36TH CONGRESS,   HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.      REPORT
1st Session.                                             No. 394.
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PROTEST OF THE PRESIDENT AGAINST CERTAIN PRO   CEEDINGS O)F THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
APRIL 9, 1860.-Ordered to be printed.
APRIL 10, 1860.-The further consideration of the subject postponed till Monday next,
April 16.
APRIL 12, 1860.-Resolved, That there be printed, for the use of the House, twenty-five
thousand extra copies of the President's protest, with the majority and minority reports
thereon.
Mr. HIcKMAN, from the Committee on the Judiciary, made the fol                              lowing
REPORT.
The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom  was referred the special
message of the President of the United States to the House of Repre   sentatives, beg leave to submit the following report:
On the 5th day of March last Hon. John Covode, a representative
in Congress from the State of Pennsylvania, submitted, and the
House of Representatives adopted, the following resolutions:
" Resolved, That a committee of five members be appointed by the
Speaker for the purpose of investigating whether the President of the
United States, or any other officer of the government, has, by money,
patronage, or other improper means, sought to influence the action of
Congress, or any committee thereof, for or against the passage of any
law appertaining to the rights of any State or Territory; also to inquire into and investigate whether any officer and officers of the government have, by combination or otherwise, prevented and defeated,
or attempted to prevent or defeat, the execution of any law or laws
now upon the statute books, and whether the President has failed or
refused to compel the execution of any law thereof; that said committee shall investigate and inquire into the abuses at the Chicago
and other post offices, and at the Philadelphia and other navy yards,
and into any abuses in connexion with the public buildings and other
public works of the United States.
"And resolved further, That as the President, in his letter to the
Pittsburg centenary celebration of the 25th November, 1858, speaks
of the employment of money to carry elections, said committee shall
inquire into and ascertain the amount so used in Pennsylvania, and
any other State or States; in what districts it was expended, and by
whom and by whose authority it was done, and from what source the
money was derived, and to report the names of the parties implicated;
and that for the purpose aforesaid, said committee shall have power
to send for persons and papers, and report at any time."
The message comes as a protest against this action of the House. The
President complains that he has been " abused," and that the consti 
TITHE PRESIDENT'S PROTEST.
tutional rights and immunities of the Executive have been violated in
his person.  The material positions assumed in the communication
are substantially embraced in the following propositions:
1. That the House of Representatives possesses no power under the
Constitution, except as an impeaching body, to accuse the President
of the United States, or any other officer of the government.
2. That the first recited resolution is an accusation of high crimes
and misdemeanors against the President, and that his accuser has
been constituted one of his judges.
3. That the charge is too vague and general.
4. That there is danger under such a precedent of an aggrandizement of the legislative, at the expense of the executive and judicial
departments.
In consideration of the high source from which the manifesto proceeds, the committee prefer to confine themselves to an examination
of the postulates of the paper, however obnoxious to criticism its
general tone may be on the score of taste and temper. But they
cannot restrain an expression of their deep regret that an officer
who prides himself upon the fact that " the people have thought
proper to invest him with the most honorable, responsible, and dignified office in the world," and who declares he feels " proudly conscious there is no public act of his (my) life which will not bear the
strictest scrutiny," and that he defies " all investigation," should
forget, amid the surroundings of place, and power, and flattery, that
he is but the servant of that same people, and that he should shrink
back in anger or terror from a simple inquiry into his stewardship.
This is the first time under the republic a Chief Executive has left a
recorded admission that he has been made oblivious of the origin and
ephemeral character of his position by the revelries of its enjoyment.
To distinguish such conduct by approbation would be to sanction
kingly prerogative, and to proclaim that rightful rule came " by the
grace of God," and not from the confidence of men. The nation,
always charitable in the interpretation of acts and motives, is not prepared to overlook such a delinquency.
The President of the United States, under the Constitution, possesses
neither privilege nor immunity beyond the humblest citizen, and is
less favored in this respect than senators and representatives in Con gress.  Article 1, section 6, reads: "They (the senators and repre sentatives) shall, in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the
peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the session
of their respective houses, and in going to and returning from the
same." No such exemption is made in behalf of the Executive or
any other officer of government. The conduct of the President is
always subject to the constitutional supervision and judgment of Con gress; whilst he, on the contrary, has no such power over either branch
of that body.  He is left, under the law, without shield or protection
of any kind, except such as is borne by all. He is as amenable for all
his acts after inauguration as before.  He can make no plea which is
denied to any other citizen, and is subject to the same scrutiny,
nrial, and punishment, with the proceedings, hazards, and pen alties of impeachment superadded. The President and the citizen
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THE PRESIDENT'S PROTEST.
stand upon equality of rights. The distinction between them arises
from an inequality of duties. Wherever the conduct of the latter
is open to inquiry and charge, that of the former is not the less
so. The President affirms, with seeming seriousness, in comparing
himself with the House of Representatives, that, "as a co-ordinate
branch of the government, he is their equal." This is denied in
emphatic terms. He is "co-ordinate" but not co-equal. IHIe is "coordinate," for he" holds the same rank," but he is not co-equal, for
his immunities and powers are less. The members of the House may
claim a privilege, whether right or wrong, which he cannot, and the
executive or law-executing power must always be inferior to the legislative or law-making power. The latter is omnipotent within the
limits of the Constitution; the former is subject not only to the Constitution, but to the determinations of the latter also. To repeat the
point: the President is not, in any respect, superior to the citizen,
merely because he is bound to discharge more numerous duties; and
he is not co-equal with that branch of government which helps to impose and define those duties. The fact that he holds a limited veto
over the legislation of Congress cannot affect the soundness of the
views here briefly presented.  His claim  to "legislative capacity,"
in other words, to possess legislative power, will scarcely be conceded
in view of article 1, section 1, of the Constitution, declaring that,
"All legislative powers herein (therein) granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which:hall consist of a Senate and House
of Representatives."
The President, it will be observed throughout his message, assumes
that the resolution to which he makes reference charges him with the
commission of high crimes and misdemeanors. This was necessary to
the argument he has advanced. It is for such charges only the House
has the power of impeachment. The gravamen of his complaint is, that
the accusations are of such a nature as, if true, would subject,him to an
impeachment, and that the House has proceeded to pass upon them, or
is moving to pass upon them, through a form of proceeding not authorized by the Constitution. Herein lies the fallacy, and that, which,
unexposed, might operate as the deception of the plea.  If this were,
in truth, a charge against the President, calling for the form of trial
prescribed by the Constitution, then the determinations of this House
might possibly be- open to animadversion. Unfortunately, for the
attempted defence of that officer, there is no charge made of any grade
of offence calling for trial of any kind. It is a mere inquiry that is
proposed. The language of the resolution may be cited as the best
proof.  The committee raised is "for the purpose of investigating
whether the President of the United States, or any other officer of the
government has, by money, patronage, or other improper means,
sought to influence the action of Congress, or any committee thereof,"
&c.; also "to inquire into and investigate whether any officer and officers
of the government have, by combination or otherwise, prevented
and defeated, or attempted to prevent and defeat, the execution of any
law or laws," &c.; and "whether the President has failed or refused
to compel the execution of any laws," &c. If no criminality is alleged, but, on the contrary an investigation or inquiry, alone is pro
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THlE PRESIDENT'S PROTEST.
posed, the question may be asked, with ruling force and emphasis, what
has the House to do with the law of impeachment? The resolutions
do not contemplate a judgment, and therefore there can be no formal
trial under them. But, admit charges proper for impeachment were
made, would the House be bound to submit the matter to any particular committee and allow the accused a cross-examination, as the
President seems to suppose? By no means I The Constitution prescribes
no rules for the House, but it is left perfectly free to adopt its own.
It may refer the charges to a standing committee, or a select cornmittee, or it may proceed without the intervention of either. It may
allow cross-examination, or deny it, as to its members may seemmost proper at the time.  The precedent set in the case of Judge Peck,
upon which great stress is laid, cannot take away the full discretion
allowed by the Constitution, nor make the law either shorter or narrower than it is written. In such a case each House of Representatives will determine for itself its mode of procedure without suggestions
from a " co-ordinate," and rely upon the highest law as its charter.
There is no judge presiding over the representatives of the sovereign'
people of the sovereign States to teach and inculcate legal proprieties.
When they shall permit even the President to do so, then there will
be a law superior to the Constitution, and a discretion locked in chains.
The resolution of the Senate of the 28th of March, 1834, upon
which the President. seemingly had his eye in the preparation of his -
protest, presents a case very different from'the present one. That
body resolved as follows:
"' That the President, in the late executive proceedings in relation
to the public revenue, has assumed upon himself authority and power
not conferred by the Constitution and laws, but in derogation of both.'"
The complaints made by President Jackson to this proceeding were,
that the acts charged upon him constituted one of the highest crimes
which that officer can commit, impeachable from its very nature.
That the Senate, as his constitutional judges in such a case, not only
accused, but found him guilty of the charge, without any opportunity
on his part to defend himself. And Mr. Buchanan, January 16,
1837, speaking on the subject,. declared that the Senate had transcended its constitutional power because the resolution charged an
impeachable offence against the President. That criminal, intent was
involved in the charge, as it was to be presumed, from an illegal or
criminal act.
The resolutions of the House, on the contrary, do not even imply
censure, much less pass judgment. They propose an examination
merely, such as may be instituted by any member of society against
any other member of society, to test informally either honesty or respectability. And has it ever been conceived before that such a privilege-that of inquiry-does not pertain to every human being? The
fact that such investigation may lead to the conclusion that the party
against whom i. is brought to bear is guilty of nefarious practices
cannot affect the right; it is preliminary to accusation, trial, and
judgment. So here it cannot be made an objection to the action of
the House that evidence may thus be found tainting the official character of any or many officers of government. If it shall be found, in
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THE PRESIDENT'S PROTEST.
executing the command of the resolutions, that the President is open
to a direct charge of high crimes or misdemeanors, it will but prove
the wisdom of the proceeding. Then, and not till then, may the
party sought to be implicated demand the full hearing secured to him
by the Constitution. As yet he is subject to the law of the citizen;
hereafter, possibly, he may invoke the law of the officer.
It is proper to make this additional remark in reference to the protest
Of 1834-that it was not presented to the Senate during the consideration of the resolution.  It was not till after a formal determination
against him that the President remonstrated. Here the interposition
comes to prevent all investigation.
The President esteems it "a violation of the principles of universal
justice" that the'member moving the resolution should have been
appointed one of the commiittee provided for by it.  His ten years of
service as a component of this body, of which he reminds us, not to
speak of'his protracted senatorial career, ought to have enabled him
to recall to mind the precedents of Congress in such cases. This is a
new and startling objection, condemning, as it does, in terms of
severe reproach, a practice in legislation co-extensive with our national existence.  Certainly it has bees the practice to appoint the
mover of a special inquiry chairman of the committee raised.  Mr.
'Cushing, in his "Law and Practice,  says: "on the occasion of the
appointment to prepare articles of impeachment against Lord Melville,
which had been ordered on the motion of Mr. Whitbread, that gentleman was first appointed one of the committee raised."  A reason
for this course is doubtless to be found in the presumption that the
person proposing examination has grounds to believe it important,
and is, on that account, the best qualified to conduct the proceeding.
The President likewise disapproves, in terms of severity, of the
phraseology and scope of the resolution. His expression is: "It is as
vague and general as the English language affords words in which to
make it." If it be true, as before urged, that there is a general right
to inquire into the conduct of private citizens and public officers, which
may or may not look to accusation and trial, then the remark sinks
to a cavil. Under such circumstances it is not necessary to apprise
the individual upon whom the inquiry bears, of either the subject or
object of inquiry.  The first opportunity for him to require notice is in
the legal proceeding which is to end in his acquital or condemnation.
What would be thought of a rule of law requiring even a prosecutor to define his charge, and frame his indictment, without preliminary proceedings or opportunity to inform himself as to its true
character?  A bare suspicion would scarcely be regarded a defensive
prudence. And in the case of an officer controlling millions of patron —ge, and an influence penetrating every city, town and hamlet of
a vast country, it would be unsafe to assume informers and witnesses
would volunteer against him, especially as favorites and beneficiaries
would be the most likely to possess the knowledge needed in the ascertainment of the truth. For Congress to reach the conclusion to which
the President would lead them, would be to practically settle forever
that impeachments were obsolete, and that executive officers had the
immunity of perfect irresponsibility.
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THE PRESIDENT'S PROTEST.
Indistinctness and uncertainty must necessarily precede research.
If it were otherwise, all investigation would be rendered useless. As
far as bounds may be set for investigation, the resolution in question
will compare favorably with that introduced into the Senate by Mr.
~[ason, December 5, 1859, bearing upon the invasion of Harper's
Ferry. This will be readily admitted from a comparison of the two.
The following is the resolution last referred to, passed by the Senate
December 14, 1859, under which the mover was appointed chairman
of the committee contemplated by it, and testimony is now being
taken:
".Resolved, That a committee be appointed to inquire into the facts
attending the late invasion and seizure of the armory and arsenal of
the United States at Harper's Ferry, in Virginia, by a band of armed
men, and report  "Whether the same was attended by armed resistance to the authorities and public force of the United States, and by the murder of
any of the citizens of Virginia, or of any troops sent there to protect
the public property;
" \Viether such invasion and seizure was made under color of any
organization intended to subvert the government of any of the States
of the Union; what was the character and extent of such organization; and whether any citizens of the United States not present were
implicated therein, or accessory thereto, by contributions of money,
arms, munitions, or otherwise;
"What was the character and extent of the military equipment in
the hands or under the control of said armed band; and where, and
how, and when the same was obtained and transported to the place so
invaded;
"That said committee report whether any and what legislation may,
in their opinion, be necessary on the part of the United States for the
future preservation of the peace of the country, or for the safety of the
public property, and that said committee have power to send for persons
and papers."
Could there well be a more limitless field for experiment? It covers
every foot of the country, if not the earth, and lays open every act and
motive of every citizen of the United States to analysis, comment, and
exposure. It is not deemed necessary to extend remark, as it is sufficient for the argument to propound the question: Where is to be found
the doctrine of jurisprudence, or justice, or propriety which subjects
the every-day litfe of every merchant, farmer, artisan, and laborer to
such a test, and protects their servant, the President, from it?
Article 2 section 1 of the Constitution declares "the executive power
shall be vested in a President of the United States of America."
There is but one executive head or fountain, and but one executive
responsibility, as there is but one legislative head, and one legislative
responsibility. The President admits the propriety of inquiry by the
Senate or the House into the conduct of his subordinates, but denies
that his liability is as great as theirs. The accepted teachings of the
executive, judicial, and legislative branches of the government are the
opposite of this.
President Jackson, in his message of April 21, 1834, to the Senate,
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THE PRESIDENT'S PROTEST.
explanatory of his protest of the 18th of April of the same year says:
"Nor do I claim the right in any manner to supervise or interfere
with the persons intrusted with such property or treasure, (the public money and property of the United States,) unless he be an officer
whose appointment is, under the Constitution and laws, devolved upon
the President alone, or in conjunction with the Senate, and for whose
conduct he is constitutionally responsible."
President Polk, of whose cabinet Mr. Buchanan was a member,
during the 1st session of the 29th Congress, used this language: "If
the House of Representatives, as the grand inquest of the nation,
should at any time have reason to believe that there had been malversation in office by an improper use or application of the public money
by apublic officer, and should think proper to institute an inquiry into
the matter, all the archives and papers of the Executive department,
public and private, would be subject to the inspection and control of a
committee of their body," &c.  The rulings of the Supreme Court have
been in the same direction. In the cases of Wilcox vs. Jackson, and
Williams vs. United States, it was decided that the law devolving particular duties upon the President, by name, was fulfilled by the discharge of those duties by his subordinates, on the ground that these
subordinates were instruments through whom he acted and spoke.  It
can certainly not be necessary to transcribe what appears throughout
the Journals of Congress, that each House has continually claimed and
exercised the necessary power of inspecting, inquiring into, and supervising the different executive departments and operations of the government. If it be true that the close and intimate connexion insisted
upon, exists between the President and others appointed by him and
exercising executive trusts, the reason is not manifest why the management of the one should not be made as plain and patent as the
other.  The most rational and plausible conclusion at least would be
that the pretentious tenets of the protest have been seriously weakened,
if not destroyed, by the force of its admissions.
The necessity for the full and unrestricted exercise of the power in
question is so overruling as to prevent its surrender:
1. With a view to impeachment,
2. For the purpose of legislation.
3 To protect the privileges of Congress.
The constitutionality, the legality, and the authorized expediency
of the inquiry proposed by the resolutions being, as is believed, amply
vindicated, no question remains in respect to it, except such as might
address itself to the discretion of the House. If, by the proceedings
to remedy a mischief, a greater mischief would be likely to follow,
then a well-regulated prudence would indicate its abandonment. The
President in his protest suggests such a danger, and rests his resistance
upon it.'  It is thus expressed: "The whole proceeding against him
justifies the fears of those wise and great men who, before the Constitution was adopted by the States, apprehended that the tendency of
the government was to the aggrandizement of the legislative at the
expense of the executive and judicial departments." If, indeed, fears
of legislative aggrandizement should ever have existed, the cause of
those fears is left in great obscurity. The history of the Consti
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THE PRESIDENT'S PROTEST.
tution, through all the stages of its formation, its adoption by the
several States, and the conspicuous differences between the great political parties at the time, would seem to deny the existence of any
such apprehension.  The strong sentiment of the democratic party
through its whole struggle with the federalists, until the election of
Jefferson, was directly the reverse of the President's statement. In
the convention which formed the Constitution, jealousy of the
executive branch of the proposed government was as great, even, as
the kindred jealousy against the probable encroachments of the
federal government upon the independence and sovereignty of the
separate States. In that body it was even proposed that tie Executive
should be removable by the legislature, without impeachment or conviction of high crimes and misdemeanors. As a further manifestation of that feeling, it was proposed that the Executive should be
plural. Madison and Randolph urgently supported it as a measure
of protection against the aggressiens of the Chief Magistrate upon
the rights of the co-ordinate branches of the government.   Mr.
Randolph, (governor of Virginia, and Attorney General under
Washington,) speaking upon this subject, said: "The situation of
this country is peculiar; the people are taught aversion to monarchy;
all the constitutions are opposed to it: Why cannot three execute?"
The ineligibility of the Executive after one term was also insisted
upon, as a necessity to prevent usurpation.   Jefferson declared his
wish to be that the President should be elected for seven years, and
be ineligible afterwards. Mr. Randolph also made use of this remarkable expression: "The Executives may appoint men devoted to them,
and even bribe the legislature." Hamilton, after the adoption of the
article of the Constitution relating to the Executive, addressing Governor Lewis, used a still more striking expression: "You nor I, my
friend, may not live to see the day, but most assuredly it will come,
when every vital interest of the state will be merged in the allabsorbing question of who will be the next President." So numerous
are the proofs that the "wise and great men" of our earlier history
entertained forebodings of the very opposite character to those which
the President ascribes to them, that it is difficult to resist a disposition
to attribute insincerity to the President to accomplish the purposes of
his protest. The suspicion on the part of the people has become so
great that they are continually reducing executive power. In many
of the States the governor has become but a mere chief of police. This
is not, however, to be attributed to legislative or judicial agency,
but to the fact that chief executives so use their patronage as to produce a tendency to a centralization of power dangerous to the liberties
of the people. The world is but a great battle-field for power; and
if universal history teaches any lesson, it is this: that "power is always stealing from the many to the few;" that executive leads of
nations absorb popular rights; and that all revolutions are on the
part of the people, not to establish thrones, but to regain that which
has been wrested from them by the throne. The citizen of the United
States has reason to fear that which every other nation has suffered.
The committee, entertaining the views herein expressed, recommend
the adoption of the following resolution:
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THE PRESIDENT'S PROTEST.
Resolved, That the House dissents from the doctrines of the special
message of the President of the United States of March 28, 1860;
That the extent of power contemplated in the adoption of the resolutions of inquiry of March 5, 1860, is necessary to tl).e proper discharge of the constitutional duties devolved upon Congress;
That judicial determinations, the opinions of former Presidents,
and uniform usage sanction its exercise; and,
That to abandon it would leave the executive department of the
government without supervision or responsibility, and would be likely
to lead to a concentration of power in the hands of the President,
dangerous to the rights of a free people.
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THE PRESIDENT'S PROTEST.
MINORITY REPORT.
Mr. HOUSTON presented the following minority report:
The undersigned member of the Judiciary Committee, to whom  was
referred the message of the President of the United States to the House
of 1"epresentatives of the 28th March, 1860, having failed to agree
with the majority of said committee, asks to submit the following as
his report:
his report:
The framers of the Constitution of the United States have thought
proper to confide to all the departments of the government the maintenance of the national honor and dignity, not only that confidence
in our institutions may be thereby maintained at home, but that the
position of our government amongst the nations of the earth may be
in nowise impaired. And in depositing such trust, they have not
omitted to place proper and just limitations upon the powers of each,
in order that it may effectually combine with the others for the accomplishment of the end in view, and at the same time not encroach upon
them. Thus is produced that equilibrium so necessary to harmony
and efficiency, and which cannot be seriously disturbed without
endangering the success of the whole plan.
"It is important, likewise, that the habits of thinking in a free country should inspire
caution in those intrusted with its administration, to confine themselves within their
respective constitutional spheres, avoiding, in the excrcise of the powers of one department, to encroach upon another. The spirit of encroachment tends to consolidate the
powers of all the departments in one, and thus to create, whatever the form of government, a real despotism. A just estimate of that love of power and proneness to abuse it
which predominates in the human heart is sufficient to satisfy us of the truth of this position. The necessity of reciprocal checks, in the exercise of political power, by dividing and
distributing it into different depositories, and constituting each the guardian of the public
weal against invasions by the others, has been evinced by experiments, ancient and modern-some of them in our own country and under our own eyes. To preserve them must
be as necessary as to institute them. If, in the opinion of the people, the distribution or
modification of the constitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected
by an amendment in the way which the Constitution designates. But let there be no
change by usurpation; for though this, in one instance, may be the instrument of good,
it is the customary weapon by which free governments are destroyed.  The precedent must
always greatly overbalance in permanent evil any partial or transient benefit which the
use can at any time yield."- Washington's Farewell Address.
The undersigned regards it as a high and important duty of the
House of Representatives to ferret out abuses and errors in the
administration of the government, if abuses and errors exist, with a
view as well to the punishment of the guilty as of providing a remedy
by the enactment of such legislation as may be necessary to prevent
their recurrence.
In the discharge of that duty, however, the House of Representatives should conform its action to the limitations and requirements of
the Constitution. And while it has been the practice of the House to
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THE PRESIDENT'S PROTEST.
give to such investigations muich latitude when proposed in good
faith, it is alike due to justice, to the dignity of the House, to the
character of our government at home and abroad, that such action
shall not be taken for purposes of oppression or for mere party advantages; that such movements shall not be made for the purpose of
throwing discredit upon an Executive by encouraging or entertaining
vague and slanderous imputations founded upon street rumors or irresponsible newspaper articles. That it has been so used as to amount
to an abuse may with confidence be asserted, and the present case is
one which should admonish the House that there is a possibility that
these occasions, occurring so frequently of late, may already have
done much, and may still do more, to weaken the confidence of the
country in, and its respect for, the legislativees well as the other departments of the government. Congress should maintain its own
dignity; but the most effectual mode of doing so is not by continued
assaults upon other departments, or upon citizens of the country in
public or private life. It weakens its own influence by the frequency
and cheapness of these assaults, thus inviting assaults back again upon
itself, and consequently impairing its capacity for good. In the language of the "father of his country," "but let there be no change by
usurpation; for though this, in one instance, may be the instrument
of good, it is the customary weapon by which free governments are
destroyed. The precedent must always greatly overbalance in permanent evil any partial or transient benefit which the use can at any
time yield."'
By the Constitution of the United States the Executive is a spparate, co-ordinate department of the government. The powers, duties,
and responsibilities of the President are plainly and distinctly set
forth in that instrument. His duties are executive, with legislative
functions to the extent of his approval of bills passed by the two
houses of Congress, which, in the contingency of his disapproval, do
not become laws until again passed by a vote of two-thirds of each
house.
The House of Representatives is one branch of the legislative department, whose concurrence with the Senate is essential to the enactment of a law. The Constitution makes the House the judge of the
elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members; gives it the
power to determine the rules of its proceedings, to " punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds,
to expel a member."  The departments of the government-executive,
legislative, and judicial-are independent of each other, excepting in
the cases in which by the terms of the Constitution it is declared otherwise. The President may be impeached by the House of Representatives, but must be tried by the Senate. The Senate has no power
to institute an impeachment.  By the provisions of the Constitution
the House has "the sole power of impeachment," and the Senate
"the sole power to try all impeachments."   The same particularity
marks the Constitution throughout in its distribution of powers between the different departments, which is also true of its distribution
between the two branches of the legislative department.
The Senate cannot judge of the elections, returns, or qualifications
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THE PRESIDENT'S PROTEST.
of the members of the House of Representatives. Nor can the House
of Representatives so judge of the members of the Senate. Neither
body has a right to expel a member of the other, or to punish such
member for disorderly behavior in the house of which he is a member.
The framers of the Constitution deemed it unwise to confer such
power.
The undersigned does not claim for the President exemption from
responsibility. The Constitution marks his responsibilities, and also
devolves upon him many duties and obligations. He is bound to see
that the laws are faithfully executed, and is sworn to preserve, protect,
and defend the Constitution of the United States; and many other
duties are enumerated in the Constitution. He is also liable to impeachment by the House of Representatives.
Article two, section four, of the Constitution provides: "The President, Vice-President, and all civil officers of the United States, shall
be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason,
bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors;" and, as has been
stated in a preceding part of this report, the Constitution gives to the
House the power of impeachment, but to the Senate the power to try
impeachments; and the undersigned states with much confidence
that there is no mode known to the Constitution by which either
house of Congress has the power to inflict a punishment upon
the President except the one of impeachment, as set forth in that instrument.
It is asserted that as the House of Representatives can' examine into
the conduct of its own members, and signify its disapprobation of such
conduct by way of punishment, it has alike the constitutional authority
to do the same as to the President or any civil officer of the United
States. It is freely and fully conceded that the House may examine
into any abuses or alleged abuses in the administration of the government for the purpose of bringing to punishment any civil officer of
the United States who has been guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors, or of providing a remedy for what the legislature may regard
as a defect in the existing laws. It is made the duty of each house
of Congress to consider of; and act upon, legislative propositions, either
to enact new laws or to amend or repeal old ones; and in discharging
that duty, either can institute an investigation to learn the character,
cause and extent of the evil which is proposed to be remedied; and in
such examination the conduct of any officer of the government, high
or low, that may have reference to such legislation, may be investigated, and the result reported to the house ordering the committee.
But the proper limit upon even this power is, that it must be necessary
to enable the house the better to perform its legislative duty.
Nor does the President in his message deny or controvert this proposition; on the contrary, he affirms it. And in such investigation
the undersigned feels warranted in saying that every facility would be
afforded a committee of either house to probe to the bottom any defects
or abuses that might be alleged to exist.
The message also states that the power of the House to examine into
charges against the President with a view to punishment, which can
only be by impeachment, is unquestioned and ample.
12 
THE PRESIDENT'S PROTESTS
The Constitution gives the House of Representatives the power to
judge of the conduct of its own members, and punish them for disorderly behavior. It gives no such power over the President. True, it
may impeach him for " treason, bribery, or other high crimes and
misdemeanors," but it can impeach him for nothing else. Any behavior of the President, however disorderly, does not furnish grounds
for his impeachment, unless it come within the provisions of the Constitution; and hence the House has no authority to punish him for it.
The correctness of this position was admitted in the debate in the
House on the day the message was received, as the following extract
will show:
" If this House proposed an impeachment of the President by one of its committees, the
President's view would be correct. They have no power to do such a thing as that. They
must present their impeachment, and the Senate must try it, if they propose to impeach
the President   But the question whether or not improper influences have been used by
anybody to affect the legislation of the country is a proper subject for inquiry and investigation by the representatives of the people. It carries with it no penalty or the infliction
of punishment."-Mr. Grow.
This extract is reproduced for the purpose of distinctly marking the
admissions contained on it; the latter branch of it will be referred to
again in this report. The speaker fully admits that there is no constitultional mode of punishing the President except by impeachment.
Observe his language: "If this House proposed an impeachment of
the President by one of its committees, the President's view would be
correct."  But his argument is understood as intending to show that
the proceeding under Mr. Covode's resolution is not an impeachment,
but a mere investigation, to see whether improper influences have been
used to affect legislation, which he says carries with it "no penalty or
the infliction of punishment."
In view of such admissions, a question very naturally arises as to
the import of the term " punishment." Happily, however, the House,
by its uniform practice, has furnished the answer. The Constitution
gives to the House of Representatives the power to " punish its members for disorderly behavior;" and in the exercise of that power it
has given its understanding of that term, and has, in more instances
than one, inflicted punishment upon a member by disapprobating
his conduct. The Constitution does not define what punishment
the House may inflict upon its members, except in one instance, when
it provides that, with the concurrence of two-thirds, it may expel
a member.  The House was left to construe the term punish, as well
as its powers under that term, and in the cases in which it has inflicted
a punishment upon its members it has employed different mriodes of
expression. In the case of Joshua R. Giddings, of Ohio, the House
passed the following resolution:
" Resolved, That this House hold the conduct of the said member as altogether unwar
ranted and unwarrantable, and deserving the severe condemnation of the people of this
country, and of this body in particular."
Here Mr. Giddings was punished by the House.  Other analogous
cases might be referred to, but it is regarded as quite unnecessary to
13 
THE RRESIDENT'S PROTEST.
specify them, as the proposition seems too clear for controversy or
doubt. The House, then, has fully settled that its censure or disapprobation is a punishment. It matters not in what language the disapprobation may be expressed, or in what terms it may be made known.
Any formal resolve of the House for the mere purpose of expressing
its disapproval of the conduct of a member or of an officer is a punishment.
Not only is it a punishment to vote a censure upon an officer-to
condemn his conduct as such, but it is also a punishment, and a harsh
one, to allow vague and indefinite charges to be insinuated against
him, based upon no responsible statement; to have them referred to
an ex parne committee for a pretended investigation, and allow that
committee, composed in its majority of the most bitter and implacable enemies and persecutors of such officer, performing more nearly
the duties of prosecutors than of judges, to report whatever ex parte
evidence they may chance to procure.  Such committee, instead of
holding the scales in a fair balance, with a view to the ends of justice,
will be far more likely to hunt up from the dregs of society disappointed seekers for place and for jobs, who have by profligate conduct
rendered themselves bankrupt in purse and in character, and who seek
revenge upon the officer, and of such men make witnesses, and examine
them in secret, without even the knowledge of the accused officer, report
such swearing to the House, put it upon the records of Congress, and
dignify it by calling it the report of a committee.  Having given the
accused officer no opportunity to be heard, not even to cross-examine the
witnesses, and as if fearful that he might in some subsequent stage of
the proceedings have an opportunity to make his defence, it is gravely
suggested in argument that there the matter would be allowed to rest.
Any one, with a proper care for his own honor or reputation as a
citizen or an officer, must regard it as a severe punishment thus to
have obloquy cast upon him by those who deny him all right or opportunity of defence.
The executive and judicial departments, in the matter of impeachment, stand in the same relation to Congress. The same clause of the
Constitution conferring the power to impeach the President, also confers the power to impeach the judges. The House of Representatives,
then, has the sole power to impeach the judges, as it has to impeach
the President, and in no other way can either be punished by either
house of Congress. Will it be contended that the House of Representatives has any constitutional authority to institute an investigation
into the conduct of the judges, except for impeachment or legislative
purposes? Has it the right to institute an examination into the conduct and decision of the judges for mere speculative purposes? to defame the character of the judges, and bring the court into disrepute?
Then, if the House cannot thus act towards the judges, how can it towards the President? The same power exists as to both. Investigations may be instituted looking to the impeachment of either, or to
remedial legislation, and in either case the conduct of the President
or the judges may alike be investigated. It may be argued that the
important duties of the President and the magnitude of the inter
14
i 
THE PRESIDENT'S PROTEST.
ests of the people in his hands, justify their representatives in making
such investigations; but the same would be true of the courts. Life,
liberty, and property, upon which the courts are daily called to act,
should be, and doubtless are, quite as important to the people as any
matters coming within the jurisdiction of the executive department.
The undersigned proposes to call attention to the resolutions of Mr.
Covode, which were adopted by the House on the 5th of March, 1860.
His first resolution is in the following words:
" Resolved, That a committee of five members be appointed by the Speaker for the purpose of investigating whether the President of the United States, or any other officer of the
government, has, by money, patronage, or other improper means, sought to influence the
action of Congress, or any committee thereof, for or against the passage of any law appertaining to the rights of any State or Territory; also to inquire into and investigate whether
any officer or officers of the government have, by combinaton or otherwise, prevented or
defeated, or attempted to prevent or defeat, the execution of any law or laws now upon the
statute-book; and whether the President has failed or refused to compel the execution of
any law thereof; and that said committee shall investigate and inquire into the abuses
at Chicago or other post offices, and at the Philadelphia and other navy yards, and into any
abuses in connexion with the public buildings and otherpublic works of the United States."
It is important that the object of this resolution should be ascertained. And what is it? Does it propose an impeachment? Certainly not; for if it had, the mover doubtless would have said so. Instead, however, of declaring that he intended an impeachment, he even
denies that he  makes any charge against the President.    In remarks
made by him in the House on the 28th of March last he said:
" w -a, 0 In the resolution which I offered I do not make the charge against the
President. The President himself made the charge. He charges in his centenary letter
to the people of Pittsburg that money has been used in carrying elections; and I stepped
forward to investigate the matter, and to see who used that money."
" Mr. COVODE. Mr. Speaker, you will perceive that there is no definite and distinct charge
against the President, but the President himself, as I stated, made a charge, and it was my
wish to investigate the matter, and ascertain who had been guilty of this offence."
Other friends of the resolution argue that it is not intended as an
impeachment, but only to see whether improper means have been used
to influence the action of Congress. No one of its friends has been
willing to avow that it looked to an impeachment; then it is but fair
to ascribe to it no such object.
And yet the charges insinuated in the resolution are the precise
offences mentioned in the Constitution for which the President may be
impeached. The resolution directs that the committee inquire whether
the President of the United States, or any other officer of the government, has by " money, patronage, or other improper means, sought
to influence the action of Congress," &c.; or, in other words, whether
the President has not attempted to bribe the members of Congress by
the use of money. If these insinuations be true, then he should be
impeached. The resolution, however, in its want of specifications, is
unprecedented as an initiatory step to impeachment. Its insinuations-the mover denies that they are charges-are as vague as they
can well be, and in that it violates the plainest principles of justice
and law. There is no civilized country in which a citizen can be arraigned and put upon his trial for an alleged offence without having
secured to him, by the law, proper information of the precise offence
charged against him. He is entitled to know what he is required to
15 
THE PRESIDENT'S PROTEST.
answer. The law, as well as justice, demands that the papers, the
indictment or resolution, shall set forth his offence. Does the Covode
resolution do that?  It insinuates that the President has "by the use
of money, patronage, or other improper neans, sought to influence the
action of Congress, or a-committee thereof, for or against the passage
of some law," &c.  How vague and indefinite is this I When and
where did the President make such attempt?  What means did he
use or attempt to use? Upon what member or members did he make
the attempt? or with what committee or committees? and in relation
to what bill or measure? These things, at least, should appear in the
resolution, and why did they not?  If there has been bribery, or any
attempt at bribery, the mover of the resolution doubtless knew it.
Then why did he not specify? For the reason that the insinuation is
unfounded-that there is no truth in it. And hence, as none of the
persecutors of the President had the boldness to make it as a direct
charge, resort was had to the less manly mode of insinuation.
To base a prosecution, and arraign a citizen, who is either in office
or out of office, upon such vague and indefinite accusations, even if
they were presented as charges, is an outrage revolting to the sense of
justice of all honorable men, and in this country will not be tolerated
by even the most vindictive political opponent. Such are the rights
of the citizen secured to him by the laws of the land, and administered through the instrumentality of the courts in all of the States.
Why are they not also the rights of the President of the United
States?  Will he be denied rights so essential to the ends of justice,
and which the laws secure to every otber citizen? Can it be that a
citizen who, by long and faithful service in the cause of his country-by
a lite, public and private, of the strictest integrity, whose character is
free from just reproach-shall be denied rights granted and secured to
every other citizen, merely because his walk has been such as to gain
for him the confidence of his fellow-citizens, and because he has been
by them placed in the most honorable political office known to the
Constitution?
The undersigned regards it as appropriate to present an extract
from a letter written by President Jackson, in January, 1837, to the
chairman of a committee of the House of Representatives, asking it to
be laid before that committee, in which he discusses the precise point
presented in President Buchanan's recent message to the House. The
views of that departed hero and statesman will be read with great
interest by all who desire to arrive at just conclusions on the important
issues growing out of the extraordinary movement of Mlr. Covode in
the House of Representatives. Speaking of a resolution which had but
recently before the date of his letter passed the House of Representatives, directing an investigation into the condition and operation of
the executive departments, as well as a resolution of the committee
asking information of the President on the charges, and also of the
vagueness of the charges that were insinuated in the resolution creating the committee, he said:
"For myself, I shall repel all such attempts as an invasioi ofthe principles of justice as well as of the Constitution, and I shall esteem it my
16 
THE PRESIDENT'S PROTEST,
sacred duty to the people of the United States to resist them as I would
the establishment of a Spanish inquisition.
If, after all the severe accusations contained in the various speeches
of yourself and your associates, you are unwilling, of your own accord,
to bring specific charges, then I request your committee to call yourself and your associates, and every other member of Congress who has
made the general charge of corruption, to testify before God and our
country whether you or they know of any specific corruption or abuse
of trust in the executive departments; and if so, what it is. If
you are able to point to any case where there is the slightest reason
to suspect corruption or abuse of trust, no obstacle which I can remove
shall be intervened to prevent the fullest scrutiny by all legal means.
The offices of all the departments will be opened to you, and every
facility furnished for this purpose.
"I hope, sir, we shall at last have your charges, and that you will
proceed to investigate them, not like an inquisitor, but in the accustomed mode. If you either will not make specific accusations, or if,
when made, you attempt to establish them by making freemen their
own accusers, you will not expect me to countenance your proceedings.
In the short period which remains of may official duty I shall endeavor,
as I have heretofore endeavored, to fulfil the obligations of that oath
of office by which I engaged' to the best of my ability to preserve,
protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States.' And for
this and other reasons of the most solemn character, I shall, on the
one hand, cause every possible facility consistent with law and justice
to be given to the investigation of specific, tangible charges; and on
the other, shall repudiate all attempts to invade the just rights of the
executive departments, and of the individuals composing the same.
If, after all your clamor, you will make no specific charges, or bring
no proof of such as shall be made, you and your associates must be
regarded by the good people of the United States as the authors of
unfounded calumnies;  and  the public servants whom  you  have
assailed will, in the estimation of all honorable men, stand fully acquitted."
The history of Congress discloses many applications to the House of
Representatives for the impeachment of civil officers, and none of
them justify the Covode resolution. In all of them the charges were
required to be specific, and such as were not so were not entertained,
and the House cannot justly depart from this practice.
If the resolution does not look to an impeachment, to what end
does it look? If the insinuations contained in it be true, it is clearly
the duty of the House to impeach; and if any member of the House
believes them to be true, it is his duty-his sworn duty-to move an
impeachment; and if he fail to do so, he is guilty of a palpable dereliction of duty. It cannot be that a representative discharges his full
duty when he believes an officer of the government to be guilty of
treason, bribery or other high crimes and misdemeanors, without
taking proper steps to have such officer punished as the Constitution
provides; and if, on the other hand, such resolution be presented to
the House by a member who believes its insinuations to be untrue,
Ht. Rep. Com. 394    2
17 
THE PRESIDENT'S PROTEST.
such member justly merits the indignant scorn of an honest public for
such flagrant betrayal of public trust.
This resolution cannot contemplate legislation. Its friends make
no such claim for it, while the resolution itself forbids any such idea.
What legislation could likely be enacted upon such report as this
committee could make? Suppose it should report the charges to be
untrue, what law would thereby become necessary? Nl(ne. Suppose,
however, that the committee should find that an attempt had been
made by the President, with money, to bribe the members of Congress,
what law should Congress then pass? No additional legislation would
be required, for in that case the Constitution furnishes the most ample
remedy-impeachment-and Congress would not have the constitutional power to change it. The Constitution provides how and for
what offences the President of the United States may be impeached,
and Congress could not add to the offences, or change the mode of
trial or the character and extent of punishment.
It is a mistake to say that the investigation in the 34th Congress
which resulted in the expulsion of some of its members was instituted
without a distinct specific charge having been first made. By reference to the proceedings on that occasion it will be seen that while
the resolution was pending, and before any vote had upon it, Mr.
Paine, a representative from the State of North Carolina, rose in his
place and said:
"I say now distinctly upon this floor that there is not an entire want of truth in the
allegations contained in that article; that a distinct proposition has been made by a member of this House, and in regard to the Minnesota land bill, that $1,500 would be guaranteed to a member for his vote for that bill, and when the committee is raised, and I am
called upon, I will give my evidence before the committee."
Mr. Paine made a positive and distinct charge, upon his own responsibility, and upon the charge thus made the resolution was voted and
the committee ordered.  If the same course had been pursued in the
present case it would have been unobjectionable. If the resolution
had made specific charges instead of vague insinuations, and the
mover had said to the House that he even believed they were true,,
there would have been no opposition to it.
There is, however, but little analogy between an impeachment of an
officer by the House and a proceeding by the House for the punishment of one of its own members. It is true the party accused has a
right in either case to specific charges and a proper opportunity fbr his
defence.  The House can punish its members for disorderly behavior,
and in the case of an offending member it has the sole power. It
mnakes the charge, conducts the,trial, pronounces the judgment, and
inflicts the punishment. It has no such authority in an impeachment.
In the case of an impeachment it investigates the charges, finds the
im peachment, and sends its articles to the Senate, where the case is
tried.
T'he undersigned asks attention to the following additional extract
from the debate in the House on the President's message:
"What does the President of the United States gravely ask us to do in the message
which has just been read? That this high judicial body shall find an impeachment upon
mere rumor. Shall we, up7on the mnere rumors which are ciiculating in the news~opers and upon the
str~e(s, find an ivn2eachmen?.The very necessity of the case implies that we have a right t
18
I I
..: 
THE PRESIDENT'S PROTEST.
investigate all charges made in the public prints and elsewhere. If it is alleged that the
President has been seriously and improperly connected with certain transactions, we have
a right in this House to inquire into the probable truth of these things. If we find that
they are probably true, then it is our duty to prefer articles of impeachment against the
President at the bar of the Senate." —Mr. Sherman, of Ohio.
It is quite difficult to believe that an unbiased mind can assent to
the propositions contained in the above extract. The undersigned had
supposed, and yet believes it to be beneath the dignity of a grave
legislative body, or a "high judicial body," to act or attempt to act
"upon the mere rumors which are circulating in the newspapers and
upon the streets." No case of impeachment has ever been instituted
upon mere newspaper or street rumor, or scandal; and the undersigned
is not aware that such an attempt has ever been made, unless the
present be such an one. But if a House of Representatives should
ever be so blinded by partisan feeling as to lose sight of its own proper
dignity and self-respect, and institute an impeachment upon mere street
rumors, such rumors should be so shaped in the resolution proposing
the impeachment as to make a positive charge upon which the officer
implicated could be tried, and if guilty, punished. The undersigned intends to say that if a rumor, however vague and irresponsible, is to be dignified by the notice of the House of Representatives,
the officer accused has a right to demand the judgment of the proper
tribunal.
SIr. Covode's second resolution is as followsd
"And resolved further, That, as the President, in his letter to the Pittsburg centenary celebral ion of the 25th of November, 1858, speaks of the employment of money to coerce
elections, said committee shall inquire into and ascertain the amount so used in Pennsylvania, and  any other State or States; in what districts it was expended, and by whom,
and by whose authority it was done, and from what source the money was derived, and to
report the names of the parties implicated; and that, for the purpose aforesaid, s?.id committee shall have power to send for persons and papers, and to report at any time."
It will require but a brief examination to enable the House to understand its object. It cannot mean an impeachment, for it makes no
charge. The House can only impeach civil officers of the United States,
and they do not seem to come within the purview of the resolution.
This being true, it is but reasonable to conclude that it has some other
object.
It is even more absurd to suppose that this resolution looks to legislation.  What legislation? Suppose money has been used in elections
within the States.  Can Congress, by law, prevent it?  Can Congrress
pass a law to punish as a crime even the corrupt use of money in elections within the States? Such a position will hardly find an advocate
in the House.  To prevent such use of money is a matter of State
jurisdiction, and must be suppressed by State laws, and not by congressional action.
The House, then, finds itself in this condition: it has ordered a
committee of investigation, under the press of the previous question.
No member was allowed to debate or to propose an amendmeat to the
resolution, and in that extraordinary and unusual mode for such resolutions it was passed without explanation.
The committee has power to send for witnesses without regard to
distance or expense; and in the exercise of that power it may, and
19
I 
THE PRESIDENT'S PROTEST.
doubtless will, involve the government in the expenditure of thousands of dollars, when it is, in the judgment of the undersigned, beyond
controversy, that no constitutional action by Congress is contemplated
by the resolution. Its inquiries are directed to the use of money in
elections in the States. - When the resolution was pending no one was
permitted to ask its meaning, and why such unprecedented inquiries
should be made by the House, or what election was meant-whether
thatof President of the United States, or senators, representatives,
governors, members of State legislatures, county, or city elections.
It is so vague in its terms that nobody can understand the meaning
of the resolution from its reading, and it fails to distinguish between
the corrupt and legitimate use of money, or whether used by an officer or private citizen.
If the committee shall undertake to bring before the House and
expose the legitimate transactions of private citizens, then will it
transcend its authority; for even admitting that such would be the
true construction of the resolution, the power does not follow; the
House itself has no such rightful authority, and, of course, cannot
delegate it to a committee. But will the House allow such construction of its resolution?  And if such be its proper construction, then
the question presents itself, whether it will allow such resolution to
remain unrescinded, subjecting the private citizen to embarrassment
and his private transactions to exposure, and for no good end-for
nothing that Congress can accomplish calculated to advance the public
interests; and, indeed, it may fairly be believed, without doing violence to the terms of the resolution, that nothing was intended outside
of discreditable party schemes and movements to accomplish party
ends and advantages. Will the House allow this extraordinary power
to be used to oppress the private citizen? Will it countenance and
encourage or force upon the government the expenditure of large sums
of money for mere partisan political purposes, which must be the
result it not the object of this proceeding?
In conclusion, the undersigned decla,es that, in his opinion, the
positions taken by the President in the message referred to the committee are right, and that the protest made by him against the action
of the House has a solid foundation in the provisions of the Constitution of the United States, and in those great principles which underlie
every well-ordered system of law hitherto established for the administration of justice.
20
t
GEO. S. HOUSTON.
I I
I. 
THE PRESIDENT'S PROTEST.
MINORITY REPORT.
Mr. TAYLOR presented the following views of the minority.
The undersigned member of the Committee on the Judiciary, to whom
was referred the message of the President, in which he protests against
the action of the House in adopting the first two clauses of certain
resolutions passed on the fifth day of March last, respectfully submits
thefollowing minority report:
The  resolutions  adopted  by the  House  on the fifth day of  March
were in the.following words:
" Resolved, That a committee of five members be appointed by the Speaker, for the purpose of investigating whether the President of the United States, or any other officer of the
government, has, by money, patronage, or other improper means, sought to influence the
action of Congress, or any committee thereof, for or against the passage of any law appertaning to the rights of any State or Territory; also, to inquire into and investigate
whether any officer or officers of the government have, by combination or otherwise, prevented or defeated, or attempted to prevent or defeat, the execution of any law or laws
now upon the statute-book, and whether the President has failed or refused to compel the
execution of any law thereof; and that said committee shall investigate and inquire into
the abuses at the Chicago or other post offices, and at the Philadelphia and other navy
yards; and into any abuses in connexion with the public buildings and other public works
of the United States.
"And resolved further, That as the President, in his letter to the Pittsburg centenary
celebration of the 25th of November, 1858, speaks of the employment of money to coerce
elections, said committee shall inquire into and ascertain the amount so used in Pennsylvania and any other State or States; in what districts it was expended, and by whom, and
by whose authority it was done, and from what source the money was derived, and to
report the names of the parties implicated; and that, for the purpose aforesaid, said committee shall have power to send for persons and papers, and to report at any time."
This message relates only to the two first clauses of the first resolution, which are recited in it, and are as follows:
"Resolved, That a committee of five members be appointed by the Speaker, for the purpose
[first] of investigating whether the President of the United States, or any other officer of
the government, has, by money, patronage, or other improper means, sought to influence
the action of Congress, or any committee thereof, for or against the passage of any law appertaining to the rights of any State or Territory; [and second,] also to inquire into and
investigate whether any officer or officers of the government have, by combination or
otherwise, prevented or defeated, or attempted to prevent or defeat, the execution of any
law or laws now upon the statute-book, and whether the President has failed or refused to
compel the execution of any law thereof."
The President takes no exception to the remaining portions of the first
resolution, which relate to alleged abuses in post offices, navy yards,
public buildings, and other public works of the United States, because,
he says, " in such cases inquiries are highly proper in themselves,
and belong equally to the Senate and the House, as incident to their
legislative  duties,"   "to  enable  them  to  provide  the   legislative
remedies for any abuses which may be" found to exist. Nothing
whatever is said by him in this message with respect to the second
resolution. His protest is made against the two first clauses of the
21 
THE PRESIDENT'S PROTEST.
first resolution, which are recited in it, and he expressly declares that
he confines himself " exclusively to those two branches of the resolution."
These two clauses are accusatory in their nature; and regarding
them in that light, the President has seen fit to avail himself of his
constitutional power of communicating with the House, to lay before
it his objections to the proceedings instituted by the House against
him and other officers of the government by their adoption. In doing
this, the President says, in substance, that the House of Representatives possess no power under the Constitution over the accusatory
portion of the resolution, except as an impeaching body. With that
exception, the President asserts " the Constitution has invested the
House of Representatives with no power, no jurisdiction, no supremacy
whatever over the President."' In all other respects, he continues,
"he is quite as independent of them as they are of him."  The President afterwards proceeds to notice the character of the investigation
which the resolution proposes to institute, and having noticed the fact
that it is directed to no specific charge or charges, but whether the
President has, by "money,  patronage, or other improper means,
sought to influence," not the action of any individual member or members of Congress, but "the action" of the entire body "of Congress"
itself, or " any committee thereof," and that the investigation which
the resolution proposes to institute " is as vague and general as the
English language affords words in which to make it," so that he can
have no "glimmering of the nature of the offence to be investigated"
under the accusation, he says, in substance, that the principles recognized in " the Constitution of the United States, and of -the several
States," which require that, in cases of prosecution for any offence, the
person prosecuted" shall be informed, in the very beginning, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him," and "other principles,
not less sacred, presenting an impenetrable shield" for the protection
of every citizen against false charges, "have been violated in the prosecution instituted by the House of Representatives against the executive branch of the government," and makes his "solemn protest"
against their proceedings "in the name of the people of the United
States, because they are in violation of the rights of the co-ordinate executive branch of the government, and subversive of its independence;"
because they are calculated to foster false accusations "incapable, from
their nature, of being disproved;" and because such proceedings, if
unresisted, " would establish a precedent dangerous and embarrassing to all" his "successors, to whatever political party they might be
attached."
The question thus presented to the House by the protest of the
President, thought one of the gravest importance, is yet restricted
within very narrow limits. There can be no real difference of opinion
as to the constitutional position of the two great departments of the
government —the legislative and executive-with respect to each
other. The power of the House to institute the inquiries necessary to
bring abuses in the administration of our public affairs to light, with
a view to the punishment of those who have been guilty of them, and
to the prevention of similar abuses in the future by remedial legisla
22 
THE PRESIDENT'S PROTEST.
tion, when that is practicable,,is fully conceded by the President.
Upon that point there neither is nor can be any dispute. The questions actually presented by the protest the undersigned believes to be
these and these alone: 1st. Has the House an unlimited power to
institute and carry on investigations of any kind and for any purpose
according to its own mere will and pleasure; or is it restrained and controlled in the exercise of the power vested in it by the operation of
the great principles of law everywhere recognized throughout our
common country, where the rights of individuals are concerned? and
2d, If it is so restrained and controlled, then was the action of the
House, in adopting the resolution complained of by the President, in
violation of those great principles of law, or in conformity with them?
The undersigned cannot for a moment conceive that there is any
room for doubt upon the first question. Our government is a government of law. It was the design of its framers that everything connected with its action should be regulated, as far as practicable, by
positive constitutional provision or legislative enactment. There is
no such thing in our whole system as a grant of unlimited, arbitrary
power. One great object had in view in its construction was to give
security to the citizen; and to that end our national and State constitutions, and our statute-books, are filled with provisions to shield
and protect him against the approaches of oppression, and to furnish
him with remedies against invasions upon his rights. These provisions were intended to operate everywhere within our boundaries for
his security and protection, and the barriers which they interpose
against injustice should be as effectual for his defence against wrong
coming from one quarter as from another. The functions of the
House of Representatives with respect to investigations into abuses
in the administration of our affairs, and into the misconduct of our
public officers, are in their nature judicial, and it is as much the duty
of members of the House to be guided by the principles of these
legal and constitutional provisions, when they are called on to act on
questions which concern the personal rights of men, as if they were
formally invested with the judicial ermnine.  This has been the common judgment of the whole American people from the very foundation
of the government, and I cannot for a moment conceive that any
one can have a doubt on the subject. Considering this question as
settled beyond all controversy, I shall now proceed to an examination
of the second one, viz: Was the action of the House, in adopting
the resolution complained of by the President, in violation of those
great principles, or in conformity with them?
The right of the House to enter upon an inquiry as to whether an
offence has not been committed, or if a particular person is not guilty
of a crime, is not the mere creature of an arbitrary discretion.   The
power of the House, like that of a court over such a subject, can only
be exerted upon a case made. The power of a court is one thing, the
right to exercise that power is another and quite a different thing.
And it is the same with the judicial power of the House. Before the
right to exercise it in an inquest of a criminal nature can exist, there
must be good cause shown for it, by evidence of some kind sufficient
to give rise to a reasonable suspicion as to the perpetration of an
23
I 
TIHE PRESIDENT'S PROTEST.
offence or the guilt of the individual.  In the absence of any such
evidence the right does not exist, and the institution of an inquiry
would be improper. But what would be merely improper in one case
might be highly censurable in another. A roving commission to
inquire into possible offences, without any reasonable ground for the
belief that offences had been committed, would certainly be improper;
but to raise a committee to inquire if a particular person, designated
by name, had not been guilty of a certain specified crime, when no evidence of any kind was before the House to give rise to any suspicion
against him, would be more than improper: it would be an outrage.
An inquiry of that kind; made with respect to any one by the public
authority, implies from its very nature that there is reason to believe
him guilty.
Our laws are not alone framed to protect the persons and property
of our citizens. They are also designed to secure them in the possession of their good names; and it is with that object that when a
private person, upon the pretence of a desire to enforce the criminal
law, throws upon another an imputation of having committed a crime,,
without having had any reasonable ground of suspicion, the act is
regarded as a wrong, and the law gives redress to the one falsely
charged by punishing the wrong-doer, or mulcting him in damages.
But no such protection is given to the citizen against similar action
on the part of the House.  His only safeguard against an unjust or
oppressive exercise of its power grows out of the obligation imposed
on its members, in the forum of conscience, to make their action, in
cases affecting his reputation or his personal rights, conform to those
great principles of law which are everywhere recognized in- the administration of justice between man and man.  Owing to the peculiar
character of the House as a political body, intrusted with a certain
portion of the iunctions of government, these principles can be enforced
neither against the House in its collective capacity, nor through the
persons of its members by penal sanctions. Their operation for his
protection can only be made effective through the voice of reason; and
it, therefore, becomes of vital importance to the House itself; and to the
people of the whole United States, that individual members should
not hesitate to expose such action by the expression of their individual
opinion against it when such cases arise.
Such a case, in my opinion, has now arisen; and it is an extraordinary one.  It is not a case of wrong done to a private person; it is
not even a case of wrong done to a high public officer.   The wrong is
done to the Chief Magistrate of the nation; to one who constitutes an
entire department of the government, which is made co-ordinate with
the Congress itself by the Constitution. It is disagreeable and unpleasant for a representative of a portion of the American people to,
differ in opinion from a majority of his brethren, when the expression
of that difference of opinion necessarily involves a censure upon the
action of that majority. But it is a duty we owe to our own constituents, to the people of the United States, to the representatives who
may come after us, to the President in his own person, to the executive department of the government, and to the Constitution, to give
a full and free expression to that opinion, and I shall, therefore, proceed to do it with the most perfect freedom, but without intending
24
I 
THE PRESIDENT'S PROTEST.
any disrespect to the majority, or to any individual member of that
majority.
The clauses of the resolution against the adoption of which the
President protests in the message before us, it will be remembered,
are in the following words:
"I Resolved, That a committee of five members be appointed by the
Speaker, for the purpose of investigating whether the President of the
United States, or any other officer of the government, has, by money,
patronage, or other improper means, sought to influence the action of
Congress, or any committee thereof, for or against the passage of any
law appertaining to the rights of any State or Territory; also to
inquire into and investigate whether any officer or officers of the government have, by combination or otherwise prevented or defeated, or
attempted to prevent or defeat, the execution of any law or laws now
upon the statute-book, and whether the President has failed or refused
to compel the execution of any law thereof."
It has been said, in justification of the course of the majority of the
House in adopting these clauses of the resolutions of the 5th of March,
that two members of the House were expelled during the 34th Congress upon charges more vague and indefinite than those implied in
these clauses; and upon this ground, those saying so, would have it
inferred that the action of the House in the case referred to was of the
same character with that had when the resolutions of the 5th of March
were adopted. But this is not so. In that case, no person was named
in the resolution; and a specific charge was made against the unknown
persons inculpated. That charge was contained in a preamble and
resolution in the following words:
Whereas certain statements have been published charging that members of this House
have entered into corrupt combinations for the purpose of passing and of preventing thepassage of certain measures now pending before Congress: Therefore  "I Psolved, That a committee, consisting of five members, be appointed by the Speaker,
with power to send for persons and papers, to investigate said charges; and that said committee report the evidence taken, and what action, in their judgment, is necessary on the
part of the House, without any unnecessary delay."
The charge thus made was a specific charge, for it stated a distinct
fact constituting the alleged offence-that is, first, a corrupt combination of members; and second, the time when and place where the fact
transpired, viz: during the then session of Congress, and in the House
itself. But though this was so, and the papers of the day teemed with
such charges, still the House refused to proceed upon them and raise
a committee to inquire into their truth until probable cause was shown
by a credible witness. The House did not adopt the resolution and
enter upon the inquiry until a member rose in his place and stated,,
under all the responsibilities of a representative, that a member had
made a corrupt proposal to him of the character charged, and that he
had good cause to believe, and did believe, that there was such a combination of members.
And how is it in the proceedings recently adopted by the House
against which the President has made his solemn protest? No distinct fact constituting an offence is set forth. The inquiry instituted
is limited to no period of time-to no class of persons-to circumstances transpiring at no particular place; but his whole official life
25 
THE  PRESIDENT'S PROTEST.
is made the subject of investigation by the House, through a committee clothed by it with extraordinary and inquisitorial powers, when
not one particle of evidence, not one syllable of testimony inculpating
him in any degree whatever had been placed before it.
But the proceedings of the House in the case of the expulsion of
members during the thirty-fourth Congress has no analogy whatever
with those now instituted by it against the President. The House, by
the Constitution, is permitted to determine for itself the rules of its
proceedings, and has the sole power of punishing its members for misconduct in their representative capacity. It is not so, however, with
respect to the incumbent of the presidential office. The House has no
peculiar authority over him. Hie is selected for the exercise of that great
trust by the direct votes of the whole American people. He is the representative of the sovereignty of the United States in their intercourse with
foreign nations.  His duties are prescribed with exactness in the Constitution; and, by the provisions of that instrument, the executive power,
to be exercised by him under its authority, is co-ordinate with that of
the legislative department vested jointly in the two houses of Congress.
Under such circumstances, it is obvious to all that the public interest,
and, indeed, the very success of our scheme of government, requires
that the magistrate, to whom is intrusted the discharge of the many important and delicate duties devolved on the presidential office, should be
protected from all interference in such a manner that he may at all times
be perfectly free to exercise the discretion vested in him by the Constitution and laws whilst acting within the scope of the powers delegated
to him under their authority. And this is what the Constitution has
done. It makes the President completely independent of the other
departments of the government whilst he acts within the line of his
duty; and its gives no right to any other department of the government, or to any man or any body of men, to institute an investigation
into his official conduct, unless it be with a view to his removal "'from
office on impeachment for" "treason, bribery, or other high crimes
and misdemeanors." When there is any reason to believe that the
President of the United States has corruptly administered the duties of
his great place in violation of his oath of office, it is the duty of every
man, whether in a private or a public station, to make known the
facts, justifying such a belief, which have come to his knowledge,
with a view to his trial and conviction under the authority of the Constitution.  But it is equally true that no one, without incurring just
censure, can question or reflect upon the official conduct of the President by imputing to him the commission of a crime, when he has no
personal knowledge of any fact authorizing such an imputation, and
no evidence of the kind has been given by any other person. And if
this be true with respect to ordinary individuals, how much more
true is it that such conduct is unbecoming a representative of the
American people, or in a House of Representatives acting in its collective capacity through the votes of a majority of its members?
Public bodies, like individuals, in their intercourse with each other,
are bound to the observance of all the proprieties of life. This obligation, which is imposed on them in the public interest, was lost
sight of by the House when it threw an imputation upon the official
26 
THE PRESIDENT'S PROTEST.
integrity of the President without having any evidence on the subject
before it; and the undersigned is constrained to say that, in hIis opinion, that action of the House was a breach of all those rules of decency
and decorum, which should obtain between different departments of
the same government, for the preservation of that harmony and kind
feeling between them which are essential to the easy and proper
transaction of the public business.
It is the imperative duty of the House to institute proceedings
against the President, if there is any reasonable ground for the belief
that he has been guilty of the violation of his official duty under the Constitution. When any fact is made known by any competent evidence
which is calculated to raise against him a presumption of that kind, no
matter how slight that presumption may be. I shall be among the first
to demand action against him. But is there any proper foundation for
the inquiry into the conduct of the President, which has been autthorizedby the House? The undersigned is compelled to say that there is not.
Nay, more, I am constrained to declare, and I do it with pain, that an
examination of the resolutions adopted by the House, coupled with the
circumstances accompanying their presentation and passage, afford
just grounds, in my opinion, for the belief that the proceeding against
the President, which is the subject of his protest, was not instituted
in good faith, and that it is not based on any ground, real or pretended, brought to the notice of members, which would afford even a
color of excuse for engaging in the inquiry contemplated. And this
I will now proceed to show.
The House, in its action on the 5th of March, adopted, under the
pressure of the previous question, two resolutions-one containing the
clauses which are the subject of the President's protest, and another(the second resolution) in the following words:
"And resolved further, That as the President, in his letter to the
Pittsburg centenary celebration of the 25th of November, 1858,
spoke of the employment of money to coerce elections, said committee
shall inquire into and ascertain the amount so used in Pennsylvania
and any other State or States; in what districts it was expended, and
by whom, and by whose authority it was done, and from what source
the money was derived, and to report the names of the parties implicated; and that, for the purpose aforesaid, said committee shall have
power to send for persons and papers, and to report at any time."
The statement contained in the letter of the President, as set forth
in this resolution, is the only ground on which the whole inquiry
contemplated in the two resolutions is predicated. No other ground
for the action of the' House was alleged at the time by the mover of
the resolutions. No evidence of any kind beyond the alleged statement contained in this letter was before the House. Nor was it pretended by the mover of the resolutions that there was any other.
Well, what does this amount to? The statement of the President, if
any such was made, was contained in a letter written in his private
capacity, in which he condemned the use of money for carrying elections, which, he intimated, was now a frequent practice, and was fast
becoming a great public evil. This statement, if it could have been
properly made the basis of action on the part of the House, would
27
4 
THE PRESIDENT'S PROTEST.
have placed the President in the attitude of one making a charge to
the effect that money had been improperly employed as a means for
controlling our popular elections. If Congress has the authority to
enter into the State of Pennsylvania and the other States of the Union,
as the resolution contemplates, for the purpose of inquiring into
violations of their election laws, and exerting a general supervision.
and control over their citizens with respect to their own elections,
such a charge, if credited by the House, would not only justify but
require the adoption, on the part of the House, of proper measures to
secure a thorough and searching investigation into its truth.
And how would such an investigation have been gone into on this
charge if it had been the intention of a majority of the House to enter
upon it in good faith? The first step taken would necessarily have
been to call upon the President for information as to the facts on
which the charge made by him was founded, and for the names of the
witnesses by whose testimony these facts could have been substantiated.
This would have necessarily been the first step taken by the House if
it really designed basing any serious proceedings on this alleged
charge with a view to the exposure of the corrupt influences heretofore brought to bear upon our elections, and applying a remedy to
them for the future. But it was not taken. On the contrary, whilst
this charge, said to have been made by the President, is the only
avowed ground for any action on the subject on the part of the House,
the first step taken by the House is to adopt a resolution, to do what?
Why, to raise a select committee of five, with authority to send for
persons and papers, "for the purpose of investigating whether the
President of the United States" "has, by money, patronage, or other
improper means, sought to influence the action of Congress, or any
committee thereof, for or against the passage of any law," &c.
The only reason assigned for raising the committee was, that the
President had made a charge that money had been improperly used
in elections; and the first instruction given to the cpmmittee is to
"investigate" the conduct of the President throughout his whole
official life. That is, the first step taken by the judge, on the pretence of acting upon an accusation, is to accuse the accuser, and make
extraordinary provision for raking up every species of testimony
against him! I will here venture to assert that a parallel to this
proceeding of the House cannot be found in the whole range of history.
And why was this done? Who has charged the President with the
corrupt use of money, or of the patronage of his office, to influence
the action of Congress? What are the facts which justify the imputation, implied in the adoption of the first resolution, upon a man
whose character, during a long life spent in the service of his country,
has been unsullied by a single stain? No such facts have been communicated to the House. The mover of the resolution did not even
pretend at the time of moving it that any such facts existed. Why,
then, we would ask, has an inquisition into the whole official life of
the President been authorized without any foundation for it on legal
or constitutional grounds, and in palpable violation of the principles
of common justice? It certainly cannot be for any constitutional
object. And then may it not with propriety be said that it is to
28 
THE PRESIDENT'S PROTEST.
throw obloquy on the Chief Magistrate of the nation, with a view to
secure some advantage to a political party in the great contest which
is now approaching?
If the authority given in the first clause of the first resolution,
for the purpose of investigating whether the President of the United
States" "has, by money, patronage, or other improper means, sought
to influence the'action of Congress," &c., was given by the House
on the ground that there was good reason to believe that he had employed money, or the patronage of his office, to influence the action
of Congress, tlien the House has failed to discharge its duty to the
people under the Constitution. If the House acted on that opinion,
in place of the action taken, it was its imperative duty to have instituted proceedings with a view to the removal of the President; for the
employment of money and of official patronage, to influence the action
of Congress, is bribery, and that is one of the very offences enumerated in the Constitution, for the commission of which it is declared
the President shall be removed from office. And how is this to be
done?  In the manner provided for in the resolution against which the
President has made his protest? Not at all. To find any precedent
for that we must go back to the arbitrary proceedings of an English
Star Chamber, or to the secret inquisition of a Venetian Council of
Ten. No. It is to be by proceedings worthy of the age in which
we live-in conformity with the settled practice of the country in
which it is to be carried on, and in accordance with the immutable
principles of justice.
The President of the United States, as well as all other civil officers,
can be removed from office only on conviction of treason, bribery, or
other high crimes and misdemeanors, upon a trial before the Senate
on an impeachment preferred by the House of Representatives   And
what ought to be the basis of proceedings by the House of Representatives when it is called on to act as the grand inquest of the
nation? WVe have had such a number of instances in our history, in
which public officers have been impeached by the House of Representatives, that this can no longer be regarded as an open question.
In no one instance, since the foundation of the government, has the
House of Representatives instituted any preliminary proceeding with
a view to the impeachment of a public officer, unless it was based
upon a memorial or petition presented by some credible person, or by
a resolution presented by a member, who set forth the specific facts
charged on which the impeachment was demanded, with reasonable
minuteness and precision, and vouched for their truth; and this is
a rule which is just both to the public and to the accused. It is just
to the public, because it enables the representatives of the people to
decide whether the charges set forth are of such a nature as to justify
an investigation; and it is just to the accused, because it gives him
an opportunity to meet the charges against him and prove them false.
But the course adopted in the proceeding against the President violates this rule in both particulars. By dispensing with a statement
of the particular facts charged against the President, no representative is in a position to decide whether there are or are not any charges
actually made against him which require looking into: whilst, on the
29 
THE PRESIDEN'I'S PROTEST.
other hand, this very circumstance, that there is no particular fact alleged against him, renders it absolutely impossible for the President to
meet the charge of bribery, which the adoption of the resolution necessarily implies is now made against him, or to provoke the judgment
of the constitutional tribunal upon it so as to obtain an acquittal from
the charge. Can another case like this be found in the whole history
of the United States? Is there any court, State or'federal, presided
over by any fair-minded man, that would tolerate for a single instant
the application of such a measure of justice to the humblest person
under its jurisdiction as that already measured out by the House of
Representatives to the Chief Magistrate of the nation?  And what, I
now ask, will be the judgment of the world upon this whole proceeding, when the animosities and bitterness of contending parties shall
have passed away?  Can any one doubt that judgment?  Will it not
be believed that the desire to do something-anything-which would
be likely to advance party interests, had made a majority of the representatives of the American people so far forgetful of the right
that they were made willing instruments to throw discredit on a distinguished opponent by casting on him an unjust imputation, and
that, too, by the adoption of a course unknown to the Constitution and
to the principles of law, and which was of such a character as enabled
the real authors of the calumny to escape all the consequences which
usually attach to those making a groundless accusation?
Will it be possible for any unbiased mind to arrive at a different
conclusion?  Was the allegation with respect to the statement, said
in the resolution to have been contained in the President's "centenary
celebration" letter, anything but a pretext for raising a committee
to assail the President?  Was the second resolution, which purports
to be based on it, anything but a pretext to get the power necessary
to carry on the assault provided for in the first resolution? There is
no law of the United States regulating elections in the different States.
There are no laws of the United States punishing the improper use
of money in elections in the different States. The whole jurisdiction and control over the subject of elections is in the several
States. It is true, that by the laws of the several States the improper
use of money in elections is prohibited, and that offences against their
prohibitions are punished by them with severe penalties. But such
offences are offences against the State laws; they are subject to prosecution by the State authorities; they are to be punished by the action
of the State courts; and if new remedies are required for the prevention of abuses at these elections, it is clear that they are to be provided
for and applied through the action of State legislatures.
It is the theory of our government that the people of the different
States are competent to manage their own local affairs. If this be
true in fact, it is difficult to understand on what principle the investigation provided for in the second resolution adopted on the 5th of
Miarch is based. The House has no authority to inquire into elections
holden in the States except in so far as it is necessary to enable it to
"judgeof the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members."
The election of presidential electors is, by an express provision of the
Constitution of the United States, placed under the sole and exclusive
30 
THE PRESIDENT'S PROTEST.
control of the several States. It'can hardly be presumed, in the face
of all these facts, that it was really the intention of the House to enter
into the State of Pennsylvania, and other States, with a view to the
prosecution of the inquiries provided for by the terms of the second
resolution. Such a proceeding would be an invasion of the rights of
the States and a usurpation of power on the part of the House. No
one can for a moment suppose that this was the object of the majority
of the House. What, then, was it? It is hardly possible to avoid
the conclusion that the real object was to obtain the power to institute
the extraordinary inquisition into the whole official life of the Presi dent, which is provided for in the first resolution.
Before a majority of the House deliberately decides to persevere in
the course entered on by the adoption of these resolutions, it will be
well for them to examine the resolutions and consider well where this
course is to lead. The resolutions not only authorize an inquisition,
in the nature of a criminal prosecution, into the whole official life of
the President, and of every officer under the government, without any
specific charge made or distinct fact stated on which a charge could be
made, but it also arms those employed in making this inquisition with
"power to send for persons and papers;" or, in other words, to com pel, at their discretion, every person within the limits of the United
States to submit all the papers in his possession to their inspection and
perusal at their mere will and pleasure.  If the institution of crim inal proceedings against individuals, without any reasonable grounds
of suspicion having been shown, displays a sufficient disregard of the
rights of the citizen under the law, what must be thought of a pro ceeding which invests a majority of the committee of the House, employed in the prosecution of such an inquisition, with a power, to be
exercised at their discretion, to call for and compel the production of
the private papers of every citizen, and that, too, in the face of the
provision of the 4th article of thte amendments of the Constitution of
the United States, which declares that "the rights of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and" that "no
warrants shall be issued but upon probable cause, supported by oathl
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the person or things to be seized."
The first approaches of arbitrary power are always insidious, and
are carefully veiled under specious pretences. If proceedings of the
character of this just instituted by the House are to be tolerated by
the American people, and pass into precedent, what becomes of the
boasted immunities of the citizen? They disappear at once and forever under the arbitrary power which may at any time be exerted for
his oppression, whether he be in a private or a public station, at the
will oft'a mere majority of the House of Representatives. It has been
truly said that the teaching of all history shows that "eternal vigilance is the price of liberty;" and it will be well for the American
people and their posterity, if they are not forgetful of the lesson in
this crisis of our affairs.
In conclusion, the undersigned declares that, in his opinion, the
positions taken by the President in the message referred to the corn
31 
THE PRESIDENT'S PROTEST.
mittee, and which were stated in substance at the opening of this
report, are right; and that the protest made by him against the
action of the House has a solid foundation in the provisions of the
Constitution of the United States, and in those great principles which
underlie every well-ordered system of law hitherto established for the
administration of justice.
MILES TAYLOR.
NOTE.-There was so little time allowed us to prepare a minority
report that, owing to the distance between our residences, it was inpossible for us to get together and prepare a joint one; and in consequence of this, though agreeing entirely in our views on the subject
of the protest made by the President in his message of the 29th March,
1860, we were compelled to prepare separate reports, in order to be
able to report in time to have our views presented at the same time
with those embodied in the report of the majority.
GEO. S. HOUSTON.
MILES TAYLOR.
32 
THE PRESIDENT S PROTEST.
THIRTY-SIXTH CONGRESS-FIRST SESSION.
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES)
March 5, 1860.
On motion of Mr. COVODE,
Resolved, That a committee of five members be appointed by the
Speaker, for the purpose of investigating whether the President of the
United States, or any other officer of the government, has, by money,
patronage, or other improper means, sought to influence the action of
Congress, or any committees thereof; for or against the passage of any
law appertaining to the rights of any State or Territory; and also to
inquire into and investigate whether any officer or officers of the government have, by combination or otherwise, prevented and defeated,
-)r attempted to prevent or defeat, the executionof any law or laws now
on the statute-books, and whether the President has iailed or refused to
compel the execution of any law thereof; that said committee shall
investigate and inquire into the abuse at the Chicago or other post
offices, and at the Philadelphia and other navy yards, and into any
abuses in connexion with the public buildings and other publi, works
of the United States.
Resolvedfurther, That asthe President, in his letter to the Pittsburg
centenary celebration of the 25th Novemb)er, 1858, speaks of "the
employment of money to carry elections," said committee shall inquire
into and ascertain the amount so used in Pennsylvania and any other
State or States, in what districts it was expended, and by whom, and
by whose authority it was done, and from what sources the money was
derived, and report the names of the parties implicated; and, for the
purpose aforesaid, said committee shall have rower to send for persons
and papers, and to report at any time.
Ordered, That Mr. Covode, Mr. Olin, Mr. Train, and Mr. James C.
Robinson be appointed said committee.
Attest:                                J. W.  FORNEY, Clerks
MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, PROTESTING AGAINST
CERTAIN PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
To the House of Representatives:
After a delay which has afforded me ample time for reflection, and
after much and careful deliberation, I find myself constrained by an
imperious sense of duty, as a coordinate branch of the federal government, to protest against the first two clauses of the first resolution
adopted by the House of Representatives on the 5th instant, and pub
lished in the Congressional Globe on the succeeding  day.   The.e
clauses are in the following words: "Resolved, That a committee of
H. Rep. Com. 394    3
33 
THE PRESIDENT'S PROTEST.
five members be appointed by the Speaker, for the purpose, 1st, of
investigating whether the President of the United States, or any other
officer of the government, has, by money, patronage, or other improper
means, sought to influence the action of Congress, or any committee
thereof, for oF against the passage of any law appertaining to the
rights of any State or Territory; and 2d,' also to inquire into and
investigate whether any officer or officers of the government have, by
combination or otherwise, prevented or defeated, or attempnded to prevent or defeat, the execution of' any law or laws now upon the statutebook; and whether the President has failed or refused to compel the
execution of any law thereof.'"
I confine myself exclusively to these two branches of the resolution,
because the portions of it which follow relate to alleged abuses in post
offices, navy yards, public buildings, and other public works of the
United States. In such cases inquiries are highly proper in themselves, and belong equally to the Senate and the House as incident to
their legislative duties, and being necessary to enable them to discover
and to provide the appropriate legislative remedies for any abuses
which may be ascertained. Although the terms of the latter portion
of the resolution are extremely vague and general, yet my sole purpose in adverting to them at present is to mark the broad line of distinction between the accusatory and the remedial clauses of this resolution.  The House of Representatives possess no power  under the
Constitution over the first or accusatory portion of the resolution, except as an impeaching body; whilst over the last, in common with the
Senate, their authority as a legislative body is fully and cheerfully
admitted.
It is solely in reference to the first or impeaching power that I propose to make a few observations.  Except in this single case, the Constitution has invested the House of Representatives with no power,
no jurisdiction, no supremacy whatever over the President. In all
other respects he is quite as independent of them as they are of him.
As a coordinate branch of the government, he is their equal. Indeed,
he is the only direct representative on earth of the people of all and
each of the sovereign States. To them, and to them alone, is he responsible whilst acting within the sphere of his constitutional duty,
and not in any manner to the House of Representatives. The people
have thought proper to invest him with the most honorable, responsible, and dignified office in the world; and the individual, however
unworthy, now holding this exalted position, will take care, so far as
in him lies, that their rights and prerogatives shall never be violated
in his person, but shall pass to his successors unimpaired by the adoption of a dangerous precedent. He will defend them to the last extremity against any unconstitutional attempt, come from what quarter
it may, to abridge the constitutional rights of the Executive, and
render him subservient to any human power except themselves.
The people have not confined the President to the exercise of execu tiveduties. They have also conferred upon him a large measure of
legislative discretion. No bill can become a law without his approval,
as reprcsenting the people of the United States, unless it shall pass
after his veto by a majority of two-thirds of both houses. In his legis
34
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THE PRESIDENT'S PROTEST.
lative capacity, he might, in common with the Senate and the House,
institute an inquiry to ascertain any facts which ought to influence his
judgment in approving or vetoing any bill.
This participation in the performance of legislative duties between
the coordinate branches of the government ought to inspire the conduct of all of them, in their relations towards each other, with mutual
forbearance and respect. At least each has a right to demand justice
from the other. The cause of complaint is, that the constitutional
rights and immunities of the Executive have been violated in the
person of the President.
The trial of an impeachment of the President before the Senate on
charges preferred and prosecuted against him by the House of Representatives would be an imposing spectacle for the world. In the result,
not only his removal from the presidential office would be involved,
but, what is of infinitely greater importance to himself, his character,
both in theeyes of thepresent and of future generations, might possibly
be tarnished. The disgrace cast upon him would in some degree be reflected upon the character of the American people who elected him.
Hence the precautions adopted by the Constitution to secure a fair
trial.  On such a trial it declares that "the chief justice shall preside." This was doubtless because the framers of the Constitution
believed it to be possible that the Vice-President might be biased by
the fact that, " in case of the removal of the President from office,"
"the same shall devolve on the Vice-President."
The preliminary proceedings in the House in the case of charges
which may involve impeachment have been well and wisely settled
by long practice upon principles of equal justice both to the accused
and to the people. The precedent established in the case of Judge
Peck, of Missouri, in 1831, after a careful review of all former precedents, will, I venture to predict, stand the test of time.
In that case, Luke Edward Lawless, the accuser, presented a petition to the House, in which he set forth minutely and specifically his
causes of complaint.  He prayed "that the conduct and proceedings
in this behalf of said Judge Peck may be inquired into by your honorable body, and such decision made thereon as to your wisdom and
justice shall seem proper."  This petition was referred to the Judiciary
Committee; such has ever been deemed the appropriate committee to
make similar investigations. It is a standing committee supposed to
be appointed without reference to any special case, and at all times is
presumed to be composed of the most eminent lawyers in the House
from different portions of the Union, whose acquaintance with judicial
proceedings and whose habits of investigation qualify them peculiarly
for the task. No tribunal, from their position and character, could in
the nature of things be more impartial. In the case of Judge Peck
the witnesses were selected by the committee itself, with a view to
ascertain the truth of the charge. They were cross-examined by him,
and everything was conducted in such a manner as to afford him no
reasonable cause of complaint. In view of this precedent, and, what
is of far greater importance, in view of the Constitution and the prin ciples of eternal justice, in what manner has the President of the
United States been treated by the House of Representatives? Mr.
35 
THE PRESIDENT'S PROTEST.
John Covode, a representative from Pennsylvania, is the accuser of
the President. Instead of following the wise precedents of former
times, and especially that in the case of Judge Peck, and referring the
accusation to the Committee on the Judiciary, the House have made
my accuser one of my judges.
To make the accuser the judge, is a violation of the principles of
universal justice, and is condemned by the practice of all civilized
nations.  Every freeman must revolt at such a spectacle.  I am to
appear before Mr. Covode, either personally or by a substitute, to
cross-examraine the witnesses which he may produce before himself to
sustain his own accusations against me; and perhaps even this poor
boon may be denied to the President.
. And what is the nature of the investigation which his resolution
proposes to institute? It is as vague and general as the English language affords words in which to make it. The committee is to inquire,
not into any specific charge or charges, but whether the President has,
by "money, patronage, or other improper means, sought to influence,"
not the action of any individual member or members of Congress, but
"the action" of the entire body "of Congress" itself, "or any committee thereof." The President might have had some glimmering of
the nature of the offence to be investigated, had his accuser pointed to
the act or acts of Congress which he sought to pass or to defeat by the
employment of "money, patronage, or other improper means." But
the accusation is bounded by no such limits. It extends to the whole
circle of legislation; to interference "for or against the passage of
any law appertaining to the rights of any State or Territory." And
what law does not appertain to the rights of some State or Territory?
And what law or laws has the President failed to execute? These
might easily have been pointed out, had any such existed.
Had Mr. Lawless asked an inquiry to be made by the House,
whether Judge Peck, in general terms, had not violated his judicial
duties, without the specification of any particular act, I do not believe
there would have been a single vote in that body in favor of the inquiry.
Since the time of the Star Chamber and of general warrants there
has been no such proceeding in England.
The House of Representatives, the high impeaching power of the
country, without consenting to hear a word of explanation, have endorsed this accusation against the President, and made it their own
act.  They even refused to permit'a iember to inquire of the President's accuser what were the specific charges against him. Thus, in
this preliminary accusation of "high crimes and misdemeanors"
against a coordinate branch of the government, under the impeaching
power, the House refused to hear a single suggestion even in regard to
the correct mode of proceeding,, but, without a moment's delay, passed
the accusatory resolutions under the pressure of the previous question.
In the institution of a prosecution for any offence against the most
humble citizen-and I claim for myself no greater rights than he enjoys —the Constitution of the United States, and of the several States,
require that he shall be informed, in the very beginning, of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, in order to enable him to
36
o 
THfE PRESIDENT'S PROTEST.
prepare for his defence.   There are other principles which I might
enumerate, not less sacred, presenting an impenetrable shield to pro tect every citizen falsely charged with a criminal offence.  These have
been violated in the prosecution instituted by the House of Represent atives against the executive branch of the government.  Shall the
President alone be deprived of the protection of these great principles
which prevail in every land where a ray of liberty penetrates thegloom
of despotism? Shall the Executive alone be deprived of rights which
all his fellow-citizens enjoy?  The whole proceeding against him jus tifies the fears of those wise and great men who, before the Constitu tion was adopted by the States, apprehended that the tendency of the
government was to the aggrandizement of the legislative at the ex pense of the executive and judicial departments.
I again declare, emphatically, that I make this protest for no reason
personal to myself; and I do it with perfect respect for the House of
Representatives, in which I had the honor of serving as a member
for five successive terms. I have lived long in this goodly land, and
have enjoyed all the offices and honors which my country could be stow. Amid all the political storms through which I have passed,
the present is the first attempt which has ever been made, to my
knowledge, to assail my personal or official integrity; and this as the
time is approaching when I shall voluntarily retire from the service
of my country. I feel proudly conscious that there is no public act
of my life which will not bear the strictest scrutiny. I defy all investigation. Nothing but the basest perjury can sully my good name.
I do not fear even this, because I cherish an humble confidence that
the Gracious Being who has hitherto defended and protected me
against the shafts of falsehood and malice will not desert me now,
when I have become " old and gray-headed." I can declare, before
God and my country, that no human being (with an exception scarcely worthy of notice) has, at any period of my life, dared to approach
me with a corrupt or dishonorable propositions; and, until recent
developments, it had never entered into my imagination that any
person, even in the storm of exasperated political excitement, would
charge me, in the most remote degree, with having made such a
proposition to any human being. I may now, however, exclaim, in
the language of complaint employed by my first and greatest predecessor, that I have been abused "in such exaggerated and indecent
terms as could scarcely be applied to a Nero, to a notorious defaulter,
or even to a common pickpocket."
I do, therefore, for the reasons stated, and in the name of the people of the several States, solemnly protest against these proceedings
of the House of Representatives, because they are in violation of the
rights of the coordinate executive branch of the government, and
subversive of its constitutional independence; because they are calculated to foster a band of interested parasites and informers, ever ready,
for their own advantage, to swear before ex parte committees to pretended private conversations between the President and themselves,
incapable, from their nature, of being disproved, thus furnishing material for harassing him, degrading him in the eyes of the country,
and eventually, should he be a weak or a timid man, rendering him
37 
THE PRESIDENT'S PROTEST.
subservient to improper influences, in order to avoid such persecutions
and annoyances; because they tend to destroy that harmonious action
for the common good which ought to be maintained, and which I
sincerely desire to cherish between coordinate branches of the government; and; finally, because, if unresisted, they would establish a
precedent dangerous and embarrassing to all my successors, to whatever political party they might be attached.
JAMES BUCHANAN.
WAsHaNGTON, Mlarch 28, 1860.
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