AND)
iE TE STATE'S GUIAIIITEE, WHAT IS IT WORTH? lll
tBEING  T 1'VO')  lg''I'lTlES BY: ROBERT TYLER, ESQ.
OF PHILADELPHIA,
AND A N D  l EXA MI1NAT.TON, BY''
"A  CITIZEN' OF VIRGINIA,
e |        ()F1  TH.-IE  I)ECISION  (O)1'Iit 
k 8UIPli'l10P: COURT.OF MlAN fRtY F'OR THE RICHV101) CIRCUIT,
IN  TI HE  CASE  01'I'tIE
1 1 (IIt'ND, FdlEIEI{iKSlUsRftlR AND POTOMACI RAIL P11:ORD COml'A,' l
1:8'1.
TIlE VIR(lINIA (EN TRAIL, XND ORANGEE & ALEXAA!'DIA R, R. (COPANMES.
R I C t Mi O N D,:
PRINTEDl AT TIHE WHIG. JOB OFFICE.;i-                  s [858.,:- p ] —   I;''4' i —----- I
r                                                  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~;:.








IS VIRGINIA A REPUDIATING STATES
AND
THE STATE'S IUARANTEE, WAT IS I T WOllTI?
BEING TWO  LETTEBS BY
REBERT?TY-LER ESQv.
OF PHILADELPHIA,
AND AN EXAMINATION, BY
"A CITIZEN" OF VIRGINIA,
OF THE DECISION  OF THE
SUPERIOR COURT OF CHANCERY FOR TIlE RICHMOND CIRCUIT,
IN  THE CASE OF THE
RICHMOND, FREDERICKSBURG AND POTOMAC IRAIL ROAD COMPANY
vS.
THE VIRGINIA CENTRAL, AND ORANGE & ALEXANDRIA R. I. COMPANIES.
RICHMOND:
PRINTED AT THE WHIG JOB OFFICE.
1858.








IS VIRGINIA A REPUDIATING STATE?
PHILADELPHIA, August 21., 1858.
To the Editors of the Enquirer:
Gentlemnen,-It is with no little chagrin that I venture to address such a question to you-is Virginia a
repudiating State?  Although I am now, and have been
for years past a citizen of Pennsylvania, and am bound
to my adopted State by the strongest of personalities, as
well as by a sense of gratitude and interest, the old
Commonwealth of Virginia is as dear to me as a faithful
memory and a just pride can make her.  Recently in a
conversation with a friend here, a man of character and
substance, I expressed my surprise at the low price of
Virginia State bonds; my attention having been attracted to the fact, that while New York and Massachusetts fives, and even New York City fives, were at a
premiun, Virginia sixes were but little above 90; and I
added, that with the great resources and the unsullied
faith of Virginia, her obligations ought to be esteemed
as safe as British consols. My friend asked, with rather
a doubtful expression at my emphasis, if I was not
aware that the faith of Virginia was not unsullied, and
that he was sorry to say to me, a born Virginian, there
was in her history one gross breach of public faith, by
which he, a Philadelphian, had been and was a sufferer.
I naturally and with no little mortification, made further
inquiries (as I have since done of others, to whom I
have been referred, and with precisely a similar exposition in every instance) when he presented, substantially,
the following statement:
"That he was one of the original subscribers to the
stock of the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac




4
Rail Road Company; that he and many others in Philadelphia had made subscriptions to this then doubtful
enterprise, on the solemn pledge given by the Legislature of the State, the, nature of which was fully discussed and understood at the time, and given only,
because without such pledge subscriptions in this or
any other market could not have been obtained for the
stock, that the work should be protected for the term of
thirty years from its completion, against all competition
for travel between Richmond and WVashington. That
notwithstanding this pledge and the published admission of the Virginia Central Rail Road (company, (then
the Louisa,) iat the time of extending their road from the
junction to Richmond, that they would have no right
to carry passengers between Richmond and Washington, and their then declaration that they had no intention to convey such passengers, nevertheless as any one
could see by the advertisements in the newspapers and
elsewhere, through tickets are now and have been for
some time back, sold by this road and the Orange and
Alexandria Rail Road, for all travel passing between
Richmond and Washington, whether passing merely
between these cities or going further North or South;
while so far the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Rail Road, in which he had become interested on
what he supposed the inviolate faith of the State, had
entirely failed to obtain of the courts of the State any
redress for this grievance, by which the Company had
been at great loss, and on account of which its bonds
and stock had been depreciated."
Now, Messrs. Editors, if the case be as stated by my
friend and corroborated by others, (and I have great confidence in the good sense and veracity of my informants,) it seems to me one of such moment to all who
feel concerned in the true honor and welfare of Virginia,
that in the midst of many pressing engagements, I




have determined to bring the matter to your notice and
that of the people of Virginia. I have the conviction
that nothing is or can be more sensitive than credit, or
more important to the standing and welfare of a State
than unbroken and unsullied faith.
It is perhaps proper I should add that I have not the
slightest pecuniary interest in the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Rail Road Company, never having
even seen a certificate of stock or bond of said Company.
But the honor of the Old Dominion should be unsuspected.  It should not be the subject on the streets of
this or any other city, of either an honest complaint or
of a pitiless taunt; and I can plainly perceive it can
scarcely continue to be confided in, if a palpable breach
of it remain unredressed by the courts of the Commonwealth, and countenanced by public opinion.  You are
aware that the reasoning of every reflecting mind must
be, that if the faith of the State cannot be preserved and
protected against merely a conlicting interest doing
flagrant wrong and admitting it at the same moment,
its sacred inviolability cannot be depended on when the
State shall have borrowed all it wants, or that it can
borrow, and the tax payers finding their taxes onerous
may be tempted to listen to the advice of demagogues
and throw them off.
Your obedient servant and friend,
ROBERT TYLER.
PHILADELPHIA, Sept. 5, 1858.
To the Editors of the Enquirer:
Messrs. Editors,-Accept my best thanks for having
so promptly published my communication, headed " Is
Virginia a repudiating State?"  I have read your pre



6
fatory editorial comments with the strict attention the
importance of the subject demands, and I sincerely wish
I could now deem it proper to abstain from all further
reference to this unpleasant topic, and point to the editorial columns of the "Enquirer" as affording a complete vindication of the good faith of the State of Virginia
when impugned, by what I might then regard, as the
querulous cavilling and complaints of the bond and
stockholders of the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Rail Road Company, residing in the city of Philadelphia.  I trust you do not doubt that it would be my
pride and pleasure to concur with you in opinion, if I
could conscientiously do so, and thus concurring, to set
about the work-a somewhat difficult task from all appearances-of disabusing the minds of many substantial
men here of false impressions. It would indeed afford
me the greatest pleasure to be able to satisfy them that
they have no more reason now for doubting the good
faith of my native State, than they had when they subscribed, years ago, large sums of money to construct
the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Rail Road,
on the pledge of the General Assembly contained in
the thirty-eighth section of the Charter of the Company.
But I must frankly declare that, after as full ani examination of the question as circumstances will admit, I
cannot agree with you. I will, therefore, proceed to
present to you, and to the people of Virginia, as briefly
as may be, my reason for differing from your conclusions, as set forth in your remarks accompanying my
communication.  And in the first place permit me to
call your attention to the 38th section of the Act of
Incorporation of the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Rail Road Company.  It reads thus:
"'And, whereas, the rail road authorized by this act
will form a part of the main Northern and Southern
route between the city of Richmond and the city of




Washington, and the privilege of transporting passengers on the same and receiving the passage money, will,
it is believed, be a strong inducement for individuals to
subscribe for stock in the company, and the General
Assembly considers it just and reasonable that those
who embark in the enterprise should not be hereafter
deprived of that which forms a chief inducement to the
undertaking:
" 38th. Be it, therefore, enacted and declared, and the
General Assembly pledges itself to the said company,
that, in the event of the completion of the said rail road
from the city of Richmond to the town of Fredericksburg, within the time limited by this act, the General
Assembly will not, for the period of thirty years from
the completion of the said rail road, allow any other rail
road to be constructed between the city of Richmond
and the city of Washington, or for any portion of the
said distance, the probable effect of which would be to
diminish the number of passengers travelling between
the one city and the other, upon the rail road authorized
by this act, or to compel the company, in order to retain
such passengers, to reduce the passage money: Provided, however, that nothing herein contained shall be
so construed as to prevent the Legislature, at any time
hereafter, from  authorizing the construction of a rail
road between the city of Richmond and the towns of
Tappahannock or Urbanna, or to any intermediate points
between the said city of Richmond and the said towns:
And provided, also, that nothing herein contained shall
be construed to prevent the General Assembly fiom chartering any other company or companies to construct a
rail road from Fredericksburg to the city of Washington. "
If I interpret your remarks correctly you seem  to
think that this solemn pledge or guarantee of the Legislature of Virginia, viz: "That the General Assembly
will not, for the period of thirty years from the comple



tion of the said Richmond and Fredericksburg Rail
Road, allow any other rail road to be constructed between the city of Richmond and the city of Washington, or for any portion of the said distance, the probable
effect of which would be to diminish the number of
passengers travelling between the one city and the other
upon the rail road authorized by this act, or to compel
the company, in order to retain such passengers, to
reduce the passage money," given to those who might
be induced by such a pledge to subscribe their moneys
to this enterprise, meant nothing at the time the act was
passed and means nothing now, and is, therefore, to
be dismissed from our consideration as a contemptuous
nullity. But in this I must differ with you; in this
I am sure others will differ with you, while there are
many, I fear, whose affection and respect for the State
of Virginia, being naturally much less than my own,
should such a construction of the terms of this section
of the Act of Incorporation prevail as the foundation for
a rule of judicial decision in the case, may be disposed
to regard the procuring of loans under such legislative
publication of special advantages to the Company, as
very nearly akin to the offence known to the law as
that of obtaining money or goods underfalse pretences.
By a strange misapprehension you appear to think, too,
that the Courts of the State and the Supreme Court of
the United States have decided that this Company are
entitled to no special privileges whatever of passenger
travel under the act of Assembly in which they find
charter-that the grave and potential authority of the
courts may be cited for the extraordinary opinion, that
the distinct and positive pledge contained in the 38th
section of the Act of Incorporation, meant nothing when
enacted, but a false light held out to the unwary here in
Philadelphia and elsewhere to secure subscriptions to a
great work of Internal Improvement for the benefit of




9
the State, and means nothing now; to be treated only as
idle words not likely to impose on any business man of
common sense and discretion. But the truth is that
neither the Courts of Virginia nor the Supreme Court of
the United States have said any such thing, but on the
contrary have committed themselves against the possibility of ever arriving at such a preposterous conclusion.
By some singular inadvertence you appear to have misconceived the whole subject, both as regards its history
in point of fact, and the principles of law which were
decided by the courts in the case heard and decided by
them, which case so heard and derided only bears incidentally on the issue now  before the Courts of the
State, and to which I have taken the liberty to invite
your attention and that of the people of Virginia.
The history of the case shows in brief, that the Richmond and Fredericksburg Rail Road Company was
chartered by the State in 1834, the charter containing,
among other things, the provisions already quoted. In
the year 1836, the Louisa Road was incorporated, and
two years afterwards it was opened from Louisa Court
House to the Junction near Taylorsville. In the year
1848 the Legislature passed an act authorizing the
Louisa Company to extend their road from the Junction
to the Dock in the city of Richmond, subject to certain
conditions, which, if accepted and performed by the
Richmond and Fredericksburg Road, would have had
the effect to defeat the charter thus given. The Richmond and Fredericksburg Road refused to accede to
such conditions, and filed a bill in the Superior Court
of Chancery for the Richmond Circuit, to restrain the
Louisa Rail Road Company from constructing the line
of their road from the Junction to the Dock in the city
of Richmond.  The bill prays that the respondents may
be enjoined:
Ist, From  entering upon any lands which may be
2




10
condemned for the use of the complainants' road, for
the purpose of constructing a rail road across it.
2d. That the respondents may be enjoined from all
further proceedings towards the construction of a rail
road between the Junction and the city of Richmond.
3d. From transporting on the rail road so proposed to
be constructed, persons, property and the mail, and
especially from transporting passengers travelling between the city of Richmond and the city of Washington.
The State Court decided: 1st,'That the privilege or
monopoly guaranteed to complainants by the 38th section of their Act of Incorporation, was that of transporting passengers between Richmond and Washington;
but that the Legislature by that enactment did not part
with the power to authorize the construction of a rail
road between Richmond and Fredericksburg for other
purposes; that they had therefore the right to authorize
the extension of the respondents' road to the Dock in
the city of Richmond."
2d. " That the grant of a franchise to one company
to make a rail road, is not infringed by authorizing
another rail road to be laid across it; and paying such
damages as may accrue to the first in consequence
thereof."
3d. "That if the Louisa Company, (now the Virginia Central,) should thereafter use their road by transporting passengers in violation of the rights guaranteed
to compiainants by the 38th section, and there should
be no adequate remedy at law, it might be proper to interfere by injunction to enforce such a proceeding."
The complainants' bill was dismissed on these grounds,
and the decree in the case having been affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, the case was then taken by the complainants to the Supreme Court of the United States.
The Supreme Court of the United States decided, 1st,
That the stipulation in the 38th section was to be con



11
strued strictly against the corporation; 2d, That it was
not violated merely by chartering another rail road
which might be used exclusively to transport mnerchandise. The opinion of four of the Judges, himself included, being a majority of the Court, was delivered by
Judge Grier, while three of the Judges, Curtis, Wayne
and McLean, dissented; Judge Daniel declining to sit
in the case, because of being a stockholder in the Richmond and Fredericksburg Company. Judge Curtis delivered a learned and powerful dissenting opinion on the
part of the minority, in favor of enjoining the Louisa
Road from the construction of their line from the Junction to the city of Richmond. It is plain, from all this,
that the question of the construction of the road, from
the Junction to the city of Richmond by the Louisa
Company, as authorized by the act of the 23d of March,
1848, was the only question decided by the Court in
favor of that Company, on the ground that the stipulation in the charter of the Richmond and Fredericksburg
Company was not violated merely by chartering another road, which might be used exclusively to transport
merchandise.
Now I am informed by the gentleman of whom  I
have heretofore spoken, that the bond and stockholders
of the Richmond and Fredericksburg Company do not
pretend, at this time, to contest the propriety of this
decision.  They submit, with as good grace as possible,
to the wisdom  of a majority of the Supreme Court,
although it is clear that the Legislature of Virginia, to
procure subscriptions to the Richmond and Fredericksburg Rail Road in 1834, promised those citizens of
Philadelphia and elsewhere, who loaned their money in
reliance on such promise, to do what has not been performed. The matter of which they complain has arisen
since the decision in this case. It appears that the
Louisa Company, known at this time, in connection




12
with other roads, as the Virginia Central Rail Road
Company, had no sooner completed their road from the
Junction to the city of Richmond, than they not only
transported freight and merchandize over their line, but
commenced to carry "way" passengers, and for some
time back have gone so far as boldly to advertise for and
to carry "' through" passengers, not only those going
merely between the city of Richmond and the city of
Washington, but those going further North and South.
Nearly, or quite five years ago the Richmond and Fredericksburg Company filed a bill in the Superior Court
of Chancery for the Richmond Circuit, and prayed for
an injunction to restrain the Virginia Central Rail Road
Company from violating the stipulation concerning travel,
admitted by all to have been guaranteed to them by
their act of incorporation, and in which, it really seems
to me, they cannot be disturbed for the period limited
in the act, unless the good faith of the State shall be
sacrificed to that end. I have carefully read the case in
13 Howard's, to which you have kindly referred me;
and also the proceedings in the suit before the Superior
Judge in Chancery in the Richmond Circuit-and when
I refer to the declarations of the Judges, both State and
Federal, when giving their opinions in the case, and to
the recorded admissions under oath, of the respondents,
I confess myself at a loss to understand, upon what plea
of honesty, or principle of justice, whether considered
between the State and the Richmond and Fredericksburg Company, or as a question of fair dealing between
man and man, the Virginia Central Rail Road Company
have been permitted, by judicial delays, and apparently
evasive decrees, to commit spoliation for so long a time,
on the guaranteed rights and profits of the Richmond
and Fredericksburg Company. I know that you will
agree with me, that no plea of expediency, or pretended
necessity, will justify a plain robbery by one consequent




13
on the repudiation of a binding contract by another.
Judge Grier, in delivering the opinion of the Supreme
Court, says: "That the respondents will not be allowed
to carry the passengers travelling between the city of
Richmond and the city of Washington is admitted; and
they deny any intention of so exercising their franchise
as to interfere with rights secured to complainants."
Again, he says: " The act of 1848, authorizing the
extension of respondents' road is silent as to any grant of
power to transport passengers so as to interfere with the
pledge given to the complainants. It is sufficient for the
decision of the case before us to say that the grant of
authority to respondents to extend their road does not
per se impair the obligations of the contract contained in
the 38th section of the complainants' charter." Still,
again, Judge Grier says: " On the contrary, the preamble connected with this section (the 38th) shows that
complainants' road was expected to form part of the
main Northern and Southern route between the city of
Washington and the city of Richmond, and the inducement held out to those who should subscribe to its stock
was a monopoly of transporting passengers on this
route, and this is all that is pledged or guaranteed to
them or intended so to be by the act."  And, finally, he
declares "leaving, therefore, the question as to the proposed construction of the contract or rights guaranteed
to the complainants by the section of their charter to be
settled when a proper case arises, we are of opinion that
the State Court did not err in refusing to enjoin respondents from constructing their road according to the authority of the act of the 27th of March, 184S, and that
said act does not impair the obligation of the contract
made with the complainants, in the 38th section of their
Act of Incorporation."
From this it incontestably follows, that there was not
a single Judge, on the bench of the Supreme Court of




14
the United States, who was not of opinion that the good
faith of the State of Virginia was pledged to the Richmond and Fredericksburg Company, to protect them
against the Louisa or Virginia Central Road in the contract made by the State with the Company in the 38th
section of the Act of Incorporation, so far as the transportation of passengers is concerned.
I find, on examining the record of the case, that the
Judge of the Superior Court of Chancery for the Richmond Circuit, while refusing an injunction against the
construction of the road, says, "I t is admitted by all,
that the guarantee contained in the 3Sth section of the
charter, secures to the Fredericksburg Company the
right to transport all passengers passing along the line
of the road throughout its whole extent; and I am of
opinion, that by a just and proper construction of that
section, taking it altogether, they are also intended to be
secured in the right to transport all passengers passing
along the line of their road for any portion of distance,
who, in the absence of any other rail road connected
with this, would find it convenient to use it as a means
of travelling."  In the answer put in by the Louisa
Company to the bill filed by the Fredericksburg Company to enjoin the construction of the road between the
Junction and Richmond, the respondents declare under
oath that:
"Upon this enactment it is obvious to remark, that
the design of it was to establish' a Northern and Southern route' by rail road, and to protect the rail road company in the enjoyment of the profits of that route, and
give them the exclusive right of all the passengers travelling to and from the city of Richmond and Washington; for it is manifest, as will be hereafter shown, and
the terrm'between,' in the preamble, and in the 3Sth
section, really means'to and from.' That it does not
forbid the construction of any other rail road between




15
Richmond and Washington, but only forbids the construction of a rail road which shall carry passengers
passing from Richmond to Washington, and vice versa,
is manifest in the terms of the section; for, not terminating with the declaration that no rail road should be
constructed for the whole, or any portion of'the distance,' the section proceeds to define the kind of rail
road which was intended, by adding   the probable
effect of which would be to diminish the number of
passengers travelling between the one city and the other
upon the rail road authorized by this act, or to compel
the company, in order to retain such passengers, to reduce the passage money.' It is clear, then, that the
Legislature retained the right to authorize the construction of any rail road which did not fall within the definition of the act, as, for instance, a road to transport
coal, and a road to transport produce of any kind, or
any other freight than passengers; and such a road
might be made to run in a parallel line with the road of
the complainants for its whole distance."
In the bill filed by the Louisa Company, with a view
of obtaining a dissolution of the special injunction
granted by the Supreme Court of Chancery, in the case,
they say explicitly, among other things, as a ground
for dissolving the injunction, " Because your orators do
not propose to carry upon their road any passengers
going from Richmond and Washington or from Washington to Richmond, or any freight which passes over
the Richmond and Fredericksburg Rail Road," &c.
Under these circumstances, might not the stockholders
of the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Company, here and elsewhere, infer, if the Virginia Central
Rail Road Company should attempt to carry passengers
between Richmond and Washington, in the face of
their own recorded admissions, under oath, as to a consciousness of their obligations and duties, that the con



16
veyance of such passengers by them, would be both in
violation of the faith of the State and the rights of the
Fredericksburg Company, unless the Courts of the
State or the Board of Public Works, if necessary, should
promptly intervene to prevent it. But it appears that so
far from positive, actual, bona fide redress being given
for those crying grievances, the Fredericksburg Road can
obtain no proper remedy, while the work of spoliation
goes unceasingly on.
You observe, "that the circuitous route between
Richmond and Washington, which, according to Mr.
Tyler's informant, is now injuring the Fredericksburg
Company, has grown out of the necessities of the
State, and because passengers select that circuitous
route, by way of Gordonsville, we cannot see how the
pledges of Virginia are violated."
Is this so?  Is it not clearly in "the power of the
authorities and the courts of the State to prevent the
adoption of arrangements to invite and divert the travel
between Richmond and Washington from the direct and
natural route, (to which, by a solemn pledge of the
State it is secured,) to the less comfortable and circuitous route?  I allude, by the term arrangements, to
" through" tickets at reduced rates as compared with
the local rates on the Orange and Alexandria and Virginia Central Rail Roads, the effect of which must necessarily be to diminish the number of travellers passing
between Richmond and Washington on the Fredericksburg Road.  The fact of this illegally competing route
being circuitous, seems to me an exaggeration of the
wrong, inasmuch as even the public accommodation
cannot be urged in favor of allowing its competition for
travel better accommodated by the route to which it is
pledged. Certainly it strikes me the least that can be
asked of the authorities and courts of the State, is that
they will not allow special inducements to be held out to




Northern and Southern travellers to leave the direct
route, to which the travel is pledged, for another and
more circuitous route,
You observe, in conclusion, "that you do not see
any very initmate connection  between the question
which heads Mr. Tyler's letter and the subject discussed
therein."  I think that a little further reflection will
cause you to view this matter differently.
1st. You will admit there may be a repudiation of
other pledges, besides obligations to pay money.
2d. The State is the owner of three-fifths of the
stock of the Virginia Central, and Orange and Alexandria
Rail Road Companies, which make these "through"
tickets in open and admitted violation of her good faith
to the Fredericksburg Company, and as the Board of
Public Works, the agent of the State in supervising the
public works in which the State is interested, appoints
three out of five of the Directors of each of the above
companies, it will naturally and reasonably be supposed
that those tickets are not objected to by them.
3d. The Board of Public Works is the agent of the
State, for procuring loans for purposes of improvement,
and it is certainly calculated to impair confidence in
those loans, if there is less sensibility than there should
be in regard to the faith of the State on the part of
those through whom its obligations are incurred.
I do regret most sincerely to find there is so much
foundation for the opinions of those in this city, who
consider that the State of Virginia has not dealt fairly
by them, and I think it more than probable that the
opinions entertained here on this subject, have prevented a demand which otherwise would have existed
for Virginia securities, The true course under such
circumstances is not to endeavor to persuade ourselves
that no wrong is being done, but as far as possible to
prevent and repair the wrong.
3




18
My attention has been called to my esteemed friend,
Mr. Lyons' letter, and to the answer of the Virginia
Central Railroad Company, to the bill of complaint of
the Richmond and Fredericksburg Company, filed some
years ago in the Circuit Court of Richmond. There
are few men, for whose splendid talents, learning and
accomplishments, I entertain greater respect than for
those of James Lyons. But he frankly informs us all,
that he is the counsel of the Central Rail Road Company, and one of its stockholders; and with all deference to him, and his admitted worth, he is not in a
situation impartially to judge this question. The credit
of Virginia cannot be maintained on the exchange here,
or in New York, or elsewhere, where money lenders
congregate, by a special plea in justification of a real
or virtual repudiation of a sacred contract.
Your obedient servant and friend,
ROBERT TYLER.
RICHMOND, September 7, 1858.
To the Editors of the Enquirer:
Messrs. Editors,-In your remarks prefatory to the
communication of Mr. Robert Tyler of Philadelphia,
published in your number of the 26th ultimo, you, I
think, are under a misapprehension of THE CHARACTER
of the judicial decisions, which have been made in
relation to the rights of the Richmond, Fredericksburg
and Potomac Rail Road Company, under their charter.
The opinion of Judge Meredith, the only one yet given
on the question of the USE OF THE RAIL ROAD of the
Virginia Central Rail Road Company; admits expressly




19
the right of the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac
Rail Road Company, under the guarantee of its charter,
BOTH TO THE THROUGH TRAVEL between Richmond
and Washington and THE WAY TRAVEL, as you will
perceive by the following extracts from it:
"First, of the through travel, or that which passes
between the city of Richmond and the city of Washington; it cannot be denied that the guarantee contained
in the 38th section of their charter, secures to the complainants the right to transport all travellers passing
along the line of their road, through its whole extent.
In truth the counsel for the respondents in their argument
in support of the claim of their clients to carry the "way
travel" from the Junction to the city of Richmond,
conceded that the privilege guaranteed to the complainants by their charter, applied to the through travel, and
insisted that it applied to that travel only.
" If any doubt existed, after what I have said of the
exclusive right of the complainants to transport the
":way travel," it would be removed by another clause
of the 38th section. By that section the Legislature
pledges itself to the complainants, not to allow any other
rail road to be constructed between the city of Richmond
and the city of Washington OR FOR ANY PORTION OF
THE SAID DISTANCE.  Why should the Legislature
pledge itself not to allow a rail road to be constructed
for any portion of said distance, if its intention had been
to confer on the complainants the privilege of transporting
the through travel only?"
Now the complaint of the stockholders of the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Rail Road Company,
here, as well as abroad, is, that whilst the opinion of
Judge Meredith (as of every judge who has considered
the case) conceded the rights of the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Rail Road Company to both the
through and way travel, the injunction asked for against




20
a violation of their rights, was refused, and in consequence of this refusal, the Virginia Central Rail Road
Company, who in their answer to the original bill of the
Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Rail Road Company, applying for an injunction against the construction
of their rail road, as a reason why the injunction should
" not be granted, stated that they did not propose to carry,
but expressly disclaim the right to carry, upon their road
any passengers going from Richmond to Washington or
from Washington to Richmond," are now conveying all
the passengers between Richmond and Washington,
who can be diverted from the Richmond, Fredericksburg
and Potomac Rail Road, by more reduced rates of fare
and arrangements with other companies in and out
of Virginia.
Now, Messrs. Editors, it humbly seems to me that
there must be some violation of faith in this matter.  If
when the State of Virginia has solemnly  pledged
herself (as an inducement to capitalists and others, to
subscribe large sums of money to build a rail road
between Richmond and the Potomac) that it would not,
"for the period of thirty years from the completion of said
rail road, allow any other rail road to be constructed
between the city of Richmond and the city of Washington, OR FOR ANY PORTION OF THE SAID DISTANCE, the
probable effect of which would be to diminish the
number of passengers travelling between the one city
and the other, upon the rail road authorized by this act;
or to compel the Company, in order to retain such passengers to reduce the passage money," another rail road
can be made for the distance of 28 miles, nearly parallel
to the one to which she has given this pledge, ON THE
DISCLAIMER, by the parties making the second rail road,
OF ANY right to convey such passengers, AND OF ANY
INTENTION to do so; and if, when these last parties,
in the face of their positive disclaimer, and the admitted




21
rights of the first, proceed to convey such passengers,
and use their utmost exertions, by reduced rates of fare
and otherwise, to divert travel which they admit was
guaranteed by the State to another rail road company,
THEY ARE ALLOWED, by the authorities and judiciary of
the State, TO PROCEED; if the faith of the State be
not thereby violated, and her engagements repudiated,
I am at a loss to imagine any act by which they can be.
A CITIZEN.
Richmond, September 7, 1858.
THE STATE'S GUARANTEE, WHAT IS IT WORTH?
Public attention, both in Virginia and beyond her
borders, has been attracted to this inquiry in a manner
by no means flattering to State pride. Earnest complaints have proceeded from the bond and stockholders
of the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Rail
Road Company, of the violation by the Legislature of
the pledge of the State, contained in the 38th section of
its charter, which, if not tolerated, has at least obtained
no redress by the judicial tribunals to which that Company has appealed; and if language has any meaningif the faith of the State can be bound by it-it is but
too clear that the subsequent grant of privileges to the
Louisa (now the Virginia Central) Rail Road Company,
in the extent to which they are now claimed and exercised, is a palpable infraction of that solemn public engagement. In this view the subject transcends the
limits of mere private interest, and assumes the weight
and magnitude of an important public question. Faith,
pure and unsullied, is the very life and soul of States



22
at once, their ornament and strength. A stain on that
of Virginia should be felt and resented as a wound.
It is well known that the Richmond, Fredericksburg
and Potomac Rail Road Company was the pioneer in
the cause of rail road improvement in Virginia. To
foster and encourage that enterprise became a favorite
and cherished public policy. Accordingly the Legislature in the 38th section of its charter declared:
"And whereas the rail road authorized by this act
will form a part of the main northern and southern route
between the city of Richmond and the city of Washington, and the privilege of transporting passengers on
the same and receiving the passage money will, it is
believed, be a strong inducement to individuals to subscribe for stock in the company; and the General Assembly considers it just and reasonable that those who
embark in the enterprise should not be hereafter deprived of that which forms a chief inducement to the
undertaking:
" ~ 38. Be it therefore enacted and declared, and the
General Assembly pledges itself to the said company,
that in the event of the completion of the said rail road
from the city of Richmond to the town of Fredericksburg within the time limited by this act, the General
Assembly will not, for the period of thirty years from
the completion of the said rail road, allow any other
rail road to be constructed between the city of Richmond and the city of Washington, or for any portion
of the said distance, the probable effect of which would
be to diminish the number of passengers travelling between the one city and the other, upon the rail road authorized by this act, or to compel the company, in order
to retain such passengers, to reduce the passage money:
provided, however, that nothing herein contained shall
be so construed as to prevent the Legislature, at any




23
time hereafter, from authorizing the construction of a
rail road between the city of Richmond and the towns
of Tappahannock or Urbanna, or to any intermediate
points between the said city of Richmond and the said
towns: and, provided also, that nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent the General Assembly from chartering any other company or companies to
construct a rail road from Fredericksburg to the city of
Washington."
The act of incorporation containing this compact,
passed in 1834; for a compact it was, to all intents and
purposes. It was a stipulation by Government, in its
sovereign capacity, with citizens, who were encouraged
by it, to advance their property for the benefit of the
public-regulating its own conduct and putting a restraint upon its own power to authorize any other rail
road to be built for a given time, with the right to levy
the tolls, which were secured to the society thereby incorporated-equivalent to a covenant for quiet enjoyment
against its own acts for a term of thirty years. When a
law is, like this, in the nature of a contract, when absolute rights have vested under it, a repeal of the law cannot divest those rights.  So any law granting privileges
to others repugnant to those previously contracted for,
and granted, would, if available, be a repeal by implication. That which cannot be repealed in express terms,
cannot be repealed by implication-by the subsequent
enactment of laws repugnant to the provisions of the
former act. The defect of power, which would invalidate the one has the same effect upon the other. These
are truths so simple and elementary as scarcely to require enunciation, but for the flagrant disregard with
which they have been treated.
The extremely liberal terms of this grant will be observed.  The Legislature was not content with restrict



24
ing its power to authorize another rail road, of which
the termini should be the cities of Richmond and Washington, respectively, by which direct competition would
be created, but the interdict extended to the building
of any other road, " the probable effect" of which would
be, to diminish the number of travellers on the road authorized by the act. And the legislative interpretation of
the words "probable effect," is fixed by the provisos to
the section. Even a rail road from Richmond to Tappahannock or Urbanna, as it would give communication
by water with Washington, it was thought, would have
this " probable effect," and would have been interdicted
but for a special saving of legislative power to authorize
it. So, as to a rail road between Fredericksburg and
Washington; and to put beyond doubt the intent to secure to the company the exclusive enjoyment of all the
rail road passenger travel over every part of the line, the
State stipulates that no such road shall be authorized
"between the city of Washington and the city of Richmond, or for any portion of the said distance."  Moreover the grant and the interdict extend over a period of
thirty years, and thus plainly relate not only to the travel
existing at the time, or shortly after the time the road
should be opened for use, but to the travel throughout
that whole period of time, however or by what means
soever, it might be increased-whether by steamboats,
stages, plank-roads, carriages, or lateral rail roads; and
that such increase was contemplated at the time, particularly by rail roads, as a part of the system of improvement then about to be inaugurated, is also historically
true.
Under the incitement of this pledge and invitation by
the Legislature the capital stock of the Company was
soon subscribed, much of it, by non-resident capitalists
and others. The road was constructed and opened for




25
use, to Fredericksburg, in 1837) (a much shorter time
than was limited by the act,) and was soon after, as
contemplated by the charter, extended to Acquia Creek,
on the Potomac. In February, 1836, an act was passed
incorporating the stockholders of the Louisa Rail Road
Company, having its eastern terminus on the line of the
Fredericksburg Road, about twenty-five miles from the
city of Richmond, making a branch on the stem of that
road, and diverging westwardly from the "Junctions"
so formed. The Louisa road was opened for use to
Louisa Court House in December, 1838, and from that
time, the passengers using the Louisa Road going to
and coming from Richmond, and points between that
city and the Junction, passed over the Fredericksburg
Road.  The increase of travel on "that portion of the
distance" of the Fredericksburg Road thus occasioned,
was regarded by all as being as clearly within the protection of the State's guarantee, as the travel on the
whole distance from  Richmond to Washington; and
those who had embarked their capital in the enterprise
which was thus beginning to receive its increased fruits,
reposed for the time, in perfect security, on the faith of
the State, that "they would not be thereafter deprived
of that which formed a chief inducement to the undertaking."
But what a spectacle is now witnessed by those who
really believed that a pledge on the part of the State,
in consideration of a public benefit conferred, really had
a meaning? From the time the extension of the Louisa
Road from the Junction to the city of Richmond was
completed, under legislative authority, the Louisa Company has been engaged in active competition with the
Fredericksburg Road for all the travel between these
points, the termini of the roads respectively, in Richmond, being within a few minutes' walk of each other,
4




26
and the roads themselves for all that distance (being
more than a third of the distance between Richmond
and Fredericksburg) never diverging from each other
more than some eight miles! And upon the completion
by like authority of the Orange and Alexandria Rail
Road from Alexandria to Gordonsville, where it meets
the Louisa (now the Virginia Central) Rail Road, (thus
forming a continuous line of rail road communication
from Richmond to Alexandria, whence there is short
and easy access to Washington,) these companies entered into active combination to divert the through travel
between Richmond and Washington from the Fredericksburg Road, to the line formed by the connection of
those two roads-and to that end, have accommodated
their hours of arrival and departure to each other, and
established in common, a system of through tickets, baggage checks, advertisements, soliciting agents and every
other appliance, to secure to themselves and increase
the travel thus diverted. And these through tickets are
put at reduced rates as compared with the local rates on
the connected roads. As one result of this enormous
spoliation, it appears by the evidence of the agents themselves of the Central Company, that between the 1st ot
November, 1855, and the 1st of April, 1857, these combined companies have received, for through tickets from
Richmond to Washington, (not to mention those from
Washington to Richmond,) within a small fraction of
eighty thousand dollars! In the language of one of
them' they have transported freight and travel without
regard to any diversion of the same from any other
road.'
How far has this grievous wrong been authorized by
legislation, and to what extent has that legislation been
sanctioned by the courts?
Until the year 1848, the transportation of the Louisa




Rail Road Company had been done by the Fredericksburg Company on terms agreed on between them; in
truth, the Louisa Road, in its origin was designed, and
when opened, was regarded as a feeder merely to the
Fredericksburg Road through which it was to find its
vent to market, and never would have been constructed
had the thought then occurred, that it would be afterwards turned into a rival, competing improvement. It
diverged from  the Fredericksburg Road at an angle
which rendered any competition on its part, unless extended to Richmond, for the travel between Richmond
and Washington, impossible. Some difference having
arisen between the companies as to the terms on which
this transportation should be done, it was at the instigation of the Louisa Compafty, by its agents, seized on by
the Legislature, as an occasion to exact from the Fredericksburg Company terms of submission too grievous
to be borne, or a forfeiture of the guarantee of the 38th
section of their charter, so solemnly assured to it. By
the act of 27th March, 1.848, this purpose was accomplished. This is absolutely declared in the title of
the act, which is, "An Act for the Extension of the
Louisa Rail Road to the Dock in the City of Richmond."
The 7th section enacts, " That in case the Richmond,
Fredericksburg and Potomac Rail Road Company shall,
at the next annual meeting of the Stockholders, stipulate and agree, from and after the expiration of the
present contract with the Louisa Rail Road Company,
to carry all passengers and freight, brought to their road
by the Louisa Rail Road Company, from the Junction
to the city of Richmond at the same rate per mile, as may
at the same time be charged by the Louisa Rail Road
Company on the same passengers and freight, and shall
also agree to carry all passengers and freight entered at
the city of Richmond for any point on the Louisa Rail
Road, at the same rate per mile as is charged at the time




28
for the same by the Louisa Company, and shall also agree
to submit to the umpirage of some third person or persons, to be chosen by the said companies, the compensation to the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac
Rail Road Company, for collecting, at the depots in
Richmond, the dues of the Louisa Rail Road Company,
and any other matter of controversy which may arise
between the said companies owing to the connection between them, then this act is to be void, or else to remain in full force. By the 5th section, it is enacted,
"That if the company accept the provisions of this act,
and the General Assembly shall at any time hereafter
authorize any Rail Road to connect with the Louisa
Rail Road, th/e passengers and produce, or other property delivered by the said road, shall be transported
from the point of connection at the same rate per mile
as may at the same time be charged by said company
on their travel, or tonnage, on the Louisa Rail Road,
from any point at or between Charlottesville and the
junction of said intersecting road to Richmond." The
act was " to take effect when accepted by a majority of
the stockholders of the Louisa Rail Road Company;"
and there was no more doubt of its acceptance by that
company than there was of its terms being rejected by
the other.  It was neither expected nor intended that
these terms should be accepted by the Fredericksburg
Company. They subject the tolls of that company on
all transportation coming from the Louisa Road to the
absolute control of the Louisa Company; they compel
the Fredericksburg Company for all time to come to
submit to private umpirage, not only its rate of compensation for the enforced service of collecting the Louisa
Company's dues at the depots in Richmond, but "any
other matter of controversy which may arise between
the companies owing to the connection between them;"
thus forever ousting the jurisdiction of the courts over




any question of right in this respect, which might arise
between the companies in the future.  And a forced
compliance with these terms is styled, a stipulation and
an agreement on the part of the Fredericksburg Company.  Should it prove contumacious and refuse to
stipulate and agree in the mode prescribed, the penalty
inflicted was to be the establishment immediately of a
direct competition for its freight and travel for one-third
of the distance of its road, and the prospective creation
of a rival route, for which provision is made by anticipation in the same act, for the through travel all the way
from Richmond to Washington.  The act speaks of authorizing hereafter a rail road to connect with the Louisa
Road, but in truth, on the very day of its passage,
(27th of March, 1848,) the same Legislature passed another act " incorporating the Orange and Alexandria Rail
Road Company" with a terminus at Gordonsville, having
just the session before authorized the extension of the
Louisa Road to the same point, and beyond it; and by
the charter of the Orange and Alexandria Road, (as
was done in the case of the Louisa Road,) provision is
made, how  transportation shall be conducted by the
companies when connected; for by the 5th section, it is
provided, "That in case any rail road shall hereafter
intersect with the rail road by this act authorized to be
constructed, the company of the last mentioned road
shall carry the tonnage and passengers from  the point
of intersection to either terminus of the said road at the
same rates per mile that they charge for the through
tonnage and passengers."  Let it be added, that to the
construction of all the roads, by which this competition
with the Fredericksburg Road has been authorized and
established, the State has contributed its subscriptions.
She owns three-fifths of the stock of the Virginia Central and Orange and Alexandria Rail Road Companies,




30
and reaps in that proportion the fruits of her own violated faith. And her agent, the Board of Public Works,
which supervises all the public works in which she is
interested, appoints three out of five of the Directors of
each of these companies, and has the power to control
their management.
To what extent has this legislation been sanctioned
by the courts? In 1849 the Fredericksburg Company
filed its bill, complaining that the Louisa Company,
under the authority of the act for its extension to Richmond, had commenced constructing a rail road, not
from Fredericksburg to the city of Washington, nor
between the city of Richmond and the town of Tappahannock or Urbanna, or to any immediate points between
the city of Richmond and these towns, but for a "portion of the distance" between the city of Richmond and
the city of Washington; that is to say, for that portion
which is between Richmond and the point where the
Louisa Rail Road has, heretofore, joined the rail road
of the complainants, computed to be twenty-five miles
from  the city of Richmond, and in close proximity,
all the way, with the complainants' road; setting out
the coercive provisions of the act of the 27th of March,
1848, in regard to the complainants' road, the plain
object of which was to force them to reduce their rates
for passengers and freight below  what (but for the
said act) they might lawfully have charged, or encounter
the rivalry of the Louisa Road along twenty-five miles
of their line; a measure which as clearly impaired
the obligation of the contract between them and the
State, as if their tolls had been reduced by a direct
act of legislation. They prayed an injunction to the
construction of the proposed road, and to the transportation of persons and property, or the mail, thereon, and
especially to the carrying thereon, of passengers travelling thereon between Richmond and Washington. The




31
Louisa Company in their answer, claim argumentatively,
to restrict the complainants' right to the carrying of
through passengers only, from Richmond to Washington,.
and with that right they protest vehemently they never'
mean to interfere; they say, "it is clear the Legislature
retained the right to authorize the construction of any
rail road which did not fall within the definition of the'
act, as for instance, a road to transport coal, and a road
to transport produce of any kind, or any other freight than
passengers, and such a road might be made to run in a parallel line with the road of the complainants, for its whole
distance."  " The true question between the parties7 is a
question as to the extent to which your respondents may
use their road; that is, whether they may or may not trasport upon their road passengers going from Richmond to
the West, or some point westward of the road of the, complainants, whose destination is not Washington, or to
some point of the country between Richmond and the
rail road of the complainants, and passengers coming
from  such intermediate point, or the West, to Richmond."   " If these views be correct, the right to authorize the construction of the road now in progress by the
respondents is settled, and of course it is also settled,
that the complainants have no right and theis court has
no right to prevent it. The only open question, if there
be any open upon the act, is, how far and in what
manner, the road of your respondents may be used
when completed.  May it transfer passengers at all?
This question does not properly arise now, because the
road is not completed," &c. They claim, however, the,right to carry passengers not travelling "from Washington to Richmond, and vice versa."  As to carrying
travellers from one of those places to the other " they
here positively disclaim, as they always have done, the
purpose or design, on their part, to transport any such
passengers; and distinctly renounce it, if there be any




32
validity in the supposed guarantee; of which they never
would have made a question if they had been left peaceably to enjoy their own rights." In a bill filed by the
Louisa Company in the course of the case, and sworn
to, by its President, Edmund Fontaine, they say:
because your orators do not propose to carry on their
road any passengers going from Richmond to Washington, or from Washington to Richmond, or any freight
which passes over the Richmond and Fredericksburg
Rail Road," &c. The State court decided:
"That the privilege or monopoly guaranteed to the
complainants by the 38th section of their Act of Incorporation, was that of transporting passengers between Richmond and Washington; but that the Legislature by that
enactment did not part with the power to authorize the
construction of a rail road between Richmond and Fredericksburg for other purposes; that they had, therefore,
the right to authorize the extension of the respondents'
road, to the Dock, in the city of Richmond."
"That if the Louisa Company (now the Virginia
Central) should hereafter use their road by transporting
passengers in violation of the rights guaranteed to the
complainants, by the 38th section, and there should
be no adequate remedy at law, it might be proper to
interfere by injunction to restrain such a proceeding."
On these grounds the complainants' prayer was denied, their bill was dismissed; from the decree of dismissal
an appeal was refused by the Virginia Court of Appeals,
and that refusal was approved by the Supreme Court of
the United States.  The Supreme Court decided, that,
"in the first charter " (that of the Fredericksburg Com-:
pany) "there was an implied reservation of the power
to incorporate companies to transport other articles than
passengers; and if the Louisa Rail Road Company
should infringe upon the rights of the Richmond Company, there would be a remedy at law, but the appre



h'ension of it will not justify an injunction to prevent
them  from building their road."  Even this was the
decision of only a bare majority of the eight judges who
heard the cause (one of the court having declined to sit);
and how much it was due to the earnest disclaimers,
which have been noticed) may be inferred from  the
language of Judge Grier, who delivered the Court's
opinion. He says: " where do we find that the Legislature have contracted to part with the power of constructi
ing other rail roads) even between Richmond and Fredea
ricksburg, for carrying coal and other freigoht?"  " That
the respondents' (the Louisa Company) "will not be
allowed to carry the passengers travelling between thd
city of Richmond and the city of Washington is admitted;
and they deny any intention of so exercising their
franchise as to interfere with the rights secured to the
complainants."  As to any future question which may
arise, as to using the road to transport passenger travellers,
"to or from the West," he adds the Chancellor wag
not bound to decide the question by anticipation; and
although he may have thrown out some intimationI
of his present opinion on that question, he has very
properly left it open for future decision, to be settled
by a suit at law or equity "upon the facts of the case;
as they may then appear."    Leaving, therefore, the
question as to the proper construction of the contracte
or rights guaranteed to the complainants, by this sectioni
of their charter, to be settled when a proper case arises;
we are of opinion that the State Court did not err ird
refusing to enjoin the respondents from  constructingz
their road," &c.  The dissenting judges, doubtless*
thought the "proper case" had arisen, as, in the language
of Judge Curtis, (one of them,) "the Louisa Company
by their original charter, are expressly authorized to
carry passengers on their rail road, and when they are
empowered by the act: now in question, to extend their
5




34
road, it is a necessary implication that the' extension
is for the same uses, and subject to the same rights and
powers, and privileges, as the original road to which it
is annexed, and accordingly we find that by the 5th
section of this act, the Legislature has prescribed a limit
of tolls, as well for passengers as for' merchandiise
coming from, or going' to, another rail road, aid pa-ing
over tie whole length of the' Lofisa Road,. and each
part of it, including the extension."  "'It is thus' clear
that there' was not a single judge' of the eight on
the bench of the Supreme Court of the United S;tatess
at the hearing, who was not of opinion that the good
faith of the state of Virginia was' pledged to the Frede —
ricksburg Company to protect them against the Louisa7
or Virginia Central Rail Road Company, in the contract
made by the State, with the company-, so far as the'
transportation of passengers is concerned," aad no denial
of this right, either actual or practical, by the judiciary,
had thus far occurred.. But the "c case"'  which the courts would not "anticipate," very soon arose. The extension to Richmond
was completed in the month of December, 1850, and
fom that time to the present has been constantly used,
alike for the transportation of passengers and freight to
and fro, upon all parts of the road from Richmond to its
ultimate termination; and in November, 1855, the connection at Gordonsville of the Central and the Orange
and Alexandria Road having been established, the system  of through tickets and through transportation on
the continuous route thus formed, commenced and has
Oince continued.  The Fredericksburg. Company had in
advance charged on these companies the design to make
this combination.  In May, 1852, the Company again
appealed to the courts for protection against the wrongfill use made of the extended road from  Richmond to
1he Junction, and in their bill prayed "an account of the




35
receipts of the said'Company for travel and freight between the Junction and Richmond which would have;accrued to the plaintiffs but for the use of the defendants'
Toad,'' and such other orders and decrees as might be
proper. In the answer of the Central Company, in
which they repeated their right to "carry passengers
from Richmr nd to any point west of the road of the
plaintiffs and to bring them fron any point west of it to
Richmond,'"'there occur the following remarkable pas
sages: "As to the rail road from Alexandria to Gordonsville, these respondents have nothing to do with its con-'struction and have no interest in it."  "If any wrong
be done the complainants by carrying passengers on
the Alexandria and Orange Rail Road, it can only be
done after the road is made, and not before, and then it
will be a wrong done not by these respondents, but by
the Alexandria and Orange Rail Road Company, and
must be redressed by that Company, and not by these
respondents, before it has been committed by any one.'"'These respondents cannot conceive, therefore, why the'construction of the Alexandria and Orange Rail Road
and its contemplated and possible but uncommitted
wrongs have been lugged into this cause," &c. The
earnest and repeated disclaimers of this Company of any
wish or design to interfere with the through travel between Richmond and Washington have been referred to
above. When, however, the wrongful combination had
been consummated which has wrought such grievous
injury to the Fredericksburg Company, an injunction
was prayed to restrain it, and an inquiry was asked
of the amount of loss which it had sustained by a
withdrawal of passengers thereby to which it was entitled. To the bill in this instance, the Virginia Central Rail Road Company had no answer to make; it was
content to demur to it, leaving to its associate, the
Orange and Alexandria Company, the difficult task of




36
defending their joint ustnrpation in an answer which uipholds the violation of the State faith by the plea of State
nececessity-the necessity to have these roads, and to
misuse them  to the prejudice of granted rights-as if
to keep that faith inviolate were not the first of all
necessities.!
The following seem to be the positions assumed by
the State judge in the various phases in which the
question of the rights of the Fredericksburg Company
was presented to him. In November, 1853, he declined
to restrain by injunction the anticipated combination,between the Central and the Orange and Alexandria
lail Road Companies because the latter road was not
then completed to Gordonsville, and it remained to be
seen whether such combination would be formed between them.  But he was of opinion "that the guarantee contained in the 3Sth section of their charter,
secures to the complainants the right to transport alt
travellers passing along the line of their road through,
its whole extent," that is, both to the way and through'
travel on the whole and every part of their road. But
as to what is termed the " Cross" travel, (meaning
thereby all the travel which the Fredericksbarg Road
had been receiving at the Junction from the lateral rail
road and transporting thence to Richmond for ten years,)
it was thought to be " created" by the Louisa Road.
Its subtraction, therefore, could not " diinmish" the
number of passengers travelling between Richmond and
Washington on the complainants' road, and the Legislature might properly authorize its transportation from
the Junction to Richmond on a road almost parallel
with and nearly approaching the complainants' road for
twenty-five miles in the direction. of Richmond. Nothing but the "way travel" from the Junction to Richmond was secured to the complainants by their guarantee, but what that was, and within what territoria




37
$imits it existed, and consequently what the orders of
account and injunction should embrace, seemed too uncertain on the proofs to justify either. So an inquiry
was directed to ascertain "what number of persons in
the neighborhood of the Jun::tion, if any, would seek
the road of the complainants as a means of travelling
to and from the city of Richmond if the road of the
defendants had not been constructed; within what distance of the Junction such persons reside, what portions of such persons, if aly, have since the completion
of the road of the respondents sought it as the means of
travelling to and from said city; what injury the complainants have sustained by reason of the diversion of
such travel from their road; what injury in future they
are likely to sustain by reason of such diversion; what
would be a reasonable compensation to be paid by the
respondents to the complainants for the privilege of
sharing with them  the right to transport such persons,
and whether the complainants are willing to accept
and the respondents to pay such compensation."  To
this, the Commissioner naturally respsnded, that such
inquiry was impracticable.  He said: " The undersigned
respectfully submits that the said inquiries cannot be
executed unless by taking the depositions of all persons
residing in the neighborhood of the Junction, and then
the limits would be a serious question to determine."
But this was by no means the full measure of the difficulties that beset such an inquiry. For it involves an
examination into the tastes and caprices of an indefinite number of persons in their choice between two
routes of travel between the same points, offering perhaps equal facilities and conveniences, and between
which many might feel indifferent, and all are liable to
change as time goes on. The same test was applied to
the complainants alleged rights to the through travel
between Richmond and Washington.  The Court being
5*




38
of opinion after the connection was established between
the Virginia Central and Orange and Alexandria Roads,
" that the said plaintiff is entitled to relief, if any, only
as to such travel passing to and fro, between Richmond
and Washington, as would have gone over the road of
the plaintiffs if the roads. of the defendants had not
been constructed, an inquiry was directed to ascertain
whether any, and if any, what amount of such travel
has been carried over the road of the defendants."  At
the time of this last. direction, there was the most abun.dant proof in the cause that through tickets to the
amount of thousands of dollars, between Richmond and
~Washington, had been sold by these companies, and
that they were systematically persisting in the abuse.
As before their roads were thus connected, there was nao
other rail road route for this through travel than the
~Fredericksburg route, it would not seem  difficult to
infer that the establishment of the new route, by Gor-.donsville had the "probable effect" to diminish, by
so much, " the number of passengers travelling between
the one city and the other on the. rail road" of the complainants.  But'as the defendants in their answers do
not admit that they have carried any such travel,'
further inquiry was directed. The Commissioner having
reported that no further evidence had been laid before
him  on this branch, the plaintiffs were incontinently
turned out of court ivrth costs on both branches of the
inquiry.  Thus was the unhappy spectacle presented of
conceded rights being violated without any remedy for
their infraction  a solecism  no less than a reproach in
the administration of justice!  And yet, how  simple
and easy appears the redress to which the complainants
are entitled.  The inquiry relates to the "probable effect" of the defendants' acts. If they are "probably".injurious to the rights secured by the complainants.charter, they are to be restrained, and if certainly iij.u



nous, to be atoned for, by making adequate compensation,
But is not the diversion of thousands of travellers from
the only route which once existed for their transit to a
new route recently established, a certain loss, and under
the circumstances of this case, a certain wrong? It is
a loss which can be counted to a cent, and is inflicted
without the color even of law or justice. Yet, it is
neither restrained nor redressed. Then, as to the way
travel from the Junction to Richmond, concede that the'cross" travel as it is called, does not belong to the
complainants.  It was abundantly proved by the Central Company's own agents, that the Company was
gathering both freight and travel at the Junction, and
all other points on their line from that place to Richmond, and were carrying that and the "cross" freight
and travel indiscriminately over their road to Richmond,
and because the complainants could not discriminate in
their proof how much of the gain thus acquired was
lawful and how much unlawful, and the defendants
would not, the complainants must sit down content, and
without redress, not for a "probable" but a palpable
and admitted abuse of their chartered rights!
No such difficulties have attended the enforcement of
the obligations of state faith in other commonwealths.
In the case of the Boston and Lowell Rail. Road Company,
vs. the Salem and Lowell Rail Road Company, ChiefJustice Shaw, of Massachusetts, gives a bright example
of the firm and steady hand with which those obligations, and the rights flowing from them, should be
upheld and enforced.  That, too, was a case of a chartered exclusive right to carry, for a long term of years,
the freight and passenger travel on a rail road, between
given points, I Lowell and Boston. No other roads were
to be established, within that period, between Lowell
and Boston, whose termini should be within five miles
of either place. The defendants, as here, sought to




40
evade the restriction by uniting sections of their roads
which were chartered to run in a different direction, at
an angle, such as is made at Gordonsville, in the combined lines of the Central and Alexandria and Gordonsville Roads, and by concert between them, formed a
rival continuous route for passengers and freight, between
Lowell and Boston.  The Court had no hesitation in
injoining these companies from carrying any persons or
property, by this continuous route, between Lowell and
Boston, and from all the means and appliances which
had been adopted for that purpose.  May we indulge
the hope that the Court of Appeals of Virginia will look
to this example.
A  CITIZEN  OF VIRGINIA,
Interested only in the Preservation of the Faith cf the State,
aud having no interest in the R. F. g; P..R. R. Co.
To the Editors of the Enquirer:
Messrs. Editors,-I have carefully perused the articles
of Mr. IRobert Tyler, of Philadelphia, on the subject of
the violation of the charter of the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Rail Road Company, with your
comments on the same, and the reply of Mr. James
Lyons, the counsel of the Virginia Central Rail Road
Company, to Mr. Tyler, and am really at a loss to perceive how, with the admitted facts of the case, there can
be two opinions on the subject.  Let us look at them,
Messrs. Editors, concisely, in a plain, common sense
aspect, and without unnecessary mystification. As Mr.
Tyler well observes, "the credit of Virginia cannot be
maintained on the Stock Exchange of New York, or




41
Philadelphia, or in any other money market, by special
pleading, in justification of a real or virtual repudiation
of a solemn contract."
The state of Virginia, as an inducement to capitalists
to subscribe large sums of money for the construction of
the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Rail Road,
pledged itself, for the period of thirty years, not to " allow
any other rail road to be constructed between the city of
Richmond, and the city of Washington, or for any
portion of the said distance, the probable effect of which
would be to diminish the number of passengers travelling
between the one city and the other, on the rail road
authorized by this act, or to compel the company, in
order to retain such passengers, to reduce the passage
money."  A rail road is, in consequence, built through
a comparatively barren district of country, which, without
such a pledge, would probably, not even at this day,
have been in existence.  When, in the face of this
pledge, the Virginia Central (then the Louisa) Rail Road
Company was about to extend its road, from the Junction
to Richmond, a distance of twenty-six or twenty-eight
miles, on a line nearly parallel with that of the Richmond,
Fredericksburg and Potomac Rail Road, and the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Rail Road Company
applied for an injunction against the construction of the
work, the Virginia Central Company admit the exclusive
right of the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac
Company, under their act of incorporation to convey
all passengers travelling from Washington to Richmond,
or from Richmond to Washington, and disclaim the purpose of conveying such passengers.  On this admission
and disclaimer, the Judge of the Superior Court of
Chancery for the Richmond district, whilst-acknowledging the rights of the Richmond, Fredericksburg and
Potomac Rail Road Company, and the duty of the.Court to protect them, declines enjoining the construction




42
of the rail road between the Junction and Richmond,
This decision of the Court is sustained by the Supreme
Court of the United States, on the ground that the act
of the Legislature of Virginia authorizing the extension
of the rail road, between the Junction and Richmond, is
silent as to any grant of power to transport passengers
so as to interfere with the pledge given the Richmond,
Fredericksburg and Potomac Rail Road Company, and
did not, per se, impair the obligation of the contract"
contained in their charter.  The work being constructed,
the Virginia Central Rail Road Company, in theface of
its admission, of the rights of the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Rail Road Company, and its
disclaimer of any intention to violate them, unites in a
through ticket between Richmond and Washington;
with the Orange and Alexandria Rail Road Company,
and does what it can, by arrangements with companies
North and South of it, to divert the travel between
Richmond and Washington, from the most direct route;
to which it has admitted it to have been solemnly
pledged.  When the Richmond, Fredericksburg and
Potomac Rail Road Company again apply for an injunction against these arrangements, to the Judge of the
Circuit Court of Chancery, for the Richmond District,
the Judge, whilst admittingt the right of the Richmond,
Fredericksburg and Potomac Company, to both the
through and way travel, refuses the injunction, the only
effective remedy in the case, and the Board of Public
Works, the agent of the state for superintending its public works, and. making its loans, and who appoint three
out of five directors in the Virginia Central Rail Road
Company, stand by and witness this violation of a solemn
pledge of the state without exercising either their power
or their influence for its preservation.
Now, Messrs. Editors, can there be any doubt that
this is repudiation?  And with these facts before us is it




43
wonderful that the Virginia Central and Orange and
Alexandria Rail Road bonds should be at seventy cents
in the dollar, and the bonds of other Virginia Companies
not much higher, or Virginia State Bonds at ninety-two
and interest? If an individual, admitting your right to
a piece of property, should endeavor to wrest it from
you, you would hardly expect him to be very particular
about meeting an engagement to pay money, if it should
happen to be inconvenient to him to do so, and would
scarcely have perfect confidence in the promises of others
who were willing to aid and abet him  in gross and
acknowledged spoliation. And if such a violation of
faith, as has been made palpable by Mr. Tyler, be countenanced by public sentiment in Virginia, will it not be a
fearful example and precedent when the burthens of the
state become heavier, and her borrowing power is exhausted? There will be, then, in Virginia, as elsewhere,
persons and districts of country disappointed in the
advantages anticipated from the state expenditures, who
will be unwilling to be taxed for debts incurred, as they
will allege, to benefit particular districts of country, and
to promote private interests.  When such a state of
things arises there will be no want of demagogues to
take advantage of it, and an abundance of special pleading, in and out of the Legislature, to justify omitting to
make provision for the public debt, unless a sound
public sentiment has been previously fostered and sustained. Rely on it, Messrs. Editors, the maxim is not
less true than trite, of
OBSTA PRINCIPIIS.