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THE MILITARY
AND COLONIAL POLICY OF
THE UNITED STATES
ADDRESSES AND REPORTS
BY          '.  t,
ELIHU ROOT
COLLECTED AND EDITED BY
ROBERT BACON
AND
JAMES BROWN SCOTT
CAMBRIDGE
HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS
LONDON: HUMPHREY MILFORD
OXiORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
1916




COPYRIGHT, 1916
HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS




CONTENTS
PAGI
INTRODUCTORY NOTE.................                    Vii
FOREWORD.....................        xi
PART I
THE AMERICAN SOLDIER.                               3
Address at the Marquette Club, Chicago, October 7, 1899.
THE CHARACTER AND OFFICE OF THE AMERICAN ARMY.   15
Address at a Banquet at Canton, Ohio, January 27, 1903,
in Honor of the Birthday of the late President McKinley.
THE UNITED STATES AND THE PHILIPPINES IN 1900...       27
Address at Canton, Ohio, October 24, 1900.
AMERICAN POLICIES IN THE PHILIPPINES IN 1902....       65
Address at Peoria, Illinois, September 24, 1902.
EEXTERNAL POLICIES IN 1904......                99
Address as Temporary Chairman of the Republican
National Convention, Chicago, Illinois, June 21, 1904.
WEST  POINT.....................  115
Address at the Centennial Celebration of the Establishment of the United States Military Academy, June 11,
1902.
THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE....... 121
Address at the Laying of the Corner Stone, Washington,
D. C., February 21, 1903.
Address at the Dedication, November 9, 1908.....    127
THE ARMY MEDICAL SCHOOL...... 131
Address at the Graduation Exercises, Washington, D. C.,
April 14, 1903.
THE CITIZENS' ARMY.............     135
Address at Junction City, Kansas, May 2, 1903.
THE MILITIA ACT OF 1903.............. 137
Addresses at the Fifth Annual Convention of the Interstate
National Guard Association of the United States,
Columbus, Ohio, May 4, 1903.
iii
302510




iv


CONTENTS


THE EXPORT OF ARMS AND MUNITIONS OF WAR.... 153
Address in the United States Senate, March 13, 1912.
THE POWER OF THE PRESIDENT TO SEND UNITED STATES
TROOPS OUT OF THE COUNTRY..........           157
Address in the United States Senate, August 14, 1912.
PART II
f  THE PRINCIPLES OF COLONIAL POLICY......... 161
Porto Rico, Cuba, and the Philippines.
(Extract from the Report for 1899)
PORTO RICO........... 177
The Military and Civil Government of the Island.
Conditions in Porto Rico.......  177
(Extract from the Report for 1899)
Organization of the Civil Government.......     179
(Extract from the Report for 1900)
CUBA............                     185
The Development and Establishment of the Republic.
Conditions in Cuba...............             189
(Extract from the Report for 1899)
The Organization of the Civil Government of Cuba..193
(Extract from the Report for 1900)
Further Progress in Civil Government.........   03
(Extract from the Report for 1901)
The Constitutional Convention.........      208
(Extract from the Report for 1901)
The Platt Amendment..............              212
(Extract from the Report for 1901)
Cuban Commerce............    217
(Extract from the Report for 1901)
Inauguration of the Republic.........     219
(Extract from the Report for 1902)
THE PHILIPPINES...............         225
The Suppression of the Insurrection and the Building-up
of Civil Government.
Military Operations in the Islands....... 225
(Extract from the Report for 1899)
Continued Military Operations in the Philippines... 234
(Extract from the Report for 1900)
The Beginnings of the Civil Government....... 239
(Extract from the Report for 1900)
Final Military Operations in the Philippines.... 246
(Extract from the Report for 1901)




CONTENTS


V


The Civil Government of the Philippines....  50
(Extract from the Report for 1901)
Instructions to the Philippine Commission..... 287
The Work of the Philippine Commission......     294
(Extract from the Report for 1902)
Conditions in the Philippines...........       302
(Extract from the Report for 1902)
The Finances of the Philippines....            306
(Extract from the Report for 1903)
The End of the Philippine Insurrection......  316
(Extract from the Report for 1902)
Relations with the Moro Tribes....   320
(Extract from the Report for 1902)
The End of the Moro Rebellion........     325
(Extract from the Report for 1903)
THE ARMY IN CUBA AND THE PHILIPPINES.......       329
A Tribute to its Courage and Efficiency.
(Extract from the Report for 1902)
THE CHINESE RELIEF EXPEDITION..........             333
(Extract from the Report for 1900)
THE REORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY.. 349
The Increase of the Army and the Abolition of the Permanent Administrative Staff Departments.
Army Reorganization...........     350
(Extract from the Report for 1899)
The Military Needs of the Nation.........    365
(Extract from the Report for 1900)
Progress of Reorganization..........          373
(Extract from the Report for 1901)
The Chief of Artillery............              379
(Extract from the Report for 1901)
THE DISPOSITION TO BE MADE OF THE ARMY IN PEACE. 383
(Extract from the Report for 1902)
MILITARY EDUCATION............... 387
West Point and the Army War College.......      388
(Extracts from the Reports for 1901 and 1902)
West Point.............     396
(Extract from the Report for 1902)
GENERAL MILITARY EDUCATION....                      398
(Extract from the Report for 1903)
LETTER TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON
MILITARY AFFAIRS..........                   401
The Bill to Increase the Efficiency of the Army.




vi


CONTENTS


THE EFFECTIVE ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY.....     411
Statement before the Senate Committee on Military
Affairs, Washington, March 12, 1902.
THE GENERAL STAFF.........                  417
Statement before the House Committee on Military
Affairs, Washington, December 13, 1902.
The General Staff...............   420
(Extract from the Report for 1902)
Organization of the General Staff.......... 426
(Extract from the Report for 1903)
Joint Army and Navy Board..........             431
(Extract from the Report for 1903)
An Act to Increase the Efficiency of the Army.... 433
THE BEGINNING OF THE NEW MILITIA SYSTEM....           441
Militia and Volunteers......442
(Extract from the Report for 1901)
The Militia System................ 445
(Extract from the Report for 1902)
The Militia and Coast Defense........... 450
(Extract from the Report for 1902)
Fort Riley Maneuvers and Camp Sites.......        453
(Extract from the Report for 1902)
Progress of the Militia Reorganization......    456
(Extract from the Report for 1903)
Promotion of Rifle Practice.......... 468
(Extract from the Report for 1903)
THE ACT TO PROMOTE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE MILITIA. 470
Approved January 21, 1903.
PROMOTIONS IN THE ARMY.....              479
Extracts from a Hearing before the House Committee on
Military Affairs in January, 1904.
THE SPIRIT OF NATIONAL SERVICE.......        487
Letter from Mr. Root to Lieutenant-General S. B. M.
Young, President of the Association for National Service, September 17, 1916.


INDEX.........


489




INTRODUCTORY NOTE


THE collected addresses and state papers of Elihu Root, of
which this is one of several volumes, cover the period of his
service as Secretary of War, as Secretary of State, and as
Senator of the United States, during which time, to use his
own expression, his only client was his country.
The many formal and occasional addresses and speeches,
which will be found to be of a remarkably wide range, are
followed by his state papers, such as the instructions to
the American delegates to the Second Hague Peace Conference and other diplomatic notes and documents, prepared
by him as Secretary of State in the performance of his duties
as an executive officer of the United States. Although the
official documents have been kept separate from the other
papers, this plan has been slightly modified in the volume
devoted to the military and colonial policy of the United
States, which includes those portions of his official reports as
Secretary of War throwing light upon his public addresses and
his general military policy.
The addresses and speeches selected for publication are
not arranged chronologically, but are classified in such a way
that each volume contains addresses and speeches relating
to a general subject and a common purpose. The addresses
as president of the American Society of International Law
show his treatment of international questions from the
theoretical standpoint, and in the light of his experience as
Secretary of-War and as Secretary of State, unrestrained and
uncontrolled by the limitations of official position, whereas
his addresses on foreign affairs, delivered while Secretary of
State or as United States Senator, discuss these questions
under the reserve of official responsibility.
vii




viii


INTRODUCTORY NOTE


Mr. Root's addresses on government, citizenship, and
legal procedure are a masterly exposition of the principles
of the Constitution and of the government established by
it; of the duty of the citizen to understand the Constitution and to conform his conduct to its requirements; and
of the right of the people to reform or to amend the Constitution in order to make representative government more
effective and responsive to their present and future needs.
The addresses on law and its administration state how legal
procedure should be modified and simplified in the interest
of justice rather than in the supposed interest of the legal
profession.
The addresses delivered during the trip to South America
and Mexico in 1906, and in the United States after his return,
with their message of good will, proclaim a new doctrine 
the Root doctrine - of kindly consideration and of honorable
obligation, and make clear the destiny common to the
peoples of the Western World.
The addresses and the reports on military and colonial
policy made by M,. Root as Secretary of War explain the
reorganization of the army after the Spanish-American War,
the creation of the General Staff, and the establishment of the
Army War College. They trace the origin of and give the
reason for the policy of this country in Cuba, the Philppnes,
and Porto Rico, devised and inaugurated by him. It is not
generally known that the so-called Platt Amendment,
defining our relations to Cuba, was drafted by Mr. Root, and
that the Organic Act of the Philippines was likewise the work
of Mr. aRot as Secretary of War.
The argument before The Hague Tribunal in the North
Atlantic Fisheries Case is a rare if not the only instance of a
statesman appearing as chief counsel in an international
arbitration, which, as Secretary of State, he had prepared
and submitted.




INTRODUCTORY NOTE                  ix
The political, educational, historical, and commemorative
speeches and addresses should make known to future generations the literary, artistic, and emotional side of a statesman
of our time, and the publication of these collected addresses
and state papers will, it is believed, enable the American
people better to understand the generation in which Mr. Root
has been a commanding figure and better to appreciate
during his lifetime the services which he has rendered to
his country.
ROBERT BACON.
JAMES BROWN SCOTT.
APRIL 15, 1916.




I




FOREWORD


THE addresses and those portions of Mr. Root's reports
printed in the present volume deal with the problems which
may be regarded as the consequence or aftermath of the war
with Spain in 1898, except such as refer to the Chinese Relief
Expedition due to the Boxer troubles of 1900. It therefore
seems advisable to prefix an introductory note of a general
nature, in addition to such introductory matter as precedes
certain of the addresses and reports.
The insurrection in Cuba, which finally cost Spain not
only Cuba but Porto Rico, broke out during the year 1895.
The cause was the same as made twenty-one republics out of
the European colonies in America - misgovernment by the
mother-country and the desire on the part of the colonists to
be free and independent states. On April 11, 1898, President
McKinley sent a special message to Congress devoted to
Cuba and recommending that the United States should
intervene in Cuba for the following reasons:
First. In the cause of humanity and to put an end to the barbarities,
bloodshed, starvation, and horrible miseries now existing there, and which
the parties to the conflict are either unable or unwilling to stop or mitigate.
It is no answer to say this is all in another country, belonging to another
nation, and is therefore none of our business. It is specially our duty, for
it is right at our door.
Second. We owe it to our citizens in Cuba to afford them that protection and indemnity for life and property which no government there can
or will afford, and to that end to terminate the conditions that deprive
them of legal protection.
Third. The right to intervene may be justified by the very serious
injury to the commerce, trade, and business of our people and by the
wanton destruction of property and devastation of the island.
Fourth, and which is of the utmost importance. The present condition
of affairs in Cuba is a constant menace to our peace and entails upon this
xi




xii


FOREWORD


Government an enormous expense. With such a conflict waged for years
in an island so near us and with which our people have such trade and
business relations; when the lives and liberty of our citizens are in constant
danger and their property destroyed and themselves ruined; where our
trading vessels are liable to seizure and are seized at our very door by war
ships of a foreign nation; the expeditions of filibustering that we are
powerless to prevent altogether, and the irritating questions and entanglements thus arising - all these and others that I need not mention, with the
resulting strained relations, are a constant menace to our peace and compel
us to keep on a semi-war footing with a nation with which we are at peace.
Congress replied to this message by the following joint
resolution, approved by the President on April 20, 1898:
WHEREAS: The abhorrent conditions which have existed for more than
three years in the island of Cuba, so near our own borders, have shocked
the moral sense of the people of the United States, have been a disgrace to
Christian civilization, culminating, as they have, in the destruction of a
United States battle-ship [the Maine] with 266 of its officers and crew,
while on a friendly visit in the harbor of Havana [on February 15, 1898],
and cannot longer be endured, as has been set forth by the President of the
United States in his message to Congress of April 11, 1898, upon which the
action of Congress was invited:
Therefore,
Resolved lnb the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled,
First. That the people of the island of Cuba are and of right ought to
be free and independent.
Second. That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the
Government of the United States does hereby demand, that the Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the
island of Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and
Cuban waters.
Third. That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is,
directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the
United States and to call into the actual service of the United States the
militia of the several States to such extent as may be necessary to carry
these resolutions into effect.
Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or
intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island
except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when
that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island
to its people.




FOREWORD                        xiii
The joint resolution of Congress was communicated by the
American Minister to the Spanish Government, and inasmuch
as Spain responded by treating, as President McKinley
informed Congress, "the reasonable demands of this Government" as measures of hostility, that body passed the
following act, approved April 25, 1898:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled,
First. That war be, and the same is, hereby declared to exist, and that
war has existed since the 21st day of April, A.D. 1898, including said day,
between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain.
Second. That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is,
directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the
United States and to call into the actual service of the United States the
militia of the several States to such extent as may be necessary to carry
this act into effect.
It is no part of the purpose of this introduction to enter
into the details of the war. Suffice it to say that, by virtue
of a protocol of August 12, 1898, due to the good offices of the
French Republic, a general agreement was reached upon
the terms of peace and an armistice was concluded between
the erstwhile belligerents; and that peace was concluded
between Spain and the United States by a treaty signed at
Paris on December 10, 1898, of which ratifications were
exchanged on April 11, 1899. Inasmuch as the protocol
and the treaty state the results of the war and the obligations assumed by the United States growing out of it, these
documents are appended to the foreword.
Even a hasty reading of the treaty of Paris shows the
nature, variety and extent of the problems confronting the
United States by reason of the Spanish-American War, and
as Porto Rico, Cuba and the Philippines were placed under
the supervision of the War Department it followed that the
Secretary of War was, by virtue of his office, forced to consider these problems and to find if possible an appropriate




xiv


FOREWORD


solution. Mr. Root recognized from the beginning that the
United States was confronted with problems of a colonial
policy, and that Porto Rico, Cuba and the Philippines should
not be considered separately but as part of a larger whole.
As the result of a careful study of colonial government and
misgovernment, he formulated the principles of colonial
policy to be found under the caption " Insular Government "
in his first annual report as Secretary of War, which was and
always will be considered to be a masterly statement of the
principles of colonial government and administration.
On July 20,1899, President McKinley offered Mr. Root the
position of Secretary of War in his Cabinet, to succeed General Russell A. Alger of Michigan, and he was appointed and
entered upon duty on August 1, 1899, under circumstances
which are best described by Mr. Root himself, in an address
he made before the New York County Lawyers Association,
in 1915, which is printed in another volume of the series.
" Sixteen years ago ", he said, " in the month of July, having
just finished the labors of the year and gone to my country
home, I was called to the telephone and told by one speaking
for President McKinley, 'the President directs me to say to
you that he wishes you to take the position of Secretary of
War.' I answered,' Thank the President for me, but say that
it is quite absurd, I know nothing about war. I know nothing
about the army.' 1 was told to hold the wire, and in a moment
there came back the reply, 'President McKinley directs me to
say that he is not looking for any one who knows anything
about war or for any one who knows anything about the army;
he has got to have a lawyer to direct the government of these
Spanish islands, and you are the lawyer he wants.' Of course
I had then, on the instant, to determine what kind of a lawyer
I wished to be, and there was but one answer to make, and
so I went to perform a lawyer's duty upon the call of the
greatest of all our clients, the Government of our country."




FOREWORD


XV


In the same address, Mr. Root described the fundamental
principles upon which he worked out his colonial policy in
Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines; and his own words
supply the most appropriate conclusion to this foreword:
" It was a fascinating work. It was the work of applying
to some ten millions of people in Cuba and Porto Rico and
the Philippines, the principles of American liberty. They
were living under laws founded upon the customs of their
lives, customs drawn from old Spain and developed in social
and industrial activity quite unlike that of the United
States; and the problem was to apply those principles which
are declared in our constitutions, which embodied the formative idea of the Declaration of Independence that all men are
endowed with inalienable rights, among which are life and
liberty and the pursuit of happiness, to the customs and the
laws of peoples which had come down from the Spain of
Philip the Second and the Inquisition. Those principles
were alien to their thoughts and their conceptions, to their
habits of life, to their ideas of the relations between men and
between men and their governments. In the first instance
they had to be applied at the hand of the military officers
who had their own code and methods of procedure. It was
a test not to be undervalued, of the vitality, the universality,
and the essential truth of the principles themselves. Through
the strong and sagacious control of Governor Taft in the
Philippines; through the sound administrative instincts and
devotion to duty of Leonard Wood in Cuba; through the
loyalty of George W. Davis, and his successors in Porto Rico,
those principles of justice, principles of state morality, which
we have embodied in our constitutions, constitutions which
are but the expression of the conception of individual liberty
that has grown through a thousand years of Anglo-Saxon
freedom, proved still to be vital, and the laws of these
Spanish countries received, embodied and made effective




xvi


FOREWORD


the preservation of individual liberty and the protection of
the individual against the tyranny of government. The ideas
that were forced upon King John when he signed the Magna
Charta, - that great and conquering conception of liberty
which has been the formative power moulding the social and
political life of the hundred and ten million people who
inhabit this continent north of the Rio Grande, - prevailed
and became effective as applied to the daily life, the protection, the prosperity and the happiness of the little brown
brothers in the Philippines; of the men whom we fought the
war of 1898 to liberate in Cuba and of our wards in Porto
Rico. Surely no lawyer was ever more fortunate than in the
opportunity to help in the demonstration of the eternal verity
of the principles of justice and liberty which underlie all the
efforts and the struggles of our American bar." 1
1 Addresses on Government and Citizenship, by Elihu Root, pp. 504,505. Harvard
University Press, 1916.




FOREWORD


xvii


APPENDIX TO THE FOREWORD
TEXTS OF THE PROTOCOL OF AGREEMENT AND OF THE
TREATY OF PARIS
I. PROTOCOL OF AGREEMENT. Embodying the Terms of a Basis for the
Establishment of Peace Between the United States and Spain. Signed
August 12, 1898.1
William R. Day, Secretary of State of the United States, and His
Excellency Jules Cambon, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
of the Republic of France at Washington, respectively possessing for this
purpose full authority from the Government of the United States and the
Government of Spain, have concluded and signed the following articles,
embodying the terms on which the two Governments have agreed in
respect to the matters hereinafter set forth, having in view the establishment of peace between the two countries, that is to say:
ARTICLE I
Spain will relinquish all claims of sovereignty over and title to Cuba.
ARTICLE II
Spain will cede to the United States the island of Porto Rico and other
islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and also an
island in the Ladrones to be selected by the United States.
ARTICLE III
The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay and harbor of
Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine
the control, disposition and government of the Philippines.
ARTICLE IV
Spain will immediately evacuate Cuba, Porto Rico and other islands
now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies; and to this end each
Government will, within ten days after the signing of this protocol,
appoint Commissioners, and the Commissioners so appointed shall,
within thirty days after the signing of this protocol, meet at Havana for the
purpose of arranging and carrying out the details of the aforesaid evacuation of Cuba and the adjacent Spanish islands; and each Government
will, within ten days after the signing of this protocol, also appoint other
1 United States Statutes at Large, Vol. 30, pp. 1742-1743.




xviii
XVlll


FOREWORD


Commissioners, who shall, within thirty days after the signing of this
protocol, meet at San Juan, in Porto Rico, for the purpose of arranging
and carrying out the details of the aforesaid evacuation of Porto Rico and
other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies.
ARTICLE V
The United States and Spain will each appoint not more than five Commissioners to treat of peace, and the Commissioners so appointed shall
meet at Paris not later than October 1, 1898, and proceed to the negotiation and conclusion of a treaty of peace, which treaty shall be subject to
ratification according to the respective constitutional forms of the two
countries.
ARTICLE VI
Upon the conclusion and signing of this protocol, hostilities between the
two countries shall be suspended, and notice to that effect shall be given as
soon as possible by each Government to the commanders of its military
and naval forces.
Done at Washington in duplicate, in English and in French, by the
undersigned, who have hereunto set their hands and seals, the 12th day
of August, 1898.
[SEAL]                                   WILLIAM R. DAY
[SEAL]                                   JULES CAMBON 
II. TREATY OF PEACE. Concluded at Paris, December 10, 1898; ratification advised by the Senate February 6, 1899; ratified by the President
February 6, 1899; ratifications exchanged April 11, 1899; proclaimed
April 11, 1899.1
The United States of America and Her Majesty the Queen Regent of
Spain, in the name of her august son Don Alfonso XIII, desiring to end the
state of war now existing between the two countries, have for that purpose
appointed as plenipotentiaries:
The President of the United States,
William R. Day, Cushman K. Davis, William P. Frye, George Gray,
and Whitelaw Reid, citizens of the United States;
And Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain,
Don Eugenio Montero Rios, president of the senate, Don Buenaventura de Abarzuza, senator of the Kingdom and ex-minister of the Crown;
Don Jos6 de Garnica, deputy to the Cortes and associate justice of the
United States Statutes at Large, Vol. 30, pp. 1754-1758.




FOREWORD


xix


supreme court; Don Wenceslao Ramirez de Villa-Urrutia, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary at Brussels, and Don Rafael Cerero,
general of division;
Who, having assembled in Paris, and having exchanged their full
powers, which were found to be in due and proper form, have, after discussion of the matters before them, agreed upon the following articles:
ARTICLE I
Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba.
And as the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occupied by the
United States, the United States will, so long as such occupation shall last,
assume and discharge the obligations that may under international law
result from the fact of its occupation, for the protection of life and property.
ARTICLE II
Spain cedes to the United States the island of Porto Rico and other
islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and the island
of Guam in the Marianas or Ladrones.
ARTICLE III
Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands, and comprehending the islands lying within the following
lines:
A line running from west to east along or near the twentieth parallel of
north latitude, and through the middle of the navigable channel of Bachi,
from the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) to the one hundred and
twenty-seventh (127th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich,
thence along the one hundred and twenty-seventh (127th) degree meridian
of longitude east of Greenwich to the parallel of four degrees and fortyfive minutes (4~ 45') north latitude, thence along the parallel of four
degrees and forty-five minutes (4~ 45') north latitude to its intersection
with the meridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees and
thirty-five minutes (119~ 35') east of Greenwich, thence along the meridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees and thirty-five minutes
(119~ 35') east of Greenwich to the parallel of latitude seven degrees and
forty minutes (7~ 40') north, thence along the parallel of latitude of seven
degrees and forty minutes (7~ 40') north to its intersection with the one
hundred and sixteenth (116th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, thence by a direct line to the intersection of the tenth (10th) degree
parallel of north latitude with the one hundred and eighteenth (118th)
degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, and thence along the one
hundred and eighteenth (118th) degree meridian of longitude east of
Greenwich to the point of beginning.




XX


FOREWORD


The United States will pay to Spain the sum of twenty million dollars
($20,000,000) within three months after the exchange of the ratifications
of the present treaty.
ARTICLE IV
The United States will, for the term of ten years from the date of the
exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, admit Spanish ships and
merchandise to the ports of the Philippine Islands on the same terms as
ships and merchandise of the United States.
ARTICLE V
The United States will, upon the signature of the present treaty, send
back to Spain, at its own cost, the Spanish soldiers taken as prisoners of
war on the capture of Manila by the American forces. The arms of the
soldiers in question shall be restored to them.
Spain will, upon the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty,
proceed to evacuate the Philippines, as well as the island of Guam, on
terms similar to those agreed upon by the Commissioners appointed to
arrange for the evacuation of Porto Rico and other islands in the West
Indies, under the Protocol of August 12, 1898, which is to continue in
force till its provisions are completely executed.
The time within which the evacuation of the Philippine Islands and
Guam shall be completed shall be fixed by the two Governments. Stands
of colors, uncaptured war vessels, small arms, guns of all calibres, with
their carriages and accessories, powder, ammunition, livestock, and
materials and supplies of all kinds, belonging to the land and naval forces
of Spain in the Philippines and Guam, remain the property of Spain.
Pieces of heavy ordnance, exclusive of field artillery, in the fortifications
and coast defences, shall remain in their emplacements for the term of six
months, to be reckoned from the exchange of ratifications of the treaty;
and the United States may, in the meantime, purchase such material
from Spain, if a satisfactory agreement between the two Governments on
the subject shall be reached.
ARTICLE VI
Spain will, upon the signature of the present treaty, release all prisoners
of war, and all persons detained or imprisoned for political offences, in
connection with the insurrections in Cuba and the Philippines and the war
with the United States.
Reciprocally, the United States will release all persons made prisoners
of war by the American forces, and will undertake to obtain the release of
all Spanish prisoners in the hands of the insurgents in Cuba and the
Philippines.




FOREWORD


xxi


The Government of the United States will at its own cost return to
Spain and the Government of Spain will at its own cost return to the
United States, Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines, according to the
situation of their respective homes, prisoners released or caused to be
released by them, respectively, under this article.
ARTICLE VII
The United States and Spain mutually relinquish all claims for indemnity, national and individual, of every kind, of either Government, or of
its citizens or subjects, against the other Government, that may have
arisen since the beginning of the late insurrection in Cuba and prior to the
exchange of ratifications of the present treaty, including all claims for
indemnity for the cost of the war.
The United States will adjudicate and settle the claims of its citizens
against Spain relinquished in this article.
ARTICLE VIII
In conformity with the provisions of Articles I, II, and III of this treaty,
Spain relinquishes in Cuba, and cedes in Porto Rico and other islands in the
West Indies, in the island of Guam, and in the Philippine Archipelago, all
the buildings, wharves, barracks, forts, structures, public highways and
other immovable property which, in conformity with law, belong to the
public domain, and as such belong to the Crown of Spain.
And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or cession, as the case
may be, to which the preceding paragraph refers, cannot in any respect
impair the property or rights which by law belong to the peaceful possession of property of all kinds, of provinces, municipalities, public or private
establishments, ecclesiastical or civic bodies, or any other associations
having legal capacity to acquire and possess property in the aforesaid
territories renounced or ceded, or of private individuals, of whatsoever
nationality such individuals may be.
The aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, includes
all documents exclusively referring to the sovereignty relinquished or
ceded that may exist in the archives of the Peninsula. Where any document in such archives only in part relates to said sovereignty, a copy of
such part will be furnished whenever it shall be requested. Like rules
shall be reciprocally observed in favor of Spain in respect of documents in
the archives of the islands above referred to.
In the aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, are also
included such rights as the Crown of Spain and its authorities possess in
respect of the official archives and records, executive as well as judicial,
in the islands above referred to, which relate to said islands or the rights




xxii


FOREWORD


and property of their inhabitants. Such archives and records shall be
carefully preserved, and private persons shall without distinction have the
right to require, in accordance with law, authenticated copies of the contracts, wills and other instruments forming part of notarial protocols or
files, or which may be contained in the executive or judicial archives, be
the latter in Spain or in the islands aforesaid.
ARTICLE IX
Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over
which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty,
may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either
event all their rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of
such property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to
carry on their industry, commerce and professions, being subject in respect
thereof to such laws as are applicable to other foreigners. In case they
remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of
Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from the date of
the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision
to preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be
held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the
territory in which they may reside.
The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the
territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the
Congress.
ARTICLE X
The inhabitants of the territories over which Spain relinquishes or
cedes her sovereignty shall be secured in the free exercise of their religion.
ARTICLE XI
The Spaniards residing in the territories over which Spain by this treaty
cedes or relinquishes her sovereignty shall be subject in matters civil as
well as criminal to the jurisdiction of the courts of the country wherein
they reside, pursuant to the ordinary laws governing the same; and they
shall have the right to appear before such courts, and to pursue the same
course as citizens of the country to which the courts belong.
ARTICLE XII
Judicial proceedings pending at the time of the exchange of ratifications
of this treaty in the territories over which Spain relinquishes or cedes her
sovereignty shall be determined according to the following rules:
1. Judgments rendered either in civil suits between private individuals,
or in criminal matters, before the date mentioned, and with respect to




FOREWORD


xxiii


which there is no recourse or right of review under the Spanish law, shall
be deemed to be final, and shall be executed in due form by competent
authority in the territory within which such judgments should be carried
out.
2. Civil suits between private individuals which may on the date
mentioned be undetermined shall be prosecuted to judgment before the
court in which they may then be pending or in the court that may be
substituted therefor.
3. Criminal actions pending on the date mentioned before the Supreme
Court of Spain against citizens of the territory which by this treaty ceases
to be Spanish shall continue under its jurisdiction until final judgment;
but, such judgment having been rendered, the execution thereof shall be
committed to the competent authority of the place in which the case arose.
ARTICLE XIII
The rights of property secured by copyrights and patents acquired by
Spaniards in the Island of Cuba and in Porto Rico, the Philippines and
other ceded territories, at the time of the exchange of the ratifications of
this treaty, shall continue to be respected. Spanish scientific, literary and
artistic works, not subversive of public order in the territories in question,
shall continue to be admitted free of duty into such territories, for the
period of ten years, to be reckoned from the date of the exchange of the
ratifications of this treaty.
ARTICLE XIV
Spain shall have the power to establish consular officers in the ports and
places of the territories, the sovereignty over which has been either
relinquished or ceded by the present treaty.
ARTICLE XV
The Government of each country will, for the term of ten years, accord
to the merchant vessels of the other country the same treatment in respect
of all port charges, including entrance and clearance dues, light dues, and
tonnage duties, as it accords to its own merchant vessels, not engaged in
the coastwise trade.
This article may at any time be terminated on six months' notice given
by either Government to the other.
ARTICLE XVI
It is understood that any obligations assumed in this treaty by the
United States with respect to Cuba are limited to the time of its occupancy
thereof; but it will upon the termination of such occupancy, advise any
Government established in the island to assume the same obligations.




xxiv                    FOREWORD
ARTICLE XVII
The present treaty shall be ratified by the President of the United
States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof, and by
Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain; and the ratifications shall be
exchanged at Washington within six months from the date hereof, or
earlier if possible.
In faith whereof, we, the respective Plenipotentiaries, have signed this
treaty and have hereunto affixed our seals.
Done in duplicate at Paris, the tenth day of December in the year of
Our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety eight.
[SEAL] WILLIAM R. DAY           [SEAL] EUGENIO MONTERO RIOS
[SEAL] CUSHMAN K. DAVIS         [SEAL] B. DE ABARZUZA
[SEAL] WILLIAM P. FRYE          [SEAL] J. DE GARNICA
-[SEAL] GEORGE GRAY              [SEAL] W. R. DE VILLA-URRUTIA
[SEAL] WHITELAW REID            [SEAL] RAFAEL CERERO




THE MILITARY AND COLONIAL
POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES
PART I




I




THE AMERICAN SOLDIER


ADDRESS BY THE SECRETARY OF WAR AT THE MARQUETTE
CLUB IN CHICAGO, OCTOBER 7, 1899, IN RESPONSE
TO THE TOAST, "THE AMERICAN SOLDIER"
AM not unmindful of the fact that the easiest way to be
interesting is to be indiscreet, and that the most attractive aids to oratory are extravagant expressions which, while
conforming to the heat of the evening, do not commend
themselves to the sober judgment of the morning.
Happily, the subject to which I am assigned tonight finds
its own interest in every American heart, and no eloquence is
needed to strike the chords of sympathy or of sentiment in
loyal souls, where the American soldier is the theme.
You do not wish me to speak of the soldier of the past. We
are a peaceful, not a military people, but we are made of
fighting fiber, and whenever fighting is by hard necessity the
business of the hour we always do it as becomes the children
of great, warlike races; and on every field from the day
when along the stone walls that line the Cambridge road, the
men of Concord and of Acton made each his own disappearing gun carriage, to the day when the flag floated over the
citadel of Manila, the American soldier has answered loyally
to every call of duty.
It is the soldier of today of whom you wish me to speak
and of whom I wish to speak. The American soldier today
is a part of a great machine which we call military organization; a machine in which, as by electrical converters, the
policy of government is transformed into the strategy of the
general, into the tactics of the field and into the action of
the man behind the gun. Through that machine he is fed,
clothed, transported and armed, equipped and housed.
s




4


MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


The machine today is defective; it needs improvement; it
ought to be improved. Thirty-three years of profound peace
have evolved in it some men upon whom the stress of harsh
requirement has proved that they are unfit for the positions
to which they have attained. Some square pegs have got
into round holes and some round pegs have got into square
holes. Some men who, in the ordinary days of peace, have
seemed to be equal to all requirements, in the stern necessities of war have failed to answer to the demands; and whereever that has occurred the machinery has stopped and failed
to accomplish its purpose. This was inevitable. It could be
avoided only by the true Anglo-Saxon method of improvement by experiment.
The machine was the machine by which was fought,
through which were clothed and armed, equipped, transported and ordered, the armies which fought, the greatest
civil war of modern times. It was the machinery that we
received through that great generation of men whom we all
honor as we look back over a third of a century, and it has
required the experience of another war to teach the American
people where it needs improvement and change.
It rests with you, through the senators and representatives
in Congress whom you shall elect, to determine whether the
lesson of this later war shall be learned, and the army organization of America shall be put in the front of American progress; but in the meantime let me say to you that within the
limits of that great army machinery there are today in the
city of Washington and in every military department, scores,
hundreds of men doing faithful, devoted, and able service in
the cause of their country and of their country's army, of
whom any people upon the face of this earth might well be
proud.
When the history of these troublous years comes to be written with cold and unimpassioned pen, the names of many




THE AMERICAN SOLDIER


5


men whose hair has been streaked with gray through the
strenuous labors of these days in the staff of the army, will be
written high in the list of those entitled to their country's
gratitude.
This army of ours is concentrated or concentrating largely
in the wonderful islands of the East, toward which all American eyes are turned today. May I say a word to you of what
it has been doing there and how the American soldier has
been performing his duty? Will you go back with me to that
May morning when all American hearts were made bright
and joyous by the news of the Nelsonic victory of Dewey?
Upon that day the title of Spain to the Philippine Islands
stood unchallenged and unquestioned. But a few months
before, the Philippine insurrection had ceased, ceased by an
agreement under which Spain had promised to give to the
Philippine Islands certain reforms, moderate in their character, reasonable in their nature, and to pay a sum of money
to the leaders of the Philippine forces. Aguinaldo and his
companions, as one of the terms of the treaty, had been exiled
from Luzon; and, although disorganized riot and bloodshed
had followed Spain's failure to keep her promise of reform,
when, as a result of the destruction of the Spanish fleet,
Dewey held Manila at his mercy, he was the potential master
of an empire, to which the title of the Spanish foe was as
unquestioned and indisputable as the title of the Queen of
England to the island over which she reigns.
Admiral Dewey brought Aguinaldo in an American ship
from exile. He set him upon the soil of Luzon and put in his
hands the arms and ammunition by which he might gather
the forces of the Philippines to aid the American army; and
then for three long months, from May until the twelfth of
August, he waited for reinforcements to come from America
to make him strong enough to capture Manila -not to
capture Manila, but to hold Manila when it was captured



6


MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


and during that time the Filipino leaders were gathering
their forces, practically without opposition, with the guns
of Dewey's fleet protecting them, and with the paralyzed
Spaniards within the walls of Manila.
On the twelfth of August the protocol between Spain and
the United States was signed, and by that we assumed the
solemn obligation of holding the bay and harbor of Manila
until the final treaty of peace was executed and ratified. We
took possession of the city, and for six long weary months,
while the slow processes of negotiation wore on, while the
slower processes of discussion and ratification dragged their
weary way, we stood on the ramparts of Manila waiting; and
theAmerican soldier, in those six months of inaction under the
tropical sun, not knowing why he waited, not knowing that
he was waiting under peremptory orders from Washington
based upon the necessity of maintaining national faith,
waited still - waited while the army of the Filipinos which
had been gathered about the walls and promised the loot of
Manila, exasperated by being kept from their plunder, grew
more and more defiant, grew at last contemptuous, showered
upon him abuse and ridicule and defiance and insult.
And the stern resolve, the self-control, the power in obedience to orders and to duty to restrain themselves from even
the resentment of insult, entitled the soldiers of America
to the admiration of civilized and law-obeying men, while
it won for them only the contempt of their half-civilized
opponents.
It was this contempt and the certainty it bred that the
Americans would not fight and were cowards, and could be
swept into the sea, that led to the attack of February fifth,
when the hordes of the Filipinos precipitated themselves
upon our ranks. They speedily learned their mistake. What
was it that the American soldier had before him then? You
all understand that the Congress of the United States, not




THE AMERICAN SOLDIER


7


expecting that these Filipinos, to whom we were ready to
give a hundred times what they accepted from Spain a few
months before, would reject the offer, had passed a law disbanding the army in effect, so that twenty-five days after the
attack upon the American soldiers in Manila General Otis
had left but 4,498 soldiers, officers, and men whom he was
entitled to command, and the remaining 17,000 of his 22,000
soldiers were entitled to be discharged and returned to the
United States.
The problem before him, then, was to hold back the
uncounted hordes who surrounded Manila, to keep in subjection the two hundred thousand Filipinos in the city who
had received orders to rise and massacre every European
and American within its limits; to wait, with the rainy
season coming upon him, until a new army could be raised
and sent a third of the way around the world to take
the place of the old army which must be sent back to their
homes.
And then, again, the American soldier, the volunteer soldier and the thousands of regulars who were entitled to their
discharge, showed what stuff they were made of. Homesick,
longing for a sight of their old homes in temperate climes,
enfeebled and sick from their long stay under a tropical sun
and in tropical rains, nevertheless in this desperate strait of
their country they abandoned the bright visions of home and
stayed, without obligation, except that of patriotism, until
a new army could be raised and sent to stand behind the
flag.
Impatience is exhibited here and there. In many places
we hear it; in many newspapers we see it. Impatience, like
the old "On to Richmond " cry of 1861, like the "On to
Havana " cry of 1898. But let me tell you that the events
of 1899 on the island of Luzon were events that followed
a fixed, settled, and wise purpose.




8


MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


In face of the fact that the country was about to become
a morass impossible for military operations; that the rains
were coming on, which gave, in fact, during the first twenty
days of July in this year forty-two inches of rainfall - three
feet and a half in twenty days - which have given more
than half a foot of rain in a single day; in the face of the
approach of that climatic condition, with an army that
must be succored from a third of the way round the world,
the problem was to establish the American position against
foes within and foes without, so that it could be held and
maintain the flag until the men came to fight and there was
land for them to fight on.
The temporary forays to punish too impertinent guerrillas have been magnified into great military movements, and
when the party of foray has returned as a part of the plan of
their operations, the return has been magnified into a retreat;
but in fact, the steady, consistent, and unswerving purpose
has run through every movement of every month and of
every day in Luzon.
Well, the army, 17,000 of them, have been brought back
from the other side of the world. Twenty-seven thousand -
another army - have been sent, and are there today. Seventeen thousand more are on the road, and 17,000 more are in
camp today, ready. By the fifteenth of next month, 49,000
American troops will answer to the commands of Otis and
Lawton and MacArthur. By the end of the following month
65,000 will be there.
They are the best youth of America. Let me tell you that
in the month of July we enlisted 2,900 men for the regular
army, and they were enlisted out of 14,000 applications, of
which 11,000 were rejected on examination. They are well
officered by the best intelligence of America. Let me speak
of what I know - that of the 700 officers of the fifteen regiments which have been officered since the first of August, not




THE AMERICAN SOLDIER


9


one has been appointed who has not seen actual service in the
regular army, or in war, and not one has been appointed who
was not appointed on his efficiency record as a soldier.
Well, against whom are we fighting? Are we fighting the
Philippine nation? No. There is none. There are hundreds
of islands, inhabited by more than sixty tribes, speaking
more than sixty different languages, and all but one are ready
to accept American sovereignty - and many of them have
already accepted it and welcomed the Stars and Stripes to
float over them. Many of them are already engaged in learning the rudiments of government under the tuition of the
American soldier. We are opposed by only the single tribe
of the Tagalos, who inhabit less than one-half of the single
island of Luzon.
Are we fighting a people who are capable of self-government? No. The practically unanimous declaration of the
men who have been there and studied the subject and studied
the people, is that they are not now capable of self-government. Senator Beveridge, of Indiana, who has been there
qualifying himself in noble fashion for the performance of his
duties in the Senate, says that they are not fit for it. General
Merritt says they are not fit for it; General Greene says they
are not fit for it; President Schurman says they are not fit for
it; Admiral Dewey says they are not fit for it.
Are we fighting a people who themselves consider that they
are capable of their own protection? No. For never has the
most advanced and violent of them gone further than to say
that they want to be allowed to govern themselves under the
protection of the United States. Their proposition is that
they should be at liberty to make the wars and that we
should fight them.
Are we fighting the whole of the single tribe with which
alone we are engaged? No; for the vast majority of that
tribe want peace, law, order, and are ready and anxious for




10     MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


the protective government of the United States. The men
who own the property, the men who do the business, the
men of intelligence among them are anxious that the Government of the United States shall protect them in their interests
and their industries.
Are we fighting in breach of faith with an ally or for any
right which we have promised to forego? No. Immediately
upon Aguinaldo's appearance on the scene, Admiral Dewey
was instructed to enter into no alliance with the insurgents
and make no promises to them. He replied that he had
made no alliance and no promises. Will any one question
his statement?
We are fighting against the selfish ambition of a military
dictator who was brought from exile by an American ship, furnished with arms by American soldiers and sailors; who was
permitted to gather all the forces of disorder, all the men who
prefer a life of brigandage to a life of industry, around the
paralyzed Spaniards during the ten months when America
was prevented by her international obligations and the faith
of her protocol from interfering; who has attained supreme
power by the assassination of his rival, and who maintains it
by the arrest and punishment of every one who favors the
United States, and the murder of every one whom he can
reach who aids her.
The closest analogy to Aguinaldo to be found in our experience is the perpetual military revolutionist of Central
America.
Gentlemen, the title of America to the island of Luzon is
better than the title we had to Louisiana. It rests upon a
more just foundation than the title we had to Texas. It
rests upon the sure foundation of international law, and the
surer foundation of high duty in the family of nations and to
the cause of humanity. No president has the power or the
right, no executive officer has the will or the wish to take




THE AMERICAN SOLDIER


11


away from American sovereignty one rod of the soil that
belongs to it; and so long as the American people stand behind
the American soldier he will maintain the honor of the flag
and the integrity of that sovereignty on the island of Luzon,
come who may against him.
But the finest thing about the American soldier is that he is
an American citizen. He carries with him not the traditions
of a military empire, but the traditions of a self-governing
people. He comes from a land where public discussion has
educated every citizen in the art of self-government; from
a land where such debates as that between Lincoln and
Douglas, where such great schools of public government as
we see in the discussion before every presidential election,
where the affairs of city and county and town and village,
have made the art of government the alphabet of life for
every citizen, where every citizen has learned that obedience
to law, and respect for the results of popular elections, is a
part of the order of nature.
And so the American soldier is different from all other soldiers of all other countries since the world began, and today
I am prouder of him for what he is doing in poor, bleeding
Cuba and devastated Porto Rico, and what he is doing in
that tumultuous city of Manila, than I ever was for the
greatest victory he ever won.
Poor Cuba, torn by years of war and dissension, with her
people gathered starving in her towns, with no knowledge of
the art of government, almost forgetful of the arts of peace,
has had her wounds bound up, her people returned to their
homes, the tillage of her soil recommenced, the industry of
her factories, the activity of her commerce, all the arts of
peace revived, under the kindly tuition of the American soldier. He goes with the sword, with the bayonet, with the
cannon; but the moment that the enemy ceases to fire he
is ready with open hand, with the spirit of John Howard and




12    MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


Florence Nightingale, to heal the sick, to succor the poor, to
teach the ignorant, to set up the arts of peace and to turn the
scene of warfare into the smiling land of plenty.
The soldiers of the United States in Porto Rico, when that
island was swept by the frightful hurricane of the eighth of
August, turned into a hospital corps every one, from general down to private. I am prouder of Wood in Santiago
and Wilson in Mantanzas and Ludlow in Havana, cleaning
the streets and disinfecting the pest holes and teaching the
Cubans how to live cleanly and orderly lives, teaching them
the simple elements of civil government; teaching them how
to go back to work, to earn their living; teaching them
how to become self-governing citizens of a free state, than
I ever could be of a hero on the ramparts amid the hail
of shot.
I will leave to others the task of lauding those qualities in
the American soldier which he has in common with the legions
of Caesar and the battalions of Napoleon, and I claim for him
the higher honor that while he is as stern a foe as ever man
saw on the battlefield, he brings the schoolbook, the plow,
and the Bible. While he leads the forlorn hope of war, he
is the advance guard of liberty and justice, of law and order,
and peace and happiness.
I stood last month on the battlefield of Gettysburg. Two
gray-haired veterans of the Civil War - one an officer of the
Union and the other an officer of the Confederate army -
who had fought upon that field, accompanied me. They vied
with each other in recounting the story of those eventful
days, themselves a happy type of our reunited land. They
showed the spot where Reynolds fell. They marked the
places where Hancock and Barlow shed their blood. They
traced the line of Pickett's charge, and the field across which
Pettigrew swept with his North Carolinians; and I thought,
as I listened to their story, how dear to their hearts and to the




THE AMERICAN SOLDIER


13


heart of every true American is the name and the fame of
every hero who fought upon that field.
My friends, today our brothers are lying in the trenches in
Luzon, and today over the length and breadth of this land
lying and envious tongues, for political effect, are spreading
vile slanders concerning the American soldiers in Luzon. The
day will come when the fair fame of these, our brothers of
today, is as dear to the American people as that of the heroes
of Gettysburg.
I protest in the name of the American soldier against all
those who, believing because they wish to believe, without
opportunity for explanation or contradiction, circulate and
print the idle stories which fly through the air from malicious
tongues, impugning the honor of the true and noble Americans who are protecting the honor of our flag.
I ask your condemnation upon all those who speak and
print imputations upon them while they are enduring the
hardships of that distant land, dying, it may be, for the honor
of your flag and theirs. They will be faithful to you and to
the Republic. Oh, Americans, be faithful and fair to them.




~Up ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~I




THE CHARACTER AND OFFICE OF THE
AMERICAN ARMY
AN ADDRESS AT A BANQUET AT CANTON, OHIO,
JANUARY 27, 1903, IN HONOR OF THE BIRTHDAY
OF THE LATE PRESIDENT McKINLEY
THANK you for your greeting in memory of your friend
and mine. Never can I forget the sweet and tender associations that have gathered about your city since I walked
and drove through your streets with that tenderest and
sweetest of natures.
It is noteworthy that the greatest American presidents
who have passed into history have been the most patient,
most peaceable, and most just of all the men whose names
are found upon the pages of our national life; and yet, that
each one of them, Washington, Lincoln, and McKinley,
led his country through the dark and bloody paths of war.
Washington, the embodiment of considerate justice, could
not obtain justice for the colonies except after the sacrifice
and the struggle. Lincoln, agonizing for peace and union,
nevertheless was devoted by fate to those years of weary
effort when the blood of his countrymen flowed like water for
the freedom of mankind. And McKinley, with a soul of the
tenderest sympathy, straining to the utmost the efforts of
diplomacy to secure justice for bleeding Cuba, was forced to
become the leader in dreadful war in the islands of the East
and the islands of the West.
Do not forget or be deaf to the lesson. No sense of justice,
no desire for peace, no kindliness of heart can turn aside the
inexorable decrees of the overwhelming powers that bring
war and will bring war in the future, as they have brought it
15




16    MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


in the past. It lies not in the will of rulers, it lies not in the
generous impulses of the human heart, but it lies in the working out of the destiny of mankind that no people can avoid.
Controversies will arise as they have arisen, when each side
believes itself to be right and the weak and feeble will go to
the wall. Great and overbearing injustice walks the earth
still, and the people who are unable or unwilling to strive for
their rights will find small respect.
In the slow progress of the ages - progress ever but progress slow, as " the mills of God grind slowly " - it is still
the part of manhood and self-respect to be able to defend
one's self against injustice, to hold the arm of strength out for
the protection of the weak, and, if need be, to sacrifice life
that the reign of justice and righteousness may still approach
upon earth.
Poor China today stands helpless, seeing, piece by piece,
parts of her territory peopled by her citizens, cut out from
her living body and subjected to the domination of foreign
power - China, which has carried the arts of civilization to
a high, if not the highest, point - China, whose people are
industrious, and frugal and enterprising, among the best
workmen, the most honest merchants, the most successful
business men of the earth - China, whose people cultivate
the domestic virtues, the affections, a high type of morality,
and fear not death at all - is helpless today because centuries ago she forgot that the part of manhood required that
men shall be able to defend their rights.
The nation least able to defend itself most invites aggression. It is to repel and prevent aggression and to defend and
assert the right, that the army of the United States exists.
Not because we love war or seek war; not because we would
infringe upon the rights of any other power or of any other
people, but because we have that manhood in us, and we have
that respect and love for the right to make us willing to




THE AMERICAN ARMY


17


defend it with life itself, we have the army of the United
States. It is an insurance against aggression. Among the
eighty million people of the United States the cost of this
insurance is less than a dollar apiece. For the hundred billions of property of the people of the United States the cost
of this insurance is less than one-tenth of one per cent.
The character of the army of the United States conforms
to the high and pacific purpose for which it exists. It is an
army of citizens of the United States- volunteers all of
them. It is a volunteer army. It is an army of citizens, each
one of whom is educated, for there is an educational test upon
admission. It is an army in which the door of opportunity,
the open door of opportunity to youth which is the crowning
and chief glory of our American institutions, is never closed,
for up from the ranks each common soldier of the United
States may pass by promotion to the highest rank. Aye,
they do pass, and no star upon the breast, no marshal's baton
held by any prince of Europe, can compare for credit with
the stars on the shoulders of that Ohio boy who through gallantry in the Civil War of '61 to '65, gallantry in command in
Cuba, gallantry in the march to Peking, wise administration
as commander in the Philippines, has reached the high rank
of major-general in the army of the United States - Adna R.
Chaffee.
The officers of the army conform in their character and
conduct to the purpose for which the army is maintained, and
the character of the people from whom they come. I wish to
say to you, not in the language of rhetoric, but as a sober
statement of what I have found by careful observation, that
they are free to a degree which I never dreamed of, until I
commenced to know of them, from the vices which have prevailed in most armies of the world during all history. They
are a temperate set of men. They are freer from the vice of
drinking to excess than almost any other class I know of in




18     MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


this country. They are free from the vice of gambling. No
such thing as duelling, which disgraces and deforms many
military services, obtains in our army. The man who is dissipated is out of favor, and the public sentiment of the officers
of the army is opposed to dissipation and excess. The man
who does not pay his debts falls into disfavor, and it is an
offense which is punished in our army by court-martial if a
man does not pay his honest debts.
No one ever knew of the American army seeking to make
itself a political agent. No one ever knew of the American
army seeking to make itself a Pretorian guard to set up a
president or an emperor. No one ever knew of the American
army seeking to throw off that civil control of the military
arm which our fathers inherited from England and which is
ingrained in the desires, the prejudices and the instincts of the
Anglo-Saxon race. It does its duty under presidents, Republican or Democratic. Whatever the political policy of the
American people may be, when the army is called upon it does
its duty, asking no questions, doubting not, begrudging no
sacrifice, fearing no danger, and hesitating not at death itself.
Whenever the enlarged army of the United States finds the
duty of the hour accomplished it melts back into the mass of
the people unnoticed. When the Civil War was over, the
million of men under Grant's command took their way to
their homes. The greatest military power which to that day
had ever existed never dreamed for a moment of threatening
the institutions of our free government. And when the war
with Spain was over, the 250,000 men who had been raised
for that war disappeared as quietly to their homes, never
thinking for a moment of exercising the slightest influence
upon the political life of the country. That this is so unnoticed, and causes so little surprise among our people, is the
highest testimony to the abiding confidence of the people in
the soldiers of the American army. They have their faults,




THE AMERICAN ARMY


19


but their faults are small and their virtues are great; and
they are justly the pride of the American people from whom
they come, and to whom, when their duty is done, they return.
They embody and act upon the traditions of the farewell
address, the traditions of Grant's dying message to his countrymen, " Let us have peace." They are an engine not of war
for war's sake, but of peace, and war for the sake of peace.
They are not the scourge of God. They are the advance
agents always of peace and justice. They are missionaries
of ordered liberty, and wherever they go ordered liberty
follows. "By their fruits ye shall know them."
Under the administration of President McKinley and his
true and loyal successor, the American army undertook three
great tasks after the capture of Santiago. It undertook to
march to the relief of the beleaguered legations in the city of
Peking; and when the work of rescue there had been accomplished, to set up a government in that city, to do justice and
protect the weak until the Chinese government could resume
its sway. Let me read to you not what I say or what the army
says, but what the people of Peking say about the way in
which these American citizens wearing the uniform of the
United States performed the duty of civilization in those
times of dire distress and disorder. I will read the translation
of a petition addressed by a mass meeting of the Chinese in
Peking on the twenty-eighth of March, 1901, to Captain John
C. F. Tillson, Fourteenth United States Infantry, ProvostMarshal, American District, Chinese City, Peking; for after
the city was taken it was divided into districts, and over each
district the troops of one country held sway. Two thousand
Chinese signed this paper:
SIm: We, the people, and proprietors of two thousand (9,000) business
houses in the American section have the honor to beg you to intercede in
our behalf to secure a postponement of the withdrawal of the United
States troops from this section, as we have been perfectly protected by
you from the beginning till now.




20    MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


After the relief expedition the city was divided into different sections,
and we were under your jurisdiction.
We are profoundly grateful because we have been so well treated. You
have, under the wise government established by you, justly punished
criminals; given us letters of protection that have saved us from molestation from bad soldiers, and enabled us to lead peaceful lives.
You have opened charity eating houses and saved the poor from starvation.
You have employed policemen to prevent crime; gambling houses and
opium dens have been closed and thieves driven from the district.
We have been made very happy and we are grateful to you because
you have protected us so kindly.
We learned recently that your Government will withdraw her troops
before the other nations withdraw theirs.
We were very sorry to learn this, because we fear that criminals will
prey upon us upon your departure.
With the best protection you could give us there was still some crime.
Should the United States troops leave here it is certain that criminals
will again pillage the people.
Though we may come under the protection of some other power, we
fear that that other power will not be so efficient as the United States has
been and the officer not so kind and just as you.
From the beginning we have been perfectly protected by you, but after
you leave we may be robbed and harmed by bad men and badly treated
by the new officer.
That would be a case of a good beginning with a bad ending which we
would keenly regret.
After mature consideration we have concluded to beg you to ask your
Government for us to kindly permit you to remain here until the negotiation is concluded.
This will prevent our being harmed, robbed, and badly treated, and
we can continue our business with content.
If this, our petition, be granted, we shall be more grateful than words
can express.
For these reasons we have the honor to submit our petition with our
names written on another sheet.
A petition addressed to Major Robertson, Ninth Infantry,
Provost-Marshal, Tartar City, reads as follows:
We, the people of the American section, consider ourselves fortunate to
be protected under the glorious flag of the United States, a flag which has
indeed secured us better protection than we have ever had before. In




THE AMERICAN ARMY


21


addition to the commercial prosperity and individual privileges we have
enjoyed since the arrival of the allied forces at Peking, we have been favored
with many beneficial institutions, such as police station, charity house,
board of health, vaccination, etc.
The Court of Provost-Marshal which seldom, if ever, leaves innocence
without recognition and the guilty unpunished is the center of justice.
The watchfulness with which the American policemen perform their duties
has protected many a merchant from being robbed by foreign soldiers and
native rascals. Everything moves on as smoothly as could be desired.
Thousands of homeless people, who otherwise would starve to death,
are being fed by the American Charity House. The excellence of the
present sanitary arrangements, which was once so foreign to us, cannot
but win our admiration. We believe that Peking has never enjoyed such
good health in her history as she is enjoying at present. In short, as a
conquered people, we are more privileged than we are entitled to. We
earnestly and sincerely request you, the American authorities, not to leave
us until the time when all the nations withdraw their forces.
This petition was signed by five thousand six hundred
leading merchants and citizens.
The second great task which the American army undertook was to lead Cuba in the unaccustomed paths of selfgovernment, and to establish a stable government in that
island. Let me read the views of the people of Cuba regarding the way in which the army fulfilled that task:
TTHAVANA, May ~0, 190~.
HONORABLE GENERAL LEONARD WOOD.         HAVANA, Ma 20,1902.
I take this solemn occasion, which marks the fulfillment of the honored
promise of the Government and people of the United States in regard to
the island of Cuba, and in which our country is made a ruling nation,
to express to you, the worthy representative of that grand people, the
immense gratitude which the people of Cuba feel toward the American
nation, toward its illustrious President, Theodore Roosevelt, and toward
you, for the efforts you have put forth for the successful accomplishment
of such a precious ideal.                 T. ESTRADA PAIMA.
HAVANA, May 20, 1902.
THEODORE ROOSEVELT,                    HAANA      ay 2
President, Washington, D. C.
The government of the island having been transferred, I, as Chief
Magistrate of the Republic, faithfully interpreting the sentiments of the
whole people of Cuba, have the honor to send you and the American




22     MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


people testimony of our profound gratitude and the assurance of an enduring friendship, with wishes and prayers to the Almighty for the welfare
and prosperity of the United States.      T. ESTRADA PALMA.
The third great task which the army of the United States
undertook, was to assert the sovereignty and just authority
of the United States in the Philippine Islands, put down the
insurrection against our authority there, and establish a civil
government which should bring to those people the blessings
of law and order and civil liberty. The army accomplished
that task, established a government which, upon the first day
of last July, received the sanction of Congressional enactment, and I beg to read to you some recent expressions
sent by cable half-way around the world from the Philippine
people indicating the character of that government so established; the government which followed the swift, resistless
march of General Young and General Lawton through the
island of Luzon:
MANILA, January 7, 1903.
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, Washington, D. C.
The Philippine people have absolute confidence in Taft. Taft! once
representing the intelligence and virtue of Ohio in the Capital of the
nation; now representing the virtue and intelligence and living power of
American institutions before all the people of the world. At the present
moment departure of Taft would have deplorable effects in the country.
The confidence won by Taft could not be improvised today. We believe
it our duty to state to the President that the presence of Taft in the
Philippines is indispensable for the ceremonial peace and the maintenance
of faith which, by reason of him, the people of the Philippine Islands have
in the intentions of the American people. We solemnly affirm that feelings
Philippine people would be deeply hurt by the departure of Taft. We
fulfill sacred duty requesting the continuance of Taft.
TAVERA, LEGARDA, LUZURIAGA,
Government Commissioners.
ARELLANO, TORRES, MAPA,
Supreme Court Justices.
ARANATA, Solicitor-General.
HERRERA, President of the Municipal
Board of Manila.
ALBERT, President of the Federal Party.




THE AMERICAN ARMY


The' greatest names, the most distinguished men of the
Philippine Islands.
ROOSEVELT, Washington.              MANILA, January 10, 1903.
ROOSEVELT, Washington.
Native press thinks Taft's untimely departure ruinous public order.
Prays he should be retained for preservation peace success American
policy here.
policy here.      GITO RINACIMIENTO PATRIA,
Fraternidad Democracia.
ROOSEVELT, Washington.            MANILA, January 10, 1903.
ROOSEVELT, Washington.
Federals, Liberals, Nationalists request continuance Taft to complete
work of America in Philippines.
ROOSEVELT, Washington.              MANILA, January 11, 1903.
ROOSEVELT, Washington.
International Club reports Philippine people deplore Taft's departure,
which causes serious perturbation.                 Ro    I.
ROSARIO.
ROOSEVELT, Washington.              MANILA, January 11, 1903.
ROOSEVELT, Washington.
The Philippine lawyers having met together consider the withdrawal
of Taft as fraught with disaster to the Philippine people, and ask that he
may remain.
ROOSEVELT, Washington.              MANILA, January 12, 1903.
ROOSEVELT, Washington.
People Manila in grand demonstration Malacanang yesterday ask for
continuance Taft as governor Philippines.   HERRE, Mayor.
HERRERA, Mayor.
MANILA, January 12, 1903.
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, Washington.
Real estate owners' association considers necessary Governor Taft's
stay.
ROSEVELT, Washington.      MANILA, January 12, 1903.
ROOSEVELT, Washington.
Filipinos not belonging existing political parties consider Taft unchangeable maintenance moral material peace.
GUERRERO LUNA,
GENERALS MALVAR, LUYBAN.
My friends, the establishment by the American army of
those governments in far distant China and the islands of the
East and West, making for peace and justice and ordered
liberty, are greater achievements than the winning of any




24     MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


stricken field, are just cause for pride to every American
citizen, and are a just title to confidence, respect and gratitude for every officer and soldier of the army of the United
States. For the army of the United States breathes the spirit
of William McKinley. It makes war only that peace and
justice may follow. Behind the gun is the school book. After
the footsteps of American soldiers the harvests spring into
fruition and the sickle reaps in peace and safety. The harsh
lesson of force administered by American soldiers is followed
by the blessed lessons of religion and learning.
But the army of the United States is not merely the little
body of men whom we call the regular establishment. The
army of the United States always has been and always will be
in time of war that greater army, when the whole people of
the United States, putting forth their strength by militia and
volunteer, second the efforts of the regular army. And in
that greater army of the country the regular army performs
the function of a teacher and an organizer. We have a duty
to perform to that greater army. We have a duty to maintain and preserve for them an organizing power in the regular
army of the United States which shall make victory possible.
There is no trouble, and there never will be trouble, in this
country about plenty of brave men to fight. All Americans
are brave, all Americans are ready to fight for their country.
The difficulties of war are met with us not in the raising of
soldiers; they are met in the equipping, the supplying, the
transporting and the organizing of soldiers. And, in order
that this may be done, the organization of the regular army
must be made adequate to the accomplishment of the task.
It is our duty to see, and Congress by wise legislation during
the present session is seeing, that when another war comes
upon us - and it is sure to come however much we may long
for peace - the young men of America shall not for the want
of adequate organization die of disease in camp, perish upon




t,
f^  \ X
THE AMERICAN ARMY                  25 
the march for lack of food and clothes, fall under hostile shot
and shell because misled by incompetent officers; but that
the great volunteer army of the United States in the future
shall have an adequate organization for its medical attendance, its supply of clothing and food and arms, its transportation, its organization, its command.
Already the Congress at the present session has passed a
bill for the organization of the militia which substantially
every administration of this country has endeavored to
secure since 1794, when George Washington sent his first
message to Congress asking for militia legislation. Already
Congress has advanced to the last stage, where it now awaits
action, a bill for the establishment of a general staff which
makes possible adequate organization for the volunteer
armies of the future. Superior intelligence shows itself by
prevision and provision for the future. The people of the
country owe it to the American army that that prevision and
provision shall be given to the organization which will enable
it to accomplish the tasks of the future as it has accomplished the tasks of the past. And I pledge you the faith
of that army that never in all the years of the future will it
depart from the highest standards of American citizenship.
Never will it depart from the lofty ideals and the beneficent
purposes for the blessings of mankind which inspired its
great commander in the recent wars, the beloved friend
whose memory we honor tonight.




lJ




THE UNITED STATES AND THE
PHILIPPINES IN      1900
ADDRESS OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR, AT CANTON, OHIO
OCTOBER 24, 1900
A HEAVY burden of proof rests upon those who ask
the American people to reject the further services of
the Republican administration. Under that administration
the legitimate objects of government have been attained to a
degree which challenges comparison with the happiest periods
in the life of any nation in any age. Never in human history
anywhere on earth have security for life and property; unfettered opportunity for intelligence and energy, individual
freedom, and the self-respect of manhood, attained a higher
level than now marks the condition of this fortunate
Republic.
The material results of wise and successful government are
visible on every hand. We never before have had so many
million people owning their own homes unencumbered, so
many million people with accumulated earnings in savings
banks, such universal employment of labor at such good
wages, such abundant production from farm and factory and
workshop of all material things which meet the necessities
and contribute to the comfort and pleasure of life. The markets for our products are extending over the whole earth.
Abundant home capital is obtainable at lower rates of interest
than were ever known before for the productive enterprise
which employs labor and creates wealth. We are rapidly
paying our debts to Europe for the money borrowed to build
our railroads and develop our country, so that the constant
drain upon our earnings for the payment of interest abroad
27




28    MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


is ceasing; and we are lending money to Europe, so that the
current of annual payments is setting in our direction. There
never was in this world a greater body of people so well fed,
well clothed and well housed.
Above and beyond all these material things are universal
opportunities for education and the general exercise and
training of intelligence. The newspaper, the magazine and
the book find their way into the humblest home. The doors
of our free schools are open to every child, and it is rare
indeed that poverty withholds access. The patriotism of
the rich is devoting millions to the building up of colleges,
technical schools and great universities, in which the poorest
boy can rise to the loftiest heights of learning and intellectual
power. Freedom of thought, freedom of speech and the constant consideration and discussion of political problems are
training and exercising the whole people to a degree of competency for self-government never before equaled. The aristocracy of America is the aristocracy of achievement. It is
with intellectual and moral qualities that our people achieve
fame and fortune. The pathway to the highest distinction is
open to every boy who thumbs his primer in the common
school. Inherited wealth is a hindrance rather than an aid in
the race of life. Call the roll of those whom the nation has
honored - the president and his cabinet, the great judges,
the great senators, the great congressmen, the great governors - call the roll of the men whose great fortunes are the
cause of envy and disparagement, and among them all you
will find that the man who cannot look back upon a youth of
privation and struggle, with no capital but his own energy
and ambition, is the exception. The softening and ennobling
influences of charity and religion find sway in every community. Hospitals and asylums and libraries and schools
and churches grow apace with homes and manufactories,
and the swift response to every appeal of humanity for the




THE PHILIPPINES IN 1900


29


relief of misfortune answers to the quickened activity of
industrial enterprise.
Of course this happy condition has not been created by
government, but without good government it could not have
been created. Without sound governmental policy and wise
and efficient governmental administration, the blessings
we have enumerated would have been impossible. Government does not make crops grow, or weave cloth, or mould
iron; but wise government opens the markets for crops
and for cloth and for iron; and for the want of them you and
I have seen corn burned for fuel in the valley of the Mississippi, cloth unsalable gathering dust in the warehouses of
New England, ores unquarried and furnaces unfired among
the hills of Pennsylvania and Alabama, and the productive
power of millions of American workingmen idle and helpless.
Government does not make enterprise; but wise government
evokes enterprise by the certainty of reward for its activity.
Government does not invest capital; but wise government
gives to capital that confidence in security for its investment
which draws it from the hiding places of distrust and transmutes it into the plant and material out of which labor creates prosperity. Government does not give employment to
labor, but wise government creates the conditions under
which industrial activity employs labor. Prosperity does not
come by chance. History is full of examples of earth's fairest regions nourishing only poverty, misery and degradation,
because of the folly and incompetency or corruption of government. We are not without illustrations in our own land,
of the ruin which can be wrought by unwise government and
the attempts of men in power to apply crude and impracticable theories to the complicated and delicate machinery of
industrial life. Under bad government no fertility of soil,
no thrift or industry of population, can bring prosperity to a
people. Security, opportunity, confidence, activity of trade




30    MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


and labor, are the fruits of good government alone. All
these the American people secured for themselves when in
the election of 1896 they committed the powers of government to the hands of President McKinley and a Republican
Congress.
There is another field in which the decision of 1896 has
justified itself. I am sure no really patriotic American who
loves his country more than he desires office can have failed
to be gratified by a certain competency and effectiveness in
President McKinley's dealings with other powers. No administration during this generation at least has been confronted
with such a succession of difficult undertakings outside
of our own country. There may be just criticism in details,
and there certainly has been much that was unjust; but
what are the results?
In April, 1898, Spain had an army of 400,000 veteran
troops, and a navy which in numbers and armament appeared
and was generally believed to be at least equal to ours. The
whole continent of Europe anticipated that Spain would hold
the land and sweep the seas, blockade our ports, and frustrate
our arms until European intervention should paralyze our
superior ultimate resources. But whose ships were ready
and staunch and sound? Whose ammunition was honest and
effective? Whose soldiers and sailors were trained? Who
swept the seas? Whose flag floats over Santiago and San
Juan and Havana and Manila? Find if you can anywhere
in history so great results secured against so considerable a
foe by force of arms on land and sea in so brief a time, and
with so small a loss of life.
/ The attack of the Tagalog insurgents upon our troops at
Manila, in February, 1899, required the President, under the
authority of Congress, to raise and equip and train an army,
and transport it a third of the way round the world for the
defense of American sovereignty against the force of arms.




THE PHILIPPINES IN 1900


31


When that army arrived in the fall of last year, a Tagalog
sympathizer declared exultingly that we held no more territory in the Philippines than a bicycle rider could circle in a
single day. Within three months the insurgent army and
the insurgent government ceased to exist, and we hold all the
islands which were subject to Spanish rule without opposition, save from fugitive bands, half guerrilla and half bandit,
who are shooting our men from ambush, and blackmailing,
and pillaging, and murdering their own countrymen until
that happy day when their prayers may be answered by the
election of an American president who will yield American
sovereignty to savage force and deliver over the peaceful
and unresisting people of the Philippines and the wealth and
commerce of Manila to their cruel and bloody domination..
When the Democratic convention met at Kansas City in
July last, all Europe believed that dreadful massacre had
swept into oblivion all the ministers and legations of the
civilized world in Peking. The admirals of the European
powers at Taku had agreed upon 60,000 troops as the number
necessary to march to Peking, and they were awaiting the
slow collection of that force from the four quarters of the
globe. London had arranged a memorial service in honor
of her dead. A frightful war of retribution, the destruction
of the dynasty, the removal of all restraint of law over 400,000,000 of people, the partition of China, the destruction of
our markets and our trade seemed inevitable; but American
diplomacy opened the sealed gates of the Tartar City and
revealed to the world the representatives of civilization living,
defending themselves against almost overwhelming hordes,
under constant fire of shot and shell, with ammunition and
food nearly gone, hoping, but almost despairing, for the
relief which never would have come but for American faith
and American persistency. Then American soldiers and
American sailors pressed for rescue, for immediate movement,




32    MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


and 18,000 men made the march and did the work of the
60,000, and Peking fell and the legations were saved and the
world rejoiced. And now, the legations saved, we continually
press for peace and reasonableness and justice. I think we
may safely say that during all this trying time in China not
one act of wrong, or injustice, and not one moment's faltering in the assertion of American rights mars our record.
All this and many other less conspicuous and striking
things done for the benefit and honor of our country have not
happened by chance. High credit, honest expenditure, sound
material, ships in readiness, guns and ammunition effective,
sailors and soldiers well armed, equipped, trained, and disciplined, consistent and effective diplomacy, prompt and decisive action, prosperity and order at home, respect and
honor abroad, are the infallible proofs of a strong, wise, safe,
and honest administration. It is easy to carp and criticise.
It is easy to point to failures of government to reach the ideal
standard of perfection; but as compared with all the governments there are or ever have been in this imperfect and erring
world, the administration now drawing to a close should
awaken the satisfaction and pride of the American people to
whom it renders its account.
And has not our President so borne himself in his great
office that his virtues plead trumpet-tongued? Who shall
estimate the value to American character of having in this
place of highest honor and power this man of blameless life,
of simple and unostentatious piety, whose character is fairly
resplendent with the beauty of pure and unselfish domestic
virtues? How ripe is the wisdom gained from his long experience in faithful and distinguished public service as Congressman, as leader of the House, as Governor and as President.
What a perpetual testimony before all the world of the living
truth of popular government is his ever-anxious devotion
to the people's will - a devotion in which he stands by




THE PHILIPPINES IN 1900


33


Lincoln's side, subject, as was Lincoln, to the sneers of the
thoughtless, but certain, as was Lincoln, to win the ultimate
meed of praise that always waits on loyalty to great ideals.
The logic of events has proved that the American people
were right when they rejected Mr. Bryan and the theories of
his false democracy in 1896. The people are confirmed in
their judgment, and great numbers who honestly believed
that Bryan was right then have come to a clearer vision in the
light of experience and follow him no longer.
Bryan and his associate leaders, who would make up his
administration if he were elected, are not convinced. They
do not accept the verdict of 1896. They intend now, as they
intended then, to put this country on a silver basis by the
free and unlimited coinage of silver at the ratio of sixteen to
one; to sacrifice our national honor and credit, and substitute
in the wages of labor, and the payment of honest debts, the
fifty-cent dollar in place of the dollar worth one hundred
cents the world over, under which all our prosperity has been
attained. They intend now, as they intended then, to destroy
the protective tariff, which they declare to be unconstitutional, and subject our manufacturing industries again to the
fate which befell them under the Wilson tariff. They intend
now, as they intended then, to deprive of power that great
bulwark of constitutional liberty, the federal judiciary. They
seek now, as they sought then, to excite animosities and
foment discord among the people; to deceive by false
promises of the demagogue, and to profit themselves by
creating a warfare of class against class. The issues of 1896
remain open, avowed, insisted upon. They have learned
nothing, and they have abandoned nothing, but they have
despaired of securing from the American people a judgment
upon those issues reversing the decision of 1896, and they
have invented a new issue which they call "imperialism,"
and upon this issue they ask the people to give them the




34     MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


power to do all that the people refused in 1896 to let them do.
" This," says the Kansas City platform, " we regard as the
paramount issue of the campaign." To this Mr. Bryan
practically confined himself in his speech of acceptance.
What is the meaning of paramount issue? What becomes
of other issues when one is paramount? We should naturally
suppose that to treat one particular issue as paramount involved leaving all other questions in abeyance and undetermined, to be taken up and decided at some future time when
the one all-important and burning question has been disposed
of. Is that what Mr. Bryan means? Does he mean to leave
the other issues of his party in abeyance, awaiting future
decision? Does he declare, nay, does he leave the possibility
of inference that his party, if put into power at the coming
election, will not act on the silver question, will not act on
the tariff question, will not act on the judiciary question?
No! He proposes to act, and he will act, if elected, and a
Democratic Congress will act, if elected, to reverse the judgment of 1896 upon every issue then before the people. Imperialism is not paramount enough for him to abandon
anything. It is not paramount for him. It is paramount only
for those who were opposed to him in 1896, and the effect of
its being paramount is merely that the sound money men, the
protective tariff men, the law and order men of 1896 are to
abandon their principles and their convictions, and surrender
upon every issue of the Democratic platform of 1896.
What is this issue which is so important to all Mr. Bryan's
late opponents, and so unimportant to him?
Imperialism! The word has a familiar sound. The cry is
one of the cheapest and most threadbare of the demagogue's
stock, always certain to produce a sensation among a people
alert for the protection of their liberties. Jefferson was
denounced as an imperialist; Lincoln was denounced as an
I'  imperialist; Grant was denounced as an imperialist; and




THE PHILIPPINES IN 1900


35


to all three of these great and liberty-loving men the party
of opposition made the country resound with loud campaign
outcries that they were about to strangle the liberties of the
country by military force, just as they are now clamoring
againt President McKinley. Is there any more in the cry
now than there was in the days of Jefferson, of Lincoln, and
of Grant? Is the character of our institutions really about
to be changed, or are our liberties really in danger? Is the
issue substantial, or is it but the demagogue's cry?
The charge is that President McKinley has been guilty of
something called imperialism, in his treatment of the people
of the Philippine Islands. Something so foreign to the character of our institutions and so dangerous to our liberties
that it requires the American people to ignore the wisdom
and efficiency of his administration at home and abroad in
other respects -to reject now and hereafter the services
which have been so beneficial to them in the past and to put
into power Mr. Bryan and his associates, with full warrant to
accomplish all the purposes they profess, which the majority
of the people believe will be so fatal to the honor, the credit,
and the prosperity of our country.
What has President McKinley done in the Philippines?
On the sixth of February, 1899, the Senate of the United
States approved the treaty of peace with Spain. By the
third article of that treaty, Spain ceded to the United States
the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands; the United
States agreed to pay Spain twenty million dollars; and in the
ninth article the treaty provided that the civil rights and
political status of the native inhabitants of the territory ceded
to the United States should be determined by the Congress.
The examination of Mr. Bryan's charge of imperialism may
commence with this treaty, because it was confirmed by
the Senate in a large measure by Democratic votes, with the
earnest and active support and advocacy of Mr. Bryan.




36     MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


Upon the advisability, the wisdom and validity of that
treaty both the candidates for the presidency, therefore, are
agreed; and in considering the charge made by Mr. Bryan
against President McKinley, we start with the proposition
that the treaty which vested in the United States the sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and committed the rights
and political status of its inhabitants to the determination of
the Congress of the United States was right.
On the fourth of February, two days before the Senate
approved the treaty, an army of Tagalogs, a tribe inhabiting
the central part of Luzon, under the leadership of Aguinaldo,
a Chinese half-breed, attacked, in vastly superior numbers,
our little army in the possession of Manila, and after a desperate and bloody fight, was repulsed in every direction.
The treaty was confirmed by the Senate with the full knowledge of that attack. On the second of March, both Houses
of Congress, by an almost unanimous vote, appropriated
twenty millions of dollars, which the treaty provided to be
paid to Spain on the cession of the Philippines; and on the
same day, in view of this hostile attack, Congress, by a vote
which had the assent and concurrence of the leaders of the
Democratic party in both Houses, authorized the President
to increase the regular army from 27,500 men to 65,000, and
to raise and equip 35,000 volunteers.
What President McKinley has done in the Philippines has
been to defend and assert the sovereignty of the United
States thus acquired with the assent of both parties and of
both candidates for the presidency, with the means thus
placed in his hands by Congress. What is charged against
him is that he did not yield or procure Congress to authorize
him to yield the sovereignty of the United States acquired
by the cession of Spain with the assent of both parties, to
the force of armed Tagalogs whose hands were red with the
blood of American soldiers; place in their hands the govern



THE PHILIPPINES IN 1900


37


ment of the Philippine Islands, lower the American flag upon
the walls of Manila and hurry away with our wounded and
our dead from the bay made glorious by Dewey's victory.
The first specification under the charge is that it was unjust
to the Filipinos not to do this. Of course it was impossible to
do it. Self-respect forbade it, national honor forbade it; the
whole world would have contemned and despised us if we had
done it; the whole country would have risen in indignant protest against any President who dared to do it. But I will pass
all that and treat the question as if it had been possible.
What made it requisite as an act of justice that the government of the Philippines should be placed in the hands of
Aguinaldo and his associates? Was there any promise or
agreement or alliance that required it? No. This Government not only never authorized it, but the President expressly
forbade anything of the kind. Admiral Dewey, who commanded our naval forces, says there was nothing of the kind.
General Anderson and General Merritt, who commanded the
land forces, say there was nothing of the kind. True, our
Democratic friends will not believe them. No length of
honorable career, no splendid record of American citizenship,
in their minds, entitles the American officer to be believed who
testifies in favor of the Administration against Aguinaldo.
Perhaps they will believe a Tagalog witness.
We have in our possession an original document, signed
by Mabini, the president of Aguinaldo's cabinet, his chief
adviser, and the brains of the insurrection. It is a paper of
instructions to a commissioner sent upon a secret mission by
the insurgent government, dated January 4, 1899, and it
reads in part as follows:
The chief of the Philippine people has not made any agreement with
the Government of the United States, but inspired by the same idea of
destroying the sovereignty of Spain in these Islands, they have mutually
assisted each other.




38     MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


Though they believe not Moses and the Prophets, perhaps
they will believe that.
Is there anything in the circumstances of the assistance
which we have received from these men which entitles them
to the reward of the sovereignty of the Philippines? Certainly not. When Dewey destroyed the Spanish fleet and the
city of Manila lay helpless under his guns, waiting only for
our troops to come in and take possession, the rule of Spain
in the Philippines received its death blow. There was no
insurrection then in the Philippine Islands. The sovereignty
and title of Spain stood unquestioned by the people of the
Philippine Islands or by any one else on earth. There had
been an insurrection led by Aguinaldo, but that had been terminated in the previous December by an agreement called
the Treaty of Biac-na-Bato, under which Aguinaldo and his
associates were bought off by the payment of $400,000, and
the promise of $400,000 more on the performance of certain
specified conditions which included their leaving the country.
That insurrection had not been a struggle for independence,
and the people of the Philippine Islands had never in their
history demanded or sought independence from Spain, or the
surrender of Spanish sovereignty. When Aguinaldo and his
associates were brought from China to the Philippines by Admiral Dewey some weeks after the destruction of the Spanish
fleet, they were but a band of adventurers, whose assistance
was availed of as is that of the disaffected inhabitants of any
invaded country, upon no terms, conditions or implied obligations, other than those of reasonable reward for such services as they might render.
To make the situation perfectly clear, let me read to you
from the treaty of Biac-na-Bato, which terminated the insurrection in December, 1897:
1. Don Emilio Aguinaldo in his quality as Supreme Leader of those in
the Island of Luzon now waging open hostilities against their legitimate




THE PHILIPPINES IN 1900


39


government and Don Baldomero Aguinaldo and Don Mariano Llanera,
who also exercise important commands in the forces mentioned, are to
cease their hostile attitude, surrender their arms that they are using
against their fatherland, and are to surrender to the legitimate authorities
claiming their rights as Spanish Filipino citizens which they desire to preserve. As a consequence of this surrender they obligate themselves to
cause the surrender of such individuals as actually follow them and those
who recognize them as leaders and obey their orders.
Let me read from the program formally prepared and
signed for the carrying out of this treaty:
25th December. Departure of Don Emilio Aguinaldo and his companions with Don Pedro A. Paterno and Don Miguel Primo de Rivera for
Lingayan, where the Spanish government will have a merchant steamer to
take them to Hong-Kong, the gentlemen going aboard may take their
revolvers and the two rifles asked for by Don Emilio Aguinaldo. On the
departure of these gentlemen from Biac-na-Bato the Spanish Government
will give, by Don Pedro A. Paterno to Baldemero Aguinaldo, a letter payable to the order of the Spanish-Filipino bank upon some bank in HongKong for the sum of $400,000, the cost of exchange being charged to the
Spanish government....
Nothing can be more preposterous than the proposition
that these men were entitled to receive from us sovereignty
over the entire country which we were invading. As well the
friendly Indians, who have helped us in our Indian wars,
might have claimed the sovereignty of the West. They knew
that we were incurring no such obligation, and they expected
no such reward. Their plan was to obtain from us arms and
ammunition and protection while they collected an army; to
use us to capture Manila, and then to take it from us by force
of arms. In their vainglorious and half-savage estimate of
their powers they believed they could do this. They believed
they could drive us into the sea when the time came; and their
attack upon our troops at Manila on the fourth of February,
1899, was in pursuance of a deliberate purpose and long preparation. Their plan was fully formed before they left China,
and it was with truly Oriental treachery in their hearts




40     MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


that they accepted the hospitality and the assistance of our
navy.
In Hong-Kong on the fourth of May, 1898, four days
after the battle of Manila Bay, a meeting of the band was
held to determine upon going to Manila with Dewey, and
Agoncillo stated the proposition in these words:
There will be no better occasion than the present for the expeditionary
forces to land on those islands and to arm themselves at the expense of the
Americans and assure the attainment of our legitimate aspirations against
those very people.
The Filipino people, unprovided with arms, will be the victims of the
demands and exactions of the United States, but provided with arms will
be able to oppose themselves to them and struggle for their independence,
in which consists the true happiness of the Filipinos.
Agoncillo's proposition was unanimously approved, and
the minutes of the meeting are in our possession, signed by
the conspirators, with Aguinaldo's name at the head. Transported by us to Luzon, furnished with arms and ammunition
by us, they collected and organized an army about the walls
of Manila, of Tagalogs and discharged Spanish soldiers and
all the bandits and pirates of those coasts, until they felt
strong enough to execute their purpose.
On the ninth of January, twenty-seven days before the
treaty was confirmed, Aguinaldo issued his order to prepare
for the attack:
MALALOS, 9th of January, 1899.
Instructions to the Brave Soldiers of Sandatahan of Manila....
Article 2. All of the chiefs and Filipino brothers should be ready and
courageous for the combat and should take advantage of the opportunity
to study well the situation of the American outposts and headquarters.
Observing especially secret places where they can approach and surprise
the enemy.
Article 3. The chief of those who go to attack the barracks should send
in first four men with a good present for the American commander. Immediately after will follow four others who will make a pretense of looking
for the same officer for some reason, and a larger group shall be concealed




THE PHILIPPINES IN 1900
f


41


in the corners or houses in order to aid the other groups at the first signal.
This, wherever it is possible, at the moment of attack.
Article 4. They should not prior to the attack look at the Americans
in a threatening manner. To the contrary, the attack on the barracks
by the Sandatahan should be a complete surprise and made with decision and courage. One should go alone in advance in order to kill the
sentinel...
Article 7. All Filipinos, real defenders of their country, should live on
the alert to assist simultaneously the inside attack at the very moment
that they note the first movement in whatever barrio or suburb, having
assurance that all the troops that surround Manila will proceed without
delay to force the enemy's line and unite themselves with their brothers
in the city....
EMImUO AGUINALDO.
Of course our forces were ignorant then of the order and
of the purpose, but they observed all over Manila Filipinos
packing their goods and gathering their families and quietly
slipping away from the city. They left by the thousands,
and they left because they had notice of the proposed attack.
One notification, signed by Aguinaldo, has fallen into our
hands. It is a letter to a friend in Manila, dated January 7,
1899, four weeks before the attack, and in it he says:
MY DEAR DON BENITO:. I beg you to leave Manila with your family and to come here to
Malolos, but not because I wish to frighten you - I merely wish to warn
you for your satisfaction, although it is not yet the day or the week.
The day was not then, but it came on the fourth of February, when a body of Filipino troops marched under cover
of the night, swiftly and silently, through our lines, regardless of the sentry's challenge, and, when he fired, volleys of
musketry and roar of cannon upon every side commenced the
proposed destruction of our army.
The bodies of our men who fell during that dreadful night
and, the days of conflict which followed, have been brought
back reverently across the Pacific and laid in honored graves
among their countrymen. But, not yet - not yet has the




42    MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


soil stained by their blood been surrendered to their slayers.
Not yet has the treacherous and wicked attack, which they
died to defeat, been turned into victory by the act of an
American president.
But we are told that, irrespective of agreements, irrespective of anything said or done by the Filipino leaders, or by
ourselves, we ought to transfer to them sovereignty over the
Philippine Islands, because government derives its just
powers from the consent of the governed, and our maintenance of sovereignty is a violation of that great principle of
the Declaration of Independence.
Nothing can be more misleading than a principle misapplied. Countless crimes have been committed by men quoting texts of Scripture or maxims of political philosophy
wrested from their true context and meaning. The doctrine
that government derives its just powers from the consent of
the governed was applicable to the conditions for which Jefferson wrote it, and to the people to whom he applied it. It
is true wherever a people exist capable and willing to maintain just government, and to make free, intelligent and efficacious decision as to who shall govern. But Jefferson did not
apply it to Louisiana. He wrote to Gallatin that the people
of Louisiana were as incapable of self-government as children,
and he governed them without their consent. Lincoln did
not apply it to the South, and the great struggle of the Civil
War was a solemn assertion by the American people that
there are other principles of law and liberty which limit the
application of the doctrine of consent. Government does not
depend upon consent. The immutable laws of justice and
humanity require that people shall have government, that
the weak shall be protected, that cruelty and lust shall be
restrained, whether there be consent or not.
When I consider the myriads of human beings who have
lived in subjection to the rule of force, ignorant of any other




THE PHILIPPINES IN 1900


43


lot, knowing life only as the beast of the field knows it, without the seeds of progress, without initiative or capacity to
rise, submissive to injustice and cruelty and perpetual ignorance and brutishness, I cannot believe that, for the external
forces of civilization to replace brutal and oppressive government, with which such a people in ignorance are content, by
ordered liberty and individual freedom and a rule that shall
start and lead them along the path of political and social progress, is a violation of the principle of Jefferson, or false to the
highest dictates of liberty and humanity.
The true question in the Philippines was, whether the withdrawal of the Spanish power which we had destroyed left a
people capable of establishing and maintaining a free constitutional government; whether the humble and peaceable
inhabitants, who constituted the great mass of the population,
were competent to protect themselves; whether the wealth
and commerce of Manila, the merchants from all the nations
of Europe who were gathered there, the producers of hemp
and tobacco and rice, would be protected by a rule of law and
order and justice, or whether, on the other hand, the people,
incapable of governing themselves, would become the subjects of a dictatorship, or the prey of bloody discord. Let
me read you what high authority declares as the universal
lesson of history regarding the people of countries situated as
are these islands, when left to themselves. In a speech on the
annexation of San Domingo, in the Senate of the United
States on the eleventh of January, 1871, my friend Mr.
Schurz, who now charges that it was cruel injustice not to
leave the Filipinos to govern themselves without control or
guidance, said:
Read that history, read that of all other tropical countries, and then
show me a single instance of the successful establishment and peaceable
maintenance, for a respectable period, of republican institutions, based
upon popular self-government, under a tropical sun. To show me one,




44    MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


do not confine your search to the West Indies; look for it anywhere else
on the face of the globe in tropical latitudes. I challenge Senators to point
their fingers to a single one. There is none, sir!...
The tropical sun inflames the imagination to inordinate activity and
develops the government of the passions. The consequences are natural,
and there is a tendency to govern by force instead of by argument; revolutions are of chronic occurrence, like volcanic outbreaks, and you will find
political life continually oscillating between two extremes - liberty, which
there means anarchy, and order, which there means despotism.
The testimony is absolutely overwhelming that the people
inhabiting the Philippine Archipelago are incapable of selfgovernment, and that the fate here described would have befallen these islands of the tropics had American sovereignty
been withdrawn. There is no Philippine people. The hundreds of islands which compose the Archipelago are inhabited
by more than eighty different tribes, speaking more than
sixty different languages. They have no common medium of
communication, and they never had a government except the
arbitrary rule of Spain. Most of them have not the first conception of what self-government means, or the first qualification for its exercise. Many of them have the capacity to
learn, but they have never learned.
The first Philippine Commission said of them:
Should our power by any fatality be withdrawn, the commission believe
that the government of the Philippines would speedily lapse into anarchy,
which would excuse, if it did not necessitate, the intervention of other
powers and the eventual division of the islands among them. Only through
American occupation, therefore, is the idea of a free, self-governing and
united Philippine commonwealth at all conceivable. And the indispensable need, from the Filipino point of view, of maintaining American
sovereignty over the archipelago is recognized by all intelligent Filipinos,
and even by those insurgents who desire an American protectorate. The
latter, it is true, would take the revenues and leave us the responsibilities.
Nevertheless they recognize the indubitable fact that the Filipinos cannot
stand alone. Thus the welfare of the Filipinos coincides with the dictates
of national honor in forbidding our abandonment of the archipelago. We
cannot, from any point of view, escape the responsibilities of government




THE PHILIPPINES IN 1900


45


which our sovereignty entails; and the commission are strongly persuaded
that the performance of our national duty will prove the greatest blessing
to the peoples of the Philippine Islands.
This was the testimony of President Schurman, of Cornell;
of Professor Worcester, of Michigan; of that old-time Democrat, Charles Denby, our former Minister to China, and of
Admiral George Dewey.
The present Philippine Commission say:
A change of policy by turning the islands over to the coterie of Tagalog
politicians will blight their fair prospects of enormous improvement, drive
out capital, make life and property - secular and religious - most insecure, banish by fear of cruel proscription a considerable body of conservative Filipino people, who had aided Americans in well-founded belief that
their people are not now fit for self-government, and reintroduce the same
oppression and corruption which existed in all provinces under the Malolos
insurgent government during the eight months of its control. The result
will be factional strife between jealous leaders, chaos and anarchy, and
will require and justify active intervention of our government or some
other.
This is the testimony of William H. Taft, of Ohio; Luke E.
Wright, of Tennessee; Henry C. Ide, of Vermont; Professor
Bernard Moses, of the University of California, and Professor
Worcester, of Michigan. All of these commissioners were sent
to the Philippine Islands to learn the truth, and to inform
the President and Congress of the United States for the performance of their duty.
The President was not in the Philippine Islands. The
Congress was not in the Philippine Islands. They were
obliged to proceed upon evidence. And find if you can, anywhere in this land, a body of men whose conclusions are more
entitled to credit and constitute a safer basis of official action
than these. The year of Tagalog domination in Luzon was
marked by the worst evils of semi-civilized misgovernment.
The first Philippine Commission said of it:
Throughout the Archipelago at large there was trouble only at those
points to which armed Tagalogs had been sent in considerable numbers.




46     MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


In general, such machinery of " government" as existed served only for
plundering the people under the pretext of levying " war contributions",
while many of the insurgent officials were rapidly accumulating wealth.
The administration of justice was paralyzed and crime of all sorts was
rampant. Might was the only law. Never in the worst days of Spanish
misrule had the people been so overtaxed or so badly governed. In many
provinces there was absolute anarchy, and from all sides came petitions for
protection and help, which we were unable to give.
Pio del Pilar, Aguinaldo's most active general, was the
most notorious bandit in the Philippines. The orders for a
combined attack and rising within the city of Manila on the
fifteenth of February, ten days after the Senate confirmed the
treaty, contained these directions:
First. You will so dispose that at eight o'clock at night the individuals of the territorial militia, at your order, will be found united in all the
streets of San Pedro, armed with their bolos and revolvers and guns and
ammunition if convenient.
Second. Philippine families only will be respected; they should not be
molested, but all other individuals, of whatever race they may be, will be
exterminated without any compassion, after the extermination of the army
of occupation.
Aguinaldo and Luna were rival chieftains. Aguinaldo rose
to supreme power over the body of Luna, stabbed to death
with swords upon Aguinaldo's threshold. The people of
the Philippine Islands never consented to that government.
It was a pure and simple military domination of Tagalogs.
The Visayans distrusted and feared them. The people of the
great island of Negros raised the American flag, repelled the
Tagalog invasion and are living today in contentment under
our government. The tribes of northern Luzon received us
with open arms. The ablest and the best of the Tagalogs,
under the leadership of Arelliano and Torres, repudiated the
government of Aguinaldo, and came into our lines with their
adherence and support. The very congress that Aguinaldo
had gathered at Malolos voted to accept the terms offered by




THE PHILIPPINES IN 1900


47


the first Philippine Commission, but he refused to act upon
their decision. A noble tribute to the Declaration of Independence it would have been indeed to deliver the people of
Negros and the commerce of Manila and the patient and unconsenting millions of all other tribes but the Tagalogs into
the hands of the assassin Aguinaldo, of the bandit del Pilar,
and the authors of the massacre order of February 15, 1899!
The second specification under the charge of imperialism is,
in substance, that the exercise of government must be over
the people of the Philippine Islands as subjects, if not as
citizens, and that this exercise of power over others will be
destructive to our national character and institutions. A
republic cannot have subjects and live, it is said. We have
survived the government of Louisiana and the Northwest
Territory and New Mexico and Alaska, and many other territories in which the people of the United States as a whole
have governed the people of the territory with as much
authority and power as need be exercised in the Philippine
Islands. The true proposition is the precise reverse of the
charge which is made. The government of the Philippine
Islands will not affect the character of our institutions, but
the character of our institutions will determine and mould the
government of the Philippine Islands. To govern as a despot
would be fatal to the character of a republic, but to govern as
Congress always has and always will govern in territory outside of the limits of the States, in accordance with the spirit
of our institutions, subject to all the great rules of liberty and
right, and responsible for every act to a great liberty-loving
people can but extend and strengthen our institutions.
"You are doing what England did when we rebelled
against taxation without representation," says Mr. Bryan.
Strange perversion! It was taxation for the benefit of England against which we rebelled. Where has there been a dollar taken by taxation for the benefit or use of the United




48     MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


States from any island ceded by Spain? There has been no
taxation in the Philippines or in Porto Rico except the ordinary taxes which the people have paid for the support of their
own government, and the expenses of maintaining law and
order and education among themselves.
Let me show you what kind of government exists today in
the Philippine Islands. I read from the instructions of the
President to the present Commission, which entered upon
legislative power in those islands on the first of September,
last:
In all the forms of government and administrative provisions which
they are authorized to prescribe, the Commission should bear in mind that
the government which they are establishing is designed not for our satisfaction, or for the expression of our theoretical views, but for the happiness,
peace and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands, and the
measures adopted should be made to conform to their customs, their
habits, and even their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with the
accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of just and effective
government.
The many different degrees of civilization and varieties of custom and
capacity among the people of the different islands preclude very definite
instruction as to the part which the people shall take in the selection of
their own officers; but these general rules are to be observed: That in all
cases the municipal officers, who administer the local affairs of the people,
are to be selected by the people, and that wherever officers of more extended jurisdiction are to be selected in any way, natives of the islands
are to be preferred, and if they can be found competent and willing to
perform the duties, they are to receive the offices in preference to any
others.
In the constitution of departmental or provincial governments, the
Commission will give especial attention to the existing government of
the island of Negros, constituted, with the approval of the people of that
island, under the order of the military governor of July 22, 1899, and
after verifying, so far as may be practicable, the reports of the successful
working of that government, they will be guided by the experience thus
acquired, so far as it may be applicable to the condition existing in other
portions of the Philippines.
The Central Government of the islands, following the example of the
distribution of the powers between the States and the National Government of the United States, shall have no direct administration except of




THE PHILIPPINES IN 1900


49


matters of purely general concern, and shall have only such supervision
and control over local governments as may be necessary to secure and
enforce faithful and efficient administration by local officers.
Upon every division and branch of the government of the Philippines,
must be imposed these inviolable rules:
That no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law; that private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation; that in all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense; that
excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishment inflicted; that no person shall be put twice in
jeopardy for the same offense, or be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself; that the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; that neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude shall exist except as a punishment for crime; that
no bill of attainder, or ex postfacto law shall be passed; that no law shall
be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press, or the rights of
the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for a
redress of grievances; that no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and that the
free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship without
discrimination or preference shall forever be allowed.
The articles of capitulation of the city of Manila on the 13th day of
August, 1898, concluded with these words:
"This city, its inhabitants, its churches and religious worship, its
educational establishments, and its private property of all descriptions,
are placed under the special safeguard of the faith and honor of the
American army."
I believe that this pledge has been faithfully kept. As high and sacred
an obligation rests upon the Government of the United States to give
protection for property and life, civil and religious freedom, and wise,
firm and unselfish guidance in the paths of peace and prosperity to all the
people of the Philippine Islands. I charge this Commission to labor for
the full performance of this obligation, which concerns the honor and
conscience of their country, in the firm hope that through their labors all
the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands may come to look back with
gratitude to the day when God gave victory to American arms at Manila
and set their land under the sovereignty and the protection of the people
of the United States.




50     MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


Is that imperialism? Will giving that kind of government
to these poor people who have suffered so long under Spanish
tyranny degrade the character of this Republic? No. The
party which governs the city of New York, the party which
governs Mississippi and North Carolina, with their class of
hereditary voters, may distrust its capacity to maintain its
virtue while it governs others, but American love of liberty
and justice will be as living a force in those islands of the sea
as it has been through all the years on the Atlantic and the
lakes and the plains of our own land. The doing of justice
to these wards of our nation, and the leading of their steps
along the pathway of liberty and progress will bring not
injury but the strength and benefit which always come from
unselfish effort for the good of others.
Our opponents will not believe any of the American officers
civil or military, in the Philippine Islands, or all of them put
together, when they tell us that the great mass of the people
in those islands are favorable to American rather than to
Tagalog rule.
Let me give you another bit of testimony from a Tagalog
pen. It is a letter from a Tagalog officer to Sandico, Colonel
and Chief of Staff, Aguinaldo's Secretary of Interior and
chief lieutenant:
My Respected Chief and dear brother:
I have received your respected order, regarding the organization of
the "Comite" in the towns of Zaragosa, Aliaga and Licab; from the
movements and actions of these towns, I don't believe it possible to organize immediately. Before we can, it will be necessary that four or five
lives be taken in each town. I believe that what ought to be done to those
towns is to make a new conquest of them, especially the town of San Juan
de Guimba; it is difficult there to set straight the Tagalos and Ilocanos of
importance, as they are badly inclined and they care to do nothing but
pervert our soldiers. This is what I am able to inform you in fulfillment
of the respected order of the Chief.
God guard you many years,
C. GONZALES.




THE PHILIPPINES IN 1900


51


Four or five lives in each town means that the support of
these people to the Tagalog cause shall be procured through
the terror produced by that number of assassinations. With
that accomplished, Tagalog rule in the provinces of Ilocanos
would forthwith assume those just powers which are derived
from the consent of the governed.
You have been told that the present activity of guerrillas in
the Philippine Islands, who, from their hiding places in the
mountains, ambush and murder our troops and the friendly
natives, is the result, under express and explicit orders from
Aguinaldo, of a desire to maintain a show of resistance, in the
hope of Mr. Bryan's election, and for the purpose of producing an effect upon the people of the United States which will
promote that election. General MacArthur has reported
this. Judge Taft has reported it. General Wright, sturdy
Democrat of Tennessee, has reported it. The whole Philippine Commission have reported it. But, of course, the opposition will not believe them. They are Americans. Let me
give you testimony that even they will not dispute!
GENERAL ORDER TO THE PHILIPPINE ARMY, No. 202
As I have in previous letters directed that all Commanders of Guerrillas
are free to attack any detachment or post of the enemy, and continually
molest the same: I reiterate the order the more strongly, because its fulfillment just now is very necessary for the advantage of the cause of independence of the Philippines in the approaching Presidential election in the
United States of America, which takes place in the early part of the
coming month of September of the present year; on account of which, it
is imperative that before that day comes, that is to say, during the months
of June, July, and August, we give such hard knocks to the Americans
that they will resound in our favor in all parts, and set in motion the fall
of the Imperialist party, which is trying to enslave us.
Date, 27th of June, 1900.
Signed by the Captain-General,
E. AGUINALDO.
Under that order, and others like it, the guerrillas of the
Philippines killed on the fourth of September, Private David




52     MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


Allen, bricklayer, of Tyrone, Pennsylvania; on the thirteenth
of September, Private William Andrews, painter, of Atlanta,
Georgia; on the twenty-first of July, Corporal Warren Billman, farmer, of New Marion, Indiana; on the nineteenth of
July, Sergeant Albert Cockayne, steam-fitter, of Milwaukee,
Wisconsin; on the twenty-fourth of August, Private William
Christman, machinist, of Hartford, Connecticut; and down
to the fifteenth of October eighty-four others - eighty-nine
officers and men, and they grievously wounded many more 
all without purpose or reason or expectation of benefit, except
the hopes held out to them by the Kansas City platform and
the belief that it was important to Mr. Bryan's cause that
America should seem unsuccessful in the Philippines.
How truly these murdered countrymen of ours could have
echoed Lawton's words:
I would to God that the truth of this whole Philippine situation could
be known to every one in America as I know it.
If the real history, inspirations and conditions of this insurrection, and
the influences, local and external, that now encourage the enemy, as well as
the actual possibilities of these islands and peoples and their relations to
this great East, could be understood at home, we would hear no more talk
of unjust "shooting of government" into the Filipinos, or of hauling
down our flag in the Philippines.
If the so-called anti-imperialists would honestly ascertain the truth on
the ground and not in distant America, they, whom I believe to be honest
men and misinformed, would be convinced of the error of their statements
and conclusions and of the unfortunate effect of their publications here.
If I am shot by a Filipino bullet, it might as well come from one of
my own men, because I know from observations coufirmed by captured
prisoners that the continuance of fighting is chiefly due to reports that
are sent out from America.
I will not say that the men here who are encouraging the
Filipino soldiers are traitors to their country. I do not
think they know what it is they do. But I will say, and
I think with justice, that the men who are reviling and
belittling America here, and the men who are shooting from




THE PHILIPPINES IN 1900


53


ambush there, are allies in the same cause, and both are enemies to the interests and credit of our country.
In the place of the old motto "My country, right or
wrong," we are told that we should adopt that other motto,
" My country when right, and when wrong to be put right."
But who is to be judge as between you and your country? Is
it the full measure of patriotic citizenship to be for your country when it agrees with you, and against it when it does not?
I cannot so estimate the impulses of loyalty. In the great
tribunal of public opinion I shall strive always to bring my
countrymen to the adoption of my views, but if their judgment, differing from mine, becomes the basis of national
action and the cause of national conflict, I can find no satisfaction in the triumph of my country's foe; neither logic nor
pride of opinion will soften the pain with which I greet the
death of its defenders; with all my heart and soul and hopes
and prayers I am always for my country and its victory; and
in no other spirit do I see aught but discord, the dissolution
of allegiance and the death of loyalty.
It is said that we have not acted fairly towards the people
of Porto Rico. The charge has no foundation, unless in ignorance, or malice. We have given to the people of Porto Rico
the most munificent gift ever conferred upon one people by
another - the free markets of the United States. The President recommended that the customs duties between the
United States and Porto Rico should be removed, and Congress passed a law providing for their removal. It provided
for the immediate removal of eighty-five per cent of the duties
under the Dingley Tariff, and for the removal of the remaining fifteen per cent whenever the people of Porto Rico should
be able by any other form of taxation to pay for the support
of their own government, with the proviso that at the end of
two years this remnant of duties should cease absolutely,
whether the Porto Ricans supported their own government




54     MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


or not. We receive none of the duties. The duties collected at
both ends of the line are paid into the treasury of the island.
I know of no reason why the Porto Ricans should not pay for
their own courts and schools and police. It is much better
for them than to be treated as paupers. They do not complain of it! They would have no right to complain of it! The
reason why this temporary provision for the payment of their
expenses is made is that they have no reasonable and fair tax
laws, and it is necessary to devise new and fair laws in the
place of the oppressive and unreasonable old Spanish laws
which were in existence. It takes time to change a system of
taxation! It affects every industry and every interest in the
country! Time had to be taken for the people of Porto Rico
to be heard upon the kind and the amounts of taxation to be
levied upon the different classes of property and of industry
in their island. We have got the best men we could find in
the country there, helping them to devise a good tax law; and
when it has been devised and adopted by their legislature,
which will be elected next month, then it will take more time
to impose the taxes and realize money upon them. In the
meantime this temporary fifteen per cent of the Dingley
duties supplies them the means of supporting their government.
Mr. Bryan says that trusts have grown to an unprecedented degree during the present administration. Yes, the
great industrial enterprises which are opening the whole
world to American markets, which are sending nearly five
hundred million dollars' worth of American manufactures
abroad during this year, to pay the wages and swell the
savings bank accounts of American laborers, have grown
beyond precedent. Some of them are monopolies and ought
to be suppressed. Most of them have no element of monopoly whatever except that which comes from selling cheaper
than other competitors, and that is not monopoly but com



THE PHILIPPINES IN 1900


55


petition. Most of them are conducting the business which is
free to any one on earth who has the intelligence and the skill
to conduct a manufactory. Would he destroy them all?
Would he close all the furnaces and all the factories and all
the mines because he sees no difference between those enterprises which are, and those which are not monopolies, or
would he consent that some one should sit down and scrutinize the different enterprises and ascertain which are good
and which are bad and attack only the bad? He has been
trying to turn what he calls "the starch trust" out of
Nebraska. There can no more be a monopoly in the manufacture of starch than there can be a monopoly in the consumption of corn. Nobody can make starch who does not
know how, and any one can make starch who knows how
and can get corn to make it with. The trouble with Mr.
Bryan's treatment of trusts is that he treats them not as a
matter of business, but as a matter of politics; and he thinks
that a general and indiscriminate denunciation of these great
industrial enterprises which are employing the labor and
increasing the wealth of America is a good campaign cry.
He has proposed two remedies for trusts; one is an amendment to the Constitution of the United States placing the
control of them in the Federal Government; the other is a
law forbidding any business concern manufacturing in one
state from selling or transacting any business connected
therewith in another state without a license from authorities
in Washington. Shade of Jefferson! What doctrines are
these to be preached in thy name? This is " imperialism "
indeed. This would concentrate in the government at Washington entire and absolute control over every business interest in the country, for no business above the dignity of the
retail store is confined within the limits of any state. The
summary judgment of the officer who must issue or withhold
the license would constitute a power for favoritism and




56     MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


oppression appalling to contemplate. Such destruction of
state rights, such centering of power in the Federal Government, has never before been suggested. Coming from the
Democratic party it is grotesque and absurd. No party will
ever seriously consider it. It is but the crude and inconsiderate suggestion of a campaign orator designed for oratorical
uses only.
It is charged that the present administration is in favor of
increasing the regular army, and this is said to be militarism,
a crime that endangers the liberty of the Republic. It is said
that the President, in his message to Congress in the fall of
1898, asked that the number be fixed at one hundred thousand men. That was a reduction, not an increase. On
the first of September, 1898, we had 272,000 soldiers under
arms - 56,000 regulars and 216,000 volunteers. When the
President's message was sent to Congress the protocol had
been signed, but the treaty had not been signed, peace had
not been made, Spain had not evacuated Cuba, a hostile
army surrounded our troops in Manila. It would have been
folly to disband our army as the preliminary to negotiations,
and the President could have retained that entire army until
after the ratification of the treaty of peace in April, 1899.
But the volunteers were anxious to return to their homes,
and insistent upon being permitted to do so, and what the
President asked of Congress was to authorize the enlistment
of 44,000 in the regular army to take the place of 216,000
volunteers discharged; that his request was not unreasonable
is shown by the fact that Congress at that very session, by
the votes of both parties, authorized an army of the precise
number for which the President called, making it 65,000
regulars and 35,000 new volunteers.
What is the regular army of the United States? It is a
body of American citizens provided for by the Constitution,
and organized in the year 1789 under the first presidency of




THE PHILIPPINES IN 1900


57


George Washington. Its duty is to man the sea-coast fortifications, which protect our harbors and great cities against
hostile attack, and to garrison the military posts along our
frontiers, and at such strategic points in the country as Congress determines to be suitable; to be ready always to fight
for our country in any sudden emergency which may come
upon us before there is time to raise a volunteer force, and
during the time while such a force is being raised; constantly
to study, experiment upon, and exercise with all the improvements in military science, - in arms, ammunition,
equipment, supplies, sanitation, transportation, drill, and
tactics; to furnish a nucleus of officers thoroughly
familiar with the business, for the strengthening and more
ready instruction of a volunteer army whenever that shall
become necessary. The kind of emergency which the regular
army has to meet is well illustrated by recent events in China.
Far from us as China is, our troops were sent there and did
their business, and are coming away again, in less time than it
would have taken to raise and equip and prepare a single
regiment of volunteers. This was because the troops and
the transports and material were ready to move on the
instant.
The authorized number of the regular army today is 65,000, but on the thirtieth of June next it will, unless there be
further legislation in the meantime, be reduced to 27,500,
substantially the number at which it has stood for the past
twenty-seven years; but as the country has grown in its
population and its multitude of interests; as our sea-coast
fortifications have been increased, under the leadership of
Samuel J. Tilden, and upon plans prepared by the first administration of Cleveland; as the art of war has become more
scientific and complicated, more men are necessary to perform the same duties than were needed to perform them years
ago. The army of 27,500 is only about one-third as large in




58     MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


proportion to our population as our army was thirty years
ago. The question how large the army should be is a simple
business question as to how many men are necessary to perform certain specific duties. The last Congress fixed upon
100,000 in view of the conditions then existing. The next
session of Congress will probably determine how many are
requisite under the conditions then existing. Specially belligerent people will probably ask for too many; specially
economical Congressmen will probably insist upon too few.
I think we can assume that about the right conclusion will
be reached.
Now does any sane American honestly believe that this
threatens the liberties or the institutions of our country?
Why, President McKinley had 272,000 men in arms at the
close of the Spanish War. Grant had an army of 1,052,000
on the thirtieth of April, 1865, and they melted away into the
peaceable body of the people like snowflakes in May. But
these are volunteers, it will be said. Well, all the soldiers of
the regular army are volunteers. Never in the history of the
army has there been a man drafted or forced into it against
his will. Their term of enlistment is but three years, and at
the end of that time they go back to the occupations of civil
life. They are all Americans. They are intelligent Americans. None are admitted who cannot read and write. They
are sound, wholesome Americans, of good habits and regular
lives, for none are admitted who are not in perfect health.
Nineteen thousand five hundred and forty-nine men were
enlisted in the year ending the thirtieth of last June, to take
the place of those whose terms had expired, and those 19,549
were selected out of 89,243 applicants - 19,549 accepted and
69,694 rejected as not up to the standard intellectually or
physically. They all swear allegiance, not to a monarch or a
president, but to the United States of America. They, like
the volunteer, come from American homes. The flag of their




THE PHILIPPINES IN 1900


59


country floats always over them. They are surrounded by
the memories and the traditions of comrades who have died
for it. They breathe the atmosphere of probity and selfrespect; for I call you all to witness that wherever in all its
history the American army has gone, whether in the States
or the Territories, whether in Mexico or Cuba, or Porto Rico,
or the Philippines or China, there the American people have
relied with confidence and with reason upon an administration, both military and civil, marked by integrity and honor.
Our soldiers are conspicuous in the arts of peace. Where they
go, law and order and justice and charity and education and
religion follow. They are not only enduring under hardship
and brave in danger, but they are patient under provocation
and magnanimous after victory. During these last years in
the Spanish islands they have been administering the civil
law with justice and moderation. They have been feeding
the hungry and clothing the naked and protecting the weak
and cleaning the foul cities and establishing hospitals and
organizing and opening schools and building roads and
encouraging commerce and teaching people how to take the
first step in self-government, with cheerful industry and zeal.
I challenge their detractors to say whether, in any community
where they have been, in all the years of the regular army,
the officers and men have not always borne themselves as
simple, unassuming, unpretentious American citizens. I challenge them to point to a single act of oppression, in all these
one hundred and eleven years, to a single act of disloyalty,
on the part of the regular army, to the supremacy of civil law
and the principles of our free constitutional government.
" I believe," says Mr. Bryan, at New York, " that one of
the reasons that they want a large army is to build a fort in
this city and use the army to suppress by force that discontent that ought to be cured by legislation." What warrant
has he for that belief? When or by whom has such a thing




60    MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


been attempted? Does he not know that it is expressly forbidden by the statutes of the United States? Does he not
know that there is a constant effort on the part of the War
Department to prevent establishing army posts and a constant pressure by the people of our cities to secure their
establishment? Let him undertake to secure the removal of
Fort Crook from the city of Omaha and see what response he
would receive from its people. Let him ask why Iowa, just
eastward of him, obtained the passage of a bill by Congress
at the last session for the establishment of a post at Des
Moines. Let him inquire why Tacoma and Seattle are contending as to which city shall have the establishment of a new
post now; why the people of Prescott, Arizona, are protesting
against the removal of Fort Whipple; why the representatives of Texas are urging the increase of the garrison at Fort
Sam Houston; why the people of Atlanta are sending delegations to secure headquarters there; and he will learn that
the people of the United States, instead of fearing, desire the
establishment of army posts in their neighborhoods because
they know that this pretended apprehension is but the idle
vaporing of a campaign orator.
" The growing practice of using the army to repress labor,"
says Mr. Bryan. When and where has the army been used
to repress labor? Never anywhere. Twice only in the past
twenty years it has been used in any domestic affair. Once
in 1896 when a Democratic President, Mr. Cleveland, sent
troops to Chicago to protect the mails, and again in 1899,
when, upon a formal requisition by the Democratic Governor
of Idaho, certifying in accordance with the Constitution and
the laws, that insurrection existed which the state authorities were unable to repress, the President, in the performance
of his constitutional duty, sent 653 officers and men into the
Coeur d'Alene district to aid the civil officers of the state in
protecting life and property.




THE PHILIPPINES IN 1900


61


" Soldiers are idlers," says Mr. Bryan. The records of the
Department show that since the organization of the regular army it has fought 2,545 separate engagements. In
the War of 1812, in the Mexican War, in the Civil War, in
the Indian Wars, in the Spanish War, in the Philippine War,
it has endured hardships and privations and wounds and
death. It has been the safeguard and protection of the settlers as they spread out over the West. Its men have fainted
under the torrid heats of summer, and frozen under the bitter
cold of winter, and nowhere have they faltered or been faithless to their trust. It has given to the country Grant and
Sherman and Sheridan and Thomas and Meade and Hancock. It has given to our later memories Lawton and Liscum
and Riley. It did not idle in Mexico. It did not idle when the
Union was threatened. It never idled on the plains when
the frontier settlements were to be rescued from savage foes.
There was no idleness at San Juan and El Caney. There was
no idleness in Lawton's swift, resistless march that broke the
power of Tagalog rule in Luzon. Did Liscum idle before the
walls of Tien-tsin? Did Riley upon the walls of Peking?
The women of the legations did not deem Chaffee and his
battalions idle when they wept over their children in the joy
of rescue. Real soldiers who have learned their business and
attend to it, in peace and in war, work hard, work long, work
early and work late.
Upon the indisputable proof of more than a century's faithful service, the American soldier is not a danger to liberty
and law and peace, but their defender. He has earned honor
and confidence and gratitude from the American people, and
I challenge the just judgment of the people as between him
and the men who, for their own selfish purpose, are aspersing
and maligning him while in distant lands he is braving hardship and disease and wounds and death in defense of our
country's flag.




62     MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


Are our opponents sincere? Is Mr. Bryan, who four years
ago made his campaign upon the money issue and talked of
nothing but money, and so eloquently bewailed the empty
dinner pail, really sincere in pronouncing the full dinner pail
to be a sordid issue? Is the party which is governing and
avows its intention still to govern ten millions of black citizens in the South, without their consent, whether by law or
fraud or force, really disturbed about imperialism and the
Declaration of Independence? Was that distinguished company which gathered in the Louis XIV room of the Hoffman
House and ate their twenty-dollar dinner, with Mayor Van
Wyck, of the Ice Trust, as presiding officer, and Richard
Croker, of the Ice Trust, as presiding genius, and Chairman
of the Democratic National Committee Jones, of the Cotton
Bale Trust, as the director of the campaign - were they
really solicitous about the evils of trusts and agonizing for
the delivery of their countrymen from their effects?
What evidence have these men given of capacity to
govern? What warrant have we but their own promises that
the men who would constitute the next administration, if the
change be made, are competent to perform the great and
difficult duties of government? What proof has their chosen
leader ever given of capacity in public affairs? He has eloquently expounded many theories. Has any theory of his
which has come to the test ever proved to be right? He eloquently denounced a protective tariff. Was he right? He
eloquently declared that if the mints were not immediately
opened to the free and unlimited coinage of silver, ruin and
desolation would be the fate of America during the four years
now closing. Was he right? During all their history, the
American people have selected for their presidents men of
tried and proved public service, whose capacity for safe, conservative and experienced administration had been demonstrated to the knowledge of all the people. Now they are




THE PHILIPPINES IN 1900


63


asked to put the reins of government and all the vast interests
upon which our happiness depends, in the hands of a man
who never did anything but talk, and never was right in anything that he said.
When, during all the years that Mr. Bryan has been a
leader of opinion, has he lifted a hand to aid his country in
any one of the hard tasks with which it has been grappling?
When has there been one word of praise or credit for America
or American institutions, or American government, or for any
of the men who represent the dignity of the people by the
people's choice? When has there been from him aught but
depreciation and disparagement and discredit for everything
that is, and everything that is done in our country? When
has there come from him one word of encouragement or hope,
one word to cheer the path of labor, to fire the ambition of
youth, to confirm or to increase the American people's confidence in their institutions and loyalty to their flag?
Every business is best managed by its friends, every undertaking is best prosecuted by those who have faith in it. Is it
not the wisest course of the American people to leave the conduct of their affairs in the hands of those who believe that
this is not the worst, but the best government on earth; that
ours is not the most miserable, but the most happy of lands;
that we have before us not the darkest, but the most brilliant
and glorious future of all the peoples who inhabit the earth?
To whom are the American people expected to commit the
momentous interests which they are asked to take away from
President McKinley, but to a motley and incongruous crowd
gathered from three parties, agreeing upon no single principle
or policy except the free coinage of silver, and held together
only for campaign purposes, by sympathy of common detraction against all the glorious achievements of American progress under both political parties during the past generation?
They are peddlers of political discontent who, with shifty




64    MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


eyes for the prejudices of each community, draw from their
pack, anti-trust arguments for expansionists, anti-expansion
arguments for sound money men, and anti-gold arguments
for silver men; always everywhere seeking to stir up bitterness and hatred by Americans against Americans. They
seek to substitute for the old and happily-ended conflict of
section against section, a new conflict of class against class.
They strike at the root of free government, with the delusive
promises of the demagogue, leading the poor and the unfortunate to look to government rather than to intelligence and
thrift to make them rich and strong. They strike at the life
of enterprise by challenging the right of the successful to the
fruits of enterprise. The strength of free institutions in
America has rested for all these centuries past upon the fact
that there were no classes in America; that all men were
equal before the law - equal in the rights of citizenship,
equal in the dignity of manhood, unfettered in the pursuit of
limitless opportunity; that the poor and humble today, having the qualities of intelligence and enterprise, are the rich
and powerful tomorrow; that the rich and powerful today,
lacking these qualities, are the poor and humble tomorrow;
that all over the land the poorest workingmen who may no
longer seek to change their own condition are looking with
pride and hope upon their boys starting out upon their careers
with advantages their fathers never had, with open pathways
to distinction and wealth. With these conditions, which
have always existed, and which exist today, there is no such
thing as class. No gulf divides American citizens from each
other. There is but one ideal, one title of honor, of pride and
of mutual respect - the ideal and the title of American citizenship. All this these men would destroy in order that they
may ride into power as the governors of an unhappy and
discordant people.




AMERICAN POLICIES IN THE
PHILIPPINES IN 1902
ADDRESS OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR AT PEORIA, ILLINOIS
SEPTEMBER 24, 1902
O   NCE before, and only once, I have visited the city of
Peoria. It was on that day, in the autumn of 1899, when
the stately and beautiful monument to the soldiers of the
Civil War, which adorns your public square, was unveiled. It
was a day of festivity and rejoicing. All business and controversy and selfish care had been laid aside, and from all the
town and all the country round the people had gathered to
look upon the face and listen to the voice of their beloved
President, William McKinley. As his sweet and vibrant tones
carried his words to the very limits of the great throng, every
sentence was an impulse to patriotism. Every wave of responsive sympathy lifted the people up to higher planes of
citizenship and of manhood. Not merely what he said but
what he was, the intimate relation of the listener to the man
himself, for the moment ennobled every heart and forever
left it better than it was before. His character was so pure,
so unselfish, so free from uncharitableness and malice; his
sympathies were so broad and genuine; his love of country
and of humanity were so sincere; his sensitive regard for the
feelings and desire for the happiness of others were so considerate; the native dignity and grace which fitted his high
office were so charming, that the interests of political opposition and the rancor of partisan prejudice insensibly lost the
wish to assail him; and even while he lived antagonism to
the party leader merged into affection and honor for the man.
His wisdom, his tenacity of purpose, his quiet and unostentatious strength, the sagacity and skill of his sympathetic
65




66    MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


control and leadership over men, made his nobility of character an active force for justice and peace and righteousness.
Men may find, or think they find, error in his judgments.
Men may differ as to the wisdom of his policies; but that his
judgments were formed in sincerity as he saw the right, that
his policies were the outcome of strong desire for the peace
and happiness and honor of his country and of his race, and
that he worked them out, so long as he lived, along the lines
of justice and of humanity, no one who knew him as we knew
him, will ever doubt.
His memory lives. The powerful impress of his noble character persists. The lofty purpose with which he undertook
the responsibilities and the duties which the fortunes of war
cast upon the American government is still the guide of
action for his party and his country. The first words spoken
by his successor, when taking the oath of office at Buffalo
were: "It is my purpose to continue absolutely unbroken
the policy of President McKinley for the peace, prosperity
and honor of our beloved country." I challenge judgment
upon the truth and loyalty with which Theodore Roosevelt
has redeemed his promise. The murderer's bullet robbed us
of a friend; it did not produce a revolution. It changed
rulers; it did not change policies. The great party which was
in power has continued the same, and its policies have continued. President Roosevelt has followed them not merely
because he promised but because he approved. If he had not
approved he could not have promised, for there is no shadow
of deceitfulness in him. With loyalty and resolution, with
the vigor of his intense convictions, and with the honesty,
frankness and courage for which the American people love
him, he has continued the work McKinley began and pressed
forward the performance of the great duties which they both
believed the welfare of their country and of mankind imposed
upon the Government of the United States.




POLICIES IN THE PHILIPPINES IN 1902


67


The American people are now called upon to consider
whether they wish to withdraw their support from the
policy of McKinley and of Roosevelt and elect a House of
Representatives which will oppose and, by a hostile majority, frustrate and prevent all further effective action by the
President.
Of course such action as that would result in an ineffective
government. A government half Republican and half Democratic can never be a government of progress or of affirmative action. It cannot deal with difficulties or accomplish
beneficent results. If the honor and welfare of the country
demand that things be done, that constructive statesmanship accomplish results, such a divided government would
fail. That may be no reason why the people should not
change the majority in the House for sufficient cause, but it is
a reason why it should not be done lightly, thoughtlessly, and
for the mere sake of change. Grave disapproval and loss of
confidence only could justify the people in thus dividing their
government against itself.
What has the Republican administration of the country
done, or failed to do, to call down upon it such a disapproval
and loss of confidence?
The principal, indeed almost the sole attack by the representatives of the Democratic party, which occupied the
greater part of the last session of Congress, was violent denunciation of the Administration's policy in the Philippines,
and of the execution of that policy. A crowd of difficulties
to be dealt with by the Administration had accompanied the
war with Spain. A large army had been raised, the national
debt had been increased by the borrowing of $200,000,000,
burdensome war taxes had been imposed. In the islands
yielded or ceded by Spain, millions of men of alien races,
differing in language, in laws, in customs, in traditions, in
prejudices, in ways of thinking, most of them ignorant,




68    MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


most of them suspicious, many of them unfriendly, were to
be pacified and reconciled and governed and taught selfgovernment. New experiments in government were to be
tried. There were no precedents, and precedents were to
be made. There was no governmental machinery, and governmental machinery was to be constructed. The principles
of American liberty were to be applied to new and strange
conditions among peoples who hardly knew the alphabet of
freedom.
By the spring of 1902 the Republican Administration had
dealt with all these difficulties, and as to all but one had
reached a point where the success of a wise policy and effective administration could not be gainsaid.
The army of 270,000 men had been disbanded, and the
regular force had been reduced to two-thirds of the permanent number allowed by law to safeguard the country against
future attacks. The war taxes had been repealed, and the industry and property of the country had been relieved of their
burden. The process of again reducing the national debt had
progressed so far that, through payment and refunding, after
paying all the expense of the war in Cuba and in the Philippines, the annual interest charge upon the debt was less by
$6,844,431.70 than it was at the opening of the war with
Spain.
Plain duty had been done by Porto Rico, and done with
such judgment and discretion that a new system of taxation,
suited to her conditions, was studied out in detail, put in
force, and made productive, taking the place of the customs
duties upon which she had relied, without a break or
embarrassment in the financial affairs of her government.
American currency had replaced the Spanish pesos, civil government had been established upon just and firm foundations, the laws which protect individual liberty had been
planted in that unfamiliar soil, the judicial procedure which




POLICIES IN THE PHILIPPINES IN 1902


69


protects the innocent had been substituted for arbitrary
power, the writ of habeas corpus, the great writ of personal
freedom, had supplanted the incommunicado. The storm of
detraction and abuse which raged around the Administration
in the spring of 1900 had died away and disappeared upon the
demonstration of the wisdom of the Republican Porto Rican
policy, and before the spectacle of a prosperous and happy
people, governed by the harmonious action of their own
elected legislative assembly and of the officers appointed by
the President of the United States.
The work of pacification and construction in Cuba had
been completed. Military government there had faithfully
given effect to the humane purposes of the American people.
With sincere kindness our officers had helped the Cuban
people to take the steps necessary to the establishment of
their own constitutional government. During the time required for that process they had governed Cuba wisely and
justly; had honestly collected and expended for the interest
of the people the revenues, amounting to nearly sixty millions
of dollars; had executed thorough sanitary measures, improving the health and lowering the death rate. By patient,
scientific research, they had ascertained the causes of yellow
fever, and by good administration had put an end to that
most dreadful disease which had long destroyed the lives and
hindered the commercial prosperity of the Cubans; they had
expedited justice and secured protection for the rights of the
innocent, while they had cleansed the prisons and created
healthful conditions for the punishment of the guilty; they
had provided adequate hospitals and asylums for the care
of the unfortunate; they had established a general system of
free common schools throughout the island, in which over
two hundred thousand children were in actual attendance;
they had constructed great and necessary public works; they
had trained the Cubans themselves in all branches of admin



70    MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


istration so that the new government, upon assuming power,
had begun its work with an experienced force of Cuban civil
service employees competent to execute its orders; they had
borne themselves with dignity and self-control, so that nearly
four years of military occupation had passed unmarred by
injury or insult to man or woman; they had transferred the
government of Cuba to the Cuban people amid universal
expressions of friendship and good will, and had left a record
of justice and liberty, of rapid improvement in material and
moral conditions, and of progress in the art of government,
which brought honor from all the world to the people of the
United States.
Of all the executive problems following in the train of the
Spanish War, the problem of the Philippines alone remained.
Success there had not then been demonstrated, and it was still
possible that failure there might lead the American people
to withdraw power from Republican hands. Accordingly the
Philippine policy of the Administration was attacked. I ask
the people of the United States to consider the record made
by the Democratic party in that attack.
The policy was simple. Spain, which for more than three
centuries before Dewey's victory had exercised undisputed
sovereignty over the Philippine Islands, ceded the islands
with all her title and sovereignty there to the United States,
by the treaty of peace which was signed at Paris on the tenth
of December, 1898, and was confirmed by the Senate of the
United States on the sixth of February, 1899. The cession
was one of the terms of peace, and was upon a special consideration of $20,000,000 to be paid to Spain by the United
States. Upon the ratification of the treaty and the payment
of that money, sovereignty over the Philippine Islands vested
in the United States; the territory of the islands became the
territory of the United States; the public lands belonging to
Spain in the islands became the property of the United




POLICIES IN THE PHILIPPINES IN 1902


71


States; all the rights and all the obligations towards the other
nations of the world which pertained to sovereignty over
the Philippine Islands devolved upon the United States.
The Supreme Court of the United States has declared this
without difference of opinion.
For a long time before the ratification of the treaty, the
army of the United States had been in possession of the city
of Manila, and on the fourth of February, two days before the
ratification, a body of insurgents, under the Tagalog chieftain Aguinaldo, attacked our forces in that city, and were
driven back with heavy loss, and with the loss of 260 of
our own soldiers, killed and wounded. Then the two armies
rested, facing each other in long lines surrounding the city of
Manila. Under these circumstances, and with a full knowledge of these facts, the treaty under which we acquired the
Philippines and paid $20,000,000 for them was ratified by
two-thirds vote of the Senate. The vote was not a party
vote. Some Republicans voted against the treaty. Many
leading Democrats of the Senate voted in its favor. Mr.
Bryan, the great Democratic leader of the day, was urgently
in favor of the ratification. Subsequently the $20,000,000 to
pay for the islands was appropriated without a party division
by an overwhelming vote of both Houses; and on the second
of March Congress, again without a party division, authorized the increase of the regular army from 27,000 to 65,000,
and the raising of 35,000 volunteers for service in the Philippine Islands, where active fighting had been resumed. The
policy of the Republican administration has been to maintain the sovereignty thus acquired; to put down the insurrection against that sovereignty by the use of the means thus
furnished by the people of the United States without regard
to party; and then to give to the people of the Islands all the
blessings of civil and religious liberty, of just and equal laws,
of good and honest administration, of education, of individual




72   MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


freedom, of social order, and of self-government just so far as
they were competent to govern themselves.
President McKinley declared that policy in his message of
that year in these words:
Until Congress shall have made known the formal expression of its will
I shall use the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the statutes
to uphold the sovereignty of the United States in those distant islands as
in all other places where our flag rightfully floats. I shall put at the disposal of the Army and Navy all the means which the liberality of Congress
and the people have provided to cause this unprovoked and wasteful insurrection to cease. If any orders of mine were required to insure the
merciful conduct of military and naval operations, they would not be
lacking; but every step of the progress of our troops has been marked by
a humanity which has surprised even the misguided insurgents. The
truest kindness to them will be a swift and effective defeat of their present
leader. The hour of victory will be the hour of clemency and reconstruction.
No effort will be spared to build up the waste places desolated by war
and by long years of misgovernment. We shall not wait for the end of
strife to begin the beneficent work. We shall continue, as we have begun,
to open the schools and the churches, to set the courts in operation, to
foster industry and trade and agriculture, and in every way in our power
to make these people whom Providence has brought within our jurisdiction feel that it is their liberty and not our power, their welfare and
not our gain, we are seeking to enhance. Our flag has never waved over
any community but in blessing. I believe the Filipinos will soon recognize
the fact that it has not lost its gift of benediction in its world-wide journey
to their shores.
The Civil Commission, of which President Schurman was
the head, after studying the subject on the ground, in the
Philippines, declared their conclusions in these words:
Deplorable as war is, the one in which we are now engaged was unavoidable by us. We were attacked by a bold, adventurous, and enthusiastic army. No alternative was left to us except ignominious retreat. It
is not to be conceived of that any American would have sanctioned the
surrender of Manila to the insurgents. Our obligations to other nations
and to the friendly Filipinos and to ourselves and our flag demanded that
force should be met by force. Whatever the future of the Philippines may
be, there is no course open to us now except the prosecution of the war
until the insurgents are reduced to submission. The Commission is of the




POLICIES IN THE PHILIPPINES IN 1902


opinion that there has been no time since the destruction of the Spanish
squadron by Admiral Dewey when it was possible to withdraw our forces
from the islands either with honor to ourselves or with safety to the
inhabitants.
In those early months of 1899, when the course of our Government towards the insurrection had to be determined, there
was no difference of opinion between the two parties as to the
duty of the administration. The Democratic equally with
the Republican press throughout the country demanded that
this policy be followed.
Said the Atlanta Constitution of February 6, 1899:
In the light of the thrilling news from Manila, there now remains but
one course for the American Government to pursue, and that is to conquer
the forces of Aguinaldo. In our own way and in our own time we can
deal with the question of local government in the Philippines, but as long
as an armed foe stands in the way the only work ahead of us will be to
vindicate the authority of the flag.
The Louisville Courier-Journal of the same day declared:
There can be but one result, which will be the prompt and complete
assertion of our authority over Aguinaldo and his Tagalogs as it was
asserted over the Spaniards. We know how to deal with the misguided
and maliciously instigated insubordination of the Filipinos.
The New Orleans Picayune said:
It will now be necessary to crush the insurrection and firmly establish
the American control before the future form of government for the islands
can be for a moment considered.
The Nashville American said:
We must make them know that our power is supreme, otherwise we
cannot give to them the blessings freedom and individual liberty have in
store. The United States cannot and will not yield to Aguinaldo. Aguinaldo must and will yield to the United States.
The New York Journal said:
To the unprovoked attack upon our forces at Manila while we were
extending every effort to reach an amicable adjustment with the Filipinos,
and while our commission of inquiry was actually on the way, there can
be but one answer. Order must be restored in the Philippines. The men




74     MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


who have taken our forbearance for weakness must be taught their mistake. American authority must be established at once beyond challenge
throughout the archipelago.
The Memphis Commercial said:
As long as they fight American troops our policy will be to fight back
and fight to conquer.
The Denver Daily News said:
That act has made it impossible for the United States to leave those
islands until it has administered justice to those responsible for the attack.
While it may be determined not to hold these islands, and may be disadvantageous to hold them, still our national dignity and honor will not
permit our forces to be driven out.
Here and there an individual voice was raised counseling
surrender and retreat; but the general voice of the people,
without distinction of party, and without regard to selfish
interest, seconded the action of Congress and the requirements of the Constitution in demanding from the Executive
the suppression of insurrection and the establishment of
peaceful government in the Philippine Islands under the
sovereignty of the United States.
That task also has now been accomplished. The sound of
angry voices declaring that it never could and never would be
done had hardly died away in our national capital when, on
the fourth of July last, the last hostile gun was laid down, the
last insurgent surrendered, the last remnant of military government was terminated; civil government, with just and
equal laws maintaining social order and protecting property
and life and liberty, was established over the last province of
the Philippines outside of the Moro country; the flag under
which Lawton and Logan fell floated over every island and
every town, the emblem of acknowledged sovereignty; and
our President celebrated the anniversary of national independence by proclaiming peace and general amnesty. The
task has not been an easy one. I cannot better describe the




POLICIES IN THE PHILIPPINES IN 1902


75


work our soldiers had to do and the way they did it than by
reading the words of the general order which signalized the
termination of their most arduous labors:
The President thanks the officers and enlisted men of the army in the
Philippines, both regulars and volunteers, for the courage and fortitude,
the indomitable spirit and loyal devotion with which they have put down
and ended the great insurrection which has raged throughout the archipelago against the lawful sovereignty and just authority of the United
States. The task was peculiarly difficult and trying. They were required
at first to overcome organized resistance of superior numbers, well equipped
with modern arms of precision, intrenched in an unknown country of
mountain defiles, jungles, and swamps, apparently capable of interminable
defense. When this resistance had been overcome they were required to
crush out a general system of guerrilla warfare conducted among a people
speaking unknown tongues, from whom it was almost impossible to obtain
the information necessary for successful pursuit or to guard against surprise and ambush.
The enemies by whom they were surrounded were regardless of all
obligations of good faith and of all the limitations which humanity has
imposed upon civilized warfare. Bound themselves by the laws of war,
our soldiers were called upon to meet every device of unscrupulous treachery and to contemplate without reprisal the infliction of barbarous cruelties
upon their comrades and friendly natives. They were instructed, while
punishing armed resistance, to conciliate the friendship of the peaceful,
yet had to do with a population among whom it was impossible to distinguish friend from foe, and who in countless instances, used a false
appearance of friendship for ambush and assassination. They were
obliged to deal with problems of communication and transportation in a
country without roads and frequently made impassable by torrential rains.
They were weakened by tropical heat and tropical disease. Widely
scattered over a great archipelago, extending a thousand miles from north
to south, the gravest responsibilities, involving the life or death of their
commands, frequently devolved upon young and inexperienced officers
beyond the reach of specific orders or advice.
Under all these adverse circumstances the Army of the Philippines has
accomplished its task rapidly and completely. In more than two thousand
combats, great and small, within three years, it has exhibited unvarying
courage and resolution. Utilizing the lessons of the Indian wars, it has
relentlessly followed the guerrilla bands to their fastnesses in mountain
and jungle and crushed them. It has put an end to the vast system of
intimidation and secret assassination by which the peaceful natives were
prevented from taking a genuine part in government under American




76    MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


authority. It has captured or forced to surrender substantially all the
leaders of the insurrection. It has submitted to no discouragement and
halted at no obstacle. Its officers have shown high qualities of command,
and its men have shown devotion and discipline. Its splendid virile
energy has been accompanied by self-control, patience and magnanimity.
With surprisingly few individual exceptions its course has been characterized by humanity and kindness to the prisoner and the non-combatant.
With admirable good temper, sympathy, and loyalty to American ideals,
its commanding generals have joined with the civilian agents of the
Government in healing the wounds of war and assuring to the people of
the Philippines the blessings of peace and prosperity. Individual liberty,
protection of personal rights, civil order, public instruction, and religious
freedom have followed its footsteps. It has added honor to the flag which
it defended, and has justified increased confidence in the future of the
American people, whose soldiers do not shrink from labor or death, yet
love liberty and peace.
The President feels that he expresses the sentiments of all the loyal
people of the United States in doing honor to the whole army which has
joined in the performance and shares in the credit of these honorable
services.
The problem to be worked out in the Philippines was not a
military problem alone. At the bottom of our difficulties lay
the fact that the Spaniards, to secure the assistance of the
people against us, and after them the ambitious men who saw
the opportunity to secure empire for themselves, had filled
the minds of the ignorant and credulous people with vile
slanders upon American character, and the most extravagant
and grotesque tales of American tyranny and barbarity.
They described us as monsters in human form, who sought
to fasten upon the miserable Filipinos a tyranny worse than
that of Spain, and who would respect neither the rights of
man nor the virtue of woman, nor the innocence of childhood,
nor the sacredness of religion. To dispel this dreadful belief
words were of no avail. Assurances and promises were useless,
for they were not believed. Before a genuine acceptance of
our sovereignty could come, except by the sullen acquiescence
of the conquered, it was necessary that we should demonstrate to the great mass of the people of the islands that our




POLICIES IN THE PHILIPPINES IN 1902


77


sovereignty meant justice and not oppression, liberty and not
slavery, protection of law and not the license of arbitrary
power. And so, without waiting until the termination of the
war, we established civil government to go hand in hand
with our advancing armies.
A new civil commission was created with Judge Taft at its
head. As armed resistance ceased, island by island, province
by province, town by town, civil government was substituted for military government; the bill of rights extended
its protection over the people; the writ of habeas corpus
became the guaranty of their liberty; elections were held at
which the people chose the officers of their own towns and
provinces; a native constabulary was organized, and proved
faithful and effective for the protection of life and property;
the people resumed their customary vocations under the protection of law. In this way when the insurrection breathed
its last in the mountains of Batangas, the great body of the
people had already commenced to learn the true and beneficent meaning of American sovereignty, and a civil government built up by the careful labor of years was already in
existence, fully organized and ready for the final extension of
its authority. The instructions given by the President to the
Philippine Commission, which constitute both the organic
law of the civil government and the code of rules and principles to guide its conduct, have been adopted by Congress
without change and practically without criticism, as the
future guide of that government's action. The system of
government created under these instructions is continued by
Congress unchanged, except by the enlargement of its power.
I invite comparison between the body of laws, 441 in number, enacted by the Philippine Commission and the statutes
of any state and of any country. They exhibit constructive
ability, legislative skill, painstaking familiarity with conditions, and fidelity to constitutional principles. The public




78


MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


revenues have been honestly collected and honestly administered for the benefit of the people, under a strict and
thorough audit. Notwithstanding the insurrection, the business of the islands has flourished and has become nearly
double what it was in the most peaceful years under Spanish
rule. I quote from a circular issued by the German government last year, for the information of German producers and
exporters:
Although the pacification of the Philippine Archipelago has not as yet
been fully established, the accounts of its economic department are so
favorable that it cannot be too strongly urged upon German exporters to
give particular attention to this group of islands. From July, 1900, to
March, 1901, the exports have increased by thirty-four per cent and the
imports by fifty-two per cent, as compared with those of the same period
of the preceding year. The testimony cannot be withheld that the American administration of the affairs of the Philippines has, as far as the
economic betterment of the country is concerned, already achieved extraordinary success.
In 1894, which was the last year of peaceful condition while under
Spanish rule, the Philippine imports reached $28,500,000 and the exports
$33,100,000, Mexican, in value. Under American rule, in spite of the
continued insurrection of the natives, the imports increased in 1899 to
$40,900,000 and in 1900 to $55,500,000, Mexican, and the exports to
$38,500,000 and $53,400,000, respectively. Military supplies are not included in these figures. The detailed statistics show that Spanish trade
with these islands is rapidly diminishing, but commercial relations with the
United States are gaining.
A million dollars has been applied to the construction of
roads, two million dollars to the improvement of the harbor of
Manila; a system of free public schools has been established;
180,000 children are enrolled; and a thousand teachers
brought from America and nearly four thousand native
teachers are instructing them. A normal school has been established in Manila. Ten thousand adults are attending night
schools to learn English. In selecting the employees of the
civil government a rigid and comprehensive civil service law
has been faithfully observed. A majority of the prominent




POLICIES IN THE PHILIPPINES IN 1902


79


men of the insurrection are taking part in the new government. Of the seven commissioners who, with the governor,
exercise legislative power, three are Filipinos. The chief
justice of the supreme court and an associate justice, many
of the judges of the first instance and many other high officials, are Filipinos. While we have reduced our American
troops in the islands from about 70,000 to about 20,000, we
have enlisted about 5,000 natives, who have proved to be
trustworthy and efficient, and there is no longer occasion to
doubt that either as a military force or as a constabulary, the
natives of the islands themselves can be trusted to take the
principal burden of maintaining order, and that only a small
force of American troops will be required. Our position in
the Philippines today is far better than the most sanguine
American could reasonably have expected in those early days
of 1899, when the Democratic press and Democratic leaders
were joining with the Republicans in the declaration that the
insurrection must be put down.
We shall have discouragements and reverses in the future
as we have in the past. Grave difficulties doubtless await us,
but the greatest difficulties are past. The legislation enacted
at the last session of Congress secures the good which has
been accomplished, and with wise conservatism opens the
way to future progress. The taking of a census under its
provisions has already been ordered, and after the census will
follow a legislative assembly elected by the Filipinos, in which
they can test and exercise their capacity for government on
the broader field as they are already doing in their local
affairs. We know now that steady and faithful adherence to
the course which McKinley began and Roosevelt is following, will prove beyond question or cavil the truth of the declaration that our flag has never waved over any community
but in blessing, and that it has not lost its gift of benediction
in its world-wide journey to the Philippine shores.




80     MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


Before the American people determine whether they will
withdraw from the administration which has done these
things, the power to continue its effective action, and hamper
it by an adverse majority in the House of Representatives, I
would like to have them understand and consider what part
the Democratic party has played in this history.
It concerned the credit and honor of our country that
we should succeed in the Philippines. If we had failed, we
should have stood before all the world, and in our own consciousness as well, convicted of weakness and inefficiency and
of lacking the strength and unity of purpose and the capacity
for resolute and persistent action, without which no nation
can be great.
And, my fellow-citizens, there come always in every great
and difficult undertaking times when failure seems possible;
times when discouragements and difficulties and doubts beset
the pathway of endeavor. Then it is that high courage and
unshaken resolve mark the quality of a nation's greatness,
and then it is that faint hearts with querulous regrets and
carping complaints seek always to give up the fight. Such
times came during the Philippine insurrection. Where was
the Democratic party then? Was it helping the nation to
succeed, or was it helping the Administration to fail? The
very men who had cried " Down with Aguinaldo ", " Hurrah
for the flag ", "The insurrection must be put down ", the
very men who had voted to take the cession of the Philippines, who had voted the money to pay for the Philippines,
who had voted for the troops to send to the Philippines to
put down the insurrection, seized the moment of discouragement to demand that in the face of armed resistance, the war
should be declared a failure, the struggle should be given up,
sovereignty should be relinquished, and defeated and humiliated America should surrender the cause for which the lives
of so many of her soldiers had been sacrificed. There were




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81


some honorable exceptions, but most of them retired to the
background and left the leadership of the party to the men
who were willing to voice this policy, which for all time would
have marked us as a nation rash in counsel and feeble in
execution.
The new leaders filled the air with outcries over the cost of
suppressing the insurrection.
They wrung the hearts of our people by parading the sad
statistics which told the story of our dead and wounded.
They protested that the islands would never pay, and
pointed with triumph to the custom-house figures, which
showed that although our trade with the Philippines had
increased, it had not in the midst of insurrection sprung up
like Jonah's gourd in a single night.
They asserted that we never could and never would succeed. " Thirty thousand, forty thousand, fifty thousand men
will be required for five years, for twenty-five years," they
cried. Five months have not passed and there are but 20,000
American soldiers there. They tore passion to tatters in their
insistence upon the construction of the Constitution which
would include the archipelago within the provisions of the
Dingley Tariff, and subject that distant tropical country to
the duties provided to suit the conditions of life and production of the United States. With vindictive insolence they
denounced the Supreme Court for deciding otherwise, and
then urged that Congress should include the islands within
that tariff law. Was it because they sought the welfare of the
Filipino that they desired to impose upon him the provisions
of this statute, which they abhor and condemn? Certainly
not. It was because those duties were so unsuited to the life
of the Philippine Islands, that business there could not continue and the people could not live under them, and an
attempt to govern the islands under them would have been
an inevitable failure.




82    MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


They gave courage and hope to the insurgent leaders by
constantly insisting that terms should be made, that independence should be conceded, that the insurgents should be
induced to lay down their arms by promises, and they thus
continually supplied incentive to further resistance by the
apparent possibility of substantial success. They slandered
our title; denied that we acquired sovereignty by the cession
from Spain. They asserted that we had no right to succeed
because we had promised Aguinaldo independence, and the
assertion of sovereignty was an act of perfidy - the perfidy of
George Dewey and Wesley Merritt and William McKinley!
They asserted this against the official reports and the sworn
testimony of Dewey, who alone could have made the promise;
against the evidence of the original written document signed
by Aguinaldo and his associates, which shows that he came
to Manila not relying upon any promise, but with the expressed intention to obtain arms from the Americans in order
to use them first against the Spaniards and then against the
Americans themselves. They asserted it against the written
statement of Mabini, the prime minister of the insurrection,
declaring that there was no agreement whatever, and against
the admission of Aguinaldo that there was none.
They charged that the outbreak of hostilities on the fourth
of February was an unprovoked and wicked attack by the
American soldiers upon the peaceful Filipinos who had no
thought of war; and this in the face of the written evidence,
over the signature of Aguinaldo himself, by proclamation, by
letter, by telegram, by military order, that the Philippine
forces had been for months preparing and intending to bring
on that very conflict. They charged that the officers of our
army were guilty of the atrocious wickedness of making that
attack to affect the ratification of the treaty by the Senate,
and they charged that the dispatches which Dewey and Otis
sent were sent in anticipation, before the fight occurred.




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83


They asserted that we had no right to succeed because we
found a people struggling for liberty and became their ally.
There is no basis for the assertion. When Dewey destroyed
the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay, the people of the Philippines
were not struggling at all. There was no insurrection there.
There had been an insurrection, and it had been terminated
four months before by the payment of money to the leaders,
the chief of whom was Aguinaldo, and their expatriation to
Hong-Kong. The agreement by which that insurrection was
terminated said nothing either about independence or about
reforms. It was a simple agreement to stop fighting, for
money; and it declared that Aguinaldo and his associates
desired to preserve their Spanish citizenship.
Here is a copy of Aguinaldo's proclamation when he left
his country:
BIAC-NA-BATO, December 25, 1897.
I lay down my arms because further warfare will bring not happiness
but trouble and disaster, which is not the end the insurrection seeks. I
quit the field since my ambitions for my people are one with the lofty
desires of the noble Governor-General, Senor Don Fernando Primo de
Rivera, Marquis de Estrella, who, inspired by his love for our dear country,
inaugurated an era of peace from the time he took up the reins of government of this Spanish territory. I lay down arms in accordance. with the
patriotic advice of the intermediary, the maginoo, Pedro A. Paterno, lover
of the well-being of our mutual native land. I go of my own will. I go,
for in spite of the personal immunity which is given me by the laws, by
promises and by Spanish honor, yet the violent passion of hatred or some
other political excitement might raise its suicidal hand and make anew
victims, thereby creating disturbances and interfering with the progress
of our development.
Viva Espana, Viva Filipinas.
He declares that he leaves because his ambitions for his
people are one with the desires of the Spanish GovernorGeneral. There was surely no independence in those desires.
And he concludes " Viva Espana, Viva Filipinas!" That was
the condition of affairs at the time when the outbreak of war
between Spain and the United States suggested to the little




84     MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


band of expatriated adventurers in Hong-Kong that they
might profit by our destruction of the Spanish power with
which they were in such appreciative accord. When Aguinaldo first went ashore from Dewey's ship on the nineteenth
of May, 1898, to start the insurrection with the arms that
Dewey furnished to him, he found no insurrection and no
support, and returned discouraged to the ship and asked to be
sent to Japan because he could do nothing. Dewey told him
to try again and sent him back. And now his friends here say
there was an implied obligation to give him the country, for
Dewey found the people struggling for their liberty. After
reading the proclamation announcing the accord of Aguinaldo with the lofty desires of the Spanish Governor-General,
this letter which he has just written to the President is most
interesting:
The Honorable THEODORE ROOSEVELT,
President of the United States of America.
SIR: I have the honor to present to you an expression of my gratitude
for the amnesty which opens the prison doors and lifts the ban of banishment from many Filipinos who have honorably struggled for their ideal.
I trust that such a generous and noble course on the part of the nation
which you represent will be beneficial in uniting, in the future, the friendly
relations between Americans and Filipinos, and I am assured that with the
disinterested and just protection of the worthy descendants of the great
George Washington, the aspirations of my country will be satisfied, and
which, I am sure, will fully demonstrate its gratitude for the benefits which
are being done for us.
Very respectfully,
EMILIO AGUINALDO Y FAMY.
MANILA, CALLE CONCORDIA, July 5, 1902.
He is a philosopher, that Aguinaldo!
The Democrats in Congress declared that we ought not to
succeed because the Filipinos were competent to govern
themselves. We know that in fact their pretense of constitutional government disappeared at the first symptom of
dissent from Aguinaldo's will, and he became an absolute




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military dictator. We know this power was made secure by
the assassination of his rival, Luna, who, whether by Aguinaldo's order or not, was slain upon Aguinaldo's threshold
by Aguinaldo's guards.
I read the description of that government from the report
of the Commission of which President Schurman was the
head:
Throughout the Archipelago at large there was trouble only at those
points to which armed Tagalos had been sent in considerable numbers.
In general, such machinery of " government " as existed served only for
plundering the people under the pretext of levying "war contributions ",
and while many of the insurgent officials were rapidly accumulating wealth.
The administration of justice was paralyzed, and crime of all sorts was
rampant. Might was the one law. Never in the worst days of Spanish
misrule had the people been so over-taxed or so badly governed. In many
provinces there was absolute anarchy, and from all cities came petitions
for protection and help which we were unable to give.
Among the captured telegrams is one from Noirel and
Cailles which further illustrates the character of the government to which we would have left the millions of humble and
peaceful people of the Philippines. It is dated on the thirteenth of January, 1899, just twenty-two days before the
outbreak of hostilities, and it throws light also upon the
Democratic assertion that we were the aggressors in that
conflict:
To the President of the Republican Government, Malolos:
We desire to know the result of ultimatum which you mentioned in
your telegram, and we also desire to know what reward our government
is preparing for the forces who will first be able to enter Manila.
And here is the answer which we have in Aguinaldo's own
handwriting:
As to the contents of your telegram, those who prove themselves heroes
will have as rewards large sums of money, lands, extraordinary promotions,
crosses of Biac-na-Bato, Marquis of Malate, Ermita, and Count of Manila,
etc., besides the congratulations of our idolizing country on account of




86     MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


their patriotism, and more if they capture the regiments with their generals, and if possible the chief of them all, who represents our future
enemies in Manila.
Where were the people to be when the Marquis of Malate,
the Marquis of Ermita and the Count of Manila were established over them with their large sums of money and grants
of land? What was Aguinaldo's title to be? What was to
become of the sham constitution under which he was then
masquerading and which forbade the granting of titles of
nobility? No, acceptance of sovereignty over the Philippines carried with it acceptance of the duty of protection;
and we should have been false to that duty if we had left
these people under the cruel and despotic rule of this dictator, with his generals and his marquises and his counts.
Our Democratic friends brush aside with contempt all
American testimony. The words of Schurman and Taft, and
Otis and Wright and Chaffee are as naught to them; but I
will cite to them a greater than Aguinaldo. The greatest
genius and most revered patriot of the Philippines was Jose
Rizal. Shortly before he was done to death by Spain he sent
a message to his countrymen. It must have been his last message; and in it he condemned the insurrection of Aguinaldo,
which terminated just before our navy appeared upon the
scene, and pointed out the path his people should follow to
liberty and enlightenment. This is the message:
MY FELLOW-COUNTRYMEN:
On my return from Spain I learned that my name was being used as a
war-cry by men in arms. This news shocked me beyond measure, but
believing it was all over I remained silent as the harm was done and the
deed could not be recalled. Now I hear rumors that the disturbances
continue and lest any one should be taking advantage of my name in good
or bad faith, I write now to correct that abuse and to undeceive those
reckless men in order that they may know the truth. When I found out
what they were attempting to do, I opposed it on principle and attacked
it and showed the utter impossibility of its success.




POLICIES IN THE PHILIPPINES IN 1902


87


I was convinced that the idea was in the greatest degree absurd and
what was worse would be fatal. When, later, in spite of my advice, the
movement was begun, I offered of my own accord, not only my services,
but my life and even my good name to be used in any way they might
believe effective in stifling the rebellion. I thought of the disaster which
would follow the success of the revolution, and I deemed myself fortunate
if by any sacrifice I could block the progress of such a useless calamity.
This can be proven.
My countrymen, I have given proof that I was one who sought " liberties " for our country and I still seek them. But as a first step I insisted
upon the development of the people in order that, by means of education
and of labor, they might acquire the proper individuality and force which
would make them worthy of them. In my writings I have commended to
you study and civic virtue without which our redemption does not exist.
I have also written, and my words have been repeated, that reforms to be
effective must come from above. These which come from below will be
discountenanced, will be irregular and unstable. Permeated by these
ideas, I cannot do less than condemn, and I do condemn this absurd and
savage insurrection planned behind my back, which dishonors us before
the Filipinos and discredits us with those who otherwise would argue in
our behalf. I abominate its cruelties and I disavow any kind of connection
with it, regretting with all the sorrow of my soul that these reckless men
have allowed themselves to be deceived. Let them return then, to their
homes, and may God pardon those who have acted in bad faith.
Josf RIZAL.
FORT SANTIAGO, December 16, 1896.
That message is the platform of the American government in the Philippines. What was true of the people rebelling against Spain is doubly true of the same people rebelling
against the United States. That judgment of the man whose
birthday the Philippine people celebrate, and whom they
worship as a saint, measures the duty of American sovereignty, which the American people will surely perform.
The Democrats declared that we had no right to succeed
because our assertion of sovereignty was a violation of the
Declaration of Independence, which declares that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the
governed. That maxim, though general in its terms, was




88    MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


enunciated with reference to a highly civilized, self-governing
people. Its unqualified application to barbarous and semicivilized people is contrary to the whole course of civilization.
Its unqualified application without regard to the rule and
progress of humanity and ordered liberty among men, is
contrary to the whole course of American history. Without
the consent of the hundreds of thousands of Indians whom
our fathers found in possession of this land, we have assumed
and exercised sovereignty over them. Without the consent
of the people of Louisiana, Jefferson and the signers of the
Declaration and framers of the Constitution purchased their
territory and exercised sovereignty over them. Without the
consent of the people of the South the Government of
the United States, with appalling sacrifice of life and treasure, enforced its sovereignty over them.
Whose consent were we to ask in the Philippines, and how
was it to be expressed? Were we to accept the results of the
misrepresentation and calumny which had painted us to
the ignorant and credulous Filipinos as monsters of cruelty,
and yield our sovereignty because they did not know what
it meant to them?
Among the captured insurgent documents we find original
telegraphic dispatches, most of them bearing memoranda or
endorsements in Aguinaldo's handwriting, which show that
the people of northern Luzon did not consent to Aguinaldo's
government, and that it was imposed upon them by force of
arms.
I read extracts from some of the dispatches: From General
Pio del Pilar, San Pedro Mascati, to Aguinaldo, December 4,
1898. "Urgent. Reliable reports from Pangasinan state there
is party composed of 4,000 individuals opposed to our government. Treason on the part of our troops and civilians."
From the Director of Diplomacy, Manila, to Aguinaldo,
December 27, 1898, 5 A.M.: "Most urgent. The discon



POLICIES IN THE PHILIPPINES IN 1909


89


tent in the provinces of Pangasinan, Tarlac and Yloco
(Ilocos) is increasing. The town of Bangbang rose in revolt
the twenty-fifth and twenty-sixth of this month, and killed
all of the civil officials. It is impossible to describe the abuses
committed by the military and civil authority of said province."
From the Secretary of Interior, Malolos, to Aguinaldo, December 28, 1898: " According to my information the excitement in Tarlac increases. I do not think that the people of the
province would have committed such barbarities by themselves. For this reason the silence of General Macabulos is
suspicious. To speak frankly, it encourages the rebels.
Some 700 of them with 150 rifles entered Panique, seized the
arms of the police, the town funds, and attacked the houses
of the people."
From the Director of Diplomacy, Manila, to Aguinaldo,
December 29, 1898: "The question of Tarlac and Pangasinan is a serious one. Malolos government calls me to
restore it in said provinces. I await your opinion and order."
Where under the rule of force to which we aided Aguinaldo
in northern Luzon was the consent of the governed to be
ascertained?
The great Visayan island of Negros has never from the
beginning wavered in its cheerful acceptance of our sovereignty and its rejection of Tagalog rule.
The difference between that and the other islands of the
Visayan group is that in the others the Tagalogs arrived first
and secured control by force of arms, which, with those accustomed for centuries to follow blindly the men in authority
over them, made consent a necessary sequence.
When the natives began to know us and to learn what our
sovereignty really meant, they did manifest their acceptance
of it by the thousands, and what happened to them then? I
read from reports received in response to a circular letter to




90     MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


our officers sent at the instance of Governor Taft, to ascertain
what was done by the bands of assassins who were supporting
the power of Aguinaldo, to the Filipinos who dared to give
the consent of the governed to American sovereignty. The
reports show in the first district of southern Luzon, natives
assassinated for sympathizing with Americans, 14; natives
assaulted for sympathizing with Americans, 104. In the
second district of southern Luzon, natives assassinated for
sympathizing with Americans, 17; natives assaulted for
sympathizing with Americans, 106. In the first district of
northern Luzon natives assassinated, 100; natives assaulted,
40. In the third district of northern Luzon, natives assassinated, 106; natives assaulted, 131. And so on throughout
the Islands, showing before the end of 1900, 350 natives
assassinated and 442 assaulted and mutilated; 67 municipal officers assassinated and 40 assaulted and mutilated for
daring to give the consent of the governed to American sovereignty. Many of them were put to death with frightful barbarity. Some of them were buried alive; some hacked to
pieces; some burned. While there were hundreds slain that
we knew of, there were thousands slain that we did not know
of. Where there were thousands put to death, how many were
deterred by fear of death? The reign of terror established
throughout the islands to prevent by secret and wholesale
assassination, the consent of the governed to American rule
makes the Mafia seem harmless and beneficent. Are we to
surrender our sovereignty because the consent was withheld
by these means?
Not content with denying our right to succeed, the Democrats of Congress came to the aid of the men who were
preventing Philippine acceptance of American authority by
misrepresentation and slander, and furnished them with fresh
material and new authority for their aspersions upon the
character and purposes of the American people:




POLICIES IN THE PHILIPPINES IN 1902  91


Said the junior Senator from Tennessee in the Senate on
May 1:
Our dealings with the American Indians have been fitly characterized
as a century of dishonor; our treaties with them have been shamefully
violated; we have delivered them over to the tender mercies of thieving
Indian agents; we have inflamed them with injustice and mean whiskey;
and when in sheer desperation they have risen in revolt we have made
them " good Indians " with powder and ball...
Alaska was ceded to us by despotic Russia, and came under the
benign rule of this great Republic. For thirty-five years our continuous
misgovernment of that country has been a shame and disgrace to the
nation..
When the gloss is worn off, when the syndicated boomers have appropriated the cream of the spoils, when the Government sinks into the dull
routine of administration, it will be in the Philippines precisely as it has
been in Alaska. We know what kind of men as a rule will be sent to serve
in the Philippine Islands. Needy and desperate adventurers, broken-down
politicians looking for a job, the sons, nephews, and cousins of American
politicians, the Rathbones and Neelys; men who have qualified themselves for service abroad by the dirty and villainous work they have done
at home. These are the men who as a rule will find service in the Philippine Islands as they did in Cuba, as my friend from Mississippi suggests..
The entire Archipelago is swarming with needy and desperate adventurers seeking to reap their inhuman harvests from the calamities of the
people. American Congressmen and American officials have been forming
syndicates and prowling over that country seeking to make off with something that could be turned into a dollar. The whole pack of lean and
famished carpet-baggers that once feasted upon the South seem to be
howling upon the scent of another victim.
Said the Senator from Utah:
I infer that this is the inauguration of a scheme of loot and plunder
and exploitation - another plowing of a ruined Carthage. You have
garnered the harvest of death, and now propose to rake the stubblefield
of a slaughtered people....
Mr. President, we have accomplished nothing for the benefit of the
Islands there. The condition there is so intolerable that language is inadequate to describe it, and what has taken place, if you continue the
same policy, is likely to be augmented, and multiplied in its distress and
disaster in the future.




92    MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


Congressman Selby, of Illinois, said:
This " new policy " business has given birth to the biggest crop of liars
at Washington and Luzon known outside the realms of Hades. It has
turned out that no Republican can visit Manila and return to Washington
a truthful man. Even the Commission headed by Governor Taft is largely
under suspicion of prevarication, if not of fraud, while Generals Otis and
Chaffee have always been under suspicion. Is it possible that large salaries
and the hope of great perquisites influence these gentlemen and their retainers in distorting the situation at Luzon? Who knows, for the almighty
dollar is a great magnet in all colonial schemes, and its cobra head is
visible in all the Philippines.
I do not wonder that with such declarations as these in
the Congress of the United States, the Filipinos distrust our
assurances and wait for proof that our rule will really mean
liberty and prosperity. If Senators of the United States have
no faith in the justice or integrity or virtue of the American
people, how can we expect the people of the Philippines to
have faith?
The most violent of all attacks was made upon the army,
which belongs to no party and is but the instrument of a
policy in which it has no part. It happened that in the long
course of guerrilla warfare against savage and treacherous
foes who observed none of the rules of civilized warfare,
there were instances of cruel and inhuman treatment of the
natives by our men. The "water-cure," so called, was administered to extort information. These acts were not justified, and they could not be justified, but spread over years
of conflict, over a vast extent of territory, over thousands of
engagements and skirmishes and expeditions, in which, first
and last, 130,000 of our troops were engaged, they were few
and far between - exceptions in a uniform course of selfrestraint, humanity, and kindness. Rumor magnified them
many fold. Each new witness to the same case seemed to be
producing a new case; published in thousands of newspapers
day after day and week after week, they seemed to be multi



POLICIES IN THE PHILIPPINES IN 1902


93


plied. Many of the stories told were false, many were grossly
exaggerated. All were published without the background of
provocation, often dreadful provocation, of exigency, often
desperate exigency, which existed to palliate, though they
could not justify the acts. All of these stories, false as well
as true, were paraded in Congress and discussed, and the
officers and men charged were denounced, the innocent as
well as the guilty, without an opportunity for hearing, while
they were away on the other side of the world fighting the
battles of their country. 
The whole army and its generals were involved in common
denunciation. The gallant and fearless Funston was stigmatized by the Senator from Tennessee as a "blatherskite
brigadier." " I do not know who General Wheaton is, particularly," said the Senator from Idaho, " but I imagine he
was a charity boy who was appointed to West Point by some
Representative or Senator and was educated by the Government."
This was of Loyd Wheaton, who enlisted from this very
town as a private in the Eighth Ohio Volunteers on the
twentieth of April, 1861, the day after Lincoln's first call,
who won his way up through every grade in that regiment
until he was honorably discharged as its lieutenant-colonel
at the close of the Civil War; who was wounded at Shiloh;
was brevetted for faithful and meritorious services in the
Mobile campaign; was brevetted again for gallantry at
the siege of Vicksburg; was brevetted again and received
a medal of honor from Congress for most distinguished gallantry at Fort Blakely, Alabama; received his appointment
in the regular army for those deeds and passed through every
grade until after more than forty years of exceptional and
conspicuous service, he was about retiring as major-general,
full of years and of honor.




94         MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY
When the worst charge of all, subsequently shown to be
utterly false, was under discussion in the Senate, the Senator
from Tennessee declared:
Of course the soldier, whatever he may have said, will promptly repudiate it as every soldier in the Philippine Islands has been required and
compelled to do.
Said the Senator from Utah:
Did Chaffee alone, unaided, in coldness, and in brutality and in savage
and unrelenting disregard of every human sentiment or possibility of
human suffering, conceive this iniquitous scheme? Whence, from what
diabolical source was it derived? The American people ought to know.
Is there any penalty beneath the sun adequate to be meted out to the
merciless wretch who has thus brought such dishonor upon the American
name and the American people?...
Mr. President, I do not believe that Bell himself ever conceived this
iniquity; this outline of policy. Perhaps it may have been Chaffee, who
received his education in savagery and in cruelty and in barbarity over in
China, where we are informed the allied forces took little children and
brained them upon posts, threw them into rivers, and slaughtered and persecuted without mercy and without limit helpless women. After he had
received that training, he superseded the more humane officer, General
MacArthur. Then it was that this diabolical programme seems to have
been adopted and carried out in all its hideousness and rigor.
This was of Adna R. Chaffee. As a boy of nineteen, on the
twenty-second of July, 1861, he enlisted as a private in the
Sixth Cavalry. He served through all the Civil War; was
brevetted for gallantry at Gettysburg; again for gallantry
at Dinwiddie Court-house; twice brevetted for gallant service in engagements with the Indians; wounded in the Gettysburg campaign; wounded again at the battle of Brandy
Station; highly commended for his services as general officer
at El Caney and Santiago; chief of staff in Cuba; commander
of the American troops in China; commanding general in
the Philippines; second ranking major-general of the United
States Army. It was he who, when officers of other nations
hesitated to make the march to Peking, when other generals




POLICIES IN THE PHILIPPINES IN 1902


95


wished to wait for reinforcements that would have come too
late, - it was he who declared that whatever they might do,
he proposed to march at once, and he did march, and they
all marched with him, and the legations were saved. Great
credit came to the American army, because in that march
and after Peking was captured, American soldiers under
Chaffee did not loot and were not cruel, but protected the
property and the lives of the Chinese.
The quarter of Peking over which the American flag floated
was crowded by the poor people when other parts were
deserted, because under that flag they found protection
and kindness, and upon General Chaffee's departure he was
accompanied by many most touching and gratifying expressions of gratitude and affection from the people who had
received the benefits of his humanity. I did not think an
American could be found who was not proud of that record.
Against these contemptuous and injurious aspersions upon
the soldiers of the United States, I will call four witnesses.
The first is William McKinley:
If any orders of mine were required to insure the merciful conduct of
military and naval operations, they would not be lacking, but every step
in the progress of our troops has been marked by a humanity which has
surprised even the misguided insurgents.
The second is President Schurman, and joining with him
Admiral George Dewey and the other members of the first
Philippine Commission:
To those who derive satisfaction from seizing on isolated occurrences -
regrettable, indeed, but incident to every war - and making them the
basis of sweeping accusations, this Commission has nothing to say. Still
less do we feel called upon to answer idle tales without foundation in fact.
But for the satisfaction of those who have found it difficult to understand
why the transporting of American citizens across the Pacific Ocean should
change their nature, we are glad to express the belief that a war was never
more humanely conducted. Insurgents wounded were repeatedly succored
on the field by our men at the risk of their lives. Those who had a chance




96    MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


for life were taken to Manila and tenderly cared for in our hospitals. If
churches were occupied, it was only as a military necessity, and frequently
after their use as forts by the insurgents had made it necessary to train
our artillery upon them. Prisoners were taken whenever opportunity
offered, often only to be set at liberty after being disarmed and fed. Up to
the time of our departure, although numerous spies had been captured, not
a single Filipino had been executed. Such wrongs as were actually committed against the natives were likely to be brought to our attention, and
in every case that we investigated we found a willingness on the part of
those in authority to administer prompt justice.
The third is Governor William H. Taft, of Ohio, who said
in his testimony under oath before the Philippine Committee
of the Senate:
I desire to say that it is my deliberate judgment that there never was a
war conducted, whether against inferior races or others, in which there
was more compassion and more restraint and more generosity, assuming
that there was war at all, than there have been in the Philippine Islands.
The fourth is Vice-Governor Luke E. Wright, of Tennessee:
General Chaffee, as a matter of course, had no patience with any acts
of oppression or cruelty, and whenever his attention has been called to
them has at once taken proper steps. The howl against the army has
been made mainly for political purposes and the cruelties practiced have
been largely exaggerated. Of course, numerous instances of this character
have occurred. There never was and never will be a war of which the same
may not be said; but taken as a whole, and when the character of the
warfare here is considered, I think the officers and men of the American
army have been forbearing and humane in their dealings with the natives,
and the attempt to create a contrary impression is not only unjust to them,
but it seems to me unpatriotic as well.
No one of these positions, these arguments, these efforts,
these attacks, by the Democratic leaders during the critical
and trying time of our Philippine undertaking stands by
itself. Men may differ upon this point and upon that point,
upon this question and upon that question, and different
environment and disposition will produce different views;
but when we consider the whole course of these Democratic




POLICIES IN THE PHILIPPINES IN 1902


97


leaders; when we find them attacking the administration
upon the ground of doing the very thing they themselves had
authorized; when we find them denying our right of sovereignty, denying the justice of our cause, assuming the truth
of the insurgents' statements upon every question, rejecting
the truth of American statements upon every question, elevating and lauding Filipino insurgent character and insurgent
competency, and ascribing the most disgraceful motives and
the most outrageous conduct to the representatives of their
own government, both civil and military; holding out to the
insurgents the hope of success through further resistance, and
painting for them in the blackest colors the dreadful consequences of failure, denying and impugning before all the
world from their high places the good faith of the American
government, the integrity of the American people, and the
beneficence of American rule; arraying argument and statistics, never to encourage, but always to dishearten the American people; insisting always upon the construction of powers
and methods of procedure which would make success difficult
or impossible; accepting and adopting with alacrity every
aspersion upon American honor, and rejecting contemptuously every evidence of American efficiency and noble purpose; I think we must say that the Democratic party which
has allowed these things to be done in its name has failed in
one more opportunity to secure the respect and confidence of
the American people. I will not say that these men wished
their country to fail, but I will say that they wished the
Republican administration to fail, and blinded by partisan
feeling and desire for power, they forgot that the failure of
the administration in the Philippines would be the failure
of their country.
Throughout all this storm of detraction and abuse, the
Republican majorities of the Senate and the House labored
unceasingly to frame and perfect legislation under which the




98    MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


people of the Philippine Islands might have peace and order
and individual freedom and prosperity. They studied the
needs of the Islands, the character of the people, the existing
laws and system of government, and they produced and
passed, against Democratic opposition, a Philippine Government bill which exhibits a high degree of wise statesmanship
and opens to the Philippine people the pathway to that
enlightenment and capacity for self-government for which
Rizal longed, and to the blessings which the noble and gentle
McKinley believed would descend upon them under the
benediction of our flag. I think they and not the others were
the true friends of the Philippine people. I think they and
not the others used well and wisely the powers vested in them
as representatives of the people in the Congress of the United
States; and I submit to you, my countrymen, that they and
not the others are entitled to the expression of your confidence in the coming election.




EXTERNAL POLICIES IN 1904


ADDRESS AS TEMPORARY CHAIRMAN OF THE REPUBLICAN
NATIONAL CONVENTION, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, JUNE 21, 1904
Mr. Root was elected temporary chairman of the National Republican Convention which met at Chicago, Ill., on June 21, 1904, to nominate the candidates of the
Republican party for the Presidential election of that year. As temporary chairman, he delivered the opening address before the Convention, reviewing at length
the record of the Republican party under the administrations of President McKinley
and President Roosevelt, of which he himself had been a member as Secretary of
War.
Those portions of the address are omitted which may be considered as falling
beyond the scope of the topics included within the present volume.
FOUR years ago we held the island of Cuba by military
occupation.    The opposition charged, and the people
of Cuba believed, that we did not intend to keep the pledge of
April 20, 1898, that when the pacification of Cuba was accomplished we should leave the government and control of the
island to its people. The new policy towards Cuba which
should follow the fulfillment of that pledge was unformed.
During the four years it has been worked out in detail and
has received effect. It was communicated by executive order
to the military governor. It was embodied in the act of
Congress known as the Platt Amendment. It was accepted
by the Cuban Constitutional Convention on the twelfth of
October, 1901. It secured to Cuba her liberty and her independence, but it required her to maintain them. It forbade
her ever to use the freedom we had earned for her by so great
a sacrifice of blood and treasure, to give the island to any
other power; it required her to maintain a government adequate for the protection of life and property and liberty, and
should she fail, it gave us the right to intervene for the maintenance of such a government. And it gave us the right to
naval stations upon her coast for the protection and defense
alike of Cuba and the United States. 
99




100


MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


On the twentieth of May, 1902, under a constitution which
embodied these stipulations, the government and control of
Cuba were surrendered to the president and congress elected
by her people, and the American army sailed away. The
new republic began its existence with an administration of
Cubans completely organized in all its branches and trained
to effective service by American officers. The administration
of President Palma has been wise and efficient. Peace and
order have prevailed. The people of Cuba are prosperous
and happy. Her finances have been honestly administered,
her credit is high. The naval stations have been located
and bounded at Guantanamo and Bahia Honda, and are in
the possession of our navy. The Platt Amendment is the
sheet anchor of Cuban independence and of Cuban credit.
No such revolutions as have afflicted Central and South
America are possible there, because it is known to all men
that an attempt to overturn the foundations of that government will be confronted by the overwhelming power of the
United States. The treaty of reciprocity and the act of
Congress of December 6, 1903, which confirmed it, completed
the expression of our policy towards Cuba; which with a far
view to the future, aims to bind to us by ties of benefit and
protection, of mutual interest and genuine friendship, that
island which guards the Caribbean and the highway to the
Isthmus, and must always be, if hostile, an outpost of attack,
and if friendly, an outpost of defense for the United States.
Rich as we are, the American people have no more valuable
possession than the sentiment expressed in the dispatch
which I will now read:
THEODORE R~OOSEv E,  A  HAVANA, May 20, 1902.
THEODORE ROOSEVELT,
President, Washington.: ~  The government of the Island having been just transferred, I, as Chief
< i Magistrate of the Republic, faithfully interpreting the sentiment of the
whole people of Cuba, have the honor to send you and the American




EXTERNAL POLICIES IN 1904


101


people testimony of our profound gratitude and the assurance of an enduring friendship, with wishes and prayers to the Almighty for the welfare
and prosperity of the United States. 
T. ESTRADA PALMA.
When the last National Convention met, the Philippines
also were under military rule. The insurrectos from the
mountains spread terror among the peaceful people by midnight foray and secret assassination. Aguinaldo bided his
time in a secret retreat. Over seventy thousand American
soldiers from more than five hundred stations, held a still
vigorous enemy in check. The Philippine Commission had
not yet begun their work.
The last vestige of insurrection has been swept away.
With their work accomplished, over 55,000 American troops
have been brought back across the Pacific. Civil government has been established throughout the archipelago.
Peace and order and justice prevail. The Philippine Commission, guided at first by executive order and then by the
wise legislation of Congress in the Philippine Government
Act of July 1, 1902, have established and conducted a government which has been a credit to their country and a blessing
to the people of the islands. The body of laws which they
have enacted upon careful and intelligent study of the needs
of the country challenges comparison with the statutes of any
country. The personnel of civil government has been brought
together under an advanced and comprehensive civil service
law, which has been rigidly enforced. A complete census has
been taken, designed to be there as it was in Cuba the basis
for representative government; and the people of the islands
will soon proceed under provisions already made by Congress
to the election of a representative assembly, in which for the
first time in their history they may have a voice in the making
of their own laws. In the meantime the local and provincial
governments are in the hands of officers elected by the Fili



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pinos; and in the great central offices, in the Commission, on
the bench, in the executive departments, the most distinguished men of the Filipino race are taking their part in the
government of their people. A free school system has been
established and hundreds of thousands of children are learning lessons which will help fit them for self-government. The
seeds of religious strife existing in the bitter controversy between the people and the religious orders have been deprived
of potency for harm by the purchase of the friars' lands, and
their practical withdrawal. By the act of Congress of March
2, 1903, a gold standard has been established to take the place
of the fluctuating silver currency. The unit of value is made
exactly one half the value of the American gold dollar, so
that American money is practically part of their currency
system. To enable the Philippine Government to issue this
new currency, $6,000,000 was borrowed by them in 1903 in
the city of New York; and it was borrowed at a net interest
charge of 1 5-8 per cent per annum. The trade of the islands
has increased notwithstanding adverse conditions. During
the last five years of peace under Spanish rule, the average
total trade of the islands was less than $36,000,000. During
the fiscal year ending June 30, 1903, the trade of the islands
was over $66,000,000. There is but one point of disturbance,
and that is in the country of the Mohammedan Moros, where
there is an occasional fitful savage outbreak against the
enforcement of the law recently made to provide for adequate
supervision and control to put an end to the practice of
human slavery.
When Governor Taft sailed from Manila in December last,
to fill the higher office where he will still guard the destinies
of the people for whom he has done such great and noble service, he was followed to the shore by a mighty throng, not of
repressed and sullen subjects, but of free and peaceful people,
whose tears and prayers of affectionate farewell showed that




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they had already begun to learn that " our flag has not lost its
gift of benediction in its world-wide journey to their shores."
None can foretell the future; but there seems no reasonable cause to doubt that under the policy already effectively
inaugurated, the institutions already implanted, and the
processes already begun in the Philippine Islands, if these be
not repressed and interrupted, the Philippine people will follow in the footsteps of the people of Cuba; that more slowly
indeed, because they are not so advanced, yet as surely, they
will grow in capacity for self-government, and receiving
power as they grow in capacity, will come to bear substantially such relations to the people of the United States as do
now the people of Cuba, differing in details as conditions and
needs differ, but the same in principle and the same in beneficent results.
In 1900 the project of an isthmian canal stood where it
was left by the Clayton-Buiwer Treaty of 1850. For half a
century it had halted, with Great Britain resting upon a joint
right of control, and the great undertaking of DeLesseps
struggling against the doom of failure imposed by extravagance and corruption. On the eighteenth of November, 1901,
the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty with Great Britain relieved the
enterprise of the right of British control and left that right
exclusively in the United States. Then followed swiftly the
negotiations and protocols with Nicaragua; the Isthmian
Canal Act of June 28, 1902; the just agreement with the
French Canal Company to pay them the value of the work
they had done; the negotiation and ratification of the treaty
with Colombia; the rejection of that treaty by Colombia in
violation of our rights and the world's right to the passage of
the Isthmus; the seizure by Panama of the opportunity, to
renew her oft-repeated effort to throw off the hateful and
oppressive yoke of Colombia and resume the independence




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which once had been hers, and of which she had been deprived by fraud and force; the success of the revolution; our
recognition of the new republic, followed by recognition
from substantially all the civilized powers of the world; the
treaty with Panama recognizing and confirming our right to
construct the canal; the ratification of the treaty by the
Senate; confirmatory legislation by Congress; the payment
of the $50,000,000 to the French Company and to Panama;
the appointment of the Canal Commission in accordance with
law, and its organization to begin the work.
The action of the United States at every step has been in
accordance with the law of nations, and consistent with the
principles of justice and honor. It has been in discharge of
the trust to build the canal we long since assumed, by denying the right of every other power to build it; and it has been
dictated by a high and unselfish purpose, for the common
benefit of all mankind. That action was wise, considerate,
prompt, vigorous and effective; and now the greatest of constructive nations stands ready and competent to begin and to
accomplish the great enterprise which shall realize the dreams
of past ages, bind together our Atlantic and Pacific coasts, and
open a new highway for that commerce of the Orient whose
course has controlled the rise and fall of civilizations. Success
in that enterprise greatly concerns the credit and honor of the
American people, and it is for them to say whether the building of the canal shall be in charge of the men who made its
building possible, or of the weaklings whose incredulous objections would have postponed it for another generation.
Throughout the world the diplomacy of the present Administration has made for peace and justice among nations.
Clear-sighted to perceive and prompt to maintain American
interests, it has been sagacious and simple and direct in its




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105


methods, and considerate of the rights and of the feelings of
others.
Within the month after the last National Convention met,
Secretary Hay's circular note of July 3, 1900, to the Great
Powers of Europe had declared the policy of the United
States:
to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to
China, preserve China's territorial and administrative entity, protect all
rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law,
and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with
all parts of the Chinese Empire.
The express adherence of the Powers of Europe to this
declaration was secured. The open recognition of the rule of
right conduct imposed its limitations upon the conduct of the
Powers in the Orient. It was made the test of defensible
action. Carefully guarded by the wise statesman who had
secured its acceptance, it brought a moral force of recognized
value to protect peaceful and helpless China from dismemberment and spoliation, and to preserve the " open door " in
the Orient for the commerce of the world. Under the influence
of this effective friendship, a new commercial treaty with
China, proclaimed on the eighth of October last, has enlarged
our opportunities for trade, opened new ports to our commerce, and abolished internal duties on goods in transit
within the empire. There were indeed other nations which
agreed with this policy of American diplomacy, but no other
nation was free from suspicion of selfish aims. None other had
won confidence in the sincerity of its purpose, and none
other but America could render the service which we have
rendered to humanity in China during the past four years.
High evidence of that enviable position of our country is
furnished by the fact that when all Europe was in apprehension lest the field of war between Russia and Japan should so




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


spread as to involve China's ruin and a universal conflict, it
was to the American government that the able and farsighted German Emperor appealed, to take the lead again in
bringing about an agreement for the limitation of the field of
action, and the preservation of the administrative entity of
China outside of Manchuria; and that was accomplished....
In 1900 the first administration of McKinley had played
a great part in establishing The Hague Tribunal for International Arbitration. The prevailing opinion of Europe was
incredulous as to the practical utility of the provision, and
anticipated a paper tribunal unsought by litigants. It was
the example of the United States which set at naught this
opinion. The first international case taken to The Hague
Tribunal was under our protocol with Mexico of May 22,
1902, submitting our contention for the rights of the Roman
Catholic Church in California to a share of the Church
moneys held by the Mexican government before the cession,
and known as the Pious Fund; and the first decision of the
Tribunal was an award in our favor upon that question.
When in 1903 the failure of Venezuela to pay her just debts
led England, Germany and Italy to war-like measures for the
collection of their claims, an appeal by Venezuela to our
Government resulted in agreements upon arbitration in place
of the war, and in a request that our President should act as
arbitrator. Again he promoted the authority and prestige
of The Hague Tribunal, and was able to lead all the powers to
submit the crucial questions in controversy to the determination of that court. It is due greatly to support by the American Government that this agency for peace has disappointed
the expectations of its detractors, and by demonstrations of
practical usefulness has begun a career fraught with possibilities of incalculable benefit to mankind.
On the eleventh of April, 1903, was proclaimed another
convention between all the Great Powers, agreeing upon




EXTERNAL POLICIES IN 1904


107


more humane rules for the conduct of war; and these in substance incorporated and gave the sanction of the civilized
world to the rules drafted by Francis Lieber and approved by
Abraham Lincoln for the conduct of the armies of the United
States in the field.
All Americans who desire safe and conservative administration which shall avoid cause of quarrel, all who abhor war,
all who long for the perfect sway of the principles of that
religion which we all profess, should rejoice that under this
Republican administration their country has attained a
potent leadership among the nations in the cause of peace
and international justice.
The respect and moral power thus gained have been exercised in the interests of humanity, where the rules of diplomatic intercourse have made formal intervention impossible.
When the Rumanian outrages and when the appalling massacre at Kishineff, shocked civilization and filled thousands
of our own people with mourning, the protest of America was
heard through the voice of its Government, with full observance of diplomatic rules, but with moral power and effect.
We have advanced the authority of the Monroe Doctrine.
Our adherence to the convention which established The
Hague Tribunal was accepted by the other Powers, with a
formal declaration that nothing therein contained should be
construed to imply the relinquishment by the United States
of its traditional attitude toward purely American questions.
The armed demonstration by the European Powers against
Venezuela was made the occasion for disclaimers to the
United States of any intention to seize the territory of Venezuela, recognizing in the most unmistakable way the rights
of the United States expressed in the declaration of that
traditional policy.
Mindful that moral powers unsupported by physical
strength do not always avail against selfishness and aggres



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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


sion, we have been augmenting the forces which comma
respect.
We have brought our navy to a high state of efficiency a
have exercised both army and navy in the methods of s<
coast defense. The joint Army and Navy Board has b(
bringing the two services together in good understanding a
the common study of the strategy, the preparation and 1
cooperation which will make them effective in time of ne
Our ships have been exercised in fleet and squadron mo'
ments, have been improved in marksmanship and mobili
and have been constantly tested by use. Since the last D
tional Convention met, we have completed and added to
navy, five battleships, four cruisers, four monitors, thir
four torpedo destroyers and torpedo boats; while we he
put under construction, thirteen battleships and thirt(
cruisers.
Four years ago our army numbered over 100,000 men
regulars and volunteers, seventy-five per cent of them in I
Philippines and China. Under the operation of statu
limiting the period of service, it was about to lapse back ii
its old and insufficient number of 27,000, and its old a
insufficient organization under the practical control of p
manent staff departments at Washington, with the sa
divisions of counsel and lack of coordinating and direct:
power at the head, that led to confusion and scandal in 1
war with Spain. During the past four years the less(
taught by that war have received practical effect. I
teachings of Sherman and of Upton have been recalled a
respected. Congress has fixed a maximum of the army
100,000, and a minimum at 60,000; so that maintaining or
the minimum in peace, as we now do, when war threatens 1
President may begin preparation by filling the ranks to 1
maximum, without waiting until after war has begun,
he had to wait in 1898. Permanent staff appointments hE




EXTERNAL POLICIES IN 1904


109


been changed to details from the line, with compulsory
returns at fixed intervals to service with troops, so that
the requirements of the field and the camp rather than the
requirements of the office desk shall control the departments
of administration and supply. A corps organization has been
provided for our artillery, with a chief of artillery at the head,
so that there may be intelligent use of our costly seacoast
defenses. Under the act of February 14, 1903, a General
Staff has been established, organized to suit American conditions and requirements and adequate for the performance
of the long-neglected but all-important duties of directing
military education and training, and applying the most
advanced principles of military science to that necessary
preparation for war which is the surest safeguard of peace.
The command of the army now rests where it is placed by
the Constitution - in the President. His power is exercised
through a military chief of staff pledged by the conditions
and tenure of his office to confidence and loyalty to his commander. Thus civilian control of the military arm, upon
which we must always insist, is reconciled with that military
efficiency which can be obtained only under the direction of
the trained military expert.
Four years ago we were living under an obsolete militia
law more than a century old, which Washington and Jefferson and Madison, and almost every President since their
time, had declared to be worthless. We presented the curious spectacle of a people depending upon a citizen soldiery
for protection against aggression, and making practically no
provision whatever for training those citizens in the use of
warlike weapons or in the elementary duties of the soldier.
The mandate of the Constitution which required Congress to
provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia
had been left unexecuted. In default of national provisions,
bodies of state troops, created for local purposes and sup



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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


ported at local expense, had grown up throughout the Union.
Their feelings towards the regular army were rather of distrust and dislike than of comradeship. Their arms, equipment, discipline, organization, and methods of obtaining
and accounting for supplies were varied and inconsistent.
They were unsuited to become a part of any homogeneous
force, and their relations to the army of the United States
were undefined and conjectural. By the Militia Act of January 20, 1903, Congress performed its duty under the Constitution. Leaving these bodies still to perform their duties
to the States, it made them the organized militia of the
United States. It provided for their conformity in armament, organization and discipline to the army of the United
States; it provided the ways in which, either strictly as
militia or as volunteers, they should become an active part of
the army when called upon; it provided for their training,
instruction and exercise conjointly with the regular army; it
imposed upon the regular army the duty of promoting their
efficiency in many ways. In recognition of the service to the
nation which these citizen soldiers would be competent to
render, the nation assumed its share of the burden of their
armament, their supplies and their training. The workings
of this system have already demonstrated, not only that we
can have citizens outside of the regular army trained for
duty in war, but that we can have a body of volunteer
officers ready.for service, between whom and the officers of
the regular army have been created by intimate association
and mutual helpfulness, those relations of confidence and
esteem without which no army can be effective.
The first administration of McKinley fought and won the
war with Spain, put down the insurrection in the Philippines,
annexed Hawaii, rescued the legations in Peking, brought
Porto Rico into our commercial system, enacted a protective
tariff, and established our national currency on the firm




EXTERNAL POLICIES IN 1904


111


foundations of the gold standard by the financial legislation
of the Fifty-sixth Congress.
The present administration has reduced taxation, reduced
the public debt, reduced the annual interest charge, made
effective progress in the regulation of trusts, fostered business, promoted agriculture, built up the navy, reorganized
the army, resurrected the militia system, inaugurated a new
policy for the preservation and reclamation of public lands,
given civil government to the Philippines, established the
republic of Cuba, bound it to us by ties of gratitude, of commercial interest and of common defense, swung open the
closed gateway of the Isthmus, strengthened the Monroe
Doctrine, ended the Alaskan Boundary dispute, protected the
integrity of China, opened wider its doors of trade, advanced
the principle of arbitration, and promoted peace among
the nations.
We challenge judgment upon this record of effective performance in legislation, in execution and in administration.
The work is not fully done; policies are not completely
wrought out; domestic questions still press continually for
solution; other trusts must be regulated; the tariff may
presently receive revision, and if so, should receive it at the
hands of the friends and not the enemies of the protective
system; the new Philippine government has only begun
to develop its plans for the benefit of that long-neglected
country; our flag floats on the Isthmus, but the canal is
yet to be built; peace does not yet reign on earth, and
considerate firmness backed by strength is still needful in
diplomacy.
The American people have now to say whether policies
shall be reversed, or committed to unfriendly guardians;
whether performance, which now proves itself for the benefit
and honor of our country, shall be transferred to unknown
and perchance to feeble hands.




MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


No dividing line can be drawn athwart the course of this
successful administration. The fatal fourteenth of September, 1901, marked no change of policy, no lower level of
achievement. The bullet of the assassin robbed us of the
friend we loved; it took away from the people the President
of their choice; it deprived civilization of a potent force
making always for righteousness and for humanity. But the
fabric of free institutions remained unshaken. The government of the people went on. The great party that William
McKinley led, wrought still in the spirit of his example. His
true and loyal successor has been equal to the burden cast
upon him. Widely different in temperament and methods,
he has proved himself of the same elemental virtues —
the same fundamental beliefs. With faithful and revering
memory, he has executed the purposes and continued unbroken the policy of President McKinley for the peace, prosperity and honor of our beloved country. And he has met all
new occasions with strength and resolution and far-sighted
wisdom.
As we gather in this convention, our hearts go back to the
friend - the never to be forgotten friend, whom when last
we met we acclaimed with one accord as our universal choice
to bear a second time the highest honor in the nation's gift;
and back still, memory goes through many a year of leadership and loyalty.
How wise and how skillful he was! how modest and selfeffacing! how deep his insight into the human heart! how
swift the intuitions of his sympathy! how compelling the
charm of his gracious presence! He was so unselfish, so
thoughtful of the happiness of others, so genuine a lover of
his country and his kind. And he was the kindest and
tenderest friend who ever grasped another's hand. Alas,
that his virtues did plead in vain against cruel fate!




EXTERNAL POLICIES IN 1904


113


Yet we may rejoice, that while he lived he was crowned
with honor; that the rancor of party strife had ceased; that
success in his great tasks, the restoration of peace, the
approval of his countrymen, the affection of his friends,gave the last quiet months in his home at Canton repose and
contentment...
But we turn as he would have us turn, to the duties of
the hour, the hopes of the future; we turn as he would
have us turn, to prepare ourselves for struggle under the
same standard borne in other hands by right of true inheritance. Honor, truth, courage, purity of life, domestic virtue,
love of country, loyalty to high ideals - all these combined
with active intelligence, with learning, with experience in
affairs, with the conclusive proof of competency afforded by
wise and conservative administration, by great things already
done and great results already achieved, - all these we bring
to the people with another candidate. Shall not these have
honor in our land? Truth, sincerity, courage! these underlie the fabric of our institutions. Upon hypocrisy and sham,
upon cunning and false pretense, upon weakness and cowardice, upon the arts of the demagogue and the devices of the
mere politician, - no government can stand. No system of
popular government can endure in which the people do not
believe and trust. Our President has taken the whole people
into his confidence. Incapable of deception, he has put aside
concealment. Frankly and without reserve, he has told
them what their government was doing, and the reasons. It
is no campaign of appearances upon which we enter, for the
people know the good and the bad, the success and failure,
to be credited and charged to our account. It is no campaign
of sounding words and specious pretenses, for our President
has told the people with frankness what he believed and what
he intended. He has meant every word he said, and the




114     MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY
people have believed every word he said, and with him this
convention agrees because every word has been sound Republican doctrine. No people can maintain free government
who do not in their hearts value the qualities which have
made the present President of the United States conspicuous
among the men of his time as a type of noble manhood.
Come what may here - come what may in November, God
grant that those qualities of brave, true manhood shall have
honor throughout America, shall be held for an example in
every home, and that the youth of generations to come may
grow up to feel that it is better than wealth, or office, or
power, to have the honesty, the purity, and the courage of
Theodore Roosevelt.




WEST POINT
ADDRESS AT THE CENTENNIAL CELEBRATION OF THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED STATES MILITARY
ACADEMY, JUNE 11, 1902
From the outbreak of the war of the Revolution, the necessity for trained
engineers and artillerists was evident. The want was supplied, as far as possible, by
inviting foreigners to assist in the military operations. General Henry Knox, Chief
of Artillery, was the first to propose the establishment of a military academy, where
cadets would be educated, chiefly in the theory of war, leaving the practice to be
gained in actual service. In a report to a committee of Congress dated September
27, 1776, he advocated an academy " nearly on the same plan as that of Woolwich."
General Knox's views were supported by Alexander Hamilton and approved by
General Washington, but the plan was not carried out until 1802, when the United
States Military Academy was established at West Point.
In the first century of its existence, West Point graduated 4,121 cadets, and these
officers have formed the backbone and the directing force of the regular and volunteer armies of the United States; and they furnished both the North and the South
with their leading officers in the war between the states. Dr. Edward S. Holden,
Librarian of the Academy, states that " every great battle of the Civil War except
two was fought under the command of a graduate " of West Point.
Mr. Root delivered an address at the Centennial Celebration of the founding of
West Point. He made the following reference to the anniversary in his report as
Secretary of War for 1902:
The Military Academy at West Point on June 11, 1902, celebrated with
appropriate ceremonies the completion of a hundred years of honorable and
useful service. The advance of the world in military science, the increasing
complexity of the machinery and material used in warfare, and the difficulty
of the problems involved in transporting, supplying, and handling the great
armies of modern times, make such an institution even more necessary to the
country now than when it was founded by the fathers of the Republic a hundred
years ago. The efficiency of the institution and the high standard of honor and
devotion to duty which have characterized its graduates justify the continuance of public confidence. The wise liberality of Congress has enabled the
institution to begin its second century with the well-founded hope of larger
and long-continued usefulness.


115




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VERY soldier here would more readily charge a battery
than I undertake to follow the eloquence, humor and
pathos of Horace Porter.' Fortunately, but few and brief
should be the words which close this cheerful and interesting
occasion. The centennial year of the Military Academy fittingly coincides with the beginning of an era of great opportunity and greater obligation. One hundred years ago the
people of the United States, few as they were, were scattered
in rural communities, the Indian and the game were near
every door, and by every door hung the rifle, the powder-horn
and the bullet mould. The men of Lexington and Concord
had little training, but every man knew how to shoot. Life
was closer to the simplicities of living, and every man knew
how to take care of himself out of doors, to feed himself, to
clothe himself under the simple and the hard conditions of
warfare. Armies were small; the opportunities for supply
were proportionately great. But now, with the increase of
our population, the collection of a large proportion of our
people in the great cities, with the disappearance of game,
with the increasing luxuries and refinements of life, the
volunteer armies upon which the Republic must in the main
depend to fight its wars, will be made up for the most part
of men who have never fired a gun. Armies are large and the
problems of supply, of transportation, have become complicated and difficult, requiring the best art of the best-trained
minds. The increase in the scientific qualities of attack and
1 General Porter, to whom Mr. Root refers, is the Honorable Horace Porter,
graduate of West Point of the class of 1860. During the Civil War, General Porter
served in the Federal army, and during the latter part of the war he was on General
Grant's staff and for his services was brevetted Brigadier-General, United States
Army. After the war he served as private secretary to President Grant. From 1897
to 1905 he was American Ambassador to France and in 1907 a delegate on the part
of the United States to the Second Hague Peace Conference.
General Porter, while Ambassador, discovered the burial place of John Paul
Jones in Paris, and through his exertions the body of John Paul Jones was transported to the United States, where it lies appropriately buried in Annapolis,




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117


defense, and the changes in the weapons of destruction,
have made it impossible that the man should come from the
counter and the plow and the workshop, and be familiar
with the tools which he has to use as a soldier.
And now, at the very time that this great institution of
military instruction is rounding out its first century of existence, the attention of our people has been sharply concentrated upon this increased necessity for military training and
military science by the events of the past few years; and the
conclusion which has been reached finds expression in the
action of the national legislature, which, through long discussion, but with absolute certainty, reaches just conclusions
in the end upon all great subjects of public importance. The
conclusion that the country needs the Military Academy
more at the beginning of the second century of its existence
than it did at the beginning of the first, is expressed by the
laws of Congress which have enlarged the number of your
corps, and which are just now devoting to the enlargement of
the accommodations of the Academy the munificent sum of
two million dollars, to be immediately expended, with an
authorized ultimate expenditure of five millions and a half.
How well you will be able to meet the obligation and to
justify this confidence, let the record of the American army
of today answer. For our army of America, small as it was,
and far across the sea, within a few weeks of active military
operation captured the fortified city of Santiago, took prisoners an army greater in number than itself, and ended in a
single short campaign the conflict with the power which once
controlled almost the whole of the western world. Having
accomplished that feat, the army gave to the island of Cuba
what it had won; it released the imprisoned; it healed the
sick; it cleaned the jails; it opened hospitals and asylums;
it dotted the country from end to end with schools; it gathered the children from the fields and forests and towns, and




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


set them in rows of bright and interested faces, with schoolbooks before them; it extirpated disease and saved more
lives than were lost in all the war; it established the most
wonderful school of government ever known, and for three
years has been teaching Cuban people how to govern themselves; and last, it has come away leaving a free and happy
and grateful people.
Its clear-sighted courage made straight the way from the
sea to Peking, and after the capture of the imperial city and
the rescue of the beleaguered legations, in the space of
a few short weeks the district of the city controlled by the
American army was found crowded with the people who had
returned to their customary vocations under the protection of
wise and just soldiers, who fought and who carried the blessings of peace and justice, as they fought, under the Stars and
Stripes.
In the Philippines, that great stretch of country extending
for more than a thousand miles from north to south, the army
has put down an insurrection of seven millions of people, so
that today peace reigns from the northernmost point of Luzon
to the southernmost island of the Sulu Archipelago. And with
the sword it has carried the schoolbook, the blessings of peace
and self-government and individual liberty; and now in little
more than three years after the great struggle began in February, 1899, nine-tenths of all the men who took part in the
insurgent government are engaged in sustaining or carrying
on the government of the Philippines, under the protection of
American liberty. Our soldiers have been criticised, and
some of them have been accused; but however ready men at
ease here may be to believe, to repeat, to rejoice in accusations against our brethren who are fighting under the American flag in support of American sovereignty, away upon the
other side of the world, let me tell you that the President and
the Secretary of War, and the officers, the public officers of




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119


our government at Washington, have followed these soldiers
of ours in report and in private letters and in telegraphic dispatches, and by the oral word of those who have returned,
during their whole course of conflict; have seen them there
often bare-footed, tramping through the jungle; have seen
them one by one dropping off, murdered by the treacherous
foe; have seen them fading from disease; have seen them
falling by shot and by sword; have seen them courageous,
patient, enduring, magnanimous, faithful, loyal always to the
highest standard of American citizenship, and we give you
our word that these men shall not be condemned unheard
by the public officers of the United States, charged to do
justice to them.
Be of good cheer, American soldiers! When the record
comes to be made up in the cool judgment of the American
people and of mankind; after Cuba, with its brilliant page,
after China, with its glorious achievement, will be written
another page equally brilliant, equally glorious, on which will
be recorded the achievements in war and in peace of the
American army in the Philippines.
All honor to the volunteers who have been and who must
always be the main support of our country in war. All honor
to the genius, the courage, the self-sacrifice of the men, many
of whom I see before me now, who have won immortal renown
as generals of the volunteer army. They will be the first
to say aye when I declare that the formative power, the
high standard of conduct, the informing spirit of every American army is to be found in the regular army of the United
States. All honor to the officers of the regular army, who in
true republican fashion have worked their way up from the
ranks, as did Chaffee, commanding in the Philippines. And
all honor to the officers who, turning aside from the allurements of wealth and honor in civil life, have been appointed
to the army as civilians, accepting the slender income and the




120     MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY
hard life that is known to accompany the duties of a soldier.
They will be with the first to say aye when I say that the
informing spirit, the high standard of the regular army,
are derived from the graduates, the teachings and the traditions of the Military Academy. Happy augury of the future
that here where for a hundred years honor has ever ruled,
honor made up of courage, truth, compassion, loyalty, is to
be found the formative and controlling power of the American army of the future, - regular, militia, and volunteer.
No army inspired by the spirit of the Military Academy
can ever endanger its country's liberty, or can ever desert
its country's flag.




THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE


ADDRESS AT THE LAYING OF THE CORNER STONE,
WASHINGTON, D.C., FEBRUARY 21, 1903
Mr. Root as Secretary of War created the Army War College. On February 21,
1903, its corner stone was laid, and on November 9, 1908, the building itself was
dedicated. Mr. Root delivered an address on each of these occasions, the first in
his capacity as Secretary of War, the second as Secretary of State and in his capacity
of founder of the War College.
The reader will find the aims and purposes of the War College stated and the
steps by which it was created set forth in those portions of Mr. Root's reports as
Secretary of War included in the present volume, pages 387-388, 390-399.
OT to promote war, but to preserve peace by intelligent
and adequate preparation to repel aggression, this institution is founded. It is a growth and not a new departure. It
is a natural and necessary development of the views with
which General Grant established the Artillery School at Fortress Monroe, General Sherman established the Infantry and
Cavalry School at Fort Leavenworth, and General Sheridan
established the School of Application for Cavalry and Light
Artillery at Fort Riley. Following the same policy an Engineers' School of Application, a School of Submarine Defense,
and an Army Medical School were afterwards established.
All of these institutions were practically suspended during
the war with Spain and in the Philippines.
When the time came for the reestablishment it had become
evident that not merely restoration, but an advance and
enlargement of military education were demanded by the
enlargement of our army, the advance and greater complexity
of military science, the increased proportion of officers who
had not the benefit of a West Point education, and the wider
range of military problems which the possibilities of our
national growth force upon our attention. The growth of
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separate institutions had reached a point where their efficiency could be increased and the results of their work could
be utilized best by bringing them into relation as parts of
a general system of military education under the inspection
and supervision of a single coordinating and controlling body,
and by supplementing their work with a post-graduate course
which should carry their best men onward along the lines of
research and of thought by which experience and theory combine to the making of skillful commanders of armies. Such
a system the army is now putting in force as rapidly as
possible.
The controlling and directing body is the War College
Board, consisting of five officers of rank specially detailed, and
the Chief of Engineers, the Chief of Artillery, the Superintendent of the West Point Military Academy, and the Commandant of the Leavenworth School, all under the presidency
of that gallant, experienced, and able soldier, Major-General
Samuel B. M. Young. Under their direction the school at
Fort Leavenworth has been reestablished and reorganized as
a General Service and Staff College, with the school at Fort
Riley as an accessory school of application. The special service schools have been reistablished. A system of schools has
been established at the principal posts and is being extended
to all the considerable posts of the country, under which a
compulsory course, following a prescribed curriculum, is
required from all junior officers.
It is the design of the Board, already provided by General
Orders, that the best men from the post schools shall be
graded up to the Leavenworth College and the special service
schools; that the best men from the Leavenworth College
and the special service schools shall be graded up to the postgraduate course of the War College, there to study and confer
upon the great problems of national defense, of military
science, and of responsible command. The courses of instruc



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123


tion in all the schools at all stages are in the highest degree
practical as well as theoretical, and military aptitude tested
by the exercise of actual command will hold a leading place
in the determination of merit.
To the men thus sifted out from the great mass of officers
by the demonstration of superior intelligence and devotion
to their profession the Commander-in-Chief will naturally
turn for details to important service and promotion to higher
rank. Membership in the War College will mean honor and
opportunity. In its confidential archives will be garnered the
results of the best thought of the army, and in the continuous existence of the institution, always changing in its elements as men come and go but remaining itself unchanged,
will be found continuity of knowledge, of thought, and of
military policy always available for practical uses under the
supervision of the General Staff, of which the War College
Board will form a part.
It is a common observation, and a true one, that practical
qualities in a soldier are more important than a knowledge of
theory, but this truth has often been made the excuse for
indolence and indifference, which, except in rare and gifted
individuals, destroy practical efficiency. It is also true that,
other things being equal, the officer who keeps his mind alert
by intellectual exercise, and who systematically studies the
reasons of action, and the materials and conditions and difficulties with which he may have to deal, will be the stronger
practical man and the better soldier. The same considerations which have led individual enterprise to build up the
great universities and technical schools, to which the graduates of our schools and colleges resort to perfect themselves
in every profession and in every branch of applied science,
apply with equal force to education in the science of war. It
is fitting that our government should profit by the lesson
which all its citizens have learned, that for success in any




124   MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


business the evolution from the simple to the complex must
be accompanied by a more perfect system, a more careful
selection of agents, and a broader training of the men upon
whom fall the responsibilities of control.
No better illustration of the necessity for such an institution
as this, and for a General Staff to make its work effective, can
be found than in the fate which befell the work of a soldier to
whose memory I wish to pay honor today - Brevet-MajorGeneral Emory Upton, Colonel of the 4th Artillery. Graduated from West Point in the year 1860, he became while
almost a boy one of the most distinguished officers of the Civil
War. He commanded successively a battery of artillery, a
regiment of infantry, a brigade of infantry, a brigade of artillery, and a division of cavalry. Constantly in the field, he
exhibited in camp and march and in scores of battles dauntless and brilliant courage, strict and successful discipline, and
the highest qualities of command. General James H. Wilson,
in his life of Professor Michie, said of Upton:
No one can read the story of his brilliant career without concluding that
he had a real genius for war, together with all the theoretical and practical
knowledge which any one could acquire in regard to it. He was the equal,
if not the superior, of Hoche, Desaix, or Skobeleff, in all the military
accomplishments and virtues, and up to the time when he was disabled
by the disease which caused his death he was, all things considered, the
most accomplished soldier in our service. His life was pure and upright,
his bearing chivalric and commanding, his conduct modest and unassuming, and his character absolutely without blemish. History cannot furnish a brighter example of unselfish patriotism, or of ambition unsullied
by an ignoble thought or an unworthy deed.
After the close of the Civil War, he addressed himself to the
task of interpreting the lessons of that war to his countrymen
for the improvement of our military system. Of his own
motion he devised a new system of tactics, which being capable of adoption by a simple military order was adopted and
revolutionized the tactics of the army. On the recommenda



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tion of General Sherman he was sent around the world with
two associate officers to study the armies of Europe and
Asia, and upon his return he made a report which gave the
results of all his accumulated experience and observation.
He recommended the three-battalion formation in cavalry
and infantry regiments. He recommended interchangeable
service in staff and line as against the permanent staff departments. He recommended examination as a condition to promotion. He recommended the establishment of a general
staff, and he recommended the general and systematic extension of military education. His recommendations had behind
them all the prestige of his brilliant military career. They
had the advocacy and support of the great soldier who then
commanded the American armies, General Sherman. They
embodied the practical lessons of the Civil War and the
results of military science throughout the world. Yet his
voice was as the voice of one crying in the wilderness. The
government did not even print his report, but with those of
his associates it was filed in manuscript and forgotten among
the millions of documents in the archives of the War Department. General Upton subsequently printed the report himself for the benefit of the public, through a private publisher.
A copy may now and then be found at a second-hand book
store.
More than a quarter of a century later, and long after death
had ended the restless striving of that far-seeing intelligence,
other men, working out the same problems with which he
dealt, found the sanity and wisdom of his conclusions and
gave them effect. Were Upton living today, still upon the
active list of the army, he would see all of the great reforms
for which he contended substantially secured: the threebattalion system, the interchangeability of staff and line,
examinations for promotion, and now, by the wisdom of the
present Congress, the establishment of a General Staff, and




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the completion of the system of military education under the
controlling body which will find its permanent home in the
building whose corner stone we lay today.
Many another officer has studied and striven and written
and appealed in vain for improvements in the military service, and has passed away, and he and his work have been
forgotten. The helplessness of the single individual who seeks
to improve a system has settled into hopelessness. The wisdom acquired in each officer's experience has been buried
with him. Only an institution perpetual but always changing in its individual elements, in which by conference and discussion a concensus of matured opinion can be reached, can
perpetuate the results of individual effort, secure continuity
of military policy, and command for its authorized, conclusive expression of military judgment upon military questions
the respect and effectiveness to which that judgment is
entitled.
I am sure that I speak truly when I say that Presidents
and Congresses and Secretaries of War invariably desire such
aid in the performance of their duties, and for this I look
with hope and confidence to the General Staff of the army
and its great adjunct, the War College, which we are now
establishing.




THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE


ADDRESS AT THE DEDICATION, NOVEMBER 9, 1908
T is not strange that on the shore of the beautiful Potomac,
in a land devoted to peace, there should arise a structure
devoted to increasing the efficiency of an army for wars.
The world is growing more pacific; war is condemned more
widely as the years go on. Humanity and the desire to promote the happiness of men are slowly but surely gaining
ground. Nevertheless, selfishness, greed, jealousy, a willingness to become great through injustice, have not disappeared,
and only by slow steps is man making progress. So long as
greed and jealousy exist among men, so long the nation must
be prepared to defend its rights. It must be possessed of
virile manhood and a capacity to prevent wrongdoing. In
order that this defense may be possible and this country may
not become a mere hulk of wealth, this institution has been
created.
At the beginning of the Spanish-American War, our little
army of 25,000 men was an effective force, but it was scattered over the entire country in little bands. Few officers had
seen great bodies of troops together since the Civil War.
There was no one at the head of the army to do the thinking;
to keep pace with the science of war. There were no means by
which the study of army officers could be made use of. There
was no coordination. The officers, while of the highest personal type, were unused to the handling of large bodies of
men. Although they studied, they had no common ground
on which they could come together. The benefit of their
study died with them. It was necessary that some measure
be taken as a remedy for this lack of coordination.
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The order of November 27, 1901, which promulgated a
general scheme of military education for the army of the
United States, and as part of that scheme created a General
Staff, was the product of earnest and long-continued study
on the part of the ablest officers of the army. This stately
building and the group of men here engaged in the study of
the highest military science, are evidence that the hope of the
promulgators of this scheme has met with fruition, and that
the liberality of the people and of Congress has ably seconded
this plan of military education.
We are warlike enough, but not military. In this we are
singularly like the English, and unlike other nations. We
have political ideas, but no mould of military ideas. History
shows that men are naturally brave, but that they always
have gone down before military science; and we must have
a knowledge of military science as well as bravery and
patriotism. It remains for the officers of the army now and
in years to come to justify the college in which the staff, the
Congress and the people are copartners. How are the officers
of the War College to justify their existence? I trust I may
be pardoned if I go into this subject and state some rules
which I believe to be necessary.
Be careful not to let your attention be focussed too strongly
on the administration of the army. The General Staff was
created with the primary object of studying military science.
You are brought together to do the thinking for the army,
not the mere administration.
Settle your military questions within the limits of the military establishment. Never permit a controversy of any description to pass beyond the doors of the War Department.
It is you who are brought together to settle military questions. The people are generous to the army and proud of it.
Don't go to them with quarrels and expect them to settle
them. Thrash these questions out, and then let the proper




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representative of the army, the Secretary of War, go to Congress with the results.
The army should consider itself an instructor. It is the
mould of form and the guide of practice for that greater army
of citizens which will take up arms in case of war. Remember
that when war shall come, - and it is idle to disregard the
possibility of its coming - it will be fought not by our
little standing army, but by the militia and the volunteers.
Instruction is needed to save that volunteer and militia army
from paying the frightful price our armies have repeatedly
paid for not learning the fundamental lessons of organization.
The regular army is to officer the citizen army.
Never forget your duty of coordination with the other
branches of the service —the naval, marine, and militia.
This is the time to learn to serve together without friction.
Remember always that the highest duty of a soldier is selfabnegation. Campaigns have been lost for no other cause
than the lack of that essential quality. Keep dissension and
jealousy out of the United States army. Officers, you have
no rights to rank and position incompatible with the best
interests of the service.
Do not cease to be citizens of the United States. The conditions of army life are such as to narrow your views. Strive
to broaden your sympathies by mingling with those outside
of the service and learning from them the things they can
teach you. As you are good soldiers, be good citizens. Let
our army be never one of aggression, but devoted to the
interests of justice and peace.








THE ARMY MEDICAL SCHOOL


ADDRESS AT THE GRADUATION EXERCISES,
WASHINGTON, D.C., APRIL 14, 1903
The Army Medical School was created by a General Order of the Adjutant
General's Office, dated Washington, June 24, 1893. It is located in the city of
Washington, and was opened October 1, 1893.
In his report for 1902, Mr. Root referred to the school in the following words:
The excellent work done by the Medical Department in the Army Medical
School in this city should not pass unnoticed. The school takes the young
surgeon, who has already graduated fom some regular medical college, and has
passed his examination and received a commission in the Medical Corps, and
instructs him to adapt his knowledge to the special requirements of military
service in surgery, medicine, and hygiene.
THE formula to be applied to these occasions requires
the officer delivering the diplomas to say something. It
also requires that what he says shall be brief.
I am glad of the opportunity to say to you that I hope the
address which has just been delivered, when it is printed, as
it will be, will be preserved by each one of you, and that on
the fourteenth of April every year during your connection
with the army you will read that address through from beginning to end and revive in your minds the wisdom enforced
by charming humor and sentiment with which Dr. Billings
has favored you.
I will add to what he has said my congratulations to you on
coming into a corps which can produce such men as he;
which has already a standard that you have got to live up to,
and by which you can measure your own growth or decadence in intellectual and moral stature.
About the only recognition that the Congress of the United
States has given to the American army for all the labors and
struggles of the past five years, is to be found in the signal
1 Dr. John S. Billings, formerly surgeon-general of the army.
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honor conferred upon a member of the Medical Corps of the
army by the statute making Dr. Gorgas a colonel in recognition of his distinguished service. That same honor would
have been conferred upon Dr. Walter Reed had it not been
for his untimely and lamented death.1
It is due to the untiring effort and the trained intelligence
of the Medical Corps that the army of the United States has
the extraordinary distinction of having in Cuba saved more
lives than it destroyed; so that the saving department of this
great agent of destruction has overbalanced, preponderated
over, the destructive element, and made a life-saving rather
than a life-destroying army.
I congratulate you upon your opportunities, - the opportunities of science secured to you by your position in the
army. I hope the opportunities are more to you than the
rank and pay and allowances, - the opportunity to pursue
your science, to develop yourselves, to accomplish something
for mankind, for your country, for your profession, free from
the restraints and difficulties that the necessity of bread and
butter throws before almost every scientific man.
The opportunities of the Medical Corps of the army are
constantly widening. The policy which is now being pursued
of taking care of the larger army in larger posts, instead of
scattering it in small posts, will greatly increase your opportunities for practice, for research and for individual growth.
The large posts where there will be the attrition among many
men, association with your seniors, and the opportunities
that come from a great collection of men, will take the place
for you of those little one and two company posts in which
the isolation and the lack of occupation and of opportunity
1 An act of Congress, approved March 3, 1905, provided for the purchase of a
site and the construction of an army general hospital in Washington, which was
named the Walter Reed General Hospital in honor of that distinguished officer who
died on November /4, 1900, of a disease contracted during his service in Cuba.




THE ARMY MEDICAL SCHOOL


133


caused so many a promising young man to dwindle and dry
up before he reached maturity.
Congress is continually broadening in its treatment of
every scientific branch of the army. It takes time and campaigns of education to secure the adoption of measures and
the grants of money necessary for great steps in advance;
but that kind of campaign is going on all the time, and I look
with great confidence to see at an early date complete success
following the efforts of your chief, the Surgeon-General, to
secure ample endowments for a greater Army Medical School,
and more complete hospital facilities for the members of your
corps in the city of Washington.
So you are entering a corps which is ennobled by its past
achievements and which has before it constantly broadening
opportunities for good, opportunities to do great things for
mankind, and to make a mark in the history of your profession and the history of the army. I congratulate you upon
it. I hope that you will never allow the desire to be military
men purely, - the desire to be soldiers, as distinct from doctors, to overcome you. I would rather hear a surgeon called
a surgeon in charge of a hospital than the commanding officer
of a hospital. I believe I have sometimes observed a tendency to sink the "Doctor" in the "Captain" or the
" Colonel." I think that this is doing injustice to a noble
profession, and that you will not become officers rather than
remain doctors. You cannot climb any higher in rank or
in title than you are when you stand on the pedestal of the
profession to which you gave your first loyalty, your first
adherence. But as members of two noble professions, both of
which have high standards of ethics and of ambition, you
ought to have every capacity that you possess developed to
the highest point, and to have through life the happiness
which comes, not from making fortunes, not from holding
great offices or wielding power, but which comes from well



134     MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY
employed, well-rounded, and useful lives, - the happiness
that comes from accomplishing things, from achievement,
from results and from individual growth and individual worth
attained by individual effort.
In the belief that you will so do honor to this institution
and to the army of the United States, it is with greatest
pleasure that I now hand you these diplomas.




THE CITIZENS' ARMY


ADDRESS OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR AT JUNCTION CITY,
KANSAS, MAY 2, 1903
T  HE only reason why I obey the order of the Commanderin-Chief to speak while you are wishing to hear him, and
to stand before you while you wish to see him, is that now 1
am before a community composed of the friends of the army
whose welfare I have so deeply at heart. The post of Fort
Riley, the great cavalry post of the United States, I know has
friends among you. It was founded as a heritage to his
country from the great cavalry general of the Civil War. It
is a monument to Philip Henry Sheridan. I believe it is and
always will be worthy of that great name. I am glad to have
the soldiers of the United States come out upon the great
rolling plains of Kansas and breathe the same air that makes
thevolunteer soldiers of Kansas. I wish nothing better for the
regular army than that it shall have the spirit of the 20th
Kansas when it goes into battle.
I beg you all to remember that you also are a part of the
army of the United States. These men in uniform are but
the committee of the citizens of America appointed to
organize the army which will fight the battles when war
comes, as war always does come sooner or later. You will be
the army. You women will be looking out eagerly for news
from camp and field where your brothers and husbands and
fathers are fighting the battles of our country; and their
health, their lives, their successes, their victories, their glory,
will depend upon the way in which this organizing committee
of war and they stand together in the relation of brotherhood and good fellowship. All citizens are members of the
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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


same great army of the future, and so when I pass by the
post of Fort Riley and come to Junction City, I see but two
branches of the military post- the organizing committee
and the body of the army itself. I bespeak from you kindliness and good fellowship with the men of the regular army,
and I enjoin upon them the cultivation of the duty of citizenship, of kindly relations with their fellow-citizens, in order
that when times of trial come all Americans - regular and
volunteer and militia - shall stand together in unity,
strength and efficiency, to fight the battles of our beloved
country.
I thank you for your patience in listening to me. I go
away with pleasant recollections of your strong typical
American faces, gladder than ever that the soldiers whose
welfare I am charged to promote are among so sound and
wholesome and true American people as are the people of
central Kansas.




THE MILITIA ACT OF 1903
ADDRESSES AT THE FIFTH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE INTERSTATE NATIONAL GUARD ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
COLUMBUS, OHIO, MAY 4, 1903
The Act to promote the efficiency of the Militia was approved January 21, 1903.
On May 4 and 5 following, the Fifth Annual Convention of the Interstate National
Guard Association of the United States was held in Columbus, Ohio, and the
Secretary of War was invited to address the convention. The president of the convention was Major-General Charles Dick, of the Ohio National Guard, then a member of the House of Representatives (subsequently United States Senator) and
chairman of the Committee on the Militia. General Dick reported the Act to
Promote the Efficiency of the Militia, which is printed in this volume, page
470. General Dick introduced Mr. Root to the convention in the following
address:
The National Guard never had a better friend than Secretary Root. He
has done great things for the army, but he has done as much for the National
Guard. His whole purpose in the administration of his office has been patriotic
and above criticism.
Realizing and appreciating what the sentiment of the country would sustain, and in what the people seemed to believe, he sought by such recommendations as he was able to make and such influence as he might exert, to bring
about their accomplishment. That he has succeeded all men who know will
attest.
In the legislation that has been accomplished for us, - I refer now to the
National Guard and speak largely for it, - we have had no more efficient
helper, no stronger or better influence, no more helpful and guiding judgment
than that of the Secretary of War; and if as a result of it we have received
more of recognition; if we have been elevated a little higher in the plane of
merit and respectability; if more is to come to us in the future, it is largely
due to what the Secretary of War has done for us and what he will do for us in
the time to come.
The legislation that Congress has passed would be useless indeed if it were
not well administered. It lies now largely in its administration to accomplish
the results proposed; but while he is Secretary of War we have every reason
to believe that its greatest success will be accomplished.
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It is a matter of great pleasure, and I esteem the privilege a great honor,
one to which this Association will gladly respond, to present to you the
Honorable Elihu Root, Secretary of War.
Mr. Root then spoke as follows:
AM very glad of the opportunity offered by your kind and
courteous invitation, to say a few things to the officers of
the National Guard collected from all parts of the country in
this convention, - nothing particularly new or original, but
things which I have from time to time said to individuals.
I am not going to undertake to teach you your business,
for I do not know much about it. I am going to speak to you,
however, in full recognition of the fact that we are engaged
in the same undertaking; that what my duty imposes upon
me as Secretary of War, is the very thing which you are
making sacrifices of time and effort and money to accomplish, and that is to place our country in a position where it
is able" to enforce the laws, suppress insurrection, and repel
invasion."
Some of my friends, both in the National Guard and in the
Regular Army, have given evidence of expectation that
immediately upon the passage of the Militia Act, to which
your president has referred, there would be published a code
of rules and regulations, and a series of decisions upon the
numerous questions which arise under that law, as questions
always must arise under every law. I think nothing could
have been more unfortunate than an attempt to formulate
a system of rules and make a series of decisions under that
law, in advance of patient and careful inquiry and conference.
It is a very broad and general statute; designedly framed
in very general terms, because it is to be applied to a great
variety of conditions, conditions in large cities and conditions in rural communities; conditions in many different
states, in widely separated parts of the country, and applied
to the National Guard in different stages of development,




THE MILITIA ACT OF 1903


139


and in communities some of them very rich and able to do a
great deal, and some of them comparatively poor, and able to
do but little. In determining the questions that arise, - as
they arise-this law must be adjusted to these varying conditions with just as much liberality and as sincere an effort to
get at the rights of things and to get at what is reasonable and
fair and will promote the purposes of the law, as is possible.
In endeavoring to apply such a law, the important thing
is to get at its controlling purpose, and to make every decision and reach every determination under it in such a way
as to conform to that purpose and promote it, instead of
frustrating it.
In determining what is the leading idea, the controlling
purpose of this law, it is necessary to go into the condition
which the law met - into the history of the militia of the
United States. It is familiar to us all that the original idea
of the founders of the Republic was, that the entire bodythe male population of the country - should constitute the
militia; that we should rely very little upon a standing
army, but that the able-bodied male citizens of the United
States between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, - each
one of them - should be a member of the militia; each one
of them should keep in his own home the gun and the powder
horn and the bullets and the various accouterments necessary
to enable him to go out and defend his country when he was
called.
We all know, too, that the expectation failed to be realized
in practice. We know that almost immediately after the
passage of the original militia bill, in 1792, the Presidents of
the United States, down, seriatim, commenced to ask Congress for further legislation regarding the militia; that
Washington asked for it; Jefferson asked for it; Madison
asked for it; and almost every administration since has
sought to strengthen it.




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The original militia system, based upon that idea, never
worked, and as time passed on and the conditions of life
became more complicated, it became less and less possible
that it should be operative, until it was absolutely a dead
letter, absolutely obsolete; so that we presented the extraordinary spectacle of a great country, a great people, whose
principles were opposed to the maintenance of any considerable standing army, relying upon a citizen soldiery for its
defense, and yet which had no law under which any preparation for defense whatever was made.
That was the situation which existed, so far as the national
preparation for defense went, down to the last session of the
last Congress.
In the meantime there had grown up in the states themselves bodies of state troops, troops for the immediate and
constant uses of the state; and those troops, although called
the " National Guard", were practically the army of Pennsylvania, of New York, of Ohio, of Georgia, of the different states by which they were maintained, and under the
command of whose governors they acted; a separate and
independent system, linked to the National Government only
by the fact that quite late in their history, - but a short
time ago - an appropriation was made by Congress to be
distributed among the different states in accordance with
their representation in Congress, without any reference to
whether they had a large or small National Guard.
These bodies of troops were not organized as a rule with reference to the service of the United States; they were organized
as a rule with reference to continuing as state troops, and not
to becoming national troops under any circumstances.
Under those conditions this bill was passed. It was passed
after many, a great many efforts, to secure some militia
legislation. And its fundamental idea is not to attempt to
revive the old militia idea and ignore the results of individual




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141


enterprise and state enterprise in the creation of our disciplined, organized, and armed bodies of soldiers, but to
recognize the existing fact that there are but two ways of
raising a body of soldiers; one is by selection and the other
is by volunteer effort, by voluntary service; and the fact that
in the National Guards of the state you will find the men
who are willing to give the volunteer service. To recognize
the fact that these bodies of troops in the states afford the
true basis for the militia system of the country; to recognize
the fact that whenever we come to fight a war, it will be
fought not by the old militia of 1792, but it will be fought
by a volunteer army, as the Civil War was fought, as the
war with Spain was fought, - the little handful of soldiers
of the regular army and the great body of volunteers; to
recognize the fact that these National Guard organizations
are the great school of the volunteer to which the country
must look, in order that its young men, when they go out
to fight the battles of their country, shall find officers competent to lead them, to organize them, to transport them,
to equip them, to feed them, to keep them in health, and
lead them against the enemy.
That is the fundamental idea of this law: to adopt as the
basis of the popular militia system the National Guard
organizations; to recognize the fact that those organizations
are the great school of the volunteer soldier, and to take
upon the shoulders of the United States the fair share of the
burden of maintaining these organizations, which are proportionate to the advantages the Aation will get from them.
Not to substitute payment from the national treasury for
payment from the state treasury, but to add to what the
states are doing in order to secure the services of the National
Guard for state purposes; to add to that what the Government of the United States can well afford to do, in return for
the advantages that the United States will get from the




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National Guard as the school of the volunteer soldier; to
add to it so that it may not take the place of state action,
but may add to the efficiency, the strength, the dignity, the
importance of the National Guard.
There you find the key to the construction of this act, and
you will find also the guide to the way in which you and I,
in which National Guardsmen, and soldiers of the regular
army, and citizens alike, ought to act under this law. The
law is to be construed for the purpose of aiding, of strengthening, of promoting the National Guard, and not for the purpose of hampering, or injuring, or interfering with it; the
law is to be construed With reference to its controlling
purpose - the intent of the legislation.
Take the question which has frequently been asked and
which has got to be settled by a regulation, when all the
information about it has been acquired. That is, the question
as to the minimum number in such organizations. That must
be settled in such a way that it will secure the greatest possible
efficiency in National Guard organizations, consistent with
maintaining those organizations. The minimum number
should not be fixed so that it will kill the organizations in the
rural community where you cannot get a large number
together, but it should be fixed so as to bring up that rural
community just as far as it can be brought, to the standard
of the greatest efficiency in discipline and strength. I am
trying to find out where that standard is. It would be a
great misfortune to decide it without getting all the information, all the light upon it possible.
Take another illustration. The question as to the requirement for five days' training during the year, preceding the
distribution under section 1661, as amended.' Query:
1 Sec. 1661 (Rev. Stats., U. S., p. 290) was amended June 6, 1900, increasing the
annual appropriation for the militia from $400,000 to $1,000,000. Sup. to Rev.
Stats., U. S., vol. 2, chap. 805, p. 1446.
Sec. 18 of the Act to Promote the Efficiency of the Militia, approved January 21,




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143


What kind of training, exercise, is required? How far is the
excuse of the governor to be allowed to go in relieving the
National Guard associations from that five days' training,
which is a prerequisite to the distribution of Federal
money?
That question has got to be treated in accordance with the
purpose of the act. It may well be that a different rule will
be applied in this first year from the rule that will be applied
hereafter; that is, we are not to treat the National Guard of
a state the same during the year which preceded the passage
of the act as we do the next year, when the state has had
fair notice of the act. The purpose of that provision is perfectly distinct. It is that the millions of dollars which the
National Government is going to expend shall not be made
the substitute for state appropriations; that the National
Government shall not step in and take all the burden of the
National Guard off of the state and carry it all itself, but
that the state shall do its share: it shall have a National
Guard, it shall have a National Guard which meets for the
purpose of training and discipline. It shall be a real genuine
institution, and not a paper institution, and that is to be the
condition of receiving this aid from the general Government,
that the general Government is not doing everything for
nothing. It is for the first time in its history giving an
equivalent for what it expects to get from you; but it gives
the equivalent only when the conditions are such that it can
1903, provides " that each State or Territory furnished with material of war under
the provisions of this or former Acts of Congress shall, during the year next preceding each annual allotment of funds, in accordance with section sixteen hundred and
sixty-one of the Revised Statutes as amended, have required every company, troop,
and battery in its organized militia not excused by the governor of such State or
Territory to participate in practice marches or go into camp of instruction at least
five consecutive days, and to assemble for drill and instruction at company, battalion, or regimental armories or rendezvous or for target practice not less than twentyfour times, and shall also have required during such year an inspection of each such
company, troop, and battery to be made by an officer of such militia or an officer of
the Regular Army." U. S. Stat. at L., vol. 32, part 1, p. 778.




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fairly expect to get something from you, and so a reasonable
construction must be given to it.
I want to say a word or two about the action which ought
to follow under this bill. The manner in which the bill
undertakes to help the National Guard is:
First. By furnishing the arms, the equipments, the
accouterments, the supplies, which you have been in the
habit of drawing against your quota in the annual million
dollar appropriation, furnishing them without charging
them up against that appropriation.
Second. By authorizing the Secretary of War to pay over
in cash the allotment under that appropriation, for the
purposes of state encampments and field exercises.
Third. By authorizing the Secretary of War to make
arrangements with the governor of any state, under which
the National Guard, or any part of it, may participate in
field exercise maneuvers, practice marches with the troops of
the regular army, and in that case to pay the expenses just
as if the National Guard troops taking part were troops of
the regular army - that is, to pay the transportation out of
the appropriation of Congress for the transportation of the
army; to pay subsistence out of the appropriation of Congress
for the subsistence of the army; to pay for the tentage, for
the quarters; and to pay the men regular army rates out of
the appropriation for the pay of the army - quite a distinct
thing, you will observe,from the former provision which gives
you your quota in cash for the purpose of state encampment.
Then, in the fourth place, by much enlarging the provisions
under which the officers of the regular army, both in the
active and the retired lists, may be utilized for purposes of
instruction and inspection in the National Guard of the
different states.
There is a consistent purpose running through the act, and
through those methods of assistance. I do not think I can




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145


state it better than by saying that its fundamental idea is
the idea of unity.
Whenever we come to a war - and come to it we know we
shall, - when, we do not know; but that we shall come to
it we do know, - whenever we come to war there will be but
one army of the United States; there will not be a regular
army, and a militia army, and a volunteer army; there will
be but one army of the United States, carrying but one flag,
answering but one command, the command of the constitutional Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States, with but one purpose to subserve. The
victories it wins will shed glory upon regular and militia and
volunteer alike, and the disasters that come from its failure
will involve the homes, the fortunes and the honor of all
alike.
The fundamental idea of this law is to recognize the
activity of the National Guard; to utilize that as the constitutional militia of the country; to utilize it as the great
school of the volunteer soldier; to make it a part of the military establishment of the United States; to lay down the
lines of activity so that the regular army and the National
Guard shall work together, and grow ever closer and closer
together, knit in bonds of sympathy and brotherhood,
preparing for a great struggle in a common cause.
No more fatal weakness exists in military affairs than
jealousy and dissension among the officers and soldiers of an
army. It has too often happened that there have been
jealousy and misunderstanding between officers and men of
the regular army and the National Guard. There has been
right and wrong on both sides. Now and then we find
officers of the National Guard who are suspicious and jealous;
now and then we find officers of the regular army who are
snobbish and supercilious. My impression is that if you
trace the two causes back, they will come together back in




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


the past, and one is the cause of the other. But they are the
exception; the rule is otherwise; and there is but one way
I know of to dispose of those exceptions, and that is the
method of honest, sincere work, side by side in the same
cause.
I venture to say - and I say it upon knowledge derived
from conversations with many officers, both of the regular
army and of the National Guard, who were together at Fort
Riley last fall, that not one officer, either of the regular army
or the National Guard, came away from the maneuvers at
that post last September without increased respect and
liking each for the other.
The idea of the provisions of this bill is to carry out the
kind of joint education which will do continually what was
done at Fort Riley.
There are certain qualities and attainments which a man
gets who devotes his entire life to a particular study, that
no one else can get; there are certain qualities and attainments which a man gets who is out in the free, rough-andtumble life of the world, that no man who has devoted himself to one particular occupation can get. There are elements
of strength and usefulness brought to this combination by
officers of the regular army which you gentlemen need, and
there are elements of strength and usefulness brought to it
by you which the officers of the regular army need; together
they will make a combination with which we can meet the
world.
With our eighty millions of people there never will be the
slightest difficulty in raising an army of any size which it is
possible to put into the field. Our trouble never will be in
raising soldiers; our trouble will always be the limit of possibility in transporting, clothing, arming, feeding and caring
for our soldiers, and that requires organization. Every one
realizes that where we strike the limit of effective action, is




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147


that line upon which you can go infinitely farther with
organization than you can by the light of nature. Careful
pre-arrangement and careful coordination of action of
numerous different agencies will carry on the capacity for
transporting, for arming, supplying, feeding and caring for
soldiers far beyond the point of first impression.
Looking forward to the possibilities of the future, looking
forward to the war that is coming with somebody sometime,
I regard the regular army as but an organizing committee, a
committee of organization for the accomplishment of certain
things which cannot be done except by the action of certain
people devoting their entire time to it; and I look upon the
National Guard as a committee for the accomplishment
of certain other things that cannot be done for that army
except by organization. You have got to have your quartermaster work, your commissary work, your financial work,
done by the National Government, and you have got to have
it done by national organization - to one source you must
go for your arms, your clothing, your food, your control of
transportation, and you have got to have national organization for that. But when you come to the creation of the
military spirit among the youth of the country, to the education and training of that military spirit, there you step in;
that is your function of preparation, for that cannot be done
at the center - that must be done all over this country.
The men who are leaders of opinion in their localities, who
are in charge of the troops, gathered in the several states,
enlisting the pride of their states, the two working together,
I have the utmost confidence will enable America to put into
the field whenever the time and the exigency come, an army
against which the whole round earth cannot contend.
We are beginning a new departure. The highest duty rests
upon every one who loves his country and is concerned in its
military efficiency-in the regular army and in the National




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Guard - to address himself to the application of this new
law in a spirit of kindliness and sympathy, of kindly concession and consideration, so that these results it is designed, and
I believe is destined to accomplish, may be accomplished.
With the right spirit they can; without that, it is impossible;
and I am confident that the whole question rests with the
officers and men of the two great organizations, the regular
army and the National Guard; and I am sure that if we
hold fast to the provisions of the Constitution, keeping
them clearly in mind-the provisions of the Constitution
now first accepted by Congress in this law - we cannot
go far astray.
You will remember that the eighth section of the first
article provides that Congress shall have power "to raise and
support armies "; "to provide for calling forth the militia
to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and
repel invasions; to provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as
may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to
the discipline prescribed by Congress."
That is what this law provides. It may be that the general
provisions which Congress has made for the execution of this
constitutional power for organizing, arming, and disciplining
the militia will to some of you be irksome. They may
interfere here and there with some of the arrangements you
have made in your own states, and which you prefer. But
so many are the sacrifices which you have made and are
making to secure an adequate military force, that surely you
can make a little further sacrifice of your own preferences, of
your own wishes, of your own convenience, in order that we
may have one system, in order that when the time of trial
comes, every officer and every soldier may be moving along




THE MILITIA ACT OF 1903


149


the same lines, according to the same discipline, the same
system, with the same arms, and accomplishing by united
and never-discordant effort, the result sought.
In conclusion, I wish to call your attention to the provision
of the Constitution, in the tenth section of the first article,
that "no state shall, without the consent of Congress,...
keep troops or ships of war in time of peace," and I congratulate the National Guard upon being now, probably for the
first time, unquestionably a constitutional force.
MILITARY PREPARATION THE GUARANTY OF PEACE
The evening of the same day, the Secretary of War was again called upon to
address the Convention, and, after introductory remarks, continued as follows:
I HAVE been this afternoon in this convention of officers of
the National Guard; later at the parade and review of the
students at the State University - the military battalion of
that institution - later at a review of the soldiers at the
Columbus Barracks. It all has a deep and serious meaning.
Sooner or later the time will come when your husband,
brothers, lover, - God grant that it may be so far distant
that it may be your sons, - but sooner or later the time will
come when what these men are doing here will mean life or
death.
One of the saving things about doing work in the public
service is that it is work for all time. You and I come and
go; what we do for ourselves dies with us; but the great
country, the institution, lives; the power of civilization, the
great bulwarks of liberty, of justice, of human happiness,
remain, generation after generation, century after century;
and what these men, my friends, citizens of Columbus, what
these men are doing is laying stones in the structure of
national strength that will endure century by century.
Within the memory of men now living but a few thousand
of people were gathered in the Atlantic States, with a few




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


pioneers pushing their way out into the wilderness. Now
eighty millions of people stretch from the Atlantic to the
Pacific. Within the experience of those now within the
sound of my voice, the eighty millions will have grown to
two hundred millions; we shall have grown so large that
the whole world outside of America will be jostling against
us, and unless America is strong to defend its rights; unless
America has not merely the men and the money, but the
trained intelligence and the skill to defend its rights - by
force if need be -America will break into an hundred
parts and the government which we love and under which we
enjoy the blessings of freedom and of justice, will cease from
the face of the earth.
It is that America shall be strong to defend the right; that
she shall have not merely the latent power, but the everready school of knowledge to defend the right, that these
men, my friends, are devoting their time, their means, their
efforts to the service of their country, in the National Guard
and the Regular Army of our country.
Nor does it mean war; it means peace, because undefended wealth but invites aggression. The house which has
in its doorway the strong man armed is passed by the predatory hordes which still exist upon the face of the earth. The
millennium is still far distant. Revenge and wrong still
claim their own. Injustice still tyrannizes over the weak, and
unless we are ready to defend our rights, our property, our
homes, our honor, we go to the wall. But if we are ready,
if the results of the work of this convention are wrought out
to their true and natural end with the resources, the power,
the sturdy people, and the immeasurable wealth of America,
peace will reign, the peace that stays with the just man
armed; and all this pomp and heraldry, all the trappings
and the music, all the form and the ceremony, which to the
thoughtless may seem to be but idle play or preparation for




THE MILITIA ACT OF 1903            151
sanguinary conflict, are really but engines of peace and justice, and the reign of law and righteousness.
I thank you for the kind welcome, not only for the kind
welcome which you have given to me, but for the kind welcome which you have given to these gentlemen who are
working for the same cause and in the same field.




I
I




THE EXPORT OF ARMS AND MUNITIONS OF
WAR TO AMERICAN COUNTRIES
ADDRESS IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
MARCH 13, 1912
On March 13, 1912, Mr. Root asked unanimous consent for the consideration of
a joint resolution which he introduced. There being no objection, the Senate
proceeded to consider the joint resolution (S. J. Res. 89) to amend the joint resolution to prohibit the export of coal and other material used in war from any seaport
of the United States, approved April 22, 1898.
The joint resolution introduced by Mr. Root was slightly amended and passed
the Senate, March 13. On March 14, it was again slightly amended and passed the
House, the Senate concurring in the House amendment. As approved by the President, March 14, the joint resolution reads:
That whenever the President shall find that in any American country conditions of domestic violence exist which are promoted by the use of arms or
munitions of war procured from the United States, and shall make proclamation thereof, it shall be unlawful to export except under such limitations and
exceptions as the President shall prescribe any arms or munitions of war from
any place in the United States to such country until otherwise ordered by the
President or by Congress.
Sec. 2. That any shipment of material hereby declared unlawful after such
a proclamation shall be punishable by fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars,
or imprisonment not exceeding two years, or both.
In explaining the joint resolution, Mr. Root said:
WILL explain that the joint resolution is the outcome of a
conference called by the President this morning with such
members of the Texas delegation in the Senate and House of
Representatives and such members of the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives as he could
conveniently reach, for the purpose of securing the extension
of his power to prevent the wholesale passing of arms and
munitions of war across the Texas frontier into Mexico. At
that conference, at which quite a large number of gentlemen
participated, there was a general expression of opinion that
we ought to take up and amend our very antiquated neutrality laws; but the suggestion was made and met with general
153




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approval, although without any formal action, that that was
a very large subject which would require long-continued
consideration and discussion, affecting, as it must, all countries in the world, and all possible contingencies. It was
thought, however, that the immediate situation, which is now
very pressing, could be dealt with by a slight extension of the
power already conferred upon the President by an existing
joint resolution passed on April 22, 1898. That joint resolution is as follows:
Resolved, etc., That the President is hereby authorized, in his discretion,
and with such limitations and exceptions as shall seem to him expedient,
to prohibit the export of coal or other material used in war from any
seaport of the United States until otherwise ordered by the President or
by Congress.
The idea was to extend that joint resolution so that it
would apply not only to seaports, but to exports from inland
places across the border line.
The joint resolution was taken up by the Committee on
Foreign Relations, was carefully considered, and, with many
suggestions from different members of the committee, was
perfected in such form that the Committee on Foreign Relations by unanimous vote authorized me to introduce the
joint resolution in the Senate and to ask for its present consideration, with the statement that it has the approval of
that committee.
The situation in Texas is such that it does not admit of
delay for the purpose of the general reform of our neutrality
laws, and the people of Texas are deeply interested in having
this extension of power to the President made immediately.
With the extension of the application of the joint resolution
from seaports to all places in the United States, the committee thought it was advisable to put some limitation upon
the power which is included in the existing law, and so the
power of the President to forbid the exportation of arms and




EXPORT OF ARMS AND MUNITIONS OF WAR 155
munitions has been limited to countries in which he finds that
domestic violence is being promoted by the procurement
of arms and munitions of war from the United States. At
the same time a penalty is affixed for the violation of the
prohibition.
The conditions are such that thousands of Americans in
Mexico are now fleeing from their homes there and abandoning their occupations, their mines, their manufactories, and
their business, because it is necessary to do so to prevent
their lives from being destroyed by arms and munitions which
are being sold and transported across the border from the
United States. I hope that the joint resolution may be
promptly passed.




I




THE POWER OF THE PRESIDENT TO SEND
UNITED STATES TROOPS OUT OF
THE COUNTRY
ADDRESS IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
AUGUST 14, 1912
On August 14, 1912, the Senate having under consideration the Army Appropriation bill, Senator Bacon, of Georgia, proposed an amendment to the effect that no
part of the money therein appropriated should be used for the pay or supplies of any
part of the army of the United States employed, stationed, or on duty in any country beyond the jurisdiction of the laws of the United States; provided, that the
prohibition should not apply to cases of emergency, within the discretion of the
President, arising when Congress was not in session. In support of his amendment,
Mr. Bacon said that the country had come to a stage where the Executive orders the
army into foreign countries, without the authority of Congress, not only when Congress is not in session, but when Congress is in session, and without communicating
the fact to Congress. He referred especially to the sending of troops into China
during the Boxer War, and said that there was no communication sent to Congress
at that time. He referred to the fact that Mr. Root, the then Senator from New
York, was at that time the Secretary of War.
Senator Bacon's proposed amendment was rejected by viva voce vote, prior to
which Mr. Root made the following remarks:
BEFORE this matter is disposed of I wish, not to argue
the question which has been suggested by the Senator
from Georgia [Mr. Bacon], but to express my dissent from
the position he takes.
In my judgment there is no law which forbids the President to send troops of the United States out of this country
into any country where he considers it to be his duty as
Commander-in-Chief of the Army to send them, unless it be
for the purpose of making war, which, of course, he cannot do.
Doubtless Congress could by law forbid the troops' being
sent out of the country; doubtless Congress has not done it;
and I apprehend that any Congress which undertook to do
it would find a general protest from the people of the United
States against depriving the Commander-in-Chief of theArmy
of the power to protect our citizens under those circumstances
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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


which exist widely throughout the world, in countries whose
governments have not the power to maintain order within
their jurisdiction. From timeimmemorial it has been the practice of civilized nations to send troops into those countries
whose governments were too feeble or too ill-organized, too
deficient in power to enforce their laws and protect foreigners.
From time immemorial it has been the practice of civilized
nations to render protection to their own citizens, to their own
consuls, to their own ministers, ambassadors, and legations.
That was the situation in China in the summer of 1900,
when the minister of the United States, the members of his
legation, and the American citizens who gathered there for
safety, were surrounded by an armed force which the
Government of China professed itself unable to control.
Our troops went just far enough and not one step farther
than was necessary to preserve them from murder.
And now, if I am not mistaken, Congress has appropriated
money for the specific purpose of building quarters in Peking,
to be used for the housing of troops who shall be stationed
there to prevent a recurrence of that most deplorable
condition.
It is the unanimous judgment of the men who saved the
legations in Peking in 1900, of the officers who had command of the troops who rendered that great service to civilization, that the way to prevent a recurrence of that condition
is to keep open the communication between the embassies
and legations in Peking and the seacoast. And I say there is
no law, and I do not believe there ever was a law, and I do
not believe there ever will be a law, to prevent the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States
from rendering that service which, through all civilization,
has been rendered by every nation that is entitled to the
loyalty of its citizens, in giving them the protection required
by self-respect.




PART II
FROM THE REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY
OF WAR, 1899-1903




i~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
I~~~~~~~~




THE PRINCIPLES OF COLONIAL POLICY


PORTO RICO, CUBA AND THE PHILIPPINES
Extract from the Report of the Secretary of War for 18991
THE Treaty of Paris provides:
The civil rights, and political status of the native inhabitants of the
territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the
Congress.
I assume, for I do not think that it can be successfully disputed, that all acquisition of territory under this treaty was
the exercise of a power which belonged to the United States,
because it was a nation, and for that reason was endowed with
the powers essential to national life, and that the United
States has all the powers in respect of the territory which it
has thus acquired, and the inhabitants of that territory, which
any nation in the world has in respect of territory which it has
acquired; that as between the people of the ceded islands
and the United States the former are subject to the complete
sovereignty of the latter, controlled by no legal limitations
except those which may be found in the treaty of cession;
that the people of the islands have no right to have them
treated as states, or to have them treated as the territories
previously held by the United States have been treated; or
to assert a legal right under the provisions of the Constitution
which was established for the people of the United States
themselves and to meet the conditions existing upon this
continent; or to assert against the United States any legal
right whatever not found in the treaty.
I assume, also, that the obligations correlative to this great
power are of the highest character, and that it is our unques1 Page 24.
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tioned duty to make the interests of the people over whom we
assert sovereignty the first and controlling consideration in
all legislation and administration which concerns them, and
to give them, to the greatest possible extent, individual freedom, self-government in accordance with their capacity, just
and equal laws, and opportunity for education, for profitable
industry, and for development in civilization.
The people of the ceded islands have acquired a moral right
to be treated by the United States in accordance with the
underlying principles of justice and freedom which we have
declared in our Constitution, and which are the essential
safeguards of every individual against the powers of government, not because those provisions were enacted for them,
but because they are essential limitations inherent in the very
existence of the American Government. To illustrate: The
people of Porto Rico have not the right to demand that duties
should be uniform as between Porto Rico and the United
States, because the provision of the Constitution prescribing
uniformity of duties throughout the United States was not
made for them, but was a provision of expediency solely
adapted to the conditions existing in the United States upon
the continent of North America; but the people of Porto
Rico are entitled to demand that they shall not be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, that
private property shall not be taken for public use without
compensation, that no law shall be passed impairing the
obligation of contracts, etc., because our nation has declared
these to be rights belonging to all men. Observance of them
is a part of the nature of our Government. It is impossible
that there should be any delegation of power by the people of
the United States to any legislative, executive, or judicial
officer which should carry the right to violate these rules
toward any one anywhere; and there is an implied contract
on the part of the people of the United States with every




PRINCIPLES OF COLONIAL POLICY


163


man who voluntarily submits himself or is submitted to our
dominion that these rules shall be observed as between our
Government and him, and that in the exercise of the power
conferred by the Constitution upon Congress, "to dispose
of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the
territory or other property belonging to the United States,"
Congress will hold itself bound by those limitations which
arise from the law of its own existence.
The problem of civil government in the islands yielded or
ceded by Spain presents itself in the simplest form in the case
of Porto Rico. That island is fully and without question
under the sovereignty of the United States. It came to us
not only by legal right, but with the cheerful and unanimous
desire of its people, who are peaceful and loyal and eager for
the benefits to be derived from the application of American
ideas of government. There is no obstacle in the way of our
providing for Porto Rico the best government which we are
capable of devising for people situated as are the inhabitants
of that island.
The questions presented by the consideration of the measures which ought to be taken for the government of Porto
Rico are threefold: (1) What form of government shall be
established, and what participation in that government shall
the people of the island have? (2) What shall be the treatment of the municipal law of the island, and how far shall the
laws which now regulate the rights and conduct of the people
be changed to conform to the ideas prevalent among the people of the United States? (3) What economic relations shall
be established between the island and the United States?
(1) In determining the question as to the form of government, and the participation of the people of the island
therein, the most important fact to be considered is that the
people have not yet been educated in the art of self-government, or any really honest government. In all their experi



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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


ence and in all their traditions, law and freedom have been
ideas which were not associated with each other, but opposed
to each other; and it is impossible that a people with this
history - only ten per cent of whom can read or writeshould ever have acquired any real understanding of the way
to conduct a popular government. I do not doubt their
capacity to learn to govern themselves; but they have not
yet learned. There are among them many highly educated
and able men, public-spirited and patriotic, and these show
what their people are capable of becoming; but there are not
enough of them to make a working government which would
be anything but an oligarchy, and many of them have merely
a theoretical rather than a practical acquaintance with the
processes of government.
The difficulty does not consist merely of a lack of familiarity with the methods and processes of government; it
lies deeper than that in the fact that the Porto Ricans, as
a people, have never learned the fundamental and essential
lesson of obedience to the decision of the majority. They
have had no opportunity to learn and they never have
learned. There can be no free government without a loyal,
voluntary personal subjection to the peaceful decisions
reached by lawful processes.
In the experiments which have already been tried in municipal elections, and toward government by municipal boards,
the minority which is voted down almost invariably refuses
to participate further in the business of government.
The attitude of the defeated party is precisely that which
causes the continual revolutions in the government of other
West Indian islands and the Central American states in the
same latitude. This habit marks a rudimentary stage of
political development, and before the people of Porto Rico
can be fully intrusted with self-government they must first
learn the lesson of self-control and respect for the principles




PRINCIPLES OF COLONIAL POLICY


165


of constitutional government, which require acceptance of
its peaceful decisions. This lesson will necessarily be slowly
learned, because it is a matter not of intellectual apprehension, but of character and of acquired habits of thought and
feeling. It would be of no use to present to the people of
Porto Rico now a written constitution or frame of laws, however perfect, and tell them to live under it. They would
inevitably fail without a course of tuition under a strong and
guiding hand. With that tuition for a time their natural
capacity will, it is hoped, make them a self-governing people.
A form of government should be provided for Porto Rico
which will assure the kind of administration to which we are
accustomed, with just as much participation on the part of
Porto Ricans as is possible without enabling their inexperience to make it ineffective, and with opportunity for them to
demonstrate their increasing capacity to govern themselves
with less and less assistance.
I think that some such provisions should be made for
future government as the following:
That we should first declare definitely, by statute, what
general laws of the United States are to be extended to the
Porto Ricans, such as, for instance, the postal laws, the
banking laws, the customs, navigation and internal-revenue
laws with such modifications as may be deemed advisable,
the laws against counterfeiting, the anti-trust laws, etc.; and
provide for Federal officers to execute these laws just as they
are executed in the various states and territories of the
Union; that there should be a provision for a Federal judiciary in the island, with the same kind of jurisdiction which
is exercised by the Circuit and District Courts of the United
States, and that jurisdiction to review their determinations
should be vested in the Supreme Court of the United States,
or in a designated Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court of the United States.




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That there should be a form of local insular government
provided which shall have complete control over the rights,
property, and obligations of the people of the island, substantially covering the field covered by the government of
our respective states, and subject to limitations prescribed
by Congress, of the same character as the constitutional
limitations generally imposed upon our state legislatures.
That the framework of this government should be substantially as follows: A governor, to be appointed by the
President of the United States with the advice and consent
of the Senate; the chief officers of state customary under our
system, such as secretary of state, attorney-general, treasurer, auditor or comptroller, superintendent of public
works, and superintendent of education, to be appointed in
like manner; and a legislative council, to be composed of the
chief officers of state, and a minority selected from the people
of the island by the President; that all acts of the council
should be subject to the veto power of the governor or to be
passed over the veto by a two-thirds vote, and no law should
take effect until it has remained without disapproval for
thirty days after presentation to Congress or to the President
of the United States, if passed when Congress is not in session; that there should be a supreme court of the island,
composed of judges appointed by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate and having appellate jurisdiction only; trial courts in separate districts, having general
original jurisdiction, with judges and officers to be appointed
by the governor, and a petty court in each municipality;
that the several municipalities now existing in the island,
with such consolidations and alterations of boundaries as the
council shall prescribe, shall be governed by mayors and
municipal councils, to be elected by the people of the municipalities, each municipality to be free from control in the
exercise of the powers of local government, except as it shall




PRINCIPLES OF COLONIAL POLICY


167


be controlled by statute, and except as its officers shall be
liable to removal by the governor in case of failure faithfully to perform their duties, and with power in the governor
in case of such failure to order a new election and to fill
vacancies in the meantime.
Such a system as this is not without precedent in our own
experience, for the provision of a governor and council was
frequently adopted in our early territorial legislation. It
would give to the people of the island participation in the
government, and would afford them an opportunity both to
acquire and to demonstrate capacity for the conduct of
government.
The question whether there might not now be provision
made for a legislature elected by the people of the island is not
free from doubt, but in view of their present inexperience I
think that it would be better to postpone such a provision
until the people can have had an opportunity for exercise in
municipal government and until the first formative period
of adapting the laws and procedure of the island to the new
conditions shall have passed under the direction of a council
composed of Porto Ricans selected for their known capacity
and wisdom, and Americans from the States competent and
experienced in dealing with legislative and administrative
problems. The constitution of such a legislature should be
contemplated as a step to be taken in the near future.
I think the basis of suffrage should be that all who can read
and write, or who hold property up to a specified small
amount, may vote, and no others. With a sufficient system
of free primary education, the entire people should acquire
the suffrage on this basis fully as soon as they are capable of
using it understandingly.
For the successful working of such a scheme, or of any
scheme of government for the island, it will be necessary that
some cardinal rule shall be adopted and rigidly followed




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


regarding appointment to office. Wherever a Porto Rican
can be found capable and willing to perform official duties he
should be selected, and the aim should be to include in the
civil service of the island no greater number of Americans
from the United States than are necessary for the introduction of the methods of administration in which Americans
have been trained and Porto Ricans have not.
Wherever it is necessary to employ Americans, except in
the chief offices, a system of civil-service examination should
be provided, under which requests from the governor of Porto
Rico for suitable persons to be appointed may be filled. /
A necessary element to the success of this, or any sch/re
of government in Porto Rico, is the complete establishmet of
a system of education which will afford the opportunity for
every child of school age in the island to acquire elementary
instruction. The cost of this should be defrayed from the
insular treasury if its revenues are sufficient, and if not it
should be regarded as a duty of the highest obligation resting
upon the United States, and the expense should be borne by
the United States....
(2) The answer to the second question, " What shall be the
treatment of the municipal law of the island, and how far
shall the laws which now regulate the rights and conduct of
the people be changed to conform to ideas which prevail
among the people of the United States? " presents little real
difficulty. The civil code established by Spain for Cuba,
Porto Rico, and the Philippines, and in force at the time of
the cession, is an excellent body of laws, adequate in the
main, and adapted to the customs and conditions of the
people. It should be continued in force, with such gradual
modification as experience from time to time suggests to
those who are actually engaged in enforcing it.
The trouble has not been that the law was defective or
vicious, but that it has never been fairly and honestly




PRINCIPLES OF COLONIAL POLICY


169


administered. The course of such an administration will
naturally lead to amendments and improvements, regarding
which the people themselves who are to be affected by them
should have a voice. The customs and conditions of the
people who are to be governed must furnish the true basis for
the law under which they are to live, and any attempt to substitute in these southern islands a system of laws based on the
experience and characteristics of a New England community
would be both oppressive and futile.
In order to secure a good administration of the laws,
extensive changes in procedure will be necessary, and there
should be material changes in the criminal law. The conditions of life are comparatively simple, and both the criminal
laws and the methods of procedure may, in the first instance
at least, be made simple also.
One of the ablest groups of men who ever addressed themselves to such a question in this or any other country undertook a similar task in adapting the laws of Louisiana, long
living under Spanish law, to the new conditions which followed the cession of that territory to the United States. The
course above outlined closely resembles the one they worked
out and followed with such signal success.
A similar course was followed after the acquisition of
Lower Canada by the English in 1763. The French province
had been governed by the laws and ordinances of France and
the custom of Paris, a mingled system of Roman and Frankish law. By the statute of 14, George III, the English law
was introduced in criminal matters, and the private law in
civil matters was left undisturbed. The result appears to
have been entirely satisfactory both to the French population of Quebec and to the remainder of the Dominion which
has been settled and governed under English law.
(3) The question of the economic treatment of the island
underlies all the others. If the people are prosperous and




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


have an abundance of the necessities of life, they will with
justice be easily governed, and will with patience be easily
educated. If they are left in hunger and hopeless poverty,
they will be discontented, intractable, and mutinous. The
principal difficulty now in the island of Porto Rico is that the
transfer of the island from Spain to the United States has
not resulted in an increase of prosperity, but in the reverse.
The industry of the island is almost entirely agricultural. The
people live upon the products of their own soil and upon the
articles for which they exchange their surplus products
abroad. Their production is in the main coffee, sugar, and
tobacco. The prosperity of the island depends upon their
success in selling these products.
So long as the island was a part of the Spanish possessions
there was substantially free trade with Spain and with Cuba.
The total exports from Porto Rico for the four years preceding 1897 averaged about $16,609,000, of which an average of
less than one-sixth part ($2,630,000) was sold to the United
States and an average of one-half ($8,025,000) was sold to
Spain and Cuba. Immediately upon the transfer of the island
from Spain to the United States, Spain erected a tariff
barrier against the introduction of Porto Rican products.
The interests of Cuban agriculture led to the erection of a
similar barrier in the tariff adopted for Cuba, so that Porto
Rico was debarred from the principal markets which she had
previously enjoyed, and at the same time this country has
maintained its tariff against Porto Rican products just as it
existed while the island was Spanish territory. The result is
that there has been a wall built around the industry of Porto
Rico.
Even before the hurricane of August 8, 1899, two crops of
tobacco lay in the warehouses of Porto Rico, which the
owners were unable to sell at prices equal to the cost of production. Their sugar shared the prevailing depression in




PRINCIPLES OF COLONIAL POLICY


171


that commodity, arising from the competition of bounty-fed
beet sugar. Their coffee was practically unknown in the
United States and had no market here. It is plain that it is
essential to the prosperity of the island that she should receive substantially the same treatment at our hands that she
received from Spain while a Spanish colony, and that the
markets of the United States should be opened to her as were
the markets of Spain and Cuba before the transfer of allegiance. Congress has the legal right to regulate the customs
duties between the United States and Porto Rico as it pleases;
but the highest considerations of justice and good faith
demand that we should not disappoint the confident expectation of sharing in our prosperity with which the people of
Porto Rico so gladly transferred their allegiance to the
United States, and that we should treat the interests of this
people as our own; and I wish most strongly to urge that the
customs duties between Porto Rico and the United States be
removed.
Our temporary occupation of the island of Cuba involves a
very simple plan of operation, with some difficulties in its
application which are apt to be overlooked by those who are
impatient for immediate results. The control which we are
exercising in trust for the people of Cuba should not be, and
of course will not be, continued any longer than is necessary
to enable that people to establish a suitable government to
which the control shall be transferred, which shall really represent the people of Cuba and be able to maintain order
and discharge international obligations. When that government is established it will be its duty and right to solve for
Cuba the problems above discussed in regard to Porto Rico.
Our present duty is limited to giving every assistance in our
power to the establishment of such a government, and to
maintaining order and promoting the welfare of the people of
Cuba during the period necessarily required for that process.




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The conduct of the Cuban people has been admirable.
There have, of course, been some agitators who have loudly
voiced their discontent over not being allowed personally
to conduct the government, but the substantial body of
educated Cubans have shown themselves to be patriotic,
appreciative, and helpful, while the great body of uneducated Cubans have been patient and law-abiding. The fact,
however, that probably two-thirds of the people of the island
are unable to read and write; that the people in general have
had no experience in any real self-government, but have been
for centuries under the dominion of arbitrary power; that
the bloody conflicts which raged so long have necessarily left
behind bitter factional feeling, make it necessary to proceed
somewhat more slowly in the formation of a government
which is to command universal respect and allegiance than
would be necessary in a country accustomed to the discussion
of public questions, familiar with the problems presented,
and trained to the acceptance of the decisions reached by the
ballot.
The year allowed by the treaty for the Spanish population
of the island to elect whether they will be Cuban or Spanish
citizens will expire on the eleventh of April next. It will then,
for the first time, be possible to determine who are the citizens
of Cuba entitled to take a part in her government. By that
time it is believed that, the results of the census having been
computed and tabulated, we shall be ready to provide for
municipal elections, which will place all the local governments of the island in the hands of representatives elected by
the people, and that when these local governments, thus
elected, are established they will be ready to proceed to the
formation of a representative convention to frame a constitution and provide for a general government of the island,
to which the United States will surrender the reins of government. When that government is established the rela



PRINCIPLES OF COLONIAL POLICY


173


tions which exist between it and the United States will be
matter for free and uncontrolled discussion between the two
parties.
The uncertainty which retards the industrial development
of Cuba and prevents the influx of capital is not only as to
the character of the future government and the safety of investments, but an uncertainty as to the future market for the
sugar product of the island, upon which the prosperity of the
island chiefly rests. The competition of the bounty-fed beetsugar product of Europe has already reduced the price which
can be realized for cane sugar to a point so near the cost of
production that the cane producer cannot pay expenses by
the old method of production. Only the new and improved
methods, on a large scale and in the most economical manner,
and requiring large capital, make a successful competition
on his part possible. The sugar producer of Cuba now finds
himself confronted by two additional dangers - one, the
prospect that the sugar of Porto Rico, like that of Hawaii
and possibly that of the Philippines, may be admitted into
the great market of the United States free of duty, while
Cuban sugar is required to pay duty; and the other, the
prospect of ratification by the Senate of the reciprocity
treaties already negotiated, under which the sugar of the
British West Indies would be admitted to the United States
at a twenty per cent reduction of duties, while Cuban sugar
would continue to pay the full duty.
The following table shows the comparative returns to the
producers of sugar in the principal countries from which the
United States derives its supply, after allowing for the duties
imposed under the conditions above stated, and assuming
the basis of the New York price July 1, 1899, of four and onehalf cents per pound for standard, ninety-six test, centrifugal
sugar:




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


Charges      Germany  Cuba    Java   English  Porto  Hawaii
Colonies  Rico
Duties:              Cents   Cents   Cents  Cents   Cents   Cents
Tariff........... 1.685  1.685  1.685   1.348  None    None
Countervailing.....59   None    None   None    None    None
Estimated freights.....080.100.300.100.180.270
Insurance on f. o. b.
value..............00  5.00.028.032.090
2.044
Less bounty...........259
1.785
F. o. b. value....... 2.715  2.690  2.465  3.024   4.288  4.140
4.50    4.50   4.50    4.50    4.50    4.50
Foreign value above... 2.71  2.69   2.46    3.02    4.28   4.14
It appears from this comparison that if these conditions are
to exist, the Cuban producer would realize but 2.69 cents per
pound for his product, as against 2.71 cents for the German,
3.02 cents for the British West Indian, 4.14 cents for the
Hawaiian, and 4.28 cents for the Porto Rican producer.
Under these conditions, as the United States is the great
market for Cuban sugar, and the prosperity of Cuba depends
upon that market, it is highly probable that, however competent and efficient may be the government of Cuba into
whose hands we surrender the control of the island, the first
measure of self-preservation which that government will be
compelled to consider will be to undertake to secure from the
United States some tariff arrangement under which Cuba can
sell her sugar at a profit...
It does not seem that, so long as we retain the control of
Cuba and preclude her people from making trade agreements
or treaties on their own account, we ought to treat her sugar
producers less favorably than we do their competitors in
those of the West Indies which are subject to other powers,




PRINCIPLES OF COLONIAL POLICY         175
and I recommend that during the period of our occupation
of the island the duties imposed upon the importation into
the United States from Cuba of the products of that island
be reduced to the same rates which will be imposed upon the
goods imported from Jamaica in case the Senate shall ratify
the pending reciprocity treaties....




I
I




PORTO RICO


THE MILITARY AND CIVIL GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLAND
As Secretary of War, Mr. Root made two extended references to the situation in
the island of Porto Rico, and the policy of the Administration as to the government
of that island in passing from Spanish to American control. These were in the
annual reports for 1899 and 1900. On May 1, 1900, the government of Porto Rico
was transferred to the civil authorities constituted under the Act of Congress
approved April 12 of that year, in accordance with Mr. Root's recommendations.
Thereafter the island is not mentioned in Mr. Root's reports except that in his
reports for 1902 and 1908, he dwelt upon the necessity of the construction of
defensive works and of the proper fortification of the harbor of San Juan, in company with various other harbors acquired as a result of the Spanish-American War.
CONDITIONS IN PORTO RiCO
Extract from the Report of the Secretary of War for 1899'
HE year has been devoted to administering and improving the civil government of the island and instructing the
people in the rudiments of self-government, and this has been
done at every step in conference with the leading citizens of
the island, and upon lines agreed upon between them and
the military governor. The work has been retarded by the
unfortunate industrial condition of the island, caused by
the fact that the people were unable to find remunerative
markets for their products.
The prevailing distress was heightened by the terrific
hurricane which swept over the entire length of the island
on August 8, 1899, followed by a deluge of rain and a tidal
wave on the south coast. The result of this disaster was the
loss of about three thousand lives, the destruction of sugar
mills, dwellings, roads, bridges, and growing crops. The
principal crop of the island is coffee, and fully two-thirds of
the coffee crop of the year was destroyed. Over one hundred
Page 17.
177




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


thousand people were reduced to absolute destitution, without homes or food or means to obtain food, and at the
same time the avenues of communication were destroyed,
so that many of the destitute were reached with the greatest
difficulty.
An immediate appeal to the people of the United States
through the War Department met with a prompt and vigorous response.... Whenever the quantities of food furnished by private charity were insufficient to maintain the
regular supply, the deficiency was made up by this Department, at an aggregate cost of $392,342.63, not including cost
of transportation.
For the distribution of these supplies and the succor of
the unfortunate victims of the hurricane, the entire army in
Porto Rico became a relief corps, and the work was prosecuted with a zeal, effectiveness, and humane spirit curiously
at variance with traditional ideas of the object of a military
organization..
During the current year 786,290 persons (practically the
entire population of the island) have been vaccinated at a
cost of three cents and six mills for each person. A general
system of education has been established, under a board of
education consisting of two Americans and three Porto
Ricans; a large number of American teachers have been
secured in this country, and nearly every transport that sails
from New York is carrying additions to the number. Under
the former government the schools afforded opportunity for
education of any description for only eight per cent of the
children of school age in the island. Only from ten to twelve&
and a half per cent of the inhabitants of the island can read
and write. At the time of American occupation the jails were
found crowded with prisoners who had been confined for
long periods without trial, and in many cases without being
informed of the charges against them. These unfortunates




MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF PORTO RICO  179


have either been tried or set free. The courts have been to a
great extent reorganized, and their proceedings simplified and
expedited. The writ of habeas corpus has been introduced.
Arrangements have been made for the taking of the census
in Porto Rico by the same methods applied to the island of
Cuba.
At the time of change of sovereignty the island was in a
condition of great disorder, and for a considerable period
bandits collected in the mountains and committed depredations and maintained themselves by robbing the peaceful
inhabitants. These have been dispersed and punished, and
order has been thoroughly restored. A number of attempts
have been made to secure a general participation by the
people in municipal elections and the reform of municipal
governments. The results in this respect have not been very
satisfactory thus far. Further experiments in the way of
municipal elections are now in progress.
ORGANIZATION OF THE CIVIL GOVERNMENT
Extract from the Report of the Secretary of War for 19001
On May 1, 1900, the government of Porto Rico was transferred to the civil authorities constituted under the act of
Congress approved April twelfth of that year. The interval of five months since the date of the last report had
been employed by the military authorities of the island in
improving the civil administration, accustoming the people
of Porto Rico to the exercise of the powers of government,
and continuing the work of relief made necessary by the
deplorable condition in which the island had been left by
the great hurricane of August 8, 1899.
The further distribution of commissary supplies brought
the total amount distributed from the time of the hurricane
1 Page 37.




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


to the fifteenth of July, when the distribution was discontinued with the concurrence of the military governor, to a
total of over 30,000,000 pounds of food, costing $831,480.16.
This distribution was made by a board of charities, of which
the chief surgeon of the military department was president,
and in which the entire organization of the army in the department was utilized. To as great an extent as practicable
the owners of the coffee plantations were utilized in the distribution of rations, and the able-bodied men receiving them
were required, in return for rations, to engage in the work of
recovering the plantations from the destruction wrought by
the hurricane, in order that as soon as possible the production
of coffee in the island might be revived.
In addition to the supplies contributed by the public, the
central Porto Rican relief committee received contributions
of money amounting to $81,090.58. Of this sum they applied
$46,072.09 to the purchase of food and (by the special request
of the board of charities of the island) of medical and hospital
supplies and clothing. The expenses of the committee
amounted to $2,053.16. To ascertain how the balance of
$32,965.33 might most usefully be applied, the secretary of
the committee made a personal visit to the island in May last,
and after consulting with the board of charities and citizens
of Porto Rico, he reported that it should be applied in aid of
the establishment and maintenance of an asylum for the care
of orphan children whose parents had lost their lives in, or
in consequence of, the hurricane. That report has been
approved, and that disposition will be made of the money.
For the purpose of furnishing further relief by giving
employment instead of alms, and at the same time securing
much-needed means of communication, the Department
authorized, October 25, 1899, the expenditure of $200,000,
and February 27 and May 14, 1900, the further expenditure
of $750,000 for the construction of military roads. This con



MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF PORTO RICO  181


struction has been in progress throughout the year under the
direction of the engineer force of the Department, the work
being continued by that body after the transfer of government by the request of the civil governor. Until the transfer
of government the engineer officer of the department was also
president of the board of public works, and in that capacity
supervised the expenditure upon roads, public buildings,
light-houses, and engineering and harbor works, for which
$581,000 of civil insular funds had been allotted.
The telegraphic system of the island has been reconstructed
by the Signal Corps, and the system is still operated by that
corps at an approximate cost of $60,000 per year, which is paid
out of the appropriations for the support of the army..
The census of the island, which had been ordered at
the time of the last annual report, has been completed by
the same methods and covering the same subjects as in the
case of the Cuban census.... Municipal elections were
held throughout the island, under orders of the military
commander prescribing qualifications of electors and the
method of election. The qualifications prescribed were either
the ability to read and write in some language, or the payment of at least one dollar in taxes within the preceding
eighteen months.
The registration and election at each polling place were
under the supervision of an officer or noncommissioned officer
of the army, but no armed soldier was present at or near any
voting place. There was no disturbance and no reason to
question the fairness and honesty of the election. Under that
election the mayors, town councils, municipal judges, and
boards of education of all the towns of Porto Rico, who perform the functions of government most important for the
people, were elected by the people themselves.
The system of taxation in the island was found to be exceedingly defective and burdensome. It tended to repress




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


and penalize industry and activity, and the necessities of the
people had required the remission of taxes to such an extent
that there remained practically no system of internal taxation
of any consequence. For the purpose of securing a new system which should be effective and which should apply sound
principles to the social and business conditions of the island,
the military governor asked for the assistance of a competent expert, and Professor J. H. Hollander of Johns Hopkins University was sent to the island as a special commissioner to aid the military governor in the framing of an
adequate system of taxation.
Upon the organization of the civil government under the
act of Congress of April 12, 1900, Professor Hollander was
appointed treasurer of the island, and thus enabled to continue the work for which he originally went to the island and
in which he had already made satisfactory progress. The
adoption of a new system of taxation must necessarily await
the action of the Porto Rican legislature, now just elected....
Accordingly, when legislation for the island was under consideration, the military governor requested that a portion
of the existing customs duties which Congress was proposing
to remove, sufficient to pay the ordinary running expenses
of the insular government, should be retained until the new
internal taxation should become effective. This request was
complied with by the provisions of the act of April 12,
1900, which, while removing the customs duties between
Porto Rico and the United States, suspended the operation of the removal as to fifteen per cent of those duties
until the island should be able to pay its expenses by
other taxation, limiting the period of suspension, however,
to two years.
After all the disorder, lawlessness, and distress consequent
upon a state of war, the withdrawal of accustomed control,




MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF PORTO RICO  183


the transfer of sovereignty to a people unfamiliar with the
language, the customs, and the prejudices of the island, the
long delay in the legislation establishing civil and political
rights and business relations, the poverty, ruin, and suffering
caused by the great hurricane, the military governor was able
to say, at the close of his administration:
On April 30 the machinery of civil government was in the charge of
experienced public officers, and the organization, with departments,
bureaus, and other branches, both insular and municipal, was such that
the new government ordered by Congress to be instituted could the following day be launched and carried forward in an efficient and economical
manner.
The courts of the island were all in the discharge of their proper functions. The dockets were not crowded as they were a year before. The
prisons and jails were well kept and were not overflowing. The public
highways were in fine condition and were being rapidly extended. The
amount that could be spared from the treasury for education was being
applied in such a manner as to give instruction according to modern
methods to over 30,000 children. The laws of taxation had been so
changed that very heavy and onerous burdens had been removed from
the poor.
In office in every municipality were officers who in every instance were
the choice of the electors, thus granting to municipalities almost complete
autonomy.
Life and property were everywhere secure, and this without the use of
troops for protection. Notwithstanding the most grievous losses suffered
by the people from raids of banditti, from arson, from disturbance of
trade relations, from losses of Spanish markets without corresponding
gains elsewhere, from unsettled conditions resulting from the use of a
currency which suffered a heavy discount when referred to a gold basis,
and, finally, from the almost overwhelming disaster of August of last year,
when seven-tenths of all the maturing crops were blotted out of existence
- notwithstanding all these obstacles and burdens, the military governor
was able to turn over to the civil governor the comfortable balance in the
insular treasury of over $300,000.
As commander of the Military Department of Porto Rico and the last
military governor, I think I may not inappropriately say that the trust
confided to the army by the President and the people has not been abused,
but has been wisely and justly exercised in the interest and for the benefit
of the inhabitants of this beautiful island....




184     MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY
I concur in these statements, and I wish to add to them an
expression of grateful appreciation of the devotion, judgment,
good temper, and ability exhibited by General Davis in the
performance of his difficult duties, and of the faithful service
of the officers of his command.




CUBA
THE DEVELOPMENT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REPUBLIC
President McKinley's message to Congress of April 11, 1898, recommending that
the United States intervene in Cuba, disclaimed any purpose of acquiring territory
by conquest, and the joint resolution of Congress of April 20, 1898, demanding that
Spain withdraw from the island committed the United States to the independence
of Cuba.
In Article 1 of the treaty of peace between Spain and the United States, signed at
Paris, December 10, 1898, Spain relinquished " all claim of sovereignty over and
title to Cuba." The island was not ceded to although it was occupied by the
United States, which felt itself bound by the terms of the resolution declaring war
against Spain to turn the island over to its people. This declaration of intention
was not a contract, but it was properly regarded as creating an equitable estoppel
against the United States in favor of the Cubans who had aided it in driving the
Spanish forces from the island. The United States occupied Cuba, and during its
occupation prepared it for self-government, to be turned over to its people when
that time should have come. On May 20, 1902, the world saw the unwonted
spectacle of a country living up to its solemn promise and turning over a coveted
possession to the inhabitants thereof in pursuance of a solemnly declared purpose,
the hauling down of the American flag, the symbol of sovereignty during the occupation, and the unenforced, voluntary evacuation of Cuba Libre by the American
troops.
Mr. Root's task as Secretary of War, from the time of the relinquishment of
Cuba under the treaty and its release to its people, was to prepare Cuba for selfgovernment and to determine the relations between Cuba and the United States.
The solution of the problem recommended by Mr. Root and adopted and put
into effect by the Government of the United States is described in Mr. Root's
reports as Secretary of War. The solution was:
1. Not to sail away and leave the island to disorder and probable anarchy and
bloodshed, but to remain long enough to create a complete civil government composed of Cubans trained to the performance of their duties, and to turn the island
over to the Cuban people with that government in operation as a going concern.
2. To require from the Cubans guarantees for the conduct of their government
and to prevent the island from falling into the hands of any other nation so that
the United States would not be placed in a worse position than before by reason of
turning Spain out of the island. This was accomplished by including in the Cuban
constitution and in the legislation of the United States and in a treaty between the
United States and Cuba the provisions known as the Platt Amendment.
These provisions were presented to the Cuban Constitutional Convention pursuant to Mr. Root's instructions to the military governor of Cuba dated February
185




186         MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY
9, 1901. They had previously been approved by President McKinley and his
Cabinet.
The clause relating to sanitation, which was not included in the original instructions, was incorporated upon the suggestion of Major-General Leonard Wood, then'
Military Governor of Cuba.
It appearing desirable to incorporate the above provisions in the statutes of the
United States, Mr. Root's instructions to the military governor of Cuba were later
introduced in the Senate by Senator Orville H. Platt at the request of President
McKinley and Mr. Root, and were adopted as an amendment to the Army Appropriation bill of March 2, 1901, thus becoming known as the Platt Amendment. The
Platt Amendment was subsequently incorporated in identical terms in the Cuban
constitution and in the treaty of July 1, 1904, between Cuba and the United States.
With unimportant changes of phraseology, Articles 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Mr. Root's
instructions became Articles 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the Platt Amendment.
The provision relating to sanitation, suggested by Major-General Wood in his
letter of February 19, 1901, became Article 5 of the Platt Amendment.
Article 5 of Mr. Root's instructions became Article 7 of the Amendment, and
Article 6 of the Amendment, concerning the Isle of Pines, and Article 8 of the
Amendment, requiring further assurance by treaty, were inserted by the Senate
Committee on Cuban Relations, of which Senator Platt was chairman.
General Wood's letter, referred to in the previous paragraph, has not hitherto
been printed. As it is an historical document of the first importance in connection
with the transfer of Cuba to its people, it follows in full:
HEADQUARTERS MILITARY GOVERNOR,
ISLAND OF CUBA,
THE HONORABLE                          HAVANA, February 19, 1901.
THE SECRETARY OF WAR,
WASHINGTON, D. C.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your communication of
February 9th, which was transmitted to me first by cable and later under the
personal care of Colonel H. L. Scott.
On receipt of the instructions by cable I immediately assembled the Committee on Relations to Exist between Cuba and the United States and made
known to them the five articles or provisions which, in the opinion of the
Executive branch of the Government, represent the wishes:of the United States
in all that pertains to the proposed relations between the Government of the
United States and the people of Cuba.
I was particularly careful to impress upon them that Congress might in its
wisdom insist upon different conditions or relations, but that the proposition
submitted embodied those which in the opinion of the Executive branch of the
Government should exist and that they were the only ones which they could at
present consider.
There seemed to be no serious objection to any of the conditions excepting
the Fifth; that in reference to Naval Stations, There was also some apparent




DEVELOPMENT OF CUBA


187


objection to the terms of the Third Article in reference to the intervention and
maintenance of a stable government to protect life and property, etc., as provided for by the Treaty of Paris. I informed them that this condition was one
which, in my opinion, could not be modified as it embodied the obligations
which the United States had assumed under the above-mentioned treaty. I
do not think the opposition on this point will be serious. The matter is now
under discussion and I believe the committee is canvassing the Convention as
to the acceptability of the different provisions.
In my opinion the demands are liberal, equitable and just and should be
insisted on throughout. It is very probable that we shall have to exercise
directly the intervention provided for under the Third Article and it is certain
that we should, were it not known in Cuba that in case of lack of stability and
failure to observe the provisions imposed by the Treaty of Paris the United
States would promptly intervene. Such knowledge will probably act as a
check on the government to come.
In reference to the Naval Stations: the objection to this seems to be a
matter principally of sentiment combined with a certain amount of selfishness.
Among the elements now dominating in the politics of the island there is little
or no gratitude for what has been done by the United States. Among the
bulk of the people there is a feeling of appreciation and gratitude.
There is another phase of this Cuban situation which seems to be of vital
importance; that is the sanitary conditions which will probably exist in
Havana and in other large cities under a Cuban government. As I understand
it the purpose of the war was not only to assist the Cubans, but, in a general
sense, to abate a nuisance. It is probable that if we leave the island of Cuba
without a definite agreement with the government to come in reference to the
maintenance of good sanitary conditions, that we shall soon find Havana and
all other large cities in practically the same condition of sanitation as during the
Spanish War and a menace to our Southern seaports and the consequent interference with commerce will continue. As a rule, the people of the island are
immune to yellow fever and, consequently, take little interest in the elaborate
sanitary precautions which have been instituted under the American rule and
which have resulted in reducing the death rate in Havana alone, from 45 per
1000 as an average death rate in times of peace to 24 and a fraction. If possible,
I think that there should also be some provision in reference to the exercise of
proper control and supervision over the construction of the new system of
sewers and pavements for the City of Havana. It is highly probable that after
the withdrawal of the Americans this work will be carried out in anything but
a complete and perfect manner.
This question of control of sanitation of Cuban ports is, in my opinion, of
vital importance to the United States.
Very respectfully,
(Signed) LEONARD WOOD,
Major-General, Military Governor.


In that portion of the instructions to the Military Governor of Cuba which
became Article 3 of the Platt Amendment, Mr. Root said that:




188


MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


Upon the transfer of the control of Cuba to the government established
under the new constitution Cuba consents that the United States reserve and
retain the right of intervention for the preservation of Cuban independence
and maintenance of a stable government, adequately protecting life, property,
and individual liberty, and discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba
imposed by the Treaty of Paris on the United States and now assumed and
undertaken by the Government of Cuba.
As the reservation of the right of intervention seemed to cause some uneasiness in
the Cuban constitutional convention, it was thought advisable to interpret the
sense in which the United States understood the right to intervene and the circumstances which would justify and require it. It was necessary that the right and
the circumstances should be understood in the same sense by Cuba; therefore, Mr.
Root put the interpretation of the Government of the United States upon this
article in his telegram to the Military Governor dated April 3, 1902, directing him
at the same time to lay the telegram before the Cuban constitutional convention,
which was then in session, in order that the article should be adopted with the
interpretation which the United States had placed upon it. The telegram which
the Military Governor laid before the convention, pursuant to instructions, was
thus worded:
You are authorized to state officially that in the view of the President the
intervention described in the third clause of the Platt Amendment is not
synonymous with intermeddling or interference with the affairs of the Cuban
Government, but the formal action of the Government of the United States,
based upon just and substantial grounds, for the preservation of Cuban independence, and the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of
life, property, and individual liberty,and adequate for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the Treaty of Paris on the United States.
The Cuban Government, as previously stated, was turned over to the people of
the island on May 20, 1902. Trouble broke out in the island in 1906, and, exercising
the right of intervention contained in the statutes of the United States, the Cuban
constitution and the treaty between Cuba and the United States, President Roosevelt intervened. A provisional governor was appointed for Cuba and various officials
were selected to aid in the work of reorganization. American troops were sent to the
island and the necessary measures taken to restore and maintain order. Upon the
accomplishment of the purposes of the occupation, the United States, on March 31,
1909, again withdrew from the island (Cir. No. 92, War Dept., Dec. 31, 1909),
leaving Cuba for the second time to its newly elected and duly constituted authorities. (See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1906, Part I, pp. 480, et seq.)
This chapter of Cuban history is, it is believed, a unique chapter in the world's
history, and it reflects great credit upon the Republic which adopted the policy and
upon the wisdom and constructive ability of the statesman who devised it. It
should be said, in this connection, that Mr. Root's policy in regard to Cuba was
intended by him not merely to apply to the island of Cuba but to form the basis of a
future Caribbean policy for the United States. The policy was conceived in the
conviction that the construction and operation of the Panama Canal under the
exclusive authority of the United States impose greater burdens upon this country
in that part of the world,




DEVELOPMENT OF CUBA


189


CONDITIONS IN CUBA
Extract from the Report of the Secretary of War for 18991
N December 13,1898, the Division of Cuba was created,
consisting of the geographical departments and provinces of the island of Cuba, with headquarters in the city
of Havana. The division was placed under the command of
Major-General John R. Brooke, who, in addition to the command of the troops of the division, was directed to exercise
authority as military governor of the island. On January 1,
1899, pursuant to the provisions of the protocol and the
arrangements made by the evacuation commission, Spanish
sovereignty was formally relinquished and the government
of the island was transferred to the military governor as the
representative of the President of the United States. On
February 6, 1899, the evacuation of Cuba was completed by
the sailing of the last of the Spanish army from the port of
Cienfuegos.
The United States forces stationed in Cuba at the time of
the transfer of the control consisted of 1,004 officers and 22,827 enlisted men.
The retiring army left a large Spanish population, and the
long war for independence had engendered an excited and
bitter feeling between them and the Cubans. The country
had long been with little governmental control, except that
exercised in the immediate neighborhood of the troops who
were about departing. The ordinary social restraints had
been destroyed, the cities were crowded with thousands of
refugees and reconcentrados, who were exasperated by suffering and the death of their families and friends, and it was
deemed necessary to take especial precautions for the prevention of riot and bloodshed at the time when Spanish con1 Page 12.




190


MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


trol was removed. It is gratifying to note that the transfer
was accomplished with entire harmony and without disorder,
the troops of the United States replacing those of Spain step
by step, as the latter retired, until a complete substitution
was effected.
On the twenty-fourth of January the Division of Cuba was
portioned into seven geographical divisions, as follows: Pinar
del Rio, Province of Havana, Havana, Matanzas, Santa
Clara, Santiago, and Puerto Principe.
On April 19 and July 1, 1899, these departments were
consolidated into four, leaving the Division of Cuba divided
into the Department of the Province of Havana and Pinar
del Rio, Department of Havana, Department of Matanzas
and Santa Clara, and Department of Santiago and Puerto
Principe.
Since the Spanish evacuation there have been no strictly
military operations, and the officers of the army in Cuba have
been largely occupied in conducting, under the direction of
the military governor and the department commanders, a
general civil administration for which no other governmental
machinery existed, and in aiding the existing municipal governments in the performance of their duties....
In all these respects satisfactory progress has been made.
The use of troops to maintain order was necessary for but a
short period. Forces of civil police organized from the people
of the island have been substituted, and are performing their
duties efficiently. The part played by our troops in the maintenance of order is now substantially but the restraining
influence of their presence... 
The sanitary conditions of the cities and towns throughout
the island were found to be as bad as it is possible to conceive.
Thorough and systematic inspections were made, sanitary
corps were organized, streets were cleaned, sewers were
opened, cesspools and sinks were emptied, public and private




DEVELOPMENT OF CUBA


191


buildings were disinfected, methods of disposing of refuse
were adopted, water supplies were improved, and rules were
established and enforced to prevent a recurrence of similar
conditions. In the larger cities a thoroughly good sanitary
condition will require the establishment of grades, the construction of adequate sewer systems, and increase of water
supplies..
The city of Havana is now undergoing a house-to-house
renovation and disinfection. Some two thousand houses
have already been treated, and the work continues at the
rate of one hundred and twenty to one hundred and twentyfive houses per day. The reports show that in no case has the
process of disinfection failed to eradicate the infection, and no
case of fever has occurred except from a fresh infection. The
total deaths from yellow fever in Havana for the first ten
months of each year since 1889 have been as follows:
1890....................  314  1895....................  512
1891....................  318  1896....................  950
1892....................  272  1897....................  991
1893....................  469  1898....................  134
1894....................  369  1899....................  63
The deaths from all causes in Havana during the first few
months after our occupation were numerous, owing to the
great number of sick and dying who were there at the time
of the Spanish evacuation. The rate has been steadily
decreased until in September it was brought down to the
annual rate of 27 per thousand and in October to 26.6 per
thousand.
Similar conditions existing at Santiago were treated in a
similar manner and with great thoroughness and effectiveness, and an outbreak of yellow fever at that point was
speedily controlled and overcome.
During the six months ending June 30, 1899, we expended
from the insular revenues $1,712,014.20 for sanitation,




192


MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


$293,881.27 'for charities and hospitals, and $88,944.03 for
aid to the destitute.
The revival of industry has been necessarily slow, but has
made gratifying progress. Many of the people who had been
driven into the towns during the reconcentration period have
returned to the country and recommenced the cultivation of
the land. Tobacco has been planted very largely and sugar
to a less degree. In many parts of the island there is an adequate demand for labor at the rates which were customary
before the war...
The rule of administration of the civil government of the
island has been to employ the people of Cuba themselves to
the fullest extent possible, and to furnish to the Cubans,
during our occupation, an opportunity for training in the
honest and efficient performance of official duties which has
never been afforded to them before.
As soon as the social conditions had become sufficiently
normal to make it practicable, provision was made for taking
a census of the island, designed to furnish the basis for the
organization of the Cuban government to which we shall
transfer the control now held by us in trust for the people of
Cuba.... The entire force through which the census is
being taken is composed of Cubans, with one well-known
citizen of each of the provinces as the supervisor for that
province, and with enumerators nominated by him from
residents of the province. The scope of the inquiry and the
blanks, forms, and orders employed were determined upon
by the Department after conference between the officials of
the United States Census Bureau and the supervisors who
came to Washington for that purpose. The taking of the
census was commenced at the appointed time, and it is now
substantially completed, with entire success....




DEVELOPMENT OF CUBA


193


THE ORGANIZATION OF THE CIVIL GOVERNMENT OF CUBA
Extract from the Report of the Secretary of War for 19001
The conduct of affairs in Cuba during the year has been a
continuance of the process of aiding the Cuban people in the
development of a Cuban government in such a way that when
fully organized it shall be stable and efficient. This has been
done by guiding the Cubans in the first steps of systematic
self-government and by introducing, mainly through the
instrumentality of Cuban officers, such reforms in the various
branches of administration as shall serve to put the business
of government in fairly good condition when a complete
Cuban administration finally assumes control of government
in the island.
The census of the island was successfully completed....
The results, which were carefully computed and tabulated by
the methods employed in the United States, show a total
population of 1,572,797, of whom 533,498, or thirty-four per
cent, are able to read and write, while sixty-six per cent are
illiterate. Fifty-seven and eight-tenths per cent, or considerably more than half the entire population, consist of
native-born whites; the foreign whites constitute but nine
per cent, and the negro and mixed race thirty-two per cent.
On the whole this exhibits rather better material for government than had been anticipated, although if sixty-six per
cent of the people were to continue illiterate, the permanence
of free constitutional government could hardly be expected,
and a definite ascertainment of the facts emphasizes the
urgent necessity for popular education....
The census having been completed and the period given for
Spanish residents to make their election as to citizenship
having expired on April 11, 1900, steps were immediately
1 Page 28.




194


MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


taken for the election of municipal governments by the
people. In view of the fact that sixty-six per cent of the
people could not read and write, it was not deemed advisable
that absolutely unrestricted suffrage should be established,
and, after very full conference with leading Cubans, including
all the heads of the great departments of state, a general
agreement was reached upon a basis of suffrage, which provided that every native male Cuban or Spaniard who had
elected to take Cuban citizenship, of full age, might vote if he
either could read and write, or owned real estate or personal
property to the value of $250, or had served in and been
honorably discharged from the Cuban army; thus according
a voice in the government of the country to every one who
had the intelligence to acquire the rudiments of learning, the
thrift to accumulate property, or the patriotism to fight for
his country.
On the eighteenth of April an election law, which aims to
apply the best examples of our American election statutes
to the existing conditions of Cuba, was promulgated for the
guidance of the proposed election. On the sixteenth of June
an election was held throughout the island in which the
people of Cuba in all the municipalities, which include
the entire island, elected all their municipal officers. The
boards of registration and election were composed of Cubans
selected by the Cubans themselves. No United States soldier
or officer was present at or in the neighborhood of any polling
place. There was no disturbance.
After the newly elected municipal officers had been installed and had commenced the performance of their duties,
an order was made enlarging the powers of the municipal
governments and putting into their hands as much of the government of the people as was practicable. As soon as the
new municipal governments were fairly established the following call for a constitutional convention was issued:




DEVELOPMENT OF CUBA


195


HEADQUARTERS DIVISION OF CUBA,
HAVANA, July 25, 1900.
The Military Governor of Cuba directs the publication of the following
instructions:
WHEREAS, The Congress of the United States by its joint resolution of
April 20, 1898, declared
" That the people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be,
free and independent:
" That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention
to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island except for
the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is
accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its
people ";
And whereas, the people of Cuba have established municipal governments, deriving their authority from the suffrages of the people given under
just and equal laws, and are now ready, in like manner, to proceed to the
establishment of a general government which shall assume and exercise
sovereignty, jurisdiction, and control over the island: Therefore
It is ordered, That a general election be held in the island of Cuba on
the third Saturday of September, in the year nineteen hundred, to elect
delegates to a convention to meet in the city of Havana, at twelve o'clock
noon on the first Monday of November, in the year nineteen hundred, to
frame and adopt a constitution for the people of Cuba, and, as a part
thereof, to provide for and agree with the Government of the United
States upon the relations to exist between that Government and the
Government of Cuba, and to provide for the election by the people of
officers under such constitution and the transfer of government to the
officers so elected.
The election will be held in the several voting precincts of the island
under and pursuant to the provisions of the electoral law of April 18, 1900,
and the amendments thereof.
The people of the several provinces will elect delegates in number proportionate to their populations as determined by the census, viz.:
The people of the province of Pinar del Rio will elect three (3) delegates.
The people of the province of Havana will elect eight (8) delegates.
The people of the province of Matanzas will elect four (4) delegates.
The people of the province of Santa Clara will elect seven (7) delegates.
The people of the province of Puerto Principe will elect two (2) delegates.
The people of the province of Santiago de Cuba will elect seven (7)
delegates.
J. B. HICKEY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
4




196


MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


Under this call a second election was held on the fifteenth
of September, under the same law, with some slight amendments, and under the same conditions as the municipal elections. The election was wholly under the charge of Cubans,
and without any participation or interference whatever by
officers or troops of the United States. The thirty-one members of the constitutional convention were elected, and they
convened at Havana at the appointed time. The sessions of
the convention were opened in the city of Havana on the
fifth of November by the military governor, with the following statement:
To THE DELEGATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF CUBA:
Gentlemen: As military governor of the island, representing the President of the United States, I call this convention to order.
It will be your duty, first, to frame and adopt a constitution for Cuba,
and, when that has been done, to formulate what, in your opinion, ought
to be the relations between Cuba and the United States.
The constitution must be adequate to secure a stable, orderly, and free
government.
When you have formulated the relations which, in your opinion, ought
to exist between Cuba and the United States, the Government of the
United States will doubtless take such action on its part as shall lead to a
final and authoritative agreement between the people of the two countries
to the promotion of their common interests.
All friends of Cuba will follow your deliberations with the deepest interest, earnestly desiring that you shall reach just conclusions, and that, by
the dignity, individual self-restraint, and wise conservatism which shall
characterize your proceedings, the capacity of the Cuban people for
representative government may be signally illustrated.
The fundamental distinction between true representative government
and dictatorship is that in the former every representative of the people,
in whatever office, confines himself strictly within the limits of his defined
powers. Without such restraint there can be no free constitutional
government.
Under the order pursuant to which you have been elected and convened you have no duty and no authority to take part in the present government of the island. Your powers are strictly limited by the terms of
that order.




DEVELOPMENT OF CUBA


197


The convention has completed its organization and is now
in session.
Especial attention has been given by the military government to the development of primary education. The enrollment of the public schools of Cuba immediately before the
last war shows 36,306 scholar,. but an examination of the
reports containing these figures indicates that probably less
than half the names enrolled represented actual attendance.
There were practically no separate school buildings, but the
scholars were collected in the residences of the teachers.
There were few books, and practically no maps, blackboards,
desks, or other school apparatus.
The instruction consisted largely in learning by rote, the
catechism being the principal text-book, and the girls occupying their time chiefly in embroidery. The teachers were
allowed to eke out their unpaid salaries by accepting fees
from the pupils, and since less than one-tenth of the children
of school age could be accommodated, the result of the fee
system was that the children of the poor were either excluded
or wholly neglected. Even these poor apologies for public
schools were, to a great extent, broken up by the war, and
in December, 1899, the entire public-school enrollment of
the island numbered 21,435.... In June, 1900, it had
grown to 143,120.
This great development was accomplished under the
Cuban secretary of public instruction and the Cuban commissioner of public schools, with the able and experienced
assistance of Mr. Alexis E. Frye as superintendent. It is
governed by a school law modeled largely upon the law of
Ohio.... The schools are subject to constant and effective
inspection and the attendance is practically identical with
the enrollment.
The schools are separated from the residences of the
teachers, and each schoolroom has its separate teacher. The




198


MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


courses and methods of instruction are those most approved
in this country. The text-books are translations into Spanish
of American text-books. For the supply of material $150,000
were, in the first instance, appropriated from the insular
treasury, and afterwards, upon a single order, 100,000 full
sets of desks, text-books, scholars' supplies, etc., were purchased upon public advertisement in this country at an
expense of about three-quarters of a million dollars.
All over the island the old Spanish barracks and barracks
occupied by the American troops, which have been withdrawn, are being turned into schoolrooms after thorough
renovation. The pressure for education is earnest and universal. The appropriations of this year from the insular
treasury for that purpose will amount to about four and a
half million dollars; but great as the development has been,
it will be impossible, for a long time yet to come, to meet fully
with the resources of the island the demand for the learning so long withheld....
During the past summer, through the generosity of Harvard University and its friends, who raised a fund of $70,000
for that purpose, 1,281 Cuban teachers were enabled to
attend a summer school of instruction at Cambridge, designed to fit them for their duties. They were drawn from
every municipality and almost every town in the island.
They were collected from the different ports of the island by
five United States transports, which carried them to Boston,
and, at the expiration of their visit, took them to New York
and thence to Havana and to their homes.
They were lodged and boarded in and about the University
at Cambridge, and visited the libraries and museums and the
educational institutions and manufacturing establishments
in the neighborhood of Boston. Through the energy of Mr.
Frye money was raised to enable them to visit New York and
Washington. They were returned to their homes without a




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single accident or loss, full of new ideas and of zeal for the
educational work in which they had found so much sympathy
and encouragement.
The issue of rations which characterized the first year of
American occupation has been discontinued and has been
succeeded by an extensive reistablishment, renovation, and
reorganization of the charitable institutions of the island.
These were left at the close of the war without funds or supplies, and, with comparatively few exceptions, consisting
mainly of the Sisters of the religious orders, without attendance. Such of them as were not closed were dilapidated,
filthy, and unsanitary. The hospitals were practically without apparatus, medicines, or physicians. The children in the
asylums were receiving but little education, insufficient food,
and insufficient care.
A comprehensive law governing the department of charities was adopted on the seventh of July last, and, under the
able direction of Major Edwin St. J. Greble, the head of the
department, has been put into effective operation.. '.. All
of the buildings have been cleaned and renovated and receive
regular and systematic support.
There are now receiving Government aid in Cuba thirtyeight hospitals, four asylums for the aged, twelve orphan
asylums, two dispensaries for the poor, one insane asylum,
three leper hospitals, two reform schools, one training school
for boys, one for girls, and one emergency hospital in Santiago de Cuba. In the orphan asylums a strong effort has been
made to secure the placing of children in private families
throughout the island, and the effort has met with great
success.
As prosperity has increased, many parents who had been
unable to support their children and had left them in these
institutions have claimed them and taken them to their
homes, and large numbers of other children have been placed




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in private families, under proper pledges for their care and
education, secured by careful investigation beforehand, and
afterwards by systematic personal inspection. For the children still remaining, a thorough system of industrial education
which will fit them for self-support has been inaugurated.
The hospitals have been supplied with medicines and surgical apparatus and attendance, and trained nurses brought
from the United States are engaged in the instruction of
trained nurses in Cuba. At the civil hospital No. 1 in Havana
there are five American trained nurses, and a training school
for nurses has been started for women with accommodations
for forty scholars. At the civil hospital in Matanzas there
are four American nurses and a training school for nurses with
accommodations for thirty scholars. At the civil hospital in
Cienfuegos there is one American trained nurse and about
sixteen scholars; at Remedios, one American trained nurse
and eighteen scholars.
Each of the charitable institutions is limited in its expenditures, in excess of such funds as it may have, to a carefully
considered appropriation of insular funds, the expenditure of
which is subject to regular and systematic inspection. Unless
it were in the Mercedes Hospital in Havana, there was not a
place in Cuba at the time of American occupation to which
a patient could go for either medical or surgical treatment
with any reasonable prospect of proper facilities and care.
The condition of the insane was particularly distressing.
They were confined in cells in the jails all over the island,
filthy and ragged, and treated literally like wild beasts. All
these unfortunates have been collected and taken to the
large insane asylum in Havana, which has been put in good
order, and they are cared for in accordance with the dictates
of modern humanity.
The prisons in the island were filled to overflowing with
wretched creatures living in indescribable filth and squalor.




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An early inspection of the woman's prison in Havana disclosed the fact that the women had no other place to sleep
than on the floor, and were unable to appear in a body because they were without clothes to cover their nakedness;
and they came before the inspector one by one, passing the
same garment from one to another.
The cruelty of these conditions is more impressive from the
fact that many of the unfortunate inmates had never been
tried, or convicted of any offense. As the simplest way of
dealing with that evil, a board of pardons was constituted in
January, which visited all the prisons and examined the
inmates. They found many who had been for long periods
waiting trial, and in one instance this period had extended
for eleven years. So far as the offenses with which they
were charged could be ascertained, a large part of these
people had been punished far more severely, whether they
were innocent or guilty, than they could have been upon
conviction...
The intolerable delays of criminal procedure which thus
punished the innocent equally with the guilty, and punished
both without any opportunity for trial, have been to a great
extent obviated by the establishment of correctional courts
throughout the island, modeled upon the court which, under
the direction of Captain Pitcher, has proved so successful in
Havana, and in which petty offenses are summarily dealt
with and disposed of, and the innocent have an opportunity
to be promptly relieved from prosecution.
As a further safeguard against the recurrence of the evils
described, an order has been made providing for the writ of
habeas corpus to go into effect in December. The character
and use of that writ do not yet seem to be fully understood by
the Cubans, who are quite unfamiliar with it, but it will
doubtless in time become with them, as it is with us, an
effective instrument for the protection of liberty.




MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


One of the results of these changes of procedure is that
many of the prisons in the island are now wholly without
inmates. Many other amendments of the law, improvements
of the courts, and procedure, and reforms of specific abuses
have been accomplished. All these things have been done
with the concurrence and mainly through the instrumentality
of Cubans, and in such a way that the Cubans have been
learning how to do them and how to maintain the improved
conditions and continue the reforms when the government
comes entirely into their hands.
PUBLIC WORKS
There has been great activity in public works. Our officers
have been renovating, repairing, and reconstructing public
buildings, building extensive and enduring roads and sewers
and waterworks, and inspecting and cleansing private and
public buildings and paving streets in most of the cities
and towns of the island....
A number of large light-houses have been constructed,
beacons have been set, and harbors have been buoyed, and in
every proper field of public enterprise there has been the
greatest activity on the part of Cubans under American
guidance in doing things for the public interest, which have
been wholly neglected for the past hundred years.
The tariff has been completely revised, and an independent
treasury for the island has been established in which the
revenues of the island are deposited and kept as they are
received..
The revenues for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1900,
amounted to $17,333,484.10, as against $7,397,148.57 for the
preceding six months. The revival of industry continues;
the tobacco crop is large and fine; the area planted in sugar
cane is continually extended; the production of fruit at the




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eastern end of the island is increasing; the mines of Santiago
are in full operation; labor is in demand at good wages.
Curiously enough, now that Spanish sovereignty has departed from the island a current of Spanish immigration is
setting in. More than forty thousand Spaniards, chiefly
hardy and industrious people from the north of Spain, have
come to the island during the year, and it is estimated that
before the end of December the number will have reached
fifty thousand. They are useful and welcome additions to
the industry of the island.
Only doubt as to the stability of the future government
and uncertainty as to the continuance of a market for her
products retards the influx of capital and the development
of Cuba's extraordinary resources.
FURTHER PROGRESS IN CIVIL GOVERNMENT
Extract from the Report of the Secretary of War for 19011
The government of the island of Cuba during the past year
has been peaceful and orderly. There has been no occasion
for interference by the United States forces with the ordinary
administration of law. Following the plan of steadily training the people in performing the duties of government, the
organization of the rural guard has been perfected, and that
body has been placed under one head, and now includes a
total of 1,300 men and officers, armed with modern carbines
and well mounted. The municipal police, which during the
formative stage were supported from the general fund, have
been placed finally upon the proper and intended footing of
support by the municipalities themselves. In order that
upon the withdrawal of our troops the island may not be
without a force competent to take charge of her coast forti1 Page 36.




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fications, several companies of Cuban troops have been
organized, which, while maintained at insular expense, are
assigned to our coast artillery companies in the island as
second platoons for the purpose of instruction and discipline,
and to fit them for the duties of coast defense.
A gradual reduction is being made in the excessive number
of municipalities in the western provinces for the purpose of
lightening taxation and increasing efficiency. There has been
a great reduction in the number of asylums and pauper
institutions. Beggars are practically unknown in the island.
There are supported by the state thirty-four hospitals, containing 2,844 beds. Six training schools for female nurses
have been established under the tuition of American trained
nurses, with Cuban girls as pupils, with regular courses,
examinations, and degrees. The Government training schools
for boys and girls have been enlarged. The bureau for placing indigent children, mentioned in my last report, has been
thoroughly established, and has during the year returned
over 1,200 children to their relatives and placed 437 in other
families. There are still 2,010 orphans under the care and
supervision of the state. The lepers of the island have been
gathered into two institutions, and the total number under
treatment is now 134.
Six private institutions assisted by the state contain 362
aged poor. Extensive improvements have been made in the
insane asylums, and they now contain 835 inmates. The
prisons have been repaired and improved, and each jail has
been provided with a physician and the necessary medicines.
School instruction has been inaugurated in the larger jails.
Extensive repairs of streets and sanitary work have been
done in Havana, Santiago, Cienfuegos, and Santa Clara.
Sewerage and paving plans for Havana have been completed
and advertised for, and the contract has been awarded. Plans
have been prepared for harbor improvements at Matanzas,




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and a contract for $550,000 has been awarded for the deepening of the harbor at Cardenas. Important first-class lights
have been established at Colorado Reefs and Bahia Honda
on the north coast of Cuba, and many harbors have been
buoyed and properly marked. Public schools have increased
in efficiency. The school law has proved thoroughly successful. Its democratic character and the local control which
it gives, combined with efficient central supervision are
satisfactory.
There are 121 boards of education elected by the people,
and as these boards become familiar with their duties the
administration of the school law improves. The system has
been kept entirely out of politics. The work of changing the
old cuartels or barracks throughout the island into schoolhouses has progressed, and $250,000 have been expended
upon this work during the year with good results. There is
still, however, great need for additional schoolhouses and
thoroughly instructed teachers.
There has been a general improvement in the administration of justice, but the courts are still far from what they
should be. There is difficulty in obtaining the proper personnel. The number of men suitable for the judicial career
is limited. One of the greatest dangers which confronts the
new government is the difficulty in obtaining an absolutely
sound judiciary. Trials, however, are in general shorter and
more prompt than formerly, and witnesses are more willing
to testify....
A systematic combat with tuberculosis, which has one of
the largest death rates, has been inaugurated. Systematic vaccination against smallpox is going on throughout the entire
island. The death rate from malaria in the large towns has
been much reduced by sanitary improvements. The eastern
part of the island is entirely free from yellow fever. The western part is practically free, there being but a few cases in or




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about Havana. This dreaded disease has passed from one of
the leading causes of death to one of the least frequent. The
reduction of the death rate in Havana alone, as compared
with the former death rate, shows an average of approximately 3,700 lives per year saved, and Havana has changed
from one of the most unhealthy cities to one of the most
healthy.... This practically absolute control of yellow fever,
has come as the result of the investigations as to its causes,
prosecuted under the direction of the military government.
Immediately preceding American occupation the Spanish
government of Cuba was occupying and using for government purposes a large amount of valuable real estate which
had formerly been the property of the Roman Catholic
Church, and which was held by the Crown subject to the
results of a long series of negotiations and agreements between the Crown of Spain and the Holy See. The government also held a large number of "censos" or mortgages
upon property in different parts of the island which had been
given to the church for various religious purposes, and which
had been taken over by the Crown and held under the agreements referred to. The Crown of Spain on its part recognized and complied with an obligation to pay to the church
a large annual sum for its maintenance and support.
With American occupation the payment of this annual
sum ceased, while the intervening government entered into
possession of the property and employed the greater part of
the real estate for the same governmental purposes to which
it had been devoted under Spanish control. The church
thereupon claimed the right to be repossessed of its property.
After a great deal of discussion and investigation the various questions as to property rights raised by the church
were submitted to a judicial commission..... The commission decided in favor of the claims of the church, and the
whole subject has been adjusted, to the apparent satisfaction




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of all parties, as to the real estate, by the military government's paying a rental of five per cent upon the appraised
values of the property, amounting to about $2,000,000, with
a five years' option to the government of Cuba, when organized, to buy the property at the appraised value, receiving
credit against the purchase price for twenty-five per cent of
the rental paid, and as to the "censos", by the military
government's taking them at fifty cents on the dollar, and
permitting the debtors to take them up at the same
rate....
In response to calls from the Senate Committee on Relations with Cuba, the War Department has prepared and
rendered a complete detailed and itemized statement of all
the receipts and expenditures of the government of Cuba
from January 1, 1899, to April 30, 1900, showing the places
where and dates within which the amounts were collected
and the officers by whom and the authority under which
the collections were made....
Notwithstanding the intimate political relations which
have existed between the United States and Cuba since
1898, American production has not succeeded to any considerable degree in superseding the productions of other
countries in the Cuban market.
The total imports of merchandise from January 1, 1899,
to June 30, 1901, amounted to $165,948,272, and the total
exports of merchandise for the same period amounted to
$138,104,515, leaving a trade balance against Cuba for that
period of $27,843,757. This excess of purchases is doubtless
in a great measure accounted for by the fact that the long
period of war and devastation which preceded the Spanish
evacuation left the island practically destitute of movable
property necessary either for the comfort of life or the reproduction of wealth. The excessive purchases have necessarily
been made in a great measure upon credit in anticipation




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of the revenues to be derived from increased production
following upon the revival of industry.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
The constitutional convention, which was in session at the
time of my last report, has concluded its labors and adjourned sine die. That convention was elected: (1) To
frame and adopt a constitution; (2) to agree with the Government of the United States upon the relations to exist between
that Government and the Government of Cuba, and (3) to
provide for the election, by the people, of officers under such
constitution, and the transfer of government to the officers
so elected.
In February of the present year, as the convention appeared to be drawing near the conclusion of the first branch
of its work, the following instructions were sent to the military governor:
WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, February 9, 1901.
SIR: As the time approaches for the Cuban constitutional convention
to consider and act upon Cuba's relations with the United States, it seems
desirable that you should be informed of the views of the Executive Department of our Government upon that subject in a more official form
than that in which they have been communicated to you hitherto. The
limitations upon the power of the Executive by the resolution of Congress
of April 20, 1898, are such that the final determination upon the whole
subject may ultimately rest in Congress, and it is impracticable now to
forecast what the action of Congress will be. In the meantime, until
Congress shall have acted, the military branch of the Government is
bound to refrain from any committal, or apparent committal, of the
United States to any policy which should properly be determined upon
by Congress, and, at the same time, so far as it is called upon to act or
to make suggestions bearing upon the course of events, it must determine
its own conduct by reference to the action already taken by Congress, the
established policy of the United States, the objects of our present occupation, and the manifest interests of the two countries.
The joint resolution of Congress of April 20, 1898, which authorized
the President to expel the Spanish forces from Cuba, declared that —




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"the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to
exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island except for
the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is
accomplished, to leave the government and the control of the island to its
people."
The treaty of peace concluded at Paris on the 10th of December, 1898,
and ratified by the Senate on the 6th of February, 1899, provides in the
first article that -
"as the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occupied by the
United States, the United States will, so long as such occupation shall
last, assume and discharge the obligations that may, under international
law, result from the fact of its occupation, for the protection of life and
property."
It contains numerous obligations on the part of the United States in
respect of the treatment of the inhabitants of the territory relinquished
by Spain, such as the provision of the tenth article, that the inhabitants
shall be secured in the free exercise of their religion; of the eleventh article,
that they shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts, pursuant to
the ordinary laws governing the same, and of the ninth article, that they
shall retain all their rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose
thereof, and the right to carry on their industry, commerce, and professions. The sixteenth article of the treaty provides that the obligations
assumed in the treaty by the United States with respect to Cuba are
limited to the time of its occupancy thereof, but that it shall, upon the
termination of such occupancy, advise any government established in the
island to assume the same obligations.
Our occupation of Cuba has been under the binding force both of the
resolution and of the treaty, and the pacification mentioned in the resolution has necessarily been construed as coextensive with the occupation
provided for by the treaty, during which we were to discharge international
obligations, protect the rights of the former subjects of Spain, and cause
or permit the establishment of a government to which we could, in good
faith, commit the protection of the lives and property and personal rights
of those inhabitants from whom we had compelled their former sovereign
to withdraw her protection. It is plain that the government to which we
were thus to transfer our temporary obligations should be a government
based upon the peaceful suffrages of the people of Cuba, representing the
entire people and holding their power from the people, and subject to the
limitations and safeguards which the experience of constitutional government has shown to be necessary to the preservation of individual rights.
This is plain as a duty to the people of Cuba under the resolution of April
20, 1898, and it is plain as an obligation of good faith under the Treaty of
Paris. Such a government we have been persistently and with all practi



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cable speed building up in Cuba, and we hope to see it established and
assume control under the provisions which shall be adopted by the present
convention. It seems to me that no one familiar with the traditional and
established policy of this country in respect to Cuba can find cause for
doubt as to our remaining duty. It would be hard to find any single
statement of public policy which has been so often officially declared by so
great an array of distinguished Americans authorized to speak for the
Government of the United States, as the proposition stated, in varying
but always uncompromising and unmistakable terms, that the United
States would not under any circumstances permit any foreign power other
than Spain to acquire possession of the island of Cuba.
Jefferson and Monroe and John Quincy Adams and Jackson and Van
Buren and Grant and Clay and Webster and Buchanan and Everett have
all agreed in regarding this as essential to the interests and the protection
of the United States. The United States has, and will always have, the
most vital interest in the preservation of the independence which she has
secured for Cuba, and in preserving the people of that island from the
domination and control of any foreign power whatever. The preservation
of that independence by a country so small as Cuba, so incapable, as she
must always be, to contend by force against the great powers of the world,
must depend upon her strict performance of international obligations, upon
her giving due protection to the lives and property of the citizens of all
other countries within her borders, and upon her never contracting any
public debt which in the hands of the citizens of foreign powers shall constitute an obligation she is unable to meet. The United States has, therefore, not merely a moral obligation arising from her destruction of Spanish
authority in Cuba and the obligations of the Treaty of Paris for the establishment of a stable and adequate government in Cuba, but it has a substantial interest in the maintenance of such a government.
We are placed in a position where, for our own protection, we have, by
reason of expelling Spain from Cuba, become the guarantors of Cuban
independence and the guarantors of a stable and orderly government
protecting life and property in that island. Fortunately the condition
which we deem essential for our own interests is the condition for which
Cuba has been struggling, and which the duty we have assumed toward
Cuba on Cuban grounds and for Cuban interests requires. It would be a
most lame and impotent conclusion if, after all the expenditure of blood
and treasure by the people of the United States for the freedom of Cuba
and by the people of Cuba for the same object, we should, through the
constitution of the new government, by inadvertence or otherwise, be
placed in a worse condition in regard to our own vital interests than we
were while Spain was in possession, and the people of Cuba should be
deprived of that protection and aid from the United States which is neces



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sary to the maintenance of their independence. It was, undoubtedly, in
consideration of these special relations between the United States and
Cuba that the President said in his message to Congress of the 11th of
April, 1898:
"The only hope of relief and repose from a condition which can no
longer be endured is the enforced pacification of Cuba. In the name of
humanity, in the name of civilization, in behalf of endangered American
interests which give us the right and the duty to speak and to act, the war
in Cuba must stop.
" In view of these facts and of these considerations I ask the Congress
to authorize and empower the President to take measures to secure a full
and final termination of hostilities between the Government of Spain and
the people of Cuba, and to secure in the island the establishment of a stable
government, capable of maintaining order and observing its international
obligations, insuring peace and tranquillity and the security of its citizens
as well as our own, and to use the military and naval forces of the United
States as may be necessary for these purposes."
And in his message of December 5, 1899:
" This nation has assumed before the world a grave responsibility for
the future good government of Cuba. We have accepted a trust, the fulfillment of which calls for the sternest integrity of purpose and the exercise
of the highest wisdom. The new Cuba yet to arise from the ashes of the
past must needs be bound to us by ties of singular intimacy and strength
if its enduring welfare is to be assured. Whether those ties shall be organic
or conventional, the destinies of Cuba are in some rightful form and
manner irrevocably linked with our own, but how and how far is for the
future to determine in the ripeness of events. Whatever be the outcome,
we must see to it that free Cuba be a reality, not a name, a perfect entity,
not a hasty experiment bearing within itself the elements of failure. Our
mission, to accomplish which we took up the wager of battle, is not to be
fulfilled by turning adrift any loosely-framed commonwealth to face the
vicissitudes which too often attend weaker states whose natural wealth
and abundant resources are offset by the incongruities of their political
organization and the recurring occasions for internal rivalries to sap their
strength and dissipate their energies."
And it was with a view to the proper settlement and disposition of these
necessary relations that the order for the election of delegatesto the present
constitutional convention provided that they should frame and adopt a
constitution for the people of Cuba, and as a part thereof provide for and
agree with the Government of the United States upon the relations to
exist between that Government and the Government of Cuba.
The people of Cuba should desire to have incorporated in her fundamental law provisions in substance as follow:




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1. That no government organized under the constitution shall be
deemed to have authority to enter into any treaty or engagement with any
foreign power which may tend to impair or interfere with the independence
of Cuba, or to confer upon such foreign power any special right or privilege
without the consent of the United States.
2. That no government organized under the constitution shall have
authority to assume or contract any public debt in excess of the capacity
of the ordinary revenues of the island, after defraying the current expenses
of government, to pay the interest.
3. That upon the transfer of the control of Cuba to the government
established under the new constitution Cuba consents that the United
States reserve and retain the right of intervention for the preservation of
Cuban independence and the maintenance of a stable government, adequately protecting life, property, and individual liberty, and discharging
the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the Treaty of Paris on
the United States and now assumed and undertaken by the Government
of Cuba.
4. That all the acts of the military government, and all rights acquired
thereunder, shall be valid and shall be maintained and protected.
5. That to facilitate the United States in the performance of such
duties as may devolve upon her under the foregoing provisions and for
her own defense, the United States may acquire and hold the title to land
for naval stations, and maintain the same at certain specified points.
These provisions may not, it is true, prove to be in accord with the
conclusions which Congress may ultimately reach when that body comes
to consider the subject, but as, until Congress has acted, the Executive
must necessarily within its own sphere of action be controlled by its own
judgment, you should now be guided by the views above expressed.
It is not our purpose at this time to discuss the cost of our intervention
and occupation, or advancement of money for disarmament, or our assumption under the Treaty of Paris of the claims of our citizens against Spain
for losses which they had incurred in Cuba. These can well be the subject
of later consideration.
Very respectfully,
ELIHU ROOT,
MAJOR-GENERAL LEONARD WOOD,                  Secretary of War.
Military Governor of Cuba, Havana, Cuba.
THE PLATT AMENDMENT
On the passage of the act of March 2, 1901, entitled " An
act making appropriation for the army for the fiscal year
ending June 30,1902", the following proviso, contained in the




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act and commonly known as the "Platt Amendment", was
communicated to the military governor, viz.:
Provided further, That in fulfillment of the declaration contained in the
joint resolution approved April twentieth, eighteen hundred and ninetyeight, entitled " For the recognition of the independence of the people of
Cuba, demanding that the Government of Spain relinquish its authority
and government in the island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval
forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and directing the President of the
United States to use the land and naval forces of the United States to
carry these resolutions into effect," the President is hereby authorized
to " leave the government and control of the island of Cuba to its people "
so soon as a government shall have been established in said island under a
constitution which, either as a part thereof or in an ordinance appended
thereto, shall define the future relations of the United States with Cuba,
substantially as follows:
I. That the government of Cuba shall never enter into any treaty or
other compact with any foreign power or powers which will impair or
tend to impair the independence of Cuba, nor in any manner authorize
or permit any foreign power or powers to obtain by colonization or for
military or naval purposes or otherwise, lodgment in or control over any
portion of said island.
II. That said government shall not assume or contract any public debt,
to pay the interest upon which, and to make reasonable sinking fund
provision for the ultimate discharge of which the ordinary revenues of
the island, after defraying the current expenses of government, shall be
inadequate.
III. That the government of Cuba consents that the United States may
exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence,
the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life,
property, and individual liberty, and for discharging the obligations with
respect to Cuba imposed by the Treaty of Paris on the United States, now
to be assumed and undertaken by the government of Cuba.
IV. That all acts of the United States in Cuba during its military occupancy thereof are ratified and validated, and all lawful rights acquired
thereunder shall be maintained and protected.
V. That the government of Cuba will execute, and, as far as necessary,
extend, the plans already devised or other plans to be mutually agreed
upon, for the sanitation of the cities of the island, to the end that a recurrence of epidemic and infectious diseases may be prevented, thereby
assuring protection to the people and commerce of Cuba, as well as to
the commerce of the southern ports of the United States and the people
residing therein.




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VI. That the Isle of Pines shall be omitted from the proposed constitutional boundaries of Cuba, the title thereto being left to future adjustment by treaty.
VII. That to enable the United States to maintain the independence
of Cuba, and to protect the people thereof, as well as for its own defense,
the government of Cuba will sell or lease to the United States lands necessary for coaling or naval stations at certain specified points, to be agreed
upon with the President of the United States.
VIII. That by way of further assurance the government of Cuba will
embody the foregoing provisions in a permanent treaty with the United
States.
By direction of the Department the military governor
formally communicated these provisions to the convention
and advised that body that the President awaited its action
thereon.
On the third of April the following dispatch was sent to the
military governor, who communicated it to a committee of
the convention:
WOOD, Havana:
You are authorized to state officially that in the view of the President
the intervention described in the third clause of the Platt Amendment is
not synonymous with intermeddling or interference with the affairs of the
Cuban government, but the formal action of the Government of the United
States, based upon just and substantial grounds, for the preservation of
Cuban independence, and the maintenance of a government adequate for
the protection of life, property, and individual liberty, and adequate for
discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the Treaty
of Paris on the United States.        E       ROOT
ELmU ROOT,
Secretary of War.
On the twelfth of June the convention adopted an ordinance making provisions identical with those above quoted
from the act of March 2, 1901, a part of the constitution.
On October first the convention performed its remaining
duty by adopting an electoral law providing for a general
election throughout the island, to be held on the thirty-first
day of December next, to choose governors of provinces,
provincial councilors, members of the house of representa



DEVELOPMENT OF CUBA


215


tives, and presidential and senatorial electors. The law also
provides that on February 24, 1902, the several bodies of
electors thus chosen shall meet and elect a president, vicepresident, and senators. The elections are to be held under
the direct supervision of a Central Board of Scrutiny, composed of the president of the convention and four other
members selected for that purpose....
I do not fully agree with the wisdom of some of the provisions of this constitution; but it provides for a republican
form of government; it was adopted after long and patient
consideration and discussion; it represents the views of the
delegates elected by the people of Cuba; and it contains no
features which would justify the assertion that a government
organized under it will not be one to which the United States
may properly transfer the obligations for the protection of
life and property under international law, assumed in the
Treaty of Paris.
By virtue of the ordinance of June 12, 1901, appended
thereto, the constitution defines the future relations of the
United States with Cuba by the provisions the presence
of which Congress has made a condition precedent to the
President's leaving the government and control of the island
of Cuba to its people. The constitution thus adopted and
perfected has been treated accordingly by the military government as an acceptable basis for the formation of the new
government to which, when organized and installed, the
control of the island is to be transferred; and such a transfer
may be anticipated before the close of the approaching session of Congress. If the people of Cuba and their officers
exhibit, under the government of their own choice, the same
self-restraint and respect for law which have characterized
their relations to the intervening government during our
occupation under the Treaty of Paris, the success of the
Cuban administration may be confidently expected.




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The new republic will begin its independent career with the
hearty friendship and sincere good wishes of all the officers
and soldiers of the United States who have fought and
labored for the good of Cuba, and who have learned to appreciate the many admirable and attractive qualities of her
people. I think that as the period of American occupation
draws toward its close there is more appreciation by the
Cubans of what the people of the United States have done
for them. During the recent severe illness of the military
governor the manifestations of esteem and affection for him
were especially gratifying; and the lamented death of President McKinley was followed by general expressions of
sympathy and sorrow throughout the island.
The chief apparent obstacle to the future prosperity of the
island is to be found in its commercial relations with the
United States, and the necessity of securing some reciprocal
arrangement under which a concession shall be made from
the tariff duties now imposed by the United States upon the
principal Cuban products.
The prosperity of Cuba depends upon finding a market for
her principal products, sugar and tobacco, at a reasonable
profit. Under existing conditions, or any conditions which
are to be anticipated, she can find such a market for her sugar,
and to a great degree for her tobacco, only in the United
States. Under the existing provisions of the United States
tariff law the prices which can be realized for Cuban sugar
and a large part of Cuban tobacco in this market are not
sufficient to pay the duties, cost of transportation and production, and yield a living profit to the producer..
In reliance upon fair and generous treatment by the United
States, the Cuban planters have made strenuous efforts to
revive their great industry, and have raised their product of
sugar from 308,000 tons in 1899 to 615,000 tons in 1900,
while the output for the present year is estimated at something over 800,000 tons. Incited by our precept and trust



DEVELOPMENT OF CUBA


217


ing to our friendship, they have struggled to retrieve the
disasters under which their country had suffered. All the
capital they had or could borrow has been invested in the
rebuilding of their mills and the replanting of their land.
More than half of the people of the island are depending
directly or indirectly upon the success of that industry. If
it succeeds we may expect peace, plenty, domestic order, and
the happiness of a free and contented people to reward the
sacrifice of American lives and treasure through which Cuba
was set free. If it fails we may expect that the fields will
again become waste, the mills will again be dismantled, the
great body of laborers will be thrown out of employment;
and that poverty and starvation, disorder and anarchy will
ensue; that the charities and the schools which we have been
building up will find no money for their support and will be
discontinued; that the sanitary precautions which have
made Cuba no longer a dreaded source of pestilence, but one
of the most healthy islands in the world, will of necessity be
abandoned, and our Atlantic seaboard must again suffer
from the injury to commerce and the maintenance of quarantines at an annual cost of many millions.
Cuba has acquiesced in our right to say that she shall not
put herself in the hands of any other power, whatever her
necessities, and in our right to insist upon the maintenance
of free and orderly government throughout her limits, however impoverished and desperate may be her people. Correlative to this right is a duty of the highest obligation to treat
her not as an enemy, not at arm's length as an aggressive
commercial rival, but with a generosity which toward her will
be but justice; to shape our laws so that they shall contribute
to her welfare as well as our own....
CUBAN COMMERCE 
Our present duty to Cuba can be performed by the making
of such a reciprocal tariff arrangement with her as President




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


McKinley urged in his last words to his countrymen at Buffalo on the fifth of September. A reasonable reduction in our
duties upon Cuban sugar and tobacco, in exchange for fairly
compensatory reductions of Cuban duties upon American
products, will answer the purpose, and I strongly urge that
such an arrangement be promptly made. It would involve
no sacrifice, but would be as advantageous to us as it would
be to Cuba. The market for American products in a country
with such a population, such wealth and purchasing power,
as Cuba with prosperity would speedily acquire, made certain
by the advantage of preferential duties, would contribute far
more to our prosperity than the portion of our present duties
which we would be required to concede.
A large part of the $37,000,000 worth of merchandise which
Cuba now imports from countries other than the United
States, and of the much greater amount which she would import if prosperous, should come, and with a proper reciprocal
arrangement inevitably would come, from the United States.... Last year she bought over $6,000,000 worth of cotton
goods, of which we supplied less than $500,000; nearly $700,000 worth of woolen goods, of which we supplied less than
$22,000; over $2,000,000 worth of vegetables and vegetable
fibres, of which we supplied but $171,000; over $2,700,000
worth of wines, of which we supplied but $329,000; over
$526,000 worth of silk goods, of which we supplied but $24,000; nearly $2,598,000 worth of oils, etc., of which we supplied but $713,000; $1,053,000 worth of chemicals, drugs,
etc., of which we supplied but $422,000; $8,476,000 worth of
animals and animal products, of which we supplied but
$1,994,000; $1,638,000 worth of manufactures of leather, of
which we supplied but $405,000; $3,335,000 worth of rice,
of which we supplied but $3,000. Substantially the whole of
these items, of which we now furnish so small a part, should
come from the fields and factories of the United States.




DEVELOPMENT OF CUBA


219


Aside from the moral obligation to which we committed
ourselves when we drove Spain out of Cuba, and aside
from the ordinary considerations of commercial advantage
involved in a reciprocity treaty, there are the weightiest reasons of American public policy pointing in the same direction;
for the peace of Cuba is necessary to the peace of the United
States; the health of Cuba is necessary to the health of the
United States; the independence of Cuba is necessary to the
safety of the United States. The same considerations which
led to the war with Spain now require that a commercial
arrangement be made under which Cuba can live.
INAUGURATION OF THE REPUBLIC
Extract from the Report of the Secretary of War for 1902 1
In conformity to the Cuban constitution and electoral law,
elections were held by the Cuban people on December 31,
1901, and by the electoral college on February 24, 1902,
when a president, vice-president, senate and house of representatives were chosen. On March 24, 1902, the following
instructions were given to the military governor:
BRIGADIER-GENERAL LEONARD WOOD,
Military Governor of Cuba, Havana, Cuba.
SIR: You are authorized to provide for the inauguration, on the twentieth of May next, of the government elected by the people of Cuba; and
upon the establishment of said government to leave the government and
control of the island of Cuba to its people, pursuant to the provisions of
the act of Congress entitled " An act making appropriation for the army
for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1902 ", approved March 2, 1901.
Upon the transfer of government and control to the president and
congress so elected, you will advise them that such transfer is upon the
express understanding and condition that the new government does thereupon, and by the acceptance thereof, pursuant to the provisions of the
appendix to the constitution of Cuba adopted by the constitutional convention on the 12th of June, 1901, assume and undertake all and several the
obligations assumed by the United States with respect to Cuba by the
treaty between the United States of America and Her Majesty the Queen
1 Page 6.




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Regent of Spain, signed at Paris on the 10th day of December, 1898. It is
the purpose of the United States Government, forthwith upon the inauguration of the new government of Cuba, to terminate the occupancy of
the island by the United States and to withdraw from that island the
military forces now in occupancy thereof; but for the preservation and
care of the coast defenses of the island, and to avoid leaving the island
entirely defenseless against external attack, you may leave in the coast
fortifications such small number of artillerymen as may be necessary, for
such reasonable time as may be required, to enable the new government
to organize and substitute therefor an adequate military force of its own;
by which time it is anticipated that the naval stations referred to in the
statute and in the appendix to the constitution above cited, will have been
agreed upon, and the said artillerymen may be transferred thereto.
You will convene the Congress elected by the people of Cuba in joint
session at such reasonable time before the twentieth of May as shall be
necessary therefor, for the purpose of performing the duties of counting
and rectifying the electoral vote for president and vice-president under
the fifty-eighth article of the Cuban constitution. At the same time you
will publish and certify to the people of Cuba the instrument adopted as
the constitution of Cuba by the constitutional convention on the 21st
day of February, 1901, together with the appendix added thereto and
forming a part thereof, adopted by the said convention on the 12th day
of June, 1901. It is the understanding of the Government of the United
States that the government of the island will pass to the new president
and congress of Cuba as a going concern, all the laws promulgated by the
government of occupation continuing in force and effect, and all the
judicial and subordinate executive and administrative officers continuing
in the lawful discharge of their present functions until changed by the
constitutional officers of the new government. At the same moment the
responsibility of the United States for the collection and expenditure of
revenues, and for the proper performance of duty by the officers and employees of the insular government will end, and the responsibility of the
new government of Cuba therefor will commence.
In order to avoid any embarrassment to the new president which might
arise from his assuming executive responsibility with subordinates whom
he does not know, or in whom he has not confidence, and to avoid any
occasion for sweeping changes in the civil-service personnel immediately
after the inauguration of the new government, approval is given to the
course which you have already proposed of consulting the president-elect,
and substituting before the twentieth of May, wherever he shall so desire,
for the persons now holding official positions, such persons as he may
designate. This method will make it necessary that the new president
and yourself should appoint representatives to count and certify the cash




DEVELOPMENT OF CUBA


221


and cash balances, and the securities for deposits, transferred to the new
government. The consent of the owner of the securities for deposits to
the transfer thereof you will of course obtain.
The vouchers and accounts in the office of the auditor and elsewhere
relating to the receipt and disbursement of moneys during the government
of occupation must necessarily remain within the control and available
for the use of this Department. Access to these papers will, however,
undoubtedly be important to the officers of the new government in the
conduct of their business subsequent to the twentieth of May. You will
accordingly appoint an agent to take possession of these papers, and retain
them at such place in the island of Cuba as may be agreed upon with the
new government until they can be removed to the United States without
detriment to the current business of the new government.
I desire that you communicate the contents of this letter to Mr. Palma,
the president-elect, and ascertain whether the course above described
accords with his views and wishes.
Very respectfully,     ELIHU ROOT,
Secretary of War.
These instructions, being communicated to the presidentelect, Mr. Palma, received his approval, and they were completely executed on May 20, 1902....
The whole governmental situation in Cuba was quite
unprecedented, with its curious device of a suspended sovereignty given up by Spain, but not in terms vested in anybody
else, and if vested remaining dormant, while a practical
working government of military occupation in time of peace,
deriving its authority from the sovereignty of another
country, claimed temporary allegiance, made and enforced
laws, and developed a political organization of the Cuban
people to take and exercise the suspended or dormant sovereignty. It was important that in inaugurating the new
government there should be no break in the continuity of
legal obligation, of rights of property and contract, of jurisdiction, or of administrative action. It would not do to wait
for the new government to pass laws or to create offices and
appoint administrative officers and vest them with powers,
for the instant that the new government was created the




MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


intervening government would cease, and the period of waiting would be a period of anarchy.
It was necessary, therefore, to take such steps that the
new government should be created as a going concern, every
officer of which should be able to go on with his part of the
business of governing under the new sovereignty without
waiting for any new authority. That everything necessary
to this end should be done, and that it should be done
according to a consistent and maintainable legal theory,
caused the Department a good deal of solicitude. It is gratifying to report that it was done, and that the government
which, until noon of May twentieth, was proceeding under
the authority of the President of the United States, went on
in the afternoon of that day and has ever since continued
under the sovereignty which had been abandoned by Spain
in April, 1899, without any more break or confusion than
accompanies the inauguration of a new President in the
United States. This could not have been done without the
most perfect good understanding, mutual confidence, and
sympathetic cooperation on the part of our officers, who
were about to retire, and the newly-elected officers of Cuba,
who were about to take the reins of government. Our troops
withdrew from Cuba in the afternoon of the twentieth of
May, amid universal expressions of gratitude, esteem, and
affection. The public feeling was well illustrated by the
following telegram from President Palma:
EIHU ROOT,                           HAVANA, May 21, 1902.
Secretary of War, Washington:
I am deeply moved by your heartfelt message of congratulation on the
inauguration of the Republic of Cuba, to the birth of which the people
and the Government of the United States have contributed with their
blood and treasure. Rest assured that the Cuban people can never forget
the debt of gratitude they owe to the great republic, with which we will
always cultivate the closest relations of friendship and for the prosperity
of which we pray to the Almighty.       T. ESTRADA PALMA.




DEVELOPMENT OF CUBA


223


I venture to express the hope that this strong and welldeserved friendship of Cuba may be permanent and may
never be alienated by our treatment of the smaller and
weaker power, and that the people of the United States may
never lose their deep interest in the welfare of the new
republic which they have called into being with so much
labor and sacrifice. I know of no chapter in American history
more satisfactory than that which will record the conduct of
the military government of Cuba. The credit for it is due,
first of all, to Brigadier-General Leonard Wood, the commander of the department of Santiago until December, 1899,
and thenceforth military governor of the island. Credit is due
also to Brigadier-General Tasker H. Bliss, who had charge
of the collection of customs revenues; Major E. St. John
Greble, and Major and Surgeon Jefferson R. Kean, successively heads of the department of charities; Lieutenant
Matthew E. Hanna, superintendent of public schools; Lieutenant E. C. Brooks and Mr. J. D. Terrill, successively
auditors of Cuba; and to the Cuban gentlemen who, as
heads of the various state departments, constituted the
cabinet of the military governor: Messrs. Diego Tamayo,
secretary of state and government; Leopoldo Cancio, secretary of finance; Jose Varela, secretary of justice; Jose R.
Villalon, secretary of public works; Enrique Jose Varona,
secretary of public instruction; and Perfecto Lacoste, secretary of agriculture. Credit is also due to Major-General
John R. Brooke, the first military governor, and the members
of his administration; and to the department commanders,
General James H. Wilson and General Fitzhugh Lee; to the
lamented General William Ludlow, whose-arduous labors in
the government and sanitation of Havana made his untimely
death not the least of his country's sacrifices for Cuba; to
Brigadier-General Joseph P. Sanger, commander at Matanzas and later director of the census; and to Major-General




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


(then Colonel) Adna R. Chaffee, chief-of-staff, and Colonel
W. V. Richards and Colonel H. L. Scott, adjutant-generals
of the department.
Especial credit is due also to the Medical Department of
the army, and particularly to Major Walter Reed and Major
William C. Gorgas for their extraordinary service in ridding
the island of yellow fever, described in my last report; and
to Dr. Jefferson R. Kean and Dr. James Carroll for their
share in that work.
The brilliant character of this scientific achievement, its
inestimable value to mankind, the saving of thousands of
lives, and the deliverance of the Atlantic seacoast from constant apprehension, demand special recognition from the
Government of the United States.
Dr. Reed is the ranking major in the Medical Department,
and within a few months will, by operation of law, become
lieutenant-colonel. I ask that the President be authorized
to appoint him assistant surgeon-general with the rank of
colonel, and to appoint Major Gorgas deputy surgeon-general
with the rank of lieutenant-colonel, and that the respective
numbers in those grades in the Medical Department be
increased accordingly during the period for which they hold
those offices.
The name of Dr. Jesse W. Lazear, contract surgeon, who
voluntarily permitted himself to be inoculated with the
yellow-fever germ, in order to furnish a necessary experimental test in the course of the investigation, and who died
of the disease, should be written in the list of the martyrs
who have died in the cause of humanity. As a slight memorial of his heroism a battery in the coast defense fortification
at Fort Howard, Baltimore, Md., has been named " Battery
Lazear ".




THE PHILIPPINES
THE SUPPRESSION OF THE INSURRECTION AND THE BUILDING
UP OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT
The Philippine question has apparently been the most serious and difficult
problem to solve bequeathed to us by the Spanish-American War. The battle
of Manila occurred on May 1, 1898, and as a result the American authorities
substituted themselves for the Spanish authorities in Manila and in other parts of
the archipelago.
Upon the exchange of ratifications of the treaty of peace between Spain and the
United States, signed at Paris, December 10, 1898, the United States found itself
possessed of whatever legal title Spain had to the Philippines and of whatever
possession Spain was in a position to transfer. From Manila as a center American
troops took possession of the islands and when, as the result of the military operations set forth in the extracts from Mr. Root's reports, they had brought about a
degree of order which made civil government seem feasible, a commission was
appointed with the Honorable William H. Taft as chairman, to assume the government of the islands. The instructions to this commission drafted by Mr. Root, and
signed by President McKinley with trifling verbal changes, properly may be called
the organic act of the Philippines, and, with modifications had in mind when they
were framed, are the basis of the Act of Congress providing for the government
of the islands.
MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE ISLANDS
Extract from    the Report of the Secretary of War for 18991
HE       principal military operations of the year have been
in the Philippine Islands. At the date of the last annual
report the Eighth Army Corps, under the command of MajorGeneral E. S. Otis, held possession of the city of Manila under
the provisions of the protocol of August 12, 1898, which required the United States to occupy and hold that city pending
the conclusion of the treaty of peace, and which imposed upon
tho troops in possession at once the obligation to protect life
1 Page 5.
225




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


and property within the city and to refrain from infringing
upon Spanish territory outside of the city limits. In the performance of this duty many annoyances were experienced
from the army of the Tagalogs, who were in insurrection
against the government of Spain, and who had been collected
about the city, after its capture by the American forces had
become inevitable, under the promise of their leaders that
they should share in the plunder of the inhabitants.
General Otis was ordered to avoid any conflict with them,
and, strictly complying with these orders, he made every
effort to secure a peaceable understanding. The peaceable
attitude of the American forces was unfortunately misconstrued as indicating weakness and fear of a conflict. On the
night of February 4, 1899, our forces were attacked by the
Tagalogs, who attempted to capture the city. They were
promptly repulsed in a series of active engagements which
extended through the night of the fourth, and the fifth,
sixth, and tenth days of February. Our lines were extended
and established at a considerable distance from the city in
every direction. On the twenty-second of February a concerted rising of the Tagalogs, of whom there are about 200,000
in the city of Manila, was attempted, under instructions to
massacre all the Americans and Europeans in the city. This
attempt was promptly suppressed and the city was placed
under strict control.
The troops composing the Eighth Army Corps under General Otis's command at that time were of regulars 171 officers
and 5,201 enlisted men, and of volunteers 667 officers and
14,831 enlisted men, making an aggregate of 838 officers
and 20,032 enlisted men.
All of the volunteers and 1,650 of the regulars were, or were
about to become, entitled to their discharge, and their right
was perfected by the exchange of ratifications of the treaty
on the eleventh of April.




EVENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES


The total force which Major-General Otis was thus entitled
to command for any considerable period consisted of only 171
officers and 3,551 enlisted men. The numbers of the Eighth
Army Corps, above stated, give the entire numerical strength.
of all troops present in the islands, including those at Cavite
and Iloilo, the sick and wounded, those serving in the civil.
departments and in the staff organizations, and deducting
these, the effective men of the line, officers and soldiers, were
about 14,000. Of these 3,000 constituted a provost guard
necessary to preserve order within Manila and prevent the,
carrying-out of the known intention of the secret hostile
organizations in that city to burn and sack the city when
our troops were engaged on the lines of defense. Including,
therefore, all the troops who were entitled to be discharged,
there were not more than 11,000 officers and men available
to engage the insurgent army, which was two or three times
that number, well armed and equipped, and included many
of the native troops formerly comprised in the Spanish army,
and to occupy and hold positions in a comparatively unknown country, densely populated by inhabitants speaking
in the main an unknown language. The months of the most
intense heat, followed by the very severe rainy season of that
climate, were immediately approaching, and for any effective
occupation of the country it was necessary to await both the
close of the rainy season and the supply of new troops to take
the place of those about to be discharged. Practically all the
volunteers who were then in the Philippines consented to
forego the just expectation of an immediate return to their
homes, and to remain in the field until their places could
be supplied by new troops. They voluntarily subjected
themselves to the dangers and casualties of numerous
engagements, and to the very great hardships of the climate.
They exhibited fortitude and courage, and are entitled to high
commendation for their patriotic spirit and soldierly conduct.




MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


The operations of the period extending from February to
the thirty-first day of August, the date of the annual report
of General Otis as commander of the Department of the
Pacific, were marked by a steady maintenance and strengthening of the position occupied by our forces, a gradual extension of our lines, a restoration of security and confidence in
the city of Manila, numerous sharp engagements in the field
marked by unbroken success, and many instances of very
gratifying conduct on the part of both officers and men. It
is probable that at any time a column of troops could have
been sent anywhere on the island of Luzon against any
armed resistance which the insurgents could have offered
after the demoralization in their ranks, resulting from the
severe defeats inflicted upon them in February; but there
were not the troops necessary to garrison the towns, or to
maintain any far extended lines of communication. Accordingly no attempt was made to occupy the country, except
in the vicinity of Manila, and at such points as were important for the protection of our lines. Such movements as
passed beyond this territory were designed primarily to
break up threatening concentrations of insurgent troops,
and to prevent undue annoyance to the positions which
we occupied.
On the eleventh of February the city of Iloilo, on the island
of Panay, the second port of the Philippines in importance,
was occupied. After the capture of Iloilo the navy took possession of the city of Cebu, on the island of Cebu, and on the
twenty-sixth of February a battalion of the Twenty-third
Infantry was dispatched to that port for the protection of
the inhabitants and property.
On the first of March a military district comprising the
islands of Panay, Negros, and Cebu, and such other Visayan
islands as might be thereafter designated, to be known as the
"Visayan Military District", was established and placed




EVENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES


229


under the supervision of Brigadier-General Marcus P. Miller,
commanding First Separate Brigade, Eighth Army Corps,
with headquarters at Iloilo.
The Third Battalion of the First California Volunteer Infantry was thereupon ordered to the island of Negros, under
the command of Colonel (now Brigadier-General) James F.
Smith, and took possession of the city of Bacolod, on that
island, without resistance.
On the fifth of May Brigadier-General James F. Smith assumed temporary command of the Visayan military district,
and on the twenty-fifth of May, Brigadier-General R. P.
Hughes, United States Volunteers, was assigned to the command of the district.
On the nineteenth of May the Spanish garrison at Jolo, in
the Sulu Archipelago, was replaced by American troops.
By the thirty-first of August the number of troops stationed at Jolo and the Visayan Islands, including a small
guard at the Cavite Arsenal, amounted to 4,145 men....
All of the forces who were entitled to be discharged as
above mentioned have now been returned to this country
and mustered out. The new troops designed to take the
place of those returning to this country, and to constitute an
effective army for the occupation of the Philippines, have
been transported to Manila....
The troops now in the Philippines comprise 905 officers and
30,578 men of the regular force, and 594 officers and 15,388
men of the volunteer force, making an aggregate of 1,499
officers and 45,966 men, and when the troops on the way have
arrived the total force constituting the Eighth Army Corps
will be 2,051 officers and 63,483 men.
By the tenth of October the process of changing armies and
the approach of the dry season had reached a point where an
advance toward the general occupation of the country was
justified.




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


At that time the American lines extended from the Bay of
Manila to Laguna de Bay, and included considerable parts
of the provinces of Cavite, Laguna, and Morong to the south
and east of Manila, substantially all of the province of
Manila, and the southern parts of Bulacan and Pampanga,
dividing the insurgent forces into two widely separated parts.
To the south and east of our lines in Cavite and Morong were
numerous bands occasionally concentrating for attack on our
lines, and as frequently dispersed and driven back toward
the mountains. On the eighth of October, the insurgents in
this region having again gathered and attacked our lines of
communication, General Schwan with a column of 1,726 men
commenced a movement from Bacoor, in the province of
Cavite, driving the enemy through Old Cavite, Noveleta,
Santa Cruz, San Francisco de Malabon, Saban, and Perez
das Marinas, punishing them severely, scattering them and
destroying them as organized forces, and returning on the
thirteenth to Bacoor.
On the north of our lines stretched the great plain of central
Luzon extending north from Manila about one hundred and
twenty miles. This plain comprises parts of the provinces
of Manila, Pampanga, Bulacan, Tarlac, Nueva Ecija, and
Pangasinan. It is, roughly speaking, bounded on the south
by the Bay of Manila; on the east and west by high mountain ranges separating it from the seacoasts, and on the
north by mountains and the Gulf of Lingayen. Through the
northeast and central portion flows the Rio Grande from
the northern mountains southwesterly to the Bay of Manila,
and near the western edge runs the only railroad on the island
of Luzon, in a general southeasterly direction from Dagupan, on the Bay of Lingayen, to Manila. In this territory
Aguinaldo exercised a military dictatorship, and with a socalled Cabinet imitated the forms of civil government, having
his headquarters at Tarlac, which he called his capital, and




EVENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES


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which is situated near the center of the western boundary
of the plain.
The operations commenced in October involved the
movement of three separate forces: (1) A column proceeding up the Rio Grande and along the northeastern borders of
the plain and bending around to the westward across the
northern boundary toward the Gulf of Lingayen, garrisoning
the towns and occupying the mountain passes which gave
exit into the northeastern division of the island. (2) An
expedition proceeding by transports to the Gulf of Lingayen,
there to land at the northwestern corner of the plain and
occupy the great coast road which from that point runs between the mountains and the sea to the northern extremity
of the island, and to proceed eastward to a junction with the
first column. (3) A third column proceeding directly up the
railroad to the capture of Tarlac, and thence still up the road
to Dagupan, driving the insurgent forces before it toward the
line held by the first two columns. These movements were
executed with energy, rapidity, and success, notwithstanding
the exceedingly unfavorable weather and deluges of rain,
which rendered the progress of troops and transportation of
subsistence most difficult.
On the twelfth of October a strong column under General
Lawton, with General Young commanding the advance,
commenced the northerly movement up the Rio Grande from
Arayat, driving the insurgents before it to the northward and
westward. On the eighteenth the advance reached Cabiao.
On the nineteenth San Isidro was captured, and a garrison
established; on the twenty-seventh Cabanatuan was occupied, and a permanent station established there. On the
first of November Aliaga and Talavera were occupied. In
the meantime detachments, chiefly of Young's cavalry, were
operating to the west of the general line of advance, striking
insurgent parties wherever they were found and driving




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them toward the line of the railroad. By the thirteenth of
November the advance had turned to the westward, and our
troops had captured San Jose, Lupao, Humingan, San Quintin, Tayug, and San Nicolas. By the eighteenth of November
the advance had occupied Asingan and Rosales, and was
moving on Pozorrubio, a strongly intrenched post about
twelve miles east of San Fabian. General Lawton's forces
now held a line of posts extending up the eastern side of the
plain and curving around and across the northern end to
within a few miles of the Gulf of Lingayen.
On the sixth of November a force of 2,500, under command
of General Wheaton, sailed from Manila for the Gulf of
Lingayen, convoyed by ships of the navy, and on the seventh
the expedition was successfully landed at San Fabian with
effective assistance from a naval convoy against spirited
opposition. On the twelfth the Thirty-third Volunteers, of
Wheaton's command, under Colonel Hare, proceeded southeastward to San Jacinto, attacked and routed 1,200 intrenched insurgents, with the loss of the gallant Major John
A. Logan and six enlisted men killed, and one officer and
eleven men wounded. The enemy left eighty-one dead in
the trenches and suffered a total loss estimated at three
hundred.
In the meantime, on the fifth of November, a column under
General MacArthur advanced up the railroad from Angeles
to Magalang, clearing the country between Angeles and
Arayat, encountering and routing bodies of the enemy at
different points, and capturing Magalang. On the eleventh
it took Bamban, Capas, and Concepcion, and on the twelfth
of November entered Tarlac, from which the enemy fled on
its approach. Meantime, parties, mainly of the Thirty-sixth
Volunteers, under Colonel J. F. Bell, cleared the country to
the right of the line of advance as far east as the points
reached by General Lawton's flanking parties. On the seven



EVENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES


233


teenth of November MacArthur's column had occupied
Gerona and Panique, to the north of Tarlac. On the nineteenth Wheaton's troops, and on the twentieth MacArthur's
troops, entered Dagupan.
On the twenty-fourth of November General Otis was able
to telegraph to the Department as follows:
Claim to government by insurgents can be made no longer under any
fiction. Its treasurer, secretary of the interior, and president of congress
in our hands; its president and remaining cabinet officers in hiding, evidently in different central Luzon provinces; its generals and troops in
small bands scattered through these provinces, acting as banditti, or dispersed, playing the r6le of " Amigos ", with arms concealed.
Since that time our troops have been actively pursuing the
flying and scattered bands of insurgents, further dispersing
them, making many prisoners, and releasing many Spanish
prisoners who had been in the insurgents' hands.
On the twenty-third General Young's column had reached
Namacpacan, thirty miles north of San Fernando, in the
province of Union, and passed north into the mountains; and
on the twenty-fourth Vigan, the principal port of the northwest coast, was occupied by a body of marines landed from
the battleship Oregon. In the meantime the destruction of
the organized insurgent power in central Luzon found a
response from the natives of the province of Nueva Viscaya,
offering their services to drive out the insurgents who were
in possession of Bayambong, the capital of that province,
upon which the insurgent army had been prevented from
retreating by the disposition of General Lawton's forces,
commanding the passes of the mountains, and which Lawton's troops were rapidly approaching.
All these movements were accomplished under great difficulties owing to the almost impassable condition of the
country. In the course of them, large quantities of insurgent
supplies of all descriptions were captured, including stores




234      MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY
of food, clothing, arms, munitions of war, quick-firing and
Krupp guns, a powder factory and an arsenal, engineering
tools, money, war department records, personal effects of
officers, and numerous private dispatches.
It is gratifying to know that as our troops got away from
the immediate vicinity of Manila they found the natives of
the country exceedingly friendly, and both men.and animals
were able to live upon the country, and for considerable
periods leave their supply trains behind. This was doubtless
due in some measure to the fact that the Pampangos, who
inhabit the provinces of Pampanga and Tarlac, and the Pangasinanes, who inhabit Pangasinan, as well as the more
northerly tribes, are unfriendly to the Tagalogs, and had
simply submitted to the military domination of that tribe,
from which they were glad to be relieved. This is emphasized by a report from General Wheaton that he had been
obliged to guard the mother and infant son of Aguinaldo to
prevent the natives of Pampanga from killing them.
Wherever the permanent occupation of our troops has
extended in the Philippine Islands, civil law has been immediately put in force. The courts have been organized and
the most learned and competent native lawyers have been
appointed to preside over them.
A system of education has been introduced and numerous
schools have been established. It is believed that in the city
of Manila a greater number of good schools, affording better
facilities for primary instruction, exist today than at any
previous time in the history of the city.
CONTINUED MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES
Extract from the Report of the Secretary of War for 19001
At the date of the last report (November 29, 1899) the
government established by the Philippine insurgents in
1 Page 6.




EVENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES


central Luzon and the organized armed forces by which it
was maintained had been destroyed, and the principal civil
and military leaders of the insurrection, accompanied by
small and scattered bands of troops, were the objects of pursuit in the western and the northern parts of the island.
That pursuit was prosecuted with vigor and success, under
conditions of extraordinary difficulty and hardship, and resulted in the further and practically complete disintegration
of the insurrectionary bands in those regions, in the rescue of
nearly all the American prisoners and the greater part of the
Spanish prisoners held by the insurgents, in the capture of
many of the leading insurgents, and in the capture and
destruction of large quantities of arms, ammunition, and
supplies.
There still remained a large force of insurgents in Cavite
and the adjacent provinces south of Manila, and a considerable force to the east of the Rio Grande de Pampanga, chiefly
in the province of Bulacan, while in the extreme southeastern
portions of Luzon, and in the various Visayan islands, except
the island of Negros, armed bodies of Tagalogs had taken
possession of the principal seacoast towns, and were exercising military control over the peaceful inhabitants. Between
the insurgent troops in Bulacan and the mountains to the
north, and the insurgents in the south, communication was
maintained by road and trail, running along and near the
eastern bank of the Mariquina River, and through the towns
of Mariquina, San Mateo, and Montalban and the province
of Morong. This line of communication, passing through
rough and easily defended country, was strongly fortified
and held by numerous bodies of insurgents.
On December 18, 1899, a column, under the command of
Major-General Henry W. Lawton, proceeded from Manila,
and between that date and the twenty-ninth of December captured all the fortified posts of the insurgents, took




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


possession of the line of communication, which has ever
since been maintained, and destroyed, captured, or dispersed
the insurgent force in that part of the island. In the course of
this movement was sustained the irremediable loss of General
Lawton, who was shot and instantly killed while too fearlessly exposing his person in supervising the passing of his
troops over the river Mariquina at San Mateo....
On January 4, 1900, General J. C. Bates, U. S. V., was
assigned to the command of the First Division of the Eighth
Army Corps, and an active campaign under his direction
was commenced in southern Luzon. The plan adopted was
to confront and hold the strong force of the enemy near
Imus and to the west of Bacoor by a body of troops under
General Wheaton, while a column, under General Schwan,
should move rapidly down the west shore of the Laguna de
Bay to Biniang, thence turn southwesterly and seize the Silang, Indang, and Naic road, capture the enemy's supplies
supposed to be at the towns of Silang and Indang, and arrest
the retreat of the enemy, when they should be driven from
northern Cavite by our troops designated to attack them
there, and thus prevent their reassembling in the mountains
of southern Cavite and northern Batangas. This plan was
successfully executed.
General Schwan's column moved with great rapidity over
the lines indicated, marching a distance of over six hundred
miles, meeting with and defeating numerous bodies of insurgents and capturing many intrenched positions, taking
possession of and garrisoning towns along the line, and
scattering and demoralizing all the organized forces of the
enemy within that section of country. From these operations
and the simultaneous attacks by our troops under General
Wheaton in the north the rebel forces in the Cavite region
practically disappeared, the members being killed or captured
or returning to their homes as unarmed citizens, and a few




EVENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES


237


scattered parties escaping through General Schwan's line to
the south. By the eighth of February the organized forces
of the insurgents in the region mentioned had ceased to exist.
In large portions of the country the inhabitants were returning to their homes and resuming their industries, and active
trade with Manila was resumed.
In the course of these operations about six hundred Spanish prisoners were released from the insurgents, leaving about
six hundred more still in their hands in the extreme southeastern provinces of Camarines and Albay, nearly all of
whom were afterwards liberated by our troops. In the
meantime an expedition was organized under the command of
Brigadier-General William A. Kobbe, U. S. V., to expel the
Tagalogs who had taken possession of the principal hemp
ports of the islands situated in Albay, the extreme southeastern province of Luzon, and in the islands of Leyte,
Samar, and Catanduanes.
This expedition sailed from Manila on the eighteenth of
January and accomplished its object. All of the principal
hemp ports were relieved from control of the insurgents, garrisoned by American troops, and opened to commerce by
order of the military governor of the islands on the thirtieth
of January and the tenth and fourteenth of February. The
expedition met with strong resistance at Legaspi from an
intrenched force under the Chinese general, Paua. He was
speedily overcome and escaped into the interior. After a few
days he reassembled his forces and threatened the garrisons
which had been left in Albay and Legaspi, whereupon he was
attacked and defeated; he then surrendered. Thirty pieces
of artillery, a large quantity of ammunition, a good many
rifles, and a considerable amount of money were captured by
this expedition.
On the fifteenth of February an expedition, under the supervision of Major-General Bates and under the immediate




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


command of Brigadier-General James M. Bell, U. S. V.,
sailed from Manila to take possession of the north and south
Camarines provinces and western Albay, in which the insurgent forces had been swelled by the individuals and scattered
bands escaping from our operations in various sections of
the north. The insurgent force was defeated after a sharp
engagement near the mouth of the Bicol River, pursued, and
scattered. Large amounts of artillery and war material were
captured. The normal conditions of industry and trade relations with Manila were resumed by the inhabitants.
On the twentieth of March the region covered by the lastdescribed operations was created a district of southeastern
Luzon, under the command of General James M. Bell, who
was instructed to proceed to the establishment of the necessary customs and internal-revenue service in the district. In
the meantime similar expeditions were successfully made
through the mountains of the various islands of the Visayan
group, striking and scattering and severely punishing the
bands of outlaws and insurgents who infested those islands.
In the latter part of March General Bates proceeded with the
Fortieth Infantry to establish garrisons in Mindanao. The
only resistance was of a trifling character at Cagayan, the
insurgent general in northeastern Mindanao surrendering
and turning over the ordnance in his possession.
With the successful accomplishment of these operations
all formal and open resistance to American authority in
the Philippines terminated, leaving only an exceedingly
vexatious and annoying guerrilla warfare of a character
closely approaching brigandage, which will require time,
patience, and good judgment to suppress. As rapidly as
we have occupied territory, the policy of inviting inhabitants to return to their peaceful vocations, and aiding them
in the reestablishment of their local governments, has been
followed, and the protection of the United States has been




EVENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES


239


promised to them. The giving of this protection has led to
the distribution of troops in the Philippine Islands at over
four hundred different posts, with the consequent labor of
administration and supply.
The maintenance of these posts involves the continued
employment of a large force, but as the Tagalogs who are in
rebellion have deliberately adopted the policy of murdering,
so far as they are able, all of their countrymen who are
friendly to the United States, the maintenance of garrisons is at present necessary to the protection of the peaceful and unarmed Filipinos who have submitted to our
authority; and if we are to discharge our obligations in
that regard the reduction of those garrisons must necessarily
be gradual.
The most efficient measures for lessening the number
of posts and consequently the number of troops necessary in the Philippines, will be the construction of roads,
making possible rapid communication, so that each post may
effectually protect the people of a larger section of country;
the establishment of personal relations between our officers
and the people of the country with whom they are brought in
contact, so that we can tell who are trustworthy sources of
information and who are not; the gradually growing appreciation of the benefits of our control and the sincerity of our
professions of good intention, which will naturally follow the
benefits of good civil government; and the organization of
native troops under American officers.
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE CIVIL GOVERNMENT
Extract from the Report of the Secretary of War for 19001
Spanish authority had for centuries furnished the only
controlling force for the maintenance of order in the Philippine Islands, and upon the destruction of the Spanish power
1 Page 22.




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


the existing administration completely ceased to perform its
functions and disappeared, leaving a great body of inhabitants, without training or capacity to organize for self-control, absolutely without government. No substitute for the
accustomed control was furnished under the Tagalog rule,
which was built up, in the first instance, by our assistance,
and afterwards under our sufferance, between the battle of
Manila Bay, May 1, 1898, and the assertion of our authority
by the army which arrived in the islands in the autumn of
1899. General Otis says of the interim:
Under Tagalog domination, which was really the irresponsible dictatorship of Aguinaldo, cruelly enforced by his military officers, there was no
rule by which the right or wrong of personal action could be determined,
nor indeed did individual liberty of any kind exist. The so-called insurgent
government, whatever it might have been at its inception, degenerated
into a military despotism of low order, in which neither property nor life
had the least security.
From these statements should be excepted Manila, southern Mindanao, and the islands of the Sulu Archipelago, inhabited by Moros, who continued under the direct control of
their tribal chieftains, under the arrangement made by General Bates on August 20, 1899, and the island of Negros,
whose people repelled the Tagalog rule and immediately substituted a government under American supervision for that
of Spain. In the remainder of the archipelago, particularly
in the regions inhabited or dominated by the Tagalogs, as
American occupation extended it became necessary to deal
with civil society thoroughly disorganized, in which all the
turbulent and predatory elements of tribes ranging from
barbarism to a semi-civilization had been set free from the
habit of obedience to law.
In the first instance the military control of the United
States superseded the military control of the Tagalogs. The
military authorities, however, promptly commenced the
organization of civil administration, in which, as rapidly as




EVENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES


241


practicable, all the ordinary functions of government were to
be vested. The substantive body of Spanish law of the Philippines was excellent and adequate if it could be applied.
The first step in its application was the organization of
courts. In this we were fortunate in securing the services of
one of the most able and profound lawyers of the islands, Don
Cayetano Arellano,who was made chief justice of the supreme
court of the island, composed of six Filipino lawyers of Luzon,
Panay, and Cebu, and three officers of the army, who were
members of the bar of our own country. This court has
been supplemented by subordinate courts, created first for
the city of Manila and afterwards for other regions from
time to time as our occupation has extended. In all of these
courts the judges and the prosecuting attorneys have, in the
main, been natives of the islands.
The Spanish criminal procedure in the islands had been
exceedingly oppressive and regardless of personal rights, and
native representatives in the new courts were very desirous
to introduce as speedily as possible the privileges accorded by
the laws of the United States to its citizens. The native and
American justices of the supreme court, assisted by the
attorney-general, Don Florentino Torres, also a distinguished
lawyer of Manila, accordingly proceeded to the preparation
of a code of criminal procedure, which was promulgated by
an order dated April 23, 1900, and which for the first time
affords real protection to the personal rights of persons
charged with crime in the Philippine Islands.
The next step in order of importance was the establishment
of municipal governments through which the people of the
islands might control their own local affairs by officers of their
own selection. For the accomplishment of this end the chief
justice, Arellano, and Attorney-General Torres, assisted by
three American judicial officers, were constituted a board on
January 29, 1900. After two months of assiduous work




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


the board reported a general statute for the organization
of municipalities, which was promulgated by an order on
March 29, 1900. Of this statute the board says in its report,
over the signature of the distinguished Philippine members:
For the first time the Philippine people are to exercise the right of
suffrage in the election of municipal officers, a right only slightly restricted
by conditions which have been imposed for the purpose of rewarding as
well as encouraging the people in their just and natural aspirations to
become educated and worthy to enjoy all the benefits of civilization.
With the new municipalities a really autonomous and decentralized
municipal government will be established in the towns....
A reading of the provisions of the law clearly demonstrates the purposes, tendencies, and beneficent intentions of the United States Government.
The statute thus adopted places in the hands of the
municipal authorities practically the entire administration of
the ordinary affairs of government, reserving to the central
authority only such power of supervision and intervention as
might be necessary to require the powers vested in the municipal officers to be exercised with loyalty and good faith.
The law relating to marriages was modified, upon the
general demand of the people, so as to permit civil marriage,
and give to persons thus married all the legal rights of those
married by religious ceremony.
The patent and trade-mark laws of the United States were
in substance adopted in the islands. The coasting trade was
regulated; burdensome taxes imposed by Spanish law were
abolished; the schools, which were established immediately
upon our occupation of Manila, were extended and improved;
a quarantine law was enacted and put in force; the customs
and insular revenues were greatly increased, and a rigid high
license and early closing law was enforced upon the saloons
in the city of Manila....
On consultation with the commission, and with the President's approval, a notice of amnesty was issued by the mili



EVENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES


243


tary governor, dated June 21, 1900, and supplemented by a
public statement by the military governor, under date of
July 2, 1900, based, in the main, upon the instructions to the
commission. Something over five thousand persons, of all
grades of the civil and military service of the insurrection,
among them many of the most prominent officials of the
former Tagalog government, presented themselves and took
the following oath:
I hereby renounce all allegiance to any and all so-called revolutionary
governments in the Philippine Islands and recognize and accept the supreme authority of the United States of America therein; and I do
solemnly swear that I will bear true faith and allegiance to that Government; that I will at all times conduct myself as a faithful and law-abiding
citizen of said islands, and will not, either directly or indirectly, hold
correspondence with or give intelligence to an enemy of the United
States, neither will I aid, abet, harbor, or protect such enemy. That I
impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion, so help me God...
The commission in their legislative action are following the
ordinary course of legislative procedure. Their sessions are
open, and their discussions and the proposed measures upon
which they are deliberating are public, while they take testimony and receive suggestions from citizens as if they were
a legislative committee. Their first legislative act was the
appropriation, on the twelfth of September, of $2,000,000
(Mexican), to be used in the construction and repair of
highways and bridges in the Philippine Islands. The second
act, on the same day, was an appropriation of $5,000
(Mexican) for a survey of a railroad to the mountains of
Benguet, in the island of Luzon.
The proposed railroad, about forty-five miles in length,
extending from the Manila and Dagupan road, near the Gulf
of Lingayen, to the interior, will open, at a distance of about
one hundred and seventy miles from Manila, a high tableland exceedingly healthy, well wooded with pine and oak,




244    MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


comparatively dry and cool, and where the mercury is said
to range at night in the hottest season of the year between
fifty and sixty degrees Fahrenheit. The value of such a
place for the recuperation of troops and foreign residents
will be very great.
The third act of the commission was an appropriation for
the payment of a superintendent of public instruction. They
have secured for that position the services of Frederick W.
Atkinson, recently principal of the high school of Springfield,
Mass., who was selected by the commission for that purpose
before their arrival in Manila.
Before the first of September a board of officers had been
engaged upon the revision of the tariff for the islands in the
light of such criticisms and suggestions as had been made
regarding the old tariff. The commission have considered the
report of this board, and after full public hearings of business
interests in the island have formulated a tariff law which has
been transmitted to the Department. This has been given to
the press and published in the trade journals in this country,
and suggestions thereon from the business interests of the
United States have been publicly invited by the Department.
A measure has been adopted for the improvement of the
harbor of Manila, where now cargoes of all large vessels have
to be lightered for several miles, and where the typhoons of
that region frequently prevent all shipment and discharge
of cargoes for weeks at a time. Plans for the construction of a
system of roads, under the appropriation already mentioned,
were made by the engineer force in the islands during the
recent rainy season, and an additional force of engineers
has been sent from this country to aid in the construction
work during the dry season now opening.
The revenues of the islands are increasing, although up to
this time they are derived chiefly from customs. The customs receipts deposited with the Treasurer during the year




EVENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES


245


ending June 30, 1900, amounted to $5,482,448.45. The
receipts for the six months ending June 30, 1900, as compared with the corresponding six months of the preceding
year, show an increase of $1,785,496.26. The revenues will
not, however, be sufficient for the construction of the roads,
the harbor improvements, the railroad, and the establishment
of necessary schools as rapidly as those undertakings ought
to progress.
I recommend that provision be made by Congress either
for a loan to the insular treasury, to be repaid out of the
revenues of the island hereafter, of a sufficient amount for
the building of the proposed railroad, or that authority be
granted for the issue of bonds for that purpose constituting
an obligation of the insular government secured by a lien
upon the road.
A civil service board has been constituted by the commission, and a civil service law has been enacted by the
commission providing for the application of the merit system
to appointments in the island....
Much embarrassment has been caused by the condition of
the currency in the islands. Under Spanish control the business of the islands was transacted almost entirely by the use
of the Mexican silver dollar of 377.17+ grains. The people of
the country practically know no other currency, and it is
impossible to transact business generally with American currency among a people to whom its value is unknown. Our
soldiers who receive their pay in American currency and wish
to spend it in the islands, our quartermasters and commissaries who wish to purchase supplies, and all other persons who
come into the possession of American money which they
desire to use in the islands are obliged to purchase Mexican
dollars. These are worth in the neighborhood of fifty cents
American money, but their price continually fluctuates with
the market price of silver.




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


The present disturbances in China have caused a scarcity
in the supply, which has sent the price up to the neighborhood of fifty-two cents, while the insular government —
which, of course, has been obliged to follow some established
rule for the payment of its employees-has been receiving
them at fifty cents. This condition, while it is profitable to the
bankers of Manila, is the cause of constant loss and annoyance
to all other people, and, both because of the scarcity and
the fluctuation in value, is a serious injury to business.
Two remedies have been suggested: One that we should
ourselves coin a dollar for use in the islands of the same
weight and fineness as the Mexican dollar, which shall be
permitted equally with that coin to take its chances with the
fluctuation of the market, but which would relieve us from an
embarrassment caused by a limited supply of coin bearing
the Mexican stamp. The other suggestion is that we should
coin an insular dollar which we shall undertake to redeem in
gold at fifty cents, and which, being substantially the same
in value and appearance as the Mexican dollar, would pass
current in the islands, and would, as rapidly as it became the
medium of exchange, bring the islands to a gold basis.
FINAL MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES
Extract from the Report of the Secretary of War for 190 1
At the date of my last report (November 30, 1900), formal
and open resistance to American authority in the Philippines
had practically terminated, and the Filipino insurgent forces
had adopted a system of guerrilla warfare, closely approaching brigandage. To contend successfully against this condition and to suppress it, to afford protection to the peaceful
and unarmed inhabitants, and to reestablish local civil governments had necessitated the distribution of our forces to
' Page 31.




EVENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES


247


more than four hundred stations. This process continued
until a maximum of five hundred and two stations were
occupied, holding every important town and strategic point
in the archipelago. The scattered guerrilla insurgent bands
obtained funds and supplies from the towns and the country
in the vicinity of their operations. The people thus contributing to the support of these guerrillas had been rarely interfered with. Prisoners taken in battle had been disarmed and
immediately released.
This policy had been adhered to in the hope that it might
make friendly neighbors of the natives, but, on the contrary,
they seemed suspicious of this beneficence, and looked upon
it as an evidence of weakness. It was therefore decided to
apply more rigidly to the residents of the archipelago the
laws of war touching the government of occupied places.
Notice of this intention was given by a proclamation issued
by the military governor, December 20, 1900, fully explaining
the law, supplemented by letters of instruction, and followed
by more vigorous field operations. It was followed immediately by the deportation to the island of Guam of about
fifty prominent Filipino insurgent army officers, civil officials,
insurgent agents, sympathizers, and agitators....
The field work of the army was continued with renewed
vigor from each of the five hundred stations and was conducted simultaneously throughout the entire archipelago
with such telling results that, with the exception of Lukban
in Samar and Malvar in southern Luzon, all prominent
insurgent leaders with their commands were captured or surrendered.
These field operations were prosecuted notwithstanding
the withdrawal from the Philippines and return to the United
States of the volunteer army, comprising one regiment of
cavalry and twenty-five regiments of infantry, a total of
nearly 1,400 officers and 29,000 enlisted men, whose transfer




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


across 8,000 miles of sea to San Francisco, where they were
mustered out of service as required by law, was accomplished
without loss.
The most important single military event of the year in the
Philippines was the capture of Aguinaldo, successfully accomplished by Brigadier-General Frederick Funston, U. S. A.,
under the supervision and guidance of his department and
division commanders, Major-Generals Wheaton and MacArthur. Soon after his capture Aguinaldo voluntarily subscribed to the oath of allegiance and issued a proclamation to
the Filipino people, urging the termination of hostilities,
that " lasting peace might come to them under the glorious
banner of the United States." His capture was soon followed by the surrender of such prominent Filipino leaders as
Tinio, Aglipay, Trias, and Cailles, with their entire following.
The operations of the field forces were so vigorous and unrelenting that more than 1,000 encounters occurred between
our troops and the insurgents from May, 1900, to June 30,
1901, in which the insurgent casualties were: killed, 3,854;
wounded, 1,193; captured, 6,572; surrendered, 23,095; with
a total of 15,693 rifles and nearly 300,000 rounds of smallarms ammunition captured and surrendered. Our casualties
during the same period were: killed, 245; wounded, 490;
captured, 118; missing, 20.
I cannot speak too highly of the work of the army in the
Philippines. The officers and men have been equal to the best
requirements, not only of military service, but of the civil
administration with which they were charged in all its details
from the date of our occupancy in August, 1898, until the
inauguration of a civil governor on July 4, 1901.
The recent disturbances in Samar and southern Luzon are
of minor consequence, and are being stamped out by the
vigorous operations of the troops. Small disturbances of this
character are, unfortunately, to be expected, but will be con



EVENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES


249


trolled and guarded against by every means possible. The
difficulties of this description are not more but less than were
anticipated when my report of last year was written....
The army in the Philippines has been reduced since my
last report from 2,367 officers and 71,727 enlisted men to
1,111 officers and 42,128 enlisted men. When the organizations now remaining in the Philippines shall by the force of
ordinary casualties and expiration of enlistments be reduced
to the numbers established by the order of May 8, 1901,...
the total enlisted strength of those organizations, exclusive of
hospital corps, will be 32,079 men.
The policy indicated in my report of last year, of creating
a native Philippine force which shall in time release a large
part of the American army from the necessity of remaining
in the Philippines, has not been neglected. The authority
then asked was granted by section thirty-six of the act of
February 2, 1901, Congress in that provision wisely empowering the President to proceed in his discretion by successive
steps, beginning with a simple organization of scouts, and continuing, when the proper time should arrive, with the more
complicated and fully officered organization of the regular
army. Pursuing this policy, the small bodies of scouts mentioned in my last report have during the year been enlarged
and multiplied until there are now 4,973 in the service. As
command in these bodies requires special qualifications for
dealing with the native soldiers, all the appointments of
officers (ninety-eight in number) have been made upon the
recommendations of the commanding officer in the Philippines..
Reduction of Expenses. The War Department has realized
the importance and the duty of following the improved
conditions by a reduction of expenditures and the enforcement of economy. War always and inevitably tends toward
extravagance. The conditions of active military operations




MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


frequently require that things shall be done without regard
to cost. The uncertainties of the future make very liberal
and often excessive estimates and requisitions the part of prudence. The difficulties of rapid transportation and extemporized storage of supplies make it impossible to enforce
the ordinary standards of official accountability. The large
sums expended and the greater interests involved, discourage small economies. Habits are acquired which cannot
be thrown off without a positive and vigorous effort. We
are making such an effort and, I think, with success...
A number of improvements in the methods of transacting
the business of the supply departments suited to the conditions in the Philippines have been formulated and will be
followed. The economical handling of supplies will be greatly
promoted by the proposed construction of much-needed
storehouses and by the progressive concentration of troops at
fewer stations, while the quantity of supplies required will be
reduced by the gradual substitution of native troops and civil
constabulary for American soldiers to maintain order.
THE CIVIL GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
Extract from the Report of the Secretary of War for 1901 
On February 19, 1901, in reporting upon a resolution of the
Senate asking information regarding lands held in mortmain
or otherwise for ecclesiastical or religious uses in the Philippine
Islands, I transmitted copies of the acts of the Philippine
commission numbered fifty-six to sixty-eight, inclusive, bringing the record of enactments down to January 2, 1901, and
these were communicated to Congress by the message of
the President dated February 25, 1901, and are printed
in Senate Document 190, Fifty-sixth Congress, second
session....
1 Page 53.
fo




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The presentation of this report to Congress will put the
National Legislature in possession of the entire body of
legislative acts, consisting of two hundred and sixty-three
statutes, under which civil government in the Philippine
Islands is proceeding.
A brief account of the growth and general character of the
present government of the Philippines may be of service in
considering these enactments.
In March, 1900, the insurgent government and the organized forces supporting it had been dispersed. The principal cities and the greater part of the country were in possession of the American forces, subject to forcible interference
only by the numerous guerrilla bands which were scattered
through the mountains, and considerable portions of the
territory were held in apparently peaceable possession. The
government was a government of military occupation, and
the civil laws were being administered under the direction of
military officers. All laws were subject to amendment,
repealing, or overruling by the order of the military commander, which was, as must always be the case in such governments, the supreme law. Such a government is always
unsatisfactory in its character, and while the conditions in
many large parts of the archipelago rendered its continuance
necessary, the people of the pacified provinces were eager
for the resumption of peaceable conditions under a government regulated by formal and public laws which should
supersede the necessarily arbitrary orders of the military
commander. The first Philippine Commission, of which
Mr. Schurman was chairman, had urged the early establishment of civil government, and it was manifestly desirable that as soon as possible those parts of the Filipino
people who had turned to paths of peace should be relieved
so far as practicable from the prejudicial effects of purely
military methods.




MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


The sole power, however, which the President was exercising in the Philippine Islands was a military power derived
from his authority under the Constitution as Commander-inChief of the Army and Navy. The question presented was
how, in the exercise of the President's military power under
the Constitution, to give the peaceful people of the Philippines the real benefits of civil government. The question was
answered by an analysis of the military power, which when
exercised in a territory under military occupation includes
executive, judicial, and legislative authority. It not infrequently happens that in a single order of a military commander can be found the exercise of all three of these different
powers - the exercise of legislative power by provisions
prescribing a rule of action, of judicial power by determinations of right, and of executive power by the enforcement of
the rules prescribed and the rights determined. It is indeed
the combination of all these powers in a single individual
which constitutes the chief objection to any unnecessary
continuance of military government.
It was accordingly determined that as the fundamental
step in giving the substance of civil government to the people
of the Philippines there should be a separation of these powers
so that the executive, the legislative, and the judicial powers
should be exercised by different persons throughout the pacified territory; and as it is well settled that the military
authority of the President in occupied territory may be
exercised through civil agents as well as military officers, it
was determined that that part of the military power which
was legislative in its character should be exercised by civil
agents proceeding in accordance with legislative forms, while
the judicial power should be exercised by courts established
and regulated by the enactments of the legislative authority.
The President accordingly, 6n March 16, 1900, appointed
the second Philippine Commission pf five members, with
I




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253


Judge Taft as the president, and vested in them authority
to exercise such legislative authority, subject to the approval
and control of the Secretary of War, leaving in the military
commanders the executive authority (except certain specific
powers of appointment not important to notice here), and
vesting judicial authority in the courts to be established
through the legislative action of the commission.
On April 7, 1900, formal written instructions were given
to the commission, which defined their powers and formulated the policy which was to be followed in the gradual
development and conduct of civil government in the Philippines. A copy of this instrument was set forth in full in
President McKinley's message to Congress on December 3,
1900. It remains the guide and rule of action of the insular
government, and all the steps taken in the government of the
Philippines since that time have been in conformity to its
provisions.  [These instructions appear on pages 287-294 of
this volume.]
Legislative Power. The scope of the authority conferred
upon the commission was declared in the following words:
Exercise of this legislative authority will include the making of rules and
orders, having the effect of law, for the raising of revenue by taxes, customs, duties, and imposts; the appropriation and expenditure of public
funds of the islands; the establishment of an educational system throughout the islands; the establishment of a system to secure an efficient civil
service; the organization and establishment of courts; the organization
and establishment of municipal and departmental governments, and all
other matters of a civil nature for which the military governor is now
competent to provide by rules or orders of a legislative character.
With due allowance for the time necessary to reach their
destination and become familiar with the conditions, the
commission were directed to commence the performance of
their duties on September 1, 1900; and ever since that time,
with the addition to their numbers which will be hereafter
stated, that body has acted as the local legislature of the




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


Philippine Islands. While the President vested and could
vest in it no greater legislative authority than the military
commander previously had, it has exercised that authority
in accordance with legislative forms. Its sessions have been
stated and public. Its legislative enactments have been
publicly introduced and printed in the form of bills. When
of general public interest they have been made the subject of
public hearings before committees, which the people of the
islands have freely attended and at which their views have
been freely expressed. The ordinary legislative opportunities
for amendment have been afforded, and finally the amendments and the bills have been publicly debated and voted
upon, and the bills passed have become in effect statutes,
subject to the approval of the Secretary of War, which has
not in any case been withheld.
The statutes thus enacted have become the law of the land
in the Philippines, and bear the same relation to governmental action and private rights in the archipelago that the
statutes enacted by the Congress and the state legislatures
in the United States bear within the territory for which they
are enacted. Under this system the Philippine Islands have
had the practical advantages of having the legislative separated from the executive authority; of having laws matured
under the influence of public discussion and deliberation; of
having the laws, when adopted, certain, permanent, and
known; and of having the moneys of the insular government expended only pursuant to previous appropriations
made by law, so that official accountability could be enforced
by a rigid system of audit, testing the accounts of all disbursing officers from the lowest to the highest by reference to a
fixed standard of lawful authority. I have no question that
the substitution of this method for the orders of a single
military commander, however competent, has been of the
greatest value. I invite the attention of Congress to the




EVENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES


two hundred and sixty-three statutes now set before them,
with the hope that the work of the commission will receive
the approval which I believe it merits for its high quality of
constructive ability, its wise adaptation to the ends desirable
to be accomplished, and its faithful adherence to the principles controlling our own government.
It should be observed that these statutes are not mere
expressions of theoretical views as to how the Philippines
ought to be governed, but are the practical treatment of
carefully studied conditions.   Many of the most important
are not the beginnings but the results of patient experiment
-the outcome and improvement of successive military
orders dealing with the same subjects.
The Spooner Amendment. In the act making appropriation
for the support of the army for the fiscal year ending June 30,
1902, approved March 2, 1901, Congress enacted the following provision (commonly known as the Spooner Amendment):
All military, civil, and judicial powers necessary to govern the Philippine Islands, acquired from Spain by the treaties concluded at Paris on
the tenth day of December, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, and at
Washington on the seventh day of November, nineteen hundred, shall,
until otherwise provided by Congress, be vested in such person and persons
and shall be exercised in such manner as the President of the United
States shall direct for the establishment of civil government and for
maintaining and protecting the inhabitants of said islands in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion: Provided, That all franchises granted under the authority hereof shall contain a reservation of
the right to alter, amend, or repeal the same.
Until a permanent government shall have been established in said
archipelago full reports shall be made to Congress on or before the first
day of each regular session of all legislative acts and proceedings of the
temporary government instituted under the provisions hereof; and full
reports of the acts and doings of said government, and as to the condition
of the archipelago and of its people, shall be made to the President, including all information which may be useful to the Congress in providing for a
more permanent government: Provided, That no sale or lease or other disposition of the public lands or the timber thereon or the mining righits




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


therein shall be made: And provided further, That no franchise shall be
granted which is not approved by the President of the United States, and
is not in his judgment clearly necessary for the immediate government of
the islands and indispensable for the interest of the people thereof, and
which cannot, without great public mischief, be postponed until the
establishment of permanent civil government; and all such franchises
shall terminate one year after the establishment of such permanent civil
government.
These provisions were immediately communicated to the
commission by cable, with the following direction:
Until further orders government will continue under existing instructions and orders.
Conditions and Policy. The conditions at that time did
not permit, nor, great as has been the improvement, do
they now permit, the abandonment of military government
throughout the archipelago. In the more unsettled portions
of the islands the restrictive and punitive force of purely
civil administration would as yet be quite inadequate to the
maintenance of order, even if the creation of a civil-service
personnel were already accomplished. The work of securing
the great number of competent and faithful civil agents
necessary for the administration of government is necessarily slow, even in thoroughly pacified territory. It requires
that the appointing power should become familiar with
great numbers of the natives, and should learn both who
are competent and who are to be trusted - a necessarily
gradual process.
The policy contemplated in the instructions of April
seventh, and followed by the War Department, has been to
press forward steadily, as rapidly as it could be done safely
and thoroughly, the gradual substitution of government
through civil agents for government through military agents,
so that the administration of the military officer shall be continually narrowed, and that of the civil officer continually
2enlarged, until the time comes when the army can, without




EVENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES,


257


imperiling the peace and order of the country, be relegated
to the same relation toward government which it occupies
in the United States. In this way we have avoided the premature abandonment of any power necessary to enforce the
authority of the United States, and at the same time have
held open to the people of every community the opportunity
to escape from the stringency of military rule by uniting with
us in effective measures to bring about peaceful conditions in
the territory which they inhabit.
Municipal Governments. The first duty charged upon the
commission by the instructions of April seventh was "the
establishment of municipal governments, in which the natives
of the islands, both in the cities and in the rural communities,
shall be afforded the opportunity to manage their own local
affairs to the fullest extent of which they are capable, and
subject to the least degree of supervision and control which a
careful study of their capacities and observation of the workings of native control show to be consistent with the maintenance of law, order, and loyalty."
In pursuance of this instruction the commission, on
January 31, 1901, passed "a general act for the organization of municipal governments in the Philippine Islands."
This is act No. 82, known as the " municipal code." Under
this act a town when organized becomes a municipal corporation having the customary corporate powers. The municipal
authority is to be exercised by a president, vice-president,
and municipal council elected for a term of two years by the
qualified electors of the municipality. Provision is made for a
municipal secretary and a municipal treasurer, who are to be
appointed by the president with the consent of the council.
The qualified electors include all persons who prior to the
capture of Manila had held certain municipal offices, and all
persons who own real property to the value of five hundred
pesos, or pay an annual tax of thirty pesos or more, and all




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


those who speak, read, and write either English or Spanish.
(Persons guilty of crime, or of certain specific acts of disloyalty, and tax delinquents are disqualified.)
The powers of government conferred upon the municipalities are similar in character and extent to those ordinarily
exercised by municipalities in the United States, and include,
in general, authority to fix salaries; fill vacancies in office;
provide fire, police, and health regulations; make appropriations of money for municipal purposes; manage the property
of the town; regulate the construction, repair, and use of
streets, wharves, and piers; establish, regulate, and maintain
a police force; preserve the public peace and suppress vice;
establish and maintain schools; assess property for taxation;
levy taxes for municipal purposes, within the limitations prescribed by law; license the sale of intoxicating liquors; fix
penalties for violation of ordinances, etc.
For the accomplishment of the purposes indicated the
municipal council is empowered to make such ordinances and
regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to
carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by the municipal code, and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote
the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants
thereof, and for the protection of property therein, and enforce
obedience thereto with lawful fines or penalties.
In proceedings relative to assessment of property for taxation and the levy and collection of taxes, the municipal
authorities act in conjunction with the provincial authorities
of the province in which the municipality is situated; and
the revenues derived from the tax levies are ratably distributed between the province and the municipalities therein.
Under this code municipal governments have been organized and are maintained in seven hundred and sixty-five towns.




EVENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES


259


Provincial Governments. A further instruction contained
in the instrument of April 7, 1900, was as follows:
The next subject in order of importance should be the organization of
government in the larger administrative divisions, corresponding to counties, departments, or provinces, in which the common interests of many or
several municipalities falling within the same tribal lines or the same natural
geographical limits may best be subserved by a common administration.
Under this direction the commission, on February 6,
1901, passed "a general act for the organization of provincial governments in the Philippine Islands," being act
No. 83, and since amended in various details by act No. 133
and act No. 223. Under this act a provincial government
upon organization becomes a body corporate, with customary
corporate powers. The officials of the provincial government are a provincial governor, secretary, treasurer, supervisor, and fiscal. The governing body is the provincial board,
composed of the governor, treasurer, and supervisor. The
governor is to be chosen by the councilors of the municipalities in the province. The other officers are to be appointed
by the commission, and, with the exception of the fiscal, are
to be appointed under the provisions of the civil service act.
The provincial government has jurisdiction over roads,
bridges, and ferries not within the inhabited pueblos or barrios; over the administration of criminal law in the province;
the protection and entertainment of the courts; the assessment and collection of taxes conjointly with the municipal
officers; extensive visitorial and supervisory powers over
municipal officers, and over the local constabulary or police.
Under this statute the commission has from time to time
organized thirty-five of the provinces in the archipelago.
Three of these - Cebu, Bohol, and Batangas - proved to
be prematurely organized, and have been turned back to the
control of the military officers. The governments of the
remaining thirty-two are in full operation. The organization




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


of these municipalities and provinces was necessarily a long
and painstaking proceeding, and to accomplish it the commissioners have journeyed through the islands, familiarizing
themselves with the conditions, meeting the inhabitants, and
consulting with the principal men. The first provincial
governors were necessarily selected by the commission, but
in every case they were selected upon consultation with the
citizens, and with due regard to their informally expressed
wishes.
The city of Manila has been placed under a special government quite similar to that of Washington, provided by act
No. 183, entitled " An act to incorporate the city of Manila",
passed July 31, 1901.
Judicial Establishment. A third duty specifically imposed
upon the commission was to provide for the organization and
establishment of courts. In performance of this duty the
commission has established a judicial system, provided for by
act No. 136, entitled " An act to provide for the organization
of courts in the Philippine Islands". The judicial power of
the government of the islands is vested in a supreme court,
consisting of a chief justice and six associate justices, sitting
in Manila, Iloilo, and Cebu, and a court of first instance in
each of fourteen judicial districts, which include the entire
archipelago, both of these being courts of record, and a justice's court in each municipality. The judges are to be appointed by the commission. The supreme court has appellate jurisdiction to review the decisions of courts of first
instance, and original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus,
certiorari, prohibition, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and
to issue writs of certiorari and such other auxiliary writs and
process as may be necessary to the complete exercise of its
original or appellate jurisdiction.
The courts of first instance have original jurisdiction in all
civil actions except those upon a money demand of less than




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261


$100; in all criminal cases in which the penalty may exceed
$100 fine or six months' imprisonment; in admiralty and
probate cases, and to issue writs of injunction, mandamus,
certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
They have appellate jurisdiction over all cases arising in the
justices' courts. The justices' courts have jurisdiction of cases
involving less than $100 and of petty offenses. Under the
provisions of this law justices' courts have been organized in
the seven hundred and sixty-five established municipalities,
courts of first instance in the fourteen judicial districts, and
a supreme court, with the Honorable Cayetano Arellano, the
most distinguished lawyer of the Philippines, as chief justice, and Florentino Torres, of Manila, Joseph F. Cooper,
late of Texas, James F. Smith, late of California, Charles
A. Willard, late of Minnesota, Victorino Mapa, of Manila,
and Fletcher Ladd, late of New Hampshire, as associate
judges.
On June 12, 1901, an act (No. 140) was passed defining
the judicial districts, and fixing the times and places where
the courts of first instance should be held.
On August 7, 1901, the commission regulated the practice
and procedure of these courts by their act No. 190, entitled
"An act to provide a code of procedure in civil actions
and special proceedings in the Philippine Islands ".
Civil Executive Organization. In the month of June of the
present year affairs in the islands were in a condition to
justify a further step in the progressive narrowing of military
administration by a division of the executive authority, and
conferring that authority, so far as the pacified provinces
were concerned, upon civil agents, leaving the executive
power as to the remainder of the islands still in the hands of
military officers.
The following order, by authority of the President, was
made on the twenty-first of June:




MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, June 21, 1901.
On and after the 4th day of July, 1901, until it shall be otherwise
ordered, the president of the Philippine Commission will exercise the
executive authority in all civil affairs in the government of the Philippine
Islands heretofore exercised in such affairs by the military governor of the
Philippines, and to that end the Hon. William H. Taft, president of the
said commission, is hereby appointed civil governor of the Philippine
Islands. Such executive authority will be exercised under and in conformity to the instructions to the Philippine Commissioners dated April 7,
1900, and subject to the approval and control of the Secretary of War
of the United States. The municipal and provincial civil governments
which have been or shall hereafter be established in said islands, and all
persons performing duties appertaining to the offices of civil government in
said islands, will in respect of such duties report to the said civil governor.
The power to appoint civil officers, heretofore vested in the Philippine
Commission or in the military governor, will be exercised by the civil
governor with the advice and consent of' the commission.
The military governor of the Philippines is hereby relieved from the
performance, on and after the said 4th day of July, of the civil duties
hereinbefore described, but his authority will continue to be exercised as
heretofore in those districts in which insurrection against the authority
of the United States continues to exist or in which public order is not
sufficiently restored to enable provincial civil governments to be established under the instructions to the commission dated April 7, 1900.
By the President:
ELIHU ROOT,
Secretary of War.
On the fourth of July Judge Taft was inaugurated, at
Manila, as civil governor under this order, and entered upon
the performance of his duties. At the same time MajorGeneral MacArthur, after an able and successful administration of both military and civil affairs, transferred the command of the military division and the authority of military
governor to Major-GeneralAdna R. Chaffee, who had recently
completed his service as American commander in the China
relief expedition.
On the first of September a further step toward civil
executive organization was made by the establishment of




EVENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES


263


separate executive departments, to which members of the
commission were assigned as follows: department of the
interior, Dean C. Worcester; department of commerce and
police, Luke E. Wright; department of finance and justice,
Henry C. Ide; department of public instruction, Bernard
Moses.
The administrative affairs of the government are apportioned among these several departments as follows:
The department of the interior has under its executive
control a bureau of health, the quarantine service of the marine-hospital corps, a bureau of forestry, a bureau of mining,
a bureau of agriculture, a bureau of fisheries, a weather
bureau, a bureau of pagan and Mohammedan tribes, a bureau
of public lands, a bureau of government laboratories, and a
bureau of patents and copyrights.
The department of commerce and police has under its
executive control a bureau of island and inter-island transportation, a bureau of post offices, a bureau of telegraphs, a
bureau of coast and geodetic survey, a bureau of engineering and construction of public works other than public buildings, a bureau of insular constabulary, a bureau of prisons, a
bureau of light-houses, a bureau of commercial and streetrailroad corporations, and all corporations except banking.
The department of finance and justice embraces the bureau
of the insular treasury, the bureau of the insular auditor, a
bureau of customs and immigration, a bureau of internal
revenue, the insular cold-storage and ice plant, a bureau of
banks, banking, coinage, and currency, and the bureau of
justice.
The department of public instruction embraces a bureau
of public instruction, a bureau of public charities, public
libraries, and museums, a bureau of statistics, a bureau of
public records, a bureau of public printing, and a bureau
of architecture and construction of public buildings.




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


At the same time, by appointment of the President, three
distinguished Filipinos, Sefor Trinidad H. Pardo de Tavera,
of Manila, Sefior Benito Legarda, of Manila, and Seior Jose
Luzuriaga, of Negros, were added to the commission.
On the twenty-ninth of October, in order to relieve somewhat the very great pressure under which Governor Taft was
laboring, the following order was made, creating the office of
vice-governor and appointing Commissioner Wright to that
position:
WHITE HOUSE,
WASHINGTON, October 29, 1901.
By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United
States, the Honorable Luke E. Wright is appointed vice-governor, with
authority to act as civil governor of the Philippine Islands whenever the
civil governor is incapacitated by illness, or certifies that his temporary
absence from the seat of government will make it necessary for the vicegovernor to exercise such powers and duties.
THEODORE ROOSEVELT.
Division of Jurisdiction. Since the fourth of July the civil
and military agents of the government of the islands have
been conducting administration within their respective jurisdictions in substantial harmony. By mutual consent the
seven provinces of La Union, Ilocos Sur, Abra, Ilocos Norte,
Cagayan, Isabela, and Zambales have been found to be sufficiently advanced in pacification for the organization of provincial governments, and the provisions of the provincial
government act and the authority of the civil governor have
been extended over them. At the same time, the three provinces already mentioned have been by like consent restored
to the executive control of the military governor....
Approximately 74,152 square miles, or fifty-eight per cent
of the estimated area of the islands, and 4,902,837 people, or
seventy per cent of the estimated population of the islands,
are now under the civil administration; and approximately
53,701 square miles, or forty-two per cent of the total area,




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265


and 2,072,236 people, or thirty per cent of the total estimated
population, are under military administration.
Insular Constabulary and Municipal Police. The initial
step in the organization of a native police force was taken on
June 18, 1900, by General Order No. 87, of the military
governor. This was followed by act No. 58 of the commission, December 12, 1900, appropriating $150,000 for expenses
of organization and maintenance of a police force. The
municipal code of January 31, 1901, required every municipality to establish and regularly maintain a police department. The Manila charter of July 31, 1901, required the
establishment and maintenance of a regular police force. On
July 18, 1901, act No. 175 of the commission provided for the
establishment, under the general supervision of the civil
governor, of an insular constabulary, for the purpose of
better maintaining peace, law, and order in the various provinces. This organization is under the general charge of a
chief of the insular constabulary, and is to consist of not less
than fifteen nor more than one hundred and fifty privates,
properly officered, for each province. The archipelago is
divided into four divisions, for each of which there is an
assistant chief.
There is also a corps of inspectors consisting of not less
than one nor more than four for each province, who are
charged with the command of the insular constabulary, and
the duty of inspecting the municipal police of the various
municipalities. The sergeants, corporals, and privates in
each province are selected from the residents of the province.
They are enlisted for two years unless sooner discharged.
The chief and the force generally are declared to be peace
officers, and are authorized and empowered to prevent and
suppress brigandage, unlawful assemblages, riots, insurrections, and other breaches of the peace and violations of the
law.... The force thus constituted is the result of a progres



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sive development covering a year and a half of experiment.
These experiments appear to justify the conclusion that a
native police force, well officered, can be made faithful and
effective, can be trusted with arms, and will be an element of
constantly increasing value in the maintenance of order.
The latest reports show a little over six thousand natives
employed in the various municipal police forces and between
nine hundred and one thousand already enlisted in the insular
constabulary.
Civil Service. In providing the personnel of the government which is thus gradually superseding military administration, the Department has proceeded upon the assumption
that the honor and credit of the United States is so critically
involved in creating a good government that the importance
of securing the best men available should outweigh and practically exclude all other considerations. This principle of selection has been followed without deviation. No officer, high
or low, has been appointed upon any one's request, or upon
any personal, social, or political consideration. The general
power of appointment was vested by the instructions of April
seventh in the commission, which is eight thousand miles
removed from all American pressure for office, and which will
stand or fall upon its success or failure in getting competent
men. The order of June twenty-first appointing the civil
governor transferred the power to the civil governor with the
consent of the commission. The exercise of this power by
the commission and by the civil governor has not been interfered with or overruled in any case. The only appointments
of a civil character made by the Administration in the United
States since the commission entered upon its duties have
been the governor, vice-governor, and members of the
commission, appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Secretary of War; the auditor, deputyauditor, and treasurer, who are officers of an independent




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accounting system, appointed by the Secretary of War;
the director-general of posts, appointed by the PostmasterGeneral.
The practice regarding all appointments to offices not
covered by the very comprehensive civil service law has been
to refer all applications for appointment received at the
White House or the War Department, with the accompanying testimonials, immediately to the commission or the civil
governor, with instructions to report when the service of the
applicant was desired. In numerous cases the commission
have cabled for further information, which has been sought
and furnished as promptly as possible. Such inquiries regarding candidates for judicial appointments have been made by
the Department of Justice through the judges and district
attorneys in the judicial districts in which the candidates
formerly resided. Special acknowledgment is due to the
officers of that Department for their active and zealous
cooperation in this respect. In like manner information as to
the most competent persons to fill places which in this country come under the jurisdiction of the Treasury Department,
the Department of the Interior, and the Department of
Agriculture has been sought through those Departments,
respectively, and they have always rendered prompt and
effective assistance.
The civil service law enacted by the Philippine Commission
September 19, 1900 (act No. 5), has been put into successful
and satisfactory operation. The civil service rules required
by the act were adopted by the board and submitted to the
military governor on the twenty-eighth of December last,
and were promulgated on the second of January. The rules
provide that examinations of a suitable and practical character, and absolutely impartial, shall be held to test the
relative capacity and fitness of applicants for the positions to
which they seek to be appointed, and that in making certifi



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cations to fill all vacancies the names of the highest eligibles
shall be certified from which selection shall be made by the
appointing officer. The board has been diligent in adapting
the principles of the act to the many varying conditions; and
regular examinations have been commenced. A manual of
information has been printed and can be obtained upon
application to the civil service board at Manila or to the War
Department at Washington....
System of Account and Audit. At the time of my last
report the accounting system of the islands was still conducted under the provisions of an executive order promulgated on May 8, 1899. At that time the conditions of very
active warfare, the confusion incident to the constant movements and changes of the military officers charged with civil
disbursements, the necessity for the exercise of independent
discretion in expenditures, and our slender knowledge of
conditions, made it impossible to apply any such complete
and detailed methods for securing official accountability as
have been found useful in the United States.
At the beginning of the present year, however, a point had
been reached in the development of government which made
an important advance in the accounting system possible,
and a complete revision of that system was undertaken. For
this purpose the experience acquired in dealing with the
accounts of Porto Rico, Cuba, and the Philippines was utilized, and the accounting officers of the United States Treasury, Post Office, and War Department were brought into
conference. Upon their joint recommendations a new system of accounting and audit was embodied in an executive
order signed by the President on February 23, 1901, and in a
series of rules and regulations, approved by the Secretary of
War at the same time, and promulgated by an act of the
commission (No. 90, of February 28, 1901). The new regulations went into effect on April 1, 1901. They practically put




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into force in the Philippine Islands the accounting and auditing system of the United States, and furnish all the checks
and safeguards which Congress has thrown about the moneys
of the United States. Since April first they have been in
force in the Philippines, and also in Cuba, with comprehensive and satisfactory results....
Education. In pursuance of the instructions of April 7,
1900, the commission, on January 21, 1901, passed their act
(No. 74), establishing a department of public instruction
under the direction of a general superintendent, with authority to divide the archipelago into eighteen divisions, to establish schools in every pueblo; to procure buildings, material,
and teachers. The act also provided for a general supervisory
board, composed of the general superintendent and four other
members appointed by the commission, and for a local school
board in each municipality organized under the municipal
code, one-half of the members to be elected by the municipal
council and the remaining half to be appointed by the division superintendent. The act gave authority to the general
superintendent to obtain from theUnited States one thousand
trained teachers, with monthly salaries of not less than
seventy-five dollars or not more than one hundred and
twenty-five dollars.
It further provided for the establishment and maintenance
in Manila of a normal school for the education of natives of
the islands in the science of teaching; for the establishment
and maintenance in Manila of a trade school for the instruction of the natives in the useful trades, and for the establishment and maintenance of a school of agriculture in the island
of Negros.
The close relations between church and state under Spanish
rule in the Philippines had resulted in the predominance of
religious over secular education in such public schools as had
existed. The complete separation of church and state, which




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is one of the fundamental principles of the new government,
of course requires a complete change of method, and tends
to leave the inhabitants of the islands with but very few
facilities for religious education. This subject was disposed
of by the following provision of act No. 74:
SEC. 16. No teacher or other person shall teach or criticise the doctrines of any church, religious sect, or denomination, or shall attempt to
influence the pupils for or against any church or religious sect in any
public school established under this act. If any teacher shall intentionally
violate this section, he or she shall, after due hearing, be dismissed from
the public service.
Provided, however, that it shall be lawful for the priest or minister of
any church established in the pueblo where a public school is situated,
either in person or by a designated teacher of religion, to teach religion
for one-half an hour three times a week in the school building to those
public school pupils whose parents or guardians desire it and express their
desire therefor in writing filed with the principal teacher of the school, to
be forwarded to the division superintendent, who shall fix the hours and
rooms for such teaching. But no public school teacher shall either conduct
religious exercises or teach religion or act as a designated religious teacher
in the school building under the foregoing authority, and no pupil shall
be required by any public school teacher to attend and receive the religious
instruction herein permitted. Should the opportunity thus given to teach
religion be used by the priest, minister, or religious teacher for the purpose of arousing disloyalty to the United States, or of discouraging the
attendance of pupils at such public schools, or creating a disturbance of
public order, or of interfering with the discipline of the school, the division
superintendent, subject to the approval of the general superintendent of
public instruction, may, after due investigation and hearing, forbid such
offending priest, minister, or religious teacher from entering the public
school building thereafter.
The act further provides that the English language shall,
as soon as practicable, be made the basis of all public school
instruction.
Under the provisions of this act $162,000 were immediately
appropriated for the purchase of text-books and school stationery and supplies, and the very difficult task of securing
suitable school accommodations and competent teachers was
vigorously begun. The superintendent reported on the




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twenty-seventh of May, subsequent to the passage of the act,
that there had been appointed eight superintendents, eight
principals and assistants for normal, agricultural, and manual training work, and seven hundred and eighty-one teachers
from the United States, and two superintendents and eighty
teachers from applicants in the Philippines, and that the basis
for these appointments had been more than eight thousand
personal written applications with testimonials appended,
and the recommendations of normal school principals, college
presidents, and state officials, and the personal certification
of the qualifications of applicants by leading educational men
in the United States with whom the superintendent is personally acquainted, or whose character is well known to him
by repute. Of the teachers appointed from the United States,
six hundred and eighty-two have been sent from this country
to the Philippines by army transports. One voyage of the
transport Thomas was devoted exclusively to the transportation of teachers, and the others went upon the regular
semi-monthly sailings of the other transports. The expenses
of travel were paid from the insular funds.
The Manila normal school for the instruction of native
teachers was opened on the tenth of April. Accommodations
had been provided for 350 scholars, and by the opening day
450 had enrolled. Additional accommodations were procured, and 600 were admitted to the classes, of whom 570
studied faithfully to the end of the term. The report of the
interest and application of the students and their progress in
acquiring English is gratifying. The need of teachers for the
establishment of the general system of schools contemplated
is just beginning to be supplied. There is a great lack of
suitable buildings. In most of the pueblos such buildings are
not to be found, and curiously enough in that country of
great forests it is very difficult to obtain lumber for construction purposes.




MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


Many more teachers must be obtained; many buildings
must be constructed. Time and persistent energy and very
large amounts of money will be necessary to put the system
in working order. No regular system of reports has yet been
possible, but from the reports received it is estimated that
not less than 150,000 children are actually enrolled in the free
primary schools; that one-half of these are being compelled
to wait because there are not adequate school-rooms, and
that there are 75,000 children in actual daily attendance
upon the schools already established. There are between
3,000 and 4,000 native elementary teachers employed. About
2,000 of these are receiving daily instruction in English.
Over 10,000 adult natives are studying English in evening
schools under American teachers, and many more are applying than can be cared for as yet. The greatest eagerness is
manifested to learn English. There is a widespread desire to
send boys to the United States for education. Many of the
towns are arranging to send and support boys here for that
purpose. The educational situation is, briefly, as follows:
There is a widespread and earnest desire for education among
the people of the islands. There are more people anxious for
education than there are teachers to furnish it. There are
more teachers than there are school buildings or rooms for
them to teach in. I think no one can become familiar with
the facts without deep interest and a strong desire to press
forward provision for education. All the good influences of
American civilization may enter through this open door.
Utilization of Forest Products. The most evident and
striking element of wealth in the Philippine Islands consists
of its forests. The official geographic statistics of 1876 fix the
forest area at 51,537,243 acres. In 1890 Fernando Castro
estimated the forest area at 48,112,920 acres. But a small
part of this vast area is in private ownership, and there are
probably between 40,000,000 and 50,000,000 acres of forest




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land which formerly belonged to the Crown of Spain, and by
the Treaty of Paris became the property of the United States.
Pine, cedar, mahogany, and hundreds of hard woods, valuable dye woods, and rubber and gutta-percha trees exist in
immense quantities.
From time immemorial the inhabitants of the islands have
been accustomed to resort to these public forests for their
firewood and lumber in the exercise of rights under licenses
regulated by law. The forestry laws and regulations of Spain
in the Philippines, while affording this use of the public
forests to the people, aimed at the establishment of a scientific system of forestry similar to that which exists in Germany and other European countries. These regulations
were, however, not adequately enforced. Upon the military
occupation of the country by the American forces it was
determined, if possible, to enforce the system and at the same
time preserve and utilize the forests. The principle followed
under such a system is, instead of cutting all the trees at
once and leaving waste land, to cut only the full-grown trees,
leaving the smaller trees to grow and in their turn become
ready for cutting in a never-ending series. The annual
growth of these forests is estimated at fourteen hundred million (1,400,000,000) cubic feet, about three times the cut of
lumber for 1900 in the entire United States. At present
more than ninety-nine per cent of this annual growth is
going to waste. With proper treatment it may be made an
inexhaustible source of wealth.
The forestry bureau was accordingly organized by the
military governor on April 14, 1900, and placed under the
direction of Captain George P. Ahern, of the Ninth United
States Infantry, an officer of experience and extensive study
in forestry matters. A small force of foresters and rangers
was employed, and a careful study of the forests was entered
upon. On June 27, 1900, the Spanish regulations were




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


reinacted with such amendments as were necessary to adjust
them to the changed conditions, in a general order of the
military governor known as General Order No. 92, which
went into effect on July 1, 1900, and the issue of licenses
for the cutting of marked trees of full growth and down
timber for firewood and for lumber, under the regulations
and supervision of the officers of the forestry bureau, was
continued.
Upon the passage of the act of March 2, 1901, containing
the provision that no sale or other disposition of the public
lands or timber thereon or the mining rights therein shall be
made, coupled with a provision for the granting of such
franchises by the President as were, in his judgment, clearly
necessary for the immediate government of the islands, and
indispensable for the interests of the people thereof, the following dispatch was received from the Philippine Commission March 7, 1901:
ROOT, Secretary of War, Washington:
High price lumber one of people's greatest burdens. Present situation very little timber on private land; people almost entirely are obliged
to depend upon purchase timber from government land to repair damage
owing to the war. If recent legislation abrogates general orders, headquarters department of military governor, series of last year, No. 92,
fixing reasonable rates and proper limitations under which any resident
may cut public timber, it will produce greatest hardship. If so, ask
authority to put imported timber on free list. Is cutting public timber for
public works forbidden? Request opinion.             TAFT.
Upon consultation with such members of the committee
which drafted the provisions above referred to as could be
reached after the adjournment of Congress, and upon full
consideration of all the circumstances in view of which Congress acted, including full reports which had already been
made regarding the system followed by the forestry bureau,
it was concluded that if the legislative intent had been to
prohibit the issue of the customary licenses and cut the




EVENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES


275


people of the Philippine Islands off from the privileges which
they had long enjoyed, far different language would have
been used, and that the intent was to prevent undue American exploitation and not to interfere with the existing and
established practice, and thus create a timber famine in the
islands.
The following reply to Judge Taft's dispatch of March
seventh was accordingly sent:
TAFT, Manila:                                March 30, 1901.
TAFT, Manila:
With reference to your telegram of the seventh, it is considered provisions act Congress, March 2, do not interfere with established system
forestry regulations provided for by Spanish law as modified by military
governor-general, orders 92, June 27, 1900. Full discussion of subject
forwarded by mail. Advise General MacArthur.         ROOT.
The total number of timber licenses issued from the organization of the forestry bureau on July 1, 1900, to October
22, 1901, has been -
Licenses issued prior to March 2, 1901.......................... 296
Licenses issued since March  2, 1901............................. 181
Total..................................................  477
All of these licenses are limited to one year, and 196 expire
by limitation on December 1, 1901. They were distributed
among forty-one different provinces and small islands.
Under them there was cut between July 1, 1900, and June 30,
1901, 2,439,431 cubic feet of timber and 2,000,000 cubic feet
of firewood, yielding a revenue to the insular government of
$199,373.11 (Mexican).    The aggregate of these cuttings,
amounting to 4,439,431 cubic feet, is less than one-third of
one per cent of the estimated annual growth of the forests, so
that if a perfect forestry system were applied, three hundred
times as much could be cut each year without decreasing the
supply. Three times as much was cut for lumber alone
during the year 1900 in Alabama, three times as much in
Missouri, six times as much in Mississippi, eight times as




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


much in Louisiana, ten times as much in Arkansas, eleven
times as much in Texas, twenty times as much in Oregon, and
twenty-five times as much in Washington - eighty-five
times as much in these eight states, although the population
of the Philippine Islands is about one-tenth of the population of the entire United States.
The amount cut has proved to be inadequate to the wants
of the community. The inaccessibility of the forests, the
absence of railroads and the prohibition against building
them, the lack of proper tools and machinery and skilled
labor, have combined with the limitations imposed by the
forestry regulations to make it impossible to get enough
timber for the uses of the people. About fifty per cent of the
timber cut has been used by the Government in the construction of barracks, storehouses, bridges, and other public
works, and with 40,000,000 acres of the finest timber in
the world standing in the islands, great numbers of native
property owners have been unable to rebuild their homes
destroyed during the war, and the Government has been
obliged to import from the United States nearly 1,000,000
feet of lumber for its absolutely necessary construction.
Every effort is being made to enlarge the force of competent foresters for the enforcement of the forestry regulations.
I earnestly recommend, as a matter of material importance
to the people of the Philippine Islands, such legislation as
shall permit the building of railroads from the towns to the
forests, and the employment of capital, under proper limitations and supervision, in the cutting of timber which shall
supply the wants of the people and utilize the now wasting
growth of the forests....
Agriculture. It is manifest that with their great extent of
fertile land, and wide variations of elevation, and consequently of temperature, improvements in the agriculture of
the Philippine Islands:can be made to the immense advan



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tage of the people. The methods of cultivation are primitive
and ineffective. The ordinary vegetables, notwithstanding
the fertility of the land, are small and poor, and the stock is
evidently run out and should be renewed. Many grains
which are unknown to the people can undoubtedly be raised.
They live chiefly on rice, and raise less than they consume.
They imported during the last fiscal year 392,932,908 pounds,
valued at $5,490,958.
The kind of work toward improvement and diversity of
crops and instruction in methods which is being done in this
country by the Department of Agriculture would be of inestimable benefit in the Philippines. On the eighth of October the commission created a bureau of agriculture, and the
Secretary of Agriculture has kindly consented to spare for a
time, to serve as the chief of this bureau, Professor F. Lamson-Scribner, one of the chiefs of division and the leading
agrostologist of his Department. It is very desirable that
the request which the Secretary of Agriculture will make for
authority to establish an agricultural experiment station in
the Philippines should be granted.
Public Works. The harbors of the Philippines are generally
shallow. At Manila all the freight of sea-going vessels of over
sixteen feet draft has to be transferred by lighters between
the ship and the shore for several miles at very great expense
and risk. Storms frequently interrupt business altogether,
especially in the season of typhoons, and great damage is
often caused to the unprotected shipping. The burden imposed upon commerce by this method of transacting business
is great. The freight rate between Manila and Hong-Kong, a
distance of about seven hundred miles, is as much as, and
sometimes more than, between San Francisco and HongKong, a distance of about eight thousand miles.
The commerce of Manila urgently demands the creation of
a thoroughly protected harbor with sufficient depth of water




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


to accommodate the largest ships, where they can lie in
safety and load and discharge their cargoes in all weathers.
More than twenty years ago the Spanish government formulated an elaborate scheme for the improvement of the harbor,
and had completed about thirty per cent of the work before
the cession of the islands to the United States. After a careful examination of the plans and specifications of the Spanish
engineers by Major Biddle, now the Engineer Commissioner
of the District of Columbia, and then chief engineer of the
Division of the Philippines, they were adopted with some
modifications. By act No. 22, passed October 15, 1900, and
an amendatory act No. 101, passed March 19, 1901, a sum of
$1,000,000 in American money was appropriated for the
improvement of the harbor, and contracts were authorized
for an additional amount not exceeding $2,000,000....
Nearly every account of the Philippines dwells upon the
wretched condition of roads, or rather the absence of roads,
which practically prevents internal commerce except immediately upon the navigable waters. On September 12, 1900,
the commission, by act No. 1, appropriated $2,000,000
(Mexican) to be expended in the construction of highways
and bridges. Both this work and the river and harbor work
above referred to have been placed under the charge of the
United States Corps of Engineers. The force of engineers in
the Philippines was greatly increased for that purpose, and
they have been working during the year on over eight hundred miles of roads. Seventy-five thousand dollars have
been expended in the construction of a road from the town
of Pozorrubio, in the province of Pangasinan, to the town of
Baguio, in the province of Benguet, mentioned in my last
report.
A cold-storage and ice plant, ample to supply the needs
of both the army, and the civilians in Manila who are accustomed to the use of ice, has been completed at an expense




EVENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES


279


of about $700,000. Two market houses in the city of Manila
have been built, and two others are in course of erection.
The Bridge of Spain has been widened, the erection of the
Santa Cruz Bridge has been commenced, repairs to the
Ayala Bridge have been undertaken, and all of the small
bridges in Manila, of which there are a great many, have
either been practically rebuilt or extensively repaired. Two
crematories for the disposal of garbage have been erected in
Manila, and an appropriation has been made for the erection
of another in that city. A new building for the customs
offices has been erected, and new warehouses, affording additional storage space for about thirteen thousand tons, have
been built. About four hundred and seventy-two cubic
meters of cut stone have been utilized in the extension of
the Luneta sea wall.
The Mariveles quarantine station has been improved by
the repairing of the old existing barracks and the construction
of a hospital for contagious diseases, at a cost of $925,166.50;
by the construction of a wharf, at an expenditure of $64,500;
by the construction of four new buildings on the wharves and
two on shore, at a cost of $38,900; the installation of an
electric-light plant, at an expense of $23,175; the repairing
of old buildings, the building of sewers, and modern plumbing. The station is now practically complete, and provides
accommodation for eight hundred steerage and forty cabin
passengers...
Currency and Banking. I beg to call attention to the statements made in my last report upon the urgent need of reforming the currency of the Philippines, which is in as bad a
condition as is possible. Time has confirmed the opinion in
which I then concurred with the Secretary of the Treasury
that the wise course is to coin and pay out for Government
uses pesos of a little less than the weight and fineness of
the Mexican pesos of 377.17 + grains of pure silver, at the




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


rate of two silver pesos for one gold dollar, the ratio now
maintained in the islands between Mexican dollars and
American gold dollars, and to maintain that same relation
between the new coins and gold by exchanging gold for
them at that rate.
I am satisfied that such coins, being substantially identical
in size and exchange value with the coins to which the people
are accustomed, will pass into circulation, and that as rapidly
as this is accomplished the business of the country will come
upon a gold-standard basis representing a fixed relation between the proposed coins and American money.
There is urgent need for greater banking facilities in the
Philippines. There are no American banks there, and there
is no power to create any banking corporation. The effect of
this is that the banking establishments which were established under Spanish rule still monopolize the field, while
American capital is excluded. I recommend the extension of
the national banking act to the Philippines, with such modifications as the circumstances demand....
Tariff. The tariff bill mentioned in my last report as
having been prepared by the commission has been completed.
The publication of the bill in the trade and other newspapers
of this country, accompanied by an invitation of criticism,
resulted in a large volume of correspondence, all of which was
carefully considered, and in some changes, which were made
with the concurrence of the commission. The appraisers of
the New York custom-house, and other tariff experts in this
country, were consulted as to the descriptive language used,
in order to avoid, so far as possible, ambiguities which might
lead to litigation.
After being first approved by the Secretary of War, the bill
was enacted by the Philippine Commission on the sixteenth
of September as act No. 230, and went into effect on the
fifteenth of November. It represents more than a year of




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281


painstaking consideration and discussion by competent men
thoroughly familiar with the business conditions and government needs of the Philippines, with the benefit of three
years' experience of the good and bad points of the former
law, with the benefit of the best expert assistance and advice,
and with full opportunity for public criticism and suggestion
by the business men both of the Philippines and of the
United States.
Commerce and Revenue. Notwithstanding the serious disadvantages under which it has labored, the business of the
islands has increased during the past year. The total value
of merchandise (exclusive of army supplies) imported during
the fiscal year 1901 was $30,279,406, as against $20,601,436
for the fiscal year 1900, and the total value of merchandise exported during the fiscal year 1901 was $23,214,948,
as against $19,751,068 for the fiscal year 1900 - an increase of forty-seven per cent in the value of imports and
an increase of seventeen and one-half per cent in the value
of exports.
The imports came from the following countries:
United States........ $2,855,685  China............... 4,339,941
United Kingdom..... 6,956,145  Hong-Kong..........,340,585
Germany............ 2,135,252  British East Indies.... 2,182,892
France..............  1,683,929  All other countries.... 5,623,625
Spain...............  2,161,352
The exports went to the following countries:
United States........ $2,572,021  China...............  73,701
United Kingdom..... 10,704,741  Hong-Kong.......... 2,697,276
Germany............   81,526  British East Indies.... 759,286
France..............  1,934,256  All other countries.... 2,736,886
Spain...............  1,655,255
The imports from the United States show an increase of
72.4 per cent over the imports of 1900, and the exports to the
United States show a decrease of twenty-seven per cent from
the exports of 1900. The imports from the United Kingdom,




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


from Germany, from France, and from the British East
Indies have increased in a greater proportion than the imports from the United States.
The revenues of the Philippine government during the
fiscal year 1901 amounted to $10,817,662.31, as against
$6,7223,852.18 during the fiscal year 1900. The total expenditures during the fiscal year 1901 amounted to $6,763,891.68,
as against $5,218,381.12 in 1900, making an increase of
revenues of over $4,000,000, and an increase of expenditures
of about $1,500,000, and a surplus of revenues over expenditures of $4,053,840.63, as against a surplus of $1,505,471.06
for the preceding year. Of course the great expenditures
which have been undertaken for public works, education,
insular constabulary, extension of the judicial system, etc.,
will rapidly dispose of this surplus....
Power to Contract Loans. Many of the things which call
urgently for attention - such, for instance, as education and
public works - ought to be pressed forward without waiting
for the slow process of saving from annual revenues, and
authority ought to be given, under proper restrictions, to the
insular government and to the cities of the archipelago to raise
money by the issue of bonds in pursuance of the same policy
which has been followed by our American states and cities.
Lands of Religious Orders. One of the purposes for which
the borrowing of money should be authorized is the acquisition of the tracts of land held by religious orders in the islands.
The policy of the Executive in its treatment of the new relations necessarily assumed by the church toward the state
under American rule was expressed in the instructions of
April 7, 1900...
Three religious orders, the Dominicans, Augustinians, and
Recolletos, who were established under Spanish rule, had at
the time of American occupation a holding of about 403,000
acres of agricultural lands. These lands are occupied by a




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native tenantry intensely hostile to the friars, and that
hostility is unquestionably shared by the vast majority of the
people of the islands. The relation of these landlords to their
tenants and to the entire people was one of the chief causes of
irritation and rebellion under the Spanish government.
The new conditions make it manifestly for the interest of
the religious orders that they should convert into money this
property, which they can obviously no longer peacefully
enjoy or practically make useful. At the same time the peace
and order of the community, the good will of the people
toward the Government of the United States, and the interest
of an effective settlement and disposition of all questions arising between the church and state in the islands, make it
equally desirable that these lands should be purchased by
the state and that title upon proper and reasonable terms
should be offered to the tenants or to the other people of
the islands. For this purpose it will be necessary that
money should be obtained from other sources than the ordinary revenues of the Philippine government. The receipts
from sales of the lands to natives can be devoted to the payment of any bonds issued to raise money for the purchase.
Slavery. It is gratifying to report that the efforts of the
American officers to bring about a cessation of the practice of
slavery among the Moros are not fruitless. The character
of the slavery practiced is quite unlike that formerly practiced
in the United States in this, that the Moro slave, so-called,
becomes a member of the owner's family, enjoying many
privileges, often having voluntarily sold himself into slavery
to better his condition. The so-called slaves themselves
exhibit no special anxiety to change their condition. All who
seek freedom receive it upon coming into the American lines.
The following proclamation has been issued by the Dato
Mandi, one of the most powerful of the Moro rulers: 
1 This is a literal copy of the original, which was written in Arabian characters.




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To THE DATOS, PRINCIPALS, AND OLD MEN OF THE
MORO RANCHERIAS OF THIS DISTRICT:
Being aware that some Moros in villages within my jurisdiction continue to engage in slavery, some by loan made to poor families, some
buying them for trading, all doubtless forgetful of the orders issued by
the old Government of Spain, which strictly prohibited slavery, and in
order not to wait to be again instructed by the civil Government of the
United States, I direct all my subjects, especially the datos, principals,
and old men of all villages in my jurisdiction, beginning with this date, to
comply and enforce the rules provided in the following sections, viz.:
First. In view of the fact that slavery has not and never will bring any
progress with it, you shall prevent Moros having slaves of their own
or other race.
Second. If actually some are in such condition because of debt contracted for his immediate needs, he will not be considered as such slave,
but as a hired man who receives a salary for his services, and with the
view of extinguishing the debt in from eight to ten months.
Third. It is strictly prohibited from this date illegal trading of Moro
slaves and also slavery among themselves. Offenders of these rules will
be liable to a penalty or a fine.
The Dato Rajahmuda.                                MANDI.
Zamboanga, April 19, 1901.
It is believed that the peaceful process, the rapid advance
of which is indicated by this proclamation, will accomplish
the desired result much more readily than it could be accomplished in any other way.
Progress of Government. In general the progress of good
government in the Philippines during the past year has been
greater than the most sanguine American familiar with the
obstacles to be overcome could have anticipated. Mutual
understanding and confidence are necessary elements to success in such a field. These cannot be extemporized or forced;
they must come freely, naturally, and slowly. I think our
legislators and administrators in the Philippines are winning
the confidence of the people by deserving it. For hundreds
of years the Filipino people had been accustomed to fair
promises never fulfilled. We have made similar promises,




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and what we have already done in the way of performance
has been a revelation of unexpected good faith.
The organization of the Federal party in the Philippines,
which has extended throughout the provinces, loyally accepting the sovereignty and asserting the sincerity and beneficent
purpose of the American people, has been of the utmost
value. The character of the military officers who have commanded, of Governor Taft and the members of the commission, and of the assistants whom they have gathered around
them, has commanded respect and dispelled suspicion
throughout a field of influence widening steadily as they have
become known. A country is very fortunate which can draft
from its citizens such men into the public service.
I believe that each successive step in the practical development of American purpose in the Philippines will result in
wider appreciation and approval in the islands, and that we
may reasonably look forward to a time not far distant which
will be characterized by general good feeling, established confidence, and active cooperation on the part of all the peoples
of the archipelago in our efforts for their benefit. The course
will not be without its difficulties, discouragements, and
reverses, but cheerful and persistent courage, faithful to the
spirit of our institutions, will prevail.
General Policy of Government. The policy followed by the
American Executive in dealing with the government of the
Philippines (and also in dealing with the government of
the other islands ceded or yielded by Spain, which have been
under the control of the War Department) has been to determine and prescribe the framework of insular government, to
lay down the rules of policy to be followed upon the great
questions of government as they are foreseen or arise, to
obtain the best and ablest men possible for insular officers,
to distribute and define their powers, and then to hold them




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responsible for the conduct of government in the islands with
the least possible interference from Washington.
Notwithstanding a rigid adherence to this policy, and consistently with it, the demands upon the Department for
action in the vast and complicated business of the island
governments have been constant and imperative. Different
civilizations, different systems of law and procedure, and
different modes of thought have evolved a great crowd of
difficult questions for determination.  New facts ascertained and changed conditions have called for the interpretation and application of our own rules of policy and the
establishment of further rules. Different views as to the
scope of authority under the distribution of powers have required reconciliation. The application of the law of military
occupation to rights and practices existing under the laws of
Spain, and the process of overturning inveterate wrongs have
brought about frequent appeals to the highest authority,
which, being made in the name of justice, have required
consideration. The work undertaken has been the building
up of government from the foundation upon unfamiliar
ground. We have had no precedents, save the simple and
meager proceedings under the occupation of California and
New Mexico, more than half a century ago, and it has been
necessary to decide every question upon its own merits and
to make our own precedents for the future.
For the performance of all these duties full and accurate
knowledge of the conditions and proceedings of all the governments in all the islands on the part of the authorities in
Washington has been required. It has been necessary to
follow them step by step. The President and Congress have
looked to the War Department for information as to how the
trust of government in the various islands was being performed, and tens of thousands of applications by the people
of the United States for every conceivable kind of informa



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tion regarding the islands have poured into the Department
in an uninterrupted stream.
Only thorough system could arrange, record, and keep
available for use the vast and heterogeneous mass of reports
and letters and documents which this business has involved,
furnish answers to the questions, conduct the correspondence,
and keep the Secretary of War from being overwhelmed in
hopeless confusion. The War Department had no machinery
for the purpose. No provision for any such administrative
machine was made by law. Of necessity, by the detail of
officers and the employment of the temporary clerks authorized by law, such machinery has been created in the Department with a chief, an assistant chief, a law officer, a competent force of translators, accountants, stenographers,
and recording and indexing and copying clerks. It is called
the Division of Insular Affairs of the War Department, and it
performs with admirable and constantly increasing efficiency
the great variety of duties which in other countries would
be described as belonging to a colonial office, and would be
performed by a much more pretentious establishment..
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION1
WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, April 7, 1900.
SIR: I transmit to you herewith the instructions of the President for
the guidance of yourself and your associates as Commissioners to the
Philippine Islands.  V    
Very respectfully,
ELIHU ROOT,
Secretary of War.
HONORABLE WILLIAM H. TAFT,
President Board of Commissioners to the Philippine Islands.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, April 7, 1900.
SIR: In the message transmitted to the Congress on the 5th of December, 1899, I said, speaking of the Philippine Islands: "As long as the
insurrection continues the military arm must necessarily be supreme. But
1 Extract from the Report of the Secretary of War of 1900, p. 72.




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there is no reason why steps should not be taken from time to time to
inaugurate governments essentially popular in their form as fast as territory is held and controlled by our troops. To this end I am considering
the advisability of the return of the commission, or such of the members
thereof as can be secured, to aid the existing authorities and facilitate this
work throughout the islands."
To give effect to the intention thus expressed I have appointed the
Honorable William H. Taft, of Ohio; Professor Dean C. Worcester, of
Michigan; the Honorable Luke E. Wright, of Tennessee; the Honorable
Henry C. Ide, of Vermont, and Professor Bernard Moses, of California,
commissioners to the Philippine Islands to continue and perfect the
work of organizing and establishing civil government already commenced by the military authorities, subject in all respects to any laws
which Congress may hereafter enact.
The commissioners named will meet and act as a board, and the Honorable William H. Taft is designated as president of the board. It is probable that the transfer of authority from military commanders to civil
officers will be gradual and will occupy a considerable period. Its successful
accomplishment and the maintenance of peace and order in the meantime
will require the most perfect cooperation between the civil and military
authorities in the island, and both should be directed during the transition
period by the same executive department. The commission will therefore
report to the Secretary of War, and all their action will be subject to your
approval and control.
You will instruct the commission to proceed to the city of Manila, where
they will make their principal office, and to communicate with the military
governor of the Philippine Islands, whom you will at the same time direct
to render to them every assistance within his power in the performance of
their duties. Without hampering them by too specific instruction, they
should in general be enjoined, after making themselves familiar with the
conditions and needs of the country, to devote their attention in the first
instance to the establishment of municipal governments, in which the
natives of the islands, both in the cities and in the rural communities, shall
be afforded the opportunity to manage their own local affairs to the fullest
extent of which they are capable, and subject to the least degree of supervision and control which a careful study of their capacities and observation
of the workings of native control show to be consistent with the maintenance of law, order, and loyalty.
The next subject in order of importance should be the organization of
government in the larger administrative divisions, corresponding to counties, departments, or provinces, in which the common interests of many
or several municipalities falling within the same tribal lines, or the same
natural geographical limits, may best be subserved by a common adminis



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tration. Whenever the commission is of the opinion that the condition of
affairs in the islands is such that the central administration may safely be
transferred from military to civil control, they will report that conclusion
to you, with their recommendations as to the form of central government
to be established for the purpose of taking over the control.
Beginning with the 1st day of September, 1900, the authority to exercise, subject to my approval, through the Secretary of War, that part of
the power of government in the Philippine Islands which is of a legislative
nature is to be transferred from the military governor of the islands to this
commission, to be thereafter exercised by them in the place and stead of
the military governor, under such rules and regulations as you shall prescribe, until the establishment of the civil central government for the
islands contemplated in the last foregoing paragraph, or until Congress
shall otherwise provide.
Exercise of this legislative authority will include the making of rules
and orders, having the effect of law, for the raising of revenue by taxes,
customs, duties, and imposts; the appropriation and expenditure of public
funds of the islands; the establishment of an educational system throughout the islands; the establishment of a system to secure an efficient civil
service; the organization and establishment of courts; the organization
and establishment of municipal and departmental governments, and all
other matters of a civil nature for which the military governor is now
competent to provide by rules or orders of a legislative character.
The commission will also have power during the same period to appoint
to office such officers under the judicial, educational, and civil-service
systems and in the municipal and departmental governments as shall be
provided for. Until the complete transfer of control the military governor
will remain the chief executive head of the government of the islands, and
will exercise the executive authority now possessed by him and not herein
expressly assigned to the commission, subject, however, to the rules and
orders enacted by the commission in the exercise of the legislative powers
conferred upon them. In the meantime the municipal and departmental
governments will continue to report to the military governor and be subject to his administrative supervision and control, under your direction,
but that supervision and control will be confined within the narrowest
limits consistent with the requirement that the powers of government
in the municipalities and departments shall be honestly and effectively
exercised and that law and order and individual freedom shall be maintained.
All legislative rules and orders, establishments of government, and
appointments to office by the commission will take effect immediately, or
at such times as they shall designate, subject to your approval and action
upon the coming in of the commission's reports, which are to be made




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from time to time as their action is taken. Wherever civil governments
are constituted under the direction of the commission, such military posts,
garrisons, and forces will be continued for the suppression of insurrection
and brigandage, and the maintenance of law and order, as the military
commander shall deem requisite, and the military forces shall be at all
times subject under his orders to the call of the civil authorities for the
maintenance of law and order and the enforcement of their authority.
In the establishment of municipal governments the commission will
take as the basis of their work the governments established by the military
governor under his order of August 8, 1899, and under the report of the
board constituted by the military governor by his order of January 29,
1900, to formulate and report a plan of municipal government, of which
His Honor Cayetano Arellano, president of the audiencia, was chairman,
and they will give to the conclusions of that board the weight and consideration which the high character and distinguished abilities of its
members justify.
In the constitution of departmental or provincial governments, they
will give especial attention to the existing government of the island of
Negros, constituted, with the approval of the people of that island, under
the order of the military governor of July 22, 1899, and after verifying,
so far as may be practicable, the reports of the successful working of that
government, they will be guided by the experience thus acquired, so far
as it may be applicable to the condition existing in other portions of the
Philippines. They will avail themselves, to the fullest degree practicable,
of the conclusions reached by the previous commission to the Philippines.
In the distribution of powers among the governments organized by the
commission the presumption is always to be in favor of the smaller subdivision, so that all the powers which can properly be exercised by the
municipal government shall be vested in that government, and all the
powers of a more general character which can be exercised by the departmental government shall be vested in that government, and so that in
the governmental system which is the result of the process the central
government of the islands, following the example of the distribution of
the powers between the States and the National Government of the United
States, shall have no direct administration except of matters of purely
general concern, and shall have only such supervision and control over
local governments as may be necessary to secure and enforce faithful and
efficient administration by local officers.
The many different degrees of civilization and varieties of custom and
capacity among the people of the different islands preclude very definite
instruction as to the part which the people shall take in the selection of
their own officers; but these general rules are to be observed: That in all
cases the municipal officers, who administer the local affairs of the people,




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are to be selected by the people, and that wherever officers of more extended jurisdiction are to be selected in any way, natives of the islands
are to be preferred, and if they can be found competent and willing to
perform the duties, they are to receive the offices in preference to any
others.
It will be necessary to fill some offices for the present with Americans
which after a time may well be filled by natives of the islands. As soon as
practicable a system for ascertaining the merit and fitness of candidates
for civil office should be put in force. An indispensable qualification for all
offices and positions of trust and authority in the islands must be absolute
and unconditional loyalty to the United States; and absolute and unhampered authority and power to remove and punish any officer deviating
from that standard must at all times be retained in the hands of the central
authority of the islands.
In all the forms of government and administrative provisions which
they are authorized to prescribe, the commission should bear in mind that
the government which they are establishing is designed, not for our satisfaction or for the expression of our theoretical views, but for the happiness,
peace, and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands, and the
measures adopted should be made to conform to their customs, their
habits, and even their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with the
accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of just and effective government.
At the same time the commission should bear in mind, and the people
of the islands should be made plainly to understand, that there are certain
great principles of government which have been made the basis of our
governmental system which we deem essential to the rule of law and the
maintenance of individual freedom, and of which they have, unfortunately,
been denied the experience possessed by us; that there are also certain
practical rules of government which we have found to be essential to the
preservation of these great principles of liberty and law, and that these
principles and these rules of government must be established and maintained in their islands for the sake of their liberty and happiness, however
much they may conflict with the customs or laws of procedure with which
they are familiar.
It is evident that the most enlightened thought of the Philippine Islands
fully appreciates the importance of these principles and rules, and they
will inevitably within a short time command universal assent. Upon every
division and branch of the government of the Philippines, therefore, must
be imposed these inviolable rules:
That no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law; that private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation; that in all criminal prosecutions the




MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense; that
excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishment inflicted; that no person shall be put twice in
jeopardy for the same offense, or be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself; that the right to be secure against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated; that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall exist except as a punishment for crime; that no
bill of attainder or ex postfacto law shall be passed; that no law shall be
passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press, or the rights of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for a redress
of grievances; that no law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and that the free exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession and worship without discrimination
or preference shall forever be allowed.
It will be the duty of the commission to make a thorough investigation
into the titles to the large tracts of land held or claimed by individuals or
by religious orders; into the justice of jhe claims and complaints made
against such landholders by the people of the island, or any part of the
people, and to seek by wise and peaceable measures a just settlement of
the controversies and redress of wrongs which have caused strife and
bloodshed in the past. In the performance of this duty the commission
is enjoined to see that no injustice is done; to have regard for substantial
rights and equity, disregarding technicalities so far as substantial right
permits, and to observe the following rules:
That the provision of the Treaty of Paris pledging the United States to
the protection of all rights of property in the islands, and as well the
principle of our own Government which prohibits the taking of private
property without due process of law, shall not be violated; that the welfare of the people of the islands, which should be a paramount consideration shall be attained consistently with this rule of property right; that
if it becomes necessary for the public interest of the people of the islands
to dispose of claims to property which the commission finds to be not
lawfully acquired and held, disposition shall be made thereof by due legal
procedure, in which there shall be full opportunity for fair and impartial
hearing and judgment; that if the same public interests require the
extinguishment of property rights lawfully acquired and held, due compensation shall be made out of the public treasury therefor; that no form
of religion and no minister of religion shall be forced upon any community
or upon any citizen of the islands; that upon the other hand no minister
of religion shall be interfered with or molested in following his calling,




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and that the separation between state and church shall be real, entire, and
absolute.
It will be the duty of the commission to promote and extend, and, as
they find occasion, to improve, the system of education already inaugurated by the military authorities. In doing this they should regard as of
first importance the extension of a system of primary education which
shall be free to all, and which shall tend to fit the people for the duties of
citizenship and for the ordinary avocations of a civilized community.
This instruction should be given in the first instance in every part of the
islands in the language of the people. In view of the great number of
languages spoken by the different tribes, it is especially important to the
prosperity of the islands that a common medium of communication may
be established, and it is obviously desirable that this medium should be
the English language. Especial attention should be at once given to
affording full opportunity to all the people of the islands to acquire the
use of the English language.
It may be well that the main changes which should be made in the
system of taxation and in the body of the laws under which the people are
governed, except such changes as have already been made by the military
government, should be relegated to the civil government which is to be
established under the auspices of the commission. It will, however,
be the duty of the commission to inquire diligently as to whether there
are any further changes which ought not to be delayed; and if so, they are
authorized to make such changes, subject to your approval. In doing so
they are to bear in mind that taxes which tend to penalize or repress
industry and enterprise are to be avoided; that provisions for taxation
should be simple, so that they may be understood by the people; that
they should affect the fewest practicable subjects of taxation which will
serve for the general distribution of the burden.
The main body of the laws which regulate the rights and obligations of
the people should be maintained with as little interference as possible.
Changes made should be mainly in procedure, and in the criminal laws to
secure speedy and impartial trials and at the same time effective administration and respect for individual rights.
In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the islands the commission
should adopt the same course followed by Congress in permitting the
tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal organization
and government, under which many of those tribes are now living in
peace and contentment, surrounded by a civilization to which they are
unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal governments should, however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without undue or
petty interference, constant and active effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and introduce civilized customs.




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Upon all officers and employees of the United States, both civil and
military, should be impressed a sense of the duty to observe not merely
the material but the personal and social rights of the people of the islands,
and to treat them with the same courtesy and respect for their personal
dignity which the people of the United States are accustomed to require
from each other.
The articles of capitulation of the city of Manila on the 13th of August,
1898, concluded with these words:
"This city, its inhabitants, its churches and religious worship, its
educational establishments, and its private property of all descriptions
are placed under the special safeguard of the faith and honor of the
American army."
I believe that this pledge has been faithfully kept. As high and sacred
an obligation rests upon the Government of the United States to give
protection for property and life, civil and religious freedom, and wise,
firm, and unselfish guidance in the paths of peace and prosperity to all
the people of the Philippine Islands. I charge this commission to labor
for the full performance of this obligation, which concerns the honor and
conscience of their country, in the firm hope that through their labors all
the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands may come to look back with
gratitude to the day when God gave victory to American arms at Manila
and set their land under the sovereignty and the protection of the people
of the United States.
WILLIAM MCKINLEY.
THE SECRETARY OF WAR, Washington.
THE WORK OF THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION
Extract from the Report of the Secretary of War for 19021
The Philippine Government Act of July 1, 1902, adopts
and continues with enlarged powers the system of government built up under the President's instructions of April 7,
1900. The growth and character of that government were
described in my last annual report. I transmit herewith all
the statutes passed by the Philippine Commission from and
including act No. 264, passed October 14, 1901, to and including act No. 424, passed July 1, 1902. These, together
with the acts previously transmitted to Congress, constitute
1 Page 59.




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the entire body of legislation by the Philippine Commission
prior to the passage of the Philippine Government Act by
Congress.
The enacting clause of all these laws is " By authority of
the President of the United States, be it enacted by the United
States Philippine Commission." Their authority as law
rests: First, upon the power vested in the Commission by
the President in the exercise of his war powers under the
Constitution, in the instructions of April 7, 1900. Second,
upon the sanction given to those instructions in that part
of the act of March 2, 1901, commonly known as the
"Spooner Amendment ", which provided:
All military, civil and judicial powers necessary to govern the Philippine Islands, acquired from Spain by the treaties concluded at Paris on
the 10th day of December, 1898, and at Washington on the 7th day of
November, 1900, shall, until otherwise provided by Congress, be vested
in such person and persons and shall be exercised in such manner as the
President of the United States shall direct for the establishment of civil
government and for maintaining and protecting the inhabitants of said
islands in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion.
And, third, upon the provision of the Philippine Government Act of July 1, 1902.
That the action of the President of the United States in creating the
Philippine Commission and authorizing said Commission to exercise the
powers of government to the extent and in the manner and form and subject to the regulation and control set forth in the instructions of the
President to the Philippine Commission, dated April 7, 1900,.. is
hereby approved, ratified, and confirmed.
The statutes passed by the Philippine Commission after
July 1, 1902, will rest upon the authority conferred beforehand upon the Commission by Congress in that act, and the
enacting clause will be: " By authority of the United States,
be it enacted by the Philippine Commission."...
Sections 63, 64, and 65 of the Philippine Government Act
of July 1, 1902, authorize the Commission to acquire title to
lands of religious orders held in such large tracts as to affect




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


injuriously the peace and welfare of the people of the islands,
to issue bonds in payment for such land, to sell the land, with
a preference to actual settlers and occupants, and to apply the
proceeds to paying the principal and interest of the bonds.
After the bill containing these provisions had been reported
favorably by the committees of both Houses, but before the
passage of the bill, Governor Taft being about to return from
Washington to his post at Manila via the Suez Canal, was
directed to stop at Rome for the purpose stated in the
following extract from his instructions:
In view, therefore, of the critical situation of this subject in the Philippines, and of the apparent impossibility of disposing of the matter there
by negotiation with the friars themselves, the President does not feel at
liberty to lose the opportunity for effective action afforded by your
presence in the West. He wishes you to take the subject up tentatively
with the ecclesiastical superiors who must ultimately determine the friars'
course of conduct, and endeavor to reach at least a basis of negotiation
along lines which will be satisfactory to them and to the Philippine government, accompanied by a full understanding on both sides of the facts and
of the views and purposes of the parties to the negotiation, so that when
Congress shall have acted the business may proceed to a conclusion without delay.
These instructions were complied with and resulted in a
very full and satisfactory understanding as to the methods
to be adopted for disposing of the various questions arising
out of the separation of church and state in the Philippine
Islands required by the change of sovereignty.... The negotiations are now proceeding at Manila between Governor
Taft and Monsignor Guidi, the papal delegate to the Philippines, in accordance with the understanding reached at
Rome. I have no doubt that, although many of the questions involved are delicate and difficult, just conclusions will
be reached, satisfactory to both sides.
The trade of the islands has been greatly hampered during
the past year by the ravages of rinderpest, causing a mortality in some provinces of over ninety per cent among the




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carabaos, and a consequent shortage of food crops. Business
in many sections has been seriously interrupted by an epidemic of cholera, yet the imports for the fiscal year 1902
were greater than in any previous year in the history of the
archipelago, and exports were exceeded in but two previous
years, 1870 and 1889. The total merchandise, exclusive of
gold and silver and Government supplies, imported during
the fiscal year 1902 was $32,141,842, as against $30,279,406
for the fiscal year 1901 and $20,601,436 for the fiscal year
1900, and the total value of merchandise exported during
the fiscal year 1902 was $23,927,679, as against $23,214,948
for the fiscal year 1901 and $19,751,068 for the fiscal year
1900, an increase of six per cent in the value of imports for
the fiscal year 1902 over the fiscal year 1901 and of fifty-six
per cent over the fiscal year 1900, and an increase in the
value of exports for the fiscal year 1902 over the fiscal year
1901 of three per cent and over the fiscal year 1900 of
twenty-one per cent...
The imports from the United States amounted to
$4,035,243 in 1902 as against $2,855,685 in 1901 and
$1,657,701 in 1900, or an increase for the past year over
1900 of 143 per cent. The value of merchandise exported
to this country in 1902 was $7,691,743 as against $2,572,021
in 1901 and $3,522,160 in 1900, showing an increase in
favor of the latest period over 1900 of 118 per cent.
The United States shows greater gains of imports for the
fiscal year 1902 than any other country, except the French
East Indies, which shows a great increase in the quantity
of rice exported to the islands to make up for deficient crops.
In exports the United States gained more than any other
country.
The showing made by the United States on the basis of
direct shipments to and from the islands discloses a marked
increase during the past few years; yet it does not take into




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account purchases made in this country entered at the
Philippine customs-houses free of duty for use of the United
States military departments of the insular government or
its subordinate branches. In these figures also this country
is deprived of the proper credit for its imports into the islands
by shipments passing through Hong-Kong and eventually
reported as originating at that point. Although this applies
also to European countries to some extent, it has been found
that only a small part of their export credits is affected, for
the reason that nearly all their shipments come direct via
Singapore; and the transshipment at that port and at HongKong and Saigon are rarely attended by the issue of new
shipping documents, under which the port of transshipment
can be taken as the port of origin.
As to the Philippine export trade to the United States, in
which this country has trebled its figures during the last two
years, the results stated represent more nearly the proper
credit, but there are numerous instances of shipments of
hemp in large quantities, intended for the United States, to
Europe and Hong-Kong under documents in which these
countries are given as the ports of final destination. This
will appear from the fact that approximately $7,500,000
worth of hemp was exported from the Philippines to the
United Kingdom during the year 1902, while during the
same period the importations of this fiber into the United
States from the United Kingdom amounted to nearly
$4,250,000, presumably included in indirect shipments, credit
for which should be given to this country. If credit is given
for these importations the United States is placed far in
advance as the leading market for Philippine products at
the present time....
Immigrants to the number of 30,094 arrived in the Philippine Islands during the fiscal year 1902 as against 17,108 in
the fiscal year 1901. Of this number 12,751 (including




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10,101 Chinese) had been in the islands before. Among the
17,343 who came for the first time there were 15,312 or 88
per cent, Americans, 368 Chinese, 451 Japanese, 222 English, 358 Spaniards, 129 East Indians, and 503 of other
nationalities. There were 2,497 females and 928 children
under 14 years of age. With the exception of 8,349 Chinese
but 3 per cent of the immigrants were illiterates. Among
the Americans there were 176 merchant dealers and grocers, 790  teachers, 122 clerks and   accountants.   The
greater number of Americans are, however, not described
by occupation. More than three-fourths of the Chinese
were laborers, and more than half the remainder merchants...
The total revenues have amounted to $33,589,819.05 and
the total expenditures to $23,253,573.13, American money.
The relative income and expenditure by fiscal years has been
as follows:
Income    Expenditure
1899...............................  $3,508,68t.83  $2,376,008.62
1900...............................  6,763,527.73  4,758,677.75
1901...............................  10,686,188.97  6,073,766.44
1902...............................  12,631,419.52  10,045,120.32
The surplus of income over expenditure has in a great measure been allotted to the payment of various contracts for
public improvements and public benefit, so that the real
surplus of free cash in the treasury is comparatively small.
I shall defer comment and recommendation generally upon
Philippine affairs until I transmit the report of the commission, now on the way to this country.
I ask the attention of Congress to two subjects upon which,
I think, if the conditions and needs of the islands could be
fully understood, there would be but little controversy, and
upon which very simple enactments would be of immense
value to the people of the islands, whose welfare the Government of the United States is bound to promote. I earnestly




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urge, first, that the duties levied in the United States upon
products of the Philippine Archipelago imported therefrom
be reduced to twenty-five per cent of the Dingley tariff rates;
second, that the government of the island be permitted to
establish the gold standard for its currency, and to take such
measures as it finds to be practicable and prudent to keep
the silver coinage which it is authorized to issue at parity
with gold, without in any way committing the United States
to responsibility therefor.
I shall not now undertake, nor is it the proper office of
such a report as this, to argue the economic questions which
may be raised by the consideration of these recommendations. The views upon which they are based have been presented in my former reports and in the reports of the Philippine Commission. The reason for presenting them now is
that the ills which have recently befallen the people of the
islands call urgently for active and immediate measures of
relief. The people of a country just emerging from nearly
six years of devastating warfare, during which productive
industry was interrupted, vast amounts of property were
destroyed, the bonds of social order were broken, habits of
peaceful industry were lost, and at the close of which a great
residuum of disorderly men were left leading a life of brigandage and robbery, had a sufficiently difficult task before them
to restore order and prosperity. In addition to this, however,
the people of the Philippine Islands have within the past
year been visited by great misfortunes.
The rinderpest has destroyed about ninety per cent of all
their carabaos, leaving them without draft animals to till
their land and aid in the ordinary work of farm and village
life. Carabaos have increased in price from $20 to $200
Mexican. The Eastern disease known as " surra " has killed
and is killing the native and American horses, further crippling transportation. The rice crop has been reduced to




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301


twenty-five per cent of the ordinary crop. Last year in the
Visayan Islands and this year in Luzon a plague of locusts
has come upon the land, destroying much of the remaining
twenty-five per cent of the rice crop. A drought in China
and the fall in the price of silver have raised the price of rice
from $4 to $7 a picul. The commission have been obliged
to go out of the islands and use insular funds to buy over
40,000,000 pounds of rice to save the people from perishing
by famine. Cholera has raged and is raging throughout the
islands. The ignorance of the people and their unwillingness
to submit to sanitary regulations have made it almost impossible to check the ravages of the disease, which, it is
estimated, will claim not less than 100,000 victims. The
decline in the price of silver has carried Mexican dollars
down from a ratio of two to one in gold to a ratio of over
two and one-half to one, and this has borne heavily on the
commercial interests and on the wage earners.
The insular government has in ten months lost over
$1,000,000 gold by the decline in silver because it was operating on a silver basis, and this has changed the surplus of
revenues into a deficit at the very time when the other
causes mentioned have caused an extraordinary demand
for the use of the revenues for the relief of the people.
Agriculture is prostrated. Commerce is hampered and discouraged. All the political parties in the Philippines urgently
demand a change of the present currency standard. Some
relief would be afforded by opening a profitable market in
the United States to the products of the islands. Still greater
relief would be afforded by delivering the business of the
islands from the disastrous effects of the decline in the price
of silver and the fluctuations in exchange, and putting it
upon the substantial basis of the gold standard currency
which exists in the United States, where we wish them to do
their business, which exists on the continent of Europe and




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in India and Japan, and the adoption of which is now under
consideration in the Straits Settlements.
CONDITIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES
On January 9, 1902, Mr. Root appeared before the House Committee on Military
Affairs, then considering the military appropriation bill, and made the following
statement concerning the necessity for a liberal appropriation for work in the
Philippines:
I think I can state quite briefly what I regard to be the
situation. About two-thirds of the people of the Islands
are now under civil government. The other third are largely
composed of non-Christian tribes. There are now thirtyone provinces under civil government. They are all new.
The communities have been in a state of unrest and disorder for a number of years, five or six years. There has
been an almost entire absence of all the customary limitations
of civil society.
There is active warfare going on in certain parts of the
Islands, in Batangas and Tayabas and Luzon, and in Samar,
and, until recently, in Cebu. The great mass of the people in
the organized provinces, which are under civilized government, wish for nothing so much as to be allowed to go on in
peace, rearing their children and earning their livelihood
under the sovereignty of the United States; but there are still
in these provinces a considerable number of men who are
giving aid and comfort to the insurrectionists in the other
provinces, and who are all the time trying to work up insurrection, to keep the people stirred up and to keep up their
secret societies. The process of settlement - of restoring
the settled conditions of a peaceable community - is necessarily a slow one, and while that is going on the moral force
of the American troops is a very important element in maintaining the condition of peace.
Every year and every month and every day tends to consolidate the peaceable conditions, to reduce the number of




EVENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES


303


disorderly and discontented and turbulent characters, and to
restore the domination of the peaceable, law-abiding citizens;
and the process has been hindered by the fact that we have
been prohibited by law, up to this time, from giving to the
people the ordinary advantages of good government in the
way of permitting industrial enterprises. The limitations
which were imposed in the so-called Spooner provision upon
the granting of franchises, upon the giving of titles to public
lands, upon all the active industries which give profitable
employment and which develop the resources of a country,
have held us in a state of suspense there, and there are a great
many people who are conspirators now who would cease to be
if they got something to do. You see we have gone into a
country which had been under a sixteenth-century government, and we have been prevented by law from introducing
a twentieth-century government there. The forests have
been cut off to a great extent near the water; what remain
cannot be reached except by building railroads. We have
been prohibited from permitting anybody to build railroads
there. Last month there were actually over a thousand
prospectors sitting on mineral lands waiting for the chance
to acquire rights to them and work their mines. Copper and
gold and coal exist there, and those minerals have been there
in the earth for three or four hundred years under Spanish
rule without the people's ever scratching them. Now, if we
can have laws under which mining claims can be taken up
and people can go to work getting out the mineral, there will
be money spread through the community and there will be
employment.
And the same way about agricultural lands. A large part
of the agricultural lands are unavailable because there is no
communication except by water, and therefore only strips
along the edge of the water are available to raise anything for
the market. The people live largely upon rice. They did not




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


raise the rice they used last year; they had to import $5,000,000 worth of rice into a country fertile beyond description.
We are not able to open up the rich agricultural lands away
from the water. Of course there has never been a census
taken. There are no surveys. The records are all destroyed;
land titles are all in air.
A year ago an estimate was made that between two
hundred thousand and three hundred thousand Filipinos
were living on lands without any title to their lands. Give
them titles and it will be worth while to improve their lands,
and you will get a contented set of people, who are interested
in the peace and prosperity of the country, instead of having
a lot of floaters. But we are prohibited from giving titles.
We cannot permit railroads to be built, we cannot permit a
manufacturing establishment to acquire rights, we cannot
permit a mine to be opened, we cannot permit any of the
industries which make a community prosperous and contented to go on there. If you will take those limitations off,
under proper restrictions, of course, and enable the wheels of
industry to move there, you will see content in the place
of discontent and conspiracy.
You see it is a peculiar situation. In a country, with, by a
rough estimate, 73,000,000 acres of land, only about 5,000,000 are held in private ownership. The remaining 68,000,000
acres, in round numbers, have become the property of the
United States. The Philippine government has had no
power to alienate an acre of it, and is expressly prohibited,
by the legislation of a year ago, from leasing an acre of it.
How can you expect a community to have the progress and
the industrial activity that brings contentment under those
conditions? They have just been holding on by main
strength and tenacity.
Mr. JETT. Would you be in favor of extending the homestead-exemption laws of the United States?




EVENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES


305


Secretary ROOT. With modifications. Of course you have
to have your laws framed to meet the communities and the
conditions. Bills have been prepared with a great deal of
care to remedy the evils that I have just referred to. A bill
was introduced in the House by Mr. Cooper, a bill in the
Senate by Mr. Lodge, and they have gone to the appropriate
committees - the Philippine Committee in the Senate and
the Insular Committee in the House. Those bills contain a
great number of provisions designed to meet these conditions;
but up to this time there has been a suspension of industrial
activity over there.
Mr. ADAMS. Mr. Secretary, the same thing has happened in Cuba, has it not, retarding the development of
industry?
Secretary RooT. It has retarded Cuba, although it is not
so bad in Cuba because Cuba was a more settled country and
her sugar and tobacco productions formerly reached a very
high point. They have been gradually working back toward
that point. The trouble in Cuba is, that the decline in the
price of sugar throughout the world has reached a figure where
the Cuban product cannot be sold profitably under our existing tariff conditions here. But in Cuba the railroads, which
were very much needed, have been prevented by the limitations of what is called the Foraker Amendment.
The Van Horne people have been building a private railroad. Under the existing laws there, any one has a right to
buy land and build a railroad upon it. They bought their
land or had it given to them. The people in the eastern end
of the island are exceedingly anxious for a railroad, and the
promoters of the railroad have been helped along in every
way, and they have gone ahead and built railroads without
any franchises. Where they have come to a road they have
crossed under a revocable license, and that license can be
taken away at any time.




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THE FINANCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
Extract from the Report of the Secretary of War for 1903 
Philippine Coinage. Under the authority of sections 76 to
83, inclusive, of the Philippine Government Act, and of the
act entitled " An act to establish a standard of value and to
provide for a coinage system in the Philippine Islands " approved March 2, 1903, the Philippine government has coined
14,145,000 silver pesos, 3,100,000 50-centavo pieces or half
pesos, 5,350,000 20-centavo pieces, 5,100,000 10-centavo
pieces, 8,850,000 5-centavo pieces, 10,600,000 1-centavo
pieces, 11,950,000 half-centavo pieces, making an aggregate
in face value of 17,883,250 silver pesos, each of the face value
of one-half an American gold dollar, and having an aggregate
face value of $8,941,625 gold money of the United States.
Eleven million three hundred and fifty-five thousand of the
pesos were coined at the San Francisco mint, the remaining pesos and all the subsidiary coins at the Philadelphia
mint....
The silver bullion purchased for this coinage amounted to
13,520,895.82 ounces. The cost of the bullion amounted to
$7,372,990.11. The purchases were made through the officers
of the mint. Of the amount purchased, 1,115,234.52 ounces
were purchased from the Mexican Pious award fund in the
hands of the Department of State. These purchases were
made at the London price at the time of delivery at the San
Francisco mint. The remainder was purchased from various
firms and corporations upon offers tendered to the director
of the mint Mondays and Thursdays of each week, in response to a public invitation by him. Of the total amount of
silver bullion purchased for coinage purposes there remain
43,324.85 ounces not used in the above-mentioned coinage,
and the cost of this surplus amounted to $30,401.22, leaving
Page 43.




EVENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES


307


the total quantity of silver bullion actually consumed in making the coins above specified 13,478,448.07 ounces and the
cost thereof $7,342,588.89. The surplus of 43,324.85 ounces
of silver will be used for further subsidiary coinage.
The prices at which this silver bullion was purchased
ranged from 49.10 cents per ounce to 60.47 cents per ounce.
The average price paid was 55.193 cents per ounce. This
makes the cost to the Philippine government of the silver in
each peso coined equal to 43.05 cents. The difference between
the actual cost of the bullion consumed in making the coins
above mentioned, including the cost of base metal for alloy
and minor coins, and the total face value of the coinage,
is $1,495,644.85. The total cost of coining, transportation,
insurance, packing, and miscellaneous expenses was $256,930.35, leaving a seigniorage or profit to the Philippine government consisting of the difference between the face value
of the new coins and the total cost of the new coins delivered
in Manila, amounting to $1,238,714.50. This sum will go
into the special fund for the maintenance of parity between
the new coins and the money of the United States.
Silver Certificates. Section 8 of the act of March 2, 1903,
authorized the treasurer of the Philippine Islands, in his discretion, to receive deposits of the standard silver coins of one
peso in sums of not less than twenty pesos, and to issue silver
certificates therefor in denominations of not less than two nor
more than ten pesos, retaining the deposited coin in the
treasury " to be held and used for the payment of such certificates on demand, and for no other purpose "; thus supplying for public convenience government notes representing
silver coin actually held by the government as against the
notes.
Under this provision certificates have been engraved,
printed, and delivered at Manila representing 10,000,000
silver pesos. Of these, 4,000,000 were in 10-peso notes,




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


4,000,000 in 5-peso notes, and 2,000,000 in 2-peso notes. This
work was admirably done by the very considerate and publicspirited cooperation of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing.
The 10-peso notes bear the engraved vignette of President
Washington; the 5-peso notes, of President McKinley, and
the 2-peso notes, of the Philippine patriot and poet Rizal....
Issue of Certificates of Indebtedness. The money for the
purchase of bullion and expense of coinage was furnished in
part from the general funds of the Philippine government and
in part by the issue of certificates of indebtedness under the
authority of section 6 of the Philippine coinage act of March
2, 1903. That section provides that in order to maintain
parity between said silver Philippine pesos and the gold pesos
provided for by the act, the Philippine government may
issue temporary certificates of indebtedness to the extent of
$10,000,000 or 20,000,000 pesos, running not more than one
year and bearing interest not to exceed four per cent. And
it provides that the proceeds of such certificates shall be
used exclusively for the maintenance of said parity, except
that a sum not exceeding $3,000,000 at any one time may
be used as a continuing credit for the purchase of silver
bullion.
Under these provisions certificates of indebtedness payable
one year after date and bearing four per cent interest have
been issued and sold in the United States to the amount of
$6,000,000. Three million dollars thereof, issued specifically
for the purchase of bullion, were sold on April 20, 1903, at a
premium of 2.513 per cent. The other $3,000,000 thereof,
issued specifically for the creation of a gold reserve fund for
the maintenance of parity, were sold on August 25, 1903, at a
premium of 2.24 per cent, making an average premium of
2.3765 per cent, and making the interest charge to the Philippine government for the use of the money borrowed for one
year 1.6235 per cent, or in round figures 1- per cent.




EVENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES


309


These sales were made upon public advertisement for bids,
and the extraordinarily favorable result was due not merely
to the credit of the Philippine government, but to the fact
that the Secretary of the Treasury authorized the War Department to announce that the certificates would be received
by the Treasury Department as security for the deposit of
United States funds in the national banks, under certain
specified conditions....
Circulation. It is estimated that there are now in circulation in the archipelago between eleven and twelve million
pesos of the Spanish-Filipino coinage of all denominations.
It is the purpose of the Philippine government to take steps
to get this coinage into the treasury and to recoin the silver
thus supplied into the new Filipino coins, thus bringing the
aggregate of the new coinage up to about twenty-eight million pesos. This will, in the judgment of the Commission,
meet the present requirements of the islands. The purchase
of silver bullion for coinage purposes has accordingly been
suspended.
It is the purpose of the Philippine government to exercise
the authority conferred upon it by section 7 of the Philippine
coinage act of March 2, 1903, and declare the Mexican silver
dollars heretofore in use in the Philippine Islands to be no
longer receivable for public dues after January 1, 1904.
In anticipation of the demonetization of Mexican dollars
those coins have been largely shipped out of the islands, leaving in circulation there an amount which is estimated at not
exceeding 4,000,000 pesos. To supply the need for currency
thus created 8,210,307 pesos of the new coinage have already
passed into circulation (including 3,305,116 pesos deposited
in Manila banks, about one-third of which probably remains
in the hands of the banks). No serious difficulty is anticipated in the absorption of the entire amount coined after the
demonetization of Mexicans, January 1, 1904.




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


Monetary Commission. The intimate trade relations
between the Philippines and the silver-currency countries of
Asia make the relations between gold and silver in those
countries a matter of great practical importance to the
Philippine government. That government has followed with
great interest the course of the Commission recently appointed by the Government of the United States upon the
request of the Governments of Mexico and China that the
United States should join them in seeking to establish a more
stable relation between the moneys of the gold-standard
countries and of the countries now upon the silver standard.
Under the recent legislation of Congress the business of the
Philippine Islands is about to be put upon the gold-standard
basis. Any action which leads to the adoption of a gold
monetary system in China will be of material advantage to
the Philippines. The promotion of that object during the
past summer by the conferences between the above-mentioned American commission, the commission from the
Republic of Mexico, and the similar commissions of the chief
countries of Europe is regarded with gratification by the
Philippine government, which hopes that this effort may
receive further encouragement and support from the Congress of the United States....
I earnestly renew the recommendation which I have already
made for a reduction of duties upon Philippine imports into
the United States. As matters stand at present we have
practically deprived the Philippines of their Spanish market,
and we have so arranged the tariff laws of the two countries
that American consumers are making money at the expense
of the Philippine revenues. I submit that there is no just
reason why the people of the Philippines should not be
treated with some fair approach to the advantages which are
awarded to the people of Porto Rico and the Hawaiian
Islands..




EVENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES


311


Navigation Laws. Section 3 of the act of Congress of
March 8, 1909, relating to the Philippine tariff, provides -
That until July 1, 1904, the provisions of law restricting to vessels of
the United States the transportation of passengers and merchandise
directly or indirectly from one port of the United States to another port
of the United States shall not be applicable to foreign vessels engaging
in trade between the Philippine Archipelago and the United States or
between ports in the Philippine Archipelago.
But for this suspension, under the decision of the Supreme
Court in the Porto Rican case of Huus v. The New York and
Porto Rico Steamship Company,1 the navigation laws of the
United States may be held to prohibit any vessel not built in
the United States and owned by a citizen of the United
States from engaging in either one or two entirely distinct
classes of trade: First, inter-island trade throughout the
archipelago; and second, trade between the United States
and the Philippine Islands. As to the inter-island trade it is
quite certain that unless there be a further suspension of the
navigation laws or other legislative relief consequences very
disastrous to the islands will result.
The waterways among the islands are, of course, the great
internal highways of the country. The business is largely
done by a great number of small vessels, in the main owned
by the people of the islands. There are now engaged in the
coastwise trade of the islands 3,471 vessels, with an aggregate tonnage of about 108,000 tons. Of these, 135 are
steamers, with a gross tonnage of 49,790 tons; 46 are steam
launches, and the remainder sailing vessels. None of the
steamers is of American origin and ownership, and but
three of the sailing vessels, and their gross tonnage is
610 tons.
The present tonnage is inadequate for the demands of the
growing trade of the islands, and there is undoubtedly a field
1 Decided in 1900, and reported in 182 United States Reports, 392.




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for the profitable use of American shipping in the inter-island
trade. Some provision, however, should be made to prevent a situation in which the laws of the United States will
make it illegal for the Philippine people to use their own
vessels in their own internal trade and which will practically
require the trade of the islands to be carried on in violation
of law.
As to the trade between the United States and the Philippines, the returns show that during the fiscal year 1903, out
of the $13,863,059 of exports from the Philippines into the
United States, nearly ninety-seven per cent, and of the imports from the United States into the Philippines approximately ninety per cent were carried in foreign vessels. At
the time of the passage of the act of March 8, 1902, the
supply of American vessels on the Pacific was quite inadequate to the transaction of this business...
Philippine Railroads. On January 5, 1903, the Senate
adopted the following resolution:
Resolved, That the Secretary of War be, and he is hereby, directed to
inform the Senate what effect, in his opinion, an adequate system of railroads in the Philippine Islands would have upon the cost of maintaining
law and order and protecting life and property in those islands, and
whether, in his opinion, the expense of protecting life and property and
maintaining a stable government would be reduced by such a system of
railroads in a sum sufficient to equal the interest on the money necessary
to build and operate such roads.
To which the Secretary replied as follows:
In my opinion an adequate system of railroads in the Philippine Islands
would greatly reduce the cost of maintaining law and order and protecting
life and property in those islands. I think the difference between the cost
of maintaining a stable government, accomplishing these ends with such
a system of railroads, and maintaining a government of equal efficiency
without railroads would be greater than the interest on the money necessary to build and operate the roads.
Experience has shown that the building of a railroad in an unsettled
country does not merely reduce the cost of policing the country, but
greatly decreases the necessity of policing it. The moral effect of rapid




EVENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES


313


communication with central authority is to discourage disorder. The
increase in the value of property, the improvement of business, the distribution of money, the employment of labor, the constant travel and
communication among the inhabitants, dispelling ignorance and prejudice - all these combine to reduce the cost and increase the efficiency of
peaceful and orderly government.
In Luzon alone there are some thirty provinces, in which eight or nine
different languages and over sixty different dialects are spoken, and there
is special need of means to make the people homogeneous and capable of
uniting in common self-government.
We have on this continent two notable illustrations of the foregoing
views - in the discontinuance of insurrection following the building of
railroads in Mexico and in the effect on Indian disturbances produced by
our own transcontinental roads.
My predecessor, Secretary Alger, urged the adoption of such a policy
for Cuba in his report for 1898. The road which he proposed has now
been built by private capital, and I do not doubt that it will prove to be
a powerful agent in the maintenance of peace and order.
I think sound policy requires that we should either build or procure
the building of railroads in the larger islands of the Philippine Archipelago
without any avoidable delay.
In pursuance of the views thus expressed and in order to be
ready with any further information which Congress might
desire on the subject of the Senate's inquiry, the War Department procured for the Philippine government the services
of two experienced engineers familiar with the work of
locating railroads in the tropics, and these engineers have
personally examined and located a line of railroad from
Manila up the easterly side of the great plain of central
Luzon, over the mountains near Carranglan, down the valley of the Cagayan to the north coast of Luzon at Aparri;
another line from the termination of the present railroad on
the Gulf of Lingayen up the west coast to Laoag, and a third
line from Manila southerly through Cavite and Batangas to
the south coast at the city of Batangas.
The estimated cost of constructing these roads is $11,140,095. I am satisfied that the Philippine government could
afford to pay the entire interest on the cost of construction in




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


return for the benefit which the government will receive in
greater efficiency and reduced cost of administration. The
increase in the taxable value of property and the benefits to
the people of the island of Luzon will of course be very great.
It is probable that private capital cannot be obtained for
investment at the risk of this enterprise without some state
aid or a loan of credit by means of a guaranty or otherwise.
I strongly recommend that should the powers of the Philippine government be deemed insufficient for this purpose,
such legislation as may be necessary to confer the power be
enacted by Congress.
Philippine Accounts. The general deficiency act of July 1,
1902, appropriated $30,000 to enable the Secretary of War to
compile for the information of Congress a detailed statement
of the receipts and expenditures by the military government
of Cuba, in continuation of statements theretofore rendered
to May 1, 1900, and furtherto enable the Secretary of War to pay all necessary expenses in compiling
for the information of Congress a similar statement relating to the Philippine Islands of all receipts and expenditures from the date of American
occupation.
The itemized audited accounts showing the disposition of
the entire revenue receipts of the military government in
Cuba, including both the government of Santiago and the
government of the entire island, down to the transfer of government to the Cubans, were submitted to Congress on
December 13, 1902. A similar statement containing the
itemized audited accounts of all receipts and expenditures of
the military and civil governments of the Philippine Islands
from the date of American occupation to June 30, 1902, was
sent to Congress on February 13, 1902.
The material for the statement for the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1903, has been completed in the Philippines and is
about to be forwarded to the War Department in pursuance




EVENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES


315


of law. The receipts and expenditures during the period of
American occupation have been as follows:
Fiscal Year Ended June   0 -............................... —                       T otal
1899          1900          1901           190X          1903
REVENUES
Customs........ $3,097,864.15 $5,739,297.40 $9,105,754.67 $8,550,758.49 $9,686,533.29 $36,180,208.00
Postal..........      42,954.87    104,282.54    122,816.83     137,811.99    146,659.44     554,525.67
Internal........    240,754.00    561,993.18    966,400.47     225,505.09    222,980.40   2,217,633.14
Provincial....................       1,993,270.97  2,559,601.94   4,552,872.91
City of Manila.............                 1,199,590.01  1,561,473.61   2,761,063.62
Miscellaneous...    127,109.81    357,954.61    491,217.00    524,482.97   1,148,877.05   2,649,641.44
Total....... $3,508,682.83 $6,763,527.73 10,686,188.97  12,631.419.52 15,326,125.73  48,915,944.78
EXPENDITURES
Customs........       8,817.90    100,194.09    267,446.88    490,126.40     587,142.89   1,473,728.16
Postal..........      30,410.75     89,149.51    155,347.77    175,156.57     226,730.33     676,794.93
Provincial...................        746,586.80   1,163,585.01   1,910,171.81
Loans and refunds
to provinces.............        324,479.35   1,760,563.87   2,085,043.22
City of Manila............       1,744,344.56  1,813,118.10   3,557,462.66
Other expenditures..........,316,779.97   4,569,334.15  5,659,971.79   6,564,426.64  8,711,363.27  27,812,875.82
Total....... 1,376,008.62    4,758,677.75  6,073,766.44 10,045,120.32 14,162,503.47   37.516.076.60
Captured Philippine Documents. There are now on file in
the Bureau of Insular Affairs some 200,000 documents captured at different times from the insurgents in the Philippines. Few of them are of value as military records, but they
contain the material for a history of the insurgent government both during its open existence and during the ensuing
guerrilla war. They include many of the orders and regulations and much of the correspondence of the insurgent
officers, and throw much light upon many important matters
of which, from the American point of view alone, but a partial
understanding can be obtained. These papers, since their
receipt in October, 1902, have been carefully arranged,
recorded, and filed, and those of special interest indexed and
translated. It seems well worth while to print the more
important of these documents with such explanatory notes
as can be furnished by officers who are familiar with the




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transactions to which they relate. The Chief of the Bureau
reports that the papers of permanent interest can be included
in about five volumes of about five hundred pages each. It
is estimated that the publication will cost at the Public
Printing Office about $15,000. The first volume is practically
ready to go to the printer in case Congress shall authorize
the printing. I recommend an appropriation for this
purpose.
THE END OF THE PHILIPPINE INSURRECTION
Extract from the Report of the Secretary of War for 19021
At the time of my last report Malvar, in the provinces of
Batangas and Tayabas, in the island of Luzon, and Lukban,
in the island of Samar, were the only insurgent leaders of
importance who still maintained guerrilla warfare. We hoped
that these leaders with their followers would yield to the
example and advice of the great body of the Philippine people
who had become friendly to the United States, and would
voluntarily lay down their arms. It soon became evident,
however, that this would not be the case. Malvar grew
stronger, rather than weaker, under the effect of a conciliatory and peaceful policy, and the fierce natives of Samar
were excited to greater hostile activity by a successful surprise at Balangiga in September, by which the people of the
town, who had given every appearance of friendliness and
were treated as friends, set upon a company of the Ninth
Infantry while at breakfast and murdered most of them.
Active campaigns were accordingly inaugurated in both
regions; and these resulted in the surrender of Malvar on
the sixteenth of April, and in the capture of Lukban and the
surrender of Guevara, his successor, on the twenty-seventh
of April. General Frederick D. Grant reports that the surrenders in Samar included every gun known to exist in the
1 Page 11.




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island, except two; and General J. F. Bell, who conducted
operations against Malvar in Batangas, reports that during
the campaign we secured 3,561 guns, 625 revolvers, with
many thousand bolos, rounds of ammunition, etc., and
detected, captured, or forced to surrender some eight or
ten thousand persons actively engaged in one capacity or
another in the insurrection. These surrenders put an end
to the guerrilla warfare in the Philippines, which had been
waged with great ferocity ever since the destruction of
Aguinaldo's government in the latter part of 1899, and had
been accompanied by constant treachery, assassination,
cruelty, and disregard of the laws of war.
The way was now clear to complete the establishment of
civil government, and by energetic action and hearty cooperation on the part of both the civil and military authorities in the Philippines this was accomplished coincidently
with the enactment by Congress of the Philippine government bill of July 1, 1902.
On July 4, 1902, the remainder of the military government
was ended by the following order:
WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, July 4, 1902.
The insurrection against the sovereign authority of the United States
in the Philippine Archipelago having ended, and provincial civil governments having been established throughout the entire territory of the
archipelago not inhabited by Moro tribes, under the instructions of the
President to the Philippine Commission, dated April 7, 1900, now ratified
and confirmed by the act of Congress approved July 1, 1902, entitled
"An act temporarily to provide for the administration of affairs of civil
government in the Philippine Islands, and for other purposes ", the general
commanding the Division of the Philippines is hereby relieved from the
further performance of the duties of military governor, and the office of
military governor in said archipelago is terminated. The general commanding the Division of the Philippines, and all military officers in
authority therein, will continue to observe the direction contained in the
aforesaid instructions of the President, that the military forces in the
Division of the Philippines shall be at all times subject, under the orders




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


of the military commander, to the call of the civil authorities for the maintenance of law and order and the enforcement of their authority.
By the President:
ELIHU ROOT,
Secretary of War.
On the same day the President issued a proclamation of
peace and amnesty...
The dual process by which the military power had steadily
acquired control over the various provinces of the archipelago, and at the same time had been superseded progressively by civil administration, was then finished, and a complete system of civil government, built up under the authority
of the President, was in operation, ready to go on under the
authority of Congress.
I described in my last report the important bearing which
the continuous offer and bestowal of civil rights and local
self-government as the result of pacification had upon the
attitude of the people toward the insurrection. It is evident
that the insurrection has been brought to an end both by
making a war distressing and hopeless on the one hand, and
by making peace attractive, through immediate and present
demonstration of the sincerity of our purpose to give to the
people just and free government, on the other. This result
could not have been accomplished except by genuine and
hearty cooperation of both the military and civil authorities
acting together under the general direction of the War
Department. The good temper and mutual consideration
and helpfulness, and subordination of personal to public
interests, displayed by General MacArthur and General
Chaffee on the one hand, and by Governor Taft, Vice-Governor Wright, and the Civil Commission on the other, frequently under circumstances of great delicacy and difficulty,
are worthy of high praise. Some of their subordinates,
through incomplete knowledge and from widely differing
points of view, have sometimes expressed discordant opinions,




EVENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES


319


but both soldiers and civilians, with very few exceptions,
have rendered loyal and devoted support to the prescribed
policy.
There was at one time in the public press and on the floor
of Congress much criticism of the conduct of the army in the
Philippines, as being cruel and inhuman. All wars are cruel.
This conflict consisted chiefly of guerrilla warfare. It lasted
for some three years and a half, and extended over thousands
of miles of territory. Over 120,000 men were engaged upon
our side, and much greater numbers upon the other, and we
were fighting against enemies who totally disregarded the
laws of civilized warfare, and who were guilty of the most
atrocious treachery and inhuman cruelty. It was impossible
that some individuals should not be found upon our side who
were unnecessarily and unjustifiably cruel. Such instances,
however, after five months of searching investigation by a
committee of the Senate, who took some three thousand
printed pages of testimony, appear to have been comparatively few, and they were in violation of strict orders obedience to which characterized the conduct of the army as a
whole.
The two observers who, as the heads of the civil government in the Philippines, had the best opportunities for information, and at the same time were naturally free from
any military bias, have given what I believe to be a true
statement of the character of our military operations.
Vice-Governor Luke E. Wright says, in a letter written
on the twentieth of July last:
General Chaffee, as a matter of course, had no patience with any acts
of oppression or cruelty, and whenever his attention has been called to
them has at once taken proper steps. The howl against the army has
been made mainly for political purposes, and the cruelties practiced have
been largely exaggerated. Of course, numerous instances of this character
have occurred. There never was and never will be a war of which the
same may not be said, but taken as a whole, and when the character of the




320        MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY
warfare here is considered, I think the officers and men of the American
army have been forbearing and humane in their dealings with the natives,
and the attempt to create a contrary impression is not only unjust to
them, but it seems to me unpatriotic as well.
Governor Taft, in his testimony under oath before the
Philippine Committee of the Senate on the fourth of February last, said:
After a good deal of study about the matter, and, although I have
never been prejudiced in favor of the military branch, for when the civil
and military branches are exercising concurrent jurisdiction there is some
inevitable friction, I desire to say that it is my deliberate judgment that
there never was a war conducted, whether against inferior races or not,
in which there was more compassion and more restraint and more generosity, assuming that there was war at all, than there have been in the
Philippine Islands.
RELATIONS WITH THE MORO TRIBES
Extract from the Report of the Secretary of War for 19021
The establishment of civil government in the Philippines
still left a function for the army to perform in the control
of the Moros in the Sulu Archipelago, southern Mindanao,
and the southern part of Palawan very similar to that which
it has long performed in relation to the Indian tribes in the
western part of the United States. It was only through an
extended series of decisions by the Supreme Court of the
United States, dealing with specific questions as they arose
in the early years of the last century, that the precise legal
relations between the Federal Government, the State and
Territorial governments, and the Indian tribes of North
America were determined.
The court said in the case of The Cherokee Nation v. The
State of Georgia:2
The Indians are acknowledged to have unquestionable and heretofore
an unquestioned right to the lands they occupy until that right shall
be extinguished by a voluntary cession to the Government. It may well
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EVENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES


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be doubted whether those tribes which reside within the acknowledged
boundaries of the United States can with strict accuracy be denominated
foreign nations. They may more correctly, perhaps, be denominated
domestic dependent nations. They occupy territory to which we assert a
title, independent of their will, which must take effect in point of possession when their right of possession ceases; meanwhile they are in a state
of pupilage. Their relations to the United States resemble that of a ward
to his guardian. They look to our Government for protection; rely upon
its kindness and its power; appeal to it for relief to their wants, and
address the President as their great father.
A similar process of judicial decision will probably be
called for by the numerous questions certain to arise from
our relations to the Moro tribes; but in the meantime the
close general analogy to the relations of the North American
Indians indicates a duty, for the present at least, of limited
supervision and control operating upon the tribal governments of the Moros, rather than an attempt to substitute an
American or Philippine government acting directly upon the
individual Moros. In the performance of this duty we find
ourselves exercising powers and following methods plainly
contemplated by the Constitution, and sanctioned by the
judicial decisions and established usage of the entire existence
of the Government of the United States.
The instructions of the President to the Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900, contained the following direction
based upon the foregoing view:
In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the islands the Commission
should adopt the same course followed by Congress in permitting the
tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal organization
and government, and under which many of those tribes are now living in
peace and contentment, surrounded by a civilization to which they are
unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal governments should, however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation, and without undue or petty
interference constant and active effort should be exercised to prevent
barbarous practices and to introduce civilized customs.
The same instructions provide that the military forces in
the Philippines shall be at all times subject, under the orders




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


of the military commander, to the call of the civil authorities
for the maintenance of law and order and the enforcement of
their authority.
These instructions were approved and adopted by Congress
in the Philippine Government Act of July 1, 1902, and they
will continue to guide the civil and military authorities in the
Philippines in their dealings with the Moros. The questions
to be worked out in that process are altogether apart from
the general questions of government in the Philippines, and
such measures of force as are necessary to control the various
Moro tribes have no more relation to the recent Philippine
insurrection than our troubles with the Sioux or the Apaches
had to do with the suppression of the Southern rebellion.
The Moros of the Sulu Archipelago and Palawan, and
those living upon or in immediate communication with the
seacoast in Mindanao, have been as a rule, friendly and well
behaved. Some of the Malanao Moros who inhabit the
borders of Lake Lanao, in the interior of Mindanao, resented
attempts made by Americans to examine the interior of the
country, and in the spring of this year entered upon a regular
system of attacking our men when found alone or in small
parties, and stealing our horses and mules. Several of our
men were murdered, and in April a demand was made for
the return of the property and the surrender of the murderers.
This demand was met by defiance, and after long continued
and repeated efforts to secure redress and a discontinuance of
the practice by peaceable means, an expedition was organized
under Colonel (now Brigadier-General) Frank D. Baldwin,
which on the second and third of May attacked and captured
the stronghold of the Sultan of Bayang and the Dato of
Binadayan on Lake Lanao, with a loss of seven killed and
forty-four wounded....
After this lesson many of the lake datos came in and established friendly relations. Some of them, however, remained




EVENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES


323


recalcitrant, and continued the practice of annoyance and
attack. General Chaffee reported on the sixth of September
that since the second of May our troops had been attacked
twelve times, with a loss of four killed and twelve wounded.
On the twenty-eighth of September another well-conducted
expedition under Captain John J. Pershing, of the Fifteenth
Cavalry, inflicted severe punishment upon the Maciu Moros,
capturing many of their fortified places, killing one of their
sultans and forty or fifty of their fighting men, with a loss
of two Americans wounded.
Some further punishment may yet be necessary, but the
present indications since this last experience seem to be
peaceful.
The numbers of the Lake Lanao Moros are estimated
variously from 100,000 to 400,000. The smaller number is
probably nearer the fact. No attempts appear to have been
made by Spain to exercise any control over them between the
middle of the seventeenth century and the year 1890. Some
unsuccessful efforts were made by small forces in the years
1890 and 1891; and in 1898, before the war between Spain
and the United States, extensive preparations had been made
by the Spanish forces in the Philippines for the subjugation
of the lake tribes.
Farther in the interior of Mindanao are numerous heathen
tribes still more savage and lower in the scale of civilization
than the Moros. In 1897 the Spanish governor of Mindanao
estimated the numbers of sixteen of these tribes at an aggregate of 262,000. From time immemorial the Moros have
been in the habit of raiding their villages and carrying away
captives into slavery, and a considerable slave trade appears
to have been carried on between the southwest coast of
Mindanao and ports in the Sulu Archipelago. It is only by
asserting and establishing our right of control over the Moro
tribes that we can put a stop to this nefarious business; and




324


MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


if there were no other reason, that alone would make it impossible for us to follow the example of Spain and leave the
Moros of the interior to themselves.
Now that the insurrection has been disposed of we shall
be able to turn our attention, not merely to the slave trade,
but to the already existing slavery among the Moros. We
cannot immediately free the slaves by a single act, first,
because it would require a war of extermination in which a
large part of the slaves would probably be found fighting
against us; and, second, because a large part of them would
have nowhere to go and no way to live if deprived of the protection and support of their present masters. I believe, however, that we can maintain a process of gradual and steady
reduction, resulting ultimately in the extinction of the practice of slavery. Some of the results of our efforts in that
direction are stated in my last report. The process will be
slow, and will require patience and good judgment, but I
believe the result will be worth the trouble. The task of
improving the Moros is by no means hopeless. General
George W. Davis, who commanded in Mindanao, and now
commands the Division of the Philippines, says of them:
Whatever may be the number of Moros, whether a few, or many hundred thousands, all, and many times more than all, of these people will be
needed as agricultural and mechanical laborers and helpers in the cultivation of the soil and the utilization of its productions for the benefit of
themselves and mankind. They are able to produce rice, sugar cane,
coffee, corn, cattle, beautiful woven fabrics, and thrusting and cutting
weapons; they manufacture bronze cannon and gunpowder, and give surprising proofs of their ingenuity and industry. Their Moro boats are
fashioned and rigged and sailed with the utmost skill, and are admired
by all strangers. A race of men who are capable of doing all this and
who possess many manly qualities, should be kept alive and not shot
down in war. They should be aided and encouraged and taught how to
improve their own natural and social condition, and benefit us at the same
time. Mohammedans in Turkey and India and Java have proved to be
industrious and useful members of the communities. Mohammedan
Malays in Sarawak, a British Protectorate in Borneo, perform all the




EVENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES


325


skilled and unskilled labor of that prosperous colony, and are as plainly
showing their adaptability for the higher duties and occupations as did
the Japanese. The Moros have certainly equal or greater capacity for
usefulness.
The report from which this quotation is taken is among
those transmitted herewith, and I commend it to special
attention. It exhibits the breadth of view and sound judgment which uniformly characterize that officer's work.
THE END OF THE MORO REBELLION
Extract from the Report of the Secretary of Warfor 1903'
The last report of the Secretary of War contained an
account of the punitive expeditions which had been found
necessary in the Lake Lanao region in the months of May
and September, 1902. I then said:
Some further punishment may yet be necessary, but the present indications since this last experience seem to be peaceful.
In April, 1903, a body of American troops under Captain
John J. Pershing, engaged in the exploration of the west
shore of Lake Lanao, was attacked by the Sultan of Baccalod
and the Sultan's fort was captured and destroyed. In May,
while exploring the east shore of the lake, the force under
Captain Pershing was opposed and fired upon by the Taraca
Moros, and their forts were assaulted and captured. Both
General Sumner, in command of the Department, and General Davis, in command of the Division, characterize the conduct of Captain Pershing and his officers and men in terms of
high commendation. On the eleventh of May the following
dispatch was sent by the Secretary of War to General Davis:
I congratulate you and Brigadier-General S. S. Sumner on the work
done in Mindanao. Express to Captain John J. Pershing and the officers
and men under his command the thanks of the War Department for their
able and effective accomplishment of their difficult and important task.
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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


In the Sulu Archipelago the conduct of the Moros has been
growing steadily more unsatisfactory during the entire year.
The agreement made by General Bates with the Sultan of
Jolo on August 10, 1899, and submitted to Congress February 1, 1900, recognized the sovereignty of the Sultan and
depended upon him for the maintenance of order. Fuller
experience with these people, however, has shown that the
sovereignty of the Sultan is little more than nominal and that
he has not the power, even if he has the will, to maintain
order. The people are really governed by a number of chiefs
or " dattos," who pay very little attention to the theoretical
authority of the Sultan. Some of these are friendly to the
Americans and some of them have become exceedingly insolent and defiant, committing or permitting their people to
commit frequent thefts and assaults and contemptuously
repudiating any subordination to American sovereignty. I
said in my last report:
Now that the insurrection has been disposed of we shall be able to turn
our attention, not merely to the slave trade, but to the already existing
slavery among the Moros. We cannot immediately free the slaves by a
single act, first, because it would require a war of extermination in which
a large part of the slaves would probably be found fighting against us,
and, second, because a large part of them would have nowhere to go and
no way to live if deprived of the protection and support of their present
masters. I believe, however, that we can maintain a process of gradual
and steady reduction, resulting ultimately in the extinction of the practice
of slavery.
The conditions which I have described, as long as they
exist, will be an insuperable barrier to carrying out the intention thus expressed, as it is found that the Sulu Moros are not
only continuing the practice of slavery, but are actively
engaged in the slave trade.
It has thus become plain that the Bates agreement of 1899,
which served a useful purpose at that time can no longer be
depended upon as an instrument of government, and that a




EVENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES                    327
new arrangement must be substituted in its place under
which American authority operates directly upon the dattos,
who are the real controlling powers in the Sulu Archipelago.
General Samuel S. Sumner, commanding the Department, in
his report of June 30, 1903, said of that agreement:
Without going into a discussion of the Bates agreement, I do not believe
any development can take place or any advance be made so long as the
treaty stands. It was made, as I am informed, to meet and cover an
emergency; its use as a temporary measure has passed, and we should
now replace it by some wise and just measures that will allow us to get
into personal contact and have more direct control and supervision of
these people.




I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~




THE ARMY IN CUBA AND THE PHILIPPINES
A TRIBUTE TO ITS COURAGE AND EFFICIENCY
Extract from the Report of the Secretary of War for 19021
THE conduct and service of the army, both in Cuba and
in the Philippines, were summed up in the following
order:
WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, July 4, 1902.
To THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES:
The President upon this anniversary of national independence wishes
to express to the officers and enlisted men of the United States army his
deep appreciation of the service they have rendered to the country in the
great and difficult undertakings which they have brought to a successful
conclusion during the past year.
He thanks the officers and the enlisted men who have been maintaining
order and carrying on the military government in Cuba, because they have
faithfully given effect to the humane purposes of the American people.
They have with sincere kindness helped the Cuban people to take all the
successive steps necessary to the establishment of their own constitutional
government. During the time required for that process they have governed
Cuba wisely, regarding justice and respecting individual liberty; have
honestly collected and expended for the best interests of the Cuban people
the revenues, amounting to over $60,000,000; have carried out practical
and thorough sanitary measures, greatly improving the health and lowering
the death rate of the island. By patient, scientific research they have
ascertained the causes of yellow fever, and by good administration have
put an end to that most dreadful disease, which has long destroyed the
lives and hindered the commercial prosperity of the Cubans. They have
expedited justice and secured protection for the rights of the innocent,
while they have cleansed the prisons and established sound discipline and
healthful conditions for the punishment of the guilty. They have re6stablished and renovated and put upon a substantial basis adequate hospitals
and asylums for the care of the unfortunate. They have established a
general system of free common schools throughout the island, in which
over 200,000 children are in actual attendance. They have constructed
1 Page 14.
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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


great and necessary public works. They have gradually trained the
Cubans themselves in all branches of administration, so that the new
government upon assuming power has begun its work with an experienced
force of Cuban civil-service employees competent to execute its orders.
They have borne themselves with dignity and self-control, so that nearly
four years of military occupation have passed unmarred by injury or
insult to man or woman. They have transferred the government of Cuba
to the Cuban people amid universal expressions of friendship and good
will, and have left a record of ordered justice and liberty, of rapid improvement in material and moral conditions, and progress in the art of
government which reflects great credit upon the people of the United
States.
The President thanks the officers and enlisted men of the army in the
Philippines, both regulars and volunteers, for the courage and fortitude,
the indomitable spirit and loyal devotion with which they have put down
and ended the great insurrection which has raged throughout the archipelago against the lawful sovereignty and just authority of the United
States. The task was peculiarly difficult and trying. They were required
at first to overcome organized resistance of superior numbers, well equipped
with modern arms of precision, intrenched in an unknown country of
mountain defiles, jungles, and swamps, apparently capable of interminable
defense. When this resistance had been overcome they were required to
crush out a general system of guerrilla warfare conducted among a people
speaking unknown tongues, from whom it was almost impossible to obtain
the information necessary for successful pursuit or to guard against surprise
and ambush.
The enemies by whom they were surrounded were regardless of all
obligations of good faith and of all the limitations which humanity has
imposed upon civilized warfare. Bound themselves by the laws of war,
our soldiers were called upon to meet every device of unscrupulous
treachery and to contemplate without reprisal the infliction of barbarous
cruelties upon their comrades and friendly natives. They were instructed,
while punishing armed resistance, to conciliate the friendship of the peaceful, yet had to do with a population among whom it was impossible to
distinguish friend from foe, and who in countless instances used a false
appearance of friendship for ambush and assassination. They were obliged
to deal with problems of communication and transportation in a country
without roads and frequently made impassable by torrential rains. They
were weakened by tropical heat and tropical disease. Widely scattered
over a great archipelago, extending a thousand miles from north to south,
the gravest responsibilities, involving the life or death of their commands,
frequently devolved upon young and inexperienced officers beyond the
reach of specific orders or advice.




THE ARMY IN CUBA AND THE PHILIPPINES 331


Under all these adverse circumstances the Army of the Philippines has
accomplished its task rapidly and completely. In more than two thousand
combats, great and small, within three years, it has exhibited unvarying
courage and resolution. Utilizing the lessons of the Indian wars, it has
relentlessly followed the guerrilla bands to their fastnesses in mountain
and jungle and crushed them. It has put an end to the vast system of
intimidation and secret assassination by which the peaceful natives were
prevented from taking a genuine part in government under American
authority. It has captured or forced to surrender substantially all the
leaders of the insurrection. It has submitted to no discouragement and
halted at no obstacle. Its officers have shown high qualities of command,
and its men have shown devotion and discipline. Its splendid virile energy
has been accompanied by self-control, patience, and magnanimity. With
surprisingly few individual exceptions, its course has been characterized
by humanity and kindness to the prisoner and the noncombatant. With
admirable good temper, sympathy, and loyalty to American ideals its
commanding generals have joined with the civilian agents of the Government in healing the wounds of war and assuring the people of the Philippines the blessings of peace and prosperity. Individual liberty, protection
of personal rights, civil order, public instruction, and religious freedom
have followed its footsteps. It has added honor to the flag which it defended, and has justified increased confidence in the future of the American
people, whose soldiers do not shrink from labor or death, yet love liberty
and peace.
The President feels that he expresses the sentiments of all the loyal
people of the United States in doing honor to the whole army which has
joined in the performance and shares in the credit of these honorable
services.
This General Order will be read aloud at parade in every military post
on the fourth day of July, 1902, or on the first day after it shall have been
received.                                 ELIHU ROOT,
Secretary of War.




Al




THE CHINESE RELIEF EXPEDITION
JULY-DECEMBER, 1900
During the year 1898 a widespread movement was started in China to introduce
western learning and civilization. The then emperor was an enthusiastic advocate
of the movement and issued a number of edicts calculated to transform China into
a modern state. It was opposed by the bureaucracy and other vested interests of
China, backed by the popular superstition and conservatism of the people. The
empress-dowager took advantage of this situation, made the emperor practically a
prisoner, and compelled him to issue an edict restoring her regency. Drastic efforts
were then made to stamp out the reform movement. This reactionary tide continued to rise until it culminated, in 1900, in the organization of the " Boxers," a
secret society whose avowed object was to " exterminate the foreigners and save
the dynasty." Foreign missionaries and native converts were massacred, and the
chancellor of the Japanese legation, Mr. Sugiyama, and Baron von Ketteler, the
German minister, were murdered. The legations, the foreign missionaries and residents and the native converts to Christianity, together with a number of bluejackets and marines of various nationalities, sent to protect the legations, were
closely besieged. Peking was cut off from all communication with the rest of the
world, and efforts to restore communication were at first unsuccessful. Finally, a
force composed of American, British, French, Japanese, and Russian troops
large enough to take the offensive was collected, and the native city of Tien-tsin
was captured July 14, 1900. However, it was not until August 4 that the combined forces were ready to start for Peking; and on August 14, after a series of
severe engagements and trying marches, they entered the city and raised the siege.
The American contingent was under the command of Major-General Adna R.
Chaffee. The total number of American troops (not including sailors or marines)
sent to and serving in China during the disturbances was 191'officers and 4,809
enlisted men. General Chaffee states in his official report that on August 14, "Two
companies of the Fourteenth Infantry, under the immediate command of Colonel
Daggett, had scaled the wall of the Chinese city at the northeast corner, and the
flag of that regiment was the first foreign colors unfurled upon the walls surrounding
Peking." The casualties among the American troops were two officers killed and
seven wounded; and thirty-one enlisted men killed and 169 wounded.
By a joint note of December i2, 1900, the powers presented to China their
demands for "equitable indemnities for governments, societies, companies, and
private individuals, as well as for Chinese who have suffered during the late events
in person or in property in consequence of their being in the service of foreigners."
The final protocol between China and the intervening powers under which the
troops were withdrawn, signed at Peking, September 7, 1901, fixed the amount of
this indemnity at 450,000,000 Haikwan taels, equivalent in round numbers to
$888,000,000 United States gold. China agreed to pay this sum, with interest at
four per cent per annum, by installments running through a period of thirty-nine
ss8




334         MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY
years. The share allotted to the United States was $24,440,778.81, for which a bond
dated December 15, 1906, was given by China to the United States; but in a note of
June 15, 1907, Mr. Root, then Secretary of State, informed the Chinese Minister
that
It was from the first the intention of this Government at the proper time,
when all claims should have been presented and all expenses should have been
ascertained as fully as possible, to revise the estimate and account against which
these payments were to be made, and, as proof of sincere friendship for China,
to voluntarily release that country from its legal liability for all payments in
excess of the sum which should prove to be necessary for actual indemnity to
the United States and its citizens.'
The revised estimate of American losses placed their amount at $11,655,492.69,
and President Roosevelt in his annual message of December 3, 1907, asked for
authority from Congress to remit and cancel the obligation of China for the payment of all that part of the indemnity in excess of that sum. By a joint resolution
of Congress approved May 25, 1908 (U. S. Statutes at Large, Vol. 35, Part 1, p. 577),
authority was given to reduce the amount of the indemnity to $13,655,492.69 and
to remit the remainder, which amounted to $10,785,286.12. The two million dollars
added by the joint resolution to the estimate of the American losses given in the
President's message was withheld to abide the result of rehearings on private claims
against the indemnity before the Court of Claims, with the proviso that any balance
remaining after all such claims had been adjudicated should also be returned to
China. The settlement of these claims was completed in 1914, and the awards of
the Court of Claims amounted to $824,164.36, thus making the total amount
retained for the United States and its citizens $12,479,657.05, with interest at the
stipulated rate, and the amount remitted to China $11,961,121.76.
An executive order issued December 28, 1908, authorized the reduction of the
amount of the bond of December 15, 1906, to $13,655,492.69, in accordance with the
joint resolution of May 25, 1908, and directed that after January 1, 1909, there be
retained by the United States from the monthly installments made by China on
account of the original bond only such sums as would, with the amount previously
paid by China, satisfy at the end of the period contemplated in the original bond the
principal and interest of the reduced amount of the bond, and that the remainder
of each monthly installment be returned to China.  (Foreign Relations, 1908,
p. 72.)
The balance of $1,175,835.64 remaining after the Court of Claims had made its
awards from the two million dollars reserved for that purpose and included in the
$13,655,492.69 retained by the United States, has been returned in installments
from the United States to China out of the sums previously paid by China and
retained by the United States as a part of the reduced indemnity.
Although the remission was made by the United States unconditionally, the
Chinese Government, in appreciation of this generous and friendly act, decided to
devote the remitted money to the education and support of Chinese students in the
United States, a certain number of whom are to be sent to the United States
throughout the period of the indemnity payments. (Foreign Relations, 1908, pp.
67-72.) This undertaking is now in operation.
1 Foreign Relations, 1907, Part 1, p. 174.




CHINESE RELIEF EXPEDITION


335


Because of the unusual nature of the transaction and its interest to the two
countries, the note of Mr. Root, written in behalf of the United States, informing
China of the remission, and the note of Prince Ch'ing of July 14, 1908, on behalf of
China, accepting the remission, and stating the purposes to which the money thus
released would be devoted, are printed in full below:
The Secretary of State to the Chinese Minister in Washington
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, June 15, 1907.
SIR: After the rescue of the foreign legations in Peking during the Boxer
troubles of 1900, the note of the Powers to China prescribing the conditions
upon which the occupation of Peking and the Province of Chili would be
ended, dated December 22, 1900, required in its sixth article the payment of
"equitable indemnities for governments, societies, companies, and private
individuals, as well as for Chinese who have suffered during the late events in
person or in property in consequence of their being in the service of foreigners."
The final protocol under which the troops were withdrawn, signed at Peking,
September 7, 1901, fixed the amount of this indemnity at 450,000,000 Haikwan
taels, equivalent in round numbers to $333,000,000 United States gold. China
agreed to pay this sum, with interest at 4 per cent per annum, by installments
running through a period of thirty-nine years.
The share of this indemnity allotted to the United States was $24,440,778.81,
and on account of the principal and interest of that sum China has paid to the
United States, down to and including the 1st day of June, 1907, the sum of
$6,010,931.91.
It was from the first the intention of this Government at the proper time,
when all claims should have been presented and all expenses should have been
ascertained as fully as possible, to revise the estimate and account against
which these payments were to be made, and, as proof of sincere friendship for
China, to voluntarily release that country from its legal liability for all payments in excess of the sum which should prove to be necessary for actual
indemnity to the United States and its citizens.
Such a revision has now been made by the different executive departments
concerned, and I am authorized by the President to say that, in pursuance of
that revision, at the next session of the Congress he will ask for authority to
reform the agreement with China under which the indemnity is fixed by remitting and cancelling the obligation of China for the payment of all that part of
the stipulated indemnity which is in excess of the sum of $11,655,492.69 and
interest at the stipulated rate.
Accept, Mr. Minister, etc.,              (Signed) ELIHU ROOT.
The Prince of Ch'ing, President of the Chinese Foreign Office, to Minister
Rockhill
FOREIGN OFFICE,
PEKING, July 14, 1908.
YOUR EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
dispatch of July 11, informing me that you had been directed by the Secretary
of State to notify me that a bill has passed the Congress of the United States




336


MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


authorizing the President to modify the indemnity bond given the United
States by China under the provision of Article VI of the final protocol of
September 7, 1901, from $24,440,000 United States gold currency, to $13,655,492.29, with interest at 4 per cent per annum. Of this amount $2,000,000 are
held pending the result of hearings on private claims presented to the Court of
Claims of the United States within one year. Any balance remaining after
such adjudication is also to be returned to the Chinese Government in such
manner as the Secretary of State shall decide. The President is further authorized under the bill to remit to China the remainder of the indemnity as an act
of friendship, such payments to be made at such times and in such a manner as
he may deem just. As directed by the Secretary of State, your excellency
requests the Imperial Government kindly to favor him with its views as to the
time and manner of the remissions, and asks an early reply to communicate to
your excellency's Government.
On reading this dispatch I was profoundly impressed with the justice and
great friendliness of the American Government, and wish to express our
sincerest thanks.
Concerning the time and manner of the return to China of the amounts to be
remitted, the Imperial Government has no wishes to express in the matter. It
relies implicitly on the friendly intentions of the United States Government and
is convinced that it will adopt such measures as are best calculated to attain
the end it has in view.
The Imperial Government, wishing to give expression to the high value it
places on the friendship of the United States, finds in its present action a favorable opportunity for doing so. Mindful of the desire recently expressed by the
President of the United States to promote the coming of Chinese students to
the United States to take courses in the schools and higher educational institutions of the country, and convinced by the happy results of past experience of
the great value to China of education in American schools, the Imperial Government has the honor to state that it is its intention to send henceforth yearly
to the United States a considerable number of students there to receive their
education. The board of foreign affairs will confer with the American minister
in Peking concerning the elaboration of plans for the carrying out of the
intention of the Imperial Government.
THE CHINA RELIEF EXPEDITION
Extract from    the Report of the Secretary of War for 19002
BELIEF that the protection of American interests in
China would soon require a larger land force than our
naval vessels on that station could supply, led, as early as
June 14, 1900, to an inquiry by the Department of the commanding general in the Philippines as to the time within
1 Stat. L. Vol. 35, Pt. I, pp. 577, 578.  2 Page 11.




CHINESE RELIEF EXPEDITION


337


which he could send troops to Taku, and on the sixteenth
of June to an order for the dispatch of a regiment of infantry
from Manila with suitable transportation, medical officers,
and rapid-fire guns, and with instructions that the commanding officer should confer with the admiral commanding the
American fleet at Taku, and report to the American minister
at Peking for the protection of the lives and property of
American citizens in China.
On the seventeenth of June occurred the battle in which the
Taku forts were captured by the European squadrons at that
point, and on the twentieth Admiral Kempff telegraphed to
the Secretary of the Navy that he considered one brigade
necessary to represent our Government properly. On the
twenty-seventh the Ninth Infantry, under Colonel Emerson
H. Liscum, after some delay caused by a typhoon in the Bay
of Manila, embarked with its transportation and supplies
from Manila, and on the first of July the Sixth Cavalry,
which had been already withdrawn from its stations in the
interior, sailed from San Francisco. In the meantime the
foreign ministers and legations were reported to be besieged
in Peking, and an expedition for their relief, under Admiral
Seymour, including a small force of marines and sailors,
had been attacked by imperial troops and driven back to
Tien-tsin with heavy loss, and on the second of July the
German minister at Peking was reported to have been
murdered.
On the third of July Admiral Kempff was instructed by the
Navy Department to confer with the commanding officers of
other nations at Taku and to report by telegraph the proportional number of American forces considered necessary
for a second expeditionary force to Peking. On the eighth he
reported to the Secretary of the Navy, that a meeting had
been held; that about 20,000 troops were ashore, which were
necessary to hold the position from Taku to Tien-tsin, and




338


MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


that 60,000 troops in addition were required to march upon
Peking; that our proportion of the entire allied army should
be about 10,000; that reinforcements were expected within
a month which, by the middle of August, would make the
entire active force of other powers 40,800....
The forces set in motion by the United States for the
anticipated campaign in China were as follows: Infantry,
921 officers, 9,539 enlisted men; cavalry, 87 officers, 2,941
enlisted men; artillery, 23 officers, 986 enlisted men; marines,
95 officers, 756 enlisted men; and staff, medical, engineer
and signal service, 79 officers, 796 enlisted men, making a
total of 435 officers and 15,018 enlisted men, besides about
3,000 marines whom the Navy Department contemplated
furnishing, as appears by its requirement of the Subsistence
Department. Of these between 5,000 and 6,000 arrived in
China before the capture of Peking.
While the climate of the province of Chili is extremely hot
in summer, it is extremely cold in winter, and the river Pei-Ho
and that part of the Gulf of Chili upon which Taku is situated are closed to navigation about the first of December,
and remain closed until late in the succeeding spring, so that
it was necessary to provide not only for the landing of the
troops with their horses, transportation, ordnance, and current supplies, but for the delivery in China, not later than
the middle of November, of six months' supply of food,
ammunition, heavy winter clothing, fuel, stoves, lumber for
quarters, medical stores and supplies of all kinds. Adequate
provisions were made to meet this requirement.
The supply problem was somewhat complicated by the fact
that it was impossible to discontinue the regular supply service for the army in the Philippines, in which our fleet of
transports was engaged; it was impossible to withdraw
from that service a sufficient number of vessels for a separate
service to China, and there was not time to secure new




CHINESE RELIEF EXPEDITION


339


transports. The problem was solved, however, through the
courtesy of the Japanese Government, which, upon our
application through the State Department, in the most
friendly spirit, permitted us to use the port of Nagasaki,
where the lines from the United States to Manila on the south
and to Taku on the north diverged, for the transshipment of
supplies and material without passing through their customhouse, and for the transfer of men (not carrying arms).
This enabled us to establish a subsidiary service, which, in
connection with the main service to and from this country,
distributed both men and materials between Nagasaki and
Manila and between Nagasaki and Taku, practically using
both our Pacific ports and Manila as main bases and Nagasaki as a secondary base of supply. This arrangement was
also very convenient and, as it ultimately proved, very valuable, in enabling us to direct each organization as it left this
country to look for orders at Nagasaki, so that if at any time
it should become apparent, as of course we always regarded
it possible, that their services were not needed in China they
could be diverted from Nagasaki to the Philippines, to take
the place of an equal number of volunteers....
The Subsistence Department shipped from the United
States and Manila 19,984,620 pounds of subsistence stores,
consisting of 8,272,800 pounds of regular army rations and
5,515,200 pounds of sales stores. The Medical Department,
in addition to the equipment of the hospital ship Relief and
the regular medical attendance of the organizations, sent full
equipment for a field hospital of 1,000 beds, with full medical
supplies, and took the necessary steps for the establishment of
an additional base hospital at Nagasaki. The Signal Corps
provided all the material and personnel for the construction
and operation of 235 miles of telegraph line, together with
the signal flags, heliographs, lanterns, telescopes, etc., for
visual signaling service. The engineer implements and mate



340


MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


rials were shipped from Manila. The necessary reserve of
equipment and arms, with an adequate equipment of rapidfire guns, with ammunition, and with over 4,000,000 rounds
of small-arms ammunition, were promptly provided for by
the Ordnance Department.
The gulf at Taku is too shallow for large vessels to
approach within ten miles of the shore, and all of the men,
animals, ordnance, and supplies had to be transported for
that distance by lighters or small boats. They were much
delayed at times by stormy weather, which particularly
interfered with the landing of horses and mules. Besides the
small vessels used in this service thirty-two large steamships
were employed in the ocean transportation required.
On the twenty-sixth of June Major-General Adna R. Chaffee, U. S. V., was appointed to the command of the American
forces in China. He embarked from San Francisco on the
first of July, reached Nagasaki on the twenty-fourth, and
Taku, China, on the twenty-eighth...
In the meantime the Ninth Infantry, from Manila, reached
Taku on the sixth of July. Two battalions of that regiment,
under Colonel Liscum, pressed forward to Tien-tsin, reaching
that point on the eleventh, and on the thirteenth took part
with the British, French, and Japanese forces in an attack
upon the southwest part of the walled city of Tien-tsin, which
had been rendered necessary by the persistent shelling of
the foreign quarters, outside of the walls, on the part of the
Chinese troops occupying the city. Colonel Liscum's command formed part of a brigade under General Dorward, of
the British army, and was assigned to the duty of protecting
the flank of the allied forces.
In the performance of that duty it maintained a position
under heavy fire for fifteen hours, with a loss of eighteen
killed and seventy-seven wounded. Among the killed was
the gallant Colonel Liscum, who thus ended an honorable




CHINESE RELIEF EXPEDITION


341


service of nearly forty years, commencing in the ranks of the
First Vermont Infantry at the outbreak of the Civil War, and
distinguished by unvarying courage, fidelity, and high character. The regiment was withdrawn from its position on the
night of the thirteenth, and on the morning of the fourteenth
the native city was captured, and the southeast quarter was
assigned to the American forces for police and protection.
This duty was performed effectively until the recent withdrawal of our troops. General Dorward, writing to the then
ranking officer of the American forces, on the fifteenth of
July, says of the conduct of our troops:
I desire to express the high appreciation of the British troops of the
honor done them in serving alongside their comrades of the American
army during the long and hard fighting of the thirteenth instant and the
subsequent capture of Tien-tsin city, and of my own appreciation of the
high honor accorded to me by having them under my command.
The American troops formed part of the front line of the British attack
and so had more than their share of the fighting that took place. The ready
and willing spirit of the officers and men will always make their command
easy and pleasant, and when one adds to that the steady gallantry and
power of holding on to exposed positions which they displayed on the
thirteenth instant the result is soldiers of the highest class.
On the seventeenth of July, upon representations made
by the friendly southern viceroys of Nanking and Wuchang,
the following dispatch was sent and the following answer was
received:
COMMANDING OFFICER NINTH INFANTRY,
Care American Consul, Chefoo:
Chinese minister has delivered following message from viceroys Nanking
and Wuchang, which is transmitted for your information:
" If Tien-tsin city should be destroyed it would be difficult to restore
same in a hundred years. Request the powers to preserve it, as consequences would affect Chinese and foreign commerce."
The President directs me to say nothing but military necessity would
justify the destruction of the city, and he hopes that no such necessity
may arise.                                            CORBIN.




342


MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


CORBIN, Washington:                                  CHEFOO.
Tien-tsin, 21. Message regarding destruction Tien-tsin received. Tientsin captured July 14. Considerably destroyed by fire and bombardment.
Meade, senior officer, will present President's instructions.
COOLIDGE.
On the twenty-first of July, owing to indiscriminate reports
of pillaging in Tien-tsin, the following dispatches were sent
and received:
FOWLER, Chefoo:
Send following cablegram to Coolidge, commanding United States
forces, Tien-tsin:
"Reported here extensive looting in Tien-tsin. Report immediately
whether American troops took part. If so, punish severely; repress sternly.
Absolute regard for life and property of non-combatants enjoined."
By order of Secretary of War:                      CORBIN.
CHEFOO, July 29, 1900.
CORBIN, Washington:                     C    OO, Jly9,1900.
Tien-tsin, July 25. Looting by American troops walled city Tien-tsin
unfounded and denied. Silver taken from burned mint under direction
Meade, commanding, who was invalided today. No property destroyed
except under military exigency. American troops have orders to protect
life and property non-combatants in American southeast quarter city
assigned them. Will forward reports commanders of American guards
in city.                                           COOLIDGE.
At the time of the capture of Tien-tsin the most positive
and circumstantial accounts of the massacre of all the ministers and members of the legations in Peking, coming apparently from Chinese sources, had been published, and were
almost universally believed. The general view taken by the
civilized world of the duty to be performed in China was not
that the living representatives of the Western powers in
Peking were to be rescued, but that their murder was to be
avenged and their murderers punished. In the performance
of that duty time and rapidity of movement were not especially important.
The resolution of the commanders of the allied forces, communicated by Admiral Kempff on the eighth of July, to the




CHINESE RELIEF EXPEDITION


343


effect that 80,000 men would be required - 20,000 to hold
the position from Taku to Tien-tsin and 60,000 to march to
Peking, while not more than 40,800 troops were expected
to have arrived by the middle of August - practically abandoned all expectation of rescuing the ministers and members
of the legations alive, for it proposed that after the middle of
August any forward movement should be still deferred until
40,000 more troops had arrived.
On the eleventh of July, however, the American Secretary
of State secured, through the Chinese minister at Washington, the forwarding of a dispatch in the State Department
cipher to the American minister at Peking, and on the twentieth of July, pursuant to the same arrangement, an answer in
cipher was received from Minister Conger, as follows:
For one month we have been besieged in British legation under continued shot and shell from Chinese troops. Quick relief only can prevent
general massacre.
This dispatch from Mr. Conger was the first communication received by any Western power from any representative
in Peking for about a month, and although it was at first received in Europe with some incredulity, it presented a situation which plainly called for the urgency of a relief expedition
rather than for perfection of preparation. It was made the
basis of urgent pressure for an immediate movement upon
Peking, without waiting for the accumulation of the large
force previously proposed. On the thirty-first of July General Chaffee telegraphed as follows:
ADJUTANT-GENERAL, Washington:                      CIIEFO.
Tien-tsin, 31 July. Do not believe ministers can be relieved without
overthrow of Chinese troops intrenched between here and Peking. An
aggressive step probable August 3. Objective Yangtsun or crossing of
railway to right bank river twenty-five miles from here. As now seems
likely, English, Japanese, American troops march on right bank and
hope for movement on opposite side by troops of other powers. Total
available force for right bank not more 10,000; about 1,600 American.




344
0-m-Mt


MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


Considerable guard necessary Tien-tsin. Assumed that defeat Chinese
troops between here, Yangtsun, will stimulate favorable action Peking,
as it has been assumed the fall of Tien-tsin effected cease fire on ministers.
Reconnoissance by Japanese yesterday and today. Result not disclosed.
Conference probable before forward movement, but not called yet. Not
to exceed 20,000 troops in this vicinity. Deduct guard for Tien-tsin.
Available for battle about 14,000, if all participate. Bay so rough yesterday and today little accomplished unloading. Battery and cavalry still
on ship.  Quartermaster started everything available working night
and day....                                       CHAFFEE.
On the third of August General Chaffee telegraphed:
ADJUTANT-GENERAL, Washington:                         CEFOO
Tien-tsin, 3d. Conference today decide battle Sunday. Chinese intrenched east and west through Pei-tsang. Left of Chinese protected by
flooded ground, practically unassailable. Japanese, English, American
forces about 10,000 strong. Attack Chinese right west of river in flank.
Other forces, Russian, French, about 4,000 strong opposite side between
river and railroad. Chinese position apparently strong. Army reported
30,000 between Pei-tsang and Yangtsun or crossing of road over Pei-ho.
Yangtsun objective. Our forces 2,000 and battery. Coremaugh arrived.
Sixth Cavalry left in Tien-tsin for guard of city and awaiting mounts.
Minister safe on twenty-eighth (July).               CHAFFEE.
The advance from Tien-tsin was commenced on the night
of August fourth by a force composed of Japanese, Russian,
British, American, and French troops, the respective numbers
of which had been reported in conference of the commanding
officers as follows: Japanese, 8,000; Russians, 4,800; British,
3,000; Americans, 2,100; French, 800; amounting in the
aggregate to 18,700.
The American troops had, in fact, by the time of starting,
been augmented to 2,500. To this was subsequently added,
on the ninth of August, one troop of the Sixth Cavalry,
which had succeeded in getting its horses off the transport,
where they had been detained by stormy weather in the gulf.
The remainder of the Sixth Cavalry and portions of other
organizations were left to perform necessary duty at Tien-tsin
and elsewhere on the line of communication....




CHINESE RELIEF EXPEDITION


345


On the fifth of August Pei-tsang, about seven miles up the
river from Tien-tsin, was captured by the Japanese troops
supported by the English and Americans. On the sixth of
August Yangtsun was captured, with an American loss of
seven killed and sixty-five wounded. On the twelfth Tungchow was occupied. On the fourteenth Peking was reached.
At eleven o'clock in the morning of that day two companies
of the Fourteenth Infantry, under the immediate command
of Colonel Daggett, had scaled the wall of the Chinese city,
and the flag of that regiment was the first of the foreign
colors to be unfurled upon the walls of Peking. After steady
fighting until about the middle of the afternoon, the Tartar
city was entered, and the legations were relieved.        Our
casualties during the day were one officer and eleven enlisted
men wounded. General Chaffee reports that he found the
following conditions:
Upon entering the legations, the appearance of the people and their
surroundings, buildings, walls, streets, alleys, entrances, etc., showed every
evidence of a confining siege. Barricades were built everywhere and of
every sort of material, native brick being largely used for their construction, topped with sand bags made from every conceivable sort of clothfrom sheets and pillow-cases to dress materials and brocaded curtains.
Many of the legations were in ruins, and the English, Russian, and American, though standing and occupied, were filled with bullet holes from small
arms, often having larger apertures made by shell. The children presented a pitiable sight, white and wan for lack of proper food, but the
adults, as a rule, seemed cheerful and little the worse for their trying
experience, except from anxiety and constant care. They were living on
short rations, a portion of which consisted of a very small piece of horse
or mule meat daily. The Christian Chinese were being fed upon whatever
could be secured, and were often reduced to killing dogs for meat. All the
surroundings indicated that the people had been closely besieged, confined
to a small area without any comforts, or conveniences, and barely existing
from day to day in hope of succor.
The legations were immediately adjacent to the interior
imperial city, from the walls of which the Chinese fire had
been directed upon them. As these walls were still held by




346


MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


Chinese troops, on the morning of the fifteenth General
Chaffee proceeded to clear them of their defenders, successively forcing three gates of the imperial city, with a loss of
one officer and three enlisted men killed and fifteen enlisted
men wounded. The loss of the officer, Captain Henry J.
Reilly, of the Fifth Artillery, is much to be deplored. He had
enlisted as a private at the age of nineteen, had risen from
the ranks, and had become a most efficient officer, with an
enviable record of faithful attention to duty throughout his
career, and of gallant and effective service in Cuba and the
Philippines.
On the sixteenth the imperial city was occupied, and the
entire city was divided, by agreement, among the various
forces for the maintenance of order, the west half of the
Chinese city and the adjacent parts of the Tartar city being
placed in charge of our troops. On the twenty-eighth a formal march was made through the forbidden precincts of the
imperial palace, in which the troops of all the powers participated. In the meantime Colonel Wint, with the Sixth
Cavalry, had encountered and defeated a large hostile force in
the neighborhood of Tien-tsin, with the loss of five wounded,
and numerous detachments of our troops had been engaged
with proportionate detachments from other forces in guarding the long line of communication between Peking and
Tien-tsin..
The Signal Corps detachment was untiring in its exertions,
and rendered especially effective service. It constructed a
telegraph line from Tien-tsin to Peking, practically keeping
pace with the march of the relief column, and, having the
first line into Peking, was able to render valuable service, not
only to our own force, but to the forces of other nations and
to the press. The total of American casualties during the
expedition was two officers and thirty enlisted men killed and




CHINESE RELIEF EXPEDITION


347


seven officers and one hundred and seventy enlisted men
wounded...
General Chaffee's telegraphic report of the fall of Peking
was received here on the twenty-second of August, and the
object of the relief expedition having been accomplished, he
was instructed, on the twenty-third of August, to take no
further aggressive action unless that should be necessary for
defensive purposes; and orders were cabled to Nagasaki,
diverting the remaining troops en route for that point to
Manila, with the exception of one battery of artillery which
had not left San Francisco, and which was returned to its
former station at Fort Riley.
On the twenty-fifth of August General Chaffee was directed to hold his forces in readiness for instructions to withdraw, and on the twenty-fifth of September he was instructed
to send to Manila all the American troops in China with the
exception of a legation guard, to consist of a regiment of
infantry, a squadron of cavalry, and one light battery....
It is gratifying to know that the Chinese have returned in
great numbers, and there has been a general resumption of
business, under the protection of our forces, in that portion
of Peking which was assigned to our care, and which is still
under the charge of the legation guard.




it
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THE REORGANIZATION OF THE
UNITED STATES ARMY
THE INCREASE OF THE ARMY AND THE ABOLITION OF THE PERMANENT ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF DEPARTMENTS
Repeated attention had been called to the necessity for a reorganization of the
American military system, particularly in its directing heads, by a series of events
during the Spanish-American War. These were the absence of coordination and
cooperation between the several bureaus of the War Department, such as those
having charge of transportation, the equipment, the commissary supplies, the clothing, etc., of an army in motion. As stated by Mr. Root in a committee hearing,
" Everybody knows that when an exigency has come, confusion has come. The
confusion comes from the fact that our organization is weak at the top. It does not
make adequate provision for a directing and coordinating control. It does not make
provision for an adequate force to see that these branches of the administrative and
the different branches of the line pull together, so that the work of each one will fit
in with the work of every other, and bring out the result which always has to be the
result of the conspiring of a great number of people doing a great number of duties."
The following extracts from the Annual Reports of the Secretary of War indicate
the reforms in the military system which were worked out by Mr. Root during his
service as Secretary and put into effect or urged upon Congress. The principal
measures were:
1. The increase of the army and the abolition of the permanent administrative staff departments.
2. The establishment of a system of military education, with the Army War
College at the top.
S. The creation of a General Staff.
4. The bringing of the militia system of the country under the same
organization, discipline, armament, supply and accounting methods, and
instruction as the regular army.
These papers show also that Mr. Root advocated the consolidation of the supply
and transportation departments of the regular army which has recently been
accomplished, the establishment of a reserve which is still under discussion, and the
extension of the method of promotion by selection, as to which nothing has been
done.


349




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


ARMY REORGANIZATION
Extract from the Report of the Secretary of War for 18991
EFORE July 1, 1901, when, under existing law, the present volunteer force must be disbanded and the present
regular force restored to its peace basis of 26,610, we shall be
compelled to face the practical necessity of providing for
some increase of the regular army. It is manifest that however speedily the insurrection in the Philippines may be
quelled, we shall be required to maintain for a long time in
those islands a considerable force to furnish the protection
which the inhabitants are entitled to receive from us, and to
maintain order among the savage and semi-civilized tribes
which still exist in nearly every island. There is no occasion
to doubt that the expense of this portion of the military establishment can readily and properly be defrayed from the
insular revenues.
It is not conceivable that a practical people should expend
the great sums we are devoting to our seacoast fortifications,
and the delicate and complicated machinery of modern ordnance with which we are equipping them, and not provide an
adequate force of men to care for, preserve, and become
familiar with the use of the guns and machinery. An increase
in our artillery force will be absolutely necessary for this purpose. The present heavy-artillery force is about one-fifth of
the requisite number.
I beg to suggest that the manifold services which have been
rendered by officers of the army of the United States during
the past year in almost every branch of civil government, and
the effective zeal and devotion which they have exhibited in
succoring the distressed, teaching the ignorant, establishing
and maintaining civil law, fighting against pestilence, introducing sanitary reforms, and promoting and aiding peaceful
1 Page 44.




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industry should be regarded as proof, if any were needed,
that American soldiers do not cease to be American citizens,
and that no danger is to be apprehended from a reasonable
enlargement of the army which affords such evidence of its
character and spirit.
It is greatly to be desired that at the same time, while the
lessons drawn from the experience of recent war are fresh in
our minds, some improvements should be made in the organization of the army.
For many years various criticisms upon our present organization have been made and discussed, and a number of
measures for improvement have been recommended by my
predecessors or embodied in bills introduced in Congress.
Some marked improvements have been made, notably the
three-battalion form of regimental organization, which, after
being urged by several successive Secretaries of War and advocated by all the high military authorities in the country for a
generation, was finally authorized by the act of April o6,1898.
As to most of the proposed changes, however, there has not
been a sufficient public interest in the subject or a sufficiently
strong conviction of the importance of good organization to
overcome the diversity of opinions and personal interests
desirous of being left undisturbed.
The method of proposing and considering, one by one,
specific remedies for specific defects does not seem to be an
adequate treatment of the subject. It seems to me that the
best course would be to settle upon the true principle which
should govern the use to be made of the army and then inquire
in what respect our present arrangement fails to conform to
that principle, and make it conform.
Two propositions seem to me fundamental in the consideration of the subject:
First. That the real object of having an army is to provide
for war.




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


Second. That the regular establishment in the United
States will probably never be by itself the whole machine
with which any war will be fought.
The first of these statements seems like a truism, and it
will probably be received everywhere without conscious
denial. Yet the precise contrary is really the theory upon
which the entire treatment of our army proceeded for the
thirty-three years between the Civil War and the war with
Spain. Present utility was really the controlling consideration, and the possibility of war seemed at all times so vague
and unreal that it had no formative power in shaping legislation regarding the army. The result was an elaborate
system admirably adapted to secure pecuniary accountability and economy of expenditure in time of peace; a large
number of small and separate commands, well officered and
well disciplined, very efficient for police duty against Indians,
and as separate commands unsurpassed anywhere in fighting
qualities; and a class of officers most of whom were of a high
order of individual excellence, who rendered valuable service
in the construction of public works, as instructors in colleges,
and in a great variety of professional duties at separate posts
and with their commands, but who, with the exception of the
general officers, were arranged in rank without any reference
whatever to their respective abilities to command or to
render effective service. The result did not include the effective organization and training of the army as a whole for the
purposes of war. This was not because the army did not
wish such organization and training, but because it was not
permitted to organize and train for that object. The army
has many able, educated, and competent officers who have
thought much upon the subject and deeply regretted this
condition, but who have been unable to secure a change.
I believe that without any revolutionary interference
with the general scheme of organization or with individual




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rights, and without excessive expense, a great improvement
can be made in the way of conforming the organization and
training of the army to its true purpose. It is not reorganization which is needed, but the grant of opportunities for
development along lines which are well understood and appreciated by the army itself.
The preparation of an army for war involves at least these
four things:
First. Systematic study by responsible officers of plans for
action under all contingencies of possible conflict, and with
this, study of the larger problems of military science and the
most complete information regarding it, study of the constant improvements in implements and methods of warfare, and of the adaptability of improvements and inventions
for the purpose of carrying out the plans devised, and study
of the arrangement of territorial and tactical organizations,
and the establishment of depots, camps, fortifications, and
lines of communication with reference to these plans, so that
all expenditures for each separate step of development may
contribute toward the practical realization of a comprehensive and consistent scheme. This requirement is not to be
met by the separate study and reflection of single officers not
charged with the duty or able to give effect to their conclusions. The responsibility of declared duty, the comparison
of different views, the contribution of different minds, the
correction and evolution by discussion, the long-continued,
laborious, and systematic application of a considerable number of minds of a high order, and with a recognized status
giving authority to their conclusions, are needed to produce
the desired result.
To illustrate: The War Department has recently received
numerous applications from different parts of the country
for the acquisition of tracts of land and the establishment of
permanent camping places for the encampment and training




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


of soldiers in large bodies, which the people of the country
evidently realize ought to be provided for. There are different ways in which these applications may be treated.
They may be rejected or favored with reference to the advantages which they will afford to the people of the towns in the
neighborhood of the proposed camps through the business
which would result from the maintenance of troops there, or
they may be rejected or favored according to the healthfulness of the locations and the conveniences which they will
afford and the ease of access from the points whence troops
would naturally be drawn. Neither of these methods is at all
satisfactory. If such camps are to be established, their locations should be selected with reference to carefully devised
and comprehensive plans, one feature of which consists in
determining the points at which troops can most usefully be
mobilized for immediate use in case of war, so that by sending
troops to them in time of peace we should be doing the very
same thing which we have to do in time of urgent necessity,
and so that every railroad that is built, every side track that
is laid, and every building that is erected will leave so much
less to do when war threatens. Such plans cannot be improvised; they cannot be produced by any other process than
that above indicated.
Second. The preparation of material of war, keeping pace
with the progress of military science and adapted to the conditions to be anticipated when war shall arise.
Gratifying progress has been made recently in this respect,
but with the restoration of peace we may apprehend that
there will be to some extent a return to the same indifference
which left us without smokeless powder or small-bore magazine rifles in the spring of 1898. Under such conditions it is
necessary that questions as to the character and form of
material should be settled by authority beyond reasonable
question, and that the things which ought to be done should




REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY


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be indicated clearly and positively. In no other way is it
possible that such things can be done. At present the
opinions of the artillery or infantry using a weapon, of the
ordnance officers making it, of the department commander,
and of the major-general commanding the army, may all
differ on such questions, and there is no way of settling
them after an appropriation, except by the decision
of the Secretary of War, who cannot possibly study the
subject thoroughly, or before the appropriation, by a
committee of Congress with whom the differing opinions
naturally tend to destroy each other and to prevent any
action whatever. Some body of competent men whose
business it is to be familiar with the whole field of invention, to consider it, to discuss it, and to reach conclusions
upon it, alone can furnish those authoritative determinations which are necessary to effective demands for adequate
material.
Third. An adequate process of selection according to merit
and effectiveness among the officers of the army, so that the
men of superior ability and power may be known and placed
in positions involving responsibility and authority.
Without some such process in time of peace the selection
has to be made after war has commenced, at the expense
always of treasure and of life, and sometimes of temporary
failure and humiliation. Such a process of selection will
necessarily at the same time afford an incentive to exertion
and a reward for professional attainments and effective service, while stimulating the development of the capable officer
and bringing to the front the men best able to bear responsibility and perform the difficult duties to be confronted in
actual hostilities.
Fourth. The exercise and training of the officers and men
of the army in the movements of large bodies of troops by
brigade, division, and corps under conditions approaching as




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


nearly as possible those to be anticipated in executing the
plans devised for their action in war.
Officers who have never seen a corps, division, or brigade
organized and on the march cannot be expected to perform
perfectly the duties required of them when war comes. The
collection of large bodies of men presents, not the same difficulties presented by a small body, multiplied or increased in
degree, but entirely new difficulties which only experience
can qualify men to meet. The sanitation, the care, the discipline, and many of the duties are new to the man who has
dealt only with a company or a regiment. The highest efficiency under these conditions can be attained only by giving
experience approximating as nearly as possible to that which
will be encountered when the war machinery is required to
do its proper work.
I think the following steps may be taken to advantage:
(1) An army war college should be established, which
shall be composed of the heads of the staff departments,
properly so called, and a number of the ablest and most competent officers of high rank in the army (including, of course,
the major-general commanding), these officers to be detailed
for service in the college for limited periods, so that while
the college shall be continuous in records, character, and
performance, it shall continually and gradually change in
its personal elements. It should be the duty of this body
of officers to direct the instruction and intellectual exercise of
the army, to acquire the information, devise the plans, and
study the subjects above indicated, and to advise the Commander-in-Chief upon all questions of plans, armament,
transportation, mobilization, and military preparation and
movement.
This college should have combined with it, reenforced and
enlarged in its scope and effectiveness, the present division of
military information of the Adjutant-General's Office, where




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its records and its conclusions should be preserved. It should
not supersede, but should incorporate, continue, and bring
under the same general management the present service
schools, supplementing where it is necessary their courses,
which now, so far as instruction is concerned, largely cover
the ground. Its instruction would, at the outset and perhaps
permanently, be given through these schools, but it should
give unity, influence, authority, and effectiveness in military
affairs to the work and the thought developed in them, aside
from mere instruction, and a weight and utility to their
records of the efficiency and merit of their pupils not hitherto
accorded to them in proportion to the high character of the
work they have done.
(2) Every officer of the army below the rank of a field
officer, and not already a graduate of one of the service
schools, should be detailed for some fixed period during his
service to receive instruction at this college in the science
of war, including the duties of the staff, and in all matters
pertaining to the application of military science to national
defense; provision should be made for the continuance of
such instruction by correspondence after the expiration of the
period of each officer's detail, and all officers should be invited
and entitled to present, as a part of the regular course and
for credit on their efficiency records, written papers and
reports upon the results of their investigations, explorations, reflections, and professional and scientific work, and
upon such special subjects as may be prescribed by the
college.
(3) All staff appointments other than medical should hereafter be made from the line of the army for a fixed period
of, say, four or five years, the holder to return to the line at
the end of the period, and not to be eligible to reappointment
until after at least one year's service in the line, and after
the expiration of a reasonable period the selection of staff




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


appointments should be made on the basis of proficiency and
fitness, as shown in the war college (or heretofore in the
service schools), including as elements for consideration both
the work done during the period of detail, and the post-graduate work. Excepting, however, that such appointments
should also be permitted for gallant and meritorious conduct
in the field, shown by recommendations of commanding
officers for brevet promotion made during the progress of a
war, and excepting that for the technical and scientific
branches of Engineering, Ordnance, and Signal Service, examinations should be continued; all promotions in the staff itself
should be upon the basis prescribed for original appointment,
combined with efficiency of service in the staff.
(4) The present system of promotion by seniority should
be modified as to all officers now or hereafter below field
rank, by making a specific proportion of the promotions to
each grade for seniority, and a specific proportion on the
basis either of efficiency records in the war college, or heretofore in the service schools, including both elements of work
done during actual attendance and subsequent thereto, or for
gallantry in the field during war, or both, accompanied in
each case by evidence of faithful performance of the ordinary
duties of the line.
(5) All selections of candidates for staff appointments and
for staff promotions and for line promotions, other than
those made for seniority, should be made by boards of officers
appointed for that purpose, upon an examination and estimate of the efficiency records exhibiting the grounds for
appointment or promotion above stated. Nothing can be
more important than that the officers of the army shall feel
that their rise in rank depends upon what they do; that
ability, intellectual activity, faithful performance of duty,
and gallant conduct are more certain claims to preferment
than social or political influence. A system of promotions




REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY


359


which is divorced from the efficiency record is not merely
unjust, but it destroys ambition and checks the effort of the
army. The way to prevent the separation is by a systematic provision to enable every officer to show what there is in
him, and to preserve a full record of what he does, by providing a competent and disinterested body to pass judgment
on the record, and by a law making the judgment reached
on this basis the imperative and sole ground of selection for
promotion.
These provisions will go far toward accomplishing results
which are provided for in the organization of every considerable army in the world, and which under our organization are
not the business of anybody in particular, and for the most
part cannot be accomplished by any one whomsoever; and if
Congress will then make the appropriations necessary for
periodical mobilization and maneuvers, the four requisites
of preparation for war above stated can be substantially attained. The only element in these recommendations which
does not result necessarily from a statement of the requirements is the limitation on the period of staff duty and the
periodical return to the line. I think this will be beneficial
to the staff, and will do away with the feeling quite prevalent
in the line that the staff is a privileged class, divorced from
its old associates, and a tendency toward unfriendly criticism
which seems to me to be prejudicial to good discipline and
effective service.
Another function which is now performed to a very slight
degree, and which is of very great importance, should be performed by the proposed war college acting in cooperation
with the existing naval war college, that is, the union of the
army and the navy in the collection and utilization of information, studying and formulating plans for defense and
attack, and the testing and selection of material of war.
Communication, conference, and interchange of instructors




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


between the two institutions could not fail to be of great value
to both services, and to make easier and more certain that
perfect cooperation which is so essential both in forming and
executing the plans which involve the operations of both
forces.
There are two special changes which, I am clear, the same
principles require. One is that the artillery branch of the
service should have a head. At present the guns, carriages,
projectiles, explosives, and all the complicated and delicate
machinery which belong with them are made and delivered
over to the artillery branch, and there is no one to represent
or speak for the men who are to work with the tools thus
furnished. There are seven colonels of artillery, and it is not
the business of any one of them more than another to speak
for his branch of the service. The valuable results of experience in the use of the ordnance machinery are not utilized
because it is not the business of any one in particular to insist
upon it. Little complaints against the ordnance or engineers
which could easily be set right if it were somebody's business
to attend to them, remain as causes of irritation. The use of
modern ordnance is a highly specialized and scientific business, and there ought to be an expert charged with the duty
and the responsibility of seeing that the officers and men of
the corps understand their business and are properly trained
in it. This officer should be a member of the war college, and
might well be on the staff of the major-general commanding.
He should not be the head of an additional bureau.
The other change referred to is the increase in the number
of inspectors-general, so that the entire work of the army
may be adequately inspected. Among these should be a
sufficient number of inspectors-general for the sanitary, artillery, ordnance, and engineering inspection, selected for their
special qualifications in those several branches and specifically assigned to those duties. Thorough inspection is essen



REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY


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tial to thorough work, but no inspector can be expected to
know everything, and inspection in these matters which
require special training made by a man who has not received
the training is necessarily perfunctory and of little value.
The second proposition which I stated as underlying the
consideration of this subject - that the regular establishment is not the whole machine with which a war will ever be
fought - has been too signally illustrated both in the Civil
War and in the war with Spain and the Philippine war to
require further demonstration. Our method is, and always
will be, immediately upon the outbreak of a war, to create an
army of which the regular army on its peace footing forms
but a part, and usually but a small part, and the great body
of which is composed of volunteers.
That the relations between the regulars and volunteers in
this new force shall be such that they shall constitute a
homogeneous body, using the same arms, familiar with the
same drill, answering to the same ideas of discipline, inspired
by the same spirit, and capable of equal and even performance, and that the preparation of the regular army in time of
peace for the event of war shall to the greatest possible extent
conduce to the benefit of the whole army, both regular and
volunteer, and make it easy to put that body in a state of
preparation, is an end toward which the best military
thought of the country may well be addressed.
It should be a special subject of consideration by the war
college, and upon it that body should invite the conference
and cooperation of the military authorities of the several
states. As one step toward attaining the end, courses of
instruction in the college should be open to officers of the
National Guard of the states, and the efficiency records of
such officers in the college, and written papers and reports
contributed by them after their terms of instruction have
ended, should be made a part of the records of the War




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Department as the authorized and accepted basis of appointments to office in any volunteer force which may be raised.
The provisions of the act of March 2, 1899, under which the
army now serving in the Philippines was created, partly out
of the old regular force, partly by new recruits in the regular
establishment, and partly by additional volunteer regiments,
made a long step in advance toward attaining the homogeneity which I have endeavored to describe. The facts
that the officers of the entire army receive their commissions
from the same source, and look for their promotions and
rewards to the same authority, while in every volunteer
regiment regular officers have been joined with volunteer officers in forming, training, and commanding the regiment,
produce this result to a degree not previously attained.
Following these lines and working through the methods
which I have described, a permanent plan ought to be
wrought out with the concurrence of the military authorities of the several states, and enacted by Congress, for the
creation of a war army composed of both regulars and volunteers whenever such an army is required. The part to be
taken by the regular army in the new organization and the
part to be taken by the volunteers should be prescribed, and
the parts should be so assigned that the new organization shall
have the fullest possible benefit of the preparation of the
regular army.
The form and the machinery for the organization of the
new army and the part to be taken in the raising of the army
by the military authorities and organizations of the several
states should be indicated, so that whenever war threatens,
and long before it is declared, the multitude of men who are
to do the work of organization may know, without waiting
for an act of Congress, what will be required of them when
the hour strikes, and may be engaged in the quiet and deliber



REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY


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ate preparation so necessary in advance of action to prevent
confusion and mistake.
The value and importance of securing during the time of
peace information as to the capacity and fitness of civilians
instructed in military affairs, and available for volunteer
commissions, cannot be overestimated. It was well illustrated by the great advantage which we had in appointing
the officers of the present volunteer force by reason of having
in the War Department the efficiency records of their service
during the war with Spain. Without some such information
all names are alike. When war has come, or is imminent,
there is no time for examination or investigation. There are
too many officers to be appointed in too short a time. Efficiency records can be established not only in war but in peace
also. Courage may fairly be assumed among Americans,
and intellectual and moral qualities can be ascertained and
recorded in the way I have indicated.
The foregoing considerations naturally bring to mind the
Military Academy at West Point. I believe that the great
service which it has rendered the country was never more
conspicuous than it has been during the past two years. The
faithful and efficient services of its graduates since the declaration of war with Spain have more than repaid the cost
of the institution since its foundation. But these graduates
have been too few in number and most heavily burdened.
The capacity of the Academy is not sufficient for the
present needs of the army on a peace footing. It will be far
more deficient for the army with the absolutely necessary
increase. Preparation for the greater army which we should
be ready to create in case of future war should be made. Our
experience during the past two years has shown that we had
not too many trained officers, but too few, both in the staff and
in the line, and in both the number ought to be increased.




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I urgently recommend that the capacity of the Academy be
enlarged and the number of its students increased....
These suggestions for the improvement of our army organization should not be taken as involving a condemnation or
disparagement of the system generally. Such a conclusion
could be reached only by a narrow and prejudiced view looking for the defects and refusing to see the merits.
No organization which was not in the main sound and efficient could have produced the results exhibited by the army
during the past two years. With its handful of regular officers
and its small body of trained troops, merged with nearly
double their number of raw recruits, and combined with large
forces of new, untrained volunteers, it has in surprisingly
short periods of time produced a great body of men, uniformly well disciplined, of good conduct and morale, patient
in endurance of hardships, steady, indomitable, and heroic in
action, who against the debilitating influences of tropical climates, against physical obstacles which seemed insurmountable, and against enemies of superior numbers and approved
courage, and armed with weapons of modern warfare, have
won a long series of victories unbroken by a single defeat.
The officers of the volunteer force are entitled to their full
share of the credit of this achievement. Without the splendid
virility and courage of the enlisted men it could not have been
accomplished; but it is fair to all to say that the chief formative power - the dominating influence which made the
achievement possible - was the organization, the training,
the discipline, and the example of the officers and men of the
regular army. The officers of that army have maintained
the honor, advanced the interests, and exalted the reputation
of our country in the discipline and command of our troops
on the battlefield, and in successful civil and military administration under most difficult circumstances, where failure
would have been a national humiliation....




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THE MILITARY NEEDS OF THE NATION
Extract from the Report of the Secretary of War for 1900 
Under the existing provisions of the act of March 2, 1899,
on the thirtieth of June next the present volunteer force will
be discharged and the regular army will be reduced to 2,447
officers and 29,025 enlisted men.
This force is about one-third as great in proportion to the
population of the country as it was thirty years ago. As our
country has grown in wealth and variety of interests, and as
more intimate contact with the other nations of the earth
has resulted from the natural extension of our trade, there has
been an increase in the duties required from the regular establishment fully equal to our increase in population....
The function of the regular army in our country is to man
the seacoast fortifications, which protect our harbors and
great cities against hostile attack; to garrison the military
posts along our frontiers and at such strategic points as Congress determines to be suitable, to be always ready to fight for
the country in any sudden emergency which may come upon
us before there is time to raise a volunteer force and during
the time while such a force is being raised; constantly to
study, experiment upon, and exercise in all the improvements
in military science, both in arms, ammunition, equipment, supplies, sanitation, transportation, drill, and tactics; to furnish
a nucleus of officers and men thoroughly familiar with the
business for the strengthening and more ready instruction of
a volunteer army whenever that shall become necessary.
In all these respects the increase of requirements from the
regular army, keeping pace with the growth of the country,
has been as inevitable as the requirement of a larger police
force for a larger city, or of more hands to care for a greater
factory and operate more complicated machinery.
1 Page 50.




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In 1888, under the impulse given by the well-timed letter
of Samuel J. Tilden, a board of officers, convened during
President Cleveland's first administration, under the direction of Secretary Endicott, adopted a comprehensive scheme
of coast-defense fortification, which involved the expenditure
of something over $100,000,000. That plan received the
approval of Congress, and under that and all succeeding
administrations regular appropriations have been made,
and the work of fortification has steadily progressed.
We have now invested nearly $60,000,000 in a great number of forts and guns, with all the complicated and scientific
engineering and electrical machinery necessary for their use.
No one can use this defensive machinery or take proper care
of it and keep it in order without being instructed and trained
in its uses. For this purpose it is necessary to have an adequate force of artillery officers and men who make the handling of such machinery their business. This is practically a
new requirement for the army. It did not exist to any considerable extent prior to the building of the new fortifications.
The number of men necessary to perform this duty is capable
of exact computation, and the number required according
to the men most familiar with the business is, at a minimum
allowance, 18,420....
More than $22,000,000 have been expended in the building
and equipment of military posts other than the coast-defense
fortifications, and the regular army is required to garrison
and care for them. The posts now in existence or required to
be built provide accommodations for, and if fully garrisoned
require, over 26,000 troops.
A large proportion of these posts are situated along our
frontier or at strategic points, the occupation of which is
desirable. The increase in their number, however, has not
been the result of any administrative policy or of any suggestion from the War Department or from the army. It has




REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY


367


been brought about by popular demands finding effect in the
action of Congress.
Notwithstanding the gratifying progress which the people
of Cuba are making toward the establishment of a stable
government, it is not reasonable to expect that the convention now in session will conclude its labors, that the relations
between that country and the United States will be agreed
upon, and that the government to be provided for by the new
constitution will have been elected and installed and firmly
established for a considerable period. In the meantime our
troops in that island cannot be withdrawn without interfering with that sense of security which is so necessary to the
industry and prosperity of the island. So long as our troops
are to remain, it does not seem practicable to reduce materially the present number of about six thousand.
The number of troops in Porto Rico to man the fortifications and constitute a reserve, furnishing moral support and
confidence while the people of the island are learning to do
their own police work and establishing their own militia, has
been practically reduced to a minimum at its present figure
of 1,636, which includes the 879 native troops.
In the Philippine Islands the restoration of order will necessarily be a work of time. The mountains of those islands have
always been infested by bandits, who have committed depredations and levied blackmail upon the peaceful inhabitants,
and for the repression of whom the Spaniards do not appear
to have ever taken any very active measures.
The practical inclusion of these bands among the insurgent forces, enabling them to rob and murder under color of
patriotism, has greatly increased their numbers, as the disturbed conditions of the past two years and a half have increased their opportunities. However completely the leaders
and the rank and file of the real insurgents may come in and
acknowledge the sovereignty of the United States, it is certain




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


that great numbers of men who prefer to live by robbery
rather than by labor will continue to call themselves guerrillas, and will require a considerable army for their suppression, and for the protection of the peaceful inhabitants in the
meantime.
Much thought has been given, both by the War Department and by the commanding officers in the Philippines, to
the question of organizing native troops for the performance
of this duty. I have no doubt that this is practicable. The
experiments which we have already made demonstrate its
practicability. We have already organized several different
bodies of native scouts under American officers - one under
Lieutenant Batson, composed of Macabebes; one under Lieutenant Castner, composed of Tagalogs, and others of Visayans
in Samar and Negros. We now have a squadron of Philippine
cavalry under the command of Lieutenant Batson as major
of volunteers. All of these have proved faithful, courageous,
and responsive to discipline when under the immediate
control of American officers. The main trouble has been
to restrain them to the usages of civilized warfare.
There would be no difficulty in securing from among the
natives the entire number of troops necessary for the Philippines if we wished to do so. Neither the needs of the native
troops nor the customary wages in the islands would justify
giving to them the same pay, allowances, and subsistence
which we give to our American soldiers. One-half the cost of
the American soldier in all these respects would be ample and
satisfactory. The creation of such a force would require
authority from Congress, and must necessarily be gradual.
It can properly proceed only so rapidly as the officers available for the purpose are able not only to organize and train
the new soldiers, but to cultivate in them the habit of subordination, respect for authority, self-control, and regard for
the usages of civilized warfare.




REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY


369


The military requirements of the Philippines may accordingly be summed up as follows: We need there for the immediate future about 60,000 men. We may expect this number
to be progressively decreased; first, by the gradual disappearance of real insurrection, suppression of robber bands, and
restoration of order; and, second, by the substitution of native
troops for the greater part of our forces, costing not more
than one-half as much as American troops for their support,
and not involving such an enormous transport service as we
now maintain. The great wealth and rapidly increasing
revenues of the islands make it evident that at no distant day
the islands themselves will be able to pay whatever they
justly should for the support of their own police protection.
The facts which I have now stated indicate that we require
permanently an army of about 60,000 American troops, and
that during the present conditions in Cuba and the Philippines about the present number of 100,000 are required.
Provision should be made for a minimum force of 60,000,
with an authorized maximum of 100,000, and with authority
to substitute for American troops serving in the islands ceded
by Spain, as that shall become practicable, native troops
under the command of American officers.
In the organization of such an army as Congress may
authorize, it is plainly desirable to keep in mind the relation
which the different branches of the regular army will bear
in case of war, to the entire body of troops, which will be
composed chiefly of volunteers. Much as we desire peace,
and strenuously as we shall always endeavor to preserve it,
we cannot, of course, expect to be free from war in the future
any more than we have been in the past. The armaments of
other powers are so great that almost any conflict in which
we may be so unfortunate as to become involved will require
a very much larger force than any standing army which we
are willing to maintain.




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


For such a conflict the country relies, and justly relies, for
its main strength upon the volunteers who will always be
available for its defense. We should arrange our regular
army so that it shall be the strongest where volunteer forces
are the weakest, so that the combined army of regulars and
volunteers may be symmetrical, well-balanced, and properly
distributed among the different branches of the service and
properly trained and disciplined for every kind of military
operation.
Wars, of course, always come unexpectedly, and modern
wars proceed with great rapidity from the very outset.
Those elements of war, therefore, which require the longest
time for preparation should receive special attention in the
formation of a regular army, and those which can most
speedily be made ready should be supplied by the volunteer.
These considerations lead to the conclusion that the regular
army should be made particularly strong in its engineering
force and material; in its artillery, which cannot possibly be
improvised and which cannot be handled by untrained men,
and in its cavalry, which requires far greater time for selection, equipment, and training than does infantry.
I do not lose sight of the fact that there are some admirable
bodies, both of artillery and cavalry, among the National
Guard organizations, but their numbers are so comparatively small as not to affect the conclusions stated, and the
expenditure of time and money necessary to acquire and
maintain proficiency in artillery and cavalry service is so
great that the numbers in those branches of the National
Guard must necessarily continue small.
The same considerations also lead to the conclusion that a
full supply of officers, both of the line and of the staff, should
be provided for the regular army.
The problems of subsistence, clothing, equipment, transportation, sanitation, the vast and complicated business of




REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY


371


supplying and transporting an army, of caring for the health
and strength of the men, as well as the actual command
of troops in battle, require long and active and devoted
thought, study, and training. To send volunteers into
camp or field under inexperienced officers is simply to educate the officers at the expense of the lives and the efficiency
of their men.
The regular army, as now constituted, and the National
Guard, both put together, can furnish only a small portion
of the trained officers necessary for the performance of the
duties which I have indicated, and in any volunteer force a
large proportion of the officers must necessarily come from
civil life and have but a small degree of the knowledge, experience, and training necessary to prevent great and needless
loss of life and efficiency at the outset of any campaign.
The regular establishment should include a sufficient number
of officers - particularly of officers trained in the duties of
the staff and supply departments - to permit of their being
detailed to service in every part and organization of the combined army of regulars and volunteers, so that their training and experience may give instruction, method, and
efficiency to the whole organization.
The present force has far too few officers. Notwithstanding the most painstaking effort to cut off all unnecessary
details, we have now 469 officers absent from the line of the
regular army —233 as officers in the present volunteer force
and 236 upon necessary detached service-leaving the regular regiments without the number of officers which they ought
to have for the maintenance of discipline and effectiveness.
Having in view especially the duties to be performed by
regular officers in connection with the volunteer force, I
urgently renew the recommendation of my last annual report
for the substitution of a system of details from the line In
place of the present permanent staff and supply departments,




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


and for the training of as many officers as possible in the
variety of experience which will fit them for the duties of
the staff and of general command in the combined force of
regulars and volunteers.
A bill to provide for a reorganization of the army in accordance with these views has been prepared and submitted to
the military committees of Congress.
It is to be hoped that the people and their representatives
will realize that the surest safeguard against war is reasonable
preparation for the use of the great powers of which this
nation is possessed, and that while the maintenance of any
army is expensive, the support of such an establishment as I
have described will involve but a moderate payment for
insurance against the loss which we are sure to suffer if we
leave ourselves impotent for defense.
RETIRED OFFICERS
The retired list of the army is now constituted as follows:
Number retired upon age limit, 64 years.......................  180
Number retired, 62  years.....................................  11
Length  of service...........................................  133
Number retired  under special acts.............................  7
Disability  on  account of wounds..............................  22
Disability  on  account of disease...............................  413
T otal..................................................  766
I recommend that as to this last class there be further
legislation to cure the evil which now exists because of the
fact that retirement under the provisions of the present law
is irrevocable. It not infrequently happens that officers are
retired for disability arising from diseases and subsequently
entirely recover, and in some cases they continue for many
years in the possession of full health, engaging in ordinary
vocations of life, in business and the professions, receiving at
the same time a handsome income from           the Government
without rendering any return for it.




REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY


373


I recommend that in the case of officers retired for disability arising from disease alone, authority be given for a
reixamination at such time as the Secretary of War may
direct, and that in case upon such reixamination the retired
officer be found fit for duty, the President be authorized, in
his discretion, either to restore him to duty with the rank
which he held at the time of retirement or to retire him
wholly from service.
The uncertainty as to what conclusion Congress will reach
as to the proper size of the army during the next fiscal year
has occasioned some question as to the basis upon which the
estimates for that year should be prepared. In the absence
of any guide, justifying me in any assumption as to what
Congress will do, I have directed that the estimates be prepared with reference to the now-existing condition for an
authorized force of one hundred thousand men. In case
Congress determines upon an army of a smaller number than
we now have, the sums allowed for those expenditures which
depend directly upon the number of troops, such as pay of
the army, cost of transportation, clothing, and equipment,
can readily be reduced correspondingly.
PROGRESS OF REORGANIZATION
Extract from the Report of the Secretary of War for 19011
The act of February 2, 1901, entitled " An act to increase
the efficiency of the permanent military establishment of the
United States", provided for an increase of line organizations
from twenty-five regiments of infantry to thirty, from ten
regiments of cavalry to fifteen, from seven regiments of artillery, including sixteen field batteries, to a corps of artillery,
practically equivalent to thirteen regiments under the old
organization, and including thirty field batteries, and from
Page 7.




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


one battalion of engineers to three. Minimum and maximum numbers of enlisted men for the different organizations
were established by the same statute, so that the total number of enlisted men might be varied by the President, according to the exigencies of the time, from a minimum of 59,131
to a maximum of 100,000, without any change of commissioned officers or in the number of organizations.
The improvement of conditions in the Philippines during
the spring and summer of this year made it unnecessary to
provide the maximum number allowed by the law, and on the
eighth of May an order was made fixing the enlisted strength
of the several organizations in such a manner as to establish
the aggregate enlisted strength of the army, including staff
departments, but exclusive of hospital corps men, at
77,287...
The new organizations authorized were recruited upon the
basis thus prescribed, leaving the organizations in the Philippines and Cuba, which had been temporarily increased to
greater numbers, to be reduced to that basis by the ordinary
expiration of enlistments and by casualties. The new organizations have been completed.
The regular establishment now consists, according to the
latest reports which have been received, of 3,253 officers and
76,084 enlisted men. There are also 4,336 men of the Hospital Corps, 172 volunteer surgeons in the Philippines,
appointed under section 18 of the act of February 2, 1901,
4,973 native scouts under the command of 98 officers in the
Philippines, and 25 officers and 815 men of the Porto Rico
Provisional Regiment.
The distribution of the force is shown in the table on the
opposite page.
The recruitment of the new organizations and the maintenance of the old have been accomplished without difficulty,
and the material obtained appears by the reports to be of the




REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY                              375
DISTRIBUTION OF THE ARMY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1901
Country                    Officers  Enlisted    Total
Men
United States............................   1,92      31,952     33,874
Philippine Islands........................  1,111     42,128     43,239
Cuba....................................     166       4,748      4,914
Porto  Rico...............................    51       1,490      1,541
Hawaiian Islands........................       6         250        256
China...................................        5         157        162
Alaska.................................     17         510        527
Total...............................     3,278     81,235     84,513
(In this table are included the 4,386 men oi the Hospital Corps and the 25 officers and 815 men of the
Porto Rico Provisional Regiment, leaving the strength of the regular army, 3,253 officers and 76,084
enlisted men.
In addition there are also in the Philippines 172 volunteer surgeons, appointed under section 18 of
the act of February 2, 1901, and 98 officers and 4,973 native scouts.)
best quality. About three-fourths of the total number of
applicants were rejected and about one-fourth accepted.
Of those accepted about ninety per cent were native born
and about ten per cent naturalized citizens. The requirements that the applicant should be in perfect health, of
good character, and able to read and write have been rigidly
enforced.
The reorganization provided for by the act required the
selection and appointment of two hundred and ninety-eight
officers of staff corps and departments, and of eight hundred
and thirty-seven first and second lieutenants of the line. The
staff positions have been filled, in most cases by the appointment of deserving officers who had held staff positions in the
volunteer force, and as to the remaining positions, by the
appointment of officers who had rendered specially meritorious service in the field.
The surgeons and chaplains constitute an exception to this
statement, having been selected partly from civil life.
Vacancies in the offices of first and second lieutenants of
the line existing after promotions had been made, and after




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


the graduating class at the Military Academy had been provided for, as required by the statute, have been filled under
the following provisions of section 28 of the act:
Persons not over forty years of age who shall have at any time served
as volunteers subsequent to April 21, 1898, may be ordered before boards
of officers for such examination as may be prescribed by the Secretary of
War, and those who establish their fitness before these examining boards
may be appointed to the grades of first or second lieutenant in the regular
army..
Enlisted men of the regular army and volunteers may be appointed
second lieutenants in the regular army to vacancies created by this act,
provided that they shall have served one year under the same conditions
now authorized by law for enlisted men of the regular army.
In executing these provisions it seemed necessary to prescribe a uniform standard of examination, and that which
has long been followed in testing the fitness of candidates for
appointment from the ranks was prescribed. At the same
time it was not deemed just to either officers or men who
were actually in the field, or who had but recently terminated
their active volunteer service, to treat them precisely the
same as applicants are treated who have had abundant time
and opportunity to prepare for examination, and accordingly
the following order was made:
WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, April 16, 1901.
In view of the long period during which volunteer officers recently
serving in the Philippines have been without access to books with which
they could prepare for examination, and the fact that a special test of
fitness is furnished by each officer's military record, the Secretary of War
directs that as to all such officers who are ordered to be examined for
appointment to the regular army, and are physically qualified, the
examining boards, instead of recommending appointment or rejection
upon the mental examination alone, shall transmit the examination papers
in each case to the War Department, with their marks or ratings, both
specific and general, and with an expression of the board's estimate of the
candidate's general intelligence and capacity. The question whether,
upon such report and the military record taken together, the candidate's
fitness has been established will then be determined by the appointing
power.




REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY


377


In view of the fact that enlisted men who have been serving in the
Philippines have also been without opportunities to prepare for examination, the Secretary of War directs that as to any of them who fail to pass
the mental examination for promotion, if the examining board is of the
opinion that the candidate has sufficient intelligence and capacity to
fit himself readily for such an examination, and that he has failed through
lack of opportunity for preparation, the board shall transmit the papers
to the Department with their certificate to that effect; and thereupon, if
the case seems to warrant such action, the candidate may have a further
examination after reasonable opportunity to prepare therefor.
ELIHU ROOT, Secretary of War.
To pass upon the papers reported under the foregoing
order, and the military records of the applicants in connection
therewith, a board of review was organized in Washington
with Brigadier-General James M. Bell, U. S. V. (now brigadier-general, U. S. A., retired), as president. To this board
of review were referred the papers of all applicants, both
officers and enlisted men, who failed to reach the required
standard before the local examining boards, and the board of
review reported as to the volunteer officers whether upon
their military records, taken together with their examinations, their fitness was or was not established, and as to enlisted men whether they were or were not entitled to further
examination. In all cases soldierly qualities and capacity
to command as exhibited in service have been treated as the
most important considerations.
I am satisfied that these duties have been performed with
impartiality, fairness, and without fear or favor. Five hundred and five enlisted men have been examined, and two
hundred and fourteen have been passed, declared qualified,
and commissioned as second lieutenants. Eight hundred and
thirty-nine volunteer officers have been ordered for examination, of whom one hundred and four declined, ninety-seven
have been found not qualified, one hundred and fifty-seven
remain with their cases undetermined, and four hundred
and eighty-one have been accepted and commissioned.




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


There remain one hundred and forty-two original vacancies
to be filled under the statute, and there are on file 10,362
applications.
In selecting the officers to be ordered for examination,
every practicable precaution to secure good men has been
taken, although, as the applications have been so numerous
and the labor of examining the enormous mass of papers
relating to them has been so great, many deserving applicants have doubtless been passed over. The commanding
officers of all the twenty-five volunteer regiments which
served in the Philippines under the act of March 2, 1899,
were called upon to furnish lists of the officers of their
command, whom they considered qualified for commissions in the regular army, and all of the officers whom
they recommended were ordered for examination, with
the exception of possibly half a dozen, against whom
specific objections existed not known to the commanding
officer. As to all the volunteer forces coming within the
scope of the act of February 2, the rule has been rigidly followed to order no one for examination except upon military
evidence of his fitness from the officers under whom he had
served. Some mistakes, of course, have been made, but it is
believed that in the main we have secured a very excellent
body of officers, who will do credit to the service. It is especially gratifying to find so great a number of enlisted men
who are able to demonstrate their fitness to receive commissions.
The selection and appointment of the new officers has very
nearly kept pace with the vacancies,for the act prohibited the
increase of officers of the artillery any more rapidly than the
number of enlisted men of that branch was increased. In
order to comply with this provision of the statute, as the
increase of the artillery was practically equivalent to six
additional regiments, with six full sets of officers, directions




REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY


379


were given that the business of increasing the artillery should
be treated in six separate stages, and that as each successive
one-sixth part of the additional enlisted men was obtained,
one-sixth part of the additional officers should be appointed
by promotion or upon examination.
The last increment of enlisted men was completed on
September twenty-third, and the last vacancies of first and
second lieutenants in the artillery were not open for appointment until that date. The postponement in the promotion
of officers of the artillery, required by this provision of the
statute, has resulted in giving the greater part of the officers
of artillery, commissions bearing later dates than those of
the officers of cavalry and infantry, who were promoted to
the extent provided for by the law immediately upon the
passage of the act. Accordingly, the officers promoted from
the cavalry and infantry all bear commissions dated February 2, 1901, while the officers promoted in the artillery
bear commissions dated, respectively, February 2, 1901;
May 8, 1901; July 1, 1901; August 1, 1901; August 22,
1901, and September 23, 1901.
I recommend action by Congress to remedy this inequality
by making all the commissions bear the same date.
THE CHIEF OF ARTILLERY
The chief of artillery, provided for by the act, has been
appointed. The sixth section of the act required the Secretary of War to prescribe the duties of the new officer. In
execution of that statute, the following regulation was made
by the Secretary:
WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, April 9, 1901.
Pursuant to section 6 of the act of February 2, 1901, entitled " An act
to increase the efficiency of the permanent military establishment of the
United States," the duties of the chief of artillery are hereby prescribed:
1. He shall keep the Commanding General of the Army, and through




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


him the Secretary of War, advised at all times of the efficiency of the
personnel and material of the artillery, and make such recommendations
in reference thereto as shall in his judgment tend to promote efficiency.
2. He shall annually and as frequently as circumstances shall require
inspect the coast and field artillery, and he shall from time to time and
as frequently as once in each year report to the Commanding General,
and through him to the Secretary of War, as to each coast-defense fortification, whether the same is in all respects ready for use in case of attack,
and if not, in what respects the preparations are defective.
3. He shall from time to time, and as frequently as conditions require,
confer directly with the Chief of Ordnance, and advise him of all matters
relating to the character and preparation of artillery material which the
experience and observation of the artillery arm of the service show to be
of practical importance.
4. He shall have general supervision of the instruction of artillery
officers and men and of examinations for promotion and for appointments
and transfers of officers to the artillery arm, and shall recommend such
examinations and such courses and methods of instruction in the artillery
schools and otherwise as he shall deem requisite to secure a thoroughly
trained and educated force.
5. He shall recommend officers for duty in coast or field artillery according to special aptitude and fitness, and is charged generally with the
recommendation of officers of artillery for special duty.
6. Before any money is expended or any land is acquired for any seacoast fortification hereafter he shall advise the Secretary of War through
the Commanding General whether the project under which the expenditure is to be made includes adequate provision for all the different elements
of a complete coast-defense establishment, including fortification, armament, and accommodations for the use of troops; whether the land
which it is proposed to acquire will be sufficient for all the purposes mentioned, and how far the appropriations available provide for the entire
work. For that purpose all projects and plans for coast-defense fortifications shall upon coming into the office of the Secretary of War be referred, as of course in the first instance, to the Chief of Artillery for his
report thereon.
7. He shall be a member of the Board of Ordnance and Fortification.
8. The records pertaining to the performance of the duties of the Chief
of Artillery will be kept in the office of the Adjutant-General of the Army,
through whom all communications relating to personnel, discipline, efficiency, transfers, and assignments should be made in accordance with
existing regulations.
9. Nothing in these regulations shall be deemed to relieve the commanders of the several military departments of the duties of inspection




REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY


381


and command, or of responsibility for the condition and efficiency of the
material and personnel of the artillery in their several departments as
now provided by regulations.  ELIHU ROOT, Secretary of War.
In pursuance of the provision of the act of February 2,
1901, which charges the coast artillery with the care and use
of the fixed and movable elements of land and coast fortifications, including the submarine mine and torpedo defense,
the Torpedo School at Willets Point has been transferred
from the care of the engineers to the artillery, by whom it
will be conducted hereafter, and the Engineer School has been
removed to Washington Barracks.
Following the same design to secure enlarged activity and
usefulness for the artillery arm, two additional artillery members have been appointed to the Board of Ordnance and
Fortification under authority of the army appropriation act
of March 2, 1901, and that important board now consists of
three artillery officers, with the Lieutenant-General Commanding, the Chief of Engineers, the Chief of Ordnance, and
one civilian. On the initiative of the Chief of Engineers an
artillery officer has been added to the Board of Engineers,
which is charged with consideration of plans of coast defense.
The two volunteer battalions in Porto Rico have been continued and reorganized as two battalions of the Porto Rico
Provisional Regiment authorized by the act. It has not been
deemed necessary to increase the number by the addition of a
third battalion.
Twenty-seven of the thirty dental surgeons authorized by
the act have been selected, after a very careful examination under the direction of the Surgeon-General. There still
remain three vacancies....
A board consisting of all the general officers of the line of
the army now in the United States and the Chief of Artillery
has been convened at Washington, and is now in session, to
formulate and submit a project for the location, examina



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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


tions, and surveys to be made for the permanent grounds
provided for by section 35 of the act of February 2, 1901.
This board is also charged with the duty of considering and
reporting upon the location and distribution of military
posts required for the proper accommodation, instruction,
and training of the army as organized under the act of
February second, not including coast fortifications, and is
directed to make " recommendations in detail as to which
of the existing posts should be retained or abandoned, and of
those retained which, if any, should be enlarged and to what
extent, and the location, size, and character of such new posts
as may be necessary, having due regard in all its recommendations to the proper distribution of the different arms of the
service, based upon strategic, sanitary, and economical
considerations."
The provisions of section 38 of the act of February 2,
1901, prohibiting the sale of or dealing in beer, wine, or any
intoxicating liquors by any person in any post exchange, or
canteen, or army transport, or upon any premises used for
military purposes by the United States, have been carried
into full force and effect, pursuant to the directions of the
statute.
When the orders were issued for the enforcement of this
section of the law, the commanding officers of the various
posts and military organizations were directed to report
upon its effects. A great body of reports have been received,
which indicate that the effect of the law is unfortunate. I
think, however, that a sufficient time has not elapsed to give
the law a fair trial, and the observation and report of its
working will be continued during the ensuing year.




THE DISPOSITION TO BE MADE OF
THE ARMY IN PEACE
Extract from the Report of the Secretary of War for 1902 
THE restoration of the normal conditions of peace, and
the return of the greater part of the army to the United
States, have made it possible to resume with increased
activity the work of preparing for future wars.
The increase of the army from 25,000 to a minimum of
60,000 has, of course, made necessary a great increase in
barracks, quarters, hospitals, and all the constructions which
go to make up an army post. The accommodations which
had been provided before the war with Spain are now quite
inadequate, and require to be more than doubled. The work
of construction has been pressed vigorously by the Quartermaster's Department to the extent allowed by the appropriations made by Congress for this purpose.
The policy followed has been rather to increase the size
of the posts in which the army is to be quartered than to
increase the number. Two considerations have determined
that policy: First, economy of administration, and second,
and most important, efficiency of officers and men. The
tendency of life in small one or two company posts is narrowing and dwarfing, and such posts can be justified only by
necessity. On the other hand, the comparison and emulation
between officers and organizations grouped in a large post, the
advantages of systematic study and practice in the schools
which can be maintained at such posts, the advantage of
being under the immediate direction and influence of officers
1Page 20.
383




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


of high rank who cannot be scattered among the small posts,
but can be collected in the large ones; the practical benefit
derived from handling considerable bodies of troops so that
company officers may be learning to handle regiments, and
regimental officers to handle brigades, and so on - all these
considerations, point to the large post as furnishing the
conditions for increasing efficiency on the part of both officers
and men.
The only argument which has been made against this view
is that the scattering of the army in a great number of small
posts would popularize it, and that there ought to be an
equitable distribution of the troops among all the different
states. I think these propositions may be dismissed with
the confident assertion that the army will be popular and
satisfactory to all the states in proportion as it is efficient
and economical.
Another line of policy followed by the Department is, so
far as practicable, to get the army posts out of the cities and
large towns, and establish them upon larger tracts of cheaper
land in the neighborhood of the same cities and towns, so
that the men may have the benefit of country air instead of
city air, and more room for training and exercise; the
neighborhood of the barracks may be under military control;
the rum shops and brothels may be pushed farther away from
the men; and at the same time the advantages of convenient inspection, transportation and supply, and a reasonable
degree of educational and social privileges, may be retained.
In order to secure a definite plan for the distribution of
troops and the construction work necessary to provide for
their maintenance, a board was convened in Washington in
November last, composed of all the general officers of the
army in the United States, under the following directions:
By direction of the Secretary of War, a board of officers is hereby
appointed to meet in Washington, D. C., on the 25th day of November,




THE ARMY IN TIME OF PEACE                     385
1901, to consider and report upon the location and distribution of the
military posts required for the proper accommodation, instruction, and
training of the army as organized under the act of February 2, 1901, not
including coast fortifications. The board will make recommendations in
detail as to which of the existing posts should be retained or abandoned,
and of those retained which, if any, should be enlarged and to what extent,
and the location, size, and character of such new posts as may be necessary, having due regard in all its recommendations to the proper distribution of the different arms of the service based upon strategic, sanitary
and economical considerations.
The board will also formulate and submit a project for the location,
examinations and surveys to be made for the permanent camp grounds
provided for by section 35 of the act of February 2, 1901.








MILITARY EDUCATION
WEST POINT AND THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE
In his annual report to the President, November 29, 1899, Mr. Root made the
first official reference to an Army War College in the United States that can be
found in any War Department document. In consonance with this recommendation and with the approval of the President, the Secretary of War appointed on
February 19, 1900, a board of officers to consider regulations with a view to the
establishment of a War College. The board met at the War Department February
26, 1900, to consider and adopt regulations for the establishment of the college, and
upon the recommendation of the Secretary of War and under his orders, BrigadierGeneral William Ludlow, then a member of the board, was directed to proceed to
Europe for personal investigation in foreign countries regarding the organization
and purposes of their war colleges, and the first appropriation for the establishment of such a college in this country was made in the Army bill, approved
May 26, 1900, as follows:
For hire of clerks, purchase of stationery, furniture, and for contingent
expenses incident to the establishment of the Army War College, having for its
object tle direction and coordination of the instruction in the various service
schools, extension of the opportunities for investigation and study in the Army
*-and Militia of the United States, and the collection and dissemination of
military information, twenty thousand dollars.
Other appropriations for the War College were made in the Army Appropriation
bill for the year ending June 30, 1902, and the War College was formally established.
Plans for the construction of the building for the college were approved by the
Secretary of War in July of that year, and the following item inserted in the Army
Appropriation Act for the year ending June 30, 1903, upon the recommendation of
Secretary Root, made the first appropriation for the construction of the War College
building as follows:
For the continuance of the Army War College, having for its object the
direction and coordination of the instruction in the various service schools,
extension of the opportunities for investigation and study in the Army and
Militia of the United States, fifteen thousand dollars.
Provided, That the Secretary of War is hereby authorized to expend the
sum of four hundred thousand dollars, or so much thereof as may be necessary,
from the unexpended balance of the emergency fund appropriated in the act,
approved March third, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, for the erection of
the necessary buildings for the Army War College, established at Washington
Barracks, District of Columbia, for the instruction of officers of the Army and
Militia of the United States.
887




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


In recognition of Mr. Root's successful advocacy of the establishment of the
Army War College, a granite tablet, which carries the following inscription, has been
placed near the entrance of the splendid building constructed for the college.
BECAUSE OF THE SPECIAL
INTEREST AND EFFORT OF
ELIHU ROOT
SECRETARY OF WAR
CREATOR OF THE GENERAL
STAFF OF THE ARMY
THIS BUILDING FOR THE ARMY
WAR COLLEGE WAS AUTHORIZED
BY ACTS OF CONGRESS APPROVED
JUNE 30, 1902, AND APRIL 23, 1904
ARCHITECTS
McKIM, MEAD, AND WHITE
CONSTRUCTING ENGINEER
JOHN STEPHEN SEWELL
CAPTAIN CORPS OF ENGINEERS
UNITED STATES ARMY
CORNER STONE LAID FEBRUARY 21, 1903
BUILDING OCCUPIED JUNE 30, 1907
Extract from the Report of the Secretary of War for 1901 
XISTING conditions make this subject one of primary
importance at the present time. The imperative demand
for the service of all our officers since the spring of 1898 has
caused a practical cessation of all systematic education of
commissioned officers for nearly four years. In the meantime, the ordinary additions to the number of second lieutenants have been, roughly speaking, about one-third from
West Point and about two-thirds from         the ranks and civil
life. In the reorganization of the enlarged army about one
thousand new officers have been added from          the volunteer
force, so that more than one-third of all the officers of the
army have been without any opportunity whatever for sys1 Page 20.




MILITARY EDUCATION


389


tematic study of the science of war. On the other hand, the
rapid advance of military science; changes of tactics required
by the changes in weapons; our own experience in the difficulty of working out problems of transportation, supply,
and hygiene; the wide range of responsibilities which we have
seen devolving upon officers charged with the civil government of occupied territory; the delicate relations which constantly arise between military and civil authority; the
manifest necessity that the soldier, above all others, should
be familiar with the history and imbued with the spirit of our
institutions - all indicate the great importance of thorough
and broad education for military officers.
I have said before that practical qualities in a soldier are
more important than a knowledge of theory. But this truth
has often been made the excuse for indolence and indifference,
which, except in rare and gifted individuals, destroy practical
efficiency. It is also true that, other things being equal, the
officer who keeps his mind alert by intellectual exercise, and
who systematically studies the reasons of action and the
materials and conditions and difficulties with which he may
have to deal, will be the stronger practical man and the
better soldier.
I cannot speak too highly of the work done in our service
schools for a number of years before the war with Spain. It
was intelligent, devoted, and effective, and produced a high
standard of individual excellence, which has been demonstrated by many officers in the active service of the past four
years. There was, however, no general system of education.
The number of officers who could avail themselves of the very
limited accommodations afforded was comparatively small.
The great body of officers were confined to the advantages
offered by the post schools called " lyceums," which were, in
general, unsatisfactory and futile. There was no effective
method by which the individual excellence demonstrated




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


could be effectively recognized, or the results attained be
utilized.
After careful consideration and study of the subject a
general scheme of instruction has been matured and embodied
in an order, the general provisions of which are as follows:
INSTRUCTION OF OFFICERS
With a view to maintaining the high standard of instruction and general
training of the officers of the army, and for the establishment of a coherent
plan by which the work may be made progressive, the Secretary of War
directs that the following general scheme be announced for the information
and guidance of all concerned:
THE SYSTEM OF INSTRUCTION
There shall be, besides the Military Academy at West Point, the following schools for the instruction of officers in the army:
1. At each military post an officers' school for elementary instruction
in theory and practice.
2. Special service schools:
(a) The Artillery School at Fort Monroe, Va.
(b) The Engineer School of Application, Washington Barracks, D.C.
(c) The School of Submarine Defense, Fort Totten, N. Y.
(d) The School of Application for Cavalry and Field Artillery, at
Fort Riley, Kans.
(e) The Army Medical School, Washington, D. C.
3. A General Service and Staff College, at Fort Leavenworth, Kans.
4. A War College, for the most advanced instruction, at Washington
Barracks, D. C.
The War College shall be under the immediate direction of a board of
five officers detailed from the army at large and the following ex offcio
members: The Chief of Engineers, the Chief of Artillery, the Superintendent of the Military Academy, the commanding officer of the General
Service and Staff College.
The War College Board shall exercise general supervision and inspection
of all the different schools above enumerated, and shall be charged with
the duty of maintaining through them a complete system of military education, in which each separate school shall perform its proper part. Such
officers as shall be requisite to assist the board in performing its duties will
be detailed from time to time for that purpose. It should be kept constantly in mind that the object and ultimate aim of all this preparatory
work is to train officers to command men in war. Theory must not, therefore, be allowed to displace practical application.




MILITARY EDUCATION


391


The officers' schools at military posts and the General Service and Staff
College will be open for instruction to officers of the National Guard of
the several States, to former officers of volunteers, and to graduates of
military schools and colleges which have had officers of the army as
instructors.
The special-service schools will be open to officers of the National Guard
and former officers of volunteers who shall furnish evidence to the War
Department of such preliminary education as to enable them to benefit
by the courses of instruction.
The college staff at the General Service and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, will make report to the Secretary of War of qualifications of officers
of the National Guard, ex-volunteers, and graduates of military schools
and colleges, who shall have attended the college or shall apply for examination, and shall further certify whether or not they are qualified for
service as officers of volunteers, specifying character of the service, whether
line or staff, for which they are specially qualified.
A special register of the names of persons so reported as qualified will
be kept in the War Department.
A register shall also be kept in the War Department in which shall be
entered the names of officers of the regular army below the grade of
colonel, as follows:
First. Officers who have heretofore exhibited superior capacity, application, and devotion to duty, the names to be selected by a board of officers
convened for that purpose.
Second. Officers who shall be reported as doing especially meritorious
work in the above-mentioned schools, other than the officers' schools at
posts.
Third. Officers who at any time specially distinguish themselves by
exceptionally meritorious service.
It will be the aim of the Department to make this register the basis of
selection for details as staff officers, military attaches, and for special
service requiring a high degree of professional capacity.
THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE
A college is hereby established for an advanced course of professional
study for army officers, to be known as the Army War College. Such
buildings and grounds as may be available and necessary will be assigned
to its use on the reservation at Washington Barracks, D. C.
The executive head of the college will be an officer of the Army, not
below the grade of field officer, who will be known as the president of the
Army War College, and who will preside over the War College board. A
course of instruction embracing the higher branches of professional study




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


will be arranged by the board, and this board will also prepare and submit
for the approval of the Secretary of War such regulations for the government of the college as it shall deem necessary.
The officers to be detailed to pursue the course at the War College will
be of two classes:
1. Those who have been recommended as distinguished graduates of the
General Service and Staff College.
2. Such field officers and captains as may be specially designated by the
War Department for instruction.
It is intended that the officers who have uniformly shown the greatest
interest and most proficiency in the theoretical and practical courses prescribed for the officers' schools at posts, the General Service and Staff
College, and the War College shall have high consideration of the War
Department, with a view to the utilization of their abilities as military
attaches or on special missions abroad and for the higher duties of general
staff work.
This order, if loyally and persistently followed, will result
in the building up of what is practically a university system
of military education. The principal advantages which it is
designed to secure are:
(1) The bringing of all the different branches of military
education into one system under direct supervision and
inspection by a body of officers whose special business it
shall be to make every part of the system effective.
(2) The establishment of definite required courses of instruction in the officers' schools, which shall be the foundation
of the whole system, in place of the very loosely regulated
lyceums, which in most cases were not schools at all.
(3) The establishment of the General Service and Staff
College, upon the foundation of the Infantry and Cavalry
School at Fort Leavenworth, so that every officer who displays superior qualities in the lower schools may be instructed
there in every branch of military service.
(4) The completion of the series of instruction by the War
College, which shall ultimately be in effect a post-graduate
course for the study of the greater problems of military
science and national defense.




MILITARY EDUCATION


393


(5) The establishment of a record in the War Department,
on which shall appear the names of officers who have exhibited special capacity, in order that they may be known by
the Commander-in-Chief, and by the country whenever
special service is required, and in order that, although under
the law meritorious service cannot be rewarded by increase
of rank or pay below the grade of general, it may receive the
reward of recognition and honor and opportunity, to which
it is entitled. This record shall be made by a board of officers
instructed and bound to select the names of those who are
worthy, without reference to any consideration but their
military records.
(6) The throwing open of the schools to the officers of the
National Guard, of the former volunteers, and the graduates
of military colleges and schools for instruction by and with
the officers of the regular army.
The courses, both of the officers' schools at the posts and
the General Service and Staff College, will be arranged so
that the young men wishing to fit themselves for volunteer
commissions may spend their vacations in military study.
It is particularly desirable that a large number of young men
should be made competent to perform the duties of volunteer officers in the staff and supply departments. Without
such a class at the outbreak of a war, with a large volunteer
force called into being, there will always be confusion, waste,
delay, and suffering, because untrained quartermasters and
commissaries of subsistence cannot properly perform their
duties. If the war lasts long enough they will learn in time,
but at a frightful cost. There are thousands of young men
in the country engaged in various kinds of civil business
which make them thoroughly familiar with the subjectmatter of quartermasters' and commissaries' duties, and
who, with a little timely instruction and practice, could learn
to apply their business knowledge in military affairs so as to




394


MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


be useful quartermasters and commissaries whenever called
into the volunteer service.
It is hoped that, if the gentlemen to whom instruction is
thus offered avail themselves of the opportunity in considerable numbers, laws may be enacted under which their proved
fitness for volunteer commissions will carry a right to receive
commissions whenever a volunteer force is called out, and
that a selection upon the ground of ascertained competency
may thus take the place of the necessarily indiscriminate
appointment of volunteer officers concerning whose fitness
the appointing power cannot possibly be informed.
Extract from the Report of the Secretary of War for 19021
An examination of the sources from which are drawn the
officers of the army, as now constituted under the act of
February 2, 1901, shows how important it is to go on with
the military education of officers in some such general and
systematic way as was outlined in my last report. Of the
2,900 officers of the line of the army, 1818 have been appointed since the beginning of the war with Spain. Of these
1818 but 276 were supplied by the West Point Academy;
the remaining 1,542 have come - 414 from the ranks, 512
from civil life, and 616 from the volunteers of the war with
Spain and in the Philippines.              c    --
The volunteers and the enlisted men have of course
acquired useful experience, and they were all selected on the
ground of their military conduct and intelligence. Yet it is
generally true of the whole 1,542, constituting more than one
half of all the officers of the line, that they have had no systematic military education. They constitute nearly the
entire body of first and second lieutenants. After some years,
when their seniors have passed off the stage, they will have
to supply our generals and colonels and chief staff officers
1 Page 29.




MILITARY EDUCATION


395


charged with the instruction, discipline, and command of
our forces. Unless the theory of military education under
which we have maintained the Academy at West Point for
a century is all a mistake, it is very important to give to this
class of young officers, now that they are in the army, some
degree of the educational advantages which the West Point
men get before they are commissioned. The same will be
true of future accessions to the force of officers, for the
West Point Academy, even with the recent enlargements,
cannot be expected to fill more than about two-thirds of
the annual vacancies which will occur in the ordinary course
of life.
The development of the general scheme of systematic
instruction, provided for by the order of November 27, 1901,
annexed to my last report, has made satisfactory progress
during the year....
The War College Board has addressed itself especially to
reinstating and regulating military instruction in the military schools and colleges of the country, which may serve
as a source for future appointments of second lieutenants
from civil life; to the establishment of systematic instruction
of officers in the army posts, and to organizing the General
Service and Staff College at Fort Leavenworth on the foundation of the Infantry and Cavalry School which existed there
before the war with Spain. Seventy-seven officers have been
detailed as instructors at the military schools and colleges.
Ninety-seven officers have been detailed as students at the
General Service and Staff College, and are now in attendance
at that institution. Thirty officers are in attendance as students at the Artillery School at Fortress Monroe, ten at the
School of Submarine Defense at Fort Totten, and eleven at
the Engineers' School at Washington Barracks..
Undoubtedly the military schools and colleges to which
details of officers as instructors are made will be found to




396


MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


differ widely in their thoroughness and efficiency, and the
maintenance of thorough inspection and supervision by
the War College Board will be essential. It is the purpose
of the Department to discontinue details to institutions
which, upon such inspection, are found not to come up to
the requisite standard, and to give to the graduates of the
thorough and efficient institutions a preference in recommendations for appointment as second lieutenants in the
regular army. The same observation will doubtless apply
to the post schools, which will vary according to the capacity
and zeal of the commanding officer. The same systematic
inspection by the War College Board is designed to hold
commanding officers to the same degree of responsibility
for an efficient school as for a well-disciplined force....
The excellent work done by the Medical Department in
the Army Medical School in this city should not pass unnoticed. The school takes the young surgeon, who has
already graduated from some regular medical college, and
has passed his examination and received a commission in
the Medical Corps, and instructs him to adapt his knowledge
to the special requirements of military service in surgery,
medicine, and hygiene. The general hospital on the Washington Barracks reservation which this school has been using
for purposes of special instruction will no longer be available
after the construction of the Engineers' School at that place.
It is very desirable that new and adequate accommodations
be provided for the continuance of the hospital at some other
point in or near the city, and for the continuance and enlargement of this most important branch of instruction.
WEST POINT
The Military Academy at West Point on June 11, 1902,
celebrated with appropriate ceremonies the completion of a
hundred years of honorable and useful service. The advance




MILITARY EDUCATION


397


of the world in military science, the increasing complexity of
the machinery and material used in warfare, and the difficulty of the problems involved in transporting, supplying,
and handling the great armies of modern times, make such
an institution even more necessary to the country now than
when it was founded by the fathers of the Republic a hundred
years ago. The efficiency of the institution and the high
standard of honor and devotion to duty which have characterized its graduates justify the continuance of public confidence. The wise liberality of Congress has enabled the
institution to begin its second century with the well-founded
hope of larger and long-continued usefulness. The present
academic year has opened with 471 cadets on the rolls of the
Academy, the largest number ever belonging to it at one time.
Under the new regulations relating to admissions, examinations of candidates were held on the first of May in this year,
at sixteen army posts throughout the country, selected with a
view to reducing to a minimum the expenses of candidates in
attending. Under the authority of the act of March 2, 1901,
the examinations were made to conform to the courses of
study ordinarily covered in the high schools and academies
of the country by boys of the average age of appointees to
the Academy. Sixty-two cadets were admitted upon certificates from educational institutions in which they had prepared, following the course which has been generally adopted
by the colleges and universities of this country.
The curriculum has been modified somewhat, reducing the
time expended in pure mathematics and increasing the attention to Spanish, English, and military hygiene; decreasing
the theoretical course in philosophy and increasing the time
given to chemistry and electricity. The increase of practical
instruction has been continued, and a new practice, which I
hope will be long continued, has been inaugurated by taking
the first class to the battlefield of Gettysburg, where for




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


several days in April they studied the lessons of that great
conflict upon the field....
The provision of the Military Academy act of June 28,
1902, authorizing the enlargement and improvement of the
plant at West Point upon a plan involving a total expenditure
of $5,500,000, has caused much solicitude to the Department
and to the officers of the Academy, lest in rearranging and
rebuilding a result might be reached out of harmony with
the historic traditions of the institution and the beauties of
the site, with its mountains and plain and river. After
much consideration the following method of working out
the plan has been adopted: A board composed of officers
of the Academy was'convened to prepare in detail a statement of the practical requirements of the institution which
were to be met by the enlargement and rearrangement.
Upon the coming in of that report, ten of the leading
architects of the country were invited to submit in competition general preliminary plans showing the proposed arrangement of buildings and treatment of the ground to meet the
various requirements of the Academy, based upon the data
thus furnished, together with an indication of the architectural treatment of the separate buildings. From the plans
thus submitted one will be selected, and the author of that
plan will be expected to develop it into the complete plan authorized by the statute. Thereafter, as the statute requires,
the work will proceed with the assistance of a consulting
architect, who will naturally be either the successful competitor or some one connected with his establishment.
GENERAL MILITARY EDUCATION
Extract from the Report of the Secretary of War for 1903 
The organization of the General Staff relieves the War
College Board of a wide range of General Staff duties orig1 Page 10.




MILITARY EDUCATION


399


inally assigned to the Board in the absence of any more complete organization, and this has made possible a simpler organization, adapted to the performance of War College duties
proper, and constituting an adjunct of the General Staff.
The following new regulations explain the organization and
assignment of duties:
I. The Army War College shall be located in the city of Washington,
D.C.
II. The college shall be under the direct control of the Chief of Staff.
III. Under the direction of the Chief of Staff the management of the
college shall be vested in a president and two directors, who shall be
assisted by a secretary.
IV. The special duty of the college shall be to assist the Chief of Staff
and the General Staff in the preparation of plans for the national defense.
For this purpose such number of suitable officers as may from time to
time be found to be necessary by the Chief of Staff shall be detailed from
the General Staff or from officers of the line, or other staff corps and
departments of the army, and these officers shall work with and under
the direction of the personnel provided in Paragraph III.
V. The War College will receive from time to time instructions from
the Chief of Staff as to the problems which it shall take up and the general
line of investigation which it shall pursue.
After the most complete study practicable, a report will be rendered
to the Chief of Staff setting forth the recommendations of the college.
This report will be reviewed and criticised by the Chief of Staff and such
section of the General Staff as may be directed to do so by him, and if
necessary will be returned to the college with these criticisms for further
study and revision.
Whenever the nature of the problem is such as to require harmony of
action between the two services the report will be submitted to the joint
board of army and navy officers appointed by General Order No. 107,
Adjutant-General's Office, 1903, and the conclusions will be further studied
in the light of criticisms made by said board.
Upon the final acceptance of the report of the college by the Chief of
Staff, the report will be filed in his office.
VI. From time to time, as may be determined by the Chief of Staff,
a selected number of officers, to be taken from the army at large, will be
assembled at the War College for the minute and detailed study, under
the direction of the Chief of Staff, of the projects thus formulated.
VII. The work of the college in the preparation of its reports and in
the subsequent instruction based thereon shall be confidential....




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


Good work has been done during the year in the General
Service and Staff College at Leavenworth, and in all the
special service schools. Some of the student officers detailed
to the Leavenworth college did not appear to understand
that they were under obligation to apply themselves to their
studies, and I felt bound to enforce respect for that obligation
by ordering them before a court-martial for neglect of duty.
Two of them were convicted, and punished by fines and
reduction in lineal rank. I think the duty will be more
clearly understood hereafter.
The continued establishment and perfection of officers'
schools at posts is producing good results, and it is evident
that when the army has become settled in the enlarged posts
now in the course of construction and extension, and this
system of schools has become thoroughly established, we
shall be able to drop from the Leavenworth course much of
the comparatively elementary instruction which we are now
forced to give there and confine that institution to the more
advanced instruction for which it is intended.




LETTER TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
SENATE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY
AFFAIRS
THE BILL TO INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE ARMY
WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, March 3, 1902.
SIR: I return you herewith the bill (S.3917) to increase the
efficiency of the army, with a corrected copy of the same.
The main features of the proposed bill, which deserve most
careful consideration, are the proposed consolidation of the
Quartermaster's, Commissary, and Pay Departments into a
new Department of Supply, making the conduct of transportation a separate division of the new department; and the
provision creating a general staff.
The great work performed by the staff departments during
the Civil War and the war with Spain is fully recognized, and
their proposed consolidation under a single chief is in no
sense a condemnation of any particular bureau. The present
transportation service is part and parcel of the Quartermaster's Department, and, whether justly or not, other bureaus
complain that when transportation is insufficient for all, their 
bureaus are prejudiced by reason of the transportation being
under the direct orders of another supply bureau. With all
these bureaus under one chief it will not be possible for one to
interfere with another in the matter of supplies, and the
army as a whole will reap the benefits arising from this
change; and at the same time none of the individual bureaus
loses anything of its importance. Under the present system
it is entirely possible for a bureau chief to work along his own
401




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


lines in ignorance of what the other bureaus are doing. Economical and business principles seem to justify the bringing
together of these bureaus under a single chief, who will have
general direction of all, and who will be able to decide
promptly and on business principles what shall be done by
each particular bureau in the mobilization and concentration
of troops.
This chief will also be able to perform a great deal of the
work now falling directly on the Secretary of War, who is
compelled to study the minor details of each question before
giving his opinion. This will be a much greater relief to the
Secretary of War than would ordinarily be imagined. It is
expected under this new system that much of the auditing of
accounts and financial work generally of the different bureaus
may be consolidated in one financial system, similar to that
in vogue in great corporations, and ultimately the new system will prove vastly more economical than the present one.
In this consolidation it has not been deemed wise to ask at
once a reduction in the number of officers, but it is calculated
that in a very few years, when the system has become fully
developed, a material reduction can be made without serious
detriment to the service. At the present, however, an
increase of two officers is asked - one chief of the supply
department and one chief of the transportation division, to
be detailed from the army for a period of four years. This
legislation is involved in sections 1, 2, and 3.
The next subject, which is embodied in sections 4 to 10,
inclusive, involves the introduction into the army of a general staff system. No increase of officers is asked for in the
establishment of this corps, as all are to be detailed from
the line of the army. There are two considerations involved
in this legislation. It has long been apparent to all students
of the situation that the time has arrived when it has become
necessary to have for both the army and navy a body of offi



PROPOSED CHANGES IN THE ARMY


403


cers trained to consider the military policy of the country and
to prepare comprehensive plans for defense, and to be charged
specially with those duties. The mobilization of armies and
similar operations require time and consideration which can
not be given to the subjects by officers who are burdened
with current and official work in the army and navy departments. This work must be done before the moment of war
arrives, because modern wars are so short and decisive that it
would be criminal to delay the preparations until the moment
of rupture.
The general staff scheme is not a new proposition, because
officers of the army have always been utilized to a certain
extent in this business; and in looking over the records for
some years past it is observed that a number of officers have
always been detailed from the army to perform such work at
the War Department, but they have had no legal status.
Neither law nor custom places the preparation of plans for
national defense in the hands of any particular officer or body
of officers, and what is everybody's business is nobody's business. It has usually been after troops were gotten together
in a haphazard fashion that brigades, divisions, and corps
have been organized by general and staff officers, who have
been designated under the dictates of expediency rather
than previous and careful selection. It has usually been
because American character rises superior to system, or
rather absence of system, that disaster has been avoided.
The result naturally produces much haphazard work and
in the end is extremely expensive by reason of frequent
changes of orders for mobilization and concentration of
troops, as was evidenced in the war with Spain. It is realized,
however, that no general staff or other system can be made to
work properly, so long as the present unbusinesslike method
prevails of having a Secretary of War and a Commanding
General of the Army to control matters at the War Depart



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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


ment. In this country, as in the British Empire, the effort to
conduct the army with two heads has always failed. Many
complications arise from the fact that the finances of the
army must according to law be administered by the Secretary of War and are wholly within his jurisdiction and that
of the various supply and financial departments, all of which
are excepted from the control of the Commanding General,
whose duties are generally confined to those of army administration and discipline.
There must always be great difficulty in fixing the responsibility when so many bureau chiefs and the lieutenantgeneral commanding are concerned in the business affairs of
the army; and the army itself has continually turned toward
the general staff scheme as furnishing the most probable
solution of the intricate situation. A general staff added to
the army as a separate corps would be powerless for good
unless the abolition of the present functions of the General of
the Army is pronounced coincident with the establishment
of the new corps. A general staff possessing the authority of
law for its existence could arrange the mass of details for the
commanding generals of the various armies and order to
depots the proper quantity and character of supplies essential
to the success of proposed campaigns, so that independent
bureaus would not provide transportation for a surplus of one
class of stores while a deficiency of another equally necessary
existed.
If the expense of the Civil War and the war with Spain, as
carried on, could be carefully contrasted with the expense as
it should have been had the military affairs of the nation been
in the hands of a trained general staff corps, no further argument would be required to carry conviction that the proposed
change is a real reform. The work of such a staff will not be
merely that of the comparatively small regular army, but
will include all of the great military questions which may con



PROPOSED CHANGES IN THE ARMY


405


cern the United States in the disposition of the greater force
to be raised whenever war comes upon us. It will be an
agency through which the military operations and civil policies of the country may be harmonized as becomes a republican form of government. Upon every business principle and
from every military point of view, it commends itself as
worthy of the most serious consideration.
It is proposed that the present lieutenant-general of the
army shall be detailed as the first chief of general staff, and
that upon his separation from active service the President
shall detail the chief of general staff from the general officers
of the army, and thereafter there shall be no more permanent
appointments to the grade of lieutenant-general.  The
senior general officer of the army, if not chosen as chief of
general staff, will be assigned to active command of troops,
or such other duty as the President may direct. The officer
detailed as chief of general staff will be detailed for four
years, unless sooner relieved. He will have charge, under the
President and Secretary of War, of executing the general military policy of the nation, and with the assistance of carefully
selected officers who will not be embarrassed with handling
current papers in the War Department, he will consider all
questions of importance, recommend all concentration and
movement of troops, assignments to command, and other
important matters concerning which the President and Secretary of War require technical and professional advice.
Officers of this corps will be detailed to make all military
inspections of the army and the country, and the InspectorGeneral's Department, as now constituted, will gradually be
eliminated without interference with the equitable rights of
those now holding permanent commission in that department. The memoranda for all important orders covering the
affairs under the jurisdiction of the general staff corps will be
sent to the adjutant-generals at the War Department or at




406


MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


the various geographical and army headquarters for publication. The adjutant-generals will be relieved from the consideration of important questions, which, in the absence of
a general staff corps they have heretofore had to decide,
and will simply issue the orders as prepared by the general
staff corps, and have charge of the preparation and preservation of the records.
The inspection of money accounts is transferred to the
Treasury Department. This commends itself as a business
proposition, as the Auditor for the War Department and the
Comptroller of the Treasury are the officials who render practically all the decisions governing the financial operations of
the army. The inspection and condemnation of worn-out
public property is regarded as too insignificant a duty to
monopolize the time of the officers of the general staff corps,
and this matter can be provided for under regulations of a
very simple character.
In order to furnish a wider field of selection and some
incentive to lieutenants who have shown special aptitude in
their profession, it is asked that the few officers of that grade
who may be selected for general staff duty may be given the
rank of captain while performing such duty. The expense
of this will be very slight.
The next subject covered by the bill is the modification of
the present laws regulating promotions from the ranks to the
grade of commissioned officer. From time immemorial it has
been the custom in the army to promote from the ranks
those noncommissioned officers who had distinguished themselves in action, or who had by their conduct shown a marked
aptitude and ability for control of men. A few years prior to
the outbreak of the war with Spain, this law was changed so
as to make the promotion to vacancies in the grade of second
lieutenant open to all enlisted men, including privates and
musicians.




PROPOSED CHANGES IN THE ARMY


407


This system has produced a number of excellent young
officers, but on the other hand, a number of men have been
able, by virtue of mental aptitude and the ability to cram, to
pass these examinations and be promoted to the grade of
second lieutenant, when they did not possess the qualities
sufficient to justify their promotion to the grade of corporal
in their own organizations. While it is necessary to have a
system of examination in order that the utterly unworthy
shall not be commissioned, it is considered not in the interests
of the country to continue a system of promoting men who
have no aptitude for command and control of men.
In connection with the preliminary examination to establish their general character and qualifications, it is proposed
to send the noncommissioned officers to the General Service
and Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, for a special
course of instruction with troops, covering a period of six
months. There they will have an opportunity to exercise
command and show their proficiency as all-round soldiers.
By this system the best men will be obtained and the
unfit ones will be prevented from promotion to the commissioned list. It should be understood that after a commission
is once secured under our system of seniority promotion, it is
quite possible for a very unfit man to hold commission and
rise through the grades without possessing any great soldierly
aptitude.
Section 13 of the bill is intended to provide for those chiefs
of staff who are detailed for duty in various corps or departments, and whose positions in the regular establishment
were filled upon their detail to the head of a corps.
Section 14 modifies the law so as to enable disbursing
officers of subsistence funds to retain small amounts in their
possession for payment of public creditors.
Section 15 relates to the disposition of certain stores to
avoid loss.




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


Section 16 provides for an increase in the number of electrician sergeants. This is rendered necessary because some of
the artillery posts have more electrical appliances than can
properly be supervised by one sergeant, which is all the present law allows.
Section 18, which should be transferred so as to be section
17, and follow the section concerning electrician sergeants,
is provided to meet the emergency in the Philippines by
authorizing more first-class sergeants in the Signal Corps.
Section 17, which becomes new section 18, is intended to
extend the period during which certain volunteer surgeons
may be continued in service for duty in the Philippine
Islands.
Sections 19 and 20 relate to certain changes of law in
regard to army transports.
Section 21 relates to the modification of the act of February 2, 1901, which provided that officers of artillery should
not be promoted except as the enlisted men for that arm were
obtained. When this act was under discussion, it was contemplated that the increase in the artillery might cover a
period of five years, but the Department decided, after
thoroughly considering the subject, to make the increase in
a shorter period. This caused the promotion of the officers
to be scattered over a period of about six months, giving them
dates different from the officers of cavalry and infantry, varying from thirty days to six months. It would be just if the
commissions of officers promoted to fill original vacancies
bore the date upon which the vacancies occurred.
Section 22 provides that all patentable inventions hereafter made by army officers in active service shall be the
property of the United States.
The last section, No. 23, is intended to restore to the President the power to appoint ten cadets a year, forty in all,




PROPOSED CHANGES IN THE ARMY


409


from the country at large, to the United States Military
Academy. This was the number fixed from 1846 to a few
years ago, when, upon the reduction of the army, it was
changed to a total of ten, instead of ten per annum. Subsequently, the number allowed the President was increased to
thirty. The number of instructors and the accommodations
at the Military Academy will admit of the restoration of the
old number of ten per annum, or forty in all, and the necessities of the service require more officers with technical training
than has ever been the case in the history of the regular
army. It is earnestly recommended that the old number be
restored.
In general, the provisions of this bill contemplate modifications in the business establishment of the army of far-reaching consequences to the service and the country. The fact
that new officers are not created and that the business is to
be placed upon a more economical and satisfactory basis
should procure for this bill the serious consideration which it
deserves.
With reference to the provisions of the bill relating to a
general staff, and to a consolidation of supply departments,
I beg to call attention to the report of the commission to
investigate the conduct of the war with Spain, of which General Granville M. Dodge was president, embodied in Senate
Document No. 221, Fifty-sixth Congress, first session, and
particularly to the paragraphs headed "Authority and
responsibility," beginning at page 115 of that document,
and to the paragraphs containing the conclusions of the
report relating to the Quartermaster's Department, beginning at page 147 of the same document.
This commission made a most thorough and exhaustive
study of the lessons to be derived from the experience of the
war with Spain. It contained a number of very distinguished




410      MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY
officers both of the volunteer forces of the Civil War and of
the regular army, and its clear and emphatic conclusion that
in both respects mentioned the organization of our army requires improvement, is entitled to the highest consideration.
Very respectfully,
ELIHU ROOT,
Secretary of War.
THE CHAIRMAN COMMITTEE ON MIITARY AFFAIRS,
UNITED STATES SENATE.




THE EFFECTIVE ORGANIZATION OF
THE ARMY
STATEMENT BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON                   MILITARY
AFFAIRS, WASHINGTON, MARCH 12, 1902
Mr. Root's statement regarding the plan and purpose of the reorganization of the
army, made in a letter to the chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs,
March 3, 1902, followed several previous hearings before the House and Senate
Committees on Military Affairs, which are omitted, the substance of his remarks
appearing more fully in later hearings. On March 12, the Secretary of War appeared
before the Senate Committee to describe more fully the need for and the working of his plan. On December 13, 1902, he appeared before the House Committee
on Military Affairs; and on December 17, he appeared again before the Senate Committee. His several statements at these hearings are presented. Frequent interruptions and questions by members of the committees are omitted, except as they throw
light on the development of his argument. These omissions are indicated by...
M        R. CHAIRMAN, this bill contains two series of provisions of primary importance, together with a number
of minor provisions on separate subjects. The provisions of
primary importance are, first, a series of provisions for the
consolidation of the supply departments. The second series
of provisions is for the creation of a general staff. Both of
these provisions seem to be of very great importance - to be
necessary to an effective organization of the army. Neither
of them will require any appreciable increase in the number
of officers. They are simply a rearrangement of the present
official force in such a way as to make that force more effective; and they are merely putting on paper the lessons which
I believe have been generally deduced from observation of
the working of the present system in the war with Spain.
As to the consolidation of the supply department, we have
now a quartermaster, commissary, and pay department, each
one running by itself.
411




412


MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


The CHAIRMAN. You provided for a transportation division?
Secretary ROOT. Yes, General; there is a Quartermaster's
Department, and the Quartermaster-General has charge of
transportation. He also has charge of the purchase and
manufacture of clothing. The work of his division is in two
classes of duty, and no more. He transports his own clothing
and the feed for the horses and a considerable variety of
stores which he provides, and he also transports the subsistence which the Commissary-General provides, and the
material which the Surgeon-General provides, and the ammunition and material from the Ordnance Department. The
Paymaster-General pays the troops.
The Commissary-General pays for the food and the supplies which he has. Each one has his own machinery, and
each one has his own business; and when it comes down to
the accomplishment of any single purpose there is no one to
bring them together and see that they move step by step, and
that each one is doing his share in the accomplishment of
that purpose, except a civilian Secretary of War, who knows
nothing about it, and does not learn anything about it until
it is time for him to go out of office, if he does then.
In the successful business world work is not done in that
way. What would happen if a railroad company, or a steel
corporation, or any great business concern, should divide
its business up in that way? What would become of that
business?
The Paymaster-General several years ago had a paper
carefully prepared in which he proposed that he should take
the payment of the bills of the quartermaster and commissary. There is no reason why he should not. That means
just one step toward the consolidation. Every few weeks
when operations are active, there comes in complaint that
something has not yet arrived. Whose fault is it? The




ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY


413


Quartermaster-General blames the Commissary-General and
the Commissary-General blames the Quartermaster-General.
The Commissary-General wants leave to make his own shipments and take his own bills of lading and have the responsibility and authority to see that the supplies he is furnishing
go to their destination, without putting them through the
hands of the Quartermaster-General. Each department is
trying to get from the other details which it thinks necessary
to complete its own work; and when we consider each one's
view of the situation and the changes that ought to be made,
it is impossible not to think that they ought all to be under
one head, and that head a military man.
Some time ago, I asked the different departments if they
could not agree on this subject, and they all have agreed upon
the general proposition. They differ as to details.
In drafting this bill I have necessarily put the details down
- have arranged the method of accomplishing this result to
which they all agree - as it seemed to me was best; but I
suppose the committee will settle the details, if it considers
favorably any method. The principle of having these great
supply departments under one head is that there will be some
officer whose business it is to coordinate their action, instead
of leaving it all for the Secretary of War to do; and the question of method which is determined in the draft of the bill
may or may not be satisfactory. The method that was
adopted in the draft of the bill was to have one supply
department called the Department of Supply....
The Commissary-General thinks that there ought to be an
absolutely hard and fast line between the members of the
different divisions of the new department, just as there is now
between the different departments. The Quartermaster's
Department does not think that. They differ on that point.
I agree with the view of the Quartermaster's Department
that it should be possible to impose upon one man the duties




414


MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


of all three, although I think it is quite right that they
should be assigned to the separate divisions; that is, that one
man should be assigned to the subsistence division, another
to the finance division, and so on. But I think that the War
Department should be at liberty to impose upon one man the
various duties of all three; that is, to require the man, even
though he is assigned to the subsistence division, to do quartermaster's duty, or finance duty, wherever it is possible for
one man to do all the work; that is, there ought to be some
elasticity...
Before leaving the subject of the consolidation of the supply departments, let me say that in my judgment it will
greatly reduce the paper work necessary; it will reduce what
is sometimes spoken of as red tape. It will put it within
the power of the man at the head to accomplish results without carrying on a diplomatic correspondence between two
departments that ought to be attending to business instead
of standing off and referring matters to each other.
Now, the proposition of the bill is to make a department
called the Department of Supplies, with a major-general at
the head, and under it four divisions, the subsistence division,
the supply and construction division, which takes one-half
of the present quartermaster's duties, the transportation
division, which takes the other half of the quartermaster's
duties, and the finance division, which serves as a cashier for
the whole business. I am confident that that would prove to
be a much more practical and efficient business system than
that which we have today....
I started last year an improvement of Governor's Island
with the idea that that should be made a great depot for the
receipt and distribution of supplies, and a base for the government's use in fitting out any expedition which might be
necessary along our Atlantic coast or for the West Indies. I
got from the state of New York a grant of about seventy or




ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY


415


eighty acres of land, under shallow water which lay south
of Governor's Island. You made us an appropriation of
$260,000, for a starter and we are at work dredging to make
wharfage on the north side of the Island.
We double the area of the Island by the additional land we
are filling in, and abandoning the separate ordnance depot
there, the arsenal, and we are proposing to put up a series of
storehouses in which can be stored all the imperishable supplies necessary for a large expedition. There will be room on
the Island for troops in case we want to send out such an expedition. We can put troops on the Island and transfer them
to transports of the deepest draft, which can come up to the
wharf on the north side. That is utilizing our property.
Now, I want to know what is necessary for the fitting out
of such an expedition. To whom do I go? I cannot tell.
Military authorities have got to work it out, and it has got to
be worked out in detail. That is necessary in order to determine how the money that Congress has voted, and has put in
my discretion to expend in the construction there, shall be
expended.
There is no single officer who could answer these questions.
Indeed, I hardly know how to put the questions in detail.
They should go to some military man who will say to this
one, work out this part of the problem, and to another,
work out that, and to another, work out that. First consider
what are the ranges of possibility as to what an expedition
being fitted out there would have to do, how long a time it
would have to be absent, what kinds of supplies it would
want, and then have the amounts of the different kinds of
supplies worked out and the amount of storage room necessary for them. We must also be able to have worked out the
other things for our ordinary uses that it will be necessary to
do at that point. There is not anybody whose business it is
to do that sort of thing except the Secretary.




11~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~




THE GENERAL STAFF


STATEMENT BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY
AFFAIRS, WASHINGTON, DECEMBER 13, 1902
/M    R. CHAIRMAN and gentlemen, this bill covers but
a single subject, and has but a single purpose. It is
the establishment of a general staff corps, to be composed of
officers detailed from the army at large, under such rules as
may be prescribed by the President.
The duties of the proposed general staff corps are described
in the bill as follows:
To prepare plans for the national defense and for the mobilization of
the military forces in time of war; to investigate and report upon all
questions affecting the efficiency of the army and its state of preparation
for military operations; to render professional aid and assistance to the
Secretary of War and to general officers and other superior commanders,
and to act as their agents in informing and coordinating the acts of all
the different officers engaged in carrying out their orders, and to perform
such other duties as may be from time to time prescribed by the President.
The bill provides that the general staff corps shall consist
of one chief of staff of the army, with the rank, pay, and
allowances of a lieutenant-general, one major-general, one
brigadier-general, who, while so serving, shall have the rank,
pay, and allowances of the grade to which detailed, all of
these three to be detailed by the President from the officers
of the army at large.
Mr. HAY. Would it interfere with you, Mr. Secretary, if I
should ask some questions as you go along?
Mr. ROOT. Certainly not.
Mr. HAY. I want to ask if that clause would not create
two lieutenant-generals of the army?
Mr. ROOT. There would be two lieutenant-generals provided at any time the officer detailed by the President to be
417




418


MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


chief of the general staff were another officer than the permanent Lieutenant-General. There would then be the same
situation which existed in the latter part of the Civil War,
when General Grant was in command of the army in the
field and General Halleck was chief of staff conducting the
administration at Washington. If, however, the President
did, as he undoubtedly would do under this bill at the outset,
detail the Lieutenant-General of the Army to be the chief of
staff, then there would be only one lieutenant-general. That
is to say, the provision affords an opportunity for adjustment
to meet the exigencies of the times...
The bill provides further that there shall be in the general
staff four colonels, six lieutenant-colonels, twelve majors, and
twenty captains, these to be detailed from the officers of the
army at large, the captains to be detailed from officers
of the grades of captain or first lieutenant, the details all to
be for a period of four years, unless sooner relieved; and it
provides that while serving in the general staff, corps officers
may be temporarily assigned to duty with any branch of the
army. That is the outline of the general staff corps.
Other provisions of the bill are designed to adjust the working of that corps to the working of the present organization.
A portion of the members of the corps would be stationed in
Washington to conduct the general business falling under the
heads enumerated in the description of duties, which I have
already read, and a portion of them, the larger portion of
them, would be assigned to the different departments to
serve under the direction of the different commanders, but
maintaining their relations to the general staff corps, and
reporting to the chief of staff now in Washington, very much
as the assistant inspectors-general now report to the inspector-general, with the difference that the chief of staff and
his assistants in Washington would be charged with advising
the President or the Secretary of War of the matters in regard




THE GENERAL STAFF


419


to which the reports showed action ought to be taken, and,
under the direction of the President or the Secretary of War,
seeing to it that those matters received attention.
Let me call your attention for a moment to the reason for
asking you to authorize the formation of such a body of officers. We have an army excellent in its personnel, not surpassed, I believe, anywhere, in the intelligence, capacity, and
devotion to duty of its enlisted men and its officers. We have
the various departments of administration organized each
within itself, and well enough organized for the performance
of its specific duties, and we have at the head of those departments men of capacity and fidelity. The Quartermaster's
Department is engaged faithfully and efficiently in conducting the transportation of the army, in supplying clothing and
forage and doing construction work and a great variety of
other duties. The Subsistence Department is engaged, with
ability and fidelity, in furnishing the food of the army. The
Signal Corps is in like manner and with conspicuous ability
performing the duties of maintaining communications, building telegraph lines and operating them, and training men to
do signal work.
I can go through the different branches of administration
and make the same statements regarding each particular
corps, department, and bureau organization. We have a
nation with great wealth, willing to spend its money freely
for the procurement of arms and munitions of war and supplies of all kinds. Nevertheless, no one can fail to see that
there has been in the past, in the administration of the army,
something which was out of joint. It is not necessary for me
to go into the specification of details; for every one of us
knows that whenever an exigency has come, confusion has
come; and that confusion, while it is not so prominent, while
it does not attract public attention to such a degree as in the
days when the newspapers were full of scare headlines about




420


MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


the condition of affairs at Tampa, nevertheless exists in the
yearly and daily transactions of the business of the War
Department. The confusion comes from the fact that our
organization is weak at the top. It does not make adequate
provision for a directing and coordinating control. It does
not make provision for an adequate force to see that these
branches of the administrative staff and the different
branches of the line pull together, so that the work of each
one will fit in with the work of every other one, and bring out
the result which always has to be the result of the conspiring
of a great number of people doing a great number of duties.
While I say that the organization is weak at the top, I am
not criticising any one at the top. It is weak at the top because the system is defective; because there is a distribution
of powers and no coordination of the exercise of powers provided for in the system. That coordination cannot be done
by any one man. It is a vast and difficult work, which can be
done only by a body of men organized for that purpose and
having no other duties to perform; and in all the armies of
the civilized world that duty is, and during our lifetime has
been, performed by a body of men who have come to be called
a General Staff,- to be called a General Staff because their
duties are staff duties and because their duties are general,
pertaining to the general conduct of affairs, and not merely to
the work of the Quartermaster's Department, as General
Ludington's duties are; not merely to the work of the Ordnance Department, as General Crozier's duties are, but pertaining to the entire work.
THE GENERAL STAFF
Extract from the Report of the Secretary of War for 1902 1
The most important thing to be done now for the regular
army is the creation of a general staff. I beg to call attention
1 Page 42.




THE GENERAL STAFF


v 421


to the remarks made upon this subject under the head of
"Improvement of Army Organization" in the report for
1899 and under the head of " General Staff" in the report
for 1901. Since the report for 1899 was made many of the
important measures then recommended for the greater efficiency of the army have been accomplished or are in course
of accomplishment under authority conferred by legislation.
Our military system is, however, still exceedingly defective
at the top. We have a personnel unsurpassed anywhere, and
a population ready to respond to calls for the increase of the
personnel in case of need, up to the full limit at which it is
possible to transport and feed an army. We have wealth
and a present willingness to expend it reasonably for the
procurement of supplies and material of war as plentiful and
as good as can be found in any country. We have the
different branches of the military service well organized,
each within itself, for the performance of its duties. Our
administrative staff and supply departments, as a rule, have
at their heads good and competent men, faithful to their
duties, each attending assiduously to the business of his
department.
But when we come to the coordination and direction of all
these means and agencies of warfare, so that all parts of the
machine shall work true together, we are weak. Our system
makes no adequate provision for the directing brain which
every army must have, to work successfully. Common
experience has shown that this cannot be furnished by any
single man without assistants, and that it requires a body of
officers working together under the direction of a chief and
entirely separate from and independent of the administrative
staff of an army (such as the adjutants, quartermasters, commissaries, etc., each of whom is engrossed in the duties of his
own special department). This body of officers, in distinction from the administrative staff, has come to be called a




MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


general staff. There has been much misunderstanding as to
the nature and duties of a general staff. Brigadier-General
Theodore Schwan, in his work on the organization of the
German army, describes it as follows:
In Prussia, at least, the term has been exclusively and distinctively
applied, since about 1789, to a body of officers to whom, as assistants to
the commander-in-chief and to his subordinate generals, is confided such
work as is directly connected with the designing and execution of military
operations. That in Germany, as elsewhere, chiefs of special arms, heads
of supply departments, judge-advocates, etc., form an important branch
of the higher commands, goes without saying, but they are not included in
the term "general staff." Clausewitz's dictum that the general staff is
intended to convert the ideas of the commanding general into orders, not
only by communicating the former to the troops, but rather by working
out all matters of detail, and thus relieving the general from a vast amount
of unnecessary labor, is not a sufficient definition of general staff duties,
according to Von Schellendorf (upon this question certainly the better
authority), as it fails to notice the important obligation of the general
staff officer of constantly watching over the effectiveness of the troops,
which would be impaired by a lack of attention to their material welfare.
Out of this obligation grows, he says, the further duty of furnishing to the
heads of the supply departments and other officers attached to headquarters such explanations touching the general military situation, or the
effect of a sudden change therein, as will enable them to carry out intelligently what is expected of them. The general staff thus becomes a directing and explaining body, and its chief, therefore, is in some respects the
head of the whole staff. It follows that of the two terms, staff and general
staff, the Germans regard the former as the more comprehensive one and
as embracing the latter.
It is conceded on all hands that the almost phenomenal success that
has attended the German (Prussian) arms during the last thirty years is
due in a large degree to the corps of highly trained general staff officers
which the German army possesses.
Neither our political nor our military system makes it
suitable that we should have a general staff organized like
the German general staff or like the French general staff;
but the common experience of mankind is that the things
which those general staffs do, have to be done in every wellmanaged and well-directed army, and they have to be done




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by a body of men especially assigned to do them. We should
have such a body of men selected and organized in our own
way and in accordance with our own system to do those
essential things. The most intelligible way to describe such
a body of men, however selected and organized, is by calling
it a general staff, because its duties are staff duties and are
general in their character.
The duties of such a body of officers can be illustrated by
taking for example an invasion of Cuba, such as we were all
thinking about a few years ago. It is easy for a President, or
a general acting under his direction, to order that 50,000 or
100,000 men proceed to Cuba and capture Havana. To make
an order which has any reasonable chance of being executed
he must do a great deal more than that. He must determine
how many men shall be sent and how they shall be divided
among the different arms of the service, and how they shall
be armed, and equipped; and to do that he must get all the
information possible about the defenses of the place to be
captured and the strength and character and armament of
the forces to be met. He must determine at what points
and by what routes the place shall be approached, and at
what points his troops shall land in Cuba; and for this purpose he must be informed about the various harbors of the
island and the depth of their channels; what classes of vessels
can enter them; what the facilities for landing are; how
they are defended; the character of the roads leading from
them to the place to be attacked; the character of the intervening country; how far it is healthful or unhealthful; what
the climate is liable to be at the season of the proposed
movement; the temper and sympathies of the inhabitants;
the quantity and kind of supplies that can be obtained from
the country; the extent to which transportation can be
obtained, and a great variety of other things which will go
to determine whether it is better to make the approach from




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one point or from another, and to determine what it will be
necessary for the army to carry with it in order to succeed
in moving and living and fighting.
All this information it is the business of a general staff to
procure and present. It is probable that there would be in
such case a number of alternative plans, each having certain
advantages and disadvantages, and these should be worked
out each by itself, with the reasons for and against it, and
presented to the President or general for his determination.
This the general staff should do. This cannot be done in an
hour. It requires that the staff shall have been at work for
a long time collecting the information and arranging it and
getting it in form to present. Then at home, where the
preparation for the expedition is to be made, the order must
be based upon a knowledge of the men and material available
for its execution; how many men there are who can be
devoted to that purpose, from what points they are to be
drawn, what bodies of troops ought to be left or sent elsewhere, and what bodies may be included in the proposed
expedition; whether there are ships enough to transport
them; where they are to be obtained; whether they are
properly fitted up; what more should be done to them;
what are the available stocks of clothing, arms and ammunition, and engineers' material, and horses and wagons, and
all the innumerable supplies and munitions necessary for a
large expedition; how are the things to be supplied which
are not ready, but which are necessary, and how long time
will be required to supply them.
All this and much more necessary information it is the
business of a general staff to supply. When that has been
done the order is made with all available knowledge of all
the circumstances upon which the movement depends for its
success. It is then the business of a general staff to see that
every separate officer upon whose action the success of the




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movement depends understands his share in it and does not
lag behind in the performance of that share; to see that
troops and ships and animals and supplies of arms and
ammunition and clothing and food, etc., from hundreds of
sources, come together at the right times and places. It is
a laborious, complicated, and difficult work, which requires
a considerable number of men whose special business it is
and who are charged with no other duties.
It was the lack of such a body of men doing that kind of
work which led to the confusion attending the Santiago
expedition in the summer of 1898. The confusion at Tampa
and elsewhere was the necessary result of having a large
number of men, each of them doing his own special work the
best he could, but without any adequate force of officers
engaged in seeing that they pulled together according to
detailed plans made beforehand. Such a body of men doing
general staff duty is just as necessary to prepare an army
properly for war in time of peace as it is in time of war. It
is not an executive body; it is not an administrative body;
it acts only through the authority of others. It makes
intelligent command possible by procuring and arranging
information and working out plans in detail, and it makes
intelligent and effective execution of commands possible by
keeping all the separate agents advised of the parts they are
to play in the general scheme....
It does not follow, however, that the principal and most
trusted general of the army cannot exercise a great and
commanding influence in the control of the army, and practically manage it in all military matters. What does follow
is that he can do this only by abandoning the idea of independent command and by assuming the position and performing the functions which I have described as belonging
to a chief of staff. General Schofield did this with entire
success and rendered great service to the country by doing




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


so. I quote his own words in describing the course he
followed:
Recent experience has served to confirm all the results of my life-long
study and large experience that the proper position for the senior officer
of the army on duty at Washington is not that of commanding general,
a position which is practically impossible, but that of general-in-chief,
which means in fact chief of staff to the President. The title of generalin-chief was a permanent one during the entire history of the country up
to the time when General Grant became Lieutenant-General.
When I became the commanding general I addressed to the President
a letter in which I pointed out to him what had been the result of my
study and experience, saying that the only way was to abandon entirely,
which I did during my seven years of service, all pretense of being the
commanding general and to content myself with acting as the chief of
staff of the army under the Secretary of War and the President. The
result was that perfect harmony prevailed during my time, and I did
exercise a legitimate influence in command cf the army, this because I
did not claim to exercise anything which the law did not give me.
Everybody is not as self-restrained and sensible as General
Schofield, and the best way to secure from others the same
kind of good service that he rendered, is to give the officer
from whom it is expected a designation which indicates what
he is really to do.
ORGANIZATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF
Extract from the Report of the Secretary of War for 1903 1
The important military event of the year affecting the
regular army has been the reorganization of the system of
military control under the General Staff Act approved February 14, 1903. This Act abolished the separate office of
General Commanding the Army, provided for a military
Chief of Staff to the President, who, acting under the
directions of the President, or of the Secretary of War
representing him, should have supervision not only of all
troops of the line but of the special staff and supply departments which had theretofore reported directly to the Secre1 Page 3.




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tary of War; and it created for the assistance of the Chief
of Staff a corps of forty-four officers, who were relieved from
all other duties. The function of this new corps is described
by the statute in the following words:
SEC. 2. That the duties of the General Staff Corps shall be to prepare
plans for the national defense and for the mobilization of the military
forces in time of war; to investigate and report upon all questions affecting the efficiency of the army and its state of preparation for military operations; to render professional aid and assistance to the Secretary of War
and to general officers and other superior commanders, and to act as their
agents in informing and coordinating the action of all the different officers
who are subject, under the terms of this Act, to the supervision of the
Chief of Staff; and to perform such other military duties not otherwise
assigned by law as may be from time to time prescribed by the President.
Although, by its terms, the Act was not to take effect until
August 15, 1903, it was obvious that this radical change in
the administration of military affairs, and the adjustment of
the new machinery to the old machinery which had been in
operation for many years, would require a vast number of
details to be worked out experimentally and upon full consideration by all the officers whose duties were affected. A
board was accordingly convened in March to recommend
selections for the new corps. It consisted of Generals Young,
Chaffee, John C. Bates, Carter, Bliss, and Randolph, and
Major Henry A. Greene, as recorder. The board was required under oath to recommend forty-two officers for detail
upon their merits as exhibited by their military records.
The order which convened the board also provided that
vacancies occurring in the General Staff Corps, after its
organization, should be filled upon the recommendation of a
permanent board consisting of the Chief of Staff and the three
senior officers of the General Staff Corps on duty at the War
Department, operating in a similar manner....
Upon the report of this board its recommendations were
approved without change, and the officers selected were




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


ordered to Washington to report to General Young, who was
to be the first Chief of Staff. They were then organized as an
experimental or provisional General Staff, and directed to
work out a permanent organization and distribution of duties
for the General Staff Corps, a draft of new regulations, and a
revision of the old regulations made necessary by the new
departure. This work was done upon full consultation with
the chiefs of bureaus and taking the opinions of general officers
commanding departments, and was accompanied by reference to the provisional staff organization of many tasks and
problems to be worked out which were appropriate for General Staff action, in order that they might become familiar
with their work, and test by experiment the best methods of
accomplishing it. In this way when the act took effect on the
fifteenth of August the General Staff was ready to enter upon
the discharge of its duties with a fully considered organization, distribution of duties and regulations, and a considerable familiarity with the new duties which its members were
to perform.
The regulations which govern the operation of the new
corps were adopted on the third of August. They divide the
corps into the War Department General Staff and the General Staff serving with troops (that is to say, in time of peace
with the generals commanding geographical departments),
and they prescribe the duties and relations of each of the two
classes.
The tenth article of the regulations relating to the Chief of
Staff states explicitly the new theory of control inaugurated
by the General Staff Act. It will be remembered that our
old plan of army administration was that there should be a
General Commanding the Army in peace as well as in war,
responsible for the efficiency, discipline, and conduct of the
troops, but having no control over finances or the departments of supply and transportation; and that there should be




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a Secretary of War controlling the finances and the moneyspending bureaus, but not commanding the army or responsible for the conduct of purely military affairs; and it will
be remembered that the result of attempting to work upon
that theory of dual and separate responsibility was almost
constant discord and a consequent reduction of efficiency.
The new theory is stated by the regulation. (See Regulation
10, page 437.)...
It will be perceived that we are here providing for civilian
control over the military arm, but for civilian control to be
exercised through a single military expert of high rank, who
is provided with an adequate corps of professional assistants
to aid him in the performance of his duties, and who is bound
to use all his professional skill and knowledge in giving effect
to the purposes and general directions of his civilian superior,
or make way for another expert who will do so.
In this way it is hoped that the problem of reconciling
civilian control with military efficiency with which we have
been struggling for so many years will be solved....
The general plan contemplates that every subject requiring investigation and study shall be worked out first by the
officers assigned to the appropriate division and section of
the staff, and, when of sufficient importance, shall then be
considered by a general staff council composed of the three
general officers of the corps and the heads of the three divisions, and shall then be acted upon by the Chief of Staff, or
laid before the Secretary of War by him with his recommendation. It is gratifying to report that the new system of
control has been accompanied by most harmonious effort
and cheerful good will on the part of the members of the
General Staff, the chiefs of all the War Department bureaus,
and the officers of the army at large. In some cases the intervention of the Chief of Staff and his assistants has resulted
in an apparent diminution of the independent authority of




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


other officers. This has been received almost universally
with a cheerful readiness to subordinate personal considerations to the good of the service. The exceptions have been so
few and unimportant as to justify the belief that they will
soon disappear.
Much of the work upon which the General Staff has been
employed is of a confidential nature, not to be exhibited in a
report which is to become a public document. Most of the
work involves questions which require investigation and the
collection of data; or involves several supply and construction departments, and therefore could not properly be determined by any one such department; or calls for expert opinion
upon military policy or needs. Of especial importance may
be noted the general subject of the distribution of troops, and
the location, construction, and enlargement of army posts;
the plan for the attendance of militia officers upon military
schools and colleges of the regular army; the detail of student officers to the General Service and Staff College; the
location of military posts in Porto Rico; the reorganization
of field batteries; the prevention of desertions; the organization of maneuver divisions and plans for mobilization at West
Point, Kentucky, and Fort Riley; the purchase of lands for
posts and coast fortifications; the revision of Army Regulations; the revision of Infantry Drill Regulations; the location
of a brigade post on the Niagara River; the examination and
revision of army appropriation estimates; the details of
officers for duty at military academies and colleges; regulations for muster of militia into the service of the United
States; reclassification and carding of the professional data
on file in the military information division; organization of
Alaskan militia; the rearrangement of territorial departments; the composition, duties, and limits of the principal
permanent boards in the army; the study of the storage and
supply depots of all kinds with reference to the prompt and




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effective collection and distribution of supplies in case of war;
the revision of the Articles of War for submission to Congress,
adapting them to meet modern conditions and requirements;
the study in detail of the supplies necessary for active military operations, including the stock on hand, the productive
capacity of Government manufacturers and of private manufacturers, the sources of raw material, and the length of time
necessary for production in requisite quantities; and an
inquiry into all the elements of cost for seacoast defenses up
to this time, and the prospective cost of continuance and
maintenance.
Special credit is due to Brigadier-General William H.
Carter for the exceptional ability and untiring industry
which he has contributed to the work of devising, bringing
about, and putting into operation the General Staff law. He
brought thorough and patient historical research and wide
experience, both in the line and the staff, to the aid of longcontinued, anxious, and concentrated thought upon the problem of improving military administration, and if the new
system shall prove to be an improvement the gain to the
country will have been largely due to him.
JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BOARD
Extract from the Report of the Secretary of War for 1903 1
Following the same line of policy which led to the organization of the General Staff, the Secretaries of War and the Navy
entered into an arrangement, with the approval of the President, which was published to the army in General Orders
No. 107.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
GENERAL ORDERS,           ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
No. 107.                    WASHINGTON, July 20, 1903.
By direction of the Secretary of War, the following order is published
to the army for the information and guidance of all concerned:
1 Page 8.




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


"July 17, 1903.
"The Department of War and the Department of the Navy have
agreed upon the formation of a joint board to be composed of four officers
of the Army and four officers of the Navy, to hold stated sessions and such
extraordinary sessions as shall appear advisable for the purpose of conferring upon, discussing, and reaching common conclusions regarding all
matters calling for the cooperation of the two services. Any matters
which seem to either Department to call for such consideration may be
referred by that Department to the board thus formed. All reports of
the board shall be made in duplicate, one to each Department. All
reports and proceedings of the board shall be confidential. The senior
member of the board present will preside at its meetings and the junior
member of the board present will act as its recorder.
" On the recommendation of the provisional General Staff of the Army
the following officers are detailed by the Secretary of War to serve upon
the board:
" Major-General S. B. M. Young
"Major-General Henry C. Corbin
" Brigadier-General Tasker H. Bliss
" Brigadier-General Wallace F. Randolph
"On the recommendation of the General Board of the Navy the
following officers are detailed by the Secretary of the Navy to serve upon
the board:
" Admiral of the Navy George Dewey
" Rear-Admiral Henry C. Taylor
" Captain John E. Pillsbury
" Commander William J. Barnette
" ELIHU ROOT, Secretary of War.
"WILLIAM H. MOODY, Secretary of the Navy.
By command of Lieutenant-General Miles:   W. P. HALL,
Acting Adjutant-General."
The common understanding and mutual assistance between the two services, which it is within the power of this
board to bring about, may be made to cover a wide range of
subjects of great public importance, including the parts to be
taken by the military and naval forces, respectively, in case of
military operations on the seaboards and on navigable lakes
and rivers; artillery defense of naval stations and naval defensive aid to seacoast fortifications; the exchange of information obtained by one branch of the service and useful for




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both; the manufacture or purchase of cannon, projectiles,
explosives, small arms, ammunition, and munitions of war
generally available for both services; the purchase and transportation of supplies; the transportation of men upon changes
of station; the study and discussion of joint military and
naval problems. In all these, and in many other respects,
much greater efficiency, at much less cost, can be obtained
by cooperation and mutual understanding than by separate
services working in entire independence of each other. If the
two forces are ever to be called upon to cooperate, the time
to determine what each shall do, and the time for each to
learn what the other can do, is before the exigency arises. It
is hoped that this joint board, which is so constituted as to
command the assistance of the General Staff in both arms of
the service for the working out of its problems, will contribute materially toward the end desired.
AN ACT TO INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE ARMY
CHAP. 553. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That there is hereby
established a General Staff Corps, to be composed of officers detailed from
the Army at large, under such rules as may be prescribed by the President.
SECT. 2. That the duties of the General Staff Corps shall be to prepare plans for the national defense and for the mobilization of the military
forces in time of war; to investigate and report upon all questions affecting the efficiency of the Army and its state of preparation for military
operations; to render professional aid and assistance to the Secretary of
War and to general officers and other superior commanders, and to act
as their agents in informing and coordinating the action of all the different
officers who are subject under the terms of this Act to the supervision of
the Chief of Staff; and to perform such other military duties not otherwise assigned by law as may be from time to time prescribed by the
President.
SECT. 3. That the General Staff Corps shall consist of one Chief of
Staff and two general officers, all to be detailed by the President from
officers of the Army at large not below the grade of brigadier-general;
four colonels, six lieutenant-colonels, and twelve majors, to be detailed
from the corresponding grades of the Army at large, under such rules for




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


selection as the President may prescribe; twenty captains, to be detailed
from officers of the Army at large of the grades of captain or first lieutenant,
who while so serving shall have the rank, pay, and allowances-of captain
mounted. All officers detailed in the General Staff Corps shall be detailed
therein for periods of four years, unless sooner relieved. While serving
in the General Staff Corps, officers may be temporarily assigned to duty
with any branch of the Army. Upon being relieved from duty in the
General Staff Corps, officers shall return to the branch of the Army in
which they hold permanent commission, and no officer shall be eligible
to a further detail in the General Staff Corps until he shall have served
two years with the branch of the Army in which commissioned, except in
case of emergency or in time of war.
SECT. 4. That the Chief of Staff, under the direction of the President
or of the Secretary of War, under the direction of the President, shall
have supervision of all troops of the line and of the Adjutant-General's,
Inspector-General's, Judge-Advocate's, Quartermaster's, Subsistence,
Medical, Pay, and Ordnance Departments, the Corps of Engineers, and
the Signal Corps, and shall perform such other military duties not otherwise assigned by law as may be assigned to him by the President. Duties
now prescribed by statute for the Commanding General of the Army as a
member of the Board of Ordnance and Fortification and of the Board of
Commissioners of the Soldiers' Home shall be performed by the Chief of
Staff or other officer designated by the President. Acts and parts of Acts
authorizing aids-de-camp and military secretaries shall not apply to
general officers of the General Staff Corps.
SECT. 5. That the Chief of Artillery shall hereafter serve as an additional member of the General Staff and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate shall have the rank, pay, and allowances of a brigadiergeneral and when the next vacancy occurs in the office of brigadier-general
of the line, it shall not be filled, and thereafter the number of brigadiergenerals of the line, exclusive of the Chief of Artillery, shall not exceed
fourteen; and the provisions of the foregoing sections of this Act shall
take effect August fifteenth, nineteen hundred and three.'
Approved, February 14, 1903.
REGULATIONS OF THE GENERAL STAFF2
WAR DEPARTMENT, August 3, 1903.
The President directs that the following additional Regulations for
the Army, numbered from one to twenty, inclusive, be published for the
government of all concerned, and that they be strictly observed:
1 United States Statutes at Large, Fifty-seventh Congress, Vol. 32, Part 1,
pages 830-831.
2 Report of the Secretary of War for 1903, Appendix C, page 63.




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GENERAL STAFF CORPS
COMPOSITION
1. The General Staff Corps, created in conformity to the act of Congress approved February 14, 1903, is composed of officers of the grades
and number specified in said act, detailed for service in said corps for a
period of four years unless sooner relieved, under rules of selection prescribed by the President. Upon being relieved from duty in the General
Staff Corps officers return to the branch of the Army in which they hold
permanent commissions, and, except in case of emergency or in time of
war, are not eligible to further detail therein until they have served for
two years with the branch of the Army in which commissioned. This
ineligibility does not apply to any officer who has been relieved prior to
the expiration of four years' duty with the corps; but such officer will
become ineligible as soon as he shall have completed a total of four years
of said duty. While serving in the General Staff Corps officers may be
temporarily assigned to duty with any branch of the Army.
RELATIONS
2. The law establishes the General Staff Corps as a separate and distinct staff organization, with supervision, under superior authority, over
all branches of the military service, line and staff, except such as are
exempted therefrom by law or regulations, with a view to their coordination and harmonious cooperation in the execution of authorized military
policies.
DUTIES
3. The General Staff Corps, under the direction of the Chief of Staff,
is charged with the duty of investigating and reporting upon all questions
affecting the efficiency of the Army and its state of preparation for military operations, and to this end considers and reports upon all questions
relating to organization, distribution, equipment, armament, and training
of the military forces (Regulars, Volunteers, and Militia), proposed legislative enactments and general and special regulations affecting the Army,
transportation, communications, quarters, and supplies; prepares projects for maneuvers; revises estimates for appropriations for the support
of the Army and advises as to disbursement of such appropriations;
exercises supervision over inspections, military education and instruction,
examinations for the appointment and promotion of officers, efficiency
records, details and assignments, and all orders and instructions originating
in the course of administration in any branch of the service which have
relation to the efficiency of the military forces; prepares important orders
and correspondence embodying the orders and instructions of the President and Secretary of War to the Army; reviews the reports of examining




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


and retiring boards; and acts upon such other matters as the Secretary
of War may determine.
4. The General Staff Corps, under like direction, is further charged
with the duty of preparing plans for the national defense and for the
mobilization of the military forces (including the assignment to armies,
corps, divisions, and other headquarters of the necessary quota of general
staff and other staff officers), and incident thereto with the study of
possible theaters of war and of strategic questions in general; with the
collection of military information of foreign countries and of our own;
the preparation of plans of campaign, of reports of campaigns, battles,
engagements and expeditions, and of technical histories of military operations of the United States.
5. To officers of the General Staff Corps are committed the further
duties of rendering professional aid and assistance to the Secretary of
War and to general officers and other superior commanders and of acting
as their agents in informing and coordinating the action of all the different
officers who are subject under the provisions of law to the supervision of
the Chief of Staff.
They perform such other military duties not otherwise assigned by
law as may from time to time be prescribed by the President. Under the
authority here conferred officers of the General Staff Corps are intrusted
with the executive duties hereinafter indicated.
6. Officers of the General Staff Corps assigned to duty with commanders of armies, corps, divisions, separate brigades, territorial divisions, and departments are collectively denominated the General Staff
serving with troops. They serve under the immediate orders of such
commander; those not so assigned perform duty under the immediate
direction of the Chief of Staff, and constitute the War Department
General Staff.
7. The foregoing assignment of duties to the General Staff Corps does
not involve in any degree the impairment of the initiative and responsibility which special staff corps and departments now have in the transaction of current business.
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
Organization
8. To facilitate the performance of its duties the War Department
General Staff will be arranged in divisions, each under the direction of an
officer of the General Staff Corps to be designated by the Chief of Staff.
Each division will be subdivided into sections as may be directed by the
Chief of Staff.




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437


Relations and Duties
9. The War Department General Staff in its several divisions and
sections stands in an advisory relation to the Chief of Staff in the performance of the duties herein devolved upon him. The distribution of
duties to the several divisions and sections is regulated by the Chief
of Staff.
CHIEF OF STAFF
Relations and Selection
10. Under the act of February 14, 1903, the command of the Army
of the United States rests with the constitutional Commander-in-Chief,
the President. The President will place parts of the Army, and separate
armies whenever constituted, under commanders subordinate to his
general command; and, in case of exigency seeming to him to require it,
he may place the whole Army under a single commander subordinate to
him; but in time of peace and under ordinary conditions the administration and control of the Army are effected without any second in command.
The President's command is exercised through the Secretary of War
and the Chief of Staff. The Secretary of War is charged with carrying
out the policies of the President in military affairs. He directly represents
the President and is bound always to act in conformity to the President's
instructions. Under the law and the decisions of the Supreme Court his
acts are the President's acts, and his directions and orders are the President's directions and orders.
The Chief of Staff reports to the Secretary of War, acts as his military
adviser, receives from him the directions and orders given in behalf of
the President, and gives effect thereto in the manner hereinafter provided.
Exceptions to this ordinary course of administration may, however,
be made at any time by special direction of the President if he sees fit
to call upon the Chief of Staff to give information or advice, or receive
instructions, directly.
Wherever in these regulations action by the President is referred to,
the action of the President through the Secretary of War is included,
and wherever the action of the Secretary of War is referred to the Secretary of War is deemed to act as the representative of the President and
under his directions.
The Chief of Staff is detailed by the President from officers of the Army
at large not below the grade of brigadier-general. The successful performance of the duties of the position requires what the title denotes - a
relation of absolute confidence and personal accord and sympathy between
the Chief of Staff and the President, and necessarily also between the
Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War. For this reason, without any
reflection whatever upon the officer detailed, the detail will in every case




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


cease, unless sooner terminated, on the day following the expiration of
the term of office of the President by whom the detail is made; and if at
any time the Chief of Staff considers that he can no longer sustain toward
the President and the Secretary of War the relations above described,
it will be his duty to apply to be relieved.
The provisions of paragraph 1, regarding the re-detail of an officer who
has not completed a total of four years' service, apply to the Chief of Staff.
Duties
11. The Chief of Staff is charged with the duty of supervising, under
the direction of the Secretary of War, all troops of the line, the Adjutant-General's, Inspector-General's, Judge-Advocate-General's, Quartermaster's, Subsistence, Medical, Pay, and Ordnance Departments, the
Corps of Engineers, and the Signal Corps. He performs such other military duties not otherwise assigned by law as may be assigned to him by
the President.
12. The supervisory power vested by statute in the Chief of Staff
covers primarily duties pertaining to the command, discipline, training,
and recruitment of the Army, military operations, distribution of troops,
inspections, armament, fortifications, military education and instruction,
and kindred matters, but includes also, in an advisory capacity, such
duties connected with fiscal administration and supply as are committed
to him by the Secretary of War.
In respect to all duties within the scope of his supervisory power, and
more particularly those duties enumerated in this and the following paragraph, he makes and causes to be made inspections to determine defects
which may exist in any matter affecting the efficiency of the Army and its
state of preparation for war. He keeps the Secretary of War constantly
informed of defects discovered, and under his direction issues the necessary
instructions for their correction.
13. Supervisory power is conferred upon the Chief of Staff over all
matters arising in the execution of acts of Congress and executive regulations made in pursuance thereof relating to the militia. This supervision
is especially directed to matters of organization, armament, equipment,
discipline, training, and inspections. Proposed legal enactments and
regulations affecting the militia and estimates for appropriations for its
support are considered by him, and his recommendations submitted to
the Secretary of War.
14. The Chief of Staff is charged with the duty of informing the
Secretary of War as to the qualifications of officers as determined by
their records, with a view to proper selection for special details, assignments, and promotions, including detail to and relief from the General




THE GENERAL STAFF


439


Staff Corps; also of presenting recommendations for the recognition of
special or'distinguished services.
15. All orders and instructions emanating from the War Department
and all regulations are issued by the Secretary of War through the Chief
of Staff and are communicated to troops and individuals in the military
service through the Adjutant-General.
16. The assignment of officers of the General Staff Corps to stations
and duties is made upon the recommendation of the Chief of Staff.
17. In case of absence or disability of the Chief of Staff the senior
officer of the General Staff present for duty in Washington shall act as
such chief unless otherwise specially directed by the Secretary of War.
18. In the performance of the duties hereinbefore enumerated and in
representation of superior authority, the Chief of Staff calls for information, makes investigations, issues instructions, and exercises all other
functions necessary to proper harmony and efficiency of action upon the
part of those placed under his supervision.
THE GENERAL STAFF SERVING WITH TROOPS
Composition
19. The general staff of a command consists of general staff officers
of such number and grades as may be assigned to it on the recommendation of the Chief of Staff.
Duties
20. General staff officers serving with troops are employed under the
direction of the commanders thereof, upon the duties hereinbefore prescribed for officers of the General Staff Corps and provided by the second
section of the act of February 14, 1903, and they shall perform such other
duties within the scope of general staff employment as may be directed
by such commanders. They will not be assigned to other than general
staff duties except by special authority of the Secretary of War.
ELIHU ROOT,
Secretary of War.




I



THE BEGINNING OF THE NEW MILITIA
SYSTEM
THE ACT TO PROMOTE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE MILITIA
The need for some well defined scheme for the coordination and cooperation of
the regular army with the state militia and volunteers in case of war had been
demonstrated both in the Civil War and in the war with Spain. Secretary Root
called attention to this subject in his annual report for 1899, and urged the necessity
of legislation under which in such an emergency the regulars and volunteers should
constitute " a homogeneous body, using the same arms, familiar with the same drill,
answering to the same ideas of discipline, inspired by the same spirit, and capable of
an equal and even performance." The Act of March 2, 1899, under which the army
serving in the Philippines was created, partly out of the old regular force, partly by
new recruits in the regular establishment, and partly by additional volunteer regiments, was a long step toward the attainment of this homogeneity. Mr. Root
returned to the subject in his annual reports for 1901 and 1903, with the result that
on January 21, 1903, there was passed by Congress " an act to Promote the Efficiency of the Militia and for other purposes," which was supplemented by an appropriation of $2,000,000 in the Army Appropriation Act of March 2, 1903. In his
annual report for 1903, Secretary Root outlines in detail his ideas of the plan and
method of the reorganization of the state militia, which should be effected under
this act. The act in question is quoted in full at the close of this section.
That later thought and observation finally strengthened the views regarding the
National Guard to be found in Mr. Root's reports as Secretary of War, is shown by
the following passages from a letter to Mr. Robert Bacon, which Mr. Root wrote
to be read before the annual meeting of the National Security League, held in
Washington, January 20, 21, 22, 1916:
It is idle to talk of developing the National Guard itself into an adequate
army for national defense, and any such attempt would inevitably result in the
failure of the whole movement and the waste of all the energy and effort
devoted to it. The National Guard are primarily state troops for state purposes, and they must continue to be so. The power to raise them and to train
them and to appoint their officers rests with the separate states. Under the
enlightened policy of the militia act of January 1, 1903, they have been fitted
to render most useful service, primarily in coast defense, in cooperation with the
national army in time of war. In the time of peace they are rendering a most
useful service, by training in the elements of military service a great number of
young Americans, to whom the President may turn when he seeks suitable
men to be appointed officers in the national army.
The idea, however, that these forty-eight different bodies of troops, with
officers appointed by forty-eight different governors, can be made the basis for
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developing an effective mobile national army, is quite absurd;, An effective
army must be built up on the principle of complete unity of control. This can
never be attained by developing forty-eight different bodies under forty-eight
different governors, and, up to the time of war, under the direction of fortyeight different commanders-in-chief. This characteristic of the National Guard
cannot be changed except by amending the Constitution of the United States,
which, if practicable, would require many years, and if that were done, the
result would simply be, not to develop an army upon the National Guard, but
to destroy the National Guard, and to develop an army on an entirely different
basis.
It seems perfectly clear to me that any effort in the direction of developing
a National Guard into the required national army of defense will be worse than
thrown away, because it will result in the miscarriage of the whole effort.
Let me add another practical observation. The proposal to create an adequate national army of defense involves a good deal of a shock to many Americans who do not appreciate the reasons for the great enlargement of our military
forces. Many of them are afraid of militarism; they are incredulous as to the
necessity; they are disinclined to incur the expense. The progress of the cause
in which you are enlisted requires a good deal of education, and many, I fear,
alas, need to have the true spirit of American patriotism reawakened in
them.
The same view is true as to the navy. Building up the military and naval
establishments to the point where they ought to be will be slow work, and we
ought to begin without further delay. The people of the country will deal with
their representatives for all inadequacies and shortcomings in this vital matter.
But in the meanwhile let us take the first steps on any sort of a programme that
is directed toward the goal we ought to attain - a trained and always available
national citizen soldiery under the instruction and administration and formative leadership of an adequate though small regular army.
The reader should also see Mr. Root's letter to Lieutenant-General S. B. M.
Young, which concludes this volume.
MILITIA AND VOLUNTEERS
Extract from    the Report of the Secretary of War for 1901 
THE present provisions of law relating to the militia, and
to the raising of volunteer forces, are quite imperfect and
unsatisfactory.      The militia law stands today virtually as it
was enacted in 1792, and is practically obsolete. It is very
desirable that Congress should now exercise the power conferred upon it by the Constitution to provide for organizing,
arming, and disciplining the militia. The organization and
1 Page 25.




THE NEW MILITIA SYSTEM


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armament of the National Guards of the several states, which
are treated as militia in the appropriations made by Congress,
should be made the same as those provided by Congress for
the regular and volunteer forces. The relations of the
National Guard organizations to the national forces, and
the obligations and duties of those organizations in time of
war, should be clearly defined, so that the confusion and distress regarding their action which accompanied the outbreak
of the war with Spain may not again occur.
The reliance of the country for the large forces necessary
in modern warfare must necessarily be chiefly upon volunteers. The method and procedure of raising volunteer forces
should be prescribed in advance, so that instead of waiting
to devise plans for a volunteer army until the excitement and
haste of impending war makes perfection of design difficult
and satisfactory execution impossible, Congress will have but
to direct the execution of a well-understood plan by officers,
each one of whom has long been familiar with the part he is
to play. It is desirable that any plans adopted should provide for utilizing, in the earlier volunteer organizations
called out, the training of those citizens who shall have
served already in the regular and volunteer forces. If the
earlier volunteer organizations can be constituted of these
trained men, much valuable time and expense can be saved,
and many dangers may be averted during the period the
ordinary volunteers are receiving the necessary training.
Provision should also be made for the selection in advance of
the officers of any volunteer force which may be raised.
Careful selection is impossible at the outbreak of a war. It
is entirely practicable in time of peace.
I recommend that the President be authorized to convene
boards of officers (including the General Service and Staff
College Board) for the examination of officers of the National
Guard, and other citizens who may apply to be examined, as




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


to their qualifications to hold volunteer commissions; that
the persons passing such examinations shall receive certificates, stating the office for which they are found to be
qualified, and upon the calling out of a volunteer force shall
be entitled to receive commissions for such offices.
I recommend that the War Department be authorized to
arm the National Guard with the present service small arms
used by the regular army, navy, and marine corps; that
the National Guard of the several states be treated as a first
reserve, to be called into the service of the United States to
execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and
repel invasions, the term of service under any call to be
limited to nine months; that the President be authorized,
on the request of the governor of any state, to detail officers
of the regular army for instruction, staff, and inspection
duties with the National Guard of such state; that the War
Department be authorized to furnish transportation, rations,
and tentage to officers and men of National Guard organizations, who shall take part with the forces of the regular
army in annual encampments and maneuvers at national
military camps; that the Department be authorized to allow
travel pay, commutation of rations and quarters, or commutation of quarters, to officers of the National Guard attending
and regularly taking part in the courses of instruction at the
General Service and Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. Both
of these provisions should be within reasonable limits, proportional to the numbers of National Guard organizations in
the several states.
I recommend that the President be now empowered to
organize the volunteer forces whenever called out, in the
manner provided for by the act of March 2, 1899, for the
organization of the volunteer force which has recently returned from the Philippines, with such modifications as shall
be necessary to give effect to the views above expressed.




THE NEW MILITIA SYSTEM


445


THE MILITIA SYSTEM
Extract from the Report of the Secretary of War for 1902 
Early in the last session a bill was prepared by the War
Department, embodying the views expressed in my last
report, upon the treatment of the National Guard of the
several states by the Federal Government, the relation of
the Guard to the militia and volunteer systems, and preparation in advance for the organization of volunteers in time of
war. This bill was submitted to the chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs of the Senate, the chairman of the
Committee on Militia of the House, and to a convention of
officers of the National Guard organizations which met in
Washington in January, 1902. The convention appointed a
special committee to consider and report upon the proposed
bill, and after some modifications it was reported favorably
to the convention, which after thorough discussion adopted
a resolution approving the measure and requesting its enactment by Congress....
I earnestly urge that this measure be made a law. It is
really absurd that a nation which maintains but a small
regular army and depends upon unprofessional citizen
soldiery for its defense should run along as we have done for
one hundred and ten years under a militia law which never
worked satisfactorily in the beginning, and which was perfectly obsolete before any man now fit for military duty was
born. The result is that we have practically no militia system, notwithstanding the fact that the Constitution makes
it the duty of the Federal Congress " to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia," and "for calling
forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress
insurrections, and repel invasions." The National Guard
organizations of the several states have grown up in default
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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY
/


of any national system and to meet local requirements.
Their relations to the Federal Government have never been
defined or settled. The confusion, controversy, and bad
feeling arising from this uncertain status were painfully
apparent at the beginning of the war with Spain; and it
must always be the same until Congress shall exercise its
constitutional power over the subject. Repeated efforts
have been made to accomplish this result. Two years after
the passage of the present law of 1792, President Washington addressed Congress on the subject in these words:
The devising and establishing of a well-regulated militia would be a
genuine source of legislative honor and a perfect title to public gratitude.
I therefore entertain a hope that the present session will not pass without
carrying to its full energy the power of organizing, arming, and disciplining
the militia, and thus providing, in the language of the Constitution, for
calling them forth to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections,
and repel invasions.
President Jefferson, eleven years later, in 1805, said:
I cannot, then, but earnestly recommend to your early consideration
the expediency of so modifying our militia system as, by a separation of
the more active part from that which is less so, we may draw from it,
when necessary, an efficient corps for real and active service, etc.
And in 1808 he said:
For a people who are free, and who mean to remain so, a well-organized
and armed militia is their best security. It is, therefore, incumbent on us
at every meeting to revise the condition of the militia, and to ask ourselves
if it is prepared to repel a powerful enemy at every point of our territories
exposed to invasion. Some of the States have paid a laudable attention
to this subject; but every degree of neglect is to be found among others.
Congress alone has power to produce a uniform state of preparation in this
great organ of defense. The interest which they so deeply feel in their
own and their country's security will present this as among the most
important objects of their deliberation.
President Madison said in 1816:
An efficient militia is authorized and contemplated by the Constitution
and required by the spirit and safety of free government. The present
organization of our militia is universally regarded as less efficient than it




THE NEW MILITIA SYSTEM


447


ought to be made, and no organization can be better calculated to give to
it its due force than a classification which will assign the foremost place
in the defense of the country to that portion of its citizens whose activity
and animation best enable them to rally to its standard, etc.
President Monroe said in 1817:
An improvement in the organization and discipline of the militia is one
of the great objects which claims the unremitted attention of Congress.
Almost every President, from Washington down, has urged
the importance of this subject upon the attention of Congress.
The chief reason why nothing has been done has been that
no one system could be agreed upon. Everybody was
agreed upon the general principle, but a majority of all the
people interested were opposed to every particular concrete
method suggested to give it effect.
The bill which has now passed the House is the result of
extensive and painstaking conference among representatives
of all the classes of citizens especially interested in the subject and especially qualified to express opinions upon it.
It does not represent fully any one's view, but it contains
many important provisions upon which a general agreement
has been reached; and it will, I am sure, if enacted, be a great
step in advance toward effective preparation for war otherwise than by the maintenance of a standing army.
The fundamental idea of the bill is to recognize the value
to the National Government of the National Guard, which
is capable of being utilized, first, as an active militia when
called out by the President for the specific purposes enumerated in the Constitution; second, as an already organized
volunteer force when its organizations respond as such to calls
for volunteers for general military purposes under authority
of Congress; and, third, as the great school of the volunteer
soldier, the benefits of which are received by the country
when the members of the Guard respond individually to calls
for volunteers. The bill undertakes to regulate and provide




448


MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


for these various relations of the National Guard and its
members to the general system; to conform the organization,
armament, and discipline of the Guard to that of the regular
and volunteer armies of the United States; to establish closer
relations and better cooperation between the National Guard
and the regular army; to promote the efficiency and dignity
of the Guard as a part of the military system of the United
States.
To aid in accomplishing these objects, and in recognition
of the benefits to the General Government that come from
the Guard altogether outside of its service to the individual
states, the bill provides that the General Government shall
furnish to the Guard the same arms which it furnishes to the
regular army, and shall provide for the voluntary participation
by the Guard with the regular army in maneuvers and field
exercises for brief periods in each year. The bill also contains
provisions making the National Guard organizations which
choose voluntarily to go beyond the limitations of militia
service in effect a first volunteer reserve, and further provisions for the enrollment of a second volunteer reserve
not exceeding 100,000, to be composed of trained men who
have served in the National Guard or in the regular army
or the volunteer armies of the United States. These would
constitute the first volunteer regiments after the National
Guard Volunteers under any call by Congress. It also provides for ascertaining by practical tests, in advance of a call
for volunteers, the fitness of members of the National Guard,
graduates of the military schools and colleges, and other
citizens with military training, to hold volunteer commissions,
thus constituting an eligible list from which in case of a call
for volunteers the officers of the second reserve must be
taken, and the officers of the general body of volunteers may
be taken. With the system provided for by the bill carried
into effect we should be able while maintaining a standing




THE NEW MILITIA SYSTEM


449


army of but 60,000 men to put a force of at least 250,000
well-trained men into the field instantly upon a declaration
of war, and the cost would be less than to maintain but a few
additional regiments of regular troops.
The military force of the United States would then be as
follows:
First. The regular army, capable of enlargement by the
President, when he sees war coming, to 100,000.
Second. Such of the organized militia (already trained as
a National Guard, and just as valuable, when used in the
manner hereinafter indicated, as any other troops) as the
President shall see fit to call into the service of the United
States for not exceeding nine months, to repel invasion.
Third. A first volunteer reserve, composed of such companies, troops, and regiments of the organized militia already
trained as a National Guard as volunteer by organizations
with all their officers and men.
Fourth. A second volunteer reserve, composed of men
previously enrolled and having previous military training in
the National Guard, the regular army or the volunteer
army, and commanded by officers whose fitness has been
previously ascertained by practical tests under the provisions
of the militia act.
Fifth. Such further volunteers as it may be necessary to
call forth from the states, according to their respective
quotas, and commanded by regimental officers appointed by
the governors of the states.
A conservative estimate of the number which would be
included in the first four classes of troops, who have already
had military service and will be available for immediate
action, is from 250,000 to 300,000.
The number of the fifth class - volunteers who may or
may not have had previous service - has no limit, except
the possibilities of transportation and supply.




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


The capacity of the National Guard organizations in
general to serve effectively as organizations, either militia or
volunteer, in the national army in case of war depends very
largely upon the aid which they receive from the National
Government. The Guard is now armed with a variety of
weapons of different kinds and calibers, including two different calibers of the obsolete Springfield rifle, the Lee, the
Remington-Lee, the Winchester, and the Krag-Jirgensen.
In several instances different National Guard organizations
of the same state are armed with different weapons of
different calibers. Among all the 115,000 National Guardsmen of the different states and territories only about 4,000
have the modern service rifle of the United States army.
With the exception of these 4,000 rifles the arms of the Guard
would be practically worthless in time of war, not merely
because they are inferior but because the Guard would have
to look to the United States Government for their ammunition, and the Government would have no ammunition for the
kind of rifles they carry: they would have to look to the
Government to replace the arms lost or broken in service,
and the Government would be unable to supply the same
kind. The militia and the volunteer National Guard organizations in general would, therefore, be obliged to throw away
their present arms at the beginning of a war and get
reequipped with weapons the use of which they had never
learned.
THE MILITIA AND COAST DEFENSE
Extract from the Report of the Secretary of War for 1902 1
One of the most valuable services which can be rendered
to the country by its militia, and the one which can be made
the easiest and most natural for it to render, is to supplement the regular force in manning the coast defenses in time
1 Page 38.




THE NEW MILITIA SYSTEM


451


of war. Our present regular force is none too large to take
care of the guns and the machinery of the fortifications in
time of peace. It will be quite insufficient in war. The
number of artillerymen for which Congress was asked to provide in the act of February 2, 1901, was intentionally made
small in view of the manifest practicability of supplementing it by a well-trained militia force, available in case of
threatened attack. Manning the coast fortifications is constitutional militia work, for it is always to repel invasion.
It can be undertaken by citizens living in the neighborhood
of the fortifications with less disturbance and sacrifice than
any other military duty, because it does not take them far
away from their homes and their business.
The handling of the modern high-power and rapid-fire guns
and the complicated machinery by which they are worked
requires, it is true, special training, but there is no trouble in
securing a reasonable degree of that for heavy artillery
militia organizations. For the past three years I have been
following closely the work of the First Massachusetts Heavy
Artillery, which has been admitted each year to one or
another of the defenses on that coast for practice. The officers
at all the fortifications speak in high terms of the intelligence
and readiness with which these men have acquired facility in
doing the work. Many of them are mechanics and take
naturally to the machinery of defense. On the other hand,
the members of the regiment evidently take great and sustained interest and satisfaction in the performance of their
duties. The same is true of the Connecticut artillery organization which took part in the recent seacoast maneuvers, and
of the Thirteenth New York Heavy Artillery, and I doubt not
of other organizations with which I am less familiar.
If the militia bill above described becomes a law, an effort
should be made to procure the organization of a National
Guard force of heavy-artillerymen in the neighborhood of




MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


each coast-defense fortification, with the understanding that
whenever the President finds occasion to call out militia to
repel invasion that organization will be called into that fortification. In the meantime an immediate and special relation
should be established between the militia organization and
the fortification for the purpose of practice and instruction.
They should be made as familiar as possible with the use of
the guns and methods of defense at that particular point.
In many cases it will be practicable to give them facilities
for meeting and keeping their equipment on the military
reservation, which would make unnecessary any outside
armory for their use. Such an organization could readily
perform all its duties to the state serving as infantry, but it
could at the same time be distinctly known, and constantly
prepared for service, as the militia reserve of the fortification
with which it sustains the relations described.
Another very important function to be performed by
militia, and having the same characteristic of not requiring
militiamen to render any service except for the defense of
their homes, is the service to be rendered by infantry in the
defense of our coast fortifications against attack in reverses
by land. That is a subject which ought to receive early and
earnest attention on the part of the Federal Government.
It is of great importance that an adequate force should be
ready to perform that service, should be ready to take their
places without confusion, and that there should be a perfect
understanding as to where the force are to come from, where
they are to be posted, and how they are to be supplied and
maintained.
The National Guard contains two widely different elements. One is composed of men who wish to perform their
duty to the state and as members of the militia, but do not
wish, or do not feel at liberty, to leave their families or their
business interests and become soldiers for all purposes, liable




THE NEW MILITIA SYSTEM


453


to be sent away for distant military operations. The other
element wish to go wherever there is adventure and a chance
to fight. The amount of strictly local military work of the
highest importance to be done in case of war is so great that
the whole National Guard force, of the seacoast states at all
events, can be made just as useful as if they all became volunteers for all purposes. In order to accomplish this, however, there should be a careful prearrangement as to the
distribution of duties.
FORT RILEY MANEUVERS AND CAMP SITES
Extract from the Report of the Secretary of War for 19021
A good example of what can be done in the way of joint
maneuvers and exercise by regulars and militia, to the great
advantage of both, in preparation for general military service,
has been furnished by the concentration and exercise of
troops at Fort Riley in the latter part of September. Three
regiments of regular infantry, two regiments of infantry of the
National Guard of Kansas, a battalion of Colorado infantry, a regiment of regular cavalry, five batteries of regular
field artillery, two batteries of Kansas field artillery, a battalion of regular engineers, and detachments of the regular
Signal Corps and Hospital Corps were concentrated at that
point and engaged for from five days to two weeks in practicing field operations, involving work from the simplest outpost and patrol duties up to and including maneuvers by
brigade and division.
A large number of National Guard officers, besides those
commanding troops in the maneuvers, and representing
twenty different states and two territories, were present.
A large number of National Guard troops of other states
would have been present had there been any appropriations
to pay their expenses. Both the officers of the Guard and
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of the regular army unite in the opinion that both branches
of the service received great benefit; and the good understanding and friendly feeling established between the two
classes of officers who were present at the maneuvers are
most gratifying. Jealousy, superciliousness, or a suspicion
of it, and bad feeling between regular and volunteer officers
have been some of the most fruitful causes of dissension and
hindrance to general military efficiency in this country. The
best way to put an end to this is to bring the officers together
and get them to know each other and work with each other
with a common purpose.
General Bates, the commander of the Department of the
Missouri, says in his report:
The value of such concentrations and maneuverings cannot be overestimated, either to the regular forces or to the National Guard, as it
gives to both an opportunity for observing the appearance and formation
of a division under various conditions, and affords to officers of the several
arms of the service a chance for seeing the evolutions and capabilities of
the other arms, and enables them to enlarge their circle of military
acquaintanceship, which can rarely be done without absorbing new ideas
upon military subjects. During the exercises under discussion young
officers had constantly impressed upon them the value of studying the
terrain, with a view to protecting their commands by the accidents of
the ground, and of seizing advantageous positions. The lessons learned
in this connection at Fort Riley may be the means of saving many lives in
future hostilities. The power of modern weapons was well illustrated and
accentuated by each opponent maneuvering for position.
At the end of the encampment the officers representing
Maryland, Texas, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, New Jersey,
North Dakota, Michigan, Rhode Island, Massachusetts,
Ohio, Indiana, Georgia, Illinois, California, Florida, New
York, Virginia, and Oklahoma met and passed resolutions
expressing their opinion as to the benefit of what had been
done..
It is to be hoped that before another autumn the passage of the militia bill will enable the War Department to




THE NEW MILITIA SYSTEM


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facilitate the attendance of greater numbers of National
Guard troops for a repetition of these maneuvers on a larger
scale.
Section 35 of the act of February 2, 1901, directed the
Secretary of War to cause preliminary examinations and
surveys to be made for the purpose of selecting four sites
with a view to the establishment of permanent camp grounds
for instruction of troops of the regular army and National
Guard. In compliance with this direction such preliminary
examinations and surveys have been made at places selected
by the board of general officers upon military posts and camp
sites already mentioned in this report; and on May 19, 1902,
the reports of the examinations and surveys were transmitted
to Congress.1 The sites selected by the board were at Fort
Riley, Kansas, where the present reservation consists of
about 20,000 acres; one in the vicinity of Chickamauga Park,
Georgia, where a not very expensive addition to the present
park grounds now owned by the Government would suffice;
one in the Conewago Valley in Lebanon, Dauphin, and
Lancaster counties, Pennsylvania; and one on the Nacimiento Ranch, in Monterey and San Luis Obispo counties,
California.
Reports of examinations and estimates of the cost of
several other sites in Indiana, Kentucky, New Mexico, Texas,
and Wisconsin were also transmitted for the consideration of
Congress. It is to be hoped that Congress will proceed to
carry out the design of the act of February 2, 1901, by
authorizing the purchase of a sufficient number of sites in
different parts of the country to make it possible to give to
the National Guard of all the states, and to the regular
troops stationed in each section, the benefits of annual
maneuvers similar to those which have been inaugurated at
Fort Riley.
1 House Document No. 618, Fifty-seventh Congress, first session.




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PROGRESS OF THE MILITIA REORGANIZATION
Extract from the Report of the Secretary of War for 19031
Of equal importance with the General Staff act in its relation to the general military efficiency of the country is the
act to promote the efficiency of the militia, approved January 21, 1903, supplemented by an appropriation of $2,000,000 in the army appropriation act of March 2, 1903. The
militia act had its origin in an agreement between the regular army, represented by the War Department, and the
National Guards of the states, represented by a convention
which met in Washington in January, 1902, upon the main
and fundamental provisions necessary to give vitality and
effectiveness to our militia system. Upon the presentation
of these provisions to Congress, the Committee on Militia of
the House took up the subject with great public spirit and
industry, and on that basis wrought out a bill which, with
but a few changes, was passed and approved in the form of
the present act. The act proceeds upon the following ideas:
That whenever the United States becomes involved in war,
the regular army will form but a small part of its armed
force; and the country must also rely, for immediate and
special exigencies, upon militia; and for service going beyond
the proper limits of militia duty, upon volunteers.
That it is of vital importance to have a trained force of
militia ready for instant service when called upon, and also to
have a large number of citizens sufficiently instructed and
exercised in the art of war, to organize, train and command
volunteer forces.
That the best way for the National Government to secure
both these requisites is by turning to the National Guards
of the states, which have grown up as state organizations
intended for state purposes, but are composed of citizens
1 Page 13.




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liable to be called upon by the National Government for
military duty, and willing to devote a considerable part of
their time to fitting themselves for the performance of that
duty.
That, without at all interfering with the services of these
organizations to their respective states in time of peace, they
can be treated as a national militia to be called into the service of the United States in time of war; and that it is for the
interest of the National Government to make these organizations as effective as possible, having in view their prospective national service as militia and their immediate service
as the school of the national volunteer soldier.
That as the militia when called into the service of the
United States and the volunteer forces commanded by the
citizens trained in this school of arms, will form, together
with the regular troops, but one army, subject to the same
command, drawing arms, ammunition, and supplies from the
same source, and subject to the same general system of
accountability for property, it will be important that all parts
of this greater army shall have used and shall be familiar
with the same arms, ammunition, supplies, and forms and
methods of transacting business, and shall have similar organization and discipline.
In this act, accordingly, Congress declared the National
Guard organizations to be the organized militia, and provided for calling them into the service of the United States,
whenever required, for the constitutional purposes of repelling invasion, suppressing insurrection, and executing the
laws of the Union. And Congress also exercised its constitutional power "to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia" by a series of provisions designed to
promote the strength, efficiency, and prosperity of these
militia organizations; to make them and the regular army a
homogeneous force; and to bring about a habit of coopera



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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


tion and mutual respect and good understanding between
the officers of the two forces.
To accomplish these purposes, the act provides that the
organization, armament, and discipline of the organized
militia shall be the same as that prescribed for the regular
army. It authorizes the Secretary of War to issue to the
militia, at the expense of the National Government, the same
arms, ammunition, and supplies which are provided for the
regular army. It provides for regular inspections by officers
detailed by the Secretary of War and for regular returns by
the adjutants in the several states to the Secretary of War.
It authorizes participation by the organized militia in joint
maneuvers with the regular army, and provides that in such
case the organized militia so participating shall receive the
same pay, subsistence, and transportation as is provided by
law for the officers and men of the regular army, to be paid
out of the regular appropriations for the support of the army.
It provides for furnishing aid to separate state encampments of the militia by allowing, out of an annual appropriation of $1,000,000 for militia purposes, to the officers and
enlisted men engaged in such encampments, the same pay,
subsistence, and transportation or travel allowances as are
made for similar purposes to officers and enlisted men of the
regular army. It provides for detailing officers of the army
to attend encampments upon the request of the governors of
the states to give instruction and information, and for detailing officers to report to the governors for duty generally in
connection with the militia. And it provides that for the
purpose of securing a list of persons specially qualified to hold
commissions in any volunteer force which may be called out
hereafter, examinations shall be held, open to any one serving
or who has served in the organized militia, to determine the
fitness of the applicant to hold a volunteer commission. The
persons passing such examination are to be certified and regis



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459


tered, and are to constitute an eligible class for appointment
as officers of any future volunteer force; and they are authorized to attend any military school or college of the United
States except the Military Academy at West Point, and
to receive the same allowances and commutations during
such attendance as are provided for the officers of the regular
army.
This statute plainly opens a wide field of new duty for
the officers of the regular army. They can no longer fill the
measure of their obligation to the country by perfecting
themselves and the forces under their command in the performance of their own military duties. They are charged
with the further duty of applying their military skill and
experience to the preparation of the militia and volunteer
force which will be associated with them in the next war, for
effective service. A new responsibility also rests upon the
officers of the National Guard to render to the nation full and
unstinted return for the enlarged means and opportunities
which the liberality of Congress has afforded to them.
It is gratifying to report that the officers of both services
have entered upon the execution of the new statute with an
evident desire to discharge these obligations and attain the
purposes of the law.
Following is a review of the principal things already done
under the law:
Militia Inspection under Section 14. Section 14 of the act
makes it the duty of the Secretary of War to cause to be
made at least once in each year, by officers detailed for that
purpose, inspections to determine whether the organized
militia is sufficiently armed, uniformed, and equipped for
active duty in the field, as a condition precedent to the use of
its allotment under section 1661, Revised Statutes, for the
payment, subsistence, and transportation of such portion of
the organized militia as shall engage in actual field or camp




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


service for instruction. Hitherto the entire expense of state
encampments has been a charge which the states have had
to meet. A special inspection of the entire organized militia of
the country was promptly made after the passage of the law.
This inspection was thoroughly and effectively conducted by
87 selected officers of the army, who in the aggregate visited
1,196 towns and cities, and inspected 196 regiments, separate
battalions and squadrons, and 1,943 companies, troops, batteries, and staff organizations. The total number of the organized militia, including officers of every rank and grade,
was ascertained to be 116,542, of which 7,610 were officers of
the line and 1,510 officers of the staff, making a total of 9,120
commissioned officers and      107,422 enlisted men; of this
number 6,695 officers and 81,007 men were present at inspection. Their distribution among the arms of service was as
follows:
icers       e     Aggregate
General and Staff.........................  1,360....   1,360
Cavalry................................  350   4,740    5,090
Artillery.................................  498  6,754   7,252
Infantry.................................  6,782  93,314  100,096
Engineers................................  63   1,011     1,074
Signal Corps.............................  52    680       732
Hospital Corps...........................  15    923       938
Total...............................  9,120  107,422  116,542
Among the immediate results of the special inspection were
the disbandment and muster out of many companies, the
recruitment of others, and the entire reorganization of the
organized militia of several states and territories, as well as a
material change in the organized strength of nearly every
state from that last report by the adjutant-generals.
Inspection under Section 18. Another feature of this
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461


order to entitle the states and territories to the benefit of the
appropriation under section 1661, Revised Statutes, relates
to the system of drill and inspection required by the states
during the year next preceding each annual allotment of
funds. The law requires that each state or territory shall
have required during the preceding year every company,
troop, and battalion in its organized militia, not excused by
the governor, to participate in practice marches or to go into
camp of instruction at least five consecutive days, and to
assemble for drill and instruction at company, battalion, or
regimental armories or rendezvous, or for target practice,
not less than twenty-four times, and shall also have required
during such year an inspection of each such company, troop,
and battalion to be made by an officer of such militia or an
officer of the regular army.
As the result of this inspection it was learned that 1,337
organizations have participated in practice marches or gone
into camps of instruction at least five consecutive days
during the year preceding June 30, 1903, and 1,740 organizations have assembled for drill and instruction at armories or
rendezvous or for target practice not less than twenty-four
times during that period. The number of organizations not
participating in the first class of military exercise is 557, and
not participating in the second class, 154. The value of the
aid rendered by the Federal Government in furnishing
material of war and paying certain necessary expenses of
encampments is so manifest that it is to be presumed that
all organizations of the Guard will in the future make every
effort to comply with the conditions which must hereafter
govern in the allotment of this annual appropriation for the
support of the militia....
Participation of Militia in Combined Maneuvers. The
participation by any part of the organized militia of any
state or territory, on request of the governor, in the encamp



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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


ment, maneuvers, and field instruction of any part of the
regular army at or near any military post or camp or lake
or seacoast defenses of the United States is authorized under
section 15. The militia taking part in these maneuvers are
to receive the same pay, subsistence, and transportation
as are provided for officers and men of the regular army,
to be paid out of the appropriations for the support of the
army.
The militia organizations availing themselves of this privilege were the National Guard of Hawaii, with the troops at
Camp McKinley, near Honolulu, June tenth to fourteenth;
the entire militia of Maine, and one regiment of coast artillery
from Massachusetts, in the combined maneuvers of the army
and navy in the artillery district of Portland, Maine, from
August twenty-second to twenty-ninth; two companies of
coast artillery of Connecticut and one regiment of coast artillery of New York in operations at the eastern entrance of
Long Island Sound, July tenth to twentieth; three regiments
of infantry and one field battery of the Indiana National
Guard, three regiments and one battalion of the Michigan
National Guard, two regiments of infantry and a battalion of
artillery of the Kentucky State Guard, one regiment of infantry and a field battery of the Ohio National Guard, and
one regiment of infantry of the Wisconsin National Guard in
the maneuvers at West Point, Kentucky, September twentyfifth to October sixteenth; one battalion of infantry of the
Colorado National Guard, one regiment of infantry of the
Iowa National Guard, two regiments of infantry and two
batteries of field artillery of the Kansas National Guard,
one regiment of infantry of the Missouri National Guard, one
regiment of infantry and one company of the signal corps
of the Nebraska National Guard, and one regiment of infantry of the Texas National Guard in the maneuvers at Fort
Riley, Kansas, from October fifteenth to twenty-seventh.




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These organizations had present approximately 1,000 officers
and 13,000 men.
These general field exercises have proved of great value to
the militia, affording it opportunity to take part in military
maneuvers on an extended scale, and to come into actual
contact with the regular army under the conditions of simulated warfare; and they tend to infuse into the militia a
spirit of discipline and respect for army standards and efficiency. They have also proved of material advantage to the
regular army through the association of the two forces. The
relations of mutual respect, good feeling, and common understanding established between the great numbers of officers of
both services, who have been working together in these
maneuvers, will prove of incalculable benefit whenever those
officers are found serving in the same army engaged in actual
hostilities.
Issue of Arms and Equipment. One of the cardinal purposes of the law being to secure uniformity of armament
between the militia and the regular army, the Secretary of
War is authorized under section 13 to issue upon the requisitions of the state authorities such number of the United
States standard service magazine rifles, with necessary equipments and accouterments as are required to arm all the
organized militia, without charging the cost under section
1661, Revised Statutes, or requiring payment therefor, and
to make the necessary exchange of ammunition for the new
arms.
Under this provision the Chief of Ordnance has issued
88,031 magazine rifles and carbines, and credited back to
various states and territories $336,893.09 which had been
charged to them for similar issues since December 1, 1901.
All of the states and territories but three have been fully
supplied, and of these three the principal one is, by preference, waiting for a change of sights upon the rifles which are




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


ready to be delivered. The rearmament may, accordingly,
be regarded as substantially accomplished.
Allotments to the Militia under Section 1661, Revised
Statutes. In the distribution and use of the $1,000,000
annually appropriated under section 1661, Revised Statutes,
the limitations which have heretofore governed the use of the
appropriation have been removed by section 17 of the new
act, so that instead of its being confined to the purchase of
ordnance and quartermaster stores, as was formerly the case,
it is available for the purpose of providing for the use of the
organized militia any stores and supplies or publications
which are supplied to the army by any department. In
addition it is applicable to the pay, subsistence, and transportation of militia participating in state encampments
under section 14, as already stated above. In lieu of the
limitations which formerly governed this appropriation,
Congress has substituted those set forth in sections 14 and 18
of the act, requiring a definite and satisfactory showing of
the militia's preparedness for military duty and the genuineness of its claims for consideration as a military organization.
Further authority is conferred upon the states to purchase
for cash, for the use of its militia, materials of war and military publications at the prices at which they are issued to the
army, with the cost of transportation added.
Militia Allotments under Act of March 2, 1903. The allotments under section 1661, Revised Statutes, are made to the
states upon the basis of representation in Congress. The act
of March 2, 1903, provided for the procurement and issue of
certain articles of armament and equipment to the militia,
with a view to conforming its equipment in its entirety to
that of the regular army, so that it became the duty of the
Department to procure and furnish the equipment in kind,
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THE NEW MILITIA SYSTEM


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pletely equipping the entire militia. That the sum appropriated was inadequate for the purpose was manifest, and it
was therefore necessary to determine what portion of the
supplies required by each state could be furnished.
An article of issue of prime importance was the field gun of
the model about to be adopted by the army to replace the
old field guns of 3.2 caliber in use by the militia. As a result
of special inspection it appears that there are in the possession of the militia seventy-two field guns of 3.2 inch caliber,
which number would constitute eighteen batteries of the
army organization. The Secretary of War therefore directed
that the sum of $700,000 should be set aside from this appropriation for the procurement by the Chief of Ordnance of
field artillery. This sum is sufficient to equip about fourteen
batteries of four guns each. A provisional apportionment to
the states and territories of $1,000,000 of this appropriation,
upon the basis of the organized strength of the militia as
reported to Congress under date of February 2, 1903, was
directed by the Secretary of War. The states have availed
themselves of this provisional allotment by calling for articles
of clothing, equipage, ordnance, medical and signal supplies.
Under this appropriation blank forms of requisitions, returns,
and many other papers used by the regular army have been
distributed to the militia in order to bring the paper work of
the two forces into conformity.
Detail of Officers with States and Territories. As an additional means of aiding the state authorities in developing the
militia under the system prescribed by Congress, authority
was conferred upon the Secretary of War by section 20 of the
act to detail, in his discretion, upon the application of
the governors, one or more officers of the army to report to
them for duty in connection with their organized militia.
The act of March 2, 1903, authorized a similar detail of not
exceeding twenty retired officers. As the conditions of the




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


service at this time do not permit the detail of officers on
the active list for this duty, steps have been taken to detail the
twenty retired officers. The governors of the states, in
the order of the strength of their organized militia, have been
afforded opportunity to secure such details, and six officers
have already been assigned to this duty. Notifications have
been sent to the governors of all the states to indicate their
wishes as to the detail of retired officers, and these requests
will be disposed of in the order of the organized strength of
the militia, until the number of retired officers authorized by
law is exhausted.
Conformity to Army Standards. The requirement of the
law that the organization of the militia shall conform to that
of the regular army within five years from the date of the
approval of the act is one which mainly falls upon the
states and territories to carry out, but the Department has
endeavored to facilitate this end by submitting for the consideration of the state authorities a proposed code of militia
law covering in detail features of organization. This code
is comprehensive in its treatment, embodying the most
approved machinery for the government of the militia, and
while it is offered to the states only by way of suggestion, it
is hoped that the substance of its provisions will be adopted,
thereby furnishing a fairly uniform basis of administration
for the National Guard.
The inherent difficulties of conforming in all particulars
to army organization are thoroughly appreciated by the
Department, but it is confidently believed that the earnest
cooperation of the state authorities will enable the necessary
changes to be gradually effected. This act provides that the
President of the United States may in time of peace, by order,
fix the minimum number of enlisted men in each company,
troop, battalion, signal corps, engineer corps, and hospital
corps. In the proposed code the suggested minimum strength




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467


of the tactical units of the several arms of the service will be
found, with the exception of the engineer companies, the
minimum strength of which, it is thought, should be the same
as that of the infantry.
Military Education of Militia and Volunteer Officers. Very
liberal means have been afforded by section 16 and 23 for the
instruction of militia officers at military schools and colleges
of the United States. Such student officers receive the same
travelling allowance and quarters or commutation of quarters, that officers of the regular army would be entitled to
while in attendance at such schools, together with an allowance for subsistence. Section 23 provides for the creation
in the Department of a roster of militia officers who are
especially qualified to hold commissions in any volunteer
force which may hereafter be called for and organized under
authority of Congress. The General Staff has prepared regulations for examining boards to determine the qualifications
of such applicants. These regulations have been approved
by the Department, and will shortly be issued.
While the army service schools are fully taxed by the present attendance of regular officers, the necessary steps will be
taken to provide accommodations for student militia officers
as soon as they become eligible to attend under the requirements of the law and the regulations of the Department.
Regulation of Use of Militia for National Defense. As the
chief interest of the United States in the militia lies in its
availability for national protection upon occasions of emergency, one of the underlying objects of this law is to prescribe
the way to make it available as a fighting force. The constitutional purposes for which the militia can be called into
the active service of the United States are embodied in section 4, the terms of service in section 5, the apportionment of
the militia when called into service in section 6, while sections
7 to 11 provide for the muster into service, courts-martial,




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


pay and allowances, and other miscellaneous subjects. Regulations to govern the muster of the militia into the service
of the United States under section 7 have been framed by the
General Staff and have received the Department's approval.
In considering the availability of the militia for national
defense, a most pertinent inquiry is that of dependable
strength. With a view to obtaining a definite idea as to what
this dependable strength would be at this time, a thorough
canvass of the National Guard was made, from which it
appears that of the 1,943 separate bodies in the organized
militia the men of 1,586 had a thorough understanding of
their obligations under the statute, 250 organizations had no
such idea, and 57 had a partial idea. Of the 116,542 officers
and men now in the service of the organized militia, 100,345
declared themselves ready to respond to a sudden call of the
President.
PROMOTION OF RIFLE PRACTICE
Extract from the Report of the Secretary of War for 19031
The Army Appropriation act of March 2, 1903, provided -
That for the purpose of furnishing a national trophy and medals and
other prizes, to be provided and contested for annually, under such regulations as may be prescribed by the Secretary of War, said contest to be
open to the army and the National Guard, or organized militia of the
several states, territories, and of the District of Columbia, and for the
cost of the trophy, prizes, and medals herein provided for, the sum of
two thousand five hundred dollars be, and the same is hereby, annually
appropriated out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to be expended for the purposes hereinbefore prescribed, under
the direction of the Secretary of War.
The very great importance of this subject led the Secretary
of War to exercise the authority vested in him by this provision to make regulations for the government of this annual
contest in such form as to promote the purpose of the statute
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by securing a comprehensive and progressive treatment of
the whole subject of improving the marksmanship of the
army and the militia. For that purpose a board was established composed of five members from the regular establishment, including the Assistant Secretary of War, two officers
of the army, an officer of the navy, and an officer of the
marine corps, detailed by special authority of the Secretary
of the Navy; the trustees of the National Rifle Association,
eight in number; and eight citizens who had shown special
interest in the subject, appointed from the country at large.
Nearly all of the members of the last two classes are prominent officers of the National Guard, representing thirteen
different states and territories. This board formulated
rules and conditions for the first contest under the statute,
which received the approval of the Secretary of War; and
the contest was held on the eighth and ninth of September.
The board has also had under consideration a number of
important questions relating to the promotion of rifle practice, and will, I am satisfied, if properly sustained in its
efforts, prove a most useful agency in the conduct of this
necessary work. I know of nothing more important in the
way of preparation for war than teaching the young men of
the country to shoot straight. It is especially important to
the efficiency of our volunteer armies in the future. It is of
no use to pay, equip, subsist, and transport a soldier to the
battlefield unless he can hit an enemy when he shoots at him.
Two recent changes in conditions require that we should
make continuous and active effort in this direction if we are
to have this necessary element of efficiency. One is the
greatly increased range of modern rifles which determines
battles in which the combatants are at great distances from
each other, and which makes practice more necessary for
good marksmanship than ever before. The other is the
decline in the use of firearms among the greater part of our




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


people. Formerly when our population was scattered and
game was abundant in all parts of the country every house
had its rifle or its shotgun, and every boy learned to shoot
them. Now it is probable that a majority of the young men
in the thickly settled parts of the country have never fired a
gun, and would be quite harmless to an enemy until taught
to shoot. The time to give that instruction is now. We
ought not to wait until we are actually engaged in hostilities.
When that time comes the enemy will not wait for us to give
the instruction. I recommend that an appropriation be
made to pay the necessary expenses of the board for the promotion of rifle practice; that the statute be amended so as to
include the navy and the marine corps, and that an additional sum be appropriated for the promotion of rifle practice
by the formation of rifle clubs and contests to which citizens
generally shall be admitted; to be expended upon the recommendation of the board with the approval of the Secretary of
War.
THE ACT TO PROMOTE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE MILITIA
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled, That the militia shall consist of every
able-bodied male citizen of the respective States, Territories, and the
District of Columbia, and every able-bodied male of foreign birth who has
declared his intention to become a citizen, who is more than eighteen and
less than forty-five years of age, and shall be divided into two classesthe organized militia, to be known as the National Guard of the State,
Territory, or District of Columbia, or by such other designations as may
be given them by the laws of the respective States or Territories, and the
remainder to be known as the Reserve Militia.
Sec. 2. That the Vice-President of the United States, the officers, judicial and executive, of the Government of the United States, the members
and officers of each House of Congress, persons in the military or naval
service of the United States, all custom-house officers, with their clerks,
postmasters, and persons employed by the United States in the transmission of the mail, ferrymen employed at alny ferry on a post-road, artificers
and workmen employed in the armories and arsenals of the United States,




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471


pilots, mariners actually employed in the sea service of any citizen or
merchant within the United States, and all persons who are exempted by
the laws of the respective States or Territories shall be exempted from
militia duty, without regard to age: Provided, That nothing in this Act
shall be construed to require or compel any member of any well-recognized
religious sect or organization at present organized and existing whose
creed forbids its members to participate in war in any form, and whose
religious convictions are against war or participation therein, in accordance with the creed of said religious organization, to serve in the militia or
any other armed or volunteer force under the jurisdiction and authority of
the United States.
Sec. 3. That the regularly enlisted, organized, and uniformed active
militia in the several States and Territories and the District of Columbia
who have heretofore participated or shall hereafter participate in the
apportionment of the annual appropriation provided by section sixteen
hundred and sixty-one of the Revised Statutes of the United States, as
amended, whether known and designated as National Guard, militia, or
otherwise, shall constitute the organized militia. The organization,
armament, and discipline of the organized militia in the several States and
Territories and in the District of Columbia shall be the same as that which
is now or may hereafter be prescribed for the Regular and Volunteer
Armies of the United States, within five years from the date of the approval
of this Act: Provided, That the President of the United States, in time of
peace, may by order fix the minimum number of enlisted men in each
company, troop, battery, signal corps, engineer corps, and hospital corps;
And provided further, That any corps of artillery, cavalry, and infantry
existing in any of the States at the passage of the Act of May eight, seventeen hundred and ninety-two, which, by the laws, customs, or usages of
the said States have been in continuous existence since the passage of said
Act under its provisions and under the provisions of section two hundred
and thirty-two and sections sixteen hundred and twenty-five to sixteen
hundred and sixty, both inclusive, of Title sixteen of the Revised Statutes
of the United States, relating to the Militia, shall be allowed to retain their
accustomed privileges, subject, nevertheless, to all other duties required by
law in like manner as the other Militia.
Sec. 4. That whenever the United States is invaded, or in danger of
invasion from any foreign nation, or of rebellion against the authority of
the Government of the United States, or the President is unable, with the
other forces at his command, to execute the laws of the Union in any part
thereof, it shall be lawful for the President to call forth for a period not
exceeding nine months, such numbei of the militia of the State or of the
States or Territories or of the District of Columbia as he may deem necessary to repel such invasion, suppress such rebellion, or to enable him to




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MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


execute such laws, and to issue his orders for that purpose to such officers of
the militia as he may think proper.
Sec. 5. That whenever the President calls forth the militia of any State
or Territory or of the District of Columbia to be employed in the service of
the United States, he may specify in his call the period for which such service is required, not exceeding nine months, and the militia so called shall
continue to serve during the term so specified, unless sooner discharged by
order of the President.
Sec. 6. That when the militia of more than one State is called into the
actual service of the United States by the President he may, in his discretion, apportion them among such States or Territories or to the District of
Columbia according to representative population.
Sec. 7. That every officer and enlisted man of the militia who shall be
called forth in the manner hereinbefore prescribed and shall be found fit
for military service shall be mustered or accepted into the United States
service by a duly authorized mustering officer of the United States: Provided, however, That any officer or enlisted man of the militia who shall
refuse or neglect to present himself to such mustering officer upon being
called forth as herein prescribed shall be subject to trial by court-martial,
and shall be punished as such court-martial may direct.
Sec. 8. That courts-martial for the trial of officers or men of the militia
when in the service of the United States, shall be composed of militia
officers only.
Sec. 9. That the militia, when called into the actual service of the
United States, shall be subject to the same Rules and Articles of War as
the regular troops of the United States.
Sec. 10. That the militia, when called into the actual service of the
United States, shall, during their time of service, be entitled to the same pay
and allowances as are or may be provided by law for the Regular Army.
Sec. 11. That when the militia is called into the actual service of the
United States, or any portion of the militia is accepted under the provisions
of this act, their pay shall commence from the day of their appearing at the
place of company rendezvous. But this provision shall not be construed to
authorize any species of expenditure previous to arriving at such places of
rendezvous which is not provided by existing laws to be paid after their
arrival at such places of rendezvous.
Sec. 12. That there shall be appointed in each State, Territory, and
District of Columbia an adjutant-general, who shall perform such duties
as may be prescribed by the laws of such State, Territory, and District,
respectively, and make returns to the Secretary of War, at such times and
in such form as he shall from time to time prescribe, of the strength of the
organized militia, and also make such reports as may from time to time be
required by the Secretary of War. That the Secretary of War shall, with




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his annual report of each year, transmit to Congress an abstract of the
returns and reports of the adjutant-generals of the States, Territories, and
the District of Columbia, with such observations thereon as he may deem
necessary for the information of Congress.
Sec. 13. That the Secretary of War is hereby authorized to issue, on the
requisitions of the governors of the several States and Territories, or of the
commanding general of the militia of the District of Columbia, such number of the United States standard service magazine arms, with bayonets,
bayonet scabbards, gun slings, belts, and such other necessary accouterments and equipments as are required for the Army of the United States,
for arming all of the organized militia in said States and Territories and
District of Columbia, without charging the cost or value thereof, or any
which have been issued since December first, nineteen hundred and one,
or any expense connected therewith, against the allotment to said State,
Territory, or District of Columbia, out of the annual appropriation provided by section sixteen hundred and sixty-one of the Revised Statutes, as
amended, or requiring payment therefor, and to exchange, without receiving
any money credit therefor, ammunition, or parts thereof, suitable to the
new arms, round for round, for corresponding ammunition suitable to the
old arms theretofore issued to said State, Territory, or District by the
United States: Provided, That said rifles and carbines and other property
shall be receipted for and shall remain the property of the United States
and be annually accounted for by the governors of the States and Territories as now required by law, and that each State, Territory, and District
shall, on receipt of the new arms, turn in to the Ordnance Department of
the United States Army, without receiving any money credit therefor, and
without expense for transportation, all United States rifles and carbines
now in its possession.
To provide means to carry into effect the provisions of this section, the
necessary money to cover the cost of exchanging or issuing the new arms,
accouterments, equipments, and ammunition to be exchanged or issued
hereunder is hereby appropriated out of any moneys in the Treasury not
otherwise appropriated.
Sec. 14. That whenever it shall appear by the report of inspections,
which it shall be the duty of the Secretary of War to cause to be made at
least once in each year by officers detailed by him for that purpose, that the
organized militia of a State or Territory or of the District of Columbia is
sufficiently armed, uniformed, and equipped for active duty in the field,
the Secretary of War is authorized, on the requisition of the governor of
such State or Territory, to pay to the quartermaster-general thereof, or to
such other officer of the militia of said State as the said governor may
designate and appoint for the purpose, so much of its allotment out of the
said annual appropriation under section sixteen hundred and sixty-one of




474


MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


the Revised Statutes as amended as shall be necessary for the payment,
subsistence, and transportation of such portion of said oiganized militia
as shall engage in actual field or camp service for instruction, and the
officers and enlisted men of such militia while so engaged shall be entitled
to the same pay, subsistence, and transportation or travel allowances as
officers and enlisted men of corresponding grades of the Regular Army are
or may hereafter be entitled to by law, and the officer so designated and
appointed shall be regarded as a disbursing officer of the United States, and
shall render his accounts through the War Department to the proper
accounting officers of the Treasury for settlement, and he shall be required
to give good and sufficient bonds to the United States, in such sums as
the Secretary of War may direct, faithfully to account for the safe-keeping
and payment of the public moneys so intrusted to him for disbursement.
Sec. 15. That the Secretary of War is hereby authorized to provide for
participation by any part of the organized militia of any State or Territory
on the request of the governor thereof in the encampment, maneuvers, and
field instruction of any part of the Regular Army at or near any military
post or camp or lake or seacoast defenses of the United States. In such
case the organized militia so participating shall receive the same pay, subsistence, and transportation as is provided by law for the officers and men
of the Regular Army, to be paid out of the appropriation for the pay, subsistence, and transportation of the Army: Provided, That the command of
such military post or camp and of the officers and troops of the United
States there stationed shall remain with the regular commander of the post
without regard to the rank of the commanding or other officers of the
militia temporarily so encamped within its limits or in its vicinity.
Sec. 16. That whenever any officer of the organized militia shall, upon
recommendation of the governor of any State, Territory, or general commanding the District of Columbia, and when authorized by the President,
attend and pursue a regular course of study at any military school or
college of the United States such officer shall receive from the annual
appropriation for the support of the Army the same travel allowances, and
quarters, or commutation of quarters, to which an officer of the Regular
Army would be entitled if attending such school or college under orders
from proper military authority, and shall also receive commutation of subsistence at the rate of one dollar per day while in actual attendance upon
the course of instruction.
Sec. 17. That the annual appropriation made by section sixteen hundred and sixty-one, Revised Statutes, as amended, shall be available for
the purpose of providing for issue to the organized militia any stores and
supplies or publications which are supplied to the Army by any department. Any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia may, with the
approval of the Secretary of War, purchase for cash from the War Depart



THE NEW MILITIA SYSTEM


475


ment, for the use of its militia, stores, supplies, material of war, or military
publications, such as are furnished to the Army, in addition to those issued
under the provisions of this Act, at the price at which they are listed for
issue to the Army, with the cost of transportation added, and funds
received from such sales shall be credited to the appropriations to which
they belong and shall not be covered into the Treasury, but shall be available until expended to replace therewith the supplies sold to the States
and Territories and to the District of Columbia in the manner herein
provided.
Sec. 18. That each State or Territory furnished with material of war
under the provisions of this or former Acts of Congress shall, during the
year next preceding each annual allotment of funds, in accordance with
section sixteen hundred and sixty-one of the Revised Statutes as amended,
have required every company, troop, and battery in its organized militia
not excused by the governor of such State or Territory, to participate in
practice marches or go into camp of instruction at least five consecutive
days, and to assemble for drill and instruction at company, battalion, or
regimental armories or rendezvous or for target practice not less than
twenty-four times, and shall also have required during such year an inspection of each such company, troop, and battery to be made by an officer of
such militia or an officer of the Regular Army.
Sec. 19. That upon the application of the governor of any State or
Territory furnished with material of war under the provisions of this Act or
former laws of Congress, the Secretary of War may detail one or more
officers of the Army to attend any encampment of the organized militia,
and to give such instruction and information to the officers and men
assembled in such camp as may be requested by the governor. Such
officer or officers shall immediately make a report of such encampment to
the Secretary of War, who shall furnish a copy thereof to the governor of
the State or Territory.
Sec. 20. That upon application of the governor of any State or Territory furnished with material of war under the provisions of this Act or
former laws of Congress, the Secretary of War may, in his discretion, detail
one or more officers of the Army to report to the governor of such State or
Territory for duty in connection with the organized militia. All such
assignments may be revoked at the request of the governor of such State
or Territory or at the pleasure of the Secretary of War.
Sec. 21. That the troops of the militia encamped at any military post
or camp of the United States may be furnished such amounts of ammunition for instruction in firing and target practice as may be prescribed by
the Secretary of War, and such instruction in firing shall be carried on
under the direction of an officer selected for that purpose by the proper
military commander.




476        MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY
Sec. 22. That when any officer, noncommissioned officer, or private of
the militia is disabled by reason of wounds or disabilities received or incurred in the service of the United States he shall be entitled to all the benefits
of the pension laws existing at the time of his service, and in case such
officer, noncommissioned officer, or private dies in the service of the United
States or in returning to his place of residence after being mustered out of
such service, or at any time, in consequence of wounds or disabilities
received in such service, his widow and children, if any, shall be entitled
to all the benefits of such pension laws.
Sec. 23. That for the purpose of securing a list of persons specially
qualified to hold commissions in any volunteer force which may hereafter
be called for and organized under the authority of Congress, other than a
force composed of organized militia, the Secretary of War is authorized
from time to time to convene boards of officers at suitable and convenient
army posts in different parts of the United States, who shall examine as to
their qualifications for the command of troops or for the performance of
staff duties all applicants who shall have served in the Regular Army of the
United States, in any of the volunteer forces of the United States, or in the
organized militia of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, or
who, being a citizen of the United States, shall have attended or pursued a
regular course of instruction in any military school or college of the United
States Army, or shall have graduated from any educational institution to
which an officer of the Army or Navy has been detailed as superintendent
or professor pursuant to law after having creditably pursued the course of
military instruction therein provided. Such examinations shall be under
rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of War, and shall be
especially directed to ascertain the practical capacity of the applicant.
The record of previous service of the applicant shall be considered as a part
of the examination. Upon the conclusion of each examination the board
shall certify to the War Department its judgment as to the fitness of the
applicant, stating the office, if any, which it deems him qualified to fill,
and, upon approval by the President, the names of the persons certified
to be qualified shall be inscribed in a register to be kept in the War Department for that purpose. The persons so certified and registered shall, subject to a physical examination at the time, constitute an eligible class for
commissions pursuant to such certificates in any volunteer force hereafter
called for and organized under the authority of Congress, other than a
force composed of organized militia, and the President may authorize
persons from this class, to attend and pursue a regular course of study at
any military school or college of the United States other than the Military
Academy at West Point and to receive from the annual appropriation for
the support of the Army the same allowances and commutations as provided in this Act for officers of the organized militia: Provided, That no




THE NEW MILITIA SYSTEM


477


person shall be entitled to receive a commission as a second lieutenant
after he shall have passed the age of thirty; as first lieutenant after he
shall have passed the age of thirty-five; as captain after he shall have
passed the age of forty; as major after he shall have passed the age of
forty-five; as lieutenant-colonel after he shall have passed the age of
fifty, or as colonel after he shall have passed the age of fifty-five: And
provided further, That such appointments shall be distributed proportionately, as near as may be, among the various States contributing such
volunteer force: And provided, That the appointments in this section
provided for shall not be deemed to include appointments to any office in
any company, troop, battery, battalion, or regiment of the organized
militia which volunteers as a body or the officers of which are appointed
by the governor of a State or Territory.
Sec. 24. That all the volunteer forces of the United States called for by
authority of Congress shall, except as hereinbefore provided, be organized
in the manner provided by the Act entitled "An Act to provide for
temporarily increasing the military establishment of the United States in
time of war, and for other purposes," approved April twenty-second,
eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.
Sec. 25. That sections sixteen hundred and twenty-five to sixteen
hundred and sixty, both included, of title sixteen of the Revised Statutes,
and section two hundred and thirty-two thereof, relating to the militia,
are hereby repealed.
Sec. 26. That this Act shall take effect upon the date of its approval.
Approved, January 21, 1903.
EXTRACT FROM THE ARMY APPROPRIATION ACT
APPROVED MARCH 2, 1903
Provided further, That for the purpose of furnishing the necessary articles
requisite to fully arm, equip, and supply each regiment, battalion, squadron, company, troop, battery, signal, engineer, and hospital corps and
medical department of the organized militia of the several States, Territories, and the District of Columbia with the same armament and equipment as are now prescribed for corresponding branches of the line or staff
in the Regular Army, without cost to said States, Territories, or the District of Columbia, but to remain the property of the United States, and to
be accounted for in the manner now prescribed by law, the Secretary of
War is hereby authorized, under such regulations as he may prescribe, on
the requisitions of the governors of the several States and Territories, or
the commanding general of the militia of the District of Columbia, to issue
the said armament and equipment to the organized militia; and the sum
of two million dollars is hereby appropriated and made immediately
available until expended for the procurement and issue of the articles
constituting the same... 




L.




PROMOTIONS IN THE ARMY


EXTRACTS FROM A HEARING BEFORE THE HOUSE
COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS IN
JANUARY, 1904
WANT to say something about the subject of promotion.
The only system of promotion by selection that we have is
that of general officers. When a vacancy in a general office is
to be filled, there are always two entirely different considerations that come up. One is a desire to reward long and faithful and meritorious service; the other is the duty of securing
men for a position most competent to do the work that has
to be done. Those two do not always coincide; it frequently
happens that they do not coincide.
Under our system of promotion by seniority alone, for
grades below the grade of general officer, there is no presumption whatever that the best man will be at the top on the list
of colonels. There is no presumption whatever that a colonel
is better able to perform the duties of a general than any one
on the list below, because the only thing that has made him a
colonel is the fact that he has been longer in the service, in his
own branch of the service. When the two considerations -
that is, the desire to reward long and faithful service and the
necessity to get a man that can do the work to be donecoincide, it is all perfectly plain. When they do not coincide, my idea has been, and President McKinley and President Roosevelt have both agreed with it, that there should
be a fair and reasonable division, and that a reasonable part
of the promotion to general office should be made primarily
with the idea of reward and that a reasonable part should be
made primarily with reference to the performance of duty.
479




480


MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


That has always been assented to in time of war. The idea
that it should not be done in time of peace proceeds entirely
upon the theory that there is nothing that it is necessary to
have done in time of peace, which is a false idea. It is of the
highest importance that the army should have in general
office in time of peace men of ability, competent soldiers, and
men who have vigor and ambition and initiative. Now, if you
are going to make all your appointments to general office
with the view to reward, inasmuch as all our men do not get
up to the point where they are colonels, in the ordinary course
of seniority, until they are nearly at the end of their service,
you would have an army commanded by generals substantially all of whom are just closing their careers and are in the
last year, or two or three last years of their active service.
Many of them have come to a point where they have
passed the enthusiasm, and ambition, and activity of youth,
and have reached the period of repose; and you cannot have
a live and efficient army which is ready to meet any contingencies that arise with the greatest force and efficiency, which
is generaled entirely by men who are just closing their careers.
You must have a reasonable proportion of your general
officers taken from men who are in the prime of life and who
have activity and efficiency. For that reason, while the
great majority of men who have been made general officers
during the time that I have been here have been men who
were approaching the end of their careers, and who have been
promoted primarily with the view to reward of service, there
has been a small part of the generals selected from the men
who have shown that they had the greatest ability to do
the work that is to be done, and who have the vigor and force
of life left in them, and who can be in office long enough to do
work in the making of a career, and long enough to have
some continuity of policy and of effort in the working out of
plans which require years to work out.




PROMOTIONS IN THE ARMY


481


Now, the public discussion upon promotions to general
office proceeds always entirely upon the idea of reward and
only of reward; but the men who are responsible for the
efficiency of the army are certainly bound to keep the other
idea in mind and to see to it that there are among the general
officers of the army some men who are discovered by what
they do to be men of exceptional capacity, and who have left
the vigor and energy and physical power to go into the field
and do the active work that some general officer has to do if
war comes.
Mr. PARKER. There is a matter which I am interested in,
which seems to be germane now. When a man from West
Point goes into the army he is trained in the artillery, the
cavalry, the infantry, and engineering to a certain extent.
The young man from civil life has to learn his duties in one of
those arms of the service. Would it be practical or beneficial
to transfer a man for the first six years so he would have two
years in each of these different arms before he finally took his
place, so that when he finally became a field officer he would
know how to ride, and when he became a general officer he
would understand the application of the arms which came
under his command?
Secretary ROOT. I think it very desirable that the result
should be obtained. That is exactly what we are trying to
accomplish now by our system of schools. The whole policy
in expending the money you have voted for the increase of
military posts to accommodate the enlarged army, has been
to make the provision by enlarging posts rather than by
increasing their number; and it contemplates having a considerable number of posts of all arms of the service; so that
the young officers will be familiar with the operations of the
other arms; and in the post schools, in which all of the junior
officers will be trained, and so far as we have been able to
establish them up to this time, all are being trained, they will




482


MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


be taught not merely the duties of their particular branch,
but of all branches. It is the object of the general service
college at Leavenworth, where we have at the full war
strength representatives of all arms of the service - infantry,
cavalry, engineers, artillery, and signal corps, the full outfit
of a brigade - it is the object of that school to train an
officer as an all-round officer, and train him in the use and
the command of organizations of every branch of the service.
I think that that kind of training will be useful, however,
for only a part of the officers of the army. Inevitably we will
find that a considerable portion of the officers of the army are
competent to be good officers of infantry, of cavalry, of artillery, to perform the duties of their own branch, but have not
the capacity which will ever lead to their being called upon
to command an army; while another part of the officers who
have superior capacity ought to be educated with the view
of being called upon to perform such higher duties. The
idea of the system we are trying to work out is, that we
will gradually differentiate those two classes, and that
we will move along the men who show superior capacity
and give them the all-round education for performing the
higher duties that they are competent for, while we will
leave the men of inferior capacity to the work of their own
branches...
Since we have gone into a discussion of military preparation, I should like to say something also about the promotion
of rifle practice.
Congress last year appropriated $2,500 for a trophy or
trophies, as prizes for a competition in sharp-shooting, to
which the army and the National Guards should be admitted, the trophy to be contested for under regulations to
be prescribed by the Secretary of War and the money to be
expended under his direction. I thought that in the exercise
of that authority it was desirable to make regulations which




PROMOTIONS IN THE ARMY


483


would lead to-at all events would begin - a general comprehensive treatment of the subject of instruction in rifle
practice; and accordingly I made the regulations provide for
a board for the promotion of rifle practice which should take
charge of this trophy competition. I made the board consist
of twenty-one members, put on it five members from the
regular establishment, the Assistant Secretary of War at the
head, two officers of the army, an officer of the navy, and an
officer of the marine corps, whom the Secretary of the Navy
detailed, the president and trustees of the National Rifle
Association, eight in number, and then eight citizens from
different parts of the country, who had shown an interest
in the subject of rifle practice.
Of course the two last classes were composed almost entirely of National Guardsmen, National Guard officers, either
active or retired. Those sixteen represented thirteen different states and territories. That board met and formulated the rules for the conduct of the competition for the
trophy, and the match was had in September under their
direction. They have also had under consideration, without
any power to act, a number of matters which affected the
general subject of the promotion of rifle practice in this country. I should be very glad if Congress would do two or three
things about that. It is plain that the navy and the marine
corps ought to be included in the classes eligible to compete. They did send teams to Sea Girt at the time of competition. These teams went into the competition, but were
not permitted to have any chance for the prizes because the
statutes did not name them. That ought to be changed.
I think the board will be useful enough to justify a small
appropriation to pay their expenses. At present they have
to pay their own expenses - their travelling expenses.
And then I wish very much that you would make a moderate appropriation which the board can use under the direc



484


MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


tion, under the approval, of the Secretary of War, for the
promotion of rifle practice generally, so that rifle practice can
have some stimulus given it. It is of no use to raise volunteer
forces composed of men who cannot shoot. It is no use to
enlist and clothe and feed and transport forces to the field,
if they cannot hit an enemy when they shoot at him; and the
changing conditions make it necessary that some effort
should be made, if the young men of the country are going to
be able to hit an enemy when they go out as a volunteer
force.
The change in small arms, the greatly increased range,
makes practice much more necessary than it was when you
did not shoot at a man until you could see the whites of his
eyes. And then our young men are less and less familiar
with firearms. When I was a boy, and some of the more
venerable members of the committee were boys, every house
had its rifle or shotgun, and the boys learned to use them.
There was game about all over the country, and the boys
learned to shoot. But in the thickly settled portions of the
country today a large proportion, I should say a majority, of
the boys grow up without ever having fired a gun. And when
war comes and they are called out into the volunteer force,
there will not be time to train them, and we cannot wait for
them to be trained. They will have to go into the field and
go to spending ammunition.
I think it is a matter of great interest and importance for
the Government of the United States to spend small sums in
promoting exercises in the use of the rifle among the young
men of the country. I made the organization under the
regulations for this particular trophy in accordance with the
spirit of the appropriation to further work in that direction;
and it affords a harmonious cooperation of the regular
army, and the navy, and the National Guard for that purpose, and I hope you will promote it. So that if in Des




PROMOTIONS IN THE ARMY


485


Moines, or Newark, or in Akron, the young men choose to
get together and form a rifle club, there can be some objective
point to work for in the way of some simple competition.
That can readily be arranged so that competitions can be put
about in different parts of the country....
I shall be very glad to come before the committee any time
that the committee thinks my presence will be useful to them.
Mr. CAPRON. I could not let you go away, Mr. Secretary,
without saying - and I voice the sentiment of every member
of the committee, I am sure, - that it is with deep regret
down in our hearts that we approach the time when you are
no more to come here as our adviser, and when we are to
depend on some source of information other than that on
which we have depended so long and so reliably; I can only
say that this regret is coupled with the hope that you will not
forget that this committee and Congress and the country
will look to you hereafter, as they have in the years just
passed, for such advice as we believe you can give for the
improvement of the military service.
Secretary ROOT. You are very kind, and I am deeply
appreciative of what you say. I want to say that I very
keenly appreciate not merely the courtesy and kindness but
the public-spirited and generous consideration that I have
received from this committee. The association has been
most delightful, and it is peculiarly pleasant to feel that it
has been without any division or distinction or prejudice upon
the score of party or locality. I do not expect ever to find
myself working with men more single-minded in the desire
to promote the public interest than the men of your committee, Mr. Chairman, with whom I have been working for
the past four years and a half; and while I shall be glad to
get home and get back to my own proper work in the practice
of law, I shall leave Washington with great regret in parting
from you all.




PI
a




THE SPIRIT OF NATIONAL SERVICE


As stating Mr. Root's views concerning the military policy which the United
States should now adopt and should pursue in the future, the volume devoted to
the Military and Colonial Policy of the United States may be closed appropriately
with the following letter to Lieutenant-General S. B. M. Young, president of the
Association for National Service:
CLINTON, N. Y., September 17, 1916.
MY DEAR GENERAL:
I am obliged to you for sending me the papers relating to
the Association for National Service. We certainly need the
spirit of national service in our country. It is a mistake to
suppose that a people can have good government, peace,
order, and progress for any long period without any effort on
their part. We in the United States need to have our patriotism awakened, to throw off our indifference, and to think more
of our duties as well as of our rights.
Every one who is fit to be a citizen of a free country ought
to be willing to serve the country when called upon, in
accordance with his ability. The young men who are physically fit for military duty should hold themselves ready to
fight for their country if need be, and if they are not ready
when the need comes they will not long have any country,
and they will not deserve to have any. The vast change
in the way of carrying on war which has occurred within a
very few years has created a situation in which it is perfectly
plain that no country can be ready to defend her independence against foreign aggression except by universal military
training and a resulting universal readiness for military
service.
The old way of waiting until war came and then calling for
volunteers has become obsolete, and is no longer effective.
487




488


MILITARY AND COLONIAL POLICY


The National Guard system is not adequate and cannot be
made adequate to meet the needs of national defense under
any real assault upon our right. It is impossible to have an
effective body of soldiers who serve two masters and are
raised and organized to accomplish two different purposes.
Universal training and readiness for service are not only
demanded by plain common sense, but they are essentially
democratic. They were required by law during the early
years of our Republic, for every male citizen between the
ages of eighteen and forty-five was required to be ready to
fight for his country and was required to be trained and provided with arms in accordance with the simple needs of
warfare in those days. It is only necessary now to apply
the principles and requirements of the national law of May 8,
1792, adapted to present conditions.
You have my best wishes in your patriotic endeavors.
With kind regards I am always faithfully yours,
ELIHU ROOT.
Lieut.-Gen. S. B. M. YOUNG,
President Associationfor National Service, Washington, D. C.




INDEX




A




INDEX


Abra, province, 264.
Accounting system, in the Philippines
and Cuba, 268 f.
Acton, Massachusetts, 3.
Adams, John Quincy, President, 210.
Adjutant-General's Department, the,
356 f., 380, 434, 438.
Aggression, invited by weakness, 16 f.
Aglipay, Filipino leader, 248.
Agoncillo, Filipino revolutionist, 40.
Agriculture, in the Philippines, 276 f.
Aguinaldo,Baldomero, Filipino leader, 39.
Aguinaldo, Emilio, Filipino revolutionary leader, 5, 10, 36-41, 46, 47, 50, 51,
71, 73, 80, 82-86, 88 f., 101, 230, 234,
240, 248.
Ahern, George P., American officer, 273.
Akron, Ohio, 485.
Alabama, 29, 275.
Alaska, 47, 91, 375; militia of, 430; the
Alaskan boundary dispute, 111.
Albay, province in Luzon, 237, 238.
Albay, town in Luzon, 237.
Albert, Filipino notable, 22.
Aliaga, town in Luzon, 50, 231.
Allen, David, American soldier, 51 f.
American army, character and office of
the, address on, 15-25.
American soldier, address on the, 3-13.
Anderson, Thomas McArthur, American
general, 37.
Andrews, William, American soldier, 52.
Angeles, town in Luzon, 232.
Anti-Imperialists, 52.
Apaches, the, 322.
Aparri, 313.
Aranata, Filipino notable, 22.
Arayat, town in Luzon, 31, 232.
Arellano, Cayetano, Filipino jurist, 22,
46, 241, 261, 290.
Aristocracy, in America, 28.


Arkansas, 276.
Arms and munitions, export of, 153 ff.
Army, the, see Table of Contents, pp.
iii-vi.
Army and Navy Board, 108, 431 f.
Army Medical School, the, 121, 390, 896;
address at, 131-134.
Army Regulations, revision of, 430, 434 -439.
Army War College, the, 349, 356 f.,
361, 387-396, 398 f.; addresses at,
121-129.
Articles of War, revision of the, 431.
Artillery School, the, 121, 391, 395.
Asia, 125.
Asingan, town in Luzon, 232.
Assistant Secretary of War, the, 469, 483.
Association for National Service, the,
487.
Atkinson, Frederick Washington, educator, 244.
Atlanta, Georgia, 52, 60.
Atlanta Constitution, quoted, 73.
Auditor for the War Department, the,
406.
Augustinians, the, 282.
Baccalod, Sultan of, 325.
Bacolod, city in Negros, 229.
Bacon, Augustus Octavius, American
senator, 157.
Bacon, Robert, 441.
Bacoor, town in Luzon, 230, 236.
Baguio, town in Luzon, 278.
Bahia Honda, Cuba, 100, 205.
Baldwin, Frank Dwight, American officer, 832.
Baltimore, 224.
Bamban, town in Luzon, 232.
Banditti, in Porto Rico, 179, 183.
Bangbang, town in Luzon, 89.


491




492


INDEX


Barlow, Francis Channing, American
general, 12.
Barnette, William Jay, American naval
officer, 432.
Batangas, city in Luzon, 313.
Batangas, province, 77, 259, 302, 313,
316, 317,
Bates, John Coalter, American general,
236, 237, 238, 240, 326 f., 427; quoted,
454.
Batson, Lieutenant, 368.
Battery Lazear, 224.
Bayambong, town in Luzon, 233.
Bayang, Sultan of, 322.
Bell, James Franklin, American officer,
232, 317.
Bell, James Montgomery, American general, 238, 377.
Benguet, province of, 243 f., 278.
Beveridge, Alfred Jeremiah, American
senator, 9.
Biac-na-Bato, Treaty of (1897), 38 f.
Bicol River, the, 238.
Biddle, John, army engineer, 278.
Billings, Dr. John Shaw, 131.
Billman, Warren, American soldier, 52.
Binadayan, Dato of, 322.
Bifiang, town in Luzon, 236.
Bliss, Tasker Howard, American general,
223, 427, 432.
Board of Engineers, the, 381.
Board of Ordnance and Fortification, the,
380, 381, 434.
Bohol, province, 259.
Borneo, 324.
Boxer Rebellion, the, 333-347.
Brandy Station, battle of, 94.
Brigandage, in the Phillippines, 10,
246 f., 367 f.
British East Indies, the, 281, 282.
British Empire. the, 404.
British troops in the Chinese relief expedition, 333, 340, 341, 344, 345.
Brooke, John Rutter, American general,
189, 223.
Brooks, E. C., American officer. 223
Bryan, William Jennings, 33-36, 47, 51,


52, 71; campaign issues of, discussed,
54-64.
Buchanan, James, President, 210.
Buffalo, 218.
Bulacan, province, 230, 235.
Bureau of Insular Affairs, the, 315 f.
Cabanatuan, town in Luzon, 231.
Cabiao, town in Luzon, 231.
Cagayan, province, 264.
Cagayan, town in Mindanao, 238.
Cagayan, the, 313.
Cailles, Filipino leader, 85, 248.
California, 106, 261, 286, 288, 454.
California, University of, 45.
Camarines, north and south, provinces
in Luzon, 237, 238.
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 198.
Camp McKinley, Hawaii, 462.
Cancio, Leopoldo, Cuban minister, 223.
Canton, Ohio, 113.
Capas, town in Luzon, 232.
Capron, Adin Ballou, American congressman, 485.
Carabaos, 300.
Cardenas, Cuba, 205.
Caribbean policy, future, for the United
States, 188.
Carmack, Edward    Ward, American
senator, 91, 93, 94.
Carranglan, 313.
Carroll, Dr. James, 224.
Carter, William H., American general,
427, 431.
Carthage, 91.
Castner, Lieutenant, 368.
Castro, Fernando, 272.
Catanduanes, island, 237.
Cavite, province, 230, 235, 236, 313.
Cavite, town and arsenal, 227, 229.
Cebu, city, 228, 260.
Cebu, island, 228, 241, 259, 302.
Central America, 10, 100, 164.
Chaffee, Adna Romanza, American
general, 17, 61, 86, 92, 94 f., 96, 119,
223 f., 262, 318, 319, 323, 333, 340,
343-347, 427.




INDEX


493


Charity, ennobling influences of, 28.
Chicago, 60.
Chickamauga Park, Georgia, 455.
Chief of Artillery, the, 122, 379 ff., 390,
434.
Chief of Engineers, the, 122, 381, 390.
Chief of Ordnance, the, 380, 381, 463.
Chief of Staff, the, 426 f., 428, 429, 433,
434, 435, 437 ff.
Chili, Chinese province, 335, 338.
China, 16, 19 ff., 23, 31 f., 38, 39, 45, 57,
59, 94, 95, 105 f., 108, 111, 119, 157,
158, 246, 262, 281, 301, 310, 333-347,
375.
Chinese, in the Philippines, 299.
Chinese indemnity, the, 333-336.
Chinese Relief Expedition, the, 333-347.
Ch'ing, Prince, 335 f.
Cholera, in the Philippines, 301.
Christian Chinese, the, 345.
Christman, William, American soldier, 52.
Cienfuegos, 189, 200, 204.
Citizens' army, address on the, 135 f.
Civil service, the, in the Philippines,
266 ff.
Civil War, the, 4, 12, 17, 18, 42, 61, 65,
93, 94, 115, 116, 124, 125, 127, 135,
141, 341, 352, 361, 401, 404, 410.
Clausewitz, Karl von, Prussian officer
and military writer, 422.
Clay, H-enry, American statesman, 210.
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, the, 103.
Cleveland, Grover, President, 57, 60, 366.
Coast defense, relations of the militia
to, 450-453.
Cockayne, Albert, American soldier, 52.
Coeur d'Alene district, the, in Idaho, 60.
Colombia, 103.
Colonial policy, see Table of Contents,
pp. iii-vi.
Colorado, 462.
Colorado Reefs, Cuba, 205.
Columbus, Ohio, 137, 149.
Commanding General of the Army, the,
379, 380,381, 403, 404, 426, 428 f., 434.
Commissary Department, the, 401.
Commissary General, the, 412, 413.


Comptroller of the Treasury, the, 406.
Concepcion, town in Luzon, 232.
Concord, Massachusetts, 3, 116.
Conemaugh, the, 344.
Conewago Valley, Pennsylvania, 455.
Conger, Edwin Hurd, American diplomatist, 343.
Connecticut, 451, 462.
Constitution, the, 88, 109, 148, 149, 162,
252, 295, 442, 445, 447.
Coolidge, Charles Austin, American officer, 342.
Cooper, Joseph F., jurist, 261.
Corbin, Henry Clark, American general,
341, 342, 432.
Cornell University, 45.
Corps of Engineers, the, 278, 434, 438.
Cotton Bale Trust, the, 62.
Croker, Richard, 62.
Crozier, William, American general, 420.
Cuba, 11, 15, 17, 21 f., 56, 59, 68, 69 f.,
91, 94, 99 ff., 101, 103, 111, 117 f., 119,
132, 168, 170, 171-175, 179, 268, 269,
305, 329 f., 367, 369, 375, 423; resolution of Congress concerning, xii; the
development and establishment of the
republic, 185-224.
Cubans, the, 12, 185, 187.
Cuban teachers, the, at Cambridge,
Mass., 198 f.
Daggett, Aaron S., American officer, 333,
345.
Dagupan, town in Luzon, 230, 231, 233,
243.
Davis, George Whitefield, American general, 324 f.
Declaration of Independence, the, 42, 62,
87 f.
Denby, Charles, American diplomat, 45.
Denver Daily News, quoted, 74.
Department of Justice, the, 267.
Department of Supply, or Supplies, proposed, 401, 413, 414.
Department of the Interior, the, 267.
Department of the Pacific, the, 228.
Desaix, French general, 124.




494


INDEX




Des Moines, Iowa, 60, 484 f.
Dewey, George, American admiral, 5 f.,
9, 10, 37, 38, 40, 70, 73, 82, 83, 84,
432; member of the first Philippine
Commission, 45, 95.
Dick, Charles, American general of militia, 137.
Dingley Tariff, the, 53, 54, 81, 300.
Dinwiddie Court House, 94.
District of Columbia, the, 278, 387, 468,
470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476,
477.
Division of Insular Affairs of the War
Department, 287. See Bureau of Insular Affairs.
Dodge, General Granville M., 409.
Dominicans, the, 282.
Dominion of Canada, the, 169.
Dorward, General, 340, 341.
Douglas, Stephen Arnold, American
statesman, 11.
East Indians, 299.
Education, in the Philippines, 269-272.
Eighth Army Corps, the, 225, 226, 227,
229, 236.
El Caney, Cuba, 61, 94.
Endicott, William Crowninshield, secretary of war, 366.
Engineers' School of Application, the,
121, 381, 390, 395, 396.
England, 5, 18, 47, 106.
English, the, 128,169, 299.
English law, 169.
Europe, 27, 28, 30, 43, 105, 106, 125, 310,
343.
Everett, Edward, American statesman,
210.
Exemptions from militia duty, 470 f.
Federals, Filipino political party, 22, 23,
285.
Fifteenth Cavalry, the, 323.
Fifth Artillery, the, 346.
Finances of the Philippines, 306-310.
First California Volunteer Infantry, the,
229.






First Massachusetts Heavy Artillery,
the, 451.
First Vermont Infantry, the, 341.
Florida, 454.
Foraker Amendment, the, 305.
Forestry, in the Philippines, 272-276.
Fort Blakely, Alabama, 93.
Fort Crook, Omaha, 60.
Fort Howard, Baltimore, 224.
Fortieth Infantry, the, 238.
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 121, 122,
390, 391, 392, 400.
Fortress Monroe, Virginia, 121, 390, 395.
Fort Riley, Kansas, 121, 122, 135, 136,
146, 347, 390, 430; maneuvers at,
453, 462.
Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 60.
Fort Totten, New York, 390, 395.
Fort Whipple, Prescott, Arizona, 60.
Fourteenth Infantry, the, 333, 345.
Fowler, John, American consul, 342.
France, 116, n. 1, 281, 282.
Frankish law, 169.
Free coinage of silver, 33, 62, 63.
Freedom of speech, 28.
French Canal Company, the, see Panama
Canal Company.
French East Indies, the, 297.
French general staff, 422.
French troops in the Chinese relief expedition, 333, 340, 344.
Friars' lands, the, 282 f., 295 f.
Frye, Alexis Everett, American educator,
197, 198.
Funston, Frederick, American general,
93, 248.
Gallatin, Albert, secretary of the treasury, 42.
General Service and Staff College, the,
122, 390, 391, 392, 393, 400, 407, 430,
443, 444, 482.
General Staff, the, 25, 109, 123, 125, 126,
128, 398 f., 402-406, 417-439, 467, 468.
General Staff Corps, see General Staff.
Georgia, 140, 454.
German general staff, 422.




INDEX


495


Germany, 106, 273, 281 f., 422.
Gerona, town in Luzon, 233.
Gettysburg, 12, 13, 94, 397 f.
Gorgas, Dr. William Crawford, 132, 224.
Government, functions of, 29 f.; not dependent upon consent, 42.
Governor's Island, New York, 414 f.
Grant, Frederick Dent, American general, 316 f.
Grant, Ulysses Simpson, President, 18,
19, 34, 35, 58, 61, 116, 120, 210, 418,
426.
Great Britain, 103.
Greble, Edwin St. John, American officer, 199, 223.
Greene, Henry Alexander, American
officer, 427.
Guam, island of, 247.
Guantanamo, Cuba, 100.
Guerrillas, in the Philippines, 31, 51 f.
Guevara, Filipino insurgent, 316.
Guidi, papal delegate, 296.
Habeas corpus, writ of, in Cuba, 201.
Hague Tribunal, the, 106.
Hall, William Preble, American officer,
432.
Halleck, Henry Wager, American general, 418.
Hamilton, Alexander, American statesman, 115.
Hancock, Winfield Scott, American
general, 12, 61.
Hanna, Matthew E., American officer,
223.
Hare, Colonel, 232.
Hartford, Connecticut, 52.
Harvard University, 198.
Havana, city, 7, 12, 21, 30, 187, 189, 195,
196, 198, 200, 201, 204, 423; cleansing
of, 191, 206.
Havana, province, 190, 195.
Hawaii, 173, 174, 310, 375, 462.
Hay, James, American congressman, 417.
Hay, John, American statesman, 105.
Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, the, 103.
Herrera, Filipino notable, 22, 23.


Hoche, Lazare, French general, 124.
Holden, Edward Singleton, American
astronomer and librarian, 115.
Hollander, Jacob H., economist, 182.
Hong-Kong, 39, 40, 83, 277, 281, 298.
Honolulu, 462.
Hospital Corps, the, 374, 375.
House of Representatives, Committee
on Militia of the, 445, 456; Insular
Committee of the, 305; Committee on
Military Affairs of the, 417-420.
Howard, John, English philanthropist,
11.
Hughes, Robert P., American general,
229.
Humingan, town in Luzon, 232.
Hurricane, in Porto Rico (August 8,
1899), 12, 177 f.
Huus v. The New York and Porto Rico
Steamship Company, 311.
Ice Trust, the, 62.
Idaho, 60.
Ide, Henry Clay, Philippine commissioner, 45, 263, 288.
Illinois, 454.
Ilocanos, Filipino tribe, 50, 51.
Ilocos Norte, province, 264.
Ilocos, province in Luzon, 89.
Ilocos Sur, province, 264.
Iloilo, city in Panay, 227, 228, 229, 260.
Imperialism, as a political issue, 33-64.
Imus, town in Luzon, 236.
Indang, town in Luzon, 236.
India, 324.
Indiana, 454, 455, 462.
Indians, 39, 88, 91, 94, 293, 320 f.
Indian Wars, the, 61.
Infantry and Cavalry School, the, 121,
122, 392, 395.
Infantry Drill Regulations, revision of,
430.
Inspection of the militia, 459 ff.
Inspector-General's Department, the,
405, 434, 438.
Insular Affairs, Division of, 287. See
Bureau of Insular Affairs.




496


INDEX


Insular constabulary, the, 265 f.
Interest, rates of, 27.
International Club, the, at Manila, 23.
Interstate National Guard Association,
the, 137.
Intoxicating liquors, army regulations
concerning, 382.
Iowa, 60, 482.
Isabela, province, 264.
Isle of Pines, the, 186, 214.
Isthmian Canal Act, the, 103.
Italy, 106.
Jackson, Andrew, President, 210.
Jamaica, 175.
Japan, 84, 105.
Japanese, the, 299, 325.
Japanese troops in the Chinese relief expedition, 333, 340, 344, 345.
Java, 324.
Jefferson, Thomas, President, 34, 35, 42,
43, 55, 88, 109, 139, 210; quoted, 446.
Jett, Thomas M., American congressman, 304.
Johns Hopkins University, 182.
Joint Army and Navy Board, 108, 431 ff.
Jolo, 229.
Jolo, Sultan of, 326.
Jones, James Kimbrough, 62.
Jones, John Paul, burial place of, 116,
n. 1.
Judge-Advocate's Department, the, 434,
438.
Judiciary, federal, a bulwark of constitutional liberty, 33.
Judiciary, the, in the Philippines, 260 f.
Junction City, Kansas, address at, 135 f.
Kansas, 135, 136, 462.
Kansas City, Missouri, 31, 34, 52.
Kean, Jefferson Randolph, surgeon, 223,
224.
Kempff, Louis, American admiral, 337,
342.
Kentucky, 455, 462.
Ketteler, Baron von, 333, 337.
Kishineff, massacre at, 107.


Knox, Henry, American general, 115.
Kobbe, William A., American general,
237.
Krupp guns, 234.
Lacoste, Perfecto, Cuban minister, 223.
Ladd, Fletcher, jurist, 261.
Laguna, province in Luzon, 230.
Laguna de Bay, 230, 236.
Lake Lanao, 322 f., 325.
Lamson-Scribner, Frank, agrostologist,
277.
Laoag, 313.
La Union, province in Luzon, 233, 264.
Lawton, Henry Wade, American general, 8, 22, 52, 61, 74, 231 ff., 235 f.
Lazear, Dr. Jesse W., 224.
Leavenworth, Kansas, 482.
Lee, Fitzhugh, American general, 223.
Legarda, Benito, 22, 264.
Legaspi, town in Luzon, 237.
Legations, at Peking, rescue of, 31 f., 61,
333-347.
Lexington, Massachusetts, 116.
Leyte, island, 237.
Liberals, Filipino political party, 23.
Licab, town in Luzon, 50.
Lieber, Francis, American publicist, 107.
Lieutenant-General of the Army, the,
418.
Lincoln, Abraham, President, 11, 15, 33,
34, 35, 42, 107.
Lingayen, Gulf of, 230, 231, 243, 313.
Liscum, Emerson H., American officer,
61, 337, 340 f.
Llanera, Mariano, Filipino leader, 39.
Lodge, Henry Cabot, American statesman, 305.
Logan, John Alexander, Jr., American
officer, 74, 232.
London, 31.
Long Island Sound, 462.
Louisiana, 10, 42, 47, 88, 169, 276.
Louisville Courier-Journal, quoted, 73.
Lower Canada, 169.
Loyalty to country, nature of, 53.
Ludington,  Marshall   Independence,
American general, 420.




INDEX


497


Ludlow, William, American general, 12,
223, 387.
Lukban, Filipino insurgent, 247, 316.
Luna, Filipino chieftain, 46, 85.
Luna, Guerrero, Filipino notable, 23.
Lupao, town in Luzon, 232.
Luyban, Filipino general, 23.
Luzon, island, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 36, 38,
45, 46, 61, 88 ff., 92, 118, 225-283, 301,
302, 313 f.
Luzuriaga, Jose, 22, 264.
Mabini, Filipino revolutionist, 37, 82.
Macabebes, Philippine tribe, 368.
Macabulos, General, 89.
MacArthur, Arthur, American general,
8, 51, 232, 233, 248, 262, 318.
Maciu Moros, the, 323.
McKinley, William, President, 15, 19, 24,
67, 79, 82, 98, 106, 110, 185, 186, 216,
217 f., 225, 253, 308, 479; review of
the first administration of, with particular reference to the Philippines,
27-64; character of, 65 f., 112 f.;
quoted, xi f., 72, 75 f., 95; his instructions to the Second Philippine Commission, 287-294.
Madison, James, President, 109, 139;
quoted, 446 f.
Mafia, the, 90.
Magalang, town in Luzon, 232.
Maine, 462.
Malalos, or Malolos, town in Luzon, 40,


243, 244, 246, 260, 262, 264, 265, 268,
269, 271, 277 ff., 294, 296, 307, 309,
313, 337, 339, 340; citadel of, 3;
normal school at, 269, 271.
Manila, province, 230.
Manila Bay, battle of (1898), 40, 83, 225,
240.
Mapa, Victorino, Filipino jurist, 22, 261.
Mariquina, town in Luzon, 235.
Mariquina River, 235, 236.
Maryland, 454.
Massachusetts, 454, 462.
Matanzas, city in Cuba, 200, 204, 223.
Matanzas, division and province of
Cuba, 190, 195.
Meade, George Gordon, American general, 61.
Medical Corps, the, 131-134, 224, 396.
Medical Department, the, 339, 396, 434,
438.
Memphis Commercial, quoted, 74.
Mercedes Hospital, the, at Havana, 200.
Merritt, Wesley, American general, 9, 37,
82.
Mexican dollar, the, 245 f., 301, 309.
Mexican War, the, 61.
Mexico, 59, 61, 106, 153, 155, 310, 313.
Michie, Professor, 124.
Michigan, 288, 454, 462.
Michigan, University of, 45.
Miles, Nelson Appleton, American general, 432.
Militarism, 56-61.
Military organization, need of improvement in, 3 f., 24 f., 349-488.
Militia Act, the, of Jan. 20, 1903, 110;
address on, 137-151.
Militia legislation, 24 f.
Militia system, the new, 441-477.
Miller, Marcus P., American general,
229.


45, 46, 89.
Malanao Moros, the, 322.
Malays, 324 f.
Malivar, Filipino general, 23.
Malvar, Filipino insurgent,
317.
Manchuria, 106.
Mandi, Moro dato, 283 f.


247, 316,


Maneuvers, joint, of regulars and militia, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 52.
453 ff., 458, 461 ff.             Mindanao, island, 238, 240, 320-327.
Manila, 5, 6, 7, 11, 22, 23, 30, 31, 36, 37, Minnesota, 261.
38, 39, 40, 41, 46, 47, 49, 56, 71, 72 f., Mississippi, 50, 91, 275.
78, 82, 92, 96, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, Mississippi, the, 29.
230, 234, 235, 237, 238, 240, 241, 242, Missouri, 275, 462.




498


INDEX


Mobile campaign, the, 93.
Mohammedans, 324 f.
Monetary Commission, the, 310.
Monroe Doctrine, the, 170, 111.
Monroe, James, President, 210; quoted,
447.
Montalban, town in Luzon, 235.
Moody, William Henry, cabinet officer,
432.
Morong, province in Luzon, 230, 235.
Moros, 74, 102, 240, 283 f., 317, 320-327.
Moses, Bernard, American educator and
Philippine commissioner, 45, 263, 288.
Municipal governments, in the Philippines, 257 f.
Nacomiento Ranch, California, 455.
Nagasaki, 339, 340.
Namacpacan, town in Luzon, 233.
Nanking, province in China, 341.
Nashville American, quoted, 73.
National Guard, the, 361, 370, 371, 391,
393; relations of, to the new militia
system, 441-477. See Militia Act.
Nationalists, Filipino political party, 23.
National Rifle Association, the, 469, 483.
National Security League, the, 441.
National service, spirit of, 487.
Navy, the, 442.
Nebraska, 55, 454, 462.
Negro disfranchisement, 62.
Negros, island in the Philippines, 46, 47,
48, 89, 228, 229, 235. 240, 264, 269,
368.
Newark, New Jersey, 485.
New England, 29.
New Hampshire, 261.
New Jersey, 454.
New Marion, Indiana, 52.
New Mexico, 47, 286, 455.
New Orleans Picayune, quoted, 73.
New York, city, 50, 59, 178, 198.
New York, state, 140, 414, 454, 462.
New York Journal, quoted, 73 f.
Niagara River, the, 430.
Nicaragua, 103.
Nightingale, Florence, 12.


Ninth Infantry, the, 273, 337, 340, 341.
Noirel, 85.
North Carolina, 50.
North Carolinians, at Gettysburg, 12.
North Dakota, 454.
Northwest Territory, the, 47.
Noveleta, town in Luzon, 230.
Nueva Ecija, province in Luzon, 230.
Nueva Viscaya, 233.
Ohio, 45, 140, 197, 288, 454, 462.
Oklahoma, 454.
Old Cavite, town in Luzon, 230.
Omaha, 60.
' Open door' policy, the, 105.
Ordnance Department, the, 412, 420,
434, 438, 473.
Oregon, 276.
Oregon, American battleship, 233.
Otis, Elwell Stephen, American general,
7, 8, 86, 92, 225-228, 233, 240.
Palawan, island, 320, 322.
Palma, Tomas Estrada, first president of
Cuba, 21 f., 100 f., 221; quoted, 222.
Pampanga, province, 230, 234.
Pampangos, tribe in Luzon, 234.
Panama, 103, 104.
Panama Canal, the, 188.
Panama Canal Commission, the, 104.
Panama Canal Company, the, 103, 104.
Panay, island, 228, 241.
Pangasinan, province in Luzon, 88 f.,
230, 234, 278.
Pangasinanes, tribe in Luzon, 234.
Panique, town in Luzon, 89, 233.
Paramount issue, defined, 34.
Pardo de Tavera, Trinidad H., 264.
Paris, 116, n. 1.
Paris, Treaty of, xiii, xvii-xxiv, 161, 185,
187, 188, 209, 210,211, 212, 215, 219 f.,
225, 255, 273, 292.
Parker, Richard Wayne, American congressman, 481.
Paterno, Pedro A., intermediary, 39, 83.
Patria, Guito Rinacimiento, Filipino
notable, 23.




INDEX


499


Paua, Chinese general in Luzon, 237.
Pay Department, the, 401, 434, 438.
Paymaster-General, the, 412.
Pei-Ho, river in China, 338.
Pei-tsang, China, 344, 345.
Peking, China, 17, 19 ff., 31 f., 61, 95,
118, 158; relief expedition to, 333-347.
Pennsylvania, 29, 140,454.
Peoria, Illinois, address at, 65.
Perez das Marinas, town in Luzon, 230.
Pershing, John Joseph, American officer, 323, 325.
Pettigrew, James Johnston, Confederate
general, 12.
Philadelphia, 306.
Philippine Commission, the First, 44 f.,
46, 47, 85, 95 f., 251; the Second, 45,
51, 101, 252 ff., 262, 267, 280; instructions to, 48 ff., 287-294, 321; work of,
294-302.
Philippine Government Act, the, 317,
322.
Philippine Islands, the, 5-11, 15, 17, 22 f.,
168, 173, 367 ff., 374, 375, 376, 408,
441, 444; address on their relations to
the United States in 1900, 27-64; address on American policies in, in 1902,
65-98; the suppression of the insurrection and the building up of civil
government, 225-327; tribute to the
conduct of the army in, 330 f.
Pickett, George Edward, Confederate
general, 12.
Pilar, Pio del, Filipino bandit and
revolutionist, 46, 47, 88.
Pillsbury, John Elliott, American naval
officer, 432.
Pinar del Rio, division and province of
Cuba, 190, 195.
Pious Fund, the, 106, 306.
Pitcher, Captain, 201.
Platt, Orville Hitchcock, American
senator, 186.
Platt Amendment, the, 99 f., 185, 186,
188, 212 ff.
Porter, Horace, American general, 116.
Portland, Maine, 462.




Porto Rico, 11, 12, 48, 59, 68 f., 161-171,
173, 174, 177-184, 268, 310, 367, 375,
381, 430.
Porto Rico Provisional Regiment, the,
374, 375.
Pozorrubio, town in Luzon, 232, 278.
Prescott, Arizona, 60.
Prisons, Cuban, 200 f., 202.
Promotions in the army, 479-485.
Provincial government, in the Philippines, 259 f.
Prussia, 422.
Public Printing Office, the, 316.
Puerto Principe, division and province of
Cuba, 190, 195.
Quartermaster-General, the, 412, 413.
Quartermaster's Department, the, 383,
401, 409, 412, 413, 419, 420, 434, 438.
Quebec, 169.
Randolph, Wallace F., American general,
427, 432.
Rawlins, Joseph Lafayette, American
senator, 91, 94.
Recolletos, the, 282.
Reconcentrados, 189.
Reed, Dr. Walter, 132, 224.
Reilly, Henry J., American officer, 61,346.
Relief, hospital ship, 339.
Religion, ennobling influences of, 28.
Religious orders, lands of the, in the Philippines, 282 f., 295 f.
Remedios, Cuba, hospital at, 200.
Reynolds, John Fulton, American general, 12.
Rhode Island, 454.
Richards, W. V., American officer, 224.
Rifle practice, promotion of, 468 ff.
Rinderpest, in the Philippines, 296 f.,
300.
Rio Grande, river in Luzon, 230, 231, 235.
Rivera, Spanish governor, 83.
Rizal, Jose, Filipino poet and patriot,
98, 308; quoted, 86 f.
Robertson, Major, 20.
Roman Catholic Church, the, 106, 206 f.






500


INDEX


Roman law, 169.
Rome, 296.
Roosevelt, Theodore, President, 19, 21,
22, 23, 66, 67, 79, 84, 112 ff., 188, 264,
334, 479.
Rosales, town in Luzon, 232.
Rosario, Filipino notable, 23.
Rumanian outrages, the, 107.
Rural guard, the, in Cuba, 203.
Russia, 91, 105.
Russian troops in the Chinese relief expedition, 333, 344.
Saban, town in Luzon, 230.
Saigon, 298.
Samar, island, 237, 247, 248, 302, 316,
368.
Sandico, Filipino colonel, 50.
San Domingo, 43.
San Fabian, town in Luzon, 232.
San Fernando, town in Luzon, 233.
San Francisco, 248, 277, 306, 337, 340,
347.
San Francisco de Malabon, town in
Luzon, 230.
Sanger, Joseph P., American general, 223.
San Isidro, town in Luzon, 231.
San Jacinto, town in Luzon, 232.
San Jose, town in Luzon, 232.
San Juan, Cuba, 61.
San Juan de Guimba, town in Luzon, 50.
San Juan de Porto Rico, 30, 177.
San Mateo, town in Luzon, 235, 236.
San Nicolas, town in Luzon, 232.
San Pedro, near Manila, 46.
San Quintin, town in Luzon, 232.
Santa Clara, city in Cuba, 204.
Santa Clara, division and province of
Cuba, 190, 195.
Santa Cruz, town in Luzon, 230.
Santiago de Cuba, city, 12, 30, 94, 199,
204, 425.
Santiago de Cuba, division and province
of Cuba, 190, 195.
Sarawak, 324 f.


School of Application for Cavalry and
Light Artillery, the, 121, 390.
School of Submarine Defense, the, 121,
390, 395.
Schurman, Jacob Gould, American educator and Philippine commissioner, 9,
45, 72, 85, 86, 95 f., 251.
Schurz, Carl, American statesman, 43.
Schwan, Theodore, American general,
230, 236 f., 337; quoted, 422.
Scott, Hugh Lenox, American officer,
186, 224.
Sea Girt, New Jersey, 483.
Seattle, Washington, 60.
Secretary of the Navy, the, 469, 483.
Secretary of War, duties of the, 402, 403,
404, 405, 412, 413, 415, 417, 418, 419,
426, 429, 435, 436, 437 ff., 455, 463,
468 f., 472, 473, 475, 476.
Selby, Thomas Jefferson, American
congressman, 92.
Senate, the United States, Committee on
Military Affairs of the, 445; Philippine Committee of the, 96, 305; Committee of the, on relations with Cuba,
207.
Seymour, Admiral, 337.
Sheridan, Philip Henry, American general, 61, 121, 135.
Sherman, William Tecumseh, American
general, 61, 108, 121, 125.
Shiloh, battle of, 93.
Signal Corps, the, 181, 339, 346, 408, 419,
434, 438.
Silang, town in Luzon, 236.
Silver standard, the, in the Philippines,
301.
Singapore, 298.
Sioux, the, 322.
Sixth Cavalry, the, 94, 337, 344, 346.
Skobeleff, Mikhail, Russian general, 124.
Slavery, in the Philippines, 102, 238 f.,
323-326.
Smith, James Francis, American general
and jurist, 229, 261.


Schofield, John McAllister, American Soldiers' Home, Board of Commissiongeneral, quoted, 425 f.             ers of, 434.




INDEX


501


Spain, 5 ff., 18, 30, 35, 36, 37, 38, 44, 56,
70, 76, 83, 170, 171, 185, 203, 210, 211,
212, 213, 219, 255, 273, 281, 285, 286,
322, 369; war with, 61, 68, 70, 108,
110, 121, 141, 177, 225, 349, 352, 361,
363, 383, 388, 395, 401, 403, 404, 406,
409 f., 411, 446.
Spaniards, 6, 10, 76, 203, 299, 367.
Spanish law, 169.
Special service schools, 390, 400.
Spooner Amendment, the, 255 f., 303.
Springfield, Massachusetts, 244.
Starch Trust, the, 55.
Subsistence Department, the, 338, 339,
419, 434, 438.
Suez Canal, the, 296.
Sugiyama, murder of, 333.
Sulu Archipelago, the, 118, 229, 240,320,
322, 323, 326 f.
Sumner, Samuel Storrow, American general, 325, 327.
Supreme Court, the, 165, 311, 320 f.
Surgeon-General, the, 381, 412.
Surra, 300.
Taft, William Howard, President, 86;
member of the second Philippine Commission and governor of the Philippines, 22 f., 45, 51, 77, 80, 92, 96, 102,
225, 253, 262, 264, 274, 275, 288, 296,
318, 320.
Tagalogs, Filipino tribe, 9, 30 f., 36 f.,
40, 45 ff., 50 f., 61, 85, 89, 225-243, 368.
Taku, China, 31, 337, 338, 339, 340, 343.
Talavera, town in Luzon, 231.
Tamago, Diego, Cuban minister, 223.
Tampa, Florida, 420, 425.
Taraca Moros, the, 325.
Tarlac, province in Luzon, 89, 230, 234.
Tarlac, town in Luzon, 230 f., 233.
Tartar City, the, at Peking, 20 f., 31,
345, 346.
Tavera, Filipino notable, 22.
Taxation without representation, 47 f.
Tayabas, province in Luzon, 302, 316.
Taylor, Henry Clay, American naval
officer, 432.


Tayug, town in Luzon, 232.
Tennessee, 45, 51, 288.
Terrill, J. D., auditor of Cuba, 223.
Texas, 10, 60, 153, 154, 261, 276, 454,
455, 462.
Thirteenth New York Heavy Artillery,
the, 451.
Thirty-sixth Volunteers, the, 232.
Thirty-third Volunteers, the, 232.
Thomas, George Henry, American general, 61.
Thomas, transport, 271.
Tien-tsin, China, 61, 333, 337,340, 341 -346.
Tilden, Samuel Jones, 57, 366.
Tillson, John C. F., American officer, 19.
Tinio, Filipino leader, 248.
Torpedo School, the, 381.
Torres, Florentino, Filipino attorneygeneral and jurist, 22, 46, 241, 261.
Treasury Department, the, 267, 268, 309,
406.
Trias, Filipino leader, 248.
Trusts, 54 ff.
Tung-chow, China, 345.
Turkey, 324.
Twentieth Kansas, the, 135.
Tyrone, Pennsylvania, 52.
United Kingdom, the, 281, 298.
United States Census Bureau, the, 192.
United States Military Academy at
West Point, the, 93, 121, 122, 124,
363 f., 376, 388, 390, 394, 395, 396 ff.,
409, 459, 476, 481; address at the centennial celebration of, 115-120.
Universal military training, necessity of,
488.
Upton, Emory, American general, 108,
124 f.
Van Buren, Martin, President, 210.
Van Wyck, Robert Anderson, mayor of
New York, 62.
Varela, Jose, Cuban minister, 223.
Varona, Enrique Jose, Cuban minister,
223.




502


INDEX


Venezuela, 106, 107.
Vermont, 45, 288.
Vicksburg, siege of, 93.
Vigan, port in Luzon, 233.
Villalon, Jose R., Cuban minister, 223.
Virginia, 454.
Visayan Islands, the, 89, 229, 235, 238,
301.
Visayan Military District, the, 228, 229.
Visayans, Philippine tribe, 46, 368.
Volunteer Reserve, provisions for a, 448 f.
Walter Reed General Hospital, the, 132.
War Department, the, 128, 249, 256, 267,
268, 286-294, 309, 313, 314, 317 f., 403,
405, 406, 414, 420, 427, 429, 456, 467,
468, 474, 476.
War of 1812, the, 61.
Washington, George, President, 15, 25,
57, 84, 109, 139, 308, 447; quoted, 446.
Washington, city, 4, 55, 92, 108, 132,
n. 1, 198, 260, 286, 296, 381.
Washington, state, 276.
Washington Barracks, 381, 387, 391, 395,
396.
' Water-cure,' the, 92.
Wealth, inherited, a hindrance in the
race of life, 28.
Webster, Daniel, American statesman,
210.
West Indies, the, 15, 44, 164, 414.
West Point, Kentucky, 430, 462.


West Point, New York, 476.
Wheaton, Loyd, American general, 93,
236, 248.
Willard, Charles A., jurist, 261.
Willets Point, 381.
William II, German emperor, 106.
Wilson, James Harrison, American general, 12, 223; quoted, 124.
Wilson tariff, the, 33.
Wint, Theodore Jonathan, American
officer, 346.
Wisconsin, 455, 462.
Wood, Leonard, American general, 12,
21, 223; letter of, to Secretary Root,
186 f.
Woolwich, England, 115.
Worcester, Dean Conant, Philippine
commissioner, 45, 263, 288.
Wright, Luke E., Philippine commissioner, 45, 51, 86, 96, 263, 264, 288, 318,
319.
Wuchang, province in China, 341.
Yangtsun, China, 343, 344, 345.
Yloco, see Ilocos.
Young, Samuel Baldwin Marks, American general, 22, 122, 231, 233, 427,
432; letter to, 487 f.
Zambales, province of, 264.
Zamboanga, 284.
Zaragosa, town in Luzon, 50.:"vr  i -. -t








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