessing Uranium In a conventional fossil fuel plant, in which coal or oil is burned, the smoke and ash which is discharged and the unburned slag contain little or not usable fuel. In a nuclear reactor, however, when the fuel rods must be replaced, they still contain appreciable quantities of U-235 and plutonium, both of which are potentially valuable as fuels. The term "reprocessing" refers to the recovering of this uranium and plutonium for further use as nuclear fuels. Reactor fuel elements that have been only partially consumed must be replaced for several reasons. First, the accumulation of fission products produced in the reactor act as “neutron poisons“ and tend to degrade the efficiency of the reactor. Second, the fissionable uranium is gradually being depleted, and eventually the nuclear chain reaction can no longer be sustained. Third, changes in the dimensions and shape of the fuel rods, vcreated by bombardment of the fission fragments and by temperature stress, may so degrade their structural integrity that they need to be replaced. In a typical light water reactor, one-third of the irradiated fuel is removed each year. If spent fuel were to be reprocessed, it would first be removed from the reactor and transferred to storage in pools of water for at least several months to allow the intense initial radioactivity to partially decay. The fuel rods could then be shipped to a reprocessing plant in casks specially designed to prevent the escape of radioactive materials. If the reprocessing were to be by the "Purex" process, the only method which has been used on a large scale, the fuel rods would be chopped up by mechanical shears and the fuel pellets dissolved by nitric acid. The solution would then be treated by a solvent—extraction process to separate out the uranium and plutonium. The uranium is produced in solid oxide form, ready to shift back for conversion into uranium hexafluoride for re-enrichment. The plutonium can be produced .in liquid nitrate or solid oxide form for shipment to a nuclear fuel fabricator. Some of the remaining fission products, which include elements such as strontium-90 and cesium-137, may be used for medical applications. However, most of*the fission products have no present use and must be stored tor disposed of in ways that will assure no release to the environment. Thus, a Purex reprocessing plant would produce three products: uranium, which is recycled to the enrichment plant; plutonium, for direct use as nuclear fuel; and nuclear wastes. Carter Administration Policy for Deferral of Reprocessing Until recent years, the nuclear industry maintained that reprocessing was a natural and inevitable step in developing nuclear technology, ldictated by the desire to conserve nuclear fuel., However, because of the dangers some analysts associate with the products of a reprocessing facility, the desirability of reprocessing has been called into question. The uranium and CRS— 8 x IB77126i UPDATE-03/18/80 the nuclear wastes produced bear no significant dangers to the national defense security, but the plutonium separated in a reprocessing facility is another matter. This plutonium could be used to make nuclear explosives without the need for further enrichment, and it could also theoretically be used as a radiological warfare agent. Because of these potential hazards. the Carter Administration in April 1977 decided to halt nuclear reprocessing work in the United States, and to take steps to discourage reprocessing in other nations. In a statement issued on Apr. 3, 1977, President Carter stated: ' "... we will defer indefinitely the commercial reprocessing and recycling of the plutonium produced in the U.S. nuclear power programs. From our own experience we have concluded that a viable and economic nuclear power program can be sustained without such preprocessing and recycling. The plant at Barnwell, South Carolina, will receive neither federal encouragement nor funding for its completion as a reprocessing facility.... We will increase U.S. production capacity for enriched uranium to provide adequate and timely supply of nuclear fuels for domestic and foreign needs.... We will continue to embargo the export of equipment or technology that would permit uranium enrichment or chemical reprocessing" The Presidential decision took the United States out of the reprocessing business, and, as one journal noted, "severed the fuel cycle.“ Reaction t this policy from the nuclear industry was strongly negative. The American Nuclear Energy Council, one of the nuclear industry's primary lobbying groups, stated: "Ironically, the White House policies are in direct contradiction to the cornerstone of President Carter's proposed National Energy Plan: conservation and improved energy efficiency.... Uranium, like oil and natural gas, is a finite and depletable resource. Therefore, we must do everything we can to conserve uranium and improve its energy efficiency.... A lot has been said about alternative fuel cycles, however,...[all] nuclear fuel cycles produce plutonium or other weapons usable material...every fuel cycle except the "throwaway" fuel cycle requires a : reprocessing step.... For these reasons and for they need to conserve our domestic uranium resources, the U.S. should move ahead with reprocessing and recycle....“ one of the leading "anti+nuclear" lobbying groups, the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), stated its anti-reprocessing position as follows: "...Another danger involves the production of atomic bomb materials. A typical plant produces 500 pounds of plutonium a year, and it takes only 20 pounds to CRS- 9 IB77126 UPDATE—03/18/80 make a bomb. If, as the nuclear industry wishes, this material is separated out and so becomes available for theft, the possibility of terrorist acquisition will be vastly increassed.... The fuel reprocessing procedure involves extracting plutonium from the wastes...." The ban on reprocessing is still in effect, and the debate continues in 1980 over the need for reprocessing and its relationship to nuclear weapons proliferation. Proliferation Resistant Reprocessing Technologies Various schemes have been suggested which might reduce the proliferation potential of reprocessing. These include: coprocessing --reprocessing uranium and plutonium together, without ever producing a separate stream of plutonium; spiking -- leaving a small amount of fission products mixed with the plutonium, which could make the mixture difficult to handle without suffering immediate adverse health effects from the radiation emitted from the fission products; denaturing - mixing non-fissionable isotopes of the same substance with the fissionable material in order to necessitate complex isotope separation procedures before the product could be used in weapons production; colocation -- locating powerplants, reprocessing and fuel fabrication facilities at the same site in order to eliminate the transportation of materials that could be used in weapons making. A specific process, called the Civex process, encompassing the concepts of coprocessing, spiking, and possibly colocation was first proposed in February 1978 by the Electric Power Research Institute (a research organization funded by U.S. electric utilities) and the British Atomic Energy Authority. Two advantages are claimed for Civex: (1) the plutonium concentration never rises above 20% and thus remains below weapons-grade levels, and (2) the fission products included with the uranium-plutonium mixture are so highly radioactive that the mixture would incapacitate or kill anyone trying to steal it. Thus, the dangers of proliferation and terrorist theft, which prompted the Carter Administration's deferral of reprocessing, would be greatly diminished. Civex is a new concept, and it might take as long as a decade to test its effectiveness. There are currently three divergent points of view regarding proliferationi resistant reprocessing. One, maintained by the Carter Administration, is that no reprocessing method can be made as proliferation resistant as the once~through fuel cycle (no reprocessing at all) and hence, all reprocessing should be discouraged. A second position, held widely outside of the United States, is that proliferation cannot be stopped by any technical means, but at reprocessing is necessary and should be allowed with suitable international controls to retard proliferation. The third opinion is that Civex or some similar reprocessing technology could substantially reduce the dangers of proliferation. cns-1o 11377125 UPDATE-03/18/80 Alternative Fuel Cycles Consideration has been given to fuel cycles which do not involve plutonium as another means of limiting the potential for nuclear weapons proliferation. In the thorium fuel cycle, thorium-232, which is not itself fissionable, captures neutrons in.a nuclear reactor and is transformed into uranium-233, which is a fissionable fuel and sustains the wheat producing fission chain reaction in the reactor. The advantage of using the thorium cycle is that one could then use the thorium resources of the world as a nuclear fuel. (These resources are believed to be substantially greater than those of uranium.) The thorium cycle has been promoted as not having the proliferation dangers of the uranium-plutonium cycle. This argument has been questioned, since U-233 can also be used to make a nuclear bomb. However, many believe that 0-233 would present problems to the potential bomb maker that are not a factor when plutonium is used. It has also been claimed that a proliferation threat would existw during the first few years of use of the thorium cycle. Since uranium-233 does not occur naturally, U-235 would presumably be used in the "start-up“ process- Since pure U-235 is difficult to produce and is itself a weapons material, the uranium would include U-238. The bombardment of this U-238 by neutrons would cause plutonium to be formed. While this threat would only exist during the start-up phase of the thorium cycle, this period could last 20 years or more. International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation In October 1977 an International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (IRFCE) was convened to study issues relating reprocessing and nuclear fuel cycles to determine, among other things, if the risks of nuclear proliferation could be reduced. Eight working groups were formed and over 250 reports have been submitted to the conference. The final plenary meeting of the 63-nation conference is to be held in Geneva, Switzerland, early in 1980, at which time the conclusions of the evaluation will be announced. According to a draft summary of the conclusions of INFCE quoted in the Washington Post, Hucleonics Week and elsewhere, INFCE will find that there is no technological fix which will reduce the potential for proliferation. The conference will not recommend an international ban on reprocessing. This represents a defeat for the position held by the Carter Administration, which had initially hoped for such a ban. However, according to the Washington Post, INFCB does conclude that at this time "there is not much of an economic case to be made for reprocessing, reprocessing, does not provide energy independence and it is not necessary for waste disposal." This attitude may slow the rush to reprocessing which began several years ago. Reprocessing Activities In other Nations The only commercial reprocessing plant for LWR fuel currently operating . the Western world is a small facility at a La Hague, France. However, a number of other nations have shown an active interest in reprocessing nuclear fuel. Great Britain has operated a reprocessing facility since 196a at cns-11 IB77126 UPDATE-O3/18/80 Windscale, which handled fuel from the high-temperature gas reactors (HTGR's) used in that country and is being modified‘ to take LWR fuel. Japan is working on a demonstration-scale plant at Tokai Mura; and France, Britain, and Japan all have larger reprocessing plants in the planning stages for the 1805, as does West Germany. Other nations that have indicated some interest in nuclear reprocessing include Belgium, Italy, India, Pakistan, and Brazil. None of these nations deferred or cancelled their reprocessing plans after the President's policy statement. The Barnwell Facility The plant most directly affected by the current Administrationfis reprocessing policy was the facility at Barnwell, South Carolina, planned as an operating civilian, reprocessing plant. BBarnwell was being built by a private firm (Allied General Nuclear Services) with its own funds, and was still in the construction stage (nearing completion) when the Carter reprocessing program was announced. President Carter declared in his April 7, 1977, statement that: “The plant at Barnwell, South Carolina, will receive neither federal encouragement nor funding for its completion as a reprocessing facility...." Efforts are now under way to find other uses for the Barnwell plant and its personnel, most likely in the area of advanced fuel cycle research projects. The DOE appropriation for FY79 included $16 million for activities at Barnwell. The Administration did not request any funds for Barnwell for FY80. However, the authorization and appropriation bills reported out of committee both contain funds for research into reprocessing of fuel to \ ntinue at that facility. Congressional Concern Regarding Nuclear Enrichment and Reprocessing. Issues of concern with regard to nuclear reprocessing and enrichment I include: (a) The future of uranium enrichment. which will be the best way to enrich uranium in the future - gaseous diffusion, centrifuge, or laser separation? Is laser separation technology so dangerous, again in terms of nuclear proliferation, that it should be discouraged? (b) The Carter Administration's plan for suspending nuclear reprocessing work, thus removing the United States from the reprocessing business. Is this a wise policy, when the benefits of nuclear vreprocessing in terms of energy conservation are balanced against the hazards of plutonium falling into the wrong hands? Will the new Civex wprocess diminish those hazards enought to tilt the balance in favor of reprocessing? (c) The nuclear spent fuel policy, which follows from the yanti-reprocessing decision. How will this be applied, especially where foreign nations are concerned? Is the United States prepared, in the i erests of nuclear non-proliferation, to become a repository for tthe world's nuclear wastes? Funding Levels cns-12 IB77126 UPDATE-O3/18/80 Funding for the Department of Energy for uranium enrichment activities, research and development on enrichment, and research and development on reprocessing (Fuel Cycle R 5 D) is shown in the following table. (Figures are in millions of dollars). Congressional action on the FY80 funding is discussed in the legislation section. QQ§_EEE2LE§-§0R EHBICE§§HI.AED-REEEQ§§§§£E. Category FY79 FY80 Approp. Approp. Request Uranium Enrichment Activities 1‘;_Q;Q___1‘1§g;§ Operating Expenses 902.5 705.2 Capital Equipment 1 17.0 18.0 Construction 300.0 436.2 Uranium Enrichment Process Development §1;§ $95.3 Operating Expenses 75.8 77.4 Capital Equipment 4.7 5.0 Construction 7.0 13.0 Advanced Isotope Separation 5fl.2 54.2: operating Expenses 06.2 u6.2 Capital Equipment 8.0 8.0 TOTAL URANIUM ENRIC HMENT 1 1 ,36 1 .7 1, 309 .14 FUEL CYCLE R 5 D (reprocessing) 75.6 30.0 The FY80 request for uranium enrichment includes a decrease from .FY79 if over $200 million in operating expenses for them three gaseous diffusion separation plants, which reflects a reduced near term demand for nuclear power. Progress on construction at the Portsmouth Gas Centrifuge Plant has resulted in an increase in the request for construction, funds, despite ma (slowdown from the original construction schedule for that plant. For FY80, $323 million is requested for construction at the Portsmouth plant. Revenues received from domestic and foreign sales of enriched uranium substantially offset the costs of operating and constructing enrichment plants. For FY80 it is expected that revenue will be $1,310 million, which will exceed the budgeted costs. Research and development relating to reprocessing and recycling of nuclear fuels is the major activity of the Department of Energy's Fuel Cycle R 8 program. Prior to FY79, Fuel Cycle R 8 D existed as a separate line itemi in the budget and contained programs relating to light water reactors as well as high temperature gas reactors and breeder reactors. In line with the cas-13 IB77126 UPDATE-03/18/80 Administration policy to delay reprocessing, Fuel Cycle R 8 D has been included in the Breeder Reactor program since FY79, and the Administration has attempted to restrict reprocessing research and development to those processes that would be needed for breeder reactors.= Congress did not fully )llow this policy in FY79 and appropriated $16 million to continue reprocessing activities at the Barnwell Nuclear Fuels Plant and $5 million in construction funding for the High—Performance Fuel Laboratory in Richland, Washington, which is related to Civex work. For FY80, the Administration has again choosen to request funding only for reprocessing activities relating to breeder reactors. It is likely that Congress will again restore additional funds for reprocessing. Action thusl far on authorization and appropriations for FY80 are discussed in the legislation section. L§§l3.§l-.A2.I.0N P.L. 96-69 (3.3. n3a3) Energy and Water Development Appropriation Act. Includes appropriations for the Department of Energy for energy supply, research, and development. Passed House June 18, 1979 (H.Rept. 96-243); passed Senate July 12, 1979 (S.Rept. 96-2&2). Conference Committee Report (H.Rept. 96-388) agreed to by House on Aug. 1, 1979, and Senate on Sept. 10, 1979. Signed intoi law (P.L. 096-69) Sept. 25, 1979. Provides the following appropriations for enrichment and reprocessing: $1,159.8 million for uranium enrichment activities; $95.0 million for uranium enrichment process development; $5fl.2. million for advanced isotope separation; $30 million for fuel cycle R 8 D, which is stly for reprocessing of breeder fuels; and $19.5 million for reprocessing activities within the converter reactor program. H.R. 3000 (staggers et al.) Department of Energy Authorization Act for Fiscal years 1980 and 1981 -- Civilian Applications. Introduced Mar. 15, 1979; referred to four committees. Title I, Research and Development, was referred to the Committee on Science and Technology, which reported to the House on May 15, 1979 (H.Rept. 96-196, part 3). Authorizes the following appropriations relating to enrichment and reprocessing: $1,101 million for uranium enrichment activities; $95.u million for uranium enrichment process development; $54.2 million for advanced isotope separation; $37.5 million for fuel cycle R 8 D, which is mostly for studies of reprocessing of breeder reactor fuels; and $14.0 million for reprocessing of light water reactor and gas reactor fuels as part of the converter reactor program. The bill also requires that the DOE prepare a report on the long-term policy and plan for U.S. yuranium enrichment to be submitted with the FY81 budget request. The measure passed the House Oct..2fl, 1979. S. 688 (Jackson by request) Department of Energy Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1980 and 1981 -- Civilian Applications. Introduced Mar. 15, 1979; reported to the Senate by t‘\ Energy and Natural Resources Committee on June 26, 1979 (S.Rept. 96-232). Tn; Committee added $100 million to the Administration request for enrichment activities to cover increased power costs and to provide assurance that commitments for enriched uranium will be met. For reprocessing the Committee added $11.8 million for work at Barnwell, $6 million for high temperature gas reactor Hanford §§3Rl!§§ &j U.S. cns—1u IB77126 UPDATE-O3/18/80 fuel cycle research, and $8 million for remote processing word at the facility in Washington. Congress. House. Committee on Small Business. Subcommittee on Energy and Environment. Problems in the accounting for and safeguarding of special nuclear materials. Hearings, 94th Congress, 2d session.i Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977. 1655 p. House. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment. Recycling of plutonium. ‘Oversight hearings, 9flth Congress, 2d session. Wabington, 0.5. Govt. Print. Off., 1977. 1112 p. Congress. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources Subcommittee. Nuclear waste disposal costs (West Valley, New York). Hearings, 95th Congress, 1st session. Mar. 8 and 10, Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977. 302 p. 1977. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Proposals Congress. Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment. affecting use of plutonium as a reactor fuel. Hearings, 95th Congress, 1st session on H.R. 523fl and H.R. 21u5. Apr. 26, 28, and 29, 1977. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977. 160 p. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs. The Nuclear Antiproliferation Act of 1977. Hearings and markup before the Committee on International Relations, House of Hepresentitives, and its Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and on International Economic Policy and Trade, 95th Congress, 1st session, on H.R. 8638. Washington, 0.5. Govt. Print. Off., 1977. 418 p. gzvoare.AI12-.<;2.Lv§§.E.§.s;;9.r1g_no9.ny.§I32. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Public Works for Water and Power Development and Energy Research appropriation bill, 1979; report to accompany H.R. 12928, June 1, 1978. [Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. off., 1978] 143 p. (95th Congress, 2nd session. House. Report no. 95-1247) 9 Congress. House. Committee of Conference, 1978. Public Works for Water and Power, Development and Energy Research appropriation bill for 1979; conference report to accompany H.R. 12928. Aug. 1H, 1978. [Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1978] 68 p. (95th Congress, 2d session. House. Report no. 95—1fl90) CRS-15 IB77126 .UPDATE-03/18/80 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Technology. Department of Energy authorization bill for energy research and development for FY79. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1978. (95th Congress, 2d session. House. Report no. Bu-1078, Part I). U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations Energy and water Development appropriation bill, 1979; report to accompany H.R. 12928. Aug. 7 (legislative day, may 17), 1978. [Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1978] 125 p. (95th Congress, 2d session. Senate. Report no. 95-1069) U.S. Congress. Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. Authorizations for Department of Energy civilian programs, fiscal year 1979. Report, together with additional views, to accompany S. 2692. July 5 (legislative day, May 17), 1978. Washington, 0.3. Govt. Print. Off., 1978. 307 p. (95th Congress, 2d session. Senate. Report no. 95-967) U.S. Congressional Budget Office. Uranium enrichment: alternatives for meeting the Nation's needs and their implications for the Federal Budget. Washington. For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976. 79 p. 2 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Technology. Subcommittee on Fossil and Nuclear Energy Research, Development and Demonstration.) ERDA authorization hearings for FY78 on nuclear power; issues and choices; a report of the Nuclear Energy Policy Study Group. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977. 107 p. U.S. Library of Congress. Environment and Natural Resources Policy Division). Nuclear proliferation factbook. Prepared for the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade of the Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives and the Subcommittee on Ener9Y: Nuclear Proliferation, and Federal Services of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977. 595 p. QEBQEQLQGY QF EV§_I§ 10/O5/79 -- The President submitted to Congress the first annual report of the need for additional U.S. uranium enrichment capacity mandated by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. The report noted that the earliest new capacity, (beyond the first 2.2 million SHU planned for the Portsmouth Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant) might be needed, is in the mid to late 1990s and that additional capacity could be provided in six years, while 10 years or more are required to build a nuclear powerplant. 09/O0/79 - 'The U.S. DOE and the French Atomic Energy Commission agreed to conduct joint experiments on a chemical enrichment process which could produce reactor grade O6/00/79 o5/2 5/73 a 05/01/73 03/10/78 02/00/78 11/05/77 10/is/77 oa/0 7/77 o7/1 1/77 O4/20/77 out/no 7/77 cns-16 IB77126 UPDATE-O3/18/80 uranium, but would reguire over 30 years to produce weapons grade uranium. The DOE will spend $1 million on the process in the first year of the agreement, which could lead to a pilot plant as early as 1985. The Anglo-Dutch-German enrichment consortium, Urenco, announced that it had obtained contracts from European customers for 7.3 million SWU of enrichment services, valued at $flOO million, which had previously been with the U.S. Department of Energy. The Department of Energy announced that it was ready to begin accepting new orders for enrichment services. Secretary Schlesinger informed the chairman of the committees and subcommittees handling the FY79 Department of Energy Budget that DOE planned a 2- or 3-year delay in the schedule for the Portsmouth Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant. President Carter signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act into law (P.L. 95-242). Among its provisions, it stipulated that it was U.S. policy to ensure an adequate supply of enriched uranium to countries which adhered to policies designed to prevent proliferation and directed the Department of Energy to begin activities to increase its capacity for uranium enrichment. The "Civex“.reprocessing concept is proposed by the U.S. Electric Power Research Institute and the British Atomic Energy Authority. President Carter vetoed the ERDA authorization because it included funding for the Clinch River Breeder Reactor Program. Administration announces new spent fuel policy, offering to accept spent fuel from domestic reactors and some foreign nations. President Carter signed into law the Public works - Energy Research appropriations bill (H.R. 7553) as P.L. 95-96. ERDA announced plan to build a $u.5-billion centrifuge facility at Portsmouth, Ohio, to begin operation in 1986. The Carter Energy Plan was announced, in which the President declared his intention to proceed with light water reactor development while discouraging work on reprocessing and on the breeder. He also declared that increased enrichment capacity should use centrifuge technology to save energy. President Carter announced "indefinite" deferral of ‘reprocessing and recycling of plutonium as nuclear 03/00/77 01/19/75 10/00/74 00/00/57 00/00/57 00/00/SH 00/00/51 00/00/06 12/02/H2 cus-17 IB77126 UPDATE-03/18/80 fuel in commercial reactors. Ford Foundation report, "Nuclear Power Issues and Choices" released. This report concluded that light water reactors should be used as a major energy source, but that reprocessing and recycling should be deferred indefinitely and the breeder program "restructured." This became the basis for the Carter Administration nuclear policy. P.L. 93-#38 went into effect, abolishing the Atomic Energy Commission and creating the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NBC), and the Energy Resources Council. The Atomic Energy Commission determined that its current contracts to supply enriched uranium obligated all of its capacity and stopped taking orders for new enrichment contracts. Initial operation of the 60-megawatt Shippingport prototype pressurized-water nuclear power plant, at Shippingport, Pa. This power plant was AEC-owned and built under a cooperative agreement with the Duguesne Power Company. The Price-Anderson amendments to the Atomic Energy Act of 195a were passed to provide insurance and partial indemnification of nuclear equipment suppliers and users for and from liability for damages arising from any nuclear accident. The purpose of these amendments was to further encourage the participation of private industry, consistent with the purpose of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Atomic Energy Act of 195a revised the 19u6 to to permit and encourage the participation of private industry in the development of nuclear energy. World's first electricity generated from nuclear energy by the experimental breeder reactor-I (EBB-1) at the National Reactor Testing Station in Idaho. Atomic Energy Act of 1946 established a Federal government monopoly of nuclear energy development. The first self-sustaining fission chain reaction was with the successful operation of Chicago Pile No. 1. ADDIELQEBL EEFEBENCE 3QQ§§§§ A furor over nuclear reprocessing. PP- American Nuclear Society. Business week, Dec. 5, 1977, 26D-26E. Nuclear power and the environment: CBS-18 IB77126 UPDATE-03/78/80 questions and answers. Hinsdale, Illinois, American Nuclear Society, Apr. 1976. 122 p.. Facts about the nuclear power controversy, August 1977. Union of Concerned Scientists, Cambridge, Mass. 8 p. Hayes, Denis. Nuclear power:( the fifth horseman. Worldwatch Institute, Washington, Hay 1976. 68 p. "Worldwatch Paper 6.0 . Laser enrichnent of uranium: the proliferation connection. Science, may 13, 1977, pp. 721-730. MITRE Corporation. Nuclear power: issues and choices: report of the nuclear energy policy study group (sponsored by the Ford Foundation, administered by the MITRE Corporation). Cambridge, Nass., Ballinger Publishing Co., 1977. 1005 p. Hurray, Raymond L. Nuclear energy: an introduction to the concepts, systems, and applications of nuclear processes. New York. Pergmon Press, Inc., 1975. 278 p. Need for additional U.S. uranium enrichment capacity and desirability of options for foreign participation in new U.S. uranium enrichment facilities. A Report by the President. Submitted to Congress Oct. 5, 1979. 11 p. New spent fuel policy unveiled. Science, Nov. 11, 1977, p. 591. President Carter's nuclear policy and the national energy plan. American Nuclear Energy Council, Washington, D.C., 5 p. (Date not given, but apparently mid-1977). Statement by President Carter on nuclear power policy. The energy daily, Apr. 8, 1977, p. 3. (Full text appears here.) _U.S. Congress. General Accounting Office. Uranium enrichment policies and operations: status and future needs. Report no. nun—77-5n. Nov. 18, 1977, 55 p. U.S. energy research and development FY78 congressional action table. Congressional record, Dec. 7, 1977, pp. H12801-B12807. U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Breeder reactors: the Clinch River project (by) Marcia S. Smith. [Washington] 1977. (Continuously updated) Issue Brief 77088 ----- Fusion power: potential energy source [by] Lani Raleigh. [Washington] 1977. (Continuously updated) Issue Brief 75ou7 ----- Nuclear fission technology (non-breeder) [by] Nigdon R. Segal. [Washington] 1977. (Continuously updated) Issue Brief 77100 ----- Nuclear waste management [by] Carl E. Behrens. [Washington] 1977; (Continuously updated) cns-19 IB77126 UPDATE-O3/18/80 Issue Brief 75012 -“r—— Weapons proliferation: legislation for policy and other measures [by] Warren H. Donnelly and Donna S. Kramer. [Washington] 1977. (Continuously updated) Issue Brief 77011 i U.S. Office of Technology Assessnent. Huclear proliferation and safeguards. Praeger, 1977. Warner, Andrew W. Understanding the nuclear reactor. Barrington, Ill. Technical Publishing Co., 1970. 106 p. LE.f?aE5«‘.Y WA:‘Es%=~%fl€f+£E§T()fd UNi\*'EFiSiT‘\’ Ln..ST' L.c‘>:‘1.—¥£!&~: — M0. L. m—.