BOSTON RAILWAYS:
THEIR
CONDITION AND PROSPECTS.
BOSTON:
LITTLE, BROWN, AND COMPANY,
112, WASHINGTON STREET.
1856.




THE deep interest of the community in the success of Boston
Railways, and the belief that a suicidal policy prevails in their
management, have led to the publication of these pages, with the
hope that railway shareholders may investigate the causes of
the present condition of their property.
E. B. GRANT.
BOSTON, December, 1856.
BOSTON:
PRINTED BY JOHN WILSON AND SON,
22, SCHOOL STREET.




CONTENTS.
Page.
INTRODUCTION..                                                 3
BOSTON AND LOWELL RAILROAD.                                     11
BOSTON AND MAINE RAILROAD.14
BOSTON AND PROVIDENCE RAILROAD......    17
BOSTON AND WORCESTER RAILROAD.21
EASTERN RAILROAD.27
FITCHBURG RAILROAD.....                           32
THE OLD COLONY AND FALL RIVER RAILROAD                         47
FUEL AND OIL. ~.......                          50
IRON........ 52
SLEEPERS......... 58
BRIDGES..                                                   59
SHORT TRAVEL......    61
FREIGHT-TARIFFS.,........    67
Low FARES......   68
SEASON-PASSENGERS......    89
"' MASSACHUSETTS RAILROADS"...  99
RISE OF PASSENGER-TRANSPORT......   112
COAL-BURNING LOCOMOTIVES......     114
HAVE EXPENSES REACHED THEIR MAXIMUM?..... 129
CONCLUSION......                               130




iv                            CONTENTS.
Page.
APPENDIX........... 133
Railway Reports.                                              133
Reducing Expenses.                                            133
The Railway System of the United States.                      134
Table A.136
Table B......137




BOSTON RAILWAYS.
IF there be doubts in the mind of any person whether
the introduction of railways into Massachusetts has
proved of pecuniary benefit to the community, or the
reverse, it would seem that intelligent observation
must clearly demonstrate that they have been the chief
instruments of the prosperity of the State. No one can
refuse to acknowledge, that railways, by the increased
facilities which they have afforded for travel and
the transportation of freight, have been the principal
contributors to the increase, not only of business and
of population, but of material wealth. There can be
no doubt that cheap transportation has given a ready
market for the sale of the productions of agriculture
and mechanics, that would not have existed otherwise;
that thousands of acres of land have been put under
cultivation, and made productive of income, which
otherwise would have lain fallow; that numberless
waterfalls, which for untold ages fiad contributed
nothing of their unemployed power to the comfort
and support of man, have been wakened into usefulness solely through their agency.
2




4
If the agriculturist distant from a market has, in
effect, been brought near to it by the all-embracing
and space-annihilating railroad; if he has been thereby
enabled to supply the tables of the capital with the
products of his skill in husbandry, - it is not, as
many have declared, at the expense of those producers
whom long possession of the monopoly of supplying
city consumers had taught to consider as their right;
for the increase of business and of population effected
by railways has so enlarged consumption, that a
perusal of the market price-current cannot fail to show
that consumers have more than kept pace with producers.
The manufacturing cities and towns of the interior,
most of which were'called into being by railways, are
so many central markets, in which the neighboring
farmer finds ready sale for his produce. Hence the
increased valuation affixed to the real estate of the
Commonwealth is not fictitious; for it is based upon
income which railways have created.
The rapidly increasing population of Boston, consequent upon the enlarged business of the State, has
induced people to avail themselves of the facilities of
railway travel to leave the crowded streets of the city,
after the business of the day, and make their homes in
the country.
Distances diminish in the ratio of the speed of travel; and railways have enlarged the area of territory
within an hour's ride of Boston more than one thousand per cent. Thus, at a speed of six miles an hour,
the area of territory whose centre is accessible within




an hour is thirty-six square miles: but, at a speed of
twenty miles an hour, it is four hundred; and, at a
speed of thirty miles an hour, it is nine hundred; and
so on. Hence the value of land in the vicinity of
Boston has vastly increased, not, as is often asserted,
at the expense of real estate in the city; for enlarged
business has increased its value in as great a ratio as
that* of the country.
If it be true, then, that railways have tended to
develop the previously concealed resources of the
State; if they have added to the comfort, the convenience, and wealth of its inhabitants, - ought not
they whose enterprise and public spirit led them to
embark vast sums of money in a system, which, at its
inception, was looked upon not only as an experiment,
but, in the opinion of most, as a foolish, ill-considered,
and Quixotic undertaking, - ought not they to receive
some return from the community they have so richly
benefited?  Are they not entitled to an ample toll
upon the vast traffic their enterprise has called into
existence? No fair-minded man can deny that they
are entitled to liberal remuneration for the capital they have invested; and I believe no man does
deny it.
But, in granting charters to railway companies; in
giving them the right of way through lands, regardless
of the owners' remonstrance; in permitting them to
enjoy a comparative monopoly of transportation,the Legislature was governed by what it conceived
to be the public good; and, in order that the monopoly might never become too burdensome to the com



6
munity, the right was reserved to. take the property,
after a limited number of years, by paying the proprietors their capital invested, and ten per cent for the
annual use of the same; also the power to reduce the
tolls.
It is maintained by some railroad directors, that,
this contingency not having yet arisen, the Legislature
has no right to interfere with their concerns; that
they have the right to affix their own tolls upon passengers and freight, and are entirely above all legislative intervention; that Government has no more right
to interfere with their affairs, and arrange their tariffs,
than it has to dictate to an individual the price at
which he must sell his commodities. But a railway
corporation is not a private, it is a public, institution:
the breath of the Legislature made, and can destroy
it. For the public interest, extraordinary privileges
were granted; for the public interest, those privileges may be modified or taken away.
If it can be clearly shown that the seven railways
terminating in Boston have failed to pay the dividends
which the law allowed them only because of great mismanagement; if it can be proved that they are now on
th:~high road to the most triumphant pecuniary success, in spite of past and present mismanagement; if,
moreover, it can be conclusively demonstrated, that,
notwithstanding the injudicious policy heretofore pursued, these roads have yet made a much larger percentage of profit than has rewarded the great bulk of
capital otherwise employed in this State; if all these
facts can be made apparent, - the Legislature will




7
surely protect the public against the proposed radical
change of tariffs.  Government will not allow the
people to be taxed and incommoded merely to enable
railway corporations to pursue the course of reckless
extravagance, which, although checked in a degree, still
prevails to an extent sufficient to warrant the Legislature in insisting, that, before applying the supposed
panacea of higher fares and fewer trains, now so popular among railroad men, a trial shall be made of a
system of judicious economy.
The public expect and desire to pay liberally for
the great accommodation which they acknowledge railways afford them; but they distinctly, decidedly, and
emphatically object to having the blunders and extravagances of directors set down to their debit in " running expenses."
All must acknowledge, that, unless amply paid for
their service, railways cannot accommodate the public.
It is equally clear, that, unless the public are accommodated, they will not pay the railways.
But some railroad directors say, - there are wise
and honorable exceptions, - " The public will have to
make use of railways; there is no way in which they
can travel so rapidly, so cheaply, or so comfortably;
and we mean to make them pay roundly for the privilege,"- a privilege, by the by, which the people had
retained for themselves in exchange for the privilege
of monopoly granted by them in chartering railway
companies.
And it is unquestionably true, that so great is the




8
convenience of railways, and so necessary have they
become to our community, that, if tariffs were advanced
fourfold, a portion of their traffic would still be retained.
Having written thus much, I shall proceed to substantiate some of my assertions.
First, to prove, if proof be needed, that railways
have been of benefit to Massachusetts, I append a
schedule, showing the increase of population in the
State:
Population  of.Massachusetts and rate of increase from  1790 to
1855.
1790.   1800.   1810.   1820.   1830.   1840.   1850.   1855.
378,717  423,245  472,040  523,287 610,408 737,699 994,514 1133,123
Inc.     11.75    11.52    10.85    16.64   20.85   34.81    *27.87
* At that rate for a term of ten years.
Population of Massachusetts within the arc of a circle with a radius
of thirty miles from Boston, including all towns intersected by the'
are, from 1830 to 1855.
COUNTIES.    1830.   1840.   Inc.   1850.   Inc.   1855.   Inc.
Bristol...   17,331   19,729  13.83   24,378  19.65   27,703 31.57*
Essex...  80,340   92,248  14.82  128,200 38.97  147,982 30.86*
Middlesex.   72,831  101,902 39.91  156,384 53.48  191,141 44.43*
Norfolk..  41,972   53,140 26.61   78,892 48.46   94,448 39.44*
Suffolk...   62,163   95,773 54.06  144,517 50.89  171,818 37.78*
Worcester.   21,982   25,027  13.85   29,947  19.65   34,672  31.57
Total.... 296,619 387,819 30.74 562,318 44.99 667,764 37.50*
* At that rate for a term of ten years.
Total increase in twenty-five years......    125.12
The first railroads in Massachusetts were opened in




9
1835; and, between 1845 and 1855, the network was
still further extended.
Population of Massachusetts within the arc of a circle with a radius
of twenty miles from Boston, including all towns intersected by the
are, from 1830 to 1855.
COUNTIES.   1830.   1840.  Inc.  1850.  Inc.  1855.  Inc.
Bristol...   2,928   3,456 18.03   4,126 19.38   4,867 35.90*
Essex...  39,761  46,427 16.76  61,883 33.29  72,215 33.38*
Middlesex.  58,990  72,996 23.07 113,054 54.89 144,753 56.96*
Norfolk..  40,870  52,085 27.44  77,611 49.00  93,035 39.76*
Suffolk...  62,163  95,773 54.06 144,517 50.89 171,818 37.78*
Total....  204,712 270,737 32.25 401,191 48.18 486,688 42.62
* At that rate for a term of ten years.
Total increase in twenty-five years.....    138.71
Population of Massachusetts within the arc of a circle with a radius
of ten miles from  Boston, including all towns intersected by the
are, from 1830 to 1855.
COUNTIES.   1830.   1840.  Inc.  1850.  Inc. 1 1855.  Inc.
Essex...  25,838  31,274 21.03  45,905 46.78  50,271 19.02*
Middlesex.  33,796  44,109 30.51  75,061 70.17  97,999 61.10*
Norfolk..  26,986  36,529 35.36  58,175 59.25  70,662 42.92*
Suffolk...  62,163  95,773 54.06 144,517 50.89 171,818 37.78*
Total.... 148,783 207,685 39.58 323,658 55.84 390,750 41.44*
* At that rate for a term of ten years.
Total increase in twenty-five years...... 162.63
Exhibiting the proportion per cent of population of Massachusetts
to the whole number in the State,from 1830 to 1855, within certain
radial distances from Boston, as explained in preceding tables.
10 miles. 20 miles. 30 miles.
1830    24.37    33.53    48.59
1840    28.15    36.       52.57
1850    32.54    40.34    56.54
1855    34.48    42.95    58.93




10
Some of the most remarkable instances of growth in the case of
individual towns.
ToWNS.           1830.      1840.      1850.      1855.
Boston...        61,392     93,383    136,881    160,508
Chelsea....      771      2,390       6,701     10,151
Haverhill...      3,896      4,336       5,877      7,940
Lawrence....                              8,282     16,081
Lynn...    1   6,138    9,367      14,257     15,713
Brookline...      1,043     1,365       2,516      3,740
Dedham....        3,117      3,290       4,447      5,640
Dorchester...      4,074      4,875       7,969      8,357
Quincy....        2,201      3,486       5,017      5,921
Randolph..         2,200     3,213       4,741      5,538
Roxbury...        5,247      9,089      18,364     18,477
Stoughton..         1,591     2,142       3,494     4,369
Weymouth..          2,837      3,738       5,369      6,530
Brighton....         972       1,425      2,356      2,895
Cambridge...      6,072      8,409      15,215    20,473
Lowell....        6,474     20,796      33,383     37,553
Malden....         2,010     2,514       3,520      4,591
Medford...          1,755     2,478       3,749      4,605
Melrose....                              1,260      1,976
Natick...          890      1,285       2,744      4,138
Newton...         2,376      3,551       5,258      6,768
Somerville...                            3,540      5,806
Stoneham...        732      1,017       2,085     2,518
Waltham...       1,857     2,504       4,464      6,049
Woburn....          1,977     2,993       3,956      5,451
Grafton....        1,889     2,943       3,904     4,409
Milford....        1,360     1,773       4,819     7,489
It requires no argument to prove that a railway will
succeed better through a populous than an unpopulous district; and the preceding tables prove that the
effect of the railway system is to consolidate the population of the State about the capital.
Valuation of real and personal property in Massachusetts from
1830 to 1850.
1830....$197,561,191.21
1840........  299,878,329.31
1850........ 597,936,995.46




I shall next attempt to demonstrate, that, while
benefiting the State, railways have received a fair
return for the capital invested, by presenting a table
of dividends paid by the seven roads: —
Table showing dividends paid by the seven roads terminating in
Boston, to and including January, 1856.
When    Av. divs. Av. since
NAME OF ROrAD.               ~finished.  11 years.  comm.
Boston and Lowell.......        1835      7.04      6.91
Boston and Maine.......          1842      7.09      6.96
Boston and Providence......         1835      5.63      6.11
Boston and Worcester.....  1835      7.36      6.85
Eastern...........        1840      6.59      6.38
Fitchburg..........       1845      6.86      6.86
*Old Colony and Fall River....                           6.*
* This Company was formed, in 1854, by the union of the Fall River and Old
Colony Railroad Companies. In the seven years preceding the union, the Fall
River paid to its stockholders average dividends of 5.71. When the union was
effected, the stockholders of the Fall River received a dividend of thirteen dollars
per share, payable in the stock of the consolidated Company. In the same time,
the stockholders of the Old Colony had received average cash dividends of 3 per
cent, and a dividend in the stock of the united companies of nearly twenty-three
dollars per share. The present condition of the new Company will be shown hereafter.
I shall next undertake to maintain the assertion,
that these roads are at present doing well, by present.
ing the history of the several roads, gleaned from
their own reports.
BOSTON AND LOWELL, —COMPLETED IN 1835.
The stock of this Corporation for a long time stood
at the head of the list of railways in Massachusetts;
having sold, in 1835, at 135 per cent. For a period
3




12
of fourteen years, from 1839 to 1853, it was not sold
for less than four per cent, ranging from that point
up to thirty-two per cent advance. It is at present
worth in the market but seventy per cent of the par
value, owing to the prevalent, but for the most part
unfounded, distrust of the value of railway property
as an investment.
Of the gross income in 1855, 66-1' per cent was
derived from business confined to their road alone.
Of the gross income from passengers, 82-8s- per cent
was derived solely from  their road.  Increase of
income on their own line, on entire receipts, 1854,
132.   Decrease of income from  connecting roads,
on entire receipts, 1854, 21.  From  these facts,
it would seem a fair inference that the local business on this road is worth cultivating. The Directors
state that "all expenses, of every description (many
of which were for permanent improvements), excepting those for the extension into the city of Boston,
have been charged to running expenses." Notwithstanding which, they have made a clear profit of
6-1 per cent.
The property held by this Corporation, beside their
track, consists, in part, of
130,000 feet upland..........  Boston,
30,000,, wharves..........
440,000,, upland.......... East Cambridge,
780,000,, flats..,,
40,000,, wharves.........,,..
88,000,, upland.                     Lowell,
of a superabundant equipment; of buildings, "well




13
adapted to the present and prospective wants of the
Company," all in perfect order, and with an affixed
valuation " supposed to be entirely within the actual
value of the property;" of $10,450, bills receivable;
of $6,509.37, cash; of $110,006.60, in "wood, materials, &c., on hand." This would seem to indicate
a very tolerable and desirable degree of prosperity,
particularly when taken in connection with the fact
that they have paid, within the last eleven years,
$1,408,650, in dividends, or an annual average of
7.04 per cent; while the cost of their road has
been increased but $255,997.61; of which sum,
$179,705.97 has been expended for the further
acquirement of real estate in Boston, and the extension of their line to Causeway Street. Their gross
income exceeded that of 1854, $47,263,20; their net
income, $45,625.95. It would thus seem that there
is ground for hope that the Boston and Lowell Railroad may yet be made a profitable concern; for, while
they have paid but little over seven per cent the last
eleven years, a gain in the years 1856 and 1857, core
responding with that in 1855, would enable the company to pay ten per cent.
It is therefore a matter of surprise that its leading
Directors have the boldness, to use a mild expression,
to advocate "a material advance of tariffs."




14
BOSTON AND MAINE, —'COMPLETED IN 1842.
The policy pursued by the Boston and Maine Railroad towards the public has always been most liberal;
and the astonishing success attained in peopling their
line of road is a sure proof of the soundness of that
policy.
The Boston and Maine refused to join in the last
general advance of passenger tariffs on roads leading
from Boston. They have since decided to do so,
however; and, if the advance be moderate, they will
doubtless increase their net income thereby. Their
tariff was unquestionably too low for present profit;
although the loss consequent upon their refusing to
advance will doubtless prove a good investment. Yet,
in spite of a remarkable series of disasters by fire and
flood in the early part of the last financial year,
which, beside the expense of repairs, for a time
seriously interrupted the business of the road; notwithstanding large expenditures for " new structures
and improvements," and a heavy outlay for new machinery, - all of which were charged to running
expenses, - in spite of low fares, and high prices for
labor and materials; the net earnings of the road
were 7-944- per cent.
The freight business of this road is large, and constantly increasing, and, when the projected improvements for its economical transaction are completed,
will be highly remunerative.




15
As a passenger-road, it stands at the head, and,
while managed with its present enlightened policy,
will doubtless remain so.
As a proof that this road is no exception to other
Massachusetts roads, in the superior importance of its
local, compared with the through traffic, it may be
mentioned that 69 8 of their business is solely from
their own line, and 302 from connecting roads.
In regard to short travel, the value of which has
been so contemptuously spoken of by the managers of
another line of road, - the fruits of whose niggardly
policy under its present government are now made
manifest by a loss of 17 per cent of its passengers in
a single year, - the value of this short travel is abundantly demonstrated by the fact, that, on the first
thirty-three miles out of Boston, being only 44 per
cent of its entire length, the gross receipts were 58
per cent of the income from its own line.
It is simply an act of justice to the accomplished
head of this road, that the community acknowledge
their indebtedness for the admirable manner in which
his duties, both as Engineer and as President, have
been discharged. It is acknowledged by all conversant with the history of this road. I shall quote the
valuable opinion of one of the most experienced and
accomplished railroad men of the day to substantiate
the justice of the acknowledgment I claim for
him: -
" It [the Boston and Maine Railway] has had the rare fortune
to be guided by one master-mind. The engineer, Mr. James Hayward, combined science with judgment, thrift, and experience.




16.... "The line has been fortunate also in its Presidents and
Directors. Since its first movement from Andover, there has been
no sudden or sweeping revolution as in other railways. The earlier Presidents, Messrs. West, Howe, and Shaw, were men of sagacity and intelligence, and enjoyed the confidence of the stockholders.
When wearied by arduous duties, they voluntarily sought retirement; and now their duties have devolved on a fitting successor, -
Mr. Hayward..... " There are certain tests by which we can measure the success of a railway. First, Has the trust confided by the State been
faithfully discharged? Railway companies are, by the theory of
our laws, trustees, to whom is intrusted, for the public good, a virtual monopoly of the public travel. In the name of the State, they
exercise the right of eminent domain, appropriate land at their discretion, and regulate the hours and rates of transportation.  Their
compensation is but a commission upon the execution of a trust.
And when a company like the Boston and Maine has traversed a
neglected district, conducted its works with skill and economy, conciliated the people, provided them with improved and safe modes of
conveyance at the most moderate scale of charges, waked into life
the useless waterfalls, built up flourishing villages and cities, and
made the wilderness blossom like the rose, it certainly has effected
one great object of the railway system, and safely laid the foundations of prosperity."...
By the annual returns to the Legislature, we find,
that, in the last six years, its passenger-travel has
increased 53, and its freight 71, per cent.
The road has been kept in perfect order; renewals
have kept pace with depreciation; its capital has
remained stationary for the last six years; its debt
is but $150,000, which is funded; its surplus is now
$228,897.93.
It has paid, since its opening in 1842, 6.95 per
cent average annual dividends, besides having largely
increased its undivided property, both real and personal.




17
Nothing can be more certain, under its present
management, than a continuation of its popularity,
and consequent speedy return to its former large dividends.
BOSTON AND PROVIDENCE RAILROAD, - COMPLETED IN 1835.
The history of this Corporation proves that its general policy has not been discreet. Built mainly with a
view to secure the New-York travel, its line was run
in the most direct practicable line to Providence, and,
as time has shown, injudiciously avoiding towns whose
large traffic it has since been thought necessary to
secure by the construction of expensive branches.
For five years after its completion, it enjoyed a
monopoly of the New-York travel; receiving about
five cents per passenger per mile, and twelve and a
half cents per ton per mile for freight. In the year
1839, its net profits were twelve per cent on the
capital.
But, as is often the case, too much prosperity
unduly elated the Directors with the success of their
supposed monopoly; and little or no disposition was
manifested to secure popularity by deserving it. The
Norwich and Worcester Railroad, warmed into existence by the unconciliatory course pursued by the
Providence Road, commenced running early' in the
year 1840, and, by their rivalry, diminished the net




18
earnings of the Providence fifty-three per cent in a
single year.  They were compelled to reduce their
tariffs; and the result was a steady increase in
receipts, until, in 1846, they renewed the payment of
eight per cent dividends.
In the yearly report to the Legislature for the
doings of the year 1840, the Directors state, that " having been obliged to reduce their passenger fare to
Providence, to $1.50, and their freight to $3, and in
the same ratio for intermediate places, they found it
necessary to encroach upon the reserved fund to pay the
July dividend; but, in the last six months, the increase
of business was such as enabled them to declare a dividend exclusively from the profits accrued in that time."
Picture their astonishment, - actually making more
money at the reduced price than they had before at
the high fares; girding themselves up for a deadly'
competition with a rival; prepared to submit to great
sacrifices, that they might, after slaying their enemy,
renew their monopoly; and finding, to their utter
amazement, that the increased travel called out by low
fares more than counterbalanced the diminished profit
on each passenger!
Again elated with their increasing revenue, this allgrasping Corporation expended more than a million of
dollars upon branches, from which, as yet, no important return has been reaped.
The business on the road is increasing slowly, but
steadily; the gross receipts for 1855 exceeding those
of any former year. The tariff on this road has doubtless been too low, and a moderate advance might well




19
have been made; but the sudden revolution in the
system, effected by a rise of fifty per cent on commu.
tation, and twenty per cent on single tickets, cannot
fail to exert a most unfavorable influence upon the
future prosperity of the Corporation. For the first
year, the net income will doubtless increase; but the
growth of the line will not only cease, but retrograde.
Attachment for the homes they have selected
will for a time retain most householders. The first
loss of passengers to the road will be of young men,
who can, without loss or serious inconvenience, refuse
to submit to what they deem a needless and exorbitant
advance. But, after a time, the increased tax will
have its effect upon the heads of families, and they
will be reluctantly compelled to seek other abodes.
There are many families on this road who pay $200
per annum to the Corporation for themselves and families, and would cheerfully continue to pay it; but the
advance to $300 will surely, in many instances, amount
to prohibition.
But let us see what necessity existed for this radical
change of tariff.
The average annual dividends, since its completion,
have been 6.11.
For the eighteen months ending Nov. 30, 1855, the
renewals are declared to have fully covered depreciation; yet the following items are charged to expenses: -
4




20
To credit of fund to meet depreciation of iron, sleepers,
and bridges (already met by renewals). $17,390.91
Depreciation of cars and engine (also met by renewals) 24,247.55
41,638.46
To which add net profits, as per treasurer's books. 267,013.84
Net earnings, 18 months.....   $308,652.30
Being equivalent to 6T-fI per cent per annum.
Although figures in the Annual Report apparently
substantiate this fact, yet I defy any man to form
any certain conclusion as to the actual condition of the
Corporation, from reading that document. Not one
word is said in relation to the construction account,
neither is any trial-balance presented.
As to the recent Report of the Investigating Committee, although a great deal is said in regard to the
increase of Construction Account, but slight mention
is made of the causes which led to it, or of the additional property acquired thereby, save the chronicle
of an unhappy investment of $90,000 in Fishkill
stock, another of $40,000 in the stock of a branch
road, and still another of $45,639.72 in a Virginia
plantation.
But there is one thing most conclusively proved by
the Report of the Investigating Committee: That it is
to " entangling alliances," which may be broken; to
unprofitable contracts with connecting roads, which
may be made profitable; to injudicious investments,
- and not to low fares, nor commutation-ticket passengers, - that the present condition of the property
is to be attributed. And yet from all these evils it was
slowly recovering; and another year, even under the




21
old. system, with its fares confessedly too low, would
have put the Company out of debt, and have enabled
them to resume their dividends. The present advance
of rates cannot be maintained; and, before the Boston
and Providence Railroad permanently resumes its
former rank, the lesson of 1840 will have to be
repeated. The introduction of coal-burning locomotives on the Boston and Providence Railroad would
be productive of an immense saving.
BOSTON AND WORCESTER RAILROAD, — OPENED
IN 1835.
The history of this road presents some most remarkable facts; proving not only the immense benefit
which a well-managed railway may confer upon a
community, but also the security of an investment in
the stock of a corporation whose affairs are properly
conducted. For although not wholly exempt from
the errors that have beset other railways, many of
which, from the peculiar circumstances of the case,
were to have been expected, yet, upon the whole, their
affairs have been well managed.
In the report of this Company to the Legislature,
in 1836, it is stated that the road had been " partially
opened for two years and nine months, and fully
opened for a year and a half;" that, "during the




22
former period, they had transported nearly three hundred thousand people;" that " the Directors have felt
it their duty to adopt every precaution which the
novelty of the mode of conveyance would admit of for
the safety of the persons so confided to them, as well
as of persons travelling on the common roads."
In the year 1836, they made "two trips a day, and
three in the summer."
Merchandise trains were sent at the rate of " one
or more a day, or as often as is necessary." Freight
from Worcester averaged about ten tons a day. It
was deemed of so little consequence to the line, that it
was proposed by a Director "to lease this branch of
the business for little more than a nominal return."
In 1855 the receipts from freight were $444,981.61.
In 1840, the freight tariff was so high as to amount
to prohibition, the business of the line was small, and
the prospects gloomy. A Committee of Investigation,
consisting of Messrs. Derby, Greele, and Lowe,
reported, in effect, that the way to increase the profits
was to charge less, and afford better accommodation.
The Directors met their arguments with ridicule, and
refused to listen to their suggestions. Nevertheless,
before three years had elapsed, their recommendations
were adopted, and the result is shown in table A,
at the end of this pamphlet.
The receipts for two years and nine months after
opening were $161,805.95.
In the twelve months ending Nov. 30, 1855, they
were $1,008,004.90.




23
The number of passengers carried in two years and
nine months was " nearly " 300,000.
The number of passengers carried in the twelve
months ending Nov. 30, 1855, was 1,590,459.
In 1838, "out of 1,336 trips, only eight occupied
more than four hours."
In 1840, "express trains were run to Worcester in
two hours."  They are now run regularly in eightyfive minutes, and have been run in one hour.
In 1843, " special trains were run to Newton, three
times each way, to accommodate the increasing population," then numbering about 3,300. The population
of that town is now nearly 6,800.
In 1835, the population of Worcester was about
4,000; in 1855, it was 22,286.
Having thus shown that the public have availed
themselves of the facilities offered by this line of road,
and that the receipts of the Corporation have increased
more than fivefold since its opening, it remains to be
seen at what profit to the Company its vast business
has been transacted.
The average annual dividends since its completion
have been 6-sie.
The average annual dividends for the last eleven
years have been 7-0~~.
Dividends for 1855, 6A%9O.
Having thus shown what the Company have divided,
it remains to show its present position:Since 1851, its construction account has been reduced  $51,000.00
The capital stands, as in 1848....... 4,500,000.00
Funded debt.........             500,000.00
Floating debt............    155,428.78




24
The Directors say, on page 10 of their Report,
"The net earnings of the year, without the allowance
for depreciation, would be 8f%9 per cent on the capital stock.
" This depreciation has not, of course, been the work
of a single year. It relates back to the earliest history of the road, embracing the entire difference
between the new and the old. In fact, since closing
the construction account against increase, we believe
the entire depreciation has been made good by renewals and enlargements during that period."
And again, on page 12 of the same Report, the
Directors state," The repairs of track, and renewals of iron, have claimed their
full share of attention; and though the amount of new rails laid
down has been less than the year before, as our last Report anticipated, we believe it has been fully equal to the wear of the year.
The average renewals for the last two years would be 1,700 tons a
year. At this rate, the entire trick would be renewed every six and a
half years. We believe seven to eight years a safe estimate for the
average duration of a rail on our road, including the entire amount
of the iron of the main road, branches, and side tracts.
" That our renewals have been sufficient, we are also confident,
from a general inspection of the track. We believe, that, looking
back to its condition in 1850 compared with the present, there is a
manifest improvement of the condition of the iron, the sleepers, the
road-bed, the mason-work, and the station-buildings, bridges, and
other structures. If some of the buildings have decayed, as all
wooden buildings must, that depreciation has been more than made
good by new buildings erected where required by the establishment
of new stations, or by the demand for increased accommodations, all
of which have been charged to current expenses, and paid from the
earnings. A large part of the masonry has been rebuilt, with
firmer and better materials and workmanship. We can safely,
therefore, assure you that the road has not depreciated, but, on




25
the contrary, has been gradually improved, and raised to a higher
value."
The Company have a large excess of assets available
to meet their indebtedness, without including real
estate, not needed for railroad purposes, valued at
$248,521.77.
A vast saving can be effected on this road in the
item  of fuel, not only by a more economical use of
wood, but by the introduction of coal-burning-engines;
in relation to which, the Directors say, —
"The various experiments in operation for the use of coal as
fuel, though none have yet been so decidedly successful as to induce
their general adoption, give encouraging promise of final success,
and great relief in this item of railroad expenses."
Intending hereafter to refer to coal as a fuel for
locomotives, I shall, for the present, dismiss the subject.
The passenger business on this road is already very
large, and constantly increasing; the policy of the
Corporation in relation thereto has been liberal and
judicious; the road is " popular" with the community,
and the frequency of its trains has induced a great
population to locate upon its line.
Its Directors apparently discern the fallacy of the
arguments of those revolutionists in the system, who,
with the most honest intentions, nevertheless advocate
a system at once suicidal for railway corporations, and
detrimental to the public; for, notwithstanding the
present relative position of stockholders and passengers, the true interests of each are not antagonistic.




26
It appears, by the report of this railway, that -
The receipts per passenger per mile in 1855 were.  2WiJ cents.
The cost of transport was.......       %lo- cents.
Profit on each passenger per mile..               a cents.
or nearly one cent per mile per passenger; a result
sufficiently satisfactory to make it desirable to cultivate
the further growth of the passenger traffic, - a cultivation well understood by the managers of this road,
and not at all understood by the managers of a certain
other Corporation,
Upon  reviewing  the  history, the  operations, and
financial situation of this Corporation, it seems to me
that one conclusion must be unavoidably attained, -
that they have succeeded, and will continue to succeed. Their past success is a matter of record; and
if for twenty-one  years they  have  gone  on  steadily
increasing their business, notwithstanding, since their
birth, other roads, not then in existence, have come to
claim a share of their travel, is it not certain that they
will continue  to  increase, with  the  surety  that no
other rival can spring up to molest them.
Total receipts of the Boston and Worcester Railroad from i851 to
1855 inclusive.
Year. Passengers.   Freight.  Mail.    Rel#.    O         Total.
~ lail.    Rent.   Income.
1851 403,362,24 318,933.10 11,438.78 10,188.48          743,922.60
1852 424,713.73 314,943.27  7,962.60  9,650.87  1,549.00  758,819.47
1853 481,222,05 382,558.51  3,540.41  9,984.90  9,964.00  887,219,87
1854 512,764.71 405,498.70 15,946.50  7,729.37 10,956.00  952,895.28
1855 529,185.67 444,981,61 10,532.32 12,285.40 11,020.00 1,008,004.90




27
I close the review of the affairs of this Company
with an extract from their last Report:
"In our Report for 1851, we ventured to predict that our gross
receipts would, at no distant period, amount to a million of dollars.
We have, within the last year, reached and passed that limit, and
within a shorter time than we should then have ventured to name.
We see nothing in the future to exclude the hope of a similar
increase. It results from causes likely to be permanent in their
character; viz., the rapid growth, in population and wealth, of Boston and the towns on the line; the rapid development of the local
business; the extension of trade and communication between
Boston and the West; and the general prosperity of the Commonwealth."
EASTERN  RAILROAD, — OPENED  IN  1840.
In the Report of the Committee of the Legislature
for 1836, to whom was submitted the application for
a charter of the Eastern Railroad Company, it was
stated that the number of stage-passengers annually,
between Boston and Newburyport, and intermediate
places, was 116,700; and it was believed that the
opening of the railroad would double that number.
The charter was granted April 14, 1836; the work
commenced; and on the 28th of August, 1838, the
road was opened to Salem. In 1840, the line was
completed to Portsmouth.
In order to show how fully the expectations of the
projectors of the Eastern Railroad were fulfilled, I
present the following -
5




28
Table showing the number of passengers between Boston and the
towns specified, from 1840 to 1855, in periods of five years.
MiBoleston.    TowNs.   Estimated. 1840.  1845.  18.50.  1855.
11   Lynn.....     8.400  66.790 107.977 157.726 142.286
16   Salem.... 155.000 146.065 192.488 250.686 146.824
36   Newburyport  60.000  19.673  37.959  43.022  32.641
It will thus be perceived that the expectations of
the projectors in regard to long travel were not
realized; while the enormous increase on short routes
very far transcended their most sanguine hopes, as is
invariably the case on railroads.
The Eastern is emphatically a passenger-road; and
its principal revenue is from short travel, -  Salem and
Boston, and the intermediate towns, furnishing over
one-half of the whole number of passengers. The
travel between Boston and Salem alone is more than
one-quarter of the whole.
The road is without high grades, or curves, the
greater portion being a straight line and perfectly
level.  The advantage of these characteristics is exhibited in the comparatively low cost of operating the
road.
There are numerous causes for the present depression in the market value of the stock of this Company, some of the chief of which I shall proceed to
enumerate.
The prime cause of the Company's position, - in
fact, the one to which all its reverses are clearly attributable, - is to be found in the competition carried on
for many years with a powerful rival. A very large




29
amount of business was done, with but small profit
at best, if not at an actual loss; and the Company
have thus directly suffered from competition.  But
the loss indirectly arising from this ten years' war has
been far more severe; and nothing will enable them
to recover from its effects but the increase of business
which the recently executed treaty of peace will enable
them to develop.
Some of the evils indirectly arising from the deadly
competition before referred to are to be found in the
pecuniary aid afforded by the Eastern to other roads,
which were expected to act as feeders to their line,
and enable them to divert business from their rival.
In other cases, the Company, at heavy cost, became
purchasers of short connecting roads, some of which
have not, thus far, proved remunerative. It is believed, however, that they will eventually become so;
but the Company have none the less suffered present
inconvenience and loss therefrom.
Neither is the loss from the ascribed causes confined
to them alone: for money thus invested was borrowed
at high rates of interest; and, when the floating debt
attained an unwieldy magnitude, it became necessary
to fund it at a time of unparalleled depression in railroad securities, thereby involving a very serious additional loss.
The extension of the road into Boston, deemed by
many an injudicious act, was hastened, if it were not
entirely promoted, by the hope of more successful
rivalry. Yet it seems there can hardly be a doubt
that this expenditure will, in the end, prove a judi



30
cious one, notwithstanding its magnitude: for it will
create an entirely new business within six miles of
Boston, which will eventually prove highly remunera-'tive; and it will, moreover, largely increase the travel
from Lynn and Salem.
In relation to the competition, that for so long a
time prevailed between this road and its great rival,
the Investigating Committee of the stockholders of
the Eastern Railroad Company, in their remarkably
able Report, presented July 30, 1855, say, -
"It cannot be denied, that depredation must be prevented and
attack repelled; but, happily, we can see in the future no cause or
occasion for any incursions upon our business, which, if they ever
shall take place, must, while they injure us, bring ruin on their projectors. We believe that the reign of peace and harmony has now
began; and we have no reason to doubt that the conflicting interests
of this, and all other corporations located within the sphere and
orbit of our business, will soon be composed and equitably arranged,
finally and for ever."
Competition has added at least two millions of dollars to the liabilities of the Eastern Railroad Company. Yet it cannot be, nor is it, denied that the
course pursued by former Directors was honestly believed by them to be for the best interests of the
Corporation.
Railroad managers, however, at length acknowledge
the folly of waging war with each other; and, in calculations for the future, this element of loss may be
left out of the account.
The Company has also been a heavy loser by defal-.
cations; the last embezzlement, to make use of the
expression employed by the Committee of Investiga



tion, " bursting forth in the full effulgence oF A QUARTER OF A MILLION OF DOLLARS." 
It is clearly discernible, from a perusal of the
history of the Eastern Railroad, that its present comparatively depressed condition is not to be attributed
to low fares; on the contrary, it is apparent that it
is upon low fares, properly applied, that all hope of
future success is to be based. I am well aware, that,
in many quarters, the statement which I am  about to
make, in regard to tariffs, will be received with sneering incredulity; yet I unhesitatingly declare that
passenger-fares are too high on the Eastern Railroad,
and shall attempt to prove the truth of the assertion
in another portion of this pamphlet.
But let us see what is the present actual condition
of the Company.
From the Legislative Railroad Reports for the year
ending Nov. 30, 1855, and from other official sources,
the following facts are gathered:
Capital stock in Massachusetts.. $2,853,400.00,,,,   New Hampshire     492,200.00.....- $3,345,900.00
Funded debt............. 2,410,000.00
Mortgage to State of Massachusetts......   500,000.00
Floating debt.............             539,737.13
Total liabilities............ $6,795,637.13
Net income for eleven months, after deducting interest on debt....           $162,739.78
Equivalent to 4T?46 per cent for eleven months, or
for twelve months..........  per cent.
In the Report to the Legislature (1856), it is stated
that $75,000 of the funded debt have been paid since




32
Dec. 1, 1855; consequently, the sum of $4,500, being
the interest on the redeemed bonds, will not be chargeable to expenses for the present year. This would
make the net income for 1856 (all other charges being
the same) 5214 per cent on the capital stock.
FITCHBURG RAILROAD,- OPENED IN 1845.
In 1842, a Committee of the Directors of the Fitchburg Railroad Company, Alvah Crocker and E.
Hasket Derby, Esqs., were charged with the duty of
preparing a condensed statement of the statistics and
advantages of the proposed railway from Boston to
Fitchburg.
They reported, that the route adopted was, in the
main, the one selected by Loami Baldwin, in 1825, as
most feasible for a canal from Boston to Fitchburg,
thence to the Connecticut and Lake Champlain.
They reported that twelve stages daily entered and
left the city by way of Waltham; that a Committee,
appointed at a meeting of delegates held at Waltham,
Jan. 11, 1842, had collected statistics from nearly all
the towns on the line, from which it appeared
that -
The annual tonnage was......   38,758 tons.
Annual number of passengers......   56,060,,
Amount paid annually for transportation of both..   $335,020




33
Further statistics were afterwards presented, which
added " 15,711 to the passengers, 8,980 to the tons of
freight, and $81,454 to the amount paid for transportation, swelling the latter amount to $416,474."
The Committee, being " aware that some deduction
must be made from this amount for the distance travelled between several of these towns and the proposed
railroad," thought that they "erred on the side of
moderation in estimating the receipts of the line, after
its completion, at- $100,000 from passengers and
mails, and $100,000 from  freight -  $200,000; and
in estimating a rapid annual increase of the receipts."
The cost of the road was estimated at..... $850,844.82
The road was opened December, 1843, to Waltham.
June,    1844, to Concord.
October,  1844, to Acton.
December, 1844, to Shirley.
March,   1845, to Fitchburg.
Total earnings of the road to January 1, 1845..  $42,759.36
From May 1, 1844, to Jan. 1, 1845, number of passir-gers
carried.............. 82,182
Cost of road, Jan. 1, 1845......... $992,433.37
The Directors, in their Annual Report, January,
1846, remarked that "more than two-thirds of the
business was way business; " a remark that more than
holds good at the present day.
On the 1st of July, 1848, fares were reduced from
three cents per mile to two and a half for local
passengers, and from two and a half to two cents
per mile for through travel. This was done principally with the hope of calling out a large passenger



34
traffic from off the Qonnecting lines, whose roads were
about being opened for travel. The length of these
lines amounted, in the aggregate, to over five hundred
miles. It is not to be wondered at, that great expectations were indulged as to the amount of business
they would influence; expectations, it is needless to
say, which have but in a limited degree been fulfilled.
The Directors state: "With all these connections,
we think that we hazard nothing in saying that there
will be no lack of business or income to our road;
and that our accommodations, now equal to any in
the United States, will fall short of, rather than
exceed, what will be required."
And they were right; but it was from the local
line, and not from connections, that the business and
income were to be derived.
Mainly with a view to accommodate this expected
traffic, great additions had been made to construction.
More than one million of dollars had been' expended
in two years, -for laying double-tracks; for land in
Boston upon which to erect a new station-house; for
new bridges, freight-houses, and increased equipment;
also on account of the Lancaster and Sterling, and
Watertown branches. Yet, notwithstanding the enlarged capital, reduced fares, a great depression in
business, and a crisis in the financial world, their
increased earnings enabled them to pay eight and a
half per cent dividend, beside adding to contingent
fund.
Their passenger-traffic increased materially in 1848,




35
under the impulse given by the low fares prevailing
in the latter half of the year.
Construction was still further increased in 1849, in
the sum of $524,989.95, for completion of doubletrack, branches, and extension into Boston; yet the
Company divided eight per cent, and added to contingent fund.
There were other reasons, beside low fares and
enlarged capital, for a diminished dividend, which I
shall proceed to lay before the reader.
This was " the low-fare year" (1849), referred to in
the Annual Report of the Directors, in January, 1856,
in support of their arguments, or rather assertions,
against the low-fare system.
They say, —
" The system of low fares was effectually tried on the Fitchburg
Road from July 1, 1848, to and including December, 1849. The
number of passengers transported in 1849, compared with 1848,
show that one hundred and twenty-nine thousand five hundred and
eighty-five more passengers were carried in 1849 than in the year
1848. But the Company received, for the service and the risk of
1849, $7,130.89 less than it received the year previous (1848); proving a loss, in twelve months' experimenting with these ruinously low
rates, of $38,258.93, or more than $57,000 for the eighteen months
that this suicidal policy was in force."
Without intending any disrespect, either to the
present Board of Directors of the Fitchburg Railroad Company, or to their family connection, the
Vermont and Massachusetts Railroad Company, but
simply from a natural desire to see charges placed to
proper accounts; having, moreover, a disinclination
to see the account of " low fares," already overflowing
6




36
with improper charges, burdened with still another,
- I venture to call the attention of the Directors -
managers of both the roads to which I have hereinbefore referred - to a fact that has apparently escaped
their observation, or to which they have forgotten to
allude. It is, that, out of the loss of $57,000, there
should, at least, be deducted a portion of the sum of
$28,717.45, " loss to the Fitchburg Road for one year
(1848), on the lease" of the Vermont and Massachusetts;
thereby materially reducing the loss, charged by them
to eighteen months' " experimenting with these ruinously low fares." Moreover, I am abundantly prepared to demonstrate, that, of the 129,585 passengers
which it is admitted the low fares brought upon the
line, a very large number remain to this day, permanent patrons of the road, not only in their own
persons, but in their families, and friends whom they
have since induced to join them.
Under the present administration, stockholders may
well believe that no loss arising from too low fares can,
by any possibility, take place; they may hope that no
" loss on Vermont and Massachusetts" will occur,
either directly or indirectly. But they may see, hear,
and, by their lack of dividends, appreciate, the fact,
true as an axiom in mathematics, that there can be
no gain in passenger-traffic while the present policy
prevails.
Having thus reviewed the statement of the case (as
given by the Directors), let us examine the facts, as
they are, in relation to low-fare year, and see to what
conclusion they lead us.




37
Business of Fitchburg Railroad (own line), 1848, 1849.
Gross earnings. Expenses.  Net earnings. Miles run. Passeng'rs. Tons fr'ht.
1848 418,680.11 174,275.17 244,404.94 301,975 655,917 255,404
1849 493,060.43 229,539.92 263,520.51 347,872 875,410 287,032
Inc.  74,380.32  55,264.75  19,115.57  45,897 219,493  31,628
It therefore appears, that, while the miles run, and
expenses, both  increased  in  1849  over 1848, and
219,493 (not 129,585) more passengers were carried in
1849 than in 1848, yet the gross earnings increased
over seventy thousand, and the net earnings nearly
twenty  thousand, dollars.   There was consequently
no loss of $38,258.93 in twelve months, but a gain of
$19,115,57, by " this suicidal policy."
In addition to which, in order still further to expose the ridiculousness of the position assumed by
the present Board, I will state, that in the year
1848, for every passenger to or from the Vermont and
Massachusetts Road, the Fitchburg Company received
one dollar; while in 1849, the lease having expired,
they received but eighty cents.
Finally, in order that no suspicion may rest upon
the mind of any one, that the present Board are
correct in their statements, I will give the reasons
assigned by the Directors for the year ending Dec. 31,
1849, why the expenses exceeded those of the preceding year, $55,264.75.
"A large part of the increased expenses of operating the road
the last year was caused by running an additional and express train
to Fitchburg to accommodate the business of the connecting roads
above Fitchburg, without increasing the way'business on our




38
road, as this train does not stop on the Fitchburg Road, excepting
for wood and water."
Of 287,032 tons carried in 1849, 105,848 tons, or
over thirty-six per cent, were "ice and bricks" from
their own line.
Sixteen passenger-trains run daily each way. The
accommodation was perfect. The public appreciated
the facilities afforded, and towns bordering on the line
increased rapidly in population. A great number of
new houses were erected; and many families brought
to the Fitchburg line in 1849 have ever since been
patrons of the road.
The fares were restored to their old point on the first
of January, 1850, and with great propriety; for the
through business did not equal the expectations of the
Directors. Where they expected a large and profitable
trade, they had a small and losing one; and the large
expenditure which they made to secure it, had so
swollen the capital, that nothing but the increased and
profitable local business enabled them to pay a dividend of eight per cent.
In speaking of the business of 1850, the Directors
remark, that "the increased receipts on freight are
not in proportion to the increased tonnage; owing,
in part, to the competition on the upper roads, and in
part to too low prices."
The Board for 1850, within the knowledge of the
writer, fought manfully for higher prices, and made
themselves peculiarly unpopular with the officers of
connecting roads; but, as the present Board remarked in 1855, "this raising of rates is a difficult




matter to do, unless all the principal roads unite in
it." The Board for 1850 found it so, but labored earnestly to secure more remunerating rates. A large
amount of money was lost in doing through business;
but, as usual, the local trade paid sufficiently to enable
the Company to declare dividends of eight per cent.
One-third of the tonnage in 1850 was from ice and
bricks.
The dividends paid in 1851 fell off to seven per
cent.  Over $50,000 were charged to expenses for
"new  works, new  cars, new  turnouts, &c."
More than one-quarter of the gross income was
on freight from connecting roads.
Increase in 1851 over 1850.
Passengers........    12 per cent.
Tonnage.... 10,, 
Earnings....    4,,,
The Directors say, in relation to the comparatively
small increase of earnings,- 
"This is owing to the very low prices at which the long freight,
so called, is taken, a large part of it hardly paying the actual cost of
transportation. This evil can only be remedied by an agreement,
carried out in good faith, between competing roads, to require paying
prices. Persevering attempts have been made to bring about this
desirable result, but so far without success."
Every man conversant with Boston railways will
admit that the through tonnage from 1848 to 1853
was carried by all the roads at a loss. It is to wear
and tear caused by this tonnage, for which no adequate
compensation was received, that the heavy renewals




40
required the past two or three years is mainly attributable.
In 1852, thirty-eight per cent of the tonnage was
for bricks and ice.
Through freight increased materially this year, compelling the Directors to contract for new freight-depots,
engine-houses, &c., to accommodate it. Being satisfied that the rate received for a large proportion of
this business "was less than the cost of transportation," the Directors raised the minimum rates about
fifty per cent.  Dividends, six per cent in eleven
months.
In 1853, the addition to construction was $93,796.50,
principally for improvements at Charlestown.
Over $50,000 were charged to expenses for new
machinery and iron. Dividends, six per cent.
With the close of the year 1853 ended the wise
administration of Jacob Forster and his able associates.
From the completion of the road in 1845, to and
including January, 18~4, it had not only paid regular
semi-annual dividends to its stockholders, but had
vastly increased the business on its line, and proved
to be of great benefit to the community. With the
retirement of this administration in 1854, the popularity and usefulness of the road, to a great extent,
ceased. As a natural and inevitable consequence, its
prosperity has, in a great measure, forsaken it, only
to be recovered by a total and entire change in its
policy.
I have thus given a sketch of the progress of the




41
Fitchburg Railroad Company, from its origin, in 1842,
to January, 1854. The particulars of its history have
been given with more minuteness than those of other
railways, because I wished to exhibit the contrast
between the progress of a railway under a liberal
administration, and one entirely the reverse.
Under the broad banner of reform; loudly descanting upon the follies, the faults, and the sins of their
predecessors; thrusting to the right and left at all
who differed with them in opinion; claiming to, possess all the intelligence and honesty in the railroad
world; treating the public as a many-headed monster,
whose sole delight, desire, and aim it was to ruin
shareholders; advertising themselves as martyrs to
the cause of railway reform; making loud professions
of their own honesty at the expense of that of other
railway managers; thanking God they were not as,
other men, — the Board for 1854 inducted themselves into office.
They declared, in their first Report, a certain class
of railway business to be " akin to self-righteousness,
the more you have of it, the worse it will be for
you." If this be true, - not of the business, but of
self-righteousness, - and I doubt it not, in order to
know, appreciate, and fully understand what selfrighteousness is, I commend to the unenlightened a
perusal of "The Annual Report of the Fitchburg
Railroad Company, presented Jan. 30, 1855."
The incoming Board, determined to stop the constant increase of construction account, - the head and
front of their complaints, - and not aware of the




42
necessity for enlarged accommodation, were astonished
to discover, immediately upon assuming the direction,
1" the necessity of still further additions to equipment
and freight accommodation." These, - as they were
not to cover depreciation, but for increased business,
- it is apparent, should therefore have gone to construction; or at least, not being an annual charge,
should not have been charged to expenses.
The Directors for 1854 charged every thing to expenses, including the sum of $170,577.97, by far the
larger portion of which was for new equipment rendered necessary by increased business, and of which
not one dollar was proper to be considered as an annual
charge. Thinking it inexpedient, after their professions, to charge to construction the cost of completing
the equipment of their road, the Directors for 1854
did so at the expense of withholding dividends from
their stockholders.  Not content with this, they
charged to expenses $45,000, for five first-class locomotives leased to the Rutland and Burlington Railroad
Company; no doubt a very judicious investment, as
they claim thereby to have "secured the business of
that road for a term of years." But it is not so clear
that the business would not have been equally secured
without the expenditure. Neither is it by any means
certain that the profit derived from the through freight
thus obtained will compare at all favorably with the
profit on special trains, even with a large proportion
of season passengers.
It will be recollected that the Directors for 1853,
in September of that year, raised the minimum rates
on freight fifty per cent.




43
In 1854, the then existing Board, in pursuance of
their high-fare policy, advanced the rates.
Let us note the effect:Income.
Year.    Freight.  Passengers.   Mails.   Rents.    Total.
1853   $342,710.66 $294,457.76 $5,783.66 $2,499.29 $645,451.37
1854    390,884.39  301,416.15  7,954.36  4,383.73  704,638.63
Increase of 1854 $48,173.73  $6,958.39 $2,170.70 $1,884.40 $59,187.26
It will be perceived, that, of this increase, 81?u per
cent is upon freight, the tariffs on which had been
altered by their predecessors; for which gain, therefore, the new Board are entitled to no credit.
It will also be noticed, that, of this gain, only
11% is on the passenger income, the average annual
increase of which, for the five preceding years, had
been 763,.  Yet notwithstanding the advance of fares,
and in spite of the fact that many passengers (who
have since left) were compelled to remain during the
year 1854, the increase of passenger income was but
2,9p  per cent.
Until 1854, the public were accommodated; the
business of the road was constantly increasing;' and
the dividends, cut down, as the Directors for those
years admit, by transporting through freight at less
than cost, would have speedily attained their former
rate under the judicious advance of through-freight
tariffs, too long unremunerative, which took place
in September, 1852.
7




44
In 1854, as has been shown, the principal gain in
income was upon freight; but the passenger income
fell considerably below its average annual gain, despite
the advance in fares. This, it would seem, should
have taught the new Board, not only that throughfreight tariffs could be materially advanced without
reducing the tonnage, but that passenger-fares could
not be advanced without a more than corresponding
loss of travel.
The lesson was unheeded; and the year 1855 made
manifest the want of judgment on the part of the
reform Board.
The Directors, in their Report for the year ending
Nov. 30, 1855, say, -
On comparing the business of 1855 with that of 1854, the following is found to result therefrom: —
On freight from connecting roads, the decrease amounts
to................. $34,826.78
And, on the branches, the decrease is..  6,509.57
$41,336.35
But, on the Fitchburg proper, there is a gain of..    23,223.50
Proving a decrease on the freight business of the year,
as compared with the business of the year preceding, of..... $18,112.85
On passengers from connecting roads, the decrease
amounts to............ $5,034.91
And, on the branches, it is...           1,441.26
$6,476.17
But, on the Fitchburg proper, the amount gained is  1,611.78
Leaving a net deficit in the passenger business, com- -. _
pared with the year 1854, of...... $4,864.39




45
Total decrease in
1854.       1855.       1855.
Freight earnings... $390,884.39  $372,771.54  $18,112.85
Passenger,,... 301,416.15   296,551.76    4,864.39
$692,300.54  $669,323.30  $22,977.24
This result is attributed to the " serious drought of
1854." Undoubtedly, the decrease in receipts from
connecting roads is attributable to the drought; for
those receipts are principally based upon agricultural
tonnage, on which the lowest tariff rates prevail. But
did "the serious drought of 1854" tend to increase
the despised local tonnage, upon which there was a
gain, in receipts, of $23,223.50O
No management, however faulty, no attempt, however persistently made, either through wilfulness or
ignorance, can, in a single year, drive away the entire
business of a road like the Fitchburg; and although
they earned a smaller percentage on the capital than
ever before, yet, -
By adding to the net earnings, as given in the Report $213.837.81
The sum expended for new work on Prison-Point
Bridge....        7,486.76
Also the amount which the present Board admit was
not properly chargeable to expenses of 1855.  7,363.40
The total net earnings for 1855 were....   $228,687.97
Equivalent to 61y& per cent on the capital.
In estimating the probable position of the Company
at the close of the present year, it would likewise be.
just to make still another deduction from " expenses."
It appears, by the Report for 1855, that this account




46
is charged with the sum of $10,233.08, being balance
of interest. The indebtedness of the Company, Nov.
30, 1855, being but $153,700, against $318,292.85,
Nov. 30, 1854, it is fair to presume that the balance
of interest chargeable to expenses in 1855 will be
materially reduced.
The only fear that stockholders need entertain for
the future is, that, in seeking income from connecting
roads, their Directors will continue to overlook the
greater and infinitely more profitable business of their
own line, both in freight and passengers.
The number of passengers carried in 1855 having
fallen off 16p5e per cent from those of the preceding
year, it is to be hoped that the Board of Directors will
not rely with too blind a confidence solely upon the
abundant crops of 1855 to bring them back, but adopt
efficient measures in another, and to most people apparently more certain, direction; namely, by rendering it
convenient, or at least possible, for business men to
reside on their line of road.
For the past year, they have diligently, yet doubtless unwittingly, striven, not only to encourage the
comparatively unprofitable traffic from connecting
roads, to which an undue value is attached, but to
drive off, kill, and utterly annihilate, the more remunerative passenger and freight traffic of their own line,
- a traffic which I shall attempt hereafter to prove is
by far the most reliable source whence Boston roads
are to receive their net income.
The results effected by the administrative reform
party are partially set forth in the following tables: -




47
Under the Old Administration.
Year.  Construction.  Debt.    Dividend   Net earnings   n January
paid.              in January.
1852 $3,633,673.57 $110,000.00 $212,400 $232,787.32    103
1853  3,716,870.10  191,500.00  212,400  214,633.66    102
Under the Reform Administration.
Year.  Construction.  Debt.    Dividends  Net earnings   Market price
paid.              in January.
1854 $3,730,965.47 $318,292.85 $106,200 $272,715.80     94
1855  3,765,998.19  153,700.00 Nothing.  213,837.81     79
The present market price is 70.
THE OLD COLONY AND FALL RIVER RAILROAD, —
UNITED IN 1854.
The last Annual Report of this Corporation, it
must be confessed, is both instructive and entertaining. It is a model railroad report; giving no great
variety of statistics interesting to the seeker after
truth, but bearing on every page proof that its managers are thoroughly awake to their responsibility, and
an earnest that the interests of its stockholders are in
the hands of men who are watching over them.
The capital stock of the Company is.....   $3,015,100.00
The gross receipts for 1855 were.......    653,499.32
Expenses.............                           377,133.62
Net earnings.............. $276,365.70
Or more than nine per cent on the whole capital.
But there are several items in expenses, that are
not a fair annual charge; viz.,



48
The debt having been diminished the past year
$22,184.65, of course diminishes the annual
charge to interest...........  $1,331,07
New station-buildings...........   6,272.83
Land and land-damages..........           632.29
South-Boston Flats............          803.50
Add to these items the reported net earnings... 276,365.70
Real net earnings............ $285,405.39
Equivalent to 9-4o  per cent on capital.
" Some of the improvements are as follows; viz., work-shop at
South Boston; station-building at Quincy; woodsheds, at Bridgewater and Middleborough, for housing 1,600 cords of wood; alterations of track at Fall River; and a large kyanizing vat at Braintree.
"' The general condition of the road is good, the repairs and expenditures upon it having been more than sufficient to make good
the usual deterioration of the year.
"The rolling stock of the Company is now generally in excellent
condition." (Annual Report.)
Debt of the Company.
Bonds................                          $198,200.00
Bills payable..............    94,450.00
$292,650.00
Assets.
Stock on hand............. $99,032.05
Real estate not needed for use of road (said by the
Directors, who are apparently remarkably low appraisers, to be safely worth)....... 224,457.06
Bills receivable.............  96,007.89
Sinking fund in Old Colony and Fall River stock.   12,270.00
$431,767.00
From which deduct debts....                292,650.00
Excess over indebtedness......... $139.117.00
I see, by looking over the Report, that this excess
could be made much larger; but, imbued with the




49
spirit of the Directors, my estimate " is intended to be
a safe one."
It seems, on the whole, after an examination of the
expenses and indebtedness of this Corporation, that
their income and property are sufficient to warrant
the hope that they will not at. present be compelled to
take the benefit of the "Act for the Relief of Insolvent
Debtors."
Those who can discern no value in any railway property, are invited to inspect the Report of the Old
Colony and Fall River Railroad Corporation for the
past year.
Let it be borne in mind, that the large railway
stockholders, alarmed by the constant annual increase
of capital, the true causes of which will be hereafter
explained, had resolved to insist upon closing the
Construction Accounts of their several corporations;
and, as enlarged business required increased'accommodations, on most of the lines freight and passenger
depots, wharves, bridges, and all other permanent improvements, were charged to expenses; while renewals
of track and equipment, repairs of buildings, and
many other charges, which should really have extended through each year of the railway's existence,
were crowded into the expenses of one or two years.
Therefore, in estimating the value of railroad property, a just proportion of these charges should be
placed to their proper account in the mind of the
inquirer; for it is not claimed that all of these expenditures are to be annual, as the manner of making up




50
accounts pursued by most corporations would lead
one to suppose.
If Expense Account for the year 1855 had borne
only those charges which of right belonged to it,
the net earnings of the Boston railways would have
materially exceeded those presented in the following
table:
2Net income per cent of seven roads terminating in Boston, as shown
by their Reports to the Legislature for the year ending Nov. 30,
1855.
Boston and Lowell............      67
Boston and Maine.............. 7
Boston and Providence.....                      5-37
Boston and Worcester............. 86Eastern (in eleven months) equal in one year to.... 52
Fitchburg.................  6T4U
Old Colony and Fall River........... 83
Being an' average on the aggregate capital, of 6 995
Having thus reviewed the several railways, I shall
attempt to establish the charge of extravagance, by
giving the result of some investigations in the use of
fuel and oil.
FUEL AND OIL.
Price per cord of wood on Boston and Worcester in 1855  $6.01,,,,,,,,  on New York and Erie in December, 1855..............  3.53
Cents.
Cost of fuel per mile run in 1855 on Worcester...   27apJ7
Average cost of fuel per mile by 215 locomotives in Dec.,
on Erie.......    14e7~
Add 71 per cent, for difference in price.. 10 %
2 5




51
Difference in favor of Erie..........    27
Saving to have been effected, being on 541,528 miles
run by Worcester at 2?7W cents......   $14,000.32
But on engine No. 56 of the Delaware division of the Erie
Road, with a maximum grade of 60 feet to a mile, Samuel H. Wood ran 2,704 miles in the month of De-    cents.
cember, at an expense for fuel per mile of...    6T
Add 71 per cent for difference in price......         4-01
Difference in favor of Erie...........   166
Saving to have been effected, being on 541,528 miles run
by Worcester at 16......          $90,001.95
Cost of oil, tallow, and waste, per mile, run on Worcester    Cents.
in 1855...........    2T
Average cost of do. on Erie, in December.....    1
Difference in favor of Erie......... 
Saving on Worcester to have been effected, 541,528 miles,
at 1......... $4,386.37
But the oil, tallow, and waste used by Samuel H. Wood,
on engine No. 56 of the Erie Road, in the month of
December, cost, per mile run, but......        fi
Difference in favor of Erie..... 
Saving to have been effected by similar economy on the
Worcester.... $8,285.38
The average of miles run, to a pint of oil, on the Erie
Road, in December, was........   133
But Samuel H. Wood ran, at an average to a pint of oil   52
or nearly four times the average number.
Provided this saving, which has been proved to be
possible, were effected, the diminution of expenses on
* This does not, of course, include the cost of oil used in machine-shops,
and for other than train-purposes; while the same item of expenditure on the
Worcester probably covers the entire amount used by the Company. After
making this deduction, the force of the contrast would not be very materially
impaired,
8




52
the Worcester Railroad, in the year 1855, would have
been, on -
Oil.$8,285.38
Fuel.                  90,001.95
$98,287.33
equivalent to a dividend on the whole capital,
$4,500,000, of 2Vm4u per cent.
Although, in practice, it would probably be found
impossible to effect the whole of this saving on the
Worcester, yet no one can doubt that half the amount
can be saved; in which case, it will amount to a dividend of 1,-52 per cent, from the economical use of
only two articles.  The Worcester Railroad is one
of the best managed and most successful roads in the
State; and, if these be the facts in relation to that
Company, is it not a fair inference, that similar extravagance may be found on other roads, not only in
these, but in other, articles?
IRON.
In the infancy of Massachusetts railways, with a
view to lessen the prime cost of works necessarily
expensive at best, and rendered still more so in
consequence of a lack of practical knowledge in relation to undertakings so novel, sufficient attention was
not paid either to curves or grades; and, as-the capacity of an engine on a level is at least three times




53
greater than on a grade of fifty feet to the mile, it
followed, that, in order to transact the enlarged business over high grades, it became necessary either
to increase the weight and power of engines, or their
number. The former course was adopted; and the
effect produced upon the track by locomotives of immense weight, running at high speed over heavy
grades, sufficiently demonstrates that true economy
would have avoided curves and grades as far as practicable, even at the expense of increased cost.. The weight and quality of rail were not sufficiently
regarded; and vast losses have been incurred from
this cause.
Experience proves that the durability of rails depends vastly more upon their quality than  their
weight.
The last Report of the Boston and Worcester Railway expresses the belief, that from " seven to eight
years is a safe estimate for the average durability of a
rail."
There are rails in some of our New-England roads,
weighing not more than fifty pounds to the yard, that
have been in daily use for more than twenty years,
and will apparently last as much longer. There can
be no question that the best quality of iron rails, of
sixty-five pounds to the yard, would last twenty-five
years, with a larger tonnage passing over them annually than any road in New England can furnish.
But there have been rails laid on our New-England
roads that broke with the passage of the first train.
Whole cargoes have been laid, and taken up useless
within one year.




54
There are rails, weighing forty-five pounds to the
yard, laid seventeen years ago, in the track of the
Philadelphia and Reading Railroad, over which has
passed an annual tonnage enormously exceeding that
of any other road in the world.
The last Annual Report of that Company, in speaking of the unusual expenditure for renewal fund,
which has been heretofore provided for by a charge of
three cents per hundred tons per mile, says, -
"This sum exceeds the accustomed charge (which, under ordidary circumstances, is believed to be sufficient for that purpose)
$95,576.52. This increased expenditure has been chiefly caused
by relaying forty and a half miles of track, which, of course, is far
beyond the usual average. The second track of the road, to replace
part of which this outlay has been incurred, was laid in 1844, and
was originally, as frequently stated in previous reports, of an inferior quality of iron. Since that date, more than 14,000,000 tons of
coal have passed over this track; and, though the weight of the
rails had but very slightly diminished, the surface had become
rough and uneven. As ten thousand wheels, in the season of active
business, daily roll upon it, it was deemed true economy to relay a
large portion of this track in such manner, and of such material, as
should secure the machinery from unnecessary wear, and make
the roadway itself as perfect and as permanent as possible. The
experience of this Company, as communicated in previous reports
and confirmed by each year's traffic, is, that upon the quality of the
iron, rather than its weight, the durability will depend. Thus the
rails first used, weighing forty-five pounds to the yard, and made of
carefully prepared reheated and refined iron, have been found far
more permanent and serviceable than those weighing one-third
more, but manufactured from iron of inferior or different qualities.
The new rails, of a weight of sixty-eight pounds, are manufactured
of the best reheated iron throughout; and the additional sum
expended to secure this description and quality of material nearly
equals the whole excess of.expenditure on account of renewal
fund."




55
To show  the superiority of these forty-five pound
rails over others in the same track, and, at the same
time, to prove the superior economy of purchasing the
best quality of iron, I extract, from the same Report,
the following table:Comparative wear and breakage of rails on the Philadelphia and
Reading Railroad, from 1850 to 1855, inclusive.
Percentage of wear.
Description of Iron.                       Proportion of breakage
in 1855.
1850. 1851. 1852.  1853. 1854. 1855.
English 52 lbs.     1.3 2.6  3.2  4.5  7.8 19.8 1 bar in 392,,  45,, 5 us 1.4 1.9  2.1  3.6  5.6 14.6 1,, 2.997,,  60,,4 j    8.3 9.4 12.  12.7 18.8 47.  1      93
Phoenix 60,,       4.8 6.3  5.9  6.3  5.9 14.3 1,,  343
Montour 60,, >       1.7  6.1  8.2  5.9 18.1 1,,   94,, 64 & 68,, J                        2.1 1,,  260 (Chiefl
64 lbs.)
Upon examination of this table, it will be observed
that the breakage on the light track, of rails forty-five
pounds to the yard, laid seventeen years ago, is only 1 in
2997; while the breakage on the same track, of rails
fifty-two pounds to the yard, is 1 in 392.  This demonstrates the superiority of the iron in the forty-five
pounds rail.
In the last Annual Report of the Fitchburg Railroad Company, page 22, it is stated that a portion of
their track, within five miles of Boston, has been relaid
twice within three years. The Directors of that Corporation need not go off their own road to satisfy
themselves of the extravagance their own declaration
admits they have been guilty of; for there are rails on
the  very  five miles referred  to, laid  in  1842, over
which the entire tonnage of the road has passed,




56
which are in vastly better condition now than other
rails, on the same road, laid within a year.
Hence the inference is irresistible, that true economy dictates the purchase of the very best iron,
particularly'as the increased cost per ton is counterbalanced by the diminished weight of track per mile.
Thus, $100,000 expended in the purchase of the best
quality of rail, weighing fifty pounds to the yard,
at $70 per ton, would lay as many miles of track as
the same sum of money expended in a poorer quality
of rail weighing seventy pounds to the yard, and costing but $50 per ton. While the cost would be less
per mile for laying the light than the heavy rail, the
durability of the former would exceed that of the latter
from two hundred to two thousand per cent.
Or, to put the proposition in another form, if rails
of the best quality, at $70 per ton, are employed,
instead of low-priced iron, at $50 per ton, the superior quality of the former will permit the use of a
very much lighter rail; and the number of miles
laid per thousand tons would be,With 45-pound rail....... 25,, 70  1,,                    8Y,,..
The loss incurred by the employment of bad iron
in our railway tracks has not been confined to renewal
of tracks alone; but as it is almost impossible, with
any amount of expense, to keep the permanent way
in condition where bad rails are employed, the loss
has extended to the increased cost of maintaining the
rolling stock, consequent upon the rough and uneven
surface of the rails.




57
In addition, the cost of laying rails is about $300
per mile; and it requires no mathematician to demonstrate that the expense had. better be incurred once,
than two, or possibly even three, times in a period
of twenty years.
There is a railroad leading from Boston, the history of whose rails will amply demonstrate the difference between good and bad iron.
In its track may now be found rails, of a lot laid in
1834, the greater portion of which are in excellent
condition now, although they have been in constant
use for twenty-four years.
In the same track may be found rails, of a lot laid
in 1843, of which about one-half have been renewed.
In the parallel track of the same road are rails, of
a lot laid in 1849, of which the greater portion have
been renewed.
In the same track were rails, of a lot laid in
NOVEMBER, 1855, but taken up in FEBRUARY, 1856,
utterly useless!
There have been rails over which forty-one million
tons have passed before renewal.
I therefore maintain, that, in estimating the cost of
transportation, the charge to running expenses of
renewing iron on our New-England roads is a fallacy;
because it can be demonstrated that the charge is, for
the most part, based upon a quality of iron that
should never have been permitted a place in the track
of economically managed roads. In fact, it is perfectly clear, that, unless our railroads had possessed




58
in a remarkable degree the elements of prosperity,
they would never have been enabled to bear the vast
expense of renewals which the employment of cheap
and bad iron has rendered necessary.
SLEEPERS.
Another heavy item of expense on railways is for
sleepers.
The average durability of a chestnut sleeper is
from seven to eight years; the cost per mile is about
$800; the cost of laying sleepers and rails is about
$400 per mile.
By the process of kyanizing, the cost is increased
about twenty-five per cent; while the durability is
prolonged at least one hundred, and probably two
hundred, per cent.
It follows, then, that the cost of laying rail and
sleepers, including cost of sleepers, being $1,200
per mile, if this expense be incurred twice in a period
of sixteen years, -
It will cost per mile............ $2,400
While, with kyanized sleepers, the cost in the same
period would be, for sleepers....... $800,, kyanizing......  200,, laying rails and sleepers. 400
$1,400
Difference per mile in sixteen years (exclusive of interest) $1,000




59
Nor is this all the saving to be effected; for defective
sleepers very materially increase the cost of "track
repairs."
BRIDGES.
The repair of wooden bridges is also a very heavy
item of expense to be taken into account in viewing
the subject of railway economy.
Wherever practicable, there can be no doubt that
true economy would dictate the construction either of
stone or iron bridges, which, although at first more
expensive, would yet stand for ages with but trifling
outlay; while the repair of wooden bridges would be
a large and constantly increasing item of expenditure.
In cases where the law compels the use of pilebridging over tide-water, every stick of timber above
high-water mark should be kyanized; a process that,
in a term of years, very materially contributes to
reduce the expenditure for repairs.
I have thus endeavored to show that sufficient
regard has not been paid to the permanence of railway
works.
Whatever time may effect in relation to the kind
of motive power employed on railways, there can be
but little doubt that no material change will be made
9




60
in the roadway. Therefore, as renewals to cover
depreciation of bridges, sleepers, rails, and buildings,
are among the chief items of expense upon a railroad, it is incumbent upon the managers of this
description of property to use only the best materials.
It is a false idea of economy that induces the, employment of cheap iron and perishable sleepers, or the
erection of frail and short-lived wooden bridges and
buildings.
Having pointed out some of the extravagances of
which railway managers have been guilty, many
of them the natural consequence of inexperience,
but which have none the less contributed to swell
the cost of their roads, I shall refer to another
great error of which they are reaping the evil effects.
I allude to the expenditures incurred in order
to secure a portion of the business of the distant
interior.
Stimulated by the early success of roads terminating
in Boston, enterprising and public-spirited men projected long lines of railway, reaching towards the
great lakes, with a view to secure a proportion of
the traffic of the West.
Believing that the opening of these iron rivers
would pour an endless tide of business into Boston,
double-tracks, extensive depot accommodations, and
increased equipment, were deemed necessary in order
to accommodate the accession of trade which it was




61
supposed only awaited the completion of connecting
roads to overwhelm them with its wealth.*
The spirit of speculation induced the building of
numerous branches to the great trunk roads, in order
to secure traffic, the greater portion of which would
have naturally found its way to their lines without
incurring the expense of these feeders.
The various lines competed with each other for
business from the same districts; and in many instances, not content with an equal division of the trade
acquired at the cost of expensive branches, entered
upon a ruinous competition to secure a business,
which, when attained, they transacted at a heavy loss.
Hence the increase of capital invested in the seven
roads terminating in Boston.
Have these roads received from  connecting lines
any return at all commensurate with the expense
incurred to secure it?
Clearly they have not.
SHORT TRAVEL.
Most Boston railway corporations would have been
bankrupt, had they not been saved therefrom by the
very element they propose to neglect,- namely, the
local trade.
* The Annual Report for 1849, of a leading road, closed with these
words: "The contest between the main lines running into Boston, a few
years hence, will be, not which shall do, but which shall get rid of doing,
large portions of the business that will be offered."




62
It will be found, upon examination, that there is
not a road in New England whose local does not very
largely exceed its through traffic.
In proof of this assertion, I annex
Table, showing the proportion of local traffic, and that from connecting roads, on seven Boston railways, in 1855.
Receipts on   Receipts from  Percentage, Percentage,
own road.    other roads.  own road. other roads.
Boston & Lowell.   $314,077.91  $165,983.09    65     35
Boston & Maine...   548,062.46   276,080.64    66   34
Boston & Providence   446,252.95    96,004.40   82     18
Boston & Worcester.   529,024.37   445,142.81    54    46
Eastern........   481,659.47    88,695.92    84  16
Fitchburg......   430,658.45   238,664.85   64   36
Old Col. & Fall River   539,482.10    96,674.54   84   16
Total...... $3,289217.71 $1,407,246.25   71  29
In the above table, passenger and freight earnings
are alone included.
The table on page 28, showing the travel on the
Eastern Railroad, between Boston and Lynn, Salem
and Newburyport, also proves how entirely beyond
expectation the short travel increased, and made manifest its superiority; at the same time, it shows how
far the long and through travel fell short of the anticipations of the projectors of that railway.
The following tables, from the Report of the Investigating Committee of the Boston and Maine Railroad,
Sept. 20, 1855, tend still further to show the superior
importance of local traffic:



Comparative Statement of Passenger Traffic on the Boston and Maine Railroad proper, and from  connecting roads, for
three years, ending Nov. 30, 1854.
1852.                                   1853.                                    1854.
Rate  Miles                             Rate  Miles              |               Rate  Miles
Passenger.  iles.   Receipts.  per  each  Passengers.  Miles.  Receipts.   each  Passengers.  Miles.  Receipts.  pe r each
ms le.    pass.                        male.    pass.                           mile. pass.
cts.                                    cte.                                     cts.
From connecting roads    291,256  9,898,466 $137,379 1.39 34.    427,785 10,777,061 $170,131 1.58 25.19   471,046 11,152,620 $196,799 1.26 25.8
Boston and Maine Road   1,174,668 14,143,665  285,585 2.02 12.04  1,392,967 16,649,624  322,468 1.94 11.95  1,498,418 17,321,259  360,093 2.08 11.56
B. & M. and con. roads   1,465,924 24,042,131 $422,964 1.76 16.4  1,820:752 27,426,685 $492,599 1.79 15.06  1,969,464 28,473,879 $556,892 1.95 14.46
Comparative Statement of the Freight Tonnage of the Boston and Maine Railroad, for the years ending June 1, 1854,
and June 1, 1855, on which charges were made.
Av'ge price per  PriceperTonper
1854.                                   Tons.       Tons one mile.  Am'nt received.  Ton, including  mile, including
depot charges.  depot charges.
Amount hauled for connecting roads.........                111,339        2,912,263       $77,452 51       $0 69.5.2.65 cts.,,,,  for Boston and Maine........              138,645        5,770,639      200,969 40         1 45           3.48,,
Amount hauled for Boston and Maine and connecting roads.       249,984        8,682,902       278,421 91        1 11.3         3.21,,
1855.
Amount hauled for connecting roads.........               90,867        2,443,977        71,991 64        0 79.2         2.94,,,,,,  for Boston and Maine.151,294                                      6,336,068       209,489 92        1 38.4         3.30,,
Amount hauled for Boston and Maine and connecting roads.       242,161         8,780,045     $281,481 56        1 16.2         3.20,,




64
These tables prove that the local trade of the Boston and Maine largely exceeds the through, not only
in quantity, but in price. The facts are substantially
the same on all other Boston railways.
It will be seen, that, while the local travel largely
preponderated, it yet paid more per mile gross4than the
average of the whole; while, from the larger number
of passengers transported, the net profit per passenger
per mile, on the local travel, exceeded in a still greater
ratio that received from connecting roads.
It has already been shown, on page 9, that the proportion per cent of population in the State, within
twenty miles of Boston, is 42y9%-, and, within ten
miles, is 34-4W  of the whole; also that the population
within those limits is rapidly becoming more dense,
and increasing in a greater ratio, than the rest of the
State. I shall hereafter endeavor to show that it is from
the inhabitants within these limits that the passengerincome of Boston railways is principally derived.
Corroborative of this statement is the fact that the
average length of travel on the Eastern, and Boston
and Worcester Roads, is only a trifle over sixteen
miles; while, on the other five roads, it is but a fraction over fourteen miles each.
The net receipts on the first sixteen miles of a certain railroad out of Boston more than suffice to pay
the expenses of the whole line.
It has been stated, by one competent to judge correctly, that the net income on the first twelve miles of
railroad out of Boston pays the entire expenses of the
seven roads terminating in that city.




65
Estimate of average daily travel on the Fitchburg Railroad, between
Boston and Waltham, and Boston and Fitchburg, in 1855.
a,,         a,,
S ~        u
m I                 CenC. 
Waltham..  10  16 * 100 1,600  160 2.01 t $2.01 $321.60 $150  $171.60
Fitchburg    50   6   60  300  300 2j t   1.25  375.00  300 $   75.00
Balance of profit in favor of Waltham travel.....   $96.60
* Ten special trains; six run with Fitchburg.
t Waltham trains are credited with average receipts on whole line in 1855.
Fitchburg trains are credited with full fares.
j Six Fitchburg trains charged at $1 per mile. Ten Waltham trains charged at
$1.20 per mile; six Waltham trains charged $0.50 per mile, for cost of hauling two
cars by engines on Fitchburg trains.
The estimate in the preceding table is doubtless, in
every respect, far more favorable for the Fitchburg, and
less favorable for the Waltham, travel than  the  facts
would warrant. Unavailing efforts were made to obtain the precise figures, in order that the relative value
of the travel from the two towns might be shown:
but the Board of Directors decided, in formal session,
that it was  inexpedient to  furnish  the  information;
thinking, probably, that it was impolitic to enlighten
the public upon such matters.
The conclusion to which one must unavoidably
arrive is, that the question as to the relative profit on
long and short travel concerns only those four or five
people with whom the destinies of the Fitchburg
Railroad Company are temporarily entombed.




66
Table showing statistics of average daily travel on the Eastern Railroad, between Boston and Salem, and Boston and Portsmouth, in
1855.
$8l  ~l;'
o,,dn;     ab...'"                —...a
Salem... 16  10  20  151 3020 320 $2.56 $819.20 $1.08t $1.48 $473.60
Portsmouth  56   4+  8' 47  376 448   1.481 663.04  0.80tl 0.681 304.64
Balance of profit in favor of Salem travel.......... $168.96
* No separate trains between Boston and Salem are required; but an additional car is
retained for Portsmouth travel.
t All trains to and from Salem are charged $1.20 per mile.
Portsmouth trains beyond Salem are charged $1 per mile.
Twelve trains are charged entirely to Salem travel, at $1.20 per mile.
Of the remaining eight trains, three-quarters, or ninety cents per mile, are charged to
Salem travel; and one-quarter, or thirty cents per mile, are charged to Portsmouth travel.
The superior value of the Salem compared with
the Portsmouth travel is well shown in the above
table.  Trains for its accommodation run 128 miles
less, and receive $168.96 more, each day.
The fact that the average length of travel on all
Boston railways is less than fifteen miles, while the
average length of road, including branches, is sixtyfour miles; the greater number of trains run on short
routes; and the density of population within fifteen
miles of Boston, - all prove the superior importance
of short travel.  It is more profitable than long
travel, because of the greater number of passengers
it affords.
The deduction to be drawn from these indisputable
facts is, that it is mainly upon the local business of
their lines that each road must rely for its sup
port.




67
If, then, this short local traffic is of such consequence to railways, why is it overlooked in pursuit
of business from a distance, which is so much smaller
in amount, and far less profitable?
FREIGHT-TARIFFS.
Through tariffs on merchandise, in many instances,
are not sufficiently high, and may be materially advanced without detriment to any one. An advance of
half a cent per ton per mile would enable some of our
Boston railways to add one per cent to their dividends.
There are many articles carried to stations in the
interior, within one hundred miles of Boston, for onethird of the price paid for transport by "baggagewagons " twenty years ago. Upon many of these articles tariffs might be materially advanced, without in
the slightest degree diminishing the quantity offered,
for transport, or burdening the consumer by the additional price.
For instance, would the charge of an additional
cent per ton per mile in the slightest degree check the
consumption of sugar, tea, coffee, molasses, flour, or
dry-goods?
Such additional charge upon a distance of one hundred miles from Boston would enhance the market
value, at that point, of sugar, tea, and coffee, half a
10




68
mill per pound; flour, ten cents per barrel; and
heavy cotton goods, less than one-fifth of a mill per
yard,-  the merest trifle to  each consumer, but
amounting, in the aggregate, to a large contribution
for the railways.
But it is doubtless true, that tariffs on many articles of merchandise are so high as to amount to prohibition, and that a trifling reduction would call into
existence an entirely new and profitable class of trade.
It is very evident that freight-tariffs on our NewEngland railways need a thorough revision.
LOW FARES.
Through fares are lower than local on Boston railways, when they should be precisely the reverse; for,
owing to the comparatively small number of passengers carried on long routes, the cost per passenger per
mile is very much greater than on the short travel,
with its long and crowded trains.
This matter is understood in England, where the
charges in express-trains for long travel are much
higher than in other trains.
But it has been abundantly demonstrated that even
a trifling advance of the passenger-tariffs will materially affect the amount of short local travel.
It is believed by the reform party, that an advance
in price, even if coupled with a diminution of trains,




69
would not materially diminish the number of passengers.
The influence of low fares on revenue is well shown
in the effect produced by the reduction of postage
rates in Great Britain and in this country.
In Great Britain, with average rates of sixpence
during the twenty years' preceding reduction, there was
no increase of revenue. The first year after reduction
to one penny, revenue declined five millions of dollars;
but such has been the increase since, the net revenue
from postage is several millions more than it was
under the old rates.
In the United States, for several years previous to
1838, the annual increase of revenue was about half
per cent.  From  1838 to 1845, a period of seven
years, revenue increased but one-twentieth of one per
cent, or Tai of one per cent per annum.
In 1845, rates were reduced to five and ten cents:
revenue increased fourteen per cent per annum for six
years. In 1851, rates were reduced to three cents;
and although the revenue declined at first, as might
naturally have been expected from so great a reduction, yet it is steadily increasing, and in 1854 was fifty
per cent greater than in 1844.
These facts in relation to postage are presented as
a striking proof that the public are materially influenced, in the use they make of a public convenience,
by its cost; and when it is considered that, after the
reduction of postage rates, it was necessary to increase
the number of letters three to six fold, in order to produce a revenue equal to that derived under the higher




70
rate, the great number of people who were influenced
in the amount of their correspondence by the postage
charge will, in a measure, be made apparent.
But there is another element developed by low fares;
and that is constant increase. Before the reduction of
postage, revenue had been for many years almost stationary.   Since reduction, the limit of increase has
not yet been attained.
That the law of low fares is universal in its application is true beyond the possibility of contradiction.
Let us see with what force it applies to railways.
A railway committee, appointed by the British
Parliament in 1840, collected statistics from every
road ii Great Britain, Belgium, and France, and
reported that these statistics proved that great masses
of passengers were created by low fares; that a rise of
fare invariably diminished the net income, and a reduction of fare invariably increased it.
The effect of high and low fares on railway traffic
is exemplified in the returns to the House of Commons by railways, July 10, 1840: —
Dundee and Newtyle Railway.
Fare advanced twenty-five per cent on Third Class.
No. of    Receipts.
Passengers.   Receipts
Nine months preceding rise......... 40,378  ~1,720. 17s. 3d.
Nine months during high fares.... 29,387  ~1,569. Os. 4d.
The fare was again reduced; and, in the
nine months after reduction....... 46,972   2,116. s. 7d:
Number of trains the same in each period,




71
Garnkirk and Glasgow Railway, eleven miles long.
Fare raised early in 1837.
Passengers.     Receipts.
1836.......  14 5,700                ~3,850. 4s. 7d.
1837........    119,400    ~3,803. Os. Od.
Further advance of fare in April, 1839.
1838.......    126,810    ~4,119. 16s. 3d.
1839.......         97,746    ~3,397. 13s. Od.
Upon the opening of three railways in England,
the following effect was produced on travel by a
certain percentage of reduction from the old stagecoach fare:Reduction Increase
per cent. per cent.
Newcastle and Carlisle.......    66        900
Liverpool and Manchester......    50        200
London and Birmingham......  Nothing   10
These are by no means the most remarkable
instances brought to light, in 1840, of the advantage,
not to say necessity, of a moderate passenger-tariff on
railways: similar results were shown upon all British,
French, and Belgian railways, particularly upon the
latter.
But it may be said that these results were produced
in the infancy of railways, and will not hold good at
the present day.
Let us see if the facts warrant such a conclusion.




72
On the 8th of January, 1856, Robert Stephenson,
M.P., world-renowned as an engineer, delivered an
address in London before the Institution of Civil
Engineers, of which body he is President, in which he
stated that 111,206,707 passengers were conveyed on
British railroads in 1854, each passenger travelling an
average of twelve miles.
Mr. Stephenson said, "As regarded fares, the
interests of the companies and of the public were
identical. Companies must regulate fares by consideration of the circumstances which produced the
largest revenue; and the circumstances which produced the largest revenue were those which induced
the greatest number of individuals to travel.
1" Nothing was so profitable as passenger-traffic, as
it cost less in every way than goods, and an average
train would carry two hundred passengers. The cost
of running a train was overstated at is. 3d. per mile;
and one hundred passengers, at id. per mile, produced 5s. 21d. But this argument did not imply
that in all cases fares should be fixed at a minimum.
Minimum fares were most profitable on short routes;
but the public were too much occupied to be tempted
by minimunt fares to undertake long journeys. High
rates of speed and increased comforts were then
required; and these might be charged for."
On the railways of Great Britain, where there are
three or four classes of cars, the percentage proportion of travel in each of the first three classes is as
follows: -




73
First class.   Sec. class.  Third class.
England.......         13.3    36.0    50.7
Scotland........    11.3    15.9    72.8
Ireland........         13.3    39.8    46.8
There is still another feature developed on English
roads in relation to the different classes of travel.
For the last ten years, the increase has been vastly
greater on the second, third, and fourth classes than
on the first.
Moreover, and strongly corroborative of the assertion in regard to the class of travel that moves on
the long routes, it is worthy of notice, that the average
length of first-class travel is nearly seventy per cent
longer than of either of the other classes; and the
average length of second-class travel is about twenty
per cent longer than that of the third and fourth
classes.
Beside which, the proportion of passengers to a
full car, on each class of travel, is as follows:
Percentage of
full car.
First class.............39
Second class............52
Third class........... 66
The advantage of full cars to a railway company
must be apparent to every one, as it costs but little
more to transport a car when full than if it were
empty.  Therefore the cost of transporting second
and third class passengers is less per passenger per
car than of the first class.




74
On the Great North of Scotland Line, in 1855,
with first-class, third-class, and parliamentary cars,
the following proportions of travel and receipts were
developed: -
Per cent of    Per cent of
travel.   receipts.
First class....... 12.16.. 23.82
Third class....... 65.96.. 54.06
Parliamentary......  21.88.. 22.12
Of the entire passenger-receipts on the railroads of
Great Britain in 1854, but twenty-nine per cent was
from first-class passengers.
In order to exhibit the increasing prosperity of
British railways, the following facts are presented,
which were gathered from returns made to the
House of Commons, Aug. 6, 1855.
About nine thousand miles of railway are in operation in Great Britain, upon which have been
expended seventeen hundred millions of dollars. The
dividends paid upon the ordinary share-capital stand
as follows in the subjoined years: —
1849....   1.88           1852.....2.40
1850.....1.83             1853.....3.05
1851...   2.44             1854.....3.39
Preferred stock yielded an average of five per cent.
Let it be borne in mind, that the British Government exacts a duty from each company amounting
to about three per cent of the expenses; that the cost
of many of these roads is as high as half a million of
dollars a mile; that some cost a million of dollars, and




75
one as high as fifteen hundred thousand dollars, for
each mile of road.
Let it be remembered, too, that, in Great Britain, a
return of three per cent upon capital is considered
better remuneration than double that amount in this
country; that an increase of dividends, equal in ratio
to that of the last six years, would, in 1860, give a
return of 5T-9 per cent on the capital invested.
In regard to depreciation, extravagance, and the
probabilities of future increase, in the speech to which
allusion has been heretofore made, Mr. Stephenson
said, "After a certain period in the history of every
railway, deterioration reached an annual average;
and, as that annual depreciation became a charge as
fixed and certain as the cost of fuel or the salaries of
officers, it should be admitted as an annual charge
against receipts. There was no instance on record
in which the receipts of a railway had not been of
continuous growth, even when portions of its traffic
had been abstracted by competition on new lines."
The address concluded with some words of practical
application: "The duty devolved on civil engineers of
improving and perfecting this vast system. Every
farthing saved on the train mileage of the kingdom
was ~80,000 a year gained to railway companies.
There was, therefore, ample field for economical appliances; and therefore no economical arrangement,
however trifling, was to be neglected."
In the beginning of the present year, a competition
sprung up between several companies whose railways
terminate in London. By the latest advices, it ap11




76
pears that this warfare still continues, and that they
are carrying passengers at very low rates. The corporations engaged in this struggle are the London and
North-western, the Midland, and the Great Northern.
Fares have been reduced about fifty per cent.
It may be asked, What effect has this reduction produced upon the number of passengers?
In a recent London publication (Feb. 23, 1856), it
is stated that "the public appear to be taking full
advantage of the low fares and increased facilities
accorded to them by the various companies." After
condemning the course pursued by the Directors of
the several lines, the writer proceeds: "One feature,
however, which we alluded to in our last notice of this
contest, is evidently developing itself; and that is,
the creation of travelling consequent upon these
extremely low fares. WVe have heard, on good
authority, that the number of passengers is already at
least forty per cent more than it was prior to the
competition. Some of these passengers are, of course,
diverted from other places between which and London the fares continue at the old rates; but the great
bulk of them are persons travelling who never would
or could travel without the great inducements now
offered."
Again, after speaking of the gratification of the
public at the reduced fares, he says, "And there are
another class of people also looking on with no great
feeling of regret: we mean the smaller companies,
over whose lines a new traffic is springing up, at



77
tracted to the great high-roads to London by the
cheapness of transit therealong."
These facts have been mentioned, not in apology
for competition, which is worse than folly, but simply
to show that reduced fares will create travel.
From the foregoing statistics of British railways, it
is evident that it is from the great masses of the people paying minimum prices that they obtain their
support; and it is equally true in this country. A
railway is emphatically a democratic institution.
Let us note the effect of high and low fares on
Boston railways.
Fitchburg Railroad passenger-receipts.
Year.         Receipts.
Year.         Receipts.   Increase  Decrease
per cent.   per cent.
1845..       $100,817
1846.        128,738      27
1847..      165,091      29
*1848..        186,727      13
1849..        213,067      14
t18.50..       252,858       18
1851..      257,562       11
1852..        253,370.     1
1853..      281,882      11
t1854..        301,416        6
+1855..        296,552.. 
* Fares reduced, July, 1848.  t Fares advanced, January, 1860.
t Fares advanced.
It will be perceived, that in 1848, notwithstanding
a reduction of half a cent per mile on all travel, passenger-receipts increased thirteen per cent; and, in
1849, fourteen per cent..'
It will also be seen, that with an advance in 1850




78
of half a cent per mile, although receipts increased in
that year eighteen  per cent, yet the  increase  fell, in
1851, to 1A  per cent; while, in 1852, there was a loss
of 1Ai& per cent.
In 1854, with an advance on season-tickets, the increase of receipts was but six per cent; and in 1855,
with a still farther advance of fares, there was a loss
of 1A  per cent.
Old Colony Railroad.
No. of passengers. In cent. per cent.  Gross receipts.  perceasnt.e
per cent. per cent.            per,ent.
1846..    213,144                         $125,711
1847...      89,994       82                171,153       36
1848..    552,203         41                227,350       32
1849..    773,124         40                275,066       21
* 1850..      684,263               11        296,170         7
1851..      630,599                 8       318,075         7
1852.. 5. 98,166                     5       322,213   1      a
t 1853..    721,450         26                374,879       16
F* ares advanced.
t In 1853, prices were reduced on the South Shore Railroad (a connecting line),
and travel much increased thereby. There was a revival of the shoe-trade, and consequent increase of business from Quincy, Braintree, Weymouth, and the Bridgewaters; also an increase of about eighty thousand passengers on the Fall River
Railroad, called out by low fares to New York.
The above table demonstrates conclusively that the
advance of fares in 1850 was injudicious. It diminished travel on the line; whereas, under the old tariff,
it was rapidly increasing. Its evil effect upon income
is likewise apparent.
In 1854, the Old Colony was united with the Fall
River Railroad. Let us see the effect produced by
still higher fares.




79
As the union of the Old Colony and Fall River
Railroads necessarily produced a change in the method
of computing travel, the number of passengers carried
one mile are given in the following table:
Passengers, passenger-receipts, and miles run by passenger-trains, on
the Old Colony and Fall River Railroad, 1853 to 1855 inclusive.
No. of pass. Inc. per Dec. per Passenger Inc. per Dec. per M. run by Inc. per Dec. per
carried 1 m.  cent.   cent.  receipts.   cent.   cent.  ps. trains.  cent.   cent.
1853 18,186,442      $425,846         266,762
1854 17,949,995  1.3  419,014    1.6  285,095  6.8
1855 17,013,717   5.2  418,931    TI2  289,274  1.4
Fares were advanced in 1854 and 1855; but travel
and income fell off, while the number of miles run
increased each year.
It will be difficult to extract any argument in favor
of high fares from the above table, which was prepared from the annual returns to the Legislature.
But the high-fare party point with exultation to
the increased net earnings of the Old Colony and Fall
River Railroad in 1855, and attribute them to high
fares.
Highll fares had nothing to do with the matter; for
there was a trifling loss of gross income, and more
miles were run than in 1854.
Where, then, shall we look for the cause of increased
net earnings?
In the comparatively economical management of the
road.
In "the saving of expenses in running the road
by one Company, and under one management, and to




80
a close attention  to  economy in the various departments."  (Annual Report Old Colony and Fall River
Railroad Company, 1856.)
Is economy incompatible with low fares?
A moderate reduction in the passenger-tariff of the
Old Colony Railroad would be immediately followed
by an increased net revenue, provided it were managed
with its present economy. That this is true, its own
history, as well as that of all other railways, abundantly proves.
Passengers and passenger-receipts on the Eastern Railroad, from
Salem and Iynn, 1842 to 1855 (season and package tickets not
included). 
No., of     Gross      No., of      Gross
YEAR.  Passengers  Fare.  Passenger  Passengers G ro Psseg
abetween      re           between   Fare   Passenger
Salem & Bost.     Receipts.  Lynn & Bost.
1842  124,301    50   $68,025    72,656    31    $22,926
1843  123,805,,    66,991    79,610,,    23,667
1844  140,298,,    76,641    87,207,,    27,034
*1845   192,488    40     81,704   107,977    25      27,997
1846  213,800,,    85,520   125,847,,    31,561
1847  240,925,,    96,370   139,410,,    34,852
1848  251,554,,   100,621   154,261,,    38,565
1849  254,063,,   101,625   155,371,,    38,842
1850  250,685,,   100,274   157,725,,    39,431
1851   172,342,,    68,936   152,825,,    38,206
1852  182,148,,    72,859   156,953,,    39,238
1853  220,364,,    88,145   179,963,,    44,990
t1854  237,089 40 & 50  96,051   186,596 25 & 35  47,584
1855  159,387    50      79,693   142,740    35      49,959
~ Fare reduced, April, 1845.  t Fare advanced, June, 1854.
It will be perceived, that, from  1846, there was a
steady and continuous gain in passengers and receipts,
until 1850-51, when the completion of the South




Reading and Saugus branches seriously diminished
the travel from Salem and Lynn over the Eastern
Road. But after 1851, notwithstanding the division
of traffic by the competing lines, passengers and receipts steadily gained until June, 1854, at which time
fares from Salem and Lynn were advanced. The
effect of that advance, in 1855, was to diminish travel
twenty-eight, and gross receipts nine, per cent.
It is admitted that the increase in 1853 was, in a
measure, attributable to the revival of the shoe-trade;
but low fares were gradually bringing receipts up to
the standard of 1844. High fares, in 1855, reduced
the income from Salem travel, in that year, below the
standard of 1845.
The Boston and Lowell Railroad have had so many
competitors for their traffic, in the Boston and Maine,
Lowell and Lawrence, Stony Brook, Nashua and
Lowell, and Manchester and Lawrence Railways, that
tables showing the effect of high and low fares on the
travel of that road will not be presented: but its history serves to confirm the universality of the law of
low fares; the only years in which its passengerincome exceeded $200,000 being 1847 and 1848, with
fares at two and a half and two cents per mile, although charges are now three, and have been four,
cents per mile.
The system of fares upon the Boston and Maine
Railroad has been comparatively uniform; but it forms
no exception to other roads, an advance of price having invariably checked the increase of income.
An advance on commutation-tickets produced a




82
decline of forty-nine per cent in the amount received
from that source in the year ending April 30, 1855.
The Committee of Investigation, in their Report,
Sept. 29, 1855, page 19, recommend increased commutation, in order to bring back to the road the class
of passengers who purchase such tickets, which has
"greatly fallen off since the commutation was reduced."
The history of the Boston and Providence Railroad
presents the most convincing proof of the wisdom of
moderate tariffs as a means of increasing income.
The history of the Boston and Worcester Railroad
is a perfect argument, proving the advantage of low
fares.
Let me not be understood as advocating an immediate return to the lowest system of fares. The price
of labor, fuel, iron, and oil, renders such a step inexpedient; but the recent advance of fares will just so
surely be followed by diminished revenue as they
invariably have been heretofore in this country and in
Europe.
The reduction of travel on Massachusetts railways
in 1855, from 1854, amounted to more than one million of passengers.
The principal cause was advanced fares.
It will be apparent, to every person who will examine the subject, that the number of railway-passengers annually transported to and from Boston, from
the area of a circle with a radius of twenty miles
from that city, is at least ten times greater than the
population within that area. In other words, the




83
whole population within twenty miles of Boston
average at least ten trips annually to and from that
city.
It is also evident that few people would be induced,
even by free tickets, to go from Boston to Springfield,
Albany, or Buffalo; and that the number of times
each of these persons would take such journeys would
be limited.
The reason is obvious, — the great masses of the
public have no time to devote to such journeys.
But let fares be even slightly reduced upon distances within thirty miles of Boston, and travel would
increase rapidly. The ratio of increase would diminish
with the distance from the city, not only because the
decreasing density of population affords a smaller
number of people to be influenced by low fares, but
also because the time required for the trip is prolonged, and that obstacle to travel thus increased.
There is still another important element of income
to be influenced by moderate local fares.
It is that arising from travel between stations in
the interior, now to a great extent diverted from railways by private conveyance.
Many causes conspire to withhold this short travel
from a railway. Some of these are, the inconvenience
of being confined to fixed hours of departure; of
going to and returning from stations; and the comparative uncertainty as to the arrival of trains dependent upon connecting lines. These, combined with
high local fares, influence many persons in the country
to use their own vehicles, in which, if they travel with
12




84
less comfort and rapidity, they are at least independent
of the ring of the locomotive bell, and choose their
own time for going and returning.  One of these
obstacles can, in a measure, be removed by reducing
the passenger-tariff on short routes.
It is believed that, at the present time, the rates
most productive of income would be, on regular
tickets, two and three-quarter cents per mile for all
distances. The increased short travel called out by a
reduction from three cents, within one year, would
induce railway-managers to make a still further reduction on short routes; while the increased income,
with no sensible diminution of passengers on long
routes, would speedily reverse the present system of
tariffs, and place local fares at two and a half, and
through at three, cents per mile.
The highest charges should exist upon railways
at the present time, consistent with the increase of
business on the several lines. Growth is an element
that should never be lost sight of by railway-managers
until their roads are worked to their full capacity.
Railway managers often ascribe the great cost of
their roads as a reason why passenger-tariffs cannot be
reduced.
As a starting-point, it is assumed that the reason
given is a complete fallacy. The present cost of a
railway is an element that should never be taken into
account in the construction of a tariff, the object of
which is to produce the largest net revenue.
If a railway with a single track have nearly all the
business it can accommodate, and a reduction of tariff




85
would create traffic sufficient to render a second track
necessary; then the cost of such track, and the probabilities of a return sufficient to warrant the outlay,
shouldsof course be calculated. But this condition
does not exist on Boston railways.
The present accommodations, so far as freight and
passenger depots are concerned, would suffice for the
transaction of more than double the freight-business
done at present, and a vastly greater amount of passenger-traffic.
All the great items of cost are fixed, whether the
railways do their present business or enlarge it fourfold. To transact four times the present business
would require an increase of equipments and workmen, but not in a ratio corresponding with the
increased traffic.
It is conceded that a large amount of business can
be done cheaper pro rata than a smaller amount.
Then, if it be possible, without materially increased
expenditure, to transact a larger business, and, as a
consequence, at a reduced pro rata cost, it is incumbent upon railway managers to reduce fares, provided
it can be done without injuring the just and acknowledged claims of shareholders. If, with reduced fares,
this latter condition can be complied with, then a
reduction by railway Directors is the only course that
can be pursued at all compatible with a faithful execution of the trust they hold from the Commonwealth.
As experience clearly establishes the fact that both
the passenger-travel and gross recdpts of a railway
may be increased by low fares, it remains to be seen




86
at what additional cost the increased business may be
transacted.
Let us see what profit is now made by Boston railway corporations in the passenger-department.,
The receipts per passenger per mile, according to
the railway returns to the Legislature for the year
ending Nov. 30, 1855, were 2-2Ai cents.
Now, if it be true that the average cost of transporting passengers on Boston roads is but 1%-fw per
mile,* which is above the estimate of many, and as
high as that of most railway managers, then the net
profit on each passenger was one cent a mile. This
will give the following result -
The passenger net earnings were 51VW per cent on
the capital stock of the seven Boston railways; they
were seventy-nine per cent of the entire net earnings
of the seven roads; passengers, "rents," and "interest"
were eighty-five per cent of the net earnings; passengers, rents, interest, mails, and miscellaneous receipts,
Were ninety-one per cent of the net earnings.
These facts are taken from returns made to the
Legislature now in session, sworn to by the Directors
of the several railways, and there can be no doubt of
their correctness. It is, therefore, fair to infer that
stockholders are looking in an entirely wrong direction
for increased dividends.
As it requires about two millions of dollars to pay
eight per cent upon the cost of Boston railways, the
only question is, How shall that money be made.
* Cost on Boston and Worcester,.21.-See Annual Report of that Company,
1856, p. 11.




87
The policy which, at the end of each fiscal year,
will leave that amount of money in the treasuries of
the several corporations, is the proper one, whether
the money be made upon a greater or less number of
passengers.
A stockholder is not satisfied when his president
tells him, at the end of the year, that he has made less
money than he did the last year, but he has made
more per passenger. What does the stockholder care
for that?   He prefers the aggregate result to the
profit per passenger. It is little comfort to him that
each passenger paid a profit of one cent and a half
per mile, unless there were a sufficient number of
passengers carried to give him his dividend. One and
a half cents per mile is a better profit than one cent,
upon the same number of passengers; but one cent
upon two millions of passengers is better than one
cent and a half upon one million; and there is, beside,
the satisfaction of having extended the facilities of
travel to the greater number, and of having thereby
faithfully executed the trust to the State.
Experience proves that Boston railways make more
money at moderate fares than at high ones.
No Bostonian, who has watched the progress of
railway enterprise in Massachusetts for the last twenty
years, will refuse to acknowledge, that, in E. Hasket
Derby and P. P. F. Degrand, Esqs., the public have
always found able, earnest, and consistent champions
of the low-fare system. These gentlemen, by their
united efforts, have accomnplished more for the promotion of cheap travel than all others combined.




88
Mr. Degrand has recently departed from the scene
of his earthly labors, leaving behind him an unsullied
name. In the last act of his life, he proved the sincerity of his devotion to the interests of his adopted
countrymen by liberal bequests made to various religious, educational, and charitable institutions.
Those persons, who at the present time advocate the
necessity of advancing fares, claim with satisfaction,
as a proof of the moderation of their demands, that
" even Mr. Derby" admits the existence of such necessity.
It has been the fortune of the author to hear one
or two speeches recently made by Mr. Derby upon
railway matters. Nothing was said by that gentleman
which indicated any change in his sentiments as to
low fares. On the contrary, although he admitted
that advanced prices of labor and materials enhanced
the cost of operating railways, yet it is believed that
he has never expressed a doubt concerning the soundness of the low-fare policy, which he has so ably,
faithfully, and consistently advocated for nearly quarter of a century. Mr. Derby has yet to be made
acquainted with the first instance in which experience
has not demonstrated the correctness of that policy
which he has supported with an ability and perseverance worthy of the success which is certain eventually
to crown his efforts.
The public owe to Messrs. Derby and Degrand a
debt of gratitude for their labors in behalf of cheap
travel; and, within one yeaA it is believed that tailway stockholders will acknowledge their interests and




89
those of the public to be identical; that moderate
fares are most productive of income; that existing
fares are too high; and that E. Hasket Derby and
P. P. F. Degrand have for twenty years pointed out
the only true course to insure the greatest pecuniary
success of Massachusetts railways.
SEASON-PASSENGERS.
There are two classes of passengers from whom
Boston railways do not obtain the average receipts
of 2-2alu cents per mile.
These are, passengers to or from connecting roads
and season-passengers; the former, because the charge
by Boston roads to connecting lines is commuted
on account of the fact that cars are provided by
the latter. In regard to season-passengers, particular
hostility has been manifested towards them by some
railway managers, when it can be readily demonstrated, that, directly and indirectly, they are the most
fruitful source of income that railways possess. This
idea is scouted at by many as absurd; but railway
engineers and superintendents, and some railway presidents, not only believe but know, and not only
know  but have proved, that season-passengers of
themselves pay a large profit, to say nothing of the
collateral advantages derived from them. Some testi



90
mony will be adduced to prove that even at-one cent
per mile, which is below the present average charge
on season-passengers, a large profit is made.
All must concede that the addition of a train upon
a railway involves an increase only upon certain items
of expenditure. The great items of cost are fixed,
whether a greater or less number of trains are run.
The cost of road, salaries of officers, wages of switchmen, depot-masters, and ticket-clerks, are the same,
whether ten trains or twenty are run each day. That
this is substantially true, no one can deny.
The items of expenditure increased by an additional
train are repairs and depreciation of road, engines,
and cars; wages of conductor, engineer, fireman, and
brakeman; fuel, oil, and waste.
These items may be safely assumed not to exceed
the following sums for a train of three cars running
one hundred miles a day, at a speed of twenty miles
an hour:
Repairs of road........ $15.00
Repairs of engines........   8.00
Repairs of cars........   7.00
Interest on equipment.......   2.67
Wages of train-hands.......   7.50
Fuel..........    19.50
Oil and waste........   1.75
Depreciation.                                     6.58
Incidentals.........   2.00
Total for one hundred miles (or seventy cts. per train-mile) $70.00
This estimate is much larger than that of many
engineers; but the allowance is intended to be such




91
that its fairness cannot be called in question by advocates of the necessity for advancing passenger-tariffs.
It can and ought to be reduced by economy to less
than fifty-five cents per mile. That it is not too low,
is confidently believed, as the author has in his possession estimates from two experienced engineers, one of
whom fixes the cost at about fifty-six cents, and the
other at less than sixty-five cents, per train-mile.
Robert Stephenson estimates the cost of transporting two hundred passengers by railway in England to
be fifteen pence, or about thirty cents, per mile. It
certainly should not cost more than twice as much in
this country.
A gentleman with a railway experience of many
years, an advocate of light engines, and frequent trains
running at reduced speed, has prepared the following
tables, based upon the existing system of railway
economy, in which system he believes great improvement is possible: -
Cost per mile of running a train ten miles from Boston, four round trips,
eighty miles daily, with three, and also with four, eight-wheeled cars,
weighing eleven and a half net tons. TWeight of locomotive, twenty-two
tons net. Speed, ten miles in thirty minutes. Stations, six. Wood, seven
dollars per cord.
Per mile,  Per mile,
three cars. four cars.
Fuel.......             21.86 cts. 25.86 cts.
Renewal-fund, cars, engine, road-stations, &c.  12.60    14.80
Train-hands......  8.90           8.90
Track-repairs...... 10.00    12.00
Locomotive and car repairs.... 11.50    13.30
Oil and waste....         2.25     2.50
67.11 cts. 77.36 ts.
13




92
Estimates for train running as in preceding table, but with locomotive weighing only fourteen tons net. Speed, ten miles in forty-five minutes.
Per mile,  Per mile,
three cars.    four cars.
Fuel..... 16.36 cts. 18.66 cts.
Renewal-fund, cars, engines, road-stations, &c.  8.50    10.50
Train-hands.                             8.90     8.90
Track-repairs....  7.00           8.50
Locomotive and car repairs...  9.00    10.50
Oil and waste.....  2.00        2.25
51.76 cts. 59.31 cts.
It will be seen that expenses with a light engine
are considerably less than with a heavy one; yet there
can be no doubt that, for the travel within fifteen or
twenty miles of Boston, they would be quite sufficient,
while expenses would be much lessened by their
employment. On long routes, where high speed is required, heavier engines would be necessary, for which
a correspondingly increased charge should be made.
There is no injustice in charging more for conveying a passenger one hundred miles in three hours,
than when the journey occupies twice that time.
High speed is an increased expense to a railway company, and it is economy to the passenger: the company
should charge the increased expense; which the traveller will cheerfully pay, in consideration of the
economy of time consequent upon increased speed.
There are very few season-passengers from a distance
greater than twenty miles from Boston; in fact, it is
believed that nine trains out of ten, run principally
for the accommodation of season-passengers, are on
routes not exceeding twelve miles from that city.
The longest route for season-passengers, over which




93
any considerable number of trains are run for their
convenience, is that between Boston and Salem, the
statistical result of which travel has already been
presented on page 66.
On the Boston and Worcester Road, by far the
larger part of season-travel is from stations on the cityside of Newton Lower Falls, about twelve miles from
Boston. This travel does not probably average over
nine miles.
The Boston and Maine carry more season-passengers
than any other Boston road. That class of travel, in
1854, averaged 8-5vf  miles in length.
On the Fitchburg Road, season-travel is for the most
part from and below Waltham, ten miles, and Lexington, eleven miles, from Boston: it probably does
not average more than nine miles in length.
The season-travel on the Providence Road is for the
most part from, and this side of, Dedham, nine and a
half miles from Boston; probably averaging in length
about eight miles.
The season-travel on the Old Colony and Fall River
Road is probably somewhat longer; South Braintree
and the Bridgewaters perchance bringing the average
length of travel to ten miles.
On the Boston and Lowell, the weight of seasontravel does not extend beyond Woburn, ten miles
distant from Boston; and the average length is probably not over eight miles.'It is safe to assume, that season-travel on the seven
Boston roads is about nine miles, and that the average
distance run by trains to accommodate it is not over
twelve miles.




94
Allow the average number of passengers per train
to be one hundred and twenty-five, which is below
the actual number, and at a charge of one cent per
mile, or nine cents for nine miles, the following result
from season-travel is obtained:
RE CEIPTS.
125 passengers, 9 miles each, at 9 cents........... $11.25
COST OF RUNNING TRAIN.
12 miles, at 70 cents per mile.................  8.40
Profit on train.................... $2.85
Equivalent to a profit of thirty-three per cent, or two and threetenth cents per passenger.
Although calculations have been published in which
season-travel was charged with the whole expense of
a train, and that train reduced to one car, yet no intelligent man will deny that a railway derives great
collateral benefits from season-passengers, who attract
to the line many full-paying passengers.
Many experienced railway managers believe, that,
where a season-ticket is sold to the head of a family,
the company annually receive, from his family and
friends, an amount at least equal to the price of the
season-ticket.
An officer of a Boston railway states, that the visitors of a certain season-passenger contribute to the
treasury of the company one thousand dollars a year.
A letter was received a few days since, from a wellknown railway manager in another State, from which
the following extracts in relation to season-passengers
are taken:




95
"Season-ticket passengers, it has always seemed to me, were
valuable to any road at prices a good deal below what some of the
roads are about to establish. The prices paid on the Boston and
Maine Railroad for last year, I have been told by the best authority, were remunerative to them. Doubtless they can carry quite
as cheaply as any other road out of Boston, as they have a very
large local population along their line. Their prices, therefore,
cannot be regarded as a criterion for all other roads. Season-ticket
passengers, if carried in the through trains, can be transported very
cheaply. The expense of adding a car to each through train is
small; because nothing is added to many of the heavy items of
expenditure on a road by such extra car.
"The items to be increased are fuel, repairs of passenger-car,
repairs of road; also oil and waste, interest, and depreciation of
car. These items may be summed up approximately as follows:
Fuel........  4 cents per mile run.
Repairs of car..... 2,
Repairs of road....  1,,,,
Oil and waste.....  0j,,
Interest and depreciation..  3,,
Total.               10.,,,,
An average of 10 passengers to a car, at one cent per mile, you
will observe, will pay the expense of an additional car on a train
already running, if my estimate above is correct; and I do not
think it is far out of the way, it being rather over than under the
cost on roads about Boston.
"My own views of the value of season-ticket passengers are
somewhat at variance with what may perhaps be regarded as the
general sentiment about Boston now.
" I have always supposed that each season-ticket passenger
brought to the road more business in other ways than his own
travel. He will necessarily have, in the course of the year, many
friends to visit him, who will pay the regular fare to the station.
He will consume various articles that must be transported on the
road as freight, and thus add to the revenue of the road. He will,
generally speaking, be a friend to the line, and, in the long run,
induce many transient people to patronize the road who would not
otherwise use it.
"Season-ticket passengers are often a nucleus around which an




96
important town springs up, which becomes valuable to a railroad,
as presenting other sources of business distinct from the seasonticket business. Such a town, within ten miles of Boston, will give
business to a road in both directions...
" A dense population on a line of road must be valuable to the
road, even if the head of every family were a season-ticket passenger; because, for every such head of a family at low fares, there
would be five or six other members who would travel often at full
fares.
"I don't wish to be understood as advocating the lowest fares
that have prevailed, for the present time; because the expenses of
railroads have increased very largely during the last few years:
but, in my opinion, all the railroads in this country, out of large
cities, will always find it good policy to encourage season-ticket
travel at moderate rates, or rates considerably below the maximum
now contended for."
In the foregoing extract it is stated that the Boston
and Maine has a very large local population on its line,
and is therefore enabled to transport passengers cheaply. Let it be remembered, that this population has,
to a great extent, been placed there by the judicious
policy of moderate fares and ample accommodation.
In order to show the relative growth of travel on
two lines of road, each the head of a system directly
opposite, the following table is presented:BOSTON AND MAINE.  FITCHBURG.
No. of passengers. No. of passengers.
1850    1,221,071    1,080,286
1851    1,449,421    1,261,159
1852    1,465,924    1,214,755
1853    1,820,752    1,269,675
1854   1,969,464     1,262,600
1855    1,869,352    1,049,757
Gain in six years, Loss in six years,
53 per cent.    2.8 per cent.




97
It appears that, in 1851, the Fitchburg carried
40,000 more passengers than the Maine did in 1850;
but, in 1855, the Maine carried 820,000 more than
the Fitchburg. The Fitchburg, as will be seen by
reference to table B, at the end of this pamphlet, is
the only Boston road, except the Eastern, whose travel was less in 1855 than in 1850; and there is little
reason to doubt that it will not exceed, if it equal,
950,000 passengers in 1856. The cause is apparent:
its passenger-business is worse managed than that of
any other Boston road. Universal discontent prevails
along the line; and many people have been driven
thence, because the lack of accommodation rendered
it impossible for them to remain.
So heavy a loss of travel is a serious matter for a
railway, because a small number of people cannot be
transported so cheaply per passenger as a larger number can; and an attempt to reduce the pro rata cost
on the smaller number, by diminishing the number of
trains, only adds to the evil; for nothing so contributes to increase the population and travel on a railroad as the frequency of trains. It is mainly to the
fact that a person can find a conveyance to those
towns at all hours, that Roxbury, Cambridge, Charlestown, Chelsea, and East Boston, owe their population.
Light engines, running every half-hour or forty-five
minutes, at two-thirds the present expense, would
speedily develop a great increase of profitable travel
within ten miles of Boston.
If, as has been shown, the profit on the passengertravel of Boston railways, in 1855, was one cent per




98
mile, it is surely desirable that such profit be made
upon two millions rather than upon one million of
passengers, particularly as the increased number enables a company to reduce materially the pro rata cost
of transport.
Then, if it be desirable to increase travel, how shall
it be done?
By holding out to the public every inducement to
travel; by moderate tariffs and frequent trains; by
encouraging season-travel; and by inducing people
to build houses on the several lines of railway, to the
end that one continuous village may line their margins, and perfect the system already commenced.
In England, this policy is so well understood, that
one of the chief lines in the kingdom, the Lancashire
and Yorkshire, furnish first-class free-tickets, for terms
of from seven to twelve years, to all who will build
on their line a house worth an annual rent of ~40.
A similar policy prevails on all European roads.
There are about 6,500 season-tickets sold by Boston railway companies; and an advance of five dollars
per annum on each, which is about the maximum
contended for, would add to income but one-tenth of
one per cent on the capital invested, provided every
passenger remained, and the companies lost none of the
collateral benefits derived from season-travel.
If the passenger-business on the various lines of
railway leading from Boston were managed as it
should be, there is no room for doubt that, within
five years, that traffic alone would pay eight per cent
upon the capital invested.




99
MASSACHUSETTS RAILROADS.
Since the greater part of the preceding pages was
written, a pamphlet, bearing the title " Massachusetts
Railroads, 1842 to 1855," has been issued, under the
auspices of the Hon. William Appleton, and William
H. Swift, Esq., formerly President, and still Director,
of the Western Railroad. It is also well understood,
that the Hon. William Sturgis is an indorser of the
paper; and it must be confessed, that such paper, with
such an indorser, is likely to pass current in Massachusetts.
No Bostonian can doubt that the sentiments expressed in their pamphlet are honestly entertained;
neither can any one suppose that the persons from
whom it emanates are actuated by self-interest merely
in its publication. Their public spirit is too well
known to justify such a suspicion. Nor can their
general intelligence or wisdom be called in question;
for, with Bostonians, their character, ability, and
standing need no encomiums. But it is submitted,
that possibly they are mistaken on the subject of
railway management, and are looking in a wrong
direction for the remedy of evils of which they complain. Are they not misled by new and false lights
in the railway world!
In the preceding pages, nearly every topic discussed
in Mr. Swift's pamphlet has been alluded to; but
there are some statements, made therein, that demand
particular comment.
14




100
On page 5 of the pamphlet alluded to, Mr. Appleton, in speaking of the Boston and Lowell Railroad,
says,
"In 1835, the gross receipts on this road were.... $64,654
And the expenses of operating the road were... 19,125
Net.... 45,529
Cost of construction and equipment......  1,312,239
In 1844, from Receipts.......... 316,909
Expenses.... 139,293
Net....    177,616
Cost of construction and equipment......  1,902,555
In 1854, from Receipts........  442,497
Expenses.... 364,478
Net..... 78,019
Cost of construction and equipment...... $2,158,932"
When the above statement was made, the legislative
railway returns for 1855 had not been published.
They have since been made public, and exhibit a
different result.
In 1855, from Receipts.......        $489,754
Expenses....     366,120
Net....    123,634
Cost of construction and equipment...... $2,188,595
Referring, on page 9, to a table in which is exhibited the net revenue of Massachusetts railroads from
1842 to 1855, Mr. Swift says, —
"Here, again, the net revenue in 1854, with more capital employed than in 1850 by the sum of $8,436,000, was $197,000 less
than it was in the last-named year; or the rate of earnings was
reduced thirty-eight per cent in the four years."




101
It is probably true, that depreciation in 1850 was
not fully met by renewals; and it is certainly true,
that, in 1854, the depreciation of former years, as well
as of 1854, was met in that year.
But on page 20 of the same pamphlet are to be
found figures that entirely destroy the force of the
comparison.
It is there reported, that in 1854, although the
Fitchburg Railroad Company charged as expenses
the sum of $647,919, yet "working expenses" were
but $431,922; leaving an amount expended on new
buildings, new cars, &c., of $215,997.
It will thus be perceived that Mr. Swift admits that
the real net earnings of one road, over those reported,
not only entirely swept away the deficit of $197,000
alluded to, but increased the net earnings of 1854 to
the extent of nearly $19,000.
A similar practice prevailed, to a greater or less
extent, on all Boston railways; and, if from their
reported expenses for 1854 were deducted the sums
which did not of right belong to that year, a result
very different from that presented in the pamphlet
of Mr. Swift would be made apparent. Yet, in that
very year 1854, the net earnings of seven Boston
railways, as stated by Mr. Swift, amounted to 6-f8vs
per cent on the capital invested.
Again: on page 9, Mr. Swift presents the following
table, showing the aggregate of passengers. and tons
carried one mile in 1850 and 1854; to which I add
that of 1855.




102
The aggregate of passengers and tons carried one mile was, —
In 1850.......   165,890,000
In 1854....... 219,799,000
In 1855....... 213,562,664
It will be seen that there was a falling off of more
than six millions in 1855. The system of high fares
is the explaining cause.
On page 16, in recommending a reduction in the
number of trains, Mr Swift says, -
" For example, there are eight trains each way between Boston
and Dedham; that is, 160 miles daily. This large number of
trains, it is to be supposed, the convenience of the public demands.
Let us see the probable cost to the company of doing this particular work.
" The cost of each mile run by trains in 1854, on the Boston and
Providence Road, was just $1, as shown in table 2: it may be inferred, therefore, that if four trains were run daily, instead of eight,
that $80 per diem might be saved in the cost of the Dedham business. This is not an unreasonable deduction: for the $1 applies to
all freight trains as well as to passenger; and these remarks in the
Dedham case, being applied to passengers alone, would seem to
show that $1 per mile run is not too much to place to cost of that
particular work. But I use these figures merely for illustration:
there are plenty like them elsewhere."
A stronger argument in favor of low fares, than is
implied in the foregoing extract, cannot be desired.
It certainly follows, that, in order to accommodate the
passengers in four trains who are now carried by
eight, each of the four trains must carry double the
present number of passengers. If, then, a saving of
$80 per day can be effected by reducing the number
of trains to four, is not the admission made, that the
cost per train of transporting twice the present number




103
of passengers is no greater than the present cost per
train with its smaller number? 
This is a more important admission than facts were
supposed to warrant. It was believed that the cost
of transporting 500 passengers per train was greater
than for the transportation of 250.
The truth was thought to be more in accordance
with a statement given on page 95 of this pamphlet;
although the estimate there given, of the cost of 101
cents per mile for an additional car to a running train,
is rather higher than it is believed to be by many
experienced persons. It is therefore very gratifying
to know, in regard to Mr. Swift's figures, that " there
are plenty like them elsewhere."
But no one can doubt that the number'of passengers transported in the four trains would not nearly
equal the number now carried; for the frequency of
trains is a material element in increasing the number
of railway travellers. With a person doing business
in Boston, the chief objection to a residence in the
country is being confined to fixed hours of departure.
The great obstacle to the interchange of visits between country and city people is the time required
therefor.
If persons, living ten miles from Boston, can visit
that city, and return within two or three hours, they
will certainly go much oftener than when trains are
so run as to render it necessary to be from home twice
that length of time.
Mr. Swift recommends, on pages 16 and 18, a reduction in the speed of all trains.




104
Doubtless many trains are run at too great velocity;
and, on short routes, the speed of passenger-trains may
be reduced to eighteen miles an hour, without decreasing travel.
On routes longer than ten or twelve miles, one
advantage arising from greater speed should be considered: it is that the area of territory tributary to a
railway increases with the speed of travel.
A reduction to ten miles an hour in the velocity of
freight-trains would be productive of great sating to
railways, and satisfactory to the public.
On page 19, in speaking of the relative cost of
transporting passengers and freight, Mr. Swift says,
"My own experience, and certain information of a tolerably
exact nature which exists upon this subject, has led me to the conclusion, that, in general with us, it does cost just about twice as
much to move a ton one mile as it does to move a passenger the
same distance. I shall so assume it here."
It appears by table 1, page 19, of Mr. Swift's
pamphlet, that the following was the result of the
passenger and freight business on thirty-seven Massachusetts railways in 1854, viz.: —
Number of passengers carried one mile....   194,158,800
Receipts from passengers........  $4,495,800
Number of tons freight carried one mile.... 104,583,000
Receipts from freight...........   $3,725,100
These figures show the following facts, viz.: —In 1854, receipts per passenger per mile.... 2?,331 cents.,,,,   per ton per mile....... 3,,




105
On page 14, the cost of transport is stated to be,Per passenger per mile..........    13,cents.
Per ton per mile............ 2,,
Now, if it cost twice as much per mile to carry a
ton as it does to carry a passenger, then the above
figures demonstrate with certainty that the passengerdepartment pays a much larger percentage of profit
than the freight. They likewise prove, that, provided
as large a percentage of profit were made on freight
transportation as settled by Mr. Swift's formula, the
receipts on freight per ton per mile should have been
4s5a8 cents, or 1f —  cents more than the actual receipts.
This additional charge on the tonnage transported
would have amounted to the sum of $1,066,746.66,
or more than sufficient to have maintained the motive
power on the thirty-seven Massachusetts railroads.
On the 9th of June, 1855, in a communication to
the  "American  Railway  Times," Mr. Swift states
(over his own signature), that on eight of the principal roads in Massachusetts, from 1846 to 1850 inclusive, 490,838,686 passengers, and 268,551,340 tons
of freight, were carried one mile, and that the cost of
transportation was $10,977,839.  He then says,
" Since that time (1851), the cost of transportation has greatly
increased, as will be shown by the following figures of the same
roads for the year 1854, viz.:Miles run by trains............    4,012,313
Passengers carried one mile.........   156,075,150
Tons freight carried one mile........   85,568,977
" Cost of doing the work, $4,353,865; or at the average rate of
1-?%s cents per passenger, or per ton of freight one mile.




106
"Now, if we assume that it does cost double the sum to carry
one ton one mile that it costs to carry one passenger one mile, the
results deduced from the previous figures will be these, as applied
to the roads named, viz.: —
Cost of transporting one passenger one mile, 1846 to
1850 inclusive...........   0.963 cents.
Do.   do.   in 1854.......... 1.20,,
Cost of transporting one ton one mile, including loading and unloading, 1846 to 1850.1.926,,
Do.   do.   in 1854.......... 2.40,,
The figures showing the cost are incorrect in every
instance. They should be,Cost of transporting one passenger one mile, 1846 to
1850 inclusive...........   1.06 cents.
Do.   do.   in 1854.......... 1.33,,
Cost of transporting one ton one mile, including loading and unloading, 1846 to 1850..... 2.12,,
Do.   do.   in 1854.......... 2.66,,
On the 26th of June, 1855, in a communication to
the " American Railway Times," Mr. Swift states
(over his own signature), —
"In the year 1852, the Boston and Worcester Railway transported as follows: -
Passengers one mile...........   20,236,684
Tons freight one mile...........    9,051,119
Total of both..........                 29,287,803
"The actual cost of this work, as appears by the report to the
Legislature, was $414,109.29; hence the average cost of one passenger one mile, and one ton one mile, was 1.42 cents.
"The President of the corporation, in his report to the stockholders for the same year, says, -




107
"'By a careful analysis of the expense account of this road,
charging to freight expense a proportionate part of the expenses
which are common to the freight and passenger department, it will
be found that the cost of freight transportation, including the cost
of loading and unloading, is, on an average, 2.10 cents per ton per
mile.'
"Now, as these figures for the year 1852, above
quoted, show the average cost of one passenger
or one ton one mile to have been 1.42 cents, two
will have cost............   2.84 cents.
Cost of one ton freight one mile, as declared by the
President in his report........   2.10,,
Leaves the cost of one passenger one mile....   0.74 cents.
" Or the cost, in this case, of transporting one ton, including the
cost of loading and unloading, is nearly three times the cost of
transporting one passenger, instead of twice, as I have stated it to
be."
Mr. Swift's  solution  of the question  is entirely
wrong. One would suppose that the cost of transporting a ton of freight, also the number of tons
transported, and the cost of transporting both tons and
passengers, being known, it would not be a very difficult
task to ascertain the cost of passenger-transportation.
It is probable, however, that the sum was so easy that
no thought was bestowed upon it.
The following is supposed to be the correct solution of the problem.
If it cost 2X  cents per mile to carry the ton, then
it cost 1    cents to carry the passenger (not 4W cents);
but, if the cost of transporting the ton were twice
that of the passenger, then it cost 1lf-ix cents to carry
the passenger, and 2-11~  cents to carry the ton.
It is unfortunate for "Massachusetts," Mr. Swift's
*                 ~~~~~~~15




108
antagonist in the controversy which called forth the
communication previously referred to, that he did not
discover the fallacy of the calculations.
In " Massachusetts Railroads, 1842 to 1855," pages
13 and 14, Mr. Swift says, -
" In 1854, by table 1, we see that 194,158,000 passengers, and
104,583,000 tons of freight, were carried each one mile; aggregate,
say 298,741,000 one mile.
" The average cost of moving one or the other of these one mile
was 1-8%-%2 cents."
He then assumes that the cost of transporting a
ton of freight is twice that of a passenger, and proceeds as follows:"Mean or average cost of one in 1854...     1.82 cents.,,,,,,    two in 1854....              3.64,,
Calling the proportion as one to two, it will be found
that one passenger costs.....  1.213
One ton costs............. 2.426,,
"In other words, it may be said, under this assumption in the
relative costs of passengers and tons, that for the year 1854 it cost,
in round numbers, about 14 cents per passenger per mile, and 2j
cents per ton per mile."
Here again we find an error utterly fatal, not only to
the correctness of Mr. Swift's figures, but also fatal
to his theory.
The true answer to the proposition is:One passenger costs.......   1o4 cents.
One ton costs......... 2,,
So much for.the figures. Now for the theory.
As Mr. Swift knows that it did not cost 1~%  cents




109
to carry passengers one mile on the thirty-seven Massachusetts roads in 1854, his favorite theory of 1 to 2
falls to the ground.
Mr. Swift's figures are incorrect, because he has
left out of the account the difference in the number of
tons and passengers carried one mile. It will be
found, if the several costs of transport as given by
Mr. Swift are multiplied by the number of tons and
passengers transported, that the product will not
amount to the sums expended; in other words, Mr.
Swift's " sums do not prove."  The only condition
under which his method of calculation can be correctly- applied is when the number of tons and of
passengers is precisely the same. Moreover, as applied to Boston railways, this arbitrary theory never
was correct, and is becoming less so every day. The
relative cost of freight and passenger transportation
is effected by numerous contingencies, and varies on
all roads.
On the Reading Railroad, with a comparatively
light passenger-travel, and an enormous tonnage,
moved over a descending grade, the cost per ton is
less than the cost per passenger; but on the Boston
and Maine, Providence, Eastern, and Old Colony
Roads, with a light tonnage and large passengertraffic, the cost of moving the ton is far greater than
that of moving the passenger.
The Fitchburg Railroad, with a large business in
both departments, presents as favorable an opportunity for the application of Mr. Swift's theory as any
Boston road. Let us make the application upon its
business in 1855 -




110
Comparative statement of business on Fitchburg Railroad proper,
and from connecting roads, in 1855..  Fitchburg.   Connecting  Fitchburg and
roads.    conn. roads.
Passengers carried 1 mile. 11,225,265  3,506,891  14,732,156
Receipts per pass. per mile  li%1  cts.  2-3j4  cts.  2To  cts.
Total passenger-receipts.  $214,236   $82,314   $296,551
Tons freight carried 1 mile  4,220,813  5,936,096  10,156,909
Receipts per ton per mile.  5yb2 cts.  26-%3u cts.  3T~7  cts.
Total freight-receipts..  $216,421   $156,350   $372,771
The total working expenses of the Fitchburg Railroad, in 1855, were $467,324. Applying Mr. Swift's
formula to the above table, it will be found.that the
cost of carrying wasPassenger per mile........... 13  cents.
Ton of freight per mile......                2.6,,
It will be seen, that, on freight from connecting roads,
the receipts per ton per mile were but 2M-3  cents, or:fw cents less than the average cost; while on the
Fitchburg  proper they were  5,M   cents, or nearly
twice as much.
The average number of passengers per train-mile was... 66
The average number of tons per train-mile was..... 52
Does any man believe that it cost no more than twice
as much to transport fifty-two tons of freight than it
did to carry sixty-six passengers, weighing less than
six tons?
Estimating the weight of each passenger and his




baggage at two hundred pounds, —which is, of course,
far above the average,- the following results are obtained:
Useful load carried one mile on the Fitchburg Railroad in 1855,
and gross receipts for the same.
Tons.      Gross receipts.
Passenger-department......        1,473,215.. $296,551
Freight-department.......   10,156,909.. 372,771
The cost of fuel per train-mile is twice greater in
the freight than in the passenger department.
The cost of cars in the passenger-department, 28 at
$2,000 each, is.......  $56,000
The cost of cars in the freight-department, 479 * at $700
each, is................ 335,300
When the expense of handling freight, the great
expenditure in real estate, and the amount of capital
invested in cars solely for its accommodation, are
taken into account, no one can doubt that the cost of
carrying a ton of freight on the Fitchburg Railroad in
1855 was at least three times greater than that of the
passenger. No mani can believe in the correctness of
Mr. Swift's theory, as to the relative cost of freight
and passenger transportation, who will visit the
freight-grounds of the Fitchburg Railroad Company
at Charlestown; witness the extent of buildings, the
great amount of land covered with iron tracks; observe
the number of cars and multitude of men employed
in the freight-department; note the length of time
required to load and unload & train, and contrast it
~ 363 eight-wheeled and 252 four-wheeled cars, equal to 479 eight-wheeled cars.




112
with the condition of things at the passenger-station
in Boston, where a train with two hundred passengers
is unloaded and ready within five minutes for further
service.
It is believed, that, if Mr. Swift will revise his
figures, and take into consideration the relative number of passengers and tons carried one mile, he will
abandon his theory, so far as the seven railways terminating in Boston are concerned. Boston railways
ought to and can obtain higher rates for freight-transportation generally; but tariffs should be judiciously
altered: on many articles they are too high, and on
others far too low. The classes of freight should be
increased, and sound discretion used in affixing tolls
thereon.
It is thought that a careful perusal of the histories
of the several Boston railways will demonstrate that
passenger-fares are too high and freight-tariffs too
low, and also that the receipts from both departments
may be much increased. It is not doubted that
expenses can be reduced at least thirty per cent, by
the introduction of a more comprehensive economy
and greater system in the management of Massachusetts railroads.
RISK OF PASSENGER-TRANSPORT.
A great deal has been said recently about the risk
of transporting passengers, and the necessity of increasing fares, in order to establish an insurance fund,




113
out of which to pay for damages incurred by passengers.
Calculations have been gravely put forth by one
company, showing the value of a car-load of passengers
at $5,000 per head; when it is believed, that, upon
the very road from whose President the calculation
emanated, more than ten millions of passengers have
been transported since its completion, without one
being killed. On the seven Boston railways, in 1855,
8,111,030 passengers were transported. The only
accidents fatal to passengers were on the'Boston and
Maine Road, in October last. A train, running over
a cow, was thrown from the track, and two expressmen
were instantly killed.
It is believed that closer attention to fences would
more effectually exclude cows from a railway track,
than an additional charge on passenger-travel.
On the railways of New York, in 1854, one passenger was killed, by causes beyond his own control,
for every 198,636,149 miles travelled; and one passenger was injured for every 66,212,050 miles travelled.
On British railways, in 1854, 93,346,149 passengers
were carried, and only nine were killed by causes beyond their own control.
Boston railways pay far more for "lost and damaged
freight" than for injuries inflicted upon passengers.
It should be remembered too, by railway managers,
that by far the larger part of the items of " taxes and
insurance," and also of "labor," are chargeable to'freight-department; and that the amount of capital




114
invested in real-estate, cars, and engines, is far greater
in the freight than in the passenger department.
It is in the freight-department that thorough reform
is absolutely necessary.
COAL-BURNING LOCOMOTIVES.
The rapid inroads upon the forests of this country,
and the consequently increased price of wood, caused
by railway demand, render it incumbent upon railway
managers to seek some fuel other than wood for locomotives.
Experiments have been made, with varied success,
with anthracite, semi-anthracite, and bituminous coals;
and recent experiments with coke are said to have
been quite successful.
In England, engines are run exclusively with coke,
costing from five to six cents per mile run.
On the Boston roads, the cost of fuel, varying from
eighteen to twenty-eight cents, averages 24W%%. It is
believed that coke can be delivered in Boston at thirteen dollars per gross ton. If this can be done, and
the consumption per mile run does not exceed that on
English roads, about thirty pounds per mile (twenty
on passenger and thirty-eight pounds on freight engines), it would reduce the cost of fuel to about
seventeen cents per mile.
But the probability is that coal will be adopted as
the fuel for locomotives' in this country, as there is




115
great waste in the production of coke; and we have
such a variety of coals, that there can be little doubt
that some of them will be found to possess all the
desired properties.
In January, 1855, Mr. G. A. Nichols, Engineer and
Superintendent of the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad, sent a communication to the "Pottsville Journal," embodying a statement of his experience in the
use of anthracite coal as a fuel for locomotives:
"Engines using coal cost from ten to twenty per cent more for
repairs than those using wood; but one ton of coal is equal to one
cord and a half of good dry oak-wood. Coal-burning passengerengines hauled six eight-wheeled cars ninety-three miles, at a speed
of thirty miles an hour, with a consumption of about two and a
half tons of coal."
At six dollars per ton for coal, the cost of fuel per
mile would be about sixteen cents.
Since that time, great improvements have been
made, by which the cost of repairs has been reduced;
and, in 1855, 2,213,292 tons of coal were transported
on the Reading Railroad exclusively by engines burning anthracite coal.
[From the "American Railway Times," March 22, 1855.]
" Result of an experiment with the'Anthracite,' coal-engine, on the
New-Bedford and Taunton and Taunton Branch Railroads.
" MR. EDITOR, - The following results of the operation on our
road of the coal-burning locomotive'Anthracite,' for ten days,
burning Cumberland coal, will be interesting to every railway
superintendent: --
The number of miles run was........ 1,082
The pounds of coal used were.......... 29,710
showing the consumption of coal to be 27A46% lbs. per mile.
16




116
" Calculating the cost of fuel, it is found that -
13 tons, 5 cwt., 1 qr., 2 lbs. coal, at $7 per ton, amounted to $92.84
Add cost of wood for kindling..........           17.00
Total cost of fuel...........   $109.84
or a cost per mile run of 10T~- cents.
"I have not been able to ascertain accurately the value of the
coke and coal taken from the grates each day, but estimate it to be
worth at least one-half the cost of the wood for kindling.
"A. E. SWASEY, Superintendent."
The subjoined table presents the result of some
experiments recently made with semi-bituminous
coal:
Experiments made on the Washington Branch of the Baltimore and
Ohio Railroad, with passenger-trains, to test the practicability
of using semi-bituminous or "Cumberland" coal in locomotive
engines of the ordinary form.
Pounds   Number   No. of
Date.         Distance.   Time.    of       of    Passenger
Coal.    Stops.    Cars.
1855.               Miles.  Hrs. Min.
June 23...     38        1 30-   2200        2        9
June 26...       38      1 30    1665        2        9
July  9...       38      1 45    1140        9        5
Comparison of results with wood and with coal on Washington
Branch of Balt. and Ohio Railroad, in June and July, 1855.
Pounds No. No.
Description of Fuel. Dist. Time. Wood.  of   of  of
Coal. stops. Cars.
Miles. Hrs. Min. Cub. ft.
Average of 8 trips    Pine-wood....  38  1 48 150.49       7   74,,,, 8,,  "Piedmont" coal 38  1 45  12.06  1956   7   7j,,,, 11,,  "Piedmont" coal 38  1 40  12.05  1401   6   64,,,, 4,,  "American" coal 38  1 48  14.05  1261  7   6,,,, 1,,  "Swanton" coal 38  1 45  10.05  1160   8   7




117
Cumberland coal can be landed in Boston at six
dollars per ton. Assuming the price per ton of coal,
or per cord of wood, to be six dollars, the result of
the  foregoing experiments may be thus summed
up:
ENGINES.  Miles    Cubic feet  Pounds  Cost  Cost
run.  of Wood.  of Coal.  per mile.    per Trip.
Wood....  38  150.49             18I ets. $7.05
Coal         38   12.78    1552   12,, 4.80
Saving on coal-engine..        5-? ects. $2.25
Numerous experiments have been made, in the
Northern and Western States, to test the practicability of using coal for locomotive purposes.  The
result of these proves conclusively that bituminous
coal can be advantageously substituted for wood.
Bituminous coal is found to have a less injurious
effect than anthracite upon iron.  Although, until
recently, no result entirely satisfactory has been attained in its use, it is probable, that, in the NewEngland States, Cumberland coal is better adapted
than any other for the purpose desired. The great
obstacle to the introduction of coal has been the difficulty of securing a perfect combustion of the smoke
and gases. At the temperature of about 700 degrees,
the smoke of bituminous coal is entirely consumed;
but at a lower degree of heat it attaches itself, in the
form of soot or lamp-black, to the shell of the boiler,
and to the flues; thus not only lessening the draught,
but also acting as a cloak to prevent the direct con



118
tact of heat to the water surface, thereby reducing
the evaporative power of the fuel. Some mechanical
arrangement was therefore desired, by which the
evolved gases, in their passage to the chimney, should
be measureably detained in sufficiently close proximity
to the fire-box, and also so mingled with the outer
air as to insure their combustion, not only to save
fuel, but also that a perfectly clean heat should come
in contact with the flues of the boiler.
This has been attempted by builders with various
degrees of success.
Many of the Western railways pass through a
country abounding in coal, but comparatively destitute of wood; and it is imperative upon their managers to use coal as their fuel.
The following letter, from a Division Superintendent
of the Illinois Central Railroad, gives the result of
recent experiments with a coal-burner on that railway: 
"ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD CO.,
DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT'S OFFICE,
Amboy, July 24, 1856.
"No. 51 completed its twenty-first trip yesterday, and has run
2,310 miles, doing regular freight-train service between Wapella
and Amboy. The results are highly gratifying; and it is a fixed
fact, that all our wood-burning engines can be converted into coalburners, at an expense not exceeding $275 each. I have caused
the fire-boxes, flue-sheets, and flues to be thoroughly examined
every trip, both at Wapella and Amboy, in order to detect any
defect or injury which might result; and, up to last night, we have
not discovered the slightest. The fire-box, flue-sheets, and flues
are as free from scales and expansion as on the day coal was put
in the furnace. The flues have not leaked a drop; the engine has
not lost a trip, nor has it ever failed for steam on any part of the




119
road, although, on six trips, the run from Wapella to Amboy was
made without shaking the grate-bars.  It is a strong piece of evidence in favor of the success of the use of Illinois coal in locomotive engines, that the grates have not sprung or warped in the least,
and are to-day as straight and as clean as if new.
"Here are the performances of several engines of the same
class as the coal-burner, doing the same work, with wood, on alternate days.
"The figures are taken from  the monthly report of fuel comsumed by engines on this Division; the cost of wood being estimated at $4.35 per cord, and coal at $3 per ton:Wood-Engine.      Miles travelled.           Wood consumed.               Cost.
No. 67..... 1320....... 49 cords...... $215.32
No. 39....         1526....... 65,..... 286.01
No. 54.....1,803....... 52,..... 228.37
No. 70..... 1,968....... 80,..... 348.00
No. 65..... 2,062......    89,,..... 389.32
Coal, 51..... 2082.....       tonscoal....  115.50
"These  engines are engaged on freight-train  service between
Amboy and Wapella, except No. 54, which is ditching, and Nos.
65 and 70, which run freights between Dunleith and Amboy.
"The  loads drawn by these engines have averaged 15 loaded
eight-wheeled cars, or a tonnage of 300,000 pounds each; and the
cost of fuel per mile run has been as follows: —
Miles run.    Cords of Wood.     Price per Cord.    Cost per Mile.
No. 57... 1,320.... 49..... $4.35.... 16.31 cents.
No. 39... 1,526.... 65..... 4.35.... 18.74,,
No. 54... 1,803.... 52..... 4.35.... 12.66,,
No. 70... 1,968.... 80....... 4.35.... 17.68,,
No. 65.. 2,062.... 89..... 4.35.... 18.88
No. 51... 2,082.... 38k tons coal, at $3.00....  5.54,,
"From   these  figures, I institute  the  following  comparisons,
showing the saving to be made in the use of coal:No. 57 ran 1,320 miles, at a cost of........  $215.32
No. 51 ran 1,320 miles, at a cost of..........  73.12
Saving in favor of coal............ $142.20
No. 39 ran 1,526 miles, at a cost of........  $286.01
No. 51 ran 1,526 miles, at a cost of..........    84.54
Saving in favor of coal.........$201.47




120
" The coal used in No. 51 is from the upper vein of La Salle
Mines, which seems to answer as well as that of the lower veins
for locomotives; though the lower, for other purposes, is esteemed
the best.
" The amount of cinders and dirt found in the fire-box, after a
trip of 110 miles, is small; averaging say two bushels from 51J
bushels of coal, — the average of coal used per trip.
"In conclusion, I submit the above to your consideration, confident I shall be able to make a large reduction in the cost of fuel
on my Division the coming year.
"I am, very respectfully,
"JAMES C. CLARKE,
"Division Superintendent Illinois Central Railroad."
It will be perceived, that, at $4.35 per cord for
wood, and $3 per ton for coal, there was a saving of
two-thirds the expense in favor of the coal-engine.
Experiments have recently been made, on the Boston
and Worcester Railway, with the " Hecla," a woodengine, altered to burn Cumberland coal, after a plan
of the Franklin Locomotive Works.
A large saving in the cost of fuel was effected, with
promise of more complete success hereafter. Trifling
alterations would materially increase the efficiency of
the engine.
The "Hecla" is an engine weighing 221 tons: she
was run exclusively with freight-trains. Estimating
the  cost of coal and wood at $7 per ton or per
cord, the following results were produced:The average cost of wood per round trip between
Boston and Worcester, with freight-trains, is 31~-f cents
per mile. With the " Hecla," burning coal, the highest cost per round trip was 191%W  cents per mile;
being a saving of 37fTh per cent in favor of coal.




121
The subjoined table shows the performance of the
engine on her several trips:Experiments with  the locomotive engine " Iecla," using bituminous
coal, on the Boston and  Worcester Railway, in May, 1856.
Worcester 441 2                       19, 01.4, 109110547 3 43 6& 65 6.42 3506.
Boston    448. 244 312.99    0  2  190 2'   2590;16,5316 0 6 8        59 6.24 2710  1
tartingcester  44  10    29,090 
0             4 09  8 85 7.99 3187.
Worcester  44 30  39,000              0     2190 14,54 3 43 6   6.42 3.06  16.09
Boston             420,900 i     4       7  2590..980' 24 87 0  5 9 65 8.2 42710  18.62
Worcester 441 18  189,900 2211 4355 6, 021600    10,2461 4 Ili 68 59 76.18 2449  11.82
Boston    44  26  3 99 100 2     41 30,2951 2064 07 2,4        72 6.74  3694  19.1
Worcester 44  18  189,090   7          26   1600 10,256  1 6 5 9 6.8 2604  11.8
favorable c ircumst         ances' for in the report of Gordon
Bosthe 44fire was not managed with th239816,531e sa      397  85 6.75as it  3514  1743
Woprevstious trials: 35  419,th00there      2800 21,24 5 02much 8  61 7.65 4336  20.27
Boston    44       the 34  370,remain000  ing  t 261019,519 4 31coal8  79 7.30 4321  19.05
Worcester quality 22  239,000 although there 590 13,224 4 09 8 85.99 3187  1190
Boston    44  38  420,900 22980 24.8705 491 8 65 8.20 4277  20.92
Worcester      23  199,000                  135 11,571was   51 7 72 8.08 3005t 10.24
Boston    41 27  349,900 225.7 3737 25,4592295 15,206 4 07 4  73 6.4638694  17.13
Worcester 44~ 15  189,090 225.7 3737 25,459 1442 10,2533 56 5 826.842606  10.71
The experiments were not tried under the most
favorable circumstances; for in the report of Gordon
H. Nott, Esq., the engineer under whose supervision
the trials were made, he states:"The fire was not managed with the same care as it was during
previous trials:* there was not so' much effort to clear the clinker
from the sides and the grate-bars. In the first four trips, the coal
was of a very inferior quality, as well as being more than ordinarily fine; upon the remaining trials, the coal was large and of a
better quality, although there were some large lumps, with veins of
slate. During these trials, there was a large portion of the time
used in taking and leaving cars at the stations on the road, which
required more fuel than if the train went over the road without
changing.
"The  furnace-door was not opened after firing, and  the smoke
* Experiments previously conducted by Mr.?ott With the "IIHeclas" under a different plan.




122
from the chimney was quite light-colored. There was an instant,
after the raw coal was added, when there was a cloud from the
chimney; and this was not very black."
It is proper also to add, that, during these trials, on
several occasions aid was rendered to other trains
on the road.
Early in the present year, a passenger-engine, called
the "Canute," constructed after plans by Mr. D.
Beattie, for the purpose of burning coal, was run in
England, on the London and South-western Railway,
with great success.
The fire-box of this engine was furnished with a
chamber formed of fire-brick. The consumption of
smoke was said to be completely attained, and the
evaporative power of the coal increased.
With an express passenger-train of 10i carriages,
weighing 66 tons, a speed of 34 miles an hour, including stops, was attained, with a consumption of but
15 pounds of coal per train-mile. Water evaporated
9T-5  pounds with- a pound of coal.
With a train of 28 carriages, weighing 203 tons,
a speed of 301 miles an hour was attained, with a
consumption of 284 pounds of coal per mile. Water
evaporated 8N-o pounds with a pound of coal.
In the " Canute," the feed-water was heated to boiling-point before entering the boiler; and the steam
was also super-heated.
In England, in 1854, the evaporative powers of coal
and coke were as 2 to 3, owing to an imperfect knowledge of the use of coal. By the improved method
of combustion, coal is equally effective with coke.




123
Hence, the cost of coal and coke being as 2 to 3,
there is a saving of one-third by the use of coal.
This apparently settles the question as to the practicability of using coal as a fuel for locomotives; for
with coal at $6 per ton, and with a consumption of
15 pounds per mile, a train containing 250 people
could be conveyed from Boston to Worcester at an
expense for fuel of $1.80; whereas, with wood at $6
per cord, the cost of the same service would be
about $7.
The experiments with the "Canute" not only
demonstrated the practicability of using coal instead
of coke, but also that it was equally effective in producing steam.
The average consumption of coke on English railways in 1855, on passenger and freight engines,
having been thirty pounds per mile (twenty on passenger and thirty-eight on freight engines), the result
of the foregoing demonstration proves, that, by adopting the improvements of the " Canute," and with coal
at $6 per ton, even if the consumption per mile were
not reduced below the average amount of coke used
in England in 1855, the cost of fuel per train-mile
would be but 8r30I cents. The average expenditure
for fuel per mile upon the seven Boston railways, in
1855, having been 24N%3 cents, it follows that a reduction to 8T-Y cents for the same service would be equivalent to a saving of 16A cents per mile, or more
than 67 per cent.
But the additional improvements on the "Canute"
reduced the consumption of coal on a passenger-train,
17




124
in one instance, to 15 pounds per mile; thus reducing
the cost to four cents per mile.
The following  table  shows the  result of experiments recently tried on the Providence and Worcester
Railroad with the " Slater," a coal-burning locomotive
built by William Mason and Company, of Taunton,
with "Boardman's patent boiler; " and the " Grafton,"
a wood-burning locomotive built by the Taunton
Locomotive Manufacturing Company, - both freightengines. Experiments made from Aug. 15 to Sept. 2,
1856, inclusive: —
Route, from Providence to Worcester, and return.
Distance, 90 miles.
Maximum  grade, 27 feet per mile for 4,300 feet.
Total curvature, 2,456~ 30'.
Shortest radius, 716 feet for 875 feet.
The  cost of wood  or coal assumed to be $6  per
cord, or per ton of 2,240 pounds.
Comparative result of experiments with wood-burner " Grafton"
and coal-burner " Slater," the latter burning Cumberland coal.
Weight of
Name of  Charter. Miles  Useful load.   Dead   Totalweiht  trains,
engine.          run.              weight.           average of
_______   _ _8  trips.
Tons.    Tons.     Tons.     Tons.
Grafton  Wood  720   1137MiW        1119   2256%5%      282
Slater    Coal   720   1094jj1f0o   1043  21373P%7%   267
Name of   Fuel used.    Wate      r pressrea  Cost of fuel Total cost of
engine.             evaporated. ed to alb. to square  per trin- fuel
Coal. Wood.        of fuel. inch.           fuel.
Ton.  Crds.  Pounds.  Pounds.    Pounds.  Cents.
Grafton          46                         381      $276
Slater    17TIfa   1  299,880  7~%~   100  151T:%-  $108.05
Saving on coal-burner, 60* per cent.




125
The consumption of wood on the " Grafton," in the
trial here mentioned, having been larger than usual,
the wood-burning locomotive "Orray Taft," constructed
by Corliss, Nightingale, and Company,, of Providence,
R.I., was run against the " Slater," with the following
result. Trial made with the " Orray Taft " from Sept.
25 to Oct. 3, 1856.
Comparative result of experiments with coal-burner "Slater" and
wood-burner " Orray Taft."
Weight of
Name of engine. Character. Miles Useful load.   Dead  Total weight.  rains
run             weight.          average of
8 trips.
Tons.    Tons.    To ns.
Slater      Coal  720 1094N3o7hf  1043   2137-f7foe  267
Orray Taft Wood 720 1128%u {1224-4  2352-72U,  294T{U
Water Pressure  st f 
Name of engine.  Fuel used.    Water  evaporat-e of steam per of uei Total cost of
evaporated. ed to a lb. to square per an-   fuel.
Coal. Wood.       of fuel. inch.   m e.
Tons. Cab.5.  Pounds.  Poundi.    Pounds.  Cents.
Slater     17ThI   1  299,880  71%7d   100  15Tu6  $108.05
Orray Taft        392                       32,?~   $237
Saving on coal-burner, 54A~ per cent.
The "Slater" was the first coal-burner built by
William Mason and Company. She has been running constantly for the past year on the Providence
and Worcester Railroad, and has given entire satisfaction. During the year ending October 24, 1856, she
ran 24,726 miles. There has been no expenditure
on her boiler; and her grate-bars are the same originally put in. A recent thorough examination of her
fire-box developed not the slightest evidence of failure.




126
On her trial-trip, she ran from Providence to
Worcester, and back (90 miles), with the ordinary
passenger-train, made 36 stops, and remained an hour
and a half in Worcester. Coal consumed, 2,300
pounds. Eight and a half pounds of water evaporated to a pound of fuel.
Assuming the cost of coal to be $6 per ton, the
cost of fuel per mile was 6-%Y cents.
After a most thorough trial of the "Slater," her
builders have recently received an order for another
coal-burner from the managers of the Providence and
Worcester Railroad Company. Since the construction
of the " Slater," Messrs. William Mason and Company
have built the " Phoenix," now being run by the NewJersey Railroad and Transportation Company.
During the week ending Aug. 16, 1856, this engine
run 655 miles with a heavy passenger-train, averaging
9 and 10 long cars each trip. The total consumption
of fuel was 6 tons 2 cwt. of coal and 1 cord of wood.
This includes all the fuel used on the engine, not
merely that consumed while on the road.
At $6 per ton and per cord for coal and wood, the
cost of fuel per mile on the "Phoenix" was 61 cents.
She ran 924 miles with a ton of coal, and dai of a
cord of wood.
A letter describing the "Phoenix" closes with these
words: "This engine runs with as much ease and
comfort to the engineer as a wood-engine, and with
much less annoyance to passengers. She makes no
smoke, gas, or sparks."
It is confidently believed that the introduction




127
of these coal-burners upon Boston railways would
be productive of an annual saving of more than
$400,000.
Whatever results may have been attained by other
builders, the success of William Mason and Company
is clear and decided; and it is believed that there are
not on record results so satisfactory as are herein
recorded of the well-authenticated performances of
their locomotives.
But it should be borne in mind, that the mere saving
in the cost of fuel is not the only advantage to be
gained by the substitution of coal for wood.
It would bring into profitable use a great extent of
valuable property now occupied solely for the storage
of the vast supplies of wood that the several companies are obliged to keep constantly on hand.
The number of fuel-stations could be reduced; because a tender could easily carry a supply of coal
sufficient for a route of 100 miles.
The comparatively small quantity of wood that
railways must necessarily consume could be purchased
at a reduced price; and the tariffs which self-preservation has compelled railway companies to affix upon
wood could be so far reduced as to add to their freightlist a new and profitable article for transportation.
These are some of the advantages to be gained by
the introduction of coal.
A perpetual investment in fuel of from $25,000 to
$100,000 by each of the corporations is now necessary, because old'and dry wood alone can be consumed
with any degree of economy. This involves the




128
necessity of a large supply. Upon these heavy investments, the several corporations lose annually a
large sum in interest; to say nothing of the amount
paid for insurance, nor of the loss and inconvenience
arising from the destruction of their wood and sheds
by fire.
All these evils would be avoided by the introduction of coal.
The immense increase in the consumption of wood
by locomotive-engines is so rapidly destroying our
forests, that it will not long remain a matter of inclination merely, but one of necessity, that coal should
be substituted therefor.  The constantly ihcreasing
cost of fuel, otherwise inevitable, would at once be
arrested by the use of coal; the inexhaustible supply
of which will remove at once the fears, often expressed by some railway-managers, that roads relying
solely upon wood for their fuel must ultimately become worthless, from an utter inability to obtain that
hitherto indispensable article.
It would seem that a careful perusal of the foregoing well-authenticated results of experiments with
coal-burning locomotives justifies the declaration, that
a saving of 50 per cent in the cost of fuel on Boston
railways may reasonably be expected.
Let us see what results would follow such saving.
The expenditure for fuel on Boston railways, in
1855, amounted to $711,773.39. A saving of 50 per
cent would amount to $355,886.69.  At par, the
capital stock of the seven railways terminating in
Boston amounts to $23,546,300. The saving in the




129
cost of fuel, by introducing coal-burning engines,
would be equivalent to a dividend of lr per cent
on the entire capital stock; this, added to net earnings in 1855, as per Legislative returns, would have
brought net revenues up to 8-1 per cent on the share
capital. These facts point clearly to the introduction
of coal-burning locomotives upon our Boston railways
as the only alternative; and, the sooner it is accepted,
the better it will be for railway stockholders and
for the public.
HAVE EXPENSES REACHED THEIR MAXIMUM?
Fuel, iron, sleepers, labor, and oil constitute the
chief items of expense in operating railways. The
introduction of coal as a fuel, and the inexhaustible
supply of that article, will dispose of the first item.
Greater care in the selection of the best quality of
iron, and the introduction of lighter engines, will
reduce the expense of the second item.
The adoption of the comparatively indestructible
sleepers of kyanized spruce and hemlock will lessen
the outlay for the third item.
A better system of discipline, and consequently
more advantageous employment of labor, must be
relied upon to diminish charges on the fourth item;
for it is not desirable that the present price of labor
should decline. Employees should be well paid, and
of the best class.




130
Greater economy in the use of oil is practicable;
and there is every reason to believe that the maximum
cost of this article has been attained.
CONCLUSIO N.
I have thus endeavored to show, -
1st, That Boston railways have been of great benefit to the community.
2d, That they have received, and are receiving, a fair
return for the capital invested.
3d, That they have not been, and are not now,
managed with the greatest practicable economy.
4th, That tariffs have not been properly discriminative; that high and low fares have not been, and
are not now, properly applied.
5th, That expenses have reached their maximum,
and can be much reduced.
6th, That the business of railways can be largely
increased with but trifling outlay.
All will agree, that there is a rate of tariff to be
applied to railways that would virtually amount to
prohibition;
That, the lower the tariff, the larger will be the
business of a line;
That a large amount of business can be done
cheaper, pro rata, than a smaller amount;
That there is a point below which no railway can
afford to run;




131
That this "point" is affected by numerous contingencies;
And that railway directors owe it to themselves,
the stockholders, and the community, to insist upon the
practice of the truest economy on their several roads.
There can be but little doubt that the true reasons
why Boston railways do not earn larger dividends,
are,
Because they are not managed with true economy;
Because through freight and travel do not pay
remunerative rates;
And because local traffic, not being sufficiently encouraged, is not nearly so large as it can be made.
It appears by table A, at the end of this pamphlet,
that, notwithstanding the multiplication of lines, each
road has steadily increased its receipts.
Does any one believe that the population and business of the State of Massachusetts will now remain
stationary, after an increase almost unbroken for more
than two hundred years?
Is there a man who supposes that the receipts of
Boston railways will remain at their present point,
after an increase steadily continued for twenty years? 
Heretofore, each road has increased its income in
spite of new and competing lines; but there need be
no fear of other rivals for the business within fifty
miles of Boston. That territory is already covered
with a close network of rails, all contributing to the
seven Boston roads.
No well-grounded cause exists for the present depressed market-value of Boston railways. The present
18




132
real value of their shares, as dividend-earning securities, is far above that attached to them in State Street;
and, prospectively, no investment presents a greater
certainty of ample return than is offered by Boston
railways.




APPENDIX.
RAILWAY REPORTS.
IT is to be desired that a better form of Railway Legislative
Returns were adopted, and that the Annual Reports of directors to
stockholders were more complete. Both are meagre and unsatisfactory; neither giving stockholders a precise idea of the situation
of their property, nor serving as a guide to directors for their future
labors.
Most of the tables in the preceding pages were gleaned from
legislative returns, in which the important facts were buried under
such a mass of useless figures that it required much time and labor
to exhume them.
A system is required that will be less irksome to railway officials,
and at the same time better serve the purpose intended.
REDUCING EXPENSES.
Within a few weeks, a notable plan has been suggested, which
it is supposed will materially reduce expenses, and add largely to
dividends.
It is proposed to withdraw railway advertisements from the
newspapers, and, in lieu thereof, issue certain monthly publications
containing the order of running of the several roads. These publications are to be printed at the rate of twelve dollars and fifty




134
cents per thousand; the expense to be borne conjointly by the
several roads. If any corporation during the month change their
time-tables, the expense of a new issue of tables is to be paid by
such corporation.
It is apparent, that, while this change would not incommode the
public, the saving thus effected would amount to a very considerable
sum, - possibly to T~a part of one per cent upon the aggregate
capital of the united corporations.
It would doubtless be politic on the part of stockholders to add
to the salary of that person, who first suggested this happy idea, the
amount of money thus saved, in order -to promote increased vigilance on the part of railway officials, and to reward the ingenuity
manifested in this extremely judicious plan.
THE RAILWAY SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES.
Few people have any just conception of the magnitude of the
railway system in the United States.
Next to agriculture, it is the chief interest. It exceeds navigation twofold.
Twenty-three thousand miles of railway are in operation, and
10,000 miles under construction, - 33,000 miles in all, or more
than sufficient to encircle the globe. The capital invested is more
than eight hundred millions of dollars! It requires 8,250 locomotives and 66,000 cars to equip the railways of the nation. Each
engine, with its tender, occupies about thirty-six feet of track, and
each car at least thirty feet. If engines, tenders, and cars were
placed in continuous line, they would form a grand train four hundred and thirty-one miles long.
If the proportionate mileage be half that on Boston railways
in 1855, it amounts annually to 107,250,000 miles, - a distance
greater than that between the earth and the sun. The daily mileage
is equal to a journey eleven times round the earth. A saving of
ten cents per mile on this vast mileage amounts to $11,000,000
per annum. When it is considered that this sum is lost to the
public, the interest of the community in the economical management of railways is apparent.




135
The force directly engaged in operating railways amounts to at
least 150,000 men. The number employed in constructing and
operating railways, and in the manufacture of railway materials, is
not less than 500,000 men. The number of persons directly dependent upon railways exceeds 1,000,000.
The railway system is a potent instrument of civilization, and a
strong bond of union between people of otherwise conflicting interests. It opens to industry territories otherwise uncultivated. It
enlarges the capabilities of production, and consequently increases
wealth.  In connection with the electric telegraph, it extends our
power as a military nation.  It affects the interests and social
relations of all within our borders.  Nor is its wide-spread influence confined to our own land: it is co-extensive with civilization.
Its magic influence presents this paradox:- -
While it scatters population, and enlarges the domain of cultivation, it brings the people into closer contact, and distant places
into proximity. Diffusing, it concentrates; expanding, it contracts.
Whatever has been its pecuniary success, badly managed as it
is, and lacking a proper organization, it cannot be denied that the
country at large has derived great benefit from the progress of the
Railway System in the United States.




TABLE A.
Gross receipts of seven Boston Railways,from 1835 to 1855 inclusive.
Boston and    Boston and   Boston and Pro- Boston and Wor-                 Old Colony and
Lowell.     Maine.       vidence.     cester.                              Fall River.
1835...   $45,529.03               $106,929.88   $161,805.95
1836...   135,327.32                 243,095.62    183,286.03
1837...   180,770.04                 250,883.66    210,048.33
1838...   191,778.57                 265,115.15    212,325.03   $37,422.36
1839...   241,219.94                313,907.04    231,807.18   125,623.15
1840..      231,575.27               202,601.06    267,547.41    199,134.50
1841...   267,541.34                230,821.03    310,807.87   299,574.13
1842...   278,310.68   $155,880.69   236,467.91    349,206.66   269,168.72
1843...   277,315.06    178,744.99   233,388.01    383,367.10   284,184.75
1844...   316,909.58    233,101.04   283,701.18    428,437.34   353,244.18    $42,759.36
1845...   356,067.67    287,063.10   350,628.97    474,855.53   363,216.23    203,996.36
1846...   384,102.29    349,136.56   360,875.03    554,712.46   371,338.61    286,645.36
1847...   448,555.90    511,404.86   363,328.37    722,170.32   424,840.83    390,736.97
1848...   461,339.35    511,627.95   354,375.43    716,284.11   479,157.89    486,265.63
1849...   461,488.00    522,335.51   354,331.60    703,361.15   517,929.17    493,060.43
1850...   406,421.00    594,963.45   370,727.26    757,946.79   539,076.43    551,607.13
1851...   409,152.88    633,095.15   377,396.57*  743,922.60   502,054.53    516,012.76 *
1852...   388,108.37    661,521.63   429,484.34    758,819.47   488,973.31    574,574.36
1853...   434,599.99    803,024.14   508,326.59    887,219.87   620,810.90    626,679.73
1854...   442,491.65    906,790.28   544,829.85    952,894.98   730,269.58t   704,638.63  $649,656.14
1855...   489,754.85    854,425.96   558,671.25  1,008,005.00   647,280.75 *  681,162.52   653,499.32
* Eleven months.               t Including $111,500 for property sold.




137
TABLE B.
Boston and Loweli.
Year.  Cost of Road. Gross Receipts. Net Receipts. Miles run. Passengers. Tons Frt.
1850. $1,945,646.68  $406,421.00  $148,536.97  235,995  558,993  231,874
1851.  1,945,646.68   409,152.88   141,123.21  250,558  569,784  249,468
1852.  1,995,249.02   388,108.37   130,881.04  247,362  541,531  246,330
1853.  2,044,53 6.15   434,599.99   114,098.34  275,681  657,391  342,629
1854.  2,158,932.89   442,491.65   104,175.12  286,458   604,706  325,960
1855.  2,188,595.25   489,754.85   123,634.78  295,517  574,614  288,836
Boston and Maine.
Year.  Cost of Road. Gross Receipts.  Net Receipts. Milesrun. Passengers. Tons Frt.
1850. $4,021,606.29  $594,963.45  $285,057.11  468,590  1,221,071  143,673
1851.  4,090,452.48   633,095.15   328,026.75  461,856  1,449,421  156,700
1852.  4,092,926.58   661,521.63   338,215.42  503,663  1,465,924  193,908
1853.  4,111,345.82   803,024.14   418,358.41  516,328  1,820,752  251,327
1854.  4,179,535.16   906,790.28   421,561.34  569,189  1,969,464  384,784
1855.  4,179,546.19   854,425.96   330,059.52  583,016  1,869,352  245,717
Boston and Providence.
Year.  Cost of Road. Gross Receipts. Net Receipts. Miles run. Passengers. Tons Frt.
1850. $3,416,232.51  $370,727.26  $208,797.00  251,950   591,949  104,203
1851.* 3,469,599.38   377,396.57   199,620.40  252,927   611,020   121,320
1852.  3,546,203.89   429,484.34   212,625.42  283,920   672,122  129,482
1853.  3,576,041.41   508,326.59   226,639.47  305,734  748,051  142,126
1854.  3,611,821.65   544,829.85   209,126.08  330,590   852,270   149,540
1855.  3,667,154.31   558,671.25   195,485.17  316,238   874,178  142,121
* Eleven months.
Boston and Worcester.
Year.  Cost of Road. Gross Receipts. Net Receipts.  Miles run. Passengers. Tons Frt.
1850. $4,882,645.23  $757,946.79  $353,607.98  436,199  1,001,989  252,253
1851.  4,862,748.00   743,922.60   329,813.33  466,523  1,100,720  242,789
1852.  4,845,966.99   758,819.47   331,296.79  478,819  1,185,371  257,657
1853.  4,850,754.70   887,219.87   413,289.83  513,580  1,460,011  309,715
1854.  4,856,370.84   952,894.98   342,129.24  551,847  1,608,602  324,989
1855.  4,865,439.03 1,008,005.00   391,261.39  541,528  1,590,459  328,806




138
TABLE B (continued).
Eastern.
Year.  Cost of Road. Gross Receipts. Net Receipts. l Milesrun. Passengers. Tons Frt.
1850. $3,120,391.67  $539,076.43  $317,415.88  311,004  1,006,552   71,586
1851.  3,120,391.67   502,054.53   277,455.32  318,900    993,256   61,952
1852.  3,120,391.67   488,973.31   241,017.39  311,964  1,004,991   81,027
1853.  3,120,391.67   620,810.90   310,875.05  355,159  1,099,418  102,617
1854.  4,447,4:59.99   730,269.58   346,425.05  390,560  1,181,514  118,013
1855.* 4,621,016.50   647,280.75   162,739.78jt 316,186    958,480   82,684
* Eleven months.
t Net earnings, after deducting working expenses..  $305,997.47
Interest on debt................ 143,257.69
Fitchburg.
Year.  Cost of Road. Gross Receipts. Net Receipts. Milesrun. Passengers.. Tons Frt.
1850. $3,552,282.59  $551,607.13  $294,523.33  375,424  1,080,286  328,258
1851.* 3,612,486.97   516,012.76   205,635.80  371,899  1,261,159  333,713
1852.  3,633,673.57   574,574.36   232,787.32  425,365  1,214,755  427,3 72
1853.  3,716,870.10   626,659.73   214,633.66  461,599  1,269,675  430,606
1854.  3,730,965.47   704,638.63   272,715.80  505,034  1,262,600  478,606
1855.  3,765,998.19   681,162.52   213,837.81  451,944  1,049,757  449,804
* Eleven months.
Old Colony and Fall River.
Year.  Cost of Road. Gross Receipts. Net Receipts. Miles run. Passengers. Tons Frt.
11854. $3,362,948.60  $649,656.14  $142,800.80  389,203  1,282,610  236,297
1855.  3,362,948.60   653,499.32   276,365.70  408,107  1,194,190  147,824
NOTE. - On page 56, twenty-second and twenty-third lines, "' 45 " should read
"50."  The number of miles given refers to the length of iron. The length of track
to be laid with a thousand tons would, of course, be half that amount; viz., —
With 50 lb. rail, 25i4U0  miles of iron, or 12 7 2 miles of track.,,   70,,   18ios,,,,,       9To,,,,