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OUR FAR EASTERN
ASSIGNMENT








By FELIX MORLEY
FELLOW OF THE ECONOMIC SOCIETY (ENGLAND),
AUTHOR OF "cUNEMPLOYMENT BELIEF
IN GREAT BRITAIN"1
With an Introduction by
THE HONORABLE HENRY MORGENTHAU
GARDEN CITY       NEW YORK
DOUBLEDAY, PAGE & COMPANY
192?6




COPYRIGHT, 1926, By
FREDERICK HARRIS
Printed in the United States of America




TO
YOSHio NiToBE' and TANG MAN-HOI
Otd Friends Who Helped Me to a
Better Understanding of
Japan and China




I




- INTRODUCTION
5Sr S  S"
INTRODUCTION
The United States must adjust itself to the position
it has acquired through its activities in, and as a result
of, the Great War. It is rapidly becoming the great
Central Power Station of the world, with influence radiating North, South, East and West. Before very long
our commercial relations with the lands across the
Pacific will be as important as those we now have with
the European Powers. It is, therefore, highly essential
that we become better acquainted with our Pacific
neighbors, the Filipinos, Japanese and Chinese. Our
woeful ignorance of their present conditions and great
potentialities must be supplanted by real knowledge.
This knowledge can be obtained through visits of experienced investigators to these countries and the publication of their observations in as interesting and as
instructive a form as Mr. Felix Morley has achieved
in this book. It happens that I have myself recently
been over almost the same territory; and while not
agreeing with all of Mr. Morley's conclusions, I find
that he shows wonderful powers of penetration and has
adopted a judicial manner in impartially appraising the
various conflicting influences that are at work in Japan,
China and the Philippines.
To readers who realize that the United States is destined to become the financier of Japan and China, while
continuing to fill this role for the Philippines, and to
those who foresee that we may well become the builders
of China's new railroads and purveyors of many of her
basic industrial and] agricultural supplies, this treatise
will prove a most valuable guide. It clearly analyzes
vii




viii
* * 
V11


INTRODUCTION


the status of the countries which will play so large a
part in America's future international problems.
It is amazing to think that the Chinese people, who
have maintained a national existence for thousands of
years, have so slightly developed their great natural resources. China, as shown by Mr. Morley, is now in a
state of ferment, acquiring modern ways and learning
modern warfare. Eventually she will use this knowledge
to assert herself as one of the great world-powers. Her
development will come with a tremendous rush. She
will not have to wait for immigration from other countries as we did, to develop her resources and create
feeders for her coming railroads. She has unlimited
manpower.
Mr. Morley also shows how China is learning to use
the boycott to avenge herself against foreign domination. Her student-bodies and labor-unions are other
powerful factors in the present unrest. They will eventually help her to abrogate the extra-territorial rights
still exercised by some of the foreign nations. Nor can
the Chinese people indefinitely be coerced into accepting
foreign products almost duty free while other nations
build a tariff wall against their infant industries.
Whether the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands,
Japan and China are to be our adversaries or our friends
will largely depend upon how we treat them, and our
treatment will entirely depend upon our appreciation of
their good qualities and their future possibilities. This
appreciation can only be brought about by a really impartial study of these people and countries. I believe
that Mr. Morley is rendering a signal service to us in
having secured, and now so attractively presented to the
American public, the facts, speculations and conclusions
contained in this book.
HENRY MORGENTHAU.




CONTENTS


INTRODUCTION,
By the Honorable Henry Morgenthau 
AUTHOR'S PREFACE.
CHAPTER
I. JAPAN'S INESCAPABLE PROBLEMS 
II. THE ADVENT OF DEMOCRACY 
III. THE JAPANESE LABOR PARTY 
IV. JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS 
V. JAPAN IN MANCHURIA.
VI. "STATES' RIGHTS" IN CHINA 
VII. THE ANARCHY OF THE TUCHUNATE.
VIII. KWANGTUNG, WHERE CHINESE GOVI
IX. SHANGHAI
X. CHINA HITS BACK.
XI. WHAT CHINA DEMANDS.
XII. FACTORS IN UNIFICATION.
XIII. OUR OWN COLONIAL PROBLEM
XIV. AN ANOMALOUS GOVERNMENT
XV. "PEACEFUL REVOLUTION" IN THE F


PAGE
vii
xi


MRN
HILIP

1
9
17
25
_34
48
60
75
87
98
108
122
136
150


PINES 
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INDEX....


~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~


164..........   175..........  181
ix




MAPS
RAILROAD MAP OF MANCHURIA....
PROVINCES AND RAILROADS OF CHINA...
THE FAR EAST.......
CHART OF PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT...


PAGZ
* 41
7 77
* 139
* 171




AUTHOR'S PREFACE
In adding this slim volume to the steadily accumulating mass of books about the Orient, a word of explanation is desirable.
To many Americans the Orient is still a country of
strange sights and sounds, a curious unreal dreamland
of temple bells and opium dens, of geisha girls and mandarins, of lotus blooms and cherry blossoms. Somehow
it is not often emphasized that Orientals are men and
women like ourselves, stirred by the same emotions, influenced by the same needs, faced with the same problems. There is, of course, an element of truth in the
belief that there are immutable differences between East
and West; but that is no reason why so much of our
literature on the subject should be long on the side of
fantasy, short on the side of fact.
To many more Americans the countries of China and
Japan, even our own great Asiatic possession, the Philippines, are countries where the inhabitants refuse to
behave with the same good sense that is shown in
Switzerland, Ecuador, or Bermuda.   China, to this
school, is a vast and teeming territory where war lords
with incomprehensible names are always fighting, and
always making life objectionable for long-suffering foreigners. Japan is synonymous with the "yellow peril,"
agog to seize the Philippines or otherwise force war upon
America. As for the Filipinos, they are a trying people,
strangely subservient to the wiles of unscrupulous "politicians," who circumvent our every effort to be nice.
For all such exaggerations another sort of Oriental writxi




xii


AUTHOR'S PREFACE


ing would seem responsible-that produced by the subtle
propagandist. It is a game which Asiatics also play.
Between the romanticist and the propagandist, between the total ignorance of Asia encouraged in our
schools and colleges and the prohibitive cable tolls which
still keep news dispatches from  that continent at a
minimum, there is room-ample room-for more writing
which concerns itself with evidence impartially selected.
Even the ignoramus, when he tells without bias just
what he himself has seen, may often be the all-important
figure in a court of law. Regarding my shortcomings
as an "authority" on the Far East I have no illusions;
but I have found through personal acquaintance in the
Orient that many of the "authorities" have some particular cause to serve, some special thesis not unconnected with their living to expound. In our current
literature on the East we need more testimony from impartial witnesses, fewer fairy tales-and fewer diatribes
from prosecuting attorneys with fat retaining fees.
If this book contains any special pleading, it is only
where I am convinced that the clear evidence justifies
such treatment. If there is anything in the rather
prosaic subjects treated which can be characterized as
sentiment, it is because sentiment, as distinct from sentimentality, is a factor demanding consideration in any
study of human affairs. What follows is the work of
a newspaper man, with a taste for, and some training
in, the studies of politics and economics. Its guiding
theme has been the fair selection, from the vast mass of
material available, of such subjects as the writer considers essential to a better and more intelligent understanding of the Orient by America.
In the late autumn of 1925 the Baltimore Sun assigned
to me, as a member of its editorial staff, the pleasant
task of visiting Japan, China, and the Philippines, there
to investigate at first hand, political, social, and eco



AUTHOR'S PREFACE


*..
Xlll,


nomic conditions and tendencies. When I departed on
this adventure, consuming five months of time and
25,000 miles of traveling, nothing was further from my
intentions than the little book which here eventuates.
I only regretted, as gradually I overcame an abysmal
ignorance of the Orient, that in my undergraduate days
the Far East found no place in any phase of the curriculum. It was this deficiency, I think, which fostered
the idea that an unpretentious volume along the lines followed herein might be of interest and value to American students in and out of college.
As time went on, and I observed on every hand the
reciprocal interest and growing importance of America
to the East and the East to America, it slowly dawned
on me that my assignment was in parvo that of the
American people at this stage of our development as
a world power. So, when in Manila the suggestion
reached me that I put my articles in permanent form,
the title at least was written. To the material originally
printed in The Sun much has been added, including expressions of personal opinion for which that journal
cannot be held responsible.
Needless to say my thanks are due and heartily given
to the A. S. Abell Company, publishers of the Baltimore
Sun, not merely for permitting republication of correspondence sent them, but even more for splendid journalistic ideals, of which my tour of inquiry in the Orient
is but a single expression. To the American Review,
also, is due appreciation for permission to reprint much
of an article written for that magazine. For the host
of individuals who, mostly unwittingly, have made this
study possible, a general expression of gratitude, though
inadequate, must suffice. The maps and photographs
are my own.
Where so much of importance and interest had perforce to be omitted, a difference in treatment between




xiv           AUTHOR'S PREFACE
the Japanese, Chinese, and Philippine sections of the
book became inevitable. The guiding rule in every case
of selection was what the author, from his own education in the Orient, considers basic to a more profitable
understanding of the Far East by America. If "Our
Far Eastern Assignment" serves as an introduction to
more comprehensive study of the problems treated, it
will have served its purpose.
FELIX MORLEY.
Baltimore, Md., September, 1926.




OUR
FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
CHAPTER I
JAPAN'S INESCAPABLE PROBLEMS
The newcomer to Japan, even before he sets foot on
the great concrete landing stage at Yokohama, will
gather two impressions which sojourn in the country
serves only to strengthen and to amplify. One is the
nervous restlessness of the people, first brought home
by the quick click-clack of numberless geta, or wooden
clogs, on the hard surface of the dock. The other is
the ruthlessness which lies behind the smiling face of
nature in these islands. The feathery plume of smoke
rising from volcanic Oshima at the mouth of Tokyo
Bay gives the visitor his first ocular demonstration
of this last characteristic, but this does not prepare him
for the desolation of Yokohama, after three years only
beginning to rise from the utter ruin wrought by the
earthquake of September 1, 1923.
Between these two impressions there is probably a
definite connection, since the characteristics of every
people are moulded by geographical factors in their environment. The climate of Japan is mild, the landscape
lovely, the seasons rich with natural beauty from early
February, when the plum blossoms appear, until November, when the chrysanthemums fulfill the honor paid
1




2      OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
them as the national flower. Behind these natural assets, conducive to geniality, optimism, and love of beauty,
lie the essentially barren nature of the country, the
prevalence of shattering earthquakes, volcanic eruptions,
destructive floods, and typhoons. The conditions of
life in Japan are much more charming and much more
uncertain than they are with us. So the Japanese, to
quote a generality by one of their own publicists, "are
more children than men, more prone to enjoy their circumstances than to alter them."  Clever, energetic, and
adaptable, their minds are more mobile, and at the same
time perhaps less persevering, than our own.
This conclusion is so contrary to the impression generally prevalent in America that its gradual fruition in
the mind of the visitor comes with difficulty. When an
American newspaper man of long Oriental experience told
me during my first week in Tokyo that "the Japanese
are more to be pitied than feared," I smiled to myself at
what I thought his lack of political sophistication. Yet,
wider experience served to show that it was not this
carefully formed opinion, but the more common American viewpoint, dating from coinage of the mischievous
"yellow peril" phrase, which is naive. We are prone
to distrust Japan primarily because she has imitated
our ways so successfully. At least, that distrust should
be tempered by consideration that facility in imitation
itself indicates a lack of the originative qualities which
alone make nations truly and enduringly great.
America has never had to face the two essential,
harassing problems before Japan: the first, how to find
a livelihood for her crowded population without disturbing the rights and sensibilities of other races; the
second, how to complete the transformation from feudalism to democracy without losing the basic spiritual
1DR. S. WASHIO, in an article on "The Earthquake and Japanese
Psychology," Japan Year Book, 1924-1925.




JAPAN'S INESCAPABLE PROBLEMS


3


values inherited from a less prosaic and competitive era.
It is important to realize how thoroughly these problems
are absorbing the energies of Japanese minds, and how
little the solutions which are indicated point to the possible war between Japan and America so loosely talked
about in both countries.
The one inescapable fact about Japan is that in a
group of mountainous volcanic islands, with less than
20 per cent. of their 140,778 square miles subject to
cultivation, smaller in area and far less fertile than the
state of California, are crowded sixty million people who
somehow, somewhere, must make their livings. These
people entered the stage of world politics too late to
succeed in an openly imperialistic policy. Indeed, it
was not until 1911 that they succeeded in eliminating the
last of the restrictions on their own sovereignty imposed
by the white powers, as somewhat earlier in the case of
China, by the unilateral treaties of 1858. It is true, of
course, that, as a result of the war with China in 1894,
Formosa and the adjacent Pescadores were annexed by
Japan. Following the war with Russia a decade later,
the Tokyo government resumed sovereignty over the
southern half of the island of Saghalien, acquired Russia's leasehold on the Liaotung Peninsula as well as the
South Manchurian Railway, and established the protectorate over Korea which preceded outright annexation in
1910. But none of this aggrandizement in immediately
adjacent territory was as pronounced an extension of national authority as that taken by our country is assuming control of the Philippine Islands, lying more than six
thousand miles from the coast of California.
An economic urge far more acute than that which
forced our own pioneers westward to subjugate the Indian tribes was primarily responsible for Japanese expansion between 1894 and 1914. Statistics do not support the claim that there has been no sizable movement of




4      OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
population to the acquired territories. The census of
1922 showed 386,493 Japanese in Korea, more than
double the number there in 1910. In Formosa, in 1922,
there were 177,953 Japanese. In the Philippines, acquired by the United States four years after Japan took
Formosa, and having approximately eight times the land
area of the latter island, there are only about 7,000 Americans. Even the small leased territory on the Liaotung
Peninsula had a Japanese civilian population of 81,573 in
1922, while inclement Saghalien then counted 117,782
Japanese settlers. Considering the strength of the religious, social, and sentimental ties binding the Japanese
to the parent islands, the present rate of migration within
the empire must be regarded as high.
As a consequence of the World War, however, Japan
for a period of some years adopted a policy of outright
aggression which properly stimulated the suspicions prevalent in the United States. If Japan is frequently embarrassed nowadays by the hostility expressed toward her
in many parts of China, she certainly invited hatred by
the notorious "Twenty-one Demands," issued as an ultimatum to Peking early in 1915, shortly after Japanese
troops had captured the German leased territory of
Kiaochou, in Shantung.
By these demands, characterized at the time by Foreign Minister (later Premier) Kato as "absolutely essential for strengthening Japan's position in Eastern
Asia," the military caste sought to make Japanese influence predominate permanently, not merely over South
Manchuria and Shantung Province, but even throughout
all China. The last group of the demands, for instance,
insisted that the Chinese government obligate itself to
employ Japanese as political, financial, and military advisers; to give Japan a share in the police administration
of certain Chinese cities; to purchase from Japan as
much as 50 per cent of any munitions China might re



JAPAN'S INESCAPABLE PROBLEMS


5


quire; to let the Japanese construct important railways
in the Yangtze basin; and to give Japan priority rights
in supplying foreign capital for the economic development of Fukien Province, opposite Formosa.
Without question it was the intention of the Okuma
ministry, then in power in Tokyo, to seize the moment
when all the great powers of Europe were engaged in
a war of doubtful outcome in order to shackle the young
Chinese republic to the wheels of Japanese ambitions.
Actually, the Twenty-one Demands were much modified before the residue was unwillingly accepted by
China, special privilege in South Manchuria and extension of the expiring leasehold on Liaotung Peninsula until
1997 being the only points on which any permanent gain
has accrued to Japan. But they caused a serious shock
to good relations between Japan and the United States,
the only power to inform Tokyo that agreements impairing the political or territorial integrity of China would
not be recognized.
The conception behind the Twenty-one Demands,
with their implicit faith in the tactics of the bully, was so
crude as to substantiate the theory that acumen and
foresight are not outstanding characteristics of the Japanese mind. Japan's second blunder of the period with
respect to China-the so-called Nishihara loans-was
scarcely less stupid. Millions of dollars were advanced
on exceedingly slim security; nominally, for such purposes as furthering Chinese participation in the World
War, perhaps to secure a lien on Chinese resources which
might eventually lead to some form of sanctions. Whatever the real design, most of the money went to line the
pockets of venal war lords and led directly to the Consortium Agreement of 1920, whereby the United States,
Great Britain, France, and Japan agreed to advance
money to China only through an international combination of banking groups approved by the four govern



6      OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
ments. The net result of the Nishihara loans for Japan
appears to have been a considerable loss of money, an
increase in foreign and Chinese mistrust, and no tangible
benefit except the uncertain allegiance of a few disreputable politicians and generals in China. All recent
efforts to secure these loans on Chinese revenues have
naturally aroused resentment among the patriotic in that
country.
Nor is the tale of Japanese diplomatic folly during the
war period complete without reference to the Siberian
expedition of 1918 to 1922. To be sure, some of the
blame here rests with the United States, which sponsored
the invasion of Russian territory intended partly to assist the escape of the Czechoslovak troops and partly to
test out the strength of Bolshevism. America, however,
confined her military participation to the suggested
quota of 7,000 troops, Great Britain, France, and Italy
taking an even smaller part in the uninvited intervention. Japan, by official admission, threw 70,000 soldiers
into Siberia, engaged in extensive warfare with the Russians costing her over 12,000 casualties in battle, and
squandered approximately $350,000,000 on this utterly
fruitless venture. Not until October 25, 1922, four years
after the Armistice, did the last Japanese regiment leave
Vladivostok. The annexation of the Siberian littoral
adjoining Korea on the northeast seems to have been
contemplated in some Japanese quarters as long as the
initial weakness of the Soviet government made the ambition tenable.
The Siberian expedition, however, is the last aggressive
action to which critics of Japanese foreign policy can
point with effectiveness. Even before its termination, in
the summer of 1921, Japan had accepted President Harding's invitation to the Washington Conference on Limitation of Naval Armaments. With this conference still




JAPAN'S INESCAPABLE PROBLEMS


7


recent history, a new and optimistic era in Far Eastern
relations was successfully initiated.
The 5-5-3 ratio in capital ships agreed upon by the
United States, Great Britain, and Japan is probably, to
most minds, the outstanding achievement of the Washington conference. Certainly, its value in breaking up
a repetition of that unrestricted naval competition which
preceded the World War is hard to overestimate. Yet,
from the more limited viewpoint of better JapaneseAmerican relations, other gains secured at Washington
are equally striking.
One was the termination of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which had unquestionably made the weaker partner feel more secure in taking the assertive steps
recounted above. Another was the Four Power Treaty,
by which the United States, Great Britain, France, and
Japan agreed to take under joint consideration controversies "arising out of any Pacific question" not satisfactorily settled by ordinary diplomatic negotiations. A
third was the restoration to China of all the German
privileges in Shantung acquired by Japan during the
war, leaving the Tokyo government's mandate over the
former German Pacific islands north of the Equator as
its only territorial gain from participation in the hostilities. At the same time the greater part of the Twentyone Demands were tacitly withdrawn.
Still a fourth advance toward better Pacific relationships was the Nine Power Treaty, in which Italy,
Belgium, Holland, Portugal, and China participated,
pledging the signatories to respect the sovereignty of the
latter nation, to refrain from seeking special rights or
privileges there, and to hasten action looking toward
complete tariff autonomy for China and the abolition of
foreign extraterritorial privileges in that country. These
last two important issues will be discussed in detail in
the chapters which consider Chinese problems.




8      OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
Since the adjournment of the Washington conference
the Japanese government has not shown, by word or
action, any disposition to renew the aggressive note characteristic of the nation's foreign policy during the wartime period. It has, on the contrary, through the League
of Nations, the World Court, and lesser international
associations, shown a much more active desire for patient
constructive cooperation with other countries than our
own government can claim.
Toward China in particular, a scrupulous forbearance,
often in the face of most serious provocation, has been
maintained during the last few years. Since 1923, moreover, Japan's share of the Boxer indemnity, with other
funds, has been applied to forwarding educational work
in the neighboring Republic. The explanation given by
certain Japanese statesmen-that the significance of such
actions as the Twenty-one Demands was always exaggerated abroad, is not conclusive. That there has
been a real change of policy in Japan, a definite liberalization of the national attitude, can no longer be
doubted. Nor is it difficult to appreciate the major factors which have combined to bring about that change.




CHAPTER II


THE ADVENT OF DEMOCRACY
Among the causes operating to restrict the military
power and to reduce Japanese chauvinism, the democratization of government is the most instrumental. We
cannot hope to appreciate the significance of the new
manhood suffrage law in Japan without understanding
how deeply autocratic theory is rooted in the constitutional structure of the nation.
Most Americans who reflect at all on how their government came into being, instinctively single out the
oppressive exercise of royal authority as the actuating
force leading to the fight for independence from Great
Britain. Judging from our own brief history as a nation,
we have built up an implicit belief that any progressive
constitutional movement postulates a restriction or elimination of the "divine right of kings" idea. Many of
us have only a very vague idea of what the feudal system was, and do not realize that at one stage of European history-as much our history as Europe's-it was
essential to political progress that autocratic monarchies
should be established in order to curb the powers of rival
nobles, each of whom was sovereign in his own sphere.
In Japan the constitutional movement was not
launched with any idea of restricting the power of the
Emperor. On the contrary, the obvious necessity after
the fall of the feudal Shogunate was to restore to royalty
the political authority which the heads of the great families had withheld from it for nearly a thousand years.
9




10     OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
Indirectly, it is useful to recall, the United States helped
to force political absolutism on Japan. The "black
fleet" of Commodore Perry, acting under instructions
from Washington to insist upon abandonment of the
Japanese policy of isolation, was the agency which unwittingly pushed the outworn medieval Shogunate into
the discard. Amid turbulent times, and with no experience in self-government, it was inevitable that a majority
of the Japanese people should be as eager as was Joan of
Arc five hundred years before to see authority concentrated in royal hands. Not the emperor but the overpowerful feudal nobility, responsible for the serious civil
war of 1877, was the agency most dangerous to political
progress. It was equally inevitable that, faced with the
necessity of solidifying the aristocracy behind the ruling
house, Japan should choose Prussian political institutions
as the only western model at all suitable to her own
domestic conditions.
Consequently, it is not surprising that the Constitution, promulgated in 1889, idealizes the Emperor in a
manner which at first glance seems' somewhat exaggerated to American eyes. The first article announces that:
"The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal."
The third article supports this somewhat positive assertion with the comprehensive statement that: "The Emperor is sacred and inviolable." Not until the fifth
article-"The Emperor exercises the legislative power
with the consent of the Imperial Diet"-is there any
mention of popular limitation to the royal authority.
Altogether no fewer than seventeen articles dealing exclusively with monarchical powers appear in the Constitution before a word is written on the rights of the
subject. The section devoted to these last, however, is
not far from being as comprehensive and enlightened by
our standards as is the case in American organic law.




THE ADVENT OF DEMOCRACY


11


Mingling the theory of divine right with certain definite constitutional checks and safeguards has resulted
in a compromise between ancient and modern which
seems peculiarly suitable to the present stage of Japan's
political development. The powers actually exercised by
the Emperor are no greater than those remaining to the
King of England, but in theory he is absolute and is so
regarded by the masses of the people. It is a common
Japanese belief that the Prime Minister is merely the
spokesman of the monarch, a conception not without constitutional importance. On occasion, astute premiers
have been known to utilize the name of the Emperor in
a way which has dissipated much of the popular support
for a dangerous opposition. To be coupled with this is
the fact that the Japanese Cabinet need not be representative of the majority party in the House of Representatives, and has the power to dissolve the House and
call a general election on any plausible pretext if it is
thought that obnoxious parliamentary critics can be unseated by that step.
Unquestioning popular reverence for the Emperor is
a great asset to the bureaucracies which shelter behind
his mantle, and in particular to the army and navy
chiefs who through the Supreme Council of War exercise
a considerably greater influence in the government
than is the case with their counterparts in the United
States. The Premier and the Foreign Minister must
share the ear of the monarch with generals and admirals,
and under the division of power between military and
civilian heads it is conceivable that the former may
act independently of civil authority. There is a common report that the War Office took upon itself authority
for greatly augmenting the number of troops authorized
to participate in the Siberian expedition. Certainly, the
Diet has never been able to obtain a satisfactory accounting of all the money spent in that venture. Since




12     OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
1914 both army and navy have been allowed an "extraordinary military expenditure" amounting to $450,000,000
for the eleven years up to 1926. Over these outlays
elected representatives have little or no control.
There are, moreover, many factors indicating that modification of the general attitude toward the ruling house,
and the military bureaucracies tied up with it, is going
to be a slow process. The fervent patriotism of the
Japanese people combines with Shinto doctrine to focus
the Emperor as the embodiment of national spirit. This
attitude is fostered by remembrance of the truly great
achievements of the Emperor Mutsuhito,1 who came
to the throne as a boy of sixteen, in 1867, successfully
guided his country out of the feudal period, ruled during the two successful wars with China and Russia, and
saw the unilateral treaties completely abolished in the
Japanese interest before his death in 1912. The simple
open-air tomb of this great sovereign, close to the ancient capital of Kyoto, is not a mausoleum like those of
British rulers in Westminster Abbey, but a national
shrine visited daily by hundreds of Japanese who come
to reverence a religious leader whom death has deified.
Here may be seen the propitiation of the spirit of the
national ruler or guardian which is the culmination of
the deep-rooted cult of ancestor worship.
The Japanese system of education, the stereotyping
effect of two years of compulsory army service on coming
of age, the depth and intensity of a religious belief which
is tied up with social custom and patriotism, and the absence of independent viewpoint among the women are all
calculated to support political conservatism, particularly
when we remember that these people are much more
skilled in careful adaptation than in philosophical initiation. Then again, it is within the memory of many who
Since his death known as "The Emperor Meiji," as the posthumous designation of his era.




FUJIYAMA
The majestic mountain which speaks the beauty and the spirit of Japan.








THE ADVENT OF DEMOCRACY


13.are still active that Japan struggled safely out of the period of feudal collapse by her ability to unite the spirit
of patriotism with worship of the ruling dynasty. In
spite of widespread social unrest springing from unsatisfactory economic conditions, it would take a bold
prophet to visualize Japan as anything but a monarchy
during the lifetime of any who read these lines.
None the less there are tendencies which show that
in politics, as in all other lines of organized endeavor,
modern Japan is caught by the same stream which has
swept all the white nations toward democracy, regardless of whether or not they are content to regard that
system as a final goal. The Constitution may state
that the Emperor is "inviolable," but the populace cannot be kept ignorant of the fact that Yoshihito, successor to the Emperor Mutsuhito, is a hopeless invalid
who, in 1921, of necessity proclaimed the Crown Prince
Hirohito as Regent in his stead. The anomalous situation weighs against continuation of the popular belief
that the Emperor is absolute, though collapse of this
idea, of course, would not lead to abolition of the monarchy any more than it has done in England.
A very much more important dissolvent of absolutist
belief, promising in time not merely to dissipate the awe
in which royalty is held as a political factor, but also
to modify and alter Japanese policy in many ways, is
the coming of fairly complete manhood suffrage. The
law bringing this great change went into effect in 1925,
though the new voters will not be able to exercise their
right of franchise until the next general election. Seldom
in history has there been an enfranchisement act of
greater magnitude than this one, increasing the electorate of the country more than threefold at a single step.
Under the original Election Law of 1890, the qualified
voters of Japan numbered only about 500,000 out of a
population of 42,000,000-less than 1.25 per cent. The




14     OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
minimum voting age was twenty-five, which has been
maintained, and there was a drastic property qualification, limiting a voice in government to those who paid
at least 15 yen ($7.50) per annum in direct national
taxes. A revision of the law in 1900, lowering the property qualification somewhat, increased the electorate to
about 1,500,000. In 1920 the requisite national tax payment was reduced again, to only 3 yen, and the electorate augmented thereby to nearly 3,000,000. Under the
new law of 1925, eliminating the relationship between
enfranchisement and property ownership, it is estimated
that the total electorate will number well upwards of
11,000,000, or nearly 20 per cent of the total population
of Japan proper.
Inevitably, the sudden addition of 8,000,000 new voters will mean far-reaching changes in Japan. Many are
now learning for the first time that the machinery of representative government exists for them in their country.
Among the millions in whom a rigid social system and
perpetual poverty have combined to induce a fatalistic
outlook there is dawning the realization that they have
in their own hands the means to shape destiny somewhat.
If there is still tremendous political apathy and ignorance among the Japanese working class there is at least
none of the disillusionment and cynicism found where
suffrage after long trial has proved no panacea for human
ills. Politically speaking, Japan is very youthful and
naive. Her newly enfranchised voters are on the whole
disposed to enter the untrodden field of democratic experiment hopefully and with enthusiasm.
The implications of the new manhood suffrage law appear equally important to the traditional governing class,
though in this case the feeling is one of doubt and
anxiety rather than optimism. The Japanese House of
Representatives has not the same constitutional power
as our own, and it is open to question that a more radi



THE ADVENT OF DEMOCRACY


15


cal parliament, if elected, would be able to exercise very
positive power in the control of national policy. The
negative power of the House, however, is sufficient to
cause a bureaucratic government great annoyance. The
old freedom of the military leaders in determining policy
cannot be recaptured now that there is a watchful electorate ready to check up on any ministry that places
swashbuckling above national welfare. One evidence
of the change is the probability that the famous Council
of Genro, or Elder Statesmen, will not be revived after
the death of its' sole surviving member, Prince Saionji.
Until the death of Marquis Okuma, in 1922, the influence of this extraconstitutional and strongly conservative body in influencing national policy was very great,
but the efforts to create a new Council of Genro have
met with strong opposition from all liberal spokesmen.
The new suffrage act, in all probability, will assist the
quiet abolition of this totally undemocratic device.
No class in Japan, however, has greater personal interest in the working out of manhood suffrage than those
who are primarily concerned with commerce. The Japanese business man, for all that he has contributed so
mightily to the strength of his nation, is still apt to be
regarded as a social parvenu. Though the tax burden
falls most heavily on his class, he has had in the past
little political control over the spending of his money.
Recognizing that Japan must compete more actively and
successfully in world markets in order to maintain adequate national living standards, the leaders in trade
nevertheless have been powerless to prevent a huge expenditure on armaments which the country can ill afford.
It is with growing discontent that they have watched the
national debt increase from $1,120,000,000 in 1912 to
$2,500,000,000 in 1926.
There is a real clash of interest between the military
and business groups, the former still believing that they




16     OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
are the authentic heirs of the Samurai spirit; the latter
maintaining that it is not great armies and fleets which
make a modern nation strong, but commercial organization. At present, government in Japan is still largely in
the hands of the aristocracy. Business men, who favor
economic expansion rather than military aggression, are
anxious to see the balance shifted to the middle class.
And if the wage earners agree with the thesis that employers and employed have a solidarity of interest as
against those who are anxious to sink all surplus revenues
in armaments, the new enfrancisement act will greatly
forward political domination by the bourgeoisie.
There are, however, Japanese who feel that the interests of employer and employed are far from being
common and who would utilize the millions of new voters
to develop a strong Labor, rather than a strong Liberal,
party. Their effort is sufficiently significant to merit
close attention, both in its political and economic aspects.




CHAPTER III


THE JAPANESE LABOR PARTY
On December 1, 1925, the very day of its formal organization in Tokyo, the first Socialistic political party
to be launched in Japan was dissolved by order of the
Home Minister. The edict of dissolution was based on
Article 8 of the Public Peace Police Law, which severely
limits the partial guarantees of freedom of speech, assembly, and press established "within the limits of law"
by Article 29 of the Japanese Constitution. Article 8
of the comprehensive Police Law reads:
In case it is deemed necessary for the maintenance of peace
and order, the police can either restrict, prohibit, or break up
outdoor meetings, mass movements, or crowds of people. They
can also break up indoor meetings.
If societies organized fall under the purview of the foregoing
paragraph, the Home Minister can veto them. One who may
consider that his rights are infringed by such action on the part
of the Home Minister may file a suit in the Court of Administrative Litigation.
Japanese radicals have their full share of the ingenuity which is a national characteristic. Realizing
that the fundamental reason for the government's action
was the activity of communist intriguers within their
ranks, they began immediately to revamp the outlaw
organization. On March 5, 1926, a second Japanese
Labor party was organized in Osaka, much more than
Tokyo the industrial center of the nation. The government has put no obstacles in the path of this new proletarian effort. On the contrary, men who are high in
17




18     OUR.FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
councils of state maintain in unofficial conversation that
the development is welcome; perhaps because it promises to be a much-needed cleansing force in Japanese
politics; perhaps because it promises to divide, and
thereby weaken, liberal strength.
For the uninitiated it is difficult to spot the fundamental difference between the proscribed and the legitimate organization. The first was called the Peasants'
and Laborers' party. The name chosen for the second
is the Laborers' and Peasants' party. In structure the
original attempt was a grouping of agricultural and trade
union organizations for sharply reformist political action.
Technically, the subsequent experiment is an association of individuals for an identical end, though the same
organizations lend informal support.
The first Labor party was designed to support a platform of thirty-four detailed objectives, of which only
half a dozen are not at the present time possessed by
citizens of the United States. Some of these demands,
however, were of a scope to offset the moderate nature
of the bulk of the platform and were illustrative of zeal
rather than intelligence among the founders; for instance, the demand for "abolition of capitalistic education in primary schools," or that calling for "provision of
perfect institutions (sic) for the convalescence and
health improvement of the proletarians." The second
Labor party, on the other hand, prefers to stress a program of generalities, aiming "to establish the right of
living for the proletarian class and... to insure fairness and equity in the production and distribution of
wealth."
The major and vital difference between the disbanded
and the recognized parties is that in the former Communists could automatically become members through
the adherence of organizations to which they belonged,




THE JAPANESE LABOR PARTY


19


while now, on the basis of individual membership, they
can be kept out.
It is this last distinction which is all important. The
Japanese authorities at the present time are in a state
of nerves about communism curiously at variance with
the amicable diplomatic relations sedulously cultivated
with Soviet Russia. Sometimes, the police measures
taken to check Red propaganda are amusingly clever, as
when the members of a Russian labor delegation were
unhesitatingly admitted, only to be followed like shadows during their entire visit by secret service men assigned to each potential agitator as personal guide and
attendant. As often the police precautions may be painfully stupid, as in the case of a most reputable Swiss
business man recently subjected to an examination at the
Korean frontier grueling beyond the average, seemingly
because the suspect is tall and has a beard. The average
foreigner, however, has' no annoyances from registration
rules and that sort of supervision. Only visitors from
Russia are suspect. Clever or stupid, the campaign of
precaution is, in their case, always thorough, for the
proximity of Soviet territory and the social unrest produced in Japan by unsatisfactory economic conditions
combine to cause constant anxiety.
Yet, out of the 60,000,000 people numbered in Japan
proper, the Communists claim only 45,000 adherents,
while those Japanese actually affiliated with the Third
International probably do not exceed 7,000 in number.
Even in a country less strongly imbued with nationalistic
sentiment, less strongly fortified by social traditions
against resistance to authority, this would be an insignificant proportion of the population. It would seem to
be a realization that repressive measures may be both
unnecessary and unwise, fostered by the growth of a
liberal spirit now strongly apparent throughout Japan,




20     OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
which has much to do with the tolerant attitude accorded
by the government to the new Labor-Farmer party.
Considering the very temperate rebukes given the government by the liberal press for its repression of the
first radical venture in politics, the extravagant editorial
welcome extended to its lineal successor by the same
journals is doubly noteworthy. The elimination of graft
and corruption in politics, the awakening of political interest among the newly enfranchised voters, the advent
of truly representative government in Japan are among
the predictions made by a large section of the "capitalist press" as a result of the formation of a distinctively
proletarian party. When one considers that this new
party was launched with fewer than 200,000 nominal
adherents throughout the nation, that leaders and members are alike without political experience, that organization must be built from the ground up, and that no
wealth and few men of national stature back the
enterprise, these optimistic prophecies seem at first inexplicable. A glance at the depressing state of Japanese
politics at the present time is necessary to show why
they are made.
By its disclosures and hints of seemingly unlimited
scandals, the 1926 session of the Diet succeeded in shaking the country out of much of the traditional Japanese
apathy toward politics. National pride was shocked and
reformist ideas stimulated by the rapid succession of
unsavory cases. The president of the Seiyukai (major
opposition party) was charged with permitting serious
irregularities with the large sums entrusted to him as
Minister of War at the time of the Siberian expedition.
Immediately, the Seiyukai leaders retorted by seeking
to impeach the Kensekai (government party) leader, who
sponsored the attack, on the ground that he had received money from Soviet Russia. On top of all this,
widespread corruption was disclosed in connection with




THE JAPANESE LABOR PARTY


21


the removal of a brothel quarter in Osaka, an incident the
more unpleasant because said not to be the first instance
of its occurrence in Japanese political life.
With serious incriminations falling impartially on all
parties, Japanese commentators have pointed out that
blame should attach not so much to individuals as to the
anomalous constitutional structure whereby the Diet is
entrusted with much less responsibility than our Congress, while the administration is relatively free from
parliamentary oversight. The faults in the Japanese
system of government, which has worked so successfully
to span the enormous gap between feudalism and democracy, are becoming more and more obvious as the latter
objective draws nearer. The pronounced executive responsibility of the British system and the careful checks
and balances in our own method of divided control are
both absent. Now, simultaneously with the spreading
demand for better public control over administration,
comes a new political party claiming to speak and act
for those who have heretofore been divorced from any
voice in government. Clearly, the Labor-Farmer party
has potentialities beyond its apparent strength, provided
there is sufficient intelligence in its leadership to dodge
radical ideology in favor of important constitutional reforms. If the proletarian party misses this opportunity,
another is sure to seize it. Viscount Goto, a courageous
liberal of independent viewpoint with a large public following is, for one, endeavoring to create a reform party.
Its chance of practical success among the newly enfranchised will be greatly augmented if the Labor-Farmer
party proves intellectually narrow.
However this may turn out to be, its organization is
well worth considering. On the agricultural side the
strength of the Socialistic party is provided by members of the Japanese Farmers' Association, which four
years after its organization numbers some 60,000 tenant




22     OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
farmers. The president of the association, Mr. Motojiro
Sugiyama, is also chairman of the executive committee
of the new party, which committee is responsible to an
assembly composed of elected representatives from the
various local branches. Mr. Sugiyama is an agricultural
economist, a Christian, and a close friend of the wellknown social worker and author, Toyohiko Kagawa,
himself a supporter of this new political movement. A
third well-known adherent is Professor Isoo Abe, of
Waseda University, who has been instrumental in the
promotion of workers' study classes in Japan, not to
mention his quarter-century of devotion to the cause of
popularizing baseball.
On the industrial side the Labor-Farmer party owes
most of its strength to the support of the General Federation of Labor, which with a membership of about
35,000 is easily the strongest unit in the poorly organized
Japanese industrial labor movement. There are only
about 220,000 trade unionists in all Japan, and nearly
half of these belong to company-organized unions.
In conversation with Bunji Suzuki, president of the
General Federation of Labor, this foremost of Japanese
labor leaders expressed to me qualified optimism about
the future of the new party, predicting that it will elect
a group of from ten to fifteen members to the House of
Representatives at the next general election. That event,
however, is not expected immediately, since uncertainty
as to the opinions of the newly enfranchised electorate
makes both Diet and Administration anxious to postpone
a national election until the present government's maximum constitutional term of four years has expireduntil May, 1928, in other words. And ten to fifteen
Laborites in a House containing 465 members is not a
very formidable proportion.
Nevertheless, it is the opinion of Mr. Suzuki, who, as
a graduate of the Imperial University and a man of wide




THE JAPANESE LABOR PARTY


23


cultural background, is somewhat misleadingly called
"the Japanese Gompers," that the Laborers' and Peasants' party may be expected to play a role in Japan
roughly comparable with that of the British Labor party
in Great Britain.
He anticipates that it will do much to educate politically many Japanese who have as yet only the vaguest
ideas of what is meant by representative government.
He believes that it will result in a better system of land
tenure than that now ruling in Japan, whereby only onethird of the agricultural population are "landed farmers,"
and many of the tenant peasantry are paid not in monetary wages but in kind by the land owners. He believes that it will result in strengthening trade-union
organization in Japan, in reducing the present standard
of a ten- or even eleven-hour day, and in increasing the
very low wages for which a majority of Japanese artisans
work. Finally, Mr. Suzuki thinks, as do others who have
less personal interest in the venture, that the new party
will forward the process of making government in Japan
more responsive and responsible to the popular will
which, quite as much as in America, is interested in
preserving in international relations the courtesy and
friendliness which are deep-rooted characteristics of the
Japanese people.
The Labor-Farmer party of Japan may not succeed
in its ambitions. Communist intrigue may blight the
tender plant by trying to twist its growth to revolutionary
rather than parliamentary ends. A more real danger is
that it may evolve as Socialistic in the purely imitative
and doctrinaire sense, thereby permanently losing to
other political ventures the support of important liberal
elements which now regard this interesting experiment
with undisguised approval. But as a portent of the trend
of thought in Japan the significance of the new party is
unaffected by what the future holds in store for it.




24     OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
Steadily and necessarily Japan is becoming industrialized, drawing the raw materials and semi-finished products of other nations to her shores, then re-exporting
them as articles which native skill and craftsmanship
much more than shoddy cheapness stamp as desirable.
The transformation from the self-contained feudal country of seventy-five years ago is staggering bnd, naturally,
the mental change has been less marked than the physical transformation. In many ways this is desirable, for
none would wish to see the spiritual beauty of old Japan
stamped out by the machine. In other ways it is undesirable, for the power given by industrialization should
be fettered by the free spirit and open self-criticism of
democratic rule.
Unquestionably, the establishment of a workers' party
in autocratic Japan is symptomatic of the blossoming
of mental freedom among her people. It is as indicative
of the future in that country as the mobilizing of three
thousand police to "keep order" at a mass meeting of
eight thousand Tokyo laborers on May Day of 1926 is
indicative of the past. Whatever line solution of the
labor problem takes, its existence, even in fairly acute
form, is more encouraging than otherwise. Here is one,
and not the least, of the abundant signs that Japan is
modernized in many other ways than armaments, and
has many other things of more importance than jingoistic patriotism to think about.




CHAPTER IV


JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS
"You have only to consider the trade statistics," Viscount Goto told me during my stay in Tokyo, "to realize how vital to Japan is the continuation of friendly
relations with America. Even if no higher motives' were
involved, commercial interdependence would constitute
for us an overpowering argument in favor of transPacific peace."
The more one examines this subject the more apparent
it becomes that business considerations are operating
steadily and increasingly to mold Japanese foreign
policy along peaceful lines. An index to Japan's international commitments in behalf of friendship with
other powers is shown by the growth in value of her
foreign trade from $13,000,000 in 1868 to approximately
$2,500,000,000 in 1925. With no other country are good
relations so important to Japan as in the case of the
United States. This country is not merely her largest
customer; we also supply a larger percentage of Japan's
imports than any other nation. Taking around 40 per
cent of Japan's exports in every year since the war, and
providing her people with from one-quarter to one-third
of all their imports, the United States has the same relative commercial importance to Japan that all of Europe
has to the United States; and though this parallel is
striking, it does not adequately bring out the supreme
importance to Japan of uninterrupted trade relations
with America. The natural resources of Japan are not
25




26      OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
to be compared with those of the United States and her
people are in every economic respect less self-sufficing
and more dependent on the results of overseas commerce.
The foreign trade statistics of Japan proper for the
last four years, measured in yen (par value 49.8 cents),
are given in the following table. It also shows the value
of exports to and imports from North America, which
would be completely cut off in the event of hostilities
with the United States. The reader will notice, moreover, how much America helps toward rectifying a persistently unfavorable trade balance.
Exports (in thousands of yen) Imports
To North            From North
Year          Total      America     Total     America
1922........  1,637,449   748,500   1,886,389   619,767
1923.......  1,368,799   622,643   1,922,239   536,804
1924.......  1,807,031   764,499   2,450,856   712,790
1925.......  2,305,588  1,032,693  2,570,590   704,973
Japanese exports to the United States fall largely in
the  luxury  class.  We purchase    from  her dealers
enormous quantities of raw     silk-over $400,000,000
worth in 1925, representing 94 per cent of the total of
this commodity sent abroad by the island empire. In
addition America is a heavy buyer of Japanese grass
rugs, tea, brushes, camphor, pottery, toys, and embroideries. Turn from this list of non-essentials to consider the character of American exports to Japan. According to figures compiled early in 1926 by E. R. Dickover, United States Consul at Kobe, the United States
supplies 35 per cent of Japan's total imports of raw
cotton, 80 per cent of imported lumber, 37 per cent
of imported steel products, 40 per cent of imported wheat,
54 per cent of imported leather, 50 per cent of imported




JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS


27


machinery, and 88 per cent of her imported automobiles,
a manufacture in which Japan is only just beginning to
engage. Those are basic commodities, the uninterrupted
supply of which is vital in time of peace, and absolutely
essential in time of war.
The increasing dependence of Japan on the United
States for these articles signifies, moreover, steadily increased insurance against war. It cannot be convincingly
argued that Japan could readily turn to other sources of
supply, when it is realized that in the case of iron and
steel products, as an example, the percentage of imports
taken from this country is more than double what it was
in 1913, while in tle case of both Great Britain and Germany the percentage of imports over the same period has
been halved. At this point it is worth mentioning that
the Russo-Japanese treaty, signed on January 21, 1925,
and restoring normal diplomatic and trade relations between Japan and Soviet Russia, after eighteen months
had not succeeded in restoring the almost negligible
volume of pre-war commerce between the two nations.
And while China is an immensely valuable source of
supply to Japan, the chaotic republic could scarcely,
even if willing, fill this role alone in case of war.
If business means anything, and whether or not we
like the fact, trade is a determinant of increasing importance in the foreign policy of every modern nation;
it means that talk of war between Japan and the United
States is dangerous nonsense. In Japan the subject is
seldom given consideration by any rational person. It
need be regarded seriously only because a jingoistic and
ignorant minority in both countries is disposed to play
with the idea. If war should come, it will be because
that type has been allowed to become numerous enough
to force it. Fortunately, nearly every Japanese now
realizes that the substitution of active hostility for




28      OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
friendship would be completely ruinous to his country,
irrespective of the military outcome. Among Americans
excessive emphasis is laid on the authority of the military and naval cliques in Japan. It is high time that
recognition be given to the way in which the growth of
democratic sentiment and the weight of commercial considerations are bringing fundamental alteration to the
old arrangements.
There can be no doubt, moreover, that American participation in the World War has influenced the prevalent
Japanese attitude toward the United States. As in
Great Britain there is a new and vivid consciousness of
the rise of the United States to the status of a leading
world power, reflected in the former country by establishment of such friendship-making organizations as the
English-Speaking Union, and in Japan by the attention
given in high quarters to the America-Japan Society.
After a recent visit to Japan, Henry Morgenthau, our
former Ambassador to Turkey, in an interview analyzed
this new attitude on the part of her leaders as follows:
Where they used to regard us as an overgrown, provincial,
smug, and self-satisfied nation with -no military capacity, they
have now come to recognize fully our enormous potentialities in
peace and war. The Japanese statesmen, who are as keen and
adroit as any in the world, fully appreciate the changed condition, and that we now hold the balance of world power. Therefore, they are now anxious to remove the notion entertained by
some that they want to attack us, or covet any of our Pacific
possessions. Instead, they emphasize their great and sincere admiration for America. To call that attitude propaganda is to
misconstrue the word as ordinarily used. It is, rather, a natural outcome of increasingly close relations between the two
countries.
Nevertheless, it must not be overlooked that increasingly close relations are apt to lead to increasing irritations. The outstanding, and indeed the only logical,
cause of direct friction between Japan and the United




JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS                 29
States at the present time is, of course, our Immigration
Act, or rather the superfluous and provocative Japanese
exclusion clause contained therein. It is superfluous because if Japan had been placed on the same quota basis
as the European nations only 100 immigrants from that
country would have been admitted annually; and it is
provocative because of the direct racial discrimination,
which applies equally, however, to the Chinese and other
Asiatic peoples.
Passage of this Act by the United States Congress in
May, 1924, while the wounds caused by the great earthquake only eight months previous were still raw, has
been a severe blow to the justified self-esteem of Japan
and has unquestionably done lasting injury to America's
reputation in that country. Among the older generation,
in particular, the absolute ban placed against Japanese
emigration to the United States will always be regarded
as a hostile action. Ample evidence could be cited to
support that statement, but it will be sufficient to quote
here part of a statement made to me by Viscount Shibusawa, the "grand old man" of Japan, who from the
vantage point of eighty-six years has special qualifications in singling out what is significant and what is
ephemeral in international relations. He said:
The sudden breaking of the Gentlemen's Agreement, in order
to classify Japan with those people whom you discriminate
against, has spoiled a splendid international relationship. The
resentment aroused in my country has done much to wipe out
the memory of past friendships, and it is well to remember that
this resentment is as strong now as when the immigration act
was passed. A proud and sensitive people are doubly offended
if it is assumed that they can easily forget what seems a direct
and personal affront.
On the other hand, many of Viscount Shibusawa's
younger, but no less keen-minded, countrymen are fully
cognizant of the fact that Japan herself long maintained
an exclusive attitude, firmly prohibiting foreign owner



30     OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
ship of land, excluding foreigners from holding shares in
certain of her companies and banks, and giving such
slight encouragement to naturalization that change of
allegiance is extremely rare except among the Chinese
in Formosa. During the 1926 session of the Diet, however, legislation was passed abolishing all restrictions on
alien land ownership, without regard to discriminatory
land laws against Japanese in other countries. This
characteristic action of present-day liberal Japan certainly heaps coals of fire upon American heads. But it
does not alter the impression that what is objectionable
in our Immigration Act in reference to Japan is not
exclusion so much as a phrasing which made the recognition of a racial difficulty appear to the Japanese as an
assumption of racial superiority.
Wise men waste no time on the idle question of
whether the white race or the yellow is "superior," the
answer to which must depend almost entirely on what
standards of valuation are uppermost in the mind of the
interrogator. The issue of whether severe restrictions on
the commingling of the two races is not desirable for
both is subject to more scientific analysis. In this connection a confidential letter written in 1892 by Herbert
Spencer, for the advice of Count Ito, the then Premier
of Japan, is still worthy of extensive quotation. It is
also noteworthy that Lafcadio Hearn, reprinting this
letter as an appendix to his finest and most penetrating
book on Japan,1 strongly approves the advice given,
though himself a naturalized Japanese subject married to
a woman of that race. The great English biologist and
philosopher wrote:
Respecting the further questions you ask, let me, in the first
place, answer generally that the Japanese policy should, I think,
e that of keeping Americans and Europeans as much as possible
at arm's length. In presence of the more powerful races, your
"Japan, an Interpretation."




VISCOUNT EIICHI SHIBUSAWA
A great Japanese Liberal who
tells his countrymen that "our
friend across the Pacific has recently shown in her attitude
toward Japan that she is not
over-eager for the friendly relations we desire."


YOKOHAMA IN 1926
Three years after complete devastation by the earthquake, Japan's
most famous seaport is rising slowly from its ashes.




I




JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS                     31
position is one of chronic danger, and you should take every precaution to give as little foothold as possible to foreigners.
It seems to me that the only forms of intercourse which you may
with advantage permit are those which are indispensable for the
exchange of commodities-importation and exportation of physical
and mental products. No further privileges should be allowed
to people of other races, and especially to people of the more
powerful races, than is absolutely needful for the achievement of
these ends. Apparently, you are proposing, by revision of the
treaty with the Powers of Europe and America, to open the whole
Empire to foreigners and foreign capital  I regret this as a fatal
policy. If you wish to see what is likely to happen, study the
history of India. Once let one of the more powerful races gain a
point d'appui, and in course of time there will inevitably grow
up an aggressive policy which will lead to collisions with the
Japanese; these collisions will be represented as attacks by the
Japanese which must be avenged, as the case may be; a portion
of territory will be seized and required to be made over as a
foreign settlement; and from this there will grow eventual
subjugation of the entire Japanese Empire. I believe that you
will have great difficulty in avoiding this fate in any case, but you
will make the process easy if you allow of any privileges to
foreigners beyond those which I have indicated.
In pursuance of the advice thus generally indicated, I should
say, in answer to your first question, that there should be, not
only a prohibition of foreign persons to hold property in land,
but also a refusal to give them leases, and a permission only to
reside as annual tenants.
To the second question I should say decidedly prohibit to
foreigners the working of the mines owned or worked by government. Here, there would be obviously liable to arise grounds of
difference between the Europeans or Americans who worked them
and the government, and these grounds of quarrel would be
followed by invocations to the English or American governments
or other powers to send forces to insist on whatever the European
workers claimed, for always the habit here and elsewhere among
the civilized peoples is to believe what their agents or sellers
abroad represent to them.
In the third place, in pursuance of the policy I have indicated,
you ought also to keep the coasting trade in your own hands
and forbid foreigners to engage in it. This coasting trade is clearly
not indicated in the requirement I have indicated as the sole one
to be recognized-a requirement to facilitate exportation and importation of commodities.  The distribution of commodities
brought to Japan from other places may be properly left to the
Japanese themselves, and should be denied to foreigners, for
the reason that again the various transactions involved would become so many doors open to quarrels and resulting aggressions.




32      OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
To your remaining question respecting the intermarriage of
foreigners and Japanese, which you say is "now very much
agitated among our scholars and politicians" and which you say
is "one of the most difficult problems," my reply is that, as
rationally answered, there is no difficulty at all. It should be
positively forbidden. It is not at root a question of social philosophy. It is at root a question of biology. There is abundant
proof, alike furnished by the intermarriages of human races and
by the interbreeding of animals, that when the varieties mingled
diverge beyond a certain slight degree the result is inevitably a
bad one in the long run.... The physiological basis of this experience appears to be that any one variety of creature in course
of many generations acquires a certain constitutional adaptation
to its particular form of life, and every other variety similarly
acquires its own special adaptation. The consequence is that, if
you mix the constitution of two widely divergent varieties which
have severally become adapted to widely divergent modes of
life, you get a constitution which is adapted to the mode of life of
neither-a constitution which will not work properly, because it is
not fitted for any set of conditions whatever. By all means,
therefore, peremptorily interdict marriages of Japanese with
foreigners.
I have for the reasons indicated entirely approved of the regulations which have been established in America for restraining
the Chinese immigration, and had I the power I would restrict
them to the smallest possible amount, my reasons for this decision
being that one of two things must happen. If the Chinese are
allowed to settle extensively in America, they must either, if they
remain unmixed, form a subject class standing in the position, if
not of slaves, yet of a class approaching to slaves; or, if they
mix, they must form a bad hybrid. In either case, supposing the
immigration to be large, immense social mischief must arise, and
eventually social disorganization. The same thing will happen if
there should be any considerable mixture of European or American races with the Japanese.
You see, therefore, that my advice is strongly conservative in
all directions, and I end by saying as I began-keep other races
at arm's length as much as possible.
Whether its influence on government was direct, or
indirect through its accordance with the reasoning of
Japanese statesmen during the transformation, Herbert
Spencer's advice has been followed in spirit and is still
to a large extent influential in Japanese policy. Its
value is most obvious by consideration of contemporary
conditions in China, where the progressive seizure of




JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS              33
privileges by foreigners has contributed so greatly to
present-day chaos. Holding the white man "at arm's
length," Japan has come successfully through her testing
period and risen with wonderful celerity to a position
where she need fear the foreigner no longer. Does that
mean that the underlying racial difficulties are solved?
The proportion of Japanese who think so is as small as
that among Americans; but the proportion who would
bring tact and friendliness to ease the rough corners of
the problem seems to be larger there than here.




CHAPTER V


JAPAN IN MANCHURIA
Among Japanese commercial magnates, military leaders, and statesmen one question, or series of interrelated
questions, in foreign policy is so predominantly uppermost that neither energy nor desire is left for adventuring in other fields. That all-important question is not
Japanese-American relations, which are considered good
and likely to become better, unless the United States
chooses to force a rupture. It is not annexation of the
Philippines, widely regarded as a bugaboo conjured up
by Americans in Manila, perhaps because it helps to
conceal the real issues in our colonial problem there.
Nor is it military aggression in China proper, abandoned
with the dawning realization that China can be a dangerous enemy now, while, in the future, she may be very
valuable as a friend. The really absorbing issue in
Japanese foreign policy at present is the steady progress
of economic penetration in Manchuria, with which is
bound up the question of whether trouble with Soviet
Russia can be satisfactorily averted.
The ceaseless maneuvering for position in China on
the part of both Japan and Russia is a phenomenon
which one meets in every section of the unwieldy and
chaotic republic. Each of the two stable nations is
playing a lone hand there, Russia obviously so, Japan
at bottom no less individualistic since the termination of
the Anglo-Japanese alliance and the passage of our
Immigration Act combined to teach her statesmen that
34




JAPAN IN MANCHURIA


35


white societies do not wish to count her as an active
partner. Nowhere is the rivalry between the most radical and the most conservative of moder governments
so pronounced as in Manchuria-that vast territory of
enormous potential wealth where Japan has invested
over a billion dollars in the property of the South Manchurian Railway Company alone, and where Soviet Russia is holding the control of the Czarist-built Chinese
Eastern Railway with a tenacity strangely out of accord
with her diatribes against imperialism as practiced by
others. No study, however slight, of Oriental problems
can fail to take into account the clash of interests between Japan and Russia in Manchuria, for it is in that
territory, and nowhere else, that Nippon plans to round
out her natural deficiencies so that she may remain the
great commercial power she has become.
To understand the situation, one must glance briefly
at the history of the Chinese Eastern Railway, a constant source of irritation in the Far East since its inception in 1896. At that time Russia, with the support
of Germany and France, had forced Japan to renounce
possession of the Liaotung Peninsula, ceded to her by
China after the Sino-Japanese war of 1894. Russian
plans for the seizure of that peninsula herself, which
took place in 1898, were well under way, and the TransSiberian Railway had been under construction for five
years. A glance at the map on page 41 will show how
construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway due southeast from Chita to Vladivostok not merely shortened the
circuitous frontier route of the Trans-Siberian by 570
miles, but also tapped for the benefit of Russia's chief
Pacific port the untouched resources of North Manchuria
and furthered the Russian policy of political expansion
in this part of China.
The concession granted by the Chinese government of
the time was typical of those extorted by European na



36     OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
tions from the decadent Manchu dynasty at Peking.
Founded as a Russian joint stock company, the Chinese
Eastern Railway was given power to acquire land which
the Czarist government deemed necessary for the "construction, operation, and protection of the line," which
sweeping preliminary was followed by clauses granting
the company "the absolute and exclusive right of administration of these lands," and the right to erect buildings
and construct telegraph lines. Russian officials, technicians, and laborers swarmed in and settled throughout
the railway zone to an extent which made it virtually a
Russian colony, despite the provision that eighty years
after the completion of the road it should revert to China
without payment. The tendency toward covert annexation was strengthened when after the Boxer rebellion
Russian regiments, sent on the pretext of guarding the
Chinese Eastern Railway, remained, not merely in the
concession zone, but throughout all of the three Manchurian provinces. The failure of Russia to withdraw
these troops and restore Chinese authority in Manchuria, coupled with St. Petersburg's obvious policy of
economic and political encroachment in Korea, was the
main cause of the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905.
Contrary to popular impression, this war was' by no
means the sweeping victory for Japan that has been pictured. The Japanese delegates to the Portsmouth peace
conference faced the Russians not as dictators, but as
negotiators fully conscious that continuation of hostilities
might see the tide of battle turn against them. For that
reason there could be no chance of expelling Russia from
Manchuria. The Russian rights in the Liaotung Peninsula were transferred to Japan, as was the South Manchurian branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway, running
from Changchun to Port Arthur, with its connections,
China consenting in a special treaty with Japan. The
main line of the Chinese Eastern Railway remained Rus



JAPAN IN MANCHURIA


37


sian, as did the section from Harbin to Changchun.
Russian influence in North Manchuria remained as strong
as ever, strengthened, if anything, by concentration, and
the net result was the division of the Three Eastern
Provinces, as Manchuria is known in China, into two
spheres of foreign influence instead of one.
Germany, with a strong foothold in Shantung; France,
expanding her influence from Indo-China into Yunnan;
Great Britain, owning Hongkong, leasing Weihaiwei,
dominating the Yangtze Valley from Shanghai, and
anxious to keep Russia from protesting her aggression in
Tibet-these three nations readily concurred in the new
arrangement in Manchuria. The United States, alone
interested in preserving the territorial and administrative integrity of China, was the only great power to
view the partitioning of Manchuria with distrust.
A test of sincere interest in the preservation of Chinese
sovereignty was put up to the other powers when Secretary of State Knox, in November, 1909, proposed redemption of the Manchurian railroads by means of an
international loan to China, administration of the lines
to be handled by a joint international commission during the period of the loan. Both Russia and Japan registered strong opposition to the plan, while Great Britain
and France were careful to refrain from indorsing a proposal so at variance with their own policies in China.
In consequence, the division of Manchuria remained a
fait accompli, with Russia in the north and Japan in
the south steadily solidifying the political and economic
power given them bi the untrammeled railroad concessions. Manchuria is a huge, underpopulated, and undeveloped country. Its area of 363,700 square miles is
approximately as great as the combined areas of the
states of New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Georgia. Its population, by the most gen



38      OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
erous estimate, is not greater than that of the three states
first named above.l Both Japan and Russia could work
in their separate zones for years without coming into
rivalry.
The World War, however, brought new factors into
play. It greatly strengthened Japan's position in the
Far East, while all of Russia's attention and energies
were absorbed in Europe, so much so that in 1916 the
Czarist government consented to sell a small section of
the Chinese Eastern Railway's southern branch to Japan.
The next year came the Bolshevik revolution. While
the Chinese Eastern Railway remained in the hands of
its Russian administration, strongly anti-Soviet in character, it was helpless without the subsidies which the
Czarist Treasury had been granting.
During the international Siberian expedition already
discussed (in Chapter I), the Chinese Eastern Railway,
as part of the Trans-Siberian system, was operated by
an Interallied Technical Board under the presidency of
John F. Stevens, the well-known American railway engineer. Of the money advanced during the international
trusteeship of the line, which continued until October
31, 1922, about $5,000,000 came from the United States.
In spite of the fact that only a trivial proportion of our
population has ever heard of the Chinese Eastern Railway, we were becoming more deeply implicated therein
than any foreign nation other than Russia and Japan.
On the date of our retirement from a share in management, Washington formally announced its interest "in
the efficient operation of the railway and its maintenance
as a free avenue of commerce open to the citizens of all
countries without favor or discrimination." Except that
' The Chinese Economic Monthly for January, 1926, estimates
the total population of Manchuria at "less than fifteen million,"
or about forty persons per square mile. The Japanese estimates
are 50 per cent higher.




JAPAN IN MANCHURIA


39


our attitude was more assertive then, the American policy towards the Chinese Eastern Railway had not
changed at all since the unwelcomed "open door" proposal made by Secretary Knox thirteen years earlier.
Neither, it has developed recently, has there been any
fundamental alteration in the Russian attitude toward
the Chinese Eastern Railway, in spite of the sounding
fury of Soviet opposition to imperialism as practiced by
capitalistic nations. On May 31, 1924, the Peking government, having recognized the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, signed with it an agreement for joint control
of the Chinese Eastern Railway, pending its presumable
ultimate redemption by China. Of the ten members of
the Board of Directors five, including the president, are
Chinese and five Russian. The vital office of general
manager is held by a Soviet government appointee and
about 25,000 of the railroad's employees, being substantially over half, are Russians, the majority of them tested
communists. That these Russian railroad workers are
in Manchuria for other purposes than the mere operation
of the Chinese Eastern Railway is attested, to cite only
one bit of evidence, by a speech made by Leon Trotsky
in Moscow on January 29, 1926. Herein, as quoted by
the Tass (Official Soviet) News Agency, he observed that
"the Russian workers on the Chinese Eastern Railway
are, as it were, the permanent representatives, the junior
diplomats of the Soviet Union in the very heart of Manchuria."
Russian Soviet spokesmen have frequently accused
Japan of seeking to detach Manchuria from control by
the Peking government. Yet, four months after signature of the Chinese Eastern Railway agreement between
Moscow and Peking, the Russians, on September 20,
1924, concluded a separate treaty with Chang Tso-lin,
war lord of Manchuria, at that time in open rebellion
against the Chinese central government. By its implied




40     OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
recognition of Manchurian independence, the Soviet government in this second Chinese Eastern Railway agreement made a diplomatic faux pas almost as serious as
the notorious Japanese "Twenty-one Demands." Since
that time Chinese suspicion of Russia's protestations of
friendship has been on the increase. In essentials, the
Russian treaties with Peking and Mukden relative to
the Chinese Eastern Railway are identical, though the
latter sets a date for the ceding of the road to Chinese
ownership, making the concession period sixty years instead of the eighty years stipulated in the original Czarist agreement.
It is natural that Japanese statesmen should be somewhat irritated and disturbed by the turn events have
taken in Manchuria since the rapid recuperation of
Soviet Russia. Instead of having the virtually clear
field in Manchuria which seemed probable for some years
after the Bolshevik revolution, Japan now finds the new
Russia about as firmly established there as was the old,
with the difference that Russian leaders no longer play
the game of diplomacy according to accepted rules, and
have many more influential friends among the Chinese
than their Czarist predecessors had. With more and
more capital going from Japan into Manchuria, the
situation there is one of tension; and this tension is being brought to the point of strain by the important Japanese railroad developments steadily working up into the
Russian sphere of influence and threatening both the
strategic and the economic importance of the Chinese
Eastern Railway.
The most important of the Japanese-controlled feeders to the South Manchurian Railway is that from Taonan to Tsitsihar, which is now nearing completion and
will probably be open for regular traffic as far as Anganchi on the Chinese Eastern main line before the
close of 1926. The map on page 41 indicates how this




JAPAN IN MANCHURIA


41


OF MANCHURIA


Key
LC4  JIWrsm#111 Iwne MI/I or l
10146-qp-.......  -T.?.
chtflast~ Goverapbeop KAradds




42     OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
line, connecting with that already in operation from
Taonan to Szepingkai, will tend to develop districts along
the Chinese Eastern Railway and drain to the Japanese
port of Dairen products which heretofore have found
haphazard outlet through the Russian port of Vladivostok. Before the section from Taonan to Anganchi
was more than half completed, Mr. Fujine, a high official of the South Manchurian Railway, reported that
100,000 tons of agricultural products had been shipped
southward over it, though not a house was visible from
the line when the preliminary surveys were made. Soviet
officials are openly anxious over this encroachment in
a territory long considered a Russian preserve, and are
doing what little they can to delay completion of the
line. For instance, as Tsitsihar, capital of Heilungkiang
Province, lies to the north of the Chinese Eastern Railway main line, the Japanese engineers will be forced to
carry their road across the Russian line by viaduct,
after first making a detour to avoid the Central Eastern
Railway land concession around Anganchi station.
Another railroad development of significance to Russo-Japanese rivalry in Manchuria is that which will extend the present Chinese line from Changchun to Kirin
by carrying it on to Tunghwa. Although planned by
Japanese interests as far back as 1909, the scheme languished until the South Manchurian Railway in 1925
agreed to construct the line as contractor for the
Chinese government, an arrangement similar to that in
operation on the Taonan-Tsitsihar railroad. This contract was repudiated in the autumn of 1925, when Marshal Chang Tso-lin's influence was temporarily withdrawn from the Peking government, and that of Russia
increased there; but later its legality was established.
The contract calls for completion of the 130-mile extension in two years, which is regarded as optimistic in
view of the mountains and forests across the route.




JAPAN IN MANCHURIA


43


Rich arable lands and mineral deposits, at present undeveloped, will be tapped. There is little doubt that
this line eventually will link up with the Korean government railways at Kanai, thus bringing another big slice
of Manchuria into the Japanese economic orbit and further threatening the commercial value of Vladivostok.
This city has now been made a free port by the Soviet
government as a part of the effort to combat Japanese
commercial penetration.
One of the lesser handicaps of the Russian-managed
Chinese Eastern Railway in rivaling these Japanesesponsored developments is its five-foot gauge. From
Harbin, center of Russian influence in Manchuria, north
to Hailun has now been started a standard-gauge line
which in time should reach the Siberian frontier at Aigun,
across the Amur River from Blagovieschensk, on a
Trans-Siberian branch line. This connection between
the Chinese Eastern and Trans-Siberian railroads would
have been put through by the Soviet government had
funds been available.  Construction now  is being
financed by the provincial government of Heilungkiang
(one of the three Manchurian provinces) and is under
the direction of M. Ostroumoff, former engineer-in-chief
of the Chinese Eastern Railway, who was imprisoned by
the Soviet authorities when they assumed charge at
Harbin in October, 1924. Here is a third link in the
chain of anti-Soviet railroad engineering which is being
spread throughout the Chinese Eastern Railway zone.
Without considering other Manchurian railroad schemes
of a nebulous character, such as a line from Hailun to
Tsitsihar, and another from Taonan to Jehol, it is
obvious from the map that the tacit Sino-Japanese alliance in development of this type is tending completely
to undermine Russia's heretofore privileged position in
the north of this economically and politically important
territory.




44     OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
Nor, as authoritative Japanese spokesmen are glad to
point out when anonymity is preserved, is Moscow in
any way able to check this highly significant trend. All
of the new railroad lines are being built on Chinese soil
at Chinese request, and to oppose them, whether on
grounds of strategic or economic interest, is tantamount
to a public admission that a reflection of Czarist imperialism lurks behind the Russian claim of being China's
most devoted friend. It cannot be said that the railroad extensions described threaten the strategic value
of the Chinese Eastern Railway without a plain implication that Russia's interest in this road is purely selfish.
And Soviet officials cannot openly object to the diversion
of traffic from Vladivostok to Yellow Sea ports since
this diversion is obviously in the interest of Chinese as
well as Japanese prosperity.
To what extent Japan, in her successful effort to
undermine Soviet Russia in Manchuria, is further encroaching upon Chinese sovereignty is a topic requiring
realistic consideration of the Chinese situation as preliminary. The answer really depends on whether one
views Chinese sovereignty as something real, or as a
phrase which may be considered meaningless in view
of actual conditions in that country. There is no
doubt that there are many influential Japanese, both military and commercial types, who would like to see their
country take political steps in conformity with the
enormous economic investment of Japan's nationals in
Manchuria; but there is equally little doubt that the
present-day statesmen of Japan above everything are
anxious to avoid any action which might contribute to
the fostering of anti-Japanese sentiment in China. The
termination of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, the passage
of the American Exclusion Act, the rise of Soviet Russia,
and the domestic problems already touched upon have
all contributed to give a new orientation to Japanese




JAPAN IN MANCHURIA


45


foreign policy. The winning of the friendship and confidence of China-as a neighbor, as a people of kindred
race, as a source of raw materials, as a vast potential
market for Japanese products, as the country which has
influenced Japan spiritually more than any otherfrom every angle seems vital in Tokyo now. The Gaimusho, or Foreign Office, is doing its utmost to see that
Japan and China draw together rather than apart.
In Manchuria, it must be remembered, Japan is playing for a tremendous stake-the solution of all her pressing economic problems. The agricultural potentialities
of the country are enormous, the 100,000,000 acres now
under cultivation in beans, kaoliang, millet, corn, wheat,
barley, rice, oats, and tobacco giving only an indication. Animal husbandry of every type, from chickens to
camels, is well developed. There are millions of acres
of virgin forest containing practically every type of tree
known to the temperate zone. Manchuria is very rich
in mineral deposits; gold, iron, and coal being most
abundant, while silver, sulphur, gypsum, asbestos, and
sodium salts are all found in considerable quantities.
The Fushun coal mines, one of the numerous industrial
enterprises operated for Japan by the South Manchurian
Railway, are alone estimated to have deposits of over
1,000,000,000 tons of rich bituminous coal of which over
10,000 tons are now being taken out daily. As for foreign trade, an idea of the rapid development under Japanese exploitation can be obtained by taking the import
and export figures for 1908 and 1924 at Dairen, through
which Japanese-leased port now passes two-thirds of
Manchuria's external trade. The value, in United States
currency, is as follows:
1908         1924
Imports..............  $13,585,354  $62,499,706
Exports...............  8,315,728  98,767,098




46      OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
No less than 20 per cent of the total foreign trade of
China is concentrated in Manchuria, which has about 4
per cent of China's total population; and Japanese ships
today provide twice as much of the tonnage carrying this
trade as do the ships of all other nations combined.
In this connection the phraseology of the famous Lansing-Ishii note of November, 1917, will come to mind.
Our State Department then stated, and there were many
recriminations afterwards because of it, that:
The governments of the United States and Japan recognize
that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and consequently the Government of the United States
recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly
in the part to which her possessions are contiguous.
Whether or not we hold today that special interests in
Manchuria must not be interpreted by Japan as "paramount interests," the fact remains that Japanese penetration there goes on apace. In the first nine months
of 1925, the Japanese civil population there increased
by over 5,000, from 179,484 to 184,528,1 the figure being
exclusive of nearly 100,000 who reside in Kwantung
leased territory on Liaotung Peninsula. The total population of Japan proper on October 1, 1925, was 59,736,822, representing an annual increase of about 750,000
since 1920. One per cent of this increase is now emigrating to Manchuria, counting Kwantung as a part thereof.
It is the only foreign territory where this circumscribed
people can accomplish essential expansion without immediate trouble.
Whether or not the expansion can continue without
arousing an acute Chinese or Russian hostility remains
'The total number of Japanese residing abroad on October 1,
1925, was estimated by the Tokyo Foreign Office at 620,000, of
whom nearly one-third are therefore residents of Manchuria. The
Japanese population of China proper on the same date was put
at 47,612.




JAPAN IN MANCHURIA                 47
to be seen. But in either or both cases it may be asserted, without assuming the dangerous prophetic role,
that Japan, whatever the political arrangement, is in
Manchuria to stay.




CHAPTER VI


"STATES' RIGHTS" IN CHINA
To most Americans and, it must be added, to a surprisingly large proportion of the foreigners resident in
China, the politics of that country appear as a vicious
and incomprehensible muddle. Vicious they often are;
incomprehensible they need not be. That confusion
arises is partially due to our shallow custom of identifying contemporary movements with the men who seem
to exemplify them. Ordinarily, this is easier than the
more logical course of studying the forces underlying
great popular eruptions, letting the so-called "leaders"
fall into their places afterwards. When such unfamiliar
appellations as Wu Pei-fu, Chang Tso-lin, Sun Chuanfang and Feng Yu-hsiang are to be memorized, the personality method becomes a boomerang for those who
would learn speedily.
We can see the fallacy of undue personification in
our own history. Nobody contends today that Jefferson
Davis was more than a by-product of the Civil War,
and even in the case of George Washington, where idealization has been concentrated for generations, we know
that the man was made by the upheaval, not the other
way around. In China, where the individual counts for
much less than in the Occident, we should be equally
realistic. In present-day China, moreover, it is not
merely that the names of outstanding personalities are
hard to remember. The causes of unrest are also difficult to analyze in a way flattering to white pride of race.
48




"STATES' RIGHTS" IN CHINA


49


These factors combine with the scarcity of impartial
news, the remoteness of the country, and other causes
to make it easy to disregard what is happening across
the Pacific. Apathy, however, is patently inconsistent
with our increasing political, financial, and spiritual implications in China, a nation whose invaluable contributions to civilization richly merit American appreciation
even without the more prosaic arguments for better
understanding.
In considering the problems of China in terms of movements rather than men, it is of prime importance to
visualize the continental nature of the country. Considerably larger in area than the United States and all
its possessions, China has only about six thousand miles
of railroads, approximately the same mileage as the
Baltimore and Ohio system alone. The difficulties of
communication must be understood, for they are basic
obstacles to every phase of national regeneration. It is
well to remember, for instance, that even in normal times
it takes as long to travel overland from Peking to Canton as to go from New York to Moscow.
Again, the Chinese, even disregarding outlying districts of the unwieldy republic, are not a homogeneous
race. Without considering the many ethnical elements
brought together by distant wars of conquest and migrations, we can readily see geographical causes for heterogeneity. Superimpose the map of China to scale upon
that of North America and it will not merely exceed the
breadth of the United States at its widest part, but will
extend from the latitude of southern Alaska to that of
Guatemala. Within this vast territory dwell some four
hundred million people,' about one-quarter of mankind as
a whole, who are divided into at least five distinct physical groups. These groups, differing from one another
'The Chinese Post Office estimate for 1923, generally regarded
as somewhat high, gives a total population of 436,094,953.




50     OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
as much as the Nordic, Alpine, and Mediterranean races
in Europe, are symbolized by the five-bar flag of the
Chinese Republic. In that flag the red stripe represents
the Chinese proper, the yellow the Manchus, the blue
the Mongols, the white the Tibetans, and the black the
fifteen to twenty million Mohammedan members of the
huge Chinese family.
Stretching from the fifty-third degree of north latitude, where Manchuria and Mongolia indent Siberia at
widely separate points, to the eighteenth degree, where
the great island of Hainan lies on a level with Bombay,
it is natural that there should be physical differences
between the Chinese of the north and the south. The
average Cantonese is between three and four inches
shorter and far slighter than his compatriot from
Peking, a spread in stature which, since the majority of
Chinese in this country are from Kwangtung Province,
has given rise to the false conception that the nation is
undersized by our standards. Mental differences are as
pronounced, the southern Chinese being as a rule more
aggressive, nervous, fiery, and mentally alert than those
of the north. Whatever government may be in power
in Peking, it is a commonplace that most of the administrators there are likely to be from south of the Yangtze,
the great river which divides China proper into two
nearly equal segments. As is well known, moreover,
the spoken language differs so that highly educated
Chinese from Canton and from Peking will often find
it easiest to converse with one another in English.
Food, clothing, architecture, and many other details
of living all differ from north to south in China as
much as the appearance of the countryside, ever verdant in the semi-tropical south, but brown, desolate,
and arid during the northern winter months.
Yet, under these superficial differences, all the
essential conditions of national unity are present, as




"STATES' RIGHTS" IN CHINA


51


those who would split China into spheres of foreign
influence have experienced to their cost. The spoken
language, where the Mandarin is not used, may vary
so much as to make the people of different provinces
unintelligible to one another; but the written language is everywhere identical.  Railroads traverse
only a fraction of the country, and run precariously
at that; but the government postal system, the telegraph, and now even the wireless as well, bind the
country together intellectually, if not physically. In
ethical ideas, cultural background, and social arrangements there is pronounced uniformity throughout the
republic, the cleavage being between indigenous and
foreign systems rather than geographical.
Historically, no other existing nation can claim anything like the political continuity that China shows,
with her recorded story of four thousand years of national existence. When Csesar was invading Britain,
the boundaries of China had been laid down much as
they exist today. Before that, when ancient Greece
was establishing a pocket of civilization on the fringe
of barbarian Europe, the Chinese had spread a culture, quite as interesting and in many ways fully as
worthy of modern respect as that of Greece, over an
area greater and a people far more numerous than
those of pre-Christian Europe. It is a small wonder
that the Chinese for centuries regarded the white race
as crude and uncivilized. Nor is it surprising that
their tradition of greatness in the past unifies the
teeming millions from Manchuria to Kwangsi, from
Szechwan to Chekiang, in a way which cuts deeper
than surface disorders and transient civil warfare.
The proof of this, in terms which the west can understand, was given when anti-imperialist risings flamed
out all over China following the shooting of demonstrators by British police in Shanghai on May 30, 1925.




52  OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT


No reasonable observer claims that Russian influence
caused these widespread protests, however much Soviet
propagandists may have abetted them. They were essentially the reflection of an outraged national unity,
no less deep than our own unity because moulded along
less assertive and more mellow lines.
Fundamentally, we must agree, China possesses all the
conditions requisite for development as a national entity in the modern sense of the phrase; but this development must follow lines natural to the conditions
and traditions of the country rather than systems imposed by or blindly copied from Occidental states.
Japan could imitate where China cannot, partly because
of the enormous geographical differences between the
two countries, partly because the Chinese character has
always resisted imitation, even where materially profitable, as much as the Japanese has leaned toward
it. Worth remembering is the fact that before Japan
began to westernize herself, Chinese literature, philosophy, and social codes were models for the island empire.
One reason why the Japanese worry so much about
"Bolshevism," while most Chinese regard communist
propaganda almost with indifference, is the relative immunity of the latter country to external influence, as
opposed to the marked susceptibility of Japan. Certainly, it is a tribute to China's inherent strength that
she remains the only non-white nation which has not
succumbed, whether by conquest or by imitation, to the
spirit of aggrandizement which has brought all the rest
of the world to the adoption of Occidental methods.
Politically, China has for centuries been the loosest
imaginable form of federal union, with each of the provinces preserving complete autonomy over its domestic
affairs, and such outlying districts as Tibet, Turkestan, and Mongolia quasi-independent in character. The
alien Manchu dynasty, which ruled in Peking from 1644




"STATES' RIGHTS" IN CHINA


53


to the abdication of the last Emperor in 1912, was during its early period of power too wise to stir hostility
by gratuitous interference in local affairs. The provinces, which are delimited much as they stand today
in the oldest maps of China which have any pretense of accuracy, saw an increase rather than a limitation of their "States' Rights" in the two centuries from
1650 to 1850. The Imperial representatives appointed
by Peking collected such relatively small taxes as the
central government demanded, of course adding a percentage for personal "squeeze," which is as much an
accepted custom in China as the taking of ground rents
or mineral royalties is in Anglo-Saxon countries. This
small financial levy, coupled with an occasional foray
by Manchu troops, if necessary to preserve civil peace,
was about the extent of federal authority until foreign
penetration combined with a succession of feeble rulers
to force the cumulative changes which underlie the present chaos in China.
It frequently has been pointed out that it was not
territorial aggression, but insistence on the right to
engage in commerce which was the objective of the
Chinese policy of the foreign powers during the early
years of the nineteenth century. Even so the destructive effect on the Chinese form of government was pronounced. The preliminary aim of the powers was to force
the recognition and acceptance of their envoys by Peking, long resisted by the Manchu court not entirely, it is
legitimate to surmise, out of "cussedness," but from the
same close reasoning based on observation which caused
Herbert Spencer, years later, to advise the Japanese to
"keep other races at arm's length as much as possible." 1
Distrust was not misplaced. No sooner were foreign
diplomats securely established in Peking than they began to demand that the central government insure proSee pp. 30-32.




54     OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
tection to their uninvited nationals in every part of
China. The pressure had begun to break down that
local self-government based on family and guild organization which was so natural and basic to the Chinese
system.
Some of the worst injuries the white race has brought
to China have been implicit rather than overt. Tang
Shao-yi, the first Prime Minister of the Chinese Republic, told me that when he was a boy in Kwangtung he
never saw a policeman, and that the absence of the
disciplinary side of government was taken for granted
by people accustomed to regulate their actions by ethical
standards rather than by laws. Nothing, of course, is
easier than to picture the past as idyllic, regardless of
the fact that such bloody interludes as the Taiping Rebellion can be found in every "golden age" of Chinese
history. But evidence is irrefutable of the ability of the
Chinese to order their lives industriously and happily
with a minimum of the evil of government. The student
need only refer to the maxims of Confucius to realize
the emphasis which his countrymen lay on the avoidance
rather than the forceful suppression of controversy. The
difference between Confucianism and Christianity in
this respect is that the former has written its ethics
much more deeply in the daily life of its followers.
A good illustration of what is meant by an implicit
injury to China is found in the effect of the Boxer
indemnity in plunging the country into political chaos.
There is no question that the Boxer rebellion was an
insane and terrible outbreak, though no impartial historian can deny that there was great provocation for
the rising in the progressive encroachments of foreign
powers on Chinese sovereignty. With polemics on this
issue, however, we are not here concerned. The insufficiently realized point is that the indemnity of over
$300,000,000 imposed on China led by direct and per



"STATES' RIGHTS" IN CHINA


55


ceptible stages to the revolution of 1911 and the establishment of a nominal Republic for which the country
was in no way fitted or prepared. To raise the first
installments of this huge indemnity, a central government which had shown itself helpless to check shameless
foreign aggression was forced to increase tax levies and
otherwise interfere in local affairs at the very moment
when the inherent Chinese dislike for the Manchus was
beginning to harden.
Whether or not the reform movement to which the
Manchu dynasty gave belated support might have modernized the Chinese government with as little disorder
as occurred in Japan is now an academic speculation. A
careful plan was promulgated in 1908, designed to alter
the existing autocracy to a constitutional monarchy with
a bicameral elected Parliament after nine years of progressive preparation.  The alien character of this
program and the enormous extent of illiteracy in China
might alone have defeated the end sought. But beyond
this the reforms were so planned as to continue and
amplify the centralization policies to which the Manchus
had become committed. In any event the time was past
for saving a monarchy which had become identified with
a progressive surrender of territory and sovereign rights
to foreign aggression.
Tzu-hsi, the formidable old Empress Dowager, might
have been able to postpone the revolution by her personal ability and prestige, but she died in November,
1908, only a few months after the initiation of the reform
program. The same week died also her nephew, Kuanghsu, the nominal emperor, who for ten years had been
kept a virtual prisoner by the Empress Dowager because
of his eagerness to revise the Chinese system of government along western lines. The new occupant of the
Dragon Throne was four-year-old Prince P'u-yi, whose
reactionary guardians quickly proceeded to make the




56     OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
pending revolt inevitable. In Peking, early in 1926, I
met the younger brother of this last of the Manchu
emperors. The weakness of his face and the delicacy
of his physique did much to illustrate how the warrior
Manchu dynasty had been played out by three centuries
of court life. Yet, even this overrefined lad, living in
seclusion and in danger of injury at the hands of his
countrymen, was so imbued with the prevalent national
feeling that he had abandoned the study of English as a
protest against the overbearing attitude of British subjects in China.
The weakness of the dynasty, the incredible stupidity
of its advisers, the impatience of Chinese who had
studied abroad with the backwardness and helplessness
of their country by western standards, all contributed
to spread revolutionary sentiment in provinces already
honeycombed with discontent. But for those who would
look toward the future, as well as the past, in China
there is deepest significance in the fact that rebellion
actually broke out over the issue of centralization versus
provincial rights.  Acting under foreign advice the
Manchu government in 1911 floated the Hukuang railroad loan, designed to complete trunk railroads in South
China and to bring them under the government-ownedand-operated system. Agitation against this interference
with local self-government, coupled with the fear that
foreign interests would secure an economic strangle hold
through the agency of Peking, led to the first bloodshed
of the rebellion. On October 9, 1911, an accidental bomb
explosion in a secret revolutionary arsenal at Hankow
forced the government to take repressive measures and
the leaders in the conspiracy to call a nation-wide rising. Within a month fourteen provinces had declared
independence of Peking and the moribund central government crumbled like a house of cards.
It would be exaggeration to say that any carefully




"STATES' RIGHTS" IN CHINA


57


formulated, philosophic theory of "States' Rights" was
behind the rebellion. It can legitimately be argued
that in the railroad issue the policy of Peking was
justified because the provincial companies then engaged
in construction in the south had shown themselves wasteful and inefficient when judged either by foreign or
Chinese standards. It is doubtless true that one reason for provincial opposition to the national scheme
was fear that local perquisites of graft would be ended
while taxation to pay interest charges to foreign investors
would take their place. Nevertheless, the facts remain
that the average Chinese is strongly local rather than
national in his loyalties; that the progressive decadence
of Manchu rule had at the time of the revolution greatly
forwarded the spirit of local autonomy and the mistrust
of centralized bureaucracy; and that the helpless subservience of Peking to foreign influence had rendered
the capital suspect throughout all China. The implicit
connection between foreign encroachments and the
Chinese Revolution is not imaginary but very real. The
natural tendency toward local self-government in China
has been greatly strengthened by the accumulating evidence that relinquishment of sovereignty to Peking is a
long step-on the road of relinquishment of sovereignty
to foreigners.
While the "States' Rights" issue, if one may force the
parallel for sake of charity, is quite intelligible to Americans, it remains perfectly incomprehensible to most Englishmen in China. These last, viewing their politics from
an imperial viewpoint and inclined to be scornful of
governmental methods not modelled on their own, for
this reason are generally prejudiced critics of the turmoil in China at the present time. They can see nothing
in the suggestion that there may be a rough political
parallelism between the distrust of central control in
China and that exhibited toward our federal government




58     OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
by the sovereign states in the anarchic period following
the achievement of American independence. In spite
of its basic importance in the problems of China, the
whole idea of federal union as a desirable form of government is ignored or misunderstood by most of the
English in China. "Old China hands," as the veteran
Treaty Port residents like to call themselves, have characterized the British Empire to me as such a union,
which is extremely inexact. Canada, Australia, and
South Africa taken separately have federal forms of
government; but the Empire as a whole has nothing to
do with federalism, having evolved from a collection of
subject colonies to something which, so far as the great
Dominions go, is best defined as a close-knit League of
Nations.
It follows that the English in China, almost to a man,
regard the collapse of central government there as the
most significant factor in the situation. To many Americans there is more meaning in the continuance of orderly local life, in all districts where war or banditry
is not actually raging, in spite of the complete inability
of central authority to enforce security. While one side
points to war-torn areas or bandit seizures, the other
will prefer to dwell on the interesting and capable government of Kwangtung Province, or to refer to the
"model province" of Shansi. The experiment in Kwangtung will be discussed in some detail in Chapter VIII.
In Shansi, it may be noted here, Governor Yen Hsi-shan
has steadily built good roads, established schools, forwarded the mining of coal and small-scale industries,
and stopped the production of opium-all without any
desire or expectation of federal aid. On the contrary,
his chief anxiety while I was in Peking was to repel
from the district under his control disorderly soldiery
masquerading as units of the "national army."
The extent of a literal anarchy in China, as opposed




"STATES' RIGHTS" IN CHINA             59
to the philosophic type disposed to dispense with government as far as possible, is nevertheless not to be
minimized. In the following chapter will be given a
summary of the main political trends since the revolution, designed to provide that background without which
understanding of contemporary policies and disorders in
China is impossible.




CHAPTER VII


THE ANARCHY OF THE TUCHUNATE
Less than three months after the outbreak of the
revolution of 1911, before the country as a whole was
awake to the issues involved, the Imperial family in a
panic delegated its authority to Marshal Yuan Shih-kai,
occupying a middle position between the republicans
and the dynasty. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the idol of particularistic South China, who had long labored in behalf
of the revolution, returned from Europe to be named
Provisional President, but turned that office over to
Yuan when the general, in February, 1912, secured the
abdication of the Manchus. Characteristically Chinese
was the final edict of the dynasty, with great dignity
granting the establishment of the Republic and giving
Marshal Yuan permission to establish it.
With his inauguration, on March 10, 1912, the revolution seemed to be ended, having run its brief five
months' course with little bloodshed or material destruction outside of Hankow. Actually, the period of
chaos which still continues was being ushered in. The
monarchy had fallen before any other system had been
even roughly prepared to replace it. China had literally drifted into a republic because the name sounded
good to a handful of enthusiasts. Half a generation
after its establishment there is neither President nor
Legislative Assembly nor Constitution nor Electorate
in China. Were it not for the strange, intangible force
60




THE ANARCHY OF THE TUCHUNATE 61
of Chinese public sentiment, which is unquestionably republican and democratic, the title given to the country
would be entirely grotesque.
Yuan Shih-kai was a very capable military leader,
who under the patronage of the Empress Dowager had
worked hard to create a modern, efficient, foreign-trained
army to replace the medieval formations so pitiably defeated in the Sino-Japanese war. His value as a civilian
executive was much more questionable. From the outset
of his presidency, which immediately assumed the characteristics of a dictatorship, Yuan proceeded on the
fallacious theory that China can be successfully governed by a military autocrat in Peking. Although the
provisional Constitution prepared by the revolutionary
National Assembly had strictly limited presidential
powers, Yuan's centralization policy was more drastic
than that of the Manchu rulers, involving a complete
subserviency by the provinces which the South, in particular, was not at all inclined to give. Just because
Yuan Shih-kai attempted to wipe out local autonomy as
completely as Napoleon did in France, he is regarded
by those who put all faith in centralized authority as
the greatest man of modern China. For this same reason he is also viewed by many intelligent Chinese as
the instigator of present-day  militaristic troubles.
Most of the war lords who now plague the country
with their disreputable campaigns were Yuan's generals,
each laboring under the delusion that he is big enough
to assume a mantle which was oversized for their old
chief.
Yuan Shih-kai's reliance on unification by force, moreover, meant subordination to foreign interests and further pledging of China's resources to secure funds. The
evil device of appointing a military as well as a civil
governor for each province in order to insure centraliza



62     OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
tion was a complete fiasco, for many of these Tuchuns 
combined selfish ambitions, jealousy of their overlord,
and local desire for autonomy to keep tax collections
from reaching the national capital. The Japanese seizures in Shantung after the outbreak of war in Europe
and Yuan's helplessness in face of the Twenty-one Demands greatly contributed to make him unpopular, particularly in the anti-federal south. Even without his
abortive effort to restore the monarchy, with himself as
emperor, Yuan Shih-kai would probably have been overthrown had death not stepped in to claim him in June,
1916.
Since that date, hopes entertained at the establishment of the republic have been progressively blighted.
From a national viewpoint, the state of political anarchy
induced is so complete that there is much justification for
utter pessimism regarding the establishment of an effective system of government throughout all China. There
remains, of course, the paradoxical feeling that political
conditions are now so bad that they must soon take a
turn for the better. But real improvement, in all probability, will come through the gradual extension and
linking up of reasonably decent local government rather
than through the fiat of whatever militarist happens to
be in control in Peking.
In a study of such limited scope as this, it would not
be possible, and would be unnecessary, to touch on more
than a few of the landmarks along the downward path
of orderly central government in China. The first of
these milestones after Vice-President Li Yuan-hung had
automatically become chief executive was the dissolution in June, 1917, of the Chinese Parliament, which had
The official designation of a Provincial Military Chief has now
been altered to Tupan, but the old name sticks. More than a
new title is needed to improve the flavor of these replicas of
feudal barons.




THE ANARCHY OF THE TUCHUNATE 63
been reassembled after the death of Yuan Shih-kai.
To some extent this step was taken to stifle opposition to entering the war against Germany, into which
Chinese leaders were partly pushed by Wilsonian idealism, and in part entered gladly because it promised
elimination of the special privileges enjoyed by one of
the leading white powers on Chinese soil. But to a
greater extent, dissolution of the Parliament sprang
from the double realization that the people as a whole
were not interested in the device, and that it would be
an inconvenient check to the policies of the northern war
lords who aimed to perpetuate Yuan Shih-kai's autocratic rule. There were other hand-picked parliaments
in Peking during ensuing years and the one dissolved
in 1917 was reassembled there in 1922, distinguishing
itself thereafter by accepting several million dollars in
bribes to elect Tsao Kun to the presidency in the following year. Since that time the central legislative body
has gradually faded from the picture of Chinese political
life. Military leaders find it better business to avoid
bribery and spend the money on building armies with
which they can put their nominees in office without any
consideration of the parliamentary will.
Collapse of the attempt to institute parliamentary
government did not, however, mean that the monarchy
could be re-established. An effort to reinstate the
Manchu Emperor was made immediately after the dissolution of the Legislature in 1917, but was blocked by
Marshal Tuan Chi-jui, outstanding leader of the
pro-Japanese Anfu party.1 This second failure in monarchical restoration confirms other evidence that republicanism, no matter how chaotic in expression, has come
So-called because most of its original leaders came from
Anhwei and Fukien Provinces. It was always more of a political
club than a party, having no central executive and no membership
outside those instrumental in national politics.




64     OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
to stay in China. Neither the new dynasty desired by
Yuan Shih-kai, nor the return of the Manchus sought
in 1917, aroused more than a passing flicker of popular
interest in their favor.
Tuan Chi-jui had been Prime Minister until President Li Yuang-hung's hesitation about declaring war on
Germany caused him to resign. After the abortive
monarchist attempt, in which the President was said to
be implicated, Tuan resumed the Premiership and assumed complete control of government, thus deepening
the cleavage with the south, to which the intensive centralization and unification by force policy of the Anfu
party was deeply objectionable. As a result Sun Yatsen, Tang Shao-yi, and Wu Ting-fang, the latter memorable among other things for his brilliant work as
Chinese Minister at Washington in 1907, had formed a
completely independent republican government at Canton. This government had ample vicissitudes of its
own, which need not be examined here, but it is important as the lineal predecessor of the present Russianinfluenced regime in Kwangtung Province, and as an
example of the strongly separatist tendency in South
China which has in recent years been a constant reaction
to attempted dictatorship from Peking.
In North China, Tuan Chi-jui, a man of generally
acknowledged personal honesty and courage, was able
to maintain superficial calm by skilfully placating the
various Tuchuns. Finances to run the government were
forthcoming out of the series of Japanese loans,1 nominally contracted on the pretext of enabling China to
participate actively in the war with Germany. Public
hostility to these borrowings, led by student organizations, coincided with the trend in the south to weaken
Anfu power. Then, in 1920, Tuan made the mistake
1See pp. 5-6.




THE ANARCHY OF THE TUCHUNATE               65
of supporting a notoriously corrupt subordinate 1 against
the wishes of Marshal Wu Pei-fu. This Central China
war lord, with the active assistance of Chang Tso-lin,
the Tuchun of the Three Eastern Provinces (Manchuria),
promptly scattered the Anfu leaders by military force,
thus inaugurating the series of civil wars which has
lasted almost without interruption down to the present
time.
With the upsetting of the uneasy balance maintained
in Peking by Tuan Chi-jui, friction soon developed between the two leading war lords, Wu and Chang. In
1922, the Manchurian leader announced his intention of
suppressing Wu, but instead was defeated by the latter,
ably assisted by Feng Yu-hsiang, the famous "Christian
General," then beginning to become prominent as a skilful divisional commander and Tuchun of Shensi Province. Feng remained the military power behind the
Peking government, now too nebulous to merit naming
its shifting puppet heads, while Chang withdrew to Manchuria and proclaimed its independence. Outer Mongolia, in the meantime, had under Soviet influence
broken its nominal allegiance to Peking, and was then,
as now, to be regarded as a republic allied with the
Russian union rather than as a Chinese province.
While Feng occupied Peking and trained the army
which was later to become famous as the Kuominchun,
Wu Pei-fu, his superior, sought to consolidate the military position throughout China proper. It was the aim
of Marshal Wu, the directing head of the so-called Chihli
military party,2 to place his patron, General Tsao Kun,
in the presidency, and to unify China by force. Through
'Hsu Shu-tseng, generally known as "Little Hsu." To almost
universal relief, he was assassinated near Peking, Dec. 29, 1925.
'The other principal military party is the Fengtien party,
headed by Chang Tso-lin. Both names are arbitrary, chosen
from Provinces. Chihli Province contains Peking. Fengtien
Province contains Mukden.




66     OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
the parliamentary bribery referred to on page 63 the
first objective was achieved. The military unification
plan failed like all its predecessors and successors patterned on that line. This in spite of the fact that open
discord in South China had resulted in the temporary
overthrow of Sun Yat-sen, enabling Chihli influence to
be considerably extended south of the Yangtze River.
The story of Wu Pei-fu's collapse in 1924 is important, because it shows how unnatural is the recent
mariage de convenance between him and Chaig Tso-lin,
old enemies who have been brought together by a mutual
dislike of Feng Yu-hsiang and the encroachments of
Soviet Russia which the Christian General has tolerated,
if not welcomed. It is hard to see permanence in an
alliance based on such negative reasons, and it is quite
impossible to see any real patriotism in the anti-Russian
attitude of Chang, deeply distrusted throughout China
because of his years of cooperation with Japan.
During 1924, an obstacle to Wu's consolidation campaign developed in the possession of the native city
of Shanghai, metropolis of Kiangsu Province, by the
military governor of Chekiang, who found possession of
the mouth of the Yangtze valuable because of the revenue derivable from opium smuggling. In September,
1924, the Tuchun of Kiangsu, supported by Wu, moved
to recover Shanghai, and occupied it after a brief campaign. Wu and Chang had been steadily drifting in the
direction of war, the former through his enforcement of
centralization, the latter by reason of his insistence on
Manchurian independence. With unofficial Japanese
support, the assistance of Czarist Russian officers, and
the aid of a British military adventurer (General Sutton), Chang Tso-lin had built up a huge armament of
trench mortars, machine guns, and mobile artillery, supplemented with bombing and scouting airplanes and
other thoroughly modern war material. Still smarting








A SOLDIER OF THE KUOMINCHUN
Regarded by foreign military
observers as the equal of any
Occidental troops in discipline
and courage.
THE INTERNATIONAL TRAIN
Not Treaty Clauses, but white
paint and a liberal display of
flags are relied upon to keep
communications open to Peking
in wartime.




THE ANARCHY OF THE TUCHUNATE              67
under his defeat by Wu two years previous, the Manchurian war lord seized the fighting around Shanghai
as pretext to move south on Peking. The Chihli leader
welcomed the gage of battle, and poured division after
division of his troops up to the battle ground at Shanhaikwan, the narrow seacoast pass where the Great Wall
of China drops from impassable mountains to the Gulf
of Pechihli on the Yellow Sea.
At this crucial moment in the military situation came
the famous defection of the Christian general, whose
well-trained army of 30,000 men held the line south of
Jehol and was regarded by Wu Pei-fu as his left wing.
It is overstrong, considering the sauve qui peut attitude
of all Chinese militarists, to define Feng's action as
"treachery" toward Wu Pei-fu. The whole story of
what occurred prior to the fateful day of October 23,
1924, has not yet been revealed, but it is certain that
Marshal Feng decided, with probably as much sincerity as human beings generally show in times of
crisis, that the civil war was following senseless lines
certain only to impoverish the country further and
strengthen Japanese penetration in Manchuria. So on
that day Feng's army ceased to be subordinate to Wu
Pei-fu and became the Kuominchun-the "People's National Army" of China, pledged not to individual ambitions but to national welfare, the bulk of it composed
not of drafted coolies, but of patriotic volunteers who
marched into Peking singing Christian hymns and,
strangest anomaly of all in modern Chinese warfare,
took nothing for which full payment was not made.
A few days later Wu Pei-fu, furious and helpless, but
too courageous to follow the customary Chinese practice
of flying to a foreign concession in time of trouble, retreated openly to his base outside Hankow and there
began to plan for the revenge which he took in the spring
of 1926.




68     OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
The Kuominchun-a modern Chinese counterpart of
Cromwell's Ironsides, imbued with an Old Testament
religious fervor, disciplined like the Prussian guard, loyal
to their commander and loyal to China-remained in
power in Peking for eighteen months, from October, 1924,
to April, 1926. During that period there was perfect
order and safety for foreigners of every nation both
in the capital and in adjacent territories controlled by
Marshal Feng. Living far outside the Legation Quarter
in Peking during January of 1926, I no more hesitated
to wander about alone at night than if it had been an
American city. With a large sum of money in my
pocket, a friend and myself, both of course unarmed,
traveled from the Great Wall to Peking in a freight
car alone with soldiers of the Kuominchun to experience
nothing worse than courteous and friendly interest.
Every foreigner in the territory controlled by the Christian General during this period would, if honest, testify
to hundreds of evidences of like security. Why, then,
was there such assiduous foreign propaganda to spread
the downright slander about Feng Yu-hsiang which has
been popularized abroad?
The answer is not difficult to find. The Christian General had not been a month in power before he showed
that his policy was diametrically different to that of
the generality of war lords. His aim was not to weaken
China for personal aggrandizement, but to strengthen
his country by calling a truce to hostilities. Instead of
encouraging his soldiers to have loot and rapine as their
chief ambition he sent them from the drill ground to road
building and afforestation projects, filling their spare
time with lectures on the contemporary history of
China and general instruction along adult education
lines. The morale built up among the Kuominchun by
these methods was truly marvelous. Several times I
offered private soldiers in that army gratuities, trivial




THE ANARCHY OF THE TUCHUNATE 69
yet equivalent to a month of their meagre pay, for
services rendered. Always the tips were refused with
courteous dignity, even though there was none to oversee the transaction.
This alone, though disconcerting to those who claim
that China is sodden with corruption and cannot be
regenerated by native effort, would not account for the
vicious foreign hostility to Feng Yu-hsiang, in which
the English in China took the lead. The real cause
for this enmity was Feng's efforts to "deepen the revolution" and thereby forward its original aim of ridding
China of the encroachments on her sovereignty. This,
coupled with the fact that he was anxious to decentralize
rather than strengthen the central government, was the
Christian General's unforgivable sin.
The "deepening" of the revolution took several forms,
of which the most superficial was the expulsion from
the Forbidden City in Peking of Hsuan Tung, last
of the Manchu emperors, who by the abdication agreements had been allowed to retain the shadow of monarchical state within the imperial palaces.  Plain
Henry P'u Yi, as this youth now prefers to be known,
took refuge in the foreign concession at Tientsin, where
his proverbial "Chinaman's chance" at restoration is
somewhat strengthened by the inability of presidents
and premiers to retain office. This action by the Christian General, however, aroused little or no popular opposition, in contrast to the disappearance of many of the
palace treasures which accompanied it, a stain on Feng's
record perhaps comparable with that of the Teapot
Dome scandal during the Harding administration.
Of far greater importance was the tacit alliance established by Marshal Feng between the Kuominchun, or
People's National Army, and the Kuomintang, or People's National Party, the oldest and perhaps the only
effective political organization in China. The Kuomin



70     OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
tang, of which we shall have more to say in the next
chapter, was in large part the creation of Dr. Sun Yatsen, and its leaders were the effective force behind the
revolution. It has two wings, practically uniform in
their domestic platform, which stands for Constitutionalism, abolition of the military governor system, suppression of the war lords, decentralization of government,
and provincial autonomy. In foreign policy the left
wing favors summary abolition of the unequal treaties
and close cooperation with Russia, the right wing being
more conservative on both these issues'. Always strongest in Canton, the Kuomintang has branches throughout
all China, and among Chinese abroad, its total membership at the present time being half a million by conservative estimate. A very large proportion of university
students, whose active participation in politics has created both interest and resentment abroad, belong to it.
The Kuomintang is not communistic, there being a separate numerically negligible party of that flavor, but the
orientation of the left wing in recent years has been
distinctly pro-Russian. The real word to describe the
Kuomintang is "nationalistic." That in itself means
"Bolshevistic" to many foreigners in China.
To the impartial observer it will seem perfectly proper,
if indeed laudable is not an equally permissible word,
that Feng cooperated with the Kuomintang, even to the
extent of placarding his barracks with such slogans as
the one reading: "The People Subjected to Foreign Imperialism Are No Better than Homeless Dogs." Nor can
his relations with Soviet Russia be called discreditable.
When he bought munitions from that country, it was
primarily because he did not possess well-equipped
arsenals like Chang and Wu, and was cut off from other
foreign sources of supply open to them.
He did not, like the other war lords, actively interfere
with the conduct of civil government in Peking. Though




THE ANARCHY OF THE TUCHUNATE 71
he imprisoned Tsao Kun, Wu's nominee who had been
"elected" President by flagrant corruption, the day after
his coup d'etat, he maintained Tuan Chi-jui of the Anfu
party as Premier and "Provisional Chief Executive."
Absolutely unprecedented in Chinese post-revolutionary
history is the fact that the first cabinet formed after
Feng's seizure of Peking did not contain a single minister nominated by him. Early in 1925, the impossible feat
of a Reorganization Conference, which would bring both
Sun Yat-sen and Chang Tso-lin to the support of
Tuan's government, was attempted; but Dr. Sun, whose
closing years had seen a decided drift toward extreme
radicalism, died at Peking during its sessions, and Chang
Tso-lin was glad of the excuse to withdraw his delegates
from a conference which sought disarmament of the warring factions as one of its aims.
The Shanghai shootings of May 30, 1925, naturally
strengthened the influence of the Christian General, as
the outstanding nationalistic leader, and in December
of that year occurred a dramatic episode which, in the
opinion of many competent to judge, almost succeeded
in stabilizing the politics of China along the lines worked
for so arduously by the Kuomintang. General Kuo
Sung-ling, one of the Manchurian war lord's chief subordinates, revolted against Chang in behalf of the
nationalistic program of the Peking government. Wu
Pei-fu, stranded without money or men in central China,
was powerless to intervene, and all Feng had to do was
to go to the aid of Kuo in Manchuria in order to finish
off Chang Tso-lin, perhaps the most disruptive influence
in China, for good and all. In occupation of Tientsin,
controlling the only railroad from Peking to Mukden,
was General Li Ching-lin, an ambitious ex-Tuchun who
had served Chang well in the past and had now no intention of seeing Feng upset a balance of power which
well suited his own schemes.




72     OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
For a few days Feng hesitated, knowing that his
enemies would hail intervention in behalf of Kuo as
evidence that all of his work for peace and disarmament
was insincere. The delay was fatal. Not merely was
Chang Tso-lin able to rally, encouraged by the Japanese
announcement that civil war would not be permitted
along the South Manchurian Railway, but Li Ching-lin
was able to defend Tientsin with a most moder system
of entrenchments in which the hand of foreign military
advisers was apparent. Then, in one of the bloodiest
battles of modern China, the Kuominchun showed its
mettle. On Christmas Eve of 1925, after several days'
preliminary fighting, Feng's first army, though far deficient to that of Li in artillery, bombs, and ammunition,
stormed the defences of Tientsin with the bayonet. It
was an exhibition of disciplined courage which drew
gasps of admiration from every foreign military observer
in Peking, but it was fruitless. On the very day that
Tientsin fell to the National Army, Kuo Sung-ling was
defeated, captured, and beheaded three hundred miles
to the north. Deeply upset by a slaughter which on
both sides cost some ten thousand casualties-the dead
were thick on the battlefield when I passed over it on
Christmas Day-Feng announced his retirement from
public life. After a heroic effort at regeneration, the
way was open for the next move in Chinese disintegration.
A month after the battle of Tientsin, I interviewed
Marshal Wu Pei-fu at his Hankow headquarters, and
was told by him of his intention to overthrow the Kuominchun because "Soviet influence flourishes wherever
its troops are established." Regardless of the portion
of truth in that asseveration-which might just as logically have induced him to attack Chang Tso-lin because
Japanese influence flourishes wherever his troops are
established-the famous Marshal did not give me the




THE ANARCHY OF THE TUCHUNATE 73
impression of being anything more than a courageous
and efficient soldier. With famine and banditry rife in
the area of China under his control, his entire mind was
concentrated on the old myth of unifying China by
force. "Disarmament," Wu told me, "is too expensive
to be considered now. It will come when a legitimate
central government is established in Peking." The
trouble is that what is legitimate to Marshal Wu is
illegitimate to half his fellow countrymen, and vice
versa.
Financed by Chang Tso-lin, Marshal Wu moved his
army north from Hankow soon after my talk with him.
Simultaneously, Chang marched south from Manchuria,
while his allies, Li Ching-lin and Chang Tsung-chang,
advanced west from bandit-ridden Shantung. Against
this circular attack the Kuominchun, lacking Feng's
leadership, greatly outnumbered, and short of munitions,
nevertheless put up a heroic resistance. After a number
of severe battles, in several of which the unnatural allies
were defeated, the Kuominchun withdrew in good order,
first to Nankou Pass, northwest of Peking, and then
to the Mongolian border, where it still remains intact.
The taking of the capital at the end of April, 1926,
was marked by grave looting and other excesses, particularly, it is reported, on the part of Chang Tso-lin's
brigade of Czarist Russians. Four months after the
capture of Peking by Wu and Chang, there was still
no civil government functioning there, Dr. W. W. Yen,
one of the ablest of the neutral Chinese statesmen, having found it impossible to retain the premiership because
of conditions arising from the scarcely suppressed rivalry
between Wu and Chang.
So rests the thoroughly depressing political situation
at Peking at the time of writing (August, 1926). Centralization by force is again being attempted, but this
time by rival militarists who have in the past been bitter




74     OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
enemies. As a military hegemony in China has always
failed before, so, it may be confidently predicted, it will
fail again. Feng, product of the simple-minded peasant
class, has retired to Moscow, where his past tolerance
toward Soviet Russia is likely to be converted to a much
more active sympathy. He will not stay in Russia. The
Kuominchun awaits his return, while the collapse of Wu
Pei-fu before the northern march of the Canton armies
shows how hollow are that general's hopes of restoring
order by a victorious war on "radicalism."
Meantime, obscured by the confusing political kaleidoscope at Peking, important tendencies in China are
steadily taking permanent shape. Having discussed the
failure of centralization, let us consider the possibilities
of provincial autonomy, as illustrated by the work of
the Canton government. The trip from Peking to Canton is, for the reader, a matter of the turning of a
page. Let us remember always that the latter city
lies two thousand miles due south of China's nominal
capital, and that the traveler is lucky, nowadays, if he
can make the journey in less than two full weeks.




CHAPTER VIII


KWANGTUNG, WHERE CHINESE GOVERN
While much of northern and central China has been
wasting its substance in meaningless civil war, and the
banditry encouraged thereby, a definite and rational
philosophy of government has been spreading its influence from Canton throughout southern China. There
has been bloodshed, loot, and disorder in full and heaping
measure among these southern provinces but, in contradistinction to the north, one faction has preserved real
continuity and a truly patriotic aim. That faction is
the Kuomintang, or People's National party. Its aim is
the establishment of a really sovereign Republic of
China, formed by a Federal grouping of semi-autonomous
provinces.
Canton, with an estimated population of 1,400,000, is
a larger and commercially much more important metropolis than Peking, just as Kwangtung Province,l in
the heart of which the southern capital lies, is much
richer and more fertile than Chihli. In Kwangtung onetenth of China's 400,000,000 inhabitants are concentrated, and there the Kuomintang has nearly half of its
500,000 members and a large proportion of the peasant
"sympathizers" which this well-organized radical movement is seeking to win over.
In the brief period since June, 1925, when the
Kuomintang, heir to Sun Yat-sen's life work, secured
1 Not to be confused with Kwangtung, the Japanese leased territory on the Laiotung Peninsula in South Manchuria.
75




76     OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
unchallenged control of Canton, its gains have been remarkable. During that time, the entire province of
Kwangtung has been brought under the strong rule of
the provincial capital, and Kuomintang influence extended into the four adjacent provinces of Kwangsi,
Hunan, Kiangsi, and Fukien, containing, with Kwangtung, a population as numerous as that of the United
States. Truly, the fighting throughout China, which is
practically all we hear about in the fragmentary news
dispatches from that country, may give a very incomplete and misleading impression of what is significant to
the Chinese as a people. We little realize that the last
twelve-month in Canton has seen the evolution of a very
capable civil government which at present controls the
military arm in a way unknown elsewhere in China, and
which runs its finances on an efficient budget system.
Most of the information about Canton abroad has come
through the neighboring British colony of Hongkong,
against which for the same twelve-month period there
has been maintained a ruinous boycott hardly conducive
to a temperate opinion of its sponsors.
To sift out the truth about Canton between the absolutely conflicting statements which fill the air there and
in Hongkong is no easy matter. But one comprehensive
statement may be made with absolute certainty. The
present Canton government is well grounded, growing in
strength, in fact if not in name completely independent
of Peking, assured of whole-hearted support by Soviet
Russia, and completely contemptuous of foreign treaty
rights. If it were not so powerful it would not be so
well liked, nor so much hated.
The Canton government may legitimately be called
Bolshevistic in the loose sense of the word. It has welcomed revolutionary Russian advisers and military instructors. It has sanctioned uncompensated seizures of
private property and established government monopo



KWANGTUNG, WHERE CHINESE GOVERN 77


PR~OVINCES AND RAILROADS OF CHINA




78     OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
lies by fiat. It rules by a frank and open dictatorship
of a minority party which glorifies the manual worker
in proper soapbox spirit. It arms striking coolies with
modern rifles and takes good care to see that disgruntled
merchants shall not be similarly protected. Without
the slightest hesitation it interferes with private trade
and commerce, Chinese or foreign, for political ends.
And it is rather more than neutral in its attitude toward
anti-foreign, anti-capitalist, and anti-Christian agitation.
Nevertheless, the Canton government is not Communistic. Nor can it be said to have severed all constitutional relationships with Peking, with which city
there is as yet no rail connection. The five-bar flag
of the Chinese Republic still flies above the Customs
Building in Canton, in contrast to the sunburst banner
of the Kuomintang which predominates everywhere else
in Canton, and customs revenues, or a part of them, still
accrue to the credit of the National government. That
this is so is partly due to the care taken by Michael
Borodin, chief of the Russian Advisory Commission, not
to draw too much foreign attention to what is happening in Canton, and partly due to the tact, good judgment, and firmness exercised by Hayley Bell, an
Englishman who is Commissioner of Customs there, in
handling an extremely difficult, delicate, and (as an
assault on him has shown) dangerous job. Customs
revenues are also collected for Peking, against strong
local opposition, at Swatow and other Kwangtung ports,
though authority in this sphere is the only point
on which Kwangtung acknowledges the theoretical Federal sovereignty.
As long as they do not attempt, for the duration of
the boycott, to trade in British goods or with Hongkong,
Chinese merchants in Canton are free to carry on their
business without any serious restrictions. There are




KWANGTUNG, WHERE CHINESE GOVERN 79
heavy taxes, levied, as T. V. Soong, the youthful Harvard graduate who is Minister of Finance, thinks necessary. But as there are no illegal military exactions,
as in so many parts of China, and as the national characteristic of "squeeze," or petty official graft, has been
greatly reduced, little grumbling has occurred on this
score. Indeed, the Canton Chamber of Commerce and
other business organizations have more than once
financed adequately secured municipal loans.
The Canton government has declared an oil monopoly,
seemingly designed to favor Russian oil, which is coming
in from Vladivostok and even the Black Sea in increasing quantities. An undue proportion of revenue goes to
the Russian-directed military academy at Whampoa and
to the labor unions in one form or another. The avowed
tendency of these last to dictate what wages shall be
paid, what contracts shall be let, who shall be employed,
and similar industrial matters is not to be ignored. But
it is necessary to remember that these symptoms reflect
tactics of the local Chinese Communist party, which is
now more hostile to than allied with the Kuomintang.
The students in Canton, it is interesting to notice, are
coming out in active opposition to native Communism.
Recently those at Canton Christian College voted, 484
to 32, to rid themselves of three Communist members
of their body, practically forcing American members of
the faculty to approve the expulsion, in which the
Chinese teachers concurred. Canton, in other words,
has lived so close to Communism that a natural reaction
first to its methods and then to its doctrines has set
in. This has been demonstrated by the withdrawal from
the city of half of the twoscore Russian agents who
were operating there during my visit, in February, 1926.
They had made the mistake, customary with all foreign
advisers in China, of regarding themselves as the direc



80     OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
tors rather than the employees of those who had taken
them into service.
The outstanding question regarding Russian influence
in Canton is the objective behind the painstaking effort
which the Soviet Government has been making at this
central point of southern China. Like every other policy
to which Moscow has committed itself since 1917, it is
probable that a dual motive enters. Comrade Borodin
was invited to Canton by Sun Yat-sen in 1923, and he
and his staff have as much right to be there as technical advisers as the Americans, British, Japanese, and
representatives of other nationalities who fill similar
posts in Peking. I do not think it would be hard to
prove that the Russian staff in Canton has been just as
interested in building a stable government as any of the
foreigners in service under the administration at Peking.
Judging from results alone, the Russians have been easily
the more efficient of the two groups.
On the other' hand, it is not to be doubted that the
Russians in Canton are also there as Communists, interested in stirring the Chinese to active hostility against
capitalistic imperialism. For this purpose Canton is
an excellent base. The map on page 139 will indicate the
strategic importance of Kwangtung Province in the admitted Russian scheme of spreading unrest among subject peoples.
From the great island of Hainan, brought under the
control of the Canton government early in 1926, after a
campaign planned by Admiral Semenoff, its Bolshevik
naval adviser, the long coast of French Indo-China is
less than a day's sail distant. Extension of Kuomintang
control to Hainan coincided with a tightening of police
regulations in this French territory. Just beyond IndoChina lies Burmah, another former Chinese vassal state,
annexed by Great Britain in 1886. Within easy reach of
the Kwangtung coast to the southeast and to the east




KWANGTUNG, WHERE CHINESE GOVERN              81
lie respectively the Philippines and Formosa, important
dependencies of the United States and of Japan. From
Kwangtung, in other words, it should theoretically be
possible to foment trouble for every one of the four
imperialistic powers which in the past have demonstrated
readiness to take arms against Soviet Russia. Farfetched as this sketch of possibilities behind the Russian
influence in Canton may seem, there is sufficient circumstantial evidence about it to justify serious consideration. But the impression must not be given that the
vigor and enterprise which dominate Canton today are
dependent upon Russian influence. There is no doubting
either the patriotism, the sincerity, or the ability of
the local Chinese leaders who are building good government in Kwangtung as an initial step towards the regeneration of their country and the complete abolition
of one-sided foreign privilege.
The Nationalist government of Canton, which is in
substance a board of commissioners with dictatorial
powers subject only to the National Executive of the
Kuomintang, was established on July 1, 1925. Its great
aim, as announced at the time, was the unification of
Kwangtung Province, then controlled by half a dozen
virtually independent generals and overrun by a horde
of bandits and river and coastal pirates. In the short
space of seven months political unification was accomplished. Plenty of banditry and piracy remain, but
there is no doubt that the military can gradually stamp
this out. It is characteristic of the administration that
action to this end is taken slowly, on the theory that
the only way to solve the bandit problem permanently
is to establish first a normal civil life into which men
driven to robbery by social chaos can be reincorporated.
Very remarkable for China, and a great personal tribute to General Chiang Kai-shek, the youthful military
genius of the provincial army, is the fact that the army




82     OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
is held in complete control by the civil authorities at
Canton. The troops are well officered and disciplined,
partly due to the ceaseless efforts of the Russian drill
masters at Whampoa Military Academy. The equipment is good, and the people of Canton no longer
bother to look up as the cadet aviators from Whampoa
fly bombing and scout airplanes over the congested city
streets. From sources hostile to the government comes
the admission that there was little or no plundering
during the military unification of the province.
Side by side with the re-establishment of order, financial reform has gone steadily and constructively forward.
Before the Kuomintang asserted authority, a great part
of the revenues of Kwangtung Province were being seized
for selfish purposes by any military commander or official who could get hold of them. Now, taxes are collected by responsible officials and turned into the
provincial treasury under comparatively strict accounting methods. There is no more issuance of the debased
currency which was helping to make economic conditions in Kwangtung chaotic and the Treasury has built
up a large cash reserve to insure stability for domestic
note issues. A budget system is installed, and without
increasing taxes the government was able, through official honesty and efficient collections, to quadruple its
revenue within eight months of taking control.
It is not so easy to state specifically what is being
accomplished in the important field of judicial reform.
C. C. Wu, son of the famous Wu Ting-fang, now Mayor
of Canton and an influential member of the government's inner circle, has directed a commission working
on this task, having his experience as a qualified member of the London Bar to serve him in good stead.
The system of penology in Canton has been brought
more in accord with western ideas than is the case
in most large provincial Chinese cities. Clearly the




KWANGTUNG, WHERE CHINESE GOVERN             83
Kuomintang government is quite as anxious as that of
Peking to do its part in removing all valid excuse for
continuation of extraterritorial jurisdiction. It has also
pledged its word to abolish likin, the inland transit tax,
which is supposed to be terminated throughout China
coincident with the promulgation of complete tariff autonomy, tentatively scheduled for January 1, 1929.
Vessels of more than twelve-foot draft cannot safely
berth in Canton harbor, so the government is endeavoring to develop the port of Whampoa, seven miles down
the river towards Hongkong, which can now be reached
by ships drawing up to twenty feet. Under the boycott
no British ships, nor those of any nationality which
have touched Hongkong en route, are allowed at Whampoa. Nevertheless, a steady stream of ocean-going cargo
steamers now plies to and from the port of Canton.
During the early months of 1926, an average of more
than ten steamers a week came up to Canton from
Shanghai without stopping at Hongkong, an omission
almost unknown in the old days. In addition, Canton's
direct trade with foreign countries, in foreign bottoms,
is increasing. Japanese shipping greatly predominates,
with Russian, Norwegian, and German tonnage competing for second place. The American merchant marine
is also represented, the Dollar Line conducting a regular
freight service between Whampoa and Pacific Coast
ports. During 1925, the boycott reacted to cause a 20
per cent decline in the foreign trade of Canton, but it is
claimed that the present year will show recovery in the
export and import statistics.
The scheme for the improvement of Whampoa harbor
to make it a permanent rival of Hongkong calls for an
expenditure of some $15,000,000. Only a trivial part of
the proposed construction work has so far been attempted, lack of funds preventing. This instance has
applicability to many local schemes. There is much




84     OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
frothy talk in Canton about what the government is
going to do in the way of port improvement, industrial
development, and general betterment of commercial and
agricultural organization. Numberless committees have
been appointed, grandiloquent plans drafted, and all
sorts of resolutions passed and given as much publicity
as possible. In fact, it will take many months before
economic ambitions can evolve from the blueprint stage,
for one good reason because the authorities have been
spending so large a proportion of their revenues on improving the army and enforcing the boycott against
Hongkong. There is much promise of, and little money
for, social and economic improvements. Months of
delay were allowed to pass before the completion of so
basic a project as a good road from Canton to Whampoa.
And, except for the military and foreign-supported
schools, less is being done for education than in other
provinces which do not advertise so freely about their
good intentions.
Yet, in spite of all shortcomings, it remains apparent
that the provincial government of Kwangtung is' the
most capable that any part of South China has seen
since the 1911 Revolution; that it is following a line
of development in general suited to Chinese temperament, conditions, and traditions; and that its actual
accomplishments give promise of further successes as
the foundations settle into place. For a time the continuation of the experiment was threatened by the success' of the Wu Pei-fu and Chang Tso-lin alliance in the
north, but geographical considerations, aside from other
factors, will probably preserve the Canton government
from military overthrow now that it has won its firm
establishment. Troops adhering to Marshal Wu, indeed,
have shown utter inferiority when faced by Kwangtung forces. If Canton can solve three problems, each
calling for a high degree of statecraft, its notable con



CANTON'S ARMY
A machine-gun detachment departing for action against the warlords of North China.


",
~, Z r;~
(~. ""I): " 9
P~~,~ ~ I,
r. i
-~ ~'.. ~~~
~' I ~ n ~~ ~'
I, i
L
a


OLDER THAN CHRISTIANITY
The Great Wall of China climbing the mountains beyond Nankou
Pass. A camel caravan laden with munitions for the Kuominchun is
passing through the gate in the lower right-hand corner.


ofrP.\
('W








KWANGTUNG, WHERE CHINESE GOVERN 85
tribution to the regeneration of China as a whole will
probably be permanent.
The first of these is the gradual elimination of a
Russian influence which has been so pronounced as to
make Chinese protests against other "imperialisms"
sound rather silly. Most of the real leaders in Canton
recognize this, and papers of dismissal are being gradually prepared for the Soviet advisers who still remain.
But the existence of a general foreign hostility as well
as the real services rendered by Borodin to constructive
development makes it difficult to dispense altogether with
Soviet support.
The second problem is government control of the
Strike Committee, in charge of the Hongkong boycott.
This committee operates independently of the government. It maintains a picket organization of some 30,000
men who are supported by the taxpayers, terrorize respectable Chinese merchants, and line their pockets
with surreptitious "squeeze."  As recently as June 27,
1926, five Chinese seeking to travel from Canton to
Hongkong were shot dead by these organized ruffians.
There is little doubt, however, that the government has
the upper hand in the matter and that the negotiations
for boycott termination will be carried through successfully. Certainly the great majority of Cantonese are
anxious to see normal trade relations with Hongkong
resumed.
The third problem is the decision as to whether
Kwangtung shall be an efficient provincial government
under loose federal control; whether it shall take the
lead in forming the separate Republic of South China
which has so often been discussed; or whether through
the agency of the Kuomintang it shall take the grave
risk of trying to gain control of Peking by military
operations. The first of these possibilities was the one
indorsed until Wu Pei-fu went on his recent rampage. It




86     OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
should be clear from what has been written that the
best hope of extending the constructive nationalism of
Kwangtung throughout China lies in providing an inspiration for other provinces rather than in subjecting
them to a conquering southern army.




CHAPTER IX


SHANGHAI
We have examined the background of the situation
at Peking, where fifteen years of effort to establish a
strong central government by military force have proved
utterly futile and vicious. We have critically studied
the government of Kwangtung, an outstanding example
of what the Chinese can accomplish when they decide
to approach the problem of regeneration from a local
rather than a national standpoint. Logically, the next
step in gaining a reasonable conception of Chinese problems is to journey 850 miles up the China coast from
Canton to Shanghai, where foreign resistance to native
grievances is concentrated and crystallized.
My own first visit to Shanghai was by way of the
broad Yangtze River from the interior. Much more
than if arrival is by sea, one obtains in this manner
a correct impression of the difference between Shanghai
and China proper. The enormous volume of foreign
shipping in the harbor, the majestic office buildings,
banks, and clubs along the Bund, the Occidental nature
of the foreign concessions with their three miles of river
frontage and 8,100 acres of area-all combine to show
what foreign enterprise can do in China when a free
hand is given, or assumed.
In harmonizing with the life of the country in which
it is situated, Shanghai is no more Chinese than Chinatown in San Francisco is American. Nor is the difference
merely one of material surroundings. The 5,879 British
87




88     OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
and 1,942 Americans listed in Shanghai by the 1925 census live for the most part completely isolated mental
lives. There are hundreds of these expatriates who
would not think of having any social relations with
Chinese, who have lived in Shanghai from five to twenty
years without attempting to learn the language, who
never set foot within the encircling Chinese cities, with
their population of some three million people of the yellow race. Yet in spite of his incredible isolation from
and ignorance of the vital currents in Chinese life, the
average white resident of the Shanghai concessions considers himself an authority on China and the Chinese
and most bitterly resents any opinion favoring Chinese
aspirations from, say, mission workers who have spent
their lives in acquiring understanding of the real China.
The situation is made worse by the fact that many
of the Anglo-Saxons in Shanghai are men who would
never have forged ahead at home, and who exhibit their
"inferiority complex" by the most brazen insults and
affronts to natives of the country which provides them
with handsome livings.
There are other causes than the effrontery prevalent
among Shanghai whites, and the pronounced dissipation and mental shallowness of foreign life there, which
have made the city, despite its modern sanitation system,
as much a plague spot as any cholera-infected native district. If we summarize, step by step, the political aggression in China which Shanghai has for three-quarters of
a century taken into its own hands, we will come to
realize that the fatal outbreak there on May 30, 1925,
was an entirely natural occurrence.
In 1842 the Treaty of Nanking, following the so-called
"Opium War" between Great Britain and China, forced
the Manchu government to recognize that "British subjects shall be allowed to reside for the purpose of carrying on their mercantile pursuits, without violation or




SHANGHAI


89


restraint," at Canton, Amoy, Fuchow, Ningpo, and
Shanghai. The same agreement gave the British government the right to appoint consular officers "to be the
medium of communication between the Chinese authorities and the said merchants." Two years later the United
States inaugurated our fairly consistent policy of getting
as much out of China as Great Britain, while letting that
nation bear the onus for methods employed. Caleb
Cushing was sent by President Tyler as Minister to
China with a letter to the Emperor which is a classic of
American diplomatic literature.  It began:  "I hope
your health is good. China is a great empire, extending
over a great part of the world. The Chinese are numerous. You have millions and millions of subjects. The
twenty-six United States are as large as China, though
our people are not as numerous."  This schoolboy note
is still a source of somewhat bitter amusement to the
Chinese, but it obtained its end. In 1844, the United
States, followed by France and other European nations,
obtained treaty rights similar to the British and began
concerted development of Shanghai, the most central
and commercially promising of the Treaty Ports. In
1863, the British and American concessions were amalgamated, forming the basis for the present International
Settlement, from which only France, with her separate
large concession in Shanghai, hae held aloof.
From these small and temperate beginnings, extorted
from a justifiably dubious Peking government at the
cannon's mouth, has developed the present anomalous
situation, more pronounced than that at any other
Treaty Port. For Shanghai, though nominally still Chinese territory, is in fact today a completely self-governing foreign community, resolutely opposed to giving
Quoted by DR. H. H. GOWEN, in "Asia, A Short History." Dr.
Gowen notes that "the letter has been attributed to Daniel
Webster."




90     OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
native leaders even a share of control, unless forced to
do so, and with an attitude towards the diplomatic corps
in Peking almost as contemptuous as that shown towards
the Republic of China.
The steps by which Shanghai has been made into a
virtual "Free City," unsupervised by the League of Nations or any other body outside its confines, have been
taken gradually. It must also be said that these steps
have been coincident with a material development which
is truly remarkable when one visualizes what a few
thousand foreigners have brought about in three-quarters
of a century. As early as 1854 a municipal council was
established by the white residents, without consulting
Peking on whether the treaty rights made such a step
legal, and eight years later was broached the first project for the complete independence of Shanghai, under
the joint protection of Great Britain, the United States,
France, and Russia. The diplomatic authorities vetoed
the idea. But two succeeding generations of foreign business men, a fair number of them descendants of the original settlers, have now achieved much of the objective in
everything but legal sanction.
In space available, the way it has been done can be
chronicled only in summary form.1 That controversial
judicial body, the Shanghai Mixed Court, was launched
in 1864. In 1869 the municipal government was strengthened by new regulations, and Chinese were excluded from
participation therein. This step was presented to the
Chinese government as a fait accompli, providing a useful precedent for further encroachments.
In 1881 further revision of the original "Land Regulations" gave the municipal council power to compel the
The whole story is related in A. M. KOTNEV'S excellent work
on "Shanghai, Its Mixed Court and Municipal Council," the
chief defect of which is its special pleading in behalf of foreign
encroachments.




SHANGHAI


91


surrender of land for road construction, conferred on the
police arbitrary authority in the matter of arrest and
search without warrant, and organized the famous Shanghai Volunteer Corps, a formidable little army with a
present strength of about 1,700 men. Two years after
these regulations were adopted, they were, as a sort of
afterthought, submitted to the diplomatic corps at Peking
for approval. That plastic body, seeing how far the
Shanghai municipal council was departing from the letter
and spirit of the treaties, stiffened its attitude and forced
modifications reasserting consular authority to some extent.
But foreign Shanghai generally knows how to make its
will effective over the doubts of the legations. Measure
after measure was quietly adopted tending to give the
city the status of de facto independence. In 1900 it was'
settled that no Chinese soldier bearing arms, even as a
military escort to Peking officials, could enter the International Settlement. Since then the right of expelling
any Chinese viewed as undesirable has been successfully
asserted, and the viewpoint that natives are only allowed
in the city on sufferance constantly reiterated. Sometime, perhaps, the Chinese residents of Shanghai will
take this attitude at face value, and march out of the
International Settlement in a body. If they do, grass
will be growing over deserted docks and streets within
six months. Berate them as they will, the foreign residents of Shanghai are absolutely dependent on Chinese
help for the success of every one of their activities. In
spite of that, the Chinese are taxed without being allowed
representation on the council, and are excluded from the
parks and playgrounds which they help to support.
There is even a ruling that no measure taken by the local
Chinese authorities with respect to their countrymen
shall be valid in the International Settlement without
approval by the foreign council.




92     OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
On one point only has the Chinese government been
able partially to check the steady encroachments of what
is not altogether jocularly called the "Shanghai Free
State." Since the boundaries of the International Settlement were last extended in 1898, all efforts to increase
the area of this virtual republic have been denied by
Peking. From 1900 to 1925, moreover, the foreign population in Shanghai has increased from 6,774 to 29,947,
while the Chinese inhabitants, exclusive of the Chinese
city, have gone up in the same period from 345,276 to
1,099,540. This ratio of thirty-six Chinese to one foreigner explains much of the nervous attitude underlying,
and doubtless helping to cause, the attitude of white
superiority in Shanghai now. Moreover, 13,804 Japanese
and 1,154 East Indians together constitute half of the
total foreign population. The increase in numbers of
Japanese in Shanghai has been pronounced. A quartercentury ago the Japanese residents were one-quarter as
numerous as the British. Now they outnumber the
British more than two to one.
The Chinese check to the expansion of territory ruled
by the Shanghai municipal council is not, however, entirely successful. Month by month, year by year, the
council acquires title to more and more land in unbuilt
sections outside the concession boundaries. Then come
well-paved streets and roads, then come foreign houses
and foreign residents, then comes an incorporation into
the International Settlement in all but name. Thus arises
another cause for future controversy, where in case of
trouble the Chinese can say the foreigners have no right
where they have built, while the latter retort that their
investment creates a right.
The story of the Shanghai Mixed Court, the present
status of which is one of the issues like a powder mine
in China now, is one which richly deserves attention.
In its evolution to a condition of complete foreign




SHANGHAI


93


control is found further evidence of the steady tendency
to detach Shanghai from all trace of Chinese sovereignty,
against which the patriots of that country are quite
naturally and properly in rebellion.
Originally all foreign offenders within the confines of
the concessions at Shanghai were brought before their
respective consuls as part of the system of extraterritoriality. In the case of Chinese lawbreakers those arrested in the settlement were sent to the nearest Chinese
magistrates for trial and punishment. The enormous
growth in the Chinese population of the concessions by
influx of refugees during the Taiping Rebellion rendered
this arrangement unsatisfactory. But in 1863 an agreement between the American Consul at Shanghai (G. E.
Seward) and the Imperial Representative said plainly:
"The right of jurisdiction of the Chinese authorities over
their subjects resident within the Settlement (American)
is acknowledged to be indefeasible, but no arrests may
be made except on warrants stamped by the municipal
authority (American Consul)."
The difficulty of handling criminals, particularly sailors, from nations without consular representation in
Shanghai led to a request, after amalgamation of the
British and American concessions, that the municipal
council be given authority to deal with such offenders.
This was readily granted by the Chinese officials. But,
as so frequently in China's relations with foreign powers,
a conciliatory attitude merely opened the way for further encroachment. In this case it was a plan for establishing a municipal police court in the settlement with
power to deal with Chinese offenders. Thus was the
present status of the Mixed Court foreshadowed a full
half-century ago.
At the time, however, Shanghai did not dare to be as
dictatorial to the diplomatic corps in Peking as it is today, and after long debate the local foreigners revised




94     OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
their plan. The new suggestion was a Chinese court in
the International Settlement with the foreign consuls
holding a watching brief, as legal assessors, in all cases
between native litigants which could be interpreted as involving foreign interests. The establishment of this
court is particularly noteworthy for three things: it went
beyond the system of extraterritorial jurisdiction to inject foreign supervision into a distinctively Chinese court
trying only Chinese defendants; it was created at a time
when the United States government was deeply absorbed
in the Civil War at home; and there is scarcely any
evidence available of the negotiations whereby Sir Harry
Parkes, then British Consul at Shanghai, obtained Chinese permission for this far-reaching step. It is certain,
moreover, that from the beginning the first British assessor, Chaloner Alabaster, interpreted his position as
one approaching at least equal judicial authority with
the Chinese magistrates. There is a note of pathetic
bewilderment in the report to Peking of the Shanghai
Imperial Representative in November, 1865. "Now,"
he wrote, "all Chinese are sentenced by the foreign official to hard labor and the circumstances of the cases are
never reported to the city magistrates."
As the Chinese awoke to what was going on, a partially
successful effort was made to restrict the power of the
assessors to a watching brief in behalf of foreign interests. It will sound strange to ears accustomed to
tales of the brutality of Chinese justice that other early
changes in the procedure of the Mixed Court were due
to native protests against the severity of sentences readily agreed to by the foreign assessors. This tendency to
assert Chinese authority, perhaps coupled with the reentry of America into the Far Eastern diplomatic field
after the Civil War, helped to prevent further foreign
usurpation of the Mixed Court during ensuing years.
Meanwhile there were many improvements in detail and




SHANGHAI


95


equipment. Better premises were built, modern prisons
were erected, and beyond question an administration of
justice much better by western standards than anything
of native origin was gradually evolved. In all the proceedings of the court Chinese and not foreign law was
and is followed, to which Chinese now point as evidence
that their system is not so incomprehensible to foreign
minds as is frequently asserted.
A seemingly minor point which has aroused much bitterness among the Chinese was the decision, taken in
1905, to employ Sikh constables in the Mixed Court.
All told, there are now nearly five hundred of these huge,
bearded, savage-looking Indian police in the International Settlement, and to see them patrolling the streets
with rifles slung in readiness is to realize how little
Chinese good-will has to do with the continuation of
foreign domination. The continued employment of these
Indians after it was discovered that they dislike the
Chinese and have, in the past, been easily able to intimidate them is an example of the veiled terrorization on
which most of the white residents of Shanghai rely to
maintain their political and economic power.
The revolution of 1911 gave Shanghai its quickly
seized opportunity to secure absolute control of the
Mixed Court. In that year, taking advantage of the absconding of two of the Chinese magistrates with funds
deposited by litigants, and of the generally chaotic conditions, the consular body took control of the court, and
has retained it to the present time. In doing so, three
vital innovations were made: (1) The Mixed Court was
completely separated from the Chinese judicial system,
the magistrates of that race now being appointed by the
consular officers. (2) Foreign assessors, as had originally been attempted, were introduced for purely Chinese civil suits, when there is a native defendant and a
native plaintiff, and when foreign interests are in no




96     OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
way involved. At the same time the assessors completely
dropped the pretense of being in any way subordinate to
the native magistrate, assuming the authority to pass
sentence themselves on Chinese offenders. (3) A municipal foreign officer, the registrar, was appointed to take
charge of all court receipts.
Since 1911, corporal punishment has been reinstituted
by the Mixed Court, the Chinese effort to establish a
court of appeal from its decisions has been denied, and
jurisdiction has been extended both to roads and to
the rivers outside the foreign settlement boundaries.
Whether or not there is any truth in the very serious accusation that some of the foreign assessors have frequently accepted bribes from Chinese litigants, I do not
know. There is strong circumstantial evidence behind the
charge, and an American assessor answered my question
on this point enigmatically by saying that "the atmosphere is favorable to it." Personal observation of both
criminal and civil cases in trial before the Mixed Court
gives the impression that the general procedure is clean,
efficient, and fair. But the real issue about the Mixed
Court is not whether its procedure is good or bad, but
whether its seizure by the Treaty Powers has any moral
or legal justification.
The answer to that question is easy. The usurpation
of the Mixed Court is a clear and brazen encroachment on Chinese sovereignty by the foreign community
of Shanghai which all the Treaty Powers, the United
States as much as any, have condoned and abetted. As
Professor W. W. Willoughby has said: 1
Since 1911 the Mixed Court, at Shanghai, has been absolutely
controlled by the Treaty Powers. The assumption of this control was justified by no treaty right and the Chinese authorities
have repeatedly, but vainly, urged that this control be surrendered.
'In a paper on "Extraterritoriality in China," read at the
Conference on American Relations with China, at Baltimore,
September 17-20, 1925.




SHANGHAI


97


The history of Shanghai is worth careful study. Much
more than any Russian propaganda it has been responsible for the growth of anti-foreign, particularly antiBritish, sentiment in China. To the average white man
in Shanghai the success of his aggression is a subject to
be joked about between drinks. To the Chinese it is a
lesson, already more than half learned, that those who
tear up treaties to rule by force can best understand the
same methods in retaliation.
Under the circumstances, no development of foreign
policy in China is of greater basic importance than the
agreement reached in July, 1926, between the consular
body and delegates of Marshal Sun Chuan-fang (the
local generalissimo) to arrange early rendition of the
Mixed Court to Chinese control. This agreement, vehemently denounced by foreign lawyers who make their
living practicing before the court, awaits approval of the
diplomatic body in Peking at the time of writing. It is
none the less an encouraging indication that the foreign
population of Shanghai is not to be allowed to carry
aggressive tactics to the stage where reprisals by the
Chinese become inevitable.




CHAPTER X


CHINA HITS BACK
As one looks back on the succession of outbreaks
which made the early summer of 1925 so terrible a period
in China, the difficulty of assessing fairly the significance
of what occurred is uppermost in mind, for other elements than foreign aggression were involved, and vitally
involved. The long period of political chaos in China
has weakened the moral fiber of the nation, encouraged
acts of violence, and stimulated the more debased elements of the population to robbery and looting. The
World War, with British, Germans, French, Austrians,
and other belligerent nationals reviling one another on
Chinese soil, has brought home to every Chinese of intelligence the weakness and division among the European
powers, which provide his country's opportunity.
The blocking-off of Russia from Europe-her loss of
Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Bessarabia-followed by the ill-judged attempt at a cordon
sanitaire, has naturally resulted in increasing Russian
interest and intrigue in China, not now in concert with
the other powers, but opposed to them. To these obvious factors must be added many others: the growing
bitterness over the white assumption of racial superiority;
the hot-headed activities of immature students too suddenly released from the old disciplines which the changes
of late years are sweeping away; the contrast between the
idealistic slogans of the war period and the disillusionment of the present; last but not least, the introduction
98




CHINA HITS BACK


99


of a new element of unrest as a result of the industrialization now taking place in many Chinese cities. As an
extreme example of the extent to which large-scale production in China is taking root, statistics of the cottonmill industry in the Shanghai district may be cited. In
and around Shanghai there are now operating no less
than 58 of these large, well-equipped factories, 32 of
them Japanese, 22 Chinese, and 4 British in ownership.
They employ approximately 117,000 work people, an
average of slightly over two thousand employees to each
mill.
In one of these Shanghai mills, significantly enough,
was lit the flame which showed how tinder-dry for conflagration is all of contemporary China. A strike at one
of the Japanese-owned concerns resulted in disturbances
in the course of which a native workman was fatally shot
by a Japanese overseer defending the company property.
A few days later, on Saturday, May 30, 1925, a large,
though unarmed, demonstration was staged under student leadership in the International Settlement of
Shanghai. Several students were arrested for disorderly
conduct and taken to the Louza police station, just off
the Nanking Road, in the very heart of the concession.
Shortly afterwards the crowd, now grown to mob spirit
and size, forced its way to the gates of the station house,
threatening violent entry. The British police officer
in charge gave the order to shoot-in English. From ten
to fifteen seconds afterwards, by admission of the authorities, a volley was fired which killed seven Chinese and
wounded many more. The following day there were further clashes with the police and several more Chinese
were killed. The municipal council placed the city under
what amounted to martial law, and 250,000 Chinese
workers of every variety went out on a completely spontaneous general strike.
Never was the underlying unity of China more strongly




100    OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
demonstrated. During the first week in June enormous
protest meetings, for the most part orderly, were staged
in Peking, Hankow, Tientsin, Nanking, Changsha, Swatow, and most of the other larger cities. On June 4 the
diplomatic corps in Peking replied to protests of the
Waichiao Pu 1 with a note stating that "the responsibility
of the events... rests upon the demonstrators and not
upon the authorities of the concession." Immediately
thereafter a new and uglier tone entered the nation-wide
protest meetings, not checked by a subsequent decision
of the foreign ministers to make a thorough inquiry on
the scene, which eventually resulted in sharp censure for
the Shanghai authorities. But long before that, on June
11, there was an outbreak of mob violence in Hankow
in which shops in the Japanese concession were looted,
a Japanese murdered, and an attempt made to storm
the foreign banks, resulting in the killing of eight Chinese
by foreign naval forces landed from gunboats in the
Yangtze. At Kiukiang a Japanese bank was burned, and
the Japanese and British consulates damaged. Then, on
June 23, in Canton, came the most terrible of all the
incidents in this significant uprising.
It had been preceded by a general strike of Chinese
workers in the neighboring British colony of Hongkong,
which for nearly a month made the white residents of
this community dependent on their own efforts for everything. As the Chinese servants and operatives of every
kind began to trickle back to work, in spite of opposition
sometimes amounting to terrorization by labor union
heads, a huge protest meeting against the Shanghai killings was called in Canton. After that meeting, at which
incendiary speeches were numerous, over twenty thousand Chinese, for the most part school children, members
of workers' guilds, and college students, but including
some two thousand armed soldiers and cadets from
The Chinese Foreign Office.








FOREIGN BANKS IN CHINA
Financial institutions of the United States. Great Britain and Japan
line the Yangtze River at Hankow, deep in the heart of the Republic.


WHITE TRENCHES IN CHINA
A corner of the foreign concession on Shameen Island (Canton)
as it looked after the fatal Twenty-third of June, 1925.




CHINA HITS BACK


101


the Whampoa Academy, began their fatal march along
the Bund opposite the little island of Shameen. On
Shameen,1 which is the foreign concession of Canton,
were detachments of British and French marines and
perhaps a hundred armed civilian residents. In anticipation of a Chinese attack, both of the bridges connecting Shameen with the mainland had been closed with
barbed-wire entanglements, and the whole side facing
Canton was (and is) entrenched and protected with
sandbags. Virtually all the women and children from
the concession had been sent down to Hongkong. It has
not been felt safe as yet for them to return to Canton.
Just after three o'clock on the afternoon of June 23,
1925, when the bulk of the parade had passed Shameen
and the Chinese troops were opposite the island, firing
started. On Shameen a Frenchman was killed, and three
English, three Japanese, and two Frenchmen wounded.
Among the Chinese demonstrators 52 were killed and 117
wounded, 22 of the dead and 53 of the injured being
armed soldiers. The immediate effect of the tragedy was
to rally all of Canton to the Russian-advised Kuomintang government, then just coming into power, and to
turn the strike at Hongkong into a carefully organized
boycott which has now continued for over a year and
nearly prostrated that once flourishing British colony.
By most Cantonese this terrible disaster is regarded as
a cold-blooded "massacre," for which the British in particular are held responsible. By a majority of foreigners
in South China, regardless of nationality, the incident is
regarded as a barely frustrated attempt by Chinese troops
to seize the foreign settlement of Canton by force. The
issue will probably go down as one of those which history can never answer with certainty. I myself am satisfied that Russian-officered Chinese mounted machine


Literally, "Sand Bank." It was exactly that until foreign
enterprise converted it into a pretty little island.




102    OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
guns on buildings overlooking Shameen some time before the parade started. Shakee Creek, which separates
Shameen from the water-front street of Canton where
the parade was marching, is not a hundred feet in
width. Yet a majority of the bullet holes with which
the buildings on Shameen are spattered are, as I observed on two visits there, more than twenty feet from
the ground and of a downward incidence. Without the
accounts of trustworthy eyewitnesses and other circumstantial evidence, it would be strongly indicated by this
that firing on Shameen came from prepared snipers'
nests on roofs in the Chinese city. The concentration of
native bitterness against the British is also strongly indicative of Russian influence, for the French, with whom
it suits the Soviet government to be on good terms at
present, unquestionably did as much firing and caused
as many Chinese casualties as did the English. But regarding the question of which side fired first there can
be no certainty.
What is certain is the fact that this culminating tragedy of a series which may at any time be reopened has
stirred China to a policy of resistance which deserves
the closest attention abroad. This resistance has been
most strongly expressed in the concerted and sustained
effort to ruin the British colony of Hongkong. The
present civil warfare precludes any attempt at nationwide, armed opposition. But the civil wars themselves
are hardening the Chinese people and enabling them to
approach equality in that military efficiency on which the
Occident mainly relies for its assumption of superiority
in China. As an American military observer in Peking
remarked to me: "It is a senseless provocation for us
to retain a few hundred soldiers here now. The situation
is totally different to what it was at the time of the
Boxer rising, when the foreign troops were opposed by




CHINA HITS BACK


103


a mob with antiquated arms and entirely ignorant of
modern warfare."
Less spectacular than armed resistance, the Chinese
boycott of Hongkong, carried on with a complete contempt of foreign treaty rights, is none the less significant,
even though the casual visitor to that British port does
not immediately see its grim effects in full. The mind
is naturally first occupied by the remarkable skill and
energy which the British have shown in converting,
within a span of eighty years, a precipitous mountainside into one of the world's greatest ports. And the
shipping in the harbor, though cut down by more than
half since the boycott started, is still sufficient to give
a false impression of bustle and prosperity.
In 1842, the island of Hongkong, then desolate and
sparsely inhabited by fishermen, was ceded to Great
Britain by the treaty of Nanking. Following her second war with China in 1860, chiefly remembered by the
Chinese for British and French vandalism in burning the
beautiful Summer Palace near Peking, Great Britain
annexed Kowloon Peninsula on the mainland opposite
Hongkong. In 1898, when Russia, Germany, and France
were all busy acquiring slices of Chinese territory and
the United States was taking the Philippines, the British
acquired a ninety-nine year lease on an area adjacent to
Kowloon known as the New Territories. The whole district is now heavily fortified and, pending the construction at Singapore, is Great Britain's most important naval
base in the Far East.
Counting Kowloon Peninsula and the leased territory,
the colony of Hongkong has an area of 345 square miles
and a population of over 700,000, of whom less than
9,000 are British and about 4,000 other foreigners. The
island of Hongkong, itself, where the officialdom, commerce, and major portion of the population concentrate,
is but eleven miles long and, in average, three miles in




104    OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
width. In substance it is a chain of rugged mountain
peaks, rising sheer from the sea to an elevation of two
thousand feet. Along an artificial shore line, which British ingenuity has constructed where once was deep water,
and up tortuous roads which have frequently been hewn
from the cliff, clusters a beautiful and cleanly tropical
city. There are many islands along the China coast as
desolate and barren as Hongkong was a century ago.
Many have harbors which could be made as fine. But
the Chinese knew very well that they could not possibly
accomplish by themselves the engineering which Great
Britain has done to make Hongkong important as a
focal point of world commerce.
The British in Hongkong are naturally sensitive about
letting it be known how hard the Chinese have hit them
through the rigid boycott which followed the Shameen
tragedy. One learns, however, that the import and export trade of the port, which is almost the sole source
of Hongkong's livelihood, was during the last quarter of
1925 almost fifty per cent less in value than during the
corresponding months of 1924. During 1924 an average
of 210 vessels of all types arrived at Hongkong daily.
After July, 1925, the average dropped to 34 vessels a day.
It is not merely small junks which, under orders of the
Kwangtung provincial government, are passing Hongkong by. The total tonnage cleared from the port has
been more than cut in half.
Naturally, individual and firm losses have been enormous, though the Chinese merchants of Hongkong
have on the whole suffered more heavily than the English. The banks have been severely strained and, in
spite of a special loan of ~3,000,000 advanced by the
British government, business men have for months found
it almost impossible to obtain credit. Everyone in the
colony is hard up and the courts are congested with
bankruptcy cases. Nevertheless there is little doubt




CHINA HITS BACK


105


that Hongkong can hold out indefinitely, though in
severely straitened circumstances, against this economic
pressure.
That, indeed, is the only course possible. The hotheads in the colony who advocate a British punitive
expedition against Canton are, fortunately, powerless
without a support which the home government is unlikely to give. Such retaliation would, in the long run,
result in complete disaster for British interests in China.
Let alone, the boycott will eventually peter out; 80 per
cent of the Hongkong strikers had returned to work by
the first anniversary of their quitting, in June, 1926.
On the other hand, attempts to force a resumption of
normal trade relations by military action can only result in hardening the Chinese resistance. You cannot
make your enemy purchase at your store by kicking him.
A problem of extreme delicacy for the colonial government of Hongkong has been rendered still more difficult
by the impossibility of ascertaining just what concrete
aims the Kwangtung government is seeking in the boycott. Reinstatement of and strike pay for those who left
their jobs in Hongkong as far back as June, 1925, can no
longer be regarded as a serious objective. Some of the
political demands are reasonable, such as Chinese representation on the legislative council of the colony. Some
are unreasonable. No restrictions on Chinese for residential purposes, for instance, would simply mean that
the far wealthier Chinese merchants would be able to
oust the British from homes which they have gradually
engineered far up on the precipitous "Peak." Then there
are demands that the Chinese in the colony should have
"absolute freedom" of meetings, parades, public speeches,
publications, etc., and that the power of banishment
should be entirely rescinded. At first glance it looks
as though Canton wants to force the rendition of Hong



106    OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
kong to China, but this is not a serious purpose except in
the minds of a few extremists.
The actual aims of the moderate leaders in Kwangtung, and they are gaining in power as Russian influence
wanes, are about as follows: First, to teach the British,
and through them the other Treaty Powers, that the
dominant race in China is the Chinese, and that foreigners are there on sufferance just as much as Chinese
are in England, or America, or France, on sufferance;
second, to stimulate the Chinese to develop their own
country for themselves, and to encourage a racial pride,
with modern military force to support it, which will no
longer passively submit to foreign impositions; third,
to hasten tariff autonomy and abolition of extraterritorial jurisdiction by making it evident that one large
section of China is no longer disposed to wait around as
a suppliant on these issues; fourth, to oppose the effort
towards overcentralization in China by showing her
people that a single province-Kwangtung-can accomplish more towards stemming foreign encroachments by
acts than the so-called national government at Peking
has ever done by talk. This last aim was achieved in
July, 1926, when the Hongkong colonial government
tacitly recognized the independence of Kwangtung by
sending an official delegation to Canton to open negotiations for terminating the boycott.
Well before these negotiations started, however, there
was no doubt that the Kwangtung government was ready
to call the boycott off, even on a basis of "honors easy."
The chief obstacle has been the authority given in this
matter to the strike committee, as already discussed.'
These strikers, acting on the Russian theory of the rights
of proletarians, have been responsible for virtually all
the serious disorders which have continually smirched
the record of the Canton government. The armed
1See p. 85.




CHINA HITS BACK


107


strike pickets like the domination which has been given
them, and like to live at public expense. They like to
loll around in the sun with rifles, shooting Chinese bourgeoisie who disagree with them. They like the countless
opportunities for bribes which come their way. This
absurd apotheosis of debased and ignorant coolies has
come near to proving the Frankenstein of the Kwangtung
government-its penalty for being too ready with lip
service to Russian doctrines.
In this juncture Hongkong is fortunate in possessing,
in Sir Cecil Clementi, a colonial governor who knows
China and the Chinese, is very sympathetic to their reasonable claims, and who is personally a most charming,
cultivated, and keen-minded English gentleman. It was
his appointment to Hongkong which gave most hope
for constructive solution of South China's most acute
problem in international relationships. Indeed, at this
period of rising Chinese antagonism, increasing Chinese
sensitiveness, and changing Chinese conditions, no duty
is more imperative for Occidental governments than to
see that their diplomatic and consular representatives in
China are of the highest grade, chosen for their advance
knowledge and understanding of the acute problems
which they will be called upon to face. More important
than warships and regiments for the protection of foreign lives and property in China is the presence there of
clear-visioned envoys. In this class, fortunately for
American prestige, belongs the American Minister at
Peking, J. V. A. MacMurray. Whether his power to act
along lines in full accord with America's traditional
Chinese policy is equal to his ability to visualize the
desirable course is, however, another question.




CHAPTER XI


WHAT CHINA DEMANDS
It is a seeming paradox, much harped upon by foreigners in China, that native insistence on the abolition
of one-sided foreign privilege in that country should
have increased pari passu with accumulating indication
that the Chinese are unable to form a stable national
government. There is that degree of half-truth in the
criticism which makes further examination imperative
if the justice of the Chinese claims is to be fairly assayed.
In the first place it is a very natural human characteristic, by no means limited to Chinese, to be most sensitive about personal dignity when circumstance has
placed one in an undignified position. In China this' attitude, known as "saving face," is carried to lengths
which to us often seem extreme. The Reverend Arthur
Smith, in his charming book on "Chinese Characteristics,"
notes many instances of the peculiarity. It was first
brought home to me by my ricksha boy in Peking, who
without understanding an address given to him in English would continually dash off in the first direction that
came to his mind rather than admit that he did not comprehend. "Face-saving" undoubtedly accounts for some
of the Chinese sensitiveness at this period of disintegration. Incidentally, did not Poland insist on having a
permanent seat on the Council of the League of Nations
just before Pilsudski's revolution showed her incapable
of solving domestic problems by constitutional means?
108




WHAT CHINA DEMANDS


109


But the actual, convincing logic behind the essential
Chinese demands is so strong that the influence of halfamusing, half-irritating racial characteristics may fairly
be ignored entirely. Stripped of non-essential claims,
put forward for the bargaining purposes so deeply rooted
in all international diplomacy, China lays claim to just
three reformations in the policy of the powers on her
soil. Those three demands are: (1) rectification of the
situation in Shanghai; (2) tariff autonomy; (3) abolition of foreign extraterritorial privileges so far as they
interfere with the "fundamental principle of public law,
recognized by all modern civilized States, that every
sovereign political body has the exclusive right to exercise political jurisdiction within its own territories." 
Whether or not the Chinese problem is to become increasingly more dangerous from the foreign viewpoint depends primarily on whether or not the justice of the
Chinese claims in these three points of controversy is
adequately apprehended abroad. Let us consider them
seriatim, sticking to fundamentals and avoiding the mist
of extraneous matter with which the issues are frequently
befogged.
On the first point, the local situation in Shanghai, little
need be added to what has been said in Chapter IX. The
barefaced and totally illegal assumption of foreign control over the Shanghai Mixed Court would have been a
clear-cut casus belli to any nation less pacific in its foreign relations than China. It may be said that the
American Minister in Peking, and many of his colleagues,
are firmly convinced of the complete justice of the Chinese claim for a surrender of consular control over this
court. The steps looking toward this end which have
now been taken by the Shanghai consular body are belated-all the more reason why there should be no
further delay in eliminating an act of aggression which
DR. W. W. WILLOUGHBY, op. ct.




110     OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
has done much to arouse anti-foreign feeling. Similarly, Chinese representation on the Shanghai municipal
council ought to be granted forthwith, the fact that an
American lawyer, Stirling Fessenden, has served two
terms as chairman of that body giving us more responsibility for this essential reform.
Shanghai is not foreign territory. It is a foreign concession. There is neither justice nor reason in the present policy of making the Chinese in the International
Settlement, many of them far better equipped intellectually than the bulk of their alien governors, pay taxes
without a vestige of self-government. Fortunately, the
Shanghai municipal council, albeit belatedly and grudgingly, is now beginning to consider giving carefully
selected Chinese residents a small minority voice in local
government. The Chinese are a very patient and longsuffering people. It is possible that they will be satisfied
with this move by viewing it as an entering wedge.
The second major issue in Chinese minds, following
the arbitrary order we have chosen, is that of tariff
autonomy. Theoretically this issue was settled on November 19, 1925, when the Customs Conference convened in Peking in conformity with the decisions reached
at Washington nearly four years earlier,' unanimously
approved the following formula:
The delegates of the Powers' assembled at this Conference
resolve to adopt the following proposed article relating to tariff
autonomy with a view to incorporating it, together with other
matters, to be hereafter agreed upon, in a treaty which is to be
signed at this Conference:
The Contracting Powers other than China hereby recognize
China's right to enjoy tariff autonomy; agree to remove the tariff
'By the Nine Power Treaty (see p. 7). The French refusal to
ratify this treaty until settlement of the Gold Franc controversy,
a totally irrelevant issue, was largely responsible for the delay
in calling the Customs Conference in Peking.
'The signatories of the Nine Power Treaty, plus Denmark,
Norway, Spain, and Sweden.




WHAT CHINA DEMANDS


111


restrictions which are contained in existing treaties between themselves respectively and China; and consent to the going into
effect of the Chinese National Tariff Law on January 1, 1929.
The government of the Republic of China declares that likin
shall be abolished simultaneously with the enforcement of the
Chinese National Tariff Law; and further declares that the
abolition of likin shall be effectively carried out by January 1,
1929.
On the face of it, the second paragraph of the above
formula explicitly promises China, as from January 1,
1929, the same freedom in fixing customs duties which is
enjoyed by every independent nation. That, certainly,
is the understanding of the Chinese, in spite of the fact
that no treaty giving the promise binding force has yet
been written. Aside from this point, however, some foreign representatives maintain that the advent of tariff
autonomy is contingent upon the abolition of likinthe tax on goods in transit inland throughout Chinaand that paragraph two of the formula must be taken in
conjunction with paragraph three. By the Chinese the
two paragraphs are taken as independent units, and it
is insisted that tariff autonomy must be granted on the
date set regardless of whether the abolition of likin is
"effectively carried out" by that date. The argument
may seem somewhat academic until the new tariff treaty
is formulated and signed, but it is almost certain to raise
future acrimonious controversy, for the situation at present holds out little promise that likin will actually be
abolished by 1929.
Likin is not an institution of old standing. It was
first imposed in 1853, in Kiangsu and Shantung Provinces, to raise special funds necessary to suppress the
Taiping Rebellion. Eight years later it was extended
throughout the Empire, but today only a very small
proportion of the revenues collected reach the central
government. Under the Tuchun system it has grown to
be the most important source of provincial revenues. It




112    OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
is, of course, the most haphazard and unscientific of
taxes, painfully detrimental to the development of
China's internal trade, and the imposition at the hundreds of collecting stations throughout the country are
doubly irritating because much of the revenue derived
is now wasted in supporting the various war lords.
Every commercial treaty with China for a quarter of a
century has sought the abolition of likin and, considering the purposes to which the tax is put at present, there
is not much to be said in favor of the institution.
It does not follow therefrom that there is any justification in the effort to make the granting of tariff
autonomy contingent on the abolition of likin. The
device has two aspects: first, as a scheme for securing
provincial as opposed to federal revenues; second, as an
uneconomic tax on trade. It is this second aspect which,
unfortunately, is uppermost. But if the incidence of
the tax were altered along scientific lines, and its proceeds used by the provincial governments for constructive purposes, no foreigner would have the right to say
a word against it. Unfortunately the criticisms of likin
by many foreigners in China indicate all too plainly that
one of the objections is that the Chinese actually dare to
collect this tax for themselves. They do not like the
contrast with the Chinese Customs Service, which is
managed by British officials, the bulk of the revenues of
which are deposited in British-controlled banks, and
from which Peking receives only such small proportion
of the total revenue as is not allocated to the payment
of the Boxer indemnities and to the service of foreign
loans, most of which have been contracted by utterly
irresponsible officials at Peking.
Further evidence that there is something suspicious
in the hue and cry about likin is the fact that it very
seldom affects the foreigner's pocketbook, which is so
frequently his one criterion of what is good or bad in




WHAT CHINA DEMANDS


113


Chinese methods. Charles K. Moser, Assistant Chief of
the Far Eastern Division of the Department of Commerce, writes as follows 1 in this connection:
Although likin is so generally recognized as one of the serious
detriments to trade development in China, as a matter of fact
comparatively few foreign merchants have ever been conscious of
it except from hearsay. The foreigner customarily sells his goods
at the Treaty Ports and takes his profits. Or, generally he has
bought them delivered there, only after he was sure he could
sell again at a profit.
The Chinese merchant, Mr. Moser concludes, is the
real sufferer. Yet these merchants want tariff autonomy
for China, with or without likin abolition. Foreigners
who would link the two together do so on the assumption
that nothing must be granted China without exacting a
price therefor.
By the treaty of Nanking, China undertook to establish at the five ports then opened to foreign trade "a
fair and regular" tariff scale to replace the multitudinous
local exactions in force at Canton, prior to 1842 the sole
port at which alien shipping was permitted. This tariff
was made "regular" by establishing a flat 5 per cent
ad valorem rate. Whether or not the rate was "fair"
the American reader, reflecting on the tariff history of
our country, may decide for himself. At all events 5
per cent has been the permissible limit imposed by the
powers for the past eighty-four years, and for long periods the duties received have been much less than that
because of delays in revaluing schedules in accordance
with price changes. The underlying motive, of course,
has been to make the great Chinese market a dumping
ground for foreign wares, and to make it more difficult
for the Chinese to develop their own industries in competition with foreign countries.
The United States has, since 1844, been a party to this
In "Commerce Reports," June 7, 1926, p. 595.




114    OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
arrangement, though we seem to see no inconsistency
in levying duties up to 90 per cent on Chinese products coming into this country. One graphic illustration
of the unfairness of the arrangement may be cited. For
a standard fifteen-cent package of American cigarettes
one must pay forty cents in Canada and the equivalent
of thirty cents in Japan, the difference being caused by
the duties levied by these countries. In China that package of cigarettes can be bought for the equivalent of
eleven cents. In other words the Chinese government is
prohibited from levying a duty on a luxury of foreign
origin (American tobacco) even equal to the internal
revenue tax taken thereon by our own government.
Not content with this injury the Treaty Powers have
added insult thereto by informing the Chinese that they
should establish a stable government in Peking (competent to abolish likin, for instance) before they are
given the right to levy such duties on foreign goods as
they think desirable. This is merely arguing in a circle,
and a very vicious one at that. The customs, at present
under British administration,' provide the Peking government with its only really reliable source of revenue at
the present time. The portion which escapes the foreign bondholders on the way to the federal treasury is
pitifully small. Without an increase in this revenue,
obtainable by establishing reasonable tariff rates, no
central government can have stability.
There is, of course, force in the objection that any
increase in revenues might be diverted to uneconomic
purposes-to building bigger armies by the Tuchun temporarily in control at Peking. But after all, that is not
our business, and the great powers are the last with any
right to assume a virtuous attitude on military extravHistorically, because when foreign inspectors were first appointed the English representative was the only one who spoke
Chinesel See "China Year Book," 1925 edition, p. 899.




WHAT CHINA DEMANDS


115


agance. What would be our attitude if China should
by force take over our customs administration and limit
our tariff rate to 5 per cent ad valorem on the argument
that if we get any more revenue from imports, we would
be likely to spend it on building battleships? The very
absurdity of the analogy ought to bring home the scandalous situation which has come to be regarded abroad as
something which China ought to stomach without question.
The Customs Conference which convened in Peking in
October, 1925, has been faced with all sorts of difficulties of Chinese making. The government with which the
foreign delegates started to treat was overthrown by
civil war six months later, the resulting anarchy forcing
adjournment of the conference sine die, in July 1926.
Several of the officials who drafted the original Chinese
proposals fled from Peking for political reasons early in
the sessions. There can be no certainty that any arrangement arrived at in the capital city will be observed
throughout China as a whole. The Kwangtung government, for instance, objects to any arrangement which
places greater revenues in the hands of the northern militarists. Yet many of the difficulties in working out an
interim schedule applicable until January 1, 1929, have
been of foreign making. Jealousy between foreign interests, each fearful that some other nation may gain a
slight competitive advantage, served greatly to delay
progress when it was possible, and also served to show
the Chinese how little unity there is now among the
powers in respect to Chinese policy. Nobody would
accuse Silas H. Strawn, the American delegate to the
conference, of any tendency to take a hostile attitude
toward the claims of foreign business to affectionate consideration. Yet Mr. Strawn cited to me the "importunity
of business interests" as one of the factors complicating
a solution of the customs problem. "If they would ask




116    OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
themselves," he said, "how the maximum tariff rates suggested for China compare with those in force in their own
countries, I think much of the foreign commercial opposition to proposed schedules would be recognized as
shallow."
It may be asked why the twelve foreign powers participating in the Customs Conference should have been
inclined to tug in various directions when the principle
of tariff autonomy for China had already been approved.
The answer is that the interim schedules which the conference sought to work out were designed to serve as the
basis, if not the absolute model, for the anticipated
Chinese National Tariff Law of 1929. Most of China's
imports are not luxuries'. A slight majority of them are
either (1) necessities unobtainable in China, or (2)
materials essential to develop her basic industries, or (3)
products which she cannot at present manufacture economically. In addition the Chinese recognize that they
are inexperienced in so technical and complicated a matter as tariff administration. It follows that any Chinese
government is willing to view foreign proposals sympathetically as the basis for a permanent tariff law. But
autonomy in this matter the Chinese are determined to
have. Whether or not this autonomy shall be exercised
on lines following foreign advice, or on lines dispensing
with it, is the real issue which the delegates to the adjourned Customs Conference have to consider.
The third of the fundamental Chinese demands, that
for the abolition of consular judicial jurisdiction over foreigners resident in China, is one on which much more can
properly be said in opposition to native claims than in
either the rectification of Shanghai illegalities or the
advent of tariff autonomy. Chinese justice is not foreign
justice, and Chinese codes, in spite of earnest efforts at
revision, do not in practice approach the level regarded
as essential in most white nations.




WHAT CHINA DEMANDS


117


None the less, this issue, by action of the foreign
powers themselves, has fundamentally been decided in the
Chinese favor. When, as a result of the war, Germany
and Austria were forced to renounce their extraterritorial privileges, and when Russia, having more nationals
on Chinese soil than any other foreign country except
Japan, abandoned hers, it was virtually settled that
sooner or later, willingly or unwillingly, the other powers
would have to follow suit. German business men in
China now endeavor to settle their legal differences as
much as possible through their own consulates or chambers of commerce, and that mode of evading Chinese
courts will remain open to other foreigners. But what
the Germans, Austrians, and Russians, to say nothing of
minor powers, have yielded, Great Britain, America,
France, and Italy cannot retain. To the Japanese the
abolition of extraterritorial rights means relatively little.
Their own system of justice, except that it is efficient and
honest, is akin to the Chinese in fundamentals. Preferential tariff rates are more important in Tokyo's
viewpoint.
The absurd weakness of the Peking government, which
is a constant source of difficulty to the foreign commissioners trying to negotiate with it on the subject of extraterritoriality, is in this situation a source of Chinese
strength.  The way the tide is trending was shown
dramatically at Geneva on June 1, 1926, when, according
to press dispatches, Chu Chao-hsin, the Chinese Minister to Italy, responded to taunts by a British member
of the League's opium advisory commission, by announcing that unless the powers themselves take revisory action "China will soon tear up the unequal treaties forced
upon her."
Every foreigner in China knows' in his heart that at
any moment the Peking government could take this step,
disclaiming responsibility for the ensuing crisis and at




118    OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
the same time securing nation-wide credit and popularity
by the step. With this contingency in view Chinese organizations are arguing that foreign consular jurisdiction is illegal, because the system is derogatory to the
territorial and administrative integrity of China, which
the Nine Power Treaty undertakes to respect. Whether
or not this reasoning seems specious abroad is not important, unless the foreign governments are willing, when the
issue comes to a crisis, to back their viewpoint with force.
And Chinese leaders do not for a moment believe that
sentiment favoring a war to force observance of the unequal treaties on China exists in any European nation,
still less in the United States.
This situation explains why American officials in
Peking, regardless of the morality of extraterritorial jurisdiction, believe that the only rational policy for the
United States in China is to "face forward and walk
backwards," which means that while this last of the three
basic Chinese demands should be gracefully conceded,
adequate safeguards should be placed around the extension of Chinese judicial authority over foreigners.
There is little doubt that the Chinese will meet all reasonable requests in this direction. It could be arranged,
for instance, that the Chinese judiciary have their salaries secured by the foreign-administered customs service in order to insure their independence from local
politics. It could also be arranged that foreign assessors,
or at least advisers, be allowed to sit in on trials of foreigners until a generation of Chinese magistrates familiar
with western law and western ethics is established. Rational compromises of this sort are as desirable as continuation of the present embittered status is dangerous.
There is the difficulty, moreover, which those who
oppose the yielding of extraterritorial privilege have to
face in respect to the German and Russian precedents.
Both Dr. Boye, the German Minister, and Mr. Karakhan




WHAT CHINA DEMANDS


119


the Russian Soviet Ambassador, assured me in Peking
that they have little cause for complaint because of the
treatment of their nationals in Chinese courts. It is
indisputable that there have been cases where Russians
adhering to the old regime have been badly handled, but
as these unfortunates are people without a country, it is
difficult to base a convincing argument on their experiences. And the admission of the Germans that, while
dubious of the future, they cannot complain of their experiences under Chinese law is not countered by saying
that this is no proof that abolition of the consular courts
would be equally satisfactory to all. A hypothesis will
not override a fact.
In closing this brief consideration of the problem of
extraterritoriality, it may be useful to report a hearing
by a Chinese magistrate of a case, involving American
interests, which I attended in Hankow. The case was
entirely typical, and in no way sensational in nature, and
for that very reason may advantageously be set down in
some detail.
During March of 1925 the Standard Oil Company of
New York dispatched two junkloads of kerosene up the
Han River from Hankow, as a routine item in the very
extensive shipping operations carried on by "Socony"
from this distributing center. Also as a routine matter
the two junkmasters reciprocally went bond for one another on safe delivery. For some time nothing more was
heard of either craft; then both of them were found
wrecked and abandoned a long distance up the river.
From one hulk three-quarters of the cargo had disappeared, and from the other about one-quarter, the whole
loss representing a value appraised by the company at
$1,250. Neither of the junkmasters was to be found,
and the natural assumption was that they had intentionally wrecked their ships and disposed of the easily
removable portion of the cargo to neighboring farmers.




120  OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT


During the autumn Chinese detectives, who seem to be
quite as efficient as their American counterparts, located
one of the junkmasters in Hankow and promptly arrested him. His ship was the one from which only a
small portion of the cargo had been lost and he protested that the wreck was caused by a spring freshet,
that he had stolen nothing, and that only fear of punishment by the foreigners had made him run away.
Regardless of the argument he was clapped in jail, held
there several months without a hearing, and produced
for trial on the day when I happened along as an interested observer. As the case involved American interests,
the United States Consul at Hankow sat with the Chinese magistrates as an assessor, his interpreter beside him
in case of need. The Standard Oil Company was represented by a youthful but keen member of its local
American office force, the Chinese head of its Hankow
shipping department, and a very alert Chinese lawyer.
There was a court stenographer and there was the man
on trial, without counsel or other assistance. No witnesses of the event appeared for either side.
The affair was over in little more than half an hour,
following the Chinese legal theory that an accused man
is to be considered guilty until he proves innocence.
The corporation presented its case, with the strong circumstantial evidence that the junkmaster had deliberately wrecked his ship and stolen part of the cargo.
The accused, shabby, pale from confinement, and forlorn looking, then reiterated his story at considerable
length, with an occasional searching interrogation from
the magistrate, who seemed possessed of competent judicial mentality. Finally the man was sent back to
prison for another month, on the understanding that if
his colleague did not appear within that period he would
be held responsible for the entire loss. Lacking attach



WHAT CHINA DEMANDS


121


able goods, this would probably mean a two-year jail
sentence.
Now the moral of this incident, as it appeared to me,
is not that the course of justice in China is particularly
corrupt, or inefficient, or dilatory. It is, rather, that the
foreigner, with his easily mobilized battery of technical
and legal assistance, and his Consul at hand to stiffen the
magistrate, is so well content with the present treaty arrangements that the very idea of change, regardless of
whether other factors make it desirable, annoys him exceedingly. As Dr. Jacob Gould Schurman observed 1 in
his official capacity as American Minister to China,
shortly before leaving to become Ambassador at Berlin:
The conservative tradition of the Treaty Ports is averse to
modifying the present system of extraterritoriality and indeed
deprecates all discussion of it. It is an extreme position and
with the lapse of time will in my opinion become more and more
untenable.
It is indubitable that the Chinese judicial system is
still primitive beside that of the Anglo-Saxon race;
that "squeeze," in the shape of unrecorded monetary
transactions, is often helpful in hastening its operation;
and that most of the provincial prisons would seem barbarous to hardened social workers. It is also unquestionable that present political chaos is a chief factor in
delaying steps by the privileged foreign powers to abolish
extraterritoriality. None the less, as much cooperation
as circumstances permit in meeting this third point in
the Chinese demands is desirable. The objections to the
system outweigh the advantages of continuation.
1In an address before the Anglo-American Association, Peking,
January 20, 1925.




CHAPTER XII
FACTORS IN UNIFICATION
In spite of the chaotic political conditions in China
during recent years, the maritime customs revenue of
that country, measured in Haikwan taels, has increased
steadily year by year since 1918. The general trend is
pronouncedly up even when fluctuations in the value of
this monetary unit are fully discounted. Converted to,gold dollars we see an advance in Chinese customs revenues from under $35,000,000 in 1912 to almost $65,000,000 in 1925. The Chinese market, in other words, is
steadily expanding. The tendency is for more and more
foreign products to be sold there, regardless of local
fluctuations due to warfare, boycotts and unrest. And as
the purchasing power of the country gains, so also gains
the interest of the foreign business man in China.
That is one side of the picture, helping to explain why
opposition to giving China tariff autonomy has strengthened out of fear that thereby the present rising tide of
foreign trade with that country might be impeded.' The
other side is that emphasized by Chinese statesmen who
see that in the five-year period, 1920-1924, their country's merchandise imports averaged $752,000,000 per
annum in value, while merchandise exports in the same
period had an average annual value of only $528,000,000.1
In the long run this normally unfavorable trade bal1During the fiscal years 1920-1924 the merchandise imports of
the United States averaged $3,767,000,000 in value; the average
annual value of merchandise exports being $5,333,000,000.
122




FACTORS IN UNIFICATION


123


ance means foreign loans to make up the deficit, and
foreign loans to China have almost invariably stimulated
foreign political interference. Every Chinese of intelligence realizes today that approximately one-quarter of
his country's imports are cotton textiles, and this continues although every factor suitable to domestic manufacture, from good land to good labor, is present in
abundance. If cotton goods now imported from Great
Britain and Japan war* manufactured at home behind a
reasonable tariff barrier (this is the argument of modern
China), a long step would have been taken towards
equalizing import and export statistics and in freeing the
country from foreign political pressure. The attitude assists in showing why Great Britain and Japan have come
in for so large a portion of the so-called anti-foreign animus in China recently. Economic as well as political
motives are involved.
The advent of modern industrialization in China is
partially responsible for, and partly caused by, the new
economic reasoning, in which the returned students of
course are playing a predominant rl6e. It is easy now
to exaggerate the extent to which the factory system has
taken root over there. It is probable that a full threequarters of the entire population is still engaged in
purely agricultural pursuits, and it is certain that not
1 per cent are as yet wage earners under modern industrial enterprise. The tendency towards modern methods
of manufacture is, however, pronounced. It is a unifying and stabilizing force of the greatest importance,
steadily expanding under the surface chaos which gives
so unfair a picture of present-day China as a whole.
Modern industrial enterprises, many of them of sizable
scale, are now reported from over fifty different centers.
They are no longer confined either to the Treaty Ports,
or to developments of foreign origin. From current pages
of the Chinese government's Economic Butletin could




124  OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT


be culled an instructive list of the manufactures steadily
springing up in all sections of the country. They are
literally of almost every variety. Here, for instance, is
the Eastern Model Cigar Manufactory in Shanghai, established and financed by Chinese and producing between 5,000 and 6,000 cigars a day, the raw materials for
which are purchased from Manila. Here is the Kwang
Hwa Match Factory in Hangchow, employing 1,100
workpeople and doing an annual business of half a million dollars. Here is the Chung Hsing Button Factory
of Wuhu, where 120 operatives turn out daily upwards of
20,000 buttons, manufactured from the shells of mussels which in themselves form an important local food
product. Here is the Pootung Electricity Supply Company, furnishing day and night lighting and power service to homes, factories, and docks in Pootung, its
capital stock all held by Chinese, and its officers and
technicians also of that nationality. Here is the Fukien
Industrial Company of Foochow, where 700 men are employed in the tanning of leather and the manufacture of
various forms of leather goods.
These examples are chosen absolutely at random, with
the sole provision that every case cited must be originated, managed, and financed by Chinese alone. Even
with this qualification hundreds of similar instances of
industrial development, most of them prospering and
nearly all of them started within the past decade, could
be mentioned. Enough has been said to illustrate the
salient point, which is the steady, and no longer negligible, progress in industrialization. In its train this
will bring, and is bringing, new social problems. But the
most important immediate effect is the stimulus to national self-confidence, the demand for the establishment
of sovereign political rights to foster the trend, and the
consciousness of national unity in the modern sense
which is being forwarded. It will not be forgotten that




FACTORS IN UNIFICATION


125


federalism in the United States was not proved successful until the expanding markets of our factories broke
down political provincialism in behalf of national
strength.
Behind industrial development lies the question of
natural resources. Rich as China is in the possession of
mineral wealth, her assets in this direction have probably been overestimated in popular opinion. In such
common metals as copper, lead, zinc, and silver the country is deficient, pronouncedly so in relation to the immense territory and population. Nor does prospecting
so far accomplished indicate any notable petroleum resources. In antimony and tungsten, on the other hand,
China alone, in both cases, now produces half of the entire world supply. It is worth noticing in passing that
the Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act levies a duty of
about 100 per cent on Chinese tungsten, making an interesting contrast with the 5 per cent duty China is allowed to levy on American imports. Another example of
this unfairness is seen in the lace-manufacturing center
of Wusih, where production has been cut in half since
enactment of our tariff law. No American industry will
be found similarly injured by Chinese customs duties,
likin included.
With regard to the two basic industrial mineralscoal and iron-China is also very rich, particularly in
coal. Studies now generally regarded as far too conservative estimate the total Chinese coal reserves at from
forty to fifty billion tons, sufficient to supply the country
for over two thousand years at present consumption rates.
Coal is produced in every province, with the provinces of
Chihli and Fengtien (in Manchuria) at present getting
out about five million tons a year apiece, and Shantung
following with an annual output of over two million
tons. Anthracite, said to rank with that of Pennsylvania
in quality, is found in large deposits in Shansi and




126    OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
Honan, its presence in the former having assisted that
relative prosperity which has made Shansi known as
the "model province." From 1912 to 1923 the annual
production of coal in China nearly doubled, rising from
thirteen million tons the former year to almost twentythree million tons a decade later. The Kailan Mining
Administration in Chihli Province, formed by amalgamation of British and Chinese companies, was producing
about eight thousand tons a day during the disturbed
months of the spring of 1926, which is not far below
the ten thousand-ton-per-diem mark of the Japaneseoperated Fushun mines in Manchuria.'
While these two largest Chinese mines are largely foreign controlled, it is noteworthy that well over half of all
the coal produced is extracted by purely Chinese companies. Of these may be mentioned the Chungshing
Company in Shantung, which increased its output from
518,000 tons in 1918 to 728,000 tons in 1923; and the
Liu Hu Kou Company in Honan, which in the same
period raised output from 118,500 tons to 444,500 tons.
A number of other Chinese-owned and Chinese-managed
mines rival these two in production. During the period
1920-1923 the coal imports of China remained almost
stationary, while her coal exports increased over 50 per
cent, Japan taking most of the increase. The upward
trend in export is continuing.
Year..............  1920  1921    1922     1923
Imports (tons)...... 1,338,356  1,361,781  1,151,392  1,366,108
Exports (tons)...... 1,970,187  1,886,398  2,377,443  3,108,682
Most of the iron mining in China is done in the
Yangtze Valley, the ore production averaging over a million tons a year. Relatively little of this is smelted in
the country, however, and Japan, again, receives most of
' See p. 45.




FACTORS IN UNIFICATION


127


the exported ore. As the following figures show, the
importation of iron ore to China has now virtually
ceased, while exportation is rapidly increasing:
Year..........................  1917  1920   1923
Imports (tons)..................  28,022  20,102  3,084
Exports (tons).................. 309,107  682,660  727,603
It is evident, therefore, that in the exploitation of her
mineral wealth, as well as in the establishment of nearly
every form of modern factory production, China is going ahead with reasonable rapidity, regardless of civil
strife and political overturns. Indeed the trend is so
pronounced, and the Chinese themselves are playing such
a leading part in bringing it about, as to indicate that
much of the opprobrium cast on the republic by foreigners for its inability to maintain order does not cut
deep. In this connection a contemporary study 2 by the
National Bureau of Economic Research, in New York, is
thought provoking. It shows that in the pre-Republican
period, for the years 1888 to 1910, China enjoyed on an
average only 6.84 months of prosperity for every year of
business depression. But by adding eight years of Republican rule, taking the period 1888 to 1920, the ratio
becomes 7.80 months of prosperity for every year of depression. It does not matter so much that by this
grading China ranks low-though above Austria and
Brazil. What is significant is the business improvement
which the republic, with its breaking of old fetters, has
brought about. Beyond doubt this will become more
rather than less pronounced in future, as the growth of
a modern business class tends to bring about a national
unification which the war lords have tried to force prematurely and by destructive methods. But even their
'The statistics on coal and iron are taken from the "China
Year Book" of 1925.
'Entitled "Business Annals."




128     OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
work has had a modernizing side in teaching the Chinese
discipline, group as distinct from family loyalties, and
equality in military strength with foreigners.
Business is unifying China. And perhaps to an even
greater extent the Chinese Labor Movement, greatly
criticized and equally greatly misunderstood by Treaty
Port foreigners, is unifying China. In summarizing the
significance of this important trend I can do no better
than to quote extensively from an article on "Labor
Problems in China in 1925," as it appeared in a recent
publication 1 of the completely non-political and admirably scientific Chinese Government Bureau of Economic Information. Herein an anonymous writer says:
Systematic organization of the labor movement in China began
soon after the Great War, but real progress dates back only three
or four years. And it was not until 1925 that the movement
definitely assumed its national aspect; that a foundation was built
for nation-wide organization. The history of this development
may be roughly divided into three periods. Previous to 1920, all
labor problems were in the dormant stage, but forces were already
at work to prepare the way for the second stage of development.
The period between 1921 and 1924 was characterized by numerous
spasmodic efforts at organization, and might be designated as the
formative period. The year 1925 constituted a period by itself
when labor organizations in various parts of China began to join
hands in putting a national aspect to the movement. But closely
welded combination has still to come, although the influence of
labor agitation has already been felt in all walks of life. Consolidation of present progress will be the work of the future.
China, being fundamentally an agricultural country, has had few
labor problems to contend with in its long history. Even in
recent years, industrial development has not gone far enough to
cause a really acute labor situation. But the effects of agitation
in other countries were felt... for in comparison with western
nations, the treatment of labor in the so-called modern factories
in China appears to be exceedingly unsatisfactory. Aside from
their meager remuneration and long hours of work, Chinese
workmen do not get the protection which is afforded in the West
both by law and by industry itself. So, after the World War,
a few advanced theorists socialistically inclined began to espouse
the cause of the workers. The leaven worked rapidly, and laborers
The Chinese Economic Monthly, March, 1926.




FACTORS IN UNIFICATION


129


in many industrial centers, such as Shanghai and Canton, began
to organize themselves in order to put more weight behind their
demands for better treatment and higher pay. Strikes became
more and more frequent.... The conclusive success of the
Hongkong seamen's strike and the Peking-Hankow Railway
employees' strike brought home the need of better and larger
organizations. With this prelude, we come to a discussion of
developments in 1925, a year which was epoch making in the
labor history of China.
The principal agitations of the year were concerned with two
important labor unions, the Shanghai Federation of Labor Unions
and the National Labor Association. The former is a federation
of thirty-seven labor groups. The National Labor Association
had its birth in Canton on May 1, 1925, under the auspices of the
Kuomintang.... The Shanghai branch of the Association, known
as the Shanghai Central Labor Union, was organized a month
later.
Through the activities of these two organizations, Shanghai became the center of the national labor movement and the source
of all important labor agitations. It was through their ceaseless
propaganda that the Peking Labor Federation was inaugurated in
June, the Tientsin Central Labor League in August, the Honan
Central Labor League in September, and the various railway
labor unions on different dates of the same year (1925). Aside
from speech making and pamphleteering, two daily newspapers
were published (that in Shanghai has been suppressed)..
The Shanghai May thirtieth affair and subsequent incidents added
impetus to the movement, and the two associations vied with
one another in acquiring influence and assuming leadership in all
maneuvers. Their ever-increasing activity, however, led them into
conflict with the authorities, and they were first expelled from the
Foreign Settlement in Shanghai, and then forcibly dissolved by
the Chinese authorities in September, 1925. But the seed of
discontent had already been sown and the movement went on
just the same, although the organizations were henceforth shorn
of official recognition.
In addition to the labor unions, the activities of the student
organizations had a good deal to do with the ever-spreading labor
troubles. Resolutions were adopted at the Seventh Annual Conference of the National Students' Federation held in June, 1925,
in Shanghai, for the purpose of (1) espousing the laborers' cause
in their fight against capitalism and assisting them to secure
adequate protection from the government, (2) rendering necessary
assistance in starting labor organizations and carrying on propaganda work, (3) founding night schools and publishing mass
education literature to help the workmen to acquire adequate
knowledge in political matters, and (4) giving proper backing to
idle workmen during strikes. These resolutions were faithfully




130     OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
carried out not only by the Student Federation but also, tc a
large extent, by the Natioa&l Federation of Laborers, Merchants,
and Students, a new organization born after the May thirtieth
episode. It was largely through the efforts of the students that
much public sympathy was successfully enlisted on the side of
the strikers, and that the labor movement has grown to its present
magnitude.
The writer then describes in detail a number of the
principal strikes called in China during 1925, concluding
his article as follows:
From the standpoint of the labor movement, the year 1925 was
characterized by (1) its nation-wide character, (2) the number of
successful strikes, and (3) the radical nature of the demands put
forward. In addition to the general demand for higher wages and
better treatment, the 1925 strikers insisted upon the official recognition of the labor union and protested against the dismissal of
union members without proper reasons and the concurrence of the
union. A good deal of pressure was also brought to bear upon the
authorities for the promulgation of an adequate set of labor laws.
The Peking government took a firm stand against these labor
unions, and the much desired labor law had not been promulgated up to the end of the year, although several drafts had been
prepared and brought before the cabinet meetings for consideration. [I would insert at this point that the military suocess of
Wu Pei-fu and Chang Tso-lin, both of them strongly anti-labor,
has further delayed institution of a national labor code.] On
the other side, the Canton government and the Kuominchun
authorities were inclined to lend support to the movement and
extend material help either openly or by non-interference. The
most drastic measures for dealing with the strikers were carried
out by the Mukden military authorities (i.e., Chang Tso-lin and
his subordinates).
The students played a considerable part in leading the agitation,
creating general labor unrest throughout the country. Notwithstanding the varying success and failure of the numerous strikes,
it is undeniable that the labor groups have taken a definite step
forward in effecting better organization and using more intelligent
methods of propaganda. They have also established a connection
with the general world of labor, received much vocal and pres
support therefrom, and the Chinese labor problem has thus, in a
measure, become a question of international importance.
It is easy to comprehend from the foregoing article
that the Chinese labor movement, with its promise of




FACTORS IN UNIFICATION


131


growth from local to provincial and then to national
organizations, is another factor of national unification
which is in reality more important than the disagreements
among the Tuchuns. Many minor instances of the same
trend could be cited, one of the most interesting being
the emancipation of Chinese women from the fetters of
tradition, which may seem to have no political significance but is none the less important in readjusting social,
and therefore political, life in accord with the demands
of the moder world. It was a surprise to me to find
Chinese women students doing advanced research in
physics and chemistry at the National University in
Peking, but before many days of social investigation the
incident did not seem unusual. In Shanghai the Women's
Commercial and Savings Bank is not merely staffed, but
was launched, by Chinese women. The Canton Telephone Administration has women operators. In every
city the sex is going by hundreds into industrial, commercial, financial, and even professional life, not merely
in subordinate but in executive capacities. The development is having a clear effect in encouraging that
national self-assurance which is a very healthy, though
to some a very irritating, symptom of modern China.
But of all the factors contributing to political unification in China the most important, without question,
is the thirst for moder education which now animates
so large a proportion of the population. And by moder
education is not meant slavish imitation of foreign systems but, as Dr. Hu Shih has put it, "the rebirth of an
old civilization under the influence of a new impulse and
a new attitude which direct contact with the ideas and
methods of the modern world has produced." 1
In a country as rich and prosperous as America the
obstacles confronting this "Chinese Renaissance" are
"The Chinese Renaissance," Bulletin 6 of the Chinese National
Association for the Advancement of Education (1993).




132    OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
difficult to comprehend. In the month of December,
1925, the Ministry of Education, which is theoretically
charged with the supervision of the modernization of instruction in China, received as its share of federal income something under $2,000. Clerks and typists whose
salaries had been in arrears for as much as twenty
months were rewarded for their patience with individual
pay envelopes with contents averaging about two dollars each.
It is obvious that state-aided institutions are likely to
be in a sorry situation in a country where the central
government has no money at all for education, and where
a great majority of the provinces and townships are in
exactly the same position. Unquestionably many of the
excesses which conceal the value in student agitation are
partially due to a lowering of morale caused by acute
financial difficulties at the government universities. But
these excesses are secondary to the self-sacrifice in behalf of learning which intelligent youth in China today
accepts as a matter of course. During an inspection of
the National University at Peking in mid-January I
commented to my student guide on the piercing cold of
libraries and class rooms. He replied, as though it were
a casual matter, that confronted with a choice between
having coal and having textbooks, the undergraduates
had unanimously petitioned for the mental form of fuel.
I could not help contrasting this with the prevalent
Treaty Port argument that the Chinese are not to be
trusted with the increase of revenue which tariff autonomy would bring.
While institutions nominally "state-aided" are struggling along without either aid or anything that can
legitimately be called a state as Occidentals understand
the word, the status of most of the missionary colleges
and schools is changing. Though the financial worries
of the latter are not similarly acute, their position is




FACTORS IN UNIFICATION


133


rendered difficult by the increasing student objection
to foreign control over curriculum and by the developing scepticism, if not actual hostility, towards Christianity, at least as practiced by the modern churches.
The Chinese Anti-Christian Union, which seeks to define Christianity as the spiritual arm of foreign economic
imperialism, is nothing like as powerful as its adherents
claim. But a conviction that Christian doctrine is not
a vital factor in the policy of western nations, and that
foreigners are more anxious to see the Chinese practice
it than to observe it themselves is practically universal
among the nationalistic students with whom I have
spoken. Most of the educational missionaries appreciate the strength of evidence behind this viewpoint,
and are rising handsomely to meet the problem by progressively relinquishing control in their schools to the
Chinese. But the transition period, for all its vital
importance, is not one leading to the best educational
results.
In spite of all these difficulties the interesting fact
remains that the passion for learning among the Chinese
people was never more adequately met by educational
facilities than is the case today. Just prior to the
Revolution of 1911 there were but fifty institutions above
high-school grade in China, with a total enrolment of
under nine thousand students. The number of colleges
in this classification has now grown to 125, with about
forty thousand students. Before the revolution not 1 per
cent of the population was able to read and write.
Now, after fifteen chaotic years, the literacy average
for the entire country is closely estimated at 15 per
cent, rising to 50 per cent in the "model province" of
Shansi. And it must be remembered that it means
something to be literate in China, where a familiarity
with four thousand separate characters is necessary for
everyday reading.




134    OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
How progressive improvement in both elementary and
higher education can coincide with a progressive deterioration in the authority of government is an interesting
problem for students of political science. The seeming
paradox certainly exists in China. But if one bears in
mind the Chinese mi3trust of and distaste for centralized
government, it will go far to explain how a remarkable
educational advance has been achieved in spite of the
powerlessness and poverty of unstable administrations
in Peking. The Ministry of Education directs a general scheme of public instruction, but professional educators and other volunteer workers determine to what
extent the bare scheme shall be put in force in the
localities where they work, and also to what extent it
shall be improved upon.
Thus one finds now operating in most of the larger
cities of China, and to some extent in rural districts
also, the "Thousand Character" adult education movement, designed to give illiterates who have no other
educational facilities available a foundation for reading
in four months' time. This movement, carried on with
governmental sanction, and varying provincial support,
was originated by the Chinese Y M C A for the Chinese
labor corps in France during the World War, and is
now carried on by voluntary local committees. Many
of the war lords, particularly the Christian General,
have encouraged the project because of the benefit accruing to soldier students. And while the difficulty of linking those who have taken the courses with systematic
continuation work is unsolved, the general success of
this spontaneous local movement against illiteracy is
indubitable.
Then, at the other end of the educational ladder, are
found such organizations as the recently organized
"China Foundation for the Promotion of Education and
Culture," of which Fan Yuan-lien, a former Minister




FACTORS IN UNIFICATION


135


of Education, is director. Operating on funds at present largely obtained from the last American Boxer indemnity remission, this foundation allocates a part of
its income, setting aside the remainder for endowment,
to the forwarding of scientific research in institutions of
standing throughout the country.
In between these two samples of current educational
activities, selected merely as illustrations from many
that might be cited, come numerous local, provincial,
and national efforts, of, by, and for Chinese, designed
to train the national intelligence to cope with modern
problems. Most of them are coordinated and, so far as
desirable, unified through efforts of the Chinese National
Association for the Advancement of Education. And in
not a single year of the protracted political disorder has
any province failed to send its delegates to the conferences of the National Federation of Provincial Educational Associations.
Education,. commerce, labor-to cite but three outstanding forces-are surely and steadily knitting China
together. It is more than advisable-it is essentialto remember when accounts of civil strife and disorder
are nearly all one reads in the daily press from this great
country, that under the surface these great movements
are making headway all the time.




CHAPTER XIII


OUR OWN COLONIAL PROBLEM
As one begins consideration of the problem which
the Philippines have become for the United States it
is worth remembering that independence advocates there
can invoke history to point to a moral for their cause.
In 1776 it took as long to journey from London to
the far-flung American colonies as in 1926 it takes to
reach the scattered islands of the Philippine Archipelago
from Washington. A century and a half ago English
military and commercial interests had succeeded in
dictating, with arguments which at the time seemed
fairly valid, what policy the governing nation should
exhibit towards the governed. The official American
attitude in the Philippines seems now on the highroad
to determination by similar factors.
In 1776 the Continental Congress stirred English
Tories to mingled wrath and ridicule by asserting that
"all men are created equal," that "they are endowed
by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights," that
"to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted
among men, deriving their just powers from the consent
of the governed," and that "whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right
of the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute
new Government."
Nowadays every move of the Philippine Legislature
which is actuated by processes of reasoning, or sentiment, similar to those that animated the signers of our
136




OUR OWN COLONIAL PROBLEM


137


Declaration of Independence, is for many Americans
in the Islands a subject for sarcasm and mockery. Let
us quote a typical editorial from the Manila Times
(American owned and edited) as evidence. Entitled
"Excess Baggage" and appearing in the issue of February 17, 1926, this sample-by no means an extreme
example-ran as follows:
It is a paradox that our legislature takes itself so seriously,
when legislatures in most countries have been abolished. The
interparliamentary union of Europe now consists of Mussolini,
Rivera, Hindenburg, and whoever is on top at the moment in
France. It works out well, with Latins at least. Just when Italy
and Spain have been pigeonholed as decadent, they take on a new
lease of life. Latins do better with a dictator than with parliaments. Filipinos do too.
The purpose of these comparisons, it goes without
saying, is not to try and force an historical parallel
where none can legitimately be drawn. It is merely to
illustrate, at the outset of our inquiry, that from the
viewpoint of many Filipinos there is much that seems
contradictory, hypocritical, and therefore doubly irritating in the way the heirs to the ideals of colonial
America are handling America's first grave colonial
problem. And this realization belongs at the beginning,
for it is basic to the restiveness and sullen attitude now
beginning to be apparent towards Americans in the
islands.
Manila itself, a metropolis with a present estimated
population of 315,000, is two days' leisurely steaming due
southeast from Hongkong across the languorous South
China Sea. Other places in the archipelago, however,
are much closer to foreign territory. The northernmost
island of the group is on the twenty-first parallel north
latitude, only sixty-five miles from the Japanese territory of Formosa. The southernmost island, not five
degrees north of the equator, lies only thirty miles east




138    OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
of British North Borneo. The Philippine Archipelago,
containing 7,083 separate islands, large and small, and
extending 1,152 statute miles from north to south, is
geographically the southern half of the great chain of
islands paralleling the coast of Asia from Siberia to the
equator. This key position athwart all Oriental trade
routes gives to the Philippines strategic and commercial
importance potentially greater than that possessed by
Japan, forming the northern half of the aforesaid island
chain.
It is easy to underestimate the size of our great
dependency in the Far East. The total land area of
the archipelago is 115,026 square miles, almost identical with that of post-war Italy, or with the combined
areas (land and water) of the states of New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Maryland. Luzon, the biggest island of the archipelago, is as large as Denmark,
Belgium, and Holland combined. Mindanao, the second
island in size, is about equal in area to Portugal. Ten
of the Philippine Islands contain more than one thousand square miles each.
Compared with most of the adjacent countries, the
Philippines are not thickly inhabited. The last official
census (December 31, 1918) showed a total population
of 10,350,640, and the present-day figures are probably
not much in excess of 11,000,000. While this is a greater
population than that possessed by Canada, and far
greater than that of huge Australia, its density is much
less than that of Japan, China, India, or the Dutch
East Indies. At the same time it is worth remembering
that the Philippines average about ninety-five persons
to the square mile as against less than forty to the
square mile in the United States. With the exception
of the Chinese, of whom there are some 50,000 in the
islands, controlling a very large proportion of all retail
commerce, the foreign population is small. There are




OUR OWN COLONIAL PROBLEM


139. r
aV


PAC  I JIC.


PRILIPPINI
Sor.3p        alp~r
64411   -4W. -
Jeh,  -                WWIII~Y  rl~


C ifA N       (SAPA")
(V4.)


t
a


THE FAR EAST
The map covers the area from 50~ north latitude to the
equator, and from 110~ to 150~ east longitude. Territory subject
to white nations is shaded.




140    OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
about 7,000 American civilians, less than 8,500 Japanese, 4,000 Spaniards and 1,000 English. People of other
nationalities are negligible in number.
There are, however, close to a million Filipinos of
mixed blood, known as Mestizos. Over half of these
represent the Chinese admixture, while those with a
considerable proportion of Spanish or other European
blood come next in frequency. The American Mestizos
are not yet a factor of considerable importance, not
because such children are rare but because it is not yet
a generation since the American annexation. There is
little doubt that relative to total numbers the Chinese
and Spanish Mestizos furnish a disproportionately high
ratio of leaders in every line. The Chinese strain seems
to contribute a business acumen and energy lacking in
the pure Malay stock. The Spanish strain seems to
provide a brilliancy and egoism which is often irritating
to the less showy Anglo-Saxon nature. How the American Mestizo will turn out the future will show. In general this mixture does not appear very promising, though
the furtive nature of the parental union rather than
biological causes is probably responsible for this.
Much effort has been spent in trying to prove that
the Filipinos are not a homogeneous race. The thesis
is difficult to maintain, except in so far as the Mohammedan and semi-savage Moros are concerned. Whatever may be said against the Spanish policy in the
islands the fact remains that three and a half centuries
of Spanish rule both Christianized and unified the Malay
population to a high degree. The Spanish churches,
many of them beautiful old buildings, are still tle focal
point of civic life in towns and villages throughout the
islands, and outside Manila the influence of the Spanish
period is still much more pronounced than that of the
American regime. The Moro problem and the different
dialects prevalent in different sections are cited with




OUR OWN COLONIAL PROBLEM


141


more energy than effectiveness to prove that the Filipinos
are not to be trusted with a greater degree of self-governments. The former is diminishing in intensity every
year, which is natural when one considers that the Christian Filipinos outnumber the Mohammedans more than
twenty to one. And the language difficulty has been
greatly exaggerated, most of the eighty-seven different
dialects on which such stress is laid being very closely
related to one another. At present, about one-quarter of
the population reads or understands English, which in
another generation will have become the universal language, with Spanish probably continuing as a second
tongue among the educated for literary and social
purposes.
On the character of the Philippine people the report
of the Wood-Forbes Mission of 1921 is particularly
valuable, because the general conclusions of this document cannot be called sympathetic to Filipino claims.
In the section of this report dealing with national characteristics Governor-General Wood and former Governor-General Forbes, both firm advocates of retention,
wrote as follows: 1
The Philippine people possess many fine and attractive qualities
-dignity and self-respect, as shown by deportment, complete
absence of beggars, personal neatness and cleanliness, courtesy and
consideration to strangers and guests, boundless hospitality, willingness to do favors for those with whom they come in contact.... They are happy and carefree to an extent seldom found
among other peoples, keen to own their land, strongly attached
to their homes and their children, proud of and devoted to their
beloved Philippines; they are free from worries arising from international difficulties and responsibilities; they are refined in manner, filled with racial pride, lighthearted and inclined to be improvident, as are all peoples who live in lands where Nature does so
much and people require so little. In many positions they have
shown marked capacity and have done better than could reason'The latter part of this section of the report is omitted, as
points therein are covered elsewhere in this and succeeding chapters.   - footnotes on the report are mine.




142     OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
ably have been expected of an inexperienced and untried people.
There are many holding high positions in the judicial, executive,
and educational departments who would be a credit to any government. They are proud, as they well may be, of the advance they
have made since the beginning of American control of the Islands,
for it can be safely stated that no people, under the friendly
tutelage of another, have made so great a progress in so short
a time....
They possess active minds, their children are bright and precocious and learn rapidly. The whole people have a consuming
thirst for education, and, as is common among those who have
had little opportunity and much hard work, there is a leaning
towards the learned professions or occupations which do not
involve severe manual labor, and a tendency to underestimate
the importance of agriculture and the dignity of labor, and to
overestimate the standing given by the learned professions.
Their support and aid in the building up of public education
is beyond praise. They have sacrificed much that their children
might be able to go to school, and the interests of an entire family
are often subordinated to sending the selected member to a higher
school or university. Schoolhouses are often constructed by
voluntary contributions of labor, money, and material. There is
a serious lack of educated public opinion, for as yet the Philippine
public is not a reading public, and there is a lack of a strong
independent press, although there has been a great advance in this
respect during recent years, and there are several outstanding independent papers of great local influence. The daily total circulation of all Island papers is a little less than 140,000, and in
the remote provinces people still depend largely upon the circulation of news by word of mouth.1 The Philippine people are
readily led by those who understand them. They make brave
soldiers, and under good leaders make excellent troops. Due to
the lack of a well-informed public opinion they are easily swayed
by their leaders. As a result of generations of disregard for sanitary measures, they are still rather Oriental in their attitude
toward diseases and questions of public health and sanitation.
This indifference is being rapidly corrected.
The Filipino woman is a strong and dominating influence in
every home and community; she is modest, loyal and hard working, and while not much in evidence she is nevertheless always to
be reckoned with.... The establishment of a large number of
women's clubs, that concern themselves with hygiene and other
civic matters, is a most encouraging sign of the times.
Total newspaper circulation now (1926) is estimated at 200,000.
The literacy of the Filipino people is about 40 per cent, or more
than twice as high as that of China.
'Under native health officers the death rate (17.5 per 1,000 in
1923) has been brought lower than that of Japan, Spain, or Italy.




OUR OWN COLONIAL PROBLEM


143


But more important than the character of the Philippine people, in the eyes of many Americans, is the character of Philippine resources. It hardly needs to be
stated that the campaign to nullify our repeated promises of eventual independence for the islands has intensified pari passu with appreciation of their commercial
value. As yet, as the following foreign trade statistics
for representative years indicate, this potential value is
far from being realized:


U. S. Fiscal Year   Imports     Other ImportsTotal Imports
from U. s.          mports Total Imports
1905...........    $ 5,761,498    $25,114,852   $ 30,876,350
1910...........     10,775,301     26,292,329     37,067,630
1915...........     22,394,381     22,085,480     44,479,861
1920...........     80,374,530     42,757,581    123,132,111
1925............    64,466,117     52,765,548    117,231,665
1926...........     69,957,871     47,679,241    117,637,112
U. S. Fiscal Year Exports to U. S. Other Exports Total Exports
1905............$ 15,668,026      $16,684,589   $ 32,352,615
1910...........     18,741,771     21,122,398     39,864,169
1915............    23,001,275     27,913,786     50,915,061
1920...........     84,186,048     68,195,193    152,381,241
1925............   101,254,536     38,822,269    140,076,805
1926............   102,831,205     38,213,225    141,044,430


The mineral resources of the islands, believed to be
of sizable quantity in gold, coal, and iron, though deficient in nearly all other metals, are still a virtually
unexploited field. The production of gold is at present
most important, but the value of this mineral extracted
was only $1,330,000 in 1921, and $1,711,000 in 1923.
Coal production is second in importance among the mineral industries, yet is in fact virtually negligible. The
entire island output during recent years has averaged
little over 40,000 tons per annum, or about the same




144    OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
as the production in four days of the Japanese-operated Fushun mines in Manchuria. Ten tons of coal
are imported from Japan, China, and Australia, for
every one produced in the Philippines. Iron mining is in a still more primitive and undeveloped
state, with a total domestic cast-iron production valued
at only $25,000 in 1923. Whatever the future may hold
for the development of Philippine mineral resources, and
it is a future subject to scepticism, the present value
of the islands in this direction is absolutely trivial.
When we turn to agriculture, which has been, is, and
always will be the chief source of Philippine wealth,
a more roseate prospect opens. The leading agricultural
products, with their approximate value when ready for
marketing, were in 1924 as follows: sugar, $53,000,000;
copra, $29,000,000; abaca (Manila hemp), $21,000,000;
tobacco, $6,000,000. The greater part of these products
are exported. Rice, and to a lesser extent corn, takes
more acreage than any of the above, but are altogether
products of domestic consumption.
The Philippines rank tenth among the sugar-producing countries of the world; eighth in tobacco production;
and first in the raising of cocoanuts, furnishing approximately one-third of the world's supply of copra. The
natural monopoly of first-class abaca, an unequalled
cordage fiber, is of great value to the islands. The
lumber industry, also, is developing and beginning to
show up in the export statistics. Yet on the whole the
underdevelopment of agricultural and forest products
is pronounced. In Japan, where not more than 20 per
cent of the land is arable, practically every acre that
can be brought under cultivation is being utilized. The
situation in the Philippines is diametrically opposite.
Of the 30,000,000 hectares in these islands it is probA hectare equals 2.471 acres.




OUR OWN COLONIAL PROBLEM


145


able that at least 50 per cent could readily be made
highly productive, yet at present only about 3,700,000
hectares are under cultivation. An acreage half as large
again as this consists of grass and open land, easily
arable but quite untouched.
In sugar, for instance, the Philippine Islands, with
three times the area of Cuba, achieve but one-tenth
the production of the Caribbean country. Hawaii has
6,449 square miles as against the 115,026 square miles
in the Philippines; has a population of 256,000 as against
some 11,000,000 Filipinos. Yet Hawaii produces more
sugar than the Philippines, for all that conditions in the
latter are highly favorable to growth of the cane. In
1924, nearly ten thousand Filipinos' emigrated to the
sugar plantations of Hawaii, clearly indicating the maladjustment in the development of domestic resources.
The question arises: Has any country in these crowded
times the right to be as indolent in self-development
as are the Philippines?
This is the vital question which has been made an
outright issue by the increasing demand for, and the increasing cost of, rubber in the United States. And here,
of course, the military argument coincides with the commercial. It does not worry the War Department that
Filipinos should be indifferent about the development
of their coal, their sugar-cane, their cocoanut and tobacco plantations. We do not need the Islands for
the development of national self-sufficiency in these respects. But rubber is a vital element in modern warfare
in which we are at present almost totally dependent on
foreign countries. And the action of the British government in restricting the rubber output of British
Malaya and Ceylon, and taxing all exports of rubber
from these countries, has brought a strong commercial
backing to the military viewpoint. It is to be remembered that the United States now consumes 75 per cent




146     OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
of the world supply of rubber, and that 80 per cent of
the world supply comes from British Malaya, adjacent
to the Philippines.
The rubber potentialities of the Philippines are beyond dispute, and, as is indicated by the following table
of the quantities and value of the product exported in
recent years, production has already passed the experimental stage:
Year               Kilos Exported  Value in Dollars
1913..................   139           173
1915..................  33,001       11,935
1917..................  29,829       40,099
1919..................  86,803       70,034
1921..................  40,627       12.850
1923..................  39,049       23,037
1925..................  140,827      87,428
While rubber can be grown, and economically grown,
anywhere in the Philippines, the best area for the purpose is that lying between the fourth and eighth degrees
north latitude, or below the typhoon belt. This area
includes most of the great island of Mindanao, and the
smaller islands of Basilan, Jolo, and Tawitawi, on the
first-named of which several plantations are already
operating. A pamphlet on rubber issued by the Philippine Department of Commerce says:
Mindanao combines all the qualities that make for a prosperous
rubber-producing district. What is needed is an adequate supply
of capital to make it so. Foreign and native capital should cooperate in exploiting this promising and profitable industry.
We have the necessary labor supply for the purpose and there is
no shortage of it, as many claim. Hundreds of Filipino laborers
are emigrating to Hawaii every year, and there are now thousands of them in that country working in pineapple and sugar
plantations....
1A kilogram equals 22046 pounds. Experts of the U. S. Department of Agriculture have estimated the potential rubber
production of the Islands at 70,000 tons yearly. Even this figure,
however, is slightly under one-fifth of the present annual consumption of raw rubber by the United States.




OUR OWN COLONIAL PROBLEM


147


Land is also obtainable on liberal terms. The Insular Government leases' through the Bureau of Lands to any private individual, corporation, or entity parcels of land not to exceed
1,024 hectares (2,500 acres), at a payment of 3 per cent of the
assessed value of the land, per annum. It is also selling land,
not to exceed 100 hectares to a private person, and not to exceed
1,024 hectares to a corporation, from 10 pesos ($5) per hectare
and up, according to the locality and condition of the land. If a
greater area is desired the Philippine Legislature may, by special
legislation, authorize the sale of a greater area, or permit the
lease of any amount of land owned by the insular government
for a longer term of years, as was done in the case of the Mindoro
Sugar Company.
In the above paragraph are summarized the most
important features of the famous Philippine Public Land
Law, approved November 29, 1919, and somewhat
amended in 1925, which is at present arousing such
bitter controversy. The overwhelmingly predominant
Filipino attitude is that restrictions on the alienation of
the enormous public domain 2 are essential, in order to
prevent ruthless exploitation of the Philippine people.
All the restrictions, it should be noted, are identical for
Filipinos and Americans, corporations organized under
the laws of other countries being prohibited from acquiring agricultural public land. The overwhelmingly predominant attitude of American business men in the
islands, on the other hand, is that the limitation of
corporate ownership to 2,500 acres is a prime factor in
checking the investment of American capital and hampering the development of the islands. In the case of a
rubber plantation, for instance, that limitation on acreage means that no single company can under the letter
of the law hope to produce beyond a maximum of 500
tons annually. That quantity is insufficient to attract
the big American rubber manufacturers.
Leases may run for a period of twenty-five years, renewable
for another twenty-five years or, in case of important improvements, for fifty years.
Estimated at 63,000,000 acres, of which a large part is in
Mindanao.




148    OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
Quite naturally it follows that the Philippine Land
Law, taken in conjunction with the potential American
market for Philippine rubber, is now the most instrumental cause behind efforts to restrict Philippine autonomy. The argument is very simple: restrict or
abolish the powers of the Insular Legislature and that
body will no longer be able to restrict American business
or to keep out an influx of cheap labor from China and
the East Indies, as it does now by various restrictive
laws. As the Journal of the American Chamber of Commerce in the Philippines phrased it recently: 1
Let Congress... give us an actual unquestioned form of
territorial government, with a Governor... preferably from
the western part of the United States... who can look at a
mountain and tear its guts out for the mineral it contains....
The unforgivable crime of the Filipinos, from this
American business viewpoint, is that they have not the
faintest desire to see the "guts" torn out of their mountains, their forests, or their fields in order to please our
Babbitts. Indeed, a fear of this ruthless, efficient "guttearing" civilization is shadowing the lives of the Filipinos and greatly contributing to the strength of the
independence campaign among the educated classes.
Nor is this fear on the part of a race which acknowledges itself lacking in physical stamina and enterprise
a subject which can be dismissed by tabulation of the
unquestioned material, educational, and social benefits
which American sovereignty has conferred upon the
Philippines.
A prominent Filipino doctor said to me one night as
we sat beneath the Southern Cross gleaming over one
of those menaced mountains:
We have seen how the red Indians, the Hawaiians, and the
South Sea Islanders have successively succumbed to the pressure
'Issue of February, 1926, p. 6.




OUR OWN COLONIAL PROBLEM                     149
of your business, the iron march of your industrialism. For you
the Philippine question is answerable in terms of more dollars
and more national power. For us it is a matter of life or death.
We are the weaker race. We do not claim that our civilization
is as efficient as yours. We do claim that American business has
no right to mold our future regardless of all the conditions of
our happiness, treating your pledges of the past like scraps of
paper. That is why every educated Filipino supports those
leaders to whom Americans like to refer slightingly as our
"politicians." That is why I gladly donate 10 per cent of my small
salary to help maintain our Independence Mission in the United
States.




CHAPTER XIV


AN ANOMALOUS GOVERNMENT
American unfamiliarity with the constitutional status
of the Philippines is well illustrated by the surprise with
which many learn that the Prohibition Amendment has
no force whatsoever in the Archipelago. Neither has any
other amendment, nor the original body of the Constitution, except in so far as parts of it may have been
specifically legislated for the Philippines.  Constitutionally the Philippines are not a part of the United
States. Yet they are American territory and other nations cannot deal with them as a separate government.
As has been said: "The Government of the Philippine
Islands is a government foreign to the United States for
domestic purposes, but domestic for foreign purposes." 1
Filipinos are not American citizens, but owe allegiance
to, and are under the protection of, the United States.
Since the Philippines are subject to the United States,
but without the guarantees of the American Constitution, it follows that the power of Congress over the
Islands is absolute. At any time, by a mere majority
vote in both Houses followed by the customary Presidential approval, our Congress can completely alter the
basic law and political status of the Islands. "Congress,"
as one of the leading Filipino authorities on constitutional law has written, "can keep the Philippines in
perpetual dependency, convert it into a State of the
'Quoted by KALAw: "The Present Government of the Philippines," p. 112.
150




AN ANOMALOUS GOVERNMENT


151


Union, or declare it free and independent."  The record
shows that our Federal Legislature has so far been scrupulously careful to exercise this enormous power over
an alien people cautiously. But the fear of what Congress may do-a fear which is quite comprehensible in
view of the general ignorance of our Senators and Representatives on Philippine sentiments and conditionsis a constant source of anxiety to the educated islanders.
Much of the energy of the so-called "Independence Mission" in Washington is occupied with combating illjudged bills on Philippine matters. Such legislation, of
course, can at any time be introduced at the behest of
interested American groups.
There is something patently un-American in our failure to give any constitutional guarantees or safeguards
to the people of the Philippines. The advertised autonomy of the Islands cannot be regarded as very real
when one remembers the unlimited power which Congress reserves to undo at a stroke the accomplishments
of the Philippine Legislature. The Jones Law stipulates
(Section 19) that "all laws enacted by the Philippine
Legislature shall be reported to the Congress of the
United States, which hereby reserves the power and
authority to annul the same." The Insular Legislature
itself could, it appears, be wiped out of existence if the
President of the United States and a bare majority of
Congress felt at any time that such a reactionary step
was desirable. Nominally autonomous, the Philippine
Islands have in reality much less-guaranteed self-government than an American state. They have not even
a vote in this Congress which is a sword of Damocles
above their heads, for the Resident Commissioners chosen
by the Insular Legislature can speak, but cannot participate in a division on the floor of the House of
Representatives.
1 MAXIM M. KALAW, op. cit., p. 113.




152     OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
Historically, it would appear that the reason for the
absence of any constitutional status for the Philippines
is our oft-reiterated pledge to give them complete independence. Permanent guarantees would have been
superfluous for the temporary American administration
which was designed. And that the design was for purely
temporary American control there is not the faintest
shadow of doubt, the only issue originally being as to
the length of time for which that control should be
exercised. The advocates of independence are able to
quote numerous statements of acceptance in that end
by Presidents McKinley, Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson,
which is perhaps not quite fair unless certain qualifying
observations (fully quoted in their turn by advocates
of retention) are included. Moreover, expressions of
executive opinion, as Europe has come to realize since
the Treaty of Versailles, are in no way legally binding
on the United States.
The preamble to the Jones Law, passed by both
Houses of Congress in 1916 and approved by President
Wilson on August 29 of that year, may, however, be
legitimately regarded as the definite pledge of the
American people on the subject. That preamble, following a title which defines the law as, "An Act to
declare the purpose of the people of the United States
as to the future political status of the people of the
Philippine Islands, and to provide a more autonomous
government for those islands," reads as follows:
Whereas it was never the intention of the people of the
United States in the incipiency of the War with Spain to make
it a war of conquest or for territorial aggrandizement; and
Whereas it is, as it has always been, the purpose of the people
of the United States to withdraw their sovereignty over the
Philippine Islands and to recognize their independence as soon as
a stable government can be established therein; and
Whereas for the speedy accomplishment of such purpose it is
desirable to place in the hands of the people of the Philippines
as large a control of their domestic affairs as can be given them




AN ANOMALOUS GOVERNMENT


153


without, in the meantime, impairing the exercise of the rights of
sovereignty by the people of the United States, in order that, by
the use and exercise of popular franchise and governmental powers, they may be the better prepared fully to assume the responsibilities and enjoy all the privileges of complete independence:
Therefore
Be it enacted,...etc.
At the present time it is being argued, in a way unpleasantly reminiscent of the famous "scrap of paper"
incident, that the preamble of a law is not a part of
that law, and has, in consequence, no legal force. Even
though true, the technicality is not wholly effective. The
issue is one in which Philippine opinion ought to be
consulted as much as American. To the Filipinos the
Jones Law is more than an organic act establishing a
semi-autonomous government in the Islands. It is regarded as' a Treaty in which the Title and Preamble,
deliberately set down and passed by Congress, are as
important as what follows. And, so the dangerous argument may now be heard, if the preamble to the Jones
Law is not binding on America, neither are certain provisos of that law necessarily binding on us. The reference, generally, is to that part of Section 22 of the
Act which states specifically that: "All executive functions of the government (of the Philippine Islands) must
be directly under the Governor-General or within one
of the executive departments under the supervision and
control of the Governor-General."
It is at this point that-entirely regardless of the independence issue-the Jones Law breaks down as a
permanent instrument of government. This organic law
provided for the establishment of a Legislature, composed of a House of Representatives with ninety-one
members and a Senate with twenty-four members.' It
1Nine members of the House and two Senators, all from the
non-Christian districts, are appointed by the Governor-General.
The remainder are elected under manhood suffrage.




154    OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
authorized improvement in the executive side of government so that there were subsequently established six
departments,1 with subordinate bureaus, corresponding
to the principal domestic purposes of a modem nation.
But it failed to settle in any clear-cut way the basic
issue of the responsibility of the department heads.
The secretaries were at one and the same time made
subject to the influence of the native Legislature, and told
that in their executive functions they were completely
subordinate to the control of the American GovernorGeneral.
Most obviously such a system could only work well
as long as there was complete harmony between Legislature and Governor-General. There was such harmony
under Francis Burton Harrison, Governor-General from
1913 to 1921. There has been anything but such harmony under the regime of Major-General Leonard Wood,
Governor-General since 1921. The reason for this difference is not primarily a matter of individual personality, mistakes, or virtues. It lies primarily in the
fact that Harrison did his utmost to forward the Filipino claim to control over the executive, which Wood
has as persistently blocked. The former sought to reduce
the practical values of his office in favor of the ceremonial, conceiving this to accord with the spirit of the
Jones Law. The latter has refused to abdicate any
part of the functions which the letter of the Jones Law
entrusts to him. Shrewd observers will see in the contrast between the two administrations, each of them
quite defensible under the organic Act, a proof that this
Act will not serve much longer as the basis of Philippine
government.
Indeed, the unsettled constitutional status of the Philippines must be appreciated before justifiable criticism
'Interior, Public Instruction, Finance, Justice, Agriculture
and Natural Resources, Commerce and Communications.




AN ANOMALOUS GOVERNMENT


155


of American administrative methods out there can be
passed. The very rapid Filipinization of the islands
under the Harrison regime was bound to make the task
of the present Governor-General a thankless one. Judging purely by the policy followed during President Wilson's two terms of office, the most logical action for Mr.
Harrison's successor would have been to pull down the
American flag and pack up. "Reactionary" is after all
a relative word, and it is well to realize that General
Wood is reactionary to the Filipinos not so much because he pulls backward, as because he gives a conservative rather than a liberal interpretation in all the
vexed cases where varying interpretations of the Jones
Law are legitimate.
Illustrative of the point is Governor-General Wood's
frequent use of the veto power, which was exercised by
]overnor-General Harrison just five times during the
five years of his stay after the passage of the Jones Law.
General Wood has no scruples about employing his veto
power lavishly,' even in matters of purely domestic concern, but maintains that he has never used it without
the most complete confidence that his action was justified. And it does seem significant that while the Philippine Legislature can by a two-thirds vote send a vetoed
bill directly to the President of the United States for
decision, such action was taken with only one measure
out of all those blocked by Governor Wood up to the
1926 session of the Legislature. Shortly after the convening of the 1926 session, however, a resolution calling
for a plebiscite on the independence issue was promptly
repassed by both houses of the Legislature after veto by
the Governor-General as outside legislative authority.
General Wood vetoed twenty-one bills in the first two sessions
of the Legislature under his administration. In the 1925 session
the proportion was approximately one bill vetoed out of every
three sent to him for signature.




156    OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
This issue of the exercise of veto power is really
a fundamental in the whole Philippine problem. When
the Governor-General vetoes a bill which may, even remotely, affect legitimate American interests he in no
way contravenes the spirit of the Jones Law. But when
he vetoes measures of purely domestic concern, as in
the recent effort to revise the divorce laws of the islands,
he makes himself a predominant part of the Philippine
legislative machinery in a way which certainly seems
inconsistent with the degree of autonomy the Philippines
theoretically possess.  It has been Governor-General
Wood's viewpoint that the Filipinos are only potentially, not yet actually, capable of self-government and
that he is, therefore, completely justified in blocking their
legislative course at any point where his reason tells
them they are in shoal water. It is the Filipino viewpoint that whether their elected representatives always
show impeccable wisdom in purely domestic matters is
none of the Governor-General's business. Feeling in
this issue has become very bitter, and will become increasingly so until the constitutional uncertainty which
surrounds it is clarified by the American Congress.
It may be stated without qualification that the Filipino people will never be a satisfied and contented community within the American Empire until they are given
real home rule. And the form of home rule must be
based upon the English system of cabinet responsibility
to the legislature rather than the American system of
divided authority. The racial difficulty plays its part
in deciding this choice, for the Filipinos will consider
themselves a subject people as long as an American
Governor-General is allowed to hold the whip hand over
a native legislature. But rational political theory which
has not failed to notice the grave defects arising from








SENATE PRESIDENT QUEZON
The brilliant leader of the Independence Movement relaxes on ship-      x
board during an inter-island propaganda trip.. 
MRS. ROSA SEVILLA DE ALVERO
The president of a girls' seminary in Manila who urges her
countrywomen to work peacefully
but ceaselessly for independence.




AN ANOMALOUS GOVERNMENT


157


our separation of governmental powers  plays a more
important role.
Moreover, the parliamentary system of cabinet responsibility, now nearly universal among all nations
with democratic government except the United States,
is rooted in Philippine political tradition. The Malolos
Constitution of the short-lived Philippine Republic provided for an outright parliamentary system of government. The Philippine Commission, which governed the
islands from 1901 to 1916, combined executive and legislative functions. The fact that the present system
does not adequately harmonize with the trend of native
political thought was mainly responsible for the creation of the Council of State during the Harrison regime,
on which the President of the Senate and Speaker of
the House as well as Department secretaries were represented. The present Supreme National Council is another instance of the ceaseless effort to reduce the
authority of the executive, failing constitutional provisions to make him responsible to the Legislature. Just as
the English parliamentarians of the past worked ceaselegsly to limit the authority of the king and make him a
largely ceremonial figure, so will the Filipino spokesmen
work to contravene dictatorial powers of the GovernorGeneral until such time as answer is given to their plea
for an executive responsible to the people through the
agency of a duly elected Legislature.
When this constitutional situation is understood, and
not concealed by stupid attempts to stigmatize the native
leaders as "politicians"-absurd when we recall that it
is our own "politicians" who in the last analysis have
'Bryce, in his "American Commonwealth"; Beard, in his
"American Government"; Ford in his "Rise and Growth of
American Politics," and a host of other authorities have commented at length on the problems arising from our balance of
power between executive and legislature.




158    OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
absolute power over the Islands-it becomes desirable
to analyze the various alternatives which lie open.
The first possibility is continuation of the status quo,
the chief argument in favor of which is that the Jones
Law has on the whole worked well during its ten years
of operation. As opposed to this, however, is the fact
that the present organic law is admittedly an ad interim
measure, which will not serve indefinitely as the instrument of Philippine government. It has served its experimental purpose, and sooner or later must be improved
upon in the light of experience. Knowledge by both
Americans and Filipinos that the change must come is
probably doing more to retard the economic development
of the islands than would be the case if outright independence were granted.
There is, in the second place, the possibility of giving
the Philippines a territorial status, similar to that of
Hawaii or Alaska, a course strongly advocated by certain
business interests because it would take from the natives
virtually all control over their own affairs. Such a "solution" would be so diametrically opposed to all our
pledges with reference to the Philippines, so certain to
create an enduring and righteous hatred of America
among all patriotic Filipinos, that it is almost incredible to find the course quite widely supported. While it
is unlikely that American public opinion would ever
subscribe to such a betrayal, the fact that it can be
seriously considered helps to illustrate how crucial the
Philippine problem has become.
A third possibility is to give the Islands the status of
an American state, perhaps with certain qualifications
such as freedom from the operation of the Federal Income Tax, or military conscription in time of war. There
is certainly more to be said for this scheme than for that
of territorial status, and early in the century it was
advocated by the Philippine Federal party. That party




AN ANOMALOUS GOVERNMENT


159


disappeared, however, when it could find supporters
neither in the Islands nor in the United States. One
of the many difficulties behind this possible solution is
found in the problem of congressional representation.
The population of the Philippines is as great as that of
the state of New York, and increasing at least as fast.
What would be the effect on our politics and public
opinion (both white and colored) if a body of fifty
brown-skinned legislators were given full powers in the
House of Representatives?
Then there is the possibility of complete and untrammeled independence. That if this were granted the
Filipinos would run their government at least as efficiently and as capably as is the case with the majority
of Latin-American Republics is not open to serious
doubt. That their continued independence, if not
already assured, could be guaranteed by treaties of
neutrality between the powers interested in the Far
East is certain. By the fair minded the effort to make
it appear that Japan would seize the islands if we left
them must be regarded as in large part propaganda
which, consciously or unconsciously, serves to obscure
the real issues. The tropical climate of the islands is
an absolute bar to Japanese colonization. Japanese
economic penetration, as shown elsewhere in this book,
is directed in an entirely different direction.' And the
balance of power in the East would not permit Great
Britain to sit idly by if Japan made any move of
aggression against an independent Philippines.
The real argument against Philippine independence is
not the chance that the natives would not be able to
maintain it if granted, but the abundant evidence that
essential Philippine desires and essential American interests can be harmonized without as yet attempting
wo drastic a solution. Opposition to independence may
See Chap. V.




160    OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
further be quite legitimately supported by the thesis that
if the Islands obtained political freedom they would soon
become economically subservient to some more businesslike race; and by the argument that the problem of
pagan minorities, while becoming less important every
year, would still prove a grave difficulty for a fledgling
republic. Most of the other points raised in opposition
are based on biased self-interest rather than dispassionate facts.
There remains the possibility of Philippine autonomy
under American sovereignty, a status which may be
defined as Dominion Home Rule, because in all essentials akin to that enjoyed by Canada, Australia, New
Zealand, and South Africa within the British Empire.1
Under this arrangement an American Governor-General
would continue in office at Manila, but his powers would
be supervisory rather than executive. The Filipinos
would exercise their own executive authority in all domestic affairs through the agency of a Premier (or
President, if they preferred that title) who with his
Cabinet would be responsible to the Philippine Legislature. The American Governor-General would have more
than ceremonial functions to attend to, for the United
States would retain complete direction of the foreign
policy of the Philippines. For that reason the GovernorGeneral's veto power over Legislative acts would continue, but with the vital distinction that it could be
exercised only against insular legislation legally definable as non-domestic. In specific controversies on debatable ground here it would seem that the United States
Supreme Court, rather than the President of the United
States as at present, should serve as arbiter for an
overridden veto.
An excellent source book on Dominion Home Rule is provided
by H. E. EaErTON'S "Federations and Unions in the British
Empire."




AN ANOMALOUS GOVERNMENT


161


In addition to reserving to the United States complete
direction of Philippine foreign policy, and a limited
veto power, the proposed arrangement would provide for
the continuation of American military and naval bases;
for a perpetuation of the present customs union insuring
permanent free trade between the United States and
the Islands; and for special American jurisdiction for a
limited period over the non-Christian tribes. As has
been stated, the Moro problem is one which is being
automatically solved, in the main peacefully, by the
steady Filipinization of the Mohammedan districts. For
this reason any such legislation as the ill-judged Bacon
bill,1 aiming to create a permanently separate Americandictated administration in the southern (rubber-growing) provinces should be dismissed. An ironic commentary on the alleged high purposes of this measure was
provided when Carmi A. Thompson, personal representative of President Coolidge, visited Mindanao in
August, 1926. To quote The New York Times of
August 24:
Some of the Datus (Moro chiefs) spoke against the Bacon bill
and none for it. Sultan Rambin said, "Mindanao will fight and
die rather than be separated from the Philippines." He added
that the religious differences between the Moros and the Christian Filipinos had been exaggerated and were diminishing.
This viewpoint must not be taken as typical, for the
Datus who favor American as against Filipino rule are
in the majority. But as the real desire of most of these
primitive, not to say savage, tribesmen is to oppose any
civilizing tendency, the Bacon bill cannot be regarded as
according with their wishes. American supervision in
the domestic affairs of most of Mindanao, however, is
unquestionably more desirable than in the other islands.
Perfection is not claimed for the Dominion Home Rule
1Introduced in the House, June 11, 1926, by Representative
Bacon of New York.




162    OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
solution of the Philippine problem, but it is the writer's
firm conviction that to all concerned it offers more
advantages and fewer disadvantages than any other
plan as yet brought forward. It would keep the American flag, and all beneficial American influences, in the
islands. It would provide certainty instead of the present uncertainty for all legitimate and honorable business
enterprise. It would give the Filipinos that command
over their own affairs which is the just ambition of this
peaceful, law-abiding, and lovable Christian people. It
is in accord both with our public protestations and our
past policies in the development of Philippine self-government. It would harmonize with the natural tread of
the highly intelligent Filipino political thought, and it
would at the present time be a solution entirely agreeable to a great majority of the people of the Islands and
their leaders. Only an Act of Congress, improving and
rectifying the Jones Law in the light of a decade's experience with its shortcomings, would be necessary to
initiate the new regime.
The danger in the situation is that the present opportunity to secure a solution of the Philippine problem,
permanently giving the United States more authority
and privilege than we have in Cuba, may well be transient. No accurate parallel with the Irish difficulty as
it developed for Great Britain can here be drawn. But
there is much which Americans can learn from a consideration of the Irish settlement which would have been
welcomed in 1890, and that which was made after so
much bloodshed and bitterness a generation later. The
Filipinos have before them clear-cut evidence that the
Coolidge Administration seeks to curtail such autonomy
as has been granted to them. There is Mr. Coolidge's
suggestion to Congress that "more authority should be
given to the Governor-General." There is the Kiess bill
(H. R. 10,940) to confer upon the American auditor for




AN ANOMALOUS GOVERNMENT


163


the Philippines powers greater than those possessed by
our own Comptroller General. There is the second Kiess
bill (H. R. 11,490) to provide the American GovernorGeneral with special funds over which the Legislature
shall have no control-a bill, said to have been suggested by General Wood, which strikes at the basic
democratic principle of public control over the executive purse. There is the Bacon bill (H. R. 12,772) already referred to, which would detach a huge area of
the most valuable Philippine territory from any semblance of popular control to open it for unhampered
American exploitation. And there is the active campaign for curtailing Philippine self-government now carried on by the New York Herald-Tribune and other
powerful administration newspapers.
Faced with many indications of a reactionary trend in
the Philippine policy of the United States, it is small
wonder that the Filipino position has hardened as ours
has hardened; that the campaign for complete and untrammeled independence is being actively and successfully pushed to offset the American campaign for a
reduction of native liberties. Soon, very soon, as the
tides are flowing, the old American relationship of
friendly guardian to the Philippines will have gone for
good. It will be the guns of our warships and the superior equipment of our soldiers which will keep the
Stars and Stripes flying above an embittered subject race.




CHAPTER XV


"PEACEFUL REVOLUTION" IN THE
PHILIPPINES
On February 22, 1926, the newly formed Supreme
National Council, dedicated to the cause of Philippine
independence, gave the first public demonstration of
its power. The day was deliberately chosen because
of its association with George Washington and his record as the leader of a people striving against alien
domination. On that "National Prayer Day" Filipinos
throughout the length and breadth of the archipelago
were asked by their own leaders to gather round the
clergy, both Catholic and Protestant, and pray to
"Almighty God, the Father of all Nations," for complete political separation from the United States. In
hundreds of thousands, on all the sizable islands from
Luzon to Mindanao, they did so.
A paragraph of the prayer, recited with equal fervor
by American-educated professional men and barefooted
rural children, is worthy of remembrance by all who
would visualize the first really serious colonial problem
which imperialistic America has been called upon to
face. It ran:
We entreat Thee, 0 most Gracious Father, stay Thou the
hand that would smite our liberties. Send forth Thy Spirit unto
our rulers across the sea and so touch their hearts and quicken
their sense of justice that they may in honor keep their plighted
word to us. Let not the covetous designs of a few interests prevail in the councils of the sovereign nation nor sway its noble
purposes toward our country.
164




"PEACEFUL REVOLUTION"


165


There was contained in that prayer all the dignity,
the piety, and the aspiration of a people who, whatever
their shortcomings, are gentle, kindly, and lovable beyond
most in this world. The wave of irritation which swept
the Filipinos of Manila when an American paper there
ridiculed their method of political protest was something
unpleasant to witness. It made one realize the significance of statements made by old residents in the islands:
that a definitely hostile attitude is replacing the friendliness and admiration in which Americans were once quite
widely held.
On the same day, February 22, there was focussed on
the Luneta, in Manila, where the Day of Prayer ceremonies centered spiritually if not numerically, a formidable American military parade in honor of Major-Genera)
James H. McRae, then about to end his term of service
as Commanding General of the Philippine Department.
By eleventh-hour negotiation the gathering of the thousands who sought spiritual fortification for the independence campaign, and the gathering of those prepared to resist rebellion with machine guns were held
at different times on the same holiday. But just as
Governor-General Wood thought that it was "damned
impertinence" for the Filipinos to choose Washington's
birthday for their demonstration, so Senate President
Quezon thought it "the tactics of a bully" to overawe
the quiet native demonstration with military might.
And there again is represented the racial hostility which
grows apace in the islands under the present tension.
Two days later, on February 24, I boarded the little
coasting steamer Cebu for a week's trip through the Philippine Archipelago with the more prominent members of
the Supreme National Council. It was the first propaganda trip of this body since, in January of 1926, it was
created by a coalition of the two political parties in
the islands with the express purpose of bringing the




166    OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
independence issue to a showdown. And on this journey
it was impossible not to realize the real tragedy of the
Philippine problem, which is the way in which the native
leaders are being forced to campaign for an end (independence), which many of them do not really want,
because of the accumulating evidence that the United
States seeks to deprive them of the degree of autonomy
so far obtained. It is a natural bargaining process to
ask for more than you expect in order to secure the
golden mean. The danger in this case is that the Filipino
people are being very successfully stirred up in behalf
of complete independence at just the time when the
President of the United States is publicly favoring
measures designed to curtail native self-government.
As a means of solidifying and crystallizing Filipino
public opinion in behalf of complete self-government,
the scheme on which the Supreme National Council is
working has pronounced theoretical impressiveness. It
involves three objectives, each of them noteworthy in
itself: first, the attraction of Filipinos of prominence
in all walks of life to the independence campaign, involving the seeming subordination of the politico element
which has heretofore been overprominent; second, the
decentralization of the campaign, so that the provinces,
where American influence is little felt, may take a controlling part heretofore reserved for Manila; and third,
an attempt at gradual and peaceful usurpation of the
executive power legally vested in the American GovernorGeneral. In short the program is distinctly, though
quietly, revolutionary.
At the center of the new independence drive is the
Supreme National Council itself, composed of ten members of whom at least eight must be elected members
of the Legislature. These eight, half from the Nacionalista and half from the Dem6crata party, are virtually
ex officio appointees, so that the general direction of




"PEACEFUL REVOLUTION"


167


the campaign is vested in the hands of those who have
been most prominent in the political development of
Philippine autonomy. The eight men in question are the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
(Quezon and Roxas); the majority leaders in both houses
(Osmefia and Aquino); the minority leaders in both
houses (Tirona and Recto); and another outstanding
minority member from each of the two branches of the
Legislature (Sumulong and Avelino). The two remaining members are designated respectively by the national
committees of the two parties.
Directly under the Supreme Council is the National
Solidarity Central Committee, composed of all the
elected Senators and Representatives and all the elected
provincial Governors. Thus the legislators from the
non-Christian provinces, appointed by Governor-General
Wood, are automatically excluded. This is not the only
instance in which a sort of stigma is made to attach to
those Filipinos who show wholehearted cooperation with
Americans in the government of the islands. The Central Committee is a sort of general policies body,
designed to give coherent direction to the progress of
the independence campaign in the provinces. As the
Nacionalistas have twice the representation of the minority party in both House and Senate, and also count
a healthy majority among the elected Governors, this
body is comfortably controlled by those who are most
radical on the independence issue.
Under the Central Committee have been established,
in all provinces except the few where Governors ark
appointed by the American Governor-General, organizations known as National Solidarity Provincial Committees. It is their function to work up independence
sentiment, and to further economic measures looking to
that end, throughout the length and breadth of the Philippine Islands. Here the effort to attract substantial




168    OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
Filipinos not previously active in the independence campaign is stressed. Each Provincial Committee is composed of (1) the Governor and members of his Provincial
Board, or junta; (2) the Municipal Presidents (mayors)
of incorporated towns in the province; and (3) a quota of
prominent citizens equal in number to (2), half of them
selected by the provincial organization of each political
party. Under each Provincial Committee in turn come
the National Solidarity Municipal Committees, planned
on a similar division of political and business leadership.
Their initiation, in towns touched en route, was part of
the program of the Supreme Council's trip which I accompanied as an interested observer. And behind the
Municipal Committees are to be established, in theory
at least, Barrio or township committees designed to give
the smallest hamlets opportunity to participate in the
campaign for political freedom.
In addition to this comprehensive organization for
stimulating public opinion on the independence issue
the Supreme Council possesses a formidable executive
arm in its National Advisory Committee. This board of
twenty-five members, all of whom are business or professional men of a type not heretofore actively identified
with politics, is now well organized in Manila. And
it is beginning to engage in schemes of national development altogether without legal sanction under the
powers of government granted to the Filipinos by the
United States Congress. Here is another example of
what Speaker Manuel Roxas calls the "peaceful revolution" now started in the Philippines.
The root issue in the Philippine problem is not independence. As has been stated, the intensification of
native propaganda for that nominal objective is due
primarily to the intensification of American propaganda
aiming at a closer incorporation of the islands under
our dominion. What the Filipino leaders are really




A PRAYER FOR INDEPENDENCE
The population of Talisay, as in hundreds of other Filipino towns
and villages, turns out on Washington's birthday to ask fulfillment
of America's pledges.


LOYALTY TO THEIR OWN
In Bacolod, on Negros Island, "the people honor the Constitution
of the Supreme National Council," which seeks to force the issue
on Philippine independence.


(o'f




I




"PEACEFUL REVOLUTION"


169


seeking and what, by fair means or foul one might
almost say, they are determined to get, is control of
the executive power so far as purely domestic policy
is concerned.
As long as the American Governor-General can veto
not merely complete legislative measures, but even specific items in the annual appropriation bills, and as
long as he can treat the department heads as minor
bureaucrats responsible to him rather than to the Legislature, the power which the latter body appears to
possess is unreal. The entire trend of Filipino political thinking in recent years has been in the direction
of supplanting the American executive with one amenable to the control of the Legislature. The effort, at the
risk of repetition, is towards substitution of the British
system of an executive deriving all his powers from
the support of Parliament, and away from the American
system of divided executive and legislative authority.
We may point to Filipino shortcomings. We may argue
that they are unfitted for self-government. But we cannot deny that the division-of-powers idea works none too
well under the most favorable conditions in the United
States; and can scarcely be expected to function smoothly
where the executive is appointed by the dominant race
and the legislature elected by the subjects. So far as
efficiency in government goes an outright alien dictatorship would admittedly be preferable in theory.
The underlying function of the National Advisory
Committee of the Supreme Council, it may now be said,
is quietly to arrogate executive power into Filipino hands
in a way which will be exceedingly difficult to counter
without seeming to put the American Governor-General
in an openly tyrannical position. How this is likely to
come about can easily be appreciated by dwelling for a
moment on the nature of this Advisory Committee.
None of its members, nor members of the subsidiary




170    OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
commissions organized to carry out the executive powers
which it is attempting to assume, can be members of
either chamber of the Legislature. And while they are
all men and women of standing, the primary purpose is
not to give the Supreme Council the nominal support of
an array of prominent personages. It is, rather, to work
out the long-range plans of government which is the duty
of the executive arm, and then to submit these plans
to the Legislature after they have been approved by the
Supreme Council. As party government ceased to exist
in the Philippines with the formation of the Supreme
Council-elections are no longer contested-and as the
Legislature may be expected to indorse without opposition anything approved by the Council, the importance
of this entirely extra-legal advisory committee is clear.
It aims to take over, by quiet encroachment if possible,
at least a part of the executive power of the American
Governor-General.
The point is further clarified by examination of the
fifteen commissions which the National Advisory Commission has already established in Manila. They fall
naturally into two groups-those which are in reality
embryonic ministries or government departments', and
those of lesser importance which are in reality integrating rather than initiating commissions. Obviously in the
first class are the following: Commissions on National
Defense; Public Works and Communications; Finance;
Agricultural Development; Public Instruction and National Language; Health and Public Welfare; Justice
and Law Revision; Immigration and Industrial Relations. The remaining seven commissions, more or less
supplementary to those just named, are: Independence
Campaign; Development of National Resources; Government and Civil Service; Economic Strategy; Protection of Native Industries; Labor Organizations; Women's
Organizations.




I


I




Governor-General


L


National Supreme
Council


I


I
Philippine
Legislature


National Solidarity
Central Commission


National Advisory
Commission
1.,


I


National Solidarity
Provincial Commissions
I --
Municipal
Committees


Specific
Commissions
Chart to illustrate the projected role of the Supreme National
Council and subsidiaries in Philippine Government. The intention is to draw the Philippine Legislature under a native
executive (as the arrows indicate) and away from the American
executive power as now exercised (see text).




172    OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
It is not surprising that this very comprehensive and
ambitious scheme has as yet received so little publicity.
The Filipino leaders, perhaps contrary to national custom, prefer working towards its fruition rather than
talking about it. And then again its complicated nature,
though well worth understanding, does not lend itself
to newspaper treatment. What is surprising is the rather
offhand way in which the Supreme Council and its subsidiaries seem to be regarded at Malacafiang, the seat
of American authority in the Islands. This may be
due to policy, or to the deep-rooted belief that the Filipinos as a people are clever in drawing grandiose schemes
and incapable in carrying them out.
At the same time it is very difficult for an impartial
observer to believe that this plan, which has been months
in the building and which follows the logical trend of
Filipino political philosophy under our rule, is doomed
to collapse by reason of the incapacity of its sponsors.
The men who are behind it, particularly those on the
National Advisory Committee, are too substantial. The
treasurer of the Supreme Council, to cite only a single
individual, is Alejandro Roces, one of the wealthiest men
in Manila, owner of three newspapers printed respectively in English, Spanish, and Tagalog, and, incidentally,
a close personal friend of Governor-General Wood. But,
as in our own Civil War, the issues involved in the
struggle of the Filipinos for complete self-government
cut deeper than personal relationships.
One more illustration-a plan drafted for financing
the work of the Supreme National Council-should be
cited to indicate the thought-provoking manner of this
campaign. A comprehensive taxation scheme, losing
none of its significance from the fact that payments
would nominally be "voluntary contributions," has been
given serious consideration as the best means for meeting all expenses, including the dispatch of special mis



"PEACEFUL REVOLUTION"


173


sions to Japan and other foreign countries to study
technical aspects of Philippine self-development.
The proposed taxation plan consists of five different
assessments, at least one of which would touch virtually
every Filipino, while many of them would be expected
to contribute under two or three of these extra-legal
imposts. There is planned: first, an annual per capita
assessment of 50 centavos (25 cents) on every adult who
is not a public charge; second, an assessment of 12 pesos
($6) per annum on all professional workers; third, a
property assessment of one-tenth of 1 per cent of the
tax valuation of all privately owned real estate, payable
annually; fourth, a sliding-scale assessment, varying
from 1 to 5 per cent, on the annual salary of every
public employee; fifth, a profits assessment on all Filipino corporations of one-half of 1 per cent of annual
net income. It is hoped by such levies to do away with
all the "drives" whereby the independence campaign has
been financed hitherto. The mere fact that so comprehensive a scheme, lacking even any pretense of legal
authority, can be drawn up for consideration is an excellent index of the welcome which the Filipino public is in
general extending to the Supreme Council.
That welcome, in the course of my trip through the
archipelago with leading members of the Council, there
was ample opportunity to observe. In all the towns
visited, whether on the big islands of Negros and Panay
or on little Romblon, the receptions staged were a striking refutation of the assertion that outside of Manila
there is no interest in the campaign for independence.
It was not so much the size of the crowds that turned
out everywhere, the decorated arches of welcome, or the
patience with which audiences would stand three hours
or more in the tropical sun listening to relays of speakers attack Governor-General Wood's "interference" with
legislation of purely Filipino concern, and applaud refer



174    OUR FAR EASTERN ASSIGNMENT
ences to American pledges on withdrawal from the
islands, that was impressive. It was, rather, the seeming enthusiasm shown by local leaders of prominence
in turning their attention to the difficult and unspectacular work of furthering the Supreme Council's farreaching plans.
The working out of this campaign will, as their leaders
admit, show whether or not the Filipinos possess the
staying qualities in which we have always claimed they
are deficient. It may show, also, whether we have delayed too long in combining common sense and idealism
to solve the Philippine problem in a way according with
our interests, our traditions, and the spirit of our
plighted word.




BIBLIOGRAPHY
The following suggestions for further reading is not intended
as a catalog of sources drawn upon for this book, which is
primarily the result of personal investigation in the Far East,
supplemented by pamphlets and periodicals not easily obtainable
in America. Moreover, certain books, the utility of which I have
acknowledged in footnotes, are not mentioned hereunder. The
purpose of this list is simply to chronicle easily obtainable reading matter for those interested in following the general subject
further, a line of comment being added on the nature of the
volume cited. The endeavor has been to make the list as representative as is compatible with brevity. It is, of course, impossible to include all the books on the Far East which may
properly be considered desirable reading. And some which may
be counted as undesirable are mentioned because their viewpoint
is important.
JAPAN
AYUSAWA, I. F. Industrial Conditions and Labor Legislation in
Japan (Geneva, The International Labor Office, 1926).
A brief but careful study in handy and readable form containing data on working conditions and details of Japanese
social legislation.
CHAMBERLAIN, BASIL H. Things Japanese (London, John Murray,
1898).
An encyclopedic, yet very compact, survey of social and
cultural Japan. Out-of-date in a few particulars, but full of
interest and useful information.
HEARN, LAFCADIO. Japan, An Interpretation (New York, The
Macmillan Company, 1924).
A new edition of a book well called "a classic in sociological
appraisement." The most matured and least emotional of all
the delightful studies by this close student of Japanese
civilization. Hearn's Kokoro, essays treating of the inner life
of the Japanese people, is also to be recommended, though
first published thirty years ago.
175




176                BIBLIOGRAPHY
KAKUZO, O. The Book of Tea (New York, Duffield, 1925).
A new edition of a charming little volume, examining and
explaining the extent to which the conception of living as a
fine art in itself is imbedded in Japan.
KAWAKAMI, K. K. The Real Japanese Question (New York,
The Macmillan Company, 1921).
An argument for better understanding of Japanese problems by a trained journalist of that nationality long resident
in America. Mr. Kawakami's study on Japan's Pacific Policy
is also worthy of attention.
LONGFORD, JOSEPH H. Japan (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons,
1923).
An up-to-date, authoritative, and stimulating history.
NITOBE, INAZO. The Japanese Nation (New York, G. P. Putnam's
Sons, 1921).
All of Dr. Nitobe's books about the Japanese people and
their ideals are instructive reading. This one is perhaps particularly designed for foreign consumption.
PARIS, JOHN. Banzai (New York, Boni and Liveright, 1926).
This novel, like the author's Kimona and Sayonara, is a
readable story which goes out of its way to emphasize the
real and imaginary vices of the Japanese character. "John
Paris" is the pseudonym of a British diplomatic officer who
knows at least one aspect of Japanese life thoroughly. Taken
with the adulatory writings of Lafcadio Hearn these three
novels help to form a balanced ration.  Either author is
misleading when taken alone. Of course "Paris" is not to be
compared with Hearn either as a writer or as a student of
Japan and its people.
SUGIMOTO, ETSU INAGAKI. A Daughter of the Samurai (New
York, Doubleday, Page & Co., 1925).
A charming autobiography revealing the daily life of an
aristocratic family in provincial Japan and indirectly explaining many of the differences between East and West which
make misunderstandings easy.
TAKENOBU, Y. (Editor). The Japanese Year Book (American
Agent: Dixie Book Shop, 140 Greenwich St.).
A valuable annual of general and statistical information
on Japan. The 1925 edition has a special section devoted to
the great earthquake of September, 1923.
The Trans-Pacific (published by The Japan Advertiser, Tokyo).
This journal is, as claimed, "a weekly review of Far Eastern Political, Social and Economic Developments." As the
leading American periodical in the Orient it ranks as something rather more valuable than the above bald statement
indicates.




BIBLIOGRAPHY


177


CHINA
FRANCK, HARRY A. Wandering In Northern China (New York,
The Century Company, 1923).
Mr. Franck goes everywhere, sees everything, and writes of
it comprehensively, entertainingly, and without bias. For
that reason this book, like his Roving Through South China,
can be highly recommended in its field-which is reportorial
and not editorial.
GILEs, HERBERT A. The Civilization of China (New York, Henry
Holt and Co., 1911).
One of the "Home University Library" handbooks, in
which a well-known English authority outlines the long
course of Chinese history and concludes that the motives of
the people are the same as those which actuate Anglo-Saxons.
GOODENOW, FRANK J. China, An Analysis (Baltimore, The Johns
Hopkins Press, 1926).
The author, now president of Johns Hopkins University,
was legal adviser of the Chinese Government in 1913 and
1914. This little volume, picturing Chinese life against the
background of our own civilization, is full of shrewd and penetrating observations.
HODGKIN, HENRY T. China in the Family of Nations (London,
Alien and Unwin, 1923).
A sympathetic study, urging foreign patience and toleration,
by the Secretary of the National Christian Council of China.
MAUGHAM, SOMERSEr. The Painted Veil (New York, George H.
Doran Company, 1925).
An extremely sordid but powerful picture of life in a foreign community in China, set against the background of a
cholera epidemic. Mr. Maugham's collection of literary
vignettes: On a Chinese Screen, is far prettier reading.
MERWIN, SAMUEL. Silk (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company,
1923).
A pleasant historical novel of the days when the civilizations of Rome and China met in a barbarian world. Mr.
Merwin's tales of modern China: The Hills of Han and
In Red and Gold are equally readable. He is one of the
very few American novelists who seem able to utilize the
wealth of literary material in China without giving a hopelessly sentimentalized and distorted picture.
MILLARD, THOMAS F. Conflict of Policies in Asia (New York,
The Century Company, 1924).
An assessment of American interest and an effort to determine the desirable American policy in China. Mr. Millard
knows China and the Chinese as well as any foreigner living,




178               BIBLIOGRAPHY
but couples with his knowledge an inveterate suspicion of
Japan.
PAN, SHU-LUN. The Trade of the United States with China (New
York, China Trade Bureau, 1924).
A technical study with a good deal of interest to the lay
reader because of its careful tracing of the development of
Chinese-American commercial relations, and its endeavor to
interpret their future trend.
PORTER, LUCIUs C. China's Challenge to Christianity (New York,
Missionary Education Movement, 1924).
A thoughtful study by one who is thoroughly familiar
with the mighty cultural heritage of China, and the consequent necessity for "respect and appreciation" from those who
would win her people to Christianity. Due tribute is paid
to the great missionary accomplishment, and reasons why the
control of missionary enterprises is being steadily relinquished
to the Chinese are set out.
SMITH, ARTHUR. Village Life in China (New York, Fleming H.
Revell Company, 1899).
This book is notable not merely as a classic in the field
of interpretive writing, but also because of the light it throws
on the subject of conservative, not to say primitive, rural
China. The author's book on Chinese Characteristics has a
delightful freshness equally undimmed by the years since it
was written.
WEALE, PUTNAM. Why China Sees Red (New York, Dodd,
Mead and Co., 1925).
A somewhat jumbled but informative account of the present
turmoil. The section describing the Chinese press is its most
valuable contribution. "Putnam Weale" is the pseudonym of
Bertram Lenox Simpson, who has lived in China for many
years and written a number of journalistic books thereon.
WILLIAMS, EDWARD T. China: Yesterday and Today (New York,
Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1923).
A thorough historical, social and economic study by an
extremely well-qualified authority.
WILLOUGHBY, W. W. Foreign Rights and Interests in China (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1920).
With the advantage of his experience as adviser to the
Chinese Government as background, Dr. Willoughby herein
provides a description of foreign unilateral privileges in
China. It is the most convenient study of a subject basic
to understanding of contemporary Chinese feelings.
WOODHEAD, H. G. W. (Editor). The China Year Book (American
agent: Brentanos, New York).
Perhaps the most complete, authoritative and careful annual
published anywhere. An indispensable reference book for
all who are deeply interested in modern China.




BIBLIOGRAPHY


179


The Chinese Economic Monthly (Peking, Chinese Government
Bureau of Economic Information).
A completely non-partisan publication providing excellent
studies of current economic and industrial questions in China.
The Bureau announces that "inquiries on subjects of this
nature from responsible persons or organizations will be
attended to gratis."
ZUCKER, A. E. The Chinese Theater (Boston, Little, Brown and
Company, 1925).
A beautifully prepared monograph which throws much incidental light on Chinese character and customs.
THE PHILIPPINES
Impartial studies of the Philippine question are very scarce,
and promise to remain so as long as political issues are so tensely
drawn. Through the Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department,
Washington, D. C., can be obtained official reports and documents
on all matters pertaining to insular government, the field covered
being too great for discrimination here. The Philippine Mission,
Investment Building, Washington, D. C., is glad to furnish material, most of which will be found to be biased in behalf of
independence. Several of the books listed below are sharply contradictory in evidence and findings, but taken together give a
well-rounded basis for conclusions.
GLENN, ISA. Heat (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1926).
A readable novel of American life in Manila. Filipino
characters hardly enter the story, but the resistance of the
country to Americanization and the influence of the tropics
upon the "army set" are excellently pictured.
HARRISON, FRANCIS B. The Corner Stone of Philippine Independence (New York, The Century Company, 1921).
Herein the much-criticised Governor-General states his
side of the case, in a narrative of seven years' official experience at Manila.
KALAW, MAXIMO M. The Present Government of the Philippines
(New York, The Century Company, 1921).
An excellent study of the principles and machinery of
Philippine government by the leading insular authority
thereon. Mr. Kalaw is head of the department of political
science at the University of the Philippines.
LAUBACH, FRANK C. The People of the Philippine Islands (New
York, George H. Doran Company, 1925).
A sympathetic study by an American missionary who is
thoroughly familiar with his field and who regards the Philip



180                BIBLIOGRAPHY
pine people as wards rather than colonial subjects of the
United States.
WILLIAMS, D. R. The United States and the Philippines (New
York, Doubleday, Page & Co., 1924).
The most authoritative and effective presentation of the
case for permanent retention of the islands. The author is a
former member of the Philippine Commission. He frequently spoils his argument by bitter and vitriolic denunciations of those who hold viewpoints opposed to his own.




INDEX


Abe, Isoo, 22
Alabaster, Chaloner, 94
American population in the
Philippines, 140
Anfu party, 63
Anglo-Japanese Alliance terminated, 7
Aquino, Representative, 167
Avelino, Representative, 167
Bacon bill, aim of, 161, 163
Bell, Hayley, 78
Borodin, Michael, 78, 85
Boxer indemnities, political effects of, 54-55; remitted funds
spent on education, 8, 135
Boye, Dr., 118
British Empire, not a Federal
Union, 58
British  Government restricts
rubber exports, 145
Canton Christian College, votes
to expel communist students,
79
Canton, population   of, 75;
events of June 23, 1925 in,
100-101
Canton Strike Committee, independence of, 85; responsibility of, for disorders, 106 -107
Chang Tso-lin, concludes treaty
with Soviet Russia, 39; defeated by Wu Pei-fu, 65; proclaims Manchurian independence, 65; captures Peking, 73;
hostility to organized labor,
130


Chang Tsung-chang, 73
Chiang Kai-shek, 81
China, railroad mileage of, 49;
population  of, 49;  racial
groups in, 49-50; customs
under British administration,
114; customs revenues of,
122; foreign trade of, 122;
industrialization in, 123-124;
natural resources of, 125; labor movement in, 128-130;
emancipation of women in,
131; education in, 131-135;
literacy in, 133
Chinese Eastern Railway, history of, 35 et seq.; rivalry
with South Manchurian Railway, 40 et seq.; gauge of, 43
Chinese Government Bureau of
Economics Information, 128
Chinese in the Philippines, 138
Chinese Parliament, none now
in existence, 60; dissolution
of in 1917, 62; bribery of,
63
Chinese Revolution, outbreak
of, 56; "deepened" by Feng
Yu-hsiang, 69; enables foreigners to control Shanghai
Mixed Court, 95; results in
greater national prosperity,
127
"Christian General," see Feng
Yu-hsiang
Chu Chao-hsin, 117
Clementi, Sir Cecil, 107
Communism, strength of, in
Japan, 19; party in China,
70, 79
81




182


INDEX


Confucianism, 54
Congress (United States), powers over Philippines, 150 -151; resident Commissioners
in, 151
Consortium agreement, 5
Coolidge, President, 161, 162
Council of State (in Philippines), 157
Cushing, Caleb, 89
Customs Conference in Peking,
110 et seq.
Dairen, trade of, 45
Datus, 161
Dem6crata party, 166
Dickover, E. R., 26
Dollar Line, 83
Educational  Institutions  in
China, 133
Empress Dowager, 55
Extraterritorial  Rights  in
China, lost by Austria, Germany and Russia, 117; mean
little to Japan, 117; safeguards on abolition of, 118;
Treaty Port attitude on, 121
Fan Yuan-lien, 134
Federal Party in Philippines,
158
Feng  Yu-hsiang, Tuchun   of
Shensi, 65; occupies Peking,
65; breaks with Wu Pei-fu,
67; policy of, 68-70; foreign
dislike of, 69;  cooperates
with the Kuomintang, 70;
obtains munitions from Soviet Russia, 70; retires from
military command, 72; goes
to Moscow, 74; encourages
adult education, 134
Fessenden, Stirling, 110
Filipinos, a Christian people,
140;  proportion  speaking
English, 141; character of,
141-142; literacy of, 142;
death rate among, 142; desire for home rule, 156; trend


of political thinking among,
169
Forbes, former Governor-General, 141
Formosa, annexed by Japan, 3;
Japanese population in, 4;
distance from Philippines,
137
Fushun Coal Mines, 45
Gaimusho, 45
Genro, Council of, 15
Gold Franc Controversy, 110
Goto, Viscount, 21, 25
Gowen, H. H., 89
Hankow, riots of June 11,
1925, 100; an extraterritorial
hearing at, 119-120
Harrison,  Governor - General,
154, 155
Hawaii, area and population,
145; Filipino emigration to,
145
Hearn, Lafcadio, 30
Hirohito, Crown Prince and
Regent, 13
Hongkong, population of, 103;
effects of Chinese boycott,
104;  colonial  government
negotiates with Canton, 106
Hsu Shu-tseng, 65
Hsuan   Tung, Emperor, see
Prince P'u-yi
Hu Shih, Dr., on the "Chinese
Renaissance," 131
Hukuang railroad loan, 56
Independence Mission (Philippine), 149, 151
Ito, Count, 30
Japan, area of, 3; international
cooperation by, 8; population, 3, 46; constitution of,
10-11,  17;  "extraordinary
military  expenditure"  account, 12; compulsory military service in, 12; manhood
suffrage in, 13-14; police law




INDEX


183


of, 17; Labor Party in, 17 et
seq.; political corruption in,
20-21; trade union strength
in, 22; foreign trade of, 25 -26; removes alien land ownership restrictions, 30; new
policy towards China, 45
Japanese Farmers' Association,
21
Japanese population in the
Philippines, 140; in all foreign countries, 46
Jones Law, preamble of, 152 -153;  subordinates  Insular
Legislature to Congress, 151;
vests executive functions in
Governor-General, 153
Kagawa, Toyohiko, 22
Kailan Mining Administration,
126
Karakhan, Ambassador, 118
Kato, Premier, 4
Kensekai party, 20
Kiaochou, captured by Japan
from Germany, 4
Kiess bills, 162-163
Knox, Secretary of State, proposes redemption of Manchurian railroads, 37
Korea, annexed by Japan, 3;
Japanese population in, 4
Kotenev, A. M., 90
Kuang-hsu, Emperor, 55
Kuo Sung-ling, revolts against
Chang Tso-lin, 71
Kuominchun, a disciplined and
patriotic army, 67-68; captures Tientsin, 72; is beaten
by Wu-Chang alliance, 73
Kuomintang, China's nationalistic party, 70; membership,
75; authority in Canton, 81;
sponsors the National Labor
Association, 129
Kwangtung Province, population of, 75; government of,
76-79; aims of leaders in
Hongkong boycott, 106; at

titude towards Customs Conference, 115
Kwantung, see Liaotung Peninsula
Lansing-Ishii Note, 46
Li Ching-lin, defeated by the
Kuominchun, 71-72; allies
with Chang Tso-lin, 73
Li Yuan-hung, succeeds Yuan
Shih-kai as President of
China, 62
Liaotung Peninsula, Japanese
leasehold on, 3, 5; Japanese
population in, 4, 46
Likin, abolishment pledged by
Kwangtung government, 83;
China agrees to abolish, 111;
analyzed as a form of taxation, 112
Luzon, size of, 138
MacMurray, J. V. A., 107
Malacafiang, 171
Malolos Constitution, 157
Manchu dynasty, early political philosophy of, 53; adopts
centralization policy, 55; abdication of, 60; attempt at
restoration, 63
Manchuria, Russian influence
in, 36, 39-40; area of, 37; population of, 38; resources of,
45; Japanese population in,
46
Manila, population of, 137;
Times newspaper quoted, 137
McRae, Major-General James
H., 165
Mestizos, characteristics of different types, 140
Mindanao, area of, 138; as rubber-producing district, 146;
American supervision desirable, 161
Mission Colleges in China, in
transition, 133
Morgenthau, Henry, on Japanese attitude towards America,
28




184


INDEX


Moros, a small minority in
Philippines, 141; majority favor American rule, 161
Moser, Charles K., on likin, 113
Mutsuhito, Emperor, 12, 13
Nacionalista party, 166, 167
Nanking, Treaty of, 88, 113
National Bureau of Economic
Research (New York), study
on trade cycle in China, 127
National Prayer Day (in Philippines), 164
Nishihara loans, 5-6, 64
Okuma, Premier, 5
Osmefia, Senator, 167
Ostroumoff, M., 43
Parkes, Sir Harry, 94
Perry, Commodore, 10
Pescadores, annexed by Japan,
3
Philippine Archipelago, area
and location, 137-138; population of, 138; people to the
square mile in, 138; dialects
of, 141; newspaper circulation
in, 142; mineral resources of,
143-144; value of agricultural
products, 144; land under
cultivation in, 145; rubber,
production of, 146
Philippine Commission, 157
Philippine Legislature, composition of, 153
Philippine Public Land Law,
147
Poland, Pilsudski's revolution
in, 108
Prohibition Amendment, not in
force in the Philippines, 150
P'u-yi, Prince, 55, 69
Quezon, Senate President Manuel L., 167
Rambin, Sultan, 161
Recto, Representative, 167
Registrar, of Shanghai Mixed
Court, 96


Roces, Alejandro, 171
Roxas, Speaker Manuel, 167,
168
Russian Soviet Government, influence in Chinese Eastern
Railway, 39; concludes separate treaty with Manchuria,
39-40; helps to detach outer
Mongolia from China, 65;
strategic interest in Kwangtung, 80-81; pushed towards
China by cordon sanitaire, 98
Saionji, Prince, 15
Schurman, Dr. Jacob Gould, on
extraterritoriality, 121
Seiyukai party, 20
Semenoff, Admiral, 80
Seward, G. E., 93
Shakee Creek, Canton, 102
Shameen, 101-102
Shanghai, area of foreign concessi6ns, 87; foreign population of, 87-88, 92; Municipal
Council, 90 et seq.; formation
of International Settlement,
89; Mixed Court, 90 et seq.;
Volunteer Corps, 91; Chinese
population of, 92; cotton
mills in, 99; riots of May 30,
1925, 99; Chinese demands in,
109-110; labor unions in, 129
Shansi, the "model province,"
58; literacy in, 133
Shibusawa, Viscount, on American Immigration Act, 29
Siberia, international invasion
of, 6
Sikh police in Shanghai, 95
Smith, Rev. Arthur, 108
Soong, T. V., 79
South Manchurian Railway, acquired by Japan, 3; Japanese
investment in, 35; "feeder"
lines to, 40-43; military protection of, 72
Spain, influence of in Philippines, 140
Spencer, Herbert, views on race
problem, 30-32




INDEX


185


Standard Oil Company of New
York, 119-120
Stevens, John F., 38
Strawn, Silas H., 115
Sugiyama, Motojiro, 22
Sumulong, Senator, 167
Sun Chuan-fang, moves to recover Shanghai Mixed Court
for China, 97
Sun Yat-sen, named Provisional
President of China, 60; forms
independent government at
Canton, 64; helps to found
the Kuomintang, 70; dies in
Peking, 71; invites Borodin
to Canton, 80
Supreme National Council, objectives of, 166; composition
of, 166-167; subsidiaries of,
167-170; plan for financing,
171-172
Sutton, General, 66
Suzuki, Bunji, on Japanese Labor Party, 22-23
Taiping Rebellion, 54, 93, 111
Tang Shao-yi, 54, 64
Thompson, Carmi A., 161
"Thousand Character" movement, 134
Three Eastern Provinces, see
Manchuria
Tirona, Senator, 167
Trotsky, Leon, 39
Tsao-Kun, bribery in election
of, 63; imprisoned by Marshal Feng, 71
Tuan Chi-jui, Premier of China,
64; "Provisional Chief Executive," 71
Tuchuns, their confiscation of
taxes, 62
"Twenty-one Demands," 4-5, 8,
40, 62
Tyler, President, 89
Tzu-hsi, Empress, see Empress
Dowager
Unilateral treaties, eliminated
in Japan, 3


United States, Japanese trade
with, 25-26; Immigration Act,
29-30; share in financing
Chinese Eastern Railway, 38;
condones seizure of Shanghai Mixed Court, 96; inconsistency of, in Chinese tariff
policy, 113-114; rubber, consumption of, 145
Vladivostok, benefited by Chinese Eastern Railway, 35;
made a free port by Russia,
43
Waichiao Pu, 100
Washington Conference 6-8
Washio, Dr. S., on Japanese
character, 2
Webster, Daniel, 89
Whampoa, port of, 83; Military
Academy, 79, 82
Willoughby, W. W., on extraterritoriality, 109; on seizure
of Shanghai Mixed Court, 96
Wood, Governor-General Leonard, on the Philippine people,
141-142; use of veto power,
155
Wu, C. C., 82
Wu Pei-fu, defeats Anfu leaders, 65; defeats Fengtien
army in 1922, 65; collapse of
his army in 1924, 67; interviewed by author, 72; captures Peking, 73; defeat of,
by Kwangtung forces, 74; attitude towards labor, 130
Wu Ting-fang, 64
Wusih, effect of American tariff
on lace industry of, 125
Yen Hsi-shan, Governor of
Shansi, 58
Yen, W., temporary Premier of
China in 1926, 73
Yoshihito, Emperor, 13
Yuan   Shih-kai, inaugurated
President of China, 60; his
centralization  policy,  61;
death of, 62




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