W rcester PtI lippi ie Ctc lecti n. k 4 ' v. I- I 'a r. r 1 rk -t 2; h 1. I 6 . WI I. Worcest( -1Philippine rC. 6? 2-,/ 2 - kA ' 6-l W.,, /' ", i Ab %,Wr.0 It REPORT I OF MAJOR-GEN ERAL-,1 E.S TS U. S. VOLUNTEERS, ON MILITARY OPERATI ONS A ND[ (1 tYIL A FFA IRS IN THlE P1"-IFLAT)PPINE ISLAN\IDS. WASHINGTON: GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 189 9.. ~~ 1/ 01. / '7 1. ANNUAL REPORT OF MAJ. GEN. E. S. OTIS, U. S. V., COMMANDING DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS, MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. 1IDQRS. I)EPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS, AND (FFICE I. S. IILITARY G)VERNOR IN IPHILIPPINE ISLANDS, JMunila, P. f., Adufsft 31, 1899. Thle ADJUTANT-GENERAL UNITED STATES ARMY, l'ast.s 1 i(jto, 1). C. SIR: I lave received instlrlctions from the Major-(;eneral Conllanldingll the Army' to subtlit an11 annual report of the military operations of the troops of this conml and, also from tile War I)epartment to "':rnish a report (if the affairs of thIis military government. The ers conillecte(l with each of these subl)jects are so closely related as to nmake the rendition of separate and independent reports very difficult, witllhout )prolucilngl ill each t 1111lll which the other iltust contain. I have, tilerefore, cocluded 1to emlllracee ill a singlle narration with comllient, as necessary -explanation may appear to ine to dem;and, the conditions w\-liil ltha-e presented tllellselves, botlh Iilitary, civil, or political, and t lie leans wh lihe lhave been. adopted to mleet themn. In (ldoilg tlhis only lthe general feat ures of tlhe more importtanlt events can be toluchlled uIpo, as ani aittemil tt o i detail causes, effects, and the action wh\ich h}as been alpplie(l by t- tle military authorities would involve a very extended rlecount ing of facts;nd a lenlgthy (liscussion of theories. The time whtlicll I amtl directed to cover in these reports may properly lbe divided illto Iwo periods-the first extenlding from June 30, 189!8, to Fel)luary 4, 1899, the (late ulpomil which the thlen rebellious sub-.jocts of Spain attaceked at MantIila, without caulse, the forces of the lnited States, which, under tlie prIotoeol, of August 12, 1898, and likewise thle articles of capitulation of the following day, were lawfully in )ossession of thle city, bay, and harbor of M3anila.. The second period extends from Febl)rary 4, 1899S (wNlhen these open and declared hostilities were illaugitrated), to tlle present date. The eveints of a portion of thel filrst perio, in so far as the concentration of troops at San Francisco an1d the transplortation of those sent out to the Philippines, to and ilnc(luding July 15, 1898, are concerned, together with all action of troops l)leliminary to, atld attendant upon, the capture of Manila onI Atgust 13, 1898, and thereafter to the end of that month, have been ably reported by mly predecessor, Major-General Merritt. But a brief reference to the preparations made by the Government, as solely affecting the Arly, in its efforts to meet existing or antici-pated conditions in the Philippines resulting from, or likely to arise ' in, the war with Spain, is pertinent here in order to present intelligently the services of troops in these islands. The Philippine problem, so unexpectedly and suddenly thrown upon the Government for solution by the destruction of the Spanish fleet in the harbor of Manila on May 1, 1898, when the concentration of all its troops and military stores was being hastily made on the southern 1 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENEIRAL OTIS. Atlantic coas, received the promplt attention whlichl its importance. demanded. At once the enlistllment of \vo(liteers in thle 1'acific Slope and adjaecent St;ties was accelerlated a(ltd their places of assemblilng changted to Sal 14 lraneisco(. I ll(der VWar l l)epalrtcntllt inlstrulctions to proceed to t tlit po)inlt for duty,! I arri vedl there oin May 17, whe\re already Majort-Generl( tl Merriaml, (co! a dllll ingoit the De I)e)prtiiefllnt llof Callifornia, ha ld p lacled inl calmp an infantry regiiment:1a11l a leavy artillery deiachinellt of Califotnllia volulteers, an infialltl'i battalio(l of ()re*g(ol troops, and five colipanilies of the Fo(urteent II United St ates Ilfant Iy. Within tlie next te]n ldays tle Ntel)aska, Colorad(lo, C1 inlesot a, \\'yoming, Idaho, Utali, North Dlakota, a1i( I ( Montana[ volunlteers arri'vel, also tlhe two relmaining bat tal lions of t lie (regon regienlei it an(:d a vol tll eer regi inent from Pennsylvania. ()I May 2' te Eighiteelth and Twently-third United States Inflltiry l nd a comlpaiy of tlte I llitedl States Engineers reported, andl d(11rilg, thle monthl of Jun II( the volunteler organ.izations of South D)akota, Iowa, Tennessee, the t stor lBattery, of New York, 4 foot batteries of thle Third and 2 light batte ries of tlhe Sixth 17. S. Artillery, and 6 trools of the Fourth (Cavalry were p)laced in camp, also 2 volunteer signal companies and lar'e Ilospital Corps detachments. On May 30 General Merritt arlived fromt New York and relieved me from commalnd of all these so-calle(l expeditionary forces, remairing there until the:29thi of the followinrg month, Lwhen lie departed for the Philippines. The proper equipmnent of these troops waIs attended wit]h great difficulty. Suddenly called to lmeet an expected emergency in a far distant portion of the world, no preparations 1ad(l been made to receive them. The supply departmlents, not anticipat.ilg anti concentration of forces on the Pacific coast, had niade no provisions for furnishing arms, aminunitioI, clothilng, subsistence, or other war material with which an arit'y al)ot to operate 7,()()() miles from its base must necessarily be sulpl)lied. Indeed, at the time tlhese troops arrived at San Francisco such l) roplerty, usually kept in moder(ate quantities on the Pacific coast, 1Iad been sent to tlhe East for the army destined to invade Cuba and Porto Rico. Thle volunteer organizations w-ere supposed to reIort e(quipped and uniformed, 1but a large Lmaljority of the armns they presented were worthlless, and in sonme instances entir'e organizations had to be rearmledl. Their clothling had evidently been in use for a long tilne in State service, was worn out, and Imany of the men were dressed as civilians. In spite of all of these embarrassments, the celerity with which these troopIs were equipped and made ready for the field, and with which great quantities of necessary supplies and war materials were placed in San Francisco and loaded on transports, furnishes very satisfatctory evidence of the efficiency of the staff departments of the Arnmy. Fortunately, San Francisco is a great market, and imuch that was needed could be obtained there through contract n(l a purchase. The facilities thus offered were taken advantage of, and assisted very materially in the work of preparation. The shipping on the Pacific coast was found to be very limited, and vessels in anywise suited (even after they were overhauled and repaired) to transport troops to the Tropics were few, and most of them were at the time absent, engaged in foreign or domestic trade. This want was the principal cause of delay in dispatching troops, but the persistent efforts of the War Department, assisted by the army supply officers *in San Francisco, accomplished the desired results very quickly, considering the embarrassments with which it had to contend. The time required for these preparations, however, was most advantageously REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 3 employed. Generail officers, as soon 'is they reported for duty, were pla~cedi hi chari ge of buigade organizatioiis arid labored assiduouisly in giving proP~er iu'4i uct ions to their coni,1iidaiil5, so that when these troops slailed for the H~i~ii1pineCs the), coti(ld be considered iioderately,efficient for servxice. U,;ponl repo(rt inu at Stanl Francisco onl Max 17, 1 learned that G'eneral M~erriani lal r(eccixvedl orders to shfip to -Maiil-a Bayl the California regiment: andi a b itt ilion of the Fourteenth U) S. InfanltryT l) a. transport that was thien behing loaded in. the harbor wvith niav~al stores for' Admiral. Joiewe's squad ronl. Tb cicaft er beiiig itisi rutcted to obtain suifficient tranisportation to forwam'd also thev OregonI reg"iient, two small transp~orts were secuired, andl oni -May 25 the t~ince vessels sailed in comipa-ny, -Camlin the t roo)ps albove ]nientioiledl under the comunia-n( of Brig. Gen. T1 ~M. Aiidcerson, U. V. V. and enitered the harbor of -Manila on the 30th day of Tune. JPurstiarIt to the instrucetions of General Merritt 4- companiies of the Eighte-entl and 4 of the Twlxent -thliLd U. S. Infantry, a -deta~chmient of eng~ineers, the Colorado,:Neb~raska, Peninsylva~nia, arid Utah Volunteers, aind a detachment.. of thie Ilospital Corps-all under the command of Birig. G4en. F. V. Gi'eene, I.S. sie fo Manila o n J unIIe 15 On. Junle 27, under instructions from the same source, 4 complanies of the Eighteenth-I anid 4 of the Twenty-third U'. S. Infantry, det~achmients of Engineer,and Signa~l Corps, thie Idaho, Minnesota, No ft 1aoaand Wy'omingr Volunteers, departed on five transports, anld on.June `29 G'eneral ~Merritt, in person, accompanied byt his staff, sailed on stearmer A ewp-IoH for the same destintation, having on boar'd 2 foot batteries of the Third 11. S. Artillery and the Astor Lighit Battery. Thie troops of wNhich these three expeditiona~ry forces were composed numbercel 470 offheers and 10,437 eiilisted men. Stibseqnently, and betxween the 1.5th and 2,5thi days of July, the fourth expedition left San. Fra~ncisco, transhportie( by fixe vessels, and made uip of 2 bat~teries of the Third U'. S. Artillery, a' comlptanies of the Fourteenth 11. S. Infantry. 6 tr'oops of the Fourt h U). S. Clavaliry, the Montana and South D~akota Volunteers, with Signa~l and I lospital. Corps detachments, nmumbering in all, 172.,officers anid 4,6)10 enlisted iieni. -Before this last expeditionireachied -Maniila, that city had ctalituilated, and time Vnited States troops were in J)ossessioli. No additional t rools -were (lispathelid firoomn thie U.nited Sta~tes initil tie, latter p~art of October. Then, and in the followingm1onithl, wei'e sent the ~a-shiiiigton, Kantsas, Trennessee, and Iowa regiment's of volutnteers, thie N evada troop of cavalry, time Wyoming Light Artillery, and 2 foot batteries of California troops, numbering, collectively, I 86' officers tand 4,466 enlisted men. There were no further urrix-als diiringv the. Inirst of the two periods -which it is intended that this meport shall cover, and suibsequent troop additions will not be. mentioned until later. With the officers of my staff I accompanied time fou-rth expedition and arrived ini the huarbor of Manila on August 21, whiere wve first learned of the operations of the 10,000 men who had preceded or accompaniied Major-Gencial. M1-erritt, and which had resulted in the surrender of Manila and its occuptation by the United States forces on)I the 18th of that month. Reportingt1) to General Meirritt, I was placed ini command of the Eighth. Army Corps by General Orders, No. 10, le~adquar'ters Departmient of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, of Atngutst.23, 1898, which were issued under War Department General Orders, No. 73, of th) at year. Upon August 29, 18,inacrne with Greneral. Orders, No. 3, Headquiarters Department of the Pacific, 4Qf that (lat-e, I relieved Major-General Merritt of the command of the 4 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. Department of the Pacific and as Alililitry (Goverlnor of the llPiliIppine Islands. At this tilme tlhe mIilitay situlatioln wa s alS follows: Under the articles of caipitulltionl, 1 Tlited States occulpation was confinled to tie harbor, city, and h)ay o(f Manila. Admiral )ewey, with his fleet, 1eld( thle bay, also t lie inaval establishnient at Cavite, which had been capturedi ill nlay. 'I'lle illsllrgent forces, comlllnanded by General Aguinaldo, entered( the (ity with our trloops on August 13, and actively heldl joilt occupation with tlheml ove'r 1a (cosiderable part of the southern portion of the salle, (de(llinini to vacate on the plea, first, that tlhe.y litad served as allies withl omur tloops. (lllrilg the operations which had l )reedede the( takilng of tlhe c ity, adI(l therefore liad the right to participate in tile victt olry; anid, secondlyl, that t hey wished to maintain all aldv.altag reous I)ositions secured inl o)r(er to resist successfully the troops of Spain, slhoulld that (Govelrn llmnt he p)ermitted to resume its formiier power in tilie islands. Brigadl ier-(enlerials Anlderson and MacArthur were exercisilng inmeldiate (comalnd ll ofll o t le troopIs —the former at (Cavite and vicinity, vwhere a snlalll co(nt i()nli t.was stationed, and thle latter at.Manila, where the great mallijority liad l been judiciously placed in barracks and other ava il;al)e b)ildings. (elileral acArthlr, also, as provost-lalgnel, ad ch ll'rge of tlihe p1olice (of that ( ity and supervision of about 13,000 )()risners-Spl)ais,nld ativ e —w11o had been surrendered by the Spanishl auithorities. TI ese li1(1 been collected in the walled portionl of the city and oc(upied, for tlhe most part, its churelies and convents. Outwardly peace reigne(l, but the insurgents, disappointed because not permitted to enjoy the spoils of war, in accordance with medieval customs, and to exercise with the United States authorities joint control of munici)al iffairs, were not friendly disposed and endeavored to obtain their uasserted rights and privileges through controversy and negotiations and a stubborn holding of the positions taken by their troops. This manifestation caused General Merritt to cable the authorities at Washington, on August 14, as follows: Since occupation of town and suburbs the insurgents on outside are pressing demand for joint occupation of the city. Inform me at once how far I shall proceed in enforcing obedience of insurgents in this matter and others that may arise, etc. To which he received reply-dated August 18-that there imust be no joint occupation of the city, bay, and harbor with the insurgents; that they and all others must recognize the military occupation and authority of the United States and the cessation of hostilities proclaimed by the President. Some correspondence between General Merritt and Aguinaldo preceded and followed this dispatch, and I believe also two or three discussions of the subject between the rep)resentatives of Aguinaldo and General Merritt's subordinate officers, all of which have been reported. Upon leaving the island, General Merritt's chief of staff turned over to me a communication from General Aguinaldo, and in letter transmitting it said: Enclosed you will find a letter from General Aguinaldo and a blue print of Manila. The letter was brought by his aid two days ago, and was informed that a reply would be sent within four days. The matter should have immediate attention, as.General Merritt has not been able to take it up, owing to his hurried J departure. The letters referred to by Aguinaldo, by General Merritt, will )e found in the press copy-book at the Department Headquarters and here. The demand now made by Aguinaldo is to retain his people just outside of the interior black pencil mark on the map. The outside pencil marks indicate the position that General Merritt desired to have the insurgents withdraw to. I REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. inferred from what the aid said that what Aguinaldo particularly desires is that in case his requests are not granted that reasons are to be given which he can use to satisfy his people. The trouble with him seems to be that he does not think it prudent to give positive orders for his people to withdraw from the city. Thle communication tullned over read as follows: REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES. Presidelci( Balkooi, Aoygust 27. 1.98. Gen. WESLEY MERRITT. Manila. MY DEAR SIR: Knowing the contents of your letter of the 24th instant. I can not do less than manifest my surprise at knowing that you had formed the idea that my commissioners compromised themselves. in the conference of the 15th. to retire my troops outside of the line that you would designate. I understood. and still understand, as well as the commissioners, that the evacuation by my troops of the posts that they occupy to-day on the outskirts of the city, would take place when the proposed conditions were accepted by you. among which figured the condition that the agreement (treaty) should be in writing to be valid; for which reason. not having yet accepted some of the propositions made at that time. nor those that were substituted in my previous communication, I do not think that up to the present time I have contracted said obligation. If I have permitted the use of the waters before the promulgation of the treaty it was more to demonstrate that I am disposed to sacrifice to friendship everything that does not prejudice too much the rights of the Philippines. 1 comprehend,. as well as yourself. the inconvenience of a dual occupation of the city of Manila and its suburbs, given in the conditions stipulated in the capitulation with the Spaniards: but you ought to understand that without the long siege sustained by my forces you might have obtained possession of the ruins of the city. but never the rendition of the Spanish forces, who could have retired to the interior towns. I do not complain of the disowning of our help in the mentioned capitulation, although justice resents it greatly and I have to bear the well-founded blame of my people. I do not insist on the retention of all the positions conquered by my forces within the city limits, at the cost of much blood. of indescribable fatigues, and lmuch money. I promise to retire, then, to the following line: In Malate. the continuation of the calzada of Singalon to the bridge that joins said road: from this bridge in straight line to that of Paco: from this last bridge, following the creek Paco. and leaving outside the suburb Tandue, to the river Pasig: following this river and entering by the creek that goes to the bridge of Aviles; from this bridge. following the road (calzada) of the same name and that of Santa Mesa, thlat are the dividing lines between Sampaloc and the village of Pandacan. to the jurisdictional limit of the suburbs of Sampaloc, Trozo, and Tondo. But before I retire to this line, I pray you to reclaim from Admiral Dewey the protection of our ships for free navigation. and permit me to insist, if you will. upon the restitution of the positions that we now are going to leave. if in the treaty of peace lo be celebrated between Spain and the Ignited States they acknowledge the dominion of Spain in the Philippines. I expect as well that you order the American forces outside of above line to retire within the city, as already agreed to. 1 do not believe that the acceptation of the conditions proposed will prejudice the slmallest right of your people, as it signifies nothing more thanl the acknowledgment of a part of the rights of a, friendly people. 1 am compelled to insist on the said conditions to quiet the complaints of my chiefs and soldiers. who have exposed their lives and abandoned their interests during the siege of Manila. I hope that this time you will manifest the spirit of justice that pertains to such a free and admirably constituted Government as that of the United States of America. Yours, very respectfully, EM iLI() AGUINALDO. Agiinaldlo's letiter was considered tle followino day, whlell it became ev-idet that tiie wouldl be ie(llllred to prepare an ailswer, as prior to doing( S' it was inilt)ortantl to gail a knowledge of tile contents of past com) i(icaItio)ns on the subject, and to ascertain what other steps had b1een taken to adjust tlle difficulty, of which I was ignorant. I there REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. upon telegraphedl to General Aguinaldo at lBlacoor,, Cavite province, his then headqularters, as follows: MANILA, AuguSt s.l, IS98. General A(GUINALDO, ]3Ct('O0)': Referring to promise made by General Merritt to reply to your letter of August 27 within four days, I desire to state that he was unexpectedly ordered away and had not opportunity to reply. Being unacluainted with the situation, I must take time to inform myself before answering, whichl I will do at the earliest opportunity. OTIS. I'o this telegrlam hle r'eplied on the same day as follows: General OTIS, ooni(ndim lg l U)oited l,'tfas fP'c(es,,1( ol.hihr. GENERAL: By your telegramii of this date I un(lerstood tlhat your excellency substitutes General Merritt in his absence. for which I b)eg you will kindly accept my cordial salutation and my I1iost siIicere congratiulations. I shall have much pleasure in contilluing with your exclh:lency the friendly relations which ought to exist between us. The l)earer is one of my aid(s. who will ac(luaint you of some reserved affairs. Hoping you will give your attention as the welfare of botll countries require, Very respectfully, yours, EM1ILIO A(GUINA 1,1)O. BACOOR,. Al,jsSt.,1/, 18ISS. A eonllt.1ilnication, Of whitilt tlhe fOll()Wilt is a, cO')Y, was 1rlleeil)lon prepared(l and slent, to (Glener'al Aguillaldo, a.t \5;t.IlOs,,loznOI, lo ui('el )loi1t Ie lha(1 removed his h}ie.al(ltiat-(ls 111al eslt.b)lilie(1 }his s —ca(':lled caapital, viz: OFFICE U. S. MILITARY G()VERNORI IN THE PHILIPPINE IS,AN-DS, Men It ilie. ')...l Sctcmvbei s, 189Ls. The COMIANDING( GENERAL OF TIlE PHIUIIPIMNS FoR(N1 u1S. Slt: I have the honor to acknowledge the receip-t of your coinmuricition of the 27th ultimno, addressed to General Merritt, amy predecessol. lanld )y him tramisferred to me on the eve of his departure froim MIanila. By telegram of t:he:31st ultimo I informed you of General Alerritt's hurried departure. in obedience to the orders of my Government; that his necessarily hurried prel)araLtions did not permafit him to make relply to your communication; that sui(h duty dlevolve(l upon me, and that I would perform it at the earliest opp)ortunity a d as so01 as I couldl:C:U:luint lmyself with the condition of affairs, of which I. lha-ing tbut recently arrived, had slight knowledge. To my telegram you, made a most courteous re.-;)pose, tn(l now, having carefully considered the situation. I have the honor to nlake reply as follows: And first, in your note of the 27th ultimeo you are pleased to manifest surprise that the late United States military governor should have reached an erroneous conclusion as to the result of a conference with your comllmissioners on August I 5, as apparently manifested by his letter to you of August 24. I (1o not know the extent of any conversation which may have )been in(lulged in at that conference, nor the nature of the impression which may have been conveyed. Referring to written memoranda in my possession which purport to contain the sublstance of propositions discussed, I find that certain concessions were mande by the commlissioners in expected return for specific privileges to be conferred, and, as there has not been a mutual agreement in these nmatters between the interested parties, I do not understand that any obligations have arisen bly reason of that conlterence. Second. I note with pleasure your allusion to your very friendly disposition toward my Government, as manifested by your prompt attendance to our request for a supply of water; also your expression as to the inconvenience of the dual occupation of the city of Manila, and I do not forget that the revolutionary forces under your command have made many sacrifices in the interests of civil liberty and for the welfare of your people. and to this I will be pleased to allude hereafter. Third. In connection with your remark as to the injustice of the United States in not properly appreciating your assistance in the capture of Manila, I beg a full consideration, on your part, of the mandatory conditions which accompany occupation, which I am sure you fully appreciate, but to which I will respectfully invite your attention in a subsequent portion of this reply. Fourth. You designate certain lines within the suburbs of the city of Manila, REPORT OF MAJOR-(GENERAL OTIS. to which you promise to retire your troops, and name as conditions precedent: First, protection to your shipping by the United States Navy, and the free navigation of your vessels within the waters in United States occupation: second, resti* tution to your forces of all positions which are now occupied by your troops. in the event that treaty stipulations between the United States and Spain surrender to the last-named Government the territory occupied by the former; and thirdly, that United States troops now occupying positions beyond the lines you name shall retire within the same. A discussion of your proposition to hold. jointly, with the United States Government, the city of Manila, involves consideration of some ot the other concessions you desired to be made. and to that I will at once refer. I wish to present the matter, in the first instance, in its legal aspect. although, from remarks contained(l i former (orres:pondence. I am of the opinion that you are fully aware how untenable the proposition is. The United States and Spain were and are belligerent parties to a war. and were so recognized by the civilized world. In the course of events the entire city of Manila, then in full possession of Spanish forces, was surrendered to the first-iamed belligerent power. The articles of agreement and capitulation gave the United States Government full occupancy of the city and defenses of MIanila, and that Government obligated itself to insure the safety of the lives and property of the inhabitants of the city to the best of its ability. By all the laws of war and all international precedents, United States authority over Manila and its defenses is full and supreme, and it can not escape the obligations which it has assumed. By the able representatives who have charge of the Philippine revolutionary forces this conclusion wili be admlitte(l to be incontrovertible, and argument on the point is unnecessary. C'an they who seek civil and religious liberty and in-vite the approval and assistance of the civilized world afford to enter upon a course of action which the law of nations must condemn? But conceding, as you do. the strictly legal right of my Government to hold and administer the aff:airs of the city of Manila and its suburbs (I thus conclude from expressions contained in former correspondence and from my appreciation of your intellectual attainillents'). you base your proposition-a joint occupationupon supposed equitable groundls, referring to the sacrifices your troops have made and the assistalce they have rendered the American forceps in the capture of Manila. It is well known they have made personal sacrifices, endured great hardships, and have rendered aid. But is it forgotten that my G(overuinent has swept the Spanish navy from the seas ot both hemispheres: sent back to Spain the Spanish army and navy forces, recently embarked for your destruction, and the secure holding of the Philippine possessions: that since May 1 last its navy has held the city of Manila at its mercy, but out of consideration of humanity refused to boimbard it, preferring to send troops to demand surrender, and thereby preserve the lives and property of the inhabitants? Is it forgotten that the destruction of the Spanish navy and the retention of Spanish armed men in its European possessions has opened up to you the ports of the island of Luzon and held Spain helpless to meet its refractory subjects? As between my Government and the revolutionary forces of the Philippines, I fail to discover on what principle of common justice a joint occupation of Manila can be maintained. Equity. in a legal acceptance of the term, would most assuredly condemn it. A sense of justice should, in my opinion, have prompted the revolutionary forces to aid those of my country in every way possible in return for the great assistance they have received. You remark, in substance, that had you not prevented the Spanish forces from retreating from the city the United States would have received naught but its ruined streets and buildings. Possibly: but had all Spanish subjects, elsewhere and here. been the contented subjects of Spain war between it and my Government would not have been waged. It was undertaken by the United States for humanity's sake, and not for its aggrandizement or for any national profit it expected to receive, and it has expended millions of treasure and hundreds of the lives of its citizens in the interests of the Spanish suffering colonists. Apart from all legal and equitable considerations. and those having their origin in personally conceived ideas of justice, I wish respectfully to call your attention to the impracticability of maintaining a joint occupation of Manila and its suburbs, and in this I know that I shall have the approval of your excellent judgment. It would be extremely difficult to prevent friction between our respective forces, which might result in unfortunate consequences, labor as we may for continued harmonious relations. Located in close proximity. irresponsible members of our organizations, by careless or impertinent action, might. be the means of inciting grave disturbances; and in this connection I call to your attention the recent shoot 8 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. ing affair at Cavite. which still requires investigation. There might also arise conflict of authority between our subordinate officers. Even now, within precincts in entire actual possession of our troops, I find that permits are given to citizens. who are styled local presidents, to make arrests. to carry arms, etc., in violation of our instructions and authority, and that several cases of kidnaping have taken place. In pursuance of our obligations to maintain, in so far as we can, domestic tranquillity, our officers have arrested suspected parties, and they have asserted (with what element of truth I know not) that the insurgent forces are the offenders. I have declined to accept their statements, as I prefer to believe the contrary, although it would appear that officers connected with those forces have issued the permits to which I allude. Such interference with our administration of civil affairs must eventually result in conflict. Again (reverting to a legal aspect of the subject), the affairs of the entire city corporation must be administered from a common center. The trust accepted by my Government from those who surrendered actual possession confers a discretionary power. which can neither be shared nor delegated. The validity of this conclusion will be readily understood by yourself and associates as a well-established legal proposition, and does not require argument. And here permit me to remark upon a view of the subject you have advocated in support of the plea for dual occupation of the city's suburbs. Your forces, you say in substance, should have a share in the booty resulting from the conquest of the city, on account of hardships endured and assistance rendered. The facts on which you base your conclusion granted, your conclusion, under the rules of war which are binding on my Government, does not follow, for it has never recognized the existence of spoils of war, denominated "booty," as have many European governments. No enemy's property of any kind, public or private, can be seized, claimed by, or awarded to, any of its officers or men, and should they attempt to appropriate any of it for their individual benefit, they would be very severely punished through military tribunals, on which have been conferred by law very sweeping jurisdiction. The enemy's money and property (all that is not necessary to be expended in:administering local affairs in the enemy's territory) must be preserved for final arbitrament or settlement by and between the supreme authorities of the nations concerned. My troops can not acquire booty nor any individual benefit by reason of the capture of an enemy's territory. I make this cominent, believing that you hold erroneous opinions in respect to individual advantages which occupation bestows. I request your indulgence while I briefly consider the concessions you ask us to make as conditions precedent to the retirement of your forces to the lines indicated by your note of the 27th ultimo. The first is: Protection to your shipping and free navigation to your vessels. Neither the extent of protection nor the limit of free navigation you request is understood. Certainly you could not mean protection on the high seas, or in the ports not in the rightful possession of the United States. That. as you are fully aware, could only be effected by treaty, or guarantee. following international recognition of the belligerent rights of the Philippine revolutionary government. While the existing armistice continues, the United States are in rightful I)ossession, in so far as the navigable waters of the Philippine Islands are concerned, only of the bay of Manila and its navigable tributaries. Within the same all vessels of trade and commerce and the war vessels of recognized national powers sail freely as long as the sovereignty of miy Government is not assailed nor the peace of the locality threatened. In this respect. whatever concessions are extended by way of relaxation of trade restrictions, incident to war, to the citizens of these islands will be extended to all alike, and discrilin~ation in this regard is neither intended nor permitted. Admiral Dewey exercises supervision over all naval matters, and they are in no way related to the duties conferred upon ine by law. Nor would it avail should I seek his consent for greater latitude of action. for even if disposed to grant special concessions he could not (1do so, and I doubt if the suplrenme authority of my Government could now, under the prevailing truce with Spain, invest him with the requisite powers to do so and at the same time preserve its international obligations. The second concession named by you is restitution of positions in the city of Manila to your forces, in case the treaty of peace remands to Spain the territory surrendered under the late capitulatory articles: and the third and last is a promise to retire our troops within the lines indicated by you, as the lines on which you desire your troops to remain permanently. These propositions having a kindred nature, many be considered together. and, indeed, have already been impliedly answered. From previous statements of facts and logical conclusions made and stated in this communication, concerning the nature of the obligations resting on the United States with regard to the territory to which they have the legal right of possession under contracting articles with Spain, it is evident that neither in REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 9 law or morals can the concessions be made. I would be powerless to grant them in any aspect of the case, being nothing mnore than an agent to carry out the instrnctions of the executive head of my Government and not being vested with discretionary power to determine matters of snch m-oment. In the present instance I am not only powerless to accedle to your requtest, bnt have been strictly enjoined by my Government, mindful of its international promises and national honor, which it has never broken nor sacrificed, not to accede joint occupation. of the city and snburbs of Mani-la, and am directed specially to preserve the peace and protect persons and property within the territory surrendered ntnder the terms of the Spanish capitulation. These mandates must be obeyed. Thus have I endeavored with all candor and sincerity, holding nothing in reserve, to place before yon the situation as nnderstood by me, and I doubt not by the Republic which I represent. I have not been instructed as to what policy the United States intends to pursue in regard to its legitimate holdings here. and hence I am unable to give you any information on the subject. That it will have a care and labor conscientiously for the welfare of your people I sincerely believe. It remains for you. beneficiaries of its sacrifices, to adopt a course of action which will manifest your good intentions and show to the world the principles which actuate your proceedings. You and your associates could not regret more than I any conflict between our forces, which would tend to e.Kcite the citizens of my country, wVho are always a -unit in action whenever its sovereignty is attacked or its rights to f ulfill its international obligations is called into question. Then they never count cost, and, as you are fully aware, its resources are abundant. Rather than see the ships of the navy of the United States controlling the navigable waters of these islands and its army devastating their territory. I would greatly lprefer to advise my Government that there is no longer need to send more of its troops to this section of the country, and that those whom its holds waiting on its Pacific slope can be remanded to their homies or employed elsewhere, as it imay determine. It only remains for ine to respectfully notify you that I am compelled by my instructions to direct that your armed forces evacuiate the entire city of _Manlila, includingim its suburbs and defenses, and that I shall be obliged to take action with that enid in view within a very short space of timie should you decline to comply with my Government's demands: aud I hereby serve notice on you that unless your troops are withdrawn beyond the line of the city's defenlses before Thursday, the 15th instant, I shall be obliged to resort to forcibl)e laction, and that my Government will hold you responsible for any unfortunate consequences which miay ensue. Perm-it me to believe that mny confidence in the sound judgmient and patriotism of yourself and associates is nlot misplaced. Y~ou -will lilease pardon mne for mumv apparent unnecessary delay in replying to your commnunication of the 27th ultfino. lbut pi'ess of thle duties connected with the adminiiistration of the affairs of this city is my excuse. In conclusion. 1 lieg to informi youi that I have conferred freely w-ith Admiral Dewey upon the contents of this comnmunicatiou and am delegated by himi to state that h~e fully approves cf the same, in all respects: thwat the conimands of our Governmlent conhlpel us to act as herein indicated, and that between our reslpective forces there will be unanimity anrd comuidete ccncert of action. I amn, sir, with great reslpect, your obedient servant. 17L. S. Otis,. Uo litn' Sfle.N Xiltl/fary icro inl (ho J)/ dipijn Iies. On seplteilll)01- 18, it C( li1151ion Senit bv) Agri iinal(l() aiid colsisitillo!_ of, tilee" 11wl(i1el5, oiie oi' whuuu wN-;s 11iw 1r leasuier and aniotlici the attine-~eiec 1ol, I lie i nsiiroent; go()ecimi un~t, (, cled foi- the pu ipose Of (liSCLISissin tI e Stil),ieet1- (if lml 1(41(1, of the St Il. ThWYasev u to wit li(Iraw it alild sjimiply requcst, inl wvnting thtI einuge top retire to the Tile, (lesigmlialke'd byv (Genei'-a] Melrcitl,vwhichl I ~refused] to (10, Sthini iigo I hat, iliiless tb ex- wvit.lidi1eNN as (retlwe, wou Id he obliged 1.o re'sort to forc1(e. They thlen askedI that;_1 I wAit l(IrlAw the let ter and issule a reqluest lmviieeolipanlied by anyv thretat, to use f'orce, as Aguiiwtalolo was fearfl tha he wouldI be unbeto re(iliove his trooJps upon0 a demniand. T(o wh~ich J re ledtht- the( leIt te of I lie Sith instant, Would sta-1it(I. Thley then said lthat as fie, denuands of thatt letter must, remain unchaged, heisisrgeiits -would withd raw as directed therein, lutl 10 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. that if I wouli express in writinlg siml)le request to Aguinaldo to witlhdraw to the lines which I (lesignalted-sonlethilng which lie coll]d show to the troo0)s 1and indluce theml to think that lie was simply actingl upon a requlest froml these lleadquarters —he1 would Iprol tably be able to retire his men without ntlucl difficullty; thait, of coulrse, they,- tllelnselves understoodf tle (lirection to wiithllraw-, which would be obeyed, and thereulpoll rel)eated their desire to obtail a note of re(qulest, whelleupon I furnished tileml witll tlhe followilng: OFFICE 1U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLAN1DS. Manila, P. 1., Se)tiember /.;. 18'98. The COMMANDING GENERAL (OF TILE PHILIPPINE FORCES. SIR: Referring to imy communication of September 8. I have the honor to inform you that I have had a most agreeable conversation with certain gentlemen who are in the interests of your revolutionary government upon the mlattters therein contained. We have (liscussed at length the complications now existing, which will exist, and will doubtless increase. wlile our troops continue to occupy jointly certain districts of the city of Manila. I have urged upon them the necessity of the withdrawal of your troops in order that the friendly relations which have always been maintained by and between them and the forces of the UTnited States Government may be perpetuated. I am sure that the gentlemen fully appreciate my sentimients and will clearly report them to you. May I ask you to patiently listen to their report of our conversation? It is mly desire that our friendly intercourse and mutual amicable relations be continued: thlat they be not jeopardized if we can by consistent action avoid it, and such, I am certain. is the dlesire of yourself and associates. May I ask, therefore, that you withdraw your troops froln Manila? Permit me to add in conclusion that I have that confidence in your ability and patriotism which will lead you to accede to this request. I am, with great respect. your most obedient servant, E. S. OITIS, Mal jor-(;eeral, 1 S.. '.. 7,lit(ed,States Military Goreroor i) tht. PThilipp:ies. Inl re)ly to whicll, on 1the I1;th, th le following was received: MA,.OLOS, BULACAN, September I 1. ISS8. The COMMANDING GENERAL OF TIlE AMERIuCAN FORCES. My DEAR SIR: Referring to your esteemed communication, dated the 13th instant, I have the honor to inform you that I have given appropriate orders that my troops should abandon their most advanced positions within some of the suburbs, and that they should retire to points where contact with yours would be more difficult, in order to avoid all occasion for conflict. I hope that by these presents you will be fully convinced of my constant desire to preserve amicable relations with the American forces, even at the risk of sacrificing a part of the confidence placed in my government by the Philippine people. A consideration of my many occupations will serve to excuse me for not having answered with the promptness desired. Your very respectful servant, EMIo AGUINALD()O. On the evening of the 15th the armedl insurgent organizations withdrew from the (ity Xand all of its suburbs, as acknowledged by their leaders, exeeptiting fron one small outlying (l istriet. This, certain agents of Aguinaldo asked on the previouls day to be permitted to retain for a short time, own the plea that the general officer in command would not obey instructions, and they proposed to reimove his men gradually by organizations and thereafter to punish himn for hiis disobedience. the withdrawal was effected adroitly, as tle insurgents marched out in excellent spirits, cheering the Americanl troopls. During the progress of these nego(tiations the tactical organization of troops was being effected. G'(neral Merritt, on August 23, had formed the corps into two divisions, the first at Cavite, com posed of troops recently arrived and expected to arrive later, with certain REPORT OF MAJOR-GENTERAL OTIS. 1 11 *exceptions; the second, of those stationed in Mlanila. Early iii Septemnler orders were issuled annouincing the staff officers of the corps and( departmient; also announchicg to the coniniiand the promotions of Briga-aier-Generals Andersoi, MlacArtliur, and.('rceene to majlor-generals I. S. V., anid of Colonels Ovenshine anid Ila-le and LieutenantColonel Wh71ittier to thie gra(le of b)irigadier-generals of volunteers; also the composition of divisions, whichi were organized as follows: The first, comiprishing all tiroops in the district of Cavite, MfaJoi-Ceneral And~ersoni to commndilll and consisting of one brigrade to be comintanded by lli ig. Gen. II. (G. (O)1is: lie second, ii nder conniluiia il of MALjor-(Gcn(Tal M1-acArthur1.1, conlsist ilig. of tw\No l)rigadles, to be "olinlnaliled.( respec tively byBig-adier-(_Xei-ierals )venishiine ald(1 hale. ileastires were taken to prompht ly iineet any difficuilties -whichl jid-ilit arise iiidei- thle (leinind to wvit lid raw fromt thle e-itN v which hadl been serv'ed u1ponl the insisur-elits. Hi1ig. (T4el. It. P'. llugohes, U. S. V. relievedl Genieral iAlac.Artlitir as lpi-ovost-marshilal of Mfaiiila, and w\Nasplacedl iii eoniiaiina of a separate l)1iga(le to conistitute the pl-)roost u (l,con1sisting~ (f the( Tlet -hidIfanitryN, the Secon(d Oregon, -ai( Fi rst Mlont aiia regimients of voluinteers. In Genieral Mlerritt's orders of August 15 alLd 16, wherein lie pi-escrib~e( regutl~ations for thie grover-nmentt of MAanifla, hie annjouncc(l Cas follows: In addition to his duties as, brigade commander, Brig. Gen. Arthur Mac..rthur, U. S. V., is hereby appointed military commandant of the walled city of Manila, and provost-mnarshal-general1 of: the clity of Manila. including all outlying districts within the municipal jurisdiction. *0 He will relieve the civil governor of his functions, and take possession of the offices. clerks, and all the machinery of administration of that, office, retaining and employing the lpresent suibordill'mte officers of civil administration ui.ntil in his judgment it is d'sirable to replace them by other appointments. * In paragrapihs 8' and 4t of the terms of capitulation, f ull lists of public property and store's and returns in (luplicate of the men by organizations are to be rendered to the United States within ten days, and lpublic property of all kinds is to be turned ov-er to the staff officers of the United States designated to receive thema. Under these paragraphs the chief of artillery at these headquarters and the chiefs of time staff departments will take possession of the p~ublic prop)erty turned over as above, pertaining to their respective departments. The returns of prisoners will hle submitted to the milit.ary commandant of the city, who will assign the men, for quarters, in such public buildings and barracks as are not required for the ueof United States troops. ***The chief paymaster at these headquarters will turn over such portions of the Spanish public f unds received by him, by virtue of this order, to the military commandant above designated. as imay be necessary for the administration of his office. All removals and appointments of subordinate offi~cers of civil administration and transfers of funds authorized by the order must receive the approval of the commanding general before action is taken. In addition to the command of his brigade, Brig. Gen. F. V. Greene. U. S. V.. will perf ormn the duties hitherto performed by the intendente-general de hacienda, and will have charge, subject to instructions of the major-general commanding, of all fiscal affairs of the government of Mlanila. Col. (C. A. Whittier, U. S. V., is appointed collector of cristoms, and the chief paymaster, Department of the Pacific, will designate a bonded officer of the Pay Department as custodian of all publicf funds. Both of these officers will report to Brigadier-General Greene for instructions. Under this last paragraph, Maj. Charles LI1. Whipple, ptaymiaster, i.T. S. A., was dim-ected to receive the Spanish public funds. Maj. R. B. C..1 ement, UT. S. Volunteer Engineers, had already been appointed the collector of internjal revenue, and by request of General Merritt an(d conisent of Admiral Dewey, Ca~pt. Henry Glass, U. S. N., was (lesiglialted as captain of the port. On Aug~ust 2'12 military commissions and provost courts were provided for and their jurisdiction defined. In the proclamation issued 12 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. at the time of the surrender of the eity, -it was orde'edl that the municipal laws ''slloulld be considlered as continuing in force in so far as colnpatilble -with the pl1rposes of military government," and should '' be admni istered throug-h the ordi nary 1!ittribunals sti l)stantia-lly as lbefore occuptation, but by offhcers appIointedl by the government of occupartion." By.) department ordiers, issuedl on the eve, of his (leltarture, Genlera~l Alerritt, under instructions from WNashington, rellieved General Greene and personal staff fiont duty, (brectilig( their- retnrn to the Uniited Stiates, and appointed ElJeut. Col. C. A. Whittier, inspectorgeneral of the corps (and shortly a-~fterwNards tannlouncel as, bria.ler greneral of vol unteers), intendente (le hiaci e nda,, w-hich gaehim chargre of all1 fiscal matters in the territory of occuptationl, ail(l continued himi as collector of customs. Such were the chief me-_asutres annollnce l(l and the melans Cadopted to continue in part and est-ablish in Ipart a temnj)ora-rry gov~erninent to administer the affairs of the city of M'Nanila. Unfortunately, the Spanish civil. authorities albandolned m1ost of their civil ofbices wit hout. mnaking transfer of the pubtlic, records and p~roperty. The officers of the Sptanish arumy never masde satisfactory return-1s of their tro.(.)ps, lbv organization or otherwise, amiol (lidl not render lists of p)roperty to the Unitedl States -within tihe per-iod of teni days, ars prolnise(I in the capitul~atory ar-ticles, nor- hiave, thely ever render-ed such lists. The civil cour-t justices vacated their positions aind griadually sailed for Spaiii without- giving notice of their intention to dep)art, miior tatking the necessary measuires to render seectre tihe pr1operty amnoI especially the recordls of t-heir courts, mamy of which coulo lnev-er be, founl, Cand1 whichl, prestimmmably, they took with thent. Tfo be slire, I hey liadl mot been -authorized to (exercise their- functions as judgI-es by tihe g)overnnient of occulpation, as lprovidleol for in the articles o)f (aj)itll lationl, unti Ocobe 4,898 and thenr only in a limtited (legree, as the granIlting of such authority, iii the then prevailing condition of pulblic feeling, wVould have been politically olisastroits, or at least inost in~jurious, to UnlitedI States interests. Indeed, in two or. thr-ee inlstanruces whene, wvithouit ap~)ointinemnt or aruthority, they atftenmpte(I to,j mdicially determine questionis in litigation and1 pending at the time of the sirrenoler of tlhe city,Ni d noigc tnamt p~rotests wer-e sub~mitted by inhabit ants, 1)0th native and fore~ign,~ anol insti ructions to) suspelid action on the gYround of uinauthorized lproceedni is wer-e issued 110111 the office of the milfitar-y governor. Finally, til)0H O)ctober 7, to mneet the needIs of the, cit izeits for tribunals to pass upoil (quest ions of a strictly civTil chiaracter, time fol)lowing- ordler was issuied: Until otherwise directed from these headquarters, the civil courts, as composed and constituted by the laws of Spain. which were heldl and administered prior to August 13, 1898, within Philippine t'erritory now subjcct) to United States military occupation and (control, are Ipermittedl to resume at o)nce the exereise of the civil jurisdiction conferred bly Spanish laws within the limits of that territory, sulbject, however, to such supervision by the military government of the United States here instituted as in its judgmient the interests of that Government may demand. This privilege does -not extend to or embrace permission to institute criminal proceedings or to exercise criminal jurisdiction of any nature or Character whatsoever. The provisions of orders heretofore issued by the authority of the United States in the Philippine Islands inconsistent with the foregoing instructions and directions are hereby revoked. The difficulties and perIplexiti es which confr-oim ted atll officers appointed to conduct civil affairs were therefore ver-y great. The REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 13 prisonls werle full to overflowing with colvicted criminals and p)Iesons charged with crimes. Imxmediate attempts -were made to relieve tllis congestion, and applications of the friends of tlose incartcelrated, for their release, were constant. In tile jail (leliveries which follow-ed, althoughl coniducted after search of reco((rds obtainable at tile time(, a few of tile molst notorious criminals escaeI)d. Subsequently greater carle was exercised an(l eaclh i iNdivilcual case was lmade tlie subject of investigation, aild even then, when I)ardldon accompanied by!release was (gtranted, it. was frlequently followed 1y appl)lication for tle return of emblllargoed estates, w\vcll prlesentled vtery pe),rplexing questions for deterimilationl. invo(lving a studly of man.y )Spanisll war-measure d(ec]ees. T'le city govtllllernment which was il operation at tlie time of surrenderl and the reveiue lmeasures p)ractice(l fo)r its supl)ort -were the results of lnati(onal coll, colonial, and local decrees, ordes, and approved reconinllendati(ons, mliore or less compali eate(l, w\itll alenidatory features, Iuniodified, aiid running over a period of many years, presenting, a system so comlpllex that aflte tlie stl(ly of 1iionttlhs it is not yet fully titdl(lestood and certailnly not al) peeciated. The monthly expenditures for tile city lilave been doluble tlie ainotult of its receipts, but as all collections of whatever hnature mad(le in tile islands are deposited with tlle general fund in t lie Treasury an(d lmoiey:is (ldawin therefrom ()ol warranits as dleman(ls arise, no1 difficulty has been exp)erienced. Tie chlliefs of the Sui)I)ly (leptartmlents and staff eorps (f tlhe Army, who llad l)eell (lireted to receive and receipt for thle Spanish militasv stoles whenl thle p)resc]ribed lists should be )preselited, were obliged to rely solely u1l)(ol thleil owin efforts to discover tilis property, as l1o assistaiice was tendered 1)- tle ()fficers of Spain. Thev were, it is believed, fairly successful ill tlleir persistent sear'ches, took up j)and aecoiunlted for thle property found, considerable of whlich, such as clothilng, subsistence, and medi(liines, were expended in the care of Spanish1 prisoners of wa]r. The inventories whllich t)hey inade were very a(lvalitageous in thle tinal selttlemlent of Un]ited States aml(l Spl)aish claims in regard to this class of property. General 31erritt's or(ders andll those whichl (loselyv follo)wed were 1)ased(l o tle articles of capitulationll by whicl it was transferred( to tle Vrlited States, as i]lformlation concernilng the peace protoco(l of August 1 2, which leld in abeyance all questions of prope]rty irights pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace, had not been] receivel. The fifth article of the IParis treaty of l)ecmbele 1() retirumned to Spain all these army stores and piroperty, a]nd the inventories which our officers had taken constituted the basis of intelligenit settlement with the represeiitatives of that government under treaty stipulatiols, and in miany instances enabled those representatives to formulate their demuands. For three and otne-half months Admiral I)ewey with his squadron and the insurgents o(n land had kept Manila tightly bottled. All comnmerce had been interdicted, intermial trade paralyzed, anld food supplies were nearly exhausted. lTpon the opening of thle port mmerchants were clamoring for the reestablishment of inter-island comm erce. They had advanced large amounts of money on their har vested crops of tobacco, hem ), and sugar which awaited, at many points of the various islands, shipment to Manila. No present relief could be furnished by the nlilitary authorities. The harbor was filled with Spanish shipping and that of other European countries. The United States was not represented by merchantmen of any character. Spain owned and was entitled to possession of all Philippine territory, except temporary 14 REPORT OF MAJOR-(GENERAL OTIS. occuptancy of thie bay!, llarbor, an( city of Manila, altlhotiht the insur-, gents had forcibly seize(d Ipl)on miany cities alld )ports. Tle insurrectionl had to spread to, anld was active in, all the islands witlh tlhe exception of tile Sulll Archipela.go, and thllere thle helreditlary antagonistll of thie 51ores was only coniparati vct ily dorniant. Spaini was ciicenltratig 11(er sca tteried forces in tile s)llut h at the (celln al Visayanl Islands and a;t Zamlbo)tanga, and-1 the Spallisl generall l wl wlas ill imnite(liate c 'hage of Sipanishl nilita.'y alffalirs (Generail Rios) liad miade( his liea(idquarters at Iloilo. Througii nelgotiatiois with l (reneral Ri ios, conducted under \\ Va )el)artmiient: p)eiilissio(), an airriagemi(eiit was effected whereby vessel car'rying eitliher the S)panish or Ame,'icaini flag mighlt engage in trade at -a llli)berl' of lie iilter-islanldl 1)(,'s, tlle Spanisli laws to be fap)lied to shipilenlt and coi (lercial privileges. lBut a gr'ave difticulty still presented itself. Vessels flvyin the Spanlish flag could not safely enter any poIts which liad( been seizeed by tihe insurgents, nor could inter-islaiitn (co)ilmerce e ob e ened to foreign governmnents as it was free and un(lutial)le in all respects. T'he nlierchants formerlye emnploying t he flag of Spain resorted to sale and transfer of their ships to Amlerican resitlents, technical doubt.less in mllany instances, but upon furnishingl dute written pr oof of a full comipliance with United States consular regulatiols in these particulars, provisional Amlerican registr&at ion was granlted(. Many of these vessels were thereupon released and trade becalie quite active. Still another difficulty was encounttered and materially affected the public revenute. The customs tariffs and reguflations which has beenl prescribed for application were faulty in mnany respects and requiired amendtment before they could be intelligently appli ed. It was, therefore, ordered on Septeimber 2! that "the enforcement of these regullations be postponed until the 10th day of Novembelr next, and that the tariffs and duties at present imposed 1>e continued to be applied in the port of Manila until that date, with tllis excel)tion, viz, that all goods and merchandlise secured, or pu11rcha.sed(, within thle ldomniniols of Spain (tle Philil)pine Islands exceptedl) since Aprlil 25, last, the date of formal (declaration of waIr' )3y the TUnited States (overnmienit between that country and the Kingdoll of Spain, shall be receivedl into this port upon the saime conditions as to payllentll of ltariffs and dutiies as the goods and merchandise of strictly neutral nations.) Upon October 3 Capt..J. F. Evans, of tlhe vollnteer sul)sistence department, who had been sent to tlie Philippines to assist in revenlue matters, was assigned to lduty at thle custom-house, his services to be tempolrarily "confined to a carefutl consideration of trad(e con(it i(onls and an exhaustive study of thIe UTnited States custolms an ta lrilff regulations prescribed for application, withl a view of stuggesting almiendlrlents and inmodificationis thlerein, in order to rend(er tlhenm:as pIracticabtle as possible to existinwg cirlcumnstances." The enltire labor of revision was imposed upon himl and lie I)erfo)lrmed it ill a most satiSfL'actory manner. Iis revision was adopted atl(d lput in force at the alnnotuced date (November 10), has given satisfaction to all parties conlcerne(d, an(d has worked smloothly, only at few mlinor amendments havillng een malde since it became operative. I'There were also other complications whicli arose froml SpLanisl action or a miisunderstanding on the part of the IUnited States authorities of Spanish expressed intention as to the particular neas ures wlhich must be adopted to secure the entranlce of Amieriican vessels to Spanish portssuch as sailing under Spanish captains and the obtaining, under certain conditions, from General Rios himself, at Iloilo, of a special permit REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 15 to visit certain trading points. Occasionally a vessel was turnedl back on her course by Spanish officers or denied entr-ance to a port after arr~ival. there. Of this the mercha nts complainied an(I the compijlainits became the sub~ject, of conisidertalle official corresponmdence an(d contr10 -versy. The insurgents, too, whose govern-ment had taken firm t-oot at, Malolos, were, through the inediuiti of presidlent, cabinet, and cong)ress, reeling off (lecrecs and constitutional lprovisiolls at a rapid talte. T1heir. army was continually successful agrainst the small Spaniish garrisons,scattered thromyghouit the islands, andl they w ere beginning to acquire the blieef that they wvere invincible. Revenue was their need anld (lsranld this theyT began to deriv-e quite largely front fimposing export duties onl all products sh~ipp)ed to Ma-nila from any shipping lpoint in their possession, compelling- the merchantlts to payx7 onl theirp)roperty- some 1() per cent ad valorem up1)on removal. These mtany obstacles so imp~eded conmmerce that tra de languishied and the customs teven tes were, greatly inipai red. With the entrance of the United States troops into Manila and the {)pelling upl of that p)ort inminpigrtion l)ecalle activ~e. Business tuen front our. own anld other counitries, stutdy'ing the situation, were quite num11eroUs. Mem_,nbers of the criminal. classes, wh-lo (always follow the wake of a. conqtierhig army, caime f rom the Amnerican, and Aksiatic seacoasts in large numbers. Th'le native p~opulation o)f the city raltidlY increased aiid was arugmcnte(I by a, considerable Ch']inese,, influix, most: of which presented cedlulas or certificates of peisonojal identity, issued by the late Spanish Gov-ernment, in order to prov-e former residence in thie islaitos, ais the United States Chinese exelso Catasdrctdt be ap~plied. Aguinaldo's ar-my of observ\ation, on the outskirts of tile city, containeol many na~tives or- residlents of M.-anilia, wh-1o, with aill others of his soldiers, were tac-corded if unlarmnedl thoivgh uiiiforincd, full liberty to enter any portion of the samte. All these hieterogene0115, elements, with t le 1 4, )O t 'nited Stattes troops (Illartcredl here, filled tihe city3 to repletion and gav\e tihe postnishlgnaland his guardls ample occupation. Thel( outside country w-as not- yet shut to trat-de tand the port wav.s openl to all Poreign ships. hlence sub1sist*ence was abundofanlt, and the minior business indust ries were well. employed. I n a( former portion of this report, I started the fact that thle insurgent auithorities hiad receie(Ie permission to ('outinuc in occup~ancv of Certain suburb-Is of thle citv for a~ short! trime, when they, on S'eptem~ber U-, withdrew tlieii rtVool)s fromn its interior portions. They did mot: subl.-,sequently rcnmovc their mtroops, — iii accordane ccvit-l h agPreenient, buit appe~ared to be, (eterm itico to relti amPaco) -anol Pl-andcan, as thiey believ-ed them to be adlvauftageoois miiilitary positions, s,,outh of the Plasigr River. rTle assertion was made, ande became current, thit. these suiburbs -were not withitn the Jurisdiction of Manila, and it becaume a dvisable t-o mtake search and survey to gaiti. desired informiation ilo th~at point. These -were muade by Lieutenant-Coloniel Pott er, chtief engineer of the corps. The s-urwve showed that the city hiad never been c-orrectly mcapped, esjpccially as concerned the trend of the Patsig Riv-er and tile lilies of outvlying districts. The best opinion (lid itot conlsider' the suburbs, still occupied by, the, insurgent troops, beyond city limits, b~ut nIO decree (coulid be fo-und which fixed their political status. These troops lhad griven great annoyance. TLhleir~ officers had extorted contributions frotn the, citizens of Manila, some of whonm they had kidnaped and ca~rried away. They had placed guards upon the river bank and in 16 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. many instances refulsed to p)erilit ()ll'r officers to 1)ass their li -es, althoulgl a, Iititual gre('lllment lhal been ilmade wlli(c per'lilitted thlle individllual 1lnelltbers of l1oth arlnies, when lunal'rne(1, to l)iass all( repass all military lilles witllout hlin(l'aml(ce. A Ililulit'l' ol repiort)S were sull)litted of inSlll'trentitertelle itlrfe il this 'resple't. (t'enleral Andersonl called:at 1yi (itlarter's ol ()October!), andl coitiplaiilt d of the indignity lie lhad receive(l at tlhe hall(ls of the instilrgllts, illn not b)eigll pernlitted to proceed up the river through the insurgenit lines, ~and was tlhereupon ilnformed tlhat,,as soon as a cerltaim map ofl) slurvey could be coml let ed, G(eneral AI uinal(l(d wo l(l 1)b (lilrected to (re'move his troops f'roml( Placo. n01 the following (lay he sl1)litt;ed 11the follo\wingl official col()1 )lailt.: HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION. EItI-ITHI AaRMY CORPIS. C'c(vite A1').,1( l, 1'. I., Oc(tobl r ](l, J 9,S. The ADJUTANT-GENEIRAL. DeJpartmelt of the Pac((clic ait(l EighI.th A-)rmy C'or)s. 1,anila, Pt. L SIR: I have the honor to report that yesterday, the 9th instant. while proceeding up the Pasig River, on the steam launch ( Ctaltcato, with three officers of my staff, the American flag flying over the boat, I was stopped by an armed Filipino guard and informed th:lt we could go no farther. Explaining that we were an unarmed party of American officers out upon an excursion, we were informed th;t, by orders given two days before. no Americans, armed or unarmed, were allowed to pass up the Pasig River without a special permit fromn President Aguinaldo. I de.nanded to see the written order, and it was brought and shown me. It was an official letter signed by Pio del Pilar, division general, written in Tagalo and stamped with what appeared to be an official seal. It purported to be issued by the authority of the president of the revolutionary government, and forbade Americans, either armed or unarmed, from passing up the Pasig River. It was signed by Pilar himself. As this is a distinctly hostile act, I beg leave to ask how far we are to submit to this kind of interference. It is respectfully submitted that whether this act of Pilar was authorized or not by the assumed insurgent government, it should, in any event, be resented. Very respectfully, THIOM AS H. ANDERSON, Major-(Gen.eral, U. S. V.. (Co-lmlanding )irisio'. As s)oon as th le coIltlletetld liap of survey of lie city co1(ld be )ltue printIed a eoIlimmication was l)repa-re(l and taken l)y one of my ai(ls to Malolos. An allusion was uluade therein to (4eieral Auu(inaldo's letter of September 1.6, in which lie informed me of his action of tile previous day in witlh(rawing, troopl) in consounance with lmy formi&ier request and which did. not at tlhe time re'(liire reply. The conumllunication was as follows: OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES MILITARY G()VERNOR, JMlfoila, P. L. October 14, 1898. GEN. EMILIO AcGUINALDO, Commanding Philij)ppine Revolttioi(ary Forces, Malolos, P. 1. GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your favor of the l16th ultimo, and beg to apologize for the late official recognition of the same, presenting as a reason for my delay the necessity of obtaining certain information in order to arrive at conclusions in matters materially affecting the substance of our late correspondence, the securing of which has been attended with great difficulty. I fully appreciate the friendly spirit manifested toward my Government in your expressions of regard, which your action in retiring your troops has confirmed. but I believe there has existed and still exists some misunderstanding as to the limits of territory which that Government is compelled to occupy and administer under its international obligations with Spain, the responsibility for which it can not escape. The articles of capitulation transferred the city of Manila, with suburbs and all defenses, as I had the honor to inform you in my letter of September 8. It was found impossible to determine definitely, on any existing map, either the limits of REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 17 the city or the lines of its defenses. The latter had been variously placed, at some points retired and at others thrust out beyond the conceded city limits. I therefore directed mly chief engineer, by a careful search of the municipal records and;* n actual survey, to ascertain the lines within which occupation by United States troopls was obligatory by reason of the terms of the surrender. He has finally concll(led these directed labors. and has presented a map. of which the inclosed blue print is a copy, on which is traced in white the lines determined upon. By reference to this print and a comparison of the same with all former existing maps of the city and suburbs, it will be perceived that the latter vary materially from it. especially as to the trend of the Pasig River anl the location of the Spanish defenses. The lines of circumvallation on the print begin at the Bocana de Vitas and thence they follow Maylpajo Creek until they reach the line of the Lico road produced, thence proceed along said line and road to Lico, thence to the junction of the two roads in front of tile Chinese hospital. thence along the road in front of said hospital to the north corner of the hospital wall, thence to Blockhouse No. 4, thence by Blockhouses Nos. 5. (i. and 7 to HSan Juan del Monte Creek at the aqueduct. thence down said creek and up the Rio Pasig to the mouth of Concordia Creek, thence 'by Concordia and Tripa de Gallinas creeks to a point opposite the place where the road from Cingalon to Pineda (Pasai) turns sharply to the right. thence by road to Maitubig, and t hence to the mouth of the Malate Creek. This map is believed to b)e correct. as the surveying and platting were executed with the greatest care and with a desire for accuracy. The lines do not include all of the territory which the late Spanish chief engineer of this city has described as lying within its suburbs and a lar1,er proportion of them are drawn within the lines of the city's defenses: but they are practical, and include all portions of the suburbs which my Government. under its lromises to Spain, could be expected to hold posssession of under any demands which Spain might present. In your withdrawal of troops I note that to the north they retired to the line described on the map furnished by mny predecessor, General Merritt, while to the east and south his request was not observed. As far as Paco is concerned, it was understood that the troops in that section would be withdrawin within a short period of time, and I have now the honor to represent that the retention of that mutually conceded suburb has been a source of great annoyance to the American authorities, and, as I fully believe. to yourself, while the revolutionary forces along the Cingalon and connecting roads have been the cause of complaint from the inhabitants of that section. I am therefore compelled by reason of my instructions, which direct me to execute faithfully the articles of the Spanish capitulation, because of the interests of my Government and, as I sincerely believe. the welfare of your own forces, to ask that you withdraw all your troops beyond the lines marked in the accompanying blue print which are above described. and I must request such withdrawal on or before the 20th instant, else I shall be forced into some action looking to that end. Permit me, in conclusion, General. to bring to your attention facts of which you are doubtless ignorant, and which all connected with the American authorities, especially that vast majority who have entertained a decided and pronounced friendly interest in the Philippine people. have viewed with more or less indignation. In a number of instances kidnaping and robbery have been committed recently within the city by parties who claimed to be connected with your forces, some of whom stated that they were acting under your instructions. This I can not believe; but the high-handed offenses committed by these persons show how important it is, for the interests of all concerned, to withdraw your troops as herein requested. In numerous instances my officers have submitted complaints to me that they have been arrested and been compelled to turn back to the city, though journeying as unarmed and peaceful citizens merely with the intent to seek health and recreation; and on Sunday last a funeral party from the British war ship )Po',refl'l, now lying within this harbor, was so delayed by the insurgent forces at Paco, when proceeding to its English cemetery, that it was obliged to return to its vessel and repeat the journey on the following day. I fail to see how such proceedings can be justified before enlightened public opinion, and it is a matter of profound surprise to me that people seeking relief from the control of a government, by whichl in the pronounced judgment of a large portion of the civilized world, it has been oppressed for centuries, should permit its armed authorities to so conduct themselves as to arouse the indignation of friendly and assistant nations. The indignities which my Government has suffered from the revolutionary forces still illegally maintained at Paco (few of them are cited herein) can not be tolerated in future. Resistance to the high-handed proceedings there committed is rot merely considered a duty from which there is no escape, but would be esteemed a virtue by any civilized government cognizant of - 2 18 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. the facts. I do not for a moment permit myself to entertain the impression that either you, or the able advisers by whom you are surrounded. have authorized these insults to my Government. but I must bring them to the notice of the authorities which maintain these troops, and upon which rests the legal responsibility for their conduct. There is another matter which I beg respectfully to present to your distinguished consideration. There are a great number of United States soldiers within this city and a large accession, primarily intended and equipped by my Government for use against the armed forces of Spain. is en route for this port. The continued unhealthfulness of the city, notwithstanding the strenuous efforts we are making for a thorough police of the same, may make it necessary to temporarily encamp such troops as are suffering from diseases contracted here on some point of land which promises favorable sanitary conditions for restoration to health. Should the emergency become imminent, the dictates of humanity and the overwhelming demands of my Government would oblige me to establish a convalescent camp in this locality, to which troops could be sent for recuperation, and to relieve the congested situation which must attend the presence of so large a body of armed men within a thickly populated city. I have in mind for this possible camp the grounds on the shore of the bay formerly occupied by United States troops and designated Camp Dewey, or the high ground to the east of the city. It is my desire to place it at a locality which would not inconvenience any organizations connected with your forces or the surrounding inhabitants, and to the emergency of this anticipated proceeding I respectfully invite your consideration and ask your assistance should execution become necessary. Should action of this character be decided upon, I beg of you to rest firmly in my unqualified assurances that it will be undertaken in a spirit of the greatest friendliness and with the sincere desire to neither compromise nor affect in the slightest degree your interests and those of the people whom you rel)resent, but, on the contrary, to enhance them. Permit me to subscribe myself. General, with the highest respect, Your most obedient servant. E. S. OTIs, lajior-(/enier(l, (T. S. V.. U'ited,States Military (J rov(crnor in the P'ilil)ippe.s. On the 18Stl of Octlober tllree accredlite(d repiesenltatives fromn Agninald(o called, and the chairman, Dr. Tavera, a member of the Malolos cabinet, presenlted( a note, of which the following is a copy: MANILA. ()ctober i1', Is'.8J His Excellency Major-General Orils, Milit(rmy (Yforer)or' of thle Ulnited St,(ttes Forces in the Ph ililq)ines. GENERA L: I have the honor to place in your hands this note, which I bring personally, in which I make known the object of the mission confided to me by President Aguinaldo and which I will reiterate verbally. The letter dated the l-ltl of this month, which you directed to General Aguilialdo, reached his hands, and desirous of complying with your desires he called in council all of his generals and made known to them the desires which you expressed in your letter. Highly appreciating the spirit of friendship and good feeling which is constantly noted in your honorable letters and which reflects the sentiments of Americans and of their policy toward us, the generals of NMr. Aguinaldo cheerfully accede to that which you ask. But the idea of the possibility that Spain may return to this territory and occupy Manila as the result of the decision of the Anmerico-Spanish conterernce now in session in Paris, has caused said generals to try and obtain a modification of the demands which you make in your letter of the I Ith. Having verbally explained, for your consideration, the reasons which influence the manner of thought of the Philippine generals, I shall make also the following propositions. made by President Aguinaldo: First. The Filipinos will retire beyond the line of demarcation indicated in the blue print. as you desire. Second. The Filipinos will retain Pandacan under their jurisdiction. Third. The Filipinos consider it of the greatest importance to occupy the blockhouses, with their forces of the line, in view of the possible return of the Spanish, promising not to pass with arms. Fourth. General Aguinaldo asks of you an extension of the time indicated, for evacuation of his troops. I repeat, sir, with the greatest consideration and respect, T. H. PARDO DE TAVERA. REPORT OF MAJOR-GENE1TRAL OTIS. 19 Collsilerablle (lislcussion followed and Tavera, a malln of excellelnt scienlific and lprofessional attaiilmlllnts, lonll a residenlt of Paris anld edluc(at.tel tllre, and who l(Iad advocateld openily the estal)lishmlent of Ai\lericani sovereignty il the islands as nec(essarv to the welfare of the ilnlhabitants, ablly represented his chief, strongly urginlg tile concessions re(qulested in l is com unlll ication. It developedl tlhat 1y let ter of lte 14lth had ar'onuse(l fierce olpposition; that Agiinaldo 1had inldiglnantly disclaimed any knowlledge of tlie p1roilise to gradlllally with(draw tlie trool)s from IP'aco 1( a nd( I' acflan, and that olpinion oil the question to withlLaw or tfight,, whichl the insurgent leaders hiad discussed, \was well-nigh equally (livided. All the concessions requested were lenie(l. Then an extension of the (late fixed in m1li letter tlpon which tlie insulrgent troop)s Ilmust tbe retifred to (October 25 was asked fo'(r and g'ranted. In tlhe course of ourll covelrsation )r. Tavera and his associates stroigly l rgeled pIersn)ission to retain all tile Splanish hIlockkhloses, but were infolrmedf tlat we could not vield in tllis matter, as son)l of thelm were witlhii tlhe lines beyond which they mullst withdraw. ']lThey I lien reverted to tlhe blockhloulses northleast of tlhe city which wvereI o(nl those lines, saying tihat they! liad n(o shelter for their tr(oops if Ihey were takeil fro'il theui, ad(l I remlarkedl casually that I li(d not ecosidlerl tihe(il of anyi illlportafice, ats we didl nlot intetnll to (ccupy tilhell, h)it thiat I was inablel to concede thle p)oint. It seetis. howe-ver, that I was misuidelrstood in this mliatter', and thle commii tee report l't( o to Agithll(lo tlalt tlese blocklhouses would reiimain in his possession. W\hen, six days lsatler, after' I lad ( c(rr1ectedt tliis mistaken ilmpr'ession. D)r. Tavei'a (called uplOn nme in person and explained tlie milost tiiifott unate p)ositi0on ill which lie had b)een place(d by reason( of lthis Illislllludelstatlding', I itformled hlnil thiat I would 1not take iminledi-.ate action e.ven 1 ilf tle i isurge(lits diid ot tvactate these houses oil tlhe dlate al noll( ee(1. All thlis alppeal) s in subse(1l(ent corresl)pondence. On ( )(ctoler 2() it was reported that inlsurgent troops were mio1ving siot-11tlward b1y rail way f"roil 51.a1lols d111(1 other poilits anl( were being colicelict raed near tie l(rtl'i lineol f tle cit-y. )n calling thle attention of 1:1ie inllsisurgl( alit(horities to tl is fllreatelill g dellmonlstration the colicentir-atio0l ceased C(l and( aliv ot tlie tr1 ps1 were relnove(l. )i ()(Octobe, ' tlhe following was received( REVOI,\- TI(ONAliY (1-OVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, I'rcsi/(1)cy, lta/o7o.s. Oc(tolb'r '2. /89S. General E. S. )OTIs. (.i o))(i(er hi C'ii('' I ' of o A cr' ('(o i orces. Malla i(', P. I. (GrEN ERA t: In view of your favor of the 1-lth instant, I consulted the opinions of my generals and advisory council. and 1 have appointed Dr. Pardo de Tavera in order that lie might place 1)efore you the wishes of all. as he did on the 18th. Said colmmissioner's, uplon giving me an accoulnt of your wisles. told me that you had consented to postplone the ultimatum for the withdrawal of our troops until the 25th and the retention by our forces of the blockhouses situated on the line shown on the blue map whicl you sent me with said letter, but had not acceded to the desires of the Philippiiie people that my forces continue to occupy Pandacan. Relative to the latter point, I take the liberty of telling you that your predecessor, General Merritt, understood that the American forces only ought to occupy, according to the termns of the capitulation o(f Manila, the city and its environs, i. e., Binondo, Tondo, Santa Cruz, Quilapo. Saimpaloc. San Miguel, Concepcion, Erinita. Malate. and Paco. or San Fernando de Dilao. and thus he clearly puts it in his letter of August 20 last. The town of Pandacan has always been considered outside of the old municipal limits of Manila. Which the general himself mentions in said letter, and I hope your high sense of judgment will see it thus. Nevertheless, I understand that your forces are already occupying the Uli-Uli, Nactahan, and Santa Mesa districts, which. although belonging to the jurisdiction of Pandacan, they can continue to do, in order to prevent the continual encounters with mine which cause disagreeable incidents. 20 REI'()T OF MATJOR-(GENE1-AL OTIS. I take pleasure in manifesting to you that it is not lack of confidence. and lluch less animosity. that protmpts nme to write in this manner. To-day, llore than ever. the Filipinos desire to live in peace and perfect harmlony with the Ameiricans, because they will take care that the Philippines do not return under the odious Spanish dominion. When it is possible for a forlmal convention to pacify and harmonize the interests of tie two peoples, then the suspicions of mIy people —which I can not coiipletely lquiet with my prestige and authority, no matter what good desires move me-will disappear. I beg of you not to consider as an insult to your flag a bad interpretation of my orders, which I will severely )punis according to the gravity of the offense. You. with your keen perception. will understand that a people agitated by a revolution return gradually, not suddenlly. to their normal life, no imatter how educated they are sulposed to be. It becomes necessary for me to act with lluch ta(ct in order to give no cause for internal dissensions. And this consideration is wllat obliges me to ask you about the form and conditions with which you wish to establish a sanitarium withlin my lines: because I wish. at all cost. to prevent the possibility of your complaints being renewed concerning acts emanating from the continual contact of our forces. I understand that you have considered it necessary to demand the withdrawal of our forces. notwithstanding the friendship which bindis us. in order to prevent friction. On this account, although I highly appreciate tlhe humane sentiments which prolmpt you. I do not dare allow it, without previous expllanations, for the very reason that I wish to preserve the friendship that constitutes the welfare of both peolles. I hope you will pardon me, as the necessity of ('onsulting various advisers has obliged me to delay my answer. I am, General, with the greatest consideration, your obedient servant, EMILIo A(iUINALDO. The represelltatives of A^guillaldo w11 prese)S ltced((l itis (commullllniication caile prepaared to arg'tl(i its illerits, lland( aftel- monsiderabl(e Colversaltiion I sent llie oral rel)ly that the stubject 11 ad been exhallstivelv discussed and that (len'eral A0gi1ialdo) mst witl(lhdraw his tro'()ps from thle ( lines (lesiglated1 0 beo t o be' the (ldatle alinonlce(d, remarkig at tlie tinthe that I \would mnake formmal reply later to certail l)oilts which lie hlad preselnted i I his note. 'Tle insurmgent t'oop)S wee' e withtdraw\ omi the afternoon aind evening' of Oct ober 25, as p)romlised, alid o ()( October 27 t lie following, letter wN-as sent to MAalfolos, andl1 rolugolit omut. those of November 4 and {16, whichl hrei naf'ter appeir. T'l hese terminatled all ofliciheal corresp)ondenev uponl thle subjects therein (liscussed: OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE IsLANDS, M(1nila, 1) I., October 27', /S9. Gen. EMILIo AGUINALDO, Commtlandil. Revoltio ar1/ Force.s, Malolos, P. 1 GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 22d instant, and have awaited the result of correspondence and conferences upon the subject of which you treat. Concerning the conference of the 18th instant with your representative, Dr. Pardo de Tavera, it resulted in an honest misunderstanding between us in one slight particular only. The doctor very ably, by letter, submnitted your wishesone of which was the retention of the blockhouses on the designated line. In regard to this matter, I said I was powerless to make any concessions, and in the conversation which followed remarked. in substance, through the interpreter. that we did not wish to occupy them. as we did not consider them of any importance. The doctor, 1 can conceive, very naturally misunderstood my meaning-in fact the interpreter might have done so-and when. on the 24th instant, the doctor again called and forcibly expressed his construction orf may language. I was so impressed with his earnestness and honesty of purpose and convictions, I remarked that, although the law would not permnit a conccssion. I would not raise any objection, unless hereafter compelled to do so by my superior authority, if your forces continued to occupy the blockhouses to the north of the Pasig River. I have referred to General Merritt's letter of August 20, which you mention. and find that it is as you state. Unfortunately, I am bound by the terms of capitulation, which recite " the city and defenses of Manila and its suburbs.' Pandacan -REPORT OF MAJOR-lENERAT, OTIS. '21 is certainly far within the line of defense and. front information obtained from 'two weighty sources, I have been led to believe that it has, of late. tbeen considered one of the city's suburbs, although we have been unable to find any Spanish decree * which fixes its status with definiteness. In regard to the establishment of a convalescent camp for the restoration to health of memtbers of my command, it was my intention to consult you and arrive at an understanding in the matter before attempting anything of the kind. I knew you would not offelr olbje(tions if it could be so placed as ilot to (giv-e your people annoyance, since it could not be in any wise a menace, but. on the contrary, would l)ace our sick within your power and to a certain extent under your protection. I have that confidence in your humane sentiments and in the kindly impulses of your lpeolie as to believe that you woul(d surely consent to a mneasure of this clharacter. and I tlhink the poorer classes of surrounldin' communities would be pecuniarily benefited by the small trade that it would give rise to, as hospitals miake manyv purchases of edible I)roducts which your people would be glad to furnish. Shlould necessity arise under which I would be forced to take action, it will be imy pleasure to confer with you lbefore proceeding in the matter. and I ain fully convinced that you will give assent and assistance. Permit me. (General1. to assure you that I fully aplpreciate the difficulties under which you labor in your endeavors to carry out the desires and ldemands of your people. As I have already expressed myself in former commnunications. I am fully convinced of your wish to maintain harmonious relations with the Unite(d States forces and government of Manila. and that you deplore. with me. any proceeding which may disturb that hlarmony and friendly feeling. I have been fully aware that all unpleasant incidents which have occurred. and to which I alluded in my former letter. were due ewtirely to irresponsible and unwarranted action of sutbordinates. and(l I amI constantly called upon to correct mnisconceptions entertaine(l by my troopis and to punmishl offenses which they have wantonly committed I am gratified with the success. both as concerns the interests of the Filipino people and the United States. troops. whilch has attended our mutual efforts for the aimicable adjustment of aftfairs. and sincerely holpe that the manifested good will which now exists by and between our forces may be long continued.. am. General. most sincerely. your obedient servant. E, S. OTIS. Mjol( -(General. U. S. V. f n.ited Sttte.s 3lility/ (~i oerlnor il thn Ph ili1) iUie.s REV()LUTIoNARY GOVERINMENT ()F THE PH1LIPPINES. Ph'esi(denc(/. Moaloos. Noce)lmber J. 189:,s'. Maj. Gen. E. S. OTIS. (ro))aomoder in Chief o the.Aninericn Forces of Occutl)(ion oft M(anila. GENEI.RAL: In having the honor of answvering your ietter of the 27th of October last. I shall make no mention of the first paragraphs of the same. because I see, with pleasure. that the matter referred to in them has had a solution adjusted to your (ldesires. I shall limit myself only to the last paragraphs that speak of the establishment of a camp for convalescents. Concerning this paragraph, I ought to observe that from the moment when a concession is mtade of a part of the territory occupied by our forces and a hospital is built in it. you will have to place there a force in charge to look after the interests there created, unless it depends for security solely and exclusively upon the guaranty offered by the laws dictated by our government. You. yourself, General. have always impressed me more than once with the fact of the impossibility of a dual occupation of Manila, because the continual contact of your forces and minie might give place to innumerable disagreeable incidents, if not serious and grave conflicts. which may disturb the harmony that exists between us. I am fully aware of the humanity you invoke in favor of the sick, l)but on the strength of this consideration it is my sacre(l duty to look after millions of souls whose security and interests would l e compromised if a conflict between us should ensue. The only solution possible is to completely cede you the use of this encampment, and this, as you will understand. reqluires some fixed basis of arrangement more concrete than can result from a verbal one made in a conference. Besides it is miny duty to submit these conditions to the representatives of the l)eol)le. It is not lack of confidence which obliges mne to proceed in this mnanner; it is necessity. These bases. if in the meanwhile a friendly convention between your lIEPJ()RT OF MA.ICOR-GENERAL OTIS. Government and mine is not realized, will (onlstitute the provisional rules that will serve as the form for the solution of the claillis that might occur. And. above all, the. —e tases will contribnte very much to l)erpetuil:te the friendship that exists between us. because my people will take great care nol()t to break thelm. I am, with the greatest consideration. your attentive and obedient servant. EMil,l.o A Ul1NALD)O. 0 1liCE U. S. MILITARY GO-VERNOR IN ITHEl PHILIPPINES. m111ihtl/t. 1, oI, A'cRml/'( ' I/J, /,S. G(en. EMILIO A-\:I'LiI). Conl i <lt(f;.dll/ teroitif(tio)(( ll y Forc(s. lJ otos, I. 1. GENE.RAL.: 1 received with pleasure your note of the 4th instant. and have the honor to reply to the point you present in regard to the establishment of a convalescent camnp beyond the present line of actual,)ccuipation by the United States troops. as follows: I aln not convinced that such establishment will be at all necessary. and. in fact. from present indications it would appear that we shall be able to care for our sick within the line and defenses of Manila. With regard to right of occupancy of territory. so many international questions arise under the articles of capitulation with Spain. which the United States is in honor bound to strictly construe and obey in all matters affecting its iaction. that I do not intend to present them for determination if it can be consistently avoided, especially not those which inight demand argument and decision. such. for instance. as might arise regarding sihore lines, which rightful occupation by the United States of the bay and harbor of Manila., with conceded rigl ts of use for commercial p urposes. Inight involve. I am. General, with great respect. your obedient servant, E. S. OTIS, ({aj.o'-(eoI('cr'ot l'. S. I.. itifedt Sftes Mililtary (Tocel'lor) inl {ihe iP1]/liij))i)es. DI) illg 1i1, latI(' pa. t of )(lOctober, instructions we', re ceived(1 frt \Waslilngt-(on (directiniig t ihal (ffort: 1be imade 1 secure( ii(, rcelease of members of 1tlie Span)ishl (clergy al(l reli giouls o (lers who were held by t-l1he insurigent govei'meliiiiiti as )1prisolleii of wvar. (Correspoide)(ilcle es i (Ied and is here given to sel e as a basis f)or commet11111 in a llaterm portion of tis reporl. Four com )IIIIIIIII(cations passed, of wAihich I ile follow inmg are colpies: OFFI(CE U. S. MImIrTARVi Go\VE-NOR IN TiHE PHILIPPINE ISLAN)S, J(fir iitflt, 1. I.,,\'ot())ils)r <', S'tS. Gen. EMIio( A(/TINA\L,DO. Colniand))( n. Phi'lipj)ife lertdOtioltO',1y/ Forces, M11(tlols., 1 1. GENERAL: By direction of my Government. I have the honor to present for your distinguished consideration a subject which is causing much comment and a great deal of severe criticism of the Filipino people throughout Europe and among the very large class of Catholic citizens of my own country, and that is the retention, as prisoners of war, of the Spanish Catholic clergy and nuns. I believe that a vast majority of the reports of great cruelty and barbarous treatment practiced by the Filipinos toward these individuals which have been put in general circulation are untrue. Indleed, I have forbidden cablegrams preplred on this subject. which I had goodl reason to suppose could not be substantiated, to be sent to other countries, and I have informed the United States authorities that many rumors of this nature in circulation throughout the civilized world were greatly exaggerated. Still, however, thle facts stand out prominently that these individuals have suffered privations and hardships and are still held in captivity, and fabrications charging most cruel and inhuman treatment. resulting in loss of life will continue to be spread abroad to the great detriment of the interest and welfare of the Filipino people. I do not consider that 1 sacrificed in any particular the confidence reposed in me by my Government in communicating to you that it has been requested by the Vatican at Rome and by many distinguished men high in the councils of nations to employ its good offices in efforts to secure the liberty of the Spanish clergy and of all in(lividudls connected with religious orders noow held in durance, among whom are especially mentioned the Bishop of New Segovia and the nuns in the northwestern part of the island of Luzon. It is, of course, needless for ime to present to you or the able counselors by whom REPORT' 1' OF 1A.II-GENERAL, O)TIS. 23 you are surrounded, and, indeed, it may be considered a presumption on my part to invite your aittention to the fact that this cilergy. anc. indeed, the civil functionlaries of the Slpanisli (overnmlelt. can not under a strict interpretation of the rules of international law be deemned prisoners of war excel)t in certain very aggravated cases. It would re'luire mnost decided action on the part of meimbers of religious orders to 1ldac;, themn in that category, and the seizure and retention of nmiis or interference witll therm in the practice of what they consider their duties under their sacred religious vows is invariably looked upon with marked disfavor by all nations claiming to plractice civilized warfare. All this is well known to you, ald I only allude to it to account. in a measure, for the erroneous impressions which pul)licly prevail regarding the humalnne sentiments and good intentions cherished by the Filipinos. and whlich are so daimaging to theml in securing a position as a l)eoI)le which they seek to invoke. You will please pardon me for this,allusion. but the matter is so iml)ortant to the best interests of the Filipinos that I have taken the liberty, uninvited. to present it. (,onfident that you seek the welfare of your people. may 1 in that confidence ask you to use your (conceded influence to correct this condition of affairs and to act with me in efforts to place these plrisolners in a position which will put an end to the acrimnlailious criticisms wvhich now so widely prevail? I would be pleased to receive themi here at Manila and care for thein while they- make preparations to leave tle (country. as I am illf()ormed llany of them desire to do: and more particularly does it al)pear to me as imost essential that l)romp)t action be taken with regard to the nuls. Any traveliing expense or cost of food required to effect their relmoval to this l)oint I would be glad to meet should you desire it. I lamn. General. with great respect. your obedient servant. E. S. OTIS. o('j/or-&co;e~'l. f -. S. I.. l lite(l,;f lt(f ls lIMilil/(!! (;, 'c')())I ' iii tf/i PI ilill)iles.". REV-()i,UTIONA —RIiY G()VERNMEINT OF TIlE PHILIPPIN'ES. P1c('si(lelw(y, [o/l(h.s, Noei)iber 3. 1,9,'. Maj. Gen. E. S. OTS,. (omi lnmlde' i, ( 'hief (f.1 iiciic(l Forces of O(e)lc(Itiool i7n fet Ph ilil)iines. (G1IN.RERAL: I take pleasure in acknowledging the receipt of your kind colnmunication of yesterday's date. and I ought to tell you that your observations. far from displeasing me. are very useful to nle. as they are dictated by the enlightenment aclquired in the atmosphere of a free country. I oughtlt also to inform you. especially, that we do not make prisoners of women and children. an( munuch less of the nulls. If some wollan or child is found among our prisoners. it is because they are part of the famlily of one from whom they do not wish to lie selparated. req(uiring us to siupport them att the expense of the Phililppine treasury. This d(etail is not foreseeIl in international law. but the FiliIiilos observe this custom. prompted by humlane sentiments. I am glad to hear you say that the Sp)anlishl clergy and civil officials can not be prisoners of war according to internati()nal law. Before answering this point allow me to observe tlhat we have only taklen as prisoners tile priests (sacerdotes religiosos) belonging to the SiPanish clergy. and not those who live the life of monks: and ptrmnit me to( maike this loiiit clear in order that the explanation which I have tile p)leasulre of giving you a111y be more intelligible. and so. also, that foreign public opinion may not be mlistaken. It is true that international law declares in genera-l tha;t the clergy and civil officials can not be prisoners of war, but tile spirit of tho-e very laws exclude the Spanish priests (sacerdotes religiosos) and civil officials in the Pihilippines. because they (Spaniards) alone possess the certain class of l,ersois known )by- that name. Beginning with the Spanish civil officials. I take the liberty of pointing out to you that at the beginning of the declaratioii of war between tile UInited States and Spain they were obliged by General Augnstin to bear armls, withlout distinction as to class. atnd even before, during the first stages of the Philippine revolution. Spanish civil officials were alre:dy formed into armed volunteer corps who, if they did not freqluently go into the field in company with the regular soldiers, sllhot alid arrestedl defenseless and pacific inhabitants in order to imprison them and sublllit them to indescribable torture. Besides, I ought also to say that in the Slpanish plenal prisons and penitentiaries groan even hundred s of p)risoilers and deported Filipinos who were torn away from their homes on account of the suspicions of the old Spanish Government. and thanks to the arts and malicious custolns of the lpriests (sacerdotes religiosos) called ministers of peace. 24 REPORT OF MAJ( R-GENERAL OTIS. Relative to the priests, or rather Spa-nish "i sacerdotes religiosos," I take the liberty of laying before you the following points: A. The religious corporations of the Philippines have acquired large agricultural colonies by means of fraud. In olden times the Filipinos. prompted by their religion, gave away a part of the products of their lands to the old priests (sacerdotes religiosos) for their support. But in the course of time that which was prompted by spiritual motive they made obligatory. taking possession of the lands, in order to better secure it, and makling the proprietors dependents or colonists who could not refuse paying, because of the vengeance of the Spanish authorities, whom the said sacerdotes had in their favor, through bribery. B. According to the canons of the Roman Church. these priests or religions sacer4otes can not claim the privilege of absolving, which is solely reserved to the secular clergy to which the Filipino priests belong. Nevertheless, the ecclesiastics. in order to be able to exercise the duties of larochial priests (cura parroco) in the Philippine towns, have been cheating the Vatican and foreign public opiniin, picturing these towns as savage ranches, which require the c;re of Spanish reiigious missionaries that the natives may not return to their ancient idolatry. Tile Filipino priests who have tried to rectify this false opinion of the Vatican relative to the religious state of the country. in order to be obedient to the canons of the church. died martyrs. accused by the ecclesiastics of being disturbers. C. The same priests (sacerdotes religiosos) tried also to cheat the Spanish Government. making it believe that they were the only upholders of Spanish sovereignty in the Philippines, and although the Spanish authorities recognized the fraud. they did not want to admit anything, as they were influenced by the gold of the religious corporations. These priests. exercising the right of absolving in the Philippine towns, have been for a long time the absolute masters of the life. honor. and property of the Filipinos. For this reason. it is a widely known and nototious fact, recognized by all the foreigners who have studied Philippine affairs, that the primary causes of the Philippine revolution were the ecclesiastical corporations which, taking advantage of the corrupt Spanish Governument. have robbed tile country. preventing progress and liberty. With these antecedents, General. you will understand that, owing to the influence and interests of the religious corporations in the Philippines. it is neither just nor politic to set at liberty the priests (sacerdotes religiosos). The archbishop, as well as the Spanish bishops in the Philippines. belong to the regular Spanish clergy, and it is not prudent to allow them to continue ruling in these islands. as they can incite a counter revolution, assisted by their gold and some fanatic Filipinos, who still obey their commands. When the Filipino priests, unjustly spurned by the Vatican, have obtained the right to appointment to the duties of bishops and parochial priests, then there will be no danger to the public tranquillity in setting at liberty the ecclesiastics. The Spanish Government and the Pope have proven themselves ignorant of law or justice. when one deals with their interests. For that reason the Filipinos wish to hold the civil officials in order to obtain the liberty of the prisoners and deported Filipinos: and the priests in order to obtain from the Vatican the recognition of the Philippine clergy. As a representative of the Government of the United States, I beg of you, General. with the greatest kindness, to notify it that neither vengeance nor hate influence the Filipinos when they hold the civil officials and Spanish ecclesiastics, but that public interests and the peace of the Philippine people demand these measures. International law will have to give way before the just cause of a country of millions of souls, because this cause is one of humanity, civilization. and progress. My people exact these measures and I can not but comply with their will. If you, General. can interpret the sentiments of the people to your Government and foreign public opinion, and by this means correct the erroneous ideas emanating from the ignorance of the true condition of the country. you will make yourself a creditor to the gratitude of the Filipino people and the civilized world. I am, with the greatest consideration, your most obedient servant, EMIJIO A4UINALD). OFFICE UNITED STATES MIIITA: tY GOVERNOR IN TIlE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, lI tt ilh, P). L., Norember 1, 18!)<s'. Gen. E.MILIO AOUINAIl)O, (otmanding Phll illJPiJpuie tlevolttionltf' /,Force's, Mfdolos, P. I. GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your cordial communication of the:'d instant. for which permit me to thank you. and to which my manifold duties have denied me the pleasure of replying as promptly as I wished. REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 25 I highly appreciate your expressed desire to act for the public interests, the peace of thle Filipinos and in accordance with the dictates of humanity, but you will pardon my candid confession that I amn unable to compreherd the force of your remark to the effect that international law must give way before the just cause of a country of millions of souls lecause it is one of humanity. I fail to understand how the principles of that law can be antagonistic in any particular to the welfare of a people. founded. as tlev are, on the best interpretation of the law of nature. which the acknowledged wisdom of ages of human progress has been able to bestow. Every independlent nation claiminig advanced enlightenment professes to be bound by these olligations of that law and certainly would be held responsil)e by the civilized world shouldl i openly violate them. My previous letter contained the re(quest of my Government for the release of the clergy and members of religious orders, including nuns of a certain locality rel)orted to be held by you as prisoners of war. Your reply informs me that you hold ais such prisoners the Spanish priests and former civil officials, but not women an(l children, "much less nuns.'' In regard to the latter, I must have been misinformed, for I received the ilmpression that they sought return of their personal effects, of which they had been deprived, with permission to join their friends in this city. Your letter. however, assures mle that they have not been despoiled and possess full liberty of action to journey whersoever they please. This informiation I will gladly convey to my Government and to persons immediately interested in their welfare who have expressed concern for their safety as regards health, life. and individual property. In respect to the Spanish officials whom you hold as prisoners of war. you are pleased to remark that during the first stages of the Filipino revolution they were formed into an armed volunteer corps. were subsequently obliged to bear arms without distinction as to class, and that if they did not frequently take the field with the army of the enemny, nevertheless shot and arrested peaceable and defenseless inhabitants. These you desire to retain until opportunity offers to exchalnge them for Filipino prisoners now in the hands of Spain. I am not conversant with the facts you narrate, and am not therefore competent to arrive at any conclusion. It is. however, a well-established principle of law that the chief officers of a hostile government, such as its diplomatic agents and those who are of particular importance and use to it, become. upon capture, prisoners of war, but I do not think that its minor officials are classed in that category. unless armed or attached in somle capacity to a hostile army for the purpose of rendering active aid. As regards the members of the Spanish clergy I understand you to state, in substance. that they are held as prisoners of war on account of the grave offenses committed by them while Luzon was under the practical domination of Spain: that they were the primlary and principal cause of the revolution which has been in progress for the past two years; that it is not prudent to set them at liberty, as they are disposed. and might be able. if released, to incite a counter revolution in Spanish interests. and that they are retained in prison not only for such reasons, but also to compel the Vatican to recognize the conceded rights of the Filipino clergy, which has heretofore been denied it. Accepting these as established facts (my knowledge is not to the contrary), the conclusion does not appear to follow that these members of the clergy can be considered prisoners of war. and I can not conceive how, under the laws of war or any international right arising from the state of belligerency existing between the Filipinos and Spain. they can be so denominated. Nor do I understand your suggestion tlat the spirit of these laws. if not their context, excludes these people from the protection which strict interpretation bestows, whatever may have been their previous crimes. Even if these priests belonged to religious corporations. against which the Filipinos had well-grounded complaint for past offenses. and indeed for cruelties received at their hands: even if they exhorted the colmmunities in which they resided to resist the revolutionists, and might still do so if released: even if they persecuted the Spanish subjects among whom they lived, they could not be considered as prisoners of war in any sense of that term unless captured while making armed resistance or giving active armed aid to the enemy. The law of nations allows every sovereign government to make war upon another, and concedes the right of revolution to a people greatly oppressed. but it does not admit a violation of the rules of regular warfare regarding the status of persons arrested or captured or in the treatment of prisoners of war, although they may belong to the forces of an unjust assailant or a formerly tyrannical lmaster. Tlhe expressed intention of holding these Spanish priests as prisoners of war in order to force th(e Vatican of Rome into certain acknowledgments with appropriate action I can not conceive to be well founded in law. custom. or precedent, and am convinced that such a position is untenable. 26 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. In this somewhat hasty letter, General, I have accepted all your facts for the sake of argument. and am unable to reach your conclusion, viz. that the iiembers of the religious orders are rightfully kept imprisoned. and that the interests of the Filipino people demand their retention. I do not think that the views you advance would receive favorable general acceptance. and believe therefore. in all sincerity. that the good name. reputation, and welfare of that people would be greatly enhanced by relieving those men from the captivity which they have so long endured. I can only ask in conclusion that the wishes of my Government may receive more favorable consideration than your most; friendly letter indicates. I amn, (eneral. with great respect. your obedient servant. E. S. OTrs. Illojor-UeocJral 1. S. I.. U' itchd Slaters '3Ilif(trl/ (orc'Jrori ill the PI/'lilp/)i/les. PRESII)ENCY Ri-EVOLUTIO(NARY G( tVERNMENST OF TILE PHILIIII'INES. MA,()IS, Aore/tl'Jbe /S9', 1,,'. To Maj. Gen. E. S. OTIS. (Geertl /i hli'foff th1/e,Amric(l forces of O()ecualtipto il 3IJlh/.ll(. GEtNEiRAL: Allow me to informl you that I have received your kind letter of the 10th instant: begging you to pardon the tardiness with which I answer, because of my many occupations. I highly appreciate your desire to intercede for the liberty of the Spanish civil officials and the priests. and be assured that if well-founded reasons did not exist in order to retain them. always attentive to the laws of humanity and agreeing with the principles that regulate the relations of independent states. I would not have given you occasion to make in their favor the petition that elevates you so much. In my last letter I have advanced the reasons which I have convinced myself justifies me in considering as prisoners of war said employees and ecclesiastics. Nevertheless, you attempt to depreciate the force of my arguments, relative to which 1 beg of you to kindly favor me by listening to my answer. You say in your letter that in virtue of the principles of a right well established the chief employees of a hostile government, as well as diplomatic agents and those that render services of a particular importance. can be considered as prisoners of war; but that you do not think mere employees can be classified in said category unless they are armed or in some way attached to a hostile army for the purpose of lending their active aid. And in view of this assertion, coming from a person so competent, I can not do less than congratulate myself, for in that statement you recognize as justified the principal reasons that I uphold in retaining as lprisoners the civil employees as well as the priests. Admitting that principle. it must be confessed that it is strictly in conformity with my conduct if it is adcnitted (an undeniable fact) that the civil employees. as well as the regular priests (parrocos), not only supported in an active way those who combated against the Filipino revolutionists, but also personally took up arms in order to fight against them. I have already said in my last letter that the decree of General Augustin of the 2.d of last April obliged not only the employees of the state and municipality to take up arms but also the Spaniards born here, and that in the first epoch of the Filipino revolution they formed armed volunteer corps which, while guarding the towns, made arrests, tortured the prisoners, executed defenseless citizens, or joined the regular soldiers to fight against the revolutionists. General, rea,( carefully the local papers from the time the revolution began and you will see there the proof of what I say. The pages of said papers are indisputable evidence of the military services rendered by the civil employees of the Spanish Government.and tle coimpensation received by them as a premium for their services. With these antecedents is there room for the least argument that the Spanish civil emnployees should not be held as prisoners of war? The same. if not worse, can be said of the priests. The latter, degrading their office. transformed from servants of the Lord to feudal lords and sul)ported by the Spanish Government, were absolute masters of the lives, lands, and honor of the Filipinos. At the beginning of the revolution they did not discharge the duties of ministers of peace or preach gentleness or Christian charity. but, profanling their sacred mission, they made themselves the police of tlhe Spanish Government. false denouncers of innocent citizens. RZEIPORT OF 'MAJOR-GENER1AL OTIS. 27 It seems incredible that the-Ise who should raise their prayers to stop so much crueltv anid infamy cominitte(1 by the Spanish (4_Tovernmneit. thlose who should give t~l(Ia.so-lv(,s over to, reclusion and mortification and penance for so much crime, we-.re preciselyx those who took lpart in thle affairs, anid w~tl base insinuationis, with finfamous, accisations and ideas, of vengreance, increased mnore and mnore the pyre of the (1 ad, anld the defamatory charges through which were sacrificd prciu anol innocent live cand the honor of many citizens. Again, venigeance does not move me in treating these ecciesiastics as prisoners of war. I conform to the, lrincililes of international law advanced by yourself. for, apart from the abuses commnitted1 by the loriests, to which 1 have referred in iay last letter, andI the facts that I add in my pireseit one, you are informled that they have tak-en upl armns against the revolutio..n: as. for- examimle, the priests (parrocos) of the t own of Lipa, lprovince of Batangas. who made themselves leaders of volunteer corlps. In Manila, durlnig the siege of the town by your forces, all the ecclesiastics. organized and uniformed, formed a lpart of the muinicipal armed guard. and all of theml you may be sure Pave lent their (directive andl effective (cooperation to the forces that fought -against the Filipinos. niot only mnaintaining. ait their e~xpense armned bodies. huit accomp)anying them in their expeditions as well as inciting them to battle. The convents have been the most im])reguable defenses where the Spanish cola1)ataints. together with the priests, hieldeo themselves inl order to attack the revolutionists, and this government preserves quite a number of muskets taken fromn the, ecclesiastics. Therefore, thle porinciple w~hich yon locution can be aplplied to thlem, and( it follows in co)-qiieoiuece that they shouid Le treated as lprisoners of war-the mnore so if all their civil attributes aire t iken into consideration. There is reason. therefore, to (lass thenin in the categoirv of chief enployees or those rendeiring ser vice( of sp ecial i lalorta nce. The prin-iles of internationial law sustained by thn most noted -authors were takeu into account by mne wheii I treated as pr isoners of war civil emnployees and the priests. Jiore, iAlartens. Bluntschli. andI others. hold that all persons'. though not t'ormninm- a part of the army. but who followx it to perform their lpacific functions. can be held as prisoners, of wvar. I oniy e~xeint the hospital personnel. according to'tlie Geneva convention, providedI that the take no active ipart in the wai: andI the Spaniishi-.Amlericani eiicyclopedhia says: All those who form part of tile caenemy's- forces. whether they are regular tioops or- militia, all those whvlo acconmpanv armies 011 their exloeditioils. the newxspaper correspondlents, providers. even the (lvil officials. canl be made prisioleis. Besides, retort (represalias) is a right admitted byn tin most cultured nations as a Ipenal powver to be exercised by one of tile belli eients with reshoect to the other when the latter viorlates tile li'ues or laws generalily a, c elpted: or as a sanction in the sense that by it the relpres:)ia. call reqluire the enemy to fulfill his dunties. In virtue of the right of retort. dluiniig time war of N ortli Americanl imidepemidence. tile great Washington. to avei~ge tile shooting of an American colonel,. a prisoner ill the hands of' the Eiiglisli, deemned loeyonId tile rules of war the En~glish Colonel Argyll. a lorisomner held by the Aniericanis. Thanks to tue imitervent~on of the Queen of Fiance. tile oroler was not executed]. In virtue of the sanie righlt, the German generalsy in the wai of 1820 ordered the houses in which their soldiers had been treachierously- attaclked to lie fired aiid destroyed. If there wnere itien nio international rules,; to justifiy the reteiition of the civil offlcials and priests as prisonmers of wnar. coulid not we Filipinos. not eveii considered belligerents by the othier ii tions-. invoke tile right of retort in order to secure measures oblig-ing time Spamnish (4overmioent to grant the liberty of many\ Filipinos (prisoners for p)oliticaml re sons) and chieck theii barbarous mietliods o)f torturnilg and shooting the loyes of liberity andl inel~epemdence of their country? This is the leason why. inl miy last letter. I said that iiiternatioiial law would have to give way befoire time n'lsf cause of.' a, comuntry of millions of souls, because this cause is one of hum mnityn civilization, and pregress. It is far fromn my intenltionl in mnakiiig th'is assertion, to show you that in retaining, as lprisoners the personjs in whose liberty you a-re interested. I cite international law only when attending to thme dlesires of my- people. because I have well (leilonstrateol that iii taking this determination I have really been guiided by those laws, at least when they do not greatly prejudice time wel-fare of My- people. I have only wanted to say that in many eases the loriliciples of international law.,,geierally observed by the mnost cultured of nations,. must conformi to existing circumistanices in the interest of a people who bewail time violation of those la 'vs. For this reason it is understood that the most civilized nations recognize the right of retort. Thus also. General, when I tell you that the Filipinlo people desire to hold -i prisoners time civil officials in order to obtain th~e release of time deported Filipinos and -their priests, and in order to obtain froni time Vatican the rights of time 28 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL (TIS. Philippine clergy. I have not wished to defend the measures adopted on that ground alone. whelen other well-founded principles justify my conduct. I have only wished to indicate that at the opportune moment, notwithstanding the motives previously advanced, liberty can be granted to these prisoners without the displeasure of the peolle. I should like to see that moment arrive as soon as possible. to demonstrate to you my liveliest sympathy for the fulfillment of your desires, which to-day I am impeded from meeting for well-understood reasons. The Philippine people, who aspire to a life of liberty and independence. have not (leserved from tie civilized nations, not even the United States, at least until the present time, the recognition of their rights in their war against Spain. They have the glory of having complied with the rules required to be observed by belligerent powers and nothing can be said to the contrary. I have no doubt, General, tlat having given your noble impulses and cultured judgment and sylmpathy to my country you will know how to interpret the sentiments of this letter before your Government and the civilized world and to justify my conduct in holding as prisoners of war the civil officials and the priests. I close this letter, begging you to pardon the trouble that its perusal will cause you. I remain, your most resl)ectful servant. EM Iniio AoIUINAYLDO. 'I'llThe lst eply, an(d po)ssibly tlie first, was (lawn bi)V Aguillaldo's attor'lev-,eii'.al, a ipersotn of ex(ellent le'al att.aillilnenlts, who is now servingu as one of the I'nite(l States judl(ges ill the cotiurt of t1lie l(1udiellcia, anld was (consi(lered unallswerab le,by thle lalolos g(over-nolient. It received liwst)paper publicati)on al Malloosand (l1lhere in Manilla. An answer wNas (1 drafte( ill part, I)bul ('\i' l(delivered. It rec'ited the factl that thle discussion of tlie subject had reached proporti(ons 11ever co(Itemplat.ed; ilhat I was not: althorized( to intler(ed(le for tlie release of tlhe eivil officials, ad11 thalt my rep uests hadl beeih lilitedl to.ipriests or menmbers of re li ious orders aMd irther remarked as follows: A reference to the correspondence will show that my expressed desires are limited strictly to requests of that character. and in leference to them you have been good enough to inform me that of the classes of persons named you hold as prisoners of war only the Spanish clergy, permitting full freedom of action to all female members of religious institutions. The announcement of that portion of your policy which affects nuns. or women who are devoting their services to the interest of church and benevolent societies, was received with satisfaction and has disarmed. to a certain extent, the hostile critics who have proclaimed that the revolutionary forces were imposing barbarous treatment on inhabitants in Luzon whom they retained in cap,tivity. Appreciating this sentiment, I was pleased to assure one of the good ladies of the church, Dona Sista del Rosario of the Dominicans, who called for an expression of my opinion as to whether she could make a contemplated journey to the province of Cagayan for the relief of certain nuns, that she would not experience any difficulty in so doing, as their movements were entirely optional with themselves and would not be interfered with. Returning now to the subject of my Government's request, viz, that which concerns priests. You are pleased to quote from my letter of November 10. not, however, the language employed, but as understood by you, doubtless, and to apply it in aid of your argument for their retention. Tlie meaning of my language is very different from that which you believed it to convey. Mly remark referred strictly to civil officials, was only a passing brief attention given to one which your former letter contained and had nothing whatever to (lo witi any other class of individuals. I said that it was " a well-established principle of law that the c i(ef of.icers of a hostile government, such as its diplomatic agents and those who were of particular importance and use to it, became, upon capture. prisoners of war," not its minor officials, unless armed or attached in some capacity to a hostile army, etc. I had not then, nor have I now, the impression that the priests c.uld be classed as important civil officials of the Spanish Government. nor as minor civil officers armed as soldiers or attached to the Spanish hostile army warring against the insurgent forces in the field. Formerly. as you are aware, a lawful prisoner of war was an active combatant secured by capture or through surrender. In these lat?r timei the class has been greatly enlarged, and embraces mnemtbers of the sovereign family,. ministers and REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERALT OTIS. 29 diplomatic agents of a government. and persons of importance at particular mionents, though separate from the mass of combatants. This extension is due to the fact that no great hardships slloul;l niow attend the lot of a Irisoner of war. while lis detention may help to defeat the military operations of the enemy or assist those of the army making the arrest. W. Vit an army in the field pursuing active hostilities. the laws of war permit civilians accom]lanying it to le taken and held as prisoners temporarily and while their services may be of benefit to that army. The termination of hostilities should put an eidl to the period of imprisonment. So with the priests. If their confinement as prisoners of war was ever lawful. further detention can hardly be justified on the ground that it will assist your revolutionary government, or that release will injure it. un;less, possibly. you al))prehend determined hostility thereto. mlanifesting itself in (dangerous delmol'itrations on the part of the lpeople who may\ be governed by their prejudices or spirit of revenge, for it is understo' d to )e the desire of the l)'iests to return to SIain anld lot linger in these islands longer tllal is absolutey nlecessary: and it is colce(lel. I presumie. that. removed froii tlle country. they will be powerless to aid Spain in its further efforts to crush what it is l)leatsed to denomilnaie a formidable rebellion. The plea that you hold them to effect ani exclhamge for priests of Phiilippine nativity and to complel certain recognition of principles by tlie Vatican t lHomie is not well founded. The imprlioned native priests were pIrol)albly state prisoners when SlSpin held acknowledged control of tlie islands and b)efore rebellioli had raised its tront. The pacification, too. which termlinated in tlhe agreement or so-c.lled treaty of Biac-na-bato may Imhav set at rest all questions;rising in tle cases of prlsoners captured during the rebellion of 1s96. For an arm11y to scize mlembers of the clergy and hold them as prisoners of war for the purposes of effecting the release and return of certain civilians. placed in captivity long before that army or the government to which it belongs hadc an existence. must be considered a novel proceeding, To seize Spanish citizens. whatever tlieir offenses, and hold them as prisoners of war to compel certain action by the Vatican of Rome is most assuredly indefensible under any circumnstances. Tle war doctrine of retort" which you introduce in your argument can not be applied, and you certainly do not wish to be understood as contelnding that you would be justified in shooting friars, whom you hold as prisoners of war, simply because Spanish subjects tried and convicted under the forms of law were executed, etc. As statedi, 11i is altswei' ws served, as I liad been reliably informied tflhat Agiiiiall(tdo conte)l plt ed, or had l1)promised influential Filipinos lo release } tlie lmio1'0 civil officials, )ut tliat tlhe te('mper' o Ilie people was such thai he eonu 11 nolt let gto lie miem hlers of the relig'iols orders 11el(1 in captivity. I also lhad an impression tlhat lie would not keep) hi is i'l)orted pri'ois witll regard'(l d to( tlle Spanish officials, but intelnded t{o l1ol(1 tlheii for celrtail purpolses, t lie cliiefest of Awhich were to secure large money consideratioiis and Europl)ean action tendingl to lite recognition of his goverlinmell n. I therefore inlformled the War l)elpartlmelt thlat effolts to obtain tlle release of tlie Spanish elergy were ullavailimg. TIhe course which has since been pursued by tlhe insullrglent aIltll(hoitieCs has conlfirme(d lie correct less of tlie ilpl)ressions whlichl were rieceivedl atl tat tillme. T1'he gelleral allusions made in fori'leer portions of this relpoIt to tli( actionl takle 1y t lie Unite(d States authoitoities wllich the private rights of or tll( frl'lmel'. liivileges and oblligations enjoyed by or imposed lpoln tlhe inhabitllants while 1lndl(' Spanish ad(inistlration, do not show thle tru'e sillnificace of' that act ion in many essential particulars. Ma1i, ila, is tlhe capitcall ofl terrlitory having seven or eight millions of pe)ole. The different isliandis anll in some instailes the different ]provinles of the sanme islalnd tare (dependent u1l1ol each othier for the ntece~ssaries of life. Cert.ain sectiolns of the country confine their industries l'(or tlhe lo()st plart to the cultivation of rice, others to tobacco, or' to hle }1m) or sugar, or the raising of live stock, and exchanging these pro(ucilcts in a great (legree for articles of colsumlption ol other necessar;ies, whiclh ar1e conveyed in light-draft vessels to thle numerous 30) REPO)RT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. towns anid villages whIdeli are situnated oin thle (901) miniles or more ofI islan(1 coast!. 1 hiie p, sutgar, alnd tobaceco (1ist1ricts nImst: have rice, and that in kinid becomnes the edl in itiln of exchlam'ir fo1 r heiri l- pr-odlict ts. Little moniey is tised or licile(e. Thie erchliants of t lihese towns anid villag-es receive the princ-il-al product of the (list 11(1 fot. Ilie lnierchandisc sold to thle inliabitant- s a 11(1 baiter thie prooduc ts o( otlic( i (listricts for it. Thile g-reat center ol' the, islaminl tradle is Manila, MA11l trade is controlled aind coniiducted im ostlY by En ropeamis-the (lii na mcii, however, looking carefully after its ret iil fe~ttitires. Tlie elosing of t ile port of Maui la, or a radical chliamw ill I It mestrictions or r-egulat-iolns tinder wbhichi this trade, is carlied (1 11) x wout(1 seriously iffeect thwe ijilimhabitants of the islanlids, and tIle luilsiiiess itetrsts of th ie large inechatilts who are also tlhe exporte(-rs of tfle native in0(1 ticuts. lUnder present social colnditions as atfectetl yly the speciad iddlistries of p1art icular sections, it is possible b cby eialetiey initerl-ictilmo iuiterislan(1 conimmieree, to reoltice to criteat iH~idividiial sitfferinig the mass of tlihe inhI )iban ts, ais wA-el as Io) seriously inpair thle large, European or foreigin bitsitiess capit-al wh~ich hableell iliiveste'd hlere( for coimmiercial pturposes. As hats beeni sla-ted, t ite srenlrof Manila threw ino thle possessioli of Ilie(I nlited. fS'tates Ior comitrol, iot only the mitC unflicipatl affa ilis of the city, 1)u11 the (lmi mmier-ce, I lie s~liippi n, amiil a large shiare of I ie trade reveiiiies of tme l ii ilippitiles, witIi power to mutodlify at: its le.leastlure tIIet. regulatiolls by whichll thlat tra(le haos lbeei coiiduet d. The, ordlers o4f the lPresideiit, Nviselv (iirect edl ili effect. acoiit-intmimmeeof' late prevail imig ctistoiiis du titis, wvith Ii ery, slighit muod ificatio I 7lis, amm lhe pulp ic interest~s dciaiitld thlat relic f should. 1 ) extended to time, people of t lie islanids throuigh t lie resuimpitioni of trade-.. r1'les1modf111(1 eations liowever, sl i gIit as tiley wvere andt( unmavoidlable under tme circum istances, were thle sources of o-rievaliices onl thle l) it, of individual mnerchiaits, wilie iclte~y- pr-eseuited th romgh 1 lie coimsuls of thieir goveirnmenits or in person. Tile leatst changle iii thie I ornmer tariff schedule affected thiose who er-e stockedi or th1ose whIo wvished to iiilport mnerchandise, an-d galve compijetitors unfatir ad anags. May had b)oighlt goo(ds inl Spaimi at high market rates for thle purimse of see if-il ri the Spainisli t-rcade privkileges onl itouie 1)iodulcs, anid wvere uniable to hiave dcl iveriv madeI inl Maimilat 011 ac'otiut of tuel( wvar. They therefoi —,-re sked to IiA ix tihe Spaui lisli trale )1v ee x ne Ito t liese special goodis to avix 1( the great: pecunliary loss wvichl thley mul ust oAlthewise stiffer. lRelpealted requtests of' this ("1.1Claract c occasionled a g-reat11 deal. of coirrespolidelitee aiid thie colcsil fSpe -e ~ a ec upon granmte(1, Nvx h i %- x-is to,( the effect that -all stichi goods as miiizite he entered p)1i0rto Nxovemibe~cr 1(0, t~ e da'te \vh ie c 'l te anieiideod tfilri fy regulations were to go( imit o effect, iii gut,: 111)011 (1tie p~roof, 011 facts, be, admitted tinder the 01( 1 Spaimisli (list Omis rules. k xcii t Iiis emc~eesionl diol not meet, the mer-chanits' oleittainds, aiid. they cont ei-idd foia- longer timuie, inl whlich to presemit, their goodIs, but hiad t)o be den-ied after frtifitless argumient by- both laltI ies iii il-iter-est. rphe United States iadl iiot otily tassumiico cha-rge of thie customs regniations of the islands, but also of -allI fiscal mattlers. General G'reenie, amid subsequently Genleral Wh~ittier, walis alppoiuitcel to thie position of intetolemite, gene dl(l hacienda, wlvhicliwa really thle othice of the colonial, Ilministet. of finatmlee, amid n alt-liougrh 11mieij dluties were limited in orders to '' time snjpervisiomi of thie fiscal affairs of thle goventimn111eltt of Manila,"111 thiey were obliged to consider thiose of a gener.al. chiaracter oquiite extensively, such as imnjort'ationmi and iute rial irevemitiie. Tihe colonial treasury had beemi surrendered, and its administration REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 3 31 involvedI qulestionis of lcland geneal inl(.Teflnso o] the city,1 the is~lanll~, the peniiisiilai- g(-overilmlent, the nioney dej)osits of Iprivate jll(livi(luials gruaranteeing, farithlful performance of local and other Conitracts" wer'e merged iheyoll-i possibihity of segregation. TiheC.laws, however, Couldl not be -onisidel'ed to impilose obligations upon. any of the inlhalbitanlts of the is'lands livi wii olltsi(le of ter-it orv in the i-ightf til possession of thie U-nited] States, however t hey Inight e aplplie(d to residents of Mlan ila. There wa-rs a dlual occupation of t his office of mitenidente oveircal, as Span islh officials still considered tho.seo fiscal matters which related to the 1)isines-;s of the islandIs in. which Manila was ilot comO11(Pl1(4 I. To avOidl unnlecessary complLlicationls and Calso to simllIify adi in iiistrn'tioni, thre offlice wa-s placed1 ill temporary suspension and all fiscal imattters suilwervised fr-on the office of the militarl-y governor. The bureau of internal revenue, like the ciistonlis, as s0011 as t akeni possessioni of by the United States officers, pI-esenlted pei-plexing" (questionls. Thie soil ice's of revenue all( tihe proper adlninist ration of funds delpend~e(h ii p)ii nii Imerolls Spanish (lecr-ees exteniding over Ca long p)eriod of yeai-s. 1I receivedi moineys -which. beloiigedi to the flunds of thec city, c'xecIt(1-' thle st-anliJ laws, thle ijididsti-iai tax regulations, and1 looked aft~i- thie issuing- of personal ceduilas to the inhabitants of the isiandls, (te. As 50011 O~ t-le office was (vs labhishedl the residents Of fthe, cit v lhegall to I eiidcr I lie periodical. payiiieints. The quest ion aIs to xvliat chiartieter (if taxes shloufld be collected 1y the United States Caille up1 for. coiisid.eration. Ilack. taxes were paidl %in andl refunduients 01 (led 1its mii pr-ior ~aylinelt s icequested. In lanswer to questions subIIll ifte1 ed l the collector. of internal revenue, the following specific inst iulctions Were1- 0.iyen and show the nature of tile dififciilties pre(s(e1nied. O FF I CE 0OF THE MIiTATAIY SECRETARY, luau ifi. I. I., SeJltember.15. -18W. Miaj. R. B3. C. BEM,-ENT, U. S. V.. C0ilectfor of,I)i crfltl ker o. io ila, P. I. Sii: I am directed by tile military governor to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of September 14, with inclosed exhibit of cash received by you since the 2~6tlh ultimio. Ile (irects me to say, in answer to your q1uestion as to whether you shaill receive the railroad tax or not, that he is not convinced that the U.nited States tJovernnient has the right to collect it. It was a tax imposed by the general Spanish.1?hilippine Government for scrvices performed in the island of Luzon. The United States have rightf ul occuipation of tile city of Manila, and its defenses only. UnDler tlhel~levailiing airmiistice they h-avei110righitto im-pose taxes for services perforinied ill any othier lpart of the world. This tax. being a lprovincial or colonlial ta-,x. makes it doubtfu'l if it comnes within tile taxies wlhicih can be paid to the present authorities of tile city of Maniila. The Spanish governor stationed at Iloilo, who has jurisdiction over all portions of the Philippine Islands -not in the actual rightffl. possession of the United States. migh-lt be able to raise a good legal p)oillt should we accept this railroad tax. ['urther consideration will be given to the qInestionl. The military governor directs mne further to sa-y that as regards ouir right to issue tile 01(1 personlal ce hula hie is also in douhbr, as he is not aware what privileges it conferred 11101 tile persoll to whomn it was granted: that lie hias been told that it was in the, Iature of a passport, permitting Ithe holder to journey inl all portions of the islands. Such authority tile United,-States canlilot give, so that any cedula issued by us would not be of value to the party to wilom issued. It would merely be evidence of personal identification giving the right to remaini in and travel ablout the city of Manila or through the territory over whicih the United States holds sway. If hie is incorrect in his ilupressions please iniform, him. For these and other reasons (one of which is the dislike exhibited by tihe inhabitanlts to the cedula tax) he has not thought it consistent with good policy to issue the cedula. Very respectfully, HENRY C. CABELL, Military Secretary. 32 REPORT' OF MAIJORl-GENERAL OTIS. ()FICE OF rTlE MIITIARY SECRETARlY, M(ll il, 1'.., Sepel, lbe '1. l's. Maj. R. B. C. BEMENT, U.. VS., Collc(tor of ('l.stoois tml lf ernal.Recem e, M[a(ila, 1P..1. SIR: I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 19th instant with inclosures (the inclosures 1 herewith return), and to state in reply that the only policy which can be pursued under the present American administration of this city is to refuse to consider all claims which were pending. treating them as claims against the Spanish Government, in which we are not interested. As a consequence of this policy we must. to be consistent, ignore all debts due to the Spanish Government prior to occupancy, whether in the nature of taxes or otherwise. WMe retain all mnoneys and securities found in the Spanish treasury at tle inception of occupation as tlie property of the public enemy and do not acknowledge the validity of any liens which the former subjects of Spain (whose status is at present that of Spanish citizens with citizenlship held in abeyance) may submit for requested adjustment. In pursuance of that policy the answer to the first question submitted by you must be, "Yes: only received taxes which have accrued since August 13." The answer to the secoiid question is, "Yes: refund taxes for the portion of the quarters prior to August 1\8 and retain taxes which have accrled since that date." To the third (uestion the answer is. 'No." Parties who have paid taxes to the Spanish Government may possilly ha;ve a claim against the Spanish Government. but certainly not against the United States (Government. Money in the treasury at the time it was surrendered to the United States is public money and call not be returned in liquidation of Spanish indebtedness, whatever the nature of that indebtedness. You will not make any refuandmenrts in any instance except from money actually received by you. To the fourth question the answer is contained in answers already made. The fifth query is met in the second answer. To be plain, the collec(tor of internal revenue should refund only from money received by hini. Mloney covered into the Spanlish treasury by Spanish officials for whatever purpose, or from whatever source. must remain there. By colmmand of Major-General Otis: HENRY C. CAELL. M1ilit(f'y S(( erC(t( -l. IITnqliries \were cont inually b)eing )preseiited from this delpalrt mlent of Ipublic affalirs, w\hich nleCessfitate(d tle laIlor of discovering an(1 tlrailslating a great mtany Spanish d(ecreoes )by which tlhe (lepartinenit \was affected. rlThe (question of issuing the cedula, from which an annual revenue amounting to $4,0(0,()0() iad beenl rceixved, and whichl was one of the chief grievances presenlted by tlle Filipinos againlst tlie Spanish Government be(cause of its cost, wtas long considered, andl was finally requested by the illhabitants, as it furnished tlhe silll)lest, mealls of personal identificatioln, provided it could be given for a, moi(e coensideration not burdensome. It was therefore issued( to applic(ants, numbering ove 6(),0)(), at;1 ur:lte sufficienlt to p)ay ll tlhe expenses connected witl tlhe issling of tlie s:ante. It was eagerly sough]t 1by tlhe people and was,a source of great satisfaction. T'lis d(eartllment, too, was so closely connected with tie a(ldninistrlatio)n of strictly llllllicipal affairs (since it collectedl (a conlsilldrbl'e slhare of the city revenie) as to present complications. 'The city revemiule:caelll froIm m1ore than twenty different sources, including Irbl)ai t;laxes (collected att tlie offic( of internal revenue, 10 t)pe cenit of thle atimo-n)lts collecte(d for port,.ha1rbor, and light, dues, etc. Until 1894 the imunicipality, strictly speaking, consisted of the walled townl, anl(l was then extendled to embllce thle ad(jacen(it surrolludin villages, such fas Ermiita, Malate, Binol(lo, and otlhers, whlicli had previously 1)een granted a certain abridged illndependent con Itro)l of its pliblic a ffai s. Te royal r dearee of'.Jatn ual 18!)4, lunder which ll is chani.ge wa.s brought( a(bout, l)ret end(ed t,o reco('"ni'ze to, certai ( n extent the( clannish or tribal, or1 ]'at (he famlily, h1(erediiry custonms whichl enter into the public affairs of all Filipino village comm() unities, lbut REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 33 had littlle w\eight in the formation of thle new 0govennnent. Th e e nti re city ws(livmdedl into eleven (listliCts, and a considerable mnuber of the cit v ofticers wvere madle elective, under striilgtent btallot regyulations. The Goenr(e Ierl, owever, Cappoint edl to thme m)ost responsible positions, andi hiad the power of Calsoltute veto,on all avtions, of the mun111icipal council, so that in fact the c —ity (omit inuedl t) be, as forimerly, unuder quasi-mi ilitary adlmiinistrationl. Shiouldi the prescribed sources of revenue ftail. to~ furnish the necessary publie fumits, the coitncil mllight seek others froin which to draw, and Iupon a pproval of its recommnendlations by the G~overnor-G'eneral that certain new featitres of t-axtation be intr o(lllced, they were at once ap1)1 Ii ed(. A rcestablisilnliet, of thus So cadled city governmllent by the Unitedi States w-as can finpossibility, evcn if the spirit of the inhiabitants had made it prulenit. Tlherefore complete oto.fntol h oieo t i ctyT, 1)ut of all its mnunliipal affairs wa,-s entrustedI to the provost-marshalgeneral. Ilie was dircted c to (Ilepsit in the greneral treasury, as was also the officer of inteinal revenue, all fund-s received from anyV sour1ce whuatsoe~ver and to draiw onl the p)lblic trearsury for m1oneys to cover the necessary cift expciditumres. The accoemipanying, reports of the provo(st-imiar-shal-g,(ieneral and the collector of internal revenue explain thie constitution an1(1 w\ork~ings of thlese resp~ect~ive (lepartmnents. The subj(eet of Cihinese immumigration had to be conisiolered very soon after occupation. Aman of this class of hinhabitanmts had retired to Chinfa duirimug the three yearis of political agritation which had p)recedled the surrendoer o)f M1anila. 'Now, w\hen. the United States took. iossessioii an11d A. MOre stable government was preite(lce, they soughlt to return. Largmimbr too, who luaol never resided. inl the Pllhilippines endea~voredI to enutcer inl ordler to talke a(lva~ntagre of the revivimco trade facilities amitici paeo-1d N otwitlistandingy the many thousands who had perimaitentlv s ttled iii the island(s, wh-o, as residents, we~re conducting large busimmess enterprises, a. great shartre of tile retail tradle in the larger cities, the muui~ll (,xc v h tuges in m-ierchianluise carriedl onl between the outlyving( twstl l'eadwower-e extensi-vely employedl to perform tile more, ar duous altd ex'Jarusting kindIsof manual labor;, not withstandling the, very imarked strain of Chinese blood noticeable in a farir proportion of thle native inhabitaimt s, showvingr eon siderable consang~uineous relatioimslmips, the old hiereditary race prejiudice w-as still. active and continual ly nmaifested it self in illegral ani(l oftentimes bloodly demionstratifns. The Filipino is by niature Zan agriculturist; the Chinaman a trader not butrdlened1 by a troublesome conscience w\henr seeking the profits of trlaffic. The fo~rmer is more or less indolent in normnal conditions. The latter is ever on thle lalert, for iinolividumal p~eciunitary grain, is imore than a maitch for the Filipino w\hieii amny business relationship is estal)lishied between thuemm amtd is apt to1) pay for the advant~ages lie acqjuires by subsequent robber-y and oftentinmes murder-. IPursuing his avocation through~ the coulntry. ars anl insigniificant tr-ader carryinig, his pack of gFoods, hie is considered by thie imore umruly classes of Filipiiios 1As a desirable object, for sequestration and often disappears forever by somei imians unknown to relatives and friends. Still, lie persistently confronts all these personal damigrers, obedient to his mastering desire to acequire money. Under Spanish rule the Chinese residents controlled the opium tra(le, secured the greater share of the profits front legalizedl gambling which was extensively prosecuted throughiout tihe islands, w-ere the winners in lawful raffling, and were close secIis to thie Filipinos in the business enterprises attending the licensed ocecupation of cockflghting. w-~3 34 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. Not only was this active race enmIity and the unforltunate existing condllitionll which were or()re o(r 1ess its consellluences i'illi trloullle, )but the Ch:nainlen themllselves were divi(led into warlrin factions. '1y the la.rger faction thlie acting ('hlines(e c(onsutl was accusted of It-kinog advantage of his conlsula.lr p)Owers b1)y exactilr l)aynlenll(Ls of ioeIey forI his individual lprofit. 'Thle conlsull therelpoll aske(l permission to discipline his refractory co()utit irynien adtod (lteport. ill hlis diS(crtionll Il()se whom he mighlt discover to belol, tol) the ll(c (iill'nnl classes After (lue consi(leratlon of the perpl'lexing (llestions whi(oll )resenlted themselves upl)0ol the o)(elling) of tile port, of MIanila inl thlis Inattter of Chinese immigi'ration, lhle colc.lsioi( \wavs rea'Cled thllat thlie aI))l]i('atilln of thle 1rnit;e(l Statles st-tatites controllingl suchl illililigrlltion) to l:nit:ed States territoly- furnislhed tile )best s(oilItion), 1111( tlereloe ( willthin tile mont11 siccee(lillg' oui (;cclCl)atio(n the follow\-ilg' ilst:tllittiolls were issued: The laws of the United States, which prohibit the entrance of Chinese, will be enforced here. The exceptions are: Chinese laborers. skilled or unskilled, formerly residenlt in Manila and temporarily absent therefrom. will be allowed to return upon proper proof of such plevious residence, whichl may be made by p)resentation of a Spanish cedula or certificate of the American consul, of the port from which the returning Chinese have sailedl. The closest scrutiny of such cedulas and certificates is enjoined. and in doubtful cases the collec'tor of this port will re(luire them to be supl)lorted by additional proof, and no Chinaman, of whatever nationality, will be pernmitted by him to land except upon conclusive lproof of p)revious residence. There will be exempted from the above restrictions the parties naired in article 3 of the convention between the United States of America and tile Empire of China, published in supplement to the Revised Statutes of the United States, volumie 2. pages 15:3-7. to wit: Chinese officials, teachers, students, merchants, or travelers for curiosity or pleaullre. The coining of these classes of Chinese will b)e permitted upon the production of a certificate from their (Governmient or the goNvernment where they last resided, vised by the diT)lomatic or consular representative of the United States in the country or port whence they depart. sllppllemented by such further proof as is require(l in section (6 of an act of Congress, applroved July 5. IS84. All Chinese entering this port shall register at the office of the Chinese consul or consular agent. It is also directed that the following regulations shall govern the return to this port of Chinese laborers, skilled or unskilled, residents of Manila, who leave this port after this date. Every such Chinese laborer will, before his departure froln this port, report to the collector of customs or his deputy, who will enter in a registry, to be kept for that purpose, the name of such laborer, his age. occupation, phlysical marks or peculiarities, and such other facts as may be deemed necessary for the purpose of identification. Said collector or his deputy will furnish to every suc h departing Chinese laborer a certificate to be signed by said collector or his deputy, which certificate shall set forth all the facts shown by the registry book above mentioned, (orresponding with said registry in all particulars. The certificate herein p)rovided for shall entitle such Chinese laborer to whom the same is issued to return and reenter this port upon l)roducing and delivering the same to the collector of customs of said p)ort, and said certificate shall 1)e the only evidence permissible to establish his right to reentry. but said certificate may be controverte(l and the facts therein disproved by the United States authorities. Upon delivering such certificate by such Chinese laborer to the collector of customs at the time of reentry into this port said collector shall cause the same to be filed in the custom-house and duly canceled. T'hese instructions are still prracticedl sllstlantiaIlly-tlhe ()1l 11odifications mnade consisting in nmethods of lapplication —ald tle orlders which have been issued by the War l)epartment since their (late have confirmed thelnl. The action taken by the United States and Chinlese governmlents in chlanging tile consular represenltltive of the latter has REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 35 resulted in (luietiJlg very nmaterially the complal.tints of the resident Chinese atgainlst each othller, althoug h an occasional one is submitted. Th'le coiidit-ioins of tlhese r'esidents alnd tlleir evidentl interest in a stlable govelrnlent t;o enable tlemn to practice ttheil natural trading prol)ensities, allso tlie utter ab)s;ellece of anlly latlriotic sentimnenlt by which they could possi)l 1) be alinilated, renders the conduct of miany of them lilOllMltlo()iu. Xritlill our111' llilitlarv lilles thlev arie artdent friends of the A ericalins, andl, lncyon, el good a. ( lmany are apl)arel'ltly active insurg,,eIts. T'Ihe fill sll1)olr(linate positionls in the ilsurgent larlll, alnd one of tlle ilb)lest ilsurgeltlt g(rlleral ()ofliers is a Chilnalllanl, but his chief (cul)atiop l apl)l)('Ra's to b)e to lolk car-(efullyx after tlhe finances within tlhe tei' itol'y of ]his sl)phere of actio)n. Tey ]have I)erfo(rlne(ld a great dea(ll of tlice -,lst am.)nlllt of a11)1al lal)or expended(l in tlle construction of thll ilsllrenlt, illtrcncl llellts whlichl are ecil()llult(le(l 1)e o1 ary1l1 whierc(-ver it is callted( ilpo to opel)(rate, )but ulller illipres;slnel)t, d(loubtless, ats 1liey seize e-very o(l),l'tlllit' t) eSCea)( ilsurgellt dominaliltion, provi(le(l tlhey a- n( ()ot rest rail((l 1)! their individlual ll)l(perlty interests. Alltusi( ili e s ade ll;i forller portion of thiis rel)oit to) thie (dificiulties elncoultere(1 ill re(e:stabllishilin s.atisfactolry c(ivil t rilbull..s. It is thlere asserted tllat "tlhe (civil ( )ol t jlustic(es -vaclate(l lle(il i))sit iolls ati(l gradiually sai le(l for)S' u -ii w it tioui giving not ice of thleir ir.l en io)u to dlepa)r t." 11efore lhis lialp(anlled 111(1'e ha(! l)eell a few ilitercstiig ilici(denlls conecte(l with t ltie ()olpeimii of thl e co uts b)y le Si )i lll jildges wAithlout p)revious c(insulttit)nll withl tlie liilitary atlli)oritle:, wlichl excited the inlllitalills of tlhle cit, v;lo si.l)ntlit(tl St-r'()Og p)ll ('sts. Tile prov()stu srlual-glcm(:cral tl(herefore.was (lir(,ete(1 to lI()se the m1iinor civil tri1billnalls ad( thle c)Irt o()f ti(, first ilstlince-a- court with jurisdiction eoextelisive with t (ie telrlitorial limeits of a )provicllee. There \-was also in sessi(olil the e)urt, ()f the audiencia, (o the sul)ipele court of the islamnds, having apl)ellatle juris(lili(tion exclusively. l'lhe chief justice, whose c(ourlt wa.s emp()()wered byl )- S)panish (ldee'('e to sit illn flie city of Mlanila ()nly, ('lailled thle righlt to 11ol1 ('co rt awld to at least ai(ldiniister il)oll case(s affe(t igl inlhal)itant]ts o(-)t resident ill I lie city, independent of I 'lIite((1 Stat(es althllority, a.1il also llarguled ils righli to deternine ('S(ss, h)ot l civil a1ll(1 l i1inal, -wli (1 -were pel(lill(ng o apl)pal prior to Utnited(l States (clul)ation. In sull)uiiitting lhis request (r deciland, lie asked for 1)(:rs()lal ilterv-iew, aill t le following- reply -was returned: OFFICE OF THE MILITARY GOVERNOR, ]Ii(Oiil(t, P.. 1., Se)tember 23, IS:;S. Hon. SERVANDO F. VICT()ORIA. Chi. it Justi(e of the Si'p)'ve Couot (of t1h, Philip)pines. SIlt: I have the honor to acknowled(lge the receipt of your communication of the 21st instant. a translation of which is now before me. Replying thereto. I beg to informn your honor that so much of your communication as is devoted to the discussion of the question of continuance under military government. such as has been established in the city of Manila by tlhe United States, of the local courts of the country and of thle civil laws (municipal). has received the consideration which its importance merits. and to say further that the views expressed by you in the main have my concurrence. But while it is true, as pointed out by your honor. that under the conditions noted the generally accepted rule under international law is that all civil law continues to take its usual course in places and territory under military government, and is usually administered by the ordinary tribunals substantially as before the estal)lishment of the military government; it is likewise true, and I am sure will be admitted by your honor, that these laws continue in force and the local courts continue in the exercise of their jurisdiction only with the sanction of the occupying belligerent, which may, for cause deemed sufficient by it, suspend the same or wholly supersede them. Upon the establishment of military government at this place, it was decreed by my predecessor that ' municipal laws (the term ' munici 36 REPORT 01i MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. pal laws' being used in its broader sense and in contradistinction to the term 'international law'). such as affect private rights of persons and property. regulate local institutions, and provide for the punishment of crime, shall be considered as continuing in force so far as compatible with the purposes of military government, and that they be administered through the ordinary tribunals substantially as before occupation, but by officers appointed by the government of occupation." (See paragraph 3 of tlroclamnation dated August 14, 1SI,'.) The effect of this provision was to suspend operation of vour court, and other courts of subordinate jurisdiction sitting at Manila, until reorganized in accordance with its requirements, and it is not understood how this unequivocal language could be misunderstood. I am informed that the provision of the proclamation above quoted was inserted after mature deliberation, and that there was understood to exist a necessity for the restriction placed upon the exercise of jurisdiction by your honor's court, and by the subordinate courts heretofore referred to, in the then condition of the public mind toward these tribunals. Whether it is now necessary to continue the restrictions heretofore placed upon the operations of the courts named is a question which I have at present under consideration. The assurance contained in your letter to the effect that the supreme court presided over by you and the subordinate courts "'considered themselves obliged to cooperate with their continual functions to the better realization of a service which the army of occupation of your excellency's command took charge of," is a most important consideration in relieving me of such doubts as have arisen. I am very desirous that the judiciary shall resume its customary jurisdiction, provided that adequate assurance can be had that the exercise of such jurisdiction shall not in any way tend to defeat or obstruct the operations of the established government and will not result in a widespread discontent and dissatisfaction among the great majority of the people subject to the military government. thereby creating greater difficulties and hardships than those pointed out in your communication, and which it is your desire as well as my own to mitigate. I beg to assure you that the questions raised by you shall have my earnest attention, and to the end that a complete understanding may be brought about and the purpose we both have in view may be advanced as rapidly as possible. I shall be pleased to appoint an interview with you in my office when informed of the time that will be most convenient for your honor to respond to such an invitation. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, E. S. OTIs, ]lajor-General, U.S. V., Military G'overr)or. Several conferences followed, also interviews with leading Filipino lawyers, and the result was the order of Octoberl) 7, set oult in a former portion of this report, by which the courts were p)ermitted( to resume the exercise of all civil jurisdiction conferred by Spanishl laws, but not criminal jurisdiction of any nature. The permitted use of these abridged functions was not satisfactory to the Spanish ju(lges, and their courts were gradually closed, depriving citizens of temlporary legal process in their business transactions, which in a few instances was desired, except in so far as they obtained remedy through the military governor's office. All citizens charged with crimes and misdemeainors were in the meantime brought before 1muilitary commissions anud provost courts, which were occasionally instriucted, in order that th ey ilighlt meet varying conditions as occasion demanded. These military tril)unals have worked very satisfactorily a(nd have been maccel)table to the inl]abitants because of conceded just administration an(l celerity of action. Even now since tlhe reestablishment of the civil c('rts they transact a large amount of business, as civil jurisdiction does "not extend to and include crimes and offenses comunitted by citizens of or persons sojourning within thle Philippine Islands, which are prejudicial to military administration and discipline, except l)y authority specially conferred by the nmilitary governor." The surrendered Spanish treasury, in which the deposit slafes and REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS'. 37 vault-s hiad been carref ully exalllifled andl contents correctly inventoried by a board of offic-ers appointed for thait purlpose, the mnembers of Which. returned thecreto allI formner contents and. securelAT sealed thie,same to await the (leternifination of the (question of rightful p~ossessionI of ontnts gae a~. good)( deal of annoyance on arccount o)f the nutnero115 tapplictations of p)1ivate ifldividluals for thie return to themn of money, bo011ds, 01 othier sec unties which) they had d.epslediI( v-oluintarily as investmienits 01 in exchange for Spanish. bonds ne-ver receivNed, or to guararnt-ee the spc(ific perfornmaimce of contracts wNhich they had entered into wNithl the city aind provisional governments. rThe trea~sury books s1oNWCed inutny special. ind~ividual (Ileposits iiinmoney anid many special (I eposi ts ol bond-s, some of which. were properly designarted wNhen. 1lacedl inl thle Spanishi vaults, so thatt ownership coul1bredy determiinedl. The mnoney wNhiich. hidividunals clainied that they had deposite(h, if receeivedl an1(l r-etatine(l, had been Inerg(edl into the greneral ftund, an(1 together with. hue claintied bonds would hiave exceedled in amiount pr-obably all the inoney aind paper securities wh-ichl the treasfli" eon-1tai iied. rhe correslpondlence. betwveeuu these individual s and the mnil itary autho0rities wa-ts v-oluminous. The conclusions reaehuei.are shown in the following-0 co1numn1inicat ions: OFFICE UT. S. MILITrAHiY GoVERNNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, M.1a IIilo, 1_ r.,Otbr618. Mr. JOSE D)E GURENA.1 ttoi-Jiy/ 4 Jh D / Fri(0i U-O, 80 inz. Mcmhil(I. P. 1. St i: The military -overnor dhrect~s me to acknowledge the receipt of your comnmunication of a, few day~s sinc e (whinch is apparently without (late). in which you request thle return to y or client. of certain mloneys deposited by him in the Sp~an~sh treasury at MaI nia etc., which were to )e hield in trust by the Spanish Government as security tor the specitic, performance of (certain contracts which bie hiad entered into wx uh tile (Toverninent of that country. Inl reply. I am directed to return the copies of contracts submitted by you and to state that your client appoars to have a claime against the Spanish Government for mioneys dellosited, but none agai nst the Government of thle U nited States. All fun~ds which' came into the possession of the United States upon the surrender of the city of -Manlila and its defenses on August 183 last, were surrendered as public fuLnds, and were turned over to th~e United States under articles of capitulationl req~uiring that -all funds in tHie Spanish treasury anld all public funds shall be turned over 'to the authorities of the United States. " As you are evidently aware. there is no reqluiremenet of international law to the effect that funds. the title of~ which is vested inl the United States by capture. shall be distributed among such persons as haive piecunuiary claims ag~ainst the country fromi which the funds were captured. The contracts made by and between your client and the Spanish Government evidently rest in suspension by reason of I-the act of the public enemy,'" and may be reviv-ed in f ullI force up1)on the cessation of United States military occupation and return of the territory occupied to Spain. The military governimient hoflds as a legal I)rl'op.,sitoiin that a Spanish subject (with citizenship in tenuporarv aheyance) can not have, either in equity or law, a lien upon moneys surrendlered by. the Spanish Government as its public funds. They caine into the possession of thle United States wholly uniocumbered and title p)assed to iny Goveranment with possession. Very respectfully, HENRMY C. CA\nELL, Xilihi itrySecretary. OFFICE U. S. MILITARIY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. Alanila, P. J., Septembder.19, -18,99. Messrs. R. AENLLE & CO., GEN-TLEMEN: In reply to your communication of the 9th instant, the military governor directs ime to state that investigation shows that, the bonds you mention in the communication are in the possession of the present custodian of1 the Spanish 38 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. public funds, and that they can not be delivered at the present time for the following reasons, viz: That they concern a contract entered into by Spanish authorities and a subject of Spain: that all obligations of such a nature. and all rights under them. are suspended during the existence of war between the dominion of Spain and the United States Government, and remain in suspension until the final declaration of peace between those two countries. That the military government of the United States established in Manila is not under any obligations to recognize in any way formerly existing regulations between Spain and its subjects, whether arising under contract or otherwise. That it is not the duty of that government, and it might be said its right, to attempt to adjust claims of such a character. They remain in abeyance, and are revived upon the declaration of peace. Very respectfully, yours, HENRY C. CABELL, Military Secretary. In answ-er to individual requests for tlhe retiurll of volnitiitar y bond deposits, whic could he i(lentifield a1(l ownlerslliI) est.;blished 1by marks and (lsignations asiccompanyinglv, these spe.cial (ldeposits, appl))icants were inform(ed tlhat tllhy,must awa\it thlle (llseatliig' of tlhe salcfes, which could n(ot be doine uintil S(),e set('tlelltent of Aillelric'alIl and Spanish inte.rlests shiou()l le arrived at. The result, lhs (been that 1he money deposits tege( (1. into thle getera.l fund 1have inot bee)( revognizedl as creatilng an.y )obligation against the Utiite(d Statleso (ovelmacent, which received tllis entiire f'uI( as tle 1)ublic m1oney of Spainl; that thle recognized special de)posils have been retturted( to thle i(lividlual. owners, 11e(1(1 the supervisiont of th.e 1 ite(l Stales and(li Slaiish board(ls of liqui(lation, whic]l were app)oilitle( several. momt l()1s sinc(e to settle thle respective intei(est-s of t}hose (ove(In'llieltS I 1il(1del tile provisions of thle late Paris trea(ty. There 1.was anotlher cls ses o ca.ses whichl for a rief 'i(.l ( constiantly obtruded tlhemselvex(s amd wA hich iivolved( lollno-co(ll1ilue( stuld a 111(1 careful considleration. lTfhevy a'(ose 11pol)) tlle ali)lic,'ti1 of individuals for tlhe retl rn to 1them ( of their estates em al).'x'.ocd by tIlie Sp1 a ish authorities durini g tlhe rec(-nt rebel)llion. The estait.s ()f i inv iY' Filipin()os wlho were ('}a'1e'(dl withl trt(.sOt \I were tken pl ))Osse (),;iO1 of antid administered( 111)011 upon S) lih officials. After tlie 1Uni 1T St i- is 1bad( taken Manihil, preseI t aind retui 11ni n1 resi dents who 1 dl sluffere (I f ro11l this ('au.se souglilt t-le iestol'titoll 03 11eir l)rol)ertics. 'I1e (caIse of the (ortes Filip)itio fatiil-, whicll h.( 1 l t(kell refll( ill e iol,, 'koil(', was; pushed to' d(ete,ttination het'o)i ll(.e Mtaila ill litla'y a xl]utli),'l it(as xwi lt all the vig'or of (l(lemoll(strlatioll of whlii(cl tle I e(iel)iirts of tltiat!'aililii alltd the Uinite(l Staits (con1su11s iat l(110okoi'.i; aild al nlitila. we\(re e (ap.l)l('. These embilargoes 'affect(ed idllividXu1al rea l )r1()lopiertie(s, a lpor1tioll orf which 1nilt.1) sitatld(,(l ill 11( (city, a pa rt it soil(e other li' ho. lity 1unde Spanish (domilmlatio(), aid( sticlh was'ts tt(he ol,()litio(l of( the Cortes estate. A conclusion was fitnally rea,.(lcd (mn the facts l)'prese(ted all(i rendered il tlhe folloxwing expressc(l opiii()ion of date Novembecr '2^: That the present United States military occupation of a portion of the Philippine Islands, under and by virtue of the armistice existing between the Governments of the United States and Spain, is of a temporary character and does not place upon the former any obligations to redress or even inquire into alleged grievances imposed by the latter while dominant here ulon its subjects, especially if such allegations are submitted by those subjects and concern only their individual property rights; that the United States, under its temporary occupancy and the conditions which prevail, would not be justified in setting aside the laws of Spain and the decisions of its courts when individual property rights are alone concerned, not even in matters arising under its war decrees promulgated for the correction, or the punishment it mlay be, of its refractory subjects participating in a formidable rebellion with intention to destroy its sovereign power; that the REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 39 relief asked for by the petitioners is civil in its nature and should be sought in the civil courts of the conquered, which have been continued and are permitted to exercise their formerly conferred civil jurisdiction in all matters not involving arrests of persons and criminal prosecution, and therefore the case does not concern the military administration. specially constituted for other purposes; that the case involves a question of United States revenue, since the petitioners demand a return to them as Spanish subjects of the public property of Spain as aeclared by its authorities to which the United States has succeeded and which it has the legal right to receive and enjoy, for I ascertain by reference to( the Spanish military code that the effect of the declared embargo of the property of the petitioners and the proceedings taken under it was to vest the uses and profits of the embargoed estates in the Spanish Government while the embargo continuedtitle to the same remaining in the individual owners from whom possession was taken. The active continuance of the embargo was made to depend uplon pardon or the result of trial by the Spanish courts upon the charge of treason. rebeilion, or sedition. confiscation attenling conviction and sentence and restoration following acquittal. During the existence of.the embargo the real property affected was al)parently held in trust 1by the Spanish Government for its sole use and benefit. with remainder vestel in parties formerly holding the unqualified fee, and dependent upon a contingency involving due conviction of the crime of disloyalty to that government. These conclusions are supported by explanatory provisions contained in a decree issued by the governor-general on January 19, 1897, wherein it was declared tlat in the case 'of an absent culprit presenting himself and being acquitted by the court, he will only have a right to claim a return of the property not alienated and to the rents and profits which have not been applied." Finally, it is concluded that the United States Government during its occupancy under its truce with Spain. which provides only for a temporary cessation of hostilities, would be recreant to its trust should it knowingly'divert, without just cause arising un(ler the laws of war. properties the uses of which woul(t again inure to the dominion of Spain upon a return of Spanish sovereignty. Declared permanlent possession lby the United States would modify conditions and present the entire (uestiol in a different aspect, for then the rights of all concernedl. whether depnendent upon treaty obligations or otherwise, would be defined or become easy of interpretation. It wtas tllerefore or(lered( tlihat tlle p)rovost-lllars1sal-gelleral seize all fuillds of' tlie (Otl'etz ('osatl( on ((e1)osit inl t1ie local banksl, take forcille p)osse(ssioll tof all lite ll'el l l)prollies belollging to tlhalt estate wllichl were'( sitla10teIl ill thl)e (citv otf Ma;llnilai, and( a(dmiitister tlie same for the use a1d(l 'Bnliefit of tll(' Un ite( Stales (&-rove(e1'!llliit. Tl'se ('co11cl1usiolns '11 'iveld (at, \wilic were f11i tll-.itistfiet il)\ tli( e facts., eniial)(le(t tlie United States it1l,1'oiti(es 1o llt " k( legal piossesioll, tenllporar'ily at least, of llot1 onkly t1le rea l(.lt ut also) lie le)( elsolalty of the ( esatle wllich Spaiil h1eld, all( whict liel ollged to l () le p)til.)lic |)1ro))(erties she( liad prom ised to sumrel(,dr iill 11 tll.art icles of eaapitllation. 'll(' 1o\ost-masal-gene(tl ook posssii ( li' tile tst('ttl as (irected, acc('outtedlll for tie )roce(,els 'rec.eiv(ed \wlile lie leld I)ssessio(), a1 fil nally, nderl tlie inst rI(.etiois of tlie War D1 l)l)partnelll. ti lle( estaatle, witi all l)rocee(Is, over to t1 e oli Wlers. -This case servedx(l as a )prece(e'lit tor future procoed iigs 111p1 l q('estions of e(111 go a,ltlholigrli ill eases of muilor imlportalnce e(il)argloed pro'l)erty was at once tl1ne1( over t() the claiinaiit ul)1po (lI( 1)(poof otf riilgt to receive- it. nTiitil ()tober 14 tlie 1nliitedl Stlates troops in tile 1l'lhilil)iines reclained st atione(l at Maiila and (ia-ite, as pr1ovided in (General 3Merritt's or(ders of Augulst 2:, \vith very slight exe(eptio ns, aJ[Xjor-General A\lersoelS reitainingl su lerJvision of tlie district of (Cav ite and Maljor(4eneral MalcArthlur of tie troops statione(d in Manfila, the three ortganlizatifons co11posing the provost gullard colntinuing, however, u(ler tlie cointrol of Brigadier-General Hulghes. lThey were most bountifully supplied w-ith subsistence and medicines, but light clothing suited to the climate and facilities necessary 40 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. for occupying and messingl in bal)rracks were needed. ''lhese were soon obtained through contlract and purclhase flromi the merchants of H-ongkong and Manila and b1) slhipment f oon the UInited States. The troops received tfactical instlructions daily, but the Vweather was too ]lot for much physical exertion, and time hung heavily upon them. They entertained the ilmpression that the Spanish war had( terminated, and the volunteers appea-(red to believe that they should be recalled to tle lhnited States at once and regulart troops sent out to perform the l monotonous garrison duties which were about to follow the victory of Manila. AMany i)ecame ill from too free( indulgence in the fruits and man ufnfactured drinks of the country, adl iindifference to that care a(nd alttentionl of per'son which a tropical clinmalte nmakes necessary. Ilomnesickness alone )produced( illness in nulmerous cases, so that early in Selptermbler tle hospitals began to be rapidly filled. This led to the adtoption of judicious precautionar'y nmeasures. Aguinaldo was faithfully executing his agreenelnt mlade with Gelneral Merritt with regard to water privileges and the city waterworks, which was to perit s to use the )pumping station situated 8 miles from the walled city, provided we would p)ay the men of ]lis selection for running it and defray all the necessary -expenditures. Tllis we were faithfully doing, but the water sic'medv was not of lesired quality al(nd boiling and (listilliing were resor)ted to. Circular instructions prepared by thie Medical D)epartlment, mwarlring men of tle results of injudicioIs act i(o)l, wre issued fro(lm headquarters, and( all satlitlary measures possi l) were aIe(ldo)t(cd. The sick rate, howeveir, ici('leased. Onr Septembler 4 onee ilIunidred and thilteen sick solli(ers \we e slilpped to the United Statles, as t lleil restcration to health il tllis (limtllte was extremely iimpl)lrol)ale, and(l more follo) we. Th]e percl'(nt of sickness to numlerical st 'regthl in some olrganizrtiols ros(), to 0(), Iandt in two or t.liree o(rgaInizations to:.), while in olhers it did not exceed 0( or Sl.althoughl tlie latter' were no better holsed nor providet l f-o thanll the folrmer; butll the m1ll( of tlle latter were, without doubtllt, ]better supervise(d antl watclle(l (ver by their officeris andl were l(,masuirall ly conltented with] c(nditiions. As long as tlice p)I'actice ()f se()(lillng sick mlell ho)me co(lltilll(ue tlllee ewas 110 improvelment ill tlhe sick rate, but1 as soo(i as thle ('()nval(esce:lt hosplital was establishled oii Corrlegidor Islan(d (an island(l at the enltrance of Manila hlBay) anld the1 sick s(ent there for, tiealt ment a marllked clrhange for the better was taI)Iarenlt. IiL Noverni)emb i lmi provnement, was noticealle,, and in Jlanuary the lealth of this larmy w( ()Iul(l compal)rle favorablly with those of any (c()oncentritated I army of like propi)ortio)ns ii existence. To be srie the men (Iad become 1)y tlins time fairly acclimatized, a (nd new troops arriving heme( will be o()liged to pass throughll() thlis lpeiio(l of acclimatization be(folre thley becollme prolperly efficiejlt for 1)prlonged service in the field. During my first weeks of duty hlc re I was il)mpi'essed with t l(e spiltit of suspicion arlnd tlie I)a.rtially c(oncl(de(ld lnfri(-: (1dly feelienlg lllli ta'estc(d by the Tagalos toward the American fomces. Iliat; t]hey eiter l ad very little confildence iiiouri promiises or0 were tlhen formmling co(iclusions to oppose atny establishment of TUnitedt Staltes authliloity ilm Luzon was apparentt, howe-ver loudly they might (lisclaimi lmh)sti l intent or declare as an excuse for theiri attitlude fear of tlie retlrlI) o(f Sp)aiin. I saw, however, with sattisfaction, their l lablest menii by c(llucat ion alnd mental equi)pent takilgr part in thleir autll ortative (lelibelrations, and( I had considerablle conftidelnee in tule efficacy of theiri slugge.stions andl advice. Still, after carefully weighinrg condlitions, I wals u1able to REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 41 ariive al any satisfactory conchlusions. To a cable received on September 16, I reIlied on the next da.y as follows: Ai).iUTANT- ( I'NlPAI AiRMY, Washington leferrino to telerraili yesterday, now think prudence dietates increased forcethis after delibleration on situation appearing to-day and possible developments. Force sufficient for present lpurposes, but contingencies mlllay arise diflicult to meet. Parties plotting constantly to convey erroneous impressions and excite insurgents. Demlands of city governlmenlt and sick list draw heavily on armed organizations. An additional 5.000 mein could be used to supply losses alnd give greater confidence. Battalions of Eighteenth and Twenty-third Infantry, still in San Francisco, should join at once. Measures were being applied constantly to improve the sanitary condition of tlhe city, to increase the efficiency of the troops, and to meet any emergency which might develop froni an uprising of the inhabitants, or from hlasty action by any portion of our or the insurgent forces, which, though maintainingi amicable ilntercourse, were, in fact, in an attitude of resistance and hostility upon all questions involving tlhe right of armed occupation of the suburbs and defenses of Manila. The insurgent sol(iers lhad looted extensively the portions of thle city to wlhicl tltey gained access, and( were greatly (lisalppointed that this privilege over other parts of the same was not accorded them. Their enforced withd(rawal to outer lines was the cause of discontent. and augmented any (lesire which they mnay hlave formerly entertained to resist or attack tlhe American troops. Titis growing discontent was observable among the lower classes of tlhe city's inhalbitants, from whom a considerable share of Aguinaldo's arnmy was drawn, and was undoubtedly increased by the reprehenlsible conduct and illegal actions of some of otur own inen, who were severely p)unished for their misdeeds when detected. Outwardly, hlowever, relations of the most triendly character were maintainied. Tlhe ofticers and enlisted men of the two armies mingled in friendly social intercourse. To tlie casual observer the only discordant element in this dense complex population, made up of every natioi and tonogue in existence. were tlie hated Spanislh )risoners, whom the Filipinos still lounged to persecute and kill, and who were obliged to keel) within the witils of Old Manila for salfety. lepeated conferences were held with influential insurgents, whose chief a im appeared to be to obtain some authoritative expression on tlhe intent of tlhe United States withl regard to tlhe P1hilippiles, and complainled that thley were unable to (liscover anyone who could speak ex cathledra. Tlhey asserted tlhat their Malolos arrangement was a government (le facto. which hlad the right to ask an expression of intent fronl the United States Governmelnt. To increase and better organize the force in Manila, the following orders were issued on October 14: Tlie troops comprising this command, with tlie exception of the Twenty-thlird IT. S. lifalntry, 'lhirteeith l Miinesota. and Second Oregon Regiments of volunteer infantry, w lich will (olntinliie to conistitute the gnard and police force of the provost-marsla:ll-genteral of the city, the lighteeithl 1IT. S. Infantry, and the (letachmient of Ca.liforniau \'olunteer lleavy Artillery, which will compose tle permanent garrison of Cavite, are, organized in'to two divisions, designated as First alnd Second l)ivisions of thle Eighlith Army Corps, eaclb to consist of two brigades. Th'le followinr designated troops, now ql:artered and to be quartered in thle city south of the Pasig l'iver, will lorm the First l)ivision: Six troops of the Fourth II. S. Cava:lry. Light lla,tteries D and (G, Sixth U. S. Artillery. Tlhe Astor Battery. Fourteentli U. S. Infantry. First (alifori:ia Volunteer Infantry. First Idaho Volunteer Infintry. First North D1 )akota Volunteer Infantry. Battalion First Wyoming Volunteer Infiantry. 42 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. The following organizations north of the Pasig River will compose the Second Division: Colmpany A. Battalion of Engineers. Four batteries Third US. Artillery. Batteries A and IB, Utah Volullteer Light Artillery. First Colorado Volunteer Infantry. First Montana Volunteer Infantry. First Nebraska Volunteer Infilltry. Tenthl 'Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry. First South I)akota Volunteer Intalitry. Troops expected to arrive froii San Francisco soon will be assigned to these divisions when numierical strenigtlh and flacilities for qulartering will be considered. For the purpose of enforcing discipline throulgh general court-ml:artial lrloceeding's, together with lappropriate action to be takei to th:lt enl, tile First and Eighteenth Companlies, Volunteer Siglnl Corps, are attached to the First, and the Hospital Corps, U. S. A., to the Second D)ivisioll. Maj. Gell.. T.. Anderson, 'J. S. V. is aIssigned to the comllland of the First I)ivision. and Majl. Gen. Arthur MaacArthnr, IT. S. V.. to the (co(:Imand of tle, Second. They will sublit as soon as practicable the lIroposed organization of brigades of their commands. Brig. Gen. Charles King and Samnel ()venshline. U. S. V.. are assigned for lduty with the First livisiol, land Brig. Gen.. G.. Otis and Irvinig Iale. lU. S. V. to thle Second Division. They will relort in person to tlhe colnllllnaing generals of their respective (livisiolls for assig1nLent to brigade commlands ((elleral King, expected to arrive soon, so reportiiig u1ponI arrival). Officers now serving on tie staffs of tgeneral officers unller lproper or(lers will continue on. such service. 'lThe chief qllartermaster and chief (cOlmmissary of the colmmand will nominate officers of their respective ldepartilent.s foir assignmient as division nd(1 brirgade liartermasters andl collissaries, being mindfu'il of assirlgnlnts in those (cap)acities which have alreadly been al;lde. The chief surgeon of the conimand will nominate otficers of the Medical D)epartmenlt for assignment as chief surgeons of divisions. The organized divisions had little exacting duty to performn, as the provost-marshal-general with his gulard of three regiments was held responsible for tlie preservation of order witliii tile more thickly pol)ulatel portions of the city. I)ivisioi colmmanders looked carefully afteer the health, )ractical ilstrttction and persoIal con(luct of their enel, prescribed drills and practiced cereinonies,;tld watchedl by 1ieals of small outposts the armI e(l inlsuroents to tle numbler of six or eiglht thousand, wlio Imaintained a warlike attitude oni the outer lines. Tlie Army Regulations, apl)ropriate to lpea(ce conditions, were enforced in Imatters of exasninations, courts, boardls, returns, relports, aind correspl)ondence. Barracks, quarters, messing facilities, and sanitary surroundings were imprrove(d, atId in so far las strictly mtilitary operations were concerned tle passing period was (levoid of excitement or allpparent imlllortance. In answer to request to imake a statelmenit ill regard to tile welfare of the troops, I remarked, on November 19, that siice August nole h]ad arrived except a[bsent Imelmbers of Land recruits for orglanizations whlichl had preceded them; tlhat the fiftli expedition left San Francisco betwee n the 19th of October and tlie 8Sth of November and its advance was expected daily, and continued as follows: The medical departtment of the c(orps has al\wa.ys been well suppllied with ie(ldical stores. There h;as been a shortage of medical officers which ihas b'ell fiirly well met through contract physicianls. Now we are albundantly supplied withl medi(cal stores and hospital buildings, thlough Illedic'al officers htave been overworked. The sick report to-day is about 12 per cent of the co(i.ii:;i1nd; that of the British armyl in this latitude is labout 10 per cent. T1'e most of our sickness is of a mild type, and the health of the troops is now markedly inmproved. The total niumlber of deaths of the cornmmarndl since leaving San Francisco is 1(1, or a little iiore than 1.per cent. Of these deaths 54 were due to typhoid fever, 25 to wounds received in battle, 7 to accident, 13 to dysentery, and 13 to smallpox. This number of deaths among 15,000 men, covering a periol of sever:l months, is surprisingly light. In the matter of slubsistence the troops have never suffered. 'They have been supplied with abundant rations, better even than any body of men I ever had association with. There is to-day well stored in this city subsistence for 17.000 men for REPORT OF MNAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 43 four months. Also large supplies for sale to officers and men, all of which are in excellent condition. In addition to the regular issues '-i'O cents per day is given to each organization for every nian reported ill wvith which. to buy (lelicacies needed by the, sick. Doubtless troolps ha-ve snffered somewhat because of their lack of kiiowledlge to properly prepare their food, but all with former experience Such as our R~egular regimients are acquiring additional regiimnwtal Iulnds. The command is now faii'ly well suipplied. with a~ll needful quartermaster's articles excepting wagon tratnsjportaticon. The v~olunteers are still armied wvith the 01(d Spring-field ridle, but steps have been takeni to) su.pply the most reliable of them with the Krag-.Jorgcnsen and sm;iokeless ammnunitionj. No one can tell what duties these troop~s may be called u1pon to lperforlII. It is more thanr lroblalble, shouuld thme islands blo retained lby the United States, that they will hie kiept exceedinigly buisy establishing United Sta-tes auithority. and maintainingf a latir (legree of order. In casthing over all the (dificulties which. have been iiiet in tranporimthese soldiers, composedl osly id a material, over 700mlso wNNater and~ pmlaciiug them here, in good counlitiomn anid well sulpplied, results must be considleredl as quite satisfaictory. -Nothinig of tihe kind had ever before been atteumulted anti no previous 1preplarationi had been ma-,de. On 'Novem-rber 21 and '25 the absent battalions of the Eighteeiith and Twen ty-third l nfanitry arrived. Thiroughout that inoiotl. alidl a good portion of December, the troops remained qutiet, their healtht steadily imp)roving. Oi D)ecember 2 I cabledi the AdJutaiit-Geiiertal of' the Arm~y that the p)ercen~tage of sick of thle coimumand, as reportedl on -November 80M, was 10-w- as against 12-~ for October 31; that the imumber of (leaths was 21; as agrainist 45 for October; that the sick~ rate was about the same as, that amiongr troops of other governments serving in tropic~al. climates; that one-thlird of'the sickc wvere suffer-ing floum tvylihoid ammail nalarial fevers; one-sixth from intestinlal tr-oublles, an~d that the remaining hialf of all ailments were slight inl character. Thle only matters iii which tr-oops took special inter-est -grewv out of their speculhations onl the, afttitde and probable intentions of thefimisuro-emnts. 0ml 1Decemnber I thle UniedStates tr~ansport Juidiuia., with head(quarters and 2 battalions of the Kansas." Volunteer-s arrivedl, lollowed onl the 7ith of that mouth by time translports i\ecwport and Pci~(syirani?(( withi other volunteer organzatiomus. The v%:oluinteers, however-i, hadgrw weary of their service alId miany al~llied for their (lischarge onl tile lplea thwat the Span ishi war had terminated. They were firmly immpressed with thle belief that the futture oceupation of the U~nited States; Army in the islamuls would be confimmel to gvarrison duty, a,1 belief' that was shared by the older Europeani residlents anid the abler nativ-es ofMtanidla, an(1 they considered th~at suich duty should be performed by regutlars. MvN owni confidentce at this timie in aI satisfactory solution of the difficulties whichl (confronted uis may be g-athered, fromn a (lispatch sent to Washiminton oil Decemlber 7, wherein 1 stated that conl(hitiolls were imlli)roving and t1hat1 there were signs of revolutionary disintegration; that I. had couf cri-ed with -a, numiber of the members of the revolutionary government and thiougit, that the umost of t'heml would fiavor peaceful submuissiomi to In'Titedl States authority. 1 had strong reasons for this expressed confDence fronm assura~nces iadle to me by some of the ablest Filipinos whto had occullied positions of importtance in the insur~gent government and had signified their intemition to withdraw from it. Had the volunteers then supposed that their services,- would soon be (lemanded to maimitain the honor and integrity of their country they would willingly heave awaited the emergency. But all official proceedings tended to give them the contrary impressionl. Returninig trahmslorts were carrying back to San Francisco imumbers of speci-ally discha-frged men. On IDecember 13 the Astor Battery was relieved from duty and directed to proceed to New York, City. Its departure on the 44 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 16th of the month was followed soon by the sailingo for home of onethird of thle Nebraska, regiment. Individual al)pllications for discliarge became lnumerous, and on l)ecember 15 1 forwarded to the AdjutantGeneral of the Army tile following communicationI: I have the honor to forward herewith 427 applicatiols from enlisted men of this comlmand for th~eir discharge fronm the servi(ce, som( on slpec ially stateil grounds which require consideration. but for the most p)art on the lplea: that War l)pirtmelltllt ordcers elltitle theml to it. Tley refer to p'arargraph 2, Generall ()rders No..1(, ~cu rrent series, and think that the present cesstation of active hostilities bletween the I-nited States and Spain is the "close of the war" within the meaning of th;at ])aragr:lpll; hence these numbrolus individual applic:ations which they consider the )aragraph iuvited theni to make. D)oubtless the end of the war awaits thle proc'lamation of peace, and in these islands that (day ma;y be somewhat deferred. The lumber of these applications indica:tes the desire of the enlisted mnen of the command to esc:ape the counitry, and shows how olifticult it is to hold themi in conditions of contented discipline. Mluchi of this desire to escape tlleir militLary obllir:' - tious at a time when their services are especially demandedl arises fromi homesickness, and( that ifact accounts largely for thle hle:rvy p)ercentulln of sickness with which we have )ceen atflicted. Un(ler preseut exigencies I a:nm obliged to dlisapprove all of these applications. I'ut notwithstanding the desire to hold the volunteers as above expressed (and it was necessary to lhold theml or no army would rellain), I continued to believe tllhat we migllt overcome ditliculties without resort to force, for, on I)e(emnber 22,' in answer to anl inq(uiry as to the trutlh of celrtain newspap)er statements of that (late -whichl cltarged us with thle colmnission of grave oftenses, I cabled that Mlanila was never more quiet; that order l)revailed tandl that tl:e native l)opulatio n of the city had beeni greatly augmented withli three molths; that the crimiiiil class was large, andll tlhat re)lrcsentatives of thle satee were arrivitig from tlme United( States and Asiatic coasts, whlo were closely watched; that tlme (conduct of the trool)s was goo(l, to a degree inl fact that it was sublject of favorable comment b)y tlhe citizemis. am(1 tlit disorders were pAromptly pluuislle(l, as the business traminsaceted by the courts would show. I furthler asserted tlihat t!he displaragingr staltemllelts which app)eared( in tlle United States, Hongkolg, alnd Singaplore lewspapers were witlhout all element of truth, and tllat nlilitary rule was firm as ccicumlstall ces demlalnded, since.outbrieaks were likely to occur. Still I continlued to have conlfi(lence in the )eaceful solution of affairs, although it was al)])arent that tile rladical element ill the insurlellt councils (consisting of men without proplelty and of little character, by whom the passions of the more ignoranlt lnatives were being inflllaed and who were then organlizing withlin thle city clubs for legitimatte improvelent aiid amunselellt, as they cla,imed, but really for revolutionary purposes), mllight l)recilpitate hostilities without giving us much warnling. Aglirnl(lo, too, aided b)y lis iore intimrnate associates, was constantly levying and collectingl war contributions anl(d excitinlg the people with the cry for in(lel)emd(lence. -Ie waLs in (Olnstallt coiiinmuicatioi witlh a busimless firIn of Allerical menlbersllip mostly, hlaving lle:.cdquarters in HIongkong (one of whose melbers, inl(ividlually l)resent in Manlil:a, llad been appointed cliet' of ordlnance of thle insurgelt.armiy), and was secretly negotiating for a large supply of arms and ammlnnlitiotn all of which was well klownll to lmue at the time. I)urilng thlis period of quiet, in so far as strictly mnilitary affairs were concerned, the labors of civil admillistration were very exacting, and necessitated a mass of correspondence too volumlllinous to be embodied in this report. A few extracts will be sul)mitted to show the character of the questions which were constantly presenlting thenlselves for official determination. Already many individual claimls against the United NIEPORT OF MKAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 45 States for da~mages to or loss of property, caused for the most parf by the insurgent soldiers who had been in occupation of a portion of the city, wvere being received. G~reat difhiculties attended the efforts to administer on business pirillCiPles the city revcnnes; to ascertain all formner sources of that revenue; to put the pi,(per iiiachinery iii operation to collect that portion of it the p)aymnent of which wvas considered app~ropriate and just, and to detect the constantly lperhpetr,,ltedl frauids ina(ie ea-sy under p)ractices of long st~andingr. and bring guilty officials or city employees to punishment. The inerchfianits were ilnlortullate. 'Those of foreign citizenship) complained to the resi(lei)t consuls of their respective govern-ments, by whom their protests were officially submitted. This action appear-ed to threa'teni international complications, and had to be promptly and judlicionsly met. On October ~31 the following relply was sent to one of these l'elresentatives of a foreign power, froin whom a protest signed by imearly all thme residemit business mnen of his goverilnment was received: PEAR Sin: I have the honor to acknowvlegfe the receipt o)f your (onnimunication of the 29th instanit, with attached copy of declaration aind letition of certain resident niercliaii s of Manila, inclosed. Had this irotest been presented to the military-governor of Manila by the protestants, the matter complained of' might possibly have readily received soume satisfiactory adjustmnent, but ais it has been submnitted direct to the go-vernient of ide-,aatoi adProtest against th cinof teUnited Sttsauthorities, receivedl as suich by that go\-ernment, it becomes a, matter requiriiingr mature deliberation. I have, tlierefore thie honor to hinvite vour attention to the statemrent of' facts containiel in this (eledrattion, the, conclusions which protestants hav-e drawni therefromn, and the pi-esenitatioii of' facts as uinlerstood by- the United States authorities here statiomied, with thti mm e -l conclusions brieflv siuhmittedl. The protestants correc tly recite the publication if the official circular from thme office of the United ~f~ti iitr governor on the 26th instant, buit the alleged. famcts', viz, '' that with the exceptioin of a. few, and soiie of theiii imisignificamit, p~orts (andi that unider cert un resti ictions whiich greatly embarrass trade), the interisland taeof the lPhilippues i pr ohibitedl,' r not warranted. S~till, it i osbeta this nuarration was m mrely intendedI to lbe a conclusive summary of fact s set -up in the indhicated1 circular, amnd it' so. it is oiilv fair to treat them as such, and they may be cons8idered in connection With the reinainlialr conclusions which the protest contains andl which are '' That the printiipadli hnip-producing (districts. su-ch as Albay, SorSogron. Leyte, aiid Samar, are closed b\ this circular agraiimst Manila trade, involving iuicaliilable loss to interenst in the Philippines;" ''that the arbitrary eimforcement of vessels engag(ed heing Obliored to carry Spanish officers only,\7 is a measure almost inipqssible to fulfill as N(ssels are unable to comply therewith in view of' the dangrer th' kSpan1,ish ofh(cers w ould lbe exposedl to fromn the native crews which they carry and the bisufficiemcy of qualified Spania~rds to man the vessels." aimd. further ''that if this arbitrary order is enforcedl it will entail the complete rui~n of Mlanila trade." Thie above, independent (if the allega-tions 1eregaI-ding~ the business'imiterests of the protestamitts, comprises, it is believ-ed, all the facts and conclusions which the protest contains. For reply to these several criticisms (althou-gh unaccompanied by any expressed opinion upon the right to demand remedial action) I beg to imnvite. youlr attentioii to, a brief sunmmary of' thme endeavors niade by the United States authorities for the int(rests, of Manila, merchants in the matter'of coasting tradle, and thereafter to give correct interpretation of' the circular which appears to be the object of' coniplaint. Shortly after United States authority had been established in thle city of' Ma~nila, to wit, Auigust 29, the, Spanish gov-erno'r-genieral of the Philippines was -approached with a prol~osition for the reestablishment of intem-island comnierce in produicts of the countr~y. T'o this that officer responded with a caldegrani, (if whichi the inclosed exhibit muarked. A, is a certified copy. This cablegram -was interpreteul as follows: "As soon as the port of Manila is open to Spanish ships flying- their flag, I will order that all the 1)014s in the territories undter mmy comuimandl shall immediately admit Ameimeicaii ships flying the American flag," etc. 'Thiereafter, 111o0n receiving information from merchants that coassting vessels from this port were not p~ermittedI to land ait certain of the piorts in the XVisa~yas, the attention of the Spanish gov-ernor-genieral was called to the fact anmi he replied, on Octoher.14, thwat he would seimdI his chief of staff to Maniila for conference. At the first mneeting, with that staff officer, upon being invited to explain the action of his chief 46 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENEIRAL OTIS~. in arresting the p)rog-ress of trade soughit to be carried on in accordlance with an exiitiug agreemient, lie replied that his goivernmlient hiad4 executed the agreement, which only exteiiled to the liorts of' Iloilo, Cebhn, andl Zanflhoanga,-. Upon being~ shownNj the original (lispa~tch from Iloilo, of' which11 E,.xliblit A is a copy, hie replieil thlat the Spanish word 'I puiertos," uised therein, embraced only ports o)f entry, of which the three above namied are all the southern island~s contain, and that sutch -was the understandlinig of' the Spanish Government when the (able-rain Nvas sent. To the (luestion why vessels dispatelhed oin o1 about September 1 were permlittedl to trade at other ports, he repliedl in stibstaunce that they were not interfered with as it was believed that they were not comnmitting inju1hry. The (exllanatioli as to the true, signification of the woid '' putertos " and the expressedl intent of'the Sp inish GUovernmient -was received in g(4ood faith, anid endeavors were thenr maile to 5seure -in ( xtensioii of coasting- privileg-es. As a result, this represent ative of the Spanisli oovernor-general agreed that aill ports of' the islands at which the authority of Spain was ina~intaiiled or which w erc~ oecuicpil Py Spanlish troops wmiihld be conisid evreI is open. to all ve~ssels enigagedi inl legitimate commierce andl flying cit her the Spainishi or Amierican flago, pro\vided officers iii chargre of've~ssels were of S;panish birth or nationality (they could nlot tiiist Filipinio (crews liecaise of' their sympathies w\Nith the insuirgents), and provided the United States miilitary governor would von('li by cablegramn at the time of' sailing of' vessels from Mlanila that they contained nothing, objiectionable. U"pon pressfing the representative for further latitudes of tradle inl Spanish possessions lie agreedl, on behalf' of his pirincipal, to adil the ports of' Yligan, Iliniagiiete, aend Surig-ao oii lilke conditions, but with the further proviso that application and conlsent foi' ve;ssels to enter them should be previoiisly mnade, andi obtained. Ilic was then Pressed4 to incliude the ports of Calbayog anid tarrig-arra, but repliedI that his goverumnnit hail no troops tlhere-onily In1dian officials-and that it could~ uiot guarantee pirotiction or safety to vessels entering the same. Asked, Spuiisli authority ha vhig~ ceased there, ifhe would considler that thc vessels then had f[lie ri- lit to enter, lie replie d thait the ports wvere ini the saine condition ais those in Jie islanid of Liizon, in the posse ssion of' tihl revolutionary forecs, anid that the Spanish (I'overnienet could iiot he IheId responsiblde for any ilaniage to entering vessels which mnight result. INo fi 'tirter c oncessions were obtainable, as it was saidi the governior-general1, 1uindei'presenit coni~ntionis, was pow\ — erless to giant them. Inq id ry wis liadel by this o)flice it Spamniard(1 to take cha-rge of' vcssels ('0111( be secured to c urry on this tradle, and reply ws re e(eived that theyconl~l be secured withbout anyv diffhici t Treiloth(iimli nmcoel, arked 13, was issuedl foi' the iniforniatiion ofaill pa ties colicerned(A it heimf oconsidered to contamn the best termns in furtherance, of' the, inteirests of' Ma nila nie m'chatiits, which could be secuired at this time, it was (drawn tiip and ratitfied by the Sp~anish grovernorgeneral's representative in order that the SpainishiG(ov ernmeiit mnight be held to a. faithful pierformlanice of its oblig-ations. The circular is not understood to be of thme nature expressed in the protest. It is viewed as a concession and iii no wise ais a prohibituiton onl the pa-rt of' the Spanisli ( overnmient, which is at liberty to close its po01ts to outside, coimmierce and( in flulences if it elects to dlo so. A governmient alm~ost ill extreimis umortis, as certainly the Spanish G4overnment in the (central Phil ippine 18linds inuist be considered to lie at presenit, has the lawfiul right to shut tniiipraiily aIl of its louts, w'hethier decla-red of entry or otherwise, and whatever the loisiness interests (if outside nierchiants, lie they foreignuers or citizens of' its domlain. This is a ideclared international right futlly accepted. I can not perceive, therefore, thwat any present action can lie adopted to further the interests of' the, protestants, and accepting in good faith the action of' the Spa~nish authorities in all p~revious negotiations, as v'ouched fur biy thein, and as it is necessary to (1(o in the absence of'priiof to the, contrary, I can not see that there exists just canse tor' compillainit against the U~nited States; -altiorities. I am still in correspiondlence in regardl to all these mwatters mnd miay be abile to secure more advantageouis conilitions, althoug~h a disinterested party might casuailly conclutde that tihis vigrorouls attack onl the policy or intention, or possibily the integrity of' constituted authority, onl the part of residen~t mnerchants mnight telid( to diminish, fuiture persistent efforts for theim' welfamre. Very respectfully, y\our obedient servant, E. S. OTLms, M3ajor- General U'. S. V., Uaited Slates3 Military G~orerior' in the J'ldlippines. The correspondence was brought to a satisfactory conclusion upon November 8 by the following corn iunication: Sm n: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of thle 4th instant wherein you informn this office that ftle action of certain lprotestants **sabjects residing and doing buIsiness here) shouild not be considered in any wise as the action of the officia1'Irepresentative of their government in this city REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 47 further thanl his notarial functions are concerned. I am pleased to accept this construction, and shall give the matter no further consideration. As regards the parties protestant whose joint anld very satisfactory communication you inclosed and is appreciated, I aml certain that they will soon be fi1rly convinced that the United States authorities have not omitted to m;ake continued effort to adlvance their bulsiness interests in every way possible. It appears to me, however, that they have not a fulll appreciation of the difficulties which the government of the United States established here have been obliged to contend with. I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, E. S. OTIS, Maj/or-General, ZU. S. 1., United States Military Gorernor. The clearalnce of vessels continued to give annoyance, as the political conditions in the soutlern islands were constantly changing, and the coasti1ng trade agreenmet between tlhe Spaiish and Americall officials could not be satisfactorily executed, as correspondence, of which the following communications are copies, clearly indicates: OFFICE 1. S. M1IIIITAIRY ('GOVERNOR) IN TlE 1PHILIP,1INE ISIANI)S, Manila, 1I., 1o Noember 1;2, 1893. CAPTAIN OF TH'E PORT, Man ila, IP. I. SIR: I:111 directed to inlform xvo1 t tht te military governor has just received a cablegram from Iloilo, dated tlhe 8th instat, n and cabled from Capiz on tlhe 11th instant, of which the following is a translation: 'ILOIILO, Voremlb)er S, 18tS. ''GOv RNOR-(GSENE1AL '( ('O GENERAL OTIS, "M/ilitary Goirernor, _Manila: "Your telegram of present date received. I order consul, Konglkong, not to send cargo whatever in consideration of what your excellency indicates. I spoke of the affair to the colnllllander of the ('harle.ton." This in response to a telegram from this office, dated November 1, 1898, of which the following is a copy: " GOVEIlNOIl-GENEIIAI,, Iloilo: "Spanish consul, llongkong, clelared vessel flying Britislh flag on coasting trade to southern ports, Luzon, thence to \I;Allila. Vessel arrived frlll Lega:1sp)i ald has been permlittedl to enter under protest. This clearance viewed as in violation of -agreement. "O TIS, ".n1if(d tlates Military (Go ernor in the 'Ph/ilippines." Very respectfully, C. 1. IlURRAY, Captain, i'otrlh U. S. C(aralry, Aid. OFFICE IT. S. MIII11TAIRY GOVEINOR IN TIE PIIIPPIIINE ISLANI)S, Mranila,. I., yorcnbcr 25, 1S9S. CAPTAIN )O THE PORT1,.Maila, P. I. SIR: I am directed to return to von tlhe inclosed letter of Messrs. Smith. Bell & C(o., anid to say in reply that, as is well known, a circular was issued from this office on October 26,, 18!8, am11llilln tllhat ulnder a mIltual agreement between the United States and Spanish authorities vessels flying' either the American or Spanish flag could be dispatched for Tacloban and otlher southern ports nanled, provided due notice by cable was given the governor-general at Iloilo that they were engaged in legitimate colmmnerce. In the case of the vessel of the Conmpania Maritima, the Salradora, which had a like experience with the vessel (ebu, tle military governor telegraphed the governorgeneral at Cebu, on the 16th, stating that the vessel had cleared firomi tlis port October 28 for Iloilo, Cebu, and Tacloban; that the vessel was turned back from Cebu and not permitted to lproceed to Tacloban to the great loss of merchants, as the Cebu authorities reported that they could not permit vessel to enter alny ports excepting tliose styled plorts of entry. To this cablegram General Rios replied as follows: " Regret what has occurred with steamer Salvadora in Cebu. Attribute it to interruptioi of telegraph lines that exists, making my notice, which I repeat by mail, arrive late. Begging your excellency that hereafter, at the same time, to notify me and the governor-general in Cebu when vessel does not previously touch at Iloilo." 48 REPORT OF MAAJOR-GE,,.N-ERAL OTIS. It would seemi, fromn the above dispatch of the 19itb, that either t be Spanish authorities in the southern islands aire not keeping fhitit (which is not charged nor believ-ed) or that they have neglected to informn officers. at the various hurts oi the aigreenieiits which have beeii eniteredl into. Under present conditions it is not p)ossilble 1o cornply wvith General llios's late request,:is there are 110 opportimiities to cnible either Iloilo or Cebii, sinceo the cable company's staff at Cebu has been reimoved onl account of threatened dlanger froni insurgents. Conditions therefore seeni to lie such that the Spanish authorities are not able to k~eep their agreenient because of tbeaction of the public enemny, and inight pileaud excuse fot' an-y seeiiiing Violation of the snime. Vessels hereafter clearing for the southern ports, maianed in the notice with which you have been furnished, will be obligedl to clear assumingn2 all attendant risk.-s. Further action will be talken in the mnatter of the Ccubi to -ascertain what remeilies can be applied in instances of such a (character. Very respiectfully, Cl. 1I. MURRAY, Captfain. Fourfh U. S. Cavalry, Aid. The requests of certain merchants for permnission to pa —ss their inerchaiidise throug~h the customs as'Spauish goods uinder former Spaiiish, tariff rates, on the plea of pulrchase in Sp~ain lbefore declaration of wvar and inability to present it sooner,, continued tlirouglioit the year. They were presented, many by theut indlividlually, and somte throug~h their con~suls. Every case was lbasedl upon a slightly (diflerent statement of facts, whichiwas fully con sidel'ed1in rel)lies. Appl~ications made through the conisul tor Germany show the character of this corresp~ondence: OFFICEt U. S. MN1ITIrr-u Govutni-oi IN TOE PHILIPPINEt IsLAND)S, i31arila, J)* J (}ctobcrl 1898. Hon. 1Dr. FR. KRUGER, Consul for Geruiony at the port of M1a0ila. Sin: Referring to your note of the 1st insta —nt, I have the honor to state that the reasoni for deferring- the application (of the Unjited States customs tariff and regutlations from October 1 to lNoveniber 10 was to galin sifflicient time to miak~e niodificatiois therein in eertain particulars ini order to hetter adapt thieii to existing -coniditions. It was discoveredI tha-t errors had l)(een conimitted in the pirehiaration or compila-tion of the(,se reg,(ula-tions, and it was wNith the desire tu) make the iiecessary corcin that the postponemient wvas ordered. A slight concession was granted to the merchants of' Manila, which wNAas thionght would not pre~judice United States interests, and it wats comisidleredi thwat sullicient, notice was givenl to phlace theni onl their goiard and allowv them opportuniity to protect theiiselves. The interests of the-Manila inerchants are so conflictingr that no rule of general action coiuld lie adopted which would be satisfactory to all, nlid the req nests submitted by the merchants in whose behialf Y-ou wNrite have receivedl greater consideration thani those of nierchiaits (if the U.nited. States dho whe(n aI changej~r of' tariff duties are made. There a tariff Law takes effect as soon as eiiaeted, anmd the rutle of caveat emptor applies. The lproof which will be required to show thwat merchandise from Spanish ports prior to April 25, 1898, will be, indlependent of the accustomed manifests of ('argo, bills of lading, and the uisual consular (certificates, a certificate fromn the United States consular agent at the Spanish port of' shipment to the effect that the goods were purchased prior to April 25, anid in caise there is no U~nited States consular agent at such port thene a tCertificate of a consular agrent of Great Britain at such port as the goods were so purchased. Very respectfully, your most obedient servant, E. S. OTIms, M1ilitary G'overnor. OFFICE U. S. MIITAR1,Y GOVERNOR IN THLE 'ILIIEILNS Manila, '. 1., Decccwber 21, 1898. Hon. Dr. Fit. KRUGER., Gervian Consul, AManila, P1. 1. SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of yonr communication of' thie 19th instamit, with inclosure, which refers to mierchlandise shipped froii Spa-in and recenitly received iii this port. Concerning sneli goods you refer to ain ordler issued from this office on September 29, last, in 'which directions were given thatgod secuiredl or purchased in Spain prior to April 25, last, would lie received at this port until November 10 under the former Spanish tariff regujlajtjions. That order clearly indicates that such mnerc-handise received here after the lastnamed dlate would lie sobject to the samec duties as the goods of all other neutral nations, the United States included. REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 49 Notwithstanding the instructions contained in this order, goods purchased in Spain by Manila merchants which arrived here as late as the present month have been admitted under the conditions expressed in that order, the merchants showing satisfactorily that delay in making shipments was beyond their control. In respect to the entry of these goods you say that certain proofs of purchase in Spain, as regards time and circumstances, which were presented by the merchants, have not been accepted by the collector of customs. On tils poilt you quote my letter of October 5, indicating the proof's it will be necessary for the merchants to furnish, among which was included the following: "A certificate from the United States consular agent at the Spanish port of shipment to the effect tlat the goods were purchased prior to April 25, and in case there is no United States consular agent at such port then the certificate of the consular agent of (reat Britain at such port that the goods were so purchased." You state that the merchaiits interested gave the best proofs they could under the circumstances, and that it was impossible to secure the certificate of the British consul at Barcelona (acting for the IJnited States) as to shipment; that under the proof the merchandise has not been admitted as desired. Undoubtedly the customs authorities have acted within the instructions received firom this office in leman(liIng a colsular certificate, and the sublject now becomes a matter for further delileration an(l further instructions. Your request is that the collector of customs be authorized to return the guaranties whicl the merchants had given in order to have the goods passed, and that their affidavits. made before the British consul at Barcelona, be accepted in lieu of the consular certificate which orders have prescribed. The request will receive attention, and you will be informed soon of conclusions reached. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, E. S. OTIS, Military Gorernor. After full investigation tlis application was denied, as were all others of like imiport which were submitted about that time. In arriving at conclusions, tlie possibility of purchasing goods il Spain under a contiiluing contract for purchase, or placing orders for them under an agreement for delivery at some future distant date, was considered, as well as the conflicting interests of merchants who were stocked or had recelitly purchased elsewhere than in Spain, and who antagonized favorable action on the al)plicatiols. Tlhe Spanish plrisollers gave annoyance and were a menace to public traiqluillity and the health of the city. Requests for permission to expatriate tlhem were preferred on several occasions but such action could not be taken witlout the consent of both Spain and tile United States, since tlie disposition of the 'hilippile Islands awaited the result of treaty stipul)atioll. These prisoners miglt yet be needed in the islalds by SpainR for military service. When Manila capitulated, many of then were ill and relluirel carefil attention and special treatllent. All the necessary articles and applliaces were furnished the Spanish officers with wllich to bestow tle needed care. The prisoners soon conmmeneed to improve it physical cotdlitioi, but, laving to e11ploy1ment, indulged too frequently in 1rel,1rellesible conduct, and1 were an object of sus1icimo by our offlicers, w1l, tliought tlhat they would require close restraint slould hostilities wit]l the Filipl)ios ensue. Tlie old antip)athy lbetween insurgent and Spllish soldiers, whlicl in tile first few weeks ot our occupaltion of tlhe city was intense., atdll which manifested itself in slihllt rioting, followed in one instance by tlie murder of an insurgent officer lear oile of tlfe gates of the walled city, was gradually disall)pearingi, and Spanish ofticcrs and enlisted men began to nmingle inl friendly intercourse witll insurgent troops. No accurate lists of numbers had been mIade, nor could one be prepared fiom tlhe rolls of organizations obta.inable. Finally, on October 1, the provost-marshal-general was directed to make an accurate count of all present. For tills purpose he caused the various organizations to form, at the same hour, at the places where they were severally quartered, w-4 50 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS,-. and had one of his officers with each of the organizations to verify numbers by actual count. This method of verification wvas repeated on subsequent occasions. Under the terms of the capitulatloit the Spanish officers, thou gh prisoners of war, were, permitted to immediately supervise the affairs of the organizations to which they beloiiged. In the demoralization which followed the condition of prisoners of war, their authority was greatly diminished; and the general who was nominally in command of these Spanish forces madle formal request to impose, through adequate punishments, a more efficient discipline. This was denied in the followinDg letter: OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNORI IN THE PHILIPPINE' ISLATNDS, M~anilt, J). J*, Noreiiber 28, 1898. Gen. FRANCISCO RIZZO, Commaniwding Spanii~h, Forces, JManila, P.* J* G'ENERAL: Referring to the re(qllest miade, ly you a few dlays since, that officers of the Spaniish Army be permlittedl anid assisted to enforce ag-ainst their men, now prisollers of war, the (dlscillilnary Ileastlres otf tileSpanish military code, 1 have the honor to reply that atter in ttore (lelibera-tioll on the special points contained in the requiest sulbnitted the c onc(lusion ha~s beeni reailehel tha-t conditions dlo not, permit the American anthorities to granit aill that has beeni asked. They Hvill endleavor to do what they ctanl coiisistenlyli to p~reserve groodl coadnelt on the part of' the prisonlers, and witil tilat elll hil VU 1( lstrlctiolns hlave bweel given to retain them within) tile walled city after ) o clock hi the evenjingr, alid to Co1Illpel t~lleit rtr thi respective barracks, afttr tilt hour of' S. The A-niericani atltiolritles Ire respollsibie for tile care of' these iprisoilers, nnd muist see tilat tilev receive hmi niaue treatmlenlt ill accordanmce witli the dlictates a~l(1 sipirit of tileir owfl llilititry code, ainl theretore 110 prolllises Call be giv~en a5 to thle letil0(18 tiley will apply hi exercising snpervision. It is Our~ desire to dlo all we cani to carry out tile wishes of' tile Sp~alisll ofli(cIs who are look1~ing -after tile w\elfare of their men, btIt it will readily occur to you that nllder prevailingt Collditiolls w\Ne can not ciiter ilnto any,agreellents wll11ichi fetter ill ally wvise a free latitude of action in the special cases whlichl may arise. 1 am, Genieral, with great respect, your olletielnt servant, E. S. i'ris, Military (?oternor. Early in October certain Spanish officers, prisoners of war, asked for permission to depart for Spain on account of illness, and their requests were favorably ilidorsed by General Rirzo. Applying to the Watr Departmient for instructions in. these cases, I w~as directed, on October 7, to grant, in my discretion, reqfuests of this character. Whereupon, on application in writing, accompanied by the proper disability certificate of a Spanish surgeon and the approval of the general officer present and supervising Spanish affairs, passports with permission to return to Spain were given. A considerable Inlnber took advantage of this privilege before the general authority to send home the prisoners was received. On December 14 the Spaiiish authorities served upon me notice of the contemplated discharge of the miative troops held in Manila as prisoners. Although it was known that a good mnany of the 3,000 of these, prisoners, had deserted to the illsurgents, it was deemed important to weigh the probable results of this colitemplated commu.inicated action, and. the following letters were prepared alid delivered: Captain-Genleral Rizzo, General of Dirision of tile Sp~anish A4rm~y, Vanila,. P. I. GENERAL: T Ilave the hionor to acknowledlge tile receipt of your collllluilication of tilis morning gin wllich you inforll lle you are -about to discharge 11011 the, Spanish service the Spanish native troops held as Uniited States prisone-rs of war in this city. I beg tilat you defer your contenlplated actioll ill this Ilatter of' discilarge until I may be able to make inquiry as to the condition, hitent, alld formler places of doulicile of these troops, tilat I may act understandingly witih regard to them. As prisoners of war, under the articles of capitulation, they should remnain mnoher guard within the city and under the inimediate supervision of their officers until instructions as to their final disposition are received from Madrid and Washingtoin. REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 51 You will therefore please suspend all action relating to their discharge until I may be able to coimuninicate further with you. 1 am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, E. S. OTIS, Major-Geineral, U. S. V., United States Military Governor in the I'hilippines. OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN TIHE PHIILIPPINE ISLANDS, Mlanila, P. 1., December 17, 1808. Division General FRANCISCO RIZzo, Coimmandinyg Spanis-) Forces, Manila, P. 1. GE1NEIXAL.: In further response to your letter of the 14th instant, regardinig your contemplatedl action in the matter of discharging Spanish native troops held in this city as prisonlers of war, I have the honor to inform you that exhaustive inquiry has been made as to their permanent homes and possible conduct should they be (lischarged at this time. It has been ascertained that a very large number of them came from the southern islands, and that soncme of them, though of Luzon, would be afraid to return to their homes, even if discharged. Those living in the southern islands should be sent there; those of Luzon who are afraid to return to their homes should lle kept here in Manila. There tre others of these natives wlio might give trouble in the city if lischarged, and they should be kept under restraint. All the native troops, tlerefore, will be continued in their present status as prisoners of war, to remain ii restraint under the immediate supervision i(f their officers until the chief authorities of the (dominion of Splin andl the ULnited States give final directions as to their d(ispositioni. This is in conformity w ith the articles of capitulation of August 1-l, last. Very respectfully, your ol(edient servant, E. S. OTIS, Major-Genercal, U. S1. V., United States Military (;orernor in the Ph ilippinies. These natives were subsequently discharged in 5Manila. Some were taken to a western Luzon plrovince and released, and others were permitted to go froum the city in any direction they wished, or to remain in it if they desired. It was subsequently a nioticeable fact that they became the most formidable trool)s in Aguinaldo's army, fought splendidly at Caloocan, where they lost in casualties a large portion of their numbers. About this date Spanish officers, with their families, were arriving in the city fronm the southern islaids. Some of them hlad been exercising command of native troops, which were disbanded there or had deserted to the enemy, or they were not desired in the Spanish military organizations still retained at the south. They came ostensibly to secure transportation to Spain by vessels plying between Manila and Barcelona. Lingerimg with us a considerable period, and not knowing their numbers, request was made upon the Spanish authorities for their names and intention, and the further request was made that tlle United States authorities be notified int future of the fact of the arrival of any Spanish officers from southern ports. The United States authorities, after entering Manila, lhad continued in place the Spanish officers who had exercised charge of the large city prisons, where about 2,000 suspects and convicts were confined. General Ilughes, tlie provost-lmarshal general, who had supervision of these prisons, detected, iwhile inspecting the August and September prison accounts, frtaudulent transactions in which these officers were concerned. He thereupon placed them in arrest and submitted the charges of '. conspiracy to embezzle public funds in violation of the laws of war,r and;" embezzlenient in violation of the laws of war," when they were brought before a military commission for trial. The result of tlIe court's long and patient investigation, during which the accused officers had the benefit of the best American and Spanish legal advice obtainable, and of their own selection, was the conviction 52 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. of two of theln, and the acquittal of the third upon an admittedly proven alibi. The two who were convicted were each sentetnced to pay a fiue in " the sumn of $"2,500 in gold coin of the United States, anld to be confined at hard labor in such place of confinement as may be designated by the reviewing authority for a period of three years." The review of the case is in language as fillows: In the foregoing case of Carlos Ayitlerich, ]Branlio Zorita, and,Jose Ruiz, jointly tried by a military commission for conspiracy to embezzle, and the embezzlelnent of, public funds, the commissionl has ldjuldged a finding of acqluittal as to Carlos AymSericl, evidently considering certain evi(leiice submitted to it and tending to establish an alibi as to this accllsc(1, as having an important bearing u1)pon the case, to the extent, at least, of raising a reasonable (louilt as to his participation in the otfenses alleged. In this view the reviewing a:uthority (loes not concur, believingi that the evid(ence of record conc lusively establishes the criminall responlsibility of the said Aymlerich jointly with the other accused unllcr both clliarges, and is, therefore. unable to colicur in the finding of acquittal in his case. Orde rs have already been issued for his rele:lse foIom continemeult. The findings and sentences ad(judged the otlher two accused, to Nwit, lBranlio Zorita and Jose IRuiz, are approved. In view of the confinement alreadl serve(l by the]i1 and the circumstances surrounllding this case, (leemned in certain respects to jiustify the extenlsioni of clemency, the confinement at llilrd labor for three years awarded each of these accused is re(luced to six miontlis. As niitigated, the sentenc'es \-ill be duly executed and so much thereof as rel'ates to confinnement,,it Bilibidl l'risoln. The commission took up thle trial of these cases onl Novelnber '22 last, and gave a long aiid patient hearling to tlme voluminoous testiilonyy introduced anid thle lenlgthy argulllelts of' the p)rosecuting officers and defendants' counsel. Thle funds \hicll it w'as charged tlhat tle l)arties had misapplropriated accrued p)revioius to tile (late of UI-ited States occul)ation, but were subsequently covered as expe]nded in thle paymnent of frauduleit vouchers mimaniiufactured in August alld September for services rendered anid property delivered for the benefit of the prisons prior to tlhat date. They tlherefore belonged to the United States by capture, or l)romlised surreldemr under the cal)itulatory articles. The Spaiiisl authlorities labored in thle interests of the accused, and thle date ol whlich they were brought before thle military comillission tlle chief of staff of' tle Spanish general, wlho sublsequently tacted as assistant counisel for one an(l slubnlittedl an able closi,' argument oil the merits, seiit ini a written lapllicatioil askiing tllat tlhey be remallnded to the Spanish authlorities for trial, relreselitillg that tile lionor of' Spain was involved. He was illformled, however, that the Uniited States tribunal, whichl llad been directed to judicially d(etelrnine the question of their guilt or innocence, lhad not been ordered until after aIm exllaustive investigation lhad beenll ade and the justness and expedieic of the step carefully consi(lered. The cases were not h)ublishedl ulltil March 13, after the olfeinders hlad been in arrest for six moutlhs. Somhie time thereafter, and( on April 19, a l)etitioll was plresented, headed by his grace thle archbislhop of' Malnila a(ld sighned by its lelading inhabitants. Spanish an(l foreign imostly, 1praying for the release of Zorita, though ackniowledging the justness of' his sentence. lie wRs released on tIle payment of $2,500, gold, ]his tifle) of coilfieiieit lhavig nearly virtually expired. Ruiz still remains in cotim emeit. No decieded flfort by friends for tlhe commlutation ofl his senrtece alis l)eel nlmadel. It would be matter for satisfaction if the same action could be applied ill lis case as in that of Zorita. Allother case, that of a Spatishl newspaper editorI, one Altonio Elidalgo, charged with "l)ublisli ing and circulating seditious newspaper articles in violation of the laws of war," was brought before a military commission in November last. The accused was found guilty anld sentenced " to pay a fine of $500 in United States gold coill to, and for the REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 53 use and benefit of, the United States; that he be placed and kept outside of tle lines of the territory now occupied by, alnd within and under the jurisdiction of, the military forces of the United States, and that the press, type, furniture, material, and all appurtenances of the printing office of La Voz Espafiaola be confiscated and sold for tlhe use and benefit of the United States. The review is as follows: In tle foregoing case of Antonio Hidalgo the record discloses that the accused was accorded an impartial trial, his rilgts liaving been protected at every stagc thereof. Tre findings are iit accord with the evidence, and the sentence, in amount and character of ipiilishlient aawarded, shows that tle connlission correctly estimated the criminality whlich, nnder the conditions existing at the tille of their comlmission. was involved in the olfienses of \-llichl the accIlsed st;nds convictel. Such a sentence the reviewing authority is relnetant to modi(fy. It ape.ars, however, from facts elicited since the conclhusion of the trial that the,accuse(l fully appreciates tle gravity of tlie oftenses coimmitted b1 hinim. and regriet.s their commllission. He has Tirnlishe (l satistlac.ttory proof of previouls good cha:r'acter alln reputable st.andling in this commllnity,.i t iand i hlas directly' alll tllrough intiluintial citizens petitionl ed tr clenmenciy. In view tf these fiacts, and il thie 1belief that the (exalnple tfrnishel d by tliis tri;tl;in1 coin ic.tioni c(onstitiltes si'fficielit xx.inarini lg that the nilitlary gov'rnllllment, hl r esttalislihd 1possesses and wvill 'exircise the lfown'r necessary to )prit(c{t itself agailist libelous:iid seditious plublications desirgned to asperse its chllaracter and1 weaken its authority, tile reviewing auithority is pleased to remit so mnucl of tlhe sentence.s relates to contiscation of lroperty aind to thl delportation of the accuseid beyontli the liites no occupie d by the ilittry fircesof the United States. Tlhe lie tine sed is redutced to $250, goldl coin of the United States, tile accused to standl conmllitted until such line is paidl; the confinement under this sentence not to exceed( three months. As miitigated, the sentence will 1be duly executed. Tlhe fine was paid and Iidallglo released. The trial plroduced a good deal of excitement, botl on accoumint of the stan(liing of the accused in the comnullnity, his lu1111111eio friends among the lbetter citizens, and the novel p)roceeding. Tlie case was prosecuted for tlie sake of example and to give warnilng to tlie p)rolprietors of,ther newspapers of tile penalties which migllt be imposed lupon0 thein it' they continued to indulge ill abuse and calumny. It hlas 1lad beneficial effects. This period was one of plottilng in the interests of the insurgent cause mand men of every nationality alppleared to be engaged in questionable enterprises promising ilnividual gain. Rumors of the purchase and introduction of arms and lmmlunition at various ports on the Luzon coast were incessant. Admliral Dewey lhad seized a vessel at Batangas englaged in this contraband trade, but the cargo had entered the interior. It was an understood fact that money in considerable quantities was being sent to thle insurgent junta at Hongkong, which was then presided over, or at least advised, by an American citizen and a British subject. Insurgent delegations departed for Japanl and the cities on tile Asiatic coast. All this occasioned a mass of correspon(lence witll United States representatives stationed ili these countries. Smuggling and illicit trade of a varied character was being actively conducted, an(d the cunning of the Filipino and the Chinese was difficult to contenid with. lnsurgentt newspapers had been established in our midst and often indulged in criticisms of' the manner in which affairs were being conductel, but were generally busy insinuating that the iUnited States offered nothing advantageous to the Filipinos, who had expended so mucl blood and treasure for their independence. The formerly expressed fear that Spain would return had given way to the statement tlhat it was tlhe intention of the United States to replace her in tflie odlious 1domination whichl1 she had exercised for centuries. The better class of Filipinos recommended the suppression of these Filipino newslpalsers, anll to my questiol whether the people believed 5r,4 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENE,'RAL OTIS. the statements found in them, replied that they dlid aend were greatly impressedl. The editors were warnied anid became more templ-eate in their denunciations, even askhing assistancee to place before tile people the true conditioii of aflfairs. Able articles wvere lpreparedl and fturnislied, at miy request, by the well-known scient-ist, Dr. Becker, uI)on. the true theory of government and the lprobable intention of the United States in Luzon and other islands. rrhey were generally usedl by these editors as targets for such uinfriendly criticisms as their Supple and lpecllliar mninds could imivent. A sangruinary anid venomous (article woulll be followed for three or four successive (layNs by temperate productions favoring Uniited States protection on lires which they were powerless to explain or mnderstandl. Questions of grave import were being constantly thtrust uponi the United States authorities, some having decided international sigm~ificamnce (lemanding p~romnpt attention. Tire acthiig Amnericani Consul was busy with political and (commercial problemns, among- whichl were those relating to the acquisition of citizeinshil) or thre partic-ipation by foreign vessels in interisland trade. Oii Decenmber 9 hie was finformned of a decision which hiad shortly before been rendered (and expr-essed in the following terms: Tile effect of section 8, article 1, of the Constitutioni of thre United States, and legislation by Conguress lirererrider, is to vest tire exclusiv-e power of cont'erringr citizenslhij by naturalization ini (oit-ress. This pow(r is not slareri iby St.ate or Territori-ii -ov(ruinienits, nor by rufilita-ry goverirrent~s established by tire Uniited Sta~tes in the exei tise, of' its war power. Ini estqblishirng rufles onl the subject, Congriess ha-s prrovid(-d amnong other condlitions upon w hich citizenship) will be (-oiiferreo~l Iil)ofl aliens8, excejltiiig those ia-virii service iii the. \i roy or N 'u y, a previous resiulence of liv-e y-ears withiir thre territorial limiits of tile U nitedl Sttites. it is very (.-lear that this coiiditio l has not beeir coniiplied with by the -withinii-iiaiied applicant. IUnited( St,tes citizeinship rir-y also result fromi (1) coirpicteil conquest anil incorproratioji of terr itory, and (2) fromi treaty. No act of the individiual in thre forirer case is necessarv other than election to becomne a citizen, usually iioanifested by continued domiicile wNithin the territory, coirnuerd audl hicorp~orated. In tire haitter ca,.se it is necessary only for thre iirrividual to coiripl)y with the coalitions thiat tire treaty nray establish. Until negotiations have lproceededi firther it is iniirrssi ble to determine whether. tire withini applicant can avail hiiiiself of either- of' tirese irethrods. Applications for citizenishuip ca-n not be actedl upoir at tire present tirire; they could merely be received anid filed. To his inquiry with regfard to coasting trade privileges hie was informned by communication as follows: In reply to your note of yesterdlay with inrelosure, I aiii dIirected to -state that the inclosure g~ranting the iperiiissioii of thre Spiraisir (Governxireirt, to dlo certaiir aicts as therein explained was given Jul,y5, last, pirior to Iiirited States' occupaitioni of tire city airr harbor of Manila, and unurler conditions, both iii this respect;nrrh in so far as the outside- ports of Lrizoir are coitcerned, which have irrateriirlly cliiiuredl. Siiice that timte certaiir atgreeirreiits have been entereri into betweeni the rejrrese~ntatives of the Uirited Stattes and slpain which the actioni ('oiteiriplated ini the hiclosure would violate~, and hence cuir riot irow be carried iiito executioir. Vessels cani not be cleared from this port for interislaird ports, nuder tire NorwegrianI ag. As regarris the tobacco iiowv hr the, up~per country, it rim ibe broughit to this port by vessels of the Maritlirie Coiripany, sailing- uiralers the Anrerica-ni flag. That coinpany has two vessels cirgagei lin this trarle -whIchl will lie aibie to bi-iirg ini all thre tobacco grown in tie(, upper pn)vriiices, auir at uniform transportation rates to all owners concerned. The Venure, niow (lire here, will sail iii about four dlays for Apairi, and the Satbourwi, flow en voyage for thait port, will s0011 Ire here, anid -is sooir -irs she can uffload will retun-n. Informiation has beeni ohrtritieul thwat thre whole tobracco crop can be moved by these two vessels ann ini sutbinicint tinrie to irreveirt arinjury to the crops. Your inclosure is herewith returneni. Thre sphere of Unrited States action in thre Philippines was now about to be enlarged. Durhimg tire last immterviewv with General Mios's staff REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 55 officer oll the subject of interislanl( trade, alluded to in a former portion of this rel)ort, lie submitted a proposition for the relief of the Spanish garrison at Iloilo by our troops, saying that General Rios would be pleased to turll that city over to the Ullited States authorities and witlhdraw to Zamlboanga. The l)roI)ositioli was discussed, but immediate action was not considered practicable, and lie was requested to convey to the general our appreciation of his offer aend to report that permission would be sought to accept it as soon as the Paris treaty negotiations indicated ujnmistakably that the United States would succee(l to thle government of the islallnds. About December 13 a l)etition was received, sigiled by the business men and firtlms of Iloilo, asking' for Americal 1)rotectiol there. On I)ecember 14 I cabled to Washilngton tlhe followling: BIankers amill mlerclailts with business hlollss at Iloilo pletition American protection at Iloilo. Spalliish authorities are still holding out, but w\ill receive United States troops. Insulrgents reporltel flavorable to American annllllexation. Can send troops. Shlall any action be takenll No response was received ulltil the 19th of tlhat month, when I was informed that the Presidefnt and Secretary were absent fromi Washingtoll, andii that a collsideration of mly question w(ould await their return, whichl would be slhortly. Appreciating thle great desirability of sectring l)ossessioli of this city, the second of the l:'lilip)l)ines in imllortallce, I was anxious to receive an affirmative answer to mliy cable questiol of the 14th instant. It was rel)orted that the S1)panish troops were liard pressed by tlhe insurgeiits, who had ilnade an attack a few days l)revious, d(eclaring that they would capture thle town before tile arrival of the Americans. It was also stated tlhat the attack hlad been repulsed, with a loss to thle insurgents of 300 men. The petitionl fbr )rotectiol w-llich had been submitted by the business menl alIl)ealredl to me to fiurnish sufficient ground upon whllich to base interventiomi in tlheir behalf, independent of specific instructions from WVashington, and I tllerefbre, in coniference with Admiral I)ewey, asked tlhat ole of his war vessels conlvoy trool)s which I meditated sending to Iloilo ait once. This the Adamiral thought it not wise to do, as we were awaitilg authority which llad already been sought, and furthermore that lie was ot the oi)inion G(elleral ios would h1old out. I shared with himl tlhis latter conviction and awaited directions. On December 23 the following dispatch was received: WASI lNGTON, Decem ber 2;3, 1898. OTIS,,Manila: Aniswering your messange, December 14, thel I'resident directs that -ou send necessary troops to Iloilo, to preserv-e the pIeace and protect life aid l)roperty. It is most importtant that there sliould be Ino conliclt with the insurgenlets. l Be conciliatory, but firm. 1By order of the Secretary of Wa-r. These instructions were conveyed to Admiral Dewey and I cabled the followillg: MIANSIA, December 2,,5 1898. General Rlos, (Go'rnor- General Philippiie slands8, 1 loilo, Panayl: A considerable UnJited States force, Armly and Navy, will leave Manila in two or three days, alnd its coummanding general is ordered to confer with you at Iloilo. OTIS, Ui ited States Military Gorernor. This message was sent to Capiz, a northern point of the island of Panay, then the terminus of tile cable, whence messages were telegraphed overland to Iloilo before the insurgents had destroyed the land 56 56 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENER-AL OTIS. lines. Cable messages were sent subsequently by special gunboats which reported for them at short interVals. The next morning, the superintendent of the cable comipany slirprised mee with the information that two gunboats arrived at Capiz the day before, collected all telegrams, andl left for Iloilo at 5.355 p. ni.; that my dispatch did not reach the cable office there till 3.50 p. in.; that the cable operator relported that Ceneral ilios would leave Iloilo with all Spa-niards for Lainbagan the afternoon of the 294th, and would go to Manila, by the end of the month. Efforts were inmiedliattely made to coitmutnicate by other means with Genieral Rios before lie could evacuate the city. A coasting vessel was secured, with which Lieutenant-Colonel. Potter, of the Engineer Corps, was (directedi to proceedl. atud if lpossible conimuumicate in perz~on with G'eneral lI'ios, requesting that lie continue ini lpossession of the city until the arrival of our ti-oops. Colonel P.otter departed on his mission that night anid nothing was hleard fronifilhi until the mnoriling oft the 28th, when lie returned. Ile reported that General ilios had evacnatedl on the evening of the.24th, thirty-niine hours before his arriival; thatt lie tlound lite inisurgents iii possession of the city; that hie ha.,d landed and held -an imiterview with the (consul for Great Britain, and that thje town. was quiet, Aguinaldo's tiag'o Hyoing, anti that he could not rea-clh any c~onclusions as to thje lprobalble results of General Miller's arrival; that lie saw the hitter on the evening of the 27th andl relported to hin fully the situation as,; lie had found it. On the miornin~g of the 27th 1 telegraphed Admiral TDewey, at Cavite, as follows: Nothing fronm Colonel P~otter. Capiz reports having seen vesssel. oflsliore last evening andl thiinks that possibly insur-ent authorities there would not permtit landing. If Potter rema~ins at lhd)io, l~ios still holds (oit. Shotild he arrive, here within the next twelve hours, Rios has ev-acuatedl. I thereafter telegraphed Admiral Dewey the substance of two dispatches a-s sooni as delivered, wh~icht were as follows: I1,oI1o, December 24. Treaty of Paris Signedl; my Government ordlers ime to gro to Manila, where I Shall arrive at end of month, and ini accordlalce with your ex~cellency will hasten repatriation. General Rios. Also, Steamer which arrived yesterday at Capiz is Spaniish guinboat Elcano. Iloilo evacuated on the 24th. This last m~essage was received from the cable company. I also telegraphed the Adiniral that "1Colonel Potter iiot having reported, I ami inclined to think that Spaniiards still hold Iloilo." I theii cabled the following: ADJUTANT-GENERAL, W1a8hington: Iloilo expedition left last night. Reported that Spanish fot-ces, evacuated 24th instant. Report not confirmed. General Miller fully histrulcte(1 as to action whether Spanish forces there or not. Action to accord fnlly withi Presidlents (hirections. Will cable results as soon as possible. Expedition should reachl Iloilo to-morrow morning(,.Z As soon as Colonel Porter had received instructions to proceed, as above indicated, the following was issued: GENERAL ORDiERS, H1DQI 1. DEP-r. PACIFIC AND) Eirommimi Auiury Courps, No. 39. Makila, '. IL, JDecembcr 2-, 1898. L.-Br-ig. Gen. Marcus P. Miller, IT. S. V.. is assigned to the commndam of thle follow-,r ing namedl troops, viz: Lighbt Battery G', Sixth UT. S. Artillery. Eighteenth U. S. In faittry. Fifty-first Iowa Infantry. REPORT OF MTAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 57 And will proceed with them to Iloilo, island of Panay, by transports -Newtport, Arizona, and IPewisylravia, under stich naval escort as the rear-admirirl.commnanding the Asiatic Squadron may furnish hini, and there execuite the special instructions he will receive from these headquarters. The troops wvill constitute a separate brigade within the meaning of the Seventythird Article of War, to be known atnil designa-ted as the First Separate lBrigade of the Eighth Army Corp~s. They will be equiipp~ed and suipplied as or(lers already and hereafter to he issued iii~dica-te. TIhe following-nauied offic~ers wvill constitute the staff of the First Separate Brigade of the E-'i~ghlth Arity Corps: First Lietut. C. G. Wowrl Third U-. S. Artillery, aid, acting assistant adjutatnt-genera —l. Capt. John B. Jefferey, U'. S. V., qua-rtertmaster. Capt. C. 11. K'rauithiot, conmnissa ry of' siibsisteiice, U. S. V., commissary-. iMaj. E. R. Morris, brigadle surgeon, I.7 S. V., chief suirgeonl. ByV coimimand of, Major (.Ceieral Otis: TioMAs If. BARIZY~ -lS.I A~ djutenit-(;eaeral. Gleneral Miller and the Iowva regiment of volunteers had recently arrivedl. The regiment iemained oul the transport 1prepared for (Ielarture. Lights Battery- G, Sixth RI'egiment Ui. S. Artillery, and( the jo-liteeith Infiantry had beent directedl to 1ho1( themselves, in readiness fo r this expected service. (Carefullyi- p~reparedl iistructioiis were thenl issue(1 of wvhich the followinog is a Copy: ( FF'ICi, 1'. S. 'MILITmA v GOVENmiOR, I EADQUAIZrFEnS, l)EPAmRMEN-r P'ACIFIC ANT) EIGmiTim Aic~,iyv (opts, Xieuila, P 1., DIecenu bcur:-4, 1898. Bri g. C'reon. MIAiu I PCS. 'MILLNE, U.S. Vr., (Jo11?(uummedimq First 8rcparaet Brupidu, Eighlth) Jruuu, Corps. SIR: in1 obediene(- to the iustri-ictioiis, of the President of the United S-.tates, dated the 231d hiistant, directing, that troop~s be senit to Iloil, island of Pariay. there ''to prcserv-e the peace and protect Ii e aumo property,' your coiuuiand has been) selected for this duty and has been ordieredl to dlelpart tlherefor onl Mondlay next, the 26th instant. Those instrucetions contain the followNing, cautiona-ry langunage: 'It is most importint thtt there should be no cotlhict with the insurgents. Be colici la.tory, buit Iil-1. Whlen t hey were ',i\-eii it was siipposedl that the Spanmishi forces in Iloilo and in conflict withi the iimsurrent inhabitants of' the island wonldl retaiii their hold of the city until thie arrival oft Unitedl States troop~s, when they would transfer all authority to the latter and pe'lce'ably evictuate. F'romn cable dispatches received this morning froii northern Panay, it is feamredl that the -Spaniish t-roop~s niay snrreii(ler the city to the iiimsurgents betoire Youi arrival. in Nvhbich event your (Imities will become more compllicatedl 111d will require delicate anid sk ill1fiil action for successfuil prosecution. However, every possible precauitionary nieasiire has been taken to retaiii the Spanish forces, there. Yesterday a caldegraum wvas sent to northern Pamuay, the limit of' telegralplic Comnmunication with Iloilo, adtvising the comimandliig general of those forces of youtr early departure for that port, aind this eveniing, a fast vessel will he (lisliatclied carrying the sa-une hiforniatioin, hut; it is possible that these measures may fatil to,acconiplisli ihesimed resuilts. In th~e event of your arrival at. Iloilo prior to the departuire of the Spanish! troops therefrom, You will communnicate with their comimanding( general, inviting himl, in accordance with aii existingr mu-tual understanding, to then remove his forces, to hermit you to ta-ke formal possession of the city and thereupon with his consent youl will proceed to occuipy the saiie with youir coinumand. It;, on the contrary, yoi tiiid the city to he in the possession ut' thme iisismgmts, you wHill piroceedl with great caution, avoidiiig all manifestation of' inedit~ate(I f'orcible action andl undue dlisplay of force. You will Iplac'e youirself in conmunnication with the finsurgent,autthorities thronigh the representative men of Iloilo, wihoi youl will take from MaLnila, with you on your voyagre, andl who will use their best endleavors to bring to a successful] deteruinitation any ulilficulties Which may present the- mselves. You will make k~nown to the inhmahitants the puripos,-e of the nifted States, whichl, havimug socceeded to all the righlts of Spainl in the Philippine Islands, under treaty stipulations followling conquest in the Ea.-stern and Western hemnisp~heres, intenlds to establish among them an efficient aind umost stalble form of (government which shall fully protect them. in all their priivilte in~terests aind liberties, iii which they shaill have representation, and whic wil secre fr thm inreaing ( and abundant p)rosperity. As a slight proof of youir declare.d iiitention, You will release uinto themn the Spanish native soldiers seiit hiere by the Spanish Governmtent, who, throtigh the efforts of the United States 58 REPORT OF MIAJOR-GE-~NERAL OTIS. authorities, wvill be returned to their hoines,, in Panay, -who will accomnpanly you and who are gratefuil for the sui1ervisionl whrich those authorities havte exercised over themn. You will find the representative people of Iloilo a superior class and antenable to reason, and it is believed that they will place confidence in. the faith and good intent ions of the U'nited States and will accord you a miost favorable reception. No unduie haste will be mnade and the rights of youir Giovernmenet wvill he fiully made hnown and insisted uipon. Conflict between troops wvill be avoidled unless it becomes necessary for (lefense. Should you he able to effect a laudling as aI result of your negotiations you will disemibark~ only a sufficient port ion of your commiandI to subserve lpresentt putrpuses-the remiainder being held on transports -iwa iting fuirther instructions. 6hould you. not he able to effect a landing without (onflict, you wvill hold y-our forees on your tran sports inl the vicinity of Iloilo and awvait fuirther directions from these headquarters. But in all these imatt-ers you muist l)C (rovertedl to a gTreat extent by your own grood Judgment a-fter a careful deliberation 11p)0n conditioiis, having, in view the instructions of the President of' the njifted States to avoidl armied repression. Th oernet hc you are called upon to establish at Iloilo will he o)ne of Military oc( uipatioii. I'poni taking- possession it will be your duty to issuev an ordler proclaimning such ai governmient within the territory occupiedl or c-ontrolled by the i-nited States foi ces uniler your comman~ud. The inunicipal laws of the territory occupied, such ais atfet t private righits of persons arid property anti. pro.)i(le for the punishnient of ( rfne, tre to lie considered as cojuttinuijig in forc-(e So fa r as coinjmatible with tlic new order of' thingfs, unless siuspenided or snperse(led bty propter military authouity. ITle judgres and other officials con~nected wvith the administration of these laws n'av, it they- 'mcept the,authority of' the United States, coutithmie to administer the ordinnary I tw of the land as between nian 1.1n( man, ibuit huller the siipervision of' the said imi litart authorities. The local courts, thuis continuedl inl power shall not, however, exercise jurisdiction over any crinie or offeuitse commmitted by any person belonging to the Arniy of' the U nitedl States, or any retainer of thme Army, or person serving wvith it, or any person fuirnishing or trainsporting armny supplies, nor over anyV crime or offense, commumitted onl cit her of time saume by any inihabitant or tentporary resident of said territory. In such cases, except. when courts-martial hiave cognizance, jurisdictiomi to try and lpmmnish is vestedl in military conitnissimlls and provost courts which will he convenied (by you) troit timue to tulne as occasion may requiire. Fo)r the Ipirpjose of providing for the prommpt punishiment of crimie inl cases -where thme civil courts may fail, from whatever cauise, the military couimmissions and pr'ovost courts %vill, in addition to the exercise of' lowCrs alouve indlicatedl be vested with jurisdiction concurrent with the civil courts to hear anid determine all crinies amid offenses committed by inhahitants or temporary residents within the limits of United States occupation. Of these cr1imtes and offenses, those wNhich are capital] and such others as you niiav desire to refer to it wvill he broughit to trial before a military commission, and those which are not (-capital, which may be adeqItiately punishied within the punishing powers o)f purovost (courts, niay he referred to themi fo~r trial. Trials by civil courts, however, will. be preferred where there is satisfactory reason to believe that justice will be done. In all sentences imposed by military commissions and provost courts the hpunisisments awarded shall1 conform, as far as possible, in chanracter and degree to the laws of the, United States, or of either of the States, or to thbe customs of war. The proceedingrs o fmilitary commissions, after beingjl acted upon by you. will be forwarded. to these headquarters for the actioni of thei commimanding, greneral. The punishment awarded by provost couirts shall not exceed confreinement, w~ithi or without hard labor, for a period of one year or a fine (If' $1,000 or both. The sentemices of' these courts do not require approval, but may be iiiitigrated or remittedI by you. (~opiesof orders on these sub~jects, the provisions of which control the action of the military courts established in this city, wvill bue furnished you for your informmation a-idu guidlance and for application tinder conditiomus similar to those prevailiiig here. It will be necessary for you to create aI goverumemit for the (leterutinatioi (of city affairs under the direct supervision of a provost-miarshial, to ap-,point officers amid assistants for the collection aiid care of revenuie, aitd to coiidutct luostal uaflairs. The customs regulations it force here will he applied by you. at Iloilo, autu an officer con-. nected therewith has been directed to report to yoti for appoitaitnemt aIs collector of customs, who will he provided with copies of all customs; regulatiomis auth the necessary blank forms. You NA-ill be furnished with the requtisite assistaiits, tlmorotnghly supplied, to establish upon your arrival all uiecessary mail facilities, andl yout will apply in this departuient the postal laws of' the UI rlted States Governmenit. Iloilo is an important Iloint of enitry, amid to seculre comipetemit aid for duity in connection with the port youi will consuilt Captain D~yer of the Navy, conimanding, officer of thme B~altinmore, which escorts y-our transports, who has a, thorough practical acquaintance wAith such ntatters. REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 5 59 In esta~blishing your aduministration you will consult various orders and reguilation-s governiing- all these subjects at this piort-iiiaking your actions contorin thereto in all essential particiilars. No farther instrucetions can. be griven youi. Mu11ch must depend upon youir tact and discretion and( youir ability to mleet var~yingr circuimstances as they arise. I lowever, shiouild youi fail to secuire a ipeaceable enitry' iunto thie city, you wvill rep~ort fully youir procecdings to thesc headquarters and requicst further instructions. By eoiniuiand of Major-Ge-neral Otis: TiiomAS 1-. BARRY, JS Ostallt Adjutant-(;eieral. On) the evening of (Teneral Mliller's departuire the following was also furnished him: -iDQa1S. DE'PT. I'ACIFIC AND — Eiouni Aiimy CORtPS, Manla,1 TP. I., D~ecembher 2G, 1398. lBrio. CGen.ii. ',\. Mi1),U.S. Commmid()1ingii los7t ~ipar'ate Briigaide, Fig/ih IArA y Corps. Sin: I aum directed by the major-general conimanding to furnrish youi with the followinga inst rimetionis In. case t~he Spanish lhorces have evacuated] Iloilo, yout will, onl ap~proaching, that city, kceep) your transpoi-ts ArZeiao;umd Pen as!/va0( wvell to the rear and heyon~d the view of thle n ihbmitdnts oti Iloilo, antid you will take iuto thev Iloilo waters your narval esromrts~ hIe hallimooe and Callao, and the tranisport vessel Un ion, ou which are the nativ'e Spanishm troops, Avidi your vessel, thle A'(cuport. Yimi will imnake knownm to the insul 'emit imithorimties thie ob e(t. of bringhig the large forc-e with you, wNhich4 is, viz: To takle poC)~5issiou o.' other pou-ts iii the islands, it' couli tions aud cireuimnstanmces are favorabhle hut tli t it iiii be necessary to keep troops at Ilo~ilo mmntjl dIelinite instrucetions conceruiug o)ther po~rts of' the islands are received fr-om Washingtou. TuioImAs- 11. BARHY, -1,sistant Adit(tatit-Geineral. General Miller, i,, comYmand, escorted by the U. S. S. Baltbimore, sailed on the evening of the 2Gthai and as Colonel IPotter did not return until the nmori)ilmg of the 28th w~e were without aniy iniformiation for thirty-six hours. In the mneantiiie reports,, were brought that Aguinaldo had exlpressedl satisfacetion with the situation, as B ghting wouldl certainly coinineiiee at Iloilo up1)01 the, landinig of' our troops, which would excite the natives in Luzon to afctive hostilities. 1lie had issued orders, it was intihltatedl, to olplOSe landing, buat feared that a considerable force of Tagalos sent there wou]ld not be in time to lparticilpate. It was alterwardls learlled that tleqe s1)ecial insurgeit trooIps (lid not reach Pana~y until lDecember.291. lIn time foregoing instructiolls mention is made of representative mnen of Iloilo and Spaniish native soldiers, whom General Mliller was directed to take with huimi, tile first to assist iii imaking tile object of the U~nited States kniowni and the latter in proof of good intentions. The soldiers referred to were sent by Geniera~l Rios to Mlamila for (lischarge from the, Spaniish m-iilitary servie, withouit 1)eriiis~sioi or warninig. They were about 2(k) of a lot uuimbering 60O( or 700, aii(l were Visayans belonging mostly to Panaty, whbile the remahinder were Ttagalos. They were discharged upon arrival in the iharbor, tliongh not lpaid oft; as the Spanish auithorities pleaded lack of sutlicieuit pulblic hlinds, and reqluest was submitted to lperulit thein to land in tile city. After much deliberation, it, was decided to lauid such of themn as desired to remain in Luizoii on the northerni shore of Mlanila Bay, and to send to Panay those wh-lo desired to g-o south. Time 200, who were accompanied by their famiflies, elected to go south. They were lplaced upon a Governmenit transport, rationed, ea~ch given a smllall -amount of nioney fromt the public funlds, and departed for their honies with General Miller's commaiid. Time relpreselltative business men had come up from Iloilo a short time before for tile purpose, as they asserted, of arranging ma —tters with the Amiericans so that REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. there might be a peaceful solution of affairs. They were introduced by some of the native citizens in whom confidence was placed, and expressed thelselves as desirous of having the United States troops go to Iloilo, alnd to accomlpalny them in order tllat they might prevail upon tlie peolle to receive themi without opposition. These men were intelligent and apparently very much in earnest, and General Miller, who was present at the last conference, shared( flly my opinion as to their honesty. He took tlheml with him on his ownl trallsI)ort and gave the best accommlodations the vessel offered, free of charge. Upon arrival at Iloilo, lie sent them into the city to prepare the way for him and they were seen no more. Ite landed the dischllarged native soldiers on the Panay coast, and it is believed that thley joined the insurgent ranks without taking much time for coilsi(ler.atiol. It was subsequently ascertained thlat whlile temp)orarily so jonurnilig in Manila one of these rel)resentative nmen ulnietly visited Malolos, and received Aguinaldo's orders, which lie carried witlh him to his l)eople. Lieutenant-Colonel Potter, whenll eturnillig from Iloilo, lIad imet the coimmandl of G(eneral Miller aund 1had reported the situation to himl when some distance nortlh, off thie l'ianay coast. Upo1n receiving his relort, and being igioran t of Genieril Miller's movements, I returied him at once wvith the following istructlions: IHI)QRl. I)EIiT. P)ACIFIC AND) El'(;III AR'MY C(CiR)!S, Manila, I'. f., Jlccembe) 1,., 189S. Brig. Geni. MARCUS P. MILLER, 1'.. V., Commaanding F'Sirt Separate l'rifade, LJi/h11 l Army Corps, Iloilo, 1P. 1. SIn: ILieiuteia!u t-Colonel Pott r lias just arri ved anrd replorted thle situation at Iloilo. He reports the evacuation 1of the city by tlhe Spmanish firces, and that the insurgoents are in full possession; lie further relports thitt those arthorities were anrticiplating your arrival, and thattlere was a widely lurevailinu sentiment in the city in favor of receiving your forces without resistantce. All of this, coloncl l'otter informed mle, he made kinown to yon when lie consulted (youn esterd(lay on lris return trip. To inect this state of affairs yorur instructions needl niiodificatio)i, althougli it is believed that you will grasp tlie sitri;tion as presented andl ie governeal dy conditions. Your instructions bid you to lbe concili.atory luit firim, an rd, further, that you will not make any great display of force, but seek to gain possession of the city through peaceable negotiations, not exercising tidue hlaste; that should you fail to secure a peaceable entry into the city you will report fully your proceedings to these headquarters and request frurther instrructions. By firmness and conciliatory action it ilbelieved that you will be able to land your force without conflict, but you will make as strong a display of the same as possible, landing them and taking possession of the city forcibly, if miore pacific measures are without avail. It is, of course, necessary now, in this stage of the proceedings, to occupy Iloilo, and the manner of doing so irust be left tto your discretion, avoiding conflict if possible, bulit accepting it ift' necessary to accomplish the object. Information received hlere is to tile effect that the insurgent forces are weak in strength even when united-that they are not united, but are divided in their sentiments toward thle United States (Governmient, tle nmajority being friendly disposed. No further instructions can lbe given you, and there is no disposition to limit your discretionary action. Conduct afftairs in accordance with the (lemands of the situation, having in view always the necessity of occrulying the city with yorur troops. Colonel Potter will return as soon as you report to hinm the situation, unless yon wish to retain him for a slrort timne to acqulaint hlim witli results of:action already taken or action which yo medl itate. Very respectfully, EI. S. OTIS, Major- (eneral, TU. S. fl., ('ommanding. LATER. Since writing the above I arn in receipt of informiation from thle Malol)s government, which was gathered yesterday. Its former cabinret resigned a few daiys ago because of its inability to agree witih Agrruinraldo anil his confidential advisers. A new provisional ca.lbinet his been all lppointel, consisting of mien lhostile to Amnerican annexation, ariong whom are a number of arniv (tfficers. These men are closely watching the results of your expedition and greatly hople tlhat you will be obliged REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 61 to use force to gain Iloilo. They think that conflict there would inspire the people here to take up arms against the Americans. It is therefore still quite necessary to avoid force if you can do so and still succeed. E. S. OTIS, Major-General, etc. HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTi ARMY CORPS, Manila, P. 1., December 28, 1898. Lieut. Col. C. L. POTTER, Chief Engineer Officer, Department Pacific and Eighth Army Corp8. SIR: Since delivering to you instructions for General Miller, I am in receipt of a dispatch from Admiral Dewey saying it is not practicable to send the Callao to Iloilo, and he further thinks the proper thing now to do is to recall the expedition, as the insurgents are in full posssesion and will probably not give up without a fight. This expression of view on the part of the Admiral only confirms my view that you shoulld use every possible means of conciliatioln, and still I all not of the belief that the exptedition cani be returned(. Better that we leave tie war vessel and a small force to confront Iloilo and scatter the force(to other ports in the southern islands, where troops are very muchl needed at the present time. You will therefore inform General Miller to he governed by tliese views as nearly as possille. I will try and send further information in regard to the condition of the islands to-morrow or lext (lay. Notwithstanding all this, 1 still llold to my view that Iloilo must be taken. Very respectfully, E.. OTIS, lMajor-General, U. 8. V., Commanding. Lieutenant-Colonel Potter sailed as soon as lie had received these instructions. I tlhen cabled to the Adljutant-General of tlie Army such inforlmation as I had obtained from Iloilo, adding ill my dispatch that I could not arrive at (olIcllsions as to results. and would not hear from there for four days, as cable commnllication had been destroyed; that the Spaniish forces had evacuated all stations in hle southern islalnds, except Zallboanga, by orders, as they asserted, from Madrid. On December 30 I cabled Washington thatAll military stations outside of u11zon, with the exception of Zaniboanga, turned over by Spaniards to inhabitants. who 1may be denominated insurgents witli more or less hostility to the United States. Some points w-e can take without friction, and could have tiakent nearly all outside of Luzon lpeaceably beforelf the 23d and 24th of thle montlh, w\lle Spain witlldrew her fi)rc(s withoutt (our knowledg. Am waiting to hear results 1fro, Iloilo, and an( medlita;ting' action i islands of,ey-te, Samar, and Ceblu. in all otf wlhicl Luzon insilurgents liave been at work for several moulslls. Conditionis here at MIanila and character of inhl;lldtats not understood in tlle United States. Large number of insiurgent troops still in tle jci(l, scattered throughout Luzon provinces, and albot 6,000 outtside this city, whi'e contains la.rge number of sym]athizers, who have threatened uprisiing. Former insurglent cabinet disrupted, provisional one formed, consisting mostly ot irresponsible men who demand complete independence and war with United States. The situation requires delicate manipulation, alnd our troop]s here can not be widely scattered ait present. Great majority of men of property desire ann(exs:tion, others seek personal advancement and plunlder, promises of wvhieh hold insurgerints togoether, but already much dissatisfaction in ranks and conllicts with inhalitants in mlid(lle provinces. \\ill report furtler in a few days. Am1 in consultation with Admiral lDewey, now engagoed in efforts to stop shilipment of inslrgent armls firoll China and Japan through meditated seizure. We will probably send another force south within a short time. General Miller's first report was received at these headquarters on the morning of I)ecember 30, annd was as follows: Dl)(itRS. FiiiST BRI;AI)E, EIG1TII1 AinMY Conl'S, O)N BOAIRI) TRANSI'IPOT NEWPORT, lloilo Hl)rbor, '. 1., December 2S, 1S9S-3 p. m. AI)JUTANT-GENEIAeAL, L)Department of the Pacific and Eighth Alrmy Corps. SIR: I have the honor to report that my command arrived in the harbor of Iloilo about 10 a. m. to-day. The Arizona and Pennsylrania were left at Point Luzaron, 30 miles away. The Baltilmore and YcNeort anchored off the city. REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. An aid of the commanding general, Mlartin Delgado, immediately reported aboard my ship. I ga-ve him an interview. Hle reported that the commanding general desired to know% ''if we had anything agrainst theiui-were we going to interfere, with them?"1 linformied himitha-tlIhad written aletter statiiig to his commniiding,oflicer and the people of Iloilo the object of my visit, andl would send the letter over. Accordingly, Lieut. M1. K. Ilarroll, Third Artillery, and two volunteer aidls andl tim commission went to visit the conlniandiLIIing general. They were met by a subcom.mittee, of the committee of which Rt. Lopez -was president, General Delgar,-do being present. MNy aids gave them my letter (a col)y inclosed). They wanted to know of Lieutenant Barroll almost at the very first -whether hie had anly instructions for them froni Agninaldo. Ilie answered no: but that time instructions were from MajorGeneral Otis, conimanding the Philippine Islands,, United 'States ferces. After rea(ding, the letter they claimed that they hadl no power to act in eases affecting their federal oGovernment,, but iprominisedl to meet mie on my ship to-imorrow afternoon. When we entered their flag was flying from two pilaces in the city. At:3 p. Ini. today it was not flying. I presume this wvas because my letter claimed the authority of the Spanish G'overnmient over Iloilo, as it, was abandoned by the Spanish troops. 'rhey -were po~lite, but I think them iletenfinined not to give us control, exceept we use force, when they will yield wvithout much lighting. They have takeni charge of the (cmstoiuhouse and post-oftice. They know that our troop ships are off Poinmt Luzaron, therefore I ordered thein in to-night-not nearer than 6 miles. The city is (quiet, but the white citizens, e specially Aiumeri-ans, are afraid. Their force is es timated at 800 well-armied inen, 1,000 lbadly armied men, and 1,000 mnen with guns, pikes, etc.; aninunition. not suplposedl to be ahundamit. I ani told flow that t~he miembers of the com~iso r fadto express an opin ion in our favor. The tact that thieir p~eople~ are in possessiomin of the city has changed the views of the ninny wvavering ones. The longer they remnain in possession collecting customs, runnps-olics, thme miore they wvill ho confirnied in the idea that they can (10 it. I shiould recominend that force ho u1sedl at once, ill Which case I desire the Callao, or some other lighlt-draft boat, aid. the California heavy artillery battalion sent dlown till the plalce is tak~en. \Vith the forces now here and that in addition I would not expect to fire a sminle shot-, as the native troops would move out. I will 'keel) you informed. Very respectfulfly, M. P. MILLE-R, Brigadicr-Gener'al, (7 S. V., COnonandINf lus?'t Separate Brigade. The following is a copy of time inclosure referred to ini the above communication: HIE~ruADQUARTRS l"11pSiT BIGh~ADE, EIGHTHnr Ai?-.%i Comims, ON BoARiz) TIIANSPORiT NmEWPoumRT Iloilo llorbor, P. IL, Dccemiber 28, 1898. CO.MMIANDING OFFIcER OF THlE TROOPS AT ILOILO, ISLAND(I) 0l~ANAY, AND T11lE PEOPLE' OF' ILOILO AND TlE, ISLANI) OF PANAY: The troops uinder umy comumand appearedl here under an order of the President of the 1rnited States of Anmerica promunlgated by Major-General Otis, cominanding all of the troops of the United States,, in the Philippine Islands. It is accompanied by the United States naval ship Baltiniore, sent by Admiral Dewey, commanding the United States squiadron in these Asiatic waters. When these orders were communicated to me it wats supposed that the troops of Spain were still in possession at Iloilo, and that thme transfer of posse-ssion 'and grovernmental authority wouldl be by them to representatives of the Governmuent of the United States, which has succeeded, by virtue, of conqulest sllppleleneted by treaty stipnilations, to all the rights heretofore exercised by Spain ini these islands. Upon arrival I find that the city of Iloilo is in the reported possession of nmative troops,. The intention of thiis letter is to place mlyself ill conlmlmlmication with those now exercising,authority at Iloilo, with the view to the aceoluplishmnent of my mnission to this place as abo-ve indicated. This comnmunicationlWl be, liaindled you by iny aid, Lienut. MN. K. lBarroll, Third Artillery, who is accompanied by four gehntlehmen, tornier residents of Iloilo, who will iiiake known to you nmore in detail the purposes of the presence of in I coiuaind at this place. There accomlpaIies my commaind nl O the steammiship Unioni certain Spanish soldiers, natives of the islalid of Pana, whom it is my puirpose, at a later date, to release, with the privilege of retuirning to their homies, an act which it is hiope-d will be interpreted as anl evidence of the good will of the major-general (comumanding in the Philippines,. under whose orders I am acting. REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 63 I shall be pileased to receive a call from representatives of those to whom this communication is addressed on board the transport Newtport at as early an hour as your convenience will allow. Very respectfully, M. P). MAILLER, Brigladier-(eneral, U. S. V., Commndi~ing.First Separate Jtriya(le, Eighth Armty Corp~s. General Miller's second report, dated December 30, and forwarded by a merchant vessel, is as follows: ILEADIQUARTERis FIRST SEPARATE BRIGADE. ON BOARIn) TRAN si'owir NEWPORT, Iloilo Harbor, J). 1., 1)ecemiber 30, 1898. AimJUTANT-GENERAL, DEi.PART-ME'NT OF THlE PA'CIFIC AND EIG11TH ARMY CORPS. Sin: I wvant to report that a, committee of' people having civil control of the city of Iloilo, an(l claiiiing also control of the island], iot inc here yesterday at 6 p. in., and again (lainoed that they conld not turn ov\er the control of J loil to iny conimmand wNiithiout (ollsiiltfitg Agoiinablo. Should they agree to (10 it thieir lives anol property would lie in dlanger. After a long talk, settingr forth tile ilteiltionl of' our G'overntInent, explainfing the hindl of grovernmient, and readIing to themn extracts of youir letter of instructions in reference to the saiie matter, I told themn there was no time to coiisult Agniinaldo -ati imy ileiiandl wNas th-at the LPresi(lent of the Unlitedl States, as sucecessor- t~o tile rights of Spaiin iii these islaiids, reqiuired thmeim to tiiri over tile control ofthtle city of' Iloilo. I then aslked tlheini dire ctly: " Shoiild we lanid would voii meet its wNith armed resistaioe? T1hey,onil(i not atnswer that qutestion. I ask~ed them if tiley wouldl tot have their troops miarch out of the city andl perm&itias, their friends, to IIioxve ill -Nithioit resistaiice to-nmorrow, tile 131st instant. They reqnested timle, to cotistilt witil the, cot1lilttIe, tih'it they rep~reseintedl, pr'omising- to retuirn with a (befinite reply at n11)01. Decenihe I330 (to day). Lieuitenant-Colonel Potter, corps engineer, arrived here yesterday evening with a letter of, instructions, fromt you to nie It is myl intentioti to land. troops in twentyfoitr hours, after hiaving, serv( d notlice on the foreign consuls of the city and the peop~le to that effect. The estimate of artned nativ e troop~s to dlay is 3,500, who are said to lie massed in time city aiil at Jaro and -Mob, '1nd( six 01 seven thousand froim tile mlouintalins armedl With holos, who are massed at the saiiie places. I think I should itaNe the Tw~entieth Kansas RegriiMent sent to trie as soon as possi1)10; 20,000 rominds of.15 caliber anmllinitilin for Gatling gimns should lie snpplicd. Two field mortars (3.6 inches), with equipments and supply of amomunition, shonld lie sent fo inc at once. I forward this commiunicationi by the steamer Unioni. Ml. P. MILLER, IBriyailiei-'-General, U. S. V., Comminandingt Brigade. General Mliller's next report is drated December 31, and was received on Jannary.2.. It is as follows: IIEAD)QUARTEJIS; SEiPARATE BRIGAD)E, Iloilo Harbor, P'. I., Decetinber' 30, 1898. COMA1AANDING, GENERAL Dm'"ARYM3ENi' OF THE' PACIFIC, MJaniila, P. I. Sin: I have jiust. concluded secoild coimference.( with commission represellting the native government at Iloilo. They- submitted a comnmann1Uica`tion, copy inclosed herewvithi. This coniunniniction wNa~s siippleamemmted b)y v-erbal statements that it' we insisted on landing- oumr troop~s, b.)itt without arias anmd as" friendls, they conld not answer for the attitud~e, of the people, but that the army wouild endleavor to restrain the people. If we lan(ledl in force they wouild not answer fo(r attitude of either army 'or people. This mneans, plainly, armed resistanDce to onr landing. A lnrge liunlier ot' tiative troolls have lbeemn brought to the city within the past, thirty-six houtrs. Best estiniate 12,000, 2,500 of which are arme~d with rifles, the remaind-ii(er being armiedlwithibolos only-. Their atmiatunition suipply reported linmited. The situiation is further comiplica~ted by petition of Iloilo mierchan~ts, representing the larger part of mercantile interests there, copy of which tind herewith. I Iunderstanld, General, tha~t it was at the request of' many of the parties signing this petitioti for protection of' life aiid property at Iloilo that this expedition was organized and dispatched to this point; that their request was largely its justification. Their present attitude contradicts their previous petition in a measure, and REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. as the situation, if forced by me by a landing of United States troops, promises great loss of life among noncombatants and destruction of private property at Iloilo, I have deemed it best to delay compliance withll my orders for a sufficient time to communicate the above information to you and receive your instructions. I am further influenced to this delay because of the fact that before making the formiidable attack upon Iloilo now necessary, it would be incunibent upon me to give the usual notice looking to the removal of noncombatants to points of safety. I entertain no doubt of my ability to take and hold Iloilo with my present force, but in view of excitement prevailing among inhabitants of the city and island as relorted to me, and the large number of people assembled in the city, it might be prudent to send an additional regiment to, this point. Two steam launches suitable for towing rowboats for use in landing troops are much needed. Very respectfully, M. P. MILLER, Brigadi er-General, Conmmanding. The inclosure reads: [Translation of the letter from President Lopez, of the federal government of Bisayas, to General GE NERAL: U)pon the return of your comlnlissioners last night we deterlined and discussed in a definite manner the situation and the attitude of this reason of lBisayas, in regard to its relations anld depelildence upon the central governlllent of ILuzon; and in view of what these commissioners Ihave manitfested, I hlave the honor to notify you that, in conjunction with the people, the army, and collmmittee, we insist upon our pretension not to consenit, in our ],resenit situation, to any foreign interference without express orders from the central gov-ernment of' Luzon, upon which we state once nlore that we depend, and with whicll we are one in ideas, as we have been until now in sacrifices. Therefore, if you insist on yo011r side upon disembarking your forces, this is our final attitude. May God give you, etc. Iloilo, December 30, 189)8. R. LOPEZ, IPresident. Vice Secretary. To General MIIIER. The petition of merchants bore the signatures of the leading business men of Iloilo, was of date l)ecember 29, and read as follows: General MIInI,Ilt, Cotlmatndin lUnitcd States IForccs, Iloilo Bay: We. the undersigned merchants of Iloilo, beg youll to take into consideration our large interests amdl the prolbable result of a conflict with tlle n:atives, which in our belief woul(l seriollsly Ir(ejilldice and llar tile trade of these islanlds for years to co(me. XWe ask you to consider tile orders they have receivedl from their chief; Aguinaldo, of MaIlolos. Gelleral Miller furtller reported on same date (probably a later hour of the day) tlhat the situation remnaimed ullcllanlged, except it was rumored thl;i 200 ariiied meii a,rrived at I loilo fi'oi Negros. lie continued: I this mnornilfg requlested thle comann(ling officer of the P/altimore, if compatilloe with his instructionls, to take, suCh1 Tsheasures a1s he deemed necessary to I'rev\(nt the entrance of v(essels carrying:irllld niI into tlhe Iloilo l iver. 1 [ic hppened in after I grot my letter \written, and I bro(ugrit the suilject ip. ()rally lie intiirmned nme that he had:(l ilo right to ldo this; tha"lt eunler his illstructions lie does not feel aluthorized to conmence(e thle attack, and acvts in defense of our exledition only. Th'11 insurgents have occ(,uplied:n1 old star fort at tile point of the pleninsula, tlhe site of Iloilo, the lire of which sweeps beaches on whicll we prolpose to lanld. Ay troops have rot to comlnlence the attack; I therefore shall put a mountaill and gatling gunll in lboats and open fire on their fort amnd a storehotuse near it filled with troops, at 2,500 yards, thus inviting the captain of the Baltimlore to help defend us by attacking the eneimy to thle best effect. NWe are aware that on the successfill accomplishment of this contest depends thle future speedy yielding of insurnrectioiiary movemneits in tIle islands. The insurgents REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 6 65 raised their flag over the fort this morning. The action ais above entitled will be contingent on future instructions to be received from the department commander. Very respectfully, MN. P. M~ILLER, Briqladier-G(reeral, U. S'. V-. rI'lie excitement in Manila and Mfalolos, over this Iloilo affair became raIpidly more inteiise and manifested itself' in uinmistak-able signs of (Ianger to the still languishing pea~ce shouldl an) attack he made by our trooLps upon that city. Aguin-aldo's government was now in full possessioH of very radical mcei, the majority of whiom (lesired war in any eveint, and it was in a great measure dominated by his army. These iiien desired s.onic finiediate -aclion on the lpart of the Ln11ited State's by which they inight be able to arouse thie opposition of the iiihabitaiits,against its troop~s, and an~ticipated hostilities at Iloilo appeared to themi to offer the (lesiredl material. I bead galso incidentally heacrd from Iloilo that Genieral MAiller would lprobably meet wvith instirgenit opplositionl should lie attempt to make a. landingo there. Knowing the g.,re-at (lesire of the U nited States Governm1enit to niaiintain peace by all honorable neans, maturely conlsideringthe situation ini Luzon wh-ichi lad b(,eemi so q1uickly developed, meditathing the transfer flater of more loops to Iloilo whene the niniattural excitement slouod he 1 tallayed, aind an opportuinity p)resenting itself to cojinmnlni('ate with G'eneral Mliller by a B~ritish ninan-of-wam, whose captain courteously offered to take any messagoe I mighit desire to sendl, I sent on the evening- of lDecemuber 29) the following hiastily p~repared coinim~uimication: 11 i)(1fi' 1 l-IT. I'ACIFIC, ANi) Eioiunmri Aa,.iy ( oiws, Brig. (4en. TNtARCUS P..Mirr1,lJ,' 17' V C-ow 1(01i~ldb/ FLrst NSJla 10(c Bripitde. PEiqli thIrmly (Corps. Iloilo, Panay. S~i?: This will be dlelivered to vIou by (aptain Mlontgomnery, of the British navy. whlo Ileaves for Iloilo inl the inornmgn 1 inclose copy of onr translation of:i cablegran rCeivedl to-day in cipherfo tii011bill(h you will llndlerstaiid the position a(Id policy of our (Governmienit towardl thies islands. iDo n1ot be in haste with youir ie-oti ttions for tile snrreiider of the city Ihul there, be strong and very decided opposition to youir entry, backed by considera —ble torce. do niot be in ha~ste'. It will not do to homba-rd the city, nor wvill it, do to let the natives loot:11( lurnr it. Foreigners have largre possessionls there aund at great deal of iuonev ill the bainks. You cani remain in tile harbor with your force. It you mneet with decided or strong oppositiol, await thiere, further instructions,:11n( if n'ecessary 1 (all (lirect a lportioti ot youir force to othicr ports in the southern islands, where you will not mneet, much, if -any, oppositioll. I trust in yotir discretionl. N-ery truly, youirs, E. S. OTIS, Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding. I. contempl(ated at the time the sending of the First California Volunitee-Ars to the southerii waters as soon as (conditions at Manil'a would justiiy tile wveakening of the miilitairy force here, andl immediately (lirected tha-t, eregment to be put in readiness for embarkation. I t wa's lplaced on board five small mnerchiant vessels preparatory to sailing at any directedl mnoment, wvas retained tlmereomi for sev-eral days, when Lnzon affairs indicating that it minght be required for use, in Manila in a short tfiime it was returned to its thriner barracks. The cfablegvram referred to in the above letter to General M1-iller was the Iprocltainlatiomi of the P~resident received in cipher. The translation was completed about ani hour before the letter was written, amnd was transmiitted to Generfal Miller to informn him of the policy which the G"overinment intentled to putrsuie. Neither its contents nor feasibility of himmediate issue had been carefully considered. _NTo direction for its pulblication imlha beenl given and~ it was nmot supposed] tha-It. it would be REPO()T ( )1 51A.IOR-( lNERAi L OTIS. proclaimed at lloilo. The generall,,owevevr, ulnler the illnplessioll that it, h1ad beenl tralnsiitted tob pllbli'cation, issue(! it very sool a'ter it was received, anl(i ill iis letter of Janulary (; illftorlied( e as tollow\s: 'Three ldays ago I senrt to thl governinlg 'collllittee ( K. iopez, presiellnt) '(op' of the letter of' ilstllructiolls of the lresident alnd askel that they lerilllit the ctr. of 1iy! tl'OOl)s. No iilnsiw'r lills 1)(een re('eiV(ed aind I expeclt lnoie. I hadU copi)s 'o t President's illstrulctiols tlr:ilslattted into Spanislh and listribllted to tlle peol)le iri variolis wavs. andl amu infoionmed tlihat the lpeople lautgh at it. The insirge'ltS r all ts co\wartls ltand;ire loritifvling the old fort at the point ol tie tlniinsula:, al(d ar11 ( ililting old sinoothl-bore guins left by thle Spalniards. 'They alre illtrenlching evel \rywhll. are lecnt on having one tigllt. an: alre conlidilent of' vitoryt. As 1 inlorllted yol i ry letter of yesterday. I lbelieve tlhat we canl nowv capture the city with the force now present and w\ith the assist;llnce of the Niavy withlolt the loss of ii(ilch life and witlhout muclh des'truction of property, and should w\e destroy it all I believe it would 1b, of a.dv\antage to the city, las a ne-wer city would 1,e built 1up soon. 'The character of the natives, hlaving biee under the suibjingation of Spain so long, is such that once well piunished they will slbbirit to fate. 'The peolle ar1e superstitious ati!d Ibelieve in frte, arid now believe that fate will give tlrleli victory. His letter of the previous day, January 5, is as follows: -[I)iFiS. FIRST SEPARATE BRI(;AI>I;, E11t;1TH ArIMY CORIs, ON BO)AR) TRANSPORT NEWI'PORT, [loilo Heirb r, P'. L., J.anary/,5, 18399. ADJUTANT-(GENERAL D]IEARITMENT OF TIHE PACIFIC ANI) EI(;irri ARMY CORIS. SII: 1 have the honor to report the situation a-s lquite serious. The native troops now number over 4,000 well-arnied mlen. There are more tIlan 12,000 armed with bolos and imiscellaneoiis weapons. They are constantly intrenclhing about the fort and at the mouth of the Iloilo River. I ldo not allow anyone on shore, as the insurgent commnander sent me word that he would not be responsible for our runarned men inl townl. ' * Last evening albout 6.40 o'clock, just at dark, while at supper, the captain of the water boat went toward the rear of the boat, where the gulard was stationed, and suddenly sprtang at the gurard with a knife, cut the head of one of the guard thlrough the skrrll, aind the otlher one on tlIe arm anid jaw: the latter was knocked overboard and then struck by tile native on the head with an oar. O()ne native then jululpedl overboard a(nd escaped; the two others were secured. A boalt fromi the ship was lowered and picked up the soldier in the water, whlo is not badly hurt. The soldier cut on the head is likely to die, b1t there is a slight hlope of his recovery. I think the longer we wait 1efore attack the harder it will be to put down the insurrection. The city is entirely at the mercy of the Baltimore, and with her assistance, advancing under her guns and Captain liridgiman's battery, I lhave no doubt we can drive the insrurgents out of the city, but their arnly will confront!is outside. That situration would be intolerable, even if firing ceases. I would therefore recommend that a force sufficient to beat them badly in the open field shouldl be prepared ready to send down, if required, after the city is taken. Let no one convince you that peaceful ineasures can settle the difficulty here, unless yori first settle matters peacefully in Manila and Luzon Island...{. * *-. *~.~ The English and German war ships and all other large vessels in thle harbor have daily received refugees fiom the city. Many of tlie city peolle witlh their effects are leaving on small coasting steamrners for neighboring islandls. Order appears to be maintained in the city, except for Americans who feel humiliated and want to get at them. Very respectfrully, M. P. MILLER, Briyadier-General, (r. S. V., Commanding. After fully considering the President's proclamation and the temper of the Tagalos with whom I was daily discussing political problems and the triendly intentions of the United States G(overmnment toward tlem, I concluded that there were certain words and expressions thereini such as "sovereignty," "' right of cession," and those whiclh directed immediate occupation, etc., though most aldmirably employed aid tersely expressive of actual conditions, might be a(lvantageously used by the Tagalo war party to incite widespread hostilities among thle natives. The ignorant classes had been taught to believe that certain 4REPOR',T (F MA.IOI-G'NEI IIRAL OTIS. 67 words. a.s ' 'sovereig ity,' " protection," etc., had peculiar meaninllg disastr (os to) tlieir welftare anll signlificant of future )political domilnatioln, like tlhat froml wNhicll they liad lrecetly beeii freed. It was my opl)iiolt, thlerefioret, tlhat I would be justified ini so altml(eding tile lpapel that the icieiiecelit olbject of tHie l iitel States (;overllllelt woul(l be broiught learlvy withlii the coImpIreilhesioii of tile l)eople, alld this coic'lusioli was tile mnore readily realled(l l)ecause of tllh radlic(al clhange of tile l)ast few (ldys ill tile (costit itioml of Agiinaldo's,governuiiiet, whic(h cou:ld Iot 1ha. l;(v elle uiid(leistoodl at \\'ashlillgtol at tile tilil( tlhe pl)I'otlllaatioll w\i;s pl)repae(l. It was also b(elieved tlhatl tile proc(lamuationl liad beei i:nluced pal tiallvy 1by tlie sug-gestilos of tlie naval authorities here, wlti'lc thr11ee weeks previousi, adl wllile affairs were ill a specific and (oll);laralrti vely (liiett state, Iiad( recomllmededl tlht the l'residleit issue;i lproi)la;liltioi deflining tile lolicy of tile Uiiitel States Governiment ill tlie Phlililppiie Islanitls all(d aassurigil tile indhabitantis tihat it is our illtelltionl to illterl're 1as little als l),ssible in tile internal affairs of tie islands. Tlhat as soon as tlhey develolped their capafbility for selfgoveritimelit their plowers land privileges \will be increase(d. Tlat will allay tle spirit of unrest." These authorities at that timle recommiendled the governllel;t (of the islatnds as a territory with a civilian as a g'overnor, to be followedt liter by a navala and military commission to dleteriiiiiie ltuestiols of ( naval an(d mtilitary cllaracter. Tlie amelnded plroc l;mlat itioii was thlereulpont preplared, and fearing tlat Gene(ral Miller would -ive plublicity to tlie fobrmer, copies of which, if issued. w\\ould be circulalted soon in Luzon, I:agafin (dislatchled Lieutena.nt-(Clolel Potter to Iloilo. botll to ascertail the course of events tlere and to advise tlhe comllllmaiiilg general oft thle daniers threatening in iuzoll, aiid whic'l migh't be auglmented if any actiol was taken which tlhe insurg'ents could make use of in furtherallce of their unfiieldlly designs. General Miller thought his action in making publication of tlie proclamllation on Jlanuary 3 correct, as he lad not beei instructed to tlhe coltrary, and his opinion, lie contelnded, was coilfirlied by a War IDepartmllelt (lislpatcli which I had d(irected Colonel P'otter to deliver to him, ind( whichl lie liad receive(l ol Jaiuary 6. lie was satisfied that the, use lie lad madle of tlie proclamation was tllht,colteml)lated by the \ tar I)el)artmlellit authorities, but it wa-s not long before it was delivered at Malolos and( was the object of vemllo, ls attack. Notling further of great moment traiislpired at Iloilo for several successive days, anll we return to tlhe narrative of Malila events. General Miller, however, remtaineid eager for battle, and with his command restive under tile taunts ot the natives and criticisms of foreign citizens, he repeatedly asked foir Iermissioi to attack the city. Complicatiols ot a civil nature were also arising as shown in his communication of.January 8, of wllichl the follo)wing is a colmy: ll1 )(iS. FIRST S;IPAiRATE BRIGA.E, El;IlTIl AxRMY ('. OR'rS, ON t OA ll) TRIANSPOIRT NEWPORT, l oilo Harbor, 1. 1., sutday, Janu ary 8, 1S99-2 p1n. A.JIUT'AN1-(ENERAI, l) 'AR]ITENT O(F 'TJE )A\('IFIC AND) EIGHIT1I AnRMY CORPS. SiR: I lhave the honor to report, tor the intortla<tion of the,major-general commlluandilg, that the sititution here is not improving silnce mly last report. I have not landled the Fifty-first lowa on thle island opposite to Iloilo, as two boat crews of troops of the Fifty-tirst Iow lantded on the 5th instant, and were met by over 75 to 1)) natives armued with various weapons, rifles, shotguns, andl knives, who asked them their business and warnted thlem off with threats of briniging out more troops if they did not go away. T'he men of thle regiment are well, and the colonel does not desire to land lunder such (rircumlstan(es of hostility. The insurgents are still at work fortifyting; last night they sunkt four mud scows at tlhe mouth of the Iloilo River to prevent passage of or1 Navy. 'TIis didl not annoy us, as the Petrel's place for action, if we 68 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. have one, is undisturbed. The city is so completely under the control of the warships of the Navy that we are intlifferellt a to, what the insurgents (lo. W\hen tile time comes nothing can save insurgents in the city but fI iglt. The subject most disturbinr to our American minds is tlle tact that a I)Dtcl ship is loaling with slgar; who shall collect the d(lty is a question. Captail E\vans andl I discussed the (ilestion last evening without conclusion. The dluties will amount to $5,((0, quite a snugl slum, with which the insurgents will be ablel to buly machine guns, etc., if' we leave tllem alone. Otller slipis arriving will aldd more anl niore to their revenues. The port ought to be closed if it is a practicablle thilg, after due notice to foreign gover'liments. VWe need here two good steam launches c.apalblle of towinrg a line of rowboats rapidly for lanlding purposes. We can niot get tleml here without seizing theim, and the good ones are under the protection of foreign 1lags. As to thle insurogents yiel(lii g to the order of the President and allowilng occ)(ipation, it will not be donle unless the central govern11ment at IMalolos directs tlhem to (o so. If we lhave to fight at Mianila and here. I should think it better to strike the first blow here, as, with the assistance of the Navy, result in our fiavor caln scarcely be doubtel. Very respectfully,. '. IIL, ER, lrigadier- (cner(l, I'. S. I., Commanding/. Full official Iloilo correspondence wlichl was carried oil about tllis date, togetler with reporte(l interviews on tile situation. wNill hIe flllnd in the accomlpanying rel)ort of Brigadier-General Ilugh^les, IT. S. \., Inow\ comnmandig there. They are of interest and of considerable iml)orta(lce in showing tlhe tlen existing attitude of Splaniish civil officials tow(ard our (overnenle t. Tlie amendled proclamation of January 4 aplpeared il thle English, Sp}taish, (aid Tag alo ]anguages, and was publisihed iin Maniila tlhongh newsplapers anl( posters. The li;Eglishl text is as follows: IIPROCLA MATION. ()Fr4ICE OF TIlE MILITARYII (;oOVEIRNOlI OF THEi '1ILIPIINE ISLANDS, Manilat, 1. I.,.t1 l uarii 4, A..'9. To the P'oplle of the Philippiie l.Ylands: Instructions of His Excellency tlie l'residenlt of thle Initedl States relative to the admlinlistratiol of alfflirs in tlle l'hilippille Islandls have been tramsmlitted to me iby direction of the honoralle the Secretary of Wdar, lnder (late of l)Deemllber 28. 18S!.. Tley direct me to publish anld proclaim, in the most 1publlic nmanner, to the inhabit;ants of these islands tlhat in the war against Spain the1 Iniited States forces (caime here to destroy the power of that nation anl to give the blessings of peace a.1dt indtividual freedom to tle P'hilippinie people; that we are here as frields of tlie lilipinos; to protect tllern in their homes, their employments, tleir ilndividual a1d religious liberty, and that all persons who, either by active aid or honest endeavor, cooperate with the Government of the UInited States to give efflect to these beneticent purposes, will receive the reward of its support amd protection. The President of the U[nited States has assumed that the muniicipal laws of tihe country in respect to private rig(hts and property and thle re]pression of crime are to le considered as continuinin n i fioce in so far as they be apldicable to a free people, and should le administered by tlhe ordinary tribunals of justice, piresiledl over by representatives of the people and1 those, in tlhrougll sympathy with th em i in their desires for good government; that the functimns and duties conne,-ted with civil andt municipal administrationl are to ble performed lby suchl oflicers as wish to accept the assistance of the iUnited States, chosen iin so far as it may e plracticalde from the inhabitants of the islands; tlhat while the mail;agelmelnt,of pu l)l i Iproperty and revenues and thle use of all lpubllic means of trallHsortatiol arel to 1)e con(l cted ulnderle tlhe military authorities, until such authorities caut be replaced by civil adm1inistration, all private property, whether of' indi'villuals or corplolrations, must lbe respected and protect(ld. If private prop'erty be takeni for milittary uses it shall be paid fiOr at a fair valulation in c;ash if plssille, and when payment in cash is miot p1racticauble at tlhe tinie, receipts therefor will be rgivejnr to I1e takeln ull and liquidlated as s0oon as cashl becomes available. 'The ports of the l'hilippine Islands shall be open to tlhe commerce of all foreign1 ations, aidl groodis nlrl mlerlchinise not prohilited for military reasons by the military authorities slhall b1e admitted upon lpayment of such duties and clharges as shall lbe in force a: tli time of' ilmport:ation. The President ()cocllul'des i tis instructions il tle following langu:ager: 'Finlally, it should lbe tile earn'est a:nd paI):I'llOllt aim of tile A(liiiistratioio to REIPO)IIT OF MAJI(Oi-GENE I'AL OTIS. 6 will the, confidence, r-espect, aitit altectioii of I lie, infliahitaiits of' thje Phili ppines by iiisnri n. to theiii inl every possible waty thie ftid menasur~e, of lad ividitial rights and liberty wvhicli is thi Iieeritagec of' a f'ree people., 111(1 by provin- to tlhemi tliAi tfe missiiii f iie1Jiitiil taes is one of, heile licenit asisiiiilatioii i 'iwll wiihsi teth miii 1(1 say of' ilstice. aInd righlt for- arbitrary ri'ie. Ini the f'nltillmnent of' this high in ission wli iii upliold ing the temporary adniin istra tion ot aftfaiirs for the greitest g'Ood of, the — ovei'iedl. there wNill be sedliloslsy iiiaantained flie stirono a-rm (if'int-hori ty to 1(1)11s d' istiirhaiice, andi to oVeicoine0 ill obstaucles to tlIe bestmv~ i of' thn' lblessiii es of (rfofo.duiu stal)lv e,ovei-nnent iiipoi tie, pIeople of' tue Ph'ilippine I slands.'' From the tnom. atlit 53111bst'aniee of' the above inistructioiis of the 'I 'i''ideitl I anm foll fo the opinion tli it it is the, i ntentioni of the I7iited States ( oxeirnen t. xxvile diriceting i' ffurs -eiieraiv. to a:po(int the relires(n'ii btive VInili TIiONA foill li i tle contvol Iioi elenient o)f the Flitpinos to ci vil positions of trust 'ndl respomisi I iility, anld it illliein m ii to:i ppoiiit thjereto snehi Fit ipinlos as inma lie 'ceptable tol th~e, supremne inthorities at \Washiit gton. Lit is also muiy belief that it is the inteiition of' the liiited S1tates I ovxermniemt to draw xv rom he Fl~ipino people s iimi cl of the niilitary force of' tle islands a's is pissilile, md consisteiit xxith a free, and wvel l-coiistituteil goverinmlent if tin comitix.y aind it is imx\ desire, to inangurate a policy of' that cha,-racter. I anim ilso c"x1wV e(d thait it is thle intention of the U nitedl Stte ovei'iiieiit to sick thi est,iblishnient iif' a liiost lit enal govern mentI foir the isla ids. inl whiclh the peop~lle themselves shall] li1i ye as fill. replresent;atiol aIs the Iinilitiunace of' law anil or'ier will per mit, mid which shaill be sii'sceptiblde of' developmient, on lini's of' increiseil lelresentlit it ol and the lo'stoxxal of' iiicreasedl pxxers, into a gov-erinient as free i' nd inidependelit 'is i's ciijoyedl lbv the, niost, f';ivx'ireil prlovinmces of the xxorhit. It xxiii i~e 1iix ('(ilstalit emideaxvor to coopeiete wvith the Filipino people, seeking hi' gi)oil(d ill' c eioiuntry, null I inivi te their fiill con tideiice a iil aid. 12. S. ( iris, Majr- eneal.U.. I.,Vilita'rj Goenr Be tore p)tbliCiatiofl of this proclamnationi 1 endeavored1 to obtaini from able I' iliploo residents of' the city an express-ion oft ophiiOll as to its prob~able effect 111)01 the ~)popithtion. but was ntot much encouraged. A Iewv days theireafter they declan'ed the publication to have beeti a ntista~ke, aItlhougi the foreig 1'u esidlents lappea.red to believe thle pi'ochtinatioli limist excellent ili toile atlit moderation, oflered cverythiiig thaIt the iliost hiostile of file ii suig(entts coultI exl)ect, an11d unidotibtedly w'ouiid h-inve a beneficial in fillvemie. It wa-s, r'eceive(d by the hietter clas-ses of' na"tives With sat isfait-ioni. as it Was, tue first authoritative, announcemnett of, thle attitude, whiich the Untited State-s ttssutied toward tile ishllads anld de(clal'e( tule policy Whicit it initended to puisue.nna 111becaul;e. tile declaredh lohiey x'as oiie Which. ill thltir opinioni, coniditionis imperative~ly (leitlan~ed 8sh0111( lbe imposedC( for' tile itterests, of ture Filipinio peopliie whio wvere inie-apable (if self-goNvern1ment. Tue 1)1i1)1c(atioll seIparate(I more Wide~ly thre frientdi~;11( wa-,r flictiotis of' the ittliabitants and W1as thle ca,1ise of excitinig (discussioni. The ablest of' iisturgenit l1ewspitel's, wvhich Wvas 10w isstued at Mahilos and editedl lby the uneiomipromisinig' imalt, lie who itad been an openly declared enemy of time Unitied States. fiomt the itime Manilia capitulated, subseqnueitly comnmlalided ani ihsurgelint aritiv amid Was a1sSa'ssina ted wvhile exriit he'uiitivclnai(f the insurgent forces, attacked tile policy (if tile United Sttates as (le('lmtled in the lproclalnatioli, tantd its "ISSllmnli)tionh of' sover'eignty iiver the islhi(1s, W'ith,all the vig:or of which lie w~'as capable. lie wvent further tilid contendted that the policy as declared wvas mierely a( subterfuge to temnpor'arily quiiet the pieople until nieasures could be inaugura-ted -and apli~ed to put in practice all the odlioius features of' g(iver'mlleit; witicit Spain had emplioyed. Everything tenided simpt~ly to a1 Cltantge ofitmasters for the Filipino people without amtediorai' olt of' conditionl. This paper xx'as published in Tagalo, had a, coilsidel'able circltlatitin. 1111d w~a-s assisted by other Ta-galo publicationms. No statemtent reflecting 111)01 the United Stcates G1overmnent and its 70 70 Itl ORT (O IV VI()-U u,; l troops in Maniila was too base, untruthful, or improbable ior nlewsplaper circlla, tioll, anmd unllft'tulately receivedl c redlit ly tlle l)or'e ieLgnoranlt of the iinatives, altllhougll thle silhiject of rid(icule or indligllaant commenllt b)v the ablel Flilil)iios. Aguinaldo met tlie proclalation by a coultel one inl whlich lie ildigdiiaiitly pIotested against the ('la1im ot sovereignty by tle Uniiited States il tlhe islalllds, wlhi(ll really lhal bee1 n ('l()co(lilere'1d froim tlhe Spaniiiard(s thro1 'i tlite,loo1(d ad(1 tr;easlre (' ills co; I trl:. i'li'. anl a)busedl tme for Ity assusm Iptioll ot tile title of 1Ililitiary goverllo(v. Even tle woImenI oft Cavite 1proviiice. ill:l docuImenIt mlinmeroL'usly signeol by tlleum, gave ime to niderstandll tlh:t. ftelt all tile 11mel were killled oft they were prel)are(l to slied thleir patr.iotic b)lood fir tile lilberty anii illdepel(len(ce of tlieir conlitry. Thle effoits miade by AgLnlialldo) all hlis assisanlt s iimade a decidedit iril)ressiol o0 tle inhabitlants of Iuzon outside of anllila, who acqulliled anl ufIl vorable opl)iniol, to say tile least, of' la Amlerican citizenl, nwhomlo of course few of tiemln hiad elver seen. Tile insurgetnt army w;s esp)ecially affected by tils tirade of abuse of Ameriicans, but agree;ably so, as it hadl mlet aI(d co(ll(uere(l tlhe sol(liers of S1)ainl aid onlly a;walte(d ani oll)ortuiiity to demnonistrate? its invincibility il war witl tile l llited States trool)s cool)pel iu) in Manila and whomi it liad comllnlecled to insult;}md charge with cowardice. Shortly tbefore this time tlhe insurgents hlad comlienced tlhe organizatioi of clubs in tlhe city, mtellmbership in which now, I was informed, ilamo(}lte(l to (10,00(0. Tle chllief orgatizer was a s1hrewd mestizo, a formbter close coIpallioii of Ag'uinaldo, by whoml lie had been (colmmissioined to p)erforll this work. lie wa.s a friend and associate of sojme of our officers; was eingaged in organlizing the clibs only, as lie stated, to give the poorer (lasses amusement amid education; hleld pub lie entertainments in athletics to which onr officers were invited, ai(nd in which our soldiers were asked to particip)ate. Gradually arms were being secretly introduced and l)olos were being mnanufacttired amdl dis tributed(. Tile arms were kept conce.aled ill biildings, uand mayll of theni were subse(iuenitly calltured. Tlhe Chlainamen were carrying on a lucrative lbusiness in bolo making, bit the provost-inarslsal had cruelly seized considerable of tlleir stock. These (lubs liad received militairy or-ganiization anod were co-n d laiami led by cunn i iig FIilipi no )officers regularly appointed by thle Malolos goverinmeilt. T'le chief organizer departed alter organlization hladl een )ertfected and thereafter becallme a confidential ad(lviser in Malolos aflirs. Thi's organlization was tlhe subject of grave apl)rellhesionl, as it was coriposed of the worst social element of the city, and was kel)t itlder police supervisiomi as closely- as possible. It was also dreaded by thle better class of Filip)ino inhllabitants, many of whom believed themselves selected for assassination oil account of their expressed (lesires tfor A merican prote(tionl. The streets of the city weire thronged with uniaruted insurgelit ofticer's aiid enllisted men from tlie nulnerically increasing insurgent lihe oil tlhe outskirts, proud of their unifforms anid exhilbitimg rmatchless coiceit, amusing- to our men, who were a)lparetitly uncol(ceriied( observets, but who vwere quick to take in tile rapidly changing conlitiolis. In tile midst of this suppressed excitement tle city was comparatively quiet, crime well suIppl)essed, aold blsiness ititerests woere floul-ishliiig. The merchants were active to tlake advaftages of all avelutes,f trade possible. Vessels were senit to thle China co:ilsts for lro(l.icts to siupply the southern ports, eilteredl lad clieared at tile l)ort ol Iloilo ag;ainst the protest of Gelieral Miller, a mmd pai(d tile ae(uistomled ch.ai'ges oil dultiable goods and )roducts to thie iisiuigenitts, wlho ha(l instaille(l thlemlselves there. United States colsuls a1t, Singapore adltl I[)Hogkonlg asked the lEPORT ()' MAJ()R-GENERAL O'1l'S. 71 )erld)exing' questiol \\wietlIer vessels could be cleared for Iloilo and Cebu, an(l coillld be answered evasively only, as fillows: MANILA, P]'.., January.9,. 9.o). lUii ted Statos (', nsnl-(;eliieial \, 1 1 VILMAN, lionl'o.?q: 1 Tr itedl Stt.s lt vet ladllillistrilLng civil ati'air is at either Iloilo or Cebl. No new coiS111itlar action as li, these ports should lll illiIg'urated at present. OTIS. Tile Malnilia Cllamberl of Colmmerce took this matter up for investigationl afd s[aw tlhat thle rights of mnerch tllt s ill ports virtually at war withi tflie IUite(l States were dleilied. I wavs c~alledl Ul)On for all explanation an d addressed its secretai'y as fillows: SIlt: I i ill n receilpt of' the comnimllllit i ofl the Maliltl (.'lamber of Commercne of ytstelila:y, tlli 12th instatnt, in whlicli I:ll~ iii'oriuil Il tli't "the A\llerican coiisul ait l-longkoig, leliciies to (lislatc'li steailners or v-essels for Celbu ald Iloilo; also, tlat.\Allleri(': a;iithol'ities lhere will iiot allow a. stlamer to conle here wNith perinission to, lpr)cceel to Celil.;andl relllest ixiforlll;tioll as to the course to lie plrsued in the illiiie(liate fiitutre by tl1e Aierican allthoritie's withl regard to the above-named ports." II relply, I have tlie ioiior to iiltforil youl that tle United States conisul at Hongl kotg liivinig, on the 6th ijust:lt. Imale infiuiry in the matter of clearing vessels at llon'komig for Iloilo and (C'el), was anuswered on the 9th instant, by cable. as tllow s: 'T'll'e Uilited Staites not yet;dllillisterilg( civil affa;irs at eitlier Iloilo or Cell. No Iie\\ ci'sular a;ction as to tl hse }iorts sllould be inauguilrate(l at present." 'rlis messag'e to the Americalii ciisul is not, consideredl authoritative by any ImeaS, as w\e hlia'\e io authority t to give him dtirections, and the mlatter of clearing vessels;It Ioigrlkoiig rests entirmely witliii lhis (is('retion. 'l'i tile (categoricall (l11estiotns hllich you submiit I aiii pleased to return answer as follo(ws: 'I'o tile first qulestioll my ll:llswer is: Not 1by any;ct of tile 1-ifited States autliorities at M1anila. To thle secolld lquestion I reply tlhat: Trade can be coniducted, in so far as tIle lUnite(i States ailtlhorities now il occupancy'of these islalnds are cionceriied, thle same as fornerly. Vessels will lie clearel i' from this port for p)rts of the isla(ndIs iuntil instr'li'tii.ns received from Ilmy (GoveriImetlt il(dicate a contraryx course of action. To the thirdl qelxestio( I ca;n only ainswer thlat: All the instructions thus far received froil y I;()overi'ineit are etihotliedl i flie priwlamation issuiled fromi this offiie 0on the 4th instant, which I iiiclose aiid to which I respectfully refer. The consllsl for Great lBritaii wished to know whly a British steamer ha(l been susp)iciously dealt witlh and was replied to as follows: SSilt: I have11 the 1ollno to acknowledge( thie receipt of' your cOnmm)mii('ation of this dlate, andl to sl illii reply thant tVle matter reilrred to therein will be iiivestigrateld. It is reported that the ste:aiiier ZiCeea a rriv-ved firomi Singaplore with a gelleral cargo, a part of' whic'lm it al)l)cars is (estiie!d flor Iloilo by sa, me -vessel. lFromim reports' received.aidl dleclarationis Iinade it wats believed tli:at sh)e hadll onl Ioar contraba:lnl of war. Theli- rellorts re'ci\-edl justified the ac(tion whicih lias been taken in so ftr as search 't1as COernll'lled. And:again inquiring colcernlig seizure at Mallila of a small steamer, ill wllic(h a Br-itish subject clalimed to be interested, lie received the following reply: MAN% Ir.., 1'... J.anary?, /899. lion. H. A. RIAMSnEtDN, H. B. il. Consul, Manila, 1'. 1. SnIt: I lay-e the hollor to a(nc11iowledgi( thile receipt of your comnllnieication of the:list ultiitno, inclosing copies of 'orrespoinde(ie betweenl yourself id lMe4srs. lioliiI;day, W\ise '&. Co., inl the matter of' tile seizllm'o by the United States authorities of thle stealellr if/a(lla t IfC Bay(l il tile l'asii Ri\ver. Th'e seizilre of tis vessel bl)(me niecessarv fioi (loveriiliint pIlroses, and brefore it was lmadl e the owner of tile saimme l1ad been io'isiilted. Later, Mr. \slitoin, in your coiially-, (calledl uptoim} iie at this oHicee, when I assuredl hiii that thie Goverunment woilh I]ot allow tile steanrlll to enigage in pri\late trade on thle l asigi River, and that it \was prepare(l to ialke *good to palrti os (oiicei'ried:amly loss w-hi lii (Govermllllent action would eiit:ail. At the timl(e f tlliis ' ti 'r'ilnce I was ln(lder the impressiou tlhat the 72 REPORT () MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. captain of the port had given permlission for this boat to navigate the Pasig River, but have been inforimed to the contrarvy. It is hoped that this matter can be satisfactorily adjusted in a few- days. Very sincerely. yours, E. S. Oi's, lnited States Military Gove)rnor. In the lmeantime tle local Spanlish autlorities were Ipresent and desired to close ll) the plelnling intelrnational business. As early as December 2S, I 1was informted by the sul)erior Sl)anish officer preselnt that the treaty of peace hlad been conlcluled alld that lie wislhed to take up the settlement of affairts. I replied that I had not received any information or instrtuctions in tlie iiatter, but as soon as received would cooperate with him in every way possible. On tlie following day he ap)l.lied for p)eirmission to leave tihe islands. lie was a priisoner of war, in ftct, sul)ervising, tlhe affairs of tlie Slpanislh prisoners l)rese'nt in Manila. A lhigh toned genltleinal, a most courteous and accLompllished officer, our oficial relationis llad alwayns been pleasant and agreeable. 1 replied to his application in the following terms: (FFICE 1OFr THIE UNITED STATES l ILITARYI (GOVE:NO()R, Mi,,il,, P. I., Decem ber.9, 1'9S,'. Division Genera:l FIRANC('CO 1zz/o,( (C'aonmmaedif Spanish IForces..lManila. 1'. 1. GENEI'AL: I have, the honoIr to ac(knowle(dgel tlie rc'(cil)t ('f your letter )of this instant reqinesting lpassport to, return tfi Spain next month, and il relply thereto I hasten to inform you that you are firte to leave at aiy' time,)yo m1ay (lesire, anIl that it will give me great pleasure to 1ren{der you every assistance tlihat you m11ay I 'ed in making, the nlecessary lre)parations for yo11r delparture on so long a \voy:age. I Iam, General, with milch esteemii, your obedient serva.it. 1E. S. OTIS, Ma. tjor-;enerul, U.S. I., Untited States Militar/ (r'o)lcror. Shortly thereafter Genertal Rios, general of division of tihe Spallish arny, wlho had been c(omnlandling in the south, arrived il iMaila.. lie itad been directed by his Governnnent to supervise, as acting' governorgeneral, Spanish interests in tile islands, and at oice addressed himself vigorously to tlhe settlement of aflfais and the shiplment of S)anish prisoners, for which I liad received authority. In I)ersonal conlfereinces, tlrough nlumerous communications landl written reqluests, lie occupied considerable of tlhe time of tlhe United States authorities, althoughl it was as yet impossible to consider miany of the matters which lie presented, since the lParis tre;aty hiad not received la;tification. A few responses to the letters lie subimitted indicate thle variety of the subjects which he wished plromiptly attended to and the difficulties of coni pliance. They are as follows: OFFICFl U. S. MIII'TAIY G(O(VERNOR( IN THE PHILIlPPINE ISLANDS., Manila, P. I., Jan ar// 9, 1899. His Excellency I)IEu;O I)E L,oS R1Kios Y NICALAU, (;eneral of Ib)iision, Spanish.rmy, Maniila, I' I. GENERAL: I have tlie honor to acknowledge tlhe receipt of your letter of this instalnt, refeirring to einl);a.rkatioi of S ipaisl troos, p)risonies o()f'var, o tlie 11thl ilstallt, and to say il reply that tlhere is no objectiti1 on() the part of the I'litell States Goverinment, and that I will give al)ippr)riate instrcitiorns to tlie officials having charge of suc(i busin1ess to have your excellency's lesiries consummtiate l. Very respectfully, your obedlient servant, EI 1. S. 11s, Major-;eneral, 1'.. I'.. 'nil(cd Salacs Mlilitaryf (Gorci'nor iiu the 'hililiUines..JANIAI:Y 1(), 1899. GENEIRALI: IIn aI hIurried( conmmIllica;ltiol o(f last even llilg, senlt ill resI(SiIse to your lettar of yesterday, in which yon in ol-rml tl tlhat you Ill ustl disc'li:trie in Min nl:ll. about REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL, OTIS. 73 2,000 troops who were taken tlhere froni the Visayan and Luzon islainds, and further say that it is imipossille to scatter them to their several holnes, I suggested that the Visayanls Illioht be takell to iloilo and I will see that the necessary orders are given to the iUnited States authorities tihre to permit them to land upon arrival. The Liuzon llien will prIllobably give gre;at trouble if they are btrolLght into the harbor of Manlila at the pres'ent tinle. Many of thlose already received here escaipel from the lauthorities, and witlh tile convicts sellt by you ha've fixed theniselves in Manila, where they give a gool deal of:llloyanc(e. WVe can inot receive any more of these troops in the city at present, and 1 wisli you would (delay sending tlheml to tliis island. After a short period we may lbe:1ldle to t:ake tlieimt anlll seld theli to their respective homes. 1 am -ery desirous of giv\ing this nmatter full consideration before arri vin g at further conclusiolls. I would like to be inflloiredl of the approxilmatel nminiber of Visayans, and also 1lhe )nuIber of Luzon i111e you iiltend to bring nortlh, stating each class separately. JAN-UARY 12, 1899. (GENE AI,: I have the honor to (acknowledge tile receiplt of your coninlliuication of the 1l0th instalt, ill w'llicl you reqliest me to direct nmy officers to hand over to the ch'liefs of tle sever:ll (lep.artilmeits of the' Spanish hacienda certain pil li(' do()uments belong in, to the Spanish Government, etc. In ri'tly pe irmit me to state that since our late conversation oii this sulject I telegr:phed niy ( (overnmient of your desire inl this particular and I have not yet recci ved Ieing,.;s I am, entirely ignorant, in so flr as official itformlation is concerned, of the relatiois existing between Spain antd the Ullited Stalts at tile present tinie. 1 do not think tlihat I have the piower to act fa\vorably upon your request until the instructions of my (Governmilet are received..JANUARY 14, 1899. (GENEn:AI,: I have. tlie honor to acknowlledge the receipt of your letter of the 21st illsta:it, referriing to youlr wish to;tlpoint a, Spanish clerk in t}he Manila post-oltice. and in reply wohld say that I am alunahlie to grlalt y-our {l request, as the appoinitilent of all postal clerks is un(der tlhe exclusive control o}f the l'ost-Oflice D)epartulllet of the lnited States. JANUARY 16, 1P!>. (GENElAL: I have thle honor to acknowlel.(ge the receipt of your letter of tthe 15th inst:ant just received. referring to thle ciiembrkation of about 100 Spanish troops, i)risonelrs of war. on the steunmship 1moiis,)rrt. and to say il reply that there is no obljctioln in the part of the United Stiates. \Appropriate instructions will be given to tlie oflicials ha vin ig charge of such lbsiness in orler that your excellency's desires 1may be coisulmliated.,JANUARY 20, 18!9. GENE RA I: I ha1ve the honor to aclknowled(lge the receiplt of your letter of yesterdlay received thils iiorniig', in which yoti ioritin met thatthere are a bout ti30 tnaive troops here belosigintil to tle \Visayas. As soonl as you desir' e to, sseiBl e th l' nic and turn tiemn oover, I canl sendl th.uli to Iloilo unllt' proiper gruatr. ('Cocerniig the iLuzon menl, \w will be glad to seind theml to somle lpiit, nearer iianil: thal Albay. I have instructed Generil 11ilglhes to iu;ike all necessary arrangements for tihe shipment, of tile Visayans atid lie wlill col'fer xwith anly ollicer you may be pletasedl to;1ae in ll regard t to tlie iatter..lJANUA,]Y 24, 1899. G ].ENEllAI.: 1 have givten inlstrucitions to thle custodian andl treasurer of public filds to pelrmiit an:y comiittee whom yon u aiiiay appoint to examine the blooks and recordls of that office for the period of time previous to American occupation of Man:ila. Tlie trialsulrer will lie pleased to show you exhibits of the contents of the safi's of tlle T'reasury as reportedl by board of officers appointed unlder authority frol these head(larters. 'T'lie safes were sealed after thlis board had inv\entoried tule contents ald ]have )iot siice )been opened. 74 1E'PO' T 01O MAJO)-GENE,1AL (01S..JAx\ AIY 25, 1899. (ExN:1EA.\,: I have the honor to al cnowled(lg Ie l e recil)pt of yori lettei r of the 24:th instant, alld ill reply to say tlhat I 1have (i rected the capta in of tie port to lpemtlit the ladies, chlildlretll, allU i i l. Rlic.ardi Fernllal;lez mandl is assista:t, now on tlle General Allt, to land. I have also directed him to ]perlnit thle of(lic1rs upron1 tll:lt vessel to visit 'otll 1n oflicial business, and to permit; sImall lparty t, l(and daily fIl t li prpose of purchasing supplies. JANUAIT- 26, 1899. GIENENIAL: I hbae tle honor to acknowledle the receipt of your letter reqllesting thait tlhe regiimentt:al records, hooks,:lad (0doc( nts elt l)ongingl to thel Spanlish troops formerly occupying certati bar:racks ol1 thiis city be r etirllne to you. Inl acco'rdatlce with your reqluest I will instrlct tlie proosot-irshall-general to tuirn over to aIv officer whom yut maty name to receive tie sami llte riecorlds belolging to Sipanishi reriments whi.lch are. il tlie possession of the I'nited States aithollities. It should be rememberetl that at tie tielll t llitedl Stlates occuplation of t lie city comutmeticed a great deal of plublic property was al)an)llnell bly the Spanish otficials, never haviing been tnrnied o-ver Inder tlhe termls of the capitlllation. The liUnited States authorities hav\e collected and preservel all such property in so fair as it wa-s possible foir them to do so. MANILA, A. I., Jantiry 2`6, 1891). Brig. (Xen. VIxENTE ARIZMNDIIZ,.Spanish.ArI,, Manila, P'. 1. SIt:: J all diretcted by the military governor to acknowledge the receipt of yiur letter of tlie 24tth instant, referrilng to a commlission of the Spanish:rnmy of w ilich you hadl Ieen appointed president by hlis excellency Gelleral Diego (ie 1ts lios, Spanish army, a1nd in reply to say that lie has not yet received any inflirmaltion as to the termlss of the treaty of peace between the (Gverunments of Spain and the United States, itow awaiting ratification, and that lie is iiot therefore at this time prepared to entter upon the stlb ject of the finail dispositioi of Spanish troops, records, funds. anld property under tlte control of tile Ulited States forces in the Philippine Islands. Very respectfully, C.. I J. UIRAY, (Captain, Fourth I.,S. Carair!, lid. MA NILA,.January 29, 18)9. His Excellency DIEG) o D LOS tiios Y NICALAU, Division rleneral, Spanish Army, Manila, P. I. GENEIRAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your conulnlnication of yesterday,. anl beg to reply that itnstructions have been given to tle United States oflicer who was Iplaced ii supervisory charge of the buiillilg contailling the mint to give tlie necessary ord(ers to enable you to carry o(t your expressed wish. Very respectfilly. yottr o((elientt servant, E. S. OTIs,.\[ajor- General.S. M.. 1. l. ilitary (;on'rn)or. JANUARY I:1, 1899. (;GENERAL: RIeplying t'orther tV( yolr colnmlunication of tle 17th ilistant, to that portion of the s;lae which asks that " permtissiol be givei fior thle withdrawall o everythiig concceriitig the se ttleeetit in hland and which does tnot affect tle treasury of tile esttbllishlment, properly speaking," I have the hoior to state that I have received as yet no instructions troi tile lUnit(l States (Govetlrltenlt cotlerlinjg these matters, 1and atm igniorlant,of thel terlis of the,pedling treaty lbetween Spail an1l tlle United States, now:awaiting ratitication. I am, tlierefo,, powerless to act uiderst:lldingly uantil I receive iniforiai;tion al1d direc'itions from \Vash in(rgto1 whilc will (dotbtless be furnishled me eas soon as tile;)ro]lpsed t'realt' receives v;ilidlity. In tlte meantimeil I shall be g1lal to filrt ller your desiros ill every way in so fa;r as I amr ablel,,and it will e possible e ssil r e to adopt some prelimi:nary measures, slulject to f'iture confirination. Tle inferelnce mIay be d w-I tViI fromi tlle tenolr (i tile toregoinl' replies to the written application of (en(rml Rios, that tilime, \.s ssought to UEPORT OF" MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 75o properly inecet hiis dleniamds. Time was reqjuired to consider fully wNhat sp)ecific action was necessa(ry to guard United States interests an~d its rights und1(er thle treaty, whiich was not yet of' validity, not having received ratific"Atioii. Bi1tt it wvas also (deenmed. inexpedienlt to eniter 111)01 a*IIV cUItise of p)rocecd(1ig'S; which would emnbarrass the United States Gov-eriineit iii case the lo)il)osedl treaty shouldI altfinately fail of conIirilliatioin. ~NI-ot t1ittil Janluary 31 were, the preliminjiaries, of any (lecided course dletermined upon. excej)t in so ftr as thec repatriation of prisoners' anl(1 the surrender of strictly ainiitamxy proper ty anli1 reeor(Is were Collcleruted. Then a board of officers w as appI-ointed. for the purposes sho~ioim in D epartment orders of that d tate w 7-inch read as tollows: 1. A board ot' officers, to consist oft Miia. ( hiarks mc(Jlnure. chiief' p ainsi erT of' thie depar-ine mnt; Ahj. 1). U. Giaiitenl bein, Second )'rc-on. U. V. antI Second i ellt. Ml. A. IHildriet~hi. Flirst, Northi D lakota, IT. S. V., is 1ieri bx a1)11( (ted to meet and -on fer w\ thl aCOMMittee na uued IXv his excellency )i visioii ('eneral I )ig~o lde l(S Riols Y Nic Ia 111, Spani~si Army, for tile purpose-, ais stated, '-of cle'lring the accounlts of the Spanlish.;overnunent in the 1Philippliies." 11he boarud -\ill dleternline npoil somle (lefinite (ourise of plrocedur~e by whlich the Spanish cominnittee, cau have accevss to all records'11111 docnIIlllltM nl0w ill posses5IOio of the Cnlitedi States authorities wvliich it niav desire to consulIt, andl will aurainge theieloie '.No pr~operty or revordis can I~e, deliveredi iiit~il tile propolsed tre ty receives vadidlity throii-Ii ratifIicaitioni. 1111 tlil board will corn nune its sessions anlticipatling tbit e ent, Nvlien dehai-ite instructionsi looking to a settlenient of puiblic 'Iflfills Jm~cal,id 1(1 I:l CutivC, (caiu he con-vevedi. The boarit \Nvill ascertainl 1Pihi1 tihe (Ilsilrs of' the eolnrnitt e is to the nature aunl fill exteii r of' its desired action 11111 give it evry possiblde fi icility ('olisistent with tile present staltus It, affairs. On- lanuarv 31 2.01 comnmissiomied officers anid 29,541 elulistedl mein. 1)risoners of' wNar, anid aibout 200 sick officers, also prisoners, who (lelarte(l iiidividual ly under privileges specially grautedl, h-ad sa lledl for Spaini. Several tlloilsaii( renuained within thle w~alled towiu, whose p)robable conduct in the event of serious distturbances within the city was the suibject of iuclh specuhtllive (liscussioi0!. Ftrom Auigust, 1893, to tile timie thte treaty of Paris came fromt the representatives of the contracting Governmients, tile insurgents had mainitained their military lines arotild Manila on tile plea theat the(y desired to be Iprelparedl to mneet the soldiers of Spain, should she returnl to her late p~ossessionus. As soon as the result of tbe treaty negotiatioius bec-ame known, the dishonesty of that lplea became fully applarenlt. Then the crisis- fii tile insurgent governmenit wa~s at hanid. Agn-1inaldo and his able adviNser, Mabfini, the inaim who had furnished the brains for the radical eleunemt and. who, in fact. was the governmnent, prol)ose(I to traniisl'eirthe(iechara-tion ofopen~i hostilities from Spain to the United States. T[his the conservative members of thie cabinet an(I congress would nuot coiniteiiaiice. I-tnd.o the lestilt wa.s their wvithrawald. Mab~ini was able to toini a, new cabinet with himself ais dictaitor, and to dominiate the remainfino mnemblers of cmonress. lil(lelI)endence was the cry and the exterminaition of' th —e Amuericaims the (letermdii-ation. They thlen sought ani excuse to iniaugrurate hostilities, buit the. Un~ited States had kept strictly within its legal righits and had simplly lpertoriie(I its international oblipations. ]Repeatedh efforts wvere niade to secure somle mark or recogimition, for their govern unct from the \ne(ric.an authiorities, somne of' which al-)pleared to be quite ciiiuiiingly devise(1 I was aildressed by so-called minfiisters. of state on (lihlhomatic, subjects, and wvas, visited by accredited iienitbers of thue M~alohos goverinmnlt. Thme various foreign consaIls resideiut ill Manlilai were officially finormul by thus gov~ernmllent ofispoe~igs ad f1(1 rni.iuihmed with copies- of its 50 (aled dlecrees. Nevvr since flue it jue Aimiadoreturmued to C.m'vite; in MiN of 1898 atid placed- huhiuself under time- masterful sp~irit of M i1bmiii. had lie the slight 7 () REPORT OF MAJT.'It,-(;ENElIAL OTIS. est intention to accept tlie kilnlt offices aild assistance of the Unlited States, except as they might l)e elllployed to llold Spain throttled while he worked the sclelmle ot sel'-agg'raltl izemellt. His success was nlot il the least astonlishilg, as after tile various islands llha (rivell out the few relmaliling and discouraged soldiers of their openly declared enlemy, they naturally turlled to Luzoil for soIlte f'for of (celt rall governmllenlt, the islatllds of the south beinlg well awaire of their ilabilit to mailltain successful sel)arate and distinc(t politiical estal)lishll lelts. Tile cr e one in l1rocess of' lorinattion ill central luzonI offerel itself tlhrough its visiting agentts anld was accepltedl ill plart (ilotwitlhstlanlillg race anlillosities and (livergenlt business interests) anied very p)robably because Ino other alternative was offered. Tlie eight 1monliths of' o()portunllity given the anblitious Tag'alo by tlie hold 1(1 S)pain whlichi the (Tited States maintained was sullicient also for hlinl to sell(l his trool)s an1l (lesignllilg menll into the distant provinces anlll 11old tle unlarmed natives ill subjection while lie imposed military autllority, 'anld thus in )ecember, 1898, we find in nortllern and soutlleasterli Luzoi, inl Min(loro, Saumarn, Leyte, P'anay, and even on tlhe coast of Milldanao anlid in soriie of tlie sma llerl islands, the aggressive Tagatlo, l)l'esent iIl persoi, alld whletlher civilian or soldier, suuplremte ill authority. Tlhe success which attelndcd tlie political etforts of Aguinaldo al(nd his close associates, a(nd gave thllem such( suddeli anld unexl)ecte(d Ip)wer was iliot calculated to idiiuce them to accel)t subordinlate l)ositiomis inl a roeestablished goverlnmellt, aildl the original premiedititated intention to (oiltrol suptrellely at least a )portion of tlle Fililpino 1)eolle liald becoitle firitlly fixed. T'le cry for liberty and illdepllendelce (re(ally license atd dlesp)otisll undler tlieir goverlnillg methods).an(l the vile aspersionls of tlie motives of tile lUnited States, which they have wi(lely circnllated, hlave served thenll to stir 1l) listrust and fear of the Amiericail amoIlng tle pleople to a colsidlera.ble extelt. especially those of Tagalo originl. Tlie clharge which tltey colitinulally broughlt, unitil l)ecemlber last, that tlie Uiiited States adlmillistL-atiol ill power intelllded to restore the isl;tlds to Spainl, whichl until thlen was the cllief clause of discontent and excitement, aid( ill tile asserted truth and circula.tion of' whlich tliey were greatly assisted by tle Spaiiislh, resident and representative, fiell fla.t wllell the result of tile labors oft the Paris treaty coinmissilos bec(aille knlowil. Thleil tlte pretext tlha:t the United States wa.s about to substitute itself' for Sipaini, (cotinlilg' all her formler governing';almuses, ilncllllig' tile illlposed alltitority of' the hated friar, was resortedl to a;lnd lad( its effect ol tile ign(Irant nasses. Whatever actionl the Uniiited States llighllt lnow take, excel)t to immediately withdraw its authority and1( subjec t tlle people to:ana.lchl y atd( the Europeall vast plroperty interests ill these islaltlss to destructioln, could be so tortured as to sup)l)po't tilis pretext. It was eagcrly waited for by the ilow irresponsible 1adtiil o' consspirators at Mailolos, few of whom liad anlytlhig to lose and ever\ythlilg' to ga.ilt by illitillg hostility. Tle United States I)po(4lamatiotn issule( ol tlhe 4th oft.Jauary offered thleml the first oppor'tumtity anld was tile oIpportullity which thile dlesired. No sooiter was it publishted tha!L it )broughtt out a virtiual declaration of war friom, ill tlis instancee at least, the wretceldly advised Presidellt Aguinaldo, who, otl January 5, issued the following': The governmient of the Philippines has considered it its dut>yt to set forth to the civilizedl powers the facts determining the rup)tre of its amicable relations with tlhet army of thle I: ited States ot America in these isl;alds, to tle end thll:t they mlay thereby reach tlie conviction that I, for my part, havo d(one everytlhing possible to avoid it, although at, the (cost of many rights uselessly sacrificed. After the naval coibl)at, which occurred on May 1 of' last year', bletwecl tlhe Spanish squadron:antld that of Amlerica, the colmnlnadeir of' the l:tter conlsented to REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 77 my retiirn f'rnimi HIiongkong tot this beloved soil, and lie distributed among the Filipitnos soune rifles found in the arsenal at Cavite, doubtless with the intention of reestablishing the revolution, somewhat quieted by the convention of Biac-nabato, in order to have the Filipinos oil his side. The people, inillueniced by the declarationll of war between the United States and Spain, undlerstood the necessity of lighting for their liberty, feeling sure thit Spain would lbe destroyed and rentldered incapable of leadling thenm along the road to prosplerity and progress. The PFilipiinos Ihailed liy advent with joy, and I had the honor of b)eintg proclaitne(l leader oil account of the services which I had rendered in the former revolitio)n. Theni all the F'ilipiinos without distiniction of classes took arms, and every province hastened to expel front its frontiers the Spanish forces. This is the explanationll of tile fact that, after the lapse of so short a period of time, my government rules the whole of l.t(on, tlie Visa;ya Islands, and a part of Mindlanao. Althoit-uh tlte North Aimerican s took io part in thlese mtilitary operations, which cost no little blood (iand gold, my governmentt does not disavow the fact that. the destructiton of the Spanislh squadron and the gift of some rilles from the arsen_. to my people inlltenced the )ro(ress of our iarms to somtte extent. It was also taken for grailt.ed that tlIe Aiterican forces would lne.cessarily sympathize t witli the revolution whichlt they Itoii inmtntged to encourage, and whi(hi liahl saved tlheit muchl lood al d 'd 'eat har(lshilps anil. above aill, we entertlinte(d absolutte confidence in tlhe history tmnl8 traditions of a lwottll whichlt fo(tglit foir its independence and for the alholition of slavetry, wlt]iri. posel as the ('lchatnpion lierator of oppressed peoples: we lelt ourselvi's undel t lie safeg'u:t'ird of ai free Ieople. '1The Ametrians, seeingt the frien(lly dlisposiiton tof tlie Fililpino pleolple, disetitl)artki(d forces a: thle tobyn otf P]'tar:iinlaIle:11(d tool"k lp positions all along tlie line' oc(cit.ied b)y tttv' troopl, as itr as.lta xtll)lir. tt aking p)sslession oft nany tretnches constructed by ttiy 1),()opl', blv hli. ei tployment oft' astite'(ness, in)t unacconmpanied by violetnce. 'l'c}y forceti a c apitunlationl oil the g;trrisioni of Min)il;. wlhich. inasmuncli as it wa:s inveiisted b' ity trtolts. 'was comptnellted to surritender at the first attack. In this I tootk a, very ative part, alllthogh I was iot notified, myiv forces reaching as far ais lit' stlubrli sf Ofialate, lKrnit:a. P'aco, Satipaloc, and Tontdo. Not\\wi{llsta:ndilgir tlti(se servicess,: a)l a lthonghi tlie panliards woiuld nuot ]have surremitlere(l liiit for tlie fiact thla:t mto)y troopls Ii ad closedl every avelnue of escape to the tlwm-ns of tlit(i itterior, tle.\Alieiit'an gellerals not only ignored me entirely in the st ipilations tmr 'caplitlatlion,!liut aIso reiiiested that my forces should retire fromn the piort of' (Cav:ite and1l the suilurbls of Mlanila. I relpr'sentle1 ti tle Alc.\ erican gen'erals thle injistice done me, antl retluested ill friedlltyll terios that they shouiltl at least expressly recognize nmy cooleration, but they utterly declitnedl to do so. Nevertheless, bteiig always dhesir'(us )f showitig 'l'iclldlinlss andl go)old feeling towar't tlhose who called themselves liber:ators of tlie tlihe' Philippine Ipeoplle, I ordered my troops to eivacuate thle port of Cavite and the suburblls of Eriita, Malate, Satilpaloc, andt Toindo, retaiining only a liortion of the suburb of Paco. Ilt slite of' these concessions, not mlan days passed before Admliral D)ewey, without ~al' realson whatever, arrested outr steami launches, which hiad been plying in the bay tof Manila; with his express consent. Alniost at -the same tiime I receixved a letter froitm;eneral Otis, ('ommiander of' the Anieric'an army of occupation, demanding that I should witlihdrawx myi fiorces beyond the lines marked on a. maiip which lie also sent inme, and xwhich showxx'ed within the lines the town of Pandacan and the hamlet of Sintgalong, which never have belonged to the municipal area. of Manila and its stl)ub1rits. In view (of this intjustifiable a:ttitude of eboth American leaders, I sumnioned a couniicil of my generals antd asked the advice of tny cabinet, and inl coiformity withl the oltpition of' both bodies I natmetl (1ommissioners, who placed thenselvxes in cotiumunicationti with these Amiericants. Althoughl Aitniral D)ewev received ill anl insolent manner and with aggressive phrases ii.y cotninlissioners. whom lie d(lid not peirnit to speak, I.yietldedl to tle friendly suggestiotns of General Otis, withdrawing iny forces to thle desiied line for the purpose of' avo()i(dil, contact witlh lis troops. ThIis gave rise to umany isunlerstaiigs, but I hoped that once the Pa:ris onferettce wls at a11n ed my people wotildl obltain the indeletndlence promised them by the consulgentiral in Singapore, Mr. 'ratt, and tat t ht the f'riendslhip formerly assured and proclaitmed in tmtanifestoes and slpeeches would be established by the Anterican generals wlio hai:ve rea,('hed thlese shores. BIut it did not tutrn out thus. The said generals accepted my concessions in favor of ipeacte and friendship as inldications of' wteakness. This it is tlhat, withi rising amblitio(, they ordered forces to iloilo oil I)ec'ember 26, with tlie lpurpose of acquirintg for thlleselves the title of conquecrors of thlat portion of the P'hilippine Islands ocicltpied by my governmient. Such procedures, so foreignm to the dictates of culture and tlie usages observed by civilized nations, gaxve me the right to act without obsterving the usual rules of 78 REPORT OF MAJOII-GENVlRANI4 OTIS. intercourse. Nevertheless, inl oirder tot be correct to the end,.1 sent, to Genieral Otis C0omln1issioners charg~ed to solicit 1dm to dresist fi-oiii his r~ilsh eiiterprisel, bit thleN were not listened to. My goverilnenit ca,-n not reinain hidll tereiit in view otf such1 a violenit alld agg-ressiXe, SC1/itOV of a p)ortioni of. its teiri tory by i iiatitti widch has arrogatedl to itself t th title. (hanipioli of oppressed na,-tions.' Tliiis it is that, lily govelliiii1el t is disposed to) open liostil ities if' thje Amlerican i troops attempt t~o tak~e lbiei ble plosisesioni of tiel V is~-av aJslands. I deounnace tliese atcts be Iore the world, in order th-i t the cemlscien _Cc of' lllaUkdini laV projiintiice its inib iillit le, ven ict ais to wilho aire the, trite opipressors of' nations -llitl the tormen~itors5 of lminiiiii kiiid. 1 pon their heads be aill thre blo)od wh~ich niiy b e shiedl E ~l 01(1 At UJI NA LI0. M~i~tAoitIs, Janmiery 5, 199. A number of cop)Iies of this uit~otuttiate (leclaratio~l were speedily sent out for eirculafition armong the pleople, when an effo~rt was itiade to rec.,all them amid sublstitute an ametided edlitiom, bit a. f'ew hl(I lound their way to -~'aniii amnd wvere eagrem] y sought afte —r by the cemti/iens. That evenIing th- Minsurgn njewspaiper entitled "~The I ler-aid of tile 11evolution' published a sup plemenet in which the following) appea~red: OFlItCIAL MANIFESr(O 01' THE PRESI1DENT OF THlE REVOLUTIONARY GOVEIINME"N"'I To illy~ brothers.-, the Filipinos, and to all the respectable consuils and other fore i gi i ers: A pirichamnation of 'Mr. E. S. Otis, lliiJor- gerieral of the Uniited States Volinnteers. appe~ared in Manila pajwrs yestcrdlay, coilipelled me to issue the presen t, with aI view to expose to all who rea-d and uintderstand the present docullient liny most 8(11 -enin protest a~lainst the xvhitle contents otf the sai~ti Irochaitimtion, the tduties of iiiy) conscitnic towvart God, nty p~olitica,,l tompqromisecs tow'ar(l mly beloved people, anld iny p)rivite and official relationship with the United States nation, afll of whi1ch forcedl me to (1( so0 The (,eneril Mii ts called himself' in the saiti proclamlat~ion military governor of tbe Philimintle IshI llstl I ptrotest one and a thonsanid tilles, with all the energy of my~ sou'l, a~railst such itiltilority. I stdIeniny (let are thwat neither,it Singapore, flongkong, nor here ill the LPhilippines dhid I ever agr-ee, it) word or inl wl'itin-g to) reco-ll0t'the sover'eigntv of Atmerica iii tltis (1111 lovely counitry. 0On the contri o\- I tdeeiire that I returnedl to these islamids, tlralisptrte(1 b)' thes, Uniledl States mian of V-war, onI the 19th tf' Mhay last., witlt the, lecitlet a111( firil iiiten1tion to fight the s~paniards ill order to recnntjter our lilterty and inidepenidence. I have thns dqvlared ill myl offiltitil ptroclalinatitin (lattedl May 24, an~d I lhave lilkewise pttublished ill I mlallift st addressed to the Filipinlo peoplel on the 12th of.)inne last, whent in mny native xil 'are of' K'awil, I exhibited for the first time our holy national flag as a sacredl eniblnin of tlitt suiblimie aspiration, inti finally, so it was confirnietl by, the American "enler].i Mr. Merritt, alitecessor ott Mr..E. S. Osith maiftwiitliedaldresst d to the F ililpino pteoplie (lays befbre lie intimtated the Spanish genleral, Mr. Jautlenes, the surrender of the city of' ilanila, in which manifest lie clearly and positively sa-id thati thle arniy ando navy oif the United States eanme here to give us our liberty and destroy the had rule of the Spanish Gover~nment. To say all at a tinie, iiatiouals and foreigners arie witut'sses. thiat the armny and navy of the United States stationed here bave acknowledged the fact of the belfigerency of the Filipinos, whN~ose flag hais triumphantly crossed our sas before, the eyes of the foreign iiatiomis here represente~d by their respective consuls. As in General Otis's proclamation he alluded to somie~ inistructions edited by 1-is Excellency the P_-'esidetit of the United States, referrilig to the administration of the mtatters in the Philippine Islands, I in the nanie of God, t le rttot anad foulitain of'all Justice, and that of all, the right which. has been visibly granted to mie to direct itiy dear brothers in the (difficlilt work of our regene~ratinn, lprotest rrost soleitnily against this intrusion of the United States G1overnmient o11 tlte sovereignity of these isands. I equally ptrotest in the niamie of' the Filipino people ag-ainst; the sa-id ilntrulsioll hbecauise as they have granted their vote of' confidence appointing me1 president of' the nation, althollgh I (lon't consider that I deserve stuchi, therefore! I consider it iiiy dunty to defend to decath its libterty and independence. Finally, I protest aga-Iins,,t sucht nit unlexpected acet of Sovereignty of the ITliite(1 States in these islands, iii the namelI of all the prcevedingr which I have illnmy possession with regard to my i-ehitionshli witli the United States autthlorities, which unmistakably prove thatt the United States ditl not take mce front llongkiolg tto fight REPORT OF MAIJOIL-(ENE RAl L OTIS. the Spaliards for t-lheir benefit, buit for tile b)eletit of olur liberty aId ildelpelndetce, tor wh ich l)urpose the sa(id authorities verbally lpronlisel me thllir most (deci(led assistalce a(ld (efict'tiouls ()oopleration; a.ld so shoul(1 you all nmy dear brotltirs ulderstand, in orlder that we ma:y unitedl;act accordingll to tlie ii(ea (of our liierty:nld ilnde-,peltldelce, vl ich were oilr o11st 1nblC le sires, and1 assist witlh yo\r workc tt, obtaii o1r atim witli the streogrth which our old coivic'tion tmny:;flord and ist t oSt goat liack i tlte way, of glory whici we have oltainet. The unmistaklable iltentionl f &Ag uin;l.!o, asl showni in these ploclaItations. ta.ken in connectioni with the well-known f1act thlat wlhat rett.Oilns of' is c('on)ress was subservient tc.'ld abini's (lict.atioli, was amplle lntice to the troops to prellare for hostile dIeIionstraLtiois on the part of the insurgent;army. (Greater precautiollnary measures were dilected and taken in the way of redisitributitn organizations througlout the city, in advanlcing and strelgtelieing (though still far within our 0own mutually coIce(le(d lnilitary lines) our posts of observation, adl for tlhe quick respo.se of tlie men if summoned for defensive action. Otlherwise no cllallnge in the conduct, coltlition, or temper of the troops was observable. So quietly were these precaltiolls effected that FJilipino citizels, lnoticing tlhe apparent indifference of our men, warnled mle repeatedly of tlhe danger to be apprehended from a sudden simultalleos attack of the insurgents witlin and without the city, adl were quietly inf;ormedl that we did not anticipate aly great difficulty. Another very noticeable 1proof of premeditated intent on tlie part of the insurgents was perceived in the excitement manlifested by the natives and their renloval in large tlumbers from the city. All avenues of exit were filled with vehicles transporting faiiilies and household effects to surrounding villages. The railway properties were taxed to tlheir utmost calpacity in carrying tlhe fleeing inhabitants to the north within the protection of tlhe established insurgent military lines. A guinaldo, by written commIunic(altions and messages. invited his oldtime friends to send their ftamilies to Malolos, where their safety was assured, but ollogkonig was colnsidered a more secure retreat and was taken advantage of. A carefully prellareel estimate slowed that 40,000 of the inhabitants of the city departed within tle period of fifteen days. Early in tlhe month I had cabled the authorities at Washington that open hostilities at Iloilo meant war tlroughout the islands, and that I had cautioned General Miller and the troops at Iloilo Harbor; and on the 9th instant [ received a joint dispatch signed by the Secretaries of the Army and( Navy and addressed to Admiral Dewey and myself, conveying tlie instructions tand suggestions of the Presidenlt. which were in part as follows: Am most desirous thaL ctiolli(t be avoided. Your statementt that a conflict at Iloilo or It Lany othler soutliern ports means war in all the islands increases that desire. Such.onfllict woild be mo1st unfortuna;te considering the present, and olight have results unflavoraldy affectingll tle futurev. Glad you did not permit Miller to bring on hostilities. Time givetl the insuigents can not injure us, an must weaken and discourage theim. They will see our beievolenit purposes and recognize that before we can give themt good governmelt oum1 sovereignty 1ist be conceded and unqulestioned. Tact andl kindnless most essenti;al at this tilme. w * a \We accepted tlie Philippines fromn high duty in the interests if their inhabi tants and for hulmanity and civilizaltion. ()1ur sacrifices were made withl this hullmalue motive. We desire to illprove the condlitioin of thle i nhahbitants, seekhing their peace, liberty, land pursuit of their highest good. '.. Will sed colmmissioners if you tllink desirable to cooperate with you both in your delicate task. They can lot leave here for two weeks or reach Mantila: for two months. It possible to hasten repatriation of Spanish soldiers before the treaty is ratifiet it will be done. -' Hope good counsel will prevail among1 the illnhabitants and that you will 1iud means to avoid bloodshed and restore tranquillity to t tiat unhappy island. H-ow is the health of Miller's corimmand? 80 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. When this (ispatcll was shown Admiral Dewey he immediately remarked that he had recollllllended a commission, and desiring to be in accord with him I cabled as follows: MANILA, P. I., January 10, 1899. ADJUTANT-GENERAL, 1 'ashingfon: Have conferred with Admiral Dewey. We think commissioners of tact and discretion could (lo excellent work here. Great difficulty is that leaders can not control ignorant classes. Health of Miller's comlland gool. 1 also cabled: Our troops well ill lhanl ind confident that we can meet emergencies.,ong conference last night and concessions asked, but insurgents have no definite ideal of what they want. Further conferenc(e to be held. If peace kept for few days Ilmore immediate danger will have passed. The injunctions of lis Excellency the President of the Unite(l States to exert ourselves to preserve tle peace had an excellelit eflfet upon the commlandll. Officers and lmeln, ollnfident of tlieir ability to successfully mleet thle declared enemly, were restless unlder tie restraints wlIiche had been inil)osed adll( were eager to avenge tlle insults receive(l. Now they slubnit very (luietly to the taunts ailI aggressive deollllstratilons of eiimbers of tlie insurgent army who continue to tlhrong the streets of tlie llsilless 1)ortions of the city. Sublseqleiit to January 5, anl befoire tile Presidenlts mIessage liad been received,. was applroahlled by influential Filipino gelltlelnen (through an agelnt, an Ailerican citizell they fearing that their individual safety would be endangered sllould tley (all in person) wllo expressed a strolg (lesire for continued )peace ald an halrmonious settlelment of dificulties. They asked me to apI)loint a comnmission whlich could colifer with one to be a)ppointed b)y tle Malolos goverrnmenit, with a view to workilg out a planl for tlie adjustmlent of tlme conflicting political interests of tile lparties (conceriedl. Reply \was Lmade that tile so-called Malolos governinment could not be officially recogllized by woril or act, but tliat I wotld( gladly call a boar(l of officers to conlfer with one whiclh General Aguinal(lo migllt lppoint. Tlle gentlemen mllade two or three hurried trips to Malolos, anid on Januaury 9 1 received the following communication: MALOLOS, January 9, 1899. Maj. Gen. E. S. OTIS, General of the American Forces of Occupation in Manila. GENERAL: I have been iiformedl after the interview between the commissioners of my governnent and Mr. Carman that there will le no inconvenience on your p)art in naming, as commlandling general, representatives tliat will confer with those whom I will name for the satme (object. Although it not being explained to mie tlhe reason why you could not treat with the comrllissiollers o0' my governmllent, I have the 'faculty for doing the same witl those of the comn;itidingl generall. " wlio can inot be recog'nized." Nevertheless, for the sake of peace, I hiave considered it advlisable to name, as " commalldlidig general," Ca commission comnosedl of thel following gentleme: Mr. Florentino Flores, In lfrasio l'lores, ailn Manuel Argiielles, that they may together rel)resent 1e and arrive at an accord with those whoum yon will naiie, with tlie object of using siclih mlethllos as will normalize the actual situation cre:ted by the attitude of' your Governlent and troops. If you will dleigSi to attend to saidl colnlmissiolers and throlugh these Imethods com(e to some iunderstan;ling, " if only temporary," that will insure tile peace and harlmony am111()og ourselves, the Filiio lipiio Iuic vwold reach: grateful glory.. I amn, yours. Geleral. with the highest consideration, your most respected servant. EMI l() AGUINADI)O. REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS., 81 Reply was at once made to Aguinaldo's peculiar letter, and was expressed in the following terms: Hl)QI. D)EPT. PACIFIC AND EI(GHTII ARMYa C(tS. Manila, P. I., January 9, 1899. 4Genleral EMILIO AGIINALDO, ('omnandin/g R2eeolutionary Forces, Malolos, P. I. GCENEIIAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of to-lday, and am much pleased at the action you have taken. I greatly regret that you have not a clear unlderstanding of my position and motives, and trust that my explanation, assisted by tlie contercnce I have invited, will make them clear to you. In my official capacity I anm merely the agent of the United States Government to conl(lict its affairs under the limits which its constitution, laws, precedents, and specitic instructions prescribe. I have nlot tile authority to recognize any national or civil power not already formally recognized by my Government, unless specially authorized to (lo so by tie instructions of the Executive of the United States. For this reason I was unable to receive officially the representatives of the revolutionary government, and elndeavored to make tiat inability clear to the distinguished gentlelnen with whom I had tile pleasure to converse a few evenings since. You will bear witness that my course throughout my entire official colnnection with affairs liere has been consistent, and it has p)ailed me tliat I have not been able to receive and answer coliiimunications of tile cal)inet officers of the government at Malolos, fet:rilng that I might be erronreously charged with lack of courtesy. l'erliit mie now brietly, (eneral, to slpeak of tile serious llisunderstanding which.exists between the Filipino people and the representatives of the United States G;overnment, and wllich I hole tlhat our conmnlissioners, by a thorouglh discussion, may lbe able to dispel. I silncerely believe that all desire peace and harmony, and vet 1b the macilinations of evil-disposed persons we have been influenced to think that we\ occ(upy the positioln If ad(lversaries. The Fililpinos aplpear to be of opinion that we llieditate attack, wllile I am under the strict orders of the President of the Ulnitedi States to:avoid conflict ill every way possible. My troops, witnessing the earlnestness, tile comp)aratively disturbed and unllfrilenlly attitude of the revolutionary trools. andl nmny of the citizeins of Manila, concllude that active hostilities have been deterllined up11on0, althlough it must be clearly within the colllprlelhesion of unpre judliced and reflectilg minds that tlie wel fare am:l hl;alilless of the Filipino peopl) els 1 tle ee o te frienllly plrotection of tile l Uited Staltes. The hand of Spain was forced,:an( slie h:as acklnowledlgedl before the wllole world tllat all her clailnced r ights ill th]is conltry Ihave d(le]tarted by due process of law. Thlis treaty acknowled(lglelt. w\ithl tlec conditios wlich aciolllay iti, awaits ratificaticon by tile Sate (f tilte Unitede States; and! tll' actioll of its Congress Ilmist also be secured blefore tlhe IExecutivt( of thlat (;overnlmenlt (ca1 proclaillI a definite policy. That policy nmust confiom to the will of the htpeople (,f tlhe Inited Statecs explressed through its tativs reIsl ill Coilnress. For tliat action the lFilipino leopl should wait, at le:ast. before severing tlie existing fri ndlly relations. I 1am governed lby a desire to further tile interests of tile Filipino peolle andl shall continue to labor with tllat (Id inl view. lThere shall b1e,no conflict of forces if I am alle to avoid it; and still I sl11l endeavor to Illaintain a position to mIeet all emergncY(ies tliat mlay arise. I'ermlit me to slllscribe Ilyself, General. with the highest respect, your most obedielit servant, E. S. OTIS, Major-General, U. S. V., Comma(ldilg. Tlie following order calling a board was thereupon issued, and the president of the same was directed to larrange for a meeting with the commission appointed by Agninaldo as soon as practicable: SPECIAL ORDERS, s Hi)(PRS. DEPT. PACIFIC ANI EIG(HTII ARMY CORlPS, No. 9. Maniila, I'. I., January 9, 1S99. [Extract.] S. Brig. Gcn. Ri. P. lmmughles, U. S. V., Col. Jamells F. Smitlh. First California Volunteers, Liceut. Col. E. H-. Crowder, judge-,advocate, U. S. Volunteers, are hereby appointeld a coilimlission to meet a commnission of like number appointed by General Aguinaldo, a.nd to confer with regard to the situation of aftairs and to arrive at a mutual understanding of the intent, purposes, aim, and desires of the Filipino people and the people of tile lUnited States, that peace and harmonious relations between these respective peoples may be continued. By command of Ma'jor-General Otis: THOMAS H. BARRY, ssi8tan t 4djutant-Gen eral. w 6 82 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. The representative boards engaged in joint conference on the evening of the day the order was issued, and had repeated and prolonged evening sessions, sometimes extending far into the night. Minutes of proceedings were kept and submitted, and the various extended arguments indulged in were duly reported to me after the adjournment of each special session. The board representing the insurgent interests could not give any satisfactory explanation of the qualified sovereignty, measure of protection, or specific autonomy whiclh it thought should be vested in or enjoyed by the respective governments, nor present any practical plan for the solution of the vexed political problems which constantly arose in the progress of the discussion. It conceded the fact that the protection of the United States was essential to the integrity and welfare of the islands, but could not determine how that protection should be applied; certainly not to the extent of interference with internal affairs further than the collection of custonms, possibly, from which source the United States might receive a conmpensation for the protection furnished. They begged for some tangil)le concessions from the United States Governnenlt-ono e which they could present to the people and which might serve to allay thle excitenmell t. Notling conld be accomplished without the sacrifice of sonic o' the attributes of sovereignty, and certainly that could not be done by ally existing authority. Finally, the coliferences beclane the object of insurgeiit suspicion, and of amusement to those who (lid not wisli benleficial results. Tlhe newspapers announced that n p)eace coImmission was about to be seit from tile United States, and it was observed that the volunteers were not being sent liome as tlhe newspapers announced liad b)een ordered. What was thle eaning of this colmmission when one was in session already and why were thle regular regiments being dispatchled from tlhe United States? The United Staites autlhorities were merely endeavoring to gain time to place themselves in position to impose slavery on the Filipinos. The members of the insurgent board inquired of our officers as to these matters. Upon the report of facts by General Hughes I informed him that I would address him an explanatory letter which lie could present, if he chose, at the next and last conference, and accordingly sent him the following communication: OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN TIE PIIIIIPPINE ISLANI)S, lManila, i'. 1., January 25, 1899. Brigadier-General HUGHES, Chairman of committee appointed to meet a committee appointed by General Aguinaldo to confer with regard to the situation of affairs and to arrive at a mutual understanding of the intent, purposes, aim., and desires of the Filipino people and the people of the United States. SIR: I am informed that the Filipino people do not place confidence in our good intentions which they are seeking from this conference. The fact that the President has appointed a commission seems to have confirmed them in their impressions. It might be well, therefore, to give you a brief history of events having relation to these commissioners. They are as follows: Early in December Admirial Dewey and myself received instructions from Washington to report the condition of affairs and offer suggestions. Upon December 7 Admiral Dewey telegraphed as follows: "It is strongly urged that the President issue a proclamation defining the policy of the United States Government in the P'hilippine Islands and showing the inhabitants that it is our intention to interfere in the internal affairs of the Philippines as little as possible; that as they develop their capabilities of government their powers and privileges will be increased. That will allay the spirit of unrest. The Spanish soldiers should be expatriated as soon as possible; they are a source of discord and danger." And the Admiral goes on to say that a force of several regiments raised from among the best insurgent troops and officered by the best of their leaders would do much to disarm opposition. REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 83 Upon this suggestion I think the proclamation was issued. Later Admiral Dewey cabled (I think sometime about the 1st of January, I am not aware of the date) that he thought the appointment of a commission by the President would be an excellent thing. On January 9 I was asked by the Washington authorities what I thought of the appointment of a commission to confer with the revolutionary authorities, and I replied that I thought it might do excellent work here. Before this date, early in January, I had been requested by prominent Filipinos to appoint a committee from my own command to meet a like committee to be appointed by General Aguinaldo. This was done on January 9, one day before receiving the Washington dispatch asking if I thought the appointmelnt of a commission by the President would be advantageous. Hence, what mirght be styled the two commissions have no relationship whatever. The one of which youl are president, sitting to ascertain the desires of the Filipinos andi having no authority to grant concessions except by permission of the Washington authorities; the other commission, appointed froin \Washington, comes with full instructions from the President of the United States and empowered( to act for limni. (n January 16 I teleg'raphed to Washington as follows: "Conditions imllprovillg; confidence of citizens returning; business active. Conference held Satlr(day; insurgents presented following statement. asking tlhat it be cabled: ' I'ndersigned conmmissioners commander in chief of revolutionary army of these islanls state to commissioners of General (Otis that aspiration lilipilio people is indlependence,with restrictions resulting from conditions whicll its government agree with American wllen latter agree to officially recognize the former.' No conclusion reachel; another comiference to-mlorrow eveoling. I understand insurgents wish qul(alilied indeel)lendene under Unlited States protection.' To this dislpatch lno reply has been receivel. IUpon an1other matter, viz, tile sending of regular troops here, the purpose of which has been greatly mnisulnderstood, you may communicate the following dispatch, received on l)ecelnber 7: "General OTI, Ma t ila: "Tlhe Secretary of War d(irects you to send Astor Battery hoine on tirst returning transport. If yon clan spare voluniteers to take first returning shils, send them in tle order of their arrival. Six regular regilments are in course of preparation to report to you. It is prolable that part of them will sail direct from this coast by 'Iway,f clanal-thus to give you good transports available for service from San Francisco Tlie meaning'i and intent of this (ispattcll was to return the volunteer troops as soon as possible and to senl part back ly tlie transports then in the harbor, if practicable. Thlie Astor Battery was sent home, 1,ibt I declined to send other volunteer troops at that time, as the revolutionary governnlent had assumed a threatening attitude, notwithstanding our great desire for peace and harmony. The orders from Washington have not chalnged. I still have authority to return the volunteer troops, so that they can be discharged in the United States, by any returning vessels available, but I decline to return them as long as we are threatened with active hostilities. Under the articles of capitulation still prevailing with Spain, as there has been no ratification as yet of a treaty, I am obliged to hold Manila and its defenses, but no hostile act will be inaugurated by the United States troops. Very sincerely yours, E. S. OTIs, Major-General, U. S. U., United States Military Gorernor. The commissioners held their final joint conference, I think, on January 25. With the insurgent representatives it was one continued plea for some concession which would satisfy the people. One of them was a man of excellent legal ability, who had occupied an important judicial position at Cebu under the Spanish Government for a number of years. He had recently arrived in Manila, and on the invitation of Aguinaldo had visited Malolos. He was animated with a desire to restore harmonious relations, or at least to effect a temporary peace until the existing excitement could be allayed, when the people might listen to reason. He secured the appointment of Aguinaldo's board and was named thereon as the most important member, but he was so circumscribed by specific instructions that he could not accomplish anything. I charged him with playing a false part, basing the charge on a knowledge of his legal acquirements. -le confessed that he was fully aware of the untenable position lie occupied, and was powerless under 84 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. the circumstances. He was an adept at legal fiction and could discover p)regnants both negative and positive in every international postulate. Tfhe appoilitmelit of the President's commission had caused so much speculation, both as to membership and object, thiat I desired to correct mistaken impressions and to take away further opportunity for deliberate falsehood, and knowing that this gentleman still held friendly relations with the Al alolos authorities and desired to know the truth in the matter, I sent hini the following unofficial letter: MIANILA, P'. I, J'ebrnary.:1, 18,99. Hon. FLORENTINE ToJRRES, Maiiila, P). 1. MY I)EAR SIR: I am in receipt of a WN.ashington dispatch dated the 1st instant, which informis me that the gentlemen who exp)eet to serve onl the jiroposeol conmnission on the part of the United States will reach HoDngkong on1 the 21st of the month. They will probably arrive here about the 25th. So many inaccuracies heave been spread abr-oad concerning- the identity of the gentleinen of the conirnission that I desire to n.iake explaiiafion. lhiev are Mlessrs. I)enby, Schurnian, and Worcester. Respectinig the first, hie, is doubtles4s wvell knuown as the late United States minister to China; the second is the president of' Cornell1 iniversity, one of the leading institutions of learning of the United States; the third is Professor Worcester, of the Uni\versity of Mlichigan, also4 one ot our leadling educators and who has a luersonal acqniaintance with the Philippines. he havingr spent some timie here. Ile is a friend of IDr. Bo(urns, of otir lheadth lu)ord, who formerly made a touir of the Phldippine Islands in the interest of science. I am sure the repultation of these grentlemien will eComianed thein to the Filipino people as men of probity, ability, andl most humane sentimients, lhav-iur at heart the linterest of that people. Admiral hDewey andl nyself have also heeui plwed on this commtission-the Goverunoent following the puolicy pulrstiedl with reference to Cuba andl 1orto Rico. Mly own inclinations and dlesire are not to serve ther-eon, being simply a soldIier, bIt I inuist oluey the eounmauiis of mny (Troxer nmenut. it is quiite iniportant that friendly relations be maintiiuled iii every~ way among11( all of us, and I am (loing mny uutniost to that end. A great deali of friction ha,,s been canseil by the action of troops, resuiltiuug, I ami (certain, fuo0111 i nisunduuerstandfilug of conulitions. Our soldiers are frequently insulted aind threaitened Nvithiun onr own lines, buit thuas fair hiave qu1ietly submitted, obeyingf their- instrul( tiois. it; huowever, these threatening- demonstrations should puroceed so fari ais to enudliuger life, I uuuighbt not he able to hold thein in cheek. I trust that the revoluot iionm aiithorities wvill e~xercise every endeav-or to purt a stop to denouostratioiis sinuilai- to those -witnessed d-uring~ the pa-st two (lays. Iamn, with gr-eat respect, your obedient servant, E.S. Otris. A few days before the, above letter ~vswritten and on January 263, I was surprised by the receip~t of a letter from. Aguinaldo because of the boldness with \vhich lie tberein indicated his purlpose to continue his Jlassulultionls and establish their correctness by the arbitrament of war. I cabled it iin cipher to Washington iii accordance withi his request, as it contained such suggestive announcements of the (course of (conduct he was likely to pursue. The cablegram and my reply to the communication are as follows: ADJUANTGENEALWashiaqoa:MANILA, P. I., January 27, 18.99. The following received PHILIPPINE NATIONAL. Go0VE;NINENr, "Office of Secrelary of Joreign Affairs. "AN. Gen. E. S. OTIS, "Coninander in CliPf of the Anmerican Forces of (ccuipation, in Manila: "My government has promulgated the political constitution of the Philippine Republic, which is to (lay enthusiastically prochainied by the people, because if its conviction that its (luty is to interp~ret fiaithfully the aspirations of that people-a people making superhuman effor-ts to rev~indicate their sovereignty and their nation.ality before time civilized lowers. "To this end, of the governments to-day recognr1ized and observedl a-mong cultured inations they have adopted the formu of governmnemt mnist compatible with their aspirations, endeavoring to adjiust their actions to the dictates of' reason and of tight, in order to denionstrate their aptitude for civil life. REPORT OF MNAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 8 85 "And, taking the liberty to notify your ecelecIeiientyxp bt on justice to thle Hiiilip~pine p~eople, You Will be pilea-sed to informi the Government of your nation that thie dlesire of mine, 111o01 hein~g accor(ledl official recognition, is to contribute to the lbest of its scanity abiility t11o the establishvnent of a general peace. ''May- ~,iud keep your excellency many years. "EMIulo AGUtI-NALDO. [Seal of the revolutionary governmient of the Philippines.] '' A. MA111INI. "MNALOLOS, Jainuary 22,.18,99." OTIS,. HTIDQIIs. DEPT. PACIFIC AND Eli(;hTH ARmyx CORPS, MANILA, P'. L, JIawiary.27, 1899.. Gen. 1EMILo 1 iIN10O Comm aiid(loy IPhilip)pineC 11Colittioflary forces. Ma lolos, P'. I. ('EI-AL I ha-ve the honor to inform you tha~t I received yesterday a communication (hated the 2~3d instant. sigited hy you a1n( pnrloirtinlg to be issued from the office of the secretary of foreigni aittairs of the " Philip-pine national gover-nment." *an lpleased to fuirther inforin you that a translation of that. comnmunication intco the Emir-lish langiuage, is shoNNn ini the accomln)anyintr paper, Ia be cabled in fuill to the U'nited States anithorities at WaIIshingcton. I ami (eneral. with getreslpect, your obedient servant, E. S. Oiis, Maljor- General, U. S. V., Cornvitaii(lbifg. lin the meantfine (General M1iller's conllnandl was retained inl the harbor of Iloilo. It conitiIuedl to be grreatly dlissatisfied because it was niot allowed to seize the city. The F, ifty-first Iowta Volunteers lhad rema-ine( Onl its tra(1ImSPort Sin~ce le~aVing0 San Francisco, a p)eriod of more than seventy days. It was very necessary to disembark it for sanlitary re~asonIs, and any attemnlt to (1o so onl the P~almy coast or the adjaceit small islandls wouldl have resultedl in coniflict with natives. It was directed to return to this harbor, wvhere upon arrival1 it was placed at Ca~vite, relieving the Tennessee reg-inuient, which was brought to this city. On January 20'. G4eneral Miller wrote that it would be his aiim "1to mainitain the existfino conditions of friendly relations with these peolple," and continuned: The people here will follow the coilditions ini LuIzon and will p11rmiit ouir military occnlpation of Iloilo as soon as ordleredl fromu the central grovernmient. Outwardlythe lest termis of frienidship) 'xist personally between iis. I have informed theta verhally thait they could go on with tileir lislal occupations, afloat and ashore, witholut interference from uis; that seizures we miade wvere necessities merely to enable us to get along from day to day and that iiotlhinl w~ouldl be taken otherwise. Theyare satisfied app~arently, believe mie most implicitly, and everything is pleasant. There were two or three matters ouitside of the enforced policy of nounmilitary.action wvhich grelatly troubled General M11iller. He lIIAd gone fromt ManLila p~reparedt to establish civil government and had with him his officers of the l)ort and of (customs. The merchant vessels entering and leaving Iloilo with subsistence and merchandise anld plying their trade between that point, Manila, Singapore, tand, the Chinese coast, payiing duty to the Iloilo insurgents in defiance of protest, becanie ob jects of suspicion, and their transaction eniabled the avowed clenemy to obtain food amid reap) revenue much to the (letriment of our interests. Thle Sp-anish native military organizations which had beeni performuing service inl the south cohltinue(1 to be brough-t to, Mlanila iii spite of our relpeatedl objections, on the plea that Spain could do nothing( else with them, an~d it was difficult to see how she could. Those ot them who wvere native of the central islands were sent to P~anay, and those havingr former homes in Luzon were scattered 86 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERtAL OTIS. there, although we entertained the belief that they would be gathered to attack us. To General Miller's complaint concerning the transactions of merchants and his request to be permitted to close the Iloilo portC, or colmpel all traders to pay accustolmed duties to his proper officers, lie was instructed in colmmunications of January 16 and 21 as fillows: 1IDQRS. 1)EPT. PACIFIC AN) EI(;HTII AIRM CO(I'S, Manila, j1'.., January 16, 1899. The COMMANDIING G1ENERAL, Jirst Separate Brigade, Eighth Alrmy Corps, Iloilo, Islald of I'anay. SIR: Replying to the letter of Captain Evans of Jlanuary 13, forwarded by you on same date, I am directed to state that the case is well put by Captain Evans under the President's recent proclamation, except tie President d irlets in that r1oclamlation that all the ports in thie actual possession of the land and naval forces of the United States will be open to the commerce of the world. The port of Iloilo is not in the actual possession of the ITnited Stttes forces, as they merely occllpy the harbor. The oljections -which present themlselves to the course recolmmended by Captain Evans are: 1. Until the ratification of the tre;ity of peace the lUnited States has not the legal right to occupy the porft of Iloilo, excelpt by the cons(ent of Spain. Spallish autlority over the s(outhern islands of the Philip)ptines remains intact until thle treaty is rattifed. If, however, Spain hadti turned over the port of Iloilo to the lUite(l States, then the (1question of legal rigrlt as betweeil thie l inited States and Sp;ll i wxuld have belen settled and the United States would then have succeededtl to tIle rilhts of Spain in so far as the collection of duties is concerned. Spain did not tillr it over to tlhe lTnited States authorities. Her action, viewted in the mildest liglt. was that of simple albandonmeut, for which she is responsible. As far as thle I itedl States are concerned, Spain, un(ler a strict interltretation of international law, ihas still the right to enlter that lport anl collect di ties until that right is terminated by treaty ratificationll. 2. Tlie closing o' the port amd thle collection of tdties on iierciltitflise taken from the island would be an a(icknlowledlgment on oilr art that the selt-ctonstituted alithorities at Iloilo stand in thle ptsition of belliger ilts or elnmlits of tlie nited St.ites, -which position we do not recognize. They a e (SpIanish subjects really until tlhe ratification of the treaty) recognixed as a file dly community with whom we are at peace. 3. Should foreign vessels accel)t cleartcllc pal)ers from the lloilo calptain of the port, it would be dilffictlt to ullerstand tile p)ttsition in which tleyv woultld place themselves. I lndoul tel lv such ai tion woiuld give rise to grave llesti olls, possibly involvi-ng international comlIlication; and shouldi they seek to clear thlrollh your authorities after having, ackiowlhedtrged the ins1rgentts at IIoilto hv payinig duties to them, then they wotild recognize eitlher Spanish or insurgent authtority at Iloilo and that of the United States in the lrblor. They probably would (ldo evverythinii tlhat bothl tule insurgelnt a1(d 1 niited States authorities would demindl of them and iintke uniler protest ally palyment which miglht be demanded. Conditions:ire so complicated tl:hat these lhea.tilquarters (1to uot feel at liberty to give positive instriictiois for your guildlance, and tihey will be sought fromn Washington, which as sootn tas reeived will be tra:ismitted to -tu. In the meantime you will not make aniy leiands ttn the mier(cltaits nor interfere bv any overt act of force with the commlerce of tle port. It might ibe well to assert lUnited States righit to condiuct tlhe colmmerce otf the port, blut you can sta:te thiat you have representedl the case to the propetir authlorities and are waiting ihistructioms. Any forcille act of detentiotu o(r seizure might prodlcte iost unlsatisfactory results. I inclose your pre)arel commllnication intended for tile British vice-consul. It is unol.jectionalle and should be sent to hlim. Siince writing the albove I unlierstand from ('aptain Montgomery, of the British navy, who has just returned from Iloilo, that he discussed all these matters with the Iloilo merchants, endeavoring to come to some arranlgement which would be satisfactory to the United States. Hie reports that lie advised the merclants and the English consul to give a ltromise in writing to pay duties in the future upou all goods now taken oult to whomsoever they might be due after affairs had become adj usted. Very respectfiully, your obedient servant, TIiOMAS II. BARRY, Assistant Adjutat t-(eneral. RE~PORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 87 IIDQRS. DEP'T. PACIFIC AMt) EIGHTii AitmY COR1PS, Manila, P. L., January,21, 1899. The CO'MAANDING G'ENFAZAL,7 First '1eparate Brigadle, Eighth Jrmty Corps, Ilo)ilo, Pailay. Sini: I am directed to informn you that there wNill b~e sent out to-dlay by steamer St. Paul to Iloilo a unuber of disc harged native-Spianish troops, to wit, to the number of about 600. These (liscilargedl soldliers live in the southern islands, andl it is thoughlt that they will t~ive less trouble if landled at Iloilo than if' landed at other points. Yioi will therefore lplea~se receive them at Iloilo or in the vicinity. The vessel transporting themi, with its guard-a company of' the First Tennessee Volunteers-wvill be directed by von to return imnmediately to this iport. In regard to the collection of (dnties on merchandise at Iloilo, you were informed that your suggestions on that sub~ject, received through Colonel Potter. would be subl.mitted to Washing-ton for (leciSioD. Thev- were so submitted, and the following cablegrrami has been received in response: O'l, S, a iti l"WASHINGTON, Ja miary 19. "The Presidlent desires nO forcible measures to be used for the present in collecting customs (lIlties at Iloilo. "CORBIN.' You AN-ill therefore b~e gutid~ed by these instructions, which are in line with those sent y\oul froam these headquarters. MNatters here remain in a -very excited condition, and conflict wvith the insuirgent, troops is avoi(ledl only by the skillful supervision of othiers. Please relport the condition of affairs at Iloilo. Very respectfully, your1s, THOMsA~s H. BARRY,.Assistant Adjutant- Gcneral. Still General Miller was greatly dissatisfiedl with his surroundings. He could ntot pime~rfmi military service, nor could lie conduct business aff~airs. He was ]kept watching and waiting nidter very ulnpleasant circuisazcewhiichogrewv more irks,,omie everyvl),:isi1ig (lay. OunFebruary 3, the (lay previous to the opening of aettial hostilities at Mtanila, lie wr-ote: l111)11S. FIRST~ SFEPARATE lhm~ 1", Gwrin ARMY1-1 (oaris, ON IhOAlI) TIRA NSIORT NEWProwR, Iloilo Harbor, 1'. 1., February 3, 1899. The A)UATGNIA. liepartmuient oj the Pacific. TFiqhth A rmn Corps. S~m: 1 ha~ve the honor to report the muilitary situation here tinchlan-edl. The in~stirgeuts atre reporte(l to be placingr aniother -gun in position. This is outside and nuear1 the entrance to the, fort, bearing oni ouir smi ps;. The insuirgents in townv are, to-dlay 1avin g a little tronide. TwAo companDies in the m1ainl barracks dIetmandled somie pay aned better food, and threatened to take up their armns tand gro back into the country if they were niot paid. T1he row is not yet settled. Some $15, 000-exp~ort and~ imphort duity-halve heen received in the collector's otfice, and.. I presumie the troops want:m part of that. l1tep~orts fromm the southern islands, Ne izros and Cebu, are to the effect, that those lpeople realize that they can not succeed with an independent government, and want us to take possession. I still feel that this place ----loilo ---onght to be captured. Such at step wvould dep~riv-e the insu~rgents of large receipts from etistoms, cripple their mueans to pay the soldiers, and arouse the lpeop~le f'avorable to uis in the southern islatids to express immore fre-ely their true sentiments. I am well satistied that at great proportion of the inhabitants of l'anay, Negros, and Cebu are fa-vorable to our- ocenpatiomi at once. A large p~rop~ortioli of the supplies for the Iloilo people comme from the Aniericanl isteamers fromn Man ila, a trade whicht is carried on through the collector of the port of M~anila with the insurgents at Iloilo. Is there no way to stop this trade? C'utting,off sup~plies ini this way wxill help to bring these peop~le to terms. I can't understand how such at business can be carried on agrainst the best good of our country. Very respectfully, i M1. P. IMILLER, Brigadier-Genieral, U. S. V., Conmmending. During this period rapidly succeeding significant eventts were fast 4approaehuing a state of war and strongly indicated the fixed dletermination of the insurgent government to drive the United States from 88 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. Luzon as soon as it could gather its armed men in sufficient numbers. It had appropriated the railway, every engine, and most of its rolling stock. It was perfecting its intreiichments around us, planting its guns, concentrating its troops, and bringillg up its army supplies, though still publicly asserting its desire for peace. With the cunning which it had always attempted to practice in its amateur diplomacy it endeavored to force the JUnited States to commit the first physical act of hostility in the way of lmusketry tire, in order to appleal to the symnpathies of the foreign public for a seemingly oppressed people, which it falsely claimed to represent. In this it signally failed. The knlifing and attempted shooting of our picket sentries brought no hostile response, except the killing, by the intended victim, of the assassin who had so dexterously used the knife upon him. Tlme excitemenlt within the city was very noticeable, anld tlhe cruelty of the "American"ll was the theme. No one seemed to be possessed of any fixed determlination but the Tagalo. All others were watcling for new demonstrations and waiting' for develoL)pments. Manila is unparalleled for diversity of race and babel of tongues; also for its grade of enlightenment from barbaric igniorance to the highest civilized stage. Rumiors innumerable andl of the most varied character filled the -atlnoslplere. To-day attack was illilnminet, ald to-morrow friendly 'councils were about to prevail. One failrly well acquainted with tlhe scheming in progress and the trend of events could lnot reach any satisfiactory con(clusions on tle probabilities of war, and to one unacquainted tlherewith sane conclusions were impossible. I endeavored to inform Admiral Dewey of the actual situation from (lay to day, and a few extracts from hastily dlictated letters of that time will slow how hard it was to formnulate opinion. These brief extracts are also an inlex to swiftly recurrilng events. The following are furnished: MANILA, 1'. 1., Janary.l, 1S!9. I have been too busy to write, but h.ad there been anything special to conimiicate should have done so. The city is now very qtliet and 1.oplle are again apl)pearing on the streets, seemingly confident that no immediate disturbances are likely to ensue. (ur conferences with General Agninaldo's commlissioners are still in progress. The commissioners had a long session on Saturday evening and meet again to-morrow evening. The conferences seem to havle quieted the atmosphere very much. The Malolos congress on Saturday, I undlerstand, disposed of son01 radical questions b)y vote. Indications are that the United States (;overnment received favora1lle consideration. I do not look for anytlhing to develop in the next few days, but we are obliged to keep up constant vigilance. JANUARY 19, 1899. * * f Everything remains quiet in the city. It is rumored this morning that insurgents say we are only trying to prolong our coiference until we can receive more troops, and that the comlmission appointed, or to be tlpointed, by tlle President is only another ruse to gain time. Their alry seems to lbe morc or less excited and is considering the matter whether it would not be Ipolicy to dlestroy is all at once, before we can get any more soldiers. All this may be called street rumor, but it is very actively circulated. The insurgent army is becoming very tired of doing nothing and demands blood. Buniness is being transacted as usual; a good many people on the streets and quite a number returning again to town. JANIUARY 21, 1899. I was very sorry when I learned yesterday that you hlad withdrawn the lAMonlerey and Concord. I said last night that there was no immediate prospect of trouble. By that expression I meant that there would be no outbreak for a (lay or two. From my information this morning I am convinced tihat the insurgents intend to try their hand in a very short time-how soon I call not tell. They will not now permit us to cross tlheir lines andl have been very insulting to onr othicers, calling to them that very shortly that they would give us )battle. MIv best inforrlation is that they have fully determined to attack both outside and within the city before our additional REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. Is9 troops arrive, anti the least spark nmay start a conflagration. Your war vessels placed as formerly N-ill not incite them to an attack, but will add to their fears of sitccess in case they begin it. They are no longer anienalble to reason; the lower elements have gained control and their congress is powerless to miianage thema. The best Filipinos in the city say that they are going to attack the city, amid that they will do it very soon, entertaining the insane idea that they can trive mis out. Should they attack, the fight will be over before your vessels can reach the points where they were formerly p~laced. I ama sending ont to-(lay for Iloilo a transport with 600 discharged native Spanish soldiers who live in the southern islands, and am trying to get rid of about 1,500 of these native troops whose honies are ini Luzon. They are all insurgents now and give us trouble in the city. JANUARY 23, 1899. * No excitinh developments this morning. Another conference was held yesterday betwveen. Agruinaldo's andl our reltresentatives, resultig in very little. It was adjourned until next Wedunesday. Aguinaldo is insistinig upon the recogmiitioa of inidependenece a1nd the return of the Abbie and the launches. I understand that thie Malolos congress passed the pioltoseti constitution with the clause inserted which Mabini insisted on, viz, "Placing the po-wer in the hands of Agninaldo to (leclare war.' The city is very quiet. Yesterday w-e got ri of 276 of the tlischarged Spanish1 -native ti'oolis, sending theii (lown the bay. We have still renainina 315 of the Macabelbes wbo are afraiti to go oiit of Manila, and ahout 300 other natives who want to stay hiere. I lbatl a big talk1 w-ith Gen'llceral Rios yesterday. I-I says that there are 214 officers. with servanlbts. on1 hlis vessel, an1d colnsideralde mnoney, which lie woulti likie to have remiain there, and 71 passengers, b~esides the soldiers aminl crew; tha t the officers belong to organidzations wvhici hav\e beenii dlisbtatale, anid that tinY camne here with their taiudilies u:1d(1 property with the intantion of goi- ~ back to Sepain) by first available traiTsport at their o)wni expIense, wI i lie does tiot auamt the soldhiers or troops to land. I ha\ve directetl the capt ami of the hot to landl the offliceis andI passengers andi to keelp the vessel in tin hiarbor. Nothimr this niorotutg f'roin Washington. 'Ihe dispatchi of yesterdayv directed mew to tiiake siteutons effortst to ha\-e insuro-ens release Splan ishi prisottets Whom thy,\ hold. I replited that my inftlneace was iit great at p)resenit, ld tia t I head ni;i(lt such au elttort to release the Spanish htrie-ts that I was now accused of' beitig inil )ttiiershlit) with the archbishop. JANUARY 24, 1899. Things look a little oinhions to-day. You have undoubtedly seen in the papers an atctoMmit of' vesterda vs affiairs at Malolos, viz: The proclnimiiur of the constituitittn. the proclaiiiii Cir (f A giiiialdo as iresidlent, captain-general, and everything else, anti the speech delivered by Paterno, ini which lie antiounced that they would drive, the imivader fr-otii the soil. EIvNerythiung points tt their detertuinatitn to attack its, if they can lpermstiale themselves that they etin do stt successfully-, before the regiulatr regimtents arrive. This is conlirtued iit a great many ways and. I ain sure it is the policy ott which they are at lpresent proceeding. They ittay sutceed in burning a portion of the town, bitt little else, I fimagine. JANUAiY 25, 1899. I am in receipt of your letter of this miorning. I tlo not consider that the war is over for the present. The insurgents won Id attack at once if they could be c(iivinced that their efforts would meet with success. The leading Filipinos of the citv are afraid to coni itar tile atiti are in a very excited condition. They know the datigers of oat outitreak at tony moment, anti we are holding all troops well in hiand constantly. Tin business men of all itationalities are intently watching develolonients. The revolutionary government seemits to be in the ascenidancy, and our former Filipino friends who fiayoretd annexation a short time ago are, for personal safety, giving a sort of adherence to the Malolos governutetit. All this I fully know, and a great (deal nioro which I can tell you first opportunity, but which it would not be prudent to write. The Cavite Filipinos \vent out to loin the itisirgent ranks duiring the inspection and review in that zonie by their secretary of war-at least so I think-and they can qJuickly go back to the ranks at any time they may be called upon to do so. EBRmUARY 3, 1899. One of the * lautiches arriveol yesterday, cleared from Hongkong; she is one of the three of wvhich -I-'I wrote, and concierihug which I reported that fron informition received here that I was quite certain was about to bring arms. Upon arrival here her cargo tallied with her manifest and she was apparently ill right. * * * REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. The officer in charge explained that she was about two days late in arriving, owingj to bad weather, which compelled her to lie off the coast. 'These two days gave her time to run to the coast and discharge. * * * Yesterday afternoon General MacArthur, whose troops north of the Pasig have experienced trouble with the insurgents lwho ha\ve passed over his lines, sent Major Strong, his adjutant-general, out to the officer in conmand to denlanl an explanation. Strong, on passing our lines, was placedl under a strong insurgent gluard and taken to Mandaloyan, a point on tle Pasig across the San Juan River. There he found the officer in charge and quite a considerable insurgent foirce taking frolil several boxes a quantity of new revolvers and Mauser rifles which had just been received. Spanish prisoners were there (the Spanish prisoners whom the insurgents hold) puitting the parts of the ritles together and making theil realy for distribution. - There has been a great deal of f'riction along the lines tile past two dlays, and we will be unable to tamely siul,lbit to the insulting colndlict and threatening (delonstrations of these insurgents innmch longer. I:a1i informed, hoev\er, tlhat the chief nmen of the insurgent government desire to avoidl any conflict at present: possibly for the reason that they are expecting to receive arnms very soon, possibly because they fear they may not be successful at the presenit tinme, anil possibly becaullse they ay hatve a belief that they can secure what they desire without conflict. Th'leyv are constantly asking nme to imake concessions, tlhat they may be able to (control their troops. They have seized a number of our men, and some. I think, inside oiur lines. Yesterday I sent Lieutenant Haan, of the Engineer Corps, to Malolos to sec'ure the release of the men; he did not return last eveniiig, but telegraphedl me froni Malolos that he would explain his delay on his return, wlich lie in: imated would be to-dlay. The city is quiet, though there is a vast amounit of undlerlying,, excitement. We are constantly losing our employees. Yesterday seven of our men at our Malaca'nali quarters left us suddenly to join the insureents, so we are now very shortlhanded. They stole and took with them whatever they could find of value,, one( of them (riving out of the lines Colonel Iarry's carriage, which we consider lost property. Notwithstainding these ominous signs, unremnittinig exertions were continually being made for a satisfactory solution of affairs. On the llth of January I hlad sent my adjutant-general, Colonel Barry, to Malolos, directing him to bear a written message to Aguinaldo, procure a personal interview with him ift )ossible, acquaint hinm fully with tlie etlorts we were making to preserve tlhe leace, and iil)ress upl)ol Iim the necessity for more conservative action on tihe 1)prt of his troops. At this time a visit by an officer at thle insurgent cal)itael was niot considered an agreeable pastiie, as he was liable to receive gross insults. Colonel Barry, however, met with little difficulty, presented himself at Aguinaldo's lheadquarters, and requested of his secretary l)ermlission to pay his respects in I)ersoln, stating that lie was the bearer of an inmportant coimmunication concerning which (General Otis desired l him to confer with tlhe general. Agulinaldo's secretary received thle letter, stating that he woull I)resent it and make known General Otis's request. Soon after he returned, conveying General Aguimalldo's regrets tliat press of business (lid not )erlnit him to accord tlie personal interview requested, and the colonel was referred to Presidetnt Mabini, of the cabinet. Mabini received him graciously, and quite a lengthy interview followed. Mabini assured him, in substance, that the insurgent government had exerted itself to maintain friendly relations with the Americans; had thus far succeeded; tlhat it would continue to make exertion to this end, but tlhat it could not control its people beyond a certain ploint, as they were greatly excited; that his government would do all in its power to effect an amicable adjustment of l)ending difficulties. The communication which Colonel Barry presented was the one of January 9, in respolise to Aguinaldo's letter of that date, in which he announced the appointment of the insurgent commission and which appears on a former page. I will now quote from my report to the Ad.jutant-General of the Army of April 6, in which I submitted a statement of the services of our REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 91 troops during February, and endleavored to present succinctly the miore important actions with resultinig causes from which war ensued: During the latter part of January the insurgents along their established lines and within the city exhibited increased aggressiveness, assuming, a defiant attitude, so mnuch so that our troops were grathered well in hand to meet anly demonstrations which m~ight be attempted, Insuirgent armed parties entered far within our lines and defied our tro~ops to resist their approaches. To arrest these proceedings, our officers, a nd citizens of Manila connectedl with the insurgent, government, were sent to insurgent general. officers at various places along their lines to request that they ]keep) their inen in (heck, which the latter invariably promlised to do, p-ayingy, howev~er, little heed to their ptromhises. Onl February 1 a small detachment belonging to our engineer company was arrested within our territory antd sent to Malolos. This act brought onl the following correspondence: "Hni)is. D)EPT. PACIFIC AMI) En;HITii ARai CoRPs, "Manila, J)*. I., Febraary 2, 899. 'General EmiLmo A( UI.NA~I,)0, 11Comma tiditig F'ilipbio Rierobin ionacry F~orces~, Mal0olos. G(ENEnRAL: I have the honor to inform you that a small party of' engrineers, consisting of a Sergeant land four lpriv-ates, who are engag-ed in making surveys for the coiihlletion of the na-p of' Mianila, which the Engineer Corps is now busy in perfecting,, has been missing for t-wo or three (lays -and is reported to be confined in Mlalolos. Time detachment was sent out to dlo work within the city, with directions to confine itself to the city' and suburban lines. Why they were arrested I (10 not undlerstand, nor can I imag1(ine for what reason they are hield at..Nlalol1os. I amil also informed that a citizen connected with fharper's Weekly. newspaper, of New- York, engage-d in taking views for that palter, has also been arr-ested and hfeld as a pr-isoner. I k~now nothing of this except froum report, nor do) I kn~ow N-lmo thre mian is. 1 aml also uitorimetl that a private soldier who went beyoimt the lines without author. ily and for wha-t motiv e 1 (10 not kno)w- is ailso held as,- aI prisoner. 1 send imy st ifl offive(r Lit utenaint HIami, of the E'ngineer Corps, to imake iniquiries,. mnd requiest yo(til ac tio in TmIhis iltttter. I aml dIoniim ev em-Nthinv- potss ible to pr'eserve the peace and avtti(d all friction until the Filipino peoplle (,in he maide timly acqut1 ainted withr the sentiments aind intui,t~ioiis o)f the Ainerican (4ov irimm t. w h(n I ami confiden t the y will -appreciate the enicleaviors of the Uniitedl taites a md w ill agrain look upon(1 that country as their frienl anid protel tor. I also fimllv 1 lit ve that the presemit unrest is the result of the machinations of' evil disptosd pl )01sons. I ain, Generah, most resltecttull\ tmin ttbetlieimt servant, '.S ~s Maj0or- Gctteral, U. S. V., Cottimmnadumq "MALOLOS, Fcbriiary 4, 18,99. "Major-GIenieral Oti'js,, (itif 01' Fit 'rccs of Occiipafiott o.t ffanila autd Catrite. ('E'NEtnxL: In r'eplyN ttt yttur letter oft F~eltruary 2, I have the honor to state that the segan nd. four~ American solthiers of the Eiigineer Corps, to-day lilterated, wtv're (letained within our- t(erritory, beyoiid our atlvained lines onl Solis str~eet, examIlining our intrenchinents anmd delci.uses at a (tistance ot' less than 200 meters. 4The sauld individuals (carried a revolver, kneives, a compass, plans of MIanila and its suburbts, a ltook with topographical imotes, a ineastiring, tape, a niachete, twvo teii knlives, Scales, t'tc. "1 deeply regret that tbese sid)diers hav-e been takenm within our lines, according to the testimony of our officers wvitnesses (of our detention, inasmuch as ther-e exists a (lcre, tatei Otobr 2,\which prohibits all foreigiiers from app)roaching our defensive works, takling photographic views., of the sa-me, drawing plans, or enterning our territory with arms,,although free transit is permitted all who are unarmed. Trhe correspontlent of 1l-arlper's WNeekly was arrested in San Juan del Monte takling photographic views, and the proof of this is that in care of Cutlonel Miguel he has beeii sent his camera anti his horse. "1I must state that in consideration of the. friendship of the Filipino people for the Americans the Said soldiers have not been imprisoned, but detained in accordance with the sptirit of the decree of October 20 last. They have been lodged in the (3obierno Miilitar aiid have been issued thme daily rations~ of our officers. If they have beenm uncoinfortable it is due tto the excessive sobriety of our race and soldiers, who are accustomed to eat but little and sleep on the hard ground. REPORT OF iMAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. "Witl these explanations I believe, General, you will (ndlerstand thle motive for the detention of your soldiers to-day liberaited all whlo have been treate(l with all due consideration. "I therefoire hope that your determilnation.-may be another Inotive onl whlich to base our friendly ri elations with the great Amnerican iepublic, an(l in consideratioln of this I also decree the liberty of tlie correspondent referred to. "I am, GeCeral, as ever, your obedient servant, "EMII,IO AGUINALDO." It will be observed that the insurgent government insisted that tllis engineer party was arrested outside of our smlall held of operations, which I am confident was nlot the fact, but tile corresl)pondence is given to show the efforts of the American authorities to sustain the peace. During all this time our officers al(d men were insulte(d and( openly proclaimed to be cowards; our outposts were attacked at lighlt, and the impression becamne general that the insurgenlts, notwithstalldig our efforts, would indulge soon ill open:attack, inl the belief aplparently entertainted by thlem that they wouill imeet witi feeble resistaice. l)uring the entire month of January thley ia(l labored iincessantly to strongly intrenlch their lines and 1 )lace tlheir artillery ii l )osition, alld boasted freely of thleir intentions to sooni drive the Amlericanl ftorces out of Manila. On the niglht of February 2 they sent inl; stromrg (letacliinent to draw the fire of our outlposts, whlich took up a position{ iminediately in front and witllin a few yards of the sanle. Th'lle outpost was strengthene(d by a few of our meni, who silently bore their taunts and abuse the entire lighlt. This w;as reported to nme by Genleral MacArtlhur, whom I (lirectedl to commlunic(ate withl the ofticer in colinmand( of the insurgent troops conceIrned. Ilis lreli)ared letter was show \' ie ald!apl)roved, amid the reply receivedl (bothl palers found ill (leneral MacIArtlhur's accompanyilg report) was all thlat coul(l be desired. However, the agreeinenit was igioredl by the insurgents, and oil the evening of February 4 another (lemlolstrationl was nIa(le onI one of our small outposts, which occupied a retired lposition at least 150 yar(ls within the line whiclh lhad b)een mutually agreed upon-an insurgent approachling the plicket and refusing to halt or answer whlen chlallenged. The result was that our picket discharged hlis pliece, when the insurgent troops near Santa MAesa opened a spilited fire oni our trool)ps there stationed. The insurgent lhad thus succeeded ill (drawiilg tle fire of a small outpost, which they had evidently labored with all their ingenluity to accomplish, in order to justify ill some way their lpreme(litated attack. It is not believed that the chief insurgent leaders wished to open hostilities at this time, as they were Inot completely prepared to assume the initiative. Tlhey desired two or thlree (lays niore to l)erfect their arrangements, but the zeal of their army brought on tile crisis whvich anticipated their l)remneditated action. They could not have dcelayed long, however, for it was their obl ject to force all issue before iAierican troops, then en route, could arrive in Manila. We niow take up for review the more iiil)ortant affilirs of the second period of the year which this directed relport must preselit-the p)eriod extending from February 4, 1899., to thle )present date. The returns of the United States trool)s rell(lered oil January 31 gave a numerical strength plresent in tlme P'lilil)l)ines of 819 comimlissioned officers and 20,()32 enlisted time. Of thlese, 77 oflicers amid 2,338 enlisted men were absent in C(avite and at Iloilo Harbor. These numbers iincluded all officers and enlisted lnen belongitng to the line or attached to staff corl)s, ta good many of wIlom had been detached for REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS 9 93 service in the various branches of civil administration which had been inaugulratedl or reestablished. On February 2 1 cabled to Washington that the deaths in all organizations since their arrival in the islands niumbered 220, of which 41. were (lue to the casualties of battle and accident, that (4 had been caused by typhoid fever, 43 by smallpox, 22 by dysentery, 8 by malarial flevers, anid the others were due to various diseases; that tlie l)revalellce of smallpox caused apprehension, but that t-he entire command had beeni va-ccinated several times, and 12 pIhysicians, mostly resident, had been engaged several weeks in vaccinating natives: that 9 per cent of the command was then reported sick, but that the great mnajority of all ailments were slight in character. Subtracting from the entire numerical strength of all trool)s present in the islands,,,', those at Cavite and Iloilo, the sick, those serv1ing in the civil dlelprrtlnents, and those belonging' strictly to and doing duty in the staff' organizations, thie eff'ective men of the line, officers anti soldiers, were about 14,000. Of these, 3,000 belong-ed to the lproyost guard and were expected to check the demonstrations of the natives and preserve order within M aiiila. The troops were occulpying( a great maiiy buildings located in thie various parts of the city, Cand I it was the (declaredl intention of the secret hostile organiizations in our midst to burii themin as soon as our troops sliould be called to the lilies ot' deliense determinned 111)(1 in order to resist the insurgent attack fromt wAithotut, as wvell as to destroy by tire the inore impluortallt business sections. For this puripose they head plrovi(led themselves with ta considerable quantity of' keroseue oil. soine of which had p~reviously beeni seizedl or confiscated. It was niecessary, there-,fore, to detail an efficient l)erlmanellt gllardl to protect each barra-ick building, which was maside uuil partially of slpecial-llty mneni. And it Imuighit be remniaked here that a curious featnue ot' the insurgent. phlan ot making war, which its sioldliems iiivar~iabll - p ictieel for two mouths afteir active hostilities colnu mcedl, wa-is to bunii lp'opcity idliscrimnilattely, followinig 1Russia's example during Napoleonfs adv-ance on Moscow. of which they had heard. or Spaii's l)1'aetice in time islands when the natives were consideredl to (Ieserve chiastisemnent. After estimating the necessities for the proper' protectionl of the city, it waus ascertained that we hnad about 10,000 men wvailable NA-ith wh10om1 to meet Aguimmaldo's ('oncenrtlatedl ari-ny, variously estimated at from twenty to thilty thtousauid, but w-e had the interioir of the circuMnseriibed half circle which was occulpied by his troolps-his flanks resting on Manila Bay north andI south of tihe city- and -about. 5 miles distant fromt each other, and his center about 4 miles east of the walled town, cut by'the Pasig River. The r'iver was not fordable and there were no means of crossing it, excelpt by small boats, hence insurgent troolps of one wing could not give support to the other in order to meet any ermegency of battle which might arise. We theretore had no fear for results ini so far as the efforts of the encircling force were concerned. To a Washington dispatch of inqiuiry received about February 1, 1 replied that in case hostilities were forced upon us we could handle Aguinaldo's army, and only feared the burning of the city by the unfriendly partially organized portion of the inhabitants. Several weeks previous to this daftte, we had uumoved tile Nebraska regiment from its barracks in the thickly-settled Binondo district to tlhe high, unoccupied ground at Santa MNIesa, the most eatstern suburb of tile city, where it was placed in camp. This cluange was made for sanitary reasons solely, as tie regimuent had been sufferinlg fiomt a, very high rate of sickness caused by uiihealthy locality. The new location 94 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. was within the view and the range of the Mauser rifles of the insurgents along the San Juan River portion of their line. During the latter part of January I was informed by good Filipino authority that the insurgents meditated an attack on these troops and was advised to remove them or, in their exposed place, the insurgents would kill them all. General MacArthur, who commanded north of the Pasig, warned Colonel Stotsenburg, who commanded that regiment and camp, and placed 2 guns of the Utah Artillery in position a short distance removed therefrom. It was expected tlhat insurgents would make the initiative at this point and they acted strictly in accordance with our anticipations. General Aguinaldo was inow at the zenith of his power. He had recently repressed rebellion which had raised its head in central Luzon. He had assembll led a pliant conlgress, many members of which had been appointed by himn to relre sent far distant congressional districts, and which had voted hiin the dictator of the lives and fortunes of all the inhabitants of tle l'hililppines. lHe dominated Manila, alnd wheil lie ordered thaet the birthday of tlhe inartyred Ilizal should b)e al)propriately observed there, butsiness was lparalyzed aind not a native d(l red to pursue his accustomed ldaily lasbors. Not a province 1ad tlhe courage to oppose his appointed governors, b)acked by tleir Tagalo guards, although a few of those governors had previously suffered martyrdoml for the zeal exhibite(l in colle{cting money an(l sequestering private property. The southern islands were obedient. The appointed governor for one, and that one mnot eager for independence, wrote in J anuary: To the Htonorable President of the Recoolutionary/ Gorernmeni t of the Philippines. HONORIZABLIE SIR: This governuiient has received thle respected coimiunication from the presidency undler your coimmuind, ordering that under no pretext whatever are American or other foreigrl troolps to be permitte(l to land on this island, which order it will le my pleasant duty to comply withI as far:is thie scanty forces under my command will permit. I have, undler to-(lay's dlate, ordlered( the officials under my command in charge of the towns of tils province to follow tlhe sanme instructions, under pain of the most severe penalties. I have the honor to reply ais above to the comnmunication before cited. God guard you for many years for our liberty and independence. He was hailed from Europe as the savior of his country and as first of "the generous and noble Tagalo people," and was assured of "the sympathy of all liberal and noble nations." He was called upon to take a prominent part in United States politics, and those extending the invitation said: President AGUINALDO. DEAR SIR: In the interest and welfare of the Filipino Republic, I take the liberty to write you regarding an educational work to be published in this country representing the views of the antiexpansion party, or the people who wish to see a free and independent Philippine republic. The object of this work is to increase public sentiment against annexation of the Philippines. Therefore, believing that some facts from the pen of your honor would strengthen the cause, I am authorized to ask certain questions. First. Will you kindly state the per cent of those who wish annexation to tlhe United States, if such there be? Second. Will the natives take constant interest in political affairs under selfgovernment? Third. Are they upon recognition ready to drop their arms and enter upon an enterprising industrial life? After answering these questions, a short article regarding the Philippine feeling toward this country and their wished-for independence will be appreciated, and I am confident will very materially strengthen this cause in the election to decide the policy of our country. Hoping your sincere love for your people will insure an immediate reply, I remain, Very respectfully, REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 95 lie was confident that the great majority of the people of the United States Justified him in his rebellion, and as for its soldiers whom he had shut up) in Manila, many sympathized with his people in, their struggle for independence and would not fight him. To an unbeliever in this last conviction hie saidl, "Go to the lines at Santa Ana and be convinced, and the mani went amid pretended to believe. The encouragements and hredyadiele received from foeg parts through newspapers adcommunications fr'omn adnrr, asndelegates, and representatives assuredl him of an easy solution of the war problem before himi if hie could strike while only a few volunteers confronted him and before the regulars tihen en route could arrive, Ilie therefore confidently concentrated his well armied and anunnnitioned forces to mnan the holes his troolps had beeni weeks in digging and where they would be secure from -attack ini any event, even if success (lid not attend his efforts to slaughlter the Americans or drive them into the waters of the bay. These 1)reparlatiomls consummated, he prepa-red the outlines of his (le-claration ofwvnr, time full text of which w-as published at Malolos on time evening and very shortly -after his hiostile shots were first resp~onded to by our troop~s, and wvithout considtering cause or intenit. The longed-for opportunity had arrivul an lihe hastened to em ibr~ace it. The (leclalatioll was circulated iin Manila the next mtornimig, and iead as follows: GENERL~ ORD1ER To THE PHiILIPPINE ARM1Y. \inc, o'clock p). wi., thisk date, I eevdfromt Caloocan station a iiiessa gre comiiliilnic-atedl to mne that. thle Aineric in for ce-s Nvithont 10,101'notification or any j ust miotiv-e. attacked our camip at San Juan 1e 1 \onte and onr for(ces garrisoning~ the blockhonises arouiild tile oultsk~irt s of M1anila, caninu, ii lsses amnong our soldliers, who ill view of this uniexpectedl ag-gression anti. of thtle (Ieiled attack of the aggressors, w\ere oblio-ed to (lefeild themnselv\es until the flfiriur bee-tun-e grenertil all. along- the line. No one(, can t deplore miore tb ill I thils inli~tnre of host ilities. I hiave a clear conscjitene that I ha \-e endeavoredl to a~void it it all costs, nsing all mny efforts to preserve friendship with the armyi of oceup.ation, even at the cost of not a fewv humiliations an iay sacrificed rights. But it is miy uua-voidlable dntv to umaintaiu the integrity of the national honor and that of' the armny so unjustly attacked byN those who, posing as ouir friends and liberators, attemp~ted to dlominate us in plate of the Spaniards, as is showvn by the grievances enuiinerated in my manifest of Jannary 8 last; such as tile contiinued outrages and violent exactions commnitted against the people of MNanlila, the useless conferences, and aill niy frustrated efforts in l'avtor of peace and concord. Summoned hy this unexpected provocation, urged by tbe duties imposed upon me by honor and patriotism and for the (lefense of the nation intrusted to me, calling on God as a witness of my good faith and the uprightness of my intentionsI order aiid command: 1. Peace alid friendly relations between the Philippine forces and the American forces of occullatioli are broken, and the latter will be treated as enemies, with the limits prescrihied by the laws of war. 2. American soldiers who may lie captured by the Philippine forces will be treated as prisoners of war. 3. This proclamation shall be communicateil to the accredited consuls of Manila. and to congress, in order that it tiay accord the suspension of the constitutional guaranties anti the resulting declaration of' war. Given at Mlalolos February 4, 1899. EMilLTo AGUINALDO, General-in- Chief. TO THlE PHILIPPINE, PEOPLE. By my proclamation of yesterday I have publishedI the outbreak of hostilities between the IPhfilppine forces and the Americ.an foices of occupation in Manila, unjustly amid unexpectedly provoked by thme latter. In amy manifest of' January 5 last I published the gielev-ances suffered by the Philippine forces at the hands of' the army of occupation. The constant outrages and taunts, which have caused the misery of the people of Manila, and, finally, the 11( 6 96 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. useless conferences and the, contempt shown the Philippine groverninent prove the premeditated transgression of Justice aiid liberty. I know that war has always produced great losses; I knowv that the Philippine people have not yet recovered fromi past losses and are not in the condition to endnre others. But I also know by experience 1how bitter is slavery, and lby experienice I k;now that we should sacrifice all on the a.ltar of our honor aind of the national hi regrity so unJ ustly attacked. I have tried to avoid, as fiar as it has been possible for inc, to do so, ariiiedl conflict, in iuy endeavors to assure our, independence b)y Ipacific means atiold to avoidi iore costly sacrifices. Buat aill my efforts have been nseless against the umeasureless pride of the American Government and of its representatives in these islands, xvho have treated mie as a rebel becanise I defend the sacredl interests of muy couintry and. do not make niyselt' an imistrunient of their dastardly intentions. Past campaignis will have convinced yon that the people are strong when they wish to be so. Without arms we have dlriven fromt our beloved coiintry our ancient miasters, andl without arums we (-an repulse the foreigmi invasion as lonig as8 we wish to dlo so. Providence always has memieas in reserve anud pronipt 11111 for tile weak in rdrthat they 11fynot be annihbilated ily the strour; thatjitc a edn n humanity progress. lie not discouragced. Our independence has been watered bly the generous blood of otir martyrs. Bflood -which. may be shed] in the future will strengthen it. Nature hats never dlespised g-enerouts sacri flees. Buit remilenhler that in ordler that our efforts miay not be was-ted, thwat oufr vows may be isene t, tatour end(,s may be,aiel it is in(Iisl~ellsable tha-t wNe adjust o11r act iomms to the, rules of lawa mid of rio-ht, le.irnhin to tritimioub over our emiemiies aind to Cotiquer our own evil passions. EMiim( A(m IINA L DO, JiesiidCat 0 tile P~hilippitte Rcepeblic. IALOLOSI, JFebrnarg 5, 189,9. The battle of Manilta, which colmmenlce( at half past 8 o'clock on the evening of February 4, continued until 5 the irext eveniihig. Its (let~ails were tuily reported on April 6; last, aiid it is iiot niecessatry to pr1esent themn aniew. 1 itisert a short extract fromt theat report to show the determiniationi of the insurgents to lprovoke coiftlict: Du)fring the entire month of J auitary they licid labored i icessamitly to strongly imittrencli their hiues and pla1ce their artillery ini losition. Oii tile nigh-t of Felbriiary 2 they sem t in a strouig detaclllieult to (niraw I lie tile of' our outpost, whmich took up a pIosit ion iuiinnedia-,tely iii f'ront of anul w'rhi n a few yardls oftile saume. The 0o1t1ost was strenigthienedl by a few mien, will silently bore the Iietaemciiut's taunits amid abuse thle entire n1ighlt. This was reported to mec by G'eneral la~cArthur, wvhonm I directed to comniniunicate wvithb the officer iii colnmland of' the~ i isurrgeiit troolls concernedi. His hprepared letter was shown umie inul Iapluoved, luild the rep~ly recei vedl (both pap~ers oulidl in General MlacArthur's accomtpanying report) wvas all tha.'t colled be desired. However, the agreemtenrt entered into was igmuored[ by the insurgenlts, and on the evening of February 4 another dlenioulstratloll wa1s uiiade ODn. one of our sullall ouitposts, which (occullied a retired position, at least 15ff) yards wvithfn the line wvhich had been mutu-illy aigreed upon, an inisiurgent approaching the pick~et aind refusing to halt or answer wllen challenged. The result was our picklet discharged his pliece, when the insurgent troops near Santa Mlesa opened a spirited tire on our troops there stationed. The engagement was one strictly defensive on the Ipart of the insurgents and of vigorous attack by our forces, although oluriiig the iiight it was confined to an exchange of fire between the opposing lines on the, north from the Pasig River to the Lico road, a distance of about 2 miles, with an occasional shot on the south ini the vicinity of IPaco, and a few straggling shots on the extreme left ine the direction of Caloocan. Admiral IDewey had placed two vessels a silort distance off shore to the north and one to the south of our flanks, where they rested on Manila, Bay, and shortly after daybreak on the mornfing of the 5th I telegrap)hed him: "Heavy firing all along our north front at midnight and at 4 a. m. Casual firing at Paco. Several casualties ine Toudo district. Charleston arid Callao could give efficient aid in that vicinity," and at 6.50 a. in. 1 wired him that "tfiring continues; few casualties; a sharp raking fire of one-half hour j ust to north of blockhouse on Vitas REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 97 Pass would reach insurgent line and demoralize them." This was effected, an(1 the Monadnock on the south was also doing good service. At midnight General Anderson, who commanded all troops south of the l'asig, consisting of King's and Ovenshine's brigades, was directed to liold them in readiness to receive a morniing attack, but not to attack until further instructed. Our imllediate interests lay to the northeast and comprised tile lpumlping stationt and delosito of tlhe waterworks, which it was necessary to secure, altllough we had provilded for their loss, ill so fitr as the army was concerned, by erecting; l numilber of distillitlg l)lants allong the river banks, by whichll good water could be obtained. Stotseiilumrg had attacked early in the morniii, drove the enlemy from the bloclkhouses il lhis fronlt, alnd reported thlat lie could caltutre tle pow(ler nmagazine and waterworks (del)sito meaing, thloughil puml)inlg station unllderstood at the time) it desiredi. MacArthur lhld been p)iessing back the lienetty il his entire front, infiicting heavy ioss. Ile had called for troops to fill gap oi Stotsenliur"'s left, and ta;)battallion of tile First Tennessee Kegimient of tile i)rovost guard, utler tlie co(inianli of its coloniel, w:is sent hlil, Iand tlhe tfllt\oing corresl)pondecle by telegrapllh ensuedl: ee('ae'il MA1rA('\RiTi: Stotsen1b)rg reports: " tlve capt.tred Ilo(icklhiuses i and 7; burtned;. Can capture iowder magiazine and; wavterworks it' lesi:r.i." I'ittalin First 'IlTen ssee li:1s passe(l to report to yo-i. l.et Stotsenlltiu(r go;llaheld with;i i of Ten nesse, if colnditions pellnlit, and ca lttre magazine..\'Vaterwirkl\s must. wait..N)i1t prl'en111 to 1a\dvance slmall for(ce so ftar out. 6iener:;l Ot'.s: A lm l tkint:' inqoiries ait various,irts oft' line ti (lctetr' ine ie xpe( lienic (Pt' 11oving' Stotselii}rg as vis siggst. so as to extencl entire liie l'roi( Mara-,tilini to Calooc:a (. StotSi-e bllrg' s slcc( ss 01 right nIayx havi, id(lulc(ed thent to retire o( tlie let.. This I amt:now trying to l-certain. 1)Do \on approve (tf thiiS mInov.iz:mnt if I lini it, exp lt dieInt. Ai ( Al A TI-. Genera I MA1ACIRiT 11: D)o not think extension it) or line fron Maralinam to ( aican pru nlent. Our I:lnk wonld ble greatlly explsed at Marat'lina. Y, ( ha lill vo;,. Iavlla i llel tl.()ops 1ulllr all'll s all night, and ptortiol,(f tll'hel ml st ] lve ls at aId Ia e Is 11111 sleep. s(i t:hat vyo conull 1n}t lla(e 11ul'oe tlh:i;-)l,) ii0llen )In linle per n p'i 1,ti'y. I I thlinkl Stoisilllnurg ieaunt reservoir an1(l not wa vte rwiiks. The INeblaska regiment and Tenllessee battalion a.dvtaiced 'api(ldly during thle morning and 'capltured tlit:e powder Hlouse and deposito, andl tlie Soutlh Dl)lakota regimenlt on the left drove the enemy from all their int renchllmets as far to t(he westward as tlie Ilico road, and tabout Ino0() tlie followilg telegram wNas sent to (General MacAr llur: IRelported that insurgent troop s were arriving all uiglit andl this lmorni)gi for servie in your front. lllink line yo, snggest. froin c,(st to 'llillese Hospital \your plroper or1e', Int: pIerlitiitig Stotslnbnlrg to exp )ose.your right llank innecessarily. T'lie insurgents liad firm possession of the railway;1d1 all of its rolling stock, aned were utilizing' it to tile best adv:anta ge in forwlrdilig to Caloocan its troolos fromn the north. 'I'o my dispatch General MacArtlur lrepllied as follows: IHav1e youri dispat.cl. Will act accordingly;1!1(1 try a;nd occulpy Clinese Hospitall;alnd extend tllc line to the left froin tlat loint. \Ve have everything now to include llocklhouse 4, aindl I hlave no doubt when Clolnel Kessler gets a giiln, which I have sellt to the front, we will demolish;an occupy the hospital if it is still ldetended by the insurgents. At 11.20 a. i)i. Stotsenlurg is c(rossing Sanii Jan hliveir lt thle lirilde; have autlhorizedl him to proceed according to your advice, but to le prudent,and not gIo( ti) far, as tlie left of tlhe insurgent line still holding on, or at all events not yet oiiclupied 1by us. w —7 98 98 REPOUET OF MAJOR-GEINERAL OTIS. This line was established during the afternoon, 811(1 General MacArthur h-ad littfle, to (contend with for the rentainder of the day, his chief difficulty thereafter comiing tromi the rear, from which an 'occasional hostile,;hot was fired, and in the evening lie telegraphed lie had everything a~t the front with. the exception of two) companies of the Montana, aii( contiiiied:1 "If you will look at the imap1 youi will see that miny line extendls from at point opp)osite San Pedro M11acatfi to the b~ay. It will hardly be lpossible to briiig anybody in to-inghit, as new demands illay arise. I, suggoes't, ltit dlo not requiest, that a, 1)attalion be sent here foir an extraordimnary reserve, to be placedl along the Lico road to Calle Iris." Two companies wvere. borrowed tromn the provost gulardl and p)laced as req uested. The troops, of' General Ani(Jerson became eager to a,,ttack the enemy early on the morning of time.Mlm, and at 7.45S o'clocki a,. in. p~ermissioni was granted, the general. being cautiomed: Do — not advancee too far. anml look out for your flank~s antid the illonadnocl."1-` General 1KCing had asked to swing his briglade, the left, of' which rested on the IPasiog near 'Santa Ana,f to the left- thereby driv~ing the enemy in his front- to the river, where lie wonld have himn at his mnercy. This was authorized and the (1ahifornias, Wcashingtonls, and Idtahos respondIfing with great. vigor, the movemenet was atte(ide(1 with sga success. The insurgent ca~suialties hiere were very hieavy andl man-y were drowned ~in the Pi siog. 1aving- attempltedl to cross it -to esc'ape 1)unlisdhnment. M.eanwhifle thec' righlt of Andierson's line. which was confronttedi by an almost in penietrable, thicket, was meeting'- with serious" dlifficuilties. It, had (iriveli thme insurg-ents frfmi their intrenclmnments, onl the, extreme right, but at the center in the jungle amid swamnp they hcld on wvith great tenacity. This position was pressedl by a portion of' the Four'teenthi Infa i( he tkuty, wider Claltainm M urphmy, an hel stroop of the Fonrthj Cavalry, which adv-anced slowly, shooting the insurgenits in their formidable intrenmchmenits,7 whic~h they had constructed therein, asthey refused to yield. At I11 o'clock a. in. I telegra-,phied General Anderson as follows: 1-~tablisli your finial line from coast opposite P. -S.a to San11 LPedro Macati. This gives youm a shiort line and command of all the roadIs leadingm to the north andl a fiairly opei (country. You can undlertake it,-as soonl is Mu11rPly overcomles difii cultx- inl his front. FIlue North Dakotas caii adtvance aloni1- c_-oast of bay near Pasa~y. I'mo canl attend to all this as 50011 as youi are sure of' capturing San Pedro Macati. And I thereupon. telegraphed Admiral D~ewey as follows: Have dlirected Aiiderson to iEstalilish solutherni line bietweeui Pasav- and Saii I elro Maca-ti on Pasig. lie will move dlown uas sooui as, lie, has fuIll posses'sion of' San Pedro Macati, which will soon fa-ll into his handis. Will you k~eep vessel to the tnt to assist -advance (lowli coastGeneral Anderson seemedl (oubttnl if his troops could obtai-li pos-,session of the iimdicated line (the Pa~say and Sain Pedro Macat-i road) theat afternoomi oim account of the (lifficulty experienced at his (center. Hie had. telegraphed fromt F)attery Knoll, riight of Paco bridge, at 12.30 p.M.: King, has takeui Santa Ana; 200 prisoners. Maniy Filipinos repo~rted k~illed(. (101', loss, unknown; believed not to ho hieavy. Ov-enishine has cleareil his f-out onl his right, drivingr the!m hack to our old initrenchmenets. Capta~in Murphy saiul to hiavel amlvancedl to blockhouse 1-h. hut iiinsurgents still- ho01( flankingr position on his rirh1t. Have sent dlown one gun -whici h)as opened onl theni, but dlo not know withi what results. Firing still contin~ues. Last seeii ot Smith (colonel of California rewiment. meaning ) was advancing onl the, right, with two battalions a-nd enterinig Sanl lledlro Macati. Prevent insurgent reeinforceeients crossilig river, REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 99 And later he telegraphed froml Paco bridge as follows: Maj or-General Anderson presents his oimplinienits and says tihat he has sent all availalle troops to rout insurgents on Captaill.1Murphy's flank, but that present force is inlade(lilatc to accomlilish this. He requests that he be recnforced with a battalion from (;eneral Hughes's command, and with these he is confident he can drive insurrgents out. Another battalion of the Tennessee regiment was borrowed froml the p)rovost-llarshal and was fconduclted by lly aid, C(iatain S;anders, to the center of this line, bit did not arrive until the ground had beenl carried. I hIad sent Lieutenant-Colonels Crowder and Potter to make known to General Andersoii the particulars of tlhe miovemeut desired, and finally, fealilng thatt sone nmisunderstandilng might result, explained to Lieutenant-Coloel Barry, my adjutant-general, all lparticulars, making careful reference to the map, and disl)atcle(d him to confer with General Ovellshine. IIe welt direct to that officer, whose troolps on tlhe right of the line Ihad returned to the original position of t!e nmol'nilfg, fearing the sliells froml tle g'uns of tle Mionaldock, whlicll struclk comnfortably near. WN hen Colonel Barry expllained fully to him wlhat was expected of his troops, he at once took up the advance, swinging a part of his line to the left, attacking the enemy in tle flank-whlom he soon routed aud (lrove beyond tlhe range of fire —and l)laced his entire line firinly on thle I) say iroad. At 1.3: o'clock Colonel Blarry telegraplhed me as follows: ]1ve just returne(d from the lighlt il front of Murphy's position. Insurgents driven olIt in sliairp fight w-len i (; en1ral ( \-enshinei advaIce-d towar d Iasay. Iittle loss to our forces. butt insurgents 1Iadly handled. 5Many killedl. \Vill see General Anderson. tleil return to Ma;il;icanai. Word lias julst been receivedla tht Ovenshine has taken Plas:y without resistance. Andersmo;it Sani Pedro Macati. \\ill return to Mala(Tann. At 4.45 1 telegralphed Genereal Anderson as follows: First Nortl l)akota, Fourteenth Ilfantry, and Fourtl Cavalry on Pasay road. King iimust tall oir and tike iposition on that road to-night. 'hat will lhe your permianeit line. It' yon cal spare Tennessee returi it. MaIy Ie trouble in Tondo and liiiiondo to-night. MacArthur's troops occupying position far in advance of this moriing and1 all on the line. l)uring tile night of February 4 and the following day the inhabitants of tlhe city- were greatly agitated, fearing for their personal safety. Streets were almost deserted, excelt by our troops. Two or three attempts were made to assemble by tlie secret military organizations, but were 1)rolmptly checked by Brigadier-General Huglhes, tile provostlmarslal-general, wrio had admirably lplacedl and retained his force at tlhe more important 1)oints. Hlis action was quick alnd decisive. Early on the morning of tlhe 5th lhis police companies so effectively delivered their fire upon these assembling organizations that they were dispersed and discouraged. Their loss in killed could not have exceeded 50( or 60), l)lt they mlade no furtlher very tdangerous demonstlations until the night of February 23, when they suffered a severe experience for their temerity. At the close of tlhe day on the 5th Admiral Dewey inquired concerning the situation, anld was replied to as follows: Situation satisfactory. On south we hold road from Pasay to San Pedro Macati. ()n tile 11orthl we. hold the water reservoir, San.luan del Monte, and all blockhouses. Country peac'lfuil an1d city quiet. Troops fought magnificently. Insurgent dead between 50) and 1,000. Lots of prisoners and '2 Krupp guns captured. Insurgents demnralizedl. \We owe you gratitude for yomr great aid. ()ur casualties for the day in killed and wounded numbered about 250. Those of tlhe insurgents will never be known. Our hospitals were filled with their wounded, our prisons with their captured, and 100 REPORT OF MAIJOR-GENERAL OTIS. we buried 700 of them. Their loss was estinmated at 3.000, and considering the number who died on the field of battle might be deemed conservative. On1 February 6 it was ascertained that Colonel Smith. with his Californians, had not halted at Sa1n Pedro Macati, but llad l)lpusuted tle fleeing enemy up the Pasig River. No one seemled to knlow deilnitely his location, except tlhat it was somewhere ii the vicinity of the towns of Pasig, Pateros, or Tagillig. lie hld gone lm, with 2 ba)ittalioIns of his regiment and occupiel tliese villages, receiviing thle written surrelnder of the inhabitants. Geieral Anderson was lirected to wit(lraw llim at once to the Pasa Ly road, whichl le li id not reach unltil tle Sth of the inonth. The enemy took l)ossessiol of tlie town\vs which lhe h;ld evacuate(d upon his directel withllawl:l and celeb'rated a victory. 'They had been collectilng to the east of the townl (f I'Pasig and oii tle southl, a.lnd there was danger that tley would cut off Smlith's retreat. in case lie dlidd not fatll back without delay to his (lirected position. A movemenlt lifro the soutlherl line was not considered advisable, as the bulk of insurgelnt troops \were agaii coIcettratilg ol tlie lnol'th ill the vicinity of Caloocaii, ald tlie slhort, aldiral)le soutlhernl line which we had establislhed was easily deflienled and c(.ul(l sjpare trool)s for any emergency at tlhe niorth. ()n the morningl of tlhe 6th our atttention wtas giV(el to thle larg'e nI1lber of p1artisams or bishlwhal}tkers, Imostly in rear oft' omi liles, who were continually firi ng tfrom nipa lits or other lp)Ices of) couIcealmnent 1l)11 our passing traullsortaitio( e, mlessen g's, and detachments. Nearly all the barrack (guards ha;td beein fiowarded to tlie front a.nd tlhe l rovost guard was widely disperseld on tle outskirts of' tlie city. 11l some instances it was necessary to resort to radical nleasures adl( (lestroy many of tlhe i pa huts whicli, situatedl in tlie,bamb1),oo aind balnala tllickets, gave Iprotection to scattered i;nlugents who dollbtless belollnged to the interiorl olrganizatios or city iisurlgelnt militia. The day was devoted to tlie removal of these daiingelo' s andl thllieatenigll obstacles and the burial of tlie dead. Albout 10oo0 (Coloiel Stotsenbuirg telegralphed from tlhe D)eposito, or' water reservi r, tlie fillowi'g: General MacArthurl iistle cts R llt to wie, su81'stiellio8s Illout waieCworks. T'l'lie should bIe takel aId11 line of lilpe occupiedl: ll ' '1'1. I t clli k I i can 1(o it f'rom here a tdl if necessary r1t111 te pump oc' cpyi:-' li,l i'h g-roII d in rea1, atid col( - uecting with the left of tlie I'irst lDiv-isio at Saii I'edtl ro II ati. My ( conll ntl ( c,11 -sists of the First Ne)braska, Tlennessee battalio), the' ': clompllani es oi' 1;1i Colo rado regimellnt, andi pie es of artillery. 'I'hlere is 1( egiIner l;tl tlie wattfrworlks tuand l o coal. I dl o not tli k we slall find:1nyl diliicl ltvy beItweell lere ndll theIre. Stotsenburghs command was aLgmented by a battalion of the i Twenty third Inftnitry fi'om thle provost guard, Ind(er c(mnnla:ido of Major (ioodale, and le was directed to )p'o(eedl al(l clarrl1y out his 1pl1. Later tlhat evening I sent for (Generl al Iale, whlo coimnal ded tlhe riglht Ilriga(le of MacArthur's limle, iifi)rming' himi that I hiad just received infllormatiol that a part of Stotsenburg:'s commandl was ill difficulty, Ihaving bIeen attacked by insurgents, adii that it was short of mmllullnition aind without water. Hale at once lproceeded to the l)eposito alnd wiredl me that Stotsenburg Iupo) leavigti the waterworks hlad ordered( (loodale to take his battalion out thle Maraquina road, extenldiing his right to cominect with his (Stotseiiburg's) left, amd (conltinued: Although I liad not contemplated sending any trools t IMaraqina, I (lid not eonsider it desirable to cllange orders aild leave Stotsenlbrg's left Ilanl k without tlhe protection he was anticipating, and as there was little resistaillce liet tlhrougI tlhe district traveled and as we leard no firing on onr left, there appeared to be no special danger in Goodale's position. We threw sonie shells in the direction of the headquarters at Maraquina to show themi that they were covered by artillery lire and to deter them from any attack they might nmake on Goodale's colmmnnl d. REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL (OTIS. 101 General Hale ascertained tlhat the reports which I had received were greatly exaggerated and that 1o )portion of Stotsenburg's command was in any imnne(liate danger. Hle at once adopted measures to keep open communication with the pumping station, which Stotsenburg had successfully reached, by means of large detachments which patrolled the 4 miles of road between Deposito and tile station, and the following morning I received this telegram from General MacArthur: Stotsenburg just reports that he has found the missing pump machinery, that insurgents have abandoned Maraquina, and that 10 colnpanies went toward Pasig. This comllland lhas been actively engaged since Friday and wants to rest to-day and to-morrow. I have authorized him to do so and not to make any further active movement of any kind without specific orders. Large band of insurgents, armed and equipped, movinJg toward Pasig. Recommend sending gunboat up river to prevent them crossing. Seem to be concentrating south of Pasig. Captain Randolph is now here and I can give him any orders you wish. To which reply was made: Order Captain Randolph to take the gunboat to San Pedro Macati and remain in that vicinity. Inforlmation w-ill hbe forwarded to him at tlat point. Acknowledge and report action. The gunboat referred to was a former Pasig River passenger steamboat known as the Lag(unma e Bay, which we had seized, though subsequently purclased, about two weeks before active hostilities commenced, for service on the upper Pasig, should occasion require. On her we had pl)aced machine and 6-pounder gtuns and heavy sheet-iroll protection, anld detailed for duty with her 2 officers and 65 men. She was coinman(led by Captain Rlandolph, of the Third Artillery, and afterwards by Captain Grant, of tlie Utah Artillery, who was an experienced steamboat man, having been formerly engaged as a captain of a passenger vessel plying tlhe northern United States lakes. She was a formidable and ugly-looking craft, drawing only 4 feet of water, gave the insurgents; much uneasiness, and subsequently great fear whenever on the Pasig ]l iver, in the waters of the Laguna de Bay, or in the rivers of Bulacan provillce she chanced to appear. She was fearlessly handled and was considered to be equivalent to a regiment of men whenever engaged. Her repeated successes led us to llurchase and put in defensive conditioll thlree other small light-draft river steamboats or launches, which, though interior to thle Lag/mna (le Bay as fighting machines, have rendered excellent service. Tlhe inlsurgelt troops, which Colonel Stotsenburg reported as moving upon the town of Pasig, at thle hea(l of the river of tliat nlame, were those which, in connection with the insurgents in the south, it was believed were about to concentrate to resist Colonel Smith and his two lost battalions of the California reogiment then in that vicinity, which on the f;tli ]lad been ordered to withdraw immediately to their intended position at San Pedro Macati. On February 7 division commanders looked to the means of readily supplying their troops with ammninnition, subsistence, and water, and whatever else miight t)e leed(ed. For tlis service we welad only tlie primnitive traLsl)ortation of the country. A few days before the fighting commenced Major Devol, trallnsportation quartermaster of the commaid, had been directed to assemmble his hired carts at a certain locality in the city upon thle first indication of active hostilities and to be prepared to seize and assemble there, also, all wheeled vehicles of which he could obtain possessionl. These instructions lie carried out most effectively, and the firing line was at all times supplied with every essential requirement. Citizens who suffered losses thereby were instructed to submit their claims, which were promptly settled, and over $7,000 (Mexican) were paid to them on these particular accounts. A good many unauthorized 102 REPORT OF MA.JOR-GENERAL OTIS. seizures were made by enlisted men going to and returning from the front, sent in many instances for ammunition and rations. This was checked under formal orders issued on the 7th instant, and all inhabitants were compensated who thereby suffered. On the morning of the 7th Colonel Stotsenburg reported that he had found all missing parts of the pumping machinery. Steps were at once talen to put this machinery in order and il the course of two (ays the city was receiving an abundant water supply, which has continued since that date. The demoralization of the insurgents, which the rough handling they had unexpectedly received from the American lnode of conducting warfare hitherto unknown in these islallds, and plronoullced by tlhen to be new and unsoldierly, continued for two or tlhree d(ays. The leaders, confessing that their lmen were overmatched by our troops, contended that they could overcome by numbers what was lackilng il individual characteristics. They commenced at once a reconcentration. of all tileir forces in every direction, hastening fronm tihe north by rail every available manl whether armed with rile or bolo. Still, they lhad lost a good many of their original soldiers, who, thoroughly satisfied with the results of their war for independence, hlad escapl)e to their lhomes in dlistant villages. There was no lack of ammunition o' subsisteice for the troops on the north, but thlose on the south hlad lost through capture all tlhe rice and cartridges which they had stored near thleir original lines and could not be resupl)lied without difficulty. The bolo men of the city, who had remained quiet since the afternoon of tlIe 5th, began to show again a, turbulent disposition, and as early as February 8 became bold and defiant. It became necessary to inake new combinations, for the insurgents still persisted in tihe intention to carry out their forier preconceived plaim of action, which was to b)e an attack on our front, assisted by an overwhelming uprising of the city insurgent militia. Our southern line was short and secure. The northern line lhad a sharp p)rotruding angle at the Chinese churchl, 1:tI niles southeast of Caloocan; thence it exteinded southeasterly toward the deposito; tlhence south to the Pasig River with a strong outpost ait the pummpinig station, 4 imiles east of the deposito. The left of this line was reftused, running from the Chinese church to Vitas P1ass in a southlwesterly direction. Two battalions of thie provost guard lhad beemn sent to thie pumnping station and otlher p)ortions of it lIad been placed far out in the suburbs. The increased insurgent activity within thle city obliged tlie returni of all this guard for city service, and(l to effect it, time Wyoming battalion, three troops of the Fourth Cavalry, tle -North D)akota regiment, tand two guns of Dyer's Light Battery were withdrawln ironi Anderson's front. The first organization relieved the Twentuy-third battalion at the pumlping station. Thle cavalry and artillery troop.s were sent to General MacArthur for tuse in time vicinity of tlhe Chinuese church, lInd the North DIakota regiment was placed in Maleate (where an uprising was thlreatened) for temporary duty. General MacArthur haId re(luested 1)erumission to swing his left on the town of Caloocan thereby giving him an excellent continuous and direct line on good ground from that towln to thle deposito, but was requested to remain as quiet as possible for a coul)le of days until the enemy could effect complete concentration in his frontr, when amnother opportunity to punish him very severely would be 1)resented. This lie did, and on thle 10th of the month (it lhaving been reported that Luna had placed about 4,000 insurgents south of Caloocanm in front of MacArthur's refused left) he was directed to rectify his alignment, which 1I4EPORT OF MAJ1LOR-GENERAL UTIS.10 103 hie atc-onilsliledl onl the atternooni of the 10th, by a very spiritedl attack li te art ofhMAontana, Kansas, adPenn sylvaniia Vlttes n the Third Artillery (brigade of -Brig-. Gen. H. C'. Otis) swinging on. the (hiiiiese church as a p)ivot. The attack, preceded by a tire, of thirty Minutes fromi the guns of the Navy vessels on aFnd in front o)f Calo~ocan, consisted of ait imipetuous charge which. swept away every o)bsta~cle, infilting great daniage onl the enemy, 'who foughlt stubbornly w-ithin his initreiichnieints for ta time, but finailly fled indiscrimjinately to the rear. Our troop~s pursued beyond the line which it was intelnde(.1 to establish, rushed onl to aind over thle stonie walls which surroundcled the Calo~oc-at cemetery, whiere the insurgents had placedl a strong force, which they well-nigi-h destroyed. Darkniess coining on the troops were q~uickly recalled, and( the- line, with the left resting on Caloocan was oecup~ie(1-the extreme left being refused to guard against any mlovement fromt the directioim of the town of MaLabon. iDuring the afternoon of February 8 I received the following dispatch frorn Admniral Dewey,: Have, sent l1ag of truce to San R~oque directing withblrawal of in1suig~eit troops. If white Ila'i is not flying at 9 a. in. to-niorrowv shall open With ships. Please (lirect ('oh)oel coMmanlding to occupy San R~oque (after insurge(nt troops leave. This is mnost implootant in interest of navy. Sami Roque was a, thickly Lpopulated village connected with the iir11val station at C11avite by a, causeway over a iiarrow intervening strip of' water and was at the nimercy of the gunls of the n~avy. The inisurgent troolps fornierly occupying Cavite had taken possession of this point, where they had] been augmenetedi by consideralble accessions fromr the Cavite province. Our ownv troops, consisting o.f the Fifty-first io)wa LReginment, 2 Califiornia battalions of heavy artillery, the Wyomning Light Artillery, and the Nevada trool) of dismounted ca~valdry, commanded b)y Colonel Loper, of the Fifty-first Iowa Reginient, occuplied Cavite and guarledl the causew~ay between tIle two towns. U-pon receipt of the Adlnir~al's tellegrami, Colonecl Loper was properly instructed, and( at 9 ocoOil the inornincr of the following dlay the insum-g4ents, having kerosemned. San Roque, fired it anid withdrew, (Tossing the nieck which joilts, it. to the. iuainlalld. Ouri tlrol)5 at oiice took possession and by persistent efforts sarved from (lestructioll many of its best buildings. Time inhabitimnts tledl, preceding 01' acc —ompamm~yfil o the inasurgents, arid Colonel Loper stationed g~uar-ds there and 1)laced a force across tile narno0w neck of' land at a lpoint about. a nile distant fromt Cavite, where hie confronted tIme imisurgreilt intremmhieullets on the main shore, where troops hatve since been iinaimtafimed -arid fromt which point, thtey hav-e operated by rec-oilloissalince as- tarast 01(1 Ca-vite and Sant Franceisco de M1alabon. Attaim-s ait the op)el p)01ts of Iloilo) an,1d Cebit, for which 'oi-eign and (olomestic Ilnerellalit1- vessels; had p)ersist ently cleared, titrlishillg goods and. I)a.yin-g t-ibttte to the inisurgentzauthorities, anid loreigil men-of-war were initenmtly watching( tile progre,,,ss otf events, gave great annoyance. The questions h)resente(1 lristled with conulndriinis of a lpolitical character, atnd the t lintenl States consuls onl the Asiatic coast waimted l)ositive inforimation) of conditiomi and statuts. The territory was 110 longer Sp~ain's, bitt we still hesitated to takle decisive action for fear of pr-ovoking' tile in~sutrgents Or' really giig thenm tile excuse to attack us5 wimich the~y (desir-ed. Now this last obstacle had beenl remioved by their (letel'lnimed omnslaugolits 011 Mlalila, and it was very important for overmufasterimig political reasons to take possessioni of these southern ports, through lorcle or other'wise, as ciremn mstancees might dem and. Notwithstamiding our' military strength at Mlanila was so linlited that we could 104 REPORT OF MA.JOR-GENERAL OTIS. not pursue into the interior the fleeing enemy, we knew our ability to worst him should he appear anywhere in our vicinity, and concluded that exigencies compelled us to clear up the field which we were confrontingr at Iloilo. On February 7 1 asked authority to direct G'eneral Miller to take the place. Thuis being, received, the Tennessee regiment, which had been acting with the Manila provost guard, was forwarded to that poinit, sailing on the 9th histant. On the evening of the Iprevious day 1 dispatched Lieutenant-Colonel Potter with the following instructionls: Hli)qRS. DvEP'r. PACIFIC AND) EIGHTHi Ajimx Coffls, MVanila, i'. I., 1cbriiary 8, 1899. Brigadier-General. MILLER, U. S. V., Commaniding _First Separate Brigade, Eighth Armty Corps, Iloilo, Panlay. Sin: The commanding general directs that you occupy Iloilo with your troolps,as soon as practicable, ba-ving a care for the lives anl lprop~erty of' the inhabitants of that eity and giving to citizens the necessary notice, to withdraw theref'rom in case resistance is anticipated. The admiral conmuanding the U nited States naval1 forces on the Asiatic Station will direct the conimandliig officers of naval vessels in the harbor of' Iloilo to support you in youir operations. Avoidt(destruction of property in so far as may be possible with successful operations, and eiiilea~vor to lprevent destruction of sanie bynative troops. The First Tennessee re-hitent will sail for Iloilo to-morrow morning, the 9th instant, andl upon its arrival you will lbe able to maike your (lispositionS. The commanding gVeneral trusts to your ability and (liscret-ion,;11( (loes iiot desire to give~ youi more specific instructions, Jpermitting full latitud~e if action on your part. Thbese instructions will be handed to you by Lieuiteiiant-Colonel Potter, who le~aves this evening by steamer Bihituaii. Ilie will remain with y-ou until you are able to report the resuilts of your -action in executing these instruictions, wheni you will dispatch him to these headq~uarters with rep~ort of same. Very respectfulfly, Trno~mAS H. l3Av,kmAssista~it Adjuatat-G(eiieral. Shortly after Lieutenan t-Coloitel P otter arrived with instructions, and on time morning of the 10th Greneral Miller had a clonferenice with the (comanaidiiig officers of the L~nitedl Sttates war vessels in the harbor and with (certain business mneii in Iloilo, wvleim the time to be given the insurgents to surreimder or evacnate anid -for the idihabittaits to withdraw from the city was (letermliiedl nponi. With the niavy commanaders the p~lan of battle, ini ca-se it became nmecessary to torcibly3 t-ake time place, was discussed, but not fully agreed iuponi. TIhe results arrive(I at are giveni in the followving comminnuica~tiomis I lnqR11. FmiEsTr SEPA ARATE, B31i(GADEi, Eu aHTrn ARMY ( TRuPS, ON' IBARI) TRANSP m:ri MNvimoi'u, Il')l( IHarb~or, J). I., Iebr)'U(ry 10, iSV)!). COMM~NuANIN GENERAL x'u i Foimncm,,_, Iloilo. Sm: IJi a corumunicatimin from (Xen). IEoque Lop~ez, dlated,( D ecemuber 31, 1898, it was stated that armied resistan-ce wvould be otiered to the forces of'the IUniteil States in case they attempted to occuipy Iloilo without thme consent ofI Generemal Aguiinaldlo. This communication was ref'erredl, Imr instructions, to Mlajo)r-(xleumeral O tis, commmanding the United States forces iii the, P.hilippine Islands. After a longr delay orders have arrived, and I aum now diricted lby hmiim to o)ccupy the citly if Iloilo wvith my troops as soon as p~racticabile. I therefore call onj youj to (leliver uip the (city of Iliiilo and adjacent territory,:and to smireumder the, irimed forces oeccupying the same bef'ore siunset Saturdlay, tme, 11th1 instant, or I shall liroiie(l with nmy troops to oeccupy the, city by force. It, is requiested that you grive warning to dil nmionmnlataiits in Iloilo, J~aro, anfl lobo that in case of resistanmce their city andl villages will be exIpose(i to bombardument. Aniyattempt oniyour ~part inthe iumli terimito close thlo(].(ilo River-or tii throw uip or improve any defensive works w~ill at once be uumet by tire troii the IUnited States wvar ships an( if m troops. Free ingress and egress to boa-ts going to and coining from Iloilo will be piermitted1 mntil sinset Saturday, thme 11 tlm instant.. After this time, all coummunications must be uniler tlag of' truce. REPORT OF MA.JOR-GENERAL onIs. 105 Official communication has been received by the steamship Juatuan of the comnplete (lefeat and scatteringr of the insurgent forces in the neiglhborhloodl of Manil.-I Ver-y respectfully, M.L P. MILLER, Briqladier- Geieral1, U1 S. I., CoilOW1andilifq. i )Qji~s. FIRST' SEPARATE BiliGAI)E, EIGHTHl Aa,.x-i CoiurIs, ON, BOARI) TRAN'SPORT NirwNporr. Iloilo Harbor, P. 1., Februtary 10, 1899. To the British, German, mud Amterican [icr-Conisulates: In view of' anticipatedl hostilities, notice is hereby given you to cause all persons -who are under your protection to seek a place of safety before 5 a. nit. Sunday, the 12th instan~t. Hostilities inay commeuce, at any time after that hour and dlate. Very respectfully, M. P. MILLER, ntrifladier Geuiral, U. S. V., Commnanidinig. Official copy also respectfully furnished comumanding officers H. M. S. Pigmyg, and U. S. S. Boston, and U. S. 8. Petrel. Bay comuuail(l. of Brigadier-General Miller. CiHAS. G. WOODWARD, First Lieutenant,. Th ird U. S. Artillery, Actiugr Assistant Ad1/udtat-G(;neral. The Tennessee regiment arrived at Iloilo on the night of February 10, a1nd next morning about 9 o'clock fouir commissioners sent lby the inhabitants boarded the -Newvport, General Miller's vessel, to discuss the situation. While in conference two shots were heard, wihwr fired from one ot the, war vessels as warning shots to the insurgents who were engaged in throwing uip intrenchments at or near the fort locatedl on the city's water line, against which p)roceeding they had beeni wa-rrned in the letter furnished them, the previous (lay. To these shots the insurgents replied, and at 9.30 a. in. the fort and time war vessels (thme Baltiliore and P~etrel) lbecamuc actively engaged. The ar-my not anticipating this action, had Inadle very little preparation for landing its troolps. The navy -attack was followed by a lallding Of its men), the seizure ot' the fort. the hoisting of' the United States flag0 over the same andl thme entrance of the mene to tile city-time ii nsurgents retiring) before landing waws effected, atnd firing time town during their retreat. Lieutenant-Colonel Potter, who was ai witness ailnl p~articip~ant iii the aftair, imade wNritten relow)t of the events whichl came under his observation. Thme vessels which hie nientions-, nainely, the Ari-zona, St. Pail, and ANeuport, were tro(ol) tlrallsJorts; tile 10.t0)r -aild Petrel, ves,-sels, of the Navy; the Jloil() aild Victeati. launcest. Colonel Potter -states as follows: As we left the.Iri:oua we sawv the BPoson's, boat-s -about halfwvav to thie shore. The (captain of' the N1. Paul wantedl to miove his ves-sel. nearer shore ind( was allowved to (10 so. As slil amcicored, her starboard boats were full and. we towed themi in andi lauded them, while the Iloilo. which caine uip (hiavinig beeni relieved at the.ll'izouo by tile Viceu ii, whIich had left the flatboat anchored) towed in thje port boats aI few minuites, latter,. Th~e exact time of this landing~ I did. not note, butt afterwards saw a recordlcd signal fl10111 thle IrtrCt to thle h0'ostou, Which said it wvas, 12 o'clock~. All of this tooki time, as the tide was runining very stromng F rom our launch, as we p~receded the St. Pauil to hier aiichoragc near shore, we saw the flag hauled down nIld ours go up. andl soona after saw tile navy forces advanIcin1g from thle tort to thie tirst warehouse, where they appeared to stop and comec back.Ti afterwa-rds lprovedl to be only thme Petrel's~ men, who lauded on the other side of the fort, where we ind not seeni ilem, whi~le the Boston"'s men mmnrler Lieutenaut Niblakhad gouc 1l]town. Not knowing this, I started imp the road, where I was met by a sigilal manl fioin the P~etrel, who said they had received a message from the JPctrel thiat we mlust be careful in adlvaiicilug into town, as a. great many insurgents were left in tlle building-s as well as ine rithe pits which were dug, on (either side of' the street. This caused mis to wait for aI suflicienit force to oeccupy all side streets 10(: REPORT OF MAJI)R-GENERAL OTIS. and advance cautioisly (at least half an liour being thus lost), when, to our sturprise, oil arriving at the customl-house, we l'foundl Lieutenant Niblack's foicc receiving a few shots froml the enemy up river, but they had come to this point without seeing any insurgents or hearing, a shot. At the first slit from the Boston the insurgenits begail firing e te lowln as thley retreated ulp town along the mlain street, tire being applied to Iothl sides of tihe street. I saw some pllaces where they had ftailed to set lire, biit where wood saturated with coal oil was piled against doors. Before the Navy was through with the bombardmenit fires had beenl set away pll on (':lle Real, and as a stroigr breeze was blowing there was little chance of saving anythinig to leeward of tlie fires. A few troops with Getneral Miller got through the tires just beyond tlie c.ustoimhouse, but the rest of us were cut off fromn advancing for two hours. These few troops adlvaiiced with no resistance:ad took Jaro and M1olo birilrges. Firs were set along the road to the Jlaro bridge before any possible landiing could ialve saved them, and very little was hburned except to lee ward, whlere the snioke and itames were such as to drive bl;ck company after conmpany trying to get to tlhe few troops in front, who would be ill great peril it' atftacked ill force. Iit. all attempts failed for a time. I saw two colnpanies of Major (tCucatham's battalion try to get around by wading on the bleach, but they were driven back. It was a case which would have bat'Iled professional firemen with a complete:a!parat.us for tiglitioig fire. General Miller, in a report nmade February 20, retimai'ks: No arrangement or agreemnent with the senior officer of' thle Na;vy was itlade that he should open the attack withliot confeirring with nle, lit it seemledl lie construed my letter to the insurgents ill thiat light and comnimencedl the attalck. SMy comnmand had been living on the rough bay ever since first arriving. WVith great difficulty we had gotten psssssion of two lighters anud three steaiii launches to transfer coal barges, etc., from supply ships to permianent ships. At the time of the attack the Samar was endea\voring to tow thle iarge Cartagena to the Newport for thle purpose of placiig:a light battery on it. TIle Ari:on, had a coa:ling slhip alongside; the other laiunch was en route to the s't. IPail. The Navy landed their forces promptly, and found upon arrival at the plalza an almost impassable bharrier of fire toward.Jaro bridge. I think a quicker landilng of' ily troops would h:ave founll the sanme conditions ill front; as it was, I piuslued through the flaiiies with what force I could get through aid saved several buildings beyond the plaza, unear Jaro bridge, and along the banks of thle Iloilo. I now quote fromn the accompanying report of' Genieral Hughes, coinmanding at present in the Visayant Islantds: Upon receipt of this infornmation w:ays andl meians were taken liy thle insurgents, then in occiiiupation and iontrol, fir burning tlhie city. Large il4uant itics of petroleumn were secured and storedl inl the ayulntaniento, Calle lRosario, Calle San Pedro, etc'. In the early morning of February 11, heflire any slhots had been tiredl or any immediate action was evident, tlhese supplies of' oil were distributed a:bout the city and placedl in dwellings, shops, stores, etc'., so as to nialke the work of the incendiaries easy, swift, and sure. The statement is iadule tlihat the local president and other officials in unifiiori assisted in the d istributioni of the petrclemn, aind the mayor of the city, Sefuor Leon, is said to have followedl tlie example of, the mayoir of' Moscow by tettitng fire to his own house ibefore abandloning the city, which had becen conlided to his caire. On the morniig of tlhe 11th the/ insuirgents w'ere idiscovered putting guins in position on the beachl for defensei, and as this was in viola:tion of the conditions specified by General Miller in granting tiime for iioni'oimbaltants, etc., to mnake their dispositions for what niig'ht occur, tlue naval guinboat Petrcl firedl two warning shots, upon which the land batterIy being put in position opened fire oi llie I'etrcl, whlich openedi a:n action that ihad not been contemtillated ir expected on the part of (ither the troops or their conminiahders mutil the following morning. Firing having opened between the hostile forces, tihe inceniliarii's in the city immniediately began tlheir assigned work, adult the city wans soon ill:humnes. Meanwhile the troops were being lanuled on the beachl and tlue rigilt bank of tile river, and working thieir way tlhrommglu and arouind the' tire succeeded in reaching' aind securing possession of the ibridge across thle Iloilo River leahding to.Jaro, and also the bridge across the estuary on tle road to Moho. Possessiioi of ltiese points assured General Miller's possession of the city. Iit submitting the ftact to tlle departnient commniander (General Miller remnarks: 4" It was not contepuilated to make an attack tblore the hour n:uamed to the consuls, but the insum'rgent forces having begun acts ofi hostility, military necessity required that action should be taken and followed up. Such action certainly miade no difference reganrding the destruction of property, as it was a matter of common REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 107 report that every preparation lad( been madle by the forces of the inisurgenlts at Iloilo to set fire to the city at the first hostile shot." In another letter, written by General Miller oii the 21st of February, the followinlg remark occurs: "I have no doubt it is owilng to the prenature attack that any of the buildligs are saved. ''he plan was one of total destruction by fire." On the following (lay the suburb of Jaro was taken bIy Major Keller with a battalion of the Eighteenth Infantry and a battery of mlachline guls. General Miller r1.ported as follows: " HDQRS. FIRST SEPARATE BRIGAiDE, EIG(;TnI AnMY CORI'S, "Iloildo, I'.., February, 1,,.1'9. ' ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DEPT. 0)1 THE PiACIFIIC AND Et(;I'TII ARMY (COI:s " Si: I have the honor to report the military situation as very vexatious. We hlave captured Iloilo, as before reporte(l, Iunt the position of0 the insurgents has bleen such that:ll the time we are exposed to sllarlpshooters' tire with the Mauser rifle, and no one knows wheni lie is safe. Jaro and Molo occupliedl would reli!eve us from this trouble, but I should lhave a battalion of four comlparnies rmore to hold Molo. To-day at 2 p. ll. I sent a reconnoissan1ce to botll Jaro and Molo-a battalion,f thle Tennlessee to Molo and one of the Eighlteenth Infantry to Jaro. At Molo 11o lienuy was found; at.Jaro the enemy was encoutltered and1 skirnlishig conmmencedl at once. 'l'le insurgents were about 1,000 strong. They threw an acclrate and conceutrated fire. They fought well, }but linally retreated to,Jaro and were driven beyvond it. I reenfiorced the first battalion with tlle secondl, and we hold.Jaro to-nightt. Second iet. i. C'. Iolles, Eighteenth Infaltry, attaclled to the machine battery, was woundled throughl tlie left leg below the knee aind onel private through the lung aInd another through tie leg. Will sen(l specific report as s8oon as possible. ()ur troops of the Eighteenth were under the command of 'Major Keller, and afterwards the two battalions were under the commilnnd of ('olonel \Van Valah. Major Keller's hattaliotn, assisted by the mlachine-glun blattery, under Lieutenant O)stlheim, dlil the work. Majoi' Keller is an a;ide. tfearless,;and brave oilicer: also lieuteliant Ostheimt. I shall lm.ake recollllendation abllut thenm later. "Very respectfully, "M. P. MIIJ:lR, " l;ri'i.odie'r- t; 'rt, I *.. *s. lo ('On O f i i 1:doi." 1)n the 14th of F'tebruary Major Keller made a. recolnoissance in the dlirectiol of Santa Barbara.. and 1 miles frol.Jaro lie encountered the enemy, about 500 strong,;lld (rove them back soime d istlince. lie lost 1 noncolmisllisioined officer killed aind 1 wotunded. ()1 the l!thl of' lFebruary a reconnloissanle was lmade to Oton by a batt:alion ot' tie First 'Tenessee Volunteers. but no e('1c('y was 'found. A batttalion of the lFirst Tiennessee Volunteers i:tade a rcconmloissance in the directiom of' Sal Miguel v ia Mandurriao oI tlie 2-th of' Februa'ry. Tlie enelmy was found a sho(rt distance beyond Man(durriao a11 d(iven backl without loss to (our tloos. 'The military operaLtions whichl lhave since taken place in Panay will be noted in a, later portion of this ireport. As soon as Iloilo was occupied by our troops a government w-;is established and has beie successfully proseculted. 'Tle raplid clhanges in the spirit, (Ide eanor. and demlostrations of the inhabitants of Mllanila of all classes between the 5th and 10th of February could be witnessed only in ai community made up of the most lheterogenleous elements. O() the nith the educated business classes, foreigi Land native born, were slurprisingly hlopefil that hostilities would soon end. The natives of tlie middle and -working classes were sullen, thouglh undetermined.. The l;rge l Chlinese laboring population rejoiced over the punishment of their race enemiies and the opplortunity offtred it for looting the country from which tlhe insurgent forces had been driven. These Chinese had followed quite closely our advancing lines and secured malny minor articles of property which by them were considered of value. WVe lad employed them, too, extensively to performl a good deal of the work connected with supplying the troops at the front, and they performed fitlhful service. On the 7th business became active again and the streets were thronged as usual. The night was the most exciting portion of the twenty-four hours, as the occa 108 REPORT OF MAJIOR-GENERAL OTIS. sional shots of our sentries, the burning of nipa buildings (the work of incendiaries), and the frequently detected interchlanige of signals between the insurgents within and those without the city lines gave constant warning of the dangers which threatened us. The means of supplying subsistence for this large motley population presented a problem for solution in which new conditions continually obtruded themselves. The great majority of the population never provides fo)r the morrow and depends upon the numerous city markets for its daily supply of food, made up almost exclusively, rice excepted, of the products of the adjacent country. That source of supply had been virtually closed since the latter part of January, and interisland traffic had been arrested by the event of war. On February 8 it was officially reported that the insurgent troops to the east of the city had returned to the mountains and those to the south had disappeared, whereupon orders were issued to permit tlhe resulllltion of trade along the P.asig River to the Laguna de Bay. This it was expected would give Manila the products of the lake country, from which source she had always obtained a large portion of articles for daily consumption No sooner, however, was this traffic reopened than the insurgents seized the Upper Pasig country and threw a large force into the towns of Pasig, Pateros, and Taguig, which it advanced to Guadalupe, witlhin rifle shot of San Pedro Macati, where the left of General Anderson 's line rested. The bold resumption of the offensive at this point, the rapid concentration taking place at the north, and thle restoration of communication between the northern and southern insurgent armies depressed the better social element of the city and correspondingly elevated the hopes of the hostile military organizations in our midst. Active demonstrations, in attacking troops on the streets, setting fires in thickly populated districts, with an occasional munrder or assassiiiation, were resumed, antd rendered it again necessary to take every precautionary measure for the city's safety. Orders were giveit to the division commanders to confine the duties of thleir men within the city to the p)rotection of their barracks, and not l)ermit them to patrol the streets, as the provost-marshal -general was prepared to effectually repress any attempt on the part of the inhabitants to inflict serious damag'e. ()n the evening of February 9 I wired Gener:al MacArthur at the Chinese church, the advanced angle of his line, the following: Reported that the inisurgents will attack at 3 o'clock in the mnorning. Their plan to attack your front in l:1rge force and at the saie time to rise in your rear in Lico district. They have been entering through Vitas swamps all (day and lauding at intersection of Calle Sande and Calle (de Lemnery at bridge. Bolo men will form between Vitas district andl l,i(o roa(d. About the same hour General MacArthur telegraphed: It has been necessary to reinforce the blockhouse at the iiouth of Vit:as Creek on account of the tlireatening attitude of the surrolunding population. Please have the situation examined and either authorize tlhe abandonmeht of the blockhouse entirely or make it part of tlhe provost duty of the city. The compiany there is from Kansas, and concentration in front of that regiment is r)porte(l as still in progress. The general was directed to hold on to the position, it being considered of vital importance, and assistance was sent to the company occupying the point. Later the general was instructed in telegram as follows: Not intended that you should keel) 3 troops at Vitas Creek unless necessary to protect your rear from contemplated aninoyance on part of inlhabitants of section. You are far out and General Hughes can not etiiciently reach you. The bolo men of Tondo are restless to-day. REPORT OF MA.JOR-GENERAI, OTIS. 109 The actimon f February 10, already hereinbefore reported, followed, but instead of having a quieting effect on the hostile 1)ortioln of the inhabitants, appeared to incite them to greater energy. Rumors of me(litate(l uprisings were constant alnd were only checked by the muntiring watchfuliiess of the lprovost guard. Fires in different sections of the city, mostly in the outskirts, were of iiightly occurrelnce. On February 15 tlhe p)iovost-maIrshal-general secured an order issued by the Malolh)s governmnezit through tlhe responsible officer wlho had raised and organized tlhe hostile inhabitants within thle city and then departed for thle insurgenIt cal)ital, which directed a rising that evening, and which for barbarous intent is uiequaled in these modern times of civilized warfare. A translation reads in part as bfollows: First. You will so dispose that at s 'cloclk at night tlhe individluals of the territorial milit ia it yomr order wvill be foiil uti:ite in all the street. 01of Sa l Pedro armed with their "i ho)ls" atd revolvers m, 1.1uns mIl amliiunition, itf convenient. Secondl. llPhilipine families 011ov wvill he respecte(l. They siould not hle o ulesteld. lut all other 1individials, of whatevr race t.hy ay la e, wie ill he exterl:i.t'ted without iany (,ii opassion after the exte'inijatitmn (I' the army iot' o(cup.Iation. Tlhird(. The dle'ender- ofi the Philiippines in your c(omiii;nd wvill attack the g'uard at Biliil a:i< liberite tlhe prisouers and presidiarios," niii. haviig ac(ceomplished this, they will )e aied, sayingi th the.. " Ilrotlhers. we must 'vege orselves on the Americi:ns a1111 exterlinate thi'n, thait wve nmay take ()or reveni,e for lthe infaimies and t'e;icleries which they ha.ve comlitt(d 11po1 s. HIav i')io omilpassioi 111)0on them; attalk with x'i X r. All I'ilipilos 'en masse' will secon(d youl. l.oiii, li.e lilipino, lFift.h. Thel order which] will he followedl in tlie attackx will Ie a;s follows: Tlhe shIarlepshooters of (''iond and Santa Aia will he-in tlhe attack f'rom withotm. and these shots will ie the signal fur the miilitia ot 'Tro, Blilonilo. (Quiap:)(. anil Saimpa;loc to gii out intl} tle street:nd do their lot'. Thlise of Pa1. Ermiita adl dalite. Sauta (Cruz aind San Mii'nel xwill ntt star,U; intil 1'2 o'Ilock;ile-s they see tlheir Comipanios needt issistanc'e. Sixthl. 'lie militia, will start ou( t a: o'clock i the nmorniil_,. Ift all (d their duty (our re.v( xni e will h)e complete. 1lrotlier., FIriope c(ntemplates us. \ e kiow hiw to die is men, sheddinli.. our hlood ill deteuse of the libertyv if our coniitrv. Death t.o lthe t yra1ls, w'ar witlhoit 'tiiarter to tlie fllse Americalis, wxho ha; Xve deceived us! Either ilidepenlldence or death! Of cou'se arrazngements were made to immnediately check this conitemiplated demoistratioli. lut the ordler gave uis our first p)ositive assuranice of the tactics which the insurgents intedled to pursue and coifirmedl tlhe rumors of intent which lhad beein prev;alent since the last week in I January, This fortunate p)recaution served to keel) very active the w\Itchfl'ulness of all officers charged with the safety of the city, al(d vigilaice was rewarded on tlhe night of February 22, when a directed risiig was aittempted alid was successful ii its inception and prim'ary stages. Considerable mnnmbers of armed insurgents, passing by water amd through swalmps aro)d( MiacArtlhuir's left, entered Tondo. the northern district of' tlhe city. about a mile to the rear of his line, and there concealed themselves, awaiting their (opplortunity. Shortly after dark in thle evening a iumber of bnildi'gs, some of (considerable importance, situated it tlhe thickly settled portion of Binondo, were simultanueously fired, having beeti previously kerosened, and wiile the city fire depl)artmient (a department the memlbership of which was conflied to natives who had always lproved(l loyal) was making great efforts to extinguish thle fires, or at least hiold them under control. the fire hiose was repeatedly cut an(l musketry shooting comnmenced very near them at tlhe north, on the Tondmo and Binondo line. This General hughes, present in person, soon che('ked with his troops, driving the attacking parties northward, when other fires broke out in the Binondo district near the river baink, which threatened our army supplies. REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. These were quickily extinguished and the armed insurgents again driven northward. Early the next niorning Greneral Hughes I-oved againlst this enemy secreted in Tondo, which i-nay have numbered,OO() or miore, drove it niorthw~ard towvard General MlacArthur's lines, although it resisted stoutly from its clommcalineimts in the bamibo atid~ rice p~addies, and behind barricades whichi it had erected. Th~Ie enviny's casuialties numnbered about 500, while GIeneral. I-Iiougles's loss, owing to the rajpidlity andl fierceness of his attacki, was very slight. This punisliment pultfan end to the dang-erous (lelnonstrtations withidn the city onl the Ipart. of time insurgemit inhabitants, amid thereafter they tfailed to resIpond( to the orders given themn by the Malolos govern ient. imuch to the latter's midi gnatiomi, which ch~arged teimen with la lack of patriotismy. Since -February 2-3, few shots ot' semitittels or patrols have beeni heard withimi the confini~es of' Manila, anjd those in the nighttinme, which were (ainedl getierally at the towers of chlurches anid convents front) whlich responlsive signials wvere being transutitted to the signials seeni at proininent pohitts occupied by the insurgemit troops. While these interesting events Nvere paessing ii _Manilia, our outer lines were being placed in a (condition of deftenise so that they might be securely hield by fewer troolps, thus giving uts the mi-en to operate with -and i itiate attack on the increasingr forces of' the enemly, wilt wer becoming quite bold (again. rflte lenigth of' ouir line north ot the iPasig River was about 9 iniles, anid it was niecessary to mnaimttaimm it tbr the sa~fety of the city an(I the protection of' our water lplanlt. Besides thle force at the pum~inphg station, we were obligedl to keep a, Large detachmenit on the Maraquina road niortfi, of the station, anud to patrol the road between it and the reservoir, a. (listailce of aboult 4 mliles. The~se (letache(1 trool s,,, which were cornmnanded by Colonel. Stotsenburgr,in vi ted the attentiomi of' time inisurgemnts. About the 12th instant they mtade a slpi~ite(I attack omi the Mar-aquina outpost, but were signally dlefeatedl and driveni several imiles not thward through Sain Francisco de'l -Monte to~ardCaloca. O Feruay 212 the First N ebraska, and Wyominig Volunteers attacked and scatteredl a considerable body of insurgents between the reservoir-, p~uinpimg statiomi, and Pasigr 1tiver, Which had placed itself ini that locality, and onl February 24 (a detachment of the Oregon regiment and a company of time Nebraska, iut'an1try attacked afnd defeated an insurgent force. north of the Maraquinia road. Similar actions, occurred on thme 15ith and 27th of the muon th, whemin the Ipersistent emneiny was driven northward with considlerable loss. Again, omi March 5'3,6, anmd 7, p~ortions of thme Nqebraska, Oregon, and U~tahm troops were obliged to attack aind. drive off other bodlies of insurgent trooIps which] apIpeared near the pumping station and onl tite Maraquina road. rilese exiteditions serv-ed to check their airdor iii that direc-tion, andthey beg-ami to pay more attemition to other p)ortiols, of our Ihunes, becomnimig very annoying in the vicinity of Caloocan and in front of' San Pedro Macati. At these points the troops wanted to attackl, but nothing substantial could be gained thereby and time city would be exlposed mtee(Ilesshy. The line of the Pasig was considered as the first requisite to iuin)rove our military situation, and we were awaiting the arrival of troops, daily expected. The Twentieth Infantry reported February 23, amnd the Twenity-second Infantry March 4 and 5. This gave us sufficient ad~ditional. force to take thme initiative. We had lost the Tfeinnessee Vohumnteers, sent to Iloilo, anid received two additional regiments, amid our enlisted strength for (luty in amid around Manila, time pr.ovost guard immeluded, numbered inearly 15,000 memi. A provisional brigade was formed consisting of the Twventieth amid Twenty-second regiments of REPO RT OF' MA.JOR-GIE'NERAL OTIS.11 ill infan-try, 3 troops of the Fourth Cavalry, a section of Light Battery D,7 Sixth~ Artillery, 2 battalions, of the W~ashington and. 7 comlpanies of the Oregon Vrolunteers, and Brig. G)'en. Lloyd Whieaton, U. S. 'V., was placed iii commanid. Tihis brigade enga,-,rged the enieiy at Gu'adalupe ridge, near San Pedro Mac~ati, at IPasiog, Pateros, Cainita, anld Taognig, and (irove, him otit aiid beyond these towns. The insurgents, however, concentratedi neatr Tfo-uio-, and imade a, spiritedl attack on General Yvleaton's troolis, there, inflicting a few carstualties, but hie collectedl his forces quickly anid early the next morning imade a counter attack. 4which the insuirgenits wvere unable to w~ith stand, routed them and drove them 1.5 miles diowii the shore (itf the lake. Their losses in killed anld wounded unubered more, th~an 24)4) while (renieral Wheatoni's casualties ini the entire six (lays ellgagel (betwxeen MaTIrch 10 anid 17) dlid not aggoreg'ate 3o. The gunmboat hqp-ja (1(, BftauI Cap-tain Grant, of the U1tah Artillery, commlanding(,, assisted grreatly iii these affairs, opened the river to thre lake whichl She entered, (lispeLred thre inisurgents' shipping, wvhichi consisted of launches. c.ascoes, and iiimmnierable simuall boats, C0lisidlera ble ofmwhich wNere calptuired. (arin mios were establishied ait the townis of Paig IatersndTaug. witlionieguniboat.in thle lake aniidonlein thie river, whjen thie ieumainider ioFthe bIrig,(Ie was returnied to the citya ad incorlmratedl in other organ~izations. Thie line of the lPasig wa thus es~tablished anrid the, insurgent conununiceatiuni betwNeeni their forces to the iomth Ii a(l on thie south wi~s I~ermanaemittl initerrup~tedl. In the mieantime my naiemscots were obtainling inforinatiomi at the norh. aloos adbecomie a 'vi-ar depot: also) Calimnpit and Balinag. It wa-s relmorted that the formiier city contained a very lar.ge q~uantity of rifle amnimnmition: that t~he imitervenhimg couintry bey ond Caloocan and alonig the liine of the ra-ilroad was virtually c-overed with defensive wvorks, intrench menits Ii avinrig been constructedI every few hin ndred ytards. 1Lietitenant-(Genreral Luna boaisted of heaving available on the short line fronting G4eneral Mac_~rthur's left 16~ 000 nien,. but my scouts numbered those between (Cal(oocan aend Malolos at froin six to eight thousand and verified their estitimate-s by personal observation. This concenitrated hinsur-vent force was thieim our true objective, anld it was believed that it would stand aiid receive our attacks. Our troops were inml~atient to be let loose and wAere ini excellent health and spirits. Thie, ii~ourtluan Seven~teenth Inifanitry, withi M1,hjor-Generaftl L~awtoni and staiff", arrived from -New York City between the 10thi and 22d of March. New military ctombinations where miade on M21arch.17, (leneral Lawtomn relievinig Ma~jor-General And~erson, who haid been advanced to the position otf brigadiler-greneral ini the regutlar establishiment and (hirectedl to lproceed to the Unjited Staites. Both this division iidn the -second, that of Generalt MacArthur, were giveni three brigades, those ini the first comnmandl~ed by B1rigadier-Generlals Ovenishinfe, Kfing, and Whleatomr, andl those iii the second by Brigadier-Genierals Hale, Otis, amid 11all. To secure suffictient force for tire northern advance it was necessary to ta ke all aI-va-ilable organizations fromn both (hivisions, but Manila. and the waterworks must remain covered. A separate column for Genieral MacArthur was made up from his owni immediate comnmamid, comIposed mostly of the volunteers, and consistingo of the brigades of Brigadier-Generals Otis and Hale, the Colora~do regiment being~ left to guard the deposito afnd p)umnping station. B1rigadier-Genieral Wheaton was (lirected to takde command of the left of this line, from La Loma to aocaand the Kansans, Montanas, Pennsylvanians, arid a battalion of the Third Artillery and nearly all the Uitah. Light Artillery were relieved therefrom by the Oregon Volunteers, the Third and Twenty 112 REPORT (F MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. second Iifaintry, a battalion of the Twenty-third Infantry of the provost guard subsequently reporting, and two or three days thereafter the Minnesota Volunteers, which had beel relieved from the provost guard by the Twentieth infantry. Brigadier-General Hall was assigned to tlie right of this line, having the Colorado and Wyoming troops, tile Fourth and Seventeentll Inlfalltry, and l)latoon of the Utah Light Artillery. IIe was directed to make ta demonlstration to the north when Gelleral MlacArthur should take up his advance, for which everything was ill readliness on March 24. That night the trool)s intended to take part ill tllis particular movemiient were withdrawn from tIle trenches and assemblled behiid La Loma alnd the l)eposito and very early tlhe lext norniiiig Iroceedle on their march. General MAacArtlhlr's instructionis were to mIove in two columIis ill e(helon from the right, the right brigade (11 le's) prece(ding tlhe left (Otis's) by a colnsideratble distalnce, so thallt tile latter would cover the left anid rear (of the liormer tanil nleutralize a l attack froin tile insurgenits in that (lirectioni, who were very stroing fromi (C;aloocan to Balintatag oil tlhe Novaliches rolad. Wheatonl, wlose left rested at La Loina, and wlho \was expected to swinl to the left on Caloocan at the l)rop)er time, was directe(d Iiot to move until sl}e(ially directed, unless MAa('Artliur's left columll slhoul becolne seriously enigagedl alnd ineed assistcance. The a(lvatlciing colunmns were to,move on Novalic(lmesHale's brig-ade to tlihat point by San llFrancisco del ]lMonte anld alagbag, alid Otis's keeping to the left ald(l retired was exlpe'ted to strike the Novali(clhes roa(id ear and to thle riglt of Balilta.luag. Clossing tile Tulihan liver. tfordable at Novalichles, they were to tturnl to t.he westwa(rd amd thence p)rocee(lilg by tlhe road whlichl strikes th!e railway south of 1lolo were to place themuiselves (oIn thle left flank of the elem ny while (Gelieral Wheatoni imade a frolltal attack. 'This nmatutredl plan failed in pairt, owing to tie natuiral (obstacles w-hichl were. constantly met )on the line of inarch. Il1ale's brig:ade moving by Saln El'ra.ncisco( del i)Monte elicouliteired serious dliicuilties there a(i lb)e.yon(l, anid was obliged to drive oft detachlnents of tlle eieilmy, b1y xwlich it was 11navoidably detained, and tlie left brigrade gaine(l tile adv1an(:ce. It was attacked by tlhe insurge'its, wheln Wlhea tomi comii(enced hlis swilngilig Imovemnelt to tlhe left andl diverted tlheir attentionu. Tlie brigadle struck tile Tulihanl lixVlc' s8omte (listance beloxw Novalichles, crossed its artillery and transportation only by a ireat (leal of labor, because of tile Ihigh banks and the deilse growth of brush, wllile the right brigade contiiued on to Novafliches and took thle designated western route. This march was exhlausting in tlne ext'reime, amnd tile entire day was coInsuimed when the right baink of thle river was attainie(d. Early the next morning both brigades imarched toward the railway, but could nmot develop a line mnorthward in tlhe imm)ediate vicinity of l'olo, as intendled, ont account of the swamps, tlhick masses o)f brush, t~and tropical:udergrowth throuigh whichl tlie artillery alld tra'sp)Ortatio) (could mlot be )asse(l, miot even the mlmen. While tllese brigades were executiig this movenment thlat of( (1elieral Wheaton had enigaged the eliemny witlh great spirit. Sonme time befoI're eveninig it had drivenl him from all of his intremlichmnents back amld across thie Tuililiali River, which it was about to cross in puirsumit when its advalice was arrested to await developments omi tile enlemiy's left 1ank b)y tlme trool)s expected from Novalichlles. Tile liext mlorniing, as sooml as the head of' that colutlmn had about gain-ed thle railway line, it was permitted to remlew tle attack, aied, quickly passing the river at two points and aided by the flanking troops, comp)letely routed the enemy and drove him northward and beyolid Polo, where lie made a determined REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 113 stand the following day, from which he was driven by General MacArthur's united troops with considerable loss. From that date to end of the month MacArthur pressed northward the enemy, who stubbornly contested every village and locality having defensive advantages and burned every town from which it was obliged to retreat. Our troops entered Malolos, the insurgent capital, March 31. That alleged government had removed all its records and property, and its army set fire to the city when it retreated on Calumpit and Quingua before our advance. The troops needed rest, and it was necessary to repair the railway over which the advance had been made in order to forward the necessary supplies. The line of communication, too, was long, considering the position of the enemy on our flank and the few troops which could be spared to protect it, and it was believed that a water base could be established at Malolos which would make available for the field an additional 1,500 men. Our casualties from the commencement of hostilities to April 1 were 12 officers and 127 enlisted men killed and 48 officers and 833 enlisted men wounded. The sick among these troops which had advanced to the north increased to 15 per cent, due mostly to their exhaustive labors and to heat prostrations. Efforts to secure a water line of communication by Manila Bay and the Malolos estuary were made immediately and continued for more than two weeks. The proper mouth of the estuary was found with considerable difficulty. A bar had forined in fiont of it, making the entrance very tortuous. Ulp this two of our gunboats worked their way, but encountered well-driven piles and other obstructions which the insurgents had placed there and around which mnud and sand had collected, making the water too shoal for navigation. Near the mouth of the stream a dredge was used and the gunboats removed a good many of the pile obstructions, but satisfactory results could not be obtained and the work was abandoned. A considerable detail of soldiers was made to put in sufficient repair for immediate use the railway from Manila to Malolos, and Chinese labor was hired. The track had been considerably damaged by the insurgents and a number of bridges partially destroyed, but Major Devol, of the Quartermaster's Department, overcame all difficulties, and, witli the engines captured at Caloocan, gave Malolos daily railway train service. While these preliminaries to a farther northern advance were being made General Lawton, commanding the First I)ivision of the corps, was directed to proceed to the city of Santa Cruz, on the south shore of the Laguna (e Bay, and secure a number of launches and a Spanish gunboat, which were reported to be concealed in a narrow stream passing along the eastern limit of that city. Returning, he was directed to seize Calamba, an important strategic point on account of its being at the intersection of important roads and telegraphic lines. For this purpose he was obliged to draw troops from the lines about Manila and along the Pasig liver. Hle collected and concentrated parts of organizations, numbering all told 1,509 men, consisting of 3 dismounted troops of the Fourth Cavalry, 2 mountain guns, 8 companies of the Fourteenth Infantry, 4 companies of the Idaho and 4 of the North Dakota Volunteers, and an organization of 200 sharpshooters, largely drawn from the Washington regiment. With these troops, in several cascoes towed by three of our gunlboats, he proceeded across the lake on April 9, captured on the following day Santa Cruz, which he found intrenched and strongly defended, drove the enemy several miles into the interior, and proceeded to secure the vessels for which he had been sent. The water of the lake had become very low and the boats could not be W -8 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. passed over the bar at the river's mouth. Reporting this fact and the further fact that he could not make a landing at Calamba on account of shoal water, a dredge was sellt him from Manila, and also instructions to return immediately to the city with his force as soon as he could secure possession of the vessels in the river, as his services were required here, and that the taking of Calamba was not imperative at this time. He returned on April 17, bringilg six steam launches and two cascoes which thle enemy had concefaled Inear Santa Cruz. The Spanish gunboat was not found, and was subsequelltly cal)tured at Calainba with machinery in good condition, but without her guns, which the insurgents had taken for land service. The insurgents at the north were becoming very bold again. They hadl worked around in the swaml)y country to thle westward and rear of Malolos, and1 downl along the roads, patls, and villagces to thle eastward, froi whicll they were making occasional nightly inlcursions on the railroad for tlle pur)pose of destroyiing it. We could not remain quiet, as we did not lhave sutfficient troops to mailltain the long liles we ~were hlolding if we l)ermllitte(l the enlemy to concentrate and take the initiative. The total strength of thle Eighth Corps preselnt in the Philippines at this time was 1967 officers and 25,0;36 enlisted men, of whoim 5,000 were serving at Cavite and tile Visayan islands. Of these 836 were of the Eingineer, Signal, and Hospital Corps; 2,739 were sick and in confinement as 1prisoners, alnd somne 1.,500 were on special duty in the various staffl departments or assistillg ili civil adlllilistration. Tlhe available fightilg force in Luzon, Cavite excepted, numbered, therefore, about 16;,500 men. General MacAr-thur could not a(lvance beyond Malolos witlh the troops at his disposal while the eniemy so seriouslythreatexned his flanks and line of communication. To assist him, the formation of an independent columnll, to consist of nearly 4,000 meni, to be taken from tile Manila liles and the railway guards, and to move to the north, on the flank of the enelly, was determined upon. The formation and movement of this column was intrusted to General Lawton, who entered upon this sl)ecial service as soon as lie returned froni Santa Cruz. Hle concentrated near Caloocan the Twenty-second Infantry, whiclh had been relieved fiorn duty on the railroad a short time previous; 8 comlp)anies of the Third Infantry; the First North l)akota Volunteers; 4 troops of thle Fourth Cavalry (one mounted); Hawthorne's battery of light guns, portion of Light Battery I), Sixth Artillery; and a detachlment of the Signal Corps. lie was furnished withl such traulsl)ortation of tile country as could be secured, aind was instructed to move these troops along the base of the mountsains by Novaliches, San Jose, and Nozagaray, where the balance of his column, consisting of 8 companies of the Minnesota and 7 of thle Oregon Volunteers, to be ttaken from tile railway a(nd to march from Bocaue by way of Santa Maria, would. join lilll. Thle lastnamed troops were to escort ten days' suplplies for his comlnand by quartermaster's transportation, which hlad just been received from the United States and was then Ibeing plut in readiness for the road. These movements commenced, and the railroad south of Bigaa being tllereby rendered secure, it was intended tlhat General MacArtlhur should move on Caluimpit, leaving sufficient force between 1Bigaa land Malolos to guard his line. General Lawton, after concentration at ~Nozagaray, was directed to move on Balliuag, from which Ipoint, the swamps being dry, he could act on an enemy opposing MacArtllur's advance. General Lawton started from near Caloocan on April 2'2; encountered somne opposition from the enemy at Novaliches and en route from San Jose, REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 115 which did not impede his march; but soon after leaving Novaliches his road, a well-defined and prominent one on all Spanish maps, became a trail, and subsequently a trail crossing or passing through rice patches, swampy country, and unbridged streams, over which his advance was conducted with the greatest difficulty. His troops proved equal to the occasion, and after lie had lost many of his carrabaos, or water buffalo, from heat exhaustion, they cheerfully hauled the transportation, working one day the entire time for 3 miles progress. He in person reached Nozagaray on Ap)ril 25 anl met there the Bocaue column, which had arrived that morning, and there awaited the Bocaue transportation and supplies, which had been detained, and the rear of the Novaliches column. General MacArthur took up his advance on the 24tl. The Bagbaog and Calulipit rivers, over which the railroad bridges had been partially destroyed, were in his front, and tlere were nlo means of crossing tlem. The couiitry was low, swaLmpy, a1nd considerable of it covered with brush, renderilg it very diilicult for military operations, and the insurgents hlad constructed strong intrenchlnents along tlhe rivers and thought themselves secure. General Hale with his brigade was sent to tlhe eastward. up the Bagbag River, and crossed in the face of fierce opposition at the Quingua ford, about 4 miles from Malolos; thence swinging down the right bank of that river he took the enemy's intrenchments in reverse, inflicting heavy losses. Wheaton, who now commanded a brigade of tlhe division, as soon as Hale's descent had somewhat cleared his front. succeeded in crossing his troops over the railway bridge, after sliglht repair, and that plortion of Caliumpit south of the river of that name was lost to the enemy the following day. Lieutenant-General Luna co(mmanded in person the insurgent troops north of the river and had collected a considerable force, estimated at 4,000 men, to oppose thle crossing, while 3,000 were held at Balinag, to tile east. To his right as far as IIaganoy strong detachments were maintained, and also to his left ( coecting with Baliuag. In the face of this opposition MacArthur's men effected the crossing on April 28, under tlhe accurate concentrated lire of tlhe guns of the Utah Light Artillery, commanded by Major Young. This fire drove back the enemy from tlhe river bank and tlhe Kansas men, swimming the rapid river, were enabled to secure boat transportation on the northern shore. Crossing with this and on tlhe railroad bridge (of which, though a spl)mn had been (irolped, tlhe outer rails remained) a foothold was secured and the enemy was soon after driven northward up thle railroad track for a distance of 2 miles. General Lawton, having concentrated his force at Nozagaray and Anggat, drove the enemy to the north and westward in a number of spirited engagements and was directed to proceed to Baliunag. A short time thereafter I was informed that 2,000 armed insurgents were about to march north from San Mateo, a place 8 miles northleast of Manila, under tlhe command of General Pilar; tlat it would pass on a mountain road with the intention of gaining the tflank of Lawtomn,who was directed to keep his scouts well out to the eastward from Nozagaray, which he did without discovering the expected hostile columnn which, to the numl)er of 1,(00, had passed farther to the right and entered the country to tlhe northeast of Blaliuag. The latter place, with large stores of rice and sugar,was captured in a spirited attack after slight opposition, the enemy retreating northward, wllile General Lawton, maintaining great activity to his right and front, felt along the east bank of the Rio Grande in the vicinity of San Luis to ascertain if the enemy was 116 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. present. He was detained at Baliuag to await the delivery of rations for his command by way of Malolos and to enable General MacArthur to secure an advanced point in a more open country and discover the whereabouts of the retreating enemy. On May 5 he was instructed as follows: GENERAL LAWTON, Baliuiag: Can not determine definite movement until MacArthur gets in position and is prepared for further action. His advance is at San Fernando. In the meantime hold present positions, observing any movements of insurgents to the north and east of you. MacArthur is confident insurgents retired up railroad instead of passing northeastward. On the same day the following telegram was sent to General MacArthur: You will arrest your advance at San Fernrando. It is impossille to ascertain route taken by insurgents, who were not expected to make a stand at San Fernando. It is believed they will take the road to Arayat, in the direction of Sau Isidro. They have strong intrenchnients at first-named place. Report fully conditions and casualties as soon as practicable. We congratulate your troops. Gunboats will soon start to seek entrance of Rio Grande, but we can not obtain any encouraging information. The river from Calumpit north is navigable; the mouth very difficult of access. Lawton holds Maasin, Balinag, and Quingua. Had quite a sharp engagement capturing first-named place. Insurgents attacked Ovenshine's line last evening; quickly repulsed. They have appeared on the lake with cascoes and are very active. On May 6 the following telegrams were sent, which show the situation as then understood: Major KOBBE, Third Artillery. Malolos: You will take command of all the troops on the railway between Caluinpit and Marilao and so dispose them as to furnish the best protection to this line of communication. It is reported that a large force from the province of Morong is now moving to attack General Lawton's right by way of Nozagaray and Angat. It is possible that a portion of this force may appear at Santa Maria and attempt the destruction of the railroad in that vicinity. With General Lawton's force at Baliuag, a detachment at Quingua, and another at Bagbag Bridge. it would appear that only that portion of the line between Guiguinto and Marilao could be in danger. Bocaue and Bigaa should be made strong, having detachments well out toward Santa Maria. Acknowledge receipt. MANILA, May 6. General LAWTON, Baliuag: Please report localities at which rice and sugar found and destroyed by your scouts were captured and what section of country your scouts are observing to-day. MacArthur's success at Santo Tomas and San Fernando greater than at first reported. Enemy's loss was very severe, they leaving some 50 or (0 dead on the field and probably a couple of hundred rifles. * * * Enemy evidently thinks you are supplied by Angat. The insurgent force at San Mateo was ready to move last night. It is fairly well armed, has fair amount ammunition and plenty of rice. Subsistence and ammunition transported by extra men. Watch well by scouting parties country to the east of you. The reported line of enemy's march is Norzagaray, Angat, San Rafael and Bustos. Also rumored that a force may strike at Santa Maria. General Hall will send out detachments to watch road by Novaliches. Acknowledge receipt. From all the information I was able to obtain, and froin the fact that the inhabitants of the Tarlac province and to the north of the same were not strongly in sympathy with the rebellion, I was convinced that Luna's immediate army, which had confronted MacArthur's REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 117 troops, would retire by Arayat, a strong natural position and strongly intrenched, into the Tagalo province of Nueva Ecija covering San Isidro, where abundant supplies could be obtained. As soon as MacArthur, by scouting to his front, had definitely ascertained and reported that this army had retreated on the line of railroad the situation was understood. There was one objective army on the line of railroad and another covering the country in front of Baliuag and to the east of the Rio Grande River. General Lawton was detained at Baliuag scouting to his north and east for several successive days, taking, in the meantime, Maasin, which he occupied with his advance, and capturing at various places a considerable qualtity of the enemy's food supplies, which had been stored in improvised granaries. General MacArthur was directed to take Bacolor and Guagua to his left and rear, and thus establish a water base at Guagua, as the railroad was not in operation beyond Bagbag, south of Calulnpit, and could not be placed in condition for use as far as San Fernando in less time than ten days, at least, and the bridges not for two or three weeks. Fortunately an engine and a few cars had been captured near San Fernando and could do service north of Calumpit after a slight repairof the railway track. On May 7 Captain Grant, of the Utah Artillery, with two gunboats, was instructed to proceed from Manila to Guagua with supplies for MacArlhur's troops, witl whom hle was directed to communicate at that point. lle found the entrance of the Guagua River without difficulty, proceeded upstream until Sexmoan was reached, when he was fired upon by some 500 of the enemy strongly intrenched on a projecting point of the river bank. lie passed the point without respondling, swung into the bank immediately after passing it and opened a deadly fire, striking the insurgents in flank behind their breastworks, and quickly scattered those who were able to retire. lie met no further opposition until Guagua was reached. Then he boldly ran along the city's whalrv-es and cleared the place of the few armed insurgents present, w1ho set fire to several buildings and retreated. Landing his men, lie plursued the enemy a short distance, then assisted the citizens to extinguish the fires, and retired to his boats. The San Fernando troops not appearing, he returned to Manila on the following day. Before Captain Grant was directed to proceed to Guagua General M\acArthur had signified his ability to communicate with himn there, but subsequently, and after Grant was beyond recall, lie reported that his situation was such with regard to thle enemy that lie did not consider the movement on Bacolor and Guagua prudent. At the first-named place there was quite a force of the enemy intrenched, and lie did not think that his force at that time was sufficient to drive it off and hold the Guagua line while maintaining also his line of communication by rail. As soon as Captain Grant riported at Manila lie was directed to find tlhe mouth of the Rio Grande and pass up that stream to Calumpit, which place he successfully reached without marked incident on May 10. He was then directed to proceed up the river and clear the banks of insurgents as far as Candaba, which lie accomplished, having a sharp engagement at San Luis. T'hese boats could navigate this river as far up as Arayat, a point some 12 miles northeast of San Fernando, and could keep that line open without much difficulty. It was determined, therefore, to mlove MacArthur's troops on Luna's flank, as a further immediate advance up the railroad was impracticable because of the impossibilityf t then taking supplies by that route; and after VLVIV Illr~~UNII~J VI II~ ~1 — b ~y l- - LI1V IIIV 118 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. we had secured the Rio Grande, on Mlay 11, I telegraphed MacArthur as follows: No intention to make San Fernando base for future operations. You say supply by water at that point impracticable and reconstruction of railway necessary. Several days yet required to reach Calumpit with railway, and probably several more necessary to reach San Fernando. Calumpit will be the base and troops supplied, for a time at least, by cascoes to be sent there at once. There are 6 feet of water in Rio Grande to Candaba, and it is practicable for light-draft boats to reach San Isidro. Your first objective is Candaba. where gunboats can meet you; thence probably by river road'north. One-half light battery and your convalescents. of which 100 South Dakota men should go up to-day, will be sent you, and probably 2 battalions Seventeenth Infantry. This will carry your enlisted force to about 4,000 and should be ample to drive any force enemy can place in your front. General Lawton has a more difficult problem. The enemy has a large force at San Ildefonso and San Miguel, and it is now reported that Generals Pilar and Geronimo have reached latter point. Should Lawton be pressed hard it may be necessary for you to give assistance by way of Candaba, otherwise he will join you on river near San Isidro. It is believed that gunboats, cascoes, and launches can supply you on river, and it will not be necessary for your train to carry very much supply. One battalion Seventeenth Infantry will probably be sent you tomorrow afternoon. You will necessarily need sufficient supplies on starting to take you to Candaba. There is great necessity for celerity of movement, and it is desired that it be inaugurated as soon as practicable. To this dispatch the General replied that he would act on the instructions contained therein at once, but considered the directed movement a very delicate one and that conlitions should be carefully weighed before it was attelmpted; that his position at San Fernando was satisfactory, and that he t houglit the troops should remain to recuperate until the railway could be repaired to thlat point; that he had about 3,800 men, (,600 of whom were continually on the firglting line, and that lie desired to exclange regiments whichll were with himn for solne in rear, which were comparatively fresll thltl- Luna was in his immediate front with 2,500 mnen and had 1,00()( at Mexico, on thle Candaba road, and that there were possibly 10,(00, between himt and the Baliuatg country. MacArthur's troops were at thlis time pretty well worn out, and a great many of tihem were on sick report. They had been fighting almost continually for three months in a tropieal climate and over a swampy country through which wagon transportation could not be moved. There were no freslh troops to send to San Fernando. The withdrawal of the Spanish forces in Mindlanao and the Sulu Archipelago, where troops nust be placed, the necessity of sending others to Cebu and to increase those in Negros-all of which was inmpelatively demanded at this timine-rendered conllitiolis soniewhat critical. I had also been directed to return the volunteer organizations to the United States without delay, and il response I cabled, on May 11, to Washington as follows: Volunteer organizations first to return now at Negros and 45 miles from Manila at front. Expected that transports now arriving will take returning volunteers. Volunteers understand they will begin to leave for United States lhtter part of month. Know importance of their presence here at this time, and accept sacrifices which United States interests make imperative. Hancock now entering harbor. Transports returning this week carry sick and wounded men. Pennsylvania and St. Paul not needed longer in southern waters where they have been retained, hence dispatched. Transports Nelson and Cleveland brought freight; return without cargo. This I did after consulting with some of the most prominent volunteer officers, pointing'out to thein the delicate situation we were in, and they responded that the volunteers would willingly remain until it was cleared up or until more of the regular regiments then en route could arrive. We must now either advance at the north or retreat to REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 119 Calumpit, holding the railroad in our rear and await reenforcements with which to replace all volunteers, having in the meantime a large insurgent force in our immnediate front and a continually increasing one south of Manila, which had become annoying and which now lnumbered 5,000 men. It was therefore determined to direct MacArthur to hold on to San Fernando with what force he had, operating against and holding Luna as best he could; to send a detached columnn up the Rio Grande, and to permit Lawton to advance. The Ninth and Seventeenth Infantry had reported by April 23, and the Twenty-first arrived on May 11. This gave us opportunity to forward more of the Manila troops. 3Major Kobbe, Third Artillery, then at Malolos, was directed to Calumpit, to which point 1 battalion of the Ninth Infantry,8 3 of the Seventeenth, and Light Battery E, First Artillery were sent. lHe was ordered to proceed up tile ri ver with this force to Candaba, attended by the gunboats which were to haul cascoes loaded with 20,)00 extra rations. This command left Calinmpit \May 16; and reached Candaba the following day, having encountered little opposition. On 3May 13 General Lawton reported from Ballinag tlhaat a commission sent by General Aguinaldo had presented itself and dlesired to be sent to Manila to confer with the United States Peace Commission. HIe was instructed as follows: HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS. lMan 1ila. P. I..May 13, 1S99. Maj. Gen. H. W. LAWTON. U. S. V., Coiimm ading lUntited Stttes Forces. Barlia(g, Luzonl. GENERAL: The commanding general of the United States forces in the Philippines directs me to inform you that you will reply to the communication addressed to you by Gen. Gregorio del Pilar, of the Philippine forces at your front, which communication was delivered to me by Captain Sewell, of your staff, and is herewith returned, that should General Agninaldo desire to send representative men to confer with the United States commission now in session in this city. you are at liberty and will pass such body through your lines, promising them safe conduct to and from Manila and ample protection during their stay here. Railway transportation between Malolos and Manila is freely accorded. Very respectfully, THOM.AS H. BARRY, Assista)l t Adj t( ta t- General. This commission was receive(d l-y me upon arrival and made known its mission, which was to take preliminary action toward the negotiation of ternis of peace. It was quickly informed that cessation of hostilities (lepended entirely upon surrender of arlms atnd the disbandment of their military organizations. Expressing then the desire to confer with the peace commission, it was afforded the opportunity. For lack of time I was not present at any of tlhese conferences, which extended through two days. The commission was then sent north through our lines, havin(,(g accomplishedl nothing in so far as my knowledge extended. On May 14 General Lawton was given permission to advance on San Miguel as his objective. Leaving a battalion of troops at. Balinag he mlarched rapidly on Ildefonso, where he routed a strong force of the enemy by a dexterous flank movement to his right, and proceeding on San Miguel, where the enemy was strongly intrenched, accomplished the same result by similar tactics. On the evening of May 15 he was instructed as follows: General LAWTON, San Miguel: Your next objective is San Isidro, unless your progress so much impeded by enemy that your subsistence likely to give out, in which event you should seek road to Rio Grande and try to communicate with Kobbe's column and gunboats, where REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. you will find rations. Kobbe's column will be pushed up as rapidly as possible, but can not tell how far gunboats can ascend river. Believe they can ascend to Arayat, where enemy have heavy intrenchments. Watch well your right. It is reported that a large number of insurgents are at Biacnabato. Report not verified. No change in MacArthur's front. Still confronted by about 5,000 men. Marching out of San Miguel the next morning, where he left a containing force, he struck the insurgents, whom he drove to the right and left, and bewildering them by his rapidity of movement, which rendered them unable to concentrate, he seized San Isidro, the third insurgent capital, on May 17, General Aguinaldo and cabinet, with troops, having retired to' Cabanatuan, 14 niles to the north, on road leadiing into the mountains of northern Luzon. Late in the evening of that day General MacArthur reported as follows: My information is not absolutely certain, but everything indicates that insurgents from my front and right retired along the railroad. A reconnoitering party reached the 67-kilometer post, and at that point discovered stragglers apparently in rear of a column moving in their front. We went out the road through Mexico to Santa Ana and found both points vacated, and was informed by natives that insurgent soldiers had gone to Angeles. Up to late hour this afternoon the line between here and Bacolor was still occupied by insurgents. To-morrow I hope to get definite information. The following (lay it was ascertained that Luna had retreated on Tarlac with about 3,000 men, leaving a considerable force under General Mascardo on General MacArthur's left, with headquarters at Santa Rita or in that vicinity. It was believed that a considerable insurgent force would be found at the strong defensive position of Arayat, and to that point both General Lawton and Major Kobbe were sent, General Lawton being instructed at midnight May 17 as follows: General LAWTON, San Isidro: Your next objective, Arayat down Rio Grande, after troops have rested and peace restored at San Isidro. Arayat reported to be strongly intrenched. Kobbe and gunboats started up river this morning at 6. This early announcement, fearing telegraphic communication may be lost. On the following morning the following informaltion was sent him: General LAWTON, San I.sidro: General MacArthur reports that from information almost positive he believes that 1,000 of Luna's men have retired to Florida Blanca and Porac, which are to his left; that Luna with 3,000 armed men is at Tarlac. He states that all his information is to the effect that Luna has not sent assistance to the east and is not likely to do so, as there is no cooperation between him and the force on the San Isidro line. He states that Major Bell is on reconnoissance and now at or near Angeles; that he will not probably hear from him until late this evening. MacArthur's information was obtained from inhabitants of the country and an Englishman, Mr. Sims, who left Tarlac last evening and has just entered his lines. Should this information prove true, all of the force sent by you to San Miguel this morning should continue its journey to Baliuag. Troops at San Miguel can not be supplied during the season of heavy rains. Lawton, descending the Rio Grande, and Kobbe, as(en(lillg the stream, struck the place on the same hour of the day; found only a small force there, which quickly retreated. It was now determined to operate on General Luna's left flank, Lawton, reenforced by Kobbe, to take the road to Talrlac, when it was ascertained that tGeneral Luna had removed his headquarters to Bayamnbang, only a few miles north of Dagupan, and that his troops were retiring north of Tarlac. The railway facilities which the insurgents possessed rendered a rapid retreat on their part very easy. The rainy season had now come and the volunteer organizations REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 121 must be hastened homeward, and should a column be sent to Tarlac the enemy would retire, leaving us a destroyed or badly damaged railroad without the means to operate it, and we were seriously crippled for lack of wagon transportation. Our troops once at Tarlac could not be supplied, and all were needed at other points until we could consumlnate the difficult feat of exchanging the volunteers for organizations of the regular establishment. We must keep what we had gained, and could do that by establishing a line to the front, extending from San Fernando on the left to Baliuag on the right, from which it would be easy to resume operations. General Lawton was recalled, a sufficient force placed at Candaba, San Luis, Calumpit, and Baliuag to hold the country in rear, and steps were taken to return and ship the volunteers as rapidly as circumstances would permit. But the condition of General MacArthur's troops was not improving. The volunteers lhald again become very restless and desired to depart. On June 2 the surgeon of one of these regiments reported that of 873 officers and enlisted )en 30 per cent were in the Manila hospitals sick and wounded, 30 per cent were sick at San Fernando, "and of the remainder there are not 8 men in each company who have the strength to endure one day's march." In respect to this report the chief surgeon of MacArthur's division remarked that he had made a careful examination of the men and that of the whole number in the regiment then plesent only!)G were fit for duty. The division commander remarked on Mlay 22 and June 5, with regard to these and similar reports, as follows: The duty required of the men of this brigade, in common with the other commands of the division, has been severe and continuous since the 4th of February of the current year. The sun, field rations, physical exertion, and the abnormal excitement arising from almost constant exposure to fire action have operated to bring about a general enervation from which the men do not seem to readily recover, although the present conditions are very favorable. The four regiments now present have an enlisted strength of 3,701. Of these 1,003 are sick and wounded, leaving an effective of 2,698, which, after deducting necessary details for special duty, yields only 2,307 for the firing line. many of whoni could not march 5 miles under the conditions which obtained from Malolos to this place. The physical condition of men in the organizations which originally commenced the campaign in this division and are still at the front has during the past month been a matter of great concern. The difficulties are progressive and without any apparent fluctuation are growing worse from day to day. N For four months these men have been continually under arms night and day, exposed in a relaxing climate to a scorching sun, almost as destructive and much harder to bear than the enemy's fire, until apparently the severe, unremitting, and almost unexampled strain has told upon whole organizations to such an extent that they are now completely worn out and broken in health. Later the chief surgeon of the department stated, when commenting on tile conditions presented: I can add nothing to the careful and valuable report made by the chief surgeon of the division. The data must be accurate and the conclusion unimpeachable. These men and the men of the companion regiments have been overworked, are broken down, and will not be fit for duty as a regiment within any reasonable period. It is difficult to explain. except at a length that would be unacceptable, how these physiological factors operate, but the fact remains, and here is a striking illustration of it, that commands do become worn out precisely as the fifth indorsement states. The weakened hearts and quickened pulses indicate a condition akin to that of typhoid fever convalescence, and restoration to physical efficiency will not take place in this climate within any reasonable period, and meanwhile such men display no vital resistance to acute disease. This feature of the "soldier's irritable heart " was a condition well recognized during the severe strain of the civil war, but with these men there is the additional disability of general physical prostration. 122 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. These reports I forwarded to Washington on June 23, with the following indorsenient: Respectfully forwarded to the Adjutant-General of the Army. I have inquired carefully into the condition of health of these organizations, which is now improving. The cause of sickness may be attributed, I believe, to the great strain attendant upon constant fighting, with lack of needed rest, neglect of person during this period, because of which a peculiar disease, designated itch, was developed, and indiscriminate consumption of fruit, which was abundant in the country over which troops passed and are stationed, and the use of water not potable. The South Dakota regiment was brought to Manila two weeks ago and is rapidly improving. The Kansas regiment is en route and the Montana regiment will soon follow. I think, like the Oregon regiment, when orders to take passage to the United States are issued, that both the Montana and South Dakota troops will recover with astonishing rapidity. There are few cases of serious illness. San Fernando, the present station of these troops, is considered somewhat as a health resort by the Filipinos, and there seems to be no good reason why men should not improve as rapidly there as in Manila, except that there is in the vicinity of San Fernando a very active enemy, which must be constantly watched, necessitating a larger percentage of men on outpost duty than at some other points. The headquarters and 10 companies of the Third Infantry, witl a platoon of artillery and a mounted troop of the Fourth Cavalry, took station at Balinag, and headquarters and 2 battalions of the Twentysecond Infantry were placed at (Candaba and San Luis, to be assisted, in case of attack, by one of the gunboats which was left in the Rio Grande, and which was to be used also in forwarding supplies from Calumpit. The rains comiing on alld heavy storms having been predicted for that section of country, the troops at San lMiguel, whose rations were about exhausted, were ordered to fall back at once on Baliuag. They were attacked while en route at Ildefonso and lMaasin, and were obliged to halt twice and drive off the enemy, whiclh they did effectively, but tile enemy published and celebrated for a long time their signal victories at Ildefonso, San Miguel, and San Isildro. During these Luzon military operations affairs in the central islands became more or less critical, deanded carefuil sul)ervision, and occasionally an accession'of troops. As early as February 3 (General Miller had reported froml Iloilo that the inhabitants of Negros and Cebu realized that they could not successfully establish an independent government and wished( the IUnited States to exercise control. After the capture of Iloilo the navy visited the city of Cebu and took quiet possession of the place-the commandiln officer of the force assuming direction of the business of the captain of the port and collector of customs and entering into an arrangement with the more prominent citizens to permit them to conduct their own internal affairs. This was reported to me with the request that troops he sent to that point to assist the small navy force there in case of necessity. (n receipt of this information, and on February 26, the following order was issued and executed: A battalion of the Twenty-third U. S. Infantry, Maj. G. A. Goodale commanding, will proceed at once by transport Pennsyllvania to the port of Cebu, Island of Cebu, for the purpose of furnishing immediate protection to the inhabitants and property of that locality. The battalion will be supplied with rations for thirty days and 300 rounds of ammunition per man. This did not relieve the officers of the Navy of the administration of civil affairs, the management of which it was desirable to turn over to the Army, and they continued in control awaiting our action to take formal possession. Upon General Miller's report that he had held a conference with some of the principal citizens of the island of Negros REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 123 and that they had raised the United States flag, wished a few troops to protect them fron the Tagalos, whoin they had declined to receive in the island, and desired to be sent to Manila to present conditions and solicit aid. instructions were given for a compliance with their request, whereupon a committee of four gentlemen arrived here on the 21st of February. Several conferences followed. They had, they said, established a crude temporary government, appointing a governor who was one of their number; that if permitted to arm a small battalion of natives to be placed under the direction of the United States officers and to receive the assistance of a few United States troops, they were confident that the quiet of the island could be maintained and the Tagalo element successfully restrained. A great deal of conversation, consuming portions of several successive days, followed. They were eager to be informed of the purposes of the United States, and were informed that a military government with general supervision of their affairs must be erected and maintained until Congressional legislation prescribed the nature and measure of control which would be inposed; that no assurances could be given them except tlat the civil government to be finally established would be republhicanl in cllaracter and would give them as much local representation as the intelligence and animus of the people permitted and as was in harmony with their own and the interests of the United States. The troops asked for were provided, and the commlittee was advised to return, call their representative people together, and, acting with andl under the advice of the military governor whoml I would send, to fornmllate and sublit a plan of governlment for the administration of strictly internal affairs, which upon receipt I would forward for the considera.tion of tile United States supreme authorities. I selected for their (overnor Colonel Smith, of the First California Volunteers, now brigadier-general of volunteers, an excelleint soidier and a lawyer of experience. Ile had several conferences with tlem and won their confidence and esteem, when tfley expressed a stroncg desire to have himi and a few troops accompany them to Negros, which was favorably acted upon. To mleet tile situation which was rapidly developing in Panay, Negros, and Cebu the following orders were issued: GENERAL ORDERS, H HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARMY CORPS, No. 8. Madaila, P. I., March 1, 1899. 1. A military district, comprising the islands of Panay, Negros, and Cebu and such other Visayan Islands as may be hereafter designated, to be known as the Visayan' military district, is hereby established and placed under the supervision of Brig. Gen. Marcus P. Miller, U. S. A.. commanding First Separate Brigade, Eighth Army Corps, with, headquarters at Iloilo. The troops already sent to Cebu and those about to embark for Negros will furnish all possible protection to those islands, maintaining peace and order while administering the civil affairs throughout the islands on lines prescribed by the military government. 2. Col. James F. Smith, First Regiment California Volunteer Infantry, is hereby detached from his regiment, and will proceed by U. S. transport St. Paul with the troops mentioned in paragraph 5 of this order to Bacolod, Negros, via Iloilo, reporting upon his arrival at the last-named point to Brig. Gen. M. P. Miller, U. S. A., commanding the Visayan military district, the specific instructions which he has received from these headquarters, and there to receive such additional instructions as General Miller may wish to give in furtherance of their execution. 3. Colonel Smith is assigned to the command of the subdistrict of the island of Negros, and will establish his headquarters at the capital of that island, furnishing protection to the inhabitants thereof, whom he will assist to develop civil administration over the affairs of that island in accordance with the specific instruictions already received from these headquarters. 124 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 4. Col. James F. Smith, First California Volunteer Infantry, commanding subdistrict of the island of Negros, will upon his arrival there, as directed in paragraph 2 of this order, proceed to organize from the natives of the island a civil police of 200 men, placing the organization under military discipline and retaining entire supervision of it. The men will be employed by the Quartermaster's Department and will be reported monthly on the quartermaster's form of persons and articles hired, on which will be stated their nativity and age, in addition to periods of service. Their compensation will be fixed by the scale of wages prevailing on the island, and the funds to pay for the services will be furnished from these headquarters. Each employee will receive a fixed ration, in addition to his money compensation, which will correspond to the native ration issued in this city. The Ordnance Department will turn over the necessary ordnance to arm and equip these men. 5. The Third Battalion of the First California Volunteer Infantry will embark at once on the U. S. transport St. Paul, prepared to proceed to Bacolod, island of Negros. It will be provided with rations for thirty days and 150,000 rounds of rifle ammunition. The commanding officer of this battalion (Maj. H. T. Sime, First California Volunteer Infantry) will report to Col. James F. Smith, of that regiment, for more specific instructions. * * * * * * * By command of Major-General Otis: THOMAS H. BARRY, Assista t Adjutant- General. General Smith, with the troops and commissioners, left Manila on March 2, and on arrival at Bacolod, the capital of Negros, he took station and successfully organized a battalion of 200 natives, which has been loyal and has performed good service for the United States to the present date. But certain of the inhabitants of Tagalo nativity and others who were disaffected, aided by their friends in Panay, both with advice and war material, and assisted by the robber bands of the mountains, created disturbances in the western, central, and southern portions of the island which culminated in active hostilities. Smith, with his troops, went in pursuit of their concentrated forces wherever they chanced to be and successfully routed them, but it was impossible to cover the country and prevent reconcentration. Ile thereupon called for another battalion of his regiment, which was sent him on March 22. With this increased conmmand he visited all occupied points of the island, and especially held in check the people of I)umaguete and Bais, on the southeast coast, where the insurgent element for a time appeared to be in the ascendancy. This force not proving sufficient to place troops at all necessary points, a call was made for the third battalion of the regiment, which was forwarded on May 21. In the mneantime thie population of occidental and oriental Negros chose delegates to represent their several political districts in a convention at Bacolod, where, after some two months labor under the direction and protection of General Smith, a constitution was prepared for submission to thle President of the United States. This document, having been received here, was forwarded to Washington about July 20 with appropriate remark, and served as a basis for the following order: GENERAL ORDERS; OFFICE U. S. MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, No. 30. Manila, P. I., July 22, 1899. The people of Negros, through duly accredited representatives, having freely acknowledged the sovereignty of the United States over that island, and having developed and forwarded to His Excellency the President of the United States, for the consideration and deliberation of Congress, a proposed constitution or body of fundamental laws, upon which they seek to have established for themselves a republican form of government, it is deemed essential, pending final REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 125 action by the President and the Congress of the United States thereon, and while military supervision of the affairs of the island must be maintained, that a provisional government to administer its civil matters be instituted, under which the people may enjoy the largest measure of civil liberty compatible with prevailing conditions and which shall conform to their desires as expressed in their proposed constitution. It is therefore ordered that a government for that island be established as speedily as practicable in plan and scope as indicated in the following enumerated provisions-the same to remain in force until modified by constituted authority. I. The government of the island of Negros shall consist of a military governor, appointed by the United States military governor of the Philippines, who shall command the United States troops stationed therein. a civil governor and advisory council elected by the people. The military governor shall appoint secretaries of the treasury, interior, agriculture, public instruction, an attorney-general, and an auditor, who shall act under his immediate instructions. The seat of government shall be established at Bacolod. II. The military governor shall exercise the supreme executive power. He shall see that the laws are executed: shall appoint to office and fill all vacancies in office not herein otherwise provided for. and may, with the approval of the military governor of the Philippines, remove any officer from office. He shall perform such other functions as the duties of his position may require. III. The civil governor: There shall be elected by the people a civil governor, who shall advise the military governor on all public civil questions, and who shall preside over the advisory council. He shall countersign all grants and commissions of a civil nature which are executed by the military governor: attend every session of the advisory council, and in case of a tie vote in said body he shall cast the deciding vote: shall receive all bills and resolutions of the advisory council; shall attest the official acts of the military governor in so far as strictly civil nmatters are concerned; shall affix the great seal with his own attestation to all civil commissions, pardons, and public instruments to which the official signature of the military governor is required, and perform such other duties as may be duly conferred upon him. IV. The advisory council: An advisory council, to consist of 8 members. shall be elected by the people, and shall be selected within the following territorial limits: One from the island of Negros at large; three from Oriental Negros, and four from Occidental Negros. The tiles and places of electing these members, after the first election, shall be fixed by the advisory council on the approval of the military governor. Occidental Negros shall have four members of the advisory council, representing four districts, constituted and designated as follows: The cities and pueblos of San Carlos, Calatrava, Escalante, Sagay, Cadiz, Manapla, Victorias, and Saravia shall compose the first district. The cities and pueblos of Estaquio Lopez, Guimbalaon. Silay. Talisay, Lacson, Granada, Murcia, Bacolod, Sumag, Kansilayan, and Abuanan shall compose the second district. The cities and pueblos of Bago, Maao, Pulupandan, Valladolid, San Enrique, La Carlota, Pontevedra, La Castellana, and Magallon shall compose the third district. The cities and pueblos of Ginigaran, Binalbagan, Soledad, Isabela, Jimamaylan, Suay. Kabankalan, Ilog, Dankalan, Guiljugan, Kauayan, and Isiu shall compose the fourth district. Oriental Negros shall have three members of the advisory council, representing three districts constituted and designated as follows: The cities and pueblos of Dumaguete, Valencia, Bakon, Dauin, Zamboanguita, Siaton. Tolon. and Bayauan shall compose the First district. The cities and pueblos of Sibulan. Ayukitan. Amblan, Tanjay, Bais. Manjuyod, Ayungon, Zayaran, Jimaalalud. and Guijulngan shall'compose the Second district. The cities and pueblos of Siquijor, Kamoan, Maria, Lasy, and San Juan shall compose the Third district. V. Elections: The times and places of holding elections for the civil governor and for members of the advisory council shall be fixed by the military governor of the island. VI. Qualifications of voters: In order to be qualified to vote at any election a person shall (1) be a male citizen of the island of Negros; (2) he shall have attained the age of 21 years: (3) he shall be able to speak, read, and write understandingly the English, Spanish. or Visayan language, or he must be the owner of real property worth $500 or pay a rental on real property of the value of $1,000: (4) he must have resided in the island not less than one year preceding and in the district in REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. which he offers to register as a voter not less than three months immediately preceding the time when he offers to register; (5) he shall, prior to each regular election, during the time prescribed by law for registration, have caused his name to be entered on the register of voters for his district; and (6) prior to such registration he shall have paid all taxes due by him to the government: Provided, That no insane person, or deaf-mute who can not read or write, shall be allowed to register or vote. The military governor shall make suitable provisions for the registration of voters, for the preparation of ballots, and for the method of casting votes at the first election. VII. The military governor of the island shall have the right to veto all bills or resolutions adopted by the advisory council, and his veto shall be final if not disapproved by the military governor of the Philippines. VIII. The advisory council shall discharge all the ordinary duties of a legislature. IX. The secretary of the treasury: It shall be the duty of the secretary of the treasury to receive and safely keep all the public funds not confided by law to the custody of other officers, to expend money only upon warrants drawn by the auditor attached to the vouchers upon which the warrants are drawn, to keep a careful account of all moneys received and expended by law, and once a month to report to tile auditor an itemized statement of the warrants paid and the money balances on haid in the treasury. He shall perform such other duties as may be prescribed by law. X. The secretary of the interior: It shall be the duty of the secretary of the interior to supervise public lands, forests. mines. surveys, public works, provide for the taking of the census, and to take appropriate measures for safeguarding the public health. He shall perform such other duties as may be duly committed to his charge. X,I. The secretary of agriculture: It shall be the duty of the secretary of agriculture to study the agricultural resources of the island with a view to increasing the wealth derived therefrom. He shall give special attention to the means of combating diseases or pests which attack animals or crops, to the study and recommendation of improved methods of cultivation, to the introduction of new products suited to the climate and soil, and shall perform such other duties as may be legally prescribed. XII. The secretary of public instruction shall have charge of the establishment and maintenance of free public schools for prinmary instruction throughout the island, and of such other schools of higher instruction as may be required or suited to the needs and advancement of the people. He shall have general supervision of all matters relating to public instruction. XIII. The attorney-general: It shall be the duty of the attorney-general to prosecute and defend all causes to which the Island of Negros or any one of its officers is a party, and to give legal advice to any officer of the civil departments whenever the same shall be required of him in his official capacity. He shall perform such other duties as may be prescribed by law. XIV. The auditor: It shall be the duty of the auditor to report to the military governor, whenever so required, an itemized statement of the expenses of the government for past periods, and an itemized estimate of all expenses of the government for the ensuing fiscal year, accompanied by a report of the amount of money on hand in the treasury to meet such expenses, and the amount of revenue necessary to be raised for government purposes by taxation or otherwise. He shall also report such scheme as to him may seem proper to secure economy in the public service. He shall draw warrants on the secretary of the treasury for all sums of public money required and estimated for by officers of the government, after having satisfied himself of the legality and correctness of the proposed expenditures which the money asked for is to meet. He shall perform such other duties as shall be legally imposed. XV. Municipal governments: Municipal governments shall be organized as soon as possible under the supervision of the military and civil governors and the advisory council. They shall have the usual powers and perform the usual duties of such bodies, subject to the direction of the military governor. XVI. Officers of cities, towns, and municipalities in office at the time of the promulgation of this order shall continue to act in their official capacity until successors are elected, selected, or appointed and qualified. XVII. The judiciary: The judicial power shall be vested in three judges, who shall be appointed by the military governor of the island. They shall severally hold court at such times and places as may be determined by the advisory council and the military and civil governors, and shall sit in banc. at a time and place to be fixed by that authority, in order to hear appeals. Their modes of procedure, REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 127 terms of office, and compensation shall be fixed by the advisory council, on the approval of the military governor. Appeal shall lie from the court in banc to the supreme court, at Manila, in all civil cases where the amount involved exceeds $500 (Mexican), and in all criminal cases amounting to felony. XVIII. Inferior courts shall be provided for and established under the advice and recommendation of the civil governor and advisory council. XIX. The jurisdiction of these courts shall not extend to nor include crimes and offenses committed by either citizens or persons sojourning within the Island of Negros which are prejudicial to military administration and discipline, except by authority specially conferred by the military governor. Jurisdiction to try and award punishment in these classes of cases remains vested in provost courts, courts-martial. or military commissions. XX. All cases and actions pending at the time of the promulgation of this order are hereby transferred for trial and determination to the courts of appropriate jurisdiction provided for in the preceding paragraphs. XXI. The style of all process shall be ' The Judicial Department of Negros.' and all prosecutions shall be carried on in the name of and by the authority of said judicial department. XXII. Education: Free public schools shall be established throughout the populous districts of the island, in which the English language shall be taught, and this subject will receive the careful consideration of the advisory council. XXIII. Revenue and taxation: Thle advisory council, presided over by the civil governor, is authorized to devise and adopt a system of taxation uniform in operation in order to raise revenue for the support of government and for all other necessary purposes. The burden of government must be equally and equitably distributed among the people. XXIV. The military authorities will collect and receive the custonis revenue, if any. will control postal matters and Philippine interisland trade and commerce. XXV. The military governor shall, subject to the approval of the military governor of the Philippines, determine all questions not herein specifically mentioned and which do not come under the jurisdiction of the advisory council. XXVI. The compensation of civil officers shall be as follows: Mexican currency. Civil governor. -.-.-... per annum - - $0.000.00 Secretary of the treasury......-..... —. --- —-- ------ - -.do - - - 3.000. 00 Secretary of the interior.... do -.- 3. 000.00 Secretary of agriculture.. —. do.. 3.000. 00 Secretary of public instruction ----—...... —.... --- do... 3. 000. 00 Attorney- general....... _ do... 3.000.00 Auditor......do.- 3.000.00 Members of advisory council, for each day while in session - per day- 8. 00 And 50 cents for each kilometer of distances traveled between place of residence and place of meeting and return. The period of the regular session of the advisory council shall not exceed one hundred aind twenty days during the year. but in case of necessity the.civil governor. with the approval of the military governor, shall call extra sessions for such periods of time as shall be deemed proper and shall be designated in the call. Per diem and mileage at the rate fixed above shall be allowed the members of the advisory council for any extra session they may attend. XXVII. The military governor of the island is empowered to take all necessary action to put in execution the foregoing directory provisions. Instructions prescribing methods and date of election of officers who are to be selected by ballot will be issued. and the election will be held at as early a day as practicable. By command of Major-General Otis: THOM.)As H. BARRY...4s,.isttat A djitant-Genera l. In tlhe new field of polits, upo n which t1ese people entered with alacrity, there were' mnany dlisagreeimetls-the result of persomal ambitionls probably, as well as of ant.agonist.ic h]oncst opinion, and coimplaints were hear'd a.lnd opposition was frequently offered to thle civil ofi(cers of districts to whom tflhey ad inltristed thle preservation of law andl( order. Those exercisimg tlie civil power, acquainted only willh Spamnishi llmethods, soughit to organlize a military police force which was ma de responsible only to its founder and which executed his orders in a very arbitrary and oftentimes cruel mianner. It wa s unreliable, and a portiol of it served tile Tagalo and robber element, 128 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. to which mlany deserted. Through all the turnioils and difficulties experienced by the advocates for United States Governnlent General Smith retained the confidence of all factions and assisted to heal their differences. They desired an election of such classes of officers as might be permlitted to direct local affairs under United Slates military supervision, and an opportunity to manifest their fitness for an abridged formi of government has been given them. What the result will be can not as yet be forecast with any certainty, but it is to be hoped that they will meet the expectations of those desiring their ultimate welfare, both for the benefits they will receive thereby and also for the sake of examplnle to the inhabitants of the other Philippine Islands, who are now distrustful of United States intentions and its expressed good will toward them. 1By this latter and very large class of Filipinos affairs in Negros are closely watched, and a successfully conducted government there —one which will protect individual rights and give a ftair mefasure of indlividual liberty —\will be a most important factor in the pacification labors of these islands. The United States troops in Negros have l)erforlned severe service. Thlie ( alifornianlls have bIeen rep)la.e(l by tlhe Sixth Ilnfantry, which, like its predecessors, has respo(led promlptly to every d(emanid tand shown itself well able to mIlaster tle military situation. General Smith still exercises supiervision, an(l to his unremittingl efforts, tact, and ability is due the fact that serious obstacles have been surnlounted. Robber bands have always existed in the mlountains of Negros, and their recent accessions from -without encolra.gerd themn to atssume a defiant front, but the hea\vy clhastise Ients whlichl they have received at thl-e hands of our troops has well-mi-h (lestroye(l the.lll Arrangements were mladle early to take over the civil ad(llinistl'ation of affairs of the city of Ceb)u. I,ieuteniant-Colonel Ialnler. of tile Idaho Volunteers, a lawyer by professioll, whllo hiad filled tlle Iosition of judg( of one of the -Manila pr)ovost (courts withI gileat c(re(lit,, was selected for that (luty, an(l on March. 14 the following oider was issued: ENERAL ORDERS, ) HDQRS. DEPT. PACIFIC AND EIGHTH ARIY CORPS, No. 13. M3a'nila, P. I., M(rch 14, 18,9. 1. The island of Cebu will constitute a subdistrict of the Visayan military district, with headquarters at the city of Cebu. Lieut. Col. Thomas R. Hamer. First Idaho Volunteer Infantry, is assigned to the command of the same and will proceed to that city by way of iloilo, where he will report to the commanding general of the district for any directions the latter may desire to convey to enable him to execute the specific instructions which he will receive from these headquarters to guide him in the performance of his duties. Colonel Hamer will report to the commanding general of the department for conference and instructions and will take passage on transport Id.ianat, which has been directed to proceed to Iloilo as soon as necessary repairs to steamer can be made. By command of Major-General Otis: TIOMAS H. BnARR-Y, AssistRat Adj1 ta t-Genleral. The battalion of the Twrenty-tlhird Infantry whicll was sent to Cebu the latter part of February had not taken any action in civil Inatters, but had preserved order in the commnunity. T'le citizens had looked after their own local interests, and officers of the Navy had contlinued to conduct harbor anl('l customs affairs, fromli which they were n1ow relieved by armny officers detailed to ierformn thle d(uties of those positions. Shortly thlereafter the dissensiions betweenl the friendllyv-disposed and hostile-intentioned nlativew s becfante bitter a.nd culminated in the assassination of onie of the most prominent citizens simply because he advocated United States protection, cand attempts were RELPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTis. 129" liae up1)o1 the lives of a flul1llbe1 of otier whoA11 favor-ed U~nited States oee tip tioi I. The t owns Avii hini a11h1rt r. Miuiis of (list anee, began to show 1 le first wr p1 o iii r~ elel liol 411(1 1 l( llloulhltltili peaIks belhind( (>1bu \lXlibl~( d p1 ( p ii iitioiis for (I( eiisel o1 possilbly attalck, ill newly ('01181 111(1 ed rii l1 iirti (11(1111(111 (Jonittiiaiad I rawle aflongr tile coa.s't olI, lie iskl' 111was 1(lv 1\d ii(l av\e the small nU111)0als lluaniied byv the itl iv es eoiisider 4111f( \ exiflugl oectipat 1011 C olonel lfctla eir called for add it i(101. I1 bo ( (I 11(1 a.Ii itt tahoul of tl( T(11111 ssee r'e-filncieit wAN.ts senit iitl jill i 011loi lo. holioi 11 fo 10 ( 111(11181011 iito the iliteriol' were mlade bv (let aweliM ('o01111)411ni of0 thle Iwetittv-1iliid lidi hmit i at- first -without cioi (01 tr('.11. 11. lici oppos~0i tioni, b)It al cy i 1very (eeidedl 01)1)Si I I1. It was t'i~p In r(l ii 1 hat ilie relbefl il -was giowilig, St )-oilg01er eachl stlice)(I iml. dav\ (11(1 1-il it IICrea'sed f oveC -would Ie r( equ ir".I to cOpe w it Iiit. T1 hoCeb(u1) p( ople possess5 gietnl 1111iinl 1(1 (If small sailing ('raits, with Ii wl 1(1 tlIe are lC~iclsi 011(d 1(o ('onduc1t tliamle b)etween tlheir own and( ]leiewllor'lllr islands. With11 these they skirted other cocasl ii i'01)1)b(t d Ih ul~lab it ailt s. They i 1lilovelrishile(1 and red uce(1 o 1( uner I lie n "titv1 8o(f t he isfland of aoh l, an withI the aidl of the Taga2-los,u1)1( lihe' eilliss"I iies jillt rod-tced aruls ~1ld'11(11au11l1lit ionl among11 theiru owni people. Ouit Aprili 1 Coloiel H ameri wi'1ot e Our presentJ occupancy includi~es only the 01(d town of C'ebu, while the insurgents under Francisco Llamnas occOpy tile adljoininlg town of San Nicholas. wihich. in fact, is a Ilart of tile city of Cebu. This man Llamas is an active and cunning fellow wllom tile natives f ear to tile extent of conceding to ilim supernatural power. I may say in this connectioul that tile president seems to hold like views wivth the rest of the natives on this su1)ject. The vice-president and treasurer deny tilat they fear hlim and say that if we b)ad sufficient force to inspire tile natives with confidence inj our albility to protect themn Llamas's standard wouldl be deserted, as hie is deeply heated as well as feared by tile people. 'and they only await a safe opportunity to throw off hisvyoke. After carefully looking over the groundlIha-ve come to the coliclusioll that 110w is tlh( tinie for us to perfect oul' occupation of the island. We can accomplish it now witil the display of force. anld. in mny opinion, witilout the loss of a mnan. * The, southern coast line of the island contains all the towins of any consequence. If you can send me twvo more battalions, I will undertake to occupy these towns andl estatblisli in each a goverullieit which will acknowledge the supremacy of the United States, and this. too, without the loss of a single man. Mut 1 here -were 11(1 t ioo}) avniib~lhe, for Luzout denlauildedl every armeh-d milin. We pelulittel (Cebu to drift alld foment opposition;, ('ari'eflll to hold sectiruely its prilleillafl ('ity, anl 11111 porclant tra-ding poillt anld o1W ofIthe, opl~l 110r15 oIf the lIfilipphies. The insurgent, leaders (Ioa-utlized t lieiri foreCes ats best thiey eoIld, -withouit mucrih interruption (Ill 0our l)Irt i'C 111 ii inl their eouceeit they commnenced to asselmllle a force 4 miles (lit (If i he citi vand oii I he( overlooking niolutains, with whieili to drive 11s off atI 1111' 0po111)1 l1( I ilue. It gr'ew to 1,50() antd thenl to 2, 000, halving' severall pieees of nril lilleu'y Ill. lositioll and 1'itles antd 411111unuit lOll ill colisidlel'alle qul-llit ifes. Its lpositiols were bl~eieved 1(1 be imprIle-guahble, an1d nlow ais I writie I leau'it that Colonel Snyder, (If thle _NiN m-etecth Ilifauilt ryN, wNho a shout t ime Since wa-,,s selit, thi'er with aIt portion of hlis u'egiuniutw to0 relieve. the reiinessee l-Mittaiolllua vi hg icollectedl atll troolps at 1l411(, ('(115sst ing of that,- contrilugent of his own11 rlgiullie it jpresenlt, two compillalies, of the Sixthl Infanltriy sent by. (G lenal 1Iuloic'hs fronm Iloilo, thie Tven ty-thlirid Ii ifanu'y battalion, 011(1 fle Teiinessee Volunteer's, wh hne htwyonte'hmwau'(l voyagti~e a411(N1 wh offered thei Ievies hs cleared the neighborin uiir ount)ainus of afll insurg-ents," excepting those who nlow lie buried there, 411(1 has gathiered ill t~heir' weapons of war. W ~9 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. The better class of the population of the island of Cebu greatly desire stable government, and tils they know they can not obtain without American supremacy and )protection. When the Tagalo is driven out and the ignorant element which now cries for independence, having no conception of the meaning of the terni, is forced to betake itself to legitimate occupation instead of robbery, tlle island will be easily controlled, and at present it would appear thlat the time required to bring about that desirable condition of thlings would not extend far into the future. About the middle of April I was requested by tle Spanish autlhorities to relieve tlhe trool)s of Spain in Mindanao and thle Sulu Archipelago. In the group of islands last namied matters were represented from Singapore and other points as being in a very unsatisfactory state, and it was asserted that the Sultan and hi s datos were secuing large supplies of arms and amimunition from tlhe Asiatic and neighboring coasts. The inhabitants (Moros) had always given Spain trouble. They had always manifested toward Spain a feeling of subdued hostility when not actually at war with her, and she had been able to impose only a recognition of very much abridged sovereignty. The Spanish acting governor-general (General Rios), who for a long time had supervised Spanish affairs in the south, informed me tlat he had never succeeded in stopping there the trade in arims, and as for commerce, it could never be placed under proper restrictions. We felt therefore considerable hesitancy in d(ispatching to the archipelago the limited force which then could be sent from Manila, apprehending more or less difficulty in securely holding necessary positions should we garrison them. All the Spanish troops which were formerly stationed along the coast of the island of Mindanao had been concentrated at Zamboanga, its chief city. The Tagalos had taken possession of the northern and northeastern coast and, with their confederates, the country in the vicinity of the above-named place. In March the Spanish authorities advertised for public sale at the naval station of Isabella, on Basilan Island, a short distance south of Zamboanga, 13 of their gunboats which had been formerly used on the island coasts. These boats were purchased by a syndicate comnposed of private individuals, with the understanding that it would deliver them to the United States authorities in the harbor of Manila. The agent of the syndicate, who after purchasing was about to leave for Isabella to receive delivery of the boats and tralnsport them north, was informed that if he could secure tlle atnlarnent belonging to tlhe vessels the United States would receive it from himl at cost price. Having been promised protection by tle Unitedl States Navy while en route with the vessels to Matnila, lie sailed for Isabella 1y ) one of the coasting merchant vessels, taking wNith himi crews for such of the boats as were serviceable, tand received thein there fronll tlie Spanish authorities with their arlmaments, which lie bollghtl under the agreemnent above stated. I-e steamled out of Isabella larborh, anld to protect him on his voyage, awaited near Zamnboanga the comning of the United States war vessel which by some mlisunderstanding liad been detained at a northern port. While awaiting thle arrival of tllis war vessel, and less than twenty-four hours before it reported, his fleet was seized by Mindanao insurgents, and nearly one-half of his ordnance, consisting of artillery, rifles, arndl amnllunition for same, was taken from him and landed about a mile from Zamboanga on the Mindanao coast. By this seizure the insurgents were supplied with a few pieces REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL orTIS. 131 of artillery, 11 quick-firing guns, 375 rifles, with considerable ammunition for all guns and pieces, and could therefore place themselves in fair condition for attack or (lefense. After they had captured and landed the arms conl)laint was mnade by the agent to the commanding officer of the Spanish- troops at Zalnboanga, who, it was understood, after having received the assurances of thle insurgelt chiefs that the arnms would not be employedl against his troops, did not concern himself f urther in the matter. The gunllll)oats and what remlained of the arimamllenIt were collvoyed to -Manila by the naval authorities and turne(l over to the lmAr1ny, whichl completed the luIclhlase by paym ent front the accruinog civil funds of thle l'hiliplpines. They were subse(tuently transferle(l to the Navy for use, and under thle direction of its commander ill chlief have ever since( rend(ered lmIost efficient service along the sltallow coasts and harbors of the islands. Th'le possession of these armns by tle Mindanao insurgents rendered it inexpedient to land troop)s at ZamlboangLa and attell)t to hold the place with any force which could be spared from Luzon. General Rios -was therefore inforllled that we were nlot prepared to relieve his garrisons at either Zamlnboanga or in the Sulu \Archipelagro until organizations then en route slould arrive; thlat thle IUnited States was entitled to a reasonable time to take over the pllaces which Sipain desired to surrender, and that since tlle ratificatioln of the tlreaty sucll timiie had not intervenedl. rTlius action was held in abevanee until M1ayN- 13:, -when news of -a surpilising chlarac.ieter -was recived(, wichl is sliownl in tlle followingl explanatory comn111 icaion: OFFICE U. S. S.MILITARY GOVERNOR IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Mlao il ia, 1. I., Mlay 1, 1899. Admiral GEORG(E DEWEY, U. S. N., (nomLimtdiig Ul'ited States Naval Force onl Asiatic Stalioa, I'lFtq Shlilp Olympia., Malnilo Iatr rbor'. P. I. MY DEAR ADMIRAI,: Yesterday I received a dispatch from Iloilo stating that the insurgents had made an attack upon the Spanish garrison at Zamboanga, using the arms and quick-firing guns which they had captured from the Spanish gunboats. They were repulsed, but the Spanish general in command and two of his officers were wounded, one enlisted man was killed and a few wounded. The insurgents have cut off their water supply and the Spanish garrison is left in rather a perilous condition. Last evening a cablegram sent from Iloilo by the Spanish naval lieutenant. Canoe, addressed to General Rios and selnt in my care, was also received. This cited facts substantially as (lid the cablegram sent to me. General Rios telegraphed to Mladrid and received( directions to withd(raw the Zamboanga and Jolo garrisons immediately. He called this morning and wished me to send troops down there at once. I made himl no promise. but told him I would defer my answer until tomorrow. He asked me then if you would not send down a war vessel to cruise in those waters to give aid to the Spanish garrison in case it should be placed in extremitv, to which I replied that I did not know, but would seek the information from you. The situation here is as follows: We have no more troops at the present time than we need here in Luzon, especially if we carry out the campaign as projected. Lawton took San Miguel yesterday afternoon and will be far out in a day or two. Kobbe with 1,500 mlen accompanies the b)oats up the Rio Grande River from Calumnpit and will start on Tuesday morning. MacArthur seems to have all he can do to cover the Pampa;nga province and give the inhabitants the protection from the insurgent troops which they demand. To the south of us the number of insurgents seem to be increasing, while to the east and north of the city they still maintain their hold. We are still holding here the two Spanish vessels, the Leont XIII and the Puerto Rico,which General Rios desires to use to take his troops away from Zamboanga and Jolo. He said this morning that if these vessels could not Le given him he must depend upon some of the merchant vessels in port to take his troops off or suffer the consequences of disobedience of his Government's orders. 1,POI()1 OF' MA.IJOR-(' EN lERALj OTIS. Looking over the entire field. '.00() men at least will be re(quired to take and hold Zamboanga. its environmellts. alld( tile water supplly. Tlhe rebels there have a good deal of artillery.,ande. - think, are su)lpplied with some 00)() or SO) rifles, for which they have )lenty of ammuniiition. Jolo ('an h)e oc(cul)ied with about 60) men. I tlink. therefore. that it might l)e a goo( scheme to send the garrison to Jolo as soon as possible. or the MIors will destroy the fortifications and gnns and turn them upon us when we appear. As for Zanih)oangall. 1 am afraid that we will have to termit the Spanliards to withdraw allnd take it later. ':-;: Does it seemi desiral)le to send a vessel downl to southernl waters, as Rios requests, or could you convoy our troops (lown south wit-hin two or three days? (ne of our great needs here is light artillery. WVe have plenty oil the transports comingii which, unfortunately. is lnot here now. The light battery which reported last tweek caime off without its guns. and they;ire following it on the steamer Lc,(lotir. which left San Francisco on tle:ld of tlie month. There are 20) comlpanies of troops du( here within the next two weeks; also luite a number of recruits.';' Yours. very truly. E. S. O TIS, Mj[((fr '-(/en( rl, l. S. I. l, ilitoifl/ (;ore(rnor. To() tlis ('co1llitilli('attioll Ad(lial 'awl Devwey resp(l)(ll( that lie ouil(l conVoV ol'r t'oops andl fturn isil ( encra l lRios with aiiy assistance lie desire(l, anId I info)riiied l lthe,'eiiiral t hat Iwiieegretting that we cou(l nlot sllen tlIoo)ps to Zatil)boag)lal i imed(liately,. wt would relieve his StlllI g' arlisols. T1le fiel(l w a thele (ca'refllv look(,(l (over, and as a bat talioi ofl the TweI(itv-thid'(l Il'tiliit'l was alreadly at Ceb(l it; was ldetermlinlled ( to selldl tlhe reaider o)f that re gi'lilf'llt o tlie arclhipe)lago; whereupon tihe following o(rd(ers w\ere( issle(l: GENERAl, ORDERS, / Hi.)(RS. DSEPT. PA.CIF[( AN) EI(iHTH ARMY CORlPS, No. 28. Jlanila, -'. I.. jlta. 15, 1899. The Twernty-third United States Infantry is relieved from duty at this station and will proceed at once by transport to Jolo, island of Jolo, and relieve from duty there the troops of Spain now constituting the garrison at that place. The quartermaster's department will furnish the necessary transportation, and the subsistence will supply rations for this command for thirty days. By command of Major-General Otis: THi()oAS H. BARRY, i.si'tao t Adjuital nt- General. G(ener'al Rios, with1 two m(ercha'('nt v\ssels, sailed on May 117 for the soull to I)la(ce ill rie.(lin iss for (d(lpartlI'ue his lgarrision at (Zaunboanga, with tlie tlluderst anin l o that ()1ur tr ()oops woul(l arrive at.Jolo on board the ti.rans)port Leon,X lI in slufficient season for his archielago rgarrisons to take tadfvantager (of it, sail )by way of Zan)()oango, when all of his comtlllililld (couild (ilbarlk, anld 1)roceed l( )Oieward. le pI)r'()ised to render useless all tlie Za(lm)bo(anga guits and( (destroy a mll aimunTition there which i( was not o b)( removed, Iand this it is believed that., ](, (lid. T'he hl:ead(l(luarters:land two Il at)l talions of tlhe Twen ty-thi ird Infant-ry, u po[n ireaching, o(l, founl d tlhe Slpanishl soldiers we ll pi'ep)ared( t(o depart, a lthoughrl they (lidl (iot expect1 to be( relievedl 13)t o0r 1 tlroops. A Spanish staftf )ficer( took )pasas'ge ()1o th(li ve\ssel il it instruc(tions fIoni General Rios to govern th:eir) I)ovements. 'l'he siimall galrrisonl mintiiainled at Siassi, island(! of Siassi, hia(i been withdliawn to.Jolo() and( tle foirmer place turned ovet to th( Sultaan, wlIo lhad in person gone there from, Mai)bun, his cat)itilal, a(d tl ken form'a.l p)ossession. 'I'he exchangle of troo()s was (lqiietfly (effecte(l, full iililita.ry ho()nors were(( a(ccrded, and the flags of tIlie rese)(cltive ilation(s I)ati(cit)ating we(re: saluted b)y our war' vessel ill the 1hall'borl when t(ie Spanliards were formed to marcll out; of the post and ebll)ark. T'he force sent to Jolo arrive(l on Mayt 19, antl con(sisted of 19 line officers, 2 assistanlt sugeons, a chaptlain, and 733 enlisted men. It INEI'ORT OF' MA.IOR-GENERALI OTIS. 133 relieve a, ga;t 'rrison ctnsistilt'l oi f 2'-1 office. ls aldl S(i() elinsted mlen. The post ol vil lae is (dessc(1ribed as foll-ows: It is hardly more than a good-sized military post, beautifully laid out, with broad, clean streets, lined with flowering trees and gardens, and surrounded by a loop-holed wall about 8 feet high andl 1 feet thick. The p)o)ulation is estimated at 400, mostly Chinamen, one G(ernan, no other Europeans. Four male Moros live within the walls. The public buildings are in a dilapidated condition. The governor's residence a(nd office is one small building. There is one group of barracks (four buildings) which will accommodate one battalion. The theater will accommodate one coimpany, and outlying blockhouses two companies. A commissary, post-office, schoolhouse, a hospital for al)out 100 beds, a market, and some few small structures compose the remainder of the public buildings. The colmmllandilln ofil(er of ile United Sltates troops rel)porltld the day after his arrival tlatThe situation, in so far as determined from our limited experience, is as follows: Spain possesses the small walled town known as Jolo. The governor has complete control within the walls. There are no civil courts. no civil officers. Outside the walls the Sultan of Jolo and Borneo is the ruler. Spain pays him i)200. Mexican, per month. At present he is not on the island, but is visiting one of the neighboring islands about 3I( miles south. He has recently returned from Mecca, and now dresses in European costume. Spanish soldiers seldom go beyond the range of the outlying blockhouses. The relation between the natives (Moros) and Spain is not altogether harmonious. SuIlseq((lenlt re)(lots slhowe(l tllt l the Span lisll troops ]ia(ld reeived orders 1o prep fo r with I drawal 1fro1 li e arlch ilelag() aId (xjecte(d to depart very sooli, lult ltadll not: lieell in'forimedl tlhat tlhey would )e relie-edl by In ited! Sta(les lroops. h'lie Slanliishl co(liali(lnalilit and grovernl'or had tlierefor'e l a ken tilhe Stultaul to Siassi flrom Ma[tilbun and turil(ed thle p1lace v (,'er to liim, ant1( inletl(le(l to turnl over Jolo also wlen lhis force should(1 evacuate. ()ur arrival wats nost opliportune, and a maltter of so irlrisie —nl)leasantly so-to) tlhe Sultan, who exlpected to award his d(atos witll iis acqu(lired possessioll. lis daitos on 1lol1 Island were llo)t, however, on the mlost- amtica'ble terms with lhiml, adul seemited to be pleasel tlo welcome tlhe Americans. They calle(d )on (Captain lratt, wlho was in colmmand (of our tlroop)S, expressed frienlly int(etllions, al ave adhllesioll to the I'lited Stales. The cal)tainl, with soe i of Ils officers, retltlrned the call, were the first, Europelans whllo liad ever etered the house of thle chief ineighboring dato, alnd were hosl)itably enterta ined. IThlie Suiltan, disappointed, linigeltre at Siassi, \iwhere le liad eslablislied a police and g'arrison, and did not respond to thle invitation to call upon olr officers. Ilis mother, the Sultaniese, hloweve-e, who was at MAaibun, sent the Sultan's secretary to welcolme thlie Amlericans, lwhies a return call was made upon her and slie received our representatives most graciously and expressed gratification. Thus tliroi gh tlie diplomnacy of Captain Pratt and his subordinaltes a most satisfactory (condition of affairs was attained upon which to base fu lture neg(ot iations, which were conducted by Brig. Gen. John C. Bates, V. S. V., during Jiuly and August. lrigadier-Geuneral HuIghes was relieved as provost-marshal —general at Manila and assigned to the colmuanid of the Visa3,yan ilitary district on May 25. lie proceeded to his headquarters att Iloilo, Panay, early in June with instructions to carefully supervise matters in Negros and Cebu, bWt not to conduct any military operations in Panay further than was necessary to ]hold Iloilo and its outlying villages, then in our possession, as 1no additional troops could be given himl a(tnd as the policy of nonaction in the island other than might be considered defense would result in dissensions between the Visayan and Tagalo, who, should we attack, would unite all factions for resistance. The REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. policy has weolked( excellently. 'Tag'lo soldielrs to the nu mber of abollt 2,0() hlad been sent from Liuzon. Tllei oifficers p)ractically asslumed the condIuct of a<ll l'anavy aff a1irs, even if tley (li(d not (do so ostensibly or expressly, a(nd the PltanaLy iliabitant Is have been made to suffer severe p)ecuniary losses alnd in some parts of the island great lack of provisions, while robberyery ( rn othel crimles hlave pl'evailed. The nmanifested hostility between Visa.yan all nd Tagalo is now very pronounced. We have been invited by the foirmlel to take possession of northern and easteni. P-anay, with promnises of assistLnce if we woell l( conisent to do so, and very irecently the Tagalos assllume control in every p)articular, disarmed all the Visayanls on the p1lea thllt tlley (ouldl not be reliedl 111)oll for suppo)rt, an(l are con(lducting a miliiat a go(ernmllent in accordlance w\ith their indivi(dual (desires, t-he c(llif ol)je( t of which is reported( to be ind(ividual p)ecuiary pr'ofit. \Wlile (duringl the mollithl of May1- tile llmajoiltv, of ol troops were operatting to tlhe north of MIanila inl (cent:al,llzo, i inlsurgentles in the Cavite and Mllorong lprovinlces, soullth al(l et stl f lle c(ity, were very active, and extirerle watcflllll ess ()11 the )aIt of ()l.' tlil lilies of defense was necessary. Their nul)mhes colitiile( to ill('ease until they 1Lad colleenltlrated some (;,()()0 l the south andl smiie 2,()) to the east. 'l The, former lhad ben eecently nimiated witl some nyslerious belief to t le effect th thl the Alt eriieani.ts -were aboull-t to be givnl over to them for slaullhler. Amiiong' tlhem a l)att-alion of bo)(s (of tel(ler age appe.ared, whose im ission was t1o throw stoines tt thle e-llemy v derle the gui(lance of l'rovi(lcnce; but olie 01' tw(o o)f tile little fellows were woundeld, and tlie desire 1'ori sel f-preservatioen beili strollget than their religious enthusiasm, they were seen n1o moire. This coincentrated southern force made daily (lemlonstlrations of soime ch'lracllter, and an occasional attack, when the loss of ai few of tlleir enl(Li cooled their ardor for two or three successive (lays. An advance to the south with the intention of permanent or t empnllrary occupa)tion was nl(t dlesirable. Should it be made and townls or villages be taken, the inhabitants would pray for protection against the return of thei insurgents, and this coulld nlot be given theml from the trioops a-vaillable without seriously interfering with projected ope rations. lience, ol thle south we had occasionally driven back tlhe enemy a few miles when lie became annoying and then retuirned the troops to the old liles. T'o the east and northeast reconnoissances were imadle frequently to locate the shifting foe, ascertain his intentions, and provide the necessary precautionary measures. General Lawton iwas diected to (isperse his troops aIt Candaba, turning over tlhe Third, Seventeenth, and 'I'wen-ty-second Infantry to the Second I)ivision, to b1e established oni tl(ie new line from San Fernando to Baliuag, with a. st'ation at Q(2lingua, and to send( b)ack to Manila the most of thle Foulirth lCavally, tle Nortlh l)akota and Oregon Volunteers, placing the Minnesotanls on the ra illro)( between Bocave and Caloocan. lIe ther:efo e gave ordelrs for tile tiroops att Sall Miguel to withdraw to Baliag and left Caal(lbal on May 23. The withdrlawal of these troops and the descelnt miade on the Rio Grande River to Canldaba excited tlhe ilnsulrgen ls to great, activity, they supposing that ta retreat w-as iltendle(l. Tlley forwvarded their forces by rail to General MacArtthlu'sl ' ftront and iconcent'rated near San Miguel. On the marlch to Ialiuagt oiur trl(ol)s ellnc(untered themr morning, noon, and eveilinlg, anll slfferedl( in casulalties 2 men killed an(d 13 rwoin(led, buit the enemy left with tllemn 16 killed, a coinsiderable numb)er of wounded, and a few prisoners, besides a small amnount REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 135 of property. rThis movement placed the entire Third Infantry, a battalion of the Twenty-second Infantry, a troop of the Fourth Cavalry, mounted, and two guns at Baliuag, rendering the place too strong for attack, and the enemly withdrew to the north. Upon the following day, May 24, a force of the insurgents attacked an outpost on the right of San Fernando, when a collision occurred involving the South Dakota, Kansas, and Iowa volunteers and portions of the Seventeenth and Twenty-second Infanltry, with the result that the enemy was badly handled and retreated, leaving 50 dead amld 3S wounded on the field, and we captured 28 prisoners, 50 rifles, and other property; our casualties, 7 killed and 0; wounded, all of the South 1)akota regiment. T'hese minor affairs correcte(l the impressions of the enemy as to olur intentions of retreatiln,, and no action of inportance took place at; tlhe north for somne time. I)uring tlie lmollth of May1 we had a large accession of regullar troops, consistilmg of six organiza.tilons, tlie Thirteentll Infantry arriving on tie 29(th of thlat nonth. ()n tle last da1 of Mlay- there lw ere present in tlie i']lililppines 1,201) (col)nissioned officers and 33,02() enlisted men, of wh-lomi;14 o()ffiers aid 6,(!098 enlisted men were stationed in the soulltiheri islan(ls and at the Caxite naval statiion. 1)ed(uctinr thle 13 l)er celt of sick, spe('iadl-dluty men, and tilose llunderloitlg coiurtmIartiatl senltences, tler ee were for duty in all tlihe islands 25,S)! enlisted men, andl in Liuzo, tlle Ca(rite airsenil excelt ed, 2),!96;5. This nas a large force, sufficient to{ accomplisim efficient work wit (celerity, b1)tt of the enltire n11lmnber present over 16,000 were volunteers or were awaiting (disclhari.ge 1un(1er Watr D)epartmenlt prom ises and less thian 18,000 were regulars owing furltler' service to tile (Governient. Tese 10,000( e1111 mulist be assembled, imust l)e individually accounted for, )laced in condition for (del)artulre, anld shil)ped to thle United States at the earliest (late. ''le great lalbor atitending tllis shipm)ent was entered upon on AMay 25, when specific orders to govern all particulars of procedure were issued. Tlie volunteers lhad been somewhat careless in rendering returlns for men allnd public prope)rty and were not familiar with legal requirinements in these lmatters. HIence several days were necessary to straighten out rolls, retulrns, and discllarge p1apers after the organizations were assembled. Under the War I)epartnment directions it was or(lered that thle departur e of thlese troops shouil( be permitted in accordance with priority of date of arrival. This brought the Oregon and California troops first., but tlie latter were scattered over the isla(nd of Negros. TlIe Oregon troop(s were assembled in IMalila on May '26( and directed to hasten the necessary pai.per work and the transfer of public property whlich was to be left behind. Thils wvas not accomplislhed until about Jlune 10i, an( portions of the regiment in the mlleantimle took I)art in tlie llilitary operations in thle vicinity of the city. It, sailed onl June 14, a delay of t.wo or three (lays attending its dedision on a question it was allowed tIo determine whlether to sail for San Francisco or -'ortlan(1, Oreg. A regular regiment must b)e secured to relieve the Californians in Negrros, and tlie Sixth Infantry, then en route, was selected. It did not arrive until June 18, when it was sent south. Bulit l)revailing typlhoons delayed relief, and tille Californialns (lid not leave Mantila arbor ullntil July 2;, after tle Nebraska, Itlall, l'ennsylvania, and Colorado troops had taken their departure. Troops were about to (dep)art mu lllel 1more rapidly than they could be receivel, and the country we were covering must be hleld. It was not possible, therefore, to make extensive offensive demonstrations REPORT OF MAJOR-G ENLRAL OTIS~. iiintil. the Eight Ih Army Corps couildI )]1 itself t opfetlieiru' In the meantline the insuirgents were iiiik iliti o-ie'tt exeol-i t 011 to Wvor-St us lby attaekiii-g 0111 lineI(s of, cMniiuiiiiieato 1011 11(1 0111 forei l llte pro\vince of Panaga l it, all of thirelrsw( 1itie'1( esotited ll in Ieir repeatl e(1 diseoiii fit ti re. Thec latter pail of Mahy it, wa-.s report td thI t: tilc mmilia bit nit s a't _Anti1)011, Morong, and( other near to~viis ( itst of M4mila Nver~(Ie siitferimi g heailyo accouint of the crimes commidt Iedl bv Gene ral I i lam's ilnstrgent 11001)s, aIld thley cidlledl for protecton 11 li'u(ljoX s the relpiita,-l tiomn of b~eino( foi- yer n ii tlbit() htsc Io'o c ount I1 ry. le sto00( hib ih iii tli~e faivor of Ap iihillaldo, elither 011 faclcomit. ()f tie. latter's feari of hini or becatis e lie had the albility to k-eej) tog-eth-er and (direct I toops dr awNn froin tlh( cri iiiiial. cla-sses, lie liatl withiiil his coninial~la ab1)01 112,501) itien and fomriiierly operated souith' of tie IPasig, fromn wlitch 1l(, hlidt 1)eell (11iN-eii andl s11lse(fpiently coiilliiailed(1 thec province of 'Mor oncg. As 81)011 as (,TImieral Lii wvton retin mued to Manhila lie was int~rncte(I( to collect CItOt( foc 11(1d (case these inisnrgemnt troops to be drive-n off. Asseiiibhing 2, 5001) iieni at the 111po iipiii stattion. uinder conimand. of BigdirGiirlhal 11hIe di rect-ed it, 0i 11 e, 3 l11)0n Antipol), aiid at the sautiie t~ine mioved 8 comnpanies of t-Ihe Waislhiiiitomi Volmnteers 1wv lake to Morong, t111( the First. North lDakota- atid~ Ca lNattalioii of tlie, Twelft lltnaiitry on Tagiiig fromt iltasig,. The rough0 chaIracter of the, couintry iii thie direct ion of Amitipolo and~ the, hieat of the day c~aused Itail's, eohriini to iiiove slwl, le Ilet withl Slight.resistance fromi a sca~ttered force of 8t0at tlie lia,-se of thle 1imonimitaiiis and entered thac~t lplace the followN-ing iiiorning. iAloroiig. andl TI'agnig we~re takeni, and the narrow st rip of land extlen-dingo into the Lagunia (le 13a-y from the north \V11s expllored wvithoult discoveriiig tle. piesence of thle ii~lemny, iniless ill the,, gutise of4 t lie '' aMigo," Nvit Ii 'vcapoii carelfully coiicealeol a ehIarf ro atsnwiih rvisetci sivel v inl thias colinti my wen Ii rst* ca.tpti r-cli 1w oulr trol ps. Ti'le illii~l Igents had( Scattere(d, 811(1 iiiost of' teml aft: least h~ad tak~en thle trails, into tile mountaius, wh-lere tlc hefoiI itb n411 ily I)1 sued the mintatrch to Ant ipolo ouir easur-italties were, 2d inii killed and 9 wounded, Itn, atTytay 2iiten killed. Thie eneuiv suffered a innel ~i grete loss and left) 9 Ilealltdand ca imuniber of won011dedl omi thle Moroiig" f ield alone, wvhere our troops (1i1 not iiieet; withl 'miy ca.slualty. Mlorongo w\as occupiedl for a time and fronti it rWomaisn es re m11ade into thle interiorfarid alomugY the shlore of the Lagunair. Its g-arrisomi\\ was reiiiovedl across thle lanke, to Calamnba-, whent thatl point becaniie ta periiarient station. The enemy liadl becom-e agrain bioldily (leiiomistrative at the south and1 it beca~me necessary 11o thinrowo hiitt back once miiore. Ilie had intrenehed huinself very stro)1(dly in tile v~icinity hf 1Iaranaopme a1n1 near Taguig; also in fronit of Sani Pediro Mfacati, the cemiter of ouir line. On June 7 General Lawton was instructed to) conmcenitrate ta force of 4,000 men approximately in the vicinity o~f the last-niamitel town-i, t~i be, placed under the immediate simpervisiomi o~f G4enerals Whieaton and ()venshine,7 move the samne to tle fi out 1111 centi-er iii two eohtiinns, disperse thre eneiiiy in the iun mncdiate front, 8111 thlen, swving-imig these columinns to) the right and left, 1)1ace them hil rear, if possible, hf his stronilg poIsitionts on ouir flaiiks. D~ispoIsitions were comptlletedI on Juine 9, andi early the iiext imiornuig~ the com aninll -iitlved ouit. Six climiipanies of the Colorados constittuted thel `adva.fnce guard, took tie, direction of the intrenehmeirts in timelinimeldiate fmont, which) t lucyattacked witligreat vigor. Thle eniemiywas sooj~idr-iveniaiti sca-tttjered. XVWheaton, swinging to the left, soon loutedl the insurgents iii thcat directioii, wNho, REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS.13 137 1i1calde suchl irajpid N I- lit to t-le soul 11 thait few of' them wvere caugtiolt Oveiish ine took ili) his swiligi iig Iiioxv'men t, to( the ri'iglv to pleace his ti'ooi oil thie B.ol( 001 10 (1South of Las P1inas, but, nut IoittunatelY, the, (tl-AY wa(,s onle of t Ii( iiiost. leneivat iii o. of tle vcatr. Tue1c sk v was Cloudless anr~d no (air sti -ii'i'ii The troops, Nv h11( I had i'eceeitlv ar-i'ved fromu the I jut ed stit es beo(-'tl to he( overeoiiie with I hle heat befoic they 1ad110(1 ilclle(I liii les. The cooloin ofthe I(i'lLirteelitll1 I1imit'au iv was puot 't (1 I'on suiis ok, aul 11 eai-k ix il ot thatt reg-iment, fell out onl the hocl of iiairch hbefoi'e it: hiad jw)i'ec(le;,(l( ats tar south ais 1P)aranmaque. Gcuici'al Lalwto 0.1 ccompilJlied thIiis eol,111u1iill pet-'oll aid~I, (juiiek lv t'akiui- ill thle sit'ulialoll, (Iireetedl \A'\lic'.11toi's coin. 11111 to join as 50011 a5 poss5i1ble hut. hbef'or this Ivas aceoiipl isliedl the enenly, advaiincimifroi h1ai'namw tic, bold ly allt, acked wh~at r'emainedl of Oveiishiine's, meni. lie x as, i'eltilse(l. after Somie active skirmislhing, andl(1 W\hiaton joinbigo the l1iareli inl the direct ion of La-s IPinacs wars, conuiit iued1 and kite ili tilie aItele'oouu G4euiercr 1 Lalwtlom WAS01ts obl(lr to hialt t~i little South of cast 'of La(,s l1inas, b)u11 (c0u1(1 niot seeure Iil r'oiild lv which it Wi-ctS lbelieved I lie eliieiiix wvoim Id utreat. i s mien hlad sufferedl severelv tiomnl the, hai'(l inaicli, aii1l esjpeei-.llv frloml lack. of' watecr, for sacl aniv that was potable could lbe founld byv them. Pui v ly )) prci'(emit lula( sucecumbled1 to, thle heat. and fatuiti.1es of I he layI. The iiisiirgoeiit s, t00, had sthyer-ed l tiom thle samle Causes, andl~ inl faddit ion had beeni si —miiav (lefetated. They left on thie ibattlefiehld I (nvat 11i utuil c of dea-d, over 7( of wNhom wvere d iscover'ed -and ('0tlillted, while oul. casualtlies Stummied(1 li) at1 1 enl1isted mlanl killed and 2 offivei-s aioi 21 imen wvouidedl. That11 n~ight the enlemiy escaped front 1 )a 'a ii0aque aliid La~s L'llnas hv Ilie B1aeooi' road al I across the Zapote Riveci, iimlou whic ('1flie v hwi( Ic( )ist i-tct ed f iuiiiida~ble hiuirienehmeiit(ll, wlieie I hey in h, inl 1 8 C0 giiued a grreat v,lo- overI ilie p"'paniard(s, amid wNher, t hey lelieve( 1 1 ey would be invincible. Inl ta(wt. a (r'eat ii nunhl (ei, ot' thuin hiadl niade r-eligious vows, astsS1iiie' l dei' superst iliolus viiies, to overt hti'ow thle Amiiei'icaiis t h(icue Oi' (lie inl the d itches. Tile ii (st coil seuva.tivye est iiiiate of t heir i.i n imi )e s Avwas:,o and to uicel thlis voiu(lltioml of;111an's nlew eoblnl~a~tiouus miust. be, Made. Th ie iiiireenithi lii amutriv wvas bi-ought ii~to M1anila and placed on the north line, id jevill iug c tliVou ithi I 1iifa u i' alldh AVyo11ming Batta1:1lion which were sent, to Gtcleneial Lawtlon, who in the mieamitimne had carefully i'eeomiomite(mcd tilie emiemiiv's, 1osit ion cand ha,,d concbided to attack at I he Zapot c River bi'idgc (:of the Bacoom' road. Iii r'econn~oiteIrili near' t hat, Joimlt illi persoin withI two coiiijuaiiies of the TwN.enty-first finfan11try lie-, wa —s suiddlclv attacked on front and flankils 1w a large force of the euiyfi'omi its lbrtushi (cneealmuellts, whier'Cup)oi, uetiri'ig a short distanec and~ hurrying1p up1 supports, hue threw it- back tupoui t he river. His I roops, hiaving~ beenl resupplied withi i'latiomis auid aniumuiliomu, and his iCeiIl( )i're ieiits foiwaurded, all by wa-ter traImsjor'tat ion phving' between Manmila, and P1arcanatque, hev, ouii Jnime 13, attacked the Cltifly iii his filtremichunents 011 thle Zapote. The ('muintrIy was most uiiiiiviting fou' military operatiomis, arid lie uimade his (disJOsitimis tom' a main atta-ck on thue river lbi'idge, near which, after' hard anid per'sistent effoi-t, he had seeumm'ed a positiomm whiehi flanked a, poi'tiomu of the enein vs lines. The _Navy had, in the meiiat~ine, at a, point on the shore ot' the bay ladd ioiiOi o t veslsear Las Pill-is:38 muen and aqjuick-th-i'ig gun whueime it couhd do (execution onl thle left flank- of the hisuiro'ent s should thiev a~ttemplt (lemistii-tatioiis iii that direction. At 3 o'clock thiat aftei'uoon (3eneral L'awtou wiried to headqiuarters in Manilula thuat tihe battle w~as severe, auid thlat, the enemy wvas fighlting in. strmong force 011(1 withi deteruiiimia1ftion. TwNenty minutes later hie REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. telegraphed, "We are having a beautiful battle. Iurry up amnmunition; we will need it;" and at 4 o'clock: " We have lridge. It has cost ils dearly. -Battle not yet over. It is a battle, however. I can not approximiate our loss. It will be 15 or 20, I think. Several are killed-2 or 3. I have not had time to ascertain." rTat evening he telegraphled as follows: LAS PINAS, June I/ —;.(' p. m. ADJUTANT-GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF PACIFIC: Impossible to give many details of fight. We were engaged at close range this morning. Enemy came boldly into the open ground and advanced to 130 and 100 yards. This evening we assaulted trenches 25 feet thick, crossing river in their front. Many of enemy's dead lay in trenches. We now occupy south side of river. The report of wounded in engagement this a. m. was exaggerated. Many heat prostrations were reported wounded. The number will be about 7 or 8. The surgeon reports i2) wounded, now in hospital. I know there are several more to colme and none of the dead are yet in. I believe some 40 will cover the killed and wounded for the day. The men and officers fought like Americans, and I will mention later several for most distinguished gallantry. Among them General Ovenshine: Captain Sage. Twenty-third Infantry; Lieutenants Donovan and Connolley, Twenty-first Infantry, the latter two wounded. L.AWTON, 3lajor-Genier(al, Vol, toters. 'The eenliy fled soitllhwari(d il) tlle Zalote liver to Iu111s alnd San Nicholas. a few westward aLlonlg tile shore of the )ly, a ld( our tlroo)ps took possessioni of l Iac(or, exlendlisg l thleir oitl)osts to 1ward (Old C(avite andl Iiiis. The inhabitants gladly welcomed tileir arrivl an(l offered to furnislh every assistance in theic' power if the requisite protection could ble (iven themn. It was not (lesiIred nor was it, tlIe intentltion to )pursue tl e cIenemy southward lmi(ler any cilrlcunlllstl('es if it iivolved us with even temll)porary occpllaltion of tlhe country, as our strength did not justify such a scattering of our forces, and as evwery availablle man should be sent toward Lour true objective in the nIorth. The Cavite and Batangas provinces, though the original h]otl)eds of all insurrections in these islands, were without military imnportanmce under the conditions then prevailing, and General Lawton, before moving out of Manila, was warned against taking possession of any southern country which looked to periimanency. However, the inhabitants of this section were suffering for rice and those near the bay coast had not planted their crops. 'hey imnportuned us for the continued presence of troops, that they mnight unmolested commence their planting and be assured that they would receive the reward of their labors. On the morning of June 15 General Lawton telegraphed as follows: A representative of the civil government at Imus has just come, formally announcing the surrender of that place and inviting the Americans to enter. He states the insurgents all left yesterday afternoon in the direction of San Francisco de Malabon. He states the people of that section are frightened and tired of war and want peace, and welcome the Americans with pleasure. This man states in further explanation of the direction taken by the troops leaving Imus that they went in several directions, but generally toward Dasmarinas and Malabon; that the men were much demoralized, but were afraid of their generals; that they have little ammunition, one rapid-fire gun. and one muzzle loading gun. They commenced removing the cartridge factory three days since and that it was taken to Buena Vista, which lies between Malabon and Dasmarinas. The reconnoissance made yesterday did not find the enemy, although it went almost to Imus. The bridge below Bacoor is now in our possession and guarded. One hundred and twentyfive insurgents buried yesterday here. Sixteen men, including one captain, were buried at Imus yesterday, I think we should push the enemy a little more. This man states that the people do not wish war and that they look upon the Americans as friends and are glad to see them come, but that Aguinaldo and his cutthroats (this is his own expression) only desire war. The vicinity of our fight on the extreme right, where the reconnoissance was made this morning, has not yet been visited; many dead must be found there. REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS.13 139 While G'eneral Lawt~or was operating inl the vicinity of Las Pinas and the niouth of the Zapot~e River 300 men of the Cavite garrison, tak-eri friom t-he Californita Iheavy Artillery andI the Pennsylvania regimen~it, were sent- southwardl on reconnlomssaitce along, the neck of land which connects that )ofint and the main 'shore, against, the town-l of Novalctta-thiis to creat-e a (liversion in ouir farvor and -ascertain What we could of the(. enemy's positions and int enti()n5. These, troops were eflgr't(e( on this (Ility ai-id illicidiental. io\enmenits for three successive days. They lpellt-rated thec country to 01ld Ca\-ite, San Franlcisco de MaLlabollo anuld niearlyh to Rlosario, and (let ermnined the fact that' no greatnumber of the inlsurgenlts eould lhave retreate(1 in that direction, alt-hougoh still inl coi-sidcrablIe force, iii thatt section. The followfin( responise, th~erefor-e, Wa-;-s sent. to (4eiieral Lawvtoni's tele~grram, w\Nhichi is talave set out: Do not think that insurgents retreated to San Francisco de Malabon. except probab~ly smiall detachmients miayl have gone inithat direction. Road fromn Inus to Malabon very b~ad. and all insurgents have retired from Noveleta. Their proper line of retreat would have been south. We do not wish to hol d linus, but you can send there a couple of b~attalions, withl 2guns, for temporary purposes, Utilizing for present dispositions all troops you have andl the 8battalions senit you ti s morning. My informiation is that many insurgents have received instructions from lBaldainero A-guin aldo to return to their homnes with their guns. and to secrete guns for future use. This may account for the unusual number of "amigos. at Paranaque. Rice andl beef for distribution to the inhabitants will. be sent to Las Pinas, also to Paranaque. in the morning. That, mlorningm I luad calt-le( to XWashfingtoni the following: MA-NILA. P. I., Jun)e 17, 1899. AGVA R, 117 aShiifujtOP: Success La-wton'stroops Cavite Provincegreater thianreported yesterday. Enemy numbering over 4,000 lost in killed, wounded, and captured more than one-tlnrd; remainder much scattered: have retreated south to ninus, their arsenal. Of 5 pieces of artillery. 8 captured. Navy aided greatly on shore of bay, landing forces occasionally. Inhabitants in that country rejoice at (leliverance. and welcome with enthusiastic demonstrations arrival of our troops. It, sublseq-ueicit-ly appeared that,1 the u1siurgoent arm-1y, aft er ret'reatingc throln(rhL lmnii1s,H-dd I lie hin rl oltol((0)111 iic t retrefatSmt -o1)s il-Ias, 'about 8 miules (list ant tllerellil)1otnierninll)Lo eCeedim N-(rwst wartld to Malaboii, wAhere they w ere found in incre~ased numbers onl.1immle 1 by the Cav-ite reconnoissance detachments. On tha tt d ay General Whea,-lon was,_ sient to lInus with the Fourth Infantry andl a platoon of artillery. On this (date the mtilitary olperations of thre- inslirgents in the, north, who wvere, again becomting~ quite active, received a severe chieck, anld once more, compa~rativ~e quliet, in that section Was restored. At n-oon we received a dispat cli from Genera. lMacArthiur, sent froin San Fr nalldo, as follows: At about 4.30 this a. m. an extensive demonstration was made by insurgents against this place. They appeared on our entire front. on both sides of the riverthat is to say, the town *as entirely surrounded. The diameter of the line of insurgent o)perations~ was about 8 mliles. As far as the town was concerned, the attack was relportedl at all points with considerable loss to insurgents. Our loss not yet ascertainied, probably not large. Line went down immediately.*** Since wvriting have information of 710 feet of track being taken up in vicinity of Apalit station. ilallory takes material, and will repair b)reak it possible. We have in neighiborhood of 50 of enemny's dead in our lpossession and something like 25 wounded. Some 75 gulis have been captured andi are in our lpossessionl or destroyed. Our loss so far reported, 12 wvoundled: mostly slight. Further particulars as soon ais ascertained. REPORT OF MAiJOR-(:ENERAL OTIS. Inl l:lie a fternoo0i tele fIollo(win - wav-s 1received:(l SAN FERNANDO).,Jtc /.;-'./) p1. nt. A)DJUTA NT-GENERA L: In reply to wire requesting report of particulars of attack this:1. n.. reference is respectfully made to my previous message in the pirenmises; in addition to which it is further remarked that prelarations inside the insurgent lines have been applarent for a number of days, and that the affair this a. mi. was prelmeditated and intended to be on a very large scale, with a view to surrounding this command and severing communication between here and Cal unmpit. There is very little doubt now that Aguinaldo was present in person and that the number of troops employed numbered quite 5.000 armed men. many of whom have been recently brought from the north by train, and possibly even from the line east of the Pinag de Candana. This elaborate preparation resulted in colmplete failure at every point. although every posilion in our front was attacked. We have in our hands in the neighborhood of 100 dead and wounded insurgents, and their losses probably run well into the hundreds. MAC'AR.THIUR, ~l lejo( -(-,~/}c'ral. And later ill the d(lay (Telie.al MacArPINlltl1 teleratl)ll(l: It is reported, with a considerable probability of being true, that Aguinaldo was present in command of troops here this morning, or in the immediate vicinity, supervising operations. The demonstration was on a very extensive scale, in which not less than:3,000 men were employed. and probably very Iimany more. The movement has been in )reparation for several d(lays; the details were very elaborate. The Iowa regiment did some fine work immediately after appearance of enemy in their immediate vicinity. They made an extensive return in fine shape. and drove the insurgents back through their own works and out of sight, with heavy plunishment of enemy, 1.5 of whose dead were left in their hands and 12 wounded. The Kansas regiment also made a handsome offensive return. The insurgent left 39 of their dead with them and quite a number of wounded. After (Geeral Nl Wheaton liad reae(lied limis lie elideavored to lo(catte the elteiny yv recolnnlissance, ald(l, believing hinl to I) il (eollsid(leralle force, lie vwas st'retlgte;lnedl(l ly aldditional troolps, so tl i;l ht liatd witl) him l the entire Fourth altdt a batt dlio() of the lomlrteelt(ll lfaltly, ithe Nevada (Cavalry, alnd 4 p)iec'es of artillery. (On th1e 111olillng' of.ille 19 he senot Majolr 1ul)bb, wtih hi.s l)attliont of thle oulrtll Ilnfantl. alnd 1 gunl, southward oi the Dliasimariias road. Shortly l)4efore,110011 whell the reconnoite(rillg );pat'ty lad(l advaniced some (; or 7 tiles witllout etncounltering o()I)osition and was abotilt to ret 1titir, the enleiny, inll strolng force, coneealed ill 1 lie tlick 1)1'us1l adl(l tlte suro-}d(li ig' swa\lpy undergrowthl, suddenlly mnade(le a alttack lon l its front atndl flaik. lW)b)b, fighting hlls mien skillfully against hleavy odds, slowly retrealted, for fourhours inflicting pttI)ishientot() tlie etiemy', until (4eneral Whteaton, learning of the affair and takitig the 2 reimaining battalions ot tlhe Fourth Infantry anld 3 gulns, joined(l himt. WhIleaton thenl( qickly threw forward his entire force, routed the enemy, and drrove hliit att rapid pace back on l)asinarinas, it.eat' whicli he b)ivouttacked for the itiglht. As soon as this movemnent was reported, a battalion of the Ni tl Itl nfantry was hastened( from llacool 1to Iius for theo ptrpol)Ose of st:re(gthelleing the force left there, tliths reld(lering tIle pl).e se('urI( agai iist attalck from the direction of eitlher Sal Nicholas or 3Maliabon, andl to reenforce Wheaton, if necessary. Its position at 1-Bacoor was takein by:)3 2()00 men hastily moved across Manila Bay in cascoes fromll tl'e Cavite Arsenal. On the evening of the following (lay this (lisl)atch was received(: DASMARINAS, Junlte 20 -(..0.]. m. Major-General OTIS; Yesterday I sent Bubb's battalion, Fourth Infantry, and one 3.2-inch gun on reconnoissance on Dasmarinas road, from Imus. Seven miles out lie met the enemy in force, advancing to attack on Imus. He engaged in combat with them until I, in person, reenforced him with 2 battalions and 3 guns. The enemy was com REPORT OF MAJOlR-GENERAL OTIS. 141 pletely routed, flying in the direction of Dasmarinas and San Francisco. His loss in killed wa.: large —)-5 of his dead were lrought to Dasmairinas chnrch. The column bivouacked on the Da:sliarinas road for tlie night. his miorning I reenforced the column with 7 companies and advanced and occni(ed I)slmarinas. small bodies of the enemy resisting on the front and flanks. They had (; killed;nid 2 woundled brouglit to D)asmarinas church. )Our loss so far. only:' wounded. Yesterday we had 4 killed and 20 wounded-all of the Fourth Infantry. The eneny's main body is now between here and San Francisco. Dasmarinas has but few houses, is surrounded by swaimps. and is a long day's march from linus. Road impracticable in bad weather. I will return to Innus with my command to-morrow, unless otherwise directed. Ile was di rected lto drive off or destlroy the insurgell nts' iovilg arsenal o01 cartrlidge imanifactory relported to be at Buena Vista, a nea' poinli, aiid1 t(herel1pon return to 11mus, as!the roads iad lbeei renidered impracticabl le Iy lheavy rains for aty.x- further oiperations in thlat seclion. Buiena Vistat could not l)e reatciwed on actioult of intervening,' swailmps, aid the coluitimn retlurned t Inus, exSel' iencing difficulty in loving'i the airtillery over tlie wretcie'dI roads. Shioitly thereafter all tmroops were retivred f'rom I11us, except ll lle FoIrth] Illf'attry and a p1)atoon., of art'illerv. Tlhe [,oumr'teentli Il 'antry and a troop1 of eavalrv were left to gari'is0! tl.e towis of Ba0o1., I'as rin;as, amd laranaqme. Local m1unicipal gpovecrni]ments of a pri11itive ellcaracter were est ab — lished, supervised by ou1ic1rs pleselnt ill Coiiimanid of troops, nd1( tile p(eople, aapparemitly well satisfied, 1)beook thilemselves to tlie planting of their' rice and 1(1 eir fo)rmerlv accustomied avocation1s. We lhad lius, u e1111( circulliistalnces whlich hla beenl forced upon us bv thle (leterimied oppositl io of the iisurgeitlls, ei'ilarged our holdino's in tlie south l)y a considerable acquisiltio of territory which was witliout, st ratlegic i ol)Otalnce, alt mough1 i-i- adle cont 'rol of t:1e waters of Mantila Bay less difficult, as the coast was now in our l)possession froimi the priovie) of Bataan to) tolthe Cavile lPeninsulla, ex(ept)ling thle slight )portion )e wee l Bae)r and NNoveleta on thle southl. But I is occuplat:ion delpr'ived us (of tlie act'live aaid of o2,3 0 m1e1 for field iiovemlients wheil their services al tile nor11il were illportallt. We (were now busily eongaged ill disellarging ovemr 60 Cper ceint of lthe eilist(ed men o{f thlie artillerv amld iifaiitiy ' reoiiments of thle regular establislhment, whlichl ad joined us previous to February, and ill brinll'o in t itol lanila 11land prlepari"g 'for departuie llie v{volmuteer or'ganizatfions. We lia1d still iin time \Visavas 6,200 1men and il Luzon D(O), (of wlioiii oe thian 20,000) were for (lilty, but tlie imost of tlie volulteers wAere 11(t1 collside(red availalle, excet!l plossibly to meel som11 unexpected e',ergeicy, and before Ithe eld of JI nlv mor) than S8,000 oft le ]had beei disclharged or sailed for tlhe Init(l(d St ates, tleir places being in plaritaken 1y new airriv:als. Tlie end otf lthe month 'found us with )9,)47 enlisted men, of whomn 2 721) w eeoted oi dt, and of wOliomi )1,00( were inll tile island o()f 11zon1. Active host ilities weie m.iintiaiied b1y a contiue ld series 1f min ior afl'airs, notwitlistandig tlIe ullparalleled heavy rainfall (f 4;) iliches in a simgl{fe mioitlIi, witll all acompl)animenlt of a nu11111mber of severe tyl)poons. These atffairs occurred mostly on our railway line (of 'co1m1111111iation andl at tlie northi, and att ended jour endeavors to ope) tlhe Laguna de Bay couitry Imfor tirafic with M3anila, for whichl the inihabitants were partiue'larly desirous. Thle latter efiomts were niot siuceessfuil 1to ani greatl extemit 1because of insurg'ent bands which alppearedll at variol1s 1points on tle lake to seure tlie cormmercial advantages.and the persistent labors of traders in MIanila, either insurgenlt 142 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. sympathizers or seekers (who were of varied nationalities) for individual gain, whom pecuniary profit influenced mnore thah conlscience or fear of punishmenlt. It wavcs found to be ilmpossible to hold in satisfactory chleck contraband trade, and as for th e rice and other Iarticles of subsistence sent oult of the city, it was ascertained thlat the greater portion of it found its way to the insurgent troops. This tra(le was therefore tagain placed u(nder restrictionls, wllicltc a1re eforced still. The trool)s doing (duty il the lake region were active. A dislllmolnted squadron of the Fourth C(avalry, under the ((ommlland of' Captain McGrath, suI)pplied with a latuich amid cascoes as tralsportati(o, v isited many points on the lake and were received at times with white flags an( the friendly ldemonll straltionls (of the inl halitallts anid at times by the bullets of the insurgent tr'ool)s, wholli they invarially drove into the interior, but who retulrned aIfter our men departed. )n July 26 Calamba, whlicl had been strongly intreinched atlnd su)l)posedly fir ly held, was capttired by (General Lawton's trools, consistiilr of tle Twenty-first Inlfanltry, a s$lquadron of tlie Folurth Cavalry, andul a battalion (Iratwn froml the W'ashiington reogiment, all p laced under the commanld of Brigadier-General IHall, with the loss in castallties of 3 men killed and 11 wounded. 'T'lle insurgents stoultly resisted(, but, as it has always happ)ened in such cases, they expierietned a cosltly discomfiture. ~Los Blanos, the location of an exp)ensive military hosl)ital erected by Spain, was also t talke, lad the two p)l'aces are still hleld by our troops, composed of a Ipl:toou of Lig(rlt IaLttery F, Fifth. Artillery, and the entire Twlenty-first Infaltrly. Several attemr)pts have been made to dislodge themn by concentratrtedl forces of the enemly, which have resulted in failure and severe )putisillient. (ur returns for August 31 shovwed a total Army force preselnt in thel Philip!ines of 30,9;63 officers and enlisted men, of whom imore than 3,500 were volunteers awaiting shi)ment and men1 (f thle regular iegiments about to t)e discharged, andl hIence could not, be reckoned(l among the ava ilables. ()f this total, twelve and a fra(ction per cent were sick, leaving 27,189 officers and mlen for duty. Deducting therefrom tihe volunteers, there were left less than 24,()0() officers adl(l men for (duty, of whoil 4,145 were ablsent in.Jol, the Visayan Islands, and at Cavite Arsenal. Of tile less than 2,000()( resmlainingl for dlity in Lulzon, 2,00) belonged to tle I)ro)vost guatrd of tlie city (f Manila, 1,00()() were o special duty, 345 were in conlfinemle t, ai(l nearly 90()( were nmeml)Cers of the lhospital Corps. 'The foirce of active colh)latamlts outsi(le of tlle city was therefore Ibetwcee 13),(000 and 14,()()) men, of wlhom 5,(0 )()0were reltilired to lol(l the l)ng liicn cci rcling the slesat. We receivel fi'rom tlhe United States in Augutst 133 officers Cad( 4, 47 (onlisted(l men, consisting of' an ernginiieer ('omlipany, tlhe Nineteenth Infltfalntry, 10} (c panies of tlhe T\venty- fouirt h anld 1wently-liflt hlllfal't ry, 2 tIroop)s of Fourth Cavalry, ind(1 1,!5 recrulits four 1,he \v ari(1is 1r^gular11 organization s. The casualties in killed al(l wotiude(l amol}g all Iunite(l States trool)s in tlie Philil)l)ines fromt Aiugulst 1, 1SSt, Aurust,, t t 1S, 111111)(ber 1,00 () and were, from the period fromi Auotlgst 1 1to Febru1ary 4, 1wich1 includes the caplture of( Mal ila f1roi tlhe Slpalliards, 1 co()m1 missioed officer andl 18 enlisted nien killed or fatally woun(led(, 11 officers and,7 enlisted mnen wonum(led, but not fatally; and( for the period from February 4, whlen tlie insurgenlts declarled war atgainst tlie United States, to August 31, 1!)99, 19) officers anid 342'2 enllisted m enu killed or who died of wounds received in battle and 87 officers and 1,325 enlisted men wounded. REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 143 The majority of the wounded have recovered. Only 4 enlisted men have been reported as captured in action. One hundred and seventyeight Imien dropped as deserters are still at large. Many of themnescaped from the islands, but this desertion list includes men who absented thlemselves from their companies without permission and carelessly wandered beyond our lines into the enemy's country. These possibly aggregate 30) or 40. A few men who had been discovered as former deserters from the Arlmy again deserted direct to the enenmyl, and solne of tlem-, it is rumored, hold commissions in Aguinaldo's forces. One officer. ('aptain lRockefeller, Ninth Infantry, is niissing. While inspectinlg his picket posts near Mianila oni tile llight of April 29 lie lost his bearings andll wandered away fromn his comnanid. Search was nmale for him for two days 1)y a detachment of his reogiientl, blut unsuccessfully, and no satisfactory inforllmation has been received concerning him, although rejleated inquiries in var ious diirections have been made. Deaths from acci(dent for the thirteen months ending August 31,'1899, aggregate 5 officers and 91 enlisted men, of which 58 resulted from drow:ningi and 11 suicide. Those drowned were mostly engaged in reconnoissance duty at the time and lost their lives in attempts to cross rivers swollen by heavy rainfalls. D)eaths fronm disease number 12 officers and 426 enlisted men, of whom 90) died of variola, 120 of typhoid fever, and 72 of dysenterv. Therefore the total loss by deaths from battle and disease of the Eighth Arnly Corps in the Philippines for the thirteen months ending, Aurgust 31, 1899, was:37 commissioned officers and 879 enlisted men, and the total of deaths and casualties of every description, slight woun(ls included, numbered 144 among comniissioned officers and 2)(8 amiong enlisted mien. lurilng tile entire period covered by the foregoing general recital of the strictly imilitary operations of thle troops in these islands, tihe va.ried subjects arising in civil administration, the settlement of affairs between Spain and the United States, and the antagonistic individual interests connected with trade and commerce gave constant perplexity andl reqluired unremitting labor. When the arnled insurgents hlad been driven away front the vicinity of Manila, the inhabitants of Manila asked for some sign of Amierican exp)ressed intention in inaugurating its Filip)ino government. We had control of nearly all of the province in which the city is situated, and it was believed for a timhe that we could with safety set up a provincial governor and revive, to a certain extent, the formnerly enforced civil regtulations with which tile people were acquainlted, amellding thleim so that reported past abuses could not 1)be prcticed. Thle organization of a civil government for 1Manila wNas also taken iud(ler advisement, but conservative precaution indicated that such action miiight be attended with risk. especially as to property, for the population was becom(aing very dense, and much of it of a floating character, and needed close watclling and a lmeasurablle degree of repression. ManLila is now and for some time has been looked upon by the natives as the only safe refuge in Luzon, and unless those seeking it for an abiding place were restrained numbers would soon beconme too great to carry out necessary sanitary measures for the preservation of the public health anid Jpossibly to enforce thle required public regulations for the public safety. No correct census of the city's population has ever been taken and none has been attempted for several years. Estimates vary widely. Conservative people place it under 400,000 and some educated and practical Filipino residents report it as high as 600,000. The majority 144 REP'ORT OF MA.IOR-GENERAL.OTIS. of: this 111assb is irresp)osiblle 11id (asily i xciled. IsuSIilgentl agetl ls, som1le wtit lft.i r so()ial stal ldin, if lnot 1)mlillnl('e, an1 hol(l(iin apl)l)iitfllelltl fIS fl''ir A.(i'llilllnlalai, c,l( l C tlllt ill:y plolt il(' ill tii(ll llldst, flnd allil't iand evt'lery landed pr(lo )vice i(ll(' r mour col\ llinto l ilas itls a('(lre'(d(liled( illst re i o'lloo, (i e d ti!s. tp a ni el. I ' 1tl (ioe (vei I id 1 (1 s-ll 'i l o, 111 le tion o ea edil sl te cisioiilals o Iilisl by eeit izmens, oft!o 1IIe le1)l)e"ltonl kiII<\vii to lld ae ti'o cl(lell O\the, 1y I1t 111)I'i, O Hs ill 0)ur1 l)o.nsse"ioIl wcrte ae(0)iet'l. l()eal '(oVerI'neIIl* 1111 (1(' 1!1ili),11ry\ SUilitersol'y i"st'icl ions, l as sdlee ow ii l In e( fIllo wil (i cdi irel tive p)olicsi f orc( ers, iviz:'. ic is ivi io fo l. In eac h town there ill be a i llunictiv( councill copo serl of a president andls -as many relresentative s fo heraden as there may be xarids or larrios in the town,a whi(ch shall be charged with the maiutenance of public order;ndl the regnlition of municiplal affairs in particulars hereinafter named. It will forinlatte rules to govern its sesions anlk ode o f businese colnet ted thl erewith, an( by tao, it vote ( to be determned y tle i esils nt ian ciase of a tlie) wll, thro ull the ladoltion of orsdinances or decrees. to o!e execute l by the tresident, becminister the municipal government bint en ortdince or decree shall goe enforced unt il it receives the approval of the oistmaning officer of the troo's there stationel. of orders, viz:. The pa reident shall be elected iciy a vl voncile votempose of aresits of te town, as miany representatives or headmen as there inay be wards or barrios in the town, approveh ll be cared ith t he coain tennce fice, adblic tooth er with t he ea en or reltioesentatives of the councial sirs ll hold part icr for one year. He swill e of nlatie rles to govern parent e n a ressento and roerty of bsi ner of te t oerewtn. Te hajoridmen vshall e electe ed by a viva vce opre rde sidents of their will,ards or br t a shallton of ordinances or decrees. to be executed by the president, administer the inlinicipal government: but no ordinaiice or decree shall be enforced until it receives the reside oval of the omandi ofer of the trooerty therein.tione 2. The president shall be the electd butive o tilemnicipt orescil to execute itso d erees iss for the follomaning poses, viz:and. tothr with the hea en or reTo establish a police force. To collect taxes and license fees, to act as treasurer of public funds, and to make disburenttive s on warrants of tthe council.l hold offic fo one ar. He lle f ntive bi To penforce resgulation reating to d property onsale of spirits, ton estle ihe ande shall bete mrkets to inspa vct live stoc an residets or thransfers and brrans aof the eside nd own ty therein. To perform the duties forlerly be longing to the lieetenant o te pail to eecute its To en fo r the sanitary measr poses, vz: To establish schoolice force. To collect taxes afor licehtingse ees, the o act as t reasurer of public funs,and to. disb4. The senior hearran ofne en y te council sll beice-presient To enforcthe regule, assistants reati to trthe rsie, and thll e sale of sicio ieutsn tt of pabli ad. 5. The headman of a ward is tile delegate of tile l1resitlel)t foi tIlat wxard' shall take measurkets to aintain orspet live stock and recower to appboint to ssist het. 6. The connc'il shall have no jurisdiction in civil cases, but (In tic 'qllhtation of1 pItrsame. ties in interest arm the ir aduties forerlyin l itilg to ccet the lieteant of thle pado fcil,s To enforce sanitarv measures. To establish schools. it shall proea ani decide se itofig pr)t t exleeding in v 5.. The senior healman otters th e esident, rreetbyin, the council. shalll ibke silen of the slimin exaination,,itnt to the l resie t, sa e officio lietenat of pr) li e. tran er headm in of ately to the ustodyegate of tle ilitar dentoitis fo r tihat al by take measures to maintain order. and shall have power to appoint two aissisftianits. 6. Thle coiiii(.il siall lavel lo),jIrisd3(liction ii civil (catses, but on tlie al)l)li(a-tiol ot ip;llrties in interestant of poice mar a rrest or ord er c the arrest of I tersn vi olatiil a city ordall ea ane disteurtine ase iee, or alccnsed tf crinte; lint e Iee o in v sl:e.ll - e() held in coniinelnent lon1)gev thasn twenty-four lors wvithout a Ilrelimninary exainination, and no Iperson shall be: arrested for nonpaynient of taxes o)r for debt.. T criinl atterhe president shall render to te council uring the first week of ach moeth preliminary examination and, according to tlie result, discliarge the prisoner or transfer himn immediately to tlie custody of thle military authlorities for trial by provost court. 8. The lieutenant of police may arrest or or(ler the arrest of person-s violating a city ordinaice. disturbing the pea -e, or accused of crime;,but 1o person shiall l)e held in coniinernent longer tlian twenty-four hours without a preliminary examIIinatior, and no person shall b.> arrested for nonpayment of taxes or for debt. 9. The president shall render to tlhe council (luring the first week of each month a certified account of collections under each tax, and of disbursemllents made during the preceding month. Said accounts, hlaving been apl)roved bly the council, shall be forwarded, with vouchers, to the commanding officer of the troops, wlio shall make and retain a certified copy thereof. REIPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 145 10. Special appropriations shall require a unanimous vote of the council; regular disbursements may be made by ordinary decree on a majority vote. 11. Whenever the commanding officer of troops shall notify. in writing. the council that in his judgment a decree issued under subdivision 3 is inadequately executed. or shall make any other criticism or recommendation. the council will colnvene as soon thereafter as practicable to consider his communication and shall make written reply thereto, which reply, if he deeim it insufficient. lie shall forward, with lhisi remlnirks. th rough military channels to tliese headquarters. 112. The foregoing provisions, tentative in character, are sulbject to amendment by enlargement or curtailment, as special conditions or development may make necessary. Il most ilstanices these simlI) local establslisllents asllwer all I)urp)oses (of a te'llI))pll'y nallatle ta allll (11r': \awnl ' fo llll'er l Slpallishl friends w-itli his extor tiolls etfore lie ca( ( he arrested. )ne illn w-hom confi(l delle ad been placed sold out fol a general (colllllissioll alll(l is 11(\ actielg e i \-ai vll llllaillv )10 tll 101) south of Manlila. The lack. of allllllifestedl suI')lprise o1' inldi 1ltio)Oll )n ill(' ])l'e at )f' citizens by1)V whllomll thI e1s crilimillals lhad )beel init11st1eild wit II thie imanlail.rgeile(lit of 1o al afl'airs on1 (dis( vei- l that te lh d ede ei ved adl,bAl)ed pls11lits a1ll1 Iilfial-oable co'll ln t (ollllllil- t.ille mlloral copell)lexion of tlie 11ti iv e. The'l Spanish c('ivil (courts, fro'()l which cri'iilnall ju 'isdi('tioll llllad been talk en, as slhowi )i on pg es ^5! anld < of Ihi(is repIolt. 11 ad \vliutarily closed their sessionsli illn ()ctobel ( and Novemlihel, leavin" tle a(filldinid - trat ion of justice by co ( st it ltled t lribulnllls to tle pl)rov0ost (c0 t'is () of rll cre1 Iion. lThese prlo \ost eou(ri't; dts oild lleet idequ(lilie('etlisi ill Co01lliel - cial llttlers, hill the blusiness of merfchants and I tie property taill]isactionis of inllab)itallls nlecessitltedl judlicial assistanlce of a strlictly civil at1 i T. hl'e rieestlab)lishime(ilt otf civil colits 1eca((e tIle sIlibject of Ima 1t'ure delib)ea t ioni. A 11i111el)'I (of (co)1itelei('ces werhe 11(hd witx1.Jut(ld'e Al'elilano, a leading Filipino laxwvye, lwho l(cepte(l tile posit ion of Secretllr ' (of' Stl't( ill Ag't iliall(idos ca(blli1elt I 'de'r poular' p11t 'less1e an1111(1 tlfro wlhliil ch l llad wit I11ldrawn l I lhis wi'N1 vIolitio )l si l hotl Il after] ac(cel)t11ilc, ill 1(lie (conviilicon that 11h could i(ot llherebv servel tie intere sts of his ipeoplle After 1iiuch hlesit.ancey he prlloised to coniplyl withli my request to assist ill the reestablisihlient oto I tlie siuplelcle ((cotrt of tlhe islandls a1(nd those (of iliferior jurisd(iction for the ciit-y of Manila and subli ebs. I 11( advisedl str'o l)gly a-ga-inst a p11'rely native judicia, I as tlie Asiatil ((cons11,s1' ('o11it lprat ice w Nould i.esu ilt, silce domiciled )tor-' (12i1 lil lould l o(l submit 1 o t) tile o1'1drsofl a liativ e coult except. un11der pl1(lest.1and ap)peial foe reliet' to their ow-n goveirnments, and tis would grive rise to internaltional (diffieilt ies. lie ad(lvisc( ( that joiudges be select(ed from thlie iiost compet lit lawyes of tile islands, anlld floni nited Stlat'es o iiceris ive n t Iif\t lie awld a cqainted with United Stales iof l'ce(s of rocl it 1r, to tinet ( n tuoht stl i1lecr foiltos te ltice 1IigtII be subsi tii uted 211d(11uallv for 1 lie eiuberIsoille li1d dilhatoi-y metlhofs hlit i lerto plielldl by lSpallCn. 'h1ie Siapantishi las, bilt i quipo royal wpre te, l.eislative 1e0act licl t, ali( (ecrees of governing officers isslled(l 1111 uder conlf'red lpolwers, cxtlendlillg over a petriod of cent1aries, hals liever beeln cod((lified. In order to or anielize tribiliails of justice, witl Ielilbelrshilip) otlie. than Spanish and witil modifieid powers and forms of )procedure. in order to ili)ose )upon tille lihiabl)itlants the laws of Spaina ilt ellirgently amiended in essential particulars, required w 10 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. exhaust ive research. Tisi lab)or.Tii2ge Aliellaino tilideitook and ecatrie(t to sutflieieit (ioilplt ion to en~abl is to iniake lit neeeQsstrl1V legal. lliolilietat-ions aliid to oi(-aiiize thle Coll its. His reconil~ileli(bationii or I. hle a1pj)0iTltlnen't ol' CC,i li 111011 to 1he benlCh Win) were11 dira-wii not on lN frontl Luizon 1 )llt also Ii ot-on thle V isaxvait Islainds wvere approved and11 orderspl)eparle(l. ly him in id Leleii ClnlCrowdler, of tile j ndgeadvocate's (leItartment, Ntve re 10(1 isie, as, tollows: GEN-\ERAL ORDERS, No. 20. OFFICE U. S. MILITARY- GovERizNoi IN TmlE I. Chapter 8), title 2,. of the Organic Royal Decree of January 5, 1.891. prescribing the qualifications of appointees to colonial judicial office, is. in its app~lication to judicial appointmients in tile Philippine islands, hereby suslpen(Ied. 1I. The supreme conrt of the Philippine IslandIs (audiencia territorial), heretofore administered in the city of Manila, tile exercise of whose, jurisdiction has been suspellded as to criminal afftairs since Aug-ust 1,1898. and as to (civil affairs since January 89. 1899. is hereby reestablished and~ will exercise tile jurisdiction, civil and criminal, which it p~ossessed prior to August 183, 1898. in so far as compatible with thle suprem-acy of the United States in saidl islands, and wviii administer the laws recognized as continning in force by proclamation from these headquarters dated August 14. 1898. except in so far as they have been, or may hereafter be. modlified by autilority of 'tile, United States. Ill. The following appointments are announced: President (presidente)., D. Cayet~ano Arellanio. CIVIL JIRANCII (SAJLA DE LO CIVIL). President (presidente). D. Manuel Araullo. Associate justices (miagistrados), D. Gregorio Araneta, Lieut. Col. E. H. Crowder, judge-advocate, U-. S. V. CRIMINAL BRANCH (SkLA DE LO CRIMINA~L). President (presidente), D. Rayinundo Melliza. Associate justices (magistrados), D. Ambrosio Rianzares, D. Julio Llorente, Maj. R. W. Young, Utah Volunteer Light Artillery, Capt. W. E. Birkhinier, Third U. S. Artillery. ATTORNEYS (MINISTERIO FISCAL). Attorney of the supreme cour~t (fiscal de la audiencia territorial), D. Florentino Torres. Assistant attorney (teniente fiscal). D. Dionisio Chanco. The appointment of subordinate officials of this court will be announced later. IV. The supreme court as above constituted wvill meet upon the call of its president at the earliest practical date for the purpose of organization and for the formulation of such recolnmendations relating to its procedure under United States authority as may be deemed by it advisable. The officers herein named and all others who may be appointed hereafter to act in any capacity in connection with the administration of conrts of justice in these islands will, before entering upon the discharge of their official duties, subscribe and take the following OATH OF OFFICE. I,, having been appointed -- in tile Philippine Islands, recognize and accept the supreme authority of the United States of America. And I do solemnly swear that 1 wvill maintain good faith and fidelity to that Government; that I will obey the existing laws which rule in the Philippine Islands, as well as the legal orders and decrees of the duly constituted government therein; that I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion, and will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office upon which I am about to enter. So help inc God. REPORT OF MAJOR-G;ENEKAL OTIS. 147 The prescribed oath may be administered by the judge of the provost court of Manila, or by such other officers as may be designated for that purpose by proper authority. By command of MAajor-General Otis: T!HO.MA.S H. B.ARRY. l..si.s/tat t(tlji/t(t n t-(Gener(c l. GENERAL ORDERS, 1 OFFICE U. S. MILITARY -GOVE)\RNOR IN THE PHILIPI'I'NE ISLANDS, NO. 20. I,Jil, 1 I..,Ji.. '1. The courts of first instance of the province of Manila and the courts of the peace heretofore held in the city of Manila. P.. I.. are herebv reestablished and will exercise the juris(licticn, civil and criminal, possessed by them prior to August 13, 1898, in so far as coml:)atible with the sulremacy of the 'United States in the Philippine Islands anid the exercise of military government therein, and will administer the laws recognized as continuing ill force by proc.limation frl m these headquarters dated August 1. 1,898. excel)t in so far as these laws have been. or hereafter may be, modified by authority of the Ulnited States. The division of the province of Manila into the four judicial districts of Binondo, Tondo. Quiapo. and Intramuros, as such districts existed prior to August 13. 1898, is continued. The territorial jurisdiction of the justice of the peace in each of these districts shall be coextensive with that of the court of first instance therein. The following appointments are announced for courts of first instance: DISTRICT OF BINONDO. Judge, D. Antonio Majarreis: district attorney, D. Perfecto Gabriel. DISTRICT OF TONDO. Judge, D. Basilio Regalado MIapa: district attorney. D. Jose Ner. I)IsTIRICT OF QUIAP1'O. Judge, D. Hipolito Magsalin: district attorney, D. Vicente Rodriguez. I)ISTRICT OF INTRAMU3ROS. Judge. D. Jose Baza Enriquez: district attorney, D. Lucio Villarreal. The following for the justice courts: DISTRICT OF BINONDO. Justice of the peace, D. Jose M. Memije; substitute, D. Ramon 3analac Alberto. DISTRICT OF TONDO. Justice of the peace, D. Pedro Ricafort; substitute, D. Ignacio Ver de la Cruz. DISTRICT OF QUIAPO. Justice of the peace, D. Martiniano Veloso; substitute, D. Claudio Gabriel. I)ISTRICT OF INTRAMUROS. Justice of the peace, D. Jose Martinez Quintero: substitute, D. Jose del Castillo. The following appointments in the supreme court of the Philippine Islands are herely announced: Secretary of civil branch, D. Roman Espiritu. Secretary of criminal branch, D. Ramon Fernandez. Assistant attorneys, D. Tomas G. Del Rosario, D. Antonio Constantino. Secretary of the fiscalia, D. Bartolome Revilla. The secretaries of the court above appointed shall receipt to Lieut. Col. E. H. Crowder, judge-advocate, U. S. V., for records and property pertaining to their respective branches of the court. 148 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. The division of the city and province of Manila into two districts for the purpose of registering titles to property, as such districts existed prior to August 1:;. 1898, is confirmed, and the tollowing appointments of registrars for the same announced: Registrar for the north district. D. Simnplicio del Rosario. Registrar for the south district, D. Francisco Ortigas. By command of Major-Genleral Otis: TiiOMAS H. BARltY..Ass.^i:l( t A(j llla t-(Gec7ral. GEvNERAL ORDERS. 1 1OFFIC U.. MILITARY ((G\VE-NOlI IN TlHE L PllII1lNE ISIAN.DS, No. 2. '2. *l[fi, 1.. iJfl /.; S99. I. The supreme court of the Philippine Islands and the courts of first instance and of the peace for the province of Manila. reestablished in General Orders Nos. 20 and 21, current series, this office, are announced as open and in the exercise of their jurisdiction, civil and criminal, on and after \Wednesday, June 21, s189. The sessions of the supreme court will be lleld in the builling known as the "audiencia:" those of the courts of first instance and of the peace in the building known as the ' Casa de la Moneda," Intraimuros. II. The jurisdiction of the courts specified in Paragraphl I of this order. and of other civil courts which may hereafter be reestablised, sllall not extend to and include crimes and offenses. committed by either citizens of or persons sojourning within tile Philippine Islands. which are prejudicial to military administration and discipline, except by atutlority specially conferred by the military governor. Jurisdiction to try and aw\ard punishment in the class of cases designated relmains vested in provost courts, courts-martial, or military commissions. By command of Major-General Otis: TIHOMAS H. BARRY, A:.sis/ti /~t lAP {tmlt-(,r ')(al. Th'ise l 1ordels \wet e f' ollowe\d bl othel ]iers;ll)olishlio' Iseless s lfic(s 1s ffeand metlliods of )procedllule, )Iresc('riliI' 1i11iles ul(lide wl\ ichlll allotir leys (could(1 )be a(lllittl (1 to ptrattice, il pltlillng ill foIe(,'ce 11l (l llotal'ial law, ada111( I oi te1 11ii l llimentt1 ll. of llotaries ald( o11( (il ) cot o(lfijcers. 'The cotlrt of tlie alude ll(ia. 1(ook up) ll 1t 0ce iufinishe(l 1lusi1e ss 11nd tlel( llearino. and (d(eci(dinog of, ap)peal ci\vi callses. II llias wolrke(l indlustfliously- anitld consielnt-io slys- 1 \111(1(1' 1the able leadlership (fl, Ibe pres1ident, andf I dl1(l lll)t if' alnly former Phililppile' t I'i l }lllel 1 li(ah s eve'(' ( isplasye( eq(1ua l egal l ' la ility. Somie 1 f' ic/tionl 1t111((11l 111t I'lle l lilg of tlie I'mllilo' cotlurts, which l ias 1been 1)(e atl reduced a( las aboutl (cesed l u111/1e1 special lprovisiolls ( f o (f l(er issl111(1(1 to ll1t var(\ vil' (co(litions. e'lte jurisdiction an11(l pu)iiishlinir power'' otf tl1e superior provost co(tl1. halsl been exteli(leld to mee(t cases00 of 1t,flr1d ilXvolvx il 1tl I)iulic rel(llelV ue. All of theset tlribuliials h lLav sl, clleel(1 il t( accomplislh ig' 111s o)1 (je(s t, or which thiey ere estallblished l(yond x y exp1(c 1 (t.l tio ll, il, I convilced(, lay tlie fouill( atiol uponIl wh i(cl lo buil (l a1 aI l)le' ald1( satisfactory jul(dici.tly f'or t11i( islalids \ie/ l) peace s sliall s.uc'ieed wiar. Two of thle three ( \ civiliian membersl ( of 1 the so-calle 1(1 Ipealce ( commission, which was aptpo)/filt(IedI (-. 1ea in.JaI aN arrived on () rch 5, a11 tllhe thir(l, (Coloel De)iib1 o(Il Alpril I2, -o (fa LS.llt / ()fil Ir 1tr)oI)s lI(1 (e11t I(red the iisuri'gent (cal' ital of Ialolos. Thl e ilrsi Ill(eef(ilu' was 11(el11 on.Malch 20O, we 1(alnl orfl'alizationl was e (ecte(1l all/ its l1esi(ling" ofil, Prlesident llrlmili, was reque1ste0 to 1)()repar(1 al a1(ldress to tlhe Filipino people, to ibe isslued as a 1prl(,1lai.ation, e',xp)e(ssive of l e111 (l(si1res alld intentions of tlie l1nited States (Gover,(t iielil iln tal;ilog (oli)tlol of tllie islanids. This lie did, and tilie paplr whic l1e subseql(et11Il 1 e l(s(elted1 was pronolilced( excellent in tone ad1(1 ter1l1s all1 1most, a.(lirLbly indicative of tihe liberal an1d huimaell policyx wlhich it was understood by all that the United States intend(led to (loptlt. It was uianimously decided to print, publish, post, and disseminate as much as possible REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL, OTIS. 149 an~~iin the inHlialittalts 11in(1(1 iiiSUVi'geiit (l0oliMIit ion this a(1ldress, prl ting(4 the Same il filie ELiigiishi, Spanishi, and Tagralo mgouagress. Trhis W~1a (ile, 1)111 s('ar1'ely 118t(1 it- beenl posted ili Manila t welt v-four- hourus before it wats 50 1011 a 11( 111.111 ialat(1 as to hIb iile('g1ia)e It sliffered the saiiie fate, as the pi'oelaiiiat ion o f Jaui iiai'y 4. Set (lit ill lpao'es.1 11 'and Ii-1 of hties r'epo1't; uit it p)lodiieel a1 IM11llk I hl'lefivical inlflut(ileeC( OnIl te Peo)lde, ('51e(liallxv t'l0o(' outside 0m1l' linles, as ii carii'id with11 it. a. (oivict iln of 1111 tiiittd Sta1tes' jiten'0i lous'. oii aeeoiiit, of the S0oilcee from liii t(li'l't it. Iweilig. an1 (XpIIssion fi'oiii a ('m11 -the (I liteli st 1114s woIId p(1 1 ue So lpel'licieOlls to ilnsuil'(lt, 111t('i'(5ts Wv85t its ('ffe('t that A-gniallalo 01r hiis of'fic(el'stoo0k 1(111'S0i'lesitwher('everl' itwatSp110s11le 1(11 1 ell to (1( 50..1i is St ill the SI)icoel of discussion. a~lid insiil'Lt'oltts of infhitellee 1111 VI' eceli I Iv ('X I)I'('55('( ' Nvi IIi II(,I) ess to aWeellI.) its Itei'miS CaIId ah bide rIlhiis (o'01111issi55i1 wvii proil thly vei'V 5(401 1(1101 its ploe(.'eediligs, flivest keattillmi's, eoniciisioiis, 11(1 eoiilldtlit' i it has nlotaled donle so. TIhit-Il t~ia 1eiii 'liirt' I f(o11 14 il ili1)0511l~e 1(o att 1(d11("1tmiiv(I its s('ssi(1s, ald ill it-Ii lor1(11it (If t'lie 5scpe()ll(I-' lart itcullar1s (If its lal)( I'S. Its 11411 (18 epee.ii 11((11 1(1Clon 1 )el Iv and.l1l'ofessmr Woi'ceslo ('1-, Iol 1reillil ed 1here n mit i1thiru ver1 re(celil- V('8ll 1 A'1, W('i (If g'ea. assist aIilee iiid st W 1'.lltethi'iollg ( it, (011(4ll( (1ie of tate1 with yeotli4ardh to f11w clollires.1111( aide (1(( Ii1' ill ii 11lv VwavS 1)A IV('11lisel 811(1 1v IVtheir inlvest itat ionls of prlaet io~a siiblj eel' S\v W c ifori ei'Il IIl l 01'(lketr' oiiiat ionl. The shitpji(liet, (If Spl 11isli pi )1'i511(8 Io (tW war \as takell till ill eaviliest as 50(1n its I ie l- iaifieato 141 (Iftlie Pariis lreal itvaW8 ofdheial iv (0111111 1111 -('at ('4; a118( 1 le s('tt 1e111('111 ()f 1111 o'i'tv V cilits N1 lwetxl'e Sp~ainl 811(1 tile thie mIlealliflog of t. realy Vpiol'isiolls \x hIch Iefist11 det ('101 urn owii''l-,1i.-ip. Thieue were daso invxolved f ie( ri'iglit of iiiaiv p)11vat e ('itizenls Will) had inv\ested ini 11(11delix1 ((1 Spa1111isli bonds Of' a late i~ssut, wli eh hd 1 een re('aiui('(i ill till' tre 1't'lti oV (II' ho 118(1 (lelosited wvitIh tilie Sptan is'li (.TO. — t11ts11111'(l. U 11(1r 1 1 li t1111:1a ao-'eeliieit b)oa1(1 (It officer's to conlsider all quei(st ions of (1is'i'i'eeuiieiit. ()I- o11 which amitagoui ist i' oplliol(i was held were Cappil(ited (1by thle r'esideit nt 11,1or'it 1(' of' The two ilations int('r'ested'(, Spa ill 115(o appo)l(i1tim' 11 Iisl)ei-al liqftidtat ion comili iiittee of Thela'hbo ls (of I ixese boa Ills w('re ('i'v gu'ea t a111( ('Nte(mdcli oxer a ileriodt of severtl I llnillt11. Thle Uii i '(I at aes 1)0111( W85t ('olvoked in the A boltrd of officers, to consist of Maji. Charles McClure. chief paymaster of the department; Mai. (2. U. Gtntenbein. Second Oregon. UT. S. A'.. aiid ~Second Lieut. M. A. Hildreth. First North Diakota. U. S. V., is hereby appointed to meet and confer witth a comtnittee niamed by his exc'ellenc'y Division General Diego de los Rios y Nicalau, Spmnish army~t, for thle purp~ose, as stated,] of clearing the accounts of the Spanish Government in the Philippines. Tile board will determine upon somle definite ('ourse-, of plrocedlure tby wvlich the~ Spanish committee can have access to;ill recoills antd dtoc'uments 11ow in possession of the United States authorities whic'h it imay desire to consul~t. and wvill arrange tiierefor. No property or records can he delivered Until tile projposed treaty receives validity through ratific~ation. anld tile b~oard xvili continue its sessions anticipating that event when definite iuistm'uctions looking, to a settlemeilt of public affairs. judicial and executive, can be conveyed. Tile board will ascertain fully tile desires of the committee as to tile nature andi full e-xtenit of' its desired action and grive it every possible facility consistent wvith tue present status of affairs. REPO-RT' OF ]MAJOR-GENERAL OTis. Membetrsitp ill 1-his, 1)oard -was Ii (frfuioly lv (1'ncted, ow jin to etui gencies of s'n'vioee All. of the oriollia 'in 1ett1)et'S w(vte Sootneto 401 at relieved and( siibstifilttio (1tiilade M iliiit('t~ I 'XI v 1 Ikito O lie Phice of. Major Mc\1Clureo.aw t11 1c f0110 lii t in, ofrfico of v 1 \ In 'tiked albilitv. whIo di(1 Iin Septtillhor 1w is 510ce ( dct l) Lael tolt( 1 t COolotel hlof. thle d tV avei esp1a1)11noiw i 0111i'silill-10 selitorlty. Ihe d(lites of the 1hoartd Care a1pproieliil (oi'Il' ion, anld 1()"1 oh ly it C~qII ie (1551 \O~ d S(ooli. It IWa.is rou id Itece -~'n'v 1o ("'ive H. bro id I ftti tiide of' a( 10n1 andi~ oin A1)iil 22 it, wa, ciS lipw\ored to l(adiiti~Iti r (,01'ot Is aild tarke tes,.t im~OfvlV 11 10let' h)O'wt'l it WvOs auitiiorize(I 10 (Nereise jut'sdit Ot e he 1wwayof 1iv('stIt 1011 01' ll'oalI)itriaiiiellt. Quiest-iotis of propeit1 r ioi dis it )(ou whici e-to 10 10(111 5 Q( ii Ii H ( i e t'eael td weire ire~feired lot lu1st 111(1 olts. The ON ii np" ljoirlalit" of' I Itese wei'e siubltiittedi to WfX 'in-10tv1ot for' out1 horita itvue dleelsioti, ond a eottlst me1ct ion of the l1e'iliiliv. of I lie, Ire'eoty rov0\isiojis wNas obltailie(1, whIijeli -served as a, rule for rturtte (nuidanee. I tei' tptvlgbrief' teport of' this board slhows thle eliat Ct,1etet and I ettetl oI..IScope, of' itIs acl ott I, NNii II it s eoiieilusions," bitt 1itot t'le Nvotieid details, of' ooe(dts witeli wree exhalustive oil all sutl)j('(is lpreosiitedi tot' cousidet'atioit. At atil early date 1IIt('tIe Wle IV r'se('t(i ('11111II115 of eo'porI io oIIs wtIeI i( 110d obla-illedl 011( were (l)po1ali I t- 1111(1ev Sp)1111sIt emott'ssioits. I'ot payittetiIt fot' p)ublic' Serviees, losses '1c(01u1 112 lo'mlie of lp'(l((' olto as pro1ltt usedl ill I'lose couicee-siotis. 01'- fI'm datitt'ii-oes 1(o pt'opet'tv iiif hilt ed by 1)0t1 inlislt'2'elts 'anld VI ttu(ld.State (5 '(p~t'Setilt[Ii\-eS; also veix' mlooy claijitis ftomtti ttsitt('55- itoutiso, '11atil 11wi\t( ititli\iditals for (lestr mt 011, lo's.s, daittaoce (r 1')t( lioii t of' 1let )t3et7 Vttt(1O siie.b qiiestiolls of' led' obldiattfotis orose Ita e bet heold ilt tin \ 111(. To guve attenttiott to il(d10111 Iptese"tleod it. wats ttila llY Iw(,ssat'xv to organI-ize 1)0 hoar of (t ihitts itll the f'ollo\\iit- ot'det \\-,.s issited SPECIAL. ORDER-n> OFICE1( U. S. MILT-itAy G~ )\+itN'i aIN THE No. 3. I:lH1LlPPItNE P IANt)5, 3Ji~d~. 1 1 /1( /, 1899I. A board of officers is hereby appointed to consider and piss, uIpof such claims agaitist the United St-ates GAovertnment. preferred bY ptrties residlent 0o' otherwise in the Philippine Isianils, and arising by reason of Unfited1 States occupation, as may he submitted to it from this office for ntvesti-atli((n aild opitiiori. It will be guided in its decisions by tlie rules of interptretation -adopted by this office in its past consideration of (feinands, of this natuire, in so far as they b)e applicable to circumstances and conditions. The board will nieet to-morrow. the 1.9th instant, at 10 o'ciock a. in., or as soon thereafte-r as praicticable, at the office of the judgeadvocate of the Departmnent of tue Placific. for thle purpose of organization aInd fixing upon methods of procedure to govern it-; deliberations; and thereafter it will hold its sessions at snchtinies and iIace.s as t-e i'~~iesi(1ittaofhcr itay ~ttllounce: Deftail fo' the lomrl.-Lieut. Col. E. Ri. Crowder. judge-advo01 ite. U. S. V.; M aj. C. U. Gantenbein, Second O-.reg-on Volunteer Infantry: (apt. It. A. Greene. Twventieth United States Infantry': (.Capt. J. Gr. ljaallancee, Twenty-secondi United States Infantry. By command of Major-GTenteral Otis: Toii"H. BARRY, 01~itm A Wlj fnt (icotra1. iMeblet'sh ip iii this lboardl has be('tn chiattge(1d (t0castOtio lly is ei relitistances comlpelelld, butl th1e seitiot' itteitbet'r is Still servingII the I'ouI. I t form utl11ated and po)1ublised I Inloes t-o goveili its proo~ed(hqgs atnd for the infori'matioii of all personts wN:ho de/sii'ed to stibtitit elaiutts and( by which they wvete to be guidied in t le prepat'atiln tin011d11)1 slibni in of the samie. REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 151 Sixt:-fouri' cilaims, ag,,'e,, 'atinig,o()5,0!)( (Mexinc n money), were received- ( fl'oll i'esidents of so(ltllhen LIuzon aindll for- the most part Manila, anld llosltl ilnvolillfvi tie bll' Iuling ad11( lootingl o)f ai)anlldoned Iiii(ises ill tlhe tt lles of Febi'ali'v and 22 at.lManila. Few of tilis ('hllai'actler appe'arl to possess il el'it a1d ll re la4pool'1y sustaill (d by 1)roof of flc('ts. Seveal al<;Iskilng' foir le retill t of I)lpropel1-R whiicl w\as claptl1e'c( ill tle eii(iv5y's cou1ntl1y o' w\li(ll was seized!by oiiur ieni fo'r colltvellie(ell( ol t 'ranspol'latiolt have lbeel adjusled wilhout diticuilty. rF1he (dest tl(I1ion of p1l ivate )'prope(l ty (as (a1 nIeCCessayl- ilicidelit of wa'i in di' 111' thle ts o tim 101 t l defe(lsi(ve p(ositions in tlhe sub)urbs of' Manila is tlhe qulestionl invol ved(1 in passill 11)poll most of thlese (1(emads. Twe Xllt —five ( ('lailms), r li,,St,11 (; (Iexica), II have beell ree( (( i 'ved1 Iloilo. T'hey (~ ( defee(t ivel and( c- arelessly drawn a.id veX( y inl(deliite <as to detal. ils. () i few x ases is pr)oof of o\wnllrslhip) of l'opel)lty submilled.!All but two) call fo llalag(es to p'ople'l ty illieflllt to tile fol''ciblel occupl)atioll of tl le city 1by our t loop)s colsiderabl'lle portion of it. ()e of the two exepltiols is -a claim for;5,01() pleselited by a Sp)a llia'dl tliirougll i tlhe onsuilai offie, l because ol thl( s(eizlr ie of his pr1 inlili estab)lislhmiei( t i (fte'l) iiaball llll iet, whIerecilln was pfillnted a scurrilous newNNspaperl, violenltlI ilncell(lial-y talnd 1abusive- of tlht l'lit(ed Stalt(s whllile oit' ti'oo(ps occ)(lupied 11oilo Harb)or, blefor lIle selizutie of l](he ('ilty. 'The olthel is also a (demand fotr Slei'll)0 floiii a Slpalliiard(l tor thie dest iu(ctlionl of lls bloat andl(l (ca loO by tile. S. l. /. lB( i.ifXi wliile lbeli eved to lie ('a11l'e0 d ill illitit trade..Mosl I all 1ie 's o f I 1 these, (clais a lie l)as(1 ll 1ilie' alletoedl re'spolsibilit otf litl t'ile l it Sltales 1o4 pIay (ldalaes to tlle several own-lies of pr)op(rt (desttri-(ed ill tie Iloilo fire selt b tlse i elsll getlls lponll fol(c(ed ena.(llati ol, Ibeca(tise of tll l iet tiit tlie IUnit ed Stales )egal tile a ttlt(k o) tlil (eit.y befole i tlie expiratio 1 ot tilm i (e t) llot(iice in ltle lnotice to 'tesidents tlal t it woulild commence, thus depllrivinor thesm of tliie (op)1)01tilly lt rteltiiove (r l p1lat(c tiil 1)woi)erty w hislil was dlestio!ed (ill i)e (eol(litio ltle fo.i piese-valtion. The atletionl of tle Ari'iiiy anl Navy, wiXX, cons ll t ile( il les tlie Celie(f alrgulient of tlhe clailants fol tlte le('I"l vai(liditl of thleil' (les allnls, llas beell set oul o il paages 1.75-177 f t llis repoit. All lbuit I t )o of tliese climilanits ale slub jects of fo(reigli (co01ittr.ies. Ultdel' War )epalrtillenit ilistrl llions i giviXl' pl'otection to the l)Xownei's of pal telits aind (copyl Lightls issilcd by tle l lit(led States, tile followin, dilect ions \'er'e publ)lished: 1. The offices of patents. of copyrights. and of trade-nimarks. heretofore administered as separaite lreau of the Direcciol-G(enerlal de Administracion Civil." are hereby consolidateil into a single offi(e. to be known as the Office of Patents. Copyrights. and Trade-martis. and placed in cllarge of ('iapt. George P. Ahern. Ninth U. S. Infantry. who will receilt to tile Spanish authorities for all records. documents. and pr operty pertaining thereto. II. The lduties enlloined in Circulr No. 12. division of customs and insular affairs. in reference to the filing here of patents and trade-marks issued in the United States and duly registered in the United States Patent Office, and all duties whichl, under the laws relating to patents. copyrights. and trade-marks applicable to the Philippines, pertained to the " Director-General de Administracion Civil" and hlis snblordilates. are hereby devolved upon the officer in charge of the office of patents. copyrights. and trade-marks above designated: all matters of administrationl arising in that office which. under those laws. required the action of any higher authority than the ' Director-General de Administracion Civil" will be forwarded for colsideration and action to the office of the United States military governor in the Philippines. III. So much of Article 27 of the royal decree of October 26, 1888, regulating the concession and use of trade-marks, as requires reference to the Real Sociedad REPORT OF MA.JOR-GENERIAL OTIS. Econoinica of industrial marks. designs, or models presented for registration, for investigation and report as to whether such mnarks, designs, or modeis are already in use or are the property of third persons, is hereby suspended. The blusiness of tbis buiea litas been active, requiring tlie wor<k of ani inlterl)ret er ald tw()o clerks unr(111e le con'stant supl)erlvision)I of Captain Alielin. It. re1quirei l I li ll to Collect atd11( lile' all ft')l'rller Sp)aInlishl lcorids otJaiaialble oil this sLubjecti soiiime of which were kept inll Spain, and 11now tlIe ocliee is runnii sIIooI tlily otiiparai,Iivel. EvLxeiv mail from thle Iilile(d States briitgs many certifield paictits for file,:and thle exacted fee of 81 fI'm lii g iimo()re Itha 1 pai ys ilie office exlpenses. In. ManHil'l a a1(d a few oher cities where 0111 roops ale slatiolc( tl io give ilhabiaita s prote.li} scnl( Is hiave beenlt establl!is]ied(I. Plarelts andl chilirlien iiire eagter for prl liiilmay-schooll i llst ructiou all artme very desirous to icquirte a sp)eakiigp kiowl-cdge otf I le nii-lish lag'uiag^'e. In thle lit of [tManila mlore han m5,000)) children ae attedlle l flig 1llese schools, lwhich artie liiaintaiilld at a (l(si of ticnailv 1wj,00 Mexican doliasl a iiont 1h. Lnstrlicitos arc diawi fi omi it 1 fornier Span ish ai I Filipino tea(heris, a t gmentei 1by Amcri.cats, so(me of whom a ie d ischlarigedl ien fiomit volut'itcer, og izati tions lti!d sil e 1'(l from those wlio came Ill tlie islands ioni aI ciunt oIf individaill it11(,esire. Thie suiperii itendent is a forlmier sohlictr wllo 1ad(1 (osi( ale expliieiece ill this prtofession il thle Utiitedl Saltes. AIaly aV )1pplicalios 'for lposiliols as ftach ers aric receive tirmouig iii aiI clle coii ic(atlls allifdll it pesonlls who, if tlie refet'eiees 'fun'lished cat le b' lid 1 o1il (woIld rllleidlle vallallle service here i, 1l)it it v will reql iiie I ii I e t() I I II ly est a) lisl th Iis e(( I ational Iplauit. The hIiig'heir dItucaitio which the islatios h]ave ilteihietto enjoyedl, as well, as that of a mitil clthariaciet, ias 1b-een eitl i'ely uti1der the contlIol of t le religiols tri s illotl I lts ceniteired ini Manila. The D)mi) ltical order, rich in lai(dlol estaltes aeqiii'ed ri,ou'lgh at series oIf yefairs, itna guatinl its eduicatliontal ypolicy tun(l(e rlil assisiaie, moneiy ion tribl1tions, atttd dlecrees whelti tit ie (lilcatiotltl fiehl1 was entirely in tile possession (I tlie cletgv, and l' seizig o bIii IIv legre(es to the ed(lational instlitutions atd(1 scieitific schooils oI'g'anizled bv t lie Jestuits under moval lotecllti atl cm]nd!ctedl with fullds frotmi itldlivildual lestato1rs aT'ter thlat (orler halld been Iirtive x fromit Ilith islalills, built utlp lie University (f Mauiila altd g'adliitally inoprlpolrat edl il it these Jesuit ftouin(datlions. (Great effort was made io sex-(c i lient tfrlmil Dominiean authority Ily rece(,nt Spamislh statlesment of adval:ced id(eas, but wii.hout success, aid ll xnow 11w lleading,'1 Filipillos lemiadl that. severence and a retlurit t(o Staie slipe'visioll. Much timie an(d 1hlaor. ili historical researu'litas Ibeei expeniled by Lieitenaiti-( olho1el (r(xowler of the law departmentl in tlie invest igaltio( of, lohse niat ltls, a(nd hIis able reports oIf past and pIleselt condiiois atid leg'al c(iocluhsions derived tlherefrom ]las so ir'esenled llIe stubjeci tliat ralical act(,1iol can be takeni int some instan.es an(l lats been ldet(linermile ullpoln. The Archbishop of Manila, wlio, I ati inforlimle(, is a meimbler (If 11i l)Domiitican order, has served parole notie that, he will streluoll)tsly )ippol)sec such actioin and hias been x invitl(,l to submliit hiis lprotest a.t a early d(late. In our last allusion to thlie Sului Archipelago it was statted (see page 222) that, thle (ccullpatlion o(f Jol() by 1)11 troilops o( May 1I! a9nd lie friendly relatimons establisled l betweent 1hemiii anid tlie rel)rese.ntatlive Moros placed affairs theire itt a very satistfactory (,towlitiioi for flt'tlutre negoteiations, which were condll(ucted by iarigadier-( e'eal I laes. Tile islands of the archipelago, that (f Basilan, and tlose of Palauan ad Balabac, were localities of concern. In Palauan, where Spain maintained a resident governor aind to which she had transported sonme of REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 153 her state criminals, the 'Tagal(),iad succeeded. ll T Spanish governor 1htdl 1)ee(( 11111 idr'(e(d 1a all prisoners lreleased. At Balabl)ac a very il)polrtant! lighlt-lholls( lhal. bee(,n establisll((ld, which was ine(essiary to to tllt safe nalviLgation of tlhose w\aterls. A: Basilan a naval station of son(i illlmportailce la(l beein 1b1il1t Iup. Oirii Naivy lookel after all matters colnliectl(e with the Il aliauan Islandsl ini so ftr as -ke,epini, affairs there i)n chelck wer'e (o(e(lecr(-ed se(stablllisihed t lie li,'lt at I: I Ial a(', where it lad dispersed a(nd l driv(l oftl withi loss an attac(kin(' party of natives andil where it keeps a stil (letaleliihenit of men, and lhl; closelywvatelled Basilan alld lhe ii( a. cit x of /Zamboaill-'a. Condlitions maylV be inferred flroin inlstruict ions liveei o0n.J uil 3 < lll 11 to Gelleral lla tes, wlo was S(111 to the SiI \' i Archipelab o) to ) ))opose t(er1)is of l'(ree(enllit to the Aorlos, w\iho lia(l becoille very illp)olt iuiatle to 1b iiltor edl of the tlea iiiig lof ouIt occupalt ion of tlhe islands, al(ln to explailn Un ited Stiates iitelntionl. They are as f ollos: OFFICE1 MIlx'AIR Y GOVE-1RN ()R IN THE PHILII PPINE ISLANDS. lo,ihl((, P. I...J ly.., Ls'.: J.. Gen. J. C. BATE S, U. S. V., l/.t,, intn. ]'. 1. GEN1 ERAL: In collmliance with orders this day issued directing you to proceed to the Jolo Ar chipelago. th h.re to execute specific ilstructions to Te communicated by the deplartmlent (conmmnlll er. you will lproceed as soon as practicable to the United States mility stary tion of.lofo. on the island of that name. and there place yourself in communication with the Sultan of Jolo. who is believed to be at Siassi, where he was sojonringi when the last information c(oncerningi hni wxas' received. You are hereby alpointed and (onstituted an agent on the plart of the lnited St(ates military authorities in thle Philippines to discuss. enter into ne/'otiatins,. and perfect. it possible, a written agreement of character and scope as hereinafter explained, with the Sultan. which upon approval at these headquarters and confirmation by the supreme executiv e athority of the United States will prescribe and control the future relations,. social and political betxwe n tile United States Government anid tlle inhabitants of the arcehipelago. The -written memoranda hertewith furnlished you. which m ention cursorily and very briefly the )past political status and recent history of those people in so far as their donestic and political relations with other nations iare concerned: w'hich present suggestions and recommlendatioiis, c(tained in the reimarks and( speculations of persons Xlho have lbetc personally acqluaimted wit l them. as to the proler policy of control or supervision whillh should lie adopted by the United States in its dealin-s with their native authorities: which give the extent and results of contact and relationship with tlhem tIhus far developed on the part of the Ulnited States through its military agency established in the port of Jol, will enablle you to understand the character and (ldiffi(ulties ot tlhe labor with which you are (chbarged. By reference to these mnemoranda you will perceive that in your discussions with the Sultan and his datos the question of sovereignty will l)e forced to the front, and( they will undoubtedly request an expression of ol)inio thereon. as they seem to l)e iinpressed aplare-ntly with the belief that the recent Spanish authorities with whlom they were in relationship have transferred full severeignty of the islands to them. The question is one which admits of easy solution. legally considered. since by the terms of treaties or protocols between Spain and European powers (those referred to in the memnoranda) Spanish sovereignty over the archipelago is concedede. Under the agreement between Spain aid the Sultan and datos of July. 1 7S. the latter acknowledged Spanish sovereignty in the entire archipelago of Jolo nd agareed to become loyal Spanish sub lects. receiving in consideration certain specific payumients in money. The sovereignty of Spain. thus established and acknowledged by all parties in interest, was transferred to the United States by the Paris treaty. The United States has succeeded to all the rights which Spain held in the archipelago. and its sovereignty over the same is an established fact. But the inquiry arises as to the extelt to which tlhat sovereignty (an l)e applied under the agreeient of 1878 with the Moros. Sovereignty, of course. implies full power of political control. but it is not incompatible with concessionary grants between sovereign and subject. The Moros acknowledged through their accepted chiefs Spanish sovereignty and their subjection thereto, and that nation in turn conferred upon their chiefs certain powers of supervision 154 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. over them and their affairs. The kinily prerogatives of Spain. thus abridged by solemn concession. have descended to the United States, and conditions existing at the time of transfer should remain. The Moros are entitled to enjoy the identical privileges which they possessed at the time of transfer, and to continue to enjoy them until abridged or modified by future mutual agreement between them and the United States,. to which they owe loyalty. uiless it becomres necessary to invoke the exer.:.ise of the supreme ipowers of sovereignty to meet cmlergencies. You will therefore ac(uaint yourself thoroughly with. the terms of the agreement of 1878, and take them as a basis for your directed negotiations. Possibly you will discover that tlie Sultan and dato-; are labo)ring under the mistaken impression thait Spain. upon withdrawing recently her military forces from the islands, reconveyed sovereignty to them. This claimn oii their part is mentioned in the nienioorandumn citing the action of tle 1Unitied States troops at Jolo. aiid mayv be seriously entertained by them. because of tie reported Spanish action in pllacing them in posse::sion of Sias.-si. accompaied by proinises to likeNwise turn over Jo!o. If they seriouslvy ntertain such an illusion. it will require tact and adroitness to dispel it. and a discus-ion of thle United States benevolent intentions, and its xwish to establish friendly relations with tlhe(n in order to carry out those irntentions. should lirecedi, any decided attelmpt at c'orrection. The territorial extent of the Jolo Archipelago. s authoritatively establlished, is set out in tlie accomtpanying memiorandla in all essential iaarticulars. except as to thle island of Bailain. where Spain maintained an important iinaival station. which is still in existeiice, thoug"h not yet inL United States actual possession. You will make inquiry with regar, to tins islaind and ascertain if the Su!tan claims any authority over it. coilceding nothing. however, on the point as to right of absolute control on the part of the 1, itd St;ties. The naval station is closely c(onnected with Zamboanga. over which and thlie adja(enr country Siuain exercised complete supervision. The Sultan aild datts liave exacted tribute from (Cagayain-Jolo and Balabac. and. ii fact. from southerIn Palauian also, when. possible, froni other islands whiiha Spain (owned absolutely [or more than th'ee huidrei Iyears. Hence, the fact of taking tribute is not prioof of a le,'al rilit to do so. Palauian and lBalabac are not considered to b- lportions of the archipelago, though it may not l)e policy to attempt to determine with the Sultan, at present, any question of ownership which may arise ini discussion. S)ai n in ntaiied a governor in Palauan. and shore accessories, such as lilght-house. etc., with soime forni of supervisory government in Baltibac. Thie I United Statts dermannds with regard to these islands will be announced -when the result of practical investigation now being pursued is ascertiinied. It inmay be well, therefore, to avoid presit ting this imatter to the Sultan or his representatives in these directed preliminary negotiations, and should he aldvance it, policy dictates tlhat time should be requested to arrive at a knowledge of facts. It is greatly desired by the United States for the sake of the individual i.iprovement and social advancement of the Moro.; and for tlhe developmuent of the trade and agriculture of the islands in their interests, also for thle welfare of both the United States and Moros, that mutual friendly and well-defined relations be established. If' thie Sultan can be minde to give credit to and frilly understand the intentions of the United States. the desired result can be accomplished. The United States will accept the obligations of Sp)ain under the agreement of 1S87 in the matter of money annuities. anl. in proof of sincerity you will offer as a present to the Sultan and datos 10,0))00, Mexican. with wvhich you will be supplied before leaving for Jolo-the same to be handed over to them. respectively, in amounts agreeing with the ratio of payments made to them by the Spanish (G-overnment for their declared services. From the 1st of September next, and thereafter, thie United States will pay to themn regularly the sums promised by Spain in its agreement of 18>s, and in any sublsequent promises of which proof can be furnished. The United States will promise, in return for the concessions to be hereinafter mentioned. not to interfere witli, but to protect the Moros in the free exercise of their religion and customns, social and (dounestic. and will respect the rights and dignities of the Sultan and his advisers. It lpromises not to interfere in their affairs of internal economy and political admininistration further than to respond to their requests for assistance or to render suplervisory action through advice and instruction in those special features of administration connected w-ith the development of trade and agricultural resources, and the methods of conducting and employing the same for the improvement and efficiency of government. It agrees to insure to the Sultan and his people the enjoyment of these rights and privileges against all foreign nations, and will declare all trade of the Sultan and his people with any portion of the Philippine Islands conducted under the American flag REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 155 free. unlimited, and undutiable. It demands, of course, the right to exercise control over the places within its actual occupation. In return for tie promised assurances tle Sultan and his chiefs. acknowledging the sovereignty of the United States. should stili)late to permit that Government to Occupy aind control such points in the islands as tie execuiion of the obli-ations which it assumes nmake nccssary. whether for naval or military operations against foreignl agg'ression or to disperse attenmpted piratical excursions. They will agree to accelt andl fly on a!l occ;lsions, and continuous-ly, tlle American flag as the emblleml andl l)roof of Unlited States sovereignty. lTey should promise to give a loyal support to the United States to maintain the integrity and peace of the archi)pelag.go, not to permit acts of pliracy by their peoplle on its waters. and to assist the United States (ovellrnen111t to su!lpress and abolish this crime by whomsoever attemllts to coimmit it. lwhether Alierican. inhabiltant. or alien. They should agree to deliver to tlie lnitedl States authorities for trial and l)unishment all persons. other thanll those of their own 1eoplel, w hom they arrest on the chari(e of colmmnitting crimes or mnisleineanors. They slhould stipulate to prohibit tile purchase by or the delivery to their leopIle of rifles or war materials. as tlie possession of tliem lias a tlendency to stir lup strife among their separate communities and to destroy the peacle o' the islalnds. which. for the welfare of all parties concerned, should l)e miniutailned. Stiould the Sultan and his datoes re:luest assistance by way of instruction, through comnpetent iAmeri(cnl rlepre,;enltatives. to ilmprove port regulations and colinveniences in tlie interest of 1 onimerce or to luild upl agricultulre;lad increase mierchaintaie pl)lOducti in tlie is!tillds. or to instruct the rising generation of itoros in 11lndstrial;nd mechaliical puIrsuits thro1ugh tile miedium of schools or lpactical applliances. tlie United States will gladly respond. It will endeavor to select the prolerl inliiiduialls to go amonn( and associate witl1 theim to imipart constant valuabtle informaition ill all suchi matters —the iiece.-sities of which for tlie growth in richles and the well beinii,t' all inhabitants of tile islands should be impressed upon the Sultan and his plrinci)pal advisers. All tliese ald otlier subjects of minor significance. wihich will suggest themselves to yon in tile progress of thle lneotiations. xxwhen conditions will be better understood, are for yvour consideration andl apl)lropriate action. Any agreemnlnt which you 11lt l) e al)le to effect will be of force only upon approval and ratiification )by Sulerior autlhority. and this mlust be distinctly underl.too(d and so stated in the ills:lllllet. Tile o(greement will be subject to future modifications by tie mutuai! colnsent of all parties in interest. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, E. S. OTIS, JlI()i'-(lit(')'lfC, 1 '. S. IU.. Iilit(t-y ((WC)bo1)l(. OFrlCE tT. S. MAI11ITA!RY GO()\ENNOR IN TlE PhIliPPIINE ISLANDS. 31{til(( 'I). l.. J4tll /li, 7''. Gen. J. C. BATE'nS, U. S. V.. lttoiltP. I'..: GINEIAl i.: Referring to iilstlrctions of the:8d instant in the matter of the directed conferenue ll;hving in xiew the execuition of an1 agreemenlt with the Sultan of Jolo. it is considered expedient to modiity slightly, in certain particulars, those instructions.anl to state sormewhat 1more specifically objects which it is desired to attain. By an investigation of the records in thie Manila archives to discover the meaning and extent of certain stilpulatiolis in the agreements made from time to time by and betw-een the Spanish authoritiets aind the Sultan. which establish conditions of trade in the Archipelago and anniouince the status of the Sultan, it is discovered that these conditions and status are very var ing, and it can not be ascertained. In fact. it is a conclusion to lie drawn froln the re;ords. that Spain never announced nor conceived a definite. fixed policy of control over the archipelago which looked to improvement ind permanency. Its freluent recorded actions seem to hlave been tlie result of a desire to temporarily meet difficulties growing out of some strained relationship with the Moros existing at the time. accompanied by the evident fixed purpose to maintain a sufficient nulmber of troops in the archipelago to show to Europe that occupation in fact which would demonstrate Spanish sovereignty. By no other conclusion can the varying stipulations of executed agreements between Spain and the Moros be accounted for. They are not explained in any recorded correspondence. and conditions existing at the dates they were entered into warrant the belief at which we have arrived. It will be seen that the Sultan 156 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. and his dates are at one time given all the revenues; that Spain permits the Sultan to collect all revenues at ports in actual Spanish occu)pation, notwithstanding its treaties with European powers permnit it to levy duties at such ports, and that Spain's entire action deprives it of money receipts, but imposes lupon her continual heavy eNpenditures for only simple nomlinal occupation of a few ports. Neither has Spain ever attempted to lay the foundation ror any reforms looling to the future collection of revenues to imeet any of the outlay. whether by the development of trade or improvement of natural resources. The pursuit of such a policy, if policy it can be called. is suicidal to the interests of the su'lervising country and the interests of the people supervised. The United States should seek to a(lopt a policy which, if devoid of inmmediate national benefit, promises bleneficial results both in the matter of revenue (that 'is. revenue to meet the necessary outlaying expl:editures) and at the same time will be atten(ied by the improvement of thle educational and social conditions of the inhabitanlts and the d(evelo)lnent of their country in trade 1and agricultural resonrces-that is, a policy which will be mutuall a(dvnt;ageous to all parties concerned. It is therefore implortalt to make somewhat more specific the former instructions a:d to mnodify them in certain particulars, as follows: It is quite important that the United States shall occupy the principal distributing centers of trade, to i;uild up and develop a revenue and to supervise that developmlent. This tlie Spanish treaties with foreign powers permit. Siassi should be occul,ied by our troops at no distant day and two or three other impiortant points. This necessity you will keel) in view in your negotiations and will show the Sultan the blessings which would be conferred upon his people by intelligent establishment and development. In declaring '"all trade of the Sultan and his peoplie with any portion of the Phi'i)ppine Islands. conducted under tlhe American fiag, free, unlimtited. aid undutiable.' care must be taken to guard against the possibility of the introduction of foreign commerce into the archipelago and thence into other Philippine ports without paying the prescril)ed duties. It is only tle products of the archipelago which can have the b1)e;efits of interisland cornmerce. While the Sultan might le supported and nllay receive revenue from certain avenues, pearl fisheries, etc., which he is now enjoying, there should be somne understandin, as to future revenues to be derived from a newly constructed and increasing trade in foreign products. Negotiations should look to the establishment of a financial and commlercial system based upon modern methods, which, while not destructively antagonistic to present conditions, can be developed upon lines consistent witli modern practices. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, E. S. )TIS,.lIojoo-( ei(l, l,'. '., Milihtfrl (rlorert'or. (Gentleltl Bat-( teIs lla(l a ldifficuillt task to perfor1ll (1 d exectile((1 it with tactl;tl at ilil. \\ile ai niu bellt of tlhe principl la(Iltos we\- favo'raly\ illi(li (ed, the S filtan, iot. 1reSlpondlin to invit atioiis, kelpt aloof and was represente( i b)y his secretltary, iunltil fitnally, tlhe gener'al alpea ring at Maibutgll, t le AMoir Capital, a per'sollal ilterview w as se'l 1'('(1. lie beinig also Slllttal of No(rtll 1)l'rne() ani'l 'reccix ilvi lar(e anlliail l)Yinents firoin thle Norl I il;rll 'I'Tradli ll, (Co(I)tllty, ((expected (l like re(lll lls froin thle Uniited Sta.tes, alldl sceie( lledl r l 111lximo s to ob)laill p(erson al revene tie thn 1renefits for l is peoplel. Se(e 1ui (rlo't 1 porlt of Siassi fro(:in the Slpalliairls, establisli:g thllere ls oa'rdll s aii(ld l)pli(', h1(' li( received(l customis reventles from the I 1'1i dae tra.(le xwlhi h li e xwas loathi to siiurrenIIi(ler. Negotiationlls co111n1led ilto Auiimlist, and1 finally, after lolgr conferences, an agir'c((!(ent was r'eachlled by w*hich the Unllited Stlates secred lucl 111i iore()1'( liberal'l teIims tlllL 11 Ie SpatliarL(ls were ever ablle to,lobtaai. 11ll11 r)epor'ts of thle ollfe(l'r(ce11s hlave beenl duly forwarded, t og'et lher wit, l e agri'eelent lrloposeod f'or authtoritlative actionl. It is Ibeliexvedl that, if l),;peace canl be lliintl.ii('( a tl'rade can be bluilt uip whlicth will )prove highly beiiefi(ial to bot}h 111( United States and tle Mo, o )epeole andfl will l)be l.loe eams of lopeninig avenues throughl whicht a nore atdvancetd civilization can be developedl in these islands. REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 157 Thie populatlion of the Sult Ai rchipelago is reckoned at 120,000, mostly domliciled i i the island of Jolo, an(1 numIbll ers 20,000 figlitino men. hIositilities would be lnfoi)llunale fo all parties conHe('tded, w1ould )e very (expensivet to lthe [nilted Siales il itien a, tnd i(oe, anidi destrucf'111he Navy, quietly Illaced 'arrlisois of ote tconlopaiiy eacll at NSiassi and at Bolt'ao, on III (i Tawai Ta\'ati i'roulp of is4lallds, where Ihey were well 'eeeived( b)y the flriedly(1 na1iveis. W\it h the a)pproval of tihe aiiOeeen1(, fithe ont11 (I lit'iell v to a satisfactory settleiment of lie Sulu affaits -ill rlise( fo)m discontielltt on thle pat fI llo e teStiltanc personally because of (a Sllposed d ecreise in antc 11iptedt reventues or I lie imachiinatlions of tlie iislurc'ents of lMitndao'.l1, w-11) aite edtltieavorii to1 create a 'feelli of (d1 i isltust 1and iostililtv allolg thlie natives a'ainsist tlie nlitled Sle;111s lr(omps. lhe Stillas governieiti is one of per fect despotism, itt form at least, is all political ptowe' is suppol)(sd to (ce(liter iil his iperstnii but tlis il((eis ](ot1 prev'ent fre(lienlit (tlllrl)'eaks oiln lie plad't (ol' Itlle dato.s, wlo frtequently revodl. and are itow, in two or thr lee iust an cel,. in declamed enmitylv. All AlMorls, itowe-vel, pofess the AMolhaimmiteedan relig'ioil,. t l((d itrlu t lie fourteleltll ceni (iliy, and tiIlie stac(.litess of the peso)n of llt Sllt-a is tlIereftcoire a ti(eet (if faitli. This facte w(mild prlevent ain y itarked success lv a daIt() ilt atl tmltiont lg to seetre s1e11e)1eIi plowe\. SpaIiin endeavored to supplat thlie Stultan witlI ((lie ()f his most eiiier'prisiln' chtie fs and(1 si'nallv failetd. Peontage m a species (of serfd(atIs followiiv 01 (4a0 submits itself without protest to his aibitrary will. The Mo po)(litlical fabrlic bearls reseiblatnce( to the state of tfeuldal times-tlie Sultllait exercisinigo suptreime power by divitte right, and his datls(, like it'e feudal toiords, suppoiI ig ()I 01pposinl him at iwill, and b)y 'force,of al'is.c;isisonallly, but li). 1( th lie extent )Iof dellhronellielit, as tlti!t wotld b1 e 1)too great I sacrille'e 'for a Mo(lta.Ittammedan peiople to seek 1to c(01onsum1a11e. lThe I'llitled ISIates 11111sl aceel)t lthese pe(ple as they arec, and eideavo lto iimeliorate theiir condit ion by delees, and Ilie best meanls It. itstirec success apipea'is to be hlirtoigh' i tlie etltivation of frieidlv senlimiienits aiid Ithe itlioiduction of trade atnIld ctmtItterce upon a.ppltoved busiiess iietltodls. T( uilideiltake forcible radical alction for iltle ielioralion of co(ditlions or 1o so iTllerferle witIi their doitestic relatl ions as to arotuse I lheir suspicionts and dist rust would be attended wilit utinforttinai cotiiisequences. The experieioe of lipe iasvt yeat' Ihas concltisively demionst rated t hat theli laiirs demanlded too) o'aize, sutip)plv, coimmand, and exchange } an armvy actively elg'ag'ed iln hlosltilitis are smalla iin cotlltparison to those whlich are requtiied to supervise lite business, social anld political interests, a iid tlie individual riohis of several millions tif people without esl tblislhedl g'verinent. or aiy existiing rules of action exceplting sucth as may lbe imposed bv militiary contitrol. li tlie Phltilippines chatos, iil so Iari as a civil atddminist ratioin of public affairs is concerned, followedl tle ovellirtxvw o'f the despotism of Spain and wvas succeeded throughIout t le islands by I he irule of t1le sw)lrd, which ihas recently been directed by a few unprintcipled Tagalos, w1ho have retained power tius far, although it is gradually passing from their grasp, by deceiving the ignorailt masses with the assertion that the United States 158 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. intenlded to elslave and (lestroy t.lelil, and( witli the ct'y for illdepelldence al(lnd repl)lli(call g(ve r tleli. e expel. rie llce o(f ilie people hlas tal.ught them tihat thie ruile of Sp).,ainl wlas ml ill il ( tllarisoln with this substtitited g0ov'er11iil'g 1)o we', andi(l the gIreal t lmajit0y of thellIl —a least of tlhse \who are arl)l(le to t(eflect. or wIho hve L propelr'ty ait stlak'e-desire its (lestlruel(ctio. Maiy a;tv ' lield il Sill)jeet( io l)b tlt(he aled bodies ill their Ilidtst, andl thelilr lives a11(1 l)'oI)elty v)!would pIl tay li l)peallly of resistance shouild tle!- ittemptlllt it eitherl 1b \vordl or (at. D1)11i tIlis politicial taln11siltioln lbisiiness ittelests d111(1 individi iial propelty rights have l)een. in jeolard(iy. I(iicorpoi'ateld. coimpanies 11o()llilg.' valtlable colcessions ai'ilitedl 1 Spaiyi, iisilless lhouses w l h-ll ihlav e 11t1adle large onoil(' i11v-est lilt'lls o(10 tile? p)11t'pose of codt(') el('ucill, t' l((c ald c(omerce il t;lIese isllanls, v (ested pl'optl)( lty ilitei'(ests, re(cently acl(lui (red estates by1 tesltamel anld des, e(,111(t; ali tiosl (,em11(11b ) l er'(l i) ort,'g;ge or eiimbaro, ae (ti l iitf iul sout ces of, e(olti01llx ec(ulinig (fitest lolis whlichl re_:lui'(e able civil aldmillistra1. t i on) ad)(l 1](Ile assistallc.e ()f comu'ts of juistice \w ithl their aixiliar\ ppllialncaties to p)l'operelv adjulst, buit w\licl alC I ee tbl)l s lb.st ulp)( 11 the ltilitai'y autl ri.ti s fo(i l (I(t(,e'miliatio()n, to()gether witi all ll ct'-ers otf a. (i'ilIi Ial v 1 ' Ire inv lvi 'i alleged(l fraud(llenit tra.ilsa(0icti)ons w|lii(l (dlei11ilm spe)(,((!y rt1emied,(l 'l ct li()o, as well as ofl('llses of' t n1ore1 ser(iouis c(lliaactei. 'Fo l'1llll t(l! 1 te larit''(g proper'ty inte ll ests 11[ l i 1), (I b l:)0(t i()ttlls ald btisilless Ilolse(s )belollng for thle m)ost )pat to E111 opl)ea's ind( l are- to a (t' l-ail exte(lt e'('sl)ected by tlie ilsligent g'overinmvilm t tihr)o11) feat of ilellirinig uitivet'sal civilizeld (co)I(lemllaltionl siho(tldl it (lest oy- (1' )openly aptlp)l l)p'iate I temI. So, aso, tlhe foreigtl (ele.mel(,t of t'll popllatioll (e'lllg("e(l ill oid(l(icting trade atre verv' larl'ely (cilizels of stlrolIg)' Eu)peal)( iL gov('er'i(eits, wllose pe(rsons llae co)I)aii rat iv ely secTree w lel evetr in tlhe isladis they 1may wish to joiurney. Hencle, it lias bee)n possible to) ca.'t'Ty (o1 trlade wheneverl tle interests of tlhe llit(el States (oi' tle (necessities oft' le large Phlilippine p)opulatiotn dwl\-ellilSg w ithlixn ilIe (t0liecouity ()o our oc()c(ll)pation lias dlemanded( it. tlnf(ortl nately, too, it mliigiiht }be said, t!his colipatat ive securit,'y of perso)l at1id )r)operty i lc(ites thel( com 111er(iai l cla sses to bl)siness activx ity an.d a desire' for insulrg'eit tlrade(( incoimpa.Itil)le with war cond(itions, even tho(glh (c()oltrail'anl do(es not L()l Illate(riall' eltr; has o(ccasionel volu l ilnolis (co'rrespond(lenc'e and11( in(cessallt p)l)liclt iolls for trade permits, necessitated constaint xwatclifuilness on til( pIart of the army, and especially of Ithe tnavy, a(nd lias rei(liie(it 1 at times neleded unpleasanit conselquent ac('tion. 'Th!e(~ volu)l(e of trade, hioweveer, for the year ending August 31, lIas been uiliite llarge, and mel(rchalnts have suffered much less than is generally suil)posel. ()Of the tlhree staple articles of the islands, hlemlp, tolbacco, an(l sugar, only the latter sihows a very marked (lepreciatioln in amounts secur(ed and exporlted. Alout the same qluantity of henml lShas been taken from the shipping I)or'ts during the past as in the prece(ling y(ear, and large< exportations of tobacco have been made. There still reimains in the isla.)ids considerable quantities of both henmp and tobac(co, bult, Aguinallo a short time since issued wlat was called a decree, most injurious to his interests, forbidding his Tagalo guiards to p)ermlit, at the ol)rts where they were stationed, the entrance of atny mlerclhant vessel flying the American flag, and as all interisland commnerce is carried on unler that flag, his decree virtually terminate(l at all points where his troops are maintained, with the result that the inhabitants are deprived of rice an(l other necessary articles of food. The decree las ctaused discontent and suffering and has taken froin the insurgents much of their revenue, while it has not affected United States interests nor the inhabitants REPORZT OF MAJOR-(GENERA L OTIS. 159 Avith iii (Oil linc 's, Ca tl'v, are flow well 'iu )1mlie(I l 1d( NviII 5001) ioal) ani aiblifi (1a11 11 IXarI.t tril 011 h1 1(1 (10)1s X vliv11 they liave, plant e~l sincee [iii itQ( States pliot('(til OH as I I(Oli -'i vII t Iicim. S(1 IlifI(IIplilali is ' 1lis (Lecree thiat tille mdliii SB Ic Illaiit "IIItS (leebire 1l Ihat thiev Nvill Iesist its e I \( (11101 slioi hi\ 1 Aec'1 a n vessels -ajpear- inl their h1aibl 015 bi~t 0111 ('\wrielwe Ilmelbis 1 11 5 I iste a bat kila]oil of Ta-~alo "lu ilds S (.01 1101(1 dI0XXil Iniait 1 V I a oe 011111111iii (5 of liniai.-Inedl1 tIys i~I eeliaiits f permitte1(l, Wvoti (1, 1ake dll flie irisks of' in tei-islaliid Irwod Iot~v I S~tall5 d1i IiI t)hIIis t-est -ilt vX (I dQ IB( - II d Si01(, IIIn II vo iit Iac lt to sifye r all1 losses 111 (lidmitI 111)01 t111(11 ve1)111 (XX 11 vIie XX1)111( 50011cr. 01 later. (l1iNlelss aLI)I(-r115 I (11a111 Ii 0111t 1114,1 iII6 iiisitraiiee ((lt)(1pflies5. N)it1 a wNise 1)o1H1y (ivi (I 1('5I tat I rIIade fiaci 1111 i('5 SI11)111I (I 11) a11 i 01 t). foi l,ieseilt lie hlas acted iiiidcit it Ill oiic 111I1 1111ec olliXIv 1- 11(11e ili tue ease of. vessel aiiciloicd iii a, oiIt (If XXv(sternLiz11oH 1(1 iX w11 iie. 114(1 50ilell ibefore it Xvas kiiowvii 111111 hie (lecree Itad I ecii isslued] li i p5seize(1 tile, eiX 11(1d (01l.,n 011(1 Xvolei Ilie ilaVv XXvlit to) Pis (1loet. I 10ilcl-e tille vcs.sel anud fire(d 111)011 tue rc'eiciiiiop1 iatvX l)( vet uni- fjie (If tile n i1vy up10111 1 111, eili ct-e lhd iil'lroiiillt 111()(15 ii 1s eeii 1)IlblielX 1)100(1 iiied fr-om 111s11 r(o'e~ltf ileao~lqf 11111(1s as 011 ic I (If 111111111011 XaVIIftai XX ii ic [lie ( tistGllis Ioecijllt (t.faiPu i 1nI( x (If till X )Iumlc (If tilade) for thie veail eiidlin) _Aigust. -\v rc '~7 7s'3 (If, it) c lleviC of Ilc eojliltr -ta A111( tills XX 11111 wve held til( 1)o)1 (If 1101111 foll (IilV six alld tilit (of ( hu. lIn tile lmalticr (If tile Imiblic ieedlmie, tuie I H itedl States 11115s collected fr-oni tile islaill(IS ill 1(1 It (IlliL ele~lgtiio (It iiiic. for. till iCOelsoll that, the ext eItI- of (liii 01tlillatjim (If terloitor 1105 becil vel-v limiited 011(1 lbee'aiisc 5(om1 of its foriiter. 1mo(st pr-olitie~ S0iirces of taxatillnl ilae been i"I~ieITd. 'hlie, lar(rest yearily\ a1m(ilit Wvilicl ~Spfaini evei. receivedl w\as a litt-1(' less t itan - 751 iii If, of XXI)icie tt liftlte ilorc tlal i oe-tlfi-d Wat~s de~i vedl f 10l (118fsoiiis, m(-qie-iarlt., filimo the( Sole oIf '' cedtilas 1)ersoliales"m(1 cer.tjifcat es (It personal idemtityV, which(1 everyv illhallitafit was oblire'd to pu-l~leiiS, and1( about i,2f ff,f;)(f) fr-om lotteries:lid g-anmbliulg aidl I le opium11 atild cock-hfirltimli, (o'(1111a0(4o18. Tile $5,5o0i0,OO0 I\Ailieli Spanii recei ved fr-oul ce(i iias, I icolls5(1 gamliciyl, alitid coiti~acts wilich thle t 1111 cld Sta-tes (olilts w~ouldi ilIlod volid onl grounids of public policy, woviil1l inl 0lly evelilt, eveit if a~ll tufe isbl~ldS 11ad been pacified aild occupied, hlave beell lost 1:(1 us, as 11( tat temlpts at collection Xvould have been mladle. HioXXveveP, tile cedtlia; tax micligit. fiave vielded something, for althouigh this is tile mlost ihate(d by the liatives of all taxes forinerly illposed 111)01 theil), tliey desire thie cedllia, a-s this simple means of identity 1s5 vailiable to tiicitii il conducthing lusiniess and l when. jour-neying tiirollgii tile islands. In response to the exlpressed desire of tile inllhalitants of Manmila for thiis ticket, it was griven) Of personal applicattion at a nlomlinal suml sufficient to defi'ay the cost of issuance, and over- sixty thousand of tileml were distributed in a, short, space of tinie froml tile MNanila office of internal re-venuie. The anniual1 revenue of nearly a Inillioll of dollars received by Spain fronm convict labor, exclusive ttaxes on Chinese residents, sales of public lands, profits of thle mint, aiid local consumption tobaceco taxes could not be collected by tue United States. So, also, the internal-revenue collections on real estate, inlllstries, and stamped paper ilave been confined to Manila 160 REPORT OF MAJOR.-GENERAL OTiS. and Iloilo, II1(1 1 lit A' i( 1(licHrefrom)lI1i11s 1)eefl 1b(it a fra-ct loll o ftlie r'eceipt's w\ -lcl( i omlo control. of:1l t~i(, islaiids wo ld -ave insurledI. The iiiei'i'i reeliill1 C( CI lt S(li ell& aC ve 0t ('Itp-I )li ll of Manui a, orf m Auus i 198 wre -Tu 48 1lie g'all(l total of -all puImblie mioiey, l-e(eipis fioii t\ey I '5011C(l to'(I thle yea('1- etll(lill(g AuusI91 (9, 1 V(oii' fi 0111 tliC (1 tlC tilte 1111l(51S 8tties too(k possession odf' te puiblic otheces ill XAl 11111a (A\ uo iist, I S98 ' ieklill \ H Very si-iialel il) animioiitedI to -8, 2>9,483;5 of wh-Iichli. k77tA 692 w rc fioni cuistmois alone. La '-IIel'I retlilu,1s tromnlgliii'te51 smlees In ioght hut\ye beeii l bta I l,11 it lo)ok tlime to) a(lJu1st t~n ii ImIcIllllely fI'm cofleel onl andl bugo-exist ilifloaull leit. pinet uics i)av ( b1)l ClI1(1 uloge( I ini. pl ( l\in1ishi iiieni s I tax e 1been mleted oit wlieii o ( IlesIs ii i ye I eeli (let ct ed, awl tI lie Ia 10 or fi nipiov-e the (li\it selvice is stiPl bei lil' (lili-elit ly prJ)l'oseelte( I Spi18systlcii. of 1a 1k-t itl I \n was vetnvollelliiosl\V (-levise"(1 inl ordIer to obta till al lll l ut po k, fi (t eover tI ie ex)eli( lit ii res (ot. mliiill st C' l'oI the island1tos, but I l Iln tat evel'v"n an11 iail 1 )il'igt showed a (I efict*. Xitlh tile restoril 11 of (l, pece 1111.1 aetkye bulsiness (olillit 1011, tlle de\veloplnent of' iiit~il'iil resoullces, th11e intit 10(111(110 (it lllaeliillel''1111( p ra~et~ie I buisi iiess' einterpi'j I m'l5, 1l heolist I'l(c i 1) of' ' nln rmiIs a 11( Ii gi -1 way_~,s, alil~l the(, elicomilagtell ict of, 1hle peol.lei ill lrl'ofitalble lborhm, I aml eo11i lv tedI t1l at 1trwde a 11(1 eo lii rei e womiil b e gra vinclrease(l I ai( I tl-l "Itlimiollt of, leel me obledl ill aI shiot't Ipelio(l (if t imle wit hiotit 5imf)Sin'clli. ltv(' h iir 1n wis 51101 o wer t'(01 m iiet'ee hasl (d iteSed. Vls thle five (111(1 1ie-1half, t1itotit is (ldilig wit Ii D eeemiber' last,1 77 f'oleign ai,1d 260 ('otst V('5's (lit entereA a 11( 80 f'tegiaiid 23 eost, vessels cleatred 11011 0M11' potts, iiiak ilig) a 1(total (i. jI vessels, wit11 hI a total I 01 -M41age Of 65)i ~40I) ols; wh il tot t')i lie six tioilseIllgwith,J tn last 135 tote i-.l 111m(1 367 eoast v-essels c entedec a 11(1 1(;) l8 oreigl aitd 4(19 coaIst ve'ssels e leired, lia 'i ga toa4 1,149 a 11(1 lii villog a to11 ae(f Thle m~os~t o4,flthe tevellite teeei\el(l ha,,s lbeen eNIpetli(ld, hotll Ii fol war. anld civil jipt r~)s bv l)a few Sc(,l(-te(,( (11)1 sbil-ig offiee's, andl~ every dollat' Iiaus b (In acci( otlte(1 o' I hm i'ete'eiaind IlAttst:I "I,64,1(8) 89 lii5. Ix n Oli(- mleu1i IA of xlicoh stoom)e(1 'ltopyfo li poi'at',xl\ 1) rct1(ks a1(1 ltosptt ails Io'm I loops a'Iml I)'m a large, t'e1.it'riet',tilug pla'ilti to hi( (rleet((1 111 AIallil'.i. -All testl Its;( if aet-iot taIkeli ill coallmeCtioli with thle (ollectionl,Illil expl~el(lit it-c (e of tjhie ptlbli(' re-enitie fronm the (lute ol' tfl( (apittilU atioti O, thiis (ityv to(.1 Ilte 8)()1 last, the (11( of the fiscal. yea i' are showvi tit flie acemilpfiiliV i hg 1'0J ilt 5 I h le cofl - lectimrcn d 'iil(ibilSl fftceirs to) wvItli alt c1nt tionl is il-l vit e rIlilu prlesent cii ireni 1 1(1ony o)f t ite i s]I ttl(ls 0 015i st s (if I lie Fl'iIipi n dollatr, of, -which (31 (0,t000 wxer'e sen~t 1(m11 81paii i ill.1897, abu 10,1(0,00000 inl s(ibid ()tycils, e igh f 1t or 11111 niclie s of Mex icati (o01 -la's Iiid $I,5(()0(.)( ill ba11'K uIotes of' I ho B tIn o Es~nallml-lilipiulm. Tille fottierI stan(lat'(l ~iioey wats ()'oll consist] ig (If the Spail isli ''ouzaIs' and I te~l, $2, (1 and "'4gdlpill( ( t IllIliteol ili hmaila. AllI oif these have,, beeii dli yen mit of' ci t'eui alit111n I flie ('healpet' si Il vel' utIi'ency. The IHaiieo Espaiiol-Fihipino ts tli onl1y ban'lk whlich ha,-s the( piowerl to) Iake paper' 155110. Vw1101 p' ".1,111s11 olncessionl 110 ill re' 11111 for loans Iitadle to fliat (4ove'nt titent,'11 it, wat~s ograui ted thle priiivilege of issuiing- its iiotes amlolinltillg to flii ee, tli ies its ealpitalt stock of' ~,11, 00) no its p~aper' (olllal' is considleirol,( tle eqtii ivaeilt (if th Mlexicanl silver dollar. The Span ishi (Goveruillielt had repiresenltation inl thle managyement of lthis bank, and recently I liel baiik invitedI the United States authorities here to avail itself of this pr'ivilege by the appoint REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAI, OTIS. 161 inent of an accredited agent, which invitation has been declined, as such.(.'tion nigh]t be construed to be aln acknowledgment on the part of the 1 iiitedl States of its obligation to recognize un(ler treaty promises the va'lidity of thle Spanish concession. The War Department has paid out in Manila U1nited States gold culrrency in considerable quantities, and it is b)elieved thL t ablout.S:,000),()()(} flo'lom tllese disbursements have been hoardedl by- the inllabitants. The,money in circulation, therefore, in the I'hilil)pines is less than 8'30,(00,0)00 of silver, or the equivalent —a very smnall suI to transact the volume of business; but then a larrge share of this trade dlep)ends upon credit and the exchange of the cotuntry's products, so that comparatively little money is required to conduct it. I:oweverl, dur1in the yea.rly p)eriods of greatest exportation I1(oney to mlove thle crops becomes very scarce and rates of exchangre hihi. Exchlange fluctuations were greater in Spanish times thani at preselt, for in 1878 Sptain prohibited 1)y deleeree the importation of Mexicain d(ollars of a Iinitage later than the date of the decree except under lhigh duty payments anld gave no substitute. This iil(i-lued smlluggliang from the foreign Asiatic ports, and the snmuggler was paid a handllsolme profit for the hazard lie encountered. The entelrprise was lbrisk until mloney becanle plentiful and exchange had ag"ain 'etllrned to a nomlinal figure. When money was in great demand the plrice of the Mexican dollar was considerably above its IIfongkong value in gold and sold in MIanila for fi'ont 10() to 15 per cent more thlan its actual value. The currency of thle couintry still fluctuates d(aily acecording to the price of silver in the great money markets of the world and has no stable value. r1This, however, al)pears to affect - very little ordinary business unless purclhases of merclhand(ise and servxices m1ust be p)ai(d for in gold, when these fluctuations enter la'nrelv into the calculations of profit and loss. rThlle merlchant who buys (old( in Ma'nila must pay not only the rate of exchangye, i)ut tlle estimated cost of transp)orting the metal, and if lie wishes to convert gold inlto silver hle must pay high exchange rates and the cost of shil)pient of thle Mexican dollar. The public revenue is p)aid ill thle currency of the countiry-, ias is most exp)edient, else daily silver fluctuations rwould necessitate daily difficult calculations upon the grold valuie of thle lnoney offered at the varliouls pul)lic offices; but as it is for the most part expen(le(l here for services and on local contract )ipurclhases the (flileulties attending rates of exchange are not serious. 'The officers and enlisted ien of the Armly who are paid in goldl have been the principal suifferers, as they are obliged to exchange their gold for silver to mneet their local payments. The two establishled banks of tle islands other thatn the Banco Espanol-Filipino, above lmentione(l, are branches of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation an(l the Chartered Bank of India, Australia, and Chinla. These have been niade d(epositories of the public civil funds and generalIly make the money exchanges for the Army. For a long time they allowed but two dollars silver for one in gold, but recently have arranged folr receiving gold deposits fronm disbursing officers on account and to make payments thereon in gold. This entire question of the currency requires the mature deliberation of our most eminent monetary autlhorities. Of the islands of the Philippines which contain large populations and which furnish valuable products for shipment to foreign marts, which engage largely in trade and in which business interests of imp)ortance lhave l)een established, the United States have not as yet taken possession of Sainar, Leyte, and Mindanao, and none of Panay, 162 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. with the exception of its chief city and surroundings. The southern and northern coasts of Luzon, where hlenI) and tobacco are produced in large quantities, still remain subject to insurgent dictation. When United States occupation of these islands and provinces will be effected depends upon the arrival of tropps in sufficient nunl)bers to justify the establishment of permanent garrisons. Little difficulty attends the act of taking possession of and tenmporarily holding any section of the country. A column of 3,000 men coul(l lmarch throu(gh and successfully contend with any force which the insurgents could place in its route, but they would close in behind it and again prey upon tle inhabitants, persecuting without mercy those who had manifested any friendly feeling toward the American troops. The policy of the insurgent authorities hlas been to arm the bandits of the mountain sections and the natives who have formerly lived on the proceeds of crimle. Many of these men have deserted the ranks, and now armed, plunder their countrymen who have property or mnoey without discrimination. If communities could be protected against this source of danger and be assured( of protection from the outrages which have beeni committed by the organized insurgent force, formidable opposition to American supremacy would cease. The inhabitants have confidence in the American troops. Even the insurgent leaders take aldvantage of the humane and clharital)le policy which the United States authorities have thus far pursued. They seek to place their families and property in Manila, where a numlber of the families of tile most noted of their chiefs are now living in comfort and luxury, believing, notwithstanding their conduct aund offenses, which, under approved rules of law, would subject their families to removal and all their property to confiscation, and which rules it Inay yet be to our interests to apply, that they can pursue rebellion as long as they desire and in the end escape all punishment. So confident are they of tle nature and scope of Amnerican charity that their illgotten gains-acquired through robt)ery, in fact, but under tlhe guise of a pretended governllellt contending, they say, for lilberty against oppression-are deposited in our banks or 1are invested in our trade. And still, while tlhey manifest this absolute confidence by their individual acts, they )pullicly circulate the most malicious statements their active imaginations can invent regarding United States intention and the horrors of war which our troops indulge in. An active society in Iongkong, composed of their people and certain Europeans retained under high pay, and in which Americlan membership is believed to exist, whicli feeds and fattens upon the corruption it is able to produce, fills the islands and the world with its invented published statements of abuse. While they fill tile newspaper press with their false statements of atrocities committed by our troops, their chief, Aguinaldo, writes: We will never accept a treaty of peace dishonorable to the Filipino arms, and consequently disastrous to the future of the country, which is what our enemies desire. For this reason I advise all those who feel that they have not strength to make this sacrifice, and whose services are not indispenable to our government, to return to the capital or to the towns occupied by the enemy, reserving themselves in order to strengthen the organization of the government when independence is gained. They can then take the places of those who need rest after the fatigues of the struggle. I am not displeased that some of the Filipinos have accepted positions from Americans. On the contrary, I am glad of it, for in that manner they can better appreciate the true American character. I am still more glad because of the fact that our enemies, having had recourse to Filipinos for the discharge of the duties of high offices in the public administration, will demonstrate that they acknowledge the capacity of the people to govern themselves. REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 163 While the T'agalo newspapers publish to the portion of their people still domniated )by the insurgents stories of insurgent prowess, and sum up American losses in battle to date at an even 26,00(), 'Agluin'aldo publishes his I)roclallnations, exhorting the people to hold out until l)ecember, when the American Congress will surely grant.them indel)endlence under his leadership, against which all good Filipinos, I am certain, would Iost assure(ly protest. Onm this line one of the principal members of the llongkong junta writes: Do you think that the country should deliver itself completely to the promises made by those who call themselves representatives of that great Republic and great people when we well know by the Constitution of the country that they can not be trusted, because they are not authorized for that purpose and can not be except by the approval of Congress? If this be so, is it not true that it is better to wait for Congress first to determine the governmental regime to be established in our beloved country? On the other hand, it is certain that if that struggle is not kept up the parties will unite and we shall hereafter be treated as the negroes are. *-. And why not, then, my dear friend, suplport that other party, in order that we gain recognition of our rights, witli all the necessary guaranties? Otis and company offer but little security that the autonomy or any other system of government which they establish there will be respected. I am informed that there is not a countryman of ours who does not want peace, but they want it on a basis of guaranties in favor of the people. Even more; so just is our cause that. gaining sympathy. several European powers have made official offers to provide us with everything we require; but as we consider the war which is being sustained is not against America, because we know that 80 per cent of that great people. which on one occasion struggled for the independence which it now enjoys. is in favor of us. but only against McKinley and his party. Other offers made have not been accepted because we have complete assurance that very soon the imperialist party will come to reason and will concede us the guaranties, etc. S() deel) an impression h]ave statements of ithis character made upon a)ble Filipinos who favor United States control and are conscientiotsly labor'ing for its complete establishment, that I amn importluned b1) 11lte1 for inlformation as to the trend of Utitedl States political affairs and to state if, in my opinion, they are finally to be surrendered( to thle lercies of their insurgent countrymen. '}'The islands are floode(l with the abusive literature which has birth in Asiatic ports and is pullislledl in Spanish andl native languages. What was ostensibly a private letter prepared by a European who hlis never visited these islands, and which was written in lIongkong, is circulated publicly by the lIongkong junta. Ext racts therefrom road as follows: You and the Filipinos who aspire to peace in the form of autonomy believe the hlollow words of the Yankees. You write me: "We have no people to govern ourselves. That is the truth. We shall have them after ten years of American sovereignty.' I reply: We shall not have them in ten. twenty, or a hundred years, because the Yankees will never acknowledge the aptitude of an inferior race to govern the country, and. as you know, under the heading of inferior races they class the Spaniards themselves. Do not dream that when American sovereignty is implanted in the country the American officeholders will give up. Never! This is what will happen: During the first few years they will admit a few Filipinos, either because it is difficult for the Yankees to learn at once the administration of the country, so different from America, or in order to disarm for the moment the suspicion of the Americanist Filipinos. After those five or ten years of apprenticeship they will tear off the mask with which they now dissemble their true object of governing the country exclusively by Anglo-Saxons, as they have done with all countries which belonged. prior to Yankee domination, to the Spanish Empire. With that proud scorn which characterizes the Yankee in his political and social contact with colored people. they will close their ears to the complaints and aspirations of the sons of the country, and will laugh at those who helped to bring the country under the American yoke. 164 REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. Yes, my friend, the Americans have no intention of leaving the Philippines, and once that sovereignty is recognized and the brave Filipino army disbanded they will send to the Philippines swarms of genuine officeholders, who will treat the noble sons of the country as they do the "colored gentlemen "in the United States. To the Yankees you are only a " nigger," who in the plresent circumstances, full of difficulties for the Yankees. is the object of a more or less perfectly simulated respect. But alas for you when the day arrives when the Yankees will no longer need your help and cooperation! Do not look for the Americans to do anything to assist the national progress of the country. In America the Government takes no part in the education of the nation. All education is the work of private individuals or associations. The Yankees have absolutely no interest whatever in raising to a hiaher educational level the native masses, both because the Government will not interest itself in such an enterprise, and because such a policy would be contrary to the object of the Amnerican imperialist, which is to convert the archipelago into a field for exploitation by trusts and officeholders. If the Filipinos accept American sovereignty with a halt and blind autonomy, if they permit the United States to seize the offices of the country and make these sacrifices in the ho)e that when they have fit men to govern the country the Americans will turn the government over to the native element. reducing the American personnel to the governor-general. then the Filipinos are going to sacrifice their liberty, their honor, their race. and, in short, everything which is included within the meaning of nationality. upon the altar of illusions. For if the Americans are the sovereigns, it depends upon them to say whether the Filipinos have sufficient men for the government of the country. They never will say it. because interests of purse, of race, and. in short, all the vital interests of Anglo-Saxonism will prevent it-American interests which ]revent a real and sincere autonomy. which are the same which caused the Spanish friars to oppose the assimilation of the country and the secularization of the curacies." The disaffected (elemelt of lle l)oplllation, or tile emliissaries of Agnilna(lo's g'ovc-ilerlcllt, contend tlhat tlic tIite(l Staltes h1as griven n(otilin sub)stalitial as yet iii resil)(ons to its (ldlinlliistraltive )l)rollises. The archbishol, tlhey d(1clar(, still holds political1 sway, ll( flriars hve not been driven out nor killedl, tllie SpLilani(rds iave btc('l (coltitiu(ied in office, tlle cllief relpresentativ-e of lnite(l States allthliorily here, (w-ho has never witnessel Roinan Calt:llolic ceremoliies a (lozel lin('5s il lhis life) is an ardent Rom)i anist and draws inspirat:i()nls f'roit le( (lllropp)illngs of thle Roman Catlolic sallctuary as set uI) i tl]o I'ilil)l)ioes ]ceove these al)oniinatiols, tile- say, and we w will \illy a(cept Inited States p)rotection and StllpeCniacy3. Seretly these sam(e critics and complainallts asser t that thllese fria is and StRnliardls 'Crendl r vallll)able aid to the insurgent callse iltn many ways, 1lth(l tle m1n1111)e' of Spaniards now officering their troop)s is strong' 1),oof that, tlieiir assertions are correct. The insurgent armtl ed forces are not to be feare(d (except as they oppress their own people and delay retulrns to c()oilitionl s of )pea(e. The length of timne thley have bleel in tlie field and thleir conduct has given the practical lesson to the inllblltalllts that tley can not expect security under Tagalo rule. rhe lesson is (eel)lS ilpl)ressded and required time to produce conviction. 1lad t}el rel)ellioll been crushed immediately ulpon its open defiant de-llmollstratioins of last February'll it would soon have appeared in new fornl, for thle Imass of the I)eople were intoxicated with thle cry for independence and11 self-gro'vernment which the reflectinfg classes now retalize, is il)possible until tlrue )oliitical education is more generally (lifflsed. The political conditions which will follow armed resistanlce demiand thle most, seriou s attention of our eminent stateslnen, and Colngressional action can not be too much accelerated. Now all executive fllunl(tions of a civil character in these islands centers in a nlilitary colnnland which is called lluponl to administer the law governing the various departmnental offices of the executive branch of the United1 States Government and to set aside REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL OTIS. 165 Spanish (lecrees when such are in conflict therewith. The mutltitude of obtrusive aiid p)crp)exinig questions which arise for determination canl only be appjreci-ated by those who have confronted such a situation. 1 have 1)een assisted in all (Iuties of administration by a conlscientious, hard-working, and able staff, who, with the officers ably exeic-isimg the coinmand of troops, have giv-en me Itheir loyal support. I herewi.ith transmit their several annual reports, which furnish valuCable dIetatils onl partictular suibjects which are only alluded to in a very generalmane in the foleregingc pages. Very respectfully, your obedient servant., E. S. OTIS, ]lfojor- Geueial, (7. S. I., (Jommnm~idig Departmenet of' 1he 1Poeific, (171d 1( Liglh _Arlmy ()rpS.~, oujld _1liitury GoLerul- lit /lhe _Phidtppivtes. - I - I~ Nd V VW I4 UNIVERSTY OF MICHGAN LIBRARY - CONSERVATION UNIT - Examination and treatment records are on file. Cauet.JcS A 4 t4 At Job# 5:. ( Work by/? A.:/.:t^^2 D te /Tct Ii -C ri-' ~.SI t =J;ie '" ' .-~ +,P' r:k:n ~~ 1. ~' ~~~ - 9: -;:F a; i, ~ —s IraraB88h: -i:;--s B ~-1:IUaP *fl-: aFpapr" : 'i "EIBllf: i~" -~ ~:it- Oda: "-;""' o, iiij5 i~"i~":::ib:l-" i.~i :ii~~-i~s;-:"" ~" D ~~ laQ ---~,: 9~ p:a,;s "" :r;" -~ a — I:-~ sl;a~~~:;ai::. s; Sttr:r II; ~ r) it Y';-u;~, 1 ~; ~-:C:" -:$ st;":~ ~pEpaL9lmusossllrp:~rurrgsa: " -: — rs k:.~.~_:::: :~::C