IL












PROLEGOMENA LOGICA:
AN INQUIRY
INTO
TIIE PSYCHOLOGICAL CHARACTER OF
LOGICAL PROCESSES.
BY
HENRY LONGUEVILLE MANSEL, B.D., LL.D.
WAYNFLETE PROFESSOR OF MORAL AND METAPHYSICA L PHILOSOPHY, OXFORD;
EDITOR OF SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S LECTURES; AUTHOR OF
"LIMITS OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT," ETC. ETC.
La Logique n'est qu'un retour de la Psychologie sur elle-meme.
COUSIN.
FIRST AMERICAN, FROM THE SECOND ENGLISH EDITION,
CORRECTED AND ENLARGED.
BOSTON:
GOULD A N D LINCOLN,
59 WASHINGTON STREET.
NEW YORK: SHELDON AND COMPANY.
CINCINNATI: GEORGE S. BLANCHARD.
1860.




Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1860, by
GOULD AND LINCOLN,
In the Clerk's Office of the District Court for the District of Massachusetts.
Andover:
Electrotyped and Printed by W. F. Draper.




P RE FAC E.
A PORTION of the following pages has already appeared in
two Articles contributed by the Author to the North British
Review.' The present Work is an attempt to exhibit more
fully the relations there intimated as existing between Logic
and Psychology, with some additional matters, which could not
be included within the limits of a Review. The title of the
work is not meant to imply that it contains an introduction to
Logic, or is designed for the use of those unacquainted with
its rudiments. On the contrary, without some previous knowledge of the elementary portion of that science, the greater
part of the present volume will not be intelligible. But it
is intended as an inquiry into that which in the order of
nature is prior to Logic; though in the order of time it is
of later scientific development, and in the order of study
should be postponed till after an acquaintance at least with
the elements of logical science; — an inquiry into a subject
which is indicated by every page of Logic in which mind and
1 No. 27: Art. Philosophy of Language. No. 29: Art. Recent Extensions
of Formal Logic.




IV                    PREFACE.
its operations are mentioned, and which is the touchstone by
which the whole truth and scientific value of Logic must ultimately be tested; - an inquiry into the constitution and laws
of the thinking faculty, such as they are assumed by the
Logician as the basis of his deductions. It may, therefore,
be regarded as an attempt to prosecute, in relation to Logic,
the inquiry instituted by the Prolegomena of Kant in relation
to Metaphysics; namely, What are the psychological conditions under which a scientific system is possible; and what, in
conformity to those conditions, are the characteristic features
which such a system must exhibit?  It is not intended as
a complete treatise, either on Psychology alone, or on Logic
alone; but as an exposition of Psychology in relation to
Logic, containing such portions of the former as are absolutely necessary to the vindication and even to the understanding of the latter.
That something of the kind is not altogether unneeded, will
be acknowledged by those who are acquainted with the literature of the subject. During the last and present century,
under the influence of the Critical Philosophy of Kant, Formal Logic, in itself and in its relations to Psychology, has
been elaborated by numbers of eminent writers in Germany,
from whose labors the English student has, as yet, derived
hardly any benefit. Misconceptions are still allowed to prevail
concerning the nature and office of Logic, which the slightest
acquaintance with the actual constitution of human thought
and its laws would suffice to dissipate forever.  Matters




PREFACE.                        V
treated of by different logicians are alternately expelled from
and restored to the province of the science, without the appearance of anything like a sound canon of criticism to determine what is logical and what is not. Attack and defence of
the study have been conducted on grounds equally untenable;
and a conception of Logic as it might be were the human
mind constituted as it is not, is frequently tossed to and fro
between contending parties, to the exclusion of Logic as it
must be while the human mind is constituted as it is.
But if an exposition of Psychology in relation to Logic is
thus needed for a distinct conception of the latter science in
itself, it is not less needed when we look to the conditions
under which that science may be most profitably employed as
a branch of academical study. Few who are acquainted with
the various logical systems of modern times will hesitate to
give a decided preference over all others to the formal view
of the science, which from the days of Kant has gradually
been advancing to perfection. Whether we regard the unity
and scientific completeness of the system itself, the great
names by which it is supported, the valuable works that
might easily be made available for its communication, or
the facility with which it might be introduced into the existing course of study, in all it possesses unquestionable advantages, as the basis of logical instruction. But, on the other
hand, its compass is small; and its contents, though clear and
definite, are, taken by themselves, too meagre to be an adequate substitute for the miscellaneous reading which is so
1*




VI                   PREFACE.
often misnamed Logical. To supply this defect, two courses
are open. The study of Formal Logic may be combined
either with its objective or with its subjective applications.
We may treat, that is to say, a system of Logic, either in
connection with some of the various objects of thought to
which it may in practice be applied, or in relation to the
thinking mind, and to that mental philosophy of which it forms
a portion. The former method has been abundantly tried,
and has abundantly failed in the trial. A system of Logic
treated in its objective application has no alternative between
an impossible universality or an arbitrary exclusiveness. By
whatever right one iota of the matter of thought can claim
admission into the system, by the same right the whole universe of human knowledge is entitled to follow.  Such a
method can only be employed as a bad means of collecting
desultory information on unconnected subjects. As a system,
it postulates its own failure.
It is in connection, not in confusion, with cognate sciences,
as a branch of mental philosophy, that Logic may and ought
to be studied. One of the objects of the present work is to
show that Logic as a science cannot be rightly understood and
appreciated, except in relation to Psychology. The neglect
of this relation has been acknowledged as the weak side of
the Kantian Philosophy; 1 its recognition has been imperatively demanded by the ablest modern writers on the subject.
1 See Fries, System der Logik, p. 22.




PREFACE.                       VII
"Selon moi," says 31. Duval-Jouve, "l'objet de la logique
n'est pas seulement la direction de l'intelligence, mais encore
l'etude de l'intelligence; la direction apres l'dtude; et un traite
de logique doit comprendre la description du fait intellectuel,
la theorie de ses lois, l'expose des riegles qu'il doit reconnaitre,
soit dans son etat psychologique et de pure pensee, soit dans sa
manifestation par la parole." 1 The propriety of including
these psychological matters in a Treatise on Logic may be
questioned; but to the necessity of including them in a philosophical course, of which Logic should form a portion, the
whole history of the science bears witness.  The alliance
established of old between Logic and Metaphysics was dissolved by the Critical Philosophy of Kant, and cannot be
restored, except by identifying the two, with Hegel. To those
who reject this alternative a blank is made in philosophical
study, which can only be adequately supplied by a well-connected course of Mental Science, embracing, as its constituent
portions, the three cognate subjects of Logic, Ethics, and
Psychology.
To Ethics, as well as to Logic, Psychology is an indispensable supplement. The science of man as he ought to be must
be based on that of man as he is. In Moral Philosophy, as in
Logic, questions of a psychological character meet us at every
stage of our course; and the value of every ethical system
must ultimately be tested on psychological grounds. Perhaps
1 Traite de Logique, Prdface, p. viii.




VIII                 PREFACE.
it is not too much to say, that half the ethical systems which
have been at different times in vogue, have started from a
psychological assumption, which, consistently carried out, would
make Ethical Philosophy impossible.
May I be allowed to suggest a still higher application of
the same criterion?  In the very conception of Revealed
Religion, as a communication from an Infinite to a finite
Intelligence, is implied the existence of certain ideas of a
purely negative character, the purpose of which is not speculative but regulative truth; which are designed, not to satisfy our reason, but to guide our practice. These, from their
very nature, are beyond the criticism of reason. But in order
to discriminate accurately between the provinces of reason
and faith, to determine what we may and what we may not
seek to comprehend as a speculative truth, an examination of
the limits of man's mental powers is indispensable.  The
ground of many a controversy might be considerably narrowed were we to inquire at the outset what are the mental
powers that can be brought to the solution of the question, and
how are they related to the data on which they must operate.
Fichte made his earliest attempt, as a disciple of the Kantian
philosophy, by an Essay towards a Critique of every Revelation. The positive portion of his principles of criticism (for
many of them have a negative character only) might be better
applied to a Critique of every Critique of Revelation; - an
inquiry, that is to say, what portion of the contents of Revela



PREFACE.                       IX
tion, as addressed to human minds, can be wrought by human
interpretation into the form of speculative dogmas.
"La psychologie," says M. Cousin, "n'est assurement pas
toute la philosophie, mais elle en est le fondement." If there
be any truth in this saying of one of the highest philosophical
authorities of our own or of any age, it will follow of necessity that a course of instruction in this fundamental branch
must be an integral and indispensable portion of any system
of philosophical teaching.
The psychological criticisms of the present work are mainly
limited to logical questions, and are designed to throw some
light on matters which, almost from the commencement of my
logical studies, have appeared to me to stand in especial need
of elucidation. Much of what has been acquired from foreign
sources, with much labor and little guidance in the search,
might have been learned in an easier and more direct manner,
had the course which I have ventured to recommend been
adopted in relation to my own early studies. The numerous
obligations which the work is under to previous writers are
most of them acknowledged as they occur. One or two, however, demand an express mention here. The reader who is
familiar with Kant's writings will probably discern obligations
to the Critical Philosophy in almost every page; even where
the language of Kant has been departed from, and the difference in detail is such as would not justify a direct reference to
his works. The method and material for thinking derived




X                    PREFACE.
from the study of the Kantian philosophy is in many respects
far more valuable than the direct information communicated.
This is especially the case with a student who views that
philosophy from the psychological rather than the metaphysical side, in its relation to Hume and Locke rather than to
W~olf and Leibnitz, and who endeavors to combine the materials thence obtained with the most valuable results of the
Scottish philosophy, which owes its rise, like the Kantian, to
the skepticism of Hume.
To two other eminent philosophers a similar acknowledgment is due. The German side of M. Cousin's Eclecticism
approaches, in aim at least, if not in method, nearer to the
philosophy of Schelling and Hegel than to that of Kant. It
is natural, therefore, that his view of the limits of human
thought, and consequently of the province of Logic and of its
relation to Psychology, should contain much which cannot be
directly transferred to the pages of a work which advocates a
strictly formal view of Logic, and which would rather contract
than enlarge the limits assigned by Kant to the Understanding
and the Reason. But the writings of M. Cousin are indispensable to all who would gain a true estimate of the importance of Psychology and its position in a philosophical course;
and the benefits which I am conscious of having derived from
their study are far more than can be adequately expressed
by a direct acknowledgment of passages borrowed from them.
From the author's view of the office of Logic I have departed
widely; which makes it the more necessary to confess the




PREFACE.                       XI
numberless advantages derived from his writings, in relation
to almost every point treated of in the following pagves.
In many points in which I have departed from the doctrines of the great Eclectic, I am much indebted to the
writings of his illustrious critic, Sir William Hamilton. The
same acknowledgment may indeed be made in relation to
nearly the whole contents of the present volume, partly by
way of direct obligation, and still more by way of hints and
suggestions of questions to be solved, and the method of their
solution. I cannot, indeed, claim the sanction of this eminent
authority for any statement which is here advanced, except
where direct reference is made to his writings; yet probably
even where I have differed from him in opinion, there is
much that would never have been written at all but for
the valuable aid furnished by him.  To say that I have
occasionally ventured to dissent from the positions of each
and all of the philosophers to whom I am so much indebted,
is only to say that I have endeavored to study their works
in the spirit in which they would wish to be studied - with the
respect and gratitude of a disciple, but, it is hoped, without
the servility of a copyist.
For the phraseology which I have occasionally been compelled to employ in the course of the following remarks,
no apology will be required by those acquainted with the
history of mental science. In no branch of study is it so
necessary to observe the Aristotelian precept, ~vocPaT70roLrEV6




XII                    PREFACE.
afr)qvEtaS &VKCEV. Nine-tenths of the confusion and controversy that have existed in this department are owing to
that unwillingness to innovate in matters of language, which
leads to the employment of the same term in various shades
of meaning, and with reference to various phenomena of
consciousness.  In this respect philosophy is under deep
obligations to the purism of German writers, which has enabled subsequent thinkers to examine the most important
problems of Psychology apart from the old associations of
language. A new phraseology may occasion some little difficulty at the outset of a work; but to adhere to an inadequate vocabulary merely because its expressions are established, is to involve the whole of the subject in hopeless
confusion and obscurity. In this respect, however, I trust
I shall not be found to have departed from authorized language in a greater degree than is absolutely necessary for
the purpose of communicating to English readers some of
the most valuable results of German thought, and of carrying
into effect the main design of the present Essay,- that of
testing the received processes of Logic, by reference to the
facts of human consciousness.




CONTENTS.
CHAPTER I.
PAGE
ON THOUGHT, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER FACTS OF
CONSCIOUSNESS,                                15
CHAPTER II.
ON THE THREE OPERATIONS OF THOUGHT,                59
CHAPTER III.
ON LAW, AS RELATED TO THOUGHT AND OTHER OBJECTS,  76
CHAPTER IV.
ON THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CHARACTER OF MATHEMATICAL
NECESSITY,                                    92
2




XIV                CONTENTS.
CHAPTER V.
PAGE
ON THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CHARACTER OF METAPHYSICAL
NECESSITY,.......   113
CHAPTER VI.
ON LOGICAL NECESSITY AND THE LAWS OF THOUGHT,.   156
CHAPTER VII.
ON THE MATTER AND FORM OF THOUGHT,...   204
CHAPTER  VIII.
ON POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE THOUGHT,               221
CHAPTER IX.
ON LOGIC AS RELATED TO OTHER MENTAL SCIENCES,    232
APPENDIX,.........   257




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
CHAPTER I.
ON THOUGHT, AS DISTINGUISHED  FROM  OTHER FACTS OF
CONSCIOUSNESS.
WITHOUT entering  into the countless disputes which
have taken place concerning the nature and definition
of Logic,' it is sufficient to observe that it will be treated
in the following pages, in accordance principally with the
views of Kant, as the Science of the Laws of Formal
Thinking. In the wide sense, indeed, in which the term
is used by Archbishop Whately, it may be admitted that
Logic, as furnishing rules to secure the mind from error in
its deductions, is also an Art, or, to speak more correctly,
a Practical Science.2 Still, it may be questioned whether
the practical service thus performed by Logic can with
propriety  be allowed to  influence its definition.   The
1 For a summary of various opinions on this question, see Zabarclla, de
Natutra Logicce, lib. i.; Smiglecii Logica, Disp. ii. Qu. v.; Burgersdicii Inst.
Log. lib. i. cap. 1, and Sir W. Hamilton, Edinburgh Review, No. 115, p. 203.
2 For the distinction between these terms, see Wolf, Phil. Rat. Proleg.,
~ 10. "Omnis Logica utens est habitus, qui proprio exercitio comparatur,
minime autem discendo acquiritur, adeoque et ipsa doccri nequit. Quamlobrem, cum Logica omnis vel sit docens vel utens, neque enim proeter
regularum notitiam atque habitum eas ad praxin transferendi tertium




16               PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
benefits performed by Logic as a medicine of the mind,
however highly we may be disposed to rate them, are
accidental only, and arise from causes external to the
Science itself: its speculative character, as an inquiry into
the laws of thought, is internal and essential.  To the
twofold character of Logic two conditions are necessary.
Firstlvy, that there exist certain mental laws to which
every sound thinker is bound to conform. Secondly, that
it is possible to transgress those laws, or to think unsoundly.
On the former of these conditions depends the possibility
of Logic as a speculative Science; on the latter, its possibility as a practical Science or Art. Now, if we look at
these two conditions with reference to the actual contents
of pure Logic, it is manifest that the abrogation of the first
would utterly annihilate the whole Science; whereas the
abrogation of the second would at most only necessitate
the removal of a few excrescences, leaving the main body
of Logical doctrine substantially as it is at present. Suppose, for example, that the difference between sound and
unsound reasoning could be discerned in individual cases
as a matter of fact, but that we had no power of classifying
the several instances of each and referring them to certain
common principles. It is clear that, under such a supposition, the present contents of Logic, speculative and practical, could have no existence. The number of sound and
unsound thinkers in the world might remain much as it is
now, but the impossibility of investigating the principles
of the one and applying them to the correction of the
other would make an Art or Science of Logic unattainable.
concipi potest; sola Logica artificialis docens ea est, qune doceri adeoque
in numerum disciplinarum philosophicarum referri potest. Atque ideo
quoque Logicam definivimus per scientiam, minime autem per artem vel
habitum in genere, quod genus convenit Logicee utenti."




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.               17
But let us imagine, on the other hand, a race of intelligent
beings, subject to the same laws of thought as mankind,
but incapable of transgressing them  in practice.  The
elements of existing Logic, the Concept, the Judgmrnent,
the Syllogism, would remain unaltered.  The Science
of Logic would investigate the laws of unerring Reason,
as the Science of Astronomy investigates the unvarying
laws of the heavenly phenomena; but an Art of Logic, to
preserve the mind from error, would be as absurd as an
Art of Astronomy proposing to control and regulate the
planets in their courses.  From  these considerations it
follows that, even granting Logic to be, under existing
circumstances, both Science and Art, yet the former is
an essential, the latter an accidental, feature; the one is
necessarily interwoven with the elements of the system,
the other a contingent result of the infirmities of those
who possess it.  In this respect, pure Logic may not
unfairly be compared to Mechanics treated as a branch
of Mathematics. As Sciences, both proceed deductively
fiom assumptions more or less inconsistent with the actual
state of things. As Arts, neither can be put in practice
without making allowance for contingencies neglected in
the scientific theory. The assumed logical perfection of
thought bears about the same relation to the ordinary
state of the human mind as the assumption of perfectly
rigid levers and perfectly flexible cords bears to the action
of those instruments in practice. But, on the other hand,
the possibility of making such allowances implies that the
difference between practice and theory is one of degree
only, and not of kind. The instrument as used may not
be identical with the instrument as contemplated, but it
must be supposed capable of approximation to it. A Science of the Laws of Thought is only valuable in so far as
2*




18                PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
its laws are acknowledged to be those to which actual
thinking ought, as far as possible, to conform, and which,
if fully complied with, would represent only the better
performance of existing obligations, not the imposition of
new ones. The same may be said of Ethical Philosophy
likewise. In describing the perfection of moral and intellectual virtue, we describe a standard to which, in the
existing state of human nature, no man does or can
attain; but the whole value of the portrait is derived
from its being a more or less accurate representation of
man as he ought to be, not the imaginary sketch of a being
of a totally distinct kind.'
In order therefore to the right appreciation of any given
system of Logic, it becomes necessary to ask, What is the
actual nature of Thought as an operation, to what laws is
it subject, and to what extent are they efficient?   This
inquiry does not, strictly speaking, fall within the province
of Logic itself. No Science is competent to criticise its
own principles. That there is such an operation as thinking, and certain laws to which it is bound to conform, the
Logician does not question, but assumes.  Whether there
are other mental operations besides thinking, and whether
these must act in combination with Thought for the attainment of any special class of truths; - these and such
like questions it is beyond his province to investigate. His
own branch of inquiry is twofold, partly constructive, and
partly critical.  In the former capacity, he inquires, what
are the several forms, legitimate or illegitimate, which
1 "Beide, Logik und Ethik, haben Vorschriften aufzustellen, nach welchen
sich, hier das Denken, dort das Handeln richten soll, obgleich es sich eins
wie das andere, aus psychologischen Griinden gar oft in der Wirklichkeit
nicht darnach richtet, und nicht darnach richten kann." —Herbart. Psychologie als Wissenschaft, Th. ii. ~ 119.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                 19
Thought as a product will assume, according as the act of
thinking is or is not conducted in conformity to its given
laws. In the latter capacity, he sifts and examines the
special products of this or that thinker, and pronounces
them, according to the features which they exhibit, to be
legitimately produced or otherwise.l
Beyond the boundaries of pure Logic there is thus
another and important field of inquiry. Is the mind capable of other operations besides those of Thought; and are
there other kinds of mental rectitude besides that which
results from the conformity of Thought to its own laws?
Do the several mental faculties act in the pursuit of truth
conjointly or separately? Does each process guarantee
the complete attainment of a limited class of truths, or
the attainment of a single element which becomes truth
only in combination? Do the Laws of Thought, as assumed by Logic, exhibit, those features which, from the
general constitution of the human mind and the peculiar
character of the thinking faculty, they might be expected
to exhibit? In relation to these and similar questions,
Logic is subordinate to Psychology.
To Psychology we must look for the explanation and
justification of the peculiar features of Logic. Logic, says
one antagonist, furnishes no criterion of material truth
and falsehood. It may be that, from the constitution of
the human mind, such a criterion is impossible. Its principles, says another, are mere frivolous tautologies.  It
may be that this very tautology has a psychological significance, that it is the necessary consequence of a mind
gazing upon its own laws. It is barren in the production
1 See Clauberg, Logica, Proleg. ~ viii. Drobisch, Neue Darstellung der
Logik, ~ 9. Fries, System der Logik, ~ 1.




20              PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
of positive science. It may be that Thought alone was
never designed by man's Maker to be otherwise. As an
instrument, it has attempted much and accomplished little.
The fault may lie, not in the tool, but in the workman.
Before we condemn Logic for what it does not perform, or
despise it for what it does, it may be as well to ask, what
we may learn elsewhere of the nature of the thinking
faculty, and what it may reasonably be expected to accomplish.
In order, therefore, to determine accurately the province
and capabilities of Logic, it will be necessary to examine
the psychological distinction between Thought, properly
so called, and other phenomena of mind. This being ascertained, there will remain the inquiry, in what manner
our consciousness itself and the several objects submitted
to it may be regarded as subject to law; what are the different classes of laws, whether of the subject or of the
object, the characteristic features of each, their mode of
determining the several operations subject to them, and
the consequent character of the respective products.
Every state of consciousness necessarily implies two
elements at least: a conscious subject, and an object of
which he is conscious. In every exercise, for example, of
the senses, we may distinguish the object seen, heard,
smelt, touched, tasted, from the subject seeing, hearing,
smelling, touching, tasting. In every emotion of pleasure
or of pain, there is a certain affection, agreeable or disagreeable, existing within me, and of this affection I am
conscious. In every act of volition, there takes place a
certain exercise of my will, and I am conscious that it
takes place. In this point of view, it is not necessary to
enter on the often disputed question, whether such states
of consciousness furnish immediate evidence of the ex



PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                  21
istence of a world external to ourselves. That of which
I am directly conscious may be an object numerically distinct from myself, or it may be a modification of my own
mind. All that need be insisted upon here is, that there
is present an individual object, whether thing, act, or state
of mind, and that we are conscious of such an object as
existing within or without ourselves. A psychological
dualism is implied in the very notion of consciousness:
whether this necessarily involves an ontological dualism,
is beyond our present purpose to inquire.1
But to constitute an act of Thought, more is required
than the immediate relation of subject to object in consciousness. Every one of the above states might exist in
a mind totally incapable of thought. Let us suppose, for
example, a being, in whose mind every successive state of
consciousness was forgotten as soon as it had taken place.
Every individual object might be presented to him precisely as it is to us. Animals, men, trees, and stones,
might be successively placed before his eyes; pleasure,
and pain, and anger, and fear, might alternate within him;
but, as each departed, he would retain no knowledge that
it had ever existed, and consequently no power of comparison with similar or dissimilar objects of an earlier or
later consciousness. He would have no knowledge of
such objects as referred to separate notions; he could not
say, this which I see is a man, or a horse; this which I
feel is fear, or anger. He would be deficient in the distinctive feature of Thought, the concept or general notion
resulting from the comparison of objects. Hence arises
1 This point has been already argued fully and satisfactorily by the
great modern advocate of Natural Dualism, Sir William Hamilton. The
reader is referred to his edition of Reid's works, especially to his notes B
and C, for a masterly dissertation on this important question.




22                  PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA.
the important distinction between Intuitions,' in which
the object is immediately related to the conscious mind,
and T/ioughts, in  which  the object is mediately related
through a concept2 gained by comparison. The former
contains two  elements only, the  subject and the object
standing in present relation to each other. The latter
contains three elements, the thinking subject, the object
about which he thinks, and the concept mediating between
the two.3  Thus even the exercise of the senses upon present objects, in the manner in which it is ordinarily performedc by a man of mature faculties, does not consist of
mere intuition, but is accompanied by an act of thought.
In mere intuition, all that is simultaneously presented to
the sense appears as one whole; but mere intuition does
not distinguish its several parts from each other under this
1 Here, and throughout the following pages, the word Intuition is used
in the extent of the German Anschauung, to include all the products of
the perceptive (external or internal) and imaginative faculties; every act
of consciousness, in short, of which the immediate object is an individual,
thing, act, or state of mind, presented under the condition of distinct existence in space or time.
2 The revival of this term, unfortunately, till very recently, suffered to
grow obsolete in philosophy, will need no apology with those who are
acquainted with the writings of Sir W. Hamilton. It is absolutely necessary to distinguish in language between the act of thought and its product, a distinction expressed in Greek by VirLats and vd7,ua, and in the following remarks by conception and concept. The latter term has been fully
sanctioned by the usage of French philosophers, as well as of the eminent writer above mentioned.
3 " In apprehending an individual thing, either itself through sense or its
representation in the phantasy, we have, in a certain sort, an absolute or
irrespective cognition, which is justly denominated immediate, by contrast
to the more relative and mediate knowledge which, subsequently, we compass of the same object, when, by a comparative act of the understanding,
we refer it to a class, that is, think or recognize it, by relation to other
things, under a certain notion or general term."- Sir W. Hamilton, Reid's
Wtorks, p. 801.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                     23
or that notion. I may see at once, in a single panorama,
a ship upon the sea, an island lying behind it, and the sky
above it.  To mere intuition this is presented only in confusion, as a single object. To distinguish its constituent
portions, as sea and land, ship and sky, requires a cormparison and classification of them relatively to so many
separate concepts existing in the mind; and such classification is an act of Thought.'
In every act of Consciousness the ultimate object is an
indivi'dual.  But in intuition this object is presented to
the mind directly, and does not imply the existence, past
or present, of anything but itself and the mind to which
it is presented. In thought, on the other hand, the individual is represented by means of a concept, which contains
certain attributes applicable to other individuals of the
same kind.2  This implies that there have been presented
to the mind prior objects of intuition, originating the concept or general notion to which subsequent objects are
referred. Hence arises another important distinction. All
intuition is direct and presentative; all thought is indirect
and representative.
This distinction necessitates a further remark on the
characteristic feature of thought, as compared with one
special class  of intuitions.   That sensitive perception
1 Hoffbauer, Logik, ~ 10.
2 The terms represent, representation, etc., are, here and throughout the
present work, used in a wider sense than that to which they are confined
by Sir W. Hamilton. With that philosopher, the representative faculty
is synonymous with the imagination proper, and the above terms are used
exclusively with reference to individual objects. See Reid's Works, pp. 805,
809; Discussions, p. 13. In the following pages the term representation and
its cognates are extended so as to include the concept, which is representative of many individuals, as well as the image, which is representative
of one.




24                  PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA.
takes place through the medium of a representative idea,
is a hypothesis which was made more than questionable
by the philosophy of Reid, and may be regarded as completely overthrown by the recent labors of his illustrious
editor, Sir William  Hamilton.  But there still remains the
faculty of Imagination, whose office is the production of
images representative of the several phenomena of Perception,l internal as well as external. In relation to this
1 The term Perception requires a few words in explanation. In modern
philosophy, from Descartes to Reid, this term was used widely, as coixtensive with Apprehension or Consciousness in general, with some minor
modifications, for an account of which the reader is referred to Sir W.
Hamilton's Reid, p. 876. By Reid and his followers it was used for the
consciousness of an external object presented to the mind through the
organs of sense, as distinguished from Sensation, the consciousness of an
affection of the subject through the same organs. In this sense they are
clearly distinguished by M. Royer Collard, Jouffroy's Reid, iii. p. 329.
" Il y a dans l'opdration du toucher sensation et perception tout ensemble:
changement d'dtat ou modification intdrieure, c'est la sensation; connaissance d'un objet exterieur, c'est la perception." Cf. Reid, Intell. Powers,
Essay i. ch. i. Stewart, Outlines of Moral Philosophy, ~ 15. According to
M. Royer Collard, the senses of smell, hearing, and taste, give rise to sensations only; touch is in every case a union of sensation and perception;
while sight holds an intermediate and doubtful position, as informing us
of the existence of extension, but only in two dimensions of space. Sir
W. Hamilton, on the other hand, holds that the general consciousness of
the locality of a sensorial affection ought to be regarded as a Perception
proper; and, in accordance with this view, he has announced the important law, that Sensation and Perception, though always co6xistent, are, as
regards their intensity, always in an inverse ratio to each other. Some
recent French philosophers, influenced by the union of physiological with
psychological researches, have employed the term Perception in another
sense, to denote Sensation with Consciousness, Sensation being extended
to those affections of the nervous organism of which we are not conscious.
This occurs in the writings of Maine de Biran, and appears to have misled
M. Ravaisson into imagining that that philosopher had anticipated the
above-mentioned law of Sir W. Hamilton. The passage alluded to is
apparently one in the Essai sin' la decomposition de la Pensee, p. 116, but




PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA.                       25
faculty, the  criterion  above  given  as characteristic  of
Thought requires a few words of explanation.
Imagination, regarded as a product, may be defined, the
consciousness of an image in the mind resembling and representing an object of intuition.l  It is thus at the same
time presentative  and  representative.  It is presentative
of the image which has its own distinct existence in consciousness, irrespective of its relation to the object which
it is supposed to represent. It is representative of the object which that image resembles; and such resemblance is
only possible on the condition that the image be, like the
object, indivictual.  If we try to form  in our minds the
the resemblance is merely verbal. A nearer anticipation may perhaps be
found in Kant, Anthropologie, ~ 20.
In the text, Perception is employed to denote all those states of Consciousness which are presentative only, not representative. It will thus
include all intuitions except those of Imagination, and may be divided
into external or sensitive, and internal; the former corresponding to the
Perception of Reid. This use of the term, allowance being made for a
different theory of external Perception, accords with that of Kant.
1 This is the ordinary psychological sense of Imagination; however
variously the term may have been employed in reference to poetry, and
generally to the philosophy of taste. It corresponds with the definition
given by Descartes (Meditatio Secunda), " imaginari nihil aliud est quam rei
corporec figurarm seu imzaginem contenmplari;" except that the latter is incorrectly limited to the reproduction of objects of sight only. The beautiful
lines of Shelley furnish an exact description of imagination relatively to
two other senses:
"Music, when soft voices die,
Vibrates in the memory;
Odors, when sweet violets sicken,
Live within the sense they quicken."
But the operation of the imaginative faculty must not be confined even
to the general field of sensations. The important question, How many
presentative faculties has man? will be referred to again. The province
of imagination will be determined by the answer to this question, as every
original presentation may be represented in a phantasm.
3




26               PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
image of a triangle, it must be of some individual figure,
equilateral, isosceles, or scalene. It is impossible that it
should be at the same time all of these, or none. It mnay
bear more or less resemblance to the object which it represents; but it can attain resemblance at all only by being,
like the object itself, individual.  I may recall to mind,
with more or less vividness, the features of an absent
friend, as I may paint his portrait with more or less accuracy; but the likeness in neither case ceases to be the
individual representation of an individual man. But my
notion of Atan in general can attain universality only
by surrendering resemblance. It becomes the indifferent
representative of all mankind only in so far as it has no
special likeness to any one. It is thus not the adequate
and actual representative of any single object, but an inadequate and potential representative of many; that is,
it may in dliffrent acts of thougfht be employed in relation
to distinct, and in some respects dissimilar, individuals of
the same class. From  this neglect of individual characteristics arises the first distinguishing feature of a concept;
viz. that it cannot in itself be depicted to sense or imagination.' It is not the sensible image of one object, but an
intelligible relation between many.
A second important characteristic of all concepts is, that
they require to be fixed in a representative sign. This
characteristic cannot indeed be determined a priori, from
the mere notion of the concept as universal, but it may be
proved to a moral certainty a posteriori, by the inability
of which in practice every man is conscious, of advancing,
without the aid of symbols, beyond the individual objects
of sense or imagination. In the presence of several individuals of the same species, the eye may observe points of
1 Cf. Hamilton on Reid, p. 360.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                    27
similarity between them; and in this no symbol is needed;
but every feature thus observed is the distinct attribute of
a distinct individual, and, however similar, cannot be regalrded as identical.  For example: I see lying on the
table before me a number of shillings of the same coinage.
Examined severally, the image and superscription of each
is undistinguishable from  that of its fellow; but, in viewing them  side by side, space  is a necessary condition of
my perception; and the difference of locality is sufficient
to make them  distinct, though similar, individuals.l  The
same is the case with any representative image, whether
in a mirror, in a painting, or in the imagination, wakinog
or dreaming.  It can only be depicted as occupying a certain place; and thus as an individual and the representative of an individual.  It is true that I cannot say that it
represents this particular coin rather than that; and consequently it may be considered as the representative of
all, sutccessively but not simuzltaneously.  To find a representative which shall embrace all at once, I must divest it
of the condition of occupying space; 2 and this, experience
assures us, can only be done by means of symbols, vei'bal
or other, by which the concept is fixed in the understanding.  Such, for example, is a verbal description of the coin
in question, which contains a collection of attributes freed
fiom  the condition of locality, and hence fiomr all resemblance to an object of sense.  If we substitute Time for
Space, the same remarks will be equally applicable to the
objects of our internal consciousness.  Every appetite and
desire, every affection and volition, as presented, is an in1 On this ground Kant refutes Lcibnitz's principle of the identity of indisceralclles, a principle applicable to concepts, but not to objects of intuition.
2 Compare Herbart, Psychologie als Wissenschaft, ~ 120. TVerke, vi. p. 163.




28               PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
dividual state of consciousness, distinguished from  every
other by its relation to a different period of time. States
in other respects exactly similar may succeed one another
at regular intervals; but the hunger which I feel to-day is
an individual feeling, as numerically distinct firom  that
which I felt yesterday, or that which I shall feel to-morrow, as a shilling lying in my pocket is fiom  a similar
shilling lying at the bank. Whereas my notion, of hunger,
or fear, or volition, is a general concept, having no relation
to one period of time rather than to another, and, as such,
requires, like other concepts, a representative sign.
Language, taking the word in its widest sense, is thus
indispensable, not merely to the communication, but to
the formation of Thought.  This doctrine is not unfiequently estimated as the correlative or consequent of that
which derives all knowledge from sensation; an estimate
apparently warranted by the association of the two theories
in the philosophy of Condillac.  But it would not be
difficult to show that the ultra-sensational philosophy is
that which could most easily dispense with the necessity
of introducing langurarge at all. Ideas, says Condillac, are
but transformed sensations; and his disciple, Destutt de
Tracy, has carried the doctrine to its fullest development
in the aphorism penser c'est sentir. But who imagines
language to be essential to sensation? Or who does not
see that the introduction of such an instrument for the
purpose of transforming our sensations implies the existence of a mental power which mere sensation can never
confer?  It is only on the supposition that the concept is
something distinct fiom and unlike all the products of the
senses, that the representative symbol becomes necessary.
Sensation, imagination, and memory, so far as the latter is




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                     29
distinct from thought,1 may dispense with its assistance.
As for the crowning extravagance of Horne Tooke, who
tells us that what are called operations of mind are merely
operations of language, we have only to ask, what makes
language operate? It might as reasonably be maintained
that a coat is not the work of the tailor, but merely of his
needle.  But it is the perpetual error of the sensational
school to confound the indispensable'condition of a thing
with the thing itself. Thought is not sensation, though
the exercise of the senses is a necessary preliminary to that
of the understanding. Science is not a well-constructed
language, as the skill of the painter is not indentical with
the goodness of his brushes and colors; yet we must
acknowledge that the power of the artist could neither
have been acquired nor exhibited, had these necessary
implements been withheld.
The above view of the relation of thought to language
is sometimes met by the following dilemma.  "Language,
you say, is essential to thought; yet language itself, if not
of divine origin, must have been thought out by man.
You must, therefore, be prepared to defend in its utmost
rigor the hypothesis of a supernatural origin of speech; or
you must allow that its inventor, at least, was a man
capable of thinking  without its aid."2  To  solve  this
1 So far, namely, as it corresponds to the puv1jaWq, not to the avdlayMLs
of Aristotle. The neglect of this distinction led Condillac to deny that
brutes have any memory, since they are destitute of language. Aristotle,
with more accuracy, allows that memory is common to men and brutes,
but reminiscence peculiar to the former. See De Memoria, ch. 2, ~ 25.
2 See Rousseau, Discours sur l'origine de l'ine'galite parmii les hommes,
Premiere Partie. "Franchissons pour un moment l'espace immense qui
dut so trouvcer entre le pur dtat de nature et le besoin des langues; et cherchons, en les supposant necessaires, comment elles purent commencer a
s'dtablir. Nouvelle difficultd pire encore que la prdcddente: car si les
3*




30                 PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
dilemma, we need not call in aid the curious hypothesis
of Condillac, who held that the dependence of thought
on sensation  (and by implication  on language) was a
consequence of the fall of Adam; we need only observe
what actually takes place in the formation of language
and thought among ourselves.  To the child learning to
speak, words are not the signs of thoughts, but of intuitions;
the words man and horse do not represent a collection
of attributes, but are only the name of the individual now
before him. It is not until the name has been successively
appropriated to various individuals, that reflection begins
to inquire into the common features of the class.l Language, therefore, as taught to the infant, is chronologically
prior to thought and posterior to sensation. In inquiring
how far the same process can account for the invention
of language, which now takes place in the learning it, the
real question at issue is simply this: Is the act of giving
names to indcividlual objects of sense a thing so completely
beyond the power of man, created in the full maturity
of his faculties, that we must suppose a divine Instructor
performing precisely the same office as is now performed
for the infant by his mother or his nurse; teaching him,
that is, to associate this sound with  this sight?  This
question may be answered affirmatively or negatively, but
in either case it has nothing to do with the relation of
language to thought, properly so called.2
hommes ont eu besoin de la parole pour apprendre a penser, ils ont cu
bien plus besoin encore de savoir penser pour trouver l'art de la parole."
1 See Adam Smith's Considerations concerning the first Formation of Languages, appended to his Theory of Moral Sentiments.
2 On this subject, the following remarks of Maine de Biran are well
worthy of attention: "Pour que ces premiers signes donnes deviennent
quelque chose pour l'individu qui s'en sert, il faut qu'il les institue luimeme une seconde fois par son activitd propre, ou qu'il y attache un sens.




PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA.                       31
In  relation to this question, the reader must be careful
not to confilse Langucage with Articulations.  The case
of the  deaf and  dumb, so often  quoted  as an instance
of thought without lanuange, is in  this respect utterly
irrelevant.  The education of these persons consists in the
substitution  of a system  of signs addressed  to the  eye
or the hand  in  the place of one addressed to the ear.
This system  performs precisely the same office in relation
to  them   that speech  performs in  the  ordinary mental
development of children:  it constitutes, in  fact, their
language.   They are  thus in no respect an  exceptional
case; and the  whole question  has to be considered on
general, not on special data.  I cannot perceive any other
man's thoughts as they pass in his mind: I can only infer
their existence by perceptible signs; and this presupposes
an established system  of communication.  The only valid
method of investigating the relation between thought and
speech  is to  examine the  only instances in which both
Ceux qui pensent que l'homme n'eit pu jamais inventer le langage, si Dieu
m~me ne le lui eut donnid on revedl, ne me sembllent pas bicn entendre la
question de l'institution du langago: ils confondent sans cesse lc fond avec
les formes. Supposd quo Dieu efit donnd a l'homme une langue toute
faite on un systeme parfait de signes articulds on dcrits propres a exprimer toutes ses iddes: il s'agissait toujours pour l'homme, d'attribuer a
chaque signe sa valcur ou son sens propre, c'est-'a-dire d'instituer vritablement cc signe avec une intention et dans un but concu par l'ktre intelligent, de menms que l'cnfant instituc les premiers signes quand il transforme les cris qui lui sont donnds par la nature en. vdritables signes de
rdeclame.
"La difficultd du probleme psychologique, qui consiste a cdetermincr les
facultis qui ont dfl concourir a l'institution du premier langage, subsiste
done la mnmoe, soit que les signes qni sont la forme et comme le matdriel de cc lanrgage aient dtd donncs on rdvdles par la suprlme intelligence,
soit qu'ils aient dtd inventds par l'homme on suggeres par les iddes on les
sentimens dont ils sont l'expression."-Nouvelles Considerations sur les rapports du physique et du?mioral de l'hoimne, p. 93.




32                 PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
elements are presentec7, the operations of my own consciousness.  Accepting what is there giNven in combination,
I must endeavor by analysis to ascertain how  much of
the compound phenomenon is necessary, and how  much
accidental.
The concept, as thus described, is the characteristic
feature of Thought proper, as distinguished  from  other
facts of consciousness: and the thinking process may be
adequately defined as the act of knowing or judcging of
things by means of concelpts.1  It remarins to inquire what,
accordinc  to this definition, must be the limits within
which Thought is operative, and what, consequently, will
be the distinguishing character of its laws.
Thought is only operative within the field of possible
experience; i. e., upon such objects as can be presented in
an actual intuition  or 1represented in an imaginary one.
For tle concept is the result of data filrnished by intuition; and -its legitimacy, as an object of thought, must be
tested by reference to the same data.  It is true that the
concept itself, as such, cannot be presented  intuitively;
but it must contain no attribute -which is incompatible
with the intuitive presentation of its object.  The concept
is not itself individual, but it must comprehend  such
attributes as are capable of individualization, such as can
coixist in an object of intuition. The notion of a triangle,
1 "Der Verstand iiberhaupt kann als ein Verm6igen zu urtheilen vorgestellt werden. Dcnn er ist nach dem Obigen ein VermiSgen zu denken.
Dcnken ist das Erkenntniss durch Begriffe." Kant, KIritik der rein. Irer,.
(p. 70). An exact adherent of Kant would regard the definition given in
the text as tautolo(ical; for with him the provinces of Thought and Judgmurnt are cocxtcnsive, and all judogment requires concepts. But as in the
following remarks the province of judg(ment is extended beyond that of
thought, the limitation becomes necessary.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                      33
as a rectilinear figure of three sidles, does not itself contain
the attributes of equilateral, isosceles, or scalene; but it is
capable of being combined with any one of the three in a
perceived or imagined figure.  But a rectilinear figure of
two sides is, by the application of the same test, shown
to be no concept at all.  So long as we merely unite the
attributes in speech, without attempting to combine them
in an individual object, we may not be aware that we are
talking nonsense; the attempt to imagine the figure shows
at once the incompatibility of the attributes. This, then,
is the criterion of positive thinkiing.  A  form  of words,
uniting attributes not presentable in an intuition, is not
the sign of a thought, but of thile negation of all thinking.
Conception must thus be carefully distinguished, as well
firom  mere imagination, as firom  a mere understanding
of the meaning of words.'  Combinations of attributes
logically  impossible may be expressed in language perfectly intelligible.  There is no difficulty in understanding
the meaning of the 1phrase bilineer,figure, or iroz-goldc.
The language is intelligible, though the object is inconceivable.   On  the  other  hand, though  all conception
implies imagination, yet all imagination  does not imply
conception.  To have a valid conception  of a horse, I
must not only know the meaning of the several attributes
constituting the definition of the animal, but I must also
be able to combine those attributes in a representative
1 These have been confounded by others besides Reid. Thus Aldrich,
after defining Simple Apprehension as nudus rei conceptus intellcctivus, proceeds: "Si quis dixerit Trian9ulzh? cquiulterunn esse a-qitieagulun2, possum
Apprehensione Simplici incomplexa intelligere quid sibi vclint singula
Orationis hujus vocabula." Apprehension in this sense is not a logical
process at all, and is not governed by any of the laws of logical thinking.
- Cf. HIamilton on Reid, p. 377.




34                 PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
image; that is, to incdividualize them.  This, however, is
not mere imagination, it is imagination  relatively to a
concept.  I not only see as it were the image with the
mind's eye, but I also think of it as a horse, as possessing
the attributes of a given concept, and called by a name
expressive of them.  But mere  imagination  is possible
without any such relation.  Without any effort to recall
an object by means of its distinctive attributes, I may
be passively conscious of the continuance, in a weaker
state, of a sensible or otherwise intuitive impression, when
the object which gave rise to it is no longer present. This
is the Imagination which is described by Aristotle as a
kined of weak sensation,' and as sensitive intaCginlation.2
When coupled with a consciousness of the past existence
of the impression which it represents, it forms the 3lemory,
as distinguished from the _Remrniscence, of Aristotle.3  Tihis
kind of imagination does not in itself involve a distinction
or comparison of presentations: it is compatible with an
ignorance or forgetfulness of the existence of any presentations, save the one represented by the image. Conception, on the other hand, in its lowest degree, implies at
least a  comparison  and  distinction  of this from  thait.
WVhen exhibited, as for its ultimate verification it must
be, in the construction of an individual image answering
to the general notion, it is still an act of thought, rather
thanr of intuition; and when coupled with the conscious
effort to  recall a past impression, it answers  in  solle
degree to the Reminiscence of Aristotle.4
1 Rhet. 1. 11.  2 De Ainhma, HII. 11.  3 De Mermoria, c. 1.
~4 "T The Understanding, thought proper, notion, concept, etc., may coincide or not with Imagination, representation proper, image, etc. The tewo
faculties do not coincide in a general notion; for we cannot represent MIan
or HIorse in an actual image without individlualizing the universal; and




PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA.                        35
Conception, where it does not coincide with imagination,
implies imagination  as the test of its validity.  To form
the notion of a cliass as distinguished from  an individual, I
must emancipate the attributes of which I am  conscious
from  their connection with a definite time and place, and
this, as has been already observed, requires the intervention
of language. The consciousness of a general notion is thus
an instance of symbolical as distinguished from  intuitive
knowledge; and the act of Conception, viewed apart from
Imagination, could  only consist in  the  enumeration, by
means of verbal or other symbols, of the different parts
constituting a given notion.2 But the symbol, though inthus contradiction emerges. But in the individual, say Socrates or Bucephalus, they do coincide; for I see no valid ground why we should not
think, in the strict sense of the word, or conceive the individuals which we
represent."- Sir W. Hamilton, Discussions, p. 13. - The Reminiscence of
Aristotle will include this kind of imagination under it, as the last step of
the process.
1 This distinction is due to Leihnitz. See his lIleditationes de Cognitione,
Feritate, et Ideis, Opera, ed. Erdmann, p. 79.
2 " In cognitione symbolica prima mentis operatio absolvitur recensione vocabulorum, vel aliorum signorumn, quibus ea indigitantur quce notionenm rei distinctam ingrediuntur. Etenim  in cognitione symbolica tantummodo verbis
enunciamus qum in ideis continentur, vel alils signis eadem reprmsentamus, ideas vero ipsas verbis aut signis aliis indigitatas non intuemur.
Quare cum in cognitione intuitiva prima mentis operatio absolvatur si
attentionem successive in idea rei ad ea diriimus quxe notionem distinctam generis vel speciei ingrediuntur, singula autem hmc enunciabilia sint,
adeoque vocabulis vel signis aliis indigitari possint; in cognitione symbolica prima mentis operatio absolvi debet recensione vocabulortm, vel reprmesentatione aliorum signorum, quibus ea denotantur, qux notionem rei
distinctam ingrrediuntur. Ita prima mentis operatio in cognitione symbolica arboris absolvitur, si dicimus vegritabile, quod ex trunco, ramis, surculis et foliis constat; ctenim sigillatim recensemus verba quibus ea indigitantur quim in arboribus tanquam communia distinguimus, consequenter
qum notionem  arboris in genere, quatenus distincta est, ingrediuntur.
Non autem jam nobis qunestio est, utrum notio distincta sit completa




36                 PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
dispensable as an instrument of thought, lends itself with
equal facility to every combination, and thus furnishes no
criterion by which we can distinguish between sense and
nonsense, between the conceivable and the inconceivable.
A  round squaqre, or a bilinear figure, is, as a form  of
speech, quite as possible as a straight linhe, or amz equilateral
triangle.  The mere juxtaposition of words does not indicate the possibility or impossibility of the corresponding
notion, until we attempt to construct in imagination an individual object in accordance with it. Till this criterion is
applied, the act of conception is rather a substitute for
consciousness than a mode of consciousness itself. The
sign is substituted for the thing signifiedcl; a step which
considerably facilitates the performance of complex operations of thought, but in the same proportion endangers the
logical accuracy of each successive step; since we do not,
in each, stop to verify our signs. Words, as thus employed,
resemble algebraical symbols, which, during the process of
a long calculation, we combine in various relations to each
other, without at the moment thinking of the original signification assigned to each.  But those who, on this account, would reduce the whole of thought to an algebraical
computation, overlook the most important feature, the verification, namely, of the result, according to the logical
conditions of conception, after the algebraical process is
finislhed.  It may be convenient, in the course of a comlplicated reasoning, to assume the logical accuracy of the subatque determinata, atque oratione ista talis notio signifiecetur, ut liec definitionis loco inservire possit. Sufficit enim hlic ea sigillatini enunciari
qun inente ab idea rci separantur, dum distincte nobis genus vel speciem
reprwtsentare conamur. Pendet enimn co-gnitio symbolica ab intuitiva,
quain supponit et ad quam refertur. Quicquid igitur huic decst, idem
etiam illi deesse debet."- Wolf, Psychologia Etmpirica, ~ 3~8.




PROLEGOIMENA LOGICA.                      37
ordinate paits, and to employ their respective symbols on
this assumption. But what the concept gains in flexibility
it loses in distinctness; and the logical and algcebraical
perfections are thus in an inverse ratio to each other. It
therefore becomes necessary, at the end of the process, to
submit the result to the logical test, to which each step has
been tacitly supposed to conform; that of the possible coexistence of the several attributes in an individual object.'
The above remarks will necessitate some modification
of the doctrines ordinarily taught in logical treatises concerning general notions, or, as they are commonly though
not very happily called, abstract ideas.  WVe are told that
the mind examines a number of individual objects, agreeing in some features and differing in others, that it separates the points in which they agree from those in which
they differ, and makes, of the former only, an abstract idea
or general notion, which is indifferently applicable to all
the individuals from which it was derived, and by virtue
of which they are all called by a common name.
The reality of this process of Abstraction,2 and of the
1 "Plerumque, presertim in analysi longiore, non totam simul naturam
rei intuemur, sed rerum loco signis utimur, quorum explicationem in presenti aliqua cogitatione compendii causa solemus prxtermittere, scientes,
aut credentes nos eam habere in potestate: ita cum chiliogonum, seu polygonum mille oequalium laterum cogito, non semper naturam lateris, et
nequalitatis, et millenarii (seu cubi a denario) considero, sed vocabulis istis
(quorum sensu obscure saltem, atque imperfecte menti obversatur) in
animo utor loco idearum, quas de iis habeo, quoniam mcmini me significationern istorum vocabulorum habere, explicationem autem nnce judico
necessariam non esse; qualem cogitationem cmecam, vel etiam symbolicam
appcllare soleo, qua et in Algebra, et in Arithmetica utimur, imo fere
ubique."- Leibnitz, Meditationes de Cognitione, Veritate et Ideis.
2 Drobisch observes that the term Abstraction is uscd sometimes in a
psychological, sometimes in a logical sense. In the former, we are said
to abstract the attention from certain distinctive features of objects preo
4




38                PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
idea to which it is supposed to give rise, has been matter
of considerable controversy among modern philosophers.
Bishop Berkeley, and subsequently Hume, denied  altogether the possibility of such an operation, on the following
grounds. The general idea of a triangle, it was argued by
Locke,' is an imperfect idea, wherein parts of several different and inconsistent ideas are put together. As limited to
no particular kind of triangle, but comprehending all, it
must be neither oblique, nor rectangle, neither equilateral,
equicrural, nor scalene, but all and none of these at once.
The abstract idea, as thus described, Berkeley easily perceived to be self-contradictory, and the doctrine suicidal.
"I have a faculty," he says, "of imagining or representing
to myself the ideas of those particular things I have perceived, and of variously compounding and dividing them.
I can imagine a man with two heads, or the upper parts of
a man joined to the body of a horse. I can consider the
hand, the eye, the nose, each by itself, abstracted or separated from the rest of the body. But then, whatever hand
or eye I imagine, it must have some particular shape and
color. Likewise the idea of man that I frame to myself,
must be either of a white, or a black, or a tawny, a straight
or a crooked, a tall or a low, or a middle-sized man. To
be plain, I own myself able to abstract in one sense, as
when I consider some particular parts or qualities separated from others, with which though they are united in
some object, yet it is possible they may really exist without
sented (abstrahere a diferentiis). In the latter, we are said to abstract certain portions of a given concept from the remainder (abstrahere differentias).
The former sense must be understood here, where we are considering the
mental process by which concepts are formed. To the latter, as a conscious process of thought, the following remarks do not apply.
1 Essay, book iv. ch. 7, ~ 9.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                  39
them. But I deny that I can abstract one from another,
or conceive separately, those qualities which it is impossible should exist so separated; or that I can frame a general notion by abstracting firom particulars in the manner
aforesaid." 1
"It is, I know," continues the Bishop, "a point much insisted on, that all knowledge and demonstration are about
universal notions, to which I fully agree: but then it doth
not appear to me that those notions are formed by abstraction in the manner premised; universality, so far as I can
comprehend, not consisting in the absolute, positive nature
or conception of anything, but in the relation it bears to
the particulars signified or represented by it: by virtue
whereof it is that things, names, or notions, being in their
own nature particular, are rendered universal. Thus when
I demonstrate any proposition concerning triangles, it is to
be supposed that I have in view the universal idea of a
triangle; which ought not to be understood as if I could
frame an idea of a triangle which was neither equilateral,
nor scalene, nor equicrural.  But only that the particular
triangle I consider, whether of this or that sort it matters
not, doth equally stand for and represent all rectilinear triangles whatever, and is in that sense universal.....
Though the idea I have in view whilst I imake the demonstration be, fbr instance, that of an isosceles rectangular
triangle, whose sides are of a determinate length, I may
nevertheless be certain it extends to all other rectilinear
triangles, of what sort or bigness soever; and that, because neither the right angle, nor the equality, nor determinate length of the sides, are at all concerned in the
demonstration.  It is true, the diagram I have in view includes all these particulars; but then there is not the least
1 Principles of Humaln Knowledge, Introduction, ~ x.




40                 PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
mention made of them in the proof of the proposition....
And here it must be acknowledged, that a man may consider a figure merely as triangular, without attending to
the particular qualities of the angles or relations of the
sides. So far he may abstract: but this will never prove
that he can frame an abstract general inconsistent idea of
a triangle."'   On the other hand, it was argued by Reid,
that if a man may consider a figure simply as triangular,
without attending to the particular qualities of the angles
or relations of the sides, he must have some conception of
this object of his consideration; for no man can consider a
thing which he does not conceive.  He has a conception,
therefore, of a triangular figure, merely as such; and this
is all that is meant by an abstract general conception of a
triangle.2
In this controversy, the question has been needlessly
confused by the vague and inaccurate use of terms.  Idea
has been indifferently employed, by modern philosophers,
to denote the object of thought, of imagination, and even
(under the representative hypothesis) of perception. Conception, again, has not been sufficiently distinguished, on
the one side, from  imagination, and, on the other, from a
mere understanding of the meaning of words; and too
little attention has been paid to the office of language,
both as a substitute for consciousness, and as contributing
to the distinctness of consciousness itself. It is not strictly
1 Principles of HIlman Knowledge, Introduction, 4~ xv. xvi.
2 Intellectual Powers, lssay v. ch. 6.
3 As it is sometimes convenient to have a general term indifferently
applicable to any object of internal consciousness, I have in the present
work occasionally availed myself in this extent of the term Idea, rejecting, however, the representative idea of perception. But the term has
been avoided wherever it is necessary to distinguish between two different
states of consciousness.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                 41
correct to say that the individual alone is perceived first,
and the general notion formed from it by abstraction; for,
without the assistance of the general notion, the individuals themselves and their several parts could not be
distinguished from each other. If I am to form a general
notion of man by examining the individuals Peter, James,
and John, and separating the accidents in which they
differ from  the essential points in which they agree, it is
clear that I must previously have formed general notions
of the parts thus separated fiom each other. In order to
separate, by an act of thought, the figure common to a
number of men from the accidents of stature, complexion,
etc., peculiar to each, I must first be able to form distinct
notions of the human figure on the one side, and of the
several statures, complexions, etc., on the other. Abstraction thus presupposes conception, no less than conception
presupposes abstraction; and we have still to learn how
either process can be a preliminary condition to the other.
The fact is, that our earliest consciousness is neither
of the individual discerned as an individual, nor of the
universal discerned as an universal, but of a confused
mixture of the two, which it requires a further development of thought to analyze into the one or the other.'
Whatever we perceive occupies a definite position in time
and space; it is seen notw and here; so far it is an individual. But position in time and space does not constitute
a mark by which this individual can be distinguished from
that; I cannot by these relations alone determine whether
tile object seen now and here is or is not the same individual that was formerly seen elsewhere. To discern the
individual as such or the universal as such, I must by an
1 See Sir W. Hamilton's Lectures on Mlletaphysics, p. 497.
AX




42                PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
act of thought discern certain attributes as characteristic
of one, and certain others as common to many; and this
power of discernment is gradually imparted to each of us
in practice by the use of language, in which our earliest
abstractions are given to us already made. In this gradual
formation of distinct thought from confused intuition, it
may in one sense indeed be said that our knowledge of the
class is prior to that of the individual.  For resemblances
are noticed earlier than differences;l and the names distinctive of individuals are at first associated only with
their general features. " Children," says Aristotle, "at first
call all men father, and all women mother, but afterwards
they distinguish one person fiom another."2 By degrees
the individual attributes are discerned and separated from
the generic; but in the first instance the name is applied
to different objects before we have learned to analyze the
growing powers of speech and thought, to ask what we
mean by each several use of this or that appellation, and
to correct and fix the signification of words at first used
vaguely and obscurely. Such is the actual service performed by language in the education of mankind under
the existing conditions of social intercourse.  What was
the origin of language itself, and how far the same description will apply to the mental development of the first man,
is matter rather of ingenious conjecture than of scientific
explanation.
Berkeley, therefore, was clearly right in denying the
existence of any such process of Abstraction as that
described by Locke.  The error of the latter consisted
1 A contrary theory on this point is the source of most of the difficulties
which Rousseau professes to find in accounting for the origin of general
language from the names given to individuals.
2 Phys. Ausc. I. 1.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                 43
in regarding Abstraction as a positive act of thought,
instead of the mere negation of thought. Abstraction is
nothing more than non-attention to certain parts of an
object: we do not positively think of a triangle as neither
equilateral, isosceles, nor scalene; but we think of the
figure as composed of three sides, without askinig the
question whether those sides are equal or unequal. But,
on the other hand, Berkeley, in maintaining that all
notions are in their own nature particular, has overlooked
the fiact that thought, and language as the instrument
of thought, is necessary to distinguish the particular as
particular, no less than the universal as universal; and
that we are thus enabled, partially in intuitive and wholly
in symbolical cognition, to discern generic attributes, and
to constitute them  an object of conception, without being
conscious of the particulars by which they are accompanied. Berkeley is right in denying that we can imagine
the universal entirely apart from the particular, but, owing
to the vague significance of the word idea, he seems to
speak of imagination as if it were coextensive with conception. In symbolical cognition, the latter process may
be carried on apart from. the former, subject, however, as
has been already observed, to the condition of being
tested as valid or invalid by the power of imagining a
corresponding object.  This distinction has been clearly
indicated by Berkeley in another of his works; and perhaps
his whole discussion needs only a more exact distinction
between the perception of individuals in time and space
and the recognition of them by their peculiar attributes, to
render it philosophically unexceptionable.
In speaking of Imagination as the test of Conception,
we do not accede to the ultra-sensationalisml of Condillac,
1 Minute Philosopher, Dial. vii. ~ 8.




44                 PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
nor even to the modified doctrine of Laromiguiere, who
derives from  the senses the whole matter of our knowledge.  Individcl alize your concepts, does not mean sensationalize them, unless the senses are the only sources of
presentation. If I am immediately conscious, for example,
of an exercise of will, as an individual act- taking place
within me, the phenomena of volition become a distinct
class of presentations, coordinate with, not subordinate to,
those of the senses, and capable, like them, of being represented by the ilnagination and thought upon by the understandingr.  If I am conscious of emotions of joy or sorrow,
of anger or fear, existing as present individual states of
mind, distinct from sensible impressions, these, in like
manner, must be considered as data for thought, furnished
by intuition. If, on the perception of certain individual
acts performed by myself or by another, I am immediately
conscious of an idea of right or wrong; I have again a
distinct class of intuitions, simple and undefinable, the
laws and common features of which may furnish matter
of further reflection, but the existence of which, as individual filcts, is the indispensable condition of all moral
speculation.
The possibility, therefore, of any branch of scientific inquiry depends upon the psychological question, IRow many
presentative faculties has man? 1 Every such faculty may
1 In speaking of the human mind as possessing a plurality of faculties,
it is perhaps hardly necessary to protest against the misinterpretation of
this language, as if it implied that these faculties were distinct and independent portions of the mind, like the separate members of the body.
Sir W. Hamilton (Lectures on Metaphysics, Lect. xx.) has shown that the
contrary opinion has been the one generally prevalent, that the vast majority of philosophers have either openly asserted or silently assumed
that the faculties of mind are nothing more than modes in which the simple indivisible principle of thought may act and exist. As thus explained,




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                     45
furnish distinct materials for thought.  Physical Science
is possible, if the senses present us with material phenonlena whose relations and laws thought may investigate.
Moral Science is possible, if we are presented with the
fact of moral approbation and disapprobation of this or
that action, in itself, and for its own sake; and the question for thought to investigate is, Whence do these feelings
arise, and on what laws are they dependent?  Acsthetical
Science is again possible as a distinct branch of inquiry,
if the emotions arising from the contemplation of beauty
in the works of nature or of art can be shown to be distinct from  ally communicated by their mere relation to
the senses. And Metaphysics must submit to the same
criterion. Rational Cosmology and Rational Psychology
are possible, only if ]Matter and Mind, as distinct fiom
their several phenomena, can be shown to be in any way
presented, as the object of an immediate intuition.
This distinction between the presentations of intuition
and the representations of thought, which is thus the key
to all the most valuable applications of Psychology, is
intimated with more or less accuracy in the writings of
several modern philosophers.  The often-quoted passage
of Locke, in which the operations of thought are comthe term is unobjectionable. It may be that in mental, as in physical
mechanics, we know force only from its effects; but the consciousness
of distinct effects will then form the real basis of Psychology. The faculties may then be retained as a convenient method of classification, provided the language is properly explained, and no more is attributed to
them than is warranted by consciousness. The same consciousness which
tells me that seeing is distinct from hearing, tells me also that volition
is distinct from both; and to speak of the faculty of will does not necessarily imply more than the consciousness of a distinct class of mental
phenomena. No one but an advocate of the grossest materialism could
understand such an expression as implying numerically distinct organs
of mind, as of body.




46                PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
pared to the productions of art, furnishes in this respect,
when understood in its proper latitude, an unexceptionable description of the respective provinces of the intuitive
and discursive faculties. "It is not in the power of the
most exalted wit, or enlarged understanding, by any quickness or variety of thought, to invent or frame one new
simple idea in the mind. The dominion of man, in this
little world of his own understanding, being much the
same as it is in the great world of visible things; wherein
his power, however managed by art and skill, reaches no
farther than to compound or divide the materials that are
made to his hand; but can do nothing towards the making
the least particle of new matter, or destroying one atom
of what is already in being."'  The Ideas of Sensation
and Ideas of Reflection of the same philosopher, however
unfortunate may be the original choice of terms, and however inconsistent their subsequent employment, point correctly enough to the two great sources of external and
internal intuition.2  A further step in accuracy is gained
in the Impressions and Ideas of IIume, though the distinction loses most of its value in his hands by the absurd
ground of distinction which he has laid down between
them, and by the unfortunate metaphor which declares
every idea to be an imnage of an impression.3  Kant, who
1 Essay, b. ii. ch. 2 ~ 2.
2 Reflection, in consistency with etymology, ought to have been limited
to the operations of thought; in which sense we can reflect upon sensible
objects as upon all other things. Locke only escapes from Reid's criticism on this point by using reflection improperly, as Stewart has observed, as synonymous with [internal] consciousness. This use of the
term, however, is not peculiar to Locke. See Sir W. Hamilton's Lectures
on Metaphysics, pp. 162, 406.
3 According to Hume, Ideas and Impressions differ from each other only
in their different degrees of force and vivacity; and belief he defines as




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                       47
took up the discussion where HIume left it, with the advantage of a new  philosophical language, unencumbered
with the associations of earlier systems, is the earliest philosopher whose writings have disentangled the confusion
universally following on the use of the term iclect, and
exhibited this most important distinction with any degree
of accuracy and precision.' It is one of the most valuable
principles of the Critical Philosophy, that the utnderstancling hcas no power of intuition; a principle which does not,
however, necessitate the adoption  of the Kantian division
of the mental faculties, nor even the determination of the
question, whether the mind possesses numerically distinct
faculties at all. It simply means, that the act of Thougiht
cannot create its own object: that, being mediate and representative, it requires to be based on an immediate and
presentative fact of consciousness.
It cannot therefore be maintained that the senses are
the sole criteria of truth and of reality, unless we assume,
" a lively idea associated with a present impression;" a doctrine which
almost justifies the sarcastic application of Reid, "it will follow, that the
idea of a lion is a lion of less strength and vivacity. And hence may
arise a very important question, whether the idea of a lion may not tear
in pieces and devour the ideas of sheep, oxen, and horses, and even of
men, women, and children."
1 In this respect, nothing can be more unfair than Stewart's sneers at
the obscurity and new technical language of Kant. The philosophical
terms of English and French writers are derived from the same source,
and subject to the same varieties of application. The purism of German
writers has given to all subsequent thinkers the inestimable advantage of
contemplating the same thoughts under a new phraseology, and with new
associations of etymology and metaphor; an advantage which no one hls
appreciated more highly, or explained more happily, than Stewart himself,
on another occasion. As it is impossible to comply exactly with the pre
cept of Locke, to judge of ideas in themselves, their names being wholly
laid aside, the next best course is, to examine them, as far as possible,
through the medium of two independent languages.




48               PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
in defiance of all consciousness, that there exist no immediate mental phenomena, but those communicated by
sensation. Any one presentation is as true and as real as
any other. Falsehood and unreality can only begin with
thought. The immediate judgment of presentation, that
I am at this moment conscious of a certain object, is
equally true as regards any class of presentations. Unreality, in this case, can only consist in the distinctness of
one class of presentations fiom  another, which latter we
have arbitrarily selected as the test of reality; and falsehood, in the assertion of the identity of distinct classes, or
of the distinctness of identical ones. But such a selection or assertion involves an act of thought; it is a
judgment concerning intuitions as classified under certain
concepts. If I choose arbitrarily to select the senses as
the sole test of reality, the phantasms of imagination are
so far unreal; but their unreality implies no more than
that they are not perceived by the senses. If I say, "A
centaur exists as an image in my mind, therefore it exists
in nature," the assertion is false, because, by an act of
thought, I judge that to be an object of possible sense,
which is only given to me as an object of imagination:
its reality in relation to the latter faculty remains undisturbed.
This view of the reality of all presentations, as such,
could not indeed be consistently held by the advocates of
a representative theory of perception. If, in all intuition,
I am immediately conscious only of certain ideas or modifications of my own mind, I am reduced to the alternative,
either of disbelieving the existence of an external world
altogether, or of drawing a distinction between such ideas
as are representative and indicate the existence of objects
without my mind, and such as are purely imaginary and




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                  49
have no objective reality corresponding.' The former will
then be distinguished as real, the latter as unreal presentations. But if, in perception, I am immediately and presentatively conscious of a non-ego (and such is the soundest
view, both in common sense and in philosophy), the representative idea and its supposed claim to superior reality
vanishes altogether. Every presentation is real in itself,
some as immediately informing me of the existence of
states of my own mind, others as immediately informing
nie of the existence of objects without; and my judgment
about each is equally true when I assert it to be what it
is, and equally false when I assert it to be what it is not.
In this respect, the philosophers of the school of Common
Sense have not always consistently adhered to their fundamnental principle, in the distinction which they have
drawn between perception and imagination.2
But though it is not true that the whole matter of
knowledge is furnished by the senses, it cannot be denied
that it is entirely furnished by the presentative faculties.
And this may throw some light on a distinction, concerning which there frequently exists considerable confusion,
the distinction between what are, vaguely enough, termed
positive and negative ideas.  A  positive intuition is one
which has been presented to us in actual consciousness,
real or imaginary: a positive concept is one whose component parts are capable of being so presented in combination. A negative concept, on the other hand, which
is in fact no concept at all, is the attempt to realize in
1 See Locke, Essay, b. iv. ch. 4, ~~ 3-12.
2 See Reid, Inquiry, ch. ii. ~ 3, and the antagonist remarks of Stewart,
Elements, vol. i. ch. 3. Both discussions might have been cleared of some
confusion by determining accurately what is meant by reality in Presentations.
5




50                PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
thought those combinations of attributes of which no
corresponding intuition is possible. The inability may be
absolute or relative, owing to the general limitations of all
human consciousness, or to peculiar deficiencies in the
experience of this or that individual. Thus a blind man
may be said to have a negative idea of color, when he
attempts to supply the defects of his experience by analogy from other sensations; as in the case mentioned by
Locke, of the man who supposed the color of scarlet to
resemble the sound of a trumpet.' But in like manner
any man, though in the full possession of his faculties, can
only negatively conceive -those simple ideas2 which have
never been actually presented in their proper intuition.
The nature of the presentation will of course depend upon
the faculty to which that class of intuitions belongs. If I
have never seen objects of any other color than white and
red, I have a positive idea of these, a negative idea of
blue and yellow. If I had all my lifetime been subject
to coercion, and hafd never performed an act of volition,
I should have a negative idea of free agency. If I had
never in my life found my volition opposed, I should have
a negative idea of coercion. As it is, I have a positive
idea of both. I desire to thrust my arm out in open space,
and my desire is carried into effect. Here is the positive
consciousness of freedom. I try to thrust it through a
wall, and am resisted. Here is the positive consciousness
1 Essay, b. iii. ch. 4, ~ 11.
2 By simple ideas are meant the immediate objects of sensation or reflection in Locke's sense of the terms, such as color and sound, which can be
apprehended only by actual sight or hearing; perception and volition,
which can be known only by the actual experience of self-consciousness.
Complex notions may be formed from these by an act of pure imagination, but the elements must be given beforehand. Compare Locke, l. c.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                       51
of coercion.'  When Locke declared  infinite space and
infinite duration to be negative ideas, he was right, if
we grant his hypothesis of their origin. The former he
derived from  sensation; and all the space which we can
actually perceive by the senses is finite: the latter he
derived firom  reflection; and  every duration  which we
have personally experienced is finite also. Those who do
not accede to his conclusion ground their dissent on a
denial of his premises.2  The language in which the concept is expressed is in this respect altogether indifferent.
We may speak of the same act as voluntary, or cnot constrained, as compulsory, or not voluntary.  The test of
its positive or negative character is to be found in the
question, Has it ever been realized in an intuitive presentation?
Those ideas whose negative character depends merely
on the deficiences of individual experience, and which
mnay therefore be described as accidentally  or relatively
negative, are beyond the consideration of pure Logic, or
1 Some philosophers represent the idea of freedom as a negative one.
Thus Kant (Rechtslehre, p. 28, ed. Schubert) and Fichte (Kritik aller Offenbarung, ~ 2) describe it as merely an absence of the feeling of compulsion.
This description would be correct, if we had never performed an act in
our lives except under coercion. As it is, the idea of freedom is as positive as that of restraint, both being at different times presented in actual
consciousness. The same is the case with heat and cold, good and evil,
and other pairs of contraries, each of which, as a phenomenon of consciousness, is as positive as the other. What may be their respective relations to a transcendental cause beyond the sphere of consciousness, we
have no means of determining.
2 See Cousin, Histoire de la Philosophie, le~on xviii. On the other hand,
Locke's conclusion is supported, though on different grounds, by Sir W.
Hamilton, Discussions, p. 605, who shows that an absolutely first unit of
Space or Time, and an infinite extent of either, are both equally inconceivable. ~




52              PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
pure Metaphysics, which deal only with those conditions
of thought which are common to all mankind. Hence the
only negative ideas with which the logician or metaphysician as such is concerned, are those which arise fiom an
attempt to transcend the conditions of all human thought.
If the human mind is subject to laws and limitations
which it is unable to transgress by any effort of thought
(and that this is the case will be shown at a further stage
of our inquiry), there will arise in relation to these a class
of notions which may be distinguished as essentially or
absolutely negative. Such negative notions, however, must
not be confounded with the absence of all mental activity.
They imply at once an attempt to think, and a failure in
that attempt.' The language by which such notions are
indicated is not like a word in an unknown tongue, which
excites no corresponding affection in the mind of the
hearer: it indicates a relation, if only of difference, to
that of which we are positively conscious, and a consequent effort to pass from one to the other. Thus, if it be
true that the infinite is not a positive object of human
thought, it will not follow that the word is to us wholly
unmeaning. We may attempt to separate the condition
of finiteness from our conception of a given object, though
the result may ultimately involve a self-contradiction. We
may attempt in like manner to conceive a space enclosed
by two straight lines, and it is not till after the attempt
has been made that We become aware that the expression
bilinear figure admits of no corresponding notion. And it
may frequently happen, owing to the use of language as a
substitute for positive thought, that a process of reasoning
may be carried on to a considerable length, without the
reasoner being aware of the essentially inconceivable
1 See Sir TV. Hamilton's Discussions, p. 602.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.              53
character Of the terms which he is employing. If we
assume without inquiry the possible existence of a circular
square, we may demonstrate of it in succession all the
properties of the circle and all those of the square, without
at the moment perceiving their incompatibility with each
other. Such a self-deception is still easier when the negative character depends, not on the union of attributes
which cannot be conceived in conjunction, but on the
separation of those which cannot be conceived apart. We
may easily analyze in language that which it is impossible
to analyze in thought. Thus we can neither perceive nor
imagine color without extension; an unextended color is
therefore a purely negative notion. Yet many philosophers of eminence have maintained that the connection
between these two ideas is merely one of association, and
have reasoned concerning color apart from extension with
as much confidence as if their language represented a
positive thought. The speculations concerning the seat
of the soul may be cited as another instance of the same
kind. Position in space and occupation of space are correlative notions; neither is conceivable apart from the
other.  Yet the above speculations for the most part
proceed on the tacit assumption that it is possible to
assign a local habitation to an unextended substance.
Such is the influence of language, even when representing,
not thought, but its negation.
If thought is operative only within the field of possible
experience, it follows, that we are not entitled, in any act
of thought, to add to the data given in the concept, without a fresh appeal to intuition. I have in my mind the
notion of a centaur, as a creature with the upper parts of
a man and the lower parts of a horse. But this concept
does'not in itself contain the attribute of existence in space
5*




54              PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
as an object of possible perception. I am therefore not
warranted in thinking of the centaur as so existing, until
the attribute is supplied from its proper source of presentation, which in this case is sensible experience. If my
notion of man does not contain the attribute of mortality,
I may think of man as mortal or as immortal, but I cannot determine which of these judgments is true, i. e., is in
accordance with the corresponding intuition, without comparing them with the fact as presented by experience. In
the mere notion of two straight lines, it is not contained
that they cannot inclose a space; and in the mere notions
of the numbers 7 and 5, it is not contained that their sum
is 12. Neither of these judgments, therefore, can be determined to be true without an appeal to some fact or other
of intuition. This limitation of the province of thought
implies some important consequences, which will appear
when we come to consider the character of the laws of
pure thinking recognized by Logic.
Before taking leave of this part of our subject, it may be
useful to point out one or two questions of controversy,
to which the distinction between Thought and other facts
of consciousness may be applied with advantage.
It has been remarked by Sir William Hamilton,' that
the whole controversy of Nominalism and Conceptualism
is founded on the ambiguity of the terms employed; on
the want, that is, of an accurate distinction, such as is furnished by the German Anschzauung and.Begriff; between
the individual intuitions of sense and imagination, and
the general concepts of the understanding. We may observe further, that the controversy between Nominalism
and Realism may be, if not absolutely decided, at least
considerably simplified, by attending to the same distinc1 Reid's Works, p. 412.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                  55
tion. Some recent critics, in examining this question, have
managed to introduce additional confusion into what was
sufficiently confused before.  It is asked, for example,
whether the great division of animal, vegetable, and mineral is not to be regarded as the work of nature, rather
than as the arbitrary product of man's classification. Undoubtedly: but what has that to do with the question of
the existence of Universals out of the mind? We admit,
that is, that nature has stamped on certain locally distinct
individuals a number of prominent features of resemblance, which cannot fail to strike the eye of an observer.
But has she thereby produced anything more than one
set of attributes existing in one individual in one place,
and another similar set existing in another individual in
another place?  But when, by an act of mind, we have
abstracted from the existence in space under which
all objects of sense are presented, and, by virtue of that
abstraction, have advanced from individual similarity to
specific unity, from the similar attributes of several objects
to the mutual relation of all, the results of the process can
only be regarded as the offspring of our minds. This consideration does not indeed prove decisively the impossibility of universals a parte rei, but it shows that no argliment in favor of their existence can be drawn from  the
observed uniformities of nature.l
Another subject of dispute between different schools of
philosophy is, What are the limits of definition?  The
Scholastic Logicians, holding that definition was by genus
and differentia, very consistently laid it down as a canon,
1 Since the publication of the first edition of this work, I have been
gratified at finding the same view maintained in an able discussion by
M. de Rdmusat, Abelard, vol. ii. p. 125.




56               PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
that no object was definable which could not be regarded
as a Species.  Summa genera and individulals were by
this rule incapable of definition. On the other hand, Descartes and Locke, rejecting this restriction, maintain that
simple ideas alone cannot be defined. Both are right, according to their different meanings of definition. With
the former, it signifies the resolution of a complex general
concept into the simpler concepts which it comprehends.
With the latter, it is the resolution of a complex individual object of sense into the simpler objects of which it is
composed. The one is a mental analysis of notions, the
other a sensible analysis of intuitions. No definition, as
Locke truly observes, will convey the idea of whiteness to
a blind man; i. e., it will not enable him to form a sensible
image of the color. But no definition (in the scholastic
sense) was ever intended to accomplish this object. The
far-famed animal rationale does not do it for man; and
for the very sufficient reason, that concepts, as such, are
not capable of being presented in sense or imagination.
If the purpose of logical definition were to enable us to
form an idea, i. e., a representative image of an object,
pointing it out with the finger would be a far more satisfactory definition than any verbal analysis.l But ideas, in
this sense, have no connection with logical definition.
Locke's ideas of sensation, simple or complex, are all excluded fiom the province of definition, as being individuals, i. e., as not being concepts at all. On the other hand,
the concept whiteness, as a species of color, is capable of
definition by its optical differentia, as a color produced by
equal mixture of the simple rays. An example adduced
1 Arist. Anal. Post. II. 7. o' y7p -   efteL?ye' a8lfalrj  4 -yT  CTaK'SX.
Cf. Mill's Logic, vol. i. p. 183.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                 57
by Descartes, as well as by Locke and Leibnitz,' will illustrate the distinction still more clearly. The concept of a
chiliogon is a regular polygon of 1000 sides. As addressed
to the sense, this definition would not enable any man to
distinguish an individual figure of the kind by sight from
another which had 999 sides; but, as addressed to the
understanding, it is sufficient for the demonstration of the
mathematical properties of the figure. Yet even here, intuition, though not directly applied, is the virtual test of
the possibility of the conception. I may not be able distinctly to represent in an image or construct in a figure a
thousand sides at once; but it is from my intuitive consciousness of the same attributes as existing on a more
limited scale, that I know that there is nothing incompatible between the number of a thousand sides and the property of enclosing a space. Under this conviction the symbolical takes the place of the intuitive cognition; and we
are enabled, by the aid of language, to think of the figure
in certain relations, without actually constructing it with
the hand or in the mind.
The same distinction will furnish a ground for criticizing
certain popular systems of logical notation. If Logic is
exclusively concerned with Thought, and Thought is exclusively concerned with Concepts, it is impossible to approve of a practice, sanctioned by some eminent Logicians,
of representing the relation of terms in a syllogism by that
of figures in a diagram. To illustrate, for example, the
position of the terms in Barbara, by a diagram  of three
circles, one within another, is to lose sight of the distinctive mark of a concept, that it cannot be presented to the
sense, and tends to confuse the mental inclusion of one
1 See Descartes, Meditatio Sexta; Locke, Essay, ii. 29, 13; Leibnitz, Nouveaux Essais, ii. 29, 13.




58                 PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
notion in the sphere of another, with the local inclusion of
a smaller portion of space in a larger.1 The diagrams of
Geometry in this respect furnish no precedent; for they do
not illustrate theform  of the thought, but the matter, not
the general  character of the demonstration as a reasoning
process, but its special application as a reasoning about
magnitudes in space. Still less is such a practice justified
by the test of conceivability which has been mentioned
above, the possibility, namely, of individualizing the attributes comprehended in a concept. For, whereas that test
is employed to determine the conceivability of the actual
contents of each separate concept, the logical diagrams are
designed to represent the universal relations in which all
concepts, whatever be their several contents, formally stand
towards each other. The contrast between these two, as
legitimate and illegitimate appeals to intuition, will more
fully appear in the sequel.
1 " Da der Mensch die Sprache hat," says Hegel, "als das der Vernunft
eigenthiimliche Bezeichnungsmittel, so ist es ein miissiger Einfall, sich
nach einer unvollkommnern Darstellungsweise umsehen und damit quilen
zu wollen. Der Begriff kann als solcher wesentlich nur. mit dem Geiste
aufgefasst werden. Es ist vergeblich, ihn durch Raumfiguren und algebraische Zeichen zum Behufe des aiisserlichen Auges und einer begrffi2osenz, mechanischen Behandlungsweise, eines Calculs, festhalten zu wollen."
While dissenting totally from the Hegelian view of Logic, I cannot resist
quoting the above passage, as applicable to every view of the Science
which recognizes the essential distinction between thought and intuition.




CHAPTER II.
ON THE THREE OPERATIONS OF THOUGHT.
CONCERNING the threefold division of the mental operations usually acknowledged by Logicians, it has been
questioned whether they are properly to be regarded as
distinct acts of Thought or not. The question may be
considerably simplified, by discriminating between different
principles of identity or distinctness, as applicable severally
to mental and material objects. The only natural and
necessary principle of distinction between objects is the
numerical diversity of individuals.  In this respect, not
only the several acts of Simple Apprehension, Judgment,
and Reasoning, but every single act of each class, is distinct from every other. An act of reasoning which I
perform to-day is numerically distinct from any act performed yesterday, though both may be governed by the
same laws and applied to the same objects. Beyond this,
any principle of specific identity or diversity is to a certain
extent arbitrary and artificial. The only ground of distinction between a natural and an unnatural classification
of individuals depends upon the frequency with which
we have occasion to view them in this or that relation; in
other words, on the respective utility of different points
of view  for certain given purposes.  On this ground,
Apprehension, Judgment, and Reasoning are rightly and
necessarily regarded as distinct classes of mental operations, relatively to Logic, inasmuch as their several pro



60              PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
ducts, the Concept, the Judgment, and the Syllogism, exhlibit distinct logical forms, and require a distinct logical
treatment.
Psychologically, the question must be examined on
somewhat different grounds. It may be urged, for example, on the one side, that the several operations are the
product of the simple faculty of Comparison; that they
are not in act ever separable from each other, Apprehension
being always accompanied by Judgment, and Judgment
by Apprehension, and Reasoning by both; that the mind,
one and indivisible, is wholly employed in each. On the
other side, it may be answered, that acts of Comparison
may be regarded as specifically distinct, as engaged on
distinct objects; that the comparison of attributes with
each other, of concepts, immediately in themselves, or
mediately with a common third concept, are pro tanto
distinct acts; that the same mind is not always equally
skilful in all three; and other arguments of the like kind.
Both these opposite opinions may be accepted as true, if
we attend to the different points of view which render the
decision of all such matters of controversy in some degree
arbitrary.
The distinction between the faculties and parts of the
mind is based on a principle exactly the reverse of that
by which a similar distinction is made relatively to the
body. The members of the latter are given as logically
and numerically distinct, and thus furnish a preexisting
basis for the classification of their several operations.
Thus, seeing and hearing are distinguished from  each
other, as the operations of the eye and the ear respectively; and the use of the pen, the brush, and the chisel,
m.ny in this point of view be classified together, as operations of the hand; whereas, in the mind, the distinctness




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                     61
of the operations is itself the ground on which, for mere
convenience of discussion, we classify and distinguish
different parts and faculties, as belonging to the  mind
itself.l  The acts, therefore, must, on independent grounds,
be determined to be identical or distinct, before we unite
or separate them, as related to the same or diverse mental
powers.
Hence it appears that the classification of operations,
relatively to distinct mental faculties, is contingent upon
the adoption of some independent principle for classifying
the same operations in themselves.  In the present state
of Psychology, much must be left to the discretion of
individual inquirers; no one  division having  been  so
universally adopted by philosophers, or having led to such
important results, as to render imperative its adoption as
the division KaMT C'$oXqv of psychologers. But to suppose a
distinct mental faculty for each of the three logical operations, solely on the ground of the distinct objects compared
in each, is, to say the least, to make Psychology unnecessarily complicated, and to offend against a rule of great
weight in all systems of classification, Etntia non sunt
multiplicanqda prceter zecessitatem.  Indeed, the several
phenomena  of conception, judgment, and  reasoning,
viewed merely as mental acts, and without reference to
the diversity of the data from which the act commences
and with which it deals, appear to furnish far more promi1 " Nous ne savons que i'ame humaine possede certaincs faculte's, que
parce que nous voyons en elle certains phdnomencs se produire. Ainsi,
parce que nous observons qu'elle sent, qu'elle pense, qu'clle sc souvient,
nous en concluons qu'clle a la capacitd de sentir, la capacitd dc pcnser, la
capacitd de se souvenir; ct ce sont ces capacitds que nous appelons sos facultes."- Jouffroy, Des facultes de l'dme hltmaine, (M3Ilanges Philosophicues,
p. 313, 2d ed.)
6




62                PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
nent features of similarity than of difference. They are
effected by the same means; they are governed by the
same laws; they are confined within the same limits;
they admit of the same distinctions of material and formal
validity. The psychological analysis of any one may be
applied, almost in the same words, to the others; and so
far as thought alone is concerned (though not always in
the possession and management of the materials upon
which thought is exercised), the same mental qualities
are manifested in the right performance of each. In a
psychological point of view, to enumerate separate mental
faculties, as giving rise to the various products of thought,
is, to say the least, to encumber the science with unnecessary and perplexing distinctions. It will be sufficient to
refer them to the single faculty of Thought, the operation
of which is in all cases Comparison.l
But the faculty of Thought, though uniform  in its own
nature and in the manner of its operation, may yet give
rise to different products, according to the diversity of the
materials upon which it operates; and this difference, as
has already been observed, forms the basis of the classification usually adopted in Logic. Hence, from the different
points of view in which thought is contemplated by the
two sciences, there arises some diversity of detail, which it
is desirable to point out more particularly.
Extending the terms Apprehension and Judgment beyond the region of Thought proper,2 it may be laid down,
1 See Sir W. Hamilton's Lectures on Metaphysics, Lect. xxxiv.
2 The division into Simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reasoning, is
usually given as one of the discursive faculties. Yet even Logicians have
extended it to the powers of perception and imagination. Indeed, these
several faculties have shared in the confusion arising from the vague use,
in modern philosophy, of the term idea. A striking instance is afforded




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                 63
as a general canon of Psychology, that the unit of consciousness is a judgment; in other words, that every act of
consciousness, intuitive or discursive, is comprised in a
conviction of the presence of its object, either internally
in the mind or externally in space. The result of every
such act must thus be generally stated in the proposition,
"This is here." Consequently, at least with reference to
the primary and spontaneous, as distinguished from the
secondary and reflex acts of consciousness, it is more correct to describe Apprehension as the analysis of Judgments,
than Judgment as the synthesis of Apprehensions.l
In a psychological point of view, therefore, it is incorrect to describe Simple Apprehension as the first operation
of the mind. In one sense, indeed, the relation of prior
and posterior is altogether out of place: Chronologically,
inasmuch as every Apprehension is simultaneous with a
Judgment, and every Judgment with an Apprehension;
and logically, inasmuch as Judgment cannot exist without
Apprehension, nor Apprehension without Judgment. In
another sense, however, we may properly say that Judgment is prior to Apprehension; meaning that the subject
and the object are first given in their mutual relation to
each other, before either of them can itself become a sepalrate object of attention.  But when a corresponding
division is adopted of the operations of Thought, properly
so called, the same order of priority cannot be observed.
Every operation of thought is a judgment, in the psychological sense of the term; but the psychological judgment
must not be confounded with the logical. The former is
by Wolf, in his account of Apprehension and Judgment. Phil. Rat.,
~~ 33-39.
1 See Reid, Intellectual Powers, Essay iv. ch. 3, with Sir W. Hamilton's
Commentary.




64                   PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA.
the judgment of a relation between the conscious subject
and the immediate object of consciousness; the latter is
the judgment of a relation which two objects of thought
bear to  each other.  The former cannot be distinguished
as true  or false, inasmuch  as the object is thereby  only
judged to be present at the moment when we are conscious of it as affecting us in a certain  manner; and this
consciousness. is necessarily true. The latter is true or
false according as the relations thought as existing between certain concepts are actually found in the objects
represented by those concepts or not. The logical judgment necessarily contains two concepts, and hence must be
regarded as logically and chronologically posterior to the
conception, which requires one only. The psychological
judgment is coeval with the first act of consciousness, and
is implied in every mental process, whether of intuition or
of thought.  It cannot, therefore, be called prior or posterior to any other mental operation, for there is no mental
operation in which it does not take place; but the judgments of intuition  are logically and chronologically prior
to the judgments of thought.l  Conception is a psychologi1 Of the important distinction between chronoZogical and logical priority
(the tempore and natura of the scholastic post-predicaments), it will be
sufficient to quote one ancient and one modern exposition. Aristotle (for
name and thing), Categ. ch. 12: fnpOTepoV ETEpOU E TfpOV A.E'yETaL TETpaXws,
7rpWTOV oEtv Kai Kvp&r6aTa KaTa  Xp&ov, KaCba b 7rpETILTepopV  E'TepoV E7epov Kai
7raAatl-TEpov AXyeTra....  Aeepov 8 T') TO aVTLtapdEcOI KaTa&'rT Tro ei/at
alCoAol&(TVL, oo, s'b f'V TC)r V V0 67rpd&rpov, SUvoiv p', yap gIvrwv aO &Xov3aE7
ebi -Is )b EV Elic,  &VbS sf Oho0S ObU &vaYKcabOV 8iO eVCaL. Mletaph. viii. 8. 2.
fIldr7Js i'Sl'ToalI'7l7S  7rporEpa aoT'lv 7 f'vEpypEa Kal X dSy  Ka! fp ouai'ol
xp vo0 8' fa  OLv pS, or&TL $' C'S 06. Cousin, Programme d'un cours de
Philosophie: "Une connaissance est anterieure h une autre dans l'ordre
logique, en tant qu'elle l'autorise; elle est alors son antecedent logique.
Une connaissance est anterieure a une autre dans l'ordre psychologique,
en tant qu'elle se produit avant elle dans l'csprit humain; elle est alors son




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                  65
cal judgment, but not a logical one, and is properly ranked
as the first operation of Thought, inasmuch as it is the
simplest.
As the design of the present essay is not to consider
Psychology in itself, but Psychology in its relation to
Logic, I shall content myself with accepting the three
operations of Thought as they are commonly distinguished
by Logicians, examining them with a view of ascertaining
what light Psychology can throw on the province and laws
of each. Other points of view, and other principles of
classification, need not be further discussed in this place.
In relation to their several logical products, the three
operations may be distinguished as follows.
Conceiving has been already explained as the individualizing of certain attributes comprehended in a general
notion and expressed in a general term; the representation,
namely, of such attributes as coixisting in a possible object of intuition. Language, as before observed, is, in its
earliest operations, a sign, not of concepts, but of intuitions. Its earliest terms are employed as the proper
names of individual objects. Conception does not take
place till after we have learned to give the same name to
various individuals presented to us with certain differences
of attributes, and hence to associate it with a portion
only, not with the whole, of what is presented in each.
This may be distinguished as Abstraction, a spontaneous,
though not always a voluntary act, the concentration of
the mind on certain portions only of a given object in
relation to its name.  This must not be treated, as is
fiequently done by Logicians, as a conscious process of
antecedent psychologique." For some admirable applications of the above
distinction, see the same author's criticism of Locke, Cours de Philosophie,
|con 17.
6*




66                 PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
thought, being only a preliminary condition to thinking,
taking place in the majority'of cases unconsciously, during the gradual acquisition of speech.1 Our names thus
gradually acquire a- signification, being transformed from
proper names to appellatives. Finally, the act of conception consists in contemplating the attributes thus combined in the signification of a name as coexisting, along
with individual features, in a possible object of intuition,
and hence, apart from  the individual features, as indifferently representing all such objects. This representative
collection of attributes, combined by means of a sign, is a
Concept.
In the above remarks, the office of language is considered as it now exists and is taught, not as it might possibly have been originally created.  We do not form  our
own language, but receive it ready formed; and its teaching, whether true or deceitful, whether promoting or distorting the right development of the mind, does, as
matter of fact, impress us from  our infancy upwards with
certain associations, and casts our earliest thoughts in a
certain mould, from which no future effort can wholly
emancipate us.  I am  not now  considering what might
have been the course of our mental growth had we been
the original inventors of our mother tongue, or if we had
been born among a people with whom (as in a hypothesis
1 Abstraction, as described by Stewart, Elements, vol. i. ch. 4, answers in
essential points to what I have here described. It should be observed,
however, that by language as it now operates, whatever may have been
the case in its first formation, the question as to what attributes shall be
abstracted and what retained, is in a great measure determined for us.
The process must thus be distinguished from the voluntary abstraction implied in all operations of thought. On Abstraction, as distinguished from
Attention, see Tissot, Anthropologie, vol. i. p. 142.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                 67
of Reid's 1) every sound represented a complete sentence.
Language is not here considered as it might have been invented by a conclave of imaginary philosophers, or as it
may have influenced the thoughts of Adam in Paradise;
but as it does influence the thoughts of children born into
the world, the offspring of articulately-speaking parents.
As in Conception a single general notion is considered
in its relation to a possible object of intuition, so in Judgment two such notions are considered as related to a common object. When I assert that A is B, I do not mean
that the attributes constituting the concept A are identical
with those constituting the concept B,-for this is only
true in identical judgmnents, —but that the object in which
the one set of attributes is found is the same as that in
which the other set is found. To assert that all philosophers are liable to error, is not to assert that the signification of the term philosopher is identical with that of liable
to error; but that the attributes comprehended in these
two distinct terms are in some manner united in the same
subject. To ask what constitutes unity or identity in a
subject of attributes, is to enter on a deep metaphysical
question, the discussion of which must be postponed to a
later stage of our inquiry; it is sufficient for the present
to observe, that the common language and common
thought of mankind universally acknowledge something
of the kind, assuming, whether they can explain it or not,
that a certain smell and color and form, which are distinct
attributes, are in some way related, as parts or qualities,
to some one thing which we call a rose; and that, when I
assert that the rose is fragrant, I imply that the thing
1 Correspondence, Lcttcr xi. to Dr. James Gregory. See p. 71 of Sir W.
Hamilton's edition.




68                PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
which affects in a certain way my power of sight is in
some manner identical with that which affects in a certain way my power of smell.  The metaphysical problem
thus lies at the bottom  both of Conception and of Judgment, and, whether it admits of satisfactory explanation
or not, must be included as a fact in any description of the
several operations of Thought.
Reasoning is the most complex of the three operations,
as in it two concepts are determined to be in a certain
manner related to each other, through the medium of their
mutual relations to a third concept.  This operation is
therefore treated last in order.'  The several relations
asserted in the premises and deduced in the conclusion,
are of the same nature as those implied in Judgment, and
lead to the same metaphysical difficulties. These, together
with the logical and psychological character of the Laws
of Thought, will be considered in a future chapter.  For
the present it will be sufficient to attempt, in accordance with  the above  observations, a definition of the
products of the several acts of Thought, the Concept,
the Judgment, and the Syllogism, the legitimate objects
of Formal Logic.
A Concept is a collection of attributes, united by a sign,
and representing a possible object of intuition.
A Judgment is a combination of two concepts, related
to one or more common objects of possible intuition.
1 "Judicium notiones conjungit vel separat, adeoque eas supponit.
Ratiocinando ex notionibus et judiciis prseviis elicitur judicium ulterius,
adcoque ratiocinatio notiones et judicia supponit. Ergo notio cst operatio
prima, judicium sccunda, discursus tertia." - Wolf, Phil. Rat. ~ 53. But
Wolf, as before observed, has not accurately distinguished between the
perceptive and discursive faculties. His remark is true, though only in a
much narrower sense than that in which he designed it.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.              69
A Syllogism is a combination of two judgments, necessitating a third judgment as the consequence of their
mutual relation.
The definition above given of a Judgment renders necessary a few remarks on a class of propositions, whose
true logical character has been considerably misapprehended by eminent authorities. According to the above
definition, every judgment in Logic must be regarded as a
combination of concepts; every term of such judgment,
as the sign of a concept. This is no less true of singular
than of common judgments, and the neglect of it has
given rise to some errors in the logical treatment of propositions.  "Proper names," says MIr. Mill, "denote the
individuals who are called by thern; but they do not indicate or imply any attributes as belonging to those individuals. WVhen we name a child by the name Mary, or
a dog by the name Coesar, these names are simply marks
used to enable those individuals to be made subjects of
discourse. It may be said, indeed, that we must have had
some reason for giving them those names rather than any
others; and this is true: but the name, once given, becomes independent of the reason. A man may have been
named John, because that was the name of his father; a
town may have been named Dartmouth, because it is situated at the mouth of the Dart. But it is no part of the
signification of the word John, that the father of the person so called bore the same name; nor even of the word
Dartmouth, to be situated at the mouth of the Dart."'
These remarks are true so far as the name alone is concerned, or as regards the reason of its being imposed, at a
certain time, on a certain man. But, then, the man, as an
individual existing at some past time, cannot become im1 Mill's Logic, vol. i. p. 40.




70                PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
mediately an object of thought, and hence is not, properly
speaking, the subject of any logical proposition.  If I say,
"Caesar was the conqueror of Pompey," the immediate
object of my thought is not Caesar as an individual existing nearly two thousand years ago, but a concept now
present in my mind, comprising certain attributes, which I
believe to have coexisted in a certain man. I may historically know that these attributes existed in one individual
only; and hence my concept, virtually universal, is actually
singular, from the accident of its being predicable of that
individual only.  But there is no logical objection to the
theory that the whole history of mankind may be repeated
at recurring intervals, and that the name and actions of
Caesar may be successively found in various individuals at
corresponding periods of every cycle.
"Alter erit tum Tiphys, et altera quan vehat Argo
Delectos heroas: erunt etiam altera bella;
Atque iterum ad Trojam magnus nittetur Achilles."
These remarks will suggest a correction of the ordinary
logical account of the quantity of propositions, which
should have been made long ago. The subjects of all
logical judgments are concepts: the true singular proposition in Logic is not one in which the concept is materially
limited to an individual by extralogical considerations, but
one in which it is formally so limited by a sign of individuality.  In scholastic language, only indivicua demonstrativa, and not, as is vulgarly taught, individua sijgnata,
are properly the subjects of singular propositions.' Indefinite, or, as they should rather be called, indesignate2
1 Cf. Fries, System der Logik, ~ 22. His principle is sound, though some
of his instances are inaccurate.
2 Properly speaking, particular propositions are indefinite, singulars and




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                      71
propositions, are an anomaly in Logic, no less when the
subject is a singular than when it is a common term. In
both, the quantity can only be known by the matter, and,
in both, an appeal to the matter is extralogical.
The same considerations will also show the propriety
of Aristotle's limitation of the logical verb to the present
tense  only.  All thought is a consciousness of present
mental acts, and its object is not the past event, but the
present concept of it.  Hence the office of the verb in
Logic is not to declare the past or filture connection of an
attribute with its subject in the represented fact, but to
declare the present coexistence  of two concepts in the
representative act of thought.'
Before quitting  this portion of the subject it will be
desirable to compare the conclusions arrived at with those
of two eminent philosophers, from  both  of whom  they
appear, verbally at least, to differ in a slight degree.
Locke's well-known definition of knowledge, "Tlle perception of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas,"
has been somewhat severely commented on by his illustrious critic, MI. Cousin.2  The French philosopher shows
clearly that, in many of our judgments, we cannot be said
universals definite. For when I say Some A is B, I leave it altogether
undetermined how many, and whether any given A is included or not.
For this reason it is better to adopt the term indesignate, suggested by Sir
W. Hamilton.
1 " Copula non est nisi verbum substantivum prasentis temporis. Dcnotat enim nexum inter subjectum et pradicatum intercedentem, qualis
nempe reprsesentatur in ideis nostris. Cum igitur in omni judicio nexus
ille semper sit aliquid presens, copula non esse potest nisi verbum substantivum presentis temporis."- Wolf, Phil. Rat. ~ 202.
2 Cours de Philosophie, legon 23. Compare Jouffroy's Reid, Preface, pp.
130, 133, sqq. For other criticisms, see Reid, Intellectual Powers, Essay I.
ch. 7; Essay VI. ch. 3; Leibnitz, Nouveaux Essais, IV. 1.




72               PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
to have distinct notions of terms united, prior to pronouncing on the fact of their agreement.  The distinctions drawn in the preceding remarks will, I think, furnish
a ground for a more exact decision of the point at issue
than has been given either by the English philosopher or
his French censor. Locke's definition abounds in verbal
inaccuracy, for which, however, the author is not entirely
responsible, as it is partly owing to the unsettled signification, in his day, of philosophical terms, which have since
been more accurately determined. Taking Perception in
the strict sense to which it has been determined by Reid
and his successors, it is not correct to say, in general
terms, that the agreement of ideas is in all casesperceivecl.
Extending lKzowleldge, as Locke himself does, to include
the evidence of the senses,' it is incorrect to say that, in
all knowledge, we have a distinct consciousness of two
ideas and their agreement.  And the term  Idea itself,
used loosely by Locke, as by Descartes, for any object
of consciousness, admits of a variety of subordinate senses,
in some of which the definition is assuredly inaccurate.
But, as limited to the logical judgment proper, as it has
been above distinguished from the psychological, the definition is substantially correct, though susceptible of some
verbal improvement. In every logical judgment there is
a union of concepts; and every concept is represented by
a sign. The concepts themselves must be regarded as existing in the mind before their union; and, the signs being
practically furnished by the existing terms of a language,
the logical judgment may be properly described as formed
by the combination of concepts; as its representative, the
proposition, is formed by the combination of terms. But
to the judgments distinguished as psychological the defi-'Essay, B. IV. cll. 2. ~ 14.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                    73
nition of Locke is inapplicable; and here the objections of
MA. Cousin may be urged with full effect.  Such are all the
spontaneous judgments of the perceptive and imaginative
faculties. Such, too, is the Cartesian cogito, ergo sum, a
primitive judgment, not of the senses, but of the internal
consciousness, which the opponents of Descartes, from
Gassendi to Kant, have misrepresented as a logical reasoning from concepts.l The definition of Locke is therefore
correct, as far as regards judgments of thought, properly
so called; judgments formed by means of concepts, and,
consequently, of language, and whose constituent parts
are given piecemeal in words, and put together by the
mind in the act of judging. It is incorrect, as regards all
judgments, whether concerning the ego or the nzon-ego,
which the mind forms for itself, by an immediate act of
consciousness, without the aid of verbal or other signs of
voluntary intuition.
From the definition of Locke we proceed to consider
that of Kant. In the Critical Philosophy, Thought and
Judgment are synonymous, and the act of the understanding. The understanding may be defined indifferently, the
faculty of thinking, or the faculty of judging; for all
thought is cognition by means of concepts; and all concepts are the predicates of possible judgments, and are, by
such judgments, referred to objects of sensible intuition,
either immediately, or through the interposition of lower
1 See an article in Cousin's Fragments Philosophiques, "Sur le vrai sens
du cogito, ergo sum." To this I am indebted for the following quotation
from Descartes himself: " Cum itaque quis advertit se cogritare, atque indc
scqui se existere, quamvis forte nunquam antea qunesiverit quid sit co-gitatio nec quid existentia, non potest tamen non utramque satis nosse, ut
sibi in hac parte satisfaciat." —Responsio ad sextas objectiones. See also
Clauberg, Logica, Qu. clx.
7




74                  PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA.
concepts.1 The intuitions of sense being, according to
Kant's theory of perception, immediate representations of
objects, the judgment is thus the mediate cognition of an
object, or the representation of a representation.2
In a psychological point of view, the Kantian definition
of Judgment is too narrow; as it virtually denies that any
act of Judgment whatever is performed in the exercise of
the intuitive fuculties; a denial which the author repeats
still more explicitly in other passages.3 In a logical point
of view, it is too wide; the province of Judgment being
made coextensive with the whole of Thought, including,
therefore, under it, Conception or Simple Apprehension.
Every concept, according to Kant, is the predicate of a
possible judgment, in which it may be affirmed of any of
the objects of intuition included within  its sphere.  IIe
might have  gone further, and  said that, in  all positive
thinking, the possible judgment becomes an actual one.
But it is a psychological, not a logical judgment.  It
1 "Wir k6nnen alle Handlungen des Verstandes auf Urtheile zuriickfiihren, so dass der Verstand iiberhalupt als ein Vermogen zu urtheilen
vorgestellt werden kann. Denn er ist nach dem Obigen ein Vermbgen
zu denken. Denken ist das Erkenntniss durch Begriffe.  Begriffe aber
beziehen sich, als Predicate mbglicher Urtheile, auf irgend eine Vorstellung von einem noch unbestimmten Gegenstande."- Kritik der r. V. p. 70,
ed. Rosenkranz.
2 " Da keine Vorstellung unmittelbar auf den Gegenstand geht, als blos
die Anschauung, so wird ein Begriff niemals auf einen Gegenstand unmittelbar, sondern auf irgend eine andre Vorstellung von demselben (sie
sey Anschauung oder selbst schon Begriff) bezogen. Das Urtheil ist also
die mittclbare Erkenntniss eines Gegrenstandes, mithin die Vorstellung
einer Vorstellung desselben." - Kritik der r. V. p. 69.
3 " Wahrheit oder Schein sind nicht im Getenstande, so ferne er angeschaut wird, sondern im Urtheile fiber den'selben, so ferne er gedacht wird.'Man kann also zwar richtifg saren: dass die Sinne nicht irren, aber nicht
darum, weil sie jederzeit richtig urtheilen, sondern weil sie gar nicht
urtheilen." — ritik der r. V. p. 238.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.               75
affirms only the mental existence of the object, as now
present in thought; and the affirmation is necessarily true,
whatever be the nature of the object. To make the doctrine of Kant consistent, the province assigned to Judgment must be either extended or contracted. It must
either be extended, to denote every consciousness of a
relation between subject and object, i. e., to every operation of mind, or it must be contracted, to denote the consciousness of a relation between two objects of thought;
in which case it does not extend beyond the logical judgment by means of, at least, two concepts.
Having thus pointed out the distinction of Thought
from other mental acts, and its various subdivisions relatively to Logic, I shall proceed to offer a few observations
on the nature of Law, in so far as that term is applicable
to a conscious subject.




CHAPTER III.
ON LAW, AS RELATED TO THOUGHT AND OTHER OBJECTS.
TInE following passage from Archbishop Whately's
Logic may serve as an appropriate introduction to this part
of our subject. "What may be called a mathematical impossibility, is that which involves an absurdity and selfcontradiction; e. g., that two straight lines should inclose a
space, is not only impossible, but inconceivable, as it would
be at variance with the definition of a straight line. And
it should be observed, that inability to accomplish anything which is, in this sense, impossible, implies no limitation of power, and is compatible even with omnipotence,
in the fullest sense of the word. If it be proposed, e. g., to
construct a triangle having one of its sides equal to the
other two, or to find two numbers having the same ratio
to each other as the side of a square and its diameter, it is
not fiom a defect of power that we are precluded fiom
solving such a problem as these; since, in fact, the problem
is in itself unmeaning and absurd: it is, in reality, nothing
that is required to be done."'
Substantially, perhaps, this is not far from the truth. But
it may be stated in a more satisfactory form by divesting
it of a hypothesis which, even if true (and this we have no
1 Whately's Logic, p. 353. (Sixth edition.)




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                    77
means of ascertaining), may for the present purpose be
dispensed with.l
When anything is said to be inconceivable, it is thereby
acknowledged that the human mind is not altogether unrestricted in its operations.  It is bounded not only as regards the sphere of objects of which it is permitted to take
cognizance, but also as regards the manner in which it is
capable of thinking about objects within that sphere.  In
other words, there are laws under which the mind is comnpelled to think, and which it cannot transgress, otherwise
than negatively, by ceasing to think at all.
The existence, then, of laws of thought is a fact of
which our every-day consciousness assures us.  Nrecessity,
of whatsoever kind, implies a necessary agent; that is, an
agent acting under a law. If, then, any question can be
proposed to the mind of man which he feels himself compelled to decide in one way only, that compulsion is at
once an evidence of the existence of laws which, as a
thinker, he is compelled to obey.
And this admission is all that is required for the solution
of such difficulties as that suggcested above.  If our whole
thinking is subject to certain laws, it follows that we cannot think of any object, not even of omnipotence itself,
except as those laws compel us.  The limitation does not
lie in the object of which we think, but in the thinking
subject.  "Whatsoever we imacgine," says Hobbes, "is
finite.  Therefore there is no idea or conception of anything we call infinite.  No man can have in his mind an
1 In venturing to criticize this note, one of the most valnualle portions
of the Archbishop's work, I becg to state, that it is to the wordingr only of
the first part that my remarks are intended to apply. With the just and
philosophical distinction laid down in the same place between the three
senses of the word impossibility, I have only to express full concurrence.
7*




78                 PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
image of infinite magnitude; nor conceive infinite swiftness, infinite time, or infinite force, or infinite power.
WVhen we say anything is infinite, we signify only that we
are not able to conceive the ends and bounds of the things
named; having no conception of the thing, but of our own
inability."'
It may be, indeed, that the conditions of possible
thought correspond to conditions of possible being, that
what is to us inconceivable is in itself non-existent.2  But
of this, fiom the nature of the case, it is impossible to have
any evidence. If man, as a thinker, is subject to necessary
laws, he cannot examine the absolute validity of the laws
themselves, except by assuming the whole question at
issue. For such examination must itself be conducted in
subordination to the same conditions. Whatever weakness, therefore, there may be in the object of criticism, the
same must necessarily affect the critical process itself.
WVe may indeed believe, and ought to believe, that the
powers which our Creator has bestowed upon us are not
given as the instruments of deception. We may believe,
and ought to believe, that, intellectually no less than morally, the present life is a state of discipline and preparation
1 Leviathan, i. 3. (p. 17, ed. Molesworth.) This opinion of Hobbes has
been severely censured by Cudworth, Intellectual System, B. I. ch. v. ~ 1,
who, however, mistakes the meaning of the assertion, both in what it expresses and in what it implies. The error of Cudworth in this respect has
been corrected by his learned translator, Mosheim, who, though no friend
to Hobbes's views in general, admits that in this particular his doctrine is
not liable to the objections urged against it. See Harrison's edition of
Cudworth, vol. ii. p. 522.
2 In itself, distinguished from, as an object of thought. As the latter, it is
of course impossible. The distinction between things per se and things
as objects of thought, will be familiar to every reader of Kant. It is, in
fact, the cardinal point of the whole Critical Philosophy.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                     79
for another; and that the portion of knowledge which our
limited faculties are permitted to attain to here may indeed, in the eyes of a higher Intelligence, be but partial
truth, but cannot be absolute falsehood. But, in believing
thus, we desert the evidence of Reason to rest on that
of Faith, and of the principles on which Reason itself
depends it is obviously impossible to have any other
guarantee.
But such a faith, however well founded, has but a regulative and practical, not a speculative application.  It bids
us rest content within the limits which have been assigned
to us: it cannot enable us to overleap them, or to exalt to
a more absolute character the  conclusions obtained by
finite thinkers concerning finite objects of thought.l  For
the same condition which disqualifies us from  criticizing
the laws of thought, must also deprive us of the power of
ascertaining how much of the results of those laws is true
in itself, and how much is relative and dependent upon the
particular bodily or mental constitution of man during the
present life. To determine this question, it would be necessary to examine the same conclusions with a new set of
faculties,2 and under new  conditions of thought, so as to
separate what is merely relative to the existing state of
1 When Kant (Kritik der r. V. p. 49) declares that the objects of our intuition are not in themselves as they appear to us, he falls into the opposite
extreme to that which he is combating: the Critic becomes a Dogmatist
in negation. To warrant this conclusion, we must previously have compared things as they are with things as they seem; a comparison which
is, ex hypothesi, impossible. We can only say that we have no means of
determining whether they agree or not. And, in the absence of proof
on either side, the presumption is in favor of what is at least subjectively
true. The onus probandi lies with the assailant, not with the defender, of
our faculties. Cf. Royer-Collard, Jouffroy's Reid, vol. iv. p. 412.
2 See Reid, Intell. Powers, Essay vi. ch. 5. (p. 447, ed. Hamilton.)




80                  PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
human consciousness, from what is absolute and common
to other intelligences.1
In accordance with these views, we are naturally led to
regard all the hitherto unsolved problems of Mletaphysics
as requiring to be treated fiom a psychological, instead of
an ontological point of view. Instead of asking what are
the circumstances, in the constitution of things, by virtue
of which they present such and such difficulties and contradictions to human understanding, we must ask what are
the circumstances of the human understanding itself, by
virtue of which a distinction exists between the conceivable and the inconceivable.  Such, in fact, was the revolution introduced by Kant into metaphysical speculation; a
revolution which  hle aptly compares to that effected in
Astronomy by Copernicus, when he thought of investigating the apparent motion of the heavens from the side of
the spectator, insteacd of fiom  that of the objects.  The
advantages of such a treatment are obvious. From the
objective view, we obtain only the fact that certain questions have up  to  the  present time remained  unsolved.
From the subjective view, we learn why they are insoluble;
and tfhe answer to this question determines the laws and
limits of thought.  The abuse of the method appears in
1 Truth relative to no intelligence is a contradiction in terms, as it implies
a relation existing after one of the correlatives has been annihilated.
Our only possilce notion of absolute truth is a truth relative to all intelligences. If all truth is sulhjective which implies a cognitive power, Omniscience itself has h)ut subjective truth.  " Aux termes de la philosophie
de Kant," says 3I. Cousin, " la raison divine serait done aussi frapp'e de
sulhjectivitd, par cela mCme quone cette raison rdsi(le dans un sujet d(ltcrmind qui est Dieu." (Lecons su7r krnt, p. 3S50.) Within the limits of human knowledge the same principle is allowed b1 Kant himself: " so bedetitet die ol)jective Giiltigkeit des Erfahrunlsurtheils nichts andcrs, als die
nothwendige Allgemeingiiltigkeit desselben."- Proleyonmena, ~ 18.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.               81
the attempts of the successors of Kant, especially of Schelling and Hegel, to construct a philosophy of the absolute
from the subjective side, by denying in certain relations
the validity of those laws of thought which they acknowledge in others, and endeavoring thereby to do away with
relation in consciousness altogether. Such a system, with
whatever ability it may be constructed, carries in its fundamental conception the germ  of its own refutation.  It
commences by giving the lie to consciousness; it proceeds
by dividing the human mind against itself, the understanding against the reason, and the reason against the understanding; it ends by leaving no test by which its own truth
can be determined. But the philosophy of Kant is like the
spear of Achilles, and possesses virtue to heal the wounds
which it has itself inflicted. While it is impossible to deny
the lineal descent of the philosophy of Schelling and of
Hegel from a one-sided view of Kantian principles, it is
equally clear that the only satisfactory refutation of the
extravagances of that philosophy must be based on a sober
acknowledgment of those laws and limits of the mental
faculties which Kant has been mainly instrumental in
pointing out.
We must admit, then, that our present faculties are
trustworthy guides to that portion of knowledge which
God designs us to attain to in our present state; that the
laws to which these faculties are subjected, though perhaps
not absolutely binding on things in themselves, are binding
upon our mode of contemplating them; that, while we
obey these laws, we seek after truth, according to our' kind
and in conformity with the end of our intellectual being;
and that, when we neglect them, we abandon ourselves to
every form of error; or, rather, we lose all power of discerning between error and truth; we commence by an act




82                PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
of intellectual suicide, and construct a system which, by
virtue of its fundamental principle, must disclaim all superiority over, and decline to combat with, any rival theory;
its sole claim to attention being, that it may, for aught we
know, be true or false, or both, or neither.
To apply these principles to the question with which we
commenced: Among the limitations to which even omnipotence is regarded as subject, none is of older birth, or
has been more frequently alleged, than the impossibility of
undoing an act already done,
oO'ov 7yp acrro Kal OEEbs o'TepiOKerai,
ayErlnTa 7rote7, citw' fy &  7rerpayldeva.
Now, it may be that Time and Space are, as Kant maintains, merely subjective conditions of human sensibility.
As such, they limit the whole exercise of human thought.
But the limits of the thinking faculty are limits of things
as objects of thought only; and beyond that sphere we
know nothing.  It may be that the whole distinction of
past, present, and future, has no place relatively to other
intelligences than ours. Still, that distinction continues to
influence all human thought; and every act, as an object
of thought, must be regarded as taking place according to
the conditions of temporal succession.  If we cease to regard it in this light, we do not extend our knowledge, but
abandon the problem  as (humanly speaking) cuthidkable.
The limitation, then, is not of omnipotence in itself, but
of all power as the object of human thought.l The ulti1 This distinction is drawn by Locke, in his Second Reply to the Bishop
of Worcester. "But it is further urged, that we cannot conceive how
matter can think. I grant it: but to argue from thence that God, therefore,
cannot give to matter a faculty of thinking, is to say God's omnipotency
is limited to a narrow compass, because man's understanding is so; and
brings down God's infinite power to the size of our capacities."




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                    83
mate consequence of this admission will be, that the unlimited is not an object of human thought at all.l  It may
be an object of human belief, but the two provinces are
not coextensive.
So again with reference to the impossibility of reversing
a necessary truth, such as those of Geometry.  To whomi
is the problem  to construct a triangle, one of whose sides
shall be greater than  the  other two, " unmeaning?"
Clearly to the geonleter, whose science has already shown
him  the necessary truth of a contradictory proposition.
By a law  of thought, he is compelled to deny that two
contradictory assertions can be true at the same time.
Why they may not both be true at different tinmes, - why
a mathematical proposition once demonstrated is held always and everywhere true, and its contradictory always
and everywhere false; while other truths, however certain
at present, are allowed only to a limited extent under
temporal or local restrictions, - requires some further consideration.
Necessity is the result of law, and law implies an agent
whose working is regulated thereby.2  But it is a law only
to that which works under it: to an observer, who sees
the results of the law without being subject to its influence, it is no more than a fact evidenced by or inferred
firom sensible observation, and can never obtain higher
value than that of a generalization from a more or less extended experience. Hence arise two very different kinds
1 See the admirable Article on M. Cousin's Philosophy by Sir Winm. Hamilton, Discussions, p. 1.
2 " All things that are have some operation not violent or casual.....
That which doth assign unto each thing the kind, that which doth moderate the force and power, that which doth appoint the form and measure
of working, the same we term a Law." - Hooker, E. P. i. 2.




84                 PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
of necessity, the results- respectively of laws of the ego and
of the non-ego;l of laws under which I feel myself compelled to think, and of laws u.nder which I see other
agents invariably working. These two it is essential to all
sound thinking to distinguish from each other; and the
more so, inasmuch as they have been perpetually confounded together.   The distinctive features of each have
been  overlooked  by  the  disciples of opposite  schools.
By one party, laws of thought have been degraded to
generalizations from  experience; by  another, empirical
laws have been invested with the character and authority
of original principles of mind.2  And yet, apart from  the
psychological tenets of any particular school, it would
seem as if a distinctive criterion might a priori be determined, from a mere analysis of the notion of law and its
operation.
Setting aside, for an instant, the question how the mind
of man is actually constituted, let us suppose an intelligent
being, subject to laws under which he is compelled to
think, and placed in the midst of a world of material
1 It is much to be wished that these expressions, or some equivalent,
were more naturalized in English philosophy. In Germany and France
they are fully established as technical terms, and the foundation of the
most important distinctions in mental science. In adopting here the Latin
expressions instead of English equivalents, I have been guided by the authority of Sir W. Hamilton, Reid's Works, p. 100, supported by that of Mr.
Hallam, Literature of Europe, vol. ii. p. 436. (Second edition.) The latter
observes, of the term Ego, " It seems reasonable not to scruple the use of
a word so convenient, if not necessary, to express the unity of the conscious principle. If it had been employed earlier, I am apt to think that
some great metaphysical extravagances would have been avoided, and
some fundamental truths more clearly apprehended."
2 The opposite theories of Dr. Whewell and of MIr. Mill, on the nature
of axiomatic principles, exhibit the extreme views in a remarkable degree. See Appendix, note A.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                  85
agents, subject to laws under which they must act. What
would be the distinctive character presented to his mind
by these respective laws of himself and of the world without?  The laws of the planetary motions are absolutely
binding on the moving bodies themselves, independently
of the existence of astronomical science. But it is optional
with an intelligent being to study astronomy or not; and,
when he does so, he observes, as matter of fact, how such
laws influence their own subordinate agents; but he does
not himself become an agent under their influence. As filcts
of his experience,' they are known solely in and through his
observation; as laws within their own sphere, they are independent of his knowing aught about them. But the
laws of his mind come into operation as laws when the act
of thinking commences, and are binding, not on this or
that class of physical phenomena, but upon the thinker
himself, in the contemplation of all of them. Hence it is
not optional with him whether he will think according to
these or other conditions. Choose what object of study he
will, he cannot think at all, he cannot conceive his liberty
of choosing, without being i2so facto under their influence.  Hence arises an obvious criterion. A law which is
not binding on me as a thinker, may at any time be reversed, without affecting my mode of observing the same
agents under their new conditions. And I have no difficulty in conceiving such a reversal as at any moment possible, because, antecedent to experience, I had no internal
bias which required the recognition of the existing law
rather than of any other. I have only to discard an ad1 " Les vdritds primitives sont de deux sortes, comme les derivatives.
Elles sont du nombre des vdritds de raison, ou des vdritds de fait. Les
vdritds de raison sont neecssaircs, et cellos de fait sont contingentes."
- Leibnitz, Nouv. Essais, iv. 2.




86                PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
ventitious knowledge. But the reversal of a necessary law
of thought, supposing that there are such, is, from  the
nature of the case, inconceivable; for conception is itself
the servant of the law, and, ex hypothesi, cannot rebel
against it. I cannot by an act of thought annihilate the
conditions by which all thought is governed. I can, indeed,
admit the possibility that there may be other beings thinking under other laws; but I can form  no positive conception of their nature. Such a supposition is not thought,
but its negation. A mind cannot think by other laws than
its own.
Now, how far is this hypothesis supported by facts?  Is
it a matter of fact, that men are acquainted with certain
truths which they acknowledge to be necessary only while
the present laws of nature remain in force, and which they
can conceive as reversible at any moment, and others
which they are compelled to regard as necessary under all
circumstances of which they are capable of thinking?  Is
it a matter of fact, that men do not attribute the same
necessity and universality to physical as to mathematical
truths? Do they not acknowledge that, while the laws of
the physical world continue as they are, seed-time and
harvest, and cold and heat, and summer and winter, and
day and night, shall never cease; and yet, have they any
difficulty in conceiving the earth's motion stopped by some
superior power, and one-half of the globe left from that
time forth in perpetual daylight? 1 Or do they see the least
1 "Tous les exemples qui confirment une vWrit6 generale, de quelque
nombre qu'ils soient, ne suffisent pas pour etablir la necessitd universelle
de cette meme vdritd: car il ne suit pas, que ce qui est arrive arrivera toujours de meme. Par exemple, les Grecs et les Romains et tous les autres
peuples ont toujours remarque, qu'avant le d6cours de vingt quatre heures
le jour se change en nuit, et la nuit en jour. Mais on se seroit trompe si




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                     87
improbability, not to say impossibility, in the supposition,
that in some remote part of space there may exist worlds
in which the alternations of the seasons have no place?
On the other hand, can they conceive the same power
forming a triangle with more or less than two right angles?
Can they conceive an occurrence taking place in any portion of space without a cause? or an object possessing
neither of two contradictory attributes?  If such a distinction exists, and our daily consciousness assures us that
it does, the fact at once affords at least a strong presumption that the necessity in the one case is a necessity of
observation only, depending on the laws of the world
without, in the other a necessity of thought, depending on
the laws of our mental constitution.
But, granting that thought has its laws, how are these to
be discovered?  Only by reflection upon the phenomena
of actual thinking, and the restriction to which, in all
cases, we experience it to be subject. To learn how we
think, we must in the first place actually think; and a
multitude of successive acts of thought will be necessary,
before we become aware that certain conditions are contingent, and limited to some of those acts only, while others
are necessary, and cannot but be present in all.1 If, therefore, Exa2,erience be taken in a wide sense, as coextensive
with the whole of consciousness, to include all of which
the mind is conscious as agent or patient, all that it does
l'on avoit crui, quo la meme regle s'observe partout, puisqu'on a vu le contraire dans le sdjour de Nova Zembla. Et celui-lh so tromperoit encore,
qui croiroit, que c'est au moins dans nos climats une veritd ndcessaire ct
eternellc, puisqu'on doit juger, que la Terre et le Soleil meme n'existent
pas ndcessairement, et qu'il y aura peut-6tre un temps, oh cc bel astre ne
sera plus avec tout son Systeme, au moins en sa prdsente forme."- Leibnitz, Noziveauzx Essais, Avalt-Propos.
1 See Hamilton on Reid, p. 772, and Cousin, Cours de Philosophie, Leg. 22.




88                 PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
from within, as well as all that it suffers from without, -  in
this sense, the laws of thought as well as the phenomena
of matter, in fact all knowledge whatever, may be said to
be derived fiom ex)perience.' But further, experience in its
narrower and more common meaning, as limited to the results of sensation and perception only,2 is, though not the
source, the indispensable condition of discovering the laws
of mind as well as of matter.  For, to think actually, we
must think about something; this something, the objectmatter of thought, whatever it may be, must in the first
instance be supplied through the medium  of the senses;
for thought itself does not become an object of thought
till after it has been called into exercise by objects presented fiom  without.3  But while the material or external
element varies with every successive act of thought, the
formal or internal remains the same in all; and thus the
necessary law, binding on the thinker in every instance, is
distinguished from the contingent objects, about which he
thinks on this or that occasion.
The last consideration necessitates a further division of
those truths which have already been distinguished as
necessary, and  therefore not derived  fiom  experience.
While we maintain that all necessary truths must have
1 In this extended sense, Wolf derives the principle of contradiction
from experience: "Experiri dicimur, quicquid ad perceptiones nostras attenti cognoscimus. Solent lucere cognoscimus ad ea attenti, quae visu percipimus. Similiter ad nosmet ipsos attenti cogrnoscimus, nos non posse
assensum prxebere contradictoriis, v. gr. non posse sumere tanquam verum,
quod simul pluat vel non pluat."-Ph. Rat. ~ 664. Here it should be observed that perception is used in a wider sense than that to which Reid and
the Scottish Philosophers after him restrict it.
2'EK /Ev ofv aloV;oeows w 7lveaL LAvtxIr,1, eic 8e twV7A7/S'7roxxaCS ToU aCuou'ytvoyExvs Ed t r E L p [ a. - Arist. Anal. Post. ii. 19.
3 Cf. Arist. De Aninza, iii. 4, 7.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                89
their origin in the constitution of the mind itself, and are
virtually prior to all experience, they cannot all of them
be referred to Laws of Thought, properly so called. For
thought, as thought, cannot be limited to any special class
of objects: its laws must operate in all cases alike, whatever be the matter on which it is engaged. That every
triangle has its angles equal to two right angles, is indeed
a necessary truth; but it is true of triangles only, and cannot be applied to any other object. But that the same
subject cannot possess contradictory attributes, is a principle equally applicable to the objects of geometrical demonstration and to the most contingent facts of sensible
experience. It is equally certain, that no man can at
once be standing and not standing, as that the angles of a
triangle cannot be both equal and unequal to two right
angles. Hence the criterion of absolute necessity, though
valid as far as it goes, is not adequate to determine the
whole question. It serves to distinguish judgments'
priori from judgments of experience: it does not distinguish between different classes of the former, nor explain
their several relations to the mind, which is the common
source of all. Of the various judgments which have been
enumerated by philosophers as necessary truths, it will be
sufficient for our present purpose to select three classes,
which may be severally distinguished as Mathematical,
Metaphysical, and Logical Necessity. All these, being in
different ways regarded as absolutely and universally necessary, must be considered as in different ways dependent
on laws of our mental constitution.  From  all must be
distinguished what is commonly called Physical Necessity,
or belief in the permanence of Laws of Nature. The
several distinctions may be represented by the following
questions:
8*




90'1ROLEGCOMENA LOGICA.
I. Why do I judge that a triangle can, under no circumstances whatever, have its angles greater or less than
two right angles?
II. Why do I judge that every sensible quality must
belong to some subject, and that every change is and must
be brought about by some cause?
III. WVhy do I judge that two contradictory attributes
can, under no circumstances whatever, coexist in the same
subject?
IV. Why do I judge that the alternations of day and
night will not, under the existing circumstances of our
globe, cease to take place?
The last of these obviously stands on a different ground
from the other three. I am immediately cognizant of law
only as I am conscious of its obligation upon myself.
The law itself may be physical, intellectual, or moral; but
to know it as a law, I must know it as a condition which
I cannot or ought not to transgress. Law, in this sense,
as a discerned obligation, can obviously exist only in relation to a conscious agent; and even with regard to conscious agents, other than myself, I only infer the existence
of the law from a supposed similarity between their constitutions and my own.  But, as regards unconscious
agents, Law means no more than a constantly observed
fact in its highest generalization. When I speak of the
alternations of day and night as consequent on a law of
nature, I mean no more than that the alternation has invariably been observed to take place; and, when I resolve
such alternations into the law of the earth's rotation, I
mean only that the earth does constantly revolve on her
axis once in twenty-four hours. Or, if I could resolve all
the phenomena of the material world into a universal law
of gravitation, I should obtain no more than the universal




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                  91
fact, that all particles of matter in the universe do gravitate towards each other, and that certain subordinate coInbinations of those particles present certain phenomena in
so doing. But I have not, by this resolution, got any
nearer to necessity; for the gravitation of bodies in the
inverse ratio of the square of the distance is, like the ebb
and flow of the tides, or the elliptical orbits of the planets,
an observed fact in the order of nature, and it is no more.'
My belief in the continuance of this observed order may
perhaps be explained by some law of my mental constitution; but, as thus explained, it is a law of mind, and
not of matter. Under what circumstances certain facts
of nature may be resolved into others, and what kinds of
experiment and observation will contribute to this end,
are questions which, with all their importance, are totally
distinct from those which form the object of the present
inquiry.
I shall only observe here, that to call such questions a
portion of Logic- that is, to regard the New Organon as
a supplement to the Old, and both as forming parts of
the same Science -is to confound two essentially distinct
branches of knowledge, distinct in their end, in their
means, and in their evidence.  "We do not enlarge the
sciences," says Kant, "but disfigure them, when we suffer
their boundaries to run into one another."  The confusion produced in the present instance is perhaps the
most injurious of all to sound thinking - a confusion between the mental self and its sensible objects, the ego and
the non-ego, the positive and negative poles of speculative
philosophy.
1 See Stewart, Elementts, vol. ii. ch. 2, ~ 4.
2 On this distinction some excellent remarks will be found in M. Jouffioy's Preface to his translation of Reid, p. 43.




CHAPTER IV.
ON THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CHARACTER OF MIATHEMATICAL
NECESSITY.
IT has been already observed, that whatever truths we
are compelled to admit as everywhere and at all times
necessary, must have their origin, not without, ill the laws
of the sensible world, but within, in the constitution of the
mind itself.  Sundry attempts have, indeed, been made to
derive them from sensible experience and constant association of ideas;2 but this explanation is refuted by a criterion decisive of the fate of all hypotheses: it does not
account for the phenomena. It does not account for the
fact, that other associations, as frequent and as uniform,
are incapable of producing a higher conviction than that
of a relative and physical necessity only. And, indeed,
this might have been expected beforehand; for the utmost
rigor in a law of the sensible world may furnish a sufficient
reason why phenomena must take place in a certain manner, but furnishes no reason at all why I must think so.
But it is one thing to recognize the operation of a men1 " La preuve originaire des verites ndcessaires vient du seul entendement, et les autres v6rites viennent des experiences ou des observations
des sens. Notre esprit est capable de connoitre les unes et les autres, mais
ii est la source des premieres, et quelque nombre d'expdriences particulieres qu'on puisse avoir d'une vdritd universelle, on ne sauroit s'en assurer pour toujqurs par l'induction, sans en connoitre la necessit6 par la
raison."- Leibnitz, Nouv. Essais, 1. i. ch. 1.
2 See, for example, Mill's Logic, vol. i. p. 305.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                   93
tal law, and another to discover the law itself.  The distinction above noticed between ~Mathematical, MIetaphysical, and Logical Necessity, implies, that, although the
origin of all is to be sought for in the mind itself, they
are in some way differently related to one or other of the
special faculties of their common source. 5We must further
inquire, what is the peculiar relation of the mind to mathematical ideas,l by virtue of which not merely the general
laws of all thinking, but the special applications of those
laws in Arithmetic and Geometry, possess a necessity
which is not found when they are applied to concepts
generalized from experience.  How is it that in some reasonings both matter and form can be furnished by the
mind itself, while in others the form  alone is from  the
mind, the matter being derived from  experience?
Before entering upon this question, it will be necessary
to give some account of Kant's celebrated distinction
between Analytical and Synthetical Judgments.  An Analytical or Explicative Judgment contains nothing in the
predicate but what has been already implied in the conception of the subject. For example: since the conception
of body implies extension, the proposition, "All bodies are
extended," is an Analytical Judgment.  Of this character
are all propositions in which, in scholastic lang(uage, the
predicate is said to be of the essence of the subject;
whether a part of the essence, as in the predication of
genus or differentia, or the sum of the parts, as in a definition.  In a Synthetical or Ampliative Judgment, on the
1 The word idea is here used intentionally, as, in modern philosophy,
the most vaLgue and indeterminate that could be selected. It would be an
anticipation of what has yet to be determined to give any more definite
expression.
2 The substitution of definition for species is intentional.




94               PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
other hand, the predicate adds an attribute to the subject
which has not been already thought therein. Thus the
proposition, "All bodies are heavy," is a Synthetical Judgment; the attribute heavy not being thought in the mere
conception of body. Of this kind are all propositions in
which the predicate is said to be joined to the essence of
the subject as a property or accident.l
All Analytical Judgments are formed by the mind a
priori, whether the notion analyzed be empirical or not.
For the mind, having once gained this notion as a subject,
has no occasion for any additional experience to determine
the predicate which is already given therein.2 Any Science
whatever may therefore have abundance of necessary truths
of this kind; but such do not contribute in any way to the
extension of our knowledge, but only to a more distinct
consciousness of what we already possess. A Synthetical
Judgment, on the other hand, is a positive extension of
our knowledge, but requires for its formation something
more than the concept which stands as its subject. All
empirical judgments are synthetical;3 but mathematical
necessity requires that the mind should be able to form
for itself synthetical judgments not dependent on experience.
The axioms of Geometry contain specimens of both
kinds of judgment. Those which relate exclusively to geometrical objects, - such as, "A straight line is the shortest
distance between two points,"4 "Two straight lines cannot
enclose a space," " Two straight lines which, being met by
a third, make the interior angles less than two right
1 See Kant, Kritik der r. V. p. 21; Prolegomena, p. 16, ed. Rosenkranz.
2 Kant, Proleg., p. 17.
3 Kant, Kritik der r. V. p. 700; Proleg., p. 18.
4 This is sometimes given as a definition, but it is properly synthetical.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                       95
angles, will meet if produced " —have been shown by Kant
to be synthetical;' and it is with reference to these that
he discusses the well-known question, How are synthetical
judgments a priori possible? But those axioms which are
not peculiar to Geometry, the common principles of Aristotle,2 -  such as, "The whole is greater than  its part,"
"Things that are equal to the same are equal to each other,"
" If equals be added to equals, the sums are equal,"- are analytical.3 The two last, indeed, may be easily shown to be
merely various statements of the Principle of Identity,
" Every thing is equal to itself," or, "A -  A."  Thus, if
the common magnitude of the first pair of equals be represented by A, and that of the second by B, the axiom,
"If equals be added to equals, the sums are equal," is expressed in the identical judgment, "A  +  B  = A +  B."4
The former class of axioms determine the peculiar
1 " Dies sind die Axiome, welche eigentlich nur Grissen als solche betreffen."- Kant, Kritik der r. V. p. 143; cf. p. 703, etc.; Proleg. p. 20. Hence
the error of Leibnitz, in maintaining that all axioms (excepting, of course,
identical judgments themselves) may be demonstrated from definitions
and the judgments of identity. (Opera, Erdm. p. 81.) He selects as a
specimen the analytical judgment, "The whole is greater than its part,"
and of such his theory is correct; but no synthetical judgment can be
proved solely from analytical premises; and without synthetical axioms
Geometry is impossible.
2 Synthetical axioms are not included, as they should have been, under
the peculiar principles (Ga a' pXaL) of Aristotle, which are divided into definitions and hypotheses. With the exception of this omission, Aristotle's
account of geometrical demonstration is far more accurate than any that
can be found in modern philosophy before Kant.
3 Cf. Kant, Kritik der r. V. p. 143.
4 Dr. Whewell (Phil. Ind. Sc. vol. i. p. 134) speaks of this axiom as a
condition of the intuition of magnitudes. This is a confusion of the common axioms of Logic with the peculiar axioms of Geometry. Stewart
(Elements, vol. ii. ch. 1) falls into the opposite error, regarding all the
truths of Geometry as deduced from definitions.




96               PROLEGOBIENA LOGICA.
character of all the conclusions of Geometry; the latter
have no peculiar relation to MIathematics, but depend on
the general conditions of all thinking whatever,   and have
therefore a logical, not a mathematical necessity.  The
whole question of the superior necessity of Geometry to
Physical Science depends upon the manner in which we
account for the origin of the synthetical axioms relating
to magnitudes as such. As an instance, we may takle the
proposition, "Two straiglht lines cannot enclose a space."
An eminent writer of the present day has labored hard
to prove that this principle is nothing but a generalization
from  experience, and, consequently, that our belief in
the superior necessity of mathematical as compared with
physical truths is a mere self-deception.  He lays much
stress on one of the characteristic properties of geometrical
forms, their capacity of being painted in the imagination
with a distinctness equal to reality; in other words, the
exact resemblance of our ideas of form to the sensations
which suggest them.l Butt while it is impossible to deny
the ability with which 3Mr. Mill combats the notion of an
a priori necessity in 3Mathematics, it is impossible to assent
to an argument which contradicts the direct evidence of
consciousness.  Nor does this reasoning against Doctor
WVhewell, however powerful as an argumenturn ad homninerm, meet the real question at issue. What is required
is to account, not for the necessity of geometrical axioms
as truths relating to objects without the mind, but as
thoughts relating to objects within. MIathematical judgments are true of real objects only hypothetically.  If
there exist anywhere in the world a pair of perfect
str:ii'lt lines, those lines cannot enclose a space.  But
if such lines exist nowhere but in my imagination, it is
1 Mill's Logric, vol. i. p. 309.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                97
equally the case that I cannot think of them as invested
with the contrary attribute. That which is to be accounted
for is, not the physical fact that certain visible objects
possess certain properties, but the psychological fact that,
in the case of geometrical magnitudes, I am compelled to
invest imagined objects with attributes not gained by
mere analysis of the notion under which they are thought;
-a compulsion of which I am not conscious with regard
to the most uniform associations of phenomena within the
field of sensible experience. A sensible object may have
been familiar to me from childhood; but, suppose the
external reality destroyed, I can assert nothing with
certainty of its imaginary representative, except what is
contained in the concept itself.  So long as I have to
conform  my judgments, not to the actual laws of the
existing course of nature, but to the possible conditions
of an imagyinary state of things, I have no difficulty in
attributing contradictory attributes successively to the
same object. I may imagine the sun rising and setting
as now for a hundred years, and afterwards remaining
continually fixed in the meridian.  Yet my experience
of the alternations of day and night has been at least
as invariable as of the geometrical properties of bodies.
I can imagine the same stone sinking ninety-nine times
in the water, and floating the one-hundredth; but my
experience invariably repeats the former phenomenon
only. WVhereas, in the case of two straight lines, which,
so far as they are objects of experience, stand only on a
level with the above and similar instances, the mind finds
itself compelled to assert as necessary one attribute, not
contained in the concept, and to reject its contradictory
as impossible.
The possibility of forming synthetical judgments a priori
9




98              PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
in Geometry admits of only one adequate explanation,
viz., that the presentative intuition, as well as the representative notion, is derived from within, not from without;
in other words, that both the matter and form of the
judgment are determined subjectively. If it can be shown
that the object of which pure Geometry treats is not
dependent on sensibility, but sensibility on it; that it is
a condition under which alone sensible experience is possible, it is obvious that its characteristics must accompany
all our thoughts concerning any possible object of such
experience; that its laws must be equally binding upon
the imaginary representation as upon the sensible percept:
for, abstract as we may from this or that particular phenomenon of experience, we are clearly incompetent to deprive it of those conditions under which alone experience
itself is possible.
Such a condition is furnished to us by the intuition of
Space. That this is a subjective condition of all sensible
perception, and not a mere empirical generalization from a
special class of phenomena, is evident fi-om the fact that
it is impossible, by any effort of thought, to contemplate
sensible objects, save under this condition.  We may
shift our attention at will from this object to that; but
we can think of none save as existing in space. We
may conceive the whole world of sensible phenomena
to be annihilated by the fiat of Omnipotence; but the
annihilation of space itself is beyond the power of thought
to contemplate. That things in themselves must exist in
space, and, as such, must be so presented to every possible
intelligence, is more than we may venture to affirm; but
this much is certain, that man, by a law of his nature,
is compelled to perceive and to think of them as so existing.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.              99
Upon this law of the mind depends the certainty of
geometrical axioms as thoughts, though not as truths.
The peculiar figures of space must, indeed, be originally
suggested empirically, from observation of the actual figures of body; but this experience is still subject to the
same condition. Bodies cannot be perceived or imagined,
but in space: bodies of this or that figure cannot be
perceived or imagined, but as occupying a similarly figured
space. The modifications originally suggested by the former become an object of thought as existing in the latter;
and the features exhibited now and here in the one, we
are compelled to think as existing always and everywhere
in the other.
The sensationalist is therefore, in a certain sense, right
in deriving geometrical axioms from experience. It must
be conceded to him that, had we never seen two straight
lines, had we never observed that as a matter of fact they
did not in that particular instance enclose a space, we
should never have arrived at the conviction that they
cannot do so in any instance. But this is equally true
of any product of the imagination. If I had never seen
separately the upper parts of a man and the lower parts
of a horse, I could not unite them together in the fantastic
image of a centaur. If I had never seen a black object, I
could not combine that color with a known form, so as to
produce the imagination of a black swan. But why is it
that in the one case I find no difficulty whatever in going
beyond or against the whole testimony of my past experience, while in the other such transgression is altogether
out of my power? Experience has uniformly presented
to me a horse's body in conjunction with a horse's head,
and a man's head with a man's body; just as experience
has uniformly presented to me space enclosed within a




100             PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
pair of curved lines, and not within a pair of straight ones.
Why do I, in the former case, consider the results of my
experience as contingent only and transgressible, confined
to the actual phenomena of a limited field, and possessing
no value beyond it; while, in the latter, I am compelled
to regard them as necessary and universal?  Why can I
give in imagination to a quadruped body what experience
assures me is possessed by bipeds only? And why can I
not, in like manner, invest straight lines with an attribute
which experience has uniformly presented in curves?
Can it be said that the ideas in the latter case are contradictory, and that their union is therefore forbidden by
the laws of formal thinking? By no means. Straight and
curved, viewed merely as objects of sense, are opposed only
as black and white, or as biped and quadruped; they cannot, that is, be thought as existing at the same time in the
same subject: but that property which experience testifies
to have universally accompanied curved lines is not, merely
by virtue of that experience, more incompatible with
straight ones than the head which has uniformly accompanied a biped body is incompatible with a quadruped
one; or than the form which experience has uniformly connected with a white surface is incompatible with a black
one. Nor does the impossibility arise from any defect in
the simple ideas, such as exists in the case of a man who
can form no idea of a color which he has never seen. We
have all the simple ideas, or combinations of simple ideas,
which experience can give: man's head and horse's body,
in the one case; straight lines and space enclosed, in the
other. Why is not the latter conjunction as easy to the
imagination as the former?
That it is not so, is a matter not of this or that theory,
but of psychological fact; and, as such, requires explana



PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.               101
tion, under any theory whatever. In fact we may demand,
as a sine qua non, of every hypothesis concerning the
character of human knowledge, that it shall accept and
account for this fact, instead of neglecting or denying it.
Only two theories can be mentioned as having fairly attempted to fulfil this condition. The one is that of Leibnitz, who treats mathematical principles as mere analytical
judgments, dependent on the laws of formal thought. On
this supposition, the distinction between Logical and
Mathematical necessity vanishes altogether.l  But the
solution, though applicable to the general axioms which
Geometry, in common with all other Sciences, tacitly or
openly presupposes in so far as it contains reasoning at all,
fails when applied to those on which all that is especially
geometrical depends. By no mere analytical process, as
Kant has shown,2 can the conception of not enclosing a
space be elicited from that of two straight lines. In this,
and all similar principles, the predicate of the proposition
is not developed out of, but added to, the subject.
The other, and far more satisfactory, solution, is that of
Kant himself. Whatever we are compelled to regard as
necessary, must be so in consequence of laws, not of the
object, but of the subject. But there are subjective laws
of the presentations of sense, as well as of the representations of thought. We can perceive only as permitted by
the laws of our perceptive faculties, as we can think only
in accordance with the laws of the understanding. If, then,
by a law of my sensibility, I am compelled to regard all
external objects as existing in space, any attributes which
are once presented to me as properties of a given portion
of space, the same must necessarily be thought as existing
1 Opera, ed. Erdmann, p. 81.   2 Prolegomena, ~ 2.
9*;




102              PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
in all space, and at all times. For to imagine a space in
which such properties are not found, would not be to imagine merely a different combination of sensible phenomena, such as continually takes place without any change in
the laws of sensibility; it would be to imagine myself as
perceiving under conditions other than those to which, by
a law of my being, I am subjected. The attempt to realize
such imagination is not a new train of thinking; it is the
refusal to think at all. It does not inquire what new
objects may possibly be presented to my present faculties;
it requires me to determine how objects may appear to a
being whose faculties are differently constituted firom mine.
Thought, as has already been observed, is representative,
and can only be exercised on objects presented to it. It
is therefore restricted by the conditions under which alone
such presentation is possible. If I am to exercise my
thought on sensible objects at all, I must think of such
objects under such determinations as the conditions of my
sensibility require.'Geometrical principles cannot, therefore, properly be
called laws of thought, inasmuch as they do not govern
every operation of the thinking faculty, but only regulate
the application of thought to a special class of objects. But
they are laws relative to the subjective condition of one
portion of our intuitions -those, namely, which are presented to the senses - the condition of their presentation
being Space. But a condition is discernible only in conjunction with that of which it is the condition. Space,
therefore, and its laws can be made known to consciousness only on the occasion of an actual experience of sense.
Hence the twofold character of geometrical principles:
empirical, as suggested in and through an act of expeli



PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                    103
ence; necessary, as relating to the conditions under which
alone such experience is possible to human faculties.'
The same considerations will explain another important
feature of geometrical judgments, in which they represent
a striking  contrast to  truths  properly called  empirical.
Imagination plays its part in both; but in the former case
it determines, in the latter it is determined by, the phenomena given in experience. The mental image which I
can form of this or that individual possesses more or less
of truth and reality, as it represents with more or less
accuracy the features of the sensible object; just as the
value of a portrait depends on the accuracy with which it
represents the features of the original. The imagination,
again, may of itself form new combinations of attributes;
but these also are hypothetically regarded as real or fictitious, according as we may or may not hereafter discover
such combinations to exist in sensible objects. But in
Geometry  the  case  is  reversed.   Its  propositions are
primarily and necessarily true of objects existing in the
imagination; they are only secondary and hypothetically
true of sensible objects, in so far as they conform  to the
imaginary model.  If there is such a thing in the visible
world as a perfect triangle, its angles are equal to two
right angles.  But if there is not, the proposition is still
true of the triangle as it exists in my imagination.  And
1 This character of the special axioms of Geometry is remarkably expressed in the language of Aristotle. For example: afoarloris, o5X X T&rv,
31oov, &XX' o'0a a I' a a av o  E a a TT'rTb e'fross tUadl7,uaTIzCToS EoXa-o0'rplYWovo,. — Eth. Nic. vi. 9. And again: TaOra 3' eorr-Iv oTo, 6p a v  r' v o X a  e T.
- Anal. Post. i. 12. With which may be compared the language of Kant,
Logik, ~ 35: " Die ersten k6nnen in der Anschauun(g dargestellt werden."
Had Aristotle been aware of the distinction between the analytical and the
synthetical axioms, he might almost have anticipated Kant's view of the
whole question.




104              PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
the whole of Geometry, as a speculative science, would be
unaffected by the annihilation of every material square
or triangle in existence, whatever might become of its
merely approximate applications to purposes of practical
utility. Whereas, the truths of Zodlogy, or Botany, or
MIineralogy, are dependent entirely on the existence of
animals, or plants, or minerals, not as images within the
mind, but as entities without. The cause of this distinction is manifest from  what has been said above. /'The
truths of Geometry, though subsequent to, are not consequent on, experience: they relate not to the empirical figures of body, but to the figures of that space upon
which sensible experience is dependent. They are therefore unaffected by the destruction of the visible bodies,
apd could only become fictitious by the annihilation of
space itself. But the truths of Physical Science depend
upon experience alone: they are true of the objects only
as actually presented to the senses; and their reality depends entirely on the real existence of the sensible type.
-As Geometry is a science of necessary truths relating to
continuous quantities or magnitudes, so Arithmetic is a
sciencii of necessary truths relating to discrete quantities
or numbers. The two sciences, however, present some
important features of distinction. Almost all the truths
of Geometry are deductive. It contains very few axioms,,
properly so called, i. e., synthetical judgments, derived immediately from the intuition of space; and its processes
consist in the demonstration of a multitude of dependent
propositions, from the combination of these axioms with
analytical principles. On the other hand, the fundamental
operations of Arithmetic, Addition, and Subtraction,' pre1 " Though in some things; as in numbers, besides adding and subtract



PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA.                     105
sent to us a vast number of synthetical judgments; each
of which, however, is derived immediately from intuition,
and cannot, by any reasoning process, be deduced from  any
of the preceding ones.l Pure Geometry cannot advance a
step without demonstration; and its processes are therefore all reducible to the syllogistic form.  Purle Arithmetic
contains no demonstration; and it is only when its calculus
is applied to the solution of particular problems that reasoning takes place, and the laws of syllogism become applicable.  It is not reasoning which tells us that two and
two make four;2 nor, when we have gained this proposition, can we in any way deduce from  it that two and four
make six.  We must have recourse, in each separate case,
to the senses or the imagination, and, by presenting to
the one or the other a number of individual objects correing, men name other operations, as multiplying and dividing, yet they are
the same: for multiplication is but adding together of things equal; and
division, but subtracting of one thing, as often as we can."- Ilobbes, Leviathan, part i. ch. 5.
1 Subtraction may be demonstrated from Addition, if all the truths of
the latter be supposed given, or vice versa; though it is simpler to regard
Subtraction as an independent process of denumeration, as is done by Condillac, Langue des Calculs, ch. i. But no result of either can be derived
from a preceding result of the same operation.
2 Nothing, at first sight, can appear more satisfactory than Leibnitz's
proof of this proposition. Nouv. Essais, 1. iv. ch. 7. But that demonstration assumes the definitions of the higher numbers (2 is 1 + 1; 3 is 1
+ 1 + 1, etc.), and this, as will hereafter appear, is in fact beggring the
whole question. The real point at issue is not whether 4 and 2 + 2 are at
bottom identical, so that, both being given, an analysis of each will ultimately show their correspondence; but whether the former - notion, definition and all -is contained in the latter. In other words, whether a man
who has never learned to count beyond two, could obtain three, four, five,
and all higrher numbers, by mere dissection of the notions which he possesses already. This remark applies also to Stewart (Elements, vol. ii. ch.
1), and to Hcgel's attempted critique of Kant ( Werke, vol. v. p. 275).




106               PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
sponding to each term  separately, envisage the resulting
sum.l The intuition thus serves nearly the same purpose
as the figure in a geometrical demonstration; with the exception, that in the latter case the construction is adopted
to furnish premises to a proposed conclusion, while in the
former it gives us a judgment which we have no immediate purpose of applying to any further use.
An apparent objection, which meets us at the outset,
must not be left unnoticed. If the results of Arithmetic
are altogether intuitive, how is it that they extend to cases
of which sense has never furnished us with the occasion
of judging? I may have never seen a thousand objects
of any kind together, yet I am as fully convinced that 976
+  24 =  1000, as I am  that 2 +  2 -4, of which I see
instances every day of my life. And, even if I have seen
examples of the former as well as of the latter, how far
does the observed fact help in the formation of the judgment? Is my sight so acute that I can distinguish at a
glance a group of 1000 objects from one of 999? Can I
then, in any case, be said to have seen the fact verified?
And if not, how is it that I do not merely know that what
I have seen in a single case must be true universally, but
even can be assured of the necessity of truths which I
have never accurately observed in any actual instance?
This objection is based on a confusion of intuition in
general with the special presentations of sight.2 When the
1 See Kant, Kritik der r. V. p. 703. I have availed myself of the term
envisage, as the best English equivalent that has yet been proposed to the
German anschauen, a word which is applied generally to any presentation
of individual objects in sense or imagination. Etymologically, both the
German and the English word are drawn fiom the sense of sight only.
If uniformity alone were to be consulted, the substantive Anschauung, usually translated intuition, should be rendered by envisaging.
2 A confusion to which Kant himself has perhaps, in some degree, con



PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                107
propositions of Arithmetic are said to be intuitive, it does
not follow that their truth must have been observed in
visible instances; that we must have seen, for example,
that two and three make five, in lines, or pebbles, or the
fingers of the hand. It implies only that we must have
perceived the truth of the proposition in some individctal
series, it may be of visible objects, it may be of audible
sounds, it may be of states of our own minds present to
internal observation. In none of these cases do we deal
with representative concepts, but with individual objects
presented to the external or internal sense.
Now, how, as a matter of fact, are arithmetical judgments usually formed?  We see inexperienced calculators
arrive at their results by running through, orally or mentally, the several units of the numbers to be added together.
If we do not remember that 18 and 7 make 25, as readily
as that 2 and 2 make 4, we supply the defect by summing
up severally 19, 20, 21, etc. The artificial aids to which
we have recourse in larger sums, by adding up, for instance,
the corresponding digits in separate columns, are but abbreviated steps of the same process.
Setting aside, as belonging to art rather than science, all
those methods whose aim is merely to extend or facilitate
already existing processes, 4the psychological foundation
of Arithmetic is to be found in the consciousness of successive mental states; and its earliest actual process consists in giving names to the several members of the series.
Such a process, which may be denominated natural, as
distinguished from artificial numeration, would proceed
steadily forward, from one member arbitrarily selected as
tributed, by representing (Proleg. ~ 2) five visible points as the intuition
of the number; thus by implication connecting Arithmetic with space
rather than with time.,




108              PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
the starting-point, acknowledging no relation between the
several steps beyond that of succession to its predecessor,
until the computation ceases firom the inability of the
memory to carry on the series. Such a system, however
limited in its practical results, would rest on precisely the
same foundation as the more perfect methods which art
has supplied us, and will, consequently, contain all the data
required for determining the nature of the necessary truths
of Arithmetical Science.
As Arithmetic, as well as Geometry, contains such truths,
it must be equally regarded as founded on an internal law
or condition of our mental constitution. This condition
is that of Time, a condition which governs not merely our
external perceptions, but our universal consciousness of all
that takes place within or without ourselves. Every successive modification of the conscious mind can be made
known to us only as a change of state; a change which is
only possible under the condition of succession in time, -
a transition from an earlier to a later phase of consciousness. Of Time, as an absolute existence, we cannot form
any idea whatever: it is made known to us only as the
condition or form of successive states of consciousness.
To ask, therefore, whether Timne has any existence out of
our own minds, is, in the only intelligible mode of putting
the question, to ask whether other orders of intelligent
beings are subject to the same conditions of intelligence
as ourselves; whether they, like us, are conscious of various mental states, one succeeding another. Put in this
form, the question is sufficiently intelligible, but obviously
one which we have no data for determining; put in any
other form, it is absolutely void of meaning; it contains not
the material for thought, but only a negation of all thinking whatever.




PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA.                     109
It might indeed be argued, with some show of probability, that the  condition  of successive consciousness is
essentially the condition of a finite and imperfect intelligence, consequent only upon its very limited power of
simultaneous consciousness.'  The scholastic doctrine of
an eternal Now, or nznc stans, so contemptuously treated
by Hobbes, in this respect contains assuredly no prima
facie absurdity.2   The error of such speculations is of aI1other kind.  It consists in mistaking the negation of all
thought for an act of positive thinking.  As our whole
personal consciousness is subject to the condition of successiveness, we can form  no positive notion of a different
state: we only know that it is something which we have
never experienced.  The nature and attributes of an Infinite Intelligence must be revealed to us in a manner accommodated to finite capacities. HI-ow far the accommodation extends, we have no means of determining, as we
cannot examine the same data with a different set of faculties.  The importance of this distinction between positive
1 Vide Boeth. De Consol. Phil., lib. v. pros. vi.
2 It is surprising to see how near some of the earlier views on this point
approached to, without actually arriving at, the doctrine of Kant. Had
the question been considered subjectively as well as objectively, on the
psychological as well as on the metaphysical side, the most important
conclusion of the Critical Philosophy would have been anticipated. When
Hobbes, in his controversy with Bramhall, said, "I never could conceive
an ever-abiding now," he was right; but he was wrong in supposing that
this was decisive of the point at issue. We can only conceive in thought
what we have experienced in presentation; and all our past presentations
have been given under the law of succession. But this does not enable us
to decide what may be the condition of other than human intelligcnces.
In this respect, the remark of Bramhall is exactly to the purpose:
"Though we are not able to comprehend perfectly what God is, yet we
are able to comprehend what God is not; that is, he is not imperfect,
and therefore he is not finite." Reid (Iltell. Powers, Essay iii. ch. 3) treats
the nune stanls as a contradiction, which it is not.
10




110               PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
and negative thinking will be more closely examined hereafter.
But, to return to the question of mathematical necessity:
To construct the whole science of Arithmetic, it is only
requisite that we should be conscious of a succession in
time, and should be able to give names to the several
members of the series. And since in every act of consciousness we are subject to the law of succession, it is
impossible in any form of consciousness to represent to
ourselves the facts of Arithmetic as other than they are.
To the art, not to the science, of Arithmetic belong all the
methods for facilitating calculation which imply anything
more than the mere idea of succession. Such a method,
and a powerful one, is afforded by the invention of Scales
of Notation, in which, to the idea of succession, is added
that of recurrence; the series being regarded as commencing again from a second unit, after proceeding continuously
through a certain number of members, ten for example, as
in the common system. Hence we are enabled to repeat
over again, in the second and subsequent decades, the
operations originally performed in the first, and thus indefinitely to extend our calculus in the form of a continually
recurring series; but the calculus, though thus rendered
infinitely more efficacious as an instrument, remains in its
psychological basis unaltered.
From  these considerations it follows that the several
members of an arithmetical series are incapable of definition. Succession in time, and the consciousness of one,
two, three, etc., are not complex notions abstracted from
and after a multitude of intuitions, but simple immediate
intuitions, differing, as far as numeration is concerned, only
in the order of their presentation. They are not by any
act of thought compounded, the latter from the earlier:




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                    111
they cannot be resolved into any simpler elements of consciousness, presentative or representative, being themselves
the a priori conditions of consciousness in general. Hence
the failure of all attempts to analyze numerical calculation
as a deductive process.  Leibnitz, and subsequently Hegel,
have endeavored to represent the arithmetical processes as
operations of pure analysis. Assuming, for example, 12
and 7 and 5, as given concepts, they show that the first
may be ultimately analyzed into the same constituent units
as the two last; and this is regarded as an explanation of
the whole process of Addition. They overlook the fact
that, in that process, 12 is not given, but has to be determined by the addition of the two other numbers. Arithmetic is not, like Geometry, a science whose definitions
are genetic and preliminary to its processes. The analysis
of any number into its constituent units presupposes the
whole operation which it professes to give rise to.  We
may call, if we please, such an analysis definition; but we
must not suppose that it in any degree corre&ponds to the
definitions of Geometry, or answers the same purpose in
the operations of the science.l
The above considerations are sufficient for our present
purpose, which is to determine the psychological basis of
mathematical judgments, and their consequent special character as necessary truths, in a distinct sense from that in
1 Writers of a very different school from that of Leibnitz or Hegel have
fallen into a similar error with regard to the nature of arithmetical processes. Mr. Mill, for example, regards the whole science of numbers as
derived from the common axioms concerning equality, and the definitions
of the several numbers. Stewart appears to have been of the same
opinion. On the contrary, the whole essentials of the science must be in
existence before the so-called definitions can be formed. The applications
of the calculus as an instrument must not be confounded with its essential
constituents as a science.




112             PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
which the term is applied to logical or physical principles.
MIathematical judgments are synthetical, based on the
universal conditions of our intuitive faculties, and are necessary, not, properly speaking, as laws of thought, but
because thought can only operate in conjunction with matter given by intuition, and intuition cannot be emancipated
from its own subjective conditions. Hence we are compelled to think of our intuitions under the same laws
according to which they are invariably realized in consciousness. Judgments of logical necessity, on the other
hand, are analytical, and rest on the laws of thought, properly so called. Their analytical character is a necessary
consequence of the constitution of the thinking faculty,
and is so far from being a proof of the unsoundness or
frivolity of logical speculations, that it is the strongest
evidence of their truth and scientific value, and leads to
most important consequences, both in Logic and in Psychology.
The nature of these judgments, as well as of those distinguished as metaphysically necessary, will be examined
in the following chapters.




CHAPTER V.
ON THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CHARACTER OF METAPHYSICAL
NECESSITY.
A DISTINCTION between necessary and contingent matter
is found, somewhat out of place it is true, but still it is
found, in most of the older, and, among English writers, in
most also of the recent treatises on Logic.l The boundaries of each, however, are not in the majority of instances
determined with any approach to accuracy.  Among the
schoolmen, the favorite example of a proposition of the
highest degree of necessity was omne animal rationale est
risibile; an example consistent enough with the,nediceval
state of physical science, but which in the present day will
scarcely be allowed a higher degree of certainty than
belongs to any other observed fact in the constitution of
things. An eminent modern Logician gives as an example of a proposition in necessary matter, "All islands are
surrounded by water;" an example which is only valid in
1 Matter in this sense must not be confounded with the modality recognized by Aristotle, and by most of the modern German Logicians. The
former is an understood relation between the terms of a proposition, - the
form of the proposition being in all cases "A is B,"- and is supposed to
be of use in determining the quantity of indefinites. The latter is an expressed relation, the form of the necessary proposition being "A must be
B;" and this is applicable to universal and particular propositions indifferently. The admission of the latter is still a point of dispute among eminent authorities; the admission of the former will be tolerated by no
Logician who understands the nature of his own science.
10*




114                PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
so far as the predicate forms part of the notion of the
subject, and which, therefore, has no other necessity than
belongs to all analytical judgments,-  a necessity derived
from  the form, not from  the matter.'  The  distinction
itself, though altogether out of place when Thought is
considered merely in its relation to Logic, is, in a psyclhological point of view, of considerable importance. The
following remarks will, it is hoped, throw some light on its
true character.
All analytical judgments are necessary; but they cannot
properly be said to be in necessary matter.  They are all
ultimately dependent on the Principles of Identity and
Contradiction, "Every A  is A," and " No A is not A:" 2
principles, the necessity of which arises solely from their
form, without any relation to this or that matter.  That
every triangle has three sides, arises from a mere analysis
of the notion of a triangle; as that every island is surrounded by water, arises from a mere analysis of the notion
of an island. This necessity is derived solely from the
laws of formal thinking.
Of synthetical judgments, every statement of a physical
fact is in contingent matter; at least if the opposite termn
be used in its highest sense.  However rigidly certain
phenomena may be deduced from the assumption of a
1 Examples of this kind were indeed indiscriminately admitted by the
scholastic Logicians, who held any proposition to be in necessary matter
in which the predicate was part of the essence, or necessarily joined to
the essence, of the subject. But this classification, though tenable perhaps in connection with realist metaphysics, is inconsistent with an accurate discrimination between the matter and the form of thought.
2 Kant, lKritik der r. V. p. 133; Proleg., ~ 2. IIe derives all analytical
judgments from the Principle of Contradiction. It would be more accurate to distinguish this principle from that of Identity, and to derive the
negative judgments from the former, the affirmative from the latter.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.               115
general law of nature, the law itself remains nothing more
than an observed fact, of which we can give no other
explanation than that it was the will of the Creator to
constitute things in a certain manner. For example: that
a body in motion, under certain conditions of projection,
and attracted by a force varying inversely as the square of
the distance, will describe an ellipse having the centre of
attraction in one of the foci, - this is matter of demonstration; but that the earth is such a body, acted upon by
forces of this description, is matter of fact, of which we
can only say that it is so, and that it might have been
otherwise. The original premise being thus contingent, all
deductions fiom it are materially contingent likewise.
The same is the case with all psychological judgments,
so far as they merely state the fact that our minds are
constituted in this or that manner. But there is one remarkable difference between this contingency and that
which is presented by physical phenomena. The laws of
the latter impose no restraint on my powers of thought:
relatively to me, they are simply universally observed facts.
There is, therefore, no impediment to my uniting in a
judgment any two notions once formed; though the corresponding objects cannot, consistently with existing laws
of nature, be united in fact. I may thus conceive a mountain moving, or a stone floating on the water; though my
experience has always presented to me the mountain as
standing, and the stone as sinking. But as regards Psychology, the powers of my mind cannot be presented to
consciousness, but under one determinate manifestation.
The only variety is found in the objects on which they
operate. I am thus limited in my power of forming notions
at all, in all cases where I am, by mental restrictions, prevented fiom experiencing the corresponding intuition. I




116               PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
have thus a negative idea only of the nature of an intelligent being constituted in a different manner from myself;
thoulgh I have no difficulty in supposing that many such
exist.  I can suplpose, for instance, that there may exist
beings whose knowledge of material objects is not gained
through the medium  of bodily senses, or whose understanding has a direct power of intuition; but to conceive
such a being is beyond my power; conception being
limited to the field of positive intuitions. In another
point of view, both physical and psychological judgments
may be called necessary; as the consequence of certain
established laws, which laws, however, might have been
otherwise. In this sense, both might be classified as hypothetically necessary;' in opposition to another class of
judgments, those relating to human actions, which, as will
hereafter appear, are, in the fullest sense of the term, contingent.  For logical purposes, however, the former classification is preferable.
On the other hand, mathematical judgments have been
almost universally regarded as belonging to the province
of necessary matter.2  We can suppose the possibility of
beings existing whose consciousness has no relation to
space or time at all. We can suppose it possible that some
change in our mental constitution might present us with
the intuition of space in more than three dimensions. This
is no more than to admit the possible existence of intelli1 For this expression see Leibnitz, Th'odicee, ~ 37; Duval-Jouvc, Logique,
p. 78.
2 Universally among those who have accurately distinguished intelligible
from sensible magnitude. The objections of Sextus Empiricus in ancient,
and of IHume in modern times, among skeptics, so far as they have any
special relation to Geometry, as well as those of NI. Comte and.Mr. Mill,
among sensationalists, are mainly based on a confusion of these two.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.               117
gent creatures otherwise constituted than ourselves, and,
consequently, incomprehensible by us. But to suppose the
existence of geometrical figures, or arithmetical numbers,
such as those with which we are now acquainted, is to
suppose the existence of space and time as we are now
conscious of them; and, therefore, relatively to beings
whose mental constitution is so far similar to our own.
Such a supposition, therefore, necessarily carries with it
all the mathematical relations in which time and space, as
given to us, are necessarily thought. For mathematical
judgments strictly relate only to objects of thought, as
existing in my mind; not to distinct entities, as existing
in a certain relation to my mind. They therefore imply
no other existence but that of a thinking subject, modified
in a certain manner. Destroy this subject, or change its
modification, and we cannot say, as in other cases, that the
object may possibly exist still without the subject, or may
exist in a new relation to a new subject; for the object
exists only in and through that particular modification of
the subject, and on any other supposition is annihilated
altogether. It is thus impossible to suppose that a triangle
can, in relation to any intelligence whatever, have its angles
greater or less than two right angles, or that two and two
should not be equal to four; though it is possible to suppose the existence of beings destitute of the idea of a
triangle or of the number two. This is necessary matter,
in the strict sense of the term; a relation which our minds
are incapable of reversing, not merely positively, in our
own acts of thought, but also negatively, by supposing
others who can do so.
There is one other science which has frequently been
supposed to share this necessity with Mathematics. MIetaphysics, though, so far as it deals in merely analytical




118                 PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
judgments, it has been sufficiently shown by Kant to be
incapable of leading to any scientific results, is frequently
regarded as possessing a certain number of synthetical
axioms, which, under the various names of Principles of
Necessary Truth, Fundamental Laws of Human Belief,
and sometimes even (however incorrectly) of Laws of
Thought,' have held a prominent place in various systems
of philosophy down to the present time. Two of these
principles may be especially selected for examination, partly
on account of the importance attached to them  by eminent
writers, and partly on account of their relation to the Forms
of Thought recognized by Logic.
1. The Principle of Substance. All objects of perception are Qualities which exist in some Subject to which
they belong.
2. The Principle of Causality.2   Whatever begins to
exist must take place in consequence of some Cause.
" I perceive," says Reid, "in a billiard-ball, figure, color,
1 This nomenclature is sanctioned by the authority of M. Royer-Collard.' Trois lois de la pensde concourent dans la perception.
1~. L'itendue ct l'impdnetrabilitd ont un sujet auquel elles sont inhdrentes, et dans lequel elles coexistent.
20. Toutes les choses sont placedes dans une durde absolue, a laquelle
elles participent comme si elles etaient une seule et mCeme chose.
30. Tout ce qui commence a exister a etd produit par une cause." —
Jouffroy's Reid, vol. iv. p. 447.
2 Called also the Principle of Sutfficient Reason, or of Determining Reason;
though these expressions, as Sir William Hamilton has observed, are used
ambiguously to denote, conjunctly and severally, the two metaphysical or
real principles: 10, Why a thing is; 2~, Why a thing becomes or is produced; and, 30, The logical or ideal principle, Why a thing is known or
conceived. - Hamilton on Reid, p. 624. Cf. Leibnitz's Fifth Letter to Clarke,
~ 125, where he states the principle in three forms: "Ce principe est celui
du besoin d'une raison suffisante, pour qu'une chose existe, qu'un dvenement arrive, qu'une vdritd ait lieu." For a criticism on the principle as
thus given, see Herbart, Lehrbuch zur Einleitung in die Philosophie, ~ 39.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                 119
and motion; but the ball is not figure, nor is it color, nor
motion, nor all these taken together; it is something that
has figure, and color, and motion.  This is a dictate of
nature, and the belief of all mankind."'
On the other hand, Bishop Berkeley had labored hard
to prove that it was much more consonant to nature, and
to the common sense of mankind, to deny altogether the
existence of this imperceptible substance, the supposed
support of perceptible attributes.  "I do not argue," he
says, "against the existence of any one thing that we
can apprehend, either by sense or reflection. That the
things I see with mine eyes and touch with my hands do
exist, really exist, I make not the least question. The only
thing whose existence we deny, is that which philosolhers
call matter, or corporeal substance. And in doing of this
there is no damage done to the rest of mankind, who, I
dare say, will never miss it. The atheist, indeed, will want
the color of an empty name to support his impiety; and
the philosophers may possibly find they have lost a great
handle for trifling and disputation."
"It will be urged," he continues, "that thus much at
least is true, to wit, that we take away all corporeal substances.  To this my answer is, that if the word substance
be taken in the vulgar sense, for a combination of sensible
qualities, such as extension, solidity, weight, and the like
this we cannot be accused of taking away. But if it be
taken in a philosophic sense, for the support of accidents
or qualities without the mind- then indeed I acknowledge
that we take it away, if one may be said to take away that
1 Intellectual Powers, Essay ii. ch. 19. Compare Descartes, Meditatio
Secunda, who adduces the changes in a piece of wax as an argument to
show that the thing itself is conceived as something distinct from its sensible qualities.




120              PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
which never had any existence, not even in the imagination." 1
But after Berkeley came Hurne, who applied to the
phenomena of internal perception the same process of
reasoning which Berkeley had applied to the external.
Within myself, he argued, I am conscious only of impressions and ideas. The substance called Mind is a mere
fiction, imagined for the support of these, as the substance
called Matter is imagined for the support of sensible qualities.2  In opposition to these skeptical conclusions, Reid
and his disciples appealed to the authority of certaiu universally acknowledged axioms, distinguished as Principles
of Common Sense, or Fundamental Laws of Human Belief,
of which we can give no other account than that such is
our constitution, and we must think accordingly.  One of
these is the Principle of Substance, mentioned above.
It is necessary to speak with diffidence on a point disputed by philosophers of such eminence; but if there be
any truth in the psychological distinction between Thought
and Intuition, noticed in my first chapter, it will appear
that the Scottish philosophers, in endeavoring to overthrow
Hume and Berkeley at once, abandoned the only position
from which an attack might have been successfully made
on either of them  separately.  Hume's philosophy is not
a legitimate development of Berkeley's, unless we allow
that our consciousness of mind, as well as of matter, is
representative only. If it be true that neither mental nor
material substance, as distinguished from the various states
and attributes of either, is in any manner presented intuitively, the two theories must stand or fall together. And
1 Principles of Human Knowledge, xxxv., xxxvii.
2 Treatise of Human Nlature, part iv. ~~ 5, 6.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                      121
this point is over and over again conceded by Reid and
Stewart.l
Under this concession, the appeal to a fundamental law
of belief is insufficient. Such a law can only state the filect,
that we are by our constitution compelled to believe in a
certain relation between two given notions: it does not
explain how either of such notions could have entered
into the mind in the first instance. But the appeal becomes
self-contradictory in the hands of any one who admits the
views of Locke, or of Kant, concerning the limits of the
understanding.2   Either a presentative  origin  must be
found for the notions of substance and cause, or we must
admit that, in these instances, the act of thought has
created its own objects.
We are therefore compelled to  ask, Is this asserted
analogy between our modes of consciousness in relation
1 For example: "The attributes of individuals is all that we distinctly
conceive about them. It is true, we conceive a subject to which the attributes belong; but of this subject, when its attributes are set aside, we
have but an obscure and relative conception, whether it be body or mind."
- Reid, Int. Powers, Essay v. chap. 2. " It is not matter, or body, which
I perceive by my senses; but only extension, figure, color, and certain
other qualities, which the constitution of my nature leads me to refer to
something which is extended, figured, and colored. The case is precisely
similar with respect to mind. We are not immediately conscious of its
existence, but we are conscious of sensation, thought, and volition; operations which imply the existence of something which feels, thinks, and
wills." - Stewart, Elentzels, Introd. part i.
2 Yet Kant, no less than Reid, allows that we are not immediately
conscious of mind, but only of its phenomena. In his hands, however,
the concession is perfectly suicidal, and forms the weak part of the Critical Philosophy. The reader who bears this inconsistency in mind, may
perhaps find an easier solution to some of Kant's Paralogisms and Antinomies of Pure Reason than could have been riven by the author himself.
On this subject, the admirable remarks of 31. Cousin, in his Sixth Lecture
on Kant, should be consulted.
11




122                  PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA.
to matter and mind really tenable?   Does it not rather
appear a flat self-contradiction to maintain  that I am  not
immediately conscious of myself, but only of my sensations
or volitions?  Who, then, is this I that is conscious; and
how can I be conscious of such states as mine? In this case
it would surely be fhr more accurate to say, not that I am
conscious of my sensations, but that the sensation is conscious of itself; but, thus worded, the glaring  absurdity
of the theory would carry with it its own refutation.'
The one presented substance, the source from  which our
data for thinking on the subject are originally drawn, is
myself.2   Whatever may be the variety of the phenomena
1 Since the publication of the first edition of this work, the author has
met with the following passage in Jouffroy's Nouveaux Me3langes _Philosophiques, p. 275, in which the above argument has been anticipated in substance, and almost in language: "These singuliire a soutenir que je no
saisis pas la cause quni est msoi, que je sens ma pensde, ma volonte, ma sensation, mais quo je no me sens pas pensant, voulant, sentant! MIais d'ou
saurais-jo alors que la pensde, la volont6, la sensation que je sons, sont
miennes, qu'elles  mnanent de moi, et non pas d'une autre cause? Si ma
conscience ne saisissait que la pensde, je pourrais bien concevoir que la
pensde a une cause; mais rien ne m'apprendrait quelle est cette cause, ni
si elle est mioi ou toute autre. La pensde ne m'apparaitrait done pas comme
mienne. Ce qui faiit qu'clle m'apparait comme mienne, c'est que je la sens
emaner de moi; et cc qui fait que je la sens dmaner de moi, c'est que je
sens la cause qui la produit et que je me reconnais dans cette cause."
2 Thus Descartes observes (Meditatio Tertia): " FEx iis vero qum in ideis
rcrum  corporalium  clara et distincta sunt, qu.Tdam  ab idea mci ipsius
videor mutuari potuisse, nempe substantiam, durationem, numerum, et si
quve alia sunt ejusmodi."  This passage perhaps suggested the observation of an illustrious French disciple of the Scottish philosophy, who has
thus supplied a marked deficiency in the system of his masters: "Le
moi," says MI. Royer-Collard, "est la scule unitt' qui nous soit donnde
immediatement par la nature; nous ne la rencontrons dans aucune des
choses que nos faculties observent. Mais l'entendement qui la trouve en
lui, la met hors de lui par induction, et d'un certain nombre de choses
coexistantes il crde des unitds artificielles." - Jouffroy's Reid, vol. iv. p.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                  123
of consciousness, sensations by this or that organ, volitions,
thoughts, imaginations, of all we are immediately conscious
as affections of one and the same self. It is not by any
after-effort of reflection that I combine together sight and
hearing, thought and volition, into a factitious unity or
compounded whole: in each case I am immediately conscious of myself seeing and healing, willing and thinking.
This self-personality, like all other simple and immediate
presentations, is indefinable; but it is so because it is superior to definition. It can be analyzed into no simpler
elements, for it is itself the simplest of all; it can be made
no clearer by description or comparison, for it is revealed
to us in all the clearness of an original intuition, of which
description and comparison can furnish only faint and
partial resemblances.
The extravagant speculations in which Metaphysicians
attempted to explain the nature and properties of the
soul as it is not given in consciousness, furnish no valid
ground for renouncing all inquiry into its character as it is
given, as a power, conscious of itself.L  That there are
many metaphysical, or, rather, psychological difficulties,
still unsolved, connected with this view of the subject,
must be allowed;2 but, so long as we remain within the
legitimate field of consciousness, we are not justified in
abandoning them  as insoluble.  To this class belongs the
question of Personal Identity, or the reference of earlier
and later states of consciousness to the same subject; an
immediate consciousness being of present objects only.
350. But the French writer to whom this portion of philosophy is most
indebted is 3Maine de Biran.
1 See Cousin, Lefons sur Kant, p. 197; Damiron, Psychologie, 1. i. ch. iv.
2 See Herbart, Lehrbuch zur Einleitung in die Philosophie, ~ 124; Hauptpuncte der 3Ietaphysik, ~~ 11, 12.




124             PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
The following question may perhaps fiurnish a hint of the
data fiom which the solution of this problem  may be
attempted. Time and Space are given as forms or conditions of the several phenomena of internal or external
consciousness; but are the same conditions strictly applicable to the conscious subject itself? I may speak, accurately enough, of my earlier or later thoughts or feelings;
but, apart from  metaphor, can I, with any philosophical
accuracy, speak of an earlier or later self, even as a mere
logical distinction for the purpose of afterwards identifying
the two? To identify is to connect together in thought
objects given under different relations of space or time, as
when I pronounce the sovereign now lying on my table to
be numerically one with that which I received yesterday
at the bank. But is the conscious self ever given under
these different relations at all? Is it not rather that from
which our original notion of numerical identity was drawn,
and which cannot be subjected to later and analogical
applications of the same idea?
This one presented substance, myself, is the basis of the
other notions of substance which are thought representatively in relation to other phenomena. When I look at
another man, I do not perceive his consciousness. I see
only a compound body, of a certain form and color, moving
in this or that manner. I do not immediately know that
he perceives, feels, and thinks, as I do myself. He may
be an exquisitely formed puppet, requiring perhaps more
mechanical skill in the construction than has ever been
attained by man, but still a mere machine, a possible piece
of clockwork. When I attribute to him personality and
consciousness, I mediately and reflectively transfer to
another that of which I am directly cognizant only in
myself. In this case, the phenomena are given in a sen



PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.               125
sible intuition; the substance is added to them by a representative act of thought.
Beyond the range of conscious beings, we can have only
a negative idea of substance. The name is applied in
relation to certain collections of sensible phenomena, natural or artificial, connected with each other in various
ways: by locomotion, by vegetation, by contributing to a
common end, by certain positions in space. But here we
have no positive notion of substance distinct from phenomena.  I do not attribute to the billiard-ball a consciousness of its own figure, color, and motion; but, in
denying consciousness, I deny the only form in which
unity and substance have been presented to me. I have
therefore no data for thinking one way or the other on
the question. Some kind of unity between the several
phenomena may exist, or it may not; but if it does exist,
it exists in a manner of which I can form no conception;
and if it does not exist, my faculties do not enable me to
detect its absence.
Such an acknowledgment of the negative character of
certain supposed thoughts, i. e., of their not being really
thoughts at all, is very different from skepticism. It does
not teach a distrust of our faculties within their proper
limits, but only tells us that they have limits, and that
they cannot transgress them. In this there is no more of
paradox than in asserting that we cannot see a man or a
tower at a thousand miles' distance. The fault of jerkeley did not consist in doubting the existence of matter,
but in asserting its non-existence. If I cannot see a spot
a thousand miles off, I am, as far as sight is concerned1
equally incompetent to assert that there is or is not a
tower standing upon it. In like manner, it is characteristic of all mere negative notions, that we have no direct
11*




126                PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
evidence whether their supposed objects exist or not. To
maintain that matter is a fiction, invented for the support
of attributes, is to dogmatize in negation, and, after all, to
give a partial solution only of the question; for fictions as
well as facts have their psychological conditions, under
which alone their invention is possible.'  Had Berkeley's
theory been accompanied by an inquiry into the origin of
negative notions and their influence on thought and language, it could scarcely  have given rise either to the
extreme  skepticism  of his successor, or to the strange
misunderstandings of some of his adversaries.
The conclusion to be drawn from the above remarks is
sufficiently obvious. The general assertion, that all sensible qualities belong to a subject, cannot with any propriety
be called a principle of necessary truth; inasmuch as it is
a principle which may be either true or false, and we have
no means of determining which. Nor is it correct to call
it a fundamental law of human belief; if by that expression is meant anything more than an assertion of the
universal tendency of men to liken other things to themselves, and to speak of them under forms of expression
adapted to such likeness, far beyond the point where the
parallel fails. The true law or principle which connects
attributes with a substance extends no further than to the
phenomena of the personal consciousness, which are neces1 "It seems to be a judgment of nature," says Reid (I. P. ii. 19), " that
the things immediately perceived are qualities which must belong to a
subject; and all the information that our senses give us about this subject
is, that it is that to which such qualities belong." In point of fact, our
senses tell us nothing of the kind; and, were these our only intuitive faculties, we should never have supposed such a subject to exist. To refer
any belief to a principle of our nature, is insufficient, unless we can at
the same time psychologically account for the origin of the notions which
that belief implies.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.               127
sarily apprehended as attributes of myself; and this principle does not warrant us in asserting that the whiteness
and roundness and hardness of the billiard-ball are attributes of the ball, in the same manner as my thoughts and
feelings and sensations are attributes of me. Nevertheless,
there is a real, though an incomplete analogy between the
two cases; which may serve in some degree to account for
the association which has led to the apparent recognition,
in the universal language of mankind, of a relation which
has no warrant in our immediate consciousness. Though
bodily attributes are not perceived as related to a substance, they are in all cases perceived as related to each
other. The perception by sense of any phenomenon of
matter is necessarily accompanied by an intellectual apprehension of its relations to space, as occupying it, and contained in it. Color cannot be perceived without extension,
nor extension without solidity; and solidity is not a single
attribute, but includes in its comprehension the three
dimensions of length, breadth, and thickness. But we can
analyze in language what we cannot analyze in consciousness; and by the appropriation of distinct names to the
related attributes we are enabled to speak of them apart,
though we cannot perceive them  except in conjunction.
This is the real distinction indicated by the use of concrete
or abstract terms: the round, hard, white body denotes
the attribute as perceived in space; the roundness and
hardness and whiteness severally denote the same attributes as separated in language. This real distinction is
coupled with an association transferred fiom the personal
consciousness; and men speak of the roundness and hardness and whiteness of the ball, as they speak of my thoughts
and my feelings and my desires, without being aware that
the relation which in the latter case is a fact of conscious



128               PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
ness, is in the other an imaginary parallel, which cannot
be positively verified by consciousness, though for the
same reason it cannot be positively denied.
But, though there is thus no speculative reason for
accepting or rejecting Berkeley's theory as true or false, or
for attempting to adapt to it common forms of speech,
there may, in certain philosophical inquiries, be a practical
reason for accepting or rejecting it as convenient or inconvenient. If the method of metaphysical research can in
any degree be simplified by divesting it of the hypothesis
of a substratum of sensible attributes, this will be a sufficient reason for accepting the theory as pro tanto valid.
Such simplification will not, however, be effected by taking
the Berkeleian theory in its whole extent. The admission
of ideas as the immediate objects of perception, whether
in Berkeley's form, as entities distinct fiom the mind, or in
Fichte's, as modifications of the mind itself, and the necessary consequence that nothing exists except when it is
perceived, is too repugnant to the common sense of mankind to have any ultimate value in philosophy.  There is
still room, however, for an attempt to construct a similar
theory, viewed from the objective side, which, banishing
the hypothesis of a substratum, shall regard the sensible
attributes as the things themselves.  Whether such a theory would offel any ground for constructing Metaphysical
Science on a surer basis, or whether it would share the
fate of' preceding systems, remains to be seen.'
MIuch of the above reasoning is applicable to the Prin1 Something of this sort may perhaps he attempted in connection with
Sir William Hamilton's doctrine of Natural Realism. But that doctrine,
admirable as it is in many of the fragments that have been published, is
unfortunately least complete in its ontological relations. On the really
weak side of Berkeley's Philosophy; see Appendix, note B.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                 129
ciple of Causality likewise.  I hold a piece of wax to the
fire, and it begins to melt.l  Here my senses inf)nrm me
only of two successive phenomena: the proximity of the
fire, and the nielting of the wax. That the one is the
productive cause of the other, is an addition to the sensible data, which, so far as this particular instance is concerned, is not given, but inferrecd. HTere, again, it becomes
necessary to inquire whether we shall abandon the belief in
Causes altogether; whether we shall concede that Thought
alone is competent to create the notion; or whether we
can discover any intuition in which Causality, as distinct
firom mere Succession, is immediately presented.
Hume, and subsequently Brown, denied altogether the
existence of Cause in this sense of the term.  With these
philosophers, a cause is nothing more than something prior
to the change, and constantly conjoined with it.  "We
give the name of cause," says Brown, " to the object which
we believe to be the invariable antecedent of a particular
change; we give the name of effect reciprocally to that
invariable consequent; and the relation itself, when considered abstractly, we denominate power in the object that
is the invariable antecedent, - susceptibility in the object
that exhibits, in its change, the invariable consequent. We
say of fire, that it has the power of melting metals, and of
metals, that they are susceptible of fusion by fire, -that
fire is the cause of the fusion, and the fusion the effect of
the application of fire; but in all this variety of words
we mean nothing more than our belief, that when a solid
metal is subjected for a certain time to the application of
1 See Locke, Essay, b. ii. ch. 26, who erroneously regards the production
of change as perceptible by the senses. The other and very different
origin suggested by the same philosopher (Essay, b. ii. ch. 21) is the germ
of the theory of Maine de Biran.




130              PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
a strong heat, it will begin afterwards to exist in that different state which is termed liquidity, — that in all past
time, in the same circumstances, it would have exhibited
the same change, - and that it will continue to do so in
the same circumstances in all future time."'
Thus far Hume and Brown are at one. Into the subordinate question at issue between them, as to the origin of
our belief in the uniformity of nature, it is foreign to my
present purpose to enter. I have at present to do only
with that portion of the theory in which both philosophers
are agreed, - the resolution of cause into invariable antecedent; concerning which Reid remarks, that we may learn
from it that night is the cause of day, and day the cause
of night; for no two things have more constantly followed
each other since the beginning of the world.
In the theory of causation, as above stated, two very
distinct principles are fused into one; and the fusion is
indicated by the two words invariable antecedent. Admitting for the moment that causation means no more than
immediate antecedence in time, it is obviously one thing
to say that every event must have some antecedent or other,
and another to say that this particular event must always
have this particular antecedent. The latter assertion, which
implies the assumption of the uniformity of nature in her
operations, is, even granting its universal truth, obviously
a law of things, and not of thought, the contradictory of
which is at any time perfectly conceivable. There is no
absurdity in the supposition, whether it be true or not as
a fact, that the phenomenon C may at one time be preceded by A, and at another by B; the other circumstances
being in both cases exactly alike. Whether such a variation actually takes place under the existing constitution
1 Inquiry into the Relation of Cause and Effect, p. 12.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                131
of the world which we inhabit, is another question; but
there is certainly no difficulty in conceiving that in an
imaginary world it may take place. This portion of the
principle being thus excluded fiom the class of necessary
truths, the remaining portion will not be difficult to explain.
The assertion that every event must have some antecedent
or other, implies no more than that we cannot conceive it
as standing at the absolute beginning of all time, apart
from  any relation to a preceding series of phenomena.
This is an obvious result of the subjection of our consciousness to the law of time. For our consciousness of time is
not of time in the abstract, but of phenomena as taking
place in time; and the law which compels us to conceive
every event as occurring in time, obviously compels us
also to conceive it as related to some temporal antecedent.l
But, as thus limited, the principle, however necessary, is
obviously inadequate as a theory of causation.  We cannot help feeling that there is a deficiency even in the
original theory as stated by Hume; we feel that cause
implies something more than invariable antecedent, and
that Reid's instance of day and night, if it does not amount
to a philosophical refutation of the theory, is at least a
practical proof of its insufficiency. The feeling becomes
still stronger when the element of invariability itself is
shown to be an adventitious accretion, and the original
principle is reduced to the mere acknowledgment of a
temporal antecedent of some kind or other. Rightly or
wrongly, all men do in fact unite with the idea of temporal
antecedence that of productive power, and regard this
1 In thus acknowledgring, one element of the principle of Causality to
depend on the mental law of existence in time, I have partially adopted
the theory of Sir W. Hamilton. For some observations on the remainder
of that theory, see Appendix, note C.




132             PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
addition as essential to the conception of a Cause. A
belief so universal, even if it be delusive in a portion of
its extent, can only be explained, even as a delusion, by
the supposition that it has an origin in truth; that there
is such a notion as power given in the actual facts of
consciousness, however it may be extended in imagination
beyond the data which suggested it.
Tile philosophers of the school of Reid could not fairly
meet Hume's theory of causation, for the same reason that
they could not fairly meet his theory of substance; because
they denied the existence of an immediate consciousness
of mind, as distinguished fiom its several states. It was
easy for HIume to show that volition is but one phenomenon, and motion is but another; and that the former is so
far fiom being the necessary cause of the other, that a
stroke of paralysis may put an end even to the uniformity
of the sequence. It was also easy for him to show that,
as the motion of the arm is not the immediate consequent
of the volition, but is separated fiom it by an intervening
nervous and muscular action, of which we are unconscious,
the one cannot be directly given as produced by the other.
The intuition of Power is not immediately given in the
action of matter upon matter; nor yet can it be given in
the action of matter upon mind, nor in that of mind upon
matter; for to this day we are utterly ignorant how matter and mind operate upon each other. We know not how
the material refractions of the eye are connected with the
mental sensation of seeing, nor how the determination of
the will operates in bringing about the motion of the
muscles. We can investigate severally the phenomena of
matter and of mind, as we can examine severally the constitution of the earth and the architecture of the hleavens:
we seek the boundary-line of their junction, as the child




PnOLEGOMENA  LOGICA.                      133
chases the horizon, only to discover that it flies as we
pursue it.
There is thus no alternative, but either to abandon the
inquiry after.an immediate intuition of power, or to seek
for it in mind as determining its own moclifications;' a
course open to those who admit an immediate consciousness of self, and to them  only.   lly first and only presentation of power or causality is thus to be found in my
consciousness of myself as willing.  In every act of volition  I am  fully conscious that it is in my power to form
the resolution or to abstain; and this constitutes the presentative consciousness of free will and of power. Like
any other simple idea, it cannot be defined; and hence
the  difficulty  of verbally  distinguishing  causation  from
mere succession.  But every man who has been conscious
of an act of will, has been conscious of power therein; and
1 This is clearly and accurately stated by Mi. Cousin: "Cherche-t-on la
notion de cause dans i'action de la bille sur la bille, comme on le faisait
avant Hume, ou de la main sur la bille, et des premiers muscles locomoteurs sur leurs extrdmitds, ou memo dans l'action de la volonte sur le muscle, comme l'a fait AM. (dc Biran, on ne la trouvera dans aucun de ces cas,
pas mbme dans le dernier, car il est possible qu'il y ait une paralysie des
muscles qui rende la volont6 impuissante sur eux, irnproductive, incapable
d'ktre cause et par consequent d'en suggdrcr la notion. Mais ce qu'aucune paralysie ne pent empacher, c'est l'action de la volonte sur ellememe, la production d'une resolution, c'est-k-dire une causation toute
spirituelle, type primitif do la causalit6, dont toutes les actions extdrieurcs,
a commencer par l'cffort musculaire, et k finir par lo mouvement do la
bille sur la bille, ne sont quo des symboles plus ou moins infidielcs."
- Fragments Philosophiqges, Prdface de la premiere ddition.  James'Mill
(Analysis of the Iiunian Mind, vol. ii. p. 256) speaks of the idea of power
in the relation of cause and effect as "an item altogether imaginary."
Such a thorough-going imagination is a psychological impossibility: the
item must be given in one relation before it can be inmagined in amother.
No effort of imagination can create its object out of nothing.
12




134              PROLEGOMEN-A LOGICA.
to one who has not been so conscious, no verbal description can supply the deficiency.
Here again, as in the case of substance, as soon as we
advance beyond the region of consciousness we find ourselves in the midst of negative notions, which we can
neither conceive, nor affirm, nor deny. Our clearest notion
of efficiency is that of a relation between two objects,
similar to that which exists between ourselves and our
volitions.' But what relation can exist between the heat
of fire and the melting of wax, similar to that between a
conscious mind and its self-determinations?  Or, if there
is nothing precisely similar, can there be anything in any
degree analogous?  We cannot say that there is, or, if
there is, how far the analogy extends, and how and where
it fails. We can form no positive conception of a power
of this kind: we can only say that it is something different froml the only power of which we are intuitively
conscious. But, on the other hand, we are not warranted
in denying the existence of anything of the kind; for
denial is as much an act of positivethought as affirmation,
and a negative idea firnishes no data for one or the other.
The principle of Causality is thus precisely analogous to
that of Substance, in its origin and legitimate application,
as well as in its perversion. The idea of power cannot
legitimately be extended beyond the phenomena of personal consciousness in which it is directly manifested.
But the phenomena of matter are thus far similar to those
of mind, that both alike are subject to the law of time;
the phenomena of nature being in all cases preceded by
other phenomena, as the phenomena of volition are preceded by a productive energy of the person willing. The
relation which is given in the latter alone is transferred by
1 See Reid, Active Powers, Essay i. ch. v.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                    135
association to the former; and men speak of the power of
fire to melt wax, as tlhey speak of their own power of selfdetermination, withoult being  aware that, in dep:arting
fiorn the field of' consciousness, they have departed finom
the only province in which the term power has anly positive significance.l   What is meant by power in a fire to
melt wax?  How  and when is it exerted, and in what
manner does it come under our cognizance?   Supposingl
sulch power to be suspended by an act of omnipotence,
the Stupreme Being at the same time producing the succession of phenomena by the immediate interposition of
his own will, -  could we in any way detect the change?
Or suppose the  course of nature to be governed  by a
p;reestablished harmony, which ordained that at a certain
moment fire and wax should be in the neighborhood of
each other; that, at the same moment, fire by itself should
burn, and wax by its own laws should melt, neither affectin g the other, -  would not all the perceptible phenomena
be precisely the same as at present?   These suppositions
may be extravagant, though they are supported by some
of the most eminent names in philosophy; but the mere
possibility of making them  shows that the rival hypothesis
is not a necessary truth; the various principles  being
opposed, only like the vortices of Descartes and the gravi1 Thus M. Engel observes: " Dans cc que nous appelons force d'attraction, d'affinite', ou mame d'impulsion, la seule chose connue (c'est h-dire
reprdsentde a l'imagination et aux sens), c'est l'effet opre', savoir, lc rapprochement des deux corps attires et attirant. Aucune langue n'a de mot
pour exprimer cc je ne sais quoi (effort, tendance, nistus), qui reste absolument
caclhd, mais que tous les esprits concoivent ndcessairement comme ajoutd a
la reprdsentation phdnominale."  (See Dc Biran, Nolcelles Colsiderations,
p. 23.) The ce je ne sais quoi expresses exactly the negative character of
the notion in question.




136               PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
tation of Newton, as more or less plausible methods of
accounting for the same physical phenomena.
Before we can positively assert, as a principle of necessary truth, that all physical phenomena must have a cause,
we must ascertain clearly what meaning we attach to the
word cause. If we eliminate the notion of power, which
has no positive significance in this relation, and confine
ourselves to that of chronological succession, we may
assign three different meanings to the term  cause, and
three different degrees of certainty to the corresponding
principle. If we mean no more than that every event
must have some chronological antecedent, the principle is
a necessary truth, dependent upon an original law of the
human consciousness, by which we are compelled to contemplate all phenomena as taking place in time. If we
advance a step beyond this, and add to the notion of
succession that of invariability, or repetition of similar
phenomena under similar circumstances, the  principle
may be stated in two different ways. We may interpret Cause to mean simply invariable antecedent, in which
case the principle may be expressed as follows: Every
phenomenon which takes place in nature is preceded by
some other phenomenon, or aggregate of phenomena,'
with which it is invariably conjoined. Or, secondly, regarding the invariability as one of consequence and not
of, antecedence, we may enunciate the principle in a some1 This last limitation is necessary: the cause, to speak accurately, is the
sum total of the conditions, whose united presence is followed invariably
by the effect. It is not any single phenomenon, unless we can, by successive experiments, eliminate all the concomitants save one, and thus show
that, as far as the given effect is concerned, they are indifferent. This,
however, in practice, is seldom the case. On this subject some valuable
remarks will be found in Mill's Logic, book iii. ch. 5.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.               137
what more complex form: Every phenomenon which
takes place has, among its immediate antecedents, some
one phenomenon or aggregate of phenomena, which being
repeated, the same consequent phenomenon will invariably
recur.
As stated in the first of the above forms, the Principle
of Causality is no more than an induction fiom experience,
and can never at highest amount to more than the assertion of a general fact in nature. We are not warranted in
stating, prior to observation, that the two phenomena A
and B are so invariably connected together that nature
never presents, and man can never produce, a single
instance of the latter without the precedence of the former. Such a conclusion may be established, as a matter of
fact, by a long course of observation: it may be regarded
as extremely probable beforehand, fiom what observation
teaches us of the uniformity of nature in other instances:
but in these cases it is not a principle of necessary truth;
it is an inductive law or general fact in the constitution of
nature as now established by the will of God. It is thus,
and it might be otherwise.
In point of flcet, the principle, as thus explained, is so far
firo   being necessary, that it has not yet been ascertained
to be true. As far as observation has hitherto gone, the
same phenomenon occurs at different tinmes with totally
different antecedents.  Thus, as MIr. 3Mill has observed,
one set of observations or experiments shows that the sun
is a cause of heat; another, that fiiction is a cause of it;
others, that percussion, electricity, and chemical action, are
also causes. It is very possible, indeed highly probable,
that fuirther observation may hereafter discover some one
uniform  feature running through these several sources;
but this is only a probability supported by the analogy of
12*




138            PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
nature in other instances; it is not a necessary law of our
own minds compelling us, prior to experience, to pronounce
that a plurality of physical causes is impossible.
The second form of the principle is less open to exception. For, though it may be a matter of question whether
the same phenomenon may not proceed from a variety of
physical causes, it appears to be beyond all doubt that any
one of those causes, whenever it takes place, will be adequate to the production of the effect. Thus expressed,
the law in question is identical with that belief in the
universal connection of similar events, which Hume reduces to the result of association, which his antagonists of
the Scottish school refer to an original principle of our
nature; while Mr. Mill holds it to be itself an instance of
induction, and induction by no means of the most obvious
kind.
None of these solutions is entirely satisfactory. That
of Hume has been sufficiently refilted even by the disciple
of his general theory, Brown; and the refutation holds
good, whether we suppose, with Brown, that the theory in
question is a dogmatic position maintained by Hume himself, or whether, with Sir W. Hamilton, we regard it
merely as the reductio ad absurdurn of the dogmatism
then in vogue. That of an original principle of our nature,
though true as far as it goes, is too vague, and confounds
under one general term things which it should be the
principal object of any mental classification to distinguish.
There are some original principles of our nature of immutable obligation; and there are others which are perpetually
leading us astray. There are some which lead us to truths
which we cannot reverse even in thought; and there are
others which point out only contingent and variable phenomena. Sight and hearing, appetite and desire, the law




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.              139
of conscience, and the intuitions of space and time, are all
equally original principles of our nature; that is, we can
ultimately give no account of them, but that it has pleased
our Maker so to constitute us. IMr. Mill's explanation overlooks the fact, that when the principle in question is found
in apparent conflict with experience, it is invariably assumed to be in the right, and experience in the wrong;
which is not the case with merely inductive laws: to say
nothing of the paralogism of making the ground and principle of all induction itself dependent upon induction, and
upon induction only. Our earliest and unphilosophical
inductions appear as often to indicate variety in the operations of nature as uniformity. The sun rises and sets, the
tide ebbs and flows, with regularity; but storm and calm,
rain and sunshine, appear to observe no fixed order of
succession.  But, in any instance whatever of physical
causation, let an apparent repetition of the cause not be
followed by that of the effect, and all men alike, philosophical or unphilosophical, will at once assert that there
was some latent variety in the circumstances, and not a
change in the uniformity of their succession.
The Principle of Causality, as thus exhibited, seems to
combine in one formula two separate elements, the one
necessary, the other empirical. That matter in every relation is subject to some law, by virtue of which a given
antecedent admits at any one time of only one possible
consequent, seems to be a necessary and unavoidable conviction. That this law will be manifested by the production
of similar phenomena on similar occasions, is the result of
a combination of this necessary conviction with the experience of the actual evidence of law in our own world, in
those cases which are most open to observation. I can
suppose it possible that in another world the law may be




140             PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
manifested in another way, according to which the phenomena of matter may have no settled relations to each
other, but phenomena at one time and in one place connected, as cause and effect, may at another time or in
another place have no connection at all. But even in this
case, I can only conceive the nlaterial agents as passively
obeying the law of their organization, not as enabled, by
their own caprice, to obey or disobey on different occasions.
WhVllether the perceptible results be more or less regular, I
am still compelled to believe that, in any single instance,
the antecedent circumstances being given, the consequent
cannot but be determined by them in one way and in one
way only; whether a similar antecedent will on a future
occasion be followed by a similar consequent or not.
At the same time I am not entitled to pronounce, a
priori, that matter cannot possibly disobey its own law;
though assuredly I am unable to conceive how it can do
so. And we have thus a remarkable parallel between the
general law of causation, as applicable to physical phenomena, and the psychological facts of our own1 constitution,
the reverse of which, as was observed at the beginning of
the present chapter, may be supposecd, but cannot be conceivedl. And this parallel, I am inclined to think, furnishes
a key to the true character of the law. If we were told
of an instance on our own globe in which the repetition
of exactly similar phenomena had apparently not been
followed by the same effect, we should without hesitation
account for it on one of two grounds: either the phenomena were not really exactly similar, or the interposition
of some intelligent being had prevented the natural result.
And if we were asked why these two alternatives alone
are admissible, we should probably reply, "Because matter
cannot change of itself." And probably, if we were




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.              141
informed that in some other world, where the laws of
matter are manifested otherwise than by regular succession, the natural relation had in any given instance not
taken place, we should ascribe it in like manner to some
external intervention, not to any power of obedience or
disobedience residing in the matter itself. Whatever relation of cause and effect is conceived as existing between
two material phenomena, whether limited to a single
occasion or repeated in orderly recurrence, we find it
impossible to attribute to the phenomena at that particular
time anything like self-action, or a choice of alternatives
to determine or be determined in this way or that. Now,
why cannot we think of matter as acting by itself?  Because power and self-determination have never been given
to us, save in one form, that of the actions of the conscious
self. What I am to conceive as taking place, I must conceive as taking place in the only manner of taking place
in which it has ever been presented to me. This reduces
the law of Causality, in one sense indeed, to an empirical
principle, but to an empirical principle of a very peculiar
character; one, namely, in which it is psychologically
impossible that experience should testify in more than one
way. Such principles, however empirical in their origin,
are coixtensive in their application with the whole domain
of thought. They cannot, properly speaking, be called
inductive truths; for they require no accumulation of
physical experience. The course of Nature is thought as
uniform, because, so long as Nature alone is spoken of, that
element is absent which alone we can think of as oritginating a change - Intelligence. And for the same reason, so
long as the several phenomena of Nature are believed to
be each under the control of a separate intelligence, the
axiom of her uniformity will admit of perpetual modifica



142             PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
tion. The winds may blow north or south, as suits the
caprices of 2Eolus; Xanthus may neglect the laws of his
periodical rise and fall, to arrest the progress of Achilles;
and even the steady-going coachman, Phoebus, may alter
upon occasion the pace of his chariot, to gratify the wishes
of his roving parent.
To call the Principle of Causality, as thus explained, a
Law of Thought, would be incorrect. We cannot think
the contrary, not because the laws of thought forbid us,
but because the material for thought is wanting. Thought
is subject to two different modes of restriction: firstly,
fiom its own laws, by which it is restricted as to its form;
and, secondly, from the laws of intuition, by which it is
restricted as to its matter. The restriction, in the present
instance, is of the latter kind. We cannot conceive a
course of nature without causation, as we cannot conceive
a being who sees without eyes or llears without ears; because we cannot, under existing circumstances, experience
the necessary intuition. But such things may, notwithstanding, exist; and, under other circumstances, they might
become objects of possible conception, the laws of the
process of conception remaining unaltered. This will be
more clearly seen hereafter, when we come to treat of
Logical Necessity and the Laws of Thought.
The Principle of Causality may thus, as far as its necessity is concerned, be referred to an intermediate place
between the axioms of mathematics and the generalizations of physical science, being contingent in some degree
as compared with the former, and necessary in some degree
as compared with the latter. It is contingent, inasmuch
as it relates to circumstances to which our experience is
subjected in the present state of things, and those circumstances might possibly have been different. It is necessary,




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                143
inasmuch as, while those circumstances remain as they are,
the conviction produced by them is unavoidable, in thought
no less than in fact. The necessity has thus a negative,
not a positive origin; and this origin suggests a practical
caution as regards the employment of the principle. Our
immediate intuition of power, as has been before observed,
is to be found in the consciousness of mind as modifying
itself, the ego determining its own volitions. That lindcl
operates upon, matter, we are not immediately conscious.
It is not given in any intuition that the determination of
the will acts utpon the muscles of the arm; though the
motion of the latter follows the generation of the former.
Hence, though we are compelled to ascribe all change to
the only power of which we are conscious, we are unable
to ascribe it in the only manner of operation of which we
are conscious. For purposes of scientific investigation, the
principle is thus purely negative, though it serves to regrulate our belief. We know not to this day, and we never
can know in this life, how mind operates upon matter;
though we must believe that, in some way or other, it does
so operate. It is impossible, therefore, to construct dcductively any system  of Natural Philosophy firom  the
Principle of Causality, or from any other axiom expressingC
the agency of mind upon matter. The value of such principles is purely psychological.
From the view above given of the Principle of Causality,
some important consequences might be drawn relatively to
otlier sciences; which, however, my present limits (lo iot
permit me to attempt. One such remark, however, will, I
trust, be tolerated, both fiom the intrinsic ilporltance of
the question to which it relates, and fiom its connection
with the doctrines of an eminent author,1 to whom I have
1 For the argument of MIr. Mill, here alluded to, see Appendix, note D.




144              PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
been considerably indebted in the preceding pages. If
the view above taken be sound, we are enabled to detect
a fundamental fallacy in the argument in favor of necessity
fi'orm the determination of the will by motives. If every
thing in nature, it is argued, must have a cause or sufficient
reason, the determinations of' the will cannot be exempted
firom this general law. If I am determined by motives in
the formation of every act of volition, then there is sometlhing previous to such act which made it to be necessarily
produced. If I am not so determined, there is an effect in
nature without a cause. In this argument, there is a latent
ambiguity of language. As applied to Physics, the cause
of a phenomenon is a certain antecedent fict, which being
repeated, the phenomenon will recur. This notion of cause
is gathered friom material phenomena, and can only by an
imperfect analogy be applied to mental. In this sense,
motives addressed to the will are not causes; for, in every
act of volition, I am fully conscious that I can at this moment act in either of two ways, and that, all the antecedent
phenomena being precisely the same, I may determine one
way to-day, and another way to-morrow. To speak of the
determinations of the will as caused by phenomena, in the
same sense in which the fusion of metal is caused by fire, is
to give the lie to consciousness for the sake of theory. On
the other hand, if cause be interpreted to mean an agent
with power, my only positive notion of cause in this sense
is derived fiom the consciousness of myself as determining,
not as determined. Of the power of motives upon my will,
consciousness tells me nothing; but only that the one is
presented and the other follows; not, however, as in Physics, uniformly. Mfy notion of causes with power, other
than myself, is derived from the primary intuition of myself as a cause, and cannot be made to reiict upon that




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                    145
intuition, without the fallacy of deducing the known from
the unknown. Of myself, as necessitated by motives, my
immediate consciousness tells me nothing. It is a mere
inference from a supposed general law of causality, which
law is itself derived from the consciousness of the very
reverse. You are conscious, says the necessitarian, of
yourself as a determining cause; therefore you must be a
determined effect.  By what logic does this follow?  If
these considerations suggest a limit to the universality of
the principle of sufficient reason, so be it.  No principle
can consistently be allowed so much universality as to
overthrow the intuition fiom which it had its rise.'
Another observation will not be deemed unimportant
by those who are aware how many philosophical theories
have been constructed on the sole basis of philosophical
phraseology.2  Locke has laid some stress on the fact, that
the names which stand for insensible actions and notions
are derived from those of sensible objects. "To imagine,
apprehend, comprehend, adhere, conceive, instil, disgust,
disturbance, tranquillity, etc., are all words taken from the
operations of sensible things, and applied to certain modes
of thinking.  By which we may give some kind of guess
what kind of notions they were, and whence derived, which
filled their minds who were the first beginners of lan1 The above cursory remarks are of course not designed as a full examination of the problem of necessity, but only as a hint for examining one
of the arguments advanced in its support. More would be out of place
here. A few additional observations will be found in the Appendix, note E.
2 It will scarcely be credited that a philosopher of Heel's eminence
should have connected a logical theory of judgment with the fact that
the German word Urtheil etymologically means oriyinal part. Such a
method of philosophizing could hardly have been surpassed by Conradus
Crambe, or his facetious relative Mr. Swan, Gamester and Punster of the
City of London.
13




146              PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
guages; and how nature, even in the naming of things,
unawares suggested to men the originals and principles
of all their knowledge."' The fallacy of the theory attached to this fact by Locke himself, and by Horne Tooke,
has been fully exposed by Dugald Stewart; but it should
also have been observed that, in point of fact, the obligation is not entirely on one side. While, as regards attributes and phenomena, the language of mental science has
mostly been borrowed from that of sensation; in all that
relates to the notions of cause or force, as has been well
remarked by Maine de Biran, the language properly belonging to the mental fact has been transferred by analogy
to the physical. As the basis of a theory, the fact is of no
great value; but its weight, such as it is, should at least
be acknowledged to bear on both sides of the question.
Before closing the present remarks it is necessary to
say a few words in reference to an objection which will
probably have frequently suggested itself to those conversant with the literature of the subject. The origin here
assigned to the principle of causality (and the same may
in some degree be said of that of substance also) may
perhaps appear to be of too empirical a character to consist with the amount of universality assigned to the principle itself; besides being in some respects at variance
with the opinions of those philosophers to whom the preceding pages are mostly indebted.2 Sir William Hamilton
has remarked, that, if the conception of active power is
derived, as Reid asserts, from our voluntary exertions, our
notion of causality would be of an empirical derivation,
1 Essay, b. iii. ch. i. ~ 5.
2 A point at issue between two eminent French philosophers, to whose
writings I am under considerable obligations, will be considered in the
Appendix, note F.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.               147
and without the quality of universality and necessity.'
Reid himself, in another passage, admits the same thing.
"The proposition to be proved," he says, "is not a contingent, but a necessary proposition. It is not that things
which begin to exist commonly have a cause, or even that
they always in fact have a cause; but that they must have
a cause, and cannot begin to exist without a cause. Propositions of this kind, from their nature, are incapable of
proof by induction. Experience informs us only of what
is or has been, not of what must be; and the conclusion
must be of the same nature with the premises."2
That experience is the chronological antecedent of all
our knowledge, even of the most necessary truths, is now
generally admitted. But a distinction is frequently drawn,
and has been more than once adverted to in the preceding
pages, between truths or notions of which experience is
the source, and those of which it is only the occasion. The
mind, instead of being compared to a tabula rasa, on which
experience impresses the whole writing, is likened to a
seed, which must indeed be planted before it will grow;
but contact with the soil is only the occasion which calls
forth the hidden germ of the plant. Both analogies are
imperfect; and both, as regards the present question, tend
rather to darken than to illustrate. The point may be
better explained by laying aside, as far as is possible, physical imagery altogether, and by examining separately the
relation to experience of notions or concepts, and of judgments; instead of confounding both under the vague
explression, origin of ideas.
Every general concept is in one sense empirical; for
every concept must be formed from an intuition, and every
1 Reid's TWorks, p. 604.
2 I tell. Powers, Essay vi. ch. 6 (p. 455 of Sir W. Hamilton's edition).




148             PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
intuition is experienced. But there are some intuitions
which, fiom our constitution and position in the world, we
cannot help experiencing; and there are others which,
according to circumstances, we may experience or not.
The former will give rise to concepts which, without any
great impropriety of language, may be called native, olr a
priori; being such as, though not coeval with the mind
itself, will certainly be formed in every man as he grows
up, and such as it was preordained that every man should
have. The latter will give rise to concepts which, for a
like reason, may be called adventitious, or a posteriori;
being such as may or may not be formed, according to the
special experience of this or that individual. To the former class belongr the notions of time and space, as implied
in all our intuitions, internal or external: to this class
belong also the notions of seeing, hearing, and such other
mental operations as, in some manner or other, are performed by every man not physically deficient in the requisite organs. Of the same kind are the notions of right and
wrong, which must necessarily arise in the mind of every
man who has ever performed an action of which his conscience approves or disapproves, - and all men must at
times do both. The numerous controversies concerning
the existence of a moral sense may be considerably simplified by this consideration.' On the other hand, to the
class of adventitious notions belong those of this or that
color, sound, etc.; in short, of all simple or complex objects
of perception which it is possible may have been presented
to the experience of one man and not to that of another.
But a necessity of which I am conscious, can, like truth
and falsehood, exist only in judgments. It may be or0
dained by the laws of my constitution that I must neces1 See Appenzdix, note G.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.               149
sarily form  certain notions; but those notions are not
therefore thought by me as necessary. The simplest form
in which necessity can be presented to my consciousness is
that of a judgment, A must be B. This character belongs
to all such judgments as by the laws of his constitution a
man must form, supposing him to be possessed of the constituent conzcepts.
There are certain concepts which, whether native or
adventitious in their own origin, must, when once gainedl,
necessarily be thought in conjunction; there are others
which we are at liberty to connect or not, according to
circumstances. This necessity or contingency of judgments is generally confounded with necessity or contingency in the corresponding concepts; but the fact is, that
they are not even coixtensive in their provinces. There
may be thousands of men who never heard of a circle or
its radius: there is not one who, those notions being once
acquired, can fail to see that all the radii of a circle must
be equal to each other.
Necessity in judgments is dependent sometimes on the
laws of thought, sometimes on the laws of other parts of
our constitution; and the term may, in another sense, be
applied to that character in certain judgments which arises
fiom the limitation of our faculties, and from the circumstances in which all men alike are placed. Thus, by the
laws of thought, every part of any given concept, be its
origin what it may, must be thought as identical with
itself; and hence arises the logical necessity of all analytical judgments. By the laws of our intuitive faculties, all
objects of external perception have a certain relation to
Space, and all objects of internal perception to Time; and
hence arises the mathematical necessity of geometrical and
arithmetical judgments. Again, the limitations imposed
13*




150                 PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA.
on our intuitive faculties restrict us, in the case of certain
intuitions, to one relation only between them; and hence
arises the psychological necessity of certain judgments, of
which we can suppose, but cannot conceive, the contrary.
The restriction in this case is not properly a law regulating
acts which we can perform, but a bar separating us fromn
acts which we cannot perform.  None of these classes of
judgments can properly be termed empirical; being dependent, not on experience alone, but on  experience in
conjunction with certain laws and limitations of our mental
constitution.  They are thus, to adopt Shaftesbury's correction of Locke, if not innate, at least connatural; the
constitution of man being such that, being adult or grown
up, at such or such a time, sooner or later (no matter
when), they will infallibly, inevitably, necessarily spring
up in him.  These laws and limitations of our constitution
render necessary the adoption of Leibnitz's addition to the
sensationalist axiom,l "Nihil est in intellectu, quod non
fuerit in sensu, nisi ipse intellectus." And even with this
addition, sense must be understood with extreme latitude,
for every possible kind of external or internal presentation.
There is another class of judgments in regard to which
our experience is restricted by the circumstances in which
1 Nouveaux Essais, 1. ii. ch. 1. This axiom has been attributed to Aristotle, who, in De Anima, iii. 4, compares the intellect before its actual exercise to a tablet with nothing actually written upon it (7pay.CuaTreov 0   tuAl3yr
v7rdpXELt'VTEAEEXeL' ye'ypapurvov). But Aristotle does not regard the blank
as filled up by the senses, but by the activity of the intellect itself. A
nearer approach to the sensational tabula rasa may be found in the doctrine attributed to the Stoics by (Pseudo) Plutarch, De Plac. Phil. iv. 11:
Os ZTrwKOt faaOv LV av J ervvcWyvi  6 &vapwros, ExEL TO 7?yEfI.cV'KbLI HOOS TjS
4vXrs, Ta'rep XadpT7S YEp-yWv els a'roypapv' ElS TOrTO Fdlay ErdtOaTrjv TrV
evvoWZv EvairoypdgerTac 7rp'Tos' 6i Ts cava'ypaQS Tpdwrs   6 &&a TCv a;loaM'afewv. Compare Zeller, Philosophie der Griechen, iii. p. 31.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                 151
we are universally placed. This is the case with the results
of existing physical laws of the universe, which we can
perfectly conceive  reversed, though within our actual
experience they never are so. I am fuilly convinced, for
example, that, under the existing state of things, a stone
thrown into the water will sink to the bottom; but it is
perfectly conceivable that it might float. Lastly, there is
a class of judgments which are, in the strictest sense, contingent; such as relate to the conduct of a voluntary agent,
who is subject to no necessary restraint, whatever may be
his moral obligations.
The above remarks are not designed as an exact statement of the theory of any previous philosopher,1 nor as an
explanation of language which has been hitherto employed
in describing a supposed origin of our ideas. They are
offered only as expressing what I believe to be a more
exact and accurate account than is conveyed by the physical analogies already mentioned, by the vague phraseology
of source and occasion, or by the obscure notions of potential and actual consciousness.  They likewise help to distinguish, what it is important to keep separate from  each
other, necessity in the acquisition of concepts, and necessity in their combination in judgments. It is hardly correct, for example, to call mathematical notions native, or
apriori; since it is by no means necessary or universal
among mankind to form the concept of a circle or a triangle, still less of an ellipse or a parabola. But the judgments affirming the properties of these figures are necessary
in the highest possible degree. On the other hand, the
1 They approach closely to the view given by Maine de Biran in his
6th and 7th Answer to the objections of Stapfer; but that philosopher
has hardly marked with sufficient distinctness the positive and negative
elements.




152              PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
conception of a cause is necessary in its origin; all men
being, in sonme degree, conscious of the exertion of power
in their voluntary acts. But the necessity of the principle
of causality, as a proposition, is of an inferior degree to
that of mathematical judgments.
The general results may be summed up as follows:
1. Judgments necessary in the first degree, or logical
and mnathematical necessity. These are dependent on the
laws of our mental operations; and their contradictions
are neither conceivable nor supposable.
2. Judgments necessary in the second degree, or psychological necessity. These are dependent on the restrictions of our mental constitution; and their contradictories
are supposable, but not conceivable. To this class belongc
the principles of causality and of substance.
3. Judgments necessary in the third degree, or physical
necessity. These are dependent on the laws of the material world; and their contradictories are both supposable
and conceivable, but never actually true.
4. Judgrnents purely contingent, where either contradictory may be the true or the false alternative.  Such are
all judgmnents reducible to no law of causation.
To this class belong at the present moment many judgments on physical phenomena; but here the contingency
solely arises from our ignorance of the law, and may hereafter be removed. Thus I am  certain that the sun will
rise to-morrow; but I am uncertain whether the wind will
blow from the north or south. But this only means that
we are acquainted with the laws of the one phenomenon,
and ignorant of those of the other. The progress of
science may raise all these judgments to cases of physical
necessity. But my whole consciousness assures me that my
own voluntary acts are subject to no invariable law, and




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.              153
that to dream of any amount of future science enabling
a man to predict these, as he can now predict an eclipse,
and may hereafter predict a change of weather, is perfectly
chimerical.  These last judgments are, therefore, in the
strictest sense of the term, contingent; while those of the
second and third class, as before observed, may be called
contingent or necessary, according to the different points
of view in which they are regarded.
It only remains to point out the relation of the present
chapter to Logical Science. Accidentally, it may be applied to the correction of a few perversions of the Scholastic Logic, such as the theory of demonstrative syllogisms;
but its essential connection with the Science will be found
in the different forms of conceptions and judgmlents.
Though the notions of substance and of cause are obscure
and negative only, the processes of conception and judgment, in their primitive form, proceed upon the tacit
acknowledgment of the existence of something of the
kind. In the act of conception, for example, different
attributes are regarded as forming one whole by relation
to a common substance. Mly conception of gold, for example, is that of a yellow, hard, heavy body; but the color
is perceived by the eye, the hardness is discerned by
touch, the weight is made known by its pressure as it lies
in my hand. WIhen I conceive these various attributes as
forming one thing, the gold is neither the color, nor the
hardness, nor the weight, but the something to which all
these qualities belong. Again, having conceived gold as
yellow, and hard, and heavy, I afterwards discover it to be
soluble. IHere, in forming the judgment, gold is soluble, I
regard the attributes forming the subject and the predicate
as coixisting in a common substance; and this identity of
substance is expressed by the copula. Our ordinary mod



154             PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
ifications of thought and speech thus contain certain negative elements, the notions attached to which no amount
of reflection or analysis can render perfectly clear and
distinct; though they have been instinctively adopted by
all mankind, and underlie forms of speech and thought
which are found among all nations. No language can in
these respects be constructed upon principles of philosophical analysis; for analysis cannot take place till language
has arrived at a certain stage of maturity; and, till that
period, it must be suffered to grow up with all the imperfections consequent on a hasty generalization from the
data of personal intuition. The logical character of these
negative notions will be more fully explained when we
come to examine the distinction between the matter and
the form of thought.
A preliminary examination of the principles of substance
and causality is also necessary, before we canll inquire into
the character of the logical laws of thought. If it were
strictly accurate to regard the principle of causality, with
MI1. Cousin,' as a Principle of the Reason; —if it were
true that one term of the judgment, that of change, being
given, the mind is competent by its own act to add the
other, and assert " change supposes a cause;" and that this
term thus added contains a positive element of thought,
and not a mere negation of the existence of data for thinking; -if this were the case, the whole Science of Logic
would have to be remodelled accordingly. The Reason,
as distinguished in Kant's sense from the Understanding,
would become a source of speculative truth; its principles
would assume the character of Laws of Thought; and
Logic would become, according to M1. Cousin's conception,
the passage from Psychology to Ontology: the process of
1 Cours de Philosophie, Lemon 19.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.            155
pure Thinking would conduct us to the science of pure
Being. A Logic of the Reason would thus become a
necessary complement of the Logic of the Understanding;
and a considerable portion, if not the whole, of the Hegelian
Dialectic must be incorporated with the Formal Science of
Kant. To show that such a treatment, instead of being a
completion, would be a corruption of the Science, -instead
of making Logic fruitful of truths, would make it prolific
of chimeras, - instead of attaining knowledge, would aim
at impossibilities, - has been one of the main objects of
the preceding inquiry.




CHAPTER VI.
ON LOGICAL NECESSITY AND THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.
THE result of the two preceding chapters has been to
mark off two classes of Necessary Truths, which, though
dependent, as all such truths must be, upon mental laws
and limitations, do not, properly speaking, exhibit the
operation of Laws of Thought, nor come within the province of Logic. We have now to examine the psychological
character of the laws of pure thinking, and the kind of
necessity exhibited in consequence by strictly logical processes. The following passage from 3Mr. Mill's Logic may
serve to introduce the subject:
" This maxim (the dictum de omni et nullo), when considered as a principle of reasoning, appears united to a
system of metaphysics once indeed generally received, but
which for the last two centuries has been considered as
finally abandoned, though there have not been wanting, in
our own day, attempts at its revival. So long as what
were termed Universals were regarded as a peculiar kind
of substances, having an objective existence distinct fiom
the in(lividual objects classed under them, the dictu.m
de omnli, conveyed an important meaning; because it
expressed the intercommunity of nature, which it was
necessa:ry upon that theory that we should suppose to exist
between those general substances and the particular subst:inces which were subordinated to them. That everything
predicable of the universal was Iredicable of the various




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.               157
individuals contained under it, was then no identical
proposition, but a statement of what was conceived as a
fundamental law of the universe. The assertion that the
entire nature and properties of the substantia secunclda
formed part of the properties of each of the individual
substances called by the same name, —that the properties of MIan, for example, were properties of all men, —
was a proposition of real significance when man did not
mean all men, but something inherent in men, and vastly
superior to them in dignity. Now, however, when it
is known that a class, a universal, a genus or species, is
not an entityper se, but neither more nor less than the
individual substances themselves which are placed in the
class, and that there is nothing real in the matter except
those objects, a common name given to them, and common
attributes indicated by the name; what, I should be glad
to know, do we learn by being told that whatever can be
affirmed of a class may be affirmed of every object contained in the class?  The class is nothing but the objects
contained in it; and the dictum de omni merely amounts
to the identical proposition, that whatever is true of certain objects, is true of each of those objects. If all ratiocination were no more than the application of this maxim
to particular cases, the syllogism  would indeed be, what
it has so often been declared to be, solemn trifling. The
dictum de omni is on a par with another truth, which in
its time was also reckoned of great importance,' Whatever
is, is;' and not to be compared in point of significance
to the cognate aphorism,'It is impossible for the same
thing to be and not to be;' since this is, at the lowest,
equivalent to the logical axiom that contradictory propositions cannot both be true. To give any real meaning to
the dictumz de omni, we must consider it not as an axiom,
14




158             PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
but as a definition; we must look upon it as intended
to explain, in a circuitous and paraphrastic manner, the
meaning of the word class."'
I quote the above passage from a work of high and in
many respects of deserved reputation, as a remarkable
instance of the total misconception of the nature and
purpose of Logic, arising from that erroneous view to
which I have before alluded, which regards the Aristotelian and the Baconian Organon as forming portions of
the same system, and as subservient to the same end, that
of physical investigation or the discovery of " fundamental
laws of the universe." That the deductive method may
be advantageously applied to purposes of physical inquiry
is unquestionable; and in this respect Mr. Mill has certainly not underrated its value. Any single proposition
of any syllogism or chain of syllogisms may thus materially
contain a fact or a law of nature; but that the fundamental principle on which all reasoning is supposed to
depend can by any possibility exhibit a law of external
nature and not a law of mind, is a supposition which, if
tenable, would make a science of Logic impossible. If
the dictum de omni were, as Mr. Mill supposes, formed on
the hypothesis that universals had a distinct existence in
nature apart from the mind that contemplates them, Logic
might be entitled to rank with Optics or Astronomy,
as a science of the laws of this or that order of natural
phenomena; or it might, perhaps, aspire to the character
of a general Cosmology, including these and other physical
sciences as subordinate branches; but it could not pretend
to the slightest knowledge of the laws which the mind
obeys in thinking; and its principles, as mere generalizations from experience, could never attain to more than a
1 Mill's Logic, vol. i. p. 234.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                 159
physical necessity, as the statement of certain facts in the
existing constitution of the world.
A science is never ultimately benefited by dissembling
any conclusion to which its principles appear fairly to
lead; still less can it gain by adulterating those principles
themselves with foreign matter, borrowed from other departments, in the hope of obviating the apprehended
results. In the case of Logic especially, it may be confidently asserted that nine-tenths of the confusion and misunderstanding which still prevail concerning its nature
and capabilities, have arisen from ill-judged attempts to
invest it with an appearance of utility in matters alien to
its province.l Let us therefore look the supposed charge
fairly in the face, and ask what will be the consequences
if we admit that the fundamental principles of pure thinking are, as they seem to be, analytical or identical judgments. Is Logic thereby determined to be false or futile?
By no means. A system is futile only when it aims at the
solution of questions beyond the reach of human faculties:
and even then, the prosecution of such inquiries is attended
with an indirect benefit; inasmuch as it is only after repeated failures that men learn to know the true limits of
their mental powers, and can profit by the precept ultimnately enjoined by a critical psychology:
" Tecum habita, et noris, quam sit tibi curta supellex."
It may indeed be humiliating to learn, what such an
admission necessarily implies, that the understanding of
man is not furnished with a power of intuition as well as
1 Rosenkranz, in his preface to Kant's Logic, speaks severely but truly
on this point: "So ist denn auch die Logik hundertfach von philosophischen Stiimpcrn utiliter gemisshandclt worden."




160             PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
of thought; but only in the same way as it is humiliating
to know that he cannot fly like a bird, nor swim like a fish.
The restriction is one which the Maker of mankind has
thoughlt fit to impose upon his creatures; and, regret it-as
they may, they cannot escape from it. If Logic, indeed,
supplied us with nothing but identical principles, it would
by no means follow that the study of it is altogether useless; but, in point of fact, it does very much more. Viewed
in connection with Psychology, it points to the important
fact, that these principles are laws of mind; and this fact
alone, applied to the past history and future prospects of
Philosophy, will give rise to a series of practic&a rules of
inestimable value in the direction of the mental powers.
To prove, then, that Logic is either fuitile or false, it must
be shown either that it is impossible for a thinking being
to attain to a knowledge of the laws by which he thinks,
and to test thereby the legitimacy of the products of
thought, or that the laws by which the human mind is
actually governed are different from those universally assumed and insisted upon by Logicians. But if, on these
two points, Logic and Psychology are found to be at one,
each becomes the strongest possible guarantee of the truth
and scientific value of the other. The laws which the
logician has all along assumed as the basis of his system
are now shown to be the very ones by which, from the
actual constitution of the human mind, the operations of
thought are regulated; the conclusions arrived at by a
critical examination of the mental powers are shown to
be the same laws of thinking which had before been accepted as principles from  a critical examination of the
mental products. Thus, by the united forces of Logic and
Psychology, we advance a step in the most important of
all speculative knowledge, the knowledge of ourselves and




PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA.                      161
of our capacities; and so far is either science from being
thereby proved futile, that they become the strongest possible safeiguard against all futile speculations, by pointing
out clearly the nature of the laws of the pure understanding, and the exact limits within which they are operative.
Enough has, I trust, been said to vindicate Logic fiom
the charge of fiivolity, whatever may be the conclusion
concerning its principles to which our inquiries finally lead
us.  But, in the eyes of a philosopher, such a vindication is
wholly unnecessary. The only question worthy of a liberal
mind, as regards the result of any investigation, is not, Is
it usefull? but, Is it true?  However fully persuaded we
may be that every speculative truth has its practical advantages, to require a foresight of such advantages before
entering on the inquiry, is to interpose the most effectual
bar that can be devised to the progress of any knowledge,
and the attainment of any benefit.l The only tenable po1 This is indeed admitted, and ably maintained, by some of that class of
writers whose researches are most to the taste of the Utilitarian. I am
happy to be able to quote the following admirable vindication of the pursuit of truth for its own sake, from a philosopher with whose general principles I am by no means inclined to sympathize:
"Si la puissance prdponddrante de notre organisation ne corrigeait,
mirme involontairement, dans l'esprit des savans, cc qu'il y a sous cc rapport d'incomplet et d'dtroit dans la tendance gdndrale de notre dpoque, l'intelligence humaine, rdduite a ne s'occuper que de recherches susceptibles
d'une utilitd pratique immeddiate, se trouverait par cela seul, comme l'a
tlrs-justement remarqud Condorcet, tout-a-fait arrktde dans ses progrls,
mmnie a l'dgard de ces applications auxquelles on aurait imprudemment
sacrifid ls travaux purement spdculatifs; car, les applications les plus imiportantes ddrivent constamment de thdories formdes dans une simple intention scientifique, et qui souvent ont dtd cultivyes pendant plusieurs siccles
sans produire aucun rdsultat pratique.  On en peut citer un exemple
bien remarquable dans les belles speculations des gdometres grecs sur les
sections coniques, qui, apres une longue suite de ge'nerations, ont servi, en
ddterminant la rdnovation de l'astronomie, k conduire finaleinent l'art de
14*




162                 PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA.
sition that can be occupied by the assailants of Logic must
be acquired by showing that men do not, as a matter of
fact, reason consciously or unconsciously according to its
rules; that the thinking process is not governed by laws at
all; or that its laws are totally different from  those which
the logician lays down.
But it is time to examine the question itself which has
given rise to these observations. Are the Laws of Thought
in reality identical judgments or not? It may, perhaps,
appear that the so-called frivolity of such judgments is
the result of unsuspected causes, having their root in the
nature of the mind itself; that the very feature which is
selected as the especial object of contempt and ridicule is
the strongest evidence of the truth and value of the principles which it characterizes. Supposing, then, that the
act of thinking is governed by certain laws, what might
we naturally expect to find as the prominent feature by
which such laws will be distinguished?  A new truth is in
its very nature partial': it is new only because it is partial;
- the discovery of the particular attributes of some particular thing or class of things.  In a psychological point
of view, the determination of the laws of thought (be their
la navigation au degre de perfectionnement qu'il a atteint dans ces derniers
temps, et auquel il ne serait jamais parvenu sans les travaux si purement
theoriques d'Archimede et d'Apollonius; tellement que Condorcet a pu
dire avec raison a cet eigard:'le matelot, qu'une exacte observation de la
longitude preserve du naufrage, doit la vie'a une thdorie congue, deux
mille ans auparavant, par des hommes de genie qui avaient en vue de simples spdculations geometriques.' "- Comte, Cours de Philosophie Positive,
vol. i. p. 64.
An IEnglish philosopher, who has treated of the same sub jects in a vecry
different spirit, has expressed the same sentiment briefly and well: "It
may be universally true, thlit Knowlede is Power; but we have to do
with it not as Power, biut as Knowledge."




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                163
character as judgments what it may) is as much a new
truth as any other; being the discovery of a particular
fact in the constitution of the human mind. But when we
consider the same laws logically, in their application to the
products of thought, how is it possible for any new truth
to be determined by them? As general laws, they can
have no special relation to this object of thought rather
than that; and it is upon such special relations that the
discovery of every new property must depend. Material
knowledge arises from the observation of differences: the
essential feature of laws of thought must be the abstraction from all differences.' A necessary law of all tlinking,
which shall at the same time ascertain the definite properties of a definite class of things, is a contradiction in
terms; for it is optional, and therefore contingent, whether
we shall apply our thoughts to that particular class of
things or not. But if all men have been thinking, some
on this thing, some on that, but all under one code of laws,
what marvel if, when their attention is called to those
laws, they should recognize them  as what they have all
along virtually acknowledged? Herein at once lies the
explanation and the justification of the so-called frivolity
of principles of this kind. They can determine only the
general attributes common to all objects of thought as
such; and these attributes must constitute the very analytical judgments which Logic is so much decried for offering.
Surely, in the name of common sense and common honesty,
never was outcry more absurd than that which finds fault
with a science for accomplishing the very purpose which it
professes to attempt, and for exhibiting the very features
which, if its pretensions are well founded, and its method
sound, it necessarily must exhibit.
1 Kant, Logik, Einleitung vii. p. 219. Ed. Rozenkranz.




164             PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
It is a remarkable fact in the modern history of philosophy, as regards identical judgments, that, while English
philosophers, taking their departure from the principles of
Locke, have been unsparing in their expressions of scorn
and censure of them as mere verbal trifling, German philosophers, taking their departure from the principles of Kant,
have placed them  at the head of all philosophy, as the
only absolute principles of truth and certainty. Yet Kant,
as well as Locke, and with far mnore accuracy of discrimination, perceived and pointed out the impossibility of
constructing a system of philosophy upon these judgments
only. That both extremes are equally in error, — that
both arise from a crude and one-sided view of a philosophy
not perhaps in all respects consistent with itself, — and
that the truth lies between the two, is a natural and obvious conclusion. To enter into the extravagances of Fichte
and Schelling would be foreign to the purposes of the
present work; but as regards the disciple of Locke, it
may be observed, that he has no choice but of two alternatives: either to repudiate the attack of his master on
frivolous propositions, or to retract his refutation of the
doctrine of innate ideas. If the principles of thought are
competent to supply any positive addition to what is given
in intuition, it follows that the act of thought can in so far
create its own materials. This brings us back, of necessity,
to the theory of innate ideas. If; on the other hand, the
understanding can. only modify what is given out of the
act of thought, it follows that analytical judgments are
not mere verbal frivolities, but fundamental laws of the
thinking faculty.
The Laws of Thought, properly so called, may thus be
psychologically distinguished from the other elements of
the process by the answers to the following questions:




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.              165
1. What is the material which must be given prior to any
act of pure thinking?  2. How is that material modified
by the act of thought itself?  3. What are the conditions
by which the understanding is bound in such modification?
The third question will determine the fundamental laws
of the several operations of Conception, Judgment, and
Reasoning.
The act of conception consists in regarding certain
attributes as coexisting in a possible object-of intuition.
It has before been remarked, that when the object of intuition is actual, i. e., now and here present, an act of thought
is necessary to distinguish it as such fromn other objects
simultaneously presented. This, however, is not pure conception, but conception in conjunction with intuition. In
pure conception, the attributes are not presented in themselves, but represented by their signs. Hence the necessity,
in some form or other, of languagne; and hence the object
of intuition, in an act of pure conception, is not presented
as actual, but represented as possible.1
Two preliminary conditions are thus requisite, prior to
any act of pure conception. Firstly, attributes must be
given which, in some combination or other, have been presented in a former intuition. For, as thought cannot create
intuition, attributes which have never been experienced
are not conceivable. They need not indeed have been
experienced in their present relation, but in some relation
or other. Thus, though I have never seen that combination of a man's head with a horse's body, which is supposed to constitute a centaur, yet the notion of such a
conjunction is perfectly conceivable, because both the
horse's body and the man's head have been presented in
other combinations. Secondly, as the attributes are now
1 Cf. Krug, Logik, ~ 15.




166               PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
given in and through their signs, the import of those signs
is presupposed to be known. A word which I cannot connect with some known attribute is, for all purposes of
thought, like the terms of an unknown tongue. Pure
thought can neither supply defects in the experience of
things, nor ignorance of the meaning of words.  Information on both these points is therefore presupposed.
These materials being given, how are they dealt with
by the act of thought, and what are the laws and limits
which govern or confine the operation? By the act of
conception, the given attributes are combined in a unity
of representation.  Are there, then, any cases in which,
certain attributes being given, I am compelled to think
them as representing an object? are there any cases in
which I am  forbidden to  do so? and are there anyin
which, as far as thought is concerned, I am  left at liberty
to do as I please? Pure conception being concerned with
possible objects of intuition only, the first and third cases
merge into one.  The actual existence of any object call
be determined only by its actual presence in this or that
intuition; and even then the evidence extends only to its
present existence now and here, not to its necessary existence at any future time when it may become an object of
thought.  As an object of a past intuition, it has then a
possible and representative existence only.' The first law
of pure thinking applicable to conception is thus indicated
l " As not now present in time, an immediate knowledge of the past is impossible. The past is only mediately cognizable in and through a present
modification relative to and representative of it, as having been. To
speak of an immediate knowledge of the past involves a contradiction in
acdjecto. For, to know the past immediately, it must be known in itself;
and to be known in itself, it must be known as now existing. But the past
is just a negation of the now existent; its very notion, therefore, excludes
the possibility of its being immediately known." - Sir W. Hamilton, Reid's
Works, p. 810.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                167
by the negative criterion, that there are certain attributes
which we cannot think as coexisting in any possible object
of intuition.  This leads us to the well-known Principle
of Contradiction,L the most general form  of which is,
"Nothing can be A and not-A;" or, "No object can be
thought under contradictory attributes."  But, though
everything which is contradictory is thus inconceivable, it
cannot be maintained, on the other hand, that everything
which is not contradictory is conceivable.2
But the Principle of Contradiction, as above enunciated,
can only be applied in thought coordinately with another
and a positive principle. If an object cannot be thought
under contradictory attributes, the impossibility arises
from its having a definite character of its own, including
one of the contradictories and excluding the other. The
universe of conceivable objects embraces both A and notA: it is only when definitely conceived as the one that an
object cannot be conceived as the other. Every object of
thought, as such, is thus conceived by limitation and difference; as having definite characteristics by which it is
marked off and distinguished from  all others; as being,
in short, itself, and nothing else. The indefinite ideas,
therefore, corresponding to the general terms Thing, Object, Being in general, are not concepts, as containing no
distinctive attributes; and the general object denoted by
such terms is inconceivable. This second Law of Thouglht
is expressed by the Principle of Identity, " Every A is A;"
or, "Every object of thought is conceived as itself."'
1 This law, as Krug has remarked (Logik, ~ 18), ought rather to be called
the Principle of Non-Contradiction.
2 On conceivability as a test of logical possibility, see Sir W. Hamilton,
Beid's Works, p. 377.
3 Cf. Krug, Logik, ~ 17, who contemplates the principle from the oppo



168                PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
But these two Laws of Thought necessarily involve a
third. The object which I conceive is, by the Law of
Identity, discerned as being that which it is, and by the
Law of Contradiction is distinguished from that which it
is not. But these two correlatives must also be regarded
as constituting between them the universe of all that is
conceivable; for the distinction above made is not between
two definite objects of thought, but between the object of
which I think and all those of which I do not think.  NotA implies the exclusion of A only, and of nothing else,
and thus denotes the universe of all conceivable objects
with that one exception. This relation, in its more general expression, constitutes a third Law of Thought, the
Principle of Excluded Middle,' "E very possible object is
either A or not-A."  These three Principles, of Contradiction, Identity, and Excluded Middle, constitute the Laws
of Pure Thinking, or of Thought as Thought.
Another limitation must be noticed, which, though perhaps not properly an a priori law arising out of the nature
of thought itself, is at least a universally valid a posteriori
restriction arising from the practical limits of our intuitive
powers. Thought can only deal with such attributes as
have been in some manner presented in intuition. Hence,
in all cases where intuition is impossible, thought is imsite side. He is wrong, however, in deducing from it the principle of
Contradiction, which is an independent axiom. The two have been confounded or identified by many eminent philosophers; as Leibnitz (Refiex.
sur Locke), Wolf (Ph. Rat. ~ 271), Kant (Logik, Einl. vii.), Herbart (Einl.
in die Philosophie, ~ 39). Hoffbauer (Logik, ~ 23) shows that the two principles are independent, and that neither can be deduced from the other
without a petitio principii.
1 Principium  exclusi medii inter duo contradictoria. For the history of this
expression, and of the Law denoted by it, see Sir T. HIamilton's Lectures
on Logic, p. 65.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                   169
possible likewise. Hence arises a class of practical limitations of thought based on the limitations of possible
experience. Some of these are partial and accidental-only;
as in the case of a blind man, who can have no intuitive
experience of colors. But one at least is common to all
men, and, so far, psychologically, if not logically, necessary.
Though, as far as the laws of thought are concerned, it is
permitted to unite in an act of conception all attributes
which are not contradictory of each other, it is impossible
in practice to go beyond a very limited number. The
number of attributes in the universe not logically repugnant to each other is infinite; and the mind can therefore
find no absolute limits to its downward progress in the
formation of subordinate notions. To arrive at a notion
which shall comprehend within itself all conceivable compatible attributes, and which shall therefore admit of no
further possible limitation but that of the individual conditions of presence in space and time, is an act which, if
not a priori self-destructive, will at least in practice require
an infinite grasp of mind and an infinite length of time for
its accomplishment.l
Hence it follows at once that a logical Highest Genus,
and a logical Lowest Species -  i. e., a notion so simple as
to admit of no further subtraction, and a notion so complex
as to admit of no further addition - are both inconceivable.
The meaning of these two terms in Logic must not be
1 This and the preceding condition are sometimes given as the Laws of
Homogeneity and Specification. See Kant, iritik der r. V. p. 510, ed. Rosenkranz; Krug, Logik, ~ 45, b; Fries,' Syst. der Logik, ~ 21. I prefer to regard
them as deductions from a higher law. It may be observed, that those
logicians who insist on the Law of Homogeneity are not consistent in calling thing or object a concept (Begriff). The third law joined with these two,
that of Logical Affinity, or Continuity, is questionable, both as regards truth
and value.
15




170              PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
confounded with that which is applicable to this or that
branch of material science. The Highest Genus in any
special science is the general class, comprehending all the
objects whose properties that science investigates; the different Lowest Species are the classes at which that special
investigation terminates. In Geometry, for example, under
the summuzn genus of magnitudes in space, we find three
coordinate in,fmce species of triangles, the equilateral, the
isosceles, and the scalene.  The geometrical properties of
the figures are not affected by any further subdivision.
These three classes are therefore lowest species in Geometry, but not in Logic. For of geometrical limitations, the
logician, as such, knows nothing. In a mere relation of
concepts, the notion of an equilateral triangle whose sides
are three feet long, is a further subdivision of the notion
of an equilateral triangle; and out of this again we may
form  the subordinate notion, "an  equilateral triangle
whose sides are three feet long and divided into inches."
This process may, as far as Logic is concerned, be continued ad infinitum.
The extreme limits of generalization and specification
being thus inconceivable, we obtain from these conditions
two characteristics of all logical concepts, namely, that
they must have both comprehension and extension. Every
notion, that is to say, as a condition of its conceivability,
must contain a plurality of attributes, in consequence of
which it is capable of subordination to a higher notion;
and it must contain a limited number only of attributes,
in consequence of which lower notions may be subordinated to it. This canon of conceivability, as we have
seen, is not invalidated by the supposed highest and lowest
classes of the logicians, which are limits never arrived at
in any process of actual thought. Neither is it invalidated




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                171
by the so-called simple ideas, which, according to the
doctrine of Descartes and Locke, are the limits'beyond
which analysis is impossible.  For a simple idea, like a
summum genus, is by itself inconceivable. In every intuition it is presented as part of a complex object; and it
can in no act of positive thought be contemplated out of
that connection. Whiteness and redness, for example, are
given to us in combination with extension; motion, with
a moving body; pleasure and pain, with a conscious subject.  VWe cannot represent to ourselves, as a possible
object of intuition, a color unextended,l a motion without
a moving body, a feeling without a mind. Simple ideas
are thus never conceived as such, but only forming parts
of a complex object. That they are indefinable (in Locke's
view of definition), has been remarked in a former chapter; but this arises, not from their forming absolutely
simple concepts, but from their being simple portions of a
complex intuition.
From  these two characteristics of all concepts follows
their capability of Definition and Division- the former
being an enumeration of the higher notions contained in
the coiprehension of a given concept; the latter, an
enumeration of the lower notions contained in its extension. The manner, however, in which these two operations
are commonly treated in logical writings manifests an utter
confusion between the general laws of thinking as applicable to any matter, such as they are laid down in pure
Logic, and the performance of a special act of thought
about this or that matter, which forms a portion of this or
that branch of applied Logic. The so-called Logical Laws
1 The error of those philosophers who suppose that color can be conceived apart from extension, has been noticed by Sir W. Hamilton, Reid's
Works, p. 860.




172             PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
of Definition and Division are merely derived from an
analysis of the notions of the operations themselves;notions such as mnight be borrowed concerning any object
fromr the art or science to which it materially belongs. In
the given notion of Definition, as the enumeration of the
parts comprehended in a concept, it is of course implied
that it must be adequate, otherwise the parts are not
enumerated; and that it is clear, otherwise they are not
parts. And so of Division, substituting parts of extension for those of comprehension. Such an analysis ftirnishes no test even of the formal validity of any single
act of division or definition; it only takes to pieces the
general notion of the process. But it is obvious that any
given notion, borrowed from any source whatever, may be
analyzed in like manner by an application of thought.
From the notion of weighing a pound of cheese, it follows
of course, firstly, that the whole quantity weighed must
be exactly a pound; secondly, that any part of the same
must be less than a pound; thirdly, that the same ounce
must not be weighed twice over.  If this criterion be
adopted, a chapter on cheese-weighing has as good a right
to be placed in Logic, as a chapter on Division or Definition.
The question necessary to determine the true logical
character of these processes is not, "Given the general
notions of the two operations, to determine by analysis
what those notions imply;" but, "Given any particular
concept, how much can be ascertained by pure thinking
concerning its relation to higher or lower concepts?"
Viewed in this light, Definition, as a logical operation, is a
portion of the act of Conception, governed by the same
laws, and subject to the same limitations. We can determine thereby nothing concerning the actual possession of




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                173
certain attributes by certain objects: we cannot even
ascertain that objects of any kind really exist in nature.
Conception being limited to possible objects of intuition
only, Definition is confined to the analysis and separate
exposition of the attributes contained in a given concept,
and determines not their reality but their conceivability.
Its only logical laws are the Principles of Identity and
Contradiction: the one compelling us to regard any given
concept as identical with the sum of its constituent parts,
and the other pronouncing that a definition which enumerates attributes directly or by implication incompatible
with each other is logically self-destructive. If the attributes are compatible, the definition is allowed as valid, as
far as Logic is qualified to pronounce judgment: for further
examination it must be referred to the tribunal of experience.  The purpose of logical definition is thus not
material accuracy, but formal distinctness as regards the
intension or comprehension 1 of the concept.
It is obvious that the rules of definition commonly given
in logical treatises have no value or significance except in
extralogical applications. To say that a definition must
be adequate to the notion which I entertain, is only to say
that what I assign as the contents of a notion must be
what I think to be the contents; which is, of course, implied in the fact of my assigning them. The rule acquires
a material significance when interpreted to mean that the
attributes assigned in the definition must exactly correspond to the characteristic features of the object as it exists
in nature.  But, then, to determine whether this rule is
complied with or not is clearly beyond the province of the
1 See Drobisch, Neue Darstellung der Logik, ~ 102. That analytical distinctness alone falls within the province of Logic is shown by Kant, Logik,
Einl. viii.
15*




174                PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
logician.  I may assign "rational animal," as an analysis of
my notion of man; but to ascertain, as a matter of fact,
that all men possess reason, and that all other animals are
without it, is manifestly a question not of thought, but of
experience. There is no alternative between exempting
the logician as such fiom all material knowledge whatever,
and requiring from him  a minute acquaintance with every
possible branch of human knowledge.  If he is bound to
know, as a matter of fact, that men are rational and horses
hinnible, he is by the same rule bound to be conversant
with the constitution and properties of every object which
nature can present or art produce.
It is obvious also that Logic can admit one kind of definition, and one only. The so-called nominal definition
by synonym  or etymology would require of the logician a
material knowledge of the vocabulary and construction of
any given language, thus making Logic a compendium
of all dictionaries and all grammars.l  The so-called accidental definition  is a logical absurdity.  If the notion
homo, for example, is composed of the notions animal
rationale, it cannot at the same time contain the distinct
attributes of bipes implume.  To use the same word for
both combinations is simply to'employ language equivo1 "In this place," says Archbishop Whately, " we are concerned with
nominal definitions only, because all that is requisite for the purposes of
reasoning (which is the proper province of Logic) is, that a term shall not
be used in different senses: a real definition of anything belongs to the science or system which is employed about that thing." In the sense in
which nominal and real definition were distinguished by the scholastic logicians, the exact reverse is the truth. Logic is concerned with real, i. e.,
with notional definitions only: to explain the meaning of particular words
belongs to the dictionaries or grammars of particular languages. But this
is only one out of thousands of errors committed by various writers,
through confounding the thing or notion in the mind with the things or individuals out of it. Even Kant (Logik, ~ 106) has not quite avoided this
ambiguity.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.               175
cally. It may so hcapen that all the individuals possessed
of reason are also provided with two legs and destitute of
feathers; but this is not implied in the notion of rationality, and cannot be elicited by any act of pure thinking.
For this reason those logicians are clearly right who consider the enumeration of properties or accidents, not as a
definition of notions, but as a description of individuals.
But such a description has clearly no connection with
Logic, but solely with the natural history of the object
described.
Division, on the other hand, corresponds in one sense to
the remaining portion of the act of Conception, the union
of the attributes in a possible object of intuition, and is
thus regulated by the same laws as Definition. But Division, in this sense of the term, is not Specification, but
Izdivicdualization; and moreover pays no attention to
any coordinate members of the same class, but is solely
occupied with the one object conceived. It thus belongs,
not to symbolical, but to intuitive cognition; being not
the mere enumeration of the constituent elements of a
concept, but the verification of their conceivability by the
aid of the imagination. Such an imagination is in one
sense a Division; for it is impossible for me to imagine an
individual triangle which shall be neither equilateral, isosceles, nor scalene: one of these attributes therefore enters
into every actual intuition of a triangle, and thus far limits
and divides the general notion. But, then, the attributes
added are not in this case contemplated as the constituents
of a lower class, but of a possible individual. In like manner, I cannot imagine a man of no color and no stature;
but in adding these particulars to my conception, I do not
think of them as related to any coordinate class, as constituting a division of men into tall and short, or white and




176                PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
not white. I think of them only as necessary to test the
conceivability of the generic attributes with which they
are combined.  The office of Division in this respect is to
make our conceptions clear, as that of Definition is to make
them  distinct.'
Beyond this, the process of Division, as contributing to
distinctness in the extension of a Concept, cannot be regarded as an act of pure thinking,2 or as solely determined
by logical laws.  Even in the case of dichotomy by contradiction, the principle of division must be given, as an
addition to the attributes comprehended in the concept,
before the logician can take a single step. For Division
is not, like Definition, a mental analysis of giveen materials:
the specific difference must be addel    to the given attributes of the genus; and to gain this additional material,
it is necessary to go out of the act of thought, to seek for
new  empirical data.  "Divide  animal " is a colmmand
which no logician, as such, can obey; for the mere notion
animal does not of itself suggest rational or irrational,
any more than mortal or immortal, virtuozts or vicious, or
any other attributes not logically incompatible with the
genus.3  The principle of division must be given in addition to the concept to be divided; and when it is given,
the process, thus raised from  a material to a formal one,
1 A conception is clear when its object, as a whole, can be distinguished
from any other; it is distinct when its several constituent parts can be distinguished from each other. The merit of first pointing out these characteristics of the logical perfection of thought belongs to Leibnitz. See his
Mleditationes de Cognitione Veritate et Ideis.
2 By pure thinking is not meant thinking which has no relation to any past
experience; for without some experience, all thought is impossible. It
means only that we can proceed to the act of thought without additional
data being required prior to and out of the act itself. The relation of experience to thought is too often lost sight of in the Kantian philosophy.
3 See Fries, Systenm der Logik, ~ 92.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                177
has, like definition, a potential only, not an actual value in
relation to experience. If the differentia rational is given,
I call divide animal into rational and not-rational; but if
the differentia mortal is given, I can also, as far as Logic
is concerned, divide into mnortal and immortal. I must
appeal to experience, and not to thought, to determine
whether one or the other of these divisions is actually true;
whether the Struldbrugs of Luggnagg or the Undying
Fish of Bowscale Tarn are really existing animals or not.
Every concept is potentially divisible by any two given
differentiae, contradictory of each other, and both compatible with the genus. And the laws by which the process
is governed are, firstly, the Principle of Contradiction;
and, secondly, that of Excluded M3iddle. By the first, we
are forbidden to think that two contradictory attributes
can both be present in the same object; by the second, we
are forbidden to think that both can be absent. The first
tells us that both differentiae must be compatible with the
genus: I cannot, for example, divide animal into animate
and inanimate. The second tells us that one or the other
must be found in every member of the genus; but in what
manner this is actually carried out, whether by every existing member possessing one of the differentiae and none
the other, or by some possessing one and some the other,
experience alone can determine.l
It thus appears that even dichotomy by contradiction is
not, strictly speaking, a formal process, as Kant considers
it;2 but that it is partly material, and so far extr~alogical;
and that the material element predominates still more,
according as any other principle of division is adopted.
Where the specific differences are not contradictory, so
1 Trendelenburg, Logische U'ntersuchungen, i. 4.
2 Logik, ~ 113. See, on the other side, 1Hoffbauer, Logik, ~~ 134, 138.




178              PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
that each naturally suggests the other, every one of them
must be given, prior to any possible act of formal thinking.
The only division of a concept which can be regarded as
a purely logical process is that sometimes distinguished as
Determination, which consists in the reunion of attributes
previously separated by definition.' In a formal point of
view, therefore, the arrangement of those logicians who
treat of Definition before Division is preferable to the
inverse order adopted by Aldrich, _Divisionemr excipit
Definitio.
Throughout the preceding remarks, the presence of all
the antecedent conditions requisite to the logical perfection of cognitions is presupposed. It is taken for granted
that we are, prior to any act of conception, in possession
of the materials necessary to complete clearness and distinctness, and that the act of thought consists merely in
eliciting the concept with these qualities out of the sufficient data. And this supposition is the only one which
can be admitted into a system of pure Logic, or into
Psychology in its purely logical relation. The failure of
materials for conception is precisely analogous to the failure of materials for reasoning. In the latter case, if a
single premise only is given, or two premises so related
that no necessary conclusion follows from them, the logician
is not called upon to remedy the deficiency; he simply
decides that the data are insufficient for reasoning at all.
In like manner, if the empirical data for clear or distinct
conception are wanting, the logician, as such, can only say
that the materials for the thought are insufficient. The
distinction between clear and obscure, distinct and indistinct conceptions, is as much out of the province of pure
Logic, as a distinction between syllogisms whose premises
1 Sec Drobisch, ~~ 17, 29, 30.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.               179
necessitate their conclusion, and reasonings in which the
consequence may with more or less probability be conjectured.  In conception and in judgment, as well as in
reasoning, there are processes necessitated by the laws of
thought from certain data; there are others which are not
necessitated, but which may be hazarded with more or less
risk of error; the presumption in their favor amounting in
some cases to a moral certainty, and binding upon our
practice, but never reaching the height of logical necessity
or speculative perfection.l The first class alone are recognized by Pure Logic, and that in relation not merely to
reasoning, but to all three operations of thought. Applied
Lobgic, in the Kantian sense of the term, may treat of the
several practical imperfections of human thought, which
lower in this or that special instance the logical standard
of perfection. Here we may treat of notions more or less
obscure or confused, of judgments more or less uncertain,
of reasonings more or less inconsequent. The object of
the present observations is rather to ascertain what light
may be thrown by psychological considerations on the
purely logical processes, and to call attention to the fact,
that the distinction between material and formal thinking
may and ought to be consistently carried out in reference
to all the operations of the understanding.
Judgment is distinguished from Conception by the difference of its data. In Conception, attributes are given,
to be united by thought in a possible object of intuition;
in Judgment, concepts are given, to be united by thought
in a common object. Like Conception, also, Judgment may
be considered either as pure, or as combined with a present
intuition. Pure judgments are those in which the given
concepts are of such a character that their mutual relation
1 Cf. Krug, Logik, ~ 35, Anm. 1.




180              PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
of agreement or difference can be determined by an act of
thought alone, without any appeal to experience.  This is
the case when the attributes comprehended in the one concept form either the whole or a part of those comprehended
in the other; or where some attribute comprehended in the
one is contradictory of one of those comprehended in the
other. In the former case we are enabled at once, by the
law of Identity, to unite the two concepts in all affirmative
judgmcl ent, and in the latter, by the law of Contradiction,
to separate them by a negative judgment. But this class
of judgments (being those commonly known as analytical
or explicative) may, with more propriety, be included under the head of Conception. The affirmative analytical
judgment is in fact nothing more than the Definition, complete or partial, of the subject-notion; while the negative
judgment expresses only the necessary condition of all
conception, which, by discerning any notion as being that
which it is, necessarily excludes it from all that it is not.
In synthetical or ampliative judgments, the  act of
thought is not sufficient to determine the relation of the
concepts to each other, without the accompaniment of an
intuition, pure or empirical.  For example: in order to
form the judgment, " Two straight lines cannot inclose a
space," I must not only be able to conceive separately the
two notions of a straight line and of an inclosing of space,
but I must also, by the ai(l of imagination, construct a
representation in my mind of two actual straight lines and
their actual positions in space. I must perceive that these
two straight lines are incapable of inclosing a space, before
I  rlo'noune the universal judgment concerning all pairs
of straight lines. hIere the relation between the two concepts is presented in a pure or a priori intuition., i. e., in
an intuition containing no adventitious element external




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.              181
to the mind itself. Again, in order to form the judgment,
"Gold is heavy," supposing that my conception of gold
does not in itself include the attribute of weight, I cannot,
by merely thinking of gold as a hard, yellow, shining body,
determine what effect it will produce when laid on the
hand. I must actually place an individual piece of gold
on my hand, and ascertain by experience the fact of its
pressure. Here the relation between the two concepts is
presented in a mixed or empirical iattuition, i. e., in an
intuition caused by the presence of a body external to the
mind itself.
Yet in this class of judgments, as well as in the former,
when the necessary intuition has once been given, the act
of thought itself is governed by the same laws of Identity
and Contradiction.  In pronouncing that two distinct
notions are united in one and the same object, that it is
the gold which is heavy, I unite the concepts "gold" and
"heavy" in a complex notion comprehending  both, and
denoting the union of both in a common object. That
which was before conceived as "gold," is now conceived
as " heavy gold " (whether the new attribute becomes part
of the meaning of the term gold or not is of no consequence), and this complex notion is now exhibited in the
act of judgment, as analyzed into its constituent parts, and
identified with them.' Synthetical judgments may thus,
as far as the mere act of thought is concerned, be brougllht
under the same law as analytical ones, namely, the Principle of Identity when the judgment is affirmative, and
that of Contradiction when it is negative.
Another law of thought is sometimes given as the
foundation of Judgment, under the name of the Logical
Principle of Sufficient Reason. This law, which must be
1 See Drobisch, N2eue Darstellung der Logik, ~ 36.
16




182                 PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA.
carefully  distinguished  from  the  Metaphysical Principle
of Causality, is enunciated, " Every judgment must have
a sufficient ground for its assertion."'     But, in truth, the
relation of this principle to the act of judgment is merely
negative: it forbids us in certain cases to judge at all, and
it does no more. If the judgment is analytical, the law of
Identity or of Contradiction is the sufficient reason for
making it. If the judgment is synthetical, we have, previously to the given intuition, no reason at all; and, accordingly, we suspend our thought till we have referred the
decision to the tribunal of experience. The only logical
reason for a thought of any kind is its relation to some
other thought; and this relation will in each case be determined by its own proper law. The Principle of Sufficient Reason is therefore no law of thought, but only the
statement that every act of thought must be governed by
some law or other.2
1 See Kant, Logik, Einleitung vii.; Fries, Syst. der Logik, ~ 41; Krug,
Logik, ~ 20; Thomson, Laws of Tlought, p. 296.
2 In excluding the Principle of Sufficient Reason from the laws of
thought I am happy to find myself supported by the authority of Sir
William Hamilton in the philosophical Appendix to his Discussions, published subsequently to the first edition of the present work. "The Principle of Sufficient Reason," he says, "should be excluded from Logic. For,
inasmuch as this principle is not material (material = non-formal) it is
only a derivation of the three formal laws; and inasmuch as it is material, it coincides with the principle of Causality, and is extralogical."
Kant (Logik, Einleitung vii.) takes a different view. He regards the Principle of Contfadiction as the criterion of the logical possibility of a judgment, that of Sufficient Reason as the criterion of its logical reality. But
of judgments, as distinguished from the conclusions of syllogisms, the
only logical reality is possibility. Directly I have ascertained two notions
not to be contradictory to each other, I have made an actual judgment of
the logical possibility of their coexistence; and to take any step beyond
this, experience is required, and not logic. The difference between problematical and assertorial judgments is extralogical, and depends on the




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                     183
Hypothetical and Disjunctive Judgments must be reserved for a separate examination. At present, we must
proceed to investigate the laws of Reasoning. This process differs from  Judgment, as Judgment differs from
Conception, in the nature of its preliminary data. In
Judgment, concepts are given, thought being required to
determine their possible coexistence in an object.  In Reasoning, one or more judgments are given, thought being
required to determine what further judgments may be
elicited from them. Under this head will thus be included
not merely the ordinary Syllogism, but likewise (so far as
they contain processes of thought at all) the immediate
inferences of Opposition and Conversion. In all these,
the material given prior to the act of thought is a judgment; and the process of judging from concepts is thus
not included, but presupposed; the conclusion being
always a different judgment, either in form, as regards
Quantity, Quality, or Relation, which is the case in immediate consequences; or partially in matter, which is the
case in mediate reasoning by syllogism.l  The  common
arrangement, therefore, which places immediate inference
in the second part of Logic, is objectionable.2
question whether a logical judgment is or is not determined by experience
to be materially true.
1 See Kant, Logik, ~ 44. His theory of contraposition affecting the
modality of the judgment is untenable, and seems to result merely from
that excessive love of system which must bring in four forms somehow.
The supposed demonstrative character of the conclusion in contraposition
is merely a necessity of consequence from the position of the premise; a
character which is found in all logical reasoning whatever.
2 This order, however, has by no means been uniformly adopted by Logicians. Aristotle treats of Opposition in the De Interpretatione, and of
Conversion in the Prior Analytics. Wolf separates Opposition and Conversion, considered as relations between two given propositions, from the
processes of inference derivable from each. The former is treated in con



184                 PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
Opposition may be treated in two points of view.
Firstly, as a relation between two given propositions;
secondly, as a process of inference, in which, one proposition being given, another may be determined.  In the former character, it is merely an explanation of the meaning
of certain logical terms; in the latter, it is a process of
reasoning, a deduction of one proposition as conclusion
from another as premise, and governed, as we shall see, by
the same laws as the mediate inference.' The primary
processes, on which the rest may be made to depend, are
those of Subaltern and Contradictory Opposition; the
former being grounded on the Principle of Identity, and
the latter on those of Contradiction and Excluded Middle.
Thus in the proposition, "All A is some B," an identity is
stated between the whole of the objects thought under
the concept A, and a portion of those thought under B.2
nection with Judgment; the latter, under the name of Immediate Consequence, in connection with reasoning. Kant and his followers treat immediate consequences as reasonings, under the name of Syllogisms of the
Understanding; an arrangement which is logically correct, whatever may
be the psychological objections to the nomenclature.
1 On account of this identity of law, various attempts have been made
by ingenious writers to reduce immediate consequence to the mediate form.
Thus Wolf exhibits subaltern opposition as a syllogism with the minor
premise, " Some A is A;" thus perversely representing the law of thought,
which governs the reasoning process in general, as a part of the special
matter given preliminary to a particular act. Still more absurd is the
elaborate system which Krug, after a hint from Wolf, has constructed, in
which all immediate inferences appear as hypothetical syllogisms; a major premise being supplied in the form, " If all A is B, some A is B."
The author appears to have forgotten that either this premise is an additional empirical truth, in which case the immediate reasoning is not a logrical process at all, or it is a formal inference, presupposing the very reasoning to which it is prefixed, and thus begging the whole question.
2 Throughout the following pages, in order to exhibit the law of
thought more clearly in each case, I have, in conformity with the views of




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                      185
The conclusion, "Therefore some A is some B," proceeds
on the principle that every part of A must be identical
with a part of that which has been given as identical with
all A.  This process resembles the inference in an affirmative syllogism, except that in the latter there is given a
double identity; firstly, of the middle term with a part of
the major; and secondly, of the minor with a part of the
middle. The inferences of Contradictory Opposition are
based on the Principles of Contradiction and Excluded
Middle.  By the former, when one of two contradictory
judgments is given as true, we infer that the other is false;
and by the latter, when one is given as fialse, we infer that
the other is true. The remaining inferences of Opposition
may be reduced to combinations of the above.
The several processes of Conversion, if the predicate is
quantified as well as the subject, may be reduced to Simple Conversion only; and even under the old system,
Conversion per accidtens may be regarded as a combination
of Simple Conversion with one of the inferences of Opposition.l  Simple Conversion is thus the only one which it
is necessary to examine. This cannot properly be regarded
Sir William Hamilton, stated the quantity of the predicate as well as of
the suliject in each proposition. Of the value of this addition to the ordinary logical forms, I have elsewhere expressed my opinion (North British
Review, No. 29). I have not, therefore, thought it necessary to enter into
an elaborate examination of it here; especially as it is sufficient for my
purpose to bring forward only those forms of reasoning universally admitted by logicians. In quantifying the predicate in these instances, we
only express what every treatise on Logic tells us to understand, viz.,
that the predicate of an affirmative proposition is not distributed; i. e., is
thouglht as particular.
1 Thus Aldrich analyzes conversion per accidens. " Sit vera E: Ergo et
ejus simpliciter conversa: Ergo et conversm subalternata: qu.T cst cxpositae conversa per accidens. Sit vera A: Ergo et ejus subalternata:
Ergo et subalternatae simpliciter conversa: quae est expositae per accidens."
1G6




186              PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
as a process of judgment; for either the converted proposition is a new judgment distinct from the original one,
or it is merely the same judgment expressed in different
language. In the former case, it is an inference from a
premise, and consequently a process of reasoning; in the
latter, there is no process of thinking at all, but merely a
change in the language by which a given thought is expressed. The former is the preferable view, so long as the
subject and predicate of a proposition are viewed in the
relation of whole and part, whether by the inclusion of
the subject under the extension of the predicate, or of the
predicate in the comprehension of the subject. For the
inversion of the relations of whole and part is sufficient to
constitute a new judgment. But in the system of Sir ~W.
Hamilton, in which every proposition is reduced to an
equation, or rather to an identification of object between
the two terms, the latter view seems more accurate; it
being manifestly the same thing to identify the object
thought under A with that of B, and that thought under
B with that of A.
To opposition and conversion must be added a third
process, that of the immediate consequence of one equipollent proposition from another.' The equipollence in
some cases can only be determined materially; and the
consequence is then extralogical; as in the instance cited
by Wolf, Titius est pater Caii, ergo Caius est filius Titii;
but there are other instances in which the consequence is
formal, and determined solely by the laws of thought.
Thus, by the principle of contradiction, from the premise,
1 See Wolf, Philosophia Rationalis, ~ 445; Fries, System der Logik, ~ 47.
The former has not accurately distinguished the material from the formal
cases of this consequence; and it was, probably, this confusion that led
Kant to reject the inference altogether.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                187
All A is B, follows the immediate inference, No A is notB, in which is produced a change of quality from affirmative to negative. In this way, when one predicate is
affirmed of a subject, its contradictory may always be
denied. The process commonly called Conversion by Contraposition, is properly the simple conversion of this equipollent proposition.l
The whole of the preceding observations clearly point
out the view in which Logic and Psychology must coincide
concerning the nature and principles of the Syllogism.
The former, as the science of the laws of pure thinking,
has nothing to do with the inferences of more or less
probability furnished by the analogies of this or that branch
of physical science, nor even with the general constitution
of the material world, so far as it is known to us only
empirically as a fact. Its only province is with those inferences which are necessitated by the laws of thought;
which, certain data being furnished, we cannot but draw
as consequences. That the premises of a syllogism necessarily imply and contain the conclusion, is so far from
being an imperfection in Logic, that it is a necessary consequence of the supposition that thought is governed by
laws at all. And in accordance with this conclusion, Psychology teaches us that thought is representative and
reflective, not presentative and intuitive; tllat, having no
positive operation beyond the field of possible experience,
its laws can only be analytical, and its processes must lead
not to the acquisition of new knowledge, but to the modification of the old. It only remains to exemplify this
result by applying it to the ordinary forms of the logical
syllogism.
1 This has been remarked by Fries (~ 49, e.), and recently by Mr. Karslake (Aids to the Study of Logic, p. 65).




188               PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
Fig. 1.                       Fig. 2.
All Ml is some P.     No 3M is any P.       No P is any 1.
All S is some IM.     All S is some M.      All S is some M..'. All S is some P.. No S is any P... No S is any P.
Fig. 3.
All M is some P.   No lM is any P.
All 3I is some S.  All MI is some S..'. Some S is some P..~. Some S is not any P.
The above examples will suffice as specimens of the different forms of affirmative and negative reasoning admitted
by the three Aristotelian figures. The fourth figure might
be easily subjected to the same treatment; but it is preferable to regard its moods as inverted forms of the first.
On inspection of these specimens, it appears, that the
Principle of Identity is immediately applicable to affirmative moods in any figure, and the Principle of Contradiction to negatives.  In Barbara, for example, the minor
term all S is identical with a part of M, and consequently
with a part of that which is given as identical with all
M, namely, some P.  In Darapti, the minor term  some S
is identical with all M, and consequently with some P.
The principle immediately applicable to both is the axiom,
that what is given as identical with the whole or a part
of any concept, must be identical with the whole or a part
of that which is identical with the same concept. This
may be briefly expressed by the Principle of Identity,
Every A is A. In Celarent, Cesare, and Felapton, some or
all S, being given as identical with all or some 31, is distinct fiom every part of that which is distinct firom all Mr.'
1 Under the system of a quantified predicate, the second figure admits
of affirmative syllogisms, which, like the rest, may be referred to the
principle of Identity.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                 189
This is briefly expressed by the Principle of Contradiction,
No A is not-A.
These two laws govern all the moods of Categorical
Syllogism, including under them, as subordinate rules, the
dictum de omni et nullo, or the nearly equivalent axiomn,
nota notee est nota rei ipsius; as well as the distinct axioms which have been framed by different logicians as
rules of the second and third figures.l The process of
Reduction, which is properly and necessarily adopted by
those logicians who, with Aristotle and Kant, acknowledge
the principle of the first figure only, now becomes unnecessary and inconsistent; inasmuch as all the syllogistic figures are exhibited as equally direct exemplifications of the
same general law. For the same reason, the distinction
adopted by Kant between Syllogisms of the Understanding
and Syllogisms of the Reason, in addition to the psychological impropriety of distinguishing two faculties of
thought,2 is now  shown to be logically untenable also;
the processes of immediate and mediate reasoning being
exhibited as cognate acts of thought, governed by the
same general laws, and differingc only in their material
data.
By bearing in mind what has been above said of the
nature of thought and its laws, we shall also be enabled to
take a juster view of a process more or less misrepresented
in the majority of logical treatises, Induction. Scarcely
any logician has accurately distinguished between Formal
Induction, in which the given premises necessitate the
1 As by Lambert, Neues Organon, part i. ~ 232; Kant, Logik, ~ 71; Sir
W. Hamilton in lMr. Thomson's Laws of Thought, p. 248, where they are
given correctly as special applications of a more general principle.
2 On this question, see Sir W. Hamilton, Discussions, p. 17; Cousin,
Lefons sur la Philosophie de Kant, p. 168; Krug, Logik, ~ 74.




190              PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
conclusion in conformity with the laws of thought, and
laterial Induction, in which the conclusion may be inferred with more or less probability fiom additional data
not furnished by the premises; between what we must
know as thinkers, and what we may know as investigators
of nature. By some logicians, Induction is treated as a
Syllogism in Barbara, with the major or minor premise
suppressed; the advocates of this view overlooking the
fact, that the suppression of either premise leaves a deficiency to be supplied independently of the act of thought,
and thus reduces the whole process from formal to material; to say nothing of the inversion of the reasoning as
actually performed, and the destruction of all foundation
for the syllogistic process from universals to particulars, by
making every universal premise itself a deduction from a
higher one. By others, Induction is represented, according to the Baconian view, as an interrogationD of nature,
by the selection, in any physical investigation, of such
phenomena as may indicate the existence of a general law.
Here it is forgotten that the fact that nature proceeds by
uniform laws at all is a truth altogether distinct from the
laws of thought, and, if not of wholly emlpirical origin, at
least one which cannot be ascertained'a priori by the pure
understanding. Others again, struck by the physical difficulty of an exhaustive enumeration of individual cases,
endeavor to effect a compromise between material probability and formal necessity, by describing the instances
cited as representatives or samples of their class; as if the
nature of samples and representatives could be made
known by an innate principle of the mind, independently
of experience. Even the wonderful acuteness of Kant in
all questions between matter and form appears to have
deserted him here; and by describing Induction as a Syl



PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                 191
logism of the judgment, furnishing a logical presumption
of a general conclusion, he not only encumbers the science
with an extralogical process, but neglects altogether tile
really formal reasoning which it is the duty of the logician
to take into account.'
The truth is that there are two totally distinct processes
confounded under the general name of Induction.  The
Baconian or Material Induction proceeds on the assumption of general laws in the relations of physical phenomena,
and endeavors, by select observations and experiments, to
detect the law in any particular case. This, whatever be
its value as a general method of physical investigation, has
no place in Formal Logic.  The Aristotelian or Formal
Induction proceeds on the assumption of general laws of
thought, and inquires into the instances in which, by such
laws, we are necessitated to reason from  an accumulation
of particular instances to a general or partial rule.  The
process in this case may be affirmative or negative; and it
is governed, like other formal reasonings, by the general
laws of Identity and Contradiction.  Specimens of its
several forms may be exhibited as follows:
Affirmative Induction.
X, Y, Z, are some B.              X, Y, Z, are some B.
X, Y, Z, are all A.               X, Y, Z, are some A..'. All A is some B..'. Some A is some B.
Negative Induction.
X, Y, Z, are not any B.           X, Y, Z, are not any B.
X, Y, Z, are all A.               X, Y, Z, are some A.,.'. No A is any B..'. Some A is not any B.
Other moods may be added to these, by varying the
quantity of the predicate in the major premise.  By assign1 Two distinguished exceptions to this general error must however be
noticed. Aristotle's account of Induction, in Anal. Pr. ii. 23, incomplete as




192               PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
ing, in conformity with the system  of Sir W. Hamilton, a
definite quantity to the predicate in all affirmative propositions, we are enabled to avoid that ambiguity of the
copula which has hitherto been the main defect in the
logical analysis of inductive reasoning.'  The relation of
whole and part between the terms of the proposition being
thus dispensed with, the subject is no longer represented
as at one time contained under, at another constituting its
predicate; but each term, in every case, is equated, or identified as to its object, with the whole or a part of the other.
Under this system it is no longer necessary to distinguish Induction from the third figure of Syllogism, as this
figure, with a definite predicate, will admit of universal as
well as particular conclusions.  Indeed, every Syllogism in
this figure, in which the minor premise is collective, may
be regarded as a logical Induction.  In this point of view
it is manifestly governed by the same laws as the syllogism,
the affirmative moods by the Principle of Identity, and
the negative by the Principle of Contradiction. The socalled imperfect Induction is altogether extralogical. The
constituted whole can in thought be identified only with
the sum total of its parts, not with a few representatives;
and without such identification no inference can be necessitated by the laws of thought. The physical difficulty of
adducing all the members of a given class is a purely material consideration, like that of the truth of the premises in
a syllogism, and is assumed, not investigated, by the logician.  But without such a preliminary datum, we have no
it is in many respects, has the merit of adhering accurately to the formal
view of the process. And the admirable Article on Logic by Sir W. Hamilton, in No. 115 of the Edinburgh Review (reprinted in his Discussions),
exhibits for the first time the logical character of Induction, divested of
its material incumbrances and formal perversions.
1 See Sir W. Hamilton, Discussions, p. 163.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                 193
materials for drawing a universal conclusion by logical
Induction.
Thus far we have shown the several forms of mediate
categorical reasoning to depend on two necessary laws of
thought, the Principles of Identity and Contradiction. A
separate examination is needed to ascertain the character
of the Hypothetical Propositions and Syllogisms, which,
as I am inclined to think, has not hitherto been accurately
exhibited, even by the best logicians of the formal school.
By Kant and his followers, the Hypothetical Proposition
is described as representing a form of judgment essentially
distinct from the Categorical; the latter being thoroughly
assertorial, the former problematical in its constituent
parts, assertorial only as regards the relation between
them. Two judgments, each in itself false, may thus be
hypothetically combined into a single truth; and this combination cannot be reduced into categorical form.' The
Hypothetical Syllogism, in like manner, is a form of reasoning distinct from the Categorical, and not reducible to
it, being based on a different law of thought, namely, the
logical Principle of Sufficient Reason, a ratione ad rationatum, a negatione rationati ad 7negationem  rationis valet
consequentia.2
Of this principle, as applied to judgments, I have before
remarked, that it is not a law of thought, but only a statement of the necessity of some law or other. As applied
to syllogisms, it has the same character. It states the
fact, that whenever a condition, whether material cause
of a fact or formal reason of a conclusion, exists, the conditioned fact or conclusion exists also. Thus viewed, it
1 See Kant, Logic, ~ 25; Krug, Logik, ~ 57; Fries, System der Logik, ~ 32.
2 Kant, ~ 76; Krug, ~ 82; Fries, ~ 58.
17




194              PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
is not the law of any distinct reasoning process, but a
statement of the conditions in which laws of nature or
of thought are operative. When a material cause exists,
its material effect follows, and the phenomenon indicates
a law of nature; when a logical premise is given, its
logical conclusion follows, and the result indicates a law
of thought.  What law, must in each case be determinedcl
by the particular features of the phenomenon or reasoning
in question; but a statement of this kind is distinguished
from laws of thought, properly so called, by the fact, that
it cannot be expressed in a symbolical form: we require
the introduction of a definite notion, Cause, Reason,
Condition, or something of the kind, which is a special
object of thought, not the general representative of all
objects whatever. The principle in question is thus only
a statement of the peculiar character of certain matters
about which we may think, and not a law of the form of
thought in general.
It is obvious that the relation of premises and conclusion
in a syllogism may, like any other relation of condition
and conditioned, be expressed in the form of a hypothetical proposition: "If all A is B, and all C is A, then all
C is B;" and the actual assertion of the truth of these
premises will furnish at once a so-called hypothetical syllogism: "But all A is B, and all C is A, therefore all C
is B." This was observed by Fries, who hence rightly
maintains that analytical hypothetical judgments are formal syllogisms.l  It is strange that, after this, he should
not have gone a step further, and discovered that synthetical hypothetical judgments are assertions of material
consequences. The judgment, " If A is B, C is D," asserts
the existence of a consequence necessitated by laws other
1 System der Loylic, ~ 44.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.              195
than those of thought, and consequently out of the province of Logic. The addition of a minor premise and conclusion in the so-called hypothetical syllogism, is merely
the assertion that this general material consequence is
verified in a particular case.
The distinction so much insisted on by the Kantians,
of the problematical character of the two members of a
hypothetical judgment, is, like the whole Kantian doctrine
of modality, of no consequence in formal Logic. All
formal thinking is, as regards the material character of
its objects, problematical only. Formal Conception pronounces that certain objects of thought may possibly exist,
leaving their actual existence to be determined by experience. Formal Judgment decides on the possible coSxistence of certain concepts; and Formal Reasoning, on
the truth of a conclusion, subject to the hypothesis of the
truth of its premises.
To state that this hypothesis is in a certain instance
true, adds nothing to the logical part of the reasoning, but
only verifies the empirical preliminaries which the logician
in every case assumes as given.  To exhibit a formal
consequence hypothetically, is only a needless reassertion
of the existence of data which the act of thought presupposes. To exhibit a material consequence hypothetically,
is not to make it formal, but only to assert that, in a
certain given instance, a consequence not cognizable by
Logic takes place. The sequence of " C is D," from " A
is B," is not one whit more logical than it was before; it
is only stated to take place materially in the present case.
The omission of hypothetical syllogisms has frequently
been deemed a defect in Aristotle's Organon; and his
French translator takes some fruitless pains to strain his
text, in order to make out that he does in fact treat of




196              PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
them.l If there is any truth in the preceding observations, it will follow, that Aristotle understood the limits
of Logic better than his critics; and that his translator
had better have allowed the omission as a merit than have
attempted to deny it as a fault. When the hypothetical
proposition states a formal consequence, the reasoning
grounded upon it may always be reduced to categorical.
When it states a material consequence, it states what the
logician, as such, cannot take into account. Aristotle is
therefore quite right in saying, that in this case the conclusion is not proved, but conceded.2  Syllogism may be
employed as a logical proof of the antecedent: the consequent is admitted to follow on grounds which the logician,
as such, does not investigate, but which may be warranted
by the principles of this or that material science.
The true character of hypothetical reasoning is lost
sight of in the examples commonly selected by logicians,
which have for their subject a proper name, and indicate,
not a general relation of reason and consequent between
two notions, but certain accidental circumstances in the
history of an individual. The adoption of this type has
led to the logical anomaly, that the propositions of a
hypothetical syllogism are generally stated without any
designate quantity; whereas it is obvious that, wherever
concepts are compared together in any form of reasoning,
two distinct conclusions may follow, according to the
quantity assigned. For example, to the premise, "If men
are wise, they will consult their permanent interests," we
may supply two minors and conclusions, in the constructive form, according as we affirm  the antecedent of all
men or of some. It thus becomes necessary to distinguish
1St. Hilaire, Loyique d'Aristote Traduite en Francais, Preface, p. Ix.
2 Anal. Prior. i. 23, 11.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                   197
between two different kinds of apparently hypothetical
syllogisms, -  those in which the inference is from a general hypothesis to all or some of its special instances, and
those in which a relation between two individual facts is
assumed as a hypothesis leading to a singular conclusion.
The former contain a general relation of determining and
determined notion, which may always be expressed in
three terms; the occasional employment of four being
only an accidental variety of language.  Thus the general
assertion, "If any country is justly governed, the people
are happy," is equivalent to, "If any country is justly
governed, it has happy people." This we may apply to
special instances; all countries, some countries, or this
country, being asserted to be justly governed: and this
is properly hypothetical reasoning.  The latter denote
only a material connection between two single facts, either
of which may, to certain minds possessed of certain additional knowledge, be an indication of the other; but the
true ground of the inference is contained in this additional
knowledge, and not in the inere hypothetical coupling
of the facts by a conjunction.  This is not hypothetical
reasoning; i. e., it is not reasoning from the hypothesis, but
from other circumstances not mentioned in the hypothesis
at all.l
1 This may be made clearer by an example. The following is cited by
Fries as an instance of a hypothetical proposition not reducible to categorical form: "If Caius is free from business, he is writing poetry."
This may be interpreted to mean either, generally, " Whenever Caius is
disengaged, he writes poetry; " or, specially, " If he is now disengaged, he
is now writing poetry." Under the former interpretation, it is a general
hypothesis, which may be applied as a major premise to particular instances; but in this case the true form of the reasoning is, "All times
when Caius is disengaged are times when lie writes poetry; and the present is such a time." Under the latter interpretation, it is one of the cases
17:




198                PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
It thus appears that the only hypothetical judgment
which can be employed as the real major premise of a
syllogism  may be expressed in the form, " If A  is B, it is
C," where A, B, and C, represent concepts, or general
notions. The complete categorical equivalent to this is,
" Every A which is B is C, because it is B," which admits
of two interpretations, according as B stands for the
physical cause of the fact, or for the logical reason of our
knowing it.  In the latter case, the judgment is analytical,
and represents a disguised formal consequence, with B as
a middle term; e. g., "Every  man who is learned has
studied, because he is learned."  Here the notion of study
is implied in that of learning, and the major premise is, " All
learned beings have studied."  The hypothetical proposition thus becomes a complete syllogism, to which the subsequent consequence is related as an episyllogism.' In the
former case, where B stands for a physical cause, the judgment is synthetical, and indicates a material consequence,
which it requires some additional knowledge of facts to
of a material connection of two facts mentioned in the text. Now, in
this last case, it is obvious that the inference is really made, not from the
hypothesis, but from some circumstance known to the reasoner, but not
appearing in the proposition. Any man being asked, " Why do you infer
that Caius, being now disengaged, is writing poetry?" would reply, " Because he told me he should do so; " or something of the kind. Assuredly
he would never dream of replying, " Because if he is now disengaged he
is writing." In this case, then, he does not reason from the hypothesis, and
the expressed propositions do not compose a syllogism.
1 Thus:
Hypothetical Syllogism.         Categorical Analysis.
If any man is learned, he has   All learned beings have studied:
studied:                     All learned men are learned beSome men are learned;            ings;.'. Some men have studied..~. All learned men have studied:
Some men are learned men;
Some men have studied.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                   199
reduce to formal; e. g., " All wax exposed to the fire melts,
because it is exposed."  Here, on material grounds, we
know  that we cannot supply the premise, "All bodies
exposed to the fire melt;" but only, "All bodies soluble
by heat and exposed to the fire melt." In this case the
consequence is extralogical, and requires additional data
not given in the thought. But here, also, when the judgment in question is employed as the premise of a reasoning, the conclusion follows categorically; though the
premise itself cannot, as it stands, be moved by a prosyllogism.1
The Disjunctive Judgment is usually described as representingo a whole divided into two or more parts mutually
exclusive of each other; and the Disjunctive Syllogism is
supposed to proceed either from  the affirmation of one
member to the denial of the rest, or from the denial of all
but one to the affirmation of that one, by the Principle of
Excluded Middle.2
This can scarcely be regarded as a correct analysis of
the process, unless the two members are formally stated
as contradictory.  The Principle of Excluded Middle asserts that everything is either A or not A; that of two
contradictories, one must exist in every object; as the
Principle of Contradiction asserts that they cannot both
exist.  But if the two members are not stated as contradictories, if my disjunctive premise is, "All C is either A
1 The analysis in this case may be exhibited thus:
Hypothetical Syllogism.       Categorical Equivalent.
If any wax is exposed to the fire,   All wax exposed to the fire melts
it melts:                      (because exposed):
This wax is exposed to the fire;    This wax is exposed to the fire;.'. This wax melts... This wax melts.
The parenthesis indicates the material ground of the major premise.
2 Kant, ~~ 27sqq., 77, 78; Krug, 4~ 57, 81, 85; Fries, ~~ 33, 59.




200              PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
or B," I make the material assertion that All C which is
not A is B.  If then I reason, "This C is not A,' therefore
it is B," I employ the Principle of Identity in addition to
that of Excluded Middle. Again, if I maintain that No C
can be both A and B, I make the material assertion that
No C which is A is B; and from hence to reason, " This C
is A, therefore it is not B," requires not the Principle of
Excluded Middle, but that of Contradiction. In the first
case, the Excluded Middle does not lead directly to the
conclusion, but only to the contraposition of the minor
premise. When we deny this C to be A, this principle
enables us to assert that it is not-A, and hence to bring the
reasoning under the Principle of Identity. But in the second case, in which one of the opposed members is affirmed,
the ground on which we deny the other is not because
both cannot be false, but because both cannot be true.
It may be questioned whether this second inference
is warranted by the form of the disjunctive premise.
Boethius calls it a material contseqjtece;2 and, in spite
of the many eminent authorities on the other side, I am
still disposed to think he is right.  But let us grant for a
moment the opposite view, and allow that the proposition,
"All C is either A or B," implies, as a condition of its truth,
" No C can be both."3  Thus viewed, it is in reality a complex proposition, containing two distinct assertions, each
of which may be the ground of two distinct processes of
reasoning, governed by two opposite laws.  Surely it is
essential to all clear thinking that the two should be separated from each other, and not confounded under one form
1 The indefinite minor, "But it is not A," is as objectionable in this
syllogism as in the conditional.
2 De Syll. Hyp. lib. i.; Opera, p. 616; Cf. Galen; Isagoge Dial. p. 11.
3 Aquinas, Opusc. xlviii.; De Enunciatione, c. xiv.; Krug, Logik, ~ 86.




PROLEGOMENA  LOGICA.                     201
by assuming the Law of Excluded Middle to be, what it
is not, a complex of those of Identity and Contradiction.
Thus distinguished, the moods of the disjunctive syllogism
are mere verbal variations from  the categorical form, and
may easily be brought under its laws.l
The preceding discussion may appear to some readers
of trifling importance; and some apology for its length
may be thought necessary.  I believe nothing to be unimportant, in a logical work, which tends to mark out more
accurately the nature of thought and its laws, to exhibit
more precisely the formal character of logical processes,
and to clear the subject from the remaining excreseences
and inconsistencies with which, even in the writings of
the best modern Logicians, it is still occasionally encumbered.2  Either Logic is not worth studying at all, or it is
worth studying in the utmost completeness and exactitude
1 Thus:
Modus tollendo ponens.           Modus ponendo tollens.
Every e which is not A is B.     No C which is A is B.
Every  Every 
Some  CisaCwhich is not A.    Some  C is a C which is A.
This )                           This 
t. itis B...It is not B.
The first is governed by the Principle of Identity, and the second by the
Principle of Contradiction.
2 For example: Fries, after expressly distinguishing the Principle of
Sufficient Reason from the other Formulae of Thought, as not being a
principle of philosophical or formal Logic, places it in his next chapter in
a coordinate position with them, as the distinctive law of hypothetical syllogisms. Krug describes it in one place as the highest principle of syllogism in general, and in another as the special principle of a single class
of reasonings. It is proper to speak with respect even of the errors of the
great philosopher of Knigsbuhnrg; but perhaps even Kant was in some
degree biassed, in his examination of logical processes, by an almost pedantic love of reproducing in every relation his four Functions of Judgment, and by the strange metaphysical theory which deduced the three
Ideas of Pure Reason from the three kinds of dialectical syllogism.




202             PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
of which it is susceptible. The length to which these
remarks have run is justified, indeed demanded, by the
eminence of the authors from whom the writer has ventured to dissent, - authors whose mere assertions in matters of logical science are not to be lightly regarded nor
hastily departed from. Even if the views here advanced
should be found, on examination, to be less tenable
than the author believes them to be, they will not have
been without their use, if, by calling the attention of others
to one or two of the weaker defences of the received doctrines of Formal Logic, they should indirectly lead to a
more satisfactory vindication of the positions assailed.
It only remains to sum up as briefly as possible the results of the present chapter. Formal or Logical Necessity
is dependent on one negative condition, and on three
positive laws. The negative condition, or sine qua non
of thought in general, is contained in the Principle of
Sufficient Reason, which, however, in this relation, belongs
to Psychology, and not to Logic; being only a' general
statement of the conditions under which, in the existing
constitution of man's mind, thought is possible; -its dependence, that is to say, on a higher thought, or on a fact
of intuition.  The three positive laws, or fundamental
principles, assumed by Logic, as regulating all its actual
processes, are those of Identity, of Contradiction, and of
Excluded Middle; the last, however, operating in most
cases in subordination to the other two. These three are
the highest and simplest forms of identical judgments, to
one of which all analytical thinking may ultimately be
referred: and all pure thinking may be shown, on psychological grounds, to be of a strictly analytical character.
The necessity arising from these laws is that of the harmony of thought with itself, -of its conformity to its own




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.              203
ruling principles; as the forms of necessity noticed in the
previous chapters were those arising from the relation of
thought to the laws and condition of intuition, -the requisite harmony of the several mental faculties one with
another. These two harmonies constitute respectively
Formal and Material Truth. Truth, relatively to man,
cannot be defined as consisting in the conformity of knowledge with its object; for to man the object itself exists
only as it is known by one faculty or another. Material
Truth consists rather in the conformity of the object as
represented in thought with the object as presented in
intuition; and of this no general law or criterion can be
given; its essence consisting in its adapting itself in every
case to the diversities of this or that special presentation.
But Logical Truth, which consists in the conformity of
thought to its own laws, can be submitted to those laws as
general and sufficient criteria; criteria, however, not of the
real and existent, but of the thinkable and possible. Of
actual truth it furnishes one element only, which becomes
truth or not in combination, according as, upon further
examination, it is found to be in conformity or at variance
with the-co6rdinate decisions of experience. By the same
criteria we shall also be able to determine the logical or
extralogical character of any portion of the contents of
existing treatises on the science; according as it is a deduction of pure thinking from given materials, or a mixed
process, combining the act of thought with the acquisition
of further empirical data. On the distinction established
between material and formal thinking, some further observations will be made in the next chapter.




CHAPTER VII.
ON THE MATTER AND FORM OF THOUGHT.
THE distinction adopted between Matter and Form in
common language, relatively to works of Art, will serve
to illustrate the character of the corresponding distinction
in Thought.  The term Mlatter is usually applied to whatever is given to the artist, and consequently, as given, does
not come within the province of the art itself to supply.
The Porm  is that which is given in and through the
proper operation of the art. In Sculpture, for example,
the Matter is the marble in its rough state as given to
the sculptor; the Form  is that which the sculptor, in tile
exercise of his art, communicates to it.' The distinction
between Matter and Form  in any mental operation is
analogous to this. The former includes all that is given
to, the latter all that is given by, the operation. In the
division of notions, for example, whether performed by an
act of pure thinking or not, the generic notion is that
given to be divided; the addition of the difference in the
act of division constitutes the species. And, accordingly,
Genus is frequently designated by logicians the mzateriacl,
Difference, the formal part, or the Species. So, likewise, in
any operation of pure thinking, the Matter will include all
that is given to and out of the thought; the Form is what
is conveyed in and by the thinking act itself.
1 See Fries, System der Logik, ~ 19. His division corresponds to tire
above, though based on a somewhat different principle.




PROLEGOMENA LOUICA.               205
The same analogy may be carried on in relation to what
are called material and formal processes of thinking. It
may happen on certain occasions that the marble given to
the sculptor is insufficient for the completion of the statue.
It becomes necessary, therefore, to suspend the artistic
process itself, in order to obtain additional material; and
this provision of new material the artist does not undertake purely as a sculptor. So in relation to any process
of thinking. The empirical data requisite for an act of
conception, judgment, or reasoning, may be insufficient,
and require the addition of fresh material not furnished
by the mere act of thinking. The operation in this case
is one of mixed or material thinking; i. e., of thinking preceded by an appeal to experience for the provision of
further data; and this appeal is no part of the duty of the
logician, as such. Whereas, if the materials originally
given are alone sufficient to necessitate, in obedience to
the laws of thought, an act of conception, judgment, or
reasoning, the process is properly distinguished as one
of pure or formal thinking.
Notwithstanding this analogy, it is in many respects inmportant that the matter and form of a thought should not
be confounded with material and formal thinking respectively. Thinking is not always formal because its product
has form, nor does the presence of a form in the antecedent of thought always necessitate a formal process in
consequence. The sculptor, to continue our image, may
ultimately complete his work with all the form and finish
of art: it does not therefore follow that all his material
must have been given to him at once in the first instance.
Or he may have carved with exactness one subordinate
figure of a group: it does not therefore follow that his
material is sufficient to enable him to complete the whole.
18




206              PROLEGOMENA L.OGICA.
The present chapter is intended to point out more clearly
the distinction and relation between the form of thought
and formal thinking.
The antithesis of matter and form,- the objective and
the subjective, - the variable and the permanent, - the
contingent and the necessary, runs through all the phenomena of consciousness. The manifold elements presented
by any object of consciousness constitute the matter; the
relations which the mind, acting by its own laws, institutes between the several elements as it combines them
into an object, constitute the form.l In this point of view,
Space and Time are called by Kant the Forms of the Sensibility in general, external or internal; the objects of the
former being necessarily regarded by the mind as lying
out of ourselves in Space, the objects of the latter, as
succeeding one another in Time. These may thus be
regarded as the subjective conditions under which sensibility in general is possible. The same antithesis may be
carried through those special acts of consciousness, in
which the understanding operates, whether in conjunction
with the presentative faculties, as in an act of mixed thinking, or representatively, as in pure thinking. A savage,
to adopt an illustration of Kant's,2 sees a house in the distance, not knowing what it is. It is thus present to him
only as an intuition in space. But the very same complex
phenomenon is presented to a man who knows it to be
a building designed for the habitation of men. To the
same sensible data the understanding now adds its own
contribution, by which the several presentations of sense
are combined into one whole, under the general notion of
1 See Kant, Kritik der r. a. p. 32 (ed. Rosenkranz).
2 Logik, Einleitung v.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                 207
a house. The sensible attributes here constitute the matter; their union in a concept is the form.
In Thought, as in Intuition, there is thus a variable and
a permanent, an objective and a subjective element, a
matter given to the thinker, a form communicated by the
thinking act. In respect to the matter, concepts differ one
from another, as being composed of this or that variety
of given attributes. In respect of the form, all agree, as
being a collection of attributes constituting an object.
The universal conditions under which attributes are conceived in this relation have been pointed out in the last
chapter, as the Principles of Identity, Contradiction, and
Excluded Middle. From these three laws we may deduce,
with some amendment, the Forms which have been regarded by logical writers as distinctive of the Concept
proper.' The concept is necessarily conceived as one, as
one out of many, and as constituting with the many a
universe of all that is conceivable.  From the last of these
three conditions it follows that the concept must possess a
generic or universal feature, by which it is characterized
as a concept in general, or a member of the conceivable
universe.  From  the second it follows, that it must also
possess a differential or peculiar feature, by which it is distinguished from all others. And fiom the first it follows,
that these two features must be united in a single whole.
Hence every concept, as such, must possess in some degree
the attributes of distinctness, as having complex contents;
of clearness, as being, by one portion of its contents, distinguishable from other notions; and of relation to a possible object of intuition, inasmuch as the unity of a complex
1 See Kant, Logik, ~ 2; Fries, System. de Logik, ~ 20. The former places
the form of a concept in its universality; the latter adopts the same view,
subdividing universality into extension and comprehension.




208              PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
notion depends not on a mere juxtaposition of ternls, but
upon its being the representative of one object.' These
three forms may be otherwise denominated (for the difference is merely verbal) comprehension, limitation, and extension.  As having  complex  contents, every concept
comprehends certain attributes; as distinguishable from
others, it is limited by its specific difference; and, as representative of a class of possible objects, it has a certain
field over which it is extended. The forms of the concept
proper may thus be indifferently enumerated as Distinctness, Clearness, and Relation to an object; or as Comprehension, Limitation, and Extension.
The matter and form of Judgments may be distinguished in the same manner as those of Concepts.
Omitting those judgments which involve merely the
enumeration of the attributes comprehended in a concept
(the analytical or explicative judgments of Kant), which
may be more properly classed as acts of Conception; and
confining ourselves to those in which the contents of the
given concepts are distinct from each other (the synthetical or anmliative judgments of Kant), we may distinguish,
as before, between the preexisting materials, which must
be given before the act of judging takes place, and the
additions contributed by the act itself.
Thus, to take an example adduced in a former chapter:
If I poise a piece of gold in my hand, in order to ascertain
whether it is heavy, the presented phenomena belong to
distinct acts of sensation. The evidence of sight attests
1 Arist. Metaph. vi. 12.'E7rl yvy 7&p o70o &vrpw'OS Ka! Xevicbv'roXXa',v
o'r'TvI, 8cav     aa )r vpXP Zcarepw SaTrEpov,'v 8','Tav i' X7rapX Kal'dSy r''r
vr'oKtEeEvov o6 tvSpw7ros''TT'E yap ev')yiyveTa Kcal OTv 6V AE vUKbS trapwo'ros.
Ibid. vii. 6.'0' 6pw!t-Js XUb yos e'TlTv eLs oTb O'vvUo'WcOt Ka&,drep'IX.Idy,
aAAx  T-^ &vbs deai.




PRIOLE(-,IOM ENA LOGICA.        209
the presence of a round, yellow, shininc body; the evidence of touch, or rather of muscular pressure, attests its
weight. To unite these attributes as belonging to one
and the same thing, is an act, not of sensation, but of
thought.  The mere sensation, aided by the concepts,
presents us with three things - the body which is seen,
and a certain temporal and local juxtaposition of the two.
To combine the present attributes as belonging to one
thing — to pronounce that it is the gold which is heavy
-is an act of thought constituting a judgment. Here,
then, we have one form of the judgment expressed in the
copula, "Gold is heavy:" this indicates the identification
of the two concepts as related to a common object; an
identification usually known as the Quality of the Judgment.
The same is the case with the Quantity of Judgments.
I see a number of balls lying on a table, and pronounce at
once that they are all white; I see another collection, and
assert in like manner that some are white and some black.
Here the senses, even when aided by the concepts in
distinguishing the balls as such, yet present to us only
individual objects.  Th2s, this, and t]his, are within their
province; but they know nothing of all or some. It is by
an act of thought that the several individuals are regarded
as constituting a whole, and a judgment pronounced concerning that whole or a portion of it.
A third Form of the Judgment, as indeed of all thought,
is Limitation. In predicating one notion of another, I at
the same time necessarily exclude everything to whlich
that predicate is opposed, and tlhereby limit the subject to
one alone of those contradictory determinations which
make up the universe of thought. In asserting, for exainmplc, that gold is heavy, I as much exclude it from the class
loss2/




210               PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
of imponderables as I include it in that of bodies possessing weight.  The canon that predication is limitation is now indeed generally admitted as an axiom  in
philosophy;1 and the various metaphysical systems of
modern Germany, since the days of Kant, may be briefly
described as so many attempts to evade the consequences
of this principle, by constructing a philosophy of the unlimited on a basis independent of logical predication.
The two forms of Quantity and Quality are generally
recognized by logicians of the school of Kant. To these
are added two others, Relation and Modality. The former
of these includes the three subdivisions of Categorical,
Hypothetical, and Disjunctive, and is necessarily included
among the forms of thought by those who adopt Kant's
theory of the nature of these three kinds of propositions.
But the view which has been taken of these in the last
chapter precludes the admission of Relation as a distinct
form from Quantity and Quality. Disjunctive judgments
have there been treated as reducible to Categorical forms;
and Hypotheticals as containing, not a judgment, properly
spteaking, but a consequence, formal or material.  In this
case, the relation is not between the different parts of a single judgment, but between two judgments, one dependent
on the other. The judgment proper being thus confined
to the categorical form only, Relation becomes only a general expression for the connection of subject and predicate
under certain conditions of quantity and quality, and thus
is not a special form of judgment, but a term equivalent
to Form in general.
1 See for example, among others, Fichte, Ueber den Grund unseres Glanbens an eine g6ttliche Wellregierung, p. 16 (ITVerke, v. p. 187); Gerichtliche
Verantzwortung, p. 47 ( Werke, v. p. 265); Bestinl2nung des ]Ienschen ( TVerke,
ii. p. 304); Hegel, Logik, P. i. b. ii. ch. 2, P. ii. ch. 2 ( Werke, iv. p. 26, v.
p. 70).




ItROLEUOMENA LOGICA.                   211
As regards Modality, judgments, according to Kant, are
of three kinds: problematical, assertorial, and apodeictical.
The first are accompanied by a consciousness of the bare
possibility of the judgment; the second, by a consciousness of its reality; the third, by a consciousness of
its necessity. Modality is thus dependent on the manner in which a certain relation between two concepts
is maintained, and may vary according to the state of
different minds; the given concepts, and consequently the
matter of the judgment, remaining unaltered.'  These
grounds are fully sufficient to establish modality, in the
extent to which it is acknowledged by Kant and by Aristotle,2 as, in a psychological point of view, belonging to
the form, not to the 9)matter, of judgment.  It is conveyed
in the act of judging, not given in the preliminary materials, and affects the copula, not the predicate. But the
forms cognizable by Psychology must not be confounded
with the forms cognizable by Logic.  The latter science
is not concerned, as is sometimes maintained, with the
Forms of Thought in general, but only with the Forms
of Thought as related to pure or formal thinking.  The
meaning of this limitation will appear more clearly in the
sequel.  In this point of view, Modality stands on a very
different footing from  Quantity and Quality.  In cases
1 Kant, Logik, ~ 30.
2 Aristotle, in the De Inteqpretatione, ch. 12, enumerates four modes of
judgment: the necessary, the impossible, the contingent, and the possible.
The addition of the true and the false is, I think, founded on a misinterprctation. These modes he reduces, in the Prior Analytics, i. 2, to the necessary and the contingent (To Et ava'ycK7Js b7rc&PXev and  oO EvaEXEtrDatL
v7rapXEYV). These, with the addition of the pure judgment (TOO ncTapXEiv),
correspond to the division of Kant.  The spurious modes admitted inl
ablndance by the scholastic logicians are not forms of the judfmcent, but
modifications of one of its terms only. They affect, that is, the subject
alone, or the pred(liclte alone, not the relation between the two.




212             PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
where a modal conclusion is drawn fromn modal premises,
it is only the form of the conclusion as a judgment that
differs from  that of the pure syllogism: its relation to
the premises as a conclusion from  them, consequently
the entire form  of the reasoning, is the same in both.
WVhereas, by the substitution of a negative premise for
an affirmative, or of a particular for a universal, the conclusiveness of the premises as necessitating a consequence,
and hence the whole form of the reasoning, will, in most
cases, vanish altogether. For this reason, Modality, though
psychologically a form of judgment, is not one of those
forlms that properly fall within the province of Logic. This
will be made clearer when we come to treat of the matter
and form of syllogisms.l
As conception furnishes the material for an act of judgment, so judgment furnishes the material for an act of
reasoning.  The Matter of the inference consists in the
several propositions of which it is composed, and which
vary in every different instance: its Form appears in the
manner in which those propositions are invariably thought
as connected together as premises and conclusion. This
connection consists in the recognition of a relation of
identity or contradiction between the terms as given in
the antecedent and those connected by the act of reasoning in the consequent. The Forms of the Syllogism may
thus be determined by the following question: Given two
judgments (no matter what may be their material signification), what relations must exist between them to warrant
us in inferring a third judgment as their consequent?
In the first place, the premises and conclusion must
stand to each other in the relation of condition and con1 On the disputed question of the relation of Modals to Logic, some further remarks will be found in the Appendix, note II.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.               213
ditioned.  As the predicate of a judgment limits and
determines the subject, so the premises of a syllogism.
must limit and determine the conclusion. Limitation is
thus a form of reasoning, as of all thinking; the act of
reasoning being such as to determine the mind to one
actual conclusion out of two contradictory possibilities.
In the second place, since the terms of the conclusion
are not compared  together directly, but through the
medium of a third, it is necessary that this third concept
should be compared with each of the others. This comparison, as we have seen in the last chapter, results in a
relation either of identity or contradiction; the objects
denoted by the two concepts being pronounced identical
when the premise is affirmative, and contradictory when
it is negative; and a similar relation being consequently
inferred to exist between the concepts compared together
in the conclusion. The Forms which the Syllogism exhibits in these relations are those of 2Mood and Figure,
affirmative or negative, which show us what relations of
identity or contradiction in the premises of a Syllogism
may legitimately determine a similar relation in the conclusion.
Inferences, as well as judgments, are in some cases the
result of an act of mixed thinking; of reasoning, that is, in
conjunction with an appeal to experience. This is sometimes distinguished by logicians as material consequence;
the strictly logical operation being designated formal. In
the earlier portion of the present chapter it has been necessary to avoid this nomenclature; the object having been
to show that in every act of thought, pure or mixed, tihe
product exhibits the distinct features of a lmatter given to,
and a form given by, the thinker. The matter and form
of thought are thus by no means coextensive with material




214             PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
and formal thinking; and it becomes, therefore, necessary
to examine separately the propriety of these last expressions, and to determine what is the exact sense in which
Logic is defined to be a Formal Science.
The distinction between formal and material, or, as for
the present it is better to term them, between pure and
mixed thinking, has not in general been consistently followed out by logicians. They have allowed the existence
of material consequences in which the conclusion does not
follow from the given premises, but requires additional
data from experience; and these they have rightly regarded
as extralogical; but they have not observed that the same
distinction is applicable to Apprehension and Judgment,
as well as to reasoning; that there are pure and mixed
concepts and judgments, as well as pure and mixed reasonings; and that in every case the province of Logic is
with the first only. In consequence of this, the province
of Logic has been by some too much widened, and by
others too much narrowed. On the one side, we are told
tlhat it can remedy indistinctness of apprehension and falsity of judgment - a pretension which, announced without
limitation, is perfectly absurd; and on the other side, it
has been described as concerned with the operation of reasoning, only; apprehension and judgment being considered
only in subordination to this. Neither view has been consistently carried out. The advocates of the former ought
to have included within the province of Logic, Induction,
Analogy, and the whole field of probable reasoning; while
the advocates of the latter ought to have extended the
signification of the term reasoning, so as to include those
forms of pure thinking which are governed by the same
laws as the formal syllogism.
It would be more correct to distinguish, with regard to




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.               215
all the three operations of the understanding, between
those errors which arise from a defect in the thought itself,
and those which arise fiom a defect in the corresponding
experience. For example: my conception of a particular
flower is obscure, when I have not noticed it so closely as
to be able to distinguish it as a whole from certain others;
it is indistinct, when I know it as a whole, but have not
analyzed it so minutely as to be able to enumerate its
botanical characteristics. In these cases the defect is empirical, and can only be remedied by closer attention to
the individual flowers of that kind. But, on the other
hand, my conception may be obscure, as containing attlibutes inconsistent with the existence of its object as an
individual whole; or it may be indistinct, as containing
attributes incapable of coSxisting with each other as parts
of a whole. Thus we may be told to conceive a flower of
no color at all, or a flower which shall be both red and
white on the same part of the same leaf. In these cases
the defect is in the thought itself; and, accordinglk, Logic
is competent to declare the supposed object inconceivable.
Again, a judgment may be empirically false, as asserting a
combination of attributes never actually found in experience; as if it is asserted that a horse has five legs. It
may be logically false, as coupling together attributes which
contradict each other; as if it is asserted that a quadruped
has five legs. In the former case, I can contradict the assertion only by an appeal to the experience of all who are
acquainted with the animal; in the latter, I can contradict
it oni logical grounds, as false in the thought itself. An
inference, in like manner, may be empirically inconsequent,
as grounded on a relation of phenomena not invariable in
nature; it may be logically inconsequent, as deduced from
premises not necessitating it by the laws of thought. Thus,




216              PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
if I am asked whether this particular fall of the barometer
is a ground for asserting that it will rain within twelve
hours, I can only reply, as a logician, that it is so, if all
falls of the barometer are so; but whether this is the case
in fact, cannot be decided by logic, but by experience. On
the other hand, if it be expressly stated that some falls only
of the barometer are indications of rain within twelve hours,
I can at once decide that it is logically inconsequent to
reason from a merely partial rule to any single instance:
the rain may in this case be expected with more or less
probability, but it cannot be inferred as a certainty.
It thus appears that, in all the three operations of the
understanding, Logic is equally competent to detect their
internal vices, as thoughts transgressing their own laws;
and that in all it is equally incompetent to detect their
external vices, as thoughts inconsistent with experience.
It can detect the inconceivability of a notion, the selfcontradiction of a judgment, the inconsequence of a conclusion, as not necessitated by given premises. It cannot
supply the empirical deficiencies of a notion, nor determine
the real existence of its object; it cannot ascertain the
truth or falsehood of a judgment as a statement of a fact;
it cannot decide as to the necessary sequence of a conclusion from understood premises, or the probability of its
truth where the given premises are insufficient to necessitate it by the laws of thought. It remains to ascertain
the exact meaning of the expressionsformnal and material
thinking, as applied respectively to those operations which
do or do not fall within the province of Logic.
Law and Form, though correlative terms, must not, in
strict accuracy, be used as synonymous. The former is
used properly with reference to an operation; the latter,
with reference to its product. Conceiving, Judging, Rea



PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.              217
soning, are subject to certain laws; Concepts, Judgments,
Syllogisms, exhibit certain forms. But the laws of thought
are not always competent to determine its form, as has
been already shown in the case of all the products of mixed
thinking. In a synthetical judgment, for example, the
laws of thought can determine only its possible truth, which
equally implies its possible falsehood; thus leaving it altogether undecided whether the form of the judgment should
be affirmative or negative, universal or particular. The
form in all these cases is determined by that universal tendency of the human mind, which has been noticed in a
former chapter, the tendency to regard physical phenomena
as indicating the existence of a substance or a cause similar
to that of which we are directly conscious in our own mental states and operations. It is thus that, when experience
presents certain phenomena in juxtaposition, the mind is
invariably led to regard them as attributes of one and the
same substance; and this constitutes the form of all mixed
concepts and judgments. And in like manner, when one
phenomenon is the invariable consequent of another, the
mind is irresistibly led to regard them as respectively cause
and effect; and this constitutes the form in all cases of
mixed inference. The same tendencies which thus cooperate with the presentations of experience in the acts of
mixed thinking, cooperate in like manner with the laws of
thought in acts of pure thinking. In the former case, the
attributes are given as empirically related as intuitions;
ill the latter, they are given as logically related as thoughts;
and in both they are regarded as mutually related to some
unknown substance or cause. But that these tendencies,
however universal or irresistible, cannot properly be regarded as laws of thought or of intuition, is manifest from
the fact, that they furnish no criterion for determining the
19




218              PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
legitimacy or illegitimacy of any product.  Thoughts,
whether empirically true or false, whether logically sound
or unsound, in this respect present precisely the same
features. An assertion, false in point of fact, or self-contradictory in point of thought, contains, as regards the
supposed relation of attributes to a common substance,
precisely the same form as one logically and empirically
valid. The Principles of Substance and Causality are thus
rather negative conditions than positive laws of thought.
They have a psychological relation to thought as it actually exists, explaining and accounting for the fact of its
invariably assuming a certain form; but they have no logical relation to thought as it ought to be, and furnish no
criterion of its validity in any special instance.
Logical or pure thinking is not, therefore, called formal,
because its product exhibits a form; for the coexistence
of matter and form is common to all thought, and to all
spurious imitations of thought. But the justification of
the terms formal and material, as applied to pure and
mixed processes of thinking, is to be found in the circumstance, that in the former the act of thought is based on
the form only of the preliminary data, without reference
to the particular matter; while, on the other hand, matter
is necessarily taken into account in every process of
mixed thinking. To an act of logical conception, for example, it is not necessary to examine in any case the
special character of the attributes, as having been actually
combined in experience; but only that they should be
compatible with the possible existence of an object in
space or time. In an act of logical judgment, one of the
given concepts being always comprehended in the other,
it is indifferent of what special attributes either is composed, provided they possess sufficient clearness and dis



PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.             219
tinctness to enable the mind to discern the relation
between them. In an act of logical reasoning, the validity
of the conclusion depends solely on the quantity and
quality of the given premises, without any reference to
the particular terms of which they are composed. In all,
so long as the formal relation of the data remains the
same, the matter may be changed as we please, without
affecting the logical value of the thought. In mixed
thinking, on the other hand, the matter is of principal importance. To determine that this or that object of conception actually exists, that this or that judgment is in
accordance with experience, that this or that inference is
sufficiently probable to furnish a reasonable motive to
action, we require to be guided by a knowledge of the
nature and circumstances of the particular object in question. And it is for this reason that all examples of logical
thinking are better expressed by means of arbitrary symbols than of significant terms; not that it is in any case
possible to think without some matter or other, but because it is wholly indifferent what matter we may at the
time be thinking about; and, therefore, by employing an
unmeaning sign, indifferently representative of any object
of thought, we are enabled to clear the process from any
accidental admixture of material knowledge, and to exhibit the form alone in its proper relation to the laws of
thought.
In accordance with the view here given of Form and
Formal Processes, it will be proper to modify slightly
some of the definitions of Logic given by those philosophers whose views have been principally followed in the
Ipresent work. Logic, to omit less accurate views of its
nature, has been defined as the Science of the bare Form




220              PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
of Thought,' or as the Science of the Formal Laws of
Thought;2   definitions which, though substantially approaching far nearer to the truth than any antagonist
view, still leave something to desire in point of verbal
accuracy. The term formal strictly belongs rather to the
process of pure thinking than to the laws by which it is regulated, or to the science which takes cognizance of them;
and Logic is not the science of the Forms of Thought in
general, but only of such as are subservient to other processes of formal thinking. Other forms, such as modality,
fall without the province of Logic, and within that of
Psychology; to which latter science, indeed, all the forms
and laws of thought belong in their relation to the constitution of the thinking subject. To Logic, on the other
band, belong the same forms and laws in relation to those
acts and products of pure thinking which are suggested
by the one and governed by the other. If, therefore,
slightly altering the language of the above definitions, we
define Logic as the Science of the Laws and Products of
Pure or Formal Thinking,3 we shall express with tolerable
accuracy its character and province, according to the views
advocated in the preceding pages.
1 Kant, Logik, Einleitung I.; Hoffbauer, Logik, ~ 17.
2 Sir W. Hamilton, Discussions, p. 119.
3 This coincides nearly with the definition given by Sir W. Hamilton
(Reid's Works, p. 698), The science of the laws of thought as thought.




CHAPTER VIII.
ON POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE THOUGHT.
LOGIC has been described by Kant as the science of the
necessary laws of the understanding and of the reason.
Psychologically, the propriety of this division of the mental faculties has been called in question by eminent critics.
And in a logical point of view it is untenable, if, as I have
endeavored to show, judgment and reasoning, in so far as
they are logical processes, are both governed by the same
laws, and must be referred to the same faculty. In the
present chapter, however, it is proposed to examine another expression of the same definition, and to inquire in
what sense the Laws of Thought can properly be called
necessary.  Kant employed this term to distinguish the
laws of thought in general from those of thought as employed upon any definite class of objects; it being optional
with every man, and therefore contingent, whether he shall
exercise his understanding on one class of objects rather
than another.2 This distinction I have preferred to express
in othei words, by separating pure or formal from mixed
or material thinking; but the Kantian phraseology may
serve to introduce a subject, the right understanding of
which is of considerable importance in Logic: the differ1 Among others, by Sir William Hamilton (Discussions, p. 17), and byM.
Cousin (Lemons sur la philosophie de Kant, L. vi.).
2 Kant, Logik, Einleitung I.




222               PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
ence, namely, between positive and negative thinking.
The phrase necessary lazos of thought, if such language is
allowable, ought to imply that we cannot think at all except under their conditions; and yet it is notorious that
such laws are daily transgressed, that nothing is more common than illogical reasoning. To reconcile the language
with the fact is the object of the following observations.
Illogical reasoning may be of two very different kinds.
It may violate the laws of thought in cases where they are
applicable, or it may endeavor to extend them to cases
where they are not applicable. The offence in the former
case consists in attempting to draw a conclusion opposed
to that which the laws require; in the latter, in attempting to draw a conclusion where none can be legitimately
inferred. Thus we may, verbally at least, reason, "All A
is B; all C is A; therefore no C is B." Or we may reason,
"All A is B; some C is not A; therefore some C is not
B."  If the laws of thought are in the strict sense necessary, i. e., obligatory upon every act of thinking, it will
follow that these supposed reasonings are neither of them
acts of thought at all.
It is, of course, always possible to compose a verbal representation of a thought in which the rules of Logic shall
be violated, and to understand fully the meaning of each
word of which it is composed. The test, however, of the
reality of a thought does not lie in the possibility of assertion, but in the possibility of conception; in the power,
that is to say, of combining the given attributes in a single
image representative of an individual object of intuition.2
10u'yap 7rpbs'rbv egow Xo yorv l   -afreLts, a.Xa r ipbs'rbv ev T4 AvXi, 7 EIl
oie~ ouvXXo-ytouds.'Ael -yap'TrTvLY  vr7Yrvai 7rpbs Tbv W ac Xo'yov,, a&Xa& rpbs
bV E'OW AXdyov ObK &El. - Arist. Anal. Post. I. 10, 6.
2 It will be necessary here to bear in mind what has been observed before,




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                 223
I may make use of the words a round square, or a bilinear
figure; but the terms imply no conception, because the
attributes cannot be united in an image. These words,
therefore, are not the signs of thought, but only express the
negation of any object on which thought can be exercised.'
And such, in ultimate analysis, will be seen to be the
case with all verbal combinations in which the laws of
formal thinking are violated; whether directly, by denying
their authority in cases to which they are applicable, or
indirectly, by attempting to apply them to cases where
they are not applicable. The only difference between
these two offences is, that in the former case the product
is no thought whatever; in the latter, it is not that kind
of thought which it professes to be.
Let us suppose, for example, a syllogistic conclusion
verbally asserted, the reverse of that which the laws of
thought require; such as, "All A is B, all C is A, therefore
some C is not B." This reasoning supposes the possibility
of conceiving a C which shall at the same time be B and
not B. Tried by this test, the form of words is ascertained
to be representative of no thought at all.
On the other hand, in a case where the law of reasoning
is not applicable, as in the apparent syllogism, "All Y is
[some] Z, no X is [any] Y, therefore no X is [any] Z," the
thought is annihilated as a syllogism only: as a mere judgment, the concluding proposition may or may not be true;
and there is no impossibility in conceiving an X which is
neither Y nor Z. But, as a syllogism, it maintains that X
is not Z, because it is not Y' in other words, that nothing
that all conception implies imagination, though all imagination does not
imply conception. See p. 33.
1 See, on this subject, an excellent note in Sir W. IIamilton's edition of
Beid, p. 377.




224             PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
which is not Y can be Z, or that all Z is Y;- an assertion
which again involves a contradiction of the major premise,
which, in asserting that all Y is some Z only, implies at
the same time that some Z is not Y. This contradiction
is not so apparent in the ordinary form of the affirmative
proposition, in which the predicate is expressed as indefinite, though thought as particular; and thus the elliptical
and imperfect language of common Logic has caused to be
overlooked the important truth, that illogical thinking is
in reality no thinking at all.
The language of this chapter may recall to the mind of
the reader a distinction made in an earlier portion of the
present work, between positive and negative ideas. A
comparison of the two cases will serve to show that the
expression negative thinking, or negation of thought, is
properly applicable to both, though in different relations
and on different grounds. Positive thinking implies two
conditions: firstly, the material condition, that certain attributes be given as united in a concept; secondly, the
formal condition that the concept be capable of incdividualization, i. e., that the attributes be such as can coixist in
an object perceived or imagined. If either of these conditions be wanting, we are deficient in the sine qua non of
actual thought. A given form of words may thus in two
different ways be void of a thought corresponding. We
may be unable to conceive separately one or more of the
attributes given, or we may be unable to conceive them in
combination. The former is the case when we have never
been personally conscious of the said attribute as presented;
the latter is the case when the several presentations are
incompatible with each other.
Froml defect in the first of these conditions, a man born
blind may be said to have a negative idea of light, which




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                    225
he knows only as sometlling different from  darkness, and,
consequently, of the various colors, which are different
modifications of light; and any man, in like manner, has
but a negative idea of a color which he has not actually
seen.l The blind man may be able to distinguish a sphere
from a cube, by touch; but if he is told that the ball which
he has in his hand is white, he cannot connect the word
with any sensation of which he has been at any time conscious. And in like manner, a man who has seen white
objects only has no idea of red; he knows it only as some
color which he has not seen.  In this manner it is that we
have negative ideas only of many of the objects on which
men most boldly speculate.  Such is the case with all our
speculations on causality, as existing apart from the conscious exertion of power; on substance, other than as a
conscious self; on consciousness in general, apart from the
conditions of space and time. Of these we can only speak
as a causality which is not our causality; as a substance
different from our substance; as a consciousness unlike our
consciousness.2  The same is the case with all the speculations of our reason  concerning  infinity and  infinite
attributes as such.  By removing the condition of limitation, we remove the only condition under which such
attributes have ever been presented to our consciousness.
Further speculation is not thought, but its negation.
1 In the first of these instances the negative idea is so obscure as to be
tantamount in its actual result to no idea at all. Still the corresponding
state of mind is not one of pure quiescence, or mere absence of thought.
A blind man who had lived all his life among a nation of blind men, and
who had thus never been led to infer the existence of visible objects at all,
would be in a different state from one who is continually told of things
which he is unable to see, and whose mind is consequently roused to an
effort, though an ineffectual one.
2 Cf. Damiron, Psychologie, vol. ii. p. 221.




226             PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
The second condition fails in cases of illogical thinking,
all of which may be shown ultimately to annihilate themselves by involving a contradiction. And in these cases
the attempt to individualize the thought furnishes at once
a decisive criterion of its negative character. In the former instances, the thought is only ultimately discovered
to be unattainable from the failure of every attempt to
realize it; in the present case, the attributes can be immediately determined to be unthinkable, as mutually
destroying one another. The former may be distinguished
as materially or relatively negative from the absence of
the requisite data for thinking; the latter are formally or
absolutely negative, as containing data which offend against
the universal laws of human thought. The former might
become positive if man were furnished with a new sense,
or any additional faculty of intuition; the latter could
only become so by a complete inversion of the existing
constitution of his mind. The negative character of the
first is shown by Psychology, which ascertains empirically
the limitations to which the mind is subject in the accumulation of materials for thinking; the negative character
of the second is shown by Logic, which lays down ia priori
the conditions to which all materials, whencesoever derived, must be subjected in the formation of thought.
It is of the utmost importance to distinguish these two
kinds of negative thinking, the material or psychological,
and the formal or logical, fiom each other. No error in
philosophy is more frequent in its occurrence, or more pernicious in its results, than a confusion on this point. Men
are apt to mistake the absence of the materials for one
thought for the presence of materials for its opposite; —
to imagine that it is all one to be unable to think of an
object as existing, and to be able to think of it as not ex



PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.              227
isting; —to fancy that certain positions are condemned by
the laws of the understanding, when the fact is only that
their materials have not been given in an intuition;- to
suppose that to be rejected by reason which in truth has
never come in contact with reason at all.
To examine in detail the prominent instances of the
above confusion, which are plentifully exhibited by some
of the so-called philosophers of the present time, would
require a work of a higher and more controversial chalacter than the present. I shall content myself with selecting
two examples, one ancient and one modern, as specimens
of the confident manner in which men of all ages, and
under all religious systems, have been prone to dogrnatize upon the highest matters of speculation, upon no
better basis than the absence of all materials for speculating at all.
Aristotle's well-known argument, to prove that the happiness of the gods consists in contemplation, is based on
the ground that we cannot attribute to them moral attributes in the only way in which such attributes come within
the sphere of human consciousness, viz., under the limitations and imperfections consequent upon human passion
and human error. What scope, he asks, can there be for
fortitude, where there is no pain to undergo; or for temperance, where there are no evil desires to keep in check?1
But the reasoning is incomplete. Cotta, in Cicero, pursuing the same principle to its ultimate consequences, shows
clearly that we must equally deny of the Deity the possession of any intellectual as well as of any moral quality.
What is the object of reason and intelligence but to gain
a knowledge of that which is obscure? What is the purpose of contemplation but to gain a closer insight into
1 Eth. Nic. x. 8.




228             PROLEGOMIENA LOGICA.
the nature of the things contemplated? Intellectual attainments have the same relation to human ignorance that
moral virtues have to human frailty.'
The error of both these reasonings is the same: it consists in mistaking a psychological deficiency for a logical
impossibility. To determine in thought that certain attributes cannot exist in any being except under given conditions of manifestation, it would be necessary that we
should have had personal experience of the abrogation of
those conditions, and of the absolute destruction of the
attributes in consequence. But such an experience in the
present case is, ex hypothesi, impossible; the conditions
being those to which the universal human consciousness is
subject. To pronounce how consciousness exists in beings
of a different nature from ourselves, it would be necessary
that we should be capable of possessing their nature and
faculties, as well as our own, and of comparing the two
together by the aid of a third power independent of
either. To pronounce that certain modes of consciousness
cannot exist save as they exist to us, it is necessary that
we should have personally tried every other possible relation of modes of consciousness to a conscious subject.
Until human experience has extended thus far, to limit the
province of faith by that of reason, -to say that what we
cannot compass in thought we may not believe as existing,
- is to pass from criticism to dogmatism, a dogmatism resting its claims to dictation on a complete ignorance of the
matter in which it dictates.
The modern Atheism of the German philosopher Feuerbach is based on a similar confusion. It assumes that the
measure of what man is to believe is to be determined by
what he can grasp in an act of positive thought; in other
1 Cicero, De Natura Deorulnl, iii. 15.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                 229
words, that the mere absence of the necessary data for
thinking at all is tantamount to a logical determination of
the non-existence of a corresponding object. God, according to this system, is but humanity deified in its intellectual, or moral, or physical attributes, according to the
varying condition, characters, and wants of this or that
people; but in all, according to one form or another of
Anthropomorphism.
Falsehood is only dangerous from its possessing a certain
portion of a mutilated truth. The one element of truth
which underlies the Atheism  of the Essence ofl eligion,l
is the fact, that finite thought can only be positively exercised on finite objects.  Thought, on its positive side, is
ultimately tested by the individualization of concepts.
To effect this, they must be referred to the representative
image of some actual state of consciousness, - sensation,
volition, affection, etc. In attempting to grasp the Deity
as an object of positive thought, to speculate beyond
what is revealed to us of the divine attributes as manifested in relation and accommodation to human faculties,
man can only bring God down to his own level, and exercise his reason on those analogous attributes of which he
has had experience in his personal consciousness. The
error consists in overlooking the religious feelings and
affections, as a distinct class of psychological facts, coordinate with, not subordinate to, the thinking faculty.
The history of mankind in general, as well as the consciousness of each individual, alike testify that religion is
not a function of thought; and that the attempt to make
1 With this work, and others of the same author, I am acquainted
through the French translation by M. Ewerbeck, entitled, Qu'est-ce que la
Religion d'apres la nouvelle philosophie Allemande.
20




230               PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
it so, if consistently carried out, necessarily leads, firstly
to Anthropomorphism, and ultimately to Atheism.
The incompetency of such reasoning to prove its conclusion is manifest from the fact, that the mental phenonlena on which alone it rests, must, from the nature of the
case, be precisely the same, whether that conclusion be
true or false. If human thought is subject to laws and
limitations, formal and material, the mode and the sphere
of positive thinking must be such as those laws and limitations require, whether there exist objects beyond it or
not. But the hypothesis, indispensable to the rationalist,
that the sphere of thought and that of being are coixtensive, fails altogether to account for the phenomenon of
negative thinking; to explain, that is, how it can be that
man, in the exercise of thought, ever finds himself encompassed with conditions and restrictions, which he is ever
striving to pass, and ever failing in the effort; that he ever
feels himself in the presence of yearnings unsatisfied and
doubts unsolved; —yearnings which countless accessions
to the domain of thought have left as vague and restless
as before; - doubts which centuries of speculation have
made no progress toward answering. These and such like
humiliating truths, altogether inexplicable on the arrogant
assumption of a human God contemplating the products
of his creative intellect,l are the natural and necessary features of our position, if we believe that man, as individual
1 "Ueber die Natur philosophiren," says Schelling, "heisst die Natur
schaffen."
"Die Logik," says Hegel, "zeigt die Erhebung der Idee zu der Stufe
von daraus sie die Sch6pferin der Natur wird." In the same spirit, Logic
is declared to be, " Die Darstellung Gottes, wie er in seinem ewigen Wesen
vor der Erschaffung der Natur und cines endlichen Geistes ist."
The mock thunder of Salmoneus was modesty itself to this.




PROLEGONIENA LOGICA.                231
or as species, is but a lower intelligence in the midst of
the works of a higher; a being of finite intuitions, surrounded by partial indications of the Unlimited, of finite
thought, contemplating partial revelations of the Incomprehensible.




CHAPTER IX.
OF LOGIC AS RELATED TO OTHER MENTAL SCIENCES.
A DIVISION was early established in philosophy between
the Logica docens and the Logica utens; the one concerned with the pure laws and forms of thought, the other
with the application of thought to this or that objectmatter. The relations of the latter it is not my present
purpose to examine. Every art or science, in so far as it
contains reasonings on its own special objects, may be regarded as furnishing an instance of the _Logica utens;
and in this point of view Logic has no special affinity with
one branch of knowledge rather than another. But in
relation to the -Logica docens, there are three branches of
science, real or apparent, which, from community of object
and method, as well as from historical connection, demand
a more special consideration.
The three sciences in question are Grammar, Psychology,
and Metaphysics. Rhetoric, from an association with Logic
and Grammar in the medieval Trivium, might also be
thought to have a special claim on our attention. But, in
truth, Rhetoric is connected by community of object-matter
rather with the art of Dialectic, as exhibited in the Topics
of Aristotle and the Probable Syllogisms of the Scholastic
Logic, than with the formal science as treated of in the
present work. Its relation'to the latter is only by way of
application, inasmuch as logical forms may be applied in




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                233
rhetorical exercises; a relation which reduces it to a level
with any other employment of the.Logica utens.  WVith
Psychology, indeed, its connection is far more intimate,
but on the opposite side from that by which the same science is related to Logic. Logic, as the science of the laws
and products of the understanding, is related to Psychology
through the medium of the speculative and discursive faculties. Rhetoric, as concerned with the movement of the
will, is related on the side of the emotional and practical
faculties, and is thus correctly described by Aristotle as an
offshoot of Dialectic and Moral Philosophy.
On the other hand, Psychology, Metaphysics, and Grammar, are intimately connected' with the faculties, the laws,
and the instruments of the universal process of thought,a connection which has been recognized, with more or less
clearness, from the origin of Logic to the present time.
The Categories, from the days of Aristotle downwards,
have been disputed ground between Logic and Metaphysics, and are treated of by the Stagirite himself in connection with both sciences. The treatise rrsEp'l Epurve'as, whose
title, sorely misnomered by various translators, might be
adequately expressed in English by, "Of Language as the
interpretation of Thought,'" is, in the early portion, devoted
to grammatical definitions and distinctions. Psychology
also, though less prominently introduced, claims her share
in the multifarious matter of the Organon; in the account
of the processes of sensation, memory, and experience, as
subsidiary to induction.
Were we indeed to start from  the whole Organon of
1 For various interpretations of Interpretation, see M. St. Hilaire, De la
Logique d'Aristote, p. i. ch. 10. The version given in the text corresponds
to that by Isidore of Seville: " Omnis elocutio conceptae rei interpres est:
inde perihermeniam nominant quam interpretationem nos appellamus."
20*




234             PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
Aristotle, as a uniform treatise on a single subject, it
would be difficult to accommodate its contents to any
modern classification of the mental sciences. But it may
fairly be questioned whether even the authority of the
philosopher himself can be adduced in support of such a
proceeding. While we cannot help admitting, with Sir
William Hamilton,' that the incorrect notions which have
prevailed, and still prevail, in regard to the nature and
province of Logic, are mainly to be attributed to the authority of the father of the science, it may be doubted how
far that authority has been put to a legitimate use by his
followers. The same eminent critic to whom we have
just referred has observed, in another place, that there is
required for the metaphysician not less imagination than
for the poet; that it may, in fact, be doubted whether
Homer or Aristotle possessed this faculty in greater vigor.2
The two authors here placed in juxtaposition may be compared in more respects than that of their mental powers.
The influence of Homer in Poetry has been similar to that
of Aristotle in Philosophy; yet, while, from the Father of
Criticism to the present day, there has never been wanting
a champion to maintain against all impugners the unity of
design of the Iliad, and its exact relation to a beginning, a
middle, and an end, the primary argument of this "one
entire and perfect chrysolite" has been almost as much
disputed among critics as the question of the definition of
Logic. Different portions of the poem have been pronounced genuine or spurious, according to this or that
conception of the poet's design; and, finally, it has even
been maintained that the model of all succeeding Epics is
little more than a fortuitous concourse of atoms, the frag1 Discussions, p. 141.      2 Reid's Works, p. 99.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.              235
ments of distinct rhapsodists. The Organon of Aristotle
has had a similar fate. Various have been the conjectures
concerning its design and method. Portions have been at
different times regarded as logical, as grammatical, as metaphysical; nor have there been wanting critics to deny the
genuineness of this or that part. The parallel might be
carried further. The different portions of the Iliad are
said to have been collected and arranged in the time of
Pisistratus, about three hundred and forty years after the
date assigned by Herodotus (rightly or wrongly) to the
birth of the poet; and the writings of Aristotle are generally supposed to have received their present form and arrangement at the hands of Andronicus of Rhodes, a philosopher who flourished about three centuries later than the
Stagirite. I am not indeed aware that any critic has been
bold enough to maintain a thoroughly Wolfian hypothesis
of the origin of the Organon; and yet there are not wanting grounds on which a not very different theory might be
supported; not indeed as regards the authorship, but certainly as regards the unity of design of the work. The
title by which the collected treatises are known is undoubtedly of recent origin; it is not found in Aristotle himself,
nor in any of his earlier commentators; and, as far as existing evidence can determine, it appears not to have been
in common use before the fifteenth century.l The several
treatises themselves are invariably mentioned by their author as distinct works under distinct titles; and even after
the time of Andronicus, commentaries were generally written, not on the Organon as a whole, but separately on its
constituent parts. If from the books we turn to the matters of which they treat, the result is the same. Logic, as
the name of an Art or Science, does not once occur in the
1 St. Ililbairc, De la Logique d'Aristote, vol. i. p. 19.




236               PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
writings of Aristotle; and the cognate adjective and adverb
are used in a peculiar and much more restricted sense than
that which has subsequently been given to them. The
names  sanctioned by the philosopher himself, such as
Analytic and Dialectic, are commensurate with portions
only of the Organon; the division of Philosophy into
Logic, Physics, and Ethics, adopted by the Stoics, and
sometimes attributed (on questionable grounds) to Plato,
receives no sanction from the Stagirite; indeed, he adopts
a classification in many respects at variance with it, distinguishing theoretical philosophy from  practical and productive, and dividing the first into three branches, Physics,
Mathematics, and Theology.'
Leaving, then, altogether the question of authority, and
adopting the formal view of Logic taken in the preceding
pages as the only one which promises to secure for the
science what it has so long needed, an exact definition and
a determined field of inquiry, I shall proceed to examine
the relation in which Logic, as thus exhibited, stands towards the cognate sciences of Psychology, Grammar, and
Metaphysics.
Of Psychology something has already been said in the
earlier portion of the present Essay. Logic deals with the
products of the several thinking acts, with concepts, with
judgments, with reasonings, as, according to certain as1 2~etaph. v. 1. Mr. Karslake (Aids, p. 10) speaks of the Organon as
presenting so coherent a system, that the assertion that it contains a few
only of Aristotle's logical works is doubtful. To me there appears little
more of coherence than may naturally be expected in distinct writings of
the same author on any question of Grammar, Analytic, Dialectic, or
Rhetoric. And, as far as we can conjecture from existing- evidence, it is
most probable that the several books were written in the reverse order of
that in which they are now arranged. See Burgersdyck, Inst. Log. Protf.;
Fries, Systenz der Logik, p. 15.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                  237
sumed laws of thinking, they ought to be or not to be.' It
is competent to test the validity of all such products in so
far as they comply or not with the conditions of pure
thought, leaving to this or that branch of material science
to determine how far the same products of thought are
guaranteed by the testimony of this or that special experience. Thus it accepts, as logically valid, all such concepts,
judgments, and reasonings, as do not, directly or indirectly,
imply contradictions; pronouncing them thus far to be
legitimate as thoughts, that they do not in ultimate analysis destroy themselves. That they will be also accepted
upon an appeal to experience, it does not decide; it only
recommends them as qualified for filrther examination. It
is thus competent to determine the possible existence of a
class of objects corresponding to a given concept, the
necessary truth of an analytical, and the possible truth of a
synthetical judgment, the formal validity of a conclusion
as necessarily following from  certain assumed premises.
Questions concerning the real existence of this or that class
of objects, the actual truth of a synthetical judgment, or
of a conclusion out of relation to its given premises, it
sends up for judgment to the tribunal of Experience.
As Experience decides on the relations of any given
product of thought to the actual phenomena presented by
this or that object of intuition, so Psychology decides on
its relations to the actual constitution of the human mind.
Why it is that the laws of pure thinking extend thus far
and no further; -what are the mental processes prelim1 "Die ganze reine Logik hat es mit Verhliltnissen des Gedachten, des Inhalts unserer Vorstellungen (obgleich nicht speciell mit diesem Inhalte
selbst) zu thun; aber iiberall nirgends mit der Tlitiygkeit des Denkens, nirgends mit der psychologischen, also metaphysischen, Mdoglichkeit desselben."- Herbart, Psychologie als Wissenchaft. Th. II. ~ 119.




238              PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
inary and subsidiary to thought, and the nature of the
thinking act itself as giving rise to the logical products;
-whence arises the phenomenon of illegitimate thinking;
— the nature and origin of various impediments and errors
to which thinking and other mental acts are subjected in
mankind;- the relation of the several mental acts to one
or more faculties of mind, and the value of such distinction
as absolute or relative, implying a notional only, or an
actual separability; — in short, all inquiries into the actual
phenomena of man's mental constitution and their explanation, form the object-matter of Psychology.l
From this it appears that Psychology, as well as Physical Science, is, in the widest sense of the term, empirical.
It inquires, that is to say, what are the actual phenomena
of the several acts and states of the human mind, and the
actual laws or conditions on which they depend; and in
this sense the laws of thought themselves are empirical,
and within the province of Psychology, inasmuch as it is
a matter of fact and experience that men do reason according to them. Logic, on the other hand, can in no sense
be called empirical, inasmuch as the actual constitution,
whether of the world within, or of the world without, is
assumed indeed and implied in its researches, but in no
respect described or investigated. We are not to ascertain, as a matter of fact, that men do reason in this or that
form, as governed by this or that law; but, on the assumption of certain laws, we are to determine a priori the forms
which legitimate thinking ought to exhibit, whether mankind in general do comply with them or not.2  Logic is
1 Much of this is distinguished by Kant as Applied Logic, which however
he allows to be more properly referred to Psychology.
2 Kant, Logik, Einleitung II. 4; Drobisch, Neue Darstellung der Logik,
~ 9.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.               239
indeed ultimately to be referred to the test of experience;
but only in respect of its conformity with facts without
its province, not in respect of the coherence of its parts
within.  So far as it implies that, as a matter of fact, men
do reason in syllogisms, so far its pretensions may be tested
by reference to the empirical truths of Psychology.  So
far as it asserts that the legitimate forms of the syllogism
are such and such, it is simply deductive a' priori, and
necessarily valid for any class of thinking beings whose
laws are such as it presupposes. An empirical science may
contain much partial truth, though omitting many important phenomena and erroneously accounting for many
which it recognizes. It offers much, therefore, for enlarged
experience gradually to supply and correct. An a priori
Science, like Logic, is tested by experience only with reference to its fundamental hypotheses. If these are accepted,
they carry with them the whole superstructure of details.
If these are rejected, every portion of the science falls to
the ground along with them.
But though Logic and Psychology have thus each their
respective provinces and methods, it cannot be too often
repeated that neither can be taught as a science, efficiently
and satisfactorily, unless in connection with the other. Ve
may learn by rote a multitude of logical rules, and fondly
imagine that we are acquiring an art which will enable us
to think; — a course of Logic being in fact about as necessary for making men thinkers as a course of Ethical
Philosophy for making them honest, or a course of Optics
for enabling them to see. Or we may analyze in dictione
and extra dictionem  all sorts of imaginary fallacies propounded by imaginary sophists, and dream that we are
forging an impenetrable panoply against all the deceits
of the world; — as if we could bind men down in heavy




240             PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
securities to lie and cheat by rule, in order that they may
be detected in due course of art. Or we may draw up
syllogisms in orthodox mood and figure, and babble about
Laws of Thought, and never dream of asking what is the
nature of Thought as a process, and with what elements
does it combine in the actual formation of this or that
compound. Or, on the other hand, starting from confused
or erroneous notions of the nature and powers of the human mind, we may blame Logic for not accomplishing what
no science can accomplish, and deem its whole contents a
tissue of jargon and imposture, because it is neither able to
open a Royal Road to the Encyclopedia, nor to convert
natural folly into supernatural wisdom. It may safely be
asserted that nine-tenths of the mistaken judgments to
which Logic has been subjected on the part of fiiends and
adversaries, unreasonable eulogy on the one hand, equally
unreasonable abuse or contempt on the other, have been
owing to its treatment out of relation to Psychology,- to
its having been expounded and studied without any preliminary attempt to ascertain what are the nature and
limits of the thinking faculty, and what character its laws
and products ought to exhibit in conformity with the constitution of the human mind.
With Grammar Logic is connected through the medium
of the universal instrument of thought, Language. The
practical necessity of this instrument for the formation as
well as for the communication of thought, has been noticed
already; it remains to inquire in what different ways this
their common object is dealt with by Logic and Grammar
respectively. Universal Grammar, with which alone we
are concerned (the history and idiomatic peculiarities of
special languages being obviously unconnected with general Logic), has been happily defined as " The science of the




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                 241
relations which the constituent parts of speech bear to
each other in significant combination."l  It is thus concerned with Language primarily and essentially; Logic,
secondarily and accidentally. The former has given certain
articulate sounds, to find their relation to certain supposed
counterparts in thought. The latter has given to determine the necessary relations of concepts to each other;
but in so doing it is compelled secondarily to exhibit the
corresponding relations of the sounds by which concepts
are represented.
The two sciences differ also in the extent of their provinces. Logic considers language simply as the instrument
and representative of thought. Grammar will include its
relation to intuitions and emotions, and every state of consciousness which finds its expression in speech.2 Logic
considers language only in so far as it is indispensable to
thought, and accordingly analyzes speech only to that
point at which it is representative of the simplest element
of thought, the concept. Any parts into which a concept
may be divided, which are not themselves concepts, are
beyond its province, as not being representative of a complete thought, nor competent instruments alone for the
performance of an act of thinking. Hence all syncategorematic words, as not being per se significant, are not
recognized by Logic.
In Grammar the unit of thought is a judgment, both
terms being necessarily represented by words. Hence the
unit of speech in Grammar is a proposition; the office of
the subordinate parts of speech being to limit or connect
1 Sir John Stoddart, Philosophy of Language, pt. i. p. 21. Universal
Grammar is properly a science, particular Grammar an art, as is observed
by Da Marsais, Encyclopedie, Art. Grammaire, p. 842.
2 See Harris, Hermes, ch. iii.
21




242              PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
the primary parts as subjects or predicates of a given
assertion. 1 Such connections and limitations may be
more conveniently effected by the invention of words expressive of relations between concepts, than by the use of
distinct signs for every new concept resulting from such
relations; this, however, is one of the luxuries only, not
one of the necessaries of language, and, as such, is not
noticed by Logic.  Viewed simply as an element of
thought, it is indifferent whether the same concept be
expressed by a combination of substantive and adjective,
as in the English "four-footed beast," or the German
"' vierfiissiges Thier," by the interposition of a preposition,
as in the French " bete a quatre pieds," or by a single substantive, such as the classical equivalent, " quadruped."
In Logic the unit of thought is also a judgment, but
not one which requires a verbal representative of both its
constituent parts. Conception, the simplest act of thought,
consists in the referring a given concept to possible objects
as imagined.  Here there is, in the psychological sense
of the term, a judgment; i. e., a consciousness of the presence of the objects in thought; but that consciousness
does not form an additional concept, nor require as its
necessary exponent a second verbal sign. Hence the unit
of speech in Logic is a term; such being a sufficient verbal
instrument for the performance of the first and the simplest
act of thought.
With reference to the second operation of thought,
judgment, wherein the two sciences come most nearly into
contact, the following distinction is important. Grammar
considers words objectively, as signs of things.  Hence
1 For a further illustration of this doctrine, not universally held by Grammarians, the reader is referred to an article by the present author, on the
Philosophy of Language, in the North British Review, No. 27.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                     243
the distinction of tenses, according as the remote or represented object is considered as contemporaneous with, or
distant in time from, the speaker. Logic considers words
subjectively, as signs of thoughts.  Hence the only logical
tense is the present, the immediate or presented objects
being necessarily contemporaneous with the act of consciousness by which they are now thought in conjunction.'
It is sometimes said that Logic recognizes two only of
the grammatical parts of speech, the noun and the verb,
forming the two terms of the proposition with and without time.2 It would be more correct to say that Logic,
viewing language in a different light from Grammar, and
analyzing on a different principle, does not recognize
the grammatical parts of speech at all.  The simplest eleinents of a complete assertion in Grammar are the noun
and the verb;3 the latter being a combination of attribute
and assertion.  Hence the grammatical type of a proposition is that distinguished in scholastic language as secundi
adjacentis; and to this form all varieties produced by
1 See p. 71.
2 " Grammatici enim, considerantes vocum figuras, octo orationis partes
annumerant. Philosophi vero, quorum omnis de nomine verboque tractatus in significatione est constituta, duas tantum orationis partes esse
docuerunt: quicquid plenam significationem tenet, siquidem sine tempore
significat, nomen vocantes; verbum vero, si cum tempore." —Boethius,
Int. ad Syll. p. 561. " Et sciendum est quod Dialecticus solum ponit duas
partes orationis, scilicet nomen et verbum. Alias autem omnes appellat
syncategorematicas, id est consignificativas."- Petr. Hisp. Sum. Log. Tr. i.
Here, as in the De Interpretatione of Aristotle, the type of the logical proposition is the form distinguished as secundi adjacentis, the verb being
neither the copula alone, nor the predicate alone, but the combination of
the two, however expressed. A neglect of this has misled many commentators and critics on Aristotle, from Ammonius to the present day.
3 " In all languages there are only two sorts of words which are necessary
for the communication of our thoughts, the noun and the verb."- Tooke,
Div. of Purley, ch. 3.




244                PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
the accidents of particular languages must, in Universal
Grammar, be virtually reduced.l In Logic, on the other
hand, for the purposes of opposition and conversion, as
well as from the necessity of assigning a quantity to both
terms of the proposition, the type is required to be of the
form tertii adjacentis; the subject and predicate being
regarded as two given concepts, the objects of which are
identified or distinguished by means of the copula. Hence,
in every case in which the proposition is exhibited in its
logical form, the grammatical verb will correspond not to
any single word in the proposition, but to a combination
formed of the copula and the quantified predicate, —to
all, in short, that is asserted of the subject. The predicate
concept may thus, in different points of view, answer to
two distinct grammatical relations.  Taken by itself, it is
a noun, identified in certain respects with another noun as
the subject. Taken in its predicate character, it forms a
portion of the verb, the remainder being supplied by the
copula. Those logicians who maintain the copula to be
the logical verb, confound the accidents of particular languages with the essentials of language in general as a
sign of thought. With them the verb is determined solely
by the subordinate feature of its personal inflection, not
by the primary characteristic of its signification.
With regard to the relation of Logic to Metaphysics,
some preliminary verbal explanation is necessary, owing to
1 Hence it follows that the copula is, grammatically speaking, no verb
at all. It fulfils none of the functions of that part of speech; for it implies
no attribute, and cannot, when united to a subject, form a complete assertion. In such a sentence as " The meadows are white with frost," the true
verb is not the copula, but the copula with the adjective, are white, as may
be seen by substituting the Latin, "prata canis albicant pruinis." Whether
this can be expressed in one word or not, is an accident of this or that language, and is beyond the province of Universal Grammar.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                    245
the various senses in which the latter term has been used.
Among modern philosophers, empirical psychology, which
the ancients regarded as a branch of physics,' is frequently
classified  as metaphysical.  Thus the  contributions of
Reid and Stewart to the inductive science of the human
mind are not unfirequently spoken of as Scotch Metaphysics; a nomenclature which the latter of these philosophers has in some degree sanctioned by his own writings.2
Such a classification is, however, inconsistent with the fundamental doctrines of the Scottish School.  It has been
before observed that one of their leading principles is, that,
in the investigation of mind as well as of matter, phenomena alone are the legitimate objects of science; the substance and essential nature of both being beyond the reach
of human faculties.  Whereas Metaphysics has from  the
earliest days been distinguished as the Science of Being as
Being, in opposition to all inquiries into the phenomena
exhibited by this or that class of objects.3 How far such
a problem is capable of solution is another question; but
the mere propounding of it implies an object totally distinct from that of an inquiry into the faculties and laws
of the human mind.
The object of the older Metaphysics has been distin1 See Hamilton on Reid, p. 216.
2 For instance: " Nothing contributes so much to form this talent as
the study of Metaphysics; not the absurd Metaphysics of the Schools,
b)ut that study which has the operations of the mind for its object."-Ele7ments, vol. i. ch. 2. In other places Stewart has noticed this phraseology
as a loose use of language, and has attempted to account for it. But the
term ought never to have been used at all.
3 Arist. Metaph. iii. 1.'ETIv L7rTiLO'jU77 Tis' eopeP'rTb 6P. or Kal Ta
ro'vTr vrdpXovrTa Ka&' aUr'T. The name Metaphysics is of much later
(late, but its object has always been regarded as identical with that
distinguished by Aristotle as First Philosophy, or Theoiogy. Cf. Wolf,
Ontologia, ~ 1.




246              1POLEGOMENA LOGICA.
guished in all ages as the one and the real, in opposition
to the many and the apparent.l Matter, for example, as
perceived by the senses, is a combination of distinct and
heterogeneous qualities, discernible, some by sight, some
by smell, some by touch, some by hearing. What is the
thing itself, the subject and owner of these several qualities, and yet not identical with any one of them?  What
is it by virtue of which these several attributes constitute
or belong to one and the same thing? Mlind, in like manner, presents to consciousness so many distinct states and
operations and feelings. What is the nature of that one
mind, of which all these are so many modifications? The
inquiry may be carried higher still. Can we attain to any
single conception of Being in general, to which both Mind
and Matter are subordinate, and from which the essence
of each may be deduced? 2
Ontology, or Metaphysics proper, as thus explained,
may be treated in two different methods, according as its
exponent is a believer in  o o'v or in Ta 5vTa, in one or in
many fundamental principles of things. In the former, all
objects whatever are regarded as phenomenal modifications of one and the same Substance, or as self-determined
effects of one and the same Cause. The necessary result
of this method is to reduce all metaphysical philosophy
to a Rational Theology, the one Substance or Cause
being identified with the Absolute, or the Deity. According to the latter method, which professes to treat of different classes of Beings independently, Metaphysics will
contain three coordinate branches of inquiry: Rational
Cosmology, Rational Psychology, and Rational Theology.3
1 Arist. Metaph. iii. 2.
2 Wolf, Phil. Rat. Disc. Prcel. ~ 73; Herbait, Allgemeine MetaphysikC, ~ 27.
3 Herbart, Lehrbuch zur Philosophie, ~ 7; Allgemeine Metaphysik, ~ 31.
Anm.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                   247
The first aims at a knowledge of the real essence, as distinguished from  the phenomena, of the material world;
the second discusses the nature and origin, as distinguished
from the faculties and affections, of the human soul, and
of other finite spirits;l the third aspires to comprehend
God Himself, as cognizable a priori in his essential nature,
apart from the indirect and relative indications furnished
by his works, as in Natural Theology, or by his word, as
in Revealed Religion. These three objects of metaphysical inquiry - God, the World, the Mind - correspond to
Kant's three Ideas of the Pure Reason; and the object
of his Critique is to show that, in relation to all three,
the attainment of a system of speculative philosophy is
impossible.
The former of these methods is the bolder and the more
consequent; and, moreover, the only one which can be
consistently followed by those who believe in the possibility of a Philosophy of the Absolute. For, a plurality
of real objects being once admitted as the highest reach
attainable by human faculties, these must necessarily be
regarded as related to, and limited by, each other. Accordingly, this method has been followed by the hardiest
and most consistent reasoners on metaphysical questions;
by Spinoza, under the older form of Speculation, and by
Hegel, after the Kantian revolution. But thus treated,
metaphysical speculation necessarily leads to Pantheism;
1 "Man findet hier die Trennung der empirischen von der rationalen
Psychologie; die erste durchlaiift die einzelnen sogenannten SeelenvermSgen; die andre spricht fiber Natur und Ursprung der Seele, fiber Unsterblichkeit, Zustand nach dem Tode, Unterschied zwischen den Seelen der
Menschen, der Thiere, und den hiheren Geistern."- Herbart, Allgemeine
Metaphysik, ~ 29. For a curious account of theories and theorists in
rational psychology, see Burton, Anatomy of Melancholy, P. i. sect. i.
Mem. 2, Subs. 9.




248                PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
and Pantheism, at this elevation, is for all religious purposes equivalent to Atheism.l The method is thus condemned by its results; and the condemnation will not be
retracted upon a psychological examination of its principles. Its fundamental conception is not thought, but its
negation. The Thought which is identified with Being in
general, is not my thought, nor any form of consciousness
which I can personally realize.2   Iy whole consciousness
is subject to the conditions of limitation and relation of
subject and object.  A system  which commences by denying this relation, starts with an assumnption concerning the
possible character of an intelligence other than human, and
consequently incapable of verification by any human being.
Yet the system  is the product of a human thinker, and
addressed to human disciples.
The second method of metaphysical inquiry is less presumptuous, though perhaps also less consistent.  It starts
with the assumption of a plurality of Beings, thus virtually abandoning the Philosophy of the Absolute. This
plurality is primarily manifest in the contrast between the
Subject and the Object of Consciousness, between self and
1 It has of late been a favorite criticism of Spinoza to say, with Hegel,
that his system is not Atheism, but Acosmism; and this is true in a speculative point of view. But if I allow of no God distinct from the aggregate
of the Universe, myself included, what object have I of worship? Or if,
according to the later manifestation of Pantheism, the Divine Mind is but
the sum total of every finite consciousness, my own included, what religious relation between God and man is compatible with the theory? And,
accordingly, the Pantheism of Hegel has found its natural development in
the Atheism of Feuerbach.
2 This is expressly stated by an eminent disciple of Hegel, who professes
to discover in Aristotle's MIetaphysics an anticipation of Hewelianism:
"La pensde que nous venons de ddcrire est la pensde absolue. Il ne s'agit
pas ici de la pensde subjective, qui est une fonction psychologique restreinte
i l'ame humaine."- Michelet, Exanmen de la Ml5tcaphysiqte d'Aristote, p. 276.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                 249
not-self, as related to and limiting each other. But the
consciousness of the relative and limited suggests by contrast the idea of the absolute and unlimited; and thus
gives rise to three distinct branches of metaphysical speculation: the ego being identified with the substance of the
human soul, as distinguished fiom its phenomenal modes;
the non-ego being identified with the reality which underlies the phenomena of the sensible world; and the absolute
or unconditioned with the Deity.l Of the last of these
three branches, that commonly known as Rational Theology, which endeavors from the conception of God as an
absolutely perfect Being to deduce the necessary attributes
of the Divine Nature, I shall say nothing in this place.
The question of the relation of the human mind to religious intuitions is one of the most delicate and the most
difficult in Psychology, and to treat it adequately would
require a separate volume. On the two latter branches of
Metaphysics, which Kant regarded as equally unattainable
with the first, something has been said in a former chapter.
It was the opinion of Kant, as well as of Reid and Stewart,
that the subject of mental as well as of bodily attributes is
not an immediate object of consciousness; in other words,
that in mind, as well as in body, Substance and Unity
are not presented, but represented.  Those who accept this
doctrine are only consistent in regarding metaphysical inquiry in all its branches as a delusion. But a philosophical
examination is incomplete unless it not only points out
the truth, but likewise explains the cause of error. The
weak point of the above doctrine is, that it fails in
1 These three branches of Metaphysics have been considered somewhat
more in detail, by the present author, in the Article Metaphysics, in the
eilghth edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, vol. xiv. pp. 604 sqq., 615 sqq.




250             PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
explaining, on psychological grounds, how the supposed
delusion originated.  Experience furnishes, if not the
cause, at least the occasion of every object of our cognition; and, unless upon the supposition that a knowledge
of Unity and Substance is immediately given in one phase
at least of consciousness, it is impossible to account for its
invention in any.  The multifarious phenomena of internal as well as of external sense, present, on the opposite
hypothesis, nothing in any respect analogous to the substance to which they are attributed, — nothing that can
operate in any way even as the occasional cause from
which the existence of such a substance could be suggested.
Metaphysical philosophy may contain much that is groundless, much that is deceptive; but the whole analogy of
deception and hypothesis in other branches of speculation
leads to the conviction that it can only arise from rashly
transferring to new relations ideas which are given in some
relation or other.
Instead, therefore, of considering the whole of Metaphysics to be based on a delusion, and its ultimate destiny
to be utter extinction, we shall probably come nearer to
the truth if we regard its unsound portions as based on a
perverted intuition, and anticipate that it will be finally
absorbed in that science to which the intuition in its original relation properly belongs. If, for example, it should
ultimately be made manifest that to the material world we
have no relation except through the various phenomena
of sense, but that in the mental world Self, as well as the
phenomena of self, is an immediate presentation of consciousness, it will follow that in the former we have no
ground for maintaining the existence of things other than
the phenomena presented; and that consequently, in this
department, Ontology, as distinct from Phenomenology,




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.                   251
is occupied solely with chimeras of our own invention:
whereas, Psychology, being called upon to extend its
inquiries from the phenomena of self to that of which
they are phenomena, will legitimately include the remaining portion of those problems which have hitherto been
appropriated to Metaphysics.
But this question cannot be discussed here. My present
concern is only with the relation supposed to exist between
Metaphysics, as above described, and Logic. In the earlier
form of Metaphysics, which prevailed from Aristotle to
Kant, an intimate connection was supposed to exist between the two sciences.  The Principles of Contradiction
and Excluded Middle, which have been exhibited in a
former chapter as Laws of Thought, are found in the metaphysical as well as in the logical writings of Aristotle;
and the former, together with that of Sufficient Reason, is
placed by Wolf, the immediate predecessor of Kant, at the
head of Ontology.2  But, after the Kantian Critique, this
association was no longer possible.  Kant showed clearly
that, without synthetical judgments a priori, Metaphysical
science is impossible; and this at once put an end to all
attempts which had hitherto been made to elicit a science
of Being from the laws of formal thinking, which are the
foundation of Logic. The two sciences, thus divorced, become apparently united again in the system of Hegel; but
the union is apparent only.  For the Hegelian Logic is
1 For the principle of Contradiction see Arist. Metaph. iii. 3, x. 5; Anal.
Pr. ii. 2; Anal. Post. i. 11. For that of Excluded Middle, see Metaph. iii.
7, ix. 4; Anal. Pr. i. 1; Anal. Post. i. 2, ii. 13. They may also be traced
to Plato. See Phedo, p. 103; Republic, iv. p. 436; Sophist, pp. 250, 252.
They are given more explicitly in the Second Alcibiades, p. 139; but this
dialogue is generally considered spurious.
2 Cf. Wolf, Ontologia, ~~ 27, 29, 56, 71, 498.




252              PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
based, not on an acknowledgment, but on a defiance of
the Laws of Thought. It is a Logic of the Reason, of
which the funldamental position is, that the Laws of the
Understanding are applicable to finite objects only, and
that Thought in relation to the infinite is free from their
dominion. Logic thus returns, as regards its object, not to
the Aristotelian Analytic, but to the Platonic Dialectic, as a
science of the Real and the Absolute; though the method
pursued is opposed to Plato as much as to Aristotle.' On
the other hand, in proportion as we adhere more closely to
the formal view of Logic, the separation of that science
from Metaphysics becomes more complete. An eminent
advocate of that view, who is far from adopting Kant's
opinion of the impossibility of Metaphysics, expresses his
conviction of the very different objects and methods of
the two sciences, by likening the union of Metaphysics and
Logic to a lecture on the Integral Calculus and the Rule
of Three.2 And there is much truth implied in this somewhat overstrained comparison. With formal Logic, ]Metaphysics stands rather in opposition than in connection.
The former is the science of the ultimate laws of the
thinking subject; the latter, of the ultimate realities of
the objects about which we think.
Metaphysical inquiry, if capable of a successful prosecution, may furnish a criticism or explanation of certain
forms of thought assumed by Logic; for a form of thought
implies a certain relation between given objects, — a relation which might be further elucidated if the nature of
objects in general could be satisfactorily determined. Thus
we have seen that the form of logical judgments and reaI On the contrast between the methods of Plato and Hegel, see Trendelenburg, Logische Untersuchungen, i. p. 89.
2 Herbart, Lehrbuch zur Philosophie, Vorrede zur zweiten Ausgabe.




PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.              253
sonings contains by implication those negative notions of
substance and cause, the investigation of which is the
special object of metaphysical inquiries. The science of
Metaphysics, therefore, if it could be constructed on a solid
basis, would furnish a criticism of those principles which
are tacitly acknowledged in every mental process. But,
for the purposes of formal Logic, such a criticism is not
needed. It is sufficient for that science to accept the principles in the obscure form in which they are acknowledged
by common thought and common language; especially as,
being indifferently implied in sound and unsound thinking,
they furnish no criterion by which we can distinguish the
one fiom the other.
This view is confirmed by the history of philosophy
down to the present time. While Logic, from the days
of Aristotle, has been in possession of a scientific method
and a definite contents, whose truth, whatever opinion may
be entertained of their utility, no critic has succeeded in
inmpugning; Metaphysics has, from the same period, been
equally conspicuous as the changing Proteus of philosophy,
whose concealed wisdom, sought after by ceaseless efforts
of strength and countless varieties of artifice, has invariably eluded the inquiries of his worshippers. The union
of the two, so far firom contributing to the scientific completeness of the former, has only served to mar its beauty
and simplicity by extralogical details, and to misrepresent
its true purpose and value by obscure intimations of deeper
mysteries lying hid beneath its apparent surface. On the
other hand, in proportion as the true character of Logic
as a science has become better known and appreciated, it
has gradually been separated from Metaphysics, and been
associated with Psychology. As the science of the laws of
thought, it is absurd to expect that its object aNf character
22




254             PROLEGOMENA LOGICA.
can be rightly estimated by those who are unacquainted
with the nature and powers of the understanding itself, -
with its relation to the cognate faculties and operations of
the human mind, - with its legitimate province and duties.
It is only in this connection that we can hope to see Logic
finally freed from the unsightly excrescences with which
it has hitherto been deformed, yet still retaining a clearly
defined portion of valuable scientific truth, and cultivated
in a spirit of enlightened appreciation and criticism, equally
removed from the blind veneration of the idolater and the
blind hostility of the iconoclast. It is only in this connection that the boundaries of the two sciences can be clearly
marked out, and those portions of psychological matter
and phraseology whose random introduction has contributed so much to deface and obscure the pages of logical
treatises, can become of inestimable value as part and
parcel of a cognate and complementary, but by no means
identical study. And if, in this association, it becomes
necessary to abase considerably the once towering ambition of the Art of Arts and Science of Sciences, the loss is
more than compensated by the substitution of a humbler
indeed, but more attainable and more serviceable aim, -
the knowledge of the distinct provinces to be assigned to
Thought and Experience respectively, of the true value of
each within its province, and its worse than uselessness
beyond;-the knowledge of ourselves and our faculties,
of our true intellectual wealth, the nature of its tenure,
and the conditions of its lawful increase. By such cultivation alone can we hope to see Logic finally exhibited in
its true character, and estimated at its true value; neither
encumbered with fictitious wealth by a spurious utilitarianism, nor unprofitably buried in the earth of an isolated
and barren formalism.




AP P E N D I X.








APPEN D IX.
NOTE A, p. 84.
IT is much to be regretted that Dr. Whlewell, who has made good use
of Kantian principles in many piarts of his "Philosophy of the Inductive
Sciences," has not more accurately observed Kant's distinction between
the necessary lws under which all men think, and the contingent laws
under which certain men think of certain things. His neglect of this
distinction has given a seeming advantage to the empirical arguments
of his antagonist, Mr. Mill, who is thus enabled apparently to decide the
question at issue by what is in reality no more than an argumentum ad
hominem. Thus Dr. Whewell says, of certain discoveries of physical laws,
" So complete has been the victory of truth in most of these instances,
that at present we can hardly imagine the struggle to have been necessary.
The very essence of these triumphs is that they lead us to regard the views
we reject as not only false, but inconceivable." In this relation, it is obvious that the inconceivability is, with reference to the human mind, merely
contingent, and relative to the particular studies of particular men. Before
the days of Copernicus, men could not conceive the apparent motion of
the sun on the heliocentric hypothesis: the progress of science has reversed the difficulty; but the progress of science itself is contingent on
the will of certain men to apply themselves to it. By thus endeavoring
to exalt inductive laws of matter into it priori laws of mind, Dr. Whewell
has unintentionally contributed to give an undue plausibility to the opposite theory, which reduces all laws of mind into the mere associations of
this or that material experience.
But, on psychological grounds, it would seem as if the point of separation between a priori principles and empirical generalizations ought not to
be very difficult of determination. The difference is not one of degree, but
of kind; and the separation between the two classes of truths is such that
no conceivable progress of science can ever convert the one into the other.
22*




258                       APPENDIX.
That which is inconceivable, not accidentally from the peculiar circumstances of certain men, but universally to all, must be so in consequence
of an original law of the human mind; that which is universally true
within the field of experience indicates an original law of the material
world. No transformation of the one into the other is possible, unless the
progress of science can change mind to matter or matter to mind. It is
therefore incumbent on the philosopher who would extend mathematical
certainty to the domain of physical science, to confirm, in every instance,
his theory by a psychological deduction of his principles, as Kant has
done in the instances of Space and Time.
Dr. Whewell lays much stress on clearness and distinctness of conceptions
as the basis of the axiomatic truths of physical science. But the clearness or distinctness of any conception can only enable us more accurately
to unfold the virtual contents of the concept itself; it cannot enable us to
add a priori any new attribute. In other words, the increased clearness
and distinctness of a conception may enable us to multiply to any extent
our analytical judgments, but cannot add a single synthetical one.
Without something more than this, the philosopher has failed to meet the
touchstone of the Kantian question: How are synthetical judgments a priori
possible?
The spirit of Dr. Whewell's Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences is
beyond all praise. In these days of Positivism and Empiricism  it is refreshing to find a writer of such vast attainments in the details of physical
science comprising them under such truly philosophical principles. But
it is to be regretted that the accuracy of his theory has been in some
instances vitiated by a stumble on the threshold of the Critical Philosophy.
The distinction laid down by Kant between the synthetical, or, properly,
geometrical, and the analytical or general axioms, seems to have been
altogether overlooked. Thus, almost at the outset of the Philosophy of
the Inductive Sciences, the analytical judgment, " If equals are added to
equals, the wholes are equal," is given as a condition of the intuition of
magnitudes; 1 and the same oversight runs through the Essay on Mathematical Reasoning, in which he speaks of "self-evident principles, not
derived in any immediate manner from experiment, but involved in the
very nature of the conceptions which we must possess, in order to reason
upon such subjects at all." The very nature of the conceptions, however
clearly apprehended, can give rise only to analytical judgments.
And such, I think, may be shown to be the character of all the mechanical axioms derived from the idea of Force. Of force, apart from the
conscious exertion of will, we have no positive conception per se; we know
1 Book ii. ch. ix.




APPENDIx.                              259
it only by its effects. Of equal forces we have no positive conception
beyond that of the production of equal effects. To assert, therefore, that
equal forces will balance each other at the tw6 extremities of a lever, is to
assert no more than that effects universally equal will be equal in any particular case.1
But to establish Mechanics as an a priori science upon the idea of force,
it will be necessary to commence with some axioms at least of a synthetical character, analogous to the geometrical principles, " Two straight lines
cannot enclose a space;" or, " If a straight line meets two straight lines, so
as to make the two interior angles on the same side together less than two
right angles, the two straight lines will meet if produced."
As a matter of fact, I do not think that Dr. Whewell has hitherto succeeded in establishing, in the science of Mechanics, a system of a priori
synthetical truths derived from the idea of force as distinct from those
which are mere applications of the mathematical intuitions of time or
space. But as regards mere hypothetical mechanics, such a system is not
inconceivable. A more exact psychological analysis of the intuitive fac1 We must distinguish between the general theoretical statement of this axiom
and its practical application to any given object. In Geometry, the axiom, "If
equals are added to equals the wholes are equal," is a mere analytical judgment
derived from the principle of Identity; but to ascertain whether two given magnitudes are equal, is a question of experiment or observation. So in Mechanics,
the axiom that bodies acting with equal forces to turn a lever in opposite directions will retain it in equilibrium, is analytical; and as thus stated, it is unnecessary to add either that the directions of both forces must be perpendicular, or
the arms of the lever equal. But in any special application of the axiom there
arises at once the question, How can we ascertain that any two given forces are
equal asforces acting upon the lever? If the force, for example, be gravity, and
two equal weights be suspended, one perpendicularly, the other obliquely, the
whole weight of the latter does not act to turn the lever in opposition to the
former, and the hypothesis of the axiom is violated; the forces not being in
that relation equal. Or if both are suspended perpendicularly, but at unequal
distances from the fulcrum, the moments, or forces in relation to the lever, are
not equal. The axiom, as stated by Dr. Whewell, " If two equal forces actperpendicularly at the extremities of equal arms of a straight line," has the appearance of a synthetical judgment, by comprehending under one formula the mere
analysis of the notion of equal forces, and the empirical determination of equality in any particular instance. If by equalforces is meant forces equal in effect
on the lever, the axiom, as stated by Dr. Whewell, is tautological; if the meaning is, forces equal in their effects in some other situation, the axiom is empirical
only, and not even universally true. But, except by its effect in some situation
or other, what test have we of the magnitude of a force?




260                      APPENDIX.
ulties may possibly establish the existence of other subjective conditions
of intuition besides those of space and time, and, consequently, of other
synthetical judgments h priori besides those of Geometry and Arithmetic.1 But when the same theory comes to be applied, not to hypothetical
rigid bodies without weight, but to the actual phenomena of natural
agecnts, as in the "Demonstration that all matter is heavy," and, verbally
at least, in speaking of the inconceivability of the pre-Copernican astronomy, we see at once that the boundary is overleaped which separates the
necessary laws of thought from the generalized phenomena of matter.
This absolute boundary is sufficiently marked. No matter of fact can, in
any possible state of human knowledge, be a matter of demonstration.2  Nay,
even supposing such a demonstration possible, it would not add one tittle
to the evidence of the fact, as such, in the eyes of any one but an egoist.
By him it would be accepted as an additional proof that what are commonly considered as phenomena of the non-ego, are really only modifications of the percipient mind, and governed solely by mental laws. But to
the Realist it would at most only suggest the possibility of a preestablished
harmony between the laws of mind and matter, —a suggestion which
would require, in every special case, to be verified by the empirical examination of the latter. Mental laws, which alone determine conceivability,
are primarily operative only on mental objects, and are applicable to
external things only on the hypothesis of their conformity. This hypothesis can only be verified empirically. That every triangle, for example,
has its angles equal to two right angles, is strictly true only of the perfect
triangle as contemplated by the mind. That this bit of paper lying before
me has its angles equal to two right angles, is only true on the supposition
of its being a perfect triangle; and the truth of this supposition, in any
possible state of perfection of human senses and instruments, can only be
determined empirically. It remains always conceivable that there may be
an error in the measurement, and that the paper may not have exactly
two right angles. The probability of such an error may be diminished to
any degree, according to the perfection of our means of measurement;
but no approximation of this kind can ever become absolute certainty.
It is not without some hesitation that I have ventured thus far to criticize a work which I believe to be, in its whole spirit and conception, by
far the most valuable contribution of modern times to the philosophy of
the physical sciences. To those who would survey this branch of knowl1 Personality may perhaps be specified as another condition of this kind, and
the d priori principles of morals as consequent upon it. On this I have remarked
at greater length in the Bampton Lectures, Lects. III. and VII.
2 Compare Hume, Essay on the Academical IPhilosophy, Part ii.




APPENDIX.                               261
edge in a sound philosophical spirit, alike removed from the idealism of
Schelling and from the positivism of Comte, the writings of Dr. Whewell
are especially valuable. To those who believe, with the present writer,
that the future hopes of speculative philosophy rest on the possibility of
a union of the critical principles of Kant with the sober practical spirit
which is characteristic of English thinkers, the writings of the same
author afford one of the most cheering assurances that the spirit of philosophy, under all its discouragements, is not yet extinct in this country.
With this declaration, the spirit that has dictated the preceding criticism
will not, I trust, be misunderstood.1
NOTE B, P. 128.
That Berkeley was fully aware of the inconsequence of the conclusions
which Hume afterwards attempted to draw from his principles, is manifest
from the third Dialogue between Ilylas and Philonous, in which he meets
by anticipation the argument of the skeptic,2 by maintaining that we are
directly conscious of our own being. He is wrong, indeed, in calling this
consciousness Reflection; this term being properly applicable only to attention directed to our internal phenomena; - an attention which does
not make known, but presupposes, the attending self. But when he
asserts, " I know or am conscious of my own being; and that I myself
am  not my ideas, but somewhat else, a thinking, active principle, that
perceives, knows, wills, and operates about ideas," he states the true
ground on which we may refute the skeptical conclusions of Hume. Indeed, this part of the Dialogue wants little more than a more complete
1 The preceding note remains nearly as it appeared in the first edition of this
work, published in 1851. Since that time, some additional remarks on the matter
in question have appeared in Sir William Hamilton's Discussions, p. 323 (second
edition, p. 335), in Dr. Whewell's Letter to the Author of Prolegomena Logica,
and in the Author's pamphlet in reply, entitled, The Limits Qf Demonstrative
Science considered. Sir W. Hamilton's view is substantially the same as my
own; and I cannot help regarding this independent coincidence as a confirmation of my original criticism. At the same time I feel bound to express my acknowledgments to Dr. Whewell for the instruction which his Letter has afforded
me, and for the liberal and courteous tone in which his objections are urged.
2 This part of Berkeley's Dialogue is meant as an answer to Locke, Essay, B.
II. ch. 23, ~ 5, but the same reasoning is also valid against Hume.




262                      APPENDIX.
exposition of the nature of the will to anticipate in principle the position
afterwards taken against the great skeptic by Maine de Biran.
The weak side of Berkeley's Idealism is not to be found in its relation
to HIume, but in its relation to Fichte. The object proposed by Berkeley
was to get rid of the contradictions and difficulties contained in the notion
of matter as existing distinct from mind, and thus to leave the existence
of minds, divine and human, beyond question. For this purpose he
availed himself of two arguments, one of which was borrowed from the
Cartesian philosophy, the other was added by himself.
The Cartesians, denying the possibility of any direct influence of matter
upon mind or of mind upon matter, explained the phenomena of perception by the hypothesis of Divine Assistance and Occasional Causes. According to this theory, the mental phenomena of sensation are not produced by any direct action of body upon mind, but by the immediate
agency of God, who produces certain sensations in the conscious mind,
upon the occasion of certain corresponding movements in the bodily
organism.1 Berkeley, while denying the existence of matter, and therefore rejecting the supposition of a bodily occasional cause, retained the
Cartesian theory so far as to maintain that the presence of ideas in the
mind is caused by the direct agency of the Deity. Thus he says, " When
in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether
I shall see or no, or to determine what particular objects shall present
themselves to my view; and so likewise as to the hearing and other senses;
the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will. There is, therefore, some other will or spirit that produces them." 2
With this argument, which represents God as the efficient cause of our
ideas, Berkeley combined another, in which the Deity is regarded as a
constantly perceiving mind. Accepting, as allowed on all hands, the
opinion that sensible qualities cannot subsist by themselves, and rejecting
the ordinary hypothesis of their existence in an insensible substratum, he
concluded that they must therefore exist in a mind which perceives them,
and that they have no existence apart from being perceived. If, therefore,
1 This theory is hinted at by Descartes, Principia, 1. ii. ~ 86, and more fully
elaborated by De la Forge, Traitj de l'esprit de l'homme, ch. xvi.; MIalebranche,
Becherche de la V&ritW, 1. vi. p. ii. ch. 3; Entretiens sur la A2letaphysique, Ent.
vii. Compare Laromigui6re, Lemons de Philosophie, p. ii. 1. 9, and Hamilton,
Lectures on M2etaphysics, p. 208.
2 Principles of Human Knowledge, ~ xxix. Compare ~~ lvii. lxii. In ~ liii. he
expressly refers to some modern philosophers, i. e., the Cartesians, as agreeing
with him in making God the immediate cause of all things.




APPENDIX.                             263
they continue to exist when wue do not perceive them (and that they do so
is the irresistible conviction of all men), they must be perceived by some
other mind. Hence the continuous duration of things implies the existence of a constantly percipient mind; that is, of God.k
The relation between the divine and the human mind, as thus conceived,
may be adapted either to a presentative or to a representative theory of idealism. We may hold that the ideas perceived at any particular time by a
given man are numerically one with those constantly perceived by the
Divine Mind; or we may regard them as having only a specific identity,
the former being the copy, and the latter the archetype. Under the first
hypothesis, the divine ideas are presented to us as the direct objects of our
perception; under the second, they are represented by similar ideas excited
in ourselves. The former theory, though susceptible of various developments in detail, is in principle that of Vision in God, and is accordingly
distinctly maintained by MIalebranche, who asserts that a thousand men
can see the same individual object, namely, the intelligible extension which
is perceived in God.2  Berkeley, by rejecting the theory of Malebranche,
was logically driven to the representative hypothesis, though his ltnguage
occasionally wavers between the two.3
But to make this hypothesis the foundation of a theistic argument, it is
necessary to retain, as Berkeley in fact did retain, the supposition of a real
distinction between the idea or object perceived and the mind perceiving.
The idea, though existing only as perceived and in the act of perception,
must yet not be identified with that act, nor regarded as a mere modification or mode of being of the percipient mind. If this simpler form of
representationism be once adopted, the legitimate inference is not Theism,
but Pantheism. The ideas of which I am conscious being admitted to
exist only as modes of my own being, it is concluded, by parity of reasoning, that the archetypal world exists only in the form of various modes of
the being of God.
1 Principles of Human Knowledge, ~~ xc. xci.; Second Dialogue between  Hylas
and Philonous, sub init.
2 See his Riponse au Livre des vraies et desfausses Idees, ch. xiii.
3 I must acknowledge my obligations to Professor Webb, the author of " The
Intellectualism of Locke," both for the instruction derived from his able and interesting work, and also for some unpublished communications on Berkeley's
philosophy, of which I have availed myself in revising this note for the present
edition. At the same time I am unable to agree with him in regarding Locke's
and Berkeley's theory of ideas as identical with that of Arnauld, in which the
representative idea is regarded as a modification of the mind. Indeed, in Berkeley's system the relation of substance and mode has properly no place.




264                      APPENDIX.
And such is in fact the form which Idealism assumes in the hands of
Fichte and Schelling. The theory of perceptions essentially representative,
which virtually regards the act and its immediate object as produced by
the inherent power of the mind itself, was not, in Arnauld's hands, carried
into any consequences beyond those required by his controversy with
Malelbranche. But a similar theory in the hands of the German philosophers became the basis, first, of an absolute Egoism, and finally, of an
absolute Pantheism. Consciousness being only possible in the form of
this or that special modification, it is but one step further to regard the
true substance as an unmodified substratum existing out of consciousness,
though manifested only in the consciousness of its several modes. We
have thus the Absolute Ego of Fichte, and, by a still further generalization,
the Absolute Being of Schelling, which, as the one substance from which
personal and impersonal phenomena alike proceed, may indifferently be
called Ego or God; the conscious self and the objects of its consciousness
being but opposite modes of the Divine One and All.
Nor will the Idealism of Berkeley, however opposed to these conclusions, offer any effectual barrier against them. The distinction between
ideas existing as objects in the mind, and ideas existing as modes of the
mind, is too slight to stand against that tendency to simplification which
forms at once the chief virtue and the chief vice of philosophical speculation. The natural judgment of mankind, which affirms the knowledge
of an external world existing independently of perception, being once
abandoned, the only qaestion which remains is, how to account for the
phenomena on the simplest hypothesis. And the simplest hypothesis is
that which postulates only one real existence underlying the multiplicity
of phenomena, the hypothesis whose various subordinate theories all
finally converge in Pantheism.
These consequences can only be avoided by abandoning the Idealistic
theory, and substituting a Natural Realism, Dualism though it be. Admit,
with Berkeley, that the real things are those very things which I see and
feel and perceive by my senses; but deny his other main position, that the
mind perceives only its own ideas. We may thus open the way for the
direct recognition in consciousness, first of our own organism as extended,
and secondly of an external world in relation to that organism.1 On this
theory we may get rid of the metaphysical distinction between phenomena
lind noumena, or between representations and things in themselves. The immediate object of perception is the thing; and the representation is not
opposed to the unperceived thing in itself, but to the presentation, or thing
as given in immediate relation to the conscious subject.
1 See Sir W. Hamilton's edition of Reid's fWorks, Notes D and D*.




APPENDIX.                              265
Another weak point of Berkeley's philosophy is his theory of the nature
of Belief. He considers that real things differ from chimeras in being
more vivid and clear, and not dependent on the will. This accords with
Hume's definition of Belief, "A lively idea, related to or associated with
a present impression." But the will is completely inactive in a dream;
and phantasms may be as lively and vivid when excited by a fiction as by a
true relation. The truth is that Belief cannot be defined, being presupposed in all consciousness. Every act of consciousness is a judgment,
and therefore a belief in the presence of its object: the question of reality
or unreality depends upon where and how we judge it to be present. If an
object present to the imagination is declared to be present to the sense, the
judgment is false; but the object is unreal only if by real we mean sensible.
All presentations, as such, may be called real relatively to their proper
intuition, and unreal relatively to any other. The further question, which
of our intuitions indicate the presence of external objects, and which are
merely affections of the mind or the sensitive organism, is one which,
however important on the realist hypothesis, is out of place in a system
of idealism.1
NOTE C, p. 131.
The following is Sir William. Hamilton's analysis of the causal judgment, as the result of the mental law of the conditioned. " The phenomenon is this: - When aware of a new appearance, we are unable to conceive
that therein has originated any new existence, and are, therefore, constrained
to think that what now appears to us under a new form had previously
an existence under others, - others conceivable by us or not. These others
(for they are always plural) are called its cause; and a cause (or, more
properly, causes) we cannot but suppose; for a cause is simply every thing
without which the effect would not result; and all such concurring, the
effect cannot but result. We are utterly unable to construe it in thought
as possible that the complement of existence has been either increased or
diminished. We cannot conceive, either, on the one hand, nothing becoming something, or, on the other, something becoming nothing. When
God is said to create the universe out of nothing, we think this by supposing that he evolves the universe out of nothing but himself; and, in
1 For some remarks on this question, see the Author's article Metaphysics, in
the eighth edition of the Encyclop(edia Britannica, p. 613.
23




266                      APPENDIX.
like manner, we conceive annihilation only by conceiving the creator to
withdraw his creation, by withdrawing his creative energy from actuality
into power."
"Our judgment of causality," he continues, "simply is: —We necessarily deny, or, rather, are unable to affirm in thought, that the object which
we apprehend as beginning to be, really so begins; but, on the contrary,
affirm, as we must, the identity of its present sum of being with the sum
of its past existence. And here it is not requisite for us to know, or even
to be able to conceive, under what form or under what combination this
quantum previously existed; in other words, it is unnecessary for us to
recognize the particular causes of this particular effect. A discovery of
the determinate antecedents into which a determinate consequent may be
refunded, is merely contingent, - merely the result of experience; but the
judgment that every event should have its causes, is necessary, and imposed on us as a condition of our human intelligence itself. This necessity
of so thinking is the only phenomenon to be explained. The question of philosophy is not concerning the cause, but concerning a cause." 1
Such is Sir W. Hamilton's statement of the phenomenon. The following is his explanation of it.
"The phenomenon of Causality seems nothing more than a corollary
of the law of the Conditioned, in its application to a thing thought under
the form or mental category of Existence Relative in Time. We cannot
know, we cannot think a thing, except under the attribute of Existence;
we cannot know or think a thing to exist, except as in Time; and we
cannot know or think a thing to exist in Time, and think it ahsolltely to
commence or terminate. Now this at once imposes on us the judgment of
causality. Unable positively to think an absolute commencement, our
impotence to this drives us backwards on the notion of Cause; unable
positively to think an absolute termination, our impotence to this drives us
forwards on the notion of Effect."  " We are compelled," he continues,
" to believe that the object (that is, the certain quale and quantum of being
whose phenomenal rise into existence we have witnessed) did really exist,
prior to this rise, under other forms (and by form, be it observed, I mean
any mode of existence, conceivable by us or not). But to say that a thing
previously existed under different forms, is only to say in other words
that a thing had causes. (It would be here out of place to refute the error
of philosophers in supposing that anything can have a single cause; -
meaning always by a cause that without which the effect would not have
been. I speak of course only of second causes, for of the Divine causation we can pretend to no conception.") 2
1 Discussions, pp. 609, 610 (2d edition).  2 Discussions, pn. 618, 621.




APPENDIX.                              267
To these extracts from Sir W. Hamilton's Discussions may be added a
short passage from the Appendix to his Lectures on Metaphysics, containing
his latest explanation of his theory.1 " Causation is, therefore, necessarily
within existence; for we cannot think of a change either from non-existence to existence, or from existence to non-existence.  The thought of
power, therefore,.always precedes that of creation, and follows that of
annihilation; and as the thought of power always involves the thought
of existence, therefore, in so far as the thoughts of creation and annihilation go, the necessity of thinking a cause for these changes exemplifies
the facts, - that change is only from one form of existence to another,
and that causation is simply our inability to think an absolute commencement or an absolute termination of being. The sum of being (actual and
potential) now extant in the mental and material worlds, together with that
in their Creator, and the sum of being (actual and potential) in the Creator
alone, before and after those worlds existed, is necessarily thought as precisely the same. Take the instance of a neutral salt. This is an effect,
the product of various causes, - and all are necessarily powers. We have
here, 1. an acid involving its power (active or passive) of combining with
the alkali; 2. an alkali, involving its power (active or passive) of combining with the acid; 3. (since, as the chemical brocard has it,'Corpora non
ag(unt nisi soluta') a fluid, say water, with its power of dissolving and
holding in solution the acid and alkali; 4. a translative power, say the
human hand, capable of bringing the acid, the alkali, and the water, into
correlation, or within the sphere of mutual affinity. These (and they
might be subdivided) are all causes of the effect; for, abstract any one,
and the salt is not produced. It wants a coifficient cause, and the concurrence of every cause is requisite for an effect."
In describing the above four conditions as all in different ways causes of
the effect, Sir W. Hamilton will probably meet with the concurrence of
most of his readers; but the further statement, that these causes are all
forms under which the effect previously existed, will probably strike them
as being at least verbally different from the common view. Most men
would readily admit that the acid, and the alkali, and the portion of water
necessary for combining them, are but previous forms of the salt itself;
but they would hesitate to admit the hand or its action into the same list.
In other words, they would allow that the earlier and the later substances
are identical in the material particles of which they are composed; but
they would insist on distinguishing these particles from the efficient cause
by which the composition is effected. But when the identity is stated in
this way, the judgment assumes a totally new character. Whether it be
1 Page 690.




968                       APPENDIX.
true or not that we cannot conceive the quantity of existence to be increased
or diminished, there is at any rate no such inability as regards the quantity
of matter. It may be true as a fact that no material atom has been added
to the world since the first creation; but the assertion, however true, is
certainly not necessary. The powerwhich created once must be conceived
as able to create again, whether that ability is actually exercised or not.
The same conclusion is still more evident when we proceed from the
consideration of matter to that of mind. Of matter we maintain that the
creation of new portions is perfectly conceivable, as a result at least, if
not as a process; of mind we believe that such creation actually takes
place. Every man who comes into the world comes into it as a distinct
individual, having a personality and consciousness of his own; and that
personality is a distinct accession to the number of persons previously
existing. Whatever may be thought concerning the material particles of
which my body is composed, it cannot be maintained that I, as a person,
had a previous existence in the personality of my parents, however I may
regard them as the causes of my being.
If, then, we are to identify the effect with the sum of its causes, we must
rise above the conceptions of matter as matter and of mind as mind, and
rise to the highest abstraction of existence in general, which is not any
particular existence. "The sum of being (actual and potential) now extant in the mental and material worlds, together with that in their Creator,
and the sum of being (actual and potential) in the Creator alone, before
and after those worlds existed, is necessarily thought as precisely the
same." This assertion involves a previous question: Is Being in this
abstract form necessarily thought as a sum at all, or indeed necessarily
thought in any way?
It is admitted that we not only can conceive, but actually know by
experience, the origination of new forms of existence: it is, questioned
whether these forms are regarded as new existences. But strip off the
form, and what is left to constitute the existence? The world, as a world,
is not identical with its Creator; the Creator, as a Creator, is not identical
with the world. The identity, if it is admitted at all, can only be admitted
as regards an unmodified substratum of existence in general, which is no
existence in particular. But existence, as an abstract substratum of this
kind, is to human thought absolute zero: thus far the Hegelian paradox is
true; pure being is pure nothing. When we have abstracted from the
world all that distinguishes it as a world, and from the Creator all that
distinguishes him as a Creator, we have nothing left to constitute the identity of existence. From the mere general statement that cause and effect
both exist, we have no more right to say that they are the same existence,




APPENDIX.                            269
than, from the general statement that they both appear, we have a right
to say that they are the same phenomenon.
Our conception of existence, as of appearance, is not singular, but
plural. We are not conscious of existence in general, but of existing
things; as we are not conscious of appearance in general, but of apparent
objects. The two may not indeed be always regarded as coextensive.
Diversity of phenomena does not always imply diversity of existence;_.ut
neither, on the other hand, does it always imply identity of existence. The
primary fact of consciousness, the distinction between the ego and the nonego, is a distinction, not of phenomena, but of realities. I know myself as
a distinctly existing being; - indeed, it is probably from that knowledge
that my conception of being, as distinguished from appearance, is derived;
- and I know the external world as something different from myself.
Arguing by analogy from this primary conviction, I believe every man to
be a distinct being from every other man and from all the other objects
around him; and I believe that every new person that comes into the
world is, as a person, a new existence. How far the same distinction may
be extended to impersonal objects is another question; for in these we
have no immediate knowledge of any principium individuationis, constituting a single reality out of this or that aggregate of phenomena. But if
we are unable to affirm the existence of such a principle, we are also
unable to deny it; and hence we are not justified in asserting that all phenomena are but different modes of one and the same reality.
From this point of view, the conception of potential existence, on which
Sir W. Hamilton's theory mainly depends, vanishes altogether.  If our
conception of existence, like all other conceptions, is subject to the conditions of plurality and difference, - if we have no conception of being at
all except in the form of this being as distinguished from that, - it follows that, where the definite characteristics of this or that being are
absent, the being itself has no existence in any form. The mere possibility of the existence of a man is not the existence of a man under another form; for the man, as such, has no existence except in the particular
form by which he is actually constituted. To say that everything which
begins had a previous existence in another form, is to say that the form is
no part of the existence; - a position which necessarily leads us back to
the Eleatic theory of the unity of all things, and identifies Existence with
Indifference.
If these objections are tenable, the common statement of the causal
judgment, in which the cause is regarded as something different from
the effect, is more accurate, and more in accordance with the philosophy
of the Conditioned, than that of Sir W. Hamilton, in which the cause is
23*




270                      APPENDIX.
regarded as identical with the effect. Both statements equally repudiate
the absurdity of supposing existence to have originated from absolute
zero; for both alike suppose that nothing can begin to exist unless something had previously existed. The question between them is merely this:
Is this something a different existence, or only the same existence in another
form?
Neither on the one supposition nor on the other do we obtain any positive conception of the nature of Causation, beyond that which is furnished
by, and limited toour own volitions. Mere temporal antecedence of one
thing to another is not the whole of causation, any more than the mere
antecedence of the same thing under other forms. We are compelled still
to ask, what is that peculiar relation between antecedent and consequent,
by which the one gives birth to the other, or is changed into the other?
The origination of the consequent by the antecedent, and the evolution of
the actual from the potential, alike require a further cause to account for
them; and this causative energy, call it by what name you will, — power,
effort, tendency; - still remains absolutely unknown, but is still supposed as
absolutely indispensable.
NOTE D, p. 143.
The following is Mr. 3Mill's argument for the subjection of the human
will to the law of physical causation: " To the universality which mankind are agreed in ascribing to the Law of Causation, there is one claim
of exception, one disputed case, that of the Human Will; the determinations of which a large class of metaphysicians are not willing to regard
as following the causes called motives, according to as strict laws as those
which they suppose to exist in the world of mere matter. This controverted point will undergo a special examination when we come to treat
particularly of the Logic of the Moral Sciences. In the mean time I may
remark, that those metaphysicians who, it must be observed, ground the
main part of their objection upon the supposed repugnance of the doctrine in question to our consciousness, seem to me to mistake the fact
which consciousness testifies against. What is really in contradiction to
consciousness, they would, I think, on strict self-examination, find to he
the application to human actions and volitions of the ideas involved in
the common use of the term Necessity; which I agree with them in thinking highly objectionable. But if they would consider that by saying that




APPENDIX.                           271
a man's actions necessarily follow from his character, all that is really
meant (for no more is meant in any case whatever of causation) is that
he invariably does act in conformity to his character, and that any one
who thoroughly knew his character could certainly predict how he would
act in any supposable case; they probably would not find this doctrine
either contrary to their experience or revolting to their feelings. And no
more than this is contended for by any one but an Asiatic fatalist." 1
And no more than this, we might add, is needed to construct a system
of fatalism as rigid as any Asiatic can desire. But we must proceed to
Mir. Mill's further remarks in the Logic of the Moral Sciences. In this
latter portion of his work, the author has done little more than repeat his
belief that the law of causality applies in the same strict sense to human
actions as to other phenomena, involving in both cases, not constraint, but
"invariable, certain, and unconditional sequence;" so that, "given the
motives which are present to an individual's mind, and given likewise the
character and disposition of the individual, the manner in which he will
act may be unerringly inferred: that if we knew the person thoroughly,
and knew all the inducements which are acting upon him, we could foretell his conduct with as much certainty as we can predict any physical
event." He adds a distinction, intended to rescue his theory from the
charge of fatalism, as usually implied in the term Necessity. "That
word, in its other acceptations, involves much more than mere uniformity
of sequence; it implies irresistibleness. Applied to the will, it only means
that the given cause will be followed by the effect, subject to all possibilities of counteraction by other causes; but in common use it stands for
the operation of those causes exclusively which are supposed too powerful to be counteracted at all."  "The causes, therefore," he continues,
" on which action depends, are never uncontrollable; and any given effect
is only necessary provided that the causes tending to produce it are not
controlled. That whatever happens could not have happened otherwise,
unless something had taken place which was capable of preventing it, no
one surely needs hesitate to admit." 2
That there is some fundamental weakness in the above theory, appears
almost on the surface, from the fact that so acute a thinker as Mr. Mill can
imagine that he has saved the principle of causality from the charge of
fatalism by this concluding sentence. That whatever happens could not
have happened otherwise, unless something had taken place capable of preventing it, is indeed in one sense a perfectly harmless position, but also a
perfectly unproductive one. It is the mere truism of the Nursery Rhyme:
1 Mill's Logic, vol. i. p. 419.  2 Mill's Logic, book vi. chap. 2.




272                      APPENDI7X
"There was an old woman lived under a hill,
And if she's not gone, she lives there still."
Examine it closer, and the question at once arises, Whence is this counteracting something to come? If from myself, from a self-determined act of
fiee will, this concedes the whole question at issue. If from an act of will
determined by preexisting causes, or altogether from without, I am still
in the iron grasp of Necessity. If the preventing circumstance, come
whence it may, comes as the certain sequence of antecedent phenomena, I
am still the slave of circumstances; if otherwise, the whole resemblance
between moral and physical causation vanishes.
But let us go up to the fundamental principle of the theory itself. The
conduct of a man, we are told, is the invariable consequent of motives
present to his mind; so that, given the motives and the man's character,
we could certainly predict the action. Character, it must be observed, is
not here to be understood in Aristotle's sense, as a disposition caused by a
series of voluntary acts; it must be something coeval with the first act of
so-called volition. At the earliest period at which I am capable of acting,
I possess a character of some sort; and that character, together with the
motives presented, determines certainly how I shall act.
The plausibility of the theory arises from an ambiguity in the term
motive. In knowing the phenomena present to a man's mind at the moment of any act of volition, is it included that we are to know their relation
to his will? If so, the supposed prediction is a mere begging of the question. When I know how he will be inclined to act, I know how he will act.
If not, the advocate of the doctrine must succumb to the sophism of the
Assinus Buridani, and concede that the unfortunate animal, between two
bundles of hay exactly alike, must starve. The solution of this sophism,
supposing, of course, that the ass in that instance represents a voluntary,
and not merely a spontaneous agent, is likewise the solution of Mr. Mill's
argument. What is meant by two bundles of hay exactly alike?  They
must be indistinguishable by sight, smell, touch, and so forth. But are
objects exactly similar as regards the senses, therefore exactly similar as
regards the will?  A lump of salt and a lump of sugar may be similar to
the eye: are they therefore similar to the palate? If taste is not dependent
upon another sense, why may not will be independent of all the senses?
If, on the other hand, the two bundles of hay are to be exactly similar,
as motives in relation to the will, the argument amounts to the mere truism,
that if the ass does not choose one he will choose neither.
Exactly the same fallacy runs through Mr. Mill's theory of the causality
of actions. The so-called motives are either a set of phenomena viewed




APPENDIX.                             273
in their relation to the will, or viewed out of that relation. If the former,
the argument has long ago been refuted by Reidl.l The strongest motive
prevails; but I only know the strength of motives in relation to the will
by the test of ultimate prevalence; so that this means no more than that
the prevailing motive prevails. I have no measure of strength but its
effects. I only know certain things to be motives at all by the fact of
their ultimate prevalence. If, on the other hand, the phenomena are considered out of their relation to the will, my consciousness testifies at once
that my actions are not subject to the same invariable sequence as physical
changes. I know, that is, whenever I lift my arm to my head, that it is at
that moment in my power not to lift it; and that, the antecedent circumstances being precisely the same, I may decide not to do so at any future
time. But, says Mr. Mill, this decision of the will is itself a new antecedent.2 Certainly, a new antecedent to the act; but with what propriety can
it be called a new antecedent to itself? The question is not whether the
act of motion follows certainly upon that of volition, but whether the act
of volition follows certainly upon antecedent circumstances. The former
sequence depends on purely physical laws; and the preventing causes,
such as a stroke of paralysis, are purely physical also. But if the latter
sequence is invariable also, we admit, not one new phenomenon, but millions; since an opposite determination of the will can only come in with
its determinant, and the determinant of that determinant, and so on, ad
infinitum. For to suppose that two opposite volitions can follow from the
same determinant is incompatible with the whole hypothesis of causality.
If, on the other hand, the sequence of volition from given antecedents is
variable, what becomes of the power of predicting a man's actions? The
contingency of a single link affects all the subsequent portion of the
chain.
In reply, then, to the question, Are our volitions, like other events, the
result of causes? Certainly not, in the only intelligible senses of the
term. I have only two positive notions of causation: one, the exertion
of power by an intelligent being; the other, the uniform sequence of phenomenon B from A. (A may here stand for a single phenomenon, or a
group; for that antecedent or sum of antecedents which constitutes the
Sufficient Reason.) The former hypothesis is Fatalism. If my will results
1 Active Powers, Essay iv. ch. 4, p. 610, ed. Hamilton.
2 Mr. Mill says, " The wish is a new antecedent." If this term is meant to be
synonymous with will, it would be an improvement in language to change it; if
it is meant to be synonymous with desire, the confusion of desire with will vitiates hiswhole argument.




274                        APPENDIX.
from the coercion of some other intelligence, I am the slave of Destiny.
The latter hypothesis is Determinism, a necessity no less rigid than fatalism, besides being at variance with the whole testimony of consciousness
and with the experience of every day. Besides these two, there is no
alternative but to admit, in the fullest sense, the freedom of the will, by
denying the applicability of the principle of causality to human actions.
"This objection, if not removed," says Mr. Mill, " would be fatal to the
attempt to treat human conduct as a subject of science."  Be it so. It is
better to accept the consequence than to admit the alternative. But it is
fatal only according to Mr. Mill's view of science. Ethology, as he conceives it, in relation to individuals, as the science of characters as they must
be according to laws of physical and mental causation, I do believe to be,
in its idea and pretensions, chimerical; but Ethics, as the science of such
characters as they ought to be according to the laws of moral obligation,
remains undisturbed, or, rather, more securely established. It seems to be
forgotten by writers of this school that these two systems are absolutely
exclusive of each other; that physical causation and moral obligation
cannot in perfection exist side by side; and that where they do coixist,
each must be in the inverse ratio of the other. In proportion as we extend
the domain of Necessity, we must diminish that of Duty; and Necessity,
notwithstanding all that Mr. Mill has advanced, I still believe to be the
inevitable result of subjecting moral acts to the laws of physical causation. But Ethology, in relation to classes of men, as affected by national,
professional, educational, physiological, or even moral circumstances, may,
notwithstanding, attain to a vast amount of important practical principles
and rules, though still subject to the influence of individual contingency.
The actuary of an insurance company, if he were to predict the duration
of life of any one individual on the books of his office, would in all probability guess wrong; - as a matter of fact, it is true, mainly from his ignorance of physical circumstances; but as a matter of theory also, if we
allow that the individual in question may falsify the prediction by a voluntary act of suicide. But if the same experiment is tried on a sufficiently
large scale, opposite errors will counteract each other, and the general
approximate result attains almost to a moral certainty. The general results of Ethology, as applied to classes, are dependent in a great degree
on similar circumstances, and may attain to the same or a higher amount
of practical utility.
In the course of the above remarks I have purposely avoided touching
on a subject alluded to by Mr. Mill, the compatibility of man's free-will
with God's foreknowledge. This question is insoluble, because we have
nothing but negative notions to apply to it. To enable us to determine




APPENDIX.                               275
the exact manner in which an Infinite Intelligence contemplates succession
in time, it would be necessary that our intelligence should be infinite also.
In this, as in all other revelations of God's relation to man, we must be
content to believe, without aspiring to comprehend. The fact of God's
foreknowledge is all that is revealed to us: the manner He has left in
darkness, and we cannot enlighten it. But we are not justified in rejecting
what we can comprehend because we do not understand its possible relation to what we cannot.1 That no conceivable amount of information
could enable a being of human constitution to predict with certainty the
acts of another, is established by the same evidence of consciousness by
which we know that there is a human constitution at all. How far the
same conclusion can be transferred to other orders of finite beings, still
less to an Infinite Intelligence, we have no data for determining.
The Necessitarian theory has recently been stated anew, in two works,
both of high ability and reputation, but written in very different spirits
and with very different purposes. The author of the first of these works,
while professedly writing in the name and in support of the principles of
Necessitarianism, strenuously asserts, at the same time, the apparently
opposite doctrine of the freedom of the will and the responsibility of man,
and writes with the avowed purpose of reconciling these seemingly conflicting beliefs. The author of the second work pushes his principles to a
conclusion which cannot be otherwise understood than as exonerating
human actions from all voluntariness, and their agents from all responsibility. The former of these works, Dr. McCosh's " Method of the Divine
Government," is one from which I cannot dissent without extreme reluc1 " Sed quia jam Deum agnoscentes, tam immensam in eo potestatem esse percipimus, ut nefas esse putemus existimare, aliquid unquam a nobis fieri posse,
quod ante non ab ipso fuerit praordinatum; facile possumus nos ipsos magnis
difficultatibus intricare, si hanc Dei pr.Tordinationem, cum arbitrii nostri libertate conciliare, atque utramque simul comprehendere conemur.
"Illis vero nos expediemus, si recordemur mentem nostram esse finitam; Dei
autem potentiam, per quam non tantum omnia, quae sunt aut esse possunt, ab
aeterno prsescivit, sed etiam voluit ac praeordinavit, esse infinitam: ideoque hane
qidem i nobis satis attingi, ut dare et distincte percipiamus ipsam in Deo esse;
non autem satis comprehendi, ut videamus quo pacto liberas hominum actiones
indeterminatas relinquat; libertatis autem et indifferentiae quse in nobis est, nos
ita conscios esse, ut nihil sit, quod evidentius et perfectius comprehendamus. Absurdum enim esset, propterea quod non comprehendimus unam rem, quam scimus ex naturL sua nobis esse debere incomprehensibilem, de alia dubitare, quam
intime comprehendimus, atque apud nosmet ipsos experimur."- Descartes,
Principia, P. i. 40, 41.




276                     APPENDIX.
tance, regarding it, as I do, as one of the most valuable contributions to
Christian philosophy which the present age has produced. With many of
the author's remarks on the present question I fully concur, and in others
I am inclined to hope that the difference between us is more verbal than
real. But there are some of his statements which, even if not substantially erroneous in themselves, may lead to error from their language and
its associations.
Dr. McCosh takes his position, as a Necessitarian, on the ground "that
the principle of cause and effect reigns in the domains of mind as in the
territories of matter."   Thus he considers the doctrine of Necessity to
be founded " on one of the very intellectual intuitions of man's mind,
which leads us, in mental as in material phenomena, to anticipate the
same effects to follow the same causes." Of this intellectual intuition he
says, in another part of his work, " In regard to any one thought or feeling, we affirm that it must have had a cause in some property of the mind,
or in some antecedent state of the mind, or in the two combined. It is by
an intuition of our nature that we believe that this thought or feeling
could not have been produced without a cause, and that this same cause
will again and forever produce the same effects. And this intuitive principle leads us to expect the reign of causation, not only among the thoughts
and feelings generally, but among the wishes and volitions of the soul." 2
I cannot help thinking that what Dr. McCosh here describes as an intuitive principle of the mind, is in fact a combination of two principles,
differing both in their nature and in their origin. That a given phenomenon, whether material or mental, " could not have been produced without
a cause," is one assertion; that "this same cause will again and forever
produce the same effects," is another. Setting aside for the moment what
we know empirically of the uniformity of nature, it is perfectly conceivable that the world might have been so constituted that there should be
no regularity in the succession of events, but that the same cause which
at one time is followed by a particular effect should at another have no
such consequence. The latter portion, therefore, of Dr. McCosh's principle is not entitled to rank among the original intuitions of the mind,
because, even if experience assures us that, as a matter of fact, it never is
violated, we have no difficulty in conceiving that it may be.
But when the knowledge of the uniformity of nature is discarded, what
remains to constitute the intuitive principle? How much or how little is
implied in the mere conviction that every phenomenon must have a cause
on the particular occasion of its occurrence, if we know nothing about
1 Appendix, p. 541.              2 p. 275.




APPENDIX.                              277
similiarity of recurrence? In the first place, with regard to voluntary and
involuntary phenomena alike, it is implied that some other phenomenon
has immediately preceded. This is a necessary consequence of the subjection of our consciousness to the law of time. In the next place, with
regard to voluntary actions alone, of which I am the cause, it is implied
that, at the moment of doing them, I am conscious of being able to abstain
from them; and this is an immediate consciousness of power, in the proper
sense of the term. In the third place, with regard to involuntary occurrences, there is the assumption of an unknown something in the antecedent
phenomenon analogous to the productive power in voluntary agents.1
This unknown something, however, is not power in the only form in which
we are conscious of it; nay, it is the direct negation of it; for power is
positively conceived only in the form of ability to choose between two
alternatives.2
It seems, then, that the apparent universality of the axiom, " Every event
must have a cause," is partly due to the ambiguity of its terms. Define
clearly what is meant by a cause, and the general axiom is at once divided
into two special ones. I am the cause of my actions, inasmuch as I do
them voluntarily, with a power at the same time to abstain from them.
In this sense we cannot speak of a cause in relation to the phenomena of
matter. It is not in this sense that the heat of the fire is the cause of the
melting of the wax. On the other hand, in the sense in which Hume and
Brown define a cause, it is applicable to material phenomena, but not to
voluntary actions. A cause, in the sense of these philosophers, means
some one invariable antecedent, or group of antecedents, the presence of
which is always followed by the phenomenon in question. In this sense,
it cannot be asserted that the determinations of the will have a cause,
meaning that the will is always determined in a similar manner by the
presence of similar antecedent circumstances. Or, thirdly, if we discard
1 See above, p. 134.
2 Dr. McCosh, p. 526, maintains that" power is implied in our very idea of sub.
stance," and that "this power, these properties of substances, are permanently
in them, and ready to be exercised at all times." But power, in this sense, is not
an idea distinct from the actual sequence of the effect; it is merely that sequence
viewed hypothetically. When I speak of the power of fire to melt wax, that
power not being in actual exercise, I mean no more than that the melting would
follow if the wax were exposed to it. In this sense we know nothing of power
or property except as the manifestation of an effect, hypothetical or actual.
Moreover, power in this sense, as a permanent property, involves the empirical
idea of the uniformity of nature as well as the mere conception of a substance
as existing.
24




278                       APPENDIX.
the conception of invariability, the axiom indeed becomes universal, but
does not amount to an assertion of a cause. It then asserts positively no
more than that every phenomenon has some other preceding it; i. e., that
no given phenomenon can be conceived as standing at the beginning of
all time. The unknown something, which we term power in the cause to
produce its effect, can neither be included in this universal assertion nor
referred to an original intuition of the mind; for there can be no intuition
of that which is unknown, and no universality in that which is denied of
one class of actions in the only sense in which it is affirmed of another.
But it is urged on the other side that human actions can be calculated
beforehand, and therefore are clearly subject to the operation of law.
" We anticipate," says Dr. McCosh, " the voluntary actions of mankind,
as we anticipate their judgments. No doubt we are at times mistaken in
the one case as in the other in our anticipations, but we do not in these
c'ases conclude that the voluntary actions of mankind have had no cause,
any more than we infer that their judgments have had no cause; we conclude merely that we did not know the cause, and that if we had known
the full cause, we could have certainly anticipated the result. There are
statistics of the voluntary actions of mankind —as of crimes, for instance — which are as accurate as the laws of mortality." 1  This statement would be a sufficient answer to a theory of complete indifference,
which regards the will as entirely uninfluenced by motives up to the time
when its choice is made; but it does not meet the objections of those who,
while fully allowing the influence of motives, yet maintain that that influence is different in its nature from any relation of material phenomena,
and therefore should not be called by the same name. Doubtless there
are general anticipations to be drawn from mental inclinations no less than
from physical successions. If I throw a piece of wax into the fire, I expect that it will melt. If I offer money to.an avaricious man, I expect
that he will take it. The question is: Is the expectation in both cases
equally certain? or is the difference only such as can be accounted for by
our greater or less knowledge of circumstances? To assume this is to
beg the entire question; and, on the strength of this assumption, to call
both relations by the common name of causation, is only to confound together two different things under an ambiguity of language.2
1 p. 276.
2 " If in moral reasoning it be mere mockery to use the language of demonstration, and to build up systems by trains of d priori reasoning upon a single
principle; it is assuredly not less absurd to affect the forms of inductive proof
in political speculation. Every political as well as every moral principle practically involves the determination of the will, and thereby becomes at once sepa



APPENDIX,                               279
Dr. McCosh himself admits the existence of a self-activity of the will;
which, if it means anything, means a power of resisting or yielding to
the motives presented to it, and of resisting at one time and yielding at
another, the concurrent circumstances being identical on both occasions.
Is there anything similar to this in the relation of a physical cause to its
effect?  If not, why call two dissimilar things by the same name? 1
In the other work to which I have above alluded, Mr. Buckle's " History
of Civilization in England," the "statistics of the voluntary actions of
mankind" are adduced to prove a further conclusion, which not merely
subjects every moral agent to the law of causation, but apparently exempts
him from all personal responsibility. Rejecting "the metaphysical dogma
of free-will," as resting on the fallible testimony of consciousness, Mr.
Buckle maintains that the actions of men "vary in obedience to the
changes in the surrounding society; " and "that such variations are the
result of large and general causes, which, working upon the aggregate of
society, must produce certain consequences, without regard to the volition
of those particular men of whom the society is composed."2 And in
applying this doctrine to particular cases, he carries it out so consistently
as to maintain, "that suicide is merely the product of the general condirated from that class of investigations in which we consider the immutable relations of physical phenomena. That the will is influenced by motives, no one
pretends to deny; but to compare that influence to a physical cause, followed
by an unvaried physical effect, is only to confound things essentially different,
and must ever end in metaphysical paradox or practical folly." - Sedgwick,
Discourse on the Studies of the University of Cambridge, p. 81, fifth edition.
1 The above remarks were written before the publication of Dr. MIcCosh's
recent work on the " Intuitions of the Mind." I do not find any substantial difference between the author's view, as stated in this later work, and that previously given in the "' Method; " though there are some expressions which tend to
confirm my suspicion that the difference between us is more verbal than real.
Thus he asserts (p. 472) that "causation in the will is entirely different from
causation in other action; " a statement in which I fully concur, only doubting
the propriety of calling the former by this name of causation at all. If there is
a causation, though of a diflerenlt kind, in moral as well as in physical action,
the generic notion of cause should be the same in both, the specific features alone
being different, as distinguishing this kind of cause from that. But can any univocal generic notion be pointed out, amounting to an adequate conception of
causation as such? If not, the definition of causation, as a common genus, is
not the same in both, and we have not the subdivisions of a generic notion, but
only the different senses of an equivocal term.
2 p. 21.




280                      APPENDIX.
tion of society, and that the individual felon only carries into effect what
is a necessary consequence of preceding circumstances."  "In a given
state of society," he continues, "a certain number of persons must put
an end to their own life. This is the general law; and the special question
as to who shall commit the crime depends of course upon special laws,
which, however, in their total action, must obey the large social law to
which they are all subordinate. And the power of the larger law is so
irresistible, that neither the love of life nor the fear of another world can
avail anything towards even checking its operation." 1 This conclusion
he endeavors to support by the evidence of statistics, " a branch of knowledge which, though still in its infancy, has already thrown more light on
the study of human nature than all the sciences put together." 2
It is surprising that this acute writer should not have seen that, in opposing the evidence of statistics to that of consciousness, he is comparing
together two witnesses who are not speaking of the same thing. The
fact to which consciousness bears witness is the freedom of our own personal actions. The fact which the statistical evidence is adduced to prove
is the recurrence, within certain limits of greatest and least frequency, of
actions distributed over an entire community. The former evidence tells
us nothing directly concerning the actions of societies; the latter tells us
nothing directly concerning the actions of individuals. Nay, it is precisely
because the individual actions are not reducible to any fixed law, or capable of representation by any numerical calculation, that the statistical
averages acquire their value as substitutes. No one dreams of applying
statistical averages to calculate the period of the earth's rotation, by
showing that four and twenty hours is the exact medium of time, comparing one month's or one year's revolutions with another's. It is only
where the individual movements are Irregular that it is necessary to aim
at a proximate regularity by calculating in masses. To what cause the
individual irregularity is due, whether to the complexity and minuteness
of the physical conditions of the problem, or to the presence of moral
conditions and free agency, - whether it indicates contingency in the facts
themselves, or only a defect in our means of calculating, —this is a
question which can only be answered by an acquaintance with the individual objects under examination, and which gains no elucidation from
the statistics of large classes.3
1 pp. 25, 26.                                    2 p. 31.
3 Some good remarks on the fallacy of this kind of reasoning will be found in
the Rev. W. B. Jones's Assize Sermon, The Responsibility of Alan to the Law of
God. Oxford, 1859, p. 15.




APPENDIX.                             281
NOTE E, p. 145.
Sir W. Hamilton, in connection with his theory of the nature of the
causal judgment, maintains that the schemes of liberty and necessity are
both equally inconceivable; though for the fact of liberty we have, immediately or mediately, the testimony of consciousness. A free volition, lhe
tells us, is inconceivable, because we cannot conceive an absolute commencement; a scheme of necessary determination is equally inconceivable,
because we cannot conceive an infinite non-commencement. "As equally
unthinkable," he says, "the two counter, the two one-sided, schemes are
thus theoretically balanced. But, practically, our consciousness of the
moral law, which, without a moral liberty in man would be a mendacious
imperative, gives a decisive preponderance to the doctrine of freedom
over the doctrine of fate. We are free in act, if we are accountable for
our actions." 1
This theory, though differing somewhat in the mode of reasoning, is in
its conclusion similar to that previously arrived at by Kant. That philosopher, in his third Contradiction of Transcendental Ideas, arranges in
parallel columns the opposite arguments in behalf of Liberty and Necessity, with the view of showing that each is irresistible in its attack upon
the other. Kant, too, like Sir W. Hamilton, maintains that the fact of
liberty is guaranteed by the testimony of the moral law, whose Categorical Imperative thou shalt necessarily implies a corresponding thou canst.2
Kant, however, denies that the liberty as a fact can claim the direct testimony of consciousness; for consciousness in his philosophy is limited to
the phenomena existing in space and time; whereas the freedom guaranteed by the moral law is a purely transcendental idea, subject to no
conditions of time, and incapable of being presented in experience.3
And this conclusion, so far as its negative result, the denial of a consciousness of freedom, is concerned, cannot be avoided, so long as we maintain,
along with the universal authority of the principle of causality, the position that we are not directly conscious of self as a reality, but only of
its several modes and affections. If my first consciousness relative to
volition is not that of myself as willing, but only of will as a phenomenon,
- if in the judgment " I will" there is no consciousness of I, but only of
1 Discussions, pp. 624, 625. Compare Reid's Works, pp. 599, 602.
2 See Kritik der reinen Vernunft, pp. 353, 429, 622; Metaph. der Sitten, p. 97;
Kr. der pr. V. p. 139; Religion innerhalb u. s. w. p. 56, ed. Rosenkranz.
3 Kritik der r. V. p. 414; Mfetaph. der Sitten, p. 92; Kr. der pr. V. p. 224.
24*




282                     APPENDIX.
will, - to this phenomenon of volition I am compelled by the principle of
causality to suppose an antecedent determining phenomenon; and to that
again another, and so on ad infinitum.
But this conclusion is no longer forced upon us, if we admit the existence of an immediate consciousness, not merely of the phenomena of
mind, but of the personal self as actively and passively related to them.
We thus obtain for the fact of liberty not merely the indirect testimony
of consciousness through the medium of the moral law, but the direct
testimony by the presence of the fact itself. I am conscious not merely
of the phenomenon of volition, but of myself as producing it, and as
producing it by choice, with a power to choose the opposite alternative.
In this case I am not compelled to go back to any prior cause whatever.
I need not suppose a prior intelligent cause; for my only positive notion
of such a cause is myself determining, which does not imply myself determined. I need not suppose a prior phenomenal cause; for I am conscious
of the influence of motives as inclining only, not as necessitating. The
whole point at issue thus turns on the following question: Can the fact of
consciousness expressed in the judgment I will, be analyzed into a relation
of phenomena subject to the law of causality? Is the principle which we
invariably apply to the sequence of one phenomenon on another also
applicable to the relation of any phenomenon to the one given cause,
myself 
Sir William Hamilton lays much stress on the impossibility of conceiving an absolute commencement. If by this is meant that I cannot conceive myself standing at the beginning of all time, out of all relation to
any antecedent series of phenomena, it is undeniably true. But is such a
conception needed to render the scheme of Liberty comprehensible? Is
it not sufficient for me to know that none of the chronological antecedents
stand to my volition in the particular relation of a determining cause?
And this is the case if it is neither given as an active power coercing, nor
as a passive phenomenon invariably preceding. To say that some antecedent or other must go before my will, is only to say that I do not stand at
the beginning of all time; but does this imply some one antecedent which
is invariably followed by volition, or some active power, necessitating in
each particular case? If, on the presence of the antecedent, or group of
antecedents, A, my volition sometimes takes place one way, and sometimes another, it is not determined in the same manner as physical phenomena. If there is not always present some conscious being, exerting his
power over my will, it is not determined in the same manner as it determines its own volitions. But, excepting these two senses, what is meant
by determining cause?




APPEND IX.                              283
Is there, then, extant any definition of will which does not imply another
will preceding?  Perhaps not; but the fault lies only in the authors of the
definitions. To refilte a given definition does not prove the non-existence
of the thing defined. If liberty itself is a simple fact of consciousness,
the error lies in the attempt to define it at all. The definition will necessarily involve a circle, and-upon that circle, and not on the fact, the antaonist reasons. But, then, if the definition and thre fact of consciousness are
at issue, the former must give way, not the latter. Now, consciousness tells
me not that my will wills, but that I will. Is it necessary to the conceivability of the fact that I should be able to analyze it into two constituent
elements, - to place an abstract I on one side, and an abstract will on the
other; thus literally fulfilling the satirical direction for the turbulent
Puritan's burial, by laying John apart from Lilburn and Lilburn from
John? Will any other state or act of mind bear a similar analysis? Can
I in any case separate the state from the mind and the mind from the
state; or give any definition which does not virt::ally repeat itself? But
is it correct, on that account, to call states which I experience every day
in consciousness inconceivable?
If, indeed, the freedom of the will be supposed to mean an absolute indifference to and independence of motives, such a liberty would be not only
inconceivable as a fact, but worthless as a principle of moral action. But
such is not the liberty to which consciousness bears witness; nor is such a
liberty required as the only alternative against fatalism. The influence of
motives on the will is not denied; only it is maintained that influence is
not necessary determination; and that motives are not causes, in any
proper sense of the latter term. Thus interpreted, I believe the scheme of
liberty is inconceivable only if the determinist argument is unanswerable;
and its answer is what I have attempted in this and the preceding note.
If the attempt to establish a contradictory conclusion fails, liberty, though
not definable, is surely as conceivable as any other simple datum of consciousness.
NOTE F, P. 146.
That our earliest notion of Causality arises from the fact given in the
determination of our own volitions, is suggested by Locke, and established
beyond all question by Maine de Biran. But then arises the question: By
what process do we transcend our personal consciousness, and acknowledge, in relation to the changes of the sensible world, the operation of




284                      APPENDIX.
causes other than ourselves? This process is called by De Biran and
Royer-Collard a Natural Induction, a term severely criticized by Mi. Cousin.
Were the process really inductive, he argues, we must believe every cause
in nature to be, like ourselves, voluntary, conscious, and free; and even
then the belief in question might perhaps be regarded as universally true
within the limits of experience, but could never rise to the character of a
necessary truth. For a more satisfactory explanation, M. Cousin has recourse to the principle of causality, which he regards as a necessary law
of the reason, by virtue of which it disengages, in the fact of consciousness, the necessary element of causal relation from the contingent element
of my personal production of this or that particular movement. This
necessity, which compels the reason to suppose a cause whenever the
senses or the consciousness present a phenomenon, is the Principle of
Causality.1
It is obvious to ask, What do we gain by the principle of causality thus
supposed? Does it explain in any degree the nature of that power which
we are supposed to attribute to inanimate objects? Does it explain how
we divest our original notion of the attribute of personality, and what is
left when we have done so? Does it furnish the slightest hint or help for
investigating the true character of efficient causes? By no means. The
principle itself is a mere statement of the fact, that we do invariably suppose a cause of physical changes, and that we cannot but do so. It offers
no psychological explanation of the fact; it merely gives it the name of a
principle of reason. It does not give us any positive notion of the cause
in question; this remains, we know not what, - a something different
from our own causality, and, as such, supposable perhaps, but inconceivable. It does not tell us how we can attain to a more positive knowledge.
Not by the senses; for these present to us only successive phenomena.
Not by the internal consciousness; for this informs us only of personal
causation. Not by the reason; for this only tells us in general terms that
there is a cause, but furnishes no means of observing and distinguishing
its character and varieties. The cause of physical changes still remains,
like the subject of physical attributes, a negative idea, a je ne sais quoi.
Nor does M. Cousin's theory, any more than that of De Biran, explain
how we get rid of the personal element with which all intuitive causality
is involved. It only says that we do so, and that we must do so. The
term Induction, employed by De Biran and Royer-Collard, is indeed objectionable, whether it be taken in the Aristotelian or in the Baconian sense.
The former is objectionable, inasmuch as our personal acts are not sup1 Cours de Philosophie, Le}on 19.




APPENDIX.                             285
posed to constitute, or even adequately to represent, the whole body of
causal relations. The latter is objectionable; for the same acts cannot be
selected instances showing diverse operations of a law, but must, from the
nature of the case, be all of one kind. But this objection affects only the
language, and not the basis of the theory; indeed, the two philosophers
in question have expressly stated that their natural induction must be
carefully distinguished from that of physics.1 But in point of language,
the phrase principle of reason is equally objectionable; partly as tending to
check all further psychological investigation into a point by no means as
yet satisfactorily explained, and partly as opening the way to the thousand
extravagances of ontological speculation, by concealing the purely negative character of the notion of physical power. On M. de Biran's theory,
says M. Cousin, anthropomorphism becomes the universal and necessary
law of thought.2 It might be replied, that in all cases where the presentation is given by internal consciousness only, anthropomorphism is in fact
the condition and the limit of all positive thinking.
I conceive, therefore, that there is nothing in NM. Cousin's theory which
dispenses with the obligation of a further psychological examination of
the origin and character of the supposed principle of causality, such as I
have attempted in the text of the present work. Whether that explanation itself be right or wrong, must be judged by others; but, whatever
may be its fate in this respect, I shall deem its purpose sufficiently answered if it serves to call the attention of philosophers to a point hitherto
too much neglected in speculation —the important distinction between
positive and negative intuitions and thoughts.
NOTE  G, p. 148.
In the controversy concerning the existence of a Moral Sense, the question at issue has suffered considerable misrepresentation from the want of
an accurate distinction between intuitive or presentative consciousness,
whose object is an individual thing, act, or state of mind, and reflective or
representative consciousness, whose immediate object is a general notion
or principle. Stewart, for example, in his Life of Adam Smith, observes:
1 (Euvres de Maine de Biran, vol. iv. p. 393; Jouffroy's Reid, vol. iv. pp. 383,
439.
2 iEuvres de Maine de Biran, vol. iv. Pr6face de lEditeur, p. xxxvi.




286                      APPENDIX.
" It was the opinion of Dr. Cudworth, and also of Dr. Clarke, that moral
distinctions are perceived by that power of the mind which distinguishes
truth from falsehood. This system it was one great object of Dr. Hutcheson's philosophy to refute, and in opposition to it, to show that the words
right and wrong express certain agreeable and disagreeable qualities in
actions, which it is not the province of reason, but of feeling, to perceive;
and to that power of perception which renders us susceptible of pleasure
or of pain from the view of virtue or of vice, he gave the name of the
Moral Sense."  The same philosopher, in his Philosophical Essays, endeavors to obviate Hume's deductions from Hutcheson's theory, by falling
back, in some degree, upon the views of Cudworth and Clarke, and referring the origin of our notions of right and wrong to reason instead of sense.
" Tastes and colors," said Hume, " and all other sensible qualities, lie not
in the bodies, but merely in the senses. The case is the same with beauty
and deformity, virtue and vice." To this Stewart replies: "The decisions
of the understanding, it must be owned, with respect to moral truth,
differ from those which relate to a mathematical theorem, or to the result
of a chemical experiment, inasmuch as they are always accompanied
with some feeling; or emotion of the heart; but on an accurate analysis of
this compounded sentiment it will be found that it is the intellectual judgment which is the groundwork of the feeling, and not the feeling of the
judgment."
In a Lecture on Moral Relations, by the late Professor Mills, the different opinions concerning our perception of Morality are summed up as
follows:
"1. Some ascribe our apprehension of it, with Hutcheson, to a peculiar
internal sense, similar in its operations to the external senses, and confound moral perception with taste; this is, strictly speaking, the theory
of a moral sense.
"2. Others attribute moral perception, not to any peculiar sense, but
yet to a peculiar faculty of the understanding distinct from its general
powers, and they appear to identify conscience with the moral faculty.
" 3. Many deny the existence of a peculiar moral faculty, and maintain
that moral principles are apprehended by the same powers of the intellect
which perceive other kinds of truth.
"4. The Utilitarian theory implies that moral relations are ascertained
and embraced by the operations of the discursive faculty only." 1
The whole controversy may be considerably cleared by distinguishing
Moral Facts from Moral Principles. Facts of all kinds are presented to, and
1 Essays and Lectures by the late Rev. W. MIills, p. 204.




APPENDIX.                                 287
perceived by, different faculties of intuition, similar in the manner of
their operation to the perceptions of sense; and hence, with some allowanceTYor metaphor, we may speak of internal or external senses.l  Is it
then asked whether we discern morality in individual acts by the same
faculties by which we discern other qualities of individual objects presented to us? But, of these qualities, some are visible, some audible, and
so on. Is it meant that an act can literally be seen, heard, smelt, felt, or
tasted, to be virtuous or vicious? If not, the perception of the moral character of acts is a distinct presentation, and, as such, to be referred to a
distinct faculty; though, being, as will appear, an object of internal, not
of external perception, it is not, like the external senses, connected with a
distinct bodily organ.
The question, whether right and wrong are apprehended by the same
powers of the intellect which perceive other kinds of truth, is only applicable to the general concepts or principles through which morality is represented as an object of thought. Truth and Falsehood can be distinguished
in representative knowledge only; and all such knowledge is most conveniently classified by reference to the single faculty of the Understanding.
The same power of thought may inquire into the ground of various presentations; it may investigate, for example, why one object is white, why
another is harmonious, why a third is sweet, why a fourth is beautiful,
why a fifth is virtuous; but in all such investigations, the fact of a given
object possessing a given quality must be presupposed as the groundwork
of the investigation. The distinction between a true and a false theory of
morals will be determined by the same test as that between truth and
falsehood in any other inquiry - its agreement or not, with the facts as
given in intuition.
It thus appears that a power of discerning right and wrong in individual acts must be allowed as the presentative basis, without which no
system of Moral Philosophy is possible.  Such a power, thus limited, it is
1 This has been observed by Aristotle, whose account of the Practical Sense, or
Intelligence, is in this respect more accurate than that of modern philosophers.
KaR.yp'r&v 7rpcTw1p ipWVo, Kal rv Eo'da rTWv YOes o'r1 KCal ol' A&yos, Kal 6!e.e
KarTa Ta&s &roSeieLs Tc7V &KLyv7Trwc  ipwv Kai WrpCTOTW,, 6' eV frars wTpacrKIKa;r'rov  e'oXdTov    al idvEXojudvOV   ecal  jr's  e'repas  7rpoTaCECO's  &pXal -yap ToO ov E'VfKa avitarc EK'rv Ka.' eaKCTa 7yap'rb Ka$Aov.
ToVTTwV oVV  XELV OE7 ato a b 71o i, auT77 I' ErrTTl vois. - Eth. _N ic. vi. 11.
Compare Pol. i. 2: To'iTo'yp 7rpbs TaAAa  oa'roTs av~,pC6rols oLS fOP,'ib  ov
aycao   Kati KaKoV KaC el  KaloV Kail &a'iKOU Kail iT-r  &Awv a o' U a    t  v  XElV.
These passages may serve as a qualification of Smith's assertion, that the word
moral sense is of very late formation.




288                      APPENDIX.
impossible for the Utilitarian to explain away by any theory of association
or education. Education may corrupt and pervert our presented ideas,
but it cannot originate them: it may teach me to regard an act as right
which is really wrong, or vice versa, but it cannot create the original impression of either. To deny, with Locke and Paley, the existence of a
moral sense, because one man holds to be wrong what another holds to be
right, is like denying the existence of a faculty of sight, because a man
with the jaundice sees all objects yellow. The existence of the faculty is
shown by our approving or disapproving at all; it cannot therefore be
disproved by the fact of our sometimes approving or disapproving wrongly.
The opposite error of Hume, in holding that virtue and vice exist in the
sense only, lies in a confusion of the subjective feeling of approbation
with the objective quality which gives rise to it. The same confusion
has taken place with regard to the secondary qualities of body. Heat and
color, as sensations, exist only in a sentient being; but that such sensations
originate from nothing at all in the bodies themselves, is an absurdity long
ago exploded, if indeed ever seriously maintained.
This presentation of right and wrong, however, is by no means accurately
exhibited in the account commonly given of moral sense. It is not correct
to describe our perception of the moral character of actions in general as
coordinate with or including the judgment of our own conduct in particular.l Right and wrong are not directly presented to me in any other actions
than my own. If I see a murder committed in a puppet-show, I have all
the same presented phenomena as if I see a murder committed by a man.
I do not feel the same moral disapprobation, because I do not attribute to
the puppet the same internal consciousness of obligation as to the man. But
this consciousness is not presented except in the case of my own acts, and,
from these, is transferred representatively to other men, whose mental constitution I believe to be in this respect similar to my own. The intuitive faculty
is properly limited to the approbation or disapprobation of my personal acts;
and to this personal consciousness must thus be traced the original notions
of Right and Wrong, as of Cause, and of Substance, and of all internal
phenomena. Hence, if the terms Moral Sense and Conscience be used according to the ordinary philosophical distinction, it will be more correct to
describe Moral Sense as an extension of Conscience, than Conscience as a
limitation of Moral Sense.2
1 As is done by Bishop Sanderson, in his Prcelectiones de Obligatione Conscientice, as well as by Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and most of the advocates of a moral
sense, and still more by Smith, in his theory of Sympathy.
2 This is exactly the reverse of the theory of Adam Smith, who maintains that
our judgments concerning the morality of our own acts is entirely derived from




APPENDIX.                              289
NOTE H, p. 212.
The difference between the relations of the several Forms of Thonght to
Psychology and to Logic has not hitherto been accurately marked. Psychologically, all that is communicated by, not given to, the act of thinking,
belongs to the form, not to the matter, of the product. But these psychological forms do not come within the province of Logic, unless some
further process of pure or formal thinking is affected by them. In its
psychological relation, modality is clearly one of the forms of judgment.
The necessary judgment, "A must be B," expresses the existence of a law,
of some kind or other, by which the attributes are inseparably connected;
the contingent judgment, whose full expression is, "A may or may not be
B," denies the existence of any law of the kind; while the pure judgment,
"A is B," states the fact of an existing connection, without taking into
account the question of law at all. The psychological question is this:
"Is the presence or absence of a law connecting the terms of a judgment
given to or by the act of judging? Is it part of the given phenomena, or a
manner in which the mind regards them? In other words, Is modality an
affection of the predicate, or of the copula? Do I in thought decide on
the actual connection of A with a given necessary-B, or on the necessary
connection of A with a given B? In the former case, the modality belongs
to the matter of the judgment; in the latter, to the form.
The true answer to this question is sufficiently plain. If sensible experience is incompetent to furnish the notion of identity between two phenomena, it is equally incompetent to furnish that of necessary or contingent
identity. These are additional products of the act of thought; experience
having only presented the phenomena in a constant or variable juxtaposition. Nay, further, the hypothesis that modality is given in the predicate
of a judgment, not thought in the copula, becomes, in ultimate analysis,
destructive of itself. For, if in thought we connect A with what is given
as necessarily B, this implies that B has previously been thought as necessarily connected with some subject or other. A necessary-B has no intelligible sense, except in relation to some previous judgment, " C must be B."
The identification of A with B, then, takes place through the medium of C;
that which we pass on others. This theory he carries so far as to assert, " Were
it possible that a human creature could grow up to manhood in some solitary
place, without any communication with his own species, he could no more think
of his own character, of the propriety or demerit of his own sentiments and conduct, of the beauty or deformity of his own mind, than of the beauty or deformity of his own face."
25




290                      APPENDIX.
and the supposition that modality can be given as an affection of the
predicate, implies that it has been previously thought as an affection of the
copula. This is sufficient to establish the psychological position of modality as a form of the judgment. But, thus admitted, it is indispensable
that it should be expressed in the copula, and not, as is frequently done,
left to be gathered from our knowledge of the matter. A judgment of
the form "A is B," whatever notions may be expressed by the terms,
can never be thought as other than a pure or assertorial judgment. An
apodeictical or problematical judgment requires a different statement of
the copula relation, "A must be B," or "A may be B."
On the other hand, the criticism of Sir W. Hamilton, though accurately
expressed in relation to one process of thought only, may be so extended
as to be decisive as regards the exclusion of modality from Logic.
"Necessity, Contingency, etc.," he says, " are circumstances which do not
affect the logical copula or the logical inference. They do not relate to the
connection of the subject and predicate, of the antecedent and consequent, as terms in thought, but as realities in existence; they are metaphysical, not logical conditions. The syllogistic inference is always
necessary; is modified by no extraformal condition; is equally apodictic
in contingent as in necessary matter."1
As regards the syllogistic inference, these remarks are strictly accurate,
and would be conclusive against any modality proposed as a form  of
reasoning. Were a distinction, for example, set up between syllogisms in
which the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises, and syllogisms
in which it may be inferred with more or less probability, the latter would
rightly be condemned as extralogical - the true syllogistic inference being
always necessary. As regards the copula in judgments, the criticism
cannot be accepted as verbally accurate unless we distinguish the logical
copula from  the psychological.  That modality relates to realities in
existence, is not conclusive; for quantity and quality, in all synthetical
judgments, do the same in the same degree, and yet are rightly classed as
forms of thought. But if we extend the distinction between formal and
material thinking, so as to embrace judgment and conception, as well as
reasoning, it is clear that the copula is always necessary in analytical or
formal judging, as the inference is always necessary in formal reasoning.
Material judgments, however, cannot be entirely excluded fiom Logic, in
so far as they furnish data for formal reasoning. They are admissible,
however, only in relation to this latter process; and hence those forms of
judgment only are rightly to be regarded as logical which affect the formal
inference derivable from them. This is the case with quantity and quality,
1 Discussions, p. 146.




APPENDIX.                             291
but not with modality: the latter affects the conclusion of a syllogism not
as a conclusion, in its relation to the premises, but only in itself, as a proposition. For this reason, it is logically preferable to exclude modality as
a form, and to treat it as if it affected the predicate only of the judgment.
The logical copula thus becomes in every instance assertorial only; and if
this be carefully distinguished from the psychological copula, the remarks
of Sir W. Hamilton may be regarded as applicable to the whole of Logic,
and to every process of thought.
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PRINCIPLES OF ZOOLOGY; Touching the Structure, Development, Distribution, and Natural Arrangement, of the RACES OF ANIMALS, living and extillct,
with numerous Illustrations. For the use of Schools and Colleges. Part I. Co.NFARATIVE PHYSIOLOGY.  By LOUIS AGASSIZ and AUGUSTUS A. G(OULD.  Revised edition, 12mo, cloth, $1.00.
" It is not a mere book, but a work -a real work in the form of a book. Zooilogy is an interesting
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"'llis work places us in possession of information half a century in advance of all our elementary
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"The best book of the kind in our language."- Christian Examiner.
PRINCIPLES OF ZOO)LOGY, PART II. Systematic ZoOlogy. In
preparation.
THE  ELEMENTS  OF  GEOLOGY; adapted to Schools and Colleges. With
numerous Illustrations.  By J. R. LOOMIs, President of Lewisburg University, Pa.
12mo, cloth, 75 cts.
" It is surpassed by no work before the American public." -. B. Anderson, LL. D., President
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" This is just such a work as is needed for our schools. We see no reason why it should not
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"Admirably adapted for use as a text-book in common schools and academies." - Congregationalist, Boston.
ELEMENTS OF MORAL SCIENCE. By FRANCIS WAYLAND, D. D., late
President of Brown University. 12mo, cloth, $1.25.
MORAL  SCIENCE  ABRIDGED, and adapted to the use of Schools and
Academies, by the Author. Half morocco, 50 cts.
The same, CHEAP SCHOOL EDITION, boards, 25 cts.
This work is used in the Boston Schools, and is exceedingly popular as a text-book wherever it
has been adopted.
ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY. By FRANCIS WAYLAND,
DD.. 12mo, cloth, $1.25.
POLITICAL  ECONOMY  ABRIDGED, and adapted to the use of Schools
and Academies, by the Author. Half morocco, 50 cts.
"It deserves to be introduced into every private family, and to be studied by every man who
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family library; not there to be shut up unread, but to afford rich material for thought and discussion in the family circle." - Puritan Recorder.
All the above Works by Dr. Wayland are used as text-books in most of the colleges and higher
schools throughout the Union, and are highly approved.
Uy' G. I4 L. keep, in addition to works published by themselves, an extensive assortment of works published by others, in all departments of trade, which they supply
at publishers' prices. They invite the attention of Booksellers, Travelling Agyents,
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a liberal discount is uniformly made), to their extensive stock. Copies of Text-books
for examination will be sent by mail or otherwise, to any one transmitting ONE
HALF the price of the same.  gi' Orders from  any part of the country promptly
attended to with faithfulness and despatch.                              (33)




WORKS FOR BIBLE STUDENTS.
KITTO'S POPULAR CYCLOP2EDIA OF BIBLICAL LITERA
TURE. Condensed from the larger work. By the Author, JOHN KITTO, D. D. Assisted by JAMES TAYLOR, D. D., of Glasgow. With over five hundred Illustrations. One
volume, octavo, 812 pp. Cloth, $3.00; sheep, $3.50 i cloth, gilt, $4.00 i half calf, $4.00.
A DICTIONARY OF THE BIBLE. Serving, also, as a COMMENTARY, embodying the products of
the best and most recent researches in biblical literature in which the scholars of Europe and
America have been engaged. The work, the result of immense labor and research, and enriched
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science. It is not only intended for ministers and theological students, but it is also particularly
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THE HISTORY  OF PALESTINE, from the Patriarchal Age to the Present
Time; with Chapters on the Geography and Natural History of the Country, the Cus.
toms and Institutions of the IIebrews. By JouH  KITTO, D. D. With upwards of two
hundred Illustrations. 12mo, cloth, $1.25.. A work admirably adapted to the Family, the Sabbath, and the week-day School Library.
ANALYTICAL CONCORDANCE TO THE HOLY SCRIPTURES; or, the Bible presented under Distinct and Classified Heads or Topics. By
JOHN EADIE, D. D., LL. D., Author of " Biblical Cyclopoedia," "Ecclesiastical Cyclopsedia," " Dictionary of the Bible," etc. One volume, octavo, 840 pp. Cloth, $3.00; sheep,
$3.50 i cloth, gilt, $4.00 i half Turkey morocco, $4.00.
The object of this Concordance is to present the SCRIPTURErS ENTIRE, under certain classified
and exhaustive heads. It differs from an ordinary Concordance, in that its arrangement depends
not on WORDS, but on SUBJECTS, and the verses are printed in full. Its plan does not bring it at
all into competition with such limited works as those of Gaston and Warden; for they select doctrinal topics principally, and do not profess to comprehend as this THE ENTIRE BIBLE. The work
also contains a Synoptical Table of Contents of the whole work, presenting in brief a system of
biblical antiquities and theology, with a very copious and accurate index.
The value of this work to ministers and Sabbath-school teachers can hardly be over-estimated;
and it needs only to be examined, to secure the approval and patronage of every Bible student.
CRUDEN'S CONDENSED CONCORDANCE. A Complete Concord.
ance to the Holy Scriptures. By ALEXANDER CRUDEN. Revised and Re-edited by the
Rev. DAvID KING, LL. D. Octavo, cloth backs, $1.25 i; sheep, $1.50.
The condensation of the quotations of Scripture, arranged under the most obvious heads, while
it diminishes the bulk of the work, greatlyfacilitates the finding of any required passage.
" We have in this edition of Cruden the best made better. That is, the present is better adapted
to the purposes of a Concordance, by the erasure of superfluous references, the omission of unne.
cessary explanations, and the contraction of quotations, &c. It is better as a manual, and is better
adapted by its price to the means of many who need and ought to possess such a work, than the
former large and expensive edition." - Puritan Recorder.
A COMMENTARY ON THE ORIGINAL TEXT OF THE ACTS
OF THE  APOSTLES. By HORATIO B. HACKETT, D. D., Prof. of Biblical Literature and Interpretation, in the Newton Theol. Inst. [i-A new, revised, and enlarged
edition. Royal octavo, cloth, $2.25.
ng This most important and very popular work has been thoroughly revised; large portions
entirely re-written, with the addition of more than one hundred pages of new rrmatter; the result of
the author's continued, laborious investigations and travels, since the publication of the first edition.
/calx




IMPORTANT NEW WORKS.
CYCLOPAEDIA OF ANECDOTES OF LITERATURE AND
THE  FINE  ARTS.  Containing a copious and choice Selection of Anecdotes
of the various forms of Literature, of the Arts, of Architecture, Engravings, Music,
Poetry, Painting, and Sculpture, and of the most celebrated Literary Characters and
Artists of different Countries and Ages, &c. By KAZLITT ARVINE, A. M., author of
" Cyclopsedia of Moral and Religious Anecdotes." With numerous Illustrations. 725 pp.
octavo. Cloth, $3.00; sheep, $3.50; cloth, gilt, $4.00; half calf, $4.00.
This is unquestionably the choicest collection of Anecdotes ever published. It contains three
thousand andforty Anecdotes: and such is the wonderful variety, that it will be found an almost
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to artists, mechanics, and others, as a DICTIONARY for reference, in relation to facts on the numberless subjects and characters introduced. There are also more than one hundred and fifty fine
Illustrations.
THE  LIFE  OF JOHN  MILTON, Narrated in Connection with the POLITICAL,
ECCLESIASTICAL, and LITERARY HISTORY OF HIS TIME. By DAVID MASSON, M.A., Professor
of English Literature, University College, London. Vol. I., embracing the period from
1608 to 1639. With Portraits, and specimens of his handwriting at different periods.
Royal octavo, cloth, $0.00.
This important work will embrace three royal octavo volumes. By special arrangement with
Prof. Masson, the author, G. & L. are permitted to print from advance sheets furnished them, as
the authorized American publishers of this magnificent and eagerly looked for work. Volumes two
and three will follow in due time; but, as each volume covers a definite period of time, and also
embraces distinct topics of discussion or history, they will be published and sold independent of
each other, or furnished in sets when the three volumes are completed.
THE  GREYSON  LETTERS. Selections from the Correspondence of R. E. H.
GREYSON, Esq. Edited by HENRY ROGE-RS, author of "Eclipse of Faith."  12mo, cloth,
$1.25.
" Mr. Greyson and Mr. Rogers are one and tho same person. The whole work is from his pen,
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" A book not for one hour, but for all hours; not for one mood, but for every mood; to think
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"The Letters are intellectual gems, radiant with beauty, happily intermingling the grave and
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ESSAYS IN BIOGRAPHY AND CRITICISM.  By PETER BATNE, M.
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These volumes have been prepared by the author exclusively for his American publishers, and
are now published in uniform style. They include nineteen articles, viz.:
FIRST SERIES: - Thomas De Quincy. -Tennyson and his Teachers. -Mrs. Barrett Browning. — Recent Aspects of British Art. -John Ruskin. -Hugh Miller. - The Modern Novel;
Dickens, &c.- Ellis, Acton, and Currer Bell.
SECOND SERIES:-Charles Kingsley. -- S. T. Coleridge.- T. B. Macaulay. - Alison..- Wellington. - Napoleon. - Plato. - Characteristics of Christian Civilization. - The Modern University.
-The Pulpit and the Press. - Testimony of the Rocks: a Defence.
VISITS TO EUROPEAN CELEBRITIES. By the Rev. WILLIAM B.
SPRAGUE, D. D. 12mo, cloth, $1.00; cloth, gilt, $1.50.
A series of graphic and life-like Personal Sketches of many of the most distinguished men and
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advantqgeous circumstances. Besides these' pen and ink " sketches, the work contains the novel
attraction of afacc-sinle of the.ignature of each of the persons introduced.  (2 8)




VALUABLE W1ORKS
PUBLISHED  BY
GOULD AND LINC OLN,
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THE  CHRISTIAN  LIFE; SOCIAL AND INDIVIDUAL. By PETER BAYNE, M. A.
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MODERN  ATHEISM; Under its forms of Pantheism, Materialism, Secularism,
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$1.25.
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in the Witness.
NEW  ENGLAND THEOCRACY. From the German of Uhden's History of
the Congregationalists of New England, with an INTRODUCTION BY NEANDER. By MIRS.
H. C. CONANT, author of " The English Bible," etc., 12mo, cloth, $1.00.
A work of rare ability and interest, presenting the early religious and ecclesiastical history of
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and most important contribution to Puritan History.
THE  MISSION  OF TIHE  COMFORTER; with copious Notes. By JULIUS
CHARLES HARE. With the NOTES translated for the AMERICAN EDITION. 12mo, cloth,
$1.25.
THE BETTER LAND; or, The Believer's Journey and Future Home. By the
Rev. A. C. THOMPSON. 12mo, cloth, 85 cts.
A most charming and instructive book for all now journeying to the " Better Land."
THIE  EVENING  OF  LIFE; or, Light and Comfort amidst the Shadows of De.
clining Years. By REV. JEREMIAH CHAPLIN, D. D. A new Revised, and much en
larged edition. With an elegant Frontispiece on Steel. 12mo, cloth, $1.00.
u  A most charming and appropriate work for the aged, - large type and open page. An
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THE STATE OF THE IMPENITENT DEAD. By ALVAH HOVET,
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A  WREATH   AROUND  THE  CROSS; or, Scripture Truths Illustrated.
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THE CHRISTIAN'S DAILY TREASURY; a Religious Exercisefor every
Day in the Year. By Rev. E. TEMPLE. A new and improved edition. 12mo, cloth,
$1.00.
a& A work for every Christian. It is indeed a " Treasury " of good things.
THE  SCHOOL  OF  CHRIST; or, Christianity Viewed in its Leading Aspects.
By the Rev. A. R. L. FOOTE, author of "Incidents in the Life of our Saviour," etc.
16mo, cloth, 50 cts.
THE  CHRISTIAN   PASTOR; His Work and the Needful Preparation. By
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APOLLOS; or, Directions to Persons just commencing a Religious Life. 32mo, paper
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THE  CHURCH-MEMBER'S MANUIAL  of Ecclesiastical Principles, Foc.
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THE  CHURCH  IN  EARNEST.  By Rev. JoHN A. JAMES. 18mo, cloth, 40 cts.
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ANGELL JAMES. 18mo, cloth, 31 cts.
9- One of the best and most useful works of this popular author.
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publishers' excellent publications. It exhibits the whole subject of growth in grace with great
simplicity and clearness." - Puritan Recorder.                               (I 2)




VALUABLE ANEW WORIKS.
GOD REVEALED IN NATURE AND IN CHRIST; including a
ltefutation ot the Dlevelopment Theory contained in the " Vestiges of the Natural iistory
of Creation."  By Rev. JAMES B. WALKER, author of "THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE kLAN
OF SALVATION."  122mo, cloth, $1.00.
PHILOSOPHY OF THE PLAN OF SALVATION; a Book for the
Times. By an AMERICAN CITIZEN. With an Introductory Essay by CALVIN E. STOWE,. 1). Ij New improved and enlarged edition. 12mo, cloth, 75 cts.
YAHVEH   CHRIST; or, The Memorial Name. By ALEXANDER MACWHORTER.
W\\itl an Introductory Letter by NATHANIEL W. TAYLOR, D. D., Dwight Professor in Yale
Theol. Sem. 16mo, cloth, 60 cts.
SALVATION   BY  CHRIST. A Series of Discourses on some of the most ImpIortant Doctrines of the Gospel. By FRANcIs WAYLAND, D. D. 12mo, cloth, $1.00;
cloth, gilt, $1.50.
CONTENTS. - Theoretical Atheism. - Practical Atheism. - The Moral Character of Man. -
The Fall of Man. - Justification by Works Impossible. - Preparation for the Advent. —  ork of
the Messiahl. -Justification by Faith. - Conversion. - Imitators of God. - Grieving the Spirit. -
A Day in the Life of Jesus. - The Benevolence of the Gospel. - The Fall of Peter. - Character
of Balaam. - Veracity. - The Church of Chrfst. - The Unity of the Church. - Duty of Obedience to the Civil Magistrate (three Sermons).
THE GREAT DAY OF ATONEMENT; or, Meditations and Prayers on
the Last Twenty-four Hours of the Sufferings and Death of Our Lord and Saviour Jesus
Christ. Translated from the German of CHARLOTTE ELIZABETH NEBEIIN. Edited by
MRS. COLIN MACKENZIE. Elegantly printed and bound. 16mo, cloth, 75 ets.
THE EXTENT OF THE ATONEMENT IN ITS RELATION
TO GOD AND THE UNIVERSE. By Rev. THoMAs W. JENKYN, D. D.,
late President of Coward College, London. 12mo, cloth, $1.00.
This work was thoroughly revised by the author not long before his death, exclusively for the
present publishers. It has long been a standard work, and without doubt presents the most complete discussion of the subject in the language.
" We consider this volume as setting the long and fiercely agitated question as to the extent of
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trious argument." - New York Evangelist.
TIIE  SUFFERING  SAVIOUR; or, Meditations on the Last Days of Christ.
By FRED. W. KRUMMACHER, D. D., author of "Elijah the Tishbite."  12mo, cloth, $1.25.
" The narrative is given with thrilling vividness, and pathos, and beauty. Marking, as we pro,
ceeded, several passages for quotation, we found them in the end so numerous, that we must refer
the reader to the work itself." — News of the Churches (Scottish).
THE  IMITATION  OF  CHRIST. By THOMAS A KEMPIS. With an Intro,
ductory Essay, by THOMAS'CHIALMERS, D. D. Edited by HOWARD MALCOI, D. D. A
new edition, with a LIFE OF THOMAS A KEMIPIS, by Dr. C. ULLMANN, author of "Re.
formers before the Reformation." 12mo, cloth, 85 cts.
This may safely be pronounced the best Protestant edition extant of this ancient and celebrated
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oF A KEMPIs, by Dr. Ullmann.                                             (13)




VALUABLE WORKS.
FOOTSTEPS OF OUR FOREFATHERS; What they suffered and what
they sought. Describing Localities, and Portraying Personages and Events, conspicuous in the Struggles for Religious Liberty. By JAMES G. MIALL. Containing thirty-six
Iliustrations. l2mo, cloth, $1.00.
IIMEMORIALS OF EARLY CHRISTIANITY; Presenting, in a graphic,
c,)Ilpact, and popular form, Memorable Events of Early Ecclesiastical History, &c. By
Rev. J. G. MIALL, author of " Footsteps of our Forefathers."  With numerous Illustrations. 12mo, cloth, $1.00.
- The above, by Miall, are both exceedingly interesting and instructive works.
REPUBLICAN  CHRISTIANITY; or, True Liberty, as exhibited in the
Life, Precepts, and early Disciples of the Great Itedeemer. By the Rev. E. L. MACGON,
D. D., author of " Proverbs for the People," &c. Second edition. 12mo, cloth, $1.25.
" The author has at his command a rich store of learning, from which he skilfully draws abundant evidence for the support of the positions he assumes." — Puritlan Recorder.
THE PERSON AND WORK OF CHRIST. ByERNESTSARTORIUS, D.D.,
Konigsberg, Prussia. Translated by Rev. OAKMAN S. STEARNS, A. M. 18mo, cloth, 42 cts.
"A work of much ability, and presenting the argument in a style that will be new to most of
American readers. It will deservedly attract attention." — lNew York Observer
CHRISTIANITY  DEMONSTRATED; in four distinct and independent
series of proofs; with an Explanation of the Types and Prophecies concerning the
Messiah. By Rev. HARVEY NEWCOMB. 12mo, cloth, 75 cts.
TI'HE SAINT'S EVERLASTING REST. By RICHARD BAXTER 16mo,
cloth, 50 cts.
THE  RELIGIONS  OF  THE  WORLD, and their Relations to Christianity.
By FREDERICK DENISON MAURICE, A. M., Professor of Divinity in King's College, London.
16mo, cloth, 60 cts.
THE CHRISTIAN WORLD UNMASKED. By JOHN BERRIDGE, A M.,
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D. D., Minister of Free St. John's, Edinburgh. 16mo, cloth, 50 cts.
" The book," says DR. GUTHRIE, in his Introduction, " which we introduce anew to the public,
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THE  IMITATION  OF  CHRIST.  By THOMAS A KEMPIS.  Introductory
Essay, by T. CHALMERS, D. D. Edited by the REV. HOWARD IMALCOM, D. D. Cheap
edition. 18mo, cloth, 38 cts.
GUIDO   AND  JULIUS.  THE DOCTRINE OF SIN AND THE PROPITIATOR; or, the
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FREDERICK AUGUSTUS O. THOLUCK, D. D. Translated from the German, by JONATHAN
EDWARDS RYLAND. With an introduction by JOHN PYE SMITH, D. D.  16mo, cloth,
60 cts.                                                                (14)




DR. JOIIN llARIlIS' WORKS.
THME  GREAT  TEACHER; or, Characteristics of our Lord's Ministry. By JONr
HARRIS, D. D. With an Introductory Essay by H. HUMPHREY, D. D. Sixteenth thousand. l2mo, cloth, 85 cents.
"' DR. HARRIS is one of the best writers of the age; and this volume will not in the least detract
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THE  GREAT  COMMISSION;  or, the Christian Church constituted and
charged to convey the Gospel to the World. A Prize Essay.  With an Introductory
Essay by W. R. WILLIAMS, D. D. Eighth thousand. 12mo, cloth, $1.00.
"This volume will afford the reader an intellectual and spiritual banquet of the highest order."IPhiladelphia Chi. Observer.
THE  PRE-ADAMITE  EARTH.  Contributions to Theological Science. By
JOHN HARRIS, D. D. New and revised edition. 12mo, cloth, $1.00.
MJ-AN  PRIMEVAL; or, the Constitution and Primitive Condition of the Human
Being. With a finely engraved Portrait of the Author. 12mo, cloth, $1.25.
PATRIARCHY; or, the Family, its Constitution and Probation. 12mo, cloth, $1.25.
This is the last of Dr. Harris' series entitled " Contributions to Theological Science."
SERMONS, CHARGES, ADDRESSES, &c., delivered by Dr. HARRIS in
various parts of the country, during the height of his reputation as a preacher. Tvo elegant volumes, octavo, cloth, each, $1.00.
The immense sale of all this author's Works attests their intrinsic worth and great popularity.
DR_. VWIJLLIANMES'1 Wci ORKS
LECTURES ON THE LORD'S PRAYER. By WILLIAM R. WTILLIAMaS,
D. D. Third edition. 12mo, cloth, 85 cts.
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RELIGIOUS PROGRESS; Discourses on the Development of the Christian
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"ITis power of apt and forcible illustration is without a parallel among modern writers. The mute
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expense of solidity of thought, or strength of argument. It is seldom, indeed, that a mind of so
mnuelh poetical invention yields such a willing homage to the logical element." - Hoarper's Jlonlthly
l.iscellahsy.
MISCELLANIES.  By WILLIAM R.WILLIIIAMS, D. D. New and improved edition.
Price Reduced. 12mo, cloth, $1.25.
" Dr. Williams is a profound scholar and a brilliant writer." — N. Y. Evangelist.
B31JNGE TERI' S WORIKS
THE PREACHER  AND  THE KING; or, Bourdaloue in the Court of Louis
XIV.; being an Account of the Pulpit Eloquence of that distinguished era. Translated
from the French of L. F. BUNGENER, Paris. Introduction by the Rev. GEORGE POTTS,
D. D. A neeu, improved edition, with a fine LIKENESS and a BIOGRAPEHICAL SKETCH OfT
THE AUTHOR. 12mo, cloth, $1.25.
THE PRIEST AND THE HUGUENOT; or, Persecution in the Age of
Louis XV Translated from the French of L. F. Bungener. Two vols. 12mo, cloth, $2.25.
rg- This is not only a work of thrilling interest, - no fiction could exceed it, - but, as a Protestant work, it is a masterly production.                                  (15)




BIOGRAPHIES AND WORKS ON MISSIONS.
THE  MISSIONARY  ENTERPRISE; a Collection of the most important
Discourses in the language, on Christian Missions, by distinguished American Authors.
Edited by BARON STow, D. D. Second Thousand. 12mo, cloth, 85 cts.
" You here see the high talent of the American church. The discourses by Dr. Beecher, ])r.
Wayland, and the Rev. Dr. Stone, are among the very highest exhibitions of logical correctness,
and burning, popular fervor." -- ew Englander.
A HISTORY OF AMERICAN BAPTIST MISSIONS, in Asia,
Africa, Europe, and North America, from  their earliest commencement to the present
time. Prepared under the direction of the American Baptist Missionary Union. By
%WILLIAM GAMMELL, Professor in Brown University. With seven Maps. 12mo, cloth,
at the low price of 75 cts.
This work was prepared at the request of the Executive Committee of the Missionary Union;
and the Committee appointed by the Union to examine the manuscript, consisting of Doctors
Cone, Shlsrp, and Chase, say: "It exhibits gratifying evidence of research, fidelity, and skill. It
sets before the reader, in a lucid manner, facts that should never be forgotten. Some of them, in
power to awaken attention and touch the heart, could scarcely be surpassed by fiction."
Rev. E. Kiszcaid says: "As I have labored more or less at all the stations in Burmah, I could
but admire the singular accuracy with which all the leading facts of these missions are detailed in
Prof. Gammell's History of American Baptist Missions. I have not found a single error of any
importance."
Rev. J. Tade says: "I can most cordially recommend it to the public as being a very truthful
and well-written work."
DR. GRANT AND THE MOUNTAIN NESTORIANS. By Rev.
THOMAS LAURIE, his surviving associate in that Mission. With a Likeness, Map of the
Country, and numerous Illustrations. Third edition. Revised and improved. 12mo,
cloth, $1.25.
ar" A most valuable Memoir of a remarkable man.
THE  KAREN  APOSTLE; or, Memoir of Ko-THAH-BYu, the first Karen Convert. With notices concerning his Nation. By Rev. FRANcIS MasoN, D. D., Missionary.
Edited by Prof. II. J. RIPLEY. 18mo, cloth, 25 cts.
" This is a work of thrilling interest, containing the history of a remarkable vsan, and giving,
also, much information respecting the Karens, a people until recently but little known."
MEMOIR  OF  ANN  H. JUDSON, late Missionary to Burmah. By Rev. J.
D. KNOWLES. A new edition. Fifty-seventh thousand. 18mo, cloth, 58 cts.
FINE EDITrON, with plates, 16mo, cloth, gilt, 85 cts.
MEMOIR OF GEORGE DANA BOARDMAN, late Missionary to Burmah, containing much intelligence relative to the Burman Mission. By Rev. A. KING
With an Introductory Essay, by W. R. WILLIAMS, D. D. New edition, with beautiful
frontispiece. 12mo, cloth, 75 cts.
"One of the brightest luminaries of Burmah is extinguished." - REV. DR. JUDSOT.
- The introduction alone is worth the price of the book, says a distinguished reviewer.
MEMOIR  OF  HENRIETTA   SHUCK, first female Missionary to China.
By Rev. J. B. JETER, D. D. With a likeness. Fifth thousand. 12mo, cloth, 50 cts.
" We have seldom taken into our hands a more beautiful book than this. It will be extensively
read, and eminently useful."- Famsly Visitor.
MIEMOIR OF REV. WILLIAM G. CROCKER, late Missionary to West
Africa, among the Bassas. Including a History of the Mission. By R. B. MEDBERY.
With a likeness. 18mo, cloth, 63 cts.
" This work is commended to the attention of every lover of the liberties of man." — Watchman
nzd Reflector.                                                             (16)




VALUABLE WORKS.
THE LIMITS OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT EXAMINED. By
HENRY LONGUEVILLE MANSEL, B. i)., Prof. of Moral and TMetaphysical Philosophy, Mag,
dalen College, Oxford, Editor of Sir William IHamilton's Lectures, etc. etc.  M'ith the
CoPIous NOTES of the volume translated for the American Edition. 12mo, cloth, $1.25.
a& This is a masterly production, and may be safely said to be one of the most important works
of the day.
FIRST  THINGS; or, The Development of Church Life. By BARON STOW, D. D.
16mo, cloth, 75 cts.
HIEAVEN.  By JAMES WILLIAM  KIMBALL. With an elegant vignette title-page.
12mo, cloth, $1.00.
" The book is full of beautiful ideas, consoling hopes, and brilliant representations of human
destiny, all presented in a chaste, pleasing and very readable style." -. Y. Chronicle.
THE PROGRESS OF BAPTIST PRINCIPLES IN THE LAST
HUNDRED  YEARS.  By T. F. CURTIS, Professor of Theology in the Lewisburg
University, Pa., and author of " Communion," &c. 12mo, cloth, $1.25.
Eminently worthy of the attention, not only of Baptists, but of all other denornlinations. In his
preface the author declares that his aim has been to draw a wide distinction between parties and
opinions. Hence the object of this volume is not to exhibit or defend the Baptists, but their prin.
eC/p2es. It is confidently pronounced the best exhibition of Baptist views and principles extant.
THOUGHTS ON THE PRESENT COLLEGIATE SYSTEM in the
United States. By FRANCIS WAYLAND, D. D. 16mo, cloth, 50 cents.
SACRED  RHETORIC; or, Composition and Delivery of Sermons.  By H. J.
RIPLEY, D. D., Prof. in Newton Thcol. Inst. To which is added, DR. WARE'S HINTS
ON EXTEMPORANEOUS PREACHING. Second thousand. 12mo, cloth, 75 cts.
THE PULPIT OF THE REVOLUTION; or, The Political Sermons of the
Era of 1776. With an Introduction, Biographical Sketches of the Preachers and Histori.
cal Notes, etc. By JOHN WINGATE THORNTON, author of "The Landing at Cape Anne,"
etc. 12mo, cloth. In press.
THE EIGHTEEN CHRISTIAN CENTURIES. By the Rev. JAMES
WHITE, author of "Landmarks of the History of England."  12mo, cloth. In press.
THE PLURALITY OF WORLDS. A NEW EDITION. With a SUPPLEMENTARY DIALOGUE, in which the author's Reviewers are reviewed. 12mo, cloth, $1.00.
This masterly production, which has excited so much interest in this country and in Europe,
will now have an increased attraction in the addition of the Supplement, in which the author's
reviewers are triumphantly reviewed.
THE  CAMEL; His Organization, Habits, and Uses, considered with reference to his
introduction into the United States. By GEORGE P. MARSH, late U. S. Minister at Constantinople. 12mo, cloth, 63 cts.
This book treats of a subject of great interest, especially at the present time. It furnishes a more
complete and reliable account of the Camel than any other in the language; indeed, it is believed
that there is no other. It is the result oflong study, extensive research, and much personal observation, on the part ofthe author, and it has been prepared with special reference to the experiment
of domesticating the Camel in this country, now going on under the auspices of the United States
government. It is written in a style worthy of the distinguished author's reputation for great learning and fine saholarship,                                                   (3 6)




VALUABLE BIOGRAPHIIIES.
EXTRACTS FROM THE DIARY AND CORRESPONDENCE
OF THE LATE AMOS LAWRENCE. With a brief account of some
Incidents in his Life. Edited by his son, WM. R. LAWRENCE, M. D. With elegant Portraits of Amos and Abbott Lawrence, an Engraving of their Birthplace, an Autograph
page of HIandwriting, and a copious Index. One large octavo volume, cloth, $1.50 i royal
12mo, cloth, $1.00.
A MEMOIR OF THE LIFE AND TIMES OF ISAAC BACKUS.
By ALVAH HovEY, Professor of Ecclesiastical History in Newton Theological Institution.
12mo, cloth, $1.25.
This work gives an account of a remarkable man, and of a remarkable movemept in the middle
of the last century, resulting in the formation of what were called the " Separate " Churches. It
supplies an important deficiency in the history of New England affairs. For every Baptist, especially, it is a necessary book.
LIFE OF JAMES MONTGOMERY. By MrS. H. C. KNIGHT, author of
"Lady Huntington and her Friends," &c. Likeness and elegant Illustrated Title-Page
on steel. 12mo, cloth, $1.25.
This is an original biography, prepared from the abundant but ill-digested materials contained
in the seven octavo volumes of the London edition. The Christian public in America will welcome such a memoir of a poet whose hymns and, sacred melodies have been the delight of every
household.
1MEMOIR  OF  ROGER  WILLIAMS, Founder of the State of Rhode Island.
By Prof. WILLIAM GAMMELL, A. M. 16mo, cloth, 75 cts.
PHILIP DODDRIDGE. His Life and Labors. By JOHN STOUGHTON, D. D. With
an Introductory Chapter, by Rev. JAMES G. MIALL, Author of " Footsteps of our Fore.
fathers," &c. With beautiful Illustrated Title-page and Frontispiece. 16mo, cloth, 60
cents.
THE LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JOHN FOSTER.
Edited by J. E. RYLAND, with notices of Mr. FOSTER, as a Preacher and a Companion.
By JOHN SHEPPARD. A new edition, two volumes in one, 700 pages. 12mo, cloth, $1.25.
"In simplicity of language, in majesty of conception, his writings are unmatched." - North
British Review.
THE LIFP OF GODFREY WILLIAM VON LEIBNITZ. By JOHN
M. MACKIEE, Esq. On the basis of the German work of Dr. G. E. GUHRAUER. 16mo, cloth,
75 cts.
" It merits the special notice of all who are interested in the business of education, and deserves
a place by the side of Brewster's Life of Newton, in all the libraries of our schools, academies, and
literary institutions." - Watchman and Reflector.
MEMORIES OF A GRANDMOTHER. By a Lady of Massachusetts.
16mo, cloth, 50 cts.
s'- " My path lies in a valley, which I have sought to adorn with flowers. Shadows from the
hills cover it; but I make my own sunshine." - Author's Preface.
THE TEACHER'S LAST LESSON. A Memoir of MARTHA WHITING, late
of the Charlestown Female Seminary, with Reminiscences and Suggestive Reflections.
By CATHARINE N. BADGER, an Associate Teacher. With a Portrait, and an Engraving
of the Seminary. 12mo, cloth, $1.00.
The subject of this Memoir was, for a quarter of a century, at the head of one of the most celebrated female seminaries in the country. During that period she educated more than three thou6and young ladies. She was a kindred spirit to Mary Lyon.                    (1 7)




VALUABLE WORKS.
SERVICE, THE  END  OF  LIVING. An Address delivered before the
Boston Young Menll's Christian Association, at their Anniversary, on Monday evening,
May 24, 1858. By ANDREW L. STONE, Pastor of Park-street Church, Boston. 16mo,
flexible cloth covers, 20 cts.; paper covers, 129 cts.
ad- An admirable work for circulation, especially among young men.
PERMANENT REALITIES OF RELIGION, AND THE PRESENT  RELIGIOUS  INTEREST.  A Sermon preached in the Bedford-street
Church, Boston, on the evening of Fast Day, April 15,1858. By F. D. HUNTINGTON, D. D.,
Preacher to the University, Cambridge. Octavo pamphlet, 12k cts.
CHtRISTIAN CITIZENSHIP AND HONEST LEGISLATION.
A Sermon delivered before the Legislature of Massachusetts, at the Annual Election,
January 6, 1858, by F. D. HUNTINGTON, D. D., Preacher to the University, Cambridge.
Octavo pamphlet, 12~ cts.
TRUTHS  FOR  THE  TIMES. By NEHEMIAH ADAMS, D. D., Pastor of Essexstreet Church, Boston. 12mo, paper covers.
This very useful and popular Series of publications comprises the following:
IL THE REASONABLENESS OF FUTURE ENDLESS PUNISHMENT, 10 cts.
II. INSTANTANEOUS CONVERSION AND ITS CONNECTION WITH PIETY, 10 cts.
III. JUSTIFICATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES, 10 cts.
IV. GOD IS LOVE. A Supplement to the Author's Discourse on the' Reasonableness of
Future Endless Punishment," with a brief notice of Rev. T. STARR KING'S TWO Discourses in reply to the same, 20 cts.
V. OUR BIBLE, 20 cts.
EXCLUSIVENESS  OF  THE  BAPTISTS; a Review of Dr. Albert Barnes'
Pamphlet on "Exclusivism."  By H. J. RIPLEY, Prof. Newton Theol. Inst.  16mo,
printed cover, 10 cts.
A kind yet manly and most triumphant refutation of Dr. Barnes' serious charges of "l Exclusivism," etc., against the Baptists.
REMARKS ON SOCIAL PRAYER-MEETINGS. By the Right Rev.
ALEXANDER VIETS GRISWOLD, D. D., late Bishop of the Eastern Diocese. "11e, being
dead, yet speaketh.' —I eb. xi. 4. Originally published in the Episcopal Register, for
the years 1827-8. With an introductory statement by Rev. GEORGE D. WILDES, A. M.
12mo, cloth bound, 371 cts.; cloth, flexible covers, 31 cts.; paper covers, 20 cts.
This admirable defence of social prayer-meetings, by one whose memory is still fragrant in the
hearts of multitudes, is highly commended by Bishop Eastburn, and the Rev. John S. Stone, D. D.
TH:E  INCARNATION; By ROLLIN H. NEALE, D. D. 32mo, gilt, 31 cts.
ANTIOCH; or, Increase of Moral Power in the Church of Christ. By P. CHURCH,
D. D. With an Essay by BARON STOW, D. D. 18mo, cloth, 50 cts.
ONESIMUS; or, the Apostolic Directions to Christian Masters in reference to their
Slaves considered. By EVANGELICUS. 18mo, cloth, 25 cts.
CHRISTIANITY  AND  SLAVERY.  A REvIEw of Drs. Fuller and Wayland on Slavery. By WILLIAM IIAGUE, D. D. 18mo, paper cover, 12~ cts.
CHRISTIANITY  AND  SLAVERY. STRICTURES on the Rev. Dr. Hague's
Review of Drs. Fuller and Wayland on Domestic, Slavery. By Rev. THOMAS MEREDITH,
Raleigh, N. C. 18mo, paper, 12i cts.                                  (18)




WORKS FOR BIBLE STUDENTS.
NOTES  ON  THE  GOSPELS.  Designed for Teachers in Sabbath Schools and
Bible Classes, and as an Aid to Family Instruction. By HENRY J. RIPLEY, Prof. in New.
ton Theol. Inst. With Map of Canaan. Cloth, embossed, $1.25.
NOTES ON THE ACTS OF THE APOSTLES. With a beautiful Map,
illustrating the Travels of the APOSTLE PAUL, with a track of his Voyage from Cesarea
to Rome. By Prof. HENRY J. RIPLEY, D. D. 12mo, cloth, embossed, 75 cts.
NOTES ON THE EPISTLE OF PAUL TO THE ROMANS.
Designed for Teachers in Sabbath Schools and Bible Classes, and as an aid to Family
Instruction. By HENRY J. RIPLEY. 12mo, cloth, embossed, 67 cts.
The above works by Prof: Ripley should be sn the hands of every student of the Bible, especially
every Sabbath-school and Bible-class teacher. They are prepared with especial reference to this
class of persons, and contain a mass of just the kind of information wanted.
MALCOM'S NEW BIBLE DICTIONARY of the most important Names,
Objects, and Terms, found in the Holy Scriptures; intended principally for SabbathSchool Teachers and Bible Classes. By HoWARD MALCOM, D. D., late President of
Lewisburg College, Pa. 16mo, cloth, embossed, 60 cts.
s- The former Dictionary, of which more than one hundred thousand copies were sold, is made
the basis of the present work; yet so revised, enlarged, and improved, by the addition of new
material, a greatly increased number of articles, new illustrations, etc., as to render it essentially a
NEW DICTIONARY.
THE EVIDENCES OF CHRISTIANITY, as exhibited in the writings of
its apologists, down to Augustine. By W. J. BOLTON, of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge. 12mo, cloth, 80 cts.
HARMONY QUESTIONS ON THE FOUR GOSPELS, for the use of
Sabbath Schools. By Rev. S. B. SwAIM, D. D. Vol. I. 18mo, cloth backs, 12k cts.
The plan differs from all others in this, that it is based upon a HARMONY of the gospels. Instead
of taking one of the gospels, - that of Matthew, for instance, - and going through with it, the author
takes from ALL Of the gospels those parts relating to the same event, and brings them together in
the same lesson.
SABBATH-SCHOOL  CLASS  BOOK; comprising copious Exercises on the
Sacred Scriptures. By E. LINCOLN. Revised and Improved by REV. JOSEPH BANVARD,
author of "Topical Question Book," etc. 18mo, 12~ cts.
United testimony of Dr. Malcom, author of " Bible Dictionary," Dr. Stow, " Doctrinal Question
Book," Dr. Hague, "Guides to Conversations on New Testament":
" It gives us pleasure to express our satisfaction with its design and execution. We think the
work is well adapted to the end designed, having avoided, in a great degree, the evils of extreme
redundance or conciseness."
LINCOLN'S SCRIPTURE QUESTIONS; with answers, giving, in the
language of Scripture, interesting portions of the History, Doctrines, and Duties, exhibited
in the Bible. 8k cts. per copy; $1.00 per dozen.
*s- Where Bibles cannot be furnished to each scholar, this work will be found an admirable
substitute, as the text is furnished in connection with the questions.:I'HE SABBATH-SCHOOL HARMONY; containing appropriate Hymns
and Music for Sabbath Schools, Juvenile Singing Schools, and Family Devotion. By
NATHANIEL D. GOULD. 12L cts.                                               (23)




VALUABLE WORKS.
MOTHERS OF THE WISE AND GOOD. By JABEZ BURNS, D. D,
16nto, cloth, 75 cts.; cloth, gilt, $1.25.
so A sketch of the mothers of many of the most eminent men of the world, and showing how
much they were indebted to maternal influence for their greatness and excellence of character.
MY  MOTHER; or, Recollections of Maternal Influence. By a New England Clergyman. With a beautiful Frontispiece. 12mo, cloth, 75 cts.; cloth, gilt, $1.25.
A writer of wide celebrity says of the book: " It is one of those rare pictures painted from life
with the exquisite skill of one of the Old Masters, which so seldom present themselves to the
alllateur."
THE  EXCELLENT  WOMAN, as Described in the Book of Proverbs  With
an Introduction by Rev. W. B. SPRAGUE, D. D. Containing twenty-four splendid Illustrations. Third thousand. 12mo, cloth, $1.00; cloth, gilt, $1.75 i extra Turkey, $2.50.
a&- This elegant volume is an appropriate and valuable " Gift Book " for the husband to present
the wife, or the child the mother.
THE  SIGNET  RING, AND ITS HEAVENLY MOTTO. From the German. Illustrated. 16mo, cloth, gilt, 31 cts.
ig- Seldom within so small a compass has such weighty teaching been presented with such
exquisite and charming skill.
THE  MARRIAGE  RING; or, How to Make Home Happy. From the writings
of JOHN ANGELL JAMES. Beautifully Illustrated edition. 16mo, cloth, gilt, 75 cts.
_WORItS BY DJR. TWEIEDIE._
GLAD TIDINGS; or, the Gospel of Peace. A Series of Daily Meditations' for
Christian Disciples. By Rev. W. K. TWEEDIE, D. D. With an elegant illustrated titlepage. 16mo, cloth, 63 cts.; cloth, gilt, $1.00.
A  LAMP  TO  THE  PATH; or, the Bible in the Heart, the Home, and the
Market-place. With an elegant illustrated title-page. 16mo, cloth, 63 cts.; clo. gilt, $1.00.
SEED-TIME AND HARVEST; or, Sow Well and Reap Well. A Book for
the Young. With an elegant illustrated title-page. 16mo, cloth, 63 cts.; cloth, gilt, $1.00.
si- The above interesting works, by Dr. Tweedie, are of uniform size and style, and well
adapted for " gift books."
GATHIERED  LILIES; or, Little Children in Heaven. By Rev. A. C. THOMPSON,
Author of "The Better Land."  18mo, flexible cloth, 25 cts.; flexible cloth, gilt, 31 cts.;
and cloth, gilt, 42 cts.
" My beloved has gone down into his garden to gather lilies." — Song of Solomon.
"In almost every household such a little volume as this will meet a tender welcome." - N. Y.
Evangelist.
OUR LITTLE ONES IN HEAVEN. Edited by the Author of "The Aimwell Stories," &c. 18mo, cloth, 50 cts.; cloth, gilt, 75 cts.
This little volume contains a choice collection of pieces, in verse and prose, on the death and
future happiness of young children.
SA:FE HOME; or, the Last Days and Happy Death of Fannie Kenyon. With an
Introduction by Prof. J. L. Lincoln, of Brown University. 18mo, flexible cloth cover,
25 cts. i gilt, 31 cts.
This is a delightful narrative of a remarkable little girl, and is recommended to the attention,
psarticularly, of Sabbath Schools.                                       (24)




GOULB  AN   LIXNEILN,
59 WASHINGTON STREET, BOSTON,
Would call particular attention to the following valuable works described
in their Catalogue of Publications, viz.:
Hugh Miller's Works.
Bayne's Works.  Walker's Works.  Miall's Works.  Bungener's Work.
Annual of Scientific Discovery. Knight's Knowledge is Power.
Krummacher's Suffering Saviour,
Banvard's American Histories. The Aimwell Stories.
Newcomb's Works. Tweedie's Works. Chambers's Works. Harris' Works,
Kitto's Cyclopsedia of Biblical Literature.
Mrs. Knight's Life of Montgomery.   Kitto's History of Palestine.
Whewell's Work. Wayland's Works. Agassiz's Works.
un. of Scient. -  
-arth and Man,  David A. WeR,.
Thompson's Better Land. Kimball's Heaven. Valuable Works on Missions.
Haven's Mental Philosophy  Buchanan's Modern Atheism.
Cruden's Condensed Concordance. Eadie's Analytical Concordance,
The Psalmist: a Collection of Hymns.
Valuable School ]Books. Wo trks  for Sabbath Schools.
Memoir of Amos Lawrence.
Poetical Works of Milton, Cowper, Scott.  Elegant Miniature Volumes.
Arvine's Cyclopsdia of A   necdotes.
Ripley's Notes on Gospels, Acts, and Romans.
Sprague's European Celebrities. Marsh's Camel and the Hallig.
Roget's Thesaurus of Engl    ish Words.
Hackett's Notes on Acts. MTeahorter's  ahveh Christ.
Siebold and Stannius's Comparative Anatomy. Marcou's Geological Map, U. S.
Religious and Miscellaneous Works.
W orks in the various Departments of Liter      niature and Art.
Works in the various Departments of Literature, Science and Art.