1,164,057


DS'
'.Dns 5




-l  l jltllll!illuL 'ul lui.t!~ij iiUii luiiiy iii iijii1ii ~;tiijjlllllllij liu iiI _  1
RE(,EIV}I) IN EXCIHANGE 
Weleyan UniROM.            _esieyanUn i_.  I
Ig^~r'w        ^^ 




J795
5 5 -



I








i'I




The Political Awakening
of the East
STUDIES OF POLITICAL PROGRESS IN EGYPT, INDIA,
CHINA, JAPAN, AND THE PHILIPPINES
By
GEORGE MATTHEW DUTCHER
Hedding Professor of History, Wesleyan University


THE ABINGDON PRESS


NEW YORK


CINCINNATI




Copyright, I925, by
GEORGE MATTHEW DUTCHER
All rights reserved, lncluiilng that of translation into
foreign languages. iecluding the Scandinavian


Printed in the United States of America




CONTENTS
CHAPTER                                                     PAGE
INTRODUCTION..............                                5
PREFACE...................                                7
I. EGYPT..................                                  13
II. INDIA..................                                 52
III. CHINA................................................. II2
IV. JAPAN..................' 74
V. THE PHILIPPINES..................                       238
VI. PROBLEMS OF PROGRESS IN THE EAST........... 300








INTRODUCTION


GEORGE SLOCUM BENNETT, a graduate of Wesleyan University in the class of 1864,, showed his lifelong interest in
the training of youth for the privileges and duties of citizenship by long periods of service as a member of the board of
education of his home city, and as member of the boards of
trustees of Wyoming Seminary and Wesleyan University.
It was fitting, therefore, that, when the gifts made by
himself and family to Wesleyan University were combined to form a fund whose income should be used "in defraying the expenses of providing for visiting lecturers,
preachers, and other speakers supplemental to the college
faculty," it should have been decided that the primary purpose should be to provide each year a course of lectures, by
a distinguished speaker, "for the promotion of a better understanding of national problems and of a more perfect realization of the responsibilities of citizenship," and to provide
for the publication of such lectures so that they might reach
a larger public than the audience to which they should, in
the first instance, be addressed.
In arranging for the fifth course of lectures on this
foundation, the committee made a radical departure from
their usual procedure in selecting as the lecturer a member
of the faculty of Wesleyan University, George Matthew
Dutcher, Hedding Professor of History. During the academic year I921-22 Professor Dutcher was granted leave
of absence by the trustees of the University in order that
he might make a first-hand study of political and social conditions in various eastern countries. In the course of his
travels, which extended over a period of fifteen months,
Professor Dutcher made the circuit of the globe, lecturing
at a large number of foreign schools, colleges, and universities, where he enjoyed exceptional opportunities for the
study of educational problems, and for making the acquain5




6                INTRODUCTION
tance of persons of distinction in all walks of life in many
different countries. During the period of his absence important political changes were taking place in the various
countries of the East, which were bound to have far-reaching effects. In particular, the question of the relations between the East and the West had begun to assume a greater
importance, perhaps, than at any other time in history, and
Professor Dutcher became especially interested in studying
the growth and influence of western political ideas in eastern
lands.
The committee on the Bennett Lectures were glad to make
available to a Wesleyan audience the result of these timely
investigations, undertaken by a scholar whose training and
experience admirably fitted him for his task, and they now
take pleasure in presenting the lectures in printed form.
STEPHEN HENRY OLIN,
DAVID GEORGE DOWNEY,
ALBERT WHEELER JOHNSTON,
FRANK EDGAR FARLEY,
HENRY MERRITT WRISTON.




PREFACE


THE invitation from President Shanklin to give this series
of lectures reached me in Egypt after I had spent a considerable portion of my year of sabbatical leave, I92I-22,
in visiting Japan, China, the Philippines, India, and other
parts of the East. On the voyage from India to Egypt I
had been reviewing the crowded experiences and varied observations of recent months in an endeavor to find some plan
of formulating them in writing for my own satisfaction. It
then became clear to me that, without quite realizing it, I
had been making an intensive study of a great revolutionary,
or transition, movement-perhaps the greatest in historythe penetration of modern ideas and' methods among the
peoples of the East.
So it happened that the plan for a series of studies on the
progress of modern ideas in eastern lands was already
worked out in my mind when the invitation with which the
board of trustees and faculty of Wesleyan University so
generously honored me arrived to offer a most unexpected
occasion for presenting my subject.
The scope of the series of lectures precludes the treatment
of the topic in all its amplitude. In addressing an audience
composed primarily of students of history and government
it was obvious that I should select for emphasis the factors
involved in the acceptance by eastern peoples of western
aims and methods in government rather than those of economic character or those of intellectual and ethical import.
Even so, I have endeavored to indicate with some clearness
the significant influence wielded by these other factors upon
political developments in eastern lands. Though the countries dealt with in the successive lectures are those in which
I spent most time, they represent many different types of
conditions and problems, and they exemplify practically
every important issue involved in any part of the East. As
7




8


PREFACE


the lectures were delivered on February I2-23, 1923, the
account of each country has been brought up to the date of
publication by the addition of a few paragraphs under the
heading "Recent Events."
I cannot refrain from taking this occasion to express my
sense of personal loss-a loss felt by all friends of Wesleyan-in the untimely death of Reuben Nelson Bennett,
who shared in the establishment of this lectureship in memory of his father. It was my privilege to be associated with
him in the arrangements for the original and several succeeding series of these lectures, and so I may feel that I
understand the purposes which he had in mind. My thoughts
have often turned to him as I have endeavored to prepare
these lectures in harmony with his noble ideals.
I wish to express my gratitude for various forms of assistance in the preparation of these lectures, to several of my
colleagues, but especially for the unstinted kindnesses of the
two who are members of the committee in charge of this
lectureship. I am also indebted for helpful suggestions to
several friends who have read all or part of the proofs.
These friends include natives of the countries studied and
persons familiar with them through long residence or special
study of their affairs.
It is not customary in this series of publications to include
a dedicatory page, so I must avail myself of this place for
the purpose. The journey which furnished the basis for
these lectures was an equal partnership with one who was
then, as ever, a "good sport" on the dark days as well as
the bright ones-MY WIFE, to whom I inscribe this volume,
every page of which recalls experiences which we shared
under eastern skies.
At the same time we would both acknowledge our debt of
gratitude to the many good friends scattered through all
these eastern lands from whose intimate knowledge of the
peoples among whom they live and work our own minds have
been enriched. To their hospitality and kindnesses were
due much of the comfort and pleasure of our journey. Nor
would we forget the numerous nameless toilers of many
races whose faithful performance of their humble tasks




PREFACE                       9
assured our welfare and lightened our burdens by sea and
by land.
It is my hope that these lectures may contribute in some
measure to the development in our western nations of a
more enlightened sympathy for the peoples of the eastern
lands and may help to advance the day when all the great
human brotherhood shall share the privileges now enjoyed
by the most favored.
G. M. D.
Wesleyan University,
November, I924.








WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY


GEORGE SLOCUM BENNETT FOUNDATION
LECTURES
For the Promotion of a Better Understanding of National Problems and
of a More Perfect Realization of the
Responsibilities of Citizenship.
First Series-I918-I9I9. STEPS IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY.     By Andrew  Cunningham
McLaughlin.
Second Series —9gI9-92o.  THE UNITED STATES AND
CANADA. By George M. Wrong.
Third Series-I920-I92I. THE VALIDITY OF AMERICAN
IDEALS. By Shailer Mathews.
Fourth Series-I92I-I922. THE IDEALS OF FRANCE.
By Charles Cestre.
Fifth Series —922-I923. THE POLITICAL AWAKENING
OF THE EAST. By George Matthew Dutcher.








CHAPTER I


EGYPT
EGYPT, so far as we now know, is entitled to the double
and paradoxical honor of being both the oldest and the youngest of the world's nations. Five thousand years ago, more or
less, it began with Menes; eleven months since it made -a
new beginning with King Fuad. What influences conspired to produce the venerable Menes the world has quite
forgotten these many centuries, but as for this Fuad, him I
saw and the western influences which were operating in his
eastern land I observed. Between the incorporeal Menes
and the corpulent Fuad, as Egypt has swung along through
the centuries, twice it has passed through periods when
western influences have considerably affected its course, and
now for a century and a quarter these western ideas have
been even more potently determining its progress.
It was in the year I68 B. C. that the Roman envoy Popilius Laenas drew his famous circle in the sand near Alexandria, forced the conquering Syrian king to retreat, and
asserted the political authority of Rome, the rising power of
the West, which was to dominate Egypt for well nigh eight
centuries. Then came the Mohammedan, whose sway has
now endured beyond a dozen centuries despite the era of
western crusading pressure from Godfrey and Baldwin,
from Richard the Lion-Hearted and Saint-Louis, and despite
the more recent French and English interventions inaugurated by the youthful Bonaparte in I798.
To Egypt, the first home of art and learning, came Alexander the Great and the Greeks with the flower of antiquity's art and philosophy. To Egypt, where the arts of
peace and the supremacy of law were first established, came
Caesar and his Romans to embrace it, last of Mediterranean
lands, within the all-inclusive pax Romana and to extend
over it the sway of law in its most perfect ancient characI3




14


THE AWAKENING EAST


ter. To Egypt, the world's oldest nation of traders, of
feudal lords, and of masters of linguistic refinement, came
Venetian ships bearing the crusading Frankish counts and
knights to reopen long-fettered routes for the rich trade of
the East on which Venice was to batten, and to introduce
Frankish speech and influences which have never entirely
vanished from the land of the Nile or been completely forgotten on the banks of the Seine.
To Mohammedan Egypt, in 1517, came the Turkish sultan, Selim, to reduce it to subjection to Mohammedan Constantinople as Christian Egypt had once been tributary to
Christian Constantinople, and to filch from the decrepit heir
of the Abbasides Islam's pontifical title of Caliph. There
followed for the devoted country three cruel, dreary centuries. The Turk and his Mamelukes were extortioners
and oppressors whose benighted sway can not fairly be accounted typical of Mohammedanism. At the end of the
eighteenth century relief came suddenly and from an unexpected quarter, when there appeared in Egypt Bonaparte,
the child of the French Revolution, posing as a new Alexander and a new Caesar, accompanied not merely with fleet
and army but also by an academy of scientists and men of
letters, to bring the land of the Pharaohs within the circle
of western imperialism, liberalism, and enlightenment.
While "from the summits of yonder pyramids forty centuries" looked down, the young conqueror transformed the
land as by enchantment and gave to its people for the first
time in generations the breath of new life. The lucky find
of the Rosetta stone by one of Bonaparte's officers enabled
Champollion a score of years later to begin the interpretation of the nation's long-forgotten history from its mysterious monuments. Thus a French general brought to life
and activity once more the peoples of the land in which the
world's civilization was born, and a French scholar began
the unraveling of the story of its ancient achievements and
grandeur. Civilization had started a backfire; the West
had begun to react upon the East; the progress of modern
western ideas in eastern lands was under way.
In I769, in the same year as Bonaparte, there was born




ECGYPT


is


in the native land of Alexander the Great, Mehemet Ali,
the second of the creators of modern Egypt. At the age of
thirty he arrived in Egypt as an officer in the Turkish army
sent to expel the French. After participating in the events
which led to the capitulation of the French to the English
and to the English evacuation of Egypt, he intrigued and
fought his way up until in I805 he was recognized by the
sultan as pasha of Egypt. It is no part of our problem to
deal with his exploits and schemes outside Egypt, either as
the agent or as the enemy of the sultan, which made him a
conspicuous and sometimes troublesome international figure
till his death in I849.
It is, however, significant to record Mehemet Ali's achievements inside Egypt. In 1811 he completed the destruction
of the Mamelukes begun by Bonaparte, thus extinguishing
the military organization which had dominated the country
for centuries. His resumption, or confiscation, of extensive
lands was accompanied by the first alterations in many a
century in the tenure of the fellaheen, the tillers of the soil.
He established various forms of manufacturing, built roads
and canals, encouraged commerce, introduced improvements
in agriculture, established hospitals, and, besides promoting
education within the country, sent brilliant youths to western Europe to pursue their studies, especially in medicine.
Europeans were permitted and encouraged to settle in
Egypt. His admiration for the French found expression
not merely in his political policies but also in his borrowing
of ideas and methods and in the utilization of the services
of numerous Frenchmen for the promotion of his enterprises for the improvement of the nation to which he had
given a quasi-independent status after centuries of subjection.
Valuable as was Mehemet Ali's work for Egypt, it must
be recognized that he was not laboring to promote the welfare of the Egyptian people but to create for himself and
his family an empire. He was not an Egyptian striving to
redeem and uplift his people, but an alien, thrown by chance
upon Egyptian soil, where fortune and his own talents gave
him the opportunity to seize the government and found a




THE AWAKENING EAST


dynasty with which the history of the country has ever since
been linked. To this shrewd adventurer modern ideas were
not an end in themselves, they were but means to the accomplishment of his aims and to the establishment of a power
which could maintain itself in the international competition
of the new age, whose tendencies he was keen enough to
discern.
Whatever may have been the reasons which lured ancient
conquerors to Egypt, it was not Egypt itself which had attracted the Venetians in the time of the Crusades or Bonaparte at the close of the eighteenth century. To the Venetians Egypt was merely an entrepot on a great trade route;
to the French it was a post of vantage, a half-way station,
on the route of empire as well as trade which led from
Europe to India and the East. To safeguard their trade
and empire in India the English drove Bonaparte out of
Egypt. Throughout the first three quarters of the nineteenth
century England proved strangely negligent of its interests
in the Egyptian portal to India, while France steadily extended its influence there and was customarily the best
European friend of Mehemet Ali and his descendants.
Only at critical moments did England rouse itself to active
measures, and then, by good fortune, with success. French
influence culminated in the construction of the Suez canal
by Lesseps, but English interests soon countered with Disraeli's famous coup of purchasing the Khedive Ismail's
shares in the canal company in I875.
Ismail, like his predecessors Mehemet Ali and Said, had
welcomed numerous foreigners to Egypt, not a few of whom
fattened themselves on the khedive's favor. Ismail delighted
to play before their eyes the enlightened patron of western
ways while behind the curtain he was acting the oriental
despot in outrageous exactions upon his subjects. Lord
Cromer dubbed him "the great high-priest of Sham." When
his credit was exhausted, he was compelled by certain European powers, in I876, to permit the creation of a commission
of the public debt, the caisse, to safeguard his creditors, and
later to accept European members in his ministry to regulate
his policies, especially in financial matters. This humilia



EGYPT


I7


tion he sought to evade by plotting the call of a national parliament, but such audacity was punished by his dethronement and supersession by his son Tewfik. Ismail's vanity
and craft had led him to patronize Europeans, to parody western ways, and at the last to acquaint the Egyptians with the
two great modern shibboleths of nationalism and democracy. For good or ill his tawdry rule inaugurated a new
epoch in Egyptian history.
Though Mehemet Ali had reserved the higher stations in
the army for Turks, Ismail had permitted native Egyptians
to work their way up in the service. One of these successful
officers, Arabi Pasha, became the leader of a native group
who caught at the new ideas, especially nationalism, and
succeeded in arousing those who felt the insult of rule by
European ministers and of foreign financial control. Other
factors, no doubt, entered into the case, but suffice it to
mention that in June, 1882, a considerable number of Europeans were murdered in Alexandria by a Mohammedan mob.
A month later a British fleet bombarded the forts of Alexandria, which it was believed Arabi, then minister of war,
was strengthening in spite of a warning from the admiral.
The previous day the French fleet had deliberately sailed
away, and the sultan was temporizing. England thus was
left to intervene single-handed to protect European interests
in Egypt. Since that date, with unwillingness and hesitation
and in face of the unfriendly attitude of the other powers,
it has controlled the fortunes of the country. In September,
1882, a British force captured Arabi and put his followers
to flight; so, by the action of one of the most democratic
nations, vanished the first dream of Egyptian nationalism
and democracy.
The British had awakened one morning to find themselves
in control of Egypt. They explained that, finding themselves
in Egypt, they could not possibly find their way out at once
without being guilty of deserting their post, but that they
intended to withdraw as speedily as circumstances might
permit. The British government occupied Egypt as a sort
of trustee for the despotic khedive and also for European
bondholders, and yet the British people claim their govern



I8


THE AWAKENING EAST


ment is the most democratic in the world. Strange conflicts
of interests and of ideas at London and in Cairo, uncertainty and wavering instead of clean-cut and consistent
policies, became inevitable. Unkind fate did not omit the
handicap of international jealousies. This was a problem
in real life; someone must undertake its solution. Imagine
yourself stationed at Cairo then as England's agent, and ask
yourself how many months you could have held the post.
England's first choice was Sir Evelyn Baring; he served
twenty-five years and retired as Lord Cromer. The tangles
he unraveled were many; the achievements he wrought were
notable.
With all his difficulties, Sir Evelyn Baring had certain
advantages. The khedive, Tewfik, was a loyal supporter if
not an intelligent co-worker. As he quaintly put it, "Tewfik
should be remembered as the khedive who allowed Egypt to
be reformed in spite of the Egyptians." Then, too, Baring
had the advantage of an illuminating apprenticeship in India,
where he had administered the finances of that empire and
had learned how to govern eastern peoples. From India,
moreover, he was able to draft experienced officials to aid
him in directing every important undertaking.
Toward the close of his administration the Anglo-French
convention of 90o4, at last, relieved him of his most jealous
international critic and gave him instead his first international supporter. Still all did not go well. In I892, Tewfik
died and his successor, Abbas Hilmi, who had been educated
at Vienna, added to his oriental heritage of despotic ideas
the European conceptions of divine-right monarchy and displayed a tendency to become a satellite of the infamous
sultan, Abdul Hamid. Cromer's masterful management
irked him and he never ceased to tug at the leash.
It was no easy task that awaited Cromer's successor, one
of his own pupils and lieutenants, Sir Eldon Gorst, who
had scarcely entered upon his duties when the Young Turk
revolution at Constantinople in I9o8 suddenly altered conditions in the Ottoman Empire, of which Egypt was more
than technically a part. The triumph of this aggressive
group of nationalists and constitutionalists could not be




EGYPT


I9


without its repercussion in Egypt. Many young Egyptians
of the better classes had been getting their education in
Europe, or at any rate along modern lines, and not a few
of them were ready to grasp the lesson of the Turkish revolution. The khedive, Abbas, also read some of the signs of
the times and, as the Young Turks became more nationalist
and less constitutionalist, gradually came to align himself
with them and, like them, to fall under the German influences which were rife at Constantinople, where he was a
frequent visitor.
In I9II Sir Eldon Gorst's broken health compelled him
to give place to Lord Kitchener, who combined both Indian
and Egyptian experience, but as an army man, not as a
diplomatist or a civilian like his predecessors. His justly
won prestige in Egypt served him in good stead, but forces
were at work both in Egypt and in the larger world which
would soon compel more radical action than had yet been
anticipated. Experience with the municipal, provincial, and
legislative councils devised by Lord Dufferin in I882 was
bound to lead to an increased native participation in government. This tendency was confirmed not merely by the
Turkish revolution but by the corresponding developments
elsewhere, notably in the Indian councils act of I9o9. An
even more striking case was the formation in I9Io of the
Union of South Africa, including two states which had been
at war with Great Britain within a decade.
The Turkish disasters in the Italian and Balkan wars of
I911-I9I3 created a deeply unfavorable impression throughout the Mohammedan world, which included Egypt. Finally
the behavior of Abbas was rapidly making his continued
occupation of the khediviate incompatible with British administration. In I913 Kitchener accorded Egypt an organic law comparable to the Indian councils act of I9o9;
and early in I914 he was apparently contemplating the termination of the irritating career of AbbaS. It should be
observed that Abbas knew, as his grandfather Ismail had
not known, how to play on the nationalist spirit while adhering unfalteringly to his despotic notions.
Then came the World War and with it sudden and far



20


THE AWAKENING EAST


reaching changes for Egypt. When Turkey entered the
war as the ally of Germany, Great Britain declared, on
December i8, 1914, the termination of the Turkish suzerainty over Egypt and the establishment of a British protectorate. On the following day there was announced the
dethronement of Abbas, who had been for some months in
Constantinople, and the accession in his stead of his uncle
Hussein with the ill-chosen title of sultan. These transactions were accomplished by British fiat without any effort
to give them the semblance of actions of the Egyptian nation, the chief party in interest.
Great Britain not only flagrantly disregarded Egyptian
sentiment, but also threw away the opportunity to develop
among the Egyptians a spirit of voluntary loyalty and service which would have made them feel their membership in
the British Commonwealth of Nations to which they might
naturally assume they were now a party. While Egypt was
expressly excluded from the privilege accorded, without
question, to the dominions, the colonies, and even India, of
volunteering to share the burdens of the war, various burdens of war were actually imposed upon the country, notably
by the creation of the Egyptian labor corps and of the camel
and donkey transport corps.
In other ways the World War had its effects upon Egypt.
The service of the fellaheen in the corps just mentioned
could not fail to have an educating influence, nor could the
presence in Egypt of the great British forces recruited from
all parts of the empire. This utilization of Egypt as a
great base camp and other war-time conditions, such as
those affecting the cotton market, necessarily involved the
pouring into Egypt of an unwonted amount of wealth, with
its consequent effects. More potent still was the example,
glaring in Egyptian eyes, of the more liberal policy pursued
with reference to India which culminated in the MontaguChelmsford reforms.
These measures stood out in flagrant contrast with the
halting performances with reference to Egypt since the
proclamation of the protectorate. During the war there
were repeated changes in the office of British high commis



EGYPT


21


sioner and also in the chief command of the armed forces
in Egypt, and the selections did not invariably prove wise.
It must be recorded as highly creditable to the Egyptian
people that, despite these circumstances, they remained quiet
and gave the British authorities practically no cause for
anxiety throughout the war. The death, in I917, of the
highly respected Sultan Hussein was a serious loss for which
the selection of his brother Fuad as his successor was slight
compensation.
These ineptitudes of British policy in dealing with Egypt
did not cease with the war. Two days after the armistice, November 13, I9I8, Saad Pasha Zaghlul, a former cabinet minister and the elected vice-president of the legislative council,
which had not been summoned to meet throughout the war,
called with some friends on the British high commissioner,
Sir Reginald Wingate, and speaking as the representative of
the Egyptian people demanded the abolition of the protectorate and the recognition of the complete independence
of Egypt. The British statement issued at the time of
proclamation of the protectorate afforded reasonable pretext
for such a demand, and the delay in raising the question
until after the armistice showed that the quiescence of the
Egyptian people during the war had been a deliberate policy
not to embarrass England. With the close of hostilities
would come the peace negotiations and the readjustment of
all questions of territorial status which had developed during
the war. The case of Egypt was obviously one of these
questions, and one in which the people of Egypt naturally
felt they had a vital interest, especially in view of the public
pronouncements on nationalism and democracy by the British premiers, Asquith and Lloyd George, and by the American president, Woodrow Wilson.
After receiving a noncommittal reply, the delegation later
returned with the request to be allowed to proceed to England to discuss the questions with the British ministry and
lay their case before the British people. In view of the rejection of this not unreasonable appeal and in view of other
disquieting developments, the Egyptian prime minister,
Rushdi Pasha, and his leading colleague, Adli Pasha, who




22


THE AWAKENING EAST


had both been in office throughout the war and were tried
friends of the British interests, asked permission to visit
London to discuss the situation with the ministry there.
The reply that the British ministers were too busy with
the peace conference to discuss Egyptian affairs was not
unnaturally followed by the resignation of the whole Egyptian ministry on March I, I9I9.
Up to this date the nationalist agitation had been conducted zealously, but in a perfectly lawful and orderly manner. A week later Zaghlul Pasha and three other nationalist
leaders of nearly equal eminence and influence were arrested
and promptly deported to Malta by the British general in
command. It was only after this abrupt measure that the
nationalist movement involved any disorder. Even then
the earlier demonstrations were peaceful if not orderly, but
they soon gave cover for disorderly elements to raid shops
and street cars. To repress these disturbances the helpless
police appealed to the military, who fired into the mob.
Bloodshed was a most unfortunate argument to give the
agitators, and worse trouble followed not merely in Cairo
but in many important provincial towns.
Just as the troubles were starting, General Allenby, the
commander-in-chief in Egypt and Syria, had been summoned
to Paris to give advice in connection with the peace negotiations. He had been in Paris only two days when the British
ministers, perplexed by the bad news which poured in from
Egypt, instead of burdening themselves with responsibility for the matter, decided to pack him off posthaste to
Egypt as special high commissioner with general orders "to
take all such measures as he considers necessary and expedient to restore law and order." Three days later "the
strong man" was at his post in Cairo. Allenby was a soldier
without administrative or political experience. His slight
knowledge of Egypt had been gained in the two or three
years since his appointment to the command of the Egyptian
Expeditionary Force, which had been operating most of the
time in Palestine and Syria.
General Allenby met the situation with sound common
sense and with energy. His first task was to restore the




EGYPT


23


normal functioning of government, which required the
securing of a new ministry. Interviews with leading Egyptians, singly and in groups, soon indicated a solution. On
April 7, I9I9, after consultation with the home authorities
and with the sultan, he announced the release of Zaghlul
and his companions and the grant to them and to other
Egyptians of freedom of travel. This meant that Zaghlul
would be free to go to Paris, as he did. The next day
) Rushdi Pasha and his cabinet, with only minor changes of
d personnel, were back in office. That their tenure was brief
was due to a new turn in the nationalist agitation, especially
in Cairo, which among other things took the form of a strike
of government employees.
The announcement was made in. May that a commission
headed by Lord Milner would proceed to Egypt to investigate and report constructive measures, but not till
December 7, I9I9, did Lord Milner and his colleagues reach
Cairo. Meanwhile Zaghlul at Paris had assumed the leadership of the nationalist movement. Internationally he met
only rebuffs. The formal recognition of the British protectorate by the American government, on April 22, could
not have rendered more timely aid to the British interest had
President Wilson deliberately planned to discomfit Zaghlul.
Two months later article i47 of the treaty of Versailles
gave general international recognition to the British protectorate. On the one hand Zaghlul and his agents carried
their campaigning even to Washington, while on the other
they organized an Egyptian boycott of the Milner commission.
The nationalist boycott of the commission held good
throughout the latter's three-month stay in Egypt and prevented consultations with the leaders of the movement, which
might have been helpful. Still the commission accomplished
much, even in learning at first hand the views of the Egyptians; the very circumstances of the boycott revealed much
of conditions which they needed to understand; the workings
of the British administration were for the first time thoroughly investigated; the views of the British and other foreign communities were gathered; various sections of the




24


THE AWAKENING EAST


country were visited. In spite of all this it was obvious that
without frank and open discussion with the nationalist leaders the work of the commission would fail of its chief purpose. Even Zaghlul and his friends were beginning to
realize that they were throwing away opportunities so valuable that they would sooner or later have to reckon with the
results of their failure to utilize an obvious means of presenting their case and perhaps achieving their real if not
their avowed ends.
When the Milner commission left Egypt early in March,
1920, its members had already reached the conclusion "that
no settlement could be satisfactory which was simply imposed
by Great Britain upon Egypt, but that it would be wiser to
seek a solution by means of a bilateral agreement-a treaty
-between the two countries." About a month later the
commission resumed its work in England, and finally,
through the mediation of Adli Pasha, Zaghlul and several
of his colleagues left Paris on June 7 and joined the commission in the discussion of the problems at issue. On the
basis of these conferences Lord Milner prepared a memorandum dated August i8, I920, outlining the bases for a
proposed treaty of alliance between Great Britain and
Egypt. This memorandum was published, and four of
Zaghlul's colleagues were sent to Egypt to sound out public
opinion upon the proposals.
The results were generally favorable, and at the end of
October Zaghlul and his colleagues returned to London for
further conference with the commission. On November 9,
Lord Milner brought the conferences to a close in a brief
address appealing to all "to cultivate and strengthen by
every means the spirit of friendship and mutual confidence
which our conversations here have helped to engender."
Zaghlul replied in similar terms, but with great insistence,
that he was still unable to give the Egyptian people definite
assurance "that Great Britain had finally repudiated the
protectorate."
The commission shortly afterward completed its report,
which was published in a white book in February, I921.
In Egypt a change of ministry brought to the premiership




EGYPT


25


Adli Pasha, who had been so largely responsible for the
successful conferences between the commission and the
Zaghlul delegation. Adli, with a new delegation, returned
to London and in July began negotiations for the proposed
treaty which after four months ended in a rupture. The
negotiations had been conducted in absolute secrecy and
were presumably making favorable progress. The reason
for the rupture was the British insistence upon free military
use of the Egyptian soil to guarantee British imperial communications. Adli naturally denounced the proposals as
"an occupation pure and simple which destroys all idea of
independence, even to the extent of suppressing internal
sovereignty."
Shortly after the breakdown of negotiations Lord Allenby urged upon Lord Curzon a definite program for the
withdrawal of the protectorate. Meanwhile disorders broke
out anew and it was deemed necessary once more to deport
Zaghlul Pasha, this time to the Seychelles Islands. Apparently the dilatory maneuvers of Lord Curzon drew from
Lord Allenby an ultimatum of resignation, which led to a
request from Lord Curzon that the high commissioner return at once to confer with the government in London.
Throughout this period Lord Allenby had not only been
acting in closest harmony with his British colleagues in
Egypt but he had also been in close touch with Adli Pasha,
Sarwat Pasha, and other representative Egyptians, and had
undoubtedly arrived at an understanding.
The success of Lord Allenby's visit to London was revealed on February 28, 1922, when the prime minister,
Lloyd George, announced in the house of commons the government proposals with regard to Egypt. These proposals
included the termination of the protectorate, the recognition of Egypt as a sovereign state, the withdrawal of
martial law on the passage of an act of indemnity by the
Egyptian government, and, pending negotiations on other
important issues, the maintenance of the existing status.
Thus, instead of securing a settlement through a bilateral
agreement between the two countries as recommended by
the Milner commission, the British cabinet, after squander



26


THE AWAKENING EAST


ing fifteen precious months, was compelled to adopt the obviously less advantageous policy of a unilateral pronouncement of concessions on the main issues before negotiating
the adjustment of conditions.
On March i6, as I landed in Suez, flags were flying and
cannon salutes were heard, which I soon learned were in
honor of the independence of Egypt, officially proclaimed
on that day. During the ensuing days in Cairo it was my
fortune to witness further demonstrations connected with
the event and to see Lord Allenby and Fuad, who inaugurated the new order by exchanging the obnoxious title of
sultan' for the unobjectionable one of king. The demonstrations, however, were not marked by enthusiastic approbation; indeed, the most enthusiastic exhibitions were of
an unfriendly sort. The students not merely went on strike
to express their disapproval but paraded the streets shouting
their declaration of principles: "Down with false independence; down with the new king; down with Sarwat Pasha;
we want Saad Pasha [Zaghlul]." That their sentiments
might be clear even to the visitor in the city who was ignorant of Arabic, a leader would give a phrase in English
or French, which would then be vociferated by the whole
group. The great university mosque of El Azhar was
closed, not without bloodshed, in order to avert further disorder.
Nearly a year has passed since those apparently momentous days, and yet, strangely, little news has leaked out
of Egypt. Martial law continues, murderous attacks on
British officials and soldiers persist, plans for the preparation of a constitution are announced, but yet no constitution
has appeared.2  Meanwhile the successes of the Angora
Turks and the dubious policies of the British government
in dealing with them have had a most disturbing influence
throughout the Near East and have naturally affected Mohammedan opinion in Egypt.
'Since 1517, the Ottoman ruler had been the caliph or ecclesiastical
head of Islam and the title of sultan had come to be reserved for
him alone.
'See below, page 44.




EGYPT


27


The persistence of British control in Egypt through four
decades is a phenomenon which requires some explanation.
It has been, on the whole, beneficial not merely to the British themselves, but also to both the Egyptian people and to
all other nations with any interest in the country. British
interests have been clearly superior to those of any other outside nation. The passage of the control of the country to
any other power would have produced a situation less acceptable internationally. The interests of no nation in Egypt
have suffered from any injustice that would have given basis
for complaint that British occupation was inimical to international welfare. It might be said that British rule continued in Egypt in default of anything better to substitute for
it, were it not that such a statement gives a false implication
that British rule was devoid of merit.
Thus far I have undertaken to outline the history of the
three greatest developments of the past century affecting
Egypt: the establishment and rule of the semi-independent
dynasty of Mehemet Ali, which was of Mohammedan but
European origin; the British occupation and administration;
and the rise and growth of the nationalist movement, which
drew its inspiration mainly from western sources and was,
therefore, to a degree difficult to determine, bound up with
ideas of representative government and democracy. Egypt
has reached the point where it is to enter upon the experiment of self-government following western models. It
becomes necessary, therefore, to inquire whether the conditions of the country and its people and the developments
toward modern ideas in other matters are such as to afford
prospect of success.
Egypt is the gift of the Nile; the almost unique source of
the nation's wealth is agriculture. The country is nearly
devoid of mineral products. Handicrafts have never prospered greatly in the land, and even to-day the development
of manufactures is quite negligible. Other peoples have always traded in and through Egypt but the Egyptian himself
has never been a trader or even a shopkeeper. The real
Egyptians, the fellaheen, are tillers of the soil as their forebears have been since the dawn of history.




28


THE AWAKENING EAST


The estimated area of the kingdom is 350,000 square miles,
but of this only I2,023 square miles (Massachusetts and
Connecticut together have I2,859 square miles) are cultivable and constitute the inhabited area. Of this small amount
only two thirds are actually under cultivation. This area is
situated in the delta and, to a somewhat! less extent, in a
narrow ribbon along either bank of the river above Cairo.
As some indication of the improvement of conditions it
should be noted that the estimate made by the French under
Bonaparte was 6,92I square miles of tillable land of which
5,500 were tilled.
The productivity of the land is absolutely dependent upon'
the inundations of the Nile or upon irrigation with Nile
water, for which purpose works have been constructed and
maintained ever since the beginning of history. During the
Turkish period these works fell into neglect, but Mehemet
Ali began their restoration and extension so as to provide
perennial irrigation. His successors did not continue his
wise policy, so that it was left for the British to carry his
work to a conclusion and to add to it the colossal undertaking at Assuan. This great dam has provided safeguards
against the two opposite disasters of inadequate or excessive rise of the river; it has largely increased the cultivable area, extended perennial irrigation, and enlarged
the possibilities for raising two and even three crops annually. This achievement alone, were there not others,
would be a sufficient monument to the British occupation.
One of the important results of perennial irrigation has been
the successful development of cotton-growing, to which
more than I,5oo,ooo acres are regularly devoted, thus furnishing the country's most profitable marketable product.
This vast benefit conferred by British effort has wrought
remarkable improvement in the economic status of the fellaheen, but far greater benefits have been bestowed upon them
at the hands of the British reformers. For the first time
since Joseph acquired their lands from them for Pharaoh
(Genesis 47. 20), they have been assured personal and property rights. 'Changes which date back to the reign of Mehemet Ali have been breaking down what may be roughly




EGYPT


described as the mixture of feudal holding and state ownership of land established by Joseph, so that many fellaheen
now own their land.
At present there are over I,700,ooo native owners with
holdings of less than five acres each, constituting over 90
per cent of the landholders and controlling over 27 per cent
of the cultivated area. On the other hand the evils of
large estates in the hands of wealthy owners have not disappeared, for over 40 per cent of the tillable land is in holdings of over fifty acres each in the hands of I3,500 persons,
less than one per cent of the total number of owners. Under
the so-called five-feddan, that is five-acre, act of Lord
Kitchener, only the portion of a holding in excess of five
acres can be levied on to satisfy debts. This measure is an
absolute safeguard against the exploitation of the fellaheen
by money lenders and others.
Further safeguards were thrown about the fellaheen by
the establishment in I902 of the agricultural bank, which
loans to them at moderate rates. As an encouragement to
the development of thrift among them, postal savings banks
were established in I9oo, which have proved successful, but
the rural savings-bank service inaugurated in I9I2 has not
yet shown such satisfactory results.
With the absolute reliance upon irrigation, the assurance
of a fair supply of water to each landowner, however humble,
is vital. Prior to British occupation the abuses in favor of
the rich and of those who could use official or financial
pressure were notorious; now the small holder gets his share
of water equally with the richest. In similar manner the
British have safeguarded the fellaheen by providing for the
weighing of cotton and the sale of seed by the government.
The ancient quasi-feudal practice of calling out forced labor
to clean the irrigation canals, to safeguard the Nile embankments in time of floods, and to toil on other public works, a
practice to which the French term corvee has been applied,
not only operated to the detriment of the normal agricultural activities of the fellaheen but was also enforced with
rank injustice and favoritism. Under the British occupation such forced labor has been replaced with paid labor.




30


THE AWAKENING EAST


Similar to the corve'e was conscription for military service, enforced by press-gangs with all manner of corruption
and abuse. The army is still recruited by conscription, but
under British supervision it is carried out with absolute
equity, and the fixed term of service, the regular pay, and
various other improved conditions in the army have removed
the horror fostered by the ancient practices. The use of
torture and of flogging, the courbash, was the regular procedure for enforcing the collection of taxes and for the administration of justice. It was due to Lord Dufferin that
these methods were officially abolished in I883 and soon
eliminated in actual practice. Equitable assessment and
honest collection of taxes brought further relief to the oppressed fellaheen.
Lord Cromer summed up these reforms as the three C's,
that is the abolition of corvee, courbash, and corruption.
Their significance cannot be overrated and, while not parallel
in detail, the relief secured may be compared in general to
that obtained by the French peasantry through the Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods.  For these benefits the
fellaheen are certainly indebted to the British. It may be
argued that the Egyptians themselves would have worked
out the reforms, but it would be difficult to find any confirmation for such an assumption.
Modern ideas have entered Egypt through the British
administration and achieved these far-reaching changes which
have swept away abuses hoary with antiquity, and have for
the first time given the fellaheen rights and decent treatment
as human beings. Though the fellaheen may still be fabulously ignorant, modern ideas have tremendously affected
them, and quite in spite of themselves they must henceforth
live and move upon the basis of those ideas. The British
have taught by practice the value of a rule of law instead of
caprice.
lThe fellaheen3 are estimated to form nine tenths of the
population of Egypt, which was shown by the census of
'This word, the plural of fellah, strictly means plowmen, that is,
peasants; but it is freely used, as here, to designate the whole group
of the indigenous population, that is, likewise, all the working classes.




EGYPT


31


19I7 to be 12,750,918, an average of i,o6I per square mile of
cultivable area. These people are not of negro race but
are of the same stock which has formed the basic element
of the country's population throughout historic times. The
Arab conquest in the seventh century and the Turkish in
the sixteenth brought in considerable numbers from those
two stocks and from the other peoples of the empires which
they represented.  Since very ancient times groups of
Syrians and Greeks have been resident in the country as
traders, and since the Middle Ages, if not since Roman
times, Italians have been similarly represented. More recently French and English communities have developed.
Though forming a small minority of the population, these
non-Egyptian racial elements are of dominant importance,
for they constitute not merely the ruling or political class
but also the propertied and cultured class. Until the reign
of Mehemet Ali these non-Egyptian elements had a monopoly of power, wealth, and culture to the absolute exclusion
of the real Egyptians, the fellaheen; and in spite of the more
beneficent influence of British control, it still remains virtually true that the non-Egyptian elements continue to enjoy
almost exclusive authority in all matters political, economic,
intellectual, and religious.
Only these classes in Egypt have been able to afford the
privileges of higher education, whether Mohammedan or
European. This fact has confirmed their control of the intellectual and religious life of the nation. The native press
is mainly in their hands, and it voices their interests rather
than those of the fellaheen. The present ruling dynasty,
as has been seen, is Turkish,4 not Egyptian. The ministers,
even throughout the past forty years, have been drawn
almost without exception from the Turkish and other nonEgyptian peoples of the country. The major proportion
of nationalist leaders belong to the same classes.  Selfgovernment for Egypt cannot mean, for the present or for
a long time to come, anything other than the rule of this
non-Egyptian minority element which for centuries has had
'Strictly, Albanian.




THE AWAKENING EAST


nothing in common with the fellaheen except the utilization
of their toil. Self-government for Egypt will not mean
democracy, or rule by a majority of the whole people; it
will mean the right of this long-privileged minority to rule
all the people, with what aim and result may be surmised.
Only the continuance of some genuine guidance of affairs
by the British can prevent such an outcome.
The commercial and financial affairs of the country,
however, are not in the hands of the fellaheen, or to any
considerable degree in those of the non-Egyptian Mohammedan elements just discussed; they are controlled by foreign
communities. Of these the most numerous are, no doubt,
the Syrians, Armenians, Jews, and Greeks, who form the
major part of the shopkeeping class, but some of whom are
engaged in larger enterprises. What may be called the big
business of the country, both commercial and financial, is
to a large extent in the control of western Europeans, Italians, French, and British, who live and do business in Egypt
under a special regime of law known as the capitulations.
The Egyptian people, whether of Egyptian or non-Egyptian stock, never have controlled and do not now control
more than a small fraction of the nation's business affairs,
and there is no indication of either their willingness or their
ability to shoulder the management of these matters. It is
a serious question how a people incompetent and unready to
handle its private business affairs can be expected to manage successfully its public business. The foreign control
of the nation's business is in itself a most serious obstacle
to national self-government, unless provision is made to denationalize these foreign elements, to merge them into the
national citizenship of Egypt, and to assure them sufficient
voice in affairs to afford some guarantee of national financial stability. Yet any such proposition would in its very
nature be undemocratic, as it would give the all-important
power of the purse to a minute fraction of the population.
The capitulations, under whose protection these foreigners
dwell and trade in Egypt, are concessions granted by the government through treaty or otherwise, assuring the nationals
concerned the protection of their own law, and freedom from




EGYPT


33


the -operation of the local law and from such burdens as the
payment of most forms of taxes.5 At present Great Britain
and thirteen other nations, enjoy such privileges for their
subjects.
Hitherto the beneficiary nations have resisted strenuously
every effort to abolish the capitulations or to modify their
application except in very minor matters. Until the capitulations are abrogated or radically modified in scope and
application there can be no self-government in Egypt in a
full and proper sense, for they constitute serious limitations
on the national sovereignty. Great Britain has repeatedly
undertaken with little, if any, success to secure such action.
With the proclamation of independence Great Britain is
pledged to endeavor to obtain the desired concessions from
the powers concerned. In this there is, however, a double
difficulty. If the powers are to abandon the capitulations,
they must have adequate guarantees for the full protection
of the law in both the administration of justice and in the
freedom of trade which can at present be guaranteed only
by Great Britain. Such an arrangement would amount to
the abandonment by the thirteen powers of favored treatment to the good offices of the one power whose position in
Egypt is already that of the most favored. A concession
of such sort would hardly be made without the exaction of
some quid pro quo at British expense. Nevertheless, England's position with reference both to Egypt and to the
powers concerned might conceivably be adjusted to the satisf action of all on a basis similar to that of the United States
to Cuba as provided in the Platt Amendment. It would be
less invidious to other powers to have England's status in
Egypt defined by a constitutional measure rather than by
means of an Anglo-Egyptian diplomatic alliance.
As long as the capitulations exist there can be no thoroughgoing judicial and legal reform in the country; equitable adjustment of the burden of taxation will remain impossible,
'The origin of the capitulations may be traced to medieval trading
arrangements. The more important existing concessions were
granted by the Ottoman sultan wfth reference to Egypt as a province
of the Turkish Empire.




34


THE AWAKENING EAST


and numerous other difficulties will persist. Taxation necessary for the establishment and maintenance of a suitable
educational system which would be the most efficient agency
in the spread of western ideas in the country is blocked by
the capitulations; as are also such apparently simple reforms
as the suppression of gambling and disorderly houses and of
quack practitioners of medicine, dentistry, and pharmacy.
The capitulations include within their scope guaranties
to the nationals of the several countries oif freedom in the
practice of their religion and permission for the conduct of
missionary activities. Christianity in Egypt seems as incongruous as Protestantism in Rome. Egypt is a Mohammedan country and has been since the tenth year after
the Prophet's death. Over 91 per cent of the people are
Mohammedan. The famous university of El Azhar at Cairo,
which dates from 972, is the intellectual and theological
center of Islam in the country and stands preeminent in the
Mohammedan world, with its 400 professors and Io,ooo
students6 drawn from every Moslem nation. Cairo is not
only the intellectual center of Mohammedanism but also the
literary headquarters of Arabic, the universal language of
the Islamic world. Extraordinary significance, therefore,
attaches to the Egyptian press in its output of both books
and periodicals.
The steady extension of Christian political domination
over Moslem lands during the past century, which has been
accentuated in recent years by the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire by Italy and the Balkan states and more recently by the abortive treaty of Sevres, has left only scattered patches of the former widespread empire of Islam free
from Christian control. These alarming changes naturally
aroused the religious zeal of pious Moslems and gave life
to a Pan-Islamic movement.
In Egypt, therefore, the development of an unfriendly
attitude toward British control was inevitable even though
the British had taken every precaution to avoid unnecessary
'These are the figures usually given, but they are probably considerably too large. El Azhar, moreover, is an ecclesiastical institution rather than a university in the western sense.




EGYPT


35


offense and had given no overt cause for complaint. The
Mohammedan leaders have, indeed, refrained from activities
which would bring matters of faith into political controversy. None the less the nationalist movement has enjoyed
consistent and generally hearty support from Mohammedan
sources, especially from the professors and students of El
Azhar. In fact, the students of El Azhar have been in the
forefront of most nationalist demonstrations and strikes.
This Mohammedan-nationalist alliance is but one of the
many paradoxes in the Egyptian situation.
Without war or revolution certain reforms which seem
desirable in western eyes can be effected only as the result
of changes developing within Mohammedanism itself. It
rests with the leaders of Islam to determine whether they
will alter the aims and methods and scope of education and
so direct the modern movement among their peoples, or
whether they will adhere rigidly to the past and resist innovations with every power at their disposal. If one can
read aright what are apparently some of the signs of the
times, the tendency toward readjustment rather than resistance is the stronger. The nationalist movement is instinct with modern or western ideas which have hitherto
remained alien to the Moslem world. The Mohammedannationalist alliance, in the case of nationalist success, cannot
fail to result in profound effects of the various liberalizing
ideas identified with nationalism upon the religious institutions and life of Mohammedanism.
Of the eight per cent of the people of Egypt who are
Christians, about three quarters are Copts. These people
have adhered to the Christian faith throughout all the vicissitudes of Mohammedan rule in Egypt for over twelve centuries. Trying experiences have benefited neither these
people nor their faith. Adherents of the western churches
have recently been exercising a helpful influence among
them, and evidences of a progressive spirit are to be found.
The percentage of literacy among the Copts is three times
greater than among their Mohammedan neighbors, for out
of every thousand Mohammedans only fifty-three are able
to read and write, whereas one hundred and seventy-one




36


THE AWAKENING EAST


out of every thousand Copts possess that ability. As might
have been anticipated on general principles, the Copts, the
oldest group in the population, have been sympathetic to
the nationalist movement. On the other hand, the leadership of the movement by the non-Egyptian elements and
the Mohammedan support would suggest an opposite attitude as natural. Absence of such opposition is perhaps
due, in part, to fear of incurring the disfavor of those
powerful elements.
There are nearly fifty thousand Protestants in Egypt and
more than double that number of Roman Catholics. Moslem lands have been proverbially barren fields for Christian missions. Until recent years the efforts which have
been put forth have been among the Copts rather than
among the Mohammedan sections of the community. Aggressive missionary enterprise by the British has for obvious reasons been inexpedient. The American Protestant
missions are chiefly conducted by the United Presbyterians,
who have founded a college at Assiut. More recently an
American University has been started in Cairo. Both institutions are already doing promising educational work. It is
probable, however, that the largest influence of these enterprises will not be in effecting conversions to Christianity but
in their helpful reactions upon Mohammedanism.
The most serious charge which has been brought against
the British control in Egypt has been that, in the face of its
pronounced policy of preparing the people for self-government, it has made but slight advances in the extension of
educational facilities. For elementary education there have
long existed in Egypt rather inefficient schools called
maktabs in which some vernacular instruction in reading,
writing, and arithmetic is given along with religious teaching. Since I897 efforts have been made for governmental inspection and supervision of these schools, and small grants
have been made to those which meet certain very moderate
standards. In I9I3 the responsibility in these matters was
transferred to the provincial councils. The attendance at
these government-aided elementary schools is not much over
two hundred thousand.




EGYPT


37


In the matter of higher education the situation is somewhat better. The beginnings of instruction of modern type
as contrasted with the time-honored theological and canonistic learning of El Azhar were made under Mehemet Ali
for the purpose of training civil servants. Owing to the
financial difficulties the British did not at first find it possible to encourage considerable undertakings, but since I897
the number of schools of the higher grades under government control has increased from I4 to 45, the number of
male pupils from 1,447 to 8,23I, and the number of female
pupils from 20 to 97I.7 A scheme has been elaborated for
a complete system of government elementary schools with a
capital cost of approximately $60,000,000 and an annual
maintenance charge of about $Io,ooo,ooo, and also for a
state university at Cairo, but as yet little progress has been
made, and under favorable circumstances a generation would
be necessary to carry the plan into execution. A fundamental difficulty will be the provision of a proper corps of
trained teachers, which will require the establishment of a
system of training schools. The problem of developing
taxation to supply the needed funds is a matter of serious
concern.
Egyptians of the better classes are able readily to acquire
higher education in European institutions, as has been the
practice since the time of Mehemet Ali. The most remarkable developments are the growth in the demand for education and the change in attitude with regard to the education
of women. In the latter case the ancient hostile prejudice has been giving place to a recognition of its value. With
this change has come the establishment of schools for girls
and a rapid growth in attendance upon them. The result
is shown clearly in the statistics of literacy. In I9I7 there
were I20 literate males per thousand as compared with 85 in
I907; the number of literate females increased from 3 per
thousand in I907 to i8 per thousand in I9I7. With the
extension of education there is disappearing the habit of
7Largely due to the fifteen years' work of the late Mr. Sidney
Wells, who was appointed director general of technical, industrial,
and commercial education in Igo7.




38


THE AWAKENING EAST


regarding the acquisition of a certain amount of higher education as merely a qualification for a post in public employ.
This change cannot fail to improve the tone of both education and the public service.
The growth of journalism has been an important though
scarcely a laudable adjunct to the development of the nationalist movement. It is not long since the field of native journalism was regarded as the refuge of those more or less
educated persons who failed to obtain civil service appointment. The tone of this native journalism has been quite too
vehement and irresponsible, denunciation, vilification, and
scurrility being the main contents of their arsenals. The
foreign-language press in Egypt has, unfortunately, set no
high standard for the native press. The inferiority of these
papers to the English papers in India affords an astounding
contrast. Except for commercial intelligence, their level
rarely rises to that of a small-town sheet in the United
States.
As regards language, in contrast with India, Egypt offers
little difficulty, since practically the whole population, except
the Europeans, speak Arabic. French is the most important European language, and, strangely enough, has never
been displaced by English for official purposes.  This
curiously characteristic British attitude of laissez faire has
undoubtedly been a mistaken policy in this case.
A second charge frequently made against the British administration of Egypt is the failure to carry through a
complete and consistent policy of sanitation. Quarantine
is under the control of an international sanitary commission.
In Cairo and some of the other larger towns the development of suitable water and sewage systems has recently
been undertaken. Vaccination against smallpox has been
widely enforced. Measures against cholera and plague have
been carried out with a high degree of success. Some of
the most unsanitary conditions have been abolished. Great
advances have been made in medical service and in the
establishment of hospitals and insane asylums. Much yet
remains to be done, especially in the smaller towns, where
conditions continue extremely unsatisfactory. The rate of




EGYPT


39


infant mortality continues unduly high. The plague of flies
has not abated in Egypt. It would be an oversight not to
mention the marked diminution of ophthalmic troubles, in
the achievement of which the work inaugurated through the
beneficence of Sir Ernest Cassel has been of the highest
importance.
In the matter of legislation the British have also been
open to criticism for failure to establish a complete and consistent system. Two almost insuperable obstacles have been
in the way-the existence of the capitulations and the dominance of Koranic law. Still another difficulty has been the
influence of the French codes which have molded the Egyptian conceptions of western law since the days of Mehemet
Ali, an influence which has been strengthened by the practice under the capitulations. Notwithstanding all these difficulties, the British have done no small amount toward the
systematization and improvement of law in Egypt. The
English genius, indeed, does not operate to produce codes
of law but to legislate for special cases.
Whatever criticisms may be justly passed upon the British in questions of education, sanitation, and legislation,
their achievement in the development of an Egyptian judicial system cannot fail to evoke praise. Prior to 1883,
the country was for all practical purposes without any
proper method of administering justice. In that year a
system of tribunals was inaugurated, and the use of the
courbash and of torture was abolished. Lack of sufficient
competent judges and the unreadiness of the people to cooperate, especially as witnesses, made progress slow, but
the advance has been steady and sure. The courts command
unquestioned respect for their impartial administration, and
to-day the sense of security of person and property under
the reign of law is such as Egypt has not known for centuries, if ever. The existence of the consular courts and
of the mixed tribunals to deal with cases affecting foreigners stands seriously in the way of the establishment of a
complete and uniform system of justice.
The unwillingness of the natives to testify, together with
other causes, handicaps the courts in the detection and pun



4o


THE AWAKENING EAST


ishment of crime. It will obviously require some time to
educate the public conscience to a proper standard for cooperation in the enforcement of justice according to modern
ideas and methods. Nowhere is the watchful eye and the
supporting arm of British authority or guidance more essential for the welfare of Egypt than in the administration
of justice, and nowhere else would the weakening of western
influences be more seriously felt. This is one of the most
difficult tasks in the education of the East to western ways,
and there are few places where their value for the East is so
free from  doubt.  Probably there is no more accurate
measure of the progress of modern ideas in eastern lands
than that of the degree of attainment of the standard set
forth in Magna Carta: "To no one will we sell, to no one
will we deny or delay right or justice."
As in the courts of law so in the other fields of administration the establishment of the principle and practice of the
honest and efficient performance of public duty, free from
bribe or unfair influence, has been a remarkably successful
illustration of British teaching by example. The idea is
novel to the East but it is not unappreciated. The eastern
idea of office as an opportunity for personal advancement
and profit gives place with difficulty to the western conception of office as a responsibility for the performance of public
duty.
Since it was the question of finance which led to the intervention in Egypt by western powers, it may well be asked
what the achievement in that field of administration has been.
Government expenditures have increased from iE8,757,597
in I882 to ~EI5,728,785 in I9I3, and the budget estimate for
the year I922-23 amounted to ~E31,440o,ooo. In other words,
the cost of government, which had nearly doubled in thirty
years, has fully doubled again in the last decade. The debt
in I883 totaled ~96,439,860 and in I92I had been reduced to
~92,97I,740, or, allowing for the treasury surplus, to about
~80,ooo,ooo. This achievement has been wrought at the very
time when elsewhere public debts have been tremendously
increased, quite apart from the burdens imposed by the
World War. The annual charge for the debt has also been




EGYPT


4I


lowered by the reduction of the interest rates, which now
vary from three to four per cent. The Egyptian pound,
which is worth a few cents more than the pound sterling,
has maintained its relative standing with reference to the
English pound in international exchange in recent years.
These favorable results have been accomplished coincidentally with the equalization and alleviation of the burden
upon the taxpayer and the introduction of fair and just
methods of collection.
The increased prosperity of the country is clearly revealed by a few statistics. The census of 1882 showed a
population of 6,83I,I3I, and that of 1917 of I2,750,918.
The average annual increase, which had been 1.25 per cent
during the period between the censuses of 1846 and 1882,
suddenly jumped under British control to 2.76 per cent in
the next fifteen years, and ever since then has remained at
a higher rate than previous to the British occupation. In
1882 the exports were lI1,108,262 and the imports ~5,696,739. The annual average for the four years I918 to I92I
was ~E6o,ooo,ooo exports and fE64,oo,ooo  imports. A
partial answer to the possible question whether England
is bleeding Egypt is shown by the British percentage of
Egyptian trade. In 1882 Great Britain furnished 52 per
cent of the imports, in I92I only 30 per cent; in 1882 Great
Britain took 65 per cent of the exports but in I92I only
46 per cent. In 1882 less than I per cent of Egyptian trade
was with the United States; in 1921 the United States took
I8 per cent of the exports and furnished 15 per cent of
the imports.
Like every other country Egypt was profoundly affected
by the World War. Whatever else may be said of the
wisdom of British policy with reference to the country
during the war, it must be recognized that Egypt emerged
from the war without any increased burden of debt and with
but trivial losses of life. Moreover, the war conditions
brought unprecedented economic prosperity to the country,
though not without hardship on certain classes and those
the least able to bear the burden. This situation was, however, not peculiar to Egypt and may be dismissed as a gen



42


THE AWAKENING EAST


eral effect of the war and not one particularly chargeable to
the conditions or situation of the country.
Likewise the effects did not cease with the armistice, but
prices rose even higher; labor difficulties found expression
in strikes that were economic rather than political; and more
or less agitation of a bolshevic sort developed. All these
factors naturally had a direct bearing on the nationalist agitation which has already been discussed. The increased
cost of living remains as an abiding result, and the necessary adjustments thereto have not yet been worked out fully.
In this respect Egypt suffers an unusual difficulty owing
to the existence of a class of large landholders with considerable numbers of fellaheen living and working upon
their estates.
Before concluding this consideration of England's work
in Egypt it is pertinent to note the foundation upon which
it rests. Prior to the outbreak of war in I914, the British
army of occupation numbered 6,067 of all branches and
ranks; since the war the number has been steadily reduced
until, at present, it is reported as below even the prewar
standard. Though England is holding Egypt under martial law, it can hardly be described as grinding the country
under the heel of military despotism. The old Egyptian
army was disbanded immediately after Tel-el-Kebir in I882,
and a new army created under British officers, which now
numbers about I7,ooo. Military service under conscription
is required, but only about four per cent of those liable are
actually called to the colors. The creation of this new army
through training the fellaheen was proved to be a genuine
achievement by the experience of the Sudan campaigns.8
The story is familiar through Mr. Kipling's "Pharaoh and
the Sergeant" and other poems.
The development of this native army is of distinct importance as furnishing the only perfectly clear and definite
evidence bearing on the question whether the fellaheen are
ready for self-government. From almost every other point
of view the evidence seems to be cumulative on the negative
8Mehemet Ali had earlier demonstrated the capacity of the
fellaheen as soldiers.




EGYPT


43


side. In the army, however, the fellaheen have been taken
out of their oriental environment, trained in western ways,
and given the only opportunity they have ever had to show
what they can do when given a chance. The verdict, above
any doubt, is that the fellaheen have made good. Of course
the fellaheen cannot be suddenly stood on their feet and
told that they are citizens and expected to acquit themselves
like Thomas Jefferson or William E. Gladstone. They have
been the servants of the nations since the curse of Canaan,
but they are not to be dismissed as "niggers" any more than
Kipling's Gunga Din. They have, at least, the right to be
given a fair chance. This discussion of Egyptian conditions
under British control has shown that in its economic and
administrative activities the British rule has been excellent
and beneficial. It has proceeded conservatively but it has
achieved remarkable progress. Few will dispute that the
results have been far better than they would have been under
Turkish or native control. Much has been said in praise of
these aspects of British administration and but little criticism has been expressed other than of a merely captious sort.
On the other hand the British have been severely criticized for their failure to promote education, to train the
people in habits of self-government, and to develop in them
a realization of the obligations of citizenship and a sense of
responsibility in matters of public concern. Many Egyptians, however, have been associated with a few Englishmen
in the regeneration of the country and have consequently
learned the forms and something of the spirit of western
administration. Though the British have governed Egypt
since 1882, the Egyptians with whom they have had to deal
had grown up under the evil rule of Ismail. The few of them
who had obtained a modern education had received it under
French or other continental influences. Fortunately, British
rule has been so prolonged that the generation upon whom
will rest the responsibilities for establishing independent
government is one which has been trained under its enlightening and progressive influence.
Egyptians are, conceivably, prepared to give their nation
excellent administration under the direction of an enlight



44


THE AWAKENING EAST


ened and benevolent despot; but are they prepared to govern
the country through a popularly elected legislature with a
responsible ministry after the manner of England and other
nations of the West? The only answer is that they are facing that obligation with slight preparatory experience. The
modern forms can readily be copied, but will it prove so
easy to instil into them that spirit which gives them vitality
in western lands? British rule has wrought laudable changes
in Egypt, but the vital question is whether modern ideas
have changed the Egyptians. The Sphinx awaits the answer
to the riddle.
RECENT EVENTS
The prolonged delay in framing a constitution produced
a condition of nervous tension.9 English soldiers and officials were murdered, while on the other hand unduly active
nationalists were arrested. Finally a severe crisis in the
relations between Egypt and Great Britain was precipitated
when it was proposed to extend the application of the new
constitution to the Sudan. A compromise was ultimately
reached by which the question of the Sudan was postponed
for future negotiation, and the British government, on
March 30, I923, ordered the release of Zaghlul Pasha, who
had been confined at Gibraltar, whither he had been transferred from the Seychelles.
The new constitution was completed on April 19, I923,
and received the royal signature. It established a parliamentary monarchy and provided for universal suffrage,
compulsory free education for both sexes in public schools,
complete religious toleration, Mohammedanism as the official religion, and Arabic as the official language. It reserved larger powers for the king and cabinet than is customary in similar European constitutions. In accordance
with the understanding when independence was proclaimed,
the completion of the constitution was soon followed by the
termination of martial law, which had been maintained under
British authority ever since 1914, and by the consequent
release of the Zaghlulist sympathizers. The independence
'See above, page 26.




tGYPT


45


which had been formally proclaimed in March, I922, was
thus practically attained in July, I923. There still awaited
settlement, however, certain questions which had been reserved for future consideration by Mr. Lloyd George when
he announced, on February 28, I922, the British decision to
recognize the independence of Egypt. These postponed
questions related to the sovereignty and administration of
the Sudan, the public debt and other financial obligations of
an international character, the capitulations, and the guaranties and protection for British communications through the
Suez canal.
Though Zaghlul Pasha had denounced the new constitution, he and his followers took an active part in the elections
to the first parliament. When the final results were announced in January, I924, they showed an overwhelming
majority of Zaghlulists elected. It was estimated that 58
per cent of the qualified electors voted. The existing ministry at once resigned and, after prolonged negotiations, a
new cabinet, including Zaghlul Pasha as prime minister and
two ex-premiers, took office on January 28, I924. Zaghlul
notified the king that his acceptance of office did not imply
his indorsement of preceding governmental acts against
which he had protested. He further declared that he would
pursue firmly his policy of independence for Egypt, including the Sudan, though he would accept an agreement with
Great Britain on other matters not inconsistent therewith.
The opening of the first session of parliament on March I5,
I924, was marked by a cordial exchange of telegrams between the British and Egyptian prime ministers and by other
conciliatory gestures.
When parliament was prorogued without having gratified
the nationalists by a summary and satisfactory settlement
of the deferred questions, Zaghlul was greeted with bitter
denunciations. At the reassembling of parliament in May,
I924, Premier Zaghlul renewed his declaration that he did
not accept the British program of February 28, 1922, and
that he would insist on complete independence for Egypt
and full Egyptian control of the Sudan. The MacDonald
ministry replied with an announcement in the British par



46


THE AWAKENING EAST


liament that it would not abandon the Sudan. As a consequence, Zaghlul tendered his resignation, which King Fuad
declined to accept. A fortnight later an attempt on the life
of Zaghlul was made in Cairo by an irresponsible extremist.
Fortunately the premier escaped serious injury and was able
to embark for England on July 24 to negotiate with the
British government over the several questions still at issue.
All these matters are difficult and complicated, but there can
be little doubt that the chief bar to an amicable adjustment
is the problem of the Sudan.
Historically, the reconquest of the Sudan, completed in
i898, was a joint Anglo-Egyptian enterprise, and the country
has since been under a joint administration. Geographically,
Egypt requires control of the Sudan to protect the flow of
the Nile waters for irrigation. A hostile government in the
Sudan could divert the waters of the Nile to such an extent
as to ruin Egypt. Consequently, Egypt must insist on control of the Sudan or on irrefragable guaranties of the uninterrupted and undiminished enjoyment of the Nile waters.
On the other hand, England's interests in the Sudan are
linked with the control of the Red Sea route to India, the
establishment of the Cape-to-Cairo route, and the security
of its possessions in eastern and central Africa. Racially,
the Sudanese are entirely distinct from the Egyptians, and
would resent domination by Egypt alone. Their absorption
or exclusive control by the Egyptians would be as serious a
violation of the principle of nationality as would have been
a British refusal of independence to Egypt.
An agreement with France was signed in London on
December 28, I923, fixing the boundary for about a thousand miles between the Sudan and adjacent French possessions. It is reported that satisfactory progress is being
made on the construction of a great barrage on the Blue Nile
at Makwar, about I70 miles above Khartum. Construction
has also been begun on a railway from Port Sudan and
Suakin to Kassala, near the Abyssinian frontier. Both these
projects contemplate the development of cotton-growing in
the Sudan, and are regarded by the Egyptians as British
enterprises inimical to their interests. In the summer of




EGYPT


47


I924 some clashes occurred in the Sudan between Egyptian
troops stationed there and the British authorities.
The negotiations with Great Britain have been further
complicated by Egypt's declaration of its position on certain
items involved in the financial readjustment necessitated by
independence. Notice has been given that Egypt will henceforth decline to make the annual payment of $750,000 toward the maintenance of British troops in the country. For
many years a portion of the Turkish national debt has been
secured on the annual Egyptian tribute of somewhat over
$3,300,000. Egypt holds that the ratification of the treaty
of Lausanne legally establishes its independence from Turkey, and has announced that it will discontinue the payment
of the tribute from the date of ratification. This action destroys the security for the Turkish bonds, which are largely
held in France and Germany as well as in England, and
produces a serious international complication. The Zaghlul
administration has taken another significant step in the appointment of an Egyptian engineer and former minister of
public works as general manager of the state railways, a
position heretofore filled by a European. More reassuring
to the outside financial interests has been the refusal of the
government to divert any part of the accumulated reserve
fund to balance the budget for I924.
Among the measures connected with the establishment of
independence has been the appointment of diplomatic and
consular representatives, especially at Rome, Paris, London,
and Washington, and the corresponding accrediting of foreign representatives at Cairo. Independence has given added
importance to Egypt's relations to Mohammedan questions.
A dispute with King Hussein of the Hedjaz over matters
connected with the pilgrimages to Mecca arose in 1923 but
has been satisfactorily adjusted. Since the Turkish government at Angora deprived the former Ottoman sultan of
the title of caliph, Egypt has maintained a noncommittal
attitude on the question of succession to the caliphate.
Though there have been rumors that King Fuad might
assume the title, it seems unlikely that he will find it wise
to take such action.




48


THE AWAKENING EAST


The report of the government finances for the year ending March 3I, I923, showed a surplus of about $37,500,000
and that the reserve fund had been increased to $6o,ooo,ooo.
The British may well feel, at the conclusion of over forty
years of management of the Egyptian finances, that their
record of achievement is a satisfactory one. Recent statistics show that the total trade of Egypt increased from $296,ooo,ooo in I9I3 to $416,ooo,ooo in I922, and that the share
of the United States rose from $I2,ooo,ooo to $47,ooo,ooo.
The use of the Suez canal in I922 surpassed all records.
The number of ships passing through the canal was 4,345,
aggregating 20,743,245 tons.
Though Great Britain may wisely develop, as far as
possible, other routes of communication with India, there
can be no concealment of the vital significance of continued
security in its use of the Suez route. In the present international situation and under existing imperial and commercial conditions it is inconceivable that the British can afford
to make any concessions which would weaken them at this
point. Other items may be compromised or yielded but
on this one Great Britain must stand firm. Fortunately this
problem seems capable of solution with less wounding of
Egyptian susceptibilities than in the case of any of the other
questions at stake. Few would contend that Egypt alone
could be a satisfactory guardian of the canal. It is impossible to conceive of any other nation replacing Great
Britain in control of the canal with equal satisfaction to all
its users. The day may come when international control
will be established at both Suez and Panama, but that day
does not seem to be at hand. Meanwhile Suez is more vital
to Britain than Panama to the United States.
The negotiations at London were broken off by the departure of Zaghlul Pasha on October 7, I924, and by the
publication on the same day of a despatch from the British
premier, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, to the British high commissioner in Egypt. The despatch recited that, in addition
to concession on the subjects already at issue, the Egyptian
premier had explicitly demanded the withdrawal of all
British forces; of British financial and judicial advisers; of




EGYPT


49


all other control of administration, including foreign affairs; of claims to protect foreigners and minorities in
Egypt; and of the claim to share in the defence of the Suez
canal. Mr. MacDonald pointed out that Egyptian insistence on the last demand constituted a bar to further negotiations. The failure of Zaghlul Pasha to meet the British
Labor premier in a more conciliatory manner and to secure
from him the very best bargain he could is difficult to
explain. An opportunity for so favorable a settlement may
not soon recur.
A report in September, 1924, of the failure of negotiations
to fix the boundary between Egypt and the Italian colony
of Cyrenaica has called attention to certain developments
which have hitherto received little consideration. France
practically withdrew  from  Egypt in 1882, and formally
renounced its interests in favor of Great Britain in I904.
Now that the latter power is pledged to withdraw, there
arises the question of the possibility of the intervention of
some other power. The census of I907 showed 34,926
Italians resident in Egypt. It is estimated that the number
has now doubled and exceeds that of any other European
nationality. In I9II Italy established itself in Tripolitania
and Cyrenaica, so that, with its older colony of Eritrea, it
is the nearest neighbor both to west and south and may
claim to have a special interest in Egypt. In recent years
there has been a considerable propaganda in Italy in favor
of Italian domination of the Mediterranean and even of a
revival of the glories of ancient Rome. There has, moreover, been definitely anti-British animus in this propaganda.
In view of these facts it appears possible, if not probable,
that the decline of British power in Egypt may be offset by
a corresponding growth of Italian influence. The British
have for some time had occasion for annoyance from Italian
activities in Egypt and for feeling that certain matters might
have been adjusted satisfactorily but for Italian meddling.
In dealing with the delicate situations which have arisen
since the proclamation of independence, King Fuad has displayed tact and discretion which have strengthened his
position and won him general esteem. The change in status




50


THE AWAKENING EAST


of Zaghlul Pasha from   irresponsible nationalist leader to
responsible premier has naturally lessened his popularity.
The more extreme nationalists have resented the sobering
effect of office upon their leader, while the premier has
shown peculiar sensitiveness to unfriendly utterances in the
press.  Even cautious observers have expressed doubt
whether the man who successfully led the struggle for independence will prove equal to the task of administering
the government. One of the most notable developments in
recent years, especially since independence, has been the remarkable growth of the power of the vernacular press in
molding public opinion. The number and circulation of
newspapers and periodicals has greatly increased. Their
contents, it must be remembered, reach a far larger public
than the number of actual readers.
The return of Zaghlul Pasha to Egypt was, soon followed
by the defeat of the Labor party in the British elections and
the return to power of a Conservative ministry. In the face
of this situation and of unfavorable movements of opinion
in Egypt Zaghlul a second time proffered his resignation to
King Fuad, who again refused to accept it. Amid the continued excitement in Cairo Sir Lee Stack, the governorgeneral of the Sudan and sirdar, or commander-in-chief, of
the Egyptian army, was wounded by assassins on November
I9, 1924, and died two days later. This unfortunate event
is not unlikely to have a sinister effect on Anglo-Egyptian
relations.
SUGGESTIONS FOR READING
A fairly readable account of the recent history of Egypt will be
found in A History of Events in Egypt from 1798 to I9I4 (London, William Blackwood and Son, I915), by Arthur E. P. B. Weigall. The Story of the Khediviate (New York, Charles Scribner's
Sons, I9o2), by Edward Dicey, gives a more independent view and
affords first-hand information for the last quarter of the nineteenth
century.
There are three standard books dealing with the British occupation of Egypt, each of which is primarily valuable with reference
to the date of its original publication. They are Viscount Milner's
England in Egypt (London, Edward Arnold, I892; thirteenth
edition, slightly revised, I920); Earl of Cromer's Modern Egypt




EGYPT                           51
(2 vols., New York, The Macmillan Company, I908; frequently reprinted); and Sir Valentine Chirol's The Egyptian Problem (London, Macmillan and Company, I920; later reprinted). All three
books are based on prolonged and intimate acquaintance with the
country. A more popular and superficial account of journalistic
type is Egypt in Transition (New York, The Macmillan Company,
1914), by Sidney Low, which must be read, like the other books,
with reference to its date of publication and not with reference to
the present. The report of the Milner commission is printed in full
in The Nation (New York) for April 6, 13, 20, 1921.




CHAPTER II


INDIA
EGYPT is a simple problem; India is a complex one. Egypt
is a limited inhabited area with a small population generally
homogeneous in race, language, religion, and historical development. India is a vast continental area inhabited by one
fifth of mankind, diverse in race and language, variegated
in religion and historical experience.
India, like Egypt, is a land with an ancient history, with a
people recently awakened to national consciousness and to
the realization of the significance of western ideas. Like
Egypt, too, India seeks freedom from the rule of the British,
to whom it is chiefly indebted for initiation into western
ways. In common with the valley of the Nile, the valleys
of the Indus and the Ganges rank among the great source
reservoirs of the world's civilization. Furthermore, India,
as well as Egypt, had experienced centuries of alien rule
before the coming of the British.
From the monuments and other remains, scholars have
been able to unravel the history of Egypt with comparative
accuracy and definiteness for more than three millenniums
prior to the Christian era. The memorials of ancient India
are no less extensive and interesting but the historical investigator is able to glean from them few definite facts for
the establishment of even the outline of the country's early
annals. The curtain rises in the sixth century before Christ
and reveals a settled society which postulates centuries of
development. In that century occurred two epochal events:
the great religious revolution inaugurated in the Ganges
valley by Buddha and the appearance of the Persian armies
on the northwest frontier, establishing the first clearly historical contact between India and the West.
Two centuries later Alexander the Great, who had already
brought Egypt and other lands under his sway, appeared
52




INDIA


53


with his all-conquering Macedonian phalanx in the valley of
the Indus. For at least two hundred years Greek influences
continued to stream, or at least to trickle, into India; Greek
visitors to India recorded their observations; regular commercial intercourse between India and the West was established. This cultural and commercial contact between India
and the West, though perhaps never extensive, continued
unbroken until the rise of Mohammedanism at the beginning
of the seventh century of our era. Buddhism reached its
climax in India in the third century before Christ under the
empire of Asoka, the most extended and enlightened rule
ever developed in India prior to the seventeenth century.
The decline of Buddhism and the revival of Hinduism had
already progressed far when the first Mohammedan contacts with India were established at the beginning of the
eighth century. It was not until the beginning of the eleventh century that any part of India was brought under Mohammedan sway, and not till two hundred years later was
a distinctively Mohammedan Indian state established in the
land with its capital at Delhi. The founder of this state,
a Mohammedan and oriental contemporary and compeer of
Richard the Lion-Hearted, has left as his splendid memorial the highest minaret in the world, the Kutab Minar,
which still overlooks the plain of Delhi and preserves his
name. By this time Mohammedan faith and rule had been
spread across northern India from the mouths of the Indus
to the delta of the Ganges. This Mohammedan empire was
not preserved intact, for there were soon almost as many
Moslem kingdoms in India as there had been Hindu states
for centuries out of mind.
It was, therefore, a welter of petty states1 ruled by Moslem shahs and Hindu rajas that made up the India of I498.
In that memorable year there landed on the southwestern
coast of India a Portuguese expedition under the command
of Vasco da Gama, whose coming was to bring India into
far closer relations with Europe than had ever before subsisted. The extension of Mohammedan power in India had
'Several of these states were comparable in size to the larger
countries of western Europe.




54


THE AWAKENING EAST


been accompanied by a renewal of trade intercourse with
the West. It was about I293 that India was visited by
Marco Polo on his way from the court of Kublai Khan back
to Venice. His description is the first account of India by
a Christian from western Europe. In the two centuries between Marco Polo and Vasco da Gama various Europeans,
both traders and Catholic friars, had visited India and
recorded their observations and experiences. The West
was getting acquainted with India and placing a steadily increasing value on its trade. Vasco da Gama opened an allsea route, which at that date was both quicker and cheaper
than any other between western Europe and southern Asia.
The consequent monopoly of the rapidly expanding trade
with the East was enjoyed by Portugal until the close of
the sixteenth century, when the folly of Philip II, who had
added Portugal to his Spanish dominions, provoked the
Dutch and English into successful competition for that rich
prize. In general, the Dutch directed their activities to
Malaysia and the English to India. English relations with
India became the monopoly of the English East India Company chartered by Queen Elizabeth in I6oo00, which retained
its privileges in whole until I773, and in part till I858. In
the seventeenth century three centers were establishedMadras, I639; Bombay, I664; Calcutta, I689-from which
English power in India was to develop in the eighteenth
century. The English came to trade; they remained to rule.
Synchronously with the growth of European interests in
India, there had grown up a vast Mohammedan empire,
which for a time seemed likely to succeed in subduing the
whole peninsula to its sway. This empire of the Great
Mughals, founded at Delhi by Babar in I526, reached its
zenith under Akbar, I556-1605, the contemporary of Queen
Elizarbeth, and under Aurangzib, I658-I707, the contemporary of Louis XIV. Under these monarchs more of India was embraced within a single empire than at any time
prior to British rule, except under Asoka two thousand years
earlier. It was the break-up of the Mughal empire after
the death of Aurangzib, and the ensuing struggle between
Mohammedan and Hindu that opened the way for the estab



INDIA


55


lishment of a new alien rule in India. In the eighteenth
century four powers-two Asiatic, the Persians under Nadir
Shah and the Afghans under Ahmad Shah, and two European, the French led by Dupleix and the English led by
Clive-struggled for the mastery of India. By 1763 three
had failed; the English alone survived, and their territorial
possessions in India amounted to less than a thousand
square miles.
The English had merely won a clear field; it remained
to be determined whether they could establish political control over the numerous heterogeneous and conflicting states.
Beginning with Bengal in 1765, the British have added province to province and kingdom to kingdom, until, for the first
time in history, a single power holds dominion over the
whole land from Cape Comorin to the Himalayas, and all the
borderlands as well are brought under its control. The British have converted India from a geographical expression
into an empire, from a congeries of peoples into a nation.
Historians have been wont to speak of the unification of
Italy and the unification of Germany as the two greatest and
most characteristic political achievements of the nineteenth
century, but have taken no thought of the more remarkable
achievement of the unification of India.
The annexation of Bengal made the English East India
Company not merely a wealthy and powerful trading corporation but the ruler of an area and a population exceeding
those of the British Islands. The first legislative effort to
deal with this curious situation was Lord North's regulating
act of 1773. This measure provided for the exercise of jurisdiction jointly by the English government and by the
Company. The dual control, as this arrangement was called,
subsisted, with some modifications, until I858. The English government was represented in India by a governorgeneral and council; Indian interests were represented in
the English government by a special minister, the president
of the board of control. The Company was deprived of its
trade monopoly in 1813 and of all its trade privileges in I833.
It was not until after the Mutiny that the anomalous continuance of the Company as a ruling power was terminated




56


THE AWAKENING EAST


on November I, 1858, when the British Crown assumed full
control of the government of India. The president of the
board of control became secretary of state for India, and
the governor-general became viceroy. The essential element
in the change was the establishment of the complete and
direct supremacy of parliament over India, with the consequent definite location of responsibility. An informed judgment on Indian affairs, if not a representation of the interests of India, was assured to the government in London by
the substitution for the old board of control, of a council of
India to advise and assist the secretary for India. On this
council a majority had to have seen service in India, and in
practice nearly every appointee complied with that requirement.
In India the viceroy, like the governor-general previously,
was to be advised and assisted by a council of four in executive and administrative matters. Under an act of I853
this number was enlarged to twelve by the addition of other
nominated members for purposes of legislation. In provincial administration, likewise, the existing status was continued with slight modifications. The governors of Madras
and Bombay were to be appointed by the Crown and assisted
by councils; the other governors were appointed by the
viceroy and acted without councils. The government was
entirely in the hands of the British and no native was
admitted to one of the higher offices or to the councils.
Natives were employed only in the subordinate ranks of
the administration.
Hitherto there had been little consideration of British
aims with reference to India and there was no formally
avowed policy. The English position in India had been
that of an exploiter. The dividends had been territory, cash,
and mutiny. The act of I858 passed by parliament did not
alter the case. The Queen's proclamation, however, in addition to proclaiming amnesty and religious toleration, included the sentence: "And it is Our further will that, so far
as may be, Our subjects, of whatever race or creed, be
freely and impartially admitted to offices in Our service,
the duties of which they may be qualified by their education,




INDIA


57


ability, and integrity duly to discharge."  Whatever this
meant specifically, its general significance clearly indicated a
new and more sympathetic attitude toward the government
and people of India.
The Indian councils act of I86I supplemented and modified the act of 1858 and provided the system under which
Indian legislation was framed until 1892. The constitution
of the governor-general's council was modified for executive
purposes, and for legislative purposes it was to be supplemented by from six to twelve nominated members, of whom
at least half must be nonofficials and might include natives,
as actually became the practice. Legislative councils were
revived in Madras and Bombay and authorized for Bengal,
where one was established in I862; and the governor-general
might introduce them into other provinces as he did into the
Northwest Provinces in i886 and into the Punjab in
1897. The governor-general's council might legislate for
all India, and provincial councils for the provinces concerned. In both cases the executive had control of the
matters introduced and a veto on the enactments. These
bodies were really committees to frame laws, not legislative
bodies empowered to consider the general welfare and take
measures freely with reference to that end. Native members were not introduced to represent the natives but to acquaint the British with native opinion and conditions. The
secretary of state in presenting this measure to parliament
explicitly disavowed the idea of a representative legislative
body in India as absolutely impracticable.
Municipal institutions, or, perhaps better, some forms of
community organization, seem to have been a very ancient
development among the peoples of the so-called Aryan race.
Consequently, such institutions have long subsisted in India,
but their operations have naturally been of a primitive and
limited sort. In creating municipal organizations in India
the British government does not seem to have built upon
these foundations, but, rather, to have introduced schemes
of its own invention. As early as i850 an act permitted
the establishment of municipal committees or councils in
the Northwest Provinces, the Punjab, and Bombay; in I856




58


THE AWAKENING EAST


there was an act for Bengal, and in 1865 for Madras. These
measures allowed some nonofficial membership, permitted
in principle rather than in practice choice by election, and
sought to stimulate local interest and taxation with reference
to a limited number of subjects.
Lord Mayo, who became viceroy in I869, faced a difficult
financial situation which he sought to remedy in part by
transferring certain matters, with the accompanying financial burdens, to the control of local jurisdictions which
should exercise the function of levying the necessarily increased taxes involved. Only the arrangement for Madras
was enacted under his administration in 1871, but under his
successor similar acts were framed for the other provinces.
These measures emphasized the nonofficial membership,
definitely introduced the practice of election in a limited
way, and considerably extended the scope of jurisdiction
to include, among other local matters, education. The plan
was a financial expedient and. was generally the subject of
native protest because of the increased taxation. It did,
however, involve a beginning in self-government and election, and it helped to educate some of the people of India
to show  interest and activity in public concerns.  The
municipal population potentially affected by the scheme
was only one tenth of the total in the provinces concerned,
and there remained a minority of these communities in
which the councils were not introduced.
Under the second Gladstone ministry, I88o-I885, Lord
Ripon and later Lord Dufferin were appointed viceroys of
India and signalized their administrations by further measures for the development of the system of local councils.
By new acts for each of the provinces in which the system
of municipal councils had been authorized the size of the
councils was increased; the proportion of official members
was limited to one third; greater freedom of election was
extended and encouraged; the choice of the chairman by
election was permitted; the field of municipal legislation
was enlarged; but certain reservations for executive control were included as both negative and positive safeguards.
These measures, with some revision, have since continued




INDIA


59


in force, and have worked with a reasonable degree of satisfaction, in some cases excellently, but in some cases unfortunately. The number of such municipalities in 1906
was 749, involving a population in excess of i6,000,000, or
approximately seven per cent of the total for British India.
These do not include the three great commercial centers,
Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras, with their large foreign
populations, which are administered under special acts of
more liberal character.
The novel feature of Lord Ripon's reforms provided for
the creation of somewhat similar boards in rural local jurisdictions and the districts throughout British India except
Burma. This innovation called forth no little debate and,
in the nature of things, has worked rather less satisfactorily
than has the system of municipal councils. In 1913 there
were I98 district boards with 5,032 members, of whom
2,364 were elected, while the local boards numbered 536 with
a membership of 8,oo5, of whom 3,711 were elected. At
the same date the number of municipalities was 712, consisting of 9,718 members, of whom 5,005 were elected. It
will be seen, then, that there was a total of nearly 25,000
members of these various sorts of councils, of which number over II,000 were elected; by far the larger proportion
of the members were natives. These figures are significant
for the evidence they give of the extension of the practice
of self-government, thus fulfilling Lord Ripon's declaration
that his plan was "chiefly desirable as an instrument of
political and popular education."
The creation of the municipal and local councils was, however, part of a plan of administrative decentralization to relieve the paid officials from various duties and some responsibility and to lessen the financial burdens of the central and
provincial governments, especially in matters which were
of local interest but which involved increasing expenditure.
The British officials were, in many cases, more anxious to
secure information from competent natives which would
assist them in administration than to afford the natives free
debate and full responsibility in the matters concerned.
British opinion, both at home and in India, revealed serious




60


THE AWAKENING EAST


doubt of the wisdom of the measures, and even strong disapproval of them.
Indian opinion was little more friendly because of the
increased taxation and because of the restrictions upon the
independence and responsibility of the councils. By failing
to attend sessions and by unreadiness to participate in a
spirit of independence coupled with cooperation, the native
members often failed to get from the new institutions the
full benefits which were available or to convince the British
officials that the system was sufficiently worth while to
justify more hearty efforts for its success. Notwithstanding
the difficulties, the indifference, and the opposition, the
latest reports available, those for I920, show that the system is expanding; that native participation and elections are
both on the increase; and, perhaps more interesting still,
that in a considerable number of cases women may vote,
and in some cases are eligible for the council.
While Lord Ripon's reforms of I883 and I884 established
district and local rural councils with Indian members and
with elective privileges, in the United Kingdom itself it was
not until I888 that the local-government act established
elective county councils, and not until I894 that the elective
parish councils were created. It may also be noted that
while the reform acts of I832, I867, and I884 made successive extensions of the franchise, it was not till I9I8 that a
considerable portion of the male population of the United
Kingdom received the right to vote, at the same time that
the parliamentary franchise was extended to women. These
facts need to be taken into consideration in passing judgment on the British policy in India.
Returning, then, to the subject of the major councils, we
find that there was a growing demand for the revision of
the act of I86I. This was accomplished by the Indian
councils act of I892. The measure provided for the increase
of the number of nonofficial, and hence of native, members
in the legislative council of the governor-general and in the
provincial councils; the election of such members was permitted by a clumsily worded and indirect provision; and the
privileges of debating the budget and of interpellation were




INDIA                       6i
accorded. While in i86i there had been deliberate avowal
of the purpose not to create "a petty parliament," this measure involved more important steps in that direction, but the
intimation that it anticipated the introduction of the representative system was promptly denied and reasons were adduced why the idea was impractical for India.
The act of I892 was destined to remain in force only
half as long as its predecessor before demand for still more
liberal privileges made its revision necessary. It was criticized because the Mohammedans, the landowners, and the
commercial classes, did not receive adequate representation,
whereas thirty-six per cent of the nonofficial members of
the councils belonged to the legal profession, this percentage
being much larger in the elective portion of the membership.
Whatever faults there may have been, the act of I892 was
a step in advance which led logically to further steps effected by the Indian councils act of I909. Before considering that measure, it will be desirable to go back and take
into account other developments which were contributory
to this result.
In India there was the demand for participation not
merely in the legislative but also in the administrative work
of government. In the subordinate posts numerous natives
had long been employed, but there was a natural resentment
that all, or nearly all, the higher posts were reserved for
Englishmen. After fruitless minor efforts at adjustment
and after investigation and report by a special commission,
several reforms were introduced in or about 1892, that is
at about the date of the Indian councils act just discussed.
These changes included the definite division into the Indian
civil service, the provincial service, and the subordinate
service. The two latter were almost wholly reserved for
natives, and the terms of competition for appointment in the
first were modified so as to give Indian candidates a reasonable chance. In addition there are certain small special
services, such as forests, engineering, and public works, for
which practically all the appointees are necessarily British.
The situation in the three principal services in i904 was
that, of 1,370 posts paying above ~8oo, 1,263 were held by




62


THE AWAKENING EAST


Europeans, 15 by Eurasians, and 92 by natives; while of
26,90o8 posts paying under ~800, Europeans held only 5,205,
while Eurasians held 5,420, and natives I6,383. Though
these figures do not show a marked change in favor of the
natives, they do indicate that the trend was clearly in that
direction. The training of natives in the practical tasks and
responsibilities of administration must necessarily be accounted one of the important items in preparation for selfgovernment.
While some recognition of the importance of education
had been given by the British in India at earlier dates, the
system really rests upon two fundamental documents, a
minute drafted by Lord Macaulay in I835 and the despatch
of Sir Charles Wood in I854 with the accompanying orders.
These documents laid down the principle of education in
English and placed the emphasis almost exclusively upon
higher education.  Since then there has been extensive
development of secondary and collegiate schools and the
numbers who have received training in them have been ample
-indeed, in excess of the opportunities for corresponding
employment. Serious criticisms have been made against the
system at almost every point, but in two particulars which
must be noted. In the first place, few of the institutions
aside from those under mission control give attention
to supplementing literary instruction with any form of
character training. The other important objection is to the
failure to provide scientific, technical, and vocational training which would fit the beneficiaries for employment and
service in varied fields and make them participants in the
development of the nation's economic life.
In contrast to the disproportionate attention to the development of higher education has been the neglect or, at
best, unsystematic and slight consideration and support accorded to elementary education. Illiteracy in India is appalling, and as late as I907 less than two per cent of the
population was in attendance upon any form of elementary
schools, most of which were of very inferior character.
The government felt that it was inexpedient, if not impossible, to increase taxation to provide the necessary means




INDIA


63


for an adequate educational system, and did not see its way
to secure the funds by retrenchment of expenditures for
other matters. Furthermore, it must be remembered that
the three great measures regulating education in Great
Britain itself bear such recent dates as I870, I902, and I9I8.
To no small degree is the growth of unrest in India directly traceable to the faults of the educational system. The
former and actual students of the high schools and colleges
have furnished the most numerous and aggressive element
in the several forms of agitation and outbursts of discontent. The great gulf between the highly educated few and
the ignorant masses is a calamity of incalculable proportions
and significance.
While the problem of education has been handled considerably better in India than in Egypt, the success of the British
in dealing with questions of assessment and taxation in
Egypt has not been duplicated in India. The permanent
settlement of the revenue, that is, the establishment of a
permanent assessment, effected in Bengal in 1793 under the
administration of Lord Cornwallis, has won praises from
the most bitter critics of the British, but the reason is that
the permanence of the assessment has made impossible any
readjustment upward so as to increase the revenue to meet
changes in values and in needs. The settlements or assessments of the land revenue in other parts of India have been
vigorously attacked because they are for fixed periods and
do permit changes in the assessment. Such changes have
been made and rates increased from time to time. These
have led to complaints both of injustice in fixing the rates
and of overtaxation.   Successive administrations have
steadily endeavored to mitigate the causes of complaint
wherever the justice of the methods employed was questioned.
Under the rule both of the Company and later of the
Crown there have been English civil servants in India who
have displayed remarkable ability to enter into the life of
the country and to labor sympathetically for the welfare of
the people. British and Indians alike unite in honoring the
memory of men like Sir Thomas Munro and James




64


THE AWAKENING EAST


Thomason. Several governors-general and viceroys, likewise, have exhibited a keen interest in measures for the
welfare of the Indian peoples and sought to carry out reforms of benevolent character and of deep significance. The
name of Lord William Bentinck will always be honorably
remembered for the suppression of sati, or widow-burning,
and of thagi, an evil which permeated the life of the country
and has given us the word thug. That he was able successfully to brave the deep-seated prejudices of the people2
in these matters is reasonable evidence that reforms of
even more far-reaching importance might have been worked
out by others laboring with equal courage, devotion, and
sympathy. A later viceroy whose name is remembered with
similar respect was the Marquess of Ripon, whose reforms
in the matter of local councils have already been considered.
Just as in Egypt, the British in India have been accused of
neglecting the development of sanitation, and even more of
failure to take adequate measures against the chronic evil
of India, famines. These criticisms do not mean that the
British have not done a vast amount of work to remedy evils
and to provide against plague and famine, but that they have
not accomplished the desired ends. Anyone who has read
Mr. Kipling's stories William the Conqueror and The Tomb
of His Ancestors has vivid pictures in mind of the splendid
work done. Even so it is an obvious excuse for criticism that
after more than a century of British rule, there should be
possible such frightful ravages as have resulted from both
plague and famine in the past quarter century, not to mention the disgustingly unsanitary conditions which are still
tolerated even in the largest and most Europeanized cities.
No doubt ignorance and superstition, religion and caste have
been obstacles to radical measures, but one may question
whether all these would not have yielded to firm but sympathetic pressure had such measures as those of Lord William Bentinck been followed up consistently through the
three generations since he left India.
Accusations made by vehement nationalists like Lajpat
'There were, however, Indian reformers who advocated the
abolition of sati.




INDIA


65


Rai, or by somewhat more moderate writers such as Romesh
Chunder Dutt, that England has preferred revenue from
India to reform for India are certainly exaggerated. Even
though one dismisses as by-gones, which these Indians do
not, the rapacity and greed under the Company in the
eighteenth century on which Burke poured forth the vials
of his indignation, or conditions far less objectionable during the later Company days in the early nineteenth century,
there remains to be considered the situation under the government of the Crown. Great Britain has taken no governmental tribute from the people of India, but it has charged
to the Indian exchequer expenses which the Indians allege
are imperial, not Indian, and, in some cases, the British have
considered the point sufficiently well taken to cause them
to transfer certain items.
The chief accusation, however, is what the Indian
economists and agitators describe as the economic drain,
which they attribute to the suppression of native industry,
the manipulation of trade, and interest charges on railroad
bonds and other capital investments.  The charge cuts
deeper, however, for it goes beyond the mere economic
drain to allege either serious errors in policy, such as preferring railway construction to canal and irrigation works,
or deliberate sacrifice of Indian welfare to English economic
advantage, as in yielding to the protests of the Lancashire
cotton spinners against certain tariff duties. It would seem
that there is too much smoke to preclude the existence of
some fire.
The correspondence of the directors of the East India
Company with their officials and agents in India affords
plentiful evidence of their loyal devotion to dividends, and
their opposition to measures either of imperial or of reform
character which might appear in any way to endanger the
size of the annual net income. None the less the agents
of the Company did carry forward almost unremittingly a
policy of conquest and of territorial absorption within India,
which reached its climax in the extensive annexations effected by the great Marquess of Dalhousie, who was governor-general from 1848 to i856. Dalhousie was a devout,




66


THE AWAKENING EAST


indomitable Scotchman who was intensely convinced that
he was engaged in a great humanitarian undertaking-a
conviction which an impartial reader will be inclined to
share-but his too masterly policy overreached itself. The
great Mutiny of 1857 was the result. Since then Great
Britain has abandoned the policy of annexations within India
and has been content to allow the native princes to govern,
under its supervision, the considerable portions of the country which had not already been incorporated into British
India.
Since the Mutiny, British policy with reference to India
has been in the control of the secretary of state for India,
a member of the British cabinet, responsible to parliament.
His vision of India has been obtained from the point of view
of the United Kingdom and of imperial interests. Down
to the Anglo-Russian agreement in I907 British imperial
policy was dominated by fear of Russia, sedulously cultivated by returned civilians and military men from India.
As a consequence of this situation, the British in India
turned their activities from annexations within India to a
policy of annexations along the frontiers and of building
up buffer states under British influence for protection
against the Russian bear's "irresistible advance into India."
Imperialism in India had given place to imperialism in Asia.
As the old policy attained its climax under Lord Dalhousie,
so this new policy finally overreached itself in the too
masterly activities of Lord Curzon of Kedleston as viceroy
from I899 to I905. He carried out annexations on the
northwest frontier which he organized into the Northwest
Frontier Province, and he sent the Younghusband mission
to Tibet in I904 and Sir Louis Dane to Afghanistan in I905.
These measures include the latest annexations of territory
to the Indian Empire and the latest extensions of the British
sphere of influence in territories adjacent to India. The
horrid contrast of this splendid and expensive imperialism
with the misery of plague and famine in the land could not
fail to produce a reaction. It is a tribute to the development
of the Indian peoples under British rule in the intervening
half century that instead of Mutiny there was Unrest.




INDIA


67


The half century had been marked by the development of
the councils, national, provincial, and local; by great material development in the construction of railways, telegraphs, canals, and irrigation works; by famine relief and
measures against disease; by improved financial arrangements; by civil service reforms; and by the spread of education-all which have been discussed; and by many minor
measures of amelioration. What had been the reaction of
all these on the Indian mind? What, moreover, is the
character of Indian mentality?
It has been the fashion, as exemplified by Mr. Kipling,
to consider the Indian mentality and western thinking as incommensurate. The Indians, not merely the Hindus, but
also the Mohammedans, emphasize their spiritual-mindedness as contrasted with the material-mindedness of the occidentals. The Hindu has been exalted for his ability for
abstruse and lofty thought. While there is perhaps some
truth in all these notions, yet much is certainly to be found
in the intellectual life of India to-day which is comparable with the mysticism and scholastic philosophy of the
European Middle Ages, rather than with the present-day
traits of western peoples.
Generalizations, always dangerous, are nowhere so likely
to lead to false conclusions as in India. Its diversities of
conditions really forbid generalization. Over against the
abysmal ignorance of the vast masses there stand experimental scientists with broad philosophic vision like Sir J. C.
Bose, and liberal-minded, well-balanced statesmen like Lord
Sinha. The leadership of large sections of Indian opinion
and action to-day has, however, been assumed by men of a
different stamp. These belong to the higher castes, many
of them Brahmins, who have received western education
in the schools and colleges. That education has unfortunately been of the sort that passes examinations but not
of the kind that trains the mind to grapple with problems
and face situations involving hard facts.  It has taught
the student to memorize many facts, whether he understands and accepts them or not, in order to satisfy the examiner. It has, on the other hand, given him the ability to




68


THE AWAKENING EAST


read, outside the curriculum, books of advanced, if not incendiary thought. This reading, without the check of the
careful analysis and searching criticism of the classroom,
results in uncontrolled thinking, loose reasoning, and often
irrational, even dangerous, conclusions.
In talking with men of this class one is frequently surprised at their adolescent evasion of facts, inability or unwillingness to reason logically, and imaginative zeal to arrive at conclusions in realities as well as in ideas regardless
of intervening obstacles. The British problem is to find the
needed supply of wise and sympathetic mentors for this
group of men, mostly young, who are leading India they
know not whither.3  They are as sheep without a shepherd.
India needs good scout-masters skilled not in the craft of the
forest or in jungle lore but in the lore and craft of politics,
economics, sociology, and religion. The British civil, educational, and other services have provided not a few such
excellent scout-masters, and the mission schools and colleges have furnished more. The supply of these men is
woefully inadequate and in recent years has been decreasing
not only relatively but absolutely. The real problem of
the future of India is to increase greatly the supply of such
wise and tactful guides. Force has been the stern schoolmaster of India for centuries, and has failed; the warm
heart and the sympathetic hand are yielding the desired
results where they have a chance.
This, however, is getting ahead of the story, for we have
been trying to collect and collate the data necessary for understanding the situation in India after Lord Curzon gave
place to the Earl of Minto in I905. Two items still remain
for consideration, the attempts of the leaders of India to
organize for the promotion of their aims and the external
influences which may have been operating to stimulate their
thought and action.
Since its organization in 1885 the Indian National Congress, an entirely unofficial and voluntary organization,
chiefly but not exclusively Hindu, and largely Brahmin, has
'It will be observed that this statement does not refer to the
whole group of nationalists.




INDIA


69


been the most widely recognized and influential spokesman
of Indian opinion. The original platform of the congress
did not present immoderate demands, but did contend for
much more than the British authorities have yet been prepared to concede.
In the earlier years, and even as late as 1915, both the
government and the congress recognized the desirability of
maintaining some contacts.  Several English people, including some prominent retired civil servants, have given
their sympathy to the congress. Five times in the first
thirty years, the presidency of the congress was held by
Englishmen. Three times a Parsi, Mr. Dadabai Naoroji,
was chosen to preside, and on three other occasions Mohammedans were selected for the presidency, which has
at other times been held by Hindus. The registered attendance during this period averaged 775 annually.  It
reached 44o the second year and did not fall so low again
until I9o09, while it reached the maximum in the Calcutta
meeting of I9o6 due to the efforts to protest against the
partition of Bengal. Radicalism grew steadily in the congress until it reached a climax in the stormy session at
Surat in I907, after which followed a period of milder
councils. During the first twenty years, then, the congress
movement had been gaining steadily in momentum. Not
unfriendly relations had subsisted between it and the government, but as the years passed without producing any
particular impression upon the government, the more radical elements gained strength.
Meanwhile external events were wielding an increasing
influence upon Indian thought. It was the unwritten law
of the British, never honored in the breach, not to permit
any military reverse to pass without being promptly
avenged. The consequent occidental prestige for invincibility remained unshattered until the crushing and unretrieved defeat of the Italians by the Abyssinians at Adowa
in I896. The success of the Boers in South Africa in withstanding for three years the greatest military effort which
the British Empire had ever yet put forth was expensive to
British prestige in Indian eyes, and was not redeemed by




70


THE AWAKENING EAST


the concession of responsible government to the two Boer
states five years later, in I906. A more convincing blow to
European prestige was the defeat of Russia by Japan, an
Asiatic nation, smaller, less populous, and poorer than India,
and, unlike India, but recently emerged from its medieval
seclusion.
Russia, furthermore, was that nation in awe of which
Great Britain had held its breath and maneuvered its imperial policy for two generations. With such a convincing
demonstration, why should India continue to cower before
the British? India had been taught and believed that England must be tolerated to save India from the worse evil of
Russian despotism. Whatever remained of that danger was
removed by the Anglo-Russian agreement of I907, which
followed upon British success in out-maneuvering Russia
in Tibet and Afghanistan in I904 and I905. Freed from
the Russian menace, there remained no foe against whom
India needed British protection; India was free to deal with
Great Britain on the merits of the question. The situation
was not unlike that which arose in North America after the
French menace had been removed from England's continental colonies by the treaty of I763.
Within the British Empire, India had not received
equitable treatment. It was true that the British monarch
now plumed himself with the splendid title of Emperor of
India and that Edward VII had recently been proclaimed at
a magnificent darbar at Delhi in 1903. In the imperial
conferences, however, which had been held occasionally
since the Queen's jubilee in 1887, India had been accorded
no part. India was good for show but not for counsel. In
various ways India had contributed to the British success
in South Africa, but the British government failed to assure
Indian laborers and others in South Africa fair treatment
after the war, and had left them to win their own battle as
best they might. Then, too, Australia and Canada, other
self-governing dominions, had contemptuously shown their
unwillingness to accord the Indian equal treatment with the
white citizens of the empire, but, rather, sought to exclude
him as undesirable. Such denial of equitable treatment not




INDIA


71


only hurt the Indian pride, but it sapped the Indian confidence in British fair-mindedness and justice.
In India itself things had not been going well. The financial crisis which affected the United States and other countries in the 'nineties of the last century hit India even more
severely. Before that crisis had passed came famines more
widespread than any in the modern history of the country.
In I900 the famine area was three and one-half times greater
than the United Kingdom, with a population two and one
third times as great. At one time the numbers gathered
in relief camps equaled the population of Greater London.
Then came the bubonic plague, which first appeared in
India in I896 and has become endemic. In I904 it caused
more than I,ooo,oo0 deaths, and in the last twenty years
I0,000,000 deaths. Against this dark background, in lurid
contrast, stood out the bustling and expensive imperialism
of Lord Curzon. Finally he, quite unwittingly, threw the
lighted match into the tinder by proclaiming the partition
of Bengal in I905.
The division of this province, which exceeded the area of
the United Kingdom by twenty-five per cent and the population by seventy-five per cent, was an obvious administrative
necessity and was arranged on lines which were apparently
expedient politically since they recognized the predominantly
Mohammedan population of the sections which were separated to form a new province. This was denounced as British
favoritism to the Mohammedans,4 since in the original province the Hindus had constituted the majority. The action was
interpreted as a departure from the avowed British policy
of not interfering in religious matters. In race and language there was no differentiation between the districts
incorporated in the new province and the portions of Bengal
left in the old province. It was easy to raise the cry that
the British had cut in pieces "Mother Bengal," and that
they had done so for their own evil purposes. Agitation
ran rife; acts of violence occurred; the Indian national
congress assembled in Calcutta in 90o6 with unrivaled
4Some Mohammedans, however, opposed the partition.




72


THE AWAKENING EAST


attendance and joined in denunciation of the outrage; and
the swadeshi boycott of English goods was initiated. Never
was such pressure brought to bear on the British government to reverse one of its policies in India. When Lord
Curzon's quarrel with Lord Kitchener resulted in the
former's resignation in I905, it was confidently hoped that
the change of administration would be accompanied by a
reversal of the act, especially as the Liberal party had recently come into power in England. Mr. John Morley, the
new secretary of state for India, however, declared the matter a chose jugee and adhered strictly to that policy.
Mr. Morley, and the new viceroy, the Earl of Minto,
undertook to divert attention by liberal reforms of the national and provincial legislative councils. Progress was slow,
for the reforms which were first outlined in a minute by
Lord Minto in I906 were not embodied into law until the
passage of the Indian councils act of I909, though Mr.
Morley had called to the council of India in I907 two Indians, one a Hindu and one a Mohammedan, and in I909
an Indian was for the first time admitted to the viceroy's
executive council; he was a Hindu, Mr., later Lord, Sinha.
The new councils act included provisions for enlarging
the provincial legislative councils and giving them nonofficial majorities; for enlarging the legislative council of the
viceroy, but retaining an official majority with a veto over
the provincial councils; for representation of the Mohammedan minority; for the election of a proportion of the
members of both the viceregal and provincial councils, with
an arrangement of electoral constituencies; for increased
privileges of budget discussion and interpellation; for the
right to introduce resolutions; and for the later extension of
executive and legislative councils to other provinces.
Comparison with the act of 1892 shows that the increase
of privileges was both liberal and genuine. The Indians
were given much larger opportunities for acquiring experience in the handling of important public questions and for
exercising very considerable influence upon government
policy. The presence of the official majority in the viceroy's council was a definite but reasonable restriction upon




INDIA


73


complete native control and responsibility. It was justifiable as an intermediate step and also because the councils
were only in the slightest degree representative of the peoples of India; they merely represented certain interests.
In other respects the measure was disappointing to the reformers in the congress party and open to reasonable criticism, but it was a long step forward and a genuine one.
Experience of its actual working, on the whole, quite thoroughly justified the wisdom both of going so far, and of not
going further. These Morley-Minto reforms were not brilliant or epoch-making achievements, but they proved to be
good solid statesmanship, constructive and progressive. In
all fairness, they must be judged as an effort to establish
not a permanent but a temporary system. The period of
unrest which had started with the partition of Bengal was
practically terminated by the reforms of I909.
The councils act of i86i had remained in force thirty-one
years; the councils act of 1892, seventeen years; the MorleyMinto reforms of I909 were destined to only a decade
of life before being superseded. The immediate result of
the reforms was favorable. Lord Minto left India amid
approving plaudits in 1910, and his successor, Lord
Hardinge, was welcomed in a similar spirit. The visit of
King George V and Queen Mary for the proclamation of
their accession at a great darbar at Delhi in I9II was the
first event of its kind and evoked great enthusiasm. The
announcement on this occasion of the transfer of the capital
from Calcutta to Delhi was perhaps a clever move, but the
revision of the partition of Bengal which gratified Hindu
sentiment was bound to give offense to the Mohammedans
who had profited from the previous arrangement.
The Mohammedans of India had been much slower than
the Hindus to avail themselves of the privileges of western
education, but with the opening of the twentieth century
this situation had begun to change. Furthermore, the Mohammedans had held aloof, as a rule, from the Indian national congress movement and had been inclined to find
their interest in supporting British rule rather than in sympathizing with the Hindu reformers. Even when the All



74


THE AWAKENING EAST


India Moslem League was formed in I905 this attitude
persisted. Education and events in other parts of the Moslem world were already modifying their views, when the
revision of the Bengal settlement gave added incentive to
change, which was still further accentuated by other events
outside India.
In I904 the Anglo-French agreement confirmed the English position in Egypt and the French hold on Morocco; the
Anglo-Russian agreement of I907 practically brought Persia
under the sway of the two contracting powers; Italy seized
Tripoli and Rhodes in I9II; and the Balkan wars of I9I2-I3
stripped the Ottoman Empire of most of its European lands.
The Christian powers were apparently banded in an unholy league for the destruction of the political power of
Islam, which could only be interpreted as precursing the subversion of the faith as well. The consequent growth of the
Pan-Islamic movement did not fail to attract followers in
India. The success of the Young Turk revolution of I9o8
caused the more restless Moslem spirits in India to link up
with its leaders and to draw inspiration from them. This
tendency became pronounced at the time of the Balkan
wars, -when the Moslems of India bore their gifts to their
sorely tried Ottoman brethren. The Indian Mohammedans
were drifting rapidly into the same dubious position as the
Hindus with reference to the British government.
Then came the World War. With surprising unanimity
the Indian peoples, as 'well as the Indian princes, rallied to
the support of the British Empire against the Germans.
There seemed to be a sudden realization that, whatever its
faults, British rule was preferable to German. The services
of Indian troops on the western front in France in I9I4-15
were of indispensable importance.  Indian troops, often
Mohammedans, did valiant service also in Mesopotamia,
Palestine, and East Africa against Mohammedan coreligionists. The viceroy's legislative council passed important war
measures not dissimilar to those enacted in England itself,
voted unanimously a gift from the Indian government of
~Ioo,ooo,ooo for the imperial war expenses, and later approved a loan for an additional ~Ioo,oo,ooo which was




INDIA


75


promptly subscribed. Whether these acts were spontaneous
and disinterested or not, India had clearly earned the right
to have its affairs regarded by the British government in
the future from "a new angle of vision," as Premier Asquith
expressed it. The first evidence of such a change came when
a native prince of India and a former Hindu member of the
Indian legislative council were seated with the representatives from the self-governing dominions in the first Imperial
war conference.
Recognition as a partner with the self-governing dominions in the empire suggested a larger measure of self-government for India. The first steps to this end were taken
by Lord Hardinge before the close of his administration in
I9I6. His successor, Lord Chelmsford, later in the same
year submitted to the government in London his project for
reforms, but there were destined to be long delays before
the British ministry and parliament could find time free to
devote to Indian constitutional questions. The delay made
the extremists in India increasingly impatient-a marked
contrast to the patience of the Egyptian nationalists until
after the armistice. The congress and the Moslem league
drew closer together with the growing power of the radical
element in each. Both met at Lucknow in 1916 and adopted
resolutions embodying radical and insistent demands for
the largest measure of self-government and for other
reforms. It was on this occasion that the theosophical Mrs.
Besant began the exercise of her remarkable and inflammatory influence upon the congress movement. Thus began a second period of unrest which apparently reached its
culmination in the arrest of Mr. Gandhi in I922.
The year 1917 saw an adjustment of the long-standing
grievance over the cotton duties, the appointment of the
Sadler commission to inquire into educational questions in
India and of the Holland committee to study the industrial
situation, the termination of indenturing Indians to work in
the Fiji and West Indian islands, and other reforms. Toward the end of the year Mr. Montagu, who had been Mr.
Morley's under-secretary, became secretary of state, for
India and arrived in India to confer upon the question of




76


THE AWAKENING EAST


governmental reforms in accordance with an announcement
that the policy would be not only "the increasing association
of Indians in every branch of the administration, but also the
greatest development of self-governing institutions with a
view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire."
Though the announcement was carefully safeguarded with
cautionary restrictions it marked a long step in advance since
Mr. Morley had accompanied his reforms with a vigorous
denial that he contemplated the ultimate bestowal of parliamentary institutions upon India.
Mr. Montagu completed his inquiries and conferences in
India by signing in April, I9I8, with Lord Chelmsford, the
viceroy, a report which was presented to parliament in July.
Long delays still ensued, which, indeed, contributed somewhat to the value of the result, before the measure was
finally passed in December, 1919.
This government of India act of I9I9 created a council
of state of not more than sixty members, of whom not more
than one third may be officials. This is an entirely new
body and forms the upper house of the national legislature.
The former legislative council has become the lower house,
with the name of legislative assembly. It is composed of
one hundred and forty-four members, of whom one hundred and three are elected and, of the remainder, only
twenty-six may be officials. The term of the council of
state is five years, and of the assembly, three years. In cases
of disagreement the two bodies may sit in joint session to
determine their differences. The reserve power which had
been invested in the national legislature prior to this act of
I9I9 had, with this creation of a native majority, to be
transferred to the viceroy, who, in certain cases, is granted
power to "certify" measures as vital to the peace, safety,
and welfare of India.  The viceroy's executive council,
which now numbers eight, has charge of the various departments of administration.
The reforms in the national government of India are
paralleled on a somewhat more liberal scale by changes in
the provincial government. In the eight more important




INDIA


77


provinces (Burma has since been included) not only were
there important changes made in the legislative councils and
their powers and in the extension of the franchise, but a
reform of vital significance was introduced in the character
and powers of the provincial executive. These administra.
tive powers are divided into two classes, one dealing with
the "reserved" subjects, and one dealing with the "transferred" subjects. The "reserved" subjects are those which
involve imperial interests, and remain in the charge of the
governor-in-council.  The "transferred" subjects, which
deal with purely provincial matters, such as education, are
under the charge of the governor assisted by ministers who
are intended to be responsible to the legislative council of
the province.
This novel constitutional scheme, which its inventors have
called dyarchy, involves certain obvious limitations upon the
freedom of action of the legislative chambers. This scheme
was devised for the explicit purpose of transferring power
and responsibility for certain matters of provincial, as contrasted with imperial, interest, to the people of India. It
is confessedly an awkward arrangement, and its real justification is that it has been created to meet a peculiar necessity. It can scarcely be regarded as other than a temporary
expedient, and as a step toward the gradual transfer of the
direction of other departments of administration and legislation to native control, as rapidly as experience appears to
justify such action.
It was recognized that these important changes in the government of British India would have an inevitable reaction
upon the government of the numerous native states. Accordingly, provision was included for the establishment of
a chamber of princes, in which the rulers of these states
might meet for conference and action upon matters of general concern. Another important provision of the act recognized its provisional character, and required that once in
ten years there should be a parliamentary commission of
inquiry into the workings of the government, the progress
of the people, and proposals for further changes in the form
of government. This provision, which is, to all intents and




78


THE AWAKENING EAST


purposes, a scheme for the consideration of constitutional
amendments, is of the highest importance, since it definitely
commits the British government to a policy of progressive
bestowal of self-government, and no longer leaves the question either to chance or to spasmodic adjustment.
The act obviously falls short of conferring upon India
full dominion status, as the most advanced leaders in India
had desired, and even demanded, as the necessary minimum.
On the other hand, moderate opinion in India recognized
the remarkable generosity of the new measure in the amount
of self-government conferred, as contrasted with the measure of I909. There was no longer any disavowal, by the
statesmen of England, of the development of a genuine
legislature, or of representative institutions, or even of a
preliminary stage of responsible government. The measure
did actually create a legislature based in large measure upon
elections in accordance with the representative principle,
and it contained also definite provision for the development
of ministerial responsibility.
Naturally, British opinion, both in India and at home, was
sharply divided upon the expediency of the measure. In
both cases a large majority recognized the necessity, if not
the wisdom, of the act, but in both groups there were numerous outspoken opponents who denounced the new governmental scheme as fraught with ruinous consequences.
They declared that the people of India were not fitted for
such responsibility, that the new legislatures and ministers
could not be trusted to work with the best interests of the
whole of the Indian people in mind, and especially did
they denounce the surrender of British imperial interests.
Before the new acts were placed upon the statute book
two events occurred which radically altered the situation
in India. The first of these was the passage of the so-called
Rowlatt acts. The other was the killing of nearly four
hundred Indians and the wounding of about three times as
many more by the orders of General Dyer at Jallianwala
Bagh, at Amritsar, on April 13, I9I9.
With the close of the war it was felt that the lapse of the
special powers conferred by the defense of India act, cor



INDIA


79


responding to the British defense of the realm act, would
deprive the government of the necessary powers for the prevention or suppression of sedition. To meet this situation
two measures were framed by a committee under the presidency of Mr. Justice Rowlatt of the high court. In the
legislative council, these proposals were denounced in the
most vigorous terms by the native members, and the government was fully warned not merely of the inexpediency but
of the danger of enacting these proposals. They were,
however, passed by the votes of the official bloc in the council. In fact, the acts remained inoperative, and the only
result of their passage was to inflame public opinion. The
measures were not unreasonable or harsh as compared with
similar laws in western countries, but the government would
have been wise not to have pressed the measures prior to
the establishment of the new legislative chambers under the
Montagu-Chelmsford act which was soon to become a law.
Of the second matter, the unfortunate and ghastly affair
at Amritsar, in the Punjab, it is sufficient to quote from the
despatch of the British government: "The principle which
has consistently governed the policy of His Majesty's Government in directing the methods to be employed where military action in support of civil authority is required, may
be broadly stated as using the minimum force necessary...
It must regretfully, without possibility of doubt, be concluded that Brigadier-General Dyer's action at Jallianwala
Bagh was in complete violation of this principle." The
only charitable view is that in ordering a body of soldiers
to fire without warning upon a defenseless mob General
Dyer lost his head.
The British government was slow in appointing the socalled Hunter commission to investigate the affair, and it
was more than a year after the tragedy before the commission's report appeared. These delays gave added weight to
the fiery denunciations of the affair by the agitators throughout India. Though the report unqualifiedly condemned
General Dyer's action, and both the government of India
and the British government at home disavowed the affair,
General Dyer was let off with mere dismissal from the




So


THE AWAKENING EAST


service, and other officers in the Punjab who were more or
less implicated in this and other measures for the suppression of disturbances in that province not merely escaped
without any penalty but like Sir Michael O'Dwyer, lieutenant-governor of the Punjab, were retired on pensions chargeable to the Indian revenues.
It was these two affairs which turned Mr. Gandhi into a
thoroughgoing opponent of the British government, which
he rightly claimed he had hitherto loyally supported, and
made him the greatest leader that the people of India have
produced. There is no more striking or interesting personality in the world to-day than this prophet, this holy man,
who suddenly rose to the leadership of the people of India.
He was a man of fifty, educated in the British schools in
India, at London University, and at the Inner Temple,
where he read for the bar. The major part of his mature
life had been spent in South Africa, where he had acquired
renown as the champion of the rights of his fellow Indians.
Mr. Gandhi's power rested primarily upon his personality.
His saintly character, his ascetic life, and his lofty spiritual
principles have won universal admiration, and it is little
wonder that the highly religious and mystical natives of
India have revered him as a holy man and have, in spite of
his own behest, insisted upon calling him Mahatma5 Gandhi,
that is, the prophet Gandhi. It would be difficult to find any
western parallel for the intense devotion to a man which
the people of India have given to Mahatma Gandhi. Only
in the Middle Ages of Europe may one find a counterpart to
the mysticism, asceticism, and sanctity of Mr. Gandhi, but
not even St. Francis of Assisi is an adequate parallel, nor
does even the crusading zeal and enthusiasm aroused at the
council of Clermont afford a comparison to the passionate
devotion of the natives of India to their prophet.
In entering the field of political agitation in India, Mr.
Gandhi was attempting a far more difficult role than he had
practiced on the smaller stage of South Africa. Likewise,
in attempting to preach for the three hundred millions of
'The word literally means "great soul."




INDIA


8I


people of India ideals similar to those of a religious ascetic,
he was attempting, as no other character in history has done,
to carry his ideals to their logical conclusion in the sphere
of government. Even Jesus of Nazareth had declared that
his kingdom was not of this world, and had enjoined his
followers to "render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's."
In proclaiming his doctrine of swaraj, Mr. Gandhi confused the idea of personal swaraj, or self-control, with national swaraj, or self-government. He insisted that the
principles, which all religions teach, of the development of
self-control as the way of righteousness and salvation, were
equally applicable in the larger sphere of the regulation of
masses of peoples in social and political affairs. One cannot
but be astounded into admiration for the boldness and magnificence of his idealism, and one feels almost a sense of
horror at applying cold reason to his great program. Even
he himself seemed at times to waver in the face of the
frightful evidence of the impracticability of his teachings.
The doctrine of swaraj in political matters was not original
with Mr. Gandhi. It had long been the ideal of the
educated classes in India. It was only in his lofty spiritual
interpretation of the doctrine that he was an innovator. The
other elements of his practical program were likewise borrowed, but also more or less spiritualized by his idealism.
The idea of swadeshi, that is, home industries, had been
one of the essential factors in the disturbances of I906, but
Mr. Gandhi declared not merely foreign goods, but all the
material inventions, machines, and enterprises of the West,
satanic, and bade his followers turn from them and return
to the use of the distaff, the spinning wheel, the plow, and
the flail, which had been the implements of Indian industry
for thousands of years. The western civilizations of Persia
and Greece and Rome and the empires of the foreign conquerors from Alexander to the Great Mughals had all passed
away, but India alone stood firm after four thousand years,
with the same religion and culture, the same economic and
social system. The salvation of India obviously lay in
rigorously throwing aside the material evils of the moribund
civilization of the West and in disowning the British gov



82


THE AWAKENING EAST


ernment, which his logic led him to denounce as satanic.
He called upon the people to return to the eternal verities of
the spiritual life of India embodied in the Mahabharata and
the Bhagavadgita. To emphasize this teaching, he not only
enjoined but practiced the use of the old-fashioned spinning
wheel, the charka, for the making of the rough home-spun
cloth in which he clad himself, and which he exhorted his
followers to make and wear.
The third great ideal which he preached was that of brotherhood of the peoples of India. No one has ever struck
so tremendous a blow at the system of caste as has Mr.
Gandhi, both by precept and example. He has endeavored to
persuade the Brahmin to overcome his scruples, and even
to sit at table with "untouchables," that is, persons of the
lower castes. One cannot doubt that the future historians
of India will record that one of the greatest forces in the
molding of unity of the peoples of India has been the work
of Mahatma Gandhi in his labor to unite them all, regardless of caste or race or creed, into one great brotherhood of
Indian people.
To the logic of this exalted ideal Mahatma Gandhi was
not unfaithful. He recognized that in this great brotherhood
not only must all the castes of Hinduism be merged but that
Hindu and Mohammedan must be brought into affiliation.
This led to the adoption of the fourth, and in some respects
the most serious, item in his program, the acceptance of the
caliphate doctrine and agitation current among the Mohammedan leaders under the inspiration of the hot-headed Ali
brothers.
The caliphate movement owed its origin in the first place
to the Pan-Islamic agitation and later to the movement led
by the Young Turks, which resulted in the revolution of
i908 in the Ottoman Empire, but it received still greater
stimulus from the steady breakdown by Christian European
powers of the independence of Mohammedan states in the
early years of the twentieth century. The World War witnessed the further disintegration of Turkish power, and
the abortive treaty of Sevres confirmed the results by
stripping the Ottoman Empire of still more provinces, leav



INDIA


83


ing to it little more than a fragment of Asia Minor. The
war had also witnessed an attempt to deprive the Ottoman
sultan of the caliphate.
The dissatisfaction of the Mohammedans of India over
certain internal matters, and the alarm at the steady decline
in the extent of independent Mohammedan states had, however, not resulted in any serious manifestations in India
until the treaty of Sevres. The Mohammedans of India
had first organized themselves for political purposes in I905
in the All-India Moslem League, which was in general sympathetic to British rule and antagonistic to the congress
movement. This original attitude had been slowly shifting
until I916, when the league took action in identical terms
with the congress in demanding self-government for India.
The caliphate question had no proper relation to political
questions in India, but the Ali brothers, who had long been
in sympathetic relations with the Young Turks, seized upon
the treaty of Sevres as a convenient political weapon to
arouse Mohammedan sentiment in India to the danger of
Christian aggression against Islam, and to the special menace
of British rule in India to the interests of that country in
general and of its Mohammedans in particular. The acceptance by Mr. Gandhi of the caliphate issue was a perfectly natural political agreement to clinch the cooperation
of Hindu and Mohammedan in the struggle for national
self-government.
The immediate purpose of the noncooperation program
was to withdraw support from the British government in
India, and particularly to refuse any participation in the
inauguration of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms. Mr.
Gandhi and his followers believed that it was possible, by
maintaining a policy of nonresistance, to render the reforms
ineffective and the British administration helpless. He did
not contemplate the use of violence, but consistently denounced it. None the less, sporadic outbreaks of violence
continually occurred.
As a consequence, the moderate element among the Indian population decided to accept the measure, and to cooperate in inaugurating the new legislative assemblies. This




84


THE AWAKENING EAST


was the first blow to the success of the Gandhi program.
A second blow came from the Moplah affair in the western
part of the Madras presidency. This was an attack by a
fanatical group of Mohammedans upon their peaceful Hindu
neighbors to convert them forcibly to Mohammedanism.
The result was a grim scene of violence and bloodshed,
which brought home to the Hindu population with great
vividness that the much-heralded brotherhood of Hindu and
Moslem might not result in an equal partnership, but in
domination by the more vigorous and strenuous Mohammedans.
Meanwhile the Duke of Connaught, the last surviving son
of Queen Victoria, came to India in I92I as a personal representative of George V to inaugurate the new legislative
assemblies, the assembly of the princes, and the more important provincial assemblies. In his various addresses he
endeavored to allay the bitterness of race feeling, and to win
for the new reforms a favorable trial. Later in the same
year the government in London decided that the Prince of
Wales should make an extensive tour of the Indian Empire.
In many respects the occasion seemed to be highly unpropitious. His arrival in Bombay was the signal for serious rioting, and at Madras, Calcutta, and Allahabad, the
hartal, or boycott, and other forms of unfriendly demonstration were disagreeably successful. As time went on, however, sentiment began to change, and the reception accorded
to the prince from city to city became less hostile and more
friendly. His reception in the native states was not merely
friendly but highly gratifying. The closing weeks of his
visit were spent at Delhi and in the Punjab, where he even
visited Amritsar without any serious unpleasantness. Meanwhile the successful introduction of the reform measures
and operation of the new legislatures were counteracting
the efforts of the agitators.
Shortly after the inauguration of the new assemblies,
Lord Chelmsford completed his term as viceroy, and was
replaced by Lord Reading. Upon his arrival in India the
new viceroy held extensive conferences with Mr. Gandhi and
through him even communicated with the Ali brothers.




INDIA


85


Efforts to establish an understanding between the government and the various agitating elements went to the length
of a proposal, at the close of I92I, for a round-table conference. It did not require much consideration, however,
to show that such a proposal was inexpedient, if not entirely
impracticable. This was made particularly clear by the continued irresponsibility of the Ali brothers, who were finally
arrested and given jail sentences. The Indian national congress in December, I92I, met at Ahmedabad, the home of
Mr. Gandhi. The question of putting into full force the
noncooperation program was discussed with approval, but
the determination of the time for action was left to Mr.
Gandhi, who was practically intrusted with dictatorial
powers by the congress.
As Mr. Gandhi confronted the immediate possibility of
inaugurating his plan, he seems to. have realized that the
various acts of violence which have just been mentioned
made it clear that noncooperation might be proclaimed as a
measure of passive resistance, but that, in spite of his first
intentions, it would result in worse violence and more bloodshed. While he was in this frame of mind there occurred
at Chauri Chaura in the United Provinces a mob attack
which resulted in the burning of a police station with about
twenty native policemen, early in February, I922.  Mr.
Gandhi promptly denounced the affair, and declared that
he would fast for several days as his personal expiation for
the outrage. His indecision and hesitation grew more obvious, though the extremists were doing their best to spur
him to action.
During this period, the question of Mr. Gandhi's arrest
was a subject of general discussion. The natives declared
that the British government did not dare touch him, and
charged the authorities with injustice in their arrest of
minor agents. The decision of the matter was precipitated
in a way that could scarcely have been anticipated. Mr.
Montagu, the secretary of state for India, who had been
responsible for the reform policy and who was considered
as being too lenient in dealing with the Indian situation, had
evidently been for some time the object of attack by his




86


THE AWAKENING EAST


more conservative colleagues in the ministry. The publication by him of a despatch from Lord Reading dealing with
the Mohammedan issue, without the customary consultation
with the prime minister and his colleagues, led to his dismissal on March 9, I922.
The following day Mr. Gandhi was placed under arrest,
promptly tried, and sentenced to jail for six years without
labor. The coincidence had a noteworthy effect upon Indian
opinion, and since that time the government of India has
followed a strong and consistent policy of enforcing law
and order and has impressed upon the popular mind the
genuineness of British power by sending bodies of troops on
long marches through the country, simply as a matter of
demonstration.
The new legislative councils have, under the circumstances, been working even more satisfactorily than might
have been expected, and this fact has had a beneficial influence. It is, of course, easy to bring criticisms against
them, either from the British or from the Indian point of
view, with reference to lack of adequate representative basis,
to personnel, to procedure in debate, to ability and readiness
to assume responsibility along with privilege, and in other
matters, but it must be remembered that things are in the
experimental stage, and perfection cannot be expected at
once, especially as it has not been attained in western lands.
The most serious problem, however, is that of financial
deficits, which have appeared in each of the budgets handled
by the assemblies. In face of the spirit of unwillingness to
increase taxation the only recourse lies in economies. As
a consequence the demand for a large decrease in the British
army in the country, and even of the native portion of the
army, has been greatly intensified. The saving in expense
would be prompt and obvious, and it would be consonant
with the desire for native self-rule, as opposed to British
control. If looked at merely by themselves, the figures for
the size of the army and for military expenditures are large,
but if considered relatively with the population of the country, they are quite small.
The number of British troops in India is about one to




INDIA


87


4,500 of the population, and the number of native troops
about one to I,8oo, or a total army of one to every I,300 of
the population. The annual cost is approximately one dollar
per capita for the population. It will be seen, therefore,
that the military establishment can hardly be regarded as
excessive in size or cost. Its necessity has been shown constantly in the past four or five years by the serious troubles
oi. the northwestern frontier, which have been almost contlnuous, as well as in the serious Afghan war of I9I9.
A more reasoned and scientific undertaking to deal with
the financial situation was the request for the creation of a
commission of inquiry into expenditures. This commission,
similar to the Geddes commission in England, is now at
work under the presidency of Lord Inchcape, and may be
expected to offer useful recommendations.
Since the arrest of Mr. Gandhi, the influence of the national congress has steadily declined. It is reported that the
number of registered supporters is now only 25 per cent
of what it was in I92I, and that the financial support has
suffered a similar decline. Moreover, serious divisions have
appeared in the congress party. One part, under the leadership of Mr. C. R. Das, who has recently been released from
prison, advocates participation in the elections which will
occur some months hence, in order to achieve their aims
either by direct action in the councils or by pursuing a
wrecking policy. This party, however, was defeated at the
meeting of the national congress held at Gaya, in December,
1922, by the faction which proposed to adhere strictly to
the extremist noncooperation policy.6
Though the outlook for the successful application of an
added measure of self-government under the MontaguChelmsford reforms is hopeful, it is not certain. The problems are tremendous, the difficulties enormous; the bulk of
the people is illiterate; the extension of education progresses
slowly; the economic and financial questions offer serious
perplexities. To overcome these obstacles India's greatest
asset is the will to win in the establishment of self-govern'See below, pages I05-io8.




88


THE AWAKENING EAST


ment and to prove to the world its equality with the progressive nations of the West.
Having studied the program of the political movement
in India down to the present moment, it is now desirable to
survey the more important factors in the Indian situation,
in order to understand the problems to be faced in the development of a system of self-government by the Indian
peoples. In the first place, the Indian Empire comprises
an area somewhat in excess of,8oo,o000 square miles, that
is, somewhat more than the area of the United States east
of the Rocky Mountains.
About 700,000 square miles of this area are contained in
native states, ruled by their own princes, with their own
administration and laws in each case. Over these native
states the British government exercises a certain benevolent
supervision. In some of them the administration is highly
progressive, and the conditions are better than in British
India itself. This is apparently, however, the exception
rather than the rule. Administration through native states,
from the point of view of the British control, is a simple
procedure, and has thus far afforded the imperial government a minimum of anxiety. Partly owing to this circumstance and partly owing to other reasons some persons
have recently seriously proposed the breaking up of British
India into a suitable number of small states, and placing
them under native rulers. It would seem to be apparent
that such a suggestion is both reactionary and impracticable,
and that it would also fail to prove a solution of the problem
of self-government acceptable to the people of India.7  The
population of the native states, by the census of I92I, was
71I,936,736.
The remainder of the Indian Empire, customarily spoken
of as British India, has an area of about I,Ioo,ooo square
miles, and its population in I92I was 247,I38,396. This
territory is divided into fifteen provincial units, of which
7Some nationalists, indeed, frankly express regret that all the
native states were not wiped out and British India made coextensive
with the Indian Empire, for they feel that the native states hamper
the nationalist and reform movements.




INDIA


89


nine have a population varying from 7,500,000 to 46,ooo,ooo,
and areas varying from 53,000 square miles to 230,000
square miles. The remaining provinces are much smaller
in area and in population, and the separate existence of each
is due to some peculiarity in geography, race, or history.
The nine principal provinces mentioned are Assam, Bengal,
Bihar and Orissa, Bombay, Burma, Central Provinces and
Berar, Madras, the Punjab, and the United Provinces. The
history of the administration of these provinces has been
already fully discussed.8
The major portion of the population of India belongs to
the Indo-European or Aryan stock, but in southern India
a large proportion of the population belongs to the Dravidian
family. Besides these two main groups, ethnologists recognize at least five other distinct racial stocks among the peoples of India.
The diversity of languages is even greater. It is estimated
that considerably more than one hundred different distinctive languages are spoken within the Indian Empire. Eleven
languages are spoken by more than Io,ooo,ooo persons each.
Twelve others are spoken by more than I,ooo,ooo each,
and ten others are spoken by more than 300,000 each, the
last figure representing approximately the number to whom
the English language is the native speech.
The peoples of India are indebted to the British and to
their educational system for the gift of a common tongue
in which to carry forward their nationalist propaganda.
This somewhat humiliating fact has led to various suggestions of developing one of the more common native languages as the national speech. All suggestions to this end
have hitherto met with such serious objection as to render
any successful outcome unlikely, though Hindustani most
nearly meets the requirements.
While, as has been seen, only about two thirds of India
are directly under British rule, and more than one third remains under the control of a large number of petty native
princes, yet British rule has given a definite unity to the
'See above, pages 57-60, 72-73, 76-77.




90


THE AWAKENING EAST


Indian Empire, such as has never existed before. It has
also established and maintained absolute peace throughout
the country ever since the Mutiny of I857 and, despite the
sporadic outbreaks of violence during the recent period of
unrest, has maintained throughout the empire the rule of
law and order, and enforced a civilized system of administering justice. These blessings were absolutely unknown to
India prior to British rule. The existence of the vast number of petty states with the confusion of race and language
and religion, involving innumerable and incessant wars,
formerly prevented any possibility of the establishment of
law and order. The prevalence of dacoity and thagi, in
other words, of brigandage and organized pillage and murder, has been eliminated only as the result of the establishment of British sovereignty.
The principal religion in India is Hinduism, which numbers approximately 218,0oo,ooo followers. Next in order
come the Mohammedans, numbering nearly 70,000,000.
Buddhism has become almost nonexistent in India proper;
nearly all its I I,ooo,ooo adherents within the empire are
to be found in Burma. About an equal number practice
some form of animistic religion. The Sikhs include about
3,ooo,ooo. The number of Christians is at present about
5,500,ooo, an increase within the past decade of over 40
per cent. 'Indeed, Christianity is the only one of the religions in India which has made progress out of proportion
to the increase in population. It may be observed that its
converts have come in major part from the lower classes.
About 500,000 of the Christians are so-called Syrians, that
is, represent a form of Christianity introduced into India
many centuries ago, traditionally, by the apostle, St. Thomas.
The Roman Catholics number about 2,000,000, and the
Anglicans somewhat over 500,000. Christians, Mohammedans, Buddhists, and Sikhs do not recognize caste.
Caste is an institution associated with Hinduism. The
question of how far caste is a religious institution and how
far it is social, economic, or political, is one upon which
experts are not agreed. At any rate, religion is only one
factor in the case, and, to a certain extent, a caste is a sort




INDIA


9I


of professional, trade, or labor guild. The spread of modern ideas, especially the extension of rapid means of transportation and communication, and the growing complications in the provision of food supplies, have had a powerful
effect in breaking down certain of the religious formalities
and restrictions associated with caste.  There have not
been wanting, in recent years, advocates within Hinduism
itself of the removal of many of these forms. Mr. Gandhi's
attitude on the question of the "untouchables" is the most important illustration of the case.
The aggressive activities of the Brahmins as leaders in
the nationalist movement and in other respects during the
past two decades have produced as a reaction the development of a vigorous non-Brahmin movement. This has acquired such headway in the Madras presidency that the
elections of the present assemblies resulted in a non-Brahmin majority, and, consequently, in the selection of nonBrahmin ministers.  These circumstances have naturally
tended to emphasize the economic, political, and social aspects of caste, as questions of debatable character.
These facts, taken together with the consequent breakdown
of the rigid restrictions of religious formalism, have led to
an increased emphasis upon the purely religious or spiritual
aspect, perhaps one should say of Hinduism rather than of
caste. The existence of the large number of castes with the
hitherto rigid separations cutting across the economic, social, and political structures, has been a serious factor in
the disintegrative character of Indian society in all its aspects. The growth of an Indian nationalist movement,
therefore, will, of necessity, involve the softening of caste
distinctions in many respects.
The peoples of India have not been dwellers in cities, but
in small villages and hamlets. In I88I there were no cities
in India with I,ooo,ooo population, and but five with more
than 200,000. The census of I92I showed two cities with
more than,0ooo,ooo, and ten others in excess of 200oo,000.
The number of cities of more than 50,000 increased during
the forty years from sixty to seventy-five. The total urban
population at the present time amounts to less than five per




92


THE AWAKENING EAST


cent of the population. The percentage of urban population
in the United States by the census of 1920 was 51.4.
Agriculture, then, is the occupation of the major portion
of the population. The annual area under crops in British
India approximates very closely one acre per capita. Of
this area, about 20 per cent is supplied with irrigation. There
exist large areas of cultivable lands which are not adequately
utilized, while other areas, particularly in the Ganges valley,
suffer badly from overcrowding. It is a difficult problem to
overcome the inertia of the natives sufficiently to secure
their migration from the overcrowded districts to the regions where land is more readily available. There has, however, been considerable progress in the extension of the
actually cultivated area, the increase amounting to not less
than 20 per cent in the past twenty years.
In addition to rice and wheat, the more important crops
include cotton, jute, and tea. The development of irrigation
has, of course, been undertaken by the government, and considerable success has been attained in securing the stabilization of crops in spite of fluctuations in the rainfall. The
amount of works for this purpose already constructed has
been very large, and the process of extension is still going on.
The British administration has also undertaken extensive
work in the supervision and care of the forests. India has
a considerably varied supply of minerals, but the size of the
output remains comparatively small, including as its main
items coal, petroleum, salt, gold, and manganese ore.
The manufacturing industries of most importance are
those of cotton and jute. The number of mills working
these materials increased from 237 with 295,000 employees
in I903 to 359 with 546,000 workers in 1921. While
various efforts have been made to establish factories of the
modern type under native management, they have not
usually been attended with success, and most of the companies are under European management.      One notable
example of native management is that of the group of ironworking enterprises controlled by the Tata Sons Corporation, but even they have relied, to some extent at least,
upon the services of Europeans. There is no doubt a large




INDIA


93


field for the development of manufacturing enterprises in
India, and it will be an important step in advancement when
the Indian people learn to invest their money instead of
hoarding it. It ought not to require a large amount of advice
and assistance by western experts to give success to such
undertakings.
The failure to secure the investment of native capital
has been particularly notable in the construction of irrigation works, of railways, telegraph lines, and highways.
MIoney for these purposes has had to be borrowed chiefly in
England, though there is no doubt adequate wealth was lying
idle in India, which might have been enlisted for these purposes, and so have retained the interest payments within the
country. The development of the railway system, as well
as of irrigation, has been one of the important safeguards
against famine, though the two have not been similarly appreciated by the people. The total mileage of railways in
operation in I921 was slightly in excess of 37,000, largely
state owned and partly state operated. They are, unfortunately, however, built upon three different gauges, which
prevents interchange of equipment, and makes necessary
frequent transfer both for passengers and for freight.
There were in I920 over 88,ooo miles of telegraph lines,
and the postal service is widely extended and efficient.
In the matter of external communication the British have
resisted every suggestion of developing railway communication from India to outside countries. There can be little
doubt that England will soon find it absolutely essential to
reverse this policy, and to link up her railways from Burma
to other parts of the Indo-China peninsula and to China
itself, while, to the northwest, the time can scarcely be long
delayed when connections will be established with the Russian Trans-Caspian line and, through Persia, with the Bagdad railway. Practically all Indian foreign trade and
intercourse is carried on by sea, as it has been ever since the
arrival of the Portuguese. This trade is mainly handled
through a few ports, Karachi, Bombay, Colombo in Ceylon,
Madras, Calcutta, and Rangoon, and to a slight extent
through some minor ports.




94


THE AWAKENING EAST


The extension of the trade of India has been remarkable.
The figures for i92I represent a growth of forty-sevenfold
over those for I834, the first year after the abolition of the
trading privileges of the East India Company. The absolute
growth, however, has been vastly greater in the past sixty
years, during which period the increase has been sixfold.
The total foreign trade of India in I92I amounted to approximately $I,8oo,oo0,ooo. In the same year the United
States with one third the population had a foreign trade three
times that of India. For many years the amount of exports
has considerably exceeded the imports of merchandise, but in
I92I the figures were sharply reversed. On the other hand,
the imports of treasure, that is, of gold and silver, have
regularly been enormously in excess of the exports. This
may be taken as an evidence to some extent of hoarding, but
it is also explained in part by use for ornaments. The stock
of jewelry worn on the person is the Indian woman's savings bank deposit. These figures do not seem to confirm
the theory of economic drain of India by England, which
has been referred to previously.
The total of imperial and provincial revenues of India
has increased from less than ~6o,ooo,ooo in I892 to over
~135,ooo,ooo in 1920, a gain of about I28 per cent. Whereas
25 per cent of the expenditures in I892 was payable in Great
Britain, in I920 only I8 per cent was so payable. Though
the absolute amount had grown from ~I5,ooo,ooo to ~27,ooo,ooo, the increase was not commensurate with the rise
in prices. It would appear, therefore, that the government
is endeavoring to lessen the causes for complaint with regard
to these expenditures. In this connection it is pertinent to
note that in the same period the railway mileage was increased from I7,000 to 37,000, the mileage of telegraph lines
doubled, and vast outlays made for irrigation works which,
incidentally, include at present more than 3,000 miles of
navigable canals. The funds for these capital expenditures
have had to be obtained, in large part, from Great Britain,
so that corresponding interest payments must flow from
India to Great Britain.
As in the case of Egypt, so with India, England has been




INDIA


95


charged with a failure to develop properly sanitation and
education. That England has done a large amount in the
way of sanitation and of public health measures cannot be
denied, but anyone who has walked the streets of even Calcutta and Bombay cannot have helped being impressed that
certain obvious measures for public health have not been
taken. The most distressing of these is the failure to segregate the lepers. One, of course, recognizes that the enforcement of sanitary measures affords peculiar difficulty because
of the embarrassments created by the existence of caste.
The teachings of most of the religions of India, especially
of Mohammedanism and only to a less degree of Hinduism,
inculcate temperance, with special reference to the use of
intoxicating drinks. Consequently, another charge brought
against the English has been the spread of the drink traffic.
This was one of the points on which Mr. Gandhi laid considerable stress. It fitted into his program both with reference to exaltation of traditional native principles and
of boycotting the English government, because the manufacture and sale of drinks are carried on under government
licenses and pay a considerable revenue to the government.
This created a sort of native anti-saloon movement which
was promptly seized upon by a well-known American prohibition campaigner, popularly known as "Pussyfoot" Johnson, who pursued his activities in India for some months.
The development of public education in India has already
been discussed. The recent report of the Sadler commission
will undoubtedly remove some of the worst evils, and is
already clearly resulting in some marked improvements.
The most essential is the emphasis which is being placed
upon the development of residential colleges. The superiority in this respect of the church colleges has been convincing,
and it is anticipated that emulation of their example will
yield improved results in the institutions under the control
of other faiths or under public management. More notable
improvements are being introduced in secondary education,
which has, until recently, received inadequate consideration.
The serious criticism with regard to both these fields is
that attention has been too largely devoted to literature,




96


THE AWAKENING EAST


rather than to professional, technical, or vocational education, which would prepare the graduates for definite careers
of usefulness. Recently, however, there has been a distinct
change for the better in this direction. One of the most
essential types of special schools is that for the training of
teachers, and particular attention is being given at present
to the development of normal schools as an indispensable
preliminary to the extension of primary education.
The growth of primary education under provincial supervision in recent years has been rapid. The number of
primary schools for males grew from 1I4,0oo with 4,400,000
pupils in 1913 to I33,500 with 4,950,000 in I920, while the
number of primary schools for females in the same period
grew from I3,700 with 830,000 pupils to 21,700 with I,I75,000ooo pupils. The total number of educational institutions has
increased from I48,500 in I902 to 202,900 in I920. While
the number of male students increased during this period
from 4,083,000 to 6,829,ooo, the number of female pupils
grew from 446,ooo to I,377,000. This evidence of the rapid
extension of female education is one of the most significant
factors in the case, for in India, as in Egypt, the breakdown
of the social barriers which have kept women in seclusion
and ignorance must be regarded as prerequisite to the development of society to anything corresponding substantially to western standards. In the development of primary
education and of the education of women, the influence and
actual contribution of Christian missions have been of the
greatest importance.
Western influences are, of course, responsible for the development of journalism in India. There are not only a
considerable number of newspapers in English and other
European languages for the benefit of western residents,
but there are also numerous periodicals published in each
one of the more widely used native languages. Some of
them are published in two or more languages. As in the
case of Egypt, it is to be regretted that the character and
tone of the native press are not very high, though there are
notable exceptions. An excellent example is set by the
English-language press in India, which is, on the whole, con



INDIA


97


ducted on a very high level. Such a paper as the Pioneer,
of Allahabad, would be a credit to any city.
The use of the printing press, together with the growth
of education and of nationalist ideals, has led to something
like a literary revival. At any rate, the output of magazines and books in native languages has become extensive,
and coincides with a deliberate effort not merely to exalt the
glories of the country's ancient literature, but also to emulate
them. There has been a great deal of investigation and publication with reference to the history, literature, religion,
and philosophy of ancient India. A considerable portion
of these works has been published in English. India has
not failed to produce some scientists of high ability, and
it is reasonable to anticipate that such worthy examples as
that of Sir J. C. Bose will not lack for emulation.
Very naturally, native journalism in India is closely associated with the nationalist movement, and tends to express
in extreme rather than moderate manner its aims and interests. The vehement, even violent, nature of its propaganda has brought the native press into considerable conflict with the government. Since the anti-British feeling
has produced in these papers expressions which are not
merely critical of the government but absolutely subversive
to it, it has been deemed necessary, as a matter of self-preservation, for the government to intervene by the enactment
and the enforcement of penal statutes.
It is natural, in every reform or revolutionary movement,
that there should appear those radicals and extremists who
carry their activities beyond legal or even reasonable limits.
Consequently, when they fall under the penalty of the law,
they endeavor to arouse, usually with considerable success,
sympathy for themselves and added hostility to the government they seek to subvert.
This situation is peculiarly unfortunate in India, because
of the temper of the people, who, less readily than in most
countries, can adopt an attitude of moderation or of suspension of judgment until all the pertinent facts in a case
can be reasonably weighed. It is, indeed, this peculiar mental characteristic, which is apparently more clearly marked




98


THE AWAKENING EAST


among the Hindus than among the Mohammedans, that
makes western observers of India doubtful of the ability of
these peoples successfully to develop and operate a system
of self-government.
Representative self-governing institutions, as they exist in
western countries, have measured their success by the degree in which the people concerned have been able to approach public questions in a judicial spirit and with a sense
of fair play. The western observer fails to find in India
what seems to him adequate evidence of the ability and
readiness of its peoples to approach political problems in
such a frame of mind. The people of India are able to see
with great acuteness the arguments in favor of their own
views and those which are disadvantageous to the other
party, but they seem to lack the ability to see how these same
arguments may look from the other side, or to consider
other elements relevant to the case.
As has already been said, generalizations are always dangerous, and particularly so with reference to India, and
when one makes such general statements as the preceding,
one must, of course, recognize that there are brilliant exceptions to them. One must also recognize that the development of political-mindedness is, after all, a matter of slow
growth, and comes with the practice of self-government.
Fortunately, England has accorded to the peoples of India,
in progressive measure, the privileges of constitutional government, and has been affording them the opportunity of
political self-education.
To estimate the value of the result is extremely difficult.
It is easy to point out certain obvious arguments both for
the success and for the failure of the experiment. While
one may conclude that the results have been as satisfactory
as could have been expected, none the less, it is difficult
to refrain from the conclusion that the results have been
distinctly less satisfactory than is desirable.
Political-mindedness, in the western sense, requires a
peculiar combination of independence and individualism
with the spirit of cooperation. This may perhaps best be
phrased by saying that in the matter of thinking and of co



INDIA


99


operating in political life the individual must enjoy full
freedom. He must be able to arrive at his own conclusions
from the facts before him, without fear or favor, and he
must be equally free to join with those whose conclusions
are similar, in seeking the political attainment of his ends.
Whenever institutions of a religious or social character,
or conditions of an economic nature exist, which seriously
interfere with this freedom of the individual, either in his
thinking or in his action in political matters, self-governing
institutions have not operated satisfactorily. The peoples
of India are subject in unusual degree to such constraints
upon thought and action. The differences of race, of historical experience, of religion, and especially the existence
of caste with its far-reaching social and economic significance, operate both to direct the character of the thinking
and to restrict the freedom of action of the individual.
If the people of India are to attain in satisfactory measure
to representative self-government, they must develop ability
to rise above these age-long restraints of race, religion, and
social and economic order upon the freedom of the individual. Each must be able to arrive at his own conclusions
upon consideration of the facts and to combine freely, regardless of these old orders, with those of any class, race, or
creed, who arrive at similarconclusions and seek aims corresponding with his own.
If India is to develop as a nation and is to establish for
itself a system of representative self-government, it must do
so not as a utopian project, regardless of the past, but it
must definitely rear the new structure upon the foundations
of its history and of its present circumstances. India proper
and, to a much higher degree, the territory which now forms
the Indian Empire, owe whatever unity they possess to the
establishment and maintenance of British rule. Never prior
to the nineteenth century were all the provinces of India
itself united under one single government.
There had always been many petty kingdoms and states,
almost incessantly at war with one another; and the country
owes absolutely to the establishment of British control the
creation within its borders of a state of freedom from war,




I00


THE AWAKENING EAST


of internal peace and security, and of law and order. Of
the Indian borderlands, which have been brought within the
empire chiefly since the Mutiny, only a small portion had
ever been under the rule of an Indian state. Their presence
within the empire is distinctly a novelty for which the British
are entirely responsible.
If the people of India, therefore, are to establish for themselves in India proper and much more in the empire as a
whole, including the borderlands, a unified Indian nationality, they must build very carefully upon the foundations
of unity which have been established under British authority.
Haste would result not merely in the falling away from
the empire of some, if not all, of the borderlands, but would
almost inevitably result in disintegration within India itself.
For this reason, the success of the Indian experiment is dependent for a long period to come, until the welding together
of races and the growth of identity of interests have progressed far, upon the persistence of a considerable degree of
British control.
This necessity for British control arises, moreover, not
only from the internal situation of India, but likewise from
the necessity of safeguarding India against aggressions from
without. It is unlikely at the present time, though it certainly was not true prior to the close of the World War,
that there is danger that any European power would seek to
replace England in India, but the situation upon the northwest frontier, as evidenced in a high degree during the past
five years, shows that, even within Asia itself, India needs
the protection of England's strong arm and the skill of its
diplomacy.
To no less degree must the people of India take into account, in the creation of their nationality, the necessity of
laying the foundations upon the control exercised by the
British in more or less of the country for a century and a
half. They must also recognize that it is solely from the
British that they have derived the ideals both of nationality
and representative self-government. It is the British who
have not merely created an Indian nationality as a fact upon
the map, but who have been responsible for the development




INDIA


IOI


of the idea as a mental and moral fact. India must confess,
as does every country on the continent of Europe or anywhere else which at the present day enjoys or is endeavoring to establish representative institutions, that the whole
system, with the ideal involved and the method concerned,
was developed by England, and has been by them borrowed
for their several uses.
It would be absolute madness for the people of India to
overlook the fact that they have enjoyed the rare privilege
of public training in these matters by the inventors and great
masters of the art, or for them to reject that guidance until
they shall have erected the new superstructure upon the
foundations already laid. Nowhere so truly as in India does
the old adage apply, that the more haste, the less speed.
There is the other side of the case, and that is the obligation upon England with reference to its future conduct.
England must fully and heartily recognize the aims and
desires of the people of India. England can lose India irretrievably by endeavoring too strenuously to maintain its
hold. The preachings of the hide-bound Tories and of the
reactionary Die-Hards, that England must save itself in
India, can have no other result than the complete alienation
of India.
Generous and sympathetic treatment of India, on the
other hand, can result in the establishment of unbreakable
ties of friendship, which will yield to the British Empire
far more valuable results when measured in terms of political profit or of trade or of financial investment or of
intellectual and spiritual usefulness, than can possibly accrue
from any policy of forcible maintenance of authority. It is
entirely possible for England to follow such a generous
policy as might result in the loss completely of political
control over India, and yet of conserving to England a relationship with that country and its peoples of infinitely
greater value than has yet accrued. This great truth has
already been demonstrated in the case of Canada and the
other dominions.
These facts have a pertinent relation to an immediate
problem. The Indian nationalist leaders, even of the more




102


THE AWAKENING EAST


moderate sort, are demanding the prompt and thorough,
though not necessarily complete, Indianization of both the
army and the civil service. It may be readily conceded that
a greater degree of Indianization of both is desirable, but the
Indian people will seriously injure their own cause by undue
insistence upon either of these policies, particularly the latter.
The nationalist agitation has seriously damaged the morale
of the British civil service in India, and has almost completely arrested the recruiting of that service. The interests
of both India and England require the continuance in India
of at least as many English appointees, in both the civil
service and the related services, as at present, and require
that that personnel shall be of the highest quality. Any
action, whether in India or in England, that interferes with
such a result will be unfortunate to both parties. It is not
necessary that the present distribution of the English civil
servants and other officials in India shall continue, or that
the powers exercised by them shall remain the same, but
their presence as guides and councilors, as expert advisers
and assistants is essential for a multitude of reasons.
One of these reasons is that India cannot become a nation
unto itself. It must become a nation as a partner in the
great society of nations; and if it is to do so, it must command the confidence of the other partners in the society.
It may be humiliating to the pride of the Indian peoples,
but it is a fact which must be reckoned with, that the continuance of such a group of British officials in India will be
the most valuable contribution toward the creation and development of that confidence. The practice of Japan affords
a clear example on this point.
The British, on their side, should take care to select only
officials who will represent the best traditions of the service
in tact and consideration for the peoples of India and who
will conform to the growing demand for recognition of their
political and social equality. There have been unfortunate
examples of the harm that the acts and utterances of a tactless official can do. Objections have been frequently raised
to the pensions paid from Indian revenues to British civil
servants who almost invariably retire to England after the




INDIA


I03


completion of their stated period of service. If instead they
should continue to reside in India after retirement, the drain
of funds to England would cease and they might continue to
contribute from their experience and wisdom to Indian national progress and welfare.
It is perhaps worth while to add a few words with regard
to the relation of the United States to this situation. It does
not occur to most Americans that there is any such relation,
but in the minds of the people of India the relation is
extremely obvious. The very existence of the United States
is a notable argument in support of their case. The States
were once colonies of England. They declared their independence, successfully maintained it, and have grown great
and powerful.
It is extremely easy for the Indian nationalist to draw
comparisons from the American conflict with England in the
eighteenth century, and he arrives without any difficulty at
all at the conclusion that the separation of the United States
from England affords an absolute parallel and a perfectly
decisive argument for the freedom of India. It can, therefore, be understood that the Indian people naturally look to
the United States for friendship and encouragement as well
as example. Their feeling is that they are trying to do what
the Americans successfully accomplished and that the Americans ought, therefore, to be friendly disposed toward the
aims of India and ready not merely to sympathize but to
assist in the achieving of those aims.
The American in India cannot fail to be impressed with
the alertness of the people to detect an American, and the
eagerness to enter into conversation with him, which
promptly turns in the political direction, nor can he have
failed to note the sudden change of attitude upon the part
of an Indian the moment he discovers an individual is an
American and not a British citizen. It becomes almost
amusing, therefore, when one raises the question as to what
would be the attitude if the United States should be substituted for Great Britain in relation to India, to find them
answering with alacrity, "We would feel just the same toward you then as we do toward them now."




104


THE AWAKENING EAST


It would be unfair to omit one further point. There is,
after all, a limit to the self-confidence of the Indians in their
ability to succeed unaided in the achievement of their nationalist aims. When brought fairly to face the ultimate
situation, they will almost invariably acknowledge that the
continuance of British authority in India in some form and
to some degree will be indispensable to them for a considerable time to come. Even Mr. Gandhi himself seems never
to have been able entirely to free himself from such a conclusion.
The future of India, therefore, would seem to lie in the
steady growth of self-government under British protection
and guidance. The safety of the future depends not upon
listening to the rabid doctrines of the British Tory or of
the Bengali Brahmin extremist, but in the development of
ever-deepening sympathy and ever-widening cooperation.
As the unification of India under British rule was the greatest achievement of its sort in the nineteenth century, so
the successful establishment of Indian self-government
under British leadership may be the greatest fact of its sort
in the twentieth century, and prove one of the most important steps toward preparing the world for an effective brotherhood of nations.
RECENT EVENTS
In Bombay, which may be taken as an illustration of progressive provincial administration, during the five years
ending in 1923, compulsory primary education was inaugurated, model tenement houses were constructed, improvements in sanitation were carried out, and work was started
on an immense irrigation scheme at Sukkur in the Indus
valley which is planned to open up for agriculture new
land more extensive than the whole cultivated area in Egypt.
An important labor reform affecting mining operations
throughout India restricts the employment of women and
children and limits the hours of work for men.
The commission headed by Lord Inchcape on the retrenchment of expenditures9 made its report in March, 1923,
'See above, page 87.




INDIA


Io05


recommending a reduction of the estimates for annual general expenditures of ~Io5,ooo,ooo by ~I2,5oo,oo0. The government has proceeded with measures for a greater degree
of Indianization of the army, and for the reduction of military expenditures. The decision to concentrate the government offices at Simla has been made with a view to further
economies. Since the establishment of the new legislature
under the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, there has been a
failure each year to balance the budget. The government
motion for doubling the salt tax made in order to attain
that end was rejected by the assembly in March, I923, on
the ground that this tax would fall heavily on those least
able to bear it. Lord Reading then exercised his prerogative
as viceroy by "certifying" the salt tax. This procedure was
the subject of serious denunciation, and in July the assembly
passed a resolution favoring the restriction of the viceregal
power of certification.
In the earlier part of I923 there seems to have been a subsidence of unrest. There were a few sporadic disturbances
and some bolshevist agents were arrested. The adjustment
of difficulties in the Crown colony of Kenya in East Africa
proposed by the British government was unfavorable to the
claims of the Indian immigrants to that region. The Indian
people regarded the arrangement as la measure of unfair
discrimination within the empire and denounced it with remarkable unanimity. In August, I923, serious disturbances
between the Hindus and Mohammedans, and between the
Sunnite and Shiite Mohammedans began to occur and have
since continued. In August also the Ali brothers, Lajpat
Rai, and other important political prisoners were released.
Finally on September I2 the viceroy announced the dissolution of the legislative assembly.
These circumstances 'were promptly followed by a
special meeting of the Indian national congress at Delhi.
The primary purpose was to allay the religious strife, and
committees were appointed to investigate and report on the
subject. With the approval of Mr. Gandhi it was agreed
that the nationalists might stand as candidates at the approaching elections to the legislative assembly. Contrary to




Io6


THE AWAKENING EAST


the advice of Mr. Gandhi a boycott of British goods was
proclaimed in protest against the Kenya arrangements. A
proposal to extend the boycott to American goods, because
of a decision of the United States supreme court that
Hindus could not become citizens, failed. A resolution declaring complete independence the goal of the nationalist
movement was defeated by a large majority, but plans were
approved for organized civil disobedience.
At the end of December the regular meeting of the national congress assembled at Cocanada under the presidency
of Mohammed Ali, whose utterances were criticized as unduly Mohammedan in tone. The actions of the congress
were practically limited to affirmation of the decisions
reached at Delhi in September, but friction over religious
matters and between the different factions of the nationalists
was ill-concealed. Mr. Das and his followers held a conference at Lucknow and issued an ultimatum that they would
refuse to cooperate in the work of the legislative assemblies
to which they had been elected unless the British government
announced the concession of full responsible government.
Some nationalists declined to follow this -course. The proceedings of the caliphate congress which met under the
presidency of Shevket Ali displayed an ultra-Mohammedan
spirit. On February 4, 1924, Mr. Gandhi, owing to his ill
health, was released by the Bombay government unconditionally. The wisdom of this act has been generally commended.
In the elections to the legislative assembly the nationalists
obtained 50 of the I05 elective seats in the house of 145
members. In the provincial elections they won an overwhelming majority in the Central Provinces, but nowhere
else did they secure a majority, though in Bengal they obtained 49 of the 113 elective members in a house of I39.
In the Bombay presidency they secured less than a third of
the elective members, and in Madras less than a tenth. In
Bengal the governor, Lord Lytton, asked Mr. Das, the nationalist leader, to form a ministry, but he declined on the
ground that it would be contrary to the policy of his party
to undertake to conduct the government under the Montagu



INDIA


Io7


Chelmsford plan of dyarchy which it considers impracticable,10 instead of attempting to defeat its operation as a step
toward securing genuine responsible government.
In February, I924, the newly elected legislative assembly
adopted a resolution in favor of a round-table discussion of
the working of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms and their
possible revision. This drew forth a statement from the
MacDonald ministry in the British parliament disapproving
hasty action in Indian affairs. Two months later the situation in India became a subject of extended debate in the
British house of commons. The MacDonald ministry rejected a proposal for a parliamentary commission to investigate the operation of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms
but it announced that ministerial investigations were in
progress and matters were the subject of discussion with
responsible Indian politicians. The secretary of state for
India created a commission of eight members including
Indians and British residents in India under the chairmanship of Sir Alexander Muddiman, with the purpose of investigating the details of the operation of the MontaguChelmsford act, but not with the purpose of undertaking a
general revision of the measure. This commission began
work in April. At the same time announcement was made
of the establishment of a national convention at Allahabad
to unify the workers for Indian home rule. The definitely
"~Considerable evidence has been presented before the Muddiman
commission to sustain 'the indictment of dyarchy by Mr. Das. It
has been shown.that ministers for transferred subjects are at a
disadvantage both under the existing financial system and with
regard to influencing budget proposals for their departments, that
they are subject to constant government intervention in their administration of their departments, and that the conditions are such
that they are practically powerless to give proper effect to such important measures as those for compulsory primary education. If this
evidence is generally confirmed it will seem to justify the unwillingness of the nationalists to cooperate in administering the government
under the Montagu-Chelmsford act as an intermediary step to securing a fuller installment of self-government at the expiration of the
ten-year period provided in the act. In any case it explains the
present demand for prompt revision of that act.




Io8


THE AWAKENING EAST


avowed purpose of this convention was announced to be the
securing of authority from Great Britain to summon an
independent or nonofficial convention to frame a constitution for India as a dominion. This proceeding is an obvious rejoinder to the appointment of the Muddiman commission, an official creation with a circumscribed sphere of
action.
Meanwhile, the nationalists in the newly elected legislative
assembly had mustered enough votes in March, I924, to
defeat the annual budget, which has since been "certified"
by the viceroy. On May 27, the executive committee of
the Indian national congress met in Ahmedabad, the home
of Mr. Gandhi. In the opening discussions Mr. Gandhi
was able to command a majority in opposition to Mr. Das.
The intransigeant behavior of the latter, however, led Mr.
Gandhi to make concessions in order to avoid an open split.
This weakness on the part of -Mr. Gandhi resulted in an
actual success for Mr. Das and his followers who, in contrast with Mr. Gandhi's teaching of nonresistance and
noncooperation, favor aggressive, though not violent, political activity, including participation in elections and
accepting membership in the legislative councils but not
cooperation in government until full responsible government shall be granted. Nevertheless, conditions seemed to
improve and even in the legislative assembly the moderate
swarajists or nationalists cooperated with the administration
and proceedings were carried on satisfactorily.
More recently there have been some untoward occurrences which have accentuated existing causes for bitterness. A royal commission headed by Lord Lee of Fareham has been investigating the question of civil service. It
appears that the compensation and other conditions are such
that few satisfactory British candidates are now attracted
and the possible effects -are considered unfortunate. The
recommendations of the commission have been the subject
of severe criticism by the nationalists and have been rejected
by the national legislative assembly, but it is anticipated that
they will be "certified." The assembly has constituted a
commission with extensive powers to inquire into the tax



INDIA


log


able capacity of the people and the distribution of the
burden of taxation.
Religious conflicts between Mohammedansll and Hindus
persisted, notably in Delhi, and disturbances were still rife
on the northwestern frontier. On September i8, I924, in
spite of his weakened health, Mr. Gandhi announced his
intention to fast for twenty-one days as penance for the
religious strife. He declared:
"The recent events have proved unbearable for me. My
hopelessness is still more unbearable. My religion teaches
me that whenever one is very distressed which one cannot
remove, one must fast and pray. I have done so in connection with my dearest ones. Nothing evidently that I say
or write can bring the two communities together. I am
therefore imposing on myself a fast.... As a penance I
need not have taken the public into confidence, but publish
the fast as, let me hope, an effective prayer both to the
Hindus and the Mussalmans who have hitherto worked in
unison, not to commit suicide.  I respectfully invite the
heads of all the communities, including the Englishmen, to
meet and end this quarrel which is a disgrace to religion
and humanity. It seems as if God has been dethroned. Let
us reinstate him in our hearts."
In pursuance of this appeal representatives of the several religions, including Christianity, have been organized
into a committee of fifteen, with Mr. Gandhi as chairman, to
arbitrate all religious disputes.
SUGGESTIONS FOR READING
The Oxford History of India from the Earliest Times to the End
of 19ii (Oxford, The Clarendon Press, I920), by Vincent A.
Smith, a former member of the Indian civil service, replaces all
earlier works of the sort. The materials are presented in abridged
form by the same author in The Oxford Student's History of
India (8th ed., Oxford, The Clarendon Press, I919). On the
government of India, there is a good monograph study by Cecil
11The action of the government of the Turks at Angora in deposing the caliph has occurred too recently to make it possible to
determine the effect upon Mohammedan sentiment in India.




IIO


THE AWAKENING EAST


M. P. Cross entitled The Development of Self-Government in India,
1858-1914 (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1922), and for the
more recent developments there is The Political System of British
India with Special Reference to the Recent Constitutional Changes
(New York, Oxford University Press, I923), by Professor E. A.
Hore of the University of Patna.
The best analysis of the recent political movements in India will
be found in Indian Unrest (London, Macmillan and Company,
I9I0) and in India Old and New (London, Macmillan and Company, 1921), both by Sir Valentine Chirol of the London Times.
These may now be supplemented by India in Ferment (New York,
D. Appleton & Company, 1923), by Professor Claude H. Van Tyne,
of the University of Michigan, who visited India in 1922. A Review
of the Gandhi Movement in India (Political Science Quarterly, vol.
38, pp. 227-248, June, 1923), by W. H. Roberts, is an excellent
summary by a competent observer. The radical nationalist views
are set forth by Lajpat Rai in Young India, an Interpretation and
a History of the Nationalist Movement from Within (New York,
B. W. Huebsch, 1916), and in The Political Future of India (New
York, B. W. Huebsch, 1919). The situation is presented from
another angle in India's Silent Revolution (New York, The Macmillan Company, I920), by Fred B. Fisher, Bishop of the Methodist
Episcopal Church, resident at Calcutta. A valuable account of the
religious conditions and tendencies is given by John N. Farquhar,
who has spent many years in India as a student of the situation,
in Modern Religious Movements in India (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1915).
The Indian Empire, its Peoples, History, and Products (3rd ed.,
London, Smith, Elder & Co., I893), by Sir William W. Hunter, was
long the authoritative descriptive work on India. The plan of this
work has been retained but the materials have been entirely rewritten
and revised to date in vols. I-4 of the third edition of The Imperial
Gazeteer of India (Oxford, The Clarendon Press, I907-09). An
account of the several races and of castes will be found in The
People of India (2nd ed., revised by W. Crooke, London, W.
Thacker & Co., I915), by Sir Herbert H. Risley, the late ethnographical expert to the Indian census.
The Economic History of British India (4th ed., London, K.
Paul, Trench, Triibner & Co., Ltd., 1916) and its supplement, The
Economic History of India in the Victorian Age (4th ed., London,
K. Paul, Trench, Triibner & Co., Ltd., 1916), by Romesh C. Dutt,
former member of the Bengal legislative council, are useful presentations of important information, but must be used with caution
because of the excessively critical attitude toward British policy.
The current economic problems are presented from opposite points
of view in The Economic Transition in, India (London, J. Murray,!9II), by Sir Theodore Morison, and in The Foundations of




INDIA                         III
Indian Economics (London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1916) by
Radhakamal Mukerjee.
The annual reports published by the Government of India on the
moral and material progress of India, of which the latest is India
in 1922-23 (Calcutta, 1923), edited by L. F. Rushbrook Williams, are
rich in useful materials arranged in clear narrative form.




CHAPTER III


CHINA
IN dealing with India the problem presented was that of
the relations between a single western ruling power and multitudes of subject native peoples who had previously fallen
victims to division and despotic misgovernment. The Indian
peoples are, in major part, members of the same racial stock
as those of western Europe. India, moreover, has not only
been under British control for a century and a half, but has
also been in extensive and unbroken intercourse with western Europe throughout the past four centuries. The development of western ideas among the peoples of India, from
a political point of view, has consisted in the achievement of
union and progress in the establishment of self-government
under the guidance of the western ruling power. Regardless of whether British rule has favored or opposed the
spread in India of any form of western ideas, it remains true
that, in every detail, the progress of modern ideas in India
has been inseparably linked with the existence of British
rule since the third quarter of the eighteenth century.
On turning to China one discovers a radically different
situation. Racially the people of China are absolutely unrelated to the nations of western Europe. Though there has
been a slight acquaintance between China and Europe for
many centuries, the establishment of any considerable
amount of intercourse between the Celestial Empire and the
West dates from so recent a time as 1842. In that year
England secured from the Chinese government the treaty
of Nanking, which was soon followed by similar treaties
negotiated by the United States and France. For many
centuries, even millenniums, before that date China, unlike
India, had enjoyed a degree of imperial unity seldom surpassed in other lands. China has never known anything but,
national independence. Even though the country has at
112




CHINA


II3


times been ruled by foreign dynasties, the seat of government has always been in China and the character of the
government has always been essentially and fundamentally
Chinese.
During the past century, in contrast with India, China has
continued, in spite of all difficulties, to maintain the independence of its government and its national integrity. No
matter what the attitude of the Chinese government, at any
moment or in any case, has been toward modern ideas, the
progress of those ideas in China has been absolutely conditioned by the continued maintenance of the national independence and integrity. In so far as China has acquired
western forms of political organization and administration,
it has not been the result of western compulsion but of the
deliberate action of the Chinese themselves working under
the authority of their own government and guarding jealously their sovereign independence and unity. The growth
of modern ideas in China has, therefore, been entirely the 
intrusion of alien influence into territory and among peoples
under independent rule, and the relations involved have been
primarily diplomatic, though at times military, whereas the
problem in India has been essentially political.
In the case of China, moreover, the various forms of modern ideas have had to win their way by definite struggle on
every line and at every point. There has been no western
power in the country, such as the British in India, to carry
things through with a strong hand. For many and obvious
reasons there is only a narrow range within which international pressure can be successfully applied to an independent nation to enforce the adoption of foreign ways.
Even the Chinese government itself, unlike the Japanese,
has made no effort to promote consistently the introduction
and spread of approved modern ideas. Practically everything has been left to individual inclination and initiative.
Almost every idea and every practice of western origin has
had to win its own way in China. In no other country is
the relation between the oriental people and the western
ways so largely a matter of individual concern.
The reasons for the slowness to accept modern ideas, or




II4


THE AWAKENING EAST


perhaps even for antagonism to them, are not to be found
in the obtuseness of the Chinese or in the fact that they are
of a racial stock different from the Europeans instead of one
similar to them, as are the people of India. The Chinese,
indeed, are perhaps somewhat more stolid than the natives
of India, and perhaps a little more inclined to consider the
loss of time as a matter of no consequence. The fact is
that the Chinese have had an unbroken imperial history of
four thousand years during which they have developed their J
political, economic, social, and religious institutions and
their culture to a high degree. They have, therefore, quite
naturally been inclined to value that which they have and to
underrate the new ideas brought by the upstart nations of
the West. A decade or even a century looms small in their
historical perspective. Another factor which has made the
Chinese very chary in the development of their intercourse
with the western nations has been their knowledge of the
aggressive policy of the European nations, especially that
of England as displayed in the creation of its Indian Empire.
There has been a real fear in China, not merely in recent
years, but ever since the beginning of European contacts,
of the aggression of Europeans. From the outset, the
westerner has been to the Chinese a foreign devil-a conception which, it must be observed, still persists. A third
factor explanatory of China's slowness in progress is the J
very bulk of the nation. Comparison, on this point, with
Japan is illuminating.
The eighteen provinces of China proper have an area estimated at more than 1,500,000 square miles, about one sixth
less than that of the Indian Empire. The population, at the
lowest estimate, is somewhat over 300,000,000, or about the
same as that of the Indian Empire, but other estimates increase this figure as much as forty per cent. If the outlying provinces, Manchuria, Mongolia, Tibet, and Chinese
Turkestan are included, about 2,500,000 square miles must
be added to the area and about 20,000,000 to the population.
These enormous outlying regions are, of course, of great
political significance. Whether considered with reference
to the future of China or of the neighboring nations or of




CHINA


"I5


Asia as a whole, their present sparsity of population is certainly not to be taken as any safe measure of their value.
Each of these four areas presents a peculiar problem only
incidentally related to the problem of China proper. Consequently, this discussion will be devoted primarily to the
China of the eighteen provinces, with its population numbering probably one fifth of the total for the world.
Like Egypt and India, China is a land of ancient civiliza- \
tion. The valley of the Yang-tse, like the valleys of the
Nile and of the Ganges, has been one of the cradles of the
human race and one of the great sources from which civilization has been diffused. In more recent years scholars
have been overcoming their skepticism with regard to the
early annals of China and are now ready to concede that its
history may, with little uncertainty, be traced into the third
millennium before the Christian era and possibly farther.
It is not necessary to concern ourselves with the succession
of dynasties; it will suffice to note a few outstanding facts.
China has had intercourse overland with India and the
countries farther west in Asia since an indefinitely early
time. As evidence of these western contacts there may be
enumerated some factors which persist in the life of China
at the present day. Buddhism was brought from India about
the first century of the Christian era. Both Judaism and
Christianity came in at a somewhat later date and have left
their traces. In due season Mohammedanism likewise spread
into China, where it still numbers several millions of adherents. Travelers to Canton, for instance, will recall visiting an ancient mosque of peculiar type in the heart of that
city.
China, like India, was brought clearly to the knowledge
of western Europe at the close of the thirteenth century by
Marco Polo, who spent nearly a score of years at the court
of Kublai Khan, the Mongol conqueror of China and a
grandson of Genghis Khan. Almost at the time that Marco
Polo left 'China there arrived a Franciscan friar, John of
Montecorvino, who established himself at Peking, where
he was followed by other Franciscans. The Mongol khans,
sprung from a small central Asian tribe unconnected with




II6


THE AWAKENING EAST


any of the great religions, were quite tolerant and openminded toward Christianity as well as toward the other
faiths.  This Christian connection continued until the
overthrow of the Mongols and the establishment in I368
of the native Ming dynasty. During the next century and
a half there was almost no recorded contact between China
and western Europe.
Direct and uninterrupted intercourse between western
Europe and China began in ISI7. In that year the Portuguese, who had reached India by sea in I498, appeared at
Canton under the command of Andrade. They soon established themselves at Macao, which they still control, and occasionally were able to trade at other points on the coast of
China. Contacts with the Spanish began with the arrival
of the latter in the Philippines, where the Chinese were
already established in considerable numbers. Dutch and
English traders commenced to appear in the course of the
seventeenth century. Down to I842 their trade was almost
exclusively conducted through Canton, with constant reliance upon the Portuguese base at Macao. The activity of
the French and of other Europeans in the trade with China
prior to I842 was occasional and inconsiderable, but beginning in 1784 the Americans became regular and important
participants.
Under the Portuguese protection the Christian contact
with China was renewed by the great Jesuit missionary,
St. Francis Xavier, who died near Macao in I552 shortly
after his arrival. Within a half century one of his successors, Ricci, had established himself at Peking. From that
time forward the Society of Jesus continued to be an active
and influential agency for the propagation of the Christian
faith in China, until it was superseded by the Lazarists in
the eighteenth century. The history of Protestant missions
in China does not begin until the arrival at 'Canton of the V
Englishman, Robert Morrison, in I8o7 and of the American, Dr. Elijah Bridgman, in I829.
It is necessary to record but one other fact in the earlier
history of China, and that is the displacement of the native V
Ming dynasty by the foreign Manchu dynasty in I644. It




CHINA


It7


was in the reign of Tao-kwang, the sixth emperor of this
dynasty, that the events occurred which opened relations on
a larger scale between China and the nations of the West,
and that the second epoch in their intercourse began.
The abolition by act of the British parliament in 1833
of the monopoly of the East India Company in the trade
with Canton led to certain difficulties with the Chinese. To
these were soon added problems arising out of the trade in
opium and the Chinese effort to suppress it. The ensuing
hostilities are known by the English as the First China War,
but are more often referred to as the Opium War. This
conflict was terminated by the treaty of Nanking in I842,
by which the British obtained the cession of the island of
Hong Kong, the right of trading at Canton, Amoy, Foochow,
Ningpo, and Shanghai, known as the five treaty ports, and
other privileges.
The United States took prompt notice of the situation and
commissioned as its first diplomatic representative to China
Caleb Cushing, who negotiated in I844 the first treaty between the two countries. By this agreement the United States
obtained, in addition to the privileges already granted to
the English, the right of extra-territoriality, -which may be
considered the American equivalent for the cession of Hong
Kong to the English.l The principle thus established has
since prevailed with reference to the nationals of all western
treaty powers in China and is comparable to the system of
capitulations in Egypt.2  The treaty also obtained several
privileges in addition to those embodied in the English treaty,
and included a so-called most favored nation clause guaranteeing to the United States equal enjoyment of privileges
granted by China to other nations. The British had recently embodied such a provision in a supplementary treaty,
and the French treaty, also signed in I844, included a simi1The treaties of I842 and i843 did not secure to the English the
right of extra-territoriality, but the supplementary regulations embodied the principle.
'In treaties negotiated since the World War, such as those with
Germany and Russia, China has secured the abandonment of the
privilege by some nations.




II8


THE AWAKENING EAST


lar clause. Consequently the concessions accorded to each
were shared by the other two powers. The French plenipotentiary also persuaded the Chinese government to grant
toleration to the Roman Catholic faith and protection to its
missionaries, for whom France henceforth posed as the
guardian.  These privileges were shortly afterward extended to other Christians.
These arrangements mark the real opening of China to
intercourse with the western world. Henceforth European
and American traders and Christian missionaries, though
within narrowly defined limits, could live and prosecute
their enterprises in China under full guaranties of security.
In negotiating these original treaties no one of the countries
had in view a policy of colonial expansion at Chinese expense; the prime motive in each case was the development
of trade. Even the British acquisition of Hong Kong was
not political in character, but commercial, comparable to
its establishment of factories, such as Bombay, in India, in
the seventeenth century. The American treaty was framed
to secure equivalent results without the cession of territory.
The American policy developed in the negotiations and in
the treaty provisions assumed equality and co6peration with
other trading nations in dealing with China. To this policy
the United States has generally adhered; it is known, under
the altered circumstances of recent times, as the open-door
policy. Though the American theory was apparently that
China was to be treated as an international equal, the treaty
with the United States introduced the principle of extraterritoriality which has been ever since a serious infringement of Chinese sovereignty, and it copied the British precedent in establishing a conventional tariff which has likewise
persisted till the present as a vexatious limitation on the
national sovereignty of China.
It was during the Taiping rebellion in the next decade that
the United States definitely developed its second fundamental
policy in Far Eastern matters-the responsibility and territorial integrity of the Asiatic sovereign power as essential
to the safeguard of treaty rights. The Taiping rebellion,
which seems to have owed its origin, in some part, to the




CHINA


II9


teachings of Christian missionaries, was in considerable
measure directed against the foreign Manchu dynasty. Its
success would, no doubt, have resulted in the disruption of
China. Humphrey Marshall, the American representative
in China, was the first to grasp this fact, and he laid down
the principle that it was to the interest of the United States
for the assurance of its treaty rights to support the integrity
of the political authority with which the treaty had been
made. This was in contrast to the generally friendly attitude at first maintained by the other trading powers toward
the Taiping rebels, but the correctness of the principle soon
found acceptance with the other diplomatic representatives.
It was at least with the sympathy of these representatives
of the foreign powers that the imperial government employed the services first of Frederick Ward, of Salem, later
of Burgevine, another American, and finally of Major
Charles George Gordon, a British officer, who thus won
the name by which he is commonly known-Chinese Gordon. The creation and direction of the Ever-Victorious
Army by these officers resulted, in time, in the suppression
of the rebellion and the restoration of imperial authority.
Out of one incident of the Taiping rebellion, the seizure
of Shanghai by a rebel force, came the establishment of the
Imperial Maritime Customs Service, which still administers
the collection of tariff duties. The service is an agency of
the Chinese government, but its efficiency is dependent upon
its foreign staff recruited from the treaty nations. One of
its earliest members was Robert Hart, an Englishman, who
came to be for a long period of years the head of the service
and the most influential foreign personage in China.
Provisions in the original treaties permitted their revision after twelve years. Accordingly, the several powers
engaged in negotiations to secure additional privileges and
larger facilities for trade. The new treaties, after many
delays, were signed in 1858. The circumstances connected
with their negotiation had emphasized the disadvantageous
conditions under which diplomatic intercourse had to be
carried on and led to a determination that, in the future,
negotiations should be conducted directly with the imperial




120


THE AWAKENING EAST


authorities at Peking and not through subordinates at a
distance from the central government. To this end, it was
decided that the ratifications must be exchanged at Peking.
The effort to achieve this result led to a new conflict
which the English call the Second China War, but which is
also known as the Anglo-French War with China. The
Americans maintained an independent position except for
the entirely unauthorized intervention of the naval officer,
Commodore Tatnall, in one of the engagements in which he
used the famous phrase, "Blood is thicker than water."
Though it is difficult to find justification for all the actions
of the British and French, the important fact was that the
ratifications were exchanged and that the way for diplomatic
intercourse at Peking was permanently opened. To meet
this new situation the Chinese created, in I86o, the Tsung-li
Yamen, or foreign office, the most important modification
of their government effected in the nineteenth century.
This achievement closed the second important epoch in the
development -of intercourse between the western nations
and China.
It was at this time that the Russians acquired control of
the provinces in the Amur valley over which China had here- v
tofore claimed sovereignty. Russia also established its first
regular diplomatic representation at Peking instead of depending upon the agency of priests of the Orthodox Church,
who had been established there ever since the original treaty
between Russia and China as far back as I689. Russia was
thus added to the group of leading western powers directly
concerned in relations with China.
In i86I President Lincoln nominated as the American
minister at Peking, Anson Burlingame. He was a Harvard
graduate and thoroughly in sympathy with the ideas represented in American politics by Charles Sumner. With such
principles it was not unnatural that he should enter into
far more intimate and sympathetic relations with the Chinese
than had any previous foreign representative in the country.
So completely did he win the confidence of the Chinese that
in 1867 he resigned his post as American minister and accepted an appointment from the Chinese government as




CHINA


121


plenipotentiary to all the western powers with which China
had treaty relations.
Burlingame, with a company of about thirty Chinese officials, landed at San Francisco and visited many of the
principal cities of the United States, arousing remarkable
enthusiasm, interest, and sympathy for China. Finally, as
head of the mission, he visited Washington and negotiated
a supplementary treaty with Secretary Seward upon very
liberal terms. Later he and the mission visited London,
where they had satisfactory conversations with Lord Clarendon, the foreign secretary. Then they went on to Paris,
Berlin, and St. Petersburg, where the activities of the mission came to an untimely end because of the death of
Burlingame from pneumonia.
The services of Burlingame to both the United States and
China will always be memorable as highly creditable to both
nations. The mission which he headed to the western powers
marks the third epoch in the development of the relations of
the Celestial Empire with the western nations, since this was
the first occasion on which China sent its envoys to the West
and was followed by the establishment of regular Chinese
diplomatic representation at western capitals. With this
exception the generation following the treaties of 1858-I860
witnessed few changes of importance affecting the relations
of China with the western powers and only minor ones affecting matters of trade. The outstanding events were the
adoption by the United States of a policy of restricting
Chinese immigration under a treaty negotiated in i880;
the settlement in i88i with Russia of the question of Chinese Turkestan on terms favorable to China; and the less
fortunate dealings with France relative to Indo-China.
China had for centuries exercised sovereignty over a
large portion of the peninsula of Further India or IndoChina. The French had begun to establish themselves there
about i860 and had gradually extended their activities,
which resulted in a war between France and China. At the
termination of this war, in 1885, the latter was compelled
to renounce its sovereignty over the Indo-China territories
in favor of France. In the adjustment of this dispute China




122


THE AWAKENING EAST


was largely indebted to the good offices of the American
minister, John Russell Young, and of Mr. Robert Hart. In
i886 China was constrained to recognize the establishment
of British, instead of its own, sovereignty over Burma.
In the course of the period various other nations entered
into treaty relations with China, so that the number of treaty
powers was increased to nearly a score. The establishment
of oceanic steam navigation, of improved postal communications, and of submarine cable service brought China into
quicker and closer relations with all these nations. The
growth of commerce in the period was considerable but not
remarkable. Imports increased in far greater proportion
than exports, a fact which showed that the Chinese were
failing to awaken to proper utilization of their opportunities.
This failure or indifference appears most clearly in the case
of the tea trade, which reached its height in i886 and then
decreased rapidly. One circumstance highly unfavorable
to China was the steady decline in exchange of silver, the
medium of trade.
Prior to I894 China, with trifling exceptions, managed
to avoid contracting foreign loans or granting foreign concessions for railway, mining, or industrial development.
Only in telegraph construction had China yielded, to any
serious extent, to the pressure to introduce modern inventions and methods.  There persisted the strongest disinclination for any action which might give the foreigner added
grasp upon the resources of the nation or influence upon its
government. The conclusion seems to be indisputable that
the generation ending in I894 was for China one of decline
and of neglected opportunities. The contrast with Japan
is illuminating. It was in 1854, a decade after the first group
of treaties with China, that Commodore Perry, on behalf
of the United States, negotiated the first treaty between
Japan and a western nation. Beginning with the changes
known as the Restoration, in I868, the year of the Burlingame mission, Japan entered upon a regular policy of
adjustment to modern and western ways. The dissimilar
behavior of the two countries came to the test of war in I894.
The fourth epoch in the relations between China and the




CHINA


I23


western nations included the important series of events
beginning with the outbreak of war between China and
Japan in 1894 and closing with the settlement with the
western nations in 1901 after the Boxer rebellion. The
defeat of China by Japan cost the empire its claim to the
suzerainty over Korea and its possession of the island of
Formosa. Only the intervention of Germany, Russia, and
France prevented Japan from exacting even more severe
terms, which would have included the possession of Port
Arthur and the occupation of Wei-hai-wei pending the payment of an indemnity. How disinterested this intervention
was appeared soon after, when Germany occupied Kiaochao in 1897, Russia obtained Port Arthur, and France acquired Kwangchow-wan, both in 1898. To offset these,
Great Britain promptly negotiated leases of Wei-hai-wei
and the Kowloon peninsula.
The occupation of these valuable strategic points was the
culmination of a series of measures by which these four
European powers and Japan had acquired numerous concessions in China for railway, mining, and other enterprises,
and by which they had entered into agreements marking
out their respective spheres of influence. The result of
these various proceedings was to assure to the powers concerned the control directly or potentially of every Chinese
port of any value and a practical monopoly of concessions
in China. The humiliation suffered by China at the hands
of these powers in the brief space of five years is without
historical parallel. It was the penalty for neglect of the
opportunities for the adoption of western ideas and for adjustment to modern conditions.
Only one power with large interests in China was not a
party to the proceedings. Not only was the attention of the
United States diverted by the Spanish War, but the aggressive acts of the powers were directly contrary to the
American policy of maintaining the territorial integrity of
China, of seeking nothing more than equality with any and
every other power under the most favored nation clause,
and of cooperating with all the treaty powers in commercial
relations with China. The establishment of the United




124


THE AWAKENING EAST


States on the Pacific coast by the settlement of the Oregon
boundary question in 1846 and by the annexation of California in 1848 had given the American people a larger
direct concern than any other western power in Pacific
Ocean and Far Eastern questions. The completion of the
transcontinental railroad to San Francisco in I869 had also
brought the United States into quicker, easier, and cheaper
communication with eastern Asia and all Pacific lands, in
spite of the opening of the Suez canal in the same year.
Notwithstanding these facts, since the treaties of 1858,
America's share in the trade with China had failed to keep
pace with that of other countries. This was largely explicable by the conditions in the United States itself, which
afforded more than abundant scope for American financial
enterprise in the great period of railway construction and of
agricultural and industrial development. The preoccupation
of the United States government with numerous other interests nearer home had led to neglect to promote, or even
to safeguard properly, American interests in the Far East,
where in general the relations with Japan, rather than those
with China, were receiving chief attention. This indifference to Pacific and Far Eastern affairs, which developed
after the retirement in I869 of Seward as secretary of
state, had become practically a settled policy under the
second administration of President Cleveland from I893
to I 897.
Though the dispute with Spain had distracted the attention of the United States from China at the critical period
of the European infringements upon that nation's territorial integrity, a lucky chance afforded by the Spanish War
enabled the Americans to establish themselves in the Philippine Islands. This advantage offset the gains of the European powers without antagonizing either China or Japan.
The further annexations of Hawaii and Guam gave a
strategic line of communications, and clinched the position
of the United States as the most important power in the
northern Pacific. Henceforth the United States was irrevocably committed to a policy of active participation in the
affairs of eastern Asia.




CHINA


125


In I899, the United States was free to turn its attention
to the changed situation in China in order to protect its
treaty rights and commercial interests from infringement
arising from the recent aggressions, by the several great
powers, upon Chinese territory and sovereignty, and to
prevent the repetition of such acts. Through the ambassadors of the United States at the courts of the powers concerned, request was made for adherence to certain principles
with regard to relations with China. The several powers
obviously did not view these proposals with uniformly warm
approbation, but each felt constrained to reply that it would
assent provided all the others did. Acting upon the basis
of these answers from all the powers, the United States
announced that the principles laid down had been accepted
by all parties interested.
This was the American diplomatic achievement of establishing the doctrine of the open door in China. In this
action the United States was not inaugurating a new policy,
but it was, under seriously altered conditions, reasserting
two fundamental principles upon which American relations
in the Far East have been based from the outset. It was
taking action to maintain the integrity of China against U
further infringement of its territory and sovereignty by asserting the principle of equality of opportunity in trade.
Furthermore, this action was based upon the principle of
cooperation or concurrent action of the powers concerned. I
Whatever may be the real interest of any other power, there
can be no doubt whatsoever that it is most consistent with
the other aspects of American policy, as well as with the
selfish interests of the United States, that the independence
and integrity of the nations of the Far East should be maintained, and that in matters of trade and of other economic
concerns there should be equality of opportunity among the
nations such as was asserted by the United States and the
other powers in their original treaties with China by the inclusion of the most favored nation clause. The United
States soon had an opportunity to uphold these principles
under entirely new conditions.
In I898 the young Chinese emperor, inspired by the pro



I26


THE AWAKENING EAST


gressive scholar, Kang Yu-wei, undertook to assume the
personal direction of the government and to inaugurate a
policy of reform and of introduction of modern ideas.
After a few weeks this presumptuous procedure was arrested by the vigorous empress dowager, who placed the
young emperor in seclusion for the remainder of his days
and took direct charge of the government.  Ever since
the Taiping rebellion, at least, the control of the Manchu
dynasty over China had been obviously precarious. The
foreign aggressions, beginning with the war with Japan
and culminating in the European occupation of Chinese
ports, had severely injured the prestige of the dynasty as
well as menaced the integrity of the empire. These and
other factors produced a sudden outburst of anti-Manchu
feeling in many parts of the country. The empress dowager
shrewdly seized the situation to strengthen the position of
the dynasty by directing the movement against the western
powers and their citizens and against all things western and
Christian in general. The serious and widespread disturbances which ensued, known as the Boxer movement, culminated in the siege of the foreign legations in Peking in
the summer of I900.
The United States joined with the other powers in the
military and other measures for the relief of the legations
and later for the restoration of settled conditions and relations. The arrangements imposed by the western nations
upon China in I901 involved not merely punishments for
outrages committed upon foreigners and payment of an indemnity, but also extension of privileges for foreigners in
China. In these negotiations, the United States adhered to
the policy of concurrent action of the powers, on the one
hand, while on the other hand, it governed its procedure
upon the basis of upholding the integrity of China and the
authority of its government. At the time it was hard to
understand why the empress dowager was permitted to remain in power, but when the policy involved is made clear
the reasons are obvious and convincing. Scarcely any other
action that might conceivably have been taken could have
prevented the break up of China. Such a contingency could




-CHINA


I27


not have resulted otherwise than disadvantageously for the
United States, unless the American people were prepared
to enter upon a policy of annexation of Asiatic territory
with all the complications and difficulties involved.
This fourth epoch in the history of the relations of China
to the western powers, which began with the opening of the
war with Japan, had witnessed serious infringements upon
the sovereignty of China and a consequent anti-foreign outbreak. This in turn had resulted in a general foreign intervention which had ended in breaking down, to a far greater
extent than ever before, the barriers of Chinese seclusion
and in throwing the country practically wide open to the
influx of modern ideas and to the activities of the treaty
powers.
The part which the United States had taken in recent
events gave it a stronger position in the Far East than ever
before. The justice of its attitude in the dealings with
China created a favorable impression in that country which
was greatly strengthened by the action of the United States,
in I907, in foregoing the balance of the indemnity money.
Ever since then the Chinese have usually regarded the
Americans as their best friends among the nations of the
world. The opposite was true in the case of Russia which,
in the years immediately following the Boxer rebellion, continued to pursue in Manchuria the same aggressive policy
as in the years immediately preceding. The behavior of
Russia aroused the indignation and fear not only of the
Chinese but also of the treaty powers, especially Japan,
which felt its own interests vitally imperiled. The first outcome of this situation was the formation in I902 of the
Anglo-Japanese alliance; the second was the declaration of
war by Japan against Russia in I904.
The victory of Japan over Russia in the war, which was
fought in the very homeland of the Manchu dynasty while
China looked on powerlessly, revealed clearly to the Chinese
the advantages acquired by Japan through the adoption of
modern ways. The achievement of Japan, a country much
smaller than China, with less population and fewer resources,
and with a civilization which the Chinese regarded as pri



128


THE AWAKENING EAST


marily borrowed from their own, afforded emphatic proof
that it was the effective utilization of western civilization
which had enabled the Asiatic island empire to check the
overwhelming power of European Russia.
The suppression of the Boxer movement by the joint action of the powers had secured the opening of China more
widely to the activities of those powers, but it had by no
means convinced the Chinese of the merits of modern ways.
Since then China had been rather sullenly permitting the
western powers to go ahead in the pursuit of their interests. After the Russo-Japanese War, the Chinese promptly
adopted a more cordial attitude toward things occidental
and sought in a much fuller measure than ever before the
counsel of western advisers. The development of railways,
telegraphs, and other improvements which had been initiated after the war with Japan began to go rapidly forward.
This is shown by the following figures: in I898 the number
of miles of railroad in operation in the Chinese Empire was
250; in I90I, 950; in I903, 2,800o; in I905, 3,700; in I909,
4,730; in I913, 5,960; and in I92o, 6,8I3.
A much more notable effect of Japan's defeat of Russia
was the abolition of the time-honored examination system
for the selection of provincial and national officials, and the
determination to introduce, in place of the old Chinese classical education, training upon modern lines as a basis of qualification for public employment. This action was taken in
I905, a few weeks after the signing of the treaty which
closed the war. While many influences contributed to this
decision one of the most important was undoubtedly the
work done in the schools and colleges maintained in China
by the Protestant missions, a majority of which were under
American management.
The government of China, as well as its culture, had been
based upon education, of which an indigenous system had
been in wide operation for centuries. This system, because
of the examination method for selecting public officials, had
developed a highly competitive character that was obviously
individualistic in its effects. There were also sharply
marked gradations of rank and privilege which gave a closely




CHINA


129


bound corporate character to the scholarly class. China did
not need western influence or missionary activities to teach
it the value of education, but it had to learn from them the
utility of western education with its greater flexibility and
freedom as compared with its own traditional classical
learning.
The introduction of modern education had immediate and
extensive practical results in the establishment of numerous
schools for training in fields of applied science, such as
medicine, engineering, and agriculture. It emphasized the
necessity for schools to train teachers in western methods,
and consequently numerous normal and higher normal
schools were created. At Peking and elsewhere under national, provincial, and private enterprise, universities, colleges, and lower schools of the western type began to spring
up. When the United States remitted the indemnity money,
it was with the understanding that it should be applied to
the promotion of education, and China decided to use the
funds for educating selected youth in the schools and universities of America.
In all these developments the influence of the missionary
example, if not more direct assistance, was potent. China
was brought into illuminating contact not merely with modern science and its useful applications but also with western
political ideas, especially those of the United States. In
this particular the influence of the American mission schools
and colleges was without doubt of extraordinary significance. This does not mean that the missionaries had deliberately disseminated propaganda in favor of American
political institutions. They had unconsciously and inevitably
exemplified liberal and republican conceptions to their pupils
in a multitude of ways, and these pupils had not been slow
to study American history and constitutional development.
In I908, within a few days of each other, occurred the
deaths of the emperor and of the empress dowager. Under
the established rule of succession, a child was placed on the
throne. The regency was intrusted to the child's father,
Prince Chun, a brother of the late emperor, who had visited
Europe after the Boxer affair to offer the apologies of China




130


THE AWAKENING EAST


at Berlin. In her last years the empress dowager had been
shrewd enough to recognize the changing situation and had
sanctioned various cautious measures of reform, had yielded
to the pressure of circumstances in other cases, and had
authorized still other acts which might appear outwardly
as concessions to progressive demands but were in reality
intended to ward off genuine governmental reform. These
measures included a reorganization of the ministries in i906,
and decrees in 1907 providing for provincial assemblies and
a national assembly, which did actually meet in I909 and
1910 respectively. Finally, in I908, a few weeks before the
death of the dowager empress, there was issued a program
for constitutional reform to extend over nine years and to
culminate in the meeting of an elected parliament.
Ever since the outbreak of war with Japan in I894 there
had been a steady cumulation of events which discredited
the foreign Manchu dynasty. The policy of foreign loans
for railway construction as well as for governmental purposes added to the general discontent. To face this situation the dynasty was represented by an infant monarch with
a regent whose career could not inspire national pride or
confidence.  Neither among the other representatives of
the dynasty nor among the Manchus was there to be found
a single possible leader. The helplessness of the dynasty
became even more apparent in May, I9II, when the old
governmental councils were abolished and replaced by a
cabinet and privy council with Prince Ching as prime minister. This individual was a septuagenarian whose inability
and corrupt petty politics had long been as much the subject
of jest in Peking as had been the similar characteristics of
the Duke of Newcastle in London in the middle of the eighteenth century.
Since the suppression of the Taiping rebellion in 1864
there had been sporadic outbreaks at frequent intervals in
many parts of the empire. Numerous secret societies of
revolutionary tendencies had sprung up, while other organizations supported less extensive demands for reforms.
Leadership in these movements was taken chiefly by foreign-trained students. The large number of these who had




CHINA


13I


studied in Japan since I895 was considered to form the
more radical group. A small number had been trained in
the United States and in European countries. These together with the former students of the mission colleges seem
to have been equally earnest in the desire for reform but
to have advocated more moderate policies.
Outbreaks, apparently of the usual sporadic sort, occurred
in the province of Sze-chuan in July, I9II, and at Hankow
in October. Since it did not, however, prove possible to
suppress them, the revolutionary movement spread, especially in the more southerly provinces. A single official,
a Chinese not a Manchu, Yuan Shih-kai, had a record
which marked him out as possibly able to save the country
and the dynasty in the crisis. Though intrusted by the
Manchus with all necessary powers, he soon discovered the
impossibility of preserving either the dynasty or the monarchy. Accordingly, he decided that the welfare of the
country required that he should come to terms with the
revolutionary party. As a consequence, on February 12,
1912, it was announced that the emperor had abdicated,
leaving authority in the hands of Yuan Shih-kai. At the
same time Doctor Sun Yat-sen, the revolutionary leader, who
had a few weeks earlier been elected provisional president
of the republic, resigned.  The revolutionary assembly
promptly elected Yuan Shih-kai provisional president, and
one of the revolutionary generals, Li Yuan-hung, vice-president. A republican document was proclaimed as the provisional constitution.  These events, which are usually
spoken of as the Revolution, constituted, as time has shown,
the first phase of the revolutionary period. They also
brought to a close the fifth epoch in the relations with western
nations, which had been characterized by the Russo-Japanese
War and its effects.
The firm establishment of the new government and the
restoration of order throughout the country proved a slow
and difficult process. The revolution had wrecked the internal financial system and left the new government practically without funds. It became necessary, therefore, to
seek another foreign loan to tide over the period of recon



132


THE AWAKENING EAST


struction. The negotiations were not completed till April,
1913, when Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and
Japan agreed to furnish the so-called reorganization loan.
One of the earliest acts of President Wilson's administration was to insist on the withdrawal of the American bankers from the arrangement on the ground that the conditions
attached to the loan were infringements upon the administrative independence of China. The first parliament of
the republic met just as the loan negotiations were being
completed. The majority in the parliament represented the
revolutionary party and had already become antagonistic
to the president because of his conservative, if not reactionary, policy. In spite of the parliamentary attacks and refusal to sanction the loan, Yuan Shih-kai concluded the
agreement which supplied him with funds adequate to carry
out his program of reconstruction. A southern revolt in
protest, supported by Sun Yat-sen, was soon suppressed,
and Doctor Sun took refuge in Japan.
In October, I913, Yuan Shih-kai was elected president
for a regular term of five years. Soon afterward he expelled his opponents from the parliament, and in January
proclaimed a dissolution. Later the provincial councils were
also dismissed. A special body was promptly nominated to
revise the constitution, and in May, 1914, the changes were
proclaimed. At this point the outbreak of the World War
seriously modified the conditions under which the reconstruction of China was to proceed. Since the close of the
Russo-Japanese War the movement of international events
had not seriously affected China, but the drift of things had
tended to strengthen Japan and to increase its interests and
influence in China. The situation created by the World War
gave Japan practically a free hand in the Far East. In
November, 1914, it seized the German concession of Kiaochao and assumed succession to German interests in Shantung. The famous "twenty-one demands" of Japan were
presented in the following January, and in May, I9I5, China
was forced to accede to the major part of them.
Inconsistency and sudden shifts seem to mark the career
of Yuan Shih-kai, but careful consideration reveals steadfast




CHINA


133


adherence to a policy of seeking the reorganization of the
country by means of the strongest and most centralized
government procurable. For this reason he had endeavored to substitute the republican government for the imperial
rule with as little break as possible; and later he had dissolved the unruly parliament and eliminated revolutionary
leaders from power. The movement of internal events had
transformed his position into a dictatorship; the intervention of Japan seemed convincing evidence that China needed
a still stronger government, and Yuan began to plan for a
restoration of the empire with himself as sovereign. Had
this plan succeeded, it would have been a reasonably close
parallel to the circumstances of the establishment of the
Ming dynasty over five centuries earlier.
In November, 19I5, a vote was secured naming Yuan as
emperor, and a month later the revival of the monarchy was
proclaimed. Thus far the Napoleonic methods worked admirably, but at this point the outbreak of widespread revolt
rendered the plan abortive. Yuan was constrained to announce the abandonment of his ambitious plan and to revoke
all the preliminary edicts which had been issued. He continued to cling to power until June, 1916, when he died a
broken man. For four years Yuan's rule had held China
together and maintained internal order, though it had not
been able to resist the intervention of Japan. This was the
second phase of the revolutionary era.
After Yuan's death the vice-president, Li Yuan-hung, at
once assumed the presidency, and, true to his original revolutionary principles, recalled the parliament which had been
dissolved a year and a half previously. The strong man in
the administration, however, was the premier, Tuan Chi-jui,
an adherent of Yuan Shih-kai, whose policies he tried to
maintain through the changing situations of the ensuing four
years. For a year events drifted steadily toward a rupture
between the president, relying upon the support of the revolutionary element in parliament, and the premier, depending upon the aid of the military governors of the provinces.
The power of the central government at Peking declined
rapidly and the country came to be more and more at the




I34


THE AWAKENING EAST


mercy of the provincial military governors, now called
tuchuns, and of the troops under their commands.
Again the situation was complicated by the World War.
In the winter of 1917, when the United States broke off
diplomatic relations with Germany, pressure was placed
upon China to follow suit. This it did in March. As soon
as the United States declared war in April, China was urged
to take the further step. The prime minister, supported by
the military governors, was eager for war, as he hoped to
secure a suspension of the Boxer indemnity. China would
also be assured a seat at the peace conference and so be
entitled to present its case with reference to the foreign infringements of the nation's sovereignty. The president and
the parliamentary party wished at least to defer action, for
they feared that war would afford the military governors
opportunity to increase their power and defeat the cause of
parliamentary government. The issues were sharply drawn.
The president and his followers were accused of yielding to
German influence, while the premier was charged with depending upon Japanese support. The rupture came in May,
1917, when the president refused to yield to the demands
of Tuan Chi-jui and the tuchuns and dismissed the premier.
Three troubled and critical months followed.
Tuan and the tuchuns formed a provisional government at
Tientsin and began to concentrate troops about Peking. The
president turned for assistance to an illiterate swashbuckler,
General Chang Hsun. On reaching Peking the general
ordered the president to dissolve parliament. On July i he
proclaimed the restoration of the Manchu boy emperor, as
a cloak for his own dictatorial ambitions. Within three
weeks Tuan IChi-jui, with the support of the tuchuns, overwhelmed the impossible Chang Hsun, sent the young emperor back into seclusion, installed the vice-president, Feng
Kuo-chang, as acting president instead of Li Yuan-hung,
and resumed the premiership. A month later Premier Tuan
was able to carry out his purpose of declaring war on Germany. Following the dissolution of parliament, a considerable group of the members installed themselves at Canton
and claimed that they were the only representatives of con



CHINA


I35


stitutional authority in the country. This crisis, with the
establishment of a rival government at Canton and the entrance into the World War, brought to a close the third
phase of the revolutionary movement.
The question of the policy to be pursued with reference
to the revolt in the South promptly produced a breach between the acting president and the premier. The former
favored a policy of conciliation; the latter, as was his habit,
preferred stronger measures. The premier again forced the
issue by resigning and appealing to the support of the
tuchuns. General Chang Tso-lin, a former bandit chief
who had become super-tuchun of Manchuria, intervened to
restore Premier Tuan and to support his policy, which the
acting president was constrained to accept. In order to give a
color of constitutionality to his proceedings, Tuan Chi-jui,
following the precedent established by his exemplar, Yuan
Shih-kai, created a new body to revise the constitution again.
The consequent changes were proclaimed in February, I9I8,
a new parliament was chosen, and a new president, Hsu
Shih-chang, elected, who was installed on the anniversary
of the revolution, October Io, I9I8. The new administration took a conciliatory attitude toward the southern revolt,
arranged an armistice, and carried on prolonged but futile
negotiations for reunification of the nation.
When China declared war on Germany the Allied powers
suspended payments due them on the Boxer indemnity and
made promises of other measures advantageous to the Chinese. The action of the United States, in November, I9I7,
in entering into the Lansing-Ishii agreement with Japan,
ostensibly guaranteed the open-door policy but actually
recognized Japan's special interest in China. It was to prove
the forerunner of President Wilson's ultimate concession
to Japan on the Shantung question at the peace conference.
China's participation in the World War involved no direct
military action, but thousands of coolies were sent to France,
where their work behind the lines was of valuable assistance.
To meet the situation in Asia created by the seizure of the
control of the Russian government by the bolshevists in
November, 91I7, Japan entered into a secret agreement with




136


THE AWAKENING EAST


the Peking government in the following March which was
renewed a year later. This agreement furnished a basis for
charges of pro-Japanese attitude brought against the administration of President Hsu and Premier Tuan. It was also
alleged that large sums of Japanese money were expended
in China to promote the continuance of unsettled conditions
and so permit the strengthening of Japanese hold on the
country. In any case there was at this time a remarkable
increase of Japanese activities in China and its outlying
provinces.
Whatever may have been the actual sympathies or purposes of the Peking government, public opinion in the country, so far as it existed, looked to the peace conference at
Paris to secure relief from all impairments of the national
sovereignty and recognition of full equality in the society
of nations. This was considered the logical outcome from
the principle of the self-determination of peoples. When it
became apparent that the treaty would recognize Japan's
position in Kiao-chao and Shantung there swept over China
a tremendous wave of strikes and boycotts directed against
the Japanese and their goods. So vehement was this protest
that the Peking government was constrained to refuse to
permit its representatives to sign the treaty of Versailles
in June, I9I9. Positive action in protection of national interests was prevented by the conflict between North and
South, by the general administrative disintegration, and by
the actual strength of Japan's position in the country.
Over a year elapsed after the signature of the treaty of
Versailles without any significant change in the domestic
or international situation of China. Dissatisfaction with
Premier Tuan Chi-jui and his supporters known as the
Anhwei party3 increased and denunciations of them as subservient to Japan constantly grew louder. Finally in July,
I920, the northern tuchuns felt constrained to permit General Wu Pei-fu, one of the few high military officials acceptable to the reform party, to drive Premier Tuan and
his Anhwei adherents from office. The triumph of the


'Also known as the An-fu (Anhwei-Fukien) party.




CHINA


I37


anti-Japanese movement in the expulsion of Tuan Chi-jui,
who had been the most important personage in the government since the death of Yuan Shih-kai, closed another
phase, the fourth, of the revolutionary period.
General Wu Pei-fu and the reformers were not yet
destined to acquire control. The northern tuchuns, Chang
Tso-lin of Manchuria and Tsao Kun of Chi-li, the province
around Peking, did not relax their grip upon the situation.
President Hsu, with a new cabinet, continued in office, but
his tenure was at the discretion of the tuchuns. The government took two actions of international importance in
the ensuing year. China now gave its adhesion to the League
of Nations, and in December, I920, was elected to the council of the League. In May, I92I, a separate treaty of peace
with Germany was signed. This included one notable advantage for China, as Germany renounced its claim to the
privilege of extra-territoriality in return for a guarantee of
trial for any of its subjects in accordance with modern law
in courts of modern type. The main occupations of the
government, however, were fruitless negotiations over foreign loans, the funding, in February, I92I, of numerous
domestic obligations by an internal loan guaranteed on the
proceeds of the wine and tobacco taxes, and the relations
with the rival southern government at Canton.
The revolutionary party, which had maintained some pretense of a government at Canton since I9i6, formally proclaimed it the only legitimate government of the republic
of China and elected Doctor Sun Yat-sen as president.
Doctor Sun was born in I867 of a Christian father and received his degree in medicine from the college in Hong
Kong. While practicing his profession in Canton in I895
he took part in a revolutionary plot and was forced to flee
the country. He resided for varying periods in Hawaii,
the United States, England, and Japan, but everywhere devoted himself to his revolutionary policies. When the revolution broke out in I9II he hurried back to China and was
promptly elected provisional president of the republic. He
retired in favor of Yuan Shih-kai, with whom he cooperated
for a time, especially promoting an elaborate project for a




I38


THE AWAKENING EAST


national railway system. In 1913 he was identified with the
abortive revolt and took refuge in Japan, but in I9I6 became
the leading figure in the establishment of the revolutionary
government at Canton. Whatever other judgment may be
passed upon his career at Canton, it must be recognized
that the city has profited greatly from the extensive material improvements and the administrative reorganization
which he inaugurated.
It can hardly be doubted that Doctor Sun is absolutely
sincere in his republicanism, his liberal ideas, and his loyalty
to the national interests of China. His behavior has often
appeared, rightly or wrongly, as equivocal, especially his
attitude toward Japan and other powers. Most observers
consider him an idealist with no gifts as an administrator
or statesman. His career bears some analogy to that of
Samuel Adams, though the points of similarity between the
two are extremely few. It is perhaps a fair judgment to
say that he holds unwaveringly to his main principles, but
in order to gain success for them he is ready to try many
shifts. His actual experience in governmental responsibility
has not been large enough to afford a fair basis for judgment. Events have repeatedly shown his inability to control the military situation in the South; indeed it has more
than once been turned to his disadvantage, as in his expulsion from Canton in the summer of I922. In spite of all
that may be said to his disadvantage, it seems clear that far
beyond any other individual he commands the admiration
and the confidence of loyal and intelligent Chinese throughout the country.
The relations between the Peking and Canton governments must not be thought of as at all comparable to the
relations of rigorous hostility and unremitting warfare between the North and the South in the United States during
the Civil War. The North and the South in China represent
respectively the solidly conservative and the distinctly liberal party types, but in revolutionary China it is the fashion
to utilize retainers armed with rifles to support political
policies. Each party type is prevalent but not dominant in
its respective section. There are no sharply drawn lines,




CHINA


139


geographical, political, or military. Military activities, indeed, are often so perfunctory as to suggest marionette
maneuvers; sometimes they degenerate into banditry; again
they attain to the dignity of political processions. The war
in China is not so much a civil war as a fronde-a sling-shot
war. In the autumn of I92I the continuance of the Peking
government seemed due to inertia rather than to any active
support. It still enjoyed exclusive recognition by the foreign powers, in accordance with their policy dating from
the time of the Taiping rebellion. Such support as the
Canton government received was due to the active interest
of the liberal element in the nation. On both sides were
to be found many whose chief aims were money and office.
Such was the situation when it became known that a conference which would consider Pacific and Far Eastern questions was to meet in Washington in November, I92I, and
that China was to be among the participating powers. The
Peking government realized its responsibility for representing the interests of China as a whole regardless of partisan
warfare, and set itself to secure the fullest possible presentation of China's case and to seek to remove every impairment of the nation's sovereignty. The outlook for success
was far from bright, but the results were surprisingly advantageous.
The strictly conference actions gave treaty sanction in
the most specific terms to the policy of the open door and
provided for moderate readjustment of the tariff duties, for
the abolition of the likin or provincial duties to be replaced
by a customs surtax, and for periodical revision of the tariff
duties. The conference also adopted resolutions providing
for the discontinuance of the foreign post offices in China,
for the elimination of foreign radio stations, for the withdrawal of foreign troops stationed in China, and for the
creation of a commission to study the question of the
abolition of the privilege of extra-territoriality, which it
was recognized should take place as soon as Chinese laws
and tribunals were qualified to handle cases of foreigners
satisfactorily.
The question of Japan's position in Kiao-chao and Shan



140


THE AWAKENING EAST


tung became the subject of direct negotiations between the
two countries under the friendly offices of the United States
and Great Britain.   The result was a treaty providing
for the complete withdrawal of Japan from political, military, and railway interests4 in Shantung and for the surrender of the leasehold of Kiao-chao. This action was accompanied by declarations from Great Britain and France that
they would, under certain conditions, surrender their leases
to Wei-hai-wei and Kwangchow-wan.
The conference arrangements did not affect the status
of the outlying provinces of Manchuria, Mongolia, Chinese
Turkestan, and Tibet, but they promised to free all territory
of China proper from actual foreign control, except Macao
under Portuguese jurisdiction, Hong Kong including Kowloon under British authority, and the foreign concessions
in Shanghai and certain other ports.5 The action of the conference terminated the period in which the carving out of
spheres of influence or even the partition of China by foreign powers had been impending. The continuance of the
conventional tariff and of the port concessions and the
failure to secure the prompt and definite termination of
extra-territoriality were serious disappointments to China,
as they were felt to be not merely impairments of the national sovereignty but also marks of the inferiority of China
to other powers. On the other hand the conditions prevailing in China were abundant justification for the refusal of
the foreign powers to make concession on these matters at
the time. It is even doubtful whether it would have been
a kindness to China if the powers had yielded to these
demands.
The more important of these agreements arrived at in
Washington have already been carried out, but some await
the ratification of the treaties. It must be acknowledged
that the events and conditions in China since the adjourn'The transfer of the railway is subject to complicated provisions
concerning financial compensations and control of operation.
'The French conditions with regard to Kwangchow-wan, however, were such that there is little likelihood of its restoration to
China in the near future.




CHINA


I4I


ment of the Washington conference have thrown doubt
upon the wisdom of the concessions accorded and have offered no encouragement for further consideration. Nothing
was accomplished at the conference or has been done since
to straighten out the financial situation aside from the provisions for tariff adjustments. China stands as a defaulter
of both principal and interest on certain loans, and yet refuses to make any new loan agreement on terms acceptable
to foreign bankers because it is feared that the terms would
infringe the national independence.
Ever since Russia had acquired the Amur provinces from
China in I858, the activities of that nation in the outlying
provinces of the empire had given serious concern not
merely to China but also to other powers. This situation became even more annoying after the bolshevists came into
power in I9I7 and was further complicated by the establishment of the Far Eastern Republic in eastern Siberia. While
it is impossible to give a precise narrative of the situation
in each area, it is clear that in Chinese Turkestan, in Mongolia-especially outer or western Mongolia, and in northern Manchuria, Russia has been very active and has seriously weakened such control as China has claimed to
exercise in these regions. In southern Manchuria and in
inner or eastern Mongolia, Japanese penetration has been
at least equally serious. The outlying provinces are mainly
inhabited by Mongolian peoples of different nationalities
from the Chinese but related to them. These sparsely settled and undeveloped areas are the natural field for the expansion of the crowded population of China proper. Bolshevist intrigue has also extended into China proper. At
one time Doctor Sun Yat-sen was said to have made terms
with the bolshevists on behalf of his Canton government,
and it is certain that one of the most active bolshevist
agents, Adolf Joffe, was in Peking in I922.
At the close of I92I, while the Washington conference
was in session, General Chang Tso-lin, super-tuchun of Manchuria, finally made bold to enter Peking and to exert more
direct influence upon the government. A new cabinet under
the premiership of a prominent financier, Liang Shih-yi,




142


THE AWAKENING EAST


was installed. Apparently this move was taken in anticipation of pecuniary as well as political advantages from the
Washington conference. Another motive may have been
to head off new activities of the reforming element, though
one rumor at the time was to the contrary effect-that there
was a rapprochement between General Chang and Doctor
Sun. In any case, General Wu Pei-fu, who had become
practically master of the Yang-tse valley and who was
looked upon by the reforming party as the military leader
most sympathetic with their aims, was not slow in responding to the challenge and marched toward Peking. After
some months of political and military maneuvering, the
crisis culminated in severe fighting near Peking. General
Chang was signally defeated and forced to withdraw into
Manchuria, where he has since attempted to maintain a
more or less independent attitude. As a result of his victory, General Wu, in June, I922, forced President Hsu
Shih-chang into retirement and recalled ex-President Li
Yuan-hung to office. With the successful conclusion of
the Washington conference and the triumph of General Wu
Pei-fu, the supporter of constitutional union, there ended
the fifth phase of the revolutionary epoch.  This date
also closed the sixth period in the international relations of
China, which had been characterized by the World War and
the activities of Japan.
General Wu was anxious to put into effect his policy of
establishing a constitutional regime and reuniting the country. Doctor Sun, who had already been in friendly communication with General Wu, was at this juncture in the
summer of I922 driven from Canton by one of his own
generals. Nevertheless the Peking government continued
to seek his cooperation. Through his influence those members of parliament who had withdrawn to Canton six years
before returned to Peking and resumed sessions with the
other members of the original parliament, who were likewise recalled. The opportunity was propitious for the establishment of a real parliamentary government, but the
members showed that, since their original meeting, they had
acquired no added sense of their political responsibilities.




CHINA


143


With a soldier's instinct, General Wu desired to establish
a strongly centralized administration as the best means of
restoring unity and peace to the country.  President Li,
however, who viewed the situation rather as a politician,
favored a federated system. To the failure of parliament
to rise above petty politics and to the disagreement between
the president and his Warwick there was added a third misfortune. The western-trained Chinese of the younger generation, especially those who had been educated in America,
had looked to General Wu as the prospective national redeemer. Quite naturally several of these men were soon
appointed to cabinet office, where they promptly became the
targets for bitter attacks from all the conservative and reactionary elements.
The first attack was directed against the finance minister,
Lo Wen-kan, who had effected a revision of a pre-war loan
with German bankers on terms that were apparently distinctly advantageous to China and had applied the savings
to the handling of certain railway bonds. Another indiscretion was the publication of a report on the financial situation in the matter both of debt and of current budget, which
was, in character and effect, quite comparable to Necker's
famous Compte Rendu. On trial the minister was acquitted,
but he had been forced out of office. The premier, Wang
Chung-hui, who had studied at Yale University, and the
foreign minister, Wellington Koo, a graduate of Columbia
University, were next driven from office and prosecuted.
The factious nature of the opposition was made even
clearer a little later when parliament confirmed all the new
cabinet nominations except that of Dr. Alfred Sze to be
minister of foreign affairs. Sze was a graduate of Cornell
University and had rendered to his country no less distinguished services than his junior, Dr. Koo. The action of
parliament in these cases is said to have been managed by
members under the influence of Tsao Kun, the tuchun of
Chi-li, in opposition to General Wu.
Thus far, however, General Wu continues to dominate
the military situation and Peking is still garrisoned by his
subordinate, the famous Christian general, Feng Yu-hsiang,




I44


THE AWAKENING EAST


with his troops, which have been compared to Cromwell's
Ironsides.6 This comparison is only one of many that may
be made between the situation in England during the period
from the execution of Charles I in I649 to the restoration
of Charles II in I66o, and affairs in China since the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty in I9II. Other comparisons
may be made with conditions and events in the French Revolution, and still others in the American Revolution, especially in the period between the close of the war with England and the adoption of the constitution.
Having traced the history of western intercourse with
China and its effect upon the nation, especially in political
matters, we must next inquire to what extent the western
developments known as the industrial revolution have affected the economic conditions of the Chinese. Even as late
as a century ago a careful observer would have noted no
marked difference between the material progress of China
and that of the nations of continental Europe. The tremendous transformation wrought by the industrial revolution had then measurably affected no country except England. For three quarters of a century China deliberately
remained stationary while western nations forged ahead.
It is only within the last quarter century that China has, to
any considerable degree, yielded to the introduction of modern inventions and the consequent changes in the methods
of life and work.
China has always been and is still primarily an agricultural nation, for its first attention must be given to feeding
its teeming millions. Such an enormous population could
exist only in a land with an extensive fertile area. Until
very recently the agricultural output has been almost exclusively food products intended for consumption within
the country. The two articles of primary importance have
long been rice and tea. Cattle have been scarce except as
work animals. The people have therefore had little meat
except pork for food, but have depended instead upon fowl
and fish. Tea was eagerly sought by the early traders from
the West, but since about 1885 the exports have fallen off
'For later developments, see below, pages I64, i66.




:CHINA


I45


rapidly as the Chinese have failed to meet the requirements
of western trade, which has come to depend mainly upon the
teas of India and Ceylon. In the last decade beans, bean
products, and eggs have become important items in China's
export trade. Though the importation of opium and the
cultivation of the poppy had been almost suppressed a dozen
years ago, both the importation and the cultivation have
again attained serious proportions.
Silk culture probably originated in China and is still one
of the most important industries of the country. The export trade in silk seemed likely to suffer, as had that of
tea, because of failure to maintain the quality of the output,
but within the last few years there has been a distinct change
for the better. The agricultural departments of two mission
institutions, the University of Nanking and Canton Christian
College, have undertaken to furnish eggs free from disease
for silkworm culture, and to aid in other ways to improve
the quality of the silk produced. The cultivation of cotton
has been extended so that China has become, next to the
United States and India, the greatest cotton-growing
country.
No country has suffered more from the destruction of its
forests. Reforestation and the systematic employment of
scientific forestry are among the greatest needs of the country. The vast coastal plain of eastern China has long been
subject to floods that work havoc both to life and to the soil.
Reforestation would undoubtedly prove an important
method of flood-prevention.  On the other hand, other
areas suffer from occasional or perennial drought, and so
require the development of irrigation.
Owing either to flood or drought or to blight, crop failures,
with consequent famine, are of almost constant occurrence
in larger or smaller areas. Occasionally the disaster is widespread and affects millions of the population, as in the case
of a large part of Shantung and portions of adjacent provinces in I920-2I, when the cause was flood. Though the
Chinese have always struggled with the problem, the Shantung famine furnished the first illustration of the extensive
application of modern scientific methods both to famine




146


THE AWAKENING EAST


relief and to measures of prevention. It has been estimated
that a complete system of engineering works for the control
of the rivers of China would not only solve the problems of
flood-prevention and of irrigation but would also result in
the reclamation of sufficient waste land to pay for the enormous cost of the undertaking. Probably no other single
enterprise is more essential to the future welfare of China.
Disastrous experiences through the centuries have shown
that the lives of the people are absolutely dependent upon it.
China is a land of vast mineral wealth which has been
only slightly exploited. It is believed that easily available
supplies of coal, iron, and copper are adequate for the fullest
industrial development of the country for generations.
Though some of the mines have probably been worked
continuously for a longer period than any others in the
world, mining operations by modern methods are only in
their beginnings and the output is still inconsiderable. China
is, however, the chief source for antimony and is also one
of the largest producers of tin. Some oil fields are being
developed.
Chinese artisans have displayed remarkable skill in many
sorts of manufacturing under the old-time domestic system.
The implements or machines used are few and simple.
The hand-loom is still employed in the chief industry, silkweaving. In Shanghai and some other places there are
filatures operated with power machinery and factories where
silk-weaving is done with power-looms. Cotton goods,
especially towels and coarser fabrics, are being manufactured
in Canton and in several towns around Shanghai. There
are match factories at Canton and elsewhere; glass works are
to be found in many places; and flour-milling is perhaps
the most rapidly developing industry. At Hanyang, near
Hankow, iron works are in successful operation. These
developments of manufacturing by power-driven machinery
have meant the introduction of the factory system with
capitalism and wage-working. In most cases the capital
and management is foreign7; the labor is native, largely
T Since the World War, however, native capital and management
have been increasingly responsible for the extension of factories.




CHINA


I47


women and children. Many of the evils which have customarily accompanied the beginnings of the factory system
are unfortunately to be found in China, but efforts are being made to prevent serious abuses, and some of the factories are admirably constructed and managed.
Next to a system of river control, already discussed,
China's greatest need is for adequate means of transportation and communication. At the beginning of the nineteenth century conditions in China were certainly not inferior to those of Europe. In one particular China was in
advance of Europe, for it had a more extensive system of
canals. The vast number of native junks engaged in coastwise shipping has been supplemented by a steadily increasing
steamer service, which was, until recently, entirely under
foreign ownership and management.   Navigable rivers,
lakes, and canals afford satisfactory service to considerable
sections of the country, and on these the introduction of
steamboats has begun.
Good roads have been scarce, but recently metaled roads
of modern type have been constructed near some of the
chief ports. In these ports many streets have been widened
and paved with asphalt. /These improvements have been coincident with the introduction of trolley cars, auto-buses,
and private automobiles. In these and other municipal improvements the lead has naturally been taken by Canton,
Shanghai and Tientsin. The use of the jinrikisha, it must
be remembered, is almost a novelty, having been introduced
in most cases since I900, and in some cases only within a
few years.
The most obvious improvement in means of transportation is the construction of railways, effected mainly since
I900. In China proper there are now approximately five
thousand miles of railroad. If the mileage bore the same
proportion to area as in the United States, China would require at least one hundred and twenty-five thousand miles.
Most of the lines have been constructed with more or less
foreign aid, but they are now under government control.
The construction has usually been well done and the roads
have, at least until recently, been well operated. The line




148


THE AWAKENING EAST


from Peking to Kalgan was built by a Chinese engineer and
is an excellent piece of work.
China needs a great extension of its railways as an important safeguard against famine, as a means of transporting the output of the mines, as a means to the development
of every form of commerce, and most of all as a means toward solving the political problem. National unity is dependent upon quick, cheap, and easy communication between
the peoples of all sections of the country. The efficiency
of the central government is dependent upon its means of
communication with all parts of the country both that its
action may be based on information and that its will may be
enforced.
A comprehensive plan for a civil aviation service throughout the country is under consideration, and some beginnings
have been made. An imperial postal service conducted with
modern methods was inaugurated in 1897 in connection with
the maritime customs service. Since I9Ii it has been under
direct government management through the ministry of communications, and in I9I4 China became a member of the
Universal Postal Union. The postal service has been extended throughout the empire and already operates more
than ten thousand offices; it is well managed and the use
of its facilities is increasing rapidly. The telegraph system
is also under the ministry of communications and maintains over fifty thousand miles of lines connecting all the
principal cities. It is being supplemented by wireless service,
which is to be extended even to the outlying provinces. Telephones are in use in the chief cities, and plans are being
made to install long distance service.
The conduct of both public and private business is largely
dependent upon a satisfactory medium of exchange. Though
much study has been given to the problem by the Chinese
assisted by western experts, the country still lacks a properly standardized monetary system and a uniform currency, either metallic or paper. Such currency as exists is
on a silver basis. For over a half century fluctuations in
the value of silver have disturbed the monetary systems of
the world.  China did not follow other nations in the




CHINA


149


adoption of the gold standard as a remedy, and since the
close of the World War has consequently suffered severely
from the wide and sudden fluctuations in exchange. Such
uncertainty in values added to unsettled political conditions
has been a serious damper on the development of new economic enterprises of any sort in China in recent years.
A sound and uniform banking system is another essential
to the proper conduct of a nation's business. China continues largely dependent upon foreign banking institutions,
though there are the Bank of China and the Bank of Communications, in which the government is a partner, and numerous private banks. Since I9I8 there has been a great
increase in the number of Chinese private banking corporations, partly due to the extraordinary opportunity offered by the fluctuations in exchange for the indulgence of
the gambling instinct. Of better omen has been the introduction within the same period of savings banks and of a
postal savings system.
It can hardly be doubted that China is actually as well
as potentially a country of great wealth. Its business methods have not yet, however, become adjusted to the corporate
form, such as joint-stock companies, for the conduct of
business enterprises on the large scale necessary in modern
mining, manufacturing, railroading, and other commercial
activities. The progress in banking affairs may be regarded
as preparatory to fuller participation of the Chinese themselves in the organization and conduct of their large business
undertakings.
Because of the wide fluctuations in exchange and other
unusual conditions it is impossible to furnish statistics of
the commerce of China in the last decade from which any
conclusions may safely be deduced. It seems clear, however,
that there has been no considerable increase in imports but
a distinct increase in exports. In view of the disturbed
political and financial conditions, this expansion of trade is
obviously gratifying. That imports have not increased is
in part due to the decline in the importation of articles, such
as cotton goods, flour, and matches, which China has begun
to manufacture. The increase in exports is in agricultural




I50


THE AWAKENING EAST


products, especially beans and bean products and eggs. The
largest items on the import list are cotton goods, metals,
petroleum products, cigarettes, and tobacco. Silk and silk
goods head the list of exports, followed by beans and bean
products, tea, tin, and various agricultural products. Owing
to the extensive trade through Hong Kong, really accurate
figures on the nation's trade cannot be obtained, but in I920 it
is estimated that 28 per cent of the trade of China was with
Japan, i8 per cent with the British Empire, and i6 per cent
with the United States. In the same year 2Y'2 per cent of
the trade of the United States. was with China.
The financial administration of the empire was broken
down by the revolution in I9I11, and since the death of Yuan
Shih-kai, in I9I6, the conditions have become increasingly
chaotic. The receipts from the maritime customs and from
the gabelle, or salt tax, are pledged for meeting the charges
on foreign loans. Similarly the receipts from the wine and
tobacco taxes are allocated for the charges on the recently
consolidated internal loan. Only the surplus income from
these sources is available to the central government for general expenses. The same is true of the receipts from the
government railway, telegraph, and postal services. In addition there should accrue to the central government the
receipts from a land tax, from stamp taxes, from the likin
or provincial customs, and from minor duties. In recent
years, the military governors have appropriated to their
own purposes, especially the maintenance of their troops,
a large part of the revenues collected in the provinces which
should accrue to the national treasury.
The central government has consequently been reduced
to serious financial straits, so much so that it has not even
been able to meet the engagements connected with the foreign loans or to pay the salaries of government employees.
The framing of a budget seems to have been abandoned as
futile since I9I9, when the estimates totaled less than 500,ooo,ooo dollars Mexican, which is roughly equivalent to
$300,000,000 gold-or less than one dollar per capita. It is
even impossible to get authoritative figures for the amount of
the national debt, but, accepting the highest estimate, it is less




CHINA


I5I


than $I,200,000,000 gold.8 The per capita debt is therefore
less than four dollars and possibly as low as three dollars,
which compares with a burden of fifteen dollars per capita
carried by the United States at the beginning of Washington's administration and of over $200 at present.
There is no suggestion that China is unable to bear the
burden of its debt and of the current needs of its government. Neither is there serious question of the ability of
the Chinese to handle their own finances. The difficulties
are two: the powerlessness of the central government and
the deep-seated practice of "squeeze." In public and private
business alike it is the custom for each individual who is
a party to a transaction to compensate himself with a certain percentage of the amount involved. The practice is
entirely comprehensible and not inherently dishonest, but
it is a bad system and is open to flagrant corruption. Its
elimination is absolutely prerequisite to the sound organization and healthy conduct of government business. The
Chinese can be honest, efficient, and disinterested, but they
need to learn that no other conduct is tolerable in public
office.
Perhaps nowhere have the Chinese officials appeared to
better advantage than in the modernization of the legal and
judicial systems. The beginning was made in the closing
years of Manchu rule, and in 1912 one of the first acts of
the republic was the proclamation of the new criminal
code. This has since been revised; codes of criminal procedure and of civil procedure have also been drafted; and
civil and commercial codes are in preparation. The French
codes have furnished the model for the work, though the
substance is essentially Chinese.
Torture and other evils have been abolished. There is
a supreme court which sits in six divisions-four civil and
two criminal-and there is a system of inferior courts. In
view of the disturbed political state of the country the
progress in legal and judicial reform has been gratifying.
8The official computation of the public debt at 2,355,570,840 dollars
silver, given out in April, I924, shows the substantial accuracy of
this estimate.




152


THE AWAKENING EAST


Courts have been permitted to function, as in Canton, undisturbed by civic and military turmoil and overturns.
Prison reform has also been undertaken, and there are
already a fair number of modern prisons.
Confucianism remains under the republic, as it had been
for twenty-five centuries, the ethical and moral system of the
nation. Twice under the republic propositions to declare
Confucianism the state religion have failed to secure approval. It has no priesthood. Its spirit is distinctly national and conservative, and intellectual rather than spiritual.
There are two other great religions in China, Taoism, which
is indigenous, and Buddhism, which was brought from India
in the first century of the Christian era. These are both
ritualistic and each has its priesthood. With the Chinese
these three religions are not mutually exclusive, but mutually complementary and regularly professed and practiced
alike by most of the population. The essential element in
Chinese religion is the pious performance of the family rites,
or ancestor worship, as it is called.  Mohammedans and
Christians each number a few millions, and they are both
to be found in almost every section of the country. The
progress of Christianity, especially of the Protestant missions, has been very rapid since I900. The number of
Protestant communicants has been trebled within a score
of years. Religious toleration is guaranteed under the constitution of the republic.
Education has always had a prominent place in the life
of China, and for centuries government officials have been
systematically drawn from the educated class. Nevertheless the mass of the people of China has remained illiterate.
The situation has been revolutionized by the introduction
of the western type of education. The beginnings were due
to mission schools and to a small number of Chinese educated in Christian lands. Less than thirty years ago the
earliest efforts outside the mission schools were made to
establish educational institutions in China to teach the modern subjects in accordance with western methods; for instance, the beginnings of the National University in Peking
date from  1898. The decree of i905 abolishing the old




CHINA


153


system of examinations for public office gave tremendous
impetus to the introduction of modern learning. 
With the establishment of the republic in IqI2 immediate
measures were taken by the government to give the nation
a fully organized modern educational system. Since that
date schools of every grade and type have been established
with remarkable rapidity in every part of the country. The
disturbed political situation has prevented the completion of
the plan as rapidly as had been proposed. Progress has
been largely determined by local conditions, so that some
provinces are still very backward while others, like Shansi
which, under the rule of General Yen Hsi-shan, is considered a model province in this and other respects, have
achieved most gratifying results.
At the head stand several national and private universities,
then come the middle schools, the higher primary and the
lower primary schools. There are numerous normal and
higher normal schools, professional, technical, and vocational
schools. The attendance is at the limit of capacity and the
standards of work are well maintained. The latest statistics
indicate a total of one hundred and thirty-four thousand
schools of all grades with an attendance of four million five
hundred thousand pupils. This is a satisfactory beginning,
but it represents less than ten per cent of a national
system proportionate to the situation in the United States.
It is gratifying to observe the practical character of the
movement. Suitable attention is being given to the establishment of normal schools to train teachers, law schools to
prepare judicial officers, technical schools for engineers,
medical schools for physicians, and also commercial and agricultural schools. Thus the Chinese are endeavoring to
provide for their nation properly trained men for all the
professions and occupations necessary to meet the demands
of modern life.
The mission colleges and schools are continuing to increase in number and efficiency, and exercise a potent influence on the whole educational development. One field is peculiarly their own-the training for Christian leadership.
Of immense significance is the radical change of attitude




154


THE AWAKENING EAST


with regard to the education of women. Under the new system they are allowed equal opportunities with the men, and
they are showing remarkable readiness and ability to avail
themselves of the privileges. Excepting the spread of Christianity, there is no single movement destined to have so
far-reaching effects in the national life as the education of
the women. Western education has also involved the introduction of athletics, which have a healthy influence not
merely in cultivating physical well-being but also in creating a sense of good sportsmanship.
The growth of nationalism and the promotion of a general
system of education have directed attention to the question
of language. It is recognized that national unity practically
requires that the diversity of dialects shall be replaced by
one form of the spoken language used and understood by
everyone throughout the nation. Naturally the tendency is
to promote the general use of im-mdarin. which is already
most widely spoken and has a sort of official standing. The
process of adjustment will necessarily be slow and will depend largely upon the spread of education and the extension
of the means of communication.
The question of the literary or written form of the language is even more difficult. For ordinary use three thousand to four thousand characters are said to be necessary,
and for scholarly purposes the number of characters required is estimated at more than twenty-five thousand.
These facts constitute an almost insuperable barrier to the
education of the masses.  MVuch study has consequently
been given to the problem of simplification of the written
language. In I913 a phonetic system of thirty-nine letters
was devised, which has since received official approval. It
is expected that this alphabet will aid in unifying the spoken
dialects, in the study of the regular characters, and in the
education of the masses. There is also a strong movement
for the use of the vernacular as a literary vehicle instead of
the classical form of the language. Though this reform was
launched only a few years ago its steady progress has already stamped it as one of the most characteristic and
potentially influential manifestations of the time.




CHINA


I55


The growth of the Chinese periodical press has been one
of the most significant facts under the republic. Prior to
the revolution in I9I I there were about two hundred periodicals published in Chinese, now the number exceeds one thousand. Daily papers are published in every important city.
Shanghai is said to have more than eighty newspapers, and
Peking and Tientsin together more than a hundred. The
publication of books and pamphlets is also conducted on an
extensive scale. The reading public is increasing rapidly,
but it must be borne in mind that the public reached by the
content of the printed page is very considerably greater
than the number of actual readers. Naturally the westerntrained Chinese control a disproportionate share of the
periodical press; the press is distinctly the instrument of the
younger and progressive generation. The newspapers published in English, French, and Japanese for the foreign communities are numerous and in general of fairly high standard, so that they exercise a wholesome influence.
The educational movement is expressing itself not only
through the press but also in various practical measures for
the material, social, and political welfare. In addition to
such matters as municipal improvements and new methods
in agriculture which have already been noted, attention is
given to questions of sanitation and public health. It is true
that there are no such obvious results as those obtained by
the wholesale measures enforced by the British in Egypt
and India or even more fully by the Americans in the Philippines. None the less, foreign precept and example are
making an impression, for the development of medical education and the remarkable extension of hospitals and clinics
are evidences of a better day. The work done by the Red
Cross in China has resulted not merely in the direct saving
of many lives, but also in exerting a widespread and wholesome influence.
Social reforms are accomplished slowly. The tyranny of
superstition and of custom is difficult to overcome. The
Chinese are apparently more conservative than either the
Indians or the Japanese; for instance, they much less readily
adopt western dress. Considering the circumstances, the




156


THE AWAKENING EAST


progress toward the abolition of the queue, of foot-binding,
and of opium-smoking has been remarkable. Less noticeable, perhaps, but no less genuine and distinctly more important, have been the improvements in the status of women,
greater attention to child welfare, and modifications in the
marriage customs and in the family life. Probably the most
fundamental difference between the East and the West is
in the status of women. Whether one attributes that difference to Christianity or to democracy or to individualism or
to all three, there will be general agreement that improvement in the position and condition of women is the truest
test of modernization in the East.
It remains to inquire what is the real nature of the transition through which China is passing, and what the probable
outcome is to be. The student of Chinese history naturally
compares the situation with the previous overturns of dynasties, of which there have been more than twenty in the four
thousand years of the nation's history, and argues that the
country will sooner or later come safely through this time as
it has before. This case, however, is different, for it is not
a substitution of one dynasty for another, it is the replacing
of the monarchy by a new form of government. Almost
every observer familiar with the situation, regardless of personal belief or sympathy, recognizes that the monarchy is
gone beyond any hope of restoration. That is proved by
the failures of Yuan Shih-kai and of Chang Hsun. Only a
republic of some form is now considered possible as the
government of China for the future. The question is, shall
it be of the French centralized type or the American federated kind?'? The latter sort is undoubtedly more consonant
with the nation's past, but present conditions and future
needs seem to point to the other solution.
The student of western history logically seeks for comparisons in the English revolution of the seventeenth century, the American and French revolutions of the eighteenth
century, and the Russian revolution of the twentieth century, and finds many similarities. In each case there is the
transition from strict monarchical government to one more
representative and liberal. Each of the four western cases




CHINA


157


differs sharply from the others, and the Chinese revolution
has elements radically unlike any of them. The western
revolutions were primarily political and secondarily, in varying degrees, economic. The Chinese revolution is both political and economic, but it is also, and primarily, intellectual
and social; it is more than a revolution, it is a renaissance.
No previous dynastic overturn in China has involved, in any
considerable degree, the introduction of new intellectual
concepts or of changes in the social order; this revolution is
working fundamental changes in the national life.
The casual observer notes that the revolution has resulted
in the breakdown of the administration, national disintegration and bankruptcy, subjection to the will of corrupt, oppressive, military chieftains, and, in short, chaos and anarchy. If these are the real results or the only ones, the
condition of the nation is indeed desperate. Fortunately
these conditions are apparent rather than real, and they are
not the only results. Since I9II China has made important
readjustments in its material conditions, it has maintained
economic prosperity, it has developed a strong sense of nationality, it has conducted a successful foreign policy, it
has enjoyed an extraordinary diffusion of liberal ideas, and
the spirit of the nation has continued steadfastly hopeful.
What, then, are the real facts with regard to the apparently evil results of the revolution? They may be considered as the logical and necessary outcome of the ancient
order which is in process of readjustment at the very points
where the evils appear. Because of its vast size and the
lack of convenient means of communication the Chinese
Empire was never able to establish and maintain effective
national administration of the provinces. Though China
has passed through experiences suggestive of the feudalism
of medieval Europe, it is necessary to go as far back as the
ancient Persian Empire to find a fairly accurate parallel for
the system of provincial administration.
In each case it was necessary for the central government,
the emperor, to intrust each province to a governor with
but slightly limited powers, who was held absolutely responsible for the satisfactory administration of the territory and




158


THE AWAKENING EAST


people concerned. The governor himself had to depend
under similar conditions on subordinates for the districts,
and so on down to the smallest governmental unit. Each
provincial or district governor was a petty despot, a subemperor, over his territory. Loyalty, the maintenance of
order, the levying of troops, and the regular transmission
of the revenue were the principal requirements laid upon
him. Removal of an unsatisfactory official was usually
effected by deceit, assassination, or military force. Under
normal conditions the imperial government had but slight
contact with the people.
To the great mass of the people of China the government
with which they were concerned was that of the village community. Whether in Persia or China, the ultimate unit of
government was something more enduring than dynasties
and probably something even older than the empire itself.
Nothing has been so little changed in the cycles of Cathay
as the life and organization of the rural village. To the
present day its character has continued patriarchal, and the
family, not the individual, has remained the social unit.
Even the growth of cities has affected but slightly the
family organization of society. The solidarity of the family in China may to some extent be understood by Europeans,
but it is quite beyond the conception of an American. The
patriarchal, not the paternalistic, spirit permeates the life
of China.
The town life in China long ago developed an important
modification of the patriarchal system, the guilds. These
have been as far-reaching in their effects as were the various
town guilds of medieval Europe in contrast with the feudal
system. Prolonged experience with this type of social and
economic organization has enabled the Chinese readily to
adapt to their uses the more modern methods of organization, such as chambers of commerce, for the promotion of
business and municipal interests. This same experience
ought, in time, to result in successful civic undertakings for
improved municipal administration. Indeed, instances of
this sort may already be cited. Perhaps the most significant
fact, however, about the Chinese guilds has been their dem



CHINA


159


ocratic character. As a consequence democratic ideas and
practices are by no means novelties to the Chinese.
With the establishment of the republic, there came no reconstruction of the local government. For each province
the central government continued to assign a civil governor
and a military governor. As had often been the case during
the last century under Manchu rule, but now more frequently, the military governor dominated the situation. To
maintain his position he had to rely upon troops; to maintain them he appropriated the revenues instead of transmitting them to the national treasury. The national government
was thus left without funds, so without troops, and consequently without power. The administrative collapse and
bankruptcy of the central government, and, on the other
hand, the rise of the military chieftains, the existence of
great armed forces, and the apparent chaos and anarchy, become easily explicable. Over against this superficial situation is the fact that the great mass of the people of China
have continued unconcernedly at their customary tasks and
remained law-abiding. Local and municipal governments
have continued to function. At bottom the peace and order
of China have been little disturbed; indeed, conditions in
the last dozen years have been no worse than those existing
at various times in the preceding century under the Manchus.
While both for evil and for good the institutions and traditions of the empire have seemed to determine the form
and manifestations of the revolution, the real revolution
has been the development of new concepts radically affecting
the whole ancient patriarchal system  from the family to
the empire. These new ideas, which are effecting the ultimate revolution, are individualism, social consciousness, national consciousness, and the sense of the obligation of the
individual to society and to the nation.  There is fortunately no suggestion of throwing the family into the discard; it is being transformed and perhaps ennobled. Neither
is there much consideration for the communistic ideas which
would substitute paternalism for patriarchal traditions.
The dangers confronting revolutionary China are both
obvious and serious. At home there is the anarchy due to




i6o


THE AWAKENING EAST


the military governors and their armies; from abroad there
is the danger of foreign intervention, direct or insidious;
from both sides there is lack of confidence in the government because of its corruptibility due to the scramble for
office and for wealth and to the deep-rooted system of
"squeeze." To remove the first danger, it is necessary for
the national government to deprive the military governors,
or tuchuns, of their power to defy or ignore it. That means
*     that there must be but one army exclusively under the control of the central government, which must in turn have the
means of paying it and of returning all other soldiers to
civil life. The problem is apparently one of money, and
might be met by a loan either foreign or domestic; but the
former alternative is open to serious objections and the
latter seems impracticable. In this dilemma matters have
remained for several years.
Another solution would be for the government to utilize
one general and his army to disarm all the rest. General
Wu Pei-fu has been in a position for months to do this but
finds it beyond his powers. It is a case of fighting the hydra
and would tend to produce universal brigandage. The superfluous soldiers must either be massacred or else assisted
to sufficiently remunerative employment in civil life. Doctor
Sun Yat-sen has made the proposal that the government
begin at once a far-reaching scheme of public works on
which the soldiers should be employed and paid. The idea
is excellent but encounters the original difficulty of procuring
funds, though such a wholesome result and such a productive
investment might together appeal to public spirit and desire
for gain combined.
Indeed, the whole question narrows down to the creation
of a public spirit which will refuse to tolerate the present
evil and which will be ready to carry out the necessary
measures for relief. The business community can solve the
problem when it realizes that it has not only a great public
service to perform but also that it will be to its own interest
to do it. In Canton, beginning in I922, there has been
evidence of the necessary awakening in the organization of
a merchants' volunteer corps for the protection of their




CHINA


i6i


business and property. China can rid itself of tuchuns,
armies, and bandits whenever the Chinese decide to abate
the nuisances; that is, whenever they develop the necessary
social consciousness and sense of civic duty.
It was such a demonstration of the national will in the
spring of 1919 that nullified the detested provisions of the
treaty of Versailles and terminated the more obvious forms
of Japanese intervention in China. That lesson was sufficient to end any idea of the partition of China by foreign
powers or of their serious intermeddling in the nation's
concerns. The treaties and agreements arranged at the
Washington conference constitute international recognition
of the integrity of China territorially and of the necessity of
reasonably prompt removal of the other impairments of
the nation's sovereignty by outside powers. It is true that
Japan's "twenty-one demands" have not all been specifically
disavowed, but, as far as China proper is concerned, they
can hardly be considered worth the paper upon which they
are written. They are a liability rather than an asset to
Japan in its relations to China. At present Russia is the
only power from which China has reason to fear serious
difficulty, and in this case the other powers would probably
support China.9
In the face of bankruptcy China has for several years
refused to sanction any new foreign loan which involves
any condition in the slightest measure restrictive of the full
and free sovereignty of the nation. Foreign intervention
except by joint or concurrent action of the powers party to
the Washington conference is almost inconceivable, and the
difficulties in the way of such action are so serious as to render it extremely unlikely. It would be the one thing most
likely to produce a "rising tide of color," to make the fiction
of the "yellow peril" a reality. Much water has flowed by
the mill since I900, and another expedition to Peking would
produce results too serious to contemplate. China will apPreciate the sympathy of the nations, 'but it will not tolerate
any assistance which it does not freely and voluntarily invite.


'See below, pages I68-I69.




i62


THE AWAKENING EAST


The danger from "squeeze" and the attendant evils can
be met only in one way. China will have a government
which will inspire respect and confidence at home and abroad
only when the national consciousness asserts itself sufficiently to insist on the incorruptibility of public officials. It
is perhaps wise to recall that two score years have not
elapsed since President Cleveland found it necessary in the
United States to preach and enforce the idea that "public
office is a public trust." The elimination of "squeeze" is no
less necessary in private than in public life; it is the greatest
foe to industrial and commercial development.
The redemption and reconstruction of China can no more
be wrought by a dictator, or "man on horseback," or "strong
man" than by a monarch. The work cannot be done from
the top down; it must begin at the bottom. When the intelligent people in China determine that things shall be done
rightly and set themselves to the task, the work can be done;
but not until then. The revolution will continue until individualism, social consciousness, and national consciousness
have developed among the thinking people of China the sense
of personal responsibility and obligation; or, in other words,
until there has developed an enlightened and effective public
opinion. That end may be attained suddenly but not quickly.
This, it may be repeated, is more than a revolution; it is a
renaissance. It is not the westernizing of China; it is the
self-modernization of China.
The change must be wrought from the bottom upward,
and at bottom China is essentially sound. Just as the Chinese are physically healthy though living in unsanitary
surroundings, so despite many evils in their environment
the Chinese are really a moral people. With those who
know them intimately their honesty, industry, business ability, capacity for scholarship, thrift, and cheerfulness are
proverbial. Probably no other people command more fully
the respect of foreigners long resident among them.
Strangers visiting the country frequently hear from the
"old timers" the phrase "You will love the Chinese," and
it usually proves true if one stays long enough to get
acquainted.




CHINA


i63


Unlike India, China is free from caste. Though there is
much that is more or less feudal in the social order, Chinese society is not feudalized into rigidly fixed compartments.
There is something essentially democratic in the life of the
people. Just as in the Christian Church the lad of humblest
birth may become a priest or perchance a bishop, or even
rise to the chair of Saint Peter, so in China no boy is too
humnble in origin to become a scholar, and a scholar may rise
to the highest station in the government.
The scholars have been the nation's reliance in the past;
they are its hope to-day. It was the students of I9I9, the
scholars of to-morrow, who aroused the national conscience
against Japan. It has been the student class who have veiltured forth into every land on missions of discovery and
have brought home rich treasures, "more to be desired than
gold," to be added to, their nation's store of knowledge and
to be utilized for its upbuilding. It is the students who are
directly and indirectly diffusing the new learning into every
section and among every class, and creating a national public opinion.
The European students of the fifteenth century with their
new learning produced the Renaissance which gave Europe
its new national states, its broadened culture, and its new
religious life, and thereby its domination of the world. The
Chinese students of the twentieth century are giving their
country a new learning, a broader culture, a national consciousness, a religious reformation. It is not the work of
a year or of a decade. Europe took more than a century
for its renaissance; perhaps China will not be so slow. Time
is necessary, however, for the old generation to pass from the
stage before the new generation-the new-born —can play
its part freely. The generation of China's renaissance faces
the future with lofty purpose and high hope, with cheerfulness and confidence.
The students of to-day are no doubt the custodians of'
China's future, and education is their panacea for the nation's ills. In a large majority of cases it will be found that
back of these students stands the missionary. The missionary and the mission school have directly trained him, aided




I64


THE AWAKENING EAST


him, or given him his inspiration. The new learning which
these students are bringing to their people is made up in no
small measure of those things in the world's culture which
are essentially Christian or the creation of Christian nations.
The institutions and the learning of Christianity are lifeless
without the spirit of the Christ. One dare not say that
China needs the Christianity of the West as the life-giving
element for its renaissance; it does need the spirit of the
Christ. There are undoubtedly more Protestant Christians
in China to-day than there were Christians in the world a
century after the crucifixion and the resurrection. Even
more than the students of China, the Christians of China
are the leaven that will impart the new life to the nation.
Five years have elapsed since the close of the World War.
In these years since the armistice, which has been the prey
to armies, to anarchy and chaos the more, continental
Europe or China? Which is in the healthier and more hopeful state to-day? In which are national differences being
accentuated?  In which is disintegration increasing?  In
which is the greater homogeneity? In which is the spirit
of unity developing? Is it still true, "Better fifty years of
Europe than a cycle of Cathay"? If so, how much longer
will it be true?
What will happen if one fifth of the people of the world,
using one language, joined in one nation, take the lead from
Europe? Is it not of vital importance with what spirit
they assume that leadership? Does it all matter to Europe?
In any case it concerns the United States more vitally than
any other nation except Japan. At the outset it was asserted that the problem of China, as contrasted with India
or Egypt, has been primarily diplomatic. If this is still
true, it is, without cavil, of the utmost importance what the
diplomatic policy of the western powers is to be henceforth.
Americans may flatter themselves that the open door is a
good policy; the Golden Rule is the best policy.
RECENT EVENTS
At the Chinese New Year in February, I923, the government was unable to comply with the traditional custom of




CHINA


i65


effecting an adjustment of its financial obligations.10
Shortly before that date the representatives of several of
the foreign powers had sent an address to the Peking government admonishing it of the importance and nature of the
desirable financial reforms. Finally, in October, it was announced that a commission had been created under the
chairmanship of W. W. Yen for the readjustment of the
finances. The commission included representatives of the
foreign interests and was authorized to make recommendations not only with regard to international financial questions
at issue, but also for the rehabilitation of the internal finances
of the nation. The report of this commission, which was
presented in April, I924, revealed that the national expenditures were not excessive considering the size, population, and wealth of the nation. On the other hand, the
revenues were proven seriously inadequate, and it was
shown that only a portion of the collections actually reached
Peking.
In March, I923, the British government gave notice that
it would comply with the promises of the Allied powers in
I9I7 to remit the balance due on account of the Boxer indemnity. More recently the United States has agreed to do
likewise with the understanding that the amount involved
should be used for the promotion of technical education in
China. In contrast, France has insisted that China should
continue payments, making them in gold rather than at the
current rate of exchange, as China maintains it is entitled
to do. One of the reasons adduced for the French failure
to ratify the nine-power pact negotiated at the Washington
conference has been the attitude of China in this matter.
Japan has also made a proposal in some respects similar
to that of the United States, concerning the portion of the
indemnity due it.
A demand from the Peking government that Japan abrogate the treaty of 1915, which contained the "twenty-one
demands," was rejected by the Japanese government in
March, I923. A revival of the anti-Japanese boycott and
" See above, pages I43-I44.




I66


THE AWAKENING EAST


rioting, which was most serious at Changsha in the Yangtse valley, drew forth a vigorous exchange of notes between
Peking and Tokyo. While Japan has carried out the arrangements entered into at the time of the Washington conference for withdrawal from Shantung and from the port
of Kiao-chao, the negotiations with Great Britain over withdrawal from Wei-hai-wei have not yet been completed, and
the French have failed to make any move to surrender
Kwangchow-wan. It must be admitted that the administration of Kiao-chao.by the Chinese was not satisfactory at
the beginning, as it was managed by and for militarist
elements.
Early in May a large number of foreign passengers were
captured at Lincheng, near Siichow, from the TientsinPukow express. In spite of the earnest efforts of the diplomatic corps at Peking several weeks elapsed before they
were all released. Since then bandit outrages have been
frequent in various parts of the country and piratical depredations have occurred at several points along the coast, especially near Canton. The foreign legations in Peking
united in presenting a note to the Chinese government demanding that adequate measures be taken to suppress brigandage and to insure security to foreigners.  Proposals
were also made for a system of policing the railways under
international supervision. After a considerable interchange
of notes the Chinese authorities, in October, practically acceded to the demands. The Chinese resented the arrangement for international policing of the railways as an
infringement of the national sovereignty, and have failed
to take adequate steps to this end or to pay the promised
indemnity.
Conditions, which had been growing steadily worse, culminated at the middle of June, I923, in 'the expulsion of
President Li Yuan-hung from Peking by the Christian general, Feng Yu-hsiang.11 For weeks there was no regular acting president -or premier. General Feng defended his action
on the ground that the payment for his troops was in arrears
General Feng has disclaimed responsibility for the act and has
assigned it to the chief of police of Peking.




CHINA


I67


and that following the president's flight he was able to make
the necessary payments. The action of General Feng, however, received vigorous condemnation from Chinese Christians. General Tsao Kun, the tuchun of Chihli, who had
been closely associated with Yuan Shih-kai and Tuan
Chi-jui, was regularly elected president by parliament on
October 5, I923. It was reported that the election was effected through wholesale corruption. In connection with
the inauguration of Tsao Kun as president on the anniversary of the revolution, October Io, the new constitution, to
replace the provisional document of I912, was formally
proclaimed. This constitution'2 consists of one hundred
and forty-one articles and provides for a system of provincial decentralization. As yet there is little evidence that
it is being put into operation. On October 15, when the
new government made known its willingness to meet the
Lincheng demands, the diplomatic corps offered formal
congratulations to the new president. Though it was hoped
that at least thirteen provinces would acknowledge the new
Peking government, its authority was actually recognized
in only the eight more northerly provinces, over which
General Wu Pei-fu and two other generals were installed,
in November, as high military inspecting commissioners.
A new cabinet was not organized until January, I924, when
parliament at last chose Sun Pao-chi as premier. Doctor
Wellington Koo, who had been recalled to office some
months earlier, was continued as foreign minister.
The former president, Li Yuan-hung, endeavored for
some months to cling to office but finally withdrew to Japan.
In the South, Doctor Sun Yat-sen was able to return to
Canton in February, I923, and since then has been carrying
on an extensive but doubtful warfare in the vicinity. It is
believed that the forces opposed to him have received support
from General Wu Pei-fu on behalf of the Peking government. In August and September, I923, efforts were made to
arrange a round-table conference at which Doctor Sun and
the various northern leaders should undertake to reunite
12A translation will be found in Current History, vol. 19, pp. 66o665, January, I924.




I68


THE AWAKENING EAST


the nation. After the failure of this proposal and the inauguration of President Tsao Kun, Doctor Sun issued a
vigorous denunciation of the new president and of the
government in Peking and demanded that the diplomatic
representatives of other nations should withhold recognition.
Later Doctor Sun, who was apparently in serious financial
straits, announced his intention of seizing the customs house
at Canton and appropriating a portion of the revenues. The
foreign powers took prompt measures for the protection of
the customs service, because the revenues are pledged for
the payment of the foreign loans.
In the early months of I924, the Peking government obtained a considerable extension of its influence through the
capture of Foochow and Chengtu. On May 22, shortly after
a false report of his death, Doctor Sun issued a pronouncement demanding neutrality on the part of the powers as
between the Peking and Canton governments, and insisting
that the policy of recognizing the de facto government in
Peking rendered unfair assistance to General Wu and the
northern interests as a whole. During the summer further
difficulties occurred at Canton, especially affecting the
Anglo-French concession on the island of Shameen, on
which most of the foreign population lived. The troubles
involved strikes by the domestic and office employees of the
foreign residents and, in the end, resulted in various concessions to the Chinese demands. On July 2, 1924, the
premier, Sun Pao-chi, resigned and Doctor Koo became acting premier. In September W. W. Yen, a graduate of the
University of Virginia, became premier.
Negotiations with representatives of soviet Russia, which
had been in progress for many months, culminated in
the signature of a provisional agreement on May 31 by Doctor Koo, the foreign minister, and by Mr. Karakhan, the
soviet envoy. China unconditionally recognized the soviet
government, and both parties agreed not to engage in
propaganda subversive to the political and social systems of
the other. Not only were the preceding treaties between the
two countries abrogated but also provisions in the treaties
of either with a third power affecting their mutual interests




CHINA


i69g


were likewise annulled. The two parties arrogated to themselves the exclusive right to determine the future of the
Chinese Eastern railway, and provision was made for the
sale to China of the Russian interests in the road. The
treaty also provided for the arrangement of new tariff schedules and in general for reciprocal relations between the two
countries. Russia relinquished its claim to the balance of
the Boxer indemnity, to extra-territoriality, and to all its
concessions in China. Russia also renewed an earlier promise of the soviet government to withdraw  from  Chinese
territories, including outer Mongolia. The signature of this
treaty has radically changed the diplomatic situation in the
Far East and its effects are difficult to forecast. Already
Russia has named Mr. Karakhan ambassador at Peking,
thus making him the head of the diplomatic corps at that
capital. Furthermore, Russian negotiations with Japan,
which had long been hanging fire, have been promptly renewed. Japan apparently realizes that its interests will require that it come to terms with both Russia and China on
Far Eastern matters, under conditions no less advantageous
to each of those powers than they have arranged with one
another in the treaty of May 31. On the other hand, the
advantages for China from the treaty with Russia have not
as yet been realized. Apparently Russia has not been a disinterested spectator of the recent conflicts and changes in
China.
China has felt seriously aggrieved because of its failure
to receive reelection to the council of the League of Nations
at the sessions both of I923 and of 1924, and has even
threatened to withdraw from the League. China, moreover,
has failed to pay its annual quotas for the League's expenses, and has protested against the proportion assessed,
apparently with some reason. An agreement with Germany
in the spring of 1924 supplemented the peace treaty and
adjusted the question of German private property in China
which had been sequestered during the war, together with
certain related questions. For some time the Germans have
been renewing their trading enterprises in China. Among
their activities is a scheme to develop the extensive coal




I70


THE AWAKENING EAST


deposits near Pukow on the Yang-tse opposite Nanking,
under the management of a Stinnes corporation.
In spite of the troubled conditions there are various evidences of progress, especially in certain provinces such as
Shansi. The question of improving the conditions of the
working classes has been receiving fruitful consideration.
In March, I923, the Peking government issued regulations
governing the employment of industrial workers and of
miners. A committee on child labor appointed by the municipal council of Shanghai effected an agreement with the
owners of the cotton mills in and near that city by which
they discontinued on September I, I923, the employment of
children under twelve years of age. Though the equipment and
operation of the railways have suffered considerably from
the military disturbances, projects for the extension of the
system are under way. In January, I924, preliminary agreements were made with a British firm for the construction of
three new lines, and in July a group of Belgian and Chinese
bankers contracted to finance the building of a railway from
Chenchow in Honan to Sianfu fin Shensi. Statistics for
the total trade of the country in I923 show a slight increase
over the preceding year, but a remarkable increase of twentysix per cent in the American share of that trade. Floods
in several parts of the country in the summer of I924 have
wrought serious devastation and necessitated relief measures to feed and otherwise assist several million people.
Ever since 1920, General Lu Yung-hsiang had maintained
his position as tuchun of the province of Chekiang in defiance of the Peking government and had even been able to
extend his influence over the neighboring district around
Shanghai in the province of Kiangsu which theoretically
belonged under the jurisdiction of the super-tuchun, General
Chi Hsieh-yuan, whose headquarters are at Nanking and
who was a close ally of General Wu Pei-fu. Commercial interests and other influences succeeded in preventing open
conflict between the two rivals until the end of August, I924.
Actual civil war began on September 3, which was immediately complicated by the intervention of General Wu's
defeated rival, General Chang Tso-lin of Manchuria, who




CHINA


I7I


had long been preparing to square accounts. Fighting ensued near Shanghai and in the vicinity of the great wall on
the Manchurian border. Owing to his position geographically, it was alleged that General Chang was in more intimate relations with the Japanese and also with soviet Russia
than were the Peking government and General Wu, and
therefore possessed a special advantage.
Though General Chi soon succeeded in defeating his rival
from Chekiang, General Wu made little headway against
his Manchurian opponent who had more effectively used
the two years since his previous defeat in preparing for the
renewal of the struggle. In October impatience with General Wu for his incompetence and his failure to justify
the hopes centered in him for political reconstruction burst
forth in the revolt of the Christian general, Feng Yu-hsiang.
He occupied Peking, forced the retirement of Tsao Kun
from the presidency, and then turned his forces against
General Wu. It is reported that this maneuver has once
more made Tuan Chi-jui the foremost political personage in
China. General Feng has avowed his purpose to bring the
military conflict to an end and to secure the cooperation of
the best minds in the nation for the establishment of a settled political order throughout the country.
In the period since the Washington conference the relations with the countries party to that conference have not
grown more friendly. The feeling of irritation at their
refusal to abandon the privileges of extra-territoriality and
to make some other desired concessions has been accentuated by various episodes of international intercourse, such
as the demands with regard to policing made in connection
with the Lincheng affair, and the intervention over the
customs question at Canton. On the contrary, China has
turned in a more friendly spirit to Germany, Russia, and
other nations which have consented to the abrogation of
extra-territoriality and other special privileges. The nationals of these latter countries in general receive more favorable treatment in commercial and other relations than do
the nationals of the powers which participated in the Washington conference, toward whom Chinese public sentiment




172


THE AWAKENING EAST


has grown distinctly less friendly. The anticipated improvements in the administration of justice in China have
not yet warranted the general abandonment of extra-territoriality, especially in the matter of criminal jurisdiction,
but it seems not unlikely that these powers will soon be
obliged, singly or collectively, to make concessions to China
on most other points in which China feels aggrieved. The
continuance of military activities of rival generals, the failure to suppress banditry and piracy, and the prolonged inability of the Peking government to bring several practically
independent sections of the country under its control, have
not prevented this growth of the insistence upon the rights
of Chinese as against other nations. Furthermore, there
have been many evidences of a steady drift toward a situation in which the better elements will cooperate to replace
turmoil and chaos with a unified and stable government.
SUGGESTIONS FOR READING
An introduction to the history and civilization of China may be
obtained from The Development of China (3rd ed., Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, I924), by Professor K. S. Latourette, formerly
of the College of Yale in China, now of Yale University, or from
The Civilization of China (Home University Library, New York,
Henry Holt & Company, I9II), by Professor H. A. Giles, of the
University of Cambridge, formerly of the British consular service
in China. Recent movements are described in Contemporary Politics in the Far East (New York, D. Appleton & Company, I916),
by S. K. Hornbeck, formerly a college teacher in China, later in
the United States department of state; and in Modern Constitutional Development in China (Princeton, Princeton University
Press, I920), by Professor Harold M. Vinacke of Miami University.
The diplomatic history is admirably recorded in the magisterial
work, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire (3 volumes, New York, Longmans, Green & Company, I9IO-I918), by
Hosea B. Morse, an American formerly in the Chinese maritime
customs service; in The Americans in Eastern Asia (New York,
The Macmillan Company, 1922), by Tyler Dennett, who has lived
in China and who has utilized the archives of the United States
department of state; and in China at the Conference, A Report
(Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1922), by Professor Westel
W. Willoughby, of Johns Hopkins University, formerly legal adviser to the Chinese government and technical expert to the Chinese
delegation at the Washington conference.




CHINA                          173
Chinese Characteristics (New York, Fleming H. Revell Company,
1894), by Arthur H. Smith, for many years a missionary in China, is
a classic. The Changing Chinese (New York, The Century Company,
1911), by Professor Edward A. Ross, of the University of Wisconsin, is an excellent survey by a competent observer. China: An
Interpretation (New York, The Abingdon Press, 1916), by the late
James W. Bashford, Bishop of the Methodist Episcopal Church
Resident in China, is in somewhat less popular style, but rich in
information and sound in judgment. China's Place in the Sun
(New York, The Macmillan Company, 1922), by Stanley High, an
American traveler recently in China, is a good readable survey
with some late information, though in the main confessedly dependent on works already mentioned. China Yesterday and Today (New York, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1923), by Professor
Edward T. Williams, of the University of California, combines an
historical survey with numerous topical articles. The best compendium of information on Christian missions in China is The Christion Occupation of China, a General Survey... Made by the
Special Committee on Survey and Occupation, China Continuation
Committee, I9I8-1921 (Shanghai, 1922), edited by Milton T. Stauffer.
The China Year Book (New York, E. P. Dutton & Company) is
an annual of nearly a thousand pages replete with the latest information and statistics. It includes a Who's Who section.




CHAPTER IV


JAPAN
JAPAN presents radical contrasts with the three countries
already studied. In the first place, it is an island country of
limited size, and not a vast continental area like India or
China. Nor is it, on the other hand, comparable to Egypt
with its small area of fertile lands hemmed in by vast
stretches of desert. As continental areas, all three of the
countries previously considered have been subject to repeated foreign invasion and conquest, whereas no successful
attack has been made upon Japan in the thirty centuries of
its history.
Furthermore, Egypt and India have been westernized or
modernized primarily through British agency, while modernization has likewise been forced upon China, in considerable measure, by the activity of foreign powers interested
in the nation's trade. Though Japan, on the other hand,
was practically compelled by the United States and other
powers to open its doors to their trade and to concede for
a time the principle of extra-territoriality, the nation has
never in any other way submitted to foreign dictation. The
Japanese have acted aes free agents in all the modernization
or westernization which has been effected in their country
in the last two generations. The story of Japan's development has been that of the deliberate effort of a people to
carry out for themselves an industrial revolution and a readjustment of their political system to accord with new conditions.
The Japanese Empire to-day has an area of approximately
260,000 square miles, with a population somewhat over
77,000,000. This empire includes, in addition to Korea on
the continent of Asia, a chain of islands extending from 20~
north latitude to 500 north latitude; that is, if compared with
America, from the southern coast of Cuba to the mouth of
I74




JAPAN


i75


the St. Lawrence. If the islands lying to the north and to
the south of the main group and Korea, which have all
been brought under Japanese control within about a half
century, are excluded, Japan proper consists of four main
islands with the immediately adjacent smaller islands, forming an area of about I48,000 square miles, and having a
population of over 56,ooo000,00oo. The situation of these four
islands corresponds in latitude to the stretch from Jacksonville, Florida, to Eastport, Maine. Prior to 1870 the most
northerly island, Hokkaido, was but thinly populated and
of negligible importance in the nation's affairs. - If, therefore, its area of 30,000 square miles be further deducted,
the territory which formed the historic Japan prior to a half
century ago amounted to about 110,000 square miles, and
extended only as far north, approximately, as the latitude
of New York City. Tokyo and Kyoto, the two great centers
of Japan's national life, are in the latitude of Raleigh, North
Carolina, and of Tangier in Morocco. In longitude, Japan
is located exactly on the opposite side of the world from the
middle of the Atlantic Ocean.
The situation of Japan adjacent to the eastern coast of
Asia has often been compared to that of Britain adjacent to
the western coast of Europe. Japan exceeds the British
Islands, both in area and in population, by approximately
20 per cent. The growth of population has been considerably more rapid in Japan, as a half century ago its population was almost exactly the same as that of the British
Islands. There are, however, marked differences as well as
similarities to be observed. The British Islands, in their
entirety, lie farther north than any part of the Japanese
Empire, and much farther north than the main group of
four islands.
In the second place, the distance across the Straits of
Dover is but a little over twenty miles. The shortest distance from Japan to Korea across the Straits of Tsushima
is over one hundred and twenty miles. This additional hundred miles of distance from the continent in the case of
Japan has been of very great significance. The British
Islands have been in unbroken intercourse with the adjacent




I76


THE AWAKENING EAST


parts of the European continent ever since the beginning of
history, and have been subject to repeated invasion and
several conquests by European peoples. Japan, on the other
hand, has frequently shut itself off from all intercourse with
the neighboring continent, and in the thirty centuries of its
history has rarely been attacked and never successfully invaded.
The British Islands have also been open to the steady penetration of cultural influences from the adjacent continent,
and while the British, because of their insular position, have
been able to give a national character to their culture, conditions have never permitted them to quarantine themselves
against further alien infusions. The Japanese have likewise
drawn their culture, in large measure at least, from the
adjacent continent, but their distance from that continent
has enabled them more than once to establish a rigid blockade against the influx of further influences, with the result
that there are long periods of Japanese history when its
culture has been so thoroughly insular and nationalized as
to become practically static. The last such period came to
an end with the intervention of the American Commodore
Perry in I853. It is only since that date that the Japanese
people have set themselves to the task of catching up with
the progress and civilization of the rest of the world.
Political and military activities on the continent of Europe
have formed an important part of British history. For centuries considerable portions of the European continent were
subject to English domination. In a similar fashion Japan
has occasionally been engaged in political and military activities on the Asiatic continent, and more than once has
claimed control of part or all of Korea, and momentarily
even of other regions. In recent centuries British interests
have tended to turn away from the European continent,
and there has been built up since i6oo an enormous British
empire, spreading into every quarter of the globe. Throughout most of this period the British have controlled a major
part of the commerce upon the high seas. Only within the
last half century has Japan in any measure emulated this
phase of British development. The consequent extension




JAPAN


I77


of its island empire both to the north and to the south, and,
more important still, the rapid growth of its commercial
and shipping enterprises are remarkable.
As is well known, the British population is made up of
various racial stocks, roughly divided into Celtic and Teutonic groups, which have never become fully amalgamated.
In Japan there are likewise different racial stocks but, though
they were originally more diverse in character than the
peoples who settled in the British Islands, they have become,
perhaps because of the long periods of national isolation,
much more thoroughly amalgamated. There are in the
Japanese population apparently two main elements, the Mongolian and the Malay. The latter type is obviously more
prevalent in the south, as would naturally be expected, a
fact that would seem to indicate that it had reached Japan
by following northward from the East Indies along the
almost unbroken chain of islands. It is of the greatest significance that the racial blending in Japan has become so
complete as to have produced a peculiarly strong sense of
national unity and solidarity, and that the whole population
uses but a single language.
Since the Norman conquest, so intimate have been the
relations between England and the continent that the steady
influx of new cultural influence has been habitual, and at no
time has there been manifested a clear national consciousness of cultural borrowing or of the intrusion of alien influences. On the other hand, no steady cultural stream has
flowed from the Asiatic continent or elsewhere into Japan.
The occasions -when foreign cultural influences have entered
Japan have been sharply marked, and the people have been
keenly conscious of the process of cultural modification.
These changes have come to Japan purely as cultural movements, as Christianity was brought to England in the sixth
and seventh centuries, and not as the result of foreign invasion or military pressure, as in the case of the Norman.
conquest.
The Japanese people have been free to receive or reject
the new ideas. The adoption of anything novel in political,
economic, social, literary, or artistic institutions and life has




178


THE AWAKENING EAST


come as the result of careful consideration and deliberate
determination. This attitude or spirit, displayed on earlier
occasions, reveals itself constantly in the changes which
have come in the last threescore years. The Japanese have
often been accused of being imitative, of being borrowers
rather than originators or creators. While this allegation
may to some extent be true, it is also true that the Japanese
people have not passively submitted to cultural change, but
that they have actively studied new ideas and methods, and
have rejected or adopted them in accordance with their own
free will and judgment.
The historical conditions under which the intensely national character of the Japanese has developed must be
studied in order to understand the radical differences from
the nations already considered, in the country's attitude toward the adoption of modern culture and in its relations
with the great powers of the West. Japan proudly lists its
present emperor as the one hundred twenty-second in unbroken hereditary succession from their first emperor, whose
date is customarily placed at 660 B. c. Originally the political, as well as the religious and social, organization was
largely patriarchal. Comparisons might in some ways, though
by no means in all, be made with the earliest history of Ireland and of the Celtic portions of Britain. Clan and local
traditions were strong, and the power of the emperor was
probably rarely exerted to any serious degree much beyond
the immediate locality in which he and the imperial family
lived. There seems to have been little in the way of a genuinely national system of administration. There was not
even a capital or fixed seat of government.
In the course of time, however, two important developments occurred. The imperial power became strengthened
and concentrated to such a degree that Japan was able to
conquer, and for a considerable period to hold in subjection,
a large part of Korea, over which its suzerainty was recognized down to 668 A. D. The other development, which was
of far greater significance for the national history, was the
establishment of intercourse with the continent and the consequent influx of Chinese ideas, which came, no doubt,




JAPAN


179


largely through Korea, but probably also, to some extent,
directly. As early as the third century A. D., Confucianism
spread into Japan, and about the middle of the sixth century
Buddhism began to come in and grew rapidly in influence.
While Buddhism never replaced entirely the original religion of the people, which was primarily a form of ancestor
worship, it has been, until recent years, the most active religious force in the nation's life and development.
Just as the year i868 is the great critical date in the modern history of Japan, so the year 645 A. D., which began the
Daika era, or great reformation, is the central date in its
earlier history. Beginning with that year there occurred a
period of reform marked by the adoption of political ideas
and methods of organization from China. Instead of the
chief importance in the nation's affairs belonging to the
hereditary heads of clans or families under the old patriarchal system, the emperor was henceforth surrounded by
a group of ministers and subordinate officials whose positions
were not hereditary but appointive. There also seems to
have been an attempt at a complete economic reorganization.
All lands were declared to be the property of the emperor,
and were carefully assigned out on a regular system in proportion to population. Landholding thus became a personal
matter on a sort of feudal tenure basis. The taxes or rents
were payable in rice and other produce, and in labor in a
way somewhat similar to the European corvee.
The influx of new ideas from China continued, and numerous new departures in Japanese culture are to be dated
from the latter part of the seventh century and from the
eighth. At the beginning of the eighth century the government became definitely settled at Nara, which for nearly a
hundred years was the imperial residence and the national
capital. The accompanying growth of Buddhism and spread
of learning have left a permanent impress on the national
life. The great bronze Buddha at Nara and numerous temples were erected, and the earliest pieces of Japanese literature were reduced to writing. At about this time scholars
who had studied in China, where they had also come under
the influence of Sanskrit learning, introduced a phonetic




I80


THE AWAKENING EAST


script, known as the kana, which still remains in use.1 It
employs about fifty syllabic signs modified from Chinese
characters. At the close of the eighth century the capital
was transferred to Kyoto,,which was destined to be the imperial residence until I869.
Important and far-reaching as the reforms were, they
could not seriously alter the patriarchal character of the national life. The wealth or power acquired by certain families
gave them an influence which could not be overlooked for
long. There was also a natural tendency for ministers and
other great officials to endeavor to transmit their powers and
honors in their own families. In time there came emperors
who lacked the ability and will to exert strong authority,
and ministers who were less loyal and disinterested. Consequently the decline in imperial power gave opportunity for
the development of an hereditary official and propertied class.
This change in Japan corresponds, at least superficially, to
the contemporaneous decline of the Carolingian Empire in
western Europe. Just as feudalism developed in medieval
Europe, so in a somewhat similar fashion it grew up in
Japan, where it continued to hold sway until the latter half
of the nineteenth century.  Feudal chieftains or counts,
called daimyo, with their knights, or samurai, made themselves practically absolute masters of the different sections
of the islands.
The height of the feudal period was marked by the supremacy of the Fujiwara family in civil affairs, and by the
rivalries of the two great military families of Taira and
Minamoto, which ended in the triumph of the Minamoto
under Yoritomo and the extinction of the Taira in 1185.
The result of this struggle was the practical annihilation of
the authority of the emperor and the assumption of real
power iby the feudal lords, or daimyo, at the head of whom
stood Yoritomo, who consequently wielded the real power
of government. In II92 he had the emperor confer upon
him the title of shogun, or commander-in-chief. From that
date until I867 the shoguns were customarily the actual
rulers of Japan.
'There are, in fact, two systems of kana.




JAPAN


Titular emperors continued to succeed one another, or,
rather, were set up and pulled down by the shoguns at will.
The nominal emperor was regularly kept in carefully
guarded seclusion at Kyoto, and was little more than a
figurehead, adorned with a sort of halo of sanctity as the
living representative of the ancient imperial family. The
government of the shoguns, which lasted for nearly seven
hundred years, was characterized by the continuance, with
little change, of the feudal conditions, and the shogun himself was merely the greatest of the feudal lords. This protracted existence of feudalism until a date only a little more
than a half century ago has left a deep impress upon the
national character, and has given to the Japanese the unique
code of chivalry known as bushido.
The military caste, that is the daimyo and the samurai,
was the sole one of recognized importance. The agricultural, artisan, and trading classes remained until the very
end of this period submerged to a low level quite outside the
workings of the code of honor. Still further down in the
social scale was yet another group, though not a large one,
known as the eta class, composed of those engaged in certain occupations which were regarded as peculiarly humiliating.
Though feudalism was, officially abolished in I87I, the
persistence of its influence is shown by the continuance of
political power almost exclusively in the hands of former
members of the feudal aristocracy of the old clans, or of
their descendants. The same persistence of the old traditional class distinctions also appears at the lower end of
the scale. Though the invidious discriminations against
the eta class were legally abolished some time ago, the differentiations have continued to prevail in practice and are at
the present moment the subject of agitation.
About a century after Yoritomo's establishment of the
shogunate occurred the most serious efforts at invasion
which Japan has ever had to resist. These attempts were
undertaken at the direction of the great Mongol emperor of'
China, Kublai Khan. The repulse of the final and most
serious of these attacks in I28I has sometimes been com



i82


THE AWAKENING EAST


pared to the destruction of the Spanish Armada in English
history. Another importance, however, attaches to this
episode, for at this time there was resident at the court of
Kublai Khan the Venetian traveler, Marco Polo, who
gleaned such information as he could with regard to the
island empire. This information, recorded in his famous
book of travels, gave western Europe its first knowledge of
Japan.
Not long after this great event, the shogunate passed in
1336 into the hands of a member of the Ashikaga family,
whose descendants continued to fill the office until I573.
Near the close of this period, in I542, Japan was for the
first time visited by Europeans, a small boatload of Portuguese who happened upon the coast. Very shortly afterward
the great Jesuit missionary, St. Francis Xavier, arrived and
began successfully Christian missionary work. The European relations were almost exclusively with the southern
island, Kiushiu, which had been in closer contact with the
Asiatic continent than the other islands, and which had
earlier been the object of the Mongol attack. The Europeans
were welcomed perhaps even more for their firearms than for
their Christianity or trade. The feudal lords of Kiushiu
were very quick to recognize the advantage which firearms
would give them in their rivalries with the feudal lords farther north. For nearly a century the westerners were hospitably received in Kiushiu, and many of the natives,
including some of high rank, accepted Christianity.
The importance of this era of the close of the sixteenth
century and the beginning of the seventeenth in Japan is to
be found, not in the earliest contacts with Europeans, but in
the careers of a group of the most able warriors and statesmen that Japan has ever produced. It was, in a sense, the
heroic period of the nation's history, and its foremost figure
was the famous Hideyoshi, who undertook, after the lapse
of nearly a thousand years, to restore Japanese sway in
Korea. Shortly after the death of Hideyoshi, which occurred in 1598, his most able and trusted subordinate, Iyeyasu, of the Tokugawa family, succeeded in defeating his
rivals and assuming, in 1603, the shogunate, which contin



JAPAN


I83


ued in his family until I867. Two acts of Iyeyasu are of
significance. He removed the capital of the shoguns, which
had been at Kamakura ever since the time of Yoritomo, to
Yedo, the modern Tokyo.
Iyeyasu also sent an agent to Europe to study Christianity
and other matters. The unfavorable report led to the continuation of the anti-Christian policy of Hideyoshi, which
culminated, in I637, under one of his successors, Iyemitsu,
in the complete extirpation of Christianity and the closing
of the island empire. The termination of western intercourse and the adoption of the policy of isolation seems a
curious and somewhat impotent close for the heroic period.
This change has often been interpreted as the result of an
anti-Christian policy. It is true that the Christian missionaries were driven out and that the native Christians were
compelled to renounce their faith or suffer martyrdom.
The Christian missionaries to Japan, however, were Roman Catholics, mostly Jesuits, and politically they were identified with Spain, which under Philip II had, in I580, seized
Portugal and succeeded to the Portuguese interests in the
Far East.  Furthermore, the missionaries often reached
Japan by way of the Philippine Islands, where they had been
zealous agents in the recent establishment of Spanish control. The Japanese were undoubtedly familiar with the
importance of Spain in European affairs and also aware of
the aggressive character of the activities of both Portuguese
and Spaniards in Asia and the East Indies. The policy of
the Japanese shoguns may, therefore, be interpreted as one
of rigorous determination to prevent the aggressive and
domineering Europeans from acquiring any foothold whatsoever in their country. Furthermore, the establishment of
the shogunate in the Tokugawa family, with its capital at
Yedo, or Tokyo, represented the triumph of the northern
clans and the definite subjection of the clans of the southern
island, who had been most involved in intercourse with the
Europeans.
The policy of isolation and of prohibition of outside intercourse, initiated in I637, was rigorously maintained until
the arrival of Commodore Perry in I853. Throughout these




184


THE AWAKENING EAST


two centuries the shoguns shrewdly permitted one little chink
to remain open through which they might obtain some information of the movement of events in the outer world. This
was done by permitting the Protestant Dutch, who cleverly
made known their hostility to the Roman Catholic Spaniards,
to carry on a limited amount of trade on the little island of
Deshima in the harbor of Nagasaki. Far to the north there
were some other contacts of even less significance, where
the Japanese found themselves confronted by the extension
of the imperialistic activities of the Russians to Saghalien
and the Kurile Islands.
Toward the middle of the nineteenth century Americans
and others began to push whaling, fishing, and trading activities into the northern Pacific. Even though it was known
that Japan was a forbidden land, these enterprises were
bound to result in a certain number of contacts due to shipwreck, stress of weather, and other accidents. It was directly out of such occurrences that there developed a situation which led the government of the United States to send
the expedition under Commodore Perry to Japan to insist
upon the establishment of satisfactory relations.
Even had Japan not been opened from without by Perry's
expedition, forces were already at work within Japan which
would, before long, have broken down the policy of isolation. In the first place, Japanese scholars were turning their
attention to a'study of ancient Japan prior to the intrusion
of Chinese influences which had resulted in the great governmental change of 645 A. D. Such studies meant the revival
of certain ideas and customs which had been current in the
centuries before Buddhism and feudalism had become established in the islands. Especially did they suggest the restoration of the ancient patriarchal authority of the emperor as
the real ruler of the nation, instead of his continuing a mere
figurehead, as had been the case for so many centuries.
In the second place, certain Japanese scholars, although
it was unlawful, managed to obtain books from the Dutch
which opened up vistas of ideas quite new to the nation.
One case was of peculiar interest. A certain book obtained
from the Dutch set forth some facts directly contrary to the




JAPAN


I85


accepted teachings derived from the Chinese sources. It
was determined to make a test to discover which was correct.
The result of the experiment afforded convincing proof of
the fallaciousness of the Chinese teachings and gave corresponding prestige to the ideas derived from the West.
Still other forces were at work. The power of the shoguns was obviously declining in the face of increasing rivalries among the clans. For two centuries not only had there
been no intercourse, either friendly or hostile, with foreign
nations, but practically complete peace had been maintained
within the empire. After this long suspension of military
operations the repressed desires for vigorous activity once
more began to appear. The study of the earlier period of
the nation's history had revealed the ability of the Japanese
to subdue and rule other peoples. Consequently, the motive
of extending the national power was added to the other influences making in favor of change from the old policy of
isolation. There were thus forces operating within the country as well as from without which were preparing the way
for startling changes in the nation's life.
Commodore Perry's first visit to Japan in I853 produced
no immediate result, but in the ensuing year the shogun consented to enter into the first treaty made by Japan with an
outside power. This treaty with the United States was revised in I858, through negotiations conducted by the consulgeneral of the United States to Japan, Townsend Harris.
Other treaties were made at about the same time with the
British, Dutch, and Russians. As in the first treaties with
China, in the preceding decade, these agreements provided
for extra-territoriality, conventional tariffs, and the mostfavored-nation treatment.  All these negotiations were
peaceably conducted, except for Perry's display of force;
thus the establishment of western intercourse with; Japan
was marked by no such untoward event as the Opiuii War
in the case of China.
In these negotiations the shogun found it necessary to pose
as the emperor. This presumption, together with the inevitable identification of the shogunate with the intrusion of
the suspected if not hated foreigners, when taken together




i86


THE AWAKENING EAST


with the operation of the internal forces already described,
made the termination of the shogunate merely a question of
time. It was in the closing weeks of I867 that the last of
the Tokugawa shoguns wisely recognized the situation and
honorably resigned his authority. His abdication was followed in the opening days of i868 by the proclamation of
the emperor, Mutsuhito, who had recently succeeded to the
title, as the sole and actual ruler of the nation.
This radical change very naturally rendered uncertain the
status of the treaties recently negotiated with the western
nations and placed the small group of foreign residents in
a highly critical position. The atmosphere was promptly
cleared by a proclamation of the emperor guaranteeing observance of the treaties and protection to the foreigners.
The first stages of the revolution had been entirely peaceful,
but it was not destined to be fully accomplished without
bloodshed, for certain internal complications produced a
short period of civil war which ended in the complete triumph of the emperor.
The overthrow of the Tokugawa shogunate was in large
measure due to the activity of the western and southern
clans, which had been excluded from power when the
Tokugawa had assumed control of the government two centuries and a half before. The emperor found himself, if
not under the control of these clans, at least dependent upon
them for the maintenance of his position and the conduct of
his government. They appropriated to themselves the control of the army and navy, and to this day a large proportion
of the higher officials in the army are members of the Choshu
clan and in the navy of the Satsuma clan. It was not impossible that the fall of the Tokugawa might have been followed, as on earlier occasions, by the establishment of a
new dynasty of shoguns representative of one of these clans.
The movement of events, in no small measure due to the
rapid influx of modern influences, soon rendered any such
contingency impossible.
The earliest results of the revolution with regard to the
conduct of the government were somewhat parallel to the
changes in 645, but in inverse direction. In matters of re



JAPAN


I87


ligion there was a distinct attempt to separate the indigenous
worship known as Shinto from the Buddhist influences
which had overlaid it for so many centuries. The spirit of
the new order was embodied in an early proclamation of
the emperor known as the imperial oath, or the charter oath.
This promised that henceforth government measures should
be decided by impartial discussion; that the civil and military powers should be concentrated in a single whole, thus
maintaining the national unity and assuring the rights of
all; that uncivilized customs should be done away and that
justice should rule; and finally, that "intellect and learning
shall be sought for throughout the world in order to establish the foundations of the empire."
It was obvious that if there was to be unity of national
authority, many of the practices of feudalism would need
to be abolished, so that the local administration might be
brought fully under the imperial control. The problem of
abolishing feudalism, therefore, became of primary importance. In I869 the daimyo of the southern and western
clans offered to surrender to the emperor their feudal rights.
This action was speedily followed by practically all the
other daimyo, and in I87I an imperial edict finally pronounced the formal abolition of feudalism.
Some arrangement was necessary to compensate the
daimyo and the samurai for the renunciation of their rights,
which had included the surrender of important sources of
income. This was managed by a system of pensions, which
were, however, calculated on a scale too liberal for the national resources. Consequently, in I873, a plan was initiated
for commuting the pensions for certain payments in cash
and government bonds. This reduction of the compensation,
which was at first voluntary, was widely accepted, and
finally, in I876, was made compulsory. Thus Japan was
freed from feudalism and the privileged status of the mili,
tary class was brought to an end.
These measures by which the ancient feudal system was,
in the course of a half-dozen years, wiped out of existence
involved a wide range of destructive consequences. They
practically swept away both the military and financial




i88


i88   THE AWAKENING EAST


systems of the nation.  It was obviously necessary that
corresponding constructive efforts should be made synchronously.  The first constructive measure was undertaken in i870, very shortly after the beginning of the voluntary surrenders of feudal privileges. It was decreed that,
henceforth, the army should be recruited by a system of
universal conscription. This single act created a general
citizen army to replace the samurai as the sole military class
of the nation. A few years later followed the final blow at
the pride of the samurai, which deprived them henceforth
of the distinctive honor of carrying swords.
The second important constructive measure was the introduction, in i872, of a general land tax payable in money.
This gave the government a regular revenue in currency,
assured it financial stability and independence from any
intervention of the feudal nobility, and assured freedom
from the uncertainties of fluctuating values and other inconveniences inherent in the old system of payments in rice
and other produce. At about the same time an imperial
mint was established and the emission of a standard coinage
was begun. These reforms, taken together, placed the new
government in a position of great strategic advantage as
against any class or local opposition or any effort for reversion to the old order.
The abolition of feudal rights, privileges, and tenures, in
spite of the original financial adjustment, meant a serious
monetary loss to the old privileged classes. This loss was
greatly increased by the final readjustments of the compensation arrangements. The creation of the land-tax system,
at least at first, inevitably worked to their disadvantage in
comparison with the popular classes. It also provided the
government with the necessary 'financial resources to overawe them in case of necessity. The abrogation of the military privileges of the samurai and the establishment of -a
military system based upon universal conscription, at a
single stroke, deprived the feudal nobility of their traditional
position in the national society and took from them the
means which they had always enjoyed of enforcing their
will. On the other hand, it gave the government an army




JAPAN


I89


to maintain its authority, which was absolutely independent
of both class and local interests.
When it is considered how radical a revolution had thus
been wrought in the social, economic, military, and political
order, it arouses wonder that the reform had been effected
with so little manifest opposition. It could, however, hardly
have been expected that the change would pass entirely without protest or revolt. The insurrection came in 1877 after
the changes had all been worked out, but also after plans
had been well laid to make the protest effective. The revolt,
though it undoubtedly had a much wider sympathy in its
favor, was actually limited almost exclusively to one clanSatsuma, in Kiushiu, the southern island. Indeed, it largely
centered around a single person, one of the heads of that
clan, Saigo, a member of the original group of reformers
who had effected the overthrow of the shogunate. There
can be little doubt that personal ambition and clan interests
were actually more important factors than the great reform
measures in producing this revolt.
The struggle was fought with tremendous bitterness.
The military forces engaged on both sides probably numbered about one hundred thousand and over one third of
these fell in the struggle. All the leaders in the revolt either
were slain in battle or took their own lives. This Satsuma
rebellion or Saigo insurrection, which occupied a few months
in 1877, has been the only civil conflict in the nation's history
since the restoration of i868, and it served to prove to the
whole nation that the new order was irrevocably established.
The changes which have thus far been recorded represent
but a small proportion of the great program of reform which
was launched at the restoration. It had been obvious that
among the internal forces which were working for the destruction of the shogunate was a revival of imperial ambitions in the nation. Another force which had operated
against the shogunate had been the unpopularity of the foreign treaties and of the intrusion of the foreigners. Naturally, therefore, the new government, although it had 
promptly accepted the foreign treaties and given to the
foreigners their desired guaranties, felt compelled to heed




I90


THE AWAKENING EAST


the popular feeling. Diplomatic missions were accordingly
sent abroad to the several treaty nations for the purpose of
securing a revision of the treaties which should eliminate
some of the most objectionable provisions. The earlier efforts proved entirely futile.
Out of the movement in favor of reviving the ancient
imperialistic policy arose disagreements with China, especially with reference to Korea, toward which country these
ambitions were naturally directed. Other questions arose
over the island of Formosa and the chain of intervening
islands known as Liu Chiu. In the north there were disputes
with Russia over Saghalien and the Kurile Islands. The
chauvinistic elements were eager to uphold the national pride
and make war, especially over the Korean affair. The failure
of the government to secure a revision of the foreign treaties
added fuel to the fire. On the other hand, those who had
been involved in the abortive diplomatic missions had
learned wisdom, and were insistent in counseling peaceful
measures. The genuine reformers also realized that war
would delay rather than advance the policies which they
had at heart. The consequent decision in favor of a peaceful settlement of the several questions mentioned was,
therefore, highly significant. This was, incidentally, another factor in the discontent which culminated in the
Satsuma rebellion.
The measures to which the reformers had set themselves
at the restoration in i868, and to the achievement of which
they had thus far successfully insisted that the government
must attend as its first duty, involved an almost sweeping
introduction of modern western institutions, inventions, and
methods. These, in turn, were calculated to produce further radical changes in the government and to alter the
outward forms if not the inherent character of the economic
and social order. Traditional restrictions against change of
occupation and residence are disappearing; provincial and
local differences are vanishing; class distinctions are steadily yielding to the demand for equality; the dominance of
the family is being greatly modified by the growth of individualism. In short, the old feudal regime of fixed status




JAPAN


II


is giving place to a new social order which is increasingly
flexible and mobile. Changes in dress and in many social
customs have been, in part, revivals of earlier usages, as
well as, in part, adaptations from the West.
In accordance with the declaration of the imperial oath
in favor of seeking "intellect and learning" throughout the
world, experts in many matters were welcomed from America, England, France, Germany, and other countries. They
assisted in planning the new form of local government, in
developing the new army and navy, in revising the legal
system, and in other reforms of an institutional and administrative character. They cooperated in the establishment of
a system of education on modern lines, in teaching medical
science, in the improvement of agriculture, and in starting
a great enterprise for the colonization of the almost unoccupied northern island of Hokkaido. They helped to plan
a commercial code, to develop a merchant marine, to erect
lighthouses, and to create systems of railway, telegraph, and
postal communications. Even the esthetic temperament of
the nation expressed itself by calling in persons capable of
instructing in the achievements of the western nations in
the various fine arts. It is impossible to measure precisely
the progress made within a given period in all these lines.
A few illustrations must suffice. The first railway was
opened in I875, and by 1883, over 200 miles had been constructed. By the same date there were already in operation
nearly 5,000 miles of telegraph lines, and over 5,000 post
offices were rendering service.
Many of these foreign experts were men of remarkable
force of character, who left a deep personal impress upon
the groups of young men with whom they came in contact.
A notable illustration was President Clark, of Amherst Agricultural College, who spent some months in Japan in I876 -1877 in organizing the Imperial College of Agriculture at
Sapporo, in the northern island. His memory, like that of
several others, is still held in high honor by the eastern
people whom he served. Peculiar interest attaches to the
visit made to Japan, in the summer of 1879, by General
Grant while on the tour around the world, which he made




192


THE AWAKENING EAST


following his retirement from the presidency. No occidental
of eminence had previously visited Japan, nor has one of
equal distinction done so since. He was the recipient of
even more attention in Japan than in India or China, and
his judgments were sought with great deference.
While it was not an item in the program of reform it
was inevitable that Christian missions should again appear
in Japan. The Roman Catholics returned and, curiously,
discovered in the vicinity of Nagasaki a small group of people who had, for more than two centuries, preserved the
traditions of Christianity, which had been introduced at the
close of the sixteenth century but had been rigidly under the
ban since I637. From Russia also came representatives of
the Greek Orthodox Church. Even more important, however, was the arrival of representatives of the leading Protestant denominations, of whom several had established their
work as early as I875. The foremost Japanese Christians
of to-day were young men who were numbered among the
earliest converts.
While Japan was applying "intellect and learning"
brought from the outside world, it was not failing to bear
in mind the first proposition in the imperial oath, that "all
measures shall be decided by impartial discussion." It is
quite unnecessary to follow in detail the various changes
effected in the organization of the central government between the restoration in i868 and the proclamation of the
constitution in I889. Various temporary expedients were
utilized and several experiments were made. As early as
1874, a demand was publicly voiced for a national parliament, and from 1877, the year of the Satsuma rebellion,
onward, several prominent members of the group of reformers and various political societies maintained an agitation
for the establishment of representative institutions. From
the beginning, though constrained to refuse to introduce a
parliament prematurely, the government felt it necessary
to make gestures of concession. In 1875 the governors of
the kens, or prefectures, were summoned in a national assembly for consultation. This was merely an administrative
device and in no way a form of representation.




JAPAN


193


In 1878 the first step toward genuine representative institutions was undertaken, by a provision for representative
assemblies in the prefectures. Two years later lesser local
assemblies were also authorized. The introduction of similar institutions, on a somewhat more liberal pattern, by the
British in India, as already described, extended over the
generation from i850 to 1885. These institutions in Japan
were elective and representative, but they had very narrowly limited functions. Their chief activity was in fixing
the rates of taxation but, even in this their decision was
subject to review by the higher administrative officers. At
the same time the system of local administration in the prefectures and lesser districts, under the direction and control
of the central government, was being worked out. There
was developing throughout the country a local bureaucracy,
largely composed of former samurai, working under the
supervision of the national department of home affairs.
In i88i Mr., later Count, Okuma, who had rendered brilliant service as minister of finance in the final adjustment of
compensations to the feudal nobility, left the government
and placed himself at the head of a progressive group (the
predecessor of the later Kokuminto party) in favor of a
national parliament. The government met this move by an
imperial proclamation, promising that a national diet should
be summoned in I890, and that meanwhile the government
would engage in the necessary study and preparation for
the new departure. To one of the younger members of the
group of reformers fell the main responsibility in this matter. He was Mr., later Prince, Ito.
In 1882 and 1883 Ito, with an extensive suite of experts
and secretaries, spent some months in Europe and the
United States acquainting himself with western institutions.
Not unnaturally he fell under the spell of the dominant personality of the time, Prince Bismarck, and found in the latter's constitution of the new German Empire many ideas
which seemed to him suitable to appropriate, though he was
planning a constitution for a unified and centralized state and
not for a federated empire. While holding various offices
at different times during the nine years, Ito was the most




194          THE AWAKENING EAST
important figure in the central administration, and was steadily adjusting the system in the manner necessary to effect
the transition to parliamentary institutions with as little
break as possible. Among the transitional measures was
the creation, in 1884, of a new nobility in five orders, quite
unrelated to the old feudal nobility, though a large proportion of the newly created nobles were members of the old
feudal noble families. In 1885 a cabinet of the German
type, with Ito himself as minister-president, was installed;
in i888 a privy council was created, and in I889 a competitive civil service was inaugurated. The new constitution, which seems to have been as fully the work of Ito
as the German constitution of I867 was the creation of Bismarck, was finally proclaimed on February 11, 1889, the
two thousand five hundred and forty-ninth anniversary of
the accession of the first emperor, and the first meeting of
the imperial diet assembled a year later.
The constitution of Japan is not a fundamental law created
by the people in their sovereign legislative capacity acting
through some form of constitutional convention. It was
proclaimed by the emperor in his sovereign capacity as a
statement of the plan by which he proposed to conduct the
government, and as a grant by the hereditary and hitherto
autocratic sovereign to his people. The constitution carefully conserves in theory and form the complete powers of
the sovereign.
The essential change effected by the constitution was the
establishment of a national legislature, called the imperial
diet. The consent of this body is requisite to every act of
lawmaking. The initiation of laws may be exercised by the
emperor or his ministers, or by the legislature itself. The
powers of proroguing or dissolving the diet, which have
been exercised on various occasions, reserve to the emperor
an important degree of control over its proceedings. The
diet is composed of two chambers, the house of peers and
the house of representatives. Originally it was planned
that each house should consist of three hundred members,
but the number was not definitely fixed and, under laws supplementary to the constitution itself, the membership of each




JAPAN


195


body has been considerably enlarged, so that at present the
house of peers consists of three hundred and seventy-three
members, and the house of representatives of four hundred
and sixty-three members. The emperor is advised and assisted
in the conduct of the government by a ministry responsible
to himself and not to the diet. The several ministers are
heads of departments, and are responsible individually, as
was the case under the German imperial constitution, not
collectively, as is the case in England. The emperor also
has two other bodies of advisers, the privy council, and the
genro, or elder statesmen. The original members of the
latter group were the more important survivors of the coworkers in the restoration. While the powers of this body
are not clearly defined, its influence has frequently been
far-reaching and decisive and has, in general, been conservative. Its attitude has usually been considered imperialistic
and militaristic.
This constitution was the first ever proclaimed in any nation not of European origin, and it established the first representative body as a national legislature among people of
non-European stock. The Japanese have also claimed that
it is the only constitution ever freely granted by a monarch
to his subjects. This claim is true in the letter, perhaps, but
certainly not in spirit, for in promising to grant the constitution the emperor had obviously yielded to political agitation. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the
constitution permitted the determination of governmental
policies by discussion in a way far in advance of what was
anticipated some twenty years before in the first clause of
the imperial oath.
The provisions of the constitution, however, were not
sufficiently liberal to satisfy those who had been agitating in
favor of the establishment of constitutional government.
These men were particularly disappointed at the provision
for ministerial responsibility to the emperor rather than
to parliament. This point became the center of political
attack for many years. The ministers selected by the emperor were denounced not merely as bureaucrats but as
agents of clan government. These charges were substantially




I96


THE AWAKENING EAST


true. Nearly all the ministers were chosen from two of the
southern and western clans, Choshu and Satsuma. The restriction of the tenancy of the war and navy ministries to
high officers in the respective services, imposed in I895,
placed these two departments almost inevitably under the
control of these two clans respectively, laid the government
open to the charge of being militaristic, and effectively
blocked efforts to render the cabinet responsible to the diet.
Though the new constitution had been established partly
as fhe result of political agitation, many observers doubted
whether the people of Japan were prepared to operate a representative government. The new educational system had
certainly not yet been in operation a sufficient time to create
a body of literate citizens of any considerable size. Neither
had the Japanese people enjoyed the privilege of experience
in the exercise of the elective franchise or in the operation
of representative institutions, except in some local matters
for less than fifteen years. These reasons certainly justified
a very narrow limitation of the franchise at the initiation of
constitutional government. These limitations naturally furnished a further cause for agitation. Though some extension of the suffrage has since been granted, the right to
vote still remains closely restricted. Meanwhile, the rapid
development of the educational system has been fitting the
whole mass of the Japanese people for political privileges.
Though the constitution was criticized from the outset
for its failure to permit party government, there really existed no political parties in a proper sense upon which such
institutions might have been based. Prior to the meeting
of the first session of the diet there were small followings
of a few prominent politicians. These groups were based
upon personal loyalty rather than upon political principles.
In the earlier sessions of the diet this situation was perpetuated, but with a growth in the size and importance of the
followings of some of the leaders. The resulting political
system is entirely dissimilar to either American or British
experience. Despite the constitutional differences, the conditions may perhaps best be compared with the contemporaneous political situation in France, with the same rapid




JAPAN


I97


rise and fall of cabinets due to the constant shiftings in the
combination of small party groups which were frequently
personal followings. In both cases the tendency was to
center interest on men rather than on principles. This comparison with France is of some significance because it shows
that the ensuing situation in Japan was due, not necessarily
to the constitution, but certainly in some measure to the
experience with political groups rather than with a twoparty system.  Survivals of clan relations, interests, and
spirit are also definite, if not easily measurable, factors responsible for group rather than party organization and
politics.
Unfortunately circumstances gave color to charges, which
were freely bandied about on more than one occasion, that
the votes of members of parliament were controlled by
patronage and corruption. In like manner the conduct of
elections aroused serious criticism. In the earlier elections
violence, even resulting in death, was not an infrequent occurrence. Though voting was later conducted somewhat
more peacefully, campaigning methods gave rise to serious
complaint and to repeated allegations of bribery.
These circumstances tended to discredit seriously the demand for party government, and even the conduct of representative institutions themselves. Throughout the first four
years the proceedings of the diet were distracted by the
filibustering activities of the advocates of a parliamentary
ministry and of revision of the treaties with western nations. It was only the use of the emperor's power of proroguing and dissolving the diet and the consistent opposition
of the house of peers to parties and party cabinets that saved
the nation from political disaster. These unfortunate conditions were temporarily interrupted and somewhat modified by the outbreak of the war with China in I894. As long
as the war endured, all party strife was laid aside.
Count Ito, who had again become prime minister in I892,
recognized the unsatisfactory character of the experiences
in trying to establish constitutional government and the impossibility of reconciling the demand that ministers should
be responsible to the diet with the constitutional provision




I98


THE AWAKENING EAST


for their responsibility to the emperor. He seems to have
deliberately welcomed the pretext for war furnished by
China as a means of distracting public attention both at
home and abroad from these facts. He has been charged
with abandoning policies of internal reform in order to conceal the failure of his constitution by the glories of a foreign war.
By a treaty of 1885 Japan and China had recognized a
sort of joint interest in Korea and had agreed on a plan of
common action in case it should be necessary to intervene in
that nation's affairs. In 1894 China accepted an invitation
to intervene in Korea, evidently reckoning the party dispute
in Japan as serious enough to prevent its protesting effectively. On the contrary, domestic discord was stilled, and
both by land and sea Japan was uniformly successful. Victories whetted the nation's appetite for military glory, and
consequently "On to Peking" became the watchword. The
extension of the war from Manchuria into China proper
was prevented by China's suing for peace. The terms were
inadequate to gratify public opinion. The failure to march
on Peking and to exact more rigorous terms from China
was promptly followed by another event which bitterly enraged Japanese sentiment. Russia, Germany, and France
intervened to compel Japan to relinquish the Liao-tung peninsula in return for a slight increase in the war indemnity to
be paid by China. These humiliations undermined the
popularity of Count Ito. Nevertheless Japan did emerge
from the war with China as the first nation in Asia to win
substantial consideration from European powers.
Japan had made rapid strides. Its constitution had been
proclaimed in I889. Parliamentary institutions had been
in operation for five years and were working about as well
as those of France, while Russia had not yet undertaken
such liberal measures. The war with China had been a
complete success.  The acquisition of Formosa and the
Pescadores extended Japanese control over the whole chain
of islands from Kamchatka southward to the Philippines.
Furthermore, China was compelled to withdraw its claims
over Korea and to recognize instead Japan's interest in that




JAPAN


199


country. The Japanese imperialistic program may be compared with the policy of the English sovereigns in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, when they were intent upon
extending English domination throughout the British Islands
and on controlling extensive territories in France. There
was, however, a much more recent model before Japanese
eyes in the achievements of Bismarck in the aggrandizement
of Prussia between 1863 and 1871. Count Ito's admiration
for Bismarck and emulation of his policies appear here as
well as in his constitution-making.
Furthermore, two weeks before the outbreak of the war,
Japanese diplomacy had won a brilliant triumph in securing
a treaty with England providing for the abolition of extraterritoriality after five years. This stroke, perhaps no less
than the war, was of peculiar importance to the Ito ministry in discrediting the opposition in the diet. The intense
desire of the Japanese people to free themselves from the
stigma of national inferiority involved in the existing treaty
provisions conferring upon the western powers the privileges
of extra-territoriality had exercised a dominant influence
in the establishment of constitutional government and in the
political activities under that constitution. While the Japanese were indulging in further violent anti-foreign agitation
after the collapse of negotiations in Tokyo with the representatives of all the treaty powers, Count Ito secretly transferred the negotiations to London and soon obtained the
distinctly favorable treaty, which was signed in I894. Great
Britain assented to the termination of the privilege of extraterritoriality after the expiration of five years, provided the
Japanese government should have given one year's previous
notice that it was prepared to undertake the consequent responsibilities. This delay was cleverly planned by the
Japanese to afford adequate time fdr the framing of a new
legal code and the adjusting of the judicial system, while
the provision for one year's notice was to give Japan the
appearance of exercising the initiative instead of redrafting
its laws in compliance with the foreign demand.
The treaty did not, however, put an end to the conventional tariff. On the contrary, new tariff concessions were




200


THE AWAKENING EAST


the price paid by Japan for British assent to the abolition
of extra-territoriality. The conventional tariff, henceforth,
was limited to certain articles which constituted the bulk of
British trade with the country, but it was provided that for
all other articles Japan might establish a statutory tariff and
that the conventional tariff should expire at the end of
seventeen years, that is, in I9II.
The ice having been broken, the other powers could
scarcely refuse to enter into similar arrangements. By I899
all the other powers had consented to the necessary treaty
revision, and on June 30 of that year Japan celebrated the
restoration of the integrity of its national sovereignty. The
only discordant note came from the foreign populations in
the old treaty ports of Yokohama, Kobe, and Nagasaki,
whose acrid criticism of Japanese laws and administration
revealed their fears for their persons and property under
the new order. With wise generosity the Japanese overlooked the criticisms and took extraordinary pains to avoid
the difficulties which the foreign element had anticipated.
The diplomatic situation at the close of the war with
China, as already noted, made the position of the prime minister, now Marquis Ito, unpopular and difficult. Though the
indemnity considerably exceeded the actual cost of the war,
the resulting imperialistic policy of greater armaments necessitated a serious increase in the burden of taxation. Owing
to the war and to the receipt of the indemnity money there
was a sudden and distressing rise in prices which produced
a momentary but unhealthy prosperity followed by sharp
financial reverses. These circumstances increased the difficulties confronting the government. The war also produced an effect upon the constitutional and political situation.
The governorship of Formosa and other appointments were
promptly appropriated by the clan oligarchy. The military
and naval interests associated with the Choshu and Satsuma
clans tremendously strengthened their influence in the government by legislation insuring their control of the war
and navy departments.
Thus, in the face of hostile opinion in the diet and in the
nation, Marquis Ito had to frame his new budget. He met




JAPAN


201I


the situation by proposing to supplement the annual budget
by a special budget for a seven-year period which would
spread over a series of years the anticipated heavy extraordinary expenditures for military and naval purposes and
for internal improvements. Another post-war problem was
the administration of the territories brought under Japanese
control as a result of the war. Both in Formosa, where political corruption and incompetence were rife, and in Korea,
where the queen was murdered, apparently with Japanese
connivance, the beginnings were exceedingly unfortunate.
The government, however, took prompt measures to remedy
the worst evils, so that a satisfactory administration was
soon operating in Formosa and the supervision of Korea
was exercised more reasonably.
Though party strife had been laid aside during the war
and though it did not again revert to the same bitter and
violent form that had characterized the early days of constitutional government, the fundamental problems remained
unsolved. Throughout the interval between the war with
China and the war with Russia partisan strife continued
acrimonious, and both in the elections and in the diet conditions still existed which seemed to justify charges of corruption and of unfair political manipulation. The question
of ministerial responsibility may be said to have remained
in abeyance. The immediate issue was over imperialism and
militarism. This was due not entirely to conditions within
the country, but partly to the highly disturbed situation in
eastern Asia.
As far as the internal situation was concerned, the political
struggle reached a climax from 1896 to 1898, after which
the control of the militarists was steadily strengthened. A
progressive party, the Shimpoto, after I9II known as the
Kokuminto, under the leadership of Count Okuma endeavored to enforce the principle of collective ministerial responsibility to the lower house of the diet. On the other hand,
the militarist element led by the genro, or elder statesmen,
sought to obtain higher taxes in order to insure more liberal
appropriations for the army and navy. At first Count
Okuma was able to secure a portfolio in a ministry headed




202


THE AWAKENING EAST


by Count Matsukata, with the understanding that the principle of ministerial responsibility would be accepted. This
arrangement failed in 1897, but not until the administration
had made itself memorable by the establishment of the
Japanese currency on the gold standard. A new ministry
of colorless character, under Marquis Ito, came into power,
and secured the acceptance of the new legal code which was
necessary to procure the abolition of extra-territoriality in
1899 as provided by the treaties.
A radical realignment of party groups and a new election
resulted in a large majority in the new diet for the progressive party headed by Count Okuma and his allies. Marquis
Ito resigned and recommended the selection of Okuma as
prime minister, while he himself undertook a mission to
China to investigate the acute situation there. This Okuma
ministry was the first one whose choice was determined with
direct reference to the majority in the lower house, but the
dominant party was utterly unprepared to assume responsibility for the government and so failed miserably.
A new cabinet, formed by Marquis Yamagata in November, 1898, represented the triumph of the partisans of militarism and clan politics. Though Yamagata, who was one
of the highest officers in the army, disdained all parties, he
found it necessary to effect arrangements for party support
in order to get the diet to pass his measures for an enlarged
military budget and for increased taxes. Nevertheless, his
hostility to parties led him to discredit the very factions
upon which he had relied and then to resign office. Yamagata's measures were purchased at the expense of an important reform enacted in 900oo which increased the membership of the lower house to three hundred and eighty-one,
provided for a more equitable distribution of representation,
reduced the property qualification for the franchise, abolished the requirement for signing ballots, and made election
districts coterminous with the prefectures.  Marquis Ito,
who was intensely opposed to the militaristic policies of
Marquis Yamagata, had labored zealously to secure his
overthrow, and made that event the occasion for the creation
of a new party, the Seiyukai, which has since played a highly




JAPAN


203


important part in Japanese politics. Ito, like Yamagata,
was one of the elder statesmen, like him supported the
imperial prerogative in the question of responsibility and appointment of ministers, and also like him was a believer in
oligarchical rather than popular government. The essential
difference between the two men was that Yamagata was a
militarist while Ito had become the advocate of a program
for the material and intellectual advancement of the nation.
Though Marquis Ito succeeded to the prime ministership,
his triumph was short-lived. Only his personal control over
his new party enabled him to secure the adoption of his
budget proposals in the lower house. When these came before the house of peers, they were promptly rejected, but
an imperial rescript compelled the peers to pass the measure.
This utilization of the imperial prerogative was not only
extraordinary but dangerous. Indeed, it is doubtful whether
Ito himself was responsible for the action. It was so much
to his disadvantage that it is possible that it was suggested
by his militarist opponents. In any case, Ito was soon forced
to resign.
A prolonged ministerial crisis ensued, in which the various
party leaders, and Ito himself, were discomfited and discredited, owing to the machinations of Yamagata, who ultimately secured the organization of a ministry under the
presidency of Count Katsura. This was the first ministry
which did not contain any of the elder statesmen. It was
frankly militaristic in character and professedly neutral with
regard to parties. Once more the budget question produced
strained relations between the two houses. By means of a
political deal and some concessions in the terms of the
measure, Katsura secured the adoption of his budget in the
lower house, only to have it rejected by the peers. He then
took up his original budget and secured its enactment by both
houses. Thus on two occasions the political and constitutional struggle had brought the two houses of the diet into
sharp antagonism. Only the support of the militarist ele-.
ment among the elder statesmen and the acrimony of party
strife enabled Katsura to continue in office. He was able,
however, to score an important success in the signing of the




204


THE AWAKENING EAST


Anglo-Japanese alliance in January, 90o2, before the new
elections to the diet took place.
The election in I902 was the first under the reformed election laws and resulted in returning an increased number of
the Seiyukai. The new house promptly defeated Count
Katsura's budget proposals for a new land tax and a program of military development. Katsura at once dissolved
the new diet and, in accordance with the constitution, extended the previous budget for another year. This action
was deliberately punitive, as it required members to stand
the expense of a second election within a year. The prevalent corruption involved such heavy expenditure by the
candidates that it was estimated that at least four years'
salary was necessary to recoup them. The new election in
I903 resulted in no substantial change in the membership of
the diet, but this time the budget was approved, because
Marquis Ito, who foresaw the approaching conflict with
Russia, dragooned his followers to its support. This action
ended Ito's career in politics. The leadership of the Seiyukai
passed to Marquis Saionji, and Ito was named by the emperor to the privy council.
The last political maneuver before the outbreak of war
with Russia was the dramatic personal act of Mr. Kono,
the president of the lower house, at the opening of the new
session in December, I903, when, instead of the customary
formal address to the emperor, he proposed an address denouncing the weak policy of the ministers, which was
adopted without dissent. This extraordinary action resulted
in the immediate dissolution of the house. There can be
little doubt, however, that Kono's purpose was an entirely
patriotic desire to forewarn the country of the approaching
struggle with Russia, which began in the following February.
The war promptly hushed party strife and the new elections
to the diet in March still re-main memorable for freedom
from bitter contests and corruption. In spite of these facts,
Katsura, unlike Ito, does not seem to have sought foreign
war as a balm for party dissension but to have pursued a deliberate and definite militarist plan for a war of conquest.
Only a few words can be devoted to the international re



JAPAN


205


lations of Japan following the close of the war with China
or during the war with Russia. Japan had been compelled
in I898 to watch with almost impotent wrath the seizure of
Port Arthur by Russia, and of other ports in China by other
European powers. The only response that Japan could
make to this situation at the time was the creation of the
supreme advisory military council composed of Marquis
Yamagata and his supporters. In I9oo Japan eagerly seized
the opportunity to participate in the expedition to relieve
the foreign legations in Peking from the siege by the Boxer
rebels.
Events during the preceding decade had convinced Japanese statesmen that they could not look for support to any
power on the European continent. The sympathies of those
governments for obvious reasons would be with Russia,
whose activities in the Far East were becoming yearly more
menacing to Japan. The United States had long been distinctly friendly to Japan, but could not be looked to as an
ally in view of its traditional policy. Under these circumstances the Japanese had for some years been considering
the possibilities of an alliance with England. English interests in Asia were no less than those of Russia, and the
Russian policy appeared even more menacing to the British
in India than to the Japanese. It was not unnatural, therefore, in spite of the surprise of the western powers, that
the Anglo-Japanese alliance should be formed in January,
I902-the first alliance of a European with an Asiatic power
on terms of national equality.
It is possible that, in I904, the Russians, like the Chinese
in I894, mistook the political strife in Japan for national
weakness and unpreparedness. At any rate, Russian aggressions were conducted in Manchuria with insolent defiance of the rights and interests of all.peoples in eastern
Asia, and to the intense indignation of most European
powers. After fruitless attempts to bring Russia peacefully
to terms, Japan declared war in February, I9o4. This strug-.
gle was regarded as a war of national defense and once more
domestic differences were laid aside and the nation entered
whole-heartedly into the struggle. The initial success of




206


THE AWAKENING EAST


Japan revived the imperialistic program, and "On to Baikal"
became the watchword. Russia was to be defeated and
driven out of all eastern Asia, which was to be brought under
Japanese control as far west as Lake Baikal. Though China
remained helplessly neutral, Japan anticipated extending its
sphere of influence over Manchuria and Mongolia if not
over other parts of the Chinese Empire, as it had done over
Korea at the close of the previous war.
As the war progressed, however, it became clear to the
military authorities that the anticipated success was not being obtained, for the retreating Russians were not being
effectively defeated. Indeed, the Japanese government became convinced of the practical impossibility of administering a crushing blow to Russia or of acquiring any considerable part of Russia's territory in eastern Asia. They also
realized that without an overwhelming defeat of the Russians a war indemnity could not be exacted from them.
Under these circumstances the government was prepared
to accept the good offices extended by President Roosevelt,
and in the end came to terms with Russia at Portsmouth in
August, 1905. As a result Japanese suzerainty over Korea
was assured and Japan replaced Russia in the control of
southern Manchuria and in the ownership of southern Saghalien. The bitter disappointment to the Japanese people
at the failure to obtain more extensive territory and an indemnity found expression in serious riots and was disastrous
to the popularity of the ministers and diplomats concerned.
The popular indignation was intensified by the vast increase
of the national debt and by the sudden addition to the burden
of taxation. The war and the treaty had, none the less, resulted in genuine advantages to Japan. The militarist and
clan statesmen might well feel satisfied with the degree of
success achieved.
The decade following the war was to witness no intermission in the prosecution of militarist policies. The national position was strengthened by the renewal in I905 of
the alliance with England in stronger terms and with a wider
scope. Furthermore, synchronously with the Anglo-Russian
entente of 1907, Japan entered into agreements with Russia




JAPAN


207


and France based upon the maintenance of the existing
status in the Far East. Nevertheless, the policy pursued by
Japan after I905 with Korea, Manchuria, and China can
with difficulty be differentiated in character from that of
Russia prior to the war. The behavior of Japan did not
improve the feeling of the European powers toward her,
lost her the sympathy of the United States, and even resulted in a weakening of the provisions of the alliance with
England when it was again renewed in 1911. The only offset, strangely enough, was to be found in the relations with
Russia, which began to take on a more friendly aspect and
to contemplate cooperation of the two countries in dealing
with the affairs of eastern Asia. It was especially the
Japanese administration in Korea and ultimately the annexation of that country in 1910 which cost Japan the
friendly attitude of other powers and the favorable judgment of the world at large.
As was the case at the close of the war with China, the
months immediately following the termination of the war
with Russia were marked by violent fluctuations in the economic and financial affairs of Japan. The government, with
some difficulty, carried through a general program of financial readjustment, and in addition undertook the national
purchase of all the principal railways of the country. This
procedure was possibly unconstitutional, certainly arbitrary,
as regards the rights of the owners of the railways. It was,
however, equally culpable on the other side because of the
excessive liberality of the compensation allowed. In private
business, the period witnessed the organization of many new
corporations and unrestrained speculation in their shares.
Prices rose rapidly to extraordinary heights and fell even
more quickly and sharply. The resulting depression was
not entirely overcome until the outbreak of the World War,
though the period was not without a certain amount of development in industrial enterprise at home and in commercial operations abroad.
Count Katsura, who had remained in power throughout
the war, was compelled by the popular clamor against the
terms of peace to yield the prime ministership to Marquis




208


THE AWAKENING EAST


Saionji. In I908, however, Katsura was able to regain office, to set aside Prince Ito, who had been intrusted with
the administration of Korea, and ultimately, in 1910, to
carry through the annexation of that country. His chief
agent was General Terauchi, who had been minister of war
since I902 and who was now despatched to take charge of
affairs in Korea.
The second Katsura ministry is notable not merely for
its handling of the Korean problem and for the renewal of
the alliance with England, but also for its domestic policy.
The budgets were arranged to provide for the annual payment of fifty million yen on the foreign debt and for the
refunding of the domestic debt at four per cent. The latter
procedure was arbitrary in view of the state of the money
market, and was regarded as more or less confiscatory because of the sharp reduction of the interest rate, the consequent decline in the market value of the bonds, and the renewal of the government policy of buying bonds in the open
market for redemption rather than in purchasing them by
lot at par, as had for some time been the custom. Though
Count Katsura had replaced Marquis Saionji, the leader of
the Seiyukai, in office, he was able to rely upon the support
of that party because of its general principles, and because,
it was alleged, of the use of bribes and patronage. One untoward incident of the administration was the so-called sugar
scandal, which involved the punishment for bribery of several members of the diet who were concerned in the wrecking of a sugar company which had sought to secure special
advantages from favoring legislation.
It also fell to the lot of the Katsura ministry to revise the
tariff and commercial treaties in accordance with the earlier
treaty agreements. Important changes were made in the
statutory tariff, but a blunder of the foreign minister, Count
Komura, prevented the negotiation of new treaties on as
favorable terms as had been desired. Finally a measure for
universal manhood suffrage, which had been passed by the
the lower house, was thrown out by the house of peers with
vehement denunciations of the measure as contrary to the
spirit of the constitution.




JAPAN


209


In August, I9II, Count Katsura voluntarily gave place
to Marquis Saionji, during whose ministry the emperor,
Mutsuhito, posthumously known as the Meiji Tenno, died
on July 30, I9I2, after a memorable reign of forty-five years,
and was succeeded by his only son, Yoshihito. Soon after
this event occurred the fall of the Saionji ministry under
peculiar conditions. The demand of the war minister for
two additional army divisions for service in Korea was
negatived and the minister resigned. The refusal of the
army to provide another high officer as minister necessarily
involved the resignation of the cabinet. It was apparently
the purpose of Prince Yamagata and the clan statesmen to
force the issue to their own advantage.
Prince Katsura, who had apparently broken with Yamagata, after some unusual measures, managed to take office
for a third time. His action was, however, in defiance of
public opinion, which did not seem to grasp the import of
the situation. After launching a new political party in his
own support, Katsura had to confess defeat and resign early
in I913, and before the year was out he died. This crisis is
particularly notable for the influence exercised by public
opinion and by the mob in Tokyo. Katsura had undertaken
to duplicate the maneuvers of Ito eleven years earlier to defy
the elder statesmen, but had failed even more miserably.
Since the Choshu clan could furnish no satisfactory candidate for the premiership, the choice of the genro fell upon
Admiral Count Yamamoto, of the Satsuma clan. This ministry, and the triumph of the genro, however, were shortlived, owing to a scandal involving the trial of high officials
in the navy, charged with bribery in connection with the
building of a warship. In April, I91I4, the prime ministership passed to Count Okuma, the leader of the Kokuminto
party which, under changing names, had long opposed both
the genro and the Seiyukai. The Okuma ministry was associated with Japan's entrance into the World War, the
capture of the German possessions in the Far East and in
the Pacific, and the enforcement of the so-called "twentyone demands" upon China.
The years preceding the outbreak of the World War, as




210


THE AWAKENING EAST


has been seen, had witnessed the steady embitterment of
Japanese politics. The situation had reached a crisis in the
naval scandal on the eve of the war. The formation of the
Okuma ministry was a triumph for the elements which had
been opposing the demands for increased military and naval
expenditures. The ministry entered office with a program
denouncing corruption, opposing militaristic expenditure,
and favoring measures for economic and social welfare. It
was a strange irony, therefore, that this ministry was called
upon to face the situation created by the outbreak of the
World War.
In August, 1914, in accordance with the requirements of
the alliance with England, Japan declared war, and a few
days later began the attack upon the German leasehold of
Kiao-chao on the China coast. This territory was surrendered to Japan in November, while the Caroline, Mariana,
and Marshall islands, the north Pacific insular colonies of
Germany, had been occupied by the Japanese forces in the
preceding month.
On the assembly of the diet at the end of the year the
ministry asked unanimous approval for a greatly enlarged
naval and military budget for the ensuing year. The diet
refused to lay aside its partisanship as it had done in the
case of the wars with China and Russia, and the budget
proposals were rejected in both houses. In face of such
opposition the only practicable measure was dissolution of
the diet and appeal to the electorate. The results were
favorable to Count Okuma and his ministry, though it was
alleged that the elections were marked, to an unusual degree,
by corruption and official pressure in favor of ministerial
candidates. The new diet promptly granted the army and
navy increases, including various demands of this sort which
dated back to the cabinet crisis of 19I2.
On the eve of the assembly of the new diet in May, I9I5,
it was announced that China had yielded to the Japanese
ultimatum in the matter known as "the twenty-one demands." Though the new diet approved the increased
budget, vigorous attacks were made upon this aggressive
Chinese policy of Count Okuma, and also charges were




JAPAN


211


pressed against one of the ministers in another matter. A
cabinet crisis ensued which permitted Count Okuma to reorganize his ministry with new nominees in place of the
foreign minister and his colleague against whom the attacks
had been directed.
After the seizure of the German possessions in the Far
East there was naturally question about the part which
Japan should henceforth play in the World War. While
it was decided not to send troops to the western front in
Europe, Japan undertook to contribute to the supply of
munitions for the Allies, and in October became a party to
the Allied agreement known as the pact of London. This
was followed in I9I6 by an agreement with Russia on matters of Asiatic policy. Of Count Okuma's original platform
of economic and social reform only two details of significance were embodied in law. These were provisions
against child labor and in favor of accident compensation
to workingmen.
The advanced age and failing health of Count Okuma
made him unwilling to continue to face the persistent attacks in the diet, and so in October, 1916, he retired and
a new ministry with Count Terauchi at the head was formed.
This new ministry did not command a majority in the diet
and was at once denounced as ultra-militaristic. Of particular vehemence were the attacks made upon the foreign
policy of the government, especially with regard to China.
Terauchi accordingly secured the dissolution of the diet
and in the new elections in April, 1917, won a victory,
thanks to the support of the Seiyukai. The year 1917 was
marked by an acute rise in prices in Japan which resulted
in numerous strikes by the workingmen. In most cases
these disturbances were short-lived, and resulted in the concession of greatly increased wages.
The victory of the Terauchi ministry in the spring of
1917 occurred shortly after the declaration of war against
Germany by the United States and the outbreak of the revolution in Russia. These two circumstances soon involved
new developments in Japanese policy. While the country
continued to contribute to the Allied supply of munitions




212


THE AWAKENING EAST


and to extend its trade rapidly, especially in fields once
almost monopolized by the British, its aggressive policy toward China received surprising confirmation from the
United States, in the Lansing-Ishii agreement of November,
I917. Later, in 1918, owing to the progress of the Russian
revolution and its possible bearing upon the World War,
Japan, if not at the suggestion of the United States, at least
with its cooperation, undertook intervention in Siberia. With
the progress of the war, however, Count Terauchi seems to
have been losing confidence in the Allied cause, and to have
convinced himself of the probability of German success. It
is said that he was actually on the point of reversing Japanese policy in July, 1918, when the tide of the war suddenly
and decisively changed in favor of the Allies. Furthermore,
his administration incurred serious unpopularity for its
failure to alleviate the economic distress caused by the extraordinary rise of prices.
In September Count Terauchi's ministry had to give
place to one under Mr. Hara, the leader of the Seiyukai,
the first Japanese commoner to attain the premiership.
Though the new cabinet represented less militaristic and
more liberal views than its predecessor, it conducted the
peace negotiations at Versailles in accordance with the
vigorous chauvinistic policy which had prevailed since the
accession to office of Count Okuma. The insistence upon
securing for Japan a position in Shantung distinctly superior
to that held by Germany before the war was so flagrant as
to produce a revulsion of feeling against Japan not merely
in China but practically throughout the civilized world.
During the war Japan had enjoyed abnormal industrial
and commercial prosperity. It had at the same time witnessed the evils of profiteering both in the production of
inferior goods and in the exaction of excessive prices.
These facts, taken together with the policy affecting China,
seriously discredited Japan throughout the East. The crisis
came in I920 when the balance of trade was suddenly reversed, and runs on the banks occurred. The reaction was
felt most severely in the newly developing industrial centers
where abnormally high wages suddenly gave place to unem



JAPAN


213


ployment and strikes. Fortunately for the country the ministry took prompt measures to secure a satisfactory adjustment of domestic affairs through the enactment of various
laws dealing with economic matters and local administration.
Though concessions adopted in I9I8 increased the size of
the electorate from two and one half per cent to five per
cent of the population, the agitation in favor of a more
liberal suffrage law-indeed, of universal manhood suffrage
-continued to develop in persistence and force. The dissolution of the diet in 1920 was ascribed, in part, to a purpose
of defeating these demands. As had been the case in the
two previous instances, the new elections were vehemently
contested but resulted in favor of the Seiyukai and the
ministry in power. Intimately bound up with the agitation
for a more liberal franchise was the demand for better educational facilities, which proved scarcely less futile. These
proposed reforms were also closely associated with opposition to the militaristic policy of the government and included demands for diminished expenditure on naval and
military affairs, for the modification of the conscription plan
of military service, and for withdrawal from the aggressive
and unsuccessful policies in China and Siberia.
Still another difficulty which confronted the government
was the matter of relations with the United States, which
had been growing steadily more unsatisfactory. The problems involved included the education, land, and immigration
questions, which arose mainly from the action of the state
of California, but they also included the effects of a possible
renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance and of the continuation of the aggressive Japanese policy in China and Siberia.
There was, in general, an American suspicion of Japanese
militarism, which, it must be confessed, was somewhat offset by a Japanese suspicion of American militarism, especially in view of the continued increase of the United States
navy after the war. The policy of the Japanese government
in dealing with the current situation had long been the subject of unfavorable comment in the United States and in
other countries. This suspicion of Japan's disingenuousness
was confirmed by the protracted delay in fulfilling Premier




214


THE AWAKENING EAST


Hara's promise of September, 1920, to withdraw from Siberia. The disturbances which developed in Korea in 1919
and the consequent Japanese measures of repression aroused
extraordinary disapproval, which was but slowly allayed
by the more politic administration of the new governorgeneral, Baron Saito. The immediate subject at issue was
the seemingly insignificant question of Yap. It involved,
however, the fundamental principle of the rights of the
United States in territories placed under mandate by the
treaty of Versailles and the important practical matter of
the security of American telegraphic communications with
the Philippines and other Far Eastern countries.
While it must not be assumed that all the complaints represented an intelligent knowledge of facts or a fair and impartial judgment upon them, there is no question of the significance of their effect upon public opinion in Japan, in
China, in the United States, and in other countries. There
can be little doubt that the situation in the year 192I was
highly critical. Fortunately the attitude of the new American administration under President Harding opened the
way to a vast improvement, through the planning of the
Washington conference and through the negotiations which
were there brought to a conclusion.2
The year 1921 was also marked by the journey of the
crown prince to visit the Allied countries in Europe. This
action was of extraordinary significance, because it was the
first occasion on which a prince in the imperial succession
had ever left Japan. The journey was undertaken in spite
of serious opposition, and its successful conclusion was regarded as a triumph for the liberal cause. Shortly after
the return of the crown prince he was named regent owing
to the long-continued ill-health of the emperor.
Just at the moment of the meeting of the Washington
conference, Premier Hara was assassinated. In his stead
Baron Takahashi became prime minister, but in June, I922,
shortly after the return of the mission from Washington,
its head, Baron Kato, succeeded to the premiership. This
3See above, pages 139-I41. The question of Yap was settled to
the satisfaction of the United States.




JAPAN


215


change of ministry was of great significance not merely because it carried approval of the Washington conference but
also because Baron Kato accepted office on specific condition
of a policy of army and navy reduction and of the evacuation of Siberia. This was the first case in which a premier
was chosen under conditions that enabled him to bring the
clan statesmen to terms in the selection of the army and
navy ministers. Baron Kato was not only able to defy longestablished traditions in entering upon office but he has also
been able to continue in power despite the direct censure of
his administration by the privy council with especial reference to the policy concerning China.
The trend of events during the year following the Washington conference has been away from militarism and toward
liberalism. It has also revealed a marked alleviation of conditions in Japan, even though there has been little in the
way of reform legislation. The international relations and
reputation of Japan have been greatly improved, owing to
the wisdom and sincerity displayed by its representatives in
the agreements made at Washington and in their execution.
The continued validity of these agreements, it must be observed, will be dependent on the accession of Russia to them
whenever that country is readmitted to international comity.
Contrary action by Russia would once more embroil the
whole Far Eastern situation and drive Japan back to militarism.3
In retrospect, from the opening of the country to foreign
intercourse in 1854 till I894, Japan officially adhered to a
policy of internal development and of nonintervention in
foreign affairs. Advocates of a vigorous foreign policy
appeared throughout the period, and at least once, in 1873,
nearly brought the country into war. From 1894, when revision of the treaties was secured and war was declared
against China, until the treaty of Versailles in 1919, Japanese
policy was, in varying degrees, militaristic and chauvinistic.
The high tides of aggressive or imperialistic spirit were undoubtedly in the years 1895, 1905, and I9I9, which re8For later developments, see below, pages 23Iff.




2l6


THE AWAKENING EAST


spectively marked the close of the three great wars to which
the nation was a party. Yet each of these dates also witnessed the sharp disappointment of the national ambition.
In 1895 foreign intervention robbed Japan of the fruits of
victory; in 1905 popular indignation was vented on the administration which had wisely recognized that the resources
of the nation were inadequate to win more than a partial
victory over Russia; in 1919 the treaty provisions secured
to Japan a fuller concession of its demands than was obtained by any other party to the peace, but the nation had
to learn that terms guaranteed on paper were impracticable
of realization. It is greatly to the credit of the Japanese
government and people that they seem to have been able to
take to heart the last unpleasant lesson as well as the former
ones. The policy of Baron Kato apparently represents a
reversion to the principles of the first quarter century of
the Meiji era-progress at home, peace with honor abroad.
It would seem that Baron Kato is actually succeeding with
the program for which Marquis Ito in 1902 and Prince Katsura in 19I2 struggled in vain.
The trend of internal political developments is far less
easy to discern and explain. The movement of events from
year to year has already been recorded; it is now necessary
to undertake to determine their significance. The restoration of i868 replaced the emperor in autocratic control of
the government. In theory that autocratic, almost theocratic,
power remains supreme: practically, by the grant of the
constitution in 1889, the emperor has not divested himself
of his prerogatives but has given them legal definition and
established the principles and methods through which they
shall operate. Vastly more divinity appertains to the Japanese emperor than hedges the British sovereign.  Every
one from the premier down still bows in alert obedience
to the imperial behest. That finality still attaches to the
expressed will of the emperor is, no doubt, due to the remarkable discretion which has characterized imperial intervention in political matters.
From the restoration to the grant of the constitution
progress was administrative rather than political. Reforms




JAPAN


217


were wrought by imperial mandate, but the work was done
by advisers and ministers drawn almost entirely from the
four southern and western clans, mainly from Choshu and
Satsuma. This was not unnatural, as the services of these
clans had achieved the restoration and as these clans were
those which the circumstances of the establishment of western intercourse had made most progressive. Political agitation in this period was confined to small groups and aimed
at parliamentary government and treaty revision. With the
election of the first diet these groups developed into political parties, and during the next four years their advocacy
of these two causes was far more vehement than discreet.
Though there have probably been more stormy sessions of
the diet in later days, the attitude assumed on constitutional
questions has never again been so violent.
The periods of the wars with China and Russia were times
of political truce or quiescence. With the close of each
war political strife revived. The question of parliamentary
government came to be treated as a matter of political expediency rather than as a constitutional issue. The emphasis
was upon men rather than measures. Though both Ito and
Katsura were originally identified with highly imperialistic
policies, the responsibilities and experience of office seem, in
the end, to have convinced each that internal progress was
more essential than expansion abroad. Both fell victims
to the peculiar power wielded by those leaders of the military clans known as the elder statesmen. It is not unfair
to assume that behind the elder statesmen was a very powerful body of public opinion, and that the tactics of the earlier
parliamentary politicians had not been of the kind to command popular support.
The entrance of Japan into the World War in 1914 did
not set a period to partisan strife as had been the case in
I894 and I904. Politics seemed, on the contrary, to grow
more corrupt and acrimonious, and members of the diet
more violent and irresponsible.  The Okuma ministry,
which entered office in 1914 on a liberal platform, outHeroded its precedessors in imperialism, militarism, and
corruption. The succeeding ministry under Terauchi per



218


THE AWAKENING EAST


petuated the evil tradition. These conditions brought their
own Nemesis. The prolonged indifference to the popular
needs had permitted the cumulation of evils crying for reform. The economic effects of the war contributed to the
crisis which forced the Terauchi cabinet from power in
1918. Meanwhile the operation of the educational system
/r+9t l roduced what did not exist when the constitution was
proclaimed in 1889, namely, a literate citizenry which was
rapidly growing in intelligence and interest in public affairs.
These people cared little for the rivalries of politicians;
they wanted increased educational facilities, better working
conditions, lower prices, and the right to vote; they opposed
military conscription, excessive taxation, increased armaments, and a foreign policy fraught with opprobium and
economic ruin. Premier Hara began to discern the signs
of the times; Premier Kato seems fully awake to them.
Sympathetic understanding of modern tendencies seems
also to characterize the recently proclaimed prince regent.
Born in the twentieth century, this young sovereign is
already showing an inclination to emulate western monarchs
in manner and policy rather than to imitate the patriarchal
attitude of his illustrious and revered grandsire. With the
deaths, in I922, of Prince Yamagata and Marquis Okuma,
the genro, the elder statesmen, who were the mainstay of
the benevolent despotism of the Meiji era, have practically
passed from the stage. Even the men of the second generation who still utilize the house of peers as a stronghold
of conservatism are giving place to younger blood. Few
members are now sitting in the lower house whose terms of
service antedate the war with Russia. The positions of
power, influence, and responsibility are rapidly being filled
by men of the younger generation, trained in modern schools,
to whom the old Japan is but a hazy tradition.
Many circumstances indicate that the nation, after a generation of experience with representative institutions and
limited suffrage under the constitution of 1889, is prepared
to take another step forward. Liberal extension of the
franchise alone will not suffice. Conditions now seem to
require and justify closer correlation of the administration




JAPAN


2I9


with the diet, if not its responsibility thereto; further development of the educational system, and improved conditions for the working classes. These reforms are demanded
by a growing public opinion, which sums up its desires in
the word "democracy." This democracy, however, is not
republican; it is sanely combined with a deep sense of loyalty
to the ancient ruling house.
The popular currency of democratic ideas, derived chiefly
from England and the United States, is doubtless due to
familiarity with the English language, which is regularly
taught in all schools above elementary grade. The Japanese
are a nation of readers. On the trains, for instance, greater
numbers of both men and women may be seen reading books
and periodicals than in any other country except the United
States. Public libraries have been multiplied in recent years
on a scale far surpassing any other eastern nation. In the
publication of books, the press of Japan rivals the progressive nations of the West. The number of periodicals
published has risen from about one thousand in Igo900 to
about thirty-five hundred at the present time. The various
types of weeklies and monthlies familiar in England and
America have their counterparts in Japan. Daily newspapers, which date from 1871, are numerous and as varied
in character and color as in the United States. Some of them
claim a circulation of a quarter of a million. The censorship restrictions, which were formerly reminiscent of German procedure, have been considerably relaxed in recent
years. The foreign-language papers, which in some cases
antedate the Japanese, are mostly of high grade, as exemplified by the admirable Japan Advertiser, edited by a native
of the United States. These developments certify to the
steady growth of an informed and alert public opinion. Today the Japanese people are educated for a more liberal government.
The constitution of I889 probably provided as large a degree of self-government as the people were then competent
to exercise. In so far as it followed any western examples
it was built upon continental European models, for only
there could be found constitutional governments of a mon



220


THE AWAKENING EAST


archical type. It would have been not only almost incomprehensible but also extremely unwise had the Japanese
suddenly broken with their venerable monarchical past and
launched out, as China attempted to do at a later date, on
an entirely new experiment in governmental forms and
methods. It was perhaps wise also that they proceeded with
deliberation in the extension of political privileges instead
of adopting universal suffrage as Bismarck had done in
Germany. The failure to follow another German precedent,
that of federation, and the adherence instead to the native
traditions of centralization, somewhat improved by study
of the French system and methods, illustrates clearly the
difference of the Japanese situation from that of the Chinese.
The wisdom which dictated the conservative character of
the constitution in I889 should now dictate its liberalization.
The changes should be natural outgrowths of the nation's
past and not mere alien grafts upon the ancient stock. On
the other hand, to refuse or long delay the grant of certain
reforms, for which there is widespread popular demand and
for which the nation is clearly prepared, would be to court
revolution. Chauvinism and militarism have thus far postponed concession to the demands for constitutional progress,
and they may again be called into use to secure further
delay.
Chauvinism seems to run in the Japanese blood as it does
in the French; each of the last three decades has seen a
notable manifestation of it, and clearly the danger of recurrence is not entirely imaginary. Japan overestimates its
primacy in the Far East and its progressiveness, just as the
French have been wont to do in Europe ever since the revolution of 1789. This spirit of international knight-errantry
is, however, in some degree, offset by a stability in the internal political life which is comparable to the solidity of
British constitutional development rather than to the fickleness of French political experimentation. For the immediate future the fortunes of Japan are in the hands of the
generation which has been trained under the constitution of
I889, but also under the regime of militarism. It is too
soon to determine whether its dominant desire will be for




JAPAN


221


political progress or for military achievement. Happily,
present indications point to the former alternative.
The spirit of the new Japan certainly insists on a fuller
measure of social and political equality in the national life.
Internationally it expresses itself unequivocally, though not
in a militarist manner, in the demand for racial equality.
The mass of the Japanese people apparently desires peace
and prosperity, which it would promote by a policy, advocated by such progressive leaders as the veteran parliamentarian, Mr. Ozaki, of disarmament by international
agreement. The aims and achievements of the Washington
conference found a hearty response throughout the nation.
The lessening of the burdens of universal military service
and of public expenditures for army and navy is considered
prerequisite to the undertaking of an extensive new program
of economic and social improvement.
The national budget for I922-I923, it is estimated, will
balance at $730,000,000. The public debt at the close of
1920 amounted to $843,ooo,ooo in internal loans and $7I4,ooo,ooo in foreign loans, a total of $I,557,ooo,ooo. The_
loans are at rates bearing from four to five per cent interest.
The annual expenditure is $I3 per capita and the debt
amounts to $27.80 per capita. These rates are surprisingly
low in comparison with various western nations, but they
are felt in Japan to be excessive. The country is on a sound
financial basis, having adopted the gold standard, and it has
an extensive banking system which dates from I872. There
are numerous private banking corporations and over six
hundred savings banks, with a considerable number of agricultural and industrial banks in addition to a postal savings
system.
Japan has made good progress in the development of internal communications. The total mileage of railways in
operation in I88o was 73; in I900, 3,638; in I920, 8,207.
Most of the lines were unfortunately constructed on a narrow gauge. As far back as I9o6 Japan had undertaken a
policy of nationalization of its railroads, at least of all the
important lines. At the outbreak of the war in I914 a
policy of railroad development to extend over a period of




222


THE AWAKENING EAST


ten years had already been entered upon.  Considerable
progress was made even during the period of the war, and
at its close further extensions of the policy, including a
scheme of electrification and plans for the adoption of a
standard gauge, were sanctioned. These undertakings are
scheduled for completion in twenty years. There are electric
tramways in the more important cities, amounting to 732
miles in I9I8. The jinrikisha, now widely used throughout
the Far East, was devised by a missionary in Japan. Telegraph lines amounted to 28,00o miles in I92I, and telephone
systems are in operation in the more important cities. There
are about 8,ooo post offices.
It was noted at the outset that the area of Japan proper is
about I48,000 square miles, and that its population in I920
was over 56,000oo,ooo, that is, about 380 persons to the square
mile. Until the opening of Japan to intercourse with western nations in I853 the population had necessarily to support
itself from the country. Since then, however, the population
has increased with tremendous rapidity. As late as i88o
Japan had approximately only 36,000,000 inhabitants. In
the five years IgI7-I92I inclusive the average annual increment has been 550,000. This increase in population has
naturally produced a problem of securing the necessary sustenance. If the whole area of Japan, or even one half of it,
were cultivable land, the problem would not be an impossible
one.  Only I4 per cent of this area, however, is reported to be under tillage. Some persons contend that much
of the rest is entirely unfitted for agricultural purposes, and
that the remainder could be adapted to cultivation only with
great effort and without assurance of a satisfactorily compensating retdrn in productivity. On the other hand, it is
alleged that the cultivated area could easily be increased by
at least one third. Trade statistics do not show that Japan
falls much short of self-sufficiency in food supply. In I919
only I6 per cent of its imports were articles of food, while
7 per cent of the exports were food products, leaving the
net importation less than Io per cent of the total trade.
Until very recently, Japan was primarily an agricultural
country, like the other eastern lands which have been con



JAPAN


223


sidered. So long as the nation is compelled to be self-supporting or makes it a policy to depend upon its own food
supply, and so long as the population remains almost exclusively agricultural in occupation, the difficulty of the
problem is obvious. There are three possible solutions. The
first of these is the extension of the cultivated area, together
with increased productivity of the lands under tillage by the
application of scientific methods. Some advance is being
made in both these directions.
The second solution is in a national policy of expansion,
either political and economic, or merely economic. The last
half century has seen important efforts made in these ways.
The first of these was within Japan itself by the policy of
colonization in the northern island, Hokkaido. That island
contains a considerable area capable of cultivation; but the
climatic and soil conditions are both considerably different
from those of the rest of the country. The Japanese have
not yet proved their ability to adapt themselves and their
modes of life to the more severe climate, nor have they
readily adjusted themselves to the necessary changes in
agricultural methods. The slowness in the growth of the
population of the island is sufficient evidence on this point.
In the next place, Japan looked to two other areas near at
hand but not under its jurisdiction. One was Formosa,
an island possession of China, which was acquired as one
of the results of the war with that nation in I895. The
other was Korea, in which Japan had a traditional interest.
This country had its own monarchical government and owed
to China a certain amount of allegiance, which was likewise
eliminated by the war in I895. Just as Hokkaido is too cold,
so Formosa is too warm, and the Japanese have not taken
any more kindly to its climate. In Formosa also the agricultural conditions differ, and while the Japanese have made
a remarkable showing in many respects in their administration of the island and its development, they have failed, as
the figures of population show, to make it a new Japanese
homeland.
In Korea, Japan steadily improved its political position
until it formally annexed the country in 1910.  From




224


THE AWAKENING EAST


I895 onward, and increasingly since I9io, Japan has undertaken in various ways not merely the exploitation but
also the colonization of Korea. The difference in climatic
conditions is perhaps a little less serious in this case, and the
same is more or less true with regard to the conditions for
agriculture.  Apparently the Japanese effort has broken
down in this case because Korea was a country with a national history as long as that of Japan itself and with a
population more or less proportional to the area and its
productivity. Furthermore, the Koreans were accustomed
to a narrower margin of existence and a cheaper rate of
living, which has rendered Japanese competition rather impracticable. This too is said with all recognition of the remarkable achievements of Japan in the material improvement of Korea. It has proved to be, in fact, a development
of Korea by the Japanese which is working out economically
to the advantage of the Koreans rather than of Japan.
Looking at it from a somewhat different angle, and speaking
in mining phraseology, Korea is a low-grade proposition,
and the Japanese lack the necessary qualities to make it pay.
After the war with Russia, and more especially after the
outbreak of the World War in I9I4, the Japanese began to
consider much more ambitious and far-reaching enterprises.
First and most naturally, they interested themselves in Manchuria, where it had seemed there was ample opportunity
for expansion with the possibilities of acquiring political
control. Again the Japanese have not shown ability, in any
considerable measure, to adapt themselves to the awkward
conditions of life and work. Then, too, they encountered
rivals with whom they could not compete. Manchuria is
more accessible to China than to Japan. It is a natural field
for Chinese expansion and, quite apart from any question of
political control, Chinese migration has been rapidly pouring
into this country in recent years. The Chinese readily adapt
themselves to the new situation and, when placed on an
equal basis with the Japanese, are certain winners in the
economic competition.  Japanese activities extended even
as far afield as inner Mongolia, but what is true of Manchuria is of even greater force in the case of Mongolia.




JAPAN


225


In the next place, Japan seized the German port of Kiaochao and claimed to supersede the Germans in control in
the Chinese province of Shantung as a sphere of influence.
While census statistics are not available, it seems probable
that this province is even more densely populated than Japan
itself. Quite apart from the diplomatic and political questions involved, Japan seems to have discovered that any notion of considering Shantung as a field for Japanese colonization or agricultural exploitation was impracticable. At any
rate, Japan offered remarkably little objection, in negotiations conducted in connection with the Washington conference, to withdrawing from the position which it had
undertaken to assume therein.   In still another Chinese
province, during the period of the World War, Japan took
steps toward creating a sphere of influence. But in this
province, Fukien, which was of interest to Japan because of
its proximity to Formosa, they made less progress than
anywhere else.
The one country where the Japanese seems to find himself
readily at home, aside from the small Hawaiian group, is
California.4 The reasons against Japanese activities in either
of these places are, however, so overwhelming as to require
no mention beyond the acceptance by Japan, in the "gentlemen's agreement" of I907, of the restriction of immigration
into the United States. It seems, in conclusion, that Japan
has made some progress, but not to a satisfactory degree,
in its effort to couple political and economic expansion, as
shown in the cases of Formosa and Korea. It has, thus far,
fared little better in its efforts at purely economic exploitation of a colonizing and agricultural type. This series of
experiences has revealed a lack of ability on the part of the
Japanese to adapt themselves easily or quickly to new physical surroundings. It has also shown that they possess too
little imagination, tact, and sense of humor to enable them
to govern successfully other peoples such as the Koreans,
'Probably Australia would have proved equally alluring had it
not been for the inflexible exclusion of all Asiatics from that continent. Canada is less desirable for the Japanese and its policy
has been but slightly more hospitable.




226


THE AWAKENING EAST


or to win the confidence of the Chinese. Though the partial
failure in Korea may possibly be dismissed as negligible,
it is absolutely essential to the political peace and the economic prosperity of Japan that the blunders and shortcomings in China shall be retrieved without delay. China can
dispense with Japan, but Japan can hardly hope to survive
in the new age of economic development without unhampered access to the resources and markets of China.
There remains the third possible solution of Japan's increasing population, that is, an occupational readjustmentan industrial revolution. That movement is in progress
and is, on the whole, apparently working successfully. Japan
is an oceanic country surrounded by waters teeming with
fish. Since Perry's visit to Japan the rapid growth of the
fisheries enterprises has been an important factor in developing a valuable source of food supply and in affording occupation to a considerable number of people. The value of
the marine products increased from somewhat over $6,ooo,ooo in 1893 to more than $85,000,000 twenty-five years later.
A second outlet was found in the development of maritime
trade. The growth of Japanese merchant shipping has been
a remarkable achievement. In I888 it amounted to less
than 200,000 tons. Twenty years later it was 1,200,000; and
ten years later still, it was approximately 2,800,000 tons.
This development on the part of the Japanese is quite as
natural as the growth of British maritime power since the
time of Queen Elizabeth. Taken together, however, the
fisheries and maritime commerce afford a living to a comparatively small proportion of the population, and do not
directly make a large contribution toward solving the probleni of food supply. Indirectly, the extension of the Japanese maritime shipping business offers a means of securing
advantageously from other countries the necessary food
supplies to make up the home deficiency.
The expansion of Japanese trade, however, must in large
measure depend upon the ability of Japan to produce commodities which can be sold at advantage in the world's markets or in exchange for food supplies. This means a development of manufacturing enterprise or the possession of




JAPAN


227


mineral products which can be exported. In the latter case,
however, Japan is peculiarly unfortunate. Whereas England
has a remarkable wealth of coal and iron, Japan lacks a
supply of these minerals adequate for its own needs, and it
has no surplus wealth of any other mineral product. Consequently the question narrows down to that of manufactures.
By this process of logical exclusion, it would seem that the
nation has recognized the necessity of directing its genius
into this new line of activity with all possible zeal.
The growth of manufacturing enterprises in Japan stands
absolutely unrivaled by any country outside of Europe and
North America. It is true, the progress thus far made is
not great as compared with the United States, Great Britain,
Germany, and some other countries.   Nevertheless it is
sufficient to indicate the ability of the Japanese to engage in
such undertakings, and the possibility, even the probability,
of their finding therein a successful solution of their problem. In 1918, the latest date for which statistics are available, the industrial census showed that Japan had 22,39I
factories employing more than ten hands each, in which
1,409,196 workers were employed, of whom more than half
were females. The chief products were cotton, silk, and
woolen goods, paper, matches, earthenware, lacquers, matting, and leather.  In addition to these, Japan produces
various minor articles which, taken together, count for a
considerable amount in the national exports. The possibility of Japanese industrial competition with the United
States and other western nations is sometimes suggested as
a menace. Lack of sufficient raw materials, if no other
reason, will prevent the Japanese from effective competition
with western nations, except in a few special lines. Japan
must find its principal markets in the neighboring eastern
lands.
By all odds the most important product of Japan, from
the point of view of agriculture, manufacturing, and commerce combined, is silk. Of this article Japan produces a'
large proportion of the world's supply, its chief competitors
being China and Italy. The value of the silk exports of
Japan in I92I amounted to over $25o,ooo,o000, being over




228


THE AWAKENING EAST


two fifths of the nation's total export trade for the year. In
considering the distribution of the Japanese export trade it
appears that, in I920, 29 per cent went to the United States,
2I per cent to China, and the next most important customers in order were British India, the Dutch Indies, Great
Britain, Hong Kong, and Australia. Of the import trade,
in I920, 37 per cent came, from the United States, and then
followed in order British India, Great Britain, China with
9 per cent, Australia, and the Dutch Indies. Japan now
ranks third among the nations from which the United
States makes imports and fifth among those which take its
exports.
As in every country, prior to the industrial revolution,
there was necessarily a considerable amount of manufacturing under the so-called domestic system. Most of the product was for local consumption, but little went into the wider
market of the nation at large, and only a very small part
found its way into the international market. This was still
true in Japan less than forty years ago, and even now continues, to some extent, to be the case, for the industrial revolution is only at the beginning of its development in the
country. Twenty years ago there were some factories of
the modern type. To-day, as the figures already given have
shown, there is a goodly number of factories, employing a
considerable percentage of the population.
As in England and other countries, the industrial revolution is associated not merely with a transition from agricultural to industrial occupations, but also with a movement of population from the country into cities. The urban
population of Japan has increased at a remarkable rate during the last twenty years, while the rural population has
shown a comparatively slight growth. In I898 there were
only two cities with over 400,000 population, Tokyo and
Osaka, which together had 2,261,000 inhabitants. In I9I8
these two cities each exceeded I,250,000 in population and
had a total of 3,425,ooo, and there were four other cities
with over 400,000. The total number of cities with over
Ioo,ooo inhabitants in I898 was eight; in I9i8 it was fourteen, while five others fell but a little short of that figure.




JAPAN


229


This development of great urban populations has carried
with it the same evils with which western nations have been
familiar, but perhaps to a somewhat heightened degree.
Osaka is Japan's great industrial center, and the problems
of labor and pauperism found there are as acute probably
as in any place in the world. The conditions are vividly portrayed in the widely circulated writings of Toyohiko
Kagawa, a graduate of Princeton University, who is living
as a Christian social worker in the slums of Kobe and who
is considered "the most influential labor leader in the Japanese Empire." It is only fair, however, to consider the
present situation as one of momentary transition, and to
believe that the Japanese will display the necessary qualities
to solve the extraordinary new problems which confront
them.
One evidence for this belief is the way in which the Japanese have handled the question of education. Elementary
education is not merely compulsory by law, but is actually
operative as successfully as anywhere in the world, so that
Japan is at present able to pride itself on its statistics for
literacy in comparison with the most advanced nations of
the West. In I9I8 over 8,ooo,ooo children were in attendance at elementary schools. There is a fair number of
higher schools and of universities. While the elementary
schools and the universities are perhaps reasonably meeting
the demands placed upon them, the number of middle or
high schools is insufficient, as is also the case with professional, technical, and vocational schools. The demands
for admission to these far exceed the capacity, and only a
small proportion of those examined each year gain admission.
Undoubtedly with a more adequate development of these
schools the demand for university training would increase
correspondingly and would require greater facilities. The
government is earnestly striving to solve this problem. This
favorable comparison of Japanese educational conditions
with the situation in China, Egypt, or India may, therefore,
be taken as justification for the judgment just offered, that
Japan will presumably prove as efficient as western nations in
solving the problem of urban population.




230


THIE AWAKENING EAST


The great changes in Japan which date from the restoration have not been without important consequences in the
religious life of the nation. While the constitution guarantees complete freedom of faith, two religions have long enjoyed full legal status. The ancient religion of the country
is Shintoism; Buddhism has prevailed throughout the country since the seventh century. The latter, owing to its more
highly developed character, long exercised a marked influence upon the older religion. The two faiths were not necessarily mutually exclusive and in course of time tended to
become more or less blended with one another. While the
restoration was in no wise hostile to Buddhism it naturally
gave its chief patronage to Shintoism. Efforts were made
to dissociate the latter from its Buddhist connection and
restore it to its ancient purity and simplicity. The results,
however, have not been enduring. Buddhism, thus stimulated to activity, has appropriated various modern methods
to recover and extend its influence.
'The restoration opened the way for the readmission to
Japan of another religion, Christianity, which three centuries
before had made its first appearance in the country, only
to be driven out by the early Tokugawa shoguns. The year
1872, practically speaking, marks the beginning of successful missionary enterprises undertaken by the Greek Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Protestant churches. Measured
by the number of converts, their achievements have not
been remarkable. To-day there are somewhat more than
Ioo,ooo Protestants, less than that number of Roman Catholics, and less than 50,000 Greek Orthodox adherents. Christianity, however, has made highly important contributions
to the development of education both through its own institutions and through its influence upon the national system.
Christianity has also wielded a moral influence of extraordinary importance, entirely out of proportion to the number
of its professed followers, as! witnessed, for example, by
the extensive practice of using Sunday as a day of rest.
Both the standards of private life and the ideals of national
life have been profoundly modified by influences emanating
from Christianity, and its adherents are among the foremost




JAPAN


231


promoters of all undertakings for the advancement of the
nation.
As the Confucian code of ethics has fixed the standard of
national life for China, so the code of honor has determined
the ideals and actions of the Japanese. The Confucian ethics
were the creation of a scholar and ministered to the individual's spirit of contemplation and sense of complacency.
Bushido is, however, the code of chivalry inspiring the individual to knightly activity and accomplishment. The code
of ethics and the code of honor symbolize the differences in
national character and achievement between the Chinese and
the Japanese. The spirit of bushido stamps every movement in the extraordinary progress of the nation in the last
half century. The defects as well as the merits of the
Japanese achievement have been inherent in bushido. Sympathetic critics have observed that where the Japanese have
not succeeded, the failure has been a moral one-an inability
to understand and cope with the moral forces involved by
bringing superior moral power to bear. Bushido is as inadequate for Japan as Confucianism is for China. Each nation
must find the missing element and introduce it into its life.
The past generation has given Japan material and political
progress: the.new generation faces the task of developing
the nation's spiritual resources and moral power.
RECENT EVENTS
After the death of Baron Kato on August 24, I923,
though the Seiyukai had a majority in the diet, a nonparty
cabinet was formed under the leadership of Count Yamamoto, who had been premier in I9I3-I9I4.5 This ministry
was in the process of organization when the earthquake of
September I occurred, and fortunately Baron Goto, formerly
mayor of Tokyo, had already been selected for the home
office.  Though the main task of the ministry was the
handling of the difficult situation following the earthquake
and the formulation of plans for reconstruction, its political
tenure was insecure because of the opposition of the Seiyu6 See above, pages 209, 215.




THE AWAKENING EAST


232


kai. The attitude of one group in the administration was
indicated in the proposal by Baron Goto and Mr. Inukai,
the minister of posts, to introduce a bill for manhood suffrage. Suggestions of reforms affecting the house of peers
were also discussed. The fall of this ministry on December
29, however, was immediately occasioned by the attempted
assassination of the prince regent while he was driving to
the ceremony of opening the regular session of the diet
two days earlier.
Again a nonparty cabinet was formed. For the post of
premier there was selected Viscount Kiyoura, a man seventy-three years of age, who had spent his life in government office and had frequently occupied cabinet positions
as a trusted lieutenant of Prince Yamagata. Though the
selection, as in the previous instance, seemed to indicate a
reactionary tendency, it was probably influenced by a distrust of party politicians and particularly of the Seiyukai.
The questions of party government and ministerial responsibility have also apparently produced a contest for power
between the two houses of the diet.' Attempts were made
to form a coalition of opposition elements on a platform of
manhood suffrage. After the failure of this plan, a break
was forced in the ranks of the Seiyukai and one hundred
and forty-eight seceders, calling themselves the Seiyu-honto,
rallied to the support of the premier. In the tense political
situation, a train on which three opposition leaders were
traveling to Tokyo was wrecked. The consequent outburst
of disturbance in the lower house on January 3I, I924 led
to the dissolution of the diet.
The ensuing elections for a new diet which occurred
on May IO, I924 were marked by more than usual disorder
and corruption.  It is estimated that under the existing
franchise, five sixths of the members of the lower house are
returned by rural voters. Owing to the small number of
urban members, the industrial and commercial interests of
the country are insufficiently represented. A surprising result of the balloting was the small number of candidates for
reelection who were chosen. About two hundred and fifty
of the successful candidates were new members. The ele



JAPAN


233


ments opposed to the ministry in power demanded universal
suffrage, constitutional government, and reform of the upper
house of the diet. The returns showed the election of one
hundred and forty-six members of the Kenseikai; one hundred and twenty of the newly organized Seiyu-honto; one
hundred and one of the Seiyukai; and ninety-seven of other
affiliations. The defeat of the ministry was unmistakable,
and on June Io it resigned. Viscount Takaaki Kato, the
leader of the Kenseikai, formed a new ministry with the
assistance of the Seiyukai and the Kakushin Club. In contrast with the previous ministry, which was drawn largely
from the upper house, the new cabinet, with a single exception, is drawn from the lower house. Though it represents
the younger and less reactionary elements, the new ministry
has been so distracted with questions of international concern in the few months of its existence that it has had no
opportunity to initiate a program of reform legislation in
internal affairs, other than financial.
The earthquake of September I, which destroyed nearly
the whole city of Yokohama, the major portion of Tokyo,
the naval port of Yokosuka, and many other places within
a considerable radius from Tokyo, resulted in the loss of
about one hundred and fifty thousand lives, the injury of
about as many more persons, and a property loss officially
estimated at from 7,000,000,0ooo to Io,ooo,ooo,ooo yen.6
The prompt response of sympathetic and generous aid from
most civilized countries, especially from the United States,
was remarkable. The warm expressions of appreciation by
the Japanese of American assistance augured for an era of
better relations between the two countries. This situation
was suddenly changed in November when the United States
supreme court announced decisions upholding the constitutionality of the anti-Japanese land laws of California and
Washington. Much more serious cause of displeasure was
given by the congress of the United States when it passed,
in April, I924, in defiance of the protest of President
Coolidge and Secretary Hughes, the new immigration act
6 One yen is almost exactly equal to fifty cents in American
money.




234


THE AWAKENING EAST


including a provision annulling the "gentlemen's agreement" of I907, under which the restriction of Japanese immigration to the United States had been administered primarily by the Japanese government. Though there are
plausible explanations for the congressional action, they do
not remove the cause of provocation felt by Japan. In July,
Japan enacted a new citizenship law abolishing dual nationality, with the purpose of removing one of the causes of
complaint alleged in the United States.
In view of the demands for retrenchment of expenditures
and, more recently, in view of the vast outlays entailed
by the earthquake, the budget of 1924 was fixed at $635,000,ooo, a saving of $52,000,000 as compared with the 1923
budget, in which extensive economies were effected after
the earthquake. The diet, in December, 1923, even scaled
down the proposed appropriations for reconstruction, so
that the government was forced to announce important
modifications in the plans for rebuilding Tokyo. The first
international loans for reconstruction were floated on terms
which were regarded as eminently fair among international
financiers, but in Japan as none too favorable. The extraordinary difficulties of the economic situation led the Kiyoura
cabinet to create an imperial economic council composed of
one hundred and ten leading representatives of the financial
and economic interests of the nation as an advisory body
which first met in April. Owing to the unfavorable movement of trade during the first half of I924, which resulted
in a heavy excess of imports over exports, due to the importation of materials for reconstruction and of luxuries,
the government introduced a measure placing an import
duty of one hundred per cent on two hundred and fifty
articles of luxury, which was promptly passed in July. A
committee is also engaged in an effort to reorganize the
administrative offices of the government with a view to reducing the number of positions and curtailing expenses.
Further plans for army reduction, which will probably limit
the period of service with the colors to one year, are also
under consideration.
In March, 1923, an agreement was reached between Japan




JAPAN


235


and the United States for the abrogation of the LansingIshii agreement, with the understanding that it would be
supplanted by the nine-power treaty signed at the Washington conference. The disarmament treaty drafted at the
Washington conference was finally ratified by France in
August, and later in the same month the ratifications of this
treaty were exchanged in Washington. The so-called ninepower treaty, however, still awaits similar ratification.7
Owing to these agreements the Japanese government was
able to cut approximately $20,000,000 from the estimates
for the navy both for I923 and for I924. There has been
a reduction of the army by four divisions, and the military
budget for I924 is nearly $Ioo,ooo,ooo below that of I923.
The appropriations for education have been increased. The
arbitration treaty between Japan and the United States was
extended in April, I924, for a term of five years. It has
been announced that the American Red Cross will furnish
$3,000,0ooo for hospital construction in Tokyo and that the
Rockefeller Foundation will contribute $I,ooo,ooo toward
the rebuilding of the University of Tokyo.
The Japanese government has been alarmed not only over
its relations with the United States but also over those with
China and Russia. The representatives of soviet Russia
had been negotiating, at intervals, for many months with
both China and Japan when their treaty with China of
May 3I, I924, was suddenly announced. The Japanese,
especially among the commercial classes, who favored
the reopening of relations with Russia, felt confirmed in
their views and demanded the prompt renewal of negotiations. In July it was announced that the cabinet had agreed
upon the bases for negotiations with Russia and on August 7
negotiations were actually resumed in Peking. No announcement of the results has yet appeared. With reference
both to Russia and China, the attitude of the Kato ministry
is clearly conciliatory and apparently inspired by the desire
to establish as favorable economic relations with both nations as possible.
The Kiyoura ministry was responsible in March, I923,
7 See above, page I39.




236


THE AWAKENING EAST


for the final enactment of a reform measure of distinct importance which provides for the introduction of jury trial.
A commission is at present visiting other countries to study
the subject, preparatory to putting the measure into operation. Recent statistics have shown the remarkable rise of
wages in recent years. For work in Kobe which received
in 1914 a maximum daily compensation of one yen, the maximum is now from four to five yen. Reports concerning
the conditions in Korea are favorable. The foreign trade
of Korea for 1923 surpassed all previous records. The death
of Prince Matsukata in July, 1924, removed the last survivor of the elder statesmen, with the exception of Marquis
Saionji. The marriage of the prince regent to Princess
Nagako, eldest daughter of Prince Kuni, was celebrated in
the early part of 1924. The public demonstrations, especially in Tokyo, testified to the popularity of the young sovereign. In the effort, at the meeting of the assembly of
the League of Nations in Geneva in September, 1924, to
draft preliminary measures in anticipation of a scheme of
universal disarmament, Japan, inspired with the idea of
promoting equality of racial treatment for its own citizens,
and for Asiatics in general, insisted on certain adjustments
of the provisional plan as the condition of its adherence.
SUGGESTIONS FOR READING
A brief introductory survey of Japanese history is furnished by
Professor Kenneth S. Latourette of Yale University in The Developnment of Japan (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1918);
and a more scholarly account by Professor Katsuro Hara, of the
University of Kyoto, in An Introduction to the History of Japan
(New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1920). A Political History
of Japan during the Meiji Era, i867-1912 (New York, Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1916), by Professor Walter W. McLaren, of Williams College, gives a reasonably complete and accurate, but rather
unsympathetic, account of the great period of modernization. A
comprehensive survey of the various phases of Japanese life and
their development during the same period written by native authorities will be found in Fifty Years of New Japan (2nd ed., 2 vols.,
New York, E. P. Dutton & Company, I91o), edited by Count
Shigenobu Okuma, former prime minister.
Some acquaintance with the Japanese people, their life, thought,
and institutions may be obtained from Things Japanese (5th ed.,




JAPAN


237


London, J. Murray, 1905), by Basil H. Chamberlain; Japan, Day
by Day, 1877, 1878-79, 1882-83 (2 vols., Boston, Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1917), by Edward S. Morse; Japan, an Attempt at Interpretation (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1904), by Lafcadio
Hearn; and The Foundations of Japan, Notes Made during Journeys of 6,ooo Miles in Rural Districts as a Basis for a Sounder
Knowledge of the Japanese People (New York, D. Appleton &
Company, 1922), by J. W. Robertson Scott, who all write from
extended first-hand acquaintance. A History of Christianity in
Japan (2 vols., New York, Fleming H. Revell & Company, I909),
by Otis Cary, is a comprehensive survey.
For the relations between Japan and the United States good
accounts will be found in The Early Diplomatic Relations between
the United States and Japan, I853-i865 (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1917), and Japan and the United States, I853-1921
(Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1921), both by Professor Payson J. Treat of Stanford University, and in The Americans in Eastern Asia (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1922), by Tyler Dennett, who has been permitted to use the archives of the American
department of state. Japan's Pacific Policy, especially in Relation
to China, the Far East, and the Washington Conference (New York,
E. P. Dutton & Company, 1922), is by Kiyoshi K. Kawakami, who
is also the author of several other works written to interpret to the
American people the Japanese and their interests.
The Japan Year Book (i6th year, 1921-22, New York, Dixie
Book Shop, I922), edited by Professor Y. Takenob, of the Waseda
University, Tokyo, contains a wealth of current information, including a Who's Who section.




CHAPTER V


THE PHILIPPINES
THE Philippine Islands are, in the extent of cultivated
area and in size of population, closely comparable to Egypt.
The island character of the area involved and the racial
traits of the people relate the situation, in some particulars,
to that in Japan. The problems of status and government
are comparable to those of Egypt and of India. As Egypt
is valuable to England for maintenance of control of the
route to India, so the Philippine Islands are useful to the
United States in affording a convenient base for commerce
and other interests in eastern Asia and in the western Pacific. The Filipino peoples, within a more limited range,
exhibit almost as many ethnographic varieties and linguistic
diversities as do the people of India.
In an important particular, however, the Filipinos stand
out in sharp contrast against the populations of the other four
countries which have here been studied. Over go per cent of
them are Christian and have been so for about three centuries. This Christian character of the Filipino peoples
not only distinguishes them from all other eastern peoples in
religion, but has helped to develop an attitude toward western civilization radically different from that of any other
people in the East.
This difference is clearly evidenced in the higher status
of women. Religious, legal, and social restrictions do not
seclude or hamper them like their sisters in other eastern
lands. In the Philippines woman plays her part in all the
affairs of life in a way not very different from the customs
of the West. The emancipation of women is, therefore,
in the Philippines, unlike the other eastern countries, a question already settled in most particulars other than political.
The freer status of women in the Philippines greatly simplifies many of the problems of assimilating the national life
to the conditions obtaining in western lands.
238




THE PHILIPPINES


239


In still another important particular there is a marked
contrast between the Filipinos and the other eastern peoples
whose problems have here been considered. The Filipinos
are not the possessors of an ancient culture or of a national
history extending over millenniums. Their rise to the higher
stages of culture has been chiefly during the period of their
contact with western civilization. Under the tutelage of
Spain for three centuries and a half their rate of progress
was slow, but the total advance attained was considerable
and has made possible the remarkable progress during the
quarter century of American supervision. The absence of
long-established cultural and political forms and of deepseated traditions accounts for the remarkable mobility and
adaptability displayed by the Filipino people in their
extraordinary advancement during recent years.
These cultural diversities from the peoples of the Asiatic
continent are, no doubt, in considerable measure explained
by the insularity of the Philippines and by their location at
a distance from the continent five times greater than in the
case of Japan. The Philippines consist of II larger islands,
2,400 smaller ones, and 4,600 of trivial size. In this respect
the group is much more broken up than is Japan. Furthermore, the four main islands of Japan are so close to one
another as to permit of regular railway connections by
ferries. The smaller size of the main islands of the Philippines and the greater distances separating them have prevented anything like the unity of development that has occurred in Japan. The total area of the Philippines is II5,026
square miles, of which Io per cent only is under cultivation.
The area is between 75 and 80 per cent of that of Japan
proper and about 95 per cent of that of the British Islands.
The group lies between 5~ and 20~ north latitude, corresponding to Central America and the extreme northern part
of South America. Manila is situated about 14~ north of
the equator, approximately on the same parallel as the city
of Guatemala, the island of Martinique, and Cape Verde.
According to census returns, the population of the Philippine Islands increased from 7,635,426 in I903 to IO,314,3IO
in I9I8. At the latter date there were domiciled in the




240


THE AWAKENING EAST


islands 43,802 Chinese, 7,806 Japanese, 5,774 Americans,
3,945 Spanish, 1,140 British, and 1,570 other foreigners.
Practically the whole trade of the islands is controlled by
these various peoples of alien origin. Manila has a population of nearly 300,000. There are seven other cities with
populations ranging from   50,00o  down to Io,ooo inhabitants. As most of the alien population is found in the
cities it will be seen that the vast majority-over 90 per cent
-of the Filipino people is rural in character and unacquainted with urban life.
Scientists count 43 ethnographic groups or tribes among
the Filipino peoples, but these tribes are almost exclusively
of Malay stock.   Though the number of distinct dialects
spoken is 87, eight' being used by more than 500,000 each,
many of these languages are more or less closely related. In
general, the diversity of race and language in the Philippines
among I0,000,000 people corresponds to the conditions in
both respects among the 300,000,000 people of India; but in
India both the racial and the linguistic variations are much
more marked, for some of the races and languages of India
are radically different in character from others.
The diffusion of so many tribes with such a variety of
languages over such a scattered and broken island area has
naturally operated against the development of national cohesion. Though the islands were under Spanish rule for
over three centuries the Spaniards accomplished comparatively little in breaking down either tribal or linguistic
barriers. Not over Io per cent of the people acquired the
use of the Spanish language.2     The one great service
wrought by the Spaniards was the introduction and establishment of the Christian religion. About 4 per cent of the
population, massed in the extreme southern islands, are
1 These leading native languages are: I, Tagalog, used by I,789,049; the three chief Visayan dialects: 2, Panayan, 1,289,142;
3, Ceb6an, 1,848,613; 4, Samar-Leyte, 601,683; 5, Iloko, 988,841;
6, Bikol, 685,309. The other two are the leading non-native tongues:
7, Spanish spoken by 757,463 persons over ten years of age;
8, English spoken by 896,238 persons over ten years of age. These
figures are for 1918.
2 Census of the Philippine Islands, 1903, vol. 2, p. 78.




THE PHILIPPINES


241


Mohammedans. In the rest of the islands about 5 per cent
of the population, mostly in the remoter and more mountainous areas, remain pagan. Approximately 91 per cent
of the population, therefore, are Christian and predominantly
Roman Catholic.
Since the American occupation several Protestant denominations have undertaken missionary work and have won a
considerable number of converts. The Protestant Episcopal
Church has followed the policy of limiting its labors to the
non-Christian tribes. Other denominations have imposed no
such restrictions upon their activities, but have agreed to
work in separate districts. While proselyting by one Christian denomination from another is open to criticism, it cannot be denied that Protestant missions have had a valuable
influence in toning up the Roman Catholic Church by their
presence and competition. The educational and medical enterprises conducted by the missions have been valuable in
themselves and have afforded an excellent example.
Unlike the Japanese, who can boast of a single native dynasty covering their twenty-five centuries of history, the
Filipino peoples have practically never enjoyed independence,
much less unity, of government. Prior to the arrival of the
Spaniards in 1565 the islands, as far back as it is possible to
trace their history, had been more or less controlled by some
Malay empire with headquarters in Indo-China, Sumatra,
Java, or Borneo. Besides, in a larger or smaller number of
the islands, there had been periods of Chinese and of Japanese intervention.
At the time of the arrival of the Spaniards the Malay
migration was still in progress, as it had been for an indefinite number of centuries. There still remain in the
archipelago small tribes of primitive peoples representing
two races that antedate the coming of the Malays. The
earlier and more primitive of these peoples belong to the
race known as negritos. The later group, whose representatives are now somewhat more advanced than the negritos, are known to the ethnologists as Indonesians. Their
racial affinities are with certain of the older elements among
the peoples of India. In general, the path of migration into




242


THE AWAKENING EAST


the Philippines has been from the south northward. The
descendants of the earliest comers of Malay race are to
be found mainly in Luzon, the most northerly of the main
islands. The latest comers, who did not arrive until Mohammedanism had spread to the East Indies, are to be
found in the most southerly of the large islands, Mindanao,
and in the Sulu archipelago to the southward. To these
latest comers, whom they were never able to bring under
their sway, the Spaniards gave the name of Moros because
of their Mohammedan religion.
The stage of civilization attained by the pagan Malay
Filipinos, before the arrival of the Spaniards, in agricultural and industrial life was not inferior to that reached
by the Incas in Peru. Though it is doubtful whether they
had made equal advancement in their social organization,
they had surpassed the Incas by developing alphabets and a
considerable written literature.3 Politically they had failed
to establish an indigenous empire and at best had been distant members of some short-lived Malay empire. The Spaniards found well-ordered towns. Manila, already a city with
extensive commercial connections, was fortified and defended with cannon made in a local foundry. It would perhaps not be unfair to compare the Moros with the Aztecs
as a fighting race, though not as the creators of an empire.
The Moro pirate, though no less ruthless than the Aztec
warrior, had at least outgrown the practice of human sacrifice, which seems to have been unknown in the Philippines.
The custom of head-hunting, however, prevailed among a
few of the more primitive mountain tribes.
The establishment of Spanish control was largely accomplished by Legazpi, who, in a milder-mannered fashion, was
to the Philippines what 'Cortez was to Mexico. The work
of establishing Spanish domination throughout the archipelago took approximately a half century. On most of the
early voyages, except the first one under Magellan, the
Spaniards arrived in the Philippines from Mexico. The
consequence was that the islands remained administratively
C. E. Russell, Outlook for the Philippines, pp. 27-30, and illustration, p. 48.




THE PHILIPPINES


243


dependent upon Mexico until 1821, when that country
became independent of Spain.  In this period a single
annual ship, known as the Manila galleon, served to carry
the trade of the islands to and from Mexico. Commercially
and politically, therefore, Spanish rule in the Philippines
was not a matter of great importance prior to 1821.
The most significant fact of Spanish domination in this
period was the zealous activity of Roman Catholic missionaries, mainly members of the several mendicant orders. The
islands may be said to have been under the rule of the friars
rather than under the rule of Spain. As a consequence of
their conversion through the activities of these missionaries,
the Filipinos have ever since been proud to rank themselves
as the only Christian nation in the Orient. During the
period of Spanish rule a considerable number of schools was
established, but they were mainly church schools and not
very efficient. The University of Santo Tomas, established
at Manila in i6ii, robs Harvard of the honor of being the
oldest university under the American flag.
Only a single episode interfered with the uneventful
course of existence in the islands during this period. That
was the seizure of Manila by a British expedition fitted out
from Madras in I762 at the close of the Seven Years' War.
In accordance with the treaty of Paris in I763 the English
restored the archipelago to Spain.
From that date forward, the administration of the islands
was conducted on somewhat more liberal lines, and was, on
the whole, not open to serious criticism. After the independence of Mexico in 1821, the government was administered
directly from Spain and the trade relations were correspondingly readjusted and permitted to develop more freely. The
expulsion of the Jesuits in 1767 left the religious activities
in the islands almost exclusively in the hands of the friars,
whose influence both over the life of the people and over
the government tended to increase. The introduction of
steam navigation about I850 and the opening of a shorter
trade route through the Suez canal in I869 brought the
Philippines into closer relations with the mother country and
stimulated trade. This development of commerce made




244


THE AWAKENING EAST


necessary renewed efforts to extend Spanish sway in the
southern islands of the group and to repress the piratical
activities of the Moros.
The revolution of I868 in Spain, which dethroned Isabella II, resulted in a brief period of unusually progressive
administration in the islands but, after the restoration of the
monarchy under Alfonso XII, the policy of the government
became reactionary and the influence of the friars reached
its height. It was under these conditions that the first manifestations of serious discontent among the Filipino people
appeared. Soon after I89o secret societies to promote policies of reform and even of revolution began to organize.
Insurrection finally broke out in August, I896, and the execution, on December 30, I896, of Jose Rizal, the brilliant
exponent of Filipino aspirations, whose novels4 had scathingly indicted the friars and the abuses under the Spanish
regime, inflamed feeling throughout the islands. As a result of negotiations and of the promise of reforms by the
Spanish authorities, the insurgent leader Aguinaldo was persuaded to leave the islands in December, I897. Nevertheless,
order had not been fully restored when war between Spain
and the United States was declared in April, I898.
The rule of Spain in the Philippines during more than
three centuries had resulted in important contributions to
the advancement of the people. Western civilization was
thoroughly established, Christianity had been introduced and
made the prevalent religion, schools and even a university
had been founded, the position of woman had been improved
in accordance with Christian ideals, European forms of government and law were in operation, a considerable trade,
especially with Spain, had been developed; the Filipino people, in short, had come to live in regular contact with the
West and its civilization. Not a few Filipinos had traveled
and resided abroad, especially as students. The Spanish had
accomplished in the Philippines what no other European
power had done in any eastern land in the same period:
they had established Christianity and European civilization
'Noli Me Tangere (The Social Cancer), and El Filibusterismo.(The Reign of Greed).




THE PHILIPPINES


245


as the prevalent condition. Despite certain obvious faults,
the Spanish administration had in a large way proved
beneficent.
Throughout this period the Filipino people had shown
themselves responsive to the efforts for their advancement,
and at its close were clearly prepared for greater progress
than the reactionary government of Alfonso XII and the
queen regent was prepared to concede. The blame for
conditions perhaps attaches more correctly, not to the Spanish government, but to the clericals in Spain and to the
strongly intrenched friars in the islands. There was also
an economic element in the problem arising from the extensive landed interests of the friars, whose treatment of the
peasant laborers on their estates was far from liberal. The
grievances which led to the insurrection were considerable
and obvious. Though Rizal had put forward a definite and
reasonable program of reform, it is not so certain that
Aguinaldo and his revolutionary followers entertained such
intelligent ideas or were prepared to carry into execution a
definite and consistent policy to establish independent government and improved conditions.
Admiral Dewey's naval victory in Manila Bay on May I,
I898, was soon followed by the landing of American forces
in the island of Luzon and the capture of Manila on August
13. The presence of the Americans revived the insurrectionary movement, and Aguinaldo was brought back from
Hong Kong, on an American ship, to resume his leadership.
The claim made by Aguinaldo and his followers that they
were promised independence has, however, been specifically
denied by Admiral Dewey. The United States did not consider its connivance at the activities of the insurgents against
Spain as constituting recognition of their insurrectionary
government or approval of their aims. Indeed, the United
States for months avoided committing itself to any policy
with regard to the Philippines and debated at length the
question of the disposition of the islands. In the course of
the negotiations with Spain the United States finally demanded the cession of the islands, which was accorded in
the treaty of peace of December 10, I898. The relations




246


THE AWAKENING EAST


between the Americans and the insurgents had been growing
steadily less satisfactory. Immediately after the news of
the cession arrived, an insurgent government was formed
under the so-called Malolos constitution, with Aguinaldo as
president. Soon after, on February 4, i899, fighting broke
out between the insurgents and the Americans around
Manila. The details of the insurrection and of its suppression may be passed over as without special relevance to the
discussion in hand.
The entrance of the Americans into the Philippines came
entirely as a war measure directed against Spain, and without any anticipation of the consequences involved. When
the war was over, the resulting problem had to be solved.
President McKinley ultimately decided to demand the cession of the islands because he felt that the Filipinos were not
prepared to establish a stable and satisfactory government
for themselves, that it would be unjust to return them to
Spanish control, that it would be unjustifiable to leave them
as a prey to any other imperialistic power, and that consequently by process of elimination it became necessary for the
United States to assume possession or control. President
McKinley, however, was determined that this control should,
from the outset, be exercised exclusively for the benefit
of the Filipino people and their advancement toward selfgovernment. He undoubtedly hoped that the Filipino people
would accept this arrangement and did not foresee the serious insurrection which followed. The insurgents, on their
side, felt that the cession was an unjustifiable transfer from
one alien domination to another.  Whether rightly or
wrongly, they also felt that the Americans had not dealt with
them fairly and honorably. Whatever may have been the
original purpose of the insurrection, whether directed
against Spanish authority or against the Americans, it became a struggle for independence.
Though the Filipinos made a brave fight, it soon became
clear to them that their effort to combat the American forces
was hopeless. They also discovered that the American government was proceeding to introduce all the reforms which
Rizal had demanded or which the Spaniards had promised




THE PHILIPPINES


247


to Aguinaldo. They were, accordingly, gradually convinced
that submission was necessary and that American rule would
be a vast improvement over any which they had previously
experienced. They found that the American government
was prepared to do even more for them through its policies
of sanitation and of education, as well as through its policy
of acquiring the lands of the friars and of detaching the
activities of the Roman Catholic Church entirely from control both of the land and of the government. They learned
further that the administrative policies and methods of the
United States were aimed, not at maintaining the old tribal
and linguistic barriers, but at breaking them down and
merging all the Filipino peoples into a single national group
speaking a single language.
It must be admitted that the policy of the American government toward the Philippine Islands, both with regard to
acquiring control of them and with regard to developing
administrative policies, is open to criticism, and that it was
already receiving extremely vigorous discussion within the
United States at that time. The suppression of the Filipino
insurrection was regarded by many in the United States with
emotions very different from those of pride. Even those
in the United States who favored the assumption and exercise of American control in the islands were prone to regard
the undertaking as a disagreeable necessity rather than as
a desirable or laudable national enterprise.  There were
some in the United States, on the other hand, who had a
clear conception of the significance of the occupation of the
Philippines with reference to the promotion of American
interests, both commercially and politically, in the western
Pacific and in eastern Asia.
Whatever may have been the attitude of extreme imperialists or anti-imperialists, and whatever may have been the
ignorance of the mass of the American people concerning
the Filipinos, their progress and culture, or their insurrectionary government, there can be no doubt that the general
sentiment in the United States was accurately voiced by
President McKinley. Beginning with his instructions of
May I9, I898, to the secretary of war, every one of his




248


THE AWAKENING EAST


utterances and formulations of policy expressed a high determination to safeguard the interests of the Filipino people
and to promote their welfare. His instructions of December 21, I898, to General Otis, after providing that civil and
municipal government shall be conducted "by officers chosen
as far as may be practicable among the inhabitants of the
islands," concluded with these words:
"Finally it should be the earnest and paramount aim of
the military administration to win the confidence, respect,
and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines by assuring to them in every possible way that full measure of individual rights and liberties which is the heritage of free
peoples, and by proving to them that the mission of the
United States is one of benevolent assimilation, substituting
the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule. In
the fulfillment of this high mission, supporting the temperate
administration of affairs for the greatest good of the governed, there must be sedulously maintained the strong arm of
authority to repress disturbance and to overcome all obstacles to the bestowal of the blessings of good and stable
government upon the people of the Philippine Islands under
the free flag of the United States."
A month later and two weeks prior to the outbreak of the
insurrection his instructions to the first Philippine commission, headed by Doctor Schurman, closed with the expression of the hope that they would be received "as bearers of
the good will, the protection, and the richest blessings of a
liberating rather than a conquering nation." Probably more
than to any other single individual the credit for the definite
formulation of American policy in the Philippines is due to
Elihu Root, who served as secretary of war from August I,
I899, to February I, I904.
It is not necessary to describe in detail the successive
forms of administration through which American control
of the islands has been exercised.  Military government
was maintained from I898 to 900oo. In I899 a supreme court
was established with six of the nine justices Filipinos.
From I900 to 1907 the government was conducted by the
Philippine commission, of which three members were Fili



THE PHILIPPINES


249


pinos after I9OI.5 William H. Taft, the president of the
second commission, was installed as civil governor in I9oI.
He was succeeded, in I904, by Luke E. Wright, whose title
was changed, in I905, to governor-general. In I907 the
people were permitted to elect an assembly which shared
legislative authority with the commission. This situation
endured until I9I3, when a further change was made by
President Wilson in substituting a Filipino majority for an
American majority in the membership of the commission.
In I916, under the Jones act, the commission disappeared;
the United States government was represented instead by a
governor-general and a vice-governor; and the Filipino
people were authorized to elect both a senate and an assembly, which taken together were henceforth to exercise full
lawmaking powers and, with certain limitations, to control
the finances. Such is the form of government at present
prevailing. In the local administration in the Christian
provinces, many officials have been elected almost since the
establishment of American   civil administration.6  The
judicial officials are likewise almost entirely native except
that five of the nine members of the supreme court are now
Americans. Positions in the civil service have from the
outset been open by preference to the natives. In I9I3 they
held 72 per cent of the places; in I921 they occupied 96
per cent of the posts.
The supreme court of the United States reaffirmed in
I9I0 its previous judgment that "the constitution is applicable to territories acquired by purchase or conquest only
when and so far as congress shall so direct," and that full
legislative power with regard to such territory was vested
in congress.7 Accordingly, congress undertook, as soon as
conditions in the islands permitted, to legislate for the establishment of civil government therein. Its acts have been,
'The number of American members was five.
' The Maura act of i893, under Spanish rule, had made somewhat
similar provision, but no great progress had been made toward
putting it into operation. Under American rule all the municipal
officials, except the treasurer, and about half the provincial officials,
are elected.
'Downes vs. Bidwell I82 U. S. 244.




250


THE AWAKENING EAST


from the beginning, without exception, inspired by the same
high principles which President McKinley had earlier enunciated. By its action there has been extended to the Philippine people every practicable American constitutional guarantee, and every law passed by it has provided for its
application equally to Americans and to Filipinos in the
islands, with a single exception, the proviso that preference
shall be given to Filipinos in civil service appointments. By
the tariff act of I909 free trade was established between the
islands and the United States. It may be added that congress has not acted to make the eighteenth and nineteenth
amendments to the constitution applicable within the islands.8
The Democratic party in the United States had consistently denounced the policy of the Republican administrations as imperialistic. Consequently, when President Wilson
entered office in I913 he promptly adopted a more liberal
attitude toward the Philippines and selected, as governorgeneral, Congressman Francis Burton Harrison, who was
known to be acceptable to the Filipinos. Throughout his
administration Governor-General Harrison pursued a policy
of Filipinization and of friendly cooperation with the Filipino leaders. After the passage of the Jones act in 1916 he
allowed himself and the Philippine legislature to interpret
and apply it with marked liberality. Though the Jones act
did not alter the preceding practice of separation of powers
between the executive and legislative branches of the government, he took upon himself the responsibility of creating an extra-legal body, called the council of state, which
was composed, in addition to himself and the heads of
the executive departments, of the president of the senate,
Mr. Quezon, and of the speaker of the house, Mr. Osmena,
the two recognized political leaders of the Filipinos. This
body established a link between the executive and the legislature, and provided a certain degree of legislative control
8In I924 the United States department of justice ruled that,
though the Volstead act does not apply to the Philippines, the
eighteenth amendment by its own terms does apply and that the
administration may and must act in accordance therewith in so far
as practicable in the absence of an enforcement act.




THE PHILIPPINES


251


over the administration, though it did not actually introduce
full parliamentary responsibility. Subsequent acts passed
by the legislature confirmed this body and extended its
powers by intrusting to it the execution of certain measures.
Governor-General Harrison also permitted the speakers of
the two houses to exercise a large influence over official appointments and administrative policy. Finally, near the
close of their administrations, both Governor-General Harrison and President Wilson definitely committed themselves
in favor of the prompt bestowal of Philippine independence.
When President Harding, the choice of the Republican
party, entered office in I92I, he consequently faced the problem of determining promptly whether the proposal of his
predecessor should be carried out. In order to secure information to govern his decision, he appointed Major-General
Leonard Wood and former Governor-General W. Cameron Forbes as special commissioners to make a full investigation of conditions in the islands. Their report, submitted on October 8, I92I, revealed the thoroughness of
their investigations and the judicious temper in which they
had approached their problem. They offered certain criticisms of the Harrison administration and indicated certain
reasons which they believed proved that the Filipinos were
not yet prepared to maintain a stable government. Soon
after the presentation of the report President Harding appointed General Wood governor-general. He also gave
assurance that there should be "no backward step" in the
American policy toward the Philippines. While this promise
has been literally observed, it has been the practice of Governor-General Wood, in contrast with his predecessor, to
interpret and apply the Jones act strictly. The Filipinos took
strong exceptions to certain portions of the Wood-Forbes
report and viewed the appointment of General Wood with
distrust. It is not surprising, therefore, that, as the administration has progressed, there has developed a steadily widening breach between the governor-general and the legislature.
The discussion of the various problems and issues involved
must occupy the remainder of this lecture.9
'For later developments, see below, pages 29gff.




252


THE AWAKENING EAST


This liberality of governmental privileges accorded by the
United States to the Filipinos far surpasses anything
granted by the British in the administration of Egypt10 or
of India. The people of the Philippines enjoy self-government, in general, as fully as do the Japanese. In I920, 5 per
cent of the population of Japan were legally entitled to vote;
in I919, Ii per cent of the Filipinos were qualified electors,
and 6.5 per cent actually did vote.11 The Philippine senate
and assembly under the Jones act have fuller legislative
power than is granted to the diet in Japan under the constitution of I889.
The attention given to education in the Philippine Islands
under American control is probably without parallel in the
history of colonial administration. From the very outset of
American occupation careful attention has been given to the
development of an adequate school system, based upon the
use of English as a common language. In order to lay the
foundations for the new system, a large number of American teachers was engaged for service in the islands in I90o
and succeeding years.  The trials experienced by these
earlier teachers and the value of the work which they accomplished can scarcely be exaggerated. Evidence of the
success of the new system of education appeared very
promptly. By I902 there were approximately 200,000 pupils enrolled; in I907, 480,000; in 1914, 621,000; and in
1920, approximately 943,000. The present total school enrollment, when the attendance at the private schools is included, somewhat exceeds the million mark; but the total
number of children between six and fourteen years of age
in I918 was over 2,400,000.
Quite properly, the chief attention has been centered upon
the development of elementary schools as widely as possible
~True only prior to the proclamation of the constitution and the
termination of martial law in Egypt, in July, 1923, though it will
again become true should the United States enact the Fairfield bill
(see below, pages 295-296) or a similar measure.
1 The census of I918 showed 2,125,423 males over twenty-one
years of age, of whom 1,097,937 were qualified to vote. The number of voters registered in 19I9 was 717,295, and the number of
votes cast was 672,122. See below, page 291.




THE PHILIPPINES


253


through the islands, but such institutions are not yet accommodating one half of the population of suitable age for
attendance. The difficulties involved in establishing schools
sufficient to accommodate the whole population of suitable
age are due to several conditions.  The population is
primarily rural, and widely diffused. The costs of securing
land and erecting a school building, of employing a teacher
and maintaining a school, are all items of very considerable
weight. Perhaps the most difficult problem is the securing
of teachers adequately trained to teach both the elementary
subjects and the English tongue.
The progress of instruction in the quarter century since
the American occupation has been notable and creditable,
but it will obviously take another quarter century to make
elementary education available for the whole population,
and to insure that every Filipino child may be trained to
become a literate person. The census of I9I8 showed over
30 per cent of the total population literate. The advancement of women is shown by the fact that 28 per cent of the
females are literate as compared with 32 per cent of the
males. At the present time, it is estimated that 37 per cent
of the total population are literate. Japan is the only nation
in the East with a better record, and no other eastern nation
approaches anywhere near the standard attained by the
Filipinos.
The significance of a uniform system of education, furnishing a common body of instruction to the youth of the
whole nation, has an importance far beyond imparting the
ability to read and write. The educational system is a highly
efficient agency for breaking down the old tribal barriers and
for the creation of the spirit of unity and nationality. It
also tends to obliterate certain quasi-feudal conditions which
have survived from the Spanish regime, or perhaps even
from the days prior to the arrival of Europeans. Instead,
the schools are daily inculcating the principles of democracy
and self-reliance. Not the least important elements in the
educational system are provisions for the care of the health,
for physical training, and for athletics. Nowhere in the
East have these modern methods been so fully utilized. The




254


THE AWAKENING EAST


valuable results are daily becoming more obvious in both
the physical and mental alertness of the people.
From the very beginning of American occupation it was
considered that the diversity of native dialects made impossible the selection of any one of them as the common language for the islands. Some recent writers have contended
that this decision was both unjustifiable and unwise. Their
arguments are based upon a later experiment, made under
the Dutch in Java, to substitute a single common dialect for
a group of diverse but related ones, through training in the
schools. The small extent to which Spanish had come into
use likewise ruled it out. The American authorities, therefore, determined to make English the common language and
to introduce its use through training in the schools.
The gratifying character of the results is shown by the
fact that, after a quarter century of American occupation,
the prevalence of English in the islands exceeds that of
Spanish, though three centuries and a half have elapsed since
the Spanish conquest.12  The utilization of English as the
common language for the islands instead of some indigenous
tongue has the decisive advantage of giving to the people
one of the great culture languages of the world, which
affords them immediate access to all that is most important
in human knowledge. English is more advantageous than
either a native language or even Spanish, because of its
widespread use, even outside of strictly English-speaking
lands, especially in commercial intercourse in the Far East.
Nevertheless, the extension of the use of English is still,
perhaps, the most vital single problem which conditions the
future of the islands. Belgium with two languages in coordinate use, and Switzerland with four, are, indeed, examples of successful national unity in spite of linguistic diversity, but they do not disprove the importance of a single
language as a bond of nationality. There can be no Philippine nation characterized by genuine unity until all the people
of the islands abandon their eighty-seven diverse tongues
Owing to instruction in the schools probably a larger proportion
of the Filipinos can use Spanish now than in I898. It is noteworthy
that more can read Spanish than can speak it.




THE PHILIPPINES


255


for a common language. It is accepted almost without
dispute that such uniform language for the Philippines must
be English. Only when it does actually come to be used
by substantially the whole population will one of the fundamental conditions for the creation of a Philippine nation
have been met. Even Mr. Quezon is reported to have
acknowledged recently that it might be desirable to postpone
the establishment of independence for ten or a dozen years
to permit the more general establishment of English as the
national language.
The diffusion of knowledge of English must be effected
almost exclusively through the elementary schools. It is,
therefore, necessary that the teachers in the schools shall
have received training adequate to make them proficient in
the language, not merely in its written form, but also as a
spoken vehicle. As it is impossible to supply a sufficient
number of American teachers for this purpose, native teachers must be given the necessary training, which ought, in a
goodly proportion of cases, to include a period of residence
and study in the United States or some other Englishspeaking  country.  There should be enough American
teachers devoting their attention exclusively to language
instruction to provide regular normal training and also
supplementary vacation courses. There should also be an
adequate number of Americans to serve as supervisors of
instruction in English in the schools. To meet these two
requirements there should be two or three times the present
number of Americans on the staff of the department of
education in the islands. It has been a serious misfortune
that the policy of the government under the Harrison administration led to a decrease in the number of American teachers by approximately 50 per cent, whereas the undoubted
need was for an increase of approximately the same proportion.
Effort has rightly been directed toward the extension of
the number of elementary schools and little attention has
been given to secondary and higher schools. Only approximately one per cent of the population of the islands has hitherto received an education of a higher grade than that fur



256


THE AWAKENING EAST


nished by the primary schools. There are good high schools,
especially in the cities, and there has been organized the
University of the Philippines, which has over four thousand
students. In addition, there are various private, denominational, and special schools of higher standing. The educational system in the islands will, of course, lack much of perfection until there has been developed a number of high
schools and colleges, and especially of normal schools and
other institutions for professional and vocational education,
adequate to supply the needs of the islands.
As yet advanced training of any sort is practically reserved
for those who can afford the private expense, and consequently this privilege is open only to a very small class.
Similar opportunities can come to the youth of the islands in
general only when sufficient educational institutions of
higher grade are established and maintained at public expense. Fortunately a considerable number of the Filipino
youth are seeking higher education abroad, mainly in the
United States. Because of their broader horizon they should
wield greater influence when they return to spend their
lives in service among their own people. A spirit of generous helpfulness displayed toward them by the American
people, among whom they may temporarily reside, can do
much to strengthen the bonds of friendship between the
great republic and the island people. Closely associated
with the development of higher education is the extension
of scientific research in the Philippines. Experts are rendering highly important service in nearly every branch of
the government. The correlation of their activities through
the bureau of science has proved very advantageous.
Credit for the remarkable educational advancement made
in the Philippine Islands during the past quarter century is
due not merely to the enlightened and liberal policy of the
United States government, but also to the earnestness of the
Filipinos in availing themselves of the opportunities placed
at their disposal. Not only does the younger generation show
itself eager to secure education of a primary and even of a
higher grade, but the older generation is also wise enough
to sympathize with the ambitions of youth, and to make ex



THE PHILIPPINES


257


traordinary sacrifices to assist the children in acquiring
education.
The development of journalism in the Philippine Islands
has been, in large measure, an achievement of the period
since American occupation. Under Spanish rule, the press
was, in all its activities, an instrumentality controlled almost
exclusively by the government and the church. This restrictive care has disappeared under American rule, and
the diversified activities of a free press constitute an important supplement to the educational system. The standard of Filipino journalism is fairly creditable, though by no
means so excellent as might be desired. Manila, for instance, has some moderately good newspapers, but they do
not compare with the two best dailies of either Hartford
or New Haven, each of which cities is less than half as
large. Neither do they equal the best English journals
printed in Japan, China, or India. Besides the papers published in English, there are also journals in Spanish and in
several of the native dialects. Some newspapers are published bilingually, and a few trilingually. The circulation
of the papers is not very extensive, the total of all periodicals in the islands being equal to only about 3 per cent of
the population. A much larger development of journalism
and the establishment of a higher standard are indispensable
to the existence of an intelligent electorate.
The public health work conducted under the American administration presents an excellent record of achievement.
The reduction of the death rate in Manila has amounted to
approximately 50 per cent, and in the provinces to about
20 per cent. The decline of infant mortality is even more
striking. The birth rate in Manila has shown a considerable
increase, while in the provinces there has been a slight decline. Among the activities of the Federation of Women's
Clubs in the Philippines, none has been more important than
its contribution to the improvement of conditions in connection with maternity and the care of infants.
The favorable showing in mortality statistics is subject
to some modification for the period of the Harrison administration, from 1913 to I921, when there was a slight increase




258


THE AWAKENING EAST


in the death rate.l3 The same period also showed an increase
in the number of cases of preventable diseases, such as
typhoid and tuberculosis. On the other hand, this administration effected a very considerable extension of hospital
and dispensary work, though the facilities of both sorts are
still woefully inadequate to the needs of the islands as a
whole. There are, for instance, less than one thousand
nurses for a population in excess of ten millions. There is
a similar shortage in the number of properly trained physicians and surgeons.
The sanitary work accomplished by the Americans in the
Philippine Islands undoubtedly surpasses anything achieved
by the British in the East, though it still falls far short of
what needs to be done. As in the matter of education, the
response of the Filipinos to the measures of sanitary reform
has been remarkable, so that to-day they rank as the cleanest
of oriental peoples. Though dire poverty exists in Manila,
one does not now find conditions in any section of the city
so repulsive or pitiful as those that one frequently encounters in nearly every city of the East. A related fact,
which should be recorded to the credit of the Filipino people, is the almost complete absence of mendicancy, which is
prevalent in most eastern lands.
The maintenance of public health requires extensive public
works in order to provide pure drinking water, to dispose of
sewage, and to eliminate unhealthy surroundings, as well
as provision for hospitals and dispensaries. The work accomplished in these matters has been creditable, but much
yet remains to be done. The Filipino government must in
the future consider as one of its chief obligations the prosecution of all reasonable measures for the maintenance of
public health, and the supply, through taxation, of adequate
funds for the purpose. In a similar way much work at
public expense must be undertaken for the purpose of ex18 The number of deaths per thousand was I6.82 in I913; 17.57 in
I914; I8.55 in 1915; 20.04 in I916; 2I.IO in I917; 35.47 in I9i8, owing
to epidemics of influenza, cholera, and smallpox, and 29.98 in I919.
Later figures are not available. In both I918 and I919 the number
of deaths exceeded the number of births.




THE PHILIPPINES


259


tending agriculture by means of irrigation and reclamation
projects.
As only io per cent of the land of the islands is under
tillage, and as it has usually been necessary to make considerable yearly importations of rice, which is the staple
food, it is clearly one of the obligations of the government
to undertake measures for bringing additional lands under
cultivation at an early date. In the Philippines there is no
question, as there is in Japan, of the existence of enough
land available for agriculture to make the population of the
islands self-sufficing. The allotment of these lands has been
thoroughly safeguarded by wise legislation. No change in
the land laws can be made without the approval of the
president of the United States. In the future only Americans or Filipinos may acquire land from the public domain.  The existing laws also contemplate the allotment
of land from the public domain primarily to peasant proprietors rather than the creation of large landed estates or
exploitation through a system of great plantations controlled by commercial corporations, such as has been demanded for the encouragement of the production of rubber.
A large portion of the friar lands, acquired in I902 (the
actual transfers were made in I904 and I905) for $7,000,000
through negotiations conducted by Mr. Taft, has already
been sold by the government to peasant proprietors. The
forests of the islands are extensive and offer valuable opportunities for their scientific exploitation. Competent observers are convinced that the islands are capable of supplying the necessary amounts of every sort of tropical product
needed by the United States. The large extension of the
cultivated area under American rule and the success of the
efforts already made to supply the American market with
Filipino products are a fair indication of what may be accomplished. Just as natural conditions seem to require that
the future development of Japan shall be industrial, so they
point to the promotion of agriculture as the wisest economic
policy for the Philippines.
The agricultural development of the islands, and especially
the ability to place the products at the disposal of American




260


THE AWAKENING EAST


and international trade, will require adequate means of
communication and transportation. Under American rule,
there has been no great extension of the railroad mileage.
At the present time there are approximately only nine hundred miles of railroads in operation, as compared with one
hundred and twenty miles in I898. This small mileage,
however, gives access to about one quarter of the population.
The existing lines are inferior in construction and equipment. On the other hand, over six thousand miles of highways have been constructed, of which nearly half are rated
as first-class metaled roads. Moreover, automobile transportation for both passengers and goods is being steadily developed, and it is possible that the transportation problem
of the islands will, in considerable measure, be solved in this
manner rather than by the construction of railways. During
the Harrison administration the extension and care of roads
was not up to the standard set in earlier days of American
occupation. If all parts of the islands are to be brought
into satisfactory communication, the Filipino government
in the future must be prepared to make large expenditures
both for new roads and for maintenance of the system. The
matter of communications in the Philippines, however, is
by no means entirely a land problem. The number of the
islands and their scattered location require a large degree
of dependence upon methods of interisland navigation. To
solve this problem there will be required expenditures not
merely for the establishment of numerous steamer lines but
also for harbors, lighthouses, and various other improvements of navigation. Though this phase of the problem has
hitherto received less attention than it deserves, there are
already in operation in interisland navigation about four
hundred boats, and the number is being steadily increased,
especially by motor boats. Political as well as commercial
interests require the existence of adequate, cheap, and easy
means of intercommunication throughout the archipelago.
The national unity of the Filipino people cannot be attained
without full and constant intercourse among the diverse
peoples and various sections of the islands.
The foreign trade of the Philippine Islands has expanded




THE PHILIPPINES


26I


with remarkable rapidity during the period of American
control.l4 This commerce reached an annual value of $50,ooo,ooo in I9go. By I912 it had increased to $Ioo,ooo,ooo,
and in I920 the total was in excess of $300,000,000. Over
6o per cent of this trade is at present with the United States,
whereas prior to I898 the annual trade between the United
States and the Philippines did not exceed $5,ooo,ooo. The
chief exports are sugar, hemp, tobacco, and coconut products. Hats and embroideries, which are perhaps the most
important manufactures of the islands, are also largely exported.
From the point of view of the United States the trade of
the Philippines is a very minor matter in comparison with
its total commerce. The United States could conceivably
lose the whole trade of the islands without any serious inconvenience. Potentially, however, the trade with the Philippines, through extension of the cultivation of various
tropical products, might become of the greatest value to the
United States. The position of the islands in the western
Pacific and in relation to eastern Asia constitutes an important strategic advantage to the United States commercially as well as politically.'5 For American exports the
Philippines might become a market of some value, but it is
unlikely that the United States will ever find it possible to
sell any considerable portion of its manufactured goods in
the islands themselves. For the period of American occupation as a whole the balance of trade, both for the total
trade and for the trade with the United States, has been in
favor of the Philippines.
On the other side, the loss of the American market would,
at least for a considerable period of years, be a serious misfortune for the Filipinos. At the present time the products of
the Philippine Islands enjoy free entry into the United
14 Compare the contemporaneous growth of the trade of Formosa
under Japanese rule. The comparison on other lines, as well, between American policy in the Philippines and Japanese policy in
Formosa is illuminating. See Ralston Hayden, Japan's New Policy in
Korea and Formosa. (Foreign Affairs, 2, 474-487, March I5, I924.)
15Numerous proposals have been made to establish Manila as a
free port. See below, page 292.




262


THE AWAKENING EAST


States. This privilege could not continue if the islands
became independent or passed under the control of any
other power. It will be seen, therefore, that the economic
argument against independence is a very strong one when
the question is viewed from the Philippine side, but is of
less concern when viewed from the American side.
This problem, however, is not quite so simple. There are
objections, both from the Filipinos and from other nations
interested in the trade of the islands, to the American action,
in I909 and 1913, establishing free trade between the United
States and the Philippines.16 These measures are criticized
because they indirectly give the United States a monopolistic
position with reference to the trade of the Philippines, as
is shown by the resultant doubling of its percentage therein.
While this arrangement is not.so objectionable as the colonial trade restrictions of most other countries, it is much
less liberal than the practice prevailing within the British
Commonwealth of Nations, for example, in India, where the
trade is open to other nations on absolutely equal terms with
the English. Moreover, in contrast with its policy of insisting on the open door in China, the United States is
practically maintaining a closed door in the Philippines.
The objection raised by the Filipinos is that they are placed
at the mercy of the American capitalists both in their buying
and selling, because the disadvantages created by the tariff
duties make it impracticable for them, in many cases, to
trade with anyone but Americans. The United States ought
certainly to investigate these complaints, and if the regulations concerned operate unjustly to the disadvantage of the
Filipinos or unfairly internationally, remedy should be
sought. Ever since President McKinley's announcement at
the beginning of American occupation the United States has
repeatedly disclaimed any intention of exploiting the Filipino
1s By the Underwood tariff of I9I3 the duties on imports into the
Philippines from countries other than the United States are, in
general, distinctly lower than the rates established in the United
States. An act of congress has authorized the president, by proclamation, to include the Philippines within the operation of the law
restricting coastwise shipping to American vessels but, wisely, the
power has not been exercised.




THE PHILIPPINES


263


people. It is, therefore, in honor bound to repeal or modify
any legislation that operates to the contrary, even though
there was no evil intent in its enactment. Under the Jones
act of I9I6, indeed, a partial remedy has already been placed
in the hands of the Philippine legislature, which is empowered to enact tariff laws with reference to countries
other than the United States, but the authority has remained
practically unexercised. A further objection to the free
entry of American goods is that it deprives the Philippine
government of needed revenue, for the receipts from customs duties would be trebled if imports from the United
States paid the regular tariff rates. Even if this deduction
be valid it does not prove that free trade is injurious or unjust to the Filipinos.
Closely related to this question of trade is the exploitation
of the islands through capital investment. Very few Filipinos hitherto have had sufficient capital for investment
except in land. The development of industrial, commercial,
and banking institutions has, therefore, become dependent
upon capital supplied by the government or attracted from
outside. Prior to the American occupation a small amount
of foreign capital had been invested in the islands. The
most notable case was the British corporation known as the
Manila Railroad Company. Since that time, however, but
little capital, either foreign or American, has been attracted.
More recent enterprises have been dependent upon government rather than private capital.
A wholesome fear of falling into the clutches of American
"big business" and of creating a privileged interest which
would oppose independence has led the insular government
to enter upon a number of important financial undertakings
requiring considerable capital. The first of these was the
chartering of the Philippine National Bank in order to free
the islands from the control of the foreign banking institutions which were doing business in Manila. This was followed by the purchase of the Manila Railroad Company
from the British stockholders. Later there were created
the National Coal Company, the National Cement Company,
and a few other corporations. These quasi-public cor



264


THE AWAKENING EAST


porations have served the purpose for which they were intended, but have met with severe criticism from the supporters of the American capitalistic interests. This attitude
was in part responsible for the unfortunate experiences of
the bank, which also had to meet the intrenched opposition
and vigorous competition of the great and long-established
English banks in the Far East. These corporations are,
strictly speaking, not socialistic in character, but are a governmental expedient to protect the Filipinos from alien or
American exploitation. Their very existence has sufficed
to check the forms of alien exploitation which have aroused
so much resentment in both China and India.
There is, however, real question whether, in the absence
of Filipino capital for investment, suitable laws might not
be devised to attract American private capital for the development of the islands, yet with abundant safeguards
against the evils of exploitation of the people, land, or resources. Means must be found to secure a much fuller development of the insular resources as a basis both for the
economic stability and progress of the archipelago and for
the creation of a body of taxable wealth competent to support the necessarily increasing costs of government. New
York state, for example, has almost precisely the same population as the Philippines, but only 40 per cent of the area,
yet its expenditures for the state government alone are three
times those of the Philippine government. The taxable capacity of the islands is indicated by the income-tax returns,
of which there were 9,5I9 in I92o, distributed as follows:
Filipinos, 3,667; Chinese, 3,I23; Americans, 1,434; other
foreigners, I,295. Thus, I out of I4 of the non-Filipinos
filed an income-tax return, exactly the same proportion as
in the United States, but only I out of 2,790 Filipinos did.
The Filipino people, as already indicated, are almost exclusively engaged in agricultural pursuits. Such manufacturing as is conducted is largely under the domestic system.
Factories are almost unknown. Mercantile and commercial
activities are rarely carried on by the Filipinos. Practically
the entire wholesale and retail trade of the islands is in the
hands of aliens. The leading business people are the Chi



THE PHILIPPINES


265


nese, but Japanese, Americans, British, and others share in
the conduct of commercial enterprise. Consequently, the
Filipino people, as in the case of Egypt, lack the private experience in money matters which is a necessary prerequisite
to ability to handle successfully problems of public finance.
It is unfortunately necessary to record that the Filipinos have
not yet developed a proper sense of the value of money, or
good judgment in business matters. What is worse, their
standards of honor in handling of banking and of public
funds have been brought under serious suspicion in the
proved mismanagement of the Philippine National Bank
in its earlier years.
It is to be alleged on behalf of the Filipino that the economic policy of Spain did not permit his acquiring any large
degree of commercial or even of minor mercantile experience. This was due both to the policy of trade restriction
and also to the policy of utilizing Filipino labor in agriculture, as on the friar lands. Experience since the American
occupation has, however, revealed the adaptability of the
Filipino to many pursuits other than agriculture. The primitive instinct for the sea reappears in the success with which
Filipinos have undertaken the conduct of the interisland
shipping, and in the extent to which they have entered a
wider range of seafaring occupations. The American and
foreign business houses in Manila and other ports of the
islands have followed, in recent years, a policy of steady
Filipinization of their staffs of clerks and other employees.
Moreover, there is a growing number of Filipinos who are
successfully undertaking mercantile and industrial enterprises on their own account. These are certainly signs of
hope for the future.
Another legitimate plea may be entered in defense of
the Filipino in business. Many of his early undertakings
coincided with the period of the World War, and consequently suffered seriously from the unusual conditions obtaining in the financial world at that time and, even more,
immediately after the close of the war. This fact may be
alleged in mitigation of the misadventures of the Philippine
National Bank. The experience of Filipino financial under



266


2THE AWAKENING EAST


takings, during these years, was not without numerous parallels in similar enterprises, both native and foreign, in every
other Far Eastern land. This is not commendation, but it
is evidence thoroughly relevant to the formation of a fair
judgment of Filipino character and ability.
The evil influence of the World War upon the financial
and economic conditions in the. Philippines was far-reaching.
Specie was drawn from the islands to the United States in
payment for generous subscriptions to liberty loans and to
Red Cross and similar war charities, as well as in other extraordinary ways. The diversion of trade from normal
channels caused varied and serious difficulties, which led to
a policy of government control for price regulation in the
case of certain commodities, especially of rice. This experiment at government regulation of business proved distinctly unfortunate. The wide and rapid fluctuations in exchange throughout the East were a constant temptation to
speculate, one might almost say to gamble. That conditions in the Philippines were not so bad as they have been
sometimes painted is clearly shown by the stability of the
peso, which fluctuated in value less than any other oriental
currency, not excepting the dollars of Hong Kong or the
Straits Settlements.
In government finance, practice in the islands was really
in advance of that in the United States, for the budget system was adopted by the first Filipino Legislature under the
Jones act in I9I6, five years ahead of similar action by the
United States government. The increase in annual expenditure and in the debt of the insular government has not been
disproportionate since the outbreak of the World War in
I914. The authorization, in I92I, for the increase of the
debt limit of the insular government from $15,000,000 to
$30,000,000, exclusive of $7,ooo,ooo friar land bonds, has
been fully utilized, and has afforded somewhat greater flexibility to the financial situation. In I922 congress raised the
debt limit to ten per cent of the assessed value of real property, which amounts, by the latest assessment, to about
$74,000,000.
Prior to American occupation, and for some years there



THE PHILIPPINES


267


after, nearly all European trade with the Philippines, not reserved by Spain, was in British hands. For several years
after I898, indeed, the British controlled a larger share of
the trade of the islands than any other country, not excepting the United States. Though the proportion of British
trade has fallen rapidly in later years, the British trading
community in the islands continues to exercise an influence
quite out of proportion to its numbers. The Americans
were surprisingly slow in developing their commercial and
financial interests in the islands. It was not until the civil
service policy of Governor-General Harrison in I913 forbade office holders to engage in trade that considerable numbers began to give their exclusive attention to commercial
affairs. This number was still further increased by the unusual conditions in the years during the World War and the
period immediately thereafter.
The commercial connections of the Philippines with the
neighboring lands of the Far East are important, especially
with China. Apparently Chinese had been trading in large
numbers with the islands for centuries before Magellan's
arrival, and, despite several attempts by the Spaniards to
expel them, they have continued to trade there ever since.
A large part of the retail trade of the islands has been in
their hands. Their position is not viewed very kindly by the
Filipinos, who seem to think of them somewhat as the Turk
does of the Greek or Armenian trader. The Chinese interests in the islands have not, however, expanded on the large
scale to which they have developed in the Straits Settlements.
The situation with regard to the foreign business community in the Philippines is not dissimilar to that which has
already been discussed in the case of Egypt. Contrary to
the practice in India, the foreign business community has
no voice in the legislature. It is true that Americans may
become Philippine citizens and thus vote for legislative representatives, but they have not done so. The consequence
is that the financial and economic interests of the country
are not likely to secure such thorough consideration as might
be desired. It may be argued that this result is not dissonant
with the interests of the Philippine nation at large, since over




268


THE AWAKENING EAST


go90 per cent of its population is rural and agricultural. On
the other hand, if the Filipino people are to achieve their independence in the near future, there are many considerations
which will compel their serious attention to economic questions of far-reaching significance. This being the case, one
of the questions which might be raised is whether it would
not be to the advantage of the Filipinos to secure an arrangement by which they should have commercial attaches in connection with the American consular service, at those ports,
especially in the Far East, where their trade is most considerable. This would certainly be a helpful step in preparation for self-government.
It must be admitted that the people of the Philippine
Islands have had little opportunity to acquire experience in
business matters, and that a single failure or several failures
must not be taken as conclusive evidence of inherent incompetence. The real question is whether they show ability to
profit by their mistakes. If the people of the Philippines are
wise, they will set themselves to the task of mastering mercantile affairs and acquiring control of a reasonable share
of their own wholesale and retail trade, instead of depending, as hitherto, upon foreigners. It is also essential that
they shall develop, both in legislative and administrative
positions, the ability to deal both intelligently and honestly
with economic questions. Furthermore, they must secure
the investment of sufficient capital to assure the steady development of the national resources. A country which fails
to do so cannot maintain a stable government.
The question is one not merely of business ability but
also of individual thrift. Perhaps the Filipinos have never
developed this virtue; at any rate its practice does not seem
to have been encouraged under the rule of the Spanish and
the friars. The development of education and the extension
of other privileges under American rule are encouraging in
the ordinary Filipino a sense of self-dependence and of the
desirability of personal financial solvency. The shortcomings of the Filipino in economic matters are but the faults
of his virtues. Among the finest traits of the Filipino are his
generosity and his cheerful, care-free disposition. To steady




THE PHILIPPINES


269


these virtues and to prevent their lapsing into faults is another prerequisite to the development of the quality of national character which will assure genuine independence.
Postal savings banks are already inculcating thrift, and in
time, no doubt, other influences will conduce to the attainment of sound business sense, without any undue sacrifice of
the characteristic virtues of the nation.
Although the Filipinos are not good business managers,
that is not the main reason why public taxation and expenditure have been considerably increased in the period
since 1916, when they acquired full legislative control of the
insular finances. The necessities of education, sanitation,
transportation, and other public concerns have naturally
appealed to the Filipinos for prompt and liberal expenditures.
As long as the responsibility rested with the agents of the
United States government there was a natural hesitation to
proceed with undue rapidity in these matters. A moderate
tax levied by alien authority might readily be more vehemently criticized than four times that sum levied by the representatives of the people themselves. In 1913 the rate of
taxation was estimated at $1.32 per capita. By I920 it had
risen to $2.50 per capita.17 National taxes alone in the
United States are in excess of $25 per capita.
The Philippine government is equally fortunate in the
smallness of its net indebtedness, which amounts to about
$3 per capita. Though the taxes and the indebtedness of
the Philippines are apparently trivial, they amount to really
considerable sums when judged by the relative economic advancement of the people as compared with conditions in the
United States. The Philippine government does not, however, pay all the costs involved. The United States government pays the charges for army, transport, navy, fortifications, diplomacy, coast survey, and in addition has made
other occasional appropriations rightly chargeable to the
7 Had the decline in the purchasing power of money been as
great as in the United States, this would have meant no real increase
in taxation. Though proper data are not available to determine the
change in price levels in the Philippines, it is probable that the
change was not as great as in the United States.




270


THE AWAKENING EAST


administration of the islands. It is estimated that the total
disbursements by the American government on the Philippine account have amounted to about $70o,ooo,ooo.18  The
credit of the United States government, not merely in theory,
but in absolute fact, has supported the currency of the islands
in accordance with the gold standard, the bonds issued by
the government, and even the Philippine National Bank.
In the administration of justice the Filipinos have, from
the beginning of the American occupation, enjoyed a large
amount of responsibility. The local or minor courts are
regularly officered by Filipinos. At the present time the
only distinct reservation of judicial office to Americans is in
the case of five of the nine appointments to the supreme
court of the islands. The chief justice, however, is a Filipino. This almost complete native control of the judicial
system has probably worked as well as could have been expected.
Unfortunately, there have arisen considerable causes for
criticism. A certain amount of laxity and of delinquency
in the conclusion of cases might naturally be anticipated
with an oriental people. This is undesirable, but not serious. On the other hand, there have been rather too many
complaints that the judicial officers have allowed political
and other improper influences to determine the disposition
of cases before them, especially of those which deal with
elections. This is due not so much to lack of honesty or capacity on the part of officials as to the lack of reasonable
safeguards to assure their judicial integrity. There does not
exist a body of enlightened public opinion sufficient to hold
judges to strict account. There is likewise no suitable governmental supervision or instruction which would serve to
hold local officials to a rigidly upright and impartial attitude
in the discharge of their duties.
In two respects the judicial administration in the Philip"8This sum equals the total expenditures of the Philippine governments, insular, provincial, and municipal, for the same period.
Such claims as are made in the article, Philippine Government Is
Self-Supporting, Philippine Press Bulletin, January, 1924, are, therefore, misleading.




THE PHILIPPINES


271


pines differs radically from that in the United States. The
local official combines administrative and judicial functions,
and furthermore acts without a jury. These practices, like
the legal system, are inherited from Spanish rule. The arrangement has its faults, but on the whole works with reasonable satisfaction, and efforts are being made to remove
the more obvious objections. Every year of American control, however, witnesses a large and natural extension of the
ideas and forms of American law. The tendency to alter
to an American standard is naturally very much stronger
in the law regarding persons than in the law of property.
The absence of a guaranty of jury trial in all cases seems,
from the American point of view, open to serious criticism,
but it is, in fact, not discordant with the established legal
conditions in the islands. Criticism of the absence of guaranty seems to come not so much from the Filipinos themselves as from some Americans who speak with sentiment
rather than with knowledge.
In the offices of civil administration the record is similar.
Many Filipinos have displayed a high degree of competency
and of official integrity, but there have also been rather too
many examples of the opposite sort. The reasons already
alleged in explanation in the case of judicial office hold
equally in this instance. Though President McKinley had
laid down the principle that, whenever possible, Filipinos
were to be employed as their own governmental officials, a
goodly number of Americans held governmental positions
in the islands down until 19I3. At that date Americans
occupied approximately 2,600 out of 9,000 positions in the
classified civil service in the Philippines. The criticism was
not so much against the proportion of Americans in the
service as against their almost exclusive monopoly of the
higher offices.
In 1913 Governor-General Harrison reported that only
one bureau was under a Filipino chief. He made it his
policy, wherever possible, to replace the American incumbent by a Filipino, so that at the close of his administration
in I92I there were 30 Filipino chiefs of bureaus. Only nine
bureaus, which required scientific experts to direct them,




272


THE AWAKENING EAST


remained under American chiefs. In the words of Governor-General Harrison, "for a period of a year from the date
of my arrival the number [of separations of Americans from
the civil service] was 716, but their places were filled by
Filipinos, not by Americans brought over for the purpose."
A regulation forbidding civil servants to engage in business
caused many Americans to resign office; the Osmena
retirement act in I9I6, which provided a bonus to officials
retiring after six years or more of service, resulted in the
withdrawal, in the ensuing five years, of 913 Americans, as
contrasted with 2I2 Filipinos.  A  third explanation of
extensive withdrawals of Americans from the Philippine
civil service was the World War, which called many into
military service or other positions elsewhere.
The Filipinization of the civil service has been in compliance with the demand for self-government, but there is
serious doubt whether the process has not been carried too
far, or at least introduced too rapidly. As a rule, Filipinos
have avoided seeking positions requiring expert scientific
ability, but even in the broader fields of general administration it is not unlikely that better results might be obtained
through the employment of a somewhat larger number of
expert Americans. Doubt has also been raised whether
Christian Filipino officials can serve acceptably among the
Mohammedan Moros or among the pagan aborigines. Experience has tended to remove this doubt.
The American civil officials in the islands, especially in
higher positions, are brought into contact incessantly with officers of the American army, and to some extent with officers
of the American navy. In general the relations with naval officers have afforded little cause for complaint. The same
cannot be said in the case of the army officers. From the
time when Mr. Taft became civil governor to the close of
the administration of Governor-General Harrison, friction
between the military and civil officials developed repeatedly.
As a rule, wisdom has seemed to be on the side of the civil
officers, and the tendency has been to increase the power of
the civil authority at the expense of the military. The unfortunate emphasis placed by Governor-General Harrison




THE PHILIPPINES


273


upon the impolitic and reactionary character of army officers,
at the close of his administration and in his book issued
shortly thereafter, seriously prejudiced the situation at the
arrival of the Wood-Forbes commission, and later at the
appointment of General Wood as governor-general. In
view of these circumstances and of the events which have
since occurred, it seems that, in spite of the high character
and ability of General Wood, the appointment of an army
officer to the governor-generalship was ill-advised.
Under the Jones act the franchise may be exercised by
men 21 years of age who can read and write either Spanish,
English, or a native language, or by those owning real property worth at least 500 pesos or paying taxes of at least 30
pesos annually. Under these restrictions, the census of
I9I8 showed that 53 per cent of the men of voting age enjoyed the right of suffrage.19 This proportion is very much
greater than is authorized in any other eastern land. It is
sometimes objected that free exercise of the franchise,
especially in the more backward rural communities, is restricted by the traditional influence of certain individuals of
local importance, because of official position, the headship of
the family, or wealth. It is impossible to form a satisfactory judgment of the validity of these charges. Even if they
are true, they are not necessarily serious in their consequences, and they may be overcome by the extension of education and the development of more intelligent public
opinion. On the other hand, it may be reasonably argued
that a much more liberal extension of the franchise should
precede independence, and that it should be obtained through
enabling a much larger proportion of the population to meet
the educational qualification. It is doubtful whether a government can be considered stable which rests upon the suffrages of only 6.5 per cent of the population, as was the case
with the legislature elected in I9I9.
The bicameral legislature established by the Jones act
possesses wide powers of legislation subject to veto by the
governor-general. A vetoed measure may be passed by
"' See above, page 252, footnote I.




274


THE AWAKENING EAST


a two-thirds vote of both houses, but even then the governorgeneral may withhold such a measure for final decision by
the president of the United States. Moreover, all legislative enactments must be reported to the congress of the
United States, which has power of annulment, though it has
never been exercised. This legislature also chooses two
resident commissioners to Washington for terms of three
years, who have the right of participating in debate in the
house of representatives. The membership of the legislature is made up entirely of Filipinos, all elected, except two
senators and nine representatives appointed by the governorgeneral to represent the non-Christian tribes. In this respect
the legislature is as completely native as in China or Japan,
and far more representative, because practically every member is elected for a short and definite term of years, under a
distinctly liberal franchise. No Americans or aliens sit in
the legislature, a contrast to the situation prevailing in India.
Both in the legislative assembly established in I907, and
in the full legislature created by the Jones act in IgI6, the
Filipinos have shown themselves surprisingly good parliamentarians, and, in general, the conduct of the sessions has
been thoroughly commendable. Taken as a whole, the
legislation enacted has been ample in quantity and of high
character. While the Filipino may rightly be proud of the
behavior of his legislative representatives, a disinterested
observer can hardly avoid recognizing the insufficient character of their parliamentary experience to justify the
concession of full responsibility or independence for the
present. It is true thai within the space of less than a
quarter century they have established an apparently stable
government, but it must be remembered that the English
required centuries of similar experience to perfect their
parliamentary institutions.20 In view of the extensive
powers already enjoyed, it does not seem unfair that the
Filipinos should be asked to consult their own future welfare
and await patiently the establishment of their desired independence until further progress and experience shall have
0 The Filipino nationalists quite naturally prefer the comparison
with Japan, but the two cases are not analogous.




THE PHILIPPINES


275


furnished additional guaranties for its successful maintenance.
As it may be admitted without risk of serious dispute
that the present status of the Philippines cannot satisfactorily be maintained for a much longer time, the question
arises concerning the practicability of other possible solutions. In all cases of territory acquired by the United States
prior to I898 ultimate incorporation into the Union through
statehood was finally conceded, with the single exception
that Alaska has not yet attained such rank. There can be
little doubt that the Filipino people would, with almost complete unanimity, reject the proposal of statehood, and that
the American people would be equally averse to granting it.
In spite of this strong adverse opinion, the idea is not without merits, and might simplify some of the problems more
satisfactorily than any other solution.21 The Filipinos reject
the plan because it is not consonant with their ideas of
independence. American opposition arises partly from antiimperialists, and partly from a general antipathy to annexing a distant area whose defense would be a constant liability and to incorporating people of an alien race. American
opinion is profoundly influenced by experience with the
negro question, and there is a marked unwillingness to take
on any other racial problem. This latter point of view is
undoubtedly exaggerated by the ignorant assumption that
the Filipinos are a backward people inferior to the negroes.
Though dominion status might not be more desirable than
statehood as the ultimate solution of the Philippine question,
it is not improbable that it may be the wisest arrangement
for the immediate future. By dominion status would be
signified such a quasi-independent relation as obtains between the Dominion of Canada and the United Kingdom,
together with the form of responsible parliamentary government which is in operation in Canada and the other British
dominions. This plan seems to have been in the minds of
Governor-General Harrison and of his Filipino advisers
when they desired to replace the former by a Filipino gover21 On the other hand it would give the Philippines equal voice
with New York in congress and in all national matters.




276


THE AWAKENING EAST


nor-general and to secure permission for Filipino representatives at the Paris peace conference. Both these proposals
were negatived by President Wilson. While individuals
may have different opinions on the abstract question of the
relative desirability of the British system of responsible
parliamentary government and of the American system of
presidential government or of government by a system of
checks and balances, it may be admitted that a modified form
of dominion status with responsible parliamentary government offers the most convenient temporary solution for the
Philippine problem. It has usually been overlooked that
the mutual relations between the United States and the
Philippines are not, and never can be, parallel to those between Great Britain and its self-governing dominions. They
are more nearly comparable to those between Great Britain
and India.
One of the strong arguments against immediate independence might also be an argument against the concession of
dominion status, were it not that this arrangement would
provide a satisfactory period of trial and experience antecedent to independence. Practically speaking, there are no
parties among the Filipinos, though there have been occasional efforts to secure an alignment with reference to a
greater or lesser degree of self-government, or to immediate
or deferred independence. The active political forces in the
islands are practically all nationalists and supporters of the
demand for Philippine independence at the earliest possible
date. This is of genuine significance, for where no party of
opposition exists there is no means of enforcing upon the
majority and upon its representatives in a ministry a sense
of legislative responsibility.
If, on the other hand, the representatives in the senate
and assembly were more or less evenly divided into two
groups representing, for instance, radical and conservative
views with regard to the establishment of national independence, the minority party would constitute an unfailing
check upon the majority and hold that party to a substantially consistent policy and behavior. The minority would
also be chastened by the realization that at any time a turn




THE PHILIPPINES


277


of the political wheel might place them in the majority. It
is at this point that the Filipinos have not yet obtained the
sort of experience in effecting a real party organization,
both without and within the legislature, which is essential
to the successful working of parliamentary institutions,
whether of the British or of the American type. Insufficient
time has elapsed to determine whether the split in the Nacionalista party in 1922 between Osmena and Quezon will result
in real advance toward the development of parties. The
nonpartisan character of the Filipino senate and assembly
would almost inevitably disappear with the establishment
of independence or of dominion status, and parties or groups
would undoubtedly arise in these bodies. A situation would
then present itself for which the Filipinos would be totally unprepared by experience, which might be obtained
more wisely under dominion status than after the establishment of independence.
Whether with dominion status or under some other new
adjustment, the real interests of the Filipino people in their
progress toward self-government clearly render desirable,
for a considerable period of time, their continued enjoyment
of the benefit of a small but effective amount of American
guidance and supervision. It is not merely that the expert
knowledge of the Americans furnishes a certain measure
of enlightenment to the Filipinos in dealing with governmental problems, but it is perhaps of even greater importance
that the Americans, in a capacity as instructors or supervisors, can act impartially in toning up the Filipino officials to a high standard of honesty, justice, and efficiency.
Americans are needed in the government of the islands to
furnish advice and sympathetic guidance, rather than to
dictate or control.
Thus far, during the period of American occupation, the
educated Filipinos have, in general, been those trained during the period of Spanish domination. For some time to
come Filipinos of this type may continue to be in the majority and to exercise a controlling influence in political
affairs. It is perfectly obvious that these men, no matter
how sincere may be their loyalty and their good intentions,




278


THE AWAKENING EAST


are prevented by the circumstances of their training from
being genuinely competent supporters of a regime in which
American ideals are dominant. The new generation, trained
under American auspices, will be free from certain prejudiced influences which necessarily affect the older generation, and they will have grown up in full acquaintance with
American methods and ideals, so that they should be able to
approach all matters of public concern with far greater hope
for success in dealing with them. It has already become
possible to see the difference of attitude toward public matters displayed by the old Spanish-trained generation and by
the young American-trained generation.
At this point it becomes necessary to refer to the most
delicate question involved in the future of the islands. The
Spanish-trained generation was also a friar-trained generation, or at least grew up in a political society in which
church and state were almost synonymous terms. Since
over 88 per cent of the Filipino people are Catholics, of
whom over 75 per cent are Roman Catholics, the immediate
or early establishment of self-government and independence
might permit the Roman Catholic Church, with a personnel
which has not yet forgotten its days of supreme influence
under Spanish rule, once more to dominate the islands.
When it is recalled that the insurrection of i896 was directed rather against the church than against the Spanish
government, it appears how natural a return to the former
condition would be. A sufficient period of time prior to
independence and complete self-government ought to elapse
to permit the thorough establishment of the American principle and practice of separation of church and state and of
the full emancipation of the individual from clerical control
in matters not of spiritual concern.22 The statement of this
very vital situation is made absolutely without prejudice
to the spiritual leadership of the Roman Catholic Church
among the Filipino people.
While emphasis is thus laid on the firm establishment of
the principle of separation of church and state, it must be
The experiences of the several Latin-American nations are suggestive in this connection.




THE PHILIPPINES


279


admitted that the attitude of the Catholic Church has appeared favorable to American control rather than to the
aspirations for independence. Catholic opposition to independence may be explained by fear of the development of a
definitely anti-clerical movement in the islands, if the restraining influence of the United States were removed.
There does indeed exist throughout the archipelago an independent Catholic Church, popularly known as the Aglipayan
Church, established in I902, under the leadership of Gregorio
Aglipay, a priest who was active in the insurrection. The
census of I9I8 showed that 13 per cent of the people were
adherents of this church, which is hostile to the Roman Catholic hierarchy.
The need for American assistance has already been pointed
out as essential not only in matters of government but also
for the completion of an educational system that will establish English as a common language, for the development of
better journalism and a more active press with greatly extended circulation, and for the establishment of an improved
system of public works, to provide for sanitation, communications, and transportation. All these matters are things essential to the welding of the Filipino peoples into a unified
and intelligent nation, competent for self-government. With
American assistance the desired end can undoubtedly be attained more rapidly than by the hastier, though perhaps more
gratifying, method of immediate independence. It would
seem to be a far greater injustice to the Filipino people for
the Americans to leave the islands without accomplishing
these tasks essential to national unity and genuine independence than for them to continue their control and to refuse
a premature grant of complete independence.
The American people may justly pride themselves on their
achievement in the Philippines. They have made enormous
advances toward molding the diverse tribes into a single,
united people, and for the first time have actually established the supremacy of a single government over them all.
They have made extraordinary progress in extending the
use of one of the great culture languages as the common
speech, and have rapidly enlarged and improved the fa



280


THE AWAKENING EAST


cilities for education. A single system of law uniformly administered has been extended through the archipelago. The
public health has been improved by extensive measures of
sanitation to a degree which has permitted the rapid growth
of the population. By the construction of roads and by
numerous other means, improved methods of transportation
and communication have been established. The Americans
have carried out, with remarkable consistency and sincerity,
a policy of training the Filipino people for self-government,
and they have administered the financial and commercial
regime in a manner so satisfactory as to produce remarkably
little discontent. Indeed, the American treatment of the
Filipinos in these particulars has been exceedingly generous. Although the problem of dealing with the Philippines, both as regards area and the amount of population,
is a comparatively small one, yet the American people may
justly feel that they can challenge comparison with any other
nation in the administration of a dependency inhabited by
people of a different race from themselves.
The liberality of the American policy toward the Filipinos
has, in numerous cases, actually resulted in more liberal or
progressive legislation for the islands than has been enacted
in the United States itself. This situation has been not unlike that of Ireland, for which British legislation was more
liberal, in many particulars, than for England itself. In
their respective cases the Americans and the British were
undoubtedly on their good behavior and dared not do less
in behalf of the wards for whom they had gratuitously made
themselves guardians. On the other hand, it may be inquired whether the Filipinos could have achieved similar
results within the same time had Aguinaldo and the insurgents won in their struggle twenty-five years ago. With
all due credit to the Filipinos for their share in the achievement of the past quarter century, there can be little doubt
that this question must be answered in the negative, for they
were not a unified nation with a long-established government
like the Japanese. They had, moreover, never had the
benefit of experience in governmental affairs.
The Filipinos are a virile people, not a dying race like the




THE PHILIPPINES


28I


aboriginal population of many of the islands of the Pacific.
They are, on the contrary, increasing rapidly in numbers and
also advancing in culture. Furthermore, the Filipinos are
a moral people. Western observers, from the earliest times,
have found few immoral practices or barbarous customs
among them, and contact with western peoples has not introduced alien vices. The faults which have been charged
against the Filipino character are negative or passive in
nature rather than offensive and active. Contact with the
Chinese has not introduced the opium habit, nor has contact
with Europeans or Americans made the Filipinos addicted to
drink. It is true that there are native drinks of an alcoholic
character, and that the wealthier classes import liquors, but
drunkenness is practically unknown among them. There
are strong arguments for the application of the eighteenth
amendment to the Philippine Islands, but no one has suggested that it is necessary as a protection so far as the Filipinos are concerned, contrary to American experience where
the negro has been involved. The chief argument, indeed,
for the application of prohibition in the islands would be,
if not to save the white residents from themselves, at least to
save them from becoming ridiculous in the eyes of the Filipinos. Chastity, as well as sobriety, is one of the characteristic virtues of the Filipinos. Their attitude toward commercialized vice has been far more commendable than that
of the white population. Efforts for its suppression, indeed,
have been among the acts creditable to Filipino opinion and
officials.
The Filipino people have shown themselves remarkably
loyal to the United States, and eager to fit themselves, with
all promptitude, for self-government in accordance with
American ideals. They have been quick and generous in
their recognition of all that the United States has done for
them. They also recognize that there are certain advantages
which can accrue to them only through American control
or protection. Reciprocally they concede that some form of
American occupation in the islands, even though it be as
limited as a naval base, is not merely essential for the Filipinos themselves, but of very great value to the United




282


THE AWAKENING EAST


States with reference to the western Pacific and eastern
Asia.
While from the point of view of political idealism and
abstract justice it may be conceded that the United States
should withdraw from the islands, and accord to the Filipino people immediate and complete independence, the dictates of practical politics, in the existing period of international turmoil and competition, furnish abundant reasons
why the United States should continue to maintain a
position in the Philippine Islands as a suitable safeguard
both for its extensive interests in the regions of the Far
East and for the welfare of the Filipinos. No nation outside
of eastern Asia itself has a greater interest in the future developments in eastern Asia and the western Pacific than has
the United States.
The Philippine Islands are too small in area and in population to be able to maintain independence and security under
present world conditions. American control or protectorate
is essential unless similar control by some other nation is
to be substituted. The islands offer such rich advantages,
through their intrinsic wealth and through the strategic
nature of their location, that they would naturally attract
the covetous interest of various powers. Governor-General
Harrison and many others felt convinced that the establishment of the League of Nations would solve satisfactorily
the problem of international status for the Philippines,
without resort to an American protectorate or to a specific
international act of neutralization.23 This hopeful augury
has not been justified by ensuing events, particularly since
the United States has not entered the League.
It is, therefore, a matter of mutual concern to the American people and to the peoples of the Philippines that, in
some form, American control over the islands should be
continued. The problem of determining what that form
2 Such an international act would now involve modification of
the four-power pact signed by the United States, Great Britain,
France, and Japan at the Washington conference, and would be
valueless without the assent of each of these powers. See below,
pages -284-286, 290-291, 296.




THE PHILIPPINES


283


shall be is open to a variety of possible solutions. The continuance of the present status or the adoption of a policy
of anticipating statehood have been shown to be impracticable. Dominion status has been discussed as a possible next
step of a temporary character. The impracticability of absolute independence, as has been seen,24 is admitted even by
the Filipinos.
There remain two possible solutions, somewhat similar in
character, but differing rather in form. The first would be
complete independence and self-government safeguarded by
an offensive and defensive alliance with the United States.
While this plan would apparently afford a nearer approach
in form to absolutely independent international status, it
would practically bind the Philippines to the United States
in permanent subordination, with less power to influence
American policy than under present conditions. The other
solution, that of qualified independence, has been repeatedly
suggested, ever since I898, and has usually been accepted as
satisfactory by all Filipinos except some extremists. Its
advantages to the United States are not so clear. It would
seem to impose liabilities out of proportion to the benefits
that might be derived. The exact form which such qualified
independence might take is usually defined as an arrangement
somewhat similar to the Platt Amendment in the case of
Cuba. Owing to the vastly greater distance of the Philippines from the United States the application of this plan to
them might not be so satisfactory to either party, and would
certainly involve some different adjustments.
Either of these two solutions which have just been suggested involves the question of defense or protection of the
Philippine Islands in their international status. Since I898
the responsibility for this has rested entirely upon the army
and navy of the United States, and the expense has been
entirely defrayed by the American government. The defense of the islands also involves some responsibility in
matters of foreign intercourse. The detached position of
the islands, moreover, has made it convenient, if not necessary, that the governor-general shall be responsible for
'See above, page 281.




284


THE AWAKENING EAST


handling a good many matters of international concern.
Particularly during the period of the World War, important
responsibilities and burdensome routine of this sort rested
upon him.
When the United States was engaged in the World War,
it almost entirely denuded the islands of troops and diverted
its effective naval vessels to other waters. The thoroughly
pacific conditions in the islands during that period are eloquent testimony to the satisfactory character of the American administration and of the behavior of the Filipino
people. They desired to organize a volunteer force to be
placed at the disposal of the United States government in
the war. This generous proposal, unfortunately, received
rather cavalier treatment by the authorities in Washington.
The only native organization in the nature of a defense
force is the Philippine constabulary, numbering about five
thousand, which has for twenty years proved itself an excellent organization, somewhat similar to the state police
forces in the United States. Its activities are more varied
and exacting. Upon it rests the responsibility for maintenance of order in the less civilized portions of the islands.
It is only possible to surmise from the attitude of neighboring or interested nations since the American occupation
of the Philippines what their attitude would be toward the
islands as an independent, or even quasi-independent, state.
In I898 and the immediately following years the chief bugbear was the possibility of German intervention in the
islands, or German ambition to seize them. At that time
the attitude of Japan was considered favorable, but since
the Russo-Japanese War imperialistic designs of that country upon the archipelago have been repeatedly alleged.
Japanese experience in Formosa, however, as well as in the
Philippines themselves, has shown that it is extremely unlikely, if not impossible, that the islands should become a
field for Japanese colonization. Their experience in undertaking business projects in the islands has also been unsatisfactory, and indicates the lack of qualities necessary for
dealing satisfactorily with the Filipino as a laborer. It is
doubtful, therefore, whether Japan would seriously consider




THE PHILIPPINES


285


intervention in the islands unless provoked thereto. The
danger of aggression by the Chinese in any political form
is apparently beyond the bounds of immediate possibility,
but their economic expansion in the islands might at any
time create serious difficulties unless their migration into
the archipelago continues to be carefully restricted.
It is by no means likely that any one of the European
powers with colonies in the vicinity of the Philippines,
namely, the British, French, Dutch, and Portuguese, would
undertake intervention unfavorable to an independent
Philippine nation unless they were given serious provocation. The islands would offer few, if any, advantages additional to those enjoyed in the territories they already
possess, and would, on the contrary, impose upon them serious new problems. On the other hand, there is no doubt
that the policy pursued by the American government since
its occupation of the Philippines is viewed with impatience
and disapproval by each one of these countries, especially
by the colonial officials and by those interested in colonial
exploitation. This feeling would undoubtedly be increased
to serious irritation by the grant of full independence or
quasi-independence to the Philippines. The reason for this
attitude is that the United States has pursued toward the
Philippines a policy infinitely more progressive and liberal
than has any one of these other nations in dealing with eastern peoples.
The rapid extension of educational facilities and the
avowed and maintained policy of preparing the Filipinos for
self-government have set an example which the European
colonizing powers view with alarm. That this alarm is not
without foundation is obvious from the encouragement
which the natives of British India, of French Indo-China,
and of the Dutch East Indies have drawn from the steady
progress made by the Filipinos in enlightenment and political capacity. The American policy and Filipino achievement have driven each of these European powers to adopt
for their eastern possessions policies of an unwontedly liberal character. Should the United States grant independence, either complete or conditional, to the Philippines,




286


THE AWAKENING EAST


Great Britain would find it extremely difficult to withhold
similar concessions from India, and the other powers would
be impelled to bestow liberal reforms as an alternative to
revolution. Even the Japanese situation in Korea would be
affected. Under these circumstances it is not at all surprising that these governments should permit, if not encourage, their press to assume a critical attitude toward the
American administration in the islands and particularly toward the independence movement.
The attitude of President Wilson's administration in refusing to enlist a Filipino corps in the United States army
during the World War, his efforts to prevent a Filipino
commission from visiting Washington after the armistice,
and his refusal to permit a Filipino delegation to the Paris
peace conference are close, almost illuminating, parallels to
the British policy toward Egypt on exactly the same points.
The discordance of these procedures with the general tenor
of President Wilson's policy suggests that in these matters
he was making concessions to British susceptibilities. President Harding's reply to the Filipino delegation in I922 was
certainly franker and in strict accord with the policy of
preceding Republican administrations, though the nature of
his declarations could not have been considered acceptable to
a large body of Filipino opinion. In spite of these official
rebuffs Filipino nationalists have continued to maintain an
extremely skillful propaganda in the United States, and their
appeal to the spirit of American institutions is ably conceived and difficult to resist.
It is not easy to combat the argument that the spirit of
the Declaration of Independence and of the Constitution of
the United States does not accord with the maintenance of
American control over the Filipino people, or to dissent
from the Filipino assertion that their ambitions are identical
with those pursued by the Americans in their own struggle
for liberty.
In one form or another, with more or less definiteness, at
many times during the twenty-five years of American occupation, it has been announced that it was the policy of the
United States to accord to the people of the Philippine




THE PHILIPPINES


287


Islands full self-government. In certain instances, notably
in President Roosevelt's message to congress in I908 and
in President Wilson's message to the Filipino people in
October, I913, the word "independence" has also been used.
Many people in the United States believe that the nation is
definitely and officially pledged to accord to the Philippine
Islands, in the immediate future, not only complete selfgovernment but also full independence. As for the Filipino
peoples, there can be no doubt that they have interpreted the
American promises in the most favorable construction as
regards the early concession of both self-government and
independence.
The critical case in question is the preamble of the Jones
act of I9I6, especially its second clause, which reads:
"Whereas it is, as it has always been, the purpose of the
people of the United States to withdraw their sovereignty
over the Philippine Islands and to recognize their independence as soon as a stable government can be established
therein."
Much argument has been consequently spent upon the
question whether a stable government has yet been established in the islands, and over the meaning of the phrase
"stable government." The significance of this preamble was
emphasized by an important episode in the debates over the
bill.
An amendment introduced by Senator Clarke of Arkansas provided for the complete and unqualified independence
of the Philippines in not less than two years and not more
than four years from the date of the approval of the act.
This amendment passed the senate by the deciding vote of
Vice-President Marshall. It was understood that it had
the approval of President Wilson. The amendment was
defeated in the house of representatives by a vote of 213
to 165. It has been alleged that this defeat was due to the
opposition of twenty-eight Democrats, who were nearly all
adherents of the Roman Catholic Church, and whose action
was at the instigation of the ecclesiastical authorities in the
Philippines. Whether this allegation is justified or not, the
circumstance gave occasion for a clever and pertinent re



288


THE AWAKENING EAST


joinder by Mr. Quezon, the president of the Philippine senate, at the ensuing St. Patrick's Day banquet in Manila.
Referring to Irish politics he said, "We wish for your
Irishmen the same independence you wished for us."
Many observers, not only Americans and Filipinos, but
also from other nations, have expressed the judgment that
the United States should promptly fulfil these promises, actual or assumed, and have declared that failure to do
so would involve a serious conflict between the Americans
and the Filipinos. Other observers take the more moderate
view that the United States should definitely announce its
policy, whether it is to be that of granting independence in
the near future in full or in modified form, or whether such
grant is to be delayed for some specified period, or is to be
postponed indefinitely. These latter feel that the real difficulty in the situation is not with which policy may be
adopted, but chiefly in the uncertainty which now exists.
This view is probably more nearly correct than the former,
but it is doubtful whether it is either possible or necessary
that the American government should make a definite and
binding pronouncement at this or any future time. The
situation is open to so many possibilities of change that it is
impossible for even the most far-seeing statesman to lay
down a policy which circumstances might not render undesirable at any moment.
The generosity, justice, and progressiveness of American
rule in the Philippines have been so complete that it is exceedingly difficult for anyone to find reason for objection
or serious criticism. The differences of judgment have to
do almost entirely with questions of status and but slightly
with the policy of ordinary administration. Americans may
well be proud of the high character of their record in the
Philippine Islands, and, indeed, the Filipinos are frank and
generous in their recognition of the benefits which they have
received. The liberal reforms accomplished quite outdistance the program sketched by Rizal less than thirty years
ago. The progress made in the Philippine Islands in the
past quarter century has not been due solely to the Americans. It has been due, in at least as great a degree, to the




THE PHILIPPINES


289


readiness with which the people of the islands have accepted
American rule and cooperated with the administration in
carrying out the various reforms and measures for improvement.
The advance made by the Filipino people themselves is
an achievement which it would be difficult to parallel and is
most highly praiseworthy. At the present time a considerable percentage of the people of the islands is fitted, at least
to a moderate degree, to undertake self-government, but an
adequate proportion of the people of the islands will not be
fitted for complete independence until a system of compulsory primary education with suitable higher schools is in
full operation throughout the archipelago.  It is difficult
to consider a government based upon the present limited
suffrage, which is really a government by a few leaders, by
a sort of Filipino aristocracy, as conforming reasonably
to the definition of a "stable government." Substantially
the whole population of voting age, at least among the Christian element, should become qualified to vote and a reasonable proportion of them should customarily exercise the
suffrage, as a prerequisite to independence. As previously
indicated, there are other advances, such as the general use
of English and greater ability to deal with economic questions, which will also be necessary to fit the people as a
whole to undertake self-government with satisfactory prospect of success. These reasons seem to indicate that some
measure of American guidance and protection will be necessary for perhaps another generation. Meanwhile, the wisest
provisional arrangement will probably be found in the establishment of some form of the dominion type of responsible
government.
No one will doubt that the American government can and
should guarantee to the Filipinos the same constitutional
rights, the same excellent administration, the same privileges
of self-government which they have hitherto enjoyed under
the sovereignty of the United States, in other words, that
there shall be "no backward step." The American government should also assure the people of the islands that it will
be the continued policy to promote the spread of educa



290


290   THE AWAKENING EAST


tion, the improvement of public health, and all other measures for the public advancement and welfare which have
already been undertaken, with the purpose of extending
these advantages as rapidly and completely as possible
throughout the islands. A third assurance can also be given
by the United States, that the interests and security of the
islands internationally will be protected. On a fourth point
the United States can give assurance, namely, that adequate
hearing shall be given to the Filipino, people at Washington
on all matters which concern them, by guaranteeing the continuance of the privileges now exercised through their resident commissioners in Washington and, if necessary, by
creating additional agencies.
It is, however, seriously doubtful whether it is expedient
for the United States to make any promises or give any
guarantees with reference to the question of independence
or as to future changes in the governmental status. These
questions should be solved when the time is ripe, without
any prejudices. from promises of a prophetic character. At
the present time American relations to the Philippines are
almost entirely in the nature of according international protection and political guidance, or, in other words, of maintaining and guaranteeing the safety and stability of their
position and government. The absolutely political character
of American relations to the Philippines needs to -be considered in contrast with the rule of Japan in Korea, of
France in Indo-China, of the Dutch in the East Indies, and
of the British in Malaya, where each power is actually exercising administrative authority over subject peoples which
have at best only trifling voice in the management of their
governmental affairs. Each one of these dominant powers
would naturally assume an unfriendly attitude toward an
independent Philippine state, which might prove seriously
detrimental without extending to any measures of a hostile
character.
The international status of the Philippine Islands was affected both favorably and unfavorably by the actions of
the Washing-ton conference. The international guaranty
of territorial possessions in the Pacific by the powers con



THE PHILIPPINES


29I


cerned25 may be considered as assurance that the Philippine
peoples need have no fears of aggressive action from the
several nations party to that conference. Should the Philippines, however, assume an entirely independent national
status, they would not be a party to the Washington treaties,
without new international agreements to that intent. The
disarmament provisions adopted by the conference, on the
other hand, prevent any further fortification or strengthening of the islands as an American naval base. This, unfortunately, will leave the strategic situation of the Philippine
Islands at a disadvantage in comparison with Japan and
with the neighboring British possessions, though it may
be fairly assumed that there need be no fear of action, by
either of these nations, hostile to the interests of the Americans in the islands, or of the Filipinos themselves.
The future of the Philippines will be as bright as has been
their past under American rule, if both peoples will continue
to deal with one another in the same spirit of justice and
fair play, of magnanimity and co6peration, that they have
hitherto displayed. It is to the credit of both nations that
the highest attainment in the matter of self-government by
any eastern people has been achieved by the Filipinos under
American guidance. The premier nation of the East in the
acceptance and practice of Christianity and democracy is
entitled to sing of itself as
Land of the morning.
RECENT EVENTS
The results of the elections held in I922 involved no
significant change. Eighty-six per cent of the 824,o058 registered electors voted, a larger number but a smaller
proportion than in I99g.26 The session of the Philippine
legislature in the early part of I923 resulted in almost no
" The four-power pact signed by the United States, Great Britain,
France, and Japan affords substantial assurances, though it is not
an explicit and ironclad mutual guaranty of their respective possessions.
"2See above, pages 251-252.




292


THE AWAKENING EAST


completed legislation. Among the measures considered were
bills to permit the introduction of woman suffrage, to establish hospitals in each of the twenty-eight of the forty-eight
provinces still without them, and to make Manila a free
port. Various projects are being carried out and others
have been suggested for the improvement of Manila. The
design is to make it not merely an important distributing
port for American trade in the Far East, but also one of
the greatest ports of the whole East.
In the summer of I923 Governor-General Wood called
the legislature into special session to consider legislation
to encourage the growing of rubber, and other matters. It
is the policy of Governor-General Wood to withdraw the
government from connection with the Philippine National
Bank,27 with the railroads, and with other business enterprises; and instead to secure legislation which shall attract
American capital for the development of resources and
business. The legislature is strongly opposed to both these
proposals, which are reversals of the policy of the Harrison
administration.
The dispute between the governor-general and the legislature, however, actually came to a head over a minor incident on July 23, 1923, when the two houses of the legislature adopted a joint resolution demanding his immediate
recall. A week previous the cabinet had presented its
resignation, for which the immediate pretext was the reinstatement, as chief of the secret service, of Ray Conley,
who had been tried three times on charges of bribery and
acquitted. It is alleged that these charges were brought
against him because of his activities in suppressing gambling,
in which certain influential Filipinos were interested. On the
other hand, the action of the governor-general was censured
as a breach of Filipino legislation enacted in pursuance of
the Jones act and, consequently, as an unwarranted and arbitrary exercise of power. The governor-general continued
to conduct the administration through the under-secretaries
of the departments and, in general, administrative affairs
7 The government is still fully associated with, the bank, which is
steadily recovering from its unfortunate experience.




THE PHILIPPINES


293


seemed to run smoothly. The fiscal year ending in I923
was closed with a surplus, as the result of a policy of rigorous retrenchment by which expenditures were reduced from
$5o,600,000 in I92I to $33,500,000 in I923. A further
saving of $I50,000 is promised in the budget for I924.
Political agitation, on the other hand, continued active,
with Mr. Quezon as the chief spokesman for the supporters
of independence. Governor-General Harrison, by his creation of the council of state, with Speaker Osmena of the
house and President Quezon of the senate as members, and
by his regular consultation with these two nationalist leaders on questions of appointment and policy, had given these
two men and the interests which they represented large
influence and power. Governor-General Wood, on the contrary, by his policy of interpreting the Jones act strictly and
conducting the administration as nearly as possible independently of the legislature, distinctly lessened the influence
in governmental matters wielded by these two men. They
have, however, adhered consistently to the principles of
self-government and independence, which they have advocated throughout their public careers, and have insisted that
their opposition to Governor-General Wood is based entirely
upon principle. They believe that the executive authority
in the Philippines should be responsible to the legislature,
and that such responsibility is not inconsistent with the Jones
act but, rather, in accordance with its spirit.
The governor-general, on his side, has maintained that,
in his position as chief executive in the islands, he is responsible to the American government. He adheres to the principle enunciated in the final paragraph of the Wood-Forbes
report that, so long as the government of the United States
holds "a position of responsibility" in the Philippines, it
must not be "without authority." This difference in point
of view between the legislature and the governor-general
is due to apparently contradictory provisions in a single
sentence of the Jones act:
"The Philippine legislature may thereafter by appropriate
legislation increase the number or abolish any of the executive departments, or make such changes in the names




294


THE AWAKENING EAST


and duties thereof as it may see fit, and shall provide for the
appointment and removal of the heads of the executive departments by the governor-general: Provided, That all executive functions of the government must be directly under
the governor-general or within one of the executive departments under the supervision and control of the governorgeneral."
The legislature practically rests its case in favor of parliamentary responsibility on the first part of the above sentence; the governor-general depends upon the latter part
of the sentence in asserting his control over the administration. A further complaint of the legislature and the nationalists against Governor-General Wood is that he has vetoed
a considerable number of measures of strictly local legislation. They argue that the veto power conferred by the
Jones act does not properly extend to this class of measures.
There are, then, two main issues involved: the constitutional relation between the government of the United States
and the government of the islands and the provision of
capital for the development of insular resources. As set
forth in the original lecture,28 the best solution of the former
question would probably be the concession to the Philippines
of responsible self-government more or less similar to the
British type of dominion government. Though Great Britain has responsibility for its dominions, it has practically
surrendered authority over them. It is questionable whether
corresponding concession is desirable in the case of the
Philippines. Dominion status would obviously carry with
it the determination of the other issue in accordance with
the wishes of the Philippine legislature, unless a different
plan should be authorized in the new constituent act. The
absence of capital in the islands sufficient for business investment makes doubtful the practicability of the legislature's policy. Either support of Philippine credit by the
United States government or arrangements for the investment of American private capital seems to be the alternative if the insular resources are to be developed. Hitherto
28 See above, pages 275-276.




THE PHILIPPINES


295


the economic elements in the problem of independence have
received too little consideration.
Dominion status, as a provisional arrangement, seems acceptable to the Filipino leaders, as indicated by a joint resolution of the legislature on October 17, I923, renewing the
petition for the recall of Governor-General Wood and adding a request for the appointment of a Filipino in his stead.
On the following day Secretary of War Weeks issued a
statement upholding Governor-General 'Wood and his use
of the veto power. Advantage was taken of a special election for a member of the Philippine senate to register an
expression of opinion on the questions at issue. Though the
Nacionalista candidate won, his Democrata opponent received 42 per cent of the votes. In November, leaders of
the Democrata party offered their cooperation to the governor-general, perhaps with the hope of receiving appointments to the vacant cabinet offices.
The legislature decided to send Mr. Manuel Roxas, who
had succeeded Osmena as speaker of the house, on a special
mission to Washington in advocacy of the independence
cause. On March 5, I924, in reply to Speaker Roxas's presentation of the case to him, President Coolidge issued a
reply strongly upholding the administration of GovernorGeneral Wood and declaring in the most specific terms that
the Filipinos could not yet be considered prepared for selfgovernment. This statement was probably the most pointed
and severe in tone of any that ever emanated from the government of the United States with reference to the government of the Philippines. The absence of evidences of conciliation may possibly be explained on the ground that the
document was addressed as much to the opponents of the
presidential policy in the United States as to the advocates
of independence in the islands. On May IO, I924, the committee on insular affairs of the house of representatives reported a bill introduced by Representative Fairfield of Indiana which has the approval of Mr. Quezon. This measure,
known as the Philippine Commonwealth bill, provides that
the people of the island. shall draft a constitution for the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, subject to certain reser



296


THE AWAKENING EAST


vations including the final jurisdiction of the United States
supreme court, the ultimate supremacy of the president
of the United States, American control of foreign affairs,
and financial guaranties. There is to be a commissioner appointed by the president and directly representing him in
the islands. At the expiration of twenty years, the Philippines shall be recognized by the United States as independent, but with the proviso, similar to the Platt Amendment
in the case of Cuba, that the national constitution shall contain certain guaranties, mainly financial. The new nation,
it is further provided, "shall never enter into any treaty or
other compact with any other foreign power or powers
which will impair, or tend to impair the independence of the
Philippine Islands, nor in any manner authorize or permit
any other foreign power or powers to obtain by colonization
or for military or naval purposes or otherwise, lodgment in
or control over any portion of said islands." The United
States, however, may retain such military and naval reservations as the President may consider necessary. A somewhat similar measure prepared by the corresponding committee of the senate provides for a plebiscite in the islands
on the question of independence in I935.
In the presidential election of I924, the platform of the
Republican party declared, "When it is evident to congress
that independence would be better for the people of the
Philippines with respect to both their domestic concerns and
their status in the world, and the Filipino people then desire
complete independence, the American government will
gladly accord it." It then continued, "The time for such
action has not yet arrived." On the other hand, the Democratic platform announced, "It is now our liberty and our
duty to keep our promise to these people by granting them
immediately their independence, which they so honorably
covet."  The  Independent Progressive  party platform
made no reference to the Philippines. Aside from the
platform pronouncements, the subject seems to have attracted no discussion in the campaign. In view of these
party declarations and of the bills before congress, it seems
likely that there may be enacted in the near future a measure,




THE PHILIPPINES


297


more or less similar to the Fairfield bill, establishing provisionally a government of the dominion type and fixing a
date for the determination of the question of independence.
Apparently in expectation of this result, the relations between the administration in the islands and the nationalists
have tended to become less strained in recent months.
For some years there has appeared as a permanent item
in the Philippine budget an annual appropriation of I,ooo,ooo
pesos ($500,000) for the promotion of the independence
cause. Within recent months this item has been the subject
of serious discussion both in Washington and Manila.
Though Governor-General Wood has meticulously avoided
any interference in this matter, the auditor of accounts in
the Philippines has recently forbidden any further drafts on
this fund, and the attorney-general of the United States has
sustained the ruling. To offset this action an attempt has
been made, apparently with success, to raise a sum twice as
large by popular subscription.
Considerable disturbances occurred in the southern part
of the archipelago among the more backward Mohammedan
Moros during several months in 1923-I924. The troubles
were, in part, caused by religious fanatics, but it is also alleged that they represented a Mohammedan protest against
the participation of Christian Filipinos in their government
and against the independence movement. Another unpleasant episode occurred in July, I924, when it was discovered
that a strike plot existed among the Filipino scouts or constabulary. The purpose of the plot, which resulted in the
trial and conviction of a considerable number, was to demand pay equal to that of the United States army in the
islands.
The latest report of the bureau of education shows the
existence of 8,174 schools in the Philippines, of which 7,64I
are public schools with 1,394,472 pupils, while the 533 private schools have an attendance of 64,835. The total number of teachers employed is 24,878, of whom only 34I are
Americans. The budget for I924 assigns over twenty-five
per cent of the appropriations to the support of education.
Arrangements have been made for a commission of Amer



298


THE AWAKENING EAST


ican educational experts to visit the Philippines in the near
future to investigate the working of the school system and
to present recommendations.
SUGGESTIONS FOR READING
Brief surveys of Philippine history are given by Professor David
P. Barrows of the University of California, formerly director of
education for the Philippines, in A History of the Philippines (3rd
ed., Yonkers, World Book Company, 1914), and by Professor
Leandro H. Fernandez, of the University of the Philippines, in
A Brief History of the Philippines (Boston, Ginn & Company, I919).
A fuller account of the Spanish period will be found in The Philippine Islands (3rd ed., New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1906),
by John Foreman, an English observer. For the close of Spanish
rule and the establishment of American administration the three
following works are standard accounts and include much descriptive as well as historical material: The Americans in the Philippines
(2 vols., Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, I914), by James A.
Le Roy, covers events to 900o; The Philippines Past and Present
(2 vols., New York, The Macmillan Company, 1914), by Dean C.
Worcester, member of the Philippine commission from I900 to 1913,
covers events to 1913; and The Philippines (2 vols., Indianapolis,
The Bobbs-Merrill Company, I916-17), by Charles B. Elliott, member of the Philippine commission from I9IO to 1912, covers to I916.
These may be supplemented by The Corner-stone of Philippine Independence, a Narrative of Seven Years (New York, The Century
Co., 1922), by Francis Burton Harrison, governor-general of the
Philippines from 1913 to 1921, though its chief value is as an
apologia for his administration.
A readable, descriptive volume is Philippine Life in Town and
Country (New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, I905), by James A.
Le Roy, who was for a time connected with the Philippine commission. The following manuals of information on economic and
social conditions present much information in convenient form:
A Handbook of the Philippines (3rd ed., Chicago, A. C. McClurg
& Co., I909), by Hamilton M. Wright; and Economic Conditions
in the Philippines (2nd ed., Boston, Ginn & Company, 1920), by
Hugo H. Miller; both by authors acquainted at first-hand with
the islands. An excellent manual on governmental and political
affairs is Philippine Government (New York, D. C. Heath & Company, 1923), by George A. Malcolm, a justice of the supreme court
of the Philippines, and Maximo M. Kalaw.
The views of the Filipino advocates of independence are set
forth by Professor Maximo M. Kalaw, of the University of the
Philippines, in The Case for the Filipinos (New York, The Century
Co., 1916), and in Self-Government in the Philippines (New York,




THE PHILIPPINES                        299
The Century Co., I919). The Philippine Commission of Independence Press Bulletin (Washington, IgIgff.), issued nine times a
year, is an able compilation of the latest materials for propaganda
purposes. The Philippine Republic (Washington, I923ff.) is an
illustrated monthly devoted to the spread of information favorable
to Philippine independence. There is no good recent exposition of
the case except from the Philippine side, but a carefully impartial
statement is the article, Philippine Independence (Foreign Affairs,
2, 488-499, March I5, 1924), by Charles C. Batchelder, who was
delegate of the secretary of the interior of the Philippine Islands
from I914 to I916.
Of fundamental importance, despite its brevity, is the famous
Wood-Forbes Report: Condition in Philippine Islands, Report of
the Special Mission to the Philippine Islands to the Secretary of
War (House of Representatives, 67th Congress, 2nd Session, Document No. 325, Washington, Government Printing Office, 192I). In
reply to it there has been issued the Filipino Appeal for Freedom,
the Philippine Parliamentary Mission's Statement of the Actual
Conditions in the Philippine Islands and a Summary of Philippine
Problems (House of Representatives, 67th Congress, 4th Session,
Document No. 511, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1923).
Owing to its later publication it utilizes information not available
at the writing of the Wood-Forbes Report.




CHAPTER VI


PROBLEMS OF PROGRESS IN THE EAST
THE contacts of western nations with eastern peoples are
not primarily the contacts of superiors with inferiors. It
is customary for most people in western lands to look down
upon the populations of the East in general as distinctly inferior to themselves. It must be borne in mind, however,
that in making comparisons between two different sets of
peoples it is necessary to make them with a certain amount
of detail, taking care always that people of the same corresponding position in the two nations are brought into comparison. It is absurd, for instance, that people of noble
birth or of high intellectual training should be regarded as
typical of the West, but the coolie laborer as representative
of the Chinese.
Most peoples of the East are of entirely different race from
the peoples of the West, so that the comparison involves the
question of the relative merits of the different races. It is
customary for members of the white race to regard themselves as unquestionably superior to any others. In America, where the white is brought into sharp relief against the
African negro, there is a tendency to regard all persons not
of white race as being as much inferior to the best of white
people as are the majority of the descendants of negro
slaves once brought from the Guinea coast of Africa. This
inference is obviously erroneous when one is dealing, as in
the case of the Filipinos, with peoples who have been Christianized for about three centuries, or with a people with centuries of high artistic development like the Japanese, or with
peoples such as the Hindus, with more than two millenniums
of literary tradition.
In the comparison of East and WVest it is customary for
the westerner to regard whatever backwardness there may
300




PROBLEIMS OF PROGRESS


3o0I


be in the East as due to the inferiority of eastern peoples.
To westerners, the persons of the Asiatic nations seem to be
on a distinctly lower intellectual and moral level and incapable of the same sort of achievement as their own.
Hence they talk in the parlance of Kipling of "the white
man's burden." It is, of course, true that there are differences in the degree of development between the nations of
western Europe and those of eastern Asia, and it is also
true that there are various gradations in the different countries of eastern Asia. There are those to whom the idea of
the white man's burden is fairly applicable, while there are
others to whom it is utterly irrelevant. An educated American lady visitor to the Louisiana Purchase Exposition at
St. Louis who was being guided through certain exhibits
by a young Filipino friend of mine expressed great surprise
that a Filipino could be so cultured and intelligent. She
had just seen in a different part of the exposition some
Igorrots, who belong to one of the most backward tribes
in the world and who happen to live in the Philippine
Islands. The young man who was her guide, however, was
descended from a long lineage of Christian and cultured
people and might fairly claim equality with people of Christian culture in any land.
If the contacts of the western nations with the eastern nations are not primarily the relations of superiors with inferiors, the question arises as to what the nature of those
contacts really is, what the proper comparisons between the
contrasting racial types may be. Careful comparison of the
culture and progress of any European people at any date
prior to I500 with the conditions obtaining among the peoples of Egypt, India, China, or Japan at the same date would
reveal surprisingly few differences in relative advancement
in civilization, due attention being given to comparing groups
of like social status. Down to about that date the eastern
and western peoples alike maintained substantially the same
status of existence and progress.
For the West, however, at the opening of the sixteenth
century, the voyages of Columbus and Vasco da Gama, the
scientific discoveries of Copernicus and Vesalius, the religious.




302


THE AWAKENING EAST


reforms of Luther and Calvin, and later the new philosophy
of Bacon and Descartes, loosened old bonds and broke
through old barriers so that the West was set free to think
and act. One may speculate on the different results for the
future of the world had an Indian fleet reached the coast of
Portugal in 1498 and had a Chinese expedition entered San
Francisco Bay in 1492. The fact is they did not, and therein
lies the difference between the nations of Asia and the nations of Europe. The changes which took place in the West
and which are spoken of as constituting the Renaissance
have had no parallel in the East and, while in the West it
became possible to get beyond the scholastic philosophy and
theology of the Middle Ages, in the East there was no such
new departure. The Chinese continued to think in the terms
of the teaching of Confucius, who had been in his grave for
more than twenty centuries, and in a similar way the peoples
of the other eastern lands remained under bondage to old
traditions of thought.
Comparisons of the East with the West in I750 would
have shown no great differences among the masses of the
peoples, but would have revealed the leaders, the better
classes in the East, clearly but not hopelessly distanced by
their western compeers. The critical changes had been in
the relative areas of geographical and intellectual activity.
The peoples of Europe by their voyages of geographical discovery had brought the whole circuit of the globe within
their ken. No such enlargement of the geographical horizon
occurred for any of the eastern peoples. They remained
hemmed in by the same narrow bounds for the physical
world as had encompassed their ancestors. While in the
West great scientific thinkers were teaching entirely new
views of the relation of the earth to the universe, no corresponding broadening of the view of life as a whole in the
universe occurred in the East.
In the West the Renaissance brought to Christianity, after
fifteen centuries of development, the advantages of comparison with the highest intellectual attainments of ancient
Greece and Rome. This developed a broader way of looking
at the problems of life in all that group of ideas customarily




PROBLEMS OF PROGRESS


303


called religion. In the East it is true that Buddhism, for
instance, has for centuries stood the test of contact with
other faiths, but with a different result, probably due to differences in the nature of the comparisons made. The comparative tests of religions in Egypt and India have served to
sharpen the lines of demarcation between the faiths, and
in China and Japan, on the other hand, to blur them, rather
than to give to the leaders of each, or any, of the faiths a
broadened vision.
As has been indicated, between I500 and 1750 there had
occurred in the West a broadening of the outlook of the
cultured class upon the world and upon life, while the East
had seen no similar change. On the other hand, as late as
I750, no changes had taken place in either the East or
the West, which sufficiently affected the conditions under
which people lived and worked to create a clear contrast
between Europe and Asia, nor had marked differences yet
appeared in matters of government. The description of the
condition of peasant life in France in the eighteenth century,
given by numerous writers and made familiar by Taine,
might well apply with slight change to the peasant of China
at the same date. The administration of the French government under Louis XV stands in comparison rather than
contrast with that of China under his contemporary, Ch'ien
Lun. The French navigator La Perouse, who visited Manila
in 1787, declared of the Filipinos, "These people seemed to
me no way inferior to those of Europe."
The industrial revolution in England and the political revolutions in America and France in the latter half of the
eighteenth century started Europe and America ahead of
the Asiatic countries by leaps and bounds. One might again
speculate on the difference for the world's history had James
Watt, Benjamin Franklin, and George Stephenson been Chinese, and had India produced Washington and Jefferson,
Rousseau and Napoleon. It is not yet determinable what the
relative potentialities of European and Asiatic peoples may
be. The fact is that the orientals have not developed their
potentialities but remain medieval while the occidentals have
developed, have passed through the Renaissance and the




304


304   THE AWAKENING EAST


industrial and political revolutions, and have become modern. There is no need to discuss questions of inferiority
and superiority. There are two insuperable facts, the existence of a difference and the nature of the difference which
is that between medieval and modern.
As the Renaissance had affected the freedom of man's
thought and the breadth of his vision, so the industrial revolution altered the conditions under which people lived and
worked, and the American and French Revolutions radically modified both the form of government and the views
of the people concerning the relations between themselves
and government. These latter changes, which happened
contemporaneously, might conceivably have occurred at different times. They both took place long after the Renaissance, though there is no very good reason why either or
both of them might not have occurred at the same time
with that great movement. This point with regard to the
time element in these changes is of significance to the present discussion because the nations of the East are at the
present time being called upon to crowd together at the
same time all three of these movements. They are being
asked to gulp down in a single generation the dose of reform
at which the Europeans sipped slowly for four centuries or
more. This incidentally brings into question the relative
potentialities of the East and the West for adaptation and
progress.
The political reform represented by the American and
French Revolutions has given the world that great complex
of political ideals and governmental methods known as
democracy. It has, indeed, changed the form of government
by creating republics and setting up parliaments where
once monarchs governed, as they claimed, by divine right
and imposed laws by their own personal authority. The
growth of democracy has, however, involved a great deal
more than this outward change of the form of government.
It has effected an enormous extension in the size of the
political class. In the monarchies of the olden time there
was, in addition to the king or emperor, a very small number of people to whom he intrusted authority and upon whom




PROBLEMS OF PROGRESS


305


he relied for the execution of his will. The political class
was, consequently, but a very small fraction of the whole
community.
Democracy, on the other hand, has by rapid stages brought
one group after another of the population into the political
class. First, the right of suffrage was granted to large
property owners; next, the franchise was extended so that
all property owners might enjoy it; then came the idea of
universal manhood suffrage; and only yesterday, as it were,
women were allowed the enjoyment of this same privilege.
The change, however, has been more even than the enlargement of the political class; it has also given to these successive
groups the facilities to become politically minded so that
they might be intelligent actors in the civic life of their nations. The change may be summed up as the transition of
the individual from the status of subject to the status of
citizen.
The industrial revolution, which began in England with
Watt's invention of the steam engine in 1765, had not yet
had time to spread beyond the bounds of England before the
French Revolution upset conditions upon the continent of
Europe. This great political upheaval postponed the spread
of the industrial revolution among the continental nations
until after the overthrow of Napoleon. From that time forward it progressed rapidly in western Europe, particularly
in France and in the valley of the Rhine, and less rapidly in
other nations in proportion as one moved further south,
east, or north. The United States was brought within the
scope of this movement by the necessities of the Napoleonic
struggle which, for it, culminated in the War of I8I2. The
first clear evidence of a change in the United States is registered in the tariff act of i8i6.
The phrase industrial revolution covers a vast range of
ideas which it is necessary to define with some clearness.
In its broadest sense the industrial revolution includes all
changes in the processes of economic production and distribution. In its narrowest sense, however, the phrase is
customarily applied to the change in the methods of manufacture brought about by the substitution of power-driven




306


THE AWAKENING EAST


machinery for hand work.' Even so, it includes more than
the mere mechanical change, because under the old order it
was possible for practically any individual to be a manufacturer in his own home. Under the new system the cost
of installing and maintaining the machinery was prohibitive
to any such arrangement. It became necessary to erect the
machinery in special buildings and to provide, by the utilization of capital, for the great cost involved. The workers
then came and contracted with the individuals who controlled the capital, and hence the manufacturing machinery,
to operate the machines in return for fixed payments known
as wages. Thus the industrial revolution changed both the
method of manufacture from hand work to machine work
and the condition of life of the industrial workers from the
domestic to the factory system.
As the factories turned out more goods it was necessary
to find larger markets in which to sell the goods, and the
demand for the manufactured goods, in its turn, made it
necessary to draw from larger and more distant sources of
supply the raw materials which were to be utilized. In other
words, both in securing the materials to manufacture and
in marketing the output the industrial revolution created a
commercial revolution. Each of these, because of their
large demands for prompt and easy exchange of commodities and of the necessity of utilizing invested capital either
to maintain the factory or to carry stocks of goods in transit
between the producer and the consumer, required, in addition, the development of banking on an extensive scale.
Even the workingman had his need of the bank, and for his
1 The potent fact was that the new machines were power-driven.
This required not merely the establishment of factories, but also
their location where streams furnished water power or where coal
mines assured a convenient supply of fuel to develop steam power.
Hence arose the aggregation of workers in urban industrial communities. Progress in the distribution of electric power may not
only diffuse the factories among smaller communities, but even displace the factory system by a new domestic scheme of manufacturing. Other factors, such as efficiency of operation, may, however,
prevent such a reversion.




PROBLEMS OF PROGRESS


307


purposes, in large measure, grew up the savings banks, and
later still the postal savings banks.
The development of the factory system carried with it
the gathering of large numbers of people into areas closely
adjacent to the factories. This took them away from the
land, so that they were no longer able, as had been the case
under the domestic system, to work part of their time in
raising their food supply from the plot of land on which
they lived and to devote odd hours to their particular manufacturing enterprise.  Henceforth they lived packed in
tenement quarters without any such opportunity and entirely dependent for their food supply upon their money
wages. There was thus created in the population a large
element which made no contribution whatsoever to the production of the food which they ate. This made it necessary
that those who still remained on the land should supply a
larger output of edible products. This in its turn, therefore,
meant an agricultural revolution which involved the use of
improved implements and of farm machinery as well as the
development of scientific methods of agriculture and of
animal husbandry.
Furthermore, all these changes involved the prompt transportation of goods from one place to another; of food from
the farm to the factory city, of the raw materials, perhaps
from distant countries, to the factory, and of the manufactured goods from the industrial centers to the consumers in
all parts of the world. These demands made necessary extraordinary improvements in the means of transportation.
First came the development of the steamboat, followed soon
by oceanic steam navigation. Then came the railroad, and
much more recently the trolley and the automobile and most
recently of all, the aeroplane. Then, too, it became necessary
to make communication upon business propositions more
promptly.  It became important, for instance, that both
buyer and seller should be aware of the prices ruling at a
particular moment, hence came improvements in the postal
service and the development of the telegraph and the telephone.
The differences between the East and the West resulting




308


THE AWAKENING EAST


from the political and industrial revolutions reached the
maximum about I880, when constitutional government and
the new industrial system had become well established in
most European countries and in America, while but few,
if any, of their effects were visible in the eastern lands. At
this critical juncture, following the Congress of Berlin, began the intense rivalry of the western nations in the commercial and colonial exploitation of Asia and Africa. In
other words, at about this date most of the European countries had attained the full development of the most 'important
changes involved in the political and industrial revolutions
while as yet practically none of these changes had occurred
in the East.
The contrast appeared with peculiar sharpness, since the
European nations, all enjoying the benefits of these changes,
found themselves plunged into bitter competition with one
another in the effort to secure more advantageously the necessary supplies of raw materials and of food, while at the
same time seeking extended markets for their products.
Under the mistaken theory that trade follows the flag, the
commercial competition became rather more obviously a
race in colonial expansion. Each of the different nations
sought to secure monopoly control for itself over a large
part of the earth's surface and of its population. This contest began about i880 and reached its climax in the World
War, which came at a time when the available supply of unappropriated lands and peoples was practically exhausted,
and when the competition between the expanding, exploiting nations had become keenest.
This aggressive activity of the western peoples has in its
turn forced upon the eastern peoples a struggle for economic
and political existence. The peoples of Japan and China
and India are finding that the conditions of life for them
are not being determined in their own communities or their
own nations but are dependent upon conditions far from
them. Large numbers in Japan and China, for instance, are
dependent upon the rate ruling in the silk market in New
York. The question of food or famine for the people of
India appears to be determined by the price of Wheat on the




PROBLE/MS OF PROGRESS


309


Liverpool exchange. The importation of an adequate, instead
of an inadequate, supply of rice into the Philippine Islands
is dependent not upon the market conditions at Manila or
Saigon, but on the price quotations in London and New
York.
Though the oriental has long experienced the necessity of
reducing his wants to a minimum and has complacently
sought in philosophy and religion to achieve the negation of
desire, he is now confronted not only by an economic order
directed to the abundant satisfaction of needs but also by
religious and philosophical systems intent on the stimulation
of desire. The philosophic and economic asceticism of the
East is being placed on trial in competition with a philosophy
of satiety and a system of economic abundance.
Politically, in like manner, the activities of the western
nations have radically changed conditions for the nations
of Asia. The problem of government in China to-day
might exist in a measure were there none of these western
contacts, but it would not exist in the same kind or to the
same degree except for these very western contacts. More
than twenty times in its history China has turned out one
dynasty of monarchs and established another, but never before has China turned out its monarchs and created instead
a republic. China has changed its dynasties repeatedly without any consideration of even the existence of Europe or
America. To-day the rise and fall of its cabinet ministers
are dependent in no small measure upon the frowns or the
smiles of the statesmen of Europe and America. More important still is the fact that the people of China, of Japan,
and of India are coming to think of their problems of government in very much the same way that the people of England and of the United States do. The process of the extension of the franchise is going forward rapidly. The
transition from subject to citizen is occurring at many times
the rate of speed under which it was effected in western
lands.
This juxtaposition of the civilization of the West, moved
by the industrial revolution, with the old civilizations of the
East, absolutely unchanged by any readjustments for many




31o


THE AWAKENING EAST


centuries, raises the serious question which of the two will
be able to survive the inevitable conflict. Will the whole
world be plunged back into medievalism by an Asiatic
triumph, or will all move forward together in modern ways
under the leadership of the more progressive western nations? The situation is not wholly unlike that which existed
when the Germanic barbarians confronted the ancient Roman Empire and its classical culture.
While this struggle is inevitable, and one or the other of
the two types of civilization, the medieval or the modern,
must triumph, there can be little doubt that the fittest will
survive, that western material progress has made the world
so small that it will force the eastern peoples to adjust their
economic life to the modern system created by the industrial
revolution. Such evidence as is available from the changes
which have already taken place clearly indicates this as the
probable result. Thus far at any rate it is the West which
is modifying the East, and it is not the East which is causing
readjustments in the West.
As the industrial revolution in the West coincided with a
tremendous political change-the development of greater
democracy in government-so it seems inevitable that if the
eastern nations are to accept the changes involved in the industrial revolution they too will find it dbligatory to reconstruct their political systems. They will, however, find this
necessary not merely for the purpose of democratization to
correspond with the rights in economic welfare and in intellectual development of the masses, but they will also find
it indispensable as a means of guaranteeing their own national integrity and of assuring to themselves freedom for
the development of their own national life. They must give
themselves vigorous governments able to contend on equal
terms with the great imperialistic governments of the West
unless their political independence is to go down at the very
time that they are accepting the western economic methods
in place of their own.
It must not, however, be inferred that the constitutional
and administrative changes in the eastern nations will be
along the same lines as in the West, or that they will result




PROBLEMS OF PROGRESS


3II


in producing the same types of government. There are
elements in the racial character, the geographical surroundings, and the historical developments of the eastern peoples
that make it not merely possible, but probable, that they will
find it expedient to work out their political progress in accordance with new theories and with the creation of new
methods and instrumentalities suitable to their peculiar conditions and needs.
In each one of the countries studied in these lectures the
last forty years have seen rapid extension of all the modern
forms of improved communication and transportation:
steam navigation, railways, mnetaled roads and automobiles,
telegraphs and telephones, even wireless and aeroplanes.
In every case there is an obvious intention to carry these developments further rather than to check them. The East is
clearly finding it to its own advantage to adopt these important inventions of the West. It might seem to be a fair test
of the degree of progress of these different eastern countries
to take the ratio of railway mileage to the area of the country, or to its population. That, however, would result in
certain inequalities in each case, but especially in the case of
the Philippine Islands, where there is an unusual degree of
dependence upon shipping; yet the ratios of railway mileage
to area may be indicated for such rough value as they may
possess. The number of square miles of area to one mile
of railroad is approximately i8 in Japan, 48 in India, 115
in Egypt, I43 in the Philippines, and 278 in China, as compared with 12 in the United States. A more exact measure
is probably to be found in the ratio of telegraph mileage to
area. The number of square miles of area to one mile of
telegraph line is approximately 5 in Japan, 17 in the Philippines, 20 in India, 38 in China, and 40 in Egypt, as compared
with io in the United States, where the development has
been limited by the unexampled extension of the telephone
service. Outside large cities with considerable foreign communities, the telephone is rarely found in the eastern countries named.
None the less, the improvements in transportation which
have been effected in the several countries have resulted in




312


THE AWAKENING EAST


a tremendous expansion of commerce in each case, and this
the eastern peoples as well as the western are clearly finding to their advantage to maintain and develop. In 1921
the proportion of the total foreign trade to each inhabitant
was about $4 in China, $6 in India, $I9 in the Philippines,
$25 in Japan, and $29 in Egypt, as compared with $70 for
the United States and $I80 for the United Kingdom. For
1922 the figures are apparently somewhat higher, amounting
in the case of both Egypt and the Philippines to about $35.
This growth of commerce has resulted in the steady replacement of barter by the use of money, which in turn has
resulted in rapid expansion, especially in the last twenty
years, of banking facilities. These changes have likewise
found obvious and ready acceptance in the East, though the
several nations differ widely in their capacity to profit by
their utilization.
In the fields of manufacturing, mining, and agriculture,
however, the situation is radically different. These occupations concern the habits of life and work and the interests
of the great masses of the people instead of the affairs of
small selected classes who have been chiefly affected by the
changes previously considered. The eastern peoples have
been accustomed to carry on such manufactures as they
found desirable in their homes, or in neighboring little shops,
with a minimum use of primitive tools or appliances. Manufacturing with them remains prevailingly a mere adjunct to
other occupations of life as was formerly the case in Europe
and America. Indeed, it has largely been a matter of family
economy or, in certain respects, of village economy, to make
the articles necessary to supply the needs of the immediate
group. This domestic system continues to exist everywhere
throughout the East and the observer will see abundant evidences of it as he passes along the street in any city or
village.
Beside this ancient domestic system, there is, however,
growing up the new factory system of the West. In India,
China, or Japan the introduction of this new system involves
more radical adjustments to-day than it did in Europe a
century ago, and consequently greater hardships for the




PROBLEMS OF PROGRESS


3I3


working classes. Except in Japan the development of the
factory system has been mainly dependent on foreign enterprise, and in no case has the progress been very remarkable
until since the outbreak of the World War in I914. It is,
therefore, quite too soon to venture a prediction of the outcome.
The new system offers two entirely different sets of problems. In the first place, there is the problem of the migration of people from the rural districts into new and rapidly
growing urban communities, and, therefore, into crowded
and unsanitary surroundings. It places the people in entirely unfamiliar conditions of living and produces not only
the absolutely inevitable evils of poverty, but also numerous
social evils which are more difficult either to avoid or to
combat.
The East, however, has the advantage of being forewarned and also forearmed by the experience of the western
nations with exactly these same difficulties in their own
industrial revolution. The East is not avoiding and cannot
entirely evade these unpleasant developments, but it can do
much to hasten their passing and to ameliorate the evil conditions while they last. The East has the advantage of being
able to benefit by the experience of the West, not only
through observation, but also through the direct advice and
assistance of those familiar with the problems in the West,
who are anxious to assist the East to avoid such evil practices as child labor, excessive hours of work, unsanitary
factories, and unguarded machines.
On the other hand, there are not merely the problems of
the actual manual labor involved in manufacture but also
the managerial and capitalistic problems. There can be
little doubt that the peoples of the East can learn to become
more or less efficient factory workers. One who has visited
the factories of Japan or China or India can testify to their
skill. It must be recognized, however, that there is genuine
doubt as to the ability of any of these eastern peoples to
compete in efficiency with the factory workers of western
Europe or the United States. Perhaps it is only a matter
of time and experience to bring them up to similar stand



3I4


THE AWAKENING EAST


ards, though it is more probable that a really fundamental
change will be required, for the oriental must learn the
value of the quick use of time. The oriental attitude is that
of having all the time there is, and such a view of life does
not make for efficiency in terms of the factory system.
On the managerial side the situation is apparently even
worse. Oriental management of factory enterprises, whether
in the supervision of the shops or in organization and direction through the office, has revealed unfortunately few examples of ability and success comparable to those demanded and
achieved in the West. Cases have been cited where attempts
have been made to carry out manufacturing enterprises as
purely native undertakings, and where, after their failure,
a few western experts have stepped in and made the same
plants with the same 'workers not merely successful, but
highly profitable. In the matter of capital Japan is the only
one of the oriental nations which has yet learned the lesson,
to any considerable degree, of the conduct of business enterprises on the joint-stock corporation basis, which in the
West has come to be regarded as indispensable in all great
industrial undertakings.
The Philippines is the only one of the five countries under
consideration which may be regarded as a new or young nation economically. In the other four countries the economic
order is hoary with age but suffering from arrested development. Japan is the only one of the four that has made
considerable progress in the modernization of its venerable
economic order. The outstanding fact is the terrific poverty,
the enormous masses living very close to the margin of
existence.  Modern methods and greater efficiency can
probably raise the standard of living, but these will require
capital. With the masses living close to the margin of existence the countries have no stores of savings on which to
draw. The deposits per capita in their postal and other
savings banks are pitifully small. There is undoubtedly a
large amount of hoarded, consequently unproductive, wealth
mainly in the hands of a small number of persons, especially
in India, but to a less degree probably in China as well.
The welfare of these eastern peoples demands that they




PROBLEMS OF PROGRESS


3I5


learn as speedily as possible to get their talents out of the
napkins and into investments in productive enterprises of
their own. Until this happens their talents will continue
to be taken from them and given in interest payments to the
western investors who already have more. Egypt, India,
and China each already have considerable burdens of indebtedness to the West, partly, if not chiefly, incurred for
the development of railways and other modern enterprises
necessary for the progress of the country. Japan and the
Philippines are not free from these encumbrances but their
obligations are less onerous. The faster the East learns
to invest such funds as it has, the more rapidly will it develop its own supplies of capital and the sooner will it be
able to free itself from economic dependence and from indebtedness to the West. Pending this accomplishment,
eastern nations must make such accommodations of their
affairs as will not merely permit but actually attract the
investment of western capital to assist in their development.
The financiers of the West, on their side, should limit to
the minimum   their demands for guaranties of political,
legal, and economic security, in order to make the period
of economic dependence as brief and as little irritating as
possible.
Undoubtedly the East will find itself compelled to accommodate itself to the West, or more correctly to the modern
economic order created by the industrial revolution, not
only in the matter of capital but also in its labor system.
Already Japan, the most progressive of these nations, finds
itself confronted by a labor problem, that is, a readjustment
of the position of the laborer in the economic and social
order. Ideas of social democracy, and even of socialism,
have gained extraordinary currency in Japan in the last
decade. Undoubtedly similar influences will pervade the
other countries as soon as they attain similar progress in
their industrial revolution.
It is a real puzzle for an occidental to understand how it
has happened that the vast mineral resources of some of
these eastern lands have remained hitherto almost untouched. There are, however, several factors which furnish




3I6


THE AWAKENING EAST


the explanation. Besides the difficulty of actually extracting
the minerals from the earth there are the problems of carrying on the processes necessary to transform the crude minerals into usable metal products. Furthermore, there are
the questions of capital investment, of management, of
labor, and of transportation. When all these items are considered it does not appear so strange that little mining had
been conducted in any eastern country prior to the present
generation.
At least one other factor of importance enters into the
case. In China, for instance, the system of "squeeze" is
said to be so serious as to make it almost prohibitive to mine
and market coal which is found in perfectly satisfactory
condition and location with reference to important cities.
Meanwhile those cities are importing from overseas, at
great expense, such coal as they can afford to use. Again,
except in Japan, the exploitation of mineral wealth in the
East has been conducted chiefly by foreigners, and in all
cases the major development has been within the present
decade.
Turning to agriculture, it must be observed that most of
the land now under cultivation in these countries of the
East is of necessity, owing to the character of the land or to
the size of the holdings, worked on the small farming, or
almost horticultural, basis. Rarely in any of these countries,
except in newly developed sections such as Hokkaido, the
northern island in Japan, or Manchuria, can large-scale
farming with modern agricultural machinery be carried on.
Most of the farm work is done with primitive implements
and by methods which have been employed for centuries
but have passed out of use even in the small farming areas
of western Europe. Much advantage could -be gained by the
use of the improved hand implements of western lands. The
steel hoe and spade possess a far greater efficiency than the
miserable makeshifts still in use in China, India, and elsewhere.
Scientific agriculture seems still to be a novelty in western
countries, but it already has achieved highly important results which can render rich contribution to the needs of




PROBLEMS OF PROGRESS


3I7


the East through studies of fertilizers, seeds, pests, and many
other subjects. This same observation also applies in the
case of animal husbandry. Beginnings are actually being
made in each of the countries studied but, except in a few
special lines such as silk culture in Japan and in certain areas
of China, no considerable results have yet been obtained.
One of the greatest achievements effected by the eastern
peoples themselves with reference to agriculture, and one
to which western experts have also added most, has been
the extension of irrigation. This has had the double advantage of enlarging the cultivable area and of helping to
stabilize production. A considerable extension of the area
of tillage has also been effected in recent years in each of
the countries through other means as well.
The use of improved implements and methods and the application of science will be absolutely necessary in the agricultural development of all these lands if the industrial revolution in its other phases is to proceed in them as it has in
Europe. These changes cannot be effected rapidly enough
under the normal working of economic laws. Much will
need to be done by various educational methods such as have
been worked out by the agricultural schools and colleges of
the western nations in their extension services.
In every one of the countries discussed the poverty is
appalling and is increasing with the growth of the urban
population, but in the major portion of their areas the
climatic conditions reduce needs for a tolerable existence
to a minimum. In spite of the destitution in southern IChina
and India, for instance, little expenditure is required for
housing, heat, or clothing, which are all indispensable and
expensive for those living in cooler climates. Even the food
supply involves less difficulty and expense. If the West
with its industrial revolution continues to press upon the
East, there must result either the adoption of the western
methods for increasing and cheapening the supply of the
necessities of life, or famine. A tragic aspect of the destitution is the number unfitted by age, disease, and physical
defects to support themselves properly in the social conditions under which they exist.




3I8


THE AWAKENING EAST


Underlying the various considerations which have been
thus far presented are two fundamental economic considerations known as the law of diminishing returns and the
Malthusian theory of population. With the probable exception of the Philippines, it seems clear that the law of
diminishing returns is already operating. Japan, China,
and Egypt are importing more food products than they
export. India is exporting slightly more than it imports,
but the situation is deceptive, partly because a large proportion of the exports is for the single item, tea, and partly
because of the British control of the economic situation.
India really needs far more than Mr. Gandhi's emphasis on
home industries, the active consideration of its agricultural
situation and the development of its food supply. Though
the Philippine exports of food articles greatly exceed in
value the food imports, the exports are made up chiefly
of two specialized items, coconut products and sugar, but
the imports include considerable amounts of several staple
articles, especially rice. In view of these facts it does not
seem probable that any of these countries, except the Philippines, can expect to maintain a population much in excess
of the present number, even when allowance is made for
possible extensions of the cultivable area and for the utilization of improved methods of agriculture.
Turning to consider the application of the Malthusian
theory to the situation, it appears from the latest census
returns that the population of Egypt has increased 85%
in 30 years; of the Philippines, 35% in I5 years; of Japan,
52%o in 38 years; of India, II% in 30 years; of the United
Kingdom, 24%o in 30 years, and of the United States, 68%
in 30 years. The annual rate of increase in the United
States, the Philippines, and Egypt has therefore been nearly
identical; for Japan, which has increased a little more than
half as rapidly, the rate has been about 50%o greater than
in the United Kingdom, while in India the rate has been
less than half that for the United Kingdom. The evidence
is unmistakable that the extraordinary rates of growth in
Egypt and the Philippines were due to the unusual conditions created by the British and American occupations




PROBLEMS OF PROGRESS


3I9


respectively, just as it is that the rate in the United States
was due to immigration. In the case of each of the countries mentioned the census returns show that the rate of
increase was slower in the last ten-year period, except in
the Philippines, for which a census return is not available,
but their records of vital statistics reveal a similar decline
in the rate of growth. Though such calamities as war and
plague were prevalent in the decade, careful study of the
data proves that they were not wholly accountable for the
decline.
These facts indicate that the law of diminishing returns
is already operative, in accordance with the Malthusian
theory, to check the growth of population. For China no
reliable data are available, but careful students have come
to the conclusion that, whereas the population increased with
extraordinary rapidity in the eighteenth century, it has remained stationary or nearly so through the past century.
Observers are practically unanimous in the conviction that
not even the utilization of undeveloped lands and of improved agricultural methods will permit China to maintain
a population much in excess of the present number. Consequently, if better sanitary conditions and medical service
shall reduce the present excessive death rate, there must be
a corresponding limitation of the present unusually high
birth rate. The situation of India is substantially similar.
Only some extraordinary economic readjustment, which
one cannot now forecast, will relieve Egypt from arresting
its abnormal increase of population in the very near future.
The Philippines may be able to postpone for some time the
diminishing of its birth rate, but only by rapid expansion
and improvement of its agriculture. The case of Japan has
already received full consideration.2
If, therefore, as seems probable, the situation in these
eastern lands is resolving itself in accordance with the Malthusian theory, the time is not far distant when extreme
economic distress will confront them each unless the birth
rate is limited to the point necessary to maintain a stable
2See above, pages 222-229.




32o           THE AWAKENING EAST
population, as has become the case in France.3 The alternatives are apparently restricted to vast importations of food
products or to migration. The opportunities for either of
these solutions are already limited and are annually being
lessened, quite apart from any question of international
action or race prejudice. The effort of any one of these nations to force an adjustment on either of these lines, especially the latter, such as has been frequently imputed to
Japan, could scarcely fail to produce an international catastrophe. Passion or sentiment are dangerous explosives to
employ in the matter. Thorough study and expert adjustment alone can furnish a secure and reasonable settlement
of the problem in its international ramifications.
From the West the East needs to learn the methods for
arresting the spread of plague and other preventable pestilences, and for the care and cure of the sick and the defective. It must even learn some of the rudiments of sanitation, starting with provision for pure drinking water and
for the disposal of sewage and garbage. The excessively
high death rates and especially the frightful infant mortality in all these countries is incompatible with economic
welfare and with reasonable standards of civilization. The
figures with regard to infant mortality furnish another test
of progress which is illuminating. In the United States
IO per cent of the children under one year of age die annually; in Japan, I7 per cent; in the Philippine provinces,
14 per cent; in Manila, 2I per cent; in India, at least 2I per
cent; while official data are not available for Egypt or
China, it is estimated that the rate is about 25 per cent
in the former and approaches 50 per cent in the latter.
The results of the efforts already made for improvement are
convincing arguments for the steady prosecution of every
possible enterprise for the promotion of public health; for
instance, in the Philippine provinces the infant deaths in
I920o were only 75 per cent of the number in I9IO, and in
F.or an up-to-date discussion of these problems on broad lines,
but with slight attention to the East, see E. M. East, Mankind at
the Crossroads (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, I923).




PROPlEMS OF PROGRESS


321


Manila the number decreased to only 50 per cent of the
total a decade earlier.
Although these matters primarily concern the peoples of
the East it is obvious that they are not without their effects
upon the West. Unwholesome sanitary conditions in several
different ways hamper the extension of intercourse and the
development of commerce. There is a natural repugnance to
traveling in unsanitary lands, and to contact with peoples
or with goods that have come from pestilential countries.
The West, moreover, must not only quarantine itself
against infection from the East, but it has an obligation to
itself and to humanity as a whole to do everything possible
for the improvement of conditions of living in eastern
lands. Such institutions as the Peking Union Medical College and Hospital, and such work as has been accomplished
by the Americans in the Philippines are illustrations of what
can and ought to be done. After all, the West can make but
little direct contribution to the East in this matter or any
other.  Its chief responsibility lies in teaching the East
to care for itself.
With all allowance for the poverty of the countries studied,
it does not seem that taxes are excessive or that public debts
constitute an unreasonable burden. The per capita proportions of the taxes and of all public debts in India, China,
and the Philippines are among the very lowest in the world.
The burden of Japan is distinctly larger but, with greater
progress in adjustment to western ways, it is probably not much more seriously felt. Egypt fares worst of
the five, but its affliction is inherited from the period prior
to British occupation and is due to the reckless extravagance
of a single despot, Ismail. The five countries taken together have a population at least seven times greater than
the continental part of the United States, but the total of
their annual taxes is only one half that for the support of
the national government of the United States, and their
national debts amount to less than one fourth the national
debt of the United States.
Considering the favorable showing of the United States
in comparison with Great Britain or France in the per capita




322


THE AWAKENING EAST


incidence of either debt or taxes it becomes clear that the
financial situation of the eastern lands cannot be regarded
as disproportionately burdensome even in view of the differences in economic status.4  Their situation, however, may
become unduly and unjustly burdensome unless adjustment
to the conditions created by the industrial revolution is
steadily advanced in such a way as to assure that production
will keep pace with the growing needs. The basic problem
is, of course, a problem of food supply, but there is the
further problem in each country of producing enough output of one sort or another to insure to the population of
the country concerned at least the indispensable means of
existence.
While the western peoples worked out the industrial revolution by the tedious, painful, and costly process of trial
and error, eastern peoples, as already suggested, have the
opportunity, through intelligent study and application, to
arrive at the results by short-cut methods, but they must
avoid the opposite danger of a short circuit. Educational
progress at the most rapid possible rate is, therefore, necessary for the eastern peoples, and in this educational development the emphasis must at the outset, at any rate, be placed
upon vocational and professional rather than literary training.
'Including all imposts national and local, the tax rate per capita
for Japan in 1912-13 was $5.54, in 1920-21, $12.35; for the United
States in I9I2-I3, $22.95, in I920-2I, $79.15; for the United Kingdom
in 1912-13, $26.07, in 1920-21, $124.84. Calculated on the prewar purchasing power basis the figures per capita for 1920-21 would amount
to $5.35 for Japan, $40.59 for the United States, and $46.07 for the
United Kingdom. Reckoned on the prewar purchasing power basis
as percentage of the prewar national income the figures for Japan
were I9.1% in 1912-13 and I8.4% in 1920-21; for the United States
in 1912-13, 6.9%, in 1920-21, 11.4%; for the United Kingdom in
1912-I3, I0.7%, in 1920-21, 19.0%. These data are derived from
Taxation and Income, Research Report Number 55, National Industrial Conference Board (New York, The Century Co., October,
1922), which contains much other interesting information. No figures
are available for any country considered in these lectures, except
Japan, to show the real, as contrasted with the apparent, burden
of taxation.




PROBLEMS OF PROGRESS


323


Literary study, however, cannot be entirely deferred, and
it must be taken utp with as much speed as possible, for the
peoples of the East must also meet the problems of political
and social readjustment, and to do so successfully requires
training in many fields of thought which are quite apart
from those connected with professional and vocational education.
In this matter of education Japan has a brilliant achievement to its credit and has shown to the other peoples of the
East a way, quite probably the way. In view of the shorter
time involved, the progress in the Philippines is, perhaps,
no less gratifying. India, Egypt, and China, in order, trail
far behind in educational achievements, as indicated by the
percentages both of literates and of pupils in schools. If
judged by priority and scope of their educational schemes,
the order would be China, India, and Egypt.
The general introduction of elementary education is, of
course, desirable, but it is something that cannot be attained
at once or within a brief period of years. The establishment
of a full system of elementary education in any country can
hardly be effected in less than a generation, because of the
necessities of acquiring the requisite lands, of erecting suitable buildings and, even nmore important, the training of
an adequate supply of competent teachers. The experience
of Japan and the Philippines affords definite evidence on
these subjects and makes clear that the starting point must
be the development of normal training schools suitable in
number and in character.
Next to the elementary schools the universities are probably most essential, because of the need in each country for
a limited number of persons with the highest training. The
high schools or, as they are called in the East, the middle
schools, are usually the last to be developed adequately, and
that is apparently not merely accidental, but the genuine
logic of the situation. While in general the educational institutions to be established in the eastern lands will, with
the necessary allowances for linguistic and national differences, undoubtedly follow more or less closely the western
types of curricula, it is certain that there must also be some




324


THE AWAKENING EAST


modifications, especially in the period of the first generation. The schools must be the means in the East of rendering a service similar to that which is expected of them in
the United States in the training of children of foreign-born
parentage. Both in the mission schools and the schools
established under governmental control these considerations
have already received no small amount of attention.
Closely allied to education by the schools is the continued
education in later life through the press, and especially
through journalism. As a consequence progress in the number and quality of newspapers, magazines, and books for
general reading becomes of great importance. Japan also
leads both in the development of journalism and in the size
of its reading public. The contrast, for instance, between
the amount of reading observable on the trains in Japan and
in the other countries is remarkable.  In the Philippine
Islands the growth of journalism and of the reading habit
does not seem to have been commensurate with the extension
of education. Though the development in China may be no
greater than in India or Egypt, it is certainly a healthier
growth.
In all five countries the improvement and extension of
education, whether through the schools or through the press,
is a problem of primary importance. In every case wisdom
will dictate careful study of western methods and the employment of experts from the West as councilors and advisers or even for a time in more responsible capacities.
The West will serve itself well if it puts forth extraordinary
efforts to assist in this all-important work. The aid already
given is warmly appreciated in each of these countries, and
is perhaps better understood than any of the other efforts
of the peoples of the West to assist the peoples of the East
or to intervene in their affairs.
Some of the best help can be rendered in the case of the
students who come to the colleges of the western lands to
complete their education. Whatever is done to smooth the
way for these young men and young women and to aid them
in their efforts will he even more tangibly valuable than
bread cast upon the waters. The two chief diplomatic rep



PROBLEMS OF PROGRESS


325


resentatives of China at the Washington Conference received their training first in mission schools in China and
later in universities in the United States. Their cases are
not exceptional, for wherever one turns among the persons
most active in the advancement of their respective nations
it will be found that a large proportion of those persons
has been trained under the western influences, and in the
most important cases educated in western lands.
The training of the masses in each country, that is, the
work of elementary education and also of secondary education in the main, must be done by the privileged individuals
from that particular country who are able to benefit from
western training whether in their home land or abroad. The
rate of progress in the extension of education and journalism
is a measure of the fitness of the people for political progress. The statistics are of some value as another index of
advancement. In Japan 17 per cent of the population is in
schools; in the Philippines, io per cent; in India, 2.6 per
cent; in Egypt, 2 per cent; and in China, 1.5 per cent, as compared with 20 per cent in the United States. Japan ranks
as one of the most literate countries in the world; in the
Philippines 37 per cent are literate; in Egypt, 8 per cent; in
India, 6 per cent, while the percentage in China is probably
even less. Japan has approximately one periodical to i8,ooo
persons, the Philippines one to 96,ooo, India one to 200,000,
and China one to 300,000.
Universal, gratuitous, compulsory, elementary education
has been legally established in principle in each of the five
countries under consideration, except India, where some
provinces have taken similar action. In the Philippines the
actual establishment of the system has been about half completed and in Japan it is in practically full operation. The
significance of these facts for the movement of the East
toward democracy must not be minimized.      Generally
training for citizenship is not only an avowed principle of
the educational system but also the actual practice. Even
where it is not, the unconscious influences of the schools
are inevitably in the direction of greater freedom for the
individual socially, economically, and politically. Through



326


THE AWAKENING EAST


out the East education is advancing rapidly and carrying
liberalism, if not democracy, in its train.
The achievements of the Japanese and of the Filipinos in
political and governmental affairs are highly commendable.
In each case the advances made seem to reach the maximum
possible in view of the conditions and of the time involved,
though one nation has worked independently and the other
under foreign authority. Considering the great difficulties
to be faced China has made hopeful progress. To India
the British have probably given at least as full a measure
of self-government as the circumstances justify, but they
are open to criticism for failure to do more in education and
in other ways to prepare the people for self-government.
The same criticism is even more pertinent in Egypt, where
their rule has savored of benevolent despotism rather than
of the English traditions of free institutions.
In each nation the tendency has been to follow the western
methods of creating constitutions and of establishing parliamentary representation. There is, however, considerable
variation in the several cases, and in no instance has the
result *been the adoption of either the British system of
responsible parliamentary government or the American
system of presidential government, though the tendency
seems to be toward the latter rather than the former. The
problems of the several countries differ greatly from one
another and the situations in them all are radically different from those in western lands. It is therefore probably
wiser temporarily, even permanently, that each country
should work out a form of government suited to its own
conditions and needs.
It can scarcely be other than disastrous for a nation to
break with the traditions of its past and to undertake to establish any new form of government, no matter how perfect theoretically. It is of the highest importance for each
of these countries that the changes made in its government
shall grow as naturally as possible out of the traditions of
its past. Outward conditions may be modified in the course
of time, but a people's habits of thought are altered only
with the utmost difficulty.  Material conditions may be




PROBLEMS OF PROGRESS


327


changed with comparative ease, but political readjustments
must be made with due consideration for these facts if they
are to be effected with safety and permanence. Contrary
methods can scarcely fail to result in revolution with all its
attendant evils.
With any people adjustments of such serious sort require
no small amount of time. Parliamentary government, for
instance, has been slowly worked out in England from the
days of Magna Carta seven centuries ago. To-day critics
express themselves harshly in judgment of the Japanese,
the Filipinos, and others if they do not prove able within
a few years to adapt themselves to the utilization of parliamentary methods with the expertness of English or Americans. It is absurd to expect such results. Indeed, comparison with the national legislatures not merely of the
smaller or newer countries of Europe or America but also
of such older countries as Spain and Italy does not prove
unfavorable to the parliamentary institutions of these eastern lands in the character of personnel, organization, proceedings, or achievement. In any case the transition must
take time, and this is the more true with the peoples of the
East who have, as has been said before, been accustomed to
regard the value of time somewhat lightly.
Hurry is something with which the East is unfamiliar.
If a mistake is made orientals feel there is plenty of time to
try again. Their patience in the matter of time is, it must
be confessed, infinitely provoking to the occidental. These
facts, however, must be taken into consideration in all the
work that is done for the adjustment of the East to western
ways or for the modernization of the East. Their habit is
to take things easily. The situation requires them, and the
world looks to them, to make the adjustments with almost
astonishing rapidity. The West will need to learn patience,
though perhaps not as much as the East will need to learn
the value of speed, even its necessity.
The attitude of the foreign residents is of some significance in each country. These residents, in general, may
be divided into two groups, the business people and the
missionaries. The position of the latter group is based upon




328


THE AWAKENING EAST


toleration rather than on reciprocity.  Consequently, the
sense of favors received or expected makes the normal missionary attitude pro-government, or at least apologetic for
the government. Nevertheless, the missionaries have customarily wielded a strong influence both on the government
of the country in which they are located and on the government of the nation of which they are citizens with respect
to the country in which they are stationed.
The business group is not so homogeneous and its position
is based on reciprocity. Its attitude is therefore more independent, though perhaps no less conventional. The business
man in a foreign community is almost inevitably strongly
nationalistic on every question involving his own country.
He is also alert to influence the policy of his nation with
reference to the country in which he is domiciled for the advancement of his interests. Discretion normally dictates
to him an attitude of outward, if not sincere, support of the
government in whose domain he is trading.
In Egypt and India the British missionaries and traders,
and in the Philippines the American missionaries and business people are inclined to regard themselves as possessed
of a preferred interest in the country and vested with special privileges in urging their views upon both the local
authorities and the home governments. The missionary,
however, usually regards himself as the foreordained spokesman of the people among whom he ministers, whereas the
business man rarely considers the welfare of the native
population.
Though the western business man engages in trade in the
East on a status of reciprocity, there are comparatively few
orientals who are similarly resident and employed in Europe
or America. The missionaries are offset by the considerable
body of oriental students attending the educational institutions of the West. Their position is not based upon reciprocity. They concern themselves little with the government under which they are temporarily domiciled and rarely
afford it concern. On the other hand, both in their student
days and afterward, they assume a keen interest in the affairs of their home government, especially in matters involv



PROBLEMS OF PROGRESS


329


ing the nation in which their studies are pursued. This
officiousness appears in exaggerated form among the youth
who pursue their studies in the country which dominates
their own land, though fortunately it is not a general characteristic. As a whole, the group of western-trained oriental
students is well aware of the value of its opportunities and
of the responsibilities which they impose. The influence of
the students after their return to their native land is properly disproportionately great.
Another personal factor in the contact and mingling of
civilizations is the casual traveler, who, unfortunately, is
rarely aware that he leaves impressions upon the countries
through which he passes as well as carrying home new information and judgments concerning the peoples among
whom he has journeyed. The oriental, no doubt, understands this fact better than the occidental and is more cautious and circumspect in his behavior when he fares abroad.
He is also probably a shrewder, certainly a more serious,
observer when he travels in the West than is the occidental
when he visits the Orient.
The preceding observation suggests a vital question. Are
the peoples of the West who consider themselves cultured
and progressive preparing to meet the East as intelligently
as the orientals are schooling themselves to face the West?
How does the number of Americans who can use the Japanese language or pretend to a familiarity with Japanese literature, even in translation, compare with the number of
Japanese who are proficient in the English tongue and well
acquainted with the literatures of England and America?
How many Americans possess a knowledge of the writings
of Confucius comparable to that hundreds of non-Christian
Chinese have of the Bible? How many English university
graduates versed in the history of India for the last two centuries could be found to match the number of Indians familiar with the last four centuries of English history? How
many Americans could continue their business in China
without a compradore? Is there not some question whether
it is not the West that is asleep and the East that is awake?
The internal problems of government in any country are




330


THE AWAKENING EAST


rarely entirely divorced from considerations of international
relations. It has already been pointed out how intimately
the modernization of China has been linked with questions
of diplomacy. The Japanese government has had to give
close attention to the correlation of internal with international policy. Its foreign relations have at times required
restraint and at other times acceleration in the progress
of internal reform. In the last half-dozen years domestic political feeling has been a powerful agent in modifying
Japanese policies in dealing with other countries, while at
the same time interests of an international sort have profoundly affected the political thought of the people and the
domestic policy of the government.
International and imperial considerations have been almost
exclusively responsible for the establishment of British control in Egypt and for its continuance. Conditions in international trade led to England's entrance into India. The
importance of the resulting commerce compelled England
to wage a prolonged international contest for its maintenance
which resulted in the establishment of political control. International situations have required England to fight various
wars, not confined to Asia, to safeguard its position in the
country. The incorporation of more than one province in
the Indian Empire has been due to international considerations. These facts have been responsible in large measure
for the military establishment in India and for the consequent burden of taxation upon the people. Perhaps some
of these problems arose from the presence of the British in
India, but others would certainly have arisen even had India
been free from any European intervention.
Both in Egypt and in India the British have repeatedly
adjusted their legislative and administrative programs to the
exigencies of international affairs. An illustration from India, where the case is less obvious, will suffice. The costly
second Afghan war necessitated unfortunate curtailments
of expenditure, especially for internal improvements and
famine relief. Imperial relations have also seriously affected internal administration in both Egypt and India.
The concession of responsible government to the former




PROBLEMS OF PROGRESS


33I


Boer republics and the proposals for the Union of South
Africa were among the reasons which made necessary the
Morley reforms in the government of India and they, in
turn, furnished an argument for the corresponding legislation for Egypt in I9I3.
Political thought in England and the alternations of the
parties in power in London have been constantly reflected
in the policy of the government in India. It is notorious
that parliamentary legislation for India often embodies
English political sentiment rather than the judgment of the
responsible British officials in India. On at least two important occasions, 1784 and i880, cabinet changes and parliamentary elections have been determined in large degree
by questions of Indian policy. For more than a century
England's relations with Egypt have been dependent
primarily on Indian considerations, and British policy in the
Near East has customarily been conducted in defiance of
the national conscience, but in accordance with the apparent
necessities or interests of India.
The decision of the United States to acquire the Philippines from Spain by the treaty of I898 was partly based on
international considerations which were not all strictly relevant to the islands themselves. The subsequent history has
afforded repeated evidence that American policy with reference to the islands cannot be conducted without careful
adjustment to the international situation.  Certainly, the
foreign policy of the United States has been strongly influenced by the occupation of the Philippines. Public opinion
and partisan interest in the United States have frequently
affected the principles and methods of government employed
in the islands. The Philippine question, on the other hand,
was a prominent issue in the presidential election of I900oo.
Not least significant has been the effect throughout the East,
upon the colonizing powers and upon their subjects, wrought
by the policies and performances of the United States in
training the Filipinos for self-government.
The great war which has recently been fought out in
Europe could hardly have failed to have its repercussion
in the nations of the East. Indeed, in each of these coun



332


THE AWAKENING EAST


tries serious changes were occasioned in the economic situation, and from four of them considerable numbers of individuals, either as troops or as military laborers, saw service
in remote lands from which they returned with new ideas
and a broader intellectual horizon. Not only these occurrences but also the very fact of the war awakened thought
in the East which has been particularly significant in the
tendency of the pacific oriental to compare himself favorably with the belligerents of the West. The conditions of
universal military service and the nature of the issues at
stake 'between the two vast warring alliances also operated
to stimulate the growth of democratic ideas in the East.
The progress of the great world conflict was already generating unwonted activity in many an oriental brain, when
the ideas were crystallized by the declarations of President
Wilson in favor of the two splendid principles of making
the world safe for democracy and of assuring the self-determination of peoples. These twin purposes gave to the
progressive and nationalist movements among the oriental
peoples a definiteness and a motive power which had previously been lacking. Whatever may be said concerning the
correctness or the wisdom of President Wilson's declarations
there can be no doubt of the potency of their influence. The
same generous principles, moreover, were enunciated, perhaps with less boldness of epigrammatic idealism, by the
British premiers, Asquith and Lloyd George.
Throughout the East the advocates of national independence and democratic government acquired new confidence
and authority from the indorsement given to their principles
by the responsible rulers of the two nations which were
recognized as the world's greatest exponents of political
liberty. By strange irony these two nations were the very
ones that were controlling the destinies of Egypt, India, and
the Philippines in apparent violation of the doctrines of national independence and democratic self-government. They
were likewise the two nations whose behavior was scanned
with most intense interest and hesitant expectation by Japan
and China. Another effect of no less significance was the
awakening of consciousness, alike in the East and in the




PROBLEM\S OF PROGRESS


333


West, that the political developments in the several nations
of the East had ceased to be local phenomena. Unity of
interest stands clearly revealed both to the peoples of Asia
and to the western nations concerned in their affairs, though
unity of action has thus far been absent. The World War
has wrought a tremendous change in the situation in the
East. Wisdom and patience in dealing with the problems are
consequently infinitely more necessary. Never has the pressure for change been so great as within the last half -dozen
years. The nature of the elements involved has not been
altered but their action has been immensely accelerated.
The factors involved in the national readjustments of the
East are necessarily not only economic and political, but also
ethical and religious. The western nations have all built
their systems upon a civilization long saturated with Christianity. Among the eastern nations which have been considered, only the Filipinos approximate such a condition.
The major portion of the population of the Philippine
Islands has been Christian for about three centuries. In
the other four countries the religious and ethical factors are
entirely dissimilar. Notwithstanding certain appearances of
dissent, Egypt as Mohammedan, China as Confucianist, and
Japan as Shintoist enjoy substantial unity and conformity of
ethical concepts and standards.  India, however, suffers
from sharp diversities which render difficult, if they do not
preclude, the adoption within the nation of common ethical
standards.
Within each one of these countries the Christian ethic is
exerting a strong influence in determining selection and emphasis within the field of indigenous ethical systems. Thus,
under Christian influence, the Chinese are passing over as
quietly as possible some of the teachings of Confucius and
are giving a greater emphasis to others. In India this form
of influence of the Christian ethic is of surprising importance, for there it is serving as a useful guide in the selective and harmonizing process among the prevailing rival
systems. It is of no small interest to observe in the native
writings, intended more or less wholly for native consumption, to what an extent the discussion of the problems of




334


THE AWAKENING EAST


the country is based on ethical principles which are Christian, or if they are Mohammedan or Hindu, are those which
may most easily be assimilated to the Christian standards.
It is necessary in this connection to distinguish clearly the
difference between the utilization of the Christian ethic and
its acceptance.
In a practical way the Christian ethic is wielding a wide
and effective influence on the development of the new social
and political order in the several eastern lands. In each one
of these countries the last half century has seen accomplished
a vast amount of new law-making. The old native laws have
either given place to new laws copied more or less directly
from western Christian models, or else the native laws have
been revamped in such a way as to remove at least those
features which might seem seriously objectionable in the
eyes of western and Christian nations. Part of this has, of
course, been done as in India directly under the guidance of
British authority. It has been done in Japan, and is in
process in China, with the different purpose of meeting
western standards in order to remove the impairment of
national sovereignty by the privilege of extra-territoriality.
This same influence has appeared even more clearly in the
administration of justice. The systems of both criminal and
civil procedure have been radically modified and practices
repugnant to western and Christian sentiment have in large
measure been eliminated. Not merely has torture been abolished, but the courts have been freed from corruption and
bribery and from superstitious practices. One is inclined
to say that the greatest actual contribution which the West
has given to the East has been the example of the honest,
prompt, and efficient administration of justice, admirably
illustrated by the British in Egypt and India, and by the
Americans in the Philippines. The progress of the Japanese
and the Chinese in the administration of their own governments can very well be measured by the advances which
they have made in this particular.
The influence of the Christian ethic permeates other forms
of governmental administration as well as that of justice.
Mention has been made of the notable change in Egypt due




PROBLEMS OF PROGRESS


335


to the substitution of a just system of military conscription
for the old methods. A much more important illustration,
however, is the reform in the collection of taxes and the disbursement of public funds. In this respect there is no doubt
that the case of Egypt already discussed is the clearest example. Notwithstanding whatever faults there may be in
the system in India, there can be little doubt that taxes have
never been more justly levied, or public funds more honestly administered in that country than at the present time
under British rule.
Examples are numerous in the history of Japan in the
last half century of the influence of the Christian ethic in
determining the practice of government. A negative illustration is furnished by the recent unfortunate experience
of the Filipinos with their national bank. Even the Chinese,
who have seemed furthest removed from the Christian ethic
in all these matters because of their system of "squeeze,"
are beginning to realize the importance of the fundamental
principle of administration, that public office is a public
trust.
Quite apart from religious considerations the Christian
ethic is in another way forcing its utilization upon the East,
that is, in the field of international relations. Like the internal polity, the international intercourse of western nations, both commercial and political, has been built upon
the common acceptance of the Christian ethical and religious
teachings, though unfortunately there have been many failures to practice those teachings. While this development
among the western nations has been quite unconscious it
has none the less been fundamental. International law came
into existence as a Christian creation for the purposes of
Christian nations. Hitherto in so far as non-Christian nations have been admitted into international comity, such
action has been based upon implicit acceptance of the Christian-made system of international law.
The situation is clearer if approached from the negative
side. Non-Christian nations have been considered without
the pale, as not merely different, but inferior, and have been
so treated. Such was the case, for instance, with Japan until




336


THE AWAKENING EAST


1894, when it convinced western nations, after prolonged
effort, of its readiness to discharge international obligations
in harmony with the western Christian conceptions. Only
then were extra-territoriality, conventional tariffs, and other
discriminations gradually removed.
The entrance of Japan into a position of international
equality with the peoples of the West was dependent upon
Japanese conformity to western and Christian standards.
This is a fact entirely apart from any question whether
Japan is or is not a Christian nation as regards the religion
of the majority of its people, or as regards the motives and
policies of those who administer its government. China and
Egypt still labor under this disadvantage from which Japan
has been freed, though it has been recognized that they too
must soon receive concessions of a similar sort.
In the case of India the problem takes a somewhat different form. In negotiations at the Paris conference and in
the League of Nations India has been granted, to a certain
degree, an international position.  This has not resulted
from anything inherent in India itself, but is due to India's
position in the British Commonwealth of Nations. The real
question then is, How far is the Christian ethic involved in
India's position in that commonwealth. There can be no
doubt whatsoever about the answer. India is able to play
a part in the British Empire more or less similar to that of
Canada, or Australia, only in so far as India conforms itself
in thought and act to the same standards as do the self-governing dominions of the empire. It must be recognized,
however, that this situation has its correlative, for not unnaturally the Indian peoples demand, in return for such conformity, equality of treatment with the other dominions and
their inhabitants. They are keen enough to recognize that
they may be fairly excluded from Australia or Canada or
South Africa, but they are utterly unable to see the equity
of a policy which places them in an inferior position in the
crown colony of Kenya. No such issue has yet been raised
in the case of the Filipino with the United States, but it is
not difficult to foresee various circumstances which may
present serious difficulties. In this instance, unlike that of




PROBLEMS OF PROGRESS


337


India, the questions will appear to involve primarily matters of race, of geographical position, and of constitutional
law because the Filipinos are a Christian people and familiar with the Christian ethic. In this respect their situation is markedly different from that of India.
It is scarcely conceivable that international law should
fail to remain essentially Christian or that Christian principles should fail to rule in its application. On the other
hand, Christian exclusiveness and superiority toward nonChristian nations must give place in the future to Christian
brotherhood. Any other policy can only breed hatred and
even worse. The question at this point turns not upon race,
but upon faith. If Christianity is the only true faith, it
does not need to adopt a supercilious attitude toward those
who are adherents of another faith. Unless Christianity
can meet the other faiths, whether Mohammedan, Buddhist,
or Hindu, upon their own ground and by its inherent superiority, quite apart from any privileged position or from
any self-assumed superiority, win the peoples of those countries to a recognition of its superior qualities, then it is
utterly unfit to claim such superiority and such exclusive
recognition. Christianity can afford to be tolerant if it is
right.
Any failure on the part of Christianity to demand to be
judged on its merits and on them alone will prove highly
detrimental, not only to Christianity but also to the Christian nations in their governmental capacities. Great Britain and France especially, with their vast numbers of colonial Mohammedans, must not only be considerate in the
treatment of those Mohammedan subjects, but they must
make their policy toward the independent Mohammedan
states one of unquestioned justice unless they are prepared
to alienate the Mohammedan subjects within their own dominions. Adherence to an anti-Mohammedan attitude and
to a policy of destroying or curtailing the political independence of Mohammedan peoples is bound to create hate with
all its attendant evils. It is possible to work out a policy for
the fair and honorable treatment of Mohammedan and other
non-Christian nationalities without sacrificing Christian




338


THE AWAKENING EAST


ideals or the standards of international law. The solution
of this problem is one of the most important issues, though
one of the least comprehended, before the world at the
present day.
The social contacts between the peoples of the West and
of the East are of no less significance than the contacts of
religions; indeed, they merely involve the application in
daily life of the same principles. The political position of
white peoples in the East is built upon the assumption of
racial superiority. This assumption is incompatible with
equality of social intercourse, without which mutual understanding, sympathy, and cooperation are impossible. Every
act of social superiority or exclusiveness builds higher the
barrier between the races and embitters feelings. There can
be little doubt that few remedies would contribute so much
to the amelioration of the situation as the absolute removal
of this barrier. The case is perhaps most acute in official
circles.
The responsibility for the lack of equal social intercourse
is, however, not confined to the occidental. The oriental,
by his religious and social restrictions, especially in the seclusion of women, denies the opportunity for satisfactory
exchange of social amenities. Another difficulty is that most
orientals have not learned to prepare food and drink under
such reasonably sanitary conditions that an occidental may sit
at table with them without risk of his health or even his life.
There are other manifestations which afford cause for
concern. Some white people are so insolent and devoid of
any sense of noblesse oblige that they visit physical abuse
upon coolies and other humble folk with whom they lose
their temper over some petty provocation. The position of
the Eurasians, especially in India, would be little worse if
they bore the brand of Cain. Few generalizations are more
false than that they lack the virtues and possess the faults of
both the races from which they are blended.
The white race seems to be irrevocably opposed to racial
miscegenation and there is little reason to doubt the existence of similar feelings among other races. There are,
nevertheless, numerous exceptions in practice, but they do




PROBLEMS OF PROGRESS


339


not conclusively prove racial intermixture either desirable
or dangerous.   For the present, at least, it is impracticable to effect a scientific or convincing demonstration of
the superiority of any one race over any other race, or, at
any rate, it is impossible to deny the inherent or potential
equality of races. This being the case it is the dictate of
wisdom to avoid raising such issues in any political or social
fashion. On the other hand, there can be little doubt that
for a long period to come the wise policy will be one which
will permit the fullest development of each race unhampered
by confusion with any considerable numbers from other
races.
Adjustments must be made, therefore, not on the basis of
the superiority or inferiority of a particular race, but upon
principles honorable to all parties, with due reference to the
maintenance of the original geographical distribution of
races into separate units. The establishment of large numbers of Japanese laborers in California or of Hindu laborers in Australia will be of doubtful value to either party,
but so would the establishment of colonies of white laborers
in Japan or India. There is no necessity for racial abuse
and recrimination in securing a workable adjustment of the
questions of migration.
Members of other races now domiciled among a different
race must be accepted and treated with full equality of privileges and duties unless mutually agreeable arrangements
for repatriation can be made. Another exception must be
provided for in full equity, namely, freedom for travel,
trade, and study, including privileges of temporary residence
and other facilities necessary for the reasonable accomplishment of the purposes involved. All such arrangements must
necessarily be upon a reciprocal basis. The questions of
capitulations and of extra-territoriality which are at present
involved in these problems make clear that reciprocal relations can be established only upon the basis of eastern acceptance of western ethical standards in the administration
of justice and in the conduct of commercial and diplomatic
intercourse.
In all these developments Christianity will necessarily be



340


THE AWAKENING EAST


come less exclusive and superior in its attitude, but it will,
on the other hand, become more brotherly and, because of
these contacts with other faiths, will be required to exemplify its best ideals in practice rather than to sacrifice them.
If Christianity, as has already been suggested, cannot stand
the contacts without losing character, it is not good enough
to be the world religion.
The pouring of coolie labor into a white man's country is
not a very different interracial offense from western concession-grabbing in Asiatic lands. On no basis of equity
or reciprocity can the white man maintain his attitude on
both these matters. If it is unjust to put coolie labor into
competition with the labor of white people of civilized nations, it is also unjust for peoples of these western nations to
undertake to exploit the resources of eastern lands, while
refusing to be subject to the laws of the land concerned and
to conduct their activities in every way on the basis of equality with the peoples in the jurisdiction in which they are
working.5 It is fairly clear that the concession-hunter who
relies upon his home nation to support him in a privileged
position is a pest to be eliminated.
This does not mean that the resources of eastern lands are
not to be developed. It does mean that their development is
the national prerogative of the people concerned. In this
they may, and perhaps ought, to utilize western aid. The
benefits, for example, accruing from placing its national
resources at the disposal of the trade of the whole world
belong to China just as they do to England or to the United
States in their respective cases. It is full time for the closing
of the age of exploitation and for the opening of the era of
reciprocity.
The traditions of American foreign policy are against
exploitation and in favor of reciprocity. Those are the ideals
which inhere in the Monroe Doctrine and which have characterized American dealings with the nations of the Far East.
To make sure against error in the statement of the ideals of
American policy it will be wise to quote the words of the
'Provided, of course, that the nation conforms to proper standards of justice and maintains the security of life and property.




PROBLEMS OF PROGRESS


341


fathers who formulated those ideals and inaugurated those
policies. In his farewell address President Washington
said, "The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign
nations is, in extending our commercial relations to have
with them as little POLITICAL connection as possible." At another point in the same address he said: "Harmony, liberal
intercourse with all nations are recommended by policy,
humanity, and interest. But even our commercial policy
should hold an equal and impartial hand, neither seeking nor
granting exclusive favors or preferences; consulting the
natural course of things; diffusing and diversifying by gentle means the streams of commerce, but forcing nothing;
establishing with powers so disposed, in order to give trade
a stable course, to define the rights of our merchants, and to
enable the government to support them, conventional rules
of intercourse."
President Jefferson in his first inaugural address declared
for "Peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, and entangling alliances with none." Finally President Monroe, in the famous message of December 2, 1823,
in formulating the doctrine which still bears his name, said:
"But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we
have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose
of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their
destiny, by any European power in any other light than as
the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the
United States."
These same ideals have recently been embodied in the
actions of the Washington conference. The American
people desire no special favors at the expense of any eastern nation nor of any western nation. They desire just
and generous relations with the eastern peoples, and equality
of opportunity with every other western nation in intercourse
with the East. The Americans desire equal privileges of
trade, but they seek no political privileges for themselves,
and they insist that others shall not seek them to the disadvantage of the United States. This policy with regard to




342


THE AWAKENING EAST


the Far East is not a violation of the Monroe Doctrine, it
is the expression of its very spirit.
In the cases of India and Egypt the United States has
merely the general interest of humanity and of trade to consider. On the other hand, Japan, China, and the Philippines
face the United States across the Pacific. In these cases the
United States has very special interest to guard against any
development there unfavorable to its own welfare. It has
the positive interest of promoting by every generous means
the economic, political, and moral progress of those who are
its nearest western neighbors. The interest of the United
States in the affairs of eastern Asia is superior to that of any
European country.
There remains for consideration another question of the
highest potential significance. If non-Christian nations are
to enter the general brotherhood of nations on equitable
terms, whether that brotherhood be the League of Nations
created by the treaty of Versailles, or any other, there will
arise the question whether Christian ethics shall continue as
the basis of international relations, and if so, how. At the
present time the populations of India and China each represent approximately one fifth of the world's total, while
Japan outnumbers the British Islands, and taken together
with Egypt and the Philippines approximately equals the
continental United States. One does not need to raise any
alarmist cry about a "yellow peril," or a "Mohammedan
menace," or anything of the sort, but it requires no emphasis to make clear how serious a situation may confront
the world in the near future.
It is not -easy at the present time to foresee how the problem may be worked out. Some light upon the ultimate solution, however, may be derived from a consideration of
the history of the last century. Compare, in the first place,
the progress of the various Christian nations with the progress of the various non-Christian nations in the same period,
*both as to the extension of their independent sway and as
to the improvements made in their systems of government.
Compare, in the second place, the area and population of
the world that could properly be called Christian a century




PROBLEMS OF PROGRESS                 343
ago, with the corresponding situation to-day. Then make
a similar comparison for Hinduism, Buddhism, and Mohammedanism. These considerations will make clear how
remarkable has been the advance of Christianity and of the
Christian political powers within a hundred years.
Very few nations which are not Christian still maintain
complete political independence. Many areas and populations have within the century come under Christian jurisdiction. Mohammedanism is the only non-Christian faith
which has shown any possibilities of expansion within the
past century, and its achievements have been insignificant
compared with those of Christianity.
The progress of the Christian faith, both as a religious
and as a political influence, has been vastly greater in the
past hundred years than in any other period of its history.
Such evidences of its vitality and power afford a reasonable hope that Christianity will be able to hold its own in
furnishing the principles and affording the driving power of
administration in whatever organic form the brotherhood
of nations may take.








INDEX


Abbas Hilmi, Khedive, I8, 19, 20.
Abdul-Hamid, I8.
Abyssinia, 69.
Accident compensation, in Japan, 211.
Act, Egypt, five-feddan, 29.
India, Lord North's regulating, 55; Government of India, 1858,
56; Indian councils, I86I, 57, 60, 73; Indian councils, 1892,
60, 6I, 72, 73; Indian councils, I909, I9, 6i, 72, 73, 331;
Defense of India, 78; Rowlatt, 78, 79; Government of India,
I919, 20, 76-79, 83, 84, 87, I07.
Philippines, Maura, 249; Jones, 249-251, 263, 266, 273, 274, 287,
292, 293; Volstead, does not apply, 250.
Adli Pasha, 21, 24, 25.
Adowa, 69.
Advisers, foreign, western, or expert, Egypt, 48; India, 68, 102; China,
128, I48; Japan, 191; Philippines, 272, 277, 298; Eastern lands, 324.
Afghans, Afghanistan, 55, 66, 70, 86.
Aglipay, Gregorio, 279.
Aglipayan Church, 279.
Agricultural revolution, 307.
Agriculture, Egypt, 15, 27-29; India, 92; China, I44, I45; Japan, I9I,
222-224; Philippines, 259, 265; Eastern lands, 312, 316, 317;
scientific, 307, 316, 317.
Aguinaldo, 244-247, 280.
Ahmad Shah, 55.
Ahmedabad, 85, Io8.
Airplanes, 307; China, I48.
Akbar, 54.
Alexander the Great, 13, 14, 52, 8I.
Alexandria, 17.
Ali brothers, Mohammed and Shefket, 82-85, 105, Io6.
Allahabad, India, 84, 107; Pioneer, 97.
Allenby, Viscount, 22, 23, 25.
Allied powers, 135, 2II, 214.
All-India Moslem League, 73-75, 83, io6.
America (see United States).
American Red Cross, in Japan, 235; subscriptions for, Philippines, 266.
American Revolution, significance of, 303, 304.
American University in Cairo, 36.
Americans, status of, Philippines, 267.
Amoy, I 7.
Amritsar, India, 78, 79, 84.
Amur provinces, 120.
Ancestor worship, China, 152; Japan, 179.
Andrade, at Canton, I 6.
An-fu party, China, 136.
Anglican Church, 90.
345




346


INDEX


Anglo-French entente of 1904, i8, 49, 74.
Anglo-French war with China, 120.
Anglo-Indian opinion of British rule, 59, 78.
Anglo-Japanese alliance, 127, 204-208, 2IO, 213.
Anglo-Russian convention of 1907, 66, 70, 74, 206.
Angora Turks (see Turks, government at Angora).
Anhwei party, China, I36.
Animal husbandry, 307, 317.
Animistic religions, India, 90.
Antimony, China, 146.
Arabi Pasha, 17.
Arabic language, Egypt, 34, 38, 44; literature, 34.
Arabs, Egypt, 31.
Arbitration, Japan and United States, 235.
Area, Egypt, 28; India, 88; China, I14; Japan, I74, 175, 222; Philippines, 238, 239; United Kingdom, 175, 239; United States, 88.
Area, cultivable (or tillable), Egypt, 28, 29; India, 92; Japan, 222, 223;
Philippines, 238, 259; Eastern lands, 317.
Armenians, Egypt, 32.
Armistice, I918, 21.
Army, Egypt, 17, 30, 42, 43; India, 74, 86, 87, 102, I05; China, 119,
I34, I43, 150, I59-I6I, 166; Japan, I86, i88, 191, 196, 200, 202,
209, 210, 215, 221, 234, 235; Philippines, United States in, 272,
273, 283, 297.
Arts, fine, Japan, I91.
Aryan peoples, India, 57, 89.
Ashikaga shoguns, 182.
Asia, 66, 70, 115, 135, I83, 198, 205, 211, 308, 309, 333.
Asia, eastern, 201, 205-207; American interests in, 124, 238, 247, 261,
282.
Asoka, 53-54.
Asquith, British premier, 2I, 74, 332.
Assam province, India, 89.
Assembly (see Legislature, Philippine, and Legislature, Indian national).
Assuan dam, 28.
Assuit college, 36.
Athletics, China, 154; Philippines, 253.
Aurangzib, 54.
Australia, 70, 225, 336, 339.
Automobiles, 307; China, 147; Philippines, 260.
Aviation (see Airplanes).
Azhar, El, Cairo, 26, 34, 35, 37.
Babar, 54.
Bagdad railway, 93.
Baikal, lake, 206.
Banditry, China, 139, 160, i6I, i66, I72.
Bank, Philippine National, 263, 265, 270, 292, 335.
Banks and banking, China, I49; Japan, 221; Philippines, 263; as factor
of economic life, 306, 307; Eastern lands, 312.
Banks, agricultural, Egypt, 29; Japan, 221.
Banks, postal savings, 307; Egypt, 29; China, 149; Japan, 22I; Philippines, 269; Eastern lands, 314.
Banks, rural savings, Egypt, 29.




INDEX


347


Baring, Sir Evelyn, Lord Cromer, I6, i8, 30; book, 51.
Beans, bean products, China, 145, 150.
Belgium, interests in China, 170.
Bengal, 55, 58, 63, 89, 106; partition of, 69, 71-74.
Bentinck, Lord William, 64.
Berlin, 121.
Besant, Mrs., 75.
Bhagavadgita, 82.
Bibliography (see Reading, suggestions for).
Bihar and Orissa, province, India, 89.
Birth rate, eastern lands, 319, 320.
Bismarck, Prince, example of, 193, 194, 199, 220.
Board of control, president of, India, 55, 56.
Boer War, effect of, India, 69, 70, 331.
Bolshevism (see Soviet government), Egypt, 42; India, o05; Russia, 135.
Bombay, 54, 56, 57, 59, 84, 89, 93, 95, 104, io6.
Bonaparte, Napoleon, in Egypt, 13, 14, 16.
Bose, Sir J. C., 67, 97.
Boxer indemnity, 126, 127, 129, 134, 135, 165, 169.
Boxer rebellion, 123, 126-128, 205.
Boycott, Egypt, 23; India, 8i, 84, 95, o06; China, 136, 165.
Brahmins, 67, 68, 82, 91.
Bridgman, Elijah, ii6.
Brigandage (see Banditry).
British Commonwealth of Nations, 20, 262, 336.
British high commissioner, Egypt, 20-22, 25, 48.
Buddha, 52.
Buddhism, India, 53, 90; China, 115, 152; Japan, 179, 184, 187, 230;
Eastern lands, 303, 343.
Budget, Egypt, 40, 47; China, I43, 150; India, 60, 72, 86, 105, 108;
Japan, 200-204, 208, 210, 221, 234, 235; Philippines, 266, 293, 297.
Bureau of science, Philippines, 256.
Bureaucracy, Japan, 193, I95.
Burgevine, China, II9.
Burke, Edmund, on India, 65.
Burlingame, Anson, 120, 121.
Burma, 77, 89, 90, 122.
Bushido, i8I, 23I.
Business (see Finance, private, and Commerce).
Cabinet (see Ministry).
Cable, submarine, China, 122.
Cairo, 22, 23, 26, 34, 38, 46, 47, 50.
Caisse, Egypt, I6.
Calcutta, India, 54, 59, 69, 71, 73, 84, 93, 95.
California, 124; Japanese problems in, 213, 225, 233, 239.
Caliph, question of title of, 14, 26, 47, 109.
Caliphate, 14, 26, 47, 82, 83, 109.
Caliphate movement in India, 82.
Canada, 70, IOI, 225, 275, 336.
Canals, Egypt, I5; India, 94; China, 147 (see Irrigation, Panama, Suez).
Canton, 115-117, 146, 147, i60, 166, I68, I7I.
Canton government, 134, 135, I37-139, 141, 142, 167, i68.
Cape-to-Cairo route, 46.




348                       INDEX
Capital, investment, capitalism, China, 146, 149; Japan, 314; Philippines, 263, 268, 292, 294; Western lands, 306; Eastern lands, 313 -316; native, 314, 315; quasi-public investment of, 263.
Capital, seat of government, Japan, I78-I80, I83.
Capitulations, Egypt, 32, 33, 39, 45, 49, II7.
Caroline islands, 2I0.
Cassel, Sir Ernest, 39.
Caste, India, 64, 82, 90, 9I, 95.
Catholics (see Greek Orthodox Church, and Roman Catholic Church).
Cattle, China, I44.
Central Provinces and Berar, province, India, 89, Io6.
Certification of laws, India, 76, o05, o08.
Chamber of princes, India, 77, 84.
Champollion, 14.
Chang Hsun, General, 134, 156.
Chang Tso-lin, 135, 137, 141, 142, 170, I7I.
Changsha, China, riot, 166.
Characteristics, national, China, 162.
Charka, 8I, 82.
Chauri Chaura, India, mob affair at, 85.
Chekiang, province, China, 170, I71.
Chelmsford, Lord, Viceroy, India, 75, 76, 84.
Chenchow, China, 170.
Chengtu, China, 168.
Ch'ien Lun, emperor, China, 303.
Chi Hsiehyuan, General, 170, 171.
Child labor, regulation of, Japan, 211.
Chi-li, province, China, 137, I43.
China, 112-173; commerce, with Japan, 228; with Philippines, 265,
267; communications with India, 93; comparison with Japan, 174,
185, 220, 224, 229, 231; Philippines, 257, 264, 274; Europe, 163;
France, 303; relations with Japan, 123, 127, 132, I33, I35, I36,
139, 140, 141, 150, I6I, 164, I65, I66, 171, 190, I97, I98, 205-207,
209, 211-213, 215, 226, 235; Philippines, 241, 265, 285.
Chinese Eastern Railway, 169.
Chinese influence on Japan, I78-I80, 184.
Chinese Turkestan, 114, 12, 140, 14I.
Ching, Prince, premier, China, I30.
Cholera, Egypt, 38; Philippines, 258.
Choshu, clan, Japan, 186, 196, 200, 209, 217.
Christian ethics, 333-337, 342.
Christian missions, Egypt, 34, 328; India, 90, 96, 328; China, II6, II8,
19, 173; Japan, 182, 192; Philippines, 241, 243, 328; Eastern
lands, 328.
Christian rule in Mohammedan lands, 34, 74, 82, 337.
Christian leadership, training for, I53.
Christian (mission or church), schools and colleges, Egypt, 36; India,
68, 95, 96; China, 128, 129, 152, 153, 163.
Christianity, influence of, 154 (see Greek Orthodox Church, Protestant
churches, Roman Catholic Church).
Christianity, position of, Egypt, 34-36; India, 90, o09; China, 115, I 6,
152, 164; Japan, 183, 230, 237; Philippines, 238, 240, 241, 244,
290, 333; Western lands, 302; Eastern lands, 333-340, 342, 343.
Christians, Syrian, 90.




INDEX


349


Chun, Prince, regent, China, 129, 130.
Church and state, Philippines, 278.
Cities, India, 64, 9I; China, 158; Japan, 228; Philippines, 240.
Civil and military authorities, friction between, Philippines, 272.
Civil andynilitary governors, China, I59 (see Military governors).
Civil disobedience, India, 106.
Civil government, Philippines, 248, 249.
Civil governor, Philippines, 249.
Civilization, pre-Spanish in Philippines, 242.
Civil service, Egypt, 37, 38; India, 56, 61-63, 68, 69, 102, o08; China,
128; Japan, 194; Philippines, 248, 249, 267, 27I, 272.
Civil service, natives in, Egypt, 43; India, 56, 6I, 62 (see Indianization); Philippines, 249, 250, 271, 272 (see Filipinization).
Civil war, China, 139, 142, i6o, 170-172; Japan, I86, 189.
Clans, clan influences, Japan, 178, 179, i8I, 183, 185-187, I95-197, 200,
202, 206, 209, 215, 217.
Clarendon, Lord, 121.
Clark, President, Amherst Agricultural College, 191.
Clarke Amendment, 287.
Clarke, Senator from Arkansas, 287.
Class distinctions, India (see Caste); Japan, 180, i8I, 190.
Cleveland, President, 124, I62.
Clive, Lord, 55.
Coal, India, 92; China, 146, 169, 316; Japan, 227.
Cocanada, India, o06.
Coconut, Philippines, 261, 318.
Codes of law (see Law).
Colleges (see Christian schools and colleges; education, higher; universities).
Colombo, Ceylon, 93.
Colonization policy, Japan, 223-225, 261.
Colonization, western, 308.
Commerce, as a factor of economic life, 306.
Commerce, chambers of, China, I59.
Commerce, domestic or internal (see Finance, private).
Commerce, foreign, Egypt, 15, 27, 32, 41, 48, 312; India, 53-55, 93, 94,
312; China, 112, 116, 122, 145, I49, 150, 170, 312; Japan, 174, I82,
212, 222, 226-228, 312; Philippines, 240, 243, 260-263, 267, 312;
Great Britain, 312; United States, 312; Eastern, 312; Western, 308.
Commission, Philippine, 248, 249.
Communications, means of, 307; India, 93, 94; China, 122, I47, 148,
154, I57; Japan, 221; Philippines, 260; Eastern lands, 31.
Communications, means of, as a factor in economic life, 307.
Concessions, port, China, 140, I68 (see Treaty ports).
Concessions, railway, mining, etc., China, 122, 23,169; Easternlands, 340.
Conferences, international (see Paris Peace Conference; Washington
Conference).
Confucianism, China, 152, 333; Japan, I79.
Confucius, 302, 333.
Congress (see Indian National Congress; United States, Congress of).
Conley, Ray, chief of secret service, Philippines, 292.
Conscription, military, Egypt, 30, 42, 334, 335; Japan, 188, 213, 218,
221, 234.
Connaught, Duke of, 84.




350                       INDEX
Constabulary, Philippine, 284, 297.
Constantinople, 14, I8.
Constitution, Egypt, 44, 45; China, I31, 132, 135, 167; Japan, I92 -I96, 198, 216, 219, 220; Philippines, Malolos, 246; United States,
in Philippines, 249-250; I8th Amendment, 250, 281; Eastern
lands, 326.
Consular courts, Egypt, 39.
Consuls and consular representation, Egypt, 47; Philippines, 268.
Conventional tariffs (see tariff, conventional).
Coolidge, President, 233, 295.
Coolies, Chinese, in France during World War, 135; Indian, in South
Africa, 70, 80; Fiji, 75; West Indies, 75.
Cooperation, American policy of, in Far East, II8, 123, 125, 126.
Copper, China, 146.
Copts, Egypt, 35, 36.
Cornwallis, Lord, Governor-general, India, 63.
Corruption, in government, Egypt, 30, 40; China, 151, I60, 162, 167;
Japan, I97, 201, 204, 208-210, 217, 232; Philippines, 271; Eastern
lands, 334 -Corvee, Egypt, 29, 30.
Cost of living, Egypt, 42; Japan, 211, 212.
Cotton, cultivation of, Egypt, 20, 28, 29; India, 92; China, 145;
Sudan, 46.
Cotton duties, India, 65, 75.
Cotton, manufacture of, India, 92; China, I46, 149, 170; Japan, 227.
Council, national or viceroy's executive, India, 55-57, 72, 76.
Council, national legislative, Egypt, 19, 2I; India, 57, 60, 72, 74, 76,
79 (see legislature, Indian national).
Council of India (in England), 56, 72.
Council of state, India, 76; Philippines, 250, 251, 293.
Councils, district, India, 59,,60.
Councils, municipal, Egypt, I9; India, 57-59.
Councils, provincial executive, India, 56, 57.
Councils, provincial legislative, Egypt, 19, 36; India, 57, 60, 72, 77,
84, 85, Io6; China, 130, 132; Japan, I93.
Councils, rural or local, India, 59, 60.
Courbash, Egypt, 30, 39.
Courts of justice, Egypt, 39; China, I51; Philippines, 270; Supreme,
248, 249, 270.
Crime, Egypt, 40; India, 64, 79, 90.
Cromer, Lord, 16, 18, 30; book, 5I.
Crops, principal, Egypt, 28; India, 92; China, 144; Philippines, 261.
Crown prince, Japan (see Hirohito).
Crusades, 13, 14.
Cuba, United States in, 33.
Currency system, China, 148; Japan, 188, 202.
Curzon of Kedleston, Lord, 25; viceroy, India, 66, 68, 71, 72.
Cushing, Caleb, 117.
Customs duties (see Tariff duties).
Cyrenaica, 49.
Dacoity, India, 90.
Daika, era, Japan, 179, I86.




INDEX                           351
Daimyo, rank in Japan, i80, I8I; feudal rights surrendered, I87.
Dalhousie, Marquess of, Governor-general, India, 65, 66.
Dane, Sir Louis, in Afghanistan, 66.
Darbar, India, 70, 73.
Das, C. R., Indian nationalist, 87, io6, Io8.
Death rate (see Mortality).
Debt, public or national, Egypt, 40, 41, 45, 321; India, 321; China,
143, 150, 15I, 32I; Japan, 206, 208, 221, 321; Philippines, 266,
269, 321; Debt limit, 266; United States, 151, 321; Eastern lands,
321, 322.
Decentralization, administrative, India, 58, 59; China, 157, 167.
Defense, national, Philippines, 283, 284.
Delhi, India, 53, 54, 70, 73, 84, 105, o16, 109.
Delta, Nile, 28.
Democracy, democratic ideas, and democratic tendencies, 21; Egypt,
17, 27, 32; China, 160, 163; Japan, 219; Philippines, 253, 290;
Western lands, 304, 305; Eastern lands, 310, 325, 332.
Democrata party, Philippines, 295.
Democratic party, United States, 250, 287, 296.
Deshima, Japan, I84.
Dewey, Admiral, at Manila, 245.
Diet, national, in Japan, 193-197, 199-204, 2Io, 211, 217, 219, 231,
232, 234, 252.
Diminishing returns, law of, 318, 319.
Diplomatic representation, representatives, or agents, Egypt, 47;
China, 120, 121.
Disarmament, universal, relation of Japan to, 215, 221, 236.
Dispensary (see Hospital).
Disraeli, British premier, 16.
Domestic system of manufactures, Japan, 228; Philippines, 264; Eastern
lands, 312; Western lands, 306.
Dominion status, India, 75, 78, IoI, o08, 336; Philippines, 275-277,
289, 294, 295, 297.
Dravidian races, India, 89.
Dual control, India, 55.
Dual nationality, abolished, Japan, 234.
Dufferin, Lord, in Egypt, 19, 30; viceroy India, 58.
Dupleix, French governor, India, 55.
Dutch, relations with India, 54; China, 116; Japan, 184, 185; Philippines, 285; in Java, compared with Philippines, 254.
Dutch East Indies, 285, 290.
Duties, customs (see Tariff duties).
Dutt, Romesh Chunder, Indian nationalist, 65, IIo.
Dyarchy, plan of government, India, 77, 107.
Dyer, General, at Amritsar, India, 78-80.
Earthenware, manufactures, Japan, 227.
Earthquake, Japan, 231, 233, 234.
East Africa, 46, 74, I05.
East and West, comparison, 81, 300-313.
East India Company, English, 54-56, 65, 94; trade with Canton, 117.
East Indies, 183; (see Dutch East Indies).
East, western acquaintance with, 329.
Economic and political retardation of the East, 308-315.




352                       INDEX
Economic conditions, interests, and development, Egypt, 28-32, 41;
India, 92-94, 308, 314; China, 144-150, 308, 314; Japan, 221-229,
234, 308, 314; Philippines, 258-268, 309, 314; Eastern lands, 308 -322, 339, 340.
Economic drain, from India, 65, 94.
Education, Egypt, 15, 31, 34-38, 43, 44, 323; India, 58, 62, 63, 67, 75,
77, 87, 95, 96, 323; China, 128, 129, I52-154, 163, 323; Japan,
191, 196, 213, 218, 219, 229, 235, 323; Philippines, 243, 247, 252 -257, 269, 273, 285, 297, 323; Eastern lands, 317, 322-326; Great
Britain, 63; (see Christian schools and colleges, universities).
Education, elementary or primary, Egypt, 36, 37; India, 62, 96, 107;
China, 153; Japan, 229; Philippines, 252, 253, 255, 289; Eastern
lands, 323, 325.
Education, higher, collegiate, university, Egypt, 31, 34, 36-38; India,
62, 95; China, I53; Japan, 229; Philippines, 243, 255, 256; Eastern lands, 323.
Education, normal, teacher training, Egypt, 37; India, 96; China, 129,
I53; Japan, 323; Philippines, 255, 256, 323; Eastern lands, 323.
Education of females, Egypt, 37; India, 96; China, I54.
Education, public or government control, Egypt, 44; India, 107;
China, 152, 153; Japan, 191, 218, 219, 229, 235; Philippines,
289.
Education, private and privately controlled institutions, Philippines, 256.
Education, secondary, India, 62, 95; China, I53; Japan, 229; Philippines, 255, 256; Eastern lands, 322, 325.
Education, vocational, professional, technical, Egypt, 37; India, 62,
96; China, 129, 153, 155; Japan, 229; Philippines, 256; Eastern
lands, 322.
Edward VII, King, England, 70.
Eggs, China, I45, I50.
Egypt, 13-51; comparison with India, 52, 63; China, 115, II7, 155;
Japan, I74, 229; Philippines, 238, 252, 265, 267, 286.
Egyptian expeditionary force, 22.
Eighteenth Amendment to United States Constitution, in Philippines,
250, 28I.
Elder statesmen (see Genro).
Election, privilege of, Egypt, 44; India, 58, 59, 60, 72; China, 130;
Japan, 193, 196; Philippines, 249; Great Britain, 60.
Elections, particular, Egypt, 45; India, 105, io6, o08; Japan, 197, 201,
204, 210, 2II, 213, 232, 233; Philippines, 270, 291, 295; United
States, 296.
Electric railroads, China, 147; Japan, 222.
Elizabeth, Queen, England, 54.
Embroideries, manufacture, Philippines, 26I.
Emperor, Japan, i80, I8I, 184, i86, 187, 194, 195, 197, 203, 204, 216;
(see Mutsuhito, Yoshihito; China, see Kwang-su, Pu-yi).
Empress, dowager, China (see Tsu-hsi).
Engineering service, India, 61.
England (see Great Britain).
English language, Egypt, 38; India, 89; Japan, 219; Philippines, 240,
252, 254, 255, 289.
Epochs in intercourse of China with western nations, first, to 1842,
115-117; second, 1842-1860, 117-120; third, I860-1894, 120-122;




INDEX


353


fourth, 1894-1904, 122-127; fifth, 1904-1912, 127-131; sixth, 1912 -1922, 132-142; seventh, since 1922, 142-144, 164-172.
Epochs of Chinese revolution, first, 1911-1912, 131; second, 1912-1916,
132-133; third, 1916-1917, 133-135; fourth, 1917-1920, I35-137;
fifth, 1920-1922, 137-142; sixth, since 1922, 142-144, 164-172.
Eritrea, 49.
Eta, class, Japan, 181.
Ethical considerations in East, 333-337, 342.
Ethnography (see Races).
Eurasians, 338.
European (see Western).
Europeans (see Foreign communities).
Ever-Victorious Army, China, 119.
Examination system, China, 128, 153.
Exchange, rate of (money rate), Egypt, 41; India, 94; China, 122, 149,
165; Philippines, 266.
Expansion, policy, Japan, 223-226.
Expenditure, public or governmental, Egypt, 40, 48; India, 94, 105;
China, 150, 165; Japan, 201, 213, 221, 234; Philippines, 266, 269,
270, 293.
Experts (see advisers).
Exports, Egypt, 41, 318; India, 94, 318; China, 122, 144, 149, 150, 318;
Japan, 222, 227, 228, 318; Philippines, 261, 318.
Extra-territoriality, Egypt, 33, 39; China, 117, 137, 139, 140, 169, 17I,
I72,334; Japan, 174, 185, 199, 200,202,334-336; Eastern lands, 339.
Factory management, Eastern lands, 314.
Factory system of manufactures, India, 92; China, 146; Japan, 313;
Philippines, 264; Eastern lands, 312-314; Western lands, 305, 306;
(see Industrial Revolution, Industry, Labor, Manufactures).
Fairfield bill, 252, 295.
Family, social unit in China, I58, 159; Japan, 190.
Family life, China, 156.
Famine, India, 64, 71, 93; China, 145, 170.
Far East, American interests in, 124, 139, 214, 282; (see Asia, Eastern;
Pacific, Western).
Far East, American policy in, 118, I25.
Far East, European interests in, 139, 209.
Far East, European policy in, 207.
Far East, situation in, 169, 205, 215, 220.
Far Eastern Republic, 141.
Federation of Women's Clubs, Philippines, 257.
Fellaheen, Egypt, 15, 20, 27-32, 42; defined, 30; as soldiers, 43.
Feng Kuo-Chang, acting president, China, 134.
Feng Yu-hsiang, Christian general, China, 143, 166, 171.
Feudalism, feudal institutions, feudal conditions, Egypt, 29; Japan,
179-181, 184, 187, 188; China, 157, 163; Philippines, 253.
Fiji Islands, 75.
Filipinization, 250, 265, 271, 272, 275, 276.
Filipino governor, appointment proposed, 275.
Finance, public, Egypt, 40, 41, 47, 48; India, 59, 65, 74, 86, 87, 94,
105; China, 131, 132, 141, 143, 148-151, I60, 165; Japan, 188, 207,
208, 210, 221, 234; Philippines, 266, 269, 270, 293, 296; Eastern
lands, 335 (see Budget, Debt, Expenditure, Revenue).




354


INDEX


Finance, private, Egypt, 15, 27, 32; India, 93; China, 148, 149, i6o;
Japan, 207, 314; Philippines, 263-266, 294; Eastern lands, 314
(see Banks, Foreign business interests).
Financial depression, Egypt, 71; Japan, 200, 207, 212.
Financial stability, national, Egypt, 32; India, 93, 94; China, 151;
Japan, 188, 221; Philippines, 264, 265, 268, 269.
Firearms, Japan, 182.
Fish and fisheries, China, 144; Japan, 226.
Flies, Egypt, 39.
Floods, China, I45, 146, 170.
Flour-mills, China, 146, I49.
Foochow, China, 117, i68.
Food production or supply, Egypt, 318; India, 318; China, I44, 318;
Japan, 318; Philippines, 318; Eastern lands, 317, 3I8, 322.
Foot-binding, China, 156.
Forbes, W. Cameron, Governor-general, Philippines, 251.
Foreign business interests, Philippines, 263, 267; Eastern lands, 328
(see Concessions, Foreign communities).
Foreign communities, Egypt, 23, 31, 32, 49; India, 59; China, 126, 168;
Japan, I86, 200; Philippines, 240, 264, 265, 267; Eastern lands,
327-329.
Foreign cultural influences, Japan, 177, 184, 185.
Foreign domination, native attitude to, India, 60, IOO-104; Philippines, 246, 247, 281, 286-288.
Foreign influences, native attitude to, India, 81; China, 113, 114, 122,
126, 128, 129, I44, 155; Japan, 178, 182, 190.
Foreign intervention, China, 139, I40, I60; Japan, 174, 176; Far East,
123, 126, 127.
Foreign intervention, native attitude to, China, 114, 126, 136, I6I, 171,
172; Japan, 183, 189.
Foreign loans, Egypt, 16, 17, 40, 47, 315; India, 65, 93, 94, 315; China,
122, 130-132, I37, I4I, I43, I50  5, I5I, 6, 68, 315; Japan, 208,
221, 224, 315; Philippines, 270, 315.
Foreign troops, China, I39.
Forests, India, 6i, 92; China, 145; Philippines, 259.
Formosa, 123, 190, 198, 200, 201, 223, 225, 261.
Four-power pact, Washington conference, 235, 282, 291.
France, interests in and relations with, Egypt, 13-I8, 31, 32, 46, 47,
49; India, 55; China, 112, II6-Ii8, 120, 121, 123, 132, I40, 165, i66;
Japan, 123, 191, 197, 198, 207, 220, 225; Philippines, 285.
Franchise, right of, Egypt, 44; India, 60; Japan, 196, 202, 208, 213,
218, 220, 232, 233; Philippines, 252, 273, 289, 291, 292; Eastern
lands, 309; Great Britain, 60; Western lands, 305 (see Election,
right of; Suffrage, woman).
Free Trade between Philippines and United States, 261, 262.
French language, Egypt, 14, 38.
French legal codes, influence of, Egypt, 39.
French Revolution, significance of, 303, 304.
Friar lands, Philippines, 245, 247, 259, 265.
Friars, Roman Catholic, India, 54; China, 115; Philippines, 243 -245, 278.
Fuad, King, Egypt, 13, 21, 26, 44-47, 49, 50.
Fujiwara family, Japan, I80.




INDEX                           355
Fukien, province, China, Japan in, 225.
Further India (see Indo-China).
Gama, Vasco da, 53, 54.
Gandhi, Mahatma, 75, 80-87, 91, 95, I04-Io6, io8-Iio, 318.
Ganges, 92.
Gaya, India, 87.
Geddes commission, Great Britain, 87.
Genghis Khan, ii5.
Genro, Japan, influence of, 195, 201, 203, 209, 217; passing of, 218, 236.
Gentlemen's agreement, 225, 234.
George V, King, England, 73, 84.
Germany, interests in and relations with, Egypt, I9, 20, 47; India, 74;
China, 117 I, II, 23, 32, I34, 135, 137, I69, 171, 212; Japan, I23,
191, 193, 198, 209, 20o; Philippines, 284.
Germany, possessions in Pacific, 2I0.
Gladstone ministry, 58.
Glass, manufactures, China, 146.
Gold, India, 92, 94.
Gold standard, China, 149; Japan, 202, 221; Philippines, 270.
Gordon, Charles George, General, in China, II9.
Gorst, Sir Eldon, British agent, Egypt, I8, 19.
Goto, Baron, 231, 232.
Governor-general, India, 55, 56, 64; Korea, 214; Philippines, 249-251,
283, 292, 293; veto power, 273, 274, 294, 295.
Governors (see Military governors).
Grant, General U. S., in Japan, I9I.
Great Britain, army of, Egypt, 42; India, 86, 87.
Great Britain, commercial relations with, Egypt, 41; India, 54, 55, 94,
262; China, II6, I50, 170; Japan, 228; Philippines, 265, 267 (see
Tariffs, conventional).
Great Britain, communications of, with India (see Suez Canal).
Great Britain, diplomatic and political relations of, China, 1I2, 117,
II8, 120-I23, 132, 740, I65, I66; Japan, I85, I9I, 199, 204-208,
2I0; Philippines, 243, 285.
Great Britain, domestic politics of, influence on, Egypt, 331; India, 331.
Great Britain, estimate of rule of, Egypt, 27, 30, 36, 39, 40, 43, 44;
India, 60, I00-102.
Great Britain, history of rule of, Egypt, I5-33, 44-50; India, 54-87,
o04-109.
Great Britain, ministry of, 22, 25, 45, 48, 50, 58, 75, 107.
Great Britain, parliament of (including House of Commons), action
concerning India, 56, 75, I07, 117 (see Act, India).
Great Mughals (see Mughal empire).
Greek Orthodox Church, missions, China, 120; Japan, 192, 230.
Greeks, ancient, Egypt, 13; India, 52, 53, 8I.
Greeks, moder, Egypt, 31, 32.
Guam, island, 124.
Guilds, China, i58.
Hankow, China, I31.
Hanyang, China, 146.
Hara, Japanese premier, 212-214, 278.
Harding, President, policy of, Japan, 214; to Philippines, 251, 286.




356                        INDEX
Hardinge, Lord, Viceroy, India, 73, 75.
Harris, Townsend, in Japan, 185.
Harrison, Francis Burton, Governor-general, Philippines, 250, 251, 255,
257, 260, 267, 27I, 272, 275, 282, 292, 293; book by, 273, 298.
Hart, Sir Robert, in China, 119, 122.
Hartal, India, 84.
Hats, manufactures, Philippines, 261.
Hawaii, 124, 225.
Head-hunting, Philippines, 242.
Heads of bureaus, Filipino, 271, 272.
Health, public (see sanitation).
Hedjaz, kingdom of, 47.
Hemp, Philippines, 261.
Hideyoshi, general, Japan, 182, I83.
Highways (see roads).
Hindu states, or rulers, India, 53, 54.
Hinduism and Hindus, 53, 68, 69, 71-73, 82-84, 90, 91, 105, I09, 343.
Hindustani, language, India, 89.
Hirohito (crown prince of Japan), 214, 218, 232, 236.
Historical experience or development, influence of, Egypt, I3, 14, 27;
India, 52, 99; China, 114, 156; Japan, 176, 178, 18I, 220; Philippines, 239; Eastern lands, 326, 327; Western lands, 327.
History, early period, Egypt, 13-15; India, 52-55; China, II5-II7;
Japan, 178-185; Philippines, 241-243.
Hokkaido, I75, I9I, 223, 316.
Holland commission, India, 75.
Home industries, promoted by Gandhi, 8I.
Honan, province, China, I70.
Honesty in public office (see Corruption).
Hong Kong, 117, II8, 140, I50.
Hospitals, clinics, dispensaries, Egypt, I5, 38; China, 155, 321; Japan,
235; Philippines, 258, 292, 321.
Hsu Shih-chang, President, China, 135-137, 142.
Hsuan-tung (see Pu-yi).
Hunter commission, India, 79.
Hussein, King, Hedjaz, 47.
Hussein, Sultan, 20, 21.
Illiteracy (see Literacy).
Immigration, restriction of Chinese, by United States, 121; opposition
to Japanese, in United States, 213, 225, 233, 234.
Imperial Maritime Customs service, China, 119, 148, i68.
Imperial relations, British, effect of, Egypt, 330, 331; India, 330, 331.
Imperial War Conference, British, 75.
Imperialism, Japan, I85 8, 189, 1, 99-201, 204, 206, 212, 215, 217,
220; Great Britain, 330; United States, 247, 250; Western, 308.
Imports, Egypt, 41, 318; India, 94, 318; China, 122, I49, 150, 318;
Japan, 222, 228, 318; Philippines, 309, 318.
Inchcape commission, India, 87, 104.
Income tax returns, Philippines, 264.
Increase of population (see Population, increase of).
Indemnity (see Boxer indemnity).
Independence, question of, Egypt, 21, 25, 26, 33, 43-45, 47, 50; India,
52, 103, 106; Philippines, 241, 245, 246, 251, 255, 262, 263, 268,




INDEX


357


269, 273, 274, 276-279, 281-287, 289, 290, 293, 295-297, 299;
Eastern lands, 332.
Independence, spirit of, China, 112, 113, 141; Japan, 174, 175.
India, 52-11; comparison with China, 112-115, 155, 163; Japan,
174, 193, 229; Philippines, 238, 240, 252, 257, 262, 264, 267,
274, 276.
India, borderlands, 55, Ioo.
India, British, 66, 88, 285.
India, native states and princes, 66, 75, 77, 88; British control of, 88;
suggestion to create more, 88.
Indian Empire, 66, 88, 90, 99.
Indian mentality, 67, 68, 97, 98.
Indian National Congress, 68, 69, 71, 73, 75, 85, 87, 105, I06, 108.
Indian opinion of British rule, 60.
Indianization, 102, 105.
Indo-China, 93, 121, 285, 290.
Indo-European (see Aryan).
Indonesians, in Philippines, 241.
Indus, river, 104.
Industrial revolution, 144, 304-307; India, 8I, 92; China, 144, 146;
Japan, 174, 226, 228; Great Britain, 303; Eastern lands, 308-322;
Western lands, 303-307.
Industry, industrial development; Egypt, 15, 27; India, 75, 8i, 92;
China, 146; Japan, 212, 227, 228; Philippines, 261, 264; Eastern
lands, 312-314 (see Domestic system, Factory system, Industrial
revolution, Labor, Manufactures).
Infant mortality (see mortality, infant).
Influenza epidemic, Philippines, 258.
Insane, hospitals for, Egypt, 38.
Insularity, Japan, 174-179; Philippines, 239.
Insurgent government, Philippines, 245, 246.
Insurrection, Japan, 189, I90; Philippines, against Spain, 244; against
United States, 246, 247.
Integrity, territorial (see Territorial integrity).
Interisland navigation, Philippines, 260, 265.
International law, relation to non-Christian lands, 335-337.
International relations, Egypt, 14-21, 33, 39, 46, 47, 49; India, 53-55,
66, 70, 74, 93; China, 112, 116-128, 132, I34-I37, I39-I4I, 150,
16I, 165-172; Japan, I74, 182-186, 190, 198-200, 204-207, 2IO215, 224-228, 233-236; Philippines, 243, 245, 267, 268, 282-286,
290, 291, 296; Eastern lands, 315, 327-331, 335-343 (see Treaties, War).
Interpellation, parliamentary, India, 60, 72.
Intervention (see Foreign intervention).
Intervention, American, in Japan, 176.
Inukai, Mr., Japanese statesman, 232.
Iron, India, 92; China, 146; Japan, 227.
Irrigation, Egypt, 28, 29, 46; India, 65, 92-94, 104; China, 145, 146;
Philippines, 259; Eastern lands, 317.
Islam (see Mohammedanism).
Ismail, Khedive, 16, 17, 43.
Isolation, policy of, Japan, 183-185.
Italy, 74; interests in and relations with, Egypt, 31, 32, 49.
Italy, failure to retrieve disaster at Adowa, 69.




358


INDEX


Ito, Prince, Japanese statesman, I93, I94, 197-200, 202-204, 209, 2i6,
217; Resident-general in Korea, 208.
Iyemitsu, Shogun, Japan, 183.
Iyeyasu, Shogun, Japan, 183.
Jallianwala Bagh, 78, 79.
Japan, I74-237; comparisons with China, 113, 122, 127, 155; Philippines, 238, 239, 241, 252, 253, 257, 274, 290; Great Britain, 175 -178, 199, 220; relations with Philippines, 183, 241, 265, 284, 286.
Japan Advertiser, 219.
Jefferson, President, quoted, 341.
Jesuits, China, 116; Japan, 182, I83; Philippines, 243.
Jewelry, India, 94.
Jews, Egypt, 32.
Jinrikisha, China, 147; Japan, 222.
Joffe, Adolf, Soviet envoy, I4I.
John of Montecorvino, at Peking, II5.
Johnson, "Pussyfoot," in India, 95.
Jones act (see act, Jones).
Joseph, Hebrew patriarch, 28, 29.
Journalism (see press, newspaper).
Jubilee, Queen Victoria's, 1887, 70.
Judaism, China, II5.
Jury trial, right of, Japan, 236; Philippines, 271.
Justice, administration of, Egypt, 30, 33, 39, 40, 334; India, 334; China,
151, 152, I72, 334; Japan, I99, 334; Philippines, 248, 249, 270,
271, 334; Eastern lands, 334.
Jute, India, 92.
Kagawa, Toyohiko, 229.
Kakushin Club, party, Japan, 233.
Kalgan, China, I48.
Kamakura, Japan, I83.
Kana, Japanese script, 180.
Kang Yu-wei, reformer, China, 126.
Karachi, India, 93.
Karakhan, Mr., Soviet envoy, 168, 169.
Kassala, Sudan, 46.
Kato, Baron, 214-216, 2I8, 231.
Kato, Viscount, Takaaki, 233, 235.
Katsura, Prince, premier, Japan, 203, 204, 207-209, 216, 217.
Kens, Japan, 192.
Kenseikai, party, Japan, 209, 233.
Kenya, East Africa, 105, io6, 336.
Kiangsu, province, China, I70.
Kiao-chao, China, 123, 132, 136, 139, 140, i66, 210, 225.
Kipling, works of, 42, 43, 64, 67.
Kitchener, Lord, in Egypt, 19, 29; in India, 72.
Kiushiu, island, Japan, I82, 189.
Kiyoura, Viscount, premier, Japan, 232, 234, 235.
Kobe, Japan, 200, 229, 236.
Kokuminto, party, Japan, 193, 201, 209.
Komura, Count, foreign minister, Japan, 208.
Kono, Mr., president, house of representatives, Japan, 204.




INDEX                          359
Koo, Wellington, diplomat, China, 143, 167, I68.
Koranic law, 37, 39.
Korea, 123, 174-176, I78, I79, I82, I90; cause of Chino-Japanese war,
198; Japanese control of, 201, 206-209, 214, 223-226, 236, 286, 290.
Kowloon, peninsula, China, 123, 140.
Kublai Khan, 54, 115, I8I, 182.
Kurile Islands, 184, 190.
Kutab Minar, India, 53.
Kwangchow-wan, China, 123, 140, I66.
Kwang-su, Emperor, China, 125, 126, I29.
Kyoto, Japan, 175, i8o, 181.
Labor, labor conditions; Egypt, 42; India, 75, 104; China, 146, I70;
Japan, 179, 218, 229, 236; Eastern lands, 313, 315, 316, 339, 340
(see Corvee, Factory system, Strikes).
Lacquer, manufactures, Japan, 227.
Laenas, Popilius, Roman envoy, in Egypt, 13.
Land laws, Philippines, 259.
Land tax, India, 63; China, I50; Japan, I88.
Land, tenure of, Egypt, I5, 28, 29; India, 63; Japan, 179, 187, I88.
Landholders, landowners, Egypt, 29, 42; India, 61.
Languages, Egypt, 38; India, 52, 89, 90; China, 154; Japan, 177;
Philippines, 240, 247, 254, 255, 280 (see Arabic language, English
language, etc., Native languages).
Lansing-Ishii agreement, concerning China, 135, 212, 235.
La Perouse, quoted, 303.
Latitude, Japan, I74, 175; Philippines, 239.
Lausanne, treaty of, 47.
Law, legislation, Egypt, 32, 33, 39; India, 334; China, 151, 334;Japan,
191, 194, I99, 202, 236, 334; Philippines, 271, 273, 274; Eastern
lands, 334 -Law, rule of or enforcement of, Egypt, 30, 39; India, 86, 90; China,
159; Philippines, 280.
Lazarist missions, China, I I6.
League of Nations, 137, 236, 342; India, 336; China, 169; Philippines,
effect on, 282; council of, I37, 169.
Leather, manufactures, Japan, 227.
Lee of Fareham, Lord, commission, India, 108.
Legazpi, Spanish conqueror of Philippines, 242.
Legislature, Indian National, 76, 84, 85, 105, Io6, o08.
Legislature, legislative institutions (see representative institutions).
Legislature, Philippine, 249-252, 266, 273, 274, 276, 277, 291-293.
Lepers, India, 95.
Lesseps, Ferdinand de, 16.
Li Yuan-hung, President, China, 131, 133, I34, I42, 143, I66, 167.
Liang Shih-yi, premier, China, I41.
Libraries, public, Japan, 219.
Liao-tung, peninsula, 198.
License, drink traffic, India, 95.
Likin (see Provincial duties).
Lighthouses, Japan, I91.
Lincheng, China, bandit raid, 166, 167, I7I.
Lincoln, President, 120.
Linguistic comparisons, 254.




36o


INDEX


Literacy, Egypt, 35, 37, 323, 325; India, 62, 323, 325; China, 152, 323,
325; Japan, 229, 323, 325; Philippines, 253, 323, 325.
Literature, Egypt, 34; India, 97; China, 154; Japan, 179; Philippines,
242, 244; (see Press).
Liu Chiu Islands, 190.
Lloyd George, British premier, 21, 332; proposals of 1922 for Egypt,
25, 45.
Lo Wen-kan, finance minister, China, 143.
Loans, internal, China, 137, 150; Japan, 208, 221; (see Foreign loans).
Loans, Liberty, Filipino subscriptions, 266.
Local government, Egypt, 19; India, 57-60; China, 159; Japan, 191,
193; Philippines, 249; Great Britain, 60.
London, England, 47, 48, 12I.
London pact, of Allied powers, 211.
Longitude, Japan, I75.
Lucknow, India, 75, io6.
Lu Yung-hsiang, General, China, 170.
Luzon, Philippines, 242, 245.
Lytton, Lord, lieutenant-governor, Bengal, o06.
Macao, Portuguese at, 116, 140.
Macaulay, Lord, in India, 62.
MacDonald, Ramsay, British premier, 45, 48, 49, 107.
Machinery (see Factory system).
Madras, 54, 56, 58, 59, 84, 89, 91, 93, io6.
Magellan, 242.
Magna Carta, 40.
Mahabharata, 82.
Maktabs, elementary schools, Egypt, 36.
Makwar, Sudan, barrage, 46.
Malay, racial element in Japan, 177; race, in Philippines, 241, 242.
Malaya, British, 290.
Malaysia, 54.
Malolos, Philippines, 246.
Malthusian theory of population, 318, 319.
Mamelukes, Egypt, 14, 15.
Manchu dynasty, China, II6-131, 134.
Manchuria, 114, 127, 135, 137, 140-142, 170, 198, 205, 316; Japan in,
141, 206, 207, 224.
Mandate, territories under, 214.
Mandarin, dialect, I54.
Manganese, India, 92.
Manila, 239, 240, 242, 243, 246, 257, 258, 261, 263, 288, 292, 297, 303,
320, 321.
Manila Bay, 245.
Manila galleon, 243.
Manila Railroad Company, 263.
Manufactures, principal, India, 92; China, 146; Japan, 227; Philippines, 26I (see Industry).
Mariana Islands, 210.
Maritime customs service, China, 119, I48, I68.
Marshall, Humphrey, in China, 119.
Marshall, Vice-President, 287.
Marshall Islands, 210.




INDEX                          361
Martial law, Egypt, 25, 26, 42, 44.
Mary, Queen, England, 73.
Match factories, China, 146, 149; Japan, 227.
Matsukata, Prince, 202, 236.
Matting, manufactured, Japan, 227.
Mayo, Lord, Viceroy, India, 58.
McKinley, President, policy in Philippines, 246-248, 250, 262, 271.
Mecca, 47.
Medicine, medical work, China, 155; Japan, 191 (see Sanitation, Hospitals).
Mediterranean, 49.
Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt, 15, i6, 17, 27, 28, 37, 39, 42.
Meiji era, Japan, 216, 218.
Meiji Tenno, Japan, 209.
Mendicancy, Eastern lands, 258.
Menes, 13.
Mesopotamia, 74.
Mexico, relations of, Philippines, 242, 243.
Migration, problem of, 339, 340.
Militarism, Japan, 196, 201-204, 206, 210, 211, 213, 215, 217, 220.
Military affairs (see Army, Navy, War).
Military caste, Japan, I8I, 187, I88.
Military government, Philippines, 248.
Military governors, China, I33-I37, I43, 150, 159-161, 170.
Milner Commission in Egypt, 23, 24, 25; report of, 24, 51.
Minamoto family, Japan, I80.
Mindanao, Philippines, 242.
Mines, mining, principal mineral resources, Egypt, 27; India, 92; China,
123, 146; Japan, 227, 316; Eastern lands, 312, 315, 316.
Ming dynasty, China, II6, I33.
Ministerial responsibility (see Responsible government).
Ministry, cabinet, Egypt, I6, 21-25, 31, 45, 47, 48, 50; China, 130,
I33-I35, 137, 141, 143, 167; Japan, I94-I97, 200-203, 208-215,
231-233; Philippines, 292.
Minorities, minority groups, Egypt, 31, 32, 49; India, 61, 72; Philippines, 272, 274.
Mint, established, Japan, I78.
Minto, Earl of, Viceroy, India, 68, 72, 73.
Missions (see Christian missions, Greek Orthodox Church, Protestant
Churches, Roman Catholic Church, Friars, Jesuits).
Mixed tribunals, Egypt, 39.
Modernization, the distinctive characteristic of the West in contrast
with the East, 304.
Mohammedanism, Egypt, 34, 35, 36, 44, 333; India, 53, 54, 82-84, 90,
Io5, Io9; China, II5, I52; Philippines, 240-242, 272; East, 343.
Mohammedanism, political interests of, Egypt, 35; India, 53, 54, 6I,
69, 71-73, 83, 85.
Mohammedanism, religious interests of, Egypt, 35, 36, 47; India, 82, 84.
Mohammedan lands, rule of Christian powers in, 34, 73, 82, 337.
Mohammedan rule in Egypt, 13-14; India, 53-54.
Monetary system, China, I48.
Money lenders, Egypt, 29.
Money, replaces barter, 312.
Mongolia, 114, 140, I41, 169, 206, 224.




362                       INDEX
Mongolian racial element in Japan, I77.
Mongols, rule in China, 115, II6; attack Japan, I8I-I82.
Monroe Doctrine, quoted, 341; relation to Far East, 342.
Montagu, secretary of state for India, 75, 76, 85.
Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, for India (see Act, Government of
India, I919).
Moplah affair, India, 84.
Morality, of Filipinos, 281.
Morley, John, Lord, 72, 75, 76.
Morley-Minto reforms (see Act, Indian councils, 1909).
Morocco, 74.
Moros, Philippines, 242, 244, 272, 297.
Morrison, Robert, in China, II6.
Mortality, infant, Egypt, 39, 320; India, 320; China, 320; Japan, 320;
Philippines, 257, 258, 320, 321; United States, 320.
Mortality, Philippines, 257; Eastern lands, 319-321
Moslem League (see All-India Moslem League).
Most favored nation provision in treaties, China, 117, 123, 125;
Japan, I85.
Motor boats, Philippines, 260.
Muddiman commission, India, 107, io8.
Mughal Empire, India, 54, 8I.
Municipal institutions (see Cities; Councils, municipal; Local government); India, 57; China, I58, I59; Philippines, 248.
Munro, Sir Thomas, in India, 63.
Mutiny, Sepoy, India, 55, 56, 66, 90.
Mutsuhito, Emperor, Japan, I86, I94, 209.
Nacionalista party, Philippines, 277, 295.
Nadir Shah, invades India, 55.
Nagasaki, Japan, I84, 192, 200.
Nanking, I70.
Nanking, treaty of, 112, 17.
Naoroji, Dadabai, Parsi, 69.
Nara, Japan, I79.
National Cement Company, Philippines, 263.
National Coal Company, Philippines, 263.
Nationalism, nationalist, 21; Egypt, 17, 22, 23, 27, 31, 35, 42, 45, 50;
India, 65, 68, 87, 88, 97, 1oo, 102-106, Io8; China, 154; Philippines, 240, 241, 247, 253-255, 260, 276, 286, 293, 294, 297; East,
332; (see Indian National Congress).
Native States (see India, native states).
Native attitude to foreign domination, etc. (see Foreign domination, etc.).
Native fitness for political responsibility (see Political responsibility).
Native languages, India, 89; Philippines, 240, 254 (see Language).
Natives in civil service (see Civil service, natives in).
Naval base, American, in Philippines, 281, 291, 296.
Navigation (see Shipping; Steam navigation).
Navy, Japan, I86, I9I, I96, 200, 209, 210, 215, 22I, 235; United States,
in Philippines, 272, 283.
Negritos, in Philippines, 241.
Neutralization, possible, Philippines, 282; Suez and Panama canals, 48.
Nile, river, value for irrigation, 27, 28, 46.




INDEX


363


Nine-power pact, Washington conference, 165, 235.
Ningpo, China, II7.
Nobility, new, Japan, 194.
Non-Brahmins, India, 91.
Non-Christian tribes, Philippines, 241, 272, 274.
Non-co6peration, India, 8I, 83, 85, 87, o08.
Non-Egyptian peoples in Egyptian population, 31, 32, 36.
Non-resistance, India, 81, 83, 85, io8.
North, in China (see Peking government).
North, Lord, regulating act of, India, 55.
Northwest frontier, India, 52, 66, Ioo, 109.
Northwest Frontier Province, India, 66.
Northwest Provinces, India, 57.
Oath, imperial or charter, Japan, 187, 191, 192, I95.
O'Dwyer, Sir Michael, lieutenant-governor, Punjab, India, 80.
Office holders, officials (see civil service).
Okuma, Marquis, Japan, 193, 201, 202, 209-211, 217, 218.
Open-door policy, China, 18, I25, 135, 139, 164, 262.
Ophthalmic troubles, Egypt, 39.
Opinion, of British residents in India, 59, 78.
Opium, cultivation, China, 145; smoking, China, 156; trade, China,
117, I45.
Opium War, China, 117.
Oregon, 124.
Organic law, Egypt, 19.
Osaka, Japan, 228, 229.
Osmena retirement act, Philippines, 272.
Osmena, speaker of assembly, Philippines, 250, 272, 277, 293, 295.
Otis, General, Philippines, 248.
Ottoman Empire (see Turks, Ottoman).
Ozaki, Mr., statesman, Japan, 221.
Pacific Ocean, questions, 139; German possessions in, 209, 2I0.
Pacific, Northern, American interests in, I24, I84.
Pacific, Western, American interests in, 238, 247, 261, 282.
Pagans, Philippines, 241, 272.
Palestine, 74.
Panama Canal, 48.
Pan-Islamism, 34, 74, 82.
Paris, 47, 121; treaty of, 1898, 245.
Paris Peace Conference, Egypt, 21, 22, 23; India, 336; China, 135, 136;
Japan, 212; Philippines, 276, 286.
Parliament (see Great Britain, parliament of).
Parliament, Egypt, 45; China, 130, 132, 134, 135, 142, 143, 167.
Parliamentary institutions or government (see Representative institutions, Responsible government).
Parsis, India, 69.
Parties, political, Egypt, 45; India, 87, 91, io6, o08; China, 136, 138;
Japan, 196, I97, 201, 202, 209, 217, 231-233; Philippines, 276, 277,
295; United States, 296.
Party government (see responsible government).
Passive resistance (see non-resistance).




364


INDEX


Pax Britannica, India, 70, 89, 90, 99, Ioo.
Pax Romana, 13.
Peers, House of, Japan, 194, I95, 197, 203, 208, 218, 232, 233.
Peking, 115, Ii6, 119, 129, 134, 141, 148, 155, i66, 169, 171, 198, 235;
siege of legations, 126, 205.
Peking government, 133, 136, 138, 139, 142, 165, I68, 170, I7I.
Peking Union Medical College and Hospital, 321.
Periodicals, circulation of, 325 (see Press).
Permanent settlement of revenue, Bengal, 63.
Perry, Commodore, intervention in Japan, 122, 176, 183-185.
Persia, relations with India, ancient, 52, 8I; modern, 55, 74, 93.
Pescadores Islands, I98.
Petroleum, India, 92; China, 146, 150.
Pharaoh, 28.
Philip II of Spain, 54, 183.
Philippine Commonwealth Bill, 295.
Philippines, 238-299; comparison with, China, I55.
Phonetic writing, China, 154; Japan, 179, I80.
Physical training, Philippines, 253.
Pilgrimages to Mecca, 47.
Pirates, China, i66, 172; Moro, Philippines, 242, 244.
Plague, bubonic, Egypt, 38; India, 64, 71; Eastern lands, 320.
Platt Amendment plan, in Cuba, suggested for Egypt, 33; Philippines,
283, 296.
Plebiscite, proposed, on independence, Philippines, 296.
Political conditions and progress, estimate of, Japan, 215-221; Eastern
lands, 309-311, 326, 327.
Political mindedness, 98, 99.
Political responsibility, native fitness for, Egypt, 32, 40, 42-44, 326;
India, 58, 59, 62, 67, 68, 72-74, 76, 78, 86-88, 97-104, 326; China,
326; Japan, 196, 219, 229, 326; Philippines, 273, 274, 276, 277,
279-283, 289, 295, 326; Eastern lands, 326.
Polo, Marco, India, 54; China, 115; Japan, 182.
Population, Egypt, 30, 31, 41, 342; India, 88, 89, 342; China, 114, 115,
144, 342; Japan, 174, 175, 222, 342; Philippines, 238, 239, 342;
Great Britain, 175, 342; United States, 342 (see Foreign communities).
Population, increase of, Egypt, 41, 318, 319; India, 318, 319; China,
319; Japan, 222-229, 318, 319; Philippines, 239, 318, 319; Eastern
lands, 318-320; United Kingdom, 318; United States, 318, 319;
Malthusian theory and its application, 318, 319.
Population, urban, 306; India, 91; Japan, 228, 229; Philippines, 240;
United States, 9I; Eastern lands, 313, 317.
Pork, China, I44.
Port Arthur, 123, 205.
Port Sudan, 46.
Ports (see Treaty ports).
Portsmouth, treaty of, 206.
Portugal, relations with, India, 53, 54; China, 116, 140; Japan, 182;
Philippines, 285.
Portugal, Spanish rule in, 183.
Pound, Egyptian money, 41.
Poverty, India, 317; China, 317; Japan, 229; Philippines, 258; Eastern
lands, 258, 313, 314, 317.




INDEX


365


Post office, postal facilities, India, 93; China, 122, 148, 150; foreign in,
139; Japan, 191, 222.
President, China, 131, 132, 134, 135, I7I; (see United States,
president of).
Press, book and periodical, development and influence of, Egypt, 34,
324; India, 96, 97, 324; China, 155, 324; Japan, 219, 324; Philippines, 257, 324; Eastern lands, 324 (see Periodicals, circulation of).
Press, foreign language newspaper, Egypt, 38; India, 96, 97; China,
155; Japan, 219; Philippines, 257.
Press, freedom of, Egypt, 38; India, 79, 97; Japan, 219; Philippines, 257.
Press, native or vernacular newspaper, Egypt, 31, 38, 50; India, 96;
China, 155; Japan, 219; Philippines, 257.
Price regulation, Philippines, 266.
Princes, chamber of, India, 77, 84.
Prisons, China, 152.
Privy Council, Japan, 194, 195, 204, 215.
Proclamation, Queen's, for India, 1858, 56.
Progress in East, indexes of, 311, 312, 318, 320, 321, 325.
Progress in East, Problems of, 300-343.
Propaganda, Filipino, in United States, 286, 297, 299.
Protectorate, American, possible plan for Philippines, 282.
Protectorate, British, in Egypt, 20, 21, 23, 25.
Protestant Churches, missions of, Egypt, 36; China, II6, II8, 128, 152,
164; Japan, 184, 192, 230; Philippines, 241; (see Christian schools
and colleges).
Protestant Episcopal Church, Philippines, 241.
Provinces, India, 56, 89; China, 114, 133, 153, I57-I59, 167, 170;
Japan, 192 (see councils, provincial; local government).
Provincial duties, China, 139, I50.
Public works, Egypt, 29; India, 6I (see Canals, Irrigation, Railroads,
Roads, Sanitation, etc.).
Punjab, the, province, India, 57, 79, 80, 84, 89.
Pu-yi, Emperor, China, 129-131, 134 (reigning title, Hsuan-tung).
Quarantine, Egypt, 38.
Queue, China, i56.
Quezon, President of Philippine senate, 250, 255, 277, 287, 288, 293, 295.
Races, India, 52, 89, 90, 99; China, 112, 114, I41; Japan, 177; Philippines, 238, 240, 275; Eastern lands, 300.
Racial equality, 300, 301, 304, 320, 336-340; Japan, 221, 236, 320;
India, 336; Philippines, 336, 337.
Radio-telegraphy, China, 148; foreign in, I39.
Rai, Lajpat, Indian nationalist, 65, o05, IIo.
Railroads, 307; Egypt, 47; India, 65, 93; China, 123, 128, 138, 140,
147, 148, 150, i66, 169, 170; Japan, 191, 207, 221, 222; Philippines,
260; Eastern lands, 311; Sudan, 46.
Railroads, mileage, Egypt, 311; India, 93, 94, 311; China, 128, 147, 3II;
Japan, 221, 311; Philippines, 311; United States, 3II.
Rainfall, India, 92.
Rangoon, Burma, 93.
Reading, Lord, Viceroy, India, 84, 85, 105.
Reading, Suggestions for, Egypt, 50-5I; India, Io9-III; China, 172 -173; Japan, 236-237; Philippines, 298-299.




366


INDEX


Recent events, Egypt, 44-50; India, Io4-109; China, 164-172; Japan,
231-236; Philippines, 291-298.
Reclamation of lands, China, 146; Philippines, 259.
Red Cross, China, 155 (see American Red Cross).
Red Sea route to India (see Suez Canal).
Reforestation (see forests).
Regent, Prince, Japan (see Hirohito).
Religion, religious conditions (see Buddhism, Christianity, etc.).
Egypt, 34-36, 44, 47, 303; India, 52, 84, 90, 91, 99, 105, 303;
China, II5, II6, II8, 152, 303; Japan, 179, 187, I92, 230, 231,
303; Philippines, 238, 240, 241, 244, 278, 279; Eastern lands,
303, 333-340.
Religious strife, India, 84, 105, o09.
Religious toleration, Egypt, 34, 44; China, II8, 152; Japan, 230.
Renaissance, significance for West, I63, 301-304; absent from East, 302.
Representative institutions, 304; Egypt, 27, 44; India, 57, 6i, 73, 76,
78, 98, 99, IoI; China, 130; Japan, 192-198, 217, 218; Philippines,
249, 273-278; Eastern lands, 326, 327.
Representatives, House of, Japan, I94, I95, 202-204, 208, 218, 232, 233.
Republic, established, China, I31; permanency of, 156.
Republican party, United States, 250, 251, 296.
Reserved subjects, India, 77.
Responsible government, Egypt, 44; India, 76-78, Io6-I8; Japan,
I95-197, 20o, 202, 217, 232; Philippines, 250, 275-277, 289, 293,
294; Eastern lands, 326, 327.
Restoration, Japan, 186-191, 216, 230.
Revenue, national income, Egypt, 48; India, 94; China, 150, 159, 165,
i68; Japan, 188; Philippines, 263.
Revenue, settlement of, India, 63.
Revolution, China, 1911, comparisons with, 138, 144, I56, 157; effects
of I57-I60, I63, 164 (see Epochs of Chinese revolution).
Revolution, in Spain, affects Philippines, 244 (see American Revolution, French Revolution, Industrial Revolution).
Rhodes, island, 74.
Ricci, Jesuit, at Peking, 116.
Rice, India, 92; China, 144; Japan, 179, 188; Philippines, 259, 266,
309, 318; market value, 309.
Ripon, Lord, Viceroy, India, 58-60, 64.
Rizal, Jos6, Filipino author and patriot, 244-246, 288.
Roads, highways, Egypt, 15; India, 93; China, 147; Philippines, 260.
Rockefeller Foundation, helps rebuild University of Tokio, 235.
Roman Catholic Church, missions of (see Friars, Jesuits), Egypt, 36;
India, 90; China, II6, 118; Japan, 182-184, 192, 230; Philippines,
241, 243, 247, 278, 279, 287.
Rome, 47, 8I.
Rome, republic and empire, control Egypt, 13, 49.
Roosevelt, President, terminated Russo-Japanese War, 206; attitude
to Philippines, 287.
Root, Elihu, secretary of war, 248.
Rosetta stone, I4.
Rowlatt acts, India, 78, 79.
Roxas, Manuel, Speaker, Philippine assembly, 295.
Rubber, Philippines, 259, 292.
Rushdi Pasha, premier, Egypt, 21, 23.




INDEX


367


Russia, empire, relations with India, 66, 205; China, 120, 121, 123, 127,
132, 141; Japan, 123, 127, 128, I84, 185, 190, I92, 98, 204-207, 21.
Russia, Soviet government, relations with China, 117, 141, I6i, i68,
169, 171; Japan, I69, 235; Eastern lands, 215.
Saad Pasha (see Zaghlul).
Sadler commission, India, 75, 95.
Saghalien, 184, 190, 206.
Said, Khedive, Egypt, I6.
Saigo insurrection, Japan, 189.
Saionji, Marquis, premier, Japan, 204, 208, 209, 236.
Saito, Baron, Governor-general, Korea, 214.
Salem, Mass., 19.
Salt, India, 92.
Salt tax, India, 105; China, I50.
Samurai, Japan, I8o, 181, 187, i88, I93.
San Francisco, Cal., 121, 124.
Sanitation, Egypt, 38; India, 64, 95, 104; China, 155, 321; Philippines,
247, 253, 257, 258, 269, 321; Eastern lands, 320, 321.
Sanskrit learning, influence, Japan, I79.
Sarwat Pasha, Premier, Egypt, 25, 26.
Sati, widow-burning, India, suppressed, 64.
Satsuma, clan, Japan, I86, I89, 200, 209, 217.
Satsuma rebellion, Japan, 189, I90.
Scholars, China, 163.
School attendance, Egypt, 36, 37, 323, 325; India, 96, 323, 325; China,
I53, 323, 325; Japan, 229, 323, 325; Philippines, 252, 297, 323, 325.
Schools (see Christian schools and colleges, Education, School attendance).
Schurman commission, Philippines, 248.
Science, India, 97; Philippines, 256.
Scouts, Philippine, 284, 297.
Seamen, Philippines, 265.
Secret societies, Philippines, 244.
Secretary of state for India, British, 56, 57, 66, 72, 75, 85, 107.
Secretary of war, United States, supervises Philippines, 247, 248, 295.
Sedition, India, 79.
Seiyu-honto party, Japan, 232, 233.
Seiyukai party, Japan, 202, 204, 208, 209, 211-213, 231-233.
Self-government, movement for and progress toward, Egypt, 27, 31-33,
36, 43, 326; India, 58, 59, 62, 75, 78, 80, 81, 83, 86-88, 98-100, 104,
107, 326; Philippines, 246, 252, 268, 272, 277-291, 295.
Selim, Ottoman sultan, becomes caliph, 14.
S&vres, treaty of, 34, 82, 83.
Seward, American secretary of state, 121.
Shameen, Canton, 168.
Shanghai, 117, 119, 140, 146, 147, 155, 170, 171.
Shantung, province, China, 145; Japanese interests in, 132, 135, 136,
139, I40, I66, 212, 225.
Shansi, province, China, 153, I70.
Shensi, province, China, 170.
Shintoism, religion, Japan, 187, 230, 233.
Shipping, China, 147; Japan, I91, 226; Philippines, 262, 265 (see Steam
navigation).




368                       INDEX
Shogunate, shoguns, Japan, I80-I86.
Shop-keeping class, Egypt, 27, 32; Philippines, 264.
Sianfu, China, 170.
Siberia, Russia in, 141; Japan in, 212-215.
Sikhs, people and religion, India, 90.
Silk, cultivation, China, 145, 150, 317; Japan, 317; manufacture,
China, 146; Japan, 227; market value, 308.
Silver, decline in exchange of, India, 94; China, 122, 148.
Simla, India, 105.
Sinha, Lord, Indian statesman, 67, 72.
Smallpox, Egypt, 38; Philippines, 258.
Social conditions and reforms, Egypt, 30-39; India, 89-92, 94-99, 109;
China, 151-156, 161-164, 170; Japan, I8I, 188-192, 211-213, 218 -219, 228-231; Philippines, 252-259, 277-281; Eastern lands, 315,
320-326 (see racial equality).
Social democracy, Japan, 315.
Social relations, between Europeans and natives, in East, 338-340.
Socialism, Japan, 315.
Soviet government (see Russia, Soviet government).
South Africa, 69, 70, 8o; Union of, 19, 331, 336.
South, China (see Canton government).
Spain, estimate of rule of, Philippines, 240, 244.
Spain, relations with India, 54; China, 116; Japan, 183, 184; Philippines, I 6, 239, 240, 242-244, 265, 271.
Spanish language, Philippines, 240, 254.
Spheres of influence, China, 123, 140.
"Squeeze," corrupt practice, China, 151, 162, 316, 335.
"Stable government," Philippines, 246, 248, 251, 268, 274, 287, 289.
Stack, Sir Lee, assassinated, Egypt, 50.
State ownership, India, 93; Japan, 207, 221; Philippines, 263-264.
Statehood, for Philippines, question of, 275.
Statistics (see Area, Literacy, Mortality, Periodicals, Circulation, Population, School attendance, Railroads, Telegraphs, etc.).
Steam navigation, inland and coastal, China, 147; Philippines, 260 (see
Shipping).
Steam navigation, oceanic, 307; effect of, China, 122; Philippines, 243
(see Shipping).
Streets, China, 147.
Strikes, labor and political, Egypt, 23, 26, 35, 42; China, 136, i68;
Japan, 211, 213.
Students, native abroad, Egypt, 15; China, 130; Philippines, 256;
Eastern lands, 324, 328, 329.
Students, political activity of, Egypt, 26, 35; India, 63; China, 130,
163; Eastern lands, 329.
Suakin, Sudan, 46.
Sudan, Anglo-Egyptian, 42, 44-47.
Suez canal and route to India and East, I6, 25, 45, 46, 48, 49, 93,
124, 243.
Suffrage (see Election, privilege of, Franchise, right of).
Suffrage, woman, India, 60; Philippines, 292; Western lands, 305;
Great Britain, 60.
Sugar, Philippines, 261, 318; scandal, Japan, 208.
Sukkur, irrigation project, India, 104.
Sulu archipelago, Philippines, 242.




INDEX


369


Sun Pao-chi, premier, China, 167, 168.
Sun Yat-sen, Chinese political leader, 131, 132, 137, 138, I41-143,
167, I68.
Sunday, Japan, 230.
Super-tuchuns (see military governors).
Surat, India, 69.
Swadeshi, home industries, India, 72, 8I.
Swaraj, self-government, India, 81.
Swarajist party, India, o08.
Syrian Christians, in India, 9o.
Syrians, in Egypt, 31, 32.
Sze, Alfred, diplomat, China, I43.
Sze-chuen, province, China, I31.
Taft, William H., Civil Governor, Philippines, 249, 272.
Tagalog, language, Philippines, 240.
Taiping rebellion, China, 118, II9.
Taira family, Japan, 180.
Takahashi, Baron, Premier, Japan, 214.
Taoism, religion, China, 152.
Tao-kwang, Emperor, China, 117.
Tariff, conventional, China, 118, 139, 140, 169; Japan, 185, 199, 200,
208, 336.
Tariff duties, India, 65; China, 119, 139, 150, 169; Japan, 200, 208, 234;
Philippines, 250, 261-263.
Tata Sons Corporation, India, 92.
Tatnall, Commodore, in China, 120.
Taxes, assessment of, Egypt, 30, 34; India, 58, 63; Japan, 193.
Taxes, burden of, Egypt, 33, 41; India, 60, 63, 86, I05, Io9; Japan,
200, 206, 323; Philippines, 264, 269; Eastern lands, 321, 322;
United Kingdom, 322; United States, 269, 322.
Taxes, collection of, Egypt, 30, 41, 335; India, 335.
Taxes, kinds of, China, 137, 150; Japan, 179, 188.
Tea, India, 92, 318; China, 122, I44, 145, 150.
Teacher training (see Education, normal).
Teachers, American, in Philippines, 252, 255.
Telegraphs, 307; Egypt, 311; India, 93, 94, 31I; China, 122, 128, 148,
150, 311; Japan, 191, 222, 311; Philippines, 311; Eastern lands,
311; United States, 311 (see Cable, submarine; Radio-telegraphy).
Tel-el-Kebir, battle, Egypt, 17, 42.
Telephones, 307; China, 148; Japan, 222; Eastern lands, 3II.
Temperance, habit of and movement for, India, 95; Philippines, 281.
Terauchi, Count, in Korea, 208; premier, Japan, 211, 212, 217, 218.
Territorial integrity, China, II3, 118, 119, 123-126, 136, 140, 161.
Tewfik, Khedive, Egypt, I7, i8.
Thagi, suppressed, India, 64, 90.
Thomas, St., in India, 90.
Thomason, James, in India, 64.
Thrift, personal, needs inculcation, Philippines, 268, 269.
Tibet, I14, 140; Younghusband mission to, 66, 70.
Tientsin, China, 134, 147, I55.
Time, value of, 304, 314; not realized by Orientals, 326, 327.
Tin, China, 146, I50.
Tobacco, China, 150; Philippines, 261; tax on, China, 137.




370


INDEX


Tokugawa shoguns, Japan, 182-186.
Tokyo, 175, I83, 209, 228, 236; earthquake, 231, 233; reconstruction,
234, 235.
Torture, Egypt, 30, 39; China, I5I; Eastern lands, 334.
Trade (see Commerce, and finance, private).
Trade, eastern, with Europe, in earlier times, 14, 53, 54, 115, 1I6.
Trans-Caspian Railway, 93.
Transferred subjects, India, 77, 107.
Transportation, means of, 307; India, 93, 94; China, 147, 148; Japan,
221; Philippines,, 260, 269; Eastern lands, 311, 316 (see Automobiles, Canals, Railroads, Roads, Shipping).
Travelers, influence of, on East, 329.
Treaties, affecting, Egypt, 18, 23, 49, 74; India, 66, 70, 74; China,
112, II7-I24, 127, 132, I35-I37, 139, I40, I65, I68, 169, 198, 235;
Japan, 127, 132, 135, I36, 139, 140, 165, I85, I98, 199, 204-214,
235; Philippines, 235, 245, 282, 291 (see names of places where
signed).
Treaty nations or powers, China, II7-19, 121, 122, I25-128, 139, I40,
i6i, i66, i68, 171.
Treaty ports, China, 117; Japan, 200 (see Port concessions).
Treaty revision, China, 119; Japan, 190, 197, 199, 200, 208, 217.
Tripolitania, 49, 74.
Tsao Kun, president, China, 137, 143, 167, i68, 171.
Tsu-hsi, empress dowager, China, 126, 129, 130.
Tsung-li-yamen, foreign office, China, 120.
Tsushima, straits, 175.
Tuan Chi-jui, Premier, China, I33-137, I71.
Tuberculosis, Philippines, 258.
Tuchuns (see Military governors).
Turks, government at Angora, 26, 47, 109.
Turks, Ottoman, debt of, secured by Egyptian tribute, 47; relations
with Egypt, 14, I5, I8-20, 31, 47; Italy, 19, 34, 74; Balkan states,
19, 34, 74 -Turks, Young, reforming and revolutionary party, 18, 19, 74, 82, 83.
"Twenty-one demands," of Japan, on China, 132, 161, 209, 21o.
Typhoid, Philippines, 258.
Unification of India under British rule, compared with unification of
Italy and of Germany, 55.
Union of South Africa, 19, 331, 336.
United Presbyterian Church, missions, Egypt, 36.
United Provinces, India, 85, 89.
United States, commercial relations of, Egypt, 41, 48, 342; India, 94,
342; China, 1I6, 124, 125, 150, 170; Japan, 227, 228; Philippines,
261-263, 265, 267.
United States, congress of, and Philippines, 249, 266, 274, 295.
United States, credit of, pledged to Philippines, 270.
United States, domestic policy of, influence on Philippines, 331.
United States, estimate of rule of, in Philippines, 261, 262, 279, 280,
288-291.
United States, expenditures of, for Philippines, 269, 270, 283.
United States, foreign policy of, 340-342.
United States, future policy of, in Philippines, 275-290, 294-297.
United States, history of rule of, in Philippines, 245-251, 291-298.




INDEX


37I


United States, Philippine commissions in, 274, 286, 295, 299.
United States, policy of, in Philippines, 245-252.
United States, political and diplomatic relations of, Egypt, 23, 342;
India, 103, io6, 342; China, 112, 117-121, 123-127, 129, 132, I34,
135, 140, 164, 165, 342; Japan, 135, 184, 185, 191, 193, 205, 211 -214, 233-235, 237, 342; Philippines, 124, 214, 238, 245, 246, 342.
United States, president of, and Philippines, 274, 296.
United States, rule of, in Philippines, native attitude to, 246, 247, 281,
286-288.
United States, supreme court of, 249.
Unity, national, Japan, I77.
Universal Postal Union, China, 148.
Universities, Egypt, 26, 34-37; China, 129, 145, 152; Japan, 191, 229,
235; Philippines, 243, 256.
University, American, Cairo, 36; El Azhar, Cairo, 26, 34, 35, 37; State,
Cairo, 37; Canton Christian College, 145; Nanking, 145; National,
Peking, 152; Sapporo, I9I; Tokyo, 235; Santo Tomas, Manila,
243; the Philippines, Manila, 256.
Unrest, India, 63, 66, 73.
"Untouchables," India, 82, 9I.
Vaccination (see Smallpox).
Venetians, in Egypt, 14, i6.
Venice, 54.
Vernacular, use of, China, I54.
Versailles, treaty of, 23, 136, 161, 214.
Vice-governor, Philippines, 249.
Viceroy, India, 56, 58, 64, 72, 76, 84, io8.
Village community, China, 158.
Visayan languages, Philippines, 240.
Wales, Prince of, in India, 84.
Wang Chung-hui, premier, China, 143.
War, British First China War, 117; British Second China War, 120;
Chino-Japanese War, 123, 197, I98, 217; Russo-Japanese War, 70,
127, 128, 204-207, 2I7; Spanish, with United States, 123, 124, 244;
Egyptian, in Sudan, 42; British with Afghanistan, 1919, 86;
Balkan Wars, 19, 74; Italo-Turkish War, 19, 74.
War, World, participation in, Egypt, 20; India, 74; China, 134, 135;
Japan, 209-212; Philippines, 266, 284, 286; Effect of, Egypt, 19,
20, 4I; India, 74; China, 132, 134, 149, 164; Japan, 217, 224, 225;
Philippines, 265-267, 272, 283; Eastern lands, 313, 331-333;
Ottoman Empire, 34, 82.
Ward, Frederick, in China, 119.
Washington Conference, 1921-22, on Pacific and Far East problems,
139-142, i6i, I65, I66, 171, 173, 214, 215, 221, 225, 235, 237, 282,
290, 341.
Washington, D. C., 23, 47, 297.
Washington, George, President, quoted, 34I.
Washington, Philippine resident commissioners at, 274, 290.
Washington, state, 233.
Weeks, J. W., Secretary of War, 295.
Wei-hai-wei, China, 123, 140, I66.
Wells, Sidney, Egypt, 37.




372                       INDEX
West Indies, 75.
Western nations, interests and relations of, Egypt, 16, 17, 27, 32, 33,
47; India, 54, 262; China, 114, 116-126, 132, 134, 135, 140-165,
167-172; Japan, I82-I85, 198, 205-207, 211-216; Philippines,
240-251, 283-286, 290, 29I; Eastern lands, 330-343 (see under
names of the several western countries).
Wheat, India, 92; market value, 308.
Wilson, President, 21, 23, 332; relations to China, 132, 135; attitude to
Philippines, 249-251, 276, 286, 287.
Wines, tax on, China, I37, 150.
Wingate, Sir Reginald, in Egypt, 21.
Wireless (see Radio-telegraphy).
Woman, status of, Egypt, 37; India, 96; China, 156; Philippines, 238,
253; Eastern lands, 338.
Woman suffrage (see Suffrage).
Women's Clubs, Federation of, Philippines, 257.
Wood, Sir Charles, educational policy for India, 62.
Wood, General Leonard, Governor-general, Philippines, 25I, 273, 292 -295, 297.
Wood-Forbes Report, on Philippines, 251, 293, 299.
Woolen manufactures, Japan, 227.
Wrecking policy, India, 87.
Wright, Luke E., Governor-general, Philippines, 249.
Wu Pei-fu, General, China, 136, 137, 142, 143, I6o, 167, I68, 170, I7I.
Xavier, St. Francis, in China, 116; in Japan, 182.
Yamagata, Prince, Premier, Japan, 202, 203, 205, 209, 218, 232.
Yamamoto, Count, Premier, Japan, 209, 231.
Yang-tse, river, 115, 142.
Yap, discussion over, 214.
Yedo (see Tokyo).
Yellow peril, I6I, 342.
Yen Hsl-shan, General, China, I53.
Yen, W. W., premier, China, 165, I68.
Yokohama, 200; earthquake, 233.
Yokosuka, naval port, earthquake, 233.
Yoritomo, Shogun, Japan, I80.
Yoshihito, Emperor, Japan, I78, 209, 214.
Younghusband mission to Tibet, 66, 70.
Young, John Russell, in China, 122.
Young Turks (see Turks, Young).
Yuan Shih-kai, President, China, 131-133, 135, I37, I56.
Zaghlul Pasha (Saad), Premier, Egypt, 21-26, 44-50.
Zaghlulists, Egypt, 44, 45.








THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
GRADUATE LIBRARY
DATE DUE
AY 11tt,,,
r- '  o  i982
APR 3 01984
Rv i^  N


Form 9584




UL 14194
UNIV. OF C'-l.
UIBRAR


UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
3 9015 00528 8504...!~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~. 


/