THE
ANALOGY OF RELIGION,
TO THE
&ndfitnt#thm a&d cimurvt  f m ptee.
TO WHICH ARE ADDED
TWO BRIEF DISSERTATIONSo
L ON PERSONAL IDENTITY.-II. ON THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.
BY
JOSEPH      BUTLER, Do.CL.
Fjus [Analogia] hae vis est, ut id quod dubium est ad aliquid simile, de quo non quseritur
referat ut incerta certis probet.-QUINTIL.. 1. C. 6.
WITH
AN INTRODUCTION, NOTES, CONSPECTUS, AND AMPLE INDEX,
BY
HOWARD MALCOM, D.D.
PRESIDENT OF THE UNIVERSITY, LEWISBUEG, PENNSYLVANIA.
SEVENTBEEXTt EDITION.
PHILADELPHIA:
J. B. LIPPINCOTT & CO.
1873.




Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1857, by
J. B. LIPPINCOTT & C3.
in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States in and for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania.




CONTENTS.
PAGN
EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION................................................................  5
"     PREFACE......................................................................  19'<    CONSPECTUS.............................................................  21
&UTHOR'S ADVERTISEMENT.............................................................. 66
INTRODUCTION....................................................  67
PART I.
OF NATURAL RELIGION.
CHAP. I.-A Future Life........................................................ 77
CHAP. II.-The Government of God by Rewards and Punishments......... 95
CHAP. III.-The Moral Government of God...................................... 105
CHAP. IV.-Probation, as implying Trial, Difficulties, and Danger.......... 128
CHAP. V.-Probation, as intended for Moral Discipline and Improvement. 136
CHAP. VI. —The Opinion of Necessity, considered as influencing Practice. 157
CHAP. VII.-The Government of God, considered as a Scheme or Constitution, imperfectly comprehended............................................. 171
CONCLUs ION..................................................................................  18
3




4                               CONTENTS.
PART II.
OF REVEALED RELIGION.
FAG]
CHAP. I.-The Importance of Christianity...................................... 186
CHAP. II.-The supposed Presumption against a Revelation, considered
as  m iraculous......................................................................  202
CHAP. III.-Our Incapacity of judging, what were to be expected in a
Revelation; and the Credibility, from Analogy, that it must contain things appearing liable to Objections................................... 209
CHAP. IV.-Christianity, considered as a Scheme or Constitution, imperfectly comprehended............................................................. 223
CHAP. V.-The Particular System of Christianity; the Appointment of a
Mediator, and the Redemption of the World by him..................... 230
CHAP. VI.-Want of Universality in Revelation; and of the supposea
Deficiency in the Proof of it......................................... 247
CHAP. VII.-The Particular Evidence for Christianity.......................... 263
CHAP. VIII.-Objections against arguing from the Analogy of Nature to
R eligion..............................................................................  296
CONCLUSION.............................................................................  306
DISSERTATIONS.
DISSERTATION I.-Personal Identity........................................  317
DISSERTATION II.-The Nature of Virtue...................................... 324
INDEX  TO  PART  I....................................................................  333
iNDEX TO PART II.....................................................  343




f bitor's       Mntroabucioa.
JOSEPH BUTLER was born at Wantage, England, May 18th, 1692,
the youngest of eight children.  The biographies of that day were
few and meagre; and in few cases is this so much to be regretted as
in Butler's. It would have been both interesting and profitable to
trace the development and occupations of one of the mightiest of
human minds. But no cotemporary gathered up the incidents of his
life, and now all efforts to elicit them have been without success.
His father was a prosperous dry-goods merchant, who, at the time
of his son's birth, had retired from business with a competency, and
resided in a suburban mansion called " The Priory," still in existence.
Being a non-conformist, he educated Joseph at a "dissenting"
academy at Gloucester, under SAMUEL JONES, a gentleman of great
ability, and a skilful instructor, who raised up some of the greatest
men of their day.*
It was while a member of this academy, and about the age of
twenty-one, that Butler disclosed to the world his wonderful power of
abstract reasoning, in his famous correspondence with Samuel Clarke,
in relation to that eminent author's "Demonstration of the Being and
Attributes of God." This correspondence is now generally inserted
at the end of that work.
Mr. Butler having deliberately adopted Episcopal views, and resolved to unite himself with the Established Church, his father, with
praiseworthy liberality, sent him to Oxford, where he entered Oriel
College, March, 1714.  Of his college life there is no account; nor
of the time and place of his ordination.  He removed to London
in 1718, on receiving the appointment of "Preacher at the Rolls."
His famous Fifteen Sermons were preached in that chapel, and
published before resigning the place, with a dedication to Sir Joseph
Jekyl, "as a parting mark of gratitude for the favors received during
his connection with that learned society."
i Among these were Jones, author of the admirable Treatise on the Canon
of the New Testament: Lardiler, laddox, Chandler, Archbishop Secker, &c.
1 -                    65




6                 EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION.
One of Butler's warmest college friends was Edward ralbok
second s')n of a clergyman who afterwards became Bishop of Durham.
This admirable young man died of smallpox; in his last hours recommending Butler to his father's patronage; and scarcely had that
gentleman attained the see of Durham, before he gave Mr. B. the
living of Haughton, from whence he transferred him, in 1725, to the
richer benefice of Stanhope.
On receiving this honorable and lucrative appointment, he resigned the Lectureship at the Rolls, and in the autumn of 1726 retired
to his beautiful residence at Stanhope. Here, without a family to
occupy his time, he devoted himself to his great work, the Analogy:
using horseback exercise, seeing little company, living abstemiously
and caring for his flock.
Seven years thus rolled away; when to draw him from what seemed
to his friends too great retirement and application, Lord-Chancello'
Talbot made him his chaplain, and afterwards, in 1736, gave him a
prebend's stall in Rochester. In 1736, Butler being now forty-four,
Caroline, consort of George II., appointed him " Clerk of the Closet,"
an office which merely required his attendance at the Queen's apartments every evening, from seven to nine.
Being now in London, convenient to the press, and enjoying both
leisure and competency, he published his immortal ANALOGY-the
cherished work of his life. The Queen was delighted with the book,
and made herself master of its glorious array of reasoning. But she
died the same year, and he lost not only a patroness, but a friend.
He returned to his benefice at Stanhope, the income of which had
been held during his residence in London.
On her death-bed, the Queen had urged her husband to promote
her honored chaplain to a bishopric; and next year, the see of
Norwich becoming vacant, the Bishop of Bristol was translated to it,
and the see of Bristol given to Butler. Bristol was the poorest
bishopric in England, its emoluments being but $2,000 per annum;
less than those of the rectorship of Stanhope.  Butler distinctly
disclosed his disappointment in his letter to the minister Walpole,
accepting the position; and declared that he did not think it "very
suitable to the condition of his fortune, nor answerable to the recommendation with which he was honored."  The king was not displeased at this candor, and in 1740 improved his income by giving
him, in addition to his bishopric, the profitable and influential office
of Dean of St. Paul's. Butler, who had retained the livi;g of Stan



EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION. 
tope along with his bishopric, now resigned that rectorship. " The
rich revenues," says Professor Fitzgerald, " of the Deanery of St. Paul,
enabled him to gratify his taste at Bristol."  He expended about
$25,000 in improving and beautifying the episcopal residence and
gardens. He fostered useful charities, and employed his wealth for
others rather than for himself.
In 1750, upon the death of Dr. Edward Chandler, Bishop of
Durham, Butler was promoted to that see, the most honorable and
lucrative in England. He had before been offered the Primacy, on
the death of Archbishop Potter, but declined it, with the remark that
"it was too late for him to try to support a falling church." On
assuming his diocese at Durham, Butler delivered and published his
famous Charge to the Clergy, upon "The Use and Importance of
External Religion." He was at once assailed vigorously, in pamphlets and papers, by Archdeacon Blackburn, the Rev. T. Lindsay, and
others, on the charge of Popery; an imputation which is still sometimes cast upon him, and which finds some slender support in his
setting up a marble cross over the communion-table at Bristol. That
he never was a Papist, is now so evident, that we can account for the
imputation only by the strong jealousy of the Romish Church then
prevalent.
Butler now became still more munificent. His private charities
were exceedingly generous, and his public ones seemed sometimes to
border on extravagance. lie gave $2,000 a year to the county hospital,
and often gave away thousands of dollars at a time. But though
quite lavish in buildings and ornaments, as well as in benevolence,
he was remarkably frugal in his personal expenses. It is said of
him, by Rev. John Newton, that on one occasion, when a distinguished visitor dined with him by appointment, the provision consisted of a single joint of meat, and a pudding. The bishop remarked
to his guest on that occasion, that he " had long been disgusted with
the fashionable expense of time and money in entertainments, and
was determined that it should receive no countenance from his
example."
Of his amusements we know little except that he took much horseback exercise, and often employed his secretary, Mr. Emms, to play
for him on the organ.
Butler held the see of Durham less than two years. Symptoms
of general physical decay betrayed themselves about the time of
his promotion, and in spite of all that skill and affection coula




8                 EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION.
prompt, he sunk to rest June 16th, 1752, aged sixty. He was never
married
A considerable number of his sermons and charges have been
printed, but are too philosophical to be generally read. Iis great
work is the Analogy, published in 1736, and from that day read and
admired by every highly-cultivated mind. He was induced to write
by a state of things very remarkable in the history of religion.
Debauchery and infidelity were almost universal, not in any one class
of society but in all. England had reached the culminating point
of irreligion, and the firm re-establishment of Episcopacy had as yet
done nothing to mend the nation's morals. Piety was deemed a mark
of ignorance and vulgarity, and multitudes of those who professed it
were persecuted to dungeons and death..,
Infidel writers, warmed into life by court corruption, became more
numerous and audacious than ever before. Their methods of attacking Christianity were various; but the most successful then, as
always, was to impugn certain doctrines and declarations of the
Sacred Scriptures, as irrational, and hence reject the whole. They
generally admitted the Being and perfection of God, and extolled the
sufficiency of natural religion; but denied any revelation, or any
necessity for one. The verdict of the world was that the Bible is not
authentic, that man is not accountable, nor even probably immortal,
that God neither rewards nor punishes, and that present indulgence,
as far as our nature admits, is both wise and safe.
Bishop Downam,* one of the most learned of the clergy, in the
early part of the seventeenth century writes thus: "In these times,
if a man do but labor to keep a good conscience, though he meddle
not with matters of state, if he make conscience of swearing, sanctify
the Sabbath, frequent sermons, or abstain from the common corruptions of the times, he shall straightway be condemned for a puritan,
and be less favored than either a carnal gospeller, or a close Papist."
It was considered settled, especially in polite circles, that Christianity, after so long a prevalence, had been found out to be an imposture. The clergy, as a body, did nothing to dispel this moral
gloom, but rather increased it by their violent and scandalous conduct.  In the sad language of Bishop Warburton, "Religion had
lost its hold on the minds of the people."  He adds with great point,
"Though a rule of right may direct the philosopher to a principle of: Sermon at Spittle, on Abraham's trial




EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION.                    9
action; and the point of honor may keep up the thing called manners, among gentlemen: yet nothing but religion can ever fix a sober
standard of behavior among the common people."   Even the universities were on the side of irreligion; for professorships, as well as
pulpits, were given to men, not for positive worth and fitness, but for
possessing qualities then most in vogue with those who held the
appointing power. Such were the trying times which had driven our
pilgrim fathers to seek a home amid the wilds of an unexplored continent, and to face the dangers of sea and savage.
It must ever be regarded as among the highest instances of Gqd's
bringing good out of evil, that this outrageous rampancy of infidelity
brought out a host of champions for the truth of His word; who
boldly met the odium of discipleship, and waged battle in such style
that the Deistical controversy was settled forever. Never was a dispute more determined on both sides, and never was victory more
complete. Literary infidelity not only recoiled, but was routed; and
can never again prevail. Ienceforth, no scholar will ever treat the
evidences of Christianity as a subject of ridicule or contempt.
When we contrast the stupendous learning, and powerful logic, of
the Christian writers of that century, with the superficial and almost
contemptible productions of the writers against whom they contended,
we are tempted to wonder why such power should be requisite to
overthrow such weakness. But we must remember, that frail logic
and shallow considerations, will persuade men to indulge their vices;
while the soundest reasonings and the most impressive inducements,
with difficulty lead them to self-restraint and true holiness.
The infidel writers of that day have sulnk into such oblivion that
their works are now seldom found but in great libraries; and even
well-educated persons scarcely know more of them than their names.
Yet so perfectly did their principles accord with the temper of the
times and the universal depravity of the carnal heart, that they
enjoyed the highest popularity with all classes. Forever honored be
the names of that noble band, who, in face of such odds, established
the authority of the Bible, and left the advocates of atheism and immorality without a lurking-place.*  In this noble cohort Butler: Among them were CvDonRTH, born 1617; "Intel. Syst. of the Universe:"
BOYLE, 1626; " Things above Reason:" STILLINGFLEET, 1635; " Letters to a
Doist:" Sir I. NEWTON, 1642; "Observations on Prophecy:" LESLIV., 1650;
"Short Method with Deists:" LOWTH, 1661, Vindic. of the Divine Author




10                 EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION.
Atands conspiouous: and to him, I think, more than to all the others,
is to be attritLted the sudden and total overthrow of infidelity, when
it was in its glory.
As a metaphysician, few have equalled him. What he added to
the science, has ever since remained a part of it, which can be said
of scarcely another. He advanced more that was new, fortified old
positions more ably, and applied speculation to religion more usefully
than any before him. Our language furnishes no profounder thinking.
Merely to understand him is an honorable distinction, and Requires
no small previous training of the power of attention. As a polemic,
he is keen, sagacious, candid, patient, persevering, calm, inventive,
and profound: every page indicates that repose of mind, which belongs
only to true greatness, combined with a full knowledge of the subject.
So far as I am able to judge, he never presses a consideration beyond
its just limits, and seldom introduces an illustration which has not
the force of an argument. Fallacies he seems to abolish at a touch.
The Analogy employed much of his life. It was begun in his
twentieth year, but was not published till he was forty-five. Such a
mode of writing never makes large books, for the matte:., constantly
revised, becomes constantly condensed.  The Analogy is so condensed, as that to make a satisfactory synopsis is scarcely practicable.
Hence, though my Conspectus and notes have aided my pupils to
understand and remember the argument, they do not in any measure
obviate the necessity of studying the book itself. If they do not
increase the number of those who shall studiously peruse the book
itself, my aim and expectations will be disappointed.
To this work no reply has ever been attempted! Extensive as is
its diffusion, and great as is its acknowledged influence, infidelity has
had the highest inducements to attempt to set it aside. Written for
a present purpose, and most signally accomplishing it, it is yet so
written as to endure, in full value, through all coming time. It is
of the Bible: KING, 1669; "Origin of Evil:" SAM. CLARK, 1675; "Evidences
of Nat. and Rev. Religion:" WATERLAND, 1683; "Scripture Vindicated:"
LARDNER, 1684; "Credibility of Gospel History:" LELAND, 1691; "View of
Oeistical Writers," and "Advantage and Necessity of Rev.:" CHANDLER, 1693;' Definition of Christianity," on "Prophecy," &c.: WARBURTON, 1698; "Divine Leg. of Moses;" Bishop NEWTON, 1704; "On the Prophecies:" WATSON,
1737;: "Apology for Christianity," (against Gibbon,) and also " Apology for the
Bible," (against Paine.)




EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION.                   11
undoul tedly "the most original and the most profound work extant,
in any language, on the philosophy of religion,"'  "the most argumentative and philosophical defence of Christianity ever submitted
to the world."t
Wr:ters in defence of Christianity had, before Butler, amply discussed the several departments of evidences; but still there remained
objections. The structure of the globe, the course of nature, the
organization of animals, &e. were affirmed to contradict revelation.
Its doctrines and duties, moreover, were pronounced inconsistent with
sound reason. Butler repeats none of the old arguments, but confines
himself to the showing that the declarations of revelation are in perfect harmony with facts seen daily in the world, and which all admit.
That the world might not have been ordered and governed otherwise,
he does not choose to dispute. Taking things as they are, and closely
studying the connection between one thing and another, we ought to
inquire what course of action on our part, will conform to the needs
of such a nature and such circumstances. Our bodies are constructed
of parts, all adapted to each other, and also to one general end. So
too, our souls. And the two together have relations and adaptations,
which may, to some extent at least, indicate what is designed to be
the general end of our existence. If Christianity befits these several
parts of our mixed nature and their obvious uses, then there is nothing incongruous between the two; and no objections against Christianity can be drawn from the course of nature. On the contrary, all
seems to be governed as the gospel declares it is, and shows that the
Author of man and the Author of the Bible is the same. This is still
more impressive when we consider that we have a moral faculty; for
it is the very object and business of this faculty to deal with right
and wrong, good and evil; the facts and magnitudes of which are
obvious in the course of nature. If Christianity does, in an especial
manner, befit this faculty, if it is adapted to promote our general
rectitude and happiness, and if it contains no principle which is not
discernible in the government of the visible world, then there is no
discrepancy between Christianity and Providence.
This is Butler's position. IIe confines himself to proving such an
analogy between revelation and the daily course of things, as that
nothing known in the universe can be offered in disproof of ChriA" MCINTOSH: "Progress of Ethical Philosophy."
t BROUGHAM: " Disc. on Nat. Theology."




12               EEDITOR S INTRODUCTION.
tianity.  The mode of warfare was new. Without professing to
prove Christianity to be true, he demonstrates that it cannot bI.
proved to be false; and that if it be even probable, the rejection of it
is a gross folly and a tremendous hazard. Every objection against it
he proves to be equally forcible against facts which constantly occur,
and which all admit, though none profess to understand. Thus leav
ing the ramparts of the church to be guarded by the mighty merwho had valiantly maintained its defence, he quietly walked out into
the camp of the enemy, and spiked every gun!
It has been said that the whole argument of the "Analogy" seems
to be built on Ecclesiasticus xlii. 24: "All things are double, one
against the other, and God hath made nothing imperfect." If it be
so, it involves no disparagement to have received thus the seminal
idea of this immortal work. Who else has so gloriously discerned
and expdnded the profound philosophy of the son of Sirac? Others
have uttered sentiments which seem to involve the whole exposition
of Butler. Origen affirms that "he who believes the Scripture to
have proceeded from Iim who is the Author of nature, may well expect to find the same sort of difficulties in it, as are found in nature."
Shall we assign to Origen the whole credit of the "Analogy"? As
well might we bestow all our admiration for the delightful papers of
Addison, in the Spectator, to the classical authors from whom he
selected appropriate mottoes! By such a rule, the entire merit of
this most Christian work of Butler should be attributed to the pagan
Quintilian, from whom he derives the motto which so appropriately
graces his title-page.
A rapid sketch of the outline of the argument will aid the student
at his outset. -Ie begins by taking for granted the existence of an
intelligent Author and Governor of the universe. Then, from the conditions and changes observed in the visible world, he argues the folly
of objecting to revelation on account of doctrines which do but
declare the same general laws and the same principles of government. That there is this harmony, he proves; and hence the probability that the same sort of government will prevail hereafter, which
prevails now. He demonstrates that man is under exactly such a
probation in this world, and as to this world, as revelation affirms
him to be under, as to the next; and that embarrassments produced
by the doctrine of necessity, involve nature no less than religion. He
then evinces the need that man should be placed in a state of trainihg and trial, if he is ever to be qualified for better conditions; and




EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION.                   13
that thif -w;ld, ab low governed, is exactly adapted to give thae
training, and to produce such a character as will insure happiness
under any possible contingencies. This is the argument of Part I.
Proceeding to examine Christianity, he discusses its importance, its
proofs, the unavoidableness of its containing strange things, the
absurdity of expecting fully to comprehend its statements, and the
abundance of its evidence for candid minds, though they are not,
and ought not to be, irresistible. He answers not only the objections
to Christianity, but the objections against its proofs; which he shows
are very different things. Though he keeps rigidly to the refutation
of objections, and nowhere meddles with the direct evidence of Christianity, yet, by removing every objection, he does in fact confirm its
claims. This clearing away of objections, after the usual proofs are
presented, crowns and completes the evidence. Thus the ultimate
result of a study of his book is not only negative but positive; and
such has been its effect on every candid and competent student.
We should remember that we have no right to require the removal
of objections, and that therefore the whole of Butler's work is in fact
supererogatory; a concession and kindness to such as have doubts,
either honest or captious. Our only rightful demand of Christianity
is for credentials. It presents these in its nature, its miracles, its
prophecies, its propagation, its influence, and its success. If these
are competent, we should bow to its teachings. To suppose that we
are capable of judging of the propriety of all God's law, or even to
understand his reasons for it, if they were disclosed, is absurd.
It is true we naturally presume that a revelation in words, and a
revelation by natural objects and the visible order of things, would
coincide; but to find out the fact or the extent of such coincidence,
is not our first business. We are to weigh the testimony in favor of
religion, embrace it, if sufficient, and attribute the obscurity of any
part, to our present want of capacity. The solution of difficulties
serves to confirm our faith in Christianity, but has no place in our
ground of reception: and we have no right to wait for such solution,
however painful and embarrassing may be the difficulties.
Another, and perhaps even more important, use of the "Analogy,"
is to dissipate the prejudices and objections to Christianity which
prevent a candid study of its evidences. These prepossess and poison
the mind, and obstruct or abate the force of the best arguments.
Few, if any, after a careful examination of the positive evidences of
Christianity, conclude them to be inadequate. But many are they,
2




14                EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION.
wh) hv.v'ng heard objections which their scanty learning does not
enable them to answer, and their no less scanty interest in the subject
does not induce them to examine, or which their inclinations lead
them to cherish, cast it all aside. In this way they relieve themselves
from the labor of investigation, as well as their compunctions of
conscience; while they indulge both their love of sin and pride of
singularity.
An instance of the use of this book to such a mind, we have in the
case of Chalmers. He had read, when a young man, several infidel
productions. Their semblance of logic and learning, and supercilious
confidence of style, disposed him to regard all religion as mere superstition. Iis mind was poisoned. Accustomed as he had been to the
positive and precise reasonings of mathematics, he could not find
similar proofs for Christianity. But he was induced, by some friends,
to study Butler's Analogy. This, as he expresses it, took Christianity
" out of the class of unlikelihoods." It brought him to the investigation, as if the evidence was neither plus nor minus. He examined
the evidences as he would have done a declaration that Cicero weighed
just one hundred and fifty pounds; open to the smallest proof or
presumption on the positive side of the question. Delivered from
prejudice, not only against Christianity but against its proofs, he soon
saw the madness of deism, and immovably accepted the word of
God, though he did not, at that time, feel its transforming power
on his own heart. Long afterwards he writes, "I cannot render
sufficient homage to the argument, which first, addressing itself to the
subject-matter of Christianity, relieves it of all disproof, and pronounces it worthy of a trial; and then, addressing itself to the evidence of Christianity, relieves it of all objections, and makes good, to
that evidence, all the entireness and efficiency which natively belong
to it." Years afterwards he said, "Butler made me a Christian."
That it did far more for him than to effect his change of sentiment,
that it continued to be a light in his firmament, is touchingly told in
the Preface of his Bridgewater Treatise, where he says, "I have
derived greater aid from the views and reasonings of Butler, than I
have been able to find, besides, in the whole range of our extant
authorship."
To the sincere believer in the word of God the study of Butler is
of great use. Doubts are among Satan's tried weapons, and often
haunt the holiest, especially if of a contemplative turn. They see
goodness oppressed, and vice rampant; the world ruled by w lked




EDITOR S INTRODUCTION.                   15
men, and truth making its way with difficulty. Their hearts are
traitorous, their surroundings full of temptation, and the direct evidence of Christianity they may never have studied. To such the
analogical argument comes with full power, meets a candid examin
nation, and prevails.
To no Christian is this book so useful as the minister. He is constantly confronted by the difficulties which Butler so triumphantly
handles. Here he is furnished, not only with a shield to protect his
own mind from subtle darts, but a sword to demolish the cavil, and
defend the system of which he is a public teacher.
To all persons this book is of great value. We arrive at certainty
in but few of our decisions, and are often obliged, even in matters of
great moment, to act on probability. Thus we employ precautions
when an evil is not certain to occur. If the evil would be very
serious, we adopt the precaution, when there is but little probability,
or perhaps a bare possibility, of its occurrence. Now, Butler has
shown that if the proofs of revelation were weak, nay, if it had absolutely no proof, nay further, if on fair examination there appeared
not even a probability of its truth, still there would remain a possibility, and this alone, considering the tremendous issues at stake,
should make every man a Christian.   This argument cannot be
applied to Mahometanism or any other religion, because against those
much may be advanced as disproof. Our author, having shown the
utter absence of disproof, shuts us up to the reception of Christianity,
were its truth barely possible.
There have not been wanting persons to disparage the "Analogy,"
because it affords, as they say, no direct proof of revelation. As well
might we demand a discussion of chemistry in a work on astronomy.
Scores of writers prove Christianity, and here we have one to relieve
us from the difficulties which beset it, and objections which still
remain. There is an aspect in which the Analogy may be said to
contribute the best of proof. What can go further towards establishing a point, than to demonstrate that there is no proof of the contrary? What can show the fallacy of a set of objections, more than
to prove that they might be urged with no less force against the
obvious course of nature? This use of analogy is conformable to the
severest logic, and though offering no pretence of positive argument,
goes far towards establishing full conviction. "The probabilities,"
says STEWART, "resulting from a concurrence of different analogies,




16                EDITOR S INTRODUCTION.
may ri,,e so high as to produce an effect on the belief scarcely dis
eCngulishable from moral certainty."
When it is considered that Butler's argument is wholly in addition
to the cumulative mass of direct and almost irresistible evidence,
and removes even the objections which attend the subject, we see the
rejection of Christianity to be inexpressibly rash and absurd. We
see the skeptic condemned at his own bar, for acting in the most
momentous of all possible concerns, in a manner the very opposite of
that which he calls sensible and prudent in his ordinary affairs. The
"Analogy" establishes, beyond cavil, strong presumptions that Christianity is true, aside from all inspection of its proofs. The man,
therefore, who really understands this book, and refuses to be a
Christian, is led by his lusts and not his reason.
Some admirers of this book have lamented as a defect, its want of
evangelical tincture, and its exclusive reference to natural things.
To me, this is a prime recommendation. Were it otherwise, the
reasoning would be in a circle. The very structure of the argument
demands that it should avoid quotations from the Bible.
It must be admitted, however, that some expressions, taken just
as they stand, without qualification by the current of the argument,
tend to lead astray. For instance, "There is nothing in the human
mind contrary to virtue." "Men's happiness and virtue are left to
themselves."  "Religion requires nothing which we are not well
able to perform." "Our repentance is accepted, to eternal life."
"Our relations to God are made known by reason."  Such expressions are not to be taken alone, but as explained by the general drift
of sentiment and doctrine. No one can be familiar with his works,
without finding the fullest evidence that Christianity was to Butler
infinitely more than a creed or a ritual. Nor should we forget that
such expressions are not to be interpreted by the tenor of the
"Analogy" only, but by that of his whole'Works.'
Even if it be judged that he everywhere fails to express himself in
such phrase as we usually call evangelical, it should be remembered
that he was a Church-of-England man, at a time when there was a
powerful reaction against the evangelism of the Puritans, and when
a real lack of enxotiooal piety was general in his church.
That he did not enjoy in his last illness, which extended over a
long period, that sustaining sense of the love of Christ which hearty
Christians generally feel, is certain. A friend, trying to relieve his
depression reminded him of his excellent life, and especialhv nis




EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION.                   17
wide liberalities.  IIe immediately replied, "I am but a steward 
All is Iis, intrusted to me, to promote his glory and the good of
mankind; how can I know that I have not abused the trust?    I
reflect on all these things, and they fill my soul with terror by the
feeling of responsibility they awaken."
On another occasion, his chaplain sought to soothe his troubled spirit
by referring to the extensive influence of his Analogy in reclaiming
skeptics. His reply was, " I began the Analogy with a view to the
glory of God; but as I proceeded, visions of the fame it might bring
me mingled themselves with my motives, and all was polluted and
made sinful! The book may be a blessing to others, but it weighs lik,
lead on my soul."  "Admit all this," tenderly replied the chaplain;
"yet has not Jesus said,'Whosoever cometh unto me shall in no wise
be cast out'?" Instantly the Bishop raised himself in the bed, exclaiming, "How wonderful that the force of this passage never struck
me before!'Whosoever,'-all, ALL!'In no wise,'-no amount of
sin can prevent acceptance! Christ's righteousness will hide the
iniquities of all who accept his offer of mercy!"
From that time, for weeks, Butler spoke to all who approached
him, of a full and free salvation. He died triumphantly repeating
this passage.
If all that is said of the lack of evangelical sentiment in Butler or
his book be conceded, it certainly cannot impair either the value of
the analogical argument, or the force of our author's use of it.
Various circumstances conspire to make the study of "The
Analogy" difficult. The nature of the reasoning-the conciseness,
and often obscurity of the style-the dislocation of parts by frequent
digressions-the arrest of a close course of reasoning to answer
objections-and the abstruseness of the subject itself-combine to
make the full comprehension of its import difficult. Mackintosh says,
"No thinker so great, was ever so bad a writer."  But this, like some
other objections of Sir James, is stated too strongly. The language
is good, sinewy Saxon, and will endure when much that is now:alled fine writing, will seem  grotesque.  Still it is possible to
write philosophy in better phrase, as has been shown by at least
two great men, Berkeley and Stewart. Had Butler but possessed the
glowing style of Berkeley, or the smooth, graceful, and transparent
diction of Dugald Stewart, his work, instead of serving only for close
thinkers, or a college text-book, would have been read by all classes,
and banished that vulgar infidelity which flippant writers still dim.
B                      2*




18                EDITOR S INTRODUCTION.
semin-:te. That it is thus restricted in its influence is a misfortune
to the workl. But he wrote for a class, and did his work completely.
Literary infidelity was conquered.  Vulgar, ignorant, licentious
infidelity, will always exist, and is even now deplorably prevalent.
Both Europe and America contain conceited and malignant ignoramuses, who by their sneers, their cavils, and their audacity, make
havoc of souls. Of these, Tom Paine is a type, whose book, the
contempt of cultivated minds, continues to be sold and read. For
this class of persons, "Baxter's Call," or "Alleine's Alarm," are
far more suitable than treatises on the evidences of Christianity, or
even Butler's Analogy.




THE text is the result of a careful collation of the various principal
editions. Occasionally solecisms are corrected, and a word transposed
or put in italics, when a sentence could thus be made perspicuous.
The author had a fashion of beginning a large proportion of his sentences with " and," " but," "now," " indeed," "however," &c., which
often served to perplex, and in such cases they have been omitted.
Long paragraphs, comprehending different topics, have been so
divided as to correspond with the true analysis; which will greatly
assist the student in detecting the successive stages of the argument.
Special pains has been taken to correct and improve the punctuation.
Hundreds of sentences have thus been rendered more perspicuous,
and many which were obscure, have been made lucid. In no respect
was Butler's style, as printed, so defective.
The Conspectus is made much ampler than any other, for this
reason: that students are apt to content themselves with such help
instead of mastering the full discussion by the author. In the present
case they cannot so do, for such is the fulness of the Conspectus, that
if they master this, they have mastered the subject itself in full.
Notes by the present editor are distinguished from those of the
author by being enclosed in brackets. They are designed to open out
further views, to elucidate the text, to facilitate extended researches,
and to suggest topics for conversation in the class-room.
The Index has cost far more labor than would be supposed, and
may not be of much benefit to the undergraduate. Its advantages
w ill not be small to him in after life when he desires to recur to par19




20                    EDITOR'S PREFACE.
ticu' ar topics. The general scholar will find it enable him to make
use of the book for occasional reference. Without it the work is not
complete for the class-room, still less for the library.
That students of the Analogy need help, is confessed; and all
attempts to furnish it have been kindly received. As is remarked by
Bishop Wilson, "His argument, clear and convincing as it is to a
prepared mind, is not obvious to the young reader, whose experience
of life being small, and his habits of reflection feeble, has not the
furniture necessary for comprehending, at first, the thoughts and
conclusions of such a mind. The style is too close, too negligent, too
obscure, to be suitable for the young."
If it be asked why, with several existing helps to the study of the
Analogy, I offer another, I frankly reply, because I have found none
of them satisfactory, either to the public or to myself.
Some teachers prefer their text-books to be accompanied by a set
of questions. Such will find in this edition all they desire. They
have only to enunciate each sentence of the Conspectus in the
interrogative form, and they will have every possible question
prepared to their hand.




lanmptms Df ilp        I^Jt0'1's     |ntarmtimi.
I. What is probable evidence?
1. It differs from demonstration in that it admits of degrees; of ate degrees.
1.) One probability does not beget assurance.
2.) But the slightest presumption makes a probability,
3.) The repetition of it may make certainty.
20 What constitutes probability is likeness; in regard to the event itself, or its
kind of evidences, or its circumstances.
1.) This daily affords presumptions, evidence, or conviction: according as it
is occasional, conmmon, or constant.
2.) Measures our hopes and fears.
3.) Regulates our expectations as to men's conduct.
4.) Enables us to judge of character from conduct.
3. It is an imperfect mode of judging, and adapted to beings of limited
capacities.
4. Where better evidence cannot be had, it constitutes moral obligation, even
though great doubts remain.
1.) We are as much bound to do what, on the whole, appears to be best, as
if we knew it to be so.
2.) In questions of great moment, it is reasonable to act when the favorable
chances are no greater than the unfavorable.
3.) There are numberless cases in which a man would be thought distracted
if he did not act, and that earnestly, where the chances of success were
greatly against him.
II. The use and application of probabilities.
Shall not go further into the nature of probable evidence, nor inquire why
likeness begets presumption and conviction; nor how far analogical
reasoning can be reduced to a system; but shall only show how just and
conclusive this mode of reasoning is.
1. In determining our judgments and practice.
1.) There may be cases in which its value is doubtful.
2.) There may be seeming analogies, which are not really such.
3.) But as a mode of argument, it is perfectly just and conclusive.,. In noting corresponden~ies between the different parts of God's govern.
ment.
21




22               CONSPECTUS OF INTRODUCTION.
1' We may expect to find the same sort of difficulties in the Bible, as we do
in Nature.
2.) To deny the Bible to be of God, because of these difficulties;requires us
to deny that the world was made by him.
3.) If there be a likeness between revelation and the system of nature, it
affords a presumption that both have the same author.
4.) To reason on the construction and government of the world, without
settling foundation-principles, is mere hypothesis.
5.) To apply principles which are certain, to cases which are not applicable,
is no better.
6.) But to join abstract reasonings to the observation of facts, and argue,
from known present things, to what is likely or credible, must be
right.
7.) We cannot avoid acting thus, if we act at all.
3. In its application to religion, revealed, as well as natural. This is the use
which will be made of analogy in the following work. In so using it,
1.) It will be taken for proved that there is an intelligent Creator and
Ruler.
-There are no presumptions against this, prior to proof.
-There are proofs:-from analogy, reason, tradition, &c.
-The fact is not denied by the generality of skeptics.
2.) No regard will be paid to those who idly speculate as to how the world
might have been made and governed.
-Such prating would amount to this:
* All creatures should have been made at first as happy as they
could be.
~ Nothing of hazard should be put upon them.. Should have been secured in their happiness.
~ All punishments avoided.
-It is a sufficient reply to such talk that mankind have not faculties
for such speculations.
3.) We are, to some extent, judges as to ends; and may conclude that Nature and Providence are designed to produce virtue and happiness;
but of the means of producing these in the highest degree, we are not
competent judges.
-We know not the extent of the universe;
-Nor even how one person can best be brought to perfection.
-We are not often competent to judge of the conduct of each other.
-As to God, we may presume that order will prevail in his universe;
but are no judges of his modes for accomplishing this end.
4.) Instead of vainly, and perhaps sinfully, imagining schemes for God's
conduct, we must study what is.
-Discovering general laws.
— Comparing the known course of things with what revelation teaches
us to expect.
III. The force of this use of Analogy.
1. Sometimes is practically equivalent to proof.
2. Confirms what is otherwise proved,




CONSPECTUS OF INTRODUCTION.                      23
3. Shows that the system of revelation is no more open to ridicule, than the
system of nature.
4. Answers almost all objections against religion.
5. To a great extent answers objections against the proofs of religion.
IV. General scope of the book.
1. The divine government is considered, as containing in it,
Chap. 1. Man's future existence.
"   2. In a state of reward or punishment.
"   3. This according to our behavior.
"   4. Our present life probationary.
"   5. And also disciplinary.
"   6. Notwithstanding the doctrine of necessity.
"   7. Or any apparent want of wisdom or goodness.
2. Revealed religion is considered,
Chap. 1. As important.
2. As proved by miracles.
3. As containing strange things.
" 4. As a scheme imperfectly comprehended.
"   5. As carried on by a mediator.
"   6. As having such an amount of evidence as God saw fit to give
"   7. As having sufficient and full evidence.
60sm    ttats Df te Inatagg.
PART I.
CHAPTER L
A FUTURE LIFE.
Will not discuss the subject of identity; but will consider what analogy suggests from changes which do not destroy; and thus see whether it is not
probable that we shall live hereafter.
I. The probabilities that we shall survive death.
1. It is a law of nature that creatures should exist in different stages, and
in various degrees of perfection.
-Worms turn into flies.
-Eggs are hatched into birds.
— Our own present state is as different from our state in the womb, a
two stares of the same being can be.




4              CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY.
-That we shall hereafter exist in a state as different from the present aP
the present is from our state in the womb, is according to analogy.
2. We now have capacities for happiness, action, misery, &c., and there is
always a probability that things will continue as they are, except when
experience gives us reason to think they will be altered. This is a gene.
ral law; and is our only natural reason for expecting the continuance of
any thing.
3. There is no reason to apprehend that death will destroy us.
If there was, it would arise from the nature of death; or from the analogy
of nature.
1.) Not from the nature of death.
-We know not what death is.
-But only some of its effects.
-These effects do not imply the destruction of the living agent.
-We know little of what the exercise of our powers depends upon; and
nothing of what the powers themselves depend on.
-We may be unable to exercise our powers, and yet not lose theme.g. sleep, swoon.
2.) Not from analogy.
-Reason shows no connection between death and our destruction,
-We have no faculties by which to trace any being beyond it.
-The possession of living powers, up to the very moment when our
faculties cease to be able to trace them, is a probability of their
continuing.
-We have already survived wonderful changes.
-To live after death is analogous to the course of nature.
II. Presumptions against a future life.
1. That death destroys us.
Ans. 1. This is an assumption that we are compound and material beings, and
hence discerptible; which is not true.
1.) Consciousness is a single, indivisible power, and of course the subject ot
it must be.
2.) The material body is not ourself.
3.) We can easily conceive of our having more limbs, or of a different kind,
or of having more or fewer senses, or of having no bodies at all, or of
hereafter animating these same bodies, remodelled.
4.) The dissolution of a succession of new and strange bodies, would have
no tendency to destroy as.
Ans. 2. Though the absolute simplicity of the living being cannot be proved by
experimaent, yet facts lead us so to conclude. We lose limbs, &c.
Our bodies were once very small, but we might, then, have lost part
of them. There is a constant destruction and renewal going on.
1.) Thus we see that no certain bulk is necessary to out existence, and unless
it were proved that there is, and that it is larger than an indissoluble
atom, there is no reason to presume that death destroys us. even if we
are discerptible.
2.) The living agent is not an internal ncterial organism, whiffh liie with
the body. Because




CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY.                       25
-Our only ground for this presumption is our relation to other systems
of matter. But we see these are not necessary to us.
-It will not do to say that lost portions of the body were not essentialwho is to determine?
-The relation between the living agent, and the most essential parts of
the body, is only one by which they mutually affect each other.
8.) If we regard our body as made up of organs of sense, we come to the
same result.
-We see with the eyes, just as we do with glasses. The eye is not a
recipient, any more than a telescope.
-It is not pretended that vision, hearing, &c. can be traced clear up to
the percipient; but so far as we can trace perceptions, the organ
does not perceive.
-In dreams we perceive without organs.
-When we lose a limb we do not lose the directing powcer; we could
move a new one, if it could be made, or a wooden one. But the
limb cut off has no power of moving.
-Thus, our loss of the organs of perception and motion, not being the
destruction of the power, there is no ground to think that the destruction of other organs or instruments would destroy us.
Objection. These observations apply equally to brutes.
Ans. 1. Be it so. Perhaps they are immortal:-may hereafter improve: we
know not what latent powers they may have.
1.) The human being at one period looks as little likely to make great
intellectual attainments; for a long time he has capacities for virtue
and religion, but cannot use them.
2.) Many persons go out of the world who never became able to exercise
these capacities; e.g. infants.
Ans. 2. If brutes were immortal, it does not prove them to be moral agents.
1.) It may be necessary, for aught we know, that there should be living
creatures not moral agents, nor rational.
2.) All difficulties as to what would become of them, are founded in our
ignorance.
2. That our souls, though not material, so depend upon the bodily structure,
that we cannot survive its destruction.
Ans. 1. Reason, memory, &c. do not depend on the body, as perceptions by
the senses do. Death may destroy those instruments, and yet not
destroy the powers of reflection.
Ans. 2. Human beings exist, here, in two very different states, each having its
own laws: sensation and reflection. By the first we feel; by the
second we remson and will.
1.) Nothing which we know to be destroyed at death, is necessary to reflecting on ideas formerly received.
2.) Though the senses act like scaffolds, or levers, to bring in ideas, yet when
once in, we can reflect, &c. without their aid.
AS. 3. There are diseases which prove fatal, &c., yet do not, in any part of
their course, impair the intellect; and this indicates that they do not
destroy it.




26                CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY.
L.) In the diseases alluded to, persons have their reflective power, in full,
the very moment before death.
2.) Now, why should a disease, at a certain degree, utterly destroy powers
which were not even affected by it, up to that point?
3. That death at least stepends our reflective powers, or interrupts our continuing to exist in the like state of reflection which we do now.
Ans. There appears so little connection between our powers of sensation and
our powers of reflection that we cannot presume that what might
destroy the former, could even suspend the latter.
1.) We daily see reason, memory, &c. exercised without any assistance, that
we know of, from our bodies.
2.) Seeing them in lively exercise to the last, we must infer that death is not
a discontinuance of their exercise, nor of the enjoyments and sufferings
of such exercise.
3.) Our posthumous life may be but a going on, with additions. Like the
change at our birth-which produced not a suspension of the faculties
we had before, nor a total change in our state of life; but a continuance
of both, with great alterations.
4.) Death may but at once put us into a higher state of life, as our birth
did; our relation to bodily organs may be the only hinderance to our
entering a higher condition of the reflective powers.
5.) Were we even sure that death would suspend our intellectual powers, it
would not furnish even the lowest probability that it would destroy
them.
Objec. From the analogy of plants.
Ans. This furnishes poets with apt illustrations of our frailty, but affords no
proper analogy.  Plants are destitute of perception and action, and
this is the very matter in question.
REMARKS.
1. It has been shown, that confining ourselves to what we know, we see no
probability of ever ceasing to be:-it cannot be concluded from the reason
of the thing:-nor from the analogy of nature.
2. We are therefore to go upon the belief of a future existence.
3. Our going into new scenes and conditions, is just as natural as our coming
into the world.
4. Our condition may naturally be a social one.
5. The advantages of it may naturally be bestowed, according to some fixed
law, in proportion to one's degrees in virtue.
1.) Perhaps not so much as now by society; but by God's more immediate
action.
2.) Yet this will be no less natural, i.e. stated, fixed, or settled.
3.) Our notions of what is natural, are enlarged by greater knowledge of God
and his works.
4.) There may be some beings in the world, to whom the whole of Christianity is as natural as the visible course of nature seems to us.
6. These probabilities of a future life, though they do not satisfy curiosity,
answer all the purposes of religion, as well as demonstration.
1.) Even a demonstration of a future state, would not demonstrate religion,
but would be reconcilable with atheism.




CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY.                        27
2.) But as religion implies a future state, any presumption against such a
state, would be a presumption against religion.
3.) The foregoing observations remove all presumptions of that sort, and
prove to a great probability, a fundamental doctrine of religion.
CHAPTER II.
THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD BY REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS.
THE question of a future life is rendered momentous by our capacity for
happiness and misery.
Especially if that happiness or misery depends on our present conduct.
We should feel the deepest solicitude on this subject.
And that if there were no proof of a future life and interest, other than the
probabilities just discussed.
I. In the present world our pleasures and pains are, to a great extent,
in our own power.!. We see them to be consequences of our actions.
2. And we can foresee these consequences.
3. Our desires are not gratified, without the right kind of exertion.
4. By prudence we may enjoy life; rashness, or even neglect may make us
miserable.
5. Why this is so is another matter.
1.) It may be impossible to be otherwise.
2.) Or it may be best on the whole.
3.) Or God's plan may be to make only the good happy.
4.) Or the whole plan may be incomprehensible to us.
Oejec. It may be said "this is only the course of nature."
Ans. It is granted: but
1. The course of nature is but the will of God. We admit that God is the
natural governor of the world: and must not turn round and deny it
because his government is uniform.
2. Our natural foresight of the consequences of actions, is his appointment.
3. The consequences themselves, are his appointment.
4. Our ability to foresee these consequences, is God's instruction how we are
to act.
Objec. By this reasoning we are instructed to gratify our appetites, and such
gratification is our reward for so doing.
Ans. Certainly not. Foreseen pleasures and pains are proper motives to action
in general; but we may, in particular cases, damage ourselves by
indulgence. Our eyes are made to see with, but not to look at every
thing:-for instance the sun.
It follows, from what has been said, that
II. We are, now, actually under God's government, in the strictest
sense.
l. P dmitting that there is a God, it is not so much a matter of speculation, as
of experience, that he governs us.




2~8 CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY.
2. The annexn g of pleasures and pains to certain actions, and giving notice
of them, is the very essence of government.
3. Whether by direct acts ipon us, or by contriving a general plan, does not
affect the argument.
1.) If magistrates could make laws which should execute themselves, their
government would be far more perfect than it is.
2.) God's making fire burn us, is as much an instance of government, as if
he directly inflicted the burn, whenever we touched fire.
4. Hence the analogy of nature shows nothing to render incredible the Bible
doctrine of God's rewarding or punishing according to our actions.
Additional remarks on Punishment.
As men object chiefly to future punishment, it is proper to show further that
the course of administration, as to present punishment, is analogous to what
religion teaches as to the future.
Indeed they add credibility to it.
And ought to raise the most serious apprehension.
I. Circumstances to be observed touching present punishments.
1. They often follow acts which produce present pleasure or advantage.
2. The sufferings often far exceed the pleasure or advantage.
3. They often follow remotely.
4. After long delay they often come suddenly.
5. As those remote effects are not certainly foreseen, they may not be thought
of at the time; or if so, there is a hope of escaping.
6. There are opportunities of advantage, which if neglected do not recur.
7. Though, in some cases, men who have sinned up to a certain point, may
retrieve their affairs, yet in many cases, reformation is of no avail.
8. Inconsiderateness is often as disastrous as wilful wrong-doing.
9. As some punishments by civil government, are capital, so are some natural
punishments.
1.) Seem intended to remove the offender out of the way.
2.) Or as an example to others.
II. These things are not accidental, but proceed from fixed laws.
1. They are matters of daily experience.
2. Proceed from the general laws, by which the world is governed.
III. They so closely resemble what religion teaches, as to future punishment, that both might be expressed in the same words.
e.g. Proverbs, ch. i.
The analogy sufficiently answers all objections against the Scripture doctrine
of future punishment, such as
1.) That our frailty or temptations annihilate the guilt of vice.
2.) Or the objection from necessity.
3.) Or that the Almighty cannot be contradicted.
4.) Or that he cannot be offended.




CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY.                       29
REMARKS.
1. Such reflections are terrific, but ought to be stated and considered.
2. Disregard of a hereafter cannot be justified by any thing short of a
demonstration of atheism. Even skeptical doctrines afford no justification.
3. There is no pretence of reason for presuming that the licentious will not
find it better for them that they had never been born.
CHAPTER III.
MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.
As the structure of the world shows intelligence, so the mode of distributing
pleasure and pain, shows government. That is, God's natural government,
such as a king exercises over his subjects.
But this does not, at first sight, determine what is the moral character of
such government.
I. What is a moral or righteous government?
1. Not mere rewarding and punishing.
2. But doing this according to character.
3. The perfection of moral government is doing this exactly,
Objec. God is simply and absolutely benevolent.
Ans. Benevolence, infinite in degree, would dispose him to produce the greatest
possible happiness, regardless of behaviour. This would rob God of
other attributes; and should not be asserted unless it can be proved.
And whether it can be proved is not the point now in hand.
The question is not whether there may not be, in the universe, beings to
whom he manifests absolute benevolence, which might not be incompatible with
justice; but whether he treats us so.
4. It must be owned to be vastly difficult, in such a disordered world, to estimate with exactness the overplus of happiness on the side of virtue: and
there may be exceptions to the rule. But it is far from being doubtful
that on the whole, virtue is happier than vice, in this world.
II. The beginnings of a righteous administration, are seen in nature.
1. It has been proved (ch. ii.) that God governs: and it is reasonable to suppose that he would govern righteously.
1.) Any other rule of government would be harder to account for.
2.) The Bible doctrine that hereafter the good shall be happy, and the
wicked miserable, is no more than an expectation that a method of
government, now begun, shall be carried on.
2. The opposite consequences of prudence and rashness, show a right ccnstitution of nature; and our ability to foresee and control these consequences,
shows that we are under moral law.
3. God has so constructed society that vice, to a great degree, is actually
punished by it.
1.) Without this, society could not exist.




80                CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY.
2.) Tfhis iL God's government, through society; and is as natural, as society.
3.) Since he course of things is God's appointment, men are unavoidably
accountable for their behaviour.
Objec. Society often punishes good actions, and rewards wickedness.
Ans. 1. This is not necessary, and consequently not natural.
2. Good actions are never punished by society as good, but because
considered bad.
4. By the course of nature, virtue is rewarded, and vice punished, as such,
which proves a moral government; as will be seen if we rightly distinguish between actions and their qualities.
1.) An action may produce present gratification though it be wrong: in
which case the gratification is in the act, not the morality of it: in other
cases the enjoyment consists wholly in the quality of virtuousness.
2.) Vice is naturally attended with uneasiness, apprehension, vexation,
remorse, &c.
-This is a very different feeling from that produced by mere misfortune.
-Men comfort themselves under misfortune, that itwas not their own fault.
3.) Honest and good men are befriended as such.
4.) Injuries are resented as implying fault; and good offices are regarded
with gratitude on account of the intention, even when they fail to
benefit us.
-This is seen in family government, where children are punished for
falsehood, fretfulness, &c., though no one is hurt.
-And also in civil government, where the absence or presence of ill
intention goes far in determining the penalty of wrong-doing.
5.) The whole course of the world, in all ages and relations, turns much upon
approbation and disapprobation.
6.) The very fact of our having a moral nature, is a proof of our being
under God's moral government.
— We are placed in a condition which unavoidably operates on our moral
nature.
-Hence it arises that reward to virtue and reprobation of vice, as such,
is a rule, never inverted. If it be thought that there are instances
to the contrary, (which is not so,) they are evidently monstrous.
-The degree in which virtue and vice receive proper returns, is not the
question now, but only the thing itself, in some degree.
7.) It is admitted that virtue sometimes suffers, and vice prospers; but this
is disorder, and not the order of nature.
8.) It follows, that we have in the government of the world, a declaration
from God, for virtue and against vice. So far as a man is true to virtue,
is he on the side of the divine administration. Such a man must have
a sense of security, and a hope of something better.
I. This hope is confirmed by observing that virtue has necessary tendencies
beyond their present effects.
1.) These are very obvious with regard to individuals.
2.) Are as real, though not so patent, in regard to society.
-The power of a society under the direction of virtue, tends to prevail
over power not so directed, just as power under direction of reason,
tends to prevail over brute force.




CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY.                       81
-As this may not be conceded, we will notice how the case stands,
as to reason:
* Length of time, and proper opportunity, are necessary for reason
to triumph over brutes.
* Rational beings, disunited, envious, unjust, and treacherous, may
be overcome by brutes, uniting themselves by instinct: but this
would be an inverted order of things.
-A like tendency has virtue to produce superiority.
* By making the good of society, the object of every member
of it.
* By making every one industrious in his own sphere.
* By uniting all in one bond of veracity and justice.
8.) If the part of God's government which we see, and the part we do
not see, make up one scheme, then we see a tendency in virtue to
superiority.
4.) But to produce that superiority there must be
-A force proportioned to the obstacles.
-Sufficient lapse of time.
-A fair field of trial; such as extent of time, adequate occasions, and
opportunities for the virtuous to unite.
5.) These things are denied to virtue in this life, so that its tendencies,
though real, are hindered.
6.) But it may have all requisite advantages hereafter.
-Eternity will be lasting enough.
-Good men will unite; as they cannot do now, scattered over the earth,
and ignorant of one another.
-Other orders of virtuous beings will join; for the very nature of virtue
is a bond of union.
7.) The tendency of such an order of things, so far as seen by vicious beings
in any part of the universe, would be to the amendment of all who
were capable of it, and their recovery to virtue.
8.) All this goes to show that the hinderances to virtue are contingent, and
that its beneficial tendencies are God's declarations in its favor.
9.) If the preceding considerations are thought to be too speculative, we
may easily come to the same result by reflecting on the supremacy
which any earthly nation would attain, by entire virtue for many ages.
RE MARKS.
Consider now the general system of religion. The government of the world
is one; it is moral; virtue shall in the end prevail over wickedness; and to
see the importance and fitness of such an arrangement we have only to
consider what would be the state of things, if vice had these advantages, or
virtue the contrary.
Objec. Why may not things be now going on in other worlds, and continue
always to go on in this world, in the same mixed and disordered
state as at present?
Al8s. We are not proving that God's moral government is perfect, or the truth
of religion, but only seeing what there is in the course of nature, to
confirm it, supposing it to be known. Were there nothing to judge by,




82               CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY.
but the Iresent distribution of pleasure and pain, we should have no
ground to conclude that hereafter we should be rewarded or punished
exactly according to our deserts. But even then there would be no
indication that vice is better than virtue. Still the preceding observations confirm the doctrine of future retribution; for,
1.) They show that the Author of nature is not indifferent to virtue
and vice.
2.) That future distributive justice would differ not in kind, but in degree
only, from God's present government. It would be the effect, towards
which we see the tendency.
3.) That higher rewards and punishments may be hereafter.
4.) That we should expect it to be so; because the tendencies of vice and
virtue are immutable, while the hinderances are only artificial.
SUMMARY.
[This enumerates the steps of the argument, in the foregoing chapter, in
as condensed a form as possible.]
CHAPTER IV.
OF A STATE OF PROBATION.
THE doctrine of probation comprehends several particulars. But the most
common notion is that our future interests are depending; and depending on
ourselves. And that we have opportunities for both good and bad conduct,
and temptations to each.
This is not exactly the same as our being under moral government; for it
implies allurement to evil, and difficulties in being good.
Hence needs to be considered by itself.
Doctrine. THE NATURAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD, IN THIS WORLD, PUTS US ON
TRIAL AS TO THE THINGS OF THIS WORLD; AND SO IMPLIES, WHAT
RELIGION TEACHES, THAT HIS MORAL GOVERNMENT PUTS US ON
TRIAL AS TO A FUTURE WORLD.
I. So far as we are tempted to do what will damage our future temporal
interests, so far we are under probation as to those interests.
1. The annexing of pleasures and pains to actions, as good or bad, and
enabling us to foresee their effect, implies that our interests, in part at
least, depend on ourselves.
2. We often blame ourselves and others for evils, as resulting from misconduct.
3. It is very certain that we often miss possible good, and incur evils, not for
want of knowing better, but through our fault.
4. Every one speaks of the hazards of young persons, from othei ouuseu
than ignorance.




CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY.                       33
II. These natural or temporal trials are analogous to our moral
and religious trial.
1. In both cases, what constitutes the trial, is either in our circumstances
or in our nature.
1.) Some would do right but for violent or extraordinary temptations.
2.) Others will seek evil, and go out of their way after wicked indulgence,
when there are no external temptations.
3.) But even those who err through temptation, must have that within which
makes them susceptible of temptation.
4.) So that we are in a like state of probation with respect to both present
and future interests.
2. If we proceed to observe how mankind behave in both capacities, we see
the same analogy.
1.) Some scarcely look beyond the present gratification.
2.) Some are driven by their passions against their better judgment and
feeble resolutions.
3.) Some shamelessly go on in open vice.
4.) Some persist in wrong-doing, even under strong apprehensions of future
misery.
3. The analogy is no less plain in regard to the influence of others upon us.
1.) Bad example.
2.) Wrong education.
3.) Corruptions of religion.
4.) General prevalence of mistakes as to true happiness.
4. In both cases negligence and folly bring difficulty as well as vice.
III. The disadvantages we labor under from our fallen and disordered
state, are the same, in relation to both earthly and future interests.
This disadvantage affords no ground of complaint; for,
1. We may manage to pass our days in comfort and peace.
2. And so may we obtain the security and comfort of religion.
3. We might as well complain that we are not a higher order of beings.
REMARKS.
1. Tt is thus proved that the state of trial, which religion says we are in, is
credible; for it exactly corresponds to what we see.
1.) If from birth till death we were in a constant security of enjoyment,
without care or correctness, it would be a presumption against religion.
2.) It might, if we had no experience, be urged that an infinitely good Being
would not expose us to the hazard of misery. This is indeed a difficulty, and must remain so; but still the course of nature is as it is.
3.) The miseries which we bring on ourselves are no more unavoidable than
our deportment.
2. It has been proved that we are in danger of miscarrying as to our interests,
both present and future..o The sum of the whole is, that as we do not have present enjoyments and
honors forced upon us, in spite of misconduct, so this may be the case,
as to that chief and final good which religion proposes.
C




34              CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY.
CHAPTER V.
PROBATION INTENDED FOR MORAL DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT.
WaY we should be placed in the condition spoken of in the last chapter, is
a question which cannot be answered. It may be that we could not understand, if told. And if we could, it might injure us to know, just now. It
certainly is consistent with God's righteous government.
Religion tells us that we are so placed in order to become qualified for
a better state.
This, though a very partial answer to the inquiry why we are so placed,
answers an infinitely more important question,-viz.: What is our business
here.
I. We are placed in this state of trial, for our improvement in
virtue, as the requisite qualification for future security and
happiness.
1. Every creature is designed for a particular way of life.
1.) Happiness depends on the congruity between a creature's nature and its
circumstances.
2.) Man's character might be so changed as to make him incapable of
happiness on earth.
3.) Or he might be placed, without changing his nature, in a world where he
must be wretched, for want of-the proper objects to answer to his
desires.
4.) So that without determining what is the future condition of good men,
we know there must be necessary qualifications to make us capable of
enjoying it.
2. Human beings are so constituted as to become fit for new and different
conditions.
1.) We not only acquire ideas, but store them up.
2.) We can become more expert in any kind of action.
3.) And can make settled alterations in our tempers.
4.) We can form habits-both bodily and mental.
As these operate in producing radical changes in human character, we will
look for a moment at the process.
-Neither perceptions, nor knowledge, are habits; though necessary to
forming them.
-There are habits of perception, however, and habits of action: the
former are passive, the latter active.
-Habits of body are produced by external acts, and habits of mind by
the exertion of principles; i.e. carrying them out.
-Resolutions to do well are acts, and may help towards forming
good habits. But mere theorizing, and forming pictures in the
mind, not only do not help, but may harden the mind to a
contrary course.
-Passive impressions, by repetition grow weaker. Thus familiarity with
danger lessens fear




CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY.                      35
-Hence active habits may be formed and strengthened, by acting accord.
ing to certain motives or excitements, which grow less sensibly felt
and less and less felt, as the habit strengthens.
* Thus the sight of distress excites the passive emotion of pity,
and the active principle of benevolence. But inquiring out
cases of distress in order to relieve them, causes diminished
sensitiveness at the sight of misery, and stronger benevolence
and aptitude in relieving it.
* So admonition, experience, and example, if acted upon, produce
good; if not, harden.
5.) The formation of a habit may be imperceptible and even inexplicable,
but the thing itself is matter of certain experience.
6.) A habit once formed, the action becomes easy and often pleasurable:
opposite inclinations grow weaker: difficulties less: and occasions more
frequent.
7.) Thus, a new character, in several respects, is formed.
J. We should not have these capacities for improvement and for the reconstruction of character, if it were not necessary.
1.) They are necessary, even as to this life.
-We are not qualified, at first, for mature life: understanding and
strength come gradually.
-If we had them in full, at birth, we should at first be distracted
and bewildered, and our faculties would be of no use previous to
experience. Ignorant of any employment, we could not provide
for ourselves.
-So that man is an unformed, unfinished creature, even as to this world,
till he acquire knowledge, experience, and habits.
2.) Provision is made for our acquiring, in youth, the requisite qualities for
manhood.
-Children learn, from their very birth,. The nature and use of objects.
~ The subordinations of domestic life.. The rules of life.
-Some of this learning is acquired so insensibly, as to seem like instinct; but some requires great care and labor, and the doing of
things we are averse to.
-According as we act during this formative period, is our character
formed; and our capacity for various stations in society determined.
-Early opportunities lost, cannot be recovered.
S.) Our state of discipline throughout this life, for another, is exactly of the
same kind: and comprehended under one general law.
-If we could not see how the present discipline fitted us for a higher
life, it would be no objection.
* We do not know how food, sleep, &c. enlarges the child's body;
nor would we expect such a result, prior to experience.
* Nor do children understand the need of exercise, temperance,
restraint, &c.
-We thus see a general analogy of Providence indicating that the
present life is preparatory.




36               CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY.
4. If virtue is a necessary qualification for future happiness, then we see our
need of the moral culture of our present state.
1) Analogy indicates that our future state will be social.
-Nature furnishes no shadow of unreasonableness in the Scripture
doctrine that this future community will be under the more immediate government of God.
-Nor the least proof that its members will not require the exercise of
veracity, justice, &c. towards each other; and that character which
results from the practice of such virtues.
-Certainly the universe is under moral government; and a virtuous
character must, in some way, be a condition of happiness in that
state.
2.) We are deficient, and in danger of deviating from what is right.
-We have desires for outward objects.
-The times, degrees, &o. of gratifying these desires, are, of right, subject to the control of the moral principle.
-But that principle neither excites them, nor prevents their being
excited.
-They may exist, when they cannot be lawfully gratified, or gratified
at all.
-When the desire exists, and the gratification is unlawful, we are
tempted.
3.) The only security is the principle within.
-The strengthening of this lessens the danger.
-It may be strengthened, by discipline and exercise.. Noting examples.
* Attending to the right, and not to preference.
* Considering our true interests.
-When improved, it becomes, in proportion to its strength, our security
from the dangers of natural propensions.
-Virtue, become habitual by discipline, is improved virtue; and improved virtue must produce increased happiness, if the government
of the world is moral.
4.) Even creatures made upright may fall.
-The fall of an upright being, is not accounted for by the nature of
liberty; for that would only be saying that an event happened
because it might happen.
-But from the very nature of propensions.
-A finitely perfect being would have propensions corresponding to its
surroundings; its understanding; and its moral sense; and all these
in due proportions.
-Such a being would have propensions, though the object might not
be present, or the indulgence might be contrary to its moral sense;
and this would have some tendency, however small, to induce
gratification.
-The tendency would be increased by the frequency of occasions; and
yet more by the least indulgence, even in thought; till, under peculiar
conjunctures, it would become effect.
-The first transgression might so utterly disorder the constitution, and




CJONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY.                      3"
change the proportions of forces, as to lead to a repetition of irregularities; and hence to the construction of bad habits, and a depraved
character.
5.) On the contrary, a finitely perfect being may attain higher virtue, and
more security, by obeying the moral principle.
-For the danger would lessen, by the increased submissiveness of
propensions.
-The moral principle would gain force by exercise.
6.) Thus vice is not only criminal, but degrading; and virtue is not only
right, but improving.
-The degree of improvement may be such that the danger of sinning
may be almost infinitely lessened.
-Yet the security may always be the habits formed in a state of discipline; making such a state altogether fit and necessary.
7.) This course of reasoning is vastly stronger when applied to fallen and
corrupt creatures.
-The upright need improvement; the fallen must be renewed.
-Discipline is expedient for the one; necessary for the other; and of a
severer sort.
II. The present world is peculiarly fit for such discipline as we need.
1. Surrounding evils tend to produce moderation, practical knowledge, &c.
very different from a mere speculative knowledge of our liability to vice
and misery.
2. Our experience in this world, with right views and practice, may leave
eternal impressions for good.
3. Every act of self-government in the exercise of virtue, must, from the very
make of our nature, form habits of virtue, and a more intense virtuous
principle.
4. Resolute and persevering resistance to particular and violent temptations, is
a continued act of virtue, and that in a higher degree than if the seduction
were transient and weak.
5. Self-denial is not essential to virtue, but is almost essential to discipline and
improvement.
1.) Because actions materially virtuous, which have no difficulty, but agree
with our inclinations, may be done merely from inclination, and so not
be really virtuous.
2.) But when they are done in face of danger and difficulty, virtuousness is
increased, and confirmed into a habit.
Objec. 1. As our intellectual or physical powers may be overtasked, so may our
moral.
Ans. This may be so in exceptional cases, but it does not confute the argument.
In general, it holds good. All that is intended to be proved is, that this
world is intended to be a state of improvement, and is fitted for it.
1.) Some sciences which of themselves are highly improving, require a
trying measure of attention, which some will not submit to.
2.) It is admitted that this world disciplines many to vice: but this viciousness of many is the very thing which makes the world a virtuous
discipline to good men. The whole end in placing mankind as they
4




.s           C<CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY.
are we know not; but these things are evident-the virtues of some
are exercised:-and so exercised as to be improved: and improved
beyond what they would be in a perfectly virtuous community.
S.) That all, or even the generality, do not improve, is no proof that their
improvement was not intended. Of seeds and animals not one in a
million comes to perfection; yet such as do, evidently answer an end
for which they were designed. The appearance of waste in regard to
seeds, &c. is just as unaccountable, as the ruin of moral agents.
Objec. 2. Rectitude arising from hope and fear, is only the discipline of
self-love.
Ans. Obedience is obedience, though prompted by hope or fear: and a course
of such obedience, forms a habit of it: and distinct habits of various
virtues, by repressing inclination whenever justice, veracity, &c.
require.
Beside, veracity, justice, regard to God's authority, and self-interest, are
coincident; and each, separately, a just principle. To begin a good
life from either of them, and persist, produces that very character
which corresponds to our relations to God, and secures happiness.
Objec. 3. The virtues requisite for a state of afflictions, and produced by it, are
not wanted to qualify us for a state of happiness.
Ans. Such is not the verdict of experience. Passive submission is essential to
right character. Prosperity itself begets extravagant desires; and
imagination may produce as much discontent as actual condition.
Hence, though we may not need patience in heaven, we shall need that
temper which is formed by patience.
Self-love would always coincide with God's commands, when our interest
was rightly understood; but it is liable to error. Therefore, HABITS of
resignation are necessary, for all creatures; and the proper discipline
for resignation is affliction.
Objec. 4. The trouble and danger of such discipline, might have been avoided
by making us at once, what we are intended to become.
Ass. What we are to be, is the effect of what we are to do. God's natural
government is arranged not to save us from trouble or danger, but to
enable and incline us to go through them. It is as natural for us to
seek means to obtain things, as it is to seek the things; and in worldly
things we are left to our choice, whether to improve our powers and so
better our condition, or to neglect improvement and so go without the
advantage.
Analogy, therefore, makes the same arrangement credible, as to a future
state.
III. This state of discipline may be necessary for the display of
character.
1. Not to the all-knowing Being, but to his creation, or part of it, and in many
ways which we know not.
2. It may be a seeans in disposing of men according to character.
3. And of showing creation that they are so disposed of.
I. Such display of character certainly contributes, largely, to the gonera
course of things considered in this chapter.




CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY.                       89
CHAPTER VI.
OF NECESSITY AS INFLUENCING CONDUCT.
FATALISTS have no right to object to Christianity, for they of course hold
the doctrine to be compatible with what they see in nature.
The question is, whether it be not equally compatible with what Christianity teaches.
To argue on the supposition of so great an absurdity as necessity, is puzzling;
and the obscurity and puzzle of the argument must therefore be excused.
I. Necessity does not destroy the proof of an intelligent Author and
Governor of the world.
1. It does not exclude design and deliberation.
1.) This is matter of actual experience and consciousness.
-Necessity does not account for the existence of any thing, but is only a
circumstance relating to its origin. Instance the case of a house:
the fatalist admits that it had a builder, and the only question would
be, was he obliged to build it as he did?
2.) It is the same as to the construction of the world. To say it exists by
necessity must mean it had a maker, who acted by necessity: for
necessity is only an abstract notion, and can do nothing.
3.) We say God exists by necessity, because we intuitively discern that there
must be an infinite Being, prior to all causes; but we cannot say that
every thing so exists. The fact that many changes in nature are produced by man's contrivance is a proof of this.
4.) Thus though the fatalist does not choose to mean by necessity an agent
acting necessarily, he is obliged to mean this.
5.) And it also follows that a thing's being done by necessity does not exclude
design.
2. It does not exclude a belief that we are in a state of religion.
1.) Suppose a fatalist to educate a child on his own principles,-viz.: that
he cannot do otherwise than he does; and is not subject to praise or
blame.
(It might be asked, would he, if possessed of common sense, so educate
his child?)
-The child would be delighted with his freedom; but would soon prove
a pest, and go to destruction.
-He would meet with checks and rebuffs, which would teach him that he
was accountable.
-He would, in the end, be convinced either that his doctrine was wrong,
or that he had reasoned inconclusively upon it, and misapplied it.
2.) To apply fatalism to practice, in any other way, would be found equally
fallacious: e.g. that he need not take care of his life.
8.) No such absurdity follows the doctrine of freedom.
-Reasoning on this ground is justified by all experience.
-The constitution of things is as if we were free.




40                CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY.
4.) If the doctrine of necessity be true, and yet, when we apply it to life,
always misleads us; how, then, can we be sure it would not mislead us
with respect to future interests?
5.) It follows that if there are proofs of religion on the supposition of freedom, they are just as conclusive on the supposition of necessity.
3. It does not refute the notion that God has a will and a character.
1.) It does not hinder us from having a will and a character; from being
cruel, or benevolent, or just, &c.
2.) If necessity be plead as the excuse for crime, it equally excuses the
punishment of crime; for if it destroys the sin of the one, it destroys
the sin of the other.
3.) The very assumption of injustice in punishing crime, shows that we cannot rid ourselves of the notion of justice and injustice.
Objec. If necessity be reconcilable with the character of God, as portrayed in
Christianity, does it not destroy the proof that he has that character;
and so destroy the proofs of religion?
Ans. No. Happiness and misery are not our fate, but the results of our conduct. God's government is that of a father and a magistrate; and his
natural rule of government must be veracity and justice. We shall
proceed to show that,
II. Necessity does not destroy the proofs of religion.
1. It is a plain fact that God rewards and punishes.
1.) He has given us a moral faculty, by which we discern between actions,
and approve or disapprove, &c.
2.) This implies a rule, a peculiar kind of rule; i.e. one from which we
cannot depart without being self-condemned.
3.) The dictates of our moral faculty are God's laws, with sanctions. It not
only raises a sense of duty, but a sense of security in obeying, and
danger in disobeying; and this is an explicit sanction.
4.) God's government must conform to the nature he has given us; and we
must infer that in the upshot happiness will follow virtue, and misery
vice.
5.) Hence religious worship is a duty, if only as a means of keeping up the
sense of this government.
6.) No objection from necessity can lie against this course of proof.
-The conclusion is wholly and directly from facts; not from what
might appear to us to be fit, but from what his actions tell us he
wills.
2. Natural religion has external evidence which necessity, if true, does not
affect.
1.) Suppose a person convinced of the truths of natural religion, but
ignorant of history, and of the present state of mankind, he would
inquire:
-How this religion came?
-How far the belief of it extended?
-If he found that some one had totally propounded it, as a deduction
of reason, then, though its evidences from reason would not be ix.
paired, its history would furnish no further proof.




CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY.                       41
2) But such an one would find, on the contrary,
-That essentially it had been professed in all countries.
-And can be traced up through all ages.
-And was not reasoned out, but revealed.
3.) These things are of great weight.
-Showing natural religion to be conformed to the common sense of
mankind.
-And either that it was revealed, or forces itself upon the mind.
-The rude state of the early ages leads to the belief of its being
revealed, and such is the opinion of the learned.
a Early pretences to revelation indicate some original real one from which
they were copied.
-The history of revelation is as old as history itself.
-Such a fact is a proof of religion, against which there is no presumption.
-And indicates a revelation prior to the examination of the book said
to contain it; and independent of all considerations of its being
corrupted, or darkened by fables.
4. It is thus apparent that the external evidence of religion is considerable;
and is not affected by the doctrine of necessity.
REMARKS.
1. The danger of taking custom, &c. for our moral rule.
1.) We are all liable to prejudice.
2.) Reason may be impaired, perverted, or disregarded.
3.) The matter in hand is of infinite moment.
2. The foregoing observations amount to practical proof.
Objec. Probabilities which cannot be confuted, may be overbalanced by
greater probabilities: much more by demonstration. Now, as the
doctrine of necessity must be true, it cannot be that God governs us
as if we were free when he knows we are not.
Ans. This brings the matter to a point, and the answer is not to be evaded,viz.: that the whole constitution and course of things shows this
reasoning to be false, be the fallacy where it may.
The doctrine of freedom shows where,-viz.: in supposing ourselves necessary agents when in fact we are free.
Admitting the doctrine of necessity, the fallacy evidently lies in denying
that necessary agents are accountable; for that they are rewarded and
punished is undeniable.
CONCLUSION.-It follows that necessity, if true, neither proves that God will
not make his creatures happy or miserable according to their conduct, nor
destroys the proofs that he will do so. That is, necessity, practically, is
4*




42               CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY.
CHAPTER VII.
DIVINE GOVERNMENT A SCHEME IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED.
MORAL government, as a fact, has now been considered; it remains for us
to remove objections against its wisdom and goodness.  A thing obing true
does not prove it to be good.
In arguing as to its truth, analogy could only show it to be credible. But, if
a moral government be admitted as a fact, analogy makes it credible that it is
a scheme or system, and that man's comprehension of it is necessarily so
limited, as to be inadequate to determine its injustice.
This we shall find to be the case.
Doctrine. ON THE SUPPOSITION THAT GOD EXERCISES MORAL GOVERNMENT,
THE ANALOGY OF NATURE TEACHES THAT IT MUST BE A SCHEME,
AND ONE QUITE BEYOND OUR COMPREHENSION.
I. The ordering of nature is a scheme; and makes it credible by
analogy, that moral government is a scheme.
I. The parts curiously correspond to each other; individuals to individuals,
species to species, events to events; and all these both immediate and
remote.
2. This correspondence embraces all the past, and all the future; including
all creatures, actions, and events.
1.) There is no event, which does not depend for its occurrence on some
further thing, unknown to us; we cannot give the whole account of
any one thing.
2.) Things apparently the most insignificant, seem to be necessary to others,
of the greatest importance.
3. If such is God's natural government, it is credible that such is his moral
government.
1.) In fact they are so blended as to make one scheme.
-One is subservient to the other, just as the vegetable kingdom subserves
the animal, and our animal organization subserves our mental.
-Every act of God seems to look beyond the occasion, and to have
reference to a general plan.
-There is evidently a previous adjustment.
~ The periods, &c. for trying men.
~ The instruments of justice.
~ The kinds of retribution.
2." The whole comprises a system, a very small part of which is known to
us: therefore no objections against any part can be insisted on.
3.) This ignorance is universally acknowledged, except in arguing against
religion.  That it ought to be a valid answer to objections against
religion, we proceed to show.
-Suppose it to be asserted that all evils might have been prevented by
repeated interpositions; or that more good might have been so produced; which would be the utmost that could be said: still,
-Our ignorance would vindicate religion from any objections arising
from apparent disorders in the world.




CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY.                      43
-The government of the world might be good, even on those supposi
tions; for at most they could but suggest that it might he better.
-At any rate, they are mere assertions.
-Instances may be alleged, in things much less out of reach, of suppositions palpably impossible, which all do not see to be so: nor any,
at first sight.
4.) It follows that our ignorance is a satisfactory answer to all objections
against the divine government.
-An objection against an act of Providence, no way connected with
any other thing, as being unjust, could not be answered by our
ignorance.
-But when the objection is made against an act related to other tnd
unknown acts, then our ignorance is a full answer.
-Some unknown relation, or unknown impossibility, may render the act
not only good, but good in the highest degree.
II. Consider some particular things, in the natural government of
God, the like of which we may infer, by analogy, to be contained in his moral government.
1. No ends are accomplished without means.
1.) Often, means very disagreeable bring the most desirable results.
2.) How means produce ends, is not learned by reason, but experience.
3.) In many cases, before experience, we should have expected contrary
results.
4.) Hence we may infer that those things which are objected against God's
moral government, produce good.
5.) It is evident that our not seeing how the means work good, or their
seeming to have an opposite effect, offers no presumption against their
fitness to work good.
6.) They may not only be fit, but the only means of ultimate good.
Objec. Though our capacity of vice and misery may promote virtue, and our
suffering for sin be better than if we were restrained by force, yet it
would have been better if evil had not entered the world.
Ans. It is granted that though sinful acts may produce benefits, to refrain
from them would produce more. We have curative pains, yet pain is
not better than health.
2. Natural government is carried on by general laws.
1.) Nature shows that this is best: all the good we enjoy is because there
are general laws. They enable us to forecast for the procurement of
good.
2.) It may not be possible, by general laws, to prevent all irregularities, or
remedy them.
3.) Direct interpositions might perhaps remedy many disorders arising
under them, but this would have bad effects.
-Encouraging improvidence.
— Leaving us no rule of life.
-Every interposition would have distant effects: so that we could not
guess what would be the whole result.
If it be replied that those distant effects might also be corrected
by direct interpositions-this is only talking at random.




44               CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY.
Objec, If we are so ignorant as this whole argument supposes, we are toe
ignorant to understand the proofs of religion.
Ans. 1. Total ignorance of a subject precludes argument, but partial ignorance
does not. We may, in various degrees, know a man's character, and
the way he is likely to pursue certain ends; and yet not know how he
ought to act to gain those ends. In this case objections to his mode
of pursuing ends may be answered by our ignorance, though that he
does act in a certain manner is capable of proof. So we may have
evidence of God's character and aims, and yet not be competent judges
as to his measures. Our ignorance is a good answer to the difficulties
of religion, but no objection to religion itself.
Ans. 2. If our ignorance did invalidate the proofs of religion, as well as the
objections, yet is it undeniable that moral obligations remain unaffected by our ignorance of the consequences of obedience or violation. The consequences of vice and virtue may not be fully known,
yet it is credible that they may be such as religion declares: and this
credibility is an obligation, in point of prudence, to abstain from sin.
Ans. 3. Our answers to the objections against religion, are not equally valid
against the proofs of it.
[Answers rehearsed.]
Ans. 4. Our answers, though they may be said to be based on our ignorance,
are really not so, but on what analogy teaches concerning our ignorance,-viz.: that it renders us incompetent judges. They are based
on experience, and what we do know; so that to credit religion is to
trust to experience, and to disregard it is the contrary.
CONCLUSION.
1. The reasoning of the last chapter leads us to regard this life as part of a
larger plan of things.
1.) Whether we are connected with the distant parts of the universe, is
uncertain; but it is very clear we are connected, more or less, with
present, past, and future.
2.) We are evidently in the midst of a scheme, not fixed but progressive;
and one equally incomprehensible, whether we regard the present, past,
or future.
2. This scheme contains as much that is wonderful as religion does: for
it certainly would be as wonderful that all nature came into existence
without a Creator, as that there should be a Creator: and as wonderful
that the Creator should act without any rule or scheme, as that he should
act with one; or that he should act by a bad rule, rather than a righteous
one.
3. Our very nature compels us to believe that the will and character of the
Author of nature, is just and good.
4. Whatever be his character, he formed the world as it is, and controls it as
he does, and has assigned us our part and lot.
5. Irrational creatures act their part, and receive their lot, -wthout reflection,
but creatures endued with reason, can hardly avoid reflecting whither we
go, and what is the scheme, in the midst of which we find ourselves.
[Here follows a recapitulation of the book.]




CONSPECTUS OF TIIE ANALOGY.                     45
PART II.
CHAPTER I.
IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY.
EVERY one must admit that we need a revelation. Few, if any, could reason
out a system, even of natural religion. If they could, there is no probability
that they would. Such as might, would still feel the want of revelation. To
say that Christianity is superfluous, is as wild as to say all are happy.
No exactness in attending to natural religion can make Christianity of small
importance.
If Christianity be from God, we must obey, unless we know all his reasons
for giving it: and also that those reasons no longer exist; at least in our case.
This we cannot know.
The importance of Christianity appears if we regard it
I. As a republication of natural religion.!. It gives the moral system of the universe.
1.) Free from corruptions; teaching that
-Jehovah created all things.
-    governs all things.
-Virtue is his law.
-Mankind will be judged according to character.
2.) It publishes its facts authoritatively.
3.) With vastly more clearness; e.g. the doctrines of a future state: danger
of sin: efficacy of repentance.
4.) With the advantage of a visible church, distinguished from the world by
peculiar institutions.
Objec. The perversions of Christianity, and the little good it has done.
Ans. 1. Natural religion is no less perverted, and has done less good.
2. The benefits of Christianity are not small.
3. The evils ascribed to it, are not its effects. Things are to be judged
by their genuine tendencies.
4. The light of reason, no more than revelation forces acquiescence.
5.) With the additional advantage that every Christian, is bound to instruct
and persuade others.
II. As containing truths not discoverable by natural reason.
1. A mode of salvation for the ruined.
2. Duties unknown before.
3. Our relations to the Son and Holy Ghost.
1.) Hence the form of baptism.
2.) Pious regards to Christ, and the Holy Ghost, based on our relations to
them.
1. The manner of extc'nal worship.




16               CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY.
III. The fearful hazard of neglecting Christianity.
1. Those who think natural religion suficient, must admit that Christianity s
highly important.
2. Our relations to Christ being made known, our religious regard to him is
an evident obligation.
3. These relations being real, there is no reason to think that our neglect of
behaving suitably to them, will not be attended with the same kind of
consequences as follow the neglect of duties made known by reason.
4. If we are corrupt and depraved, and so unfit for heaven, and if we need
God's Holy Spirit to renew our nature, how can it be a slight thing
whether we make use of the means for obtaining such assistance?
5. Thus, if Christianity be either true, or merely credible, it is most rash and
presumptuous to treat it lightly.
REMARKS.
1. The distinction between positive and moral obligations.
1.) For moral precepts we can see the reason: for positive we cannot.
2.) Moral duties are such prior to command; positive duties rae such because
commanded.
3.) The manner in which a duty is made known, does not make it moral or
positive.
2. The ground of regarding moral duties as superior to positive.
1.) Both have the nature of moral commands.
2.) If the two conflict, we must obey the moral.
-Positive institutions are means to moral ends.
-Ends are more excellent than means.
-Obedience to positive institutions, has no value but as proceeding from
moral principle.
3.) Both moral and positive duties are revealed, and so are on a level; but
the moral law is also interwoven with our very nature, and so its
precepts must prevail when the two interfere.
3. There is less necessity for determining their relative authority, than some
suppose.
1.) Though man is disposed to outward and ritual religion, nothing can give
us acceptance with God, without moral virtue.
2 ) Scripture always lays stress on moral duties.
3.) It is a great weakness, though very common, to make light of positive
institutions, because less important than moral.
-We are bound to obey all God's commands.
-A precept, merely positive, admitted to be from God, creates moral
obligation, in the strictest sense.
CONCLUSION.
This account of Christianity shows our great obligation to study the
Scriptures.




CONSPECTUS OF TIE ANALOGY.                        47
CHAPTER II.
PRESUMPTIONS AGAINST A REVELATION, CONSIDERED AS MIRACULOUS.
IAVING shown the need of revelation, we now examine the presumptions
against it.
The analogy of nature is generally supposed to afford presumptions against
miracles.
They are deemed to require stronger evidence than other events.
I. Analogy furnishes no presumptions against the general scheme of
Christianity.
1. It is no presumption against Christianity, that it is not the discovery of
reason, or of experience.
2. Nor is it a presumption against Christianity, that it contains things unlike
the apparent course of nature.
1.) We cannot suppose every thing, in the vast universe, to be just like what
is the course of nature in this little world.
2.) Even within the present compass of our knowledge, we see many things
greatly unlike.
3. If we choose to call what is unlike our known course of things, miraculous,
still that does not make it inprobable.
II. There is no presumption against such a revelation, as we should
now call miraculous, being made, at the beginning of the
world.
1. There was then no course of nature, as to this world.
2. Whether man then received a revelation involves a question not of miracles,
but of fact.
3. Creation was a very different exertion of power from that which rules the
world, now it is made.
4. Whether the power of forming stopped when man was made; or went on,
and formed a religion for him, is merely a question as to the degree or
extent, to which a power was exerted.
5. There is then no presumption from analogy against supposing man had a
revelation when created.
6. All tradition and history teaches that he had, which amounts to a real and
material proof.
III. There is no presumption against miracles, or a miraculous revelation, after the course of nature was settled.
1. Such a presumption, requires the adduction of some parallel case.'2. This would require us to know the history of some other world.
3. Even then, if drawn from only one other world, the presumption would
be very precarious.
To be more particular,
2o There is a strong presumption against any truth till it is proved-which yet
is 7-ercome by almost any proof.




48               CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY.
-Hence the question of a presumption against miracles, involves only
the degree of presumption, (not whether the presumption is peculiar
to miracles,) and whether that degree is such as to render them
incredible.
2. If we leave out religion, we are in total darkness as to the cause or circum.
stances on which the course of nature depends.
-Five or six thousand years may have given occasion and reasons for
miraculous interpositions of Providence.
3. Taking in religion, there are distinct reasons for miracles; to afford
additional instruction; to attest the truth of instruction.
4I Miracles must not be compared with common events, but with uncommon;
earthquakes, pestilence, &c.
CONCLUSION.
1. There are no analogies to render miracles incredible.
2. On the contrary, we see good reasons for them.
3. There are no presumptions against them, peculiar to them, as distinguished
from other unusual phenomena.
CHAPTER III.
OUR INCAPACITY OF JUDGING WHAT SHOULD BE EXPECTED IN A REVELATION
FROMT GOD.
BESIDE the objectors to the evidences of Christianity, there are many who
object to its nature. They say it is not full enough: has in it foolish things:
gives rise to superstition: subserves tyranny: is not universally known: not
well arranged: figurative language, &c.
It is granted that if it contained immoralities or contradictions they would
show it to be false. But other objections against religion, aside from objections
against its evidences, are frivolous: as will now be shown.
Let the student look to the force of the proofs, rather than any consequences
which may be drawn from them.
I. The Scripture informs us of a scheme of government, in addition
to the material laws of the world.
1. If both these schemes, the physical and the moral, coincide and form one
whole, then our inability to criticise the system of nature, renders it
credible that we are incompetent to criticise the system of grace.
2. Nature shows many things we should not have expected, prior to experience.
3. Hence it is altogether likely it would be so in religion.
i. If a citizen is incompetent to judge of the propriety of the general laws of
his government, he is equally incompetent to judge when and how far
those laws should be suspended, or deviated from.




CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY.                      49
II. We are no better judges of how revelation should be imparted.
Whether to every man, or to some for others; or what mode
or degree of proof should be given; or whether the knowledge should be given gradually or suddenly.
1. We are not able to judge how much new knowledge ought to be given
by revelation.
2. Nor how far, nor in what way, God should qualify men to transmit any
revelation he might make.
3. Nor whether the evidence should be certain, probable, or doubtful.
4. Nor whether all should have the same benefit from it.
5. Nor whether it should be in writing, or verbal. If it be said that if not in
writing it would not have answered its purpose: I ask, what purpose?
Who knows what purposes would best suit God's general government?
6. All which shows it to be absurd to object to particular things in revelation
as unsuitable.
III. Hence the only question, concerning the truth of revelation is,
whether it is a revelation.
t. No obscurities, &c. could overthrow the authority of a revelation.
2. It can only be overthrown by nullifying the proofs.
3. Though the proofs could be shown to be less strong than is affirmed, it still
should control our conduct.
IV. Modes of arguing, which are perfectly just, in relation to other
books, are not so as to the Bible.
1. We are competent judges of common books, but not of Scripture.
2. Our only inquiry should be to find out the sense.
3. In other books, internal improbabilities weaken external proof; but in
regard to revelation, we scarcely know what are improbabilities.
1.) Those who judge the Scripture by preconceived expectations, will imagine
they find improbabilities.
2.) And so they would by thus judging in natural things.
-It would seem very improbable, prior to experience, that man should
be better able to determine the magnitudes and motions of heavenly
bodies, than he is to determine the causes and cures of disease, which
much more nearly concerns him.
-Or that we should sometimes hit upon a thing in an instant, even when
thinking of something else, which we had been vainly trying to
discover for years.
-Or that language should be so liable to abuse, that every man may be
a deceiver.
-Or that brute instinct should ever be superior to reason.
V. Sutch observations apply to almost all objections to Christianity,
as distinguished from objections against its evidence.
For instance, the disorderly manner in which some, in the apostolic age,
-ased their miraculous gifts.
1. This does not prove the acts not miraculous.
D1                        5




50               CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY.
2. The person having any such gift, would have the same power over it which
he would have over any other ability, and right pervert it.
3. To say why was he not also endued with:rudence, to restrain its use,
is but saying why did not God give a:tigher degree of miraculous
endowment? As to which we are not compstent judges.
4. God does not confer his natural gifts, (memory, eloquence, knowledge, &c.)
only on those who are prudent and make the best use of them.
5. Nor is worldly instruction, by educators, commonly given in the happiest
manner.
VI. There is a resemblance between religion and nature in several
other respects.
1. In both, common and necessary things, are plain; but to'go on to perfection" in either, requires exact and laborious study.
2. The hinderances to both religious and physical knowledge, are the same
in kind. A more perfect knowledge may be brought about,
1.) By the progress of learning and liberty.
2.) By students attending to intimations overlooked by the generality.
3. It is not wonderful that our knowledge of Bible truth should be small; for
the natural world has laid open to inspection, for thousands of years, and
yet only lately are any great discoveries made.
4. Perhaps these scientific discoveries, are to be the means of opening and
ascertaining Bible truth.
Objec. The cases are not parallel; for natural knowledge is of no consequence,
compared to spiritual.
Ans. 1. The cases are parallel; for natural knowledge is as important to
our natural well-being, as spiritual knowledge is to our spiritual
well-being.
Ans. 2. If the cases were not parallel, there are plenty of other analogies,
which show that God does not dispense his gifts according to our
notions of their value.
Objec. 2. If Christianity be intended for the recovery of men, why not sooner
introduced, and more widely diffused?
As8. The objection is just as strong against the natural sciences. Nay, if the
light of nature and of revelation are both from the same source, we
might expect that revelation would have been introduced and diffused
just as it is.
1.) Remedies for disease are known but to a few, or not known at all, nor to
any without care and study.
2.) When proposed by discoverers, they have been treated with derision, and
the use rejected by thousands whom they might have cured.
3.) The best remedies have been used unskilfully, and so made to produce
more disease.
4.) Their benefit may come very slowly.
5.) In some cases they may be wholly ineffectual.
6.) They may be so disagreeable that many will not submit to use them, even
with the prospect of a cure.
T.) Sometimes the remedy may be entirely out of reach if we were rewily
to take it.
All this reasoning may be applied to Christianity.




CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY.                         51
VII. Having obviated all objections to Christiantty, from?ts containing things we should not have expected, we will now
consider the objections against its morality.
1. Reason may judge, as to whether revelation contains things contrary to
justice, and wisdom, &c. as those attributes are taught by natural religion.
But no such objections are advanced, except such as would equally
condemn the constitution of nature.
2. There are indeed particular precepts, to particular persons, which would be
immoral, but for the precept. The precept changes the nature of the
action.
3. None are contrary to immutable morality. We are never commanded to
cultivate the principles of ingratitude, treachery, &c.
4. God may command the taking of life or property because these are his.
5. The only real difficulty is, that such commands are liable to. be perverted by
the wicked to their own horrid purposes; and to mislead the weak. But
such objections do not lie against revelation, as such, but against the very
notion of religion as a trial.
6. The sum of the whole is, objections against the scheme of-Christianity
do not affect its truth; since there are no objections against its morality.
Hence objections against it, aside from its evidences, are frivolous. Objections against the evidence, will be considered in a subsequent chapter,
[i.e. ch. vii.]
CHAPTER IV.CHRISTIANITY A SCHEME IMPERFECTLY UNDERSTOOD.
IN the last chapter it was shown that we might expect, beforehand, that a
revelation would contain strange things, and things liable to great objections.
This abates the force of such objections, or rather precludes them.
But it may be said this does not show such objectionable things to be good,
or credible.
It was a sufficient answer [ch. vii. part i.] to objections against the course
of nature, that it was a scheme, imperfectly comprehended.
If Christianity be a scheme, the like objections admit of a like answer.
I. Christianity is a scheme, beyond our comprehension.
1. God's general plan is to conduct things gradually, so that, finally, every one
shall receive what he deserves.
2. Christianity is a particular arrangement, under this general plan: is a part
of it, and conduces to its completion.
3. It is itself a complicated and mysterious economy.
1.) Its arrangements began from the fall of man.
2.) Various dispensations, patriarchal, prophetic, &c. were preparatory to it.
3.) At a certain juncture in the condition of the world Jesus Christ came.
* [In studying this cnapter, let chap. vii. part i. be kept in view.l




52                CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY.
4.) The mission of the Holy Ghost was part of this economy.
S.) Christ now presides over it, and will establish the church, judge the
world, give up the kingdom, &c. &c.
4. Of course, we can comprehend but little of such a scheme.
5. We plainly see, from what is revealed, that there is very much unrevealed.
6. Thus it is evident that we are as little capable of judging as to the whole
system of religion, as we are as to the whole system of nature.
II. In both material and spiritual things, means are used to
accomplish ends.
1. Hence a thing may seem foolish to us, because we do not know its object
and end.
2. Its seeming foolish to us, is no proof that it is so.
III. Christianity is carried on by general laws, no less than nature.
1. Why do we say there are lavws of nature?
1.) We indeed know some such. But nothing of the laws of many things, e.g.
-Pestilence.. Storms.. Earthquakes.. Diversities of
human powers.. Association of ideas.
2.) Hence we call many things accidental, which we know are not matters
of chance, but are subject to general laws.
3.) It is a very little way that we can trace things to their general laws.
4.) We attribute many things to such laws, only by analogy.
2. Just for the same reasons, we say that miracles comport with God's general
laws of wisdom. These laws may be unknown to us; but no more so than
those by which some die as soon as born, or live to old age, or have
superior understandings, &c.
3. We see no more reason to regard the frame and course of nature as a
scheme, than we have to regard Christianity as such.
1.) If the first is a scheme, then Christianity, if true, would be likely to be
a scheme.
2.) As Christianity is revealed but in part, and is an arrangement to
accomplish ends, there would of course seem to us, in it, irregularities;
just as we see in nature.
3.) Therefore objections against the one, are answered in the same manner
as objections against the other.
Having, in a previous chapter, [ch. iii.,] answered objections to Christianity
as a matter of fact, and in this, as a general question of wisdom and goodness,
the next thing is to discuss objections in particular.
As one of these is directed against the scheme, as just now described, it will
be considered here.
Objec. Christianity is a roundabout, and perplexed contrivance; just such as
men, for want of understanding or power, are obliged to adopt, in
their designs.
Ans. 1.) God uses just such complex arrangements in the natural world. The
mystery is quite as great in nature as in grace.




CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY.                       53
2.) We do not know what are means, and what are ends.
3.) The natural world, and its government, are not fixed, but progressive,
4.) Great length of time is required in some changes; e.g. animals, vegetables, geological periods, &c.
5.) One state of life is a preparation and means for attaining another.
6.) Man is impatient, but Jehovah deliberate.
CHAPTER V.
OF A MEDIATOR, AND REDEMPTION BY HIM.
NOTHING in Christianity is so much objected to as the position assigned to
Christ; yet nothing is more unjust. The whole world exhibits mediation.
I. Our existence, and all its satisfactions, are by the medium of others.
1. If so in the natural world, why not in the spiritual?
2. The objection therefore is not only against Christ's mediation, but all
naediation.
II. We cannot know all the ends for which God punishes, nor by
whom he should punish.
1. Future punishment may be as natural a sequence of sin, as a broken limb
is of falling from a precipice.
2. This is not taking punishment out of the hands of God, and giving it to
nature; it is only distinguishing ordinary events from miraculous.
III. In natural providence, God has made provision that the bad
consequences of actions do not always follow.
1. We may say God could have prevented all evil. But we see he permits it,
and has provided relief, and even sometimes perfect remedies for it.
1.) Thus the bad consequences of trifling on a precipice may be prevented
by a friend, if we do not reject his assistance.
2.) We may ourselves do much towards preventing the bad consequences of
our misdeeds.
3.) Still more if assisted.
2. It might have been perfectly just if it were not so; but that it is so, shows
compassion, as distinguished from goodness.
3. The course of nature affords many instances of such compassion.
4. Thus analogy sanctions an arrangement, by which the ruinous consequences
of vice or folly may be averted, at least in some cases.
5. If the consequences of rash and inconsiderate acts, which we scarcely call
vicious, are often so serious, we may apprehend that the bad consequences
will be greater, in proportion as the irregularity is greater.
6. A dissolute disregard to all religion, if there be a religion, is incomparably
more reprehensible than the mere neglects, imprudencies, &c. of this life.
7. As the effects of worldly imprudence and vice are often misery, ruin, and
even death, no one can say what may be the consequences of blasphemy,
contempt of God, and final impenitence.
5*




54                CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY.
8. Nor can any one tell, how far the consequences of such great wickedness
can possibly be prevented, consistently with the eternal rule of right.
9. Still there would, from analogy, be some hope of room for pardon.
IV. There is no probability that any thing we could do alone, would
entirely prevent the effects of our irregularities.
I We do not know all the reasons for punishment, nor why it should be fit
to remit punishment.'  Nor do we know all the consequences of vice, and so should not know how
to prevent them.
3. Vice impairs men's abilities for helping themselves.
4. Misconduct makes assistance necessary, which otherwise would not have
been. Why should not the same things be so, as to our future interests?
5, in temporal things, behaving well in time to come, does not repair old errors,
why should it as to future things?
6. Were it so in all cases it would be contrary to all our notions of government.
7. (t could not be determined in what degree, or in what cases, it would be
so, even if we knew it might in some cases.
8  rhe efficacy of repentance, as urged in opposition to atonement, is contrary
to the general sense of mankind; as shown by the prevalence of propitiatory sacrifices.
V. In this state of apprehension, awakened by the light of nature,
revelation comes in, and teaches positively, the possibility of
pardon and safety.
1. Confirms our fears as to the unprevented consequences of sin.
2. Declares the world to be in a state of ruin.
3. That repentance alone will not secure pardon.
4. That there is a mode of pardon, by interposition.
5. That God's moral government is compassionate, as well as his natural
government.
6. That he has provided, by the interposition of a mediator, to save men.
7. All this seems to put man in a strange state of helpless degradation. But
it is not Christianity which puts him so. All philosophy and history
show man to be degraded and corrupt.
VI. Scripture, in addition to confirming the dim testimony of the
light of nature, reveals a Christ, as mediator and propitiatory
sacrifice.
1. He is "that prophet."
1.) Declared the will of God.
2.) Published anew the law of nature.
3.) Taught with authority.
4.) Revealed the right manner of worship.
5.) Revealed the exact use of repentance.
6.) Revealed future rewards and punishments.
7.) Set us a perfect example.




CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY.                       55
2. He has a kingdom which is not of this world.
1.) Founded a church.
2.) Governs it.
3.) Of it, all who obey him are members.
4.) Each of these shall live and reign with him forever.
3. He is a propitiatory sacrifice.
1.) How his sacrifice becomes efficacious, we are not exactly told.
2.) Conjectures may be absurd; at least cannot be certain.
3.) If any complain for want of further instruction, let him produce his
claim to it.
4.) Some, because they cannot explain, leave it out of their creed; and
regard Christ only as a teacher.
5.) We had better accept the benefit, without disputing about how it was
procured.
VII. We are not judges, antecedent to revelation, whethera mediator
was necessary, nor what should be the whole nature of his
office.
1. We know not how future punishment would have been inflicted.
2. Nor all the reasons why it would be necessary.
3. The satisfaction by Christ, does not represent God as indifferent whether
he punishes the innocent or guilty,
1.) We see, in this world, the innocent forced to suffer for the faults of
the guilty.
2.) But Christ suffered voluntarily.
4. Though, finally, every one shall receive according to his own deserts;
yet, during the progress of God's scheme, vicarious sufferings may be
necessary.
1.) God commands us to assist others, though in many cases it costs us
suffering and toil.
2.) One person's sufferings often tend to relieve another.
5. Vicarious atonement for sinners, serves to vindicate the authority of God's
laws, and to deter men from sin.
6. Objections to vicarious suffering are obviously not objections to Christianity,
but to the whole course of nature.
7. The objection, therefore, amounts to nothing more than saying that a
divine arrangement is not necessary, or fit, because the objector does
not see it to be so; though he must own he is no judge, and could not
understand why it should be necessary, if it were so!
VIII. We have no reason to expect the same information touching
God's conduct, as we have in relation to our own duty.
1. God instructs us by experience.
2. This experience, though sufficient for our purposes, is an infinitely small
part of his providence.
3. The things not understood involve God's appointment, and Christ's exe.
cution; but what is required of us, we are clearly informed.
4. Even the reasons for Christian precepts are made obvious.




56               CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY.
CHAPTER VI.
SUPPOSED LACK OF PROOF OF REVELATION, AND ITS WANT OF UNIVERSALITY.
IT has been thought to be a positive argument against revelation, that its
evidences are not adequate, and that it is not universally known and believed.
But the argument amounts to just this, that God would not bestow on us any
favor, except in such a mode and degree as we thought best, and did exactly
the same for everybody else.
Such a notion, all analogy contradicts.
I. Men act in their most important concerns on doubtful evidence.
1. It is often absolutely impossible to say which of two modes of acting will
give most pleasure or profit.
2. If it were possible, we cannot know what changes temper, satiety, ill
health, &e. might produce, so as to destroy our pleasure.
3. We cannot foresee what accidents may cut it all off.
4. Strong objections and difficulties may attach to the course of action we
adopt, which yet all would admit ought not to deter us.
5. We may, after all, be deceived by appearances, or by our passions, &c.
6. Men think it reasonable to engage in pursuit of advantage, even when the
probabilities of success are against them.
II. As to the light of Christianity not being universal.
1. Temporal good is enjoyed in very different degrees even among creatures
of the same species.
2. Yet it is certain that God governs.
3. We may prudently or imprudently use our good things.
4. The Jewish religion was not universal.
5. If it be intended that Christianity should be a small light, shining in a
great and wide-spread darkness, it would be perfectly uniform with
other parts of God's providence.
6. If some have Christianity so corrupted, and interpolated, as to cause
thoughtful persons to doubt it, as is the case in some countries; and if,
where it is the purest, some learn much less from it than they might, there
are manifest parallels in God's natural dispensations.
7. No more is expected of any one, than is equitable under his circumstances.
8. Every one is bound to get rid of his ignorance, as far as he can, and to
instruct his neighbor.
9. If revelation were universal, in extent and degree, different understandings,
educations, tempers, length of lives, and outward advantages, would soon
make the knowledge of it as different as it is at present.
III. Practical reflections.
First. That the evidence of religion is not such as unavoidably to convince all,
may be part of our probation.
1. It gives scope for a wise or vicious use of our understanding. Just as is
the case in conruon affairs.




CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY.                       57
2. Intellectual inattention to so serious a matter, is as immoral, as disobedience after conviction of the truth.
Secondly. If the evidence is really doubtful, it puts us on probation.
1. If a man were in doubt whether a certain person had done him the greates
favor, or whether his whole temporal interest depended on him, he ought
not to regard that person as he would if there were no reason to think so.
2. So if there is only reason to apprehend that Christianity may be true, we
are as much bound to examine, &c. as we would be bound to obey, if we
knew it was true.
3. Considering the infinite importance of religion, there is not much differ.
ence as to what ought to be the mode of life of those who are convinced
and those who doubt its truth. Their hopes and fears are the same in
kind, though not in degree; and so their obligations are much the same.
4. Doubts presuppose some evidence, belief more, and certainty more still.
Each state should influence our conduct, and does so, in common things.
5. It shows a mental defect not to see evidence unless it is glaring; and a
corrupt heart not to be influenced by it unless overpowering.
Thirdly. Difficulties as to believing religion, are no more a ground of complaint,
than difficulties in practising it.
1. They constitute a wholesome discipline.
1.) In allowing an unfair mind to deceive itself.
2.) In requiring belief and the practice of virtue under some uncertainties.
2. In the case of some minds, speculative difficulties as to the evidence of
religion is the princip.al trial.  A full conviction of its truth would
constrain some to obedience.
Fourthly. The difficulties may be in the objector rather than in the religion.
1. Not sufficiently in earnest to be informed.
2. Secretly wishes religion not to be true.
3. Looks at objections rather than replies.
4. Treats the subject ludicrously.
Fifthly. The proof of Christianity is level to common men.
1. They are capable of being convinced of the existence of God, and of their
moral accountability.
2. And they can understand the evidence of miracles, and the fulfilment of
prophecy.
3. If they are capable of seeing the difficulty, they are capable of understand.
ing the proof.
4. If they pick up objections from hearsay, and will not or cannot examine
them thoroughly, they must remain ignorant, just as they do as to the
sciences.
Objec. Our directions should be too plain to admit of doubt; like those of an
earthly master.
Ans. The earthly master only wants his work done, and is careless as to the
state of the heart; but as the whole of morality consists in the state of
the heart, the cases are not parallel.
Finally. The credibility of our being in a state of probation is just as great
as the credibility of there being any religion. Our probation may
be whether we choose to inform ourselves as to our duty, and then
whether we choose to do it.




CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY.
Such is exactly the case as to temporal matters. To discern what is
best often requires difficult consideration, and yet leaves doubts:
and not reflecting carefully, or not acting even when there may
be doubt, is often fatal.
CHAPTER VIL
POSITIVE EVIDENCES OF CHRISTIANITY.
HAVING considered the objections both to the general scheme of Christianity,
and to particular doctrines in it, it only remains to consider the positive evi.
dence of its truth; i.e. what analogy teaches with regard to that evidence.
There are many evidences of Christianity, beside those from miracles or
prophecy, which are the principal; embracing a great variety of proofs, direct
and collateral, and reaching through all past time. We shall now consider
the proofs from MIRACLES and PROPHECY.
I. Miracles.
1. Bible history gives the same evidence for the miracles described, as for
common events.
1.) The miracles are evidently not put in for ornament, as speeches are by
historians and poets put into the mouths of heroes.
2.) The accounts of them have been quoted as genuine, by various writers,
from that day to this.
3.) These accounts are confirmed by subsequent events; and the miracles
alone, can account for those events.
4.) The only fair way of accounting for these statements, and their reception
in the world, is that the things really happened.
5.) The statements should be admitted till disproved, even if doubtful.
2. Paul's Epistles have evidences of genuineness, beyond what can attach to
mere history.
1.) Additional. His evidence is quite detached. He received the gospel not
in common with the other apostles, but separately, and direct from
Christ, after his ascension.
2.) Peculiar. He speaks of Christ's miracles and those of others incidentally,
as familiar facts, fully believed by those to whom he wrote.
3. Christianity demands credence on the ground of its miracles, and was so
received by great numbers, at the time and on the spot; which is the
case with no other religion.
1.) Its first converts embraced it on this ground.
2.) It is not conceivable that they would have done so, at such fearful
sacrifice, unless fully satisfied of the truth of these miracles.
3.) Such a profession and sacrifices furnish the same kind of evidence as
if they had testified to the truth of the miracles in writing.
4.) It is real evidence, for they had full opportunity to inform themselves.
5.) It is a sort of evidence distinct from direct history, though of bth same
nature.




CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY.                        59
6.) Men are suspicious as well as credulous, and slow to believe against theis
interests, as these did.
4. It lies upon unbelievers to show why all this array of proof is to be
rejected; but in such an important concern we shall proceed to notice
some possible objections.
Objec. 1. Enthusiasts make similar sacrifices for idle follies.
An". 1. This objection ignores the distinction between opinions and facts.
Suffering for an opinion is no proof of its truth; but in attestation
of observed facts, it is proof.
2. Enthusiasm weakens testimony, it is true, even as to facts; and so does
disease, in particular instances. But when great numbers, not weak,
nor negligent, affirm that they saw and heard certain things, it is the
fullest evidence.
3. To reject testimony on the ground of enthusiasm, requires that the
things testified be incredible; which has not been shown, as to
religion, but the contrary.
4, Religion is not the only thing in regard to which witnesses are liable
to enthusiasm. In common matters, we get at the truth through
witnesses, though influenced by party spirit, custom, humor,
romance, &c. &c.
Objec. 2. Enthusiasm and knavery may have been combined in the apostles
and first Christians.
Ans. Such a mixture is often seen, and is often reproved in Scripture; but not
more in religious than in common affairs. Men in all matters deceive
themselves and others, in every degree, yet human testimony is good
ground of belief.
Objec. 3. Men have been deluded by false miracles.
Ans. Not oftener than by other pretences.
Objec. 4. Fabulous miracles have historical evidence.
Ans. 1. If this were equal to that for Scripture miracles, the evidence for the
latter would not be inpaired. The objection really amounts to this,
that evidence proved not to be good, destroys evidence which is good
and unconfuted! Or to this, that if two men, of equal reputation,
testify, in cases not related to each other, and one is proved false, the
other must not be believed!
2. Nothing can rebut testimony, but proof that the witness is incompetent,
or misled.
3. Against all such objections must be set the fact that Christianity was
too serious a matter to allow the first converts to be careless as to its
evidence; and also that their religion forbid them to deceive others.
II As to the evidence from prophecy.
1, Obscurity as to part of a prophecy does not invalidate it, but is, as to us, as
if that part were not written, or were lost. We may not see the whole
prophecy fulfilled, and yet see enough fulfilled to perceive in it more
than human foresight.
2. A long series of prophecies, all applicable to certain events, is proof that
such events were intended. This answers the objection that particular
prophecies were not intended to be applied as Christians apply them.




60               CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY.
Mythological and satirical writings greatly resemble prophecy. Now we
apply a parable, or fable, or satire, merely from seeing it capable of such
application.
So if a long series of prophecies be cpplicable to the present state of the
world, or to the coming of Christ, it is proof that they were so intended.
Besides, the ancient Jews, before Christ, applied the prophecies to him, just
as Christians do now.
3. If it could be shown that the prophets did not understand their own predictions, or that their prophecies are capable of being applied to other
events than those to which Christians apply them, it would not abate the
force of the argument from prophecy, even with regard to those instances.
For,
1.) To know the whole meaning of an author we must know the whole
meaning of his book, but knowing the meaning of a book is not
knowing the whole mind of the author.
2.) If the book is a compilation, the authors may have meanings deeper
than the compiler saw. If the prophets spoke by inspiration, they are
not the authors, but the writers of prophecy, and may not have known
all that the Divine Spirit intended. But the fulfilment of the prophecy
shows a foresight more than human.
REMARK.
This whole argument is just and real; but it is not expected that those will
be satisfied who will not submit to the perplexity and labor of understanding
it; or who have not modesty and fairness enough to allow an argument its due
weight; or who wilfully discard the whole investigation.
We now proceed to THE GENERAL ARGUMENT embracing both direct and circumstantial evidence. A full discussion would require a volume, and cannot
be expected here; but something should be said, especially as most questions
of difficulty, in practical affairs, are settled by evidence arising from circumstances which confirm each other.
The thing asserted is that God has given us a revelation declaring himself
to be a moral governor; stating his system of government; and disclosing a
plan for the recovery of mankind out of sin, and raising them to perfect and
final happiness.
I. Consider this revelation as a history.
1. It furnishes an account of the world, as God's world.
1.) God's providence, commands, promises, and threatenings.
2.) Distinguishes God from idols.
3.) Describes the condition of religion and of its professors, in % world
considered as apostate and wicked.
4.) Political events are related as affecting religion, and not fox their
importance as mere political events.
5.) The history is continued by prophecy, to the end of the world.
2. It embraces a vast variety of other topics; natural and moral.




CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALO.              61
1.) Thus furnishing the largest scope for criticism.
2.) So that doubts of its truth confirm that truth, for in this enlightened age
the claims of a book of such a nature could be e.sily and finally shown
to be false, if they were so.
3.) None who believe in natural religion, hold that Christianity has been
thus confuted.
3, It contains a minute account of God's selecting one nation for his peculiar
people, and of his dealings with them.
1.) Interpositions in their behalf.
2.) Threats of dispersion, &c. if they rebelled.
3.) Promises of a Messiah as their prince; so clearly as to raise a general
expectation, &c.
4.) Foretelling his rejection by them, and that he should be the Savior of
the Gentiles.
4. Describes minutely the arrival of the Messiah, and his life and labors; and
the result, in the establishment of a new religion.
II. As to the authenticity of this history.
Suppose a person ignorant of all history but the Bible, and not knowing
even that to be true, were to inquire into its evidence of authenticity, he
would find,
I. That natural religion owes its establishment to the truths contained in this
book.  This no more disproves natural religion, than our learning a
proposition from Euclid, shows that the proposition was not true before
Euclid.
2. The great antiquity of revelation.
3. That its chronology is not contradicted but confirmed by known facts.
4. That there is nothing in the history itself to awaken suspicion of its
fidelity.
1.) Every thing said to be done in any age or country, is conformable to the
manners of that age and country.
2.) The characters are all perfectly natural.
3.) All the domestic and political incidents are credible. Some of these,
taken alone, seem strange to some, in this day; but not more so than
things now occurring.
4.) Transcribers may have made errors, but these are not more numerous
than in other ancient books; and none of them impair the narrative.
5. That profane authors confirm Scripture accounts.
6 That the credibility of the general history, confirms the accounts of the
miracles, for they are all interwoven, and make but one statement.
7. That there certainly was and is such a people as the Jews; whose form of
government was founded on these very books of Moses; and whose
acknowledgment of the God of the Bible, kept them a distinct race.
8. That one Jesus, of Jewish extraction, arose at the time when the Jews
expected a Messiah, was rejected by them, as was prophesied, and was
received by the Gentiles, as was prophesied.
)o That the religion of this Jesus spread till it became the religion of the
world, notwithstanding every sort of resistance; and has continued till
now.
Uo0W.
6




O62          CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY.
10. That the Jewisn government was destroyed, and the people dispersed into
all lands; and still for many centuries, continue to be a distinct race,
professing the law of Moses. If this separateness be accountedfor, in
any way, it does not destroy the fact that it was predicted.
CONCLUSION.
1. Recapitulation of the preceding ten observations.
2. Add the fact that there are obvious appearances in the world, aside from
the Jews, which correspond to prophetic history.
3. These appearances, compared with Bible history, and with each other, in
a joint view, will appear to be of great weight, and would impress one
who regarded them for the first time, more than they do us who have
been familiar with them.
4. The preceding discussion, though not thorough, amounts to proof of something more than human in this matter.
1.) The sufficiency of these proofs may be denied, but the existence of them
cannot be.
2.) The conformity of prophecies to events may be said to be accidental, but
the conformity itself cannot be denied.
3.) These collateral proofs may be pronounced fanciful, but it cannot be said
they are nothing. Probabilities may not amount to demonstration, but
they remain probabilities.
5. Those who will set down all seeming completions of prophecy, and judge
of them by the common rules of evidence, will find that together they
amount to strong proof. Because probable proofs, added together, not
only increase evidence, but multiply it.
6. It is very well to observe objections; but it should be remembered that a
mistake on one side is far more dangerous than a mistake on the other;
and the safest conclusion is the best.
7. Religion, like other things, is to be judged by all the evidence taken
together. Unless all its proofs be overthrown, it remains proved. If
no proof singly were sufficient, the whole taken together might be.
8. It is much easier to start an objection, than to comprehend the united force
of a whole argument.
9. Thus it appears that the positive evidence of revelation cannot be destroyed,
though it should be lessened.
CHAPTER VIII..
OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE ANALOGICAL ARGUMENT.
IF all made up their minds with proper care and candor, there would be no
need of this chapter. But some do not try to understand what they condemn *
and our mode of argument is open to objections, especially in the minds o.
those who judge without thinking. The chief objections will therefore be considered. They are these:-it does not solve difficulties in revelation to saf
that there are as great in natural religion:-it will not make men religious to




CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY.                      63
show them that it is as important as worldly prudence, for showing that, does
not make them prudent:-the justice of God in the system of religion, is not
proved by showing it is as apparent as in his natural providence:-no reasuiiing from analogy can carry full conviction:-mankind will not renounce present pleasures, for a religion which is not free from doubt. To each of which
a reply will now be given.
I. As to requiring a solution of all dificulties
1. This is but resolving to comprehend the nature of God, and the whole plan
of his government throughout eternity.
2. It is always right to argue from what is known, to what is disputed. We
are constantly so doing. The most eminent physician does not understand
all diseases, yet we do not despise what he does know.
3. It is very important to find that objections against revelation are just as
strong, not only against natural religion, but against the course of nature.
II. As to men's having as little reason for worldly pursuits, as they
have for being religious.
1. If men can be convinced that they have as much reason to be religious as
they have to practise worldly prudence, then there is a reason for being
religious.
2. If religion proposes greater than worldly interests, and has the same reasons
for belief, then it has proportionally a greater claim.
3. If religion being left doubtful, proves it to be false, then doubts as to the
success of any worldly pursuit show it to be wrong. Yet we constantly
act, even in the most important affairs, without certainty of being right.
III. As to the justice and goodness of God in religion.
1. Our business is not to vindicate God, but to learn our duty, governed as we
are; which is a very different thing. It has been shown that if we knew
all things, present, past, and future, and the relations of each thing to all
other things, we might see to be just and good what now do not seem so:
and it is probable we should.
2. We do not say that objections against God's justice and goodness are
removed by showing the like objections against natural providence, but
that they are not conclusive, because they apply equally to what we know
to be facts.
3. The existence of objections does not destroy the evidence of facts. The
fact for instance that God rewards and punishes, though men may think
it unjust. Even necessity, plead for human acts, does no more to abolish
justice than it does injustice.
I. Though the reasonableness of Christianity cannot be shown from analogy,
the truth of it may. The truth of a fact may be proved without regard
Vc its quality.  The reasonableness of obeying Christianity is proved,,
if we barely prove Christianity itself to be possible.
N. Though analogy may not show Christian precepts to be good, it proves
them to be credible.




64               CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY.
IV. The analogical argument does not remove doubt.
1. What opinion does any man hold, about which there can be no doubt?
Even the best way of preserving and enjoying this life, is not agreed
upon. Whether our measures will accomplish our objects, is always
uncertain; and still more whether the objects, if accomplished, will
give us happiness. Yet men do not on this account refuse to make
exertion.
2. This objection overlooks the very nature of religion. The embracing of it
presupposes a certain degree of candor and integrity, to try which, and
exercise, and improve it, is its intention. Just as warning a man of
danger, presupposes a disposition to avoid danger.
3. Religion is a probation, and has evidence enough as such; and would not
be such, if it compelled assent.
4. We never mean by sufficient evidence, such an amount as necessarily
determines a man to act, but only such as will show an action to be
prudent.
V. As to the small influence of the analogical argument.!. As just observed, religion is a test, and an exercise, of character; and that
some reject it is nothing to our purpose. We are inquiring not what sort
of creature man is, but what he should be. This is each man's own
concern.
2. Religion, as a probation, accomplishes its end, whether individuals believe
or not.
3. Even this objection admits that religion has some weight, and of course
it should have some influence; and if so, there is the same reason,
though not so strong, for publishing it, that there would be, if it were
likely to have greater influence.
FURTHER. It must be considered that the reasoning in this treatise is on the
principles of other men, and arguments of the utmost importance are omitted,
because not universally admitted. Thus as to Fatalism, and the abstract fitness
or unfitness of actions. The general argument is just a question of fact, and
is here so treated. Abstract truths are usually advanced as proof; but in this
work, only facts are adduced. That the three angles of a triangle are equal to
two right angles, is an abstract truth: but that they so appear to us, is only
a matter of fact. That there is such a thing as abstract right and wrong, which
determines the will of God in rewarding and punishing, is an assertion of an
abstract truth, as well as a fact. Suppose God in this world rewarded and
punished every man exactly as he obeyed or disobeyed his conscience, this
would not be an abstract truth, but a fact. And if all acknowledged this as a
fact, all would not see it to be right. If, instead of his doing it now, we say
he will do it hereafter, this too is not an abstract truth, but a question of fact.
This fact could be fully proved on the abstract principles of moral fitness; but
without them, there has now been given a conclusive practical proof; which
though it may be cavilled at, and shown not to amount to demonstration, cannot
be answered.




CONSPECTUS OF THE ANALOGY.                         65
HIence it may be said as to the force of this treatise,
1. To such as are convinced of the truth of revelation, as proved on the
principles of liberty and moral fitness, it will furnish a full confirmation.
To such as do not admit those principles it is an original proof.
2. Those who believe will find objections removed, and those who disbelieve
will find they have no grounds for their scepticism; and a good deal
beside.
3. Thus though some may think too much is here made of analogy, yet there
can be no denying that the argument is real. It confirms all facts to
which it can be applied; and of many is the only proof. It is strong
on the side of religion, and ought to be regarded by such as prefer facts
to abstract reasonings.
CONCLUSION.
Recapitulates the general structure and design of the argument, the classes
jf persons for whose benefit it is particularly adopted, and declares these who
reject Christianity to be wholly without excuse.




btatiemlalt puftO          a t t^  first (D m.
IF the reader should here meet with any thing which he had not
hefore attended to, it will not be in the observations upon the constitution and course of nature, these being all obvious, but in the application of them; in which, though there is nothing but what appears
to me of some real weight, and therefore of great importance, yet he
will observe several things, which will appear to him of very little,
if he can think things to be of little importance, which are of any
real weight at all, upon such a subject of religion. However, the
proper force of the following treatise lies in the whole general analogy
considered together.
It is come, I know not how to be taken for granted, by many
persons, that Christianity is not st much as a subject of inquiry;
but that it is, now at length, discovered to be fictitious. Accordingly
they treat it, as if, in the present age, this were an agreed point
among all people of discernment; and nothing remained, but to set
it up as a principal subject of mirth and ridicule, as it were by way
of reprisals, for its having so long interrupted the pleasures of the
world. On the contrary, thus much at least, will be here found, not
taken for granted but proved, that any reasonable man, who will
thoroughly consider the matter, may be as much assured, as he is
of his own being, that it is not so clear a case, that there is nothing
in it. There is, I think, strong evidence of its truth; but it is certain
no one can, upon principles of reason, be satisfied of the contrary.
The practical consequence to be drawn from this, is not attended to
by every one who is concerned in it.
May, 1736.
66




INTRODUCTION.
PROBABLE evidence is essentially distinguished from demonstrative by this, that it admits of degrees; and of all variety of
them, from the highest moral certainty, to the very lowest presumption. We cannot indeed say a thing is probably true upon
one very slight presumption for it; because, as there may be probabiiities on both sides of a question, there may be some against
it; and though there be not, yet a slight presumption does not
beget that degree of conviction, which is implied in saying a
thing is probably true. But that the slightest possible presumption is of the nature of a probability, appears from hence; that
such low presumption, often repeated, will amount even to moral
certainty. Thus a man's having observed the ebb and flow of
the tide to-day, affords some sort of presumption, though the
lowest imaginable, that it may happen again to-morrow: but the
observation of this event for so many days, and months, and ages
together, as it has been observed by mankind, gives us a full
assurance that it will.
That which chiefly constitutes probability is expressed in the
word likely, i.e. like some truth,* or true event; like it, in itself,
in its evidence, in some (more or fewer) of its circumstances.* For
when we determine a thing to be probably true, suppose that an
event has or will come to pass, it is from the mind's remarking
in it a likeness to some other event, which we have observed has
come to pass. This observation forms, in numberless daily instances, a presumption, opinion, or full conviction, that such
event has or will come to pass; according as the observation is,
that the like event has sometimes, most commonly, or always, so
* Verisimile.
a [These three ways of being "' like," are very distinct from each other. The
firt is equivalent to a logical induction. The second produces belief, because
the same evidence made us believe in a similar case. The third is just an
analogy, in the popular sense of the term.]
67




68                     INTRODUCTION
far as our observation reaches, come to pass at like distances of
time, or place, or upon like occasions.  Hence arises the belief,
that a child, if it lives twenty years, will grow up to the stature
and strength of a man; that food will contribute to the preservation of its life, and the want of it for such a number of days, be
its certain destruction.  So likewise the rule and measure of our
hopes and fears concerning the success of our pursuits; our expectations that others will act so and so in such circumstances;
and our judgment that such actions proceed from such principles;
all these rely upon our having observed the like to what we hope,
fear, expect, judge; I say, upon our having observed the like,
either with respect to others or ourselves. Thus, the prince*
who had always lived in a warm climate, naturally concluded in
the way of analogy, that there was no such thing as water's becoming hard, because he had always observed it to be fluid and
yielding. We, on the contrary, from analogy conclude, that there
is no presumption at all against this: that it is supposable there
may be frost in England any given day in January next; probable that there will on some day of the month; and that there
is a moral certainty, i.e. ground for an expectation without any
doubt of it, in some part or other of the winter.
Probable evidence, in its very nature, affords but an imperfect
kind of information; and is to be considered as relative only to
beings of limited capacities. For nothing which is the possible
object of knowledge, whether past, present, or future, can be probable to an infinite intelligence; since it cannot but be discerned
absolutely as it is in itself, certainly true, or certainly false. But
to us, probability is the very guide of life.
From these things it follows, that in questions of difficulty, or
such as are thought so, where more satisfactory evidence cannot
be had, or is not seen; if-the result of examination be, that there
appears upon the whole, any even the lowest presumption on one
side, and none on the other, or a greater presumption on one side,
though in the lowest degree greater; this determines the question, even in matters of speculation.  In matters of practice, it
will lay us under an absolute and formal obligation, in point of
prudence and of interest, to act upon that presumption or low
probability, though it be so low as to leave the mind in very great
* The story is told by Mr. Locke in the Chapter of Probability.




BY fHE AUTHOR.                       69
doubt which is the trutl-. For surely a man is as really bound
in prudence to do what upon the whole, according to the best of
his judgment, appears to be for his happiness,b as what he certainly knows to be so.
Further, in questions of great consequence, a reasonable man
will think it concerns him to remark lower probabilities and presumptions than these; such as amount to no more than showing
one side of a question to be as supposable and credible as the
other: nay, such even as but amount to much less than this.
For numberless instances might be mentioned respecting the common pursuits of life, where a man would be thought, in a literal
sense, distracted, who would not act, and with great application
too, not only upon an even chance, but upon much less, and
where the probability or chance was greatly against his succeeding.*
It is not my design to inquire further into the nature, the
foundation, and measure of probability; or whence it proceeds
that likeness should beget that presumption, opinion, and full
conviction, which the human mind is formed to receive from it,
and which it does necessarily produce in every one; or to guard
against the errors, to which reasoning from   analogy is liable.
This belongs to the subject of Logic; and is a part of that subject which has not yet been thoroughly considered.    Indeed I
shall not take upon me to say, how far the extent, compass, and
force, of analogical reasoning, can be reduced to general heads
and rules; and the whole be formed into a system. But though
so little in this way has been attempted by those who have treated
of our intellectual powers, and the exercise of them; this does
not hinder but that we may be, as we unquestionably are, assured,
that analogy is of weight, in various degrees, towards determining our judgment and our practice.    Nor does it in any wise
cease to be of weight in those cases, because persons, either given
to dispute, or who require things to be stated with greater exactb [This is good common sense, and men always act thus if prudent. But it
is not enough thus to act in the matter of salvation. "He that believeth not
shall be damned:" Mark xvi. 16. "He that believeth hath everlasting life:"
John iii. 36. "With the heart man believeth unto righteousness:" Rom. x. 10.
Belief is part of the sinner's duty in submitting himself to God; and not merely
a question of prudence.]
t See Part II. chap. vi.




70                    INTRODUCTION
ness than our faculties appear to admit of in practical matters,
may find other cases in which it is not easy to say, whether it be,
or be not, of any weight; or instances of seeming analogies,
which are really of none. It is enough to the present purpose to
observe, that this general way of arguing is evidently natural,
just, and conclusive.  For there is no man can make a question
but that the sun will rise to-morrow, and be seen, where it is seen
at all, in the figure of a circle, and not in that of a square.
Hence, namely from analogical reasoning, Origen* has with
singular sagacity observed, that "he who believes the Scripture
to have proceeded from him who is the Author of nature, may
well expect to find the same sort of difficulties in it, as are found
in the constitution of nature."  And in a like way of reflection
it may be added, that he who denies the Scripture to have been
from God upon account of these difficulties, may, for the very
same reason, deny the world to have been formed by him. On
the other hand, if there be an analogy or likeness between that
system of things and dispensation of Providence, which revelation informs us of, and that system of things and dispensation of
Providence, which experience together with reason informs us
of, i.e. the known course of nature; this is a presumption, that
they have both the same author and cause; at least so far as to
answer objections against the former's being from God, drawn
from any thing which is analogical or similar to what is in the
latter, which is acknowledged to be from him; for an Author of
nature is here supposed.
Forming our notions of the constitution and government of
the world upon reasoning, without foundation for the principles
which we assume, whether fiom the attributes of God, or any
thing else, is building a world upon hypothesis, like Des Cartes.
Forming our notions upon reasoning from principles which are
certain, but applied to cases to which we have no ground to
apply them, (like those who explain the structure of the human
body, and the nature of diseases and medicines, from mere mathematics,) is an error much akin to the former: since what is assumed in order to make the reasoning applicable, is Hypothesis.
But it must be allowed just, to join abstract reasonings with the
observation of facts, and argue from such facts as are known, t9
* Philocal. p. 23, Ed. Cant.




BY TIE AUTHOR.                     71
others that are like them; from that part of the divine government over intelligent creatures which comes under our view, to
that larger and more general government over them which is
beyond it; and from what is present, to collect what is likely,
credible, or not incredible, will be hereafter.
This method then of concluding and determining being practical, and what, if we will act at all, we cannot but act upon in the
common pursuits of life; being evidently conclusive, in various
degrees, proportionable to the degree and exactness of the whole
analogy or likeness; and having so great authority for its introduction into the subject of religion, even revealed religion; my
design is to apply it to that subject in general, both natural and
revealed: taking for proved, that there is an intelligent Author
of nature, and natural Governor of the world. For as there is no
presumption against this prior to the proof of it: so it has been
often proved with accumulated evidence; from this argument of
analogy and final causes; from abstract reasonings; from the
most ancient tradition and testimony; and from the general consent of mankind. Nor does it appear, so far as I can find, to be
denied by the generality of those who profess themselves dissatisfied with the evidence of religion.
As there are some, who, instead of thus attending to what is
]n fact the constitution of nature, form their notions of God's
government upon hypothesis: so there are others, who indulge
themselves in vain and idle speculations, how the world might
possibly have been framed otherwise than it is; and upon supposition that things might, in imagining that they should, have
been disposed and carried on after a better model, than what appears in the present disposition and conduct of them.c Suppose
now a person of such a turn of mind, to go on with his reveries,
till he had at length fixed upon some particular plan of nature,
as appearing to him the best.-One shall scarce be thought guilty
of detraction against human understanding, if one should say,
even beforehand, that the plan which this speculative person
would fix upon, though he were the wisest of the sons of men,
probably would not be the very best, even according to his own
r [Some of these speculations, carried to the full measure of absurdity and
impiety, may be found in Bayle's great "Historical and Critical Dictionary."
See as instances, the articles ORIGEN, MANICHIEUS, PAULICIANS.]




72                    INTRODUCTION
notions of best; whether he thought that to be so, which afforded
occasions and motives for the exercise of the greatest virtue, or
which was productive of the greatest happiness, or that these two
were necessarily connected, and run up into one and the same
plan.
It may not be amiss, once for all, to see what would be the
amount of these emendations and imaginary improvements upon
the system of nature, or how far they would mislead us. It
seems there could be no stopping, till we came to some such conclusions as these: that all creatures should at first be made as
perfect and as happy as they were capable of ever being: that
nothing, surely, of hazard or danger should be put upon them to
do; some indolent persons would perhaps think nothing at all:
or certainly, that effectual care should be taken, that they should,
whether necessarily or not, yet eventually and in fact, always do
what was right and most conducive to happiness; which would
be thought easy for infinite power to effect, either by not giving
them any principles which would endanger their going wrong, or
by laying the right motive of action in every instance before their
minds in so strong a manner, as would never fail of inducing
them to act conformably to it: and that the whole method of government by punishments should be rejected as absurd; as an
awkward roundabout method of carrying things on; nay, as contrary to a principal purpose, for which it would be supposed
creatures were made, namely, happiness.
Now, without considering what is to be said in particular to
the- several parts of this train of folly and extravagance, what has
been above intimated, is a full direct general answer to it; namely,
that we may see beforehand that we have not faculties for this
kind of speculation.  For though it be admitfed that, from the
first principles of our nature, we unavoidably judge or determine
some ends to be absolutely in themselves preferable to others, and
that the ends now mentioned, or if they run up into one, that
this one is absolutely the best; and consequently that we must
conclude the ultimate end designed, in the constitution of nature
and conduct of Providence, is the most virtue and happiness possible; yet we are far from being able to judge what particular
disposition of things would be most friendly and assistant to virtue; or what means might be absolutely necessary to produce the




BY THE AUTHOR.                     73
most happiness in a system of such extent as our own world may
be, taking in all that is past and to come, though we should suppose it detached from the whole things.  Indeed we are so far
from being able to judge of this, that we are not judges what
may be the necessary means of raising and conducting one per
son to the highest perfection and happiness of his nature. Nay,
even in the little affairs of the present life, we find men of different educations and ranks are not competent judges of the conduct of each other.  Our whole nature leads us to ascribe all
moral perfection to God, and to deny all imperfection of him.
And this will forever be a practical proof of his moral character,
to such as will consider what a practical proof is; because it is
the voice of God speaking in us. Hence we conclude, that virtue
must be the happiness, and vice the misery, of every creature;
and that regularity and order and right cannot but prevail finally
in a universe under his government. But we are in no sort
judges, what are the necessary means of accomplishing this end.
Let us then, instead of that idle and not very innocent employment of forming imaginary models of a world, and schemes
of governing it, turn our thoughts to what we experience to be
the conduct of nature with respect to intelligent creatures; which
may be resolved into general laws or rules of administration, in
the same way as many of the laws of nature respecting inanimate
matter may be collected from experiments.  Let us compare the
known constitution and course of things with what is said to be
the moral system of nature; the acknowledged dispensations of
Providence, or that government which we find ourselves under,
with what religion teaches us to believe and expect; and see
whether they are not analogous and of a piece. Upon such a
comparison it will, I think, be found that they are very much
so: that both may be traced up to the same general laws, and
resolved into the same principles of divine conduct.
The analogy here proposed to be considered is of pretty large
extent, and consists of several parts; in some more, in others less
exact.  In some few instances perhaps, it may amount to a real
practical proof; in others not so. Yet in these it is a confirma
tion of what is proved otherwise. It will undeniably show, what
too many need to have shown them, that the system of religion,
both natural and revealed, considered only as a system, and prior
7




74                    INTRODUCTION
to the proof of it, is not a subject of ridicule, unless that of aa.
ture be so too. And it will afford an answer to almost all objections against the system both of natural and revealed religion;
though not perhaps an answer in so great a degree, yet in a very
considerable degree an answer to the objections against the evidence of it: for objections against a proof, and objections against
what is said to be proved, the reader will observe are different
things.
The divine government of the world, implied in the notion of
religion in general and of Christianity, contains in it: that mankind is appointed to live in a future state;* that there every one
shall be rewarded or punished;t rewarded or punished respectively for all that behaviour here, which we comprehend under the
words, virtuous or vicious, morally good or evil:t that our pre.
sent life is a probation, a state of trial,~ and of discipline,ll for
that future one; notwithstanding the objections, which men may
fancy they have, from notions of necessity, against there being
any such moral plan as this at all;[ and whatever objections may
appear to lie against the wisdom and goodness of it, as it stands so
imperfectly made known to us at present:** that this world being
in a state of apostasy and wickedness, and consequently of ruin,
and the sense both of their condition and duty being greatly cor.
rupted amongst men, this gave occasion for an additional dispensa,
tion of Providence; of the utmost importance;'tt proved by mira.
cles;tt but containing in it many things appearing to us strange,
and not to have been expected;~~ a dispensation of Providence,
which is a scheme or system of things;ll11 carried on by the mediation of a divine person, the Messiah, in order to the recovery of
the world;T[ yet not revealed to all men, nor proved with the
strongest possible evidence to all those to whom it is revealed;
but only to such a part of mankind, and with such particular
evidence, as the wisdom of God thought fit.***
The design then of the following treatise will be to show, that
the several parts principally objected against in this moral ald
Christian dispensation, including its scheme, its publication, and
tne proof which God has afforded us of its truth; that the pas* Ch. i.  t Ch. ii.  t Ch. iii.  C Ch. iv.  |I Ch. v.  ~ Ch. vi.
** Ch. vii. tt Part II. Ch. i.:C Ch. ii.  Ch. iii. i.   Ch. iv.
~~ Ch. v            Cb" Ch. vi. vii.




BY THE AUTHOR.                    75
ticular parts principally objected against in this whole dispensation, are analogous to what is experienced in the constitution and
course of nature or Providence; that the chief objections themselves which are alleged against the former, are no other than
what may be alleged with like justness against the latter, where
they are found in fact to be inconclusive; and that this argument from analogy is in general unanswerable, and undoubtedly
of weight on the side of religion,* notwithstanding the objections
which may seem to lie against it, and the real ground which there
may be for difference of opinion, as to the particular degree of
weight which is to be laid upon it. This is a general account of
what may be looked for in the following treatise. I shall begin
it with that which is the foundation of all our hopes and of all
our fears; all our hopes and fears, which are of any consideration; I mean a future life.
*Ch. iii.








THE
ANALOGY OF RELIGION.
PART I.
Natuarl 4igialn.
CHAPTER I
A FUTURE LIFE.*
STRANGE difficulties have been raised by some concerning pet
sonal identity, or the sameness of living agents, implied in the
notion of our existing now and hereafter, or in any two succes
a [This chapter Dr. Chalmers regards as the least satisfactory in the book:
not because lacking in just analogies, but because infected with the obscure
metaphysics of that age. His reasoning, however, only serves to show that B.
has perhaps made too much of the argument from the indivisibility of consoiousness; and by no means that he does not fairly use it.
We certainly cannot object that the subject of identity is not made plain.
Who has explained identity, or motion, or cohesion, or crystallization, or any
thing? Locke goes squarely at the subject of personal identity, (see Essay,
ch. 27,) but has rendered us small aid. His definition is, "Existence itself,
which determines a being of any sort, to a particular time and place, incommunicable to two beings of the same kind." I had rather define it "the uninterrupted continuance of being."  What ceases to exist, cannot again exist:
for then it would exist after it had ceased to exist, and would hare existed before it existed. Locke makes consciousness to constitute identity, and argues
that a man and a person are not the same; and that hence if I kill a man, but
was not conscious of what I did, or have utterly forgotten, I am not the same
person. Watts shows up this notion of Locke very ludicrously.
Butler, in his "Dissertation," urges that consciousness presup8oses identity,
as knowledge presupposes truth. On Locke's theory, no person would have
existed any earlier than the period to which his memory extends. We cannot
suppose the soul made up of many consciousnesses, nor could memory, if ma.
ierial, spread itself over successive years of life.]
7*                        77




7'8                  A FUTURE LIFE.                  PART I.
sive mvments; which, whoever thinks it worth while, may see
considered in the first dissertation at the end of this treatise.
But without regard to any of them here, let us consider what the
analogy of nature, and the several changes which we have undergone, and those which we know we may undergo without being
destroyed, suggest, as to the effect which death may, or may not,
have upon us; and whether it be not from thence probable, that
we may survive this change, and exist in a future state of life
and perception.
I. From our being born into the present world in the helpless
imperfect state of infancy, and having arrived from thence to
mature age, we find it to be a general law of nature in our own
species, that the same creatures, the same individuals, should
exist in degrees of life and perception, with capacities of action,
of enjoyment and suffering, in one period of their bingng, greatly
different from those appointed them in another period of it. In
other creatures the same law holds.  For the difference of their
capacities and states of life at their birth (to go no higher) and
in maturity; the change of worms into flies, and the vast enlargement of their locomotive powers by such change: and birds and
insects bursting the shell of their habitation, and by this means
entering into a new world, furnished with new accommodations
for them, and finding a new sphere of action assigned them;
these are instances of this general law of nature. Thus all the
various and wonderful transformations of animals are to be taken
into consideration here. The states of life in which we ourselves
existed formerly, in the womb and in our infancy, are almost as
different from our present in mature age, as it is possible to conceive any two states or degrees of life can be. Therefore that we
are to exist hereafter, in a state as different (suppose) from our
present, as this is from our former, is but according to the analogy
of nature; according to a natural order or appointment of the very
same kind, with what we have already experienced.
II. We know we are endued with capacities of action, of happiness and misery: for we are conscious of acting, of enjoying
pleasure and suffering pain. Now that we have these powers and
capacities before death, is a presumption that we shall retain
them through and after death; indeed a probability of it abundantly sufficient to act upon, unless there be some positive reason




CHAP T.                  A FUTURE LIFE.                          7P
to think that death is the destruction of those living powers   because there is in every case a probability, that all things will continue as we experience they are, in all respects, except those in
which we have some reason to think they will be altered. This
is that kind* of presumption or probability from       analogy, expressed in the very word continuance, which seems our only natural reason for believing the course of the world will continue
to-morrow, as it has done so far as our experience or knowledge
of history can carry us back. Nay, it seems our only reason for
believing, that any one substance now existing will continue to
exist a moment longer; the self-existent substance only excepted.
Thus if men were assured that the unknown event, death, was
not the destruction of our faculties of perception and of action,
there would be no apprehension that any other power or event,
unconnected with this of death, would destroy these faculties just
at the instant of each creature's death; and therefore no doubt
but that they would remain after it; which shows the high probability that our living powers will continue after death, unless
there be some ground to think that death is their destruction.t
For, if it would be in a manner certain that we should survive
death,b provided    it were certain   that death    would   not be
our destruction, it must be highly probable we shall survive
* I say kind of presumption or probability; for I do not mean to affirm that
there is the same degree of conviction, that our living powers will continue after
death, as there is, that our substances will.
t Destruction of living powcers, is a manner of expression unavoidably ambiguous; and may signify either the destruction of a living being, so as that the same
living being shall be incapable of ever perceiving or acting again at all; or the
destruction of those means and instruments by which it is capable of its present
life, of its present state of perception and of action. It is here used in the
former sense. When it is used in the latter, the epithet present is added. The
loss of a man's eye is a destruction of living powers in the latter sense. But
we have no reason to think the destruction of living powers, in the former
sense, to be possible. We have no more reason to think a being endued with
living powers, ever loses them during its whole existence, than to believe that
a stone ever acquires them.
b [The next paragraph indicates that Butler does not, as Chalmers thinks,
consider this argument as "handing us over to an absolute demonstration." It
just places all arguments for and against the soul's future life, in that balanced
condition, which leaves us to learn the fact from revelation, free from presumptions against its truth. This view of the case entirely relieves the objection as
to the future life of brutes; and shows how entirely we must rely on revelation, as to the future, both of man and beast.]




80                    A FUTURE LIFE.                 PART I.
it, if there be no ground to think death will be our destruction.
Though I think it must be acknowledged, that prior to the
natural and moral proofs of a future life commonly insisted upon,
there would arise a general confused suspicion, that in the great
shock and alteration which we shall undergo by death, we, i.e.
our living powers, might be wholly destroyed; yet even prior to
those proofs, there is really no particular distinct ground or reason
for this apprehension at all, so far as I can find.  If there be, it
must arise either from the reason of the thiny, or from the analogy
of nature.
But we cannot argue from the reason of the thing, that death
is the destruction of living agents, because we know not at all
what death is in itself; but only some of its effects, such as the
dissolution of flesh, skin, and bones.  These effects do in no wise
appear to imply the destruction of a living agent. Besides, as
we are greatly in the dark, upon what the exercise of our living
powers depends, so we are wholly ignorant what the powers themselves depend upon; the powers themselves as distinguished, not
only from their actual exercise, but also from the present capacity of exercising them; and as opposed to their destruction: for
sleep, or certainly a swoon, shows us, not only that these powers
exist when they are not exercised, as the passive power of motion
does in inanimate matter; but shows also that they exist, when
there is no present capacity of exercising them: or that the capacities of exercising them for the present, as well as the actual
exercise of them, may be suspended, and yet the powers themselves remain undestroyed.  Since then we know not at all upon
what the existence of our living powers depends, this shows further, there can no probability be collected from the reason of the
thing, that death will be their destruction: because their existence may depend upon somewhat in no degree affected by death;
upon somewhat quite out of the reach of this king of terrors.
So that there is nothing more certain, than that the reason of the
thinw shows us no connection between death and the destruction
of living agents.
Nor can we find any thing throughout the whole analogy3 of
nature to afford us even the slightest presumption, that animals
ever lose their living powers; much less if it were possible, that




CHAP I.                A FUTURE LIFE.                      ]8
they lose them by death: for we have no faculties wherewith to
trace any beyond or through it, so as to see what becomes of
them.   This event removes them from    our view.   It destroys
the sensible proof, which we had before their death, of their being
possessed of living powers, but does not appear to afford the least
reason to believe that they are, then, or by that event, deprived
of them.
Our knowing that they were possessed of these powers, up to
the very period to which we have faculties capable of tracing
them, is itself a probability of their retaining them beyond it.
This is confirmed, and a sensible credibility is given to it, by observing the very great and astonishing changes which we have
experienced; so great, that our existence in another state of life,
of perception and of action, will be but accordingto a method of
providential conduct, the like to which has been already exercised even with regard to ourselves; according to a course of
nature, the like to which we have already gone through.
HoweTer, as one cannot but be greatly sensible, how difficult
it is to silence imagination enough to make the voice of reason
even distinctly heard in this case; as we are accustomed, from
our youth up, to indulge that forward, delusive faculty, ever obtruding beyond its sphere; (of some assistance indeed to apprehension, but the author of all error,) as we plainly lose ourselves
in gross and crude conceptions of things, taking for granted that
we are acquainted with what indeed we are wholly ignorant of:
it may be proper to consider the imaginary presumptions, that
death will be our destruction, arising from these kinds of early
and lasting prejudices; and to show how little they really amount
to, even though we cannot wholly divest ourselves of them.
And,
I. All presumption of death's being the destruction of living
beings, must go upon supposition that they are compounded f and
c [Dodwell had published a book, in which he argues that human souls are
not naturally immortal, but become so, by the power of the Holy Ghost, in regeneration. Dr. Clarke replied. The controversy was continued by Collins.
Dr. C. wrote four tracts on the subject.
These "presumptions" form the base of materialism, and hence the denial
of a future state. Surely, thoughts and feelings, if material, have extension.
But can any one conceive of love a foot long, or anger an inch thick? How
superior to the gloomy mists of modern infidels have even pagans been! Cicero
F




82                     A FUTURE LIFE.                   PART I.
so, diserltible.  But since consciousness is a single and indivisible power, it should seem that the subject in which it resides
must be so too.  For were the motion of any particle of matter
absolutely one and indivisible, so as that it should imply a contradiction to suppose part of this motion to exist, and part not
to exist, i.e. part of this matter to move, and part to be at rest,
then its power of motion would be indivisible; and so also would
the subject in which the power inheres, namely, the particle of
matter: for if this could be divided into two, one part might
be moved and the other at rest, which is contrary to the supposition.
In like manner it has been argued,* and, for any thing appearing to the contrary, justly, that since the perception or consciousness, which we have of our own existence, is indivisible, so
as that it is a contradiction to suppose one part of it should be
here and the other there; the perceptive power, or the power of
consciousness, is indivisible too: and consequently the subject in
which it resides, i.e. the conscious being. Now, upon supposition that the living agent each man calls himself, is thus a single
being, which there is at least no more difficulty in conceiving
than in conceiving it to be a compound, and of which there is the
proof now mentioned; it follows, that our organized bodies are no
more ourselves or part of ourselves, than any other matter around
us. And it is as easy to conceive, how matter, which is no part
of ourselves, may be appropriated to us in the manner which our
present bodies are; as how we can receive impressions from, and
have power over, any matter. It is as easy to conceive, that we may
exist out of bodies, as in them; and that we might have animated
bodies of any other organs and senses wholly different from these
now given us; and that we may hereafter animate these same or
new bodies, variously modified and organized; as to conceive how
makes Cato say, "The soul is a simple, uncompounded substance, without parts
or mixture: it cannot be divided, and so cannot perish." And in another place,
"I never could believe that the soul lost its senses by escaping from senseless
matter; or that such a release will not enlarge and improve its powers;" and
again, "I am persuaded that I shall only begin truly to live, when I cease to
live in this world." Xenophon reports Cyrus as saying, in his last moments,
"f 0 my sons! do not imagine that when death has takec me from you, I shal]
cease to exist."]
* See Dr. Clarke's Letter to Mr. Dodwell, and the defenceF of it.




CHAP I.                A FUTURE LIFE.                       88
we can animate such bodies as our present. And lastly, the dissolution of all these several organized bodies, supposing cnrseives
to have successively animated them, would have no more conceivable tendency to destroy the living beings ourselves, or deprive us of living faculties, the faculties of perception and of
action, than the dissolution of any foreign matter, which we are
capable of receiving impressions from, and making use of, for the
common occasions of life.
II. The simplicity and absolute oneness of a living agent cannot, from the nature of the thing, be properly proved by experimental observations. But as these fall in with the supposition
of its unity, so they plainly lead us to conclude certainly, that our
gross organized bodies, with which we perceive objects of sense,
and with which we act, are no part of ourselves; and therefore
show us, that we have no reason to believe their destruction to be
ours: even without determining whether our living substance be
material or immaterial. For we see by experience, that men may
lose their limbs, their organs of sense, and even the greatest part
of these bodies, and yet remain the same living agents. Persons
can trace up the existence of themselves to a time, when the bulk
of their bodies was extremely small, in comparison of what it is
in mature age: and we cannot but think, that they might then
have lost a considerable part of that small body, and yet have remained the same living agents; as they may now lose great part
of their present body, and remain so. And it is certain, that the
bodies of all animals are in a constant flux,d from  that neverceasing attrition, which there is in every part of them. Now,
things of this kind unavoidably teach us to distinguish, between
these living agents ourselves, and large quantities of matter, in
which we are very nearly interested; since these may be alienated, and actually are in a daily course of succession, and changing
their owners; whilst we are assured, that each living agent red [As every particle of our bodies is changed within seven years, an average life would take us through many such changes. If the mind changes
with the body, it would be unjust for an old man to be made to suffer for the
sins of his youth. To escape this, the materialist is driven to affirm that the
whole is not altered, though every particle be changed.
This argument from the constant flux is irresistible. It proves our identity,
and that matter and mind are not the same. Does it not also destroy ALt pro.
sumption that the Ego cannot exist without this particular body?]




-84                   A FUTURE LIFE.                 PART I.
mains one and the same permanent being.*   And this general
observation leads us on to the following ones.
First, That we have no way of determining by experience,
what is the certain bulk of the living being each man calls him.
self: and yet, till it be determined that it is larger in bulk than
the solid elementary particles of matter, which there is no ground
to think any natural power can dissolve, there is no sort of reason
to think death to be the dissolution of it, of the living being,
even though it should not be absolutely indiscerptible.
Secondlly, From our being so nearly related to and interested
in certain systems of matter, (suppose our flesh and bones,) and
afterwards ceasing to be at all related to them, the living agents
ourselves, remaining all this while undestroyed notwithstanding
such alienation; and consequently these systems of matter not
being ourselves, it follows further that we have no ground t(
conclude any other (suppose internal) systems of matter, to be
the living agents ourselves; because we can have no ground to
conclude this, but from our relation to and interest in such other
systems of matter: and therefore we can have no reason to conclude what befalls those systems of matter at death, to be the
destruction of the living agents. We have already several times
over, lost a great part or perhaps the whole of our body, according to certain common established laws of nature, yet we remain
the same living agents. When we shall lose as great a part, or the
whole, by another common established law of nature, death, why
may we not also remain the same? That the alienation has been
gradual in one case, and in the other will be more at once, does
not prove any thing to the contrary. We have passed undestroyed
through those many and great revolutions of matter, so peculiarly
appropriated to us ourselves; why should we imagine death will
be so fatal to us?  Nor can it be objected, that what is tlus
alienated or lost, is no part of our original solid body, but only
adventitious matter. Because we may lose entire limbs, which
must have contained many solid parts and vessels of the original
body; or if this be not admitted, we have no proof, that any of
these solid parts are dissolved or alienated by death.  Though we
are very nearly related to that extraneous or adventitious matter,
whilst it continues united to and distending the several parts t.f
* See Dissertation I.




CHAP. I.               A FUTURE LIFE.
our solid body, yet after all, the relation a person beanr to those
parts of his body, to which he is most nearly related, amounts but
to this, that the living agent, and those parts of the body, mutually affeet each other.e  The same thing, the same thing in kind
though not in degree, may be said of all foreign matter, which
gives us ideas, and over which we have any power.  From these
observations the whole ground of the imagination is removed,
that the dissolution of any matter, is the destruction of a living
agent, from the interest he once had in such matter.
Thirdly, If we consider our body somewhat more distinctly,
as made up of organs and instruments of perception and of motion, it will bring us to the same conclusion.  Thus the common
optical experiments show, and even the observation how sight is
assisted by glasses shows, that we see with our eyes in the same
sense as we see with glasses.  Nor is there any reason to believe,
that we see with them in any other sense; any other, I mean,
which would lead us to think the eye itself a percipient. The like
is to be said of hearing; and our feeling distant solid matter by
means of something in our hand, seems an instance of the like
kind, as to the subject we are considering.  All these are instances of foreign matter, or such as is no part of our body,
being instrumental in preparing objects for, and conveying them
to, the perceiving power, in a manner similar to the manner in
which our organs of sense prepare and convey them. Both are
in a like way instruments of our receiving such ideas from external objects, as the Author of nature appointed those external
objects to be the occasions of exciting in us. Glasses are evident
instances of this; namely of matter which is no part of our
body, preparing objects for and conveying them towards the perceiving power, in like manner as our bodily organs do.  And if
we see with our eyes only in the same manner as we do with
glasses, the like may justly be concluded, fiom analogy, of all
our other senses.  It is not intended, by any thing here said, to
aiffrm, that the whole apparatus of vision, or of perception by
e [The mind affects the body, as much as the body does the mind. Love,
anger, &c. quicken the circulation; fear checks it; terror may stop it altogether. Mlania is as often produced by moral, as by physical causes, and
hence of late moral means are resorted to for cure. The brain of a maniac,
seldom shows, on dissection, any derangement. But this does not prove thai
Uiere was no functional derangement.]
8




86                    A FUTURE LIFE.                 PART a.
any other sense, can be traced through all its steps, quite up to
the living power of seeing, or perceiving: but that so far as it
can be traced by experimental observations, so far it appears, that
our organs of sense prepare and convey objects, in order to their
being perceived, in like manner as foreign matter does, without
affording any shadow of appearance, that they themselves perceive. And that we have no reason to think our organs of sense
percipients, is confirmed by instances of persons losing some of
them, the living beings themselves, their former occupiers, remaining unimpaired. It is confirmed also by the experience of
dreams; by which we find we are at present possessed of a latent,
and what would be otherwise an unimagined unknown power of
perceiving sensible objects, in as strong and lively a manner without our external organs of sense, as with them.
So also with regard to our power of moving, or directing
motion by will and choice; upon the destruction of a limb, this
active power evidently remains, unlessened; so that the living
being, who has suffered this loss, would be capable of moving as
before, if it had another limb to move with. It can walk by the
help of an artificial leg. It can make use of a pole or a lever,
to reach towards itself and to move things, beyond the length
and the power of its arm; and this it does in the same manner
as it reaches and moves, with its natural arm, things nearer and
of less weight. Nor is there so much as any appearance of our
limbs being endued with a power of moving or directing themselves; though they are adapted, like the several parts of a
machine, to be the instruments of motion to each other; and
some parts of the same limb, to be instruments of motion to the
other parts.
Thus a man determines that he will look at an object through
a microscope; or being lame, that he will walk to such a
place with a staff, a week hence.  His eyes and his feet no
more determine in these cases, than the microscope and the staff.
Nor is there any ground to think they any more put the determination in practice; or that his eyes are the seers, or his feet the
movers, in any other sense than as the microscope and tlie staff
are. Upon the whole, then, our organs of sense, and our limbs,
are certainly instruments,' which the living persons ourselves
["S. What shall we say, then, of the shoemaker? That he cuts with I i




GBAP. I.                 A FUTURE LIFE.                          87
make use of to perceive and move with: there is not any probability, that they are any more; nor consequently, that we have
any other kind of relation to them, than what we have to any
other foreign matter formed into instruments of perception ana
motion, suppose into a microscope or a staff; (I say any other kind
of relation, for I am not speaking of the degree of it) nor consequently is there any probability, that the alienation or dissolution of these instruments, is the destruction of the perceiving
and moving agent.
And thus our finding that the dissolution of matter, in which
living beings were most nearly interested, is not their dissolution;
and that the destruction of several of the organs and instruments
of perception and of motion belonging to them, is not their
destruction; shows demonstratively, that there is no ground to
think that the dissolution of any other matter, or destruction of
any other organs and instruments, will be the dissolution or
destruction of living agents, from the like kind of relation. And
we have no reason to think we stand in any other kind of relation
to any thing which we find dissolved by death.
But it is said, these observations are equally applicable to
brutes: and it is thought an insuperable difficulty, that they
instrument only, or with his hands also? A. With his hands also. S. Does
he use his eyes also, in making shoes? A. Yes. S. But are we agreed that he
who uses, and what he uses, are different? A. Yes. S. The shoemaker, then,
and harper, are different from the hands and eyes they use? A. It appears so.
S. Does a man then use his whole body? A. Certainly. S. But he who uses,
and that which he uses are different. A. Yes. S. A man then is something
different from his own body." PLAT. ALCIBI. PRIM. p. 129, D. Stallb. Ed.
"( It may easily be perceived that the mind both sees and hears, and not those
parts which are, so to speak, windows of the mind." " Neither are we bodies;
nor do I, while speaking this to thee, speak to thy body." " Whatever is done
by thy mind, is done by thee." CICERO, Tusc. Disput. I. 20, 46 and 22, 52.
" The mind of each man is the man; not that figure which may be pointed
out with the finger." Cic., de Rep. b. 6, s. 24.]
g [Butler's argument, if advanced for proof would prove too much, not only
as to brutes but as to man; for it would prove preexistence. And this is really
the tenet, (i.e. transmigration,) of those who arrive at the doctrine of immortality only by philosophy. Philosophy cannot establish the doctrine of a
fature state, nor can it afford any presumptions against either a future or a
preexistent state.
Nothing is gained by insisting that reason teaches the true doctrine of the
soul; any more than there would be by insisting that by it we learned the
ooctrine of a trinity, or atonement. Philosophy does teach that He who can




83                      A FUTURE LIFE.                    PART L
should be immortal, and by consequence capalle of everlasting
happiness. Now this manner of expression is both invidious and
weak: but the thing intended by it, is really no difficulty at all.
either in the way of natural or moral consideration. For 1, Suppose the invidious thing, designed in such a manner of expression, were really implied, as it is not in the least, in the natural
immortality of brutes, namely, that they must arrive at great
attainments, and become rational and moral agents; even this
would be no difficulty, since we know not what latent powers and
capacities they may be endued with. There was once, prior to
experience, as great presumption against human creatures, as
there is against the brute creatures, arriving at that degree of
understanding, which we have in mature age.    For we can trace
up our own existence to the same original with theirs.  We find
it to be a general law of nature, that creatures endued with
capacities of virtue and religion should be placed in a condition
of being, in which they are altogether without the use of them,
for a considerable length of their duration; as in infancy and
childhood.  And great part of the human species go out of the
present world, before they come to the exercise of these capacities
in any degree.
2. The natural immortality of brutes does not in the least
imply, that they are endued with any latent capacities of a
rational or moral nature. The economy of the universe might require, that there should be living creatures without any capacities
of this kind.  And all difficulties as to the manner how they are
to be disposed of, are so apparently and wholly founded in our
ignorance, that it is wonderful they should be insisted upon by
any, but such as are weak enough to think they are acquainted
with the whole system    of things.   There is then absolutely
create, under infinite diversity of forms, can sustain existence, in any mode he
pleases.
The reader who chooses to look further into the discussion as to the immortality of brutes, will find it spread out in POLIGNAC'S Anti-Lucretius, and still
more in BAYLE'S Dicticnary, under the articles PEREIRA, and RORARIUS.
The topic is also discussed in DES CARTES on the Passions: BAXTER on The
Nature of the Soul: HurE's Essays, Essay 9: SEARCH'S Light of Nature:
CsEYNE'sPhilosophical Principles: WAGSTAFF on the Immortality of Brutes
EDWARDS' Critical and Philosophical Exercitations: WATT'S Essays, Essay 9 
COLLJBER'S Enquiry: LOCKE on the Understanding, b. 2, ch. ix. - DITTON on
Whe Resurrection: WILLIS De Anima Brutae.]




,HAP..                 A FUTURE LIFE.                         89
nothing at al' in this objection, which is so rhetorically urged,
against the greatest part of the natural proofs or presumptions of
the immortality of human minds; I say the greatest part, for it
is less applicable to the following observation, which is more
peculiar to mankind.
III. As it is evident our present powers and capacities of
reason, memory, and affection, do not depend upon our gross
body in the manner in which perception by our organs of sense
does; so they do not appear to depend upon it at all, in any such
manner as to give ground to think, that the dissolution of this
body will be the destruction of these our present powers of reflection, as it will of our powers of sensation; or to give ground
to conclude, even that it will be so much as a suspension of the
former.
Human creatures exist at present in two states of life and perception, greatly different from each other; each of which has its
own peculiar laws, and its own peculiar enjoyments and sufferings. When any of our senses are affected, or appetites gratified
with the objects of them, we may be said to exist or live in a
state of sensation.  When none of our senses are affected or
appetites gratified, and yet we perceive, and reason, and act, we
may be said to exist or live in a state of reflection.   Now it is
by no means certain, that any thing which is dissolved by death,
is in any way necessary to the living being, in this its state of
reflection, after ideas are gained.  For, though, from our present
constitution and condition of being, our external organs of sense
are necessary for conveying in ideas to our reflecting powers, as
carriages, and levers, and scaffolds are in architecture:h yet when
these ideas are brought in, we are capable of reflecting in the
most intense degree, and of enjoying the greatest pleasure, and
feeling the greatest pain, by means of that reflection, without
h [It is as absurd to suppose that a brain thinks, as that an eye sees, or a finger
feels. The eye no more sees, than the telescope or spectacles. If the nerve be
paralyzed, there is no vision, though the eye be perfect. A few words spoken
or read, may at once deprive of sight, or knock a person down.
The mind sometimes survives the body. Swift, utterly helpless from palsy,
retained his faculties. In some, the body survives the mind. MORGAGNI,
UHA:LER, B1ONNET, and othors, have proved that there is no part of the brain,
dot even the pineal gland, which has not been found destroyed by disease,
wheie there had been no hallucination of mind, nor any suspicion of such
disease, during life.]
8-*




90                    A FUTURE LIFE.                  PART i
any assistance from our senses; and without any at all, which we
know of, from that body which will be dissolved by death. It
does not appear then, that the relation of this gross body to the
reflecting being is, in any degree, necessary to thinking; to intellectual enjoyments or sufferings: nor, consequently, that the
dissolution or alienation of the former by death, will be the
destruction of those present powers, which render us capable of
this state of reflection.
Further, there are instances of mortal diseases, which do not
at all affect our present intellectual powers; and this affords a
presumption, that those diseases will not destroy these presept
powers. Indeed, from the observations made above,* it appears,
that there is no presumption, from their mutually affecting each
other, that the dissolution of the body is the destruction of the
living agent. By the same reasoning, it must appear too, that
there is no presumption, from their mutually affecting each other,
that the dissolution of the body is the destruction of our present
reflecting powers: indeed instances of their not affecting each
other, afford a presumption of the contrary. Instances of mortal
diseases not impairing our present reflecting powers, evidently
turn our thoughts even from imagining such diseases to be the
destruction of them. Several things indeed greatly affect all our
living powers, and at length suspend the exercise of them; as
for instance drowsiness, increasing till it ends in sound sleep:
and hence we might have imagined it would destroy them, till
we found by experience the weakness of this way of judging.
But in the diseases now mentioned, there is not so much as this
shadow of probability, to lead us to any such conclusion, as to
the reflecting powers which we have at present. For in those
diseases, persons the moment before death appear to be in the
highest vigor of life.  They discover apprehension, memory,
reason, all entire; the utmost force of affection; a sense of character, of shame and honor; and the highest mental enjoyments
and sufferings, even to the last gasp.  These surely prove even
greater vigor of life than bodily strength does. Now what pretence is there for thinking, that a progressive disease when
arrived to such a degree, I mean that degree which is mortal,
will destroy those powers, which were not impaired, which wroe
* Pp. 84, 85.




CHAP. 1.                A FUTURE LIFE.                         91
not affected by it, during its whole progress quite up to that
degree? And if death by diseases of this kind, is not the
destruction of our present reflecting powers, it will scarce be
thought that death by any other means is.
It is obvious that this general observation may be carried
further. There appears to be so little connection between our
bodily powers of sensation, and our present powers of reflection,
that there is no reason to conclude, that death, which destroys
the former, does so much as suspend the exercise of the latter, or
interrupt our continuing to exist in the like state of reflection
which we do now.1    For suspension of reason, memory, and the
affections which they excite, is no part of the idea of death, nor
implied in our notion of it. Our daily experiencing these powers
to be exercised, without any assistance, that we know of, from
those bodies which will be dissolved by death; and our finding
often, that the exercise of them is so lively to the last; afford a
sensible apprehension, that death may not perhaps be so much as
a discontinuance of the exercise of these powers, nor of the
enjoyments and sufferings which it implies.* So that our posthumous life, whatever there may be in it additional to our present,
may yet not be beginning entirely anew; but going on. Death
may, in some sort and in some respects, answer to our birth;
which is not a suspension of the faculties which we had before
it, or a total change of the state of life in which we existed when
in the womb; but a continuation of both, with such and such
great alterations.
Nay, for aught we know of ourselves, of our present life and
of death, death may immediately, in the natural course of
i [We are told by sceptics that "mind is the result of a curious and complicated organization." A mere jumble of words! But were the mind material,
there is no evidence that death would destroy it: for we do not see that death
has any power over matter. The body remains the very same as it does in a
swoon, till chemical changes begin.]
* There are three distinct questions, relating to a future life, here considered:
Whether death be the destruction of living agents; if not, Whether it be the
destruction of their present powers of reflection, as it certainly is the destruction of their present powers of sensation; and if not, Whether it be the suspension, or discontinuance of the exercise of these present reflecting powers.
Now. if there be no reason to believe the last, there will be, if that were
possible, Jtss for tne next, and less still for the first.




92                       A FUTURE LIFE.                      PART I.
things, put us into a higher and more enlarged state of life, as
our birth does;* a state in which our capacities, and sphere of
perception and of action, may be much greater than at present.
For as our relation to our external organs of sense, renders us
capable of existing in our present state of sensation; so it may
be the only natural hinderance to our existing, immediately, and
of course, in a higher state of reflection.   The truth is, reason
does not at all show us, in what state death naturally leaves us.
But were we sure, that it would suspend all our' perceptive and
active powers; yet the suspension of a power and the destruction
of it, are effects so totally different in kind, as we experience
from  sleep and a swoon, that we cannot in any wise argue from
one to the other; or conclude even to the lowest degree of probability, that the same kind of force which is sufficient to suspend our faculties, though it be increased ever so much, will be
sufficient to destroy them.'
These observations together may be sufficient to show, how
little presumption there is, that death is the destruction of
human creatures.     However, there is the shadow of an analogy,
which may lead us to imagine it,-viz.: the supposed likeness
which is observed between the decay of vegetables, and of living
creatures.   This likeness is indeed sufficient to afford the poets
very apt allusions to the flowers of the field, in their pictures of
the frailty of our present life.  But in reason, the analogy is so
far from  holding, that there appears no ground for the comparison, as to the present question; because one of the two subjects compared is wholly void of that, which is the principal and
chief thing in the other, the power of perception and of action;
which is the only thing we are inquiring about the continue; This, according to Strabo, was the opinion of the Brachmans, VOsiEtnv piv
yap 6r TrOV /uv EvOdces iov, wS a dKU7t KVvoIpVw C elvat' rov y  S varov, y7veaIv Eis ropv vrTw
fl(ov, Kai rTOV evaipova rotgs t)Xoao(b-aa,'   Lib. xv. p. 1039, Ed. Amst. 1707. [" For
they think that the present life is like that of those who are just ready to be
born; and that death is a birth into the real life, and a happy one to those
who have practised philosophy."] To which opinion perhaps Antoninus may
allude in these words, h0 uv 7repl1vEge, nrrte'upip ov CK TIrS yaarpog rir yvva7 K oo ao
5iVTO9, orcos KcXCEOOat, Tr ) c(JOr y a  TO a - divXptl av crot rovX rpOU Tro6rov 7TEOcrrrat. Lib.
ix. c. 3. [As this last passage may, by some, be thought indelicate, it is left
untranslated.]
i [The increase of a force in any direction, cannot of itself change that direction. An arrow shot from a bow, towards an object, does not aim at some
otheo hbject, by being shot with more force.]




CHAP. f.               A FUTURE LIFE.                        93
ance of.  So that the destruction of a vegetable, is an event not
similar or analogous to the destruction of a living agent.
If, as was above intimated, leaving off the delusive custom of
substituting imagination in the room  of experience, we would
confine ourselves to what we do know and understand; if we
would argue only from that, and from that form our expectations,
it would appear at first sight, that as no probability of living
beings ever ceasing to be so, can be concluded from the reason
of the thing, so none can be collected from the analogy of
nature; because we cannot trace an) living beings beyond death.
But as we are conscious that we are endued with capacities of
perception and of action, and are living persons; what we are to
go upon is, that we shall continue so, till we foresee some accident or event, which will endanger those capacitities, or be likely
to destroy us: which death does in no wise appear to be.
Thus, when we go out of this world, we may pass into new
scenes, and a new state of life and action, just as naturally as we
came into the present.   And this new state may naturally be a
social one.k  And the advantages of it, advantages of every kind,
may naturally be bestowed, according to some fixed general laws
of wisdom, upon every one in proportion to the degrees of his
virtue.  And though the advantages of that future natural state
should not be bestowed, as these of the present in some measure
are, by the will of the society; but entirely by his more immediate action, upon whom the whole frame of nature depends: yet
this distribution may be just as natural, as their being distributed
here by the instrumentality of men. Indeed, though one should
allow any confused undetermined sense, which people please to
put upon the word natural, it would be a shortness of thought
scarce credible, to imagine, that no system  or course of thin g
can be so, but only what we see at present:* especially whilst the
k [Our nature will alwoays be ours, or we should cease to be ourselves, and
become something else. And this nature is social. Every one feels, at least
sometimes, that he is not complete in himself for the production of happiness;
and so looks round for that which may fit his-wants, and supply what he cannot produce from within. Hence amusements, of a thousand kinds, are resorted to, and still more, society. Society is a want of the mind; as food is
of the body. Society, such as perfectly suits our real nature, and calls out, in
a right manner, its every attribute, would secure our perfect happiness. But
i'uch society must include God.]
x See Part II. chap. ii, and Part II. chap. iv.




94                    A FUTURE LIFE                   PARR l
probability of a future life, or the natural immortality of the
soul, is admitted upon the evidence of reason; because this is
really both admitting and denying at once, a state of being different from the present to be natural. But the only distinct meaning of that word is, stated, fixed, or settled; since what is natural
as much requires and presupposes an intelligent agent to render
it so, i.e. to effect it continually, or at stated times, as what is
supernatural or miraculous does to effect it for once.
Hence it must follow, that persons' notion of what is natural,
will be enlarged in proportion to their greater knowledge of the
works of God, and the dispensations of his providence. Nor is
there any absurdity in supposing, that there may be beings in the
universe, whose capacities, and knowledge, and views, may be so
extensive, as that the whole Christian dispensation may to them
appear natural, i.e. analogous or conformable to God's dealings
with other parts of his creation; as natural as the visible known
course of things appears to us. For there seems scarce any other
possible sense to be put upon the word, but that only in which it
is here used; similar, stated, or uniform.
This credibility of a future life, which has been here insisted
upon, how little soever it may satisfy our curiosity, seems to
answer all the purposes of religion, in like manner as a demonstrative proof would. Indeed a proof, even a demonstrative one, of
a future life, would not be a proof of religion. For, that we are
to live hereafter, is just as reconcilable with the scheme of
atheism, and as well to be accounted for by it, as that we are
now alive is: and therefore nothing can be more absurd than to
argue from that scheme, that there can be no future state.
But as religion implies a future state, any presumption against
such a state, is a presumption against religion.  The foregoing
observations remove all presumptions of that sort, and prove, to
a very considerable degree of probability, one fundamental doctrine of religion; which, if believed, would greatly open and
dispose the mind seriously to attend to the general evidence
of the whole.




CHAP. II.         GOVERNMENT OF GOD.                  95
CHAPTER II.
THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD BY REWARDS AND PUNISHMIENTS.
THAT which makes the question concerning a future life to be
of so great importance to us, is our capacity of happiness and
misery. And that which makes the consideration of it to be of
so great importance to us, is the supposition of our happiness and
misery hereafter depending upon our actions here.  Indeed,
without this, curiosity could not but sometimes bring a subject,
in which we may be so highly interested, to our thoughts; especially upon the mortality of others, or the near prospect of our
own. But reasonable men would not take any further thought
about hereafter, than what should happen thus occasionally to
rise in their minds, if it were certain that our future interest no
way depended upon our present behavior; whereas, on the contrary, if there be ground, either from analogy or any thing else,
to think it does, then there is reason also for the most active
thought and solicitude, to secure that interest; to behave so as
that we may escape that misery, and obtain that happiness, in
another life, which we not only suppose ourselves capable of, but
which we apprehend also is put in our own power. And whether
there be ground for this last apprehension, certainly would deserve
to be most seriously considered, were there no other proof of a
future life and interest, than that presumptive one, which the
foregoing observations amount to.
In the present state, all which we enjoy, and a great part of
what we suffer, is put in our own power. Pleasure and pain are
the consequences of our actions; and we are endued by the
Author of our nature with capacities of foreseeing these consequences. We find by experience that he does not so much as
preserve our lives, exclusive of our own care and attention, to
provide ourselves with, and to make use of, that sustenance, by
which he has appointed our lives shall be preserved; and without which, he has appointed, they shall not be preserved. In
general we foresee, that the external things, which are the objects
of our various passions, can neither be obtained nor enjoyed,
without exerting ourselves in such and such manners: but by




96                   GOVERNMENT OF GOD                   PART Ithus exerting ourselves, we obtain and enjoy these objects, in
which our natural good consists; or by this mean.s God gives uas
the possession and enjoyment of them. I know not, that we have
any one kind or degree of enjoyment, but by the means of our
own actions.  By prudence and care, we may, for the most part,
pass our days in tolerable ease and quiet: on the contrary, we
may, by rashness, ungoverned passion, wilfulness, or even by
negligence, make ourselves as miserable as ever we please. And
many do please to make themselves extremely miserable, i.e. to
do what they know beforehand will render them so. They follow
those ways, the fruit of which they know, by instruction, example, and experience, will be disgrace, and poverty, and sickness, and untimely death. This every one observes to be the general course of things; though it is to be allowed, we cannot find by
experience, that all our sufferings are owing to our own follies.
Why the Author of nature does not give his creatures promiscuously such and such perceptions, without regard to their
behavior; why he does not make them happy without the instrumentality of their own actions, and prevent their bringing any
sufferings upon themselves, is another matter.5 Perhaps there
may be some impossibilities in the nature of things, which we are
unacquainted with.*   Or less happiness, it may be, would upon
the whole be produced by such a method of conduct, than is by
the present. Or perhaps divine goodness, with which, if I mnistake not, we make very free in our speculations, may not be a
bare single disposition to produce happiness; but a disposition to
make the good, the faithful, the honest, happy.    Perhaps an
infinitely perfect mind may be pleased with seeing his creatures
behave suitably to the nature which he has given them; to the
relations which he has placed them in to each other; and to that
which they stand in to himself: that relation to himself, which,
during their existence, is even necessary,b and which is the most
a [Objections and difficulties belong to all subjects, in some of their bearings.
Ingenious and uncandid men may start others, which care and candor may
remove. It is therefore no proof of weakness in a doctrine, that it is attacked
with objections, both real and merely plausible. Error has been spread by two
opposite means:-a dogmatic insisting on doubtful points, and an unteachable
cavilling at certain truth.]
* Part I. chap. vii.. [Our relation to God is "even necessary," because we are his creatures: so




CHAP. ii.     BY REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS.                   97
important one of all: perhaps, I say, an infinitely perfect mind
may be pleased with this moral piety of moral agents, in and for
itself; as well as upon account of its being essentially conducive
to the happiness of his creation.  Or the whole end, for which
God made, and thus governs the world, may be utterly beyond
the reach of our faculties: there may be somewhat in it as impossible for us to have any conception of, as for a blind man to
have a conception of colors.   However this be, it is certain
matter of universal experience, that the general method of divine
administration is, forewarning us, or giving us capacities to foresee, with more or less clearness, that if we act so and so, we shall
have such enjoyments, if so and so, such sufferings; and giving
us those enjoyments, and making us feel those sufferings, in
consequence of our actions.
" But all this is to be ascribed to the general course of nature."
True. This is the very thing which I am observing. It is to be
ascribed to the general course of nature: i.e. not surely to the
words or ideas, course of nature; but to Him who appointed it,
and put things into it; or to a course of operation, from its
uniformity or constancy, called natural;* and which necessarily
implies an operating agent.    For when men find themselves
necessitated to confess an Author of nature, or that God is the
natural governor of the world, they must not deny this again,
because his government is uniform.   They must not deny that
he does things at all, because he does them constantly," because
the effects of his acting are permanent, whether his acting be so
or not; though there is no reason to think it is not.  In short,
every man, in every thing he does, naturally acts upon the forethought and apprehension of avoiding evil or obtaining good:
and if the natural course of things be the appointment of God,
and our natural faculties of knowledge and experience are given
that the relation must endure so long as we endure. But our relations to other
creatures are contingent, and may be changed or abrogated.]
* Pp. 93, 94.
c [" The terms nature, and power of nature, and course of nature, are but
enpty words, and merely mean that a thing occurs usually or frequently. The
raising of a human body out of the earth we call a miracle, the generation of
one in the ordinary way we call natural, for no other reason than because one
E usual the other unusual. Did men usually rise out of the earth like corn we
should call that natural." Dr. CLARKE, Controv. with Leibnitz.]
9




98                   GOVERNMIIENT OF GOD                   PART I.
us by him, then the good and bad conse;uences which follow our
actions, are his appointment, and our;oresiht of those consequences, is a warning given us by him, low we are to act.
" Is the pleasure then, naturally accompanying every particular
gratification of passion, intended to put us upon gratifying ourselves in every such particular instance, and as a reward to us for
so doing?"   No, certainly.  Nor is it to be said, that our eyes
were naturally intended to give us the sight of each particular
object, to which they do or can extend; objects which are destructive of them, or which, for any other reason, it may become
us to turn our eyes from. Yet there is no doubt, but that our
eyes were intended for us to see with.d  So neither is there any
doubt, but that the foreseen pleasures and pains belonging to the
passions, were intended, in general, to induce mankind to act in
such and such manners.
From this general observation, obvious to every one, (that God
has given us to understand, he has appointed satisfaction and
delight to be the consequence of our acting in one manner, and
pain and uneasiness of our acting in another, and of our not acting at all; and that we find these consequences, which we were
beforehand informed of, uniformly to follow;) we may learn. that
we are at present actually under his government in the strictest
and most proper sense; in such a sense, as that he rewards and
punishes us for our actions.
An Author of nature being supposed, it is not so much a
deduction of reason, as a matter of experience, that we are
thus under his government; under his government, in the same
sense, as we are under the goyernment of civil magistrates.
Because the annexing of pleasure to some actions, and pain to
others, in our power to do or forbear, and giving notice of this
d [That man consists of parts, is evident; and the use of each part, and of
the whole man, is open to investigation. In examining any part we learn wha.t
it its, and what it is to do: e.g. the eye, the hand, the heart. So of mental
faculties; memory is to preserve ideas, shame to deter us fiom things shameful,
compassion to induce us to relieve distress. In observing our whole make, we
may see an ultimate design,-viz.: not particular animal gratifications, but intellectual and moral improvement, and happiness by that means. If this be
our end, it is our duty. To disregard it, must bring punishment: for shamao
anguish, remorse, are by the laws of mind, the sequenees of sin,
Kg LAw's Notes on King's Origin of Evil.]




AP.o.         3 BYI REWARDS AND PUNISIHMENTS.              99
appointment beforehand to those whomn it concerns, is the preper
formal notion of government.
Whether the pleasure or pain which thus follows upon our
behavior, be owing to the Author of.nature's acting upon us
every moment which we feel it; or to his having at once contrived and executed his own part in the plan of the world;
makes no alteration as to the matter before us.    For if civil
magistrates could make the sanctions of their laws take place,
without interposing at all, after they had passed them; without a trial, and the formalities of an execution: if they were
able to make their laws execulte theems(Xes, or every offender to
execute them upon himself; we should be just in the same sense
under their government then, as we are now; but in a much
higher degree, and more perfect manner.
Vain is the ridicule, with which one foresees some persons
will divert themselves, upon finding lesser pains considered as
instances of divine punishment.     There is no possibility of
answering or evading the general thing here intended, without
denying all final causes.  For final causes being admitted, the
pleasures and pains now mentioned must be admitted too as instances of them.  And if they are; if God annexes delight to
come actions, and uneasiness to others, with an apparent design
to induce us to act so and so; then he not only dispenses happihess and misery, but also rewards and punishes actions.  If, for
example, the pain which we feel, upon doing what tends to the
destruction of our bodies, suppose upon too near approaches to
fire, or upon wounding ourselves, be appointed by the Author of
nature to prevent our doing what thus tends to our destruction
this is altogether as much an instance of his punishing our
actions, and consequently of our being under his government,e as
declaring by a voice from heaven, that if we acted so, he would
inflict such pain upon us; and inflicting it, whether it be greater
or lsso
Thus we find, that the true notion or conception of the Author
[It is almost amazing that philosophy, because it discovers the laws of
matter, should be placed in antagonism with the Bible which reveals a superintending Providence. The Bible itself teaches this very result of philosophy,
-viz.: that the world is governed by geccnral lactus. See Prov. viii. 29: Jobo
r:xxviii 12, 24, 31, 33: Ps. cxiX. 90, 91: Jer. xxxi. 35, and xxxiii. 25.]




QOo                 GOVERNMENT OF GOD                  PART L
of nature, is hat of a master or governor, prior to the consideradion of his moral attributes.  The fact of our case, which we
find by experience, is, that he actually exercises dominion or
government over us at present, by rewarding and punishing us
for our actions, in as strict and proper a sense of these words,
and even in the same sense, as children, servants, subjects, are
rewarded and punished by those who govern thenm
Thus the whole analogy of nature, the whole present course
of things, most fully shows, that there is nothing incredible in
the general doctrine of religion, that God will reward and punish
men for their actions hereafter: nothing incredible, I mean,
arising out of the notion of rewarding and punishing.  For the
whole course of nature is a present instance of his exercising that
government over us, which implies in it rewarding and punishing.
As divine punishment is what men chiefly object against, and
are most unwilling to allow; it may be proper to mention some
circumstances in the natural course of punishments at present,
which are analogous to what religion teaches us concerning a
future state of punishment; indeed so analogous, that as they
add a further credibility to it, so they cannot but raise a most
serious apprehension of it in those who will attend to them.
It has been now observed, that such and such miseries naturally follow such and such actions of imprudence and wilfullness,
as well as actions more commonly and more distinctly considered
as vicious; and that these consequences, when they may be foreseen, are properly natural punishments annexed to such actions,
The general thing here insisted upon, is, not that we see a great
deal of misery in the world, but a great deal which men bring
upon themselves by their own behavior, which they might have
foreseen and avoided.  Now the circumstances of these natural
punishments, particularly deserving our attention, are such as
these.  Oftentimes they follow, or are inflicted in consequence
of, actions which procure many present advantages, and are accompanied with much present pleasure; for instance sickness
and untimely death are the consequence of intemperance, though,accoimpanied with the highest mirth and jollity.'These punish.




CHAP. n.      BY REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS.               101
ments are often much greater, than the advantages or pleasures
obtained by the actions, of which they are the punishments or
consequences. Though we may imagine a constitution of nature,
in which these natural punishments, which are in fact to follow,
would follow, immediately upon such actions being done, or very
soon after; we find on the contrary in our world, that they are
often delayed a great while, sometimes even till long after the
actions occasioning them are forgot; so that the constitution of
nature is such, that delay of punishment is no sort nor degree
of presumption of final impunity.   After such delay, these
natural punishments or miseries often come, not by degrees, but
suddenly, with violence, and at once; however, the chief misery
often does. As certainty of such distant misery following such
actions, is never afforded persons, so perhaps during the actions,
they have seldom a distinct, full expectation of its following:*
and many times the case is only thus, that they see in general, or
may see, the credibility, that intemperance, suppose, will bring
after it diseases; civil crimes, civil punishments; when yet the
real probability often is, that they shall escape; but things notwithstanding take their destined course, and the misery inevitably follows at its appointed time, in very many of these cases.
Thus also though youth may be alleged as an excuse for rashness
and folly, as being naturally thoughtless, and not clearly foreseeing all the consequences of being untractable and profligate, this
does not hinder, but that these consequences follow; and are
grievously felt, throughout the whole course of mature life.
Habits contracted even in that age, are often utter ruin: and
men's success in the world, not only in the common sense of
worldly success, but their real happiness and misery, depends, in
a great degree, and in various ways, upon the manner in which
they pass their youth; which consequences they for the most
part neglect to consider, and perhaps seldom can properly be said
to believe, beforehand.  In numberless cases, the natural course
of things affords us opportunities for procuring advantages to
ourselves at certain times, which we cannot procure when we
will; nor ever recall the opportunities, if we have neglected
them. Indeed the general course of nature is an example of
this. If; during the opportunity of youth, persons are indocile
- See Part II. chap. vi.
9:*




102                   GOVERNMENT OF GOD                      PART r.
a.nd self-willed, they inevitably suffer in their future life, for
want of those acquirements, which they neglected the natural
season  of attaining.   If the husbandman lets seedtime pass
without sowing, the whole year is lost to him beyond recovery.
Though after men have been guilty of folly and extravagance up
to a certain degree, it is often in their power, to retrieve their
affairs, to recover their health and character, at least in good
measure; yet real reformation is in many cases, of no avail at al'
towards preventing the miseries, poverty, sickness, infamy, naturally annexed to folly and extravagance exceeding that degree
There is a certain bound to imprudence and misbehavior, which
being transgressed, there remains no place for repentance in the
natural course of things.     It is further very much to be remarked, that neglects from inconsiderateness, want of attention,*
not looking about us to see what we have to do, are often attended with consequences altogether as dreadful, as any active
misbehavior, from the most extravagant passion. And lastly,
civil government being natural, the punishments of it are so too:
and some of these punishments are capital; as the effects of a
dissolute course of pleasure are often mortal. So that many
natural punishments are finalt to him who incurs them, if considered only in his temporal capacity; and seem inflicted by
- Part IL chap. vi.
t The general consideration of a future state of punishment, most evidently
belongs to the subject of natural religion.  But if any of these reflections
should be thought to relate more peculiarly to this doctrine, as taught in Scripture, the reader is desired to observe, that Gentile writers, both moralists and
poets, speak of the future punishment of the wicked, both as to the duration
and degree of it, in a like manner of expression and of description, as tha
Scripture does. So that all which can positively be asserted to be matter of
mere revelation, with regard to this doctrine, seems to be, that the great distinction between the righteous and the wicked, shall be made at the end of this
world; that each shall then receive according to his deserts. Reason did, as it
well might, conclude that it should, finally and upon the whole, be well with
the righteous, and ill with the wicked: but it could not be determined upon
any principles of reason, whether human creatures might not have been appointed to pass through other states of life and being, before that distributive
justice should finally and effectually take place. Revelation teaches us, that
the next state of things after the present is appointed for the execution of this
justice; that it shall be no longer delayed; but the mystery of God, the great
mystery of his suffering vice and confusion to prevail, shall then be finished;
and he will take to him his great power and will reign, by rendering to every
one according to his works.




CHAP. iI.     BY REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS.               103
natural appointment, either to remove the offender out )f the
way of being further mischievous, or as an example, though frequently a disregarded one, to those who are left behind.
These things are not what we call accidental, or to be met witn
only now and then; but they are things of every day's experience. They proceed from general laws, very general ones, by
which God governs the world in the natural course of his
providence.f
And they are so analogous, to what religion teaches us concerning the future punishment of the wicked, so much of a piece
with it, that both would naturally be expressed in the very same
words, and manner of description. In the book of Proverbs,* for
instance, wisdom is introduced, as frequenting the most public
places of resort, and as rejected when she offers herself as the
natural appointed guide of human life.  How long, speaking to
those who are passing through it, how long, ye simple ones, will
ye love folly, and the scorners delight in their scorning, and fools
hate knowledge    Turn ye at my reproof. Behold, I will pour
out my spirit upon you, I will make known my words unto you.
But upon being neglected, Because I have called, and ye refused,
I have stretched out my hand, and no man regarded; but ye
have set at nought all my counsel, and would none of my reproof: I also will laugh at your calamity, I will mock when
your fear cometh; when your fear cometh as desolation, and
your destruction cometh as a whirlwind; when distress and
anguish come upon you.    Then shall they call upon me, but I
will not answer; they shall seek me early, but they shall not find
me. This passage, every one sees, is poetical, and some parts of
it are highly figurative; but the meaning is obvious. And the
thing intended is expressed more literally in the following words;
For that they hated knowledge, and did not choose the fear of
the Lord —therefore shall they eat of the fruit of their own
way, and be filled with their own devices.  For the security of
f [Our language furnishes no finer specimens of the argument analogical.
Butler here seizes the very points, which are most plausible and most insisted
on, as showing the harshness and unreasonableness of Christianity; and overthrows them at a stroke by simply directing attention to the sane things, in the
universally observed course of nature.]
* Chap. i.




104                GOVERNMENT OF GOD.                PART x
the simple shall slay them, and the prosperity of fools shall de.
stroy them.  The whole passage is so equally applicable to what
we experience in the present world, concerning the consequences
of men's actions, and to what religion teaches us is to be expected
in another, that it may be questioned which of the two was principally intended.
Indeed when one has been recollecting the proper proofs of a
future s,tate of rewards and punishments, nothing methinks can
give one so sensible an apprehension of the latter, or representation of it to the mind, as observing, that after the many disregarded checks, admonitions, and warnings, which people meet
with in the ways of vice and folly and extravagance, warnings
from their very nature, from the examples of others, from the
lesser inconveniences which they bring upon themselves, from
the instructions of wise and virtuous men: after these have been
long despised, scorned, ridiculed: after the chief bad consequences, temporal consequences, of their follies, have been delayed for a great while, at length they break in irresistibly, like
an armed force: repentance is too late to relieve, and can serve
only to aggravate their distress, the case is become desperate:
and poverty and sickness, remorse and anguish, infamy and
death, the effects of their own doings, overwhelm them beyond
possibility of remedy or escape.  This is an account of what is,
in fact, the general constitution of nature.
It is not in any sort meant, that, according to what appears at
present of the natural course of things, men are always uniformly
punished in proportion to their misbehavior.  But that there are
very many instances of misbehavior punished in the several ways
now mentioned, and very dreadful instances too; sufficient to
show what the laws of the universe may admit, and, if thoroughly
considered, sufficient fully to answer all objections against the
credibility of a future state of punishments, from any imaginations, that the frailty of our nature and external temptations,
almost annihilate the guilt of human vices: as well as objections
of another sort; from necessity, from suppositions, that the will
of an infinite Being cannot be contradicted, or that he must be
incapable of offence and provocation.*
Reflections of this kind are not without their terrors to serious
- See chaps. iv. and.vi.




CHAP. II.     THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.                  iOb
persons, even the most free from enthusiasm, and of the greatest
strength of mind; but it is fit that things be stated and considered as they really are. There is, in the present age, a certain
fearlessness with regard to what may be hereafter under the
government of God, which nothing but a universally acknowledged demonstration on the side of atheism can justify; and
which makes it quite necessary, that men be reminded, and if
possible made to feel, that there is no sort of ground for being
thus presumptuous, even upon the most sceptical principles. For,
may it not be said of any person upon his being born into the
world, he may behave so as to be of no service to it, but by
being made an example of the woeful effects of vice and folly?
That he may, as any one may, if he will, incur an infamous
execution from the hands of civil justice, or in some other
course of extravagance-shorten his days; or bring upon himself
infamy and diseases worse than death?      So that it had been
better for him, even with regard to the present world, that he
had never been born. And is there any pretence of reason for
people to think themselves secure, and talk as if they had certain
proof, that, let them act as licentiously as they will, there can be
nothing analogous to this, with regard to a future and more general interest, under the providence and government of the same
God?
CHAPTER III.'
THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.
As the manifold appearances of design, and of final causes, in
the constitution of the world, prove it to be the work of an intelligent mind, so the particular final causes of pleasure and pain
distributed amongst his creatures, prove that they are under his
a [This chapter, more than any other, carries the force of positive argument.
If in this world, we have proofs that God is a moral governor, then in order to
evince that we shall be under moral government heretfter, we have only to
supply an intermediate consideration,-viz.: that God, as such, must be unchangeable. The argument, as just remarked, assumes a substantive form,
because admitted facts, as to this world, exhibiting the very principles on which
t- d's government goes at present, compel us not only to suppose that the prineiplie of God will remain, but to believe so.]




106          THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.            PART I.
g-Vfrrnment; what may be called his natural government of
creatures endued with sense and reason. This implies somewhat
more than seems usually attended to, when we speak of God's
natural government of the world.  It implies government of
the very same kind with that which a master exercises over
his servants, or a civil magistrate over his subjects.  These latter
instances of final causes, as really prove an intelligent Governor
of the world, in the sense now mentioned, and before* distinctly
treated of; as any other instances of final causes prove an intelligent Jlaker of it.
But this alone does not appear at first sight to determine any
thing certainly, concerning the moral character of the Author of
nature, considered in this relation of governor; does not ascertain his government to be moral, or prove that he is the righteous
Judge of the world. Moral government consists, not in barely
rewarding and punishing men for their actions, which the most
tyrannical may do, but in rewarding the righteous, and punishing the wicked: in rendering to men according to their actions,
considered as good or evil. And the perfection of moral government consists in doing this, with regard to all intelligent creatures,
in an exact proportion to their personal merits or demerits.
Some men seem to think the only character of the Author of
nature to be that of simple absolute benevolence.  This, considered as a principle of action and infinite in degree, is a disposition to produce the greatest possible happiness, without regard
to persons' behavior, otherwise than as such regard would produce higher degrees of it. And supposing this to be the only
character of God, veracity and justice in him would be nothing
but benevolence conducted by wisdom. Surely this ought not to
be asserted, unless it can be proved; for we should speak with
cautious reverence upon such a subject. Whether it can be
proved or no, is not the thing here to be inquired into; but
whether in the constitution and conduct of the world, a righteous
government be not discernibly planned out: which necessarily
implies a righteous governor.  There may possibly be in the
creation beings, to whom the Author of nature manifests himself
under this most amiable of all characters, this of infinite absolute benevolence; for it is the most amiable, supposing it not, ab
* Chap. ii.




CHAP. IIn.    THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.                  107
perhaps it is not, incompatible with justice; but he manifests
himself to us under the character of a righteous governor.  Ile
may, consistently with this, be simply and absolutely benevolent,
in the sense now explained: but he is (for he has given us a
proof in the constitution and conduct of the world that he is) a
governor over servants, as he rewards and punishes us for our
actions. And in the constitution and conduct of it, he may also
have given, besides the reason of the thing, and the natural presages of conscience, clearand distinct intimations, that his government is righteous or moral: clear to such as think the nature of
it deserving their attention, and yet not to every careless person,
who casts a transient reflection upon the subject.*
It is particularly to be observed, that the divine government,
which we experience ourselves under in the present state, taken
alone, is allowed not to be the perfection of moral government.
Yet this by no means hinders, but that there may be somewhat,
be it more or less, truly moral in it.  A righteous government
may plainly appear to be carried on to some degree, enough to
give us the apprehension that it shall be completed, or carried on
to that degree of perfection which religion teaches us it shall;
but which cannot appear, till much more of the divine administration be seen, than can be seen in the present life. The design
of this chapter is to inquire how far this is the case: how far,
over and above the moral naturet which God has given us, and
our natural notion of him as righteous governor of those his
creatures, to whom he has given this nature; I say how far besides this, the principles and beginnings of a moral government
over the world may be discerned, notwithstanding and amidst all
the confusion and disorder of it.
One might mention here, what has been often urged with
* The objections against religion, from the evidence of it not being universal,
nor so strong as might possibly have been, may be urged against natural religion, as well as against revealed. And therefore the consideration of them
belongs to the first part of this treatise, as well as the second. But as these
objections are chiefly urged against revealed religion, I choose to consider
them in the second part. And the answer to them there, ch. vi., as urged
against Christianity, being almost equally applicable to them as urged against
the religion of nature; to avoid repetition, the reader is referred to that
chapter.
t Dissertation II.                       Chap. vi.




'08           THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.                   PART I.
great fovce, that, in general, less uneasiness and more satisfaction, are the natural consequences* of a virtuous than of a vicious
course of life, in the present state, as an instance of a moral
government established in nature; an instance of it collected
from  experience and present matter of fact.b       But it must be
owned a thing of difficulty to weigh and balance pleasures and uneasinesses, each amongst themselves, and also against each other,
so as to make an estimate with any exactness, of the overplus of
happiness on the side of virtue. And it is not impossible, that,
amidst the infinite disorders of the world, there may be exceptions to the happiness of virtue; even with regard to persons,
whose course of life from their youth up has been blameless: and
more with regard to those who have gone on for some time in the
ways of vice, and have afterwards reformed.     For suppose an instance of the latter case; a person with his passions inflamed,
his natural faculty of self-government impaired by habits of indulgence, and with all his vices about him, like so many harpies,
craving their accustomed gratification; who can say how long it
might be, before such a person would find more satisfaction in
the reasonableness and present good consequences of virtue, than
difficulties and self-denial in the restraints of it? Experience
also shows, that men can to a great degree, get over their sense
of shame, so as that by professing themselves to be without prin*' See Lord Shaftesbury's Inquiry concerning Virtue, Part II.
b [At the foundation of moral improvement, lies the conviction that what is
right, is our happiness, no less than our duty. This again is based upon a conviction that God governs justly; and has all power over us for good or evil.
As creation is full of the evidences of design, so is Providence. And as the
human mind shows, in its structure, the most exquisite marks of design, so the
government of mind shows a final object for all our faculties. Among the
attributes of mind we observe, conspicuous, a disposition to seek ends, lay
plans, and sacrifice present indulgence to future and greater good: and a
facility in learning how to subordinate one thing to another, so as to secure
success in our plans. This, with conscience to approve or disapprove our
modes, constitutes an evident adaptedness to a moral government on the part
of God; and would be worse than superfluous, if there be no such government.
Every rule of action, deduced by reason from the light of nature, may fairly be
regarded as God's law; and the inconveniences resulting from wrong actions,
are God's retributions. These retributions, felt or observed, are divine teachings, saying, emphatically, if you act thus you shall receive thus. We do
actually so judge, in relation to physics. Every rule of motion, distance,
gravitation, heat, electricity, &c. &c., is received as God's law; and we would
deem it insane to act in opposition.]




CHAP. mI.    TIE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.               109
ciple, and avowing even direct villany, they can support themselves against the infamy of it.  But as the ill actions of any
one will probably be more talked of, and oftener thrown in his
way, upon his reformation; so the infamy of them will be much
more felt, after the natural sense of virtue and of honor is recovered. Uneasiness of this kind ought indeed to be put to the
account of former vices: yet it will be said they are in part the
consequences of reformation.  Still I am far from allowing it
doubtful, whether virtue, upon the whole, be happier than vice
in the present world.   If it were, yet the beginnings of a
righteous administration may, beyond all question, be found in
nature, if we will attentively inquire after them."
I. In whatever manner the notion of God's moral government
over the world might be treated, if it did not appear, whether he
were in a proper sense our governor at all; yet when it is certain
matter of experience, that he does manifest himself to us under
the character of a governor in the sense explained,* it must
deserve to be considered, whether there be not reason to apprehend, that he may be a righteous or moral governor.  Since it
appears to be fact, that God does govern mankind by the method
of rewards and punishments, according to some settled rules of
distribution; it is surely a question to be asked, what presumption is there against his finally rewarding and punishing them
according to this particular rule, namely, as they act reasonably,
or unreasonably, virtuously or viciously?  Rendering men happy
or miserable by this rule, certainly falls in, much more falls in,
with our natural apprehensions and sense of things, than doing
so by any other rule whatever; since rewarding and punishing
actions by any other rule, would appear much harder to be accounted for, by minds formed as he has formed ours. Be the
evidence of religion then more or less clear, the expectation
which it raises in us, that the righteous shall, upon the whole,
be happy, and the wicked miserable, cannot possibly be cone [Consult CAPP on the Gov. of God: TwISSE VindiciN Prov. Dei: WITTICHII
Excrc. Theol.: DWIGIT'S Theol.: MARTINIUS de Gubernatione Mundi: LIEFCHILD on Providence: MORTON on do.: SHERLOCK on do.: RUTHERFORD on
do.: and the Sermons of Thos. Leland, Porteus, Topping, Hunt, Davies,.orseley, Souti' Wisheart, Seed, Collings, and Doddridge.l
* Chap. ii
10




't10          THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.                PART.
sidered as absurd or chimerical; because it is no more than an
expectation, that a method of government already begun, shall
bo carried on, the method of rewarding and punishing actions;
and shall be carried on by a particular rule, which unavoidably
appears to us at first sight more natural than any other, the rule
which we call distributive justice.  Nor,
II. Ought it to be entirely passed over, that tranquillity, satisfaction, and external advantages, being the natural consequences
of prudent management of ourselves, and our affairs; and rashness, profligate negligence, and wilful folly, bringing after them
many inconveniences and sufferings; these afford instances of a
right constitution of nature, as the correction of children, for
their own sakes, and by way of example, when they run into
danger or hurt themselves, is a part of right education.d  Thus,
that God governs the world by general fixed laws, that he has
endued us with capacities of reflecting upon this constitution of
things, and foreseeing the good and bad consequences of behavior,
plainly implies some sort of moral government; since from such
a constitution of things it cannot but follow, that prudence and
imprudence, which are of the nature of virtue and vice,* must
be, as they are, respectively rewarded and punished.
III. From the natural course of things, vicious actions are, to
a great degree, actually punished as mischievous to society; and
besides punishment actually inflicted upon this account, there is
also the feal and apprehension of it in those persons, whose
crimes have rendered them obnoxious to it, in case of a discovery;
this state of fear being often itself a very considerable punishment.   The natural fear and apprehension of it too, which restrains from such crimes, is a declaration of nature against them.
It is necessary to the very being of society, that vices, destructive of it, should be punished as being so; the vices of falsehood,
injustice, cruelty: which punishment therefore is as natural as
d [In the structure of man, physical and mental, we find no contrivances for
disease or pain, so that in general those who conform to the laws of their being,
enjoy happiness; and suffering is chiefly the result of our own conduct. But,
as without revelation we could only learn the evil of vice, by its effects, and
would often learn it too late to retrieve our affairs, or our souls' peace, God hap
in mercy given forth his teachings, by which, beforehand, we may &now the
effects of actions.]
* See Dissertation II.




CHAP. II.     THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.                 1ll
society, and so is an instance of a kind of moral government,
naturally established, and actually taking place.  And, since the
certain natural course of things is the conduct of providence or
the government of God, though carried on by the instrumentality
of men, the observation here made amounts to this, that mankind
find themselves placed by him in such circumstances, as that they
a;e unavoidably accountable for their behavior; and are often
punished, and sometimes rewarded, under his government, in
the view of their being mischievous, or eminently beneficial to
society.
If it be objected that good actions and such as are beneficial
to society, are often punished, as in the case of persecution and
in other cases; and that ill and mischievous actions are often
rewarded:e it may be answered distinctly, first, that this is in no
sort necessary, and consequently not natural in the sense in
which it is necessary, and therefore natural, that ill or mischievous actions should be punished: and in the next place, that
good actions are never punished, considered as beneficial to
society, nor ill actions rewarded, under the view of their being
hurtful to it.  So that it stands good, without any thing on the
side of vice to be set over against it, that the Author of nature
has as truly directed, that vicious actions, considered as mischievous to society, should be punished, and put mankind under
a necessity of thus punishing them, as he has directed and necessitated us to preserve our lives by food.
IV. In the natural course of things, virtue as such is actually
rewarded, and vice as such punished: which seems to afford an
instance or example, not only of government, but of moral
government, begun and established; moral in the strictest sense,
though not in that perfection of degree, which religion teaches
us to expect.  In order to see this more clearly, we must distinguish between actions themselves, and that qualifty ascribed to
them, which we call virtuous or vicious.f The gratification itself
c [It was contended by MANDEVILLE in his " Fable of the Bees," that private
vices, as luxury for instance, are often conducive to the well-being of society.
This idea is fully refuted by WARBURTON, Divine Legation of Moses, b. 1:.3ERKEIEY, Minute Philosopher, Dial. 2: and by BROWN, Characteristics,
Ess 2.]
f [A strong illustration of this distinction is seen in the "delivering up" of
our bavior to be crucified. As to the mere act of lelivering up, we find it




113          THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.               PART I,
of every natural passion, must be attended with delight; and
acquisitions of fortune, however made, are acquisitions of the
means or materials of enjoyment. An action then, by which
any natural passion is gratified, or fortune acquired, procures
delight or advantage; abstracted from  all consideration of the
morality of such action. Consequently, the pleasure or advantage in this case, is gained by the action itself, not by the
morality, the virtuousness or viciousness of it; though it be perhaps virtuous or vicious.
To say that such an action or course of behavior, procured
such pleasure or advantage, or brought on such inconvenience
and pain, is quite a different thing from saying, that such good
or bad effect was owing to the virtue or vice of such action or
behavior.  In one case, an action abstracted from all moral consideration, produced its effect: in the other case, for it will appear that there are such cases, the morality of the action under
a moral consideration, i.e. the virtuousness or viciousness of it,
produced the effect. Now I say virtue as such, naturally procures considerable advantages to the virtuous, and vice as such,
naturally occasions great inconvenience and even misery to the
vicious, in very many instances.  The immediate effects of virtue
and vice upon the mind and temper, are to be mentioned as instances of it.  Vice as such is naturally attended with some sort
of uneasiness, and not uncommonly, with great disturbance and
apprehension. That inward feeling, which, respecting lesser
matters and in familiar speech we call being vexed with oneself,
and in matters of importance and in more serious language, remorse; is an uneasiness naturally arising from an action of a
man's own, reflected upon by himself as wrong, unreasonable,
faulty, i.e. vicious in greater or less degrees: and this manifestly
is a different feeling from that uneasiness, which arises from a
sense of mere loss or harm.   What is more common, than to
hear a man lamenting an accident or event, and adding-but
referred, 1. To God the Father, John iii. 16: Acts ii. 23: Rom. viii. 32. 2. To
Christ himself, Eph. v. 2, and v. 25, &c. In this last passage it is literally
delivered himself. 3. To the Jewish rulers, Luke xx. 20: Mark xii. 12. 4. To
Pontius Pilate, Matt. xxvii. 26: Mark xv. 15: John xix. 6. 5. To Judas, Matt.
xxvi. 15: Zec. xi. 12.
As to the mere act, Judas and Pilate did just what God the Father, and our
Lord Jesus did. But how infinitely unlike the qualities of the act!]




CHAP. in.    THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.                113
however he has the satisfaction that he cannot blame himself for
it; or on the contrary, that he has the uneasiness of being sensible it was his own doing? Thus also the disturbance and fear,
which often follow upon a man's having done an injury, arise
from a sense of his being blameworthy; otherwise there would,
in many cases, be no ground of disturbance, nor any reason to
fear resentment or shame.  On the other hand, inward security
and peace, and a mind open to the several gratifications of life,
are the natural attendants of innocence and virtue.  To which
must be added the complacency, satisfaction, and even joy of
heart, which accompany the exercise, the real exercise of gratitude, friendship, benevolence.
And here, I think, ought to be mentioned the fears of future
punishment, and peaceful hopes of a better life, in those who
fully believe, or have any serious apprehension of religion: because these hopes and fears are present uneasiness and satisfaction to the mind, and cannot be got rid of by great part of the
world, even by men who have thought most thoroughly upon the
subject of religion. And no one can say, how considerable this
uneasiness or satisfaction may be, or what upon the whole it may
amount to.'
In the next place comes in the consideration, that all honest
and good men are disposed to befriend honest good men as such,
and to discountenance the vicious as such, and do so in some
degree; indeed in a considerable degree: from which favor and
discouragement cannot but arise considerable advantage and inconvenience.  Though the generality of the world have little
regard to the morality of their own actions, and may be supposed
to have less to that of others, when they themselves are not concerned; yet let any one be known to be a man of virtue, some.
how or other he will be favored and good offices will be done him,
from regard to his character, without remote views, occasionally,
and in some low degree, I think, by the generality of the world,
g [I When one supposes he is about to die, there comes over him a fear and
anxiety about things in regard to which he felt none before. For the stories
which are told about Hades, that such as have practised wrong, must there
suffer punishment, although made light of for a while, these torment the soul
lest they should be true. But he who is conscious of innocence, has a pleasant
end good lope, which will support-old age." PLATO, Respub. i. s. 5.]
10*




114          THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.            PART I.
as it happens to come in their way.  Public honors too and ad.
vantages are the natural consequences, and sometimes at least,
the conse;quedces in fact, of virtuous actions; of eminent justice,
fidelity, charity, love to our country, considered in the view of
being virtuous.  And sometimes even death itself, often infamy
and external inconveniences, are the public consequences of vice
as vice. For instance, the sense which mankind have of tyranny,
injustice, oppression, additional to the mere feeling or fear of
misery, has doubtless been instrumental in bringing about revolutions, which make a figure even in the history of the world.
For it is plain, that men resent injuries as implying faultiness,
and retaliate, not merely under the notion of having received
harm, but of having received wrong; and they have this resentnent in behalf of others, as well as of themselves.  So likewise
even the generality are, in some degree, grateful and disposed to
return good offices, not merely because such a one has been the
occasion of good to them, but under the view, that such good
offices implied kind intention and good desert in the doer.
To all this may be added two or three particular things, which
many persons will think frivolous; but to me nothing appears so,
which at all comes in towards determining a question of such importance, as, whether there be or be not, a moral institution of
government, in the strictest sense moral, visibly established and
begun in nature.  The particular things are these: That in
domestic government, which is doubtless natural, children and
others also are very generally punished for falsehood, injustice,
and ill-behavior, as such, and rewarded for the contrary: which
are instances of veracity and justice and right behavior, as such,
naturally enforced by rewards and punishments, more or less considerable. That, though civil government be supposed to take
cognizance of actions in no other view than as prejudicial to
society, without respect to the immorality of them, yet as such
actions are immoral, so the sense which men have of the immorality of them, very greatly contributes, in different ways, to
bring offenders to justice.  And that entire absence of all crime
and guilt in the moral sense, when plainly appearing, will almost
of course procure, and circumstances of aggravated guilt i'rovent,
a remission of the penalties annexed to civil crimes, in many
cases, though by no means in all.




ChAP. II.      THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.                  115
Upon the whole then, besides the good and bad effects of
virtue and vice upon men's own minds, the course or the world
does, in some measure, turn upon the approbation and disapprobation of them as such, in others.    The sense of well and'ill
doing, the presages of conscience, the love of good characters
and dislike of bad ones, honor, shame, resentment, gratitude, all
these, considered in themselves, and in their effects, do afford
manifest real instances, of virtue as such naturally favored, and
of vice as such discountenanced, more or less, in the daily course
of human life; in every age, in every relation, in every general
circumstance of it. That God has given us a moral nature,* may
most justly be urged as a proof of our being under his moral
government: but that he has placed us in a condition, which
gives this nature, as one may speak, scope to operate, and in
which it does unavoidably operate; i.e. influence mankind to act,
so as thus to favor and reward virtue, and discountenance and
punish vice, this is not the same, but a further additional proof
of his moral government; for it is an instance of it.   The first
is a proof, that he will finally favor and support virtue effectually:
the second is an example of his favoring and supporting it at
present, in some degree.
If a more distinct inquiry be made, whence it arises, that
virtue as such is often rewarded, and vice as such is punished,
and this rule never inverted, it will be found to proceed, in part,
immediately from the moral nature itself, which God has given
us;h and also in part, from his having given us, together with
* See Dissertation II.
h [Aside from revelation, our ideas of the divine attributes must be derived
from a knowledge of our own. Among these is our moral sense, which constrains us to consider right and wrong as an immutable distinction, and moral
worth as our highest excellence. Hence we ascribe perfect virtue to God. It
does not follow from such reasoning, that we form a Deity after our own conceptions, for it is but the argument a fortiori, " He that formed the eye, shall
he not see? He that teacheth man knowledge, shall he not know?" Ps. xciv.
9. We do not conceive of a Deity who sees just as we do; but that lie sees, for
be makes sight. So we infer that he has moral attributes, because we have
hem, from him.
This point is not sufficiently pressed upon infidels. They readily acknowledge God's physical attributes, because the argument is addressed to their
understanding, but deny his moral ones, because their hearts are hardened
through the deceitfulness of sin.]




116          THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.            PART I
this nature, so great a power over each other's happiness and
misery.  For, first, it is certain, that peace and delight, in some
degree and upon some occasions, is the necessary and present
effect of virtuous practice; an effect arising immediately from
that constitution of our nature. We are so made, that well-doing
as such, gives us satisfaction, at least in some instances; ill-doing
as such, in none. And, secondly, from our moral nature, joined
with God's having put our happiness and misery in many respects
in each other's power, it cannot but be, that vice as such, some
kinds and instances of it at least, will be infamous, and men will
be disposed to punish it as in itself detestable; and the villain
will by no means be able always to avoid feeling that infamy, any
more than he will be able to escape this further punishment,
which mankind will be disposed to inflict upon him, under the
notion of his deserving it. But there can be nothing on the side
of vice, to answer this; because there is nothing in the human
mind contradictory, as the logicians speak, to virtue. For virtue
consists in a regard to what is right and reasonable, as being so;
in a regard to veracity, justice, charity, in themselves: and there
is surely no such thing, as a like natural regard to falsehood,
injustice, cruelty.  If it be thought, that there are instances of
an approbation of vice, as such, in itself, and for its own sake,
(though it does not appear to me, that there is any such-thing at
all;) it is evidently monstrous: as much so, as the most acknowledged perversion of any passion whatever.  Such instances of
perversion then being left out, as merely imaginary, or at least
unnatural; it must follow, from the frame of our nature, and
from our condition, in the respects now described, that vice cannot at all be, and virtue cannot but be, favored as such by others,
upon some occasions, and happy in itself, in some degree. For
what is here insisted upon, is not the degree in which virtue and
vice are thus distinguished, but only the thing itself, that they
are so in some degree; though the whole good and bad effect of
virtue and vice as such, is not inconsiderable in degree. But
that they must be thus distinguished in some degree, is in a
manner necessary: it is matter of fact of daily experience, even
in the greatest confusion of human affairs.
It is not pretended but that, in the natural course of things,
happiness and n isery appear to be distributed by other rules,




CHAP. III.    THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.                 117
than only the personal merit and demerit of characters.  They
may sometimes be distributed by way of mere discipline.  There
may be the wisest and best reasons, why the world should be
governed by general laws, from whence such promiscuous distribution perhaps must follow; and also why our happiness and
misery should be put in each other's power, in the degree which
they are.  And these things, as, in general, they contribute to
the rewarding virtue and punishing vice, as such, so they often
contribute also, not to the inversion of this, which is impossible,
but to the rendering persons prosperous, though wicked; afflicted,
though righteous; and, which is worse, to the rewarding some
actions, though vicious, and punishing other actions, though
virtuous.i But all this cannot drown the voice of nature in the
conduct of Providence, plainly declaring itself for virtue, by way
of distinction from vice, and preference to it.  For our being so
constituted as that virtue and vice are thus naturally favored and
discountenanced, rewarded and punished, respectively as such, is
an intuitive proof of the intent of nature, that it should be so;
otherwise the constitution of our mind, from which it thus imnimdiately and directly proceeds, would be absurd. But it cannot
be said, because virtuous actions are sometimes punished, and
vicious actions rewarded, that nature intended it.  For, though
this great disorder is brought about, as all actions are, by means
of some natural passion; yet this may be, as it undoubtedly is,
brought about by the perversion of such passion, implanted in us
for other, and those very good purposes. And indeed these other
and good purposes, even of every passion, may be clearly seen.
We have then a declaration, in some degree of present effect,
from  Him who is supreme in nature, which side he is of, or
what part he takes; a declaration for virtue, and against vice.
So far therefore as a man is true to virtue, to veracity and justice:
to equity and charity, and the right of the case, in whatever he
is concerned; so far he is on the side of the divine administration, and co-operates with it: and from hence, to such a man,
i [It is easy to see that the occasional disadvantages of virtue, are no less
conducive to moral excellence, than its being generally advantageous. In view
of its general advantages, we are virtuous with a proper and commanded view
to our instinctive desire for happiness. In face of its disadvantages, we cultivate virtue for its own sake.]




118            THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.                  PART I.
arises naturally a secret satisfaction and sense of security, and
implicit hope of somewhat further.
V. This hope is confirmed by the necessary tendencies of
virtue, which, though not of present effect, yet are at present
discernible in nature; and so afford an instance of somewhat
moral in the essential constitution of it.  There is, in the nature
of things, a tendency in virtue and vice to produce the good and
bad effects now mentioned, in a greater degree than they do in
fact produce them.    For instance; good and bad men would be
much more rewarded and punished as such, were it not, that
justice is often artificially eluded,j that characters are not known,
and many, who would thus favor virtue and discourage vice, are
hindered from doing so, by accidental causes.     These tendencies
of virtue and vice are obvious with regard to individuals.     But
it may require more particularly to be considered, that power in
a society, by being under the direction of virtue, naturally increases, and has a necessary tendency to prevail over opposite
power, not under the direction of it; in like manner, as power,
by being under the direction of reason, increases, and has a
tendency to prevail over brute force.     There are several brute
J [The common remark, "virtue brings its own reward," is true only with
qualifications. The apostles, as to this life, were the most miserable of men:
(1 Cor. xv. 9.) Virtue does not always bring earthly rewards. The grand
support of the good is drawn from considerations of that future state which
the infidel denies. Observe, 1. We cannot suppose that God would so construct
man, as that his principal comfort and reward for virtue, is a delusion. 2. Very
good persons are often beset with painful doubts and fears, as to their future
safety. Would God allow such doubts, if the expectation of future happiness
were the only reward of virtue?  3. This reward, at best, is private; but for
the encouragement of virtue, it must have obvious triumphs.
On the other hand, bad men grow callous to the rebukes of conscience, so
that great sinners suffer less from remorse than small ones, and what is worse,
owe their tranquillity to their guilt. Again, he who kills a good man, wholly
deprives him of his only reward, if this life alone gives it. And the villain
who kills himself, escapes his only punishment.
Virtuous persons, in the strong language of ROBERT HAIL,L would be " the
only persons who are wholly disappointed of their object; the only persons
who (by a fatal and irreparable mistake), expecting an imaginary happiness
in an imaginary world, lose their only opportunity of enjoying those present
pleasures, of which others avail themselves; dooming themselves to grasp at
shadows, while they neglect the substance, and harassed with a perpetual
struggle against their natural propensities and passions, and all in vain!"]
* Sermon on the Vanity of Man




CHAP. iI,    TIHE M:1ORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD 109
creatures of equal, and several of superior strength, to that of
men; and possibly the sum of the whole strength of brutes may
be greater than that of mankind; but reason gives us the advantage and superiority over them; and thus'man is the acknowledged governing animal upon the earth. Nor is this superiority
considered by any as accidental; but as what reason has a tendency, in the nature of the thing, to obtain.:  And yet perhaps
difficulties may be raised about the meaning, as well as the truth,
of the assertion, that virtue has the like tendency.
To obviate these difficulties, let us see more distinctly, how the
case stands with regard to reason; which is so readily acknowledged to have this advantageous tendency. Suppose then two or
three men, of the best and most improved understanding, in a deso
late open plain, attacked by ten timles the number of beasts of
prey: would their reason secure them the victory in this unequal
combat?   Power then, though joined with reason, and under its
direction, cannot be expected to prevail over opposite power,
though merely brutal, unless the one bears some proportion to
the other. Again: put the imaginary case, that rational and
irrational creatures were of like external shape and manner  it
is certain, before there were opportunities for the first to distinguish each other, to separate from their adversaries, and to forni
a union among themselves, they might be upon a level, or in
several respects upon great disadvantage; though united they
might be vastly superior. since union is of such efficacy, that
ten men united, might be able to accomplish, what ten thousand
of the same natural strength and understanding wholly ununited,
could not. In this case brute force might more than maintain
its ground against reason, for want of union among the rational
creatures.  Or suppose a number of men to land upon an island
inhabited only by wild beasts; men who, by the regulations of
civil government, the inventions of art, and the experience of
some years, could they be preserved so long, would be really sufficient to subdue the wild beasts, and to preserve themselves in
security from themi yet a conjuncture of accidents might give
such advantage to the irrational animals as they might at once
overpower, and even extirpate, the rational ones. Length of
time tnenl, proper scope, and opportunities for reason to exert




120          THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.            PART 1.
itself, may be absolutely necessary to its prevailing over M4ute
force.
Further: there are many instances of brutes succeeding in
attempts, which they could not have undertaken, had not their
irrational nature rendered them incapable of foreseeing the danger
of such attempt, or the fury of passion hindered their attending
to it: and there are instances of reason and real prudence preventing men's undertaking what, it has appeared afterwards,
they might have succeeded in by a lucky rashness.  In certain
conjunctures, ignorance and folly, weakness and discord, may have
their advantages.  So that rational animals have not necessarily
the superiority over irrational ones; but, how improbable soever
it may be, it is evidently possible, that in some globes the latter
may be superior. And were the former wholly at variance and disunited, by false self-interest and envy, by treachery and injustice,
and consequent rage and malice against each other, whilst the
latter were firmly united among themselves by instinct, this might
greatly contribute to the introducing such an inverted order of
things.  For every one would consider it as inverted: since
reason has, in the nature of it, a tendency to prevail over brute
force; notwithstanding the possibility it may not prevail, and the
necessity, which there is, of many concurring circumstances to
render it prevalent.
Now I say, virtue in a society has a like tendency to procure
superiority and additional power: whether this power be considered as the means of security from opposite power, or of obtaining other advantages.  It has this tendency, by rendering
public good, an object and end, to every member of the society;
by putting every one upon consideration and diligence, recollection and self-government, both in order to see what is the most
effectual method, and also in order to perform their proper part,
for obtaining and preserving it; by uniting a society within itself,
and so increasing its strength; and, which is particularly to be
mentioned, uniting it by means of veracity and justice.  For as
these last are principal bonds of union, so benevolence or public
spirit, undirected, unrestrained by them, is, nobody knows what
And suppose the invisible world, and the invisible dispensa
tions of Providence, to be, in any sort, analogous to what appears:
or that both together make up one uniform scheme, the two parrs




CHAP. m.      THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.                 121
of which, the part which we see, and that which is beyond our
observation, are analogous to each other: then, there must be a
like natural tendency in the derived power, throughout the universe, under the direction of virtue, to prevail in general over
that which is not under its direction; as there is in reason,
derived reason in the universe, to prevail over brute force.
But then, in order to the prevalence of virtue, or that it may
actually produce, what it has a tendency to produce; the like
concurrences are necessary, as are, to the prevalence of reason.
There must be some proportion, between the natural power or
force which is, and that which is not, under the direction of
virtue: there must be sufficient length of time; for the complete
success of virtue, as of reason, cannot, from the nature of the
thing, be otherwise than gradual: there must be, as one may
speak, a fair field of trial, a stage large and extensive enough,
proper occasions and opportunities, for the virtuous to join together, to exert themselves against lawless force, and to reap the
fruit of their united labors. Now indeed it is to be hoped, that
the disproportion between the good and bad, even here on earth,
is not so great, but that the former have natural power sufficient
to their prevailing to a considerable degree, if circumstances
would permit this power to be united. For, much less, very
much less, power under the direction of virtue, would prevail
over much greater not under the direction of it.k    However,
good men over the face of the earth cannot unite; because,
(among other reasons,) they cannot be sufficiently ascertained of
each other's characters. And the known course of human things,
the scene we are now passing through, particularly the shortness
of life, denies to virtue its full scope in several other respects.
The natural tendency which we have been considering, though
real, is hindered from being carried into effect in the present
state: but these hinderances may be removed in a future one.
Virtue, to borrow the Christian allusion, is militant here; and
various untoward accidents contribute to its being often overk [Because, so soon as any community, or collection of persons, conclude a man
to be wholly vicious in his course, and without any restraint of conscience, he
is at once shorn of his influence, and will soon be stripped of all power of mischief. On the other hand, we see the might of virtue unarmed with power, in
LAther, in Roger Williams, in Wi. Penn, and innumerable other instances.]
11




122          THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.           PART I.
borne: but it may combat with greater advantage hereafter, and
prevail completely, and enjoy its consequent rewards, in some
future states.  Neglected as it is, perhaps unknown, perhaps
despised and oppressed here; there may be scenes in eternity,
lasting enough, and in every other way adapted, to afford it a
sufficient sphere of action; and a sufficient sphere for the natural
consequences of it to follow in fact. If the soul be naturally
immortal, and this state be a progress towards a future one, as
childhood is towards mature age, good men may naturally unite,
not only among themselves, but also with other orders of virtuous creatures, in that future state. For virtue, from the very
nature of it, is a principle and bond of union, in some degree,
among all who are endued with it, and known to each other; so
as that by it, a good man cannot but recommend himself to the
favor and protection of all virtuous beings, throughout the whole
universe, who can be acquainted with his character, and can
any way interpose in his behalf in any part of his duration.
One might add, that suppose all this advantageous tendency of
virtue to become effect, among one or more orders of creatures,
in any distant scenes and periods, and to be seen by any orders
of vicious creatures, throughout the universal kingdom of God;
this happy effect of virtue would have a tendency, by way of example, and possibly in other ways, to amend those of them who
are capable of amendment, and of being recovered to a just sense
of virtue.  If our notions of the plan of Providence were
enlarged in any sort proportionable to what late discoveries have
enlarged our views with respect to the material world, representations of this kind would not appear absurd or extravagant. They
are not to be taken as intended for a literal delineation of what
is in fact the particular scheme of the universe, which cannot be
known without revelation: for suppositions are not to be looked
on as true, because not incredible: but they are mentioned to
show, that our finding virtue to be hindered from procuring to
itself such superiority and advantages, is no objection against its
having, in the essential nature of the thing, a tendency to procure them. And the suppositions now mentioned do plainly show
this: for they show, that these hinderances are so far from being
necessary, that we ourselves can easily coneeive, how they may
be removed in future states, and full scope be granted to virtue




CLAP. mI.    THE MORAL 6OVERNMENT OF GOD.            123
And all these advantageous tendencies of it are to be considered
as declarations of God in its favor. This however is taking a
pretty large compass: though it is certain, that, as the material
world appears to be, in a manner, boundless and immense, there
must be some scheme of Providence vast in proportion to it.
But let us return to the earth our habitation; and we shall see
this happy tendency of virtue, by imagining an instance not so
vast and remote: by supposing a kingdom or society of men upon
it, perfectly virtuous, for a succession of many ages; to which,
if you please, may be given a situation advantageous for universal
monarchy. In such a state, there would be no such thing as
faction: but men of the greatest capacity would of course, all
along, have the chief direction of affairs willingly yielded to
them; and they would share it among themselves without envy.
Each of these would have the part assigned him, to which his
genius was peculiarly adapted; and others, who had not any distinguished genius, would be safe, and think themselves very
happy, by being under the protection and guidance of those who
had. Public determinations would really be the result of the
united wisdom of the community: and they would faithfully be
executed, by the united strength of it. Some would contribute
in a higher way, but all in some way, to the public prosperity:
and in it, each would enjoy the fruits of his own virtue. And
as injustice, whether by fraud or force, would be unknown among
themselves, so they would be sufficiently secured from it in their
neighbors. For cunning and false self-interest, confederacies in
injustice, ever slight, and accompanied with faction and intestine
treachery; these on one hand would be found mere childish folly
and weakness, when set in opposition against wisdom, public
spirit, union inviolable, and fidelity on the other: allowing both
a sufficient length of years to try their force. Add the general
influence, which such a kingdom would have over the face of the
earth, by way of example particularly, and the reverence which
would be paid it. It would plainly be superior to all others, and
the 7rorld must gradually come under its empire; not by means
of lawless violence; but partly by what must be allowed to be just
conquest; and partly by other kingdoms submitting themselves
voluntarily to it, throughout a course of ages, and claiming its
protection, one after another, in successive exigencies. The head




124-        THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.           PARi -
of it would be a universal monarch, in another sense than any
mortal has yet been; and the Eastern style would be literally
applicable to him, that all people, nations, and languages should
serve him. And though indeed our knowledge of human nature,
and the whole history of mankind, show the impossibility, without some miraculous interposition, that a number of men, here
on earth, should unite in one society or government, in the fear
of God and universal practice of virtue; and that such a government should continue so united for a succession of ages: yet admitting or supposing this, the effect would be as now drawn out.
Thus for instance, the wonderful power and prosperity promised
to the Jewish nation in the Scripture, would be, in a great measure, the consequence of what is predicted of them; that the
people should be all righteous, and inherit the land forever;*
were we to understand the latter phrase of a long continuance only,
sufficient to give things time to work. The predictions of this
kind, for there are many of them, cannot come to pass, in the
present known course of nature; but suppose them come to pass,
and then, the dominion and preeminence promised must naturally
follow, to a very considerable degree.
Consider now the general system of religion; that the government of the world is uniform, and one, and moral; that virtue
and right shall finally have the advantage, and prevail over fraud
and lawless force, over the deceits as well as the violence of
wickedness, under the conduct of one supreme governor: and
from the observations above made, it will appear that God has,
by our reason, given us to see a peculiar connection in the
several parts of this scheme, and a tendency towards the completion of it, arising out of the very nature of virtue: which
tendency is to be considered as something moral in the essential
constitution of things. If any one should think all this to be of
little importance, I desire him to consider, what he would think,
if vice had, essentially and in its nature, these advantageous
tendencies; or if virtue had essentially the contrary ones.
It may be objected, that notwithstanding all these natural
effects and natural tendencies of virtue, yet things may be now
going on throughout the universe, and may go on hereafter, in
the same mixed way as here at present upon earth: virtue some* Isa. Ix. 21.




CHAP. Im.   THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.             125
times prosperous, sometimes depressed; vice sometimes punished,
sometimes successful.
The answer to which is, that it is not the purpose cf this
chapter, nor of this treatise, properly to prove God's perfect
moral government over the world, or the truth of religion; but
to observe what there is in the constitution and course of nature,
to confirm the proper proof of it, supposed to be known: and
that the weight of the foregoing observations to this purpose may
be thus distinctly proved. Pleasure and pain are, to a certain
degree, say to a very high degree, distributed among us without
any apparent regard to the merit or demerit of characters. And
were there nothing else concerning this matter discernible in the
constitution and course of nature, there would be no ground
from the constitution and course of nature, to hope or to fear
that men would be rewarded or punished hereafter according to
their deserts: which, however, it is to be remarked, implies, that
even then there would be no ground from appearances to think,
that vice upon the whole would have the advantage, rather than
that virtue would. Thus the proof of a future state of retribution
would rest upon the usual known arguments for it; which are
[ think plainly unanswerable; and would be so, though there
were no additional confirmation of them from the things above
insisted on.  But these things are a very strong confirmation
of them. For,
First, They show that the Author of nature is not indifferent
to virtue and vice. They amount to a declaration, from him,
determinate and not to be evaded, in favor of one, and against
the other; such a declaration, as there is nothing to be set over
against or answer, on the part of vice. So that were a man,
laying aside the proper proof of religion, to determine from the
course of nature only, whether it were most probable, that the
righteous or the wicked would have the advantage in a future
life; there can be no doubt, but that he would determine the
probability to be, that the former would. The course of nature
then, in the view of it now given, furnishes us with a real practical proof of the obligations of religion.
Secondly, When, conformably to what religion teaches us, God
shall reward and punish virtue and vice as such, so as that every
cne shall, upon the whole, have his deserts; this distributive
11:




i26         THE M011AL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.           PART 7
justice will not be a thing different in kind, but only in degree,
from what we experience in his present government. It will be
that in efect, towards which we now see a tendency. It will be
no more than the completion of that moral government, the principles and beginning of which have been shown, beyond all
dispute, discernible in the present constitution and course of
nature.
Thirdly, As under the natural government of God, our experience of those kinds and degrees of happiness and misery, which
we do experience at present, gives just ground to hope for, and
to fear, higher degrees and other kinds of both in a future state,
supposing a future state admitted: so under his moral government our experience, that virtue and vice are, in the manners
above mentioned, actually rewarded and punished at present, in
a certain degree, gives just ground to hope and to fear, that they
may be rewarded and punished in a higher degree hereafter. It
is acknowledged indeed that this alone is not sufficient ground to
think, that they actually will be rewarded and punished in a
higher degree, rather than in a lower: but then,
Lastly, There is sufficient ground to think so, from the good
and bad tendencies of virtue and vice. For these tendencies are
essential, and founded in the nature of things: whereas the
hinderances to their becoming effect are, in numberless cases, not
necessary, but artificial only. Now it may be much more strongly
argued, that these tendencies, as well as the actual rewards and
punishments, of virtue and vice, which arise directly out of the
nature of things, will remain hereafter, than that the accidental
hinderances of them  will.  And if these hinderances do not
remain; those rewards and punishments cannot but be carried
on much farther towards the perfection of moral government:
i.e. the tendencies of virtue and vice will become effect; but
when, or where, or in what particular way, cannot be known at
all, but by revelation.
Upon the whole: there is a kind of moral government implied
in God's natural government:* virtue and vice are naturally rewarded and punished as beneficial and mischievous to society;t
and rewarded and punished directly as virtue and vice.t The
notion of a moral scheme of government is not fictitious, but
* P. 109.      t P. 110, &c.     f P. 111, &c




CHAP. IIT.   THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD              127
natural; for it is suggested to our thoughts by the constitution
and course of nature: and the execution of this scheme is
actually begun, in the instances here mentioned. Ana these
things are to be considered as a declaration of the Author of
nature, for virtue, and against vice: they give a credibility to
the supposition of their being rewarded and punished hereafter;
and also ground to hope and to fear, that they may be rewarded
and punished in higher degrees than they are here. All this is
confirmed, and the argument for religion, from the constitution
and course of nature, is carried on farther, by observing, that
there are natural tendencies, and, in innumerable cases, only artificial hinderances, to this moral scheme's being carried on much
farther towards perfection, than it is at present.*
The notion then of a moral scheme of government, much more
perfect than what is seen, is not a fictitious, but a natural notion;
for it is suggested to our thoughts, by the essential tendencies of
virtue and vice. These tendencies are to be considered as intimations, as implicit promises and threatenings, from the Author
of nature, of much greater rewards and punishments to follow
virtue and vice, than do at present. Indeed, every natural tendency, which is to continue, but which is hindered from becoming effect by only accidental causes, affords a presumption, that
such tendency will, some time or other, become effect: a presumption proportionable in degree to the length of the duration,
through which such tendency will continue. From these things
together, arises a real presumption, that the moral scheme of
government established in nature, shall be carried on much
farther towards perfection hereafter; and, I think, a presumption
that it will be absolutely completed.  From these things, joined
with the moral nature which God has given us, considered as
given us by him, arises a practical prooft that it will be completed: a proof from fact; and therefore a distinct one from
that which is deduced from the eternal and unalterable relations,
the fitness and unfitness of actions.
* P. 118, &c.       t See this proof drawn out bilefly, ch. vi.




] 8            PROBATION, AS IMPLYING TRIAL,-             PART 
CHAPTER IV.
PROBATION, AS IMPLYING TRIAL, DIFFICULTIES, AND
DANGER.a
THE general doctrine of religion, that our present life is a
tate of probation for a future one, comprehends under it several
particular things, distinct from  each other.  The first and most
common meaning of it seems to be, that our future interest is
now depending, and depending upon ourselves; that we have
scope and opportunities here, for that good and bad behavior,
which God will reward and punish hereafter; together with
temptations to one, as well as inducements of reason to the other.
And this, in a great measure, is the same as saying, that we are
under the moral government of God, and to give an account of
our actions to him. For the notion of a future account and
general righteous judgment, implies some sort of temptations to
what is wrong: otherwise there would be no moral possibility of
doing wrong, nor ground for judgment, or discrimination. But
there is this difference, that the word probation is more distinctly and particularly expressive of allurements to wrong, or
difficulties in adhering uniformly to what is right, and of the
danger of miscarrying by such temptations, than the words moral
government.   A state of probation then, as thus particularly implying in it trial, difficulties, and danger, may require to be
considered distinctly by itself.b
As the moral government of God, which religion teaches us,
a [This chapter is one of many attempts to account for the mixture of suffering and enjoyment in this world; and demands close examination both of its
theory and its arguments. The student may consult, as he has opportunity,
MuSJEi Disput.: HOLTZSFUSII Disp. de Lapsu Prim. Hominum: SELDEN de Laps.
Angelorum: STAPFERI Inst.: WITSII Econom. Foed.: BATE'S Harmony of the
Divine Attrib.: CALCOTT on the Fall: SHUCKFORD on the Creation of Man:
MANTON'S Sermons: SOUTH'S do.: TOPLADY'S do.: PEARSON on the Creed:
LE CLEnC'S Diss.: HENLY'S Dissert.: KENNICOTT on the Tree of Life: and
FABRICIUS de Primo Peccato Angelorum Lapsorum.]
b [The evils of life, are not to be regarded as entering, necessarily, into
God's plan of probation; and they are not here so presented. The Scriptures
show that all suffering is either punitive, or castigatory. Man at first was to
be tried by temptations, not by sufferings.]




OCAP. IV.       DIFFICULTIES, AND DANGER.              12o
implies that we are in a state of trial with regard to I futuco
world, so also his natural government over us implies that we
are in a state of trial, in the like sense, with regard to the present world. Natural government by rewards and punishments,
as much implies natural trial, as moral government does moral
trial. The natural government of God here meant,* consists in
his annexing pleasure to some actions, and pain to others, which
are in our power to do or forbear, and giving us notice of such
appointment, beforehand. This necessarily implies, that he has
made our happiness and misery, or our interest, to depend in part
upon ourselves. So far as men have temptations to any course of
action, which will probably occasion them greater temporal inconvenience and uneasiness, than satisfaction, so far their temporal
interest is in danger from themselves; or they are in a state of
trial with respect to it. Now people often blame others, and even
themselves, for their misconduct in their temporal concerns. And
we find many are greatly wanting to themselves, and miss that
natural happiness, which they might have obtained in the present
life: perhaps every one does in some degree. But many run
themselves into great inconvenience, and into extreme distress
and misery, not through incapacity of knowing better, and doing
better, for themselves, which would be nothing to the present
purpose, but through their own fault. These things necessarily
imply temptation, and danger of miscarrying, in a greater or less
degree, with respect to our worldly interest or happiness. Every
one too, without having religion in his thoughts, speaks of the
hazards which young people run, upon their setting out in the
world: hazards from other causes, than merely their ignorance,
and unavoidable accidents. And some courses of vice, at least,
being contrary to men's worldly interest or good; temptations to
these must at the same time be temptations to forego our present
and our future interest.
Thus in our natural or temporal capacity, we are in a state of
trial, i.e. of difficulty and danger, analogous, or like to our moral
and religious trial.. This will more distinctly appear to any one,
who thinks it worth while, more distinctly, to consider, what it
is which constitutes our trial in both capacities, and to observe,
bow mankind behave under it.
- Chap. ii.




[30           PROBATION, AS IMPLYING TRIAL,           PART I.
That which constitutes this trial, in both these capacities, must
be something either in our external circumstances, or in our
nature.  For, on the one hand, persons may be betrayed into
wrong behavior upon surprise, or overcome upon any other very
singular and extraordinary external occasions, who would, otherwise, have preserved their character of prudence and of virtue:
in which cases, every one, in speaking of the wrong behavior of
these persons, would impute it to such particular external circumstances. On the other hand, men who have contracted habits of
vice and folly of any kind, or have some particular passions in
excess, will seek opportunities, and, as it were, go out of their
way, to gratify themselves in these respects, at the expense of
their wisdom and their virtue; led to it, as every one would say,
not by external temptations, but by such habits and passions.
And the account of this last case is, that particular passions are
no more coincident with prudence, or that reasonable self-love,
the end of which is our worldly interest, than they are with the
principle of virtue and religion; but often draw contrary ways
to one, as well as to the other: and so such particular passions
are as much temptations, to act imprudently with regard to our
worldly interest, as to act viciously.* When we say, men are
mirled by external circumstances of temptation; it cannot but be
upd(erstood, that there is somewhat within themselves, to render
those circumstances temptations, or to render them susceptible of
impressions from them.   So when we say, they are misled by
passions; it is always supposed, that there are occasions, circumstances, and objects, exciting these passions, and affording means
for gratifying them. Therefore, temptations from within, and
from without, coincide, and mutually imply each other. The
several external objects of the appetites, passions, and affections,
being present to the senses, or offering themselves to the mind,
and so exciting emotions suitable to their nature; not only in
cases where they can be gratified consistently with innocence and
prudence, but also in cases where they cannot, and yet can be
gratified imprudently and viciously: this as really puts them in
danger of voluntarily foregoing their present interest or good, as
their future; and as really renders self-denial necessary to secure
* See Sermons preached at the Rolle, 1726, 2d ed. p. 205, &c. Pref. p. 25, &o.
Serm. p. 21, &c.




CHAP. IV.        DIFFICULTIES, AND DANGER.                 131
one, as the other: i.e. we are in a like state of trial with respect
to both, by the very same passions, excited by the very same
means.
Thus mankind having a temporal interest depending upcn
themselves, and a prudent course of behavior being necessary to
secure it, passions inordinately excited, whether by means of
example, or by any other external circumstance, towards such
objects, at such times, or in such degrees, as that they cannot be
gratified consistently with worldly prudence, are temptations;
dangerous, and too often successful temptations, to forego a
greater temporal good for a less; i.e. to forego what is, upon the
whole, our temporal interest, for the sake of a present gratification. This is a description of our state of trial in our temporal
capacity.  Substitute now the word future for temporal, and
virtue for prudence; and it will be just as proper a description
of our state of trial in our religious capacity; so analogous are
they to each other.
If, from consideration of this our like state of trial in both capacities, we go on to observe farther, how mankind behave under it;
we shall find there are some, who have so little sense of it, that
they scarce look beyond the passing day: they are so taken up with
present gratifications, as to have, in a manner, no feeling of consequences, no regard to their future ease or fortune in this lifeany more than to their happiness in another. Some appear to b*
blinded and deceived by inordinate passion, in their worldly conD
cerns, as much as in religion.  Others are not deceived, but as it
were forcibly carried away by the like passions, against their
better judgment, and feeble resolutions too of acting better.d And
there are men, and truly not a few, who shamelessly avow, not
their interest, but their mere will and pleasure, to be their law
of life: and who, in open defiance of every thing reasonable,
c ["If we persist in our objection, notwithstanding these analogies, then
should we conclude, either that we are under the regimen of an unrighteous
Deity, or that there is no Deity at all."-Dr. CHALMERS.]
d [Shall we be of such? Shall we forget or disregard the great fact that
when death has transferred us to other conditions, we, our proper selves, will
remain? No longer, indeed, united with flesh and blood, surrounded with
nouses, lands, business, or enjoyments, such as the present, but still ourselves.
Still with wants to be supplied, desires to be gratified, and capacities to oe
employed and developed!




132           PROBATION, AS IMPLYING TRIAL,           PART 1..
will go on in a course of vicious extravagance, foreseeing, with
no remorse and little fear, that it will be their temporal ruin;
and some of them, under the apprehension of the consequences
of wickedness in another state.  To speak in the most moderate
way, human creatures are not only continually liable to go wrong
voluntarily, but we see likewise that they often actually do so,
with respect to their temporal interests, as well as with respect
to religion.
Thus our difficulties and dangers, or our trials in our temporal
and our religious capacity, as they proceed from the same causes,
and have the same effect upon men's behavior, are evidently analogous, and of the same kind.
It may be added, that the difficulties and dangers of miscarrying in our religious state of trial, are greatly increased, and one
is ready to think, are in a manner wholly made, by the ill
behavior of others; by a wrong education, wrong in a moral
sense, sometimes positively vicious; by general bad example; by
the dishonest artifices which are got into business of all kinds;
and, in very many parts of the world, by religion's being corrupted into superstitions, which indulge men in their vices. In
like manner, the difficulties of conducting ourselves prudently
in respect to our present interest, and our danger of being led
aside from pursuing it, are greatly increased, by a foolish education; and, after we come to mature age, by the extravagance and
carelessness of others, with whom we have intercourse: and by
mistaken notions, very generally prevalent, and taken up from
common opinion, concerning temporal happiness, and wherein it
consists.
Persons, by their own negligence and folly in temporal affairs, no
less than by a course of vice, bring themselves into new difficulties,
and, by habits of indulgence, become less qualified to go through
them: and one irregularity after another, embarrasses things to
such a degree, that they know not whereabout they are; and
often makes the path of conduct so intricate and perplexed, that
it is difficult to trace it out; difficult even to determine what is
the prudent or the moral part. Thus, for instance, wrong behavior in one stage of life, youth; wrong, I mean considering
ourselves only in our temporal capacity, without taking in religion; this, in several ways, increases the difficulties of right




CHAP. IV.         DIFFICULTIES, AND DANGER.                   133
behavior in mature age; i.e. puts us into a more disad-antageor3
state of trial in our temporal capacity.
We are an inferior part of the creation of God. There are
natural appearances of our being in a state of degradation.* We
certainly are in a condition, which does not seem, by any means,
the most advantageous we could imagine or desire, either in our
natural or moral capacity, for securing either our present or
future interest.  However, this condition, low, and careful, and
uncertain as it is, does not afford any just ground of complaint.
For, as men may manage their temporal affairs with prudence,
and so pass their days here on earth in tolerable ease and satisfaction, by a moderate degree of care: so likewise with regard to
religion, there is no more required than what they are well able
to do,e and what they must be greatly wanting to themselves, if
they neglect. And for persons to have that put upon them,
which they are well able to go through, and no more, we naturally consider as an equitable thing; supposing it done by proper
authority.  Nor have we any more reason to complain of it, with
regard to the Author of nature, than of his not having given us
advantages belonging to other orders of creatures.
[REMARKS.]      The thing here insisted upon is, that the state
of trial, which religion teaches us we are in, is rendered credible,
by its being throughout uniform and of a piece with the general
conduct of Providence towards us, in all other respects within
the compass of our knowledge. Indeed if mankind, considered
in their natural capacity, as inhabitants of this world only, found
themselves, from their birth to their death, in a settled state of
* Part II. chap. v.
e [This is one of those passages, remarked on in our introduction, as a statement not properly explained or guarded. We cannot suppose the author, to
have overlooked the great fact of man's fall and corruption. That the argument properly considered, stands good, is the verdict of such a man as CHALMERS. After speaking of human helplessness in matters of religion, he says,
"There is nothing in this [helplessness] to break the analogies on which to
found the negative vindication that forms the great and undoubted achievement of this volume. The analogy lies here:-that if a man wills to obtain
prosperity in this life, he may, if observant of the rules which experience and
wisdom prescribe, in general, make it good. And if he wills to attain blessedness in the next life, he shall, if observant of what religion prescribes, most
certainly make' good; in conformity with the declaration,'he that.eeketh
findeth.' "]
12




IX34          PROBATION, AS IMPLYING TRIAL,            PART I.
Srcurity and happiness, without any solicitude or thought of their
own: or if they were in no danger of being brought into incon.
veniences and distress, by carelessness, or the folly of passion,
through bad example, the treachery of others, or the deceitful
appearances of things: were this our natural condition, then it
might seem strange, and be some presumption against the truth
of religion, that it represents our future and more general interest, as not secure of course, but as depending upon our behavior, and requiring recollection and self-government to obtain it.
It then might be alleged, "What you say is our condition, in one
respect, is not in any wise of a sort with what we find, by experience, is our condition in another.  Our whole present interest
is secured to our hands, without any solicitude of ours; and why
should not our future interest, if we have any such, be so too?"
But since, on the contrary, thought and consideration, the voluntary denying ourselves many things which we desire, and a course
of behavior, far from being always agreeable to us, are absolutely
necessary to our acting even a common decent, and common
prudent part, so as to pass with any satisfaction through the
present world, and be received upon any tolerable good terms
in it: since this is the case, all presumption against self-denial
and attention being necessary to secure our higher interest,' is
removed.
Had we not experience, it might, perhaps speciously, be urged,
that it is improbable any thing of hazard and danger should be
put upon us by an infinite being; when every thing which has
hazard and danger in our manner of conception, and will end in
error, confusion, and misery, is already certain in his foreknowledge.  Indeed, why any thing of hazard and danger should be
put upon such frail creatures as we are, may well be thought a
difficulty in speculation; and cannot but be so, till we know the
whole, or at least much more of the case.  But still the constitution of nature is as it is. Our happiness and misery are trusted
to our conduct, and made to depend upon it. Somewhat, and,
in many circumstances, a great deal too, is put upon us, either to
f [It comes to this:-good things, in this life, are not forced upon us; for we
may refuse them, or turn any of them into evils. Nor are they offered for our
mere acceptance: but only as the results of self-control and paini-taking  So
is it, as to heaven.]




ZnAP. TV.         DIFFICULTIES, AND DANGER.                    [35
do, or to suffer, as we choose. All the various miseries of life,
which people bring    upon themselves by negligence and folly,
and might have avoided by proper care, are instances of this:
which miseries are, beforehand, just as contingent and undetermined as conduct, and left to be determined by it.
These observations are an answerg to the objections against the
credibility of a state of trial, as implying temptations, and real
danger of miscarrying with regard to our general interest, under
the moral government of God. And they show, that, if we are
at all to be considered in such a capacity, and as having such an
interest, the general analogy of Providence must lead us to apprehend ourselves in danger of miscarrying, in different degrees,
as to this interest, by our neglecting to act the proper part belonging to us in that capacity.   For we have a present interest
under the government of God, which we experience here upon
earth.  This interest, as it is not forced upon us, so neither is it
offered to our acceptance, but to our acquisition; and in such
manner, as that we are in danger of missing it, by means of
temptations to neglect, or act contrary to it; and without attention and self-denial, we must and do miss it. It is then perfectly
credible, that this may be our case, with respect to that chief and
final good, which religion proposes to us.
g [They are an answer, but a cavil remains,-viz.: "the difference between
temporal and eternal things, is so vast that the cases are not analogous."
Fairly considered, the cases are analogous, differing only in degree, and not at
all in principle. What would be wrong on a great scale, is wrong on a small
one.
Perhaps the analogy may be pressed further. As the happiness and life of
some animals, may be sacrificed for the benefit of man, why may not the happiness and life of some men, be sacrificed for the good of innumerable beings
of a higher order, who witness the affairs of this earth?  It would but be
securing "the greatest good of the greatest number."  No analogies could
teach this, for analogies of course teach nothing. But if the Scriptures contained this doctrine, immensely more repugnant than that which our author is
here defending, would analogy offer repellant presumptions?]




:* 83          PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE.          PART I
CHAPTER V.
PROBATION, AS INTENDED FOR MORAL DISCIPLINE
AND IMPROVEMENT.
FROM the consideration of our being in a probation-state, of
so much difficulty and hazard, naturally arises the question, how
we came to be placed in it? But such a general inquiry as this
would be found involved in insuperable difficulties. For, though
some of these difficulties would be lessened, by observing that all
wickedness is voluntary, as is implied in its very notion; and
that many of the miseries of life have apparent good effects:
yet, when we consider other circumstances belonging to both,
and what must be the consequence of the former in a life to
come, it cannot but be acknowledged plain folly and presumption, to pretend to give an account of the whole reasons of this
matter; the whole reasons of our being allotted a condition, out
of which so much wickedness and misery, so circumstanced,
would in fact arise. Whether it be not beyond our faculties, not
only to find out, but even to understand; or, though we should
be supposed capable of understanding it, yet, whether it would
be of service or prejudice to us to be informed of it, is impossible to say. But as our present condition can in no wise be
shown to be inconsistent with the perfect moral government of
God: so religion teaches us we were placed in it, that we might
qualify ourselves, by the practice of virtue, for another state
which is to follow it. This, though but a partial answer, a very
partial one indeed, to the inquiry now mentioned; is yet a more
satisfactory answer to another, which is of real, and of the utmost
importance to us to have answered,-viz.: What is our business
here? The known end then, why we are placed in a state of so
much affliction, hazard, and difficulty, is, our improvement in
virtue and piety, as the requisite qualification for a future state
of security and happiness.
The beginning of life, considered as an education for mature
age in the present world, appears plainly, at first sight, analogous
to this our trial for a future one: the former being in our tern
poral capacity, what the latter is in our religious capacity. Soma




THmAP. v.       PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE.               13'
observations common to both, and a more distinct cinsideration
of each, will more distinctly show the extent and force of the
analogy between them; and the credibility, which arises from
hence, as well as from the nature of the thing, that the present
life was intended to be a state of discipline for a future one.
I. Every species of creatures is, we see, designed for a particular way of life; to which, the nature, the capacities, temper,
and qualifications, of each species, are as necessary as their external circumstances.  Both come into the notion of such state,
or particular way of life, and are constituent parts of it. Change
a man's capacities or character, to the degree in which it is conceivable they may be changed, and he would be altogether incapable of a human course of life, and human happiness; as
incapable, as if, his nature continuing unchanged, he were placed
in a world, where he had no sphere of action, nor any objects to
answer his appetites, passions, and affections of any sort.  One
thing is set over against another, as an ancient writer expresses
it.*  Our nature corresponds to our external condition.  Without this correspondence, there would be no possibility of any such
thing as human life and happiness: which life and happiness are,
therefore, a result from our nature and condition jointly: meaning by human life, not living in the literal sense, but the whole
complex notion commonly understood by those words.   So that
without determining what will be the employment and happiness,
the particular life, of good men hereafter; there must be some
determinate capacities, some necessary character and qualifications, without which persons cannot but be utterly incapable of
it: in like manner, as there must be some, without which men
would be incapable of their present state of life.
II. The constitution of human creatures, and indeed of all
creatures which come under our notice, is such, as that they are
capable of naturally becoming qualified for states of life, for
which they were once wholly unqualified. In imagination we
may indeed conceive of creatures, incapable of having any of
their faculties naturally enlarged, or as being unable naturally
to acquire any new qualifications. But the faculties of every
a [That is, the son of Sirac, who says, "All things are double, one against
auother; an- He hath made nothing imperfect: one thing establisheth the
good of another:" Ecclesiasticus xlii. 24.]
12-*




188           PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE.             PART I
species known to us, are made for enlargement; for acquirements
of experience and habits.  We find ourselves, in particulal, endued with capacities, not only of perceiving ideas, and of knowledge or perceiving truth, but also of storing up ideas and knowledge by memory. We are capable, not only of acting, and of
having different momentary impressions made upon us; but of
getting a new facility in any kind of action, and of settled alterations in our temper or character. The power of the two last is
the power of habits.  But neither the perception of ideas, nor
knowledge of any sort, are habits; though absolutely necessary to
the forming of them.  However, apprehension, reason, memory,
which are the capacities of acquiring knowledge, are greatly improved by exercise. Whether the word habit is applicable to all
these improvements, and in particular how far the powers of
memory and of habits may be powers of the same nature, I shall
not inquire.  But that perceptions come into our minds readily
and of course, by means of their having been there before, seems
a thing of the same sort, as readiness in any particular kind of
action, proceeding from being accustomed to it.  Aptness to recollect practical observations, of service in our conduct, is plainly
habit in many cases. There are habits of perception, and habits
of action.  An instance of the former, is our constant and even
involuntary readiness, in correcting the impressions of our sight
concerning magnitudes and distances, so as to substitute judgment in the room of sensation, imperceptibly to ourselves. It
seems as if all other associations of ideas not naturally connected,
might be called passive habits; as properly as our readiness in
understanding languages upon sight, or hearing of words. Our
readiness in speaking and writing them, are instances of active
habits.
For distinctness, we may consider habits, as belonging to the
body, or to the mind: and the latter will be explained by the
former. Under the former are comprehended all bodily activities
or motions, whether graceful or unbecoming, which are owing to
use: under the latter, general habits of life and conduct; such as
those of obedience and submission to authority, or to any particular person; those of veracity, justice, and charity; those of
attention, industry, self-government, envy, revenge.  Habits of
this latter kind seem produced by repeated acts, as well as the




CHAP. V.        PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE.               139
former. And as habits belonging to the body are produced by
external acts, so habits of the mind are produced by the exertion
of inward practical principles; i.e. by carrying them into act, or
acting upon them; the principles of obedience, of veracity, justice,
and charity. Nor can those habits be formed by any external
course of action, otherwise than as it proceeds from these principles: because it is only these inward principles exerted, which
are strictly acts. of obedience, of veracity, of justice, and of
charity.
So likewise habits of attention, industry, self-government, are
in the same manner acquired by exercise; and habits of envy and
revenge by indulgence, whether in outward act, or in thought
and intention; i.e. inward act: for such intention is an act.
Resolutions to do well, are also properly acts.  And endeavoring
to enforce upon our own minds a practical sense of virtue, or to
beget in others that practical sense of it, which a man really has
himself, is a virtuous act.  All these, therefore, may and will
contribute towards forming good habits.  But going over the
theory of virtue in one's thoughts, talking well, and drawing fine
pictures, of it; this is so far from necessarily or certainly conducing to form a habit of it, in him who thus employs himself, that
it may harden the mind in a contrary course, and render it gradually more insensible; i.e. form a habit of insensibility to all moral
considerations. For, from our very faculty of habits, passive impressions, by being repeated, grow weaker. Thoughts, by often
passing through the mind, are felt less sensibly: being accustomed to danger, begets intrepidity, i.e. lessens fear; to distress,
lessens the passion of pity; to instances of others' mortality,
lessens the sensible apprehension of our own.
From these two observations together, that practical habits are
formed and strengthened by repeated acts, and that passive impressions grow weaker by being repeated upon us, it must follow,
that active habits may be gradually forming and strengthening,
by a course of acting upon such and such motives and excitements, while these motives and excitements themselves are, by
proportionable degrees, growing less sensible; i.e. are continually
less and less sensibly felt, even as the active habits strengthen.
And experience confirms this: for active principles, at the very
time that they are less lively in perception than they were, are




140            PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE.              PART I,
found to be, somehow, wrought more thoroughly into the temper
and character, and become more effectual in influencing our practice.  The three things just mentioned may afford instances of it.
Perception of danger is a natural excitement of passive fear, and
active caution: and by being inured to danger, habits of the latter
are gradually wrought, at the same time that the former gradually
lessens. Perception of distress in others is a natural excitement,
passively to pity, and actively to relieve it: but let a man set
himself to attend to, inquire out, and relieve distressed persons,
and he cannot but grow less and less sensibly affected with the
various miseries of life, with which he must become acquainted;
when yet, at the same time, benevolence, considered not as a
passion, but as a practical principle of action, will strengthen:
and while he passively compassionates the distressed less, he will
acquire a greater aptitude actively to assist and befriend them.
So also at the same time that the daily instances of men's dying
n.round us give us daily a less sensible passive feeling or apprehension of our own mortality, such instances greatly contribute to
the strengthening a practical regard to it in serious men; i.e. to
forming a habit of acting with a constant view to it.
This seems further to show, that passive impressions made
upon our minds by admonition, experience, or example, though
they may have a remote efficacy, and a very great one, towards
forming active habits, yet can have this efficacy no otherwise
than by inducing us to such a course of action: and that it is not
being affected so and so, but acting, which forms those habits:
only it must be always remembered, that real endeavors to enforce
good impressions upon ourselves are a species of virtuous action.
Nor do we know how far it is possible, in the nature of things,
that effects should be wrought in us at once, equivalent to habits;
i.e. what is wrought by use and exercise. The thing insisted on
is, not what may be possible, but what is in fact the appointment
of nature: which is, that active habits are to be formed by exercise. Their progress may be so gradual, as to be imperceptible
in its steps: it may be hard to explain the faculty, by which we
are capable of habits, throughout its several parts; and to trace
it up to its original, so as to distinguish it from all others in our
mind: and it seems as if contrary effects were to be ascribed to
it.  But the thing in general, that our nature is formed to yield




CHAP. v.       1 ROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE.             141
to use and exercise, in some such manner as this, is matter of
certain experience.
Thus, by accustoming ourselves to any course of action, we get
an aptness to go on, a facility, readiness, and often pleasure, in
it. The inclinations which rendered us averse to it, grow weaker;
the difficulties in it, not only the imaginary but the real ones,
lessen; the reasons for it offer themselves of course to our thoughts
upon all occasions; and the least glimpse of them is sufficient to
make us go on, in a course of action, to which we have been accustomed.  Practical principles appear to grow stronger, abso.
lutely in themselves, by exercise; as well as relatively, with
regard to contrary principles; which, by being accustomed to
submit, do so habitually, and of course. Thus a new character,
in several respects, may be formed; and many habitudes of life,
not given by nature, but which nature directs us to acquire.
III. Indeed we may be assured, that we should never have had
these capacities of improving by experience, acquired knowledge,
and habits, had they not been necessary, and intended to be made
use of. And accordingly we find them so necessary, and so much
intended, that without them we should be utterly incapable of
that which was the end for which we were made, considered in
our temporal capacity only: the employments and satisfactions
of our mature state of life.
Nature does in no wise qualify us wholly, much less at once, for
this mature state of life.  Even maturity of understanding, and
bodily strength, not only are arrived at gradually, but are also
very much owing to the continued exercise of our powers of body
and mind from infancy. If we suppose a person brought into
the world with both these in maturity, as far as this is conceivable,
he would plainly at first be as unqualified for the human life of
mature age, as an idiot.  He would be in a manner distracted,
with astonishment, and apprehension, and curiosity, and suspense:
nor can one guess, how long it would be, before he would be
familiarized to himself and the objects about him, enough even to
set himself to any thing.  It may be questioned too, whether the
natural information of his sight and hearing would be of any
manner of use to him in acting, before experience. And it seems,
that men would be strangely headstrong and self-willed, and disp, -ed to exert themselves with an impetuosity, which would




142             PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE.           PA5I I
render society insupportable, and the living in it impracticable,
were it not for some acquired moderation and self-government, some
aptitude and readiness in restraining themselves, and concealing
their sense of things. Want of every thing of this kind which
is learnt would render a man as incapable of society, as want of
language would; or as his natural ignorance of any of the particular employments of life would render him ina.ipable of providing himself with the common conveniences, or supplying the
necessary wants of it. In these respects, and probably in many
more of which we have no particular notion, mankind is left by
nature, an unformed, unfinished creature; utterly deficient and
unqualified, before the acquirement of knowledge, experience,
and habits, for that mature state of life, which was the end of
his creation, considering him as related only to this world.
But, as nature has endued us with a power of supplying those
deficiencies, by acquired knowledge, experience, and habits; so
likewise we are placed in a condition, in infancy, childhood, and
youth, fitted for it; fitted for our acquiring those qualifications
of all sorts, which we stand in need of in mature age. Hence
children, from their very birth, are daily growing acquainted
with the objects about them, with the scene in which they are
placed, and to have a future part; and learning something or other,
necessary to the performance of it. The subordinations, to which
they are accustomed in domestic life, teach them self-government
in common behavior abroad, and prepare them for subjection and
obedience to civil authority.b  What passes before their eyes, and
daily happens to them, gives them experience, caution against
treachery and deceit, together with numberless little rules of
action and conduct, which we could not live without; and which
are learnt so insensibly and so perfectly, as to be mistaken perhaps for instinct, though they are the effect of long experience
and exercise; as much so as language, or knowledge in particular
business, or the qualifications and behavior belonging to the
several ranks and professions. Thus the beginning of our days
is adapted to be, and is, a state of education in the theory and
practice of mature life. We are much assisted in it by example,
instruction, and the care of others; but a great deal is left to
b [Consult MILLMAN'S Hist. of Christ, vol. i.: PRIESTLEY'S Institutes o! Nat
and Rev. Rel., vol. i. ch. i ~ and WHATELY'S Pol. Econ., sec. 5.1




CHAP. v.         PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE.                  143
ourselves to Jo.   And of this, as part is done easily and of
course; so pirt requires diligence and care, the voluntary foregoing many things which we desire, and setting ourselves to what
we should have no inclination to, but for the necessity or expedience of it.  For that labor and industry, which the station of
so many absolutely requires, they would be greatly unqualified
for, in maturity, as those in other stations would be for any other
sorts of application; if both were not accustomed to them in
their youth.   And, according as persons behave themselves, in
the general education which all go through, and in the particular
ones  adapted  to particular employments, their character is
formed,0 and made to appear; they recommend themselves more
or less; and are capable of, and placed in, different stations in
society.
The former part of life, then, is to be considered as an important opportunity, which nature puts into our hands; and
which, when lost is not to be recovered. And our being placed
in a state of discipline throughout this life, for another world, is
a providential disposition of things, exactly of the same kind, as
our being placed in a state of discipline during childhood, for
mature age.   Our condition in both respects is uniform and of a
piece, and comprehended under one and the same general law
of nature.
If we were not able at all to discern, how or in what way the
present life could be our preparation for another; this would be
no objection against the credibility of its being so.  We do not
discern, how food and sleep contribute to the growth of the
body; nor could have any thought that they would, before we
c [We are too apt to overlook the effect of actions on the actor; (which is
often the chief effect) in improving or impairing his own powers. A razor
used to cut wood or stone, is not only put to an improper use, but spoiled for
the use which is proper. But this is a faint illustration. The razor may be
sharpened again; but how shall we restore a blunted sensibility, an enfeebled
judgment, or a vitiated appetite? Our wrong-doing inflicts worse results on
ourselves than on our victims; and the evil may spread disaster over our whole
future. Hence the young make a fatal blunder when they suppose that an
occasional indulgence in impropriety may be compatible with general welfare,
and improvement. Instead of balancing the pros and cons of a particular
act, in the scale of utility or pleasure, they should mark well its effects on
themselves. See the description of how an upright being may fall; in a
subsequent part of this chapter.]




144            PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE.            PkA[T i.
had experience.  Nor do children at all think, on the one hand,
that the sports and exercises, to which they are so much addicted,
contribute to their health and growth; nor, on the other, of the
necessity which there is for their being restrained in them. Nor
are they capable of understanding the use of many parts of discipline, which nevertheless they must be made to go through, in
order to qualify them for the business of mature age. Were we
not able then to discover, in what respects the present life could
form us for a future one; yet nothing would be more supposable
than that it might, in some respects or other, from the general
analogy of Providence. And this, for aught I see, might reasonably be said, even though we should not take in the consideration
of God's moral government over the world. But,
IV. Take in this consideration, and consequently, that the
character of virtue and piety is a necessary qualification for the
future state, and then we may distinctly see, how, and in what
respects, the present life may be a preparation for it; since we
want, and are capable of, inmrovement in that character, by,moral and religious habits; and the present life is fit to be a
state of discipline for such improvement: in like manner as we
have already observed, how, and in what respects, infancy, childhood, and youth, are a necessary preparation, and a natural state
of discipline, for mature age.
Nothing which we at present see, would lead us to the thought
of a solitary inactive state hereafter.  If we judge at all from
the analogy of nature, we must suppose, according to the Scripture account of it, that it will be a community. And there is no
shadow of any thing unreasonable in conceiving, though there
be no analogy for it, that this community will be, as the Scripture represents it, under the more immediate, or, if such an expression may be used, the more sensible government of God.
Nor is our ignorance, what will be the employments of this
happy colmmunity, nor our consequent ignorance, what particular
scope or occasion there will be for the exercise of veracity,
justice, and charity, among the members of it with regard to
each other, any proof, that there will be no sphere of exercise
for those virtues.  Much less, if that were possible, is our ignorance any proof, that there will be no occasion for that frame of
mind, or charac'er, which is formed by the daily practice of those




CHAP. v.         PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE.                   140
particular virtues here, and which is a result from it.a This at
least must be owned in general, that, as the government established in the universe is moral, the character of virtue and
piety must, in some way or other, be the condition of our happiness or the qualification for it.
From what is above observed, concerning our natural power of
habits, it is easy to see, that we are capable of moral improveinent by discipline.  And how greatly we want it, need not be
proved to any one who is acquainted with the great wickedness
of mankind; or even with those imperfections, which the best
are conscious of.  But it is not perhaps distinctly attended to by
every one, that the occasion which human creatures have for discipline, to improve in them this character of virtue and piety, is
to be traced up higher than to excess in the passions, by indulgence and habits of vice.      Mankind, and perhaps all finite
creatures, from the very constitution of their nature, before
habits of virtue, are deficient, and in danger of deviating from
what is right; and therefore stand in need of virtuous habits, for
a security against this danger.   For, together with the general
principle of moral understanding, we have in our inward frame
various affections towards particular external objects.     These
affections are naturally, and of right, subject to the government
of the moral principle, as to the occasions upon which they may
be gratified; as to the times, degrees, and manner, in which the
objects of them may be pursued. But the principle of virtue
can neither excite them, nor prevent their being excited. On the
contrary, they are naturally felt, when the objects of them are
present to the mind, not only before all consideration whether
d [" It might seem, at first sight, that if our state hereafter presented no
temptations to falsehood, injustice, &c., our habit of indulging these vices here
would be no disqualification for such a state; and our forming the contrary
habits no qualification. But habits of veracity, justice, &c. are not merely
securities against temptations to the contrary, but needful for conserving the
principles of love of truth, justice, &c. As our happiness depends upon the
ratio between our circumstances and our dispositions, our happiness, in a state
where things are ordered so as to give no scope for the practice of falsehood,
injustice, &c., must depend on our having formed a lovefor their opposites.
Besides, the circumstances of the future life may be such as only to remove
temptations from characters formed by such moral discipline as we undergo
in this life, and not all things that could be temptations to any one."-Por.
rITZGERALD.]
13




146              PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE.                  PART I.
they can be obtained by lawful means, but after it is found they
cannot.   The natural objects of affection continue so; the necessaries, conveniences, and pleasures of life, remain naturally desirable, though they cannot be obtained innocently: nay, though
they cannot possibly be obtained at all. And when the objects
of any affection whatever cannot be obtained without unlawful
means; but may be obtained by them: such affection, though its
being excited, and its continuing some time in the mind, be as
innocent as it is natural and necessary, yet cannot but be conceived to have a tendency to incline persons to venture upon such
unlawful means: and therefore must be conceived as putting
them  in some danger of it.     Now what is the general security
against this danger, against their actually deviating from right?
As the danger is, so also must the security be, from within: from
the practical principle of virtue.*  The strengthening or improving
this principle, considered as practical, or as a principle of action,
will lessen the danger, or increase the security against it.   And
this moral principle is capable of improvement, by proper discipline and exercise: by recollecting the practical impressions
which example and experience have made upon us: and, instead
of following humor and mere inclination, by continually attending
to the equity and right of the case, in whatever we are engaged,
be it in greater or less matters; and accustoming ourselves always
to act upon it, as being itself the just and natural motive of action;
and as this moral course of behavior must necessarily, under the
divine government, be our final interest.    Thus the princ/,p-   of
* It may be thought, that a sense of interest would as effectually r, fstrain
creatures from doing wrong. But if by a sense of interest is meant a s: eculative conviction or belief, that such and such indulgence would occasio J them
greater uneasiness, upon the whole, than satisfaction; it is contrary to )resent
experience to say, that this sense of interest is sufficient to restrain then from
thus indulging themselves. And if by a sense of interest is meant a practical
regard to what is upon the whole our happiness; this is not only coincident
with the principle of virtue or moral rectitude, but is a part of the idea itself.
And it is evident this reasonable self-love wants to be improved, as really as
any principle in our nature. For we daily see it overmatched, not only by the
more boisterous passions, but by curiosity, shame, love of imitation, by any
thing, even indolence: especially if the interest, the temporal interest, suppose,
which is the end of such self-love, be at a distance. So greatly are profligate
men mistaken, when they affirm they are wholly governed by interestedness
and self-love; and so little cause is there for moralists to disclaim bhis principle.-See p. 131.




CHAP. v.       PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE.              147
virtue, improved into a habit, of wthich zm2rovement we are thus
capable, will plainly be, iln proportion to the strength of it, a
security against the danger which finite creatures are in, from
the very nature of propension, or particular affections.  This
way of rutting the matter, supposes particular affections to remain in a future state; which it is scarce possible to avoid supposing. And if they do; we clearly see, that acquired habits of
virtue and self-government may be necessary for the regulation
of them. However, though we were not distinctly to take in
this supposition, but to speak only in general; the thing really
comes to the same. For habits of virtue, thus acquired by discipline, are improvement in virtue: and improvement in virtue
must be advancement in happiness, if the government of the
universe be moral.
From these things we may observe, (and it will further show
this our natural and original need of being improved by discipline,)
how it comes to pass, that creatures made upright, fall; and how
those who preserve their uprightness, raise themselves by so
doing, to a more secure state of virtue.  To say that the former
is accounted for by the nature of liberty, is to say no more, than
that an event's actually happening is accounted for by a mere
possibility of its happening. But it seems distinctly conceivable
from the very nature of particular affections or propensions. For,
suppose creatures intended for such a particular state of life, for
which such propensions were necessary: suppose them endued
with such propensions, together with moral understanding, as
well including a practical sense of virtue as a speculative perception of it; and that all these several principles, both natural and
moral, forming an inward constitution of mind, were in the most
exact proportion possible; i.e. in a proportion the most exactly
adapted to their intended state of life; such creatures would be
made upright, or finitely perfect.  Now particular propensions,
from their very nature, must be felt, the objects of them being
present; though they cannot be gratified at all, or not with the
allowance of the moral principle.  If they can be gratified without
its allowance, or by contradicting it, then they must be conceived
to have some tendency, in how low a degree soever, yet some
tendency, to induce persons to such forbidden gratification. This
tneneny, in some one particular propension, may be increased,




14?               PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE.                   PART I
by the greater frequency of occasions naturally exciting it, than
of occasions exciting others.    The least voluntary indulgence in
forbidden   circumstances,e though but in thought, will increase
this wrong tendency; and may increase it further, till, peculiar
conjunctures perhaps conspiring, it becomes effect; and danger
of deviating from right, ends in actual deviation from it; a danger
necessarily arising from the very nature of propension, and which
therefore could not have been prevented, though it might have
been escaped, or got innocently through. The case would be, as
if we were to suppose a straight path marked out for a person, in
which a certain degree of attention would keep him steady: but
if he would not attend, in this degree, any one of a thousand
objects, catching his eye, might lead him out of it.
Now it is impossible to say, how much even the first full overt
act of irregularity. might disorder the inward constitution; unsettle the adjustments, and alter the proportions, which formed
it, and in which the uprightness of its make consisted: but repetition of irregularities would produce habits. Thus the constitution would be spoiled; and creatures made upright, become
corrupt and depraved in their settled character, proportionably to
their repeated irregularities in occasional acts.' On the contrary,
e [Discipline is mainly promoted by a careful regard to acts of small individual moment. The subjecting of trivial acts to moral considerations, is the
sure, and the only mode of self-culture. These acts are embryo habits, and we
may often see clearly the moral character of a habit, when the single act seems
indifferent. Thus viewed, the importance of single acts will seldom seem small.
A single cigar, one glass of wine for convivial purposes, one story told with
exaggerations, may change the complexion of our character, and of our whole
destiny!
It is doing or refusing to do, from a law-abiding regard to consequences,
that constitutes self-discipline. Papists wholly err in teaching the repression
of bodily desires as in itself virtuous. Indulgence may be either an obstacle or
an aid to moral progress, according to our reason for indulgence. When we
can repress an appetite or passion whenever indulgence would be wrong, its
mastery over us is broken; and when the passions and appetites act rightly,
from force of virtuous habit, without direct volition, discipline is complete.
Ascetic acts are only useful as mleans, and so long as they are ascetic (askesis)
are proofs of imperfect obedience. Discipline is good only cs discipline; and
when complete, changes from a struggle between principle and inclination, to
a spontaneous habit, and permanent mental peace.]
r [Chalmers objects to this hypothetical fall of man, that it wants harmony
with the Scripture account. But I do not see the force of the objection. Butler
of course does not copy the Scripture account, for he would then depart from ti,




CHAP..V.         PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE.                 149
these creatures might have improved and raised themselves, to a
higher and more secure state of virtue, by the contrary behavior:
by steadily following the moral principle, supposed to be one part
of their nature: and thus withstanding that unavoidable danger
of defection, which necessarily arose from propension, the other
part of it.  For, by thus preserving their integrity for some time,
their danger would lessen; since propensions, by being inured to
submit, would do it more easily and of course: and their security
against this lessening danger would increase; since the moral
principle would gain additional strength by exercise: both which
things are implied in the notion of virtuous habits.
Thus vicious indulgence is not only criminal in itself, but also
depraves the inward constitution and character. And virtuous
self-government is not only right in itself, but also improves the
inward constitution or character: and may improve it to such a
degree, that though we should suppose it impossible for particular
affections to be absolutely coincident with the moral principle;
and consequently should allow, that such creatures as have been
above supposed, would forever remain defectible, yet their danger
of actually deviating from right may be almost infinitely lessened,
and they fully fortified against what remains of it; if that may
be called danger, against which there is an adequate, effectual
security.  Still, this their higher perfection may continue to consist in habits of virtue formed in a state of discipline, and this
their more complete security remain to proceed from them.
Thus it is plainly conceivable, that creatures without blemish,
as they came out of the hands of God, may be in danger of going
wrong; and so may stand in need of the security of virtuous
habits, additional to the moral principle wrought into their natures
by him. That which is the ground of their danger, or their
want of security, may be considered as a deficiency in themselves,
aim and nature of his book. The Bible says man fell suddenly, no less in his
state than in his character. Butler says that we could not reason out how much
disorder and damage would ensue from the first sin: and in saying this, avoids
ally incongruity with the Mosaic account, which tells us how much. What B.
says of the formation of habit, by repeated transgressions, certainly cannot be
gainsayed.
Adam "died," the very day he ate the forbidden fruit. The sinner "lives"
the very day he believes on the only-begotten Son of God. Increase of guilt,
or growth in grace are predicable in both instances. In both also there is an
iansant transition into a new relationship with God.]
13:




1O0            PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE.            PART I.
to which virtuous habits are the natural supply.  And as they
are naturally capable of being raised and improved by discipline,;t may be a thing fit and requisite, that they should be placed
in circumstances with an eye to it: in circumstances peculiarly
fitted to be to them a state of discipline for their improvement in
virtue.
But how much more strongly must this hold with respect to
those who have corrupted their natures, are fallen from their
original rectitude, and whose passions are become excessive by
repeated violations of their inward constitution! Upright creatures may want to be improved: depraved creatures want to be
renewed. Education and discipline, which may be in all degrees
and sorts of gentleness and of severity, are expedient for those:
but must be absolutely necessary for these. For these, discipline
of the severer sort too, and in the higher degrees of it, must be
necessary, in order to wear out vicious habits; to recover their
primitive strength of self-government, which indulgence must
have weakened; to repair, as well as raise into a habit, the moral
principle, in order to their arriving at a secure state of virtuous
happiness.
Whoever will consider the thing, may clearly see that the
present world is peculiarly fit to be a state of discipline for this
purpose, to such as will set themselves to mend and improve.
For, the various temptations with which we are surrounded; our
experience of the deceits of wickedness; having been in many
instances led wrong ourselves; the great viciousness of the world;
the infinite disorders consequent upon it; our being made acquainted with pain and sorrow, either from our own feeling of it,
or from the sight of it in others; these things, though some of
them may indeed produce wrong effects upon our minds, yet
when duly reflected upon, have, all of them, a direct tendency
to bring us to a settled moderation and reasonableness of temperthe contrary both to thoughtless levity, and also to that unrestrained self-will, and violent bent to follow present inclination,
which may be observed in undisciplined minds.
Such experience, as the present state affords, of the frailty
of our nature; of the boundless extravagance of ungoverned
passion; of the power which an infinite being has over us, by
the various capacities of misery which he has given us; in short,




CHAP. V.       PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE.             151
that kind and degree of experience, which the present state
affords us, that the constitution of nature is such as to admii
the possibility, the danger, and the actual event, or creatures
losing their innocence and happiness, and becoming vicious and
wretched; has a tendency to give us a practical sense of things
very different from a mere speculative knowledge, that we are
liable to vice, and capable of misery. And who knows, whether
the security of creatures in the highest and most settled state of
perfection, may not in part arise, from their having had such a
sense of things as this, formed, and habitually fixed within them,
in some state of probation. And passing through the present
world with that moral attention, which is necessary to the acting
a right part in it, may leave everlasting impressions of this sort
upon our minds.
To be a little more distinct: allurements to what is wrong,
difficulties in the discharge of our duty, our not being able to act
a uniform right part without some thought and care, and the
opportunities which we have, or imagine we have, of avoiding
what we dislike or obtaining what we desire, by unlawful means,
when we either cannot do it at all, or at least not so easily, by
lawful ones, these things, i.e. the snares and temptations of vice,
are what render the present world peculiarly fit to be a state of
discipline, to those who will preserve their integrity: because
they render being upon our guard, resolution, and the denial of
our passions, necessary in order to that end. The exercise of
such particular recollection, intention of mind, and self-government, in the practice of virtue, has, from the make of our nature,
a peculiar tendency to form habits of virtue; as implying, not
only a real, but also a more continued, and a more intense exercise of the virtuous principle, or a more constant and a stronger
effort of virtue exerted into act. Thus suppose a person to know
himself to be in particular danger, for some time, of doing any
thing wrong, which yet he fully resolves not to do; continued
recollection and keeping upon his guard, in order to make good
his resolution, is a contintucd exerting of that act of virtue
in a high degree, which need have been, and perhaps would
nave been, only instantaneous and weak, had the temptation
b)ecn so.
It is indeed ridiculous to assert, that self-denial is essential to




152             PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE.               PART I
virtue and piety: but it would have been nearer the truth,
though not strictly the truth itself, to have said, that it is essential to discipline and improvement.   For though actions materially virtuous, which have no sort of difficulty, but are perfectly agreeable to our particular inclinations, may possibly be
done only from these particular inclinations, and so may not be
any exercise of the principle of virtue, i.e. not be virtuous actions
at all; yet, on the contrary, they may be an exercise of that
principle: and when they are, they have a tendency to form and
fix the habit of virtue. But when the exercise of the virtuous
principle is more continued, oftener repeated, and more intense;
as it must be in circumstances of danger, temptation, and difficulty, of any kind and in any degree; this tendency is increased
proportionably, and a more confirmed habit is the consequence.
This undoubtedly holds to a certain length: but how far it
may hold, I know not. Neither our intellectual powers, nor our
bodily strength can be improved beyond a certain degree: and
both may be overwrought. Possibly there may be something
analogous to this, with respect to the moral character; which is
scarce worth considering. I mention it only, lest it should come
into some persons' thoughts, not as an exception to the foregoing
observations, which perhaps it is; but as a confutation of them,
which it is not.  And there may be several other exceptions.
Observations of this kind cannot be supposed to hold minutely,
and in every case. It is enough that they hold in general. And
these plainly hold so far, as that from them may be seen distinctly, (which is all that is intended by them,) that the present
world is peculiarly fit to be a state of discipline, for our improvement in virtue and piety: in the same sense as some
sciences, by requiring and engaging the attention, not to be sure
of such persons as will not, but of such as will, set themselves
to them, are fit to form the mind to habits of attention.
g [A forced or reluctant obedience is wholly incompatible with earthly happiness; but may, in the highest degree promote our future happiness. It will
not long mar our happiness, even here; because being based on principle, and
established by habit, it will, in process of time, be superseded by prompt and
pleasurable submission. Thus a person habitually virtuous, is hardly conscious
of self-denial; a fact noticed by Aristotle. "He who abstains from bodily
pleasures and delights, is virtuous in this very abstinence; but he who is
troubled by it, is undisciplined." Ethic. Nic. ii. 3.1




CAP. v.         PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE.             153
Indeed the present state is so far from proving, in event, a dis.
cipline of virtue to the generality of men, that on the contrary
they seem to make it a discipline of vice. And the viciousness
of the world is, in different ways, the great temptation which
renders it a state of virtuous discipline, in the degree it is, to
good men. The whole end, and the whole occasion, of mankind's being placed in such a state as the present, is not pretended to be accounted for.  That which appears amidst the
general corruption, is, that there are some persons, who, having
within them the principle of amendment and recovery, attend to
and follow the notices of virtue and religion, be they more clear
or more obscure, which are afforded them; and that the present
world is not only an exercise of virtue in these persons, but an
exercise of it in ways and degrees, peculiarly apt to improve it:
apt to improve it, in some respects, even beyond what would be,
by the exercise of it, required in a perfectly virtuous society, or
in a society of equally imperfect virtue with themselves. But
that the present world does not actually become a state of moral
discipline to many, even to the generality, i.e. that they do not
improve or grow better in it, cannot be urged as a proof, that it
was not intended for moral discipline, by any who at all observe
the analogy of nature. For, of the numerous seeds of vegetables
and bodies of animals, which are adapted and put in the way to
improve to such a point or state of natural maturity and perfection, we do not see perhaps that one in a million actually does.
Far the greatest part of them decay before they are improved to
it; and appear to be absolutely destroyed. Yet no one, who does
not deny all final causes, will deny, that those seeds and bodies,
which do attain to that point of maturity and perfection, answer
the end for which they were really designed by nature; and
therefore that nature designed them for such perfection. I cannot forbear adding, though it is not to the present purpose, that
the appearance of such an amazing waste in nature, with respect
to these seeds and bodies, by foreign causes, is to us as unaccountable, as, what is much more terrible, the present and future ruin
)f so many moral agents by themselves, i.e. by vice.
Against this whole notion of moral discipline, it may be obiected, in another way; that so far as a course of behavior,
materially virtuous, proceeds from hope and fear, so far it is only




,54             PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE.           PART I.
a discipline and strengthening of self-love. But doing what God
commands, because he commands it, is obedience, though it proceeds from hope or fear. A course of such obedience will form
habits of it.  And a constant regard to veracity, justice, and
charity, may form distinct habits of these particular virtues; and
will certainly form habits of self-government, and of denying our
inclinations, whenever veracity, justice, or charity requires it.
Nor is there any foundation for this great nicety, with which
some affect to distinguish in this case, in order to depreciate all
religion proceeding from hope or fear. For, veracity, justice,
and charity, regard to God's authority, and to our own chief interest, are not only all three coincident; but each of them is, in
itself, a just and natural motive or principle of action.  He who
begins a good life from any one of them, and perseveres in it, as
he is already in some degree, so he cannot fail of becoming more
and more, of that character which is correspondent to the constitution of nature as moral; and to the relation which God
stands in to us as moral governor of it: nor consequently can he
fail of obtaining that happiness, which this constitution and relation necessarily suppose connected with that character.
These several observations, concerning the active principle of
virtue and obedience to God's commands, are applicable to passive submission or resignation to his will: which is another essential part of a right character, connected with the former, and
very much in our power to form ourselves to. It may be imagined,
that nothing but afflictions can give occasion for or require this
virtue; that it can have no respect to, nor be any way necessary
to qualify for, a state of perfect happiness: but it is not experience which can make us think thus. Prosperity itself, while
any thing supposed desirable is not ours, begets extravagant and
unbounded thoughts. Imagination is altogether as much a source
of discontent, as any thing in our external condition.  It is indeed true, that there can be no scope for patience, when sorrow
shall be no more; but there may be need of a temper of mind,
which shall have been formed by patience. For, though selflove, considered merely as an active principle leading us to pursue our chief interest, cannot but be uniformly coincident with
the principle of obedience to God's commands, our interest being
rightly understood; because this obedience, and the puroill of




CHAP. V.       PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE.             15.
our own chief interest, must be in every case one and the sams
thing: yet it may be questioned, whether self-love, considered
merely as the desire of our own interest or happiness, can, from
its nature, be thus absolutely and uniformly coincident with the
will of God; any more than particular affections can:* coincident
in such sort, as not to be liable to be excited upon occasions and
in degrees, impossible to be gratified consistently with the constitution of things, or the divine appointments. So that habits of
resignation may, upon this account, be requisite for all creatures:
habits, I say; which signify what is formed by use. However,
in general it is obvious that both self-love and particular affection
in human creatures considered only as passive feelings, distort
and rend the mind; and therefore stand in need of discipline.
Now denial of those particular affections, in a course of active
virtue and obedience to God's will, has a tendency to moderate
them; and seems also to have a tendency to habituate the mind,
to be easy and satisfied with that degree of happiness which is
allotted us, i.e. to moderate self-love. But the proper discipline
for resignation is affliction. A right behavior under that trial;
recollecting ourselves so as to consider it in the view, in which
religion teaches us to consider it, as from the hand of God, receiving it as what he appoints, or thinks proper to permit, in his
world and under his government; this will habituate the mind to
a dutiful submission. Such submission, together with the active
principle of obedience, make up the temper and character in us,
which answers to his sovereignty; and which absolutely belongs
to the condition of our being, as dependent creatures. Nor can
it be said, that this is only breaking the mind to a submission to
mere power; for mere power may be accidental, and precarious,
and usurped: but it is forming within ourselves the temper of
resignation to His rightful authority, who is, by nature, supreme
over all.
Upon the whole: such a character, and such qualifications, are
necessary for a mature state of life in the present world, as nature
alone does in no wise bestow; but has put it upon us, in great
part, to acquire, in our progress from one stage of life to another,
from childhood to mature age; put it upon us to acquire them,
by giving us capacities of doing it, and by placing us, in the
* p. 145.




{5(1 PROBATION AS A DISCIPLINE.                 PART L
beginning of life, in a condition fit for it. And this is a general
analogy to our condition in the present world, as in a state of
moral discipline for another.
It is in vain to object against the credibility of the present
life's being intended for this purpose, that all the trouble and the
danger unavoidably accompanying such discipline, might have
been saved us, by our being made at once the creatures and the
characters, which we were to be. For we experience, that what
we were to be, was to be the effect of what we would do: and
that the general conduct of nature is, not to save us trouble or
danger, but to make us capable of going through them, and to
put it upon us to do so. Acquirements of our own, experience
and habits, are the natural supply to our deficiencies, and security against our dangers: since it is as plainly natural to set ourselves to acquire the qualifications, as the external things, which
we stand ia need of. In particular, it is as plainly a general law
of nature, that we should with regard to our temporal interest,
form and cultivate practical principles within us, by attention,
use, and discipline, as any thing whatever is a natural law; chiefly
in the beg inning of life, but also throughout the whole course of
it. The alternative is left to our choice: either to improve ourselves, and better our condition; or, in default of such improvement, to remain deficient and wretched. It is therefore perfectly
credible, from the analogy of nature, that the same may be our
case, with respect to the happiness of a future state, and the
qualifications necessary for it.
There is a third thing, which may seem implied in the present
world's being a state of probation; that it is a theatre of action,
for the manifestation of persons' characters, with respect to a
future one: not, to be sure, to an all-knowing Being, but to his
creation or part of it. This may, perhaps, be only a consequence
of our being in a state of probation in the other senses. However, it is not impossible, that men's showing and making manifest, what is in their heart, what their real character is, may have
respect to a future life, in ways and manners with which we are
not acquainted: particularly it may be a means, (for the Author
of nature does not appear to do any thing without means,) of
their being disposed of suitably to their characters; and of its
being known to the creation, by way of example; that they are




CHAP. VI.       THE OPINION OF NECESSITY.                 15/
thus disposed of.  But not to enter upon any conjectural account
of this; one may just mention, that the manifestation of persons'
characters contributes very much, in various ways, to the carrying
on a great part of that general course of nature, respecting mankind, which comes under our observation at present. I shall
only add, that probation, in both these senses, as well as in that
treated of in the foregoing chapter, is implied in moral government; since by persons' behavior under it, their characters cannot but be manifested, and if they behave well, improved.
CHAPTER VI.
THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, CONSIDERED AS INFLUENCING
PRACTICE.
THROUGHOUT the foregoing treatise it appears, that the con
dition of mankind, considered as inhabitants of this world only,
and under the government of God which we experience, is greatly
analogous to our condition, as designed for another world, or as
under that farther government, which religion teaches us.  If
therefore any assert, as a fatalist must, that the opinion of universal necessity is reconcilable with the former; there immediately
arises a question in the way of analogy, whether he must not also
own it to be reconcilable with the latter, i.e. with the system of
religion itself, and the proof of it.  The reader then will observe,
that the question now before us is not absolute, i.e. whether the
opinion of fate be reconcilable with religion; but hypothetical,
whether, upon supposition of its being reconcilable with the constitution of nature, it be not reconcilable with religion also.  Or,
what pretence a fatalist, not other persons, but a fatalist, has to
conclude from his opinion, that there can be no such thing as
religion. And as the puzzle and obscurity, which must unavoidably arise from arguing upon so absurd a supposition as that of
universal necessity, will, I fear, easily be seen; it will, I hope, as
easily be excused.a
a [The student should learn to distinguish between the kinds of necessity.
There is-1. " Logical necessity," which requires the admission of a consequent
to a premise  2.' Moral necessity," which requires means in order to ends.
14




158              THE OPINION OF NECESSITY,                 PART 1,
Since it has been all along taken for granted, as a thing proved,
that there is an intelligent Author of nature, or natural Governor
of the world; and since an objection may be made against the
proof of this, from the opinion of universal necessity, as it may
be supposed, that such necessity will itself account for the origin
and preservation of all things; it is requisite, that this objection
be distinctly answered; or that it be shown, that a fatality supposed consistent with what we certainly experience, does not
destroy the proof of an intelligent Author and Governor of
nature; before we proceed to consider, whether it destroys the
proof of a moral Governor of it, or of our being in a state of
religion.
When it is said by a fatalist, that the whole constitution of
nature, the actions of men, every thing, and every mode and
circumstance of every thing, is necessary, and could not possibly
have been otherwise; it is to be observed, that this necessity does
not exclude deliberation, choice, preference, and acting from certain principles, and to certain ends: because all this is matter of
undoubted experience, acknowledged by all, and what every man
may, every moment, be conscious of.       Hence it follows, that
necessity, alone and of itself, is in no sort an account of the constitution of nature, and how things came to be and to continue as
they are; but only an account of this circumstance relating to
their origin and continuance, that they could not have been otherwise, than they are and have been.     The assertion, that every
thing is by necessity of nature, is not an answer to the question;
Whether the world came into being as it is, by an intelligent
Agent forming it thus, or not: but to quite another question;
Whether it came into being as it is, in that way and manner
which we call necessarily, or in that way and manner which we call
3. "Physical necessity," which is the compulsory connection of sequences to
antecedents, in the material world. 4. "Metaphysical necessity," which belongs to God only, as existing eternally and immutably. All these exist and
operate, and by them we govern ourselves.
But there are various other kinds of necessity, erroneous and pernicious,
which may be grouped under two heads:-1. "Atheistic," sometimes called
the Democritic, which ascribes all things to the mechanical laws of matter.
2. "Theistic," which admits the existence of God, but denies to him moral
character, and makes him the arbitrary and only agent in the universe, and
creatures not responsible. See COLLINGS on Providence, PRICE'S Dissertations,
RUTHERFORD On Providence, CHARNOCK'S Sermons, and WHATELY's Logic ]




CHAP. VI.       AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE.              159
freely?  For suppose farther, that one who was a fatalist, and
one who kept to his natural sense of things, and believed himself a free agent, were disputing together, and vindicating their
respective opinions; and they should happen to instance a
house; they would agree that it was built by an architect. Their
difference concerning necessity and freedom would occasion no
difference of judgment concerning this; but only concerning another matter; whether the architect built it necessarily or freely.
Suppose they should proceed to inquire concerning the constitution of nature. In a lax way of speaking, one of them might
say, it was by necessity; and the other, by freedom: but if they
had any meaning to their words, as the latter must mean a free
agent, so the former must at length be reduced to mean an agent,
whether he would say one or more, acting by necessity: for abstract notions can do nothing. We indeed ascribe to God a necessary existence, uncaused by any agent. For we find within ourselves the idea of infinity, i.e. immensity and eternity, impossible,
even in imagination, to be removed out of being. We seem to
discern intuitively, that there must, and cannot but be, something, external to ourselves, answering this idea, or the archetype
of it. Hence, (for this abstract, as much as any other, implies
a concrete) we conclude, that there is, and cannot but be, an infinite and immense eternal being, existing prior to all design contributing to his existence, and exclusive of it. From the scantiness of language, a manner of speaking has been introduced;
that necessity is the foundation, the reason, the account of the
existence of God. But it is not alleged, nor can it be at all
intended, that every thing exists as it does, by this kind of necessity: a necessity antecedent in nature to design: it cannot, I
say, be meant that every thing exists as it does, by this kind of
necessity, upon several accounts; and particularly because it is
admitted, that design, in the actions of men, contributes to many
alterations in nature. If any deny this, I shall not pretend to
reason with them.
From these things it follows; First, That when a fatalist
asserts, that every thing is by necessity, he must mean, by an
vgent acting necessarily; he must, I say, mean this, for I am
very sensible he would not choose to mean it.  Secondly, That
the necessity, by which such an agent is supposed'to act, does




160             THE OPINION OF NECESSITY,            PART I.
not exclude intelligence and design.  So that, were the system
of fatality admitted, it would just as much account for the formation of the world, as for the structure'of a house, and no
more. Necessity as much requires and supposes a necessary
agent, as freedom requires and supposes a free agent, to be the
former of the world. And the appearances of design and of final
causes in the constitution of nature as really prove this acting
agent to be an intelligent designer, or to act from choice; upon
the scheme of necessity, supposed possible, as upon that of
freedom.
It appearing thus, that the notion of necessity does not destroy
the proof that there is an intelligent Author of nature and
natural Governor of the world; the present question, which the
analogy before mentioned suggests,* and which, I think, it will
answer, is this: Whether the opinion of necessity, supposed consistent with possibility, with the constitution of the world, and
the natural government which we experience exercised over it,
destroys all reasonable ground of belief, that we are in a state of
religion: or whether that opinion be reconcilable with religion;
with the system, and the proof of it.
Suppose then a fatalist to educate any one, from his youth up,
in his own principles; that the child should reason upon them,
and conclude, that since he cannot possibly behave otherwise
than he does, he is not a subject of blame or commendation, nor
can deserve to be rewarded or punished. Imagine him to eradicate the very perceptions of blame and commendation out of his
mind, by means of this system; to form his temper, and character, and behavior to it; and from it to judge of the treatment
he was to expect, say, from reasonable men, upon his coming
abroad into the world: as the fatalist judges fiom this system,
what he is to expect from the Author of nature, and with regard
to a future state. I cannot forbear stopping here to ask, whether
any one of common sense would think fit, that a child should be
put upon these speculations, and be left to apply them to practice.  And a man has little pretence to reason, who is not
sensible, that we are all children in speculations of this kind.
However, the child would doubtless be highly delighted to find
himself freed from the restraints of fear and shame, with which
* P. 157.




CHAP. VI.       AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE               161
his play-fellows were fettered and embarrassed; and highly con.
ceited in his superior knowledge, so far beyond his years. But
conceit and vanity would be the least bad part of the influence,
which these principles must have, when thus reasoned and acted
upon, during the course of his education. He must either be
allowed to go on and be the plague of all about him, and himself
too, even to his own destruction, or else correction must be continually made use of, to supply the want of those natural perceptions of blame and commendation, which we have supposed to
be removed; and to give him a practical impression, of what he
had reasoned himself out of the belief of, that he was in fact an
accountable child, and to be punished for doing what he was
forbid. It is therefore in reality impossible, but that the correc
tion which he must meet with, in the course of his education,
must convince him, that if the scheme he was instructed in were
not false, yet that he reasoned inconclusively upon it, and somehow or other misapplied it to practice and common life; as what
the fatalist experiences of the conduct of Providence at present,
ought in all reason to convince him, that this scheme is misapplied, when applied to the subject of religion.* But supposing
the child's temper could remain still formed to the system, and
his expectation of the treatment he was to have in the world, be
regulated by it; so as to expect that no reasonable man would
blame or punish him, for any thing which he should do, because
he could not help doing it: upon this supposition it is manifest
he would, upon his coming abroad into the world, be insupportable to society, and the treatment which he would receive from it
would render it so to him; and he could not fail of doing something very soon, for which he would be delivered over into the
hands of civil justice. And thus, in the end, he would be convinced of the obligations he was under to his wise instructor.
Suppose this' scheme of fatality, in any other way, applied to
practice, such practical application of it will be found equally
absurd; equally fallacious in a practical sense. For instance, that
if a man be destined to live such a time, he shall live to it,
though he take no care of his own preservation; or if he be
destined to die before that time, no care can prevent it, therefore all care about preserving one's life is to be neglected: which
X P. 158.
L                     14*




[62             TIlE OPINION OF NECESSITY,              PART r.
is the fallacy instanced in by the ancients.  On the contrary,
none ot these practical absurdities can be drawn from reasoning,
upon the supposition that we are free; but all such reasoning
with regard to the common affairs of life is justified by experience.
Therefore, though it were admitted that this opinion of necessity
were speculatively true; yet, with regard to practice, it is as if it
were false, so far as our experience reaches: that is, to the whole
of our present life.  For, the constitution of the present world,
and the condition in which we are actually placed, is, as if we
were free.  And it may perhaps justly be concluded, that since
the whole process of action, through every step of it, suspense,
deliberation, inclining one way, determining, and at last doing as
we determine, is as if we were free, therefore we are so b
The thing here insisted upon is, that under the present natural
government of the world, we find we are treated and dealt with,
as if we were fiee, prior to all consideration whether we are so or
not.  Were this opinion therefore of necessity admitted to be
ever so true; yet such is in fact our condition and the natural
course of things, that whenever we apply it to life and practice,
this application of it always misleads us, and cannot but mislead
us, in a most dreadful manner, with regard to. our present interest.
How then can people think themselves so very secure, that the
same application of the same opinion may not mislead them also,
in some analogous manner, with respect to a future, a more
general, and more important interest?    For, religion being a
practical subject; and the analogy of nature showing us, that we
have not faculties to apply this opinion, were it a true one, to
practical subjects; whenever we do apply it to the subject of religion, and thence conclude, that we are free from its obligations,
it is plain this conclusion cannot be depended upon. There will
still remain just reason to think, whatever appearances are, that
we deceive ourselves; in somewhat of a like manner, as when
people fancy they can draw contradictory conclusions from the
idea of infinity.
b [HUME says, "though man, in truth, is a necessary agent, having all his
actions determined by fixed and immutable laws, yet, this being concealed from
him, he acts with the conviction of being a free agent."
Which is the same as to say that God intended to conceal from men aP
important fact, involving the whole subject of right and wrong, but Mr. Hume
found him out! ]




CHAP. VI.       AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE.                 163
From  these things together, the attentive reader will see it
follows, that if upon supposition of freedom the evidence of religion be conclusive, it remains so, upon supposition of necessity,
because the notion of necessity is not applicable to practical subjects: i.e. with respect to them, is as if it were not true.  Nor
does this contain any reflection upon reason, but only upon what
is unreasonable.  For to pretend to act upon reason, in opposition
to practical principles, which the Author of our nature gave us to
act upon; and to pretend to apply our reason to subjects, with
regard to which, our own short views, and even our experience,
will show us, it cannot be depended upon; and such, at best, the
subject of necessity must be; this is vanity, conceit, and unreasonableness.
But this is not all.  We find within ourselves a will, and are
conscious of a character. Now if this, in us, be reconcilable with
fate, it is reconcilable with it in the Author of nature. Besides,
natural government and final causes imply a character and a will
in the Governor and Designer;* a will concerning the creatures
whom he governs. The Author of nature then being certainly
of some character or other, notwithstanding necessity; it is evident this necessity is as reconcilable with the particular character
of benevolence, veracity, and justice, in him, which attributes
are the foundation of religion, as with any other character: since
we find this necessity no more hinders men from being benevolent, than cruel; true, than faithless; just, than unjust; or, if
the fatalist pleases, what we call unjust.  It is said indeed, that
what, upon supposition of freedom, would be just punishment,
upon supposition of necessity, becomes manifestly unjust: because
it is punishment inflicted for doing that which persons could not
avoid doing. As if the necessity, which is supposed to destroy
the injustice of murder, for instance, would not also destroy the
injustice of punishing it!  However, as little to the purpose as
this objection is in itself, it is very much to the purpose to observe from it, how the notions of justice and injustice remain,
even while we endeavor to suppose them removed; how they
4 By will and character is meant that which, in speaking of men, we should
express, not only by these words, but also by the words temper, taste, dispowitions, practical principles: that whole frame of mind, from whence ze act in
one malner s ather than another.




164            THE OPINION OF NECESSITY,            PART L
force themselves upon the mind, even while we are making suppositions destructive of them: for there is not, perhaps, a man in
the world, but would be ready to make this objection at first
thought.
But though it is most evident, that universal necessity, if it be
reconcilable with any thing, is reconcilable with that character in
the Author of nature, which is the foundation of religion;'Yet,
does it not plainly destroy the proof that he is of that character,
and consequently the proof of religion?" By no means. Foi
we find, that happiness and misery are not our fate, in any such
sense as not to be the consequences of our behavior; but that
they are the consequences of it.* We find God exercises the
same kind of government over us, which a father exercises over
his children, and a civil magistrate over his subjects. Now,
whatever becomes of abstract questions concerning liberty and
necessity, it evidently appears to us, that veracity and justice
must be the natural rule and measure of exercising this authority
or government, to a Being who can have no competitions, or interfering of interests, with his creatures and his subjects.
But as the doctrine of liberty, though we experience its truth,
may be perplexed with difficulties, which run up into the most
abstruse of all speculations; and as the opinion of necessity seems
to be the very basis upon which infidelity grounds itself; it may
be of some use to offer a more particular proof of the obligations
of religion, which may distinctly be shown not to be destroyed
by this opinion.
The proof from final causes of an intelligent Author of nature
is not affected by the opinion of necessity; supposing necessity a
thing possible in itself, and reconcilable with the constitution of
things.t  It is a matter of fact, independent on this or any other
speculation, that he governs the world by the method of rewards
and punishments:t and also that he hath given us a moral faculty,
by which we distinguish between actions, and approve some as
virtuous and of good desert, and disapprove others as vicious and
of ill desert.~ This moral discernment implies, in the notion of
it, a rule of action, and a rule of a very peculiar kind: for it
carries in it authority and a right of direction; authority in such
a sense, as that we cannot depart from it without being self-cou.
* Chap. ii.   t P. 157, &c.    4 Chap. ii.   { Dissert II.




CHAP. VI.       AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE.                1O6
demned.* And that the dictates of this moral faculty, which are
by nature a rule to us, are moreover the laws of God, laws in a
sense including sanctions; may be thus proved.  Consciousness
of a rule or guide of action, in creatures who are capable of considering it as given them by their Maker, not only raises immediately a sense of duty, but also a sense of security in following
it, and of danger in deviating from it.  A direction of the Author
of nature, given to creatures capable of looking upon it as such,
is plainly a command from him: and a command from him necessarily includes in it, at least, an implicit promise in case of obedience, or threatening in case of disobedience.  But then the
sense or perception of good and ill desert,t which is contained in
the moral discernment, renders the sanction explicit, and makes
it appear, as one may say, expressed. For since his method of
government is to reward and punish actions, his having annexed
to some actions an inseparable sense of good desert, and to others
of ill, this surely amounts to declaring, upon whom his punishments shall be inflicted, and his rewards be bestowed. He must
have given us this discernment and sense of things, as a presentiment of what is to be hereafter: that is, by way of information
beforehand, what we are finally to expect in this world. There
is then most evident ground to think, that the government of
God, upon the whole, will be found to correspond to the nature
which he has given us: and that, in the upshot and issue of
things, happiness and misery shall, in fact and event, be made
to follow virtue and vice respectively; as he has already, in so
peculiar a manner, associated the ideas of them in our minds.
And hence might easily be deduced the obligations of religious
worship, were it only to be considered as a means of preserving
upon our minds a sense of this moral government of God, and
securing our obedience to it: which yet is an extremely imperfect view of that most important duty.
No objection from necessity can lie against this general proof
of religion. None against the proposition reasoned upon, that
we have such a moral faculty and discernment; because this is a
mere matter of fact, a thing of experience, that human kind is
thus constituted: none against the conclusion; because it is
immediate and wholly from this fact.  For the conclusion, that
* Serm. 2, at the Rolls.               t Dissert. II.




166               THE OPINION OF NECESSITY,                  PART i.
God will finally reward the righteous and punish the wicked, is
not here drawn, from its appearing to us fit* that he should; but
from  its appearing, that he has told us, he will.    And this he
hath certainly told us, in the promise and threatening, which it
bath been observed the notion of a command implies, and the
sense of good and ill desert which he has given us, more distinctly expresses.  This reasoning from fact is confirmed, and in
some degree even verified, by other facts; by the natural tendencies of virtue and of vice;T and by this, that God, in the natural
course of his providence, punishes vicious actions as mischievous
to society; and also vicious actions as such in the strictest sense.t
So that the general proof of religion is unanswerably real, even
upon the wild supposition which we are arguing upon.
It must be observed further, that natural religion has, besides
this, an external evidence; which the doctrine of necessity, if it
could be true, would not affect.     For suppose a person, by the
observations and reasoning above, or by any other, convinced of
the truth of religion; that there is a God, who made the world,
who is the moral governor and judge of mankind, and will upon
the whole deal with every one according to his works: I say,
suppose a person convinced of this by reason, but to know
nothing at all of antiquity, or the present state of mankind: it
would be natural for such a one to be inquisitive, what was the
history of this system of doctrine; at what time, and in what
manner, it came first into the world; and whether it were believed by any considerable part of it. Were he upon inquiry to
* However, I am far from intending to deny, that the will of God is determined, by what is fit, by the right and reason of the case; though one chooses
to decline matters of such abstract speculation, and to speak with caution when
one does speak of them.  But if it be intelligible to say, that it is fit and
reasonable for every oe to consult his ownI happiness, then fitness of action, or
the right and reason of the case, is an intelligible manner of speaking. And
it seems as inconceivable, to suppose God to approve one course of action, or
one end, preferably to another, which yet his acting at all from design implies
that he does, without supposing somewhat prior in that end, to be the ground
of the preference; as to suppose him to discern an abstract proposition to be
true, without supposing somewhat prior in it, to be the ground of the discernment. It doth not therefore appear, that moral right is any more relative t(
perception, than abstract truth is; or that it is any more improper to speak of
the fitness and rightness of actions and ends, as founded in the nature of thir ga,
than to speak of abstract truth, as thus founded.
t P. 118.                                t P. 110, ac.




CHAP. VI.       AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE.               167
find, that a particular person, in a late age, first of al proposed
it, as a deduction of reason, and that mankind were before
wholly ignorant of it; then, though its evidence from reason
would remain, there would be no additional probability of its
truth, from the account of its discovery.
But instead of this being the fact, he would find, on the contrary, what could not but afford him a very strong confirmation
of its truth: First, That somewhat of this system, with more or
fewer additions and alterations, hath been professed in all ages
and countries, of which we have any certain information relating
to this matter.  Secondly, That it is certain historical fact, so
far as we can trace things up, that this whole system of belief,
that there is one God, the creator and moral governor of the
world, and that mankind is in a state of religion, was received
in the first ages. And Thirdly, That as there is no hint or intimation in history, that this system was first reasoned out; so
there is express historical or traditional evidence, as ancient as
history, that it was taught first by revelation.
Now these things must be allowed to be of great weight. The
first of them, general consent, shows this system to be conformable to the common sense of mankind. The second, namely,
that religion was believed in the first ages of the world, especially
as it does not appear that there were then any superstitious or
false additions to it, cannot but be a further confirmation of its
truth.  For it is a proof of this alternative: either that it came
into the world by revelation; or that it is natural, obvious, and
forces itself upon the mind.  The former of these is the conclusion of learned men. And whoever will consider, how unapt for
speculation rude and uncultivated minds are, will, perhaps from
hence alone, be strongly inclined to believe it the truth.  And
as it is shown in the second part* of this treatise, that there is
nothing of such peculiar presumption against a revelation in the
beginning of the world, as there is supposed to be against subsequent ones; a sceptic could not, 1 think, give any account, which
would appear more probable even to himself, of the early pretences to revelation; than by supposing some real original one,
from whence they were copied.
And the third thing above mentioned, that there is express
e Chap. ii.




16S             THE OPINION OF NECESSITY,            PART I.
historical or traditional evidence, as ancient as history, of the
system of religion being taught mankind by revelation, this must
be admitted as some degree of real proof, that it was so taught.
For why should not the most ancient tradition be admitted as
some additional proof of a fact, against which there is no presumption?  This proof is mentioned here, because it has its
weight to show, that religion came into the world by revelation,
prior to all consideration of the proper authority of any book
supposed to contain it; and even prior to all consideration,
whether the revelation itself be uncorruptly handed down, or
mixed and darkened with fables.  Thus the historical account,
which we have of the origin of religion, taking in all circumstances, is a real confirmation of its truth, no way affected by
the opinion of necessity.  And the external evidence, even of
natural religion, is by no means inconsiderable.
It is carefully to be observed, and ought to be recollected after
all proofs of virtue and religion, which are only general, that as
speculative reason may be neglected, prejudiced, and deceived,
so also may our moral understanding be impaired and perverted,
and the dictates of it not impartially attended to. This indeed
proves nothing against the reality of our speculative or practical
faculties of perception; against their being intended by nature,
to inform us in the theory of things, and instruct us how we are
to behave, and what we are to expect in consequence of our
behavior. Yet our liableness, in the degree we are liable, to
prejudice and perversion, is a most serious admonition to us to be
upon our guard, with respect to what is of such consequence, as
our determinations concerning virtue and religion; and particularly not to take custom, and fashion, and slight notions of
honor, or imaginations of present ease, use, and convenience to
mankind, for the only moral rule.*
The foregoing observations, drawn from the nature of the
thing, and the history of religion, amount, when taken together,
to a real practical proof of it, not to be confuted: such a proof
as, considering the infinite importance of the thing, I apprehend,
would be admitted fully sufficient, in reason, to influence the
actions of men, who act upon thought and reflection, if it were admitted that there is no proof of the contrary. But it may be said;
- Dissertation II.




CHAP. VI.       AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE.              169
" There are many probabilities, which cannot indeed be confuted,
i.e. shown to be no probabilities, and yet may be overbalanced by
greater probabilities, on the other side; much more by demonstration. And there is no occasion to object against particular
arguments alleged for an opinion, when the opinion itself may be
clearly shown to be false, without meddling with such arguments
at all, but leaving them just as they are.* Now the method of
government by rewards and punishments, and especially rewarding and punishing good and ill desert as such respectively, must
go upon supposition, that we are free and not necessary agents.
And it is incredible, that the Author of nature should govern us
upon a supposition as true, which he knows to be false; and
therefore absurd to think, he will reward or punish us for our
actions hereafter; especially that he will do it under the notion,
that they are of good or ill desert."
Here then the matter is brought to a point. And the answer
is full, and not to be evaded,-viz.: that the whole constitution
and course of things, the whole analogy of Providence, shows
beyond possibility of doubt, that the conclusion from this reasoning is false; wherever the fallacy lies. The doctrine of freedom
indeed clearly shows where: in supposing ourselves necessary,
when in truth we are free agents. But, upon the supposition of
necessity, the fallacy lies in taking for granted, that it is incredible necessary agents should be rewarded and punished.
That, somehow or other, the conclusion now mentioned is false,
is most certain.  For it is fact, that God does govern even brute
creatures by the method of rewards and punishments, in the
natural course of things.  Men are rewarded and punished for
their actions, punished for actions mischievous to society as being
so, punished for vicious actions as such; by the natural instrumentality of each other, under the present conduct of Providence. Nay, even the affection of gratitude, and the passion of
resentment, and the rewards and punishments following from
them, which in general are to be considered as natural, i.e. from
the Author of nature; these rewards and punishments, being
naturall yt annexed to actions considered as implying good intention and good desert, ill intention and ill desert; these natural
rewards and punishments, I say, are as much a contradiction to
Pp. 68, 71.                - Serm. 8th, at the Rolls.
15




170       NECESSITY, AS INFLUENCING PRACTICE.            PART I.
the conclusion above, and show its falsehood, as a more exact and
complete rewarding and punishing of go.od and ill desert as such.
So that if it be incredible, that necessary agents should be thus
rewarded and punished; then, men are not necessary but free;
since it is matter of fact, that they are thus rewarded and
punished. If, on the contrary, which is the supposition we have
been arguing upon, it be insisted that men are necessary agents;
then, there is nothing incredible in the further supposition of
necessary agents being thus rewarded and punished: since we
ourselves are thus dealt with.
From the whole therefore it must follow, that a necessity supposed possible, and reconcilable with the constitution of things,
does in no sort prove that the Author of Nature will not, nor
destroy the proof that he will, finally and upon the whole, in his
eternal government, render his creatures happy or miserable, by
some means or other, as they behave well or ill.  Or, to express
this conclusion in words conformable to the title of the chapter,
the analogy of nature shows us, that the opinion of necessity, considered as practical, is false. And if necessity, upon the supposition above mentioned, doth not destroy the proof of natural
religion, it evidently makes no alteration in the proof of revealed.
From  these things likewise we may learn, in what sense to
understand that general assertion, that the opinion -of necessity is
essentially destructive of all religion. First, in a practical sense;
that by this notion, atheistical men pretend to satisfy and encourage themselves in vice, and justify to others their disregard to
all religion.  And secondly, in the strictest sense; that it is a
contradiction to the whole constitution of nature, and to what we
may every moment experience in ourselves, and so overturns
every thing. But by no means is this assertion to be understood,
as if necessity, supposing it could possibly be reconciled with the
constitution of things, and with what we experience, were not
also reconcilable with religion: for upon this supposition, it
demonstrably is so.0
c [Consult, in favor of the doctrine of necessity, atheistical writers generally; such as Fichte, Ilegel, D'Holback, Comte, Crousse, Martineau, Leroux,
and Holyoake- also, BELSHAM'S Essays, COLLINS on Liberty, CROMBIE on
Phil. Necessity, IIOBBES' Liberty and Necessity, and Leviathan, PRI S'rLEY on
Liberty, HARTLEY on Man, and EDWARDS on the Will.
Against the doctrine, see BEATTIE'S Works, Part 2; Replies to Hobbes by




CHAP. vnI. GOVERNMENT OF GOD, INCOMPREIIENSIBLE,       171
CHAPTER VTL.
THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD, CONSIDERED AS A SCHEME OR
CONSTITUTION, IMPERFECTLY COMPREIENDED.
THOUGH it be acknowledged, as it cannot but be, that the analogy of nature gives a strong credibility to the general doctrine of
religion, and to the several particular things contained in it, considered as so many matters of fact; and likewise that it shows
this credibility not to be destroyed by any notions of necessity:
still, objections may be insisted upon, against the wisdom, equity,
and goodness of the divine government implied in the notion of
religion, and against the method by which this government is
conducted; to which objections analogy can be no direct answer.
For the credibility, or the certain truth, of a matter of fact, does
not immediately prove any thing concerning the wisdom or goodness of it; and analogy can do no more, immediately or directly,
than show such and such things to be true or credible, considered
only as matters of fact. But if, upon supposition of a moral constitution of nature and a moral government over it, analogy suggests and makes it credible, that this government must be a
scheme, system, or constitution of government, as distinguished
from a number of single unconnected acts of distributive justice
and goodness; and likewise, that it must be a scheme, so imperfectly comprehended, and of such a sort in other respects, as to
afford a direct general answer to all objections against the justice
and goodness of it: then analogy is, remotely, of great service in
answering those objections; both by suggesting the answer, and
showing it-to be a credible one.
Now this, upon inquiry, will be found to be the case. For,
First, Upon supposition that God exercises a moral government
over the world, the analogy of his natural government suggests
and makes it credible, that his moral government must be a
scheme, quite beyond our comprehension: and this affords a
BRAlHALL and LAWSON; Replies to Priestley by PALMER and BRYANT; GROVE
on Liberty; CLARIKE'S Sermons at the Boyle Lectures; GIBB'S Contemplations;
kING'S Origin of Evil; REID on the Mind; WATTS on Liberty; HARRIS' Boyle
Lectures; JACKSON'S Defence; BUTTERWORTH on Moral Government.]




172             THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD,              PARI I.
general answer to all objections against the justice and goodness
of it.  Secondly, A more distinct observation of some particular
things contained in God's scheme of natural government, the like
things being supposed, by analogy, to be contained in his moral
government, will further show, how little weight is to be laid
upon these objections.
I. Upon supposition that God exercises a moral government
over the world, the analogy of his natural government suggests
and makes it credible, that his moral government must be a
scheme, quite beyond our comprehension; and this affords a
general answer to all objections against the justice and goodness
of it. It is most obvious, analogy renders it highly credible, that,
upon supposition of a moral government, it must be a scheme.
For the world, and the whole natural government of it, appears
to be so: to be a scheme, system, or constitution, whose parts
correspond to each other, and to a whole, as really as any work of
art, or as any particular model of a civil constitution and government. In this great scheme of the natural world, individuals
have various peculiar relations to other individuals of their own
species. Whole species are, we find, variously related to other
species, upon this earth. Nor do we know, how much further
these kinds of relations may extend. And, as there is not any
action or natural event, which we are acquainted with, so single
and unconnected, as not to have a respect to some other actions
and events; so possibly each of them, when it has not an immediate, may yet have a remote, natural relation to other actions
and events, much beyond the compass of this present world.
There seems indeed nothing, from whence we can so much as
make a conjecture, whether all creatures, actions, and events,
throughout the whole of nature, have relations to each other
But, as it is obvious, that all events have future unknown conse
quences; so if we trace any event, as far as we can, into what it
connected with it, we shall find, that if it were not connected
with something further in nature, unknown to us, something
both past and present, such event could not possibly have been
at all. Nor can we give the whole account of any one thing
whatever; of all its causes, ends, and necessary adjuncts; those
adjuncts, I mean, without which it could not have been. By
this most astonishing connection, these reciprocal correspondences




ChAP. vn.       A SCHEME INCOMPREHENSIBLE.                   173
and mutual relations, every thing which we see in the course of
nature is actually brought about.    Things seemingly the most
insignificant imaginable, are perpetually observed to be necessary
conditions to other things of the greatest importance; so that
any one thing whatever, may for aught we know to the contrary,
be a necessary condition to any other.
The natural world then, and natural government of it, being
such an incomprehensible scheme; so incomprehensible, that a
man must, really in the literal sense, know nothing at all, who is
not sensible of his ignorance in it; this immediately suggests,
and strongly shows the credibility, that the moral world and
government of it may be so too.a    Indeed the natural and moral
constitution and government of the world are so connected, as to
make up together but one scheme: and it is highly probable,
that the first is formed and carried on merely in subserviency to
the latter; as the vegetable world is for the animal, and organized
bodies for minds. But the thing intended here is, without inquiring how far the administration of the natural world is hubordinate to that of the moral, only to observe the credibility, that
one should be analogous or similar to the other: that theiefore
every act of divine justice and goodness may be supposed to look
much beyond itself, and its immediate object; may have some
reference to other parts of God's moral administration, and to a
general moral plan; and that every circumstance of this his moral
government may be adjusted beforehand with a view to the whole
of it. For example: the determined length of time, and the
degrees and ways, in. which virtue is to remain in a state of warfare and discipline, and in which wickedness is permitted-to have
a [MAIMONIDES makes use of the following similitude. " Suppose one of good
understanding, whose mother had died soon after he was born to be brought
up on an island, where he saw no human being but his father nor the female
of any beast. This person when grown up inquires how men are produced.
He is told that they are bred in the womb of one of the same species and that
while in the womb we are very small and there move and are nourished. The
young man inquires whether when thus in the womb we did not eat, and drink,
and breathe, as we do now, and is answered, No. Then he denies it, and offers
demonstration that it could not be so. For says he, if either of us cease to
breathe our life is gone; and how could we have lived close shut up in a womb
for months? So if we cease to eat and drink, we die, and how could the child
live so for months? and thus he satisfies himself that it is impossible man
snould come into existence in such a manner."]
15*




174               THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD,                    PART I.
itj progress; the times appointed for the execution uf justice;
the appointed instruments of it; the kinds of rewards and punishments, and the manners of their distribution; all particular instances of divine justice and goodness, and every circumstance of
them, may have such respects to each other, as to make up altogether a whole, connected and related in all its parts; a scheme
or system, which is as properly such, as the natural world is, and
of the like kind.   Supposing this to be the case, it is most evident, that we are not competent judges of this scheme, from the
small parts of it which come within our view in the present life:
therefore no objections against any of these parts can be insisted
upon by reasonable men.b
This our ignorance, and the consequence here drawn from it,
are universally acknowledged upon other occasions; and though
scarce denied, yet are universally forgot, when persons come to
argue against religion. And it is not perhaps easy, even for the
most reasonable men, always to bear in mind the degree of our
ignorance, and make due allowances for it.   Upon these accounts,
it may not be useless to go a little further, in order to show more
distinctly, how just an answer our ignorance is, to objections
against the scheme of Providence. Suppose then a person boldly
to assert," that the things complained of, the origin and continuance of evil, might easily have been prevented by repeated interpositions;* interpositions so guarded and circumstanced, as would
b [Let us imagine a person to be taken to view some great historical painting,
before which hangs a thick curtain. The attendant raises the curtain a few
inches. Can the spectator, from the unmeaning strip of foreground, derive
any conception of the figures yet concealed? Much less is he able to criticize
their proportions, or beauty, or perspective, or even the design of the artist?
The small fragment of a tree, or flower, or animal, or building, may seem quite
unmeaning and even ugly, though the whole would present beauty, fitness, or
grandeur. Now the portion of God's dominions within our survey, is as utterly
insignificant, compared to the universe, and its interminable duration, as. an
atom compared to a planet or a man's age to eternity.
The concluding observations of this chapter, abundantly remove every diffi.
culty as to such ignorance being as valid against the proofs of religion, as it is
against objections to it.]
c [No truly philosophical mind can be arrogant; because the wider the range
of thought, the greater are the discoveries of our ignorance. The young student may well hesitate to decide points, on which the profoundest thinkers
take opposite sides, and when conscious of inability intrust hiusislf to the
guidance of those whose lives are best.
* Pp. 177, 178.




ClhiP. VI.    A SCHEME INCOMPREIIENSIBLE.               li; 
preclude all mischief arising from them.  Or, if this were in..
practicable, that a scheme of government is itself an imperfection,
since more good might have been produced, without any scheme,
system, or constitution at all, by continued single unrelated acts
of distributive justice and goodness; because these would have
occasioned no irregularities.  Farther than this, it is presumed,
the objections will not be carried. Yet the answer is obvious:
that were these assertions true, still the observations above, concerning our ignorance in the scheme of divine government and
the consequence drawn from it, would hold, in great measure;
enough to vindicate religion, against all objections from the disorders of the present state.  Were these assertions true, yet the
government of the world might be just and good notwithstanding;
for, at the most, they would infer nothing more than that it
might have been better.  But they are mere arbitrary assertions;
no man being sufficiently acquainted with the possibilities of
things, to bring any proof of them to the lowest degree of probability.  For however possible what is asserted may seem, yet
many instances may be alleged, in things much less out of our
reach, of suppositions absolutely impossible, and reducible to the
most palpable self contradictions, which, not every one would perceive to be such; nor perhaps any one, at first sight suspect.
From these things, it is easy to see distinctly, how our ignorance, as it is the common, so it is really a satisfactory answer,
to all objections against the justice and goodness of Providence.
If a man, contemplating any one providential dispensation, which
had no relation to any others, should object, that he discerned in
it a disregard to justice, or a deficiency of goodness; nothing
would be less an answer to such objection, than our ignorance in
other parts of providence, or in the possibilities of things, no way
related to what he was contemplating.  But when we know not
but the part objected against may be relative to other parts unknown to us; and when we are unacquainted with what is, in
the nature of the thing, practicable in the case before us; then
our ignorance is a satisfactory answer; because, some unknown
relation, or some unknown impossibility, may render what is
oDjected against, just and good; nay good in the highest practicable degree.
II. How little weight is to be laid upon such objections, will




176            TIE GOVERNMENT OF GOD,              PART I.
further appear, by a more distinct observation of some particular
things contained in the natural government of God, the like to
which may be supposed, fromn analogy, to be contained in his
moral government.
First, As in the scheme of the natural world, no ends appear
to be accomplished without means: so we find that means very
undesirable, often conduce to bring about ends, in such a measure
desirable, as greatly to overbalance the disagreeableness of the
means. And in cases where such means are conducive to such
ends, it is not reason, but experience, which shows us, that they
are thus conducive. Experience also shows many means to be
conducive and necessary to accomplish ends, which means, before
experience, we should have thought, would have had even a contrary tendency. From these observations relating to the natural
scheme of the world, the moral being supposed analogous to it,
arises a great credibility, that the putting our misery in each
other's power to the degree it is, and making men liable to vice
to the degree we are; and in general, that those things which
are objected against the moral scheme of Providence, may be,
upon the whole, friendly and assistant to virtue, and productive
of an overbalance of happiness: i.e. the things objected against
may be means, by which an overbalance of good, will in the end,
be found produced. And from the same observations, it appears
to be no presumption against this, that we do not, if indeed we
do not, see those means to have any such tendency, or that they
seem to us to have a contrary one. Thus those things, which we
call irregularities, may not be so at all; because they may be
means of accomplishing wise and good ends more considerable.
It may be added, as above, that they may also be the only means,
by which these wise and good ends are capable of being accomplished.
It may be proper to add, in order to obviate an absurd and
wicked conclusion from any of these observations, that though
the constitution of our nature, from whence we are capable of
vice and misery, may, as it undoubtedly does, contribute to the
perfection and happiness of the world; and though the actual
permission of evil may be beneficial to it: (i.e. it would have
been more mischievous, not that a wicked person had himself.abstained from his own wickedness, but that any one had forcibly




CHAP. VII.    A SCHEME INCOMPREHENSIBLE.            1i7
prevented it, than that it was permitted:) yet notwithstanding,
it might have been much better for the world, if this very evil
had never been done. Nay it is most clearly conceivable, that
the very commission of wickedness may be beneficial to the world,
and yet, that it would be infinitely more beneficial for men to refrain from it. For thus, in the wise and good constitution of the
natural world, there are disorders which bring their own cures;
diseases, which are themselves remedies. Many a man would
have died, had it not been for the gout or a fever; yet it would
be thought madness to assert, that sickness is a better or more
perfect state than health; though the like, with regard to the
moral world, has been asserted.
Secondly, The natural government of the world is carried on
by general laws. For this there may be wise and good reasons:
the wisest and best, for aught we know to the contrary. And
that there are such reasons, is suggested to our thoughts by the
analogy of nature; by our being made to experience good ends
to be accomplished, as indeed all the good which we enjoy is
accomplished, by this means,-viz.: that the laws, by which the
world is governed, are general. We have scarce any kind of
enjoyments, but what we are, in some way or other, instrumental
in procuring ourselves, by acting in a manner which we foresee
likely to procure them: now this foresight could not be at all,
were not the government of the world carried on by general laws.
And though, for aught we know to the contrary, every single
case may be, at length, found to have been provided for even by
these: yet to prevent all irregularities, or remedy them as they
arise, by the wisest and best general laws, may be impossible in
the nature of things; as we see it is absolutely impossible in civil
government.
But then we are ready to think, that, the constitution of nature
remaining as it is, and the course of things being permitted to go
on, in other respects, as it does, there might be interpositions to
prevent irregularities; though they could not have been prevented, or remedied by any general laws. There would indeed
be reason to wish, which, by-the-way, is very different from a
tight to claim, that all irregularities were prevented or remedied
by present interpositions, if these interpositions would have no
other effect than this. But it is plain they would have somo
M




178             THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD,              PART I.
visible and immediate Lad effects: for instance, they would
encourage idleness and negligence; and they would render
doubtful the natural rule of life, which is ascertained by this
very thing, that the course of the world is carried on by general
laws. And further, it is certain they would have distant effects,
and very great ones too; by means of the wonderful connections
before mentioned.*  So that we cannot so much as guess, what
would be the whole result of the interpositions desired. It may
be said, any bad result might be prevented by further interpositions, whenever there was occasion for them: but this again is
talking quite at random, and in the dark.T
Upon the whole then, we see wise reasons, why the course of
the world should be carried on by general laws, and good ends
accomplished by this means: and for aught we know, there
may be the wisest reasons for it, and the best ends accomplished
by it. We have no ground to believe, that all irregularities could
be remedied as they arise, or could have been precluded, by general laws. We find that interpositions would produce evil, and
prevent good: and, for aught we know, they would produce
greater evil than they would prevent; and prevent greater good
than they would produce. And if this be the case, then the not
interposing is so far from being a ground of complaint, that it is
an instance of goodness. This is intelligible and sufficient: and
going further, seems beyond the utmost reach of our faculties.
It may be said, that "after all, these supposed impossibilities
and relations are what we are unacquainted with; and we must
judge of religion, as of other things, by what we do know, and
look upon the rest as nothing: or however, that the answers here
given to what is objected against religion, may equally be made
use of to invalidate the proof of it; since their stress lies so
very much upon our ignorance." But,
First, Though total ignorance in any matter does indeed
equally destroy, or rather preclude, all proof concerning it, and
objections against it; yet partial ignorance does not. For we
may in any degree be convinced, that a person is of such a character, and consequently will pursue such ends; though we are
greatly ignorant, what is the proper way of acting, in order the
most effectually to obtain those ends: and in this case, objections
-P. 173, &ec.                       t 1' 175




CHAP. VIL     A SCHEME INCOMPREIENSIBLE.                L79
against his manner of:-cting, as seemingly not conducive to obtain them, might be answered by our ignorance; though the
proof that such ends were intended, might not at all be invalidated by it.  Thus, the proof of religion is a proof of the moral
character of God, and consequently that his government is moral,
and that every one upon the whole shall receive according to his
deserts; a proof that this is the designed end of his government.
But we are not competent judges, what is the proper way of
acting, in order the most effectually to accomplish this end.*
Therefore our ignorance is an answer to objections against the
conduct of Providence, in permitting irregularities, as seeming
contradictory to this end. Now, since it is so obvious, that our
ignorance may be a satisfactory answer to objections against a
thing, and yet not affect the proof of it; till it can be shown, it
is frivolous to assert, that our ignorance invalidates the proof of
religion, as it does the objections against it.
Secondlly, Suppose unknown impossibilities, and unknown relations, might justly be urged to invalidate the proof of religion,
as well as to answer objections against it; and that, in consequence of this, the proof of it were doubtful.  Still, let the
assertion be despised, or let it be ridiculed, it is undeniably true,
that moral obligations would remain certain, though it were not
certain what would, upon the whole, be the consequences of
observing or violating them.  For, these obligations arise, immediately and necessarily, from the judgment of our own mind,
unless perverted, which we cannot violate without being selfcondemned. And they would be certain too, from considerations
of interest. For though it were doubtful, what will be the future
consequences of virtue and vice; yet it is, however, credible,
that they may have those consequences, which religion teaches
us they will: and this credibility is a certaint obligation in point
of prudence, to abstain from all wickedness, and to live in the
conscientious practice of all that is good.
Thirdly, The answers above given to the objections against
religion cannot be made use of to invalidate the proof of it.
For, upon suspicion that God exercises a moral government over
the world, analogy does most strongly lead us to conclude, that
this moral government must be a scheme, or constitution, beyond
* Pp. 72, 73.         t P. 68, and Part II. chap. vi.




[80                   CONCLUSION.                   PART L
our jomprehension.  A thousand particular analogies show us,
that parts of such a scheme, from their relation to other parts,
may conduce to accomplish ends, which we should have thought
they had no tendency to accomplish: nay ends, which before experience, we should have thought such parts were contradictory
to, and had a tendency to prevent. Therefore all these analogies
show, that the way of arguing made use of in objecting against
religion is delusive: because they show it is not at all incredible,
that, could we comprehend the whole, we should find the permission of the disorders objected against to be consistent with
justice and goodness; and even to be instances of them. Now
this is not applicable to the proof of religion, as it is to the
objections against it;* and therefore cannot invalidate that proof,
as it does these objections.
Lastly, From the observation now made, it is easy to see, that
the answers above given to the objections against Providence,
though, in a general way of speaking, they may be said to be
taken from our ignorance; yet are by no means taken merely
from that, but from something which analogy shows us concerning it. For analogy shows us positively, that our ignorance in
the possibilities of things, and the various relations in nature,
renders us incompetent judges, and leads us to false conclusions,
in cases similar to this, in which we pretend to judge and to
object. So that the things above insisted upon are not mere
suppositions of unknown impossibilities and relations: but they
are suggested to our thoughts, and even forced upon the observation of serious men, and rendered credible too, by the analogy of
nature. Therefore to take these things into the account, is to
judge by experience and what we do know: and it is not judging so, to take no notice of them.
CONCLUSION
THE observations of the last chapter lead us to consider this
little scene of human life, in which we are so busily engaged, as
having a reference, of some sort or other, to a much larger plan
of things. Whether we are, any way, related to the more d4is
- Serm. at the Nolls, p. 312, 2d ed.




CHAP. VII.             CONCLUSION.                    181
tant parts of the boundless universe, into which we are brought,
is altogether uncertain.  But it is evident, that the course of
things, which comes within our view, is connected with some
things, past, present, and future, beyond it.* So that we are
placed, as one may speak, in the middle of a scheme, not fixed
but progressive, every way incomprehensible: incomprehensible,
in a manner equally, with respect to what has been, what now is,
and what shall be. This scheme cannot but contain in it some
things as wonderful, and as much beyond our thought and conception,t as any thing in that of religion. For, will any man in
his senses say, that it is less difficult to conceive, how the world
came to be and to continue as it is, without, than with, an intelligent Author and Governor of it? Or, admitting an intelligent
Governor of it, that there is some other rule of government more
natural, and of easier conception, than that which we call moral?
Indeed, without an intelligent Author and Governor of nature,
no account at all can be given, how this universe, or the part of
it particularly in which we are concerned, came to be, and the
course of it to be carried on, as it is: nor any, of its general end
and design, without a moral governor of it. That there is an
intelligent Author of nature, and natural Governor of the world,
is a principle gone upon in the foregoing treatise; as proved, and
generally known, and confessed to be proved. And the very
notion of an intelligent Author of nature, proved by particular
final causes, implies a will and a character.4
Now, as our whole nature, the nature which he has given us,
leads us to conclude his will and character to be moral, just, and
good: so we can scarce in imagination conceive, what it can be
otherwise. However, in consequence of this his will and character, whatever it be, he formed the universe as it is, and carries
on the course of it as he does, rather than in any other manner;
and has assigned to us, and to all living creatures, a part and a
lot in it. Irrational creatures act this their part, and enjoy and
undergo the pleasures and the pains allotted them, without any
reflection. But one would think it impossible, that creatures
endued with reason could avoid reflectinlg sometimes upon all
this; reflecting, if not from whence we came, yet, at least,
whither we are going; and what the mysterious scheme, in the? P. 172, &c.        t See Part II. ch. ii.    J P. 173.
16




i82                     CONCLUSION.                  PART L
midst of which we find ourselves, will, at length, come out and
produce: a scheme in which it is certain we are highly interested,
and in which we may be interested even beyond conception.d
For many things prove it palpably absurd to conclude, that
we shall cease to be, at death.  Particular analogies do most
sensibly show us, that there is nothing to be thought strange, in
our being to exist in another state of life. And that we are now
living beings, affords a strong probability that we shall continue
so; unless there be some positive ground, and there is none from
reason or analogy, to think death will destroy us. Were a persuasion of this kind ever so well grounded, there would, surely,
be little reason to take pleasure in it. Indeed it can have no
other ground, than some such imagination, as that of our gross
bodies being ourselves; which is contrary to experience. Experience too most clearly shows us the folly of concluding, from the
body and the living agent affecting each other mutually, that the
dissolution of the former is the destruction of the latter.  And
there are remarkable instances of their not affecting each other,
which lead us to a contrary conclusion. The supposition, then,
which in all reason we are to go upon, is, that our living nature
will continue after death. And it is infinitely unreasonable to
form an institution of life, or to act, upon any other supposition.
All expectation of immortality, whether more or less certain,
opens an unbounded prospect to our hopes and our fears: since
we see the constitution of nature is such, as to admit of misery,
as well as to be productive of happiness, and experience ourselves
to partake of both in some degree; and since we cannot but know,
what higher degrees of both we are capable of. And there is no
presumption against believing further, that our future interest'
depends upon our present behavior: for we see our present interest doth; and that the happiness and misery, which are naturally annexed to our actions, very frequently do not follow, till
long after the actions are done, to which they are respectively
annexed. So that were speculation to leave us uncertain, whether
it were likely, that the Author of nature, in giving happiness
and misery to his creatures, hath regard to their actions or not
yet, since we find by experience that he hath such regard, the
d [The remainder of this chapter is a recapitulation of the whole argmu eut
from the beginning; and should be carefully conned.]




CHIP. vn.              CONCLUSION.                    183
whole sense of things which he has given us, plainly leads us, at
once and without any elaborate inquiries, to think that it may,
indeed must, be to good actions chiefly that he hath annexed
happiness, and to bad actions misery; or that he will, upon the
whole, reward those who do well, and punish those who do evil.
To confirm this from the constitution of the world, it has been
observed, that some sort of moral government is necessarily implied in that natural government of God, which we experience
ourselves under; that good and bad actions, at present, are naturally rewarded and punished, not only as beneficial and mischievous
to society, but also as virtuous and vicious: and that there is, in
the very nature of the thing, a tendency to their being rewarded
and punished in a much higher degree than they are at present.
And though this higher degree of distributive justice, which
nature thus points out and leads towards, is prevented for a time
from taking place; it is by obstacles, which the state of this world
unhappily throws in its way, and which therefore are in their
nature temporary. Now, as these things in the natural conduct
of Providence are observable on the side of virtue; so there is
nothing to be set against them on the side of vice. A moral
scheme of government then is visibly established, and, in some
degree, carried into execution: and this, together with the essential tendencies of virtue and vice duly considered, naturally raise
in us an apprehension, that it will be carried on further towards
perfection in a future state, and that every one shall there receive
according to his deserts.
And if this be so, then our future and general interest, under
the moral government of God, is appointed to depend upon our
behavior; notwithstanding the difficulty, which this may occasion,
of securing it, and the danger of losing it: just in the same manner as our temporal interest, under his natural government, is
appointed to depend upon our behavior; notwithstanding the
like difficulty and danger. For, from our original constitution,
and that of the world which we inhabit, we are naturally trusted
with ourselves; with our own conduct and our own interest.
And from the same constitution of nature, especially joined with
that course of things which is owing to men, we have temptations
to be unfaithful in this trust; to forfeit this interest, to neglect
it, and run ourselves into misery and ruin. From these tempta.




184                    CONCLUSION.                   PART I
tions arise the difficulties of behaving so as to secure our temporal
interest, and the hazard of behaving so as to miscarry in it.
There is therefore nothing incredible in supposing there may be
the like difficulty and hazard with regard to that chief and final
good, which religion lays before us.
The whole account, how it came to pass that we were placed
in such a condition as this, must indeed be beyond our comprehension.  But it is in part accounted for by what religion teaches
us, that the character of virtue and piety must be a necessary
qualification for a future state of security and happiness, under
the moral government of God; in like manner, as some certain
qualifications or other are necessary for every particular condition
of life, under his natural government: and that the present state
was intended to be a school of discipline, for improving in ourselves that character.  Now this intention of nature is rendered
highly credible by observing; that we are plainly made for improvement of all kinds; that it is a general appointment of Providence, that we cultivate practical principles, and form within
ourselves habits of action, in order to become fit for what we were
wholly unfit for before; that in particular, childhood and youth
is naturally appointed to be a state of discipline for mature age;
and that the present world is peculiarly fitted for a state of moral
discipline. And, whereas objections are urged against the whole
notion of moral government and a probationary state, from the
opinion of necessity; it has been shown, that God has given us
the evidence, as it were, of experience, that all objections against
religion, on this head, are vain and delusive. He has also, in
his natural government, suggested an answer to all our shortsighted'objections, against the equity and goodness of his moral
government; and in general he has exemplified to us the latter
by the former.
These things, which it is to be remembered, are matters of
fact, ought, in all common sense, to awaken mankind; to induce
them to consider in earnest their condition, and what they have
to do. It is absurd, absurd to the degree of being ridiculous, if
the subject were not of so serious a kind, for men to think themselves secure in a vicious life; or even in that immoral thoughtlessness, into which far the greatest part of them are fallen. The
credibility of religion, arising from experience and faces here con



CHAP. II.               CONCLUSION.                    185
sidered, is fully sufficient, in reason, to engage them to live in
the general practice of all virtue and piety; under the serious
apprehension, though it should be mixed with some doubt,* of a
righteous administration established in nature, and a future judgment in consequence of it: especially when we consider, how
very questionable it is, whether any thing at all can be gained by
vicet how unquestionably little as well as precarious, the pleasures
and profits of it are at the best, and how soon they must be parted
with at the longest. For, in the deliberations of reason, concerning what we are to pursue and what to avoid, as temptations to
any thing from mere passion are supposed out of the case, so inducements to vice, from cool expectations of pleasure and interest
so small and uncertain and short, are really so insignificant, as, in
the view of reason to be almost nothing in themselvesj and in
comparison with the importance of religion they quite disappear
and are lost.
Mere passion may indeed be alleged, though not as a reason,
yet as an excuse, for a vicious course of life. And how sorry an
excuse it is, will be manifest by observing, that we are placed in
a condition in which we are unavoidably inured to govern our
passions, by being necessitated to govern them: and to lay ourselves under the same kind of restraints, and as great ones too,
from temporal regards, as virtue and piety, in the ordinary course
of things, require. The plea of ungovernable passion then, ~n
the side of vice, is the poorest of all things; for it is no reason,
and a poor excuse.  The proper motives to religion are the proper
proofs of it, from our moral nature, from the presages of conscience, and our natural apprehension of God under the character
of a righteous Governor and Judge: a nature, and conscience,
and apprehension, given us by him; and from the confirmation
of the dictates of reason, by life and immortality brought to light
by the Gospel; and the wrath of God revealed from    heaven
against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men.
* Part II. ch. vi.                    t P. 108.
END OF THE FIRST PART.
16*




PART II.
CHAPTER I.
THE IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY.&
SOME persons, upon pretence of the sufficiency of the light
of nature, avowedly reject all revelation, as in its very notion in.
credible, and what must be fictitious. And indeed it is certain,
no revelation would have been given, had the light of nature
been sufficient in such a sense, as to render one not wanted and
useless.  But no man, in seriousness and simplicity of mind, can
possibly think it so, who considers the state of religion in the
heathen world before revelation, and its present state in those
places which have borrowed no light from it: particularly the
doubtfulness of some of the greate:l men, concerning things of
the utmost importance, as well ts the natural inattention and
ignorance of mankind in general.      It is impossible to say, who
would have been able to hav reasoned out that whole system,
which we call Natural Reli~., in its genuine simplicity, cleal
a [There is a slight indication in this chapter that Butler falls into the old
plan of settling the necessity of Christianity, before determining its truth.
Paley discards this order of arrangement, in his very first sentence; and with
good reason. The necessity of revelation is an abstraction; the proofs of it
are patent facts. To hold in abeyance the credentials presented by Chrt3
tianity, till we first satisfy ourselves that God could or would make any such
announcements, is unphilosophical and irreverent. This chapter discusses the
importance rather than the necessity of revelation; and so is a fitting corn
mencement of the discussion. Every truth disclosed in revelation, over and
above the truths which natural religion furnishes, proves the necessity of
revelation, if we would know any thing of sulch tru'hs. And it is such truths
which constitute the very peculiarities of revelati a, and teach the way ev
salvation, for the sinful and helpless.]
186




CHAP. I.        IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY.                    ]87
of superstition: but there is certainly no ground to affirm that
the generality could.   If they could, there is no sort of proba
bility that they would. Admitting there were, they would highly
want a standing admonition to remind them of it, and inculcate
it upon them.
And further, were they as much disposed to attend to religion,
as the better sort of men are; yet even upon this supposition,
there would be various occasions for supernatural instruction and
assistance, and the greatest advantages might be afforded by
them.    So that to say revelation is a thing superfluous, what
there was no need of, and what can be of no service, is, I think, to
talk quite wildly and at random. Nor would it be more extravagant to affirm, that mankind is so entirely at ease in the present
state, and life so completely happy, that it is a contradiction to
suppose our condition capable of being, in any respect, better.
There are other persons, not to be ranked with these, who
seem to be getting into a way of neglecting, and as it were, overlooking revelation, as of small importance provided natural religion be kept to. With little regard either to the evidence of
the former, or to the objections against it, and even upon supposition of its truth; "the only design of it," say they, "nmust
be, to establish a belief of the moral system   of nature, and to
enforce the practice of natural piety and virtue.  The belief and
practice of these were, perhaps, much promoted by the first publication of Christianity: but whether they are believed and practised, upon the evidence and motives of nature or of revelation,
is no great matter."*  This way of considering revelation, though
b [No one can read the writings of the great sages of antiquity without a
full and sad conviction that in relation to the character of God, the sinfulness of man, the future state, and the rules of living, those prime points on
which we need knowledge, they were almost profoundly ignorant. See on this
point, LELAND'S Adv. and Necess.: CHALMERS' Nat. Theol.: McCosn's Div.
Gor.: PASCAL'S Thoughts: WARBURTON'S Div. Legation.]
Invenis multos —propterea nolle fieri Christianos, quia quasi sufficiunt
sibi de bona vita sua. Bene vivere opus est, ait. Quid mihi pracepturus est
Christus?  Ut bene vivam? Jam bene vivo. Quid mihi necessarius est
Christus; nullum  homicidium, nullum furtum, nullam rapinam facio, res..lienas non concupisco, nullo adulterio contaminor? Naml inveniatur in -;.ita
iea aliquid quod reprehendatur, et qui reprelenderit faciat Christianum. /,i
in Ps,! xxxi. [You find many who refuse to become Christians, beewist
they feel sufficient of themselves to lead a good life. "We ought to live wiA.




88            IMPOP TANCE OF CHRISTIANITY.           PART II
it is not the same with the former, yet borders nearly upon it,
and very much, at length runs up into it: and requires to be
particularly considered, with regard to the persons who seem to
be getting into this way.  The consideration of it will likewise
further show the extravagance of the former opinion, and the
truth of the observations in answer to it, just mentioned.  And
an inquiry into the importance of Christianity, cannot be an
improper introduction to a treatise concerning the credibility
of it.
Now, if God has given a revelation to mankind, and commanded those things which are commanded in Christianity; it is
evident, at first sight, that it cannot in any wise be an indifferent
matter, whether we obey or disobey those commands: unless we
are certainly assured, that we know all the reasons for them, and
that all those reasons are now ceased, with regard to mankind in
general, or to ourselves in particular.  It is absolutely impossible
we can be assured of this.0 For our ignorance of these reasons
proves nothing in the case: since the whole analogy of nature
shows, what is indeed in itself evident, that there may be infinite
reasons for things, with which we are not acquainted.
But the importance of Christianity will more distinctly appear,
by considering it more distinctly: First, as a republication, and
external institution, of natural or essential religion, adapted to
the present circumstances of mankind, and intended to promote
natural piety and virtue: Secondly, as containing an account of
a dispensation of things, not discoverable by reason, in consequence of which several distinct precepts are enjoined us.  For
though natural religion is the foundation and principal part of
Christianity, it is not in any sense the whole of it.
I. Christianity is a republication of Natural religion. It instructs mankind in the moral system of the world: that it is the
work of an infinitely perfect Being, and under his government,
that virtue is his law, and that he will finally judge mankind in
says one. "What will Christ teach me? To live well? I do live well, what
need then have I of Christ? I commit no murder, no theft, no robbery. I
covet no man's goods, and am polluted by no adultery. Let some one find in
me any thing to censure, and he who can do so, may make me a Christian."]
c [The true mode of distinguishing a temporary, local, or individual command from such as are of universal and perpetual olligation. is well laid laowa
by WAYLAND, M r. Sci. ch. ix. sec. 2.]




CHAP. I.      IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY.             189
righteousness, and render to all according to their w rks, in a
future state. And, which is very material, it teaches natural
religion in its genuine simplicity; free from those superstitions,
with which it was totally corrupted, and under which it was in a
manner lost.
Revelation is, further, an authoritative publication of natural
religion, and so affords the evidence of testimony for the truth
of it. Indeed the miracles and prophecies recorded in Scripture,
were intended to prove a particular dispensation of Providence,
i.e. the redemption of the world by the Messiah: but this does not
hinder, but that they may also prove God's general providence
over the world, as our moral governor and judge.  And they
evidently do prove it; because this character of the Author of
nature, is necessarily connected with and implied in that particular revealed dispensation of things: it is likewise continually
taught expressly, and insisted upon, by those persons who
wrought the miracles and delivered the prophecies.  So that
indeed natural religion seems as much proved by the Scripture
revelation, as it would have been, had the design of revelation
been nothing else than to prove it.
But it may possibly be disputed, how far miracles can prove
natural religion; and notable objections may be urged against
this proof of it, considered as a matter of speculation: but
considered as a practical thing, there can be none.   For
suppose a person to teach natural religion to a nation, who
bad lived in total ignorance or forgetfulness of it; and to
declare that he was commissioned by God so to do; suppose him,
in proof of his commission, to foretell things future, which no
human foresight could have guessed at; to divide the sea with a
word; feed great multitudes with bread from heaven; cure all
manner of diseases; and raise the dead, even himself, to life;
would not this give additional credibility to his teaching, a credibility beyond what that of a common man would have; and be
an authoritative publication of the law of nature, i.e. a new
proof of it? It would be a practical one, of the strongest kind,
perhaps, which human creatures are capable of having given
them. The Law of Moses then, and the Gospel of Christ, are
authoritative publications of the religion of nature; they afford
a proof of God's general providence, as moral Governor of the




190            IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY.              PART IL
world, vA well as of his particular dispensations of providence
towards sinful creatures, revealed in the Law and the Gospel.
As they arc the only evidence of the latter, so they are an additional evidence of the former.
To show this further, let us suppose a man of the greatest and
most improved capacity, who had never heard of revelation, convinced upon the whole, notwithstanding the disorders of the
world, that it was under the direction and moral government of
an infinitely perfect Being; but ready to question, whether he
were not got beyond the reach of his faculties: suppose him
brought, by this suspicion, into great danger of being carried
away by the universal bad example of almost every one around
him, who appeared to have no sense, no practical sense at least,
of these things: and this, perhaps, would be as advantageous a
situation with regard to religion, as nature alone ever placed any
man in. What a confirmation now must it be to such a person,
all at once, to find, that this moral system of things was revealed
to mankind, in the name of that infinite Being, whom   he had
from principles of reason believed in: and that the publishers of
the revelation proved their commission from him, by making it
appear, that he had intrusted them with a power of suspending
and changing the general laws of nature.
Nor must it by any means be omitted, for it is a thing of the
utmost importance, that life and    immortality are eminently
brought to light by the Gospel.  The great doctrines of a future
state, the danger' of a course of wickednessd and the efficacy of
repentance, are not only confirmed in the Gospel, but are taught,
especially the last is, with a degree of light, to which that of
nature is but darkness.
Further.  As Christianity served these ends and purposes,
when it was first published, by the miraculous publication itself,
so it was intended to serve the same purposes in future ages, by
means of the settlement of a visible church:e of a society, disd [Natural religion shows us the danger of sin; but not the infinite danger
of eternal retribution, and the hopelessness of restoration after death. And as
to the efficacy of repentance, it rather opposes that doctrine than teaches it.
At least it does not teach that repentance may be accepted, so as not only to
cancel guilt, but restore to the favor of God.]
e ["I Christianity was left with Christians, to be transmitted, in like manner
as the religion of natare had been left, with mankind in general. There waa




CHAP. I.       IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY.                  191
tinguished from common ones, and from the rest of the world, Dy
peculiar religious institutions; by an instituted method of Instruction, and an instituted form  of external religion.  Miraculous
powers were given to the first preachers of Christianity, in order
to their introducing it into the world: a visible church was established, in order to continue it, and carry it on successively
throughout all ages. Had only Moses and the prophets, Christ
and his apostles, taught, and by miracles proved, religion to their
contemporaries; the benefits of their instructions would have
reached but a small part of mankind.     Christianity must have
been, in a great degree, sunk and forgot in a very few ages. To
prevent this, appears to have been one reason why a visible
church was instituted; to be like a city upon a hill, a standing
memorial to the world of the duty which we owe our Maker: to
call men continually, both by example and instruction, to attend
to it, and, by the form of religion, ever before their eyes, remind
them of the reality; to be the repository of the oracles of God;
to hold up the light of revelation in aid to that of nature, and to
propagate it, throughout all generations, to the end of the worldthe light of revelation, considered here in no other view, than as
designed to enforce natural religion.    And in proportion as
Christianity is professed and taught in the world, religion, natural
or essential religion, is thus distinctly and advantageously laid
before mankind, and brought again and again to their thoughts,
as a matter of infinite importance.
A visible church has also a further tendency to promote natural
religion, as being an instituted method of education, originally
intended to be of peculiar advantage to those who conform to it.
For one end of the institution was, that, by admonition and reproof, as well as instruction, by a general regular discipline, and
public exercises of religion, the boody of Christ, as the Scripture
speaks, should be edified; i.e. trained up in piety and virtue for
a higher and better state.  This settlement, then, appearing thus
however this difference that by an institution of external religion with a standing ministry for instruction and discipline, it pleased God to unite Christians
into visible churches, and all along to preserve them over a great part of the
world, and thus perpetuate a general publication of the Gospel." BUTLER'S
sermon before the Soc. for Prop. the Gospel. IIe goes on to show, in that discourse, that the-e churches, however corrupt any may become, are repositories
for the written r acles of God, and so carry the antidote to their heresies.]




192           IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY.            PART n.
beneficial, tending in the nature of the thing to answer, and, in
some degree, actually answering, those ends, it is to be remembered, that the very notion of it implies positive institutions; for
the visibility of the church consists in them.  Take away every
thing of this kind, and you lose the very notion itself.  So that
if the things now mentioned are advantages, the reason and importance of positive institutions in general is most obvious; since
without them these advantages could not be secured to the world.
And it is mere idle wantonness, to insist upon knowing the
reasons, nwhy such particular ones were fixed upon rather than
others.
The benefit arising from this supernatural assistance, which
Christianity affords to natural religion, is what some persons are
very slow in apprehending.  And yet it is a thing distinct in
itself, and a very plain obvious one.  For will any in good earnest
really say, that the bulk of mankind in the heathen world were
in as advantageous a situation, with regard to natural religion, as
they are now among us: that it. was laid before them, and enforced upon them, in a manner as distinct, and as much tending
to influence their practice?
The objections against all this, from the perversion of Christianity, and from the supposition of its having had but little good
influence, however innocently they may be proposed, cannot be
insisted upon as conclusive, upon any principles, but such as lead
to downright Atheism; because the manifestation of the law of
nature by reason, which, upon all principles of Theism, must
have been from God, has been perverted and rendered ineffectual
in the same manner.  It may indeed, I think, truly be said, that
the good effects of Christianity have not been small; nor its supposed ill effects, any effects at all of it, properly speaking.  Perhaps, too, the things done have been aggravated; and if not,
Christianity hath been often only a pretence, and the same evils
ill the main would have been done upon some other pretence.
However, great and shocking as the corruptions and abuses of it
have really been, they cannot be insisted upon as arguments
against it, upon principles of Theism.  For one cannot proceed
one step in reasoning upon natural religion, any more than upon
Christianity, without laying it down as a first principle, that the
dispensations of Providence are not to be judged of by their pei




CHAP. i.        IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY.                   193
versions, but by their genuine tendencies: not by what they do
actually seem to effect, but by what they would effect if mankind
did their part; that part which is justly put and left upon them,
It is altogether as much the language of one as of the other: He
that is unjust, let him be unjust still: and he that is holy, let him
be holy still.* The light of reason does not, any more than that
of revelation, force men to submit to its authority; both admonish
them of what they ought to do and avoid, together with the consequences of each; and after this, leave them at full liberty to
act just as they please, till the appointed time of judgment.
Every moment's experience shows, that this is God's general rule
of government.f
To return then: Christianity being a promulgation of the law
of nature; being moreover an authoritative promulgation of it;
with new light, and other circumstances of peculiar advantage,
adapied to the wants of mankind; these things fully show its
importance.
It is to be observed further, that as the nature of the case requires, so all Christians are commanded to contribute, by their
profession of Christianity, to preserve it in the world, and render
it such a promulgation and enforcement of religion.     For it is
the very scheme of the Gospel, that each Christian should, in his
degree, contribute towards continuing and carrying it on: all by
uniting in the public profession and external practice of Christianity; some by instructing, by having the oversight and taking
care of this religious community, the church of God. Now this
further shows the importance of Christianity; and, which is what
I chiefly intend, its importance in a practical sense: or the high
obligations we are under, to take it into our most serious consideration; and the danger there must necessarily be, not only in treating
Rev. xxii. 11.
f [" It is no real objection to this, though it may seem so at first sight, to say
that since Christianity is a renedial system, designed to obviate those very
evils which have been produced by the neglect and abuse of the light of nature,
it ought not to be liable to the same perversions. Because-1. Christianity is
not designed primarily to remedy the defects of nature, but of an unnatural
state of ruin into which men were brought by the Fall. And 2. It is remedial
of the defects of nature in a great degree, by its giving additional advantages.
3. It might be impossible that it should be remedial in a greater degree than
it is, without destroying man's free agency; which woaud be to destroy its own
end, the practice of virtue."-FITZGERALD'S Noues.]
N                       17




194           IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY.             PART It.
it despitefully, which I am  not now speaking of, but in disregarding and neglecting it.  For this is neglecting to do what
is expressly enjoined us, for continuing those benefits to the
world, and transmitting them down to future times. And all
this holds, even though the only thing to be considered in Christianity were its subserviency to natural religion.
II. Christianity is to be considered in a further view; as containing an account of a dispensation of things, not at all discoverable by reason, in consequence of which several distinct
precepts are enjoined us.  Christianity is not only an external
institution of natural religion, and a new promulgation of God's
general providence, as righteous governor and judge of the world;
but it contains also a revelation of a particular dispensation of
Providence, carrying on by his Son and Spirit, for the recovery
and salvation of mankind, who are represented in Scripture to
be in a state of ruin.  And in consequence of this revelation
being made, we are commanded to be baptized, not only in the
name of the Father, but also, of the Son, and of the Ioly
Ghost: and other obligations of duty, unknown before, to the
Son and the Holy Ghost, are revealed. Now the importance of
these duties may be judged of, by observing that they arise, not
from positive command merely, but also from the offices which
appear, from. Scripture, to belong to those divine persons in the
Gospel dispensation; or from the relations, which we are there
informed, they stand in to us.  B3y reason is revealed the relation, which God the Father stands in to us.  Ience arises the
obligation of duty which we are under to him. In Scrpture are
revealed the relations, which the Son and Holy Spirit stand in
to us.  Hence arise the obligations of duty,g which we are under
to them. The truth of the case, as one may speak, in each of
these three respects being admitted: that God is the governor
of the world, upon the evidence of reason; that Christ is the
mediator between God and man, and the Holy Ghost our guide
and sanctifier, upon the evidence of revelation: the truth of the
g [CHALMERS (Nat. Theol., b. v. ch. iv.) makes this very plain. He shows
the ethics of natural religion to be one thing and its objects another. Natural
religion discloses no Redeemer or Sanctifier; but it teaches how we should
regard such a person, if there be one. It teaches love and conformity to such
a being by the relation in which we of course stand to him. How we are to
express that love and obedience it cannot teach.]




CHAP. t.       IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY.               195
case, I say, in each of these respects being admitted, it is no
more a question, why it should be commanded, that we be baptized in the name of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, than that
we be baptized in the name of the Father. This matter seems
to require to be more fully stated.*
Let it be remembered then, that religion comes under the
twofold consideration of internal and external: for the latter is
as real a part of religion, of true religion, as the former.  Now,
when religion is considered under the first notion, as an inward
principle, to be exerted in such and such inward acts of the mind
and heart, the essence of natural religion may be said to consist
in religious regards to God the Father Almighty: and the essence
of revealed religion, as distinguished from natural, to consist in
religious regards to the Son, and to the Holy Ghost.  The obligation we are under, of paying these religious regards to each of
these divine persons respectively, arises from the respective relations which they each stand in to us.  How these relations are
made known, whether by reason or revelation, makes no alteration
in the case: because the duties arise out of the relations themselves, not out of the manner in which we are informed of them.
The Son and Spirit have each his proper office in that great dispensation of Providence, the redemption of the world; the one
our Mediator, the other our Sanctifier.  Does not then the duty
of religious regards to both these divine persons, as immediately
arise to the view of reason, out of the very nature of these offices
and relations; as the good-will and kind intention, which we owe
to our fellow-creatures, arise out of the common relations be
tween us and them?   But it will be asked, "What are the in
ward religious regards, appearing thus obviously due to the Sor
and Holy Spirit; as arising, not merely from command in Scripture, but from the very nature of the revealed relations, which
they stand in to us?" I answer, the religious regards of reverence, honor, love, trust, gratitude, fear, hope.
In what external manner this inward worship is to be expressed, is a matter of pure revealed command, as perhaps the
external manner, in which God the Father is to be worshipped,
may be more so than we are ready to think. But the worship,
* See The Nature, Obligation, and Efficacy, of the Christian Sacraments,
kc., [by WATERLAND,] and COLLIBER of Revealed Religion, as there quoted.




19b           IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY.               PART P.
the internal worship itself, to the Son and Holy Ghost, is no
further matter of pure revealed command, than as the relations
they stand in to us are matter of pure revelation: for the relations being known, the obligations to such internal worship are
obligations of reason, arising out of those relations themselves.
In short, the history of the gospel as immediately shows us the
reason of these obligations, as it shows us the meaning of the
words, Son and Holy Ghost.
If this account of the Christian religion be just, those persons
who can speak lightly of it, as of little consequence, provided
aatural religion be kept to, plainly forget, that Christianity, even
what is peculiarly so called, as distinguished from natural religion, has yet somewhat very important, even of a moral nature.
For the office of our Lord being made known, and the relation
he stands in to us, the obligation of religious regards to him is
plainly moral, as much as charity to mankind is; since this obligation arises, before external command, immediately out of that
his office and relation itself. Those persons appear to forget,
that revelation is to be considered, as informing us of somewhat
new, in the state of mankind,h and in the government of the
world: as acquainting us with some relations we stand in, which
could not otherwise have been known. These relations being real
(though before revelation we could be under no obligations from
them, yet upon their being revealed), there is no reason to think,
but that neglect of behaving suitably to them will be attended
with the same kind of consequences under God's government, as
neglecting to behave suitably to any other relations, made known
to us by reason.  Ignorance, whether unavoidable or voluntary,
so far as we can possibly see, will just as much, and just as little,
excuse in one case as in the other: the ignorance being supposed
equally unavoidable, or equally voluntary, in both cases.
If therefore Christ be indeed the mediator between God and
man, i.e. if Christianity be true; if he be indeed our Lord, our
Savior, and our God, no one can say, what may follow, not only
h [If Christianity were but "a republication of natural religion," or as
Tindall says, "as old as creation," why do deists oppose it? It does indeed
republish natural religion, but it adds stupendous truths beside. If it gave us
no new light, no new motives, it would be but a tremendous curse, making as
all the more responsible, and none the more instructed or secure.]




CHAP. I.       IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY.             197
the obstinate, but the careless disregard to him, in those high
relations. Nay, no one can say, what may follow such disregard,
even in the way of natural consequence.*  For, as the natural
consequences of vice in this life are doubtless to be considered as
judicial punishments inflicted by God, so for aught we know, the
judicial punishments of the future life may be, in a like way or
a like sense, the natural consequence of vice:t of men's violating
or disregarding the relations which God has placed them in here,
and made known to them.
If mankind are corrupted and depraved in their moral character, and so are unfit for that state, which Christ is gone to
prepare for his disciples; and if the assistance of God's Spirit
be necessary to renew their nature, in the degree requisite to
their being qualified for that state; (all which is implied in the
express, though figurative declaration, Except a man be born of
the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God:) supposing
this, is it possible any serious person can think it a slight matter,
whether or no he makes use of the means, expressly commanded
by God, for obtaining this divine assistance? Especially since
the whole analogy of nature shows, that we are not to expect
any benefits, without making use of the appointed means for
obtaining or enjoying them. Now reason shows us nothing, of
the particular immediate means of obtaining either temporal or
spiritual benefits. This therefore we must learn, either from
experience or revelation. And experience, the present case does
not admit of.
The conclusion from all this evidently is, that Christianity
being supposed either true or credible, it is unspeakable irreverence, and really the most presumptuous rashness, to treat it as a
light matter.  It can never justly be esteemed of little consequence, till it be positively supposed false. Nor do I know a
higher and more important obligation which we are under, than
that of examining most seriously into its evidence, supposing
its credibility; and of embracing it, upon supposition of its
truth.
The two following deductions may be proper to be added, in
order to illustrate the foregoing observations, and to prevent theii
being mistaken.
* P. 94.             t Ch. v.          ~ John iii. 4.
17*




198            IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY.              PART n
First, Hence we may clearly see, where lies the distinction
between what is positive and what is moral in religion.  Moral
precepts, are precepts the reasons of which we see: positive precepts, are precepts the reasons of which we do not see.*  Moral
duties arise out of the nature of the case itself, prior to external
command.    Positive duties do not arise out of the nature of the
case, but from  external command; nor would they be duties at
all, were it not for such command, received from   Him whose
creatures and subjects we are. But the manner in which the
nature of the case or the fact of the relation, is made known, this
doth not denominate any duty either positive or moral. That we
be baptized in the name of the Father is as much a positive duty,
as that we be baptized in the name of the Son, because both arise
equally from revealed command: though the relation which we
stand in to God the Father is made known to us by reason, and
the relation we stand in to Christ, by revelation only. On the
other hand, the dispensation of the Gospel being admitted, gratitude as immediately becomes due to Christ, from his being the
voluntary minister of this dispensation, as it is due to God the
Father, from his being the fountain of all good; though the first
is made known to us by revelation only, the second by reason.
Hence also we may see, and, for distinctness' sake, it may be
worth mentioning, that positive institutions come under a twofold
consideration.  They are either institutions founded on natural
religion, as baptism in the name of the Father; (though this has
also a particular reference to the gospel dispensation, for it is in
the name of God, as the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ:) or
they are external institutions founded on revealed religion; as
baptism in the name of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.
Secondly, From   the distinction between what is moral and
what is positive in religion, appears the ground of that peculiar
preference, which the Scripture teaches us to be due to the
former.
The reason of positive institutions in general, is very obvious;
This is the distinction between moral and positive precepts considered respectively as such. But yet, since the latter have somewhat of a moral nature,
we may see the reason of them, considered in this view. Moral and positive
precepts are in some respects alike, in other respects different. So far as they
are alike, we discern the reasons of both; so far as they are different, we disceer
the reasons of the former, but not of the latter. See p. 189, &o.




CHAP. I.       IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY.                  199
though we should not see the reason, why particular ones are
pitched upon rather than others.    Whoever, therefore, instead
of cavilling at words, will attend to the thing itself, may clearly
see, that positive institutions in general, as distinguished from
this or that particular one, have the nature of moral commands;
since the reasons of them appear. Thus, for instance, the external
worship of God is a moral duty, though no particular mode of it
be so. Care then is to be taken, when a comparison is made between positive and moral duties, that they be compared no further
than as they are different; no further than as the former are
positive, or arise out of mere external command, the reasons of
which we are not acquainted with; and as the latter are moral,
or arise out of the apparent reason of the case, without such external command. Unless this caution be observed, we shall run
into endless confusion.
Now this being premised, suppose two standing precepts enjoined by the same authority; that, in certain conjunctures, it is
impossible to obey both; that the former is moral, i.e. a precept
of which we see the reasons, and that they hold in the particular
case before us; but that the latter is positive, i.e. a precept of
which we do not see the reasons: it is indisputable that our obligations are to obey the former; because there is an apparent
reason for this preference, and none against it.  Further, positive
institutions, all those I suppose which Christianity enjoins, are
means to a moral end: and the end must be acknowledged more
excellent than the means.i  Nor is observance of these institutions
any religious obedience at all, or of any value, otherwise than as
it proceeds from a moral principle.  This seems to be the strict
logical way of stating and determining this matter; but will, perhaps, be found less applicable to practice, than may be thought
at first sight.
Therefore, in a more practical, though more lax way of con[WTithout offering the least objection to what is here said of the comparative
value of moral and positive institutions, it should not be overlooked that somotimes, obedience to a positive rite is more indicative of an obedient spirit, than
obedience to a moral rule. The latter is urged by its intrinsic propriety, over
and above the command, and appeals to several of our finer impulses. The
former rests singly on our reverence for the will of God. There are many who
would repel a temptation to steal, or to lie, who yet are insen sible to the duty
of baptism or the Lord's supper.]




200           IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY.            PART n
sideration, and taking the words, moral law and positive institutions, in the popular sense, I add, that the whole moral law is as
much matter of revealed command, as positive institutions are:
for the Scripture enjoins every moral virtue.  In this respect
then they are both upon a level. But the moral law is, moreover,
written upon our hearts; interwoven into our very nature.  And
this is a plain intimation of the Author of it, which is to be
preferred, when they interfere.
But there is not altogether so much necessity for the determination of this question, as some persons seem to think.  Nor are
we left to reason alone to determine it.  For, First, Though
mankind have, in all ages, been greatly prone to place their religion in peculiar positive rites, by way of equivalent for obedience
to moral precepts; yet, without making any comparison at all
between them, and consequently without determining which is to
have the preference, the nature of the thing abundantly shows all
notions of that kind to be utterly subversive of true religion, as
they are, moreover, contrary to the whole general tenor of Scripture; and likewise to the most express particular declarations of
it, that nothing can render us accepted of God, without moral
virtue.
Secondly, Upon the occasion of mentioning together positive
and moral duties, the Scripture always puts the stress of religion
upon the latter, and never upon the former. This, though no
sort of allowance to neglect the former, when they do not interfere
with the latter, is yet a plain intimation, that when they do, the
latter are to be preferred.  And as mankind are for placing the
stress of their religion anywhere, rather than upon virtue; lest
both the reason of the thing, and the general spirit of Christianity, appearing in the intimation now mentioned, should be ineffectual against this prevalent folly, our Lord himself, from
whose command alone the obligation of positive institutions arises,
has taken occasion to make the comparison between them and
moral precepts; when the Pharisees censured him, for eating
with publicans and sinners; and also when they censured his
disciples, for plucking the ears of corn on the Sabbath day.
Upon this comparison, he has determined expressly, and in form,
which shall have the preference when they interfere. And by
delivering his authoritative determination in a proverbial manner




MnAP. x.      IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY.              201
of expression, he has made it general: I will have mercy, and
not sacrifice.*  The propriety of the word proverbial, is not the
thing insisted upon: though I think the manner of speaking is
to be called so. But that the manner of speaking very remarkably renders the determination general, is surely indisputable.
For, had it been said only, that God preferred mercy to the rigid
observance of the Sabbath, even then, by parity of reason, most
justly might we have argued, that he preferred mercy likewise,
to the observance of other ritual institutions; and in general,
moral duties, to positive ones. And thus the determination
would have been general; though its being so were inferred and
not expressed. But as the passage really stands in the Gospel,
it is much stronger. For the sense and t' very literal words of
our Lord's answer, are as applicable to any other instance of a
comparison, between positive and moral duties, as to that upon
which they were spoken. And if, in case of competition, mercy
is to be preferred to positive institutions, it will scarce be thought,
that justice is to give place to them.  It is remarkable too, that,
as the words are a quotation from the Old Testament, they are
introduced, on both the forementioned occasions, with a declaration, that the Pharisees did not understand the meaning of them.
This, I say, is very remarkable. For, since it is scarce possible,
for the most ignorant person, not to understand the literal sense
of the passage in the prophet;t and since understanding the
literal sense would not have prevented their condemning the guiltless,t it can hardly be doubted, that the thing which our Lord
really intended in that declaration was, that the Pharisees had
not learned from it, as they might, wherein the general spirit of
religion consists: that it consists in moral piety and virtue, as
distinguished from ritual observances.  However, it is certain we
may learn this from his divine application of the passage, in the
Gospel.
But, as it is one of the peculiar weaknesses of human nature,
when, upon a comparison of two things, one is found to be of
greater importance than the other, to consider this other as of
scarce any importance at all: it is highly necessary that we remind ourselves, how great presumption it is, to make light of any
institutions of divine appointment; that our obligations to obey
* JLatt. ix 13, and xii. 7.  t Hosea vi. 6.  4 See Matt. xii. 7.




202       REVELATION CONSIDERED AS MIRACULOUS.             PART IL
all God's commands whatever are absolute and indispensable;
and that commands merely positive, admitted to be from       him,
lay us under a moral obligation to obey them: an obligation
moral in the strictest and most proper sense.
To these things I cannot forbear adding, that the account now
given of Christianity most strongly shows and enforces upon us
the obligation of searching the Scriptures, in order to see, what
the scheme of revelation really is; instead of determining beforehand, from reason, what the scheme of it must be.* Indeed if
in revelation there be found any passages, the seeming meaning
of which is contrary to natural religion; we may most certainly
conclude, such seeming meaning not to be the real one.      But it
is not any degree of    uresumption against an interpretation of
Scripture, that such interpretation contains a doctrine, which the
light of nature cannot discover;t or a precept, which the law
of nature does not oblige to.
CHAPTER II.
SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION AGAINST A REVELATION CONSIDERED
AS MIRACULOUS.
HAVING shown the importance of the Christian revelation,
and the obligations which we are under seriously to attend to it,
upon supposition.of its truth, or its credibility, the next thing in
* See ch. iii.
J [Dr. ANGUS judiciously remarks on this sentence, "This sentiment, as understood by Butler, is just, but very liable to abuse. Clearly, the Bible must be
so interpreted as to agree with all known truth, whether of natural religion or
natural science. At the same time, to correct the theology of the Bible by the
theology of nature, as finite and guilty men understand it, may involve the
rejection of Bible theology entirely; and of the very light and teaching it was
intended to supply. The converse of Butler's statement is equally true, and
even more important. If in natural theology there be found any facts, the
seeming lesson of which is contrary to revealed religion, such seeming lesson
is not the real one." Practically, it will be found that seeming meanings of
Scripture, really erroneous, are corrected by other parts of Scripture itself. I
understand Butler as only affirming that we must interpret Scripture according
to immutable principles, and known truth. The infidel rejects it for n( t con
forming to his assumed hypothesis.]
t P. 203.




CHAP. II.  REVELATION CONSIDERED AS MIRACULOUS.        203
order, is to consider the supposed presumptions against revelation
in general; which shall be the subject of this chapter: and the
objections against the Christian in particular, which shall be the
subject of some following ones.* For it seems the most natural
method, to remove the prejudices against Christianity, before we
proceed to the consideration of the positive evidence for it, and
the objections against that evidence.t
It is, I think, commonly supposed, that there is some peculiar
presumption, from the analogy of nature, against the Christian
scheme of things, at least against miracles; so as that stronger
evidence is necessary to prove the truth and reality of them, than
would be sufficient to convince us of other events, or matters of
fact. Indeed the consideration of this supposed presumption
cannot but be thought very insignificant, by many persons. Yet,
as it belongs to the subject of this treatise; so it may tend to
open the mind, and remove some prejudices, however needless
the consideration of it be, upon its own account.
I. I find no appearance of a presumption, from the analogy of
nature, against the general scheme of Christianity, that God
created and invisibly governs the world by Jesus Christ; and by
him also will hereafter judge it in righteousness, i.e. render to
every one according to his works; and that good men are under
the secret influence of his Spirit.  Whether these things are, or
are not, to be called miraculous, is perhaps only a question about
words; or however, is of no moment in the case. If the analogy
of nature raises any presumption against this general scheme of
Christianity, it must be, either because it is not discoverable by
reason or experience; or else, because it is unlike that course of
nature, which is. But analogy raises no presumption against the
truth of this scheme, upon either of these accounts.
First, There is no presumption, from analogy, against the truth
of it, upon account of its not being discoverable by reason or experience. Suppose one who never heard of revelation, of the most
improved understanding, and acquainted with our whole system of
natural philosophy and natural religion; such a one could not but
be sensible, that it was but a very small part of the natural and
moral system of the universe, which he was acquainted with.
He could not but be sensible, that there must be innumerable
* Chaps. iii., iv., v., vi.         t Chap. vii.




204     REVELATION CONSIDERED AS MIRACULOUS.         PART IL
things, in the dispensations of Providence past, in the invisible
governmens over the world at present carrying on, and in what
is to come; of which he was wholly ignorant,* and which could
not be discovered without revelation.  Whether the scheme of
nature be, in the strictest sense, infinite or not; it is evidently
vast, even beyond all possible imagination.  And doubtless that
part of it, which is open to our view, is but as a point in comparison of the whole plan of Providence, reaching throughout
eternity past and future; in comparison of what is even now
going on, in the remote parts of the boundless universe, nay, in
comparison of the whole scheme of this world. And therefore,
that things lie beyond the natural reach of our faculties, is no
sort of presumption against the truth and reality of them; because it is certain, there are innumerable things, in the constitution and government of the universe, which are thus beyond the
natural reach of our faculties.
Secondly, Analogy raises no presumption against any of the
things contained in this general doctrine of Scripture now mentioned, upon account of their being unlike the known course of
nature.  For there is no presumption at all from analogy, that
the whole course of things, or divine government naturally unknown to us, and every thing in it, is like to' any thing in that
which is known; and therefore no peculiar presumption against
any thing in the former, upon account of its being unlike to any
thing in the latter.  And in the constitution and natural government of the world, as well as in the moral government of it, we
see things, in a great degree, unlike one another: and therefore
ought not to wonder at such unlikeness between things visible
and invisible.  However, the scheme of Christianity is by no
means entirely unlike the scheme of nature; as will appear in
the following part of this treatise.
The notion of a miracle, considered as a proof of a divine
mission, has been stated with great exactness by divines; and is,
I think, sufficiently understood by every one. There are also
invisible miracles,a the Incarnation of Christ, for instance, which,
P. 172.
a [Papists urge that the actual conversion of the bread and wine in the
Eucharist is an invisible miracle. But an invisible miracle is such because
wrought under circumstances which exclude examination: while transubstan



CHAP. II.  REVELATION CONSIDERED AS MIRACULOUS.          205
being secret, cannot be alleged as a proof of such a mission; but
require themselves to be proved by visible miracles.  Revelation
itself too is miraculous; and miracles are the proof of it; and
the supposed presumption against these shall presently be considered. All which I have been observing here is, that, whether
we choose to call every thing in the dispensations of Providence,
not discoverable without revelation, nor like the known course of
things, miraculous; and whether the general Christian dispensation now mentioned is to be called so, or not; the foregoing
observations seem certainly to show, that there is no presumption
against it from the analogy of nature.
II. There is no presumption, from analogy, against some operations, which we should now call miraculous; particularly none
against a revelation at the beginning of the world: nothing of
such presumption against it, as is supposed to be implied or expressed in the word, miraculous.b  A miracle, in its very notion,
is relative to a course of nature; and implies something different from it, considered as being so. Now, either there was no
course of nature at the time which we are speaking of; or if
there were, we are not acquainted what the course of nature is,
upon the first peopling of worlds.   Therefore the question,
whether mankind had a revelation made to them at that time, is
to be considered, not as a question concerning a miracle, but as a
common question of fact. And we have the like reason, be it
more or less, to admit the report of tradition, concerning this
question, and concerning common matters of fact of the same
antiquity; for instance, what part of the earth was first peopled.
Or thus: When mankind was first placed in this state, there
was a power exerted, totally different from the present course of
nature. Now, whether this power, thus wholly different from the
present course of nature, (for we cannot properly apply to it the
word miraculous;) whether this power stopped immediately after
it had made man, or went on, and exerted itself further in giving
him a revelation, is a question of the same kind, as whether an:iation invites and facilitates examination.  It is wrought publicly, and constantly, and yet cannot be discovered to be a miracle. Indeed it supposes the
working of a second miracle, to make the first invisible.]
b [Paley shows conclusively that a denial of miracles leads not only to
a denial of revelation, but a denial of the existence of God, all of whose
extraordinary acts are necessarily miraculous.]
18




20b       REVELATION CONSIDERED         AS MIRACULOUS.      PART IL
ordinary power exerted itself in such a particular degree and
mianner, or not.
Or suppose the power exerted in the formation of the world be
considered as miraculous, or rather, be called by that name; the
case will not be different: since it must be acknowledged, that
such a power was exerted.     For supposing it acknowledged, that
our Savior spent some years in a course of working miracles:"
there is no more presumption, worth mentioning, against his
having exerted this miraculous power, in a certain degree greater,
than in a certain degree less; in one or two more instances, than
in one or two fewer; in this, than in another manner.
It is evident then, that there can be no peculiar presumption,
from the analogy of nature, against supposing a revelation, when
man was first placed upon earth.d
Add, that there does not appear the least intimation in history
or tradition, that religion was first reasoned out: but the whole
of history and tradition makes for the other side, that it came
into the world by revelation. Indeed the state of religion, in the
first ages of which we have any account, seems to suppose and
imply, that this was the original of it among mankind.e        And
these reflections together, without taking in the peculiar authority
of Scripture, amount to real and a very material degree of evidence, that there was a revelation at the beginning of the world.
[WHATELY, in his Logic, b. iii., has shown the folly of the Deistical attempts to explain our Savior's miracles as mere natural events. Having
labored to show this of some one of the miracles, they then do so as to another,
and thence infer that all were accidental conjunctures of natural circumstances.
He says, they might as well argue "that because it is not improbable one may
throw sixes once in a hundred throws, therefore it is no more improbable that
one may throw sixes a hundred times running."
FITZGERALD says, "the improbability of a whole series of strange natural
events, taking place unaccountably, one after another, amounts to a far greater
improbability than is involved in the admission of miracles."]
d [That man, at first, must have had supernatural instructions, or in other
words some revelations, is shown by Archbishop WHATELY in his "Origin of
Civilization." Rev. SAMUEL STANHOPE SMITH expresses his conviction, both
from reason and history, that man in his savage state could not even have pre.
served life without instruction from his Creator.]
e [The maintenance by the Jews, of a system of pure Theism, through so
many and so rude ages, without being superior, or even equal to their neighbors,
in science and civilization, can only be accounted for on the presumption of a
revelation.]




CHAP. I1.  REVELATION    CONSIDERED AS MIRACULOUS.              207
Now this, as it is a confirmation of natural religion, and therefore
mentioned in the former part of this treatise;* so likewise it
has a tendency to remove any prejudices against a subsequent
revelation.
III. But still it may be objected, that there is some peculiar
presumption, from analogy, against miracles; particularly against
revelation, after the settlement and during the continuance of a
course of nature.
Now with regard to this supposed presumption, it is to be observed in general, that before we can have ground for raising
what can, with any propriety, be called an argument from analogy,
for or against revelation considered as something miraculous, we
must be acquainted with a similar or parallel case.    But the history of some other world, seemingly in like circumstances with
our own, is no more than a parallel case: and therefore nothing
short of this can be so. Yet, could we come at a presumptive
proof, for or against a revelation, from  being informed, whether
such world had one, or not; such a proof, being drawn from
one single instance only, must be infinitely precarious.      More
particularly:
First. There is a very strong presumption       against common
speculative truths, and against the most ordinary facts, before the
prooff of them; which yet is overcome by almost any proof.
s P. 166, &c.
f [MILLS (Logic, chap. 24, ~ 5,) points out what he deems a mistake of "some
of the writers against Hume on Miracles," in confounding the improbability of
an event, before its occurrence, with the improbability afterwards; that is, considering them equal in degree. He fully proves that the great Laplace fell
into this error, and the student should consult the passage.
Prof. FITZGERALD holds Butler to have fallen into the mistake adverted to
by Mills; and quotes the latter author in a way which seems to make him say
that such is his opinion also. I do not so understand Mills, nor do I see that
Butler has confounded these meanings; but the very contrary. He expressly
affirms, and most truly, that the strongest presumption may lie against "the
most ordinary facts before the proof which yet is overcome by almost any
proof." Butler's position here, may be thus illustrated. Suppose a hundred
numbers to be put in a box, and it is proposed to draw out the number 42.
Now there are 99 chances to 1 against drawing that, or any other given number.
3ut suppose a child tells you he put the hundred numbers into a box, and drew
Jut one, and it proved to be 42; you at once believe, for that was as likely to
come as any other.'rhe proof of Christianity from prophecy becomes amazingly strong, thus
vewed. There are many predictions, for instance that Christ should be born




"08      REVELATION CONSIDERED AS MIRACULOUS.           PART IL
There is a presumption of millions to one, against the story of
Csesar, or of any other man.  For suppose a number of common
facts so and so circumstanced, of which we had no kind of proof,
should happen to come into one's thoughts; every one would,
without any possible doubt, conclude them to be false. And the
like may be said of a single common fact.    Hence it appears,
that the question of importance, as to the matter before us, is,
concerning the degree of the peculiar presumption supposed
against miracles; not whether there be any peculiar presumption
at all against them.  For, if there be the presumption of millions
to one, against the most common facts; what can a small presumption, additional to this, amount to, though it be peculiar?
It cannot be estimated, and is as nothing. The only material
question is, whether there be any such presumptions against
miracles, as to render them in any sort incredible.
Secondly, If we leave out the consideration of religion, we are
in such total darkness, upon what causes, occasions, reasons, or
circumstances, the present course of nature depends; that there
does not appear any improbability for or against supposing, that
five or six thousand years may have given scopeg for causes,
occasions, reasons, or circumstances, from whence miraculous
interpositions may have arisen. And from this, joined with the
foregoing observation, it will follow, that there must be a presumption, beyond all comparison greater, against the particular
common facts just now instanced in, than against miracles in
general; before any evidence of either.
Thirdly, Take in the consideration of religion, or the moral
system of the world, and then we see distinct particular reasons
for miracles: to afford mankind instruction additional to that of
nature, and to attest the truth of it.  This gives a real credibility
to the supposition, that it might be part of the original plan of
things, that there should be miraculous interpositions.
at a certain time, and place, and under certain very particular circumstances.
The probabilities against such a conjuncture of events are almost infinite; yet
they happened exactly as foretold.]
g [For instance, a mass of ice or snow, may imperceptibly accumulate for an
age, and then suddenly fall and overwhelm a village. Or a planet, or comet,
may have been gradually nearing our earth for a million of years, without producing, as yet, any effect on our orbit; but in process of time, its proximity
may work great changes in our condition.]




ClAP. Im.  REVELATION LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS.          209
Lastly, Miracles must not be compared to common natural
events, or to events which, though uncommon, are similar to
what we daily experience: but to the extraordinary phenomena
of nature. And then the comparison will be between the presumption against miracles, and the presumption against such
uncommon appearances, suppose, as comets, and against there
being any such powers in nature as magnetism and electricity, so
contrary to the properties of other bodies not endued with these
powers. And before any one can determine, whether there be
any peculiar presumption against miracles, more than against
other extraordinary things; he must consider, what, upon first
hearing, would be the presumption against the last mentioned
appearances and powers, to a person acquainted only with the
daily, monthly, and annual course of nature respecting this earth,
and with those common powers of matter which we every day see.
Upon all this I conclude; that there certainly is no such presumption against miracles, as to render them in any wise incredible: that, on the contrary, our being able to discern reasons
for them, gives a positive credibility to the history of them, in
cases where those reasons hold: and that it is by no means certain, that there is anypeculiar presumption at all, from analogy,
even in the lowest degree, against miracles, as distinguished from
other extraordinary phenomena: though it is not worth while to
perplex the reader with inquiries into the abstract nature of evidence, in order to determine a question, which, without such inquiries, we see* is of no importance.
CHAPTER III.
OUR INCAPACITY OF JUDGING, WHAT WERE TO BE EXPECTED
IN A REVELATION; AND THE CREDIBILITY, FROM ANALOGY,
THAT IT MUST CONTAIN THINGS LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS.
BESIDES the objections against the evidence for Christianity,
many are alleged against the scheme of it; against the whole
alanner in which it is put and left with the world; as well as
tgainst several particular relations in Scripture: objections drawn
* P. 208.
0                    18*




.10         REVELATION LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS.         PART IL
from the deficiencies of revelation: from things in it appearing
to men foolislhness;* from  its containing matters of offence,
which have led, and it must have been foreseen would lead, into
strange enthusiasm and superstition, and be made to serve the
purposes of tyranny and wickedness; from its not being universal;
and, which is a thing of the same kind, from its evidence not
being so convincing and satisfactory as it might have been: for
this last is sometimes turned into a positive argument against its
truth.t
It would be tedious, indeed impossible, to enumerate the
several particulars comprehended under the objections here referred to; they being so various, according to the different
fancies of men.  There are persons who think it a strong objection against the authority of Scripture, that it is not composed by
rules of art, agreed upon by critics, for polite and correct writing.
- And the scorn is inexpressible, with which some of the prophetic
parts of Scripture are treated: partly through the rashness of
interpreters; but very much also, on account of the hieroglyphical
and figurative language, in which they are left us.
Some of the principal things of this sort shall be particularly
considered in the following chapters.  But my design at present
is to observe in general, with respect to this whole way of arguing,
that, upon supposition of a revelation, it is highly credible beforehand, that we should be incompetent judges of it to a great degree: and that it would contain many things appearing to us
liable to great objections; in case we judge of it otherwise, than
by the analogy of nature.  Therefore, though objections against
the evidence of Christianity are most seriously to be considered,
yet objections against Christianity itself are, in a great measure,
frivolous: almost all objections against it, excepting those which
are alleged against the particular proofs of its coming from God.
I express myself with caution, lest I should be mistaken to vilify
reason; which is indeed the only faculty we have wherewith to
judge concerning any thing, even revelation itself: or be misunderstood to assert, that a supposed revelation cannot be proved
false, from internal characters.  For, it may contain clear immoralities or contradictions; and either of these would prove it false.
Nor will I take upon me to affirm, that nothing else can possibly
*1 Cor. i. 28.                    t See Chap. i.




CHAP. iI.  REVELATION LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS.          211
render any supposed revelation incredible.  Yet still the observation above, is, I think, true beyond doubt; that objections against
Christianity, as distinguished from objections against its evidence,
are frivolous. To make out this, is the general design of the
present chapter.
With regard to the whole of it, I cannot but particularly wish,
that the proofs might be attended to; rather than the assertions
cavilled at, upon account of any unacceptable consequences, real
or supposed, which may be drawn from them. For, after all,
that which is true, must be admitted, though it should show us
the shortness of our faculties: and that we are in no wise judges
of many things, of which we are apt to think ourselves very
competent ones. Nor will this be any objection with reasonable
men; at least upon second thought it will not be any objection
with such, against the justness of the following observations.
As God governs the world and instructs his creatures, according to certain laws or rules, in the known course of nature;
known by reason together with experience: so the Scripture
informs us of a scheme of divine Providence, additional to this.
It relates, that God has, by revelation, instructed men in things
concerning his government, which they could not otherwise have
known; and reminded them of things, which they might otherwise know; and attested the truth of the whole by miracles.
Now if the natural and the revealed dispensation of things are
both from God, if they coincide with each other, and together
make up one scheme of Providence; our being incompetent
judges of one, must render it credible, that we may be incompetent judges also of the other. Upon experience, the acknowledged constitution and course of nature is found to be greatly
different from what, before experience, would have been expected; and such as, men fancy, there lie great objections
against. This renders it beforehand highly credible, that they
may find the revealed dispensation likewise, if they judge of it as
they do of the constitution of nature, very different from expectations formed beforehand; and liable, in appearance, to great
objections: objections against the scheme itself, and against the
degrees and manners of the miraculous interpositions by which
it was attested and carried on. Thus, suppose a prince to govern
his dominions in the wisest manner possible, by common known




212        REVELATION LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS.        PART IL
laws; and that upon some exigencies he should suspend these
laws; and govern, in several instances, in a different manner.
If one of his subjects were not a competent judge beforehand, by
what common rules the government should or would be carried
on; it could not be expected, that the same person would be a
competent judge, in what exigencies, or in what manner, or to
what degree, those laws commonly observed would be suspended
or deviated from. If he were not a judge of the wisdom of the
ordinary administration, there is no reason to think he would be
a judge of the wisdom of the extraordinary. If he thought he
had objections against the former; doubtless, it is highly supposable, he might think also, that he had objections against the
latter. And thus, as we fall into infinite follies and mistakes,
whenever we pretend, otherwise than from experience and analogy, to judge of the constitution and course of nature; it is evidently supposable beforehand, that we should fall into as great,
in pretending to judge in like manner concerning revelation.
Nor is there any more ground to expect that this latter should
appear to us clear of objections, than that the former should.
These observations, relating to the whole of Christianity, are
applicable to inspiration in particular. As we are in no sort
judges beforehand, by what laws or rules, in what degree, or by
what means, it were to have been expected, that God would naturally instruct us; so upon supposition of his affording us light and
instruction by revelation, additional to what he has afforded us
by reason and experience, we are in no sort judges, by what
methods, and in what proportion, it were to be expected that this
supernatural light and instruction would be afforded us. We
know not beforehand, what degree or kind of natural information
it were to be expected God would afford men, each by his own
reason and experience: nor how far he would enable and effectually dispose them to communicate it, whatever it should be, to
each other; nor whether the evidence of it would be certain,
highly probable, or doubtful; nor whether it would be given with
equal clearness and conviction to all. Nor could we guess, upon
any good ground I mean, whether natural knowledge, or even the
faculty itself, by which we are capable of attaining it, reason,
would he given us at once, or gradually.
In like ma-ner, we are wholly ignorant, what degree of new




CHAP. In.   REVELATION LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS.          211
knowledge, it were to be expected, God would give mankind by
revelation, upon supposition of his affording one: or how far, or
in what way, he would interpose miraculously, to qualify them, to
whom he should originally make the revelation, for communicating the knowledge given by it; and to secure their doing it to
the age in which they should live; and to secure its being transmitted to posterity.  We are equally ignorant, whether the evidence of it would be certain or highly probable, or doubtful:* or
whether all who should have any degree of instruction from it,
and any degree of evidence of its truth, would have the same:
or whether the scheme would be revealed at once, or unfolded
gradually.- Nay we are not in any sort able to judge, whether
it were to have been expected, that the revelation should have
been committed to writing; or left to be handed down, and
consequently corrupted, by verbal tradition, and at length sunk
under it, if mankind so pleased, and during such time as
they are permitted, in the degree they evidently are, to act as
they will.
But it may be said, "' that a revelation in some of the abovementioned circumstances, one, for instance, which was not committed to writing, and thus secured against danger of corruption,
would not have answered its purpose." I ask, what purpose? It
would not have answered all the purposes, which it has now
answered, and in the same degree: but it would have answered
others, or the same in different degrees.  And which of these
were the purposes of God, and best fell in with his general
government, we could not at all have determined beforehand.
Now since we have no principles of reason, upon which to judge
beforehand, how it were to be expected that revelation should
have been left, or what was most suitable to the divine plan of
government, in any of the forementioned respects; it must be
quite frivolous to object afterwards as to any of them, against its
being left in one way, rather than another: for this would be to
object against things, upon account of their being different from
expectations, which has been shown to be without reason.
Thus we see, that the only question concerning the truth of
Christianity is, whether it be a real revelation; not whether it
be attended with every circumstance which we should have
* See Chap. vi.         a [See note, page 218.]




214         REVELATION LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS.         PART I.
looked for: and concerning the authority of Scripture, whether
it be what it claims to be; not whether it be a book of such sort,
and so promulged, as weak men are apt to fancy a book containing a divine revelation should be.  Therefore, neither obscurity,
nor seeming inaccuracy of style, nor various readings, nor early
disputes about the authors of particular parts, nor any other
things of the like kind, though they had been much more considerable in degree than they are, could overthrow the authority
of the Scripture: unless the prophets, apostles, or our Lord,
had promised, that the book containing the divine revelation
should be exempt from those things. Nor indeed can any objections overthrow such a kind of revelation as the Christian claims
to be, (since there are no objections against the morality of it,*)
but such as can show, that there is no proof of miracles wrought
originally in attestation of it; no appearance of any thing miraculous in its obtaining in the world; nor any of prophecy, that
is, of events foretold, which human sagacity could not foresee.
If it can be shown, that the proof alleged for all these is absolutely none at all, then is revelation overturned.  But were it
allowed, that the proof of any one or all of them is lower than
is allowed; yet, whilst any proof of them remains, revelation
will stand upon much the same foot it does at present, as to all the
purposes of life and practice, and ought to have the like influence
upon our behavior.
From the foregoing observations too, it will follow, and those
who will thoroughly examine into revelation will find it worth
remarking, that there are several ways of arguing, which though
just with regard to other writings, are not applicable to Scripture: at least not to its prophetic parts. We cannot argue, for instance, that such and such cannot be the sense or intent of a passage
of Scripture, for, if it had, it would have been expressed more
plainly, or represented under a more apt figure or hieroglyphic.
Yet we may justly argue thus, with respect to common books.
And the reason of this difference is very evident.  In Scripture
we are not competent judges, as we are in common books, how
plainly it were to have been expected, that the sense should
have been expressed, or under how apt an image figured. The
only questicn is, what appearance there is, that this is the sen';: P. 220.




CHAP. mI.   REVELATION LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS.               21.5
and scarce at all, how much more determinately or accurately it
might have been expressed or figured.b
"But is it not self-evident, that internal improbabilities of all
kinds weaken external probable proof?"    Doubtless.  But to
what practical purpose can this be alleged here, when it has been
proved before,* that real internal improbabilities, which rise even
to moral certainty, are overcome by the most ordinary testimony;
and when it now has been made to appear, that we scarce know
what are improbabilities, as to the matter we are here considering: as it will further appear from what follows.
From the observations made above it is manifest, that we are
not in any sort competent judges, what supernatural instruction
were to have been expected; and it is self-evident, that the
objections of an incompetent judgment must be frivolous.   Yet
it may be proper to go one step further, and observe, that if men
will be regardless of these things, and pretend to judge of the
Scripture by preconceived expectations; the analogy of nature
shows beforehand, not only that it is highly credible they may,
but also probable that they will, imagine they have strong objections against it, however really unexceptionable. For so, prior to
experience, they would think they had, against the circumstances,
and degrees, and the whole manner of that instruction, which is
afforded by the ordinary course of nature.  Were the instruction
which God affords to brute creatures by instincts and mere propensions, and to mankind by these together with reason, matter
of probable proof, and not of certain observation; it would be
rejected as incredible, in many instances of it, only upon account
of the means by which this instruction is given, the seeming disproportions, the limitations, necessary conditions, and circumstances of it.  For instance: would it not have been thought
highly improbable, that men should have been so much more
b [It is not to be understood that Butler would not have the ordinary rules
of interpretation applied to the Holy Scriptures. Because the interpretation,
"if not gathered out of the words, must be brought into them." We cannot
interpret them as if we knew beforehand, what the Holy Ghost meant to say;
as SPINOZA proposes to do, in his Philosophiia Scripturse Interpretes. The
student will do well to consult BENSON'S Hulsean Lectures on Scripture Difficulties: KING'S Morsels of Criticism: STORn, Exertationes Exeget.: MICHAELIS,
Introd. ad. N'ov. Test.: and FEATLEY'S Key.]
* Pp. 207 208.




216         REVELATION LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS.        PART II.
capable of discovering, even to certainty, the general laws of
matter, and the magnitudes, paths, and revolutions, of heavenly
bodies; than the occasions and cures of distempers, and many
other things in which human life seems so much more nearly concerned, than in astronomy? How capricious and irregular a way
of information would it be said, is that of invention, by means
of which nature instructs us in matters of science, and in many
things, upon which the affairs of the world greatly depend: that
a man should, by this faculty, be made acquainted with a thing
in an instant, (when perhaps he is thinking of something else,)
which he has in vain been searching after, it may be, for years.
So likewise the imperfections attending the only method, by
which nature enables and directs us to communicate our thoughts
to each other, are innumerable. Language is, in its very nature,
inadequate, ambiguous, liable to infinite abuse, even from negligence; and so liable to it from design, that every man can deceive
and betray by it. And, to mention but one instance more; that
brutes, without reason, should act, in many respects, with a
sagacity and foresight vastly greater than what men have in those
respects, would be thought impossible. Yet it is certain they do
act with such superior foresight: whether it be their own, indeed,
is another question. From these things, it is highly credible
beforehand, that upon supposition that God should afford men
some additional instruction by revelation, it would be with circumstances, in manners, degrees, and respects, against the credibility of which we should be apt to fancy we had great objections.
Nor are the objections against the Scripture, nor against Christianity in general, at all more or greater, than the analogy of
nature would beforehand-not perhaps give ground to expect;
(for the analogy may not be sufficient, in some cases, to ground
an expectation upon;) but no more nor greater, than analogy
would show it, beforehand, to be supposable and credible, that
there might seem to lie against revelation.
By applying these general observations to a particular objection, it will be more distinctly seen, how they are applicable to
others of the like kind; and indeed to almost all objections
against Christianity, as distinguished from objections against its
evidence. It appears from Scripture, that, as it was not unusual
in the apostolic age, for persons, upon their conversion to Chris



CHAP. II.    REVELATION LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS.              217
tianity, to be endued with miraculous gifts; so, some of those
persons exercised these gifts in a strangely irregular and disorderly manner;n and this is made an objection against their
being really miraculous.  Now the foregoing observations quite
remove this objection, how considerable soever it may appear at
first sight.  For, consider a person endued with any of these
gifts, for instance that of tongues: it is to be supposed, that he
had the same power over this miraculous gift, as he would have
had over it, had it been the effect of habit, of study and use, as it
ordinarily is; or the same power over it, as he had over any other
natural endowment. Consequently, he would use it in the same
manner as he did any other; either regularly, and upon proper
occasions only, or irregularly, and upon improper ones: according to his sense of decency, and his character of prudence.d
Where then is the objection? Why, if this miraculous power
was indeed given to the world to propagate Christianity, and
attest the truth of it, we might, it seems, have expected, that
other sort of persons should have been chosen to be invested
with it; or that these should, at the same time, have been
endued with prudence; or that they should have been continually restrained and directed in the exercise of it: i.e. that
God should have miraculously interposed, if at all, in a different
manner, or higher degree.    But, from  the observations made
above, it is undeniably evident, that we are not judges in what
degrees and manners it were to have been expected he should
miraculously interpose; upon supposition of his doing it in some
degree and manner. Nor, in the natural course of Providence,
are superior gifts of memory, eloquence, knowledge, and other
talents of great influence, conferred only on persons of prudence
and decency, or such as are disposed to make the properest use
c [See 1 Cor. xii. 1-10: xiii. 1: and xiv. 1-19.]
d [" The power of healing, or working miracles, is, during the whole course
of its operation, one continued arrest or diversion of the general laws of matter
and motion. It was therefore fit that this power should be given occasionally.
But the.sp2ealcing with tongues, when once the gift was conferred, became thenceforth a natural power; just as the free use of members of the body, after being
restored, by miracle, to the exercise of their natural functions. In healing, the
apostles are to be considered as the workers of a miracle; in speaking strange
tongues, as persons on whom a miracle is performed."-WARuBURTON, Doct. of
qrace, b. i. ch. iii.]
19




218         REVELATION LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS.            PART II.
of them.    Nor is the instruction and admonition     naturally
afforded us for the conduct of life, particularly in our education,
commonly given in a manner the most suited to recommend it;
but often with circumstances apt to prejudice us against such
instruction.
One might go on to add, there is a great resemblance between
the light of nature and of revelation, in several other respects.
Practical Christianity, or that faith and behavior which renders
a man a Christian, is a plain and obvious thing: like the common
rules of conduct, with respect to ordinary temporal affairs. The
more distinct and particular knowledge of those things, the study
of which the apostle calls going on unto perfection,* and of the
prophetic parts of revelation, like many parts of natural and even
civil knowledge, may require very exact thought, and careful
consideration.  The hinderances too, of natural, and of supernatural light and knowledge, have been of the same kind.  And
as it is owned the whole scheme of Scripture is not yet understood; so, if it ever comes to be understood, before the restitution
of all things,t and without miraculous interpositions, it must be
in the same way as natural knowledge is come at: by the con.
tinuance and progress of learning and of liberty;e and by par.
ticular persons attending to, comparing, and pursuing, intimations
scattered up and down it, which are overlooked and disregarded
by the generality of the world. For this is the way in which all
improvements are made; by thoughtful men's tracing on obscure
hints, dropped us by nature as it were, accidentally, or which
seem to come into our minds by chance. Nor is it at all incredible,
that a book which has been so long in the possession of mankind, should contain many truths as yet undiscovered.  For, all
the same phenomena, and the same faculties of investigation,
-: IHeb. vi. 1.                           t Acts iii. 21.
e [The doctrine of " development" has of late been popular in some quarters.
Butler here shows the only safe notion we may entertain on that subject.
" Exact thought, and careful consideration" may show us how to confute
specious heresies, expound embarrassing passages, dissipate painful doubts,
and remove many prejudices or misapprehensions. But revelation is complete
as it stands.
We may hope for progress in theology as in other sciences; not in the
development of new facts or faith, as Papists and Socinians pretend, but in
the increase of sound wisdom, aided by a more perfect interpretation of God's
word.]




CAP. im.    REVELATION LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS.           219
from which such great discoveries in natural knowledge have
been made in the present and last age, were equally in the pos.
session of mankind, several thousand years before. And possibly
it might be intended, that events, as they come to pass, should
open and ascertain the meaning of several parts of Scripture.
It may be objected, that this analogy fails in a material respect: for that natural knowledge is of little or no consequence.
But I have been speaking of the general instruction which nature
does or does not afford us. And besides, some parts of natural
knowledge, in the more common restrained sense of the words,
are of the greatest consequence to the ease and convenience of
life. But suppose the analogy did, as it does not, fail in this
respect; yet it might be abundantly supplied, from the whole
constitution and course of nature: which shows, that God does
not dispense his gifts according to our notions of the advantage
and consequence they would be of to us. And this in general,
with his method of dispensing knowledge in particular, would
together make out an analogy full to the point before us.
But it may be objected still further and more generally; "The
Scripture represents the world as in a state of ruin, and Christianity as an expedient to recover it, to help in these respects
where nature fails: in particular, to supply the deficiencies of
natural light. Is it credible then, that so many ages should have
been let pass, before a matter of such a sort, of so great and so
general importance, was made known to mankind; and then that
it should be made known to so small a part of them? Is it conceivable, that this supply should be so very deficient, should have
the like obscurity and doubtfulness, be liable to the like perversions, in short, lie open to all the like objections, as the light of
nature itself?*
Without determining how far this, in fact, is so, I answer; it
is by no means incredible, that it might be so, if the light of
nature and of revelation be from the same hand.    Men are
naturally liable to diseases: for which God, in his good providence, has provided natural remedies.t But remedies existing
in nature have been unknown to mankind for many ages; are
known but to few now; probably many valuable ones are not
inowrk yet. Great has been and is the obscurity and difficulty,
* Chap. vi.                    t Chap. v.




320         REVELATION LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS.         PART I.
in the nature and application of them.   Circumstances seem
often to make them very improper, where they are absolutely
necessary. It is after long labor and study, and many unsuccessful endeavors, that they are brought to be as useful as they are;
after high contempt and absolute rejection of the most useful we
have; and after disputes and doubts, which have seemed to be
endless. The best remedies too, when unskilfully, much more
when dishonestly applied, may produce new diseases; and with
the rightest application the success of them is often doubtful.
In many cases they are not effectual: where they are, it is often
very slowly: and the application of them, and the necessary
regimen accompanying it, is not uncommonly so disagreeable,
that some will not submit to them; and satisfy themselves with
the excuse, that if they would, it is not certain whether it would
be successful. And many persons, who labor under diseases, for
which there are known natural remedies, are not so happy as to
be always, if ever, in the way of them. In a word, the remedies
which nature has provided for diseases are neither certain, perfect, nor universal. And indeed the same principles of arguing,
which would lead us to conclude, that they must be so, would
lead us likewise to conclude, that there could be no occasion for
them; i.e. that there could be no diseases at all. And therefore
our experience that there are diseases, shows that it is credible
beforehand, upon supposition nature has provided remedies for
them, that these remedies may be, as by experience we find they
are, neither certain, nor perfect, nor universal; because it shows,
that the principles upon which we should expect the contrary are
fallacious.
And now, what is the just consequence from all these things?
Not that reason is no judge of what is offered to us as being of
divine revelation. For this would be to infer that we are unable
to judge of any thing, because we are unable to judge of all
things. Reason can, and it ought to judge, not only of the
meaning, but also of the morality and the evidence of revelation.
First, It is the province of reason to judge of the morality of
the Scripture; i.e. not whether it contains things different from
what we should have expected from a wise, just, and good Being;
(for objections from hence have been now obviated:) but whether
it contains things plainly contradictory to wisdom, justice. or




CHAP. III.  REVELATION LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS.           221
goodness; to what the light of nature teaches us of God. And
I know nothing of this sort objected against Scripture, excepting
such objections as are formed upon suppositions, which would
equally. conclude, that the constitution of nature is contradictory
to wisdom, justice, or goodness; which most certainly it is not.
There are, indeed, some particular precepts in Scripture, given
to particular persons, requiring actions, which would be immoral
and vicious, were it not for such precepts.  But it is easy to see,
that all these are of such a kind, as that the precept changes the
whole nature of the case and of the action; and both constitutes
and shows that not to be unjust or immoral, which, prior to the
precept, must have appeared and really been so: which may well
be, since none of these precepts are contrary to immutable
morality.  If it were commanded, to cultivate the principles,
and act from the spirit of treachery, ingratitude, cruelty; the
command would not alter the nature of the case or of the action,
in any of these instances.  But it is quite otherwise in precepts,
which require only the doing an external action: for instance,
taking away the property, or life of any. For men have no
right, either to life or property, but what arises solely from the
grant of God. When this grant is revoked, they cease to have
any right at all in either: and when this revocation is made
known, as surely it is possible it may be, it must cease to be unjust to deprive them of either. And though a course of external acts, which without command would be immoral, must
make an immoral habit; yet a few detached commands have no
such natural tendency. I thought proper to say thus much of
the few Scripture precepts, which require, not vicious actions,
but actions which would have been vicious, but for such precepts; because they are sometimes weakly urged as immoral, and
great weight is laid upon objections drawn from them.
To me there seems no difficulty at all in these precepts, but
what arises from their being offences: i.e. from their being liable
to be perverted, as indeed they are, by wicked designing men,
to serve the most horrid purposes; and perhaps to mislead the
weak and enthusiastic.  And objections from this head are not
objections against revelation; but against the whole notion of religion, as a trial: and against the general constitution of nature.
Secondly, Reason is able to judge, and must, of the evidence
19~-N




222          REVELATION LIABLE TO OBJECTIONS.            PART II.
of revelation, and of the objections urged against that evidence:
which shall be the subject of a following chapter.*
The consequence of the foregoing observations is, that the
question upon which the truth of Christianity depends, is scarcely
at all what objections there are against its scheme, since there
are none against the morality of it, but what objections there are
against its evidence; or, what proof there remains of it, after
due allowances are made for the objections against that proof:
because it has been shown, that the objections against Christianity, as distinguished from objections against its evidence, are
frivolous.  For surely very little weight, if any at all, is to be
laid upon a way of arguing and objecting, which, when applied
to the general constitution of nature, experience shows not to be
conclusive: and such, I think, is the whole way of objecting
treated of throughout this chapter.  It is resolvable into principles, and goes upon suppositions, which mislead us to think, that
the Author of nature would not act, as we experience he does;
or would act, in such and such cases, as we experience he does
not in like cases. But the unreasonableness of this way of objecting will appear yet more evidently from hence, that the chief
things thus objected against are justified, as shall be further
shown,' by distinct, particular, and full analogies, in the constitution and course of nature.
It is to be remembered, that, as frivolous as objections of the
foregoing sort against revelation are, yet, when a supposed revelation is more consistent with itself, and has a more general and
uniform tendency to promote virtue, than, all circumstances considered, could have been expected from enthusiasm and political
views, this is a presumptive proof of its not proceeding from
them, and so of its truth: because we are competent judges, what
might have been expected from enthusiasm and political views.'
* Chap. vii.                 t Chap. iv. latter part, and v. vi.
f [This pregnant paragraph should receive very full attention. We know
much of men, little of God. What men are likely to do, or say, in certain
circumstances, is often very clear; and generally may be guessed at. But
what God would do or say in new contingencies, who shall attempt to prescribe
or predict? We are poorly qualified to assert that such and such declarations
could not have come from infinite wisdom; but we are quite competent to atfirm that such and such things could not have come from humabn co trivanoo
or enthusiasm.]




CHAP. Iv.      CHRISTIANITY, A SCHEME, ETC.              223
CHAPTER IV.
CHRISTIANITY, CONSIDERED AS A SCHEME OR CONSTITUTION,
IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED.
As hath been now shown,* the analogy of nature renders it
highly credible beforehand, that, supposing a revelation to be
made, it must contain many things very different from what we
should have expected, and such as appear open to great objections:
and that this observation, in good measure, takes off the force of
those objections, or rather precludes them. It may be alleged,
that this is a very partial answer to such objections, or a very
unsatisfactory way of obviating them: because it does not show
at all, that the things objected against can be wise, just, and
good; much less, that it is credible they are so.  It will therefore be proper to show this distinctly; by applying to these
objections against the wisdom, justice, and goodness of Christianity, the answer abovet given to the like objections against
the constitution of nature: before we consider the particular
analogies in the latter, to the particular things objected against
in the former.  Now that which affords a sufficient answer to
objections against the wisdom, justice, and goodness of the constitution of nature, is its being a constitution, a system, or
scheme, imperfectly comprehended;5 a scheme in which means
are made use of to accomplish ends; and which is carried on by
general laws. For from these things it has been proved, not
only to be possible, but also to be credible, that those things
which are objected against may be consistent with wisdom,
justice, and goodness; nay, may be instances of them: and even
* In the foregoing chapter.
t Part I. ch. vii., to which this all along refers.
a ["It is the last step of reason to know there is an infinity of things
which surpass it."-PAscAL. "The wall of adamant which bounds human
inquiry. has scarcely ever been discovered by any adventurer, till he was
aroused by the shock that drove him back."-Sir JAS. MACKINTOSH. " Of the
dark parts of revelation there are two sorts: one which may be cleared up by
the studious; the other which will always reside within the shadow of God's
throne where it would be impiety to intrude.''-WARBURTON. "A Christianity
without mystery is as unphilosophical as it is unscriptural."-ANGUS.]




224              CHRISTIANITY A SCHEME              PART n.
that the constitution and government of nature may be perfect
in the highest possible degree. If Christianity then be a schemd,
and of the like kind; it is evident, the like objections against it
must admit of the like answer. And,
I. Christianity is a scheme, quite beyond our comprehension.
The moral government of God is exercised, by gradually conducting things so in the course of his providence, that every one,
at length and upon the whole, shall receive according to his
deserts; and neither fraud nor violence, but truth and right,
shall finally prevail. Christianity is a particular scheme under
this general plan of Providence, and a part of it, conducive to
its completion, with regard to mankind: consisting itself also of
various parts, and a mysterious economy, which has been carrying on from the time the world came into its present wretche~
state, and is still carrying on, for its recovery, by a divine person, the Messiah; who is to gather together in one the children
of God, that are scattered abroad,* and establish an everlasting
kingdom, wherein dwelleth righteousness.t  In order to it; after
various manifestations of things, relating to this great and general scheme of Providence, through a succession of many ages:
(For the Spirit of Christ which was in the prophets, testified beforehand his sufferings, and the glory that should follow: unto
whom it was revealed, that not unto themselves, but unto us they
did minister the things which are now reported unto us by them
that have preached the Gospel; which things the angels desire tc
look into:t)-after various dispensations looking forward and preparatory to, this final salvation: in the fulness of time, when infinite wisdom thought fit; He, being in the form of God,-made
himself of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a
servant, and was made in the likeness of men: and being found
in fashion as a man, he humbled himself, and became obedient
to death, even the death of the cross.  Wherefore God also hath
highly exalted him, and given him a name, which is above every
name: that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of
things in heaven, and things in the earth, and things under the
earth: and that every tongue should confess, that Jesus Christ is
Lord, to the glory of God the Father.~  Parts likewise of this
economy are the miraculous mission of the Holy Ghost. and his
* John xi. 52. t 2 Peter iii. 13. f 1 Peter i. 11, 12. ~ Phil. ii.'[611.l




CHAP. IV.      IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED.                225
ordinary assistances given to good men:b the invisible government, which Christ at present exercises over his church: that
which he himself refers to in these words: In my Father's house.
are many mansions-I go to prepare a place for you:* and his
future return to judge the world in righteousness, and completely
re-establish the kingdom of God.   For the Father judgeth no
man; but hath committed all judgment unto the Son: that all
men should honor the Son, even as they honor the Father.t  All
power is given unto him in heaven and in earth.  And he must
reign, till he hath put all enemies under his feet.  Then cometh
the end, when he shall have delivered up the kingdom  to God,
even the Father; when he shall have put down all arle, and all
authority and power.   And when all things shall be subdued
unto him, then shall the Son also himself be subject unto him that
put all things under him, that God may be all in all.~  Surely
little need be said to show, that this system, or scheme of things,
is but imperfectly comprehended by us. The Scripture expressly
asserts it to be so.  And indeed one cannot read a passage relating to this great mystery of godliness, l but what immediately
runs up into something which shows us our ignorance in it; as
every thing in nature shows us our ignorance in the constitution of nature. And whoever will seriously consider that part
of the Christian scheme, which is revealed in Scripture, will find
so much more unrevealed, as will convince him, that, to all the
purposes of judging and objecting, we know as little of it, as of
the constitution of nature. Our ignorance, therefore, is as much
an answer to our objections against the perfection of one, as
against tL.; perfection of the other.s
II. It is obvious too, that in the Christian dispensation, as
much as in the natural scheme of things, means are made use of
to accomplish ends.
The observation of this furnishes us with the same answer, to
objections against the perfection of Christianity, as to objections
of the like kind, against the constitution of nature.  It shows
b [The influences of the Ioly Spirit are not only "given to good men,' but
ale sent upon many who live unmindful of eternity, quickening their consciences, enlightening their understandings and arresting their passions, aR4
thus it is they are converted unto the truth in Christ.]' John xiv. 2.    t John v. 22, 23.    k Matt. xxviii. 18.
{ 1 Cor. xv. 28.   I 1 Tim. iii. 16.  ~ P. 174, &c.
P




t26              CHRISTIANITY A SCHEME              PART II.
the credibility, that the things objected against, how boolish*
soever they appear to men, may be the very best means of accomplishing the very best ends. And their appearing foolishness is no presumption against this, in a scheme so greatly beyond
our comprehension.t
III. The credibility, that the Christian dispensation may have
been, all along, carried on by general laws,J no less than the
course of nature, may require to be more distinctly made out.
Consider then, upon what ground it is we say, that the whole
common course of nature is carried on according to general foreordained laws. We know indeed several of the general laws of
matter; and a great part of the natural behavior of living agents
is reducible to general laws. But we know in a manner nothing,
by what laws, storms, tempests, earthquakes, famine, pestilence,
become the instruments of destruction to mankind.  And the
laws by which persons born into the world at such a time and
place are of such capacities, geniuses, tempers; the laws by
which thoughts come into our mind, in a multitude of cases;
and by which innumerable things happen, of the greatest influence upon the affairs and state of the world. These laws are so
wholly unknown to us, that we call the events which come to
pass by them, accidental; though all reasonable men know certainly, that there cannot, in reality, be any such thing as chance.;
and conclude that the things which have this appearance are the
result of general laws, and may be reduced to them.  It is but
an exceeding little way, and in but a very few respects, that we
can trace up the natural course of things before us, to general
laws. It is only from analogy, that we conclude the whole of it
to be capable of being reduced to them: only from our seeing
that part is so. It is from our finding, that the course of nature,
in some respects and so far, goes on by general laws, that we conclude this of the rest.
If that be a just ground for such a conclusion, it is a just
ground also, if not to conclude, yet to apprehend, to render it
supposable and credible, which is sufficient fcr answering objections, that God's miraculous interpositions may have been, all
along in like manner, by general laws of wisdom. Thus, that
miraculous powers should be exerted, at such times, upon such
* 1 Cor. i. [18-25.]   t Pp. 178, 179.      t Pp. 180, m.81.




CHAP. IV.      IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED.                Z27
occasions, in such degrees and manners, and with regard to such
persons, rather than others; that the affairs of tne world, being
permitted to go on in their natural course so far, should, just at
such a point, have a new direction given them by miraculous interpositions; that these interpositions should be exactly in such
degrees and respects only; all this may have been by general
laws. These laws are indeed unknown to us: but no more unknown than the laws from whence it is, that some die as soon as
they are born, and others live to extreme old age; that one man
is so superior to another in understanding; with innumerable
more things, which, as was before observed, we cannot reduce to
any laws or rules, though it is taken for granted, they are as
much reducible to general ones, as gravitation.  If the revealed
dispensations of Providence, and miraculous interpositions, be
by general laws, as well as God's ordinary government in the
course of nature, made known by reason and experience; there
is no more reason to expect that every exigence, as it arises,
should be provided for by these general laws or miraculous interpositions, than that every exigence in nature should be, by the
general laws of nature.  Yet there might be wise and good
reasons, why miraculous interpositions should be by general laws;
and why these laws should not be broken in upon, or deviated
from, by other miracles.
Upon the whole then, the appearance of deficiencies and irregularities in nature is owing to its being a scheme but in part
made known, and of such a certain particular kind in other respects.  We see no more reason why the frame and course of
nature should be such a scheme, than why Christianity should.
And that the former is such a scheme, renders it credible, that
the latter, upon supposition of its truth, may be so too. And as
it is manifest, that Christianity is a scheme revealed but in part,
and a scheme in which means are made use of to accomplish
ends, like to that of nature: so the credibility, that it may have
been all along carried on by general laws, no less than the course
of nature, has been distinctly proved.  From all this it is beforehand credible that there might, I think probable that there
would, be the like appearance of deficiencies and irregularities
In Christianity, as in nature: i.e. that Christianity would be
liable to the like objections, as the frame of nature.  And these




228              CHRISTIANITY A SCHEME              PART I;
objections are answered by these observations concerning Christianity; as the like objections against the frame of nature are
answered by the like observations concerning the frame of
nature.
The objections against Christianity, considered as a matter of
fact,* having, in general, been obviated in the preceding chapter;
and the same, considered as made against the wisdom and goodness of it, having been obviated in this: the next thing, according to the method proposed, is to show, that the principal objections, in particular, against Christianity, may be answered, by
particular and full analogies in nature. And as one of them is
made against the whole scheme of it together, as just now described, I choose to consider it here, rather than in a distinct
chapter by itself.
The thing objected against this scheme of the gospel is, "that
it seems to suppose God was reduced to the necessity of a long
series of intricate means, in order to accomplish his ends, the
recovery and salvation of the world: in like sort as men, for
want of understanding or power, not being able to come at their
ends directly, are forced to go roundabout ways, and make use
of many perplexed contrivances to arrive at them." Now every
thing which we see shows the folly of this, considered as an objection against the truth of Christianity.  For, according to our
manner of conception, God makes use of variety of means, what
we often think tedious ones, in the natural course of providence,
for the accomplishment of all his ends. Indeed it is certain
there is somewhat in this matter quite beyond our comprehension: but the mystery is as great in nature as in Christianity.
We know what we ourselves aim at, as final ends: and what
courses we take, merely as means conducing to those ends. But
we are greatly ignorant how far things are considered by the
Author of nature, under the single notion of means and ends;
so as that it may be said, this is merely an end, and that merely
a means, in his regard. And whether there be not some peculiar
absurdity in our very manner of conception, concerning this
matter, something contradictory arising from our extremely iml
perfect views of things, it is impossible to say,
* P. 172, &c.




CHAP. IV.      IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED.                 229
However, this much is manifest, that the whole natural world
and government of it, is a scheme or system, not a fixed, but a
progressive one: a scheme in which the operation of various
means takes up a great length of time, before the ends they tend
to can be attained. The change of seasons, the ripening of
fruits, the very history of a flower, are instances of this: and so
is human life. Thus vegetable bodies, and those of animals,
though possibly formed at once, yet grow up by degrees to a
mature state.   And thus rational agents, who animate these
latter bodies, are naturally directed to form each his own manners
and character, by the gradual gaining of knowledge and experience, and by a long course of action.  Our existence is not only
successive, as it must be of necessity; but one state of our life
and being is appointed by God, to be a preparation for another;
and that to be the means of attaining to another succeeding one:
infancy to childhood; childhood to youth; youth to mature age.
Men are impatient, and for precipitating things: but the Author
of nature appears deliberate throughout his operations; accomplishing his natural ends by slow successive steps." And there
is a plan of things beforehand laid out, which, from the nature
of it, requires various systems of means, as well as length of
time, in order to the carrying on its several parts into execution.
Thus, in the daily course of natural providence, God operates
in the very same manner, as in the dispensation of Christianity;
making one thing subservient to another; this, to something
further; and so on, through a progressive series of means, which
extend, both backward and forward, beyond our utmost view.
Of this manner of operation, every thing we see in the course
of nature is as much an instance, as any part of the Christian
dispensation.
c ["Providence hurries not himself to display to-day the consequence of the
principle he yesterday announced. He will draw it out in the lapse of ages.
Even according to our reasoning logic is none the less sure, because it is slow."
-GUIZOT on Civilization, Lect. I.
How impressively is this sentiment sustained by modern geology, and as.
tronomy!]
20




230                  THE APPOINTMENT OF                    PART IL
CHAPTER V.
THE PATTICIULAR     SYSTEM   OF CHRISTIANITY; THE APPOINTMENT   OF A    MEDIATOR, AND      THE   REDEMPTION     OF THE
WORLD BY HIM.
THERE is not, I think, any thing relating to Christianity, which
has been more objected against, than the mediation of Christ, in
some or other of its parts.   Yet upon thorough consideration,
there seems nothing less justly liable to it.a  For,
I. The whole analogy of nature removes all imagined presumption against the general notion of a Mediator between God and
rman.*   For we find all living creatures are brought into the
world, and their life in infancy is preserved, by the instrumentality of others: and every satisfaction of it, some way or other, is
bestowed by the like means.     So that the visible government,
which God exercises over the world, is by the instrumentality
and mediation of others. How far his invisible government be
or be not so, it is impossible to determine at all by reason.  The
supposition, that part of it is so, appears, to say the least, altogether as credible, as the contrary.  There is then no sort of objection, from the light of nature, against the general notion of a
mediator between God and man, considered as a doctrine of Christianity, or as an appointment in this dispensation: since we find
by experience, that God does appoint mediators, to be the instruments of good and evil to us: the instruments of his justice and
his mercy.   And the objection here referred to is urged, not
against mediation in that high, eminent, and peculiar sense, in
R [ Philosophers make shameful and dangerous mistakes, when they judge
of the Divine economy. lie cannot, they tell us, act thus, it would be contrary
to his wisdom, or his justice, &c. But while they make these peremptory assertions they show themselves to be unacquainted with the fundamental rules
of their own science, and with the origin of all late improvements.'True
philosophy would begin the other way, with observing the constitution of the
world, how God has made us, and in what circumstances he has placed ns, and
theaz from what he has done, form a sure judgment what he would do. Thus
might they learn'the invisible things of God fromn those which at- clearly
seen' the things which are not accomplished from those which are." —:^WELL'S
Use and Abuse of Philosophy.]
* I T;m. ii. 5.




CHAP. v.       A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER.                231
which Christ is our mediator; but absolutely against the whole
notion itself of a mediator at all.
II. As we must suppose, that the world is under the proper
moral government of God, or in a state of religion, before we can
enter into consideration of the revealed doctrine, concerning the
redemption of it by Christ: so that supposition is here to be distinctly noticed. Now the divine moral government which religion teaches us, implies that the consequence of vice shall be
misery, in some future state, by the righteous judgment of God.
That such consequent punishment shall take effect by his appointment, is necessarily implied.  But, as it is not in any sort to be
supposed, that we are made acquainted with all the ends or
reasons, for which it is fit that future punishments should be inflicted, or why God has appointed such and such consequent
misery to follow vice; and as we are altogether in the dark, how
or in what manner it shall follow, by what immediate occasions,
or by the instrumentality of what means; so there is no absurdity
in supposing it may follow in a way analogous to that in which
many miseries follow such and such courses of action at present;
poverty, sickness, infamy, untimely death by diseases, death from
the hands of civil justice.  There is no absurdity in supposing
future punishment may follow wickedness of course, as we speak,
or in the way of natural consequence from God's original constitution of the world; from the nature he has given us, and from
the condition in which he places us; or in a like manner, as a
person rashly trifling upon a precipice, in the way of natural consequence, falls down; in the way of natural consequence of this,
breaks his limbs, and in the way of natural consequence, without
help, perishes.
Some good men may perhaps be offended with hearing it spoken
of as a supposable thing that future punishments of wickedness
may be in the way of natural consequence: as if this were taking
the execution of justice out of the hands of God, and giving it to
nature.  But they should remember, that when things come to
pass according to the course of nature, this does not hinder them
from being his doing, who is the God of nature: and that the;Scripture ascribes those punishments to divine justice, which are
known t, be natural; and which must be called so, when distinguished from such as are miraculous.  After all, this suppo.




232                 THE APPOINTMENT OF                  PART n.
sition or rather this way of speaking, is here made use of only
by way of illustration of the subject before us.  For since it must
be admitted, that the future punishment of wickedness is not a
matter of arbitrary appointment, but of reason, equity, and justice;
it comes for aught I see, to the same thing, whether it is supposed to be inflicted in a way analogous to that in which the
temporal punishments of vice and folly are inflicted, or in any
other way. And though there were a difference, it is allowable,
in the present case, to make this supposition, plainly not an incredible one, that future punishment may follow wickedness in
the way of natural consequence, or according to some general
laws of government already established in the universe.
III. Upon this supposition, or even without it, we may observe
somewhat, much to the present purpose, in the constitution of
nature or appointments of Providence: the provision which is
made, that all the bad natural consequences of men's actions
should not always actually follow; or that such bad consequences,
as, according to the settled course of things, would inevitably
have followed if not prevented, should, in certain degrees, be prevented. We are apt, presumptuously to imagine, that the world
might have been so constituted, as that there would not have
been any such thing as misery or evil.  On the contrary we find
the Author of nature permits it: but then he has provided reliefs,
and in many cases perfect remedies for it, after some pains and
difficulties; reliefs and remedies even for that evil, which is the
fruit of our own misconduct; and which, in the course of nature,
would have continued, and ended in our destruction, but for such
remedies. And this is an instance both of severity and of indulgence, in the constitution of nature.  Thus all the bad consequences, now mentioned, of a man's trifling upon a precipice,
might be prevented. And though all were not, yet some of them
might, by proper interposition, if not rejected:b by another's
coming to the rash man's relief, with his own laying hold on that
relief, in such sort as the case required. Persons may do a great
b [The interposition of a man of known probity and worth often saves the
thoughtless or the guilty from punishment. Mediation is seen in a thousand
forms in the arrangements of social life; and the common sense of all mankind
approves of it. The release of the offending, by the intercession of the good,
and all the benefits of advice, caution, example, instruction, persuasion. fanu
authority, are instances of mediation.]




CHAP. V.        A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER.               233
deal themselves towards preventing the bad consequences of their
follies: and more may be done by themselves, together with the
assistance of others their fellow-creatures; which assistance nature
requires and prompts us to. This is the general constitution of
the world.
Now suppose it had been so constituted, that after such actions
were done, as were foreseen naturally to draw after them misery
to the doer, it should have been no more in human power to have
prevented that naturally consequent misery, in any instance, than
it is in all: no one can say, whether such a more severe constitution of things might not yet have been really good. But, on the
contrary, provision being made by nature, that we may and do,
to so great degree, prevent the bad natural effects of our follies;
this may be called mercy or compassion in the original constitution of the world: compassion, as distinguished from goodness in
general. And, the whole known constitution and course of things
affording us instances of such compassion, it would be according
to the analogy of nature, to hope, that however ruinous the
natural consequences of vice might be, from the general laws of
God's government over the universe; yet provision might be
made, possibly might have been originally made, for preventing
those ruinous consequences from inevitably following: at least
from following universally, and in all cases.
Many, I am sensible, will wonder at finding this made a question,
or spoken of as in any degree doubtful. The generality of mankind are so far from having that awful sense of things, which the
present state of vice and misery and darkness seems to make but
reasonable, that they have scarce any apprehension or thought at
all about this matter, any way: and some serious persons may
have spoken unadvisedly concerning it. But let us observe,
what we experience to be, and what, from the very constitution
of nature cannot but be, the consequences of irregular and disorderly behavior: even of such rashness, wilfulness, neglects, as
we scarce call vicious. Now it is natural to apprehend, that the
bad consequences of irregularity will be greater, in proportion as
the irregularity is so. And there is no comparison between these
-'regularities, and the greater instances of vice, or a dissolute
profligate disregard to all religion; if there be any thing at all in
religion. For consider what it is for creatures, moral agents,
20



2,34               TIHE APPOINTMENT OF               PART IL
presumptuously to introduce that confusion and misery into the
kingdom  of God, which mankind have in fact introduced: to
blaspheme the Sovereign Lord of all; to contemn  his authority;
to be inj rious, to the degree they are, to their fellow-creatures,
the creatures of God.  Add that the effects of vice in the present
world are often extreme misery, irretrievable ruin, and even
death: and upon putting all this together, it will appear, that as
no one can say, in what degree fatal the unprevented consequences
of vice may be, according to the general rule of divine government; so it is by no means intuitively certain, how far these
consequences could possibly, in the nature of the thing, be prevented, consistently with the eternal rule of right, or with what
is, in fact, the moral constitution of nature.  However, there
would be large ground to hope, that the universal government
was not so severely strict, but that there was room for pardon, or
for having those penal consequences prevented.  Yet,
IV. There seems no probability, that any thing we could do
would alone and of itself prevent them: prevent their following,
or being inflicted.  But one would think at least, it were impossible that the contrary should be thought certain.  For we are
not acquainted with the whole of the case. We are not informed
of all the reasons, which render it fit that future punishments
should be inflicted: and therefore cannot know, whether any
thing we could do would make such an alteration, as to render it
fit that they should be remitted. We do not know what the
whole natural or appointed consequences of vice are; nor in what
way they would follow, if not prevented: and therefore can in no
sort say, whether we could do any thing which would be sufficient
to prevent them.  Our ignorance being thus manifest, let us
recollect the analogy of nature or Providence.  For, though this
may be but a slight ground to raise a positive opinion upon, in
this matter; yet it is sufficient to answer a mere arbitrary assertion, without any kind of evidence, urged by way of objection
against a doctrine, the proof of which is not reason, but revelation.  Consider then: people ruin their fortunes by extravagance;
they bring diseases upon themselves by excess; they incur the
penalties of civil laws; and surely civil government is natural;
will sorrow for these follies past, and behaving well for the future,
alone and )f itself prevent the natural consequences of them?




CHAP. V.        A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER.                   235
On the contrary, men's natural abilities of helping themselves
are often impaired; or if not, yet they are forced to be beholden
to the assistance of others, upon several accounts, and in different ways; assistance which they would have had no occasion for,
had it not been for their misconduct; but which, in the disadvantageous condition they have reduced themselves to, is absolutely necessary to their recovery, and retrieving their affairs.
Since this is our case, considering ourselves merely as inhabitants
of this world, and as having a temporal interest here, under the
natural government of God, which however has a great deai
moral in it; why is it not supposable that this may be our case
also, in our more important capacity, as under his perfect moral
government, and having a more general and future interest
depending?   If we have misbehaved in this higher capacity,
and rendered ourselves obnoxious to the future punishment,
which God has annexed to vice: it is plainly credible, that
behaving well for the time to come may be-not useless, God
forbid-but wholly insufficient, alone and of itself, to prevent
that punishment: or to put us in the condition which we should
have been in, had we preserved our innocence.
Though we ought to reason with all reverence, whenever we
reason concerning the divine conduct: yet it may be added, that
it is clearly contrary to all our notions of government, as well as
to what is, in fact, the general constitution of nature, to suppose,
that doing well for the future should, in all cases, prevent all the
judicial bad consequences of having done evil, or all the punishment annexed to disobedience. We have manifestly nothing
from whence to determine, in what degree, and in what cases,
reformation would prevent this punishment, even supposing that
it would in some.  And though the efficacy of repentance itself
c [MR. NEWMAN notices a distinction between the facts of revelation, and its
principles; and considers the argument from analogy more concerned with its
principles than with its facts. "The revealed facts are special and singular,
from the nature of the case, but the revealed principles are common to all the
works of God; and if the Author of nature be the author of grace, it may be
expected that the principles displayed in them will be the same, and form a
connecting link between them. In this identity of principle, lies the analogy
of natural and revealed religion, in Butler's sense of the word. The Incarnation is a fact, and cannot be paralleled by any thing in nature: the doctrine
of mediation is a principle, and is abundantly exemplified ih nature."-Essay
on Developments.]




236               THE APPOINTMENT OP               PART II
alone, to prevent what mankind had rendered themselves obnoxious to, and recover what they had forfeited, is now insisted
upon, in opposition to Christianity; yet, by the general prevalence of propitiatory sacrifices over the heathen world, this notion
of repentance alone being sufficient to expiate guilt, appears to
be contrary to the general sense of mankind.d
Upon the whole then; had the laws, the general laws of God's
government been permitted to operate, without any interposition
in our behalf, the future punishment, for aught we know to
the contrary, or have any reason to think, must inevitably have
followed, notwithstanding any thing we could have done to prevent it.
V. In this darkness, or this light of nature, call it which you
please, revelation comes in; and confirms every doubting fear,
which could enter into the heart of man, concerning the future
unprevented consequence of wickedness. It supposes the world
to be in a state of ruin (a supposition which seems the very
ground of the Christian dispensation, and which, if not provable
by reason, yet is in no wise contrary to it;) and teaches us too,
that the rules of divine government are such, as not to admit of
pardon immediately and directly upon repentance, or by the sole
efficacy of it. But teaches at the same time, what nature might
justly have hoped, that the moral government of the universe
was not so rigid, but that there was room for an interposition, to
avert the fatal consequences of vice; which therefore, by this
means, does admit of pardon. Revelation teaches us, that the
unknown laws of God's more general government, no less than
the particular laws by which we experience he governs us at
present, are compassionate,* as well as good in the more general
notion of goodness: and that he hath mercifully provided, that
there should be an interposition to prevent the destruction of
human kind; whatever that destruction unprevented would have
been.  God so loved the world, that he gave his only blegotten
Son, that whosoever believeth, not, to be sure, in a speculative,
but in a practical sense, that whosoever believeth in him, should
d [The student will find the inadequacy of repentance to cancel guilt, beautifully exhibited by WAYLAND, Mor. Science: MAGEE, Atonement: ITowV.
Living Temple.]
* P 232, &c.




CHAP. V.          A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER.                     237
not pei ish:* gave his Son in the same way of goodness to the
world, as he affords particular persons the friendly assistance of
their fellow-creatures, when, without it, their temporal ruin would
be the certain consequence of their follies: in the same way of
goodness, I say, though in a transcendent and infinitely higher
degree. And the Son of God loved us, and gave himself for us,
with a love, which he himself compares to that of human friendship: though, in this case, all comparisons must fall infinitely
short of the thing intended to be illustrated by them. He interposed in such a manner as was necessary and effectual to prevent
that execution of justice upon sinners, which God had appointed
should otherwise have been executed upon them; or in such a
manner, as to prevent that punishment from       actually following,
which, according to the general laws of divine government, must
have followed the sins of the world, had it not been for such
interposition.t
If any thing here said should appear, upon first thought, inconsistent with divine goodness; a second, I am persuaded, will
entirely remove that appearance.     For were we to suppose the
constitution of things to be such, as that the whole creation must
* John iii. 16.
t- It cannot, I suppose, be imagined, even by the most cursory reader, that
it is, in any sort, affirmed or implied in any thing said in this chapter, that
none can have the benefit of the general redemption, but such as have the
advantage of being made acquainted with it in the present life. But it may
be needful to mention, that several questions, which have been brought into
the subject before us, and determined, are not in the least entered into here.
questions which have been, I fear, rashly determined, and perhaps with equal
rashness contrary ways. For instance, whether God could have saved the
world by other means than the death of Christ, consistently with the general laws of his government. And had not Christ come into the world, what
would have been the future condition of the better sort of men; those just persons over the face of the earth, for whom Manasses in his prayere asserts, renentance was not appointed. The meaning of the first of these questions is
greatly ambiguous: and neither of them can properly be answered, without
going upon that infinitely absurd supposition, that we know the whole of the
case. And perhaps the very inquiry, What would have followed, if God had
not done as he has, may have in it some very great impropriety: and ought
not to be carried on any further than is necessary to help our partial and
inadequate conceptions of things.
e rhe "pra-er of Manasses" is one of the apocryphal books of the Old Testament, which
neyl precedes "Maccabees."'




'238              THE APPOINTMENT OF                PART II.
have perished, had it not been for something, which Grod had
appointed should be, in order to prevent that ruin: even this
supposition would not be inconsistent, in any degree, with the
most absolutely perfect goodness.  Still it may be thought, that
this whole manner of treating the subject before us supposes
mankind to be naturally in a very strange state. And truly so
it does. But it is not Christianity which has put us into this
state. Whoever will consider the manifold miseries, and the
extreme wickedness of the world; that the best have great
wrongnesses within themselves, which they complain of, and
endeavor to amend; but that the generality grow more profligate
and corrupt with age; that even moralists thought the present
state to be a state of punishment: and, that the earth our habitation has the appearances of being a ruin: whoever, I say, will
consider all these, and some other obvious things, will think he
has little reason to object against the Scripture account, that
mankind is in a state of degradation; against this being the
fact: how difficult soever he may think it to account for, or even
to form a distinct conception of the occasions and circumstances
of it.  But that the crime of our first parents was the occasion
of our being placed in a more disadvantageous condition, is a
thing throughout and particularly analogous to what we see in
the daily course of natural providence; as the recovery of the
world by the interposition of Christ has been shown to be so in
general.
VI. The particular manner in which Christ interposed in the
redemption of the world, or his office as Mlediator; in the largest
sense, between God and man, is thus represented to us in the
Scripture.  He is the light of the world;* the revealer of the
will of God in the most eminent sense.  He is a propitiatory
sacrifice;t the Lamb of God:t and, as he voluntarily offered
himself up, he is styled our High Priest.~ And, which seems
of peculiar weight, he is described beforehand in the Old Testament, under the same characters of a priest, and an expiatory
victim. l And whereas it is objected, that all this is merely by' John i., and viii. 12.
t Rom. iii. 25, v. 11: 1 Cor. v. 7: Eph. v. 2: 1 John ii. 2: Matt. xxvi 28.
J John i. 29, 36, and throughout the book of Revelation.
8 Throughout the epistle to the Hebrews.
Isa. liii.  an. ix. 24: Ps. ex  4.




CHAP. V.       A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER.                239
way of allusion to the sacrifices of the Mosaic law, the Apostle
on the contrary affirms, that the law was a shadow of good things
to come, and not the very image of the things:* and that the
priests that offer gifts according to the law-serve unto the example and shadow of heavenly things, as Moses was admonished
of God, when he was about to make the tabernacle.  For see,
saith he, that thou make all things according to the pattern
showed to thee in the mount: i.e. the Levitical priesthood was a
shadow of the priesthood of Christ; in like manner as the tabernacle made by Moses was according to that showed him in the
mount. The priesthood of Christ, and the tabernacle in the
mount, were the originals; of the former of which the Levitical
priesthood was a type; and of the latter the tabernacle made by
Moses was a copy. The doctrine of this epistle then plainly is,
that the legal sacrifices were allusions to the great and final
atonement to be made by the blood of Christ; and not that this
was an allusion to those. Nor can any thing be more express
and determinate than the following passage.  It is not possible
that the blood of bulls and of goats should take away sin.
Wherefore when he cometh into the world, he saith, Sacrifice
and offering, i.e. of bulls and of goats, thou wouldest not, but a
body hast thou prepared me. Lo! I come to do thy will, 0 God.
By which will we are sanctified, through the ofering of the body
of Jesus Christ once for all.T  And to add one passage more of
the like kind: Christ was once offered to bear the sins of many:
and unto them that look for him shall he appear the second time,
without sin; i.e. without bearing sin, as he did at his first
coming, by being an offering for it; without having our zniquities again laid upon him, without being any more a sin-offering:
-unto them that look jfr him shall he appear the second time,
without sin, unto salvation.~ Nor do the inspired writers at all
confine themselves to this manner of speaking concerning the
satisfaction of Christ; but declare an efficacy in what he did and
suffered for us, additional to and beyond mere instruction, example, and government, in great variety of expression: That
Jesus should die for that nation, the Jews: and not for that
nation only, but that also, plainly by the efficacy of his death,
* IHe. x. 1.                           t Heb. viii. 4, 5.
t Heb. x. 4, 5, 7, 9, 10.  "            Heb. ix. 28.




2rL0               THE APPOINTMENT OF                  PA r It.
he should gather together in one the children of God that were
scattered abroad;* that he stffrred for sins, the just for the unjust:t that he gave his life, himself, a ransom:+ that we are
bought, bought with a price:~ that he redeemed us with his
blood: redeemed us from   the curse of the law, being made a
cursefor us:11 that he is our advocate, intercessor, and profpitia.
tion:~ that he was made perfect, or consummate, through sufferings; and being thus made perfect, he became the author of salvation:** that God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself; by the death of his Son, by the cross; not imputing their
trespasses unto them:tt and lastly, that through death he destroyed
him that had the power of death.1  Christ having thus humbled
himself and become obedient to death, even the death of the cross;
God also hath highly exalted him, and given him a name, which
is above every name: hath given all things into his hands: hath
committed all judgment unto him; that all men should honor the
Son, even as they honor the Father.~~  For, worthy is the Lamb
that was slain, to receive power, and riches, and wisdom, and
strength, and honor, and glory, and blessing.  And every creature which is in heaven, and on the earth, heard I, saying, Blessing, and honor, and glory, and power, be unto him that sitteth
upon the throne, and unto the Lamb forever and ever.llll
These passages of Scripture seem to comprehend and express
the chief parts of Christ's office, as Mediator between God and
man, so far, I mean, as the nature of this his office is revealed;
and it is usually treated of by divines under three heads.
First, He was, by way of eminence, the Prophet: that Prophet that should come into the wcorld,J  to declare the divine
will.  He published anew the law of nature, which men had
corrupted; and the very knowledge of which, to some degree,
was lost among them.  He taught mankind, taught us authoritatively, to live soberly, righteously, and god/y in this present world,
in expectation of the future judgment of God.   He confirmed
- John xi. 51, 52.                   t 1 Pet. iii. 18.: Matt. xx. 28: Mark x. 45: 1 Tim. ii. 6.
2 2 Pet. ii. 1: Rev. xiv. 4: 1 Cor. vi. 20.
1 Pet. i. 19: Rev. v. 9: Gal. iii. 13.  ~ Heb. vii. 25: 1 John ii. 1, 2.
- Heb. ii. 10.: v. 9.      tt 2 Cor. v. 19: Rom. v. 10: Eph. ii. 16.
$i Heb. ii. 14. See also a remarkable passage in the book of Job, xxxiii. 24.
P Phil. ii. 8, 9: John iii. 35, and v. 22, 23. ijll Rev. v. 12, 13. ~~ John vi. 14.




CHAP. V.       A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER.                241
the truth of this moral system of nature, and gave us additional
evidence of it; the evidence of testimony.*   He distinctly
revealed the manner, in which God would be worshipped, the
efficacy of repentance, and the rewards and punishments of a
future life. Thus he was a prophet in a sense in which no other
ever was. To which is to be added, that he set us a perfect example, that we should follow his steps.
Secondly, He has a kingdom which is not of this world.  He
founded a Church, to be to mankind a standing memorial of
religion, and invitation to it; which he promised to be with
always even to the end. He exercises an invisible government
over it, himself, and by his Spirit: over that part of it which is
militant here on earth, a government of discipline, for the perfecting of the saints, for the edifying his bodyl: till we all come
in the unity of the faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of
God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the
fulness of Christ.t Of this Church, all persons scattered over
the world, who live in obedience to his laws, are members. For
these he is gone to prepare a place, and will come again to receive them unto himself, that where he is, there they may be also;
and reign with him forever and ever:  and likewise to take
vengeance on them  that know not God, and obey not his
Gospel.~
Against these parts of Christ's office I find no objections, but
what are fully obviated in the beginning of this chapter.
Lastly, Christ offered himself a propitiatory sacrifice, and
made atonement for the sins of the world; which is mentioned
last, in regard to what is objected against it. Sacrifices of expiation were commanded the Jews, and obtained among most other
nations, from tradition, whose original probably was revelation.
And they were continually repeated, both occasionally, and at the
returns of stated times: and made up great part of the external
religion of mankind.  But now once in the endc of the world
Christ appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself.\l
This sacrifice was, in the highest degree and with the most extensive influence, of that efficacy for obtaining pardon of sin,
which the heathens may be supposed to have thought their sacri
* P. 188, &c. t Eph. iv. 12, 13. f John xiv. 2, 3: Rev. iii. 21, and xi. 15
2 2 Thess. i. 8.          1 Heb. ix. 26.
Q                       21




24,2               THE APPOINTMENT OF                PART In.
fices to have been, and which the Jewish sacrifices really were
in some degree, and with regard to some persons.f
How and in what particular rway it h d this efficacy, there are
not wanting persons who have endeavored to explain: but I do
not find that the Scripture has explained it. We seem to be
very much in the dark concerning the manner in which the
ancients understood atonement to be made, i.e. pardon to be
obtained by sacrifices. And if the Scripture has, as surely it
has, left this matter of the satisfaction of Christ mysterious, left
somewhat in it unrevealed, all conjectures about it must be, if
not evidently absurd, yet at least uncertain.  Nor has any one
reason to complain for want of further information, unless he can
show his claim to it.
Some have endeavored to explain the efficacy of what Christ
has done and suffered for us, beyond what the Scripture has
authorized: others, probably because they could not explain it,
have been for taking it away, and confining his office as Redeemer of the world, to his instruction, example, and government
of the church.  Whereas the doctrine of the Gospel appears to
be, not only that he taught the efficacy of repentance, but rendered it of the efficacy of which it is, by what he did and
suffered for us: that he obtained for us the benefit of having our
repentance accepted unto eternal life: not only that he revealed
to sinners, that they were in a capacity of salvation, and how
they might obtain it; but moreover that he put them into this
capacity of salvation, by what he did and suffered for them; put
us into a capacity of escaping future punishment, and obtaining
future happiness.  And it is our wisdom thankfully to accept
the benefit, by performing the conditions, upon which it is
offered, on our part, without disputing how it was procured on
his. For,
VII. Since we neither know by what means punishment in a
future state would have followed wickedness in this: nor in what
manner it would have been inflicted, had it not been prevented;
nor all the reasons why its infliction would have been needful,
nor the particular nature of that state of happiness, which Christ
is gone to prepare for his disciples: and since we are ignorant
f [Consult MAGEE, on Atonement: STAPFERI Institutiones: TURRETTN, IS
Satisfactione: CHALMERS, Discourses: OWEN, Satis. of Christ.]




CHAP. v.        A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER.'243
how far any thing which we could do, would, alone and of itself,
have been effectual to prevent that punishment to which we were
obnoxious, and recover that happiness which we had forfeited;
it is most evident we are not judges, antecedently to revelation,
whether a mediator was or was not necessary, to obtain those
ends: to prevent that future punishment, and bring mankind to
the final happiness of their nature.  For the very same reasons,
upon supposition of the necessity of a mediator, we are no more
judges, antecedently to revelation, of the whole nature of his
office, or of the several parts of which it consists; or of what was
fit and requisite to be assigned him, in order to accomplish the
ends of divine Providence in the appointment.  Hence it follows,
that to object against the expediency or usefulness of particular
things, revealed to have been done or suffered by him, because
we do not see how they were conducive to those ends, is highly
absurd.  Yet nothing is more common to be met with, than this
absurdity. If it be acknowledged beforehand, that we are not
judges in the case, it is evident that no objection can, with any
shadow of reason, be urged against any particular part of Christ's
mediatorial office revealed in Scripture, till it can be shown positively not to be requisite or conducive to the ends proposed to be
accomplished; or that it is in itself unreasonable.
There is one objection made against the satisfaction of Christ,
which looks to be of this positive kind: that the doctrine of his
being appointed to suffer for the sins of the world, represents
God as being indifferent whether he punished the innocent or
the guilty.  Now from the foregoing observations we may see
the extreme slightness of all such objections; and (though it is
most certain all who make them do not see the consequence) that
they conclude altogether as much against God's whole original
constitution of nature, and the whole daily course of divine Providence in the government of the world, (i.e. against the whole
scheme of Theism and the whole notion of religion,) as against
Christianity.  For the world is a constitution or system, whose
parts have a mutual reference to each other: and there is a
scheme of things gradually carrying on, called the course of nature, to the carrying on of which God has appointed us, in various
ways, to contribute. And when, in the daily course of natural
providence, it is appointed that innocent people should suffer for




241                THE APPOINTMENT OF                PART I
the faults of the guilty, this is liable to the very same objection,
as the instance we are now considering.  The infinitely greater
importance of that appointment of Christianity, which is objected
against, does not hinder but it may be, as it plainly is, an appointment of the very same kind, with what the world affords us
daily examples of. Nay, if there were any force at all in the objection, it would be stronger, in one respect, against natural
providence, than against Christianity: because under the former
we are in many cases commanded, and even necessitated whether
we will or no, to suffer for the faults of others; whereas the sufferings of Christ were voluntary.
The world's being under the righteous government of God
does indeed imply, that finally, and upon the whole, every one
shall receive according to his personal deserts: and the general
doctrine of the whole Scripture is, that this shall be the completion of the divine government. But during the progress, and,
for aught we know, even in order to the completion of this moral
scheme, vicarious punishments may be fit, and absolutely necessary.  Men by their follies run themselves into extreme distress;
into difficulties which would be absolutely fatal to them, were it
not for the interposition and assistance of others.  God commands
by the law of nature, that we afford them this assistance, in many
cases where we cannot do it without very great pains, and labor,
and sufferings to ourselves.  We see in what variety of ways one
person's sufferings contribute to the relief of another: and how,
or by what particular means, this comes to pass, or follows, from
the constitution and laws of nature, which came under our notice:
and, being familiarized to it, men are not shocked with it. So
that the reason of their insisting upon objections of the foregoing
kind against the satisfaction of Christ is, either that they do not
consider God's settled and uniform appointments as his appointments at all; or else they forget that vicarious punishment is a
providential appointment of every day's experience. And then,
from their being unacquainted with the more general laws of
nature or divine government over the world, and not seeing how
the sufferings of Christ could contribute to the redemption of it,
unless by arbitrary and tyrannical will, they conclude his suffer
ings could not contribute to it any other way. And yet, what
has been often alleged in justification of this doctrine, even frox




CHAP. V.       A MEDIATOR AND REDEEMER.               245
the apparent natural tendency of this method of our redemption;
its tendency to vindicate the authority of God's laws, and deter
his creatures from sin; this has never yet been answered, and is
I think plainly unanswerable: though I am far from thinking it
an account of the whole of the case. But, without taking this
into consideration, it abundantly appears, fiom the observations
above made, that this objection is not an objection against Christianity, but against the whole general constitution of nature.
And if it were to be considered as an objection against Christianity, or considering it as it is, an objection against the constitution of nature; it amounts to no more in conclusion than this,
that a divine appointment cannot be necessary or expedient, because the objector does not discern it to be so: though he must
own that the nature of the case is such, as renders him incapable
of judging, whether it be so or not; or of seeing it to be necessary, though it were so!
It is indeed a matter of great patience to reasonable men, to
find people arguing in this manner: objecting against the credibility of such particular things revealed in Scripture, that they
do not see the necessity or expediency of them. For though it
is highly right, and the most pious exercise of our understanding,
to inquire with due reverence into the ends and reasons of God's
dispensations: yet when those reasons are concealed, to argue from
our ignorance, that such dispensations cannot be from God, is infinitely absurd. The presumption of this kind of objections
seems almost lost in the folly of them. And the folly of them
is yet greater, when they are urged, as usually they are, against
things in Christianity analogous or like to those natural dispensations of Providence, which are matter of experience.  Let reason
be kept to: and if any part of the Scripture account of the redemption of the world by Christ can be shown to be really contrary to it, let the Scripture, in the name of God, be given up.
But let not such poor creatures as we are, go on objecting against
an infinite scheme, that we do not see the necessity or usefulness
of all its parts, and call this reasoning; and, which still further
heightens the absurdity in the present case, parts which we are
not actively concerned in. For it may be worth mentioning,
Lastly, That not only the reason of the thing, but the whole
analogy of nature, should teach us, not to expect to have the like
2,..




246              THE APPOINTMENT, ETC.             PART II
information concerning the divine conduct, as concerning our
own duty   God instructs us by experience, (for it is not reason,
but experience which instructs us,) what good or bad consequences will follow from our acting in such and such manners:
and by this he directs us how we are to behave ourselves. But,
though we are sufficiently instructed for the common purposes of
life: yet it is but an almost infinitely small part of natural providence, which we are at all let into. The case is the same with
regard to revelation. The doctrine of a mediator between God
and man, against which it is objected, that the expediency of
some things in it is not understood, relates only to what was done
on God's part in the appointment, and on the Mediator's in the
execution of it. For what is required of us, in consequence of
this gracious dispensation, is another subject, in which none can
complain for want of information. The constitution of the world,
and God's natural government over it, is all mystery, as much as
the Christian dispensation. Yet under the first he has given
men all things pertaining to life; and under the other all things
pertaining unto godliness. And it may be added, that there is
nothing hard to be accounted for in any of the common precepts
of Christianity: though if there were, surely a divine command
is abundantly sufficient to lay us under the strongest obligations
to obedience. But the fact is, that the reasons of all the Christian precepts are evident. Positive institutions are manifestly
necessary to keep up and propagate religion among mankind.
And our duty to Christ, the internal and external worship of
him; this part of the religion of the Gospel manifestly arises
out of what he has done and suffered, his authority and
dominion, and the relation which he is revealed to stand in
to us.*
* P. 194, &c.




CIIAPTER VI.
THE WANT OF UNIVERSALITY IN REVELATION; AND THE
SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN TIE PROOF OF IT
IT has been thought by some persons, that if the evidence of
revelation appears doubtful, this itself turns into a positive argu.
ment against it: because it cannot be supposed, that, if it were
true, it would be left to subsist upon doubtful evidence. And
the objection against revelation from its not being universal is
often insisted upon as of great weight.
The weakness of these opinions may be shown, by observing
the suppositions on which they are founded: which are really
such as these; that it cannot be thought God would have bestowed any favor at all upon us, unless in the degree which we
think he might, and which, we imagine, would be most to our
particular advantage; and also that it cannot be thought he
would bestow a favor upon any, unless he bestowed the same
upon all; suppositions, which we find contradicted, not by a few
instances in God's natural government of the world, but by the
general analogy of nature together.
Persons who speak of the evidence of religion as doubtful,
and of this supposed doubtfulness as a positive argument against
it, should be put upon considering, what that evidence is, which
they act upon with regard to their temporal interests.  It is not
only extremely difficult, but in many cases absolutely impossible,
to balance pleasure and pain, satisfaction and uneasiness, so as to
be able to say on which side is the overplus. There are the like
difficulties and impossibilities in making the due allowances for a
change of temper and taste, for satiety, disgusts, ill health: any
of which render men incapable of enjoying, after they have obtained what they most eagerly desired. Numberless too are the
accidents, besides that one of untimely death, which may even
probably disappoint the best-concerted schemes: and strong
objections are often seen to lie against them, not to be removed
or answered, but which seem overbalanced by reasons on the
other side; so as that the certain difficulties and dangers of the
pursuit are, by every one, thought justly disregarded, upon
247




248             REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL:               PART n
account of the appearing greater advantages in case of success
though there be but little probability of it.  Lastly, every one
observes our liableness, if we be not upon our guard, to be
deceived by the falsehood of men, and the false appearances of
things: and this danger must be greatly increased, if there be a
strong bias within, suppose from indulged passion, to favor the
deceit.  Hence arises that great uncertainty and doubtfulness of
proof, wherein our temporal interest really consists; what are the
most probable means of attaining it; and whether those means
will eventually be successful.  And numberless instances there
are, in the daily course of life, in which all men think it reasonable to engage in pursuits, though the probability is greatly
against succeeding; and to make such provision for themselves,
as it is supposable they may have occasion for, though the plain
acknowledged probability is, that they never shall.
Those who think the objection against revelation, from its light
not being universal, to be of weight," should observe, that the
Author of nature, in numberless instances, bestows that upon
some, which he does not upon others, who seem equally to stand
in need of it. Indeed he appears to bestow all his gifts with the
most promiscuous variety among creatures of the same species:
health and strength, capacities of prudence and of knowledge,
means of improvement, riches, and all external advantages.  As
there are not any two men found, of exactly like shape and
features; so it is probable there are not any two, of an exactly
like constitution, temper, and situation, with regard to the goods
and evils of life.  Yet, notwithstanding these uncertainties and
varieties, God does exercise a natural government over the world;
and there is such a thing as a prudent and imprudent institution
of life, with regard to our health and our affairs, under that his
natural government.
As neither the Jewish nor Christian revelation have been universal; and as they have been afforded to a greater or less part
a [This objection is ably urged by TINDALL. The answer of our author is
complete. We should remember, that twice in the history of mankind, revelation has been universal. The first pair, and the occupants of the ark, comprised the whole population. But how soon was light rejected! Christianity
is universal, in nature and intention; is to become so in fact; and accoraing
to a very probable construction of prophecy, will continue to be universal, for
three hundred and sixty thousand years.]




CHAP. VI.   SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF.            s49
of the world, at different times; so likewise at different.,nes,
both revelations have had different degrees of evidence.  The
Jews who lived during the succession of prophets, that i,, fro,,
Moses till after the Captivity, had higher evidence of the truth
of their religion, than those had, who lived in the interval between the last-mentioned period, and the coming of Christ. And
the first Christians had higher evidence of the miracles wrought
in attestation of Christianity, than what we have now. They
had also a strong presumptive proof of the truth of it, perhaps
of much greater force, in way of argument, than many think, of
which we have very little remaining; I mean the presumptive
proof of its truth, from the influence which it had upon the lives
of the generality of its professors. And we, or future ages, may
possibly have a proof of it, which they could not have, from the
conformity between the prophetic history, and the state of the
worldb and of Christianity.
And further: if we were to suppose the evidence, which some
have of religion, to amount to little more than seeing that it may
be true; but that they remain in great doubts and uncertainties
about both its evidence and its nature, and great perplexities concerning the rule of life: others to have a full conviction of the
truth of religion, with a distinct knowledge of their duty; and
others severally to have all the intermediate degrees of religious
light and evidence, which lie between these two-if we put the
case, that for the present, it was intended that revelation should be
no more than a small light, in the midst of a world greatly overspread, notwithstanding it, with ignorance and darkness: that
certain glimmerings of this light should extend, and be directed,
to remote distances, in such a manner as that those who really
partook of it should not discern whence it originally came: that
some in a nearer situation to it should have its light obscured,
and, in different ways and degrees, intercepted: and that others
should be placed within its clearer influence, and be much more
enlivened, cheered, and directed by it; but yet that even to these
b [May not this be a principal object of the Apocalypse? As the book of
Daniel furnished a constant and powerful support to the faith of the Jew, by
the constant development of prophecy, so the Apocalypse, rightly studied must
powerfully, and through all time, support the faith of the Christian by the
continual unfolding and verification of its predictions.]




250            REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL:             PART II.
it should be no more than a light shining in a dark place: all
this would be perfectly uniform, and of a piece with the conduct
-if Providence, in the distribution of its other blessings. If the
fact of the case really were, that some have received no light at
all from the Scripture; as many ages and countries in the heathen
world: that others, though they have, by means of it, had essential or natural religion enforced upon their consciences, yet have
never had the genuine Scripture revelation, with its real evidence,
proposed to their consideration; and the ancient Persians and
modern Mahometans may possibly be instances of people in a
situation somewhat like to this; that others, though they have
had the Scripture laid before them as of divine revelation, yet
have had it with the system and evidence of Christianity so interpolated, the system so corrupted, the evidence so blended with
false miracles, as to leave the mind in the utmost doubtfulness
and uncertainty about the whole; which may be the state of
some thoughtful men, in most of those nations who call themselves Christian: and lastly, that others have had Christianity
offered to them in its genuine simplicity, and with its proper
evidence, as persons in countries and churches of civil and of
Christian liberty; but that even these persons are left in great
ignorance in many respects, and have by no means light afforded
them enough to satisfy their curiosity, but only to regulate their
life, to teach them their duty, and encourage them in the careful
discharge of it. I say, if we were to suppose this somewhat of
a general true account of the degrees of moral and religious light
and evidence, which were intended to be afforded mankind, and
of what has actually been and is their situation, in their moral
and religious capacity; there would be nothing in all this ignorance, doubtfulness, and uncertainty, in all these varieties, and
supposed disadvantages of some in comparison of others, respecting religion, but may be paralleled by manifest analogies in the
natural dispensations of Providence at present, considering our.
selves merely in our temporal capacity.
Nor is there any thing shocking in all this, or which would
seem to bear hard upon the moral administration in nature, if we
would really keep in mind, that every one shall be dealt equitably
with: instead of forgetting this, or explaining it away, after it is
acknowledged in words. All shadow of injustice, and indeed all




CHAP. VI.   SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF            251
harsh appearances, in this various economy of Providence, would
be lost, if we would keep in mind, that every merciful allowance
shall be made, and no more be required of any one, than what
might have been equitably expected of him, from thb circumstances in which he was placed; and not what might have been
expected, had he been placed in other circumstances: i.e. in
Scripture language, that every man shall be accepted according
to what he had, not according to what he had not.*  This however does not by any means imply, that all persons' condition
here is equally advantageous with respect to futurity. And
Providence's designing to place some in greater darkness with
respect to religious knowledge, is no more a reason why they
should not endeavor to get out of that darkness, and others to
bring them out of it, than why ignorant and slow people in
matters of other knowledge should not endeavor to learn, or
should not be instructed.
It is not unreasonable to suppose, that the same wise and good
principle, whatever it was, which disposed the Author of nature
to make different kinds and orders of creatures, disposed him also
to place creatures of like kinds in different situations.  And that
the same principle which disposed him to make creatures of
different moral capacities, disposed him also to place creatures of
like moral capacities in different religious situations; and even
the same creatures, in different periods of their being.  The account or reason of this is also most probably the account why the
constitution of things is such, as that creatures of moral natures
or capacities, for a considerable part of that duration in which
they are living agents, are not at all subjects of morality and religion; but grow up to be so, and grow up to be so more and more,
gradually from childhood to mature age.
What, in particular, is the account or reason of these things,
we must be greatly in the dark, were it only that we know so
very little even of our own case. Our present state may possibly
be the consequence of something past, of which we are wholly
ignorant: as it has a reference to somewhat to come, of which
we know scarce any more than is necessary for practice. A
system or constitution, in its notion, implies variety; and so
nomplicated a one as this world, very great variety.  So that
i 2 Cor. viii. 12.




252           tREVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL:             PART IL
were revelation universal, yet, from men's different capacities of
understanding, from the different lengths of their lives, their
different educations and other external circumstances, and from
their difference of temper and bodily constitution, their religious
situations would be widely different, and the disadvantage of some
in comparison of others, perhaps, altogether as much as at present.
The true account, whatever it be, why mankind, or such a part
of mankind, are placed in this condition of ignorance, must be
supposed also the true account of our further ignorance, in not
knowing the reasons why, or whence it is, that they are placed
in this condition.
The following practical reflections may deserve the serious consideration of those persons, who think the circumstances of mankind or their own, in the forementioned respects, a ground of
complaint.
First, The evidence of religion not appearing obvious, may
constitute one particular part of some men's trial in the religious
sense: as it gives scope, for a virtuous exercise, or vicious neglect
of their understanding, in examining or not examining into that
evidence. There seems no possible reason to be given, why we
may not be in a state of moral probation, with regard to the exercise of our understanding upon the subject of religion, as we are
with regard to our behavior in common affairs.  The former is as
much a thing within our power and choice as the latter. And I
suppose it is to be laid down for certain, that the same character,
the same inward principle, which, after a man is convinced of
the truth of religion, renders him obedient to the precepts of it,
would, were he not thus convinced, set him about an examination
of it, upon its system and evidence being offered to his thoughts:
and that in the latter state his examination would be with an
impartiality, seriousness, and solicitude, proportionable to what
his obedience is in the former. And as inattention, negligence,
want of all serious concern, about a matter of such a nature and
such importance, when offered to men's consideration, is, before
a distinct conviction of its truth, as real depravity and dissolute.
ness, as neglect of religious practice after such conviction: so
active solicitude about it, and fair impartial consideration of its
evidence before such conviction, is as really an exercise of a
morally right temper; as is religious practice after.  Thus, that




A4AP. VI.   SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF,           253
religion is not intuitively true, but a matter of deducti'n and
inference; that a conviction of its truth is not forced upon every
one, but left to be, by some, collected with heedful attention to
premises; this as much constitutes religious probation, as much
affords sphere, scope, opportunity, for right and wrong behavior,
as any thing whatever does. And their manner of treating this
subject, when laid before them, shows what is in their heart, and
is an exertion of it.
Secondly, It appears to be a thing as evident, though it is not
so much attended to, that if, upon consideration of religion, the
evidence of it should seem to any persons doubtful, in the highest
supposable degree; even this doubtful evidence will, however,
put them into a general state of probation in the moral and religious sense. For, suppose a man to be really in doubt, whether
such a person had not done him the greatest favor; or, whether
his whole temporal interest did not depend upon that person; no
one, who had any sense of gratitude and of prudence, could
possibly consider himself in the same situation, with regard to
such person, as if he had no such doubt. In truth, it is as just
to say, that certainty and doubt are the same, as to say the situations now mentioned would leave a man as entirely at liberty in
point of gratitude or prudence, as he would be, were he certain
he had received no favor from such person; or that he no way
depended upon him. Thus, though the evidence of religion
which is afforded to some men should be little more than they
are given to see, the system of Christianity, or religion in general,
to be supposable and credible; this ought in all reason to beget a
serious practical apprehension, that it may be true.  And even
this will afford matter of exercise for religious suspense and deliberation, for moral resolution and self-government; because the
apprehension that religion may be true does as really lay men
under obligations, as a full conviction that it is true.  It gives
occasion and motives to consider further the important subject;
to preserve attentively upon their minds a general implicit sense
that they may be under divine moral government, an awful solicitude about religion, whether natural or revealed.  Such apprehension ought to turn men's eyes to every degree of new light
which may be had, from whatever side it comes; and induce
+heem to refrain, in the mean time, from all immoralities, and live
22




254            PEVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL:             PART n.:n the conscientious practice of every common virtue.  Especially
arc they bound to keep at the greatest distance from all dissolute
profaneness, for this the very nature of the case forbids; and to
treat with highest reverence a matter, upon which their own
whole interest and being, and the fate of nature, depend. This
behavior, and an active endeavor to maintain within themselves
this temper, is the business, the duty, and the wisdom of those
persons, who complain of the doubtfulness of religion: is what
they are under the most proper obligations to. And such behavior is an exertion of, and has a tendency to improve in them,
that character, which the practice of all the several duties of religion, from a full conviction of its truth, is an exertion of, and
has a tendency to improve in others: others, I say, to whom God
has afforded such conviction. Nay, considering the infinite importance of religion, revealed as well as natural, I think it may
be said in general, that whoever will weigh the matter thoroughly
may see, there is not near so much difference, as is commonly
imagined, between what ought in reason to be the rule of life, to
those persons who are fully convinced of its truth, and to those
who have only a serious doubting apprehension, that it may be
true. Their hopes, and fears, and obligations, will be in various
degrees: but, as the subject-matter of their hopes and fears is
the same, so the subject-matter of their obligations, what they
are bound to do and to refrain from, is not so very unlike.
It is to be observed further, that, from a character of understanding, or a situation of influence in the world, some persons
have it in their power to do infinitely more harm or good, by
setting an example of profaneness and avowed disregard to all
religion, or, on the contrary, of a serious, though perhaps doubting, apprehension of its truth, and of a reverent regard to it
under this doubtfulness; than they can do, by acting well or ill
in all the common intercourses among mankind.  Consequently
they are most highly accountable for a behavior, which, they may
easily foresee, is of such importance, and in which there is most
plainly a right and a wrong; even admitting the evidence ot religion to be as doubtful as is pretended.
The ground of these observations, and that which renders them
just and true, is, that doubting necessarily implies some degree
of evidence for that, of which we doubt.  For no person would




CHAP. VI.  SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF.           255
be in doubt concerning the truth of a number of facts so and so
circumstanced, which should accidentally come into his thoughts,
and of which he had no evidence at all. And though in the
case of an even chance, and where consequently we were in
doubt, we should in common language say, that we had no evi
dence at all for either side; yet that situation of things, which
renders it an even chance and no more, that such an event will
happen, renders this case equivalent to all others, where there is
such evidence on both sides of a question,* as leaves the mind in
doubt concerning the truth.  Indeed in all these cases, there is
no more evidence on one side than on the other; but there is
(what is equivalent to) much more for either, than for the truth
of a number of facts, which come into one's thoughts at random.
Thus, in all these cases, doubt as much presupposes evidence, in
lower degrees, as belief presupposes higher, and certainty higher
still. Any one, who will a little attend to the nature of evidence,
will easily carry this observation on, and see, that between no
evidence at all, and that degree of it which affords ground of
doubt, there are as many internediate degrees, as there are, between that degree which is the ground of doubt, and demonstration. And though we have not faculties to distinguish these
degrees of evidence with any sort of exactness; yet, in proportion
as they are discerned, they ought to influence our practice.  It
is as real an imperfection in the moral character, not to be influenced in practice by a lower degree of evidence when discerned,
as it is in the understanding, not to discern it. And as, in all
subjects which men consider, they discern the lower as well as
higher degrees of evidence, proportionably to their capacity of
understanding; so, in practical subjects, they are influenced in
practice, by the lower as well as higher degrees of it, proportionably to their fairness and honesty.  And as, in proportion to defects in the understanding, men are unapt to see lower degrees
of evidence, are in danger of overlooking evidence when it is not
glaring, and are easily imposed upon in such cases; so, in proportion to the corruption of the heart, they seem capable of satisfying themselves with having no regard in practice to evidence
acknowledged to be real, if it be not overbearing.  From these
things it must follow, that doubting concerning religion implies
~ Intruduction.




256            REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL:             PART IT.
sucl. a degree of evidence for it, as, joined with the 3onsideration
of its importance, unquestionably lays men under the obligations
before mentioned, to have a dutiful regard to it in all their
behavior.
Thirdly, The difficulties in which the evidence, of religion is
involved, which some complain of, is no more a just ground of
complaint, than the external circumstances of temptation, which
others are placed in; or than difficulties in the practice of it,
after a full conviction of its truth.  Temptations render our state
a more improving state of discipline,* than it would be otherwise: as they give occasion for a more attentive exercise of the
virtuous principle, which confirms and strengthens it more, than
an easier or less attentive exercise of it could.  Speculative difficulties are, in this respect, of the very same nature with these
external temptations.  For the evidence of religion not appearing
obvious, is to some persons a temptation to reject it, without any
consideration at all; and therefore requires such an attentive
exercise of the virtuous principle, seriously to consider that evidence, as there would be no occasion for, but for such temptation.
And the supposed doubtfulness of its evidence, after it has been
in some sort considered, affords opportunity to an unfair mind of
explaining away, and deceitfully hiding from itself, that evidence
which it might see; and also for men's encouraging themselves
in vice, from hopes of impunity, though they do clearly see thus
much at least, that these hopes are uncertain.  In like manner
the common temptation to many instances of folly, which end in
temporal infamy and ruin, is the ground for hope of not being
detected, and of escaping with impunity; i.e. the doubtfulness
of the proof beforehand, that such foolish behavior will thus end
in infamy and ruin. On the contrary, supposed doubtfulness in
the evidence of religion calls for a more careful and attentive
exercise of the virtuous principle, in fairly yielding themselves
up to the proper influence of any real evidence, though doubtful;
and in practising conscientiously all virtue, though under some
uncertainty, whether the government in the universe may not
possibly be such, as that vice may escape with impunity.  And
in general, temptation, meaning by this word the lesser allurements to wrong and difficulties in the discharge of our duty, as
* Part I. chap. v.




CHAP. vt.  SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF.           257
well as the greater ones; temptation, I say, as such and of every
kind and degree, as it calls forth some virtuous efforts, additional
to what would otherwise have been wanting, cannot but be an
additional discipline and improvement of virtue, as well as probation of it in the other senses of that word.*  So that the very
same account is to be given, why the evidence of religion should
be left in such a manner, as to require, in some, an attentive,
solicitous, perhaps painful exercise of their understanding about
it; as why others should be placed in such circumstances, as that
the practice of its common duties, after a full conviction of the
truth of it, should require attention, solicitude, and pains: or,
why appearing doubtfulness should be permitted to afford matter
of temptation to some; as why external difficulties and allurements should be permitted to afford matter of temptation to others.
The same account also is to be given, why some should be exercised with temptations of both these kinds; as why others should
be exercised with the latter in such very high degrees, as some
have been, particularly as the primitive Christians were.
Nor does there appear any absurdity in supposing, that the
speculative difficulties, in which the evidence of religion is involved, may make even the principal part of some persons' trial.
For as the chief temptations of the generality of the world are
the ordinary motives to injustice, or unrestrained pleasure, or to
live in the neglect of religion, from that frame of mind which
renders many persons almost without feeling as to any thing distant, or which is not the object of their senses; so there are
other persons without this shallowness of temper, persons of a
deeper sense as to what is invisible and future; who not only see,
but have a general practical feeling, that what is to come will be
present, and that things are not less real for their not being the
objects of sense; and who, from their natural constitution of
body and of temper, and from their external condition, may have
small temptations to behave ill, small difficulty in behaving well,
in the common course of life. Now when these latter persons
have a distinct full conviction of;ne truth of religion, without
any possible doubts or difficulties, the practice of it is to them
unavoidable, unless they do a constant violence to their own
minds; and religion is scarce any more a discipline to them, than
* Part I. chap. iv. and pp. 156, 157.
R                     22*




258            REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL:             PART I.
it is to creatures in a state of perfection. Yet these persons may
possibly stand in need of moral discipline and exercise, in a higher
degree than they would have by such an easy practice of religion.
Or it may be requisite, for reasons unknown to us, that they
should give some further manifestation* what is their moral character, to the creation of God, than such a practice of it would
be. Thus in the great variety of religious situations in which
men are placed, what constitutes, what chiefly and peculiarly
constitutes, the probation, in all senses, of some persons, may be
the difficulties in which the evidence of religion is involved: and
their principal and distinguished trial may be, how they will
behave under and with respect to these difficulties.  Circumstances in men's situation in their temporal capacity, analogous
in good measure to this respecting religion, are to be observed.
We find some persons are placed in such a situation in the world,
as that their chief difficulty with regard to conduct, is not the
doing what is prudent when it is known; for this, in numberless
cases, is as easy as the contrary: but to some the principal exercise is, recollection and being upon their guard against deceits,
the deceits suppose of those about them; against false appearances of reason and prudence.  To persons in some situations,
the principal exercise with respect to conduct is, attention in
order to inform themselves what is proper, what is really the
reasonable and prudent part to act.
[Foeurthly.] As I have hitherto gone upon supposition, that
men's dissatisfaction with the evidence of religion is not owing
to their neglects or prejudices; it must be added, on the other
hand, in all common reason, and as what the truth of the case
plainly requires should be added, that such dissatisfaction possibly may be owing to those, possibly may be men's own fault.
For,
If there are any persons, who never set themselves heartily
and in earnest to be informed in religion: if there are any, who
secretly wish it may not prove true; and are less attentive to
evidence than to difficulties, and more to objections than to what
is said in answer to them: these persons will scarce be thought
in a likely way of seeing the evidence of religion, though it were
most certainly true, and capable of being ever so fully proved
i Pp. 156, 157.




CHAP. VI.   SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF.               259
If any accustom   themselves to consider this subject in the
way of mirth and sport: if they attend to forms and representations, and inadequate manners of expression, instead of the
real things intended by them: (for signs often can be no more
than inadequately expressive of the things signified:) or if they
substitute human errors in the room of divine truth; why may
not all, or any of these things, hinder some men from seeing that
evidence, which really is seen by others; as a like turn of mind,
with respect to matters of common speculation and practice, does,
we find by experience, hinder them from attaining that knowledge
and right understanding, in matters of common speculation and
practice, which more fair and attentive minds attain to? And
the effect will be the same, whether their neglect of seriously
considering the evidence of religion, and their indirect behavior
with regard to it, proceed from  mere carelessness, or from  the
grosser vices; or whether it be owing to this, that forms and
figurative manners of expression, as well as errors, administer
occasions of ridicule, when the things intended, and the truth
itself, would not. Men may indulge a ludicrous turn so far as to
lose all sense of conduct and prudence in worldly affairs, and even,
as it seems, to impair their faculty of reason.  And in general,
levity, carelessness, passion, and prejudice do hinder us from
being rightly informed, with respect to common things: and they
may, in like manner, and perhaps, in some further providential
manner, with respect to moral and religious subjects: may hinder
evidence from being laid before us, and from being seen when it
is.  The Scripture* does declare, that every one shall not understand.  And it makes no difference, by what providential conduct this comes to pass: whether the evidence of Christianity
was, originally and with design, put and left so, as that those who
are desirous of evading moral obligations should not see it; and
- Dan. xii. 10. See also Isa. xxix. 13,14: Matt. vi. 23, and xi. 25, and xiii.
11, 12: John iii. 19, and v. 44: 1 Cor. ii. 14, and 2 Cor. iv. 4: 2 Tim. iii. 13:
and that affectionate as well as authoritative admonition, so very many times
inculcated, lHe that hath ears to hear, let hiim hear. Grotius saw so strongly the
thing intended in these and other passages of Scripture of the like sense, as
to say, that the proof given us of Christianity was less than it might have been,
for this very purpose: Ut ita serao Evansgelii trenquitm la pis esset Lydius ad
queen ingeiia sanabilia eaplorareittsr. De Ver. R. C. lib. ii. [So that the
Gospel should he a touchstone, to test the honesty of men's dispositions.]




G60            REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL:             PARI Ir.
that honest-minded persons should: or, whether it comes to pass
by any other means.
Further: [Fifthly.] The general proof of natural religion and
of Christianity does, I think, lie level to common men: even
those, the greatest part of whose time, from childhood to old age,
is taken up with providing for themselves and their families the
common conveniences, perhaps necessaries, of life: those I mean,
of this rank, who ever think at all of asking aftel proof, or
attending to it.  Common men, were they as much in earnest
about religion, as about their temporal affairs, are capable of
being convinced upon real evidence, that there is a God who
governs the world: and they feel themselves to be of a moral
nature, and accountable creatures.  And as Christianity entirely
falls in with this their natural sense of things, so they are capable, not only of being persuaded, but of being made to see, that
there is evidence of miracles wrought in attestation of it, and
many appearing completions of prophecy.
This proof, though real and conclusive, is liable to objections,
and may be run up into difficulties; which however persons who
are capable not only of talking of, but of really seeing, are capable also of seeing through: i.e. not of clearing up and answering
them, so as to satisfy their curiosity, for of such knowledge we
are not capable with respect to any one thing in nature; but
capable of seeing that the proof is not lost in these difficulties,
or destroyed by these objections.  But then a thorough examination into religion with regard to these objections, which cannot
be the business of every man, is a matter of pretty large compass,
and, from the nature of it, requires some knowledge, as well as
time and attention; to see, how the evidence comes out, upon
balancing one thing with another, and what, upon the whole, is
the amount of it. If persons who pick up these objections from
others, and take for granted they are of weight, upon the word
of those from whom they received them, or, by often retailing of
them, come to see or fancy they see them to be of weight; will
not prepare themselves for such an examination, with a competent degree of knowledge; or will not give that time and
attention to the subject, which, from the nature of it, is necessary for attaining such information: in this case, they must
remain in doubtfulness,:gnorance, or error: in the same way as




CHAP. VI.   SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN ITS PROOF.          261
they must, with regard to common sciences, and matters of common life, if they neglect the necessary means of being informed
in them.
Perhaps it will still be objected, that if a prince or common master were to send directions to a servant, he would take
care, that they should always bear the certain marks, who they
came from, and that their sense should be always plain: so as
that there should be no possible doubt if he could help it, concerning the authority or meaning of them.  The proper answer
to all this kind of objections is, that, wherever the fallacy lies, it
is even certain we cannot argue thus with respect to Him who is
the Governor of the world: and that he does not afford us such
information, with respect to our temporal affairs and interests,
experience abundantly shows.
However, there is a full answer to this objection, from the very
nature of religion.  The reason why a prince would give his
directions in this plain manner is, that he absolutely desires an
external action done, without concerning himself with the motive
or principle upon which it is done: i.e. he regards only the external event, or the thing's being done; and not at all, properly
speaking, the doing of it, or the action. Whereas the whole
of morality and religion consisting merely in action itself, there
is no sort of parallel between the cases.  But if the prince be
supposed to regard only the action; i.e. only to desire to exercise,
or in any sense prove, the understanding or loyalty of a servant;
he would not always give his orders in such a plain manner. It
may be proper to add, that the will of God, respecting morality
and religion, may be considered either as absolute, or as only conditional. If it be absolute, it can only be thus, that we should
act virtuously in such given circumstances; not that we should be
brought to act so, by this changing of our circumstances. And if
God's will be thus absolute, then it is in our power, in the highest
and strictest sense, to do or to contradict his will; which is a
most weighty consideration.  Or his will may be considered only
as conditional, that if we act so and so, we shall be rewarded; if
otherwise, punished: of which conditional will of the Author
of nature, the whole constitution of it affords most certain
instances.
Up n the whole: that we are in a state of religion necessarily




262            REVELATION NOT UNIVERSAL.             PART II.
implies, that we are in a state of probation: and tne credibility
of our being at all in such a state being admitted, there seems no
peculiar difficulty in supposing our probation to be, just as it is,
in those respects which are above objected against. There seems
no pretence, from the reason of the thing, to say, that the trial
cannot equitably be any thing, but whether persons will act
suitably to certain information, or such as admits no room for
doubt; so as that there can be no danger of miscarriage, but
either from their not attending to what they certainly know, or
from overbearing passion hurrying them on to act contrary to it.
For, since ignorance and doubt, afford scope for probation in all
senses, as really as intuitive conviction or certainty; and since
the two former are to be put to the same account as difficulties in
practice; men's moral probation may also be, whether they will
take due care to inform themselves by impartial consideration,
and afterwards whether they will act as the case requires, upon
the evidence which they have, however doubtful. And this, we
find by experience, is frequently our probation,* in our temporal
capacity.  For, the information which we want with regard to
our worldly interests is by no means always given us of course,
without any care of our own. And we are greatly liable to selfdeceit from inward secret prejudices, and also to the decoits of
others.  So that to be able to judge what is the prudent part,
often requires much and difficult consideration. Then after we
have judged the very best we can, the evidence upon which we
must act, if we will live and act at all, is perpetually doubtful to
a very high degree. And the constitution and course of the
world in fact is such, as that want of impartial consideration
what we have to do, and venturing upon extravagant courses because it is doubtful what will be the consequence, are often naturally, i.e. providentially, altogether as fatal, as misconduct occasioned by heedless inattention to what we certainly know, or
disregarding it from overbearing passion.
Several of the observations here made may well seem strange,
perhaps unintelligible, to many good men. But if the persons
for whose sake they are made think so, (persons who object as
above, and throw off all regard to religion under pretence of want
of evidence;) I desire them to consider again, whether their think- Pp. 100, 257, &c.




CHAP. vii. PARTICULAR EVIDENCE FOR CIIRISTIANITY.      263
ng so be owing to any thing unintelligible in these observations,
)r to their own not having such a sense of religion and serious
solicitude about it, as even their state of scepticism does in all
reason require?  It ought to be forced upon the reflection of
these persons, that our nature and condition necessarily require
us, in the daily course of life, to act upon evidence much lower
than what is commonly called probable: to guard, not only against
what we fully believe will, but also against what we think it supposable may, happen; and to engage in pursuits when the probability is greatly against success, if it even be credible, that
possibly we may succeed in them.
CHAPTER VII.
THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE FOR CHRISTIANITY.
THE presumptions against revelation, and objections against
the general scheme of Christianity, and particular things relating
to it, being removed, there remains to be considered, what positive evidence we have for the truth of it; chiefly in order to see,
what the analogy of nature suggests with regard to that evidence,
and the objections against it: or to see what is, and is allowed
to be, the plain natural rule of judgment and of action, in our
temporal concerns, in cases where we have the same kind of
evidence, and the same kind of objections against it, that we
have in the case before us.
In the evidence of Christianity there seem to be several things
of great weight, not reducible to the head, either of miracles, or
the completion of prophecy, in the common acceptation of the
words.  But these two are its direct and fundamental proofs:
and those other things, however considerable they are, yet ought
never to be urged apart from its direct proofs, but always to be
joined with them. Thus the evidence of Christianity will be a
long series of things, reaching, as it seems, from the beginning
of the world to the present time, of great variety and compass,
taking in both the direct and also the collateral, proofs, and
making up, all of them together, one argument. The conviction
arising from this kind of proof may be compared to what they




264             THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE              PART ii.
call the effect, in architecture or other works of art; a result from
a great number of things, so and so disposed, and taken into one
view. I shall therefore, first, make some observations relating
to miracles, and the appearing completions of prophecy; and
consider what analogy suggests, in answer to the objections
brought against this evidence.  And, secondly, I shall endeavor
to give some account of the general argument now mentioned,
consisting both of the direct and collateral evidence, considered
as making up one argument: this being the kind of proof, upon
which we determine most questions of difficulty, concerning
common facts, alleged to have happened, or seeming likely to
happen; especially questions relating to conduct.
First, I shall make some observations upon the direct proof of
Christianity from miracles and prophecy, and upon the objections
alleged against it.a
I. Now the following observations relating to the historical
evidence of miracles wrought in attestation of Christianity appear to be of great weight.
1. The Old Testament affords us the same historical evidence
of the miracles of Moses and of the prophets, as of the common
civil history of Moses and the kings of Israel; or, as of the
affairs of the Jewish nation. And the Gospels and the Acts
afford us the same historical evidence of the miracles of Christ
and the apostles, as of the common matters related in them.
This indeed could not have been affirmed by any reasonable man,
if the authors of these books, like many other historians, had
appeared to aim at an entertaining manner of writing, and hence
interspersed miracles in their works, at proper distances and upon
proper occasions.  These might have animated a dull relation,
amused the reader, and engaged his attention.  And the same
account would naturally have been given of them, as of the
speeches and descriptions given by such authors: the same account, in a manner, as is to be given, why the poets make use of
wonders and prodigies.  But the facts, both miraculous and
natural, in Scripture, are related in plain unadorned narratives,
a See WITSII Meletemeta, Diss. IV.: PFAFII Disput: CAMPBELL on Miracles:
DOUGLASS' Criterion: FARMIEI'S Dissertations: PALEY'S Evid.: TAYLOR'S Apol.
of Ben Mordecai: TUCKER'S Light of Nat.: WATSON'S Tracts, vol. iv.: JORTIN'S
Sermons: Bp. FLEETWOOD'S Essays: BOYLE Lectures: LARDNEK s Credibility.]




CHAP. vii.           FOR CHRISTIANITY.                   265
and both of them appear, in all respects, to stand upon the same
foot of historical evidence.
Further: some parts of Scripture, containing an account of
miracles fully sufficient to prove the truth of Christianity, are
quoted as genuine, from the age in which they are said to be
written, down to the present: and no other parts of them,
material in the present question, are omitted to be quoted in such
manner, as to afford any sort of proof of their not being genuine.
And, as common history, when called in question in any instance,
may often be greatly confirmed by contemporary or subsequent
events more known and acknowledged; and as the common
Scripture history, like many others, is thus confirmed; so likewise is the miraculous history of it, not only in particular instances, but in general.  For, the establishment of the Jewish
and Christian religions, which were events contemporary with the
miracles related to be wrought in attestation of both, or subsequent to them, these events are just what we should have expected, upon supposition such miracles were really wrought to
attest the truth of those religions.  These miracles are a satisfactory account of those events: of which no other satisfactory
account can be given; nor any account at all, but what is merely
imaginary and invented
It is to be added, that the most obvious, the most easy and
direct account of this history, how it came to be writteln, and to
be received in the word as a true history, is that it really is so;
nor can any other account of it be easy and direct.  Now, though
an account, not at all obvious, but very far-fetched and indirect,
may be and often is, the true account of a matter, yet it cannot
be admitted on the authority of its being asserted.  Mere guess,
supposition, and possibility, when opposed to historical evidence,
prove nothing, but that historical evidence is not demonstrative.
The just consequence from all this, I think is, that the Scripture history in general is to be admitted as an authentic genuine
history, till something positive be alleged sufficient to invalidate
b [, The miracles of the Jewish historian, are intimately connected with all
the civil affairs, and make a necessary and inseparable part. The whole
history is founded in them; it consists of little else; and if it were not a
history of them, it would be a history of nothing."-BoLINGnBRKE, Posthumous
Works, vol. iii. p. 279.]
23




266               THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE -                PART T.
it.  No man will deny the consequence to be, that it cannot be
rejected, or thrown by as of no authorit-, till it can be proved to
be of none; even though the evidence now mentioned for its
authority were doubtful.   This evidenc:e may be confronted by
historical evidence on the other side, if;here be any: or general
incredibility in the things related, or inconsistence in the general
turn of the history, would prove it to be of no authority.   But
since, upon the face of the matter, upon a first and general view,
the appearance is, that it is an authentic history, it cannot be
determined to be fictitious, without some proof that it is so.
The following observations in support of these, and coincident
with them, will greatly confirm the historical evidence for the
truth of Christianity.
2. The Epistles of Paul, from the nature of epistolary writing,
and moreover from several of them being written, not to particular persons but to churches, carry in them evidences of their
being genuine, beyond what can be in a mere historical narrative,
left to the world at large.    This evidence,c joined with that
which they have in common with the rest of the New Testament,
seems not to leave so much as any particular pretence for denying their genuineness, considered as an ordinary matter of fact,
or of criticism: I say particular pretence, for denying it; because any single fact, of such a kind and such antiquity, may
have general clonbts raised concerning it, from the very nature of
human affairs and human testimony.     There is also to be mentioned a distinct and particular evidence of the genuineness of
the epistle chiefly referred to here, the first to the Corinthians;
from the manner in which it is quoted by Clemens Romanus, in
an epistle of his own to that church.* Now these epistles afford
0 [An admirable work on this recondite mode of proving the truth of the New
Testament narrative, is PALEY'S Hore Paulinle. The same department of evidence is ably handled by BIRK, in his Horse Evangelicm, and Hore Apostolicae:
GRAVES on the Pentateuch: and BLUNT in his "Undesigned Coincidences both
of the Old and New Testament." GROTIUS, De Verita.te, has some excellent
passages on the same subject.]
* [Clem. Rom. Ep. 1. c. 47.] CLEwaENT, who is here quoted, lived in the first
century, and is mentioned Phil. iv. 3. Iis epistle to the Corinthians, written
in Greek, contains the passage here referred to, which may be thus translatted
"Take the letter of the blessed Paul the Apostle. What did he write to you,
in the first beginning of the Gospel? Truly he sent you a divinely inspired
letter about himself, and Cephas, and Apollos."




CHAP.. n.           FOR CHRISTIANITY.                   267
a proof of Christianity, detached from all others, which is, I
think, a thing of weight; and also a proof of a nature and kind
peculiar to itself. For,
in them the author declares, that he received the Gospel in
general, and the institution of the Communion in particular, not
from the rest of the apostles, or jointly together with them, but
alone, from Christ himself; whom he declares likewise, conformably to the history in the Acts, that he saw after his ascension.*
So that the testimony of Paul is to be considered, as detached
from that of the rest of the apostles.
He declares further, that he was endued with a power of working miracles, as what was publicly known to those very people,
speaks of frequent and great variety of miraculous gifts as then
subsisting in those very churches, to which he was writing;
which he was reproving for several irregularities, and where he
had personal opposers. He mentions these gifts incidentally, in
the most easy manner, and without effort; by way of reproof to
those who had them, for their indecent use of them; and by
way of depreciating them, in comparison of moral virtues.  In
short he speaks to these churches, of these miraculous powers,
in the manner any one would speak to another of a thing, which
was as familiar, and as much known in common to them both, as
any thing in the world.t And this, as hath been observed by
several persons, is surely a very considerable thing.
3. It is an acknowledged hisorical fact, that Christianity
offered itself to the world, and demanded to be received, upon
the allegation, (i.e. as unbelievers would speak, upon the pretence,) of miracles, publicly wrought to attest the truth of it, in
such an age; and that it was actually received by great numbers
in that very age, and upon the professed belief of the reality of
these miracles.  And Christianity, including the dispensation of
the Old Testament, seems distinguished by this from all other
religions. I mean, that this does not appear to be the case with
regard to any other; for surely it will not be supposed to lie
upon any person, to prove by positive historical evidence, that it
was not. It does in no sort appear that Mahometanism was first
-* Gal. i.: 1 Cor. xi. 23, &c.: 1 Cor. xv. 8.
t Rom. xv. 19: 1 Cor. xii. 8, 9, 10-28, &c., and xiii. 1, 2, 8, and the whole
14th chapter: 2 Cor. xii. 12, 13: Gal. iii. 2, 5.




268              THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE                PART n.
received in the world upon the foot of supposed miracles,* i.e.
public ones:d or, as revelation is itself miraculous, all pretence
to it must necessarily imply some pretence of miracles.  And it
is a known fact, that it was immediately, at the very first, propagated by other means. And as particular institutions, whether
in Paganism  or Popery, said to be confirmed by miracles after
those institutions had obtained, are not to the purpose: so, were
there what might be called historical proof, that any of them
were introduced by a supposed divine command, believed to be
attested by miracles; these would not be in any wise parallel.
For single things of this sort are easy to be accounted for, after
parties are formed, and have power in their hands; and the
leaders of them are in veneration with the multitude; and political interests are blended with religious claims, and religious distinctions.  But before any thing of this kind, for a few persons,
and those of the lowest rank, all at once, to bring over such great
numbers to a new religion, and get it to be received upon the
particular evidence of miracles; this is quite another thing.
I think it will be allowed by any fair adversary, that the fact
now mentioned, taking in all the circumstances, is peculiar to the
Christian religion.  However, the fact itself is allowed, that
Christianity obtained, i.e. was professed to be received in the
world, upon the belief of miracles, immediately in the age in
which it is said those miracles were wrought: or that this is
what its first converts would have alleged, as the reason for
their embracing it.  It is not to be supposed that such numbers
of men, in the most distant parts of the world, should forsake the
religion of their country, in which they had been educated;
separate themselves from their friends, particularly in their
festival shows and solemnities, to which the common people are
so greatly addicted, and which were of a nature to engage them
much more, than any thing of that sort among us: and embrace
" See the Koran, chap. xiii. and chap. xvii.
d [MAHOMET expressly declares that he worked no public miracles in confirmation of his mission, "because the former nations have charged them with
imposture." He claims, however, to have had private miraculous assurances
of his mission, and most preposterous they were.
WHATELY, in his Christian Evidences, has handled this aspect of miracles
with great ability. See also PALEY'S Eviderces, sec. 3: and GIBBON'S )eeline
and Fall, chap. 1.]




CHAP. vII.            FOR CHRISTIANITY.                    260
a religion, which could not but expose them to many incon
veniences, and indeed must have been a giving up the world in a
great degree, even from the very first, and before the empire engaged in form against them: it cannot be supposed, that such
numbers should make so great, and to say the least, so inconvenient a change in their whole institution of life, unless they
were really convinced of the truth of those miracles, upon the
knowledge or belief of which they professed to make it. And
it will, I suppose, readily be acknowledged, that the generality
of the first converts to Christianity must have believed them:
that as by becoming Christians they declared to the world, they
were satisfied of the truth of those miracles; so this declaration
was to be credited. And this their testimony is the same kind
of evidence for those miracles, as if they had put it in writing,
and these writings had come down to us.     And it is real evidence, because it is of facts, which they had capacity and full
opportunity to inform themselves of.
It is also distinct from the direct or express historical evidence,
though it is of the same kind: and would be allowed to be distinct in all cases.  For were a fact expressly related by one or
more ancient historians, and disputed in after ages; that this
fact is acknowledged to have been believed by great numbers of
the age in which the historian says it was done, would be allowed
an additional proof of such fact, quite distinct from the express
testimony of the historian.  The credulity of mankind is acknowledged: and the suspicions of mankind ought to be acknowledged
too; and their backwardness even to believe, and greater still to
practise, what makes against their interest. And it must particularly be remembered, that education, and prejudice, and
authority, were against Christianity, in the age I am speaking
of. So that the immediate conversion of such numbers is a real
presumption of somewhat more than human in this matter.e I
e [ALEXANDER, in his Evidences, and several other writers have placed this
argument in a very convincing light. ARNOBIUs, one of the earliest Christian
writers, asks, "Shall we say that the men of those times were inconsiderate,
deceitful, stupid, and brutish enough to feign having seen what they never
saw? and that when they might have lived in peace and comfort, they chose
gratuitous hatred and obloquy?"
The rejection of Christianity by so many in the first age was the result of
te continued action of personal and hereditary prejudice and depravity
23*




270              THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE               PART n.
say presu.mption, for it is not alleged as a, proof alone and by
itself.  Nor need any one of the things mentioned in this
chapter be considered as a proof by itself: and yet all of them
together may be one of the strongest.*
Upon the whole: as there is large historical evidence, both
direct and circumstantial, of miracles wrought in attestation of
Christianity, collected by those who have writ upon the subject;
it lies upon unbelievers to show why this evidence is not to be
credited.  This way of speaking is, I think, just; and what persons who write in defence of religion naturally fall into. Yet, in
a matter of such unspeakable importance, the proper question is,
not whom it lies upon, according to the rules of argument, to
maintain or confute objections: but whether there really are any,
against this evidence, sufficient, in reason, to destroy the credit
of it. However, unbelievers seem to take upon them the part
of showing that there are.
They allege, that numberless enthusiastic people, in different
ages and countries, expose themselves to the same difficulties
which the primitive Christians did; and are ready to give up
their lives for the most idle follies imaginable.  It is not very
clear, to what purpose this objection is brought.  For surely,
every one, in every case, must distinguish between opinions and
facts. And though testimony is no proof of enthusiastic opinions,
or of any opinion at all; yet it is allowed, in all other cases, to
be a proof of facts.  A person's laying down his life in attestation of facts or of opinions, is the strongest proof of his believing them. And if the apostles and their contemporaries did believe the facts, in attestation of which they exposed themselves
to sufferings and death; this their belief, or rather knowledge,
must be a proof of those facts: for they were such as came
under the observation of their senses.  And though it is not of
equal weight, yet it is of weight, that the martyrs of the next
age, notwithstanding they were not eye-witnesses of those facts.
capable of resisting any supposable evidence. The reception of Christianity
by multitudes, under the same evidences, and to their immediate personal
damage, shows strongly that there was enough evidence to produce those
effects. Thus the rejection by some does not countervail ]he acceptance by
others.]
~* P. 294, &c.




CHAP. VII.          FOR CIRISTIANITY.                   271
as were the apostles and their contemporaries, had, however. full
opportunity to inform themselves whether they were true or not.
and gave equal proof of their believing them to be true.
But enthusiasm, it is said, greatly weakens the evidence of
testimony even for facts, in matters relating to religion: some
seem to think it totally and absolutely destroys the evidence of
testimony upon this subject. The powers of enthusiasm, and of
diseases too, which operate in a like manner, are indeed very
wonderful, in particular instances.  But if great numbers of
men, not appearing in any peculiar degree weak, nor under any
peculiar suspicion of negligence, affirm that they saw and heard
such things plainly, with their eyes and their ears, and are
admitted to be in earnest; such testimony is evidence of the
strongest kind we can have, for any matter of fact.  Possibly it
may be overcome, strong as it is, by incredibility in the things
thus attested, or by contrary testimony.  And in an instance
where one thought it was so overcome, it might be just to consider,
how far such evidence could be accounted for by enthusiasm; for
it seems as if no other imaginable account were to be given of it.
But till such incredibility be shown, or contrary testimony produced, it cannot surely be expected, that so far-fetched, so indirect and wonderful an account of such testimony, as that of
enthusiasm must be; an account so strange, that the generality
of mankind can scarce be made to understand what is meant by
it; it cannot, I say, be expected that such an account will be
admitted of such evidence; when there is this direct, easy, and
obvious account of it, that people really saw and heard a thing
not incredible, which they affirm, sincerely and with full assurance, they did see and hear.
Granting then that enthusiasm is not (strictly speaking) an
absurd, but a possible account of such testimony, it is manifest,
that the very mention of it goes upon the previous supposition,
that the things so attested are incredible: and therefore need not
be considered, till they are shown to be so.  Much less need it
be considered, after the contrary has been proved.  And I think
it has been proved, to full satisfaction, that there is no incredibility in a revelation, in general; or in such a one as the Christian, in particular.  However, as religion is supposed peculiarly
liable to enthusiam, it may just be observed, that prejudicei




272             THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE              PART IL
almost without number, and without name, such as romance,
affection, humor, a desire to engage attention, or to surprise,
party spirit, custom, little competitions, unaccountable likings
and dislikings these influence men strongly in common matters.
And as these prejudices are often scarce known or reflected upon
by the persons themselves who are influenced by them, they are
to be considered as influences of a like kind to enthusiasm. Yet
human testimony, in common matters, is naturally and justly
believed, notwithstanding.
It is intimated further, in a more refined way of observation,
that though it should be proved, that the apostles and first Christians could not, in some respects, be deceived themselves, and
in other respects, cannot be thought to have intended to impose
upon the world, yet it will not follow that their general testimony is to be believed, though truly handed down to us: because
they might still in part, i.e. in other respects, be deceived themselves, and in part also designedly impose upon others; which,
it is added, is a thing very credible, from that mixture of real
enthusiasm, and real knavery, to be met with in the same
characters.t
I must confess, I think the matter of fact contained in this
observation upon mankind is not to be denied; and that something very much akin to it is often supposed in Scripture as a
very common case, and most severely reproved. But it were to
have been expected, that persons capable of applying this observation as applied in the objection, might also frequently have
met with the like mixed character, in instances where religion
was quite out of the case. The thing plainly is, that mankind
are naturally endued with reason, or a capacity of distinguishing
between truth and falsehood; and as naturally they are endued
with veracity, or a regard to truth in what they say: but from
many occasions they are liable to be prejudiced and biassed and
deceived themselves, and capable of intending to deceive others,
in every degree: insomuch that, as we are all liable to be deceived by prejudice, so likewise it seems to be not an uncommon
thing, for persons who, from their regard to truth, would not
invent a lie entirely without any foundation at all, to propagate
it with heightening circumstances, after it is once invented and
f [Compare BUTLER'S Sermons; on Balaam, and on Self-deoit.l




CHAP. VII.          FOR CHRISTIANITY.                 273
set a-going. And others, though they would not propagate a lie,
yet, which is a lower degree of falsehood, will let it pass without
contradiction. But notwithstanding all this, hurman testimony
remains still a natural ground of assent; and this assent a
natural principle of action.
It is objected further, that however it has happened, the Jact
is, that mankind have, in different ages, been strangely deluded
with pretences to miracles and wonders.  But it is by no means
to be admitted, that they have been oftener, or are at all more
liable to be deceived by these than by other pretences.
It is added, that there is a very considerable degree of historical evidence for miracles, which are, on all hands, acknowledged to be fabulous. But suppose there were even the like
historical evidence for these, to what there is for those alleged in
proof of Christianity, which yet is in no wise allowed, but suppose this; the consequence would not be, that the evidence of
the latter is not to be admitted. Nor is there a man in the
world, who in common cases, would conclude thus. For what
would such a conclusion really amount to but this, that evidence,
confuted by contrary evidence, or any way overbalanced, destroys
the credibility of other evidence, neither confuted nor overbalanced?  To argue that because there is, if there were, like
evidence from testimony, for miracles acknowledged false, as for
those in attestation of Christianity, therefore the evidence in the
latter case is not to be credited; this is the same as to argue, that
if two men of equally good reputation had given evidence in
different cases no way connected, and one of them had been
convicted of perjury, this confuted the testimony of the other!
Upon the whole then, the general observation, that human
creatures are so liable to be deceived, from enthusiasm in religion, and principles equivalent to enthusiasm in common matters,
and in both from negligence; and that they are so capable of
dishonestly endeavoring to deceive others; this does indeed
weaken the evidence of testimony in all cases, but does not
destroy it in any.  And these things will appear, to different
men, to weaken the evidence of testimony,;n different degrees:
in degrees proportionable to the observations they have made, or
the notions they have any way taken up, concerning the weak-?iess and negligence and dishonesty of mankind; or concerning




27-             THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE              PART I.
the powers of enthusiasm, and prejudices equivalent to it. But
it seems to me, that people do not know what they say, who affirm
these things to destroy the evidence from testimony which we
have, of the truth of Christianity. Nothing can destroy the
evidence of testimony in any case, but a proof or probability,
that persons are not competent judges of the facts to which they
give testimony; or that they are actually under some indirect
influence in giving it, in such particular case. Till this be made
out, the natural laws of human actions require, that testimony
be admitted.   It can never be sufficient to overthrow  direct
historical evidence, indolently to say, that there are so many principles, from whence men are liable to be deceived themselves,
and disposed to deceive others, especially in matters of religion,
that one knows not what to believe. And it is surprising persons can help reflecting, that this very manner of speaking supposes they are not satisfied that there is nothing in the evidence,
of which they speak thus; or that they can avoid observing, if
they do make this reflection, that it is on such a subject, a very
material one.*
Over against all these objections is to be set the importance of
Christianity, as what must have engaged the attention of its first
converts, so as to have rendered them less liable to be deceived
from carelessness, than they would in common matters; and likewise the strong obligations to veracity, which their religion laid
them under: so that the first and most obvious presumption is,
that they could not be deceived themselves nor deceive others.
And this presumption, in this degree, is peculiar to the testimony
we have been considering.
In argument, assertions are nothing in themselves, and have
an air of positiveness which sometimes is not very easy: yet they
are necessary, and necessary to be repeated; in order to connect
a discourse, and distinctly to lay before the view of the reader,
what is proposed to be proved, and what is left as proved. Now
the conclusion from the foregoing observations is, I think, beyond
all doubt, this: that unbelievers must be forced to admit the external evidence for Christianity, i.e. the proof of miracles wrought
to attest it, to be of real weight and very considerable; though
they cannot allow it to be sufficient, to convince thoe.of thl; See the foregoing chapter.




CHAP. VI.           FOR CHRISTIANITY.                 275
reality of those miracles. And as they must, in all reason, admit
this; so it seems to me, that upon consideration they would, in
fact, admit it; those of them, I mean, who know any thing at
all of the matter; in lile manner as persons, in many cases, own
they see strong evidence from testimony, for the truth of things,
which yet they cannot be convinced are true: cases, suppose,
where there is contrary testimony; or things which they think,
whether with or without reason, to be incredible. But there is
no testimony contrary to that which we have been considering:
and it has been fully proved, that there is no incredibility in
Christianity in general, or in any part of it.
II. As to the evidence for Christianity from prophecy, I shall
only make some few general observations, which are suggested
by the analogy of nature; i.e. by the acknowledged natural rules
of judging in common matters, concerning evidence of a like
kind to this from prophecy.
1. The obscurity or unintelligibleness of one part of a prophecy
does not, in any degree, invalidate the proof of foresight, arising
from the appearing completion of those other parts, which are
understood. For the case is evidently the same, as if those parts
which are not understood were lost, or not written at all, or
written in an unknown tongue. Whether this observation be
commonly attended to or not, it is so evident, that one can scarce
bring oneself to set down an instance in common matters, to
exemplify it. However, suppose a writing, partly in cipher, and
partly in plain words at length; and that in the part one understood, there appeared mention of sever I known facts; it would
never come into any man's thoughts to imagine, that if he understood the whole, perhaps he might find, that those facts were not
in reality known by the writer. Indeed, both in this example
and in the thing intended to be exemplified by it, our not understanding the whole (the whole, suppose, of a sentence or a paragraph) might sometimes occasion a doubt, whether one understood
the literal meaning of such a part: but this comes under another
consideration.
For the same reason, though a man should be incapable, for
want of learning, or opportunities of inquiry, or from not having
turned his studies this way, even so much as to judge whether
particular prophecies have been throughout completely fulfilled;




76               THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE                PART II.
yet he may se3, in general, that they have been fulfilled to such
a degree, as, upon very good ground, to be convinced of foresight
more than human in such prophecies, and of such events being
intended by them.   For the same reason also, though, by means
of the deficiencies in civil history, and the different accounts of
historians, the most learned should not be able to make out to
satisfaction, that such parts of the prophetic history have been
minutely and throughout fulfilled; yet a very strong proof of
foresight may arise, fiom that general completion of them, which
is made out. As much perhaps, as the giver of prophecy intended should ever be afforded by such parts of prophecy.
2. A long series of prophecy being applicable to such and such
events, is itself a proof that it was intended of them: as the rules
by which we naturally judge and determine, in common cases
parallel to this, will show.g This observation I make in answer
to the common objection against the application of the prophecies, that, considering each of them distinctly by itself, it does
not at all appear, that they were intended of those particular
events to which they are applied by Christians; and therefore it
is to be supposed, that if they meant any thing, they were intended of other events unknown to us, and not of these at all.
Now there are two kinds of writing, which bear a great resemblance to prophecy, with respect to the matter before us: the
mythological, and the satirical, where the satire is to a certain
degree concealed. And a man might be assured, that he understood what an author intended by a fable or parable related without any application or moral, merely from seeing it to be easily
capable of such application, and that such a moral might naturally be deduced from it. And he might be fully assured, that
such persons and events were intended in a satirical writing,
merely from its being applicable to them. And, agreeable to the
last observation, he might be in a good measure satisfied of it,
g ["Whenever a general scheme is known to be pursued by a writer, that
scheme becomes the true key in the hands of his reader, for unlocking the
meaning of particular parts, which would otherwise not be seen clearly to refer
to such scheme. The inspired writers had one common and predominant
scheme in view, which was to bear testimony to Jesus. Whatever passages
occur in their writings, which bear an apt and easy resemblance to the history
of Jesus, may, or rather must in all reasonable construction, be applied to
him."-HURD on the Proph., p. 117.]




CHAP. VII.          FOR CHRISTIANITY.                  275
though he were not enough informed in affairs, or in the story
of such persons to understand half the satire.  For, his satisfac.
tion that he understood the meaning, the intended meaning, of
these writings, would be greater or less in proportion as he saw
the general turn of them to be capable of such application; and
in proportion to the number of particular things capable of it.
And thus, if a long series of prophecy is applicable to the present
state of the church, and to the political situations of the kingdoms of the world, some thousand years after these prophecies
were delivered; and a long series of prophecy delivered before
the coming of Christ is applicable to him; these things are in
themselves a proof, that the prophetic history was intended of
him, and of those events: in proportion as the general turn of it
is capable of such application, and to the number and variety of
particular prophecies capable of it. And though, in all just way
of consideration, the obvious completion of prophecies is to be
allowed to be thus explanatory of, and to determine, their meaning; yet it is to be remembered further, that the ancient Jews
applied the prophecies to a Messiah before his coming,h in much
the same manner as Christians do now: and that the primitive
Christians interpreted the prophecies respecting the state of the
church and of the world in the last ages, in the sense which the
event seems to confirm and verify.  From these things it may be
made appear:
3. That the showing even to a high probability, if that could
be, that the prophets thought of some other events, in such and
such predictions, and not those which Christians allege to be
completions of those predictions; or that such and such prophecies are capable of being applied to other events than those, to
which Christians apply them-that this would not confute or
destroy the force of the argument from prophecy, even with regard to those very instances.  For, observe how this matter really
is. If one knew such a person to be the sole author of such a
book, and was certainly assured, or satisfied to any degree, that
one knew the whole of what he intended in it; one should be
assured or satisfied to such degree, that one knew the whole
a [Consult on this point, GULICK, Theologia Prophetica: VITRINGA, Observationes: HENGSTENBURG, Christologia: HORSLEY'S Tracts and Sermons: KING'S
Miorsels c' Criticism: WAUGH'S Dissertations: LYALL'S Propocdia Piophetica.]
24




27b            THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE             PART IL
meaning of that book: for the meaning of a book is nothing but
the. meaning of the author. But if one knew a person to have
compiled a book out of memoirs, which he received from another,
of vastly superior knowledge in the subject of it, especially if it
were a book full of great intricacies and difficulties; it would in
no wise follow, that one knew the whole meaning of the book,
from knowing the whole meaning of the compiler: for the original
author of them, might have, and there would be no presumption,
in many cases, against supposing him to have, some further
meaning than the compiler saw. To say then that the Scriptures, and the things contained in them, can have no other or
further meaning than those persons had, who first recited or
wrote them, is evidently saying, that those persons were the
original, proper, and sole authors of those books, i.e. that they
are not inspired: which is absurd, while the authority of these
books is under examination; i.e. till you have determined they
are of no divine authority at all. Till this be determined, it
must in all reason be supposed, not indeed that they have, (for
this is taking for granted that they are inspired;) but that they
may have, some further meaning than what the compilers saw or
understood. And, upon this supposition, it is supposable also,
that this further meaning may be fulfilled.
Events corresponding to prophecies, interpreted in a different
meaning from that, in which the prophets are supposed to have
understood them; affords in a manner, the same proof, that this
different sense was originally intended, as it would have afforded,
if the prophets had not understood their predictions in the sense
it is supposed they did: because there is no presumption of their
sense of them being the whole sense of them. And it has been
already shown, that the apparent completions of prophecy must
be allowed to be explanatory of its meaning. So that the question is, whether a series of prophecy has been fulfilled, in a
natural or proper, i.e. in any real sense of the words of it. For
such completion is equally a proof of foresight more than human,
whether the prophets are, or are not, supposed to have understood it in a different sense. I say, supposed: for, though 1
think it clear, that the prophets did not understand the full
meaning of their predictions, it is another question, how far they
thought they did; and in what sense they understood them




CHAP. VII.            FOR CHRISTIANITY.                     279
Hence may be seen, to how little purpose those persons busy
themselves, who endeavor to prove, that the prophetic history is
applicable to events of the age in which it was written, or of ages
before it.  To have proved this, before there was any appearance
of a further completion of it, might have answered some purpose;
for it might have prevented the expectation of any such further
completion.  Thus could Porphyry have shown, that some principal parts of the book of Daniel, for instance the seventh verse
of the seventh chapter, which the Christians interpreted of the
latter ages, was applicable to events, which happened before or
about the age of Antiochus Epiphanes; this might have prevented
them from expecting any further completion of it.   And, unless
there was then, as I think there must have been, external evidence concerning that book, more than is come down to us; such
a discovery might have been a stumbling-block in the way of
Christianity itself: considering the authority which our Savior
has given to the book of Daniel, and how much the general
scheme of Christianity presupposes the truth of it.   But even
this discovery. had there been any such,* would be of very little
weight with reasonable men now; if this passage, thus applicable
to events before the age of Porphyry, appears to be applicable
also to events, which succeeded the dissolution of the Roman
empire.  I mention this, not at all as intending to insinuate, that
the division of this empire into ten parts, for it plainly was
divided into about that number, were, alone and by itself, of any
moment in verifying the prophetic history: but only as an example of the thing I am speaking of.  Thus upon the whole, the
matter of inquiry evidently must be. as above put, Whether the
prophecies are applicable to Christ, and to the present state of
the world, and of the church; applicable in such a degree, as to
imply foresight: not whether they are capable of any other appli-:- It appears that Porphyry did nothing worth mentioning in this way. For
Jerome on the place says: Duas posteriores bestias-in nso iMacedonum regno
ponit. And as to the ten kings; Deceim reges enumerat, qui fueiruet scevissimi:
ipsosque reyes non unius ponpit regni, verbi gratia, Macedonice, Syrice, Asice, et
zEgypti; sed de diversis rgnis 1unit  effieit regun ordile1e. [" The two latter
leasts he places in one of the Macedonian kingdoms." " He reckons up ten kings
who had been excessively cruel and these not kings of one country, as Macedonia, for instance, or Syria, or Asia, or Egypt; but makes up his set of kings
out of different kingdoms."] In this way of interpretaticn, any thing may be
made o" any thing.




280            THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE             PART I.
cation. Though I know no pretence for saying the general turn
of them is capable of any other.
These observations are, I think, just, and the evidence referred
to in them real: though there may be people who will not accept
of such imperfect information from Scripture.  Some too have
not integrity and regard enough to truth, to attend to evidence,
which keeps the mind in doubt, perhaps perplexity, and which
is much of a different sort from what they expected.  It plainly
requires a degree of modesty and fairness, beyond what every
one has, for a man to say, not to the world but to himself, that
there is a real appearance of great weight in this matter, though
he is not able thoroughly to satisfy himself about it; but that it
shall have its influence upon him, in proportion to its apparent
reality and weight. It is much more easy, and more falls in with
the negligence, presumption, and wilfulness of the generality, to
determine at once, with a decisive air, There is nothing in it.
The prejudices arising from that absolute contempt and scorn,
with which this evidence is treated in the world, I do not mention. For what can be said to persons, who are weak enough in
their understandings to think this any presumption against it;
or, if they do not, are yet weak enough in their temper to be influenced by such prejudices, upon such a subject?
Secondly, I shall endeavor to give some account of the general
argument for the truth of Christianity, consisting both of the
direct and circumstantial evidence considered as making up one
argument. To state and examine this argument fully, would be
a work much beyond the compass of this whole treatise; nor is so
much as a proper abridgment of it to be expected here. Yet the
present subject requires to have some brief account of it given.
For it is the kind of evidence, upon which most questions of difficulty, in common practice, are determined: evidence arising from
various coincidences, which support and confirm each other, and
in this manner prove, with more or less certainty, the point under
consideration. I choose to do it also: First, because it seems to
be of the greatest importance, and not duly attended to by every
one, that the proof of revelation is not some direct and express
things only, but a great variety of circumstantial things also;
and that though each of these direct and circumstantial things is
indeed to be considered separately, yet they are afterwards to be




CHAP. nII.          FOR CHRISTIANITY.                   281
joined together; for that the proper force of the evidence consists in the result of those several things, considered in their
respects to each other, and united into one view.  In the next
place, because it seems to me, that the matters of fact here set
down, which are acknowledged by unbelievers, must bq acknowledged by them also to contain together a degree of evidence of
great weight, if they could be brought to lay these several things
before themselves distinctly, and then with attention consider
them together; instead of that cursory thought of them, to which
we are familiarized.  For being familiarized to the cursory thought
of things as really hinders the weight of them from being seen,
as from having its due influence upon practice.
The thing asserted, and the truth of which is to be inquired
into, is this: That over and above our reason and affections,
which God has given us for the information of our judgment and
the conduct of our lives, he has also, by external revelation, given
us an account of himself and his moral government over the world,
implying a future state of rewards and punishments; i.e. hath
revealed the system of natural religion: (for natural religion may
be externally* revealed by God, as the ignorant may be taught it
by their fellow-creatures) —that God, I say, has given us the evidence of revelation, as well as the evidence of reason, to ascertain
this moral system; together with an account of a particular dispensation of Providence, which reason could no way have discovered, and a particular institution of religion founded on it, for
the recovery of mankind out of their present wretched condition,
and raising them to the perfection and final happiness of their
nature.
This revelation, whether real or supposed, may be considered
as wholly historical. For prophecy is nothing but the history of
events before they come to pass; doctrines also are matters of
fact; and precepts come under the same notion.  The general
design of Scripture, which contains in it this revelation, thus
considered as historical, may be said to be, to give us an account
of the world in this one single view, as God's world: by which
it appears essentially distinguished from all other books, so far as
i have found, except such as are copied from it.  It begins with
an account of 0C-d's creation of the world, in wrder to ascertain,
- P. 189, &c.
24-*




2S2             TH-E PARTICULAR EVIDENCE             PART IT.
and distinguish from all others, who is the object of our worship,
by what he has done: in order to ascertain, who he is, concerning
whose providence, commands, promises, and threatenings, this
sacred book, all along, treats; [viz.] the tMaLker and Proprietor
of the world, he whose creatures we are, the God of nature: in
order likewise to distinguish him from the idols of the nations,
which are either imaginary beings, i.e. no beings at all; or else
part of that creation, the historical relation of which is here given.
And John, not improbably with an eye to this Mosaic account
of the creation, begins his Gospel with an account of our Savior's
pre-existence, and that all things were made by him; and without him was not any thing made that was made:* agreeably to
the doctrine of Paul, that God created all things by Jesus Christ.t
This being premised, the Scripture, taken together, seems to profess to contain a kind of an abridgment of the history of the
world, in the view just now mentioned: that is, a general account
of the condition of religion and its professors, during the continuance of that apostasy from God, and state of wickedness, which
it everywhere supposes the world to lie in. And this account
of the state of reliaion carries with it some brief account of the
political state of things, as religion is affected by it.  Revelation
indeed considers the common affairs of this world, and what is
going on in it, as a mere scene of distraction; and cannot be supposed to concern itself with foretelling at what time Rome, or
Babylon, or Greece, or any particular place, should be the most
conspicuous seat of that tyranny and dissoluteness, which all
places equally aspire to be; cannot, I say, be supposed to give
any account of this wild scene for its own sake.  But it seems to
contain some very general account of the chief governments of
the world, as the general state of religion has been, is, or shall
be, affected by them, from the first transgression, and during the
whole interval of the world's continuing in its present state, to a
certain future period, spoken of both in the Old and New Testament, very distinctly, and in great variety of expression: The
times of the restitutionl of all things:: when the rmystery of God
shall be finished, as he hath declared to his servants the prophets:~
when the God of heaven shall set np a kingdom, which shall
never be destroyed; and the -kingdom shall not be left to other
* John i. 3.   t Eph. iii. 9.  4 Acts iii. 21.  P Rev. ~ 7.




CHAP vrn.           FOR CHRISTIANITY.                 283
people,* as it is represented to be during this apostasy, but judgment shall be given to the saints,t and they shall rei'gn:t anil tho
kingdom and dominion, and the greatness of the kingdom under
the whole heaven, shall be given to the people of the saints of the
Most High.~
Upon this general view of the Scripture, I would remark, how
great a length of time the whole relation takes up, near six thousand years of which are past; and how great a variety of things
it treats of; the natural and moral system or history of the world,
including the time when it was formed, all contained in the very
first book, and evidently written in a rude and unlearned age;
and in subsequent books, the various common and prophetic history, and the particular dispensation of Christianity. Now all
this together gives the largest scope for criticism; and for the
confutation of what is capable of being confuted, either from
reason, or from common history, or from any inconsistence in its
several parts.  And it deserves, I think, to be mentioned, that
whereas some imagine the supposed doubtfulness of the evidence
for revelation implies a positive argument that it is not true; it
appears, on the contrary, to imply a positive argument that it is
true. For, could any common relation of such antiquity, extent,
and variety (for in these things the stress of what I am now observing lies) be proposed to the examination of the world: that
it could not, in an age of knowledge and liberty, be confuted, or
shown to have nothing in it, to the satisfaction of reasonable
men; would be thought a strong presumptive proof of its truth.
Indeed it must be a proof of it, just in proportion to the probability, that if it were false, it might be shown to be so: which, I
think, is scarce pretended to be shown, but upon principles and
in ways of arguing, which have been clearly obviated. l Nor
does it at all appear, that any set of men, who believe natural
religion, are of the opinion, that Christianity has been thus
confuted. But to proceed:
Tcgether with the moral system of the world, the Old Testament contains a chronological account of the beginning of it,
and from thence, an unbroken genealogy of mankind for many
ages before common history begins; and carried on as much
* Dan. ii. 44.    t Dan. vii. 22.   $ Rev. xi. 17, 18; xx. 6.
D Pan. vii. 27.   U Chap. ii. iii. &c.




o84            THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE             PART Il
farther as to make up a continued thread of history, of the
length of between three and four thousand years. It contains
an account of God's making a covenant with a particular nation,
that they should be his people, and he would be their God, in a
peculiar sense; of his often interposing miraculously in their
affairs; giving them the promise, and long after, the possession,
of a particular country; assuring them of the greatest national
prosperity in it, if they would worship him, in opposition to the
idols which the rest of the world worshipped, and obey his commands; and threatening them with unexampled punishments if
they disobeyed him, and fell into the general idolatry: insomuch
that this one nation should continue to be the observation and
the wonder of all the world. It declares particularly, that God
would scatter them among all people, from one end of the earth
unto the other; but that when they should return unto the Lord
their God, he would have compassion tupon them, and gather
them from all the nations, whither he had scattered them: that
Israel should be saved in the Lord, with an everlasting salvation;
and not be ashamed or confounded world without end.*  And as
some of these promises are conditional, others are as absolute as
any thing can be expressed: that the time should come, when
the people should be all righteous, and inherit the land forever:
that though God would make a full end of all nations whither
he had scattered them, yet would he not make a full end of
them: that he would bring again the captivity of his people
Israel, and plant them upon their land, and they should be no
more pulled up out of their land: that the seed of Israel should
not cease from  being a nation forever.t It foretells, that God
would raise them up a particular person, in whom all his promises
should finally be fulfilled; the Messiah, who should be, in a high
and eminent sense, their anointed Prince and Savior. This was
foretold in such a manner, as raised a general expectation of such
a person in the nation, as appears from the New Testament, and
is an acknowledged fact; an expectation of his coming at such a
particular time, before ary one appeared claiming to be that person, and when there was no ground for such an expectation, but
from the prophecies: which expectation, therefore, must in all
* Deut. xxviii. 64; xxx. 2, 3: Isa. xlv. 17.
t Isa. Ix. 21: Jer. xxx. 11; xlvi. 28: Amos ix. 14, 15: Jer. xxxi. 36




CHAP. VI.             FOR CHRISTIANITY.                    285
reason be presumed to be explanatory of those prophecies, if
there were any doubt about their meaning.   It seems moreover
to foretell, that this person should be rejected by the nation tc
whom he had been so long promised, though he was so much
desired by them.*   And it expressly foretells, that he should be
the Savior of the Gentiles; and that the completion of the
scheme contained in this book, and then begun, and in its progress, should be something so great, that in comparison with it,
the restoration of the Jews alone would be but of small account.
It is a light thing that thou shouldest be my servant to raise up
the tribes of Jacob, and to restore the preserved of Israel: I will
also give thee for a light to the Gentiles, that thou mayest be for
salvation unto the end of the earth.  And, lit the last days, the
mountain of the Lord's house shall be established in the top of
the mountains, and shall be exalted above the hills; and all nations shall flow into it-for out of Zion shall go forth the law,
and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem.    And he shall judge
among the nations-and the Lord alone shall be exalted in that
day, and the idols he shall utterly abolish.t
The Scripture further contains an account, that at the time
the Messiah was expected, a person rose up in this nation, claiming to be that Messiah, to be the person to whom   all the prophecies referred, and in whom they should center: that he spent
some years in a continued course of miraculous works; and
endued his immediate disciples and followers with a power of
doing the same, as a proof of the truth of that religion, which
he commissioned them to publish: that invested with this authority and power, they made numerous converts in the remotest
countries, and settled and established his religion in the world;
to the end of which the Scripture professes to give a prophetic
account of the state of this religion among mankind.'
Let us now suppose a person utterly ignorant of history, to have
9 Isa. viii. 14, 15; xlix. 5; chap. liii.: Mal. i. 10, 11, and chap. iii.
t Isa. xlix. 6, chap. ii., chap. xi., chap. lvi. 7: Mal. i. 11. To which must
5e added, the other prophecies of the like kind, several in the New Testament,
and very many in the Old; which describe what shall be the completion of the
revealed plan of Providence.
[See DAVIDsoN's Disc. on Proph.: BLANEY on Daniel's LXX. Weeks:
HRD's Inmrod. to the Study of Proph.: JORTIN'S Ser. at Boyle Lect.: FULaLEn'S Gosp its o'n-n Witness, part ii.: WArGH's Diss.: APTHORPE's Discourses.]




286             THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE             PART n.
all this related to him out of the Scripture. (Jr suppose such
[tn one, having the Scripture put into his hands, to remark these
things in it, not knowing but that the whole, even its civil history, as well as the other parts of it, might be, from beginning
to end, an entire invention; and to ask, What truth was in it,
and whether the revelation here related was real, or a fiction?
And, instead of a direct answer, suppose him, all at once, to be
told the following confessed facts; and then to unite them into
one view.
Let him first be told, in how great a degree the profession and
establishment of natural religion, the belief that there is one
God to be worshipped, that virtue is his law, and that mankind
shall be rewarded and punished hereafter, as they obey and disobey it here; in how very great a degree, I say, the profession
and establishment of this moral system in the world is owing to
the revelation, whether real or supposed, contained in this book:
the establishment of this moral system, even in those countries
which do not acknowledge the proper authority of the Scripture.*
Let him be told also, what number of nations do acknowledge its
proper authority.  Let him then take in the consideration, of
what importance religion is to mankind. And upon these things
he might, I think, truly observe, that this supposed revelation's
obtaining and being received in the world, with.all the circumstances and effects of it, considered together as one event, is the
most conspicuous and important event in the history of mankind:
that a book of this nature, and thus promulged and recommended
to our consideration, demands, as if by a voice from heaven, to
have its claims most seriously examined; and that, before such
examination, to treat it with any kind of scoffing and ridicule, is
an offence against natural piety.  It is to be remembered, that
how much soever the establishment of natural religion in the
world is owing to the Scripture revelation, this does not destroy
the proof of religion from reason, any more than the proof of
Euclid's Elements is destroyed, by a man's knowing or thinking,
that he should never have seen the truth of the several proposi.
tions contained in it, nor had those propositions come into hi;
thoughts, but for that mathematician.
Let such a person as we are speaking of be, in the next plce,
-  P. 250.




CHAP. VII.            FOR CIHRISTIANITY.                    287
informed of the acknowledged antiquity of the first parts of this
book; and that its chronology, its account of the time when the
earth, and the several parts of it, were first peopled with human
creatures, is no way contradicted, but is really confirmed, by the
natural and civil history of the world, collected from common
historians, from the state of the earth, and from  the late invention of arts and sciences.
And as the Scripture contains an unbroken thread of common
and civil history, from the creation to the captivity, f(r between
three and four thousand years; let the person we are speaking
of be told, in the next place, that this general history, as it is
not contradicted, but confirmed by profane historyk as much as
there would be reason to expect, upon supposition of its truth; so
there is nothing in the whole history itself, to give any reasonable
ground of suspicion of its not being, in the general, a faithful
and literally true genealogy of men, and series of things.    I
speak here only of the common Scripture history, or of the
course of ordinary events related in it, as distinguished from
miracles, and from the prophetic history.  In all the Scripture
narrations of this kind, following events arise out of foregoing
ones, as in all other histories.  There appears nothing related as
done in any age, not conformable to the manners of that age:
nothing in the account of a succeeding age, which one would
say could not be true, or was improbable, from the account of
things in the preceding one. There is nothing in the characters,
which would raise a thought of their being feigned; but all the
internal marks imaginable of their being real.  It is to be added
alse, that mere genealogies, bare narratives of the number of
k [Hundreds of instances might be adduced, in which profane historians
corroborate the statements of the Scriptures. The following are merely specimens: DIODORUS SICULUS, STRABO, TACITUS, PLINY, and SOLINUS, speak of
the destruction of Sodomn and Gomorrah. The lives of David and Solomon are
given'in the remains of the PHCENICIAN ANNALS, in DrAsMACENUS, and ErPOLEMITS. MENANDER describes the carrying away of the Ten Tribes by Sal
manasor. SUETONITu, TACITUS, PLINY the younger, and N UMENIUS, speak of
Jesus Christ. His miracles are owned by CELSUS, PORPHYRY, JULIAN, and
Jewish writers opposed to Christianity. SUETONIUS, TACITUS, PLINY, JULIAN,
and others describe his being put to death; and TACI'US says that many were
put to death for adhering to his religion. PHLTEGON mentions the miracles of
Peter; and Paul is Enumerated among eminent authors, in a fiagment of
LONUTNUS.]




238              THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE                   PART rL
years, which persons called by such and such names lived, do not
carry the face of fiction; perhaps do carryosome presumption of
veracity: and all unadorned narratives, which have nothing to
surprise, may be thought to carry somewhat of the like presumption too.  And the domestic and the political history is plainly
credible. There may be incidents in Scripture, which, taken
alone in the naked way they are told, may appear strange; especially to persons of other manners, temper, education: but there
are also incidents of undoubted truth, in many or most persons'
lives, which, in the same circumstances, would appear to the full
as strange.1 There may be mistakes of transcribers, there may
be other real or seeming mistakes, not easy to be particularly accounted for: but there are certainly no more things of this kind
in the Scripture, than what were to have been expected in books
of such antiquity; and nothing, in any wise, sufficient to discredit the general narrative.
Now, that a history, claiming to commence from the creation,
and extending in one continued series, through so great a length
of time, and variety of events, should have such appearances of
reality and truth in its whole contexture, is surely a very remarkable circumstance in its favor.   And as all this is applicable to
the common history of the New Testament, so there is a further
credibility, and a very high one, given to it by profane authors:
many of these writing of the same times, and confirming the truth
of customs and events, which are incidentally as well as more
purposely mentioned in it.   And this credibility of the common
Scripture-history, gives some credibility to its miraculous history:
1 [This thought is elaborated with skill by WHATELY in his " HIistoric Doubts."
He takes up all the popular infidel objections as to the life of Christ, and applies
them with undiminished or even increased force against the evidences that such
a man as Buonaparte ever existed.
JOHNSON in a lively sally once said-" It is easy to be on the negative side.
I deny that Canada is taken. The French are a much more numerous people
than we; and it is not likely they would allow us to take it.'' But the Government have announced the fact.''Very true. But the ministry have put us to
an enormous expense by the war in America, and it is their interest to persuade
us that we have got something for our money.''But the fact is confirmed by
thousands who were at the taking of it.''Aye, but these men have an interest
in deceiving us: they don't want you should think the French have beat them.
Now suppose you go over and find it so, that would only satisfy yourself; for
when you come back we will not believe you. We will say you have beea
bribed.' "-BOSWELL.]




CHAP. VII.          F.OR CHRISTIANITY.                289
especially as this is interwoven with the common, so as that they
imply each other, and both together make up one relation.
Let it then be more particularly observed to this person, that
it is an acknowledged matter of fact, which is indeed implied in
the foregoing observation, that there was such a nation as the
Jews, of the greatest antiquity, whose government and general
polity was founded on the law, here related to be given them by
Moses as from heaven: that natural religion, with rites additional
yet no way contrary to it, was their established religion, which
cannot be said of the Gentile world: and that their very being
as a nation, depended upon their acknowledgment of one God,
the God of the universe. For, suppose in their captivity in
Babylon, they had gone over to the religion of their conquerors,
there would have remained po bond of union, to keep them a
distinct people. And while they were under their own kings, in
their own country, a total apostasy from God would have been
the dissolution of their whole government. They in such a sense
nationally acknowledged and worshipped the Maker of heaven
and earth, when the rest of the world were sunk in idolatry, as
rendered them, in fact, the peculiar people of God. This remarkable establishment and preservation of natural religion
among them, seems to add peculiar credibility to the historical
evidence for the miracles of Moses and the prophets. Because
these miracles are a full satisfactory account of this event, which
plainly needs to be accounted for, and cannot be otherwise.
Let this person, supposed wholly ignorant of history, be acquainted further, that one claiming to be the Messiah, of Jewish
extraction, rose up at the time when this nation, from the prophecies above mentioned, expected the Messiah: that he was
rejected, as it seemed to have been foretold he should, by the
body of the people, under the direction of their rulers: that in
the course of a very few years, he was believed on and acknowledged as the promised Messiah, by great numbers among the
Gentiles, agreeably to the prophecies of Scripture, yet not upon
the evidence of prophecy, but of miracles,* of which miracles we
have also strong historical evidence; (by which I mean here no
more than must be acknowledged by unbelievers; for let pious
frauds and follies be admitted to weaken, it is absurd to say they
* P. 267, &c.
T                    25




290            THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE             PART at.
destroy our evidence of miracles wrought in proof of Christianity:)*
that this religion approving itself to the reason of mankind, and
carrying its own evidence with it, so far as reason is a judge of
its system, and being no way contrary to reason in those parts of
it which require to be believed upon the mere authority of its
Author; that this religion, I say, gradually spread and supported
itself for some hundred years, not only without any assistance
from temporal power, but under constant discouragements, and
often the bitterest persecutions from it; and then became the
religion of the world: that in the mean time the Jewish nation
and government were destroyed in a very remarkable manner,
and the people carried away captive and dispersed through the
most distant countries; in which state of dispersion they have
remained fifteen hundred years: and that they remain a numerous
people, united among themselves, and distinguished from the rest
of the world, as they were in the days of Moses, by the profession
of his law; and everywhere looked upon in a manner, which
one scarce knows how distinctly to express, but in the words
of the prophetic account of it, given so many ages before it
came to pass: Thou shalt become an astonishment, a proverb,
and a byword, among all nations whither the Lord shall lead
thee.t
The appearance of a standing miracle, in the Jews remaining
a distinct people in their dispersion, and the confirmation which
this event appears to give to the truth of revelation, may be
thought to be answered, by their religion's forbidding them intermarriages with those of other nations, and prescribing them many
peculiarities in their food, by which they are debarred from incorporating with the people in whose countries they live. This
is not, I think, a satisfactory account of that which it pretends to
account for. But what does it pretend to account for?  The
correspondence between this event and the prophecies; or the
coincidence of both, with a long dispensation of Providence, of a
peculiar nature, towards that people? No. It is only the event
itself, which is offered to be thus accounted for: which single
event, taken alone, abstracted from all such correspondence and
coincidence, perhaps would not have appeared miraculous: but
that correspondence and coincidence may be so, though the event
X P. 270, &c.                    t Deut. xxviii. 37




CUAP. VI.            FOR CHRISTIANITY.                291
itself be supposed not. Thus the concurrence of our Saviour's
being born at Bethlehem, with a long foregoing series of prophecy
and other coincidences, is doubtless miraculous; the series oi
prophecy, and other coincidences, and the event, being admitted:
though the event itself appears to have been brought about in a
natural way; of which, however, no one can be certain.
As several of these events seem, in some degree expressly, to
have verified the prophetic history already, so likewise they may
be considered further, as having a peculiar aspect towards the
full completion of it; as affording some presumption that the
whole of it shall, one time or other, be fulfilled. Thus, that the
Jews have been so wonderfully preserved in their long and wide
dispersion; which is indeed the direct fulfilling of some prophecies, but is now mentioned only as looking forward to somewhat
yet to come: that natural religion came forth from Judea, and
spread, in the degree it has done over the world, before lost in
idolatry; which, together with some other things, have distinguished that very place, in like manner as the people of it are
distinguished: that this great change of religion over the earth
was brought about under the profession and acknowledgment,
that Jesus was the promised Messiah: things of this kind naturally turn the thoughts of serious men towards the full completion
of the prophetic history, concerning the final restoration of that
people; concerning the establishment of the everlasting kingdom
among them, the kingdom of the Messiah; and the future state
of the world, under this sacred government. Such circumstances
and events, compared with these prophecies, though no completions of them, yet would not, I think, be spoken of as nothing in
the argument, by a person upon his first being informed of them.
They fall in with the prophetic history of things still future, give
it some additional credibility, and have the appearance of being
somewhat in order to the full completion of it.
Indeed it requires a good degree of knowledge, and great
calmness and consideration, to be able to judge thoroughly of
the evidence for the truth of Christianity, from that part of the
prophetic history which relates to the situation of the kingdoms
of the world, and to the state of the church, from the establishment of Christianity to the present time. But it appears from a
general viw of it, to be very material.  And those persons wno




.292            THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE            PART II.
have thoroughly examined it, and some of them were men of the
coolest tempers, greatest capacities, and least liable to imputations
of prejudice, insist upon it as determinately conclusive.
[CONCLUSION.] Suppose now a person quite ignorant of history, first to recollect the passages above mentioned out of Scripture, without knowing but that the whole was a late fiction, then
to be informed of the correspondent facts now mentioned, and to
unite them all into one view: that the profession and establishment of natural religion in the world is greatly owing, in different ways, to this book, and the supposed revelation which it
contains; that it is acknowledged to be of the earliest antiquity;
that its chronology and common history are entirely credible;
that this ancient nation, the Jews, of whom it chiefly treats,
appear to have been, in fact, the people of God, in a distinguished sense; that, as there was a national expectation among
them, raised from the prophecies, of a Messiah to appear at such
a time, so one at this time appeared claiming to be that Messiah;
that he was rejected by this nation, but received by the Gentiles,
not upon the evidence of prophecy, but of miracles; that the
religion he taught supported itself under the greatest difficulties,
gained ground, and at length became the religion of the world;
that in the mean time the Jewish polity was utterly destroyed,
and the nation dispersed over the face of the earth; that notwithstanding this, they have remained a distinct numerous people
for so many centuries, even to this day; which not only appears
to be the express completion of several prophecies concerning
them, but also renders it, as one may speak, a visible and easy
possibility that the promises made to them as a nation, may yet
be fulfilled.
To these acknowledged truths, let the person we have been
supposing add, as I think he ought, whether every one will allow
it or no, the obvious appearances which there are, of the state
of the world, in other respects besides what relates to the Jews,
and of the Christian church, having so long answered, and still
answering to the prophetic history.  Suppose, I say, these facts
set over against the things before mentioned out of the Scripture, and seriously compared with them; the joint view of both
together must, I think, appear of very great weight to a con
siderate reasonable person: of much greater indeed, upon having




CHAP. VII.          FOR CHRISTIANITY.                  293
them first laid before him, than is easy for us, who are so familiar.
ized to them, to conceive, without some particular attention for
that purpose.
All these things, and the several particulars contained under
them, require to be distinctly and most thoroughly examined
into; that the weight of each may be judged of, upon such examination, and such conclusion drawn, as results from their united
force. But this has not been attempted here. I have gone no
further than to show, that the general imperfect view of them
now given, the confessed historical evidence for miracles, and the
many obvious appearing completions of prophecy, together with
the collateral things* here mentioned, and there are several
others of the like sort; that all this together, which, being fact,
must be acknowledged by unbelievers, amounts to real evidence of
somewhat more than human in this matter: evidence much more
important, than careless men, who have been accustomed only to
transient and partial views of it, can imagine; and indeed abundantly sufficient to act upon. And these things, I apprehend,
must be acknowledged by unbelievers. For though they may
say, that the historical evidence of miracles wrought in attestation of Christianity, is not sufficient to convince them, that such
miracles were really wrought: they cannot deny, that there is
such historical evidence, it being a known matter of fact that
there is. They may say, the conformity between the prophecies
and events is by accident: but there are many instances in which
such conformity itself cannot be denied. They may say, with
regard to such kind of collateral things as those above mentioned,
that any odd accidental events, without meaning, will have a
meaning found in them by fanciful people: and that such as are
fanciful in any one certain way, will make out a thousand coincidences, which seem to favor their peculiar follies. Men, I say,
may talk thus: but no one who is serious, can possibly think
these things to be nothing, if he considers the importance of
collateral things, and even of lesser circumstances, in the eviJence of probability, as distinguished in nature, from the evidence
of demonstration.  In many cases indeed it seems to require the
truest judgmnnt, to determine with exactness the weight of cirAli the particular things mentioned in this chapter, not reducible to the
head of certain miracles, or determinate completions of prophecy. See p. 263.
25*




294               THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE                    PART IT.
cumstantial evidence: but it is very often altogether as convincing,
as that wlich is the most express and direct.
This general view of the evidence for Christianity, considered
as making one argument, may also serve to recommend to serious
persons, to set down every thing which they think may be of
any real weight at all in proof of it, and particularly the many
seeming completions of prophecy: and they will find, that,
judging by the natural rules, by which we judge of probable
evidence in common matters, they amount to a much higher
degree of proof, upon such a joint review, than could be supposed upon considering them separately, at different times; how
strong soever the proof might before appear to them, upon such
separate views of it.   For probable proofs, by being added, not
only increase the evidence, but mnultiply it."   Nor should I dissuade any one from setting down, what he thought made for the
contrary side.   But then it is to be remembered, not in order to
influence his judgment, but his practice, that a mistake on one
side may be, in its consequences, much more dangerous, than a
mistake on the other. And what course is most safe, and what
most dangerous, will be thought a very material consideration,
when we deliberate, not concerning events, but concerning conduct in our temporal affairs.  To be influenced by this consideration in our judgment, to believe or disbelieve upon it, is indeed
as much prejudice, as any thing whatever. And, like other prejudices, it operates contrary ways, in different men; for some are
m [Butler states this argument with more than his usual brevity, and its
force is not seen without reflection. "If contrivance or accident could have
given to Christianity any of its apparent testimonies, its miracles, its prophecies, its morals, its propagation, or [the character of] its founder, there could
be no room to believe, or even imagine, that all these appearances of great
credibility, could be united together, by any such means. If successful craft
could have contrived its public miracles, or the pretence of them, it requires
another reach of craft, to adopt its prophecies to the same object. Further, it
required not only a different, but a totally opposite art to conceive and promulgate its admirable morals.  Again, its propagation, in defiance of the
powers and terrors of the world, implied still other qualities of action. Lastly,
the model of the life of its founder, is a work of such originality and wisdom,
as could be the offspring only of consummate poweis {f invention, or rather
never could have been devised, but must have come from real liie. The hypothesis sinks under its incredibility. Each of these suppositions of contrivance,
being arbitrary and unsupported, the climax of them is an extra agaace."DAVISON, on Prophecy.]




CHAP. vII.          FOR CHRISTIANITY.                 295
inclined to believe what they hope, and others what they fear.
And it is manifest unreasonableness to apply to men's passions
in order to gain their assent.  But in deliberations concerning
conduct, there is nothing which reason more requires to be taken
into the account, than the importance of it. For, suppose it
doubtful, what would be the consequence of acting in this, or in
the contrary manner: still, that taking one side could be attended
with little or no bad consequence, and taking the other might be
attended with the greatest, must appear, to unprejudiced reason,
of the highest moment towards determining how we are to act.
The truth of our religion, like the truth of common matters, is
to be judged of by all the evidence taken together. And unless
the whole series of things which may be alleged in this argument, and every particular thing in it, can reasonably be supposed to have been by accident (for here the stress of the
argument for Christianity lies); then is the truth of it proved:
in like manner, as if in any common case, numerous events
acknowledged, were to be alleged in proof of any other event
disputed; the truth of the disputed event would be proved, not
only if any one of the acknowledged ones did of itself clearly
imply it, but, though no one of them singly did so, if the whole
of the acknowledged events taken together could not in reason
be supposed to have happened, unless the disputed one were
true.
It is obvious, how much advantage the nature of this evidence
gives to those persons who attack Christianity, especially in conversation.  For it is easy to show, in a short and lively manner,
that such and such things are liable to objection, that this and
another thing is of little weight in itself; but impossible to
show, in like manner, the united force of the whole argument
in one view.
Lastly, as it has been made appear, that there is no presumption against a revelation as miraculous; that the general scheme
nf Christianity, and the principal parts of it, are conformable to
the experienced constitution of things, and the whole perfectly
credible: so the account now given of the positive evidence for
it, shows, that this evidence is such, as, from the nature of it,
cannot be destroyed, though it should be lessened.




CHAPTER VIII.
OBJECTIONS AGAINST ARGUING FROM THE ANALOGY OF
NATURE, TO RELIGION.
IF every one would consider, with such attention as they are
bound, even in point of morality, to consider, what they judge
and give characters of; the occasion of this chapter would be, in
some good measure at least, superseded. But since this is not to
be expected; for some we find do not concern themselves to
understand even what they write against: since this treatise, in
common with most others, lies open to objections, which may
appear very material to thoughtful men at first sight; and, besides that, seems peculiarly liable to the objections of such as can
judge without thinking, and of such as can censure without
judging; it may not be amiss to set down the chief of these
objections which occur to me, and consider them to their hands.
Thcry are such as these:' That it is a poor thing to solve difficulties in revelation, bs
saying, that there are the same in natural religion; when what
is wanting is to clear both of them of these their common, as
well as other their respective, difficulties; that it is a strange
way indeed of convincing men of the obligations of religion, to
show them, that they have as little reason for their worldly pursuits: and a strange way of vindicating the justice and goodness
of the Author of nature, and of removing the objections against
both, to which the system of religion lies open, to show, that the
like objections lie against natural providence; a way of answering
objections against religion, without so much as pretending to
make out, that the system of it, or the particular things in it
objected against, are reasonable-especially, perhaps some may
be inattentive enough to add, must this be thought strange, when
it is confessed that analogy is no answer to such objections: that
when this sort of reasoning is carried to the utmost length it can
be imagined capable of, it will yet leave the mind in a very unsatisfied state; and that it must be unaccountable ignorance of
mankind, to imagine they will be prevailed with to forego their
296




CHAP. IIn.  OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE ANALOGY.            29"
present interests and pleasures, from  regard to religion, upon
doubtful evidence."
Now, as plausible as this way of talking may appear, that appearance will be found in a great measure owing to half views,
which show but part of an object, yet show that indistinctly, and
to undeterminate language. By these means weak men are often
deceived by others, and ludicrous men, by themselves. And even
those, who are serious and considerate, cannot always readily disentangle, and at once clearly see through the perplexities, in
which subjects themselves are involved; and which are heightened by the deficiencies and the abuse of words. To this latter
sort of persons, the following reply to each part of this objection
severally, may be of some assistance; as it may also tend a little
to stop and silence others.
First, The thing wanted, i.e. what men require, is to have all
difficulties cleared. And this is, or at least for any thing we
know to the contrary, it may be, the same as requiring to comprehend the divine nature, and the whole plan of Providence
from everlasting to everlasting! But it hath always been allowed
to argue from what is acknowledged, to what is disputed. And
it is in no other sense a poor thing, to argue from natural religion to revealed, in the manner found fault with, than it is to
argue in numberless other ways of probable deduction and inference, in matters of conduct, which we are continually reduced to
the necessity of doing. Indeed the epithet poor may be applied,
I fear as properly, to great part or the whole of human life, as it
is to the things mentioned in the objection.  Is it not a poor
thing, for a physician to have so little knowledge in the cure of
diseases, as even the most eminent have?  To act upon conjecture and guess, where the life of man is concerned? Undoubtedly it is: but not in comparison of having no skill at all
in that useful art, and being obliged to act wholly in the dark.
Further: since it is as unreasonable, as it is common, to urge
objections against revelation, which are of equal weight against
natural religion; and those who do this, if they are not confused
themselves, deal unfairly with others, in making it seem that
they are arguing only against revelation, or particular doctrines
of it, when in reality they are arguing against moral providence;;t is a thing of consequence to show, that such objections are as




298                OBJECTIONS AGAINST                PART II.
much level'ed against natural religion, as against revealed.  Objections, which are equally applicable to both, are properly speaking
answered, by its being shown that they are so, provided the
former be admitted to be true.  And without taking in the consideration how distinctly this is admitted, it is plainly very material to observe, that as the things objected against in natural
religion are of the same kind with what is certain matter of experience in the course of providence, and in the information which
God affords us concerning our temporal interest under his government; so the objections against the system of Christianity, and
the evidence of it, are of the very same kind with those which
are made against the system and evidence of natural religion.
However, the reader upon review may see, that most of the
analogies insisted upon, even in the latter part of this treatise, do
not necessarily require to have more taken for granted than is in
the former; [viz.] that there is an Author of nature, or natural
Governor of the world: and Christianity is vindicated, not from
its analogy to natural religion, but chiefly from its analogy to the
experienced constitution of nature.
Secondly, Religion is a practical thing, and consists in such a
determinate course of life, as what, there is reason to think, is
commanded by the Author of nature, and will, upon the whole,
be our happiness under his government.  If men can be convinced, that they have the like reason to believe this, as to believe that taking care of their temporal affairs will be to their
advantage; such conviction cannot but be an argument to them
for the practice of religion.  And if there be really any reason
for believing one of these, and endeavoring to preserve life, and
secure ourselves the necessaries and conveniences of it; then
there is reason also for believing the other, and endeavoring to
secure the interest it proposes to us. And if the interest, which
religion proposes to us, be infinitely greater than our whole temporal interest; then there must be proportionably greater reason
for endeavoring to secure one, than the other; since, by the supposition, the probability of our securing one is equal to the proba.
bility of our securing the other.  This seems plainly unanswerable;
and has a tendency to influence fair minds, who consider what
our condition really is, or upon what evidence we are naturally
appointed to act; and who are disposed to acquiesce in the ternm




CHAP. VIII.    THE ANALOGICAL ARGUMENT.                299
upon which we live, and attend to and follow that practical in.
struction, whatever it be, which is afforded us.
But the chief and proper force of the argument referred to in
the objection, lies in another place.  The proof of religion, it is
said, is involved in such inextricable difficulties, as to render it
doubtful; and that it cannot be supposed that if it were true, it
would be left upon doubtful evidence.  Here then, over and
above the force of each particular difficulty or objection, these
difficulties and objections taken together are turned into a positive argument against the truth of religion; which argument
would stand thus. If religion were true, it would not be left
doubtful, and open to objections to the degree in which it is:
therefore that it is thus left, not only renders the evidence of it
weak, and lessens its force, in proportion to the weight of such
objections, but also shows it to be false, or is a general presumption of its being so. Now the observation, that from the natural
constitution and course of things, we must in our temporal concerns, almost continually, and even in matters of great consequence, act upon evidence of a like kind and degree to the evidence
of religion, is an answer to this argument. Because it shows,
that it is according to the conduct and character of the Author
of nature to appoint we should act upon evidence like to that,
which this argument presumes he cannot be supposed to appoint
we should act upon: it is an instance, a general one, made up of
numerous particular ones, of somewhat in his dealing with us,
similar to what is said to be incredible. As the force of this
answer lies merely in the parallel, which there is between the
evidence for religion and for our temporal conduct; the answer
is equally just and conclusive, whether the parallel be made out,
by showing the evidence of the former to be higher, or the evidence of the latter to be lower.
Thirdly, The design of this treatise is not to vindicate the
character of God, but to show the obligations of men: it is not to
justify his providence, but to show what belongs to us to do.
These are two subjects, and ought not to be confounded. Though
they may at length run up into each other, yet observations may
immediately tend to make out the latter, which do not appear, by
any immediate connection, to the purpose of the former; which
is less our concern, than many seem to think.  For, first,




300                OBJECTIONS AGAINST                PART li.
It is not necessary we should justify the dispensations of Providence against objections, any farther than to show, that the things
objected against may, for aught we know, be consistent with justice and goodness.  Suppose then, that there are things in the
system of this world, and plan of Providence relating to it, which
taken alone would be unjust: yet it has been shown unanswerably, that if we could take in the reference, which these things
may have to other things, present past and to come; to the
whole scheme, which the things objected against are parts of;
these very things might, for aught we know, be found to be, not
only consistent with justice, but instances of it. Indeed it has
been shown, by the analogy of what we see, not only possible that
this may be the case, but credible that it is. And thus objections, drawn from such things, are answered, and Providence is
vindicated, as far as religion makes its vindication necessary.
Hence it appears, Secondly, that objections against the Divine
justice and goodness are not endeavored to be removed, by showing that the like objections, allowed to be really conclusive, lie
against natural providence: but those objections being supposed
and shown not to be conclusive, the things objected against, considered as matters of fact, are farther shown to be credible, from
their conformity to the constitution of nature; for instance, that
God will reward and punish men for their actions hereafter, from
the observation, that he does reward and punish them for their
actions here. And this, I apprehend, is of weight.
Thirdly, it would be of weight, even though those objections
were not answered. For, there being the proof of religion above
set down; and religion implying several facts; for instance again,
the fact last mentioned, that God will reward and punish men for
their actions hereafter; the observation, that his present method
of government is by rewards and punishments, shows that future
fact not to be incredible: whatever objections men may think
they have against it, as unjust or unmerciful, according to their
notions of justice and mercy; or as improbable from their belief
of necessity. I say, as improbable: for it is evident no objection against it, as unjust, can be urged from necessity; since this
notion as much destroys injustice, as it does justice.
Fourthly, Though objections against the reasonableness of the
system of religion cannot indeed be answered without entering




CHAP. TIII.     THE ANALOGICAL ARGUMENT.                   301
into consideration of its reasonableness; yet objections against
the credibility or truth of it may.  Because the system of it is
reducible into what -is properly matter of fact: and the truth, the
probable truth of facts, may be shown without consideration of
their reasonableness.  Nor is it necessary, though, in some cases
and respects, it is highly useful and proper, yet it is not necessary, to give a proof of the reasonableness of every precept enjoined us, and of every particular dispensation of Providence,
which comes into the system     of religion.  Indeed the more
thoroughly a person of a right disposition is convinced of the
perfection of the Divine nature and conduct, the farther he
will advance towards that perfection of religion, which John*
speaks of.a  But the general obligations of religion are fully
made out, by proving the reasonableness of the practice of it.
And that the practice of religion is reasonable, may be shown,
though no more could be proved, than that the system of it may
be so, for aught we know to the contrary: and even without
entering into the distinct consideration of this.
Fifthly, It is easy to see, that though the analogy of nature is
not an immediate answer to objections against the wisdom, the
justice, or goodness, of any doctrine or precept of religion; yet
it may be, as it is, an immediate and direct answer to what is
really intended by such objections; which is, to show that the
things objected against are incredible.
Fourthly, It is most readily acknowledged, that. the foregoing
treatise is by no means satisfactory; very far indeed from it: but
so would any natural institution of life appear, if reduced into a
system, together with its evidence.  Leaving religion out of the
case, men are divided in their opinions, whether our pleasures
overbalance our pains: and whether it be, or be not, eligible to
live in this world.b  And were all such controversies settled,
which perhaps, in speculation, would be found involved in great
- 1 John iv. 18.-[" There is no fear in love," &c.]
a [Obedience from dread, if it continue to be the only motive, precludes advance toward perfection; for "He that feareth is not made perfect in love."
But obedience from a discernment of the reasonableness and beneficence of
religion, and of the perfections of its Author, increases love till it " casteth out
fear,"]
b [See a discussion of this subject, in BAYLE'S Historical and Biographical
Dictfnary: art. XENOPHANES: notes D, E, F, G.]
26




302                 OBJECTIONS AGAINST                PART 1.
difficulties; and ivere it determined upon the evidence of reason,
as nature has determined it to our hands, that life is to be preserved: still, the rules which God has been pleased to afford us,
for escaping the miseries of it, and obtaining its satisfactions, the
rules, for instance, of preserving health, and recovering it when
lost, are not only fallible and precarious, but very far from being
exact. Nor are we informed by nature, as to future contingencies and accidents, so as to render it at all certain, what is the
best method of managing our affairs. What will be the success
of our temporal pursuits, in the common sense of the word success, is highly doubtful. And what will be the success of them
in the proper sense of the word; i.e. what happiness or enjoyment we shall obtain by them, is doubtful in a much higher
degree.  Indeed the unsatisfactory nature of the evidence, with
which we are obliged to take up, in the daily course of life, is
scarce to be expressed.  Yet men do not throw away life, or disregard the interests of it, upon account of this doubtfulness.
The evidence of religion then being admitted real, those who
object against it, as not satisfactory, i.e. as not being what they
wish it, plainly forget the very condition of our being: for
satisfaction, in this sense, does not belong to such a creature
as man.
And, what is more material, they forget also the very nature
of religion.  For, religion presupposes, in all those who will
embrace it, a certain degree of integrity and honesty; which it
was intended to try whether men have or not, and to exercise in
such as have it, in order to its improvement.  Religion presupposes this as much, and in the same sense, as speaking to a man
presupposes he understands the language in which you speak; or
as warning a man of any danger presupposes that he hath such
a regard to himself, as that he will endeavor to avoid it.  Therefore the question is not at all, Whether the evidence of religion
be satisfactory; but Whether it be, in reason, sufficient to prove
and discipline that virtue, which it presupposes. Now the evidence of it is fully sufficient for all those purposes of probation;
how far soever it is from being satisfactory, as to the purposes of
curiosity, or any other: and indeed it answers the purposes of
the former in several respects, which it would not do, if it were
as overpowering as is required. Besides, whether the motives or




-HAP. vIII.     THE ANALOGICAL ARGUMENT.                   303
the evidence for any course of action be satisfactory, neaning
here, by that word, what satisfies a man that such a course of
action will in event be for his good; this need never be, and I
think, strictly speaking, never is, the practical question in common matters.   The practical question in all cases is, Whether
the evidence for a course of action be such as, taking in all circumstances, makes the faculty within us, which is the guide and
judge of conduct,* determine that course of action to be prudent.  Indeed, satisfaction that it will be for our interest or
happiness, abundantly determines an action to be prudent: but
evidence almost infinitely lower than this, determines actions to
be so too; even in the conduct of every day.
Fifthly, As to the objection concerning the influence which
this argument, or any part of it, may, or may not be expected to
have upon men; I observe, as above, that religion being intended
for a trialc and exercise of the morality of every person's character, who is a subject of it; and there being, as I have shown,
such evidence for it, as is sufficient, in reason, to influence men
to embrace it: to object, that it is not to be imagined mankind
will be influenced by such evidence, is nothing to the purpose of
the foregoing treatise.  For the purpose of it is not to inquire,
what sort of creatures mankind are; but what the light and
knowledge, which is afforded them, requires they should be: to
show how, in reason, they ought to behave; not how, in fact,
they will behave. This depends upon themselves, and is their
own concern; the personal concern of each man in particular.
How little regard the generality have to it, experience indeed
does too fully show. But religion, considered as a probation,
has had its end upon all persons, to whom it has been proposed
with evidence sufficient in reason to influence their practice: for
by this means they have been put into a state of probation; let
* See Dissertation II.
c [It is remarked by DEAN FITZGERALD, that " It is not inconceivable that
the Almighty should apply such a test of men's candor and fidelity, as should
require them first to act upon a thing as true, before they were so fully satisfied of its truth as to leave no doubt remaining. Such a course of action
might be the appointed, and for all we know, the only possible way of overcoming habits of thought and feeling, repugnant to the belief demanded, so
that a fixed religious faith might be the reward, as it were, of a sincere course
of pradent behavior."l




304                 OBJECTIONS AGAINST                PART I;
them behave as they will in it. Thus, not only revelation, but
reason also, teaches us, that by the evidence of religion being
laid before men, the designs of Providence are carrying on, not
only with regard to those who will be influenced by it, but likewise with regard to those who will not. Lastly, the objection here
referred to, allows the thing insisted upon in this treatise to be
of some weight; and if so, it may be hoped it will have some
influence. And if there be a probability that it will have any at
all, there is the same reason in kind, though not in degree, to lay
it before men, as there would be, if it were likely to have a greater
influence.
Further, I desire it may be considered, with respect to the
whole of the foregoing objections, that in this treatise I have
argued upon the principles of others,* not my own: and have
omitted what I think true, and of the utmost importance, because
by others thought unintelligible, or not true. Thus I have argued
upon the principles of the fatalists, which I do not believe: and
have omitted a thing of the utmost importance which I do be.
lieve,-[viz.] the moral fitness and unfitness of actions, prior
to all will whatever; which as certainly determine the divine
conduct, as speculative truth and falsehood necessarily determine
the divine judgment.  Indeed the principle of liberty, and that
of moral fitness, so force themselves upon the mind, that moralists, ancient as well as modern, have formed their language upon
it. And probably it may appear in mine, though I have endeavored to avoid it; and, in order to avoid it, have sometimes been
obliged to express myself in a manner, which will appear strange
to such as do not observe the reason for it.  But the general
argument here pursued, does not at all suppose, or proceed upon
these principles.
Now, these two abstract principles of liberty and moral fitness
being omitted, religion can be considered in no other view, than
merely as a question of fact: and in this view it is here considered. It is obvious, that Christianity, and the proof of it,
are both historical.  Even natural religion is, properly, a matter
* By arguing upon the principles of others, the reader will observe is meant,
not proving any thing from those principles, but notwithstanding them. Thua
religion is proved, not from the opinion of necessity; which is absurd bue.
notwithstanding or even though that opinion were admitted to be true.




CHAP. VTI.     THE ANALOGICAL ARGUMENT.                305
of fact.  For, that there is a righteous Governor of the world, is
so: and this proposition contains the general system of natural
religion.  But then, several abstract truths, and in particular
those two principles, are usually taken into consideration in the
proof of it: whereas it is here treated of only as a matter of
fact. To explain this; That the three angles of a triangle are
equal to two right ones, is an abstract truth; but that they appear so to our mind, is only a matter of fact. This last must
have been admitted, if any thing was, by those ancient sceptics,
who would not admit the former: but pretended to doubt,
whether there were any such thing as truth, or whether we
could certainly depend upon our faculties of understanding for
the knowledge of it in any case.
The assertion that there is, in the nature of things, an original
standard of right and wrong in actions, independent upon all
will, but which unalterably determines the will of God, to exercise that moral government over the world, which religion teaches,
(i.e. finally and upon the whole to reward and punish men respectively as they act right or wrong;) contains an abstract truth,
as well as matter of fact. But suppose that in the present state,
every man without exception, was rewarded and punished, in
exact proportion as he followed or transgressed that sense of
right and wrong, which God has implanted in his nature: this
would not be at all an abstract truth, but only a matter of fact.
And though this fact were acknowledged by every one, yet the
same difficulties might be raised as now are, concerning the abstract questions of liberty and moral fitness. And we should
have a proof, even the certain one of experience, that the government of the world was perfectly moral, without taking in the consideration of those questions: and this proof would remain, in
what way soever they were determined.
Thus, God having given mankind a moral faculty, the object
of which is actions, and which naturally approves some actions
as right, and of good desert, and condemns others as wrong, and
of ill desert; that he will, finally and upon the whole, reward the
former and punish the latter, is not an assertion of an abstract
truth, but of what is as mere a fact, as his doing so at present
would be. This future fact I have not, indeed, proved with the
foie with which it might be proved, from the principles of liberty
U                    26*




306                     CONCLUSION.                  PART II.
and moral fitness; but without them have given a really conclusive practical proof of it, which is greatly strengthened by the
general analogy of nature; a proof easily cavilled at, easily shown
not to be demonstrative, (and it is not offered as such;) but inpossible, I think, to be evaded, or answered. Thus the obligations of religion are made out, exclusive of the questions concerning liberty and moral fitness; which have been perplexed
with difficulties and abstruse reasonings, as every thing may.
Hence therefore may be observed distinctly, what is the force
of this treatise. It will be, to such as are convinced of religion
upon the proof arising out of the two last mentioned principles,
an additional proof and confirmation of it: to such as do not
admit those principles, an original proof of it,* and a confirmation of that proof. Those who believe, will here find the scheme
of Christianity cleared of objections, and the evidence of it in a
peculiar manner strengthened. Those who do not believe will at
least be shown the absurdity of all attempts to prove Christianity
false, the plain undoubted credibility of it; and, I hope, a good
deal more.
Thus, though some perhaps may seriously think, that analogy,
as here urged, has too great stress laid upon it; and ridicule, unanswerable ridicule, may be applied, to show the argument from
it in a disadvantageous light; yet there can be no question, but
that it is a real one. For religion, both natural and revealed,
implying in it numerous facts; analogy, being a confirmction of
all facts to which it can be applied, and the only proof of most,
cannot but be admitted by every one to be a material thing, and
truly of weight on the side of religion, both natural and revealed.
And it ought to be particularly regarded by such as profess to
follow nature, and to be less satisfied with abstract reasonings.
CONCLUSION.
WHATEVER account may be given of the strange inattention
and disregard, in some ages and countries, to a matter of such
importance as religion; it would, before experience, be incredible,
that there should be the like disregard in those, who have had'- P. 141, &c.




PART II.               CONCLUSION.                     307
the moral system of the world laid before them, as it is by Christianity, and often inculcated upon them: because this moral
system carries in it a good degree of evidence for its truth, upon
its being barely proposed to our thoughts.  There is no need of
abstruse reasonings and distinctions, to convince an unprejudiced
understanding, that there is a God who made and governs the
world, and will judge it in righteousness; though they may be
necessary to answer abstruse difficulties, when once such are
raised: when the very meaning of those words, which express
most intelligibly the general doctrine of religion, is pretended to
be uncertain; and the clear truth of the thing itself is obscured
by the intricacies of speculation. To an unprejudiced mind, ten
thousand thousand instances of design cannot but prove a designer. And it is intuitively manifest, that creatures ought to
live under a dutiful sense of their Maker; and that justice and
charity must be his laws, to creatures whom he has made social,
and placed in society.
The truth of revealed religion, peculiarly so called, is not indeed self-evident, but requires external proof, in order to its
being received. Yet inattention, among us, to revealed religion,
will be found to imply the same dissolute immoral temper of
mind, as inattention to natural religion: because, when both are
laid before us, in the manner they are in Christian countries of
liberty, our obligations to inquire into both, and to embrace both
upon supposition of their truth, are obligations of the same nature.
Revelation claims to be the voice of God: and our obligation to
attend to his voice is surely moral, in all cases. And as it is insisted, that its evidence is conclusive, upon thorough consideration of it; so it offers itself with obvious appearances of having
something more than human in it, and therefore in all reason
requires to have its claims most seriously examined into.
It is to be added, that though light and knowledge, in what
manner soever afforded, is equally from God; yet a miraculous
revelation has a peculiar tendency, from the first principles of
our nature, to awaken mankind, and inspire them with reverence
and awe. And this is a peculiar obligation, to attend to what
claims to be so, with such appearances of truth.  It is therefore
most certain, that our obligations to inquire seriously into the
evidence of Christianity, and, upon supposition of its truth, to




308                    CONCL USION.                  PART I.
embrace it, are of the utmost importance, and moral in the highest
and most proper sense.  Let us then suppose, that the evidence
of religion in general, and of Christianity, has been seriously inquired into, by all reasonable men among us. Yet we find many
professedly to reject both, upon speculative principles of infidelity.  All of them do not content themselves with a bare neglect of religion, and enjoying their imaginary freedom from its
restraints. Some go much beyond this. They deride God's
moral government over the world. They renounce his protection,
and defy his justice.  They ridicule and vilify Christianity, and
blaspheme the author of it; and take all occasions to manifest
scorn and contempt of revelation.  This amounts to an active
setting themselves against religion; to what may be considered
as a positive principle of irreligion, which they cultivate within
themselves; and, whether they intend this effect or not, render
habitual, as a good man does the contrary principle.  Others,
who are not chargeable with all this profligateness, yet are in
avowed opposition to religion, as if discovered to be groundless
Now admitting, which is the supposition we go upon, that
these persons act upon what they think principles of reason, (and
otherwise they are not to be argued with,) it is really inconceivable, that they should imagine they clearly see the whole evidence
of it, considered in itself, to be nothing at all: nor do they pretend this.  They are far indeed from having a just notion of its
evidence: but they would not say its evidence was nothing, if
they thought the system of it, with all its circumstances, were
credible, like other matters of science or history.  Their manner
of treating it must proceed, either from such kind-of objections
against all religion, as have been answered or obviated in the
former part of this treatise; or else from objections, and difficulties, supposed more peculiar to Christianity. Thus, they
entertain prejudices against the whole notion of a revelation, and
miraculous interpositions. They find things in Scripture, whether
in incidental passages, or in the general scheme of it, which
appear to them unreasonable.  They take for granted, that if
Christianity were true, the light of it must have been more
general, and the evidence of it more satisfactory, or rather overpowering: that it must and would have been, in some way, otherwise put and left, than it is. Now this is not imagining they




rART II.               CONCLUSION.                    309
see the evidence itself to be nothing, or inconsiderable; but qite
another thing.  It is being fortified against the evidence, in
some degree acknowledged, by thinking they see the system of
Christianity, or something which appears to them necessarily con-nected with it, to be incredible or false; fortified against that
evidence, which might otherwise make great impression upon
them. Or, lastly, if any of these persons are, upon the whole, in
doubt concerning the truth of Christianity; their behavior seems
owing to their taking for granted, through strange inattention,
that such doubting is, in a manner, the same thing as being
certain against it.
To these persons, and to this state of opinion concerning religion, the foregoing treatise is adapted.  For, all the general
objections against the moral system of nature having been obviated, it is shown, that there is not any peculiar presumption at
all against Christianity, considered either as not discoverable by
reason, or as unlike to what is so discovered; nor any, worth
mentioning, against it as miraculous, if any at all; none, cerainly, which can render it in the least incredible.  It is shown,
that, upon supposition of a divine revelation, the analogy of
nature renders it beforehand highly credible, I think probable,
that many things in it must appear liable to great objections;
and that we must be incompetent judges of it, to a great degree.
This observation is, I think, unquestionably true, and of the very
utmost importance. But it is urged, as I hope it will be understood, with great caution not to vilify the faculty of reason,
which is the candle of the Lord within us;* though it can afford
no light, where it does not shine; nor judge, where it has no
principles to judge upon. The objections here spoken of, being
first answered in the view of objections against Christianity as a
matter of fact, are in the next place considered as urged more
immediately against the wisdom, justice, and goodness of the
Christian dispensation. And it is fully made out, that they
admit of exactly the like answer, in every respect, to what the
like objections against the constitution of nature admit of: that,
as partial views give the appearance of wrong to things, which,
upon further consideration and knowledge of their relations to
other things, are found just and good; so it is perfectly credible,
v Prov. xx. 27.




810                    CONCLUSION.                  PART n.
that the things objected against the wisdom an I goodness of the
Christian dispensation, may be rendered instances of wisdom
and goodness, by their reference to other things beyond our
view. Because Christianity is a scheme as much above our
comprehension, as that of nature; and like that, a scheme in
which means are made use of to accomplish ends, and which,
as is most credible, may be carried on by general laws. And
it ought to be attended to, that this is not an answer taken
merely or chiefly from our ignorance: but from something positive, which our observation shows us. For, to like objections,
the like answer is experienced to be just; in numberless parallel
cases.
The objections against the Christian dispensation, and the
method by which it is carried on, having been thus obviated, in
general, and together; the chief of them are considered distinctly, and the particular things objected to are shown credible,
by their perfect analogy, each apart, to the constitution of nature.
Thus, if man be fallen from his primitive state, and to be restored, and infinite wisdom and power engages in accomplishing
our recovery: it were to have been expected, it is said, that this
should have been effected at once; and not by such a long series
of means, and such a various economy of persons and things;
one dispensation preparatory to another, this to a further one,
and so on through an indefinite number of ages, before the end
of the scheme proposed can be completely accomplished; a
scheme conducted by infinite wisdom, and executed by almighty
power. But now, on the contrary, our finding that every thing
in the constitution and course of nature is thus carried on, shows
such expectations concerning revelation to be highly unreasonable; and is a satisfactory answer to them, when urged as objections against the credibility, that the great scheme of Providence
in the redemption of the world may be of this kind, and to be
accomplished in this manner.
As to the particular method of our redemption, the appointment of a Mediator between God and man: this has been shown
to be most obviously analogous to the general conduct of nature,
i.e. the God of nature, in appointing others to be the instruments of his mercy, as we experience in the daily course of Providence. The condition of this world, which the doctrine of oui




PART II.               CONCLUSION.                     311
redemption by Christ presupposes, so much falls ilI with natural
appearances, that heathen moralists inferred it from those appearances: inferred that human nature was fallen from its original
rectitude, and in consequence of this, degraded from its primitive happiness. However this opinion came into the world, these
appearances kept up the tradition, and confirmed the belief of it,
And as it was the general opinion under the light of nature, that
repentance and reformation, alone and by itself, was not sufficient
to do away sin, and procure a full remission of the penalties annexed to it; and as the reason of the thing does not at all lead
to any such conclusion; so every day's experience shows us, that
reformation is not, in any sort, sufficient to prevent the present disadvantages and miseries, which, in the natural course of things,
God has annexed to folly and extravagance.
Yet there may be ground to think, that the punishments,
which, by the general laws of divine government, are annexed
to vice, may be prevented: that provision may have been, even
originally, made, that they should be prevented by some means
or other, though they could not by reformation alone. For we
have daily instances of such mercy, in the general conduct of
nature: compassion provided for misery,* medicines for diseases,
friends against enemies. There is provision made, in the original
constitution of the world, that much of the natural bad consequences of our follies, which persons themselves alone cannot
prevent, may be prevented by the assistance of others; assistance
which nature enables, and disposes, and appoints them to afford.
By a method of goodness analogous to this, when the world lay
in wickedness, and consequently in ruin, God so loved the world,
that he gave his only-begotten Son to save it: and he being made
pe:fect by suffering, became the author of eternal salvation to all
them that obey him.t' Indeed neither reason nor analogy would
lead us to think, in particular, that the interposition of Christ, in
the manner in which he did interpose, would be of that efficacy
for recovery of the world, which the Scripture teaches us it was.
But neither would reason nor analogy lead us to think, that other
particular means would be of the efficacy, which experience shows
they are, in numberless instances.  Therefore, as the case before
us does not admit of experience; so, that neither reason nor
" Serm. at the Rolls, p. 106.       - John iii. 16: Heb. v. 9.




;12                     CONCLUSION.                  PART II.
analogy can show how, or in what particular way, the interposition of Christ, as revealed in Scripture, is of that efficacy, which
it is there represented to be; this is no kind nor degree of presumption against its being really of that efficacy.
Further: the objections against Christianity, from the light of
it not being universal, nor its evidence so strong as might rossibly be given, have been answered by the general analogy of
nature.  That God has made such variety of creatures, is indeed
an answer to the former: but that he dispenses his gifts in such
variety, both of degrees and kinds, among creatures of the same
species, and even to the same individuals at different times; is a
more obvious and full answer to it.  And it is so far from being
the method of Providence in other cases, to afford us such overbearing evidence, as some require in proof of Christianity; that
on the contrary, the evidence upon which we are naturally appointed to act in common matters, throughout a very great part
of life, is doubtful in a high degree. And admitting the fact,
that God has afforded to some no more than doubtful evidence of
religion; the same account may be given of it, as of difficulties
and temptations with regard to practice.  But as it is not impossible,* surely, that this alleged doubtfulness may be men's
own fault; it deserves their most serious consideration, whether
it be not so.  However, it is certain, that doubting implies a
degree of evidence for that of which we doubt: and that this
degree of evidence as really lays us under obligations as demonstrative evidence.
The whole of religion then is throughout credible: nor is
there, I think, any thing, relating to the revealed dispensation
of things, more different from the experienced constitution and
course of nature, than some parts of the constitution of nature
are from other parts of it.  If so, the only question which remains is, What positive evidence can be alleged for the truth of
Christianity?  This too in general has been considered, and the
objections against it estimated.. Deduct, therefore, what is to
be deducted from that evidence, upon account of any weight
which may be thought to remain in these objections, after what
the analogy of nature has suggested in answer to them: and
then consider, what are the practical consequences from all this
P. 258, &c.




PART Ir.               CONCLUSION.                     813
upon the most sceptical principles one can argue upon (for I am
writing to persons who entertain these principles): and upon
such consideration it will be obvious, that immorality, as little
excuse as it admits of in itself, is greatly aggravated, in persons
who have been made acquainted with Chriatianity, whether they
believe it or not: because the moral system of nature, or natural
religion, which Christianity lays before us, approves itself, almost
intuitively, to a reasonable mind, upon seeing it proposed.
In the next place, with regard to Christianity, it will be observed that there is a middle between a full satisfaction of the
truth of it, and a satisfaction of the contrary.  The middle state
of mind between these two consists in a serious apprehension,
that it may be true, joined with doubt whether it is so. And this,
upon the best judgment I am able to make, is as far towards
speculative infidelity, as any sceptic can at all be supp,sed to go,
who has had true Christianity, with the proper evidences of it,
laid before him, and has in any tolerable measure considered them.
For I would not be mistaken to comprehend all who have ever
heard of it; because it seems evident, that in many countries
called Christian, neither Christianity nor its evidence, is fairly
laid before men. And in places where both are, there appear
to be some who have very little attended to either, and who reject
Christianity with a scorn proportionate to their inattention; and
yet are by no means without understanding in other matters.
Now it has been shown, that a serious apprehension that Christianity may be true, lays persons under the strictest obligations
of a serious regard to it, throughout the whole of their life; a
regard not the same exactly, but in many respects nearly the same
with what a full conviction of its truth would lay them under.
Lastly, it will appear, that blasphemy and profaneness, with
regard to Christianity, are absolutely without excuse. There is
no temptation to it, but from the wantonness of vanity or mirth;
and these, considering the infinite importance of the subject, are
no such temptations as to afford any excuse for it. If this be a
just account of things, and yet men can go on to vilify ot disregard Christianity, which is to talk and act as if they had a
demonstration of its falsehood, there is no reason to think they
would alter their behavior to any purpose, though there were a
demonstration of its truth.
27








DISSE RTATIONS.
OF PERSONAL IDENTITY,
OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.




IN the first copy of these papers, I had inserted the
two following dissertations into the chapters, on a Future
Life, and on the Moral Government of God; with which
they are closely connected. But as these do not directly
fall under the title of the foregoing treatise, and would
have kept the subject of it too long out of sight, it seems
more proper to place them by themselves.
316




DISSERTATION I.
WHETHER we are to live in a future state, as it is the most
important question which can possibly be asked, so it is the most
intelligible one which can be expressed in language. Yet strange
perplexities have been raised about the meaning of that identity
or sameness of person, which is implied in the notion of our
living now and hereafter, or in any two successive moments.
And the solution of these difficulties hath been stranger than the
difficulties themselves. For, personal identity has been explained
so by some, as to render the inquiry concerning a future life of no
consequence at all to us the persons who are making it. And
though few men can be misled by such subtleties; yet it may be
proper to consider them a little.
When it is asked wherein personal identity consists, the answer
should be the same, as if it were asked wherein consists similitude, or equality; that all attempts to define would but perplex
it. Yet there is no difficulty at all in ascertaining the idea. For
as, upon two triangles being compared or viewed together, there
arises to the mind the idea of similitude; or upon twice two and
four, the idea of equality: so likewise, upon comparing the
consciousness of one's self, or one's own existence, in any two
moments, there as immediately arises to the mind the idea of
personal identity. And as the two former comparisons not only
give us the ideas of similitude and equality; but also show us
that two triangles are alike, and twice two and four are equal: so
the latter comparison not only gives us the idea of personal
identity, but also shows us the identity of ourselves in those two
moments; the present, suppose, and that immediately past; or
the present, and that a month, a year, or twenty years past. In
27*                    317




818                    PERSONAL IDENTITY.
other words, by reflecting upon that which is myself now, and
that which was myself twenty years ago, I discern they are not
two, but one and the same self.
But though consciousness of what is past does thus ascertain
our personal identity to ourselves, yet to say, that it makes personal identity, or is necessary to our being the same persons, is to
say, that a person has not existed a single moment, nor done one
action, but what he can remember; indeed none but what he
reflects upon. And one should really think it self-evident, that
consciousness of personal identity presupposes, and therefore
cannot constitute, personal identity; any more than knowledge,
in any other case, can constitute truth, which it presupposes.
This wonderful mistake may possibly have arisen from hence;
that to be endued with consciousness is inseparable from the idea
of a person, or intelligent being. For, this might be expressed
inaccurately thus, that consciousness makes personality: and
from hence it might be concluded to make personal identity
But though present consciousness of what we at present do and
feel is necessary to our being the persons we now are; yet present consciousness of past actions or feelings is not necessary to
our being the same persons who performed those actions, or once
had those feelings.
The inquiry, what makes vegetables the same, in the common
acceptation of the word, does not appear to have any relation to
this of personal identity: because, the word same, when applied
to them and to a person, is not only applied to different subjects,
but it is also used in different senses.  For when a man swears
to the same tree, as having stood fifty years in the same place, he
means only the same as to all the purposes of property, and uses
of common life; and not that the tree has been all that time the
same, in the strict philosophical sense of the word. For he does
not know, whether any one particle of the present tree be the
same with any one particle of the tree which stood in the same
place fifty years ago. And if they have not one common particle
of matter, they cannot be the same tree in the proper philosophic
sense of the word same: it being evidently a contradiction in
terms, to say they are, when no part of their substance, and no
one of their properties is the same: no part of their substance,
by the supposition; no one of their properties, because it is




PERSONAL IDENTITY.                     31i
allowed, that the same property cannot be transferred from one
substance to another.  Therefore when we say the identity of
sameness of a plant consists in a continuation of the same life,
communicated under the same organization, to a number of particles of matter, whether the same or not; the word same, when
applied to life and to organization, cannot possibly be understood
to signify, what it signifies in this very sentence, when applied to
matter. In a loose and popular sense then, the life and the organization and the plant are justly said to be the same, notwithstanding the perpetual change of the parts. But in strict and
philosophical language, no man, no being, no mode of being, no
any thing, can be the same with that, with which it has indeed
nothing the same. Now sameness is used in this latter sense,
when applied to persons. The identity of these, therefore, can.
not subsist with diversity of substance.
The thing here considered, and as I think, demonstratively
determined, is proposed by Mr. Locke in these words, Whether
it, i.e. the same self or person, be the same identical substance?
And he has suggested what is a much better answer to the question, than that which he gives it in form. For he defines person,
a thinking intelligent being, &c., and personal identity, the sameness of a rational being.*  The question then is, whether the
same rational being is the same substance: which needs no answer, because being and substance, in this place, stand for the
same idea. The ground of the doubt, whether the same person
be the same substance, is said to be this; that the consciousness
of our own existence, in youth and in old age, or in any two
joint successive moments, is not the same individual action,t
i.e. not the same consciousness, but different successive consciousnesses. Now it is strange that this should have occasioned such
perplexities. For it is surely conceivable, that a person may
have a capacity of knowing some object or other to be the same
now, which it was when he contemplated it formerly: yet in this
case, where, by the supposition, the object is perceived to be the
same, the perception of it in any two moments cannot be one and
the same perception. And thus, though the successive consciousnesses. which we have of our own existence, are not the same,
yet are they consciousnesses of one and the same thing or object;
* Locke's Works, vol. i. p. 146.   t Locke, pp. 146, 147.




820                 PERSONAL IDENTITY.
of the same person, self, or living agent.  The person, of whose
existence the consciousness is felt now, and was felt an hour or a
year ago, is discerned to be, not two persons, but one and the
same person; and therefore is one and the same.
Mir. Locke's observations upon this subject appear hasty: and
he seems to profess himself dissatisfied with suppositions, which
he has made relating to it.* But some of those hasty observations have been carried to a strange length by others; whose
notion, when traced and examined to the bottom, amounts, I
think, to this:t "That personality is not a permanent, but a transient thing: that it lives and dies, begins and ends continually:
that no one can any more remain one and the same person two
moments together, than two successive moments can be one and
the same moment: that our substance is indeed continually
changing; but whether this be so or not, is, it seems, nothing to
the purpose; since it is not substance, but consciousness alone,
which constitutes personality: which consciousness, being successive, cannot be the same in any two moments, nor consequently
the personality constituted by it."  Hence it must follow, that it
is a fallacy upon ourselves, to charge our present selves with any
thing we did, or to imagine our present selves interested in any
thing which befell us yesterday; or that our present self will be
interested in what will befall us to-morrow: since our present
self is not, in reality, the same with the self of yesterday, but
another like self or person coming in its room, and mistaken for
it; to which another self will succeed to-morrow. This, I say,
must follow. For if the self or person of to-day, and that of tomorrow, are not the same, but only like persons; the person of
to-day is really no more interested in what will befall the person
of to-morrow, than in what will befall any other person.
It may be thought, perhaps, that this is not a just representation of the opinion we are speaking of: because those who maintain it allow, that a person is the same as far back as his remembrance reaches.  Indeed they use the words, identity, and same
person. Nor will language permit these words to be laid aside;
since if they were, there must be I know not what ridiculous
* Locke, p. 152.
t See an answer to Dr. Clarke's Third Defence of his Letter to Mr. Podwell,
2d edit. p. 44, 56, &c.




PERSONAL IDENTITY.                  321
periphrasis substituted in the room of thenm. But they cannot,
consistently with themselves, mean, that the person is really the
same. For it is self-evident, that the personality cannot be really
the same, if, as they expressly assert, that in which it consists is
not the same.  And as, consistently with themselves, they cannot, so, I think it appears, they do not mean, that the person is
really the same, but only that he is so in a fictitious sense: in
such a sense only as they assert, for this they do assert, that any
number of persons whatever may be the same person. The bare
unfolding this notion, and laying it thus naked and open, seems
the best confutation of it.  However, since great stress is said to
be put upon it, I add the following things.
First, This notion is absolutely contradictory to that certain
conviction, which necessarily and every moment rises within us,
when we turn our thoughts upon ourselves, when we reflect upon
what is past, and look forward upon what is to come. All imagination of a daily change of that living agent which each man
calls himself, for another, or of any such change throughout our
whole present life, is entirely borne down by our natural sense
of things.  Nor is it possible for a person in his wits to alter his
conduct, with regard to his health or affairs, from a suspicion,
that, though he should live to-morrow, he should not, however,
be the same person he is to-day. Yet, if it be reasonable to act,
with respect to a future life, upon the notion that personality is
transient, it is reasonable to act upon it, with respect to the present.  Here then is a notion equally applicable to religion and to
temporal concerns. Every one sees and feels the inexpressible
absurdity of it in the latter case; therefore, if any can take up
with it in the former, this cannot proceed from the reason of the
thing, but must be owing to inward unfairness, and secret corruption of heart.
Secondly, It is not an idea, or abstract notion, or quality, but
a being only, which is capable of life and action, of happiness and
misery. Now all beings confessedly continue the same, during
the whole time of their existence.  Consider then a living being
now existing, and which has existed for any time alive. This
living being must have done and suffered and enjoyed, what it
has done and suffered and enjoyed formerly, (this living being, I
iay, and not another) as really as it does and suffers and enjoys,
V




822                 PERSONAL IDENTITY.
what it does and suffers and enjoys this instant. All these suecessive actions, enjoyments, and sufferings, are actions, enjoyments, and sufferings, of the same living being. And they are
so, prior to all consideration of its remembering or forgetting:
since remembering or forgetting can make no alteration in the
truth of past matter of fact. And suppose this being endued
with limited powers of knowledge and memory, there is no
more difficulty in conceiving it to have a power of knowing
itself to be the same living being which it was some time ago,
of remembering some of its actions, sufferings; and enjoyments,
and forgetting others, than in conceiving it to know or remember
or forget any thing else.
Thirdly, Every person is conscious, that he is now the same
person or self he was as far back as his remembrance reaches:
since when any one reflects upon a past action of his own, he
is just as certain of the person who did that action, namely,
himself who now reflects upon it, as he is certain that the
action was done at all. Nay, very often a person's assurance
of an action having been done, of which he is absolutely assured,
arises wholly from the consciousness that he himself did it.
This he, person, or self, must either be a substance, or the
property of some substance.  If he, a person, be a substance;
then consciousness that he is the same person is consciousness
that he is the same substance.  If the person, or he, be the
property of a substance, still consciousness that he is the same
property is as certain a proof that his substance remains the
same, as consciousness that he remains the same substance would
be; since the same property cannot be transferred from one
substance to another.
But though we are thus certain, that we are the same agents,
living beings, or substances, now, which we were as far back as
our remembrance reaches; yet it is asked, whether we may not
possibly be deceived in it?  And this question may be asked at
the end of any demonstration whatever: because it is a question
concerning the truth of perception by memory.  He who can
doubt, whether perception by memory can in this case be depended upon, may doubt also, whether perception by deduction
and reasoning, which also include memory, or indeed whether
intuitive perception can.  Here then we can go no further.  Fot




PERSONAL IDENTITY.                     323
it is ridiculous to attempt to prove the truth of those perceptions,
whose truth we can no otherwise prove, than by other perceptions
of exactly the same kind with them, and which there is just the
same ground to suspect; or to attempt to prove the truth of our
faculties, which can no otherwise be proved, than by the use or
means of those very suspected faculties themselves.'
a ["One is continually reminded throughout this dissertation, of what is
called The commono-sense school of Scotch metaphysicians. Nor can there be
any doubt that REID, in particular, was largely indebted to Butler, of whose
writings he was a diligent student, for forming that sober and manly character
of understanding which is, I think, his great merit."-FITZGERALD.]




DISSERTATION II.
k Fatuore        of fituto
THAT which renders beings capable of moral government, is
their having a moral nature, and moral faculties of perception
and of action.   Brute creatures are impressed and actuated by
various instincts and propensions: so also are we. But additional to this, we have a capacity of reflecting upon actions and
characters, and making them an object to our thought: and on
doing this, we naturally and unavoidably approve some actions,
under the peculiar view    of their being virtuous and of good
desert; and disapprove others, as vicious and of ill desert.  That
we have this moral approving and disapproving* faculty, is certain from our experiencing it in ourselves, and recognising it in
each other. It appears from our exercising it unavoidably, in the
approbation and disapprobation even of feigned characters; from
the words right and wrong, odious and amiable, base and worthy,
with many others of like signification in all languages applied to
actions and characters: from the many written systems of morals
which suppose it, since it cannot be imagined, that all these
authors, throughout all these treatises, had absolutely no meaning at all to their words, or a meaning merely chimerical: from
* This way of speaking is taken from Epictetus,t and is made use of as
seeming the most full, and least liable to cavil. And the moral faculty may be
understood to have these two epithets, oKciacrioK and dno6oKlpaartci1 [applauding
and condemning] upon a double account; because, upon a survey of actions,
whether before or after they are done, it determines them to be good or evil;
and also because it determines itself to be the guide of action and of life, in
contradistinction from all other faculties, or natural principles of action; in
the very same manner as speculative reason directly and naturally judges of
speculative truth and falsehood: and at the same time is attended with a consciousness upon reflection, that the natural right to judge of them belongs to it
t Arr. Epict. lib. i. cap. L
324




NATURE OF VIRTUE.                    325
our natural sense of gratitude, which implies a distinction between merely being the instrument of good, and intending it:
from the distinction every one makes between injury and mere
harm, which, Hobbes says, is peculiar to mankind; and between
injury and just punishment, a distinction plainly natural, prior
to the consideration of human laws.
It is manifest that great part of common language, and of
common behavior over the world, is formed upon supposition of
such a moral faculty; whether called conscience, moral reason,
moral sense, or divine reason; whether considered as a sentiment
of the understanding, or as a perception of the heart; or, which
seems the truth, as including both. Nor is it at all doubtful in
the general, what course of action this faculty, or practical discerning power within us, approves and what it disapproves. For,
as much as it has been disputed wherein virtue consists, or whatever ground for doubt there may be about particulars; yet, in
general, there is in reality a universally acknowledged standard
of it. It is that, which all ages and all countries have made
profession of in public: it is that, which every man you meet
puts on the show of: it is that, which the primary and fundamental laws of all civil constitutions over the face of the earth
make it their business and endeavor to enforce the practice of
upon mankind: namely, justice, veracity, and regard to common
good. It being manifest then, in general, that we have such a
faculty or discernment as this, it may be of use to remark some
things more distinctly concerning it.
First, It ought to be observed, that the object of this faculty
is actions,* comprehending under that name active or practical
principles: those principles from which men would act, if occasions and circumstances gave them power; and which, when
fixed and habitual in any person, we call his character. It does
not appear, that brutes have the least reflex sense of actions, as
distinguished from events: or that will and design, which constitute the very nature of actions as such, are at all an object to
their perception. But to ours they are: and they are the object,
and the only one, of the approving and disapproving faculty.'- Oilt'  i1 iper7 Kai KaKia — v 7reio-t, dX)a  yvepyefa, [Virtue and vice are not in feeling, but in action,] M. Anton. lib. ix. 16. Virtutis laus omnis in actione con%istrj. -The whole praise of virtue, depends on action.] Cie. Off. lib. i. cap. 6.
28




326                  NATURE OF VIRTUE.
Acting, conduct, behavior, abstracted from all regard to what is
in fact and event the consequence of it, is itself the natural object of the moral discernment; as speculative truth and falsehood is of speculative reason.  Intention of such and such
consequences, is indeed, always included; for it is part of the
action itself: but though the intended good or bad consequences
do not follow, we have exactly the same sense of the action, as
if they did.  In like manner we think well or ill of characters,
abstracted from all consideration of the good or the evil, which
persons of such characters have it actually in their power to do.
We never, in the moral way, applaud or blame either ourselves
or others, for what we enjoy or what we suffer, or for having impressions made upon us, which we consider as altogether out of
our power: but only for what we do or would have done, had it
beenin our power: or for what we leave undone, which we might
have done, or would have left undone, though we could have
done.
Secondly, Our sense or discernment of actions as morally good
or evil, implies in it a sense or discernment of them as of good
or ill desert.  It may be difficult to explain this perception, so as to answer all the questions which may be asked concerning it: but every one speaks of such and such actions as
deserving punishment; and it is not, I suppose, pretended, that
tney have absolutely no meaning at all to the expression. Now
the meaning plainly is not, that we conceive it for the good of
society, that the doer of such actions should be made to suffer.
I or if, unhappily, it were resolved, that a man, who by some
innocent action, was infected with the plague, should be left to
perish, lest, by other people's coming near him, the infection
should spread; no one would say he deserved this treatment.
Innocence and ill desert are inconsistent ideas. Ill desert always
supposes guilt: and if one be no part of the other, yet they are
evidently and naturally connected in our mind. The sight of a
man in misery raises our compassion towards him; and if this
misery be inflicted on him by another, our indignation against
the author of it.  But when we are informed, that the sufferer
is a villain, and is punished only for his treachery or cruelty;
our compassion exceedingly lessens, and in many instances our
indignation wholly subsides. Now what produces this effect is




NATURE OF VIRTUE.                  327
the conception of that in the sufferer, which we call ill desert.
Upon considering then, or viewing together, our notion of vice
and that of misery, there results a third, that of ill desert. And
thus there is in human creatures an association of the two ideas,
natural and moral evil, wickedness and punishment. If this
association were merely artificial or accidental, it were nothing:
but being most unquestionably natural, it greatly concerns us to
attend to it, instead of endeavoring to explain it away.
It may be observed further, concerning our perception of good
and' of ill desert, that the former is very weak with respect to
common instances of virtue.  One reason of which may be, that
it does not appear to a spectator, how far such instances of virtue
proceed from a virtuous principle, or in what degree this principle
is prevalent: since a very weak regard to virtue may be sufficient
to make men act well in many common instances.  On the ot)er
hand, our perception of ill desert in vicious actions lessens, in
proportion to the temptations men are thought to have had to
such vices. For, vice in human creatures consisting chiefly in
the absence or want of the virtuous principle; though a man be
overcome, suppose by tortures, it does not from thence appear to
what degree the virtuous principle was wanting. All that appears is, that he had it not in such a degree, as to prevail over
the temptation; but possibly he had it in a degree, which would
have rendered him proof against common temptations.
Thirdly, Our perception of vice and ill desert arises from, and
is the result of, a comparison of actions with the nature and capacities of the agent. For the mere neglect of doing what we
ought to do, would, in many cases, be determined by all men to
be in the highest degree vicious. This determination must arise
from such comparison, and be the result of it; because such
neglect would not be vicious in creatures of other natures and
capacities, as brutes. It is the same also with respect to positive
vices, or such as consist in doing what we ought not. For
every one has a different sense of harm done by an idiot, mad.
mlan, or child, and by one of mature and common understanding:
though the action of both, including the intention, which is pan
cf the action, be the same: as it nay be, since idiots and madmen, as well as children, are capable not only of doing mischief
but also of intending it. Now this difference must arise from




328                 NATURE OF VIRTUE.
somewhat discerned in the nature or capacities of one, which
renders the action vicious; and the want of which, in the other,
renders the same action innocent or less vicious: and this plainly
supposes a comparison, whether reflected upon or not, between
the action and capacities of the agent, previous to our determining
an action to be vicious.  Hence arises a proper application of the
epithets, incongruous, unsuitable, disproportionate, unfit, to actions which our moral faculty determines to be vicious.
Fourthly, It deserves to be considered, whether men are more
at liberty, in point of morals, to make themselves miserable without reason, than to make other people so: or dissolutely to
neglect their own greater good, for the sake of a present lesser
gratification, than they are to neglect the good of others, whom
nature has committed to their care.  It would seem, that a due
concern about our own interest or happiness, and a reasonable
endeavor to secure and promote it, (which is, I think, very much
the meaning of the word prudence, in our language;) it would
seem, that this is virtue, and the contrary behavior faulty and
blamable; since, in the calmest way of reflection, we approve of
the first, and condemn the other conduct, both in ourselves and
others. This approbation  and disapprobation  are altogether
different from mere desire of our own, or of their happiness, and
from sorrow upon missing it.  For the object or occasion of this
last kind of perception is satisfaction or uneasiness: whereas the
object of the first is active behavior. In one case, what our
thoughts fix upon is our condition: in the other, our conduct.
It is true indeed, that nature has not given us so sensible a
disapprobation of imprudence and folly, either in ourselves or
others, as of falsehood, injustice, and cruelty: I suppose, because
that constant habitual sense of private interest and good, which
we always carry about with us, renders such sensible disapprobation less necessary, less wanting, to keep us from imprudently
neglecting our own happiness, and foolishly injuring ourselves,
than it is necessary and wanting to keep us from injuring others,
to whose good we cannot have so strong and constant a regard:
and also because imprudence and folly, appearing to bring its
own punishment more immediately and constantly than injurious
behavior, it less needs the additional punishment, which would
be inflicted upon it by others, had they the same sensible indigna



NATURE OF VIRTUE.                   329
tion against it, as against injustice, and fraud, and cruelty.  Be,
sides, unhappiness being in itself the natural object of compassion,
the unhappiness which people bring upon themselves, though it
be wilfully, excites in us some pity for them; and this of course
lessens our displeasure against them.  Still it is matter of experience, that we are formed so as to reflect very severely upon the
greater instances of imprudent neglect and foolish rashness, both
in ourselves and others.  In instances of this kind, men often
say of themselves with remorse, and of others with some indignation, that they deserved to suffer such calamities, because they
brought them upon themselves, and would not take warning.
Particularly when persons come to poverty and distress by a long
course of extravagance, and after frequent admonitions, though
without falsehood or injustice; we plainly, do not regard such
people as alike objects of compassion with those, who are brought
into the same condition by unavoidable accidents.  From these
things it appears, that prudence is a species of virtue, and folly
of vice: meaning by folly, something quite different from mere
incapacity; a thoughtless want of that regard and attention to
our own happiness, which we had capacity for. And this the
word properly includes; and, as it seems, in its usual acceptation: for we scarcely apply it to brute creatures.
However, if any person be disposed to dispute the matter, I
shall very willingly give him up the words virtue and vice, as
not applicable to prudence and folly: but must insist, that the
faculty within us, which is the judge of actions, approves of prudent actions, and disapproves imprudent ones: I say prudent and
imprudent actions as such, and considered distinctly from the
happiness or misery which they occasion. And by the way, this
observation may help to determine what justness there is in the
objection against religion, that it teaches us to be interested and
selfish.
Fifthly, Without inquiring how far, and in what sense, virtue
is resolvable into benevolence, and vice into the want of it; it
may be proper to observe, that benevolence, and the want of it,
singly considered, are in no sort the whole of virtue and vice.
For if this were the case, in the review of one's own character, or
that of others, our moral understanding and moral sense would
be indifferent to every thing, but the degrees in which benevo28



330                NATURE OF VIRTUE.
lence prevailed, and the degrees in which it was wanting. That
is, we should neither approve of benevolence to some persons
rather than to others, nor disapprove injustice and falsehood upon
any other account, than merely as an overbalance of happiness
was foreseen likely to be produced by the first, and cf misery by
the second.  On the contrary, suppose two men competitors for
any thing whatever, which would be of equal advantag3 to each
of them; though nothing indeed would be more impertinent,
than for a stranger to busy himself to get one of them preferred
to the other; yet such endeavor would be virtue, in behalf of a
friend or benefactor, abstracted from all consideration of distant
consequences: as that examples of gratitude, and the cultivation
of friendship, would be of general good to the world. Again,
suppose one man should, by fraud or violence, take from another
the fruit of his labor, with intent to give it to a third, who he
thought would have as much pleasure from it as would balance
the pleasure which the first possessor would have had in the
enjoyment, and his vexation in the loss of it; suppose also that
no bad consequences would follow: yet such an action would
surely be vicious. Nay further, were treachery, violence, and
injustice, no otherwise vicious, than as foreseen likely to produce
an overbalance of misery to society; then, if in any case a man
could procure to himself as great advantage by an act of injustice,
as the whole foreseen inconvenience, likely to be brought upon
others by it, would amount to; such a piece of injustice would
not be faulty or vicious at all: because it would be no more than,
in any other case, for a man to prefer his own satisfaction to
another's, in equal degrees.
The fact, then, appears to be, that we are constituted so as to
condemn falsehood, unprovoked violence, injustice, and to approve of benevolence to some preferably to others, abstracted
from all consideration, which conduct is likeliest to produce an
overbalance of happiness or misery. Therefore, were the Author
of nature to propose nothing to himself as an end but the production of happiness, were his moral character merely that of
benevolence; yet ours is not so.  Upon that supposition indeed,
the only reason of his giving us the above mentioned approbation
of benevolence to some persons rather than others, and disapprobation of falsehood, unprovoked violence, and injustice, must be,




NATURE OF VIRTUE.                  831
that he foresaw this constitution of our nature would produce
more happiness, than forming us with a temper of mere general
benevolence.  But still, since this is our constitution, falsehood,
violence, injustice, must be vice in us; and benevolence to some.
preferably to others, virtue; abstracted from all consideration of
the overbalance of evil or good, which they may appear likely to
produce.
Now if human creatures are endued with such a moral nature
as we have been explaining, or with a moral faculty, the natural
object of which is actions: moral government must consist in
rendering them happy and unhappy, in rewarding and punishing
them, as they follow, neglect, or depart from, the moral rule of
action interwoven in their nature, or suggested and enforced by
this moral faculty;* in rewarding and punishing them upon account of their so doing.
I am not sensible that I have, in this fifth observation, contradicted what any author designed to assert.  But some of great
and distinguished merit, have, I think, expressed themselves in
a manner, which may occasion some danger, to careless readers,
of imagining the whole of virtue to consist in singly aiming, according to the best of their judgment, at promoting the happiness
of mankind in the present state; and the whole of vice, in doing
what they foresee, or might foresee, is likely to produce an overbalance of unhappiness in it: than which mistakes, none can be
conceived more terrible.  For it is certain, that some of the most
shocking instances of injustice, adultery, murder, perjury, and
even of persecution, may, in many supposable cases, not have the
appearance of being likely to produce an overbalance of misery
in the present state; perhaps sometimes may have the contrary
appearance.
This reflection might easily be carried on, but I forbear. The
happiness of the world is the concern of Him who is the lord and
the proprietor of it: nor do we know what we are about, when
we endeavor to promote the good of mankind in any ways, but
those which he has directed; that is indeed in all ways not contrary to veracity and justice.  I speak thus upon supposition of
persons really endeavoring, in some sort, to do good without
regard to these. But the truth seems to be, that such supposed
* P. 145.




332                 NATURE OF VIRTUE.
endeavors proceed, almost always, from ambition, the spirit of
party, or some indirect principle, concealed perhaps in great
measure from persons themselves. And though it is our business
and our duty to endeavor, within the bounds of veracity and
justice, to contribute to the ease, convenience, and even cheerfulness and diversion of our fellow-creatures: yet, from our short
views, it is greatly uncertain, whether this endeavor will, in particular instances, produce an overbalance of happiness upon the
whole; since so many and distant things must come into the ac3ount. And that which makes it our duty is, that there is some
appearance that it will, and no positive appearance sufficient to
balance this, on the contrary side; and also, that such benevolent
endeavor is a cultivation of that most excellent of all virtuous
principles, the active principle of benevolence.
However, though veracity, as well as justice, is to be our rule
of life; it must be added, otherwise a snare will be laid in the
way of some plain men, that the use of common forms of speech,
generally understood, cannot be falsehood; and in general, that
there can be no designed falsehood, without designing to deceive.
It must likewise be observed, that in numberless cases, a man
may be under the strictest obligations to what he foresees will
deceive, without his intending it. For it is impossible not to
foresee, that the words and actions of men, in different ranks and
employments, and of different educations, will perpetually be
mistaken by each other.  And it cannot but be so, while they
will judge with the utmost carelessness, as they daily do, of what
they are not, perhaps, enough informed to be competent judges
of, even though they considered it with great attention.




INDEX TO PART I.
REFERENCES TO THE EDITOR'S NOTES ARE IN BRACKETS.
PAGE                              MPAG
Abstract reasonings may mislead. 162 Atheists not argued with, in this
fitness of things....... note 166      treatise............. 181
Actions
distinguished from their quali-  Beginnings of a righteous governties................. 111           ment seen on earth.... 107
manifest character........ 156 Bible, teaches the existence of
rewarded and punished...... 8C8        general laws......... [99
this world a theater of..... 156 Bodies
what sort exercise virtue..... 152  not necessary to us......... 82
Active and passive impressions. 140  not ourselves............ 83
Advantages of virtue.......... 113  only instruments....... 85, 86
may never recur.......... 1G1     their solid elements........ 88
Affections, excited by objects.... 1(5 Bodily and mental habits...... 134
need control.............. 1C6 Brain, does not think......... [89
part of our constitution...... 147 Brahminical notion of death..... 92
Affliction, a discipline......... 150 Brutes,
chiefly of our own making.... 10)  are they immortal?........ [88
Agent, the living, not compounded 81  may have greater strength than
Alienation of parts of our body..?     man................. 119
All things made double........ 137  under man's control......  119
Allurements, use of........... 151
Analogy                           Capacities,
answers objections as to a pre-   state of in infancy.........  88
sent state of trial....... 135  not destroyed by death..... 89
as to modes of existence..... 78  not dependent on the body... 79
carrying the force of positive  Causes and ends incomprehensible 172
argument............. [105 Changes compatible with idendeals only with facts....... 171      tity.............. 78, 83
indicates future punishment.. 101 Character
may amount to proof....... 168    manifested by probation..... 156
objections which it cannot an-    not given but acquired...... 155
swer............... 171       what it means.........note 163
the only proof of some things  79 Conscience,
Antiquity ofreligion......... 167   how it acts............... 164
333




334                      INDEX TO PART I.
PAGE                                PAGE
Conscience                          Distributive justice a natural rule. 110
implies government....... 115 Divine government a scheme. CHAP.VI,
a rule............ 164 Domestic government........ 114
authority......... 164 Dreams, what they prove....... 86
future retribution.... 165
may be impaired......... 168 Earthly satisfactions attainable.. 183
perverted................ 168 Effects of actions on the actor... [143
Consciousness an indiscerptible     Ends often produced by unlikely
entity.............  82          means.............. 180
presupposes identity........ [77 Enjoyments in our own power to
Consequences                                a great degree........ 95
may sometimes be avoided... 102 Error, how spread............ [96
may be foreseen........... 98 Evidence of natural religion..... 166
show a moral government.... 98 Evil, may possibly be useful.... 177
Course of nature constant...... 97   its possible origin......... 147
Creatures finitely perfect...... 147  not a necessary part of probamay  fall............... 148         tion................ [128
have each a way of life..... 137 Exceptions to the happiness of
virtue............. 108
Danger of wrong doing, how in-      Experience indispensable...... 141
creased............. 132
Death                              Faculties, human, not perfect at
and birth similar......... 91           first............... 141
enlarges our sphere........ 92 Fallof man............ 133, [148
has no power over matter.... [91 Fallacy in fatalism.......... 169
is not a suspension of our       Fallen creatures require discipline. 150
powers............... 91 Fatalism,-see Necessity.
is not our destruction....... 80 Fear a proper motive to obewhat it is............. 80              dience............. 154
Decay of vegetables, inference      Folly, destructive, as well as
from..............     92         crime............. 132
Definitions of identity......... 77 Formal notion of government... 99
Delivering up of the Lord Jesus     Foundation  of moral improveChrist............. [111          ment............... [108
Destruction of seeds.......... 153 Future advantages, how proporDifferent states ofhuman existence. 89     tioned.............. 93
Difficulties belong to all subjects. [96 Future existence probable... CHAP. I.
exercise the virtuous principle. 152            of brutes...... [79
Disadvantages of virtue tempo-     Future interest dependent on conrary............. 126              duct............... 95
Discipline, its true nature and    Future life,
use.............. [148       a solemn subject......... 95
Disease not destructive to the soul. 90  not an inactive condition.... 144
sometimes remedial........ 177    reconcilable with atheism.... 94
Disorder produced by sin....... 148  this life preparatory to it. CHAP. V.
Distress excites passive pity and  Future punishment credible..... 103
active relief........ 140 Future retribution, how proved. 125




INDEX TO PART I.                       335
PAGE                               PAGS
Future state                      Government,
different from the present... 78  not perfected in this world... 107
brings us into new scenes.... 93  the formal notion of it...... 98
may have temptations...... [145  the perfection of.......... 100
social.................. 144
will not require such virtues  Habits,
as does the present life.. 154  how formed, &c........... 139
necessary to us hereafter... [145
General laws                         of resignation........... 155
govern the world....... 177, [99  often ruinous............. 101
produce punishment....... 103     of virtue an improvement in
wisdom of them........... 178          virtue.............. 147
General method of God's govern-      passive............... 138
ment.............. 97        shape the character........ 141
General system of religion..... 124 Happiness
Gradual improvement, a wise          not always the immediate rearrangement.... 141, 142         ward of virtue........ 108
GOD                                  not given promiscuously..... 138
an intelligent governor...... 06  requisites for............ 137
determined by what is fit....[166  the result of virtue......... 118
governsby humaninstruments. 111 Helplessness of man.......... [138
governs justly........... [108 Higher degrees of retribution prohas a will and a character.... 163    bable.............. 127
his aims incomprehensible... 97 Hinderances to virtue......... 121
his attributes inferred from our  History of religion........... 169
own.............. [115 Honest men befriend the honest.. 112
his general government...... 97 Hope and fear appeal to selfhis government just and good. 176      love............... 153
his indirect commands...... 165   are just principles of action. 154
moral government of... CHAP. Ill. Human life preparatory....... 144
natural    ".....   "   II. Hume's wonderful discovery... [162
necessarily existent....... 159 Human powers may be overtasked. 152
not indifferent to human actions.............. 125 Identity
not simply benevolent...... 106  does not depend on the same.
rewards and punishes....... 169       ness of the body...... 83
the only necessary being..... 159  of living agents........ 77, 78
Good actions, how punished..... 111  not explicable........ [77
Good habits necessary even to the  Ignorance
virtuous............ 149     acknowledged on all subjects
Good men befriended as such.. 112       but religion.......... 174
cannot now all unite....... 121   answers objections......... 175
Good not forced upon us...... [134  the argument from......... 180
Government,                          total, destroys proof....... 178
civil, an ordinance of God... 111 Illustration of the modification of
considered as a scheme. CHAP. vi.      an action by its intenof God.............. CHAP..           tion.............. [111




336                     INDEX TO PART I.
PAGE                                AGO
Imagination a source of discontent. 154 Man
produces much error........ 81     has a nui'ral nature......... 11
Immortality of brutes......... 88    his fall not accounted for by
Improvement                                his free agency....... 147
by discipline........... 144   his helplessness......... [138
by habit............... 147        knows nothing fully........ 173
of our faculties gradual..... 141  may become qualified for new
wisdom of this........... 142           states.......... 137
Incomprehensibilityof God's plans 97  not a competent judge of God's
Inconsiderateness destructive... 102       schemes............ 174
Inferiority of brute force....... 119  requires moral culture...... 145
Infidelity unjustifiable......... 105 Mania often produced by moral
Insignificance of our knowledge. [174      causes............. [85
Interest coincident with virtue... 154 Materialism, its philosophical abnot a sufficient restraint.. note 146   surdity............. [81
Interpositions to prevent irregu-   Matter and mind not the same... [83
larities............. 177     affect each other.......... 85
would produce evil......... 178 Means
Intentional good rewarded..... 114   learned by experience....... 176
Irregularities perhaps unavoid-        man not a competent judge of
able.............. 177             the fitness of them..... 178
seeming may not be such.... 176    not always agreeable....... 176
Inward peace attends virtue.... 112 Men often miss possible temporal
good..............129
Kingdom, idea of a perfect..... 123 Men's temporal interests greatly
Knowledge of man insignificant. [174       depend on themselves.. 131
Might of unarmed virtue...... [121
Liberty does not account for the   Mind
fall................ 147      influenced by the passions... 131
implied in our present condition 162  is the man.............. [87
Life a probation........... 128      its effects on the body....... [85
one part of it preparatory to      may survive the body....... [8-9
another........... [142      the only real percipient..... 85
what is it intended for....... 137  uses the body as an instruLiving agent not subject to death. 79      ment.............. [87
Living powers.......... see Death. Miracles, properly speaking, not
Locke on human identity....... [77         unnatural.......... 94
Miseries as contingent as conduct. 135
Maimonides, his similitude..... [173  generally are avoidable..... 100
Man                                Mixture of suffering and enjoyan inferior part of creation... 133     ment in this world..... [128
a system of parts......... [98 Moral and natural government of
by nature social........... [93         God  similar  to  each
capable of improvement..... 145         other.............. 181
connected with present, past,    Moral attributes of God may be
and future........... S81         inferred from our own.. [115
dealt with as if free........ 162 Moral discipline....... CHAP. V.




INDEX TO PART I.                        337
PAGE                               PAGE
Moral government of God.. CHAP. III. Objections,
Moral Improvement, basis of.... [108  destruction of seeds........ 153
Moral world, its apparent irregu-     difference between temporal
larities............ 176          and eternal things..... [135
Mystery of God, finished.... note 102  discipline might have been
avoided............156
Natural, the true meaning of the      God simply benevolent...... 106
word............. 94         good and evil may be mixed in
Natural government of God. CHAP. II.       the next world........ 124
Natural religion,                     gratification of appetites natuits evidences not affected by the       ral and proper.......  98
doctrine of necessity... 166  ignorance, the argument from
proof of................. 166           invalidates the proof of
teaches the doctrine of punish-         religion............. 178
ment............... 102       immortality of brutes....... 87
Necessary agents may be punished 169  incredible thatnecessaryagents
Necessary bulk of one's self..... 84       should be punished.... 169
Necessary existence of God..... 159  irregularities of the moral world 176
Necessary tendencies of virtue... 118  necessity destroys the proof of
Negligence and folly disastrous. 132       religion............ 165
Necessity                             our powers may be overtasked 152
consigns us to a fallacy.... 169  probabilities may be overcontradicts the constitution of         balanced by probabilinature............. 170           ties............... 169
destroys no proof of religion.. 170  punishments are only natural
different kinds of.......... [157      events............. 99
does not exclude design..... 160   rectitude arising from hope and
doctrine of........... CHAP. V.        fear, sordid.......... 153
not an agent............ 159      rewards and punishments..... 95
not applicable to practice.... 163  sin need not have entered the
not in conflict with religion... 160   world............. 177
our condition indicates freedom 162  society punishes good actions. 111
reconcilable with religion.... 168  special interpositions might
the doctrine absurd........ 157        prevent evil...... 177, 178
what it means........... 158      to the doctrine of neceswriters for and against..... [170      sity........... CHAP. VI.
New scenes in the next world... 93   to the doctrine of future punishments........... 100-103
Obedience, reluctant, useful..... [152  virtue sometimes punished... 111
Objections                            virtues of the present life not
against a proof and against a           wanted hereafter..... 154
thing to be proved..... 179  world disciplines some to vice. 153
against the scheme of Provi-    Obligation certain, when proofs
dence.............. 174            are not............ 179
analogy of plants.......... 92 Occasional disadvantages of virtue 117
Christianity not universal.... 169 Occasional indulgences in wrongcourse of nature..........  97         doing awfully dangerous [143
W                        29




338                     INDEX TO PART I.
PAGE                               PAGI
One period of life preparatory to  Powers
another........... [142      no reason for supposing that
Opportunities once lost irrecover-         death will destroy them. 81
able............... 143 Practical proof, what......... 168
Organs of sense mere instruments  89 Present existence unaccounted for
Our moral nature proves a moral            by atheism.......... 94
government......... 115 Presumptions that death will destroy us............  81
Pain, no contrivance for it in man. [110  that it will suspend our existPartial ignorance does not destroy         ence..............    91
proof.............. 178 Presumptuousness unjustifiable.. 105
Passions                           Private vices not public benefits. [111
carry away the judgment.... 131 Probabilities in favor of religion
make our condition one of               may be overbalanced by
trial............... 130          probabilities against it.. 169
may account for the fall of man 147 Probation.............. CHAP. XV.
may be excited where gratifi-      applies to the present life as
cation is impossible or            well as the future..... 130
unlawful............ 146     does not necessarily imply
may remain in a future state.. 147     suffering........... [128
should be subject to the moral     implies allurements........ 129
principle........... 145     is more than moral governthe bare excitement of, not             ment............... 128
criminal........... 145      requires severe discipline.... 150
but dangerous........ 146 Proofs of natural religion...... 166
Passive habits.............. 138     of religion not affected by the
Passive impressions weakened by            doctrine of necessity.... 160
repetition........... 139 Propensions  necessarily  create
Passive submission essential.... 155      temptations.......... 146
Peace of the virtuous......... 112    are excited by their appropriate
Perception, instruments of...... 85        objects............ 147
possible without instruments.. 86 Proper gratification of the appePerfection of moral government 106,107    tites...............   98
of an earthly kingdom...... 123 Prosperity of a virtuous commuPersecution unnatural......... 111        nity............... 123
Philosophy never arrogant..... [174   may beget discontent....... 154
what it cannot teach....... [87 Providence, objections to God's 140,174
Pleasure                           Public spirit a fruit of virtue..... 120
not a sufficient reason for action  98 Punishment
and pain mostly depend on          an alarming subject........ 105
ourselves........... 95      especially considered....... 100
the distribution indicates moral   greater hereafter than now.. 127
government......... 105      in a future state credible. 1(t3, 125
Powers                               is God's voice of instruction.. [108
may be improved by exercise.. 138  is sometimes capital....... 102
may be overtasked........ 152     not unjust.............. 163
may exist and not be exercised. 80  often long de'.ayed........ 101




INDEX TO PART I.                    339
PAGE                           PAGB
Punishment                     References to other authors.
often overtakes suaueny.... 101  Chalmers.......... [77, 79, 148
of virtuous  actions........ 111 Charnock.............. [158
religious and natural similar. 100  Cheyne................. [88
results from folly as well as  Clarke......... 82, [81, 97, 171
crime.............. 132   Colliber................  [88
the result of general laws.... 103  Collings........... [158, 170
Compte................. [170
Quotations.                       Crombie...............[170
Aristotle..............   [152  Crouse............ [170
Chalmers....... [131, 138, 148  Davies................. [109
Cicero............... [82, 86  D'Holbach............. [170
Clarke................. [97   Descartes............... [88
Fitzgerald..............  [145  Ditton................. [88
Robert Hall............ [118  Doddridge............. [109
Hume................. [162   Dodwell................. [81
Maimonides............ [173   Dwight..............   [109
Mandeville.............[111   Edwards............ [88, 170
Plato............... [87,113  Fabricius..............  [128
Son of Sirac............. [137  Ficht................ [170
Strabo................. [92   Gibbs.................. [171
Grove................[171
Rashness, consequences of...... 96  Haller.................. [89
Reason                            Harris................ [171
an incompetent judge of means 178  Hartley...............[170
gives power over brute force.. 119  Hegel................. [170
needs experience......... 141  Henly.................. [128
not dependent on bodily powers 89  Hobbes................ [170
requires a fair opportunity 119-121  Holtzfusius............. [128
Recapitulation of the whole argu-  Holyoake............... [170
ment............... 180   Horseley............... [109
Rectitude, i. self-interest a proper  Hume.................. [88
motive to it?......... 153  Hunt................. [109
References to other authors.     Jackson............... [171
Bates................. [128  Kennicott..............  [128
Baxter................. [88   King............ [98, 171
Bayle..................  [88  Law..................  [98
Beattie................. [170  Lawson...............  [171
Belsham...........   [170  Le Clerc...............[128
Berkeley................ [111  Leland................. [109
Bonnett................ [89  Leroux................  [170
Bramhall...............[171   Liefchild..............  [109
Brown................[111    Locke................. [88
Bryant................ [171   Manton...............  [128
Butterworth............. [107  Martineau............ [170
Calcott................. [128  Martinius............. [119
Capp.................. [109   Milman............... [142




840                    INDEX TO PART I.
PAGE f                           PA15
References to other authors.     Reluctant obedience profitable.. [152
Morgagni............... [89 Remedies often very disagreeable 176
Morton................ [109 Repentance may be too late..... 104
Musseus................[128 Requisites to the superiority of
Palmer.................  [171       reason..............  119
Pearson............... [128     of virtue............ 120, 121
Polignac............... [88 Resentment of injuries........ 114
Porteus............. [109 Resignation
Price................. [158     a temper consonant with God's
Priestley............ [142, 170      sovereignty.......... 155
Reid.................. [170    essential to  virtue........ 154
Rutherford......... [109, 158   the fruit of affliction....... 155
Search................. [88     the habit necessary hereafter.. 155
Seed.................. [109 Retributions are divine teachings [108
Selden................ [128 Revelation,
Shaftesbury............  108  antiquity of............. 167
Sherlock............... [109    notimprobable............ 167
Shuckford.............[128      notuniversal.......... note 107
Son of Sirac............ [137 Rewards and punishments, how
South............ [109, 128         distributed........... 126
Stapfer............... [128
Strabo.................  92  Satisfactions of virtue........  108
Toplady................ [128 Scheme of God incomprehensible. 172
Topping.......... [109 Self-denial, its relations to present
Twisse................ [109         happiness........   134
Wagstaff................ [88    not essential to piety....... 152
Warburton.............. [111 Self-discipline, what......... [148
Watts........... [77, 88, 171 Self-love
Whately............ [142, 158    a just principle of action.... 154
Willis................. [88     appealed to............. 153
Wisheart............... [109    how moderated and disciplined 155
Witsius............... [128     not a sufficient restraint. note 146
Wittichius.............. [109   reasonable and safe........ 130
Reflection not dependent on sensa-  Sensation not necessary to reflection...............   91         tion..............   91
Reformation is attended with dis-  Senses not percipients......... 85
comfort............ 108 Severe discipline necessary..... 150
may not prevent penalties.... 102 Similitude of a historical painting [174
Relation between us and ourbodies 85 Simplicity of the living agent... 83
Relations of things, limitless.... 173 Sin, why not kept out of the world 177
Religion                         Skepticism does not justify irrea question of fact.......... 165    ligion.............. 05
historical evidence of....... 168 Social, our nature essentially such [93
professed in all ages....... 167 Society
its proofs not affected by the   must punish vice.......... 110
doctrine of necessity... 170  natural and necessary...... [93
nor by our ignorance....... 178  sometimes punishes the good 1iI




INDEX TO PART I.                         341
PAGE                                PAGN
Soul                                Ultimate design of man....... [9S
a simple substance......... 82 Understanding may be perverted. 168
not destroyed with the body.. 79 Uneasiness produced by former
not naturally immortal...... [81        sins............... 109
Souls of brutes.............. 88 Union of good beings......... 122
Special interpositions of Provi-    Unjustifiableness of religious indence........... 177, 178           difference.......... 105
Stages of existence...........  78 Upright creatures may fall...... 147
State of probation........ CHAP. IV.  need good habits......... 149
State of discipline and improve-    Universe and its government imment........... CHAP. V.           mense.............. 123
Submissive temper necessary.... 155
Subordinations exceedingly bene-   Vice
ficial............... 142     actually punished by society 110,111
Subserviencies in nature....... 173  must produce uneasiness.... 112
Sufferings may be avoided...... 95    never rewarded as such..... 116
not necessary to the cultiva-      not onlycriminalbutdepraving 149
tion of virtue........ [128   often increased by trials..... 153
punished as such.......... 114
Temporal and religious probation   Vicious men lose their influence. [121
similar............ 132 Virtue
Temptations                           a bond of union.......... 122
increased by bad examples... 132  as such, rewarded on earth... 111
and by former errors...... 132   "brings its own reward".... [118
intended for our improvement. 136  has occasional disadvantages. [117
involve probation.......... 129   hinderances accidental...... 121
may improve or injure us.... 153  how and why rewarded..... 111
security against their evils... 146  improved by trials........ 151
sources of, to upright beings.. 147  its benefits to a community... 123
the necessary result of propen-    natural, not vice.......... 116
sions............... 146     not always rewarded in this life 108
Tendencies of virtue.......... 118   on the whole happier than vice 113
hindered............... 121       secures peace............ 112
essential, not accidental..... 126  tendencies essential........ 126
Terms "nature" and "course of         tends to give power.... 118, [121
nature"............. [97 Virtuous beings need virtuous
Theorizing no aid to virtue..... 139      habits............. 149
Thoughtlessness often fatal..... 101 Virtuous habits a security...... 147
Transmigration of souls....... [87    how formed............. 139
Trials                                improve virtue........... 147
manifest character........  156    necessary in a future state... [145
may exist in a future state... 147 Voice of nature is for virtue..... 117
produced by our propensions. 131
qualify for a better state..... 144 Waste of seeds............. 153
unreasonable ones are not in-    Wickedness may produce some
flicted.............. 133         benefits............. 177
why we are subjected to them. 136   voluntary...............136
29*




342                      INDEX TO PART I.
PAJE                                PAfB
Will and cl-aracter                 World, (continued.)
of God, how determined.. note 166   disciplines some to vice..... 153
what they mean....... note 163     fitted for man's discipline.... 150
Wonderful discovery of Hume.. [162    governed by fixed laws...... 110
World
a system of subordinations... 173 Youth
a theater for the manifestation     a determining period...... 101
of character......... 156    if lost, not to be recovered... 143
its beneficial subordinations.. 141




INDEX TO PART II.
REFERENCES TO THE EDITOR'S NOTES ARE IN BRACKETS
PAGE                               PAGoa
A common absurdity......... 243 Analogy, (continued.)
Abstract truth distinguished from    between natural information
facts.......... 305, [1S6        and that derived from
Absurdity of some objections to           inspiration.......... 212
Christianity........ 245      between the remedies of nature
Abuse of our natural endowments 217       and those of grace..... 219
Accidental, what events are so        between the gospel and human
called............. 226           discoveries..........219
Accountability gradually increases 251  between the light of nature and
Actions,                                  of revelation......... 218
definition of, in morals..... 261  between the use of natural
distinguished from things done 261     gifts, and miraculous... 217
their bad consequences some-      between the government of God
times escaped........ 232        and that of a human masvirtue and vice consist in them 261    ter................ 261
Advantage, as proper a considera-    its small influence on men... 303
tion in religion as in tem-   how used in this treatise.... 306
poral affairs......... 298   may show our duty, but not the
variously bestowed.... 249, 312       design of the requirement 246
Analogy                              objections to this mode of
a confirmation of all facts to         arguing........CHAP. VII.
which it can be applied.. 306  shows that there may be infinite
affords no argument against the        reasons for things, with
scheme of Christianity.. 203     which we are not acnor against miracles... 203       quainted............ 188
answers presumptions against      the only ground for some of
miracles...........207           our knowledge....... 306
does not prove the wisdom of    Antidote to heresies......... [191
God............... 301 Apocalypse, its principal object.. [249
ioes not teach that the whole  Appearances of men and things
of God's government is            deceptive........... 248
like that on earth...... 204 Arguments proper as to human
easily cavilled at, but unan-          writings, are not so as
swerable..........    306         to Scripture.......... 214
343




344                     INDEX TO PART II.
PAGE                               PAGI
Atonement,                         Christianity, (continued.)
how held by the ancients.... 241  a scheme revealed but in part. 226
makes the innocent suffer for      brings life and immortality to
the  guilty.......... 243        light............... 190
Author of nature taken for granted 298  could not possibly be a contriAuthoritativeness of revelation.. 189      vance......... [222, 294
demands attention, if barely
Baptism                                    probable........... 253
a test of obedience........ [199  has evidences besides miracles
commanded and important... 194         and prophecy....... 263
why the form of words.... 194     in what degree remedial.... [193
Bible, how to be interpreted. [202, 215  is a real revelation......... 213
Brutes, their great sagacity..... 216  is conformable to the constituBoundary of human inquiry.... [223        tion of things....... 295
its benefits require the use of
Candor necessary in judging of             means............. 197
Christianity........ 302     its establishment and prevaChance, really no such thing... 226        lence, the most conspicuCharacters drawn in Scripture              ous and important event
evidently unfeigned... 287        in history........... 286
Christ                                its evidences......... CHAP. VI.
a mediator.......... CHAP. v.     its good effects not small..... 192
a prophet.............. 240       its precepts plain and obvious. 218
a priest and king.......... 241   its proof historical........ 304
his history, as given in Scrip-    its proofs liable to objection.. 260
ture............... 285       men bound to examine its evihis pre-existence taught..... 282       dence.............. 197
his satisfaction........... 239   miracles and prophecy its direct
his sufferings voluntary..... 243       and fundamental proofs. 263
manner of his interposition... 238  must have mysteries....... [223
not merely a teacher and ex-       no objection to the morality of
ample.............. 242           it...........214, 220, 222
offered himself a propitiatory     not merely a republication of
sacrifice............241          natural religion...... [196
Christianity                          not primarily designed to rea fearful curse, if it give no          medy the defects of namore light than natural            ture.............. [193
religion............ [196     not the discovery of reason... 188
a question of fact......... 301   objections to its evidence.... 210
a remedial system......... [193   objections to its nature..... 210
an authoritative republication     offered to some in a corrupt
of the religion of na-             state.............. 250
ture............ 188, 189     prescribes new duties....... 194
a particular scheme under a        preserves natural religion in
general plan...... 194, 224      the world........... 191
a scheme imperfectly compre-       propagated against all obstruchended....... cHAP. IV.           tions............. [294




INDEX TO PART II.                       345
PAGE                               PAGI
Christianity, (continued.)         Compassion distinct from goodness 233
rashness of treating it light-     visible in the constitution of
ly.........194, 196, 197         the world.......... 233
requires means to accomplish    Consequences of infidelity; more
ends.............. 225            dangerous than those of
reveals a particular dispensa-          faith............... 294
tion of Providence.... 194   of sin, often averted........ 233
reveals important facts...... 196 Conversational objections to revesome of its dark parts may be           lation.............. 295
cleared up, others can-    Conversion, how produced...... [225
not...............[223    Course of nature
teaches more than natural re-     different from what we might
ligion.............. 194          have supposed, previous
the evils ascribed to it, are          to experience......... 211
not its evils......... 192   none at the beginning...... 205
the one great question concern-    our total darkness as to its
ing it..........213, 214          causes......... 208
the only religion professedly   Creation
confirmed by miracles.. 268  Mosaic account of, referred to
to be transmitted by Chris-            by John............ 282
tians..............[190      a different exertion of power
universal, in nature and in-           from government...... 205
tention............. [248    why Scripture describes it.. 281
what alone could disprove it.. 295 Creatures of like moral qualities
why not remedial to a greater          placed in different relidegree............. 193         gious situations........ 251
why not sooner promulgated.. 219 Credulity of mankind acknowChristians                                ledged.............. 269
bound to spread Christianity. 190 Cumulative proof of Christianity. [207
primitive, their testimony.... 267
Church                            Daniel
men bound to support it..... 193  his book had more evidence of
preserves a knowledge of reli-         authenticity than  has
gion.............. 191           come to us.......... 279
visible, its design...... 190, 191  his predictions a support of
Circumstantial evidences of Chris-        Jewish faith........ [249
tianity...... 263, 281      quoted by Christ.......... 279
often as convincing as direct   Dark parts of revelation...... [223
testimony......... 294 Degrees of evidence have degrees
Clemens Romanus, testimony of. 266        of weight.......... 255
his letter to the Corinthians.. [266  require nice examination.... 258
Climax of infidel extravagance.. [294 Deistical explanation of Christ's
Coincidence of natural and re-            miracles.......... [206
vealed religion.... 211, 218 Deists, why do they oppose ChrisCoincidences of Scripture...... 266      tianity............. [196
Comparison, how it may mislead    Depravity of man obvious...... 238
us................. 201       doctrine  of............. 218
~~~~~~~~~~~~~L




346                     INDEX TO PART II.
PAGE                                PAGE
Desert of g!od and ill, the notion  Duties arising from revealed relaof................ 305            tions.............. 195
Development, of truth......... 218    moral and positive......... 194
modern, doctrine of........ [218
Differences of religious advantages  Earth, its appearances confirm
may have like reasons as            Scripture........... 238
those for different tern-   Effect of Adam's transgression... 238
poral advantages..... 251     of combined probabilities. 294, [294
would remain if revelation       Efficacy of repentance........ [190
were universal........ 252     not taught by the light of naDifficulties                                ture................ 190
absurdity of requiring them to   End, God's not known........ 246
be all removed........ 297 Enthusiasm
as to the evidence of religion,     is not peculiar to religion.... 272
analogous to those at-        impairs no testimony for Christending the practice of it 256     tianity............. 271
cannot be solved by analogy.. 296  may often weaken testimony.. 271
speculative, may be the chief       sometimes mixed with knavery 272
trials of some........ 257    the absence of all sign of it in
the discernment which can see            Christianity, a presumpthem, might suffice to             tive proof in its favor... 222
see through them..... 260     will not account for the spread
Direct and circumstantial evidence         of Christianity....... 270
must be taken together. 280 Enthusiasts make as great sacriDiseases of body and mind, analo-          fices as Christians.... 270
gous as to their reme-      Epistles of Paul, proof from..... 266
dies............... 220 Eternal retribution not taught by
Disobedience, without possible ex-         natural religion...... [190
cuse............. 253 Ethics of natural religion distinDispensations, preparatory one to          guished from its objects [194
another............ 310 Events expound Scripture...... 219
Disregard of religion a great pro-  Evidence
fligacy.............. 233     of Christianity impregnable.. 295
Distinction between moral and         collateral and direct to be
positive obligation. 198, [198      viewed together....... 294
between acts and principles.. [235  from miracles and prophecy.. 267
between temporary, individual,     imperfect, should yet influence
and universal commands [188         practice in proportion to
Doubt                                      its degree..........255
affords scope for probation... 262  of circumstances may be most
exercises our virtuous princi-           direct.............. 294
pies............... 256       of religion, open to all..... 260
implies some evidence. 252,254, 283  of religion, the same in kind
involves some obligation.... 263        as that which controls us
puts us upon probation..... 253         in temporal things..... 258
Doubtful evidence should have         much lower than satisfactory
some influence........ 255          often determines us..... 303




INDEX TO PART II.                       347
PAGE                               PA.GO
slvidence, (continued.)           Future punishments,
not only increased but multi-     rendered credible by temporal
plied by a combination            punishments........ 300
of probabilities.... 294, [294
reason the proper judge of.. 221 Genealogy of mankind given in
requires careful sifting...... 256     Scripture........... 283
candor in judging... 302, [303  General laws
safety always in admitting it. 294  a wise arrangement........ 227
why liable to objection..... 257   do not render miracles inEvil, remedies provided for it. 219, 232  credible............. 227
Exaggeration practised by many       control the Christian dispensawho will not lie....... 272      tion............ 226
External manner of heart worship 195  few events can be traced up to
Experience                                them............. 226
affords no presumption against     miracles may be their reChristianity......... 203        sults............ 226, 227
corroborates  Christian  doc-      the ground of believing there
trines.............. 245           are  such...........  226
teaches the effects of actions.. 246  things called accidental goExtravagance of some    objec-            verned by them....... 226
tions........... 187,188 Geology, its impressive lessons.. [229
GOD
Facts                                a master giving laws...... 261
analogy the only proof of          all his reasons for giving a
some.............. 306           command must be cerdistinguished  from  abstract          tainly known, and known
truths............. 305          to have passed away, beof  revelation  distinguished          fore we can safely disrefrom its principles..... [235      gard it............. 188
Fall of man, assumed as a fact... 236  duties towards him  as the
confirmed by appearances.... 238      Father........ 194, 195
Falsehood, its degrees and induce-   governs by mediation...... 230
ments............. 272       his government shows comFalse miracles have deceived many 273     passion........... 233
have some historic evidence.. 273       progressive........ 229
Fatalists, their principles argued   his means and ends we cannot
upon............. 304            distinguish......... 228
Fear cast out by love......... [301  his providence, objections to it
Fitness, moral..........304, 305         idle............. 300, 301
Flippant objections to Christianity 295  his reasons not assigned..... 246
Folly, a real vice............ 280   his will, as absolute or conForesight of brutes........... 16        ditional............ 261
tuture punishments,                  how he would act in contingenall the reasons for them not           cies, unknown....... [222
known.............. 234      how to be worshipped, a pure
not arbitrarily appointed.... 232     matter of revelation.... 195
natural sequences....... 231, 232  instructs us by experience. 211, 246




348                     INDEX TO PART II.
PAGE                               PA14
GOD, (conltilled.)                 Ignorance
little known............. [222    of other worlds, forbids objecnot indifferent as to who suffer. 243   tions to Christianity on
reveals our duties, not his             the ground of miracles. 207
plans............. 246       of the laws of miracles, not
the real author of the prophe-          greater than of natural
cies............... 276            laws.............. 256
Good and evil unequally distri-       of the reason of our present
buted............. 248            condition........... 251
Government of God sometimes,          much of it our own fault.... 259
apparently, tardy in its   Imagination  may fancy unreal
results.......... 224, 225        coincidences......   293
Gradual growth of causes.... [208 Immorality  not authorized  in
Scripture........ 221, 222
Happiness not always secured by    Impassable limit to human knowwell-laid schemes..... 247         ledge.............. [223
Hazard of neglecting Christianity. 262 Imperceptible accumulation  of
Heathen world, condition of. 186, 250      forces............. [208
Hieroglyphic and figurative lan-   Imperfect knowledge, better than
guage of Scripture..... 210       acting in the dark.... 297
Hinderances to natural and spiri-  Imperfection of language..... 216
tual knowledge similar.. 218 Importance of revelation... CHAP. I.
History                               an abstraction........... [186
of miracles............. 264      precludes the idea that the first
of the Jews confirmed by their          witnesses were careless.. 274
condition......... 289, 290 Improbability before and after an
of the origin of religion..... 206      event............. [207
furnishes no parallel to revela-   of the Deistical theory greater
tion............... 207           than that of miracles... [206
prophecy is history anticipated 281 Inadequacy of repentance...... [236
Scripture, has not been inva-   Inattention to religion, real depralidated.............. 283         vity............ 252, 307
Holy Spirit, its operations on the    prevents convincement...... 258
heart............ [225 Incarnation an invisible miracle. 204
Human contrivance unequal to          cannot be paralleled...... [235
some things......... [222 Influence of the Holy Ghost...... [225
Human life, in what sense it may      of the analogical argument.. 303
be called poor....... 297 Innocent sometimes suffer for the
Human testimony, reliable not-             guilty............. 243
withstanding the preva-    Inspiration, the proper kind and
lence of falsehood.... 273       extent of it not discoverable by reason........ 212
Identity of principle between na-     not to be interpreted like other
tural and revealed re-             writings..........    218
ligion.............[235 Inspired writers, key to their
Ignorance                                  meaning........... [270
of heathen writers........ [187   their one great schema.... [276




INDEX TO PART II.                       349
PAGE                              PAGS
Inspired writers, (continued.)    Knowledge of Scripture, improved
show a foresight more than             in the same way as knowhuman.......... 278, 279         ledge of the sciences... 218
Instruction from God to savages. [206  unequally distributed....... 249
Intercession by the good for the
bad............... [232 Language necessarily ambiguous. 216
Interest, temporal, not always       of the prophecies, often figuraapparent........... 302          tive.............. 210
Interpositions of men for each    Laplace, error of.......... [207
other............. [232 Levity destructive to religious
Internal improbabilities weaken           influence........... 259
external proof...... 215 Liberty
Interpretation of Scripture..... [215  belief of our, unavoidable.... 304
Irregularity, really no such thing. 226  of the will, not discussed. note 304
whence the appearance of.... 227  necessary to the progress of
Irregularities  of men, conse-            knowledge......... 218
quences proportioned to      the principle so natural that
magnitude........... 233         language is formed on
Irreligion an aggravated sin.... 233     it................. 304
especially in persons in high  Life
standing........... 254     future, brought to light by the
not justifiable on any pre-            gospel............ 190
tence........... 256, 312    may be taken away by cornInvention an irregular way of in-         mand............. 221
formation.......... 216     not thrown away because sucInvisible miracles........... [204       cess is uncertain..... 302
things of God, how learned. [230  whether desirable or not..... 301
Light of nature
Jews                                 displayed in the Scriptures... 188
God's dealing with them.... 290  does not teach our future contheir continuance, a standing          dition............. 190
miracle............ 290     favors the doctrine of a Metheir history confirmed by facts 291   diator............ 230
their system of Theism..... [206  has left the greatest heathen
Jewish miracles, a part of civil          in doubt............ 18
history............ [265 Ludicrous turn, danger of..... 259
John, his allusion to Christ, in the
beginning of his gospel. 282 Mahometanism not received on
his doctrine agrees with that          the footing of miracles. [268
of Paul............ 282 Mahometans and ancient Persians, how situated as to
Kingdom of Christ on earth..... 241      revelation.........   250
Knowledge                         Man
profound, not necessary to        accepted according to what he
piety.............  218         hath.............. 251
scientific and religious, have    his circumstances no ground
the same difficulties.... 218    of complaint........ 252
30




350                     INDEX TO PART II.
PAGE                               PACO
Man, (constinued.)                 Miracles, (continued.)
his obligation to study the        distinct reasons for them.... 208
Scriptures........ 202, 262  large historical evidence for
must be renewed......... 197           their truth.......... 270
Manasses, prayer of.......... [237   manner in which related.... 264
Manner of worship a matter of         no argument of analogy against
pure revelation....... 195         them............ 205-207
Martyr                                none parallel to those of Scripcould not have been impostors 272      ture............... 207
had full knowledge of facts 269,271  not mere embellishments.... 264
the full force of their testimony 269  not to be compared to common
their obligations to veracity.. 274    events.............. 209
were not enthusiasts........ 271  nowise incredible......... 209
Means as related to ends....... 225   occasions for them likely to
Mediation seen everywhere..... 230         arise in the course of
exemplified in social life.... [232    ages............... 208
Mediator,                             of the Old Testament, insepaappointment of....... CHAP. V.         rable from history.. [265
the notion of, natural....... 230  operate by general laws.... 226
the Scripture doctrine of. 238-240  Pagan  and   Popish, were
whether one was necessary.. 243       wrought after those syswhy most objected to...... 243         tems had obtained..... 268
Medium between full satisfaction      peculiar to the Jewish and
of a truth and full satis-         Christian religions..... 268
faction to the contrary.. 313  received as genuine from the
Memory, eloquence, &c. impru-              first........... 268, 269
dently used......... 217     regulated by general laws.... 227
Men apt to be deluded by pre-         satisfactorily account for the
tences.............. 273          existence of Christianity 265
their conduct may be guessed       should be compared to uncomat................ [222           mon events......... 209
Mercy seen in the constitution of     the credentials of Christianity 267
the world........... 233     the evidence of their truth at
Messiah came at the expected time 285     first............... 249
his mission............. 224      the question of their truth only
Minuteness of predictions touch-           one of degree in point of
ing Christ.......... 207          evidence............ 208
Miracles                              the only satisfactory account
admitted evidence for such as           of some events...... 265
are false does not impair     the real nature of presumpthe evidence of Chris-             tions against them..... 208
tian................ 273     the term a relative one...... 205
contrary to the course of na-      their direct proof of Christure?.............. 206           tianity............. 261
denying   them   leads   to        their evidence the same as that
Atheism............ [205          for common facts...... 264
disorderly use of........... 217   their force as proofs........ 189




INDEX TO PART II.                       351
PAGE                              PAGE
Miracles, (continued.)            Natural light compared to revela.
visible and invisible.... 204, [204   tion............... 218
what evidence arises from their  Natural religion
having been accepted as       and revealed, coincide..... 211
true by the first Chris-      as much perverted as Christians..............  26         tianity.............. 192
writers upon.......... [264, 268  could not have been reasoned
Miraculous power                          out................ 192
creation not properly an act of 205  discloses no Redeemer..... [194
misused by some....... 217, 267   its ethics and objects distinpretences of, have deluded             guished............. [194
some............... 273      its light wholly insufficient... 187
why bestowed........... 190      might be authenticated  by
Misconduct creates need of assist-        miracles............ 190
ance.............. 235     moral system of......... 187
Mistake of some of Hume's oppo-      taught and confirmed by Chrisnents............. 207           tianity....... 188, 286, 292
Mistakes of philosophers dan-        what it does not teach... [190, 194
gerous............. [230 Nature carried on by uniform
of transcribers, &c......... 228      laws...............226
Modern geology, lesson from.... [229  implies the agency of God... 231
Moral action, the nature of..... 261  its light insufficient........ 186
an action becomes such by       Nature and obligation of sacracommand.......... [221           ments.......... note 195
Moral duties. See Positive.       Necessity of revelation....... [186
Moral faculty, its object........ 305 Negligence prevents the recogniMoral government. See Govern-             tion of truth........ 258
melnt.                        wholly inexcusable......... 197
Moral precepts. See Positive.
Moral system revealed to man-     Obedience from dread......... [301
kind............... 190      or disobedience, an important
Morality of Scripture, reason a           matter.............. 188
judge of........... 220     to a positive rite, especially
Mysteries to be expected in reve-         indicative of piety..... 199
lation........... 223, 224 Objections
as many in nature as in Scrip-    to certain precepts of Scripture............... 246          ture, as immoral....... 221
Mystery of godliness.......... 225   to prophecy, from its obscurity 275
Mythological writings resemble       to revelation, are of equal
prophecy............ 276         weight against natural
religion............  97
Narratives of Scripture unadorned 228  to the analogical argument, as
Natural consequences of vice are          such......... CHAP. VII.
judicial punishments... 197  to the distribution of good and
and spiritual things analogous         evil............. 248-250
in importance........ 219   to the doctrine of mediaendowments often abused.... 217        tion........... CHAP. v.




352                     INDEX TO PART II.
PAGE                                PAGJ
Objections Ccontinued.)             Objections to Christianity, (conto  the  evidence  for  mi-             tinued.)
racles........... CHAP. II.  slowly developed......... 219
to the unequal distribution of      some of its precepts immoral.. 221
religious knowledge.... 249   sufficiency of natural religion. 187
SJljections to Christianity           vicarious sufferings......... 245
as a matter of fact......... 301 Obligation arises from the bare
as a remedial system.... [193, 219       supposableness of Chrisas a roundabout, perplexed              tianity.......... 253, 262
contrivance......... 228 Obligations to God arising out of
as deficient in point of truth.. 247    relationship.......... 196
as a scheme............. 209 Obscurity in part of a prophecy,
as mysterious........... [223           does not impair the evias to its wisdom  and good-              dence of foresight..... 275
ness........... CHAP. IV. Offenders often shielded by friends [232
as unimportant......... CHAP. I. Offices of Christ as a mediator 238-240
atonement makes the innocent     Opinions must be distinguished
suffer for the guilty. 227, 243    from facts........... 270
contains things unlike the       Ordinary rules of interpretation.. [215
course of nature..... 204
does not remove difficulties. [223 Pagan and Popish miracles easily
has been perverted......... 192          accounted for......... 268
has been productive of evils.. 192 Parables show what the author
has internal improbabilities 225-227     intended........... 276
disclosed to the world so re-    Partial views give an appearance
cently.:............ 219           of wrong............ 309
disorderly use of miraculous     Passion hinders correct judgment 259
gifts.............. 227 Paul, his separate testimony... 266
has small influence..... 192, 303  how he received the gospel... 267
if true would not be left doubt-   summary of his testimony... 267
ful................ 299 Perfection of religion, what? CHAP. VIII.
is not satisfactory...... 260, 261 Persons for whom this treatise is
its doctrine of mediation. CHAP. v.      written............. 309
its external proof weakened      Philosophy, its true mode of proby internal improbabili-           ceeding........... [230
ties...............215 Piety superior to ritual observits lack of evidence.... CHAP. VI.     ances.............. 201
its late introduction....... 219 Pleasures and pains, which overmay be advanced flippantly,              balance?...........301
but cannot be so an-        Political events, how mentioned
swered............. 295            in Scripture.......... 282
natural things too unimportant   Popish doctrine of a miracle at
to furnish analogies in            the Eucharist....... [204
its favor............ 219 Popular conversational objections 295
not just and good..... cHAP. IV. Porphyry's mode of interpretation
not necessary............ 147          frivolous......... note 279
not universal...... CHAP. I. 248  objections to the book of Daniel 279




INDEX TO PART II.                       35,^
PAGE                              PAGB
Positive  evidence  of  Chris-    Progressions in our existence.... 229
tianity......... CHAP. vI. Progress in theology probable... [218
afitive institutions             Probable proofs, by being added,
belong to the notion of a              not only increase evichurch............ 192            dence, but multiply it... 294
lay us under the strictest obli-  Probability should influence pracgation.............  202         tice...............  254
means to moral ends....... 199 Profane   history  corroborates
men disposed to depend on              Scripture statements.. 287
them............... 200 Proofs of Christianity
necessary to keep up and pro-     a touchstone of honesty..... [259
pagate religion....... 246  level to common men....... 260
not to be made light of...... 201  some important ones omitted
not to supersede moral obe-            in this treatise, and why. 304
dience............. 200      why not more plain....... 261
the reason of them often ob-    Prophecy
vious.............. 198       a joint review of prophecies
two modes of viewing them... 198       furnishes a far stronger
Positive precepts compared with           proof than examination
moral........... 198, 201        in detail........... 294
create moral obligations..... 221  a series of, being applicable to
Power of healing............ [217        certain events, is proof
Practice should be influenced by          that it was intended of
probability.......... 254        them............... 276
Predictions of Christ very nume-     compared to compiled   merous and minute... 207, 208      moirs.............. 278
Prejudice a hinderance to know-      created the expectation of a
ledge............. 258           Messiah............. 284
a mark of weakness........ 280   confirmed by appearances.... 292
as hostile to truth as enthu-     evidence from............ 275
siasm.............. 272     expressed in figurative lanoperates contrary ways...... 294       guage.............. 275
Preservation of the Jews as a dis-   how understood by ancient
tinct race............ 291        Jews..............-. 277
Presumptions                         in relation to the Jews..... 284
against miracles.......... 205   is history anticipated....... 281
against revelation as miracu-     its obscurity........... 275
lous............CHAP. I.    its proofs amazingly strong. [207
none  against  the  general       may not always have been unschenme of Christianity.. 203    derstood by the writer.. 278
uLne peculiar to miracles..... 207  proves foresight........ 276, 279
strong, overcome by weak          sometimes obscured by interproof.......... 207, [207         preters............. 210
Priesthood of Christ........ 238    summary of, concerning Christ 284
Jewish,'ypical of Christ..... 239  use of, to future ages...... 249
principles argued upon in this       writers upon......... 277, 285
treatise............ 304 Prophet, Christ a............ 249
X                         30*




854                    INDEX TO PART II.
PAGE                              PAGE
Prcphets                           Rashness of interpreters....... 210
not the authors of what they      of treating religion lightly... 197
wrote............ 278 Reason
their sense of their predictions  could not have invented Chrisnot necessarily the whole          tianity............. 206
sense.........        278     could not ascertain the power
whether they had in view the           of penitence........ 194
events which Christians       discovers our relation to God
consider fulfilments.... 277      the Father........... 194
Proverbial, use of the word..... 201  but not our relation to the Son
Providence, never hasty....... [229      and Holy Ghost... 194, 196
objections to it useless... 300, 301  its limits very narrow..... [223
the course of, progressive..... 229  its proper province........ 220
Province of reason.......... 220    must have right principles... 220
Prudence, its best plans often       needs the aid of experience in
frustrated........... 247        judging of the conseoften requires us to act with          quences of actions..... 24e
uncertain  prospect of        not sufficient to construct a
success......... 247, 248        system of natural reliPunishment                                gion free from superstifollows wickedness, of course.. 231    tion................ 1T6
instances of vicarious....... 244  our only faculty for judging
not always avoided by reforma-         even revelation........ 210
tion................ 235    requires the importance of a
not promiscuously inflicted... 243   question to be taken into
provision made for escaping            account............ 295
it.............. 232, 311    teaches nothing of the certain
we cannot of ourselves escape          means of either temporal
it................ 234           or spiritual good....... 197
we cannot know why such and       very incompetent to judge
such are inflicted...... 231     what a revelation ought
to be.......... 210-212
Quotations.                       Reasoning by analogy to any
Angus.............. [202, 223         extent, leaves the mind
Augustine...........note 187          unsatisfied.......... 296
Arnobius............... [269 Redemption
Clemens Romanus......... [266     agreeable to our natural noDavidson............... [294          tions............... 235
Fitzgerald.............. [303    analogous to natural remedies. 232
Grotius................. [259     conjectures about it must be
Guizot................. [229          uncertain............ 242
Hurd................. [276       mode of, not discoverable by
Dr. Johnson............ [288          reason............. 243
MIahomet.............. [268      men not competent judges of
Powell................ [230         its plan............ 24S
Warburton........... [217, 223   on whom are its benefits.. note 237
Whately............... [206      Scripture account of.... 239, 240




INDEX TO PART II.                   355
PAGE                           PAGS
Redemption, (continued.)       References, (continued.)
we should be thankful for it,  Menander........       [287
without disputing how it   Michaelis.............. [215
was procured........  242  Mills................. [207
References to other authors.      Newman........        [235
Alexander............. [269   Numenius............  [287
Apthorpe.............. [285   Owen......[.......     [249
Bayle............ [301   Paley.......... [205, 266, 268
Benson................ [215   Pascal............. [187, 223
Birk................... [266  Pfaffius...............  [264
Blaney............... [285    Phlegon................[287
Blunt................. [266   Phcenician Annals.........[287
Bolingbroke............ [265  Pliny................. [287
Boswell................ [288  Porphyry..........279, [287
Boyle............   [264  Samuel Stanhope Smith....[206
Butler.............  [190, 272  Solinus............... [287
Campbell.....[...... [264     Spinoza...............[215
Celsus................  [287  Stapfer................. [242
Chalmers......... [187, 194, 242  Storr.................. [215
Colliber................ 195  Strabo................ [287
Damascenus............. [287  Suetonius.............. [287
Davidson.............  [285   Tacitus................ [287
Diodorus Siculus.......... [287  Taylor................ [264
Eupolemus............. [287   Tindall..... [.... [196, 248
Featley................ [215  Tucker................ [264
Fitzgerald........ [193, 206, 207  Turretin.............. [242
Fleetwood...............[264  Vitringa...............  [276
Fuller................. [285  Warburton............. [187
Gibbon................ [268   Waterland.....[.... [195
Graves................. [266  Watson...............  [264
Grotius................. [266  Waugh.........  [277, 285
Gulick.................. [27  Wayland............ [188, 236
Hengstenburg.... [.....[277   Whately......... [206, 268, 288
Horseley..............  [277  Witsius.................[264
Howe................. [236
Hurd................. [285 Reformation does not always preJortin............. [264, 285    clude punishment...... 235
Julian................ [257 Regard due to the Son and Holy
King.............. [215, 277      Spirit............ 195
Lardner............... [264 Regard to God as Creator, the
Leland................187        essence of natural reliLonginus.............   [287      gion............... 195
Lyall................. [277  Rejection of Christby many,at first,
McCosh............... [187        the argument from it... [269
Mackintosh.............  [223  foretold................  285
Magee............. [236, 242 Relations, being learned, duties
Manasses..............  [237     are perceived......... 194




356                    INDEX TO PART II.
PAGE                               PAG!
Relations of man to Deity...... 194 Religion, (continued.)
to the Son and Holy Ghost.. 195  the evidence for it may be
Religion                                  lessened, but cannot be
a practical thing.......... 298       destroyed......... 295
a question of fact...... 301, 304  why its evidences are allowed to
affords particular reasons for         admit of doubt. 249, 253, 299
miracles........... 208 Relief for evils provided....... 232
confirmed by the establish-     Remedial nature of Christianity. [193
ment of a church...... 191 Remedies
considered as external and         provided in nature......219, 232
internal............ 195     may be unskilfully used.... 220
doubt of its evidence does not    show   the   compassion  of
release from moral obli-           God................ 233
gation............. 254       and also his strictness....... 234
has its end on all persons to   Repentance
whom proposed.. 303, [303   cannot cancel guilt..... 236, [236
if true, why susceptible of any   general sense of mankind on
possible doubt?...... 299        the subject........... 236
its acceptance safe......... 295  its efficacy not taught by naits general spirit intimated 200, 201  tural religion........ [190
its great importance........ 254  its efficacy taught in the Scripits introduction into the world 206    tures............... 190
its reasonableness fully shown,    not sufficient to  preclude
if it can only be proved           disaster......... 234, 235
that it may be reason-     Revelation
able............... 301       a particular part of a great
its very nature overlooked by          plan............. 224
those who insist that it      accounts for the Theism of the
should have overwhelm-            Jews............. [206
ing evidence........ 302     at the beginning of the world,
may be true, though doubtful. 299      would not be miraculous 205
must be judged by its evi-        cannot be neglected with imdences taken together... 294      punity........... 260-262
not a thing reasoned out..... 206  considered as miraculous. CHAP. II.
not equally taught to all men. 206  considered historically...... 281
objections to it removed by       difference between its facts
analogy............ 300          and its principles..... [235
presupposes candor in those       discovers new relations, and so
who examine it 256, 302, [303     new duties........... 194
reason may judge of its mo-       distinguished from natural rerality..............  220        ligion...............  195
reasonable, for aught which       does not compel assent...... 253
can be shown to the          has twice been universal... [248
contrary............ 301    how it could be overturned... 214
the perception of.......... 302  its disclosures, of course, could
the view of it taken in this           not have been anticitreatise........... 299         pated...........211, 212




INDEX TO PART II.                       357
PAGE                              PAGE
Revelation, (continued.)          Safety an important consideration
its measure of evidence puts           in judging........... 294
us on probation....... 253 Satirical writings, how  underits facts necessarily singular. [235   stood.......... 276, 27?
no more different from the      Scheme of nature, vast........ 204
course of nature than        progressive.............. 229
some parts of the course   Scheme of providence, if underof nature are different           stood, would justify facts
from other parts....... 312       which are objected to... 300
necessary........... CHAP. i Schemes, the best may be disconrepublishes and confirms na-           certed............ 247
tural religion..;... 188, 189 Science confirms Scripture history 287
nothing incredible in it...... 271 Scorn of prophetic diction...... 210
teaches that God's laws are     Scripture
compassionate........ 236   announces a general restorathe use of unwritten revela-           tion of things........ 282
tion.............. 213       antiquity of.............. 287
what is to be expected in reve-   characters evidently not feigned 287
lation.......... 210, 212    confirmed by profane authors. 288
Reverence for the will of God... [199  confirmed by the state of the
Ridicule of Scripture                     earth.............. 287
an  offence against natural       considered historically...... 281
piety............. 286      contains an abridged history
easier than examination..... 259      of the world......... 282
the great weakness of being       exposed to criticism........... 283
influenced by it....... 280  expounded by itself...... [202
Roman Empire mentioned...... 279    gives a history of this world as
Rules for health very fallible and        God's world......... 281
inexact.............. 302       gives an account of civil goof Biblical interpretation.... [215   vernments only as they
affected religion....... 282
Sacrifices                           has internal evidence of truth 287
commanded............. 241       history genuine........... 265
expiatory............... 239     how distinguished from other
how  the ancients regarded             books..........281-283
them.............. 242      how to be interpreted..... [202
learned by the heathen from       if false could be shown to
tradition............   241     be so............... 283
really efficacious......... 242  includes a history of thouthe prevalence of......... 236        sands of years........ 283
Sacrifice of Christ                  includes the chronology'of
an objection to it.......... 243       nearly  four  thousand
how efficacious, not taught.... 242   years.............. 284
proper and real........ 239-241   its authority the great quesputs us into a capacity for            tion, not its contents... 214
salvation............ 242    its chronicles confirmed by
vcluntary.............. 244           history............ 287




~58                     INDEX TO PART II.
PAGE                               PAGI
Scripture, (continued.)            Shamefulmistakes of philosophers [230
its evidences comprise a series  Similarity of objections to reliof things of great variety         gion and nature....... 298
and reaching to the be-     Sincerity of belief proved by
ginning of time....... 263          dying for it......... 270
its evidences not intended to    Skepticism no justification of irre.
be overpowering....... 253         ligion............. 253
its great proofs are miracles    Sorrow cannot of itself restore
and prophecy......... 264          abused benefits........ 234
its relation to miracles only    Speaking with tongues........ [217
to be accounted for on      Speculative difficulties similar to
the supposition of their           external temptations.... 256
truth.............. 265       the chief trial of some... 257, 259
its strangeness not surprising. 288 Spread of Christianity unaccountits style objected to........ 210      able if it were an imits truth must be judged of by          posture............ 290
the evidence taken to-      Standing ministry, what for... [191
gether............. 295 Strangeness of some Scripture
may contain things not yet              events............. 288
discovered.......... 218 Stupidity of the martyrs, if inmiracles, their first reception.. 265    sincere............ [269
naturalness of its statements.. 287 Subserviences, the world a system
not composed by rules of art.. 210      of................. 229
nothing improbable related in    Success, temporal, always uncerany part........... 287           tain...............302
not to be judged by precon-      Suffering, ignorance does not preceived expectation..... 215        vent it either in temponot to be judged exactly as             ral or spiritual things... 196
other books......... 214 Sufferings of Christ vindicate
ordinary rules of interpreta-           God's law...........  244
tion.............. [215      of the early Christians...... 269
our duty to search it.... 202, 262 Sufficiency of light of nature preprecepts, some give offence....210     tended............ 186
reveals our relation to the Son  Summary of Jewish history..... 284
and Holy Spirit....... 194   of the historical evidence of
the possibility of its truth de-        Scripture............ 292
mands investigation.... 258 Supernatural instructions necestruths not discoverable by              sary from the first..... [206
reason............. 203
variety of topics introduced.. 283 Temporal interests not always
written in a rude age....... 283       discerned........ 247, 248
why it describes creation..... 282  managed by prudent persons
Searching the Scriptures a great           on the very principles
duty.............. 202            proposed by religion as
Self-deceit, our liability to it.... 262  to spiritual interests 298, 299
Serious apprehension may com-      Temporal interests often decided
port with loubt...... 313          by considerations which




INDEX TO PART II.                       30 5
PAGE                               PA9G
fall short of demonstra-           and influence can be action............... 299           counted for by accident.. 295
Temporary   commands,   distin-    Truth, how developed......... [218
guished from perpetual. [188  the, of an event may be fully
Temptation                                 proved, though no one
a wholesome discipline..... 256        of sundry proofs may be
earthly and spiritual similar.. 256    complete........... 295
calls forth virtuous effort..... 257  whether there is any such
Testimony                                  thing, denied by skeptics 305
can be destroyed   only  by     Twofold effect of the analogical
counter-testimony, or by           argument.........    30
the incompetency of the
witness............. 274 Unbelievers, acknowledgment of.. 289
for miracles not mentioned in      cannot deny a conformity beScripture, does not im-            tween   prophecy  and
pair the testimony for             events.............293
those there recorded.... 273 Understanding, its right use..... 245
of Paul, separate and inde-     Undesigned coincidences in Bible
pendent............. 266          history............ [266
of profane authors to the trutp  i Undeterminate language deceives
of Scripture history.....  7    many.............. 297
of the first Christians.... 269, 271 J Unequal distribution of religious
must be judged candidly.... [259       knowledge........... 249
none counter to Christianity.. 275 Unfair dealing of objectors..... 297
slight, overcomes strong pro   I Unreasonableness of applying to
sumptions............ 30          passion for guidance.... 295
unconfuted, must be admitted. 273 1 Unsatisfactory  evidence,  men
value of, lessened by enthu-            often  obliged  to  act
siasm.............. 271           upon it............ 302
Theism of the Jews accounted
for...............[206 Variety in the distribution of
theology of the Bible, not to be           God's gifts.......249, 312
corrected.........    [202 Vastness of the scheme of nature. 204
Things which it is unreasonable    Veracity of the first Christians... 274
to dispute.......... 307 Vicarious punishments witnessed
Thoughtlessness of men........ 233         every day.......... 244
Tradition teaches that there was      deter from sin........... 245
a revelation at the be-    Vice
ginning............ 205      appointed to be punished.... 231
of the fall of man......... 311   blinds men to just evidence... 255
Transubstantiation........... [205  its effects in the present world 234
Trial by speculative difficulties,    its natural consequences are
analogous to other trials. 256     God's judicial inflictions. 197
True philosophy inductive...... [230  its real enormity.......... 234
Truth                                 not palliated by any supposed
of Christianity proved, unless          lack of evidence for relithe whole of its history           gion.............. 255




8O0                     INDEX TO PART II
PAGE                                PAGO
Vindication of religion by ana-    Worship, mode of, a matter of
logy impossible....... 296        pure revelation........ 195
of the character of God, not    Writers
attempted in this trea-        on the atonement........ [242
tise............ 299, 300     Christian sacraments...... [195
miracles...........   [264, 268
Way of salvation for the helpless [186  necessity of revelation..... [187
Will of GOD, as absolute or con-       prophecy...........[277-285
ditional............. 261     Scripture difficulties....... [21.5
World, wickedness of........ 238       undesigned coincidences.... [266
THE END.