THE
ALBANY
BRIDGE _UESTION.
OF THE
Hlon. DANIEL E. SICKLES,
OF NEW YORK,
IN THE NEW YORK STATE SENATE.
IN OPPOSITION TO THE REPORT OF THE SENATE
COMMITTEE, FOR A BRIDGE ACROSS THE
HUDSON RIVER, AT ALBANY.
MAR CH, 1856.
TROY, N. Y.
TROY DAILY WHIG PRINT, 213 RIVER STREET.
1856.








SPEECH.
Mr. CHAIRMAN:-4n order to place before the Senate in a
clearer and more conspicuously expressed form, the amendment, on which I intend to offer some observations, I will
withdraw the motion to amend, and in lieu offer the following section as a substitute for the 8th section of the bill. It
is not for any one to hope, and certainly I shall not have the
vanity to presume, that I can offer for the consideration of
the Senate anything new upon this subject. A question
which has been before the people of the State, and been considered in the Legislature since 1814, and which has enlisted
the attention of the ablest minds in and out of the Legisla-,
ture, may well be considered exhausted, so far as argument
is concerned. If I shall succeed in presenting the case in a
light which may have the slightest claim to novelty, it is only
because I have been enabled to regard it, not in the light of
a partizan, but with the utmost freedom from bias and the
utmost degree of freedom from partiality, of any kind, that I
have been able to attain. It is indeed true, as has been argued, that the new means and facilities for transportation
converging to this point, as a centre, and the increasing trade
and travel due to these sources of traffic, and tributary to
them, demand some additional means for crossing the river
at this point. But I have been induced to think, while there
has been a great deal of crimination and recrimination between the different interests involved, that after all the real
question at issue is, in fact, a question of mechanics and engineering-not political engineering, but scientific engineering. All will concede,. who have examined the question in
its legal and Constitutional aspect, that it would never answer to construct, or authorize to be constructed, a bridge
crossing a navigable river, like the Hudson, which may be,




4
in the fair meaning of terms, an obstruction to navigation;
while, on the other hand, not the most enthusiastic Trojan or Albanian, will be inclined to contend that if the
demands of trade-no matter through what channel it may
flow, whether over the railroad or through the canalcan be reasonably furthered and promoted by the construction of such a bridge over the Hudson, at this point, as will
not obstruct navigation, not one, even the most determined
partizan against this bill, in the form in which it is now before the Senate, can reasonably maintain his opposition.
The considerations which I shall submit to the Senate, have
reference entirely to the question, whether it is not possible
to construct a bridge which will answer all the demands of
those who ask for it, and at the same time obviate the objections of those who cannot give their assent to the project now
before us. Let us glance for an instant at the state of the
case as thus presented to our view. Here, surrounding us,
is a large and prosperous city, a very considerable proportion
of whose inhabitants, owners of real estate, such persons as
are engaged in commercial pursuits, are opposed to this project. Near us, and above this point of navigation, is another
considerable city, young if you please, but flourishing and
prosperous, and ambitious-certainly not an unreasonable
ambition-of attaining a higher distinction for power and
importance. These two cities, and the people identified with
them by the interests of trade, claim that here is the Hudson,
a river from time immemorial a navigable river, a river on
which they have been accustomed to transact business, which
they have been accustomed to navigate, a river placed under
the jurisdiction of the Federal Government by reason of a
port of delivery being constituted at the head of its navigable
waters, a river on which large sums of money have been expended by the General Government, and much of it above
the point at which it is proposed to locate this bridge. These
cities, their merchants, their men of business, claim that under this long continued usage, and by virtue of the legislation of Congress, this river and its free navigation have been
placed under the aegis of the Constitution. They.claim that
they have a vested right in its navigation. Conceding, for
the sake of the argument, that they have, in reality, no such
vested rights, in the technical meaning of the term, yet these
are privileges long enjoyed, and intimately interwoven with
their business and their prosperity. Every Senator, I am




sure, would be glad, if possible, to avail himself of any mode
by which these rights or these privileges would be protected
and enjoyed in all their value, while, at the same time, the
reasonable wishes and expectations of those in other parts of
the State, and engaged, if you please, in rival modes of trade,
can also be gratified. It is in this point of view that I have
come to the conclusion, after a careful examination of the
facts bearing on the case, that the amendment I have submitted is a practicable and feasible mode of attaining this
end. At the outset I wish to free myself from any impression which might otherwise exist, were I to allow the supposition to be entertained, that I participate at all in a feeling
which I cannot help characterizing as a prejudice against
corporations —even railroad corporations. I have no prejudice against them. I consider them useful to society, and
important tributaries to the progress of modern civilization.
Whatever I can do to promote their welfare, either as an individual or a Senator, I shall be glad to do. My section of
the State has certainly nothing to fear from the increased
prosperity of railroads; it has, on the contrary, perhaps much
to gain. As my views, in relation to the question now before the Senate, differ from those of the persons who are
esteemed the peculiar friends of railroads, I say to them that
this difference does not originate in any hostility to those corporations. On the other hand, I also wish to state that I am
not afraid of railroads, whether small or great. In coming
to a conclusion on this question, I have endeavored to avoid
being influenced by that overshadowing power which some
seem to think is attaining too great a stature and too powerful an arm in the State. Looking, therefore, at the question
free from prejudice against railroads, as well as free from any
apprehension of their power, I say here to the Senate, that I
concede, that indeid I believe, there is necessity for a bridge
across the Hudson river. I think there ought to be a bridge
constructed here. I think the exigencies of trade and of
travel require it, or, at all events, that the facilities for trade
and travel would be promoted by it. But I contend that,
while the law and the Constitution;- -.id in the way, we cannot, in the exercise of our legitimate power, authorize the
construction of a bridge, no matter how great these exigencies, no matter how much these interests and facilities would
be promoted, if it interferes with the vested rights of a single
American citizen, to say nothing of the vested rights and




6
privileges of great communities. I think the proposition capable not only of being sustained, but demonstrated, that
while it is entirely feasible to construct a bridge of the character indicated in my amendment, which would accomplish
all that could reasonably be desired, it would be nothing less
than an outrage on justice, nothing less than a most highhanded and arbitrary act for this Legislature to authorize the
construction of a bridge which would to any considerable degree, or to any degree, interfere with the prosperity of any
community in the State; while the difference between this
and the other method is simply a question of expense, and
expense of no extravagant or excessive magnitude; but entirely within the means of those who will undertake this improvement and for whose benefit it is to be undertaken. I
listened with a great deal of attention, on the last occasion
on which this subject was before the Senate, both to the argument of the Senator from the 19th, (Mr. Richardson,) the
Chairman of the Committee which reported this bill, on that
side of the question, and to the able argument presented by
my colleague, the Senator from the 6th, (Mr. Brooks,) on this
side. I must say, in all candor, that I can extend the same
compliment to the able argument of the Senator from the
19th. I regard his argument as presenting in all its force
and power the whole argument on his side of the case. I
think he left nothing material unsaid that could reasonably
be said on his side. Yet I think it susceptible of easy answer; not for a want of ability in the presentation of it, but
for a want of material-and that is a want for which the
Senator is in no degree responsible —to construct a better.
In the course of his address to the Senate, he made a very
just observation on the report and testimony in this case.
Just in this, that it contains a great many facts and a great
many contradictory statements in regard to the facts of the
case. He said anything could be proved from the report,
and that anything could be proved from the testimony Now
as the whole weight of the argument in favor of the bill, and
of his mode of carrying out this bridge project, depends on
the testimony which accompanies the report, I put it to the
Senator whether he has not surrendered the whole case by
this admission. If anything can be proved by the report, it
can be proved that his view of the case is not sustained by
the facts and the testimony; and if his view of the case is
not sustained by the facts and the testimony, how can he call




on the Senate to sustain the views of the Committee he represents? But, sir, I think there is one exception to the remark
of the Senator. I think there is some testimony in this report
in reference to a suspension bridge, which cannot be contradicted in the report, and which therefore cannot be slighted.
I do not understand that the testimony of Mr. Robling, the engineer who made the estimates for a suspension bridge, was in
any way attempted to be contradicted by any of the witnesses
produced before the committee during this session, or in the
testimony taken at previous sessions when this subject has
been under consideration. In order that I may not seem to
stand before the Senate, in reference to this subject, on a
basis of mere speculation, and that I may not appear to speak
the views of only private individuals, or non-professional
persons, but to show that I am sustained by the testimony of
competent engineers, I will read a few extracts from the testirgony of Mr. Robling.
In view of these opinions, put forth on such high authority, I think my friend from the 1st (Mr. Rider) was quite
excusable in giving his adhesion to the views of a scientific
man like Mr. Robling, rather than yield to the criticisms of
a layman, like the Senator from the 28th (Mr. Upham.) He
(Mr. Robling) then goes on to detail the various plans which
have been proposed for the construction of a bridge over the
Hudson at this point, and concludes by saying that Bissell's
plan would not obstruct navigation at all. Having read this
testimony of Mr. Robling, I take occasion to say here, that Mr.
Bissell was recently in the city of Albany, and that I called on
that gentleman, and conversed with him on this subject. I
sought an interview on my own responsibility, and entirely at
my own suggestion. Not only every inclination, but every
sense of duty devolved upon me, as a Senator, to ascertain if
there might not be some mode to satisfy all parties to this question. I took the liberty to ask him to send for his drawing, as
he told me he had made one, which was in the city of Rochester. I have brought it here to-night, and with the indulgence of the Senate I will make profert of it as a part of my
argument. It is a better argument than any Senator can
make, with all deference to those around this circle. It
presents the whole subject at a glance. I think, after examining it, in connection with the testimony of Mr. Robling,
the Senator trom the 28th (Mr. Upham) will not speak quite
so lightly, quite so disparagingly, or quite so confidently in




8
opposition to the plan of constructing a bridge proposed by
my amendment. (Here the drawing was displayed to the
Senate by two of the Pages in attendance.)  There is the
argument pictorially illustrated. There are the points indicated, between which the bridge should be constructed.There are the starting and terminating points; and the
number of proposed abutments. It starts, as will be seen
here, from a point of high ground which receives the
bridge without any necessity for any considerable structure
on the other side, to bri:mg the grade of the bridge parallel
with the natural grade of the land. This is a bridge, which
I am informed, not only on the authority of Mr. Bissell, but
on that of other engineers with whom I have had the honor
to consult, can be constructed at an expense very little beyond that necessary to be incurred in carrying out the provisions of the bill as it is now before us. The span of the
bridge across the main channel is but 800 feet-less than the
bridge now existiDg at Niagara-and 400 feet, yes, nmore
than 400 feet less than the span of the bridge now being
constructed across the Kentucky river. There is nothing
unusual in this mode of carrying a road, across a bridge,
over arches, through or in the vicinity of cities. Nearly all
the great roads in Europe, as they approach cities, are constructed on arches. They are carried on in this way for miles
atan enormous expense. Indeed, no railroad is ever allowed
to pass through any considerable portions of European cities.
They are required and compelled to pass above the streets,
or underground-for they have underground railroads in
Europe, as well as in this country, though for different purposes. Here I have presented from the hands of a scientific
man, a gentleman now engaged in constructing the suspension bridge at Rochester, a man of high character and attainments, a plan, made from actual surveys, of a bridge meeting
all the exigencies of the case, which interferes with nobody,
and trespasses on the rights of nobody, and which can be
constructed for $900,000. The bill before you contemplates
as a contingency, and as we are bound to believe, a probable
contingency, an expenditure of a million and a half; for the
company is allowed to increase its capital to that sum. The
nominal capital, as fixed, by the first section of the bill, is
$500,000; and, according to a subsequent section, it may be
enlarged to a million and a half. Take it, however, at half
a million-when you bring into the account the fact that




9
they must maintain tow-boats of sufficient number and power
to tow vessels through the draw; when you take into account
that they will be obliged to have dredging machines and
hands to work them, in order-to remove whatever obstructions may be accumulated in the river by means of the piers
and abutments: 1 say, when you take these things into account, even supposing the cost of the bridge itself, as indicated by the bill, not to exceed $500,000, even then the
difference is in favor of the suspension mode. But when
you come to consider the expense and embarassmrents to
which these c rporations (I mean the Bridge Company and
its allies, the railroads) would be put by the constant warfare and litigation which would be maintained against this
bridge by those who would conceive their interests to be
affected by it, I cannot see why those persons who desire
the construction of a bridge do not embrace a mode which
will at once free them flom all these annoyances; this litigation, and its consequent embarassment and expensive law
suits, which would arise from injuries caused by collisions
between vessels approaching the draw-injuries received in
passing through it, and detentions of vessels during the
periods at which the draw would necessarily be closed-not
to speak of that greater contest, analagous to the contest con.
cerning the Wheeling bridge, which these corporations, if
we allow them to construct a bridge like this, will be compelled to maintain with the cities of Troy and Albany-cities
which consider their vested rights and privileges infringed
and violated by the comtemplated measure. I do not propose, at this stage of the debate, to detain the Senate by any
extended remarks on the testimony taken before the committee. Those parts of the testimony bearing on the question
of obstruction, have been pressed on the attention of the
Senate by my colleague, the Senator from the Sixth, (Mr.
Brooks), and I doubt not that Senators have become too
familiar with them to require tarthur reference. But it cannot be gainsaid by any fair mind that the preponderance of
testimony on this point must strike every one here, that a
bridge constructed as proposed by the bill, will be an essential obstruction to navigation. In despite of what has been
said by the able Chairman of the Committee on Roads and
Bridges, no man will maintain that such a bridge can be
constructed rightfully, and with a decent regard for the Constitution and laws of the land. On this point I wish to
2




10
say a few words. The Hudson river, between New York
and Troy, is a public highway of commerce, which, under
the Constitution of the United States, has been regulated by
Congress, and the free navigation of the Hudson, as a common highway having been regulated by Congress, cannot be
lawfully obstructed by any State legislation. Now, as to the
first proposition: —The State Governments ceded to the
Federal Government the power to regulate commerce. This
will not be disputed. The Supreme Court of the United
States has repeatedly decided that the power to regulate
comlmerce embraces and includes the power to regulate navigation on navigable waters. Under this power the city of
Troy has been made a port of delivery. Licenses to coasting vessels may be and are issued there. Coasting vessels
go there as to a port of delivery, being licensed there, and in
other ports, to discharge their cargoes. Congress has made
appropriations for the improvement of the river between
Albany and Troy-between the point where this bridge is to
be placed and the residences of those who remonstrate
against it, and who claim a right to the navigation of the
river. Therefore, I say, the Hudson river, up to Troy, is a
public highway of commerce, under the jurisdiction of the
Federal Government.
JMr. Richardson -If the Senator will allow me, I will state
a fact which I think destroys the entire force of his argument
on this point. It will be remembered that some years ago a
bridge was constructed across the Hudson at Troy, while at
the same time Waterford, a port of entry and delivery, existed on the river, at a point four miles above. Certainly if
it is not competent fbr us to authorize the construction of a
bridge at Albany, because Troy, a port of delivery, is situated above, it was not competent for us to authorize the
construction of a bridge at Troy, four miles below the port
of Waterford. The principle contended for by the Senator
from the Third is just as applicable in one case as the other..Mr. Sickles.-I think the Senator assumes as a fact, a
position which begs the whole question at issue; that
Waterford was a port of entry and delivery. This was not
the fact; -and, moreover, I understand the case to be that no
navigation-no rights of navigation-were involved in the
question thus presented, because there was a dam across the
river between Troy and Waterford, which completely destroyed the utility of that portion of the river as a navigable




11
stream. These two facts deprive the case of all analogy to
the one now before us. Nobody now denies that, in the
absence of any legislation, or any act by which the Federal
government acquires jurisdiction over a river, the State
sovereignty and State jurisdiction remain unimpaired and
absolute. Nobody disputes that. It Congress had never,
either directly or through its agents, made Troy a port of
delivery; if it has never made appropriations for the improvement of'the navigation of the river, in other words if
the power which Congress has authority to acquire had not
in fact been acquired through the exercise of those functions
which include the power, then the proposition of the Senator
would be true —that the jurisdiction ot the State is absolute
over the waters as over the lands within its limits. IBut the
language of the, case, and the doctrine, I think, cannot be
successfully contradicted, is that wherever Congress has
acquired jurisdiction over a river, or its navigable waters,
by the designation of a particular place as a port of entry or
delivery, whereby coasting vessels or others have acquired
the right to navigate the stream, to that extent the State
jurisdiction is rendered subordinate to that of the federal
government; and although you have a right to permit a,
bridge to be constructed over navigable waters, not thus
brought within the jurisdiction of Congress, yet, the moment
they are brought within that jurisdiction, vested rights are
acquired, and you must legislate with a view to those vested
rights of navigation.
I come now to the second proposition:-A bridge across
the Hudson, if found to be an obstruction to navigation is 1a
public nuisance, and liable to be abated by a court of equity,
on the complaint of any injuired party. Now allow me to
refer Senators to the Congressional precedents, or series of
precedents which bear on this point. I refer to the Wheeling bridge, not while it was pending in the courts, but whilethe subject was before Congress. In 1836 petitions to Congress praying for the construction of a bridge at XWheeling
were laid before that body.  They were backed by resolutions of the Legislature of Ohio instructing her Senators and
requesting her Representatives to endeavor to procure authority for the construction of a bridge at that point. The
advantages of the structure in connecting disjointed lines of
railroad, and affording facilities for travel and trade across
the Ohio river, the advantages it would offer to government




12
in time of war, the inconvenience of ferries, were duly discussed, and presented in glowing and exaggerated colors.
(Mr. Sickles read an extract from the report of the case.)
This is almost a description, arid perhaps a very good description of the arguments now made before this Legislature
in support of the project under consideration.  The advantages of the structure in connecting disjointed lines of railroads, and in affording increased facilities for travel, these
things are now presented to us in almost the same words.
The same class of arguments urged on Congress, and urged
on Congress by sovereign States as well as by merchants, and
traders, and railroad corporations, are now urged upon us.
That year a favorable report was procured from the Committee on railroads and canals, but Congress rejected the
application on the ground that the bridge would be an obstruction to navigation.  (Here Mr. Sickles read another extract in illustration of this position.)
At the next session of the same Congress the subject was
again brought forward, the same plan was proposed and the
same arguments reproduced. It was again opposed on the
ground of its injury to navigation, and the application was
again defeated. (Mr. Sickles here continued to read.)
Still insisting on the bridge, these same cities, and these
railroad corporations, and these great interests went again to
Congress, in 1838, to procure the passage of their favorite
measure. And now, sir, mark the strength of these precedents. The appeal was made by these sovereign States, and
these cities, and these corporations to Congress, which, by
general concession has jurisdiction, if any body has jurisdiction over the subject. Besides this, minute explorations and
surveys were made by engineers attached to the war department. At this period anew plan was offered, the city of Wheeling entering into obligations to surrender all the land necessary
for the purpose, the use of streets contiguous to the bridge,
&c. Again in December, 1843, another series of resolutions
were procured from the Ohio Legislature. A bill was reported authorizing the construction of a bridge, but so elevated
as to permit the safe and easy passage of steamboats of the
largest dimensions.  This pl tn also was rejected. This application, I believe, was the last in the congressional history
of this enterprise. What then do we see? From  1836 to
1843, a series of applications to Congress for power, so far as
the power existed, to construct a bridge across the Ohio river




at Wheeling, and the Congress of the United States disregarding the applications, backed as they were by petitions
from as high sources, as petitions can possibly emenate from,
and declining to authorize the construction of a bridge. The
bridge was afterward constructed, under charter granted by
the State of Virginia. It presented an obstacle to the passage of six or eight steamboats of a very large and unusual
class on the Ohio river. The plan, as presented to Congress
allowed all kinds of sailing vessels navigating the Ohio river
to pass under the bridge; yet Congress refused to accede to
the al plication only because it would interfere with six or
eight steamboats of an unusual class. Even when the case
was finally brought before the Supreme Court of the United
States, for, as I have said, the bridge was built under a charter granted by the state of Virginia, it was not attacked because it materially obstructed navigation -having reference
to the total number of boats and persons engaged in navigating them-for the testimony shows, and the reports made by
Walworth and MeAlpin show that the obstacle presented by
the bridge, interfered with only six or eight steamboats navigating the Ohio. The whole stress of the opposition, and
the whole conflict between these sovereign States-Pennsylvania, Ohio and Virginia-rested on the absolute right of
these six or eight steamboats to the free navigation of the
Ohio river. So high, so solemn, in the estimation of Congress, and of the Supreme Court of the United States, are
these rights of navigation which seem to be so lightly regarded here, by the Senator from the 19th. I desire to call
the attention of the Senate to a very clear statement of this
proposition, as laid down in the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice
Wayne, in the well-known case of
(Here Mr. Sickles read an extract from the opinion of Mr.
Justice Wayne.)
I read from 7 Howard, 414. I cannot help feeling some
degree of surprise that the honorable Senator from the 19th
should have likened this power to construct bridges across
navigable rivers, to the power to grant ferry privi'eges.
He took much pains to prove that the State has a right to
grant ferry privileges, and from these premises he drew the
conclusion that the State has a right to authorise the construction of bridges. Logically this is taking a span about
as wide as that across the river to be taken by my suspension bridge,. If the capacity of the draw in the proposed




14
bridge should equal the ability of its author in drawing inferences, it surely would answer all the purposes of navigation.
"' Why, says the Senator, 1" we can authorise ferries; we do
it every day. A ferry authorizes people to cross a river. A
bridge is another mode of crossing a river - therefore, as we
have a right to authorize people to cross the river in a ferry
boat, we have a right to authorize them to cross on a bridge.
It is only a different mode of doing the same thing"  Swimming across, also, is only another mode of doing the same
thing. It is entirely within the constitutional power of the
Legislature to authorise people to swim across riversnobody will detny that. But does not the Senator see there
is no earthly analogy between the cases he has presented?
Does he not see that crossing by a ferry is very different
from crossing by a bridge? Crossing by a ferry is only one
mode of navigation. That right is subject to all the incidents
and rights of every other form of navigating the river. The
ferry boat must keep out of the way of all otiler vessels,
and has a right to demand that no obstructions be placed in
her way. In no sense of the word is she an obstruction to
the navigation of the river by any vessel, and therefore it
does come within our power as a State to authorize companies for this purpose. But the essence of a bridge is that
it is a permanent structure, which may obstruct navigation,
which may interfere with the convenience of navigation,
which may hinder vessels of a certain size from passing, not
one of which objections can possibly occur in the case of a
ferry. I therefore submit to the Senator that his analogy fails,
I devote the more time to this point in the Senator's argument, because he laid so much stress on it himself.  He
seemed to think he had disposed of the constitutional objection when this was said. The constitutional objection was
fully developed in the celebrated case of Givens vs. Ogden,
in the 9th of Wheaton. (Here Mr. Sickles read a portion of
the decision in this case.)
This is an extract from the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall. It is a leading case and arose in our own State, when
it was very important that these rights of navigation should
be strictly defined and thoroughly understood.; when it was
important that the relative duties and powers of the federal
government and of the States should be fully and definitely
ascertained. Fortunately the powerful and comprehensive
mind of a Marshall was brought to bear upon the question,




and in an opinion which will stand for all time as a model of
judicial wisdom, and a perennial fountain of light and of law
he has written in imperishable characters the whole law on
this subject.
This has never been gainsaid or assailed in any quarter. It
will never be as long as our States bear the relation which
they now hold to the federal government, under the existing
constitution of the United States. In a subsequent case
it was held that any exercise of this power by Congress
excluded all State action.  We have ceded to Congress the
right to regulate commerce. It has been decided, in this
case, that the right to regulate commerce includes the power
to regulate navigation. Congress acquired jurisdiction over
this part of the river by a series of acts, and by making
Troy a port of delivery.  We have the decision of the courts
to the effect that the exercise of this power by Congress excludes all State action. Subsequent decisions extended and
applied this doctrine to various cases which at several times
arose. Another familiar illustration of the doctrine is fbund
in the passenger cases. In these it was held that the act
was unconstitutional because it interfered with laws passed
by Congress. I submit that the argument on this bridge of
the question in regard to roads and bridges, as well as the
elaboration of that argument by the Senator from the 19ti,
entirely fails to meet this proposition. Its fallacy consists in
the idea that we do not transcend our powers unless we
authorize a bridge which obstructs navigation in the absolute
sense of hindering it so effectually that it must cease. Certainly no greater error could be committed than that. This
error is as great as that which, in the early part of the discussion, was committed on the other side, when it was asserted that the State, under no circumstances, could authorize
the construction of a bridge over a navigable stream. Neither of these positions is tenable. Those who oppose this
measure have maintained that New York could, at no time,
authorize the construction of a bridge over a navigable
stream. In this they have been corrected. This doctrine is
no longer contended for. But the advocates of a bridge have
fallen into an error from which they have never rlecoveredl;
on which they have never,been enlightened-which they
persist in maintaining-that unless there is a total obstruction of navigation the act is not unconstitutional. It is stated




16
in so many words in the able argument presented by Mr.
Reynolds, the counsel for the measure.
JMr. Richardson.-My doctrine is that it is a comparative
question, or a question of comparative interests..Mr. Sickles.-If that is th:e gentleman's position, I must
say that he has fallen into a still greater error, if possible, than
is contended for by those who maintain the proposition I have
just stated. The Senator is entirely in error in supposing
that this is only a question of comparative interests. Whether
we take railroads as an exclusive means of transportation, or
water carriage, or alternate between the two, it leads to the
same conclusion as that for which I have just been contending. The Senator argues thus: if, after an examination of
the general interests of the State, we find the balance of trade
to be in favor of railroad transportation, then, in behalf of
the system of railroad transportation, he has a right to obstruct navigation. This is the argument of the Senator.
iMr. Richardson.-The Senator is mistaken.  That is not
my doctrine.
JMr. Sickles. —The Senator, as I understand him, says that
this is a question of comparative interests. (Mr. Sickles here
read from the Report of the Committee, on this point.) Did
I not fairly state the argument of the Senator?
Mr. Richardson.-Not quite. My position is this: That
in the exercise of its State sovereignty, and its rights over
its streams, always having reference to the rights of commerce delegated by the Constitution of the United States to
Congress, that the exercise of State authority to afford facilities fobr the crossing of navigable streams should govern; and
that is the adjudication of the Courts in all cases-that it
should be so exercised as to afford such facilities, if the benefits in affording such facilities are greater than t]he  injuries to
navigation up and down. That an authority to cross a stream
should be so exercised as to do the least injury to navigation
up and down. It is, as I said before, a question of comparative interests. The greater interest should always be so exercised as to do the least injury to the smaller interest.
JVMr. Sickles.-I am very much obliged to the Senator for
the pains he has taken to prove that I have not in any respect misrepresented his position. I wish to meet his argument in its full force. I do not, however, see that the
gentleman's explanation amounts to anything more than a




17
repetition of his previous position in the sense in which I
stated it. The Senator says two things,-first, that the power
which he claims for the State should be exercised and subject to the powers of Congress under the Constitution.  That
is entirely sound, and nobody disputes it on my side of the
house. His second proposition is in direct contradiction to
his first, and is an absolute repetition of what I said when I
first entered on this branch of the discussion. He still says
that this is a question of comparative advantages; and lihe
does not appear to view it all as a question of Constitutional
right. But, sir, I maintain that it can never be decided as a
question of advantages, merely. The real question is, whether
we have power to obstruct the navigation of the river, or
whether we have it not. Our right does not depend on the
question how much we obstruct navigation, but whether the
proposed bridge will obstruct navigation at all; and it cannot be removed from that basis. I therefore say that the
Senator, in his statement of his position, only puts, in another
form, the proposition of the counsel who appeared on behalf
of this measure, and made the very able argument which was
published to-day. He says that the question is, whether the
bridge really totally obstructs navigation or not; but the
Senator maintains that it is whether the advantages to be
derived from the bridge, even should it totally obstruct navigation, would be greater than without it. This is a difference only in words. The two doctrines terminate in the
same point. But the Senaftor, in addition, has indeed presented the case in another light.  He says he has always been
tanught the doctrine of compensation. He says that though
the effect of legislation may be to injure one portion of the
community, and to diminish or destroy trade in one locality,
yet if the benefit to another class and another locality is
equal, you are even, because the result, in the aggregate, is
the same. This is in harmony with his proposition. What
I complain of is the little respect the Senators on the other
side pay to what we have been accustomed to regard as
rights-rights of property-rights of navigation-rights of
States and communities. These are facts, stubborn facts, of
which, as Senators, we should not lose sight  I must say
that I was never more surprised at any proposition, than
when it was said by the Senator, that it makes no difference
how what amount of commerce we take away from the peo3




18
ple above, provided the same amount be gained at some point
below..Mr. Richardson.-I made no such proposition as that.
Mr. Sickles.-Well, sir, I took it down with great care
when it was stated by the Senator, and I do not think I have
mis-stated it.
JMr.. Richardson.-In reference to the question  of the
depreciation of property above the bridge, I made some
observations similar to those attributed to me by the Senator
from the 3rd. But I said nothing about commerce. I said
the only real opposition to this measure was made by persons who are fearful of its effect upon their property, situated above the proposed location of the bridge. I said that
though property above the bridge might be depreciated, yet
property below it would be increased in value to an equal
or greater extent.
Mr. Sickles.-Either I must be very unsuccessful in my apprehension of the Senator's meaning, or he must be very unsuccessful
in his explanation; for I think he not only fails to convict me of
any misrepresentation of his position, but absolutely confirms me in
my interpretation of it. The only difference is in a more limited
application of his doctrine, by me. I referred it only to trade. He
applies it to property in general. I always thought property the
principal term, and trade the subordinate. Trade is certainly an
incident of property.  Steamboats, and vessels of various kinds
employed in traffic are just as much property as houses and lots.I therefore thought myself entirely safe in stating of trade, the
subordinate, and included term, what the Senator applied to property
in general. Instead of limiting the doctrine to commerce, as I
supposed, the Senator extends it to every description of property.The illustration of this new doctrine of political economy, now put
forward by the Senator, is, that it makes no difference how much
we injure some one, provided we benefit somebody else. Suppose
the Senator from the 19th is a man of handsome fortune, as I am,
myself, a man in very humble circumstances;-suppose the honorable Senator sh'ould be compelled, by an act of the Legislature, to
divide with me; that he being rich, and I being poor, he should
give me one-half of what he possesses: —No harm would be done —
The State would be just as rich as-it was before. The equilibrium
is maintained. What one loses another gains. Fifty thousand dollars above Albany have, in accordance with the theory of the honorable Senator, been transferred to mo below, in the city of New
York, where I assure the Senator, if it ever comes, it will be well
taken care of, or at least liberally appropriated. This extraordinary




19
doctrine of compensation, if developed to its logical conclusions,
would justify the conduct of a very different class of persons from
those who have hitherto heen considered in this discussion. I think
this doctrine of compensation, if presented with the ingenuity manifested by the Senator from the Nineteenth, if brought forward in
Courts of Justice, and believed in by juries, would go far to clear
many a rascal. He would say " true I took that man's watch; but
the watch remains-there are just as many watches in New York as
there were before, and, according to the doctrine of compensation,
there is no harm done in the aggregate. The only difference is, that
the watch, which before was in that man's pocket, is now in mine."
I think, sir, the bridge had better not be built on the doctrine of
compensation, or that other doctrine, which is only another phase
of it-the doctrine of comparative advantages between one set of
people and another. No, sir, we must look at it as a constitutional
question-in view of the legislation of Congress and the decisions
of the Supreme Court of the United States, and of other courts.By these decisions we find that an obstruction which interferes with
one or more vessels, is such an obstruction as renders the bridge a
nuisance. We have seen that the river, at this point, has been
brought within the jurisdiction of Congress. Large sums of money
have been expended for its improvement, by the Federal Government. I read from Senate documents, where I find that $400,000
have been expended by Congress for improving the navigation of the
Hudson river, a very considerable portion of which sum has been expended above this point. We have seen that Troy is a port of
delivery, where, not only citizens of this state, but of other states have
a right to go to discharge cargoes from their vessels engaged in navigating the river.  We have seen that flourishing cities are situated
on a part of the river which will be affected by this measure, and we
must; respect their rights. By the proposition I have submitted, and
the mode of realizing it, as presented, the rights of trade can be
maintained-all the rights which would otherwise be placed in
jeopardy, can be protected in this mode-one which, it is proved, is
entirely practicable. Nor does this rest merely on the authority of
Mr. ]Bissell; but on the testimony of Mr. Robling, and on the
opinion of a gentleman named in the very bill before us-one of the
engineers designated in this bill as a commissioner to build the
bridge, and one of the most distinguished engineers in the state. —
It is their opinion that the suspension mode is not only practicable
and feasible, but that it is the true and only mode of constructing
this bridge. I have also consulted a very distinguished engineer of
New York, a gentleman in charge of the Croton aqueduct, who also
gave it as his opinion, familiar as he is with suspension bridges, that
such is the true and only mode in which this bridge ought to be con



20
structed.  Thus this state of facts is presented; that the one mode
will, and in the opinion of practical men must obstruct navigation,
and the other mode, which accomplishes all that is necessary to be
accomplished, saves the rights of every person   The only question
between these two plans is a question of expense, and of no considerable expense. I ask Senators whether such a consideration
ought to stand in the way a moment when rights so important, and
interests so vast are involved.  If it were true, as stated by the
Senator from the 19th. that this bridge is indispensable to trade,
that unless it were built, the vast commerce of the fertile West
would no longer flow through this state, that the railroads would be
forced to,bandon the carrying trade, and our cities would have no
way to connect themselves with the interior, except by means of this
bridge, these things might render it worth while to consider, from a
comparison of interests, how far we might go outside of our constitutional power, to protect and save these vast interests and secure these
tributaries of wealth. But no such state of things exists.  All these
great interests can be protected, and all these objects attained by the
construction of a bridge which will not obstruct navigation-a bridge
of the kind contemplated by the amendment I have had the honor to
submit to the Senate. From this statement of the case there can be no
question between the relative propriety of these two methods of constructing the proposed bridge.  Uut I will put it to the railroad
corporations themselves, for we all understand it is for the benefit,
and in the interest of railroads that this bridge is to be constructed,
I put it to them, with all their resources and their wealth, whether
they can come to the I egislature, soulless as they are called,-whether
they have not self respect and conscience enough, whether they have
not discernment enough, if they understand their own interests, to see it
is best to construct a bridge which will save them from the opposition of a hundred thousand persons whose hostility would be arrayed
against them if they insist upon a bridge of the form proposed by
the committee. I cannot imagine why the advocates of a bridge
should wish it to be constructed in any other form than as a suspen.
sion bridge, when they must know that the moment they assent to
that plan, the whole opposition, which has any claim to respect, will be
withdrawn, and that even Troy, and West Troy, and Albany will
aid in the construction of a bridge as proposed by my amendment.
I have no doubt, if you authorize this bridge to be constructed as a
suspension bridge, these cities will be glad to avail themselves of the
privilege which the bill gives to railroad corporations to subscribe
for the stock.  But the bill does not give to cities the right to subscribe, theugh it does give that right. as I have said, to railread
corporations. I venture to say that, if the bridge should be one on the
suspension plan, the cities of Albany and Troy will be willing to




21
take the risk, of building the bridge, upon themselves. I cannot see
why this opposition to a practicable and feasible method, which injures nobody, should be persisted in. Can it be that this bridge
will fall into the hands of those who want to speculate on the exigencies which brought it into existence? Are we at liberty to suppose that a few individuals will get control of it;-that they will
build a bridge which will answer their purposes, however much it
might injure others, for a small amount, and then enlarge their capi.
tal, and afterwards enter into negotiations with the railroad companies,
converging at Albany, with a view to consolidate the bridge company
with those corporations?  Can it be that they desire to construct a
bridge in this way? Can it be that the whole project is merely a
gigantic speculation, with a view to get a million and a half of dollars for what will cost only half a million? And yet. if they have
not some reason of this kind, I am at a loss to account for the pertinacity with which this project, involving so many difficulties and
embarrassments, is insisted on.
I find by the bill before the Senate, that although Commissioners
are appointed, and a great many of them, to divide the stock, no Commnissioners are appointed to determine on the plan to be adopted, or
the extent to which the plan may or may not interfere with the rights
of navigation. In this regard I observe that the advocates of a bridge,
instead of making progress. are actually losing ground.  The project
before the Senate in 1854 offered some safeguards; it presented some
guarantees for the preservation of the rights of commerce and navigation. It provided that the plan of the bridge should be one not
liable to the objection that it would obstruct navigation.  In the bill
of this year, that salutary stipulation is omitted, and I find nothing
but a mere legislative direction substituted in its place. There is no
mode pointed out to prevent the bridge from interfering with navigation.  (Here Mr. Sickles read from the bill of 1854.)
The proposition of the Committee of 1854 was one that at least
acknowledged and respected the rights of navigation.  It presehiifd
some mode by which the preservation of those rights could be accomplished. I do not find in it the fatal principle which lies at the basis
of the bill before us-that principle of comparative advantages —of
equilibrium or compensation, which has been so much eulogized by
the Senator from the 19th, (Mr. Richardson.)
The Senator from the 31st (Mr. Wadsworth) has spoken of the
common law as unsuited to these progressive times, and that in the
progress of events the common law would have to bend itself cnd
adapt itself to the advancing civilization of the country.  I ought
then to have reminded the Senator of what I will now take occasion
to say to him and the committee; that the decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States, on which the opponents of the present




bill take their stand, are not based upon the common law —they
do not rest on the common law doctrine as applicable to navigable
streams or streams not navigable. Those decisions are based on the
Constitution of the United States, and the relation which the Federal Government, by means of that instrument, hold to the individual States. In our State Courts it is undoubtedly true-in those
States where the common law of England has been adopted-in our
State Courts, for in New York we have adopted the common law,
we are governed and controlled by common law rules as applicable
to navigable streams.  But the rules of the common law of England
are not taken as the basis of decisions by the Supreme Court of the
United States, in that class of questions in which it has jurisdiction
by virtue of the jurisdiction of the United States,-I mean the class
of questions growing out of the relations between the Federal Government and the States of the Union.
It is only where the United States Courts are exercising jurisdiction in the States, in relation to contracts arising locally in the States,
that they take into consideration the common law rules or principles
of adjudication; and Senators who have examined or will examine
this question, will look in vain in any one adjudicated case for any
rules of common law applicable to this subject.
Now, if I am correct in this, Mr. Chairman, and I have entire
confidence in the position I have stated, it is not possible to avoid
the Constitutional difficulty that exists here by adopting any new
rules of construction. Get rid of the common law, if you please;
get rid of precedents, if you please; but the fact remains.  Then to
what conclusion are we brought? Why, that if the truth be, if the
fact be as contended for by Senators on the other side, the great increase of transportation-that the large number of railroads which
have been established-that the increasing internal transportation
between the States, has created a necessity for new modes, new fa.
cilities of crossing livers —has created the necessity of invading what
has hitherto been deemed the jurisdiction of Congress and the Federal Government.
And now, sir, if these exigencies and these interests are so imperious and so vast as to demand the construction of this bridge, and if
it can be constructed in no other way than the one proposed by the
bill now under consideration, there is but one method-one legal and
Constitutional method-to avoid the difficulty which now stands in
the way, and that method is an amendment to the Constitution of
the United States —an amendment by which the States shall take
back, and regain and recover that power to bridge navigable streams,
which, at the formation of the Federal Government, they ceded to
Congress. There is no dispute anywhere in this country, and it
cannot be successfully denied, that it has always been the under



23
standing that we did cede to Congress jurisdiction over commerce
and ravigation in the broadest sense of those terms, and that there
is only one limitation to this cession-a limitation expressed in the
opinion of Chief Justice Marshall, in the celebrated Givens' casethat over completely and exclusively internal commerce, the respective
States continue to have control, subject to the jurisdiction of Congress, over navigable waters leading to ports of entry or delivery.
Gentlemen may say, that at that time transportation was carried on
almost exclusively by means of navigation-that railroads were unknown-that the necessity of crossing navigable streams by bridges
was not anticipated. All this, sir, makes no difference. The question is, was that power conceded to the Federal Government —was it
surrendered by the States?  Nobody will deny that it was.  Was
any reservation made by the States, of the power to bridge navigable streams? No one will pretend that such a reservation was made.
If an exigency has arisen, if a new state of things not foreseen at the'
time of the formation of the Constitution has come to pass, which
makes it necessary that the States should have power to bridge navigable waters in a way that would obstruct navigation, if these things
are so, in this land of organized governments, and constitutional governments, where the greatest political virtue consists in a strict observance and regard for written Constitutions, and the greatest political crime in a violation and a disregard for written Constitutions,
whether in their letter or their spirit, there is but one mode that can
suggest itself to the lawyer, or the statesman or the citizen, of escaping from the difficulty.  There is no other mode than an amendment to the Federal Constitution by which you regain the power you
have ceded away. And now as to this exception which has been contended for. Under that exception the State does indeed possess power
to regulate intercourse between its own citizens, and also transportation and navigation, and transactions between any two or more points
within its own boundaries; but you must be careful in exercising
this power; for you have not power to interfere in any way with the
jurisdiction of the United States, While the State has indeed,
originally, the right to authorize a railroad to cross a navigable
stream, the moment it comes to a navigable stream over which the
Federal Government has acquired jurisdiction by establishing ports
of entry or delivery, then the exercise of this right must be subordinate to the jurisdiction of Congress, and you cannot interfere with
any right thereby become a vested right. The Senator from the
31st is not content with assuming that we should adjudicate as well
as legislate, and not in view of Constitutional obligations, but in view
of what he calls the demands of civilization; he is not content with
suggesting such a novel course, but I understand him to deny the
correctness of the proposition contended for by me, that where Con



24
gress has obtained the power contemplated by the Constitution, the
State is forbidden from authorizing the construction of bridges, or in
any other manner interfering with navigation.  The Senator refers
to the case of Livingston to maintain him in disputing the proposition I have laid down.  I have always regarded this case as a leading authority in support of my position. The Senator. I amn sure,
cannot have given the attention to this case which he is in the habit
of giving to any subject he examines. If he had read this case, or
-the opinion of Chief Justice --—, he would not have stated it
in support of his views, but would have seen that it goes every length
in support of the doctrine laid down by me. I will read a few extracts, in order to show the doctrine it establishes. Senators will
bear in mind that this case was an application to the Court of Chancery, to grant an injunction against Livingston's running a boat to'Troy from some point in the State of New Jersey. It was thought
then that New York had a right to grant licenses to vessels to run
between two points in New York; but a difference was made in the
case of vessels coming from another State. The Chancellor granted
the injunction in part, and denied it in part.. He granted it against
vessels running between two points within the State, and denied it
when the vessel came from another Stale.
(Here Mr. Sickles read an extract froml the opinion.)
This is the doctrine laid down by Chief Justice Savage, reading
the opinion of the Court of Errors, which was almost unanimously
approved by the Court, and which contains the very doctrine maintained by me in this debate, and disputed so pretentiously on tle
other side. We see that without a violation of the Constitution, an
utter disregard of our obligations as a State to the Federal Government, under the solemnity of the compact into which we have entered, we cannot do any act which interferes with or obstructs the
navigation of the Hudson river, because it is a public highway of
commerce, over which the Federal Government has acquired jurisdiction by establishing ports of entry, by which those persons engaged in navigation in this and other States have acquired a vested
right, sanctioned, so far as the Constitution can sanction anything,
and protected so far as the Constitution can protect anything, which
we cannot take away; and by which, if we do anything to obstruct
navigation, any man or set of men have the right to abate such obstruction, which the Courts will abate if applied to in due course of
law. The Senator from the 31st does not seem to think the Wheeling bridge case a case in point.  If it is possible to conceive of a
case entirely conclusive on any point, it is the Wheeling bridge case
on the right of a State to obstruct navigation even in any degree.
We have heard much from the Senator from the 19th about a material obstruction-a considerable, or an inconsiderable obstruction.




25
The Senator thinks that we can authorize the construction of this
bridge, because it does not materially interfere with vested rights,
and because it does not obstruct the navigation of the river to any
ruinous extent. I have always supposed, that if by any act of legislation we injure vested rights to any extent, that. the act is wrong,
and we do that which we have no right to do without giving adequate
compensation. It is an extraordinary construction that you do no
harm if you stop this side of ruin —that if you do not injure navigation to a ruinous extent, you are within the Constitution of the United
States. Let us see how this doctrine compares with the doctrine of
the Supreme Court in the Wheeling bridge case. That bridge,
which was the subject of extraordinary legal controversies between
sovereign States, and which well nigh involved the peace of the
country,-on what did the contest concerning it depend. That
bridge was of such a height, that at the time it was built every vessel engaged in the navigation of the Ohio was able to pass under itevery vessel, without exception. But after its construction, during
the progress of the controversy concerning it, seven steamboats-this
is statel in Chancellor Walworth's report-were constructed with
pipes so high that they could not pass under the bridge without lowering them, they being so constructed as to admit the lowering of
their pipes. Bear in mind, that when the bridge was built every
boat could pass under it, and that afterwards these boats with high
chimneyvs were constructed, a, d furnished with apparatus to enable
them to lower their chimneys; but that, as they were compelled to
do this, the bridge was ordered to be taken down on the ground that
it was an obstruction to navigation. This bridge was an obstruction
to only one-hundredth of the boats navigating the river; indeed, in
the ordinary meaning of the word, it was not an obstruction; yet in
the eye of the Supreme Court it was a material obstruction if it caused
delay to any vessel. The Court did not ask, like the Senator from
the 19th, whether it interfered with navigation to a ruinous extent;
but whether it interfered with navigation to any extent-whether it
interfered with the vested right of every man to navigate the Ohio
river, without hindrance from any quarter, even from a sovereign
State, and that sovereign State the State of Virginia.  Therefore I
contend, that the question is not how much we obstruct navigation,
for the Constitution forbids us to do it to any extent. Nor can I
give assent to that other proposition of the Senator from the 31st,
that we are at liberty to exercise this power by virtue of what is
called the right of eminent domain-the right to take private property for public uses —the right to sacrifice an individual for the benefit of the State. That is a high prerogative with which we are invested by the State Constitution. In our scheme of government in
this country, we admit this as a necessary element of legislative
4




26
power' It is carried to a greater extent here than in any Constitutional Monarcey of Europe. Yet even in this country there is a
limitation to its exercise. That limitation is inscribed in every Constitution which grants the power. If this exercise of power in the
bill is to be defended on that doctrine, where are your provisions for
compensation? What have you done to reimburse the 10,000 persons whose business will be interfered with, and whose property rende:ed unavailable. or at least depreciated in value. You may say it
is impossible to do this, so great and wide-spread will be the injury.
But if this is so, you must abandon the defence you have interposed.
If you interpose the doctrine of eminent domain, you must abide by
the limitations imposed by that doctrine, or you cannot shelter yourselves beneath its aegis.  The Senator from the 31st has spoken of
some experience that the citizens of his locality have had in reference
to suspension bridges.  He spoke of a project, some time since entertained, to construct a suspension bridge in that vicinity; but which
was afterwards found to be impracticable, and had to be abandoned.
The Senator, therefore, and others who have taken part in this debate, have treated with light derision the proposition to build a suspension bridge over the Hudson at this point. Let me remind the
Senator of that other instance, in his section, when a suspension
bridge was proposed at the Falls of Niagara, and which was also received with light derision-with general derision, if you please. When
this same Mr. Robling, who has testified to the feasibility of a suspension bridge over the Hudson, when he testified to the practicability of
a bridge at Niagara, he was laughed at by the sceptical, as this project
is now laughed at  As is now the case with Mr. Bissell, he was
called no Engineer, a man of genius perhaps, but a wild visionary,
an idle dreamer who only wanted people to give him money. Not
only America, but Europe was ransacked for opinions and testimony
to overwhelm him.  Even Stevenson, the celebrated English Engineer, whose fame had filled the world, and whose opinions were considered infallible, was sent for to examine the ground. He came, he
made the examination, and declared it as his opinion, based on his
experience, that the plan was impracticable and absurd. But the
bridge was built. It is there now. It stands there as a perpetual
rebuke to the scoffers who ridiculed the conception of the man of genius who erected it.  So I predict, whatever may be said of this proposition now, the day is not distant when a similar structure will
cross the channel of the Hudson between Troy and Albany, and be
a like rebuke to those who have ridiculed its practicability here.
It has been claimed in the course of this discussion that the bridge
proposed by the bill before us will not obstruct the channel of the
river, because it provides a draw through which vessels can pass, and
that in this it differs from a permanent structure, which would not




27
allow the passage of vessels.  There is some plausibility in this
position at a first glance, but when examined the distinction is found
to be one without a difference.  Look, for a moment, at the practical operation of this structure.  What is the bridge intended for?
It is intended to be a railroad bridge. In all after time, should this
bridge be constructed and the question brought before the courts,
they will look to the act for the object of the bridge, and they will
there find it to be intended for railroad travel and transportation
across the Hudson river; and according to the principle of interpretation adopted in all courts, they will seek, should the measure be
sustained, as far as they can, to carry out the intentions of the Legislature.  So much for the object of the law.  And how would that
object be carried out? The bridge would be owned by railroad
corporations, for, by the second section of the bill any railroad corporation is authorized to acquire stock in it. It would therefore be
controlled by the railroad interest, and would be managed so as to
subserve that interest.  By the report it appears that five important
railroads now terminate at Albany, three on this side and two on the
other, and carrying on a business in passengers and freight even
now immense, and every year rapidly increasing.  During the year
1855 the number of passengers passing over these roads was over
four millions, and the total tonnage of freight was over one million..Here, by the report of the committee, we have a statement of the
stupendous and yearly increasing magnitude of the business to be
carried on over this bridge.  Bearing in mind that the express object
of the bill is the convenience of railroad travel and transportation,
and that it will be owned by railroad corporations; bearing in mind the
immense magnitude of the traffic which will cross it, what will be the
state of facts if it be constructed? Will the draw be opened-will
the channel be free for the vessels constantly passing between Albany and Troy?  Does any sensible man believe this for an instant?
What is the testimony as to the number of boats and the frequency
with which they pass this point? I read from the testimony of Mr.
Tillinghast, page 57, (here Mlr Sickles read from the testimony of
Mr. Tillinghnst,) I also read from the testimony of Captain Edwards
(reads,) also, on page 29, the testimony of Captain Silliman, (continues to read.)  Here the testimony is as to one particular branch
of navigation alone, which would require the draw to be opened
16,000 times during a season. According to the testimony I have
read, a vessel would pass every eight minutes.  By reference to the
report we have seen the magnitude of transportation, and the immense number of passengers that would cross the bridge.  We have
seen that five railroads terminate here, and we can well imagine the
number of trains that would pass over these important roads, and
which would be crossing this bridge almost constantly.  We can




28
easily see that the draw " closed" would be the rule, and the draw
" open" the exception; and this necessity is, in all probability recognized in the bill, as gentlemen will perceive if they take the trouble
to look at section 8. It means exactly this and no more-that the
draw shall be kept open except when the railroads shall wish it
closed.  Look at the magnitude of transportion depicted by the report of the committee as now existing; imagine the amount of transportation yearly to be added, and you will easily conceive how often
the railroads will want the draw to be shut, and how often and how
long they will allow it to be open for the purposes of navigation.
You will perceive this still better when you come to consider that
the railroads are in competition with navigation, and that it will be
for their interest to keep the draw closed as much as they can so that
shippers will find it to their interest to send their freight by car instead of by boat. In view, then, of these very exigencies, so confidently appealed to on the other side, and on the showing of the
partizans of the measure themselves, this draw will have to be closed
so much for railroads, that there will be no time to open it for navigation.  Apply this to the constitutional point.  WzAith all the boldness with which gentlemen on the other side have denied legal propositions, they have not denied that if the bridge be a material obstruction, it cannot be constructed.  And is not this an obstruction as
much as anything can be an obstruction? If you detain vessels by
the half hour; if vessels which come down every ten minutes are to
be stopped while the draw remains closed for cars to pass, is not that
a hinderance? Does it not interfere with navigation? Gentlemen
on the other side seem to think that rivers are no longer of any particular utility-they have become obsolete-old fogies as it were,
that, for all practical purposes, they are to be superseded by railroads; that the Mississippi, and the Delaware, and the Ohio, and
our own noble Hudson, which we are accustomed to consider the
greatest boons that a benificent Providence has conferred upon our
favored land, are to be delivered over to their original wildness; that
the steamboats are to disappear from their bosoms, and their surface
to be no longer dotted with the thousand sails of traffic bearing vessels; and that, therefore, it is not worth while to pay much attention
to the rights of navigation or of navigators; that those old salts who
are so familiar now, and so famous in story, are to be so henceforth
only in tradition, and to live only on the page of history; that the sailor,
both before and aft the mast, is to abandon his calling and become a
railroad conductor or a brakeman; that navigation is to be abolished
and railroads installed with absolute power. If all this is so. statistics
do not show it quite yet. So far as I see anything of the future, there
is no indication of such an extraordinary state of things as gentlemen
seem to think now exists, or soon will exist, I venture to say, and




I am prepared to establish it by statistics, that not one one.hundredth
of the trade between New York and Albany, and between Albany
and the West, is carried on by steamboats; that the river and the
canals are infinitely in advance of railroads, even in capacity to perform this work.  For my part I think the rivers will continue for
some time yet to be of use to New York and the commerce of the
nation, and that it will be quite as well for the Legislature to look
to the interests of the one as of the other.
Now, Mr. Chairman, a few words in reply to the Senator from the
19th, (Mr. Richardson,) and I will submit the question to the Senate as far as I am concerned. The honorable Senator has taken occasion to address the Senate, I am sorry to say it, in what seemed to
me to be a very bad humor with my humble self. I regretted to see
it, for I don't like to see any one in bad humor, for I endeavor not
to deserve or excite the bad humor of any person. The honorable
Senator, in the course of his remarks, charged me with misrepresenting his argument. He dwelt upon that. Well, sir, if I did, it was
not certainly for want of the argument being explained often. He
explained it to us so often, and I must say in so many different
modes, that it rather confounded a person in understanding it; and
if anybody is responsible in the misconception of his argument it is
the honorable Senator himself; for, as far as my humble capacity
will enable me to judge, he did not state it on any two occasions
alike.  But, sir, the honorable Senator was not satisfied with charging me with misrepresenting his argument, but, sir, he allowed himself to be led into a more serious question, and a more important one,
allow me to say. He charged me with misreading a quotation-with
suppressing a portion of a quotation-and imputed to me the intent
to help my case along by suppressing some of the facts.
Mr. Richardson.-I stand by that.
Mfr. Sickles. —I am sorry for him. I am sorry the Senator has
sb little of fairness and candor and fair play-so little of ingenuousness, as to persist in an offensive charge on a state of facts so utterly
absurd as to repel the possibility of anybody agreeing with him.The Senator says he stands by that. It is because he stands on it
wantonly, and avails himself of the privilege of a seat on the Senate
floor in persisting in a charge that is not justified by the occasion or
the facts. Sir, I don't like to argue on a question of character or
truth. It is beneath the dignity of any man of self respect to submit such a question to argument; but, sir, as this is a forum where
reason must ultimately triumph, and where a man may appeal to the
justice of the Senate, I will suffer myself to state a fact which precludes the possibility of any such intent by me. I stated in my
place, when I took the report of the Committee and accompanying
documents, that I desired to read from page 20 of the testimony. —




30
Every Senator here will bear me out in this statement of fact. I
stated the name of the witness from whose testimony I desired to
read. I stated that I desired to read from that part of the testimony
wlere the witness was examined by the Chairman of the Committee.
The Senator from the 19th, (Mr. Richardson,) had a copy of the
book in his hand; he had the book before him; he had the page,
he was looking at the very words I was reading; could he imagineah! I will not ask if the Senator can imagine, he will suffer himself
to say anything-but can any other Senator imagine that I could be
guilty of the folly, the fatuity, when the Senator from the 19th was
reading the very passage word for word.  Yet on the statement of
the fact the Senator suffers himself, in the desperation of his case, to
make a wanton charge on my good faith.
I have cited to the Senator from the 19th, legislative precedents,
congressional precedents, adjudications of the Supreme Court of the
Untied States. It appears I have cited these in vain, since he is as
insensible to any legal precedent, or any adjudicated case, as a
rhinoceros is impervious to a bullet. But I think I have, at last, in
the limited time I have been able to bestow on the investigation
of this question, found an authority which even that Senator will
respect. Some m,, indeed, have very little respect for anything;
but, I think howeve  little respect the Senator from the 19th may
have for what is above'l im, he will not be found wanting in respect
for what eminates from himself, to however small an extent others
may be inclined to respect what has its origin at that source.  I have
in my hand a report by that Senator, in reference to the construction
of a bridge across the Genesee river.  Compare the doctrine in the
Albany bridge case, with the doctrine of the Genesee river report,
both emanating from the same distinguished source. With the leave
of the Senate I will read from the report of the Senator in the
Genesee river case:
"The Committee have heard the proofs and allegations of the petitioners and of the remonstrants; have duily considered the same, and
have come to the conclusion that such a public necessity for the bridge
mentioned in the petitions and the bill submitted to the Committee,
does not exist as to warrant the action of the Legislature as against vcsted rights of individuals in the unobstructed navigation of the river. not
only as a navigable stream, but as a port of entry established by an act of
Congress in 1805. The Genesee river is a stream so well known that a
description of it is not necessary."
A very interesting piece of information, for which we are indebted to the the Senator from the 19th.' It is navigable for all classes of vessels which navigate Lake Ontario, for a distance of about five miles from its mouth. to a point called
the upper landing, within the limits of the city of Rochester, and the




81
river from its mouth to the head of navigation, the point above indicated,
is, by act of Congress passed in 1805, a port of entry, now called the
port of Rochester, in charge of the proper officer of the general government "
How long did it take the distinguished and enlightened Chairman
of the Committee on railroads to unlearn the law as applicable to
the Genesee river, and apply another and very different state of the
law to the Hudson river at Albany. Judging the capacity of the
Senator by the manifestation of his reports, it is evident that he is
able to change his position on legal questions, with all the facility of
a Punebhiillo.  He has been enabled to transform himself into an
entirely new law-giver between the 27th of February and the 7th of
March   On the 27th of February it was not to be thought of to
construct a draw-bridge across the Genesee river, because it would
interfere with vested rights, and because the city of Rochester is a
port of entry, established by act of Congress, in 1805. Troy is a
port of entry, or a port of delivery, which amounts to the same thing
so far as the argument is concerned.  It is situated on the Hudson
river, in the navigation of which one hundred thousand people are
interested, and in which they have a vested right in common with
the people of the whole Union. It appears that the Senator did
recognize these obstacles prior to and on the 27th of February,
though since that time they seem to have faded from his mind.
These things may not be interesting to any one else, indeed I do not
suppose they can be so, but to the Senator from the 19th, who really
seems to have forgotten what little he ever knew, it must be extremely interesting, as well as gratifying and useful, to be instructed
in his own precedents:
f' At the head of navigation on the river, are /ft.: s and wharves upon
each side of the river, and a warehouse for comm icial purposes. The
channel of the river, for the whole distance from these docks and wharves
to the proposed bridge, is deep. and the current slight, so that vessels
navigating the lake can come up to load and unload at the wharves. The
channel of the river at its mouth, is some three hundred feet in width.
A bridge at that point, although constructed with a suitable draw,
would, necessarily, to a greater or less extent, be an embarassment to
vessels destined to ascend the river."
So it appears from the report of the honorable Senator that they
have "A WAREHOUSE" on the Genesee river.  We must not interfere with that " WAREHOUSE." We are told, also, that Rochester
is a port of entry, and that vessels can actually come up and " load
and unload" at the wharves.  They must, indeed, have a lively
time there; perhaps, at the Custom-house, not having leisure to
attend to the regulation of the political affairs which are so important a portion of the duties of a collector. The Senator from thq
19th thinks that a due regard for the Constitution, and for the




32
vested rights of that extensive navigation, and that immense commerce which concentrates itself in a single warehouse should prevent us from doing anything to mar the beauty of that magnificent
spectacle of navigation and trade.  But when he comes to the Hudson, that inconsequential stream the Hudson, and those inconsiderable cities of Albany and Troy, where there is no vwarehouse —nothing but railroads-he finds no difficulties in the way, he is affected
by no constitutional scruples, he encounters no vested rights; he
perceives no ports of entry, no warehouses, no wharves at which
vessels can load and unload, no trade, no transportation, no navigation. In his report of March 4th, upon the Albany bridge, he tells
us, "that a bridge across the Hudson river at Albany may be so
constructed, maintained and managed as not to be in conflict with
the Constitution and laws of the United States, of this State, and
of civilized nations, not materially to inju?,e vested rights and not
necessarily to obstruct the navigation of the river to any ruinous
extent, the committee, therefore, ask leave to introduce a bill entitled,
an act authorizing the construction of a bridge across the Hudson
river at Albany, which contains such safeguards and restrictions that
the bridge, if constructed and managed according to the provisions of the bill, will not cause any serious injury or obstruction to
the commerce or navigation of the river, or work the injury to property and vested rights so fearful!y apprehended."
We may build the bridge across the Hudson if it do not ruin
navigation; if it do not necessarily obstruct navigation to any ruinous extent, if it do not cause any serious injury to the commerce or
navigation of the river; if it do not materially injure vested rights
— this is the Albany bridge doctrine.  The Genesee bridge doctrine
of two weeks before is, that if you construct a bridge with a "suitable draw" over that river, it would operate I" against the vested
rights of individuals, in the unobstructed navigation of the river;"
and that it " would necessarily, to a greater or less extent, be an
embarassment to vessels destined to ascend the river;" that it would
mar the imposing spectacle of that warehouse which the public flock
from  all quarters to behold, as they crowd to see St. Peters at
Rome, or the docks at Liverpool, or Barnum's museum. No doubt
the people go from all parts of Genesee county to gaze with wonder
and delight on this " warehouse" and that remarkable port at whose
wharves vessels can actually come up and load and unload. I admire the Senator for the care he has taken to preserve this curiosity
for that section of the State; and the people should thank him that
he has kept the view unimpeded even by a i suitable draw"-for
that would ruin it. Should such a catastrophe ever overtake that
now flourishing port and that noble warehouse, the Senator might
go there, like another Mavius, and grieve over the mournful spec



33
tacle. Let us praise him for the good he has done in interposing to
save this magnificent port and this spacious warehouse, from the
sacrilege which would mar their usefulness and their beauty with a
bridge with a suitable draw; let us praise and revere him for this,
even though he threatens Albany and Troy with annihilation. Let
us, in extenuation of his sins, remember that he has preserved that
noble port, and that rare curiosity-a warehouse, and those very
remarkable wharves where vessels can actually come up and load
and unload, to be the admiration of this and the envy of succeeding
generations.  Let us remember that with an affecting pathos, he
implored the Senate to spare them yet, as Morris implored the
Woodman" to "spare that tree."
The Senator, in his report of February 27 th, reports against the
Genesee bridge, because it would embarass the navigation o' that useful stream; but he appears perfectly willing to do anything in regard
to the Hudson which will not absolutely ruin its commerce. To
embarass the one would be an outrage on vested rights, and a
violation of the Constitution; to stop just this side of ruin where
the other is concerned, would be justifiable in the'eye of the Senator
from the 19th. Such are the doctrines presented to us in his two
reports.
I will pass over several things I had intended to say on this
question, and come at once to one which I think carries with it no
little force and authority. The Connecticut Legislature, at one time,
had before it a proposition very like the one we are now discussinga proposition to bridge a navigable stream. Listening to the soft
and winning persuasions of those eloquent gentlemen who are so influential, and perhaps even with us all, they passed the act, Governor Toucey, then the Executive of the State, vetoed it. I think
I am entitled to the consideration of the Senate for placing before it
the opinion of so eminent a man as Governor Toucey, now a mem.
ber of the United States Senate, and distinguished for the reliability
of his opinions on all questions relating to State and Federal powers.
The following is the Message:" The general object of the charter, which is the grant of a railroad from New Haven, by way of Middletown, to the eastern line of
the State by the route proposed has my unqualified approbation.
The principal objection which will be presented, is against the grant
to this corporation of a right to construct a bridge across the Connecticut river, below a port of delivery established by act of Congress.
"The city of Hartford is at the head of sloop navigation in the
Connecticut river, the tides of the ocean ebb and flow there, and
thence to the mouth of the river, its waters are navigable by vessels
5




34
engaged in the foreign and coasting trade, and constitute an arm of
the sea, and a portion of the navigable waters of the United States.
By an act passed in the year 1799, Congress opened the port of
Hartford and other places above the proposed bridge, and established
them as ports of delivery.  At the port of Hartford are stationed by
the National Government a Surveyor and an Inspector, whose duties
are prescribed by the laws of the United States.  Congress has explicitly authorized the registered vessels of the United States, (with
an exception,) and all enrolled and other vessels sailing under a coasting license, to proceed to this port of delivery to unlade their cargoes.  The question presented. therefore, is, whether the Legislature of Connecticut can grant to a corporation the power to interrupt
this navigation, by vessels of the United States, in the navigable
waters of the United States, between a port of delivery and the sea.
" The question is one of more than usual importance, not only to
the people of this State, but to the whole Union.  If this State has
the power to shut up, by an act of her Legislature, the port of Hartford or the port of Middletown, every port of entry or delivery in the
Union can be shut up, not only without, but against, the authority
of Congress.  The ports of New York and the Hudson might be
closed in a like manner; the Delaware and Chesapeake bays might
be rendered inaccessible to vessels of the United States, and the
mighty river of the West, whose banks will soon be peopled by nations might be encumbered by a hundred bridges, to be passed with
danger and difficulty by the immense and immensely increasing multitude of vessels that float upon her waters.
" It will be admitted on all sides, that an act of the State, prohibiting vessels engaged in the coasting trade, and sailing under a
coasting license, from proceeding to a port of entry or delivery established by Congress, would be in conflict with the laws of the United
States passed in pursuance of the Constitution, and would be utterly
void for the want of power in the State to pass it. If such act of
the State should prohibit the passage of such vessels, not totally but
partially, as, for example, for one-half the day, or one-fifth, or onetenth, or a less fraction of time, such act of the State would be in
conflict with the laws of Congress, and would be equally void,  It is
not the extent, but the fact of such conflict which makes void the
legislation of the State. If the law of the State conflict but little,
and therefore be not void, that little might be repeated, until the
sum total entirely subverted the action of Congress. If one bridge
but partially obstructs the navigation, and may therefore be permitted, then a second and a third bridge may be constructed, and by the
same process of reasoning the whole river may be encumbered with
bridges from the port of Hartford to its mouth, till the navigation is
totally broken up and rendered impracticable.




35
"It will be readily admitted, that if Congress has not exercised
the power of regulating commerce, so as to conflict with the legislation of the State, the latter will not be void. It. has therefore been
adjudged by the Supreme Court of the Union, that a navigable creek,
which is an arm of the sea, may, by State authority, be entirely
closed by a dam, if the legislation of Congress do not interfere; while
in the same case it is held, that if Congress do interfere by the passage of an act, the law of the State in conflict with it would be entirely void. If in such case Congress had established a port of entry
or delivery within the navigable waters thus closed up by a dam,
erected by authority of the State, the dam would be abated as a public nuisance,
" In one of the best judicial opinions to be found upon record, pronounced by the late Chief Justice Marshall, in the great case of Gibbons vs. Ogden, the power of Congress and the rights of the State
are defined with almost unexampled clearness and precision.
" The State of New York had granted to Livingston aud Fulton
the exclusive right to navigate her waters in vessels or boats propelled by steam, and her Chancellor and Judges, in all her Courts,
had adjudged the law to be Constitutional and valid. But the Supreme Court of the Union. in the judgment alluded to, held the law
of the State to be void, because it obstructed the trade and navigation of the United States, as regulated and carried on under the authority of Congress. A vessel engaged in the coasting trade, and
sailing under a coasting license, though propelled by steam, could
not, by all the power of the State, be obstructed in passing through
her waters, to its port of destination.
The question, therefore, presented to the General Assembly upon
this charter, must be, will this bridge, with its numerous piers in the
bed of the river, be an obstruction to this navigation.  One would
suppose that the question could be readily answered by any person,
having a general knowledge of the character and commerce of the
Connecticut river. It is hardly possible to suppose, that this bridge
with its piers in the bed of the river, and its trains of cars, passing
perhaps hourly upon it, and passing still more frequently as time
advances and business increases, should not be such an obstruction.
And it would seem to be a decisive answer to the inquiry, that if
this bridge will not be an obstruction to this navigation, then another
and another might be authorized, until the whole river would be
bridged, from its mouth to the port, which would be, thereby, effectually shut, and its commerce annihilated.
It affords me satisfaction to believe, that the grant of this exclusive right to this company, is not necessary, nor of any great importance to any portion of' our citizens, who desire it. The inhabitants
of the valley of the Connecticut river, and the inhabitants residing




upon the route of the proposed railroad have respectively rights and
claims upon the justice and equity of the Legislature, which ought
not to be disregarded. If the road be granted, with the usual privilege of passing navigable waters in the usual manner, the rights and
claims of both these portions of our fellow citizens will be regarded
with equal justice, and neither be sacrificed to the other. Such of our
citizens as will be way passengers on this road, will think little of a
few moments delay. Those who would merely pass through the
State with railroad speed, have no very strong claims for extraordinary legislation. To the owners of freight, the inconvenience will
be inconsiderable. At all events, the delay and inconvenience will
be no more than is usual upon the great lines of railroads in the country, when they cross the navigable waters of the United States. It
would, therefore, be unnecessary, and most extraordinary to grant
to this corporation the privilege of crossing these waters, between
the mouth of the river and the head of sloop navigation, by a bridge
-a privilege which has hitherto withheld from the citizens of this
State; a privilege which is not now enjoyed by the people, or by
any corporate body; a privilege which would now be withheld, should
any portion of our constituents apply to this legislature for leave to
cross by a bridge, on horseback, in wagons or carriages, or with teams
carrying the produce of their farms or their workshops, to the nearest market. Such an excise of the power of legislation, by granting
such an exclusive privilege over the navigable waters of the United
States, to a private incorporated company, in derogation of the rights
and privileges of a large portion of the people, which they, in all
times past have been accustomed to enjoy, while the same charter,
granting it, refuses to the landholder, whose property is taken from
him for the use of this corporation without his consent, the right to
appeal to any court, or to a jury of his countrymen for a re-assessment of his damages, does not commend itself to my judgment;
and for the reasons which I have stated, I feel constrained by convictions of imperative duty, which it is not in my power to over-rule,
to return this bill to the reconsideration of the General Assembly.
ISAAC TOUCEY.
Executive Chamber,      -
General Assembly, June 6, 1845.
Here is a case exactly in point, where a railroad company applied
to be permitted to construct a bridge across a navigable stream, below a port of entry and yet the Governor of Connecticut vetoed the
measure on the very grounds I have presented to the Senate in this
debate.  There is one more point which I wish to press upon the
attention of the Senate before I close. The testimony on the records
of the Senate shows that by diverging at Schenectady and coming




37
down on the other side of the river the Rail Road Companys can
avail themselves of a perfectly feasible mode of crossing the river
at Troy above navigation and without interfering with or molesting
anybody; and it is a fact that the Company to be most largely benefitted by the measure, already owns that route. It does not avail
itself of the rights it acquired there, simply because it does not
choose to do so. Does the failure of this Company to exercise its
volition and to avail itself of that route, constitute the pressing
necessity which would justify us in sacrificing great public interests?
Can any thing be more absurd than such a proposition? I know it
will be answered that to do this would require them to alter their
track and make their route a few miles longer, and involve the expenditure of some money. Suppoee such to be the case can you
pretend to call that a great public necessity justifying the sacrifice of
vested rights when that great public necessity can be avoided at an
expense of two or three hundred thousand dollars by the very corporation to be benefitted by this proposed improvement? The road
is already made between Schenectady and Troy, but to shorten the
route as much as possible between Troy and Albany, some expense
must be incurred. They certainly could stand the two or three hundred thousand required for that, when they propose to expend half
a million to construct a bridge across the Hudson at the point indiacted as the only place where they will condescend to cross.
To conclude, I submit, that it has become evident that I have indicated a mode by which all the good desired can be attained, and
all the harm predicted, avoided. And I put it to the judgment and
candor of the Senate, that our duty as legislators; as New-Yorkers,
is to know no discrimination between one portion' of our population
and another. I regard the theory of the Senat'or from the 19th,
as unworthy of New York-this doctrine of paying no regard as to
how much you injure one portion, so long as you benefit another of
our people. The government of New York is paternal. Her citizens have equal rights —equal claims on her regard.  When we see
that we can benefit any portion of our citizens, it is our duty to do
so. It must be a positive benefit. When we see that we can improve
trade and navigation above and-below Albany, it is our duty to do it.
But the doctrine never will be sustained by the people of New-York,
that the Legislature may discriminate against ome portion of her citizens, and in favor of another. On such a question we should know
no locality-no north, south, east or west.  The rights df all are
equal; the rights of any are' sacred, no matter whether it be-in the
smallest village in the State, or the most fNourishing metropolis. It
is on this broad ground alone, that we can justly legislate. On
any other principle it is impossible to maintain that harmony of
feeling, that concord, that brotherly affection which should be en



38
couraged, not only between individual citizens, but all our towns,
villages and cities  Sir, in a commercial point of view, so far as you
may look at a locality, no portion of the State is more benefitted by
these improvements than the city of New-York.  The interests of
the consumer are always promoted by any thing which cheapens
transportation —that lessens prices. No portion of the State consumes so much of the produce that will go over this bridge, than
New York.  The mighty mass of consumers there, always look with
friendly eyes on every measure that lessens the price of the necessaries of life. I represent a class as much interested as merchants
and consumers, in trade and manufactures, as any portion of the
State, yet I know that I only represent, and only do justice to the
city of New-York, when I say here in my place, in their nameand I am proud to say it-that I reject any and every advantage
proffered to them in cheapening transportation, which involves a violation of her rights. the vested rights, the constitutionally vested
rights of any other portion of the people of New-York.